176-10038-10035 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10038-10035 RECORD SERIES : The Personal Papers of Gordon Chase AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: ) ‘TITLE : Meeting With the President-December 19, 1963 DATE : 12/27/1963 PAGES : 6 _ SUBJECTS : - DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 , OPENING CRITERIA : , COMMENTS : Gordon Chase, Box 1: Chronological file 8/63-12/63, Box 1. Box 8.
rl we see ee” re, PEER poo. Ne [a OO bre. ro | | (1) TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE December 27, 1963 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT - December 19, 1963 - 10:55 A.M. SUBJECT: Cuba Others Present: Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompsonij Deputy Under Secretary. Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin; John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatric; Secretary ' Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon; Acting Director General Carter; Richard Helms; Desmond Fitzgerald; Deputy Director Wilson; McGeorge Bundy; Wililam Moyere; George Reedy; Gordan Chase. The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about eome of the basic Cuban issues. Essentially, the discussian described where we have been ofmce January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go. (An outline which was prepared for the discussion is attached. ) 1. A large part of the meeting wee devoted to a briefing by Mr. Fitzgerald and a general discussion on CIA's present covert program and on the U.S.. Gevernment's economic denial program. Essentially, this part of the dis- cussion covered 6 areas. (a) Mr. Fitsgerald described covert: intelligence activities directed against Castro's regime, including the numbers, characteristics, and geoe graphic spread of CLA asecta within Cuba. | (b) Me. Fitzgerald described ClA-controlied radio p programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tensicn. within the regims and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. . He noted the recent increase of opontancaus anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba. (c) Mr. Fitsgerald said that CLA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba commodities from the Free World which are critical to the economy. The results have been mixed. For exampte, while we have been able to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know that equipment vitally needed in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the teland via Canada. and Great Britain, \ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET ~- SENSITIVE The group agreed that this is not an easy problem; Mr. Bell said that our allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have always had a different view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that there are still things we cando. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could consider ways in which the new amendment. to the Fortign Assistance Author- ization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program. Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World gov- ernments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities in- volved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson. , _ (a) Mr. Fitzgerald spoke about CIA's program to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non+-Communist elements m the power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular up- rising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling such an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime's power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the one hand, we have been able to make an important penetration in the Cuban army. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not yet witling. to act together. They simply don't trust each other, mainly because Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups. The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba. Mr. Mr, Fitzgerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the inourgents generally seem to suf- fer heavy fosses at Castro's hands. (e) Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has directed four emai! seale, externally mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating reaistance and hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack ona major.target -- the Matanzas power plant. Mr. Fitzgerald noted that this would have a significant favorable impact, psychologically as well as economé ically; the diasidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Admin- istration is not giving up the fight for Cuba. - GPP SECRET - SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE Pax, But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the chances of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than 50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point was weak -- we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third, such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level. In this regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want te lie low for now so that Castro, ‘presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might slow up the withdrawal of Soviet traops from Cuba. Fifth, Ambassador Thompson _ said that the timing seemed bad -- the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation. where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. Anmattack onabig ._ Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in bis negotiations for more | ‘Seviet aid. General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want ~ to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out that an air atéiike might cause retaHation against one of our U-2 flights. In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an attack on Matanzas. : It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzas power plant at this time, primarily because of ite high probability of faifure and be- . cause of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principie, that low- — risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary te develop an air strike capability. (f}) Mr. Fitzgerald described CIA's program in aiding two aufmnomous Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group, which is headed by. Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is some- what to the teft of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both _of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send ‘teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and te establish contact with dis- sidents. Mr. Fitzgerald added that there are some disadvantages in these oper- . ations -- the groups aren't trained by CIA and they operate outside of CIA control. . But there are advantages too -- they operate fram outside United States territory and we will have relatively little troubbi denying U.S. association with theese groups. TOP SECRET ~- SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE . whe Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. Fitzgeratd agreed, that these groups operate a long distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from their raids. 2. Mr, Bundy gave a very quick briefing om some other aspects of the current. Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief. ) (a) With respect to Soviet /Cuban military strength on the island, Mr. Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives is to ensure that there is no reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so far as we lmow, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully: As for the Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly. (b) Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, ovr anti-subversion efforts. The key to the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American countries to counter the threat. Our efforte in the field of controfling travel between Latin America and Cuba are also important. (c) Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal contacts we have established with Castre himeelf. The initiative is on Castro's part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are prepared to listen to what Castro has to say. Mr. Ball noted that such U.S. / Cuban rontacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations. 3. Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we ¢ can take in the future to make life difficult for Castro. (a) Adr attacks, unleashing of exfles (allowing them to use U.S. territory as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acts which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they affitend to raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At the same time, they could precipitate the shooting down of a U-z. (b) Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures -- e.g. clese ports and deny U.S. -financed commodities to Hines engaged in Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through. past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free _ World shipping te Cuba. At the same time, we should net deceive ourselves. TOP SECRET © SENSITIVE
TOP SEGRET « SENSITIVE. «Se We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba's _ shipping needs even if we are able te eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba. (c) Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in the near future, taking a more vigorous Line than we have in the past. He noted that in his November 18 speech, President Kennedy made two pointa about Cuba «- the first was designed to encourage anti~Castre elements within Cuba to revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the Hemisphere. (d) Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target. NOTE: At this point the President left the recom and there was a brief discussion about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that resettlement remains our basic policy. {I is-true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettle- ment is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it hae been for some time. 5. On the President's return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the aubject of the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache. (a) My. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the Unk between the arms cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas. (b) Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arma cache. The evidence is convincing in showing that the arma were from Cubs. The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it willbe able to tie the arms cache into a general phat to subvert Venezuela. The repert — should be ready by about January 10. (c) Mr. Bundy described the types of action : we can hepe to get in the OAS - aga result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the surveillance action where we have essentially two basic chaices «- we may want to pusit for a system whichiinvolves search and seizure of Cuban vessela on the high sea; this implies the pogsible use of force. Or we can puch for a system involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this evades the {ssue of force. Mr. Bundy adénd that.it fa still too early to now how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We have put out feelers. ' 6. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of bifting travel restrictions on Americans who wish to go to Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to TOP SECRET ~ SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE . . «6< go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department recommends that we Lift our travel restrictions. H we don't, we will probably be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed to Mfting the travel reetrictions because of the effect it will have on L&tin American countries. We have been trying fe get the Latin Americans to impose restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will -be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with. the ‘Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject. Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel restrictions and a policy of selective presecution. Gerden Chage TOP SECRET « SENSITIVE