1 ‘Working Arrangements for the Warren Commission Investigation. The HSCA Report. fails to describe the working arrangements for the conduct of the Warren. Commission inquiry. Such an understanding is basic to any interpretation of what. did and did mot happen during the inguiry. Following the assassination ‘of president ‘Kennedy, President "Johnson designated the ‘Federal Bureau of Investigation as the principal investigative arm of. the Government to investigate the “assassination. This was a logical step as the Bureau had | “the largest body of trained investigators .,- ‘the role of the Bureau continued in this respect during the. Warren Commission’ - inguiry. ‘The Commission, which had. a much smaller states | “relied extensively ‘on the. Bureau, for the exhaustive investigation that was conducted. AS testified Ad by. ur. Helms, as cited in the LHSCA . _ Report, CIA. considered itself: vesponsive ‘to Warren. ‘Conmigsion oainiti atives. In addition “to Mr. Helms’ ‘testimony, hewewer, the record shows that, CIA. ‘took a number of initiatives on’ ‘its own -in collecting ‘information. and reporting directly. to the Commission. Consistent with the understood ‘arrangements. of ‘the time, nowawar, cra ‘reported he aetailea information a om vrner pal: “that it Ahad. to the PBL. ‘in ‘the latter! Ss role as invdstigative arm of the. warren commission: ghis involved both quality. “ yeporting and a great dross of material that. ordinarily ae so 367
13-00000 “ by the FBI \ might not be considered worth reporting. A consideration raised here is that intelligence analysts routinely winnow out useless and marginal reports to avoid flooding the recipients with unevaluated trash. That the HSCA has taken issue with so few instances of non-disseminated material indicates that the practice worked well in the course of the Warren Commission inguiry. zn this respect the FBI and the CIA worked closely together) There are a number of dnatances in whieh initial reporting by CIA was the subject of an investigative follow- up by the Bureau, just as CIA responded to Bureau requests. This constituted something of a team operation, providing the available information at that time to the Warren Commission. HSCA investigators seem to have treated the work of the Bureau and CIA as separate from one another, /eriticizing cra for not conducting investigations that obviously were conducted . aan As testified to by the Deputy Director of Central “Intelligence, in his testimeny before the HSCA, CIA ia not ‘an investigative agency in the usual sense of the term. While it does collect information abroad, its sources are carefully selected for their potential access to very specialized and sharply focused subject matter. Those resources are nok ‘readily subject to redirection for the purpose of police~ type investigations, Further, CIA's representatives abroad are under cover and should not expose their true identity by pole fre 185 ot votes ted engaging wdn—the-usuei—polica-type investiqative techniques. OY 2 2 . oe . se ae They can seek assistance from those police and security MER GL ptccde ccd tote ah’ ra ‘ oe z “s ieee organizations where, existing arrangements permit, fut ceil h a et omen t An te
13-00000 ; in any general police-type investigation they are, Limited by cover, training ana “resources. | Jf a result] Fhere were . a number of instances An which CIA Xeports: of: information possibly related . to the assassination of president Kennedy | . . | puusued,. Pru es Wwa)isd eX” Were actually ihvestigated by PRI personnel yassigned to the fafa asf for gourds - location tee thet inguiry.| This working arrangement and the results, is overlooked in some of the treatment by the HSCA Report. While | the HSCA €id consider the question of how such an inguiry should be conducted in the future, there seemed to be a tendency to treat the Warren Commission inguiry the way ssa staff investigators felt it should have been done ingtead of. how it was done under the arrangements actually: in effect at the. tine.
