llowever , neither the review of the Bureau's investigative file, nor the sworn testimony of Bureau personnel alleged to have know- ledge of the delivery of the note and its subsequent destruction has allowed the,Committee to resolve any of the above noted factual discrepancies. “The Committee has also not received a satisfac- tory explanation as to the reasons why the existence of the note was not discussed internally in the Bureau, or at the Dallas field office during the assassination investigation. Rather than attempting to draw conclusions from an eviden- tiary record replete with factual discrepancies, the Committee decided that: it would make the entire record available to the . public for its review. Section (A), infra, summarizes this record, highlighting those areas where discrepancies exist. The- materials relating to the investigation in this area will be made available ‘under separate cover. 2 (@) R , (@) The wording of the note Approximately one week or ten days prior to November 92, 1963; Oswald appeared at the reception desk in the Dallas field office and asked to seé Hosty. After being informed that Hosty was not in, Oswald left an envelope with a note inside. On the envelope appeared the name SA Hesty. The envelope was not sealed and the note was partially sticking oul. The recep- HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 132
125 hy iiohist read the note and according to her recollection it read as follows: Let this be a warning, I will blow up the FBL and the Dallas Police Department if you don’t stop bothering my wife. Signed -- Lee Harvey Oswald. Sometime later in the day the receptionist persorially gave the note to Hosty. 4/ Hosty recalled the note's wording as: If you have anything you waht to learn, about me, come talk to me directly. If you don't cease bothering my wife, I will take appropriate action and report this to proper authorities. 5/ Hosty's supervisor -- Kenneth Howe -- who claimed to have seen the note, said that he seemed to recall it contatned some kind of threat but could not remember specifice. &/ Aside from these three persons -- the receptionist, Agent Hosty, and Agent Howe -- no one else who was interviewed by the Bureau admitted having seen the note, Some indicated they under- stood that the note contained a threat; however, this was hear- gay knowledge, having come primarily from conversations they had had with the receptionist. 4] Affidavit of receptionist, TALS STS. 5/ Affidavit of James P. Hosty. dv., 7/17/75: testimeny of : James P. Hosty, Jr., 12/13/75, p. 6/ Affidavit of Kenneth C. Howe, 7/21/75 HY 450955 Docld: 32423526 Page 133
re) Hosty had placed the note in his workbox -- where it ” remained until the day of the assassination. —! Hosty partic-~- ipated in an interview of Oswald at the Dallas Police Department on the day of the assassination and returned to the Field Office about an hour later, at which time he was ¢alled into Shanklin's office: Howe was in the office along with Shanklin; one of them displayed the threatening note and asked Hosty te explain its “contents. © By Hosty’s &éccount, he told them he had interviewed Marina Oswald and Mrs. Paine on November L, 1963; and that when he parti- cipated in the interview of Oswald at the Dallas Police Depart- ment, Oswald, upon learning his name, commented that he was the Tl Hosty initially stated that he did not recall any signature on the note and in fact thought it was from the subject of a case he had handled who had made a complaint alleging his civil rights had been violated and upon his interview of this individ- -ual's' wife she furnished a different version cf the allegations, completely wiping out the civil rights complaint. (Hosty affidavit, 7/17/75) Subsequently, after being informed by Bureau officials that he had interviewed the above referenced subject in June, 1963, Hosty stated in his affidavit of September 22, 1975, "fin that] the interview took place in June, 1963, [it seems] inconceivable that I would think that this was from [the civil rights subject]." 8/ Affidavit of James P. Hosty, Jr., 7/17/75; testimony of James P. Hosty, Jr., 12/13/75. cat Yen VL wee HW 50955 Doocld: 324235526 Page i134
HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 135 - : ion! ‘ we A _6- en a i . 4 . na ; v. pos a a Lad . 7 , > \ one who was talking to and bothering histwife -- that if the Agerit wanted to know something about Oswald he should have comé and talked to Oswald himself. 2 At this point, Hosty claims that Shanklin ordered him tod prepare a memorandum setting forth the information regarding “the note and his interview with Narina Oswald and Mrs. Paine. He stated that he did prepare such a inemotandum, three or four pages in Length, and delivered it to Shanklin on the even~ , 10/ ing of November 22, 1963.77 Agent Howe said that it was he who fourid the note in Hosty's workbox very soon after the assassination of President Kennedy. ’ He stated that he took the note to Shanklin's office, but had no recollection where the note may have gone or who tay have “had it thereafter. He has no knowledge of the disposition of ; 11/ the note.~— According to Hosty, approximately two hours after Oswald had been pronounced dead on November 24, Howe told him that Shanklin wanted to see thes. Hosty claims that upon arriving in ShankLin's office, he was instructed by Shanklin to destroy both the note and the November 22 memorandum regarding it. Hosty atates -that he complied with these instructions by flushing them 12/ down the toilet. 9/ Hosty Affidavit, 9/22/75; Hosty, 12/13/75, p. io/ Moety Affidavit, 9/22/75; Hosty, 12/13/75. p. 11/ Howe Affidavit, P/et/eo ; Agent Howe actually submitted. tlifee affidavits: the queted statements are as he corrected them. 12/ Hosty Affidavit; 9/22/75; Hosty Testimony, 12/13/75; Deputy ASscciate FBI Director James B. Adams while testifying on October footnete continued
