HW 54714 -9- with even a reformed Castro and whether or not we could prove to the . 4 American people that we've gotten from Castro what we say we've gotten, Nevertheless, there is rebuttal for such arguments and accommodation remains a distinct possibility, if not for now then for later. Cc. A Soviet Decision to Quit Cuba This may be the most unlikely of the three eventualities, yet such a Soviet decision cannot be dismissed categorically in view of such factors as (1) the lackof real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "showpiece", (2) the obvious U.S. determination to make Cuba a Soviet "dead end" in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will be permitted), (3) the magnitude of ‘ Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how ths the Russians would view tse eviction from Cuba, either by the overthrow of Castro's regime or by a Castro decision to accommodate with the U.S. on U.S. terms. Relief would conceivably mix generously with Russian grief, especially if the Russians could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf. IV Current Estimate of Possible Success The $64 question -- Will our present offensive measures, even if implemented vigorously and flawlessly, ever lead, by one way or another, to the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere? -- is impossible to answer, Castro's position within Cuba appears to be erroding gradually, while the situation in Cuba is characterized by economic stagnation, depress: livine conditions the loss of revolutionary impetus, and the disillusionment DoclIda: 32977085 Page i1
= . - | -10- of an increasing large majority of the population; moreover, Castro's stature in Latin Ame rica is generally very low. Nevertheless, the general consensus seems to be that Castro still retains control; without stepping up our pressures considerably, the chances are practically nil that we will get to Castro in the near future and only fairly good that we will get to him eventually. Probably the most we can say for certain is that we appear to be moving in the right general direction; and this, of course, is important. A vigorous, tough, and nasty policy probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the three eventualities which are noted above and * « . which constitute the removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. From a domestic political viewpoint, this is probably fortuitous; a tough but no invasion policy is one policy which the American people appear prepared to support at this time. V. Further Possible Measures Against Cuba . | The general consensus in the Government is that we should try to find ways of stepping up our pressures against the Castro regime. One of the most important reasons for this is that the Castro regime continues to constitute a threat to Latin America. While Castro's efforts in Latin Ame rica may not be substantial in absolute terms, he is operating in an - area which is politically especially fragile. It is also gencrally agreed that we are now ina good time-frame to ———————_--sicpupour pressures. The recent discovery of the Cuban arms cache in e - § ’ HW 542714 DBocld: 32977085 Page 12 ; ~
-ll- Venezuela should permit us to raise the general noise level in and around Cuba. Actions which we may have been reluctant to take several months ago, may now be feasible. “The following is a list of further actions, short of invasion and blockade, which we may want to take in the near future. They can con- veniently be divided into unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measure Ss, _ The brief description following each measure is meant to give you a flavor for some of the more important implications. At the NSS meeting, State, Defense, and CIA will be prepared to discuss each of the measures with , you in depth and in detail. e ! A. Unilateral Measures | (1) Air Attacks -- We can authorize CIA to conduct or to equip | . . autonomous exile groups to conduct air attacks against selected major economic targets such as power plants and oil refineries. Asa starter, we -- have 4 targets in mind. These wourd-be considerably more difficult to attacx from the ground but planning for a ground attack on one of these targets is already underway. Planning for an attack on the Santiago oil refinery will alny Alu, ; be completed i#=Marek, 1964. While the concrete and psychological advantages of selected air strike. have always been recognized, and while unauthorized air strikes have in fac: already taken place over Cuba, up to now it has been our policy to steer cle:- of U.S. involvement in this sort of activity. Primarily it has been considere:. - -- , . : © LODOYW HW 542714 Bocld:32977085 Page 13
_TORSHGRET -SENSHIIVE | -12- a relatively high risk, high noise-Icvel type of operation which would not have a major impact on Castro, which would be hard to control (e.g. innocents might be killed), and which could conceivably lead toa sharp Soviet reaction in Cuba (e.g. shoot down a U-2) or elsewhere. (2) Unleashing of Exiles -- We can relax our present policy of not permitting independent Cuban exile groups to base sea and air attacks on Cuba from U.S. territoryifive can urge the British to do the same for 1] Bahamian territory.j| While such attacks might inflict only small concrete damage on Cuban targets, they have some distinct advantages. For | example, they would tend to high-light the regime's weakness, cause Castro to divert more resources to defense, lift the morale of the exiles and of the anti-Castro elements within Cuba, and provide cover for CIA- controlled raids, This also is not a new subject, and, in the past, the disadvantages were believed to be over-riding. Such autonomous raids, which would in- - volve the U.S, directly and which would raise the noise-level in the Caribbean, would be hard to control; it is possible that raiders would attack Soviet vessels and installations and precipitate strong Russian reaction, including, possibly the transfer of more Soviet troops to Cuba. Moreover, encourage- ment of autonomous raids on Cuba from U.S. territory would be in sharp - variance with our publicly and privately stated position. Since March 30, 1963 we have taken‘the public position that we will not tolerate the violation of Us. Bey ily laws, even by anti-Castro raiders. Privately, we have 3 f HW 542714 Bocld:32977085 Page 14