13-00000 It Comments on Findings of -the Committce At page’ iz in the Findings and’ Recommendations of the Committee, Section I, D.4., there is a stark statement that SIA “was deficient in its collection and sharing of - information both prier to and subsequent to the assassination.” The unqualified nature of that finding conveys impressions that are subject to disagreement. The Committee is entitled to its conclusions, but by the same token, the Agency is entitled to express its reservations about them. For instance, as a comment at this point, what CIA could be expected te do prior to the assassination is an interesting question in itself, which the stark statement handles simplistically-. The £aet ig that CIA had no advance information of any sort on the assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas. At page 24 of the Report, in the Section discussing the structure: of ‘the investigation, ‘the ‘Committee observes ‘that — access. “was unprecedanted by any congressional committee." ods “of. ‘tourse, the permanent oversight. committees, which: have Tt ig more correct to: fay that no special investigative < committee has ‘had similar access in ‘the past. && ee us segs ease cnn “institutionalized: security procedures, have similar ACE ESS oy oS f >? “a A
13-00000 eo ee S Was reduced , ‘to the question of the: reliability. of what. an: detector ‘says. an “the” early days of his “defection. TE, ne wa ELLE “Commerits on Hosenka At page 86 the HSCA Report observes that “strangely, - while (Nosenko) was. interrogated during this period (1964—005 1968) he was questioned very little about Oswald." Without wee defending the mistreatment of Nosenko or the mistakes in’ the handling of his case, this aspect has an easily understandable rationale, which was offered to the Committee. As the 4 = + 3 Committee omitted reference to it. it is repeated here. one of the problems with what Nosenko said had arisen out of inconsistencies as tO what he knew about Oswald, complicated by the question - as to whether he was a bona~fide defector or @ dispatched agent. “Ib was not judgea profitable to belabor the Oswald issue and the decision was taken to try to resolve the question as to whether or not he WAS a bona-fide defector. If he was determined to be a bona-fide | defector, then the significance of his inconsistent etatements determined..to. “not ve aA, bona~ fide defector, then the ‘signifi of ‘those inconsistencies would assume major proportions The problen was reported to. Chit Justice warren a time and ‘ag. the: @ estion was “not resolved auring: thes comaission inquiry, Nosenko's testinony was not. cused. Had at been: used it would -have tended £0 reinforce the: findings of! the warren Commission that there was nO evidence of. Boviet involvement: ©
13-00000 iv ".” Comments on AMLASH a I hin iin ney ce ba At pages, 89-94 the HSCA .Report discusses what is known: as the: AMLASH operation. It also discusses a study written in CIA. in 1977 ceferred: to in the HSCA Report ag” ar the CIA Yagk Force, Report. First, there are certain things og hat. should be understood about ‘the’ AMLASH operation. “While the. HSCA investigators read the 1977. ‘CIA Task Force Report, aici Bada We Sedma ass ses they. “apparently. aia, not appreciate a. key consideration to “Rew: the operation was handled during the Life of President Rennedy. Both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations had major programs aised at the overthrow. of Fidel Castro's % “at involved: economic and political Pigs/ invasion attempt sanctions and government-wide programs: directed at ‘subversion and clandestine activities in. Cuba. | Te: was in this context position, held: “by the man. in: the" castro government, he represented oas contact: with considerable potential, which should be exploited “LE possibie.:, However, the’ asse sment ‘of: the man was that he was not stable and not subject’ to discipline of the Sort required for a “reerui ed agen
13-00000 i f The decision wz. vaken that the man could not be dealt with as a principal agent and that an attempt would have to . Se be made to. find someone in his organization with whom the . ey i cos necessary agent relationship could be established. The problem thus became one of how to maintain the contact with * | a man who claimed to have the organization and weaponry to carry out a coup, while.at the same tine developing a way of taking advantage of whatever eventuated. The record is unequivocal in the conditional approach ‘ ne - that was settled upon for dealing with the man. He would be S told that he would be given no advance support and that only if he succeeded in a coup would -he receive support. This position was given him on 29 October 1963. Subsequent reporting from FBI and CIA sources made it clear that the man, unders tood that he had. been rebuffed and that he was outraged.” ‘te ‘was. us a clear that if CIA did not want to lodse the contact, which had as yet to be developed into anything tangible, steps ; ; had to be taken to mollify him. ANLASH/1 was asked to have a meeting with a CLA representative. A CIA case officer ‘travelled to Europe, arriving the morning OEC23. ‘November 1963 and was” meeting with AMLASH, possibly at the time of the assassination of the President. The purpose eft this summary LS simply to point out the voeok 3 benuous nature of the relationship of AMLASH/ 1 during. ‘the | life of ‘the President. “this tenuous quality was deliberately : because of the assegement of the ability of the Agency to work with Be SSG :
13-00000 the man. As a matter of fact, the Agency never did develop a firm relationship with the man although it did provide what was intended to appear. to him as tokens of its support : i in the form of weapons. Consistent with its original assessment of the man, CIA i Put AMLASH in touch with a Cuban exile leader, with whom the Agency had a viable operational relationship. It was ‘hoped that through the Cuban exile leader and his organization ‘AMLASH/1 might come to fit into some future plan. : Hah wake nl as anernrmnime
