HY 40955 te the ‘President. —_ Attachia, eee Ag Siated OSA, ASG Contral Ne = OR BDoclda: 322776038 Page 4 Aden, Yoo SECRET le a sigenge Comosniog Conumwated Paks Signed He w 8@Seph A, Cal.taB, Jrg Secretary ner = nthe cc: Mr. Califano Lean” _ Lt. Col. Patchell LES. Ee a a ASG mae (19 ) % YEAR INTERVALS GRADED AT Ln ta a te SECRET eOMECLASSTS PIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10 - ‘ “we Sanvemns, at, ® " 60°0SE €9/se/€ Mal £9/ST/€ WSO
' SECRET THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES GROUP-1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC SECRET DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSI- FICATION HW 30955 Bocld:32276038 Page 5
HY 0955 SECRET CUBA THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES qT. Introduction In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through- out Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the timely acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the US Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited, and much remaing to be done. It is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information regarding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it. -II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem 1, Limiting Factors a. There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved. Com- pounding the problem further, where Latin.America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and Gisputes which have characterized relations among the nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings cof nations are not com- pletely healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries would be eager to exchange intelligence | on a full and frank basis. SECRET Boctlda: 322776038 Page 6
’ SECRET . b. Beyond this, Latin America is not: a homo- geneous entity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange of intelligence concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be regarded as attainable. ec. Additional impediments to intelligence ex- change are the generally low level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, their ‘lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the ‘absence of adequate security systems, and the lack of security consciousness. Deficiencies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection. d. These defects promise to persist, since the governments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time | as they might find themselves out of power. More- over, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government. e. These realities all underscore the fact that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis, It should not be concluded, however that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper definition, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba.of subversives, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, the movement of arms, and the movement of funds, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing thie effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence SECRET. 2 HY 50955 DBoctd: 32276036 Page 7
« 8 eee 1 SECRET gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former involves’ the requirement to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromise. . Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence The following describe generally the categories of exchangeable matter, and exemplify the types of material under each: a. Travel information - Unevaluated information devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement of individuals between Latin America and Cuba or Soviet Bloc countries. Such reports can be reduced to a few elements such ag identification of the individual, point of departure, date and time of departure or arrival, destination, and carrier. When presented in an. abbreviated form such information offers minimum security problems with respect to: exchange with one or more countries. _b. Intelligence information reports - Un- evaluated information derived from clandestine collection operations or confidential sources reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or communist connected subversive individuals or groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds; on shipping and air movements and on results of surveillance efforts Because continued receipt of such information by the United States. is dependent on careful protection of sources and methods of collection, the exchange of this information with | other countries must be carefully controlled by the collecting department. ec. Intelligence reports and studies ~ Evaluated intelligence in all of the above areas, prepared by an appropriate element of the US government in a’ form which is releaseable to other Latin American countries d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news stories drawn from press, periodical and other overt publishers. Selected for maximum impact on SECRET 1) HY 50955 DBocld:32276038 Page &
. SECRET other countrics particularly where such infor- mation isnot Freely available to security services, ag in the, cas e .ofF forelgn broadcast reports. 3 C rrent Exchange ange Arrangements ‘ LA ° a. At present there is little organized ex- change of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is'a limited amount of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relation- ships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter. b. The Central Intelligence Agency has .estab- lis hed working liaison arrangements in those | ; Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service, — This inhibits the. passing of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be pro- vided -to. other countries, [ Intelligence items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelli- _ gence reviews, name traces and travel reports. e. The US Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities, communist infiltration, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small value. The ‘Army also provides selected information on: sub- versive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the ex- change of intelligence among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy and the US Navy. SECRET . 4 HW 50955 Boclda: 32276036 Page 3
