13-00000, SEGRE NO FOREIGN DISSEM OCI No. 2336/65 . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY “ Office of Current Intelligence 20 October 1965 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Cuban Subversion in Latin America 1. Cuban spokesmen continue to reiterate their determination to aid subversive movements in Latin America. A variety of sources confirm that some aid is being provided, although the level of such _material assistance seems to be less thana ° 2. Eowever, Cuba's activities in support of revolu- tion in Latin America seem to be undergoing a change. Ernesto "Che" Guevara's fall from power is sympto- matic of this shift. Guevara was Cuba's most doc- trinaire spokesman for militant revolutionary tactics. Moreover, at the Havana Conference of 1964, Cuba agreed to funnel its aid only to those subversive movements endorsed by the pro-Moscow Latin American Communist parties. It is still too early to judge the extent to which this commitment is being imple- mented. For the present, Cuba seems to be following a cautious policy of providing support--largel the form 6 ropagahnda--—-n those countries where Havana judges indigenous revolutionary movements ta ave the most chance of success. Castro will probably Havana for a summit meeting 0 atin American sub—- , ‘versive groups to assess the results of the 1964 Havana Conference,what has been accomplished, and what will be required for the future. 3. As recently as 3 October, Fidel caste re- affirmed tha che ta tionaries of this continent. He stated that Cuba has the "responsibility" for aiding the revolutionary movements in the hemisphere, and "we assume the re-. Sponsibility and the consequences and the risks." Lest there be any question as to Cuban aims he an- nounced that "while there are exploited and colonial- ized peoples, we shall continue running these risks, NO FOREIGN DISSEM
13-00000, SECREF NO FOREIGN DISSEM and we shall continue serenely assuming these responsibilities." In mid-August, another regime spokesman called Cuba's assistance to subversion His country's "international duty." Propaganda Support 4. Propaganda has bee heavily used by the Castro regime in its attempts to overturn established governments in Latin Amer- ica. Cuban broadcasts to Latin America total more than 160 hours a week i i French Creole, and the Indian languages of echua, Guarani, and Aymara, In the early days of the Castro regime, such broadcasts were primarily devoted to strident calls to immediate armed action. Now the emphasi is more on laying the groundwork for future revolu- ‘tionary action and on attempts to unite feuding rev- Olutionary organizations The majority of these Broadcasts masquerade as objective commentary on political, economic, and sociological conditions in the various countries of Latin America; they replay statements by revolutionary groups, and feature documentaries designed to show that only the "Cuban way'' will solve the problems of Latin America. 5. During the month of July, for example, one third of Havana radio's total international radio service commentaries were devoted to specific Latin American countries. Venezuela received the greatest attention, primarily through the regular three-times- a-week program "Venezuelan Realities." 6. Broadcasts to Haiti are an exception to the general rule. In these, Havana directly incites the Haitians to launch immediate revolutionary action. Haitian Communists long-resident in Cuba broadcast vitriolic commentary on the economic and political deterioration of Haiti and the need for unity among the revolutionary forces. Commenting on the lack of concrete action by Haiti's two Communist parties, a recent broadcast stated, "it is of. the utmost neces- sity that all honest Haitians gather under the banner of the Unified Democratic Front...to make Duvalier «pay for. his treason and all of his crimes." On the practical side of revolution, Havana radio has been serializing selections on guerrilla warfare tactics -2— NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
13-00000. SEGREL NO FOREIGN DISSEM and broadcasting speeches that were given in Cuba by the representative of the militant Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). 7. Havana radio broadcasts have had some de- gree of success, according to both their supporters - and their opponents. During the Dominican revolt, several clandestine sources reported that the rebels listened regularly to Radio Havana and were impressed by the speed with which the Cuban network reported on local developments. In Haiti, President Duvalier is making strenuous efforts to outlaw the Cuban lottery; Haitians listen to Radio Havana for the lottery re- sults and absorb a good dose of anti-~Duvalier propa- ganda at the same time. Peruvian President Belaunde . has attacked the provocative reporting_of the Cuban. radio, which the Peruvian Government ,{L | Ce eel plans to jam with equipment it as ye Oo purchase, Venezuela is already jamming Radio Havana. In August, a high Honduran