13-00000 mae -during the Warren Commission investigation. The various. “aspects of the tensions between the Kennedy Administration : : ‘the provocation theory in this form earlier, the fact is Vv L977 CIA Task Force Report At pages 90-92, the HSCA Report misrepresents the 1977 CIA Task Force Report. sebeeti sess e As stated in the HSCA Report, CIA responded to Bdok Vv of the Church Committee Report by conducting an internal inquiry. Essentially, the key consideration, so far as this internal inquiry was concerned, was the significance of what has come to be khown as the “provocation theory," i.e., CIA plotted the assassination of Castro, Castro might have learned of it, he might have dispatched assassins to kill 1 President Kennedy in retaliation. As the provacation theory agplied especially to Cuba, the focus of the study was on CIA's Cuban operations. The provocation theory had not been perceived in 1964 i and the Castro Regime were recognized in a broad. sense as possibly giving cause to extreme action by Castro against the President. HEdéwever, that specific operations might have & more specific effect simply was not conceived at that time. “In fact, the HSCA-Report states that the provocatjon theory was First advancéd in 1967. by members of the criminal : pve syndicate. While CIA might be faulted for not perceiving that it did not. In any event, the concept is still a 25 -'b theory. coro encom tina id,
13-00000 Statements to the effect that CIA "withheld". information on Specific operations directed against Castro have the \ connotation of a deliberate suppression o£ the information. i | If one is to accept the HSCA conclusion that the concept was not developed until 1967, then objective fairness would require a modification of the characterization accorded the absence. of reporting. The 1977 Task Force Report accepted in principle the hypothesis of the provocation theory. The report states, as a: cited in the HSCA Report, that CIA should have taken proader initiative than it did. Contrary to the HSCA Report, however, the CIA Task Force Report did not fail to say what should be done, What it did was to undertake what was not done in 1964, it reviewed all Cuban operations for any reference ~ to allegations of assassination plotting, or that might have a specially provocative aspect. There are many pages of eo discussion of instances 6f reports found in the files on ~ assassination plotting, the persons who were involved, and what rélationship if any; CIA had with them. Each was followed “with ah evaluation as .to whether it could have provoked a xetalitory attack on President Kennedy. This extensive discussion was seen by several mambers of the HSCA staff, but apparently not by the author of the section of the’ NSCA Report where it is said that CIA did not say what should have been done about it. This assertion in the HSCA Report is in error. . B5-ll Ab Ut tga ase vine mene on gh Ree
AG Page 91 the HSCA Report makes the following statement: "Phe ‘1977 Task Force. Report! reviewed the question of Agency operations directed at Cuba, ae : Particular, including, the. Mafia and ANLASH plots. in “every. area the report concluded that the Agency" 8 196 was adequate and could not. be faultea, even with the benefit’ of hindsight, The: Task Foree, wnoritically accepted | ‘the Senate Committee’ s conclusions where they were favorable to the Agency, and: critically rejected the, Senate Committee’ s conclusions, asin the case of AMLASH, whenever some possible. investigative: oversight was suggested." j f In- the first place, this is, not what the 1977 Task Force Report: ¢ dia. Tt ‘took the Provocation ‘theory serio a and as noted, : been a better case because there was a plan to. assassinate Zrom the’ AMLASH operation. Castro, as 5 distinguishea “In fact, Sada hee en saan
13-00000 with Book v of its final report at the time Book V was in Graft, The 1977 Task Foree Report specifically records that : view. (See comments concerning page 97 of HSCA Report.) The 1977 CIA Task force Beport, after presenting its critique ! of the relevance of the AMLASH operation to the provocation theory, made the following statement concerning the significance of its analysis: “The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final Report may seem anomalous. Tt a cea iy places CIA in the position of contesting the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibllity--not seriously considered as a Likelihood during the Warren Commission Anguiry-~ that: other operations “could have suffered the. defects attributed to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. tn protesting the presentation in one “instance, and ‘the pacific conclusions Lt seeks to support, the effect is to disagree with a4 substantial portion ‘of the report as written, On the other hand we tend to not contest ‘a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given by the Warren Comaission to ‘the anti-Castroe programs of the U.S. Government; including CIA activities.” he thrust of the Task Force Report is at material variance from the HSCA characterization of it. 4 ~73 ‘ ee a
Page $2 of the HSCA Report states that the 1977 Task i Force Report made no inquiry into what was done in the : Fiorida Station. In fact, the 1977 Task Force Report specifically destribed the frenetic and intehsive activity there in connection with the investigation following the assassination of President Kennedy. The statement that the 1977 Task Forca Report failed -to é document or even discuss the details of efforts, or the oo responses Cf stations to CIA headquarters, ig in/error. There ‘ Sn is an entire section in the Report devoted to intelligence ; 4 reporting disseminated to the intelligence community following the death of President Kennedy and during the investigation ef the Warren Commission. ‘Tn addition, there is a section of several pages discussing the general nature of investigations in’ the field, and | reporting back from the field, with ‘selected examples of that revorting. There is separate treatment of information from Mexico City, where Oswald had visited. The HSCA Report ignores (or the HSCA staff ignored) the detailed presentation in the 1977 Task Force Report. 36-14 EN ar oer ern 5g Siti GA. oe
