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FIELD DOUBLE AGENT GUIDE. TABLE OF CONTENTS _ SUBJECT _ PAGE. L INTRODUCTION | ; 1 I, THE DOUBLEAGENT OPERATION: 9 2-24 | GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS - A. Definition 2 . | | -'B. DA Types by Origin 3-6. 1, Transfers . 3 . 2. Walk-In or Talk-In 3n4 € 3, Dand D - 4 * 4 Provocation ; 45 arc at ean Ee ARSON IS eR RASCALS C. Goals in DA Operations 6-10 1, KUBARK. 6-9 2. Adversary 9-10 B. Selection and the Four Key Tests . ; 16-13 L The Tests . oo "49-12 a. Withholding py b. Stayability — i ec, Adversary Trust i ad, Control of Communication 11-312 i -:. KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY wim SECRET
+ aye Ga SECRE KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY | EX i SUBJECT _ PAGE 2. Significance of Tests 12 3. U.S. Citizens as DA's 12-13 ; E, Planning and Preliminary Steps 13~24 i 1. Estimating Adversary Goals 13 2. Information Needed for Planning 13-17 i 3, The Plan 17-22 , 4, Preliminary Testing of Bona Fides 23-24 ' I, THE DOUBLE AGENT AS A PERSON 25.33 A. Willingness 25-26 B, Emotional Stability 26—27 i C. Emotional Attachments to Others 27-28 ey . | D, Level of Intelligence 28 : | E. Gullibility - Scepticism 29 i F. Trustworthiness 29430 | G. Ambition "30 H, Clandestinity 30-31 ! I. Introversion - Extroversion 32 e J, Other Traits 32 i i K, Summary 32-33 | i 44 Gopy No. ! | o \ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY d. WEP SECRET | “eet aurea sonnmtrineertnane moat ne ne 8 Plo m o orcmmceice: eee mre caren etna a EAA lyn 8G A me SO eat ot et aia ner i od Apwanatae u dae cate res 8s sa coke Mince tate
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SUBJECT 64-67 H, Finances -t ‘L Reporting © 67-69 -10=82 VL CASE OFFICER'S CHECK LIST 83-90 iv .. .KKUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY
TEs, oon CRIES ENS Sear tn. eaemumnaN i. Hanson na roite sen de tenet mesatee! ah NEP TEUTE dana ome Cee ett eeatocemee Rit + a . KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY. . Field Guide for Double Agent Operations I, INTRODUCTION — For the past two years KUDESK’has been engaged in a detailed analysis of KUBARK double agent cases, The results have been collated, and the findings have been dis- seminated within headquarters in a study which is also © ' available to the field upon request. - 1 This guide is intended for field use by case officers and . others concerned with DA operations, It represents both the above research and the views of a number of experienced and senior KUBARK officers. , If field reporting of double agent operations: includes all: essentials discussed here, further research on. this subject: -. will be facilitated and further guidance'will result, ina’. continuing cycle, The comments and views of the users of this guide are solicited, oO KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ° | GBP SECRET 7" 7 Pegggnaen — sams cg aD i
ll. THE DOUBLE AGENT OPERATION: | GENERAL PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS _ a.’ discussion of operational details appears in Part V of this guide. Here the purpose is to present basic infor- mation and principles about the beginnings of DA operations. A. Definition, A double agent is a person who engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one to the other or about each to the other, and who is. wittingly withholding significant information from one on the instruc- . tions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so ae ‘that significant information ig. upethheld from the other. 2 service, Peddlers, fabricataks. and. others. who do not per~ form a service for an intelligence organization, ‘but only for ‘themselves, are not agents at all and therefore are not .” - Cc DA's. As a rule the DA has an agent. relationship with both - services, a fact which distinguishes him: from the penetration : agent, who usually serves the CI service as an agent but. the. target or adversary service as a staff member or ina staff capacity. Multiple agents frequently draw a variety of assignments from several services, Although they may pro- vide counterintelligence information, and although they ‘present difficulties in handling and security which resemble these problems in the double agent operation, the two types are distinct. The DA is usually directed against a single __ va adversary, whereas the multiple agent resembles a private detective with a number of clients, The part of the definition which stipulates the with- holding of significant information results from the fact that an agent who tells everything he knows to both sides becomes, unless unwittingly manipulated by one of the services, an un- authorized liaison channel with the enemy. Such situations are unprofitable and cease to be operations, 7 hee aP "” KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY | AS -KUBARK INTERNAL USEONLY) 92 0) wee ele
Stee: mA (Mand Mok aaa eerie ed INDE rere Rab he 2 act ORIENT Ot vs Ladte teat Aah PIE entat Elo 2s ARB A bak te’ ge betet patentee se sot. g tap ETE DESI RE ROSS eID EE RROD The ER PALA Ph DOES He ASAT Be AT TS hate le A ee LTT ES eC) ¥ ‘ways: a walk-in or talk-in, hostile agent detected and ‘liaison; when it does, it is important that the type of origin briefed as completely.as possible. Flaws imbedded in the an agent of an adversary service volunteers information to a ” KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY. B. Types of DA Operations by Origin. . " Almost all double agent operations begin. in one of three doubled, or a provocation. KUBARK often.acquires a DA. case by transfer from another 'ODYOKE> service or from oe Teeter = be included in the information obtained from the transferring service, A DA.case can also result if one service offers recruitment to the agent of another not because of provoca- tion or stake-out but by chance, 1. The Transferred Agent. Analysis suggests that nearly two-thirds of KUBARK's. oo DA operations begin (for KUBARK) by transfer from another‘ service, Usually, however, the transferring service merely rade initial contact with a walk-in and turned him over to KUBARK without having used him operationally, Ifa going | operation is transferred, it is vital that the base or casé officer accepting jurisdiction obtain the case-records ofthe <« prior service, If:these.are unavailable; knowledgeable::.. --- representatives of the transferring service'should: be de- operation may make it unsuitable for exploitation or may” require correction, In addition to determining origin, the KUBARK case officer should obtain the prior service's assessment of the DA, both as person and as agent. Even if the case officer considers that the earlier handling was defective, he should give due weight to such an assessment, _P In a few operations KUBARK has repeated the mistakes. of RS the transferring service through failure to obtain an assess- ment or' through ignoring the earlier record, , sae gemcmasarapasirage ss | + sam eee cage tee 2, The Walk-In and Talk-In, More than half of KUBARK's DA cases start because | <> KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY
.. apteseinee . non-Bloc service or official, Although the danger of provo- _. ¢ation is always present in walk-in cases, the fact remains ' that DA operations that have bégun in thia way have, as a _ Class, proven more re-rarding to KUBARK than any other ‘KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY. type. The agent of an adversary service who approaches KUBARK. and volunteers information about the adversary has ‘a choice of a number of means of making the first contact. In addition t to presenting himself physically (to KUBARK or any‘: ‘ODYOKE. intermediary), he can send an emissary, write a ‘a letter, make a phone call, or even establish radio contact, KUBARK's problem, clearly, is to separate the walk-ins and talk-ing who are acting on their own initiative from those who are seeking contact at the instigation o of a hoeatile. service. 3, Detected and Doubled (D & D). About a fifth of the DA cases handled directly by KUBARK have begun with the identification of a hostile agent, -interrogation, and doubling, Analysis suggests . that in peacetime D &-D. cases are frequently perilous and «<<. “unprofitable, The:agent's agreement'to double, obtained under stated or: implied duress,’ is rarely accompanied by’ - ‘a real -switch-in loyalties. . The likeliest exception is the _ agent. who served the adversary unwillingly, under pressure, and who (though afraid to approach the authorities on his own initiative) is relieved when his clandestine role is brought te light, The risk in handling D k D cases is also mitigated \ in joint operations conducted with liaison services that can exercise strong executive authority. |. 4 The Provocation Agent, Provocation is the least common origin of DA cases. When employed, it has, in the past, been used by a Bloc service against KUBARK or another Western service more frequently than vice-versa, Provocation may be direct, as a KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY .
_. KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY i : 3 mt : _in an approach by a walk-in or talk-in, or indirect. The i 5 | ‘latter technique usually employs an agent whose access i 3 ‘ and other assets make him attractive te the adversary and . i § '- who. places himself in the way of recruitment without seizing t é 7 the initiative. Provocation through direct-approach is — ? % mS plainly difficult if the adversary service is sophisticated. ; ‘Even the agent whom we initially consider detected and doubled can be a provocation, We may have learned something (but not all) of the atory of his ties to the adversary i because the adversary wanted us to. Or the agent's con- : fession ray be partial; he may withhold, for example, one : channel of communication to the hostile service and then, through that channel, ‘tell the adversary how much he has told us. Pete cree atten: A provocation agent establishing initial contact as te, -a@ walk-in must have direct contact with the target service ne at least once, And the target service, if interested in the a) - bait, is likely to try to arrange for future meetings on te . territory under its jurisdiction (or that of a cooperative ~ ; , service), Under such circumstances the provoking. service ee, ; usually fears some slippage of:control. The provocateur: . , ne _-who never appears - who makes contact only by mail, W/T, Tony ‘@ go-between, or a like medium ~ is less likely to be acceptable to the target service, and if accepted is less - likely to be trusted, But the security and control advantages — for the provoking service are obviously weighty. og GET (RPP AR ES AN Had PRT ase ag te nay oe pee MRR SAE pT aterm KUBARK use of provocation seems to be a rarity, so that the available evidence has not provided a basis for estimating our effectiveness in using the technique, Because its value has been demonstrated by others, however, personnel are urged to plan and mount, as feasible, provocation oper=- ations designed to yield counterintelligence of high quality. 5, The way in which a double agent operation starts is of continuing significance, The chances that KUBARK oO __ °.-  KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY 5 teage omen tuner eeneNaen cfr reve Ne (ta ‘ iiaettdieiiememes ance tae atone teed tee “oe
KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY will "get the edge" are best if the agent's prior service - was with KUBARK rather than the opposition, are better oo a | than average if he is a walk-in who has not delayed in | ; oo CO L telling his story to a non-Communist official or service i and who passes KUBARK testing, and are poor if a detected | adversary agent has been compelled to double. As the oper = | ation develops, the case officer -‘should'‘not forget the. Significance of the way in which it started, C. Goals: Kubark and Adversary, 4 5 t { E 5 ph _ KUBARK INTERNAL USEONLY =) ss (‘on Trent et A hate eae Stee eet pe Le et ENRON go aE ANN ~~~ = tReet feet ei 4
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te ste ah ae eRe ata he elt ere bot teen Matte ee Ree ae ce eee oe PRA ab ek I te Fe er Reo Tp SRN ods Ui Cente CER RR ro rs Mi SCNT BEX Me Sapte Shai ies PRR eae SSSI RE IEP er ie 4 % \ i i i | teats aye wat GBB SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY i i t } “4 i 2, Adversary Goals, Analysis of a number of unilateral KUBARK double agent operations has shown the following adversary objectives, listed in order of descending frequency: a. To obtain information on emigres and emigre Groups outside the Bloc. This goal is frequently coupled with the purpose of gaining information about AIS (or other non-Communist IS) use of emigres, b. To penetrate the AIS or other non-Communist services. -9- eet, KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY BBB SECRET >
ne FE Sy thea : Va | SECRET o VA KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY c,. To acquire intelligence about U.S, non-intelli. gence personnel and organizations abroad, principally military. d, To serve other adversary operations ina supporting role. e, To obtain information about AlS-associated organizations abroad, £. To assassinate or kidnap, ge To ensure the safe return of an agent detected by the AIS, h, To exploit for KUCAGE purposes. i. To recruit or place an agent inside PBPRIME, je To establish an agent as a long-range illegal ao in the West, er k. To determine the fate and whereabouts of Bloc intelligence defectors. The early discernment of the adversary's true ob- jectives is important because determination of hostile appetite, obtaining clearances for release of information to the DA, other operational decisions, and termination and disposal require an understanding of the purposes of the opposition. Of course, the ultimate goals of the hostile service may not become evident for some time. But esti-~ mates based on targets, access, and the DA's potential are still useful, D, Selection and the Four Key Tests. 1, The testing of a double agent should be continuous, and a wide choice of testing mechanisms is available, But ~ 19 - KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY O pee se ree a pee ene t i
4-90000 e cama PLR AL A AE DEPRIN NBA oe kt SB NY A FESS IESE REED EY EPIL gb CIE ETSI 2 oa Sa SEME RSAC OE NEE heen NOL ae tn elena ei ee SA nce bie nee Poe ee peg GIO cate 8 bins on, aot batts KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY before a decision is reached on accepting or rejecting a DA opportunity, asking the following four key questions will help us to strike the balance, a, Has the potential DA told us everything? Or are there any indications of withholding? In particular, is there reason to suspect that he has withheld a communi- cations channel to the opposition? b, Does the prospective DA have stayability? That is, is he emotionally and psychologically stable, and are there good prospects of conducting the operation on a long- term basis? Can he sustain the anticipated stresses indefinitely ? c, Does the opposition trust him? Some indication of degree of adversary trust may be found in his length of service, che nature and level of his assignments, level of pay, and quality of communications systems provided him, SpER UMN eR hte BEDE DS TT Ela PUR TP IIE termed Patines pate Bem RRMA HER TUR PO RAEI reat canine mmr -~li- KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY WERE SECRET - | ee ee sey erreigy teen enatren ee ©
i 4.90000 KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY . ae ety Direct control of a DA's W/T link would require the presence of the KUBARK case officer whenever the agent receives or transmits, Although direct control is not usually feasible, monitoring all incoming and outgoing transmissions permits effective indirect control. Such monitoring has the advantage that it can be concealed from the DA. Most agents to whom hostile services communi- cate by one-way voice-link are scheduled to receive >road- Casts at least once a week, One preliminary test of bona i fides, accordingly, is the monitoring of the next scheduled oo i message after initiation of the double agent operation, , : 2. A potential DA operation need not be rejected because it fails to pass all four tests. But ncgative answers are danger signs, marking the elements of the case which must be regularly re-evaluated as the operation progresses, ; i i = 12 = KUBARK INTERN AL USE ONLY WO create pontine mentee en - cere teen ame ee we me ee ert ae cee pte cee . Tot tee TO aaa te if ates
tort gc pa a erring eee tn ete ree aloe gt ate 1 tea ae SRNL eke nate REGAN TES AEST 250, CP ly OSGI MALATE Te DAM AAU Pal co DA RRR RIN RS bP rn et Ph AO wopanic TERNAL USE ONLY Bs oe EB Planning. and: Preliminary Steps. Se ec cam 1, Before.a DA operation starts, a considered plan oe oot should -be prepared, In its details the plan is necessarily , ‘ ‘more tentative than is r;ost operational planning because : the operational initiative rests - and should rest -almost = - re | entirely with the adversary. But usually we.can estimate _ ae - the goals of the opposition at or near the beginning of a DA “ | case, If we have.a good idea of what the enemy is after and = if we know everything essential to our-part‘of the case,:the .: - 7 re hidden fraction which. constitutes the: double: life ‘of’ the agent” an ne | | and the operation, then we can plan effectively. oO | | we ten EE Ne ree ee meng ae eR ee ne ee ame wigj usin eons Ram nt A (sneer
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14-00000 f 3 SECRET t “~ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY - ; , m, Time and support availabie, The base or station planning a double agent operation should consider whether enough time and support will be available, Ideally, | the case officer who will conduct the operation should be i staying in the field for a lengthy period, so that a transfer is not required soon after the operation has started. He should have enough time to conduct and report the case well, Assistance should be available when needed for surveillance, countersurveillance, monitoring of radio communications, control of hostile dead-drops, continuous testing and assessment of both agent and operation, and other time-consuming essentials, If time and support are inadequate, the operation may consist almost entirely of ; periodic debriefing of the DA, with little or no attempt to i i obtain information independently, Under such circum- stances it may be better, at the outset, to drop other activity to make room for the case or to reject the prospective DA operation, n, Termination and disposal, In some long-range ; operations no plans for termination and disposal can be ‘ made at the outset. In other cases, and especially those , intended to run for shorter periods, it is best to plan the ending at the start. o~ 21 » EN eBe tae, GREE UPS wa nee Poentee Otte sews se weer persons ng € KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY a wet Aree & wy SECRET , oy, ETRE Ta Te ete etme etre o | | | “a / | |