officia Stated that his government has evidence of coded broad- casts from Cuba, - Training &. It is on training of Latin American sub- versives and limited financial support of their move- ments that Cuba rests much of its hope for revolution- ary success. The experience of the Dominican Republic --where a small group of Cuban-trained extremists was able to lead the rebels in the worst of the fighting-- has probably convinced Havana of the merit of continu- ing to train subversives from a variety of countries so as to be ready for targets of opportunity. Cuba's organ for intelligence and subversion, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), maintains installa- tions for training Latin American subversives in the specifics of revolutionary warfare and providing them with ideological orientation. Two weeks ago the DGI's director, Manuel Pineiro, was named to the Cuban Com- munist Party's Central Committee and to its select three-man foreign affairs committee, an act which af- firms the priority Cuba places on the activities of his organization. , 9, Reliable estimates of the nationality and numbers of trainees are difficult to obtain because of -3- NO FOREIGN DISSEM
13-00000 . NO FOREIGN DISSEM the devious routes most of them use to travel to Cuba and because of the efficiency of the DGI in providing false documentation. However, clandes- tine sources provide so some j such | travel that the party ptiann “to send 60 men to Cuba in early August for special training in guerrilla tactics and Communist doctrine. Another group of 15 to 20 men who had been under- going training in Cuba was expected to return to Guatemala during July. A number of Panamanians are expected to leave for guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in the near future; several earlier trainees recently returned to Cuba for a refresher course. 10 reports that since early e People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of British Guiana--the party of ousted premier and Castro-supporter Cheddi Jagan--has emphasized the reorganization and expansion of its long-term po- litical education program. On 1 September, Jagan's wife reportedly told an organizer of the PPP that she was making arrangements fora nine-month "political Science" course to be held in Cuba. Two PPP "scholar- ship students" who returned to British Guiana in September informed police that thé obligatory military training they had received in Cuba had included making four types of bombs, including Molotov cocktails. 11. Although Jamaica is not one of Cuba's priority targets in the hemisphere, a report of June 1965 indicates that Cuba intends to train about 200 Jamaicans during the next few years. These Jamaicans are then to become leaders and instructors for the pro-Castro elements in Jamaica. The Cuban-Consul in: Jamaica, although not directly involved in the arrange- ments, reportedly has given assurances that the group _. would receive guerrilla warfare training if it could get to Cuba. *An additional 25 Guianese are scheduled to leave soon for guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. 4. NO FOREIGN DISSEM
13-00000 - ~SEORET- NO FOREIGN DISSEM 12. Although sufficient documentation is not available, it is believed that Cuba continues to train unspecified numbers of representatives from other Latin American revolutionary groups. It should be noted, however, that very few Colombians and no known. P ians eivin uerrilla = are training in Cuba at the present time, despite. the fact at these two countries are at the top of Cuba's subversion list. 13. Cuba's only known large shipment of weap- “ons to a Latin American subversive group was a three- ton cache seized by Venezuelan authorities in Novem- . ber 1963, This experience apparently convinced Castro that weapons procurement is a problem to be solved by the internal subversive forces, not by Cuba. In a speech on 28 May, Castro said, "In reality, the people's weapons are in the hands of their enemies. ...When we learned to take weapons from the enemy, we had learned to wage the revolution." This appears to confirm the statement of a defector from the DGI that because of the exposure of arms Shipments to Venezuela it is now Cuban policy to re- ject all Latin American requests for assistance other than for funds and somé training. The Havana Conference and Afterwards 14. The most Significant recent change in Cuba's support of subversion in the hemisphere oc- curred at the Havana Conference of Latin American Communist Parties held in November 1964. At that time, Cuba and the Latin American representatives agreed to limit their support to those revolutionary movements officially endorsed by the pro-Moscow Communist Party .of the respective country... The attending parties pledged themselves to increase their support of such groups and to attempt to unify revolutionary movements in the hemisphere. 15. Implementation of this policy involves a sharp departure from past Cuban practice. Formerly, Cuba devoted much of its support to revolutionary groups which were competitors of the regular Commu- nist parties. Cuba's adoption of the new policy may partially be the result of its disillusionment over the failure of these organizations, its recognition ~5m NO FOREIGN DISSEM
