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ror . srt muta mea wr SEC NOFORN] = caurm> prsemurron Rahs ET FOR THE EXERCISE OF DESIGNATED US FQROBB) NIBKNAME : “—_ References: a. CINCLANT CONTINGENCY OPLANS 314-61 and °316-61 | b. CINCONAD OPORD 1-61 (Southern Tip) 1. Situation a. General (1) The Cuban Revolution of 1959 under the leadership of Fidel Castro, a self-professed communist, has resulted in the growth of a full -fledged communist satellite in the Western Hemisphere. Through Soviet economic, maiiitary and technical assistance, the military structure in Cuba has rapidly developed into a threat to the US and other Western Hemisphere nations. Soviet Colonial Empire and Chinese communi.s 3 infiltration of influence, personnel, and military equipment is expected to proceed at an increased tempo. Effective governmental control over the institutions and daily life of the Cuban people is likely to increase, making effective internal opposition more difficult and risky. There is no foreseeable development in the internal economic or political situation’ which would be likely to. bring about a critical shift of popular opinion away from the present government. On ‘the contrary, all indications are that the existing communist ruling pody in Cuba will consolidate its. dominant political position, and will continue to present a constant threat of harassment and a potential base for : hostile actions against the US. This threat will ‘increase with the passage of time. : ‘ (2) Incident to the communist threat presented by Cuba, CINCLANT has been directed to and has prepared contingency plans for execution in the event that the JCS determine that US military operations in Cuba are necessary. (Reference a) MEP secret MP SECRET NOFORN Docld: 32423993 Page 27
¢ Lo FAB ye = C . je Sie HOP SECREL NOFORN) # See SECRET (3) Ineident to the communist threat presented by Cuba, CINCONAD has been directed to and has prepared and implemented plans for an increased air defense capability in the southeast United States area.(Reference b) | (4) In the event of US-Cuban overt military hostilities, it is probable that both CINCLANT contingency operatinns and CINCONAD air defense operations would be required and conducted concurrently. | (5) In accordance with existing directives that require military forces to be exercised and evaluated to determine their capability to perform their assigned mission, and in order to practice the coordination required in the event of US-Cuban overt military hostilities, this Outline Plan provides for the conduct of concurrent CINCLANT/CINCONAD exercised which will accomplish the following: (a) Test and evaluate CINCLANT Contingency OPLANS 314-61 and 316-61 as realistically and thoroughly as possible, utilizing a joint airborne/amphibious task force in the Caribbean area. {(b) Test and evaluate CINCONAD Operation Order 1-61 (Southern Tip), including the capabilities of the air defense forces assigned. b. Enemy Forces See Annex C (Intelligence) ec. Friendly Forces (1) CINCSAC Provides base services as required in support of this plan. (2) CINCARIB | Provides base services as required in support of this plan. OP scorer 2 ee NoFORN " Docld: 324239953 Page 2765 ‘
Ne : PO SS S| CRED NOFORN | SDECIAL HANDLING ( OP SECRET COMSTS Provides and operates seaborne transportation in support of this plan. (4) COMATS Provides and operates air transportation in support of this plan. (5) COMTAC Provides electronic reconnaissance aircraft and air rescue aircraft in support of this plan. (6) STATE DEPARTMENT Provides support t the Department of Defense as directed by higher authority. . (7) CIA | Provides support as avaixable, in accordance with accepted requirements, or as directed by higher authority. (8) USTA | Provides support to the Department of Defense as directed by higher authority. ad. Assumptions . None 2. Mission CINCLANT and CINCONAD will conduct concurrent training exercises in the Caribbean/Southeastern US area in order to increase thereadiness in conducting contingency military operations and air defense operations in this area. 3. Execution a. CINCLANT (1) Conduct operations to tactically evaluate CINCLANT contingency plans for military operations in Cuba in accordance with the concept in Annex A hereto. (2) Provide fighter escort for CONAD aircraft in accordance with Annexes A and B hereto. P oe 3 Secnel NOFORN' SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET Docld: 32423993 Page 29