ere. a8EH SECRET WA KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Prosecution is normally ruled out because of the necessity to avoid condonement and legal entanglement, But if a decision to prosecute can be reached at the beginning, all subsequent handling can be designed to pre- serve the chain of evidence and other requirements of the court. In such cases, including those involving U.S, citizens, KUBARK should either bow out, as a rule, or seek immediately the assistance of a duly constituted executive authority. Joint operations usually present fewer problems of termination and disposal because of the facilities avail- able to the host service, Ifa unilateral DA case is to be turned over to liaison, it is usually best to do so before th- dwindling equity has disappeared completely, so that there is more chance that liaison will accept jurisdiction and less chance of irritating the liaison relationship, Eurly | | transfer has two other advantages; it minimizes the amount of information which the DA acquires about KUBARK, and it facilitates legal detention in those cases in which pro- longed interrogation of the DA is desirable, - 22 - wSSEaaae. KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY SECRET ft ve we cette ee / eee ane ee rennet ee ge gang attnnmanienennege en Fg Mats Mea a
£4-00000 WR SECRET / =~ | KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY / 4 Preliminary Testing of Bona Fides, A thorough teating of bona fides requires the ava:l- ability of all the information outlined above and in Part IV of this guide... But in one or two initial meetings the case officer can conduct the following quick and pr eliminary tests, to be augmented by deeper probing as the operation develops, ' c. If the agent arrived on the scene recently, any _ friends or relatives of his in the area should be traced quickly. If he is a provocation agent, he may have ordera to establish contact with a friend or relative who has an established IS tie. d. The agent's documents should be subjected to technical examination, ® e, If LCF LUTTER is te be used atall, the first test should be made as early as possible. Refusals to undergo testing should be reported, as well as any indi- cations that the agent has been briefed on the technique, o Beer tn - 23 - EASES, ) KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY SGP SECRET / RM RTE RTE ST pte St de UR ae EIEN LA SIR, wate (etree niet atctentenes Tite ge Mae A AGERE Lr ethonennentntate se tee ow etin eee mp nem ta oe gaan “at meursareeserunens « ees RIT ig ran E : Pe “EFF
14-00000 $ + REA & Rete usermagiaetn He tn aero > / J / SECRET f ~/ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY om, f, The interviewer or prospective case officer should be on the alert during initial meetings for phrases or concepts characteristic of clandestine activity and for any other clues to prior intelligence training or experience which the agent is concealing. g. The agent should provide dates and reasons for any errests, Arrests in denied areas, followed by come paratively quick release, may indicate intelligence recruit- ment. h, The prospective DA may be asked to signa statement that if he is held and aurfaced by the opposition or exploited for purposes of propaganda, this fact will constitute prima facie evidence of coercion, Refusal to sign may indicate hostile control, although it may also indicate timidity. If a DA operation is conducted and if the DA later remains or is detained in a denied area, where he is used for purposes. of Communist propaganda, the signed statement may be useful, “y it is stressed that this list of suggestions is intended to serve only as a superficial guide to assessment of bona fides before the operation is launched. Much more information about the DA as both person and agent is re- quired for the establishment of bona fides, - 24 - Gree: FOBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY _~ senate ae oe Te rte a AT geet tam aromas eee : PM ete teeta Lobe isin, SECKET | . i { ee eee nee ot me Me ontee ante Om Ieee vine amen
ri SECRET —_ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY f MW. THE DA AS A PERSON In the opening phase of the DA operation, as was mentioned earlier, all basic personalia on the agent and selected associates are assembled, bona fides are deter- mined or estimated, and a preliminary psychological assessment is drawn up, Somewhat later, but still early in the case, a more searching examination should be made : of the agent as a person, This assessment, sent to head- quartera as a separate dispatch, should include informa- tion about the following topics, The following discussion of the psychological charac- teristics of double agents is based upon research and : analysis of unilateral, peacetime, KUBARK cases, Our i postwar experience strongly suggests that there are vital differences between peacetime DA's and DA operations and } those directed in war, when patriotism, idealism, and subordination of self were rnore frequently encountered. f A, Willingness to serve as a DA, The results of case analysis to date amply demonstrate the importance of establishing whether the agent wants to be a double or not. Those peacetime DA's who enjoy the xole tend to share, in greater or lesser degree, a number of distinctive psychological and emotional characteristics, An understanding of these traits is extremely useful to the case officer, Unwilling DA's, serving either service er both against their own inclinations, are more variegated but are usually unlike the willing doubles in major respects, They usually seek - consciously or not - to end the oper~ ation as quickly as they can without damage to themselves or those emotionally close to them, Therefore a long-range pian, of indefinite duration, based upon an unwilling double agent is very likely to founder because of his persona lty rather than external, operational factors, » 25 = KUBARE INTERNAL USE ONLY 4 : . ne tet eaten EH enn, eee ow gas an 5 Weoade + 4 Rae ae ea Cee a LR EE Te od Ts an AED ARE nae! : BEAR Ree ten ges pa aR s fo. SRSA HUN ie ated otiee + Pope ENTER Se Pere Ba ctl Esa aad Bhi anced a ee ‘ i i i H ( ‘ i iH ' : ARETE Nerina: rere aan ate net er tor cer rmprmemeneiey erewererninen ++
14-00000 ay ogy @ER SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY i e 1, In the operations studied to date willing DA's have outnumbered the unwilling in a ratio of seven to one, 2. Ina majority of the KUBARK DA cases studied to date the case officers have made little or no attempt to ex- plain in writing the kinds of persons with whom they were dealing, It is plain that case officers cannot be expected to produce professional psychiatric or psychological analyses, nor are these usually necessary, It is also clear that case officers invariably form an estimate of the agent's per- sonality. But if the estimate is dim, unformulated, or unreported, two drawbacks result, The case officer's handling of the agent is weakened; and the quality of help from headquarters, station, or elsewhere also suffers, Our experience shows that there is a high correlation be~ tween a sound assessment and a sound operation, B. Emotional stability. 1, More useful than a general conclusion about the ~ DA's emotional stability is a report of the circumstances ~ under which he is stable and unstable, 2, Willing DA‘s show much higher-than-average emotional stability in stress situations, which they tend to dramatize and enjoy. For example, they often show little or no reluctance to meet the adversary in a denied area, (They are apt, however, to exaggerate their cool- ness under fire when reporting on the adversary.) Con- versely, they are less stable in slack periods than are most persons, Suffering from boredom rather than tension, they may relieve the monotony by heavy drinking, sexual eadventurousness, or shady financial deals, Their ; dangerous restlessness evaporates, however, when they are kept busy operationally. 3. Unwilling DA's show the reverse pattern, They i avoid situations of stress and are agitated by them. They ~ 26 - a KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Cc g aa SECRET 1 ' . Seon rae an lh in mantener ek tomes -sts angen wlek hee, tornanetnele remmennenyir aie + mote TSN sraemamemtemer ar wes mmm 4 ot i ater 77 ~s . . ST ese 7 SORT URL ae eleee pene + ene peepee ere nt gin f Sok RETO a ‘ze
Pee arte 7 nem A RL, Zin TSE, eine orwpaaanamataermeraatomaae Me eo Ge SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY / do their best work under safe and routine conditions, DA's who are unwilling but valuable require much help and ’ yeassurance from case officers, especially in the form of detailed security safeguards, C. Emotional attachments to others, 1. The voluntary double agent often seems incapable of forming lasting, adult, ernotional relationships with others. His attitude toward other people is basically com- petitive and exploitative. Many willing DA's have been divorced at least once and have gone through a series of mistresses. Because most willing doubles are good con- men and good verbalizers, they are usually adept at creating an impression of sincere feeling, of courtesy and concern ‘for others. Sometimes they are good enough actors to con- vince themselves, temporarily. Most of the time, however, they are emotionally empty. One consequence is that a KUF.ARK case officer handling a willing DA in time of peace should be extremely chary about concluding that esteern or friendship for the case officer plays a significant role in the agent's motivation, The DA may feel a close rapport as a result of the clandestine nature of the association rather ‘than the personality of the case officer, but even this reaction _is likely to last about as long as the agent meeting. Another practical consequence is that the location of members of the voluntary DA's family is likely to be much less important as an element of control than it may seem, The agent may feel close to one or more persons, more commonly a son or daughter than a wife or parent; but even such bonds are not typical, The defector or double who left a wife behind in a denied area and who continues to express concern is likelier to be reacting as he thinks he is expected to react than to be expressing sincere and deep feeling. 2. Unwilling DA's are unlikely to be demonstrative, but they do seek enduring emotional relationships. Their concern about members of the immediate family is likely -27- Beceeaae KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY BE SECRET : \ i a j eeneniyiate ermptteemntnerr eine mortem carte * swetetsroe wa mirror dine abe: ee
