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13-00000 29 November 1963 _ SC No. 00620/63 Copy No.397 -WEEKLY REVIEW - OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SERIES “BL" COPY BATE 0.7 APR 1997 ~ THIS COPY HAY ROT BE FURTHER REPRODUCED. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY _ THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM . SIP TQUE TOP: SECRET GROUP 1” Exetuded!fram cutomatic » downgrading and declassification rr rr Reece ira mn oF é See ree en rN ROS Ce OR OE EG My emp
13-00000 . a This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits | a its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial ‘to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE - information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS. ~ No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI- — GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages - to be gained, unless such ‘action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. _ - ~~ . - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination controls in-accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of 8 the limitation so imposed.
13-00000 TOP SECRET DINAR CONTENTS (Information as of 1200 EST, 27 November 1963) CUBA . Page CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE 1 Fear that President Kennedy's assassination will bring a more “aggressive" US policy was reflected in a military alert which followed his death and in speeches by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. THE COMMUNIST WORLD Ss T_STANDDOWN ON BERLIN AUTOBAHN HARASSMENT _. _- 2 /The USSR's failure~since- the~4=5-November~ incident || to stop Allied convoys of nondismountable size and ). OY its statements of 16 and 21 November suggest that } Moscow has decided to settle for a standoff in the/. autobahn | dispute at je ast for the bresent. ‘| SOVIET. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE. “PATROLS _ 3 i ‘recent 4i=day voyage by an™ ‘E=¢ lass submarine” in \\ i/the northern Pacific, the first known out-of-area — )) \\mission by any of the USSR's nuclear units, may pre-~/ usage. their regular us use on _long-range | patrols. a | a aren eae: x eee! . Eo ~ a SOVIET THOUGHT ON ARMORED VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT _ oe ““Tnformation compiled from classified-Soviet docu- ~~ (| ments thas ‘provided a good picture of the thinking i;among Soviet military leaders on development of ‘tanks and other armored vehicles. They appear to | be aiming toward two distinct tank types--a recon- | naissance and a main battle tank--to replace the ‘ traditional light, medium, and heavy types. (Pub- “lished s¢ separately as Special Report sc No. ,00620/634) 7 *' EASTERN EUROPE. PREPARES FOR HARD WINTER ae —\ (The regimes theré-hope - to- ‘prevent— a~-recurrence of 7 \ ithe widespread discontent and the economic disloca- tions which resulted from last year 'S severe -winter » — ee - a aes cen eemettne ea ING'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NON=-COMMUNIST ASTA Their “gradually increasing trade-in “non=Communist ——- Asia provides foreign exchange the Chinese need to | | buy grain. Their aid activities in the area will } \ | fi fi probably remain at a moderate level as tong as the grain imports continue. ne Bo ae z mee ee ee ee ua ——— + = a ——ee ooo 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page i Si | TOP SECRET DINAR
13-00000 7IRy TOP SECRET DINAR ASIA-AFRICA Page JAPANESE ELECTION OUTCOME __ Sere Te (ft The“ruling Liberal Deugetatic ‘Party' s victory” ry id *) not significantly. shift the balance between saty | \ and left, although the moderate socialist party | scored significant gains at the expense of its _ imore. extreme,rival SE GH LEVEL OF VIET CONG ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM 7 “Communist military act lon has™becone ™morewerrectives ) | \( and widespread in recent weeks, thereby increasing’ ;\ pressure on South Vietnam's new rulers to produce * Some dramatic achievement. — _. pe AREA NOTE 8 On Laos gE -TURKISH EQLITIGAL, SITUATION | yleaders=-who have retaine sagt *——, fan party they do not trust or try to maintain in | {power the present group which not only lacks popu~ i ilar support but shows no signs of being able to - [| |} generate it. Hitherto submerged currents of left- . i list opinion may be coming to the surface. (Published if “Separately | as. Special Report SC No. 00620/63B) eo SOCKS moderate elements in both the Booked i and the Damascus regimes seem anxious to reach an || | || accommodation with their various internal factions / i \as well as between the two governments, but extrem-/ lwist_ pressures are still strong. ecm. | —_ — cS SCAR CONGOLESE EXPEL SOVIET DIPLOMATS —__ ae 9 SEViem representatives in Leopolaville had beea 7) 'f assisting a radical exile group plotting against iy Premier _Adoula from neighboring» Brazzaville. De MALAISE IN_ MALI. ara _— HAISE IN MAMI a of "president ‘Modibo Keita is 4s ‘faced | ‘| with mounting criticism from powerful local polit~/) j deal figures, dissidence among nomads , and a des~ | \\ berate foreign exchange shortage. } ne DE GAULLE _ ~-ERHARD. TALKS. —— 12° "The 21-22 November talks ‘So sééi to “have” established 4 ‘: good working relationship between the two lead-# (fers and clarified certain aspects of French and | - (West German policies | but produced few decisions. 4 a ee: SST RTT es R _ Soe - nent ine ” Std oe RE Py Coe ee 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page ii TOP SECRET DINAR »
] s+ TOP SECRET DINAR EUROPE (continued) Page WESTERN EUROPE'S STEEL, PROBLEM .._______-____. *®-A-meeting -next- week-of- the Coal-Steéel ‘Community's s- ! Council . promises to have far-reaching implications || for the CSC‘'s future as well as for the outcome of | cinternational _ tariff negotiations in the spring. Sh LY'S_ ALDO MORO. sg he In nearly-five-years as ‘party— ‘secretary, ~Moro- has“, / won the confidence of Italy's perennially divided \ Christian Democrats but has only Limited experience’, in cabinet posts. Personally retiring, he seems to Sy be undertaking the premiership with reluctance. (Pub-> lished ed separately_as_§ Special Report. sc. -No.. 2 00620/63C) <. lished separately_as Special Report SC_No. 00 20/63C)_} AREA. NOTE “Sia. _ On Italy WESTERN HEMISPHERE AREA NOTES 14,15 On Brazil and Venezuela ‘Page iii 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW TOP SECRET DINAR
