157-10014-10075 Vo Date } 08/06/95 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSI (NATION IDENTIFIC i AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCTA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10075 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY BILE NUMBER : 10-H--07 DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCIA HELMS, RICHARD ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE : . DATE : 06/13/75 PAGES : 191 — SUBTECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES a0 fe 8a CTA OPERATION MONGOOSE DOCUMENT TYPE TRANSCR CLASSI PICATION ASE UNCLE 1B RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 67/21/98 rg | me tS i hens feet Pay inf tac ¢ qe? eae © Zs tn os eo 09 oS + 0] bu bene ran ~f va Mm OM res ie] me kd 4 mt a] Box 3 eer puts eine ah tran pace ty sev, meee Tash CRETE ASR MED UTD TOD TRY PO! ota IL rey EE ERG FED Do cose NE eral vane un CN wie mane Ew cima Mee Fey ete we) ny a ET USE Gert Zim Ou Kew say nes omy Son Hae anny eae OES AE Tush aety FER Hehe SD SA A Heke IR ORAS SAE Ewe! MRIS ADE Aku eee UE os RP rR] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED > HW 50955 BDoold:324273463 Page 1
The Auited States & Report of Proceedings on Blu . a ev . 2 ae ee cana EED ne Hearing held before senate Select Comittee to Study Governmental — th Respect to Intelligence Activities | Operations Wi eo priday, Juné 13, 1978 Washington, D.C enema e and Waste turned over ~ (Stenotype Tap cee for destruction) co the Commit WARD & PAUL | 4190 FIRST STREET. 8. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008 erm (202) 644-6000 “TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 2 :
TESTIMONY OF Mr. Richard lielms APTERNOON SESSION - p. 93 Mr. Richard Helms -- Resumed 10° li Aa? Baaee & Fave an 12 . Se 7 13 Bo oo . 14 - | ae a 15 _ ee 16 - OO - 1? ae te oe | 18 og ; a . 19 20, 24 23 24 , so. e 410 Carat Street, EL . Waerengton. OC 2000)
EXECUTIVE SESSION Friday, June 13, 1975 United Statas Senate, Select. Committee. to Study Govermeental Operations with Respect to | Intelligence Activities Washington, dD. Cc. The Committee mat, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 o'clock a.m., in Room $-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman), preaiding. . Praesent: Senators Church | (presiding). Morgan, ‘lart of Colorado, Baker, noldwater, Mathias and Schwetker. Also present: william Miller, Staff Mirector: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chie Counsal: Curtis 8. Smothers. Minority Counsel; and Charles Kirbow, William Bader, Michael -. Madiqan-and David Aaron, Profwssional Staff Members. 21D F ert Sreeut. $  , Warmengrian, OC. 70003 TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32493463 Page 4
The Chairman. I am going to ask Fritz Schwarz if he would give us a short rundown on what it 1a wa intand to focus on in the questioning today, what we expect to cover, what we hone to get, and anything, I SUPPOsa,y Mr. Smothers, that you would like to add, just to give us 4 sense of direction in connection with the proceedings this morning. Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Halms was Dissell's Deputy during the period that the Ray of Pigs was planned. Ile apparently was ‘kept pratty much out of that, that is both consistent with what he said yesterday and with what the writtan racord appears te show. yy 9 ie took over a8 Deputy Director of Plans in the winter o° ”. w 3 a a 4 @ & € 8 1962 and remained in that position ussentially until he becane ~ the head of the Agency in 1966. the first thing ‘that I think that we should cover with him is to go through his perspective on what was happening with respect to Cuba generally without qattiag to the assassire- | tion question, On that he's qoina to say, F belisva, based ¢c:. interviswina him yasterday and what -he said to the Rockefellar Comission, that thera was conti:ulna latense pressure to do “gomat hing about Castro or Jet rid of Castro or overthrow the Communist government ia Cuba. | “ft think he will say that in that connaction, in affect, SIO Foyt Steoet, $.€ . Wavrengion, D.C. 2000) anything gous. Or, 48 Sunator Goldwater put the queation th: TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:327423463 Page 5
‘other day, there were not any limitations. But it's going to be worth a little bit exploring with him and understanding what he means. Does he mean that the CIA could have dropped bombs, could have blown up shipa in the harbor? What does he mean bv anything goes and what does he mean by there ware no Limita- tions? | When we come to the subject of assassination, I think. you will see his testimony kind of bounce hack and forth. On the one hand, he ia qoing to be saying, well, anything goes, and that fa something. On the other hand,.he's goina to be saying, I think, well there really wasn't anythina aoa in the a4sgassination area. 7 7 We will admit that he knew about Mr. Rosa@liiy he will + admit, I balieve; that he, indeed he and hia man Harvey too é 2 @ @ € 8 & € & over Koselli. But 1 believe you'll find the tastimony, bara on what he said to the Rockefwller Commission and what he said ‘yesterday, quite vague on that subjact. Ne will turn on that subiect: before too long to the 196" memo which is the most completa description of the avents in conusction with Castro. Hes had that prepared becaunre Presiden’ Johnson asked him to briaf Prasident Johason on the allataticn” abuut Castro that were appearing iu the Press. Then Johnson os hia own added Trujillo and Diem. Senator Saker. Is this the Praw Pearson article? B26 Past Steet, $8. Wemengian, OC. P0003 “tr. Schwarz. Yes, which President Johnson had bean TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 32429463 Page 6
B20 Cart Steeer, $.0. Worenyton, OC. 20003 HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Personally told about and had been told additional details One I think he will say the memo is accurate. We will discuss what he did after the memo was written telling people to destrcy certain documents relating to the memo. We will have to. take I him through the parts of tha :memo which say he decided or he agreed with Harvey's decision not to brief McCona. put that is stated on threw occasiona in the meno. 1 think he will teatity either he remembers no such thing: That is what he said yesterday and what he said to ‘the Rockefeller Commission. Moreover, I think he's going to disagree with ‘icCona's testimony about “eCone'n attitudes toward assassination, and at least say that he never heard McCone expresa any doubts abaut assassination, A, and B, that if McCone had such doubta he would have heard them. | Senator Baker. What's He going to say, Fritz -- well, t thought you wars finished. Go ahead. (NE. Schwarz. Another thing on Castro. On the General subject. ‘of disclosures to President, I heve a hook on mail “opening which ws should aot qet into the datails of but is relevant in this suise, in the so-callad Huston Plan which h- and J. Edgar lioover, Gaylar and Bennett, General Asnnet® signed thers wag 4 flat statement, and this was in June 1979, that mail opening has besn discontinued that was aiqned by ris and submitted to Prasidant Nixon. In fact, the mall opanina TOP SECRET Page 7
project lasted into 1973 in New York and was just starting on hie authority in San Francisco at the very time he was writing Prealdent Nixon saying it had been discontinued. . " That ia worth having him explain. The Chairman. las he axplained that to you previously? Mr. Schwarz. He didn't, because we didn't have this in mind until afterwards. That is essentially tt on the Castro. The Chairman. What did ha gay on the question of Presidential authority in assassination? | | Mr Schwarz. Well he puts it in this sense, Senator. Anything goes, and we knew the President wanted the qovernman’ ovarthrown. ve The Chairman. Nothing mors specific? yy. ~ Fd 2 4 @ 8 e & 4 8 Mr. Miller. I disaqrew. If I might, 1 think this might An halp, Fritz.’ 4 Yesterday in the discussion we followed the theme that was 7 raised by Bissell without stating where -- in fact, we did express the notion of plausible denial. Mr. Schwarz. Yes, we should discuss that with him, what dogs it inean and so forth. Nr. ‘tiller. And we caite baldly out with the question, could this have happaned without the President's approval. Ané I think, it is my impression and thera mav be other gradings on this, because he waa very careful in his answer, was he ‘did + BIG F ore Steqer, & E , Weaehengton, DC. 20003 not think so. The Prusident and the Attorney General wete aWare TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docla:32423463 Page 6
of these things and the pressure of the times -- this is where he ie very qood -- ha talks about the intense desire to do something about Cuba, 90 milas off the coast and so on, that there was pressure, vary ‘abenge pressuca vfthl. the goverane: to mount operations and get things done. Senator Goldwater. Would you yield at ‘that point? Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. — Senator Goldwater. I think it will be very helpful to this Conmittes if we could, in some way, have Mr. Helns explais. the philosophy that is wrapped up in the Prasident knowing or not knowing. This ian't confined to this Committee, éhia is international and I think they have to protect the President. 6 AA 18 ‘We & FP And whan Bissell said in affact, yes, I would lie, { would do it to. — A Mr. Miller. He got into that question yesterday. Senator Goldwater. If wa could devalop that philosophy, because I don't think enough of the staff or enough of the meabers have ever besn exposed to that kind of thinking. In other words, is it batter to have One man assagsinated or have. to qo to war and all of us qet. back into ths business of killir: thousands. Mr. Schwarz. Ne certainly says that there was intense pressure and he explicitly naid that thera ware no Limitations expressed with reqard to Chat prassura. On the specific of 810 Fernt Steoet, 4 C, Waunngion, OC. 20003 | assassinations, he said that may have been discussed as an TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 9
| TOP. SECRET option but he is very fugzy when you get down to was it actually discussed. | Me. Smothers. What da very helpful, I think, and We spent nome time with him vesterday, on simply qoina through his impressions of how Mongoose developed.and how he ‘had cone to the feeling that he articulated very clearly that there was no doubt in his. mind about what his marching orders. waerfe about what ‘they wanted ‘done, they. being the Preaidant on down. We talked ahout the question of the various sources of thir kiad of impression, meetings he-had with Cabinet people, Meetinagn that Mr. McCones would have, his conversations with MeCone. While not explicit, it in vary clear tha* all of these meetings i ¢ ¥ 2 & a ¢ g € 8 appear to him to be consistent. "I think tha othar thing that may be vary heleful for us to try to gut a close look at is the natures of the coordination, again as raflectad by Mongoose: Hera we have 4 pulling tode*her of essentially all of tha government aqencies in. an effort to | gat a task done, and if wa focus on sonethind Like, ona ,the , Attorney General's involvement, it anpsars as he aald vestercday that the whole concept of ths Spactal Group Auamanted was to ‘allow for the Attornsy General's input, aad also to provida for the stewardship of Lansdale who, for the first time, whose role becones a little clearer here 43 We Look at why Lanadaly comes out of sowhers. 810 Feet Steet, $. . Wavrengton, OC. 20003 I think if we really pursue, the quastion of how this TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423463 Page id
coordination effort looked, it will probably give us the best _dneight on the authority then. I think T alao found interesting yesterday his attitude “toward the Mafia people. He clearly talks about them ag just another asset, but his attitude -- and correct me if I’m wron: here =~ was more or less to pooh-pooh it. Here was something, bt was wild-eyed, it probably will never work, but f¢*s someth tir we'll throw against the wall. And I think left ua with the impression, okay, let him go out and try it. Dut, you know, nobody ‘really expects anything to coma of this, anid he is particularly pooh-poohed when he talks about what was expecte' of Hogelli. And I believe ha finally ended up using the terr. aif zilch as to what thay would get out of that «effort. | aut I think probably the most valuable thing he can do for us is to dive us soma of the impressions, soma of the fuelincs about what was going on in that timeframe. I don't think ha’s tarribly specific as to saying what. Senator Baker. ‘lay [ ask a question, Mr. Chairman, and : think a way to get him in hare is not to leave him out thare with Dau Schorr too lond. “tell mg about his frama of mind, his attitude. | , Doss he sesm apprehensive, evasive? ‘Ls theres any point in us thinking while vxanining the witness, what ts he holdin back, if anything? Is there any necessity, If think, to think 410 Fort Sirert, SE, Wavhngion GC. 20003 about the possibility of immunity? TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32429463 Page ii
Mr. Miller. 2 think the attitude that, number one, he stated, I mean this is the statement, that he is going to respond to any quastion by the Committea fully. That was his intention declared. a Secondly I think that he feels that twenty-five years, his H twenty-five years of service to the government is under attack now. lie atated that it is his belief that everything he has dona in govarnment has been ‘under direct order or lawful authority. Senator Schweiker. From tha top, niiil? Mr. Miller. Yas, he was very heated on that point at one. -podnt. I think it would be well worth, you know, presalina thi: button.. So { think it is a mixture of saying vou nust underatand &, 3 eS on @ oe q c* c the times. Helms himself was acting under lawful authority or. direction. fy 7 Thirdly, he wants to explain to the Committees why he did thinas and so on. I must say that yasterday, trying to hold him onto a question was difficult. Mr. Schwarz. . He isa vary, vary intelliaqent witness, and if you ever want to pin the man ‘down -on precise facts, hea knows Very Well how to make that difficult. “rc. Miller. I! think the way you can draw tha most infor- mation out of him is asking him in the context of the times, 810 F ost Street, $2, Warrengton, OC. 70003 the proceduras by which things were done, and he tells more TOP SECRET HW 50955 DBocld: 327423463 Page 12
“Senator Goldwater. Wall let me back up. I know this fellow vary, very well, and he is very touchy on the subject of 8 6 f F his years of service to tho government. ? ! a The. ‘Chatrnan, All right, let's have him in. i 1 a Mr. ‘Schwarz, “The only document that on tes. face =e only folder that on its face. is not aelf-explanatory ara a bunch of handwritten notes: Those’ ata his notes, r think, for the purpose Of briefing President Johnson On the subject. 5 7 7 BAe e Pau, on HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 13
WW 50955 i ° § I ; : : (Mr. Helms entered the hearing fgoom at 10128. a.m.) The Chairman, Mr, Helns, would you please atand and be sworn? DO you swear that all of the testimony you are giving in these proceedings will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? | Mr. Helms. | Yes, sir. ‘The Chairman, Mr. schwarz will begin the questioning. Docld:32423463 Page 14
TESTIMONY OF MR. RICHARD HELMS a Me. Schware. Juet some procedural matters, Mr. Helma. As we discussed, you know you have a right to counsel? Mr. Helms. Yes, thank -you. Mr. Schwarz. And you have your constitutional rights, as we discussed yesterday. And you also have the right te atop and obtain counsel if you want, do you know that?’ Mr. Helms. Thank you. : Mr. Schwarz, You joined the Agency at its outeet, is right? Mr. Nelms. Yon, Mr. Schwarz. Me. Schwarz. And you had baen in the OSS before that? Mr. Nelms. Yes, I was in the OSS and then I went on to the, what was later known as the SS8U in. | Departments. - Then I was da the CIG and when ‘the C1G Was subsumed in the CIA, 1 went to the CIA which had been set up under the National Security Act of 1967. | Mr. Schwarz. And you were on the operational side of the Agency or the clandestine sida, is that right? Mr. Nalms. Yes. 1 started in what was known asp the Offices of Special. Operations and that latwr became the clandestine servica. And t was in that until 1965. Me. Schwarz. Moving to the late ‘53's, were you the Deputy Director for Plans? 416 Ferd Garoet, 4 , Worengien, OC 2000) | fe. Halms. No, { didn't -- let mea see, I became Deputy TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 15
Director for Plans in early 1962. ME. Schware. All right. Were you the second in command in the Plans section? Mr. lielms. Yes. I had the title of Chief of, Operations which was the number two. Mr. Schwarz. And you reported to Mr. Bissell? Mr. Nelms. I reported first to Mr. Wiener and then to Mr. Bissell. - | Mr. Schwarz. And then when Mr. Bissell. left in the winter of ‘62 you left his placa as the deputy Director for Plans? Me. ftwlms. That ie correct. Mr. Schwarz. And you stayed in that job until you hecavs #% WAOO ® PAU pcr, or did you have an intervening joh? c c Cc Intelliqence which was a job that I received in I think it was April of 1965. . 7h. Mr. Schwarz. At about ths time Admiral Rayburn took Over? Helms. Exactly the same time. Sewharz. And then you succeeded Admiral Rayburn 4 ligims, Thae is correct. Schwarz, And you held that job until the winter S1G Foet Meet, 4 €, Wavmangien, OC “ANG! lialmsa. 1 think it was very TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld: 3274279463 Page 16
Ke, Schwarz. At that point, you went to your present 2 | post, which is Ambassador to Iran? Mr. elma. ‘Yes, gir, Mr. Schwarz. ALL right. 7. aS Would you recount for the Committee, turning to the country 6 | of Cuba, your understanding of the relationship bet aen the castro! ‘a takeover and running up to the time you becane ne And wher 9 j qt say. relationship, I don't ‘maan the formal diplomatic sense, 10 | but in the sanse Gf what was the United States government 11 q daterasted in accomplishing as-far as the qovernment of Guba 12 Was Concernadd. 13 Mr. Helms. . Wall, this recital may be somewhat impreéasion~ 14 detic. ‘Because I have not gone into any dutails abou dates. . 15} ia fact, I don't recall right now what ynar it was that Castro 16 took over, in the Yeal sense. When was that? vhs Mr. Schwarz. ‘$9, 1¢ ‘zr. Helms. '§9, V9 After he took. over there was no doubt that Presidunt “4 20 Fisenhower' 8 Adninistration reqarded that ‘lavalonment as a 1 mons 2) unfortunat te Ons, and starting early on, various thought Was 22 | Given to how this takeover of Cuba by 4 Conmuniat could bs, | how the balance could he radressed. 24 | You ramenber thera was some trouble, I believe, down in 216 Foret Sevest, % ., Wemungion, OC. F000) 25 Columbia at the time. One of: our fiecretarias of State want TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 3274273463 Page i?
