CODE . TELETYPE - TMOMEDIATE \ 41-29-75 . -. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEST BATION a a TO ALL SACS AND ALL LEGATS | COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Jad : | Co, . , ; : g FEOM DIRECTOR FBI" {| 3 JAN 2.9 176 YC; « tow ft DESTRUCTION CF FIELD FILES AND RECORDS. won raepatchien IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPCT TO INTELLI- ’ sue oo 2S GENCE ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE REQUESTED THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FROM OUR POSSESSION 3. Be « Bow ee oe OR CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OR PERMIT DISPOSAL OF— _ ANY RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON SUBJECTS UNDER INVESTIGATION. ACCORDINGLY, UPON RECEIPT 4 kas tathatidoned wth co, 3 7 a aa, “, Uf ss ” fi ADOSIG BAD bh OF THIS COMMUNICATION, RECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD 5 (7 tenes tet et beat te IN ABEYANCE ANY RECORDS DESTRUCTION Eu it PREVIOUSL Caen APPROVED BY STATUTE OR husGULATIONS. FURTHER RISERUCTIONS. B FSvaTaN NOs G3SS3IOUd ITS Bl oo? weiter ah en REL nh Ar annaet tian Omen anne areas nartanomemmantanamtnney, 1 IN THIS MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON RECEPT. “a. FEB 28 1975 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (sent direct) 1 - Mr. Callahan (sent direct) i aie “exages Pee peeesy y 1 - Mr. Jenkins (sent direct) J 1 - Mr. Adams (sent direct) Oe ! 1 - Each Assistant Director (sent direct) ij; wv Assoc. Dir. PFS sbpr, , Ff Donan (19) et ks NOTE: Reference letter to the Director dated 1-27-75 from Hugh Scott, Comp. Syst. Republican Leader, and Mike Manstield, Majority Leader, United Ea Aes Stites Senate... Ve ~ ete \ J “ake a) yo Ste “(4 oS i 7 wenection “ | at t Te y ' ( Pp bene? ao are , Laboratory BP * ae a7. be P . ) (7 re i . * ; \\ Plan. & Eval.’ et ae \ ; } rem A nei ‘jes ; ,egal Coun, : “hye rp ea a Q sneer oo 95 WORRHEG IE 3 CERISE 494387 ; irector Sec’y -. = MAIL ROOM[_] ‘TELETYPE UNIT[_] ee HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 129
NTA i NED f ou C4 uF Cunt $*f wit RIMATE Porn ALL INEOR'S PEREI IS U:2SLAS * Assoc. Dir. Asst. Dir.: Admin. Comp. Syst. __ Ext. Affai Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Ident. inspection Intell. Laborato Pilon. & Spec. Inv. Training meer Directbr’S HW 5 Telephsde ‘. S073 ely weons/ Honorable Hugh Seott United States Senate VWashincton, BD. C. CL, ul Dear Senator Scott: ee o “£3 raat Lil baw at oN deere accordingly. You raay be 20510 Seated bet * ae ball ' / 4 oo ve ne a id ° , . ‘ ” ra ion ae - wee oe . 4 oy yclL"~ Mr. Callahan 1 ~Mr. Adams : L+~Mr. Jenkins _- k= Mr. McDermott * an February 19, 1975 Cur procedures recardiny the destruction of dscuments a our files are zeverned by the es Serail Records Act of 1959 and resu- Nations of the National Archives and Records Service, policy to destroy all records over twenty-five years old pertaining to sub- versive activities which were based on unsubstantiated allevations and did not result in prosccutive action. In addition, all criminal files over ten years old are recuced to rsicrcfilm and the original recorus are destroyed. We alse destroy the duplicate copies of all dccuments when thece copies no Ienger serve aus oful purpose. Upon receipt of your letter, we immediately suspended our degtraction program and aro attempting to determine whether any documents are involved that might relate to matters set out in section 4 of Sonate Resolution 21. We algo contacted William G. iiller, & Director, Senate Ealect Comraittese cn intelligence Activities, who adviced us that ho vill consult with Senator Charch and advice us . 1- Mr. Ash 1 - Mr. Wannall 1 - Mr. Mintz 1- Mr. Farrington 1 - Mr. Bowers 1 - Mr. Hotis )}: We have received the letter of January 27, 1975, with enclosure, from you and Senator Mike Manofield which requests that we not destroy or otherwise dispose of any records or documents a c relating to. forthcoming Senate investization of intelligence activities. cate it is cur current eS SEE aa WE, SOW ara sat SA TR eve. BER cts . 4 ‘prs ascured that wo are taking every possible oe ApAIn measure te preserve those records or decuments rolating to intelligence Dep. AD iv. _ AEtIvities that might be of interact to the Senate. It is certainly our intention to cooperate fully with the Select Coramittee in this a very +... important inquiry. ws ry Eval. “apie zy 7 (15) We AQTO AIL ROOM [_] DoclId: 32999530 ec'y We Rize 5+ Clarence Li. Kelley " Director TELETYPE UNIT C_] wf Page 130 Lf } “Bee NOTE next page). ive Sincerely yours A a Clafence Kelley fi" i ~ La he™ GPG
HW 55073 Honorable Hugh Scott ee gre? United States Senate ee Washington, D. C. 20510 oO - engi ce ee ae Reo ae NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 2-14-75 captioned "SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mansfield aid Hugh Scott re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75," JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield nor Senator Scott is on the Bureau’s mailing list. Doclda: 32989530 Page 1531
| “ ae OPH'ONAL FORM NO. 10 wi 5010-106 y Fe MAY 1262 EDITION GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27 ‘ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum ms | Ape TO : Mr. LaPrade pate: 1-31- TS, le j ai " a “ i » Gi ‘- mow H.R. Hauer$ 7 Set fer geo Foo) / i sa | pow o : ren 8 Eh SUBJECT: DESTRUCTION OF FILES AND RECORDS Trelsings FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION Legal Coun. Telephone Rr. —_ Director Sec’y 5,4 As you are aware, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Repub ican- 4 Leader’ Hugh Scott, in a letter to the Director dated 1-27-75, requested the-Bureau - not tofdestroy, remove from our possession or control, or otherwise dispose or 3 permit “the disposal of any records or documents which might hav have a bearing on } subject's under inveStigation proposed by Senate. Accordingly, Files and Communications Division is hdlding in abeyance any destruction program previously. & approved by statute or regulation and has issued instructions to all field offices a and Legats:to do likewise until clarification of above request is received. ‘Recommend Office of Legal Counsel prepare letter to Senators Mansfield and ‘Scott asking clarifi- Cation of their request and whether or not it includes existing destruction procedures. previously approved by the Archivist of the United States. “EAD ie Regulations of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS), General = Services Administration, which are based on Title 44, Chapter 33, Sections 3301 and 3302, U.S. Code, govern the type of material which we must maintain. NARS: regulations also govern what material may be destroyed. Record material is Bee described as including "all books, papers, maps, photographs, or other docuififa tary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received $ by an agency of the U.S. Government under Federal law or in connection with the if transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by thai agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies. decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or because of the information value of data contained therein, '' Our destruction pro- grams are conducted in compliance with NARS regulations to conserve space and manpower. In those instances where we have more than one copy of a communication, it is aur policy to file only the original of the communication and to destroy any copies when they no longer “wo useful purpose. aia: ‘oS . & ReC- be on CF APE ee, er i 1- Mr, Callaban OW “\N gi FEB 28 1975 1 - Mr. Jenkins | we as “®) 1 - Mr. Adams - ee . i) | corse, RES +. 1 - Mr. Mintz on 1- Mr. Ash ye FEE B. oe ©. AS <u m te &@ 8 x % . as Wis HW 55073 Docld: 252909890 Page 1@Q)NTINUED - OVER ol
n HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 133 Memo Hauer to LaPrade Re: Destruction of Files and Records Files and Communications Division Identification Division has purge-type projects in both the criminal and Civil fingerprint files involving the destruction of certain fingerprint cards and related name index cards, primarily duplicate-type cards on persons considered ,” inactive because of age. A Insofar as destruction of material by Files and Communications Division is concerned, files, index cards, and related material over 25 years old maintained at FBI Headquarters pertaining to unfounded allegations of subversive activities, membership in subversive organizations, subversive sympathies and tendencies on the part of individuals and organizations are approved for destruction by NARS when _ investigations revealed allegations predicated upon rumor, nebulous complaints and . honspecific allegations from which no prosecutive action occurred, Archival authority has been obtained to destroy FBI Headquarters files in connection with Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles cases, Selective Service Act cases, Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles cases (provided no prosecution results from the inquiries conducted and the case had been closed ten years); = = - - - and Archival authority has been obtained for destruction of files at FBI Headquarters in unknown subject cases in which there was no criminal prosecution (no time limit set regarding the destruction of unknown subject cases). In addition to the above authority for the outright destruction of FBI Headquarters records, Archival authority has also been obtained to microfilm any closed criminal file: , oo after the case has been closed for ten or more years. Thereafter, the paper records may be destroyed. We currently have on hand 38, 601 index cards to be destroyed which pertain to paper record material which has been destroyed previously under NARS regulations and authority. In addition, personnel files concerning employees who have been separated more than one year are reviewed and temporary records contained therein which no longer serve a useful purpose are purged and only those permanent records as described in the Federal Personnel Manual are retained in the official personnel folder, Also files, index cards and related material, over 15 years old, maintained at FBI Headquarters relating to laboratory examinations requested by various local,
Memo Hauer to LaPrade Re: Destruction of Files and Records. Files and Communications Division state and Federal law enforcement organizations in cases other than FBI cases wherein positive identification was not effected are also purged, These files no longer possess sufficient reference or evidentiary value to merit retention, Administrative and noninvestigative records maintained in the various field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are purged also. This material is retained in the field offices until necessary action has been taken or it has served its purpose. RECOMMENDATION: That Office of Legal Counsel prepare an appropriate reply to Senators Mansfield and Scott to determine if their request not to destroy records and documents was intended to include the destruction programs enumerated above. KG hte of | AW 55073 DoclId:32989530 Page 134
/ 1 - Mr. Callahan 1 - Mr. Adams 5 . 1- Mr. Jenkins _ nue ‘ | 1 - Mr. McDermo&t \y SS prpelt ME a 2 Leaary 19, 1975 . ~ #42. Ash Honorable Mike Manofield i - Mr. Wannall United States Senate i ~ Ma aaa . Washinstoa, D. C. 20510 i Me Bowees on. mil Dear Senator Mansfield: 1 - Mr. Hotis hl i D Ll) : Yee Vie have received the letter of January 27, 1975, with enclosure, from you and Senator ugh Seott which requests that we not destroy or otherwice Jispose of any records or dccuments relating to 2 , forthcoming; Senate investication of intelligence activities. - AP OEE eet Eker Ve ake ut Cur procedurce regarding the destruction of documents - in our files are governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950 and regu- \\ lations of the aticaal Archives and Necords Zervicc. I ic our eurrcnt AN policy to destroy all records over twenty-five years old pertaining to sub- vergive activitics which wore based on unsubstantiated allegations and LW! did net result in presecutive action. In addition, all criminal files over Gx ton years old are reduced to microfilm and the original rccords are destroyed. We also destroy the duplicate copies of all documents when thece copies no longer serve a uceful purpose. ‘ NY A > fe ‘ ie iv ALLE HERE TE. oe » Upon reccint of your Ietter, we inumediately suspentica r destruction prozram and are attempting to determine wWnhcthor any ocuments are involved that might relate to matters sct cut in section 2 f Senate Recoluticn 21. We also contactes William G. roegae btaff irector, Senate Select Committee ca Intelligence Activities, who dviced us that he will consult with fenator Charch and advise us cordingly. PABECORDED CORY 5 akc) ust ww. MAILED6 * F EB Lg 1975 Sota > 4 “Tr, 7 ¢ . You may be assured that we are talzing every pasciole Assoc! Di. _MHoasure to preserve thoce records or documents relating to intelligence De ap. activities that might be of interest to the Senate. It ic certainly our Asst dies Intention to ccoperate fully with the Select Commaittce in this very Admin. Comp. sya, _aeaportant inquiry. ¢ i ; Ext. Affoirs yy tf _, Files & Com. — . Sincerely yours, Hi iE a ’ I an . Aa ot Ident. Inspection, at - G M. Kelley: : ity ean J BH:mbk y ane be | A15) Clirence 1. elley cogent T's Fit re Director a Ne sag < i . (See NOTE next page) \ ™ GPO $3.5 TELETYPE UNIT CO , oe PO 954-545 Page wee = Laboratory Plan. & Eval. — Training | Legol Gear
Honorable.Mike Mansfield United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510 NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J.B. Adams dated 2-14-75 captioned "SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75,'' JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield nor Senator Scott is on the Bueau‘s mailing list. fate eee ‘ a ryne 1 i Mialibewv HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 136 = a = - - = — - _
— SPIKE ANSFIELG et ‘ “ United States Senate Office of the Majority Teader 4, 5 Pe LAr Washingion, B.C. 20510 v8 COND. fc January 27,. 1975 seo thse v. y 2 wut Lome ( wie Honorable Clarence M. Kelley Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation ce a Washington, D. C. 20535 . , € i mt é 7 / Dear Mr. Director: Co. Sibir tpn AS o i ' } me As you may be aware, the Senate is to conduct an investigation and study of government operations with . respect to intelligence activities. The scope of the “ investigation is set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which has been enclosed for your information. wot We are writing to request that you not destroy, remove from your possession or control, or otherwise dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertain- ing in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. ely Sincerely yours, re Enclosure , oo 3it , oD <& oe <a - “pod cn sos a | ae ye we -  & MAR 4 1975 "oad to Lal resis bg phone bo BF pin pear and reeyaegies no desgtructiaa of ary faut fe 4  cwaaigeaptenes = ; . uit! fortnce aches » ans - wl . wok re " é qd at . Pris a ne’ a 1978 opp Mee a HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 137
HW 545073 re + as - & og « ¥ - _" GEDERAL BUREAU‘OF INVESTIGATION MR. JENKINS UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF susni oof Oe- MR, ADAMS ie * *, a * OFFICE OfF*DPRECTOR pert MR. CALLAHAN wre MR, ASH MR. BASSETT MR. CLEVELAND MR. DECKER MR. GALLAGHER MR, GEBHARDT MR. JAMIESON MR. LA PRADE § Lai\ MR. MC penis are wu MR. oer OAT ow MR. WALSH Af MR. WANNALL rat MR. WHITE MR. COLEMAN MR. REED TELE, ROOM MRS. METCALF prenosiiee . bA W/o SFs7_2Y Doclda: 327989530 Page 136
Al - * 7 iad ‘ ” ° , wy - ~ a > : . *. . ~ re ~ Sak 7 . Y » e ew wv f % ar. * Y ‘ E : 6 ‘4°. + State or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or _§  .< by any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency .3 ° Of the Federal Government including but not limited Ae to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eaves- 5 dropping, illegal opening of the United States mail, or 6 the monitoring of the United States mail. “m7, . (11) The need for improved, strengthened, or con- 'g: °° solidated oversight of United States intelligence ac- .g . tivities by the Congress. ‘i0-. (12) Whether any of the existing laws of the 1g. ° United States are inadequate, either in their provisions 12 or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of 13 American citizens, to improve executive and legislative 44. . | control of intelligence and related activities, and to re- 15° solve uncertainties as to the authority of United States 16. intelligence’ and related agencies. 17 (13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of 1g expenditure and effort in the collection and processing +9 | of intelligence information by United States agencies. 20 (14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert 91 | intelligence activities in the United States and abroad. 99 (15) Such other related matters as the committee 93 deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibilities 24 ‘urider section (a). 25 Szo. 3. ‘(a) To enable the select committee to make ‘ NS S075 Docld: 3296953 ieee, _
