HW 54955 What I said then -- in 1974 -- and what I believe today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of the United States. Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to California. The victims of these acts were human beings -- men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril -- whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government, their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their rights. There were many calls for action from Members of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands...impatient demands...for immediate action. FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith, Docld: 327989494 Page 69
HW 54955 initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial’ efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities. In the development and execution of these programs, mistakes of judgment admittedly were made. Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counterintelligence Programs ~-- and there were some substantial ones -~ should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs. We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi- gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or property. In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities by. investigating only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to human life. Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of Docld: 327989494 Page 70
whether or not such preventive action should be available to the FBI. These matters are currently being addressed by a task force in the Justice Department, including the FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible manner. Probably the most important question here today is. what assurances can I give that the errors and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again? First, let me assure the Committee that some very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of office as Director on July 9, 1973. Today we place a high premium on openness ~- openness both within and without the service. I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion in the decision-making process which insures that no future program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a full and critical review of its propriety. HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 71
me @ , S Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI. . I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations. The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command structure. The results of this program have been most beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined performance...and to the morale of our employees. In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability -- in his own words -- "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests." Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 72
HW 54955 requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the request, I believed presented the appearance of impropriety. I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or made overtures -- directly or otherwise -- to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes. I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider honoring any such request. I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities over the FBI. I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity can be assured only through institutional means. Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the character of the person who occupies the office of Director and every member of the FBI under him. DoclId: 32989494 Page T3
e ® I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism, their standards, and the self- discipline which they personally demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI. The Congress and the members of this Committee in particular have gained a great insight into the problems confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields -- problems which all too often we have been left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress itself. As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even to the Executive Branch. The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised. An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 74
9 commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum participation with the members of that Subcommittee. I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history. One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step -~ a step that I believe is absolutely essential -- a legislative charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for the FBI. Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in the past. This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role, not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of our performance. I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the Courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages HW 54955 DBocld:32989494 Page 75 - 10 -
“4 HW 54955 e of the investigative process and, thereby, would take over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions. I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive decision. The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the American people. Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer -- a career police officer. In my police experience, the most frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing law enforcement in this country -- Federal, state, or local ~- is when demands are made of them to perform their traditional role as protector of life and property without clear and understandable legal bases to do so. I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding task. - ll - Docld: 327989494 Page 76
HW 54955 sd e It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle FBI effectiveness in combating the growing incidence of crime and violénce across the United States. That charter must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive challenges. The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced the formulation of operational guidelines governing our intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress. In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that information needed for the prevention of violence can be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations. As a practical matter, the line between intelligence work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there are some fundamental differences between these - 12 - Docld: 327989494 Page fi?
y e ° eels. investigations that should be recognized -- differences in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution. |. Since the investigation normally follows the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly well defined. By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation, in turn, is dependent on advance information -~ that is intelligence. Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress. We - 13- HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 73
@ ® recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or its successor in this important task. In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact. - 14 - HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 79
EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR -- DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS TESTIFYING BEFORE THE | SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN, GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI TO PREVENT VIOLENCE () DECEMBER 2, 1975 HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 60
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS : -...-you do use informants and do instruct them to spread dissention among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not? We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights used much more than we hear today. We saw with the Little Rock situation the President of the United States sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement use the troops. only as a'last resort. When you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical problems. With the Klan coming along, we had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information as he pointed out during his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance. We also know that in certain instances the infor- mation upon being received was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 61
. ; @ sg memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem. And here we were--the FBI~-in a position where we had no authority in the absence of an instruction from the Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials. So historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable information-~and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon as he indicated. QUESTION: In none of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act. MR. ADAMS: The Departmental rules at that time, and still do, require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you have no violation. Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 62
individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This was a problem that the whole country was grappling with-- the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing the Klan and that was one of the reasons. QUESTION: e..-A local town meeting on a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such meetings because they may result in violent government disruption? MR ADAMS: No sir, and we don't.... QUESTION: Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement? MR. ADAMS: No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration. This is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the lst Amendment right, yet at the same time, being HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 63
aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. We have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe and the courts have said that the FBI has the right, and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree- ments fall. QUESTION: In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known about. I know we have asked this several times~-I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was known. MR. WANNALL: Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be the one to answer the question. MR. ADAMS: The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 64 L
5 a NW 54955 ie @ since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice, and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on activities. We furnished the information to the local police who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those areas where the local police did not act. It resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights. This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in the South at the time either, because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that was a conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. We have over the years as you know at the Docld: 329689494 Page 635
QUESTION : MR. ADAMS: QUESTION : MR ADAMS: | | AW 34955 DoclId: 32969494 Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area. What would be wrong, just following up on your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence? We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same time and this is the approach that the Federal Government finally recognized. On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have. Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or 50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning -6§- Page 86
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: for Boston, for instance, took: place a year in advance, with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government had no mechanics which protected people at that. time. Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member- ship. That's right. I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants, both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone. Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters and informants at that particular time and I think the figures HW 54955 Docld: 32999494 Page 6? -7-
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Kian is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone, was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time. I acknowledge that. Our only approach was through informants. Through the use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved. They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could see that this could continue forever unless we could HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 63 -8-
QUESTION: MR ADAMS: QUESTION: create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer. I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in 1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto situation? I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington, areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the Situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have another group here that is getting ready to start another fire fight or something. --. Without going into that subject further of course we have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime when you had information that it was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where you have. HW 54955 Docld:32999494 Page 69 -9-
MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: We disseminated every single item which he reported to us. To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime. Not necessarily knew. Your informant told you that, hadn't he? The informant is on one level. We have other informants and we have other information. You were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham Police in order... That's right. He furnished many other instances also. So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already a part of it. We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.S. Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions. ..-This brings up the point as to what kind of control you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you were supposedly trying to prevent. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer using him as an informant in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had But you also told him to participate in violent activities * AW 54955 Docld:32969494 Page 90 -10-
MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 91 -ll- We did not tell him to participate in violent activities. That's what he said. | I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence. Just to do what was necessary to get the information. I do not think they made any such statement to him along that line either and we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject and have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case during the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a day and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities. So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files. Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going
MR. ADAMS: ’ QUESTION: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead but the implication is that he would have to go along or would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his liability as a --- There is no question that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place but I believe his statement was to the effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is one thing being present, it is another thing taking .an active part in a criminal action. It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut apparently. How does the collection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention. Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever. -12- HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 92
. . @ @ é QUESTION: You don't know of any such case where these instructions were given to an Agent or an informant? MR. ADAMS: To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir. ~13-
Rowing Slip _ 6-7 (Rev. Go} , TO: FAC: Albany FF (_} Houston (") Oklahoma City i 4 or (Copies to Offices Checked) . _ —_— 1 } LEGAT: {—] Albuquerque (C1 Indianapolis (_] Omaha (C} Bern (li Alexandria = [©] Jackson Cl Philadelphia ro Bonn [4] Anchorage [("] Jacksonville Phoenix [7] Brasilia (1 Atlanta C__} Kansas City [_] Pittsburgh {__] Buenos Aires C_] Baltimore CJ Knoxville (_]} Portland {_] Caracas {_] Birmingham [] Las Vegas C_] Richmond (.} Hong Kong Boston (_] Little Rock ([j Sacramento (J London {_] Buffalo [_] Los Angeles (CJ St. Louis f_] Madrid (_]} Butte (_] Louisville C_] Salt. Lake City (_] Manila {_} Charlotte [_] Memphis (_] San Antonio (_] Mexico City {__] Chicago C_] Miami (__] San Diego (_] Ottawa C2) Cincinnati C_ | Milwaukee San Francisco (__] Paris {_] Cleveland [7] Minneapolis (_} San Juan {_) Rome [| Columbia [_] Mobile (} Savannah (J Tel Aviv (_] Dallas C_] Newark (] Seattle {_} Tokyo (_) Denver ((] New Haven C} Springfield LJ Detroit (] New Orleans Tampa Rinh (Cj &] Paso (_} New York City. ((_] Washin’gton Field (4) Honolulu _] Norfolk fj} Quantico RE: Retention {] For infomation [7] optional (7) The enclosed is for your information. If used i in a future report, [7] conceal all sources, ("] paraphrase contents. (] Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA dated -. Comittee on 12/2/75, allegations made by Gary Rowe, For appropriate ([) action DateDecember 4, 2.975 HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE : SELECT COMMITTEE (J Surep, by Remarks: j For your assistance in responding to eee press inquiries, attached is a copy of dated excerpted remarks by Assistant to the Digpator~—Deputy. Associate Director James B. s while testifying before the Senate Select concerning anti-FBI ia wate { le me) DEC -& 1975 Bufile Urfile FBI-ALBANY HW 54955 |. DocId: 32969494 Page
