co} “ ‘ . ( . — : Date : 07/14/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM ee ee ee AGENCY INFORMATION ——isi(éds Released under the John)» Kennedy AGENCY : N&c Lesasgsination Records RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10262 ollection Act of 1952 RECORDS SERIES : (44 Use 210% Note} . AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 58 ase#:NW 54214 Date: wO-O4—-2017 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : NSC FROM : MCGEORGE BUNDY TO : THE PRESIDENT TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT DATE : 12/15/63 PAGES : 22 SUBJECTS : MEETING ON CUBA 12/19/63 CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND REVIEW OF MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : 1B CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/17/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 54214 Docld:32977085 Page 1
wot r _7OP SECRET > SENSHIVE DRAFT A 12/15/63 * MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT _ of SUBJECT: *%53 Mecting on Cuba -- December 19, 1963 At 11:00 A.M. on Thursday, you will be mecting primarily with State, Defenses CIA, to discuss further possible measures we can take against Castro, which stop short of invasion and blockade. The following is an attempt. to describe the Cuban problem as a whole -- where we have been since January, 1963; where we are now; and where we seem to be headed. The paper ends with a brief description of a number of further possible measures we can take against Cuba. State, Defense, and CIA, which, by and large, *have reserved their positions on these measures, will be prepared to discuss them with you in detail at the meeting. . I. Current U.S. Policy The bare minimum objective of our policy is a Cuba which poses no threat to its neighbors and which is not a Soviet satellite. In moving towards this objective we have rejected the options of unprovoked U. 5, military inter- vention in Cuba and of ayeffective, total blockade around Cuba -- primarily because they would risk another US/USSR confrontation. Instead, we are enga: in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures, both defensive and offensive, which stop short of these drastic measures. Il. Review of U.S. "Measures Against Cuba Since January, 1963 On January 8, 1963, the White House set up an interdepartmental task ______ force, headed by State, to coordinate all matters pertaining to Cuba. _—_—_ Oe HW 542714 DBocld:32977085 Page 2?
peak reaction the aotemn-ef, 1962; a net outflow appears to be continuing. HW 54714 missile crisis measures against Cuba began. These measures have been -2- With the establishment of the Cuban Coordinating Committce, our post- é rd ° ' s i ° e essentially cither defensive or offensive in nature. A. Defensive Measures Our defensive measures have primarily aimed at three targets: (1) Cuba, the Military Threat -- We have been intent on ensuring that Cuba does not become again an “offensive weapons" (e.g. missiles) threat to the U.S. or Latin America. To this end we have conducted intensive air and sea _ surveillance around and over Cuba and have collected intelligence from within Cuba. So far as we know, we have been entirely successful in this effort and Cuba is not now an "offensive weapons" threat to either the U.S. orto Latin * - America. But even without "offensive weapons" Cuba remains a powerful military establishment in Latin America. To discourage possible Cuban military attacks against its neighbors, we have put ourselves clearly on record that wapeswit, hope any such Cuban moves m=d will have extremely dire consequences Hr Cuba, (2) Soviet Troops -- We have been intent, for domestic political, as we:- as national security reasons on effecting the removal of all Soviet military persc: nel from Cuba. To this end we have made it eminently clear to the Soviets on steoncly A \eees ; . ; numerous occasions that we cannerte the permanent assignment of Soviet military personnel to Cuba. Asa result of Soviet self-interest and our pressure. there are now 4, 000 to 7, 000 Soviet military personnel (mostly advisers and technicians) remaining in Cuba, representing a drop of about 65% to 75% from th- How - (33% ‘ eve: os 3 suj remains a dellecate one. At any moment the Russians could DocId:32977085 Page 3
- 2(a)- . | oe frm by, arbitrarily decide to send more troops into Cuba. Also, the fact that volatile: a e ’ . ow Cubans will probably control the surface-to-air missile sites by mid-1964 is disturbing. ARDS i | wae qo HW 542714 DBocld: 32977085 Page 4