13-00000, SHCRET- NO FOREIGN DISSEM of a need to repair relations with the old-line Communist parties, and. some strong urging by the Soviets. A letter/ ‘indicates hat Castro has indeed had a change Of heart in regard to the official Communist parties. Castro is quoted as saying that "the present Communist parties are the best things that each Latin Ameri- can nation has" and his attitude is represented as demonstrating that Castro's confidence in the Latin American parties has increased substantially. 16. Along with agreeing to channel support through the orthodox parties, the representatives at the Havana Conference also specified the countries in which they beliéve that an “exploitable revolu- ‘tionary Situation already exists: Ree Guate- mala, Colombia, Paraguay, Haiti, Honduras, and Panama. All of these countries, and especially the first three, are constantly mentioned by Cuban spokesmen as the leading revolutionary targets in Latin America. Jul Castr LS ist of areas of primary Cuban interest. 17. Evidence is still inconclusive as to the extent to which the agreements reached in Havana are being implemented. The resuits of the con- ference seem to be most apparent in Guatemala. Previously, extensive Cuban support --Q@gGaiaes “Ge fime--had been provided to the 13th of Novem- ber Movement led by Cuban-trained Marco Antonio Yon Sosa. This group operated outside the official Guatemalan Communist Party, the PGT. However, Cuba has apparently switched its support to the PGT, which has cooperated by establishing a new paramilitary arm, the Rebel Armed Forces. (FAR). | re- Ce RUMEUAnEy that the PGT had recéived a com- munication from Castro stating that if the PGT succeeds in intensifying its activities and sustains itself until the end of 1965, Castro will then give the PGT complete financial support. This pledge appears to have been instrumental in increased militancy on the part of the PGT and FAR. 18. Cuba confirmed its commitment to the PGT at Cairo in September by insisting that the FAR, rather ~6- NO FOREIGN DISSEM ~SECREF
13-00000 . NO FOREIGN DISSEM than the Yon Sosa group, be accepted as the official Guatemalan representative to the preparatory meeting for the "Tri-Continent" Conference. This conference opens in Havana on 3 January. Thus the FAR is ap- parently Havana's choice for Guatemafan representa- tion at the Conference. Representatives of the Com- munist and radical states of Asia and Africa, as well as delegates from revolutionary movements in these two areas and Latin America will be brought together at the conference to discuss problems of imperialism and colonialism, and ways to coordinate their revolu- tionary movements. An observer at the Cairo meeting commented that only the Guatemalan representative seemed to be really in "Castro's pocket." 19. In Peru, Cuba is continuing its propaganda suppo of t the Revolutionar e . (MIR). In the past, the MIR received considerable material assistance from the Cubans-~-although this is no longer so. Its leader, Luis de la Puente Uceda, has visited Cuba several times and is reportedly on good terms with Castro. In an interview printed by a Lima newspaper on 3 May, de la Puente was quoted as Saying, "I have chosen the path of action. Our people's only way to liberation is armed rebellion..." This statement was followed up in June, when the MIR began its long-delayed guerrilla operations with at- tacks near Huancayo in Peru's central zone. The action has been applauded in Cuban propaganda media. On 27 September, the Union of Peruvians in Cuba (one of several such national groups parroting the Cuban line) issued a manifesto stating, “under the condi- tions prevailing in Peru, there is no other way to eliminate all the ills that afflict our people than the path blazed by the MIR guerrillas. ...we...pro- _ claim our wholehearted support to the guerrillas." Formal Cuban support for this position was contained in a July article in the Cuban daily Hoy which de- clared, "The Peruvian masses have learned where the only solution to their ills rests, and for that reason they are looking today toward the mountains, the jungles, and the guerrillas." Since August, the pro- Soviet and pro-Chinese wings of the PCP have taken increased cognizance of the guerrillas and condemned the government's counterinsurgency activities. They have not openly endorsed the MIR, however. At pres- ent, it seems unlikely that either faction will support ~7- NO FOREIGN DISSEM
