HW 450955 Docld: 32276061 Page 102 2) “prohibition of ships ‘Of OAS © ‘member * states From transportating embargoed ‘items and deny use.of © ports ‘to ships: ‘in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) “denial of Soviet ovér-flights and transit: rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) “a call on other states to .. take similar action. After obtaining the maximum ‘possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS” members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. ‘It should be possible ‘for this consultation and OAS action on ‘the resolutions to be completed within ten’ days. E ‘Of the: resolutions, we will inform our © NATO (allies of the impending OAS action. Prior, to formal COAS approval ‘At the first NATO meeting ‘after formal ‘OAS action on the resolutions, we will ‘request . that NATO include Cuba on. the | list of countries to which shipment’ o£ COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited. decision on our: -COCOM request, we will seek to get. agreement. from Free World industrial” nations to prevent | shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107. of the Foréign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade. @a@@ SECRET
HY 50955 B. Docld: 32276061 @ Secret -8- Contigency Planning New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc -. action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations ‘for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights. primarily directed toward surveillance ’ and collection of intelligence, and which may also chave the ‘effect of embarrassing the Castro “government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communic ations to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately, the use jof U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily- trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort. os. SECRET Page i103
HY 50955 — - > * an , , & . <o . SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 asty) FROM 5 Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs. SUBJECT: United States Policy re > Cuba in the Organization of American States. | sturse of s Guba. 4 aded Cuba from 2 partion ‘omy declared et arms emoargo, and pubversive activities in the The “a. invoked thé “Rio opeRty on’ Setober22, “19625 Piirsuant™ thereto, She Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to-vact™ proviision~ ally as tie Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (0¢) Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanis: sassed-a resolution calling for the withdrawal of ali. offensi: ‘apons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such ac “netuding the use of armed force, as might be necessary to prev continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prever:. . the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere. | In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. insti- tuted its quarantine. .Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic cooperated with us inthe quarantine and 9 others offered their assistance. and facilities. With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Con- sultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing to concern themselves with subversion and possible. extension of economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken, COURSES SECRET Boclda: 32276061 Page 104. seek Whee ee eg ett it Fog -
SECRET murs er eae age pnt te NPY COURSES OF ACTION | + (1) Continue the CoAs/oc in being ‘under the Rio Treaty but take no further action at present. Considerations: The Rio Treaty was invoked and the coas/oc brought into being for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis. 4 If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either | - be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed circumstances. | . ob - (2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a‘resolution in COAS/OC which | | Ld condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, | fot deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Se - Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued oe : vigilance against subversive activities. . | Considerations: oe tg | This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step following the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks. Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained. fot ype eee spe were egies, age el om Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insur- rection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection. It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemis- phere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to _ the Soviet Union. ' (3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This . would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions , ‘It and VI1ll of Punta del Este. (which provided for a Special Consul- | tative Committee on Security and a 2 Special Committee to study’ ‘the : . further suspension of trade. ) Considerations: - This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was” called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis. Taken SECRET -HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 105
= 2 a ea CaP ee RN RATE Nei eR Considerations: : (SECRET -3~ Taken by itself, this course of action might naise doubts concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are continuing our surveillance. Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive weapons) (4) Combine (2) and (3). Considerations: _ This combination of actions is feasiblexand is likely to obtain unanimity or near-unanimity. The termination'of the coas/oc makes strong language in the resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority. Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3). ‘Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accom- panied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic sanctions. __. (5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a Fesolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal. ~ With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able. to obtain a substantial majority. . . Such action would’ give a better basis for urging such addi- tional steps as (6) and (7) and (8). , “It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement action. (6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force, to bring about the withdrawal. of soviet. troops in Cuba if the - OAS call is not heeded. Considerations: SECRET ‘HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 106