TOP SECRET DINAR Cuba CUBANS APPREHENSIVE OVER POSSIBLE US POLICY CHANGE Cuban Leaders are appre- hensive that President Kennedy's assassination will result in a wore “aggressive US policy to- ward Cuba. Intercepted Cuban military messages revealed that certain units of the armed forces were put. on defensive alert immediately after news of the President's death reached Cuba. The alert was maintained for about three days. Fidel.Castro's two-hour speech on 23 November, which he termed an “objective analysis" of the implications of the 48Sassination, warned Cubans that the President's death was “serious and bad news." It could, he said, turn "a bad . situation” into a worse one. He also asserted that President Kennedy's alleged promise not to invade Cuba had been strongly attacked by those “ultrareac-— tionaries" in the United States who now are trying to create a climate of “anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria" designed to pressure the new US Presi. dent toward a Cuban policy "highly prejudicial to the in- terests of peace and of man- Kind." - Castro stated that he had never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald and insinuated that the Castro- 29 Nov 63 Communist affiliations of the accused assassin were fabricated by US "reactionaries" who, he claimed, were the only people who could benefit from the Presi. dent‘s death. In this connec- tion he warned that a “sinister maneuver" was under way, and declared “we must be cautious and vigilant and alert." Che Guevara echoed these warnings in a speech of 24 November, declaring that "the - years coming are going to be as tough as, if not tougher than, the years just past...we must be prepared to repel any attack." He expressed confi- dence in ultimate victory, not only for Cuba but also for “the peoples of Latin America." Guevara stressed that the ‘revolutionary ferment in Latin America is reaching a climax and that the people there “are going to conquer power in what- . ever manner necessary, destroy-— ing whatever force that. opposes them." He pointed out that Cuba's continuing "anti-imperi- alist struggle" is closely linked with the coming revolu- tion in the rest of Latin Amer- ica. "The fight of all peoples is also our responsibility,” he maintained, “and it is part of our daily preoccupation." (SECRET KIMBO) ; CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW | Page 1 - TOP SECRET DINAR
‘OP SECRET DINAR _— i Moscow apparently has de~ cided to refrain from harass~ | I ing Allied convoys on the Berlin autobahn, at least for the time | being. On 21 November the USSR | yeplied to the Western notes of i' @ November which protested ite , detention of the US convoy on i |. 4-5 November, The main purpose | Of the reply was to restate for | } the public record the Soviet ' Claim that the June 1945 agree- i: ment between the Soviet and | Western commanders in Germany | gave the USSR the right to ex- | ercise “protection, maintenance i. supervision, and control" on ' highways used by the Western | garrisons in Berlin. | The Soviet note sought to [ | strengthen this claim by stating i | that the “harmonized procedures" ' conveyed by the Western powers '; On 29 October “are in no degree at valid for Soviet military au- I thorities." . Moscow denied (| that American authorities have , any right to establish the ob- ! ligations and "manner of opera- tion" of Soviet checkpoint of- ficials, L | The note reflected Moscow's |: sensitivity to the point made in the Western notes contrast- . ing the detention of the US convoy with the normal process- ing accorded. closely similar British and French convoys on 5 November which also refused to dismount. Moscow took ref- | uge in the pretense that |. these latter convoys were not |: challenged because they observed SOVIET STANDDOWN ON BERLIN AUTOBAHN _HARASSMENT _ The Communist World checking, ' " , whereas “the US con- voy was detained until it agreed to "go through the same check." The passage since the 4-5 November incident of five con- — yvoys of a size which are non- dismountable under Allied pro- cedures, the 16 November. Soviet statement on access procedures, and Moscow's 21 November note f all suggest that Moscow has j decided to accept a standoff | in the autobahn dispute for the present. The Soviet procedures marked a clear retreat from earlier extreme demands that all \ i L personnel in convoys of more than five vehicles are obliged | to dismount. Although the Soviet procedures are not identical to if the Western “harmonized proce- i dures," the differences are not 7 great enough in themselves to ii give rise to “urther incidents. Ly The Soviet rules seem to pro- i ' vide Moscow with a practical _. 7 working arrangement not incon— i sistent with normal Western fos convoy practices, ! In light of the failure to divide the Allies on the access issue and the reper- cussions of the Barghoorn case, the Soviet leaders probably de~ cided this was not an opportune time to propose formal negoti- ations, Their efforts to es- tablish an exclusive right to control autobahn traffic, how- ever, suggest that the Russians will revive this issue whenever theyfeel the situation is ripe for another attempt to bring { ioresente procedures and the West into a new round of ; | "presented tneir personnel for Berlin negotiations. (SECRET co ve NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 2 TOP SECRET DINAR