/ SREP SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY - to be genuine, In fact, it may have been this concern which the adversary exploited in recruiting the agent. Un-vvilling DA's tend either to remain aloof or to seek filial relationships with case officers. D. Level of intelligence, 1, Both willing and unwilling double agents are characteristically above average in terms of intelligence, Willing DA's usually think quickly and show cleverness; their extent of formal education (well above average) and their typical vocations suggest some depth of intelligence (but not feeling) as well, The fact that willing DA's are almost invariably without funds or property reflects not a Jack of intellectual competence but a tendency to trust to their wits, not to their bank accounts. 2. Linked with high native intelligence is the voluntary DA's skillas a verbalizer, Typical overt occupations in this group are those of interpreter /translator; editor, journalist, writer, or speaker; bibliopgrapher: teacher: and 7“ salesman, The DA may be at home in two or several janguages. One drawback is that his reports, both verbal and written, may require careful stripping before the plain facts can be discerned, 3. The willing DA's combination of intelligence and unscrupulousness make him as hard to handle as a two- edged razor blade. One piece of usually applicable advice can be offered. The case officer should avoid competing with the DA, Relying on the authority inherent in his posi- tion, the case officer can best handle a clever, competitive ; double through calm firmness, not through evident anger. Willing DA's are likely to respond well to a stick-and- carrot or kick-and-kiss technique, “Your last report was ; excellent, but it was not as good as the work I expect from - aman of your abilities, '' = 28 ~ KUBARK INTERNAL USE“GNLY an) Zp Pe imate serine cnerteye cectnmt cake TOE etme Ne ae te eo Het eae fw eeepc rit te ERNE eRe amend cermneninene emma “TREE aie A cermearires seen Ehgtesaree i uv i
~ KUBARK: INTERNAL USE ONLY E, Gullibility - scepticism, 1, Willing DA's are usually sceptical about the motives and abilities of others but unsceptical about themselves, They distrust others, including those with whom they are on terrns of intimacy, They are frequently cynical, They tend to underrate the adversary ~ and presumably KUBARK = and to overrate themselves, 2. Unwilling doubles are also sceptical, though less so than the hardbitten, willing types, and they are as sceptical about themselves as about others. F. Trustworthiness. 1, Willing DA's can be trusted to follow instructions that coincide, in their view, with their own int-rests, They become unreliable if the case officer's orders conflict with their wishes, Confronted with indications or evidence of the agent's untrustworthiness, the KUBARK case officer should consider whether the unreliability is the result of the agent's loyalty to the adversary or of his own ego- centricism, The former cause ends the case or puts it on a totally different footing. The latter is merely one of the facts of DA life, to be expected and countered by inde- pendent checks and sound handling, 2. The scanty evidence available on the trustworthi- ness of unwilling doubles suggests that ona day-by-day basis they are more reliable than their opposite numbers. If they disagree with the case officer's instructions, as they are particularly likely to do if an element of personal risk is involved, they will usually express their concern, But if they accept an order, they will normally try faithfully to carry itout. Ona long-range basis, however, unwilling DA's cannot be considered reliable, because the indefinite continuation of the operation is directly contrary to their wishes. They are prone to make deliberate or unconscious slips which will end the operation without bringing retribu- tion down upon them, } ~ 29 - eEGon, KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Cj Ne @RBB, SECRET Tr A cea He tend Dhaene ae Ree ET me ee es wea a eomttnpenn eee f grove arma mart neat oe et! Hm tame pee PRE ee Saran sh ntttanaet gm ehh ert artuninerstns ee-tesooenin 9 gu i : | SMUESR ene ies carer ene apenernenen teed Mgemacenn +
he 1 4-00000 F va f ( f v GES SECRE 7 KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY _ | 3. Part 0, paragraph D, listed the four key questions used in deciding whether to accept a DA opportunity. One of the questions is whether the opposition trusi.u the DA, In the continuous task of agent assessment, the KUBARK case officer, therefore, should mirror-read, Is adversary : confidence in the DA diminishing, increasing, or stable? If it is static or weakening, what can be done to bolster it? G. Ambition. i 1, Willing double agents are ambitious in the sense of seeking immediate material rewards with little effort, Few are content to work slowly and consistently toward long-range goals, Gratification is non-deferable, They seek the immediate effect or gain, by a display of skill or cleverness, by demonstrating artistic or intellectual attainments, or by such displays of generosity as buying drinks for the nouse, But they lose interest when the easy satisfaction has been achieved, The case officer * orking ' with a willing DA on a long-range operation is usually well- : advised to stress immediate objectives - especially those which permit the agent some ego-pratification « rather than distant goals, in which the agent may not be interested, 2. Unwilling doubles are likely to be only moderately ambitious. They are, however, far rnore content to move i slowly toward long-range goals, Their reluctance to serve { as double agents can sometimes be thawed if successful DA performance over a lengthy period can be identified with the attainment of such long-held, personal objectives as security and status, The length of required service may be less important to them than the fixing of a definite, agreed date for concluding the operation. H, Clandestinity. 1, In the typical willing DA, clandestinity is doing what comes naturally. He is usually accustomed to concealing - 30- ERRATA. i KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY VY J cea om ete 8 le OSH + ent aan eam mareeetare mat * ‘es i camepcorig tom © ee extents edits +
» which reflects his own exploitative motives toward others, ‘gelnforcea his zecretiveness, He enjoys concealing. or -ness of his wits. But there are two dangers.. One is that . ; forrnally in. accordance with a PHS outline, may merely. : arouse his. competitiveness, his desire to outwit, But. - -' to be less. clandestine than the average person, They need = re ". KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY | facts from others - his wife, ‘his creditors, the local authorities. His scepticiam about the motives of others, withholding for its own sake, In the early stages of . handling a willing DA the case officer may be delighted with his innate knack for the clandestine and the nimble- — the agent is prone to conceal things from his case officer too, KUBARK's need to know-everything about -him cone - flicts directly with his desire not to place himself in the power of another through divulging too much. Persistent . case officer digging into his past, especially if performed encouraging:him to reminisce, especially about episodes. that place him in a favorable light and let him brag a little, is likely to be rewarding.” Another danger is that the , ee willing DA may resist or ignore training in operational : “fs security. He is used to depending on his natural talents ; to get him out of trouble. But he is intelligent enough to ids recognize that the adversary service is professionally clandestine and that KUBARK security training is not a denial of his aptitudes but a chance to expand them..: - “2,- The few unwilling DA's studied to date were found : careful, step-by-step training in security, If they are to face a situation which they consider dangerous or even un- usual, they want and need'a epecific prior briefing by.the | case officer. ee ‘3, Whether the DA is willing or unwilling, the case officer should determine the kind and amount of security training needed and should supply it, being careful to tailor the training to DA purposes and avoiding training the agent for the adversary's purposes, we ie ele KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ___
14-00000 Ls ad SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ~ “LL Introversion - extrover sion, i, The willing DA is introverted in the sense that he is much more preoccupied with himself than with the world around him, But his actions resemble those of the extro- vert. He is likely to be gregarious and to dislike solitude. He prefers large social gatherings at which he can make a bid for attention or admiration, Because the wide array of contacts is sought for self-gratification, willing DA's are not likely to form firm friendships, at least not friendships involving a normal give-and-take, The aim is to exploit or impress. It has been noted that some willing DA's strike up conversations with total strangers solely to achicve a striking effect, 2, The unwilling DA is likely to be introverted, ic is not typically gregarious, and his circle of friends may, be small, To those few friends, aa to his family, he is likely to be loyal, J. Other major traits. The following additional traits of willing DA's have appeared with sufficient frequency during the analysis of past cases to merit their mention: sporadic heavy drinking (but not alcoholism); failing to react visibly to harsh reprimands or threats but mirsing a consequent grudge in secret; frequent demands for money (no case was found in which a willing DA refused payment; almost all of them were importunate in trying to get more); vanity and a desire for prestige; and sexual promiscuity, K,. Summary of analysis of traits, 1, The foregoing profile of willing double agents repre- sents their psychological patterns as a group; the individual DA will naturally have his own pattern of divergency from these norms, » 32 = / KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ad . we eee a ee oe . - oe we - semgnpodecta wie atneen sv: i ; | eae nn setae einai tant oe + Ane tmnt pair nspntodines eer peep $ext cae
“eae sk RE Ag Ln LET ie ~ Salen tent | KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY 2. Effective management of the DA requires an early determination of how much he wants (or does not want) to play the part. Because willing and unwilling doubles show different ~ and sometimes antithetical - characteristics, the determination of willingness will help the case officer te fit his treatment of the agent to the agent's personality. 3. The psychological profile of willing DA's as a clasa or group is that of the con-rnan (or, in the psychiatrist's terms, of the sociopath). The incidence of con-men is high among willing double agents in time of peace, just as the incidence of persons in rebellion against any form of authority is high among defectors, This fact is cause for caution but not for apprehension, The case officer who recognizes the dangers to himself and his service which are likely to result from the very nature of the willing double is better able to control them, And he is likely to find that the agent's stabil-ty under stress, intelligence, scepticism, and natural clandestinity are valuable assets when channeled against the opponent. ce eee te - 33 = KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Neg Rac BP tr el a RTI RT a tee Se Te # 3s erqpeneaecarmmemapemter en a 2 q
