January 1959~~CHAUMONT still a Commandante but not being paid by the government. CHAUMONT is supported through "Directorio Revolucionario" treasury and by friends such as AMTRUNK-10. CHAUMONT made a statement to AMICE-~14 and AMICE~14's cousin that Fidel would- have ~~ to be killed. Fidel was anti-~Directorio and there was ae personal dislike between CHAUMONT and Fidel because they both wanted to be "El Maximo Lider" and Fidel won out. 1960--After over a year without any official position, Fidel brought CHAUMONT into the government where he could keep an eye on him and control him to a-degree. In late | 1960 or early 1961, Fidel appoints CHAUMONT Ambassador to. ~ the Soviet Union. CHAUMONT is recalled from the USSR af- ter barely 1 year as Ambassador. When queried by close friends about the USSR, CHAUMONT replies "Rusia es-un gran mierda". Appointed Minister of Communications in 1962 where he remains. AMICE~14 states that CHAUMONT is a leftist, but not a communist. .To a degree, he shares the same position as Rolando CUBELA in that he has gone too far to turn back and he enjoys the privileges of his position. According — to AMICE-~14, CHAUMONT is highly intelligent and shrewd — - and has a large personal following resulting from his long- time revolutionary activities. AMTRUNK-~10 believes that he can approach CHAUMONT safely. He thinks that (CHAUMONT may turn him down but” won't turn ‘him in. Cc. enw NIEVES NIRVES 3G stout 30 years old, a Commandante from humble origins in s Villas Province. NIEVES has little education but regardtess worked his way up to Commandante while fighting in the Eqcambray along with AMTRUNK-10. NIEVES is a member of the original “Directorio Revolucionario". NIEVES is believed to be a troop commander in one of the provinces, probably Las Villas. NIEVES has a brother, also fnu, who was aide to Camilo Cienfuegos during the war, who was arrested about 4 months ago with one AVERHOFF on trumped-up charges of trying to kill Fidel. AMTRUNK-10 considers NIEVES very reliable. AMTRUNK-10 believes that NIEVES can be approached and that he will cooperate i D. "Bu RAVIESO TRAVIESO™ is “about 25 years old, a member of the DR, and formerly was executive officer to the Chief of the Air Force, Sergio del VALLE. TRAVIESO has since been thrown — SE gee Docld:32373816 Page 14° ;
ut of the Air Force because he was not "politically reliable”, ording to AMTRUNK . TRAVIESO does not now hold any offi- — cial position. © TRAV 0. could be valuable for his contacts in- he Air Force and his contacts in the Rebel Army. which -stem ig when he was a Captain under Camilo: CIENFUEGOS. AMTRUNK-10 considers: TRAVIESO.-a possibility for recruit- ment but he is not as sure of TRAVIESO as he Ag the other three, CUBELA, -CHAUMONT. and NI VES. R. Captain ‘Enriqu NPABONA aka "Varonita" . _VARONA is the Cuban Commander of San Antonio de. los Banos Mr: Base. He is a pilot. VARONA is a friend of AMTRUNK-10's, but AMTRUNK- 10 does not co: ider him reliable or trustworthy. F. Captain Diego (?fX ENDO OQUENDO is’ flying MIG “of unknown type. He. de a ‘friend of AMTRUNK- 10 and VARONA. He might be willing ° to defect with a MIG. ls: ARTTAGA te ARTIAGA is. an INRA official and ‘AMTRUNK=10' s sapervis ma \RTIAGO was a member of Fide +s bodyguard and is now Chief of == eracion Escambray", an anti=guerrilla. operation in the Escam~ y which has both: Ferigear gid and gs prarcaiog Eabrigg Corba aree heviben A. NW 53320 Docld:32373816 Page 15°