-3- (3) Subversion -- We have been intent on impeding and if possible stopping Cuban based and supported subversion in the Hemisphere. -To e . toe ” this end we have made a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direét Latin American attention to, and to assist (materially where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problem of controlling internal insurgency and in controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin Ane rica and Cuba. On the one _ hand we have had some success -- there is now an increased awareness in. c Latin America of the extent and nature of the threat along with an increased capability and will in Latin America to do something about the problem. - One measure of our success is Venezuelan readiness, in contrast to previous reluctance, to make an international issue out of the &Frise~<Ga She discovery, Another small measure of this success is that primarily through the use of travel control by Latin American governments, there has been a 50% drop over the past year in the number of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba. On the other- hand, with Castre still exceedingly intent on producing "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere, and with many Latin American govern- ments still unwilling or unable to cope effectively with subversive efforts, much remains to be done. In this regard proper exploitation of the recent discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela might take us a long way towards getting wholehcarted Latin American cooperation in the fight against subversion, Such cooperation is a vital key to success in this field. aan ee HW 54714 CONBY 4 DoclIda: 32977085 Page 5
oe . “4. B. Offensive Measures Offensively, our ultimate minimum target is to remové the Soviet satcllite from the Hemisphere. We hope to achieve this by concentrating mainly on three intermediate targets -- intensifying Cuba's already-serious economic difficulties; increasing the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets of maintaining Cuba; and stimulating direct and indirect internal resistance to the regime. Our chief weapons for achieving these offensive targets are two -- isolation measures and covert measures (which also have an impact on our defensive targets, particularly Cuban subversion), (l) Isolation Measures -- The most outstanding characteristic of our isolation measures is that they have been exceedingly difficult to implement -- primarily because implementation depends on the cooperation. of others and not merefy on U.S. will alone. Nevertheless, while one could have reasonably expected our isolation policy to break up as the world moved away from the heat of October, 1962, in fact, this has not happened. Instead, while far from pe rforming pe aty over the past year, our isolation policy generally has held the ground already made in some fields, while making further Progress in others. About a year ago, only 5 OAS countries maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba; the number not only remains the same now, but anticipated OAS reaction to the discovery - Of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela gives some reason to hope for further ruptures, The low level of Free World trade with Cuba reached in 1962 has ecnerally been maintained in 1963. Air isolation of Cuba has been fairly ‘ sufi Sh Vadramatic demonstration of this is the fact that many Latin ‘ ate | . - HW 542714 DBocld:32977085 Page 6
. TOP SECHE-P== SERSTTIVE_ -5- SO . . TL IAA yah of Americans have had to travel to and from Cuba via Prague. , Free World oly « nesaenl v= ° shipping to Cuba in 1963 is running at roughly 40% of 1962 levefs. Prospects for further reduction are good since we now seem to be making good progress with the three principal shipping countries -- Greece, Lebanon, and the UK. In this regard, the Grecks have recently issued stiffer laws to prevent their ships from going to or from Cuba, while the Lebanese have drafted (but have not yet enacted) legislation to the same end; and on important British shipping companies “en finally ae : that they should play ballwithus. . But there is plenty of room for improvement, There are still roughly 30 Free World ships per month in the Cuban trade, Free World countries oth. tha. fered + durgs, still send many commodities, to Cuba which Cuba needs desperately. And there are still air routes between Cuba and Spain and Mexico. The effectiveness of our isolation policy in hitting the target is impossible to gauge accurately. While Hurricane Flora, ina few days, probably hit the target more squarely than our isolation measures did in a year, it is generally agreed that the economic chaos which now in fact exists in Cuba and the enormity of the Soviet aid bill is, in part at least, due to our efforts. Castro's repeated and loud public protestations about our isolation policy and his serious and energetic efforts to break ait of Free World isolation substantiate the view that the isolation measures probably hurt him, cconomically and politically. HW 542714 an POHBY DoclIda: 329770685 Page fF
(2) Covert Mcasures -- Our covert program over the past year has covered essentially six areas, First, through a varicty of techniques, we have collected intelligence for both U.S. strategic requirements and for operational requirements; the quantity and quality is good but there is always room for improvement. Second, CIA-controlled radio programs and other | propaganda media, directed at Cuba, have been used to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. Third, CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba com- : modities which it urgently needs, Fourth, we have been trying to identify, © i seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime, with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro; we currently are in direct contact with several people in Cuba who may be of significance. Fifth, we have directed four small-scale externally-mounted sabotage operations for the Atay Cle tem: purpose of stimulating resistance and 3e-an-economic_weapen. Sixth, in order to expand sabotage and resistance activities we have been involved in aiding autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals, who will probably be ready to begin infiltration and sabotage in mid-January, and who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. (A financial breakdown of CIA's covert Cuban operations since 1960 is attached at Tab 1) The most outstanding characteristic of our covert action program so Briethat ite poteatiol far bringing about a basic change in Cuba is still © LADY HW 542714 DBocld: 32977085 Page 6
