> SECRET “L1o- _ continued hostility toward the regime was incongruous? ould we not have moved a decisive step toward granting Castro full “respectability? If we are to be realistic about our intent to get rid of the cancerous potential of Castroism, is an attack on the, symptoms enough? Is it not essential to get at the disease itself?. - 2 BY Secondary . ©: While our. major interest in the proposed operation a “- this hemisphere, but that mounting cost and grave risks ‘=. 9° “necessarily and inevitably will follow any such efforts, Quite — . «o SECRET = Docld: 32423484 Page 51 7 - | Lyndon B. Johnson Li brary. “ «2 would .beto eliminate the dangers. inherent. in Castroism, an. |... added congideration would be to demonstrate to the Soviet Union _ that not only is no monéy to be made from efforts.to infiltrate ~~ Farnocna
SECRET | rs oo -il-) evidently the Soviet leaders are concerned for many different ae a ee RY IL - yeasons with the incompatability between their active pursuit of world revolutionary goals and Soviet national interests. .. ° “The occasion of this generalization is amply demonstrated. by history} | and | .. fmature of the conflict, that has developed between the USSR 9...» - / and Communist China. Our best hope for a favorable resolution | a 7 of the cold war is. for this ‘concern to grow to a point where” ; a os - >. Mpscow will decide once and. for ‘all’ that world revolution is Bo that stands in the way of such a happy deciston 4s the prospecty  gounettes, that big gains can be ade in thts Realsphere and at Docld: 32423484 Page 52 Oo oo Lyndon BB. Joh nson Ai brary. —
SECRET _-]2 - campaign against Cuba, this prospect would be all but obliterated. The gain we would have made could, then, extend far beyond that ; ‘of simply increasing the innediate security of this heaisphere. ote ssl eten 56 the potas of enteen forward movement toward _ Mquidation of our, cold war swith, the Soviets. (It might also . cold have implications: ‘for our second/war, that with Communist China.) 9). iy Meus Issues| oe “thie First of. a “number of basic questions \ ‘that will BE eave Rene wets ae 7 nature of the. ‘demand. , See emmnmanante pa haere ee a Sl Se eRe Se Aiba SB: Seana eer --"“gueceas.was ‘that our demand could be clearly and simply stated °° adversaries... It was all a matter of removing offensive. weapons | °° SECRET. Copy’ Lyndon ‘B. Johnson Library” ‘Docld:32423484 Page 53 > has te, do with the “would postulate for Castro. | In the case oe hy abadine ceista’ 58 Ootober, 1962, @ caitod thas made for. “and could be satisfied by a concrete action on the part of our.
/ - SECRET ... 7 ae Oe as ~1R-. ee from Cuba. We could in this instance be equally straight | a | | ET PL pret er cpa snes ee Se : i - forward if we wanted to be. We could make it a matter of a { Castro! ‘S, "easing! this efforts to export, revolution... ‘But where. vee soca this leave us.? As noted above, a Castro commitment to. . conform to this demand, even if made with sincerity which - would be highly unlikely, would not take care of our problem, - "and short of a sincere commitment, we could find ourselves with _ “a whole can of worms...on'o our, hands. Castro could offer to ‘trade. sem em ott min ce abttang “actually increase his potential. > gponen “Copy” eee Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld:32423484 Page 54 -
SECRET -w- We aight, on the other hand, make clear that nothing ‘less than the demise of the Castro regime would satisfy as. ‘Bat could we afford to be so candid? faving endured the regime for seven years, and having taken a very great deal from it, | how could we justify suddealy. moving for its extinction? And | Af we were publicly to acknovledge this ax our ain, would not “sudan Blow sea 4 moze Logical tty of proceaéing than he '* application of measured pressures? Also, the statement of this. .° which although | -. . ag our objective would maximize the chances, | gilitary support of Cuba, Te would, in other words, throw down. - the gauntlet for the Soviets and without the face saving escape.) e " natehes that would be available if oir objective wes stated in less \ sweeping terms, oe tay “pocld:32423484 Page 55 7 oe Lyndon BL Johnson Library "ed
