157-10044-10081 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Date : 08/04/95 Page : l Me ee wer ce cet ee ne nee we nn yy Ct em em mm rt eee mv rs enter ag ey en er ma =e mae. A AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION SSCIA | 157-10014-10081 HEARINGS ee ee wc me ee ee a en ew a a ee IR a mY OH ER TR ER EN AD BNR ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS oF ee ¢¢ of #6 t4 84 DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCIA GOODWIN, RICHARD 07/10/75 61 ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLO DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CIA EISENHOWER, DWIGHT TRANSCRIPT UNCLASSIFIED OPEN IN FULL RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 05/12/98 Box 3 ee wee re ee ea os tt Sh Gee rh ee Gm em mer rr am a en ah a a = SE [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 Docld:324234659 Page i
? 33 + 4 re ra 2 BB aci6 ure Bubjsect ‘tO Criginsl/ge &tiongi . t) States Senate ” : os cy Lr Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Tateliigence Activities ne Thureday, July 10, 1975 Washington, D.C ans seeremeeniaans-epey (Stenutype Tape and Waats turned over tO the Comntteeg for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, 8. k. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 {808} 844-6000 TGP SECRET
TESTIMONY OF Richard M. Goodwin. EXHIBITS EXHTBIT FOR IDENTIFICATION No. 1 10 No. ii > 7 No. 21 NS. 23 BARD & Paw, a an Cc c , on a . LS 410 Oreyt Steed. BL Wrawungion, 0.C. 20003 gy ek ABLE Rue epee
4 ; ; c omy c c c Ls ALO Peat Dieeet, $.2_ veetenqion, B.C. POOC3 _ “yee ee we , . TR ear Ib Te tect ihe garetts RUE Rare BP peo ReCLy EXECUTIVE SESSION =a wm we Thursday, July 10, 1975 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Govarnmeantal Activities, Washington, 0. C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at $:02 o'clock pem. in Room S-128, Thea Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee) prasiding. Present: Senators Church (prasiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and Schwelker. Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Prederick A. Go Schwarz, Je., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan, David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Flizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea, Professional Staff Membars. TOP SECRET
as 2 The Chairman. We will come back into order. Mr. Goodwin, would you please take thea oath? Do you swear that all the testimony you ara about to give in this Procesding will be tha truth, the whole truth, end nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Goodwin. I do, The Chairman. £ am given to understand that there has | | been some problem in connection ‘wien your appearance here today and that there are soma notes that you have that you feel you 3 need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought I with you. Is that the cage? 45 Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful. Thav fy WARD & Pau have baen in storage for Several years and fr just had no access notes ~=- my files and averything have been in storage for 7A AN Several years. I've had no access to tham. And they consist of the files that I brought from the White House with me. The Chairman. Have you baen interviewed by members of the staff and shown cartain documents that the staff believes will be pertinent to your testimony? a to them. I have to go get them out of tha storage. They wera | t ! } i | Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujille today. @IG Foret Street, $.€_ warmernn, G.c. 20003 today to give us testimony relating to Me. Trujillo or do you TOP SECRET { i The Chairman. And do you belleve that you ave prepared | [ } | .
rat eater: idea ot “he a you give any testimony? 6 49 The Chairman. So that if the Comnittes were to qiva you ay ME. Goodwin. Well, I'm ef course fully prepared to testify a : 4 | to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think | Ee 6 | probably in the case of tha Dominican Republica, the documents | a | . 6 | have been adequate. £ think there's a qood chance that going | q 9 | through the files may very well add something to my recollect io, a | 8 of Cuba and Castro. a ! a. a | The Chairman, Well 1 will have this suqgestion to make. 4 a 10 We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and | 4 ~_: 11 || then -= how long will dt take you to qet your files and review | a ai 12 }) them and coma hack fully prepared to give us your testimony on | q 6-; 13} the other issues? a a 14 Mr. Goodwin, ‘fell, it will take a day or two. It is | A c “a8 | posaible I will not be able to get access to them until Monday : , «= 16 | morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello x aa 17 | an@ find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine. 4 zg || But Z am sure that it would not take more than a day or two. 4 20 | that opportunity, would you then get those filus, raview then, 2} and respond to the request by the Committesa that you appear th- 22 first of next week to testify? 23 Mr. Goodwin. If that {s your wish, certainly, The Chairman, We are most anxious to complete the record sth ot @1G Fore Stroct, $2. treunengion, OC. 90003 and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly TOP SECRET
Poissy BARD & Pau, ea 76000 ) 6 9 8 426 Perse Freese, 4.E.. tramagien, B.C. P6063 > 9 10 ii 12 13 44 15 16 17 18 19 20 2) 22 23 24 25 | ae tas : j hei as ; fn f oe ee Nov. Nor ree iF . adcomodate’ cur, ft a: se you would ; cooperate, i Magra ane , zs ‘would: be glad te. ag we . Goodwin, | the ma ene iat right. With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you prepared te proceed with the questioning on frujille? Mr. Schwarg. I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn’t hava @ chance to get together. f£ thought we were going to have a chance te do that on Tuesday, and X have not hag a chanee to @peak to you but I do know some of the material, and perhaps We én work on the material. Refore we do 0, could you state your full name and you: addrasa please? TOP SECRET
sh oocmUCl rlCrCO CU 2 © 10 ii 12 13 RARD & Pavey 14 15 16 F76ONANSAT RF 17 18 19 20 21 810 Fest Seevet, S$. _ vrarmengion, OC. POOF Mr. Goodwin. Washington, B.C. Mr. Schware. Richard M. Goodwin, 1836 32nd Street, N.W., And ag a master of course, we tell all of our witnesges what they no doubt know, that they have their right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop to obtain counsel, you know that you cen do that? Mr, Goodwin. Mr. Schware. rights are? Mr. Goodwin. Mr. Schwarz. t already have too many lawyers. And you know what your constitutional Hopefully. Now, what cannection did you have with the Dominican Republic in the winter and apring of 1961? Mr. Goodwin. I came inte the White House ea Assistant Bpecial Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin American affaire policy statements in the precseding campaign. I became involved in Latin America. X left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a daily basia with Prasident Kennedy and his activities’in Latir. America which dnecluded what was happening in the Dominican Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepare cables that went to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that And from that period until; \ ; 4 : i q t t 1 1 you are interested in, and I waa with him every day on something connected with Latin America. Me, Schwarz, Without your turning to the documentary TOP SECRET
we i ee ; 2 ONE RCE - 2 e Ver: material, would you recount for the Committee your understandin. of what the United States governmant policy toward the Dominic Republic was in the winter and spring of '61 and what actions wera taken to implement that poliey. Mr. Goodwin. Well, that poliey was a continuation of th- policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -=- dacide: by the attempted assassination of Prasident Betancourt by th- a President of the Dominican Republic. } ee ee { | I 13 wag, firat of all, of course that Trujillo was even more : oi 12 So that from that point on when we cama in, the feeling (Ga c 14 || at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress tha: a 15 had been and beyond that; having cut off diplomatic and other ; < 16 Yelétians, that Trujillo's time: dh office was probably, : ~ 1? numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade | la which waa often in great domestic difficulty had been the § 19 concept of Amarican support, it strengthened Trujillo agains: s 29 | his opposition. i Pa | At that point our policy becams one of trying to anticlrc: ‘ 2p | at least, the fall ef Trujillo. Of course the Castro thing j 21 | was very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern o: Ge : 24 tha Prasident, tha one thing he didn't want waa for Trujillo . 25 to go and a Communist leader to coma in. - So 2 think the policy TOP SECRET te sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican. ; Repubiie and the eithation whith you know arcee was precipitat:::!
