JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10221 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files:William H. Brubeck AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO : TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record DATE : 10/1/1963 PAGES ZY? SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : ; COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4. HW 49061 DBocld:326263271 Page 1
“CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN A "SUPARABLE “PIRST STAGE DISREMAHENT AGREEMENT 1 October 1963 I INTRODUCTION The discussion within the Administration concerning a Separable 1st Stage Disarmament Agreement (hereafter referred to as SFSDA) has been unsatisfac- tory because the parties to the debate have started from divergent positions. One school has tended to look at the problem primarily from the stendpoint a of what appears to be negotiable with the Soviets judgea primarily in the context. ‘of the Geneva negotiations or, if not negotiable, of what would have favorable propaganda implications for the United States. Another school has become: convinced that none of the Separable ist Stage proposals so far suggested are to the U.S. interest but has tried to accommodate (within the Limit that. no such SFSDA be actually agreed to) to the propaganda demands of our situation at Geneva. A third school has held that the ‘uSG should seek out and analyze the substantive elements of potentially desirable SFSDAs, ones the U.S. could live with, before considering the tactical and propaganda issues of negotiation (whether at Geneva or in other forums). | | This paper endeavors to continue the evaluations of the latter school: “It deals first with certain basic considerations, second with the four main | substantive elements: © strategic systens, conventional forces, tactical systems, and concurrent political developments and only indirectly with the tactics of negotiation. | SECRET _ __ DOWNGRADED AT 12 =a INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIE 6200.24 ee renee ee 8 ee Se HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 2
SECRET II BASIC CONSIDERATIONS The fact without which the entire disarmament effort would have collapsed long ago, is that control and reduction of armaments can benefit both sides, that it is not entirely a zero sum game. But in pert it is a zero sum game; what improves the relative position of one side, harms the relative position of the other. The Soviets will certainly attempt to optimize their reletive position. ‘Not only must we attenpt to optimize ours as an offset to their attempt, but also to offset a very real asymmetry in the position of the two blocs:- We proclain, and are, a defensive alliance; they proclaim and are an offensive alliance, in which the debate is only as to the level of violence to be used in pursuing the aims of the alliance. Qur task in devising a SFSDA is therefore complex. It involves fully ex- pa “ploiting the potential of the non-zero sum aspects of arms control (those which benefit both the USSR and ourselves) while preserving or improving the relative Western position in the zero sum aspects. Principal U.S. interests are: (a) the maintenance of our ability to contain Soviet or Chinese expansion; (2) @ reduction in the risk of nuclear war, either from escalation of undeterred Soviet or Chinese expansionism under (1) above or in the forn of a direct mclear attack on the U.S. or its allies, and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of nuclear war should it nevertheless occur, and (4) continuation of the prospect that - US (nuclear and other) forces surviving a nuclear war would be able to ensure SECRET rte Aa PN Rd AA TWEE Ty MNT bee BIT ETE RT SP PIE TINT PEAT BRET AT TUTE EAD BES STE FMT MIRE SE OY EERO S ENA TNE STII hn DW AE MRA Som pe ery a HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 3
pot ~ aie we a : wt en ee pd a Qs 7 _ — ne By ; Lay "SECRET @ settlement of hostilities fPevorable to the United States. Principal Soviet interests are; (1) a reduction in the prospect that the U.S. might escalate to general nuclear war @ local confrontation resulting “from what the Soviet leadership would consider the inevitable expansion of the area of Communism; (2) a reduction in the prospect that U. 8. militery forces surviving a nuclear war would allow the US to dictate terms oP settlement of hostilities and (3) a reduction in the destructiveness of muclear war should it nevertheless occur. From the Soviet standpoint very substantial cold war gains could oecur if we failed to preserve our objective @) while they succeeded in achieving their objective (1). In such @ situation they could expect a rapid dissolution of NATO and a loosening of the ties holding together.the forces standing in the way of clear Communist domination of the European-Asia land MASS. They could then concentrate their Pull effort _ on securing their primacy over their Chinese "partners". IIT THE FOUR SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM: A. The Strategic Nuclear Relationship Le Present Trends Projections through 1968 of programmed U.S. strategic forces, on the one hand, and NIE estimates of Soviet forces, on the other, indicate that : without arms control the U.S. should be able to maintain a 2 to 3-fold . superiority in numbers of intercontinental alert weapons, and a superiority in the average survivability factor of those forces. . The megatonnage of the Soviet strategic forces may, however, come to exceed those of the U.S. 3 SECRET eee TAT ES ORR cet oe Bm ime Ste ne OR IN Lt nay HW 49061 Docld:3262763271 Page 4
SECRET forces and under all but the most favorable circunstences the percentage of the U.S. population expected to be casualties after a nuclear ex ‘change might exceed that of the USSR. Under no foreseeable circumstances, hovever, could the USSR,: eyen if it struck first, have high, confidence in ending the initial exchanges with a superiority in surviving strategic Yorces. In the absence of arms control the U.S. should therefore be able, at least through 1968, to maintain a very credible deterrent, a deterrent adequate, not only to protect the U.S. ageinst a@ premeditated nuclear attack (Class I Deterrence), but ‘also to keep low the risks of escalation the Soviets could predently face in bringing pressure against Europe or in support of their . policy in other areas vital to the West (Class II Deterrence). The sacrifice of this advantage in any SFSDA would have to be ‘weighed against US non-zero sum and other zero-sum gains. 2. Objectives In considering the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle part of a SESDA the Following U.S. objectives come to mind: a. To reduce the size, weight, and likelihood of success of a Soviet strike against the US or its allies. b. While doing so, insure against unacceptable risk to ow security, or to that of our allies, through cheating, including withholding of un. declared weapons, clandestine production, or improvement of weapons, and abrogation with the purpose of gaining a significant time advantage in rearmament. | | | Discussion If both sides reduce the size and weight of their strategic attack. SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 5
SECRET capabilities, it should be possible to retain and even enhance Type I Deterrence. As the strategic forces are brought under control, major instabilities resulting from the psychology of the arms race should diminish. Decreased concern on either side about the survivel of its retelietory force should remove ‘Lingering incentives toward, or fears of, premeditated attack against one another. _ The same course could seriously damage Western deterrence in Type IT : situations to the extent it is based on quantitative superiority.  Conpensations would have to be sought in | arrangements either contained in the, disarmament ‘treaty or permissible under the treaty. These might involve (1) 2 full spectrum of deterrence below the strategic level, and/or (2) capabilities for deliberate, selective, controlled response. None of the reductions contemplated, would reduce the possible destruct-_ iveness. of an all-out war, “if it cecur's, even close to the levels Imown. ‘through’ World War II. Since it takes relatively few missiles to target ‘the: major « ‘cities on either side, and since substential fractions of each side's missiles are toraettea on each other's strategic forces mutually agreed redmetions in their number could proceed with little effect on the number of cities which - ight be at risk to residual forces. The casualties experienced in any ectuel wer perhaps would be reduced somewhat because of (1) reduction in collateral’ demage with diminished counterforce exchange, and (2) decreased nuniber of ° nuclear aetonations in any one area resulting from lower damage expectancies pecause of smaller force levels. In other words, ‘the number of nuclear hostages might be better controlled at roughly the level ‘considered necessary for ef- fective deterrence. The level of prospective own damage (in terms of percentages of population casualties or of industrial ‘aestruction) at which the USSR would certainly be deterred 1 is an arguable figure: Te is 8 probably higher for the USSR than for the US. -5- SECRET Pepa EET ong ert cater cat aregmenerne naman t Ae a BEE em EN ATEN ATS SLES BARTER YE RE BEM GE Pn PMA ROGET PLEAS POOR LT RTC T ats Se tte, RE NRA gE Ee gst HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 6