owe . % MIGROFILMED” MAR 25 1965 Boe. MICRO. SER. 16 September 1963 SUBJECT: RESULTS OF OPERATION LEONARDO AND PLAN OF ACTION (1) On 3 February 63 we formulated the preliminary plan of "Operation Leonardo", considered as a preliminary step to the coordination of “anti-Castro"elements within the Cuban Government, The Rebel Army and Militia with the ultimate objective of producing and carrying out the overthrow of the Government. (2) The immediate objective of the operation was to estab- lish contact with some of these elements, with the purpose of converting into action their anti~communist sentiments and to convince others who up to now had maintained a passive attitude but who would be susceptible to being induced to act against the Communist regime. (3) The basis for making us think of the feasibility of "Operation Leonardo" had its origin in information received | on the following extremes: a) The time had come for action of this kind, inasmuch as favorable conditions were rapidly ripening. b). .The progressing moral and economic weakening of the et) Communist Government and the internal tension among its members. c) The favorable effect of President Kennedy's speech made at the Orange Bowl to the Brigade 2506 in the last days of 1962, which recognized this possibility. | . (4). In order to prove these ends and take the first steps towards the aforementioned coordination, we offered to land in Cuba and establish contact with Rebel Army officers and Government officials, The object of this memorandum .is to give a resume of the conclusions to which we have arrived after fulfilling phase II of “Leonardo". CONCLUSIONS ow We can definitely establish the following: (1) It is estimated that about 80% of the Cuban population is against the Communist Regime. However it lacks effective — organization and necessary resources.to attempt the overthrow of ‘the Communist dictatorship. (2). In addition, also opposed to the Regime although main- \ taining a passive attitude*is.an important nucleous of the Rebel ‘ e ni his26 | podtd: Soxbrere and WA coy
HW 53320... Docld:32373816 Page 17 oR y, Militia and Civil officials of the Regime. This group is : baragterized by the following: ° a). For the most part these aré men who took part in” the revolutionary activities against the Batista Government and gave full. approval to the Revolu-~ tionary Government in those initial moments. b) They continue offering apparent cooperation and help -to the Regime. c) They maintain a state of total or partial inactivity, due to the lack of means and. coordination for. the fight against the Communist Government, in whose invincibility they are beginning to believe, AT THE SAME TIME THAT THEY HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF CUBA AND THE IBIL. ‘Y OF TH RETURN ORR REGIMES OF THE P '(3) We understand that the basic plan of “Operation Leonardo" has been approved in its entirety. Especially regarding the exis- tance of an important nucleous within the Government, Reel Army and Militia, ready to lend collaboration to plans of internal action “in crescendo", which would culminate in the overthrow of the Communist dictatorship and the re-establishment of a democratic regime based on a respect of God, Human Rights and which promotes the general well being and social justice. (4) -It has also been duly proven that these men are ready to act against the Communist Regime for purely ideological reasons, © AS LONG AS THEY ARE GIVEN A MINIMUM OF GUARANTY, which can be summed ALD in the fol owing terms: (a) tnplementation of the principles which were first decreed by the triumphant Revolutionary army at the beginning of January. 1959 and then betrayed by the Communist Government ; and the establishment of a democratic regime, with respect towards God, and to human rights, which promotes the general well being and social justice. “()) . The non acceptance of individuals who have directly or indirectly committed or been implicated in crimes and tortures or have made illicit gains. (c) The selection of capable men with clean public service records, preferably from the Rebel Army, to direct — ---gnd-orient thé action against the Regime and the VISIBLE AND. -- DOMINANT PARTICIPATION of persons offering guaranties to in- dividuals who still, apparently, represent the backing of. the imperious regime. Said guaranty should not cover those indi- ff viduals stained by blood.