we SY ‘ *) tattoo 7h ° eon ar re meaty RS Td ay tae Se a was to keep up eur economie and diplomatic pressure to hope that when Trujillo went, however he went, whether violently or peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would be a moderate, democratic group friendly te the interests of | the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keap in touch with and halp out and keep communications open with | the potential successor groups, and it was very hard to pinpoint. He. Schwarz, What stapa did you take during the period of tima you were involved, or prior thereto, if you know about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident 12 groups? 13 Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from WARD & Pawn policy statements, the usé of USIA, the ube of economic Pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with axile groups principally'in New York and elsewhere. A certain number FANNANS IRA ZA of Limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn of course was one of tha principals, his principal instruction managment per ays g 19 || was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was ; 20 zealous in thie because he disliked Trujillo intensely himself i 2) and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups. | k 22 And { read through the sort of overall Planning papers, and I | I 23 think thay fairly reflect that range of operations, , ’ : 24 None of them wera terribly effactive. é : . 25 Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arma, TOP SECRET Pome ENT Le TT WEE
¢ Ar * = ages ‘ + sf what, to your understanding, wae the time at which authorizatio: 2 | was provided to transfer arme? 5 Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Eisenhower .; 4 Mr. Schwarz, And that was at a meating of the Special 5 || Group? 6 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't know because they didn't let ! ? me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of i7 || effort to kill Trugille, the smaller guns were to be given as 18 | Dearbern told ma later in conversation after the assassination é : ow 3 - “3 124 of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of is the @-:;: ci: 13 4 transfer of a couple of carbines and .38 pistols. After the | 8 I c 14 | transfer had been made,: « the message of communication that e 15 | came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request i < i 16 | for the transfer of machines guns which were to ba used in an i * I i ' ! 19 | because theses people felt their own lives were in danger, 20 | especially if they embarked on anything as risky as trying to kill Trujillo, and they wanted some self-defense weapons, and 27 4 they were given to them for self-defense and then they made a 22} request that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, thev | AgS Frat Seeoet, 4H | Maho eon, D.C. FOO08 24 | wanted a machine gun. es Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of People had TOP SECRET 8 | some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really a 9 | know the procedure. ! .- 10 Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms passed? =: 11 ‘Mr. Goodwin. 1 don’t know. I became aware of the transfer eee ee ee
epee Teanga 5 ote ti tried and most of them, they were all dead. It was a very rigaky buginess. Ye's not the kind of thing they would want to try with a .38. And f think also, I mean nobody, I think -- aa I say, we | had no particular anticipation that this or any other group TOP SECRET would be successful in somathing that nobody had been able to v7] do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops. 8 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know how the arms were passed into “ 9 the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the diesidents? Gus, 10 Mr. Goodwin. No, YT only know what Dearborn later told ma aa = 1? || in conversation. I only have this fifteen year old mamory fal s” ¢ 12 | on my part that he gave tham to them in the consulate. 1 may e cé ; & 14 | have known at one time how he qot thum. Thare were a lot of cz a c 14 || guna in the Dominican Republic. \ Qe _ c 15 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know] | i sw 17 Mr. Goodwin. I did not know that, but T wouldn't be 1& | surprised, weapons of that size. « { § ol Mr. Schwarz. Now again, when were the arms passed, as 3 6 be | far as you know? § “y % : i a! Mr. Goodwin. Well I don’t know. Y don't have the exact -- < “ | the magsaga is in here. I think it was after President } a1 || Kennedy toak office. ; h 5 Be My knowladga of it was on the basis of the massage -- ey ' The Chairman. Ja there someone that can halp Mr. Goodwin
10 + 3 11 § 13 a n i on 14 an 15 7 4 815 F ont Street, SE | oenington, OC. 20003 16 7 Stat Sayeed Gis Re Ee YEO ay Seeley : yet eb e wots ‘ i with the documents? Mr. Schwara. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibie No. 1, & document consisting -~ dated May 23, 1961 and headed Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating: ' “Attached is the spacial briefing paper of CIA covert activitien directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin at the White House,° and attaching a Several page document with that heading and that date. Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and that's where, I guess, I found out about it. (Thea document referred to waa marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 1 for | | identification. } | TOP SECRET #
i Hg SS REESSS ® LEE HUNG + zs ; ¥ 3 5 YT casa ORT Ra Cea C AN Praia A oat pi ets Oe eee g teat? ste {a : THRE Be Tot te TO oe sé ve Th fe ae amg nt wead ii 1 Mr. Schwarg. Now that indicates, does it not, that the weapons were passed somatime after late January, you can tell 3 that? 4 Mr. Goodwin. Yeah. | 5 Nr. Schwarz. All right. 6 You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which 9 indicates whan the Tequast for the passage of the arma was { F) made. t en r) Mr. Goodwin. Yas, it says in late January. Of course ™ 10] they weren't authdrized until the 12th. | ; ; _ 41 Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any avent, after i wi 12] the Kennedy Administration took office. ; a . 1 c3 13 ‘4r. Goodwin. Yas. ce c 14 Mr. Schwarz. Now you told Presidant Johnson, Vice c 15 | President Johnson,-- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2, < 16 || & Memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab H, the book which is BS . 1 17 || Barked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1962, | 18 (The document referred to | 4 3 19 was marked Goodwin PF F 20 Exhibit No, 2 for I 2: idantification.} $ 4 22 a au : z 3 24 TOP SECRET Soeuat betes abate eemenn
WAsdD & Pasa S5G Corsa Street 3 C , Wantheagion, OC, P0003 Mr. Schware. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin, this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1962, subject Report of Point Raised at meating with Vice President. Hould you read into the record the second paragraph? Mr. Gocdwin. “At one point during tha meeting, the Vice Prasident asked about the three carbines which the Agancy had turned over toe the dissidents, specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effact that thie was done under the previous Administration, 1.@., prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group.” Can you tell ma if thia hia memo I'm reading? t'd like to know. Mr. Schwarz. Wall, there are some initials at the bottom of the page, do they help you decide whose memo it ia? Me. Dennine Y belleve we wera told by Secretary of Stata Rusk that it's Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what the U stands for. ; Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin? Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It dean inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen. 1 thought that I wouldn't hava made it. I had no purpose in making it. And this is -- The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this? TOP SECRET { f i 3 1 1
foe 4 sieeh stestie it “tts nye SES eat ATE LT Atytieita ts AACE tr eas cee : ; EATEN OE one ete pareve Besa URES ‘eas avemtr is a Mr. Goodwin. The delivery'of the arms wag not made prior ‘to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, wae prior to January 20th. i f i Senator Schwaiker. Was when, ag@in? Was what date? 5 Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January. ry Sanator Schweiker. What year? 7 Mr. Goodwin. 1962. a Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when? | om) 9 Me. Schware. Somatime subsequent to Jahuary 24th. 10 Me. Goodwin. Wall, now that X leok at this, all it says | a 1) || as late January. | aad ; 42 The Chairman. This is Juna ist, thia is date! June ist, o- : 13 and you ars reported to have said, “At one point during the - . 14 maating the Vice President asked about the threa carbines c 15 || which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents and . < 16 || specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin * 17 made the statement to the effect that this was done under 18 the pravious Administration, i.¢@., prior to January 25th, | i 19 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group.” _ ° by : Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961. | j vB) | Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my firat imprassion on reading | : ay that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator, : 24 | so 1 suppose the 20th or the 19th in somebody's mind could be | : 24 ; late January. I mean, ft don't really remembar. | Ps : Mr. Schwarz. Bus Mr. Goodwin, you know, independant of | | | | TOP SECRET me pa an? be Paste praes BS a =
the document which we marked ag Exhibit 1, in fact the arms 2 were delivered after January 20th. 3 Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I -- my firet 4 knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requested enn eee & | which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had heen 6 | made in late January. don't know any more than that. | ? Me. Schwarz. All right. | 8 Mer. Goodwin. Thie ia my source of knowledga. I may have — 9 learned more subsequant to it if Dearborn pinpointed it. - 10 Me, Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, wera r 11 |] you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this? vi 12 Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the meetings. x : 13 | Mr. Schwarz. Who d¢@ you remember from the CIA? a 14 | Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -~ I can't be sure who all was om 15 || there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure some- < 16 || body like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm ™ 17 | sure you must have 4 list. | 18 Mr. Schwarz. tlow I would like you to tastify in answer to | g 19 | a series of questions as to what you ware or ware not told. | an | Now, were you told that the arms which had been delivered | i es | had been delivered to persona who said at timer that they | . a wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more H } pt i that they wanted to use them for assassination pursoses? | Gc : 24 Mr, Goodwin. I! was given to understand and told ; as, || specifically and it's raflacted in the documents, that thay TOP SECRET
