HW 53320 ie AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORD SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS ‘DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS NY, } Date: . Page: _JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION Peleased under the John CIA Kennedy 104-10431-10107 Wssassination Records JFK oOllection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#: NU 53320 Date: 6-24-2017 RUSS HOLMES WORK FILE DOCUMENT INFORMATION CIA CLEVELAND C. CRAM A REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LITERATURE, 1975-1992. 05/00/92 18 OSWALD NOSENKO PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CONFIDENTIAL 1B RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 12/22/98 02/18/00 JFK-RH18 : F20 1998:12.22.15:03:47:250108: THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT CONTAINS 103 PAGES; ONLY THE ATTACHED 18 PAGES ARE JFK RELEVANT. Doclda: 32397295 Page 1
DENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Selene ge eA ae DRAFT May 1992 oe ree ew ae RPT IE BRIER Fn oe A_REVIEW OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LITERATURE, 1975 - 1992 By Cleveland Cc. Cram NOTE: © Final version will have proper page breaks, etc. —CONPEDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT HW 53320 Docld:32397298 Page 2
HW. .53520 TIAL NOFORN. NOCONTRACT Introduction The year 1974 was a watershed in literature about the CIA. ide to that time thete{nad been\yisty tev books / critical of the Agency and they had been by outsiders, usually professional journalists such as Wise and Ross. Most books had been $A thet neutral or even positive, especially those written by former Agency officials such as Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick. But in 1974 a disgruntled former Agency employee, Philip Agee, published his highly critical book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary. He was followed by others in quick succession: J. B. Smith, John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti (with J. D. Marks), and R. W. McGehee-~placing highly confidential information in the public domain. These a pthors usually made their disclosures wy veteule: Wn 6y/ about subj ea SF wick they | had special knowledge gr interest, but the cumulative effect was to breach the walls of confidentiality Wiicn had protected Agency operations and personnel. Although the net effect was damaging, especially in the case of Agee where his efforts were directed at. revealing the identities of officers serving abroad under cover, this general scatter shot approach, while distressing, did not reveal information about the most sensitive Operations, namely, those directed against the main target--the Soviet Union and its intelligence organs. In the mid-seventies this changed with the publication of a series of magazine articles authored mainly by Edward J. Epstein, a New York writer, which culminated with the publication of his: book in 1978 called Legend. The . articles, but especially the book, publicized for the first time a series: of clashes within the Agency (both the cI Staff and the Soviet Division) concerning the bona fides of a defector from the KGB named Yuriy Nosenko. Epstein's articles and his book contained so much detailed information CONF TIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Docld:32397298 Page 3 Snes ee yeas esate ine Ge ie ug ny ve as
1 an ed ce HW 53320 I CON NOFORN NOCONTRACT about sensitive operations by the CIA and the FBI that it was generally agreed Epstein had a willing and knowledgeable source, either a serving officer (which was thought doubtful) or a retired person 6f~@ sufficiently senior epositior that he had wide knowledge of operations against the en target’ both overseas and om phe" "U.S." Although from abdut 1978 onward Epstein admitted on occasion he spoke with James Angleton, the retired former Chief of the cI staff) he never admitted Angleton was his source.. In fact, Epstein, wisely perhaps, never sourced his articles nor his book, leaving the:reader in the dark as to how he came upon such rare nuggets of sensitive information.- Then in 1988, with Angleton dead, Epstein in a new book called Deception admitted that from 1977 onward he had obtained large amounts of highly classified information from Angleton,’ N.S. Miler, Tennent H. Bagley and others who shared Angleton's beliefs. (We When Angleton | was dismissed by DCI William Colby in late 1974, he had no thought of what he would do in his retirement. For the feitowing six months he spent part of his time at Langley,. assisting the new CI Staff by introducing them to such persons as his defector friend, Anatole Golitsyn. After a few months it became clear to Angleton ‘that he really had been dismissed and his future Quy with CIA was finished. The whole matter was a terrible, . blow; he became embittered and at first withdrew into alcohol. But quite soon people began to seek him out and he began to formulate some ideas about the future. As he got more attention from media people, he began to cultivate a_ method of playing them off one against another, planting an idea here and there amongst them. He changed his luncheon venue from a local restaurant to the more politically congenial atmosphere of the Army-Navy Club. One~idéa~ | Angleton develope Was tos eetp_a counterattack Hy the Agency and, in particular, the new cI Staff bY which he would prove ve tty wrottpig their new approach 2 a ne indict them. . CONFIDENTEAE-HOFORN NOCONTRACT | oe Docla: 32397298 Page Bee veers Fn re ene wr anesmtnarts Hacentni Uk ke tute Wop mene tt