m oc bp HE ea) ~ fo) nr 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 - | 6 ‘ ? 7, .the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select committee as an'agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the com- pensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate, but it may not exceed’ the normal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive docu- mentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses of any persons who the select committee believes have knowledge or information concerning any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5) to require by subpena or order any department, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government, or any private person, firm, or corpora- tion, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials re- lating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study which they or any of them may have in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to the
8 Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate m respect to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer ques- tions or give testimony in his character as a witiess durmg im wi ip Ee his appearance before it or in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government or any person, firm, or Oo oO corporation to produce before the committee any books, “1 g checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, g document, financial records, papers, physical evidence, 19 records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any {1 subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testi- 49 mony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any 13 other country; (8) to procure, the temporary or imtermit- 14 tent services of individual consultants, or organizations there- 15 of, In the same manner and under the same conditions as 1g astahding committee of the Senate may procure such serv- 17 ices under section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganiza- ig tion Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable basis, with 49 the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Adminis- 99 tration, the services of personnel of any | such department 91 or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis or other- 99, wise with the prior consent of the chairman of any sub- 93 committee of any committee of the Senate the facilities or 94 services of any members of the stafis of such other Senate 95 committees or any subcommittees of such other Senate com- : a ; . 073 Docld:329895: a
ep RE RS ET ET ONT TT i be er Docld; 32989530 Page 137- 10 A1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a1 22 23 24 e iy ttecs whenever the select committee or its chairman deems S) tht such acticn is necessary or appropriate to enable the select committee to make the investigation and study author- ized cnd directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct’ access through the agency of any members of the select committee or any of its mvestigatory or legal assistants designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis, or document or papers, relating to any of the matters or questions which it is authorized and directed to investigate and study in the custody or under the control of any depart- ment, agency, officer, or employee of the ezecutive branch of the United States Government, including any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Govern- ment having the power under the laws of the United States to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to prosecute persons charged with crimes against the United States and any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the authority to conduct intelli- gence or surveillance within or outside the United States, without regard to the jurisdiction or authority of any other Senate committee, which will aid the select committee to prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; and (12) to expend to the extent it determines necessary or appropriate any moneys
me Ww bd o fe FF Dm OH 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24. 20 > ’ > , ” ™ . . 10 made available to it by the Senate to perform the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the mvestigation and study it is authorized by this resolution to make. (b) Subpenas may be issued by the select committee acting through the chairman or any other member designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or other member anywhere within the borders of the United States. The chairman of the select committee, or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to admin- ister oaths to any witnesses appearing before the committee. (c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powers conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of - title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses. Src. 4. The select committee shall have authority to recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces- sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national secu- rity, mtelligence, or surveillance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens with regard to those activities. Sec. 5. The select committee shall make a final report
11 1 .of the results of the investigation and study conducted by bo it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it mw 0 deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975. The select committee may also submit to the Senate such interim reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its on JN OD OH final report, the select committee shall have three calendar 9 months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of such 10 three calendar months shall cease to exist. 14. Suc. 6. The expenses of the select committee through | 12 September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed 13 $750,000 of which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be 14 available for the procurement of the services of individual 15 consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be 16 paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers 17 approved by the chairman of the select committee.
OG ENED mM ALL INFORMATION CONTA. 2 HEREIN IS YNCLASSEY: DATE/ ~ erent ms v = % ’ “ OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 5010-106 ‘a os MAY 1962 EDITION j GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 da eat UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc. Dir. —__ M d. 1 ~ Me. N. P,. Callahan OAD ne omp. Syst. ‘Me, Ws R. Wannall per DATE: 2/11/75 Files & Coma Gen. Inv. 1 —- Mr. W., R. Wannall pent Me qi P egar 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton ea Vaare 1 —- Mr, W. O. Cregar Laboratory a . Plan. & Eval. SUBJECISQENSTUDY 75 Tete. Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. Director Sec’y __ This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled ” "The/Role of Counterintelligence" be furnished to Mr. Colby AMD: mags! as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion Hi aS an annex in a series of annexes Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness, The FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U, S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees, Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by the Intelligence Division entitled "EZhe Role of Counterintelligence." It is a basic paper and describes what counterintelligence means from an intelligence community viewpoint. It incorporates a considerable amount of input from the CIA, as well as from the Intelligence Division of the FBI. The paper has been circulated as a draft to representatives of CIA, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force and NSA, All have concurred in its content and have recommended it be furnished to Mr. Colby for use as an annex in connection with his forthcoming appearance before the SSC, ACEION: ERT RECB 4) ecg. IZ If approved, the paper entitled "The Role of © Counterintelligence" will be furnished to Mr. Colby for his use as an annex,to his prepared statement before the SSC, Enclosures (2) _e [ei - Sh 1918 woc:din )* ty . cael ae . ne A quan 5, lo, So Ln 11
HW 545073 6 | o : SEQRET aoete | ¢ —- SaoLASSterm BYS- PPE NLAIE. - ON mig ZO" THE ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE Counterintelligehce is an integral part of our national defense. By definition and by its very nature counterintelligence is a defensive posture to the extent that it reacts primarily to intelligence initiatives of hostile intelligence services, As any good defense, however, it cannot be static or passive. It is based upon knowledge of this country's adversaries; it seeks out and engages hostile agents and the intelligence services that employ them. The national counterintelli- gence defense, in other words, requires both. sound preven- tive measures and an energetic and sustained counterattack, ‘The purpose of defensive and aggressive counter~ intelligence is to ensure that adversaries. who do not want to risk open confrontation cannot attain the same objectives through stealth, In more concrete terms, the purpose ‘of counterintelligence is to identify and neutralize Spies @ud their maSters who Serve our. opponents, -.--. . Spycatching, by itself, is not enough, because Spies are replaceable, American counterintelligence must | also know who sent the spies and who supported and directed their work in this country and in friendly nations, And beyond identifying these agent handlers--the officers of the KGB and other such clandestine communist organizations—- our counterintelligence must know how these people are moti- vated, recruited, trained, structured, rewarded, and punished, We need to know how they communicate with each other--from New York or Washington, for example, to Moscow or Prague, In short, we need to know everything we can find out about them, as individuals and as organizations. And finally, what we know must be shared appropriately with other services equally concerned, This need is even more acute today than in the 1950s and 1960s. We know from hard experience that the clandestine communist services always increase the range and the intensity of their operations during periods of Western relaxation, when the openness and multiplicity of exchanges provide favorable conditions and opportunities for launching intelligence operations against our country, OA-MbEfS— AF Pele FEO ED iSnOmwiS o Doclda: 32989530 Page 152
AN tenet . - 6 ® ae B “ ry . . SEGRET “minimal suppo¢t capacity and only occaSionally. The growth in communist-bloc intelligence representation over the past several years, not only in the United States but also throughout the rest of the world, is statistically and operationally demonstrable, For convenient reference there is attached to this paper a fact sheet documenting this growth based on information recorded by the CIA and FBI. In considering the number of communist—bloc nationals posted to official establish- ments outside their countries, it is important to recognize that a substantial proportion of these are intelligence officers, These officers have a primary mission to conduct intelligence operations and official duties involved in their cover positions, if required at all, are secondary and serve mainly to legitimize their cover, In the Soviet case, it is an estimate accepted by the United States . intelligence community that at least 40 per cent of the officials are intelligence officers, Indeed, some defector Sources have estimated that 70 per cent to 80 per cent of Soviet officials have some intelligence connection, although this figure includes officials who act only in a ee one The most effective way to achieve the counter-~ intelligence purpose is to recruit personnel from hostile Secret services, It is also the hardest of counterintelli- gence tasks, a goal usually requiring years of close study and meticulous planning. Even if the effort succeeds, we , cannot accept at face value what the penetration source tells us, His reports must be most carefully crosschecked against everything known-from all other sources, Otherwise we may be duped by an adversary who uses "our" agent to ™“ ~ tell us what he wants us to hear, If there is no penetration of the adversary, or none at the level of seniority, all the other sources (hostile agents whom we have detected and "doubled," inter- cepted communications, defectors, etc.) become all the more important. . If counterintelligence is to identify and then contain or control secret action directed against the .United States, it must be closely coordinated, The adver- sary services do not run uncoordinated, haphazard operations cd HW 545073 _DoclId: 32989530 Page 143
[a 55073 Docld:32969530 Page 154 , r _ against us, All their major programs of espionage, counter- espionage, subversion, sabotage, deception, and disinforma~'. tion are intertwined, For example, a computer program designed to keep track of CIA personnel at home and abroad was planned in the Soviet Union, is maintained in Czechoslovakia, and draws upon information from East Germany, Hungary, and elsewhere, Another example: informa- tion from multiple defector sources indicates.that the. Cuban security service, the DGI, since 1968-69, has agreed to operate against the United States and American intelli- gence in areas where the Soviets are at an operational — disadvantage, “ A second reason why United States counterintelli= ' gence must be coordinated is the need for effective liaison with counterintelligence services abroad, No one Western service can cope by itself with the worldwide, centrally directed, attack of the Soviets, the bloc (including the Cubans), and the whole array of Communist Party auxiliaries. A counterintelligence defense which stops at a border is mG defense at ail, ; The work within our borders is equally essential. to our safety. Because the United States continues to'be- the main site of hostile clandestine operations, it is also the main site of American counterintelligence, Both forms of counterintelligence--the security of our own operations and the penetration of operations . against us--—have to be sustained if the Director of Central ‘Intelligence is to be able to protect United States intelli- gence methods and sources, as required by law. Counterintelligence has three values which flow from its functions. The value of its security function is that it prevents our adversaries from gaining information that the United States Government does not want to make public. Counterintelligence cannot perform this security role by rote and routines, And it cannot depend entirely upon guards, safes, and other passive measures, It must be active to prevent the subversion of those people to whom as ywen
ee», ?® the United States Government. has entrusted its classified information, Some of these persons are members in American intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, ; It must also prevent leakage of sensitive United States information from foreign services to whom American secrets are necessarily confided as a matter of common concerp but which in turn have been penetrated by enemy agents, The value of what might be called an anticipatory defense is not always evident because when it succeeds, nothing happens, It is like preventive medicine, Its value becomes dramatically clear only when it fails, . The second value of counterintelligence is that it provides information about hostile clandestine intentions and capabilities, This information is the more valuable i our adversaries do not know that we have it, . ; Finaliy, the third vaiue-of counterintelliigence is the large amount of straight intelligence obtained as a by- product by counterintelligence agents in the normal course of their business, . lgome specific and subsequently publicized examples of “ Soviet success in the recruitment of American officials, in most cases exposed and frustrated by the FBI, are: Nelson Drummond (1962), Jack Dunlap (1963), William Whelan (1963), Robert Johnson (1965), Herbert Boeckenhaupt (1966), and Ulysis Harris (1967), “There may be cited here some of the completed counter- intelligence cases which resulted in the identification and suppression of high-level Soviet penetrations of Western intelligence services and which were directly attributable to CIA counterintelligence work: George Blake (UK - 1961), Heinz Felfe (West Germany - 1961), Harold Adrian Russell ~~ ("Kim") Philby (UK = 1963), George Paques (France -~ 1964), Giorgio Rinaldi Ghislieri (Italy, Spain - 1967), Yuriy Loginov (South Africa ~ 1967), Nahit Imre (Turkey - 1968), and Francis Roussilhe (France - 1969), Serer 7 ~ 4 = | HW 35073 Docld: 329895350 Page 155