SECRET 2; Other Variables | _ Iimportent variables in analyzing the optimm solutions to these objectives ere the assumptions as to the general political context including the possible impact of erms control measures on owr European allies, the provisions of other portions of the SFSDA and the degree of inspection which is considered. desirable or negotiable. This paper assumes that a SFSDA will not come into peing except after, or concurrently with, a comprehensive test ban agreenent, a comprehensive non-diffusion agreement, some improvement in the Berlin-German Reunification situation and other points of immediate high risk. The variables ‘in other parts of the SFSDA will be teken up as they appear pertinent. Different — ‘solutions will be proposed for a high inspection case, a medium inspection case and @ low inspection case. h How many? | ‘Some number of permitted U.S. strategic delivery vehicles between 100 and 1000, should assure the U.S. a high order of counter city, Class I Deterrence, provided the number permitted the Soviets were smaller or, at least, no greater, Let us assume no controls over Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, _40 control over civil defense programs, no control over nuclear materials or werheads and a low level of permitted inspection. At the upper range of the __Buagested numerical limit, say 1000 weapons, it should still be possible for us to create a mix of super-hardened, dispersed, large; multiple-warhead missiles, plus Polaris submarines plus dispersed or air-borne planes with improved eir-to-surface missiles which would be able adequately to survive any ‘conceivable Soviet attack. Such a Soviet attack must be assumed to include the ; SECRET sree gamaimy TES TT  e Bre ORT RERN EMOTES COTES OTRAS RRR RCE EAN NY TOPE ORE HOON ERMA PITAL ARNEL US ORLY EOP RAE STS et HW 49061 Docld: 32626321 Page 7?
SECRET permitted Soviet vehicles, plus vehicles which could escape detection plus vehicles which could be produced and Gsployed during eny time gap in rea rmament vy clandestine Soviet Preperation for sbroget tion. US forces shoulé be able to survive in sufficient volume to penetrate to at least 50 Soviet ‘cit ties with sufficient weight to wreak very great destruction on these cities ana cause casualties of at least 10% of the Soviet population. Such a solution would 1 Boks however, make any substantial contribution to the objective stated in’ ‘iil A2@a. above of significantly reducing the | Possible size and 1 weight “of a Soviet attack below what is now projected without a SFSDA. The USSR ‘could theoretically opt for missiles of 100 Mr or larger size up to its full permitted number if only numbers are to be limited. Within any plausible ratio of Soviet numbers to US numbers, say 50h of the US permitted figure, the weight of a Soviet attack could be virtually totally devastating. Therefore, more complex solutions must be considered, Two measures which would greatly increase the certainty of effective US retaliation within lower numbers would be measures prohibiting the deploy- went of ABM Systens or prohibiting the construction of elaborate civil defense nelters. (Of these two categories prohibition of ABM Systems would have less. problems since it is psychologically more aifficult for a nation to deny | its citizens the basic individual security of civil defense. ) Both of these measures coula be reasonsbly well nonitorea through unileterel surveillance and “intel ligence. The cost of. a | strategically significant ABM system would, be of the order of magnitude: of at least 10 to 20 ‘billion dollars. A significant shelter in sonstruction program would also be costly. Both ‘would probably be necessary sub- stentially to reduce the destruction and. casualties to be expected even, from two or | SECRET. BTRWTR Te meretier aemimarrnse ies See pipe aerate am eww naamc rene rit tare Bt 3 SPATE Mo om TM GAB tn uy Rat hae P OT TEES RET a PEM ete ana SDT TS) Toba seeming icy eet HW 49061 Docld: 32626321 Page @
0 ; [Ge | i & SECRET tisree hundred multiple-varhead weapons on target. No such large scale programs ould be clandestinely executed. | If one did not have to be concerned with substantial AEM and civil defense ue ograms, it would be possible t> assure unacceptable damage without hardened multiple or multi-megaton warheads.. 150 one-megaton warheads (of say 500 tbs weight) on target would certainly be able to demolish the titty leading custrial and populetion centers of the USSR and leave a reserve for contin- gstnucles. | Soviet cities are, of course, only one part of the target structure as Eves ently understood. Other main components, and their implications for disarmament, are as follows: - a. The Soviet Nuclear Threat. In present war plers, Soviet bombers end, missiles and their supporting bases are the highest priority class of targets. If strategic forces are stabilized at anything approaching perity, counterforce targetting probably. will be less and less remunerative. Depending on vulnerability of the opposing forces, some reduction of enemy capabilities may continue to be attractive as a first-strike objective; but the level of reduction achieved probably. coula not be decisive. To make strategic bases iess compelling second-strike targets, missile refire or bomber recycle capa-— bilities might be controlled. | be. Other Military Capabilities. Certain tactical airfields and general military targets in Europe are now targetted by SAC. These could just as well be covered by European theater forces, if survivable weapons systems were vovided SACEUR. A consistent set of categories would have to be corstructed for the disarmament agreement in order to prevent strategic force limitations from injuring the position of NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact countries. , 8 SECRET Fete tape teeenagertes can nn a RE Cetra ct rtegeg ter gg emit 2 gperintae ge ne heat natn Deer RTE MIT ETE SEN, DON AE ANT eye Age ec eee 7 HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 93
SECRET The conclusion here. seems to be that, provided thester forces are considered separately, one alternative would be to relate the number of strategic weapons more or less directly to the urban-industrial (second-strike retelistory) target structure. . What number of permitted strat tegic delivery vehicles, then,would be necessary to essure the ability to detonate 150 warheads on target? The answer ‘ts a ' function of the survivabilit ty of the vehicles and their relicbility. If one oo) assumes @ reliability of .66 (in other words, two out of three surviving vehicles could be expected to reach target with adequate accuracy), we would then have & requirement that 225 of our vehicles be able to survive any counter- force attack the Soviets could aspire to mount with (a) their permitted vehicles, (>) vehicles not declared, vehicles clandestinely produced, and vehicles con-- verted from civil aircraft, etc., and (c). vehicles produced during any time gap achieved by preperation for hostile ebrogation | No precise computation of the | starting number of U.S. vehicles required. As possible; too many variables are involved. 500. vehicles would, however, not seem to be an unreasonsble figure, If both sides 1 were limited to pemnitted delivery vehicles with a Litting... cepecity sufficient aly for one megaton warheads, a rentastic improvenent in. present day standards of accuracy and reliability would be needed to. give the Soviets confidence in taking out one of our hardened missiles without devoting at ‘least three to the task. (A 1 MI weapon ” with, & CEP of iy 1M would have 12h chance of severely damaging a eye PSI silo). re @ method coula be devised to limit guidance systems to a CEP no less than one mile at inter-continentel range, they would have to devote about 30 missiles to take out one of ours. in any case, such of our missiles as were in Polaris submarines at sea would be comparatively -9 2 SECRET. I a a ea eR H¥ 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 10