(itount Clipging in Space Below) TO met ey votes pet - wie ey roa ESS . Te ROS LS EY, (Indicate page, nam of newspaper, clty and stcte.} THE patty. STAR ONEONTA, N.Y. . et oe tes: ~ - OTR OST * re Arg * . A disgusting tale is unf ng before the-Se na - Subcommittees. +) sySi ake. eye: mr) té ntelligence st is a story of the FBI in the 1960s and.early 70s. sing its. 2 Citizens, 2.0 . : awesome power to subvert traditional. constitutional rights: of : FBI threats and intimidation of the late-Dr-Martin'Euther—}- King are getting the headlines, but.as Senator-Philip.A-Hart (Def Mich.)”says;‘:'Lots: of ‘people ‘named. Jones “and Smith;s whois: >” never came close to a’Nobel Prize (which DriKing received in‘; , . 1964) have had their First Amendment Fights-trampled on CVS ; A‘couple of'examples=s mei cae a YE BR RE The: FBE would’ send: anonymous. letters. intended to break: $ "up marriages.of dissenters,“ Orit would send similar letters to -:: . colleges and/or newspapers aimed.at getting speakers the FBI. ; - | didn’t like barred from using-campus facilities: praeert dec cas: i James B. Adams, deputy associate’ FBI director-coneeded:- - that the‘ FBI had “no*statutory“authority’for its h rs . METIS thee 22 Be Mas < arassment™ | - activities\That’s certainly an understatement... oom, . | The current hearings point up. the need. for tighter control , _ +4, OVer the EBIF We should never-again have a situation where the -- pater 7 11/22/75 | . Editloa: = he ~~: a7 > - ye wena ENE we Paeee rer apa? . a, Author> a . _¥ BY directorteans‘run amuck;? free: from ‘control. from the :. ma, . -* Attorney General and CongressThat’s exactly what happened” ~ frie 2 RR. -. during the‘last years of JEdgar Hoover’s teniire. :7* ae “lo ee aX the EBL = and Hoover — setved thé nation well for'many."* Siar ee ae os “e ee ad Fe OS ye TO Charecter: But that is not, and should never be, a license to be above or thelaw. “77 To Saly at MO. eas - ce aro 2 al ar’ > ft “ Classtilection: * 06 see Submitiiag Offices AL C) Hoing Investigated —_ " If our law enforcement agencies cannot stay within both ; the letter and Spirit of the law,our “‘nation of laws’”’ may soon become a nation of thugs. - ——e : . ment > ~ yo an gf? ~LARCHED a OO | SEMAUZED SAB FILLY | —_—~ pei ALBACT Docld: 32989494 Page 95 HW 54955
Routing Slip (Capies to Offices Checked) O-7 (Rev. 7-11-75) q 7 °  ) TO: SAC: + T AT: [-) Albany (-), Houston C_] Oklahoma City 0 LEGAT {_] Albuquerque [__] Indianapolis Omaha Bem {_] Alexandria baal Jackson i Philadelphia = Bonn (_] Anchorage [} Jacksonville {_] Phoenix (_] Brasilia fr] Atlanta [_] Kansas City (_] Pittsburgh f] Buenos Aires (_} Baltimore {_] Knoxville {_] Portland f_} Caracas (-] Birmingham [_] Las Vegas (_} Richmond - [J] Hong Kong (_] Boston” {_] Little Rock [_} Sacramento (_} London (_] Buffalo {_] Los Angeles Lj St. Louis (_] Madrid t [_] Butte (_} Louisville (_) Salt Lake City _] Manila {_] Charlotte (_} Memphis {__] San Antonio {_] Mexico City [_] Chicago (_] Miami (_] San Diego. [_] Ottawa (_} Cincinnati {_] Milwaukee (_] San Francisco {_] Paris (—] Cleveland [_] Minneapolis (} San Juan [_} Rome . ‘ (~j Columbia [_] Mobile {_} Savannah [) Tel Aviv . - f_] Dallas. (_] Newark [_} Seattle {_] Tokyo } {_} Denver {] New Haven (_} Springfield (-] Detroit (_] New Orleans CJ Tampa . (_] El Paso (-] New York City -[—] Washington Field (C) Honolulu () Norfolk [_] Quantico Date December 5, 1975 RE! TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-— DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS ‘BEPORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 12/2/75: Retention For appropriate ; (<] For information [J optional [(7]j action ([] Surep, by C7] The enclosed is for your information, If used in a future report, [7] conceal all =~ sources, [7] paraphrase contents. (C) Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA ——_____ dated Remarks: — Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided | excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony. Attached for your information and assistance, is the-complete transcript of above-referenced testimony. pe (1) AMEDITEO “TRANSCAIPT~ Bufile . . Urfile HW 54955, noota:szeneadé) pale ae A3 G §- /b. ; | |
Vol. 15 ; é The United States Senate se ‘Report of Proceedinge Hearing held before “ lect Committes to Study Governmental Operations | With Respect to Intelligences Activities INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION UNeorteD sca Resday, December 2, 1975 oe - Washington, D.C. _ “oh: 238 (@ vtAKGHED _ INDEXED SERIALIZED_(AP_ FiLeD DeSi 75 CSIs ALBANY (| all Coo (202) 544-6000 y 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 HE 54955  Doold: 32989494 Page 97
1 a be] & 12: a 2 3 14 15 16 1? 18 | 8 19 G 3 ¢ 20 3 5 21 | & é 22 i 23 é 2 24 t 25 (HW 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 936 Senator Tower.. The next witnesses to appear before the Committee are[._onaro im 4 Assistant to the Director- Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal security and foreign counterintelligence ‘investigations; Mr. John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division; Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations; Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., Assistant to Section Chief, Supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigali, Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelicy, Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, Gener-.i Invocli- gative Division. Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.
¥* . dun 16 2) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li 12 13 3 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 eal 22 23 oe 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25  ] . 7 @ 1901 . Do you’ solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothin but the truth, so help you God? I do. Mr. Wannall. I do. . a - Mr. Mintz. I do. Mr. Deegan. I do. Mr. Schackelford. I do. Mr. Newman. I do. | Mr. Grigalus. I do. Mr. Kelley. I do. Senator Tower. It is intended that.Mr. Wannall will be the principal witness, and we will call on others as questionin might require, and I would direct each of you when you do respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record. I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow the members of the Committee to return from the floor. (A brief recess was taken.) Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order. Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide ‘83 percent of your intelligence information. Now, will you provide the Committee with some information on the criteria for the selection cf informants? HW 54955 DBocld:32999494 Page 99°
° is] ° A) ‘ z ¢ uw ~ N ] fe) N g o 2 ¢ = J Cc é 10 ll (12 _ 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 uy 18 “1g 20 21 22 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 29) oo 8 e , 1902 - PESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION .- ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS,. ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) ; . JOHN A. MINTZ» ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L. SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR., 7 ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT CHIEF; AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF, CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting Office. | Senator Tower. That is GAO. Mr. Wannall. Based on a sampling of about 93 cases. Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate figure. | Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that we do get the principal portion of our information from live sources. Senator Tower. It would be a relatively high percent. then? ° | . ’ Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your ques!’ os to A criteria? AW Wek 55>... Booth 33909494-—Page 100 ibiiciatininh
°°: is) 9 rr) : z g a ~ wy 5 S N Q 9 he x = a & é “10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 L? 18 19 20 al ae ' 23 ‘eo 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 | HW 54955 DocId: 16, 1903 “Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection of informants? Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged ina criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require > that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field office indices, checks with other informants who are operating in the same area, and in various established sources such as local police departments. Following this, if it appears that the person is the type who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we would interview the individual in order to make a determination as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI in discharging its responsibilities in. that. field. Following that, assuming that the. answer is positive, we would conduct a rather in depth investigation for. the purpose of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability. Senator. Tower. .How. does the. Bureau. distinguish between the. use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to _ intelligence. collection? Is the guidance different, or is it the same, or what? 29899494 Page 101 . i ' } ! ey er ee ee eo AIR OF ar tem
° 9 3 © . z s wm = rs) 3° N acd 9 M < = oO S 2 LO li 12 ‘13 [WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 . 24 ' A410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 54955 Docld: 32989494 Page 102 21 @ @ | 1904 Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over the operational Givision on that. Mr. Adams, you do have somewhat of a difference in the fac that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be just for purposes of pure intelligence. The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to, through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be used independently of the cestimony of the informant so that he can continue operating as a criminal informant. Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to function as provocateurs? Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula- tions against using informants as provocateurs. This gets into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the. opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don' occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 L LO Ll ‘12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 32939494 Page 103 1905 engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that, especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that: the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but because there is lacking this ‘criminal intent to violate a law, we stay away from that. Our regulatioris fall short of that. | If we have a situation where we felt that an informant has to become involved in some activity in order to protect or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United - States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our informants. Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not? Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs, which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probab y one of the best’examples of a situation where’ the'‘law was- in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the troops only as a last resort. And then you have a situation like this where you do try
oomn 21 2 & 1 . 8 Zs 4 5 6 vi] 8 “9 10 11 a Ps] fo & 12. . . & ‘ QO & 13 F4 14 , 15 16 1? 18 8 19 g : 20 5 21 a 3 22 ‘a f RS 2 24 gt 25 to preserve the respective roles in law enforcenient. You have historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We ‘had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those, he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance. We also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, ina position where we had no authority in the absence of instructio from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest. Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in United States Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials. ' So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus- ' trated as anyone else was, and when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information, and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to HW 54955 DoclIdt32989494 Page 104 ou | | | | t
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 @ - ® 1907 do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he indicated, © ; . Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act? ~ Mr. Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. . You ~ can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you havel. no violation. Congress recognized this, and-it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights statute, which added punitive measures against an individual that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem that the whole country was grappling with: the President of the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General. The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one. of the reasons. . “senator Towex. What was the Bureau's purpose in con- tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam Docld: 32989494 Page 105
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 smn 23 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el Re 24 295 Bocld 32999494 Page 106 Veterans Against the War? Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the intent to halter political expression? Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War that indicated that there were subversive groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting. with the Communist forces, They were going to Paris, attending meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the International Communist Party. We feel that we.had a very valid basis to direct our attention to the vvaw. It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made, and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow’ the national organization. But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation and subservience to the national office. . Senator Tower. Mr. Mart? Senator Hart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of informatio that clearly has no relationship to any Federal -eriminal
° ° fo) © r t ¢ wn ~ w 3° n i] .o 2 < = iJ c & WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 11 13 14 15 16 er 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 3495 DoclId: 32969494 Page 107 statute. Mr. Adams. TI agree, Senator. Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your inforant? Mr. Adams. Here is the. problem that ‘you have with that. When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the violent statements made by the group or do you also show that you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have some of these church -groups that were mentioned, and others, that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the real purpose of an organization, do you only report the violent statements made and the fact that it is by.a small minority, or do you also-show the broad base of the organizatioh and what it -really is? | And within that is where we have to have the guidelines ‘we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in our files. | Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process, you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people who are, who have been engaged in basic First Amendment
woe < hy “ sian 25° r Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO, Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 “19 20 ‘a t.: 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up. Mx. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, eithe asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter- viewed concerning some friend'who is applying for a job. Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the FBI? Now,. someone can Say, as reported at our dast session, tha this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree. It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because of consideringy a man for the Supreme Court of the United States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't ‘see. where any harm is served by having that in our files. “Senator Hart.of Michigan. But if.I am. Reverend. Smith and. the vacuum. cleaner. picked up the fact.that.I. was. helping the veterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years later a name check. is. asked.on Reverend Smith and. all. your file shows. is that he was. associated. two years ago. with a group that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful. patriotism to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on them -- Mx. Adams. This is a problem. HW 54955 DBocld:32999494 Page 103
