HW 53060 Page Eleven both pills, money and supplies to de Varona which As. cor- roborated by O'Connell during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating "that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that...(de Varona) was the contact in the United States who arranged for... (Orta)...to administer the poison. — (Comment: There appears to be no factual way to resolve > de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts, es- pecially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills from Rossselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. (See Varona transcript).) r (Comment: The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots while continuing his post on the. Revolutionary Council. How- ever, "steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but (they) were apparently ineffective." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 32)) PHASE TWO The debacle which marked the mid-April: 1961 Bay of Pigs effort curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, and it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Rosselli. However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harvey “took over a going operation." (I.G. Report, p. 33) The exact details of what that operation might have been has not been uncovered, but Rosselli's ability to regenerate his forces in response to Harvey's contact in.April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Varona was to provide the individuals who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba. However, there were some significant differences be- tween Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and serious-~ ness in carrying out their part of the bargain. struck in 1960 with the Agency. Docld: 32272935 Page i7
HW 53060 Pad Page Twelve First: In Phase One, Rosselli, et. al., demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming . their source, who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast'“the details of the modus operandi and the ability of the putative assassins was deliberately vague. After Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the. lethal material was to be introduced into Castro's food (which involved) an asset of Varona's who had access to © someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." (1967 I.G. Report, p- 47) By June, 1962, after Varona had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the pills into Cuba, "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt ~-- perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned their names or anything about them." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51) (Comment: As the 1967 I.G. authors correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" poisoning opportunity was familiar in that Edwards had’ described precisely the same: plan!" The fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that: 1. Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking 7 over an on-going operation in April 1962; or 2. The mob had been using de Varona before, during and a@ter the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or 3. De Varona was simply making up a story for the a Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to ‘ directions from organized crime.) Second: The cast of underworld characters changed. Harvey had insisted that Maheu and Giancana be dropped from -- the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. - Trafficante's "interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names Garcia-Gomez and Godoy. (Comment: "Maceo's" introduction into one-of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history, without any attempt made by the Agency to check his background or to as- certain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency ap- parently went blithely "to bed" with the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic. background security investigation. oe a ae Docld: 3227727935 Page 138
Page Thirteen Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes "Maceo" as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba. The termination of the CIA-Mafia plots was slow and undramatic. Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to Harvey that the pills and guns which had been delivered to Varona in Miami in April had arrived in Cuba, and an unidentified three- man team had been dispatched in June to execute the plan. (Interim Report, p. 84) During September 1962, Rosselli related to Harvey that de Varona was readying a second three-man team who were | "supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate Castro's body guard. During this period, the 'medicine' was reported as still in place and the three men of the first team safe."(1967 I.G. Report, p. 51). However, the second _ team never made Cuba and a series of alibis were constructed during December and January, 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona supposedly collected $2,700 for the maintenance of these in- dividuals from Rosselli who had received the payment from Harvey. . (1967 I1.G. Report, p. 52) In mid-January, 1963 both Harvey and Rosselli agreed | ‘that "nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52) Rosselli was instructed to ease his way out of touch with Varona which he presumably did. The last meeting between Harvey and Rosselli occurred in Washington, D. C. in June 1963, when he - was Harvey's overnight guest. However, their meeting ostensibly was not directly related to any assassination plots. 7 Oo loeb 7 ~ FF i oo « 7 pops tune (e rh ; a CONCLUSION | The available evidence suggests the thesis which, in. part, is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way...In a sense, CIA might have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." (1977 I.G. Report, p. 20) ae HW 53060 DBocld:32272935 Page 19
HW 53060 rs ? Page Fourteen The relevant evidence is as follows: l. FBI memo 18 October 1960 re: Giancana ELSUR: ---Giancana reportedly assured those present _ that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had ai- ready met with the assassin-to-be on three oc- casions...Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a ‘pill’ in some drink or food of Castro. (1977 I.G. Report, p. 19) Comment: Although the dates of initial meetings between Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana are subject to diffenent interpre- tation, it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties until sometime after October 18, 1960, the date of the FBI's intercepted conversation of Giancana. The poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February~ early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Giancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA Operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer . its support. The mob was then in a perfect position. If their private plot actually worked, and Castro died, then the syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their intrigue back-fired, then their position would be that they were only attempting to execute the wishes of their government. , Additional Comment: The actions of Giancana's "hired hand", Richard Cain, raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission to the FBI that he had joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Gian- cana's payroll, Cain's approach to the CIA Chicago Office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer information on the Cuban com- munity appears a little more than coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life Magazine (one story), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-President Prio (second story), the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Giancana to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain could be the "“assassin-to-be" whom Gian- cana referred to in the FBI memo of October 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation. (Tie in memo on Cain with Salerno's view which is strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing + A a ee oo meme SE Docld: 3227727935 Page ?0