Subsequently the Executive Director renewed his request orally and also in writing on May 22. . On May 30, the National Security Council stated that it had completed a review of all records of the predecessor groups of the Forty Committee and trans - mitted some additional documents, although still denying overall access. Included in the copies of the documents transferred on May 30, 1975 were the following: (a.) Copy of the November 3, 1960 "Minutes of Special Group Meeting" attended by Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, General Cabell and General Lansdale. The last paragraph stated: a GTWYaAD AHL WONT AdOODOLOHA ‘Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has. been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He wvddIT quog conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities. "' HW 53244 DoclId:32112954 Page 39
(b) The remaining documents all related to 1964 and will be discussed in the concluding part of the section of the Statement of Facts pertaining to possible assassination plans directed against Premier Castro. je June 13, 1961 Taylor Report According to a June 13, 1961 paper, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed President-elect Kennedy in November 1960 at Palm Beach about the Bay of Pigs planning. The Taylor paper was prepared pursuant to an April 22, 1961 directive’by the President to Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arley Burke and Allen Dulles for an overall analysis and study of governmental practices for military, paramilitary, guerrilla and anti- guerrilla activity with special attention ''to the lessons that can be learned from recent events in Cuba.'' There is nothing in the June 13, 1961 Taylor report which specifically discusses assassination. However, during the time the study was being under- taken the aforementioned May 22, 1961, FBI memorandum was prepared and. sent to Attorney General Kennedy. k, Relationship of Phase I Plan with Bay of Pigs Sheffield Edwards, himself, thought that these plans were developed in connection with the Bay of Pigs, and it was Bissell HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 40 AMWdGIT quod *-y aIwado azHL WOUT AdODOLOHd
who was in charge of the overall coordination of the Bay of Pigs operation. Bissell denies that these plans were part of the Bay of Pigs planning. He testified that he was "quite clear" that the plans. for attempted assassination of Fidel Castro were not developed as apart of the Bay of Pigs operation. . l. Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba Bissell stated that he did not think the actual attempt was ever made, although it is physically possible that the poison | pills did reach Cuba. He also said that although he did not remember having any evidence that Castro knew of these attempts, "it is perfectly possible that, with some time lag, Castro would have come on some evidence of this operation." Bissell also testified that to the extent individuals in the Cuban exile community in Miami may have been involved, "our belief was that Castro was extremely well informed on what was going on,!! m. Termination of Phase I Plan After the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, according to Sheffield Edwards "the plan, as I recall, petered out.!! Edwards said that he did not become involved with any other person, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, to try to get the pills to Cuba. HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 41 “ad GQIWAID AHL WOU AdODOLOHA “RUWdaIt auoa
n. Other Plans During Phase I While the Phase I plans were underway, the Agency received confirmaton from contacts in Cuba concerning possible assassination attempts inside Cuba against Castro. Most of these contacts took place in the first part of 1961 immediately preceding the Bay of Pigs landing. In particular, there were several cables received referring to a possible assassination atternpt against Fidel Castro on April 9, 1961, during a public appearance at the Sports Palace in Havana. There were also messages received from dis- sident Cubans inside Cuba in the first few months after the Bay of In some of these messages there were references Pigs invasion. to trying to kill Castro. None of these possible assassination attempts from dissidents inside Cuba appear to have been coordinated with the Phase I plans. HW 53244 DoclId:327112954 Page 42 AUWdGIT Guod -Y AIwugao AHL NOoUA KdODOLOHd,
HW 53244 39 3. 1962-63 and the Phase II Plans. a. Possible authorization - the Testimony of Richard Bissell , In late 1961 or early 1962, Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, recalled asking a new case officer "to take over a part of our reviving effort against Castro and the Castro Administration...I probably urged him to look into this plan...which had been the subject of active attention nearly a year before. I have no recollection of authorizing him to revive it, except to look at it as a plan, or to proceed with any action along those lines.” Richard Bissell resigned from the Agency in February, 1962. His successor as Deputy Director for Plans was Richard Helms. b. The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer (1) Developing an "Executive Action" capability. The Phase II case officer in a signed recorded interview said that he had a conversation with Richard Bissell, which he believed took place in the latter part of 1961 or early 1962, in which Bissell told him in substance that someone in the White House had raised the question whether or not the Agency should develop what, was called an “executive action capability," which was a capability of assassination or DoclId:32112954 Page 43 AUWdGIT GuOT “A aGTwusS FHL NOI AdODOLOHG
40 liquidation of leaders of foreign countries. The case officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation against Castro "had been mounted". and "that it had been handled through Sheffield Edwards." (2) Discussions with Edwards and Helms The case officer said he was then briefed by Edwards on the operation that’ had been previously conducted. This testimony was corroborated by Colonel Edwards. Both Edwards and the case officer stated that Edwards did not have any further contact with any subsequent phase after Phase I. Colonel Edwards put the Phase. II case officer in contact: with the case officer who had been involved with Phase I for a briefing. The Phase II case officer then took over this entire operation for the Agency. The Phase II case officer stated in his recorded interview that after he was briefed by the previous case officer and discussed the matter with Sheffield Edwards, AUWdGIT GYOd “Yd GIWYAS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA he then discussed the matter with Richard Helms. The Phase II case officer took over the direct contact with the Mafia personnel which to the best of his recollection occurred “about early April 1962." (3) The Phase II Plans The Phase II plans involved two possibilities of assassination: rifle fire and the use of poison pills. HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 44