SECRET OS invulnerable to this form of attack, as would air-to-surface missiles in air-borne alert aircraft. Moreover, in the evolution of weapons mixes under any such agree- ment the US might make major shifts away ‘from hardened, fixed. strategic missiles in favor of mobile lend end sea based types. The nagnitude of effort required to supplement’ the permitted systen 1 with . covert delivery means sufficient for a counter~force attack effective against the opposing strategic delivery systen Considered as a whole) seems 60 great as to make ne attempt hardly worthwhile. Even if one were to assume a clendestine force as large es the permitted force, and a force created during the time gap after hostile abrogation of equal size egeain, this would give the Soviets only a three Fold superiority in numbers which, assuming present day reliability and accuracy factors, would not be adeouate to assure a high level of destruction even of the fixed base portion of our permitted systems. Future improvements could, of course, change this estimate. | | In summary, it appears that something of the order of 500 permitted vehicles" . would be adequate to protect against the risks of deception provided, (a) ABM" a ms systems were prohibited, (bd) major civil defense shelter construction were - . prohibitea, and (c) the Lift capacity of permitted systems were. ‘Limited to one oe megaton warheads, (a) 2 no ‘great improvement in accuracy to the order of + - me t CEP, were in prospect. . | . ae 7 The most sensitive variable in arriving at this judgment is that caps, of! less than al 000° ft. at inter- continentel range will not be within the state of the art until the 1970's. Thought shoulda be given to prohibitions and controls over terminal guidance, ete., designed to make such super accuracy tmoseinte. ‘The increasing yleld and. decreasing CEP. of ‘the: attacking weapon can ‘be offset to a degree by hardening the target. 5. Larger and Smaller Yields It is generally agreed “SECRET thing to hide, and therefore -~10- r ' HW 49061 Docld:327626321 Page 11.
SECRET easy to control, is @ launch ving facility for an inter-continental missile, . it cannot, however, be demonstrated that i+ would be impossible, assuming the iB ssery effort, to conceal individual deunchers. That it would be possible ot hide hundreds of such launch facilities becomes less eredible. To check on the lift (payload) capacity of a system is more difficult; the necessary assurance wovld “probably require on-site inspection of the ‘vehicle. To check on the accuracy of the system will be still more aifeicult. It would require: 1) mrtual observation of strategic missile test firings of the other side to observe:accuracy plus sufficient inspection of emplaced missiles to be sure they were the same design as those tested; 2) construction of strategic delivery vehicles by e third state (e. ge Sweden) for both sides; or 3) other radical inspection procedures. a There has therefore been a. tendency, in considering SFSDA's to | concentrate on number of launch vehicles rather than on’ yield or accuracy. With sufficient yield, accuracy and reliability, it is possible to approach a one-for-one kill probability egainst even super-hardened dispersed launch sites. With multiple, guided warheads it might at some future time be possibile to reduce the exchange-ratio to less than unity, but this is not within reach of present technology. Furthermore, the destructiveness of even 50 100-megaton warheads is such as to fail to meet the objective in IIT A 2A, while less than | . &@ hundred permitted delivery vehicles would seem to present far too great a risk of successful elimination through counterforce or covert attack. Control over _super-weapons, therefore, seems indicated. One possible alternative would be to prohibit all intercontinental land-based missile launching facilities, relying solely upon sea or airborne vehicles. But 25,000 Tb. warheads can also be carried by plane and probably syb-based missiles could be cevised SECRET HW 49061 DBocld:326263271 Page 127
SECR RET to launch such weights. Substantial inedequacies therefore would appear to vhere in eny SESDA which provides only for control over numbers of isunch If controls over lift capacity and accuracy are to be included in a SDA, then the question becomes pertinent as to whether limitation of war- > eed weight and yield below one megaton. might not be. advisable. Against most Soviet umrotected industrial and population centers, 100 KT would be adequate for destruction; against large industrial areas ‘Buch as Moscow and Leningrad, 5 to 8 such weapons would be adequate. An adequate surviving U.S. deterrent Force of 100 KT delivery systems, therefore, might be 300-350 as opposed to the 225 one-megaton vehicles suggested in the previous section. If the Soviets are similarly limited to 100 KT KT weapons, the number of weapons they would have to allocate to insure killing one of ours would be three times that necessary with one-megaton weapons. No significant increase above 500 in the permitted humber of delivery vehicles would therefore seem required even if lift | capacity is limited to 100 KT warheads (say 150 lbs.). A crucial question, “however, is whether the weight carrying capacity of a given system can be’ accurately enough controlled to guard against substantial deviations in the yield of warhead which could be delivered. <All existing ICEM systems would have to be serapped and new ones meeting precise criteria substituted, The closer both sides come to the practical limits of improvement of yield-to-~ weight ratios, the more feasible weight limitations would be since the margin for clandestine yield/weight improvements would be narrowed. 6. Other Possible Controls | In the above light, a suggestion worth . exploring is the prohibition of all inter-continental delivery systems except for submarine-basea missiles. SECRET TUT ce amnmerorsccermenee sour yonemeamenr es sem oeen or Aenea RAE ER RRND UPI RAEN MD RTE Ie EEE NNER sant ERE MRR Tam H¥ 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 13
SECRET This could be coupled with limitations on the number, size, range and deploy- ment of such submarines end missiles. Let us assume that each side is limited to 100 missile-carrying submarines, each subrarine being Limited to four launch tubes capable of 1ifti ing @ 200 lbs. warhead 2,500 miles, with no weight allowance for inflight course correction equipment. Peacetime deployment of these submarines © within 3,000 miles of the other’s territory would be prohibited and monitored. There might also be a limitation on the number and range of attack submarines and @ prohibition ageinst deep sea mining: Under such an arrangement it is difficult to see how a counterforce attack would be conceivable. (An alternative would ‘be to limit all intercontinental missiles to hardened land-based sites. The 1 MI “yield limitation would make a counterforce attack extremely unlikely. The need for monitoring submarine deployments would be unnecessary and the expense would be less.) . | The principal difficulty with such arrangements is that the principle of a mix of retaliatory systems is sacrificed. It may be that this difficulty is less than that of allowing a mix of systems, some of which, particularly bombers , seem to be inherently uncontrollable as to precise small scale lift capability. — A further possible control is over nuclear materials and warheads. As will be seen, later, some such controls may be required in the tactical nuclear field. the confidence which one can have in such controls is not, however, adequate to give much assistance in the strategic field where the number of warheads is small and the amount of fissionable material required to produce major changes in capabilities insignificant. It would be reasonable to back up controls over ~ numbers, lift capacity, - accuracy, range, ‘ete. ‘with production controls to guard against clandestine improvement in numbers or characteristics. The elaborateness required in controls over production would very with the sensitivity of _‘the ar- . rengements to. detect cheating. 7. Optimum Solutions Varying with the pogice of Inspection which can be Negotiated . _-13- Se ep RE Ee ST oon eenee een 2 nr errant a HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 14