$ | / W) SECRET f ¥ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY IV. THE DA AS AN AGENT a asain lia maleneteelieiaaleene nel A. Prior Intelligence Associations, As was stated in Part , paragraph E 3, it is necessary for planning purposes to obtain all the facts about all the agent's intelligence experience before he became a double. The extent of that experience is likely to be one of the basic differences between the DA and the non-Cl agent. If the double has not had prior contact with more than one service, the operation itself will give him some insight into a second service and thus permit him to compare and learn, The result of this extent and breadth of experience (and in some cases of considerable agent training) is that DA's are Likely to be sophisticated in clandestine matters. Asa result the margin of superiority ususally enjoyed by the KUBARK case officer, who ordinarily has had much more training and experience than his agent, may diminish, vanish, or even be reversed, For this reason KUBARK case off who have had little or no earlier experience in directing / DA's should not be hesitant about seeking help from others at the base, from the station, and from headquarters, t i | 1 | 7 icers B. Continuing Investigation, As was noted earlier, background checks and the in- spection of all overt records should precede the decision ; to accept the case and the formulation of the operational ! plan, During the operation these measures should be con- tinued, to the extent consonant with security, (Continuing checks do pose a graver security problem in some DA cases than in many other types of operations; at times the task is impossible or the risk is unacceptable, But if the DA lives outside a denied area, safe ways to continue inde- Pendent probing can usually be found.) Apart from the danger of concluding that all the facts are in, that the - = 34 See vy KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY WBE SECRET eee ee tacterteemeansy coment naw neon fore TTR ee deena ne a ae enonvemne mm ee De erence Fh ceprmasy
record is complete, continued Probing is ‘required for ‘. the duration of the operation, Cc. Training. ‘], Adversary Training, . Most of the agent training given by:hostile services concerns tradecraft, and the emphasis is on communications. 2. KUBARK Training. Os KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY “wae SECKET ~ BAIRAEH AR arate ER ASI INOD ts Green nemeamneceniendtee en Aane ENON Men Mine mene eet eres ne gestern enettenne tte ee a roa i : eiEyre — ie Ril ce ata Si? Zig AE, ge TRANG oD Ae 6 ey Sooner ~~ ee ee
aa he 14-00000 ‘ t ve a a a WER SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ‘ } 7 : { ¢. If the agent has weaknesses as a double, ‘ corrective training will be far more effective than merely haranguing him, i i ‘ D. Testing. I 1, KUBARK Testing. : | ' I I | : | | - 36 - sites 9, KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY =p SECRET . b if aE, ee emirate
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ee 7 @. Adversary Testing, . “ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY — ' d. Most of these methods entail a significant ex- ' penditure of time and effort, This fact should be weighed at the outset, before KURARK is committed to the oper- ation, and should also be reflected in the planning of the operation, It is manifestly insecure to conduct a double agent operation as a series of debriefings, in which the case officer merely records the unchecked assertions of the DA, : e. Analysis of substance is useful as a testing mechanism, but only if the adversary has been identified correctly, If, for example, a double agent who is a citizen of a satellite state provides useful and valid information about one of the intelligence or security services of that state - counterintelligence of such caliber that it seems obvious that the satellite. service would not willingly per-. ve mit its release - KUBARK may easily misread the DA's loyalties and assume that he is “ours'' when in fact he is providing the information on orders of the KGB or GRU, probably without the knowledge of the satellite service, The four key tests were described above (see - II D) as an aid to deciding whether or not to accept'an . opportunity for a double agent operation, «The case officer - should ask the same four questions periodically during the later phases of the operation because they constitute a sound framework for testing. ; Aree tone pre eny naargine camenss per tae omtpa* * ae pe hte re " . KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY -~ 39 -
“ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY b. Hostile services may test the agent: and oper- ation by testing the communications channel, See pp. 61-64. " AKUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY) oD enna cantina teeta uate hires |
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so ‘KUBARK INTERNAL USE ‘ONLY | 2. Adversary Control, . . 1 cae A major weakness of the Communist intelli- . gence and security service is an inadequate understanding ; ; of the principle that control rests upon an under standing- , , 4 _of the motives of individual agents. Consequently there ig an adversary. tendency to. pay scant heed to the agent as. &@ person and to consider hir:, instead, as an instrument, “y In half the KUBARK DA cases studied to date, for example, — . the DA has alleged that his work for the adversary was ye totally or partially motivated by duress and fear, No.other . elernent of motivation for.serving:the. ‘opposition is cited by - DA's as frequently,: Even after allowance:is:made for | - agent exaggeration, it remains evident that adversary | attempts to achieve control through duress may of them- selves cause the agent to approach a Western service. _ Continuation of hostile pressure on the agent is likely to ereate in him attitudes which the KUBARK case officer can exploit to our advantage, " b, A related weakness in adversary control stems — from overcentralization, The headquarters of a typical Communist service exerts tight control upon its field repre- ‘sentatives, who often relay requirements to agents without tempering them to achieve some corrélation between head- quarters! needs and the agent's access and capabilities, ne Ww |. KUBARK INTERNALUSE ONLY a — 4 .
ne Senne eee Seen Beaee 4 -. KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY.) Agents who have protested that assigned tasks were im- possible have sometimes been told, in effect, that the case officer recognizes the lack of realism but is help- légs, Such an explanation, and thé attitude underlying it, ; militate against effective control, ' Co On the other hand, the adversary services, . and especially the KGB, have at times shown skill in the manipulation of political motivation for purposes of control, KF, Agent Motivation, - 2 1, Analysis of double agent operations has indicated that there is somewhat more uniformity in the motives of ‘double agents than case officers have recognized, Clearly, the reasons why the agent works for KUBARK may not be wholly identical with his reasons for serving the adversary. For example, an agent recruited under duress by a Com. munist service may obey its orders chiefly through fear ‘ and may serve ag a double chiefly because of hostility toward —_ — 4 the adversary, But if he is a fearful person, predisposed - Sm of. to yield quickly under pressure, then fear of detection and | retribution in the Free World ‘is. also likely to play a part in his performance for us. : an 2. According to the statements of DA's and case: officers, the following are the principal motives of DA's for serving KUBARK (the percentages state the number of agents reportedly thus motivated in comparison with. the total number studied): monetary (77%), political (55%), pleasure in the clandestine (50%), personal (50%), self- protection (41%), ideological (23%), fear (23%), and - . Patriotism (9%), The statements of the same agents and their case officers about their motives for serving the opposition show a very different picture: fear (50%), monetary (50%), pleasure in the clandestine (27%), self- protection (27%), and personal (14%). No political, ideo- logical, or patriotic motives for serving a Communist service were reported in any of the DA cases studied, ~ mr eeteae.o sermarnumanengueteincaprate ees mane te Meme erste va een ~ 44 4 KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY. + emer ctr wee ft et Rh a apafthcemcnsRBan cero} oe te a ermal ee i AE SCR eh OU eae Set is et Ta, AR seein AIR OF Tees en rec aE Lie
if the same basic reasons, _” KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY 3, An element of rationalization seems to be reflected | in these findings. For example, an agent who finds very -- veal pleasure in clandestinity per se is likely to be thus. oe ae j nearly twice as many agents were reported to serve KUBARK | : for this reason as- were lieted. under the same heading for i t . . £ i a motivated in working for both sides, not justone,. Yet. 9 8 pos “3 be t t 1 j service to the adversary, It seems likely that KUBARK case officers may consider it somewhat reassuring if an agent works for us because he likes the. game but may find Bhd it threatening if he conducts espionage on behalf of a hostile ; ‘service for the same reason, 4, During analysis it was also noted that agents and case officers had advanced nearly twice as many explana~ tions for KUBARK service.as for adversary service, In. ale a significant. number of operations KUBARK case-officers: voy | had made no report at all on the agent's reasons for working * for the opposition, a wy 5. Some precepts can be based on these findings: Be a. KUBARK should always examine and reporta double agent's motives for engaging: in both halves: of. his» clandestine. work. b. Most peacetime DA's serve both sides for much eect, ae nth emma yuenae see? a an Ce The examination of motivation should be as A f probing as the case-officer can make it, The use of a label, oe such as “anti-Communist, is not a substitute for a oo, a searching examination of what makes the agent tick. . da, The case officer who is working with a willing - DA should be slow to conclude that the agent's esteem for the case officer plays an important motivational role, Genuine esteem for others is not common among willing DA'ts, although many are adept at creating an impression of esteem, 2 5 o- KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY i a”
