an , ry ry ~ 3 Ciassiflegtion:. 2 (iis form is te be used fer motanicl antenatal fom ClA==centrelled documents.) *The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered by the Agency related to its investigation of possible Cuban involvement in the assassination: Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection. Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated--- looking at it from my point of view. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti- Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President? Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side. The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic) 0... within -- it was an enigma at the time. They were just” getting started. This was WH's area. This was. Win Scott's area of proficiency. So the defectors had only ~begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban defectors. ; , So, I can't ~~ I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time. tay e € The Harker interview should have been undoubtedl given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated? Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate. SECRE i, 000013 Gigssifisatign: Classified by derivation: | Classified by derivation: 2
- 9a - . neat Classifleation; __ SECREL (is farm is fe be used for motarial axtcacta: fem ClA—<centrelled documents.) *The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee | Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered by the Agency related to its investigation of possible. Cuban involvement in the assassination: cette Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection. - Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-~ Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill, the President? Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have- simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side. The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic) .. 4 within -- it was an-enigma at the time. They were just’ getting started. This was WH's area. This was, Win Scott's area of proficiency. So the defectors had only _~-begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban defectors. So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time. Sy e é The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated? Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don’t know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate. hai 0090018 Classified by derivation: Classified by derivation: | Gigssitfisetion: me) sare ear Tm. = . ena sr & ees a r
Pe niet tre net HS bY. Rete Elassification:. This form is te be used for matstial sateecied m €lA=<ontralled documents) Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent E was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the Agency provide -- Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly didn't do it. Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me? Mr. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R & A. f Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not -- Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all. This was something left to the people who were concerned specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation. Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information 3 pertinent to the assassination was to go through your office, correct? Mr. Rocca. Yes. ee EE Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent to the assassination went through your office, I take (it) you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would be relevant for the Warren Commission to see. SEB. Is that correct? Mr. Rocca. Well -- & - mh wankgnl. Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew? Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes. eae Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the > position, it would seem, to know what information was "being generated in the field that was going to the Warren Commission. Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis. and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (did). Elassificatisn: 930643. Classified by der ivation: — lassitied by derivation:
Classification: (his form if ts be used fer motesial satencted €iA—centrelled documents.) Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans. “Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record.” \ (Discussion off the record.) ae So paceman . em remem aime 6 a ae yan Seyi | yur jug we tn neta oceans Me. Goldsmith. Let's continue, _, Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this. This was the great concern. Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. There are different -- Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WH: do you have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in this kind of thing. There was extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised to try to clarify that side. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility | of an assassination plot by Castro against — the President was adequately investigated? (Pause) Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hind- Sight, I could say probably not. But at the time i seems, to me that they gave due attention to it -~- within the * information that I had at my disposal. O< Soe uf **In fact, EHO spent 2 years, 8 months in the Soviet Union October 1959 - June 1962 ew) re oO Q with wf Gisscification ———___ sagez0 Zu O33 | Classified by derivation: Classi fied by derivation: a, Th. WG WR Wen - by tt ee Shae He |
2 i Gessification: — This, farm is $8 be used far metgrial sabastad fom Cla—ceantralled aSeUmERtE >) P18) because the people he was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB people. They were under consular cover and obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular job in those earlier contacts. (Ibid., p. 33)- However, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects of the CIA investigation were not ignored “because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans." (Ibid., p. 44) Mr. Helms also testified that the possibility of Cuban involvement in President Kennedy's assassination was a source of deep concern within the Agency. (Exec. Session Testimony of R. Helms, 8/9/78, p. 21) Nevertheless, Mr. Helms stated that development of informa- : + tion pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation ° _in the assassination was very difficult to-obtain. (Ibid., p. 138) Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis that during the second phase of the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its a _ Seni tet, —— SOMA, . ngage a weg qhedy ED, i ' h