n 3 7, nN a + Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO Ll L2 13 > WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al R22 235 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 54955 Doctl upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back 132999494 Page 109 e a 7 ® on ast Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require us to rethink this whole business, Mr. Adams. Absolutely. And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well as the Congressional input ave going to address themselves to. Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetratio and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition of when an extremist or security investigation-may be under- taken refers to groups whose activity either involves ¥iolation of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then informants may be used. Another guideline says that domestic intelligence investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations. The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved, again in a world of possible violations or activities which may result in illegal acts. Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition, conceivably may xesult in viclance or disruption of sv town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holdin
to ° ° fs) © c +: and n 18 ° an) g o 2 ¢ ~ 9g ¢ é WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 LO il 12 13 14 15 16 17 "18, 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Doct @ -  ) "92 the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because ' théy may result in violence, disruption?.-:- Mr. Adams. No, sir. Senator Hart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of ‘the peace movement? Mr. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we - monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored ‘by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative intérest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where’ there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration. But this is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time, But we have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the courts have said that the FBI has ‘a right, and indeed a duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut 132999494 Page 110
n 3 = NS © end J 3 < a % i] . & < = O 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 UT Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 - 4 - ® _ 1913 case, Our problem is where we have a demonstration and wé have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to-moniter the activities, and that's.where’ I think itidst. Of ‘our disagreements ~falle 0 Ut Docld: 32989494 Page 111
’ e* . ae , & , . NARRIS : GSI Sen. Sel. CIA Pnone (Area 202) 5 ioe) LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 25 qn 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 e a ® /1914 Senator Hart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The Bureau manual states that ‘informants investigating a subversive organization should not only réport on what that group is doing but should look at and report on activities in which © the group is participating. There is: a Section 87B3 dealing with reporting. on connections with other groups. That section says that the field office shali "determine and report on any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." Any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups. | Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of 1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential sources reported on the plan's participants and activities of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM, particularly in open public debate in’a high school auditoriun, | which included speakers from the Defense Department for the ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM. The informants reported on the planning for the meeting, the distribution of materials to churches and schools ee Ne te ’ participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on i: ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat’:. un | HW 34955 Docld: 32989494 .Page 112
(~2 1 c4 E 3 4 5 6 "7 8 9 10 . 11 a 2 rN 12 ra t 13 3 14 15 16 1? 18 8 19 G a) g 20 F 21 = ui 22 i 23 aan) 24 t 25 HW 54955 Bocld:32969494 Page 113 White House. ‘would you do it again? @ . ry Oo 1915 plans for a subsequent town meeting in Washington with the names of local political leaders who would attend. Now the information, the informant information came as part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive. group - participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt with all aspects and all participants, The reports on the plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminatdd to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to- the How da we get into all of that? Mr. Adams. Well -~ Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it, Mr. Adams. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969 was. The problem we had at the time was where we had an informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was goirig to take place and it was going to bethe Daily World, which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments | about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May .28, 1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this organization, | Now the problem we get into is if we take’a quick leck and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security 75 a8 Jikp
>] Lo] 2 © oa z : ¢ - wu . qQ ° . a Q "@ 5 KS = Qo . iad é * WARD & PAUL ‘a 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al ras) Doct 132969494 Page 114 . . - . "1936 ae Soviet espionage where they: can put one’ person in this country and they supported him with total resources. of the Soviet Union, false identification, all the money he needs, communi- cations networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and you're working with a paucity of information. The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations. So someone reports something to you which you feel, you take a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's what they did. Senator Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let me bring you up to date, closer.to current, a current place on the calendar. This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there . were several national conferences involving all the groups and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty. “Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is not against -~ while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law, we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either. Mr. Adams, That's right. Senator Hart of Michigan. Some of the sponsors wore umbrella organizations involving about 50° diverse ereanps -° vund the country. FBI informants provided advance dsecetio ca . ET rae gm Y 2!
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL ‘a 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 LO Li de 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20. el 22 23 24 25 1917 plans for the meeting and apparently atténded and reported on the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the participants as having. represented diverse’ perspectives -on the issue of amnesty, including civil Liberties and human rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of-men killed in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues, delegates from student organizations, and aides of House and _Senate iaembers, drafting legislation on amnesty. The informant apparently was attending in his role as a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive and it described the topics of the workshop. Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted that in view of the location of the conference at a theological seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage | to informant reports. Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last fall.- And this is‘’a conference of people who have the point of view that I share, that the soaner we have unconditional amnesty, the better for the soul of the country. Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on ‘a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups in that setting having contact with other groups, all and everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the DocId {32969494 Page 115
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL » 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.c. 20003 HW 54955 fan) ray GI > cn fe3) LO 11 Le 14 15 16 1? 18 19 . BO al a2 24° 25 Bureau files. Is this what we want? - Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this. “Ne is particular knowledgeable as to this operation. Mr. Wannall. Senator Hart, that was a case that was opened on November 14 and closed November 20, and the informatign which caused us to be interested in it were really.two particular items. One was that a member of the steering committee therel was a three man steering committee, and oné of those members of the national conference was in fact a national officer of the VVAW in whom we had suggested before we did have a legitimate investigative interest.° Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I would almost say so What at that point. Mr. Wannall. The second report we had was that the \ VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the conference to take it over. And the third report we had -- Senator Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the information that your Buffalo informant had given you with ; respect to the goals and aims of the VVAW gave you a list of goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected ohjectives. There wasn't a single item out of that VVAW that jeopardizes the .security of this country at all. Mr. Wannall. Well, of-course, we did not rély entirely on the Buffalo informant, but even ‘there we did. rece)": Docld: 32989494 Page 116
Q n a7 a Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 io 10 Ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 a 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 ©  ) 1919 from that informant information which I considered to be significant. The Buffalo chapter: of the VVAW was the regional office . covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the five most active VVAW chapters in the country and ata national conference, or at the regional conference, this informant reported information back to us that an attendee at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the VVAW to the revolutionary union, There were some individuals in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in agreement with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the . interest of the revolutionary union. So all of the information that we had on the VVAW did not come from that source but even that particular source did givé us information which we considered to be of some significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the investigation of that particular chapter of the VVAW. Senator Hart of Michigan. But does it give you the right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VVAW when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we seek to achieve unconditional’ amnesty? What threat? HW 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 117
gsh 7 {~: 1 .§ _ § . B 3 Lo ; 5 6 " 8 “9 -10 11 , ; 5 a L2- | a | | < 13: 15 16 17 18 8 19 g 2 20. = a "22 ay ‘ 2 24 t - 25 Mr. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VVAW influence on a particular meéting, if you ever happened to be holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was. Senator Hart of Michigan, What if it was a meeting to Seek #0 mnaké: more @f fective the food stamp system in this country? mot - 7 an 7, - Mr.) Wannall.- Well, -of course ‘there had been some organizations. Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the same logic follow? Mr. Wannail. I think that if we found that if the Communist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic . in doing that. You have a whole’ scope here and it's a matter. of where you.do afd where you don't, an@,hopefully, as we've said before, we Will have some guidance, not only from this committee but from the guidelines that are being developed. But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and not gathering everything there was about it. In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us, and that was .the person who had, who was not developed for this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other matters for some period of time, And as soon as we got the report of the outerse qi thie meeting and the fact that in the period of some <i: Cyn Ie HW 54955 Docld 32999494 Page 116 eee wate cers neneen eee memes
discontinued any further interest. Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, my time has expired but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 f k ‘ really want to control the dangers to our society of using informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And that gets us into what I would like to raise'‘with you when my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants, obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before’a full-fledged informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or individuals. I know you have objections to that and I would like to review that: with you. WARD & PAUL Sénator Mondale, pursue that question. Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn loose a full- fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run into you Or you run into, or who walk in as information sources the Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the Committee. The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement | might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their ' government. Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ought to - hearten all the civil libertarians, HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 119
° ° o 4 ¢ t o a & \ g ° 2 < = o Cc é WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 10 li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21° 22 23 24 25 DoclId: eo . . ©@ en But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement raise a serious constitutional question? Mr. Adams. Well, for one thing it's the practicability of it or the impacticability of ‘getting a warrant .which: ordinarily involves probable cause to" show that a crime has been or is about to be committed. In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activitie such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have discussed before, where they say publicly we're not. to engage ‘iin any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United States, Well, now, you can't show probable cause if: they're about to do it because they're telling you they're nok going to do it and you know they're not going to do it at this particular moment. It's just: the mixture somewhat of trying to mix ina criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particulak Organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization: and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations. 29899494 Page 1270
| ~ 'Q oF oy re Fy We don't: have probable cause for him’ to target against that organization, ‘but yet we should be able to receive informa Phone (Area 202) §44-6000 tion’ £roin him that he as a Communist Party member, even though in an informant status, is going to that organization’ and don't worry about it. We're making no, headway on it, It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants, the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have recognized the necessity that the government has to have individuals who will assist them in carrying out their | governmental duties. Senator Hart of ‘Michigan. ‘I'm not sure I've heard anythi g yet in response to the constitutional question, the very WARD & PAUL practical question that you addressed. Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutiona rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress can prescribe some safeguards, some rules and some standards, just as we have with respect to your use of electronic ‘surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants. That's quite different from saying that the warrant procedure itself would be unconstitutional . But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show x 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003 probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a“warrant, therefore you oppose the proposal to require you. to get a e 12
e Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ~~ ° p.* be WARD & PAUL End Tape 6 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.Cc. 20003 Pe oO MD BH aon LO 11 12 “13 14 Begin Tape /P 16 1? 18 - 19 20 al 22 23 24 25 Docld: 32989494 Page 1272 an informant, warrant. It seems to beg the question. Assuming that you say that since we use informants and investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities but which might engage in activities that can result in violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity, including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss the anti-ballistic missilé system, and we don't want you to use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or unless you present your request to a magistrate, in the same. fashion aS you are required to do with respect to, in most cases, to wiretap. oe This is an option available to congress. Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker. Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much. Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential security informant and a security informant? Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator’ Schweiker, that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth background check. A potential security informant is someone who is under consideration before he is approved by headquarters for use as’ He is someone who is under current consideration.