SQ USE Na» PERTTI PT 663 — EP Ae : a cars er wee, $3 ET *. ee ia RCE st ms i wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, thay thought they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns. I don't remember any indication that anyone thought that @ BESS cig Fo pier PP telco graoat Fe N + carbine or a .38 was adequate to mount an affort of that kind against Trujillo. Rut they, of course, were interested in agsassinating Trujillo, involved ae they were in @ very Life Re? Pic ts and death etruggle. theie families were being glaughtered -- te Nah Seip Ra ke a! at ali times, continually, up into May, there was the very 8 Me. Schwarz. Tha record demonstrates ehat the Agency was 4 m7 9 | informed in April, prior to the memorandum that went to you ; ~ 10 || which we marked a8 Exhibit 1, that the Aiasidents intended to . a 11 || undertake the assassination effort and to do 80 within the d a 12 ! means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the 4 @ Oc : yz road and shooting Mr. Trujille ag he was vieiting his mistress. fr <" 14 | And that they intended to do it whether or not they received z c~ 15 the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns, just . < 16 | to help. 4 é + 4 1 Now, were you informed by the Agency oF by anyone else . lt that the dissidents intended to accomplish the assassination ; f 1 with the small arms whether or not they got the machines? | 3 2u | Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other | i “} groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We qot. | | : on | reports of assassinations about to occur almost avery two or | : i et | three weeks in the White House. There is 4 long gap between : | wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -= hut. TOP SECRET
Shim TE Rpe awe ac OS RS ET ORE we ee B Slee + +t + ont oe © as Wend @ Pours ef i Lar ag ~ 410 Fost Saree, $ £. warwengton, B.C FOCEE § 6 9 10 il 12 | fe ev insistent request for additional arma that would make the plot feasible and at the specific request of Prasident Kennedy, those arma were denied and <- Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know what you were informed about the intentions of the dissidents. You didn't answer my question. You said you were fraquently informed about assassination plots all over the world, but specifically with reapact to the Dominican Republic, were you oF ware you not informed that the Aqency had been told by the dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castro -- excuse ma, of Trujillo -- whether or not they received the machine guns? Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. If 14 wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that 15 > Hi wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you maan Dearborn, or ~~ Me. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency in thia instance? Mr. Schwarz. Thare were Aqency people in the Republic. Did you know thera were Agency people in the Republic? Mr. Goodwin. I knew they were in and out. tir. Schwarz. In and out? Mr. Goodwin. They ran soma guns in at one time, as 1 Femember, and they also were angaged in the collection of TOP SECRET
ee " tg qi intelligence about dissident qroups. Mr. Schwarz. Was it your impression that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic, or the Agency personnel Ges was in charge of the pominiean Republic? os a | Mr. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the instructions given to Dearborn were carried out, and all co) 9 inatructions from the President went to Dearborn. Mr. Schwarz. Apart from inatructions from the Prasident,. 8 ~—< ‘ 9 was it your impression that the Agency wag in chargé of the | — 10 Dominican Republic or that Dearborn was in charge of the rm ; 1) Dominican Republic. i iP Mr. Goodwin. My imprasaion was that Dearborn was in charas a “4 g iz | of the fominican Republic, subject to very close supervision 4a aw a | from Washington. ' c. 14 = iE the Chairman. Oearborn wae the °~ rey . <= * | Mr. Goodwin. fife was the Consul. We had no formal aan 17 relations. i 1e The Chairman. He was the consul? 3 19} Mr. Goodwin. Right. J i Pes Py * Wasn't that true? § “i i oi! Mr. Schwarz. The paper racord makes it look quite likely 3 & he ‘ 2 | that tha Agency, at Least from their point of view, thought : “ i i ot | that thay were in charge. 4 ee = |, i vs | Mr, Goodwin. They should have told the President. Wa H e rs ‘ 3 “|! | sunt all of our massages to Nearborn. ! | TOP SECRET beter ies ag exh Bees ree
Me. Schwarz. What was gour understanding of the Location of the machine guns that the dissidante wanted? Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in hera somewhere in the paper. (Pause) | Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question. nid you know that the nacre is quns were aent to the = Dominican Republid i j Mr. Goodwin. I know now. Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it? Mr, Goodwin. Nov-. £ knew, when the issue arose in May that wa had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the pracisa mathod by which thay were brought in I never asked about. Waa & Fauve The Chairman. I am having a little difficuity following. We began with your heing told that it was the policy of the pravious Administration to encourage dissident groups and do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down the Trujillo regime. Then, foltowing the Tnauguration of President Kennedy, eartain weapons are passed to these | dissidents in the Dominican Republic for tha purposé of assaasinating -- of their use in the assassinating President | Trujillo. Now when did you learn that. weapons had been in fact ALO Foret Gisoet, $F .. trarmaton, O.C. +0003 ss ° passad to disaident groups, that obviously had occurred after President Kennedy had bean inaugurated. When did you first TOP SECRET | | | | | | ! | | | |
ee an Pa 3 eee Ok ee) £4 aire LAE RES ay aap Soe z a EIR SRN TER aR ony-t7 reais Ao , ; F oy St ANE EY i learn? Mr. Goodwin. On the Lith of May when we raquested from the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in the Dominican Republic, that had been eonducted in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from whorn? Mr. Goodwin. Well, i¢ would have been requested by me for the President. Mr. Schwarz. From tha CIA? 4 Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA. The Chairman. From the CIA, and that briefing paper has a been identified for the record? BARS ® PAVE The Chairman. ALL right. When you found out that these weapons had been transferred sanone in January to certain dissident groups for the purpose of assassinating Trujillo, what did you do? Me. Goodwin. That is correct. | | | | | j | : 19 | Was it then your understanding that this was Prasident ° 2c | Kennedy's policy? ; PS | Mr. Goodwin. Na. : vo | The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received } 24 | that information? : : b Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator, * ; | and that ia the briefing paper involved a vary cisar distinction TOP SECRET
eS EN AI RIE Bue lag Vann x 4 iva B Fg a between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of personal type side~arms, the salf-defense attendant to any 3 | project and the desire for assassination weapons which would have consisted of machine guns. Our response to thia briefing paper was immediately to try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic instructions to the Consul about the nature of future’ relations | 9 and prepare, which we aia over tha next couple of weeks, 8 rt. 9 with dissidents, because the President felt that thingé : _ 10 || might be gatting out of hand, with what wes happening in the | b m 1} || Dominican Republic. | ; we 12 So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I : ce iz said, two qraat concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to | ‘ ce! 14 push Trujillo over unleas he knew what was going te happen . 15 | next. bacause he would much rather have Trujillo in there than | < 16) 4 Communist’. leader. And secondly, that the United States ! | ~~ 17 | not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in | 128 the telegram that was “=~ | 3 | g 19! The Chairman. All right. u 1 is} 20 | Now whan the Prasident told you that those were his & & . § “} | two concerns, what action was then. taken to implement the g fi « ay | President's policy? - DY } 2% Mr, Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to taka : “a and set aside the original instructions from the State 25 Nepartment and at the President's instructions, I typed up the | :. TOP SECRET
telegram which is here in my handwriting, which was to go and aid go, slightly revised to -- Me. Schwarz. All right. Let me mark the one in your hand as Exhibit 3. (The documant referred to was marked as Goodwin Exhibit No. 3-A for identification.) CA % é 3 8 @-: a a oar Cc cc. LL La SE. arenatnn, OC. 20003 Bye Cred Brest, TOP SECRET
WARS & PAVE BO Sarat Sisowt. BE. Wewmengion, D.C. 2One 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 | +2 nat Bis at Mr. Schwars. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -~ you know how to do this ag wall as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-3 and 3-C. Mr. Goodwin. In which f personally added in the course ef rewriting -- fhe Chairman. Can you ddantify in the Senatora’ hooks where thage documents appear? Mr, Schwarz. Where is 3A? Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom. (Pause) [This xerox of my raw, pergonally typewritten draft appears on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting. And then paqe 256 ia the final. And the same page, 242, page 237 and 242. The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message that want out? Mr. Goodwin. Yes. The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State? Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. Thea Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed? Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secratary, I guess, but they are both my drafts. 1! received a draft from the Stata Dapart- meant, discussed it with the President, and at his inatruction prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden the State Dupartment on my OWN. and adding to it two major points aside TOP SECRET