HW 54714 - 13 - : . é said the same thing to the Sovicts while maintaining the position that we have no control over raiding activities which originate outside of U.S, territory. Dn th Laat of olf pornbl wml, ' Optinmumly, we would prefer that these completely autonomous, amateur exile raiders operate from non-U,S, territory. However, we may not have ;this option. Generally speaking, such amateurs have their homes in Florida and don't want to move. Moreover, the fact that U.S, territory is physically very close to Cuba makes a difference to the rela- tively poorly-equipped amateurs who would be involved in this sort of raid. e . ¢. (3) Military Feints -- We can move U.S, air and surface units over * . and in international waters near Cuba in a manner designed to keep Cuban military forces ina state of alert and uncertainty. This is a measure which has not been explored to the extent of the first two. On the positive side, it would harass Castro, cost him resources, and, if desired, offer opportunities for escalation. On the negative side, there is the ever-present problem of possible escalation which we may not want as well as the investment of U.S. forces, over time, in an essentially 4 psychological exercise. Implicit in this measure is the assumption that we urn ld would be able to conduct military feints ona level at which the Cubans etd get jumpy but the Russians would not. (4) Low-Level Flights -- We can reintroduce low-level reconnaissance ‘flights over Cuba in such a way as to minimize the chance of Cuban counter- : Bflicly, we can fationalize the resumption of theflights on the DoclId: 32977085 Page 15
-15 - compensate for a number of forcign policy losses we would suffer, Gencrally speaking, we have instead concentrated on applying in- tense bilateral pressures on the governments of Free World countries to control their shipping to Cuba; and have had considerable, but not total, success (sce also Section V B (2) below). At the same time, we have not entirely ruled out further unilateral sanctions. Some shipping experts seem to feel that if we apply certain unilateral sanctions in March, 1964, the Soviets and Cubans will have to scramble seriously in order to adjust charters and shipping schedules in time to be prepared for the heavy Cuban shipping season which begins in May. | (6) Public Presidential Statement -- You can issue an early policy declaration on Cuba, making clear that the U.S. regards the current situa- tion in Cuba as intolerable. Such a statement would be designed to stimulate anti-Castro/Communist dissident elements issthe-esmed—forces to carry out a coup. It would also have a salutory effect on those Latin American leaders who have indicated a willingness to follow a positive U,S, lead in " taking more forceful action against Cuba. Your statement might also include the point that the U.S. #6 uZ/ neiogoix stocpexmit shocestuh itch ehiurstobdigkhmontiafsroath exxCubes not goiagte permit the establishment of "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere. This point would be designed to make it clear to the Soviets and Castro that they have reached a "dead end" in the Hemisphere. 3 CPE Yovembver 18 in Miami, President Kennedy includsd both of the HW 542714 DBocld:32977085 Page 17
HW 54714 - 16 ~ é above points in his speech to the Inter-American Press Association (excerpts are attached at Tab 2). Whether or not you would want to take a more vigorous line in your own statement would have to depend on many - factors - e.g. upon U.S. willingness to pursue a more active anti-Cuba : policy over the next months, upon possible adverse Latin American re- action to a statement which hints of U.S, interventionism and upon domestic political considerations. , (7) Talks with the Soviets and Cubans -- We can, through normal = ees ang ubans ‘diplomatic and private channels attempt to drive a wedge between the Soviets and the Cubans and possibly, to encourage some Russian thinking in favor of withdrawal and some Castro thinking in favor of accommodation with the U.° U.S. terms. To the Soviets, we can emphasize (a) that we are never going to let things stand as they are in Cuba, (b) that the Soviets, despite con- siderable expense, are making and can expect to make, no further real Progress in Cuba sr elsewhere in the Hemisphere, (c) that the existence of the Soviet tie-line in Cuba is a serious impediment toa U.S. /USSR detente, and (d) that the U.S. is prepared to assist the USSR in finding a fig-leaf to cover Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. To Castro, very well aware that the Russians pulled the rug out from him in October, 1962 and aware that he is making no progress despite massive Soviet aid, the following type of message might have some appeal, It could be confident in tone to mitigate the possibility of relieving Castro LNW DoclIda: 329770685 Page 16
-17- of any anxicties he may have which work in our favor, “ "Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressures against you until you fall; we are arctty certain that we will be successful.- Moreover, you can forget about getting "another Cuba' in the Hemisphere. We have learned our lesson and ‘another Cuba! is simply not going to happen. However, we are reasonable:men. We are not intent on having your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people. ’ You know our central concerns -- the Soviet connection and the subversion. . - If you fe’el you are in a position to allay these concerns, we can probably | . | | work out a way to live amicable together and to build a prosperous Cuba. | If you don't feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole | thing; we are quite content to continue on our present basis." { B. Bilateral Measures Further efforts in this field essentially would represent a continuation, sharpening, and intensification of programs already in effect. A basic limiting factor is the degree to which we are willing to expend credit with our allies to obtain we cooperation in making life diffi- cult for Cuba. (1) Free World Trade with Cuba -- We can, through overt and covert, legal and extra-legal, diplomatic and private means, make a greater effort to deny Cuba access to Free World. :markets and sources of supply; extra- rr . $I YR Yhtion can be directed to those Free World commodities which HW 542714 Bocld:32977085 Page 19
