404-10143-10220 (of Sues a (4 ‘Lf Ye Bia WARD { ae sa ve rr Agr t a Atal Py a / SECRET la OF / MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WHD for Cuba > Espinosa Allegations Sensitivity PE eon, they A. present a po case ie: their having been presented to othe pier halal ncies; B. in view of matters touching on U.S. security, are delicate and could have unfavorable repercussions iz repeated to newsmen by the complainant or his associates (shose independent, previous threats were of greater potential embarrassment); ©. affect the reputations and the security of our personnel at Madrid and Paris. Action: In view of the foregoing, the allegations A. should be put in proper pexspective - i.e., not ignored because of the potential embarrassment but considered in the light of what we already know | (Almost all of them are repetitions of previous charges and reports, Known well to both the Nadrid and Paris stations and to Headquarters officers concerned with the AMLASH grouv, whose members' reliability, reputations and good faith are question— able. Two of the charges - about Earle and "Tota" and about AMVHIP-1] and CARRILLO - are new.); B. should be Seana v as to protect us against any charge of 1. te establish the facts but, at the same pies to them more alge er Rjavoid attributing WMeserves C. should be fee hia pe Xamples of other charges which eng sd] A) Ht and reported by the AMLASH group to o + al ayencles or to other governments or to news media (in the Jast connection recall the implied threat of publishing ODYOKE responsibility, as reported previously by MADR~-~3716,IN 38634.); 3 aay JF ‘a NE
14-00000 D, should be examined togethar with all the other avallable reports so that we may (1) clarify our own objectives and wishes with respect to ali the AMLASR group (and this includes AMWHIP): ~ [DCT ANTE ANAN (2) sort [AYE |fhich | people; 4 velbby, are worth oux time in the Future; OAL (3) take ap a ne sh al a. including inter- rogation anduy clarify doubts and then, when necessary, terminate those who are working for us but are not worthyvhile: (4) tighten up our own operational and security procedures in connection with the AMLASH group. 3. Preliminary Analysis: As pointed out in a preliminary analysis of the SaTABa complex, made in March 1965 when I wag preparing for travel to Madrid in connection with the GUAOPS-1 case; "...There is no convincing evidence that the grous is working either for or against the regize of Fidel CASTRO. Repoxts on their contacts with us and their discussions anong themselves are at variance. In 1962 Pidel CASTRO, xveportedly knowing that they were plotting against him, talked to AMLASH-3 and seven members of his group to enlist their Support against Anibal ESCALANTE Dellunde and the communists in Cuba. Pos ssiply they are playing both ends against the middle. They certainly have been and are in contact with the two ends." ‘The Zollowing coments are keyed to matters raised by ESPINOSA: A. The AMLASH conspiracy -~ As detalled by MADR-3715 (IN 28634) on 6 April 1965, QUSPORT-1 reporting on a meeting of.the AMLASH group, including AMVHIP-1 mentioned the following significant points: (1) KUBARK was criticized for "Zo0ling around for years" without ine all OE for jeopardizing the operation; | MTATETG (2) the g BO ol! Oren ia TEM to denounce ODYOKE as responsible oie ballads Pagid and believed that the resulting scandal wou Fasreannd itive Pigs seen insigni-~ fiennt; and ARG WIR BIATTE if WWD Ye i} | 3) AMLASH-3 was in touch with Cuban Intelligence established by coded messages which he exhibited. . she if reported by| sass 2 (IN 3293 9) on 4 June 1965, baged on stings: with ESPINOSA, the problem seen by Paris ia that - rs Road oa} re 2