ye aaa ro) | from rewording it. The firet one is on a different matter, and i 2 || the second one was to say in the final version, “However, We must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassinations, since the United States ag 4 matter of general policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is overriding and most prevail in doubtful eituations.* i That was inserted at the instruction of the Prasident, a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State Department draft, and it finishes again with -~ 1¢ says, ! “Clearly, at the presant time wa are unable to transfer arms | te dissidents. “Wa feal that the transfer of arms would serve | | f _ | very little purposa." 2 s p= =~ o — (The document refaerrad to é 3 4 & « 8 & € 8 ‘ was marked Goodwin cC , Exhibit No. 3-8 for identification.) 749 roy a B30 Beret Seeeet. ST. sven etn. D.C. 20003 Nn TOP SECRET
The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it before it was sent by State? 3 Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it. c. 4 The Chairman, But you said that tha State Department he 5 changed tha language. o 6 Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft. a > ll which I changed and redrafted, Now that is here too, including ee g || a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their os = 9 draft. aa ” 10 The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that | oS ™ 11 |] you believed accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy? | Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific inetruction | a é 12 | of the President. It was shown to him before transmission. | a 14 | The Chairman. It was shown to the President? ; A 15 Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes. ee 16 The Chairman. Very well. o 17 Then, reading the first paragraph, “The President has now i 18 approved contingency plans discussad during your satay here a f | with one major exception. You are not to request a pre~ a 3 ey | siqned request for help from Nominican dissident qroups." be i al Mr, Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator. Fe . 22 There was a proposal made in the State Dapartmant version | ; } os | that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case: : pa | they managed to taka over the governmant and there was some of fighting that they should request help from Venazuela. TOP SECRET
SAE 4 SO CARN ; PE a MeBUAE <i aNae she igh, Pe SHES 1 Bi a oy, seth Columbia, a few of our allies ané therefore we ought to prepare them in advance for such & request. The President thought that putting such a document in their hands would amount to 4 declaration of war and wanted it struck. The Chairman. All right. Than the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that you continua to work" <-- wall, before we go on with the ascond paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, “Phe President has now approved contingency Plans discussed during your stay here 10 with ona major exception.“ il Now, what were those contingency plans that had bean 12 discussed? 1B) Mr. Goodwin. They have tham here, I believe. 1 think -- wWaee? & FAVE contingency plans, it discusses here. “Tha paramount interast of the United States ia to assure that Castro-Communist 14 this is a very thick document, whare you have a garies of 15 16 1? | chenens not take over.” It says Trujillo ia weak, and then it | 19 weakness of the Trujillo regime, and it goes into the covert is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the ‘ p, | activities, which, % think probably ~~ is that your principal “4 | interest at this tims? ‘ The Chairman. Yes. i Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sats forth all the os || covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States, BIG Feed Srrset, SE, Harmen ator. oc 2000} not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform prow.S. TOP SECRET 25
wey ey 5! Re aat FA dissidents that if they succeed on their own and form an acceptable government we will be glad to come in and help then and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing -~ The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency — | q q 4 Ps ‘plan that contemplated the assagsination of Trujillo himself? : 6 Mr. Goodwin. I contemplated only the possibility that q The Chairman. But if he were “assassinated, it would have q prasumably been the result of an action by a dissident group 3 to overthrow his regime? he might ba assassinated, not that wa would assassinate him. Mr. Goodwin. Yes. ? tape $b 8 = 9 ~ 16 ii : 2 | The Chairman. All right. : 13 Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message ~~ the President's c? 14 message to Mr. Dearborn, “We consider it esmential that you i 15 continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. santimant among disai- 9 16 dent groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable. ~ 17 However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with 18 | political assassination, since the U.S., ag a matter of general g 19 policy cannot condone assassination. ‘This last principle is 3 3 overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations.” oy Now that language, it has been suggested by soma members if by | of tha Committee that your concern here had to do with avoidina Pf , ' a any relationship that might lead to a diaclosure that the > i 24 United States had indeed an interest in or was gomshow involvad in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, “nowavar TOP SECRET
4 . Ei gps * aks = TS oe Yea) ox 3 v wee ra 1 || we must not run the visk of 0.8. association with polities! p | assassination, gince the U.S. as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle ia overe ° i . a] 4 | riding and must prevail in doubtful situations.® ne 5 | Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves ae 6 | to the interpretation that your primary concern was that the = 7 || United States should not get caught? a 8 Mr. Goodwin. Wali, Tf don’t heldeva so, Senator, becaus@ 3 = 9 I think, to me, the plain meaning of the words and as 1 ae 10 understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S. fi 1} association with political assassination. That means not a : wy >e associated with the process of political assassination in Re 1s | any form. 4 14 | Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman? ie 1b In that same vein, if I could interrupt for just a second, ay 16 de it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had " 17 | already been dispatched? iq Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns. wed x esr j al ‘Senator Baker. T'm not talking ahout how many, Fritz. 3, an | . . u | is 5 vo | Guns had been dispatched. pS £ - ; ? at Mr. Schwarz. fue this telegram refuses the passage of ie : i a : i four machine guns. e. * 22 a 5 on! Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am ; eS re) t« \ oy 5 vs | juat saying that guns had been dispatched, 3 é ‘ ‘. Senator Schwaikar. What’s tha date of this teleqran? es eee alle) TOP SECRET
om tr t- a c c c < n WRRO & FAVE 4h@ Feet Sereat. $F .. Warhengron, O.C, 3000} RDC RACE ea Reon eae fy: pe eats f “%) . pfs z, j i ESEEETO PS SECRET i Se eed Nea a ; > Senator Baker. This waa just before the assassination, two days before the agsageination. Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had bean dispatched. Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over to the diasidants. Senator Baker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite gure -~ or there's no indication that the qung were actually used in the assassination, although they may have been in tha back seat. Ia that. about the way it atacka up? The Chairman. And the dissidents hed requested machine guns. Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has said wa thought the signala for assassination afforts for machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead with the material in hand. Mr. Goodwin. I beliave they had additional guns of their own. You wouldn't try it with a .38. Senator Tower. I think the type of guna is important, because carbines or pistols wouldn’t be used in an assassinatio: against & heavily armed ~- Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards ina heavily armed car. Also, if I might add, Senator -- The Chairman. Just to understand what you hava said, as the author ef this instruction and having conferred about. TOP SECRET
5 ¢” he 6: - ra ara a a . oa @ < cs 7. < a te ABO Ceeas Street, GE. Mrashengron, D.C. 20003 ee er Eat, it and having shown it to President Kennedy, are you teatifying that it was your understanding that the meaning of that gantence -- that that sentence wae intended to convay to Mr. Dearborn 4 prohibition againat involving the United States i in an assassination attempt on tha life of Mr. Trujillo? Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my firat draft, I did it in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul; bscause I used‘the vary word disclosure, you can seé hera, and I crossed it out, in my handwriting. Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you changed it? Mr. Goodwin. Well, {t's not very grammatical, it's ambarrassing. Also, en the xerox -- I can’t raad the hand- writing on the xerox. “However We aiso must not" -~ something -- “permit any danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political assassination or intervention in the Rominican Republic,” it says or intervention. All that was atruck. Senator Baker. That sounds like exactly what the Chairman | asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please den't get caught. Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which ia why t changed it, Senator, to read “Howaver, we must not run risks of U.S. TOP SECRET
x * Fa Bees ab seit 3 + . Ks ILE a : piven ai ek SHEE H : = aas"s } a 4 ae @: pSTE GE i i iM ret RS EES oh Sy poe ets o 7: 23 ant bier be EARLE TE ne? : 4 Paty Pi mt " ) ies age whe a Ses e tj association with political asgasaination since the U.3., 48 4 4 2 | matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination.” a 3 Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it te | 4 4 || bea critical of this witness, but on first reading of this | 9 5 document, which was some time ago, 1¢ sounded a lot to me like ' 6 | the Mission Impessible opening when they say, if you get caught | e. % the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking. a & Mr. Goodwin. 1 wasn't familiar with the program at this = 9 time. | : . 10 Senator Baker. Nor was I, at that time. | ' e. 11 I need raassurance, and I think the record doas, that the | j - 3 1p || coincidence of that this cable, this wires, going out, gay two | é 13 || days before the assassination, ‘ after quns in fact had been | 3 " 14 | dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under | : c 15 | the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation. | ij fom 16 This witness says i¢ does not. There {is no avidance to | " ~ 1? | the contrary that I'm aware of, and 1 don't know that we need : 18 | to pursus the issue any further. g 19 Mr. Goodwin, Uf I may, Sanator == | ; 20 ! Senator Bakar. And it also, as Smothers points out, that | i 2} there was another communication saying destroy anything you've i : oy | got, all those communications excapt this cabla. ' 22 Mr. Aaron. That is standard practice. That is ths atandan! @ : 24 practice for covert operations. i: ; Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines } TOP SECRET
