| Be For many people outeide of the US, even the export of : I: : ‘subversion py forcé and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication, ° : | ES ag well as funds, arms, end ‘other (We, for example, are } . not ashemed of the Bay of Pigs expedition except that it failed. 7 So . a | b, Usually attitudes toward violent subversion depend on - a , 5 attitudes toward thetarget, (Example: acts against J tminez , Trujillo 1 did not offend US/ most of Latin: Aworten/ + most of the world; the paral-— 1s ge, today: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser), We run the danger of felling fe : into the USSR projection of the US «s the “world gendarme." Subversion ve, 4 “directed against the Dutch goverauent would owbrage not only all Americans, o but also all non-Commmist Buropesne; ites legitimacy is total, . But the ‘sane can not be said for most LA governments, he aitference is decisive end per aps sometimes neglected. | . . oS _t, Most people general Ly recognize thet when violent subversion as is yowerdul, it is because it taps fndanental sources of discontent. ad. We in the US tend to look ot su eion in Letin America fe @ ‘ron the point-of-view of hardware. Bub a gre at deal of. the subversion " in latin Aneriea is or at least sappe ears ag ide ca-centered, not hardware-. Oy centered, The export of “armed eaeression" w dedicated revoluticnaries bE is only & pert of the process. | Another yart, watch is at ‘Least as imper- 7 tant, and probebly more: BO, ‘is the export ¢ of: propaganda. This ’ however, to much of the worl, including LetincAmer toa outside of ‘the oligaerchies , will eppoer as an export of idens and ideals (perhaps wrong, bub never- - thels s ideas). Qur approach, then, tends to pass rather then meet the sets saonun » BE sere . “ 2 HY 50955 DBocld: 324293736 Page i234
latino viewpoints, We are very close to putting ourselves into the _ position of ‘the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute force against ‘the powerof ideas. The tre: ap is thet we may seem thereby to be acknow~ leaging the decline. and lominent fall of our own Idess e.” One consequence of this line of “reasoning would be that, “ “Lf we ever find it necessary to invede Cuba, we’ should do sO nies to stop the tiring squads," "to gusrantee free elections," -- but not to save Pomona 6 “How feasible is it for us to control both:kindsa of subversion se Be tee = rather then at ‘the source? | Be tis often feasible. This is how we have “dn fact success~ fully controlled subversion e3 xcept in the dubious case of 5. Vietnam. Even in the: aifftoult case of Greece, * we succeeded by. a  combinetion of militery ond economic. measures. tng the problens rather 16 is often practicable and also often the most abt way ES. a ve eas with th x eg ‘That for reasons ol! exped oy We a ty to tistntain Castro! 8 ag" ae d.e., what many Letinoes Wo wid resara os "socialism." ce. That we gave the Cuban people an obvious free choice, no Cc. " matter what ensued, How would the prospects for Co:snmism in the Western Hemisphere be affected? a _eemeom semen v, The point, is not tha t thie is alweys a. feasible wey or ond 4 HY 50955 DBocld: 324293736 Page 125
TO evecare P SEC Case A: Boomerang ~- we would almost certainly enhance the y Casé B: There would be strong pooulear Lotin American support > iy - ome governmental outrage, but the pros speets for Commmism would be catia aned., Case C; Paradoxically, the result would depend on what ensued, -because most Latin Americans do not trust-the US (and particulerly would a _ be skeptical of "free elections" if US scldters were present). - CONCINSIONS © 0 _ . oad. Conditions in most parte of Iatin America ere such that sub- care “version (Cuban. or > Bloo | or -poth) is real y dangerous. S 2, Sin ce this is 80, the US public posture should not recomiize ‘this } and we should abstain from public pronowmeenents that subversion . ds conceivably a casus belli. 4, The point-of-view Bet forth in this papery insofar as 1% can o -; be mace operative, may tend to bring 3 fundement col eli Lgmment between the US public posture and LA opinion. 7 | ok: the US ‘course 0 of action tovards - any TA country has to we igh the _ advan ‘ages anid disadvantages , dn any given ¢ case at any given tine, of subversion eontrol () at, “source or (o).2 at point of. ‘impact. . x . The seme principles ‘vould apehy red enother Commmist-oriented “govert mont 9 were ta “core: ‘to power in any part of Latin America, reset anetnnenbtdce  atnce ‘prospects for Commmisn. . ae ats \ HY 50955 DBocld: 324293736 Page 1236