_his motives with his actions, which are sometimes clues " KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY / 6, There has been relatively little KUBARK reporting on unconscious motives. “Although lengthy and theoretical _ speculation on this subject may be a waste of time, the case officer's continuing assessment of the DA as a person does permit him to compare. the agent's own statements about to'deeper drives, of which the agent may be unaware or only dimly aware. 7. If KUBARK has accepted jurisdiction of an oper- or verbal estimate of motivation should be obtained in as — . 1 ‘ation from a transferring service, that service's recorded ' - much depth as. possible and should be weighed carefully. | | Failing to benefit from earlier insights often leads to a repetition of errors in handling and control that were made by the transferring service, . 8. The case officer should determine whether «ny of ne the agent's basic motives are incompatible with KUBARK's goals in the operation, He should also consider whether a oy , ; the DA is. looking to KUBARK for satisfaction of a desire we os which KUBARK cannot or will not satisfy. : i a ae - KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY oe a whe ao eee can cme ff emer fm saan ee A OS SS ES Sc eEneaneienetien cease asemeenCneeae seen ns ro mane meta st aremomaminin tinct ly
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oF, LKUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY  & To Adversary Targets, a. In the DA cases analyzed to date each agent has had believable.access, from.the viewpoint of the adversary, to the opposition's targets, ‘This fact, however, seems to -veflect less a careful program of recruitment than the wide — Bee range of hostile goz\s listed in Part Il, above, _ OR b, The list makes it clear that many. of these goals are counter-intelligence objectives: ‘penetration of Free , ae . World intelligence and security services, obtaining infor - . Co, fo mation on AIS sponsorship and.use of various: groups. (RFE, "- ne Sy VOA, refugee organizations,: etc.), securing information." = 0) ; ; oat on the emigration abroad, checking on the fate and location . , o : of intelligence defectors from the advérsary service, and the ike, The DA's contact with KUBARK obviously means that he has some access to one or more of these CI targets.. Sometimes KUBARK case:officers have tended to dismiss ; this fact lightly by remarking, "All he knows is my face and - a cover.name." As-the later discussion of KUBARK security in DA cases.makes clear, this observation simply does not hold for the great majority of these. operations, Because KUBARK normally cannot control the kind and amount of | cae intelligence and counterintelligence passed to the hostile | , service by the double agent, his access to a principal target e of adversary CI makes it mandatory that KUBARK handle the operation, to the extent practicable, as though the DA oe ee as ea : “4 i [oY “4 - 50 - -¢_ . KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ,- 1 2 nN ee we ete aA neem ee Oe ee ete oe eteeet fess
. ..KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY | _ would tell the opposition everything he learns. Hence the _ oO os ro c. Adversary services test the agent's access to. | their targets in a number of ways,. The agent is usually . asked to explain in detail how he acquired each significant item of information and to identify all sub-sourcés, witting or not, as fully as possible. -In the early phase of the oper- ation he may be given targets about which the opposition already knows a good deal, bo that substance can be tested uo analytically. Other adversary agents. may be assigned to. : report on him,. and various other techniques of surveillance no - | may be employed, Such adversary testing underscores the , superiority of true access, which permits the agent to : ; ‘. function normally, over hand-outs, , B.. Appetite. 1. As was stated earlier, it is useful to determine : the opposition's appetite, as well as goals, as soon as: . available information permits.:. Examination of the' record: ‘has shown that the charices of obtaining a:net profit ‘form: a DA operation are considerably enhanced if the case officer - continuously assesses the nature and intensity of the adversary's appetite. If he has a strong desire to get what _ the agent's access promises to make available, ‘the adversary may be-inclined toward greater patience with error or delay, == == . is likelier to plan the operation as long-range, and is more ° wt prone to expose additional assets, for such purposes as , training, Here.is another exploitable weakness of an over~ centralized intelligence service, An inferior report ona subject of currently intense interest to the headquarters may enhance the agentis standing more than a sound report’ . ' . On a matter given a low headquarters priority, ees Pe Tee oe eRe Eo = 51- vo roy _ =.) KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY .,”
eed tate meee at pee iment os Re teen See ee ee ee tyr ESE SECRET / KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY / ~ 2. One indicator of hostile appetite is the sudden levying of a requirement on a target to which the agent has no real access. Agents who have protested such assignments have sometimes been told frankly that head- quarters pressure had obliged the field unit to give the task to several agents without regard for access. If the new target is significant, and especially if widespread allocation of the target is confirmed by other DA's or other means, itis advisable to notify headquarters expeditiously. 3. As was said earlier, a notional access ray awaken an ungovernable appetite, The same is true for real access, and for this reagon the KUBARK case officer should attempt to foresee these topics or areas too sensitive for release to the opposition and block off the agent's access to them with- out his knowledge, Otherwise, as has happened, the case officer reviewing for release a sensitive report already prepared by the DA may find hirns: lf constrained to forbid its transmission, Asa rule, he «- ot be sure that the double agent will respect the prohililion, And there is the “ added danger that the adversary service will gain new in- sights upon learning which items were cleared for passage and which were blocked, Keeping abreast of shifts in hostile appetite will help the case officer to anticipate and avoid these risks, C, Production, 1, For KUBARK, - 52 @ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY oe) SECRET J - - TR me pect Se Ber tee > 77 tee . OR RNIN AER mene aren at tee = Ae ae ees eee SE RRP etree vor tent cen gain eres tmmeseenaren *
14-00000 wa tas ete mr Armd et ear KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY | | { ~ 53 - KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Paneer al ete! a ee 2G, Seep: CS RRRSTEITEY MTEL Ios brit 99% oy, + __e
‘KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY A case officer review of this list before the meeting or its use as a check-list during the meeting may prove helpful, Analysis of production in former DA operations has shown that the number of the above topics on which each — double agent reported ranged from 5 to 18, with an average - of 10, Although this. -range.is obviously dependent upon the DA's access and the life-span of the operation, it also depends upon the thoroughness of the case officer. Failure to debrief a knowledgeable DA on predecessor services or any other item listed above nullifies a Principal Purpose of the operation, & For the adversary, a. As noted above, KUBARK must keep careful records of all classified information released 'to the DA, In addition, - it is suggested that the case officer keep a log on all of the DA's reports to the adversary, whether classi- fied information is included or not. If the DA reports to the adver sary i in writing, the case officer should take at a KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY © oe ‘sera? H t Hi {
{ | ODYOKE® military services, for example, will consent to ee feito KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY | least two ‘copies of cach report before approving it for release, one to be forwarded to headquarters and the other , to be retained, If the DA reports verbally, the KUBARK . case officer may, require him to submit a.written version; er the case officer may elect to write a fullaccount. What- ever methods are used, it is important to keep close tabs on the agent's reporting to the adversary. Such a record may make it easier to detect a DA's transmittal of un= authorized information, It will certainly facilitate a com-. parison of hostile requirements and the DA's production for the adversary and thus make it easier for the case officer to put himself in the place of his opposite number -- that is, to mirror-read the operation, And finally, in the broadest sense, KUBARK's effective conduct of counter- intelligence {including deception) requires that headquarters maintain a current and complete record of all information known to have reached adversary hands. b, Despite the general principle that it is almost © always better to require that the DA obtain on his own the information. which he reports to the hostile service, some cases necessitate the release of build-up material, The. twin problems of acquiring such material and obtaining :.. clearances for:its' use are easier to solve.if the operations. 4)... has been developed. according to a plan carefully designed: ae to. satisfy specific counterintelligence requirements, The release much more readily if the potential gain to national security is demonstrable. . D, Mirror-Reading. 1, Throughout the life of the operation the case officer should consider each development not only from his own, point of view but also from that of his adversary. Only in. __KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY _ wove. yop