(3) Collect ELINT on Cuba in accordance with Annex D hereto. (4) Provide search and rescue services for the joint exercise. b. CINCONAD . (1) Conduct operations to tactically evaluate the CINCONAD air defense capability in the southeast United States in accordance with the concept in Annex B hereto. (2) Provide navigational assistance to over-water aircraft as required to prevent overflight of Cuban territory. | ¢. CINCSTRIKE (1) Provide Army and Air Force combat-ready forses to CINCLANT in support of this plan. ad. CINCPAC (1) Provide and deploy designated forces to CINCLANT in support of this plan. x. Coordinating Instructions (1) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt and effective for operations as directed by JCS. (2) Planned effective date for operations is early March 1962. (3) CINCLANT and CINCONAD shall maintain close liaison for planning and coordination of operations. (4) Reproduction of this plan in part as required in preparation of supporting plans is authorized. (5) Use of nuclear weapons is not contemplated in executing this plan. 4, Administration and Logistics In accordance with existing directives and references (a) and (b). To preclude a lowering of actual contingency readiness, individual and unit basic loads of ammunition, supplies and equipment will be carried. cnt en adhe t's OY SPECIAL HANDLING SECIR EE I Docld: 32423993 Page 30
Au. tae fee WA FS ey 8 . Command and Signal NOFORN ' a. Command Relations SPECIAL HANDLING (1) This is a joint CINCLANT/CINCONAD operation under the JCS. CINCLANT and CINCONAD shall conduct their respective phases of the exercise keeping one another informed of schedules and operations to insure integration of effort and non-interference. (2) CINCLANT shall act in support of CINCONAD in providing fighter escort for CONAD aircraft. (3) CINCSTRIKE forces required for support of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 will be alerted as requested by CINCLANT and placed in appropriate DEFCON as directed by the JCS. Actual STRIKECOM forces participating in the "taiicred" JTF 122 Vieques exercise and the coastai loading-out maneuvers will CHOP to CINCLANT as directed by the JCS. (4) CINCPAC forces required for support of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 will be deployed and CHOP to CINCLANT as directed by the JCS. b. Communications (1) As mutually developed by CINCLANT and CINCONAD. (2) Code word for this operation is (TS). c. Headquarters Locations JCS Washington, D.C. CINCLANT Norfolk, Va. CINCONAD Colorado Springs, Col. ANNEXES A. Concept and Forces for CINCLANT . Concept and Forces for CINCONAD B Cc. D E. Intelligence . ELINT Collection Implementation SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET Docld: 32423993 Page 31
c AO SECRET SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOFORN 7 HK - | LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 4 » SEGKEL ANNEX A - } PRINSOR CINCLANT SPEGIAL, HANDLING C) FORCES AND, COb 1. Forces a. CINCLANT will plan for exercising all of the forces currently listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61. The General concept in paragraph 2 below indicates forces to be deployed, forces to be repositioned, forces to be alerted, etc. b. In addition to the above, CINCLANT will plan with COMTAC for the exercise of COMTAC electronic reconnaissance aircraft and air rescue aircraft as required in the Cuban area to support the joint exercises. It is estimated that five electronic reconnaissance aircraft will be required for - three-day period and three air rescue aircraft. will be required for a one-day period. 2. General Concept CINCLANT's directives in compliance with this outline plan will support the following general concept: a. A realistic tactical evaluation of CINCLANT's OPLAN 314-61 is required. b. "C-Day" will be the term used for the day that US military forces commence the exercise initial assault. This will be the same day on which CONCONAD faker aircraft conduct their simulated: attack on southeastern US. © c. C-day operations will include amphibious assault, air drop, and air landed (if feasible) operations at Viegues. d. Operations at Vieques will include one PHIBRON with embarked Marine and Army elements, Army airborne elements, and required air and sea support. e, About C-22 days, CINCLANT will request those PACOM forces designated in CINCLANT OPLANS 314-61 to be deployed enroute to Lantcon. ft SECRET A-1. | Annex A PSECRET SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET DoclId: 32423993 Page 33
pes oan oak eatin Aan MOE SECRET ON  @DTAlAl ann Tr NOFORN | SPECIAL HANDLING Pid QEURET C-1 to C+2 days, one PHIBRON with embarked Marines and supporting Marine air will be within 4 hours distance of Guantanamo (GTMO reinforcement listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61). g. At C-1 day, one Marine Infrantry Battalion (minus) will be airlifted from CONUS to Guantanamo (GTMO reinforcement listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61). h. Starting at C-3 days, one PHIBRON will be in the Morehead City -Camp Lejeune area conducting loading and training drills. i. H-hour (time of commencement of the Vieques amphibious assault) will be scheduled no earlier than six hours after | the first scheduled faker aircraft ADLZ penetration. Partici- | pating exercise units will be ready to shift from a "training" status to a ready contingency status of all times. j. CINCSTRIKE combat-ready Army and Air Force forces will be chopped to CINCLANT in sufficient time before C-day to ensure their effective utilization and as . mutually agreed between CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE. These