ee, Hi 53320 4 v i ! i i his own researcher as well as secretary. Foreseeing a dim CONFIDE _NOFORN NOCONTRACT for negligence of duty. This task was given to his loyal aide, N.S. Miler. Miler took on the job but found he was future of virtual servitude, he took his family and withdrew to remote New Mexico. I Angleton's activities in this period, while not neglecting the idea of KGB penetration, focused more immediately on his strong belief in the threat from the KGB of deception and disinformation. To support this thesis he £e saea [uth “that caught fire amongst some of his supporters and led to a continually raised the issue of Nosenko. sort of cottage industry in which many academics and think tank specialists propagated the theory. Oddly, however, Angleton's allies in Great Britain took a different line. There they concentrated on KGB penetration largely because events threw up some exceptional examples, such as Sir Anthony Blunt. Because of the so-called Cambridge "Ring of Five," public attention was more easily caught by the idea of moles in Her Majesty's government. This eventually led to much embarrassment for the Thatcher government, culminating in the "Spycatcher" trial in Australia in 1986. , 8 CON, ENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT DocId:32397298 Page 5 2°, cee oh
| CONFEBENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT endeavor, Angleton waS on surer ground. For starters, he 4 had the support of the large number of FBI retirees as well as many from CIA. This was the period when the Pike and Church committees in the Congress were in full cry and a number of ex-intelligence people who believed Congress had gone too far were rallying a defense. (David Phillips was also starting the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.) The drive by Angleton was Ven successful; over $600,000 was raised and six months after its founding SIF ah was reported to have more than 17,000 members. Angleton was wee made chairman with his friends in senior positions. But typo soon after, the US Attorney General decided not to pursue the prosecution of the FBI men and the reason for SIF more or less evaporated. Sieve. Rhgieton converted it “into a forum by which he spread information about what he saw as various forms of Soviet deception and it continued into the next decade until, after Angelton's death and the coming of glasnost, it withered away. The publication of Legend in 1978 provided enormous stimulus to the deception idea by suggesting the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko, had been sent by the KGB to provide a cover story for Oswald. Epstein had made a small reputation with an earlier book on the Warren Commission called Inquest, which was generally well received because it pointed out some obvious inadequacies in the Warren | Commission report. In Legend, Epstein wrote what in effect were two books: one focused on Oswald's Marine career in. Japan, his time in Russia ‘and then his return ‘to america: | while the second portrayed Nosenko as playing a key role“in a major KGB deception operation intended to provide cover for Oswald (and the Soviet government) as well as to negate the effects of Golitsyn's revelations. As so much classified information could only have come from a person or persons with intimate knowledge of the Nosenko case, blame for the leakage naturally focused on Angleton and his 10 Cc AL NOFORN NOCONTRACT. HW ,53320 Docld:32397296 Page 6 ee a Fs neneny ear satanantins meanness
L NOFORN NOCONTRACT supporters. It came as no surprise when ten years later 4 (and after Angleton! Ss death). Epstein admitted his sources to have been Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and other supporters. Despite some negative reviews such as George Lardner! s in The Washington Post, which denounced the book as "essentially dishonest," the book sold well and was. very important in spreading Angleton's ideas of a super KGB manipulating American society and politics via its sophisticated deception apparatus. The theme of Legend is extended ina novel which | appeared in 1980 callea The Spike by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. De Borchgrave, soon to be editor of the new Washington Times and Moss, then editor of "The Blue Economist," were close friends and admirers of Angleton, whose conspiracy theories largely jibed with their own. Moss had been spreading bogus Angleton propaganda in his sheet for some time, an example being his