14-00000 ESR SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY this way can he estimate whether the operation looks normaltos the opposition, whether the agent is making P , 5 3 satisfactory progress, and what action the hostile service is likely to undertake at critical junctures, é. Mirror-reading is not merely a process of putting oneself in the other man’s place, itis a process of being 3 the antaconist, as nearly as is possible, and then viewd: eg the operation, Therefore the case officer needs to know as much as he can about the antavonist personally, the sceCtion and base in which he warks, his headquarters -- in fact, his entire service, Tle alsa needs to krow some- thing of the typical customs, thouchts, and feelings of the country which the hostile service represents. Otherwise the case officer will be a mentaliy transplanted American, > is rnirror-rcading out of focus and his conclusions dis- torted, The same distortion results frorn identifying the adversary service incorrectly, 3. For the kind of information that allows the case officer to mirror-read accurately he is partly dependent on the agent. He needs to draw from the agent all the details and nuances of the DA's meetings with the adver- Bary, So that he can sense the character of the opposing case officer and the flavor of his réiationsnip with the agent. In doing so, the KUBARK case officer must rectify dis- tortions produced by the agent's personality. The obser- vation that the hostile case officer is brutal and. overbearizg, for emarnple, rnu confident man, another way i eh ae Ur O ars cad so its made by a normaly my expressed by a fearful persen, 4, A knowledge of the service as a whole and of its im headquarters is particularly important for sound handling of DA operations run against Communist services because of their characteristic centralization, The Operation will be misread if the KUBARK case officer attributes to his Opposite number decisions actually made ata headquarters far away. - 56 - aes KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ‘Bae SECRET a ernie tte RAE
14-00000 ae be SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY KUBARK Security, E. weitenennenmentbineenticrwmaimmennitnih ra Seema inal boheme inl Meee eta = 57 - KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ToT rmentceer au cece seen Rah OHA SUSU EV AE ER, core Tg EE ele BRO NON a a 4 a ‘ ‘ah ee OTE 4 Alec “a mente ene sempre tind at 7 heey
: on e / KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY os, 4. As was noted in Part Wl, cover must be established tor KUBARK, the case officer, the DA, and agent meetings, i | . \ i =~ 58 ~ H i KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY t | WR SECRET eer etER enon ont meee ee ee am oe ne tae amg a eT nee ns anne at INPRO VALAT ee INAEPIMENITCy ae gg eee eee om TT mime tn! pe hh a! . : Ra vd se aE USina e Soearncie enertin arte, SS 2 = caper erect ae Be game
co aetieate eS een Ss SL “ee CARE te A, GRAN hy SAS A ee ee fee mena nee eee en » a WEP SECRET 4 KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY a f c. The double agent's cover for clandestine work for the adversary is a problem for the adversary, not KUBARK, to resolve. But the KUBARK case officer must consider the agent's cover as a double, In practise DA cover is nearly identical with cover for DA meetings, As a rule such cover does not consist of a valid reason for overt association, as it may in a positive operation, because it igs necessary to conceal from the opposing service all indications of AIS association (except under such specialized circumstances as deception operations), The problem is more one of concealment than of cover, Selection of a proper meeting site or sites and training the DA in sound security practises are the best defenses, Once the adver- sary service learns that the DA is in touch with the AiS or even with an American, the operation may become worse than valueless. 5. Like other agents, DA's -- and especially willing doubles -- sometimes tell wives, mistresses, and others about their clandestine activities for either side or both, despite all admonitions to the contrary. DA's have been knwon to exaggerate their roles, in order to impress, and to confide that they are chiefs of services, undercover staff members, and the like, Discovering such indiscre- tions, some KUBARK case officers have merely repri- manded the agent and continued the operation as before leaving the confidant half-in and half-out of the case, KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY veneer ere err ane tre eter weno rien te ee encase eae OreRtNE neem sari gS eye xn q me me
-$eBR SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY a ~ 6, A security check-list is included in Part VI of 7 ~ this guide. ' FE, Adversary Security. 1, As was mentioned earlier, the fundamental principle regarding adversary security is that the KUBARK case officer should not interfere, Adversary services have been guilty of some elementary breaches: meeting agents in their homes, exposing the clandestine status of agents to families and friends, failing to provide or even consider agent cover for trips, using ill-chosen or untrained couriers, requiring travel too frequently, and other sins, Fearing that such practises «ll expose the operation to local security forces, the KUBARK case officer may be tempted to tighten up his opponent's operation, But intervention 4 by KUBARK is likely not to save the operation but to blow 7” it, to local security, the adversary, or both, Our restraint may permit flaps or near-flaps, from the adversary's view~ point; but experience has shown that unless a flap indicates . that his agent has been doubled, the adversary is not ‘-likely to terminate, On the other hand, flaps do tend to ‘cause the opposing service to view the agent and oper- ation with increased scepticism and may produce periods of inactivity which are profitless for KUBARK, If the agent is somewhat sophisticated and aggressive, and if his relatienship with the hostile case officer permits, he may be told to complain about sloppy handling. In any i event, the underlying principle remains the same: the , adversary's problems are his, not ours, If rapport is good, the DA tends to present his KUBARK case officer with difficulties created for the agent by the opposing service, And naturally, the case officer must not refer - 60 - Toei, } I KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY iA : Regus. SECRET ‘weno mene yeti eee ee tate eee pete ee cate oe SE eR OR les lice DP AAA mine So - Tm teen nF ara mts ca gilts sateen tee of Wear ter { . i eee en merempee renee erent te rae tg eee naan eine pene et amare Ae er omnaNARN tee pmaasts Sagar PENRO OPT stir esate & wae re rempnete jag Pima fhermere oe aed gue oleamandtice
14-00000 = cee nga fo eet an seen op CATAL tee MARLEE SOL MIC rae iene ad SR ee en ecards ee SAMOS Kenichi AOE. ee ine, asap tteneak CLINE te WE Rca Bet ae ix ue at | of ‘Weae SECRET KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY the double agent to the adversary so coldly that the DA feels rebuffed, Sympathy and perhaps non-discernible material assistance #-e in order, along with an explan- ation of why our direct intervention would imperil the agent. G. Communications, 1, Adversary Communications. - 61- 7 ‘eter. KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY fo fo WEB SECRET fo Crete ncintamnenine armani meme eterna teeta nme wenden
7490000" < an al 7 f y Pee SECRET i ra J KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ms wes ancora pment ee ; . - 62 - SA. KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY , CEP SECRET : leet iw. aan er eee eee ce a dad dence mune 8 emer tcee knee eay tne eect . Fete Bae BLL “eine mp artineTn eee Magia OA! seme tee en + bate xs Ph eaccon, vetaserrs: & <7 on pam nes atti
: J 7 8 SECRET f ee nner enna f : ZL. GaP SECRET ; 7 a KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ! i | , | 5 } 2. KUBARK Communications. i ‘ _ + @» In the unilateral, post-war, KUBARK DA cases i : studied to date, direct meetings between case officer and ' ; agent have been by far the commonest method of communication. : ~ 63 - SRR - KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY / i NE RGR TIRATOS MURR bl did AS in KAR hatte ETS iARxlmetna mg Ot met ete or cern meters a “sgraclenmbcarineqacnipeitniny palochtnaniat, sgn Mar atmcnmincirreeny meena ease 5 u we wer etimn penBpeBnipanee . i.
Soggy re t ao a / Gee> SECRET f KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ceeeeenenieanaetantin aainenettitammmamte uathdininms<aarhini-ceca Although personal contact is slightly more risky than other mcthods because it increases the damage that can be done by a DA who is giving tve edge to the opposition, its advantages are notable, The possibilities for adver- sary counterintelligence manipulation of the operation are increased if KUBARK maintains communication solely KUBARK's opportunities for testing the case are largely restricted to testing its For this reason it is especially important in w/T, S/W, and similar operations to remember that more than one adversary service may be involved or that the opposition may aot be the service that the circumstances Even if the adversary is identified accurately, KUBARK's inability to assess psychologically, employ LCFLUTTER, interrogate, or otherwise probe directly greatly increases the risk of being deceived, by an impersonal means, seem to indicate, Personal meetings are sometimes supplemented by additional forms of communication, chiefly the tele- phone, open code mail, and S/W. A fast emergency channel is essential in most DA operations because the initiative rests with the adversary, who may require the Lf forced to act on his own, because he cannot reach the KUBARK case officer, the DA may wreck the operation, agent to act quickly. Details of KUBARK's communication channels with the DA, like other details of our modus operandi, should be included in the reporting to headquarters, primary reason is that such reporting enables headquarters to study the effectiveness of our methods and to make the results of such study available to others who can use them, H, Finances. The key principle in paying DA's is that the money should be used by the case officer as one of his emerge te eet ener KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY WB SECRET joo a+ er nmanaeremg semana meet
instruments of manipulation and control, i ~ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY / | | | { | | - 65- PSIG KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY can wn a sen etme Asatte aliwell vipa Tata en BN Lead MoE MSE ECU 9 IATA TR we TERT ROR tome «gra oe
OF 74-90000 , f KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ‘ i i i i + i i ; 4, Hostile services have more frequently made pay- i ments to relatives on behalf of the agent than has KUBARK, i : The operational value of such payments depends chiefly on how the DA feels about the recipient, He may be grateful, . : - 66 - STS KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY e : GER SECRET vance new neat atiun site tetntem nts ope ke + tlhe 5 caer 2 oat om ote ete eos sn a nee ee gf ort oa ae in : ere arn
