176-10036-10002 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM | "AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10002 . RECORD SERIES : National Security Files - Oe A a eh en an ae hf a aN 0 etm af A. Nh ee et LE sl ID 8 6 SS A A ED OP AED SO GE SS a ORIGINATOR : FROM : - TO: oe TITLE : New Policy on the Congo DATE : 12/13/1962 PAGES : 9 _ SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 | OPENING CRITERIA : , COMMENTS : Congo Cables; restriction information innacurate/missing; box 1
re Ca eideiadiieien sineea Sat Salt eatete eden een eciataie ek near eaten ot eee ees ee ee ate ‘ - TENET ETS, ES erent seem pret ating PROM eee kg te i a nn . “ emable, et with. a, | hosts. Porlienant around has neck, ta take. tops * " aBoaasary for 2 roounoliietion sna Fotntogretion. oe Fhe eM ee ppg oe “"de - Redo). ars - 2-2-8 Oe C NtL- 03°94, ae maa C co, Sa oe Copy g of 25 copies Series A. HEXORANDOR FOR CHE PRESTON ‘We aFo y sacking | te prevent an increase ia Commit inf lusnse | in the Congo,, to reintegrate the Etenga, and to strongthon and. maintain a moderate government ie Leopoldvilie thet can in fact rm ‘thie ‘comtry. ; Without reinvigoration, our ‘Prosont policy cannot achieve a these ands. We Es . ¢rongor and continuss to neneuvar for an a atcestly: volated: to those ascosauont of om: “whl: to act tn Central - | Agpiea. Their disadvantages, in trying to opsrate ia Central. africa . = are ao > great ‘that e thoy: will not move unless it appoars ww: ara’ aise. ms _ : Ss 1 Hatieas, wash. linkted ‘fimenciel Fosouress’ ‘ema probapiy early withéramals of Inddan: ‘troops, cannot Fenain fa the. > Cage: tap os Longer 2 aa, 5a. effestive. fares. Lo ae ‘Bosause United States and. oH poltes/fer™ ell practical purposes, | | ‘pecan inatstinguishsbie, the: Organisation's failure in the Congo, soo bo @ masor Feilure of this. Aduted stration's policy and ous” sortously ‘wndersiine ‘the ) Peacekeeping role of ‘the. Undted: ‘Baticnse oo on
"Fhe pase 5 easumption of our , present Cengo policy ds that ; . wo eould get Katanga reintegrated into tho Congo and an effective moderate government established and functioning in Leopoldvills, : by persuasion end diplomacy backed up by threats ‘of econenis action. fais assumpticn hes turned out to be UFONE. ie as Wong because Thsombo end his supporters are clearly not going to reintegrate wiles: they have. to eid. ‘nothing we have done. convinces Gshanbo that, sa tho i last analysis, he will be forced to it. It is also ‘wrong beeawse We are ‘Bot building en effective Contra! Government: in Leopoldville. A largely irresponsible Perliansnt end 8 flabby administration at not good enough as a political fremeworkes ' Adoule is the best leader on the horizon, ‘but we should be dolping “to develop other political Asedership. 7 “After mush intermational canversstion, Foreign Hinteter Spacie | Ras: sent a private omieseary to Tshoube to get hin %6 accopt a ohango © wo in the method by. viich. UHEK maless its paynsnte. Tho decision to make the ‘peynenits %e. the Central Goverment instead of 6 ‘Bebonbo ahead oo havo been. talon without trying to "oloar ip? with, Pehambs, but. oe Spaak elected to consult fehombe fire, Ye as not yot iene on Maat oo temas Pshoubs will accept Spask*s proposal. Yo ao Yenewe. fron. ; ‘expertionss: that. {2.2¢ requires any astioa on his part to carcy.cut he. dotetl, that action wil] mot be tebon,
CO Peel = a a ‘Shutting oft ‘the UMEK paynente ‘0 Tehambe is still tha ‘best | ; single thing ‘that oan ‘be done to put pressuré on. ‘Tebainbe and lead him to make Katange in fact a part of ‘the Congo. . But UMHK is paturally reluctant. to ‘get out in front of governments, and the Belgians are naturally reluctant to seem more resolute in this matter then tho _ United States. There ‘has also been much ‘talk ebout halting ‘the ‘purchase of on, | Katangen copper and. cobalt. Adoule has now, without adequate, _ceonsultation, proposed to eleven _ countries that they stop buying ~ Katengen cooper end cobalt. Secretary General ‘T Thant was about ‘then’ affective, end. new + logielation in s0ns countries» including \ ALtornative: Hises of Action - to ao. the BAND » but ve prevailed on him to delay his action until next Wook, to. give. tiie Spank. efforts on ‘the payments scheme ime. “= te works 7 an ee ot - Oo . We do not noltove’ that eooriemic sanctions. would be very = “ettistive. “Moreover, they would require ‘poveral months. to make . me a | | “mere: fa, ‘therefore, no imnediate ‘préspect that measures now an teain under the: “y ‘Thant Plan" will do very much ¢.{ ther ‘to res) a integrate ‘the, ‘Katange or to build in Leopolavilie a. govsramont a that can. governs. | er oe a te ee We have carefully considered and rejected, for the time. boing. et least, the’ follows alternatives: 7 aor ‘Bisongnsenont the. Untied. Stats, The _peongptve a