wt ee peed ae Ee is e. Low Inspection SECRET _ On-site inspection is probably not required to control an agreement prohibiting the deployment cf ABM 5 systems, or an elaborate shelter construction meee, a 2lso would be @ifficult clendestinely to deploy iavgs munbers or intercontt entel missiles with large weig % lifting capacity. - ‘Clandestine production and deployment of large numbers of submarines or heavy bombers would also appear aifticult. | | if little on-site. ‘inspection can be negotiated, weight yield, range and accuracy Limitetions would be impossible. MNubers limitation, which would not be critically upset from a counterforce viewpoint by clandestine deployment of several hundred weapons, would be possible. If ABM and substantial shelter construction ere prohibited, numbers approximating 500 would seem appropriate. “re there is no prohibition on AEM’s and shelter construction, mudbers epproximating 1,000 would seem ‘appropriate. Particuleriy in the latter case, we would have to assume the Soviets would be striving for large -yield, | hardened multiple warhesas, etc.,' ete. We would, therefore. have to compete strenuously in the same direction as well as deploying an ABM system and engaging in a substantial shelter construction program. In either of these cases the Class II Deterrent ettect of our strategic nuclear capability would be small and, would be seen to be small by our allies. There would be no creaibility in our adopting a counter- force strategy and a city-busting strategy would be clearly and totally ruinous. The same would apply equally to the Soviet Union. The correlation of forces in the conventional and tactical nuclear Pields. would then become even more significant to both sides. b.. Medium Inspection . If it were possible to negotiate a declaration of retained and replacement delivery vehicles, plus periodic inspection of such vehicles, plus SECRET a wo mimimeng, aaa ater eyez eS aetauce seep ok ot nae RUE 8 A SE mE, RE EN ge TOE EURO DOE SNE TOMS pen tee ig i Spe SeSEe ee AAI e sennartemmctm enemies, amen s HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 15
SECRET _ asonable progran or random ins; sections to provide a check against clandes- f sine ws oduction or deoloyment, a more useful arrangement should be possible. In addition tO prohibition of ABM systems, and shelter construction and a limitation on mumbe ere, it would then be possible to control weight lifting capacity, range, and possible accuracy if observation of test firings or physical inspection of missiles vere permitted. Whereas under & ebove, ‘there could be no assurance by either side that the other would not build uw toa megatomnage in excess of 10 or 20 thousand, under this elternative one could — have reasonable assurance that negatonnage of. permitted. systems could be kept below one thousand for each side and could perhaps be reduced below one hundred. | With no control over nuclear materials, warhead production or. . warhead stockpiles, there would, however, always be the threat of the deploy- 7 1 | ment of large weapons in ships, civil air craft, ete. ‘While such deployment would be unlikely to have significant counter-force potentials, 1t would ~ continue as an unsettling and suspicion arousing possibility. C. Optima solutions with high degree of inspection If in addition to the controls suggested under b ebove, it were possible to negotiate controls over nuclear materials, warhead production, and . ‘warhead stockpiles, further possibilities of. designing a system maximizing the non~zero sum advantages ‘to both sides might, over time, ‘become possible, There seems to be no sclentific way in vhich one could have high confidence that nuclear naterials or warheads had not been ‘secreted in some remote or subtly concealed storage area, in magnitudes perhaps as great as ten or twenty per cent | of existing Soviet stockpiles. Security in the United States is not such that we could have confidence in executing such an operation ourselves. It is possible, 15 . - . Loe , SECRET | A HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 16
a ne 2 ns \ , \ should the Soviet leaders desire to do SO, that weys could be found to give us_. confidence that they also were DO longer cr in a position to do 50. Transitional J earranzcements would undoubtedly be necessary to cover “the period during which - such confidence was being est tablished. -. Ev en such transitional steps would, however, seem useful in getting on toward the objecti ives stated in TIT A 2 Be A possible transitional step night permit stockpiles of warheads sufficient to supply the pernitted systems with ea reserve, plus continuously insvected additional stockpiles in some state of ‘remoteness ‘from delivery systems or in some stage of incomplete febrication so that there would be s .- time delay in their availability sufficient to make them useless in @ counter-~ force role, but short enough to make clandestine withholding or concealment of little value to the other side, _ — oo 8, Relationship of control net st mes and i Sc . tactical systens _ Se 7 - ae General . Control over strategic weapons ‘increases the importance of tectical nuclear weapons to deterrence of the use of conventional forces while at the same time the problem of control in the tactical nuclear and conventional force area get more complicated. . be Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Systems In ‘surveying the controls of strategic nuclear weapons, which have been discussed under the low, medium, and high inspection cases, it becomes apparent that the more stringent the limits and controls under this “category of weapons, the greater would be the degree of control required over tactical nuclear forces. The reason for this correlation is that the more _ 16 SECRET | HW 49061 Docld:3276296321 Page 17
SECRET ivgent the limits and ‘cont trols over strategic weapons the greeter would be the y-orf to a potential egeressor in "pocket battleship" development Ss within ck ‘the tactical category. Moreover, the more stri ngent the limits over ‘strat tegic weapons, the more deste biliging would be the disparities in tactical nuclear ' weapons which would be possible without controls. | c. Relationship of Conventional to Nuclear Forces The grea ater the degree oF control over strategic end tactical | nuclear forces, the greater the importance. of conventional forces and a che refore the greater the need Por controls over these conventional forces which would assure that: negotiated balances are not violated. The history | of cenventional arms races needs no recounting. The achievement of agreements for controls over nuclear weapons is most Likely to be observed if both sides are able to achieve a non-zero sum agreement on their conventional forces which achieves certain political objectives for each. (This in turn implies a degree of political settlement which will be discussed later). B. Conventional Weapons — ; “1. Area Considerations. ae NATO-Warsaw Pact Relationship | This is the key area of the world. The vital interests of both blocs confront here. For that reason it is here that it is most difficult and most . important to achieve a non-zero sum settlement. Until the political environment has changed appreciably (such as might eventuate if HEC integration continues or if the European satellites achieve’ significant disorientation from the USSR) the best hope for a balance of conventional forces in this area is a limited | rabproachment and disengagement as part of a broader arms control package. For 17 . SECRET HW 49061 Docld: 32626321 Page 16