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13-00000 | SOVIET NUCT SAR SUBMARINE | PATROLS _ The Communist World ae ee “on “about” 16 November a. - Soviet E-class nuclear-powered |: submarine, equipped with cruise missiles, completed a 4l-day patrol in the northern Pacific. This voyage, the first known out-of-area mission by any of the USSR's nuclear missile sub- marines, may presage their regu- lar use on patrols in the Atlan- tic and Pacific Oceans. The first Soviet nuclear submarine was probably completed ; in 1958, and some 30 nuclear- VF powered units have since been piaced in service. Until re- ‘cently, these seldon left home waters, perhaps with good “reason. There are numerous reports of troubles with venti- lation and propulsion systems. Since June of this year, however, there have been several erations, culminating in the Pacific cruise. This suggests that technical problems have generally been ironed out and that the submarines, or at least some of them, now have become fully operational. These operations included a five-week voyage by an E-class SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE long-range nuclear submarine op- submarine “rom Wiadivostok to Petropavlovsk in July and August, which apparently simulated an ocut-| of-area cruise although the sub- |. marine probably never left So- te viet waters. From late July to || early September an unusual de- pioyment of auxiliaries, includ- ing submarine support ships, to an area near the Canary. Islands may have been in support of a nuclear submarine mission into the Atlantic. There is also some || tenuous evidence that, during the || same period, Northern Fleet H- class and Ne-class nuclear subma- rines may have participated in an interfleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea and northeast At- lantic. In early September an N= class torpedo-attack submarine of the Northern Fleet left the Kola Inlet, transited polar seas, and arrived at Petropavlovsk some 15 days later. Another N~- class submarine apparently carried|': out a polar operation in late September and early October which may have included the. circumnavi-~- gation of the Spitsbergen Islands. The only extended operations by Soviet nuclear submarines noted earlier were four probable under-ice cruises near Spits-— bergen and some N-class submarine participation in the 1962 summer : Northem Flest Pacific Fleet Totuls interfleet exercise in the At- Ne-class (Tespede Attack) W J 2 lantic and Norwegian Sea. (TOP | Hecloss (Ballistic Atesile} 12° 12 SECRET DINAR) } E-closs (Cruise Missile) as 4 6 [: Ss Fetels a 7 30 ae? TOP SECRET — i a _? fs gen a 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 3. TOP. SECRET DINAR
13-00000 fo’: eee nae TOP SECRET DINAR EASTERN _ EUROPE. -PREPARES FOR _ HARD _ WINTER seccoop oo UE Us Eastern Europe is ‘making plans to prevent a recurrence of the widespread discontent and the se- rious dislocations in some sectors .of the economy which resulted from last year's severe winter. The fuel, power, and construction in- dustries and the railroads were the hardest hit, and although a repetition of last year's weather ; conditions would be unusual, it is primarily in ‘these sectors that preparations are being made. While there are signs that the other Communist regimes are making sim- ilar plans, the most detailed in- formation is available on East Germany's preparations. The East German regime has already warned that electric prao- duction capacity again this winter will be inadequate to meet demands of all consumers. The shortfall results from growing industrial use of electricity, delays in com- pletion of new generating capacity, and the low water level available for power generation. The regime on 30 September published an ur- gent appeal to save electricity. It was followed a month later by announcement of a “competition” for “power thrift." Throughout industry power consumption norms are being established. Production during night shifts is being in- creased to make more efficient use || of the hours when power consumption is normally at a minimum. In the coal industry, the East Germans have made an exceptional effort to increase production and have succeeded in raising coal re- serves in industry by 5 percent since last autumn. Measures also have been taken to prevent freezing of coal loaded in open rail cars and of rail switches at the mines, ae ee 29 Nov 63 ‘sumption industries such as steel CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW The Communist World which posed major problems last winter. The transport of coal has been given priority over trans- port of other items on the rail- road. East Germany is easing the burdens on its railroads by con- tinued transferal of short-distance hauling from the railroads to trucks. New schedules for contin- uous loading and unloading of trains and trucks were instituted on 1 October. Production in high~fue1l-con- and ceramics reportedly will be curtailed or halted as required. About 60,000 workers would be af~ fected by such drastic measures.” Czechoslovakia also has warned that electric power output will be insufficient to meet all needs this winter, largely for the same rea- sons as in East Germany. The Czechs began instituting measures to save power as early as mid-August, and preparations at power plants were to be completed by the end of October. Both Poland and Hungary appar- ently are concerned with ensuring adequate coal supplies for the do- mestic market. The chief of Po- land's coal exporting agency has said that the country this year will export to nonbloc countries one million tons less than last year. This move, along with greater coal production, will increase sup- plies for the domestic market. Hungary has announced that coal production will exceed the planned level by one million tons as a re- sult of overtime work, and that im- ports of coal will be 1.2 million tons above plan. (SECRET KIMBO NO FOREIGN DISSEM) - Page 4 TOP SECRET DINAR
