404-10246-10447 gga RR Ee a6 AER STOR ES ROAST en LL BADR ’ Lins fh ten to AAR HED Tea HO Me by Fale Siac aD tehont GAS AeTadtans anita Sonstige aed eis ea, eche t 4 eee MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WHD for Cubs SUBJECT i. sarveeienttenn foie tally ee me I i ' fetta mace nn one nm nen ce enn a commas enor te mma mona momma @ 3 Esplnoga Allegations Sengitivity: Regardiese of accuracy, they 4. present a problem becauge of their having been Presented to other government agencies; B. in view of matters touching on U.8. security, are delicate and could have unfavorable repercussions if repeated to newsrzen by the complainant or his @egociates (whose independent, previous threats were of greater potential embarrassment); Cc. affect t ations and the security of our pergonne] at and Action: In view of the foregoing, the allegationa &. should be put in proper perspective - i.e., not ignored because of the potential embarrassment but considered in the light of what we already know . (Alse-t all of them are repetitions of previous charges @ix. reports, Known well to both the| - apd Paria stations and to Headquarters offi concerned with the AMLASH group, whoge members’ reliability, reputations and good fa are question- able. Two of the charges - about) and “Tota” and about AMVHIP-1 and CARRILIO ~ aFe tew.); B. should be treated so ag to protect us against any charge of laxity and so ag to establieh the facts but, at the same time, treated so as to avoid attributing to them more importance than they deserve; ¢C. should be kept in mind ag examples of other eharges which may bemndied about and reported by the group ts other governmental agencies or to other governments or to news media (In the iast connection recall the implied threat of publishing _ODYORE respunsibility, as reported previously by O71G,IN 38634.):; Euvrmarete
14-00000 PAS eigen 6 | — ; - (3) AMLASH-3 was in touch with Cuban Intelligence \ ar Ts pat in ruta elidel dhd adi heii tN et thes a wes acre Seamer ons we uae SECRET a 3 ’ D. should be examined together with al1 the other available reports so that we may _ (1) clarify our own objectives asd wishes with respect to a1] the AMLASH group (and thie includes . AMWHIP); ae (2) sort out which people, if any, are worth our time in the future; (3) take appropriate measures, including inter- rogation and polygraphing, to clarify doubts and then, when necessary, terminate those who are working for us but are not wortbwhile; _ ye erent ce ae ee not (4) tighten up our own operational and security procedures in connection with the AMLASH group. 3. Preliminary Analysis: Ag pointed out in a prelinzinary @nalysis o e compiex, made in March 1965 when I.was preparing for travel to Madrid in connection with the QUHOPS-] cage: “,..There 18 no convincing evidence that the group ig working either for or against the regire of Fidel CAS:RO. Reports om their contacts with us and their discussiona among themselves &re at variance. ‘!n 1962 Fidel CASTRO, reportedly knowing that they were plotting against him, talked to AMLABR-1 end seven members of hig group to enlist their Gupport against q Anibal ESCALANTE Dellunde and the communists in Cuba. Possibly they are playing both ends against the middle. They certainly have been and are in contact with the two ends.” The following comments are keyed to matters raised by ESPINOSA: - . Jr SNORE We FO RE OR I AEE NT Um Le EERE ACE OT OER venom oe eaten nO REEL ERO ERE emer crear enna een ne + A. The AMLASH conspiracy - As detailed by 3716 (IN 28634) on 6 April 1965, QUSPORT-1 reporting on a mee ing ef the AMLASH group, including AMWHIP-1 mentioned the following significant points: ; Ak ie k LEAR ROMER NA a BE AT IT TT (1) KUBARK was criticized for "fooling around for years” without helping and for jeapardizing the operation; (2) the group was to be prepared to denounce ODYOKE ag responsible if the operation fails and believed that ‘, the resulting scandal would make the Bay of Pigs seem insigni- ficant; and . . : ; 4 , 88 established by coded wessages which he exhibited. eo ‘! Aw reported by 1532 (IN 82939) on 4 June 1965, based on \, Meetings with ESPINOSA, the problem seen by[ jis that pide y SECRET ae — ease a woe me wae wee - + - TTT am aetna earn canna saemaane ame eg : ‘ eqnesunmennaamnectenn naan ecnaipeeecenenaee ate wtlthies ences se coeanrpenaptien + set of AEG eRe | 1 a ‘ t a