a + 7ANnTAA BARD ® PALL ALD F arnt Givees, BE, Yearmonatom, OC. 700013 ian assasgination attempt against Mr. Trujillo. $ mg SAE ; : # ee RT ELEY aaah Te ah al : : ¥, abe ECRET s 4 32 and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking office. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. 1 haven't geen any indication of the date of that transfer. 7 do know that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns, because he told ma he was not aware of it, until we finally requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at hich point we becama aware that this transfer had occurred. rt etill don't know the date of that transfer. And then 4¢ was the bagie of that briefing paper, which obviously the Dominican Republic was not thea first matter on President Kennedy's agenda when he came into office, on tha basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sent this telegram. The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call apd off any further involvement by the United States government in Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The Presidant was not that.anxious to sae@ Trujillo thrown out. Mr. Goodwin. Well, t'm sorry. | | Sgnator Tower. That doasn't totally answer tha question. | + | The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony, TOP SECRET
aay re eee RN ey i ey iy aa that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had bean transferred to cartain dissident groups who at least had expressed an interast in assassinating Trudiile. Mr. Goodwin. Correct. The Chairman. So there was a connection, the connection being that the Amarican government, through the CIA, furnished weapons to @ group that had communicated ite interest, if not its intention, to assassinate Trujille. So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the Massage was meant to call this off, this involvement. What axactly was meant? You weren't ssying recover those arms. Mr. Goodwin. No, fF wasn't. No. wawdh & Faus , i The Chairman. But at the game time, you ware saying, don’ ‘ transfer the machine guns, Wate you not? Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -~ what we were saying is -~ The Chairman. What exactly were you saying? Mr. Goodwin. We were saving that we didn't want to do | anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo. The Chairman. I see. I saa. Mr. Goodwin. Because we ware not for assassination. Senator Baker. The distinction is -- Senator Tower. Well, it saya here in number 3, it says, 420 Carat Giveet, SE Mraahengion, B.C. P0058 ' sontinuse to inform dissident slements of U.S. support of their TOP SECRET
AANNNSA Bao & Paw, 7? 810 Fase Girees, $ EC , Wangan,  £. F000! 'SECRE 33 position. S80 what, again the interpretation that can be drawn from this ia that wea don't want to be involved, but go ahead and havea the other quys on, because their position would be to assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in affect doing is sayina, let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support for what they are doing. Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our suppert for what they . Were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office wa wanted to be our man, that da corract. And so wa were going | to support and try to retain relations and say we would support, | which is not 4 difficult thing to do, as you know, any droup that might take office and be moderate and pro-tnited States. i that was all we wore interested in, was having a pro-American govarnment. Senator Schweiker. Wall, there are two other references here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, “In case of assassination or overthrow” -~- obvicusly you still had a reference thare, whether initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we feel the transfer of arms would serva vary little purpose ani expose tha United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure - in participation in an easassination attempt," and that is scratched out, and says “assassination attempt,” meaning that thers was -- to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate TOP SECRET '
rs feta ead SRR Ne ig tA are WARS @ PHL ALO Carat Sieeet, WT, Baremgiaen, OC. 7O0SS ° AE oe sore eon EDN TOTES a apg Tey 1" me ny bee i aaek oe "TOP SECRET” ven Me a7 if ial P since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this. So what interpretation? I mean, thie ie rift here with assassination propositions, and the fact that you have “ultimate disclosure,” fear of ultimate disclosure of participation, Meant that certainly there was something already afoot, that ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this pass through. Mr. Goodwin. If think what we were saying is if we did, it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away,. but later. In the case of asrasaination or overthrow, there wate many groups, a continual flow of groups, of information, ' that there were various groups planning to assassinate Trujillo. Senator Schweiker. Wall, if that's what it meant, than why did you delete it? Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think -- Senator Schwuiker. If that was your interpretation, why in fact did you delete those four words, “ultimate disclosure . of participation?” Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell ma what page you're reading from? Senator Schwalker. Page 3. The very words that you interpret one way ware in fact deleted, which shows to mu that you maant them another way, or | they wouldn't have been deleted, and you substitute two words TOP SECRET
for it. Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean -- Senator Schwaiker. Se that you disguise that. Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words ware deleted because they Wafe words that were going to give exactly the impression you are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, ws wate afraid of being found out and what wa didn’t want wag any association with the assassination attempts, so the reference to disclosure was struck and the words association were inserted. Senator Schweiker. Mut you still call off -- you still ‘+ left the language, in actual fact we feel the tranafer of arns would serve very little purpose and expose the United States BARD & PAE yo to great danger of association with assaseination attempts. fn That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had a) fy other language, that says “ultimate disclosure of participation 7 which implies to ma you were concerned about other things you : , | | | | were doing and things that had already been programmed and ar operation that you wers as much concerned about those baind -- or you wouldn't hava changed the language to atilil say the sane, thing with that one distinction ahout somathina else being afoot. 1 don't +~- Mr, Goodwin. Well, t changed it, T believe, Senator -- maan it's hard to bea held responsible for languaqa that was B90 Faret Groowe, GE. Markongten, OC 2000} rejectal because it was inaccurata. Tha problem was not one TOP SECRET
PT ee in ae Ba ° of disclosure, the problem was wa did not want to be associated with assassination. That's why I atruck it out. Sanator Schweiker. You changed the language, but the first part of it remained exactly thea same. In fact, wa feel the transfer of arma would serve very Little purpose and expose the United States. So while you changed the language, you had | the sama condition there that you were net qoing te eupply thos arma. Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We ware not -- Sanator Schweiker. Nut why were you not concerned about | the other language, because -~ Mr. Goodwin. Necause the implication of the other lanquane | was that, well, wa were worried ahout baing found out, whan in “ 2 a a € 6 @ € 8 fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be involved. So I struck the implication. Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why wags the communication of ! | | af e. c. Cc &. < | a , | our withdrawing to Dearborn? ‘The only way Dearborn could have | | bean any closer to this plot would have been to become one of the dissident group. They told him evervthing thay did, down _ i to and including when the car was coming down the road. And «ws knew that, didn't we? Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't sawn any communications to ; us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his | dnetructions was to keep in very close contact with these SAS Carat Gereet, $T . Mowmrongion, OC. 20002 ll dissident groups. { wouldn't ba surprised if they dropped hy TOP SECRET
WED & PALE 410 Cwrt Breet. $f. Wawmenqion, OC, FOO} GRA Wee etna adap a 4 Ne }, ig: i . "ee and if they told him everything they were planning to do. But it's a long jump between saying you're going out and kiil Trujillo and pulling it off, ag many people tried. But I was not aware, a3 I can remember, that he had any kind of detailed information. Mr. Smothers. lis massages back to CIA, in fact, convey thosu datails, don’t they? ur. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these ~~ none of tham that o7 Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that the dissidents intended to use the small arms, carbines and pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended to use the weeponsa we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in precisely the way he was, in fact, assassinated? Nid you know that befora you wrote the telagram, or not? Mr. Goodwin. No, becausa what I’m rasponding to is a request that says we can’t do it unless we have the machina guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. Wa are saying, don't give them machina quns. Later on they said to Dearborn, F mean hea did tall me that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, wa'll do it, whether or not we get tha machina guns. I mean, that might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying, well, you might as wull giva it to them anyway since they're going to do it. 1 don't know why anyone would take on TOP SECRET