gsh 12 @ OS @ 7 1925 1 {on some occasions that person will have been developed to a 2 point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are o engaged win checking upon } his Yeliability. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 In some instances he may be paid for information furnishe 1 5 but it has not gotten tothe point yet where we have satisfied 6 ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does, ? the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and 8 headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an 9 || approved FBI informant. LO Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of. 11 || being an informant, I guess. 12 Mr. Wannall. It is a preliminary step, one of the 13 || preliminary steps. WARO & PAUL 14 Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in:the Rowe 15 |} testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again 16 || for not intervening when violence was known? 17 I know we asked you several times but I'm still having 18 |} trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was 19 in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was 20 || known. | 21 Mr, Wannall. Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address 221) himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to 23 || answer that, 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 24 Senator Schweiker. All. right. 25 Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the HW 54955 DoclId 382989494 Page 123
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 LO 11 L2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 al ‘22 25 24 25 e a @ 1926 problem today ,. we are an investigative agency. We do not have police powers like the United States marshalls do, About 1735, I guess, or some period like that, marshalls have had.the authority. that almost, borders on-what a sheriff,has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintai the role of an investigative agency. We were to report: on ‘ activities to furnish the information to the ‘local police, — who had an obligation to, act. We furnished it to the Departmen of Justice. | In those areas where the local police did not act, it resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights. This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.| This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies _in itself at the time either because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that there was a-conspiracy available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and Page 1274
gsh 14 3. (\ 5 1 é , 2 4 a : 9 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 . Fe) a é 12 om: a t 13 E4 14 15 y 16 “Ly 18 8 19 798 [aj g 20 5 21 = é 22 E las a 23 é 2 24 ¢ 25 _— HW 54955 Docld: 32969494 Page 125 next -to- the Army, the United States marshalls should make them, not the FBI, even though we developed the violations, And over the years, as‘ you kriow,..at the time there were many questions raiséd. Why doesn't thé FBI-stop this? Why don't - | you do something about it? - Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area. Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following up your point there, Mr’..Adams, with setting up a program , sincé it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to have pre-knowledge of .violence of using U.S. marshalls on some kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence? | Mr. Adams. We do, We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the ‘Civil: Rights Act. But the narshalls are in Boston, they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this is the approach, that the rederal government finally recognized was the solution to the problem where you had to have added Federal import. Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced confrontation, shouldn't we have some , ere a coordinated prograr that when you go up the ladder of com'and in the PBI, that on an immediate'and fairly contempor:ry basis, that kind of
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL x ‘gish ‘15 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 PO Mw FF ao 10 ul 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 327989494 Page 176 ) , @ 1928 help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it gets toa Boston state? I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not . saying it isn'¢.. But. it seems. to me. we needa better remedy _ than we have. . Mr. Adams. Well. fortunately, we're at-a time where conditions have subsidéd in the country, even from the '60s and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and 1608. We .report to the |. Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the: country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them, whe planning for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance with State officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston? I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protecte people at that time. Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he was a witness before the House. But since this affects my state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized a raid on the Camden draft board. An:! according to Mr. Hardy's . gis ; testimony before our Committee, he snii that in advance of the raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000. WARD & PAUL. 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 549455 ‘lo li 12 13 14 15 16 “1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctId: that they had all the information they needed to clamp down on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time, and yet no arrests were made. | Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true? Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based oniy on the material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your, question. There was, in fact, a representative of the Department of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously as that case progressed as to what sypoint the. arrest should be made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort.. So I. think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the: effect that there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true. Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with who under your procedures? Mr. Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests, when they should be made, and decisions with regard to prosecutions are made either.by the United States attorneys or by Federals in the Department. | Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have a departmental attorney on the scene '# :ause there are questions: £ conspiracy. Conspiracy is a tough violation to prove and sometimes a question of do you-have the added value of catching 2969494 Page 127
Q n a. tw ~ Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 © “I (on) on P el Pav] ad ie) 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 r | @ 1930 someone in the commission of the crime as further proof, rather than relying on. one informant and some circumstantial evidence to prove the violation. Senator Schweiker. Well,.in this case, though, they even had a dry run. - They could have arrested them on the dry run. That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to me. “They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on the dry run. I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry run. Who was this Departinent of Justice official who made that decision? Mr. Adams, Guy Goodwin was the Department official. Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965, during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership. I believe these are either FBI figures or eStimates. That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the government. And I believe the figure goes on 20 indicate that 70 (35 percent of the new members of the Kla:. that year were FBI informants. \ HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 126 ‘
08 ena, TT ). TT erate am enter ete mri emeatintt eae rer Ruan Are peinete tins Whe ite tie wnt mada son, ~  gsh'as rH ray) . a Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 (on) an e, Gl ~~ LO - di 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 ‘to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that ‘ you shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what's racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I 12 -mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress an em Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the tail wagging the dog. For example, today we suppoSedly have only 1594 total informants for both domestic informants and potential informant and that here we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone. Mr. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was aroun 6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the: testimony. Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group that you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left af- ter the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information, but he never knew what was going on because each one had an action group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it, Bear in HW 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 129
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.Cc. 20003 WARD & PAUL everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights ® workers, the Linio Kent case, the Viola Liuzzo case, the | ° bombings of the church in Birmingham, We were faced with one. i _tremendous problem at that time. ° Senator Schweiker. i acknowledge that. 6 Mr. Adams. Our only approach was through informants ? and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the 8 ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have & never solved. They are extremely difficult. ° 10 These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and it as we told the President, that we had moved informants like 12 Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the 1s head man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us 14 | of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and 15 yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever 16 unless we can create enough disruption that these members will 1? realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers, 18 | even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are 19 | in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was 20° the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and 41 i that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure "22 I and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of 23 | their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't £4 Il dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they 25 ‘ couldn't control the conspiracy any longer. _ Page 130 989494
Ne + gsh 20 . . 1933 & 3 1 Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have 8 3 2 one quick question. 5 3 Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500 4 informers for black ghetto situations? 5 Mr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year. We did 6 || ‘have one year where we had a number like that which probably v4 had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities 8 were being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this.: We. 9 were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is 10 || violence going to break out, what next? 11 They weren't informants like an individual penetrating 12 || an organization. They were listening posts in the community 13 || that would help tell us that we have a group here that's gettin a WARD & PAUL " 14 ready to start another fire-fight or something. 15 Senator Tower, At this point, there are three more 16 || Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get 17 || everything in in the first round, we will not have a second 18 || round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can. go 19 | on and terminate the proceedings. 20 Ir However, If anyone feels that they have another question 21 | that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00. 22 Senator Mondale? > 23 Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the 416 First Street, S.., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 || record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the field.of crime investigating, it may be the best professional HW 54955" > eld: 32989494 "Page 131 g Se Y St prot ip
e ® | 1934 . }- organization of its kind-in the world. And when the PBI acts 2 in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 3. has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the 4 last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped 5 shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of 6 the crucial public confidence in an essential: law enforcement | v7 agency of this country. 8 In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it 9 was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI 10 in 1924, LL In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from 12 its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and 13 || protector of political ideas. “Ana through the interference WARD & PAUL of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public [ | if | | 14 : 15 became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and- 16 Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement I . . . : . | 7 by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department ig || get involved in political ideas. ; . 19 And yet here we are again looking at a record where with 20 Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with ~- we even 21 had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of 22 Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined, z impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 lan 235 24 It seems to be the basis of the-strategy that people 25 can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the _ AW 54955) Docld: 329899494 Page 132
" “s gsi ‘22 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 Ot Pp Nn LO il 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.c. 20003 24 25 12 @ . © 1935 tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive or dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly at odds with the philosophy of American government. I started in politics years ago and the first thing we had to do waS to get the communists out of our parts and out. of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help from the FBI or the CIA. We just rammed them out of the meetings on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't good union leaders when .we didn't want anything to do with them And yet, we see time and time again that we're going .to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous, that we've going to protect véterans from whatever it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy ‘and confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that precisely what is expected of the PBI is known by you, by the public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask you? | Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we foll+ed that policy for abou ten years until the President of the " ted States said that | we should investigate the Nazi Party. HW 54955 DBocld:329899494 Page 133 a
: sh 23 ® ® 1936 1 I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party. 2 I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in ol L Phone.(Area 202) 544-6000 the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I, _4 there wasn't ‘one single ineident of foreign directed sabotage 5 which took place in -the United States. — 6 Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could 7 ll have investigated these issues of sabotage. | 8 Isn't sabotage a crime? - | 9 Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime. ‘10 _ Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that? 11 Mr. Adams. After it happened. eo 12: Senator Mondale. You see, every time we yet’ involved 13 || in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of’ WARD & PAUL 14 || crimes that could have been committed, It's very interesting. wv 15 In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to 16 continue what you're now doing and as. I understand it, you 17 || stall insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam ig || Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of Le ee RRNA em ae mg re y9 || Churches, and this can still go on, This can still-go on under 20 || your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to 21 justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics ‘99° in terms of criminal matters. 23 Mr, Adams. The law does :not say we have to wait. until 24 || we have been murdcred before we can -- 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of HW 54955 DoclId:}2989494 Page 134
2) WARD & PAUL ae gsh 24 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 «>. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 9.c. 20003 WW 54955 Docld: wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority 25 ® ; . ® 1937 law again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges. That.'s the law. You can do that. | Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can direct an intelligence operation against the German-American Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said -- Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that? Why did you object to going to court for authority for that? Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for probable cause to investigate an organization. There were activities which did take place, like one time they outlined the Communist Party -- | Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under court authority you can investigate where there is probable cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest. Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these decisions on your own? Mr. Adams. We have expressed ccmplete concurrence in that. We feel that we're going to gics¥ieat to death in the next 100 years, you're damned if you ‘s, and damned if you don't LE wa don't have a delineation of our responsibility 2989494 Page 135
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 AW 54955 [. 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: ) . . ) 1938 in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States. I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley. has set a pattern of being as forthright as any LGirector of the FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because of the necessity that we must concentrate on these areas of abuse. We must not lose sight of the overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I still feel that this is the freest country in the world. I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night and feel safe. a ; ‘ ‘Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an argument then, Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or continuing a policy which we now see undermines ‘the public confidence you need to do your -job. Mr. Adams. Absolutely. The mistakes we have made are what have brought on this embarrassment to us. I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some 29899494 Page 136
I .*~« gsh"26 / - - Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 6 7 9 10 11 12 | r | End Tape 7 8 | ! | 13 WARD & PAUL 15 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 some mistakes. But I just don't agree with bungling. 14, 16 HW 54955 DBocld: 32999494 mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity of zercing in on abuses. I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think the accomplishments “in the Klan was the finest hour of the FBI and yet, I'm.sure in dealing with the Klan that we made Page 137