-16-— of the arms cache in Venezuela, such evidence is lacking. It may be. we can make the aras cache an adequate pg. If 30 . however, it will be necessary to have an OAS finding in regard to the cache that, willmake ita plausible _causus for action, in March? Would it not be of the utmost importance that in — - addition to a formal OAS reaction, we haye anguished cries for. _ “succor from individual Latin American countries, if. not from - Venezuela then at least from certain of the other.Caribbean | oc. Should the arms. cache prove a dud,. which well may be the a “Temenos aoe mae oneth we neve @.tcetatestby. vase iss ~ Castrot s proclivity “for irresponsibility, + we. can. sit back and nce ner te meen Tye mee m. aime were 2A Re ” we gts ey rete ioteeete =~ . “wait with reasonable, ‘assurance for cone to be throw into our lap. eoege. (eee FT “put would, not. a. better. bet be to. provoke one?’ , ee sar. ~e SECRET | Copy Docld:32423484 Page 57 ~ a “Lyndon B. “Johnson Library if
| SECRET SO : eS -17- ae a ! The important thing about the occasioning incident is that the more serious it is, aad the more the Latin American countiies’ themselves -- in whole or in part -- get out in front and scream about it, the less complex will be our Problem with regard 0 Mate tocrtcan oxpport and world © opinion generally. should, for ex xanple, we_rely upon.pase © + actions, including the arms “cache, we ¥ would necessarily face 7 —_ mere ee & oer > srs a good deal of scepticism and apathy. The world hes simply runes rannterenaenaamemnamenl men: Re 0s re CR ETRY Ae oa . 7 oan 7 . . . "gotten too used to these, and has, among other things, dis-. ' “favorable of circumstances (e.g., a strong OAS resolution re the _.-. arms cache) , US. movement ou the basis of warmed up complaints oe of the past will have a ring of phoniness.-. If,. on the other. : hand - - SECRET | Copy “Lyndon iB. Johnson Library” Docld: 324235484 Page 5B
SECRET. -— ae as er , hand, we have something like the assassination of a prominent - Latin American leader, even if only indirectly traceable to the '. Cubans, or some kind of aras clash affecting one of the Latin American countries in which cuban participation can be -iaeatibiiea made to seem plausible, the situation would be 2 altogether different, particularly if we moved fast. “0... Legal “justification. . However dramatic and ~~ | _. impressive: the immediate occasion for US action, we will still. | face the problem of legally justifying ourselves before the ean. be certain ; we will be confronted’ with: strong charges in neonate Mame Dee eS Scr | Oo Gi eas ak ASGAG ised wo Wo Mecues woh tahoe he  @isproportionate to the particular inci whatever its Aature, | Copy “Lyndon B: Johnson Library Docid: 32423484 Page 59°
SECRET. Our legal position would have to rest in the first. 7 St a instance. on the provisions of the uN, Charter recognizing the ee ee S07 erent dha econ wars Ort et Ah EBT VE Ne a er mene ens aa [ee te ee, ieee sem ees OWN Be RO. One Net ne en me right of nations to self defense and the right of / regional oe ct eremirte Ane - groupings of states to establish and t uatitata cotlectivé "Security arrangements. With these Charter provisions as a base, the direct “Legal « case “éould be built’ upon subparagraph oR of ‘Resolution oat of the ighth | Meeting of Consultation of LE PRINT MI RT . Rees." - Oo asneegpere set memenrie Hye mae rome se coneee © AWinisters: of Foreign Affairs at, . Punta, del Este in. -anuary 1962. oe 2 hatte oie. tae eta that. ‘they may. consider appropriate for their ' individual or collective. self-defense, and to — ““egoperate, as. may be necessary or desirable, me tO: strengthen their capacity to. counteract “threats or acts of ageression, subversion, or. other dangers to peace and. “security. resulting ‘from the continued intervention ‘in this. ~ hemisphere . of Sino-Soviet powers in accordance’ =. with the obligations established in treaties “\) and agreements such as the Charter of the | ci, Organization of American States. and: the. Inter- sO American Treaty (of Reciprocal . Assistance." oo a Copy” Lyndon ‘8B. Johnson Library ‘Docld: 324293484 Page 60.
