( . ? nc a ~ - sn : nee _ a re 1 LTA RR a oe ee TOP SECRET | . April 7, 1964 Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program A ainst Cuba . U. S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a * higher level, | The present covert program is designed in: support ofa general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro, accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in © fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to ~ . . decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, _or (d) abandoned, Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories: . ates 1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex-. filtration of agents and covert supply of agent operations, - & y & aerate Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this pro- aren re “deeam be continued. . yy Me ah we 4 “ "2, Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the ,j>, regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc. \ we Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be X continued with regular review of their operational guidelines. 3. Cooperation with. other agencies in economic denial by selec- tive economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban » {> economy. » yee Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con- . ' tinued, uo 7 . . - 4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential - dissident elemenjs near the power centers of the regime. wer Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con- t inued. eee ee TN eRe TIE ee TOP SECRET ey ane g. tahinson li brary Docld: 32493484 Page 190
TOP SECRET . 7 ee 5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and . detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating re elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food). a Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued. , . -conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before . authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons. . 4 Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom- mended that higher. authority hear the arguments of different parties. JS 6. ClA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which \ A — iN . . 7. ClA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them. Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended ‘that higher authority hear the arguments. Docld: 32423464 ‘Page 191 7 77
_ THE WHITE HOUSE - SECRET - EYES ONLY a WASHINGTON December 30, 1964. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Artime I talked to John Crimmins again about the Artime situation. Here is the picture up to now. , ; 1. If we decide to try to stop Artime, the most appropriate scenario appears to be as follows: (a) A decision to stop him must be made by 9:00 A.M. on Thursday '- morning. (b) Locate the Artime ship by plane tomorrow morning. (It:is not certain that we would be able to find it, but we think we probably ~ could. ) (c) Send three fast destroyers from Gitmo to the scene. (d) These destroyers would circle and shadow the Artime ship. John Crimmins guesses that the chances are 50-50 that this sort of approach would be successful in deterring Artime; presumably, — he would be afraid that the security of the operation was jeopardized. 2. As for the desirability of interfering with Artime, State, Defense, and CIA all oppose. The main arguments, in their bare bones, are as follows: (a) Interference will be interpreted as a case of aiding Castro and, as such, will probably be very hard to justify to all sorts of audiences (e. g. Latin America, Congress, the American people). We could hardly expect Artime to keep it quiet. (b) -The operation would have to take place relatively close to Cuba. Conceivably, this could bring Cuban forces into the picture. (c) Artime could.use the opportunity to get us involved. To the Cuban Government, the destroyers might look like. cover for Artime and Artime could use us. SECRET - EYESONLY | a | Copy DocId: 32423484 Page 192. | . “Lyndon B. Johnson Li brary ca newer ee ee
SECRET - EYES ONLY Mr.: Bundy , -2- December 30, 1964 3. All things considered, it seems to me that the best course is to sweat this one out (Artime may not make it even if we leave him alone - e.g. the usual mechanical difficulties), and to work in the future on ways to stop Artime before he gets so far along in his operation and so close to Cuba. If you feel differently, please let me know immediately and I will crank up a special Special Group meeting for tonight or for 8:00 A.M. tomorrow morning. (For your information, the knowledgeable people around town on this one are Vance, Fitzgerald, and Crimmins.) —Ol Gordon Chase | he - oh be SECRET - EYES ONLY - a ae “Copy | peotarazasoaas Page 193, ae : “Lyndon B. Johnson Library |
Docld: 324273454 Page 194 THE WHITE HOUSE SECRET ~- EYES ONLY ee WASHINGTON January 5, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY SUBJECT: Artime's Contact with Dissident Leader I went to a meeting with John Crimmins and a couple CIA types to hear about a recent Artime meeting in Europe with a Cuban dissident named Cubela, Here .are the barebones of the Artime/Cubela meeting, as reported by Artime to a CLA agent. 1. Cubela told Artime that there are three groups in Cuba with which he has - contact and which are ready to act against Castro. First, there is a group '.which Cubela heads himself. Second, there is a group headed by a man named .del Gado who is a fairly high-level official in the Cuban Government. Third, ‘and most important, there is a group headed by Frias, the Commander of the _Western Army. This army is the largest in Cuba and consists of roughly 75,000 people. At the least, the Frias group seems to include the Deputy Commander of the Western Army and the Commander of the Artillery of the ‘Western Army. (We don't know how loyal the Army would be to Frias in the crunch. ) Cubela told Artime that there are others who are ready to act. One of these is Machado, the Minister of Health. 2. Cubela and Artime agreed tentatively on the following scenario for removing Castro: (a) On D-Day minus 30 days, Artime would try to step up his attacks on the coast, largely for psychological purposes. There would not have to be many attacks to make a large psychological impact since the dissidents could count on Castro to over-react. (b) Before D-Day, Artime would infiltrate people into Pinar del Rio to make a "safe area.'' What this would amount to is an area to which the dissi- dents could run in case their attempt at a coup failed. (c) On D-Day minus 7 days, Artime would himself enter Cuba. SECRET - EYES ONLY Lyndon B. Johnson Library cee ane ep ee ee NN A ENS
SECRET - EYES ONLY Mr. Bundy - -2- January 5, 1965 (d) On D-Day there would be a "palace coup! during which Castro and other top leaders would be neutralized. (ec) After the coup, a junta would rule the country. The junta would be made up of 3 internal dissidents, Artime, and 2 lesser-known political prisoners who are now on the Isle of Pines,. Artime would be President of the junta. (The CLA agent explained that Cubela and other internal dissidents feel ’ that they need Artime. They have a guilt complex about the fact that they have been living with Castro for so long without apparently doing anything about it; they feel that, with Artime, the U.S. would accept the new regime.) . , 3. Artime said that he would be meeting in Europe again with Cubela in about a month to discuss the plan further. 4. As for the timing of D- Day, Artime said he was thinking of March 13 (Fidel will be speaking at the University on that day), which is an important historical date for the group (the DR) which Cubela represents; he says he has not yet suggested that date to Cubela. CIA will be sending over to us a more detailed paper regarding the Artime/Cubela conversation on Wednesday. Also, the subject will be discussed at the Special Group meeting on Thursday since, among other things, it has an obvious bearing on the decision of whether or not to cut off Artime's water immediately because of the raid he is now threatening to make. It is pertinent to note that Cubela is not an unknown quantity to CIA, They have been dealing with him for three years; to the best of CIA's knowledge, he has never given them bad information. At the same time, CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation of the Artime/Cubela plot. (Ithink this is fair in view 7 of the fact that we really don't know much about the plot; indeed, it may be that | Artime and Cubela don't know the answers to a lot of hard questions - e.g. How ' much muscle could the Commander of the Western Army really muster?) Gordon Chase : Copy Lo DocTa:32423484 Page 195° Lyndon B. Johnson Library 28S SECRET. - EYES ONLY -
Lifes vik 13 January i565 MEMORANDUM FOR: The 303 Comnittes \ SUBIBCET: Future of Cla’s cuban Paramilitary Progres; Proposed UDT Seanotage Cperatioa 1. This paper requestea approval for recommendetiona concerning Cla's parsmilitary srogram which are contained in paragrapa il. a. Beginning in i962, CiA developed ® Major capability for paramilitary operations against Cuba. A subeatantial number of Cubans have been selected snd intensively trained in all sspecta of paremilitary work, inelnding commsado tactics and Babotage. Considerable use vas made of this capability at one time but since early 1564 the force bas, due to solicy considerations, been restricted to suall infiltration operatious aimed at the develosment of internal intelligence agents, radio operators and suppert agents. — ‘While thia activity has Deen successful, only a small percentage of the trained personsel has been employed, the remainder being beld in training or other non-operationni pursuits. The costs involved in this stand-by status cre considerable. LtBt - 7 an a Copy | | | “Lyndon B. Johnson ‘Library ~Docld: 324239464 Page 196
— f cHES cv i”, i i ieee | 7 ; _ 3. ‘The issue now arises, in connection vith efforts to reduce both yersonnel and funds devoted to the Cuban paramilitary program, whether this capability should be maintained on its present scale or substantially reduced. 4. This issue does not, however, arise as a result of budget considerations alone. There remaing the serious of the Cuban parnmilitary agents who are not b being used as originally envisaged. These agents are highly ‘selected and have shown an unusual degree of motivation; by the cane token, however, they are becoming discouraged at inaction in direct proportion te their desire to help liberate their country. Furthermore, those who are content with the . present inaction, and with whom we have less problems an a result of inactivity, are the least desirable elements; on the other hand, those gho have the highest motivation are increasingly likely to cuit, either to seek otker employment or te engage in paramilitary adventures cf their own. Particularly affected are the menbers. ef the commando group, the underwater demoiition team, and crews of various clandestine tafiltration sea craft. 5. Some types of operations which the paramilitary assets are capable of conducting have been judged by the probler of the maintenance of the morale and motivation . Copy Docld: 32423484 - Page 197. “Lyndon B. Johnson” Li brary
Docld: 32423484 Page 196 — -3- 203 | Group to be clearly unacceptable under present circum stances. Others are in a borderline category because of the lesser riaks involved. We are subaitting an Operation of the latter type for approval at this. time. 6. The proposed operation would use the underwater demolition team to sink Cuban uavy patrol vessela or other Cuban targets of opportunity, which firn intelligence shows are frequently located in the Port of La Ieabela. The team, consiating in toto of eight highly trained undervater demolition men, would be divided iate three sub-teams of two men each, plus a two-man boat (Crew. — The team would approach the harbor during darkness in a =)- foot Swift or similar veasel until it reaches a point three niles north of La Isabela. At this peint it would embark on a snaller Soat -in which it will slowly proceed to Caye srbolito, & small island near the mouth of the harbor. The boat ard crew would. remain hidden on the island; after a brief Fecon- - Raissance and final briefing by the lender, the team itself - would swim into the harber, It would then split into three sub- teams and attach charges to the hulle of Cuban vesseis lying at anchor. Pre-set timing devices would explode the charges five hours after Placement. The tean would leave the target area and upon nevurning to the island, he - 7A ra en Bb ie | Copy “Lyndon B.. Johnson Library Lyndon b. 30m nson—cr rary ~ completion of the review ew (Which w we think will Come out positive), the CIA is continuing, in a somewhat restrained fashion, its efforts (a) to pene- _ trate the PPP, (b) to keep the PNC/UF coalition alive, (c) to support the - Justice Party, and (d) to prop up the democratic trade unionism in BG, 3, BG Rice Exports - There is a glut of rice in BG these days and we are ~ working overtly and covertly on ways of moving some of it into the export market. This is important; as you may recall, one of Cheddi's major claims during the campaign was that only the PPP was able to dispose of BG rice (grown primarily by East Indians). 4, Cuba - Artime Group Attacks Cuba - Artime's group, apparently against Artime's orders (he is in Europe), attacked some fuel tanks in Cuba on February 2. They apparently fired at the tanks with 50 caliber machine guns and 57 millimeter cannons and caused little, if anys damage; no one was caught during the debacle. Later in the week, the group had the hare-brained idea of going into Cuba, capturing a couple hostages and holding them as an exchange for the captured Menoyo. Fora variety of reasons (including some wiser heads in the group), this particular plot never hatched. eC. Gordon Chase SECRET - EYES ONLY c 0 py Lyndon B. Johnson ibrary
Coo cay This iseument ¢conclstc «2 S225 AS $3 OFFICIAL, TOMMUNICATIONS TO C > , . as 7 - nein ead (_ THE SECRETARY OF STATE wean Ge eens EEL, GES LSS rw as ; WASHINGTON E&, De Ge “spd eatlas : ; DEPARTMENT OF STATE ff WASHINGTON a ' February 23, 1965. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PETER JziSsu?, THE WHITE HOUSE’ SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Support for the Artime Group Ambassador Thompson has approved the enclosed ‘memorandum for Members of the 303:Committee, which strongly recommends withdrawal of support for the. Artime Group. We believe you will want this memorandum circulated to Members of the 303, Committee. It will be noted that the Department recommends that. this action be taken immediately and that support be terminated as of February 28. Murat W. Williams _ ‘Deputy Director for Coordination Bureau of Intelligence and Research Attachment; Memorandum for the 303 Committee. Docld:32423484- Page 199 Lyndon. . B.. Joh nson_ Li brary a aS