14-00000 . Q ws 2, oe i f eye ges uF i} ( ’, Se AS ab bt ig . . Ce a LET "che AMLASH circle is wide and each new friend of whom we learn seens to have knowledge of the plan." I balieve that the ‘problem is a more serious and basgle one. As indicated. in paragravh 3 of the present memorandum, Fidel CASYRO hinwelf reportedly knew as far back as 1962 that the group was plotting against him and, knowing it, enlisted its aupport. Hence we cannot rule out the possibility of provocation. Assassination, obviously, is a dangerous game, not merely to the plotters in & physical sense, but to a sponsoring government which may suifer severe political repercussions at home and abroad if its involvement is made known. In the instant case, the risks of exposure of the ODYOKE hand would appear high, whether there is & provocation or not. Considering the individuals who sre involved directly, their ONOKE. nee with sisting, in officers,and their reported plan to e e Feat aK Au the plan could pe highly “cubarrassiait| to URI now that ESPINOSA hadJ\t. : rane ie even more the cage pure dd ODURGE, although Zortumately the tenor of his ao eee that KUBARK had not given adequate support PND om TED. 3. The contac MOLE matters affecting the Paris Station.- The  reeraitmont” of Haureen had been the se subject of an eXchange of cables between Paris and Headquarters - =: and of discussions at Headquarters between “H/C and VE (See PARI-1071 (IN 66557) and DIR-10955). The annoying thing in this connection now is that ESPINOSA bas talked about if to ODENVY and CDURGS and the danger that, i2 he is indiscreet, his story about this (and the other matters) could reach some curious newspaperman. (In this connection, it aypears that the questionable decision to put Maureen in touch with the AMLASH group was made without the knowledge of STCCEVCOD.) ‘SSPINOSA did not report any criticism of the KUBARXers at Paris but it is evident that the AMLASH group knows more about them than we might wish. What is new and of concern from ESPINOSA about matters in Paris is his story of AMWHIP 1 and UNSNAYU-19 dealings. The questions raised about AMWHIP-1l] are of mutual concern also to Headquarters which has been running him and Madrid which he has visited often. (On the occasion of my previous trip to Madrid on the QUHOPS-1 case, GROWERY had voiced nis doubts about the whole group and specifically about AMVHTP-3 and his connection with ONSNATU~19.) At issue are two basic connection with AMWHIP—] and the charge that Beene has been -defrauding KUBARK in the jewelry transaction. Also to be kept in mind is the fact that ODENVY has an office in Paris which . well might have been informed of the allegations and which might ‘have been asked for comments ~ although ODENVY policy always. has been to stay away from any investigation of other government agencies unless ee DED directed ed the r AERORESY General to investigate. itz fe
14-00000 C. Criticism of the Hadrid Station - Criticism of the Hadrid Station by the AMLASH croup is not new. AMLASH~2 and ~3 were in Madrid and wanted direct contact, but the Station has had reservations about seeing them. The Station has been involved indirectly because of reporting by its sources about and involvement of station targets with both the AMLASH and AMWORLD operations (both handled fron Headquarters). _., Gee MADR-2982 (IN 72256) and BADR-2998 (IN 73094) (both RYBAT).) . “Meetings among QUSPORT, QUSWIPT-1, AMWHIP-1 and AMLASH fis gures produced conflicting reports which previously were discussed at Hadrid and at Headquarters. insofar asa GROWERY hinsel? is concerned, it must be kept aa bent ees he is 4 natural target on whom the AMLASH group ay q chinda ies focus its com eae giaints. With revard i ADec Pre conpuaine about "Tota", GEOWERY has ty regard $a] etl qBauiads coupdA ‘fas reported that no staifer from the 7 DEE NTR with her. 4 be | ‘a (! li diss NP TPR &. Further iavolven ne Weu esa stoec'l|! On 26 June ODENVY - notified £0 4& at New York chat ANLASH-2 nad telephoned ESPINOSA to ask whether he had succeeded in contacting “the prover people” ~ i.s., responsible KUBARK representatives - and to request notice of the resulting arrangements. Br oS. AAVRID-1: Our plan calls for meeting him next week to Obtain PRY latormation and to optain clarification of the roles played by those involved with him in the AMNLASH operation. His dealings with UNSNAYU-19 also will be covered. Following chis, an LCFLUTTER examination is planned. This may heln to datermine whether he has been truthful in his reporting. Harold ¥. Syenson DEI 5) ~ aN 1p Ton if) D F As et Le 2a ak