( ae SECREE / ‘The wording of this paragraph is sufficiently broad 7 Co oo i | — | | | to cover any steps the US should take, even if it moved - | oo ! entirely on its: own. However, the force of the Resolution _ would be greatly increased if the OAS should. specifically . sanction action under the Resolution, even if only after~ action had begun. ‘Moreover, the case would obviously be far "more defensible if at hens eraral Latin tmrisén F488 oh) “2. §o in ed actively’ 4 in the action | program. ES ec ca deve ais Midal Gover ton waite again Castro would ‘not still, or even affect, criticism  —: | pros tee comments no mee neutralists. The» e “had an air tight. Legal case, vee Sometimes tl emt b 28 I Ram 0 Teale cee om seats Bae is ‘that even ae Ww at would. not: be ‘accepted in many quarters of the globe. st ean BE AL AT A ET EEE 7 Ree omnia nebaiainal ab OF “ts eae ee. CT : - “Perhaps Copy Docld:32423484 Page 61 . ce Lyndon. B Johnson Library.
SECRET _- 17d ~ Perhaps, therefore, we should not base our action simply upon international understandings and agreements. In the an em 82 nar Hh SPN Yee ap ALE Goer anal net wy A final analysis, ¢ our case will be strongest, and will be | most respected, if we make full. ¢ use of the inherent right « of any - state to self-defense, as we did in the missile crisis of 1962, In this connection, we have and should bring into immediate play the succinctly + vorded doctrine enunciated by — President Kennedy at his press conference on ‘Septenber | 13, 1962, ce et TTR ee II OMe Be ym D or Oe OT 7 Te eee en a ae ae ee ran He See were? vo This Kenne ay Doctrine, which was categorically reaffirmed mt on occasion ook the davevensat ‘of und West Crisis and-as a caveat limiting the no-invasion commitment" but. which seems_ to have slipped 4 into ‘the ‘background since, reads as follows: "But let me make this clear once. again: LTE ar any, time the Communist. build-up in Cuba were to ~ endanger or interfere with our security in any including our base at Guantanamo, our passage ‘to the Re Ae ee , i ‘ 5 i y Way, | an a i 3 Panama Canal, our missile and space activities in Cape Canaveral | or the lives of the American people SECRET in. this: Docld:32423484 Page 62 | Copy Ss | Lyndon (B. B. Joh nson Li brary
SECRET - lJe - in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to expand its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in the hemis-~ phere or become an oifensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then. “this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies." D. Hemispheric Coordination. Perhaps the most consequential problem the US will face will be to get maximum solidarity among the American states for its action. This, as ly facilitated if a serious new» was noted above, would be great ‘manifestation of the Cuban threat is available. Even in this | _.. eircumstance, however, great difficulties will be encountered — “) oan securing the support of several key Latin American countries. | Under other circumstances,. i.e., action on the basis of warmed | over charges, this support will more than likely be lacking. “the” “SECRET pecta:sza2s4ea pages ~=©6-—SCté<‘<‘é;*;*;*#*«*LYndo «BJ Jonson Library
‘Docld: 32423464 Page 64 SECRET: The fundamental question before us is, therefore, how far we are willing to go without full. hemispheric support, oF even in the face of important hemispheric opposition. LE we are not willing to assume a certain amount of stigma with regard to a revival of "Yankee Imperielion" a la the past, which incidentally will certainly grow as oux operations are drawn out, or even to risk at least a temporary and probably “trying division within the family of American states, the "judicious thing would probably be to refrain froa action unless and u until the Cubans give us | a sufficient! Ly dangerous justification : | “friction with our southern allies, it will still be sportant that we secure the attive cooperation of as. many 0 of thomas a 7 | | ; "possible | aaa — Copy Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