13-00000 NO FOREIGN DISSEM the MIR with acts of violence. The pro-Soviet PCP faction may yet decide to seek the best of both worlds by giving partial support to the insurrec- tional movements while continuing its current ac- tivities in the political sphere. 20. It is believed that as of April, the Cuban Government had cut off financial support to leftist Peronist groups in Argentina and promised to channel its support through the official Communist Party of Argentina. 21. Venezuela and Colombia--two of Havana's most emphasized targets in the hemisphere--fall into separate categories. Cuba has always strongly sup- ported the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Libera- tion (FALN), over which the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) exercises a dominant influence. The PCV, beset by internal problems, is making attempts to justify more emphasis on political action, although not giving up the support of paramilitary activities. The extent of Cuba's current material support of the FALN is un- known but the propaganda support is continui high level. Cuba maintains an official office for a FALN representative in Havana and approved having a FALN delegation at the Cairo preparatory meeting: for the Tri- Continent Conference, 22. In Colombia, it is even difficult to speak of an official Communist party; on 30 May the party. split into two factions, each professing to be "authoritative." The original Colombian Communist Party (PCC), by far the larger, has been generally content to follow a pacifist, political role, with the exception of the defense of the so-called "en- claves" of Marquetalia and Riochiquita. The rival faction, the Colombian Communist Party--Marxist Leninist (PCC-ML) is more violence oriented but there is no evidence of its having received any support from Cuba. Before the Havana Conference, Cuba sup- ported an independent insurgent force, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), with money and training. However, this aid appears to have been terminated. The ELN, in fact, may soon disband as an entity; its remnants may be absorbed by the PCC-ML. . 23. There are only tenuous indications that ‘another aspect of last year's Havana Conference--the _3. NO FOREIGN DISSEM
13-00000 , SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM promotion of unity among revolutionary forces in the hemisphere--is being accomplished. A source of proven reliability has reported that a Latin American Commu- - nist: "politburo" has been established to coordinate the implementation of the agreements reached at Havana. reports that the Communist t— parties o entral America have formed the Military Revolutionary Front of Central America to coordinate Communist military movements in their area. The po- litical bureau of this organization is reportedly composed of the secretaries~general of the five Commu- nist parties. This select group was planning to hold its first meeting in August. Both of these unity efforts appear to be still in the first stages of organization. Outlook 24. The shift in emphasis in Cuban propaganda and Havana's assumption of the responsibilities and drawbacks inherent in the decisions of the Havana Conference reflect Cuba's increasing awareness of the realities in Latin America. In 1959, Castro was con- vinced that his revolution would spark similar revolu- tionary movements in the rest of Latin America, He backed up this conviction by blatant incitements to immediate revolution and by aiding small-scale in- vasions of Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. However, the luster of Castro's revolution has been dimmed by Cuba's performance in the domestic field and the failure of its hemispheric goals. In the last two years, Castro's hopes have been rebuffed in Venezuela, British Guiana, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic, as well as in the failure of any of the continent's militant subversive groups to overturn a government. These have all served to convince Castro that his "inevitable" revolution is not imminent. In addition, Castro now seems confident that his own regime can continue to exist without like regimes elsewhere in the hemisphere. 25. Thus, while Castro is still willing and able to aid subversive movements, he has shifted em- phasis. He now is concentrating on those countries. 9. NO KY aoe DISSEM
13-00000 . “SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM where he believes the "objective conditions" are most conducive to revolutionary action and where there is a viable or potential revolutionary group to take concrete action. The Cuban regime's constant refer- ences to Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia stress its desire to “concentrate on these areas. At any rate, Castro's conSuming interest for the past year and a half has been his desire to improve the per- formance of Cuba's economy. His revolutionary pro- gram for Latin America has definitely taken second place in his order of priorities. 26, The Havana conference was indicative of a major policy shift in that Castro committed himself to work with--not against or outside--the official Communist parties. Part of this shift was based on the dual hope that promise of his support would stir the Communist parties to more militant policies and that they could achieve together what he could not achieve unilaterally. So far this hope has not been realized. 