os 4 ‘ - 1g: . . SHARRIS/smnl1. @ @ 1940 t. 8 Co 3 1 Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but , 8 . : 2 I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble i 3 || over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we 4 need to have new legal standards. 5 Mr. Adams. yes, t agree with that. 6 Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston. 7 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 8 Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at: some 9 length seems to have been an inclination on the part of 190 || the, Bureau to establish,a notion about an individual or a group 11 || which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In 2 12 the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was oO 8 E 13 being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi- ; 14 gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating tha 15 this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out 16 to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a 17 willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts. 18 Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar : 19 to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, tha 8 20 every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau 6 : 21 seemed to indicate that the Bureau was, not correct in its ; 22 assumption that this organization planned to commit violence, g 23 or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist | oO ; 24 that this investigation go on, and thes information was used . 95 || against the individuals. | \ he. 94955 Docli:32999494 Page 133
“ fy 1 Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted tha é its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ° || course? 4 Mr. Adams. We have admitted that. We have also shown 5 from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after 6 five days we closed the case. We were told something by-an 7 individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence 8 in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King 9 |} situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just 10 dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and 11 on, ad infinitum. The wiretaps on Mdrtin Luther King were Le all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin 13 Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This WARD & PAUL L4 wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that 15 there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point. 16 What I testified to was that we were improper in discredittir 17 Dr. King, but it's just like -- 18 Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memorand g 19 written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the e) . . : 20 information they were receiving from the field, from these z ‘21 surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition = 4 82 was. : 23 Mr. Adams. That_memorandum was rot on Dr. King. That O : 24 was on another individual that I thi-.. somehow got mixed up: ‘25 {| in the discussion, one where the issue was can we make people (HW 54955  DooTd:39989494 Page 139
‘ aan fy j @ @ bere 1 || prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to 2 investigate them. 3 But the young lady. appearing this morning making the Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 comment that she never knew of anything she told us that 5 she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch 6 as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and 7] agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard- 8 ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals 9 from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most 10 concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary Union to take over 11 || the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this.. 12 I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW- 13 WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped WARD & PAUL 14 || the investigation. They don't agree with these principles 15 laia down by the -- 16 Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your 17 || continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that 1g || information against members who certainly had not been involved 19‘) in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job 20 | or whatever? Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the 21 22 || criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to 9% || prevent crime, and you can't wait unt:l something happens. . The a - od. 24 || Attorney General has clearly spoken 2+ that area, and even our 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 || statutory jurisdiction. provides thet we don't -- 1 _ AW 34955) Docld:32969494 Page 140
smn 4 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 LO il Le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 295 @  @ 1943 Senator Huddleston. Well, of course we've had considerabl evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime, when you had information that it was going to occur. But I'm sure there are instances where you have. Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he reported to us. Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime. | Mr. Adams. Not necessarily. Senator Huddleston, Your informant had told you that, hadn't he? Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have other informants, and we have other information. Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in order to --~ Mr. Adams. ves. He furnished many other instances also. Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already part of it. Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so tha when the Department, agreeing that we had no further. juris- diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform: certain law enforcement functions. ' DoclIdg32969494 Page 141
. iS) 3. el + 54) ) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO ll la 13 WARD & PAUL 15 16 L?7 18 19 20 21 22 23 p, 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 25 HW 54955 DBocld: 32999494 14 @ @ 1944 Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee has received documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assiste an informant who had been established in a white hate group to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid his expenses in setting up this rival organization. Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might have undertaken? o Mr. Adams. I'd iike to see if one of the other gentlemen knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a specific group. This is Joe Deegan. Mr. Deegan. Senator, it's my understanding that the informant we're talking about decided to break off from the group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of the United Klans of America, and he decided.to break off. This was in compliance with our regulations. His breaking off, we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it on his own. .We paid him for the information he furnished us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organiza-~ tion. Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that organization? - Mr. Deegan... He continued to advi:: us of that organizatio Page 142 ‘e
Py oa se ; . | @ e aves ; , and other organizations. He would advise us of planned activities. 2 Senator Huddleston. The new organization that he formed, did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one? Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, ‘and it did not last that long.. Senator Huddleston. ‘There's also evidence of an FBI informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of responsibility within the Party with the knowledge of his ‘FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing them in how to use those weapons. presumably this was in the knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became -- came in contact with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici- WARD & PAUL pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably-all in the knowledge of the FBI. How does this square with your enforcement and crime prevention responsibilities. Mr. Deegan. . Senator, I'm not familiar with that particula case. - It: does not square with our policy in all respects, and I would have to look at that particular case you're talking about to give you an answer. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Senator Huddleston. I don't have the documentation on tha d particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of i aE 54955 Docld 32989494 Page 143 —
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO Ll 12 13 * é 14 WARD & PAUL 15 16 717 “18 19 20 al 22 235 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 295 NW 54955 Docl 1946 control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind of an organization and to, what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you are supposedly trying to prevent. Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became active in an action group, and we told him to get-out or ‘we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have had cases, Senator, where we have had -- Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participate in violent activities. Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent activities. Senator Huddleston. That's what he said. Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But.that's what lawsuits are.all about, is that there. are. two sides to the issue, and our agents. handling. this have. advised. us, and I believe have advised. your. staff, that at no time did they advise him to engage.in violence. Senator. Huddleston. Just to do what was. necessary to get the information, I believe maybe might have been his instructions. Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement to him along that line, and we -have informants ,- we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law £ 132999494 Page 144
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARO & PAUL 5 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.c. 20003 HW 54955 Doclad:32999494 Page 145 information to the police department. No violence.occurred,, | . he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,. @ | @ . 1947 and we have immediately converted their status from an informan to the subject, and have prosecuted I would: say, offhand, 7 ‘can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for- violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence inthis case, during the review of the matter, the agents told me that they found one case where their agent had been working 24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for his delay in properly. notifying local authorities. So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards.in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant. files. Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you happen to be with someone and they decide to.do something, that and be a good informant. .He wouldn't take the lead, but the implication is that he would have to go along and would have to be involved if he was going. to maintain his credibility. Mr. Adams.. There's no question but that an informant at. times. will have to be: present. during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was
ive) » Phone (Area 202) saeco | el 10 Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 “19 20 al ' 23 24 410 D} Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 | _25 HW 54955 Doctl @ . @ 1948 to the effect that -~- and i was sitting in the back of the room and I don"t recall it exactly, but some of them were beat with chains, and I-didn't hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing taking an active part in criminal actions. Senator Huddleston. He was close enough to get his throat cut.. How does the gathering of information -- | Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that we probably should recess a few minutes. Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should we convene this afternoon? Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more question. Senator Tower. Go ahead. Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of information about an individual's personal life,.social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention. Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge ‘concerning it, and I can's see where it would be.of any value whatsoever. * Senator Huddleston. You aren't aware of any case where 232989494 Page 146 en et
“smn 10 @ @ 1949 rn: 1 these instructions. were given to an agent or an informant? by 2 Mr. Adams. To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir. < ; 3 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 4 Senator Tower. Senator Mathias. . 5 ‘Senator Mathias. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 6 I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth ” Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants 8 and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one 9 time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have 10 a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you 11 || may see him. I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which 12 there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying 13 || degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual WARD & PAUL 14 will’ have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first , 15 16 test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like to explore “49 with you is the difference between a one time search which 18 requires a warrant, and which you get when you make that 19 search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or 20 the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover 21 agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is ina 20. slightly different category than an informant. 23 Mr. Adams. Well, we get there into the fact that the 7. Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does 410 » Street, S.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 24 25 not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, ,and AW 549550 DoclA: 32969494 Page 147
a Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 LO il 12 13 14 15 16 1? ‘18° 19 20 21 22 25 24 25. Doc - instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the 132999494 Page 146 @ @ 1950 if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't protected by the Supreme Court. An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected item, but information and the use of informants have been conSistently held as not posing any constitutional problems. Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier, but is it true that under existing procedures informants are given background checks? Mr, Adams, Yes, sir. Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they are providing to us reliable information. Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation- ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the handling agents. ‘Mr. Adams. That's true. Senator Mathias. So in effect they can come in a very practical way agents themselves to the FBI.:- Mr. Adams.. They can do nothing -- Senator Mathias. Certainly agents in the common law use of the word. Mr. Adams. That's right, they can do nothing, and we agent himself cannot do, and if the agent can work himself into
Phone (Area 202) §44-6000 WARD & PAUL @ jo} Q », 410 First Street, S.E., WaSRington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 10 11 12 13 14 15: 16 1? .18 19 -20 al 22. "23 24 25 @  @ 1951 an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem. Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a member | of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require a warrant? Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular -- it depends on the purpose for which he is entering. If a regular agent by concealing his identity, by -- was admitted as.a member of the Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he ‘can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's no constitutionally invaded area there. Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has a less formal relationship with the Bureau than.a.regular agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation as an undercover .agent.or as an informant. -~ : Mr, Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts. Senator Mathias. Let me ask you.why you feel that it is impractical to.require.a warrant since,.as I understand it, headquarters must approve the use of an informant. Is that degree of formal action required? Dockd: 32989494 Page 149
’ 3 ry t ~ s# %& Df | waaRts : GSU Sen. Sel. CIA @ @ 1952 12/2/75 i pap@Q 1 Mr, Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity AVS: . " 1 3. which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant. You $ 2 < have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify 8 5 || & what you're going after, and an informant operates in an area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's - going. to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the State Department building, . . Senator Mathias. If it were a criminal investigation, you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't . 10 you? 11 Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to 12 use someone as.an informant in that area because the same WARD & PAUL 13 ; ; difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify. 14 ; . Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's 15 very Similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection + Say wiretaps on a national security problem, a Mr. Adams. That's it, and there we face the problem of we where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy +8 in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy 20 there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't al : show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that 22 he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States, 23 we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements 410 doen S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 , . which have been discussed, If the good fairy didn't drop the 25 HW 54955 Doctd: 329899494. Page 150
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL, 14 15 16 1? “18 19 20 21 22 23 24 + 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 © 25° | HW 54955- Do @ . @ 1953 evidence in our hands that this individual is here conducting ‘espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's why we're still groping with it. Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really, you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Adams. That's right, except for the fact that the ‘President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all national survival, and these are the areas that not only the President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle ground in here. Senator Mathias, Which we discussed in the other nationa security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular need. Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some ‘mathod of sealing indefinitely your interest, say, in an ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties, we may get their yet. Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that middle ground? © Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch d:32999494 Page 151 I _ ~
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO “11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a1 23 » 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 HW 54955 Doc§d:329899494 Page 152 a2 @ , @ 1954 and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these areas resalved. Senator Mathias. And you believe that the Department, if we could come togethex, would support, would agree to that kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language? Mr. Adams. If we can work out problems and the Attorney General is personally interested in that also. *” Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement might extend to some of those other areas, that we talked about? Mr. Adams. I think that that would be a much greater difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who reports on many different operations and different types of activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet “espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a littl more degree of specificity to deal with. ‘Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that ‘would be -the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, ‘and the same general process could be used for informants, since you come to headquarters any way. Mr. Adams, That could be an alte @uitive. I think it would be a very burdensome alternative -:d I think at some -point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered 2