down there, at which time -- thia was before Castro “took over --| but at which time he was identified apecifically as @ | Communiat and thers was 4 very real feeling in the Eleenhower Administration that having a Communist reqime 96 miles from ths Me shores of the United States was a most unwelcome development. ‘These thoughts ied to the project which over time has cone to be known under the rubric of the Bay of Pigs. It was certainly not known ag that when it began and | 1¢. was bequn. as a - project to organize Cuban exiles, Cubans who had been. by Castro from Cuba or had fled of their own volition, into a brigade trained in guerrilla tactics, the objective being to land in Cuba in the hope that with this show of force, thoss 7 Bane & Paw. Cubans still thers who wars against Castro wor'd rise up and oy 4 implicit in this scheme was that if tha invasion force ot inte any serious trouble, or conversely if they had a ‘qood chee of making it, they could probably rely on American military support or American support of some kind. - In any event, you 411 know ‘the history of the Ray- ot Plas. OY yy ' It failed, it. was a traumatic experience. I want to say for anybody who wags serving in the Central Intelligence Agency dae those days it wag Very traumatic. put it did fahl. Tf think ‘gome 90 peoples lost their lives in the briqada, four Amer icass or five Americans -~ pladase don't hold ns to those detalla -~ € 1 quess about a hundred on the other sida and about 1299 of S16 f owe Giewns, % E , Wavdungian, OC. 70003 = i REESE TE the brigaits were taken prisoner which led, 4% you will racail. TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:324273463 Page 18
Tc ESD LI cig ad <a later to a very complicated series of negotiations to free these prigonera or at least to free some of them. You will recall also, because {f think we must put in this element that it was Praaident Eisenhower under whom the original concept of mounting a guerrilla operation aqainat the island cama into being, but by the time the execution of the operation waa to take place, President Kennedy had come into office. Therefore this project had been at work under two Presidents. It has been said since -- It don't know if this is fFelevant to our discussion this morning <-- that one of the reasons for this misfortune was that President Kennedy had bear. in office such a short. time that he had hardly had 4 chances to + 9 % get ahold of ths qovernmunt apparatus hefore this thing was BAO ® Pave presented to him and mounted and off. it went. And this. was “4 pretty tough on him and pratty touqh on everybody Lavolved. Subsequent to the Sav of Piga, obviously there was @ licking of wounds and 4 sort of reqrouping, and then as I recall it, sometime in late 1961, 1 qussa -- the Bay of Plas «s L recall was in April of ‘61 --. Mr. Scwharz. aoeil of ‘G). Mr. Helms. So this would have been in the fall, like October or November. | We Were instructed to -- at least the Agency was inatruc’s! to get going on plans to qet rid of Castro by some devica whit. 410 F wet Garant, 4 € , Wormungion, OC. F000) obviously would have to be covart bucause nobody had any TOP SECRET i HW 350955 DBocld:327423463 Page 19
HW 450955 216 Faw Breast, 1.2... Wormemen, OC. 20008 Docld: 32423463 stomach anymore for any invasions or any military flescos of that king. The Chairman. Mr. Nealme, could you be more specific on this particular point? You say that in the fall of ‘61 after the regrouping and the licking of wounds, the Agency received instructions te get on with a plan to get rid of Castro... ors Now juat from whom did these instructions come and was the nature of the instruction. Can you be more precise about this? ' Mr. Helme. Sir, IY am not very helpful in this period here for the simple reason this came to me second or maybe thir? hand, and. it did not involve me particularly. The Chairman: At the tim, what waa your position? the fall of ‘617 : | - oe Mr. Helms. I was Chief of Operations or the Deputy Director for Plans. In other words, it was a number two job. The Chairman. Secon! in command of covert operations? Mr. Nelms. Yes. The wav this had been worked, ‘Ir. Bissell had come in ag Director of Plans, having buen in the Agency and havi bees. the agent, if you remember, of U~2 operations and that kind, and he brought those things with him into the job of the ope awl he spent. a good daal of tims prior to the Sav of Pigs working on that. TOP SECRET -Bage 20
In other words, Lt was a big operation for an organization 4 t for the CIA. In retrospect, far too big. S80 let's not shilly- shally with the words about that. I think he spent a great deal of time on it, and my role was to try and take care of what renained of the world. | Therefore, I was absorbed outside, obviously on the fringes of | this, but not tnvolved in the Aecisions or how it was to be j done or who was doing what, or anything of that kind. So it was -- as I say, wa go downhi11 tato, t think it ‘was late- 1961 or early 1962 and I'd have a hard tine putting my finger on exactly when, Mr. HeCone ‘had by ‘that time hecomes ‘Director. And as I recall it, this was the first time thet I y 4 BAO® & Pare! should interest myself more on this that we had to build. up. ia in order to conduct a larger effort. “4 And this then began. Then later, somewhat later, fT became Deputy Director, I think it. was in Pebruary, and then q | was sort of brought into Cuhan operations. And hea indicated 1 s obviously these things came qenerally under my aeais. ‘ . | aed Wu set up sort of a task force in order to work on thade Cuban problens. Mr. Schwarz. Was Mr, Harvey the man‘ in charqe? Mr. Helms. itr. Harvey was than put in charge of that sometime in this ting frame. Gi® F ove Geet, 4.0 ., Waetangten, © C. POOGS I'm sure in tha documents it shows what it was called, Task Forces W or somathing of that kind sticks in my mind, but TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 21
that may b: wrong. Then later, and f don't know anymore in terns of tine; but a bit later, I belleve, General Lansdale was brought in to head up this Cuban effort. Senator Schweiker. Within the CIA? Mr. Nelms. No, sir, I'm sorry. I'm not being very specific, Senator Schweiker, I'll clear that up right now. | la tha CIA, we were informed that General Lansdale, who was working in the Department of Defense in an office which I think at that time was headed by General Frakine(?), it was aun office in the Department of Defense which was dedicated to supporting covert Operations and actions of the Central Intelliqence Agency. | That was One Of ita functions, among Others, 1 have no doubt, but that was one of them. r $ cé @ cg ; € ct But. in other words, it was the point at which the CIA in these matters plugged into the Department of Defense. My 7 4 Fecollection is that ths propositian at first was that General Lansdale was going to orqanize a whole orqanization underneath himself, sort of outside of other existing departmants and agencies to work on this Cuban oneration. Hut in any event, that was a Very Short-livad idea because I think Mr. MceCone objected to putting, senliing his people out Of the Agancy to-be under somebody slse's command. .I think the Stats Departinsnt objectad. So thet died aborning. S36 F wel Shower, 4. @ _ Krartengien, O €. 90002 SG the result was that General Lansdale became « sort of TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 22
i 25 | 24 426 Few Jerect, £.€ , Wasengien, OC 20003 25 WW 50955 Docld: 3274273463 Chief of Oparations, Chairman of the Comaittes, “if: you'd Like which would ait down at the table with representatives of State and I gues# Defense and CIA and I think USIA was algo involved, to mount what you could only refer to, I think, properly as 4 governmental approach to the Cuban problem, in other words, to organize all of the facilities of the govern- ment. And I remember that the FRI was brought in, “and ‘even the Customs and the Coast Guard and so forth. . . The Chairman. This Committee operated under the policy direction of the 54/12 Special Group? fe. Helms. “Yes; sir, but Mr. chairman, in those days, that famous Committes was called the Spectal Group, so for tha purposes of this timeframe, that ia what it was called. There cams into vogue the term Special Group (auaiien which meant that whan ‘the Special Group was sittina on profec’~ involving Cuba it becams Augmented. Otherwise, it stayed the Special Group. And when it was Augmented, ie had added in representatives of USIA, I think, other representatives of the Department of Defense and State, the Attornay General principally -- that was one of: the reasons it was called Augmented, because normally he woulda't have been involved in. any of theses things. ‘4g, Gehwarz. Was the code name Mongoose uged for that Operation? 4c. Helms. Yes. When this neaded a code name, Ut think TOP SECRET Page 23
HW 450955 ay 4 BAe & Fava ~ 4 850 Fort Stoo, 4 E , tremengian, OC POGES Docld: 32423463 I recall it it was a code name contributed by the Agency, : don't know who thought {it up, but <-- so this became known as _ Operation Mongoose. And Operation Mongoose I believe -= now this is the best of my recollection -- otayed in existence until the Cuban missile crisia in the fall of 1962 at which tine it vas disbanded in that. form. | tir. Smothers. . Mre Anbassador, before we get away tron Lansdale who was, as you * say, in: charge of operatio a you know. or do you have any impresalons as to who Lansdale reported to, what was the line ‘of. authority that he respondet to with respect to the Spactal Group? ‘ir. ‘lalms. Well, Mre Smothers, 1* was my impression at the time that he had been put into the job by the Attorney General. ‘low I don't have this firsthand, I was not there wha he was given the asaignment, but this was my understanding. “You will recall perhaps that General Lansdale had had quite a rich experience in political action and political warfare. When he worked for ths Central Intalliaence Aqdency he had been in the Philippines and had helped to organize | ths fighting against ‘the Huks and aftar. “hat he nov att to Vietnam and wags {notrumental in setting up the Olen governmen® from thse chaos that existed hafore tha*. So he had substantial credentials for, if you want to Bay, & political warrisr, and T hava no doubt that it waa that TOP SECRET Page 24
- i : feason that he attracted the attention of the powers that be. 2 | Mr. Smothers. At this time, was the Attorney General ‘Chairing the Special Group Augmented at this time? Mr. Helme. 2 believe go. After all, he would have been 6 | the senior official. { think he was, yea. 6 | Mr. Smothers. $0 was it your impression that he was sort” 2 | of setting the tone for the group's action or activity? Sf Mr. Helms. of that. ie was very much interested in thia and spent @ great deal of time on it. Mr. Schwarz. ‘Via want to come back to those particulars, | but would you continue with your answer an to what the United States government was trying to do about Cuba? . You had reached the missile crisis which was in October of 1962 and the missile crisis was resolved by some kind of an understanding between Chairman Khruschev and President De you know the nature of that: understanding? Mr. Helms. I don't know anymora about it than anybody would have known from reading the papers at the time. I was ‘aot privy to any inside information. Mr. Schwarz. | Some kind of combination: — | the missiles removed. | Mr. Helms. The I-28's were removed. Mr. Sewharz. Now, after that, what happened to the 410 Faw Goran, &.€ .. Weerungten, GC. POTD? affortea of the United Status government to overthrow the TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 25
: t ! H f 4 ft i i i regime after the missile erlei@ and up to the time you became DCI in 1968 or '66? Mr, Helma. You remember that after the miasile crisis -- and f think | I'm right about this, and I would appreciate it Ar. Chairman it: there's anybody in the room, where I get my historical facts wrong, would Correct me, because T have no interest in trying to gat thte all messed UP. This ts just my best recollection, The Chairman. We understand. Mr. Helms. There was quite an. operation in the Orqanization of, American Staten after the mianile crints ta orqanize a combined American approach te isolating Cuha. And ft helleve At wan out of these delibsrations at the OAS at that time | that came the economic. embargo of Cuba. But also, there were various sanctions which the United States 90vernment. wag trying to work out. | don't know it I'm using the right word here, now, bue thay. Certainly would liks to have punished Castro for the * Cuban missile crisis becauss I ‘think ic a renember the temper Of those days, there were 4 lot of lumps 4. People’ 8 throats all Over: the United Staten when they realized how close 4 call Wes had had on this really axtraordinarily daring. Operation have them pointing down tha throats of Amaricans. So in those days, the tamper of yetting after Castro wag TOP SECRET WW 50955 Bocla:3?473463 Page 26
@ Feal one. 2f mean, people had their heart in it, 1 muse of the Congress or the American People to cabal with doing anything that was possible to Punish this man, The Chairman. That was Particularly trug atter the missile criais? Mr. Helms. Thig ts my point, this ts RY point. . Mr. Schwarca, | So not only the multilateral efforts through the OAS, as you described, but what might be called the unilateral efforts by the United States to take covert action against Mr. Castro to overthrow continued after the missile erisia. Baee @ aug Mr. Helms, They did indaed. ‘Ag I Bay, CPeration Monqoose, as 1 Facall - it, disappeared, hut it sinply was c ¢€ I replaced by a continuing affort on the part of the CIA to ™~ mount harrassment: operations and so forth. against Cuba. The base in Miami from which thase operations were conducted was continued in being, and it Geatinued in being for two or three years thereafter, but On @ gOMewhat declinina Scale, because firat, the operation, I sust confess, was not ‘Vary successful, 1 mean, there ware soma things done and somes yoou intelligence acquired, but as far as the Sabotage -- and if Io may call Lt, the rough stulf wags concerned, it waa not Very affective. The Russians had moved i: to Cuba , into the Cuban security sarvice and had done a rather astonishing job TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 27
of bringing the Cubana into the twentieth Gentury when it came to security and counterintelligence. And thay ran it with « Very skilled hand, so they Were constantly rolling up and @tfesting these Various operations, landings and air drops and all the Yeat of thoga things. So that Tt am gad to Bay it was & tather (“unsuccessful show in the. and.. ‘Me. Schwarz. Did - ‘these sttorts continue up to the ‘65, "G6 time frame? Mr. Melma. It Seems to me tt was atin. going in "64, yes Tn relatively certain they Ware continued to the 65 timefrane on a somewhat Keduced scale. It was after that, I believe, or eround this tims that We began to ask for ‘some relie! from this responsibility bwcause Vietnam was piers u in those days an? | | { } { : ! if there was 4 neal for manpower that, undleratood paranilitary activite- , ies and things of this kind, no* only in Vietnam, but in Laos, 80 thet the Agency was ruaning short of effective, manpower in this field. Therefore the Cuban effort dropped off as interest in Cuba tended to drop off and cool and interest in Vietnam built up. Me. Smothara. Well, I think in terms” of, we! fe talking about these of forts, fir. Ambassador, and those responsibil iti- i think what we want ‘to do ta try to get ahold of what’ thone” ffurta and £euponsibilities were. 420 6 mt Serene, H., Waungion, OC. POOR) Would it be fair to say that it was your understanding TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:327423463 Page 26
of Mongoose that the task was to get rid of Castro by any means without limitations, not limited to overthrow? ‘ix. Helm. Well, my distinct recollection at the time was -- I perhaps phrased the injunction. on us in a very simplistic American language which you could use other words,’ but te was to get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba, . lat's put fe that way, and ‘no limitations were placed on the Reans. “In tact, ‘iT. never. recall having bean told by anybody doa’ t do this, don! t do that, don't do the other thing. Me. Smothers, Let me ask then what do you fwal you could do at that time? “pid that fewling change any as this moved? Nr. Nelria. Well, I think this is Feasonadle to State, aim! 1 hope. this is responsive ‘to your quastion,. The ‘oarcentions, ot BARD & Page, the Administration, and I say, also, f belleve. the Congress aid ~ * the Americaa people, a8 reflected by. thy Administration, as 4 ‘those things intensified on two or thres occasions in connection with Cuba, obviously tha sxtent of the means that One thought were available, obviously increased too, In other words, the pressure was ratty intense, and 1 remanber vividly it was Very intense. And therefore, when you go into the record, you know, you find a lot of very nutty acheines there and thosw autty schemes Wefe born of the intensit© of the pressure. And we Wets. quite frustratad. tte. Smothers. Well juet try tO trace that pressure aa 410 Fares Street, % & , Cuowmrongien OC. 90003 it develops and subsides for us. I think that would he TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32493463 Page 29
Me. Helms. Well I think you find it hudlding up to the Bay of Piga and you have a crescendo and you have the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs and things lying quiet. Well, there's a Great concern about the prisoners, what's to be done about than and ao ferth. And then at the end of (the year, "61, “you find the intenaity building up again. where ‘te waa. ver trong at the end of “62 and "62. | We then go along into that period, if you will. recall, tas cS) the summer of ‘S62 when thore firat reports were coming out about missiles in Cuba, and you remember. eo 1 forget which Senator it was that had: some inside information —_ Senator Mathias. Senator Keating. Mr. ‘Helms. _ Tavany event, that beqan And then We came into the missils crisis Atnelf which I queens was the hottast momant at all in intensity. : 9 doubt about i, it was whites heat. And then that continued on for some time until it gradually beyan to taper off. I would have ‘thought -- well, lasted pretty much through ‘63, becauge I can still. remember Meetings about how are we doina with econonic warfare, have We turned off the oil deliveries, what are we doing about takin cars of bua dsliverias. I think the Leyland Bus Company in spate Wanted to sell some buses to Cuha and wa did eVerythin: that wa could to step the sales and ao forth. TOP SECRET S10 Frnt Goce. GE. Weekenaten, OC. POOR HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 30
Schwarz, Wall, is that the kind of thing “o-thee the process worked? Reading the Monqoose files -- and see if this wag a fair summary of the process -~- there were intensive Meetings, frequent Meetings and a great deal of Pressure to have action occur. | Mz. Helms. Mr. Schwarz, I think the record will. show ‘e4 I'm not mistaken that thoge ‘meatinga were attended by Very high level menbera of the government. a | Me. Schwarz. ‘And the pressure to have something accon- -plished was being put on the Agency ‘in other Places. of the government by the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the head of tha Defense Department and so forth. 7. 9 Now, at mastings there would be discunsions or * WARD & Pho’ discussion of various plans and options, in that Mr. flelms. Yes. The Chairman. Did fir. Helms attend the meetings. of the 74 Spacial Group Augmented? Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I am surs that I must have. did not do it with any great regularity, because it is my recollection that normally Mr. MeCons was the Director who Wad @ member of the Conmittea would usually take the task force chief with him to the meetings, t inust have attended some cf 2s i them, certainly, but 1 was not necessarily a requler . 24 attendant. 410 Fon Steet, $8 _ Werrngion D.C. 20005 25 Mg. Schwarz. ut at the ones you dic attend, thery woul.! TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page Fi
Mr. Nelms. Well I think there were various sabotage Operations. r Femember one against an electricity Plant that was supposed to be, have the web for all of Cuba. _ And ‘4 was 4@ major operation waged against that. F i ‘ Mr. Schwarz. And those specifics were diecadsca tiret 4@ plane and then ae matters that were aithorized, 8 you te | understand it, both from attendance at the meating and your understanding of the maatinant ima. Yea, air. I Group Augmented was the place that the task ‘force chief and everybody else went to say we're planning this, | 90. We'll go at midnight tomorrow night, no, it’s been Called 1 Off, nO, We go back and so forth. So they were in the picture i almost On @ dally basia. ‘ir. Schwarz. In detail, and on a dally basis. dg. Helma. That's right, Mr. Schwarz. Nag, to your knowledge, the subject of aseassinating Custro authorized in that fashion at any. of thoa. Reatings? 416 8 ow Serer, $€ . wamengion, OC 7000) Mr. ielma. 1 don't know that 4 plan to assassinate Casters TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 32
wag authorized in any formal way like that. these échemes ~o and I call them schenas -~ would have taken Place in ‘the context of doing what yaw cauld to get rid of Castro, and the difficulty with this kiné cf thing, as you gentlemen are all paintully aware, is thet achody Wants to cnberrass a President of the United States discumsizg the assasaination of foreign leadars “ta his presence. ‘Tks fs somathing that has got to ‘be dealt with in Some Stier Sash fos. Even though you ure expheniens you've ati gots a problen and under our system of qavacumert, & President ia elected. four years ‘normally aot he“s ope Like a Prime Mnlata whe 7 ’ te this Seectial vou ah a) « $ € a é é 4 8 a * Now when President Kisentower took cesponsibitity tor +! U-2 flights, that wes an tis aw: -- for the U-2? flights --- tha: to. ALL chose peophe coult be fired. The Chairman. “wr. Mims, this mekes it all the more | important to recogcize im whet you sew am! in, unjerstandin, this makes it ali ths mare immportact for the Committers to “know 416 Cow Moot, 4, Wwerergion, OC POOR whether, within the Scecie! Graurm Augmented which was in char TOP SECRET WW 50955 Bocla:327473463 Page 33
@f the general ‘ettore againet the Castre regime and whitch | *Pproved thease can You tell ua, do you: know? Mr. Helms. The only thing r can contribute is what” you have here in a document, a ‘Atecuasion which took place ina: meeting which: I did “not attend, And the, aftermath of that. | Meating, 4f 2£ was, aware of What -- what I now Learned ia that dh Me. MeCone went to sae Mr, “McNamara who said «« this but that doesn’ t inean he didn't do it, but x don't recall eVert having bean told by Mr, NeCons thet any attempts on Castros | Aife ware out of bounds, they Wet@ not to he Fecall this. I must say that Mr. McCone had qiven me my job, he had Promoted me to be Deputy Director of Plans. “We had Fe Very yood relationshin, a very good working relationshio. I saw hia constantly on a daily basis, 1 felt warmly toward him, and therefore I would not have dons something hg asked me not to do. And I would like to Say, “ir, Chairman, - if: i may juse whi les We afe at this point, that da my twenty- five Years in the 22 Central Intelligence Agency, f always thought | wag work iaq “23 1 within authorization, that r wan doing what 1 hail bean asked be to du by ProDder authority and whea I wag Operating on my own 25 I was dotna what | bellevad to ba tha legitimate business of @h., TOP SECRET WW 50955 Doclad:324249463 Page 34
HW 50955 Docld: 1) 16 17 20 2) 22 23 24 25 i Agency ag it would have been axpected of me, And therefore 1 don't want to leave in anyone'g 1 this room that P Of that f had authorities or PoWers that were @Xercised tn ry the illeqalities came around, I must gay it seamed rather | uf Johnny-on-tha-spot, that i always ‘Seamed to be around where poor. . Senator Dakar. ‘ir. Chairman, we have « live quorum now and I have a question or two in shat connection, The Chairman. = YOu ovwrated excep: &8 you understood you Should within the chain of authority. Our endsavor of assassinatic:.. Whan you Bay that “tr, MNeCone, with whom you worked very Closely, nevar told you that assassination wag (out of bounds o qave YOu any reason to think that this Wa& 80, did that “= or that suggests a corollary question, Old Mer. McCone ever SXpraassaly teal} You, in go Many words | that O884ssinution was within bounds and We should NCOCwad, or the Agency should Proceed, with 48$sassination Plans? TOP SECRET 32473463 Page 35
6 ? : t i FE [i 3 i i L Me. Helms. Mr, Chairman, & don't Fecall his ever having I put ie in anything 4@ apecific aa that. The Chairman. f see. Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman, just following this | point, we have some other documentation or testimony to the effect that on a couple of occasions relating to the Cuban Situation, you decided with someone not to brief Mr. ‘eCone on 8 fa couple of occasions, and obviously you muse have hed a good e 1 # H | f i 17 | Treason or authority for doing that, and t juae wondered what thet route was and why that happened? Mr. Nelms. That in a Perfectly good Mestion, Senator Schweiker. 1 belleve what we're talking about was the == an that v. . that Mr. Harvey sale kad about a plan he had to use a Gangster named John Rosalli and that I had agreed not to brief Mr; ‘cCone. I frankly don'* recall having agreed to this, but. since 18 ji T have no reasor to question ‘ir. Harvey's word either, in thi« 410 6 wat Stoner. £ E , Wartungion, G€ peces 19; i ' Question, f heve heen going through my Surmiseys since and thee. are surmises, that Me. Harvey waa the formar ayent of the rire He had server there for many years. and hy Came to Me and nai-! he wanted to ses what he could determina about Underworld links with Cuba through Roselli since Rosalll had basen involve: with the Agency warlior on in an effort 4gainut Cuba tn Connection with other gangsters and 90 forth. TOP SECRET WW 50955 Bocla: 327473463 Page 36
NING Cea a TOP See My Fecollection ia wisdom of this, hat Cine age fut the thing did Rot loom large in my mind at that time, I was enormousiy: Aira busy with a lot o¢ other’ things, taking Over. a « McCone wag Telatively new in the Agency ant z ‘thought to myself, 1 beldeve that'a the ~~ Senator Schweiker; “De YOU recall] any other Situations “Where you might not have briefed mr, 4cCona? Mr. Nelma. I don't Tecall any other | Senator Schweiker, ona dally basis, Now Obviously hy didn't need 4 full beLeting on everyents. that we were doing, but he certainly was up te date on the: things he wag interested in knowing. 1 Feported to him Pegularly and “Mr, MeConwu, if 1 might Bay go, was a good eXseCutive. ie knew how to run OFGanizationg, There was no doubt about ft. And hy WaS an inglatant and pretty tough TOP SECRET | ? WW 50955 Bocld:374273463 Page 3