Seat Hecte dire PEP tHite See eee te | Weyatas , “ft eles oe “ent ‘ as * 4 ACU tay roy ‘ “SEC : : een BE est y- yy be . 4 my " L*. ¢ she RET Trujillo with a .38. I wouldn't have thought that, i@ I thought about it. President Kennedy went to Paris a week or two later. When the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by surprise, so that Nearborn had detailed knowledge of when it i was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- ha called | an emergency masting with the Vice President, a telegram was nent to Paris, and then the assasaination ended up gatting announced | by Pierre Salinger. | But this instruction, the President told me he wanted to make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in | assassinations. "¢ 2 q af ® 6 8 @ ri 8 Cc c a Cc Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record shows -- I think you've testified to this -- that toward the end of the Zisenhowe Administration, thay decided to supply arms to this dissident fy group and assist in the assassination of Mr. Trujillo. Then, 7 | as these documents show, at some point very near to the time ' that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was : sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with : this. Why didn't we also gay stop it, tell thasa people not | : to proceed further, in light of thea fact that they may have thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to ELE Ferss Severs, FE. easnenqten, D.C. P0003 z4 | assassinate Trujillo had our blessing? In other words, thare Ris lis still a piece miasing, in my opinion, that ahould have TOP SECRET
4 on RWASD & Paw, a1 fy 7 230 Fornt Sremet, £E . Wavhengian, OC. POOCE nwa eaedise Sut y Aas TO P'SECRET’ suggested «= Senator Tower. Wel}, the next line says, "Continue to inform dissidents of U.S, gupport for their position.” Senator Mondale. In other words, if r were one of those dissidents and I quot that from thea United States Pursuant to this earlier agreement, I would feel encouraged to believe that I had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, anal thet we weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our govern- ment wag not really neutral, that it encouraged them. Tt is true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it is true, apparently that what you understood was that they ) Wanted the machine guns for assassination and they wanted the ‘ other weapons for personal defanse, but there was etill, it | would seam to me, reason for tham to belisve that they had our support. | Why didn't we say or communicate to tham Wa want you to stop and we don't want thia man assasainated, and wa want you | to know that we will have nothing to do with it? Why wasn't that final -- I just want to maka one more There was a similar talegram sent just before Diem was assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and yt appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're | worried about human life, if we're worried about correcting 4 policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion, TOP SECRET
Sgt ‘ Sn pc HC 882g fies y" the way to really disassociate it ia to gay atop, and that is really what I don't understand. Mr. Goodwin. Wall, let me say, Senator, first of all, that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's | minds. There ‘is no doubt that we hoped that frudillo would. he | overthrown, Not only was their no doubt, but there was a unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it ba ostracized and sanctiona imposed with the hopa that it ? might happen. And that occurred aver before wa took office and we were in full agreement with it, There are papers here which talk about the event of a coup 4 ; Of how you're going to get Trujillo some Money to get him out 7AnNnngS of the country. Assassination wan always a possibility, but HARD & FAULT , & coup d‘etat, & revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that Trujillo was going to be ovarthrown one way or another and not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassi- i Ration because -- in fact, 1¢ would seem at that time to be the : most difficult thing of all to do. Ne was heavily guarded and protected, ordinarily. Thay knew more about it than we did. And when that happened, which we favored that happened, because wa felt that the satablishment of a democratic raqime the United States and to our pelicieas. ft mean, whan we'ra AIG Barat Srcoet 3.1 . Mesimemenn, OC 20002 ‘ talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human ilfe, | ' ‘ {n the Dominican Republic was something not only baneficial to | | TOP SECRET FE RV pA RAED jis
4l tha man waa not only a Fasciat, but he was & murdvurer. He used to have @ freezer room in the back of his house where he would take people and show them the bodies of enemies. But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real concetn was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we wanted to ba associated with the new government. with respect to that last teleqram that it was a fig leaf % Senator Mondulea. I understand, but the arqument is made | teleqram designed to cover our tracks whould assassination occur 4 # / and you arque, and I think Persuagively, that you intended much ~~ a more than that, you intended to make it clear that we wears not y 4 a) WHR & Par to be used. Supporting the assassination, that machine Guns were not going | If that was our intent, and I take ie that it was, why nna we didn‘t wa go one step further and say please communicate to fy i these dissidents who have every reason to believe from past 7 , history that we may be supporting the overthrow,- including assassination, that we Oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo. Wouldn't that make it vary Clear then that we were out of “the business? Mr. Goodwin. [I don't know. It would have made it, I Bupposse, Claarer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as thay wanted SAM C wrt Seemws ST angen, 9.6. 20002 , tO, It was not going to be us that deale with him in.this s, | fashion. ea A a at oa TOP SECRET songs
socks ett ae a nA yn 4 4 7h RARE &® PAWL . Rowerane D.C. 20008 BIG Fret Severs, § & UR Sire RUSE died eats MAMIE “TO PSSECRET fine ae 4 i, Senator Mondale. Yeah, but sea, if we were completely neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate Trujillo that's their buainass. TI agree with it, that’s none of our business. But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day before the job is done and not telling anybody. It seams to ma you should say, boys, I'm out and I don’t want you to @o it. Thea Chairman. I've changed my mind. Senator Mondale. That's why I don’t understand. Senator Baker. It's sort of like the aituation that’s been described to ur where peopla wara beyond control and you couldn’t communicate with tham after the forces had heen set in motion. Mx. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, — don’t know that ther ever was any statement that those guna that were authorized on January 12th, either in ths authorization or subsequant, for “the purposes of assassination or otherwise. Mr. Schwarz. Well,.there' were :scores of those; i and whether they reached you.or not 4s 4 separates and important ll question, but there are four or five examples of communication | ¢0 the Aqancy, and I think passed on to tha State Department, " and that thosa guns were to be used for an assasaination effort i wheather or not tha machine guns wera obtained. Senator Mondale. Well, you sae, that could be important. TOP SECRET
becausa if your understanding was as you have just described than the telegram makes more sense. But if in fact we were implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts ~~ The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Pearborn is. I think it's vary important to understand this matter, to look at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having received the inatruction, the following -- now this is at Tah J, book 2 of 2, the second J. It says -- first of alt, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin? Mr. Goodwin. Yes, 1 do. The Chairman. It says: “One, 1 believe we can hold pro-tinite: States dissidents, although with soma grumbling on the basis 22RD b PAUL sat forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tall tham you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr. Dearborn had not been instructed to tell tham that. “two, following our observations for Department and CAS considerations, A) if attempt is made by United Statea' friands | ' to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations aqainst us | and the best wa can do is sae there ia no proof." | Senator Baker. To see thera is no proof. The Chairman. “The greatast danger point is Thomas Stockar‘l. He was given a small numher of arms hy dissident agents to hold several days and has told several persons disaidants obtained AID 9 wat Greet, SE, Rorh-naten. OC POET Oe aero “ay Pact ttat S | t i theas items from Consulates. Stockard told me saying, I have | TOP SECRET ened ane. Pe ESAT Sof sea Eres) f
FNS Ge erg ie ops ath soiree ner aes rad & Peers (Aves TOP) 344-4008 WARD & PHU Cc c Cc 4 0 7 410 Corer Seeeea ST. veo hienetns. O.6 29083 ow & aoe Rie ROP SECRET informed him this cannot be true oF f would know and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents, I teld him it was impossible. He ‘is greater danger because of parsonal ambiterment against CAS, a matter of which CAS head- | quarters is fully informed.” | Then he goes on to say that “since local CAS is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, ! recommand urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materizlie 30 | they would be in danger and might ba picked up for frujillo- 1 | eee questioning. This ie easily avoidable by quick transfer Fy no These three have engaged in fully authorized activity which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public | position. There ie still considerable job in counterespionsegs and the collection and reporting and nead to follow GODR, | foster Leftist activities.” Now thare’s a vote On. t read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a j different message than thu one you say you intended to send. {AK brief recess was taken.) The Chairman. Let's go back on the record. “ar, Goodwin. Wall, that paraqraph, to ma, Senator, ” nearaqraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear. He saya that he has informed them that he cannet supply arms TOP SECRET i