13-00000 RI so, Se ee WE ome ~~ o , Communist. China’ Ss “economic hactivivies in the countries of ‘| non-=Communist Asia now are re- |’ covering from the setback they " guffered in 1960 following the failure of the “leap forward." Peiping's 1963 trade with most of these countries appears to be above last year's, so the Chinese probably will earn more | from their Asian trade this year than they have in the re- cent past. These earnings will again be used chiefly to finance imports of Western grain-—which presumably will continue at | about last year's level. China's net export earnings from trade with Hong Kong, its largest source of free world currency, are up about 25 per- cent over 1962 and are running at an annual rate of about $250 million. China's favorable trade balance with Malaysia may | reach about $80 million this year, about 10 percent over the level achieved last year with the members of the new federa- tion. Sino-Japanese trade is currently at an annual rate of ‘slightly over $100 million-—-up from $84 million last year. China's economic aid. proj- ects in the non-Communist Far East have been implemented slowly in the last few years. Such activities are expected to remain at a moderate level as long as China's attention is riveted on earning foreign ex-~ change to buy grain. 29 Nov 63 ee eee es (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW cet tte hy Dh oa he The Communist World PEIPING 'S -ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH NON -COMMUNIST.. ASIA. eer eo a eng ee nn The Chinese may, however, be willing to provide additiona economic assistance to Cambodia which so far has utilized about 60 percent of a total of $50 million in Chinese grants. Peiping responded favorably al- though cautiously to overtures from Prince Sihanouk after his announcement of Cambodia's de- cision to end the US aid progra Earlier good-will gestures in- cluded Liu Shao-chi's visit to Cambodia last May, followed by a trip to China by a Cambodian bank delegation. Recently Chinese technicians arrived in Cambodia to survey prospects for construction of a glass factory to be financed under a 1960 gran 4A Chinese delegation this month arrived in Djakarta to discuss impleméntation of a $30- million credit extended in 1961 for a textile plant. Peiping recently agreed to provide Cey- lon with textile plants and equipment under their $16-mil-— lion aid pact signed in 1957. ‘Peiping's largest single economic aid pact--an $84-mil- lion credit extended to Burma in 1961--has been drawn down by only about $2 million. Burma, however, has recently aecepted a Chinese offer to build two bridges in northern Burma, and there are indications that formal approval of other Chinese aid projects will be forthcoming in the near future. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Page 5 TOP SECRET DINAR
13-00000 ‘ + aN TOP SECRET DINAR JAPANESE ELECTION OUTCOME os aie cen _ —--+ The Japanese general elec- tion on 21 November was charac- terized by a paucity of real issues and a low voter turnout. It brought no significant shift in the balance between the ruling Liberal. Democratic Party (LDP) and the leftist opposition. : The LDP won 283 seats. and is expected to pick up most of | the 12 conservative “independ- ; ents." Adherence by all of these |] mevertheless would leave the LDP || Still seven seats short of the .-| position it held after the 1960 elections. . On the left, the important feature was the failure of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to gain, while the more moderate .,| Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) obtained six more seats than it |, won in 1960. The Japan Commu- |! nist Party (JCP) now holds five | seats, a gain of two over its 1960 performance. The voter's support of -the ij LDP suggests that the electorate “4° is generally satisfied with con- \} ditions and progress under the \), Tkeda government. The LDP's victory falls short, however, 29 Nov S53 CURRENT INTELLICENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Asia~Africa of assuring Ikeda a third term as party president or of strength- ening his position within the party. Intensification of internal rivalries for position within the party is certain until precedences among the fac-. tion leaders can be hammered out. Actual damage to the party and to Ikeda's position nevertheless will probably be offset by the fact that-the lost seats for the most part went to the DSP, while the JSP, the real enemy, was defeated. A period of critical seif- examination and possible changes of leadership clearly are in store for the JSP. Its net loss of one seat in the face of gains by its DSP and JCP - rivals may have seriously damaged its carefully self-con-— trived image as the leftist ‘twave of the future," destined to control the government by 1970. Loss of extreme left- wing. support to the JCP may be attributed to the confrontation of the JSP and JCP over the nu- clear test ban treaty and to the JCP's pro-Chinese stand. / The JSP's failure to reform | internally may have influenced -some voters to shift to the DSP. ' (CONFIDENTIAL) Page 6
13-00000 Ni "NORTH, | Muang Nakhon Pranomde ry ainek oe) | Sakon Nation B ENS DEMARCATION LINE | | | ¢ | "¢ ene § See Te revere! LNG ro Un see | ‘ee VAS “Een EL CORPS ZONE QTHTEN: ote Ga MAR wens * BBa Nang (Tourene) f QUANG N As opefain Buu hea! Nien sth Divisian we BINH oy. : Non 4 DINH ae i 2054 ave Il CORPS j PHU, ZONE YEN Stuy Hea Hap We tu: ee gh huoe Bini OARS TRUC Car ee ae 7H 4 SaptratMilit y Zone ya TTI ‘CORPS. ZONE - ‘ \ Motes HOA Pe SOUTH VIETNAM Ty TNO ee . | MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ee RES Hoa COTA BIN, i BOUNDARIES HEY Hung w . BA XUVEW 5 ‘e xh “TV cones ZoNE | "mana Division boundary N . i ames Military Region boundary Province boundary Pe a Sere (Pouts Condore} COR Son ' CONFIDENTIAL CON $Om 4 2 50 75 100 Mites *Initials PBT (Phuoc Binh Thanh) derived | 75 100 Kitomaters from names of provinces within the Zone. | z _ 1% ge BOUMBARY f REPRESENTA TIN 6s err ECABERRELY AUTHORITATIVE | ‘CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