‘d. Exchanges of information are also effected from time to.time hrough channels of the Depart- ment ef State, * SECRET e. AS yet, however, the program for the pro- vision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possibility of achieving the results desired, f. United States experience in the matter of intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange. : g. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward at numerous Inter- American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II. l. Under the Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a "Special Consultative Committee.on Security (Sccs)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-~Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to An SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:322776038 Page 10
““* SECRET HW 450955 counteract them. Since the Punta del Este meeting, -the OAS has been making slow progress in the. eountersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence through its machinery. . h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has also demonstrated an awareness of the need for exchanging intelligence regarding communist sub- version. Annex 4 of the General Military Plan prepared by the IADB requests the American States to report information to the Board and to establish agreements among themselves for exchanging infor- mation of collective interest. The United States has approved the Genéral Military Plan, but similar action has not been taken by all member countries. i. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral ; intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange between the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the possibilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized limitations involved. Til. Existing Programs Enumerated below are the principal programs now in progress. They are subject to continuing improvement. 1. Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US agencies with their Latin American counterparts in instances where it has been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements. 2, A study is currently underway to evaluate the feasibility and desirability of establishing military intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in con- junction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activities directly to. the countries concerned through the US Ambassador. SECRET 6 Doclda: 32276038 Page iL
HY |" SECRET a 3. Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean Command by CIA and other elements of the US Embassies in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate, 4, Various agencies of the US Government are now disseminating to Latin. American governments unclassi- fied studies and reports and other non-sensitive information concerning Castro-Communist subversion. 5. US Government communications systems through- out Latin America are being: expanded and improved upon ona high priority basis. 6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Additional programs could be established in other countries where it is . , found to be in the best interests of Tthe’: United’ States and acceptable to the country concerned. 7. All information received by CIA concerning travel to and from Cuba is put into a computer system capable of producing lists by-name, by country, by point of travel, or sorted on various other bases. IV. New Actions Recommended l. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III. l. by recommending that the US Ambassadors utilize the existing Country Team mechanisms as an intelligence advisory committee to coordinate procedures for ensuring timeliness, completeness and freedom from duplitation or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange with 0955 the host governments. 2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro- Communist subversive activities, 3. Arrange for the electrical dissemination .to — appropriate Latin American governments of daily summaries of radio broadcast material as monitored by the FBID of CIA. SECRET 7 Bocld: 32276038 Page i2
“= “ SECRET HW 450955 « “ +. Make availabie to as many countries as security permits, sanitized results of the extensive travel coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, already processed by machine. (See paragraph III. 7.) 5, Increase, where feasible, emphasis on the provision of US intelligence advisors to Latin American countries. Discourage the employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the United States except in Instances where the United States can arrange to previde for the training and control of any third country intelligence advisor. 6, Arrange for the preparation of periodic studies or Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can be disseminated to selected Latin American govern- ments. 7. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate govern- ments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of subversive activities in their respective countries. 8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Pian of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities, 9. Undertake action in the OAS to establish a security Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of senior representatives of the appropriate services of each government to deal with all major aspects of sub- versive activities in their respective countries, consider new coordinated plans of action to counter and neutralize subversion, and implement necessary actions to insure the most effective and timely exchange of information between the governments on subversive activities. SECRET 8 Doclda: 32276038 Page 13
S THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25,D.C, | SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUSAN SUBVERSION THE JOINT STAFF 25 March 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY - Subject: Intelligence Paper on Cuba L. Attached is a copy of the final paper prepared by my committee on the exchange of intelligence. It reflects the changes proposed by CIA in our earlier agreed paper, as well as amendments to the CIA proposals arising from the meeting of my committee last Saturday. 2. The only change of significance proposed by CIA is found on page 3, paragraph 2, "Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence." This oaragraph, as submitted by CIA, would have seriously limited the kinds of intelligence which we would exchange with our Latin friends, so much so as to make the paper relatively insignificant. At my meeting last Saturday we made the additions which are underlined in red on page 3. Those additions are designed to vitiate the adverse restrictions involved in the CIA proposal. As you will see, the additions characterize the categories of exchangeable intelligence only as examples, and add, specifically, all of the intel- ligence areas in which we are interested. 3. The remaining changes proposed by CIA were relatively insignificant - removal from the action category of certain on-going programs and the addition of CIAts IBM computer capability among the actions. 4, This paper, as you see it, was fully concurred in py my committee, including the CIA man who, to my surprise, ' agreed in the changes which broadened greatly the CIA contribution. I have forwarded the paper to Cottrell. AA eine, V. H, KRULAK Major General, USMC Chairman Attachment asa ASE mie e 7 . HY 5OO55 Boclda: 37276038 Page 14 Se ma EQ /ST/E tH (€9/62/€) 60°OSE VSO
HY 15 MAR 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. * SUBJECT: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion Report of the Exchange of Intelligence (0) . 1. Reference is made to the Second Working Draft, Cuba, The Exchange of Intelligence Concerning Communist. Subversive Activities. 2. The Army Staff has reviewed referenced paper and although it is felt that Section If is too leng, it concurs in general with the recommended actions. However, the following changes should be made: a. Page 2, change last sentence to read: "A completely . . . cannot be expected.” b. Page 3, omit second paragraph as superfluous. ¢. Page 6, second paragraph: This entire paragraph should be deleted or the state~- ment proved since Army knows of no approved exchange of information program between CINCARIBCOM and Latin American countries. d. Page 7, first sentence second paragraph, change to read: “The concept . . . meetings, but has. not been fully impletiented although this subject has been included in intelligence brief- ings presented at the regular meetings of the IADB Council of Delegates." CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS, JR. Major General, GS , Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations geh CHlEy Ob 2LVEL. i Lb (rn) . li BOK ID SS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING OSA, ASG Lone. 0. : DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY LUHED, ( AGSE COS s¥-63 50955 Daocld: 32276033 Page 15 / vano-60°O0SE ¥SO ’ Ma £9/St/E eg/stye
OSA, ASG Control No. SECRET, MEMORANDUM MO -GENERAL ZABLE G, WHEELER (G3) CAPTANE B &. RUMWALT, JR. , VOCE ed, s. WENDT, Ot EURIECT:  itaterdeparimental Coordinating Committes of Coban Atimirn: Muchaege of meclligesce Attached to the final drait ef the paper an Duchange of latelligenie ¢oncesnieg fquuntiniel subversive netivities pro perod by the Sabsommition on Gabversion of the wabject comesithes. Ae iadicated to Memerantam No. 15, Ib ia coqnested that pour comments wn this gagew be eubsaliied 06 me not fates thee 1500 Noave on March 24, 1963. Pita with be the last epportaniay i SOmieneMt 68 thie gaper belore it ie praceniud te Tha Proaident. ee ght gasepe A. Calliaes. Ix. Special Acolstast te the Seeretiey of the Aeuvy Atecheoent ao Stated ce: Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky Colonel Patchcll Colonel Freda Mr, Califano SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY HY 50955 DBocld: 32276036 Page 16 ” corstee RES 60" 0Se VSO vano
SECRET SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION 15 March 1963 TO SERVICE, OSD AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS: This is our final effort on the paper for exchange of intelligence. Please give me your views on the manuscript by 1500 today. V. H. KRULAK Major General, USMC GROUP-1 SECRET 7 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC an ' DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION OSA, ASG Control No. AZ AL. HY 50955 DBocld: 32276038 Page if
‘HW 450955 SECRET SECOND WORKING DRAFT CUBA THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES I. Introduction In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through- out Latin América, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the timely | acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned, While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, SUCCESS thus far has been limited, and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information re- garding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it. SECRET Doclda: 322760538 Page 16
HY 0955 IT. * SECRET The Nature and Scope of the Problem lL. Limiting Factors _ There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be pre-~ served. Compounding the problem further, where Latin America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and dis- putes which have characterized relations among the nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are not completely’ healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the question of Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full and frank basis. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homogeneous en- tity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange or intelligence concerning this menace, there- fore, cannot be regarded as attainable. Te Pane 276038 Page 19 2
. AW 0955 & @ SECRET 5, Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities. 6. Continue the development at high priority of U.S. communications in Latin America. 7. Increase emphasis on the provision of U.S. in- telligence advisors to Latin American countries. Dis- courage their employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the 0.5. 8, Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA, and Military programs for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Establish such programs in additional countries where it is found to be in the best interests of the United States and acceptable to the country concerned. 9. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate govern- ments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on ' @ continuing basis of the nature and incidence of sub- versive activities in their respective countries. 10. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities. SECRET 10 Bocld: 32276038 Page 27