Shanklin denies having any knowledge of Oswald's visit to the Dallas Office or of Oswald's leaving a rote there. He main- tains that he did not issue any orders to destroy the note. In fact, he claims that he had no knowledge of this entire matter until-July 1975.43! | The’ personnel who were assigned to the Dallas Office in November 1963, and who have admitted personal knowledge of the Oswald visit and note, all have denied having any knowledge that the facts of this matter wete brought to the attention of FRI Headquarters. . | | | However, William Sullivan, who was an Assistant Directcr at -, the time of the assassination, has stated that he discussed the Oswald case many times with Shanklin, and that Shanklin men- -tioned on one occasion that “he had an internal problem involv- inz one of his Agents who had received a threatening messape “ £rom Oswald because the Agent was investigating Oswald." Sulli- van tecalls that Shanklin seemed disinclined to discuss the matter other than to say he was handling it as a personnel problem footnote continued 91, 1975, before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee cn the Judiciary, stated that thea agent who destroyed the note did so to “avoid embarrassment to the Bureau." However, there is no testimony in the record which supports such a claim. . . 13/ Affidavit of J. Gordon Shanklin; 7/24 /8 Testimony of J, Gordon Shanklin, popie]es. Ural Horton, a recently retired Special Agent, ii an affidavit submitted to the Bureau, swore that he mentioned rhe note and the destruction to Shanklin while driving with him in a car in August of 1974, ae 7 4 HW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 136
13%. with Assistant to the Director, John P. Mohr . EA! Mohr has . denied under oath any knowledge of tHe rote or the destruction, £2/ ‘Similarly, all other living .Bureau officials in the chain of command of the two investigative Divisions which supervised the Kennedy assassination case, each furnished the Bureau with “gworn statements denying any knowledge of this mattex. 14/ “Affidavit of William C. Sullivan, 9/16/75. 15/ AEfidavic of John P. Mohr, 9/12/75. HY 50955 Docld: 324233526 . Page 137
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. * = Ag Sa th eas HW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 145 . . ns yea pe /4 ve DISCUSSION It is hoped that the preceding report sufficiently conveys ' the preliminary nature of the subcommittee's investigation and the fact the subcommittee has not been able to. develop a complete evidentiary record in the time available to it. Where conflicting evidence was received, the subcommittee has attempted to set forth both sides in its: report so that the evidence may speak for itself: Resources did not permit the subcommittee to hear from every witness whose name arose during the investigation. In certain cases, time constraints necessitated that testimony be taken prior to the receipt of all relevant agency materials. The subcommittee believes that the preliminary nature of its inquiry precludes the issuance of findings atid conclusions. However, the subcommittee also believes that disclosure of the evidence developed to date is necessary. Thos, this discussicen is meant merely to highlight those questions which have arisen during the course of the investigation: for which the subcommittee has not received an adequate answer, Tt is apparent that the Warren Commission's findings were affected, at least in tone if not in substance, by the FBI's fear the Commission vould criticize its performance prior te the assassination. For example, the Bureau by letter to the Commission indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on Oswald's passport with the Department of State since its investigation had gm, GF ete \
Y disclosed no evidence that Oswald AW ng under the instructions or at the behalf of any foreign government. Yet internal FBI fuemorarida reveal that this was only a "public posture," that FBI concluded Oswald's: background should have causéd FBI to request a stop on his passport, and that disciplinary action was taken against the agents responsible for this “investigative deficiency." The Bureau assured the Commission that it had mo reason to beiieve Oswald was.a threat to the President; yet some twd weeks prior to the assassination Oswald delivered a note; claimed by some FBI employees to be threatening in tone; to the FBI’s Dallas field cffice: The FBI also knew some five weeks before the assassination that Oswald had been in contact with an alleged KGB sabotage and assagsination case officer in Mexico City: yet it did not know what Oswald discussed with them, and did not vigorously push its Local agents. to interview Oswald about the meetings. For these failures, the Bureau also censured certain of its supervisory personnel. The fact that the Bureau had determined that there were serious investigative failures in connection with its pre-assassina- tion Oswald case, was never disclosed to the Warren Commission, Indeed the documentary record reflects it was the Bureau's "public position” that this case was "properly handled." It is also clear that knowledge of CIA asSassitiation plots generally, and of CIA's AMLASH operation in particular: would have focused a great deal of Commission attentien on Oswald's Cuban connections. Indeed Commission documents reveal its conearn with the subject of political assassination generally, in its HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 146
requests about assassination attempts’ against De Gaulle. Sukarno and other foreign leaders. Moreover, CIA provided the Commission, and the subcommittee, with detailed accounts of KGB's Department 13 -- a department specializing ‘in sabotage and assassination. Knowledgeable CIA personnel told the subcommittee that they had "second-hand" information that this Department had hatched plots to assassinate foreign leaders in.the early 1950s, including a plan to kill. President-elect Eisenhower during a visit to Korea. However, these CIA analysts also noted the primary mission of the 13th Department had changed in the late 1950s to one of preparation for sabotage in the event of war. They could not subscribe to any theory that the 13th Department was given a mission of assassinating President Kennedy. They -were also asked to analyze Oswald's apparent contact with the Soviet Vice-Consul Kostikov, an alleged 13th Department case officer, during Oswald's trip to Mexico City. The analysts testified that Oswald's contact with Kostikoy and Oswald's sub- sequent actions did not conform to the known operating methods of the 13th Department. Their informed opinion was the same as that reached by CIA analysts in 1964 -- Oswald was not given a mission by the KGB to assassinate President Kennedy. Nevertheless, even the limited amount of evidence the sub- committee has uncovered in the Cuban 4rea raises the issue of whether the eviderice excluded from the Commission's review would have affected its findings that Oswald acted atone. Only days HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 147