SECRET exaole, should the U.S. give up its preponderance of strategic weapons with its concomitant Class It deterrence, the USSR TRBM threat to Europe would have to be: eliminated, aiid some conventional balence would, have.to: be, rane ted. This could not be e simple numericai..parity.. The. interior, eoutinental dines along which the USSR forces operate (as opposed to the sea lanes over which the U.S. must support Europe) are an “adventage which would require compensation in a steble séttlenent. This might be achieved by ‘berm tting aporcepriately larger NATO lend forces in Europe, than the Warsaw nations would ve allowed to have West of the Bug River or West of a Leningrad~Smolensk-Odessa ine. Alternatively, a formula might be worked out which allowed the NATO c powers to continue to heave larger tactical air forces while the VarseweIATO nations had parity of lend armies within a defined area in Europe. Still another alternative, or an added element of security, might be to negate offensive opportunities for conventional forces by creating a "nuclearized" zone -- a jointly planted, jointly policed, jointly controlled ADM zone, half of which either side could set off at will. The balance to be sought is that the. . advantage should lie with the defending forces regardless of which side initiates the offensive. The higher the controls over the strategic and tactical nuclear forces, . the more critical the European conventional balance becomes. Here both’ superpowers have potential problems. (2) The U.S. relationship | It is difficult to visualize the lineup of U.S. conventional forces which could handle the problem of China in Asia. While U.S. seapower could insure the defense of Japan, Formosa, the Philippines and other Pacific islands, and, with land forces, could make @ creditable defense in | 18. SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 19
ae : k, 4 fa ee eat a. ~ a ee eC! ie _—- & 7 the Korean peninsula, the problem of Southeast Asia would have to be met: 2) by depending on superior US’ conventional airpower ‘and the manpower of allies; b) by resort to a retained sut eriority in tactical micleer weapons; c) by inerscasing the size of U.S. conventional forces by an amount which might be difficult to sustain, politically; ad) by relinguishing Southeast Asia to the Chinese Communist (inate, with US support, end given adequate Indian motivation might still be defensibie); e) by insisting upon a reduction in.the land and air forces of China. Of these possibilities, the retention of tactical nuclear weepons seems to be the most feasible alternative for the foreseeable future. ' 2) The USSR relationship | | The increasing preoccupation of the Soviet leadership with the problem of China and the differential in manpower resources give evidence of — a similer need for the USSR to retain tactical muclear weapons to redress the potential imbalance in conventional forces. | 3) US-USSR Non-Zero Sun | . Both superpowers have a mutual interest not only in redressing potential manpower imbalances vis-a-vis China, with tactical nuclear weapons but also would gain advantage ‘by maintaining mechanized dand forces of greatly superior mobility and Tirepower to the Chinese. The tactical adr forces of the USSR, deployed well eastward to honor a European settlement, and the Pacific sea forces of the U.S. would be indirectly supporting @ common mission. ; in many respects. More important, any detente in Europe, with force levels reduced within European geographical limits, would free land forces from both sides to be deployed against the threat of China. | Over the long haul, the military facts of life might persuade the Chinese Communists to ease their burden by joining in a second generation series. SECRET / . 19 \ HW 49061 Docld:326276321 Page 20
Tae Vane oe a en i ae nr a ee ee { | | re f SECRET of arms control measures but this could only come if those measures negotiated in the first generetion had permitted & good margin for containment of China's aspirations. 4) The Zero Sum Aspect The great hazard of Commmist China to the U.S. is the poten- . tiality that would exist for the USSR end Chinese Commmists to patch up ideological differences and jointly concert against U. S. security interests. c. Middle East-Africa-Latin America The conventional forces of these areas ore relatively insignificant in comparison to the forces of the wajor powers. With the exception of the Iisraeli-Arab strife, the beacekeeping record of the overt forces of the nations of these areas in recent years is a reasonably enlightened one. Within this framework, a reduction in indigenous forces would be likely to retain present power balances and to free increasing proportions of limited national incomes” for economic improvement. If properly monitored, such reductions should not increase political instability. Thus, arms control constraints on the con- ventional forces of the superpowers would have an important relationship to the power balance in these areas. Ideally the reductions to be negotiated should be calculated to make it less likely that USSR lend forces could become engaged in these areas, thus producing @ zero sum advantage to the U. S. in the increasing degree to which these areas would be dependent on sea lines of commmication. A settlement on conventional. forces which merely resulted in European deployment constraints, and which left sizeable forces in the USSR strategic reserve, would make it possible for the USSR to deploy into the Middle East or Africa unless the U.S. retained a preponderance of conventional sea forces and equality of strategic reserve land and conventional air forces. -~ 20 - SECRET HW 49061 DoclId:32626321 Page 21
ie SECRET d. US-USSR relationships . . | Beyond the discussion of the US-USSR reletionship in n Burope,. China, Middle Zast-Africa-Latin America, there remains to be discussed their tespective cage ba ilities as the heertiend bases of conventional weapons end forces. Given the achievement of a balanced power situation eround these tyo nuclei, end etyen a ‘European mainiend in which the edventege would tie with the defense, the resulting overall edventege would lie wit ch the US on three counts. First Be “the pover balance would contutbute, by the neutralization of militery forces: as a S001 of aggression, to the US Strategy « of maintenance of a pelatively stable, wor id order in which orde erly changes can cee, and would be in contrapositién to thet required: for the Communist concept of the destruction end. reordering ‘oP political patterns. Second, the U.S. for the foreseeable future would retain the greater industriel capability with which to be ‘able to 1 mass “produce. ‘to. . ; regain a larger power plateau -- conventional or - nuclear -- should that becone necessary for such fundanental reasons as Communist abrogation of arms control agreenents or restoration of militery cooperation between the USSR ‘end China. The thira reason follows. e. Freedom of “the seas — a The stebility postulated in a . Lineup of forces slong the foregoing Lines, depends on the tying together oP “the _veunining forces of ‘the U.S. ena” her allies taroughout the worl. This binding together of conventional forces of. the Free World, in contrapositién to the. retained forces of a » potentially united continental Communism can only be affected by insuring the. freedom of the’ seas. The present ‘preponderanée in seapower is a function of Superior navel forces and possession of edequate bases within the sea commnity of the Free World. = 21. - SECRET HW 49061 DoclId:32626321 Page 22
Bir SECRET fems Control settlements which ne, gotiated parity of military seapower as between the continental lendpower of the USSR end the sea commmity of the U.S. end NATO would result in a basic reduction in the relative balance of power by denying redeployment of the U.S. strategic reserve lend forces and denying logistic support to any point under pressure from Communist lower order conflict. ‘This eo i may require us, in equity, to concede the right of the USSR toa net superiority Fb of ground forces under suiteble e deployment constraints. In @ world in which the threat of nuclear war hed been tamped down, the power advantage to the US, ia such circumstances, covld be considerable, depending upon the relative balance struck. The extent to which en overall preponderance in Soviet ground forces could’ be counter balanced by preponderance of U.S. conventional air and seapower . would require careful calcvlation and would be difficult to define since two very different things would have to be balanced. The imbalance mist be sufficient to provide security to the continents of the Western Hemisphere, Africe, and | fustralia, but not so great as to prevent the necessary US support of NATO lena armies and occasional support of us allies in South and Southeast Asia. 2. Control Considerations a For Tactical Air. As mentioned earlier, the two superpowers, if they tsl need of the U.S. to retain a preponderance of surface seapower and eir power .. are to maintain their power positions vis-a-vis Commmist China, and other nations, require superiority over these nations in conventional tactical air forces. This superiority is one of the vital factors which would make it possible for both the US and USSR to match the conventional land power of Commmist China and for the US to meet commitments in several areas of the world simitaneously with small land forees. First, the same vehicles used for conventional tactical air — are susceptible of use as tactical nuclear delivery vehicles. This / 22 SECRET HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 23