Bo I don’t want to get a picture of the man today at age 73 who's still pretty aprightly, but in thoae Gays he was mighty sprightly, and he had a mighty glinty hlue eye and, if it would divert the Committee at-all, when he was feally going after you and most seriously he never raised his voice, he never seemed to be the slightest bit irritated, he simply would start: the: conversation by saying, I am “totally diasatis fied and then he would go. on from there. ell, 1 got totally dissatisfied with Cuba and & got: totally dissatisfied with China and there were various others durina this period, but wa saw each other fegularly. And { want to say, Mr. Schweiker, because [ lon't want ¢o leave any misimpreasion in your mind, _ thee laomy best recreat thon” of something that happened a Jong time ago, hut “here Wan or attempt On my part to keep ‘something from ‘tr. McCone per ‘se because I told him everything. Senator Schweiker. Again, I gather you felt that what wat happening hers was in accordance with the Special Group's policy and plans and while you didn't reqard it as 4 feaaitis alternative, it fell within the ‘ramawork of what you underet. —- the policy at tha time was? ‘Ng. Nelms. Yus, air. The Chairman. Wo'll take a five minute recess for VOte and then wa will come back, “ir. Schwarz. 810 Fans Siewert, 4 E . ewmommon. OC. P0003 (A brief recess was taken.) TOP SECRET WW 50955 Bocla:327473463 Page 36
Chairman Church. The hearing will coms back to order. Me. Schwartes. Me. Schwartz. Wo previously marked three documents relating to Mongoose as Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, and we will come back to those in a moment. . Would you turn, Mr. Ambassador, to Exhibit 5, which is @ single plece of paper previously furnished to you, dated. May 23, 1967. It is in all of the folders of the Senators. It is a memorandum for the record from J.8. Farman, subject, "Report on Plots to Assassinatoe Fidel Castro,* dated May 23, ‘67? | Mr. Holme. Yos air. Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Earman was Inspector Ganeral? Mr. Helms. Yes, he was. Mr. Earman had previously been Special Assistant to Mr. Allen pulles and then he was made ~: Inspector General. Unfortunately he is now deceased, | Mr. Schwarz. And you asked him to prepare a report on plots to assassinate Fidel Castro? Mr. Helms. Yes sir. FOO? Mr. Schwarz, Did you do that because of requesta you. had received from someone olse? Mr. Helms. Yea. My recollection of asking the Inspector General to look into these matters resulted from, i believe, @ request from Proaident Johnson. 1! believe thatthere not only had bean at that time a column by Drew Pearson but I TOP SECRET S16 Forat Gtowet, 2 F , Wenmongten, & C HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 39
belive thet Drew Pearson had epoken privately to the President about the subject mater of ithat column and the President asked me about the facte and I oxida, well, I would have to try to ascertain them, and it was ‘a result of that that I asked the Inspector General to get into this mattor, and I realized that memory gets very foggy with tine but ay ‘mpression wae Y asked the facta wore. And just to finish this off, & do recall going to the President later after this material had been given to me and. briefing him orally about the contentea. Mr. Schwarz. The report that was submitted to you you i read before going to the President? Mr. Helms. Yes, Mr. Schwarz. And you shave & copy of the report in front of you, do you not? t Mr. Helms. Is‘this it here? . ; . Mr. Schwarz. Tt is intended to be a tab relating to Mr. Castro. Mr. Holms. Yes sir. This Looks like ti anyway. Mr. Schwarz. The report was, as far as you knew the facts, a good job, an accurate job? Mr. Helms. I don't recall that q went ovor this report. : ” 1 noticed that in the early part of the report ‘there are a TOP SECRET GE © ret Greogt, GE , auger OC POGES HW 50955 Docld:324235465 Page 40
. Couple of notations in my handwriting. 2 have no recollection anymore of what they were or the reason for then. z believe that X used this report as a fact-finding report. I don't have any recollection of having gone over it in detail for accuracy, particularly, excapt to the extent this was the best they were able to get out of the various people they interviewed, bute it satisfied my requirement because it ser in proper perspec- tive the assertiona which Drew Pearson was making. Tt separated them and enabled me to explain to President Johnson what had been going on. 7 Mr. Schwarz. All right, in that connection, Mr. Reporter, would you put in front of Mr. Holms the praviously marked Helms Exhibit 6, which are Mr. Helm‘'a handwritten notes, and the previously marked Helms Exhibit 7, which is page 118 from the study. These again are both in the Senators‘ folders. ‘Page 118 of the atudy is headed “The Draw Pearson Story?* Mr. Helms. ves sir, Mr. Schwarz. And it has two columns. It published the details and the facts as wa know them? — 7 ee ‘Mr. Holms. Yes sir, I have them now in my hand, Mr. Schwarz. | ' Mr. Schwarz. It is in your folders. Now, turning first to your notes, ia it your belief that those notes were prepared in order for you to brief the " B16 Moree Stooet, & FT , Hsmongten, OC P00) TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:324273463 Page 41
President? Mr. Helms. Well, at this late date 2 can't say that wit any finality but they must have been for some reason and 7 think that waa: probably why X did ie. Thay look like the kind of thing that are those reminders out of a report that you | Wanted me @ point you particularly wanted to make for some - ‘reason or another, which has now long since blown out to sea. But I have no reason ‘not to accept the theaie that maybe this ds what these notes were. Mr. Schwarz. The notes carry the story through mid- 63, ‘you. will see in the middle of the page of your handwritten notes. Hr; Helms. Yes air. ‘Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell, to the beat of your “recollection, President Johnson that, according to the 1967 Study, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into President Johnson's ‘Presidency? Mr. Helms. I just can't answer that, I just don't know. I can‘t recall having done so. What was it ~= after he became President? Refresh my memory, if you will. You say they continued into hia Presidency? Which episodes were those? Mr. Schwarz. The AMLASH episode, Mr. Cubela. In any evont, the 1967 study indicates that in President Johnson's ‘Presidency afforts wore made by the CIA to aupply guns to the TOP SECRET 250 Fort Stoont, 4 & . Weukengten, OC POCO) HY 50955 DBocld:324273463 Page 42
mi & ; me - iy Ne as van ted ih e ca a, i. .. TOP’SECRET Cuban person known ag AMLASH, in code, and Cubela in actuality 4 Mr. Helms. I think I can't point to somebody else whose perceptions might be more accurate than mine. I don’t think that one would have approached the AMLASH thing as an assassination plot against Castro. I think that one would hava approached that as an extension of our efforts to set up some kind of opposition group to Castro inside Cuba of which Cubela was, f guess, our prime opportunity, and that the pressures, as I recall it, for guns and things of that kind all came from Cubela himself, they didn't come from thea Agency. This wagon’ t something we were trying to sat up. “This waa gomothing Cubsla was trying to set up. He hated Castro and wanted to get rid of him. Mr. Schwarz. The Agancy facilitated that by helping him get guns; is that right? Mr. Helms. I think the number of people wea tried. to give guns to in the history of these Cuban operations was multitudinous. ‘Me. Schwarz. But you did give gun's to Mr. AMNLASH or -- Mr. Helms. If the record shows that we did. Mr. Schwarz. And you just don't remember whethor that was disclosed to President Johnson -- it occurred during his Presidency? | Mr. Helms. I don't recall it, but I can as 1 sit here ’ today, I can see why it wouldn't have occurred to me to do it. TOP SECRET S10 6 ort Street. $ E . Wowmngion OC S000) HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 43°
"TOP SECRET. Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, would you look at exhibit 7, which ie the two-column -- Senator Goldwater. Could I ask a question? Did the CIA aver do anything to try to find where these leaks came from? Mr. Holmes. Which leaks wore those? Senator Goldwater. To Pearson, to be able to write his column. Mr. Helms. At the time thie review was made, Senator Goldwater, and I think that it appears in the back of it someplace, because that is what refreshed my memory -- this is many years later. I am not saying I remamber all of these things just cold as: that. But from reading thie and trying “% ‘ WARD & Pause to remember concrete the circumstances of the time, ‘thore was ae’ an effort made to figure. out who might have done this, and 1 think it may well be that this is one of the reasons I have got these names up in the top of these handwritten notes of mine -- it might have been the lawyer, Ed Morgan, dt might be Roselli, it might be Mahou, or Garrison, who was out in Pao ¥ Los Vegas,. with Maheu and some of the others. In other words, 1 think that is what. this note could very conceivably, the tov one, refer to. It was for me to indentify to President Johnson where this might have come from. Senator Baker. Meaning that you were listing the- people who might have had access to this information? TOP SECRET . G10 6 ret Sreewt, 5 F | rawemetan. O ~ HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 44
TOP. SECRET" Me. Helme. £f am sorry, I can't see very well with ay giasses. Mr. Kirbow. He hag Exhibit 6. Mr. Nelms. These names here just at the top where the first line is Morgan, Roselli, Maheu, Garrison, March in Las Vegas. Senator Baker. Yes. Mr.: Helms... At the vary top. Those names conceivably could. have related. to my effort to identify to President Johnson where the leak came from. Underneath I see Morgan, vand Jack Anderson; and in those days Jack Anderson was a principle assistant to Drew Pearson, I believe, and he knew Ed Morgan. That was probably & possibility where the information could come from. But I don't know to this date with any accuracy. Senator Goldwater.. Did you ever chase it down? Mr. Helms. No farther than that, Senator Goldwater. I want to say that, since you have asked the question, that leaks to newspapers have been an albatross around my nech. FOGG F for sc many years and have gotten me obviously by hindsight in’ moré trouble than any other single thing and I don't know of anytime ‘except on one or two occasiona when there was really a pretty accurate research of who had done the leaking, but nothing Was ever done about it. Mr. Schwarz. Canwe go to the summary headed “The Drew TOP SECRET G28 Farw Stree, & EC , WH entiengion, pe WW 50955 DBoold: 32423463 Page 45°
+9 7% @ ehus, a . oe a Be e o% 7 416 Fort Sooo &E . Weumemgien OC FNOO! _ Story’ Bublished Detaile and the Facts as We Know Then. Mr. Helms. Yes sir. Mr. Schwarz. Exhibit 7. Mr. Melma. Right. | Mr. Schwarz. And doaa everybody have that {n front of then? tt is page 118 of the atudy. -The page is on its side. All right, now, would you read the summary and state whether it does in fact accurately reflect the facts as you understood them at that point, or as you understand them now? Mr. Helms. Well, as I look this over I think it is not only simplistic but I don't think it really accurately reflects all of the facts. . l would be hard pressed to tell you in specific inatances where it want wrong, but I noticed this business about hired assassins and lone survivor and so forth. I don't recall anybody having any hard information this was the case. If don't know that anybody ever demonstrated those men ever got to Cuba. And the CIA hatched a plot to knock off Castro. I. think thia is using Drew Pearson's language, if I am not mistaken, because I can’t imagine any Inspectors using language like that. . Me. Schwarz. But the right column is your Inspector ‘s language? | Mr. Holms. That ia right. And 1 think they are doing their best to identify to me in the most simplistic and over- TOP SECRET
SIG 8 cnt Steer, 4 E _ wreehington, OC POO) pach “TOP SECRET. simplified terms what their investigation allegedly showed abou these Drew Pearson allogations. But as I look at the facts ae we know them I think that they, too, are incomplete. Maybe some of the. other witnesses canflesh out some of that for you. But let's, for example, gay Roselli informed Harvey presumably on the basis of information from Verona that a team of three men was inside Cuba. That was never demonstrated . ‘and I can only say that. based on Verona’s track record and Rogelli's track record, those ara not very good witnesses. nt Mr. Schwarz. Let's take tho pills quostion, which is ‘under the heading of unpublished datalle. The unpublished detail, that is the detail which was given to Prasidant Johnson informally, by Mr. Pearson. Ie that your bellef? Mr. feolma. I guess so. I honestly don't know. Mr. Schwarz. The first unpublished detail, pills were sent to Cuba for use in the assassination, and your Inspector General's staff said with respect to. that, summarizing their investigation, true. At least we were told by Roselli that the pills were sent in during Phase I.and again in Phaso 11. Phase 1 was the pro-Day of Pige operation, is that right? Mr. Helms. That is right. ; Mr. Schwarz. And Phase II was the operation that occurred or allegedly occurred while you wore Deputy Director for Plans: ia that right? _Mr. Helis. Yos gir. TOP SECRET
eae SUE TE ig teeth hires i ye HEN Cee ee “HW 50955 TTA Ta oy ead OMe “ 2 > r@ a @ S & a 8 ~ 4 410 Fore Seow AE | Ramingion Me sneg fh Docld: 3242346 Mr. Schwarg. Now, ia it eo that the CIA was told that pilla wer sent in during Phase I1? Mr. Helms. My recollection of this is that there is pretty good evidence that the pilis got as far aa Florida; that the evidence is most unsatisfactory they ever went any further. Mr. Schwarz. Oid you authorize at least their getting to Florida? . . | The purpose of the pills was to kill Castro? _ Mr. Helms. I believe they were Polson pills and Zz don’ t recall necessarily ‘on this day approving them, but: ‘since Harvey alleges to have them and says that he took them to Miami, I must have, I must have authorized them in some fashion Mr. Schwarz. And the ‘study also says that guna were ‘supplied during Phase II for. the purpose of: assassination of Castro? Mr. Helms. Mr. Schwarz, that Phase II with the Roselli and Verona BO far to me ended up. if I may use the vernacular, zilch. I don't believe that any of these things were done. There was never satisfactory evidence adduced that these peoris _wero playing fair.with us. They were taking money and all the rest of it. Nothing over came of it and [ am quite prepared to believe to thin day it was a cock and bull story. The Chairman. But, Mr. Helms, that really avoids the point. Whether they carried through as they represented the. would is quite a -- TOP SECRET 1 aqe “a Fe
Prange (hoes PHF). $44-4008 oe : “~ 3 RAs & Pau “ BIG F oet Strom, OE . Wewmngion 1 C F000) HW 50955 Docld: 39493463 ee ee “TOP SECRET Mr. Helms. I realise that is true.” Chairman Church. You'did and the CIA did engage them _for the purpose of assasasinating Castro, and pille were supplied and guns wore supplied for that purpose. The fact that they failed to do it or may not have carried through is ‘quite a different question. Mr. Helma. I understand. ‘Mr. Schwarg. Let's look at the other item under ‘ anpulieshed detaile. The item ia quotes “There was a meeting at the Department of State at which the assassination of Castro was discussed"-- tha conclusion of your Inspector -General and his taff was truo;"“tha subject was raised at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is unrelated to any full attempts to assassination", then they describe the Lansdale mamo that we have discussed previously. But do you agree with their statement of true and that) it was unrelated, or not? Mr. Helms. I. just don't know anymore. But there is no reason for me to question the documents, and if the documents indicate that this was the case, I am prepared to accept it. I think I ought to make a diatinction between what 1 NO, personally remember and what ia in the documents; but I have no reason to fight the question. . 4 Mr. Schwarz. As of that time, August '62, Mr. Harvey wag under you, he wag on your ataf{? TOP SECRET
Mr. Helmea. He was under my jurisdiction. In other words, he was a part of the Deputy Director for Plans Office. Mr. Schwarz. And he was specially assigned to Cuba? Mr. Helma. He was head of the task force which was tied into the larger Government Operations under Lansdale. Me. Schwarz. You-.knew that he was working with Mr. Roselli, didn't you?” ‘Mr. Helms. Yes air. Mr. Schwart. Now, Exhibit 2, which was previously put before you, is Mr. Harvey's memo to you of August 14, °62, and it is also in all of the Senator's folders. Mr. Helms. Yos sir. ~ 4 Mr. Schwarz. Now, he refers thera to the August 10 WARS & Pave meeting and to the fact that Mr. Lansdale had dasued after ~ 4 that a memorandum which stated that a planning document should be prepared, including in’ the case of CIA plans for the liqui- dation of leaders, is that corract? Mr. Helms. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. Now, as of August ‘62, you were aware, ag you. just teatified, that Mr. Roselli and Mr. Harvey were in touch, and Mr. Roselli had been retained for the purpose of accomplishing assassination, is that right? - Mr. Helms. Well, I am not cavilling with this but I don’: have the record in front of me. I thought by August of ‘62,) BIO 8 st Qoomt OE em mgan TC POO) any. concerted efforts of Roselli had pretty woll died, hadn't - TOP SECRET. HW 50955 ~Docld:
Schwarz. No, Mr. Helma., Am I wrong about this? x: am juse asking for - the facta, Me. Schwarz, The 1967 study demonstrates that Mr. Roselli stayed active, Stayed in the employ of the CIA, until June of *63. nr. Holma, Was he ever == MF. Schwarz. And stayed active at least until December ‘Mr. Holmes. 1 don't mean to argue with you. Was he over din the employ or did he. agrea to work for nothing? } & Perog Mr. Schwarz. 1 think YOU. are quite Fight. He-was ~ associated with you. a @ @ o8 Mr. Smothers . Maybe it would. help if W@ got some faal- ing about what atayed active ia? Mr. Helms. f didnte understand. Mr. Smothers. 1x was Saying just to mr, Schwarz maybe ‘B0Mme tndication of the Perception of stayed active, one POR 8 helpful to you in your recollection of these events. , I am AO so sure we know what you mean by that in terms of Rogol ti® s activities, » Fam mgion 1 ¢ Mr. Schwarz. You want to know those details wea ought to look at the atudy itself. Mr. Smothers. the witness hag indicated no recollection TOP SECRET BIO & ane Stowe, 4 & WW 50955 Docld: 32429463 Page 51
Mr. Holms. I think what I was ‘trying to say, as best I recall this, the Roselli effort petered out and although he stayed associated with Harvey and Harvey was in touch with hin, it was not a very long continued active and I use. the word active dn the sense that. the man was pushing, ‘prodding, hauling in efforts to get something done. It didn't seem to me it. lasted vary long. Tt was pretty quiescent for quite a long time. | | Mr. Schwarz. Would you look at. page 52 a= - Mr. Helms. Yes, giadly. ‘Mr. Schwarz. <= of the etudy,. At .the bottom ef $1 it & indicates, ‘rotorring to the time between September *62 and > 4 a @ e @ 4 € January ‘63 -- it states that in December or. January 62, ‘64, Mr. Roselli made a. payment of $2700, or Payment was made to Mr. Roselli of $2700. Mr. Helms. I am finding the place now. I am sorry, between December and January. Well, then, then it was going” one okay. - That: clarifies it. Something was going | on or alledgedly going « on. Mr. Schwarz. Now, to the heat of your recollection, ae of 1962 meeting of the Special Group that hag been discussed, * . Wer nginn OC oeoa! the August 1962 meeting, in which Mr. Lansdale after asking that plana bu deve loped for liquidation of leadera, did Mr. B10 © at drome: AG Harvey disclose to the membership of the Special Group, or an. TOP SECRET “HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 5? .
1s ‘ member of it, that actual efforts were underway to assassinate. 1 : t . i Castro as opposed to the request to look at that as an option | or plan? - ¢ Mr. Halma. I don't know. I wasn't at the meeting. I was never told that this occurred. I don't know of any paper that supports it. But I am sure maybe Mr. Harvey will remember. Mr. smothers. What was your relationship with Mr. Narvey? pid you solect him? | ; ‘Mr. Holms. 1 think I did. IT think I did. I know that thore was some discussion at the time he was selected of trying to find someone who was a hard-hitting officer to head up this Cuban effort, and I certainly, if 1 didn't, actually was not | the one who first suggented it, I certainly approved the selection. 1 just don't remember anymore. It fa likely thas I might have picked him. 1 just don't remember those details. But it is silly of me to say flatly, yes, I selected llarvey because I just don't remember the exact chain of circumstances. But I coratinly accepted him for the job, which is all your are trying to find out, isn't it? PPO * Mr. Schwarz. Was he working closely with you or was he working more closely with the Director or with Lansdale? Rawmngtan Tf ¢ Mr. Helms. No. Before he got this job in charge of ‘the Cuban task force he had been the head of a staff known,an 1 recall it, Chief of FID, which meant that he was in charge 1B wat Meowee HE of a staff in the Foreign Intelligence Staff insides it, whose TOP SECRET 50955 Docld:32473463 Page 53
mp a4 3 3 cé @ : é @ 8 . Ravi agan © € wos 1G 6 wat Steger 4 7 SECRET 100 percent function was to mount operations against embassies | and inatallations of foreign powers overseas, to acquire codes and ciphers by surreptitious entry. That was the one function this staff had. | Mr. Schwarz, bid you know about the so-called Executive Action or the portion of that assignemtn which alledgedly - related to a capability to kill or assassinate foreign leaders?” Mr. Helms. Woll, in reviewing thia, these papers, I "noticed that thore was something called ZR RIFLE, which established and was referred to as an Executive action capability, which is a pretty fancy title for one man who was to constitute a epability in being, as I underatood it, under ‘Bissell‘s instruction. If you needed somabody to carry out: murder I guess you had a man who might he prepared to carry it out. | Senator Baker. A Presidential hit man? Mr. Helms. Some kind of hit man. Mr. Schwarz. Is that something you are reconstructing - from having read the record? Mr. Helms. No, I remember 2R RIFLE thing. I remember more particularly iy desire to get this whole idea put to rest and sce if we could use that man in some other way usefully. and he was eventually torminated two or three years later. q don't remember hia name. I don't remomber his nationality. 1 don't ramember the details about him at all. But I don't TOP SECRET
te has pean TOP like the whole idea so If finally phased it out. ay °; &® hw 4 @ 4 & BiG F ast Weomee QE . te sememngion GC PReas TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 54
fola usl_ . e Raed & Chu ~ . 410 F one Steet, SF , Havmgion, OC SOOO! HW 50959 Docld: 3242 E Senator Baker. Could I ask a question, just briefly? Do I understand from the tenor of these remarks that ZRRIFLE really wasn't a big thing in the agency, in your view, and you never thought much of it? Mr. Helms. No. “Aa a-matter of fact, it was a tiny little thing and I noticed, ‘Sonator Baker, in one of the pages here that Mr. Har- vey said that he got this involved in his mind with gome of tha things he was trying to do on “Cuba. I havo no recollection of that whatever. | ‘Senator Baker. Mr. Bissell indicated we ought to make a clear distinction hetwoon the goncral effort to “oliminate Castro or dispose of Castro," and the ZRRIFLE effort at assassination of Castro. ‘Mr. Nelms. In most minds those lines never crossed. } / Senator Baker. Sir? “Mr.Helms. In my mind those lines never crossed. This man was the ZRRIFLE fellow, I believe, was in Europe. “Senator Baker. Thank you. _ Mr. Schwarz. Maybe this is confusing and you could | ‘clear it up. On page 38 of the study it states, after describing executive action -- it states the following -- “Tho ‘Project named Z2RRIFLE firat appears in the files in May ‘61, although the first recorded approval de dated February 1962. The new TOP SECRET
HW 50955 wy ad. 3 a a @ cg. a. 8 oe 810 6 ret Seemer, 4 , Wmmengion OC Sonat Docld: 32423463 “TOP ‘SECRET DDP (Helms) on that date authorized flarvey by memorandum to handle the project on a special basis. Accounting for expendi~ tures was to be by general category and on Harvey certification. The initial approval was for 14,700, consisting of 7200 for Q. J. Winn's annual salary and 75 for operational expenses” Then, it describes ZRRIFLE as ostensibly to develop capability for entering gafes and for kidnapping couriers, that de was aoparate from the operation against Castro until \ November. 15, ‘61, and that on that date Harvey discussed with ‘Bissoll application of the CRRIFLE program to Cubs. Now, first, did you, as it says here, authorize Harvey to handle the ZRRIFLE project: on a apecial basia? Mr. llelms. I guess Imust have. But may I explain what I think undoubtedly was involved? In the clandestine services wo had a very careful bookkeeping system that. all monies had to be allocated againat specific projects ‘and by proper authority because, as you Senators will remember, that when: the Agency was set up under the National Securfty Act of 1947, and then later Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, there were authorities given: to the Director of Central Intelligence for use of unvouchercd funds and certification to tho use of those funds had to come from the Director by law. And so every Director aga far aga I know, certainly with Mr. McCone and with mo, we had a very care~ ful bookkeeping and auditing aystom inaide the Agency to be. TOP SECRET Page
gure when the year wag over wa knew where almost avery ‘single dollar literally had gone during the year, so when we signed the certification this had been used for proper purposes we had some reason to believe it had been used for proper pur- poses. So, you could have a project of a man getting a salary. . unless somebody authorized the establishment of the piece of paper which gave the salary and gave the circumstances and F Ts) forth and signed off on it. | | Normally in most projects there was a clearance procedure but with a sensitive project, and this would have been a sensitive project, there was an exception made to the general ® ruls go that a specific officer could siqn off on tho use of the money. rs € & te a ce 3 "Have Imade that clear? J want to be sure I have. gure Ihave. . a4 Mr. Schwarz. Did you understand ZRRIFLE as having one. or two purposes? | Mr. Helms. I don't. recall any more, Mr. Schwarz. Did you understand that it had as one of its purposes a capability to assassinate foreign leaders? | Mi. eins. Well, I think that Harvey would have played fair with me and said this wags something Bissell asked me to setup and we have got it here and here is this man and go forth. 816 8 ast Steeet, SEL Rehman, OC POS Yor, I don't think there was any doubt about it, but “TOP SECRET H¥ 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 56