- 17g - ‘possible, and to give the operation an inter-American character. How can we best do this 2? One possibility would be to move for a decision for action (either as against the arns cache case or against a new incident) , sesking to force through 2 ‘majority vote in our favor, and after that working bilaterally “with those states sharing our point of view to get an action Sat PAE AA OS Ser program underway .. Does shot _experience susgest however, that . mere DG A FA ee we: “have a better, chance of getting wi despread support, and oe en Ee _ eeping : down at least the, formalization of “oppos! ition, if we ene Diver See meets SN ae ee reweiioge decide “upon. ‘what we. need and intend to. do and ‘then ‘tell ¢ our: Pees asteen area. % ces : es ‘rather. -than ask about. te? “Do we not, eee DLS Tare ro ete on en ee agen + Latin’ American alli SES LT LEG a vetblle enadsaap of te Solace mien Be fe of Ses ome ae eee prefer such « a course on our. pare? In any event, given a conviction | | “Copy” Docld: 32423484 Page 65. - “Lyndon B. Johnson Library
SECRET - 17h - conviction on our part that action is necessary from the standpoint of our security interests and our overall political ; goals, can we afford to risk the delays, the dulling of the. sharpness of justification when it arises, and the general | " fuzzing up of issues that will inevitably foliow on a regular | - “debate-decision making process in a forum of the gamut of  Aneriican states? On the other hend, can we afford to go ahead “without et least the tacit approval of the henfsphere as a “whole? “These are key questions that must be answered. 9 ~ The Sequence, How should thé US "proceed in the actual “> would operate calls for an ascending scale of actions that =~ or “would continue until the desired changes in the policies or we : oe ae | 7 os , _ o as mo make ‘up 2 7 oo SECRET Docld:32423484 Page 66. | | Lyndon B. Johnson Li brary
make up of the Castro regime were effected, Should we from “the opening salvo of the operation signal cur overall “ ntention as we aid in the Missile crisis! (Or should we let our purposes unfold and develop as incidents and counter- incidents in the campaign took place? Logically, the nature 9 the Gate nee should play a large part in this "determination, should Castro “be nailed with an activity of civtscsy gun pietey, Gur ben cactic would seem to be to ‘set forth our aims and intentions in maximal terms. But if. “We have to move on the basis of 4 minor or questionable provocation, would it not be best to tailor one immediate 7 “response to that order of magnitude and leave it to subsequent : Castro aétions: and defiancies to justify stepping up the pace? o If we decide to start with mild measures, would we not need to - phan : a | | Copy | poctd:32423484 Page 67. , 7 Lyndon B. Johnson Library
SECRET - 175 - plan, and perhaps even make known, what sort of actions on the part of the Cubans would be cause of further actions on part? ez 2, however, an importent question arises, No matter how we begin, whether on low or higan keys do we nothave to een mn alan SOP Nw nara Nt oe Meer cea raed at a "fatto ee t4cat i ta wo nee shin ultimately. to “go? ~ One thing that would seem axiomatic is that we cannot’ sbtoca” another "Bay of Pigs” in one form or other. LE 3 we enbark on a program designed to achieve certain cads and the first measures, whether’ relatively strong or-mild, do not achieve those ends, °° <A % ~ could we afford to back.down and simply accept the status quo — “cante, which might in practice leave Castro stronger and more. . -. defiant than ever? But what if the difficulties proved greater. than foreseen and we found ourselves being forced nearer and - nearer | to open warfare « or even _ invasion, would our. ‘nat ional. oo Lg — a interest. . | | | | | Copy DocId: 32423484 Page 68 os Lyndon: B. Johnson Library.
