476-40037-10245 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10245 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: Robert W. Komer AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : NUFK FROM : TO: ‘TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record DATE : 11/8/1962 PAGES AIL SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 415: Cuba 11/1/1962- 4/30/63. Box 4.
/ . PROUD ey em em . T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T mo, me TS#185487 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 8 Noverber 1962 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Military Reactions to the Cuban Outcome; Gimmicks and. Programs l. In putting strategic missiles into Cuba, the USSR clearly was seeking a major political accomplishment. But the venture, and the risks which were accepted, suggest that in addition the Soviets may have been seeking a way to improve the strategic relationship between themselves and the US. While they probably attribute their failure primarily to US local advantage in the Caribbean they also believe that its strategic superiority bolstered US confidence in responding to the local challenge. At any rate, the outcone certainly has not reduced their desire to find some way, in real terms, to counter or off- set US long-range striking power. And their desire to do this “in apparent terms has doubtless grown, since the course of the erisis has led many in the world to wonder whether the USSR backed down because of strategic weakness. Group l- . Excluded from automatic [T-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and oe declassification fe
T-O-P S-E-C-R-EsT 2. There are some measures, based on existing prograns , - Which could be taken fairly quickly and inexpensively to help rebuild the world image of Soviet strategic might. ‘These measures ; however, are unlikely to have much effect on US government cal- culations of relative strength. Changing the real balance is much harder. Programs of this sort would necessarily be costly; they eannot all be pursued simultaneously; any substantial in- . crease in the present array of pimerams will injure non-military objectives; the USSR would have to expect the US to obtain enough knowledge ‘of new efforts to begin countermeasures before they are completed. Furthermore > only Limited measures can be taken quickly. It would be virtually impossible » tor example, for the USSR to acquire within the next year any significant new ICHM or missile submarine capability over that presently planned. Demonstrations in the Next Yea# Or So. 3. A number of military and space accomplishments are now within Soviet capabilities, and some demonstrative feats were probably scheduled well before the Cuban crisis. None of these represents a radical advance, and none is ‘likely to change the world opinion about, relative US-USSR strength. Sone have important political drawbacks. Nevertheless » the Soviets may believe that = 2 = T-0-P §-E-C-R-E-T
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T continuing accomplishnents of this sort would help to restore the power image tarnished in the showdown over Cuba. 4. Space Feats. A series of space accomplishments during the next year was certainly programmed before the Cuban crisis, but the USSR might try to accelerate its earlier schedule in hopes of off-setting the impression of inferiority left by the outcome. In 1962-63, the following individual space missions will probably be within Soviet capabilities, although it is un- likely that they can all be accomplished during this period: multi-manned satellite; rendezvous and possible docking of two satellites; a ten-day manned satellite; unmanned circunlunar Plight; unmanned satellite placed in lunar orbit; soft lunar landings of instrumented packages; planetary probes. 5. Very High-yleld Weapons. The USSR can at any tine detonate a nuclear weapon yielding over 100 MT and expect Western verification. Soviet spokesmen could go on to imply that many or all Soviet long-range missiles are equipped with this warhead. Such a demonstration would conflict to some extent with Soviet | protestations of peacefulness and concern for disarmament. Mores over, it would not be a radical advance on previous. demonstrations and claims. The Soviets might therefore choose to denonstrate - (23 T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
T-0-P . S-E-C-R-E-T similtaneously a delivery capability for a very high yield war- head. They could probably do this now, usinc an existing ICEBM to launch and detonate 2 100 MT weapon over Novaya Zemlya. Or | they night choose to detonate a nissile= delivered lower yield weapon (around 25 MT) over the Pacific. 6. Anti-Satellite Cepability. ‘There is some chance that the USSR now has a capability to shoot down an earth satellite, either its own or a US one, and this chance will grow in the conning year. The Soviets would probably believe that such a demonstration would increase general respect for their power and fear of their determinntion. On the other hand, they would take on themselves the onus for making the first military use of space and, if they considered bringing down a US vehicle, they would have to concern themselves about possible US reprisals against Soviet vehicles or other countermeasures. 7. Orbital Bombardment Capability. The USSR can at any tine clain that a newly leunched earth satellite is. carrying 6 nuclear weapon, arguing that US accressivencss must be curbed by such special means. The US could not make a convincing denial, and the USSR would probably expect to win some credibility for -~k. T-0-P- S-E-C-R-E-T
