HW 54714 DoclId: 324274904 Page 6 esgsistance fron the OAS nation. La mf$zgoie If the operation is conducted 6&3 guichly es possible and with euffictent force so that the Corsiunist bloc evolility to tale effective cousctorercusulss Wal reducoc to a wes then exnphasized strongly by Gen Craig thet th JCS were very apprehensive in regard that the Soviets vere carable of taking a page fiuom our Leck ard estetisn &h overseas miiltary bese om bases in Cuua. It would greatly Snerease our national vulnerability and our defense cost as furces would heave to be developed or shifted to meet this tnrest from the South, that the Soviets Lad ar option on which they could foreclose at any tie in this regard. They can care decision to establish a .iilitasy base tn Cuba at their will and pleasure with as little ax if any cost, that shecuid this te doe, fe, military base established by the Soviets in Suva before we inter- vere, We would Likely be unable to remove thei by initiating World var Liz. Consequently, we feel it rardatery we face the facts squarely now eng Gftermine as carly as possible whether we can rid Cuba of Conmunism ty covert eupport cf Cubans within and Cuba. It 19 equally ‘aportant frox logistics pabtiieng PUMPres wee that we have en early decision as to whether we defini ely intend to uge rilitery force ££ the covert means fail. It was em-hasiced shat én the event the Sovicts foreclose the cpticn ard ectabiish bases in Cuba cor accept Cute as the iccitinate sccher of the Varsar Pacs that either onc cof these cots weuld place ren dtuens ond and new facts beartng on the problem and intrcduced cendiderations which would pectpone positive acticn tndefintely if ret pree.ude for ‘the foreseeatle Miture the eliinination of the Concminist recime since to remove the base might vell triccoor Vorid Wor Til. “pr, Goodwin inéfeated to the creup that the views Toonerossed 4n regard to the cons &e tame a: a) ah ok er or. er oa a rian on - Sfens under which we toele co in withonuey
A political judenent. I indicated that this was & political. military judgment, there waS no doubt about it but thas it certainly did involve the Defense and Ics responsibilities, inasmuch as NSAM No. 55 published last June, the President had informed tne Joint Chiefs of Staff that he considered tnem to be more than military men and should advise him on such ratters, when it involved the security of the United States, that the JOint Chiefs of Staff felt obligated to so advise the rresident, When I made this statement Hr, Kennedy indicated to the effect that this was correct, that it was the responsibility of the Jcs to make recommendations o: this nature. ‘ Mr. Goodwin did not pursue the matter further at tnis time. Mr, Goodwin then queried me in regard to the reactions capabilit?: of the US forces in cher countries of Latin America, that if suck & requirement occureed while we were engaged in Cuba, this seemed to be the general tarust of his queries. i indicated to him that Gen O'Mara was currently comfing up with estimates based on U3 reaction for 2 countries to be selected ty him in the Caribbean area. Each one to have plans for a company size unit ard a battl group size unit, tir, Gilpatrie the 1a that it was the intent of Defen € the Panama Canal Zone to give this capability a quick reaction proposed to say at this time that the 6 - 1303 remain i 5 'e;° ; Kr, Goodwin then was requested to Give a briefing on the Sta’ Situation in regard to tie Caribbean Survey Group. He teyan by Baying thee was no proof of Cudan infiitrations into other count or Latin Averica of Cuban exportation of weapons and cuerrilias and Coc:mnists irom Cuba to otner Latin Arerican countries. He ’ indicated BO far we have been unable to get any evidence to the effect that this waa being done. -Mr. Kennedy questioned i'r. Goodwin closely on this s.b’cet ashing why he could not find evidence when we knew this to be a fact. itr. Goodwin 3ai@ tiat everytning possible was being done to turn up this evidence but without success, Er, rennady then queried hin as to wnat kinw Of poeple were worzins on tnis for state, Mo, Helms interceded t< Say that at was quest.icnable whether Castro was takins such ac HW 542714 DBocld:324274904 Page 7
HW 54714 DoclId: 324274904 Page 6 to export Corsszuniss by way of guerrillas, arms, ete., had been temporarily played in the lew key that CIA too had treuble in turning up positive evidence since it had been unable to do so to date. Mr. Goodwin added that many allegations had been sade against Castro but no proof of Cuban aggression had been proven as yet. He indicated the proof of it would be a distinct asset to us at this tims. He then said the US should probe harder for splitting the leadership in Cuba. Raul Castro, for example, is a good possibility. We need a way to get next to this man, Mr, Goodwin then said that there were overtones througnout the US that the US was planning an invasion of Cubs, that this was detrimental ,to our relationships world-wide. Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. Kennedy indicated that no matter what was being done, there would be rumors to this effect and such overtones would be voiced about the country that it was possibly because we were nearing the anniversary of the Purpy Road operation. Mr. Goodwin said the Cuban Revolutionary Cou manresentative was in Washington and wanted reassurance that the US planned ty help Cuba. .Mr. Goodwin indicated that sympathy for Cuba 1s gaining ground, ..e mentioned Guatemala and Argentina as examples where Cubans had succeedea » tenporary gain in public opinion and propaganda, Mr. Kennedy then asked mr, faninin whet the prospects were for the future and Mr. Goodwin said that the prospects for the next 2 or 3 years are terrible. Mr. Goodwin indicated that one of the items on tomorrow's agenda for the Special Group would be discussion of tractors for prisoners in Cuba. Mr, Helms broucht out the fact that cembers of Congress had been opposed to this and before anything was done in regard to spending US money in this way, Consress must be checked, pince they had expressed a desire to be brought into the picture before such a project was laid on, Mr. Goodwin indicated that the Piat Automotive Compan had needed for 416,000,000, no dewn payment, ten years to pay. So
HW 54714 DoclId: 324274904 Page 9 2 fo 4 ad 0 “4 x ° 39 red Q. w w “a fo] log 7) fe] ‘3 ow ° ct Q < 3 ys 0 oy e3 hi ~ Q to cf oo tor Ht u ar ie) 1: rary (o% QQ wv to rary Bp he said I was free to tring up anything tomerrow morninc, 22 Maren, that Ioweuld léke for hie were to handle before he left. I indicated there xz several cutstand ing pieces of business which I would lile to get his ecproval on and signature before he left and arransed that I would met hin at 10009, 22 March, in his office. He indicated also he would 14 to have the risk paper ready to be referred to the Speeital Group on 22 March, I indicated this could be done bince JCS had alread approved it and it was ready for hts signature and referance to Gen Lansdale, Mr. Ryan of USIA then presented the following information from that agency. They are increasing the Cuban coveraze in radio to 3 hours a day. No direct damning has yet been expertenc and tendency to edge in on wave lengths being used has been noticed. He mentioned the refugee children as being a sood propasanda pessibility, one which we should exploit. There are 8000 children being sent out of Cuba in order to avoid the Commun indoctrination and the hard times elperienced in Cuba now. This tsasanad taxne: should be exploited, Their conte books are being prepoee eee being the fact that Comminigsm is the enemy of religion. Another idea 1s the fact that the Communists have taken over the Havana University. This igs being propagandized, Another project is the Gefectcr situation, which USTA ‘8 pushing through television coverags?, Mo. Ryan edded that us vill be flayed and criticized no matter what she does in this area in Latin America, but we should fet foins with a counter-ferse oprra- tion to counter such criticisn, The US seams to have a dutlt-in resistance in Latin fmeriea, People fust naturally do not like the US, as far as thet Verbal roaction to our actions, These consider the US an ereressor verdaliy, It 4g Proper to critict«a the US in this crea, However, @ ccunter-foree can help. Most hatin Amerteans realize that the Ul must do Something abou but their farst meaction, neverthetes » Will bo !f we do enythinn anowt, Cuba ¢o er‘ttetes tha US, this ‘5 th
HW 54714 < DoclId: 324274904 Page Gen Lonscale indicated that we Should exploit the evotronal Fessibiliities of the CCcOO Gutan children mentioned by USIA, Following ccomnents made ty lir, Robert Kennecy: The work involved in the last 2 months has helped us to develop the prodlen we are up against in Cuba. we now fairly well urdéereturd the steps we must take in the future, sore of theae steps we do not like but nevertheless, they are inevitable. It ts not conceivable at this time to ¢all for invasion of US forces in Cuba, however, this sucmer, fall end next year may chance all this. in this first prase, we cuss find out the situation in Cuba and maybe take steps beycrd that. Wekiow more now and we are keeping our- Selves informed. We know what we c2n do, we know what is required. It is not like the situation was last April with resard to our preparedness, The President and his chief advisors consider this the highest priority project in the Governnent. A serious situa- tion has ocen existing in Cuba for several years and it will get mo: oaraful, The President 1s most anxious we be avle to do something about this $9 change it. Gen Lansdale'ts leadership in this project has pushed forward, You are making prosress, doing good work, There is & possizility that the Beslin and South Zast eituation would have an impact on developments in Cuba. we oust he ready to exploit any change that occurs for us. All of this sork and effort is essential and the President keeps an appraisal on it akhost on a daily basis, Tho Presidans is prepared to do whatever has to be done, we nust use our imagination. Mr, Henniedy expressed complete satisfaction with the Group workings on the Project now with Gen Craig, Mr. darvey and Mr. Eelts. He did not mention anyone else repsesenting other Gepartnants, Ve need push nore effort, imagination. He feels the Croup is up wath She Task he urgee for us to go on and he indleated ha would be watching US closely one datiy vesis to see how we are doing and to help us if nezced,