Considerations: . This. action should be seriously considered only if we are mo determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet troops. While it should be possible with adequate consultation and preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political and ecoriomic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet . troops, it would be difficult to-obtain the necessary 2/3 majority for authorization of the.use of armed force. (7) Seek _a résolution in.the COAS Octo sever all diplomatic and consular relations with Guba (probably possible only in con- junction with (5) or (11).- Considerations: This would be consistent with general U.S.. policy to increase the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.” 4 ye g a a 4 4 4 a st 4 4 y 4 "| 4 : i “4 A ~F vt ; 4 Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal. Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained for. this. | , (8) Seek _a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic. and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba. (probably possible only in conjunction with. (5) or (il).- Considerations: The severance of all economic and commercial relations would go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from. the U.S..to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies. Such action would. expose us to charges of inhumanity and would probably nullify our. public statements that we have no quarrel with the Cuban people. A number of telecommunications between Latin America and _ Burope are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services would interrupt communications vital to many of our Latin American friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be main- tained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national interest and those for humanitarian reasons. _ These SECRET HW 50955 Doold: 32276061 Page i107
He is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries These considerations would make it extremely difficult to obtain a 2/3 majority in the CoAS/0C. (9) Seek resolution in _COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend: 7 (a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); (ob) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed ' items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; (c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet air- eraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also be added to No. (8).) Considerations: This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could be taken independently of other steps. With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps. — It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U:S. unilateral steps in’controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and | for ‘urging other states to control Soviet flights to Cuba. — (10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended controls over subversive activities. Seek COAS resolution warning . Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action under Rio Treaty. a a, Considerations: The course described in the first: ‘sentence. of (40) is being. presently. pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unani- mous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because of the reference to ‘the Rio > Treaty. 50955 Doelds32276061. Page 188. 5° (0 wae Be Lie ce eo
(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued subversive activities. Considerations: If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs. the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be. neces- sary to invoke:the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the - COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveil- lance and recommendations to governments for control measures. The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive | activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection in Latin America. , Sp Sonini 2 aban Yanan what st A ann Drench tn bent tl eT tRNA RE MONS I The basis of any such action should consist of the production of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, in- sufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS _ action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under way.) . coe . . (12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory _ Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board {TADB). This could be done: (a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to the IADB; - (bo) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or (c) having the OAS member governments designate their representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC. Considerations: | As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover, amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments. As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the ~ COaS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be diffi- cult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the Council of the desirability of such action. © sis leh LTE RAGE Rs Raisin lala apn SiS ocho. bata Tu As. SECRET — oo (NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 109. .
HW 40955 Docld: 32276061 Page 1106 . >. SECRET oe -7~ As to (c), member governments could take this course on an_ individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that - "exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this action under the OAS Charter. SS COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION | In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international . complications were key factors which I have carefully considered. Courses of action: (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance us toward our objective, would. be politically feasible, and would involve minimum adverse international effécts. We could probably. obtain a near-unanimous vote in thé OAS for these courses except (10) and (12). Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11) . particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would involve adverse international effects, including akprobable acute confrontation with the USSR. _ . I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best interests at this time. I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9). Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns - the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveil- ‘lance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and (ob) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further sus= pension of trade. oo . oe a : Course: (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend: (a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fallback position:. extension of - arms embargo to all strategic items); (b) SECRET DOME ETT Pee Tn ETS RET eae SDE ASE EEL TE NCP ENE TTR TT TS AEB SRE rerio se BREET
HW 450955 ‘SECRET (b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting. embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; “(c) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet air- eraft on Bloc-Cuba runs. (a) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar actions. Rationale - The. steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our objective, carrying the OAS with USy without committing us to any further action. ' After these initial measures are in effect, | we should assess “ee situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which may be opened ‘to us by events. . ; I believe we should. develop our pressures steadily and gradu ally, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation under constant review for the optimum opportunity. to initiate additional measures. ‘I do not’ believe we should take’a track now which will break hein spheric | cunity. We may need unity later in. an emergency Neither do I ‘Believe we should push the OAS into probable, acute confrontation with the USSR at this time. ; Both, of: sthese prices the U. 5S. may find it. necéssary to. pay. ~ for: action. ata later date ‘but, not NOWs in my opinion. | SECRET Docld: 32276001. Page 111.