after the CIA met with AMLASH in Brazil and learned of his plan to enlist U.S. support to topple the Castro regime and to "eliminate" Castro, Castro met with a U.S. reporter at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana for three hours, talked of U.S. leaders supporting terrorists plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, and threatened retaliation. He warned the stiuation could lead to a crisis worsé than the missile erisis of October 1962. Despite this warning, CIA continued to plot with AMLASH .. Indeed AMLASH asked for and received the assurance of a senior CIA official that President Kennedy’ was fully in support of his intended action. AMLASH was not given the final assutances he requested -~ a poison pen device and the promise of a weapons drop (including rifles with telescopic sights) -- until the very day of the assassination. However, two days before then, he was telephoned and told that there would be a meeting on November 22 and that it was the meeting he requested. Whether Castro know or suspected AMLASH was working with CIA has not been determined. Castro's hastily arranged meeting with Jean Dahiel, the French reporter, on November 19 to discuss President Kennedy and his policies may have been e product of his alarm over Kennedy's strongly anti-Castro speech on November 18 in Miami. Castro‘s decision to spend the day with Mr. Daniel on ‘November 22, especially in view of Daniel’s great difficulty in getting any interview with Castro cannot be explained. Even Daniel, not privy to the details of CIA plots against Castro, reatized the c t éignificance of Castro's question about Lyndon Johnson: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?” HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 148
Moreover, the CIA uncovered but did not pursue tantalizing leads which suggested the possibility of Cuban involvement or prior knowledge in the assassination. It learned that a Cubana Airlines flight to Cuba onthe afternoon of thé assassination had been delayed five hours awaiting an unidentified passenger who arrived in a light plane, bypassed customs, and rode in the cockpit of the Cubana aircraft. It learned that a Cuban-American had left Tampa, where Fresi- dent Kennedy had made public appearances only four days before the assassination, travelled to Mexico on the day after the assassina- tion, and flew to Cuba as the only passenger on a late evening flight on November 27, using an expired passport. CIA later re- ceived an allegation that this individual was “involved” in the assassination. FBI's investigation of this same Cuban-American was also far from adequate. It was terminated without any conclusion because the Cuban-American had returned to Cuba. There is no evidence that the significant FBI reports pertaining to the Cuban-American which pre-dated the Commission's termination, were provided the Warren Commission. The Warren Commission was not given the details of CIA's covert actions against Cuba. The Commission may not have realized that CYA's Cuban operations were specially compartmented within CIA under the Special Affairs Staff and that it had pot been in contact with any members of this section. HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 149
yur spun While the Warren Commission way have believed that CIA counter- intelligence experts on the Soviet services were the most logical ones to deal with the. assassination investigetion, CIA had. only seven days before the assassination, routed FBI's report of Oswald's activities in New Orleans to SAS's counterintelligence staff before it was sent to Soviet counterintelligence personnel. _ SAS also directed the activities of the CIA's WAVE station in Florida which had the closest and most extensive contdcts with the Cuba exile community. Although CIA headquarters received some information by WAVE evidencing Oswald contacts with residents of this Cuban exile community, about Oswald there is no record of CIA having ever directed WAVE to obtain ftirther information about Oswald or about various Cubans whose names arose in the course of the Warren Commission investigation. Indeed, the FRI wrote the Commission noting that CIA had an operational interest in some Cuban groups the Commission had inquired about, but the Commission did not pursue the implicit suggestion that CIA be asked to provide information on these groups. Although the FBI interviewed some Cuban exiles connected with CIA operations, neither these individuals nor CIA volunteered information about their CIA connections. Of course, a complete disclosure of CIA operations to the Warren Commission was not called for. The Warren Commission might reasonably have assumeeCIA would make its own investigation of such operations and report to the Commission only whatever infermation the CIA felt significant. Yet there is no evidence that CIA made such an investigation cf its AMLASH operation, although it did review all its Cuban/Caribbean operations in early December 1963. Finally, the subcommittee ques stions HW 50955 Docld:324235276 Page 150