ce SEQRET FACT SHEET COMMUNIST-BLOC INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATION There are presently 667 intelligence and security services operating throughout the world, The 13 countries comprising the Soviet Union and other communist states, including Cuba, operate 52 services of domestic and foreign intelligence and security. Some 23 of these work outside their own frontiers. The principal service in action throughout the world against the - United States and Americans-—~which our highest grade documentary sources confirm are termed "The Main Enemy" (Glavny Vrag)--is the Soviet State Security Service (KGB), together.with Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, headed by a senior KGB officer, Soviet intelligence representation in the Free ‘World has been massively increasing for at least the past io years, as the following data show: Years . Persons: 1959 .- -. 2. 4,500 ~ 1966 2,490 1971 OF sO 2; 106. - - ‘January, 1974 3, 100. (est. ) — eee -.-<The Central Committee of the Communist Party--of-. - the Soviet Union and the Soviet intelligence services also direct communist parties--or, more accurately, certain sections of and individuals in such parties--for purposes of espionage and subversion abroad, During the period 1969-73, Soviet funding of non-bloc communist parties showed actual and estimated annual costs to be almost $17 million, But we do not have the quality of sources that would guarantee this as anything but a minimal figure. The scope of the clandestine attack upon the United States is suggested by the number of identifiable recruitment approaches made to Americans by Soviet, bloc, Cuban, and Chinese services during the 9 years from 1965 ; _ «& _ 55073 Docld:3295895350 Page 158 G2 -//16395 wwe ft “
. . : < « . 4 m / ? wt ® ~— * . FS —_* ce SECRET through 1973, which totals 742, This averages out to 82 per year, or better than one recruitment attempt per week, These are the things we know, Our primary concerns now are those recruitment approaches that have been successful and where there has been no volunteering of information, Communist-bloc officials assigned to legal establishments in the United States. Date Soviets Other _ Total - 9/61 333 285 518 ‘9/71 707 459 1,166 " 1/75 1,078 1,015 2,093 Temporary visitors 1972 —. 1973 ; 1974 . Soviet Commercial Groups| ' 81 370 -. 466 ___’ Individuals — owe G4l> 5°: 1,299.5". ~1,500-- ~~: Soviet Special Exchange- --- -330-- -429 --- —- 486-- Groups ns Individuals _ 1,944 - 2,024 2,683 : Visits by Soviet Ships 26 267 219 Crew members 1,300 13,000. Not available SEQRET | ~2. | HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 159 . —
-} ortionat FORM NO. 10 , 5010-106 — “e es °° MAYS 962 EDITION nd 4 @ GSA GEN. REG. NO, 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT . Dir, Memorandum srener~-emefrave TO : Mr. J. B, Adams parr: February 7, 1975 Ext. Affairs we Files & Com. __ FROM : W. R, Wannall . 4}25160. ° AIAL: or Gh, Pome tee te pool ingle YY We a art at us a aed SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE Fmpr | Specs Iw taining This communication is Secret ~ Sensitive since the Tlorhave Rane information herein and in the attachments has been so classi~ an ay fied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (S Aga Of 2/6/75 the writer was furnished the attached material “by Mr. William EA Oolby, Director of Central Intelligence, ria a meeting in his office which was also attended by Lt. General _ Lew Allen, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA)i-" .C 0... 1/> General Allen was provided copies of the same material. € includes — a three-page statement containing a a listing of categories of activities of subject matters that require stringent “protection. during ‘testimony before the captioned Committee by any members of the U,S, Intelligence Community. The FBI had input in connection with the compilation of this information and the material we furnished has been included. (s) : Also among the material is a copy of a statement which + Mr. Colby is hopeful of securing permission to present at the very y beginning of the Select Committee hearings in order that he can oe ‘ emphasize the importance of and need for intelligence operations .— i pts-—precesses, the processes for collection of intelligence, how ja, “+, they are controlled and overseen, why there is an overriding need;, ‘i:. for secrecy in certain areas and what Congress can do to enhance - 2: U,8S, intelligence collections. (Ss) roe Bs The third paper lists eleven papers which Mr. Colby intends “ to turn over to the Committee whether or not he is permitted to make his opening statement. These papers supplement his statement and have been the subject of previous memoranda. The FBI has prepared the last two papers listed and is coordinating with all other interested Intelligence Community members to assure that all of the papers will be in such form as not to conflict with Bureau Jparerests.(5) yy ‘Lig REOSB 6a - 763-75 nel Pe 12. Ne A review of Mr. jy's or eet opening statemelit, has_peen.. ie fe. Among the highlights are the following: (5) He points out (page 2) that it is important ere "58.29 WPS 1i- gence activities be viewed in proper perspective and that, the. few ($) Enclosures WRW: 1m) (6 Rw BG) vanan (with enclosures) Mr. Adams (with enclosures . \ (wi th encrosures} 7} 1 NE: Wannela (wrk enc ours} 2 B4NR3 9 ‘Suenen—sthornive HW 55 DoclId: 329695 o\ Page 160 | aoe p8os RS bg po. Orn 00 et oN
ry a . ‘ a . ae € ‘ _ z ‘ Memorandum to Mr. Adams Re: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE instances of failure or error that may have occurred in the past be understood in context. He states we cannot operate effectively without more precise provisions in the law to protect our secrets, (s) Referring on page 5 specifically to the FBI, he notes that intelligence collection on a worldwide basis contributes to our internal security. The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate our society and to manipulate our citizens are well documented. There are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence operatives in this country seeking information about the United States and its plans and their efforts must be met by an intensive counterintelligence effort. He states "Within the United States, this is the function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the foreign agent before he arrives in America or to learn of the plans of foreign groups to try to subvert our institutions. To this traditional danger has been added a new threat of international terrorism. CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic intelligence activities have collaborated to frustrate several plans to bring to America and its citizens the kind of hijacking and indiscriminate terrorist bombings that characterize too many areas of the world." (S Beginning at page 7, Mr. Colby undatakes to explain the processes of collecting intelligence and on page 10 briefly goes into the roles of the various intelligence components and the legislative bases for their activities, For example, he states the intelligence roles of the other members of the Intelligence Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and in part from separate legislation, such as that charging the FBI with responsibility for internal security, which I consider a correct statement. (S On page 11, he notes that all intelligence elements operate within legal authority and are given further direction by the National Security Council, but (page 13) "each of us in the Intelli- gence Community takes full personal responsibility for the actions recommend or taken in conformance with such general guidance and policy." (S He explains the role of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) whose "members are an impressive group of responsible Americans who report their independent views of the accomplishments and weaknesses of the Intelligence Community direetly to the President." (¢) Following this, he notes that in addition to responding to various Congressional committees,the National Security Council and the PFIAB, a11 of which exercise oversight~type functions, the('s) ~w 2D om = IVE WW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 161
Memorandum to Mr. Adams Re: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE intelligence agencies are exposed to audit-type functions exercised by the Office of Management and Budget, internal audit systems, the General Accounting Office, and the Director of Central Intelligence. (5) On page 14, after referring to the manner in which the Intelligence Community functions through a series of committees and boards, Mr. Colby states that the work of such committees and boards is limited to foreign intelligence,"as internal security falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI participates in the Intelligence Community effort, however, so that any contribu- tions that foreign intelligence might make to internal security can be properly handled." 5) On page 17, Mr. Colby expresses confidence that the American people not only support but insist upon an effective intelligence apparatus to protect their security and intelligence. Thereafter, referring to Congress, on page 17, he states "Just tell us in the intelligence business what the Nation wants and does not want, and we will do our best to satisfy it. But also give us a way openly to change these rules when the Nation expects them to be changed." He then calls upon Congress to organize itself to protect the necessary secrecy of our intelligence operations while exercising its responsibility for oversight. (¢ A review of Mr. Colby's proposed statement has revealed no information which I feel would be objectionable from the Bureau's standpoint. ACTION: For the Director's information. wo -3- HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 162 ; ~
CR Ka ve the Attorney Conornl “February 20, 1075 ° pn eh lees? r- Mr. A ANIA ene) i - Mr. Adams Dircetor, rol rE RRS 0 welt 1 - Mr. Mintz oy 1 - Mr. Wannall “s leslie Pike e a) a 1 - Mr. Cregar “SERA DELECT COUIETTON -7 Pocoronco ic mado to a telophena conversation botveen Doputy Atternoy Goneral Laouronce Silborcan and ty. Janos Adacs, Fomrty Associate Director, PRI, on Tobruary 24, 1LO75. This will contirn the authorisation provited by Me. Siibornan to Mr. Adens with rerard te permitting CEA to Yurnich a memorandum dated Pebruary 7, 1000, entitied "Scntral Intellirenee froney Operations in the United States,” to Iie. fanmuok 0. Preston, fenicr Stari Member, Mause Appro=- priations Comittee. Sor your invormation, attached is a aie: canpy of thin momorandurn. ed it is qur understandiny that My. Preston teice phonically contacted Mr. Joim Clarke, Associate Teputy to the Director of Central Intellicenes, and requested 211 yweitton anrecnents between the PGI and CTA be ferniched hin ' tor the use of the Heuso Appropriations Comaittec. 7 nelocura 3 |G2-2108D5 REC-59 1 = fhe Feputy Attorney Coneral (Cnelesure) , . ff ron _p- / | i HOC :ebe Vw are (8) Gc (es Pee Tarde a1 FEB 21 1979 NOTE: Reeser CSE eae mail MAILED 2 Agsoc, Dir. araniaal See memorandum W. 0. Cregar to Mr. Wannall, dated Aest Din 2/18/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75," prepared by WOC: ebe. Comp. Syen Ext. Affairs Files & Com. ._ Gen. Inv. Ident. Inspection Intell. . Laboratory Plan. & Eval. — Spec. Inv. Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. cto Ail ROOM LE B: SEES a) rth (TELETYPE uniT (J P55073 Docld:32989530 Page 188
4-312 (Rev. 12-11-78) é $ Date of Mail ____ 2/7/75 Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section. ow THIS if AF repre Ath THPORN LATION can ferme rn DASSTF LED, ena psfon BL SPL MLNS See File 66-2554-7530 for authority. Subject . JUNE MAIL SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE OM 3 197 Removed By é AR 38S File Number 62-116395-20 joe . Permanent Serial Charge Out HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 139
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 of 5010-106 : " J MAY 1962 EDITION * GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 ., UNITED STATES GO D asses e Ezoc. Dir. 1 = Mr. Callahan Dep. A "A / 1 — Mr. Adams ance yt Memorandum 1 = tir. Adans my Comp. Syst. —— TO :-Mr. W. R. Wannallow [ol DATE: 2/7/75 Files & Com { ” 1 - Mr. Mintz FROM :W, O regar 1 - Mr. Wannall Ee 1 = Mr. Fulton Laboratory save ENSTUDY 75, Training ‘ Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. — 2/6/75, recommended that Section Chief William 0. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, be authorized to concur in recommendations dealing..with proposals to protect the intégrity~of élassified documents which will By. nécéssarily be provided to the Select Committee of the Senate ' (SCS) during forthcoming hearings. Referenced memorandum was approved subject to a recommended change by Inspector J/E. Herington, Legal Counsel Division. Jeu uf Director Sec’y — Memorandum F, B. Griffith té Mr. Bassett, dated Cy The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community met on the morning of 2/7/75, at which time the above-described Paper was considered, The change of language offered by Inspector Herington was submitted to the Group for consideration and was adopted. No substantive changes in the Paper were made and the over-all Paper was approved. These security proposals will now be discussed with Senator Church and his staff by Mr. Colby's staff in an effort to insure proper protection of. classified documents that might be presented during forthcoming SCS testimony. ACTION: For information and record purposes, _/l6 Po Fre 62~116395 . 1 maP col y woCzebe Oye *-Ahe FEB 19 1975 | \6 # OF cess ut . f HOTT EASED pat AG \n" ws ye aa DET LUA 3 Nas S4 FER 20 2.0 80 2. gaoss0 Page 190
Y Fmor(G COUPAILTD HERSIY 15 UCCLASSIPIE] DATE 4-7-0 ALE, SORA TON SIFEB23 Bye e* (CONTINUED - OVER) X ae \. SUBJECT: ' HW 35075 - ONITED STATES GOMMRNMENT | Pi | Memoranaum . ot a | Comp. byst. — | . Gen. Inv. - 4 Legal C v ae : Oo oem A Inpect 4 y €gai Counse VOSS. a > tetall. ‘ vias — _f s =—— SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EBL OVERSIGHT . ar iy ‘ ‘ ee . . eal Rm. — ‘f On 1-23-75 Tom Hart, Professioral Staff Member, Presto secy I Senate Judiciary Committee, advised Inspector John B. Hotis \: that the creation in the Senate of a Select Committee on Intelligence ~ on * Operations raises serious questions about the future of the FBI - } £ Oversight Subcommittee. The Select Committee will make a final Ane report to the Senate in September, together with recommendations ~ as to any new legislation that might be necessary. It is possible that Ww Docld:32989530 Page 191 oR eee npn anew committee dealing solely with the intelligence community may be created or that recommendations will be made that there be stronger , oversight by the parent committee. wie Ie yrtete . \y ithe Congress to reduce the power and effectiveness of the Bureau. He feels thatis what is behind the "phony stories" that have suddenly been circulating about Bureau files on Congressmen. Even some of the "right wing Republicans, " he said, are attempting to capitalize on the controversy, hoping thereby to take some of the criticism away from former President, Nixon. - : “ES IPs a REC GB (7 564 es, 7 He said that some of the younger Senators A {Pek to take over the oversight responsibilities on the grounds that Senators Eastland and McClellan have been overly protective of the Bureau. it is important, therefore, that the Oversight Subcommittee show some immediate activity. As soon as the confirmation hearings on Attorney General Designate Levi are completed, Hart will go to the Rules Committee to get budget approval for the Oversight Subcommittee. le Hart said that he is troubled over the mounting pressures in mae ORIGINAL FILED IN Ls Dy bes tame cee TT ball 395 ax \y ar Valyy his ~ Mir, Wanna NOT RECORDED ~ Bo 2- Mr. Mintz fe oR emesis ecb. ILS 1 - Congressional Services Unit EB 27 1975 ayes i - Mr. Reed _ _. cost 1 - Mr. Hotis V/ VYoo@Ey J BE mbky?