SECRET If we decide that there are ¢ Limits, beyond.» which, we will - not BOs, what escape routes can we provide for. ourselves? Would we be prepared to enter into a segot iat settlement “whereby we would. lift pressures in exchange for a verbal | commitment from castro?” What if we proved unable to get _. even a verbal commitment? Would a feasible out be stmt fo | drop the pressures and unilaterally declare that if suc ch and “such took place in the future, we vould act with all me - Might we have as an "alternate objective a bargain with the “' gsr whereby we would lay off Castro if it abandoned its ties 7) °F, Orchestration: _ | - 7 | ; “Cony vocta:32409484 page 70 | a - Lyndon ‘BL Johnson Library
SECRET - 7m _ F. Orchestration. In the actual application of measures, we will necessarily be subject to two conflicting considerations. On the one hand, we will need to get the job done as expeditiously — as possible in order to minimize the chances of adverse re- “actions, untoward incidents, etc, On the other, we will need - to hold danage to Cubs and the Cuban people to an absolute " minisum, Which of these should nost affect out conduct’ “4 Again, decisive weight might attach £0 the causative incident. | TE it is grave, our best course will probably be to move _ rely for at. Least . a, trial period on “essentially, ‘ind dire eck Ea So licly ae oo Gans GO : justigyt Hovever ; are the possibilities here sufficiently | “great 4 to 9 hold out any ‘prospects of success? We can tighten. ; | _ ee a | -econonie - ; | a | Copy” ae Dood: 32425484 Page 71 7 — “Lyndon B. Johnson Library
- SECRET _- Wa economic screws by tougher policies toward our allies and by a campaign to keep down the hard currency price of sugar. * ‘But could we expect these to produce any more decisive results. than other economic pressures in the past? “We no doubt can “effect a substantial step up of clandestine and subversive — " getivities, but probably not £0 a point bérlously to bother fe ‘the regine unless accompanied by important support from the Would it: be. feasible to, appear, to be acting | with restraint: Sr aa 7 of Peta calmed Ne ot while: actually bearing dovm, heavily? | ‘yout 4€'pae be:possrbtag 2" Dlockade?. ‘Also could we “not, “without any formal public”  acknowledgnent, ‘instigate and g blishely. Support. Em lived of ce pe as residents” gor example,. to “destoy ‘larger scale naval forces inthe vicinity'~ ~ es Docld:32423484 Page 72 ae Lyndon — B. Johnson Library
Fete SECRET - l7o - . residents to action, and furnishing any and all equipment needed and desired? Our aim in this case would not bea een rN OTR a a Sle AB Rt te Coe ar Te nen hoe single, all. encompassing blow, but a succession of li ttle but cone we EEE MLL MSDE pean rset ge ete oe Lene ete t. an Pa te cie a Nor tenane hie growing successes. Pernod wgartn ted RET MT BT er : pie LR : As we ,sasgecea the regime to the weight of acasive, but, “genetally unused, militaty forces and to a US managed end ‘supported internal wet of Uibexation, ve could expect (1) the ‘in so many instances, and (2) to precipitate particular incidents ~~ Sor ete eee te ne _ step up in the. harshness of our measures. “thus, ee ee opinion or a single take it or Leave : it challenge | to. the USER. “Copy” | Docld:32423484 Page 73 7 - Oo Lyndon B. Johnson Library
G. Costs and Risks of Action. The re can ‘be little: chee ee ee ‘ oe) ba a=) I question that | _a high pressure operation against Cuba will be, “a costly and perhaps risky affair. AT one end of the spectrum is. 4 the possibility of military involvement with the USSx., | We ee eee eo . - / : ean, perhaps, heavily discount this possibility, but we cannot . ignore it. The Soviet leaders are on record that they will 9. ‘support Cuba against any military attack, Ina case of an _ oo out and out US invasion, they would be hard pressed to ignore. * _ their assurances without a severe loss of face. In case Of a heen of- US hostility, they would ‘find ‘an Laue ” eaten, PET TO FET ier etteperr nr Se a HE: 2 teh easier and would very probably take full advantage of ee ~ we ge LEE A ose teh ~ eas wee 8 vo on EE yd Sanncety sure.. Here, ada te 3 ~.\.- chance.we would simply have to take. Are the stakes sufficiently ~ oo pigh to take ith” °- mhe BSex will certainly take a licking in "international a pubite 7 _. SECRET : BS - Copy Docld:32423484. Page 74 Lyndon B. ‘Joh nson Li bra ry
