157-10002-10083 Date:09/30/93 . Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10083 RECORDS SERIES : MEMORANDUM AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TREVERTON, GREGORY TO : THE RECORD TITLE : INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA DATE : 05/27/75 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : » GOODWIN, RICHARD 9> KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION ASSASSINATIONS BAY OF PIGS CUBA CASTRO . | MCNAMARA, ROBERT NITZE, PAUL | | DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT =. | CLASSIFICATION : S vis RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : - p \ DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93 O ye OPENING CRITERIA : ‘COMMENTS : Box 244 Folder 5 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED. HW 50955 DBocld:3226819273 Page 1
INTERV {EW AND MEETING SUMMARY _ Page 1 of 6 INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN iF 1 y iC FILE: Date: May 27, 1975 Time: 10:00 a.m. Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW ' ; NVENTO REE Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America CIA HAS NO OBJECTION 7 DECLASSIFICATION AND/O RELEASE OF THIS DOGUMENT AS SANITI 5 WS Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late 1 t in 1965. 1. Assassinations: In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as- sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro, someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant HW 50955 DBocld:3227819273 Page 2 G
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 2 of 6 FILE: "Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown tha Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy th which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szule reported that pledge in an article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but- tress his position in Latin America. During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967. ' Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in- volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominica Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be as- sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern~ ment was surprised when it occurred. HenryDearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti- “Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that HY 50955 DBocld: 3227681973 Page 3 5
INTERVLEW AND MEETING SUMMARY. Page 3 Of 6 the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group. Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort of another as within his mission in supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA. Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United On the military side, Waltexs*was brought from Rome to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How~much~further Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not Kw HW 50955 Docld: 32261923 Page 4 a
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 4 of ¢ FILE: 33 ee Activities in Chile: The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic Latin America were the only means of combatting communist rarely, only if i. tin America ver the subject of the meeting. As he remembered it, the proposals that!came to the Special Group were genera Xa statements, policy papérs, not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. i i iet:policy, support was given to left democrati Sad, vantage point in the ci & White House it did not seem so. 4, Changes during the Johnson Administration: Johnson cared less about Latin America than Had) Kennedy—- ann ee Eas: Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin Atierican HY 50955 Bocld: 3227819273 Page 5 - 5
“"NTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 5 of ¢ Wet democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled became rtd] 5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency: When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency. was some~- thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police throug AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. ra Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support. HY 50955 DBocld:322781973 Page 6
HW 50955 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY _ Page 6 In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good- win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like. Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin America. 6. Goodwin Suggestions: Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to- day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee, on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional checks are required. With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub- director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szule. In response toa. question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of that. BDoclda: 327819293 Page 7