SECRET Seif SANTTI2EO VERSLON NEYANING oF PEABIC.C. afor AGL Sune 30, 1961 ‘eee _MEMGR <ANDUM Fu. THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: CIA Reorganisation = eS. pew —_ | ap het: Tig. eo: Aad * - be - oa: 1 submit the following views ‘as one who worked in CSS during the / wer and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since. ‘Gn balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. in the nature uf clandestine eperations, the triumphs of an rare ene ‘agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear ebout} are its errora. Put, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible crrors. . The important thing to recognise today, ta my |. ‘judgment, ie that the CIA, a6 at present named and constituted, has . about used up its quota, - bs margin for future errez is practically “* -nensexistent. -Cne more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably. "". in US ‘policy, at home ae well as abroad. And, until CIA te visibly ‘reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely b blamed for _ Saxelepmente.s of which ig. is | wholly & innocent. i o wee ORIGINAL §' z ~ % % ‘and that thie autonoray is dus to three main causes: | _ doctrine of clandestine operations; . (2) an inedequeta conception af. NW 49061 Docld:32622644- Pane 2 %--
SECRET | \oL . . | conception of the. reintionship between eperasions and intelligence. .. The memerandum also suggests ways in which seme of these prob- lome can perhaps ‘be alleviated: | | CA. conducts three :.ain forms of secret work; clandestine intelli- gence collection; co~ort pelitical operations; and peremilitary . activities, it carr::s a: these functions with relative autenemy. The reasoag for the sutonomy are historical. ‘Whea CIA began, th<« State Department, still thinking tee mech in ‘terms. of its traditiexal missions in foreign affairs, losked onthic new venture with suspleion and rencunced the oppertunity te seize =” - {izm contyel of CLA. aperations. i did net, for example, tryto establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities: and _ some ambassadors frankly preferred net to know what ClA wes up to '-. ia their countries. Aer 1955 the fact that the Secretary of State and “the Director of Central intelligence were brethers farther confirmed . CIA's indepeadence from epervision by State Department desks. THE DETERIORATION J: BRARY. ‘DUE TO 7 ae in the meantime, CIA grew in eiae tind power. During the fttice it: “bagha in some areas te outstrip the State Departmeat in the quality of | mh ite personnel. . Partly because CIA paid higher selaries and even eee ‘mere perhaps because Allen Dulles gsve his peeple courageses pro-. _ tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able te attract and held ' @ larga sumber of eble end independenteminded men. The mere it-. cdaod'ynilliane ectiviste t0 tte etafi, the mace mementam ite eperations eet sad the greater rele tt played tn the tnttanion of paliey, HW 49061 Docld:32622644 Pace 3°...
zi SECRE. ti “Vee Yor its part. CIA hed developed a whele asries of functions paral- leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Ceparts..2nt as well. Today it has ite own political desks and military affe; it hag in effect its own foretgn service; it has (or bes had) !:6 own combat forces). it even hee ite own alr force. Rs annual Vudget to about times that of the State Depart-— iment. The contemporary CIA posetaces meay of the characteristics ef a state within & state. - IL Dectrine Theugh C1A's eutonw ay developed for histerieal reagans, it has been able to endure because there is so doctrine governing our conduct of . _ Clandestine operatiene, Tae problem of doctrine fer CIA ie the extent . to which its various clamisstine missions are compatible with a free and open society. 0 THE-DETERIORATIONY =. 3? “OF! THEORIGINAL 3 S222 io os ee Ig ig idle to argue that, because the Communists cac do euch-and-sech, _ we are free to de it too. Communism is a ereed nurtured in con- apiracy; and the whole point of Communist secial and pelitical or ga::i- sation ie to make couspiracy effective, If ‘fighting five with fire’ means contracting the frecdems traditienally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedo-« to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do. not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits . which the meintenancs of an epen society places on secret activity. Until thie ie done, CIA's rele will sot be clearly defined and under- stead. The preble:n which must be faced ie: what sort of secret - activity is consistent with the preservation of & free secial order ? eat 9 Soret " |PHOTOCOPTED , BY THE KENNEY, LIBRARY. DUET nid ~ We must begin, I believe, by accepting the tact that the United States will continue to be a astion in which politicians will ask questions and -. make speeches, reportere will dig ow stories, newepapere will pub- _ --° Iish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings « ef conscience, will . eT bart ous things harmful to the state, and se on. We de not wish to. "Jy change these things and could not do so witheut viclating the esecnce - _: of our society.. Thess things make up the framework ia which CIA : cmust operate. - in abort, they constitute the problem; and, as . ol: General Marahall | used to say. “There! 8 #.Be point tn fighting the are sme Ram V oo PHOEBE AM Dawe f
