e © be largely sheer luck; it could have taken days. .We . accept the explanation that the fingerprint search was a normal next resort after nomnal lead procedures were exhausted. Second, the task force views the evidence pointing to the guilt of James Earl Ray as the man who purchased the murder gun and who fired the fatal shot to be conclusive. It was possible for the task force to create a well documented history of James Earl Ray from the moment of his escape to his capture in England, using the investigation reports in the FBI files and to corroborate and fill in essential details with Ray's own statements (admissions) in his letters to author William Bradford Huie. From this chronology, fran the laboratory proof, and fran Ray's judicial admissions it was concluded that he was the assassin, and that he acted alone. We saw no credible evidence pro- , bative of the possibility that Ray and any co-conspirator were together at the scene of the assassination. Ray's assertions that someone else pulled the trigger are so patently self-serving and so varied as to be wholly unbeliev- able. They becom, in fact, a part of the evidence of his guilt by self-refutation. Third, we found that conspiracy leads (aliunde Ray's versions) had been conscientiously mm dow by the FBI even -108- DoclId: 327199575 Page 117
C | O though they had no possible relation to Ray's stories or to the known facts. The results were negative. | We found no evidence of any complicity or the part of the Memphis Police Department or of the FBI. We acknowledge that proof of the negative, i.e., proof that others were not involved, is here as elusive and difficult as it has universally been in criminal law. But the sum of all of the evidence of Ray's guilt points to him so exclusively that it most effectively makes the point that no one else was involved. Of course, someone could conceivably have provided him with logistics, or even paid him to commit the crime. However, we have found no competent evidence upon which to base such a theory. | Fourth, it is true that the task force mearthed some new data - data which answers some persistent questions and which the FBI did not seek. But the Bureau concentrated on the principal in the case and much was not considered important to his discovery and apprehension. We find no dishonesty in this. A lead suggesting that one or both of James Earl Ray's brothers were in contact with him after, and in aid of, his escape in 1967 from the Missouri State Prison, and before the murder of Dr. King, was not followed. It was not unearthed until after Ray's capture in England on June 8, 1968; it was then apparently deemed a lead made --109- | ! i } { Ri - 1 HW 55509 Docld:321995276 Page 116
O O sterile by supervening events. By hindsight the task force believes Jerry and Jotn Ray could have been effectively interrogated further to learn their knowledge, if any, of James Earl Ray's plans, his finances and whether they helped him after King's death. Finally, the task force observed instances of FBI headquarter's reluctance to provide the Civil Rights Division and the Attorney General with timely reports on the course of the murder investigation. For example, early in the investigation in a reaction to a press report of Attorney General Clark's expectation of making a progress report to the nation, FBI Director Hoover wrote: "We are rot going to make any progress reports" (HQ 44-38861-1061). The Bureau files reflect a significant degree of disdain for the supervisory responsibilities of the Attorney General and the operating Divisions of the Department. For example, ‘the Attorney General authorized the institution of prosecutive action against the suspect "Galt" (Birmingham 44-1740-1005) . But then, apparently without further consul- tation with the Attorney General or the Civil Rights Division, the Bureau prepared and filed a criminal complaint. Tne Bureau selected Birmingham as the venue in which to file the complaint in preference to Memphis because the Bureau "'could not rely on the U.S. Attorney at Memphis" -110- HW 55509 DBocld:321995276 Page 119 ,
e : 0 and "would lose control of the situation'' (HQ 44-38861-1555). “The Bureau scenario called for then advising the Attorney General "that circumstances have required the action taken" (HQ 44-38861-1555). | We submit that in this sensitive case the Departmental officials in Washington should have been consulted. As another example, at the extradition stage of the case, marked discourtesy was exhibited to the Attorney General and to Assistant Attorney General Fred Vinson. In a telephone discussion with the Attorney General who . complained of being "kept in the dark", an Assistant to the Director accused the Attorney General of falsifications and "hung up the phone''. Again, when Assistant Attorney General Vinson was detailed to England to arrange for the extradition of James Earl Ray, the Legal Attache was ordered to be "diplomatic but firm with Vinson and that under no circumstances should Vinson be allowed to push our personnel around" (HQ 44-38861-4447). The task force views this lack of coordination and cooperation as highly improper. The Attorney General and the Division of the Department having prosecutorial | responsibility for an offense being investigated should be kept fully abreast of developments. The responsible -l11- } AW 55509 Docld:32199526 Page 120
O - O a Division, moreover, should have sufficient control of the Bureau's investigations to insure that the legal necessities of pleading and proof are met. In fairness to the Bureau it has to be observed that it is the obligation of the Department to insist on these perogatives. We do not think it effectively did so in the King murder case. -112- HW 55509 DBocld:32199526 Page 121
III. THE SECURITY -IWESTIGATION A. FBI Surveillance And Harassment Of Dr. King 1. Initiation of Technical Surveillance and COINTELPRO Type Activities In order to reconstruct the actions taker by members of the FBI toward Dr. King, the task force scrutinized the basis for the initiation by the Bureau of any action with respect to Dr. King. During the review it was revealed that on May 22, 1961, Mr. Alex Rosen, then Assistant Director of the General Investigative Division (Division 6), advised Director Hoover in an information memorandum, per his request on Dr. King and four other individuals in connection with the "Freedom Riders," | that "King has not been investigated by the FBI'' (Memo from Scatterday to Rosen, May 22, 1961, App. A, Ex. 7). The memorandum contained few references on Dr. King. The Director commented, with regard to the omission of a subject matter investigation on Dr. King: ‘Why not?'' The substance of the report was forwarded to Attorney General Kennedy, and the FBI did not pursue the King matter at this time. Thus, FBI personnel did not have nardid they assume a personal interest in the activities of Dr. King through May, 1961. Furthermore, in 1961, information in the Bureau files on -113- [ WW 55509 DoclId:32199528 Page 122