we O SECRET - MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m) FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: Cuban Brigade PROBLEM To determine the future of the Cuban Brigade (participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion recently released from Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who participated in or trained for the invasion. To determine the future of existing Cuban training programs. DISCUSSION - Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay _- of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over 1100 were released. - A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and - other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically _proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts ‘toward Cuba. . . a . A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively _ marginal military value because of its quantitative limitations and restricted military capability, but its. .” SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 112 ere semceennernet a NO
ae ene SET SECRET -2- politico-psycholégical value as a symbol of Cuban resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate for its limited military utility. Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be weighed. COURSES OF ACTION Three courses of action appear | feasible with respect to the Brigade's future. Saul p baat Sh i Ae salle what Tate alti ett sta nage Neat teats eo min etnein anna Calne in Fi len onan aban Bo ttle, > « (1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military unit, with no further U. 5. special assistance. If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and their families would be eligible for the benefits now accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area. (approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent to those received by American citizens in Dade County, Florida who are in need. The principal ones include: financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals for acute illnesses; distribution of. surplus food commodities; employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation — and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied ' children; special English and refresher courses for doctors and Lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program _ for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides ~ up to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary | and secondayy schools; payment for a substantial part of special language courses and vocational training; and physical examinations and inoculations at time of ‘entry into the U. Se 7 HW 50955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 113
aire ery remnant a DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the _— U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides 20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they are transferred as individuals to U. 5. Reserve status. They are not required to know English. A’two week period. for resettlement is also provided at the termination of the training. ; Another DOD program enables former officers of the Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly | selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces. Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is necessary.. The officers are in civilian status. They receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer co available. . : : Considerations: This course of action would provide the simplest and most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent to benefits offered to American citizens. . Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill and country knowledge could be distributed through various U. S. units which might be used in an invasion. The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade as a result of Administration statements and actions; it. . would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would probably engender some adverse political reaction domestic¢ally as well as from the Brigade and its sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the . Free World concerning the determination of. the United States palsek Douro eS oN SECRET _ HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 114 — im
HY 0955 ' SECRET -hn to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to arguments that the U. 5. may be leaning toward coexistence — with the Castro regime. (2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve component of the U. S. Armed Forces. Considerations: Under this course of action whater "mystique" the . Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps -_ be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile community, It would constitute an immediate political and psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the present Cuban regime. It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit _among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with the statements and actions of the Administration in connection with. the future of the Brigade. But it would inevitably become a focal point for Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to maintain over the long term without early employment to retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups in the U. S. armed forces reserve. component. There is a SECRET Bocld: 32276061 Page 115
we nite nents atten ani Rained ME man tara ’ . HW 30955 SECRET 759 risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of serious embarrassment to the U.S. (3) Tailor a special civilian and military pro ram for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue as_ a 'fraternal'' unit similar to the "Flying Tigers", Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current military training program for Cubans to establish a Brigade military reserve. component which other U. S. militarily-trained Cubans could join. Under existing authority, HEW could provide the ., following additional benefits for Brigade members in need, over and above those now offered: special emp loy~ ment counseling and placement service; extended student loans to provide for all institutional costs such as tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per year (living costs to be provided by another agency); expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased financial assistance to needy persons while in training; increased distribution of surplus food (with approval | of the Department of Agriculture). The following additional programs could be under- taken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such _ action would contribute to the defense and security of the United States or advance its foreign policy interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for vocational training anywhere in the United States; an expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure of 92,5 500 ‘per person per year would be about $2.5 million. SECRET Boclda: 322776061 Page ; 116