there ia a great deal of difference between establishing a @ § 2 capability and ueing Ate 3 a 3 Senator Baker. On that point, though, was it also in the : 4 H contemplation of the parties, as we lawyers are fond of saying. 4 5 \ that ZRRIFLE had @ capability for the assassination of Cas- é tro? | | - Was that discussed? @ Mr. Holms, Never that I heard of, Senator Baker, 48 beat I, recall those circumstances. 7 9 © 10 | - In other words; you geo, there is e passage in here which a 4) 4 gays that thase two Lines cross. qnie finds no place in my 4 t 12 i recollection. : Senator paker. Thank you. nn wate & PAWL 16 Senator Schwaiker. Tho point « on thephysical lines of c _ ih authority you. just desciibed, to pay people under your . a ao ic vouchered system, then vould the CIA issue checks to these . ok ~ sel ‘people or was it done by cash as a rule, oF how did that ' 4 wel youcher follow-up occur under physical control? . Wy. Mr. Helms. We did it variously. Sometimes actual a t vo Hg ash was passed to a sensitive agent. L ‘ 2) For example, you might pay him in Indian rupees, then the . i pp man who passed the money would sign in the office a certifi- | ‘ gi cation under the cryptonym of this operation saying on auch and vA ; such a day he passed xX Indian rupees to agent so-and-so. 2 25 Ff Senator Schweiker. Who would give him the cash? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:324273463 Page 59
‘TOP SECRET Who would dispense that caeh? Mr. Helms. In cach station overseas there was either a finance officer whose full time job was finance, ig it was a large station, or another officer who had a part- time job of keeping the accounts for that atation. So, whon the: auditors want around there was also- somebody who could present to them the books for. that station. of exactly how much money had been expended in the previous month, and wo wore onormously scrupulous about this thing. I think you wild find if you get the auditors from the Agency down you willl find a very good job was done on the protection of tho funds of the United States. oe Pe ee? Sonator Schweiker. Thank you. The Chairman. All right, Mr. Schwarz. “nand « Mr. Schwarz. Would you return again to exhibit 75 two-column thing? “Mr. Helms. Exhibit 7? Mr. Schwarz. The ewo-colunn thing -- Drew Pearson the top. Mr. Helms. 0 Okaye “right. Mr. Schwarz. Now, “you have; already talked about. the first entry which says the CIA had a plot to knock off Castro. Let's talk about the second ontry. the published details are Robert Kennedy had approved an asuassination plot in the right-hand column, Your staff states not truce. He was briefed TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 3274273469 Page 60
Sct tlie Y ductor ae < Bet © eee Made 2 Ml é i i i cee De ae ee EIN ones a SAY eon HW 50955 Raed @ Pause Peony - Rarhengtan DF AIO 6 wet Kteeet, 4 F “TOP "SECRET on gambling Syndicate phase one after it was over. He was not briefed on phase 2,° Waa that correct? Is that correct, as you understand it? Mr. Helms. 1 don't know of my knowledge that Robert Kennedy was ever asked to specifically approve an assassina- tion plot. That he was briefod on gambling syndicate phase onc ia certainly ‘true, and the record shows that. I don’t recall about phaso 2. I don't recall briefing hin myself on it. Whether anybody Glee may havo briefed him or _Mot I don't know. But out of my resources and my recollec- tion I don't recall his having been briefad on it. Mr. smothers, Would it be necessary for him to be ‘briefed on phase 2? Mr.Helms, 1 would have thought not, sir. I think I would. probably have 4 more ‘apecific recollec- tion {f I had gone and done it. Mr. Smothers. Are you saying then that he was suffi- ciently involved in the activities and intentions of . Special Group: Augmented that he would have known about phase- 2? Mr. Helma. Not necessarily, He might have. He might not have. But I think that Harvey kept Phase 2 pretty much \ in his back pocket. Mr. Smothers. on Phase 1, thon, with respect to what you believe would have been the state of the Attorney General'a knowledge, would he have known about the assassination plot, TOP SECRET Docld: 32473463 Page 61—
would this approval have taken place with his concurrence? Mr. Helms. I don'tknow, sir. The phase 1 business is something I had almost -nothing to do with and got into rather late in the game and my perceptions would be of no assistance to you, I don't think. | | The Chairman, These questions, are important to the Committee because the documents suggest and the testimony, if. you correctly ‘remember it, seams to: suggest se that. when Mee a Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, was informed about phase 1, it was done in the past tonse == the -Gocuments. bear that out <= and phase 1 had in fact been terminated. So, well, the. briefing related to that phase of. the ¥ BABE & FAL, ‘operation which has been terminated? 9 Mr. Helms. That is right. ~ + The Chairman. We don't know whether Robert Kennedy was ever advised of the so-called phase 2 part? Mr. Helms. No, sir, I don’t, And I must say that the presumption based on the papers I have seen within the last two or three days, would indicate that. he.was not, but I F008 3 don't know this for. sure. “Senator Goldwater. I am wondering out loud doos it make any difference? The Chairman. Well -- Senator Goldwater. I think thore is a Lot to this S10 f ort Steet, SE. Hrentengion, 1 business of I don't care whether Robert Kennedy ordered it TOP SECRET es res HW 50955 bBoctld: 32423463 Page 62
HW 450945 “4 x 3 3 é @ Cy 8 & e 8 - ‘ O50 F our Rooert AE , Ravkmgan OC POOH? Docld: 32423463 or Bill Rogers ordered it or knew about it, it ia done and gona, and we know I think quite a bit about the total operation. But 1 don't think it is fair to try to assign by this line of of questioning blame.. The Chairman. That isn't the purpose of the questioning, a don* t think, Senator. It is to determine how these things worked, what the line of authority may have been, and Mf te is true that assacsination plots can-be carried out without the specific. knowledga of the highest people in the govern- ment, this Committee ought to know that and we ought to considor whethor that is tolerable. That is the reason for the questioning. Mr. Schwarz. Could: we pursue -- Senator Baker. Before you do 1 think both Senator Goldwater and you -are correct -in a@ way but I think we need to refine that point a little more because I think it will be helpful in our further evaluation of this witness’ testimony and our general undertaking. | It may be that the facts will not yield up the conclu- sion on whether the President or the Attorney General at any point in time knew of those’ undertakings. It may be that | the most we can do is indulge in conjecture or surmise. We have ‘three alternative possibilities, it seoms to mo, that are relevant to the inquiry of this committee, and the problema that wo will make. TOP SECRET Page 63
OREM RT "TOP SECRET One, the President did know and was preserved in deniability and it cannot be established. I doubt that we reach that concluaion. Two. That we are not sure but that the force of circumstances, operating procedures, intuition, but better still expert testimony from those who were in the committee _ probably knew, it is unlikely someone would have acted without authority or, threo, that the CIA was acting on its cen in an irresponsible way in matters of extraordinary importance. The Chairman. Yes. Senator Baker. To the extent that we focus on ? two or three it is important. To the extent we focus on one 2) and try to strain desperately to find out Robert Kennedy or 3 5 @ a e ce @ 8 John F. Kennedy knew or didn’t know is not important, but I do ~ rf think. it is terribly important to ask Mr. Helms, and with. your permission I am going to ask him right now, whether or not in any situation that he knows of in conjunction, with any “assassination efforts against Fidel Castro, whether ornot he or anyone he knows of in the CIA acted in a way that he '-would conceive as being beyond thoir authority and beyond the instructions they received from some authority? N Mr. Helms. Sir, I believe to this day that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, that thoy were what we had been asked 810 Fase Steet, ST . Moveongian, OC S00} to do. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 64
aN a eRy Gar In other words, we had been askad to get rid of Castro, and as 7 said a little earlier, there were no limitations put on the moniea, and we folt wea were acting well within the guidalines that wa understood to be in play at this parti- cular time. Senator Baker. ‘Then in view of that answer. it seems te me that the further inquiry of this committee, of the . furthor ‘deliberation of this committee at this point ought to be whether or not we ought to at thie time even p lines of communication between the ultimate civil author- ity of the U.S. and the intelligence community so there is oe e an expressed and provable line of authority or whathor it functions adequately in its present format. a a ? -@ & @ @ & « 8. Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr. Chairman,I am sorry. ~ I was taking a deposition. Mr. Helms. Good morning, Senator Hart. Senator Hart of Michigan. You tell us that it is your impression that nothing done with respect to Castro by the Agency was done without authority. | Do I understand that correctly? gar 14 SOO) Mr. Helms. It was done within the guidelines of " - appropriate authority. In other words, we folt that we were operating aa we were supposed to operate, that. these things if not specifically authorized at least wore authorized in B16 F wrt Steet, RE, Prepares general terms. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 65
By te ‘TOP SECRET" Senator Hart of Michigan. | I am uneasy with that and not at all critical either. Does it moan that you understood that the highest authoritioa of government were anxious that the Castro governmont fall and that in somo fashion Castro go away? Mr. Helms. Senator Mart. Zz. think] you put At. very well. Senator Hart of Miehigan.All right. Now, do you ansumo. from that, ‘that being the general authority, that there was nothing you had .to check back with, | like the sinking of a Soviet ship in Navana harbor, or napalm- ing the island or assaasinating Castro? Me. Helma,. Sir, before you came in I was explaining the interrelationship between the operational officials BAe &® FRE and the Special Group and our efforts to find out af that wan gatisfactory to run a raid against a4 rofinery or whatovor the case might be. In other words, there was -a great deal of interplay | here for permission, reports on success, reports on failure, ‘and 80 forth. | : ‘ | The Chairman, That is what makes) {t 80 puzzling, if I may, Senator Hart, because you say there was a great deal «* interplay with respect to cortain projacts Like the attempt against a copper mine or something of that kind. But there appears to have none, no interplay atvall we can tia down BIO Fert Steet, &E , Wavtengion, OC SOO): ) with respect to the most sensitive project of all, the TOP SECRET WW 50955 Doclad:32429463 Page 66
be J “, 3 3 a & @ S a a a “a “a 25 8 tt teow TE , aegias, OC Soon Ts nla Sesh ce ee sear “TOP preteers assassination of the Cuban leader. You say with respect to that that you weren't told not to do it and you weren't told in so many words to do it, but you understood that that was within the Porameters of the gencr- al policy? Mr. Helms. Yes. The Chairman. Now, it is quite hard for me to under- atand how you go back and check constantly with the Special Group on ordinary sabotage operations but you have apparently no such communication with the Special Group on an assagssination plan against the Cuban toader. Can you explain that? Mr. ifelma. I understand your puzzloment and I don't know whether I can satisfactorily put the matter to rest in your mind. I will do my best. The item that seems to loom large in this I.G. raport is the use of John Reaelli in-phase 2. As I testified earlier this morning, as bost I can recall the circumstances at the time, I did not have much hopo for what Roselli might be able to do hut I was prepared to have llarvey work with him to see if there woro lines that the underworld had into Cuba. Now, I! roalized that oven in retrospect the polaoned pills look very bad and I must say that they don't look very good to me today of 1 look at thom. fut Tf have to say TOP SECRET
“ ~ a ‘ RhRS & Faw, BUG Cent Stree, SE. Penh egtion, Oc Soar 15 V6 wb it yy omy Sheys eat HN < wes : \ ‘TOP'SECRET e in all fairness “and honesty that in the perceptions of the tim people were losing their lives in raids, a jot of people had lost their livas at the Bay of Piga, agents were being arrested laft and right and put before tha wall and shot, and that, therefore, this operation of Roselli‘s with the pills would scem to me to be a very feeble operation under the beat of circumstances and indeed turned out to be one. Frankly, at the time it didn't loom large and that is not beacause I don't have any moral Judgment or bacause I am & cynical know-nothing, it was simplybecause in the perceptions of the time and the things we ware trying to do thie was one human life against many other human Lives that wore being lost. The Chairman. Rven in the perception ef the times. when you engaged elements of the Mafia to perform and operation for the CIA, that if it had worked out as hoped would have resulted in the assassination of Castro, then you tell us that you didn't bring it to the attention of Mr. neCone because you didn’t think that it was that. important. and that he had any particular need to know about it. That strikes mo a8 being very strange. 1 should think that if there waa one thing that the Director of-the CIA did have need to know would bo a cennection with the Mafia. Well, air occ Mr. Helms. The Chairman. As you know == TOP SECRET
‘ Ne SETBACK gang QUE OUTED. nak Se SCRA, TT: TG Rea Fs bia TENS My facet Ged Brae EN © Ve s mor) i : a “PRE bag EP OE ES + anes SUMMERS Nand “hae 1s RON ep ER TOP. SECRET . 68 Mr. Helma, Mr. Chairman, let me gay that there had already been ona connection with it which unfortunately 2 | eay that you say this ia ali strange. I agres it sounds strange and I regret it and f think that at a different time and under different circumstances I would have wanted no relationship with the Mafia, but ag I say, we were struggling very hard in those days to find anybody that had any connec~ tions into Cuba and thie was just one that I just didn’t feel I could say 100 percent no to until it demonstrated there was no euch connections. They never developed, they never turned into anything. The whole thing wont down the rat hole. But I must say that my ‘in the hindsight of 1975, and even at that tima, I regret “ é > 4 & e . a < & it very much. That is all. But I can't give any other explanation than the one I have given you. It fa the only one I have got. Senator Mathias. When Mr. Bissell was here I think 1 asked him whether the job of communicating with superior authority was one of protecting superior authority, and specifically the President, protecting him from knowledge anit at the same time informing him, which igs a difficult and delicate jeb, and he agreed that that was really the diff i- culty. , “And you this morning have waid that in adviainy a 816 Font teat SE _ Paermumgian ME $OO6F President or very high authority of any particular delicate TOP SECRET
eHOMAS mai fle nash BAO ® bauy B10 tant Strom NE, Mr aringtoon T26 2OOD) Bait” é Pa eadtga i NS TY 65, oy See NT ee gine : 4 ‘TOP SECRET gubject, that resort was had to you euphemian. Mr. Helms. Yes air. Senator Mathias. Now, what emerges, and I want to satiafy if my perception of this is right what emerges is laadership within the Agency of men who knew each other very well, who could communicate virtually without words. is that. correct? | Mr. Helms.» That is correct. Senator Mathias. And to take & case in point, Hr. Biesell and Mr. Alien Dulles, as an example, was it generally _considerad that Mr. Bissell was Mr. Duilea’ heir apparent in the period ‘60-617 Mr. Helms. That is an interesting queation. f hadn't thought about that for 4 long tima but I wouldn't be surprised if you are correct. 1 think there was soma talk about that. Senator Mathias. Perhaps what is more important, did Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell consider they had that relationship? Mr. Helme. I think thoy did. Senator Mathias. And living in that kind of @ frelation- ship to éach other. did they have a sort of confidential relationship in which thoy could share things almost without words? . Mr. Helms. 1 wouldn't be surprised. GSonater Mathias. And was it in fact probably the way that they communicated on subjects puch as the one the Chairiran TOP SECRET
“ % -? a ee Raed & PRU ty AYO Fant Breet AE, am natan, Ao Fetes? has raised, the question of an assassination, potential in general and apecific assasaination attempt on Castro? Mr. Helms. I think that Allen Dulles did know about that Mafia thing. If think his Deputy Cabell knew about ite COO, didn't he? I think so. Senator Mathias. Obviously this is not the kind of subject that urbane and civilized man would particularly want to dwald Ons and Xe) they spoke about it as little as possible? Mr. Helms. That is ceratinly true. 1 don’t think that even in the perceptions of. the times with all the preasures and so forth that the moral draware of tho people involvad were dropped. I think we ware just trying to qet on with a very toubh job and there were certain aspects of it wa didn’t like at all, but I realize that the Chairman's problem hara about this matter is a real one and I wish that % could come up with something more specific about. actually recalled conversations, but I don't remember them. On the ether hand, you see, I don't hve any recollection either that I was heing delinquent here. I was inflagrante delicto,or whatever it 4s. I thought 1 was getting on with the job and may It say that -- Senator Mathias. If I can proceed with a couple more x ‘pointa. This sort of doctrina of plausible denial which was perceivad to he, and f assume is still perceived to be the operational doctrine in the Agency to protect Presidents, we TOP SECRET
AIO 8 ext Lteoee 81, Prpen-mgtan, Pk Pred) ra *Prte 3} tt igs naar est a? W ia ree Tree He q ge Bas eG ay “TOF "SECRET * have explored how Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles might have communicated without words. How about how, to your knowledge, | did Mr. Dulles communicate in these serious matters with President Eisenhower? Mr. Helms. £ think that probably Mr. Dulles dealt with these mattere the way I subsequently did when I became Director and dealt with them, which was to discuas with the President aomething you felt you couldn't discuss with anybody also, yy then discuss with his immediate assistants thoae things which seemed to be proper for them to help you out with, go to the. Secretary of State when you needad him, go to the Secretary of Defense whan you needed him, and Mr. Dulles did qo to Andy Goodpastear when he could be of halp, or Gordon Gray when you thought he was one who would be of assistance. And my recol- lection of Mr. Dulles is that being the astute gentleman he was 1 think he kept hia lines clear 411 over town ; As best [ recall {4t, I think there was a time when he didn't have these lines so clear with some Senators about some missiles, but ether than that f think hekept his lines pretty clear. Senator Mathias. Do you think he had the capacity to communicate directly with President Eisenhower on anything he felt the President had to know?) He. ilolmsa. No question about it. Senator Mathias. ifow about the Kennedy brothers? Mr. ilelma. Well, I think that Mr. Dublas had «~< well, TOP SECRET
a eecedsseeksatdckebchaaeetietelincaeecttl. Sietatpeenistirteeuaestet ? “y Fd a a * @ ae H a B1Q 8 ont Ateeet, NE, Pepe mnetcon, CFC PROD? “TOP SECRET I think Directors have always had access to the President if they want to inaist on it. I think there has grown up a little bit of an impression that this is not the case, but each Director has to dacide how ha ia going to work for the Prasident and the President obviously is the first one to decide how he fa going to do it. Then you get into a course of @ealing and X think every person that works in the Executive Branch becomes aware of the enormous burden on a President’s time, so you don't take things to him that you really don’t think you have just got to take to him, but Mr. McCone, I don't know how much he saw President Kennedy, but 1 think he gaWw @ good doal of tha Attorney General both professionally and secially. Senator Mathias. Maybe it is even more {important to explore how President Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy would want to express themselves in these dalicate areas. To your knowledge, did they have any inhibitions in talking to either Mr. Dulles or Mr. McCone? Mr. Helms. Not that I ever heard of. In fact, © used to go to the Attorney General with apacific intelligence problems on which I needed asuistance. I used to deal with. him directly. He was very accessible. Senator Mathias. And direct? Mr. Helms. And very diroct. Sunator Mathias. You didn't need to use your euphemisms? - TOP SECRET
Aipls Bae sea CRAM abe bier TOP SECRET. Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, Ray I go off the record for just one second? Chairman Church. -Sureiy. -Mt. Helms. Thies has nothing to do with your inguiry. (Discussion off the record) Senator Mathias. You have already described to somo extent how you dealt personally with President Johnson. Was thore evar: any doubt in your mind that you weren't getting through to President Johnson or that he wasn't gatting through to you in a clear way? Kr. Holme. No sir. In the firat faw months that f was Director I had a,bit of @ problem as to how I was going to communicate with Prosident Johnson, but aa a regult of some circumstances surrounding the June War of 1967 1 began to see him quite regularly because I became a mambo r of what was known as the Tuesday Luncheon Group and when I did not see him there, which was a small group where one had opportunity if necessary to speak to him privately, I saw him frequently in National Security Council imeetings and also moetings having to do with the Middle Fast, with Vietnam, and things of that kind. -So that I heard, I think 1 was quite familiar with \ President Johnson's views, in answer to your queation. Senator Mathias. And he with youra? Mr. Helms. Yes sir, I believe so. Senator Mathias. ilow ahout President Nixon? TOP SECRET QED fans Sores 4 € + Pawtengran, DE FO)
pane Fak bos ra “TOR: Mr. Helma. My dealinga with President Nixon were not frequent at all. I dealt with him almost entirely through Mr. Kiasinger, who was his Assistant for National Security ee eee en Affairs. I used to’ see President Nixon in the National Security Council meetings but I think the number of private _talka, including having some staff member there during the time that 1 eerved him, could be counted on the fingers of ‘one hand, I doubt it came oven to tha end of the fingera of ona hand. | Senator Mathias. Did you as 4 result of this tack of personal access aver have any question about whether the +s policy you wore executing was in fact Presidential policy? Mr. llelms. I didn't have any doubts about it, Senator 4 . HOnD & Fane Mathias, because Dr. Kissinger and General Haig wera both very articulate fellows and they were able to get these viaws across, and when on two or three rather important occasions Presidert Nixon in National Security Council meatings told me what ne wanted done on certain things in front of the others. that made it very clear, so I never had the feeling that because there was a different relationship with President Nixon 1 didn’t know what he wanted. I felt 1 did know what " . he wanted. Senator Mathias. Did Prosidunts indulge in ouphemians as well as Directors? ALS Carat Greens, AE, Revkengion OC PnGaI In thie connection, historically, you can think of TOP SECRET
& Paves aod BIG Fort Stree SF. atengian, OC POOR! Aone SEAR + OP SECRET Mr. Helms. I don't know. I found in my experience that Presidents used the entire range of the English language from euphemiams on the one extreme to cory explicit talk on the other. | Senator Mathias. Lot me draw an axample from nistory. When Thomas A Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, 48 Castro, the king said who will rid m0 of this man. He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that. Does that kind of -- Mr. Helms. That is a warming reference to the problom. Senator Mathias. You feel that spans the generations and the canturics? Mr. Helms. 1 think it does, sir. Senator Mathias. And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the Director or by anyhody else 46 Presidential authorization to go forward? . Mr. Helms. That ia right. But in answer to that, 1 realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time anc I think that any of us would have found it vary difficult to discuas assassinations with 4 President of the .United Statas. | I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the Oval Office. Senator Mathias. And yet at the same time you felt that somo spark had been tranamitted, that that was within the TOP SECRET
eoOE a! Saba ol Sieh LiL Oe ERIE RIT BUR 4 7 BID Foes Aten. & FL enengtan 1 C Seo ase Pie Ty RL De hy “a 7 LM thes cere "TOP SECRET the permissible limits? Mr. Helma. Yea; and if he had disappeared from the sceno they would not have been unhappy. Senator Baker. Do you think that is good practice or bad practice? Senator Goldwater. it da the only practice. Mr. Helms. Senator Baker, that is an awfully hard queation to anawer. Senator Baker... Ian't that what we are up against? Mr. ilelma. f think it ie what you are up against and f think in a Christian country like the United States of America — which is a Democracy, and Ao forth, thia queation of kibbina people ia-a prime moral issuc. The Chairman. That indeed is the ultimate question. The techniques aro secondary. Mr. Helma. A prime moral issua and, therefore, I think that if it comes to be felt Ly this Committee or otherwise ‘that things Like this and perception of the present day should be put on a different plain or handled in a different manner, 1 could find no objection. Senator Mart of Colorado. Mr. Ambassador, sevoral paragraphs hack, prior to Senator Mathias’ queationas, you une! @ torm twist, the term guidelinun. That seema to mu to be a fairly apectfic term. - In the period of ‘61-62 that we aro dealing with here, TOP SECRET