2 serine : [VEE The 1977-CIA Task Force: Report onthe Mafia Plot At page 97 of the HSCA Report the- statement appears that CIA, with the Senate report, held that the plot. with the Mafia was irrelevant to ‘the inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination. This nistepresents the Task Force Report and CIA’ 8 actual view of the matter. i i As. stated elusuhare, Lt was “felt ‘that the AMLASH operation a eo : was, - irrelevant to che investigation, simply because the - 2 relationship with ANLASH had not materialized into. anything: involving commitments or agreements during President Kennedy' & ‘life, However; . in the context of the provocation theory, CIA felt that. ‘the operation involving the criminal syndicate cane: closer to sil.ing the bill. rt ‘contained | an actual Blot, At the | ‘same time it. was. ‘obse ved that: theoretically there: was greater! “possibility. o£: leaks. from ‘the, earlier operations *: involving ‘the criminal underworld, although there was’ no known evidence of stich leaks. While. general, “rather than os “e specific, ‘this could have’ provided more. reasonable support 36-18
oy for the Subcommittee's view that there were CIA operations that should have bean reported to the Warren Commission. 1 The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise..v." . : Further, the 1977 CIA Task Force Report engaged in : | | j considerable discussion of the Mafia plots, which, interestingly : ‘ enough, seems to have been adopted in toto by the discussion in ( the HSCA report, although the HSCA report would lead one to believe there is no such treatment. 4 z ¢ 4 i if y a Ml 2 x = any % > Os
13-00000 VIII: Gilberto Policarpo Lopez At-page 98 of the HSCA Report there is a discussion of a man named. Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, an aAmexican citizen of : 2 coke h tA ty Coping . . wa Cuban extraction. This man who, flew, to Havangla on 27 November. CIA reported on the man's flight, and then over the succeeding days reported additional information concerning his travel through Mexico and his departure. This information was passed to the PRI. Under the arrangements at the time, the - PBI conducted (extensive investigations of the man in the United me States. CIA had no investigative resources in Cuba, and with the exception of interviewing a refugee from Cuba who . knew something about Lopes it was unable to add to its earlier Yeporting. The confusion in this particular case arises out of a eeport some months after the. Man's departure from Mexico. it was. filled with erroneous detail on facts already réported accurately, and clearly was a report that could not be accorded any. validity. The vreport-was not disseminated _ because of this, although a CIA cable addressed to the og that the “information jibed with’ that already available. Quite frankly, that cable was in error. ‘There was no reason to do anything further. the decision against its dissemination at that. time remains valid today. 35-17 “in the field, made the mistaken comment oe 2
Luisa Calderon — eters enn AG pages i-2 DII-PATS, the HSCA report discusses | information concering a Cuban employee by the name of inisa. Calderon. 7 This discussion is based on a memorandum written, in 1975 by a) CIA employee for. the Rockefellex Comission... ft cites a field report of a conversation that, Calderon had taken, place some five hours after the assassination OF . President. Kennedy which quotes her as “stating “knew almost before Kennedy, * (emphasis added) . On the basis of this the HSCA ‘perceives it as possible that the statement constitutes an indication af. foreknowledge of: the assassination. of President. Kennedy on the part “of Calderon. ‘The HSCA Report does not ; discuss the full infozmation : “eae was based on an incorrect - translation whereby. the a she Alea. later. | ‘The i by a CIA. it also omits those ‘elements of. the fepo ted. conversation “removi g- ‘the. . that place the comment in context, on the mistranslation.
The evolution of thissection of the - ESCA Report is interesting te the extent that it reveals attitudes on the part of the HSCA Staff. Calderon. had suspected DGI (Cuban intellige ence service) connections. An early HSCA draft report alleged that. CIA withheld this information from the Warren Commiss sion, ‘This was joined with a presentation that tried to make Caldéron out as a CIA gent. The heavy implication of CIA deception was unconcealed. As the evidence proving that these statements were untrue was brought, forward, they had to be dropped, not without reluctance, All that was _ left of the original dramatic presentation was a mistranslation that omits qualifying facts. re cca eer ee Se
x Elena Garro At page 3, DII-PATS there is. treatment of statements by Elena Garro. Information concerning statements by this person about Oswald's 1963 visit to Mexico City, came into the possession of CIA in late 1964, after the Warren Commission report had gone to prass. It was duly reported to the FRI. it is correct to say that there was a tendency to discount ; : rs ; 4 the source, but CIA had no direct access to the person in - : | . q question. It is observed that Footnote 16 at the bottom of : page J makes it obvious that CIA did collect some information on the subject although the body of the text suggests that it did not. Under the arrangements at the time, FBI headquarters received additional information on the subject.