13-00000 ‘ ee OP SECRET DINAR Asia-Africa HIGH LEVEL CF VIET CGNG ACTIVITY IN SCUTH VISTNAM on PT ~ “ s 7 i fe" "~~ Gonmunist military activity -/ ain gouth Vietnam has continued at an unusually high tempo in the |; three weeks since the coup in ‘; Saigon. Despite some slackening ' Of the pace, the greater effec- {i spread to new areas will increase | pressure on the country's new military rulers to produce some dramatic achievement to sustain the psychological lift generated by their takeover. In the week ending 13 November, Viet Cong attacks dropped to 149 from the previous week's alletime high of 233, but were still 50 percent above the average level set over the past year. A number of actions on 24 November emphasized the . i boldness of the Viet Cong offensive. A battalion-size attack overran a Special Forces. training camp about 25 miles: “north of Saigon,causing heavy losses among both government {| troops and US advisers. Ground > i) fire damaged several government ‘; aircraft operating in the south- ernmost.provinces. Near the ;} QLaotian border in the central | highlands province of Kontum, two strategic hamlets were attacked. In the delta, along the area of the heaviest Communist activity, a recent concentra- tion of attacks in Dinh Tuong Province, just southwest of Saigon, and to.a lesser extent in its northern neighbors Long An and Hau Nehia, has suggested a possihle effort to secure a nee ae tiveness of the attacks and their ‘Dinh, the new security minister, 29 Nov 63. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW corridor between the Communist . war zone adjacent to Cambodia in Tay Ninh Province, and strongholds farther south in the delta. The Kontum attacks, however, suggest a step-up may now be under way in northern South Vietnam. A heavy volume of communications traffic was directed to this general area by North Vietnam's | military high command from 15 | November through at least 21 November. South Vietnam's military leaders are aware of the need to move rapidly in pressing the war against the Viet Cong. They are continuing to try to ' strengthen intelligence functions, and reportedly plan to reshuffle commanders in the I and II Corps if gones in the north. They have | | already named vigorous new commanders in the III and IV Corps Zones, but reportedly have not yet succeeded in : getting ambitious General i { to relinquish control of the | IiiI Corps Zone, which surrounds i Saigon. Dinh, whose political iF intentions remain a concern | of the junta, that he hopes to keep the t | is also stating } i strategic hamlet program under iy | his ministry. Meanwhile, the generals |" are getting little active help | from civilian politicians, iz and remain under pressure from various urban groups to continue j weeding out the traces of the iy Diem regime. (TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Page 7 TOP SECRET DINAR
13-00000  Muong Kheung Ban Song Hoc 3 uate Bauak psaregl ou Phou tert bd Phou Khoun — _Muong Ptianh e 2% : | | 7 : evelengOanh- og : vines ; Lg Lat Howang _. spp Meng Khouang Oe Jot. nh) or wae 3 - * } Ef f X Xe ¢ Ban Ta Viang "palin . “ww oe rs ‘ an Le” A O- “Sf Ban Nameone rye See Ban Hin Heap nomenon Track or trail . pao me. STATUTE MILES CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
13-00000 TOP SECRET DINAR AREA NOTE nn a ae ae Laos: {° K ‘widening ‘breach — /Wappears tobe developing be- . /tween the Souvanna government | in Laos and the Communist | Pathet Lao. Further talks on |: the Plaine des Jarres between i: Kong Le, chief of Souvanna's |' military forces, and Pathet Lao || Commander Singkapo have been , jeopardized by an exchange of ‘allegations of bad faith. The ‘| particular attitudes and inten~ , tions of Premier Souvanna and. of the Pathet Lao strategists remain obscure. In the military field, the || initiative rests for the moment :{ with the government. A well- ef coordinated clearing action ', launched north of Vientiane on ii 21 November by forces under Kong | Le and rightist General Phoumi, , along with Meo guerrilla elements, I has met with considerable success. + The government forces have secured “Vang” Vieng “and its ,airfield-- | | town remains under heavy threat.’ | developments thus far has been ~ FOREIGN. DISSEM) _ Asia-Africa long held by the Pathet Lao-= | and also have pushed enemy ele- || ments from Ban Namone, farther. south on the main road. Al« though an earlier push by a similar combination of govern= ment forces in the Plaine des Jarres area did not attain com- parable successes, the Pathet Lao position at Xieng Khouang || -Communist reaction to these | i limited to propaganda warnings. | However, there are unconfirmed [ reports of North Vietnamese troop reinforcements in the [ Plaine des Jarres, and irregu- i | larities noted since mid-Novem-. ber on the Hanoi-controlled aa military net in Laos could in~- =| ‘dicate a change in disposition =. or strength of Communist.forces | in Laos. (TOP SECRET DINAR NO Is The stability of the re« /. gimes in Iraq and Syria is still / uncertain in the wake of the , army coup in Iraq. leaves unsettled the status of future relationships between these two countries as well as between them and Egypt. i In Iraq, two ministers have threatened to resign unless the new government adopts a firm Mt stand regarding union with Egypt, according to an intercepted 2h 29 Nov 63 This in turn -—[who oppose the retention of inet, and President Arif may CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW | Keyptian ‘message from ‘Baghdad. Also unhappy are a number of non-Baathist army officers several Baathists in the cabi-~- have some difficulty in holding together the disparate army ele-: ments who carried out the coup. // A meeting to elect a National | Revolutionary Council--on paper |: the country's highest organ-- adjourned without reaching a decision when disputes proved insuperable. a ae foresees eS ne cemenemennrne 7) Page 8 TOP SECRET NINAR
