Se | ASSASSINATION SYSTEM © ___ IDENTIFICATION FORM ie@leased under the dohn F. kennedy poo ssination Records Collection 1992 (44 Tc 2107 Note). sei NW 53320 -O6-27 Pate: ~Z2017 pe he 0% it Ht ir nA: nh, ay‘ est as ts pee tS ie ed D HAPPEN TF CASTRO DIED?" SUBJECTS + CASTRO “DOCUMENT TYPE : B - CLASSIFICATION : SECRET . “RESTRICTIONS y TA 0 RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC = RELEASED WITH “DELETIONS. 01/27/99. 2 SFK-WFOS -: FL: 1999.01.27.14:11316:950120- CURRENT STATUS [R] a ITEM Is: RESTRICTED » 104- 10315- ~10006 NW 53320 Docld:32373844 Page 1.
6 October 1961 SUBJECT : Preparation of Draft Paper on Castro eos leon compliance wi with request of 5 October 1961 ae to prepare a paper ject of “What Would Happen if eae Died?" sub subject pe paper is attached herewith. : 2. This paper was prepared utilising contributions from WH/4/PA-PROP, WH/4/INTEL/REPORTS, WH/4/FI-CI and this section. In addition, a conference was held on 5 October 1961 with representatives of OCI, who have been following the Cuban developments, and their thoughts end SaPrenetCNS a are Aneladed in the attashaent. pers ALBERT C, DAVIES C/wa/4/Intel. NW 53320 DocId:32373844 Page 2
ST 6 Getober 1961 MEMORARDOM FOR: Mr. Park F. Wollem SUBJECT: What Would Happen If Castro Died? The attached paper, subject as above, is forwarded in | veaponse to your request of § October 1961. ind. Fai a PS rc) ere 4 RAPORD W, HERBERT 1 Attachment pop /WH/4/Intel/ACDavies j;naw (6 Oct 61) Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 = AC/wap 1 = AC/wH/4 1 - WH/4/Exec 1 - C/wa/4/Intel 1 = WH/4/PA-PROP 1 = WH/4/¥FI-CL 1 = WH/4/2mM 1 + WH/4/Intel/Reports /SO- Cf HW 53320:--Docld:32379844..Page.3
Pome evecare linie auint + Seana mepii niininnigis nent nn i i i 6 October 1961 SUBJECT: What would happen if Castro died? The impact of Fidel Castro's sudden death would ob- viously have come internal on ie Comments repercussions dominated ragime. However, it would be wishful setieee thar’ Che Goran pougie uoald tamadiately cise up oat overthrow the regime, now that Castro had the ecene. In view of the tremendous stxides made during the last five months toward the organization of Cuba into a agente pir ager comeing ren ray Seam empritig? tro opposition, there can be little doubt that the de- waae af videl Canecs. whether by natural causes or assass~ ination, would offer "iietle opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Commumist and Soviet Bloc control. To believe otherwise would be to underestimate the strength and power of control of e Comamist police state. If he died of as- sassivation, instead ef natural causes, the factor of his martydom to the Cuban masses would f strengthen the power of the prasent regime in maintaining control. Also, it is probable that the Soviet Bloe would react to such an event with greatly increased econoate aid in order to assure comtinent. Although it is possible te anticipate the in- mediate results of the death by assassination of apie Castre, rage vagal ei qc par Pano earalkcazal aps gan a great ex tent on the respective effectiveness of work of the police, the Communists, the military, and the aenti-Castre groups. It would eppear that Castro's successor would emerge from the following choices: SECRET. AW:53320 —Docld: 32373844 Page -4
WWO53320 . Docld:32373844 . Page 5 stem «cette keer cinerea pe angrier esaneenes wee het Raul Castro, Minister of Armed Forces “Che” Guevara, Minister of Industry Runez Jimenez, Director INRA Faure Chomon, Ambassader to USSR Early in 1961, Raul Castro was appointed Vice-President and principal executive officer of the Central Planning Con- mittee. This increased authority and his continuing power as Minister of the Armed Forces rank him second only to the Prime Minister. It is felt that Ernesto “Che" Guevare would not be ac- ceptable to the Cuban people as he is not Cuban born. He pears destined to wield tremendous power but not as the - ing euthority. Hunez Jimenez, the Director of the Institute of Agrarian Reform lost a good portion of his industrial emire to “Che'' Guevara during past reorganization and consequently relinquished considerable prestige among the present leadership. Faure Chomon fought with Castre to oust Batista. He led his ow “13th of March" group in the early fighting. Subse~ quently he was appointed as Cuban Ambassador to Moscow and it was generally conceded that, at the time, Castro was ridding himself of a potentially dangerous rival. Of the four individuals aforementioned, none of them have the personal magnetism or popular support ef Fidel Castro. On the other hand, Reul Castro, Guevara end all the tep Coumunists