bog Pye . Oo BES Re , . Met BE} ete ec kd reaction to allegations advanced by eh ed ¥ assassination may have been instigated by Gastro in retaliation for CIA plots. The documents reflect that the FPI reluctantly inter- viewed Morgan only after being ordered to do so by the President. it reported what he said to the President, but did not further investigate his charges. The day after the President received'the report of FBI's interview of Morgan, Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to investigate and report on CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Although the I.G. Report characterized the AMLASH opera- tion as an assassination plot and although the Report speculates Morgan could have obtained information abeut the AMLASH operation, Director Helms apparently did not mention the operation when he briefed the President about the I.G.’s Report. The subcommittee believes that even the limited amount of evidence developed pursuant to its preliminary investigation is of sufficient substance and relevancy € in ae F the adequacy of the process through which the Commission, arrived at its conclusions. The subcommittee can what are evidence a more extensive investigatiogn would disclose. The sub- committee again emphasizes that its,investigatfon has uncovered no a deeect evidence that the assassination of President Kennedy was the result of a conspiracy. Therefore, the subcommittee recommends the full Committee consider thé evidence developed with a view to a Committee recommendation that the investigation initiated bv the subcommittee be continued HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 151 . bad
nw in a manner deemed appropriate by the full Commit satisfactory answers to the questions raised can be obtained. HY 50955 Docld:324233526 Page 152
Appendix A REVIEW OF CLASS EPLTED AGENCY AND WARREN COMMISSTON MATERLALS (A) EBT The FBI has an extensive and efficient data retrieval system. Each filed document is indexed and serialized. ‘An abstract of every document is prepared and filed separately by author and subject. The 8ystem ensures that it is virtually impossible te destroy the record of a document's ex vistence once that document has been filed. However, the Committee is not itself allowed to use this data retrieval system; it has been required to make requests to the FBI and rely upon a good faith compliance. Thus, gaining access to FBI materials was a tedious and time consuming project. Unlike the CIA, the Bureati did mot make its Oswald and assassination investigation files available en toto for review. This necessitated a series of lengthy Committee document requests. ea Pic. ee gees yee mM CA A Daas . a eS nn nC ETN, ME? wey * ‘The Conmittee is aware that tHe Bureau had a “Do Not File” procedure, pursuant to which certain decuments are initially filed in other than the usval. files and ‘periodically destroyed. Memorandum from W. C.abamman-to C. §. DeLoach, FL18/66. . Although it would appear that the "Po Not File” ‘procedu en quests for authorization for illegal stich as break- ‘ins,, the Comittee bas not been able to establish Srerho this or a similar procedure was ep hosp in connection with materials relating to, Asvald or “the aga be fe coated fd oethes i feat) ar ; rede US . py HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 153 J 7 at YW Vee. fencer
i The Bureau reviewed its files and produced documents responsive to vay bm taiaan UO the request. In those areas where general document requests would have required an inordinate review of Bureau documents, the Committee virtually requested access to abstracts of the documents. After. reviewing the abstracts, the Committee selected certain authorizing documents to be reviewed in their entirety, and such documents were requested by the Committee and produced by the FBI. However, even the use of abstracts has not allowed the staff to familiarize itself with FBI materials in other than the few areas to which it decided to direct attention. This inability to review even the relevant FBI documentary record in its entirety should be considered in evaluating the staff's conclusions and recommendations. HW 50955 Doecld:32423526 Page i154
eo HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 155 B i ; — aE? ist eats (B) CIA The CIA granted the staff free dccess te three major files related to the assassination of President Kennedy: the Agency's "201 file" on Oswald; the files of the Mexico City Station on Oswald and the assassination investigation; a file of materials CIA developed because of the Garrison investigaticn. Shortly after the assassination Mr: Rocca of the CIA's Counterintelligence staff was designated the “point of record” for then ‘ékisting CIA's work on the assassination investigation. Rocca attempted to collect all their existing documents on Oswald and tre assassination and he had those doctiments, or copies, put into Oswald's "201 file." Rocca also attemmted to put into the tne "201 file’ all later documents received or generated by CIA.. Thus the "201 file" oh Oswald now has appreimately 56 file folders containing the CIA's pre-assassiuation documents on Oswald, documents generated during the life of the Warren Commission. and ‘ miscellaneous documents (including books and articles) collected by the Agency over the past twelve and one half years relating to the assassination. The Mexico City station maintained a smiliar file on Oswald until 1967 when ali its holdings were transferred to CIA headquartets. The Mexico City Station files fill sis large file Faldets. Since New Orleans District Attorney Garrison made meny allegations relating to,CIA in the course of his investigation. the CLA Office of Security opened a File on the Garrisen investiga- TH ction. That file contains, fer the mest part, books and article:
HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 156 about the Garrison investigation and internal CIA memoranda analyzing allegations about CIA. . The sheer size of these files precluded detailed examina- tion and analysis of each document. The Select Committee staff concentrated on documents received or prepared in the first few weeks after the assassination, although it reviewed all documents prepared during the course of the Warren Commission investigation. In addition te these files, the Select Committed recuested access to a number of other CIA files, such as those on AMLASH, those containing Director McCone's memoranda of conversations with President Johnson, and those on certain individuals whese namés arcse in the course of the Select Committee's investigation, (C) NSA and the Military Intelligence Agencies Assassination files of the military intelligence agencies -- Navy, Army, and Air Force intelligence -~ are considerable. For the most part, tney are merely duplicate copies of material other agencies prepared and turned over to the Warren Commission. All three agenices have, with one exception, furnished the staff with all preassassination documents on Oswald. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONT) invoked the third-agency rule and did not give the staff a copy of any pre-assassination decument in its file which was originated by a third agency but did furnish a list of all third-agency documents it acquired between May 1962 and December 1963. All three agencies gave the staff access to ali their files on Oswald or the essassination. The Werren Cammission had fll access ho
HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 157 military intelligence agencies. agency with principal interest in Oswald. were reviewed in their entirety immediately after the assassination by senior State and Defense Department officials. . NSA maintains it has no materials pertaining to Oswald, the assassination, or the cast of characters (American. Soviet, and Cuban) that were identified by Committee document requests, aside from a few relatively unimportant documents it furnished. NSA has stated that it, unlike the ether intelligence agencies, has no existing file on Oswald or the assassination. The staff interviewed Dr.’ Tordella, who was Deputy Director of NSA in 1963. He stated NSA developed no significant information relating te the assassination. This statement was confirmed by Mr.’ Angleton of CIA. (D) SECRET SERVICE The Secret Service -- unlike the CIA and the FBI -- is not an intelligence agency. It is charged with protecting certain government officials; (mest notably, the President), visiting dignitaries and Presidential candidates. The Service's protective research files contain information only on persons who are presently regarded as potential threats to the safety of the pro- mited namber ree tected individuals. Thus, with the exception of the 1l of documents pertaining to that Agency's Limited participation in the assassination investigation, there is little relevant material in Secret Service files. The staff reviewad what the Secret Service represented as
HY 50955 Docld:324233526 Page 156 all materials pertaining to the assassination, the subsequent investigation, and the Warren Commission. Aside from reports dealing with Presidential protection and the actions of individual agents in Dallas on November 22, 1963, these materials primarily supplement FBI _reports. ‘They do, additionally, reflect the Service's limited role in the assassination investigation and reveal specific instances where the Service's investigation was terminated at the Bureau's “request. It is worth briefly noting that the Secret Service did not have certain documénts one would expect them to have. For example, there were neither materials pertaining to Warren Commission proceedings as such, nor memoranda reflecting internal mestings or discussions relating to Warren Commission testimony by Secret Service personnel. Additionally, although FRI documents make reference to Warren Commission related meetings attended by Secret Service representatives, the Service's files contain no decuments which even refer to these meetings. It is also surprising that there is no formal report of the Service's forty-five minute interview of Marina Oswald on November 23, 1963 -- the first post assassination interview of Marina by any Federal agency. The “absence” of materials is not, in itself, sufficient to give rise to the inference that documents were not provided to the Committee. It is ef concern, however, and the stafFl requested a written response from the Service assuring it that the materials the staff reviewed are all they ever had. oO * President Johnson, on November 25, 1963, directed the Bureau to conduct the investigation of the assassination ON. rae “fy
(E) Immigration and Naturalization Service. The staff reviewed all documents at I & NS on Lee and Marina Oswald. Inveking the third agency rule, I & NS refused to allow the staff to examine FBI documents. However, it did provide a listing of these FBI materials. (F) State Department The staff reviewed selected materials in State Department files pertainirig to.Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald. Most of these documents in State's files were generated elsewhere. The State Department generated materials relating toe: (1) Oswald's applica- tions for passports: (2) Oswald's defection to and return from the Soviet Union; and (3) Marina Cswald's admission to the United States. There are significant questions raised by the State Department's handling of the Oswalds. For example, with a "step" on Lee's passport file after his defection, Department procedures should have precluded the automatic reissuance of the passport Oswald obtained in July 1963. Other questions surround State's decision tc allow the Oswalds to return from the Soviet Union (and even finance the trip) after Oswald's announced defection. However, the Committee did not pursue these questions; since all this information was available to the Warren Commission. (G) Warren Commission An understanding of the information that was made available ro the Commission is a prerequisite te any determination that evidence was withheld. Although limited resources precluded a Le review of Commission materials in their entirety, the staff attempted HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 159