SECRET prodlen will be discussed in another section but the need of these vehicles for conventional power prevents their elimination as the solution to the nuclear threat. This dichotomy can be lessened by dept oyment constraints discussed. na later section, . . The tactical air force requirenents for NATO in Burope are, as elsewhere, related to the Army levels negotiated. If parity of 1 AMTO-Werseaw forces in mueope, west of the Eug, ov if pe reentage redu etions oP current. European force balance were negotiated, NATO would still require s superiority of tactical air to counterbalance the inferiority of exterior sea lines of reinforeenent over Soviet landlines of commmication. The protection against rapid re- dep oyment of USSR tactical air forces from the USSR to Europe would have to: rest on US capability to redeploy rapidly from the US mainland, This in turn would require approximate parity of tactical air forces in the two heartlands. - Beyond this, the US would require additional tactical air forces (perhaps navel. air) to maintain a favorable balance of power against the Chinese Communist threat in the Pacific. This means that the overall balance of tactical airpower would have to rest with the West: some | Superiority in Europe; equality within the two mainlands (for this purpose the USSR mainland should be defined as “USSR east of the line Leningred-Snolensk-0 Odessa) and superiority in the Pacific. This requirenent for a favorable balance of tactical eir . forces could be legitimized in several ways: 1) by insisting on percentage reductions in current levels of tactical air forces, including naval air, 2) by having the European powers provide a large portion of European NATO tactical air forces, while granting parity of US and Soviet tactical air forces excluding naval air; 3) by winning acceptance of the right to superior us tactical air forces as well as sea forces to conpensate for superior Soviet: lana armies. SECRET HW 49061 DocId: 32626321 Page 24
SECRET | b. For Tactical Aix ‘Defense. The stabilizing aspects of tectical air defense forces, especially SAMs are: 1) these expensive installations axe & protection to the conventional forces of each large power against the crude nuclear assault of smaller Nth powers; 2) they are stabilizing to the defense, against surpris ® attack by air forces of the other superpower; 3) they would, to some extent, reduce the advantage one superoover tight gain by clandestine retention of tactical nuclear weapons for use in tactical air assault. The destebilizing aspects are: 1) the superpower which builds avy tactical air defenses is in a better position to launch its own air attack with less concern for enemy retaliation in kind; 2) any allowed superiority or tactical air is partially negated by opposing air defenses. In this case the stebilizing aspects appear to be controlling. If the US were able to. negotiate en arrangement which permitted tactical air superiority, substantial air defenses would still appear to be the desired situation. . | c. Manpower. Notwithstanding the fact that the US might have to” be prepared to grant higher manpower levels to the USSR to achieve the necessary preponderance in other conventional areas, sticky problems of con- trol would remain. Within any agreed force levels there woula be complicated problems of definition. We would need to be sure that: both sides interpreted force levels as applicable to all personnel engaged in agreed military chores. The use of civilians by one side to increase the virtual effectiveness of the uniformed personnel could not be unilateral. Similarly, there woula have to be commonality of definition of reserve forces although not necessarily parity. If force levels were defined in terms of divisional strength there would have to be some agreed definition of what a division and division slice could be. . 2h - , a SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 25
SECRET In the manpower area these problems would require a high degree of iaspection in order to achieve assurance against cheating. With lesser degrees - of i nspection, only very rough’ manpower controls would appear feasible. a. Mobility and Firepower. It is necessary for both the Us and USSR to retain a high degres £ mobility and firesower in their conventional forces if they are to retain their power superiority over other potential rivals. Yet the equipment which mokes this possible represents @ threat to the opposing mertower by making it possible to overcome, suddenly, deployment constraints. Furthermore, such equipment is more easily produced clandestinely or cached than is the case with strategic weapons. The control over these’ categories oF wes apons which is feasible is directly related to the amount of inspection permitted. . And since it is mobility and firepower which could be most dangerous during aggression in an arms control environment, the greater the limitations at the nucleer end of the spectrum of weaponry, the greater the control we would require over. weapons providing conventional mobility and _ firepower to insure that negotiated balances are not overcome. | @. Bases. Bases heve correctly been identified by the USSR as” the Achilles heel of the US in arms control negotiations, because of 2 two fold, distinct asymmetry in the US-USER relationship: 1) Asa continental iand power the USSR does not need overseas bases to protect vital national interests with conventional power; 2) as an aggressive ideology Communi sin uses subversion and indirect aggression rather than the overt. forces end bases required by the more defensive free world. Elimination of US bases in any overseas area, tends to sever that sea lane in the military Sense. Under mejor reductions of conventional forces or thinning ovt in an. area, some pases might be given up or reduced in strength but this would have to be the follow 25 SECRET HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 26
SECRET cn of and not the substance of an arms control agreement. If, subject to the foregoing, the USSR insisted on a listing of the beses to be liquidated, the ‘US showld insist on a similar reckoning of bases within the satellite and Soviet areas which were being rolled up and should require inspection to make sure ‘that such areas remained, in effect, demilitarized. f. Deployment. The non-zero sum gains resulting from controls on deployment are: 1) the two blocs could reduce the extent of the confrontation in Furrope, yet; 2) this could be done without decreasing and even while increas-. ing conventional commitments elsewhere. As suggested earlier, overall US security could be enhanced if a "thin-out" of conventional forces in Europe, both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, resulted in a better relative balance for ‘the West in Europe, an increased strategic reserve of troops in the US, and/or some greater deployment into the Pacific. If disarmament negotiations developed in such ‘Yashion that an overall reduction in the armed forces were essential to get an otherwise intelligent agreement, deployment constraints in Europe which per- mitted stability at lower levels there probably would be mandatory. Whatever the approach, thinning out in Europe would surely require the US to retain super- iority of tactical air forces and naval forces, together with sufficient airlift and stockpiling of additional sets of protected division equipment, to > Brovide rapid response to a major Soviet conventional thrust in Europe. Deployment constraints might be policed: by a border ATM Pield; by construction of a broad commercially useful canal along the border in” | the German plains; by stationing of fixed ground post observers at road end” reil jonctions and sea and air ports; by exchange of military missions between. . NA ATO and Warsaw headquarters units, and by reciprocal aerial surveillance. 26 SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 27