AEG E wae Neomet AE. Bt atngree FT Std * ‘TOP SECRET Z what wre those guidalines and where did they come from. Try to tie this philosophical diacussion down a little more closely? Mr. Helma. Woll, air, I think that, as wa were saying @ bit earlior, and I think, sir, before you came in, the general effort in the aftermath of the Bay ef Pigs and then in the latter part of that -- lat me start again, because you were not here to go through this. . Senator tlart of Colorado. I think 1 have been here all morning. | . Mr. ttolms. Uut this was very early on. Well, anyway, I am sorry. 1 got Senator ilart confused, I am sorry. The general injunction waa to get rid of Castro. Sanator Hiart Of Colorado. That came from the Oval Office of the White House? Mr. Helms. Well, it certainly came to me who was down in the organization from what I would have regarded as constituted athority. In other words, it came down the proper chain, if you want to put it that way, from my Director. to the man above me and to me. Senator Hart of Colorado. Get rid of Castro? - Mr. elms. Yosa air, As I said earlier, thare were no limitations put on tho moans. And tho effort to do that was presided ovar by this Special Group, Special Group Augmented, which 1 explained variior. TOP SECRET
x > *y % % Bard & Pawa. 7 BIG 6 et Srsags AE | Rawmington Of Aamo» ~ “mle AR re ad Hy TOP SECRET Senator Hart of Colorado. Yas, Mr. Helma. And when I used the word guidelines, unfortunately I am not a lawyer and sometimes I get into words that convey different meanings to lawyers than they do to us lay folks. I am just referring to the kind of thing you saw in thia memorandum of General Lansdale's that here we are going to do psychological warfare, political, military, economic and so forth. That was what I was referring to as guidelines. Senator Hart of Colorada,. But you would admit, and oven though I thinkwe have established, the Chairman has established that the purpose of this Committea fa not to find a amoking gun or point a finger at a villain, what wo are after is how these things get started, how they area directad and controlled, and whether, as Sonator Mathias wag pursuing, whether people at the top want to “know specifically what is happening, But the Buck “ocs have to stop somewhere in terms of carrying out what is the explicity purpose of a misaton. Orders to be given, contracts have to be signed, money has to be authorized. Somebody has to do those things. And I think that is what we are all trying to pin down, at this time, under those circumstances, who was doing those things. And I think the counsel may have been touching one point Or another on the $100,000, for oaxample, tothe Mafia contacts. ‘Mr. Helms. $150,000? Which era was this? Mr. Schwarz. That was the amount of money authorized TOP SECRET
for Phase I, Not in fact paid but authorized, Senator Hart of Colorado. This was a time when the Ambassador was occupying? Mr. Schwarz, Second in command to Mr. Blesell. Mr. Helme. 2 know nothing about that Operation ac f don't know how it was funded. This is why 7 wag asking. £ wanted to get straight in my own mind what some of this money Waa, | Senator Hart of Colorado. That is all. Mr. Welme. May I contribute something, Please? The Chairman. Yes, certainly. Mr. Holma. Ags a result of my expertaences through thu yoara, whon I became Nireactor 1 had made up my mind that thia option, if you want to put it that way, of killing foreign leadora, was something that I did not Want to happen on my watch. My reasona for this were these: | There are not only moral reagons but there are siso sore Other rather practical reasons. 1. It ig almoat impoasible in a Democracy to keep anything Like that Becrat. Lf you will examine human behavior you will find that the toughest nut One day six years Later may become just a weakling running for cover, looking for asaintanca somewhere, I think i€ would he almost impossible, if f may put it that way, to keep such a thing secret for any AID Fast Reem FU mango Tm ¢ protractad length of time, Somebody would go to a Conyrossmin, TOP SECRET CS Orgs epee dee ee Hi 50955 Bocld: 32473463 Page 60
TOP SECRET hia Senator, ha might go to a Rewapaper man, whatever the case may be, but it just is not & practical alternative, it seems to me, in our society. Than thers ig another consideration which comes into this. That if you are going to try by thie kind of means to romove a foreign leader, then who is going to take his place funning that country, and are you e8sentially hetter off as 3 Matter of practice when it is over than YOu were before? And ‘ft can give you I think a very aolid axample of thia which happened in Vietnam whon Presidont Diom wag eliminated from the scone. We thon had a revolving door of prine ministers after that for (fuite some Poriod of time, during which the 79 S& Paws Vietnamese Government at a time in ite history when it should havo been atrong wag nothing but a Caratakar government, constantly. fn other words, that wholo exercise turned out to ct & c the disadvantage of the United States. 4, 7 So when one looks &t the scope of thig thing this is why I am contributing the timo. After all there is no Benge in my sitting here with all the experiance I have had and HOt sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. re isn't bocause ZT have. lost my cool, or because 1 have lost my guts, it simply is because { don’t think it isa Viable option in the United Statos Of America those days, , Chairman Church, Doosn’t it also follow, Mr. Hedme -+ to agrea with you what you haven said fully -- but dovan't) it TOP SECRET HW 50955 Doecld: 327429463 Page 61
W94 also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side, that since thase secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do vary grave political Gamage to the United Statas and the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Rugsians involved themselvea in political assassinations, but under their aystem they at least have @ better Prospect of keeping it concealed. Since wa do like a free eoclety and Since these Secreta are going ta come out in due course, the tevelation will then do serious injury to the good naze and reputation of the United States. Would you agree with that? Mr. Helms. Yea, I would. Al0 F ort At0o~t AE Ramngtar aren» TOP SECRET up 3 ey ates HY 30955 Decld: 3274273463 Page 6&2
AS RR Pap arctan Senereheteh ees WP tT Ny TOP SECRE Nr. elma. Yeu, would, NOTES iKee: minh , ste F . ‘ f FF 3 ‘ i J | ft) t Fy 2 The Chairman. And Finally, 4% we Preserve to ourselves the Prerogative to sssassinate foreign leaders, we may invite | cectprocal action from foreiqn governments who assume thet if Hat's Our prerogative to do ao, it te their Prerogative as well, land that is another danger that we at least invite with this kind of action, woulda't you agree to that? He. Nelms. Yes, sir, The Chairman. And in that connection, qoing back to this Same Drew Pearson story on Fxhibie 7? -- “rv. Nelma., Yes, t have it hera. The Chadrman. I call your attention to the item in the 4 yy: one . ~ o % @ 3 1s ‘ te I | middle of the page where Pearson aoserted, “Castro learned : % 14 enough at least to believe the CIA WAS seeking to kill hin. - 1s j Ne is reported to have cooked up 4 counterplot againat . ce or 16 7 President Kennedy,” and then on the facts as the IG report 7 ~ 17 | Summarizes them, wa read, "Thin reportedly has come out in the . 1é Garrisoy investigations. Tt also waa atated by Castilio tn - is the Philippines under direct interroyation. Us have no Lade- 2U Penden® confirmation of ony S6rt.Note that Garrison met with § 2) H Roselli in Los Veqas in March, L967." | 22 Our tustimony to date indicates that Castro did Learn o! : 2s | these a¢susaination attempts. Yow just axactly what he learnec! a e ; 24 ! it not antirsly clear but the fact is that he did learn, ant e 2 25 this of course always raises the suspicion of whether he was TOP SECRET HY 50955 Doecld: 3274239463 Page 63
aR ae yo Bs bus Well, who hag -- Senator Morqan? i Senator Baker. Mr, Chairman, f Cannot belleve, gir, that eo; : i thera couldn't be tome commenatary from the witness on a matter 6 of euch grava géensitivity ae you Just suqgested, 4 6 The Chairman. po you have any comment? ee . Etat 9 Mr. Helms. 1 have no Comment, because If have never had mg a brought to ray attention any convincing evidence that Castro did o. 9 heve @ plot against any of our leadera. had . - 1} Senator faker, Any convincing avidenca? oF iz Mr. Nelms. Well, see here, this mlgh* be called evidence ep! 33 ON this sheet of papar, and if you say evidence, I say any oe , < couvincing avidunce. ct 14 - 15 Senator Baker. Do you have any other nonconvineing ” 16 f evidence? ~ 17 Hr. tielma. No, 16 Senator Baker. But quite apart from the evidence, and! i. Vy think the Comaittes ts without any such evidence, my comment H 20 | Went to motive only. I found it extraordlnary when hr, ‘eCons t 2) f tastifiad that the CIA did Noe supply the Warren Commission wie I 22 information Felating to its own a8sassination attempts against & . * 24 | Castro, which attempts pracesded the assassination of t ws 2 ; 24 Prasidaat Rennady, ° 25 Can you enlighten ua in any vaqard with reapect to TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:327473463 Page 64
aaa se TENET ORR Ne AER Tae Face spay Satori 3 TOP SECRET why -- Mr. Helms. No, sir. The Chairman. -- these disclosures were not made to the Warren Commission? Hr. Helma. If you Want Ma to maka 4 aurnige, Mr. Chairnar., i would be glad to try that, but © have no independent recol- lection of why. . The Chairman. You did not Participate in that declailor? Bre itelma. Wo, My job with Fespect to the Harren . Commission was to answer inquiries from the Commiasion and try to get together the Matetlal that they naaded for thelr inves- tigation and f Spent a qreat deal of time on thin, bue 1 dor.‘t ~ Ferenber the quustion ariaeing ahout our Own operationa and _ % S288 & Cave their effect on these matters. Nut somuhow there lingers -- Tha Chairman. Well,can you tell us why chat lingers, e-:. if you must surmise why the CIA didn't feel obliged to volunteer information of this kind that does run to the question of motive to the Commisaion that wag investigating the asnassirg- tion of the Americar. Prasident >? Mr. Welms. Well, thare was such -~ f€ mean, after all, the Castro governmuret in Cuha and tha Kennady Toveramunt in the United Staten, hed heun at dangers drawn over the Cuber misnite crisin and £4 wags fully publ te faformation tha® ther: “Ae Nay of ae, S2O Crt tro 4 + Hovtmoman OC Peas p awary of that. ite 4 eae is 132473463 Page 65 oH HY 50955 Docld
W&S aware of all the Cireumatances Surrounding the missile Ctiais and ag I Say, I don't know whether he became aware of @ny pleta to get rid of him, but he muse have known that this wae going on nonstop among Cuban axiles and backed by the United States government. Ag I said, his Soviet intelligance advisors were running a pratty good linge into the Cuban exile community 4a Florida and i'm gure they must have known pratty wall whet was @olng on. SO having said that, that contributes to tha tamper of the time, and when the Warren Commission's inventiqation waa going One I had tha impression and there are a jot Of the ataf¢ around who could contirm or Straighten Lt out, that the Warren Commisuion was well aware of afforts to get rel of Castro an! that his wae taken into considwration tn their deliberations, The Chalrinan, Senator Morgan? Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, © have two or Matters, 4r. Melms. Good morning, Senetor Morgan, Sendsor Morgan. Lat mg -- Mt. itelms, you were Seatt tic PONE 8 Materiel touether fur the Warresn Coaminasion, you say, And at that ting you knew of the S88asS3inution ploes Sheath t haat bees against Castro, did you not? + Mantrogt on, ‘ge. Helms. Yon, sir, Senator Norgan. And you didi moe think j¢ important to Yive that to the Warren Commi aa tor? TOP SECRET SED 0 was Gaemoe 4 @ bt: FANT Tae aa HW 50955 Docld:32493463 Page 86
ire BA 7 oe cRer Mr. Helma, Well, Senator Morgan, I wags not the Diractor at that time. . Senator Morgan. Well you were gathering material. Mr. Helms. Yes, sic; I was following about orders and Tequests and { wag asked to get together this material but r Carteinly was not asked to gO and taustify before the Commission, Senator Morgan. But I'm asking you now if you were gathering the material and you had known for about threes years that there were assasaination plots and yet you did not think it important to give thia materiel to the Warren Commission. That da correct, fantt 1¢? 40. te lina, Well, the way you phrate the question, you Bay I dida't think Lt was important, i ai not trying to ferce with you, sir, I am trying to-put the circumstances as f t ; understood them at the time. don't recall that & was A, either inatructad or 1€ occurred to me to cover vith the Warrea Commission the preciss datails of the Aqancy's operetio:.. not because 1 mada a significant judgmant not to do thie, but a8 1 said just a moment aqo, my Facollsction at the time wan that it was public knowledas that the Unitet States was trvia- to Yet risk of Casten, Sgaator Norges. Vell, you know, ‘ir, Ambassador, I don’: Want to arqdus with you, hut this is what fisturbs nme about YOur Sottinvay igs thet you assume, you thought it was public 258 Favs Grenes, 4 + Momongen OC Pep) KiewWledje, Wa never can pin anything down. Aged yer wate no? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32473463 Paye @7
HY 50955 3 > é & @ a & @ & , » Woamrngion 0 ¢ 810 Powe drome, 4 ¢ Doecld: 32473463 Page 36 ‘ «TOP SECRET. es oii: Pah ae ai —_ Tt that time just an employee of the Cra, You were in the top echelon, the Management level, were You not? Mr. Halms. Yan, f Wag, Senats: Morgan, Senator Morgan. And you had bean a Part of the essagsina- tion plots ayainst Castro? Mr. Helas, Well, you know «= Senator Morqan. well this much is true. Ta that true, that part? You were -- in that ‘regard, you participated? Mr. Helma. I was aware that there had been efforts made to get rid of him by these means. Senator Morgan. Ain! you ware Charged with furnishing the Warfral Committees information fram the Cia, dufornatior YOR theught was relevant? ‘ir. Healtas. 10, air. {was instructad to Feaply to inquiries from the Narren Conmission for information from the | Agency. I wags not asked to initiate any particular thing. Senator Morgan. ‘Well what tT understood you to gay %o Give information, Ii; other words, YOU Wuren‘'t asked for is, YOu didn’t giva it? ie. Helms. Thee ts right, air. Senator ‘lorga::. You know also, 48 onw of the leaders of the CIA, that Oswald had calla tha Cuban UMbassy in ttexico shore: bafors the t3SHanSinat ior? He. Nelms. ‘tell, wir, wy provi-tal that information, Senator Norgan. You vurovided that, hut dit you net the: TOP SECRET
, ty think 4¢ wag unecessary for you to come forward with this other information that thers had been assassination plots? Me. Helme. Well, air, I'm Sorry, I didn'e, Senator Morgan. No one followed up on the telephone calls, OF the information that Oswald had contacted the Cuban Embassy beyond the information that waa supplied to you by some other goverment? . Mr. itelme. don’t know gir, anymore, but tf theught at the time Oswald's vieit in Mexico City had heen investigated the maximum extent possible both by the Fri and the CIA, Senator Morgan, “Mr, Helms, this is the thing thet bothers m8. fverybody.neama to think this, or aresume thia. 7 9 Bal & Paua fa there anyons who would know whether or not it tad hean dnvestiuated, beyoad junt -- c € c fy. ilalmn. Yea. I think Mir. Rankin, who was the Chie! ’ ? Counsel of the Warren Commission would know, 7 Senator Morgan. I'm talking about the CIA following up Oo: YUswalid‘'s call. “ug, elms, Well, tt might be possible to find out who was the chief in “exleoo City at that time, and the extant to which Nhe actually did these jobs. 1! think with the deares of Specificity which you raised, and quite proaverly, I think you Would have $0 ust somsone who was actually physically presen? at the tims, and F don't racall anymore who was our Chief of 410 Few ose BE. emenytan, OC pene S Statiouw da Mexico, TOP SECRET HY 50955 Doecld: 3274239463 Page 69
Ser pan TOP SECRET Senator Morgan. Well, Mr, Ambassador, will ntats my Concern and then 7O On to my other two questions, Sf tt concerns me that tha CIA knew | that Oswald had calied | - $s the Cuben Fmba aay and that this information Was furnished to q 5 4h the Warren Commission, but as far ag I heave been able to 6 ascertain from Questioning others, there war no effort Rade . on 9 the part of the CIA or anyone alse to pursue Oswald's @ call - a 4 . 9 | oe lo Certainly he was not going to say anything on the telephone of Le 1} any consequence. Aad then. knowing that, that it the Harren: - - ® rs 12 H Commission Wes never furnished miformat tion about the Castro @:: 32 438a8Biration plot, ft am not One Who Byer 4 budder behind ave , et lé tree a, and 1 have nover Mastioned the Warren Commission’ 8 ‘ ve finding untii this information Comms Out, ant © think s0mehow a? 16 thet we need to pin that down. ~ 17 i You have said three things this mornina that disturb ma, le he You said you understoo! that YOU Ware to qet rid of Castro and . 1% " that was your under standind, f | 2 i Mr. Sfeliag, Yas, sir. _ ' 2} i ‘ ienator Moran. Then you Said there were Bo Minttatlon: 1 ey put wn the meann. | * 2s ; That fsamn to imply to ms thet murter or anseas ination 7 © : 23 f Wan ay accepted Megas “when you said thera were no limitatio..s £ 2s Put on the Means, is that ha way you undarstood it? TOP SECRET oom 30 . 132423463 Page NW. 50955 DocIa,
Mr. Nalms. That La the way I understood it, Sanator Morgan. And that had been in the past been an | accepted practica of qetting rid of anyone unwénted? Me. Healma. Well, £ don't recall, Sir, any comparable effort, at least during my time, te change another qovernment. Certainly there were Changes at times and there were operations i affecting changes, but f don’t recall anything thet was comparable in its offore, | Senator Morgan. hut, sir, it seams to me that there we rey PHO Limitations put on the meann, that you imply that assaasine- tion was an accepted practice. 4c. elma, Wall, Senator Morgan, -f as not @ lawyer. fet Me Fephlage what | was tcyluyg to get across, BARE & Faw I waa not to ths bast of my recollection, ever instructed not £0 do some specific thing with Cuepect to the injunct tor to get rid of Castro. i realize there area a lot of things that would havea been implausible within the range of rational RéNnse, thet one woujr! Hot try, so T didn't mean by phrasing it that Way that f£ woul! droj au atomic bomb or do something silly like that. 1 was simply trying tu qet across tha fact that nobody ever told me that raids and providing guna and putting fn people oO try and Get Frid of the whole operation of Castro wasn't a perfectly legitimate wav. Ia fact, I understand it war.- 41D F ont Serome, hE. Ca satenge mn 2 ¢ Senator Morgan. In fact you underatoud it Wan? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Decld:32423463 Page 91
HY 50955 RSD & Faay , Raho BE prone DIEGO wee dene 4 ¢ ' ase ere . Se bas vowel : P SECRE TO Mr. Nelme. Yea. Senator Morgan, Why did you understand it was? Mr. Halme. itecaume 1 was asked to qet rid of him. Senator Morgan. And <o aet rid of hia, you understood to mean that killing would be an acceptable way? Me. Helms. Yen, gir, Senator Morgan. Welk, let me the it tin, Mr. Chairman, One final question. 1 won't impose on the Committea’s time TOF ws. In light of your previous atatument that this is Christian country and that this Committee has to face up to prima moral issue of whether or not kitline as an acceptah}s wey, 1} believe you said worda “assantially to that effect. in light of tha® statement, and thee that atatement was truc at the tine, don't you think it would have taken affirmative Permissio: or authority to kill rather than just aaying Lt was not sliminsted from the duthority or you wars not restriletet by thet? NAS i8 @ thing that concerns ing avout tha CIA, The thir: thet f wane to know is, is killing a part of the CIA's ermal uctavitien? (fF ie is, then To thie’ the Amsrican vublic TadyY @Want to abolish it. YOU Wafe Carrydiyi out specific vrPhority from Sidhe: WP Shan To tuank to would Pooh at i* in a Yr ferane Light, ar. thdvis. hell, sir, kibline waa nO’ pare Of the CHEATS TOP SECRET Doceld: 324735463 Page 92
RT hs revs + a Ze wag not part of the CIA'g armory. A® @ matter of I don't know of anyhody that wag killed by the cra in the sense that YOu @peak about it, where KOMebody wane out and actually Killed a human being Starting from here to qet to hat individual, } won't say that in some of the limited warg in Southeas¢ Asia people Weren't killed, but in this Castro Gperation, anc 1 fcealize you are Pressing me Very hard, and f “ccept thia, f have testified aa beat 1 could abone the atmosphere of the fin, what Io undseratood was desired, and T don't want to take rafirc, fea mayding that I was diatructed .to Specifically murder Castrs, fhat thin was Yetting rid of Cantroa, if he hal been aotten val Pa 2 @ & @ & & 4 6 rid of by thie Maane that thia woke Haves hoses ACCaeptad of ecCuptabls to ceartaly individualn, Maybe not to fhe country ~ at large, tT don’+ know, Mut 1 wasn't running these thinaa tr those days and f{ Was just doing my best to do what 1 thouahe i W45 supposed to do, Senator Norgan.  Thask YOu, “Meo. Chairman, { Won't ours; at further. Power t “Ns Chairman, Senator Mart? Vester art of Coloradu. Suse O23 "eat ios, — oyu MbUNt observe for the recurd on the fast issue thers Wate LO arena ren th 4 fGur that tayvg Bean Ulscunsygd, Trusakio, Lumusthe, Odean aid Castro. ve’ Nas thras “or four, yo wheather we Gil wt Gursedv..: OF not, thrae of then nat Prather violesat sheaths, > TOP SECRET MEO F oat Aca ut HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 93
Puy Fy f irrresecn piers TOP SkcREr During your watch as either Deputy Director of Plana or Deputy Director of the CIA or as Director of CIA, there ware @ number of troubling political leaders around the world, and I'm going to name Several and in the case of #ech of them, 1 wieh you would consider whether ¥%1, during this tine, in any of those three Capacities you've Participated in, overheard, SPeculated e>out or Participated in goaaip concerning the possible 4ssasaination of any of them, Mr. Sukarno, “ir. Nagser, Nr. UeGaulle, Hr, Allende, Mr. Arafat, Mao Tae-Tung? Mr. Hlelma. I don't recall discussing assassination of any Of thea. Senator Nart of Colorado. or OVerhsarts9 anvone else Giscuasiing the SAvasHi nat fey? ‘ig. jislms. ‘lo, sir, not to ths huat of mY Fecollact lon, ddd nee. whe Chairman. lt looke like We're HOt tolna to Stata MOradad with the quasttoning. Could vou come hack a? o’clock, ‘ir. Helms? “Sr, Nelms. Yes, sir. “he Chairman. Tha* will give US a Chaney °C that somes duuch. funetor Hart, 1 think? - » Werrmen Od Site t Senator Wart of Michigan. 1 TMS" Wanted 9 clear urs, Wy. Wabauseador, an gatlier commant of voura, to Ran te .ty NeCone amt Phases I] and Natvey. TOP SECRET 1G Fw Steuer 4 7 HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 94
OP SECRET Now, my notes have if. you aaid that you did not tell McCone about Phase II beacause you really were letting Harvey go off on a mianton that didn't have any proapaect of success. Mr. Helms. Well, Sanator llart, May I just reline that 4 hittle bit? . 1 honeatly didn't recall that Mr. McCone was not informed and when I was told tha there was avidence that he wasn't informad, I was trying to scratch my head aa to why I didn't tell him at the time and my aurminas are the beat f can cons up with. Tam raally aucprined 1 did not discuss it with him at the time. Ny relations with him wore Hood, ant so my surinener afe purt thy baat f'n able *a do in 1975 over an vpisode that. took place that many years aac. (Senator Nakur. Mr. Chairman, woul'l ths Sanator yvlelid: PAR & Cae ta it your imprasgion that you dtd tabi him? ‘tr. elms. Yo, it isn't my impression that | told hit, least | don’t have any impraxsion, unfortunately. Thia is blank. . venator Hater. “So akeal, Seuator Hart of Yichiqan, “here is a note in the Lspector Guner.t's tile thare, tate VW, thet “Narvey adel .. cate (when Nhe briefel aims on Yoselii he obtaing! ‘lalas' approval mm pu Hot to brief the Director.” Do you fast thst? e's «sh the vere Hotton, ‘tr. Nalims, Yas, Sir, thst is the santence to which ! TOP SECRET AED & st Stowe 4 T HW 50955 Decld:32423463 Page 95
HW 50955 S o% 7 RAPD ® Carry “a” 210 9 ret Geom AT | Sr geengnan, 1 ¢ Regt Docld: 32423463 Ter nm cemee manana 4 os tad st hte tte ae AS Nabe eth te gs on Falarrad., Senator llart of Michigan. What ig your present memory of this sweasion? Mr. ttelms. That's what I meant. Senator iNart of Michiaan. All right. you've explained What motive would Narvay have had, to YOur gurmise, to stata as he hag? . ‘ir. Helma. Asking ma to do ft and to get my agreement, you mean? Senator Hart of Michigan. That YOu a%reel that Director not being informed. ‘ir. Halms, fn other words, what Wat hia motive for azhk4a;. that? tf don't recall that. T believe he's qotnea to teati fy before this Committas, ian't he. tn which evant maybe he reca: or has soms noses from the time. I'm sorry, sir, f don't FeManber what hia notive was. he Chairman. Hut you have no reason t2 *hink that if igiin fact his testimony thee it was ac¢ “92 cate? Mr. Husgtias. Podun't think it wan, Senator. f think (must have Nei something to do with, YOU Know, the sondditiona the tines or something, ¢ Senator tlart of Sichigan. Nall, mv point <- thig iaia heer tate, tae ge You thosehe you tad authority to qo frees ‘Sebi te braahkant te tarma of Getting crits Casters, what Wan TOP SECRET Wa etic heres Page 96 fee yave aes
Hy 50955 i ‘ @ > a mY ¢ ay « £ TT a Fae gtr 1 6 42O 9 ort Aree Re Docld: 32423463 Page f sty at gt? SY pnpar’ a an TOP SECRET the concern about keeping HMcCone in the dark? Mr. flelmgs. If think -- Sunator Hart, f think Harvey will be able to clear thie up batter than f, bue 7 think that fe Probably would have had to do with the fact that [t was a Mafia connection and Mr. MeCone was Yelatively new to the Otganization and this waa, you know, not 4 very savory effort. And 4¢ waan'’t <= 7 mean, Ioam not feekingd refuge and Bayday thie this was @ good idea. As I said a moment 4q0, 1 very much reyret: the whole axerciaga, Senator Schwelker. Mr, Chairman, P'il watt until we ee back. The Chairman. AL) righ, We'll adjourn until 2:00 of clock thi+t afternoon, (thereupon, At 12:48 o'clock P-M., tha Committea Tecenan ! to Teconvens at 2:09 o'clock Pom. She sama day.) HER ED: oT