SECRET -7~ Establishment of additional programs, after a 2 Presidential determination, would increase’ costs even . more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary" -privileges for Brigade members. — COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION 1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored program for Brigade members. 2. I recommend against a Presidential determination | providing broader privileges for Brigade members. 3. I recommend no change in existing U. $5. military training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should be permitted to join.. - 4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange consultation with them immediately if this course of action is approved. Rationale Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we should disband. the Brigade as such. Since we may in the ‘future desire the presence in the U. .S.. Armed Forces of militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade: members to enlist. in the existing. military training | program for. Cubans. and to enter. a U.S. Reserve Unit ‘thereafter... SECRET. 50955 DBDocld: 32276061 Page i117
SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ae oO (Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m) FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba l. Verification of withdrawal of missiles. ' 2. Removal. of Soviet troops: from Cuba. 3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons PEE Mr. Robert. Geddes, British subject married to a oo po | U.S. citizen. : _— oN ~ 4, Cuban subversive activities in the Western | : Hemisphere. ' - Ro an ; | ? he 4 Dee Future activities of Mr, Donovan. ol ee 6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a political weapon against the Castro regime. — 7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Council and exile groups. 8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic ' paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba. . 9, Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in intensified intelligence collection; Policy on illegal infiltration and exfiltration. 10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia : flights: to Cuba. | | | | ' : 7 . | - OO SECRET | Loe HW 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 119
consist’s* be ces “CENTRAL INTELLIGENCESRGdMcI6r ~19_copies, . Tia matertal contatug Information affecting the National Defense of the United Siates within the meaning of the Espi¢nage Lawe, Tithe "18, U.S.C. Becs..793 and 704, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. S-E- C- R-E~+T: ‘NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY country Cuba ot : - > REPORT NO. SUBJECT Analysis of DATE DISTR. . 17 January 1963 NO. PAGES = 4 oe _y- | ro) REFERENCES RD-W-2088 (Af ) 7 a | RD-W-2107 pate of © December 1962 - ’ . INFO. a co | a , Kool PLACE & | | . eee DATE ACQ. Z ecembér 1962) —— FIELD REPORT NO. seem ent ERG natfaatahand ena mradnnnen setts ttanetfeeere tS et EEE rete eee eetAHARHERORYD. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL CF CONTENY 1S TENTATIVE, = ‘SOURCE: , [|] Appraisal of _Content: 2, that the document is genuine. — - : oo The following is a translation of a report dated 6& Necemher 196? sent hy In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the considerations. regarding the consequences which the recent. an ‘> erisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I E '. “will now add some comments on the conjecture which has been reported by some members of our representations. . Se -- 1) The possibility that there will soon be a loosening of - -. the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me . ...to be nil at this time. The fact that the talks with Mikoyan . were lLong~and-difficult and that Castro expressed in private | -his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still _ alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce ‘that ., . ' Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance cannot be replaced by the Chinese. Certainly the Chinese Ambassa .dor to Habana will have os done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspéction). ‘Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR -in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me that /China/7 can furnish more than it has furnished to. date, which consists of second quality foodstuffs, rather Shoddy — “§-E-C-R-E-T | p : . * NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONT ROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY “ , OST > - otoncors| to, ee L_trenifrerion | c- HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 121
. . . Ps, S-E-C-R-E-T ~ | . NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DIS__M ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSE% BACKGROUND USE ONLY © | | -~ 2 - CSDB-3/652 ,924 ‘wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores in Habana are full. As for machinery and spare parts, /China7 is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. , In substancé Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined as pro-Khrushchev, is tisd to the USSR in.such a way that he cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this” regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations, . he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends 4 of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations.". oa Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director ° of TASS as reported by are a ‘good re resume of the Situation, IVé 7, a 6OViet lenders have for — - some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character ae and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by |. Moscow. b) The USSR will continue to give all its economic aan support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a. - “| grave blow particularly in Latin America. 