claim Golitsyn had provided the lead to Philby. This caught the eye of then DCI Turner, who inquired of the CI Staff. The latter replied from solid knowledge that Golitsyn could only be credited for an assist on Vassal and none on Philby or Blunt. | ‘The low quality and general crudeness of theme in The ‘Spike exceeds that even of the Latham novel. Briefly, it told the story of a young liberal taken in by leftists who came to realize his error thanks to timely guidance received “from an elderly former CIA counterintelligence officer who had been fired by a Director obviously acting on the Kremlin's directions. Moscow's secret designs are revealed by a KGB high level defector whose escape is managed by MI-6 because the CIA is so penetrated it could not be trusted with the mission. The KGB defector then uncovers the Soviet agents in the White House, CIA and elsewhere and the wise old counterintelligence chief, obviously meant to be il. ORN NOCONTRACE « AY..53320... Docld: 32397298...Page, Foe Wenrie iam ear settee wile tent eee 2 Fe meets co neeme ee
HAW 53320 .. CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN N but instead he len® it impetus by suggesting the Mounties consult Golitsyn. That sealed Bennett's doom and brought his dismissal from the service although no substantial evidence existed against him and he passed his polygraph _ tests. The case tore the Mounties. apart and furthermore NES gave ammunition to those who argucdthe Security Service should be removed from the RCMP. Within a few years Canada had a civilian security service. Sawatsky's book drew considerable attention in Canada but little in America. In 1988, one year after Angleton's death, Epstein produced his book called Deception. In the years between Legend and Deception Epstein had become something of a specialist on the subject of Soviet disinformation and deception. These twin subjects, along with "active measures" (to which they are related), WG! occupied a a number of scholars and writers during the 1980s. In this they were assisted by the testimony of several Soviet defectors, including the indefatigable Golitsyn who added his own volume to the field called New Lies for Qld, whose turgid prose had to be endlessly rewritten before it was rendered readable. os Epstein's book Deception, like its predecessor, is really in two parts. ‘The second part in which he describes various deceptions practiced through the centuries can be ae! ignored as it says nothing new. // It’ is the first 105 pages . dl _ that are of interest, wherein he repeats the old theories about Nosenko, and then in the section "Acknowledgments" names all his sources for the years past: Angleton, Bagley, Miler, Sullivan, etc. He also indicates in this part that his informants understood Clearly they were providing him with classified information. (tt ’ is an astonishing set of revelations. (te is difficult to avoid the feeling that this book is Epstein's last hurrah, at least din the world of - intelligence. He senses with glasnost the days of the : 15 CONF: . OCONTRACT DocId: 32397296 . Page & Chen pipnsersens vee
CONFIDENTIA NTRACT various reasons, it remains a highly restricted issue. ‘ Despite this minor misconception, for which the author | pe cannot be blamed, the Wise book is otherwise factually correct and is another cautionary tale management should bear in mind. Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald by Edward Jay Epstein; The Reader's Digest Press/McGraw-Hill Book Company (New York, N.Y.), 1978~--382 pages Epstein is a pit bright and able writer who took his MA at Cornell and his doctorate in government at Harvard (1972). He had made a name for himself with his book inquest: The Warren Commission and the Establishment of fruth, done as his master's thesis at Cornell. As. one of the first serious works to expose the shortcomings of the Commission, it sold well ana made Epstein momentarily well known. Epstein became aware of the Nosenko case through the Reader's Digest, from which he became acquainted with James Angleton.’ Their association flourished and Angleton became Epstein's major aource on Nosenko:. and the issues surrounding him. Eventually The Reader's Digest sponsored Epstein's research to the tune of $500,000. The book was a best seller, brojecting Epstein into the forefront of those who were popular exponents of the ideas of Angleton. Following the publication of Legend, Epstein wrote numerous articles for New York magazine, Commentar 1 and other publications, mostly-~though . not lways--supportive of the Angleton theories, Legend is in fact two books: the first is about Nosenko and the Angleton belief that he was part of a KGB deception operation while the second is about Oswald's service in the Marine Corps in Japan where it is suggested he acquired information about the U-~2 flights flown from the CC airfield on which he was stationed as well as his later -~ L7. - CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT HW.53320.. Docld:327397298. Page 9 - ei ae : sevens: