“bao but never hear an auawer.” Hie exid that the U . «2) Cammando action ag outlined in plan preaented . £9 na on 6 Letober, 3. Coramando Moa enema awa Then Dr, MIRC handed me 4'plan (in English) for Clandestina action prepared by his milllary collaboraters, whom he BaMéd as : Colonel Manus! VAKKLA Castres, an officer of the Academy, Captata Farique DES PAIGNE, and Colonel (fan) MON TEAGUUC, He stated — that they wore of the BAR(UIN gfoup aod hed been princnera, eh reopect to the Plan fer claadeating Operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could ba counted ugon for carmrmande action, part of thernbore, part iu Cuba, He reiterated {hat a commands upe ration Was ssountial to polster morale among the aotl-Caetro elaments In Cuba am] In exile 83 well as te conduct sabotaye that would further weaken . Cabas economy aud the Communiat regime, a gaid that for this overation MV. 3. help would be necessary in PTovidlig weapgone, arnino, demelittons, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if thia plan was conalidered to have merit, ¢hat 7 aFrange to have somooue mact with hig milltacy mon te wurk ont the detaile. Afier all preparations had been made aad tmatozicl provided, ete, the operatica would be purely a Cuban affair. GICTE: Plan turned over to Thomgescn at our no eting at 13:39 on 6 Cetober for traasmiaaton. } , . 4. flequest for Arma, ete. to send to Uscambra Lr. t4IRO Poruoarhed that over a eavnth 420 he had made a request fe Clark for arma for the anti-Cactro ineurzents in the + seambray, but to Gate had heard nothing relative te the request. He commented wryly, ghiero there should be supperted. EDF, MIRC stated that ha had a boat (orovided by us) and & means for delivery of the arma. Cavaldo RAMIREZ (a chief af the 5 scambray group, ° | COMMANT: fas anything bees done abeut thie Fequest 7 3. Information an Arins Heceivad by Castro Rerimne Ur, UU handed ine a lons Peport which he aaid was brouvzhe to him by the Argentine Awbasgador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. 5. at the time of Freeident # RONGILNe visit. “He said the Anipassador would not divulge the source af tha informatiogd but commented, “You wil} know, ‘! * Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October. a
Saue Or. MIRG oald theres was no way ta determine the accuracy ef the figures given of plaues, guns, ete. received jrur the Soviet bloc land Raly end Canada) but even tf the figures wore shag gerated 100 por teat, thay would still be impreasive, ito addod that Castro ie daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a infke militia of ¢lose te 303,000 boing treined te nee them while the economy coutinues to deteriorate. F ‘erhape only half the militia wouid be effective, But tuat is siseable. Thus, de eald, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the ‘greater will be the task, ““a.umust act soon, vigorously and effectively, to fesure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cuaas, Latin Arneri¢ans and others believe Castro to be invincibia, Than would come accommodations and oven worse, the fraplanting of Castro-becked’ Poqimea in the becuisphere, And tha U. 5S. would aafier worst of ah, ‘being discredited for defeat and “gullt af laterforence. * “in the UR no nation would stand beside the U, 3," 6. irr: roposal that Connell so to Cuba with Corsmando G Eoup and Establish a Gaveroiment on a Cubaa sail Dy, MUS thea declared that he was coavinced that Castro would never be cverthrown by all tho prepaganda, the sabotage, esmumands raide, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that tt was inconceivable to.cutablish a vovernment-lresite fey aothing wonld c:.me of It; that the only soluilea for defeating the Castro vegime was ior the Revelutionary Conncll to goto Cuba and estab- lish a goveramenst on Cuban soll, ask recognition by all friendly countries aad alliiary aseistance wf ite prircisalally, the U. &., ond that the U.S. be roady te intervene immediately with ta Forces. “This would ail have tc take place in a matter ci 48 hours, ctherwise it would (ail. I reccgaize that thie is a bold plan, buf boldness ia necessary. There will be many fighe, fnany may ba billed, As fer myeeli, Idon't care if i die. f have isat all my perconsl possessiuas and my son is a prisoner, ' He reiterated that all raust be well prepared in advance, thera must be no vacillation, everything mest proceed rapidly. First, & commando raid in ferce to eeisea s pisee of Cuban territory, praferably near Gaantansmo, sod iosme= Giately tha membera of the Council xu aghore, proclaini 3 pruvisianal governmcot, breadcast by radiv te all astions an appeal for recajalticn (and cables prepared in advauce would aloo be sent out), requeat U, 3 asstztance, and the U. 5. should furaish eech assistance at orca in ade- quate strongth to ensure victury. ype ce eb mS Pewee, Mead Ebert wy gianni bey wearin eet. 5