fe ne ue tee ee SECRET Other variations of deployment constraints could be considered. 7 it mighs be possible some day, if the satellites continue present political trends, to negotiate demilitarization of East Germany in exchange for an Austro-Hungary type "real-union" of the two Germanies which maintained two ‘sovereign administrative systems end which kept FRG security forces out of the East German territory. or a & denuclearized. zone extending a specified distance on either side of the iron curtain might iuprove the stability of the corventional Force lineup, provided the zone were not SO Wide as to prevent stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Euorpe for rapid re-entry into the zone if required. A variant which would appear to have marked disadvantages would be to create & demilitarized zone-shorn of conventional as well as nuclear forces -- on both sides of the present iron curtain border. In general, for the foreseeable — future, the West would have greater difficulty in sweeping back into a demilitar- ized zone with conventional forces than woula the USER, perticularly if there | | is a debilitating effect on the NATO allies of a withdrawal of forces to. their homelands. , ° g- Production Controls. The non-zero sum gains from controls on production would be: halting the expense and destabilizing effect of the conventional arms rece: while preserving the supericrity of both super - powers over other possible rivals. Curtailment of expenses and stabilization of be “race could be accompli shed by: Prohibition of production of all armaments “except agreed categories (such as are in the US GCD Treaty Outline) in which in- |. ventories would have to be reduced by specified emounts; replacenent of Weapons on a one~for- -one basis; prohibition of testing and ‘production of new types of armaments; prohibition of equipping or construction of new production facilities or expansion of existing ones. Preserving the superiority -of the big two requires: . 27 _ SECRET HW 49061 DocId: 32626321 Page 26
SECRET setts ing inventories for these two at a level superior to any combination of rivals in which one superpower does not join; authoriz ng one-for-one replece-. lent within category so that old production lines would not have to be re started and so that each side could gredually improve the quality of its force to the maximum state of the art eat the time R&D were halted. | A disadvantage to the US in any reduction of active inventories is the superiority of the reserve stocks of conventional Soviet equipment, especially tanks. To minimize this fact the US should try to negotiate a correlation between personnel and inventories on a TO&E basis. h. Budget Controls. The openness of the US society and the basic élements of the capitalistic system insure that budgetary control on US defense spending would be largely effective. In the USSR, the extent of secrecy of its closed society would present very real inspection obstacles. More significantly, the artificiality of the USSR's pricing system, in which mit prices may be set mach Lower than actual cost and the shortage made up by overpricing in other areas, and other "Socialist" strategems could result in grossly higher production | of military hardware than a true budget would permit. “This control is therefore & ZeCo sum disadvantage and should be avoided unless it can be effectively pled with other controls which are effective. | . . .3« Possible Solutions | a. Low Inspection. A low inspection case might consist of Soviet willingness to permit observers to witness bonfires of equipment, declared but. ' uninspected inventories and perhaps an exchange of fixed ground observation points. Under such circumstances the US could place reasonable assurance, using unilateral means, on USSR compliance with controls on: inventories of tactical air forces; . ‘tactical air defense and surface naval vessels, -utilization..of..bases «limited SECRET H¥ 49061 Docld:32676321 Page 29
SECRET confidence could be placed on-Soviet compliance with controls on deployment. Controls on total manpower, prcduction, and budget would not be high confidence measures. This would make negotiated reductions in amy strength dangerous. a fnd in view of the need for the Free World Commmity to rely on superior air and sea strength, any reductions in these forces without inspected reductions in armies, could be dangerous and destabilizing. | | be Medium Inspection. This case might include (in addition to those elements of the low inspection case) inspection: of conventional: production by stationing of resident insvectors in all plants declared to be engaged in final assembly of agreed armaments; plus a limited quote, of inspections at plants not a 6 declared, to check against clandestine production; plus some areas open to fre nspection by roving USMIM type patrols; Plus aerial inspection of all of Europe, | Western USSR and Eastern US. Under such criteria, end coupled with unilateral intelligence, the US could place reasmable econPidence in controls on tactical air forces, tactical air defenses, naval forces, utilization of bases, deployment, and fair confidence in inventories of conventional army weapons and equipment . This would make some reductions in army (and possible naval) strength acceptable and equivalent reductions in tactical air forces could therefore be risked. c. High Inspection Case. In this case, to the elements of the two inspection cases above, we might add: inspection of declared inventories; stationing of resident insrectors at factories producing sub-assemblies for finished agreed armaments 3 8 large quota of random inspections at wideclared factories suspected of clandestine production; relatively unlimited areas open, to roving USMIM type patrols; and unrestricted aerial inspection. Access to production and budget data might in this case be of additional: assistance. Under this rigorous inspection system the US could sefely afford to negotiate major reductions in and deployment constraints upon all aspects of its conventional SECRET HW 49061 DocId: 32626321 Page 30
SECRET Force, subject to the caveats discussed concerning erea and exterior I0c problens. C. Tactical Nuclear Weapon 1. Context - Discussion of these weapons has to be treated in the light of a world whi ch, in order to control the awful aspects of its strategic WESPOnSs must arbitrate controls over conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons « Consideration of control over tactical nuslear weapons subsumes that there has. been a comprehensive test ban treaty, a non-diffusion pact, some degree of | control over strategic w weepons, end sufficient political settlement between the superpowers to reduce tension at such pressure points as Laos, Berlin and Cube. | | The problem of Commi st China woula be a major factor in such -consicerations. | | 2. General Considerations a. What Can Contribute to Stability? The overriding complexity introducea into a SFSDA by the considera- tion of tactical nuclear weapons is thet modern conventional delivery eystens (tactical air, artillery, rockets, nortars etc. Je are capable of being mclearized. This fact presents the greatest difficulty in constructing switable controls ‘over | tactical weapons systems except with relatively intense inspection procedures. it seems necessary to require some degree of control over both the range and deployment of conventional delivery systems in order to limit the range and impact area which would be affected by their  Surreptitious converstion to nuclear use. . An important difficulty int he discussion of tactical nuclear weapons is the sematics problem as to what is meant by & "tactical nuclear system," _ As we consider stringent controls over a reduction of what are commonly accepted. 30 SECRET HW 49061 ‘DocId: 32626321 Page 31