THE DETERIORATION | wae a & eaed ER ee seta’ t 6. OF THE ORIGINALS: ,4 ce os ~ gak whether the operation la technically feasible ia te own terms a must ask whether ite seccess requizee our_open sectaty to be in’. wes AON ' great problem. organisations in other countries. the wlelbilicy ef the eperation, the more ite quceend Cependé an — .\? thuesting the Impelees end denying the valese ef an epen society, fhe riskier it becemes, and the more urgent it ts thet aa overwhelming "ease be made for its necessity. - 7 —_ Bo lo There fellows from tla, I would think, the eenelusion that secret |  ~gstivities are permissible eo long aa nek de net covrupt the principles and practices of our society. thet they e6ae6 bo be permissible when their effect ia to corrupt these ie and practice: Lach form ef secre: activity presests ite own problem, Clandestine intelligence collecti«:: hae been a traditional funetion of the national etate. ks rules and usages are fairly well established, In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present ao. However, when conducted with an epen checkbook and a broad mandat+ even espionage can begin to push agninet the limits of secret acti<ity in an open society. lcensider later, for _ example, the questica of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and - whether the overdoing ef CAS is net beginning to harm other ac: oe : of the government. Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians anc But corruption of the pelitical life  — of another nation is not u respensibility to be lightly assumed. [1  - wonder whether CIA taa not done too much of thie for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficalt pecblem, if ealy because the probiems of cencealmant ere oo mech more difficult. In general, I uwuld suggest that any secret operation whose wuccess is dependant om the auppredeion ef news, on lying te Congrensmen and journaliete and on the decegtion of the electorate cheuld be undertaker only when the crisis ie so considerable that the gains really seer to _ @utweigh the disadvantages, Thie suggests thet the aise ef the pro-— - posed operation may be ef crucial importance. — &: be done with a minimum ef accompanying corruption. anda cee In short, when confroated with a 5 m we must not only Radta- 29699644 Dane
\o | It. Cperations and olicy Clandestine activilie should be assessed not only im the context of their relationghip = on Span society but also in the eentext of thei: relationship to United States foreign policy. CLA cperations have at been held otfecciely subordinate to U.S foreign. policy. l, Clandestine sstelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Legertment comtrel. This fact expeses American foreign policy to a muitituds of ombarragsments when CIA is discovered recruitin,s agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singasore case, when CLA, without netice te the Consul General, tried to subvert a member af the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of . ludicrous complexity, inclading an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-deisctor test, ig turned out that the recruit had leng since informed his superiors ef tha CIA approach and was leeding CLA inte a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable emberrass~- ment to relationa between the UU aad the Slagupere government. There have been trovblce of a comparahic sort in Pukieten and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smaggled inte Seseho te work in a CIA-NSA operation). ‘ 2s temo « (PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION Payne tee ee “ ite CIA has said that, tn wach cases, » neither the Embassy nor the Depa: - ment in Washington is sorrmally infermed ef thie type ef eperatian. in short, no one knowe how many potential preblems fer US foreign peliey -- and hew much potential friction with friendly states << are being crested as this moment by CIA clandestine ingalligence operations. Suvely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the cperation (6. g,, the information derivatis frem en agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) aut- — weighe the risk (e.g., exeeperating the iccal government and shakin; ite confidence both in our purpeses and in cur ecnee), Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared beth with the Depart - ment of State and (save for exceptions! tnetances ead on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the lecal U.S. Ambessadee, ° OF THE ORIGINAL 2m emer BRINE lesohe of eee AY amy 2aQmcaa NaoTra:t9KIIkAd Pane
6. Ae -“B 2. Covert politisal operations technically require State Department clearance. - In practice, however, ClA has aften been _able to seize the initiscive in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of 3 rubber eta: Pe Thia has been partly : rae consequence of the guperior drive and activism of CIA perz-unel, especially as compared with the difficer.s:< of State Leoartmment sersornel. Yor example, when men come to Ci with the assignment uf developing cevert political campaigne or organising cougs or preparing for peramilitary warfare, these men natorally fall to work with ingeavity and seal; they prebably feel that they are net earning thelr pay unless, say, they organiae a6 many coupe aa possible. The concept of ‘contingency planning’ has legitimatised the concrete preparation of operations esti) presumahi } in @ hypothetical stage; people did act at first notice that ‘eantinge:cy ‘planning, ‘ when carried to the