forees will be used | in the Vieques area, the North Carolina area deployed to loading/ staging areas, or alerted at home base as CINCLANT requests in order to realistically test his contingency plan. k. CINCLANT will request required MSTS forces in sufficient time to make them available for operations envisaged / in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61. Although conditions may preclude all the individual MSTS ships from active participation, in order to properly evaluate the exercise, CINCLANT should etermine: (1) Names of MSTS ships designated - (2) Location of these ships (3) Degree of readiness (4) Time of availability of individual ships at loading ports (5) Capabilities of ships in speed, troop capacity, etc. P gECRET > SECRET Docld: 324239953 Page 34
NOFORN | SPECIAL HANDLING : SECREfept for some of the MSTS ships discussed in j above, all forces will participate at least +6 the level of alerting them for contingency operations at their home -bases. m. CINCLANT shall arrange for Navy, Marine or Air Force fighter escort of all CINCONAD faker waves from the time they approach within 50 nautical miles of Cuba until entering che ADIZ on their simulated strike missions. n. Exercise forces shall at all times maintain a quick reaction capability in event of actual hogtititvies; to include individual and unit basic loads of ammunition, supplies, and equipment. A-3 Annex A Docld: 32423993 Page 35
te C A SSECRET MO Sst SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED ~OFORN aye 753 A - Total Forces Assigned in CINCLANT Oplans 314/316/61 xB B- Forces (Tentative) to be Deployed to Hieques Area 2aB € - Forces (Tentative) to be Deployed to Guafitanamo Aréa Camp Lejeuné/Cam 35S . Carolina: | -_ BOSECRET _ SPECIAL HANDLING mer” SECRET Docld: 324239953 Page 37
po C NL A SSCRED We SEUKE! TOTAL FO SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED (NOTE: All forces listed herein are on alert status except those operationally employed as listed in Tabs B through E) BMY Hq. XVIII Airborne Corps 82nd Airborne Division AOlst Airborne Division _ 1 Artillery Group (1 Bn 105s; 1 Bn 153's) 4 Helicopter companies | . 2nd Infartry Brigade (5th Infantry Division) 1 Medium Tank Battalion 1 Armored Cavalry Regiment (Combat Command A) _ Combat Support, Logistic, and Administrative units as required. AIR FORCE “il Command Headquarters ; 6 Squadrons Troop Carrier Aireraft (72 C-123) 5 Squadrons Treop Carrier Aircraft (80 C-130) 14 Squadrons Troop Carrier Aircreft AFR (C 119) (NOTE: AFR Squadrons to be mobilized) 16 Squadrons Transport Aircraft (C 12+) 9 Squadrons Transport Aircraft (C 118/121) _3 Squadrons Transport Aircraft (C 133) Total + approximately 164 Transport Aircraft 21/3 Recon Squadrons (204) . . 17 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (243 ) % Tactical Aircraft Command Controt Center (Reduced) Aerial Refueling Aircraft as required SECRET TAB A(1) ye SECRET NOFORN Docld: 324239953 Page 365
oF ECR: i i SPECIAL PANCLING Ae Y SURTKI LNG. iG, COVERING AND LOGISTIC FORCES ‘Conmand Ship. ‘(oLe): oe a a : : re . Attack. Carriers: (CVA) ‘ Graisers. (CA/CAG/CLG) Destroyers. (4. Squadrons) ASW Group (ASW Carrier plus 8 destroyers, 2 land based air patrol. squadrons) © : Airborne Harly Warning Squadron Subuarines : immune on Ships Seagoing Tugs fa De) is »tys is Loto Fe Luphibious Task Force 200 Destroyers =’ 16. Mine © ‘countermeasures ships Ampbihious, ships as. available and | assigned MARIN |/ One. Marine. Division/Wing Team. (less 1 Battalion danaing Feam) 1/3 eb ane ‘ pocld: 32423993 Page 39
Vee . FS BECRiG T SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOFORN | NOFQRN SPECIAL HANDLING POSCES (TENTATIVE) TO BE DEPLOYED TO VIEQUES AREA 1 é “ne Sattle Group au bart. ribious Squadron (1 attack Transport, 1 attack Cargo Ship, 2 lending Ships, Tank, 1 Landing Ship Dock) 1 Marins Sattalion landing Team (Embarked in the Amphibious Squadron) Tactical Air Command Transport Aircraft as required to lift the Airborne Battle Group. ° saval striking and support shipping as available and assigned Docld: 32423993 Page 40
Pe SCREL . SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOFORN WO SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANGLING FORCES (TENTATIVE) TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE GUANTANAMO AREA 1 Mecins Infantry Battalion (minus) (to be airlifted into — Caentanamc Neval Bese on C Day) 1 Marine Sattalion leading Team (To be within 4 hours of the Neval Base, embarked in the Ready Amphibious Squadron) 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team, Pacific Command (Embarked in amphibious shipping from the Pacific Fleet. To be in the vicinity but not dectectable from Cuba) . Guentaname Naval Base Forces Marine Transport Aircraft as required to lift the Marine Battalion from Cherry Point, 5.C., to Guantanamo Naval Striking and support shipping assigned Amphibious shipping necessary to lift the Pacific Command 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team and the Ready Amphibious Squadron (Approximately 4 or 5 Amphibious Squadrons) TAB C SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET Docld: 324239953 Page 41