13-00000 aware ‘of this, XI Alleged Refusal ft CIA. ‘to take Available Sources In Mexico At page 3, DII~PATS, ‘Footnote 18, the HSCA Report states that: the “Committee' s investigation in Mexico City was further inhibited by the refusal of the CIA to make available. its sources on the Elena ‘Garkto allegation." ‘This statement is incorrect. CIA had no influence over the persons in question (they were not established or controlleg cont acts) and the, Committee’ had to rely on Mexican. authorities Siahe; also; labored under difficulties in locating or compelling contacts by its citizens or residents, The Committee was made and this misstatement. is despite information to the contrary. ie: os
ee SPE cece Sere ecese All Contreras Allegations At page 4, DIL-PATS, at footnote 17, the HSCA Report states that “(t) Contreras story . « . was not adequately pursued when it first af to the attention. of CIA". Contreras alleged that he met Oswald during his visit to Mexico in 1963. The Contreras allegation was first reported by the American Consul in Tampico, Mexico, in May 1967, two anc a half years after the conclusion of the Warren Connission investigation. CIA representatives interviewed. Contreras in June 1967. It was felt inappro- priate for CIA to be further involved directly, and the Agency recommended a that additional inquiry be conducted by Mexican authorities. CIA disseminated the information from its interview, as it did with the report by Mexican authorities. 35-24 pliapdigt ies 5 oS ak So ORR egiek aKn « s i 4 2
xIM Maurice (Morris) Bishop At pages 11-13, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report discusses aman by the. ely Name of Antonio. Veciana Blan& and a man named Maurice Bishop with whon he says he had contact... Vectana was involved with a Cuban exile group Yecians, 4 ‘the Hsca he knew the man for over 13 Years and thE be met with theca on over 100 occasions. The HSCA tried to establish the identity of this man Bishop, called ALPHA- 66. and wis organizational affiliation, The HSCA was concerned ‘that, he might be from CIA and the. ; Report leaves the. question somewhat up in the air. C14 has heme br a very specific requi renent for review and approval of continuing operational contact and @ recruitment of agents. A record on this is required to be maintained in.detail. Obviously impromptu and one-time contacts may ot be subject to such a controlled. procedure, but even those usually are reported: - There is no way that a CIA employee would have had operational contacts with a man such as Veciana, in the way described by him, “without there being a. retter full. record of - it, from approval of the. relationship through detailed reports on it. Not aad anty would this be® in operational files, te it would be fn Finandial ae ed Peace Any involvement with ‘his organization would be similarly ° ey aed records. FEL BEE Ua recorded. Ss Above cand: beyond this there would have been some record: ‘of a ‘man. “vith the name Maurice (Horris) Bishop, if he were from CIA, I CIA never . : nad an employee by that. name nor r has any of its euployees ever received | oS : : approval to use such a nama-as ah alias ora pseudonym. Additionally, Veciana’s organization, ALPHA~66, was not oneret—Lhoge.organigatiens Supported by the CIA, 38 ~ 3
13-00000_. wwe adhd WS ‘4 : poet EEE ay : cin opaele . Maurice (Morris) Bishop (continues) 0 he a i : eo The former CIA enplayee ‘who recollected Knowing of -Soneone by the 4 : J 7 name of Maurtee Bishop is highly imprecise. He did not know the man Personally. He did not know where the man was assigned or what his responsibilities were. “He only recollected that someone had pointed him out to hist in the hall. - ; Given the controls and records of Agency employees and. the ‘Persons a j if as Clee ts 5 with whem they are authorized to deal, » theee—is no. one by the name of Fi : ne. F i‘ i Maurice (Morris) Bishop, orpusing that name, whe had a CIA connection. : i a) ion y AG
13-00000 Trafficanté-Ruby At page 25, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report erroneously attributes to a cod State Department cable information concerning a British journalist whe said that in 1959 an American gangster-type named Ruby visited an : American gangster in prison in Cuba. The name given the imprisoned gangster was "Santos". This report was passed to the FBI, and (subject to Bureau verification was included in its reporting to the Warren Commission on r Ruby. | There was subsequent reporting casting considerable doubt on the stability and reliability of the journalist. ‘Contrary ‘to og ednte Eicon the statenent in the HSCA Report, to the effect that CIA did nothing further on the subject, following. a search of Agency sources, a Six page report concerning the man was provided the FBI. Today, it is speculated that the" ‘Santos’ ‘ment foned in. the report de BE whi “ 4 Gs frombendor may be the same as Santo Trafficantey” ‘Wo oh made the possible connect ion ir 1964, and those who knew about Trafficante! $. e involvement in the Castro plot Probably did not see the cabled reports Soba i : “At page 41, ‘DIIe PATS, the’ HSCA Report: states that "Ruby may, have met : “ with Trafficante™. It goes on to suggest. ‘that, CIA knew that in 1964 and ; one di scounted it; the fact. is that the, Peport about such an encounter did” not, name Trafficante, but aman by the name of Santes instead. The “treatment t by. the Committee on this. point 4s: misleading. ne
1 3-00000 mY CIA Records on Oswald me Sec ores_on Oswald At page $9 of DIL PATS, the HSCA Report emphasizes the possibility | that CIA fay have a Significant record concerning Lee Harvey Oswald that has not been found. While one must assume that this is a theoretical : ; 5 i 4 Possibility, it is a most unlikely possibility. There obviously are Many casual contacts with persons of no interest, on whom there are will not be a record simply because there was no reason to make a record, However, in instances in which “an individual was affiliated with the é “Agency”, as stated tn the HSCA Report, there would be a record. There were records on Lee Harvey Oswald, but they show no contact with him, Further, the Agency has conducted such an-extensive search for al] Manner of records concerning him that it is safe to Say that all significant . references tc him have been found. The Committee's attempt to cover the possibility of there befng such a record js more than slightly overstated.