” © wa Q n a °F > ~ i Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 , : 10 11 12 13 WARO & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 23 > 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 24 25 HW 54955 Do 22. €:32999494 Page 153 @ | -@ 1955 major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think od . we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the’day. Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests - itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally > with one level of information in one sense of gathering information, You hear what you hear from the tap. Mr. Adams. But you're dealing ina much smaller number also. Senator Mathias. Smaller number, but that's all .the more reason, When an informant goes in, he has all of his senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being can acquire from a situation and has access to more information than the average wiretap. | | And it would seem to me that for that reason a parallel process might he useful and in order. Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main distinction. to me which I had overlooked from our prior discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is more in .the position of being a concentral monitor in that one of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual
gsh 5 ») Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ) WARD & PAUL 410 cnn Dea S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 10 11 12 3 ‘14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | 25° 24 25 whose telephone is being tapped is not aware and there is, and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their conversation could be monitored. . Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept. If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is takin place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't consented to my overhearing my conversation. Then they consent if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan of theirs, | But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for someone else, they wouldn't be consenting. Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator Hart raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that _there may not be some legislative compromise which might be addressed. Senator Mathias. Well, I particularly appreciate your attitude in being willing to work on these problems because I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from these hearings, so that we can actually look at the Fourth Amendment as the standard that we-have ts achieve. But the way we get there is obviously going to i‘ “a lot easier if we can work toward them together. I’just have one final question, ‘ic. Chairman, and that . Dobld: 32969494 Page 154 . 4
Phona (Araa 202) 544-6000 vis LO 11 2 WARD & PAUL 13 14 15 16 “17 18 19 20 al «. Washington, 0.C. 20003 23 410 First’Strect, S.E 24 "25 12 22. "1957 deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling _the use of informants and the kind of information that they collect. Do you feel that'this would be too restrictive? Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do. When I look at informants and I see that each year informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective of what we give the local law enforcement and other Federal agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost reached a point in the criminal law where we’ don't have much left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure that we have the means to gather information which will permit us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations that are acting to overthrow the government of the United States. And I think we still‘ have some areas to look hard at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to. stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement. Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress has informants, you have individuals in your community that you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly, HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 155
WARD & PAUL 10 il le 13 14 15 16 “19 » 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 ” WW 54955 18 19 20 21 22 23 R4 25 Do @ @ 1958 am I carrying out this? It's here to say. It's been here throughout history "" and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to avoid is abuses. like provocateurs, criminal activities, and to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that. But we do need informants. Senator Tower. Senator Hart, do you have any further questions? Senator Hart of Michigan. Yes. I ask unanimous request perhaps with a view to giving halance to the record, the groups that we have discussed this morning into which the Bureau has put informants, in vopular language, our liberal groups -~ I would ask unanimous consent that .be printed in the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups," is not a left only pre-occupation. Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered. ‘(The material referred to follows:) a:32999494 Page 156 . foie we mene
| J 3 f vole Y. fo} dD Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 20 el nS 25 +) 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 25 ny , WW 54955 19° Re Docld:32969494 Page 157 é 6 Senator Tower. Any more questions? Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this . afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00, and I hope everyone will be in attendance. ) Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans, Cartha DeLoach, ‘Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach. The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 1:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.) Be
Vol. 20 Che United States Senate Report of Proceedings Hearing held before Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION Wednesday, December 10, 1975 Washington, D. C. 2 -AgbS J 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 ; | (202) 544-6000 ; _ ee ft 1 | 34955 Doctld: 32999494 Page 153 : es see ee = SO = | __ a e
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.c. 20003 25 C 54955 Docld:32999494 Page 159 ® - ® CONTENT STATEMENT OF: PAGE The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve- stigation 2451
| AHW/smhl Phone (Area 202). 544-600 LO 11 12 WARD & PAUL 13 14 15 16 1? 18 20 al 22 ae) 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 Nia 54955 Docld: 32969494 Page 160 19° INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION Wednesday, December 10, 1975 United States Senate, Select Committee to study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D. C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and Mathias. Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minorit Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob Kelley, John E1L1iff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea, Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff. Members. The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is
N - ) ‘ e 2448 1 the Honorable Clarence M..Kelley, the Director of the Federal Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 8 2 Bureau of Investigation. re) Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 ina 4, troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative 5 law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City 6 Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as 7 a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified 8 to lead the Bureau. 9 _ The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation 10 extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over il the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the 2 < 12 openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and F : 13 their willingness to consider the need for legislation to 14 clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility. 15 It is important to remember from the outset that this 16 Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's 17 activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic 18 intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our : 19 admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative ; 20 and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importanc : 21 of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic = ul 22 intelligence has raised many difficult questions. : 23 The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather ; 24 than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light : 25 in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Directo N HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 161
. ‘ were + Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 ” 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 32989494 Page 162 Kelley took charge. The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance. The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in developing policies and standards for intelligence. These are welcome developments. Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved. Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress should take into account in thinking about the future of FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-| lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certai types of investigations or uses certain surveillance technique whether foreign related intelligence activities should be strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement functions, and what should be done to the information already in’ the FBI files and that which may go into those files in the future. The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? | 1e 19 20 21 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 aida 54955 DoclId: 34969494 e . ® 2450. | General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice Department in the next months as the Committee considers recommendations that will strengthen the American people's confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal law and for the security of the nation against foreign espionage. Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off with, please proceed. me, Page 163
* smn’ 5 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 mH 54955 Docld: 32969494 Page 164 @ . | @ 2451 ~~ STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and gentlemen. I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli gence and internal security fields. I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my 35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with law. I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight. This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in responding to your questions and complying with your requests.
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 25 I believe we have lived up to those promises. The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece- dented access to FBI information. You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type investigations and who are personally involved in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations. . You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with all major areas of our activities and operations in the nationall security and intelligence fields. In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the Congress. } As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's ee rm record of performance. It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the organization. The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our overall work. A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, ©.C. 20003 10 1l 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 @ . @ 2453 to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it- found 3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370, less than three fourths, were approved. I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative matters per year. ; Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate and understandable. The question might well be asked what I had in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it did under the circumstances then existing would have been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people.. What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what the felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of the United States. Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to California.
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 AW 54955 6 rights. 2454 fo] = . ae . pa 1 The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women, a g 2 and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or 2 3 perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and 4 appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement 5 agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their 7 There were many calls for action from Members of Congress 8 and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other 9 law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient 10 demands, for immediate action. 11 FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a 12 responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions 13 designed to countér conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed 14 revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities. 15 In the development and execution of these programs, 16 mistakes of judgment admittedly were made. 17 Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter- 18 intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones, 19 should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs. 20 We must recognize that situations have occurred in the 21 past and will arise in the future where the Government may well 22 be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's 23 case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering 24 agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet 25 an imminent threat-to human life .or property. Docld: 32969494 Page 167
; ‘ _ smn 9 @ @ 2455 3 1 In short, if we learn a murder or bombing’ is to be carried : 2 out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigatin ; 3 only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the 4 ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is 5 a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to 6 human life. ” Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt, | 8 the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such | 9 preventive action should be available to the FBI. | 10 These matters are currently being addressed by a task 11 force in the Justice Department, including the FBI, 12 || and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls ca 13 be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress WARD & PAUL 14 to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsibl 15 manner. 16 Probably the moSt important: question here today is what » 17 assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose 18 under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again? 19 First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub- 20 stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's : 21 methods of operations Since I took the oath of office as | 22 Director on July 3, 1973. | 23 Today we place a high premium on openness, openness 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 both within and without the service. 25 I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 166
, smn 10 @ @ 2456 8 8 vt % 1 in the decision-making process which insures that no future N . oS . N § 2 program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a 4 3 3 full and critical review of its propriéty. 4 Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI. 5 I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and 6 Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of 7 position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts 8 and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or 9 reservations they may have concerning any area of our. operations. 10 The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take ll full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum 12 critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner 13 weakening or undermining our basic command structure. WARD & PAUL 14 The results of this program have been most beneficial, to 15 me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to 16 the morale of our employees. 1? In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past 18 were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outsid 19 the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's 20 guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his 21 own words, "as a ‘lightning rod' to deflect improper requests." 22 Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi 23 instructed that I immediately report to him any requests 4106 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, 25 considering the context of the request, I believed presented HW 54955 Docld: 999494 Page 169
smn1l e e 2457 ° me t iB 1 the appearances of impropriety. | s . $ 2 I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the | : | 5 3 Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years a ‘ i 4 Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no } 5 one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise, 6 to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper | 7 purposes. 8 I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider 9 honoring any such request. 10 I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI 11 I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and 12 the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including 13 those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and WARD & PAUL 14 practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order 15 that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities 16 over the FBI. 17 I am convinced that the basic structure of the. FBI today 18 is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity 19 can be assured only through institutional means. . 20 Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the 21 character of the person who occupies the office of the 202 Director and every member of the FBI under him. 23 I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is iv] ° i=] ° N g fa) ¢ ° o a £ <£ w 8 3 ul n < o o = Po] n ~ uw = wu °o et t 24 || my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalilsm, 25 their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 170
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 z re N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 2458 demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI. The Congress and the members of this Committee in particular have gained a great insight into the. problems confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields, problems which all too often we have left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress itself. As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even to the Executive Branch. The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised. An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum participation with the members of that Subcommittee. I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history. One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that 999494 Page 171
@ @ 2459 8 8 = - 2 1 || those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step, °o N 2 a step that I believe is absolutely essential , a legislative F 5 charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence 4 jurisdiction for the FBI. 5 Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the 6 security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it ? must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Cangres 8 nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to 9 the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in 10 | the past. il This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role 12 not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of WARD & PAUL 13 our performance. 14 I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the 15 courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that 16 have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role 17 of the courts into the early stages of the investigative 18 process and, thereby, would take over what historically have 19 been Executive Branch decisions. 20 I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would eal seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast 22 them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our 23 Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con- 24 gressional oversight or Executive decision. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 17?