. TR ere eee tee an ee ee tem mnnnne nnenine cae samnetete nn ee et: v Memorandum to SEK Act 6 (4) Re: Senate Subcommittee on FBI Oversight for the committee regarding the foreign counterintelligence functions of the Bureau and it is expected that hearings will be scheduled in mid-February. i s Professor J omy lliff and two interns have been preparing materials Hart added that he does not know who the new members of / he Oversight Subcommittee will be at this time. It could inciude Senators Tunney, Hart, or Kennedy. This determination will be made later this month. RECOMMENDATION: None. For information. 7 HW 55073 Docld: 32989530 Page 192
r x J. B. ADAMS a, ~~ DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR ital : Comp. Syst. Ze Wan 2/12/75 Ext. Affairs ay, Files & Com. — Oe - . Gen. Inv. ———— ~ wcte . , TS Ident. a Irispecti 7 TO MR. KELLEY: intel vA i Laboratory , Attached is a memorandum rej) Plan. & Eval. — ’ approval of an annex to be furnished to Spec. Inv. " entitleg Origin and Disposition of the i vee Pian. “iso enclosed is a proposed anng|*°o* ~°" Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y —— “whiitélligence Evaluation Committee prepat “Departiient since the Committee was a — function. Both were prepared from existing records, do not involve any policy statement and, accordingly, upon approval by Mr. Callahan and myself were transmitted to Mr. Colby. . B. ADAMS ae net eS) —s Or4skER ANGIE ooo Page 194
to aaaaine eT or Le a “Sat ee aT he Ree BO eg CFL i! : Coe ae ee, SS me ee * amy TS "y ttn ee ty ara er ee eilitenes > Wire prerrovonaare easier) mans Sen D sity ~ ee ON geal te wap ae mew vee Be Eg bas] tad Page 195 alt IRR 132989530 etabitd b DoclIda HW 545073
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January 27, 1975 \ Honorable John oc Pastore C) roy je United States Senate / | vip 7 f Vashinetor, D. CG. 29510 en ce Boar Senator Pastore Z have bad an opportunity to read the remarks you nade January 2Zist on the Senate fleor when you presented a resolution to estamlish a select cormmithes te conduct a study of governreontal operations with respect to intelliqence activities. Eo vant you to knew of my sincere appreciation for YOUr very cenarous comments concerning re and roam pleased by your insistence on a cormletely fair anc objective investigation. I valeome the opportunity to appear hefore the distinduished rarbers of the Senate to discuss all matters of interost to the committec. ms more a Sincerely yours, | . har a res , Clarence A 4l25/oo. - Sp 2 ar t UE Clarence i. Kelley Director ¥EXLIO lute 4 “ x 1 - Boston-~ Enclosure 1 - Congressional Services Office - Enclosure Wo lee Assoc. Dir. UWS: ‘DIY: (6): oo Dep. AD Adm Dep. AD Inv. __ me : Asst. Dir: } me Vie Admin. TOW ee Comp. Syst, at cic’ “| ~ Ext. Affairs ane . , Files & Com, —! Pnel Gen. Inv, i ; AM a i Jan 29 1975 Ident. Ins i Stee pection ; = CPE Intell. Meda we bas Laboratory ee Plan. & Eval. _ vol Spec. Inv. Training Legal Coun. Tele 7 os . y YM Teles FE Bin oF nocer TELETYPE UNIT CF _) j vi 7 GPO 954-545 55073 Doclda:32989530 Page 197
te 5 ea " SRNATR RRSOLITION 21H he oe ar ‘ 7 a ” Gq TION AND STUDY ‘OF GOVERH- RMENTAS. | mo ERATIONS, RESEECT TO INTELLIGENGH AC. | IVETE ES- PLACeH TRipER. * OLUTIONS AND MOTIONS. OVER, UNDER THE RULE” * Mie. MANSETELD! ur, President,’ I yield to the distineutshed Senator from, ‘ Rhode Island. - ‘Mr, PASTOR, Mr. President, send’ to the desix a xesolution and ask for its immediate consideration. . The VICE. PRESIDENTS, Bs there’ obs » jection? +. °° +. Mir. Besar scorn ‘Nts President, fo do with fie OFA. Mis MAIS " community, ; Ma Hue me SCOTT. With the intelli- fences conmmunity. : Mz, MANSPINED, I do not think we SRD, With thoInteliigenes - o dataae * should emubasize the CIA too much, be- cause it is the intelligence. community, L -{hink thahshould he understood. <.. . She View PRESIDENT, ‘The clerk: will ' r '- revoritherezolution.. | The legis! lative clerk vead as follows: " Resatyed, to establish a select committeo ., Sbudy of governmental operations with re- ; Speck to inteltigence. activities, : ° Mir it Aye "ls MANSETSD. addressed: the Chair, have reserved the right to object... Min MANSERELD. Mr, President: I ask, - uhanimous consent, so thetit will be fully ©  Understaad, that, the resolution be read i in. Mr, PASTORE, That 18 right, . Whe WCE eRESMETT, ‘The clerk will report the resélution in full, ‘The lesisiative clerk réad as ‘follows: . ... & Bes, 21! ; Resatved, To establish & relect committee . 6 the Senate: to conducé an investigation and study: of governmental operations with respect ta Intelligence ectiyiiies and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or . wnethical, “potivities wera. ongeged in by any _ agency of-the Federal Government: pr by any ' persons, acting individually or In, combing« ~ Hon, with others, with respect t6 any intelli- - ae «(pened activity catricd out by, or on behalf. of the Federal Government, | -- Resolved, ‘That. ta) thera is hereby estab. lished, 6 sslecf -committes of tha’ Senate “ which mev be called, for convenience of ex- ” pressioti;- ‘the, Select Commitites ta’ Study. Governviehbal. Operations With Respect to . Intelligence Activities ta conduct an in- ''” vestigation and study of the extent, if any, towhich ileaal, improper, or uiethical activ- ities were enzeged iu, by any agency or by any persons, seting either Individually or in combination. with others, { carrying out any intelligence or surveiiiance activities by ‘or on behalf. of any agency of the Federal Government, {bo} The goleck committes created by this resolution shall consist of slaven: Members of tha Senate, sis to be appointed by the President of tho Senate’ from the majority Members of Sho Senate upon the recom- " mendation of tho Majority Leader of the Sen~ pte, and five minority Members of the Sen- . ate te be appointed by the Fres{dent of the ” -Sertate upon the recommendation of the Mi+ _norlty Lender of tha Senate, . . +, rox ‘the Purpates of paragraph 6 of Rule _DoctId: 32989530 © WIEE Tae teservine. the, right fo’ object; I under. -- ‘Stand thet tals is the resaintion having “Yect committee shall constitute a quorum . for the transaction. of husiness, but the se~- dect committee may atix 9 lesser number as. toatiewer | ’ Of the Senets taconduct an investigation.and: Mx SUCH SCOTT. Mr. President, I ; | aan ee Rage. 198 eepriir oee ice of a Senator as & member, chairman, or vica chairman of tho select committee shell * not beteken inte xnccount. tc) ‘The majority members of the commit. tee shall select .« chairman and the minor- {ty zaembors shall celeck a vico ‘chairman snd the coramittes shall adopt rules and pro~ cedures to govern its proceedings, ‘The yico chairman shall preside over mectings of the select commitfes during the absence of the chairman, and discharge such other respon~ . sibilities as may pe assigned to him by the f ' B GRESSIONAL RECORD — ma “ Tis. 25 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, sel SION RELATING TO INVEEEIGA- ‘gelect’-comraittea or the chelrman. Vacen- iefes. in the membership of the select. com- mittee shall not affect the authority of the ‘remaining members to execute tho functions of the-Aelecé.committes and shall be Diled in whe samo manner 23) original appointments te +. are made, - (Ay, A majority of the members of the se- # Yuornm for the purpose of taking testi- ‘mony or depositions. Sze. 2. The select committee ia author~ ized and directed to.do everything necessary or appropriate to make the investigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the first section, Without abridging in any way the authority conferred upon the select committees by the preceding sentence, the Senate further expressly authorises and-di~ rects the select committee to make a com- plete investigation and study of the activi- ties of any agency or of any and all persons Kind which, have any tendency to raveal the fall facts with respect to, the following mat. " ters or questions: {1} Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conductetl an iMlegat domestic intelligence operation in the United States, “s, ».(2), The, conduct, of, domestic, intelligence or counter-intelligence operations against ‘TH. citizehs by the Federal Bureau’ of In- vestigation or any other Fetieral agency. (3) .The origin ‘and dispositton of the.so- beled “iuston Plan” to apply United States intelligence agency capabilities against In- dividuals or organizations within the United States. - (4) The extent to which the Federal Bu- reau of investigation, the Central Inteli- gence Agency, and other Federal law enforce~ ment or intelligence afencies caordinsate their respective activities, any agreemonta which govern that coordination, and the ex~ tenf to which # lack of coordination has contributed to activities or actions which are legal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or contrary to the intent of Congress. (8) The extent to which the operation of flomestic intelligence or counter-iitelli- gence activities and fhe operation of any other activities within the United Stetes by the Central Intelligence Agency conforms to the legislative charter of that agency and the Intent. of the Congress. {G) ‘Fhe past and present interpretation by the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to the provision In section 192(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 1.S.C. 408(d) (3)) that“... that the.agency shall have no police, subpens, | law enforcement powers, or internal security ‘functions... .” (7) Nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities. 48) The need for specific legisiative au-~ thority to govern the operations of any in- telligence agencies of the Federal Govern- ment now existing without that explicit stabutery authority, Including but not lim-~ ited to agenctes such ag the Defense Intel~ ‘Higence Agency and the National Security “Agency. - The nature ahd oxtent to which Federal yale ts or groups of-persons or organizations of any "© lab Fanuary FL 975 agencies cooporats ond axchoneo intelll- gence Information and the edanuacy of any regulations eo: otatutes which povern-fach cooperation and pxchanrce of Inteliiconee in- formation. (9) The extent te which United Btates in- telligence agencies hre poverned by executive _ orders, rules, or rasulations clther published or secret and the extent to which those ex- ecutive orders, rules, or mpuistions inter- . pret, expand or are jn confiies with specific legislative authority, . (10) The violation or suspected ‘ylolation of any State or Federal statute by pny in- telligence agency or by any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed- eral Government including but not Umited to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire- taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the United States mal, or the monitoring of the United States mail. (11) The need for improved, strengthened, * or consolidated oversight of United States - Antelligenco activities by tha Congress, aay Whether amy of tho dxisting laws of the United States are inadequate, elther in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and Jesisiative control of intelligence and reinted activities, end to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of Uatted States intelligence and related agen- eles, (43) Whether there is unnecessary dupli- cation of expenditure and effort in tho col lection and procesning of intelligence infor- mation hy United States pagenciés, (14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligences activities in the United States and abroad, (16) Such other related matters og the committee deems necessary in. order to carry out its responsibilities under section (a). Sec, 3(a). To onable the select committes to make the investigation and study author- ized and directed by this resolution, the Sen~ ate hereby empowers the select committee as an agency of the Sennte (1) to employ and fix the compensation of such clerical, inves- “tigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate, but it may not exceed the normal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, recesses, and adjourn- Taent periods of the Benate: (3) to hold hear- ines for‘taking testimony on oath or to re« ceive documentary or physical evidence relat- ing io the matters and questions it ig author- ized to investigate or study; (4) to require by subpens or otherwise the attendance as wit- nesses of any persons who the select commit- tee believes have knowledge or information concerning any-of the matters or questions it is nuthorized to investigate and study; (5) to require by subpena or order any depart. ment, agency, officer, or employee of the ex- ecutive branch of the United States Govern- ment, or any private person, firm, or corpora~ tion, to produce for its consideration or for ‘use ns evidence in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled checks, corre- spondence, communications, document, pa- pers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials relating to any of the mat- ters or questions if is suthorized to inves- tigate and study which they or any of them may have in their custody or under their con- trol;" (6) to make to the Senate any recom- mendations it deems appropriate tn-respect to the w!iful failure or reftisal of any person to answer questions or give testimony in his character as a witness during his appearance hefore it, or in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Gov- ernment or any person, firm, ot corporation to produce before the committee any books, checks, canceled checka, correspondence, communications, document, finenctal records, papers, physical evidence, recorda, recdrdings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any sub-
2, am, Sy ory qos Januath 21; 70095: ” pon om onder: o¢7)- ta tote a rad legislation, if deema necessary or desirable@ae other teshir renostkcurwher twarain the the Senate at the sariiest practicable date, United Atates cr in.ony other country; (8) to but no, Jeter than September 2, 1975. The procure the tamporary. ot intermittent serv- select committee may also submit te the Sen~ ‘lees of Individust consuitants, or erganiza~ ste such interim xeports as it considers ap~ tions theréoz, in the samo mannernnd under propriate, After submission, of its flnal re- the same conditions as a standing committcsoe.. port, the select committees shall have three of the Sennto may-precure such services un= calendai months to close its affairs, and on . Agr coctior 202%) of tha Legislativa Reorga- the expiration of.such three calendar months | nization, Act of 1946; 49). ta use on ‘a reim- shall cease to exist, bursablo bsctz, wits the prior comsent of the | Sec, 6. The expenses of the select com- , Committés-on Rules and Administration, the ‘xalttee through September 1, 1975, under “services of Bereonnel of any such department. this resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of “or agener; €10)'to uke.on, a reimbursable basis which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be * or otherwise with the prior consent of the available for-the procurement of the services ‘chairmen of gay sebeommittee of Any coms ‘of individual consultants or organizations Miltteo of She Senate the facilities or services thereof’, Such expenses shall be paid from the of any qeomiftors of tha staffs of such othey contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers Senete coxonsittets or ang subcommalttees of approved .by the: chairman of the select auch other Esuste commitiacs whenever the _ committee: Eelect conamitfes or its nhairrian deems thes, nag = Beth ‘ fc neopeiad : .. The Vick PRESIDENT. Is there ob- sych defion Is necessary or appropriate to en: fection to the resolution? none eble the cetect committee ta make the inves, ligation’ cud. study aufnerized and directet:.’ Mir, HUGH SCOTT, Mr. President, re- by tats resoltion: (14) to havedirest access serving the right to object, I do so in thongs tra ageney of sue mi>mbers of the order, first, to make the point that what Or Tera ee eee Ry of ta Ty it on ye, Weare really trying to do here is agree on OF Cbak cecintants Gerignated by it or $3. 