SECRET An additional impediment to intelligence exchange is the low lével of competence of most Latin American \ intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, and the absence of adequate security systems .and the lack of security conscious- ness, Deficiencies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence ob- tained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection. ‘This defect promises to persist, since the governments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activi- ties of members of the existing governments at such ‘time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government. These realities all underscore the fact that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be Ei! HW 50955 DPTTaTS2276038 Page 20
® SECRET concluded, however, that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper defini- ion, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of trainees, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, and the movement of arms, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former in- volves the requirement to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be -exchanged without fear of compromise. . 2, Current Exchange Arrangements At present there is little organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is a limited amount of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relationships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter. SECRET 4 HY 50955 DBocld: 32276038 Page 21
ae @ SECRET The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in some Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in.the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passage of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. Intelligence items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports. The U.S, Army, through its attaches, currently has an. informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned SECRET . An HW 350955 Bocla: 32276038 Page 22
® ] SECRET with subversive personalities, communist infiltra- tion, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation, The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy and the U.S, Navy. Some information has been released from time to time to Latin American countries by the Commander- in-Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the Military Groups, and exchanges of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Department of State. As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subver- Sion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and re- liable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possi- bility of achieving the results desired. HY 50955 D@RGRED 76038 Page 23 6
HY 0955 SECRET United States experience in the matter of intel-_ ligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO, Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activi- ties has been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Under the Punta del Esta decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity SECRET to counteract threats or acts of aggression, sub- version or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communiat Subversion, and a "Special Consultative Committee on Security (Sccs)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating 7 BDocld: 322776038 Page 24
ws i SECRET to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to counteract them. Since the Punta del Esta meet- ing, the OAS has been making slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence through its machinery. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral in- telligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange be- tween the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the possibili- ties of a multilateral approach within the recog~ nized limitations involved. SECRET 8 HY 50955 DBocld: 32276036 Page 25
HW 450955 e - i SECRET III. Actions Recommended : 1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of in- telligence conducted by cIA, DOD, and other U.S. agencies, where it is found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for the exchange of selected information con- sistent with security requirements. 2. Establish military intelligence centers at the headquarters of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissem- ination when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activity directly to the countries concerned through the American Embassies therein. 3. Increase and expedite the existing flow of in- telligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate. 4, Increase the dissemination to Latin American governments , by all U.S. agencies concerned, of unclassi- fied studies, reports and other non-sensitive information concerning Castro-Communist subversion. SECRET 9 Docld: 32276038 Page 26
a? = om me > “> - ~ SECRET 1l. Take action to cause the TADB to be designated as the agency to provide advice and assistance to the Council of the OAS in regard to the exchange of intelli- gence on Castro-Communist subversive activities. 12, Arrange for regional meetings of senior intelli- gence and security service representatives of Latin American countries and the United States for the purpose of fostering the exchange of intelligence concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities and developing the necessary mechanisms and procedures therefor. SECRET 11 HW 350955 Bocla: 32276038 Page 26