nee: oS oe ea ate 1 April 1977. _ MEMORANDUM FOR: — “Executive Advisory Group | : Deputy. Director for Operations THROUGH = = caren peemey, Director for Administration nar fk “Need ‘For ’ ‘an “agericy-Level | Central. “Mechanism S “for Policy Review and Release of. Potentially - Controversial and Publicity Generating ~ Information pee " Tesuer ‘Toa ‘growing , degree, newsmen ;. ‘scholars and others . including particularly the Center’ for National Security *, Studies, are better organized. than the Agency~to collat and analyze information released from‘a multiplicity of Agency release points. ~A central poli cy overview is. . “-.. yequired to assess the total Agency impact of information . '- release, and.to insure consistency and continuity. 3 in our. “< approach | to. release of. information. - Biseussion: | an a “External pressures ‘for ‘intelligence information a Yelease have increased dramatically, and have resulted in. a £low external to the Intelligence: Community unparalleled - in the first 27 or 28 years of the Agency's existence... “The : Freedom of information and Privacy Acts, mandatory declassifi- -. Cation requests under E.0. 11652, Congressional and Department | °: o£ Justice investigations, individual and class action Civil | aa suits~-these, . and more, . have been the vehicles. —— 2. Within the Agency, there are at least. 1s identifi- eS _able points of release of information to the outside. a Coordination with involved components usually does occur - but generally not in accord with a’ common standard, except (0200s. in ‘the case of FOIA/PA and E.0. 11652 requests. And then, standards for-sanitizing differ, depending on whether the. information is sought in response to civil.or criminal .. litigation, FOIA initial requests or whatever. -Standards | for handling names of personnel and organizations differ within the Agency. A new handbook soon will introduce . Standards in the FOIA/PA world; nevertheless, cover will ... [eszz770 | Be e %. %e 4, . hge®, Pade] 3 é
continue to pose 2 particular problems + ‘to the ‘ppo, and others whose activities support or co-exist with DDO - activities must share a- common understanding of potential - ? _ .. problems for..liaison services.as well.as agents that CaNn fs _ result from official releases of information which tend to, . a identify station docations. Or activities ONOYSEAS 6 7 reg oo. a oe ‘We: ‘have as" S yet. no ‘comprehensive index to a retrievable --. collection of documents already released in sanitized form . | ‘so that we can know what we have already done, should the oe :.. Same documents: come’ for release review. in another request -”: -.! or another context. The Center for National Security. Studies oo 2" Knows... many - individuals, detractors, newsmen: and others, *... * .- pool. their receipts from FOIA and Privacy Act requests... --, | (They have acknowledged doing so to us in their appeals - _ “im which they allege that there seems.to be different .: treatment for different requesters).° Much ‘substantive | <.».;~jinformation released is also available, commercially, from 9°. °.. the Carrolton Press. There are many examples of what. appears |" ' “to the. outsider. to be confusion, absence of sophistication or. “professionalism--or what could be misinterpreted as ; arbitrary and. “capricious | actions. contrary to. the law. ae ae Conclusion: “Some ‘centralized overview, ‘to ‘assess the total . .:. Agency impact of release of potentially sensitive or | es _ iJ controversial information is required to protect sources © — - and methods as well.as to project a credible professional © _:. Gmage. There are several organizational options, including ', expansion of the IRC role; establishment of a fairly renee -.@entralized office as the funnel for all releases as was. -. ‘approved for mandatory declassification review; expansion aes _.. o£ the function of the Assistant to the DCL or of the OGC.gr -- IG. The option which seems least costly,.'least disruptive, or) while organizationally located in the right: spot for policy .. °°... 4 - ‘awareness seems to be that of adding a senior DDO and a DDA. Tare | officer with clerical support, to the O/DDCI. Their activity — should be backstopped by a computer supported index. (or - . indexes), with input from the directorates, OLC, OGC et al, in accord with their needs to support their own systems. . Certain common standards could evolve, aiming at.a single © system to the degree feasible; the DDO-system will operate on ODP computers with an IBM Standard program and could | serve as an Agency system if input were decentralized. ‘Coordination: The principle of centralized policy review | and of an index of released documents as described, has at aT) . Pe
13-00000 drawn favorable response from OGC, IRC Secretariat, OLC,. --.. IG, O/Comptroller, and O/DDCI representatives, and the Loe nT recent Assistant to the DCI, Mr. Falkiewicz. _. Recommendations: 7 coud wake we ee ee eee = wee ee a ee we ee Be: That. ‘the Office. of the DDCI be expanded to +. include the ‘policy review of flap-potential . - information. r leases described BDOVC eh! oe +. hbeed 2 ‘Binge: ‘That. two “professionals, ‘senior DDO and DDA 2” Pure. - officers: (the former ranking because of the oe: . particular. problems of the DDO), be detailed -. ‘to the O/DDCI to undertake this expanded <->. * _ function, with appropriate clerical Support. “That: the’ ‘ODP - ~supported DDO. “index: to its released -. documents be. considered a service of common .. =: * concern anda model for an. eventual. single Agency . system, to: ‘the. degree | feasible, with non- ~DDO. input . That systems. ‘which for. ‘defendable ‘reasons cannot of evolve into a single system meet retrieval standards ae ' consistent with the need for the 0/DDCI to Provide “comprehensive and tamely overview. wen ealig & Oe ‘Distribution: 5 —_ Be ey Coa > 1 - Each EAG Mbr_ ot ee re “4 - ER _ ‘ Nr. Rettenberg *- Mr. Clarke ©... ~ Mr. Lapham .... . - Mr. Meyer - ~ Mr. Acree ~°_ ~ Compt - dad ad foot fd st I | : ! et mee gee mae PRP