4] Delivery of funds for the acquisition. of rifles and handguns plus some medicinal drugs and anti-biotics took place in the summer of 1962. According to the case officer, it was somewhat less than $5,000. The money was delivered to the Mafia contact, and the case officer received a report from the Mafia contact that the Cuban contact had called to report that the arms and poison pills had gotten into Cuba. The case officer stated that he felt he ‘was dealing with a very volatile situation that "in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs failure" was the kind of an operation that the Government, the Agency or anybody else could not afford to have surface. "...It was quite obvious that there was an explosion potential here-~-an explosion not in the technical sense-~a flap potential, if you will, but it took some time to find out just what could be done and how it could be done, to try to sanitize the possible reper- cussions of this." He claimed that very shortly after taking over the operation he reached a tentative conclusion that the plans had little chance of success and he decided to "wind down" the plans gradually. The winding down was completed in the Spring of 1963 and in June, 1963, the case officer went abroad to another position wholly unconnected with the Cuban operation. HW 53244 Docld:32112954 Page 45 ANWddIT Guod "YY AIwaqo FHL nNoNT AdODOLOHG
HW 53244 42 When asked why the operation did not meet with success, the case officer said "T don't know if I have any valid opinion why. There are a great many things that could have happened. It wasn't tried, it was choked off, it was penetrated from the start~--at least on the Cuban end--that is the end in Cuba. When I say I have no personal knowledge of this, I am aware that Castro has claimed there were a number of attempts on his life. I am aware that he has blamed those on the U.S. in general and the CIA in particular. But I have no personal knowledge of facts which would prove that there was ever actually, if you will, a shot fired or any poison administered, or any other attempt other than in the inchoate stage." The case officer also stated that "given the capabilities of Castro's security apparat and the general seive-like character of the community in exile and the number of people who knew at least something about this particular incident or operation, before I had any connection with it, or later as a result of things that occurred before I had any connection with it, I think and thought at the time that it was conceivable that it had been penetrated. I cannot honestly state that I had at that time any firm reason to believe that Castro was aware of this operation.” DoclId:32112954 Page 46 AMWddIT GuYOd “HY AIWYaS AHL woud KdOODOLOHd.
43 The Phase Ii case officer stated that he knew of. no other plan to assassinate any other foreign leader except Castro. c. The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge of Phase II According to Colonel Edwards, at the time of the May 7, 1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy, he did not know that the Phase II case officer, whom he had earlier briefed, was undertaking another plan along the lines of Phase I. Therefore, he did not tell the Attorney General at the time of the briefing that there was a Phase II plan underway. ad. Knowledge of John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence re Phase II The Phase II case officer stated that sometime prior to August 1962, he had a conversation with Richard Helms, who had succeeded Richard Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans. AUMVddIT GdOd “UY GIWUAD FHL WOUA AdODOLOHA The case officer said that the question was raised whether or not the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, should be briefed of the operation. "I did recommend to Mr. Helms that since this ‘operation' and the possible repercussions from it all stemmed from actions which had taken place long before either Helms or myself had had any personal connection with it, and before John McCone had had any connection whatever HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 47
44 with the Agency, and since the decision had been made at that time that this should be sanitized, tied off and terminated as soon as practically feasible, I saw no reason why the new DCI should be briefed on it, ana I strongly recommended that he not be." The case of ficer said that to the best of his knowledge McCone at no time in 1962 knew of the fact that Phase II of the operations were underway. John McCone testified that he first learned about Phase II when he was first interviewed by the Executive Director of the CIA Commission in April, 1975, and McCone further stated that the only knowledge he had of Phase I was knowledge he received on August 16, 1963 upon receipt of a memorandum from Richard Helms together with a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" delivered to Attorney General Kennedy. e. The Testimony of Richard Helms re Phase If Helms was asked whether he remembered any discussions with the case officer concerning the furnishing of either arms or poison pills to Cuban exiles to have them Helms replied try and carry out any assassination plans. "I don't have any question that we tried to line them in Cuba, to bring down this government or to kill anybody they HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 46 AUWdGIT Quod °*y qIwaas AHL WOWA AdODOLOHA.
55 sit here and start to hink about this, Califano was one of them. It seems to me Lansdale, who had been successful in this kind of operation out in the Far East was brought in for a while." (2). Possible Assassination Plans . Ambassador Helms testified that he did not recall “any plans that were approved or that were viable specifically directed at eliminating Castro, but that there were conversations about it, I haven't the slightest doubt." "The business about the assassination of Castro, I have read about this in the papers. I have heard about it from associates. It has been kicked around whether this was a viable proposition or not. I have no doubt it was written into various plans as one of many options but I don't recall any successful effort that was made in this direction and since Castro is alive and apparently well in Havana, the extent to which this was serious I have never ascertained." AMVdaIT GuOr *y aIwugo AHL Wout KdOD0LOHa Ambassador Helms said he did not "recall ever having heard anything about poison pills or any of that." He did recall that "at some juncture" a decision was reached "that it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the Attorney General " about "various things that the Agency had had to do" with certain Mafia members. He did recall that HW 53244 Docld:3271127954 Page 59