oat to identify what materials were povided to the Commission in certain areas, and to review completely the materials sa identified. It also reviewed regardless of subject area, the ninety classified numbered Commission documents and the ninety-five classified unnumbered Commission documents presently stored at the National Archives. Of the ninety numbered Commission documents , nineteen are CIA generated, gixty-three are the FBI's and eight are the Department of State's. The CIA generated decuments include a chronology of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union, miscellaneous infermation re- lating to Oswald's activities in Mexico City, personal background information on George DeMohrenschildt and information pertaining | to Soviet and Cuban intelligence agency activities. The FBI materials inelude personal background information on Michael and Ruth Paine and Mark Lane, investigative reports on Oswald's visit to Uexice City, and extensive background information on Cuban groups. The Department of State decuments include reports ou alleged assassination attempts of werld leaders and cabie traffic from the American Embassies in Mos cols and Mexica City. The thirty-three unnumbered documents classified by the CIA and the Warren Commission are either letters and memoranda “fo the CIA or internal Warren Commission memoranda containing national 3 security information. More specifically, these documents contain records of conversations between Warren Commission staffers and CIA personnel about administrative and substantive iasues:; memo- randa of the Commission about CIA infermation on Oswald's shay de TY in the Soviet Union and his trip te Hexion Ci'v; information per- taining to the Soviet dvafit vepartsa of the HW 50955 Docld:324235276 Page 160 |
Warren Commission on the possibility o€ a foreign conspiracy; 4 memorandum by Warren Commission staffers on their visit to Mexico City; aud, letters to the Soviet and Cuban Governments asking for information on Oswald. Included in tlhe thirty-nine classified unnumbered FBI documents are investigative reports fFrem Mexico and personal information concerning Mark Lane and Marina Oswald. The twenty-three classified unnumbered Department of State docu- ments include correspondence between the Warren Commission and the Department of State concerning Odwald's defection to the Soviet Union and Kis return to the United States, and the Department's: requests to the Soviet and Cuban Governments for materials relating s rela 3 to Oswald. WY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 161
Appendix B Were There Connections Between Oswald and U.S. Intelligence I. Agencies Other Than the FBI The Warren Commission investigated the charge that Oswald had in some way been an agent for the U.S. Government and concluded: Thus, close scrutiny of the records of the Federal agencies involved and the testimony of the responsible officials of the U.S. Government establish that there was absolutely no type of informant or undercover re- lationship between an agency of the U.S. Government and Lee Harvey Oswald at any time. (WR 327) Nevertheless, Warren Commission critics have continuously asserted such a relationship existed. For example, it has been claimed that Oswald was an agent for military intelligence and defected to the Soviet Union at its instigation; or that Oswald was likewise an agent for CIA.: Such allegations often cite the rather unusual circumstances of his defection to Russia, his ease in returning to the United States, and the apparent lack of interest in him by U.S. intelligence prior to the assassination. Indeed these were unusual circumstances and there is no satisfactory explanation for them. For example, despite evidence that the Navy, FBI and State Department were extremely interested in and did determine the precise date and place Oswald would return to the United States he was not interviewed by FBI until three weeks after his return, and even. then was not questioned in detail HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 162
as to his activities in the Soviet Union. ‘The subcommittee received testimony from a former CIA employee - claiming to have read a CIA report of a debriefing of a re-defector who had been in Minsk and who was either a corporal or captain in the Marines. The subcommittee reviewed the cases of other re- defectors noting many were debriefed by CIA as well as FBI. And, CIA documents disclose that at least some at CIA had, prior to Oswald's return, proposed he be debriefed. Because of CIA's interest in re-defectors and because of the testimony indicating a possible debriefing of Oswald, some CTA debriefing of Oswald after his return would be expected. Neverthe- less, the subcommittee has not been able to locate evidence of a CIA debriefing. The Oswald file at CIA contains no record of any contact; the records of the Domestic Contacts Division (the CIA Division which the former CIA employee alleged to be the originator of the report he saw) denies having any record of a debriefing. At the subcommittee’s request, CIA reviewed its data base on Minsk. and stated it could locate no information which it could attribute to Oswald. The limitations and restrictions under which the subcommittee has operated has not allowed it to definitively resolve the question * One CIA employee did recall reading a report about Oswald's stay in Minsk. He thought he saw it after the assassination. He was shown copies of the three known FBI reports summarizing its interviews of Oswald but could not positively identify any as the report he saw; however, he indicated one report might have been the one he saw. Assuming CIA's denial of such a debriefing is correct, the only explanation for his recollection is that he saw some version of information on Oswald, such as his diary, which CIA acquired after the assassination., BW 50955 Docld:3274235276 Page 163
of whether Oswald was in any capacity employed by U.S. intelli- gence. The extreme compartmentation of information within CIA makes it possible for CIA to employ agents without centralized clearance and without records retrievable by anyone other than knowledgeable CIA employees. Indeed CIA's compartmentation permits only the Director to have access to all information about ail Agency relationships with agents. However, Director McCone in 1964 denied, under oath, that Oswald was in any way connected with CIA. He remains the only person qualified to make such a flat statement. And there is nothing in any of the CIA's files the subcommittee staff reviewed which suggests Oswald was employed by CIA. More- over, present CIA officials state they have found nothing, after an extensive search to indicate. he was so employed. Furthermore, from the time of Oswald's defection to Russia in 1959 until after the assassination, procedures required CIA be informed of the names of all agents used by any U.S. intelligence agency. This procedure obviously was necessary in order to avoid two agencies using the same individual. For example, Army intelli- gence was required to clear with CIA the name of any agent it intended to use. CIA is not aware of any agency's circumvention of this procedure. So, if Oswald were employed for foreign intelligence purposes by an agency other than CIA, there should be a record of such employment at CIA. CIA has informed the subcommittee that it has no such record. BW 50955 Docld:3274235276 Page 164