THE WASHINGTON POST 03 December 1992. MARY McGRORY Terminating the CIA pushing for Bill Clinton’s consideration for CIA director: Nobody. The Democratic senator from New York hinted at his choice in a report he sent to the president-elect about Bosnia, which he visited over Thanksgiving. Yugoslavia is another _ former country that Moynihan thinks the agency misread— by completely missing the ethnic ferocity that is causing slaughter and famine. He wants the agency shut down and its functions folded into the State - Department, not just because it was a creation of the Cold War that has fe at Moynihan has a candidate he is ” outlived what little usefulness he thinks | _. it had. It is because on the central “question of the Cold War era, the | spooks got it dead wrong and caused us to misspend ourselves into bankruptcy competing with a pauper nation, Moynihan may have a better chance of convincing Bill Clinton to trim CIA and stuff it into State than he has of convincing his colleagues in the Senate. His recent attempt to give a semblance of democracy to the secrets factory—he _ wanted to publish its budget—lost badly. Democrats have not yet cast out their fear of seeming “soft” on national security; and Republicans, who hate all _ government with a great passion, become passionately protective when cloak and dagger are in danger. Clinton, at least, is anxious to save money. “He could get about $5 billion if he closed it down,” says Moyhnihan, “and not a drop of blood on the floor.” Some senators, notably the current chairman of the intelligence committee, _ are starry-eyed about “The Company.” David L. Boren (D-Okla.) earnestly believes that the CIA is serious about “reform.” He lobbied vigorously for the confirmation of the present director, Robert M. Gates, from an almost childlike conviction that Gates wished to democratize the agency and would confide in his so-called overseers in Congress. “I know,” Boren would say to doubters, “because he has told us so much, even things he didn’t have to tell us.” Recently, Boren has undergone a conversion. Gates failed to share his information about the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, the state-owned Italian giant and its little Atlanta branch, that - provided the funds for loans to Iraq, and the burgeoning scandal about our generous financing of Saddam Hussein’s _ War machine. As it happened, the CIA = know-—even when they’re wrong.” | got it right about what was going on in Rome, but when challenged by the | Justice Department, which is prosecuting on different theory, it obligingly revised its information and did not tell all it knew to a federal judge. Boren has now joined in the hue . and cry for an independent counsel, . But Moynihan does not discuss such transgressions when he presses his idea of eliminating “with extreme prejudice”——-CIA’s phrase for offing someone who thwarts its purpose. He does not recite the catalogue of crimes committed by the agency when it was being identified in the late Sen. Frank Church’s 1976 exposé as“arogue elephant.” The forbidden domestic spying during Watergate, the infamous LSD experiments on unwitting subjects, the subversion of the Chilean government, © the assassinations, to some Americans hardly reflect our values, Moynihan, the most scholarly _ Senator, is a social scientist, and he knows about taking the measurements that the agency got so wrong for so - long. In 1979, without the aid of satellites or any other sophisticated intelligence-gathering equipment, he figured out that the Soviet Union was headed for extinction. He credits a “modest” employee of the Census Bureau, one Murray Feshbach, - who in a forest of statistics found the tree that mattered: the life expectancy for Soviet males was dropping. This should not be happening in a country whose growth rate was routinely cited by CIA as on a par with that of Italy and - Japan. In one’of their most egregious bloopers, they figured that the per capita income in East Germany was higher than West Germany’s. - “The agency was so wedded to the notion of the Soviet Union as a successful state, that they couldn't absorb other ideas or realities,” Moynihan says. Stansfield Turner, Jimmy Carter’s CIA director, has admitted the hugely wrong estimates; but Gates and the others now in charge are incapable of saying “Boy, did we ever get it wrong.” Moynihan notes “revisionist rumblings” from Langley to the effect that they had it right all along. It has to have been their best-kept secret, Why does Congress put up with such ruinously expensive incompetence and, year after year, increase the CIA's secret budget? , Moynihan sighs. “It’s the cachet of knowing things that other people don't
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