(5). That the above is possible and that there actually in truth exist some individuals, anti-communists, who are ready to act, was demonstrated by the following: a) the establishment in Cuba of a growing organized nucleous and other contacts; b) the establishment of communication with the exterior which is already HW 53320. Docld: 32373816 Page 16 working: ¢c) the organization of a route of entry and exit of the Island whose effectiveness has already been proven. - Obliged by the growing rythmn of. the organization in Cuba, which under no circumstances should be held back and where for lack of action or contacts with the exterior the impression of: “abandonment might be created, we urgently consider that Leonardo rent . should be continued.on the following basis:——~—~~——-—~ RECRUITMENT of an integrated group in exile, of persons who combine the charactéFistiés described under item c) paragraph (4) some of which are mentioned in our initial. Memorandum of 3 Feb 63, which will have in its charge the following: ee a) Establish the ideological basis for the fight. b) Orient. and direct the propaganda towards Cuba. Said propaganda should be in accord with the before mentioned principles and very specially should project the a’) guaranties offered to collaborators who directly or indirectly are the backbone of the imperious regime; b') the implementation of the principles first offered by the triumphant Revolution at the beginning of January 1959. ~ ce) Establish the contacts within Cuba, personally or by we whichever means possible in order to penetrate the military, the militia and the civil section of th Government, d). Establish contacts within Cuba, personally or by any other means possible and onganize 2c landestine com batant net which will have in its charge, with the héIp tobe given from the exterior, the execution of all types.of action, which will tend to demonstrate the vulnerability of the Regime and the disposal of . the people of Cuba to fight until the overthrow is accomplished. - _ It is well to point out the importance of these clan- destine actions by their effects: a') facilitating the recruitment of persons who hold or are carrying: out Government charges. b') Their favorable moral effect on those already recruited, who feel they must continue these actions against the group of which they are a part, since their participation, directly in the fight, will necessarily fall behind at the opportune moment at the deciding level. |
Direct participation by the exile group in the fight which will be produced in Cuba, at the moment con- - sidered most opportune by said group, and for which - effect they necessarily must transfer to Cuba. The preceding represents the results of conversations” with various elements in Cuba, who offered their opinions and” moreover represented the opinions of the majority of the recruitable people. This affirmation is also a result of the manifestations made by an ex-Comandante of the Rebel Army during a recent trip to this city, which are voiced in some of his writings before he returned to continue the development: of "Operation Leonardo", Td:32373816- Page 19.
ry Cd Since we arrived in Havana at 2 i qe and could not establish reer the contact, _we decided to gO to the house of Tea ‘accompanied by Teresa’ anied by nig aunt, ‘were to make the first. contact ‘with Orozco, use of David's aug, from where they tried to contact Orozco on. then moved to the house of Te: arate. “to whom he gave the first in- Sot lowing day. He was able to et ites including Orozco and: be were not aEvacted to return or tant with the wife of Fernandez scussed with them. That night we siep in the house of Mrs. Zs Aho [a MTRUNK—Io The next ornate we had an interview with Gufn, and it lasted fC all day. . That night Aldo's car arrived, accompanied by Angel — ‘rmin, and we returned to the infiltration area, accompanied by — pon arriving at the mentioned area, in the town of Marti,.— ere informed that the car which was to be used to take us to the safehouse on the coast, was being used by the militiamen of the area, so, being accompanied by an expert of the zone, we decided to go where the boat was located, walking through the fields. We made the trip without een any house of inhabited areas, arriving the next morning. _ Fo Wud . That morning we saw a helicopter combing the area east of Playa Menendez, and, thinking of the possible contact of one of the ex- filtrees, Fermin, with a G-2 informer, we decided not to wait for "Kilo" and that night we left for Cay Sal. This was done without im- portant incidents, except the fact of not being able to use the silent motor, as it did not function properly, apparently due to the gasoline pump as it. was explained above. The arrival at Cay Sal was at about 8:30 a.m., 23 August. We ob- tained the cooperation of the persons there, and were able to call Jorge Volsky by radio telephone, as we'd agreed, giving our position. This was done at 8:45 a.m. (| NW 53320 Docld:32373816 Page 20 t house, and got ready to make —