stage of reeruitment and training of pereennel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contin- gencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is sasembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure te carry the . project through (it le argued) will lavite the disappointment and alienation of the greups ee the pressure inereasce to follow through | on what had started 93 & pure speculation. Thie wae a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the _ Cuban force in Guaterala just seemed te creste toe many problems and embarrasements. Having entered inte relations with persenalitice in foreign lande, CIA has sometimes seemed te feel that we must thorc- . after do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security oy even go over to the Communists. Te, TPproash hee made vem occasion the priocnars e@ our own agents. © ; nati a ‘Fwe become priscnero of our egoste in enether couse ton The Cuba: ‘ apisode leaves the strong impression that CIA le not able to control its - . wa low-level operetives.. -While the CIA people in Washingten are ion ‘cy ed exceptionally high quality, the mea ettracted to Meld jebe are some - - times tough and even vielous peuple mativated by drives of thalr oun" 2 and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes Lee "ef the operation. .Soch actions ae locking up the Revelationisy Couscil, » J; «ecb enterprisea 38. Cperation 40 in Miami where CIA agente meester ata MW 49061 Docld:32622644° Page. 7
7... le it has meant too the ve State Department, often apprised of an | operation only in ity ater stagee, is under great pressure to endoree the operatic. ac already mounted because af the alleged evil consequences a exercising avete. I well remember Tem Mann's remark the «ay the decieien was made te go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have igvered initiating this eperation; but, since it has gone as far as it hae, I de not think we can risk calling it off. '' Moreover, at atime vhen there is incressing premium en activier, State, when it queet.cae CLA operations or initiatives, caste itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activitics _seeme ‘tough' and realistic; the epponent hae te invoke such intangibles ag the reputation of the United States, world public epinion, "What do we gay in the Untied Nations?”, ete., and ssems bepelessly idealietic, legalistic and ‘safe. ' The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations chich have ferced policy on the State Department. This was net the or:,inal idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in hie 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committ .:c, “Tae Central Intelligence Agency should have soething to do with polic;. Yet, inthe years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ pelicy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even txen targets of CIA attempts at everthrow ~- not & State of mind caleuiated te stimulate friendly feelings teward the - United States,. ef course, is @ prime ezample. | i ETERIORATION : » neal, . JE TG THE Dp OV LIARARY py OF THE ORIGINAL, This experience suggests thet the present system by which CIA notifies State ef a projected covert operation ie inadequate te protect US fetereetse. There mast be some means by which State can be inferrad ef gueb eperations at an early enough stage toe affect the conception ' and preliminary plenning of the operation. Otherwise CLA will con- tinue (o confreet Hate with prepesitions having potential lmepact an foreign policy but at tee lete a point t subject that impact te reasocn- ’ able coatrel. 3. ‘Seamaster, THE KENWE MES AQHKS TanTa-%t9699644 Page B :
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ae aa _—— 7 ° =~ S fm c<q .f Ge c pe ud - ae - a . ; bd 4 * Paramillitury warfare, I gather, ie regarded in seme quarters — as 8 cesaip technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there- fore a proper function ef the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CLA function more peculiarly dependent am the political context than paramilitary warfare. There are several reasens for this. Fer ene thing, a paramilitary operation is in ite nature a large and attributable operation and thersi;. aa suggested above, clashes with the presuppesiticns of our open aociety. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the Jeuth Vietnamese in guerrilla tectice er to the . wappert of already existing guerrilla activities.) For ancther, the moral and political orice of direct peramilitary failure is acute for us. Cormrrunists, when they stimalate perarmilitery activity, are doing what the work expects from them; when we de ft, we appear - to betray cur own profeased principles and therefore canaet afford to _tompound delinquency by defeat, Moreover, ag the regent Algerian ' episodes showed, ence we convince the world that we ere committed to « paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all carte ef things. Acc, i the recent tractora-far-priscners episodes chewed, when we do se::4 _ men to peesible death, we cannet lightly write them eff and clese the besks. The Communigte, en the other hend, have no scruples about Mecidating ¢ @ * loolss ehow. HE KENNEDY LISRARV. DUE TO OF. THE ORIGINAL, -:° -. Pd PHOTOCOPIED BY T L WH 49941 Dontd:396799644 Pade 19