ine ss landing Team (s Bux) 1 ‘Amphibious Squadron (F) -Qther units as available and assigned Pe SECRET oor Docld: 324239953 Page 42 4 SECRET
got SECRET ; Lor sSECKE | NOFORN | ~ "APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO ENCLOSURE 1 Rules’ of Engagement with Cuban Aircraft 1. The following rules of. engagement for aircraft are applicable if Cuban airereft are encountered. a. If a Cuban aircraft. commits a hostile act, fighter aircraft in immediate area of attack will follow in immediate pursuit of the cuban aircraft that has fired upon US forces, flying over Cuban territory if necessary - in order to destroy it. b. If Cuban aireraft have been guilty of harassment only and have not fired upon US forces, fighter aircraft will make presence known to harasser by flying close aboard until Cuban aircraft withdraws to Cuban territoral airspace. | | ce. US forces are prohibited from conducting prolonged pursuit deep into Cuban territory and shall not deliberately and systematically organize and dispatch a pursuing force to effect reprisal unless otherwise directed by higher authority. 3. In the event that CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 is ordered executed by higher authority, the order of execution will place normal wartime Rules of Engagement in effect. Zt SECRET A-I-1 Appendix I to Annex A , : to Enclosure 1 Jar SECRET NOFORN SPEGIAL HANDLING gee SECRET Docld: 32423993 Page 44
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED a SECRET | POTTED DISTRIBUTION anwNOFORN] SPECIAL HANDLING FORCES AND CONCEPT FOR CINCONAD 1. FORCES a. CINCONAD shall plan for exercising those of his forces he considers necessary for a realistic tactical evaluation of his air defense capability in the southeastern Usited states area. In general these forces will be: (1) Approximately thirty-four faker aircraft to conduct simulated air attacks. (2) Four airborne early warning and control aircraft to provide navigational assistance to overw:ver aircraft. (3) Forces of the Montgownery Air Defense Sector as required. 2, GENERAL CONCEPT. CINCONAD"s directives in compliance with this outline plan will support the following general concept. a. CONAD (USAF ADC target fleet) aircraft will fly predetermined routes. . (1) A flight of 19 B-57 aircraft out of Tyndall AFB, will fly to approximately 10 miles off the Northeast coast of the Yucatan Peninsula and then head for the West coast of Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off shore, the aircraft will turn to maintain a track that will parallel the North coast of Cuba approximately 10 miles off shore. Upon reaching a position directly south of Key West, the aircraft will turn North and. recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or MacDill AFB. | (2) The 15 B+57 aircraft being scheduled out of Ramey AFB will initially fly Southerly and then head for CINCLANT Vieques Joint Task Force; then changing to SECRET . Bel . Annex B PE So NOFORN] SPECIAL HANDLING | sor SECRET | Docld: 324239953 Page 46
-SECRE. hernly course, fly around the east end of Puerto Rico; taking a course to the North of the island of Hispaniola: then heading directly toward military and governmental targets in Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off shore (initiating turns at 15 miles), the aircraft will alter course to maintain a track parallel to the North coast of Cuba approximately 10 miles off shore. ‘ron reaching a position south of Miami the aircraft will turn North and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or McDill AFB. b. The target force will be launched at a time to have the forces from Ramey AFB arrive at the East coast of Cuba at the same time as the target Yorces from Tyndai; AFB arrive at the West coast of Cuba. When in~bound toward CONUS, these forces will simulate attacks on US targets in the Southeast U.S. area to test the US air defense. ec. Feker aircraft will at no time approach closer than 10 miles to the Cuban coast. The waves should arrive at IP 10 mites off the Cuban coast at the same time. d. Time and space factors, as determined by CINCONAD, v.ELL affect the detailed flight plans. e, CINCONAD will provide sufficient airborne early werning and control aircraft off the Cuban coasts to assist faker aircraft in their navigation to insure that they stay at least 10 miles from Cuban territory. f. ABW and C aircraft will also be exercised in their. AEHW and radio relay missions. g. Provision will be made for positive control to recall participating forces and to terminate the exercise. | h. CINCLANT fighter escort will carry live loads with ammunition fed into the chambers. All pilots, however, will be briefed on the "Rules of Engagement" as specified in Appendix 1 to Annex A to Enclosure 1. J sE0RE1 B-2 Amex 8 | Jé SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 32423993 Page 47
7 | C HOP SECRET SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED | NOFORN’ 2 SPECIAL HANDLING FORGHS TENTATIVE TO BE EMPLOYED IN EXECUTION OF CINC CINCONAD's AIR DEFENSES OF SOUTHEASTERN UNITED ED STATES 15 B-57's from Ramey, AFB, Puerto Rico 19 B-57's from Tyndall AFS, Florida 4 AEW&C aircraft 5 or 6 ELINT collecting aircraft Fighter and escort aircraft as assigned by CINCLANT Aircraft carriers and supporting ships as assigned by CINCLANT Es: in TAB A - yoFORN’ —_ SPECI, HANDLING S He Cl IR | ik hg oy Docld: 32423993 Page 49
¢ NOFORN | 5 February 1962 INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 1. Mission. Intelligence estimate outlining Cuban offensive and defensive capabilities and estimating possible Cuban, Soviet Communist Chinese and South American reactions and possible courses of action. 2. Situation. a. General (1) Cuba has by far the most formidable military machine, except for its Navy, in the Latin American area. Cuba is a Communist beachhead in the defense = system of the Western world, and the Soviet Bloc nations have put forth special effort to entrench their influence in the present Cuban government. It is apparent that this government fits very closely into the world domination plans of the Communist conspiracy. The amount of control exercised by the Soviet Bloc over Cuba is unknown, but is probably considerable. A "“lend- lease” arrangement between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba whereby Cuba furnishes territory for actions against the US in return for arms and technical assistance from the Bloc is a distinct possibility. There are believed to be over 500 Soviet Bloc technicians in Cuba traveling under various guises. Generally, these technicians can be broken down into groups as follows: (a) Soviet - Government advisors, military construction experts, economic advisors, military planning and training advisors, and military equipment instructors - especially instructors for the jet aircraft which Cuba is receiving from the USSR. . C-l Annex C SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 32423993 Page 51
te SECRET SECRET. (b) Communist NOFORN,. +, on cud HANDLING warfare and cagmouflage. (c) Soviet Bloc personnel - Jet fighter instructors, factory technicians and instructors on use of smaller military equipment, such as automatic and anti-aircraft weapons. (2) It is conceivable that the military advisors will play an important part in decision making if and when the Cuban leaders are faced with the problem of whether or not an actual attack is underway. The Soviets, being past masters at "byinkmanship", might exert a sobering influence on such decisions. (3) The Cubans have trained approximately 200 pilots _to fly MIGS. However, the Cuban pilot training program is only about 18 months old and it may be expected that the Cuban fighter pilots are not equal in ability to pilots of the US forces. In the event of actual hostilities, it is possible that Soviet or Soviet Bloc pilots flying MIG-19 FARMERS will be encountered. These pilots are of the instructor category, and would be flying high performance aircraft with possible air-to-air missile capability. (4) The EW/GCI capability of the Cuban military runs the gamut of radar types from GCS to SCR-627. EW capability may extend as far out as 250 and possible 350 miles from the Havana area. The capability of Cuban radar technicians and operators is not known; however, technician and operator assistance must be expected from Soviet Bloc dnistructors in the event of suspected hostilities. This assistance should provide a marked increase in radar detection capability over that of Cuban operators. SECRET a Cc-2 SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 324239953 Page 52
NOFORN ° SPECIAL EANDUING SECRET Little information is available on the GCI/AI SECRET capability of the Cuban Rebel Air Force (CRAF). (5) Guerrilla warfare holds a high priority in’ Cuban army training. The average.Cuban adapts well to military life and especially to guerrilla warfare. He is small in stature but rugged, strong, inured to hardships, and able to subsist. on a Simple diet for a long period of time. It should be expected, therefore, that if the Cuban Army were confronted with an unprofitable military situation it would revert to guerrilla warfare which could be . long and costly. (6) The average Cuban fights well while winning, but may tend to offer less and less resistance as the situation becomes more untenable. The Army is reasonably mobile with good ground communications. Areas of special activity such as gpply depots, are usually surrounded by prepared defenses with tanks, troops, trenches, and automatic weapon (AW) positions. The AW positions normally are unoccupied; however, mobile amounts of quads, eve., could be-moved: into these positions on short notice. Areas of heavy military activ ity and airfields are usually further protected by AA weapons up to 57 mm. Larger numbers of .30 and .50 calibre machine guns are included in AA and ground defense installations. Ground forces are well equipped with mortars, AT guns, assault guns, tanks, submachine guns and rifles. b. Characteristics of the Area of Operations (1) Transportation | (a) There are over 5,000 miles of all weather roads in Cuba, some 3,500 miles of which are paved. SECRET | C-3 SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 324239953 Page 53