y é @HAk SECRET a KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ‘ i . | | | or he may be uninterested in the recipient's welfare and inclined to view such payments as involuntary deductions from his own salary. 5. If the opposition directs the DA to take a trip or otherwise incur expenses for which he lacks funds, the . KUBARK case officer should be hesitant about supplying the money, The adversary riay be testing. Usually the DA should respond by explaining his problem to the epposing service, I, Reporting. - 67 - By Mee a nanepnenearte Semen os en ee KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY TARP tA taettrs qirpreticcreaime mein sooner camenewurenrane anes enssne ¢; if oo anpenpmeumnapnenne meneihenenetes | Z Ge SECRET AL Ls Oa te iegthelar Ce oe ae aR re ET a RO me ee ee gloat re eee ee Bde Le oians we tat ae t,t a 4 cee ee te = cmntempmreemngnen een w
j400000 2 59 SECRET | / KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ~ i i I | | ; | i ! _ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Ww Beep SECRET seen seems Toten mente cence A A REE ARR OE be ER uaa 6 pee as 4 agitate ear art 2 EUR IES RICSOSE ERR ERERE ten Sanegmetaneetin etyecbart pirates a , a tow. erie siren Tarmeeme 2 = Get ceemecn-
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14-00000 rs KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY -- | VI, CASE OFFICER'S CHECK LIST The questions that follow are intended as a check list to be used by KUBARK case officers to ensure that none of the essentials of a doubie agent operation have been overlooked, ~ 70 « KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY cena noes ne a ene / cee eet ee nema wan ane ee ap tune eee see Gu asad Liat a ee weer Ot Were RE RORU CI tte * 3 4 io : a : iy un me a snmp
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> KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY INDEX ACCESS saccecesecs eeoe ne eaeeeesseoressseeseeanen Alcoholism ,....0.. eee Ree eeoeeoneseoeseneese Ambition fee Seat eres ees ea esseoseesseaovneese Analysis of agent production by hostile service . Analysis of agent production by KUBARK Appetite, hostile Seeoraeeeeoaeeoseneeensesene Arrests COOP e CoCo moe ee HeDrereeHoeecaacece i, Assessment, psychological Attachments to other persons, emotional Attitude of DA toward case officer Cee GReC Bees ee Audiosurveillance Background of DA i i ee ee oe oe ee i ee ee ee oe ee ey 2 SECRET } t Page 19-20, 39-40, 47-51 32 30 40 39, 47~48 13, 19-20, 51-52 24 25-34, 68, 74 27-28 27 63 71-72 Bona fides, preliminary testing of eseeeeeneened 23-24 Build-up material eaueeceseetse sees eoeaseeeeeenas Cables SOCCC CH HAH ATEHERET EHD ODER HEB SHEE BOS saehtee nd See - 83 . 3 KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ew fe agp Rata Lo ingen) May Tad fe 2 aes , Wa? SECRET 40, 48, 55 68 Gein ge a eee ee A Hates nya ripaempnntetts re ee ae ot oot 9 mente ater ep sa) mance: teronernensien pee en
home KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY an Page Case load ,.ccvcccacercascngee seo eer eoesnsase 21, 39 Case officer's check List .ccosscevressesorceses 70-82 Centralization in adversary services ..csccecces 43-44 Clandestinity in DA'S wsccsccccnescervssecnses 30-31 Communications, KUBARK weoecocececorvceces 63-64 i Communications, opposition .eeeseeescceeeveee U-LZ, 61-63 Contact reporting wecccccecconccsaccenccseres 67, 68 Continuous investigation of DA'S ...ecccceeeers 34-35 Control, by adver sary SEHK HEHOESEHTHOHRHTHEEEE 19, 41, 43244 os ros a Control, by KUBARK .acoscccsstceseeovscesce 19, 41-43, ; ‘ 65, 75-76 58-59, 66, © 78 i Cover SCHOHHEHADRHSSHHHSHOHHSHEHHSSESSHFHHEHHTEHSHBESES D and D caSES cowceccnereseseosasesneeseueee 4 ‘ i ' Dead drops SESH REESCHEHHSSCHOHEHHHEHEHEE HT EHHEEEHEEOH 63 Deception ,.ccccececsvecsccnarssessescvesace 7 Disposal Cee OAR OHEC EHH HEHHOFESEAEHEHERHEESHOHEE 21-22 Document analysis ...cecsccececcccsesecssoes 14, 23 =~ 84 = KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY ao eget er ten eens ater rere D t - ‘ ECRET i bee Se ccruet es — i Pm Act a at MO I at Ns cits LET, RITE Marae tm TT TTT eer nly Sit Rt ' ean og oe Fy 2, ¢ i : % ate muneaes genctenrtenale . &
74-00000 KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY De-u:ble agent, definition of SOS CGHSSEFEOOOaGSOe0B00 Duress Soe F SOBRE OES OEE REESE OREO HOSOOHEEBEE DBE OE OS Exposure of KUBARK personnel and assets to DA's ...6. EXtroverSion cccoccseccaccecccuvescveseceecece Fabricators ..cccerccevccccsescecccvececccens Finances SCUCHTHEESE RSET ECHHEHR ORE OTHE BEEBE OC EOE Four key tests wcsccccccacceacceccosccscevcees Goals in DA operations, KUBARK and adversary .coe Gullibility-scepticism scocoseeccoccsececccecce Identity of DA, establishment of ..scecocceccece Intelligence background of DA'ts opeeeseroocc0ee Intelligence of DA'S ss escssceesecececccecccese Interference ceccccccsccsccccceccscscccceconces Introversion .csscccecceceesccesccccceoccecece Joint DA operations eceeeeegeowaecsececossensecn » 85 - Fads pee oe KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY eo GHD SECRET Page 2 43 35 32 2 64-67, 80-81 11-12, 39 6-10, 13, 50 29 13-14 15-17, 34 28 50, 58, 60 32 a te © Peart a rite mime teye ee
i KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Knowledge by outsiders .scccscrerncesvsocsces LOFLUTTER SPSHREHSOHEHHTTHOHGHSHHEHOHEES HEHEHE HS Mirror-reading .cocccccoecseneeeeoneesesnce MONCY coosseenceesccsoessceascasscesesoees Monitoring of adversary commo channels .... Motivation, conscious and unconscious..scesse Motivation for serving KUBARK ..ccccescvcos Motivation for serving the opposition .cccorvsee Multiple agents ..ccccccvccasosceccareccscace Objectives of adversary in DA operations ....6.. Objectives of KUBARK in DA operations .eccaee Origins of DA cperations, significance of ...e0. Overt information on DA's, sources of .seceees OWVL wcccanccccccrseceeceouseecreweseceees Parallel DA operations ..ccsecceccosccscsccces Pay SOTA HOHARHSESHASHHSKSHSHSEHHHTESTHHHFOTHHOOHE Page 14-15, 59-60, 67 23, 36-37, 61, 74 30, 55-56 see Finances 42, 61 44-46 44.46 44045 2 see Goals see Goals 3-6 13-14 BB, 61 7 see Finances i } i t i { Peddlers SOTPHFSOHSSHHHESSHSHHRHKSFHORPHSHFHHSSEHBE 2 . i ~ 86 ~ seewemaeenrne KRUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY i“ PES SECRET i Sree caeemcnng armen ee Se mt ar ne ta . athe Oe ee eS pegpime mente yy ~ Tee ee OL Ue Sato a TE . iene Tene eT ae “ < tee areppaniananer yy cpt eatery pent an ee
to “ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Penetration agentS ..conscecsccossseoscscascees Planning the DA operation ...cacsscscassvaceee Positive production from DA operations ..ewceece Prior intelligence ties of DA's ..cecuscasescene Prior record of Case .eccccccnscccavccsccnvccs Production for adversary .cescevscsesecscesens Production for KUBARK .ccucccsececereseveces Prosecution of DA'S .ccsccscccercccccscnssesce Provocation ccoscacccccescccceeseccsessecsece Psychological assessment .conscoscosesesssere i Recruitment by adversary wccooscccccaascceons Recruitment by KUBARK of adversary staff personnel... Reporting the DA operation ..ssccrccceronnovees Reporting of DA's on hostile services ...ccceoce Scepticism in willing DA's ...cccvecnecrccecce Security of the DA ..csccccnsascccvscccccsvere - &7 - 265 ee ei sae 2 KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY 5 i : ls a Llp! BTS SR RA Fs EES ak ye Pa ee RE ORE 7 buat akties SMART eR NE ET am “fg artisan mets serene = see Assessment, psychological 15-17 6 67-69, 81 52—54 29 59 coer pan me an te ERE RENE = pat tee erate Le ee eee enamine ee gene ee met tit ee ee cee ee enn cee ee aarti mom rey ep remy actor Hee | we Fevers aiemyy hae:
7 i i i t i } i i H { | i { H { i ‘ 3 Pee SECRET 2 SECRET f KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Security of KUBARK in DA operations ..ccesesas Security of opposition in DA operations c.sessooe Selection of DA'S ccescscecsavesarseeccucansene Side-COMMO caacoeceseceveccovecesvercvaroee Spoon-feeding DA'S ..c.cccenenccassesesesesece Stability ...sccooscccecoscsensasersonsesscaes Stayability .cccccccsvccesvcevccssnesseesseses Sub-sources, identification to adversary .esscoe Support of DA operations ,.ccecaeresccncsccece Surveillance of DA operations .csscesseavsccece Talk-inS cosoccccescsesevccsveseseseceseeses Taps, mail and phone cuugenesluseceuesecses Targets wevasccccesccsesseoenseressssssecese Terminal LEPOTt .cesecccccccccaccccccecscoss Termination .occsccosesccccoscrssevecsesoces Testing by adversary CoS ROSEBUD EOROREHROSERHEE » 88 - KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY i/ Te ernment + pam ae neeparnn ean mad PS EN Ne aA I rh ina 57-60, 79-80 60-61 lo-l1 38, 61 40, 49 26-27 39 38 61-62 3-4 22, 63 see Access 68 20, 21-22, 49, 81-82 39-40, 62 aye t See ec IE an Fee noe ee mee ee serene in tema nares snare te oe nate sorcerer easements & tee marry a emanate a
ooh a CAP TG ea Sect sare no. ay madly A Abney oes: ran ¥ KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Testing by KUBARK Ce Per seseeeeeeoreeruessas Third services CPO CHOS Ooo HOSE Eee Oeeeeserorene Threats ee Tracing ie ee re Training by adversary Cease eeeesecceceourece Training by KUBARK oo cecccccccsccccsccccace Transfer to KUBARK from another service .,,, Trust of DA by OPPOSITION oeeececcuccccccccece Trustworthiness OL DA'S . co ccccasccccccsccencs Types of DA cases, by origin .......ccccccocee Unconscious MOLIVES 6. oswencescccevcessuccce Unwilling DA'S .occesccenccccessscssncecnces Unwitting DA'S seecccescccccccnccscceccccece U. S, Citizens as DA's ee eeeevarsevoncaceces Verbal skills in willing DA'S cecccuccecsvccecs Walk-ins ee Willing DA's CeCe Fees oe eeeEsorsoenneeeseses ~ 89. KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY TRG T eet AOR ot mretenmntipeetat ong “aren a 10-12, 36-39 | bepageeteee ashen nt re SSP oa ae Se: CRG SANA NR ag RMS oO Vara mae oem eee Taengee = +
14-00000 or Te KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY Withholding COKE THER ORRESHOEHEHHO RH EEHEEO HRT EEE 2, 36 w/t SOSH TTEOSEHEES HEBEL ESET EEE HH EHRERH ERODES 8, 2, 37, 61-63, 69, 74 ~ 90 » KUBARK INTERNAL USE ONLY SECRET seme RL RSE AE NRT tne 2 ee ane Sat 7 son here AONE NESE OE OT ie SpE if) £1 oe arene wane na Bie st Ai Lind ecg Wee, td pe 2 RE a ay : sh ay ne roe Dacre tte i 5 & 5 4 * 4 ae i rower