HY 50955 Fa 2 . & * @ @ 4 a & ae 2 He » POM ong uv SEG Font Gacenr at * soe TOP SECRE AFTERNOON SESSION aera emene A ON wiv & ah oN (2198 p.m.) Senator Hart of Michiqan. The Committee will be in order. I believe that Mr. Schwarz may have queations, Did any member of tha Committees care to direct any Questions | to the Ambassador at this time? Senator Baker. A little later. Senator Hart of Michiqan. Mr, Schwars? TESTIMONY OF RICHARD HELMS = Reaumed Mr. Schwarz. Mr, Ambanaador, f would like to see i?! we i could set all in one place the teat imony concerning “rw NeCone. Now, 49 ! heard the testimony thia morning, you had four explanations for why you might not have briefed Mr. HeCone about the efforts to assassinate Mr. Cantro. tat 's ape tf tte could discuss gach ona of them in turn. Can we ado that? Mr. Halms, Surely. Mr. Schwarz. <All right, { think your first explanation, your first testimony on ie Was that the matter was only exploratory, or that 10 wasn't Clear that anything wag actually cooing to happen. Mr. Helms. J believe that. Yes, that certainly ta pare " of it. Mr. Schwarz. Now, if You would look at the atudy on vace Holme, Yoo, I'm at Pade 449, TOP SECRET Docld: 32473463 Page 98
HY 50955 Bayo @ Pau OO & Hea nro, yy 21D 6 wae Reem ag an . raat ‘ oo Pr ' TOP SECRET Mr. Schware, Now, that 1a a long section that comes Under the heading, April, 1962, That heading ig on Page 41, i Just 80 we're sure what time we're talking, ; Mr. Helma. Yes. Mr. Schwarr, Page 41, April '632, Mr. Helma, Yas, Me. Schware, Cxay. Now apparently in April 1962 some Poleoned piiis Were given Cuban exile leader through Mr, Roselli. fg that rignhe? Mr. Helms. I don't know that ‘fron my OWN resources. It 44 ' atieded. I don't know wheather thay were or not, Mr. Schwarz, Well, the ftudy showa thar to have happened, Mr. Helms. The Rtudy shows this, Mr. Schwarz. And a? ‘he game time the study shows thae i Fifles were aiven to a Cuban exile, right? “xr. Helme, Yes, Mr. Schwarz. Now, assuming those face, to be true, at the Polnt that poisoned pills had bean handed to a Person, it wag. BO longer so that the Matter was only exploratory, was ie? Mr. Helma,. No, © think that one could Say that Fomething, yOu know, was being put in train there. Mr. Schware, Looking at paug 593, the Study indflecates that Mr. Harvey was told that the pills were actually in Cuba, at the hottom of Pate 59, and indesd had dean taken into the Festaurant regularly uned by Mr. Castro, Is that so? Tha very TOP SECRET Decld:324273463 Page 99 FS eee
SEU ay eet part Py ? -4 4a @ HN a 8 ¥ . Barong Tt ALC t ent Veet 4 € HY 50955 Docld:324233463 Page 108 bottom of page 56. Mr. Helms. Of page $9? Mr. Schware. Yes. The last sentence On page 50. Mayhe if you read it into the record -- Mr. Helms. Yea, I see. “Roselli reported that the pilis wete in Cuba and at the restaurant reportedly used Fequlariy by Castro.® ¥a only have Rosalli‘s word for that, I would Like to Point out. Mr. Schwarz. Yes, but it was given to Mr. Harvey, right? Mr. Nelms. 4 beg ret pardon? Mr. Schwarz. [¢ waa ravportedly given to “re. Harvey. Mr. Helma. Rogwlli said. Mr. Schwarz. The word was given to Mr, Harvey. Mr. Heims. Yes. Mr. Schwarz, And Mr. tlarvey atated that he reqularly Fuported to you on the Cuba matter and tndeed you would have expected him to report to you, wouldn't you? Mr. Nelms. That's rinht. “rp. Sewharz. Now aqain, assuming that he did report to you,:' it certainly wan no londer a matter that wan exploratory, wae it? Me. Helma. (Nous bis the affirmative.) “gy. Schwarsz. Now, accordédng to your hast recollection, at thet point did you brief Mr. “4cCone? TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET $6 Mr. Helas. I Gs mot cecall havieg dane go and I don't Fecal] why 1 did not. Mr. Schwarz. Orxay. ; A second point that you mate asout ent briefing Mr. “cCons -- and thia was towards the ead =f your testimony in the morning -- was that the effort involved tthe Meafle. Mr. Helms. Theat was @ miceise now that since he was new in the organization and tis wes @ sort sf Gublous thing thet | guess what J was trving tc ma’ wae 28 By perception of it in recreated now thet £ f@lt that thera avzit ®*> he «a lot more solid than just aoetns ta Nim anf wtelims we've been In touch with a fellow im the Mafra to sae 32 we've qot Underworld links te Cuba. 2 > @ a « & 8s 4 8 Mr. Schwarz. So it Nae zcennar ts ¢o with his attitude towards using the “taefira? Mr. Helms, I was umeware of eny attitude hea may have Mr. Schwarz. “crew fue teeetifies im rassaonse to thia Line of guestioning thet &£ he Ret been tol? thet there was an assaasi-~ nation effort unterway, re world rere stanmed such an affort. tow, if that. 2m yous Jurrmaect, correct? Mewrengerm TMT ligina. F dom’t sume, sir. Schwarz. To you Rate amt Tudgren* on it? Helms. Ore Teron IF say 2 fion"* 2now, Yr. Schwarz, BID wt Reem NE ta thet elsewhare “ir. “NcCome vtatet thet he went to ses “Fr. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:324233463 Page 162
TOP SECRET McNamara in connection with this August 1962 affair and told 3 Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with this, | but To heve no recollection and I don't believe he ever said Femero § thee PEP) tbh Ree anything to me about hia not wanting to have anything to do with te. Mr. Schwarg. And you were close to Me. McCone in that Period? You were hie Deputy for Plans? Mr. Helms, f saw him almost daily. Mr. Schwarz. And in it your belief that if he had made any guch statement to Mr. McNamara that he would have come to you and told you about ft at some point?” Mr. Helma, [ just don't know why he fidn't, hut f donn's Fecali any such statament. And as 1 said, and I would like. ec e 3 ¢ * 2 & @ a # Fepeat it, “r. MeCone had yiven me my job, he hed promoted ma, i felt close to him, | felt loyal to him, and I would not have violated an fustruction he gave me if £ could possibly have helped it. Mr. Scwharz. Rut in any event, it is your best ftudgmant thet he did not indicate that he was Opposed to assassinations? chen: Mr. Helms. ‘lot to te. Mr. Sewhar2z. All riahe. Then f think. this morning in discussing the question of ed mgt fs Whether or not you advimed “Mr. ‘teCons, in anothar portion of your tastimony you made the noint that ths ganeatal inatruction ate # woe Witmer OF wes to gat rid of Castro, number one. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:324233463 Page 162
TOP SECRET Mr. Helma. Yea. Get rid of the Castro govetrnment, including Castro, but get rid of the whole business. | Me. Scwharg. Number two that that qeneral inatruction had no limitations placed upon 1t. Mr. Helma. Well toe say no Limttations is mot proper. it did mot have any specific Limitations, but the rule of Faeason would have prevailed that if somebody had some bright idea of putting an atomic bomb in Cuba, |! certainty would have reqarded that ag well outside the permissible parametera and that it. would have wither have been stopped or £¢ would have to hava been taken to higher authority or somethina, “vy. Sewhary. Hut ig it your teatimony that -- now let us take One of the things that the record sunqenta was actuakiy e ry @ a 8 a . & attempted, which was to poison Mr. Caatro by pills supplied from the CIA to a Mafia person to a Cuban exile leader and ultimately to be put in his food. igs at your testimony that thet activity war within the bounds of the qunvral understanding that efforts were being made to yot rid of the Castro qovernment? Sree: Mr. Helms, tt ia my recollection that the answer is affirmative. Ph geteenge reo fhe Mr. Sewharg., And what is that hased on? ta tt becaurw -- how do vou dacide under what you said is a rule of reanon, how do yeu distinguish now or how did you BIO F ant Atco 4 E distinguinh then between accapted activity within the qeneral TOP SECRET asst ited 3 EINES hiss fea UG eg HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 103
TOP SECRET instruction and activity that you felt you could not have » takan? Mr. Helms, Well. vou sea, fir, we're having -- at lease a (toe PRP) Fab ene I’m having a difficult time here, becaune W@® have one enlaodes im a long atring of activities relating to Cuba that because it involves the Specific word asasagaination or the @limination of an individual looms large in thin investiqation. rf under stan? that and t understand the reasons for ft. Mut the fact of the Matter remains that with afl of tle Ofheay Pings hee ware Yoia, On at that time, I can Only say to you ag beet I can recall} at, that thin newmed to he within the Permiaeible part of thts effort. People ware being killed in ralds and various other ways PROM &@ Pein aad I can only gay that hed ag it may sound tT don't have any Fecollection of thinking, well, Lord, this {a wall outalde anything we ware being permitted to do. Mr, Smothers. May I raise a queation here? Mr. Ambassador, you indicated, and have throughout your testimony, that as§aentially you felt you had your marching orders, that you had a fairly accurata unterstaading of what the Special Group, the Director and other Persons who may have “been. involved here in the leadership element Wantad tone. ta that correct? “Mr. listmm. 1 thoudhe an, Mr, Smothers, Ts it a@lao your undaratanding that Mr. “cCone TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page i104
109 i &8 the Director head his marching orders and he understood what they meant? 3 Mr. Helme, Yes, beacause Many of my marching orders came 4 | from Mr, McCone who got his marching orders elsevhere, & Mr. Smothers. Is there any doubt in your mind that he 6 had a substantial familiarity with what YOu were doing? 7 | Mr. ‘Helms. There's no doubt in my mina, 8 | | Mr. Smothers. Xnowing him as you aid and working with a) him, is there any idea in your Mind that he disapproved of 16 | what you did and the undertakings in this Connection, - that 1) § he would have indicatad to you that ha wag totally dissatig- 12 | fLed? + 2 | Mr. Helms. 1 would have thought so, Mr, Smothers, because se D 14: he was a pracise Man and a vary forceful Man, and when he ‘ } WAKO & Fae ¢ 1s disagreed, he said 80 and a man of Very high intelligance. ‘ “7 16 1 Mr. Smothera. Could you imagine himself as Director in a i] . ™ it } situation where he wag at odds with the desires of the. Presidant -f le OF the Spacial Group? 1% ‘ Mr. Walms. Well, it's an interesting point you make, because theoretically thig would not be the cas6, but thera : i “88 & situation in which he Got himself very much on the other ww” ay | Side of the fance from the Prasident and that waa over the 4 + Gestion of whether there were missiles in Cuha or not, or 24 i whather thy Huselans were putting missiles in Cuba. 41D F oct Street gg + Martongan OC 71003 25 i And he atuck to the line that they wure Puttiag TOP SECRET SHEED — ow 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 105
i them in when almost everyones else in the Pederal government was saying they were not putting them in and wouldn't be Putting them in and he turned out to be right. And I think in all fairness to Mr. McCone, I think it's fair to be said that he made himself slightly unpopular with the President for having been right. Mr. Smothers. This is a fairly small qroup we're talking about. Had he been hearing a different drummer from the Presi- dent and thosa that the Preaident wanted, that the Special Group i Wanted, do you think you would have been aware of the fact that he was doing something other than that which had bean sanctioned? Mr. Helms. I do, ar. Smothers, because Y think all of us a ™ FAO & Phin. t working on this thing thought that wa were going to the same ~ drummer, walking, marching to the same drummer. Mr. Schwarz. Ie it now your testimony thet He. MeCone Wags aware of the assassination effortea against Castro? Mr. Hielms: No, it {@ not my testimony, I haven't changed it. I just wanted. to answer Mr. Smother‘s quastion. rim not Changing -- Mr. Schwarze. Well I’m not suggesting that you're chanqing your testimony. I just want to make gure what it is. Ta it your testimony that to the best of your knowledge Mr. McCone was aware of assassination attempts against Castro? SIO Prat Gteoet, BF. Mamingtan, OF 709} Mr. Halms. I don't know whether he was or not, Mr. Schwarz. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 106
ie an honorable man, He has done hig own testifying,: and all f can fay Le that rt do not know Specifically whether he was aware Or not. £ Only can recal} that he 41d not tel} Me that he was against ie, Mr. Smothers. Wag totally Gissatisfied? Mr. Schwarz, Well, it is confusing, and Mr. Harvey Stated in 1967 that for some F@ason, not explained, but for some reason, he decided and YOu agreed not to brief Mr. MeCone about the efforts to &b888sinate Castro, direction. Can you think of &ny reason why Mr. Harvey would Say that if it were ROt true? “g 4 6 a @ € € @ Mr. Helms. No, I do not really know why he would say it if it were not true. Mr. Schwarz. All right, now -~ Mr. Selma, Or if he did not balieve it to be true, Mr. Schwarz, Recognizing that this may be a question on which you are not sure, what {s Your best judqment as to Whether Mr, McCone knew about the attempts to 4&88assinate Castro? Mr. Helms.  f have a hard time, this thirteen or so years after the event, balieving that when Mr, MeCone was involved in all of these Meetings about trying to get rid of Castro that 810 Fara Streor og » Watengion, 6 € Prnes he could have ruled out in his mind that Somebody might take & TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 107
vy 12 Yep * i shot at him, or kill him in some fashion. or. other. 1 quat cannot believe that that was not a considered part of the 3 risks inherent in the operation we wera undertaking. Prone {Avan FOF} 344-4008 sS 4} Mr. Sewharz. Okay. 5 | Now, let's turn to May, 1362 for a moment. 6 , You knew, in Msy '62, that there was an ongoing relation- 7 || ship with the Mafia, with Mr. Roselli, ie that right? a Mr. Helms. Yea. :¢ 9 ii Mr. Scwharz. And you kraw -- whether or not you thought 4 10 \ that was likely to succeed, you knew that it was an effort 7 which involved an attempt to assassinate Mr. Castro? 13 f, lp * Mr. Welms. Well, in any event, I was in touch with the @ “i 13 Mafia. I knew that we were in touch with the Mafla. : i. 1é : Mr Schwarz. But you did know also that the purpose of : lb ; being in touch with the Mafia wes to attempt to assassinate a 16 Castro? : fs Vy Mr. Helms. Well, maybe it wasn't all that clear in May a4 le | 1962. This record is heing mace, you know, wa're diqging . Ve kind of a trench here by repetition, and £ am not sure it's f Ps "fair that we dig that trench. ; er. Mr. Scwharz. Well, Let's just say that the 1967 record oy | shows that Harvey was told by Roselli that pills had baan taken : pe : to Cuba for the purpose of assassinating Castro in ‘Nay of 1962, ; ve” We have gone over that before. © 3 ; ' Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, would the General Counsel yield TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 106
for just a moment? IT have listened to the teetimony from thia morning and this of this afternoon and in all fairness 7 cannot agree that * f that te what the witness said this morning. He has repeatedly 5 | this afternoon disavowed any Personal knowledge of what the 6 Purpose, or that there were any pills delivered, or toe whom. ? | And I think that. among us attorneys the best avidence of what is 8 on the record is the document itself. “Fr 9 If he has no personal knowledge, I don't think we should : 10 | subject the Ambassador to trying to authenticate a document a4 : ; hi about which he has and profusses no Personal knowledge. I think ts iv s we put him in a position that is untenable in this regard, @': 12 i think that he has made it as clear 4s he could thin : 3 14 afternoon that he had no personal knowledqe of those events, 4 a 34 : that if Mr. Harvey said 80, he beliaves that Mr. Harvey probably = 1¢ ; told the truth at that time. ~ iw : Senator Hart of Colorado, Wall, with @ll respect, If would ls : like Counsel to continue tha final question. s, - ly : Me. Sewharz. The document wa're talking about was a 196? : t Be } study and it wag prepared for you go that you could brief ‘ 2! : President Johnson and did You ever Cull anybody you thought H 2e there was something wrong about that, about the document, or : ae : that it was inaccurata? . @ : 26 Mr. Helms. No, as I testified this morning, Mr. Schwarz, 2 25 | I don't recall studying the document 199 percent from the TOP SECRET Giiteseeatelss BPS tees HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 109 Me
atandpoint of the accuracy of it, every sentence. I was trying to relate it to some tnformation which Ir had been given, which it appeared in a newspaper to try and sort out the facts go that I could report to President Johnson certain events which occurred at certain places in time, and I do not recall that i ever went over this document line by line to check on the veracity of it, and I certainly never went behind the Inspectors -~- in other words, I didn't talk to the people individually concerned whom they had interrogated. Mr. Schwarz. Sut you don't recall telling anybody that " there was something wrong with it. Mr. Helms. No, I don't recall doing that. Mr. Scwharz. Now the document indicates that in May 1962 "WARS & FAY : pills ware in Cuba. Now, aasuming that was 80, the reporting <8 ; Chain was that Mr. Harvey was expected to report to you, is that right? Mr. Helms. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. And your assumption {4. that Mr. Harvey 4s a good lieutenant, did report to you, 48 that right? Pisce] Mr. Helms. Well he was reporting quite ragularly what was * golag on. Whether he reported everything or not, I obviously don't know. Mr. Schwarz. But is it your expectation that he would , (have raported a matter like the pills being in Cuba? SIG #aray Steet, GE, rowureion, OC Mr. Helms. f would have thought so. TOP SECRET | HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 110
Mr. Schwarg. Now, you knew in May 1962 that there was a @ § 2 problem involving the Justice Department and a Las Vegas matter involving Mr. Maheu and Mr. Glancana, did you, and Mr. Roselii? 4 | Mr. Helma. Yes. 5 i Mr. Schwarz. And you knew that the Attorney General was 6 || briefed about that matter? 7 | Mr. Helms. I was told subsequently that he was. os j 8 | Mr. Schwarz. Wall, turning to paga 65 of the document 2 « 9 | Prepetae for you -= “s | Mr. Ilelms. Yes, I have it. _ ila Mr. Schwarz. -- in the second full paraqraph, {t reads: “> “ “Harvey states that on 14 May he briefed Mr. Helms on a meeting "? with the Attorney Ganeral, as told him by Edwarda,. Harvey, too, 5 * RARE & ear, _ (x " vy saviees against briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and r 15 | states that Helms .concurred in this.” am 16 | You have no reason to doubt the accuracy of that? ™ 17 | Mr. Helms. It says that I didn't concur. ie! Mr. Schwarz. [It says that you did concur. 1 Mr. Helms. In the recommendation. I don't have any 20 , idea why I wouldn't have wanted him briefed if the Attorney 21 | General had been briefed. I don't understand this to this day and I don't <-- I have nothing specific to aay to challenge tha ko - accuracy of it, but I don't remember going along or being consulted in this fashion, and I realize that it makes me look 416 Fest Sicmet, 3 £., Mastenetan, OF. 20004 very guilty, the words that are here, but I do not recall this TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 111
107 5 | Very logical that it would be very important to briaf the 4 Director at that time on the same thing. — 5 | Me. Schwarz. Now Mr. Houston, who wes the General Counsel, 6 || Confirmed alao that to the best of his recollection the Director 9 | Waa not briefed at his testimony here. Would you look at Exhibit 4 now. which {ga memorandum: 9 from Mr. Halmg to the Director dated August 16, 1963, Subject : so | Sam Glancana. “: i - hr : Senator Mathias. Would Counsel tell us what Page it is? ~ is . Mr. Schwarz. This is a Separate document {tn your folders 1s lof this morning. fe fa dated August 16, 1963. re haa & number . “. WARE & Pau 14° Of attachment, dncluding a nemo for the Attorney of May °62. ‘ Now did you send that mamo to Mr. MeCone who was the je « Director in August 1963? Pre We Mr. Helms. Yes, I would ‘have thought so, re is siqned re Whth my initials and it {8 directed to him. le Me. Schwarz. Wag that sent because of a newspaper article é cs. that indicated s0Me connection between the CIA and the Mafia? ; 2; | You Were asked about that. i on | Mr. Helms. I think ao. Something Fanerated it. os | Mr. Schwarz. Now Mr. McCone has testified and the 1967 : a, | study states that this was the first occasion on which Mr. MeCone © 2 2s Was advised of the CIA's use of the Mafia. Does ‘that accord TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 112
a TOP SECRET with your Facollection? = ie maretie ete 4 Mr. Helms. don't know, I usay here, f assume you're aware of the nature of the Operation. f must have had some 1 F@ason for the assumption, | Mr. Schwarz. Yes, He stated in that connection that you and he had a conversation On this day aboue ft. Bo you Fecal? j that? . | Mr, Helms, No, but maybe that's whee generated the | Memorandum, Hoe Can we consider the attachment, which waa y May 14, 1962 and purports to be & mamorandum for th i Prepared by t i Counsel of the CIA? 2 > @ a @ a & € g Mr. Helma, That fea what it “ppéared to be, and if Mr, | Houston has testified to this, he's ay, honorable Man, I would &Ccept that. : Mr. Sewharz, All right. |The memorandum on May 14, 1962 déscribag the project ag \ being completed, 210 Cage Stree $ & , PRawungton, D ¢, 2hO0 3 aH 50955 Docld:324233463 Page 113
TOP 8 TE 7 4 a | Mr. Helms. XY am not at all familiar any longer with what causgea this cenfusion. fr hope that Mr, Hatvey can straighten it out when you talk to him, but I am not able to tell you whether this operation was ongoing, whether it had really been stopped, whether it had been fairly stopped, whether there was { fun and games going on between thea officars involved as to, we will create a fiction that it stopped or go ahead with it. I just don't recall any of those things at all, I am gorry to Bay, and I think anything I say would be unheipful. He. Schwarz. All right. At any point after you became Daputy Director of Plans F and up to the point that you left that joh to assume your | higher job, did you instruct the Agency to in effect stand down ia] WA & PauL from ongoing efforts to assassinate Mr. Castro? Mr. Helms. I don't recall whether there was any time at which anything specific like that was said. As the operation was reduced in intensity and reduced in scope, my recollection that we ware continuing with & certain few operations of which this gangster business was not one of tham. I realized that ‘ Harvey was in touch with Roselli for some time, but I do not have any impression any lonqer that after the first few menths thera was any real substance to this. Ap a Matter of fact, I have toothis day wondered 4f there's ; any substance to it from the very beginning. 10 Pest Steset, $F, Washmgton, OC. F006 5 Mr. Sewharz. Well, let's leave out the Mafia question. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 114
FOTN cnn A a ARE bel ES eS Se a, tee ee ee BY ee ne SEE 110 he The question I asked was, did you at any time instruct the Agency to stand down from the. effort to aesaeeinate Mr. Castro? 5 Mr. Helms. On Cuba? Prong [Arne POT) 344-6500 ee 4 Mr. Schwarz. Yea, 5 Mr. Helms. I don't recall having done s0 in any such 6 | specific terms, 7 | Is there anything in the record which indicates that I 4a 8 ft ata? | ee 9 Mr. Schwarz. Well, I'm asking you whether you did. “ 10 - Mr. Helms. I don't recall having done anything that 11 | Specific about it. . V2 Mr. Schwarz, Now the record demonstrates that in the fa}} “9 of 1963 the Agency preparad -- and when I 8&y the record, 1 “4 % Rab & rau pao? ts 14 | Mean the 1967 study. . { a! i - 15 Mr. Helms. Yes. as 16 | Mr. Schwarz. The Agency prepared a Polson pen, a Papermate Ir. 17 i Pen with a little syringe in 4¢ that could be used through 4 f l+ poison to accomplish an assassination? “t 1g Did you authorize that activity? 26 F Mr. Helms. I don't recall a&uthorizing it, and it Seams 21 1 to me ~- is this referring to the Cubela business? + Wastongron, OC FN001 22 "1 Mr. Sewharz, Yes. ; pes Mr. Helms. ile's the one who was trying to find various ~SE ‘ Means Of getting rid of his arch-rival, Mr. Castro. The record i FEO P sent Steops Ea) oe 25 || does show that such a P@n wags taken to Paris, but f balieve TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 115
112 the facts are that this wag never taken in the hand of Mr. Cubela anyplece. fae sizply did mee &coept it. Mr. Schwarz. fut tie. Agency Prepared it for him, did it not? Mr. Helms. te wag texan to him, I believe. Senator Morgan. ur. Schwarz, eould x interrupt? Who wag Mr. Cubete? Was ke actually tn the Cuban Army? Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. fe was, ££ mot the titular head, . &t least he was one cf the leaters of a group which had been opposed: to Batista but was act he #4me@ group which Castro headed. In Other wordw, this was a-cther qroup that wanted to get rid of Ratiste, but alse was intensely interested in taking Over Cuba for Ltseftf. * AGS & aun Senator Morgax. Wes im still fc the Cuban Army at the time all of this wes Ging cn? MY. Helms. £ can’t recall. sir, whether he was actually in the Army or mot, but he wag certainly living in Havanna and he had a post ard was well-know: to “wr, Castro. Senator Morgan. Well mow, this morming you referred to the fact, talking abowt the moor at che tine ~-- Mr. Helms. Yes. Senator Mergen. —— thes Castra aewag lining everybody up ageainat the wall aot shieeatizot them. They never did shoot’ him, did they? GEG Cont Ateert, AE. ating, OC. POoe 9 Mr. Nelms. f ondecstand thee he was pardoned in the end -- TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 116
not pardoned, excuse Ba. I believe that you're a lawyer and I'm mot. I think the word is, he was supposed to go before the firing wall and Castro, I believe, put him in jail instead. Senator Morgan. Were you ever satisfied as to who he was Feally working for? Mx. Helms. I have never been satisfied with any of these operations as to exactly who was working fer whom. If £¢ was ever a frustrating time in my life, it was trying to get these Cubans to do the things they said they were going to do. . Senator Morgan. Excuse me. I just wanted to clean up that (one point. Mr. Scwharz. And after the November ‘63 meeting, at ‘ which at least he was offered a poison pen, and poison for . “2 3 -@ e @ e & € E 9 it, did the Agency arranges to aupply him with guns as well? Mr. Helms. I dom’ t* know.’ i think thet ali through: the Cubeala period, there were requests from him for guna.of various kinda, I think there were efforts made to provide" lay down caches in Cuba. This is an ongoing precccupation of providing caches of arms and explosives and so forth to various groups . that we though might have some possibility of mounting an Operation. I wouldn't question that he had asked for guns and maybe in the end he was able to get some. Somshow, if my memory of reading this is correct, he was later put in touch with a fellew BID Farad Siveet, TE, Mashmgias, OFF PNOOt named Artime who was a Cuban in Florida, and the two were sort TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page ii?