13-00000 By .* * ’ 6 4 TOP SECRET DINAR 5 Pome gown wee ere te shee Statements by Iraqi regime sposxesmen, however, have con- tinued to be conciliatory to the Baath. They have reiterated that the coup was not directed toward any party, and Premier Tahir Yahya has said that the new government will continue the previous regime's policies. In Syria, the Baathist re- gime is split between moderates | who want tc broaden the regime's | power base and a doctrinaire faction that wishes to keep the government under exclusively Baathist control. The doctrin- aire faction feels that several statements made by Premier Hafiz since he returned from Baghdad (where he was caught at the out- break of the coup) are concilia-~ tory to non-Baathist elements and reflect his personal opin- ions rather than party decisions. ' This dissension within the Baath may affect the government's - ability to protect itself against anti-Baath coup plotters who have been heartened by events — in Iraq. In an effort to moderate the initially violent Syrian reaction against the coup in Baghdad, Hafiz had in fact en- dorsed the Iraqi Army's move against the national guard, the i\. Iraqi Baath Party's paramili- | tary arm. He also praised Presi- dent Arif as a "brave Arab sol- | dier" and claimed that the coup 1, was staged by "Baathist ele- |, ments." The Iraqi regime for ‘its part has proclaimed that |’ military union with Syria re- \\ mains in force and that a new 29 Nov 63 Madrid. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW ASia-Africa will be announced shortly. Syrian troops fighting in north- ern Iraq will evidently remain there, but a small Syrian unit stationed near Baghdad is being withdrawn. The Syrians have also agreed to expel Iraqi Baathist extremist Ali Saleh Saadi after a message from Iraq protested that his presence in Damascus violated an agreement--presum= ably made by the new Iraqi leaders with Hafiz and other Syrian Baathists. Saadi_ had arrived in Syria unannounced following a short exile in While Cairo propaganda con— tinues to call for a coup in Syria similar to that in Iraq the Egyptians appear to be grow- ing disillusioned over the course of events in Iraq. Inter- cepted Egyptian messages from Baghdad. express considerable concern with the inclusion of Baathists in the new cabinet and with the course President Arif appears to be following. The messages complain that no pro=- Egyptian nationalist party is represented in the cabinet and that Arif is an opportunist. The Egyptians in Baghdad have advised Cairo radio to "expose" Arif. Cairo papers have backed | off somewhat from their all-out support of the Iraqi coup since the announcement of the com=- position of the new cabinet. (TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN - DISSEN) Page 9 TOP SECRET DINAR
13-00000 CONGOLESE EXPEL SOVIET DIPLOMATS _ . “Congolese Premier Adoula | last week declared all Soviet Em bassy personnel in Leopoldville persona non grata. Adoula's move followed the arrest on 19 Novem- ber of two Soviet diplomats found carrying documents showing the Seo. viets to be giving financial as- sistance and encouragement to a group of radical anti-Adoula exiles across the Congo River in Brazzaville. All of the Soviet staff reportedly had departed by 23 November. .The premier charged that the captured documents proved “unques— tionably" the collusion of the So- viet Embassy with the leftist “com mittee of national liberation" in Brazzaville. He did not however, break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and has stated that he will consider the appoint- ment of a new ambassador. Although Moscow has bitterly protested the expulsion of its officiais, it has indicated an intention to replace them rather than retaliate against the Congo. No action has been taken against the Lecpoldville missions of three other Soviet blioc coun- tries--—Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria. Adoula earlier planned to expel both the Soviet and Czech missions, and for at. least a month the Congolese have been debating gome action to curb antigovernment activities by all the Soviet bloc missions, Soviet bloc representa-— tives have long been in contact with dissident Congolese groups, ' and their activity appears to re- flect routine clandestine contacts and financial aid rather than So- viet backing of any imminent coup attempt. TOP SECRET DINAR Asia-~Africa adherents of ‘the imprisoned Antoine Gizenga and the late Premier Patrice Lumumba. They fled to Brazzaville following Adoula‘s closing of parlia- ment in late September, Led by for- mer Lumumbist Vice Premier Chris. tophe Ghenye, thev have been able to operate fairly freely in the Brazza- ville Congo's present confused at- mosphere under the shaky provisional | regime of Massamba-Debat. They have declared themselves a “committee of national liberation" for the Leopold- ville Congo and are trying te convey the impression that they constitute a "government—in-exile," The captured documents reveal considerable infighting and confusion on tactics within the group. The exiles nevertheless have been press- ing for foreign support, arms, and ‘funds, are trying to establish an or- ganization inside the Leopoldville Congo, and hope to subvert its army. They reportedly plan also to try to assassinate leaders of its govern- ment. Their successes and capabili- ties presently seem limited, but their activities may well lead to further friction between the Leo- poldville and Brazzaville regimes. Katanga's ex-President Tshombé, still in exile in Barcelona, has again appealed to Adoula to permit him to return soon to the Congo, Leopoldville government apparently still opposes Tshombé's return, and his bid for a high government post | has been rejected. Tshombé's recent promise to col-/|; laborate with the Leopoldville gov- /, / ernment in the 1964 parliamentary elections appears to be having some | appeal, however. Tshombé says he has decided to return soon, but has | indicated he will await assurances | for his personal safety from the The | 7 The Congolese exiles in Braz- | central government. (SECRET NO 7 | \ zaville consist of perhaps 50 anti- FOREIGN DISSEM) ty \4 Adoula politicians and soldiers, | i eye ee ce a wee oe — —y u : — -+ eee “y 29 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 10 TOP SECRET DINAR ee ae
13-00000 _ ALGERIA MAURITANIA Ti mbu ktu S oKayes BAMAKO oe AL ° UPPER VOLTA. iol QUAGADOUGOU . yA GUINEA i ' CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