sot NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING An additional 3,200 miles ofroad are passable in the SN dry season. The most important artery of communication and chief connecting link between Cuba's major cities is the Central Highway. Over 700 miles long, it runs between Pinar del Rio and Santiago de Cuba following the central axis of the island except where it turns north of Havana and Matanzas and south to Bayamo and Santiago de Cuba. From the Central Highway a road and highway network extends outward toward the coast, and ranges from farm roads, at times unusable, to all weather highways connecting important coastal areas. The mountainous area east of Santigao de Cuba is completely unserviced by rcads or railroads, and air or sea transportation is the only reliable means of reaching some eastern tip areas such as Baracoa. (b) Total railroad trackage in Cuba is over 11,000 miles. The rail network closely parallels the highway network along the central island axis with connecting lines to all areas of commercial Syanortance. Basically, Cuba's railroads are in suoport of the sugar industry and their financial stability and operative effectiveness have fluctuated with this industry. Castro has probably seen to it that both rail and highway systems have been brought up to a higher level of effectiveness than in the pre-revolutionary days. Assuming that the rail and highway systems are in good repair, rapid deployment of ground forces to any part of the island is a distinct capability. This deployment will be further enhanced by the three (3) self-sufficient territorial © commands designated as the Armies of the West, the Central and the East. Each of these Armies has full operational control of all regular and ready reserve units in its area. SECRET c-4 SECRET) NOFORN Docld: 32423993 Page 54 SPEGIAL HANDLING
| ~ | “~ | ne NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET, (c) Cuba has good facilities throughout the island for air transportation. Approximately 95 airfields in various stages of usability from highly efficient international airports with 10,000 feel (plus) runways to 2,500 feet landing strips of sod, dot the countryside. over 45 transport/cargo type aircraft are presently in service with additional Soviet made CRATE aircraft being procured. (ad) A negligible coastal trade is in effect in Cuba which in some instances uses sailing vessels for cargo carriers. There are a number of excellent ports with modern facilities for international trade. The main ports are Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Cienfuegos, and Nuevitas. (2) Telecommunications (a) The entire island of Cuba is criss-crossed with a complete network of communications including landline, manual and automatic telegraph, teleprinter, both UHF and VHF voice links, and facsimile circuits. All communications are controlled by the Ministry of Communications and communications systems are available for use by the military as required. Complete portions of the present communications systems were installed by RCA and Philco Corporations and are considered to be very reliable. Along with tele-communications systems, the island is covered with an extensive network of radio and TV stations.. Nearly all areas, no matter how remote, may be recipients of regularly broadcast radio and TV programs. The US embargo and the lack of adequate telecon equipment producing industry in Cuba together with an acute shortage of | engineers severel, limits maintenance or expansion of SECRET 0-5 SECRET | SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN | , Decld: 32423993 Page 55
C ’ : y Le SECRET NOFORN SPEGIAL HANDLING SECRET . the present system. However, some development programs are in progress and equipment for these programs is: being obtained from Hungary, Switzerland and the Soviet Bloc. (3) Political (a) The present regime in Cuba is in the process of reorganizing the government into a totalitarian political system. The traditional provincial and munici- pal governments are being replaced by Juntas for Coordination, Execution and Inspection (JUCEI). Already established in each province of Cuba, the JUCEI consists of a Provincial Congress, representative of all major economical entities in the territory which meets occasionally, the "plenum" of the Congress which meets every few months, and several smaller bodies which meet frequently and actually direct the provincial administration. The new totalitarian political machine is to be called the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, a merger of the amorphous “5 of July Movement with the well organized Communist party. Although Castro, is, of course, to be the supreme head of this party, the man who is pushing the project is Blas Roca, the Secretary General of the Communist party. Party membership is to be limited to the elite of the revolutionary struggle and will be prerequisite for appointment to any important political or economic position. The new organization will enhance the already extensive communist control of Cuban institutions and the influence of Blas Roca on policy. (bo) An important arm of the Castro political organization is the Association of Rebel Youth (AJR). SECRET C-6 SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 324239953 Page 56