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T its claim. Again, it would incur some general blame and might provoke US counteraction. . 8. Global Rocket. The USSR probably is capable ntw of sub- stantiating its claims to a "global rocket" which avoids BMEWS detection by firing a missile (with a reduced payload) ona southerly trajectory to impact in the southern or western Paci- fic. A prior announcement establishing an impact area would in- erease the credibility of the demonstration. The effect of this demonstration could be increased if instead of using a ballistic trajectory, the vehicle was fired into orbit and then brought down in the announced impact area. 9. Anti-Missile Demonstration. The USSR is in a position to stage a denonstration in which an anti-missile intercepts and destroys an inconing ballistic missile. This sort of accomplish- nent might commend itself to the Soviet leaders as a means of switching attention from strategic striking power to strategic defense capabilities, where the USSR has a better chance to make eredible claims of superiority. Photographs , films, news stories, and leadership statements could be used to sustain claims in this field, but the chances of impressing world opinion would be greatly improved by an actual achievement generally accepted as -~ 5+. {-0-P §-E-C-R-E-T
(T-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T valid. This might be an interception over Sary Shagan or ' possibly Kamchatka, accompanied by as much publicity as was con- sistent with security requirements. Real Inprovenents in the Near Term 10. Soviet strategic capabilities are of course constantly being strengthened, but a number of immediate measures are available to improve the USSR's present nilitary posture. These include putting more submarines on station within striking dis- ‘tance of the US, dispersing mobile MRBMs, and establishing a higher level of alert and dispersal for the Long Range Air Force. The USSR probably believes that these moves, all of which could ~ have been rade at any time in the recent past, would come to the attention of the US government, which would then conclude that it faced a greater strategic threat, but not one which gave the USSR a clear strategic advantage. Neasures of this sort would not reach the world public. Rea Inprovenents in the Long Run ll. Existing National Intelligence Estimates project a continuing improvement in Soviet long-range striking forces and air defenses over the next several years. In the offensive field, T-O0-P S-H-C-R-E-T
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T ‘intelligence estimtes a steady buildup in nurbers of ICBMs and missile-launching submarines, although the numerical in- crease estimated in delivery vehicles is not so steep as that programmed for US forces. In addition, survivability will in- prove as nissile sites are hardened and the subrarine fleet becomes larger, while the warheads yield capabilities for all systems will increase. In strategic defense, the major new ~ element is the anti-nissile progran, where deployment of one system has already begun at one location (Leningrad) and re- search and developrent work toward a nore advanced capability is continuing. l2. In any reconsideration of defense programs, we think 1t very unlikely that the USSR will abandon the concept of balanced forces in an effort to maximize one particular kind of capa~- bility, say long-range attack. The Soviet military leadership places @ high value upon theater forces and has already succeeded in undoing Khrushchev's plan launched in 1960, to reduce then. With respect to air defense, the traditional Soviet concern with defense and the great seale of the USSR's anti-missile efforts to date persuade us that this program will not be abandoned or drastically cut back to provide resources for competing programs. -T.- T«-O=-P S-E-C-R-E-T
T-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T Thus while some savings night be effected in various areas, ve think that any major upward revisions in individual prograns could only be accomplished through roughly equivalent increases | in total military spending. 