13-00000 een _— TOP SECRET DINAR Asia-Africa et erent aman ma MALAISE IN MALI nas Mali' s leftist governnent: is facing increasingly urgent economic and political problems at a time when President Modibo Keita's efforts to mediate the - Moroccan-Algerian dispute have raised his standing to a new high elsewhere in Africa. In the face of mounting criticism from politicians with strong local power bases and from young gov- ernment functionaries, Keita is devoting major attention to defending his party's hegemony. He must also contend with dissi- dence among nomadic tribesmen and with a desperate foreign ex- change shortage. The key problem probably is that. of foreign exchange. The government brought most of its troubles on itself a year and a half ago when, in a fit of excessive Marxist-~flavored anticolonialism, it in effect cut itself off from automatic access to the French foreign . exchange reserves and set up a Malian currency. Since then a steady adverse trade balance has cut into the country's own meager reserves, and by mid- November they had fallen to an estimated $1 million. The gov- ernment's budget deficit is '' running about $14 million an- |: wally. France reluctantly ' bailed the Malians out once be- \- fore with a stopgap dole, but | it may be unwilling to do so | again. The bloc has consistent- 8 refused to extend budgetary | assistance, although it has pro- | vid:d development credits. 7_amoun ting to $67. 5 million. \ Aen cere a eee -fluential spokesmen both in the ' country's northern deserts. Doctrinaire rigidity has helped to make ineffective the government's efforts to alleviate this situation. Whereas Guinea's Sekou Touré has recently retreated from "African socialism" when faced with an even worse situa- tion, Keita and his associates have been reluctant co curtail the activities of such consistent money-losers as the state trading company and the state airline. This evidence of ineffective- =. ness has brought to the surface dissatisfaction among local pol- iticians whom Keita has never succeeded in bringing under close control of his Soudanese Union Party. These local figures, who generally occupy the conserv- ative end of the spectrum, seem to control the National assembly. They also have at least some in- party's political bureau and in the executive branch of the gov-~- ernment, especially among elements desiring a pragmatic approach to Mali's problems. At the same time, Keita is faced with active defiance of the regime's authority on the part of Tuareg nomads in the Half of the army reportedly now is deployed in an effort, so far unsuccessful, to halt raids by these tribesmen. Keita himself has spent most of this month in outlying areas, trying to re-establish party control over potential and actual centers of dissidence. -(CON- FIDENTIAL).
13-00000 ix TOP. SECRET DINAR The 21-22, November talks” between Charles de Gaulle and Ludwig Erhard seem to have estab- lished a good working relation- ship and clarified aspects of France's and West Germany's national policies, but produced | few. decisions. De Gaulle-reportedly en- couraged Erhard to take some initiative toward a politically united Europe, and Erhard re- sponded that he would give the matter sympathetic consideration. In his public statements, how- -ever, Erhard again made it plain {| that he favored a Europe rooted in an Atlantic community rather than the French-led third force which De Gaulle envisages. On defense questions, the new German chancellor and the veteran French chief of state “agreed to disagree." De Gaulle reportedly lectured Erhard on the “Gaullist view that France cannot depend on the US but rather. needs its own nuclear force, while Erhard publicly reaffirmed Germany's trust in the protec- tive shield of US military power. Neither leader disparaged the other's position, however, and Erhard that France has no inten- tion of forcing Bonn to choose between Paris and Washington. On the divisive and po=- litically treacherous issue of 29 Nov 63 THE, DE GAULLE ~ - _ ERHARD. TALKS. _. ‘|. EEC agricultural policy. De Gaulle is said to have assured — CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Europe er ntti eer ce engaging mente nein: 5 Sn ie aes Rae nn . Rewer ae sn cree on Teeth esis Fees a pene ne Common Market, some slight progress was made. Neither leader appeared prepared as yet to accept the Mansholt plan whereby a single community grain price would be set between the high German level and the lower French level, but, accord- ing to a German observer, they agreed that the proposal offered a good working basis. Implicit in the relaxed atmosphere was — the suggestion that De Gaulle now is willing to discuss the grain issue beyond the year- end deadline he had previously set for final agreement on It was agreed, moreover, that EEC arrangements for beef, dairy products, and rice-be completed by the end of December. In addition, the communiqué issued at the close of the. talks looked forward to the successful conclusion of the negotiations envisaged by the US Trade Expansion Act. Erhard and De Gaulle throughout the talks apparently maintained an air of cordiality, but Erhard demonstrated that he was neither so innately sympa~- thetic to De Gaulle's views as was Konrad Adenauer nor so willing to play a secondary role, Thus Erhard may have served notice that a somewhat sterner era for Franco-German relationships has arrived. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Page 12 TOP SECRET DINAR
13-00000 TOP SECRET DINAR WESTERN 1 EUROPE 'S STEEL PROBLEM — The Council of “the “European Coal-Steel Community (CSC) is meeting on 2 December to deal with the problems that afflict the continental steel. industry. The session promises to have far-reaching implications for the CSC's future as well as for ; the eventual outcome of inter- /« national tariff negotiations ' that are set for next spring. The steel industry in the Six now is running about 20 “percent below capacity. More- + 4 over, steel manufacturers have, in recent months, suffered from .. | reductions in price that have taken place both inside and out- side the community. During the past year, CSC officials have advanced several possible solu- tions to the problem--including the promotion of both official or private agreements with for-~ ' eign producers to limit their | @xports--but mone of these has proved effective. Py More recently, the CSC has {| been increasingly attracted to the idea of raising tariffs, ‘but so far has not received solid backing from the member states for such a move, The Council has also been put on notice by the US that a tariff hike on an item