a -7- largely unknown. The Program, which makes use of Cuban exiles and which is not yet fully underway has already achicved a degree of success -- e.g. in demonstrating to Cubans that Castro is not invulnerable, in forcing Castro to divert valuable resources for defense against covert activities, in inflicting small, but cumulatively significant economic damage, and perhaps in stimulating to some degree the insurgency which is evident in Cuba. As yet our covert program has not been directed in such a way as to inflict serious economic damage on Cuba. There are those who believe that much can be done in this regard, as wellas in stimulating further resistance. But our covert program presently operates under severalhandicass— * T ‘ A. present policy prevents air attacks on Cuban targets and prevents free-lance exile raids on Cuba from U.S. territory. Ill. Where are We Going? In theory, at least, our present offensive measures, vigorously pursued and, to a degree, complemented by our defensive measures, could lead finally to one of the following three eventualities, each of which con- ‘Stitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. A. Overthrow of the Castro Regime Most Cuban experts in the U.S. Government regard this as the most likely of the three eventualities. Hopefully, by exerting maximum pressure by all the means available to the U. S. Government; short of military force, we will be able to bring about a decree of disorganization, uncertainty, and ill predispose elements in the power centers of the CNAeSy 4 HW 542714 DBocld: 32977085 Page 9
FOP SECRET = SERSHIVE_ -8- regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and “ the elimination of the Sovict presence in Cuba; at some stage of the revolt, it is likely that direct, or indirect U.S. support will be needed to ensure its success. Theoretically, the Cuban people, tired of economic hardship, lack of freedom, and isolation from their Latin American brethern, will , embrace the revolt. . B. Accommodation with Castro on U.S. Terms Under this eventuality, Castro would agree to break his tie-Line with the USSR, stop his subversion efforts, and perhaps renounce the Com- munist idsology. While highly unlikely, it is not inconceivable that such factors as (lt) U.S. isolation and covert measures, (2) further Cuban economic deterioration, in spite of Soviet aid, and (3) distrust of the Soviet intentions will lead Castro to believe he has no choice but accommodation. Indeed, there is evidence that Castro may already be thinking along these lines. In the past few months he has made a number of accornmodation noise: and since he undoubtedly has a pretty good reading of our minimum terms, these noises could conceivably indicate that he is willing to go a long way towards meeting them. Che Guevera's reported nervousness at Castro's that accommodation tendencies substantiates the view / Castro's desire to negotiate is genuine and not a ploy to reduce U.S. heat on Cuba. But there are obvious major problems with this alternative. Not the least of these is whether the American people would tolerate accommodation eee HW 54714 ONAnDBV 4 DoclIda: 329770685 Page 10
-14- grounds that they will give us more intelligence on Castro's capabilities to ship arms to Latin America. In fact, the primary advantages to low- level flights are psychological; they would indicate a tougher U.S, line and would be extremely irritating to Castro - a blatant disregard for Cuban sovereignty. Much discussed, the reintroduction of low-level flights has been turned down in the past primarily because of the noise-level problem, and because it might lead to Soviet reaction against our U-2 flights and in other areas. Also there is a real possibility that low-level flights might lead to escalation we would not want; the Cubans are on record that they might try to shoot one down. (5) Free World Shipping to Cuba -- We can take further unilateral measures to reduce Free World shipping to Cuba. For example, we can close U.S. ports and deny U.S, Government sponsored shipments to lines. of some or all countries which have ships in the Cuban trade. This is a subject which has probably received as much attention as any in the whole realm of Cuban affairs. Briefly put, we have thus far re- jected further unilateral measures mainly because the nature of the Cuban trade is such (small shipping lines with a greater involvement in Cuban trade than in U.S, trade) that our unilateral measures would simply not provide the Icverage needed to produce a substantial reduction in Free World shipping to Cuba; the slight reduction we would get would not be enough to re, ‘ ‘ ° fABY , HW 542714 DBocld: 32977085 Page 16