Nn i io] wa re Phone (Area 202) 544-600 10 ‘Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 * 16 1? 18 19 20 Al Re 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 p4 25 HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 173 2460 of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the American people. Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a career police officer. In’my police experience, the must frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is When demands are made of them to perform their traditional role as protector of life and property without clear and understandable legal bases to do so. I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding task. It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence of crime and violence across the United States. That charter must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change -and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive challenges. The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced the formulation of operational guidelines governing our intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the nee for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris- diction resides with the Congress. In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which
/ smn 15 © t ) 2461 8 ® 3 1 question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that 3 . g 2 information needed for the prevention of violence can be 5 3 acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations. 4 As a practical matter, the line between intelligence 5 work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult 6 to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may 7 well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there 8 are some fundamental differences between these investigations 9 that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective 10 and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a 11 crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to 3 < 12 identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence 3 . c 13 for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows 3 | 14 the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is 15 limited and fairly well defined. 16 By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of 17 information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well b | 18 not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the 19 Government has enough information to meet any future crisis 20 or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it 21 must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether 22 the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the 23 means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability 24 of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation, WW 54955 Docld:82989494 Page 174
‘ smn 16 e @ 2462 8 5 1 in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli- i 2 gence. . _ 5 3 | Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues. 4 Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need 5 for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfactio | 6 of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not. ? the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every | 8 citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolutio | 9 of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful : 10 deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the il complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or : 12 its successors in this important task. 8 cE 13 In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as 3 14 Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit 15 of such legislation as the Congress may enact. 16 That is the substance of my prepared statement. 17 I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note ; 18 that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciar | : 19 Committee Which heard my testimony at the time I was presented | A 20 to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time g z 21 I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result ‘ 202 in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate. : 23 I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that : 24 time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of ¥ 25 the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take HW 54955 Docld: 32989494 Page 175
“ smn Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 if 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 295 24 25 DoclId: 32969494 r 2409 them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek Sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the period these things occurred I was with the local police - department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time, however, I was in the FBI. During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I was with the police department, I continued throughout that period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for the FBI. I only want to point out that based on those years, based on those observations, we have here a very fine and very sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there is much that can still be done. I know that we are not withou fault. I know that from those experiences I have had. .We will not be completely without fault in the future. But I assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at - this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a matchless organization, one which I continue to say was not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of th Page 176
© © 2464 8 3 wt 8 1 best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am g 2 only putting in your thinking my objective observations as 2 Fs) a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this 4 organization. It is too precious for us to have it in 5 a condition of jeopardy. 6 Thank you very much. 7 The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley. 8 I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able 9 to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one end t. 1 10 question he would like to ask. 11 re] 2 é 12 caf a & 13 = 14 15 16 17 18 . 8 19 d a ¢ 20 3 FA 21 = a 22 i 23 z ° 24 Tt 25 HW 54955 Docld: 82989494 Page.1?T?
s WARD: GSH ‘IA Op8n 2/10/95 ‘ap 28 1 Phone (Area 202 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of HW 54955 Docld:3p~989494 Page 178 Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30 ITahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the top of ll. There you are indicating that you caution us about extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplatef for the courts under the Constutution. Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions and concern has been on the possibility requiring court approval for the use of informants, informants directed to penetrate and report on some group. And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen, pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He can ask me questions to get information the government would like to have. Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters
1) osh Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 eal Re 295 24 25 2466 of the Constitution to have a‘ neutral third party magistrate screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval would violate the role envisaged for the courts. And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to my feelings. Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable. It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant, by numerous court decisions. Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use of the informant. | I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance. You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protectiaqn of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none- theless, you have the right. I think that were we to lose the right of the informant, we wauld lose to a great measure our capability of doing our job. Wow I'm not arguing with you, Senator, that it is not an Docld: R2989494 Page 179
¢ gsh 3 1 g 2 < 4 5 6 9 8 9. 10 11 J 2 £ 12 & a 13 3 14 15 16 1? 13° 8 19 ) : 20 3 5 21 = a 22 RS = ° 24 ¢ 25 HW 54955 Docld: 32989494 Page 130 2467 unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted. We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that are attendant. We take great care. Now you say about the court having possibility taking jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we could present the matter to the court but what are they going to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to have to follow it all the way through? Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts. Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court given for each contact? There are a great many problems insofar as administration of it. I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my idea -~ I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control ove the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this is going to happen no matter what you do. Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your reaction. I was not suggesting that there is consideration here -to prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as
‘ 2468 8 8 eshe4 you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a oe . nN : : é e third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is ° 7 ; 3 ° warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand 4 your position. 5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 6 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart. @ (Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.) 8 The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions? 9 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 10 Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect .for you and your 11 |} organization and I personally regret that the organization is J 2 é 12 || in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that i>) < 13 |} it is, along with other agencies and departments of the 14} government. 15 I think you probably would agree with me that even though 16 || that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects 1? unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives 18 |} us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity, 19 at least, to improve the level of competency and service of 20 || the government itself. 21 With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to 22 || volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve 25 || the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 || indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government, 25 || to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and HW 54955 DocId: #2989494 Page 161
gsh Phone (Area 202{-844-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.c. 20003 HW 54955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 “18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctId: beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents, the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to see that these functions, these delicate functions are being undertaken properly? I am concerned about. even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. you are the first one to be confirmed hy the Senate of the United States. | direction. additional importance that requires it to have closer supervisipbn and scrutiny by us. involved in the daily relatianship between you and the Attorney And before you answer, let me tell you two or three thing It hasn't been Jong ago that the FBI Director was not At the same time I rather doubt that we can become General. needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the FBI. intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a 2989494 Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General I would appreciate any comments on that. Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the Page 1352 I believe I think that is a movement in the right I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an
fo] oO Oo 9° 3 ask 6 1 a ri 2 < . 2 - ° Fo) E 10 li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 Al 22 235 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 54955 Docld: 2470 look at these decisions and the process by which they were made to decide that you are or you are not performing your services diligently. I don't think you can have oversight unless you have access to records, and in many cases records don't exist and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now departed and in other cases you have conflicts. ; | How would you suggest: then that you improve the quality of service of your agency? How would you pronose that you increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the ‘United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that is required? | Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed, one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very important is that the position of Director, the one to which great attention should be paid in choosing the ian who will properly acquit himself. I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency toward consulting with other members of the official family, 29899494 Page 133
Ss Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ~ WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 ee 25 24 25 DoclId: 29899494 Page 134 2471 that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very carefully. I think further that he should be responsible for those matters which indicate impropriety or illegality. Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for the President of the United States, for the Attorney General, for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch? Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to? Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General, but I think this is such an important field of influence that it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the Attorney General. ; - Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea of the President of the United States calling the Director of the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task? Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that the relationship between the FBI Director and the President is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited through the Attorney General? Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There
ry - ; ®@ g 2472 8 ash3e 1 has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if E 2 the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he E 5 may do so, call him directly. 4 It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter 5 report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I 6 have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this 7 was revealed in full to them, 8 Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that 9 Says the President has to go through the Attorney General, 10 although I rather ‘suspect it would be a little presumptuous, il But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary 2 é 12 for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the : 13 Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least 14 some sort.of account of a Presidential order or an order of 15 the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI? 16 | Do you think that these things need to be handled in 1? a -more formal way? 18 Mr. Relley. Personally, it would be my practice in 9 3 19 the event I receive such an order, to request that it be J : 20 documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification : 21 |} as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislatio . 4 22 I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera- : 23 tion. : 24 I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it 25 can be worked very easily. HW 54955 Docld: #2989494 Page 185
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 \o fH LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 25 DoclId: 32999494 ! e e 2473 Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I believe, has already established some sort of agency or function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent, I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department, including the FBI. Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of Professional Responsibility. , Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it. Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will you give us any observations as to whether you think that will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your relationship to it in the future? Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the Attorney General. Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely subscribe. Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector General who is involved with an oversight of all of the agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionallly protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care Page 186
2474 8 8 = gshz10 1 to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while? i] : a Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one. 2 5 Senator Baker, I'm not surprised. Would you think about 4 it and let us know what you think about it? 5 Mr. Kelley. I will.. 6 Senatcr Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very 7 much. 8 The Chairman. Senator Huddleston. 9 :Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 10 Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that 11 existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during 12 this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the WARD & PAUL 13 Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them 14 by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and 15 he people of the United States. 16 Does not this suggest that there has heen a reaction 1? there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the 18 country because of certain circumstances rather than any 19 clear and specific direct instructions that might have been 20 || received from proper authorities? And if that is the case, 21 is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline, 22 to provide for that kind of specific instruction? 23 Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 logically be incorporated and that -- 25 Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing HW 54955 Docld: 339999494 Page 137
| Q is" Phone (Area 2024-544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 | HW 54955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 999494 Page 1863 2475 danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the attitudes may be.at a specific time in this country because -- Mr. Kelley. Senator; I don't contemplate it might be a continuing danger, but it certainly would be. a very acceptable guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems to arise, know what we can do. Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which | Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can | provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the court in determining what action might be proper and specific - ‘ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various techniques that might be used? For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as has already been done, that informants are necessary and desirable. ow do we keep that informant operating within the proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual rights? Mr. Kalley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must be placed on the agent and.the supervision of the FBI to assure that there is no infringement of rights. Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the particular action was necessary, that there was a present threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but
44-6000 echgi2 7 Phone (Area 20 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 ad e 2476 in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been necessary to have addressed the original threat, How do we keep within the proper balance there? Mr. Kelley. Well,.actually, it's just about like any other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer. There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him. This is one which I think might flow if he counsels” the informant. Now insofar as his inability to control the informant, I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is still supervisory control over that agent and over that informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuin basis. Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone else. Ifa White House official asks the FBI or someone to do something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported by the FBI. Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to our attention should either be handled by us or the proper authority. HW 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 189
s AHW/smnL t. 3 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants. Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever intelligence gathering techniques. The original thrust of my question was, even though we may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do we control the techniques that might be used, that ini themselves might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation of the rights. Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed out that the association to, the relationship between the informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one, and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide- lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship Insofar as the activities of agents, informants’ or others which may_be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of violations of the law on the part of informants, and either prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority. We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would HW 5495 DoclId: 37969494 Page 191 pr Ee te