Discussion: Alleged Oswald. FBI Connections A. The 1964 Allegation. On Wednesday, January 22, 1964, J. W. Rankin received a call From the then Attorney General of Texas, Waggoner Carr. ~ Mr. Carr stated that he had recieved on a4 confidential basis an allegation to the effect that Oswald was an undercover agent for the FBI since September 1962 and that he had been paid $200 a month from an account designated as No. 179. Carr indicated that this allegation was in the hands of the press and defense counsel for Ruby and suggested ‘that his information came ultimately from District Attorney Henry Wade, although he stated that he had not discussed this matter with Wade. Rankin immediately informed the Chief Justice of these allegations and a meeting of the Commission was called for _ 5:30, Wednesday, January 22, 1964. Rankin then laid out the allegations for the attending members. In response to Senator Cooper's query as to how the Commission could test “this kind of thing,'' Rankin responded: It is going to be very difficult for us to be able to establish the facts in it. TI am confident that the FBI would never admit it, and -I presume their records will never show it. ey nnn oF . Executive Session-1/22/64, President's Commission on the Assassination ,of President Kennedy,..p:-1l. ade ata WN Memorandum for the files from J. Lee Rankin, undated. HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 165
On Thursday; January 23, 1964, J. Lee Rankin reviewed a Secret Service Report which summarized an interview of Houston Post reporter Alonso Hudkins. Hudkins had told the interviewing Secret Service agents on December 17, 1963 that Allan Sweatt of the Sheriff's Office had an “opinion" that Oswald was being paid $200 a month by the FBI. Hudkins also told the Secret Service that Oswald's alleged informant number was "Si72", On Friday, January 24, 1964, Rankin and Chief Justice Warren met at Commission headquarters with Texas Attorney General Carr, Dallas District Attorney Wade, Assistant District Attorney Alexander, Leon Jaworski and Dean Storey. They were informed that the sources for the Oswald informant allegations fea were several reporters, including Hudkins. On Friday evening, January 24, 1964, Rankin was informed that the Secret Service had also interviewed Allen Sweatt regarding the Oswald informant allegations. Sweatt stated that he received the allegation from Alexander. He also mentioned Houston Post Re whee ate Ee a] vad ir rd reporter Hudkins as a source of the information. All of the above was presented to the full Commission on Monday, January 27, 1964. The transcript reflects the concern of the Commission members with this allegation, and their desire to avoid offending Hoover and the appearance of accusing PAY Memorandum for the files from J. Lee Rankin, undated. tek U.S. Secret Service Investigative Report, 1/3/64. he te we rs ari Op. cit.,p. 4. todtok . Op. cit.,p. 5 pm HW 50955 Docld:3242735276 Page 166 ie :
1% the FBI. Various possible approaches for "running down" the allegations were discussed. It was decided that Rankin would inform Hoover directly of these allegations, and allow the FBI the opportunity to refute the allegations, ‘Rankin discussed Hudkin's allegation that Oswald was an FBI informant with James Malley, FBI liaison to the Warren whe abe reriY Commission, on February 7, 1964. Hudkins was interviewed by FBI agents on February 8, 1964. He stated that a government official (not a federal official in Dallas) had told him that aaa ae Executive Session, 1/27/64, President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. Hoover submitted to the Commission an affidavit which he swore ~ That he has caused a search to be made of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, by employees of the said Federal Bureau of Investigation and that said search discloses that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI, was never assigned a symbol number in that capacity and was never paid any amount of money by the FBI in any regard. (Hoover affidavit, 2/6/64, attached to letter from Hoover to Rankin, 2/6/64) The Bureau additional forward nine affidavits (of Special Agents Clark, Hosty, Carter, Bronw, Howe, Maynor, Quigley, Lynn and retired Special Agent Fain): who because of their assignments, would have been responsible for or cognizant of any attempt to develop Lee Harvey Oswald as an informant of the FBL." (Letter from Hoover to Rankin, 2/12/64.) stent rer Letter from Hoover to Rankin, 2/11/64. HY 503955 Docld:32423526 Page 167
Oswald was on the payroll of either the FBI or CIA with voucher number 179 and that he had received no less than $150 a month and no more than $225 a month." Hudkins further stated that Philadelphia Inquirer reporter Joseph Golden had also mentioned - to him that Oswald was an FBI informant, but with a voucher number different from 179. In testimony to the Committee, Hudkins detailed his, role udking TecTi wae in the allegation that Oswald was an FBI informant, wh4teh differs \ significantly from the information he sipplied Federal agencies in 1963 and 1964. Hudkins testified that on or about January 3, 1964 he visited Allan Sweatt at the Sherriff's office in Dallas and was told that an FBI agent (who was still in the building) had been trying to locate him. Hudkins met with two FBI agents, immediately thereafter, and told him that "S172" had been.fabricated. Hudkins testified that he, Hugh Aynesworth and William Alexander "made-up" the informant story during a three way conference call in early December as a means of determining whether any of their telephones were being tapped. According to Hudkins, within thirty minutes of this conversation an FBI agent from the Houston office (whom ioceeeeaaeieneeeaeenes When contacted by the FBI, Golden declined to identify his source beyond stating that he “had obtained the information from a Law enforcement officer in Dallas."' (Letter from Hoover to Rankin, 2/11/64.) “Ny Alonzo Hudkins testimony, 11/20/75 --f-~ HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Fage 168