SECRET public opinion," Our friends and even some of our less ee ee oe RE atte a pT “friendly friends, might secret bly applaud our decision. ‘But they would keep their approval to theaselves. Voiced opinion will alnost certainly be overwhelmingly against us. And, in “ bruth; we vill appear ina nasty light, and one which the fires from 7 We will also face many difficult days in the UN. an relationship with the Latin American countries can only be. “Certainly we. can ‘not escape without an. “increase. in’ mo non he fay sity oti ein ha ae ~a- oes sn art VALET. RA AOD: Sree tee SN em NS “ating. And: there well. may be a ‘revival of reat concern among —_——_———— - nes Oe a 2 even, conservative circles over the bugabos of us intervention. a tailed Te SPAN Nido A Ponbtn grag TIE LD as tort Tete oe Bi toi. Rete DE ante we RS Ain Pantin an Stone, sae: . eee we ees Mage ZB BR oo But among both radicals and conservatives, there should be an offsetting 3 increase in 1 respect, even if partly based | on fear, ~ Lyndon B. Johnson Library. eee Docld: 32423484 Page 75 ~ -
Docld:3242935464 Page 76 SECRET oe oe - l7r - | | ° | One immediate cost that will need to be weighed is. the interruption of the detente ‘trend with respect: to the - - . Sneed eran oe . —s~ Je mee tee USSR. We. can, of course, tak cea the positioa, as to the Soviets under similar circumstances, that improving rela ations between the US and the USSR are not” incomp patible with o our Liquidation ee ee hte ee seen ne cote pepetes eee BITE T semaine “of an intolerable situation on our own: faculties ies. But at least until the. Cuban matter is finally settled, we can expect .. (venewed strains in our dealings with the Russians. He “The Costs and Risks of Failure to Act. On the other “gide of the coin are’ the fact that failure to bring Castro’ ~~ ~~ “to heed will: (1) increasingly complicate the retien of | “ourselves and our friends in Latin America; (2) > raise a real enn avis | possibility « our. having either to tolerate the esta ablishment of a ee Shapes gs LAER AE ga TT STS SLAIN Unwsomere oc oot ial TRS LR OT Pee ey eer 2 ia oe a eG EAN TT TEE ‘countties or use “force. ‘to, prevent sty (() encourage the pa abe eet 6 sac a a ‘Copy Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library
SECRET o* L?s - er Communists, and most impor rtantly the Communists in the potat a eture ee megs > ussR, | to believe that this tactic of indirect aggression . " fete ee nee ee tree te cape, -. can and will work; (d) necessarily erode domestic and foreign ' confidence ih the will and firmness of the US. In short, continued | tolerance of the aggres sive actions: and intrigues . nai . . Sr me ae ihaihnaied not ee of castro in | this ‘hemi sphere will ‘represent a 1 self-imposed “but. nevertheless . serious handic Sap in oF ar efforts to hold up our "end of the cold war, and otherwise to safeguard’ our national “security interests. oo : . “copy” oT | — af Docta:32423484 Page 77 ~ Lyndon B. Johnson Library a
awa THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET - EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Cuba - Covert Program Docld:32423484 Page 78 ae . 7 “Lyndon. ‘B. Johnson “Library” 1. Pet'er Jessup and I talked about the Special Group meeting last week, and the intention to get higher authority's decisions this week on a number of specific matters. .2. Attached is a collection of background documents which bear. ‘on the problem. Tab 1+ Aletter, dated March 6, from Des Fitzgerald to you © describing a number of decisions which need to be taken. Tab 2 = A memorandum, dated March 30, to the Special Group giving a status report on autonomous Cuban exile groups. Tab 3 --A memorandum, dated about January 25, which re- views and evaluates the current covert program. Among other things, it attempts to show how the covert program ties in with our other programs directed against Cuba. , Tab 4 - A CIA memorandum, dated February 21, describing our possible courses of action (a) if we decide we can live with - Castro, and (b) if we cannot live with Castro. “Tab 5 - A memorandum, dated March 17, which describes the morale among anti- Castro Cubans. 