2 time to vote on this resolution if we ‘chairman or the ranking minority member to can. It may be necessary to object for- ‘eny data, evidence, inforraation, report, ane Pt - slysis, or document or papers relating to any , Mally to get the matter on the calendar. of the rartters or questions which St is au- “2 so, I will be prepared to object for that thorized cat directed to investigate:and study . _ purpose, - - ; . it the euctody or under tha cotrol of any ‘’ T am not objecting fo the early’ con~ ‘Mepatiment, agency, officer, or employee of ~ sideration of the-resolution. The distin- ‘ho executive, brench of tho. Untted States - imiished majority leader and I have dis~ ‘Goterninent, including say’ department, pussed the possibility of an early vote. L agency, .wlicer, or emplovea of the Tnited . ; hat. States Gommment Hering tho power under , Personally am in accord with that. the lews of the United States to Investigate © = should like to ask.one question for any alleged criminat retivitiss otto prose. the benefit of the legislative history: It _ , Suite persons chetpod with crlmes-agninsi the <i my understanding that it would be - United, States ond any department, agency, - thé intention of the majority that the oficer, or employes of tha United States Gov» ” vice. chairman of the committee will be | ernment having the enthority to-conduct Ins | 9 member of the minority party. teligence or. surveillance within or putside 5 the Dnited States, withoul regard to the ture ih 1 Oe atin tre te olution ‘, and isdiction, or- authority of any other Senate 4 : committer, watch wilkatd the select commit- __ Mr, HUGH SCOTT. I yield to the dis- ‘. 4€6 to prepare ton or conducé the investiga. ‘tinguished Senator from Texas, if I may, tion and afucy authorized end directed by who may also wish to reserve the right this resolution; end (32) to expend to the - to object, : e . extent it fotermines eiebie te fe penroprinte -! Myr, TOWER. T have nothing to add any moneys m-de:evaliobls £0 fh by the Ben. . 3 ’ powers’ confersed upon. i) by this resolution . he he that when’ th jection is “ang to make the investigation and study is “the hope thet when the o i" ‘ is nuthorized by this recolusion to.meke, " . formally raised, we can consent to ge _.. | <b} Sitbpesas may he teauad by the select - the resolution. on the calendar as soon as committee ectiig through the chairman.or possible: Monday, if possible. - pny other momther designated-hy him, and | Wir, HUGH SCOTT. For the’ purpose ‘Tang he rorved by'anm person designate: by - of achieving that, L can object now. tithin tha borders of the United States wre Loblect, within the borders of the Unite ates, The §- 5 “ ‘Chairman of the ‘elect. committee, or any ,” ‘The VICE PRESIDENT. The objection other member thereof, is herevy authorized 4 2 ete a he wee tottte y tinesses appear rey ManbenED, Mr. President, T ask _, ag hefors tho committee, 20-0 : . ULid, Nit > XG) 2a preparing Sox or conducting the in- Unanimous consent that notwithstand~ Westigation ond study: enthorized, and di- . Ing the objection, the resolution be placed ': $écted. by thin xesolution, the select com mittee shall, be. empowered to’ exercise the powers copferred upon committees of the “ pena 2%, section 8002, of fife 18 or the ny trues Coda or andy other Act of Con- ¢ | eres rho thee: f on Thursday. We will be in. Friday. It 4s . Sress kegminting he: granting : ¢ Spamnunity _ for that reason that = make this unani- ’ Src. 4. Che pelech vommittes, shall have Mous-consent request. | . -, puthority to recommend the enactment of . Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I have no objec- any ‘Row epislation ox tha Hmendment of tion. ; _  * ‘4, 8R¥ Exiching statute. which it;considers nec The VICE. PRESIDENT. Without ob- . - essay Ric ieniorer ea strongihen or clarity Jection, it is so ordered. The resolution _ © national security, Intelligence, or surveil | 6 ; , fates activities of the United States end to" 95 Placed on the calendar a time of the Senate. I do'so heeause itis ‘mot anticipated at the moment that we . WIL be in tomorrow, and perhaps not "Stine ela apis owed: iene “with renovd to those nctlyittes. etors Stennis end McCrenran of what Src. Fa The select committce shall make » WS going to happen today and have also Gnal report of the results. of the investigation . discussed the matter with the distin-~ ? ” recommondations, 8 to nevr congressional mittee, Mr, Tower, a % resolutiqn, together with its findings and its ing member of the Armed Services Com- 4 55073 - Docld: 32999530 - Page 199 2 . ss QPNGRESSIONAL RECORD —SEZAGR © As "tio “one . plain at the time that in is heard. The resolution will go over. - on the calender at this time to save the . protect the vights-of United States citizens” 1;, it» MANSFIELD. T have notified Sen~ and study. conducted by {6 pursuant to this, Sulshed Republican leader and the rank- . ’ ‘ . wk “ $525 ‘The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob- jection, it is so ordered. Mr. PASTOR. Mr. President, I do want-to say, while the resolution is be-~ fore the Senate, that there is no Inten- tion here to conduct a witch ere he Senate who has more appreciation Or more respe 2 necessity for “a CIA, a civilian intelli- pence agency, ff “hit itary intedigence * ‘Reency, and on Met in order to puar- antes “thé sectirity end the survival Of this” sreat” Republic, But Ia recent weeks, and in recent months there have heen charges and counter charges spelled - out on the front page of every newspaper in, this country, The matter has been discussed over, television and radio. The people of America, are.confused. ‘They are asking themsélves, “What is actually happening to these organizations which are essential for the security and the sur- vival of our great Nation?”..... in order to, clear tho air, in order to cleanse whatever abuses there have been in the. past, so that we can put these agencies on the right track, so that we can recite, onca and for ‘all, the proper parameters within which they can func- tion, T em afraid we will do irreparable harm to the security and the survival of the country ynless we do this. It was for that reason, Mr. President, that I introduced this resolution before the Democratic conference. X made it Ph mm my judement ‘here are no three préster eriCR Ds. than Colby, Helms, and Kelley, I know ‘alr three, L have worked with all three, ave sound them to be distin~ an guished gentlemen who are patriotic and Ivo Tis Country as much as any othes, “Sus there has been Sbuse, They have been influenced in. making their jude- ments, and these influences, I am afraid; have come from on high, may times right out of the Oval Room of the White House, and sometimes from some under-~ lines at the. White House. | We had the instance hefore our com- mittee where Ehrlichman calied up the Deputy Director of the CIA and instruct- ed him to give disguise paraphernalia to Mr. Hunt. The question is, Under whose authority? Who was Ebrlichman?. Was it within the purview of the statute? Was it in conformity with the charter that es- tablished the CTA? These are questions thet have to be resolved, because we want the CIA to be responsive to the Président of the United States directly, and not indirect- ly. We want him to be responsible to the Congress that is responsible, in turn, to the people of this country. It is for that ‘reason’ that this investization is being conducted and this resolution is before this body. It was argued by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi that this falls within the purview and the jurisdiction of his own Armed Services Committee. As a matter of fact, when we talk about - jurisdiction, we also have the Foreign Relations Committee, we have the Ap- propriations Committee, and‘I do not think we are éver going to get around discussing the question of jurisdiction unless we get it into 2, select committee. If we get it into the Appropriations Com~-
* * -_Baople, Tpit jot esoinst putting, senior Mem= . at Bonen OOTY Sor Ie PQUENY: » BO eee a Baia him, ‘and funda~ expired, -: Tee EO LG. Wien. ae ‘ t BE san * ° mites ox , Avimed Services! Prt tee, Tata agratd wa oro ming back again - to tas ae “Hon of seniority, the seniority _ gemnlest tink has. dis sturhed so many “Pera on Vals select eoronilitee, bub we haves “vealih, wy have a reservoir of “gompatence in fats body, of People who hare” neh settled 4 “WHesd To cin wie 3 Ma wor or the other ~ Brentty ¥, T aust cay, ixoin my own con~ feet with -Bhesa tivo arencies, Zam a tle nrciuciced, miself, In “favor aor foe a or Militery I mativiencs ond.oft ort the Rey ara chairman ofthe su ay aries WOR Tas WEL, Wa may ae Seller, & Gains he is au oes z SUCTSTS CTI ULF UN aes Piss) Sane ao A rite | : hint hunt a Tet cas, We are nok out, to fe aie + polne t ta 4 conduck: 2 eit ee a) SOE tS aoa BPG US Oper SG- Cele River in bn open society, sometimes - ‘we have fa have 2 secrot. organization. ‘The big question is, “oa whom are they - “responsitsln? Who pot ns Into Cambodia? “Whe sok us into Laos? Wea cot us Into “the Bay of Piss? Wha got us Inte Chile? “Who got vs in all-over the world, and . “under whose authority, and wi hy was not * Here’ ve axe: “We possed the wer powers "wiih in order to restrict tie power to de- ~ glare “ine arid renuire that Congress be “goxsulted, and we find, now. they can do “it surreptisiously, throush the GIA or itrokich. crime other enencey. of Govern ment. Lhis is ell wrons. Pir, President, and J¢ should he tectif'ed. IE hope that “the majority leader end. the. minority . leader will pick out. comnetent personnel, of whom we_heve enoveh here in the . Senate, end that they will conduct a 2 hearine, toatthey wilh protect the secrecy ' = - uspread. this ot, heh us of the GEA, the FRI, ane the military in~: . telligence, and thet they will nob spread , db. ouh nulblicly and “thos _ injure this, “Nation. . vs kt .think we have: thas pompatence. e * think we have. the responsibility to do - that, And after. all, the Armed Services - . Committes, the Appronrie; tions, Commit~ | os bee, and tho Foreign Relations Commit- ‘tee ora. “ob go sentifiet, fhat they. axe ’ Eho only omeq who cant doit... - The onis thing F om, saying is, ‘Jeb us who are not al- ready. too much involved: with other re-~ ; .. Sponsibilisies in. the Senate, and can get on and do Shis job that needs to-be done, _ and id Renate. back to the people. . Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the . . - ''‘genator 3 yield?. Mr. PASTORE, X yield. Mx, ISERINEDY, I wonder if E could : . direct the Senator’s attention to certain” ’ . provisions of the resolution, and ask his _Interpretetion of such provisions. “My, PASTORE,: “The Senator may. | vie. * EDY. “Lhe first resolve clause,’ refers fo’ gatablishiing a “select | their mitds or prej- | “a we BLA teiny to todo. Decree etal widen our scope, . . end jet us pick aut men who will devote _ themselves.to this faskk, + NGRESSIONAL RECORD —-§ “committee of the Senate to conduct “vestigation and study,” and then I “draw particular attention to these words, “oft Government. operations with respect ‘to intelligence activities.” I want .to find out from the author of the resolution whether he interprets those particular words to include covert actions as well as literal intelligence- ‘gathering. activities, Including the full range of Central Intelligence Agency activities’ such as the paramilitary operations, propaganda, subversion, de- stabilization, operation of proprietary companies, and counterintelligence. ‘The inquiry would thus include, for example, activities like the secret war in Laos, ‘ opimien, mers Tue ae s, Zespeck Mm incrs, Operation Phoenix, and destabilization -Of the Government of Chile, |. The VICE PRESIDENT. Te 10 min~ Hove. utes .of the Senator from Montana has , Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, z ask unanimous consent that I may proceed “for an additional 10. minutes, and yield that additional time toe the distinguished Senater frony Rhode Island, The VICH PRESIDENT. Without ob~ jection, it Is 50 ordered. Mr. PASPORE, The answer is “Yes,” If they fall within the purview of arly of the activities of. these agencies; and whether these actions are performed domestically or abroad, the resolution is Very. specific in ‘that respect. The answer is' yes, | Mr, KENNEDY. I thank the Senator, i believe this is again referred to in sub- ” section 2(44) of the resolution, where it conchides with reference to “the extent _pnd necessity of covert intelligence ac- tivibles in the United States and abroad. Mr, PASTORE. That is correct. “Mr. KENNEDY. I bring this up be-+ -eBlse ore might later argue that the resolution does nat cover some of the ac- tivities the CEA has been inyolved in be- cause they are not liferaliy “intelligence activities,”. and therefore that they are not-subject to the scope of the resolution. Mr, PASTORE. No. . Mr. KENNEDY. Bué quite clearly, as ft have listened to the Senator here on the floor and also to his explanation in the caucus, the scope of the resolution ‘covers all of these matters I have just referred to, and they would’ be so in-~ pluded in the, inquiry guthoriged by the _ resolution. . "ss Min PASTORE, That is correct; arid the majority ledder will address himself . to that point; that this is not to be con- strued in any Umited way, that it has to be piven a-broad interpretation, and that interpretation. will be the interpretation. a the committee itself, and of nobody else, - Mr, KENNEDY: I thank the Senator. . Mr, GOLDWATER. Mr. President will “the Senator yield? . Mr. PASTORE. IT yield to the Senator _ from Arizona. Mr. GOLDWATER. Serving on the Armed Services, Committee, as I do, I ‘cam understand the anxiety and the “interest of other Members of this body over reparts emanating from the New . Mork Times and other newspapers in the eountry relative to the activities, or at “Teast charged activities, of the CIA, | 55073 ‘Docld:32989530, Page 200 |. a A' January "2%, 1975 I expected ‘that such a resolution would be introduced, and X am very glad that it hag heen introduced, and particu- Jariy because my friend, the Senator from Rhode Island, seems to be heading up. Now, the point that F am, trying to get to is, servine on the Arrned Services Committee, there are many times-———- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order so that those who wish to can give attention to the debate? The VICE PRESIDENT. Order. Mr. GOLDWATER. There are many . times, Mr. President, when we are con- fronted with testimony that we do not want to hear. It is of such a highly classi- fied nature, X do not think, frankly, any- one outside of the intelligence commu- nity shouldhearit. ~ Now, it is my hope and prayer that during the course of this investigation, first that a proper committee be selected. ‘We do not want to have anyone running ‘for President on this committee, or any other office. We want ta have people who are going te be objective atid hew to the ne. Mi. PASTORE. That is correct. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mow intelligence - js not something that we gather on Americans, It is something we gather on an enemy. Infelligence is 9 worldwide operation and, mush say, we have al- ready lost from the CIA probably the world’s nest intelligence officer, because he was not going to put up with what he thought he would be subjected to in questioning on the CTA. Mr, PASTORE. Wilt the Senator from Arizona admit that part of that has al- ready been accomplished by the stories that have appeared? Mr. GOLDWATER. I am sorry about what happened. Mr. PASTORE. Absolutely. Mr. GOLDWATER. What I want to see prevented js a further diminution of | the infelligence forces we have had. Z never worked too closely with intelli- gence but I have worked close enough to know, though, people in these jobs and in this field are very difficult to come by, they are very sensitive to exposure, and are very sensitive to haying their records and discussions brought “out in the press. * So I would hope, when the majority leader and: minority leader get together to select this committee, that they select a committee that will welgh alt of the facts and be particularly careful about what is allowed to leak, because the Wa- tergate leaked like an old sieve, and we sure do not want that to happen in an area as sensitive as intelligence. . I might say that we have gone through a@ lot of criticism or we have suffered through a lot of criticism in this country in the last several years, criticism of the military. Who is responsible for the mili- tary to go to Vietnam? It was not the Pentagon; it was the President of the United States who was the only man who | could do it, Who is responsible for the CIA, FBI and DIA and others getting into fields X have a feeling they did not want to pet into? ‘The President of the United States, Now should we go that high?