14-00000 ete F2y wha we Sead Before auch an action ja undertake, the enenry srast be scftened by propasanda, eabctace, raids, undesarvund action, aad the maga of the. peanle of Cuba causi be prepared to accept the PP ovisionai governrognat through propayanda, increased knowledya of he Coancil agi ite unifying efforts, Ur, MIRC asked me what I thought of ibbe-prejeet; did i think | that Castro could be overthrown in Boy other way. Ladriitted that atrong military setion appeared uceces sary. J otated furtner that «f course hia plan would have to be otudied at the highest government levate. He proposed that be might elaborate a plan with hia riliter y ‘eollaboratora, and I suszested that he ds thie so that it might be examined and coasidered, . ‘Dy, MIRO declared that he waa coavinced that thie Com muntat Gegger in tha side of the States could only be avadicated by aula action, thal the U.S. tg and will be blamed fer all aati-Castre préiezanéa, sabotage, etc. and that enomy otaton wil senounee it Yor tate rvention ia Cuba, but that Mthe U. 5. Goes to the aid of a frienaly revoletionary . regime establiehed In the country and helso it defeat the Seviet-bacaad Communist regime, all friendly governments will aoplaad, 7 : “Dhave no parsonal pollticei ambitions," declared MIRO, “merely am trying to chatr tae Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castroe elements inside aad culside of Cuba. UW tha teara isn't con- sidered offective, then ¢hanze the pitcher, But I betieva the fosneil mast establish itself on Cuban autl, and s0ua, Tire is against us.""The : unta del Este agreameat will backfire avalist the U. 5, if Castrs te allowed . to remain in Cuba. Ina year, alter tho politicsa of the countries re- ; ceiving U. 5. ald have gotten their hands ou. d, ald, they will aay, | *Thanks to Castro, ve sot thie.’ And they will epend { aa in the gaat with no berefita to the social and economic welfare of the gaggle, ° ?. Views about the Judzos and Lawyera I quavicd Dy, AIRC as to his views relative to the fedzes aud lawyers and their future atates. Ho aah ho Bored that they ecald all reanite and that they euuld be given sgatstance as. in tho pae?. He dec Clared that Dr, ALABAL waa act qualified to ba a justice and that ae wag - daing acthing but sak ing politica and trying to discredit the Council : and BERG amd VARONA, Dr. LiEKO declared that he, a9 Price Liinister in the ourly days cf the Castro government, had named - LAZAL te the qv Kit beaeecien ey 4) Med TE oe gic amyerties f Spine
(nn ar treet aren etstetet tee rertoe adie ieee ese ‘and miNtary, should be coordipated. by msémbers of the Coun Supreme Court, but that now he considered * LABAU unfit to hold any judicial poeition. ; : ; F . \ _ &,. Maembera of the Revolutionary Couneil . , Dr, MIRG. remorked that he had a meeting af the Council an 10 Cctober, [ askad what elements now composed it and-what he pro- posed to add, He namod.the fellowing as presently inthe Consejo: = Rescate. . ; . 30 de Noviembre a: oh + MRR - 7 Aceien Demoeratica 20deMayo-  - AAA Independiento | : Montecristi , 7 _ He eaid ho had invited to join: | MRAP Unidad Revolucionaria -. . 7 and awaited their reply. He would also like te have the Workora, Studeatea, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyera, ete.) come inte the Council, He bee Heves Batistiancs and Comunistas and elements unwilling to.cooperate. should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council, . He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine cil, but thas the excepted activities should ba known only to him (MIRO), 9. Probable. Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba Dr. MIRO declared that he believed finminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to | Guba (Julle AMUEDO) was ordered to return to Havana the had been vacationing inthe U. S. after FAONDIZ I's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a . Secretary of the Argentine Embasay in Cuba was coming to see MIRO | teday; and further that hy (MIRC) had received 3 phone call last night . i few tot ade f ee ent nna etenstr mnie ened ca at eee
- with him; ; _ tle: and: place through’ Clarks: ; from. a Spaniard (Meanor PEANANDE 2) in Buenos Alrea, “urging MIRG to go te Huosos Airco to arouse aatl- Castre sentiment of the people, liasomuch ae some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDE j % said be had already written MIRC: a letter.) MIKC says, “Of course, I cannot go. Ihave tho Consejo meeting on tho 1th,. ‘Farthermore, lam going to New York on Cetobor Lith or 12th for the SIP (Secleded Interamericana de irensa) meeting and have. been allotted” 12 wiinutes te address the meeting. “40, MIKO. to attend Homage to, LACE RDA: Brasilia who : Precipitated QUADKG 5! peed; nation ren October 1S Dr, MIRO sald he planned ti. remain in New York City- lafter 11 and 12 Cetober SIP snooting), until Cetober 15th to attend the homago for LACERDA, othe Governor of: Guanabara province in Brasil, ‘14IRO probably’ will stay at tho Fark Chambere Hote), but will advise Clark of his location. - a cominented that i would probably remaia in W asbington a noxt week in view of: his plana, but that I might go to New York City to meet -if go,. T would get in touch with him and arrango a moeting : ai. Propazanda Commission , i asked: Dr, MIR0-about hia ideas on the future organization. and structure. of the Propaganda Comnilesion. He stated that it is out- aide the Consejo and act uhder Als’ direct control, although the Council accountant has beon passing funds to ft. Ho said CAFRILLC had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUFAC to handle .  