Oswald's rile At page 62, DII- PATS, the WSCA states that according to the Agency" the Oswald file was opened. because as an Amey an defector he This. comes was considered to be of cont inut g intel lfgence interests From a memo ndum written in 1975. “in fact, the Oswald file. as a Simple matt of bureaucratic conveldence fn- response to @ réguest ; : A ; from the Department o tate, as is shown later in n theeport. The “agency* 3a stated it to the HSCA, pointing out ‘the g-error fa the 1975, _ memorandum. opened . At page 63, OL1-PATS, the HSCA reports that no Agency witness could vee dane pte tak ® Gt, explain why Oswald’ s "S middie name showed as “Henry” instead of “Harvey”. The explanation was simple -and was). given, as stated in he fol Towing Comments fn the HSCA Report. Tt was: “a bureaucratic. error. “Joes ¢toepartes > yon o} > : Attention’ As. given to the meaning of, "AG" at: page. 63, “DIL-PATS, on A;
XVII Possibility of a Dual Fillag System. At page 65, DII-PATS, the HSCA Report states that "the Committee Was aware of the possibility that a-dual Filing system could have been used to disguise the relationship with Oswald. This so- ~called awareness Stems fromthe fact that an instance came to the attention of HSCA investigators in which. two CIA employees contemplated establishing a false file in order to conceal the true records of a sensitive operation, The HSCA Report failed to acknowledge that what had been contemplated by the two employees was, in fact, not carried out. False or dual files were not used. Any familiarity with the Agency filing system--whatever Popular views to the contrary--vould make jt clear why the contemp]ated dual files were not employed and why it fs not a realistic consideration,
1300000 AVITI \ Debriefing Oswald \ At pages. 67 an 68, DTI-~PATS, Nhe 4 HSCA reports c sideration . | ; { = o Sa G a Ds x @ ey & “| ee, a wv o o “| mi om o ot os = we ae Me ce = x a ce S rod Oswald was not contacted o gebriefed. Tt\omitted an ok aspect of the natber in which the offi question about t desirability of such a contact, ; a. in } ss KS fall Eonee
“eit ‘ : | OXKEX Red~flagging the File of a Foreign Service Ufficer / At page 73, DII-PATS, ‘the HSCA Report states thad\clA persennel . were unable "te explain adequately" te re easing of fe belonging fo a short tine employee of CIA. who left the Agéncy in 1950 for the \ * + coe » 4 \ Foreign Service, An explanation was offered, which would ba reasonable as to persons oe with such considerations. - Following the individual's departure from CI 2 the fact of his earlier brief employment with CIA ckuld impair his future usefulness fn theForeign Service, if it Nas SS 2 Ne Kno that he once was with CIA. It js an appropriate concern of CTA to Save foxmer employees eo Such embarrassment. “While this is a reasonable explanatio there is no record“today that specifica supports it. lf this is aNinadequate explanation by HSCA standards, then so be it. That it orotbly is correct, however, is the point that should be kept in mind, oe ih #6
RX CIA Reporting on Oswald Before the Assassination pes The HSCA Report criticizes CIA reporting both before and after the Ps assassination of President Kennedy. Because the point is made in that : oe way, 1t is important to keep in mind that prior to the assassination there was no particular reason to report in depth on a man by the nane / p x of Lee Oswald ho was something of a nonentity.| CC CIA learned that aman calling himself Lee Oswald (not Lee Harvey Oswald, as stated in the HSCA Report at page 98, DII-PATS) contacted the : RE ae ings Soviet embassy fn Mexico. City on 1 October 1963. [this was duly reported. . ~ i to appropriate Governmant agencies in Washington. At that time CIA had additional. information about contacts with both the Cuban and Soviet Facilities by unidentified persons. This information was in CIA i files, but it was not until after the assassination that it was reviewed ak “and. some. of it wes identified, by analysis, as involving Lee Harvey ; Oswald. The point ié that prior to the assassination Oswald's namie had been made known only in connection with his contact with the Soviet . embassy onl October. There had been no research of. the files prior to ee the assassination, and it was only by analysis after the assassination “thatthe other contacts became known. The fact is that CIA did’report what it, knew at the ‘times fiat i & ww9s Ps chan in eho gee, CP . ont page 101, DII-PATS. of the WSCA Report, it is stated that “the Committee was unable to determine whether the CIA did in fact come oe os ct inte @ photograph of Oswald’. The answer, categorically, is that ro ¢ onete —s