Nee ‘ snore NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING SECRET, It now numbers ‘some 150,000 members. Many of these teenagers are of the type which elsewhere is. found in juvenile gangs. Recognition and status accorded them by the regime makes them fanatical in its service. Active participation in the AJR is becoming requisite for educational advancement and eventual political preferment. 1 (4) Economics (a) The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of three revolutionary changes: (1) the loss of experienced middle and upper level managerial and technical talent, (2) imposition of elaborate state control, and (3) a drastic shift in the trading pattern from primary dependence on the US to primary dependence on the Soviet Bloc. The elimination of the US quota for Cuban sugar has deprived Cuba of its major source of dollar income. US embargo has also produced economic difficulties especially through the denial of spare parts for previously acquired US equipment. Although Cuba's free world trade has declined sharply, and foreign exchange reserves have been exhausted, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough goods and machinery to keep the economy going. In addition, to trade, the Soviet Bloc has extended to Cuba 357 million dollars in credits for industrial development. (b) In general, the Cuban economy is now - characterized by major shortages and considerable disorganization. However, in view of the availability of Bloc assistance, it is not believed that the economy will deteriorate so far as to bring about Castro's over-throw or to force him to make basic changes in his policy. SECRET c-7 NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 32423993 Page 57
SECRET SECRE] SECRET ¢. Cuban Military Situation. fo foot a NOFORN «SPECIAL HANDLING (1) Strength The Cuban ground forces are in the process of a thorough reorganization designed to enhance their effect- iveness. The numerical strength of the Army has declined as Army personnel are absorbed into the militia as cadres. At the same time there has developed within the militia differentiation between various categories of units. Thus, meaningful distinction is no longer that between the Army and the militia, but rather that between the regular ready reserve and home guard type units. On this basis the ground forces available to the regime to suppress insurrection or reel invasion are estimated to be: Regular Forces - 75,000 (Army, Navy, Air and active duty militia) Ready Reserve - 100,000 Home Guard - 100,000 (a) Army 25,000 of which 9,500 are performing internal security and police missions in the provinces. 1 Militia (Active Duty Ready Reserve /Home Guard). 250,000 of which an estimated 50,000 is on active duty. 2 National Police. 9,000. The National Police were recently removed from Armed Forces jurisdiction and assigned to the Department of State Security. (ob) Air Force. The present personnel strength of the Air Force is unknown. However, latest information indicates that there are about 200 Cuban pilots who have been trained by Bloc personnel in high performance aircraft. C-8 SECRET | NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld:324273993 Page 53
a aang saree NOFORN L HANDLING SECRET —(c) Navy The Cuban Navy is capable of moderately effective patrol operations along selected portions of the Cuban coast. But its combat capabilities are negligible. Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few professionally trained and technically qualified men, Its present personnel strength is composed largely of new recruits and militiamen and is estimated at not more than 4,000. Defections among Navy personnel have been so high that active duty militia personnel are assigned to units as security against further defections. (2) Uniforms and Insignia (a) The uniform of the Cuban Army closely resembles that of the US Army's olive green, cotton, field uniform - although many combinations and variations exist. The lack of uniformity in dress may be attributed to a lack of discipline, which within certain limits permits many combinations of what is, in reality, a simple and practical field uniform. (b) The majority of militiamen possess uniforms which they have provided themselves. The uniform of the Farmer's Militia is a straw hat, blue work shirt, and olive green trousers. The uniform of the Students’ Militia consists of a black beret, maroon shirt, and gray trousers. (3) Mobility The Cuban forces are estimated to have the capability of reasonably good mobility for all active duty units. This mobility is enhanced by the acquisition of some 5,000 pieces of military transportation including US and Soviet made 4X4 and 6x6 truck and tractor-trailer type units. (See paragrpph 2b(1), Transportation). The ability to «SECRET 8 ~ WOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 324239953 Page 59