SECRET I Mereover, guerrilla warfare is fought, mech mere than military mea ordinarily real: iy in en ideclogieal context. The guerrilla ‘gucceeds when his program enlists grassrects support; end it is wery difficult indecc to best him whea the countryside {8 with Birn. -Van Mosk told Genoral Marshall in 1946 ast to worry about the | . guerrillas in Indonesia; “we are sending 50, COC men out there Be ' and will clean the situation up in the three menthe." Marshall, Aw asi... ho bad had experie-ce fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, Pele | peptied, "It won't Le eo easy. You will find that they will bleed 7 you to death." Cypvas and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over - \- 'eeming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force. Sortous guerrilla roverments have been defested only three times ince the exd of the Secovd Vorid tar: in Greece, because Tite's defection -_ closed the sorthara vorder; in the Philippines; and in Melaya. i ~ the last two cases the guorrilla resistance ended because of tac oe : ‘combination of political and military countermeasures, The strugs}« “tn malaya, ao Field “arshal Templer under stecd (acd said), wes f:- _ the minds and hearts ai the people; it therefore invelived not =i; . paranililary operations but a vaet educational progvam, organisation of trade unions, political reform sad an offer of national independencs. . If the guerrillas power lies ia his revalutiensry progrem, the answer : lies in part tn meeting the ageds which enable the guerrilla to rouse - , the countryside, "i ithout 6 political goal,” wrete Mao Tse-tung, ©. *. “guerrilla warfare must fail, as it muses if ite politiesal ebjectives | do. . ot ' net eolacide with the aspiraticns of the peeple and if thelz eympathy, «= cooperation and aseistance cannct be gained," He edded, “Do wo went the support ef the masses? if wa do, we must go ameng the . -  MNASSeS; arouse them. ta  sctivitys concerns curecives with their v weal hoy wan — For these reasons, saramitlitary warfare cannot be considered es. ., primarily a military weapon. 8 is primarily 8 polities! weapon and | : must therefore be subj ected te close and careful political oversight  Doctd:32622644::P:
Vow Ak... 5. How to ata :dish Policy Centrol? Here I wonder whether the British experience « ight sot be af value. The notable feature of ths Eritieh intelligence -vetem is the determination te keep clandestine activity under atric: “orcign Office contral. This control is achieved ing number of f wayz ce ) Secret stalligence Service (M1-6) itself operates under Sn a _ the direction af \he Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a ' Foreign Cfifice .asirmes (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who ‘is now the Britict representative at the UN) and which includes. the Service Inte‘ligence directors aud representatives of the — ‘Colonial Cfifice and the Commenwealth Reiatione Office as well aa the Chief of ‘15, b) bale poitical warfare directives are evigiaated, sot Se ‘by SES, but by tac Information Research Department inthe. - | Foreign Ciflce, uften in consultation with an interdepartmental Werking Group «co International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate ca.trol of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent vader Secretary's Department im the Fesetgn _ Clfice, TO. THE OETERTORAT ION ’ “te a e c) SIS covert political actioa campaigns mast not emly con- ferm to Foreign. office divectives but must be cleared with the _ Appropriate Foretgn Office geographical desks. oo, ry working groupe usder IRD chairmanship govern epera- os "tens in pects) areas, euch ae, for example, Gine-Seviet rela- tons or the World Youth Feetival. Se) a Foreign Office Staff Lisisea Officer ce sexi to the 515” Catal, and Torelga Office efficiale serve teure of dnty in SIS 7 ry HW 49061-.Doctd:32622644: Page-12--"
12, enforced by directive, by State Depertment chalwmanship ef | working groupe, a: by the infiltratica ef State Department pereoune! | into the belligence agency. *Chvisusly & this set-.2 would not auececd, however, unless the = os State Departraeat iteslf were prepared to overcomes He inbred = i nakite of diffusion, -egativiam aad delay and te take a firm and purpossfal stip « on ine ettustion. The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particu- =< ‘1. Marly pesplezing questions. ‘Intelligence’ includes twe separshic —  " aetivities: clandéessine cellection; and research, saalysis and . . | q@waluation, The firet.deale with that emall portion of raw inteili- “THE-DETERIORATION| :- 0° e ce . gence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that - "a sroper analysis of the tutelligence obtainable by. . . overt, . 1: . normal, and abovetoard meane weald supply ue with eves 86 percent, “.  { should estimate, of the information required fer the guidance of our '-"" nasionsi policy"); the second invelves the calletion and interpretatic:: of at! forme of intelligence, . however obtained ext the production of - ectimatee. RARY,DUESTO “Under the British system, clandestine collection io entrusted te the Secret Intelligence Service, The research, ansiyeis and ectimating: re tanction is located in the Fereign Office Research Department. — Under the dimerican system, CIA hes reeponsihllity fer beth teentte Bereau of Intelligence tod Reaeares alee hag poasaral Gnd : ‘analysis reaponaibilities; bal, in practice, CLA hee eatabliched _
SECRET . a The argument agains: incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dalles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situat:on in any foreign country it is important that _ information szould ts processed by an agency whose duty if is to weigh facts, and to iraw conclusions frem these facts, without «| ipo. °° °° having either the facta or the conclusions warped by the inevitable Ba - and even proper prs zwélces of the men whose duty it is te determine kn os 2. peley and whe, havi-g once determined a policy, are too likely to ee + be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be. wre fealty." Precisely the same cegument | can be used with equal effect ageinet: the incorporations ai -he research and estimate function in CIA -._ ~ fo@., Sf intelligence i9 toe closely connected with operetiona, then “theese committed to + particular operation will tend ie select eut the 1° a intelligence which validates the operation, = a THE: DETERTORATION |: - Gbvieusly beth arm: scenks conclude ta & case for the esteblishmeat ef . & fairly independent -esearch and estimate growp. But, if the Ri é: — | greup ie tee independent, one ruse inte the opposite danger: that is, ie oo ‘that neither policy aor. operetions will be , Subjected te adequate PES! intelligence checks. — ae The trouble with the cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, bus preciealy that the = -. .- Cuban.cperation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in-: tealligence branch (DUD of CLA was never informed ef the existence ~~ - @f the Coban operation, The Office ef Nae¢ienal Eatimates was never ' a@ked to comment on the seaumption, for example, that discontem: _:* hed reached the potat in Cuba where o successful landing operation. oS wpe provoke uprisings behind the lises and defectiens from the’: -- Militia, In December and February, the Cffiee of National Estimates NW 49061 - Dockd: 32622644." Page .1.
THE DETERIORATION]: °.« : Xnew sven ises about the Cuban operation. a ‘The’ ‘problem, then, ig to have an R&E group p sufficiently independex: ' ef beth policy and cverations te resist the pressure te make the case pendent of both Stars and CLA, yet closely connected with both in ‘d:.. - oT! _-tg=day operations. The R&F subagency would receive intelligence _ ' from CIA and from. “tate, as well as from the services and, of cours, ~~ . fvom public sources. - ‘ment of our presect. intelligence set-up. 90 in ao effective and purposeful way. OCUNnCi , . - 14, Von that knowledge of the cuban operation, flaunted in dilami bare a by any cumber of lc:>-level agentes in the operations branch of CLA, was denied tc even .se top officials of the intelligence branch, Tho _ Bureau of Inteliigens¢ and Researeh of the Department « ef State fox vested ideaa anc iutcrests -- yet enfficiently clese te be able to subject projected oc-erations er pelictes te the moet intense and = searching ecrutiny~ Ve ngre could this g: uup ve located? Ef the CIA were to beceme gubordinate ta Stats. aa l4i~6 is to the Foreign Office, then the F.é-.. function might Se vented in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde > : it would represent, in effect, @ fuelon of CLA/iT! | and State/Intelligozce and Research. B& might alee take over certai: — ef the service functions now confided to CIA ~~ photographic interpre-._ tation, biegraphice. data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt cellec- =. tien, maps, etc. . There might be in additien a Joint Intelligence Eca:é- with representatives from all the intalligence sgenciee aad with a we ‘State Departmant or White House chairman - ‘The aygument of thie memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearranges - & also implies the eapacit I the State Department ae a: 6-9.
‘The structure. waict would reat the criterta caggoeted ‘in thie aot . memorandum | would 8 as follows: -t we TO: THE: DETERIORATION a 1S, y) The Stes: Departs nem would be granted general — _ aa .Gi@ayance authe: sity ever all clandestine activity, This roight be effectuaced on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Unt» -sacretary of State fox intelligence, who would act fort! Secretary in theses matters and who might et Serve Bs chairs: aa of a Joint Intalligence Board. os 2) The SOiF intelligence Board would include repre- extatives frorr «il elewente in the intelligence camnrounity. and eles from te White House. 3) The operating branches ef the present CIA would be. reconstituted under some blameless tifie (the National Informa- _ tion Service). This new agency would be charged with responsai-. bility for clandestine collection, for covert pelitical operations © — m _ and for paramilitary activities. it would eubmit projects to the . “. Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. =. © _ In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation- | cs thip te State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA eS - :, Presently do. SO ne i con - = : os) A second ‘sensicindependent ‘agency would bee wet Ups. sein a - Bearing a blameless. title (the F oreign Research Agency), coordi -. nate with the operations agency. ‘This agency would be char Bee _ with responsibility for collation and interpretation, 8 would © " include CLA/ODi, the Lureau of Intelligenes and Research in . : State, and the various service functions new carried on by CIA: 2 “(photographie interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcasi j,toaltorings ecientific intelligence, mape, overt collection, etc.)