‘Rep orting to the Warren comission ; Neg page’ 102, Dir PATS, of the HSCA, Report, ‘there ‘4s discussion about reporting to the Warren Conn'ssfon, In this discuss on, a ‘statement a by Bre Helms that CIA responded. only to ‘Specific reques ts is joined to. ma statement ‘that the working level focal ‘Point in. the Agency for oo : dealing with the Commi ss fon did not know about. the: anti-Castro plotting. Two points should be rade on this. First, Mrs Helms! recolTectin : on this point - is ‘partly: inaccurate. The record is replete with: reporting. “ty CIA. to the Harren Commission, on its own initiative and ‘not ‘solely in response 6 specific requests.” Of course, it ‘reported. ext ens sively to - the For Which: in turn reported'ts t the Warren Cotimi ss ton. The footnote &. cited on this page seems to accept ‘the provoceton. ‘theory. ‘as fact. By not report ing operational details, therefore, CIA is _ judged a “as failing to meet its responsibility. It ds only. noted. here, as is stated elsewhere in these © corments, that the Provocation, theory did, Var ny Cont ss on: investigation nO ‘one » thought to have a Stalling of those perational activities, wick might” then have broadened the scope.
13-00000 — Reporting to the Warren Commission (continued) of the inquiries. With the advantage of hindsight, it would have been desirable had the concept been developed then as it was later, according to the HSCA Report, in 1967. And perhaps it would have been useful if HSCA had inquired intonthose other activities as well. CIA conducted its review following articulation of the prevocation theory in Book V of the Church Committee final report. The Find4 nos of that review are in the 1977 CIA Task Force Report and was available for review by HSCA investigators. Y
| : XXL Calderon At page 102, DEL-PATS, of the HSCA Report, the view of the Committee on the significance of the Calderon conversation is raised actin. This time the’ report states "the CIA was unable to explain the onission” in not reporting the Calderon conversation. The explanation that the conversation was. meaningless by reasonable standards was offered, whether or not if was acceptable to the Committee. SY q uae =o
13-00000 a ‘ot se provided to ‘the Warren Cori ssion, : methods, ae i “have. meant reveal nd the sources “and methods, the substance of the” Sensitive sources. In prectcay every. case, CIA demonstrated that the information Was reported, Asponting fren Sensitive Sources - At pade 102, DII-PATS, of the’ HSCA Report, it is/stated that "with “ - . = the exception, of that which was obtained fron sensitive sources and wethods , CIA information, iv general, was accurdtely and expediticusty. In cases of sensitive sources’ cand se a se ennai ntti rather then provide the Commi ss ion’ with raw data. which would “information was submitted: in. 1 accurate’ ‘summary Form.” This statement’ constitutes ‘the/thin: residue ofa series of complicated treatments of early érate\ winch ¢ the HSCA ‘staff first attempted to demonstrate that CIA withheld \iAfermat ion in order to protect its 's with evaluations of the val di ty of the ‘reported information. ‘be placed « on | the informat fon, but it 4s the “snférmation which, is coritical, anid: it ‘is is provided, Re ease point che sch nem hy a page 102, DEL-PATS, ne . "discusses the handling of CIA inforinat ion on Oswald's contacts with the _
13-00000 ge i : Z Reporting from Sensitive Sources (continued) : Soviet and Cuban installations in Mexico City. The Warren Commission iS Was not fully organized until the end of 1963. In mid~January 1964, Mr. HeTms informed the Staff. Director of the Warren Commission about this informations It was provided in considerable written detail the end of that month, with an unusually emphatic endorsement of its accuracy and reliability. That a Warren Commission investigator seems not to have absorbed this information until April 1964 cannot rationally be attributed to the fact’ that the source was not specified. Seeman eee A In this particular "case", the original HSCA draft on this subject \ charged that the informa ton was not provided the Warren Commission to “Sseemashnesnnniemenen ao i until Aprf] \eaphas izing in in ‘the harmful tect the alleged eley, { and attributin it to the protection of sensitive\sources. As the Dasis for. the criticism collapsed\¥n 4 the face of tha\ facts, the dkatt of \ the ceport was simp] \fodi fied to Devi a new criticism, however” thin. 357 2