one eee gg eee Oe a te ee oe NE cl A ne mm Ree na me mt oa eke - Afrioa,. aad probably isreparable aime to the WH asa poacolsepers es sO . ‘Afpicans cannot handle , 8, end: fais would open the Congo - $e evontuel Commu ist talkaover's. 7 ‘ge czceten. Loopoldviiie cannot be voughs 30 ‘Long as it has thio 7 alternative of Sovist b adds end SO og Oo no prospact that Pehoibe coula din n eaough ‘support ¢ throughout the Congo to ‘make this a realistic possibility. , : o Content Problems Us eS Polioy cena 0.8, wan. oo Whet: is wrong ‘whee, the ploture 48 ‘ehe abserioe of a 0.8. rs . éeoiston ‘as to what wo would ao, in the. ‘fia enalysic, to. prevent | oS obaciss. ‘Latge-soale massacres, ‘endfor a ina for’ Sovist ‘presanee called a | ia by. radical suosedeors ‘Be Adoula;. If we ‘eontinus to piraus 7 present policies, thoy wild resulé in. hardening the Raombs ssceseion, further. woaltaning the position of ‘Adowla (beieause of bia Anabiiity Go . solve. the Katenga problen, the: ons. big nodernestyle political tess - “an Congo polities)... rf wo fav this. Foady We. may eventually have to. ase. ‘United States, end porheps: other western } Forces to: eleae ap: ' a ‘very: ‘messy ‘state of. eftaire. Cm dies es "ge i RP we are oleer now. that cry the. ‘ultimate: case we would 30 ‘our : | a om powar re central Africa, ‘then, anything short of thas that ‘wal - provant a breakdown in ‘the: Congo: te. ‘proteable to waiting too tong. “end than Raving to go in With too mon. aon ,
apr) Meneame op tometeem assumption that we veally tice ater Ba - fa) the Us forces in ‘tho ecige stioula be buss up pnd that the United. Statos Government tale . . £6 asa major cbjective to develop a modern and moderate Central | Coveramant .C) the Congo," to gat Katanga vointegrated inte the  Conge end to prevent a Soviet presones in ths Congo, te recomend | | immediate steps both to ‘BOVE Fepidly touard these objectives sad te domonetnts that wo have in fact: taken this decision and are . - prepared to beck 26 with the full weight of United States power. 8 Democracy cannot: ‘plure unless ae Hoan it. %f wo. mean My ‘end 4¢ at 4s elear to all cancerned that vie moan 4, wo can use tho possibility of our fuller intorventica, Jeter: to. ‘accomplish our purposes with, Jess. Antervention now. er oe We recomend three kinds of steps ‘to move ahoed, on the | to the point wiere it would olosriy be ridiculous for ‘Pehonbo's Katangan forces to ohallengo then. | . | ey) Convince Adoula ‘to ‘prorogus the | Parliemont, oo to govern with a backing of a ‘procuastern group headed by : Mobute, and to establish more effective adniniotration vith. ws, 5.8. and Belgien assistance, a : {ed Continue to purse ‘vigorously the most feasible - oleate of ‘the Phant Plan, notably ‘ths: ‘@ivision of ravenuss ° (without further consultation with Peticube, if necessary) She Gontral Govertment's amesty» the mili tary stendetil? ia Herth Retanae, and en attempt te force an agrood : | — division AY an ’ pe TO eS See
co™ . Dd te & @ division. of. pours and the beginnings of niiitery. intogratian | betinen Gk Contral Government end the Katanga. tin these  otvoumstances, ce) Feccnmage, three major stops: | . | at ‘tho present btm, « our. ascossmant is that with the new o — ‘Indonesian battalion (ane of them. supposodly a paratroopos battaiien) end tis relatively good soourity situation in the reat of tho country, the. UH bas onough gromd fercos to kandlo emy challenge from | as Retangazese genderusrie af 28 is not challenged. from the alr. - ‘Fuore ‘problem is, therefore, to male sure that no present. f . “oF conceivable Katenga, aie capability hes a chance to operate against |- the UH forces. Faic moans following through on all of the procent | artengemants | to beet: wp the UF air. forces. in. ths arva with Supdiohy 7 Teolien, ‘Trenton, ena. :Bthopion oqutyssat end. personnels Beyond this; 3 i ears : ho assesment of all LaLa taxy § forces im tho a | Genge is attached at ZB fo An analysis supporting the peropocad | for - oe ‘Wakted Statos Air Force uit io at TAB B. oo “Xt would be: 0 departure deem the ‘original Heameretjela os policy for! the Talted Bations to acccpt an American wait eo. part of the regular ‘wNOC Forod< Horsover y ‘wouna ‘want te maintain 7 . eommand of cur om Air Pores wits. in the.area. If tho secrotary dcsoral aa ‘walling, it Uae probably be possible $e ‘aavelop a. a | quest fron “ghe ‘Adoula: Govoransnt, endorsed ‘by. the. U8, for tho Sg - placement sa taopelavtiie of on Anorioen. ‘Aix oreo waht with vo . po a OS misatea or
