14-00000 a ‘SERE-E5 oy : of a discussion vith DCM Trueheart: "The Ambassador is considering a charging MACY with making approach to SVN military! ‘he rentioned Gen. ookte ,, Dor, to attempt stimulate early coup action with appropriate US esFurances.- Ir inquired had Ambassador made such. proposal to Washington anette plat weet ae aca pa eR BOS A ELTON BPMN RATER eRe eetestattee ecto | and’ was told this was within Lodge's authority.” ‘Neil Sheehan writing from Saigon stated that the various elements i fo . , ts of the US mission in Vietnam were so badly divided that Washington : cs ui _ had intervened. He said: “The only civilian official still strongly — 4 C im favor of going along w. th the Ngo family regime is the Chief of wp the Central Intelligence Agency here." On the same day, David . ; ae Halberstam stated that high US civilian officials in Saigon vere Son ". ‘making ah all-out effort to convince Washington that the military. ta “| and political situation is deteriorating. ‘He said that “the Chief of { the Central Intelligence Agency favors all-out support fer the present regime but that almost ali other members of his steff are enbittered- ” over the raids on the pagodas. They also feel their Chief's close « association vith Nhu, vhile necessary,’ has severely damaged intelligence , gathering. : es a
eater pest ane BO EYER EAD BOTS EMEA Reng ski eam Ree“ H H : 1 ' 16 September CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0922 "Richardson replied to Washington's request. for nis judguent the desirabllity and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. . He cabled: * - "We must go on trying to win war with current administration for as long as it persists in power. . .. . . We should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN when probability * of attainment is virtually nil... . + . We cannot covertly tinker with or engineer a coup unless general si tuation is reasonably - propititious and if we are unable to establish necessary woraing contacts with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. « « + « » Agree we should carefully explore, and perhaps carefully experiment with gredusted measures designed to pressure Diem, within context of persuading him, to take steps ‘needed. These measures would be more effective if ney are linited, to practical and achievable objectives. . . « « « iT September Memorandum for the Record prepared by DDP + "Smith . . . discussed with me... reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson. ... . - Mike Dunn . . . had . told Conein.. . that Lodge was going ‘to get. rid of Richaréson'. oe « On one occasion Dunn.asked Conein, "Do you think that Dave . Seith can run the station for a temporary period while a new Station Chief is: being sent out here7‘" i a 19 September Lodge to the President: State tele from Saigon (Ho. Sib "J agree that no good opportunity for action to remove present
| i | | 2. St Sangean epee emare rare ~ ret em aclattraaet 2 aa acenertBatc, eceraPoRSTsTo NS la aaa aan .. Richardson probably should be replaced. .. . + » #e have no current __ there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regine that. government in immediate future is apparent end that we. should, therefore, do whatever ve can as an. interis measure pending such an eventuality. .... + . Frankly, I cee no opportunity at all. for substantive changes." oo . (og Personal letter from McCone“to Lodze . sao "T was told by Dean Rusk that you had proposed that General Lansdale... replace Richardson as Chief of Station. . ... « I wish to emphasize that the Agency will reorient tne Saigon Station in any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the Station Chief, can be replaced... . . - Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally. .. . . . If the ‘@ecision is to abanden all hope of working with the regime, then intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which would lead us to... the conclusion that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better.‘ This is not however to sry that a coup might not occur even before you receive this letter. .....«” 23 September ~ per briefing’ of CIA Subcomittee of House Armed Services fhe Director sald there did not appear to be any cohesive military group capable of ousting the Diem regime, and further that was ‘capable ‘of running the government. A new regime probably would be . no better.* Consequently, the Agency was urging a cautious, slov _ ‘approach tothe problem. oo a aan aaa ~ SECRET-EVES HWY