mRey Ve ered Retna 7 sett tt 104-10330-10028] °” - SECRET poo 75-3057 ~ | fae 1999 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board FROM: David Cohen Daputy Diractor for Operations SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents 1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the releasa of documenta which would identify CIA stations to the public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations during a specific window of time if they are substantively relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the decuments in question are sanitized! ‘to > conceal the permanent | presence of the station? (8) 7 la ae 2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host government and would threaten ongoing aenaitive operations and liaison relationships. Ina few instances, the damage probably would be minimal or net at all as long as the presence appears to be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and determined the damage to national security which would follow such release. (8) 3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information regarding the Congo and [|te be released. The[ | is now Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in Leopoldvillea, now Kinshasa | er CL BY} ‘0695930 ; CL REASON? 1/5 (C) DECL ON: Xl DRV FRM LOC 3-82 SECRET
13-00000 Bw votes ~~ _— = SECRET SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents _ NE pn eter : ree in - eed 4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the following comments: ~ Public acknowledgment would force the government and liaigon service to pay closer attention to Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S) [ _——si|= A neutral country. Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarrags the government and liaison; thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (8S) Paris - No additional damage. (8) Bonn - No specific damage. (S) Berlin - No specific damage. (8) | |- Public acknowledgment would embarrass the government and inhibit liaiagon cooperation; thus endangering ongoing operations. (S) . - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and create political problema for the govarnment and liaison. This would endanger the continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S) __ rr eee eae cmaine tates oe wre TSR cemenn meee arcs te EO = ——— oe SECRET
13-00000 Wee ee wus at SECRET SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documenta - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive ongoing joint operationg. (8) [is Publica acknowledgment would draw prase attention and embarrassing questions for the government and liaison service. This would further damage an already delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for counterterrorism operations. (8) . | | A| __|Publie acknowledgment woul @ po cally embarrassing for the government and liaison services. This would likely endanger any continuation of joint operations. (S) - A | Public acknowledgment would create political problems for the government and liaison service and force greater attention to our operations. This would create an intensive counterintelligence atmosphere for our. operations; likely to cause a decrease in our operations. (8) London - No specific damage. (Ss) Ottawa ~- No specific damage. (8) 5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when we consider public exposure. Station is recovering from operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During the laat three years we have managed, with much effort, tea begin the establishment of good working relations with the host government and internal/external services. As a result, the station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will of the host service. The | citizenry came of age in an atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of our station's. previously undisclosed presence and operational activities during the Cold War will necagsarily raise questions about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further ak ales - pene, rar gehts
13-00000 © wv er tee os SECRET SURJECT: Release of JFK Documents 'inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our \ \ relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could | '; withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time without gerious damage to national security. (S) 8an Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any release of information about_a clandestine service breeds distruat in professionalism \ \ 6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua, | (8) 7. We receive significant national collection systems | support from |which affects national system collection \ ‘ efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would | jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the | ' public. is a special case in that there is continuing i disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in There have been two | incidents regarding our presence in during the present if year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmosphere for our atation and personnel. (8) 8. Public acknowledgment of a atation in| —— |would be a problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and[_ | foreign relations are always delicate; the. Government is very { sensitive to parceived slights to its national sovereignty, and public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to the | Government which in turn could aak that the station be closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized, it would affect a large number of important intelligence collection operations. (8) ——— 9. Public acknowledgment of a station inL______| would be a problem for[  _—_—si| vis-a-vis its neighbor. and share a border which means thel _—s——s_—s«| Government must act with some prudence regarding its relations with The . Government. would almost certainly respond vary negatively .
13-00000 . twy ast Sate Eabuet = “Feat # 6 ra, no ‘ - . a - SECRET SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents a eel ne (su pumte acknowledgment of a station in[_s Jand might well ‘ engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in | to ; show its displeasure. If the[  _|Government should ask that / our station be closed, the _U.&8. Government would lose a | capability to collect on stability, and Islamic extremiam. (8) | 10. Public acknowledgment of a station in | would be a problem for vis-a-vis its Islamic fundamentalist population. a so many countries with a majority Muslim population,. has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.s. in . general and_the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a | station in could cause ita Islamic fundamentalist \ ‘population to react negatively and demand that our station be \ closed. If the station were closed, the U.8. Gevernment would \} lose intelligence on the conflict, \ || etability and Islamic extremism. (8S) il. In those instances where I have indicated damage to . operational capability and national security, I would feel compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I muat call your attention to the general damage done to us by any | disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S) David Cohen SECRET