13. The question of the Soviet long run military reaction to the cuban affair may be posed in terms of whether the Soviet Union will continue to concentrate on dominating Europe and the Eurasian periphery with strategic weapons and large ground forces, with their intercontinental weapons systems limited to some sort of minimum deterrent level, or will initiate a basic change in its strategy and attempt to achieve parity or even superiority in weapons systems for intercontinental thermonuclear war. We can also look for some intermediate alternative. “qh. one plausible option would be to continue what appears to be the current strategy with such modifications as hardening ao larger portion of the ICBM force, possible some upward revision of the force level, and ABM deployment far 4 nuriber of the larger urban areas -~- say 20 to 25 «= together with the maintenance and continued modernization of the ground and associated naval and air forces at about present levels. Military space systens night be limited to modest reconnaissance and early warning forces. -8- T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T 15. A second option, at the other extrene » would be ‘to enter into an ICBM race with the US with the object of achieving parity or marked superiority in the number of launchers operational and in the yleld and accuracy. of the systen. A large submarine-— launched long-range ballistic missile force would likely be part of this option. This ICBM force would be supported by extensive deploynent of reconnaissance and early warning space systens. Carried to its logical extrenes, this option would also include large-scale ABM deployment » say 25 to 30 urban areas as a nini-un, and onaintenance of ground and naval forces at sonething like the present levels. 16. Under either option, limited orbital bonbardment and other offensive space systems might be added to supplement the other forces and to maximize the political effect of Soviet nili- tary posture. (The USIB is currently giving intensive study to Soviet military space objectives; its conclusions will appear in NIE l1-1-62, "Soviet Space Programs," due Noverber 1962.) _ 17. If the Soviet leaders seek an option falling between these extremes we believe that.it will emphasize diversity, seek to create an image of technical superiority, and to maximize the political effects which are offered by very large weapons and by -9- {-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T
T-O0-P S-E-C-R-E-T orbital weapons. Thus we would expect that the Soviet nilitary posture relative to Europe and thé periphery to be sirdlar to that postulated in the first option. Expansion of ground based ICEM prograns would be modest, but there would be increased emphasis on hardening. A sizeable sub-lounched ballistic nissile . progranwould be carried out. ABM deployment might be on the | order of 20 to 25 urban arens defended. The nost spectacular developments would be in the field of deploynent of ICBMs de- livering weapons in the 50 to 100 megaton class and of deployment of long-lived orbital bombardment vehicles. If current suggestions are indicative of future plans, the future ICEMs delivering the large weapons would not be limited to north polar trajectories but would be able to approach from almost any azimuth utilizing orbital or sub-orbital trajectories. 18. Clearly, the first option ‘is the least costly and the " gecond option is quite expensive. If the Soviets should continue to eschey a race for intercontinental weapon system parity and settle for a modest ABM system, then the current strain on the Soviet economy could ease considerably within two or three years. The rapid rate of investment growth could be resumed and ‘the pro- spect of catching up with the US, between 1970 and 1980, at least -10- #+O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
T-O0-P S-E-C-R-E-T as far as heavy industry is concerned, would be relatively good. The middle option would continue the strain sonewhat longer but would be more consistent with Khrushchev's competitive coexistence strategy. The all out arns ‘race option would exacerbate present . nilitary burden, continue the strain for 5 to 10 years, continue to #low the rate of growth by liniting the investment progran, and din the prospects of catching up with the US in this century. It would also draw heavily on the resources required for the | Soviet space progran, perhaps moking it impossible for the USSR to compete with the US in a manned lunar landing and other missions. 19. Some insight into the economic implications of various strategies nay be provided by current estimates of the relative cost of various advm ced weapons systens. We estimte, for ex- auple, that the full cost of creating and operating a 600 launcher -gecond generation ICBM force would be in the neighborood of 15 billion dollars, and that the bill for 60 ABM complexes (60 launchers each) for 20 to 25 ‘urban areas would be about the sane. One hundred ABM complexes would cost nearly 25 billion while the ' eost of defending 100 cities probably would exceed hO billion dollars. We estimate that the 600 soft MRBM/IREM launchers have cost the USSR «= li» {-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T just under 7 billion Gollars while a hardened progran of 150 to 200 launchers might cost on the order of 2 billion dollars. 20. Soviet submarine-lnunched ballistic missile systens suitable for attacking the US currently are considerably more expensive than an ICBM force with comparable capability, but — ‘progress in developing a subnarine/missile weapon systen with a larger missile load per submarine would probably reduce the disparity. We believe that orbital borbardment systems will be significantly more expensive than ICIDM systems. The relative eost of large payload reDMs is difficult to estimate in view of the uncertainty concerning their technical characteristics and the problems of hardening launchers of this size. T-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T