of set to work together. Ie it not true that when he eventuelly did get some guns or something he got tham from Artime rather than the CIA case , officar? Mr, Schwarz. And that the CIA arranged that that would happen. . Mr. Helms, Well, I think they put the deal together, but I don't know whether the Agency actually arranged it or not. Mr. Schwarz. But Cubela was an agent -- now agent may » be the wrong word -- Cubela was a person with whom the Agency "had contact. Mr. Helms. That's right. Mr. Schwarz. And Cubela was « person for whom the Agency WARD & Pau - prepared & poison pen and some poison. Mr. Helms. Well, I think I would like -- my perception of what happened under those circumstances is an accurate one. “ The Agency volunteered thia piece of equipment rather than his “having specifically asked for it. Mr. Schwarz. And the purpose, if he had accepted, was to assassinate? Mr. talms. Was to take care of a request from him that he * nad some device for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, ” murdering him, whatever the case may be. Mr. Sewharz. Would you turn in that connection to the ALO Foret Steeni, ST. Harhengion. OC SOON E Appendix to the report which is a letter dated March 7, 1966 TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 118
TOP ‘SECRET yourself to the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State. Mr. Helms. Yes, I have it. Mr. Schwarz. Okay. That is a letter referring to Mr. Cubela's arreat, isn't | it, by the Cuban government? Mr. Helma. Yea, the arrest of Cubela Secades and Ramon Tomas Guin Diaz. Mr. Schware. After their arreat, and based apparently up). " some judicial proceedings, the Cuban Prasa alleged that they had been in contact with the CIA in efforte to assassinate ' Castro. Ie that right? *} Mr. Helms. Yas, I gueas. [8 this what the Press said? * WARG @ Pause Because I notice that the sentence that you're coming to, I ~ | apBpume, is the one that says tha Agency said was not involved i with either of these. 7A Me. Schwarz. Why don't you read that into the record? Mr. Helms, “The Agency was not invelved in wither of these two men in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act.” Mr. Schwarz. The question is, was that true when you made that comment to Mr. Rusk? > Mr. Helms. Wall, interestingly enough, when I raad HIG Feat Sisoet, BE, Mashongeon, B . 7NOO; just recently, certainly my recollection was that ha was TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 119
TOP SECRET encouraged to do it, he was the: one that was doing all of the requesting and asking and pushing and so forth with respect to | this issue. But it seema to me that in Light of all the | information which is in the 1967 memorandum, this is an inaccurate “statement. Yesterday, I called up the man who recommended ay signature underneath there, Mr. Karamessines, and asked if he had any recollection of why we had stated the thing this way, and ha said he didn't know either. And it may be until we conducted that investigation somewhat later we didn’t have the facts atraight, or maybe wa had the facts straight then, but we did not have them straight later. ‘¥ In any event, this is not truthful in the Light of the '47 WAM & MAUE _o | Memoranda and I don't know why and he does not know why. Senator Baker. Is that Tom Karamessines? Mr. Halms. Yes. | Mer. Schwarz. Now, Mr. Pitegerald was the man who worked for you, Desmond Fitzgerald? Mr. Helms. Yes, he succeeded Mr. Harvey on these Cuban 2000 2 i operations. Me. Schwarz. And he is now dead? Mr. Helms. He's dead. Me. Schwarz. Was he someone who had a ciese personal " relationship as well as a professional relationship with you? fr. Helms. Yes, he did, and ha did also with the Attorney TOP SECRET BID Feorst Stones, & FL wawhengion, OF. ‘HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 120
ag! pn i 24 [a General. Re was a Harverd College graduate and Harvard Law School graduate, and I believe they had some things in common, S | but I certainly knew him and saw his family frequently. Page {ron TOF) $04-C0mp a 4 | Mr. Schwarz. All right. ot 6 | Now, if we both look at pages @@ and 89 of the report, 6 | under the date October 29, 1963 — 7 | Mr. Helms. 88 and 997 8 | Mg. Schwarze. Pages 68 and a. 7 9 , Mr, Helms. I am there. , - ic Mr. Schwarz. Gur copy has @ number of blanks of names. a 1] ' Mr. Nelms. Yas. NS, 32 4 Mr. Schwarz. Could you reat ints the record what appears pe: ld under that date entry? And tf you went to use a code name for a oi 14 someone instead of an actual name, I don"t object if the o Le Committes doesn't object. “ 16 : Mr. Helms. Where do you want mm'to start reading? - 17 ; Mr. Schwarz. Under the entry 2% October 1963, le Mr. Helms. “Desmond Pitzgarald,, then Chief SAS who was 1y going to Paria on other business arranged to mest with Cubela * 2u * te give him the assurances he saught. Time contact plan: for i 2) | the mesting, a copy cf which fs fn tthe AMLASH file has this 3 22 to say on the cover. ‘Fitzgerald will represent self as. : 2! personal representative of Robert F. Kenmedy who travelled to & i 6 Paris for apecific purpose meeting Citbela and yiving him - I 25 assurances of full U.S. support with: a change of the present TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 121
government in Cuba.’ According to Fitzgerald, he discussed the | i Planned meeting with the DOP (Helms) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for Pitegarald : to speak in hia name.* Mr. Schwarz. Aili right. First, do you recall that conversation with Mx. Fitzgerald? Mr. Helms. No, £ do not recall the conversation. Mr. Schwarz. Are you able to cast any light upon the meaning of the statement purportedly made by you that it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald , to speak in his name? Mr. Helms. I don't think that's the way I would have j phrased it if I had been asked at the time, and this meeting 19 7 WAED A Pave i did indeed take place. What I would like to say was, that A given this Cuban of his standing and all the history of the i relationship of trying to find someone inside Cuba who might | head a government and have a group to replace Castro. This was so central to the whole theme of everything we had been trying to do, that I find it totally unnecessary to PROS E ask Robert Kennady at that point, should wa go ahead with this. ; This is obviously what he had bean pushing, what everybody hac been pushing for us to try to do, and it is in that context that ' I would have made some remark like this’. ‘ _ It wasn't that I was being smart or tricky or hiding + 41D Fort Seemes, AF | Maywengten, & € r anything. I just thought this is exactly the kind of thina 1 . tl | TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 122
gas rey abate TOP SECRET I hed been asked -- e's bean waking us to do, let's get on with doing it. Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, if f may ask a question, mainly for the purpeses cf making a note in the record, Mr. Ambassador, it woult be {mir to assume then that if Mr. Fitzgerald carried cut the fnetenctions of advising the Cubsn that he was there af & representative of Robert Kennedy that-- to agsume that Casts: -- ar if be in fact was working for Castro -- thought trat the Hemetys had ordered his assaaggsina- tion, whether or not they ware eware of it or not, would £t? Mr. Helms. Siz, wien yoo spoke to me a moment ago about Gealing with these Cubans am? wines thay ware working for, and ft go forth, I don't kmow ext I dom’t recall that ag of this 4 WARH @ Pay particular point thece seemed to be any doubt that Cubela wasn't yon representing what ke claimed to represent, which was a man who ‘ would lika to take Br. Orstxo’s Place. In other words, I da amt recall that we would have thought that he was reporting te Castro on his connections with U.S. agents in Paris. Senator Morgen. Gue ether point. He at one time was exrested and confessed? Mr. Helms. Bot thet is later. Sunator Morgac. Hut at Llemet this was information that was given to him, wes that Bchert Kennedy knew what was being | 410 Fost Stemet SE Waemation, OF 7HONS done? TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 123
. Mr. Helms. You know, it's a peculiar thing, Senator Morgan, I don't -= I am not familiar enough in detail with all of the files and telegrams and so forth at the time, but {it Seems to me that what Cubela Subsequently admitted to when he was try was the latter Phase of the operation. rf don't know that he really went back to the beginning of the Operation and covered all of these things. | So that this partdeular contact might not hecessarily have been in hig confession, f& believe. Now if I'm wrong, would one of you straiqhten me out? Me. Schwarz, Well, I think One thing is worth saying. “According to the reports that the CIA got, Mr. Cubele confessed to an effort to assassinate Castro, but according ts the reports they got, he did not confess to the involvement of WARD B Pau the Central Intelligunce Agancy. ft c c Cc Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman, one point I was trying to make for future reference was that if he was in fact double agent, then we did lead Castro to believe that it was a Pilot, : that the Kennedys knew of ‘it, whether they did or not. That is i the point I wanted for the record, Senator Baker. I think you might also, for future reference, podnt out that according to newspaper accounts, at least, Castro | Claims to have known and claims to be in a position to supply ; us information about it. Mr. Schwarz. Although I'm not sure he's put 4a date on it, 460 Fest Steer. $ E., Wastesmon. OC. 20003 but he has said that. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docld:324233463 Page i234
2 i | | i | i ri + 2? 4 WAMe a Cave TOP SE RET Senator Baker, I wonder how we could go about doing that. £ wonder what he does . know. Senator Morgan, How about you as the Chairman of ¢ delegation go down there, Senstor Baker, No, I would yield to you. Senator Morgan. Well, £ apologize for taking the Committee's time, but for me this is really a very crucial point, because x cannot ge6 how a man who had access going in and out of Havanna to Prance and all of these other places, f really don't Bae how we could have trusted him that much. of course, I know you have to trust somebody, and I think if this 4s a vary Seal Possibility, then we Ought to pursue ft. and look &t it ag Wa go along in the investigation. Mr. Sehwarz, How about as a4 general problem, Mr, Helms, how do you know when someone Bays they're a double agent that they're not a triple agent, or do you? ! Mr. Helms. This is one of the most aifficult and tricky “ aspects of secrat intelligence Work, and there isn't anybody fl | 410 Fura Stree ye. Wavmington, DO 20003 who's bean in it very long who hasn’t been tricked once, twice - i maybe many, many times. And you fust start @ach time afresh taking the same chances and hazards that you took the time before. And I must confass that it’s a most extraordinarily frustrating business, Senator Baker. Mr, Chairman, may I ask Mr. Helms a question in that respect? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 125
TOP “ 122 Tt has no doubt happened, but could you give me some estimate of how many times we have pretty good evidence that say the KGB infiitrated the CIA? Mr. Helma. Well, Senator Baker, I don't know of any place where the KGB successfully infiltrated the CIA. Certainly we | found traces of efforts, but may I just say, which I think will angwer your question, during the years that I was Director, hardly a day passed when I walked into the office that If didn't - wonder if that was going to ba the day when somebody was going to come up with the fact that there was somebody in that * budlding who had been recruited by the Soviets. I mean, this is the nightmare of a Director of Central Intelligence. + 9? & Pave Senator Baker. I don’t mean to be apuctacular and I'll ad ' ask you one more question in that reapect. m wa + The rumor is rampant in the Cloakrooms of tha Congress that there ware KGB penetrations of Congressional offices, or KGB electronic intercepts of Congressional conversations while you were DCI or otherwise. Do you have any information on either one of those things? 2700) Mr. Halms. No, sir. I never saw any reports on that. | At least that I can recollect, Senator Maker. 1 should be careful about being categorical. Senator Baker. I underatand. I understand, Mr. Schwarz. Were you aware in the fall of '63 that, t 410 D waa Steset, SE. Wasmngian, G.E guess peace feelers is the wrong word, but there was effort TOP SECRET HW O50955 Docld:32423463 Page 126
underway to try and reach some kind of accomodation with Mr, Castro? Mr. Helms. In '63? Mr. Schwarz. Yas, in the fall of °63. Mr. Helms. I don't recall that. I thought -- when was the prisoner exchange? Whan did that take place? In other fo) | words, the. negotiations to get the prisoners of the brigade out 8 f of cuba in exchange for medicines and so forth? 9 Mr. Schwarz. {I think that they were in their height in 101 og and early ‘63. The tractors and the drugs, and so forth. mes aI Mr. Helma. But I don't. recall these peace feelers. r, ear ‘Me. Schwarz. Well, lat's see if one thing will trigger a a” 14 | recollection in your mind. oe i et 144 Do you recall the name of a Franch journalist, Jean Daniel ° 15 | smo was in Cuba in the fall of '63, allegedly carrying messages ‘ . ~ 16 | of good will to Mr. Castro? N 17 4 Mr. Helms. On whose behalf? lt Mr. Schwarz. On the behalf of the United States govern- 24 > ment, ii i 2U Mr. Helme. I don't recall it, sir. I think the name Jean a ‘. i 2} Daniel I have heard, but I do not recall him in this capacity. : 22 tl Mr. Schwarz. I have just got One more question on the ‘ 24 : fall of '63. | @ ; 24 The record shows that a crash affert was mada to produce a 8 TOP SECRET it I 25 i poison pen and a poison to ba used in it which could be given to HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 127
Cubela which would be used to aasasainate Castro, and it was under Mr. Fitegerald's diraction. Now, did you know about that? Mr. Helms. { can’t remember. I have tried, and the reason 4 I say this, that I cannot remember, is that when I saw it in the report, I thought, that's odd, I don't recall any such thing. . So I'm sorry, I just cannot be helpful about it. The only thing that : did check up on was that he never took the pen. I've done this within the last forty-eight hours. Tha racord was not particularly clear on this, {t didn’t seem to ma, and I thought, well, this is a key point and I happened to realize there was somebody in Washington whom I thought mioght f Cc c € c: know and I just checked: WARD & PAUL’ Mr. Schwarz. Who waa that person? Mr. Helms. A man named Samuel Halperin. Mr. Schwarz. I was planning to move on to Lumumba, unless ed 7 are thera more matters on Mr. Castro? Senator Morgan, Mr. Chairman, is the Ambassador, are you going to be back Monday, or -- Senator Hart of Colorado. I would only add one ramark to the record, pursuant to Senator Morgan's observation, that is Cubsela needn't have bean a double agent to have created the impression in Mr. Castro's mind that the Kennedys themselves were behind this assassination attempt, if he just caved in AbD 4 wet Street, ST, Wawungton, OC PO003 under interrogation himself and he helieved he was receiving his TOP SECRET | 50955 Docld:32493463 Page 128
32 Orders from them, the game effect would be achieved. Senator Morgan. Or if he had just talked to one of his friends as we talked this morning, he can't keep 4 secret, he undoubtedly was talking to somebody in Cuba. Senator Mathias. If think Senator Morgan might have gotten the point, just a little boasting. Senator Morgan. That'g right. It's logical the man would have done a little boasting. Senator Schweiker. I have one gueation on Castro, Mr. Helms, if in fact Castro did know of these plots, and it’s hard for me to understand that he did not, given all the facts that we have seen, might this not have precipitated a Climate hounded by the Day of Pigs that really fostered tha Cuban missile crisis that made Castro go Out looking for ways to get even with us? Is not that a real possibility, that if in fact we did know of our attempts to kill him? Mr. Helms. Yes, but -~ I had always understood that the Cuban missile crisis was something that was generated by the Soviets and their desires and that they approached Castre to do this. Maybe his willingness to go along might have been affected by it, but there cannot be the slightest doubt that « Pavongtus, O16 2000 Castro, when ha came to power, must have been keanly aware that the American government was very antipathatic to him in every conculvable way. 210 wea Store. OE Senator Schweiker: Wall, just as you were describing a TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 129
; 125 moment ago, your frustration and period of unhappiness of being unable to deal with Castro and the Castro regime, it would. een to me that you put it On the other foot and that kind of ibitterness and hostility on the receiving and would certainly engender ail sorts of brainstorming and thinking how to gat ‘even and the Soviets come in and say, well, wa'd like to put missiles in, and it would just seem to me that the assassination attempts, therefor, may well have :helped: to trigger 1t.., compoundedbyfe . the Bay of Pigs, and going back to the Point you made earlier i about YOu wondered about the futility of assassination attampts, y wonder about the aqual and opposite reaction -- the law of _ Physics, for every action there ia an Opposite and aqual : Feaction -- by our asgaseination attempts or indirect Lnvolvemen® tf Cc wt 2 « a ¢ & "a 4 s Or direct wa certainly set Up Ourselves for a whiplash foretan “ policy that could trigger a nuclear war, 1 think there are sony real dangers from this. foam glad to hear you gay your earlier atatemant, but it just seams to me it could well have taken place right in thea Cuban missile crisis itself, You would agree, I would assume, that if in fact he fou:d Out We were trying to kill him, 1¢ certainiv would have made i him rather receptive to the Russian offer of missiles, T would assume, Mr. Helms. Sir, I would think {t would be fair to say that Fidel Castro was awara that there were hundreds of Cuban exiles TOP SECRET TID Fest Sireet. 4 €., Haenengqan, OF 7900) a MEE HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 130
126 who would have been delighted at the opportunity of disposing of him, let alone of the United States government. I think he was Keenly aware that he was @ target twenty-four hours a day. Senator Schwaiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Morgan. Mr. Helma,. one other observation and | then I'm going to leave, and I apologize for doing .it, but | since we aren't taking notes, the only way I know to joy my i memory later on is to put it in the record, If on tha very day that the President was assassinated, 1G) We ware talking with Cubela in Paria and telling him that the | | lis 5 pen was being given to him with tha full knowledge of Robert Kennedy, it would seem clear to me that somatime in prior negotiations that it would have bean conveyed to him that 7 ry WARD & FRU Robert Kennedy had knowledge of what was going on, whether ~~ ['s: ~~ OS "fot saying Kennedy did or not, but I'm saying it's fair to as- fy sume that Cubela thought that Kennedy was a part of it, and 7 therefore even in boasting or as double-agent for some time prior to the Kennedy assassination, may very well have dropped the word that they wera Involved. Mr. Halms. Sir, before I answor this quastion, this mesting Fitzgerald had was when? Senator Morgan. Was on the day the President was assassinated, Me. Schwarz. The poison pen was offered on November 72, 410 Fest Steer, 6 € . Wemmegian, OF 70003 the Pitzgerald meeting is in the latter part of October. TOP SECRET Gi HY 50955 Docld: 3242735463 Page ‘3 131
AVA AA RAR & PRU 7 230 F oat Wreee!, SE. wash ngton, HC P2600) Helms. I sea, it's two or three weeks before. Schwarz. But the polaon pen was pagsed on November Senator Morgan. That would have bean the day that Pitrgerald would have advised him. Mr. Schwarz. There were two meetings at least with Cubela. The first meeting is Fitzgerald giving him the advice of the U.S. government ig behind him -- Senator Baker. Well, make aure we get the record straight here. Someplace in this file, I saw the breathless statement that the very day that Prasidant Kennedy was shot in Dallas, we were in Paris offering soma sort of assistance to somebody. Mr. Schwarz. [t's just that there are two different meetings, Senator. There's one -~ that day is the day the poison pan -~ Senator Schweiker. A preliminary mesting and s passing meeting. . Mr. Sohwarz. That's axactly right. Senator Morgan. How long was the preliminary meeting before thy passing meeting? Mr. Schwarz. It was 29 October ‘63. Senator Morgan. In other words, it was about a month hefore the actual passing, so that makes my suspicions even more. Mr. Helms. But in the month before, I don't think we should go bayond what's written down here, because we've got to TOP SECRET
SSRIS Be re SST CNL ae ne Sara TOP SECRET 128 accept something as our series of facta. Cubela did not know what he was going to gat in the October meeting at the time that hea met with Pitzqerald in October. Senator Baker. He knaw he was going to gat something, Mr. Helms. Well, in other words, he didn't know whether 6 Ihe was going to get anything or not. ' | Mr. Smothers. If we consider this meeting to be the possible source of information against Kennedy, mightn't we be ja Little bit off the track? 16 | Tan't it true, Mr. Ambassador, that Mr. Kennedy had himself | ti | indicated that. he desired contact with a Mafia source? Hadn't ‘ he put out a search for Mafia people that might be of help? i Mr. Helms. Well, at one time that's correct, he suggested ‘i 4 i i sure exactly in what part of the Mongoose or subsequant a i i : with the Cuban task force activities there was a case officer RAPD ® Paul we might have a look at Underworld figures and #0 On. E'm not operations this came up, but I baliev-= at one time in connection actually assigned pursuant to the suqgeation to check in New York, Chicago, places like that and see if there were any ; Underworld figures who had ties into Cuba, Mr. Smothers. So pursuant to Mr. Kennedy's request, a CIA case officer: actually bagan a ssarch for the Underworld, the Mafia contacts? Mr. Helms. Underworld contacts, I'm not sure they ware FIO bent Stem ST | Wemngton, 0 C. Peery Mafia or not. TOP SECRET