Hudkins could not identify) dropped by his office and asked whether he had heard anything about Oswald having a payroll number. Hudkins expressed puzzlement ever the controversy that has developed from the "made-up" number for Oswald and stated that he could not understand "why(the Bureau) let the(Warren Commission go through all that crap(about Oswald _ being an FBI informants) (fiw thers otimini 4 ) 1/20]7 ? f ) B. MORE RECENT ALLEGATIONS On January 22, 1964, the allegation that Oswald was an FBI informant was brought to the attention of the Commission by Texas officials. John McCone swore that Oswald “was not an agent, employee, or informant of the CIA . . .* Hoover swore that 'a search (of FBI records). . . discloses that Oswald was never an informant of the FBI. . .'*e*Similar affidavits of Special Agents Shanklin, Clark, Hosty, Carter, Brown, Howe, Manor, Fain, Quigley, and Lynn were also submitted to the Commission. *** | More recently, in sworn Committee testimony Special Agents Hosty and DeBrueys unequivocally denied any Bureau relation- ship with Oswald. Although the staff is not permitted to physically review raw FBI files, in response to specific Committee 7 df OVI Pt, iar - be ~ ~~ requests the Bureau has informed yg that they have no *John MeCone affidavit, 5/18/64. **Hoover affidavit, 2/6/64, attached to Letter from Hoover to to Rankin, 2/6/64. *x**Letter from Hoover to fonkin, 2/12/64. ae Byte 4 HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 169 weep ay
documents indicating that Oswald was ever a Bureau “source, informant, agent or asset." On April 29, 1964 Walter Jenkins, Special Assistant to ‘President Johnson, informed Assistant FBI Director Cartha DeLoach that a close personal friend had spoken with an FBI agent that had assisted in the investigation of the Oswald case and that the agent had stated that Oswald was definitely an FBI informant and that Bureau files in Washington was definitely prove this fact. Jenkins added that the agent had.also told his friend that he had been transferred from with a woman in the French Quarter. At the close of the memorandum pursuant to which DeLoach recounted Jenkins statements for Associate Director John Mohr, DeLoach recommends: 3 . / —_ fof, **Jenkins declined to divulge his friend's identity to the FBI. In that the Committee did not receive the FBI reports which discuss this matter until March 3, 1976, the staff attempting to contact Jenkins for the first tiem on March 4, learned from his attorney that he was under a “doctor's care" and his health precluded the Committee's directly contacting him. The attorney agreed to supply the Committee with a doctor's statement verifying the above, and further agreed that Mr. Jenkins would answer written interrogatories from the Committee. “Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to J. Mohr, 4/30/64. According to DeLoach, Jenkins stated that "there was no question in his mind regarding the falsity “of this allegation, and Jenkins had previously informed his friend that" this was an old rumor .; ., and that the FBI had branded it as being completely false.” ” HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 170
Despite the fact that this matter has been tied down as being false, it is considered desirable to review personnel files of agents in Dulles to find out if any of the Agents have been trans- ferred there from New Orleans for a type of disciplinary problem as desribed above. If there is such an Agent he should be interviewed regarding this matter. The subsequent review of Dallas field office personnel files revealed that one agent had been transferred from New Orleans in May, 1958, following misconduct while attending a night club in the New Orleans French Quarter, and a second ‘ agent was similarly transferred in May 1960 following an allegation involving himself and a female FBI employee. These agents were personally interviews by the Special Agent in Charge of the Dallas field office, J. Gordon Shanklin and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge Kyle Clark. They categorically denied ever telling: anyone outside the Bureau the reason for their transfer and they similarly denied telling anyone that Oswald was an FBI informant. On May 6, 1964 DeLoach orally informed Jenkins of the Bureau's investigative findings, noting that the Bureau would not pursue this matter further unless Jenkins subsequently chose to reveal his friend's identity. On January 1/7, 1976, the Committee staff interviewed a former FBI agent who had been assigned to the Bureau's Kansas * Memorandum from W. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan, 5/5/64. sok Memorandum from W. Branigan to W.C. Sullivan, 5/5/64. work Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to PAM Ass, 5/16/64. HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 171
City field office when Hosty was transferred there from Dallas in September, 1964. This ex-agent is positive that Hosty told him that both Hosty and the Dallas agent who had handled the Oswald case prior to Hosty [i.e., John Fain] had attempted to develop Oswald as a potential security informant ("'PSI'). More specifically, the agent quoted Hosty as stating: that Oswald had been a PSI (Potential Security Informant) for an older agent who reitred just before Hosty moved to the Dallas office. Hosty told us that his older agent had had no contact with Oswald, and that one of the last acts the older agent did before he reitred was to deactivate the Oswald file as a PSI. Hosty commented that as part of his effort to reopen the Oswald matter, he left notes at Oswalds' apartment, urging him to get in touch with the FBI.- I recall Hosty commenting that although he had Listed Oswald as a PSI, he had not had any contact with him.* This former agent also advised that Hosty made similar remarks to certain other FBI agents then stationed in Kansas - City. The Committee has talked to two agents; neither one recalls Hosty ever stating that Oswald was a PST. *Affidavit of former FBI agent, 1/30/76. HY $0955 Doecld:32423576 Page 172