- mission of > ta) protesting our transport wanes vate are operating, ta the ¢nterior ef the Cenge on behalf of the Wis (bd) backing up tho ‘we Poresa; and (e) training end devo loping an adequate naticnal == . ete fares for the Central Goveranent ef the Congo. Our willingness to de this would be very well seeoived by ar: a gront. majority ef the UN mombers, and espoctally. by mambers of tho Gengo Advisory Cemittas. fo the ‘Seeretary Genoral, it would syuboliso end. dommnstrate in a. practical way our earnest -Feselve to: see: Siaka thing through end avoid a. na jor failure by the UH ja ite 3 Largoot ov = /_possokmeping attempt. a Besdless to Bay, the presence of : U.8: forces - oP even: tho — oleer knotledge that v.38. forces Were available for this purpese o ; | ‘would, be a aignifioent pressure, ) ‘Eshoubs. ana his assesiates. ‘Fahombo * . - coulda interpret: this. 4ecisicn in no. other way than as prog? chat. | "any roatstence co bio part to the UH, ar any attempt to destroy . | Bapepeain fodiities in Katanga, would bo met by a devastating = : Be ebaator’ bicw. Oo : . pee , tatogiate the , Katanga. “the ‘taea 10-06, that the Mited States or. ; Wwe are > oudasctiog a attd-ep of U: 8. military forene wader ie UB would take a Alitary initiative ‘to destroy @ohombe’a oe goveransnt. “But the TH, with U.8. basking, would be placed in a open to Tohombay end political negotiation leading toward . pocitaen vhore the altornative of na litary Fesistanco was Ro les or ho ~ peceaothtstion | ’ : . hoe
Soe o8 =. ‘reconciliation and seintegration, t would be the only - ‘rational. : choles ‘eke to ‘hams * gho steps. require’. to strongtbon the Central ‘Geverament ave sot forth in PAB Go oe , . | Ta general, walle Adoute 4s not ea 4éeal choice, 1 we, believe ‘he. is. the beet. individual avaliable te. hold. tho veins of govermmant a Logpoldvitie and, even with trliasiont Atumissed, he would enjoy | the vistas of. having talon offies logitimetely. - _ 7 _ Por ebvicus reasons, 12, trou prefer. to pep oe Seamer a een ween ee ' the ontire ‘operation as overt as possible, ana the fnet that Kasavubs oan legelty proregue: Parliomeat, for thirty days faotlitates this. a - this GGaneetion,. wo would éxpset ‘Adoula +6 éatablich. 4 more ol: we | ebtestive ‘exooubive beandhi Wadia ‘have cctiddd@ored giving. * | - adtiltaeiel essitande te the G00 ta. Sateblichiig Ita om ale capability, 4 this’ _Fouutsonsnt would, foe the’ << betas, be-vedundantin.view . of he m sireainnte of he ‘goree. Cais, ». bao, would, ~ oS — peduee the need Sar us to rE > covert 0 operations with | the ” oo constant : Pit of cxporure. * Bho dotaSled 1 agenda of. f stops rowiived 4s available = = inteoa, ds ell. too familiar. But 4 2 new atzibsphore produced by « now " . “denanetration | that we mean | ie Bos: of ‘the > steps required. ooule bo oe |
By ee toe re me ep te aie, pe . taken immediately. . Adowla. could onder the standstill with minienam airftoulty if assured of this more forthcoming 0s /UH. support. . Moreover, _ . although ‘the UME ae now negotiating the. subject with TPohombe, when it is ‘faced with vs dotmination to end. secession, this mndght stimulate them to turn, over inmedate ly their taxes and foreign = - exchange to the Monetary. Council with oF without Pshombe's agreement. Worlking - out the agreed dvision of power betwen the . Central Government ena the Katanga and arrangements for military - | integration, would. be a more complex task. We think this could a, - best be aohisved by having v Thant personally fly 40 ‘the Congo . end. negotiate a ‘final settlonsnt with Adoule: ana shombe on these questions. Both aides would bo: given to understand that WS: would tolerate ° | RO. nonsense in’ ‘firaing up epecifio arrangements. based upon: the nogotiations that. have. already been hold. rr a réctapssiece/eaties _ TOsHCleve land smtb Oo a