SECRET as strategic weapons, those delivery systems which have commonly been considered tactical Cwld increasingly vecems the legical i nstruments of clandestine strategic suxpriss attack. Moreover, weapons which might not be considered, even efter is reduction = SIVS, to be strategic, by the US, might very well te considered strategic by our European allies who would see & reduced strategic umbrella x b ct the US mainland and who also might see large munbers of Gelivery vehicles in the Fastern Europe cepable of reaching Western European targets. It my be necessary, in order to win allied support for arms control agr cements limiti ing SDV¥s, to adopt as the definition of tactical nuclare delivery sys’ tems, those systems which are ceapatle of att tacking ‘the urban-industrial complexes of any Nato-Warsaw nation from outside of its national boundaries. ‘These factors require consideration both under the strategic weapons analyses, discussed earlier, and also in this section. | Whatever the resolution of the peculiar sematics question, it seems basic to the consideration of the tactical nuclear weapons that the existence of nuclear warheads capable of being used by traditionally conventionel delivery vehicles is stabilizing in ‘two ways: (1) Their existence dampens the temptation to initiate a conventional attack; (2) They reinforce the overall power of the nuclear nations as opposed to that of the non-nuclear nations. Here again, the non-zero sum factors “point to a retention of some tactical nuclear warheads. But the zero sum factors point towerd a controlled situation in which effort is made to limit. the numbers of such warheads, and/or the numbers of conventional delivery vehicles capable of firing then, and/or surprise offensive opportunities. ::. , ne 3 SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 32
SECRET -be. Rules or Ascumptions of Engagement and Escalation, The assumpticns as to the use of tactical nuclear warheads would . very with the numbers retained, and the deployment limitations, range limitet- ions, etc. of the related. delivery systems. Working backwards fron the assumptions we would choose in eccking an intelligent SFSDA, the optimum con- trols would be developed. First ’ for the foreseeable future, it would seem unnecessary and unwise to plan to usé nuclear weapons in an arms controlled world environment against the nations of Africa, Latin American and the Middle Kast. Second, both superpovers would undoubtedly want a reserve of tactical nuclear weapons for possible use against Comnmist Chine. Third, it would ax pear to be to the adventase of both superpowers to avoid the use of tactical tuclear weapons in any confrontation between their forces around the periphery, although, again, geography may make them essential to the West for defensive pur- poses in certain areas. Fourth, in Europe there is a special case in which it may be to the benefit of both superpowers to retain the capability to use short range tactical nuclear weapons. The West might have to do so in order to “retain @ credible NATO deterrent after opposing strategic forces have been brought into a condition of controlled mutual deterrence. The extent to which this would be necessary would depend on the extent to which a relaxation of inter-- national tensions, under the political settlements that would be necessary to . achieve a SFSDA, had occurred. ‘The assumptions as to the use of tactical nuclear weapons which both sides might accept, then, would be: (1) Neither would use tactical nuclear weapons against inferior non-nuclear nat (2) .Both would be prepared to use such weapons against major. non-nuclear powers - i.e., Commmni st China; SECRET HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 33
SECRET (3) Both would be prepared to escalate to the use of such weapons > =) =) + ve BS if attacked, especially Burope,: and perhaps in other areas, depending upon the political and military situetion: obta ning. Under these assumptions, the proplem of control becomes one of work- ing out ways to minimize the opportunity for the attacker to usé tactical wclear weapons in an initial surprise ttack, whil reservine for the da? Rucicar weapors in an initial surprise atteck, while preserving for the défense whe capability to use tactical nuclear wearons after the attack has besun. 3. Control Considerations = The complexities of this ® problem are: the ones on which meanine Pull disarmament nesotiations are most 14 ely to a Delivery VYehicl The primary problem with regard to conventional delivery Problem wes mentioned above - i.€., the fungibility of delivery means. Yet, the need to retain some tactical miclear weapons capability requires that. ther re be & meaningful avproach to the control of tactical delivery vehicles. Restated, the problem is to preserve conventional delivery means for the defense, to handicap their use ag nuclear delivery vehicles in the offense, yet to vetain the possibility of their use for delivery of tactieal nuclear weapons - : in the defense. | | | | As suggested ebove, each super power would need enough delivery vesicles to remain superior to non-nuclear rivals and to deter super power avsack. For use against Communist ‘China! s land armies and other 7 targets, aixcratt would appear to be optima delivery vehicles. Ideally both sides would retain sufficient tactical aircraft, configured for tactical nuclear weapons (sey 500), deployed against China, rangé-Limited to prevent surprise use against the opposing super power, to suit this need. Ideally the tactical | 33 SECRET HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 34
re Or SO, be cee ene ee tne ee ey 7 ce Fee ™ SECRET aircraft reserved for conventional air battle in Europe would be estopped, by coxrtiguration and insp ection, from using tactical nuclear wea’ PONS. In keeping with the concept that Eurone should be aefense-ord ed, in addition to a border AGM screen, each side might be authorized sufficient (say 5 900) fexy short venge (sey 10 to 50 km) tactical missiles in hardened be used against an attacker, but located far enough behind the border that thsy could not serve as offensive tactical weapons. Both sides could be allowed to determine for +2 nemselves the accuracy and yield restraints they would place on such missiles since their warheads would, of course, exolode in own territory. | This concept of immobile positions for tactical missiles would be optimized by an agreement to provide controls over the deployment of artillery of ranges larger than 30 miles. Roving inspectors could be used : a to assure that all artillery of greater range remained deployed behind lines evéeral hundred miles either side of the Iron Curtain. This would provide maximum utility in the use of immobile tactical nuclear missiles against invasion and, beyond that, artillery for defense in depth or for reinforcement of the imraded area. Another real. problem with regard to delivery vehicles is the BO possibility of use of commercial vehicles with clandestine warheads for surprise attack. The extent of this threat is a direct function of the degree of inspection allowed. 7 b. Warheads If the foregcing ideal situation with regard to delivery vehicles could be negotiated, constraints on warheads would be less of a protlem. Warhead controls, as a sole constraint, are infeasible. Both superpowers have SECRET. HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 35
L. | | [ r L [ SECRET produced so much material from which such weapons may be fabrica ced an ad have & cr ockpiled so many tactical nuclear warheads that. it would be ditricult to peeclude clandestine as sembly end use, without controls over delivery vehicles. AV ee tet 7 tt ! nis fact, in addition to those cited above, argues for the retention by both te des of a reserve of tactical nuclear weapons, to denigrate the importance Go i clandestine stockpiling by the cther side. This reserve (of. say LOCO tactical weapons, in addition to the 500 warheads retained for European Pixed | tactical missiles) would have to be deployed away from Europe, in the vicinity of the 500 aircraft deployed by each side for possible use against China. If the ideal si wuation with regard to a fixed European tactical missile were not negots able, then some form of physical separetion of tact tical nuclear weapons from tactical aircraft in Europe would have to be negotiated together with controls on the numbers, range, and yield of mobile tactical missiles in that theater. This is inherently less stable than the ideal situation. co Fissile Materials A significant aspect of assurance against clandestine stockpiling - of tactical nuclear weapons would be the negotiation of a cutoff of production of fissionable materials. This would hav= other non-zero sum factors. It would serve to inhibit the opportunity of other nations to acquire nuclear WeapPoas , if they signed the agreement before they attained @ nuclear capability and provided controls over peaceful uses of nuclear materials were carefully: monitored. It would also slackm the strategic weapons race. This is an easily. policed control although the great quantities of Pissile material already 35 SECRET WW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 36