ca ety NP eT Pe GTN TEE NS [ e RARD B® PHU, 20001 41GB Foret Stemet, SE Wasmenginn, O | should materialize” -- now that in itself, if I may digress a | Moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion assassination might l bs imminent. For he says “If simmering assasaination plat 4 et ¥ to the dissidente, and that ie what is what Kennedy, of course, had said in the telegram. And the requast had baan to know whether or not he could supply arms. So that I aee from that point of view, I am not sure, quite clear, in what way he misinterpreted the telegram. The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms. That's clear enough. But if you go down to B == are you with Me now? Mr. Goodwin. Yas. The Chairman. “Since local CAS" -- I guass that should be chief of Station «- “Since local Chief of Station, than” -- and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- “Since local Chief of Station is now to angaqe mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I recommand urgent transfer from Dominican Rapublic of three CIA cfficers. If simharing assassination piot , | ' 4 1 l { should materialize, they would ba in danger and might be picked up for Trujilllo-type guastioning. This is easily avoidable by | quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling that an assassination might ba imminent, otharwise, why transfar: ‘them. “These three have engaged in fully authorized activities which, if uncovared, could put the United Status in bad public TOP SECRET
7-7 F é 5 | WARD A PHL An 416 Feent Si0004, BE. Hreemeinn, DE poons : inaaegt: died oa HEE UREEEES er OT pecan "he ETOP SECRET position.” Now f would read those words a8 meaning that Mr. Dearborn anticipated at least the real possibility of assaseination attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommending that those CIA officers that had been connacted with having supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic right away. Mr. Goodwin. Well, f would agree with a good part of nae. Senator, although 1 think that there wets assassination plots : simmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this in fact took place. Ané I think he was concerned that the up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill then, And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in t ! | assassination would be unsuccasaful, that Trujillo would pick | t i é the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing. I think, in the telegram that was sant to him that danies the possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that thare might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of Duarborn's, because if the assassination war successful, thera was no need to get the CIA out. The Chairman. . But there ig somathing more, really. tf the possibility of assassination was a Lond continuing thins, always on tha mind of Naarhorn, why doas he raspond to this TOP SECRET
instruction by saying, get these man out now? Mr. Goodwin. Well X think obviously these people had relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt anyway, with or without the machine guns. lie thought the attemp ‘might be abortive, and if so, he thoudht that all Americans or people that worked for him or with him would be in danger. The Chairman. Then-you would have to aqres with ma, wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt was imminent. Mr. Goodwin. % think that's clear. Year, 1 think 1@ was. . wah & Fave The Chairman. And he took this sufficiently serious to recommend getting the three CIA aqents out without further ; delay? ands Mr. Goodwin. 1 think that’s riqht. That's absolutely ltrua, because I think he believed that there was a serious 74 9 attempt in the offing, as’ indeed there was, and he was absolute! I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of | vight and he was doing his job wall. . | ie | the telegram, is that I sat in the office with Prasidant h Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which ¢ did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, beacause he cannot 610 Foyt Seewet $C. Harrengton, OC. 20003 testify to that matter, 80 it’s not a quastion of reading the text so much as deciding whether or not t'm telling the truth TOP SECRET t raise agra aN ee ee cs
Aae SES about that instruction. Mc. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth -- | Me, Goodwin. Thank you. { | Mr. Schwarz. We hava to explore wheather something went j wrone in the communication procass, and f want to put some information in front of you and then see if you can help us | explain what, if anything, want wrong. Would you show him Exhibit 2-A. Now Exhibit 2-A is a cable dated March 20th from the Agency in the pominican Republic to the Aqancy in Washington, And reading in Paragraph 1, it describes the way in which =~ it i describes a plot. In Paragraph 4, it says the following: “To do, thay need five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1909 rounds f RAPD ® PAUL ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently fs the assassination. a ‘told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the 4 4 carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense \ i | now again, wate you told -~ now, in Exhibit 1, you were | \ ‘weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telagram indicates. vt Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says. | _ Mr. Schwarz. . Right. I understand that, | ae Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that BLO Past Gereet. OE. Peasnmatnn, OC. on00 5 } the weapons had been passed for parsonal defense purposes, do " il TOP SECRET Saga MZ CpAs ETE SEY. Sart
ory rats 4597 23" IG Py COO eet, Sa ae fe ee “SP SECRET © cds Fees o you think that 4s consistant, © is candid, in light of the EY fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons ware | # 3 going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination. ve ~ ft Mr. Goodwin, Well, thera are several communicationa ~| | regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously : RTS FUR Hs: cn * inconsistent. | you're going to have a fire fight with machine quns, IT mean Be 7 Mr. Schwarz. They are. | a b Me. Goodwin. The telagrams say it, but on the other hand, | a { e 9 a carbine or pistol is hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would + io - 10 regard that as raying T am going ta strangle him. And if | in other words, it swema to ma that somebody is interpretting | me ee! x wae y a4 @. % WARS @ Pave b | i? | what they say, or they might have had five or six different . i e c | a, i ka co 1é : plans. re Cc ws The request that came to the White Houssa, finally, was He “ al very spacific, and this is too, that additional weapons are | ts oo : : a YW i needed in order to carry out an assasaination plot. If maan, | Pe 1, | however you read this, thsy do say they need additional weapons ' g yy te carry off an assassination. And that is what the President [ 3 a Lat that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about e oe the oriqinal transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that. i yy | he had established or any directions that he had given, immadiately “ . : i cae said, you know, make it clear to Nearborn that we're not getting a “ae i a i ve, involved in assassinations. They can do what thay want, but | i we are not going to gat duvolvad. | TOP SECRET
WAT & PAUL BO Feat Street, SE. eaahinaien, OC fogs 4 it peraeeees He RE Saag SCHR AE Sg gues HERE SUR ON RRP ae oharee/semern nr yere ny, : Sar aT Crt. eT ao “a 86 Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which wa wete implicated and he told you that we don‘t want any part of it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that, and that is what you thought you had dona? Nr. Goodwin. Tt would phrase it a little bit differently. Senator, which is to say 1 would say there were people who wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns and his response was probably like, ycu mean some idiot gave them guns? I said, yes. He said -- thia is a paraphrase <-- you know, if you knaw Senator Kennedy, or Prasident Kennedy, ' { maan, he said, well, let's maka it Clear. And if you compare . 1 my draft with the State Department draft, I was overriding, as ; they point out, bacduse their draft says, we're trying to tet ' this message through but we're blocked by “Mr. Goodwin and have » to send his message instead. They would rather blame ma, of * courge, than the President. It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condones assassination. {%t does not say cannot condone being caught at ‘assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And! hind | “ ehat bacauss he told me to do that. The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kennedy policy a8 one of gettinn the qovernmant no further involve? because there had besn @ past involvaemant? tle knew that an: TOP SECRET
% TOP SECR you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished dissident groupa who had expressed an interest in assaseinating Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram y was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kennedy Administration wanted no furthsr involvement in thig =~ Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the President found out on May Lith that pursuant to the authorization that ' pracesdad his coming into office that a couple of carbines and pistols had been transferred in order to mount 4 major assault on @ governmant thet had lasted for thirty years, and 1t seamed 1 at that point likes 4 formidable threat to Trujillo. | lie wanted to make it absolutely clear when he found out that anybody who wanted to assassinata Trujillo in the Dominican waa & Fave ' Republic that they ware going to do it on their own, the i no more Weapons and -this is why he said wa do not want to _ condone assasSination or be associated with it. And that’s why t United States would have nothing to do with it and wea give out | i | ‘rt wrote the telegram that Tf drafted that's in my handwriting. Senator Towar. Well, may T ask you, then, what you 'dinterpratted the meaning of thea first sentence in number 3, ‘*continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for Ji their position?” : Me. Goodwin. Thay Were 7 their position was that, what i they regarded a8 that Trujillo should be overthrown and replaces: I by a moderata govarnmant. Wa supported that position, as did B10 F oat Stewes, $E . Mahenton, oc 7oOoO) | i 4 t Fk i | TOP SECRET | a bean ae: SES TEAL CRS Ae GIS od : oe a tai IPS Cra : < Fas eee ee Me™