so important as steel would have grave polit-— ical and psychological conse-— quences on the forthcoming tariff negotiations, re However, pressure for a steel tariff hike or some oth- er restrictive action again seems to be building up. The latest word from Paris, for example, indicates that the \ g | French Government “may have re- European communities. versed its ‘position and | now will support a tariff rise that was proposed by Bonn three months ago. If Paris and Bonn | see eye to eye on this, it is 4 probable that their tariffs will y go up to 9 percent-~the pres- i o3 ent level in Italy. A restric- {| ° tion on trade would primarily Poo affect Japan, Austria, and the . UK, the bloc. The political importance _ of the steel tariff question to the CSC has been generally recognized in the community. | President Del Bo has intimated to US officials that unless the CSC can produce a Community- | wide solution to the challenge, the CSC's very existence will be threatened. The CSC's failure to pro- duce a solution to date, how- ever, is indicative of its de- clining power and prestige. Its governing body, the High Authority, has, in theory, more power than its counterpart in the Common Market, But this authority has sharply deteri- orated because of its failure to exercise its powers and the appointment of mediocre per- sonnel to its staff. This deterioration began in 1958 when, under very smiliar cir- cumstances, the High Authority was unable to produce a solution to the then serious glut in coal, Should the member states resort to urilateral solution to the present problems in steel, there would be little left of the CSC..the first and most supranational of the three (CONF IDEN. TIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) since the CSc already has : strict quotas on imports from 7
13-00000 ‘ @? > TOP SECRET DINAR AREA NOTES cee wie ame npr wR gene cane cea fer . poe tally. (Geaders: of “Tealy* s / four Coalition parties reached ' agreement over the week end on ‘the proposed program for a cen- ter-left government and submitted ‘it to their parties’ national executive committees for approval. Ratification by Pietro Nenni'‘s | Italian Socialist Party is com- plicated by an intransigent group of 10 of the 32 left-wingers anong the party's 87 parliamen- tary deputies. A party spokesman told US Embassy officials that Nenni was willing to risk a } split on _... Brazil: Sy Recently published ‘statements by President Goulart .{{have added to the widespread un- -yest in Brazil and increased speculation that he is planning to establish an authoritarian regime, In an interview with the Brazilian weekly Manchete, published on 20 November, Gou- lart declared that he had no doubt Brazil's rampant infla- tion will push the country "in- evitably to bankruptcy" and a “social disaster of catastrophic proportions." He emphasized his lack of presidential powers to solve the present crisis. Goulart's words have aroused | Sharp criticism from reponsible ' political leaders and influential | newspapers, Ranieri Mazzilli, | president of the Chamber of Dep~ “uties and next in line for the ‘presidency, expressed his sus- _picion of Goulart's motives to Ambassador Gordon and ‘Stated 29 Nov 63 7. in the party to go along with ' one stumbling block. ; that Brazilian democracy is eX~= ‘army officers that Goulart may CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW the accord. Negotiations over appoint- ments to the cabinet have pro- ceeded with some degree of ur-— gency. There was general agree- ment that the Christian Democrats would retain the defense portfolio, | as well as the Ministry of In~ | terior, which controls the police, || The question of ex-Premier Amintore | Fanfani's participation has been | (CONFIDEN- TIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) | ae Western Hemisphere _ a Low woe as 4 herewmen” periencing ‘its "gravest -testing time" since the 1946 Constitution was adopted. The US Army attaché reports a growing concern among attempt some extreme action during the next few weeks. The additional unrest provoked by the President's comments has encouraged re- newed plotting by rightist elements, such as the Marshal Odylio Denys group. It has also increased the chances of an illegal action by the op- position which Goulart could use aS @ pretext to assume greater powers. In any event, it is likely that political tension will remain high for the foreseeable future. (SE- CRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACK~ GROUND USE ONLY) Page 14
13-00000 AREA NOTE Venezuela: + Communist ter- Trorists can be expected to con- | tinue right up to election day \ their campaign to sabotage the | voting in Venezuela on 1 Decem- | ber for a new president and congress. There is no reason, moreover, to helieve they will turn from violence afterward. ernment security forces has been steadily improving, how- ever, and more terrorists are being arrested each day. The Venezuelan armed forces con- tinue to investigate reports lof Clandestine landings of weap- -‘lons for terrorist forces, as : well as airdrops of supplies. ine ' \gide Venezuela.. The air force ‘lis laying plans to intercept With the security situation easonably well in hand, there ‘29 Nov 63 The proficiency of the gov- | i “Raul Leoni, heading the Demo- a _ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW TOP SECRET DINAR TOP SECRET DINAR Western Hemisphere “is no “question that the elections will be held on schedule. In addition, the prospects are that the voters will turn out in large numbers despite Com- munist efforts to intimidate them. In any event, electioneer- ing has continued apace, and most observers still consider cratic Action party's ticket, | to be the likely winner by a small plurality. The victor's biggest prob~ | lem will be to pull together | an effective coalition govern- ; ment. Leoni lacks the personal : magnetism and political acumen of incumbent President Betan-— court. Failure on Leoni's part | to convince the military of his Y ability to handle the terrorist problem could encourage plotting for a coup d'etat. (TOP SECRET DINAR)__ pe i i OT ‘ NN Page 15