14-00000 cae waegpreenret eS PSPRET “the AMLASH circle is wide and each new friend of whom we learn geems to have knowledge of the plan." I believe that the problem ig a more serious and basic one. Ae indicated in paragraph 32 of the present memorandum, Fidel CASTRO himself reportedly knew as far back as 1962 that the group was plotting @gainst him and, knowing it, enlisted its support. Hence we eannot rule out the possibility of provocation. Assassination, obviously, ig a dangerous game, not merely to the plotters in @ physical senge, but to a sponsoring government which may - guffer severe political repercussions at home and abroad if ite megyteie Reet imvolvement ig made known. In the inatant case, the risks of @ezposure of the ODYOKE hand would appear high, whether there ig @ provocation or not. Considering the individuals who are involved directly, their contacts with KUBARK officers,and their reported plan to expose ODYOKE, persisting in the plan could be highly embarrassing to KUBARK. (This is even more the cage how that ESPINOSA has talked to ODENVY and ODURGE, although fortunately the tenor of hie complaint was that KUBARK had not given adequate support to the plan.) ‘ B. The contacts at Paris and the matters affecting the[—s«| Station.- The "recruitment" of Maureen had been the subject of an exchange of cables between and Headquarters and of discussions at Headquarcers between WH/7C and WE (See 1071 (IN 66557) and DIR-10955). The annoying thing in this connection mow is that ESPINOSA has talked about it to ODENVY and ODURGE and the danger that, if he is indiscreet, hie story about thie (and the other matters) could reach some curious newspaperman. (in this connection, it appears that the questionable decision to put Maureen im touch with the AHLASH group was made without the knowledge of STOCKfOOD.) ESPINOSA . did not report any criticiem of the KUBAREers at but it ie evident that the AMLASH group knows more abou em than we might wish. What ig new and of concern from ESPINOSA about matters in Paris is his story of AMWHIP 1 and UNSNAFO-19 dealings. The questions raised about AMWHIP-1 are of mutual eencern @igo to Headquarters which has been running him and which he hes visited often. (On the cccagion of my evious trip to Madrid on the QUHOPS-1 case, GROWERY had voiced his doubts about the whole group and specifically about AMWHIP-1 ang hie cenmection with UNSNAFU-19.) At issue are two basic points, the knowledge om the part.of UNSNAFU-19 about KUBARE’s connection with AMWHIP-1 and the charge that AMWHIP-] has been defrauding KUBARK in the jewelry transaction. Algo to be kept im mind is the fact that ODENVY has an office in Peris which well might have been informed of the allegations and which might have been asked for comments - although ODENVY policy always bag been to stay away from any investigation of other government agencies unless specifically directed by the Attorney General to investigate. . 4 a&% pie SORES aeaeyainenwi siete mnie Sete mm ee ea ee we ee gem es i neta Renee ne tect np ere ae es errerrenteamrineiratnnie tee serene
14-00000 “ iad ‘e vite greet . | o4— . Criticism of enol a ttntion - Criticism of ! the Station by the A 6H group 1g not new. AMIASH-2 / and were ina and wanted direct contact, but the ‘ Station has had reservations about seeing them. The Station has, been involved indirectly because of reporting by its sources . about and involvement of Station targets with both the AMLASH and pee operations (both ,ed fron Headquarters). i wee Bere wee __... (Bee 82 (IN 72256) and 2908 (IN 73084) (both R Heetings among QUSPORT, QUSHWIFT-1, AMWHIP-1 and AMLASH figures i produced conflicting reports which previously were discussed at ; and at Headquarters. Insofar aa GROWERY himself? ia ed, it must be kept in mind that he ia a natural target on whom the AMLASH group would be inclined to focus ita com- ——-- pleints. With regard to the specific complaint about "Tota", GROWERY has identified her as QUSWIFT-7 and has reported that no staffer from the Station ever had contact with her. 4. Further involvement of ESPINOSA: On 10 June ODENVY notified a ew Yora gaat ~2 had telephoned ESPINOSA to ask whether he had succeeded in contacting “the proper people” - i.e., responsible KUBARE representatives - and to request notice of the resulting arrangements. 8. AMWHIP-1: Our plan calls for meeting him next week - to obtain PRO information and to obtain clarification of the roles played by those involved with him in the AMLASH operation. Hie dealings with UNSNAFU-19 also will be eovered. Following this, an LCFLUITER examination is planned. This may help to determine whether he has been. truthful in his reporting. can amass ireamerrttnetale PAPACY 9 at 9° OR etree A WH/C/8P fee secact F | | | | | | wR Tenet ancenseren ie RAGE late sn Raeepeette ey ce epemy vom nineteen epee? “yet po eevee Soe auenrapenentete rece tog . : see ectaastienrenrenneteeninttntetontin 3 = “sermee rarerms af aenarimmiense merece were -maLdllibansinumeraaetetenaasentenrantenene fonds ne ane ny ee aad Dene AS a hele hot tn oe