gS RUE Ug SES gg PHY Hee eet RSs ¢ BD: SOMES I as cgine at: Fis = ey cae » B Selec. Se ote SST it peg ae Soe SH SEraee Sear eaeee sy pores ns d denna rit meer: av aretener ¢- ROSARY SERRE S ANE TORE TSE YE TE ABO B' SECRET. $2 the other mambers of the Organization of American States, and we wanted to make it very clear that we did support that position, and we wished them well in their efforts to establish y that position and if they did we would recoqnize their govern- ‘ment and sand them assistance, which we did. As & matter of fact, wea took much greater efforta to 1 gat rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the | j assaagination than anything that precesded it, ineluding bringing i; the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad .Trujille at the direction of tha Secretary of Dafanse. Instead | of carbines and pistols, wa brought in dastroyers, aircraft ; carriers and Marine battalions so that thay would know what a ‘the consequences might be if they didn't gat out when they cot fn a Bam a Fave i) " out. nq If I might make one more point, Sanator, if I may, is that a) ‘the countries of South America are full of quns sent thare by the American government to be used to kill thousands of ; People over the last several decades, and with the leone “exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armies ~ 4! from on top -- of courses you'rya well-acquainted with that -- “sant knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal . | struqqies. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo ee happened to be the head of State, which is a practical ‘distinction, but you’ could hardly make a moral one. BLO ® ret Sheet AE  Wasneneton, (FC Poo? Senator Baker, Mr. Chairman, could t agk a quastion in TOP SECRET Pd
TR Sa des es cites fee dotance herd aay EA UT AE ETT mes at Eye rae ae SR ait es : that respect? The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that, although that is a philosophical argument. Sanator Raker. Ara you talling ua, Mr. Goodwin, that assassination, not of heads of state, hut assassination of lesser figuras was a common, ordinary occurrence in South America at the behest of America or with American support? Mr. Goodwin. No, t am talking about that we supply arms to revolutionary groups or to armed groups which we did in say Bolivia, or sometimes to tha government itself, of in Chile we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with | the knowledge that our assistance would he used in internal £ 3 atruggies. WASH & Fae oe I don't have to use the word assassinations. ‘7 Senator Baker. But how about for internal struggles, then, 4 as opposed to assassination? fy “r. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struggle in the The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction, : Dominican Republic. | | | because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is i I 3 . hoa difference between first deqras murder and manslaughter. te 1 t I Thers is supposed to connote 4 certain differance in moral i{ ; ih connotations, and undertaking delibarate action that is _ Maahangtns, OC 20602 we 420 © cert Seeowt_ k ; 3 targetted against a particular parson with the intantion of it I murdering that person is normally reqardad undar our crimina) TOP SECRET WDA AE a Nee EST eae
a : a6 ioe’) laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore 9 || definted as murder'in the first degree. So there mast be some 3 {|} gradation there. “| r $ Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are qradations, althouch I do | think that many of the activities against, say, someone like 6 | Allende or others are aqually tarqatted in Latin American 7 || countries and not just general conflict or the killing of g | Particular += Mexicans, of'course, traditionally go out and 9 shoot down leaders of naw guerrilla groups or insurqents, but iy || not necessarily with our guns. The Chairman. But in any evant you're not testifying hare | to your cartain knowledge the United States government particinas ' | ted in an assassination attempt or assisting in an assassina- RAM & Pave { i { | tlon attampt’ -=- Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that ' subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acte. | In any eVent, I do want to return to this. | This was -- clearly Prasidant Kennedy was much closer to yours, Nr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination: took, place, 7 | I ‘ i i President Kennedy was in Paris and a3 ona of the documants we looked at indicates, thera was a meeting at which Vice President! Johnson was interasted in finding out what had happened and you t | nad a teview of this, and discussad in that review that the B1O F weet Feet SE Mawnan, OC. 20003 TOP SECRET weapons had been passed, the small arma and the machine guns | |
RASH & Pave, BEER ret Steer FT RMprringen OC POOR co ke ee BRERA pg oR Qe ESE IEG pikes: hadn‘t been passed and the assassination occurred. Now, after that review, were any steps taken to make, a8 a matter of more general, governmental peiicy, the policy which is expressed in the telegram you drafted at Prasident Kannedy‘- instruction? Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge. {A brief recess was taken.) Tha Chairman. Po you have any more questions? Me. Schwarz. I don’t hava any more questions. Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enliahten- i | meant? i a Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination? if if f i t Me. Goodwin. I don't think so, but Let me read through The Chairman. On the assassination. i all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have {! | something else, if f can find anything else in thera -- I do i \ think this is pretty complete. The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again sarly next Nr. Goodwin. And Puvallier. The Chairman. Mr. Dennin, they've been un all niqhe, , a would lika to ask ¢wo quastionrs. | i Mr. Dannin. Wall, whan you said thera ware no more i fl | questions, I just ralsad ths possibility and you discussad it Weuk, On the Cuban phase of your testimony. | ' i H TOP SECRET ¥ ENS
Pret (Pome 202) 946-4069 be) 6 7 8 . 9 e 106 = i ra a 3 H Vis oO: ct le 8 14 Cc. 16 c el 1 ~ }7 yes Boys wv 6 .. + Be we » t é ) : 5 ee t a 20 i ° at 2f ee STOP’ SECR about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held after the assassination before ha came back, at which the whole matter was discussed, initially with Vics President Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last ons, with President Kannedy. Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We had, of course, a serias of emergencies. We had an emergency mesting, and cabled the Prusident who was in Paria, and the first matter on our mind was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who waa the son of Trujille, from taking over, and we didn't know whare he was, at first, it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at least indicated, Senator, that if thay were planning it, it waan't done in a very comprehanaive fashion, and we found ha was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to detain him, but it was too late. By the time wa found out, he had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to Cuidad Trujillo, and I believe there was some effort mada to bluff him off by sending messages to ths plane in flight, diverting it to some Amurican airport, but he didn't do that. and he landad and took over. And I think the principal aim of our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle, Nector -- and I forget tha othar fellow's nama «- cut of there so that the kind of moderates government that we wantad could | be installed. TOP SECRET oe ee
And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make 2 | various inducements like ha could take his money out, it was 3 discussed that if ha would leave peaceably, but what finally happened was when McNamara movad tha fleet in over the horizon 1 and an Air Force General bombed the palace, that was the end, ha got on his boat and left. The Chairman. Air Force Ganeral? Mr. Goodwin. A Pominican Air Force General. tla decided that wag an easier target than the Amettcan float. Thea Chairman. Wasa tha bombing done at our instruction? Mr. Goodwin. No, I don’t buliave so. TI was tryina to remeambur that, but I don't baliavea it was. As T remember, RPAROH &® Pave it was quite a surprise to us that this fallow had takan the initiative, The moving of the fleet was intended as sort of a threat that if they didn't gst out we might come in and gat them. There was no, howsver, no, at that point, no country attempted to do that, just to scara them, And the fleet was actually chesred in the Gominican Republic, a very rare occasion, But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make Parriagnn D.C 20002 himself Aictator and two of his own officers arrestad him. They &li hed been trained in American military achools. Mr. Schwarz. Te completa the racord on thea responsa to BIG Cas Seow VE the teleqram We had Nearborn'a raaction, © Ya will read into TOP SECRET S ¢
wad d Paute B10 Forse Grreet. 4 €., Wavmsegtion, OC 7006) RARER ene SP StCRET the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of Station in response to the telegram 'Mr. Goodwin drafted. Assume -- vefarance fh, that's the telegram, “Final word on present policy in which KUDARK” == that's CIA -- “work here must be based. Para 2 and Para %, that reference, are for practical purposes retreat from previous policy. Howaver, i Headquarters aware extent to which opyoxee that is, the United States ~-“already associated vith RSE - == that is the assassination of Trujillo. -- "if we are to at least try ‘cover up tracks' KUBARK parsonnal directly involved tn fae preparations must be withdrawn now.” I don't know if that merits comment or not. Tt just Mr. Goodwin. I think it's accurate and it also raflects Dearborn's own disappointment that -- Nr. Sehwarz. CIA. | happens to be how it was interpratted hy CIA. - | | i Mr. Goodwin. CIA's disappointment, which is understandable. The Chairman. Any further quastions? Senator Tower? Mr. Smothers? Mr. Smothars. Mr. Chairman, I'd rather wait t111 the return of the witness. The Chairman. Yas, Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to RGR Seeder ae ee CRE 5 Teas Ree ed
“ x Tas i aq £ dle hae Pigs eeartal « Nous a 4 ATTESTED ECRET 222: vot. up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be reviewed. We're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We want you to be fully awara of whatever documentation we havea so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the policy at the time. Mr. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and - then duplicate it. Mr. Schwarz. Well, shall wa plan, for safety, on the staff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday? Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going ta Rumford, faine and getting tha things out, I think it will be safer Wednesday, | e ? re that's not too inconvenient. Rate » FAW a The Chairman. Wednesday? a ALL right. Thank you very much. i. A (whereupon,. at 6:35 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at .8:30 o'clock a.m., Priday, July lL, 1975.) Sto Fast Street, SE Wawmecgton, O.0. POO) TOP SECRET