Characterization of ANLASH Operation ho oe At paye 163, Volume K of the HSCA Report, the Committee emphasizes the recollections of a former CIA employee called Langosch, to the effect that the AMLASH operation was characterized a5 an assassination operation during the period preceding the death of President Kennedy. Langosch was not aware of or privy to the details of the AMLASH Operation during the period preceding the assassination of Prestdent Kennedy. While he had a staff responsibility, asa counter intelligence officer, for security aspects of the relationship, he had not been made witting of the substantive details of what went on. As has been stated elsewhere AMLASH/1 had been evaluated as an unstable man who did not have the self-discipline to accept directions or to serve in the role of & controlled agent. AS a result, the records show that the decision wes nade to attempt to work through some of his colleagues while retaining a contact with him. As a senior person in the Castro government. his. potential seemed great, whatever the difficulties ‘of dealing with him, The problem was one of how to hold the contact open without getting involved in activities that could not be controlled or influenced. On 29 October 1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met with ANLASH/1 and told him he would be given no support in preparation for a coup in Cuba. ALT * of the planning papers showed that AMLASH/1- was to be told only that if he succeeded would he receive support, and that. after the fact. The report of the meeting shows that the plan was adhered to. Later reporting showed that AMLASH/1 considered this as a turn=down. His strong reaction ga
Chara cterization of AMLASH 0 eration (cone ELAS Hon OF AVLASH Op Was such that the decision was taken to make sone gesture thet had sufficient tangible appearances to keep the contact alive. This took - the form of a pen, designed to contain a syringe to administer poison, which was of fered to AMLASH/I1 at about the very time of the President's assassination in Dallas. The point of this Sequence of events js that during the President's life, CIA had no commitment to AMLASH/1, and had made no representations of support te hin. Reporting showed that he knew this. The significance of. this is that--in the context. of the provocation theory-=he had nee nothing that he could report or leak concerning U.S. support. When Langosch testified befere the Church Committee, he st grated that he could not recall the time framé of the activity. Yet, the time frame was key to the. ‘analysis of the operational relationship with AMLASH/1, Particularly tn the context of the provocation ‘theory. With. the: HSCA, however, _Langosch recal Ted as tine Franie for events, as wall as facts that are inconsistent with all the evidence about the development of. the operation... . “The HSCA Report cites an. affadavit. by &@ former CIA employee known as” Pollock, one of the two people living today who know the details of 7 the AMLASH operation at the time in question. He contradicts the ‘state- nents made by Langosch as to: how the AMLASH operation wa¢ characterized during the period preceding Presidant Kennedy's death. 2 \3 “ > DoT LS wo oo ere BOR ey, a Caer Sete
13-00000 Se aa a - ' Characterization’ of AMLASH Operation (continued) . It is of some interest that the -HSCA investigators did not elect to . call as witnesses the two living persons who knew the details of the AMLASH operation at the time that it was going on. Qne of them, @ retired CIA employee, volunteered an aff{davit by way of refuting the recollections of Langosch. The existence of the other one, whose testimony is cited in the Church Committee report, was not secret. An( Fs HSCA review of the AMLASH files. was not extensive, reviewing only one of the folders of the entire file (14 in number) which wags made available for them. The handling of this phase of the investigation by the HSCA staff serves ta confuse rather than clarify the issues. bce
RXV 1967 16 Report At page 188 of Volume X of ‘the HSCA Report, there is emphatic criticism of -a statenent in the 1967 IG Report on the plotting against oa OY Fidel Castro. The of fein ing ‘Statement is quoted in full: _ fo "The gambling sy dicate operation had been taken from hin (Colonel Edwards), and, iA retrospect, he ~ X probably: acted properly Min briefing the Attorney General on onily that aspect of the operation for which he had z cf ¢ € 5 3 a been responsible and of which he had direct, personal knowledge. - \ Edwards was the Director of Security, under whom the so-called Phase | “of the Castro plot with ‘the criminal syndicate was carried out. The briefing of the Attorney General was. on 7 May 1962... A memorandum on the briefing, sent’ to ‘the Attorney General\at his Tater request, “was. : dated 14 May. On that. Same - date, ‘V4 Mays Edwa ds wrote another: memorandum. for the Office of Security file, stating ‘that | Harvey (the man taking over what the 1967 1G Report termed Phase AD OF: t @ operat jonal relation ; with the syndicate), had told him that. he. was dro ping, the contact, with . “the nenbers of. the syndicate. In 1967, ‘when ‘he was Antervi ve : ninect for on with the 16. inquiry, . Edwards could not recall ‘that he knew that his: 6 was in: Miami ‘turning over. hig contacts to Harvey, at about ‘the SaAe time that Edwards - - WAS briefing the. Attorney General. This, specific point is recorded, in the 1G Report, although the ig Report expresses ‘the vidw et that Edwards must have knowin at the time (1962). It. was not until 1975 Po inthe a FY Sa AY