o There are some real obstacles to further progress in this field -- a world-wide shortage of sugar which increases Cuba's leverage over Free World sugar consumers, and a reluctance among many Free World countries to interfere in non-strategic trade. Nevertheless, there appears to be general agreement that more can be done in this area. Among other things, we can interpret more restrictively various legislative provisions which bear on Free World trade with Cuba; we would have to be prepared, however, to accept political losses in the offending countries as well as the domeStic political losses inhe rent in tacitly admitting that our former interpretations were wrong. (2) Free World Shipping to Cuba -- We can increase our bilateral pressures to eliminate the slowly dwindling number of Free World ships which remain in the Cuba trade. We can try to ensure that the Greeks en- -18-— ° are critical or important to the Cuban economy. ‘ 1 { force their new shipping legislation against ships in the Cuba trade. We can press the Lebanese to enact the necessary shipping legislation which has already passed through a number of constitutional processes; ~-a letter from you to the Lebanese Prime Minister mighthelp. Although we appear to have recently found a way to reduce British shipping to Cuba without HMG help (through direct dealings with the shippers), we can continue to press for IMG cooperation, which, if obtained, would be most helpful, Since our prospects scem to be good with respect to the three major eee . sift INIT Ptries, it is axiomatic that we should keep pressure on other HW 542714 DBocld: 32977085 Page 20
HW 54714 -19- Free World countries to ensure that they don't pick up the slack which the Greeks, Lebanese, and selective British shippers will soon be leaving. In this regard, the sclective refusal to exercise the Presidential waiver of the Cuban transportation provisions of the new Foreign Aid Authorization Act (cessation of aid to any country which has not taken steps to prevent the transport of commodities, by plane or ship, to or from Cuba), could increase our diplomatic pressures on the maritime nations, assuming of course, we are ready to incur the foreign policy costs involved in this step. (3) Air Service to and from Cuba -- We can increase pressure to *. 2 . e s s reduce, restrict and harass Free World and Communist air services to and from Cuba. Strict application of the new Foreign Aid Authorization Act could help in this regard if we are prepared to accept the costs involved in offending certain countries (e.g. Spain). On the other hand, the con- clusion of a U.S. /USSR civil air agreement could erode our strong position against Free World air service to Cuba. (4) Anti-Subversion Program -- We can continue to press in the direction of strengthening both the will and the capability in Latin America to take the political and technical measures which have been recommended both bilaterally and multilaterally. The basic lines of the ‘anti- subversion Program have been laid out and they are being followed, with varying degrees of success, in the different countries, Constant follow-up, technica! advice and assistance, and training are essential to the improvement and tz, vw : SAIN >A the program. : DoclIda: 32977085 Page 271
SSLTIVE -20- We can also make a tough approach to the Russians with evidence " of the Venezuclan arms cache. Gromyko in the past, has expressed doubt that we could show evidence of Cuban subversion. We can show it to him now. | C. Multilateral Measures (1) Rio Treaty Action Against Cuba -- At present, we are in the process of deciding what Rio Treaty action we can get the OAS to takeagainst Cuba as a result of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela. What we push for will depend, in large part on the hardness of the evidence presented in an OAS investigating team's report.and on the attitude of other OAS countries towards energetic anti-Cuban action. Best estimates are that we will push for and get 4 or 5 of the following 7 measures: and (a) Stop and search, on the high seas, of selected Cuban «a OAS- registery vessels. This measure implies a willingness to use force and involves the concommitant risk of unwanted escalation. The ostensible purpose of this measure is to stop arms shipments,but because the quarantine could be easily by-passed and because the chances are good that arms shipments to Latin America from Cuba are minimal, no arms are likely to be found. The real purpose of this measure is to infuriate, humiliate, and provoke Castro. (b) Stop and search, in territorial waters, of all suspect vessels, Ti. is a variation of the above, which is probably almost as effective in controlli: arms shipments and which does not involve the possible use of force. At the DAU e HW 542714 DBocld:32977085 Page 22
; -22- however, such action will be fairly meaningless. . - (2) Other Surveillance Measures -- Outside the context of Rio Treaty Action we can try to conclude OAS-wide or bilateral agreements with Latin Ame rican governments to take joint measures to detect and prevent arms smuggling by land, sea, or air into Latin America. Because of the . Canled! . urgency of the threat, Venezuela and Colombia sheuwid be given first priority. He €8 HW 542714 Bocld:32977085 Page 23