At about 6 p.m. we found out that a boat without visible flag was approaching the place, and informed that it was a North American coast guard boat, we went. to retrieve the equipment that was drying. Later the boat sent a motor boat, with 4 persons. As it approached and the men landed, we realized they were English. . There was no time to hide the weapons and ammunition, for which upon searching us and finding it, they asked us to go on the boat. At this time another boat arrived, ‘apparently a recreation boat, handled by Fred, “among other persons. Once on the British ship, the group was put under custody. waiting for the Nassau authorities to decide the situation. On the ship a for- mal interrogation was given basically addressed to Leon. The police inspector and the ship's officer informed us that the most probable decision would be to hand over the group to the American authorities in Key West with all the equipment, but without the ammunition. Nevertheless, they. made clear, that the final decision depended from Nassau, since that was only a suggestion of theirs. The group remained on the wentioned. ‘hip until 25 “habuse et which time they were authorized to land, accompanied by a member of the American Immigration Department, and they were given all the equipment except weapons, maps , infra red light, etc. etc. ammunition, « NW 53320 Docld:32373816 Page 21
A oe : ce ; C en ROFILMED MAK 16 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR. THE RECORD RO. SER. po. MIC SUBJECT: Initial Operational Debriefing of AMTRUNK Team “~~ 1. Pick-Up by the British The. AMTRUNK. team was picked up by the British destroyer "Caprice" at. Cay Salon the afternoon of 23 August approximately 20 minutes. before the KUBARK boat "Matusa Times" reached. them. .The cover story given to the Brits was that they were a group of refu~ gees fleeing from Cuba. Although it is quite obvious. that the British did not believe this story fully, they were never able to Jus break the team's cover. The personal documents of the team members : were never checked by the British. The team members gave the fol-~ (tach: / lowing /names, none of which are true names: MICE~27 used the name f "Leon™“Lopez", AMIQGE-14 used the name. "Davi ardo", AMTRUNK~7 used , the name ''Carlos Menendez"', AMTRUNK~8 used the name ‘Rodrigo Fernandez Lopez", (AMTRUNK~-9 used the name "Jose Lopez" ~and the sixth member of the group Fermin sed the name "Ramon Lopez". (From the names given to the British, it. looks as though most of the Lopez! in Cuba came out on this Boston Whaler!) When the team was landed at Key West and reported to Immigration there, the names given to Immigration were the alias documentation names for the first four members of the team, the name "Jose Lopez Lopez" for AMTRUNK-9, and the true name for Fermin Gonzalez Fernandez. The weapons picked up by the British and not returned consisted of one FAL, three M~3 sub-machine guns, two 9 mm Brownings, one Colt .38 Detective Special, one Smith~Wesson’ .38 Chief's Special. (personal weapon of AMICE-~27) and one .38 automatic belonging to AMTRUNK~9.. Team members were not searched by the British and were not interrogated separately. The majority of the talking was done by the team leader AMICE~27. In addition to the weapons listed above, the British took a set of 1:50,000 maps of the north coast. of & Cuba and maritime charts. of the Santa Clara Bay area. They also took team along with AMTRUNK-9. He was born 7 July 1931 in Marti, Matanzas, Cuba and his last address was Finca Favorito, Itabo, Marti, Matanzas. He was an auto mechanic by profession, is married and has one child 20 “months old. His father's name is Gumersindo Gonzalez Gonzalez and his oo mother's name is Catalina Hernandez Suarez. Fermin acted as coordinator ) -of numerous underground activities in the Marti area. When the team re- / # eruited Fermin to help them shortly after their infiltration, they also time that the team was in Havana, Fermin was approached by a negro named|? one dynalite which was not returned. 2. Information on Fermin? Gonzalez Fernandez “Subject was the other individual exfiltrated by the AMTRUNK wo promised to exfiltrate Fermin if he got into serious trouble. During thay Jose LNU who had infiltrated with two other persons from the Miami area |~ * -in-recent days and whose boat had run aground and was leaking. Jose LNU | attempted to recruit Fermin to help him. Fermin suspected this indi- widest ‘of being a G-2 informer and declined to help. He later heard Acéording to his story, this ig e032 Ja