yr QPTIONAL, FORM NO, 10 ’ 5010~106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG.“NO, 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc. Dir, 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan aaa Memorandum 1 - Mr. J. B, Adams Ashi Dine 1-Mr. J. A. Mintz Admin, Comp. Syst. Mr. W. R. Wannall DATE: 2/10/75 Bie mean Gen, Inv. 1 - Mr. W. R, Wannall [= tnenoon FROM W, olf@egar 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton & ys! Dagtte lL - Mr. W. O. Cregar J1\j_ 7 Leboratory SUBJECT: Sensropy 75>. Training & ast... Page 201 Plan. & Eval. — Spec. Inv. se ~ . Lega! Coun. Fe a rn te RM Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y __ This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled “Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by tievad 1 Hoc, Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. — The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community is chaired by Mr; John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI. It is.made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees. There are enclosed two papers which will be used as annexs. The first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division, is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan." Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking ¢ the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby. The second... paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was pe prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted to the fie™ Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process. The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition. It is completely footnoted to documents which have been pre- viously furnished to the Committee on the Judiciary. These documents appear in published form in the document entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant to H, Res. 803." The paper was reviewed by those member . aot Enclosures (2) ‘: eet » 02 Ut f 53 3 7 sesnvintie - oven Woe: din 4 ; Wins
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: Senstudy 75 Ad Hoc group who participated in the development of the plan. No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for use aS an annex, The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided to the FBI for our review and concurrence. Here again this paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It is footnoted to various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as attachments 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee paper. This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement. « ACTION: 1. If approved, the paper entitled "Origin and Mya We, Disposition of the Huston Plan" will be furnished to Mr. Colby. We 2. Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI concurs Nod 4 in the paper entitled “Intelligence Evaluation Committee" for \ use as an annex by Mr. Colby. ue Ww Re 55073 Docld: 32969530 Page 202
Fee AAR ate Att te walk ah MAb aM lt LED MEI! tah ane tamirnind ae te gtvome Sentrnrar liad fame ek tm voy TO FROM SUBJECT MA Y GSA Urn, UNI’ ATES GOVERNMENT : Assoc. Dit. J L- Mr. N. B. Callahan ania 1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz Admin. aan an Comp. Syst. Mr. W. Wannell DATE: 2/10/75 Files 8 Conn Gen, fave ay 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall eae W 0peregar 1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton twee afe _ at -y Laborgtery - i Mr. W. 0. Cregar wept Plan. & Evel. ALL TUPORUATTION 620 7at Spee. Inv. SENSTUDY 75 Training This memorandum recommends that a paper entitied “Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence HW 545073 (DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs ir. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community. Ad Hoe Coordinating Group on Congressional Review Taha MbLawha wr enan wee OD 5 TT he a aA DM Awan te ee : oh LA on Pan FN ~ whe de oe ey RR ted h tba oe wy —~ a RS aR Ser AwALY } ay loother W- masaerraesst Taser Rise Wd chaizrcd by Sir. &ssociate Deputy to the DCI, I%¢ is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having. membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees. to he ed 70) be There are enclosed two papers which will be used as annexs, The first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division, is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan." Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby. The second paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted ‘to the Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process. The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition, It is completely footnoted to documents which have been pre- viously furnished te the Committee on the Judiciary. These documents appear in published form in the document entitled “Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803." The paper was reviewed by those members of Enclosures (2) CONTINUED - OVER fa WOC: din '*-s. (7) Docld: 32989530 Page 203 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED pare hielo py SP) aohecel Coon, -— Diractor Sec'y
[aa a Meath ahi dina AMontd Sadie TSC OY Ma Rie Hal bellied nnn A ish tlh DNAS telnet Att hy th bata Db Neel Linton nasheeds abba neni tinea Rann iiTimat 1st HW 545073 Pes pentane anne tease neeiatin renee SF Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: Senstudy 75 Ad Hoc group who participated in the development of the plan. No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for use aS an annex. The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided to the FBI for our review and concurrence, Here again this paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It is footnoted to various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as attachnents 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee paper. This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to Mr, Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement. ACTION: Manany If approved, the paper of the Huston Plan" will 1. Dispnosition entitled "Origin and te be furnished to Mr. Colby.. 2. Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI concurs in the paper entitled ‘Intelligence Evaluation Committee’ for use aS an annex by Mr. Colby. a Qype if ie. J PA ft aff i ( i Pera A DoctId: 329895300 BE ETL __Page 204 SR ER ETL ALE MRE RRCEY ETITRREMRED TE ITE ARNT CEN ARETE BOE VERSURI OU Rg A Fw Sep Rn FE OY EAE ARETE PIN PR GON AIO Sea ene
| ! | | : ! | | | | : : aw 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 205 PAY \\- 6700 at. CLASSIFIED BY. sf2 Am , DECLASSIFY ON: 26%). ORIGIN AND DISPOSITION OF THRE HUSTON PLAN ALD INFORMATION CONTATENS vee HEREIN LS UNGLASST PISS Bacgee WHERE SHOUN STURRULSS ‘BACKGROUND: By letter dated 6/20/69 Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, addressed a letter to the Director, FBI, Stating that the President had directed that a report on foreign communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the United States be prepared for his study. According to the Hnatoan Tether, the President specifically requested that the report draw upon all the sources available to the intelligence community, that it be as detailed as possible, and that the word "support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements. in the United States. The letter stated that on the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of the problem, it was apparent “present" intelligence collection capabilities in the area were inadequate. Huston stated the President wanted to know what resources were currently targeted toward monitoring foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States, how effective they were, what gaps existed in our (U.S.) intelligence because of either inadequate resources or low priority of
‘oteienitien mae eraaeeeehemerentenminntn adamantane amenannenea eee | i tetieeaiit attention and what steps could be taken, if the President directed, .to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities. The request was also sent to CIA, NSA and DIA seeking contributions relating to this same problem. Pursuant to the request, the FBI and CIA submitted available information on the matter. These responses were handled unilaterally and without coordination between CIA and FBI. on 6/5/70 Director Hoover met with President Nixon at which meeting the President appointed him as chairman of a special intelligence committee to coordinate a more effective 1 He also instructed that the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (Cia), National Security intelligence-gathering function. Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were to coordinate their efforts to insure that comprehensive informa- tion would be obtained for the President's use which would provide him with a worldwide picture of the efforts of new left and subversive groups in directing dissident activities in the United States. Present at this meeting were CIA Director Richard Helms; Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, NSA; General Donald V. Bennett, DIA; Mr. Tom Charles. Huston, White House Staff Assistant; luearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant to H. Res. 803, "A Resolution Authorizing and Directing the Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States of America," Book VII, Part 1, pg. 375. PRES SIS 2D Feb 5-29 89.5 Bearepe Rm cr ee ements nctinmncremn yoni cmgnmamenns re
Assistant to the President H. R. Haldeman ; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrilichman and Robert H. Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. An initial meeting of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (AD HOC) was held in Mr. Hoover's office on 6/8/70. This meeting wos attended by Mr. Helms, Vice: Admiral Gayler, General Bannett and Mr. Huston, Mr. Hoover emphasized the President's keen interest in the problem of intelligence collection and outlined the general objectives to which the Committee was to address itself. He instructed that a working subcommittee be established, composed of Leps S ag @ n if Har} cr a] it jot rl PS c. ka se fp honed c Lint member agencies which subcommittee was to be headcd by FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan. The first mecting of the working subcommittee was held on 6/9/70. At this meeting Mr. Huston presented “the subcommittee with an outline which he stated the President desired the subcommittee to follow in preparing its report. | The outline addressed itself mainly to the purpose, procedures and objectives of the subcommittee's review. The following from the outline is quoted: "PURPOSE: (A) To define and assess the existing internal security threat. (B) To evaluate the collection procedures and techniques presently employed and to assess their effectiveness. (C) To identify gaps in our present collection efforts ‘and recommend steps to close these gaps. MPVS aa | po eB | | | HW 55073 Do A 5073 _ Docld: 32989530 Page 207
(D) (LE) (F) PROCEDURES: (Cc) (D) OBJECTIVES : (A) (C) To review current proGedures for inter- community coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps to improve these procedures. To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data and to recommend procedures to increase both its timeliness and usefulness. To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic intelligence collection efforts and to recommend new priorities where appropriate. Although the sub-committee will be officially constituted within the ‘framework of USIB, it will in fact be an independent, ad hoc, inter- agency working group with a limited mandate. Operational details will be the responsibility of the chairman. However, the scope and direction of the review will be determined by the White House member. The sub-committee will submit its reports to the White House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970. To insure that the President has all the options available for consideration, the WH member may direct detailed interrogatories to individual agencies in order to ascertain facts relevant to policy evaluation by the President. Information resulting from such interrogatories will, if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a confidential basis and not be considered by the sub-committtee as a whole. Maximum coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community. The sub-committee may wish to consider the creation of a permanent Domestic Intelligence Operations Board, or some other appropriate mechanism to insure community~wide evaluation of intelligence data. Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal security collection efforts. Maximum use of all special investigative techniques, including increased agent and informant penetration by both the FBI and CIA.