“p WARD & Pails + 4 HY 50955 Docld:3 BUG Cotas S1eeet, & E , Waemongton, OC PO 9493 ips at 463 a4 i i i ‘ , i ‘ i u | t li " nt “ Page 129 Mr. Smothers. But persons who. had-had prior dealings in Cuba? Mr. Helms. That is my recollection. Some of thesa facts, I think if you want to run them down, his recollection is much better than mine, you might try Mr. Halperin or some of the people whe were intimately involved in the day to day work of this task force who are still alive. I mean, Harvey 4s one, but maybe someone from the staff to talk to == Sanator Baker. Which Halperin ia this? Mr. Helms. it's Samuel italperin. ft’s not anybody who's known to you. He's now retired from the Agency, but he was involved in these activities. Mr. Schwarz. Is he the case officer who was assigned the. Mafia case, is that what you're saying? Me. Helms. No, he was not. He was in the operation, he recalls this. Mr. Schwarz. He recalls the name that you just said? Mr. Helms. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. What was the name of the case officer? Mr. Helms. = don't know. As a matter of fact, tha raason I don't know is that he was giving me, when we chatted about this for a moment , he was Laughing and gave the nickname that the case officar was givan, and { don’t remember what his real name was. TOP SECRET
‘Ae ee RET Wo Rb? Me. Schwarz. What was the nickname? Mr. Helma. I heave even forgot that. Machiola, or Pagiole, OF Some strange Italian name tying into the Mafia business. Mr. Smothera. Do you recall, Mr. Ambassador, about the timeframe of this request? How long before the avents that we're talking about now in October or November of '63 did this occur? Mr. Helms. 1 don't know. I don’t know at what period in _the apan this matter cama up. I'm sorry, % don't. Mr. Smothers. Do you recall during what phase of the deliberations in the Spucial Group it might have come up? Mr. Helms. No, I don't. Please, I think honestly you would be much better advised to ask him and pursue it with him. Maybe he will remember, but I cannot help. Mr. Smothers. But at the time of your meeting with Fitzgerald, it was your understanding then that you weran't saying anything different from what Mr. Kennedy's desire's Were, Robert Kennady's? Mr. Helms. Well, this seemed to us to be -- this Cubela business, if it were rual and ha had the courace that he claimed to have, it was what we had been looking for all of this time, of a fellow that constituted an asset insida Cuba who was able to move in the streats of Havanna, had friends, associates, supporters, who might be of some raal use to us. And this 410 Fest Steeel, S$. £.. Wamengion, O ©. 20003 killing bueiness, which was on his mind, and his desire to gat TOP SECRET HW O50955 Doacld:32423463 Page 135
rid of Castro this way, wae no part of our plan. Actually, if I recall this, and the Cubela case ie one I do vaguely refer to, you know -- well, wa -would not only get good intelligence from him, he was the asset we ware looking for. ; We didn’t want him to blow himself or blow anything eles by getting involved in something like thie and have it fail. We [| Wanted him to stay in place. - Mr. Smothers. And I think what you're swaying is that with Fespect to your advise to Fitzgerald regarding the need to tell Mr. Kennedy, ware you aimply exercising & management kind of judgment simply saying you don't need to go to him with? This 1s something f'm sure he's in agreement with? Mr, Hielma. Sir, as best’ as 1 can recall this kind of < 2 a a a a & « 8 thing, Fitzgerald and I having both of us talked to Robert Kennedy at various timsas, this would have been the kind of a : conversation where we would have agreed that, ian't this what this has all been about. I mean, do you really want me to go te all of the trouble to go down to the Department of Justices and go over the sams ground again here. Go ahead and say that from the standpoint of political support, the United States . government will be behind you if you are successful. This had nothing to do with killings. This had only to do with the political action part of it. ‘Mr. Smothers. Let me go back for a moment if I might to AID Fort Siemet, KE | Wawengion, 8 ¢ 20003 #nOther instance where we raised questions about the failure to TOP SECRET HY 450955 2423463 Page 136
ms Yy fy n . wate aeade 7 S30 Feat Srooar BE, Wermungion, O¢. P0004 4 ": rOP SECRET’ ‘Mr. madigan. Let 'me ask ons question on this specific point, Mr. Ambassador, dot undergtand what you are really saying with regard to your meeting with Fitzgerald about his Meeting with Cubela, fa that you felt you had pre-existing, ongoing authority to indicate that the government was behind such an action, therefore you hadno need to check it apeciflcally and reiterate it? Mr. Helms. i. think I felt so sure that if I went to see Mr. Kennedy that ha would have said Yes, that Y don't think there was any need to. Senator Ilart of Michigan. Was such an action -- your question was intended to mean what? Mr. Madigan. It was intendad to mean the Ambassador felt he had pre-existing authorization to indicate that the government was interested in dealing with Cubela and that Cubela was the type of Person that when Pitzgerald -- Sanator Hart of Michigan. Dealing with respect to what? A change in government, or assasaination? Hr. Madigan. I think actually «+ Mr. Helms. A change in government, ‘Senator Hart. This is what we were trying to do. tf I may point out -- Mr. Madigan. Would that necessarily exclude assassination, TOP SECRET
Mr. Ambaasador? Mr. Helms. May I include again that Major Cubela's desire for these weapons and this desire of hig to hit Castro | by murder or killing was not part of our desiras at all. This | was going to ruin our whole plan, if he insisted on this. And I think you'll find {f you get all of the telegrams, you'll find that there was an enormous amount of temporizing with this fellow to keep him on the tean, to keep him working away at the job, but to try and persuade him that this was not the way to “go about it. I think this has to show in the record, hecause Cubela AMLASH must have loomed reasonably large in this whole Cuban Operation because it was one of the few live ones We got ahold TOS & Fain of. , Mx. Schwarz. You maan you wanted him as a Spy or & gource of information as opposed to a killer? Mr. Helms. We wanted him as a SPY, a3 &@ political action agent. We didn't want him to go around killing people. Senator Baker. What did you give him the pan for? TOO £ ‘Mr. itelms. Because he waa insisting on something and this wa8 4 temporizing gasture rather than giving hin soma kind of '& gun he had asked for, as I recall. The question was how do you keep this fellow on tha track, how do you keap him going with you. He keeps insisting he AID Fat Gteoee Be . Waaengtar 0 6 25 | Wants this, he wants that, he wante the other thing, and | TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423464
we want you to go back and do X. Senator Bakar. Lat ma back up and take a run at this for juat about thirty seconda. Mr. Halms. Certainly, Senator Baker. How many plans do you know of in the Agency that were mounted to assassinate Fidel Castro? - Mr. Helms. I don't have any way of coming up with any other than the ones we have discussed. . Senator Baker. Well, how Many is that? Can Counsel teil Nine ie the figure that comes to mind. Mr. Schwarz. I would aay 4 lot, Senator. Senator Baker. Wall, lat's see. . Theres waa the poison in + 9 WAlO ® Fat the diving suit. There was the depilatory to make his beard + fall off. There were the arms caches, the explosive sea shells, tha cigars, the poison pills, the rifles -- Cc c Mr. Schwarz. The poison pen. - A 7 Senator Baker. -- the poison Paparmate ballpoint. £ don't Know how many that is, but there 4t@ & great number. But there was no question on earth that they ware to kill Fidel Castro, is that true? Mr. Helms. But, sir, the diving suit naver Want anyplace. It was never put in anybody's hands. It was just an idea that somebody had. Mr. Schwarz. But it wag bought and the poison was put 810 8 wat Steews 3.0, Warrington, DC. 2003 inside it. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 139
r, aq TOP SECRET: Mr. Helms, Yes, but it never left the jaboratory in Washington, D.C, And the shell, this was a cock-ayed idea fron the outset. This was the highly intensive imagination of a fellow mho thought, well why wouldn't thia be a great idea, but a totally impractical thing. I mean, I cannot call that a Plot. . Senator Baker. But there are others, let's not call it a Plot, call it playing with fire, if you want to, but it's sort of a dangerous thing to do evan, just to contemplate with any official sanction of an organization, killing someone elae. it doesn't maka any differance really how far it went. The point I'm trying to make is, it seams to me-a4 long jump from nine plans to kill Fidel Castro by assaasination to saying WARS & PAL. that we gave the poison pen to 4 fellow not to kill him, but it was to placate him. Mx. Helms. Well, maybe I read these words wrong, and maybe my recollection at the time is imperfect. But I thought that this operation was really designed to net only get information through Major Cubela, but to try and organize a political 20003 action operation inside Havanna and at no time was it the idea of his” case officars, or those people in the chain behind, to use him to assassinate Castro. These ideas cama from him and he kept raising tham at these meetings. Am I wrong? The telaqrams must show something. Do you AID Fort Street, $F. Wammctun, OC. have the telegrams from that period? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:324293463 Page
499 frre ee as “Senne “TOP SE RET. Mr. Schwarz, To characterize the record ia very hard, The Ambassador is right. Senator Schwaiker, Well, Mr. Ambassador, den't what you'ra saying again and again, as I listen to you on the subject, Sure you acratched soma of thase On the drawing board, Sure you scratched a few more after you left the door and sure you scratched a few more after they left for Paris and eure you acratched a few more hera, but if you had thought that one of them would have worked then it would have been go, and that Feally is what the issue hera. I mean everytime you say you scratched @omething or ¢ didn’t get out of the bottle, we didn't let the horas out, only because it was either halrbrained, dimwitted OF numbskulled, RARS &@ PauL not. because that wasn't the objective. So it becomes & little ~ “4% bit irralevant to me whather 1¢ wag scratched here or there. f If your objective was gO and you had a good Plan you would 7 have gone, but you didn't have a good plan. Isn't that what you are telling us? Mr. Helms. Sir, I thought that &ll of thig testimony | indicated we thought that these things we were trying to do i were within what we had been told to do. Senator Schweiker. ‘But every time we pin you dowh on ‘ons lof these other plota, you discount it and in essence Say, well " that really doesn't count, when in fact {t does count. The 810 Fost Steest, SE. Hrowmington. 16 2000) Only thing that didn’t count was that it probably wasn’t TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 141
Workable a6 YOu discarded ft. That fs Whera we hava trouble communicating, H *? Of tha government } emanted by the Cra ’% WARE a Pave, ~ @X pected, , Senator Baker, And without, &8 you say, digging the tranch I i by repetition, you felt that the Agency was acting fully within | . " the scopes of its authority as undarstood by the Agancy? i ' Yas, Sanator Baker, that is my Perception, Senator Baker. Thank you, f Senator Hart of Nichiqan. pid YOU @Ver obtain Clearance for ‘i . 25 pany One of the nine, :six, ten or twelve that we talked about? | TOP SECRET 410 Font Stemet 4 e,, Washenatan, OC 9nd) HW 50955 Docld: 324
“A Ny 9 WROD & bau, % S10 Fed Street ar + Wrewon, & © PROG 5 HW 50955 Docld:324 TOP SECRET I don't know What \- 7 know, sir, this Cubela Operation must have been a part of the Special Group delibera~ because it Went on so long and it Went through various | Phases, and I don'e know whether You have those Kecords or not, i but I would have thought that it would be there, and avery &spact ef it x would have thought would have. bean in thera, ts this not the case, Counsel? Mr. Hadigan. We haven't gotten those Facords, : Senator Baker. I understand We have requested those i | recorda, Mr, Helms, but we haven't Fecelvad them, H « Tecords? ry Could you give ua any advice on where wa might find those Mr. lelms. Y don't any longer know under whose aegis thosg &ra. Those ware, I think, at one time National Security work Or fFegarded ag that. Whether thay were Stored in the National Security Council files or the Agency files, x don't know, Senator Baker. Thank you, sir, Me. Schwarz. pdid you Look at any of tham in Preparing for this teatimony? Mr. Helms. No. I don't even know where they are, Coungel. Mr. Schwarz. After President Kennedy waa a43sassinated on November 22, 1963 and Prasident Johnson took over, the record indicates some afforts through Mr, Cuhela continued, Now, did the Agency ragard whatever marching orders thay TOP SECRET
aa ey Al 4? $ oes Ee aia Raed ies ry eee ‘Pe : : f J = ” 7 o a Gap as “TOR SECRET: had obtained prior to the death of President Kennedy as still 47 being valid and operative after the death of Prasident Kennedy? Mr. Helma. This is not very clear to me at this atage. Prgne {dons POT) $44-4088 | A lot of the same officers were serving Presidant Johnson as they served President Kennedy, and I don’t -+ i can't recall anymore whether there was any specific issue about whether this was taken up with President Johnson at any meeting or any session. tf it had been, I would have thought there would have been records someplace. Mr. Schwarz. And you have no recollection of Prasidant Johnson either being advised or authorizing continuing efforts, ‘ds that right? Mr. Halms. But you sea, the Special Group would have HARD & Fave continued to consider these matters, and f would have assumed _ 4 that whoever was chairing the Special Group would havea in turn reported to the Prasident, which was the -usual practice. Mr. Schwarz. Wall, did the Spectal Group, after Novemher 22, 1963 take any action .aither to authorize or to suspend or in any way to focus on the question of whether the United States government was still seeking to assassinate Mr. Castro? Mr. Helms. I don't recall, sir. Senator Schweiker. Why don't wa go ahead with the others? Mr. Schwarz. To Lumumba. Senator Hart of Michigan. Are there any further questions 410 Frat Steoet, SE, Waemingtan, HC Mens on Castro? TOP SECRET ‘HW 50955 Docld:32423463 Page 144
“ > a & a “oO 8 8 450 Fstae Serene SE Warnngion, OF SROO3 Docld: 3242734 TOP : SECRET Mr. Schwarz. You remember Mr. Lunumba ? Senator Baker, Let me ask one question. T hate to bring it up, but I can't resist, since the Ambassador {s here and will not be back anytime soon. To advert to another unhappy period in our life, to go back to the Watergate hearings, and particularly to the White House tapes, there was a conversation recorded on those tapes which was released dated June 23, 1972 which was of general interest, but ona of the things in that tapa wag a ramark attributed to President Nixon having to do with the cooperation of the CIA and saying, in affect, that we've done a lot of things, ox protected Helms from a lot of things. Do you have any idea of what he's talking about? Mr. Helms. I have never known, Sanator Baker, I have evar gotten any personal courtesies from President Nixon that I was aware Of. I don't know that he ever interceded for ma anyplace that I know of except to the extent that 48 Brasident of the United States and in connection with my official duties he might have supported a request I had for some assistance in Laos for some money or something of this kind. But when I read that on that tape I could hardly believe “My eyes, bucauge I had no idea what he waa raferring to, Senator Baker. Thank you, sir. Mr. Schwarz. I wonder if before turning to Lumumba we could pick up something relating to your relationship with TOP SECRET
“ . .- . aot as ae Dee. ueielgny President Nixon aince that has been raised, The Senatora each have a book headed mail opéning. I have placed before Mr. Helms the covar two pages and pages 29 and 30 from a document entitled “Special Report, Interagency Committee on Intelligence Ad Hoc" dated June, 1970 showing on the second page that you signed that Teport preparad for the President. . ‘Now is that the report that da referred to a6 the so-called Huston Plan? . Mr. Nalms. If you say it is, I have no reason to quarrel with it. ft just don't remamber the official name of that Faport, and certainly if it Bays I signed soma report hers, and that's the report, then let US agrea that it is. WARD ® Pasay Mr. Schwarz. And you do recall, wa talked about it morning, that there was an effort in the summer of 1979 resulted in a documant of this sort, right? Mr. Helms. Yes. Me. Schwarz. Okay. Now, that was prepared at the request of President Nixor for advice On whethar thera were threats that were not adequately being met by the intelligance community and whether there were restrictions on the techniques available to the intelligence community that might ba chanqed to make it more efficient, ts that corract? 410 Fat Stemet SE. Waemington, 8 ¢ 20001 TOP SECRET HY 50955 “Docld: 32493463 Page 146
ergs “TOP § es : folg Alex Mr. Nelme. My recollection of what they ware direct- @ 7 ing their attention to was improved and more effective in- formation developed on domestic affairs in the United States On not only dissidents but penetrations of foreign intelli- gence services and activities of foreign intelligence ser- vices, and so forth. I don't say that other thinga aren't covered in the report but my recollection of what the whole purpose of the exercise was to try to improve coverage in the domestic field. Mr. Schwarz. And in that connection to tell the Presi- dent whether there were certain restrictions on the ability of the intelligence agencies to operate that might be lifted: ig that right? % WARS &® PRR as Mr. Helms. Yes, it strikes me that what he had asked for originally was for a wide-ranging repore on all of the things that got in the way of improving this domestic coverage from the FBI and NSA and so forth so he could consi- der what these various obstacles were or were considerad to be, such as laws and traditions and things of that kind, Mr. Schwarz. One of the techniques which the Committee, including yourself focussed on, was the one callod mail coverage; is that right? $F . womregton, OC FO0G} Mr. Helms. I assume so. Yes, we have a heading here mail covarage, right. Mr. Schwarz, And -- TOP SECRET G10 F wel Stemea, HY 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 147
Bid ia SECRET That is part of, a larger part of the Mr. Helma. document, re igs (C) and I don't have (B) and (A), what came i 3 before {t, 4 Mr. Schwarz, I think breaking and entering and cer- 5 i tatn kinds of code restrictions on the NSA, 6 Mr. Helma. I sea, 9 | _ Mr. Schwarz, Mail coverage was divided into two af 8 types, covert and routine; is that right? a Mr. Helma. This fs what it Saya. I must say these are distinctions, which are Pretty esoteric, let's accept them. Mr. Schwarz. And toutine meant juat looking at the t, in ! envelope, and covert involved opening the letters? @ i 1s ; Mr. Holms. Yes, let's accept this definition here. - E “| 14 These are new terms to me really and, in other words, thoy - 15 are not famous *trade graph terms. — 16 | Mr. Schwarz. In any event, we will accept when it }7 4 S4ys covert it means opening the letters? le Mr. Helma.. I guess so. ly Mr. Schwarz. Is that what it says in the first : ‘ i &ragraph? ¢ 2U i p grap e I § 2) i Mr. Helms. Covert mail coverage also known 3 en 48 sophisticated mail coverage or flaps and seals, fentirely g aan . ae i ; . 4 es, | surreptitious screening and may include opening and examina- 5 6 @ : 24 F tion. 2 25 | Mr. Schwarz. Of domastic and foreign mail? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:329493463 Page 148
Fey <7 Mr. Helma. Yea,air, Mr. Schwarz. You told the President, President Nixon, that fa, that “covert coverage may be diacontinued®, Mr. Helms. This 18 what the report tells him. . : Mr. Schwarz. You aligned it? Mr. Helms. I signed it. Mr. Schwarz. Ali right, that wasnt true, was it? Mr. Helms. You see, what I don't know here, sir, I wouldn't knowingly have signed something that I didn'e believe to be true, and I don't know whether this was referring to covert coverage by the FBI or somebody else. At least the agency was going to be at that time with this same small operation in New York that had been going for some 20 years, but I can't imagine that it was referring to that P} 3 ea & a a ry € & m, if because otherwise I would be aigning something that wasn't *y true, and ~ would have no reason for doing it. £ could haave it stuck out so I can only assume in the context of working level meetings which produced this report this must apply to something the FBI had been doing or planning to do. Mr. Schwarz. How would President Nixon know that. Ag far as he was concerned he was reading a document that says flatly covert coverage has been discontinued and he kind of ‘got in a lot of trouble on this, you remember the re- lease of the Huston Plan, and that it went on and President. 819 Fert Street. $F. Wrewtingtan. 0. 20005 Nixon authorized the opening of mail for at least a short TOP SECRET HWW 50955 Docld: 32423463 Page 149
period of time, and he authorized it even though his assist- ant told him it was illegal, and so forth, It was kind of an important matter as it turned out for him, and you signed the report that said flatly 4t had been discontinued when you knew it was continuing? Mr.Helms. If you were wanting to @ingle me out, Mr. Hoover signed it and he knew it was going on. And General Bennett and Admiral Gayler I imagine knew thie small opera~ tion was going on in the agency. I can't beideve this is directed at that particular thing. I am sorry, but 1... can’t helieve that. Mr. Schwarz. How was President Nixon to know that? rire Mr.Helme. I don't have any idea. I waan't chairman ‘% WARS & F % of the committee and I wasn't the one that had the job of explaining to him. Mr. Smothers. Did you have reason to believe President Nixon knew this mail opening was going on, the operation in New York? Mr. Helms. I don't remember about President Hixon, believe I told President Johnson about it at. one time but Kk don't recall telling President Nixon. It never came up. He was not very available for these matters, unfortunately. SE. Wawengton. 0.0 XOd) I think there were a lot of things that might have been told °. 2 to him. ALG Forest Street, Senator Schweiker, Tf I may inject. TOP SECRET Pe EES HY 50955 Docld:324233463 Page 158