AW.53320. Docld: 32373816 .Page 23 con irmed his suspicion that Jose was a G~2 and was out to get informa~ tion on Fermin. He requested exfiltration from the AMTRUNKers. and they agreed to bring him out. 3. Initial Team Contacts in Cuba On the first night when the team infiltrated they went to a point at coordinates 139514 Map 4085 III, the entrance to a large lagoon into which they hoped to sail and hide the following day. At the en- trance to this lagoon they saw a boat and they therefore kept moving in a westerly direction to point 133512, at which a natural canal heads in- to the mangroves in a southerly direction. They steered into this canal, down through two small. lagoons, and into a third larger lagoon located at — 130495. This lagoon was the site of their base camp where the Boston Whaler was kept hidden in the mangroves during the entire stay. The first contact that they made was with a fisherman by the name of Isaac. ‘Moreno who was recognized and previously known by AMTRUNK-7 and 8. He was approached on the following day in the large lagoon and.was asked to. -gend word. to the team's first contact Oscar €Diaz, the uncle of AMTRUNK~7. Oscar, his son Antonio *Diaz Torres, and Candido #Diaz | ‘(no relation t6 the others) next showed up in a small fishing boat. These, men recom- mended Fermin Gonzalez Hernandez as the best man to be ablé.to help them in the town of Marti. Fermin was then contacted by one of thp’Diaz' and came out by boat along with another man by the name of Felix lunoz to discuss the operation. In the meantime Oscar Diaz had recru one Juan #Perez another fisherman, to act as a guard and to fish outside the lagoon in order to give warning of any approaching boat. ae 4. Transportation car in- which he 5 transporte fish between the Casuali ad area and Cardenas. In this car az went to Cardenas and contacted AMICE-14's old. friend Pedro #Barbi. Candido took the team members..AMICE-27 and _ -AMICE-14 — from Casualidad in his old car_ to Itabo. In the ot rts of Menendez. the road. passes ‘the house of a chivato named Braulio adruga. The latter's entire family is a chivato family and reports te, the G=<2 on any strange traffic passing on the road to Playa Menendez... At Ltabo the two agents were passed 6n to Fermin. Gonzalez who took them in his own car to Marti.“ In Marti the team was passed on to a negro named Esmeraldo *Montalvo, nicknamed "Aldo" qr "Aldito" who works in a sugarmill near “Marti and also-drivés’ a> taxi.~“He was b ermin Gonz Zo ‘and by Pedro Barbi. Aldo picked the team up and took them from Marti to Habana. "On the return trip from Habana, Aldo again drove from Habana to Marti, and the procedure was reversed. ws 5B, Underground Activities in. Marti Fermin Gonzalez claimed to be a _member_ of the Union cubaae de Accion Libertadora (UCAL). He said that “the coordinator of this organi- zation had been Daniel Cardo but that subject had been caught in July and was executed in mid-August as a counter-revolutionary. Gonzalez said
io gas , C Since we arrived in Havana at 2 a.m. and eould not establish immediately the contact, we decided to go to the house of Angel's mother and sister where we waited until 6 in the morning, “PERS"NE— eon contacted Teresa ‘Azcarate and David went to contact his family. oer ee At 10 .a.m., Leon. accompanied by Teresa’ te, and David, ac~ companied by his aunt, were to make. the first. contact with Orozco, which could not be done, as the person.was not home, so they went to the house of David's aunt from where they. tried to. contact Orozco again, unsuccessfully. on then moved to the house of Ter A. where he joined Adolfina uarez More to whom he gave the first in- structions on S.W. He slept in that house, and got ready to make con- tacts with the principal targets the soe meee day. .He was. able to make the contacts from noon un ate ¥ reir including Orozco and success since ey were out of town ‘a ad were not Sxpected to return for a couple of days. Nevertheless, contaet with the wife of Fernandez Supervielle and with the sister of Suarez More was made, and the matter was discussed with them. That night we slept in. the house of Mrs Vazquez. WA am NTRUNK—| ( The next nornike we had an interview with Guin: and it lasted almost all day. . That night Aldo's car arrived, accompanied by Angel and Fermin, and we returned to the infiltration area, accompanied by Orozco. pon arriving at the mentioned area, in the town of Marti,. ére informed that the car which was to be used to take us to the safehouse on the coast, was being used by the militiamen of the area, so, being accompanied by an expert of the zone, we decided to go where the boat was located, walking through the fields. We made the trip without approaching any house of inhabited areas, arriving the next morning. _ BY ( That morning we saw a helicopter combing the area east of Playa Menendez, and, thinking of the possible contact of one of the ex-~ filtrees, Fermin, with a G-2 informer, we decided not to wait for "Kilo" and that night we left for Cay Sal. This was done without im- portant incidents, except the fact of not being able to use the silent motor, as it did not function properly, apparently due to the gasoline pump as it was explained above. The arrival at Cay Sal was at about 8:30 a.m., 23 August. We ob- tained the cooperation of the persons there, and were able to call Jorge Volsky by radio telephone, as we'd agreed, giving our position. This was done at 8:45 a.m.