Sante ntesoibie _ HW 55073 White House instructing that “Che ‘nemorandum be returned. Docld: 32969530 Page 213
i 3 i i { 3 3 : i & INTELLIGENCS L EVALUATION {COMMITTEE Introcuction Since its existence was first revealed publicly during the height of the Senaie Watergate Committee investigation in 1973, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (TEC) has been the object of suspicion and misunderstanding. Unfortunately associated by some politicians and representatives of the media. with such things as political spying, illegal electronic surveillance and surreptitious entry, it was nothing more than an effort by the Exccutive Branch to better coordinate and S telligence and investigative agoncids in the Federal Government. While the fact of its existence was kept secret, which may have contributed to the misuncersta inding of its purpose and function, the IEC was not an operational entity. Thatis, it did not conduct its own investigations as did the FBI and other agencies. Nor did it engage in surreptitious entries, wiretapping or other similar activity. It merely received data collected by the agencies represented on the Committee and put this information into one comprehensive report or estimate for dissemination to interested agencies and individuals within the Executive Branch. The Committee was staffed by career personnel Oo eee er eer ere sory geome ae eg cree fib aditar Aka st edhdt hein ene
ee hint le i ri atitiltasare wheal tard SEE sn ele Raa arate Met  ne on Bah NTA Khe ORY A ald aKa ret aia aNNEA A Me SU Qe et OEE NRO TOLLE CTE A SIE AN I A RR A A a : @e and it existed for approximately 18 months. In Novenber, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell met with John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs; Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General; Uerris Leonard, Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LERA) 3 Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division; and a consultant from the State of Washington, former State Judge Morell Sharp, to discuss the need for an inter-departmental unit capable of obtaining and evaluating intelligence information from all the resources of the Federal covernmetit relating to the membership, status and activities of militant terrorist groups operating within the United States. The meeting took place on November 10, L970 in Mr. Mitchell's office and, according to a memorandum dated November 12, prepared by Mr. Mardian, past attempts to elicit such cooperation srom interested departments and agencies of the Executive Branch had been unsuccessful. It was decided that Judge Sharp, John Dean, then Counsel to the President, and Mr. Mardian were to contact the heads of various agencies and explain the wishes of the President’ ’and seek their advice and’ cooperation. (See Attachment 1). Doclda: 32989530 Page 215
iz b q town HW 545073 fourth scheduled monting on January 25, 1971, at which time DoclIda: 32989530 Page 2716 ’ 8 e According to a memorandum dated December 17, 1970, from * t Mx. Mardian to the attorney General, a second meeting of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee took place at 9:00 a.m. in the Executive Office Building, and was attended by Mr. Mardian, Judge Sharp, Mr. Dewn, Egil Krogh (Deputy Counsel to the Poosigent), Jobect crvah! ¢ Kia (Assistant Secretary of Defense), James Angleton (Coutral intelligence Agency), Thomas Kelly (Secret Service), Benson Beéftham (National security Agency), George Moore (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and John Doherty (NDepartmens of Justice). .ITt was agreed at that eeting that on ox bnwore Jucuary 6, L971 the agencies repre- sented would furnish information relating to “organizational targets and intelli om canjets." Judge Sharp was to be tad Q t 4 iB Q o ci » "> ron to ct uN . available on a full-time cansulting basis beginning January 11, 1971, and the Committee was to have its next meeting on January 11 at 9:00 a.m. (Sea Attachment 2). . Judge Sharp sttended three meetings of the IEC during its initial stages of develonment. He did not attend the Mr. Mardian explained his absence by stating there had been several inquiries by the fornser Judge's acquaintances
| se . 8 in Congress which caused the Attorney General and the White House to be concerned that it would be difficult to maintain appropriate security regarding the Committee's work with Judge Sharp as its head. Mardian stated that at a meeting at the White House on January 21, it was decided that Judge Sharp would be removed from the Committee and assigned other consultanc duties with the Justice Department. | Subsequent memoranda revealed that certain individuals were designated by their respective agencies as representatives on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, and by February LO, > 1971 a document outlining the authority, mission, membership, staff, procedures and functions and office space and facilities . y was drafted and presented to each of the member-representatives. Functions and Purpose 7 ‘ According to the February 10, memorandum, the purpose of. the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was to provide intelli- ‘gence estimates to the respective Government departments and “agencies on a need-to-know basis, in order to effectively evaluate and anticipate problems for appropriate response to civil disorders. In carrying out this mission, the Committea was to have access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession of the United States Government. The membership HW 545073 Docld: 32989530 Page 217 - eee fe ee NM EE TRL SONNE NE RANE EEN TERT RERT TREE RETTRT AOS ON SN MISOR OB aN SSI EME Fe. IY ON RIE we re
at apenas orth eA a deca Biarhenan ana i Malti ane tase, DeaNeremantn ite tnind Werke hE Sa ht AE alam jetta NR le ane RM CAT 4 tara had Foun semalll an i fia ai 9 nce mettre ttle rn Le i ah VP a rth A Rn eR eR Rt Se TN a Fee et pe Fone en eee mee ee t HW 545073 produced and disseminated by the IEC during its existence. e produced and disseminated 31 estimates or reports dealing .with such subjects as anti-war demonstrations, potential for vio- lence in major cities, black power organizations, Arab terrorist groups, prison riots, and related topics. There is attached a complete list of all of the estimates or reports (Sce Attachment 5). The estimates were disseminated to -the Counsel to the President; Director, Central Intelligence; Director, National Security Agency; Director, Secret Service; ra ~ ~ * t 7 ws. . Stag Pond Ge LI gp FL al 3 Investigation; Dixrcetor, Office of Low Enforcement, Treasury Department; the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security pivision, Department of Justice; and the Defense Intelligence Agency. No estimates were produced after April 30, 1973. A communication to all . interested agencies dated June il, 1973 pointed out that inasmuch as the end of the war in Vietnam had resulted in the cermination of demonstrations which carried a potential for violence, there was no longer any useful function to be served by the ITEC and that, effective immediately, the IEC would no longer be in existence. - During July, 1971, Mr. Mardian, at a meeting of the IEC, stated that President Nixon had requested a report regard- ing the handling of classified information, which was prompted Docld: 32989530 Page 270
Farther coma tas Te cb it Taal ENN TS A Els TE ne Csr ht ete EK a oh AlN a a nd atte alone tart eit natn itnrttetni mae harris satan eet! tty ter armen amy mane -~B8~ a by the Pentagon Papers case. Shortly thereafter, the IEC, staff was advised that White House Staff Member Gordon Liddy had been appointed to work with the LEC regarding its study of the handling of classified information and by November, 1971 the IEC completed and disseminated a special report entitled “The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified information." ry Relationship of the ITEC to the "Huston Plan" In June 1970, og. Edgar Hoover met with President Nixon, at which time Mr. Hoover was appointed chairman ofa special committee to coordinate more effectively the intelligence- gathering efforts of the FBI, CIA, WSA, and DIA. The head of each of these agencies was présent at a June 5, 1970 meet- ing with the President, which included White House Stafe£ Assistant Tom C. Huston. Subsequently, a working subcommittee headed by Assistant Director William C. Sullivan of the FBI was formed, and it held a series of meetings beginning June 9, 1970. A final meeting held in late June 1970, a "Special Report" was filed and approved by the head of each member agency. The "Special Report", which was submitted by Mr. Hoover to the President, was divided into three sections: a summary of the internal security threat; summarized limitations on See ea oe Ler Soom er ec ee eee Lee oe ca | Re 2-7 | ee Oe eee eee
« ’ . ~ . . « . ‘ « é certain intelligence collection techniques; and, a brief evaluation of.interagency cooperation, with suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collec- tion. Mr. Hoover objected to certain options for relaxation of restraints on intelligence gathering. Although president Nixon at Zirst approved the celaxation of certain restraints, this approval was rescinded about five days later. Inguiries by Various Committees of Congress and Other Entities Into rhe Operations of the IEC Since its Gisclosure, the TEC has béen tha target of a number of investigations and inquiries, none of which has revealed any illegality or impropriety. The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Senate Water~- gate Committee) interviewed former IEC personnel. in 1973, and a member of the Committee staff was offered access to all IEC reports and documents. The final report of the Watergate Committee published in June 1974 makes no reference to any improper or illegal activity by the IEC, but devoted a section to the Huston Plan. (See Attachment 6). The House Judiciary Committee Investigating the Impeach- | ! ment of Richard Nixon (Rodino Committee) did not see fit to Hl | conduct any investigation of the IEC, and one May conclude that 3 | i [IHW 55073 DocId:32989530 Page 222
ian activities or assignments.” See, Hearings Before the Select HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 223 j it developed no information which would require scrutiny. The Lo - & Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Ervin Committee) , after submitting voluminous questionnaires to the Department of sustice beginning in August, 1973 regarding the activities of the former Internal Security Division, was given complete information and access to all documents relating to the IEC and, to date, has reported no finding of impropriety or illegality. | “The Watergate Special Prosecution Force has been given J ‘ 3 . eI ad complete access te the decuments and records cf the Committec i and it has conducted interviews of former Committee repre- y sentatives and staff with no report to the Attorney General of any improper conduct. Moreover, the IEC will continue to- be a target of inquiry by the recently formed Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) . rn his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee, former Counsel to the President, John Dean, testified that "T am unaware of the IEC ever having engaged in any illicit Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93rd Cong., ist Sess., at 916 (1973).
Fe a a ret NI Ni be wal RN EAE Ta A CON AA ROOE TRE TE i NANA Sty I Re awry ern ene er nen oe ~Atctachmence L- Form DJ-140 oo (Ed. 4-26-6355 om? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ra ae DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Memorandum | st EGRET TO : The .i:torney General DATE: 11/12/70 ad ivan ‘Robert C. Mardian Assistant Attorney General Internal Security Division SUBJECT: . DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ‘UNIT ‘ The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the tentative conclusions reached in the discussion in your office on November 10, 1970, which was attended by yourself, John Ehrlichman, the Decuty Attorney General, Jerris Leonard, Justice Horell Sherp, and Robert Mardian. 1. hat there was a wevd For im inter departmontal unit capable of obtaining and cvuluneting zatellicence information from all the resources of the Federal covarnment 3 relating to membership, status and i of militant terrorist groups operating within the United States. 2. That previous atternts to e233 cooperation of the Departments and i information have bedén unsuccessfu that the most recent attemcot fai x RB j agt > 45) MQ cl t $ oa Q if (0 fli be £ Agencies in ¢ “2 contacting t vot ct ty Fy i) Fe 3. That Justice Sharp, John Dezn, and Robert Mardian be appointed es an ad hoc committee to con c heads of the affected Departments and Agemcies and expl the wishes of the President in this regard, and te see their advice and enlist their cooperation. in this effec That such contacts would only ke made after the heads o affected Agencies were advised by the % ite House of th appointment and purposes of the ad hoc ccmmittee, it cr a en) i ¢ ~ = « = the t hh oct @ cc ~ Deputy AG . Sohn Dean 2S > Jerris Leonard oH. 21: Deed di 32989530. Page. 224 occ op meme i pees
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Memoranduin ~ snesse — eves’ ow TO >The Attorney General DATE: December 17, 1970 ZOFFICE OF OF > Ty. / PROM > Robert C. Mardian AU Assistant Attorney General Internal Security Division The second meeting of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee took place at the hour of 9 AM in the Conference Room of the Vice President, Executive Office Building, on Wednesday, December 16, 1970. Attending were Justice Morell Sharpe, Egil Krogh, John Dean, Robert Froehlke (DOD), James Angleton (CIA), Thomas Kelly (Secret Service), Benson Buffham (NSA), George Moore (FBI), John Roherty (Technical Advisor to the Chairman), and myself. Assistant Secretary Froehlke explained that he had been requested by Secretary Laird to attend the preliminary meetings and chat . after he had had an opportunity to brief the designee (probably | ‘Colonel Downey) that said designee would attend future meetings. - He requested that I meet with him and Don Bennett of the DIA preliminary to Secretary Laird's making any designation. This . I agreed to do. . XY opened the meeting by briefly outlining the conclusions reached at our first meeting for the benefit of those who were not vresent. We then discussed how best to approach a solution to the problem and it was unanimously agreed as follows: That on or before January 6, 1971, the cperative agencies represented would furnish to me under appropriate security measures: (1) organizational targets and (2) intelli- gence targets (such as the extent and nature of foreign influence on our organization targets ani the extent and nature of the financing of our organization targets). Lea a Anata a ln iar Lenin tn te a betetnn Rn 9 een ere ee Inspector Moore disclosed that the FBI had compiled a calendar of demonstraticns and a@vents planned by certain of the target organizations. He agreed to furnish a copy of the calendar to SEGRE? - EYES ONLY
Rare TEN ED RR RT Re SECRET ~2- me and it was agreed that I would circulate the calendar .(much of which is public knowledge) under appropriate security measures to ascertain whether or not the other agencies represented were aware of any further planned demonstrations. We informed the Committee that sufficient space for the evaluation committee had been provided in FOB #7 and that Justice Sharpe would be available on a full-time consulting basis starting on January li, L971. The Committee agreed to have its next meeting on Monday, January 11 at 9 AM, at which time I will have engrossed the submissions of each of the member agencies and further that at the next meeting we would attempt to establish priorities with respect to our intelligence targets. The meeting adjourned at 11:35 AM. ~ ce: The Honorable John Ehrilichman The Honorable Robert Haldeman Fr a ol ie we ag Ne OE ah Sh 8 Ee eh? spect Ee RS WS Ie be ihe 2% hPa ott iY Bb bn dba) BEEP BP oacintn pain Bibl Set ohn EE OTS Mh BON SA SE A NIA A EE AA MANE IE NE SLES DHE ABLES ARE El SO Sa A Se Ne ROAST ta ENB RAL eA PERL NAGLE AEL CAD LA IOLA EAR BIEL LD OS AD AD TOE BEE LO LOD AEE TE TO rr Slaw, HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 227 ee ee q
et a i a rit caren tPA ER CODA SEAL CCCP LENGE ALOR AL ECOL Ae te I Be re fot stm DJ-250 "Wid. 4-26-65) card . Y ee . - . , “ . . . 1 - * . , - : we . ote . UNITED STATES. GOVERNMENT * nant DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE _DRAFT o Memorandum ~~~ sucaen = EYES ONLy . tO : See Addressees Below DATE:February 10, 1971 FROM : Robert C. Mardian™ ' SUBJECT: Ce LN Assistant Attorney General Internal Security Division . Intelligence Evaluation Committee I. AUTHORITY: Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances. It, MISSION: To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible - Government departments and agencies on a need~to-know basis in order to effectively evaluate and anticipate _/7~ problems to appropriately resvond to civil disorders. -f In carrying out this mission, the Committee shail have / a vo | ; j io, access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession ef the United States Government. ' EI. MEMBERSHIP: ; , ° Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives of the following departments and agencies: Department of Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service; National Security Agency, and, when necessary, representa~ tives of other departments or agencies designated by the Committee. IV. STAFF : 7 The Committee will be supported by a permanent intelligence estimation staff* consisting of representatives from member * The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised it would not provide personnel for this staff. ; HW 55073 DoclId:32989530 Page 228 -anememe  omyra ayy —_—— ns —_— an te ve ONT