~ ~~ NN ‘ Wo NOFORN SECRET rapidly deploy combat forces will further be enhanced SECRET by the recent reorganization dividing the island operationally into three self-sustaining Army areas of command. Operational control of all forces within the East, Central and Western Army areas is vested in the commander of the particular area. (4) Availability of Reinforcements The Peoples! Militia both male and female, with a potential strength of 500,000 spends several hours a week in training under the tutorship of the active duty forces. This militia is well equipped with Communist Bloc produced small arms, plentiful supplies of ammunition, and constitute an available source of reinforcements to add depth to the active forces. No outside source of reinforcements is known to be available. (5) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft (a) In the event that Cuba elects to act against an exercise force, the Cuban Rebel Air Force in an all-out effort could probably launch about 25 high performance jet aircraft. Conventional aircraft — possessed would probably be held in reserve to repel ground and landing forces. Due to the early stages of training, probable early stages of organization and poor terminal facilities, the reattack capability of the CRAF jet fighters is considered to be relatively low. (0) There is evidence to indicate that T-33 and other American type aircraft may display US military markings. The problem of turn around is complicated by the fact that parts and supplies for British and American type aircraft have been cut off. A pressure SECRET C-16 SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING Docld: 324239953 Page 60
SECaEe NOFORN SPEGIAL HANDLING SECRET refueling capability is not. indicated at any Cuban base supporting jet type aircraft. During combat operations MIG aircraft: which normally fly from three Cuban fields could be expected to deploy to other more remote airfields. e. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation (1) Guerrilla Some guerrilla activity against the Castro forces ‘can be expected. by widely dispersed bands of anti- Castro groups operating from mountainous areas of the island. Due to the small size of the bands and lack of coordinated leadership, it is doubtful that they can do more than harrass the active forces by occasional cutting of lines of communications. (2) Psychological At the first indication of US operations oriented toward the area of Cuba, the Cuban Government is expected to charge the US with hostile intentions. Charges will undoubtedly be placed before the UN and the OAS, and to the world public through all propaganda media. In addition, it is expected that Cuba, through her representatives and/or agents in all South American countries, will try to bring pressure to bear to cause Latin American governments to condemn the action of the US Government. _ (3) Sabotage Sporadic cases of sabotage may be carried out by anti-Castro groups against the communications systems. However, they will probably be on’such a. Bmall. scale as to be an annoyance rather than a handicap to the Cuban Government. SECRET C-11 “SECRET NOFORN' —_SPEGIAL Ha B) Cs iLING Docld: 32423993 Page 61
“, | i SECRET SECRED an Capabilities. a. Cuba is capable of interfering with the accomplishment NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING of this training mission by: (1) Launching high performance jet fighters and actively engaging the training forces. (2) Launching both conventional and jet aircraft against exercise vessels. SECRET Cc-l2 Docld: 324239953 Page 62
OL | 7 YF SECRET ae SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED | AOE SECRET NOLrcEN COCO _EINGTED DISTRIBUTION e SECRET OF OFORN!  SPEGIAL HANDLING ELINT CCLLECTION As determined necessary by CINCLANT and as can be ' provided +o CINCLANT by COMTAC. 2. GENERAL CONCEPT a. The conduct of the concurrent exercises provided for in the basic olan in the Cuban area prcevides an excellent opportunity to acquire ELINT data on Cuban capabilities in this field. b. This basic mission will be to locate and determine the capabilities of the various types of electro-magricuic.radia- Sion devices operating on the isiand of Cuba and adjacent territorial and international waters, and to collect all military communications ane. transmissions having intel- Iigence implications. ce. It is contemplated that six RB-66s and qualified eisetronic reconnaissence personnel fly sorties in the “Aginity of Cuba on E-~2, E-1 and E-day. Sorties on E-day whould accompany each of the faker waves from IP to the ADIE. a. DAC reconnaissance forces will be under the coemational control of CINCLANT while in the target area. e, CINCLANT fighter escort for ELINT forces will be provided as outlined in Enclosure 2. SECRET Docld: 32423993 Page 64
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