3. ‘In essence, the issues in the covert program seem to boil down to the following: | (a). CI A now collects intelligence from within Cuba. It is axiomatic that this: will go on, and, thus, no decision from higher authority is needed.’ (b) ClA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media are now directed at Cuba to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet SECRET oor ee on cc eects LE “Copy Ne Dn Dnasnemeensenmmnesestemncneaanestiteincenanns nessteeuesteniaiamteata
SECRET - EYES ONLY ~2- Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program. (c) CIA is now working with State in its economic denial program. Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program. (a) CIA is now trying to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non- Communist elements in the power centers of the regime. ‘Higher authority may want to continue or disband this program. (e) CIA is now supporting two autonomous Cuban exile groups. ~ These will be operating in the very near future. While withdrawal of . our support will not prevent these groups from raiding Cuba in the short run, it will probably dry up this capability over the long run. Higher authority may want to (1) withdraw support immediately and try, if possible, to prevent any raids, (2) withdraw support if and when the exile activities seem to be leading to an intolerable situation, or (3) continue support to the exile groups indefinitely. (f) CLA now supports and directs a sabotage raiding apparatus - in Florida; this apparatus is now standing by, waiting for something. to do. Higher authority may want to (1) disband the apparatus, (2) per- _ _mit the apparatus to go ahead with its sabotage program. Me "  (g) CIA now has the capacity to sabotage Cuban merchant vas \ ships calling at foreign ports. “ ve , ee w vO ) Higher authority may want to (1) disband the program, (2) try to X: atl keep this capacity on the shelf for a while longer, or (3) permit the ay we 7 sabotage of Cuban ships. . 4. Where do we go from here? - a, (a) Peter Jessup is prepared to boil down whatever documents J! Gn the folder you think the President ought to read before the meeting. il _ Please let me know which ones. SECRET Docld: 32423464 Page.79 . we eee | eet ee eee ee ener erinaainpanpeent
| - the meeting - perhaps a 3 or 4 page paper, which describes briefly |; the pros and cons of the issues listed above under paragraph 3. _ | Such a paper might or might not include departmental recommenda- tions. Please let me know your views on this. gg ( ( SECRET - EYES ONLY -3-6 of 3 (b) It seems to me that we might need another paper for : | - Gordon Chase | | | 1 | | _ SECRET pacra:32ai3404 Page eo ; Lyndon iB. Johnson Library ae
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET - EYES ONLY June 15, 1964 | MEMORANDUM FOR > =. | | MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Assassination of Castro 1. Attached is a memorandum from CIA describing a plot to assassinate Castro which would involve U.S. . elements of the Mafia and which would be financed by | Pepin Bosch. 2. John Crimmins is looking into the matter, is plan- . to ning to talk to Alexis Johnson about it, and feels that _ the matter should be: discussed at a Special Group “meeting.. John's own inclination is that the U.S. Gov- _€rnment cannot knowingly permit any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing and should go all out to stop the plot. This would involve sicking the FBI on the American criminal elements involved and intervening : with Bosch. — ae an Ihave not yet thought ‘this one through and respectfully — _ withhold judgment. § a - . Gordon Chase errs Ne nt fob HS .. SECRET - EYES ONLY We ee cee an a | | Copy pocta:32423464 page 154 | - _ 7 “Lyndon B. Johnson Library | tt eae ee