176-10036-10169 AGENCY : : 176-10036-10169 RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : : DOS : Ambassador Lodge : Rusk TITLE : DATE : PAGES : SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : RECORD NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO Cables. Box 2 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM NARA National Security Files 9/10/2000 f National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam, 10/29/63-10/31/63, State
fr3 TOP s. ECRE , ; . . ff, "MEP aN gr he :+ : oa , Vd VIA CAS SAIGON 2065 FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE DTG 3919392 10 SECSTATE WASH EYES ONLY FOR RUSK, HARRINAN, BALL, HILSMAN, HUGHES “OSD'EYES ONLY FOR MCNAMARA, GILPATRIC, TAYLOR, HRULAK, MR. WM. BUNDY "WHITE HOUSE/EYES ONLY MCGEORGE BUNDY oe | INFO| _|HONOLULU FOR ADM FELT EYES ONLY | ” GIA/EYES ONLY NCCONE, CARTER, HELUS . : co ‘REF:. CAS WASHINGTON 79109 1@. WE ANTICIPATE THAT AT THE OUTSET OF THE COUP, UNLESS IT “MOVES WITH LIGHTNING SWIFTNESS, THE GVN WILL REQUEST ME OR GEN “HARKINS TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO CALL IT OFF. 1 BELIEVE OUR “RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE THAT OUR INVLUENCE CERTAINLY COULD NOT- BE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO IS CONMANDER IN CHIEF AND “THAT IF HE IS UNABLE TO CALL-IT OFF, WA WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNABLE — “TO DO.SO AND WOULD MERELY BE RISKING AMERICAN LIVES ATTEMPTING TO " INTERFERE IN THIS VIETNAMESE PROBLEM. THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT REQUEST “AIRCRAFT. HELIOCOPTERS, FOR THE EVACUATION OF KEY PERSONALITIES __ -THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED CLOSELY, BUT VE WOULD CERTAINLY _ NOT COMMIT OUR. PLANES: AND PILOTS BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES OF THE - ‘OPPOSING FORCES. WE SHOULD, RATHER, STATE THAT WE WOULD BE, WILLING TO ACT IN THIS FASHION DURING A TRUCE IN WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE TO THE REMOVAL OF KEY PERSONALITIES. I BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN ATTEMPTING TO TAKE’ THESE PERSONALITIES 10 ANOTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRY AND PROBABLY WE WOULD _BE BEST SERVED IN DEPOSITING THEN IN SAIPAN WHERE THE ABSENCE OF PRESS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC, WOULD ALLOW US SOME LEEWAY TO ‘MAKE, 4 FURTHER DECISION AS TO THEIR. ‘ULTIMATE DISPOSITION. IF SENIOR — VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES. _AND® THEIR FAMILIES REQUESTED ‘ASYLUM IN Toe beet el gee! at o «saree noisier Shai Joh ae ela Be cage Be . . .
cree oe be THE EMBASSY oR ‘OTHER: AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS, “WE “WOULD PROBABLY Have "TO GRANT iT ‘IN LIGHT OF OUR PREVIOUS . ACTION WITH RESPECT TO TRI QUANG. THIS WILL ‘UNDGUBTEDLY PRESENT LATER ‘PROBLEWS BUT HOPES. FULLY THE NEW GOVERNHENT MIGHT. Fr EL DISPOSED ‘TO HELP US SOLVE THIS, PROBLEM. . NATURALLY ASYLUM WOULD BE GRANTED OF THE SANE BASIS aS THE BUDDHISTS, I.E. PHYSICAL PRESENCE AT THE EMBASSY OR OTHER’. - LOCATION. : oe | | A. “As ‘TO REQUESTS. FROM THE GENERALS, THEY MAY WELL HAVE NEED ’ OF FUNDS AT THE: LAST NOMENT. WITH WHICH TO. BLY OFF. POTENTIAL ~~ OPPOSITION. TO THE EXTENT THAT THESE’ FUNDS CAN BE PASSED”. | DISCREETLY, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FURNISH THEM. PROVIDED WE ARE | CONVINCED THAT THE PROPOSED’ COUP. Is SUFFICIENTLY | WELL ORGANIZED TO HAVE & gooD CHANCE. OF SUCCESS. IF. THEY. ARE SUCCESSFUL, THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR PROMPT RECOGNITION. AND SOME ASSURANCE © THAT ‘MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID WILL CONTINUE. AT NORMAL LEVEL: WE SHOULD’ BE PREPARED TO MAKE THESE STATEMENTS IF THE ISSUE IS CLEARCUT, PREDICATING OUR. POSITION: ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATED | DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE. WAR AGAINST THE VC TO FINAL VICTORY. . VOA. MIGHT BE AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF DISSEMINATING THIS MESSAGE. SHOULD _ THE COUP FAIL, WE WILL HAVE TO PICK UP THE PIECES AS SEST WE CAN - AT THAT TIME. WE HAVE A COMMITMENT TO THE GENERALS FROM THE AUGUST EPISOBE TO ATTEMPT TO: HELP IN THE EVACUATION OF THEIR DEPENDENTS. * WE. SHOULD. TRY TO LIVE UP TO THIS IF CONDITIONS WILL” PERNIT. AMERICAN CONPLICITY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CHARGED AND’ THERE” “WIGHT BE, SOME ACTS TAKEN, AGAINST SPECIFIC PERSONALITIES WHICH WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE: AND MAKE PROVISION AGAINST -AS BEST WE CAN. a " SHOULD THE COUP PROVE INDECISIVE AND A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE is IN, | PROGRESS, WE’ “SHOULD cise OUR ,GOCD OFFICES TO, HELP. RESOLVE THE ISSUE IN THE INTEREST OF THE WAR AGAINST | THE Ve! 2 om sonnet met
AFTLL NATURALLY: AINCUR “SOME OPPROBIUM FROWN ‘BOTH ‘SIDES wn OUR ROLE as” ‘EDIATOR. “HOWEVER, THIS OPPROBI Ut WOULD PROBABLY BE LESS DISTASTEFUL THAN. A DEADLOCK vHICH WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO THE vee.) } UE CONSIDER SUCH & DEADLOCK as THE LEAST LIKELY POSSIBILITY OF: 2. THE THREES an oe aS REGARDS YOUR FARA 10, I Do-NoT KKou WHAT MORE PROOF | CAN BE OFFERED: THAN THE FACT THESE HEN ARE OSVIOUSLY PREPARED TO. RISK THEIR LIVES AND THAT THEY: WANT NOTHING FOR THEMSELVES. IFS. T AM ANY JUDGE OF. HUMAN NATUR et, DON'S FACE, EXPRESSED OF SINCERITY AND: DETERMINATION ON THE MORNING THAT I SPOKE TO RIM. HEARTILY . EE THAT-A MISCALCULATION COULD ¢ EOPARDIZE POSITION IN SOUTHEAST | sStAaL YE ALso RUN TRENE enous }RYSKS BY DOING NOTHING. . : LP WE. WERE CONVINCED “ie THE COUP YAS GOING TO FATLy 2 WE WOULD, -OF COURSE ‘DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO: STOP Te | 13. GEN HARKINS. HAS READ THIS. AND DOES NOT CONCUR. (TOP ‘s EGRE T | SP=1 T ui