| 3. Reaction Among the Military and Security Forces. The wilitary leaders, under the direction of Raul Castro, would undoubtedly call for iomediate increased use of police state methods, which would indlude masa errests, tightening of all types of controls, increase of vigilance and informant reporting, and elimination, at least by arrest if not more violent action, of any enti-Castro figures of influence or 4. General Reaction of the Cuben Populace. the firet reaction should be a stunned shock the Guben FR ¢ i Services. The government would then most obviously be unpopular and at war with ite om people. This would be the time for small well-trained, well- HW.53520. -Docld: 32373844. Page 6
NW 53320. DoclId TL eupplied guerrilla groups to appear in the mountains. This would give heart to whatever may be left of the 5 give those who want to fight somewhere to gc, privide a base for urban sabotage end greatly fecilitate the overthrow of Fidel's wapepular heirs and their Bloc supporters. If by some fluke such an assassination attempt should be successful, the only opposition group in any position at egent to take advantage of wresting control from the Com- ts ie the right-wing movement forming under PRIO. This groups' plans reportedly include use of a re-activated BATISTA aruy, now called the "Ex-Constitutional Army", which has an external militant organization composed of upwards of 5000 s gaged in limited sebotage and resistance activity against the Castro regime. It also includes the CIC in Exile, headed by Eusebilo MUJAL, and composed of a large number of experienced labor leaders. The resumption of power by this group would probably result in en early renewel of civil war and an even- tual return to power of the Commmists. There ere still a number of Cubans who support the cause of the socialist revolution, who revere Fidel Castro, end who ott it reneia in Cube, but wee 60 Bet ere ee ee 1323575844. Page 7
are those persons who, although they do not basically sup- port the Castro government, would wait te eee the turn of events before they would commit themselves to changing sides. 7. Cextainly those Cubans who have gained through the changes brougkt about by the Castro revolution would continue to sitp~ port his cause and to avenge his death. Those peasants who have gained materially, the youth who have acquired a new im portance and recognition and who have been thoroughly indoc- trinated by the socialist regime, would continue to support the goveranant. 8. Commmist Party Reaction. Those leaders of the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular) the Cuban Communist Party, who ere already in influential po- sitions would certainly attempt not only to retain that in- fluence but to increase it under eireunstences. There are few goverment leaders left in Cuba who are enti- Comminist to the extent that they would oppose the Communists. 9. “ * Fo eo¥ ¢ 4 + FEy Ly ¢ oF, *y ‘ Ge ae ener wen rT site eee i 1 eh event teagan onl od During the last few years, the Latin Americans have in eddition to overthrowing three well established police stetes ~<« Foron, Perez Jimenez, Batista «~ via internal uprisings -< conducted successful assassinations eageinst four chiefs of state «= Remon of Panama, Gomoza of Wicaragua, Eastillo Aruas HY = 53320 Docld:32373844 Page 6
to remain the symbol of “Revolution", Thus, beacause of the need to undercut this image in the hemisphere eas well ae to destroy the finel vestiges of regard in which he is held within Cuba, it ie important that he not become a new martyr. ate te nee ten ae cn Ent Pony eek lee refutably be set in one of two alternative situations; first, tribute to besmirching hie character or second; he can be eliminated by the Russiens as being unstable end no longer necessary to their interests. In the event of the death of Castro by natural weens, tather than assassination, the immediate reaction by govern~ ment forces might net be so severe, since they could not con- tt de fairly eertsin that the use of an ee Se 8 ee re a ts" Caaeate, ood eoseaal cacy Cee : Che" end « BRED HW 53320... Docld: 32373844. Page 9