27. Castro has also been forced to the realiza- tion that tagging a "Communist" or "pro~-Castro" label On a movement is not always useful to Cuban interests. This was demonstrated in Cuban reaction to the Domini- can revolt. Havana apparently decided that the achievement of popular support for the Caamano forces demanded that Communist and Cuban-trained participation in the revolt be overshadowed by its pro-constitution, pro-Bosch, anti-Imbert cast. As a result, Havana did not refer to Communist participation and used its propaganda media to concentrate on the "evils" of the Dominican military establishment, the Imbert junta, and the OAS and US intervention. 28. Nor is Cuba alone in its realization that identification of a movement as Castroite is not always in the best interests of Cuba or the group concerned Pea eOURO Ee ronConmine EEO 23 reeves stated that one reason why his party wavered in its support of a planned Solidarity with Cuba Congress--which, significantly, has not been held --is that its central committee now believes that identification with Cuba is not in the best interests of the party and is, in fact, dangerous. ~~ _O-~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
13-00000. ‘SECRET> NO FOREIGN DISSEM 29. Two coming meetings may reveal whether Cuba intends to maintain its new policies toward subversion in Latin America. A clandestine source reported that representatives of Cuba, the’ Latin American Communist parties, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are scheduled to hold extensive discussions Gaeeeiers. rent The Cuban delegate to the congress is “Lionel “Soto, a member of the newly- named Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party and the director of the regime's Schools of Revolu- tionary Instruction. 30, An equally significant meeting of Latin American representatives will reportedly take place after the Tri-Continent Conference in Havana next January. This conference will provide another op- portunity for a summit conference of Latin American Communist Parties. In addition, the identities of the participating revolutionary groupS may give a hint as to Cuba's willingness to abide by the de- cisions of the Havana Conference. At the preparatory conference in Cairo, Cuba accepted a delegate from the Guatemalan Communist party's new militant arm, the FAR, rather than the long-time Cuban-supported movement of Yon Sosa. This decision~--as well as the general question of what other Latin American move- ments were to be invited--aroused controversy among other participants. | __}reports that these differencés of opinion ovér who Should be accredited to the Havana Conference led to the de- cision that each Latin American leftist group will have to agree upon the composition of a single dele- gation from his country. Then Cuba, as the sponsor of the meeting, will have the final say on who will receive official invitations. This arrangement gives Castro a great deal of leeway in designating those whom he considers the most representative of the some- times conflicting and antagonistic revolutionary move- ments in several Latin American countries. If Havana is indeed serious about living up to the commitments it made last November, this meeting would provide an excellent opportunity to assess the results of the past year and to plan strategy to carry out more ef- fectively the decisions of the Havana meeting. 31. This shift in Cuban policy toward subversion does not, in itself, mean a lessening of the potential -ll- NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
13-Q0000. SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM subversive threat against established governments in Latin America, Moreover, hundreds of anti-government extremists in a number of countries, feeling that their grievances continue to grow, are moving ahead with organizational efforts and plans to step up violent activities. The total Cuban support effort will probably be smaller, but more of the aid may well be channeled to those who can use it effectively. Cuban-trained militants already make up the hard core of numerous Latin American extremist and Communist groups. Cuba also has given ample notice that it in- tends to continue its propaganda and some training and financial support to revolutionary movements. The only change is in regard to means and priorities, not ends. As long as exploitable situations exist in the hemisphere, Cuba is on record as being willing and able to contribute toward the establishment of "more Cubas" in Latin America. It seems increasingly apparent, however, that Cuba is unwilling to run great risks to provide material assistance to anti-govern- ment groups in Latin America, Castro's more cautious subversion policy means that now, more than ever, the burden of carrying out revolutions rests with the local revolutionaries themselves. ~12- NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET