JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10216 RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record DATE : 9/3/1963 —— . PAGES :-4s~ SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 ~ OPENING CRITERIA °: - COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4. HW 49061 DBocld:326276318 Page 1-
ead 420} ; A THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 4 ~ WASHINGTON 25, D.C. r= AN _JCSM-685-63 3 September 1963 ‘MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject; US-US5SSR Negotiations on the Establishment of Observation Posts and Related Matters (U) - - 1, By memoranda, dated 10 and 13 August 1963, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on several alternative possibilities for negotiating an agreement to establish observation posts in NATO and Warsaw Pact areas, 2. Inhis 10 August memorandum, Mr.. Nitze asked specifically that. ‘the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the current US position on ground and aire. field observation posts as found in the 11 April 1962 "US Position Paper —— on Mcasures to Reduce the Risk of War by Accident, Miscalculation, - Failure of Communications, or Surprise Attack." In their review of ‘March of 1962 (JCSM-170-62), the Joint Chicfs of Staff had no specific reoervations concerning that portion of the position paper which dealt with the establishment of observation posts, but they did stress that before seeking agreement with the Soviets, the basic concepts of the paper should ‘ be fleshed out, with assistance from our Allies, 3. In line with these earlier vicws and to prepare for the approaching discussions in NATO on these matters, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, . has directed that an outline plan for observation posts be developed, When © approved by proper authority, this study could then provide a basis for the US negotiating position on this aspect of the negotiations. It will list - preferred locations of observation posts for NATO, with suggested priorities C3 _. wherever feasible, and will list certain type areas where Warsaw Pact. i ':yposts in NATO territory should not be located. It will spell out the functions | of the observation poste’ teams and will also suggest the manning and ~ “a equipment for each of the various types of posts and teams. Finally;, it will DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10 HW 49061 DocId:32626318 Page 2 i t Vi - -26.306/63 of ch
o~ HW 49061 address the degree and type of advasnid eotification, If any, of military maneuvers necessary for the succs nad Hnplemontation of the agreement, and compatible with US military Conuiderstions. — 4, This study will be forwardca ¢ you caxly in September. Until then, and until the alternative negotiating scusiilisies have been thoroughly evaluated, it is recommended that tha Dep sartment of Defense take the position that the United States should not initiate detailed negotiations with our Alliea, ¢ or with the Soviet Union. 5. In his 10 August memorandum, Mr. Nitze aleo requested that the .- Joint Chiefs of Staff analyze certain alternatives to the 28 November 1958 Soviet proposal, Each of the alternatives is discussed. briefly below: a, Agreement limited to control posts alone. Although limiting ‘agreement to control posts alonc would reduce considerably the ~ possibility of detecting a rapid concentration of forces for a surprise . attack, the éstablishment of such posts would be militarily acceptable — - AaB a separate arms control agrcement if (1) the control posts were | located and allowed to operate s6 as to provide optimum safeguards against surprise attack and (2) the procedures for advanced notifica= » tion, if any, were re stricted to military movements directly related | to NATO and did not include NATO~«assigned submarine movements or unilateral US force deployments outside the Allied Command Europe-Warsaw Pact area or NATO naval movements, b. Agreement. limited to control posts plus aerial photography. The United States should seek this proposal in preference to the previous one, with the aerial surveillance being carried out in the defined area on a 24-hour, all-weather basis, with no restriction on ben sensing equipment, With respect to the defined area, the Soviet 19538 © proposal suggested an aerial photography zone in Europe extending — 800 kilometers to the east and west of the dividing line between the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces, and also in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, If these three countrics are to be included, the border © areas confronting them should likewise be’included, Asa general. rule, the United States should attempt to make the zone for aerial “observation as large as possible. In addition, negotiations on ground ' observation posts should seek provision for the use of unarmed aire craft to augment the ° capability of those posts, zZ : DocId: 32626318 Page 3
o> me | | : : | Sa-hi- c. Agreement providing ic¢ control posts, aertal photography, anda reduction of foreign troops in Isurope, The United States should - 7 a ; \ - oppose any major reduction or HNmitation of NATO forces in Europe Dod until the causes of world teniian hive beon reduced and an adequate | verification system to police any force reduction agreement has been | | agreed upon and is in operation, An avreement on observation posts + | could be a first step toward achievement of this objective. Further, a all proposals to reduce troops in Europe must be carefully analyzed to insure that they do not place NATO at a military disadvantage because of the shorter Soviet military lines of communication, and the resultant relative ease with which they could reintroduce their* forces into Europe. Assuming a reduction in the causes of world ; tensions, any major reductions would also have to be evaluated in “ terms of their impact on NATO strategy and force planning. A significant general purpose force reduction will result in a greater ne —_ roliance upon nuclear weapons and could lead to a downward trend 7 in Europe's defense efforts at a time the United States. is encouraging further build- ~up of forces. aed With specific reference to Mr. Nitze's request for evaluation _ of a proposal to reduce all forelgn troops in Europe to five divisions © “ _onecach side, such an agreement might be militarily acceptable under Of the terms described below if it followed establishment of obser vation oa posts, aerial surveillance (because of the increased importance of . | a 7 having early warning of enemy concentrations), and their as sociated . 4 | adequate verification procedures. if adopted in the near future, the proposal would result in the withdrawal from West Germany to within their national boundarics ot approximately six ‘plus divisionees, =. |. two plus British, two French, two Belgian. As proposed, it should © ou ; entail no substantial reduction m US ground forces. ‘It would, however, © Sa clearly add to the relative burden ‘of the United States and probably - would be domestically unsatisfactory, particularly to the Congress. a An alternative to be explored should allow for sorne reduction of US nt a 7 forces with other Allies moving forward to replace them. PS | The Soviets, to satisfy the terms of the proposal, would have C Sw, | BO withdraw 15 divislone from East Germany. With arrangements for oe rapidly moving NATO forces into their pogitions in times of tension, = rae NATO thus could conceivably make a relative gain from an agreement Ht or ace of this kind, At any rate, the proposal has enough advantages to - NATO to warrant its consideration in conjunction with our Allies, at the appropriate time, although the imbalance in the reductions probably ? i 49061 DocId:32626318 Page 4 . — oo er
LS © would make the proposal unacceptable to the Soviets. In any such proposal, however, the riek that the Sovicta may station voluntcers or disguised units within East Germany must be recognized, d, An agreement providing for control posts, aerial surveillance, and a reduction of foreign troops in Europe, and removal of weapons of mass destruction from Gerreany, There appear to be no satisfactory methods for determining the yield of a nuclear warhead by verification i procedures that would be acceptable from a security (restricted data) _ point of view. Further, there i.» uo present indication of Soviet weapons of masa destruction in East Germany. Thorefore, this  *. proposal has disadvantages to NATO with no compensating gains. It ip thus miltarily unacceptable and should not be negotiated. — 6, On 13 August, Mr. Nitze forwarded a supplementary memorandum -gnd requosted that a furthor alternative bo explored, It would include aire fields among the observation posts, would climinate aerial inspection, and reduco forces by one-third in Germany rather thanin Europe. After evaluation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reached these conclusions: It — would be most desirable to include airfizids in the array of observation posts, Aerial inspection should not Se eliminated. The reduction of . foreign forces by one-third in Germaay should be opposed since the reduction | ' of US forces of such a magnitude is not militarily acceptable at this time because it could destroy tho military and political cohesion of the Alliance, The Soviet proposal could be modified and rade acceptable militarily if any troop reduction was undefined in magnitude at this point in time and _ was made subject to negotiation following a successful period of operation | of effective observation posts and serial inspection. Alternately, it could © bo mado acceptable by reducing foreign troops in East and West Germany to five divisions, if the reductions were made as discussed earlier, "2 Any agreement on the establishment of aerial inspection, observation ; posta, and related matters will require agreement in principle with our Allies prior to further exploration of basic Soviet views. Before either of these steps is undertaken, the specific conditions of implementation ‘the United States would profer must be determined, With respect to observation posts, this should include the types and locations of posts, and “the composition of the observer teams, The study now being carried out. “for tho Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide a basis for a more detailed US es “position on these aspects of the problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not HW 49061 believe the list of suggested posts in the 11 April 1962 paper: is: adequate, coe and they cannot endorse it for negotiating Purposes. : 2 4 - SECRET Docld: 3276276318 Page 5
i co bot deka g ca 8. Based on the analysio above, tha Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a 7 i) : the United States should offer a comprehonsive altsrnative to the Soviet , Co af \ proposal which would proclude the poasibility of NATO's becoming oO ot immodiately involved with the Soviets in discussing troop reductions in Bo fo _ Europe or removal of weapons of macs destruction from Germany. We CC F z ghould sock a proposal that is more corapatiblo with NATO political a . -. gonsitivities and military plenning. ‘The US proposal should be based on rr » the fundamental principle that the first step toward agrooment botwoen en! the two blocs should be that of acquizing agreed knowledge of the military : ~ gorc0s and movemonto of the other side, it should set forth as thio initial ee Y step a comprohonsive control and inspection plan for the NATO and Warsaw , ae Pact areas. Roduction in forces would follow later. Tho inspection aroa should include ao wide an area as possible. Aovial inspection, observation ~~ posta with team mobility, and overlapping radar coverage should be included.” -. There should bo, however, no control os inspection of nucloar weapons ee a | as such} inspection procedures rathor should concentrato on delivery meanss |... and vohicles.- pd 9. Tha Joint Chiofs of Staff believe that a plan along the lines outlined © in the precoding paragraph would bo more acceptable than any of the a . alternatives discussed above. its principal advantages are that it is | ~~... Mmitod in scope but, at the pame time, it provides for a reduction in the poe a intentions concerning ed “causes of tension and a basta for testing Sovict future moro significant steps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recome= ee mend that a plan slong these lines bo ovaluated as tho United States . eee se eee tee a rn meet CBA BETA AE SSS preforred negotiating position for coordination with our Allios. ae Fog the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Ty = Signed _. ; 4 7 vd oe MAXWELL D.. TAYLOR vd 7 . . Chairman | oe ; eohoadp - oe | | Joint Chiefs of Staff fh _ EERE ao so TEN en oy WW 49061 Docld:32626316 Page 6 . ‘