¢ DRAFT  . | | (: SBERET - EYES /0NLY Ok ~2- —_ departments and agencies and headed by an executive director appointed by the Committee. Ve PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS: The permanent staff will perform the following functions: lL. When requested by the committee, the Departments or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee staff all pertinent information relevarmt to the stated request, of the Committee. Such requests for intelligence data shall first be approved by the Committee. The. _ Executive Director of the permanent staff may initiate requests for information from member agencies subject to review and approval by the committee. 2, Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by ‘- the Committee. oa 3. Report information gaps to the Committee as such gaps are identified. : - . 4 Recommend to the Committee no less often than monthly subjects for intelligence, estimation. a 5. Prepare other relevant studies and reports as directed by the Committee. 6. Provide for the security of information received and the protection of all sources of information7— VI. OFFICE SPACE AND FACILITIES: The Department of Justice shall provide necessary office space, supplies, and incidental administrative support. ° ' , SECRE?P - EVES ONLY | HE 55073 DocTd:32989530 Page 229 |
« ADDRESSEES : Inspectox George C. Moore ‘ Mr. Benson Burtinan ; Mr. Thomas J. Kelley , . Colonel Jonn W. Downey Mr. Richard Ober . 3 2 . " ‘ ! HW 55073 .Docld:32989530 Page 230 - ;
a HW 3507.4, -RAGTA, IP IBINIO Page, 2Iy . -ewegemnyreceeronace mane SECRET PROCEDURES FOR THE AGENCIES CONTRIBUTION TO IEC ESTIMATES 1. The INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC) has been charged with the responsibility of providing intelligence estimates to designated Government departments by effectively evaluating and anticipating problems of civil disorder. To evaluate a potential problem it will be necessary for IEC to request each assisting agency to prepare an intelligence analysis. The analysis, in the form of evaluated contributions, will be forwarded to the Executive Director of IEC. These contributions, pursuant to requirements set forth by IEC, will become the basis for the IEC's intelligence estimate of potential problems of civil disoraexr. 2. The IEC does not desire to receive a voluminous collecticn of intelligence data from the member agencies. The contribution should be an evaluation of the particular Situation based on the data which that agency has in its possession. The IEC Staff may issue GUIDELINES, to assist the five agencies in the preparation of their intelligence con- tribution. Additionally, such GUIDELINES will be of assistance to IEC in identifying intelligence "gaps" and the basis for making supplemental requests to the individual agency for further intelligence informetion. 3. The following format will be generally used by the IEC evaluation staff in the preparation of intelligence estimates. It would be of great assistance if the participating agencies would follow the same format when submittting the completed contribution. FORMAT 1. The Problem 2 Summary 3. Conciusions/Comment 4, Background 5. Discussion , GROUP I oe diueiehaaieeadat's scchcsachdhas enctandealioateataieegsesamembaisenm ies iecohameeeieeiaaiate atta mamead oc aieamar ar ae 4
aah es Attachment 6 1. THE HOUSTON PLAN The earliest evidence tlat this concept of presidential power existed is found ina 18TU top secret document entitled “Operational Restraints on Intellionce Collees ion,” #8 and the various memorandums from Tom Charles.Euston to £1, R. Halde man which were first revealed by John Dean.’ In preparation for his testimony before the Select Com- mittee, Dean placed these papers, sorne of which bore the highest se- cur ity classiileation, in the custody of Chief Judge John Sirica of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. This step was taken hy Dean, en the advices of counsel, to avoid violation of any Presivcuual divective of Tederel laws >rohibiting release of Governm-nt docu- Inents alecting natiozal security. Aiter due consideration, - udge Si- rice released one copy of these papers to the Department of Jig? ceand one copy to the Select Committee, pursuant to its motion. United Slates vo John Doe, et al, Mise. No. T7-75, May it, 1978.) The committee, with the aid of various intelligence agencies, re- viewed these doeumen ts. While the committee sealed a few items there- in, Which could involve national security considerations, it conelrded that these papers, for the most part, deals primarily with domestic affairs and were unrelated to national security matiers2$ The papers, as sanitized by the committee, were entere.. into the committee’s record during Dean’s testimony.?? These papers and the President’s own statement of May 22, 1973, disclose that the President approved the use of illegal wir etapping, il- leyal break-ins and illegal mail covers for domestic intellixence pur- DOSES, The President was fully advised of the illegality of these intel- igence-gathering techniques prior to approving them. Tn the top secret document entitled “Oper: ational Restraints on Tntellixence Collection,” the recommendation for surre ptitious entries (break-ins) contained the following statement under the heading “Rationale”: ‘Use of this technique is clearly illegal. It amounts to burglary. Jt is also hig rhl x risky and could result in great em- - barrassment if ex sposed. fflowever, it is also the most freitful Msbiblt 35.3 Fesrings 1062, at Bahibigs Soo40, 42, 9 stearings 1062, 1824-33, 1838, wa Hearings 1000, 1462. 2» Exhibits 835—41, 3 earings 1062, 1319-37. od aR. Tar Poon9N30 Page Zaa ee re eee * f \ | 4 g . : e 4 - Pte pregtecrrmennnrrims wire St, Poe Aes ee ee 2 ee tem es wb meee et Seen RT RR spewen sng, sey Aan ereeeme mere ee nl ae i t i t H t ~ ? 7 : "fa By a] RE arecrey ee aaagary vote oe 2 TSE MS ITS TUN ET Gs eT IIE SEEOENE S EIN OO EE Ey eT TET I a MOEN Te EE MEET TEI NIN . he Me marae nm coe Rn heRS tee weeps che wpe ee een teT a ena as Ae Te re hla PIE hE RRO a ere: “ ~¢ a ad
4, tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion.7° On July it, 1970, Haldeman seni a top secret memorandum to Huston, notifying him of the President's approval of the use of bar- glaries, illegal wiretaps and illegal mail covers for domestic intelli- gence. In the memorandum, Haldeman stated: The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review, lave been approved by the President. He does not, however, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page £ of your memorandum regarding implementation. He woul profer tbat fhe ching simply be wet tnca netton, on the basis of this approval. The formal oiteial incmorandum should, of course, be prepare‘ and that should be the device by which to carry it out .. .74 [emphasis added] It appears that the next day, July 15. 1970, Huston prepared a desi- sion memorandum, based on the President's approval, for distribution to the Federal intelligence agencies involved in the plan—the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.” In his Mey 22, 1973, public statement, the President reported that the decision memorandum was circulated to the agencies involved on July 23, 1970. However, ihe decision memorandum is dated July 15, 1970, indicating that is was forwarded to the agencies on that day or shortly thereafter.’ Huston’s recommendations were opposed by J. Edgar Hoover, ivector of the FBI* Hoover had served as the chairman of a group comprised of the heads of the Federal intciligence agencies formed to study the problems of intellivence-gathering and coopération among the various intelligence egencies.*® In his public statement of May 22, / 41978, President Nixon stated : ; After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposi- tion of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified 5 days later, on July 23, that the approval had been rescinded. Haldeman’s testimony is to the same effect.2® Dean, however, testified that he was not aware of any recision of approval for the plan ** and . there apparently is no written record of a recision on July 28 or any other date. There is, however, clear evidence that, after receipt of the decision memorandum of July 15, 1970, Mr. Hoover did present strong objections concerning the plan to Attorney General Mitchell.28 Euston was concerned that Hoover’s objections would interfere with the plan’s implementation. On August 5, 1970.8 days aféer the Presi- dent states he ordered recision, Huston sent Haldeman a lengthy tep secret memorandum on the subject, “Domestic Intelligence,” which strongly attacked Hoover's objections and raade a number of recom- mendations concerning a forthcoming meeting regarding the plan oF xhlblt 35. 3 Wearings 1321. 2 Eshlsit 36,3 Tearings 1924, 3 New York Cumes, June 7, 1573, p. 36. A New Yor Times, June 7, L973. 23 Hearinga 916. 5 Appendix of Le AT Hearings 237 7 3 Hearings 106 333 Hearings 916" 4 Hearings 1603. al Documents at p. 628, Awe BRA a eee Sa 8 eee Nene) Ktnaeub ale Pande nee Wied neuen ated ile yee ea as oO vrtas te ca panesbanmenhdaedinaciaaeiaietice chain aisha Cs cosmo panties chaadababicabanere ebotosienamntameandace canton kammne ar teiamemenmmntaton stata , i 4 USS DIE TERN IRAE RMIT RE AT AC ba TTT A A aN cn AEMACD I AIMS MLROLAE EO CRRA EU Nom 1D en hed EBS tow sates + NIRA RS a PN among Haldeman. the Acc the fact that the pian ws the following Janguscze i. At some point. [200 has become toteiir vz mental to our can. important to remet. : knows that the P: . and Floover has nos gets his wav, it fs co'r . ors ‘stand why the AG i: going to Bennett, and t: reverse a Presi people worked merits, was 9 first-rate. Tt should be noted ch.t recommendations, Two days later, on memorandum to Eel: Attorney General ands - that the Director (Iiso.. . and that all intellizenes + 5 once.” 3? FInscon nee 3 coast to vacation for 3-..- ihe problems surrox be into the new seho Later, on Sepiery claims the plan was i to the Attorney Genera: + our domestic inteitic:» added] This menx Inter-Agency Domest! part of the Huston vi observed that Hoor: $ unit and that it was im->- Far from indicating t1:..2 7 mendation to remove res- been withdrawn, Dean, ir General: yee I believe we azres! any blanket re:wov.i + priate procedure von. we need, based on on > Exhibit $7, 3 Hearne: 30 Exhibte 37, 8 Wea z Pabibit 33,3 Hearing id, . ‘ PRONE, ELE ONIN EOL TON WRONG YE EEN YO OTE NORA EES LI PARTI TE PO SLOT FEM ENE Pay wegsarea TERI Tg cere eRe rye gtey ee et ete te i} | J-55073,.DocTd:32989530 Page 235 Po fT ee cmap age y
Y AW 35073 5 among Haldeman, the Attorney General and Hoover.” Indicative of the fact that the plan was still quite alive, but imperiled by Hoover, is the following language in this memorandum: ‘At some point, Floover has to be told who is President. He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detri- mental to owe domestic intelligence operations ... It is important to remember that the entire intelligence community knows that the President made w positive decision to go ahead and Eloover has now succeeded in forcing a review. If he _gets his way, it is going to look like he is more powerful than the President. Te had his sav in the footnntes and RN decided against him. Ghat should close the matter aark T can’t under- ‘stand why the AG is a party in reopening it. A} of us are going to look damned silly in the eves of Helms, Gayler, Bennett, and the military chiefs if Ifcover can unilaterally reverse a& Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and which, on the merits, was a first-rate, objective job. ; Tt should be noted that this mernorandum indicates that the NSA, DIA, CLA and the military services basically supported the Huston. recommendations. . Two days later, on August 7, 1970, Huston sent a brief, confidential memorandum te Tfaldeman ureins that Waldemon “moet with the Attorney General and secure his support for the Presideni’s decision, that the Director (Hoover) be informed that the decision will stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proeced to implement them at once.” + Euston noted that: “Me, Hoover has departed ir the west coast to vacation for 8 weeks. If you wait until his return to clear wp the preblems surrounding our domestic intelligence operations, we will be into the new school year without any preparations.” # , Later, on September 18, 1970 (almost 2 months after the President claims the plan was rescinded), Dean sent a top secret memorandum to the Attorney General suggesting certain procedures to “commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible.” [emphasis added] This memorandum specifically called for the éreation of an Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit which had been an iniegral . part of the Huston plan. Dean's memorandum to the Attorney General observed that Hoover was strongly opposed to the creation of such a unit and that it was important “io bring the FBI fully on board.” Far from indicating that the President's approval of Huston’s recom- mendation to remove restraints on illecal intelligence-gathering had peen withdrawn, Dean, in his memorandum, suggested to the Attorney eneral: st ‘ I believe we agreed that it would’be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions: rather, the most appro- priate procedure would be to decide on the type of intellicance we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of 8 Exhibit $7, 3 Hearings 1325-29, » Exhible 37, 3 Hearing: 1328. aa yylbit 38, 3 Hearings 1330, Docld:32999530 Page 236 ee Seer tr es j An pene eaenpes 5 petra os, Racaale nia s- frvvereemoces i . ‘ . emg aay a tree mone geteeensran ae ar tp merMLe ey ote ww s mae ea nerermenee mt ome fy - G . ek go aOR ER AiR le PRR oe aL aS ee Te hea bid. : ip : r if ) : ’ ‘ t
alpen ET ream see ween pet wre me Ce alee he BG ag Teeww en har eres ae 6 this mini, 9 and then proce ced to remove the restraints as neces- sary tv cbtain such intelligences? [emphasis added] Dean's remorandam indicated that the creation of the Inter-Agency Domest: Lntsllizence Unit would go forward and provided recom: mendat!} as lor the chessing of a unit di a eotor to serve as a “righthand man? te ise Atcorney Conzral and for the selection of representatives from the various intellicence agencies who would serve on it. Dean closed 3". s.emoranduny with the suggestion that the Attorney Gen- oral call s.exLy mectines to monitor problems as they emerged and “to make crstain that we are moving this Drown: v into implementation as quickliy os paxstile. = fomphasis added] Reeognizing that Eloover a : WOE DFU . Dea noo etilod : ange in ™ Wotton og his EVaEIGS Vite re rn a re anys % 3 Gu Mata DAD LeHmelk 22s" suggested Lo Tae re a it you would tice 3 a im to join yeu in a meeting with Eloover he will be happy to do so,” Hoover, however, never did ecme completely “on board” and the plan Lor gn Tnter-Agency Doinestic Intelligence Unit was never im- plemanted. A clue to the fate of the Huston plan is provided by the edited, an : hentics ted “Submission of Recorded Presidential Con- versation io tie Fudlacry Committee of the Flouse of Representatives PY Drees at Ri hard Nixon”, on Apel: 30, 1974, where the following “OATS Noanawal “p, 2. what Bil Sallivan’s desire j in life is, is to seb up a A eee nae x intelli gone: oyotom, & a White Flouse we Li@ dye fa says we have never been i ijuover lost his guts severe] years ago. Ik ‘Con, Fluston worked on it. Tom Huston 16 to co ont and do it and the-whole thing “y beeancze on roost he ar had 3 ove instructs just wiambied, VP [Trandible.] ° Dean t-fed that rhe plan for the creation of an Inter-Agency Domesiie Snellizence Cnit was the product of White House fear of deni: vuafions and Cicent 3? Haldeman denied that such an atmos- phere of fevy existed in tho White Houge.?* In his statement before e the comrniticy, Haldeman gave as the reason for White Flouse. interest in improvi. ‘2 intelli genee-gathering operations the “critical proportions” of the c.cnestie security problem in 1970 as illustrated by “a wave of bombings: ond explo: sions, rioting and violence, demonstrations, arson, gun battles and other disruptive » activitie s across the country——on col- lego CaIMDNSES primarily—but also in other areas.” °° On this issue, Bhrlichman’s testiniony corroborates Halden man’s. The Tin-ton recommendations themselves refer to “a major threat to the infernal secnrity “? and express the belief that “the potential for even giiaker ‘iolence is present pnd we have a positive obligation to take every step w ithin our power to prevent it... for surely drastic violence end disorder threaten the very fabric of our society. 742 HPau081s 41, 8 Hearinga 1333, sthiatt 32, 3 Hearings 1337. splenttal Conrersations, pp. “93-4, ones “6 beers 72 2312-13, OPxk itt 5 BA, 3 Hearings 1319. #2 Exhibit $7, 8 Wearinys 1527-28 Cpe el bee tl late Be ates ALE Paattu cae een etd abe She an wrk ASS HES ERO ate oere des ON vate sorntweemrsaoretioccicen — RAE Peon aA P ACE 0% VAT Ce a Prensa e Fo ee A eee IO ORI mete eok ELENA: “seer TN TR ITE PT sweeper ROE Se LIT TT ARIAT Te | Sap ere ne HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 237 0 vey The commiites Clelian’s Permane Committee on Crov 1970, indivates t! were significant | Goy erninent faci against law enfore.n: “Dean testified. howevis. not only tovard viol: strations and dissent. £ as: 4 Nite DAOUSE Wile me stretched Out in ire: meg to his ofce ( . : the sign in the r wen had to conte c we Thaviee é -~ tee ~ ms