it.: He elaimed that. MESTRE: had not dane. anything with propaganda, 12. MIRO's Views Relative t to Suprema Court Justice or PRIO bein: wesognised ag Hiead of a Provisional Sovernment Lasked Dy, MIRO if he believed that there were many anti- Castro Cubaas (both fo and out of Cuba) who favored PRIC, or the head of the Suprerne Court to be the provisional president if a sovernment were to be established on Cuban soil. Ur. MLULC declared that the revolution ia a fact, and that practically nobody wants te go back to any former vogime, The people in Cuba would resist any ouch poeaibility. He deo
14-00000 . press, the refugee ‘center, otc, nounced FRIC'’s activities acainal the Council and ita efforts ta’ unify the anti-Castro clements, fic aaid that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chiel of state after Castro's overthrow amd recstabliahment of order in the island, 83. Cflicee of Council (Consejo Revetuctonario) oF ee When. questioned about his business and private telephones, _— 7 KIRO- sald, “The? ‘business: .phone is also ta my” house. ‘have ao office Lo  eucépt in my ‘house, but that phone is always busy: (JEffereon. 2-4680), So use the. other phone (JEfforean 4-275) whoa you wish to call me. “ 'l need to. have a smatl office somewhere, away {rom my. home - because all the activities there are driving my: saife-cragy. I want te. find: something modest 90 that no accusation can be nade of ostentation os morely a room for nryasolf, one for my secretary, and.one for- rieotings, . : . of the Council, ate.. The FRD had a place but at that place also waa the lt. would net be satisfactory. Tho F.RD io now practically dead, K wae the foreruancr of the Cansojo as the tnify ing agency of the anti-Castro rosistaace, ” 4, MIRO's Views. on Coordinating the Activities of Cther Extte. Groups’: ‘ ‘ After De. MIRC. reiterated. his view that he should be the channel for funde and coordinating the activities of groups outside the - Consejo euch as tha Students, FORD (Labor), ete., Laaid that funders — @tood that gore of those elomenta were unwilling to function ander. the Conse jo;-and that.in wiew 6f that situation, did he consider that an. . Activity Committce might.be organized with a delegate from cach of... these groups sad under the chairmanship of 'a.momber of thie: Consojow This would serve to €oordinato thoir activities, give them a tlee-in with the ‘Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it, Dr. MIRO replicd that thie would merely set up ancther Consejo outside of and parallel te the existing Consejo. I did not pursue thie further, not having enough backgrouad of these organisations te be able to discuss the matter effectively. Totepie Conversation with MIRO on 7 Cetober Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October, I telephaned to Dr, MIRO (porn the alepert. He appreciated the call and Gsked if | had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by
pn ae tne tar eat - . -of the chief justices in exile) ae ‘and his adhorents among the exiled lawyers and judpes. Fe ne saad the ALABAU Lawyere’ group in prociairaing Juillo CARCE RAN {one “Pegsident of Cuba at var. “' He en- pressed hip indignation ai-thig unilateral “political move by ALABAU He added his beat wishes te 10 and reminded me that he would probably go to Naw York on Cetober llth or 12th for the Sip (Seciedad Iuteramericana de Prensa}: mooting. 1 ‘yeplisd that I would appreciate if he would contact ‘Clark’ nix ‘this seemed ‘desirable, A ‘wuggosted. that in future phone conversations -Ewould be known.ag. JUANITOC. ‘be. 6 good procedure, I wished hin Codepeed. and he replica likewise - ter his arrival te give nis location in New York City, aad that ght ‘havea ‘Fequest ‘from me for an. appointment with him, 4 He agreed with pleasure that this would. to. 8. “16; Comment : During. thea: first two meeting I endeavored to. establish myself favorably: with: ‘De. MIRG and therobre. refvained-from bringing up détalla of budget or. opposition te any of bis specific proposals. i lotened, asked various ‘questicas, and he talked at laagth. la future meetinge, after I have gained further background and. have. more. polley. guidance; I shall be able to discuss with him specific _ isouss and endeavor te reach agreéments or compromises, aamay bo roquirod. - oo. em eee alee te eye, 2 Pe Hh Etre Re ART ge cor Bp peth AP MEF ita ect Tay RPS %.  cactutfon vels-tusecby eyneradNt- aware mT