O O Dr. King nad only been sleaned from sporadic reports, and this particular report to the Director was provided by Division 6 which had responsibility for civil rights matters. — | In the begirming of 1962, the FBI started and rapidly continued to gravitate toward Dr. King. The sequence of events has already been reported in some detail by the Senate Select Committee as well as in the Rohbert Murphy Report which you received in March, 1976. The task force in its review of pertinent documents con- i. firms these reports. In essence, the Director commmicated to Attorney General Kermedy during 1962 and 1963 a host of memoranda concerning the interest of the Commmist Party in the civil rights movement, and, in particular, Dr. King's relationship with two frequently consulted advisers whom the FBI had tabbed as members of the Commmist Party. As a result of the deep interest in civil rights affairs by the Attorney General and by the Kennedy Adninistration, these FBI reports had the effect of alarming Robert Kennedy and affecting his decisions on the national level. ; The net effect of the Bureau memoranda nearly culminated in the summer of 1963 when Attorney General -114- fr WW 55509 Doclda:321995275 Page 123
Kennedy suggested consideration of technical surveillance on King and the SCLC (HQ 100-106670-3631). Previously, the bulk of FBI intelligence on Dr. King was secured by technical surveillance of one of his advisors and from informants close to his associates. However, when Attorney General Kennedy was confronted shortly thereafter with the ' Director's request for such surveillances, he reconsidered his suggestion and denied the request (HQ 100-106670-165, 171). Attorney General Kennedy as well as several other Department officials were sincerely concerned with King's association with alleged.commmist members since proposed civil rights legislation was then very vulnerable to the attack that commmists were influencing the direction of the civil rights movement. Yet, an affirmative program to gather intelligence with King as the subject was still considered ill-advised. However, a significant tur of events within the circles of the FBI hierarchy would soon reverse the Attorney General's decision, and without his _ knowledge the FBI would also laumch an illegal counter- intelligence program directed to discredit and neutralize the civil rights leader. Director Hoover's demeanor toward Dr. King has been well publicized and is summarized below. Certainly, as the task force determined, this played a vital role in -115- f WW 55509 Docld:321995276 Page 124 ,
O | © FBI affairs, as did tne Director's attitude toward the Commmist Party. On August 23, 1963, then Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, William C. Sullivan, pursuant to the Director's request, presented a Seventy-page analysis of exploitation and influence by the Commmist Party on the American Negro population since L919 (HQ 100-3-116-253X). This report and Mr. Sullivan's any significant inroads into the Negro population and the civil rights movement. Director Hoover responded: "This memo reminds me vividly of those I received when Castro took over Cuba. You contended - then that Castro and his cohorts were not Commmists and not influenced by Conmmists... Time alone proved you wrong. I for one can't ignore the memos as having only an infinitesimal effect on the efforts to exploit the American Negro by Commmists'" (HQ 100- 3~116-253X).. The Director's comment had a resounding effect on Mr. Sullivan. Seven days later, he replied: "The Director is correct. We were campletely wrong about believing the evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro was not a conmmist or under communist influence. In investigating and -116- synopsis showed a failure of the Commmist Party in achieving F HW 55509 Docld: 32199526 Page 125
writing about commmism and the American Negro, we had better remember this and profit by the lesson it should teach us.'' (Mem _ from Sullivan to Belmont, August 30, 1963, App. A, Ex. 8). Even more importantly, Mr. Sullivan also said - in response to the action that he now believed was necessitated in determining commmist influence in the civil rights movement: "Therefore, it may be unrealistic to limit ourselves as we have been doing to legalistic proof or definite- ly conclusive evidence that would stand up in testimony in court or before Congressional committees that the Commist Party, USA, does wield substantial influence over Negroes | which one day could becane decisive." (idem. ) The FBI hierarchy had no written comments on this memo- randum either supporting or negating the Assistant Director's proposed line of action. Then, in September, 1963, Mr. Sullivan recommended "increased coverage of coummist influence on the Negro’ (emo from Baumgardner to Sullivan, September 16, 1963, | App. A, Ex. 9). The Director refused and commented: "No I can't understand how you can so agilely switch your think- ing and evaluation. Just a few weeks ago you contended that the Communist influence in the racial movement was ineffective and infin- itesimal. This - notwithstanding -117- HW 55509 DBocld: 321995276 Page 126
a O © many memos of specizic instances of infiltracion, Now you want to load the field dom’ with more coverage in spite of your recent memo depreciating CP influence in racial movement. I don't intend to waste time and money until you can make up your minds what the Situation really is'' (idem. ) In commenting on a cover memo to the above Sullivan request, Director Hoover also stated, "I have certainly been misled by previous memos which clearly showed commmist penetration of the racial movement. The attached is contradictory of all that. We are wasting manpower and money investigating CP effect in racial movement if the attached is correct" (Memo for the Director fran Tolson, September 18, 1963, App. A, Ex. 10). By now the Domestic Intelligence Division was feeling the full weight of the Director's dissatisfaction with their work product. Mr. Sullivan again replied on September 25, 1963, in a humble manner that Division 5 had failed in its interpretation of commmist infiltration in the Negro movement (Memo fram Sullivan to Belmont, September 25, 1963, App. A, Ex. 11). The Assistant Director asked the Director's forgiveness and requested the oppor- tunity to approach this grave mtter in the light of the Director's interpretation. Director Hoover sanctioned this request but again reprimanded Mr. Sullivan for stating L -118- 1 HW 55509 Docld: 32199526 Page 127