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 y WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 a - LO ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 L9 20 al 22 23 24 25 DoclId: e @ pursue it to the point of prosecution. Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic review. Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well as other matters. Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed. out the difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in gathering evidence after a crime has been committed. Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the departments, for instance, with not having a mixing of gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques definable and different? : Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I see no objection to the way that they are now being handled on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fatt, it is a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement. Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes information to numerous government agencies. Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for information, what kind of information they can ask for, and 999494 Page 192
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 smn 5 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 Ro 24 25 DoclId: 2480 who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him to do specific things? Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest? Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must come from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case, wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with a letter so requesting. This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in take care that you just don't follow the request of some underling who does not truly reflect.the desire of the President. Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad projects undertaken. Would it be feasible from time to time in a .Congressional oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department, with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent with the very protections? Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to.the oversight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of 29899494 Page 193
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 LO Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 25 DoctId: 2481 probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put on the use of that information once it has been supplied by the FBI? cmt . Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator. Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictiagns now? Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reaso for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules that at least to us we are satisfied. Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the informatio your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment of the rights of any individuals. Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I do myself. I would say that I am satisfied. Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed on what the request, and what they can do with it after they get it. Mr. Kelley. Yes. Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just 999494 Page 194
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 i AW 454955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 39969494 2482 bound to gather a great deal of information about some individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli- gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific purpose unrelated to this information. Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to doing that? Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection- able. Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time that these files are kept in the agency? Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework, too. Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done. Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the President of the United States from calling up the head of the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction to the agency. But how about that? What about White House personnel Page 195
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ne) LL 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 25 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 RA 25 2483 informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our present activities. I think this is the only way that we can exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to accomplish and what I want to accomplish. Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction and total permission to move in a certain direction and go beyond what is intended or what was authorized. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director. The Chairman. Senator Goldwater? Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were produced. Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI? Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir. Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you? Mr. Kelley. No, sir. Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of you HW 54955 Docld: 3P989494 Page 196 |
~] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 295 24 25 HW 54955 DoclId: 32989494 Page 197 2484 staff, to your knowledge? Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed]. I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of this particular section. There has been no review of them since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that. Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear them? Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which i of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to be a discussion of this in an executive session. The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and - decided that it would compound the original error for the staff to review the tapes, because that would be a_ still further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at what.we needed to know about the King case. So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information before the Senator. Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if, and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to
° } ‘ Bo Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 RS 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 54955 DocId: 2485 ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and decided on it. Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris- diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the Attorney General. Senator Goldwater. I see. Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a target of inquiry? Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years. Senator Goldwater. Ten years. Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir. Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any, to the Bureau of retaining such information? Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a destruction or erasure,we will abide by it. We will, on those occasions where we think that matters might come up within that period of time which may need the reténtion of them, we will express our opinion at that time, but other than that we would be guided by guidelines. Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations 999494 Page 193
7) Phone (Area 202) oaa-cooe WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 wo 10 | 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2486 with respect to retention of such information, or do we need the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials when the investigation purposes for which they were collected have been served? Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close look at the retention of material, and we would of course like to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this., Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Mondale? Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines, limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments, and the question is, where should that line be drawn? As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we go beyond the authority-imposed upon us to get into political ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement. Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to draw the guidelines ina way that your activities are restricted to the enfonmcement of the law, investigations of Docld: 32989494 Page 199
g- ke (on) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO Ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 235 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 999494 Page 2700 @ @ 2487 crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather than to leave this very difficult to define and control area of political ideas? Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last statement of involving the area of political ideas. I-say tha I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based on statutes in the so-called security field, national. or foreign. These are criminal violations. I feel that they should be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have more personnel working together, covering the same fields.. I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligencd matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows from the investigation of the security matters and the criminal. Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what:'Mr. Stone said was- this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When the police system goes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of justice and human liberty.
ry smn 11 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 R22 ie) 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 20 HW 54955 Docld: 3P989494 Page 2701 21 e ® 2488 Do. you object to that definition? Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's area of concern some matters which were probably not as important at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in touch with the security investigations and the gathering of intelligence is something which has proved to be at times troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable, productive procedure. I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today. Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in fact, in my Opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one you've just defined. If the FBI possesses the authority.to investigate ideas that they consider to be threats to.this nation's security, particularly in the light of the record that we have seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi- cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders, war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 54955 smn 12 LO Li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 25 DoclId: #2969494 that would provide any basis for oversight? How can you, from among other things, be protected from criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't do something that some politician tried to pressure you into doing? Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be criticized for doing that which today is construed as very acceptable. Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy for the predicament the FBI finds itself in. Mr. Kelley. And the Director. Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20 hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specifi¢- ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by the law. If we don't define it specifically,it seems to me that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what you should have done. Don't you fear that? Page 2702
2490 1 Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a 2 great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have 3 come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 that I think that we have a different type of spirit today 5 in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in, 6 that I think the Bureau is a matchléss organization, and they ” are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact 8 that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the 9 organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we 10 had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in 11 the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct. 12 We may not be able to project this on all occasions, 13 because we must equate this with the need and with our WARD & PAUL 14 experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're 15 going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a 16 flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those 17 || guidelines. 18 Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think 19 there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I 20 21 think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been, 22 from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of 23 enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you 24 are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that th 7 : git Ter Be Ses oe 2s Cane ma os oe Se co nee
smn 14 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 HW 54955 Docld: 37989494 Page 2704 2491 great controversy exists, and.where you are almost inevitably going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you. get into trouble. Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working with you we can at least make some achievements that will be significant. | Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I think we've made a good start. | Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August 9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them. Which liberties did you have in mind? Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis- understood many, many times. Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to clear it up. “of oo Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement of the approach which the courts historically have used in resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute
° re) ° © : = z wo N 9 N J o & < ~ o c 2 WARD & PAUL _ NW 54955 fe! rau) ot 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: i refers to those that are unreasonable. 2492 protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only I came from the police fiedd. What is more restrictive to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation. We do have to , in order to love in the complexities and intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our rights. Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If is os, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there has to be a balance. Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give « up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you Mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch. that and ask again, you have to give up some tights. Which rights would you have us give up? Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would have the right for search and seizure. Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend- ment right. Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right. Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind? Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure. 999494 Page 2705
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 _ HW 54955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2493 Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Consti- tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable, under court warrant. Did you mean to go beyond that? Mr. Kelley. That's right. Senator Mondale. That you Should be able to go beyond that? Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee. Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that that sentence might have been inartful in your speech? Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which -4- yes, it was inartful. Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were saying something different, that it was taken to mean somethin different than I think you intended. What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling of those issues, have to balance rights and other values. That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct? Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't Docld: 969494 Page 2706
° r=) ° 2 < < “ ~ N ° N s os - is ~ e r= 2 end t. WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 54955 ae 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 Al 22 25 24 295 2494 understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual. I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake. Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that in effect, the rights: of the American people can be determined not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the law. You meant that. Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir. Senator Mondale. All right. Thank you. DoclId: 969494 Page 2707
» WARD: GSH CIA pen 12/80/75 Tap¢ 4 Phone (Area 202 LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 54955 Docld: The Chairman. Senator Hart, Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably hamper you from investigations of crime control in the country. But I think implicit in his question was also an area that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political figures, particularly in the White House? And we've had indications that at least two of your predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr. Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use the facilities af the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplilsh some plititcal end. Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in. What .Kindof restrictions can we lay down to protect you from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the coin, if you would. Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would 999494 Page 2703
gs Phone (Area 2029'544-6000 WARD & PAUL rm) ° ° ° a g a ro 5 g a £ x£ “vw ng F4 ul rm) Pea a a 2 = a ~~ w = a ° wd t | AW 54955 10 Li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 Al 22 R95 24 25 ® ® 2496 protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any consideration of such directives. Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me. Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been a problem for the people that preceded you? Mr. Kelley. I think so. Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the Congress ought to address? Mr. Kelley. I think so. Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi- gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart- ment asking this Comnittee for FBI files? DoclId: 32989494 Page 2709
2 2497 8 ¢ asi 3 1 Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files, a N : e I think they're asking for what testimony was given by 2 5 witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know. 4 Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all 5 material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates 6 to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference." 7 I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department 8 || asking this Committee for material provided to us by the 9 || FBI? 10 Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I li || just ask -- 5 by 12 (Pause) C) a & 13 Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one. 3 14 Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did 15 they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I 16 don't know why. 17 Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you 18 provided us that's not available to the Justice Department? 19 Mr, Kelley. That's right. 20 Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why 21 an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee 22 for your records? 23 Mr. Kelley. No, sir. 24 Senator Hart of Colorado. You released a statement on 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 || November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's. counter~intelligen Q esd 54955 Docld: 37969494 Page 2710
Phone (Area 202)'544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 379689494 Page 211 program and you said you made a detailed study of COLTHTELPRO activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote: "The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against individuals, organizations and institutions both public and private across the United States." Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of occasions he planned violent acts against black people in groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the FBI actually prevented violence from taking place. How does his testimony square with your statement that I have quoted? . Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth. We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes and that type of thing has been substantiated. Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony he gave us under oath was not accurate? Mr. Kelley. Right. Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statemen and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the F3I was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against 2498