2) Also excluded, it appéars to me, is the possibility that “the revolutionary regime of Castro can be changed into.a er . _ . - . . : Jt _ . } “"Pitoist” regime. It is comprehensible that, |. 4 reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even Some © enn, matin American countries desire’Such a change and ‘are doing everything possible to proveke it. It is also possible that some Cubans Share these Sentiments. But, in my opinion, it is impossible that such a change can take. place while Castro - is in power. As I pointed out in my previous report, it is not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned", to imitate anyone, and even less to’ take Tito as a model. Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this possibility Seems very remote. 3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime : will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate © a ‘subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated -by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico} are taking Strong meaSures against the dissemination. | of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the Security of other countries, if only because he lacks the. necessary funds. I tend to Share the opinion of the Ambassador -to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, includ- ing the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by | | [during the recent meeting of the OAS the - Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the- recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish ' proof, he was unable to do so. oo It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious pressure action on Cuba could be exercised withi 7 Latin American framework as pointed out by bo ee aan Iho oon ton OLR RAT |/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY | AW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 122
PPS eres n ; mo . + —_ ; lo S-E-C-R-E-T Sa! : NO. FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DA_-EM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEY/BACKGROUND USE ONLY oe ° 7.3. CSDB--3/652 , 924 ae lees But it is an extremely remote possibility. The. -».  . . COWRETTES which could do it do not have the necessary material | means. A partial Solution would worsen the situation and a’ definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. 1° _.. think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by | “material strength can obtain results in Cuba. z In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is ne necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament. |. ° of Fidel Castro, the influence which he-has on a part of the... - population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United States. - It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary © ‘regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example -/for other Latin American countries. This would not take into J account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly - (their. chief, who accepts council from no oe and intends to. imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another. >. path. As Guevara said the. other day in an interview for the —-_ _ Daily Worker, "this is a battle to the death with the United. °_.° States in which the most. possible damage must be done to the .° adversary." — , , : ee Undcubtedly, after the events of October and November, ~_ me ‘Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this. : a Gescent will last no one can Say today. The only certain coe thing is that the economic Situation is getting worse CVEVyie eo .. day and therefore the revolutionary vegime needs the er assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night . a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who: -) ~ .'. heads the most important institution of the country ~ the ooo jo ots uitnstitute for Agrarian Reform ~- left. The mission will BOr le, oo. 8 first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that | + DO new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits, ... mo _ to permit the Cubans to dast through 1963, which will cer- ae ‘“tainly be the most difficult year. ee a Co - But economic assistance can permit this country to Survive, not resolve its problems. For a definitive solu- ‘tion it would be necessary: in the first place for the Cubans ~ to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the machines which they have, Agricultural production, princi- *" pally Sugar cane, as has been recognized even by the. > -, . fanatics of indusStrialization, constitutes the basis of - the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good i ; harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary . which should last ten years are ‘unusable after two years? i ft is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer ‘from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But’ for another year they will find a.way. to get by. Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent _policy. followed by the United States in the recent months is the best and perhaps the only policy. After the aanger of strategic weapons has. been eliminated, the wisest measure is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Cestro will SEY armwnaetrmoe Eames ww ' : °) §+E-C-R-E-T OO ee / XO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO, DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY | soe. Bl ae LL er bone eT sors . ST ce ee cee ee me ee og HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 123
nn oo $-E-C ~R-E- ed . a NO FORE CS ‘ M ABROAD /CONEROLLED DISSEN/BACKGROUN USE ONLY: iat r -4-" — CSDB-3/652,924 “pres ent Some more "headaches" to the United States; but the «>. pemos phere is.changed and -even without count ing OM the , yoothetical coup d'etat of-Castro which would fcrce the ra solution of the problem - one can hope for a perhaps not too distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as. the ‘Cubans. insist on the known five points and the United States .refuses any Bpuarantees, so long as the USSR is Obliged to - .. feed Castro to permit his survival, the less. uncomfortable — position appears to: me ~ to be that of, the. Government. in. a Washington. oo. : 4 . S-E-C- R-E-T 3. FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY a joo — | HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page i124