SECURITY INVES ratte 878 ‘ (10) - Communist infilts | oa of mass organizations program ‘ (a) Submit semia..«. .2 letters March io and September 1 under t caption of a’ : program, Bufile 100-2-106, using following . topical outlo..- and hesdangs LI. Informaticn concerning Communis xt Party program Puraish summery of information received concerning . overall Communi s st Party program to infiltrates mass organizaticnus, nationally. and locally; steps taken to carry out program including statements made by Conmunis4 Party leaders, directives issued by the Commnict Party, and articles appearing in Communist Party publications; - . ,and success being achieved by party. Ir. Recommendations for additional investigation 7 , . Briefly outline steps being taken to keep abreast cf Communist Party efforts to infiltrate mass organizations = . and indicate spe ecificalily what sdditional - tavestigati Lon whe will be undertaken to determine the extent to which & mass organizations are being influenced, dcminated, ox t controlled by the Communist Party. es . ITE. Identity cf organizations which are targets for infal- x tration or have been infiltrated by the Communist Party 2 List names and Bureau file numbers of all organinationas ‘at a ; which are subject of a pending communist infiltration & case, Include descriptive data concerning each-organi- # zation and indicate extent to which organization has os . been infiltrated. . . ss [ f. [Established sources and informants who are students or employees at . ie { an institution of learning, but who are not reporting on any camcus rs [ activities or any matter pertaining to the educational institution, es { may be contacted without Bureau authority. These contacts.must be “ Bs : f made away from the campus. ] < * { {g.] Members of lew enforcement agencies are not to accompany Bureau . Bs mon . Agents during course of se acurity-type investigati dns without px cior 2 { r Bureau authority . . & - f {h.] Photographic surveillances - . . (1 No photographic surveillances are to be conducted in communist — = front organization cases unless it is essential to protect = . ; Bureau's interests in internal security field by supplementing Fs, . live: informant coverage of'a particular meeting with such a _# surveillance. . . : e - (2) Request Bureau authority te inst titate such a surveillance snd . outline manner in which it will be conducted and supervision- . - which will be afforded it. a na wt (3) No such.surveillances should be instituted without specific . 8 an ‘ Bureau authority. _¢ . . “Se. . a ™~ - . | E * - Fe 85 . xe MW 55072 Doold:323999529 Page 535 - 6-13-47 - ; ae
“—, NW 55072_ {4.] Rissemination of information to Seeret Service re Decld: 32989525 Page 436 = _ _ fr 13+6 “87 _ oo . oe appendix A to the agreement) _If such identities and information are known at the time the . - “e ‘ ‘ ‘ : + . “¢ TCW 87. SECURIDTS ENTE “—~@ ' B72 e be rary ple 60 3 r ° et wu against the President On 2+3~-65, an “gp cement Betteen the ? gation and the eoret Scorvice Conse Was Signed ana. became effective. 3 x its entirety in section 102, voluwe IV,: of ry Ht ts tt wa Ite pole I oo ef td iS $ oO © & tee oO ie) He ot ck od 4 9 we td ‘ 8 food © HO rovides th: whose activ 11 be elert of meet infor mation in@ics’ Pr dent; thereafter, it to initiate such acticn a FBI, in its inves eve inimical _to the be) fo) rr oa bh pte ram i] ay aw - 4 ch he O co) oO bee ur Fr Q yr fa ” by S 3 Q rok QA ON n ] O mw e wl eon oo we Le 9 0. eo: . The field must be alert during th an organization for information person of the President. mnedlately furnish complete Scores Service and apprepriate 2 advise the Bureau at that time ty; facts warrant, of the information fur been so disseminated, An immediate 2 verify the information received but r should be attempted, te, e co tle oO ba] am boty aes n @e ° Lear) o  ® fate “3 a od Lo] Qo0 FN on ny es] QD pte dot Oro Oo ety ch MWD gn tik bo ° te v3 n oy of) co el fw bh 3 he A TM Pach So cr 2 3 oe fee the hate fas o the nearest aw enforbtemont ype, or tele ep shed andi the fact empt showld be made 4+ evaluation of the information ® eo ck WM Id \ a ano 9 Ns @ 5 ck Mb Ee 8 es . Ol a He PO D t > be o ae Prepare at once a letterhead memoranium which should inelude . complete details disseminated ani the identities of the Secret . Service officer and the local law. enforcement officers to whom given and the date and time of notification. Promptiy disseminate. the letterhead memorandum locally to Secret Service dnd any other appropriate Government agency and furnish sufficient copies its the Bureau for dissemination at the S6G. WVhereafter, copies cf all letterhead memoranda and reper concerning the organization s Sty, ary yi aye Ong ry aE anh wih op Bins should be disseminated locally eret Service on a continu ng basis ani extra copies of such cs nications should be Furni hed the Bureau for dissemination 47 aG : we c : gi ay The field should insure thiut organization who are "in" on information concerning the in AMAR, tities of the members of the are determined. Background ~ s (see items 1 and 3 of fully developed and included in the communications prepared “and disseminated to Secret Service. !4 As » 2,0 tou ee oF G fla cf chk oe iy jb? om © a le qe be 4 te whe a a ys § EB ate initial information is received, they should be included in the first letterhead memorandum prepared in the matter. ‘ ae “ wee Reames 4? 4, at ak wi Nye { he t S : } Pp aftacca ag 1 . t hel can Ue 4 4 4 ' 1 i ‘ 2 4 ( hoe : i i t ) ’ i ag * Sone Wet et htt et Sayege aot | 5
cy ait hay In evaluating this type of care, carefully consider the nature and activities of the front organization in dehalf of the Communist Party or other revolutionary organisations throughout the country or in a cartain ares, c. Special training. in a subversive movement , (1. Training in the Leniu School or in a subversive movement abroad (2 Leadership training in one of the basic rovolutionary organizax tions mentioned above 7 d. Military service (2) Service in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Members ship in one of the basic revolutionary organiz. “ions is not’2 prerequisite to initiating investigations in this category. (2) Service in the military forces of any country, including the - . U. S. armed forces or the Office of Stratefic Services whenever a there is an allegation that an individual has been a member of ; one of the basic revolutionary organizations at any time - “e. Employment in key facilities ’ ‘ Investigate the activities of any individual employed in or having access to a key facility who is alleged to have been at. any time in . the past a member of any bas sic revolutionary organization or against vee . . . Whom sufficient other subversive information is. known. ff. Otner individuals with revolutionary beliefs Individuals who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, are likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare. in basic revolutionary or front groups is not a vrerequisite to initiating investigations of this type. Use sound judgment and dis-— cretion in this evaluation, Falling within the above category are members of the Nation of Ts! When it is known or becomes known that this organization is active. oo the field office territory, ® security—type investigation of ail. 7 ie _ “individuals who are reported to be (1) functionaries or leaders of the Nation of Islam, or (2) active participants carrying out fanatical -and disloyal aims of ‘the organization should be initiated. tions should not be initiated based on mere membership alone, During: the course of security investigations of individuals af with the Nation of Islam, be alert’ for any information indicati a n oy I pte dy 2 ot ae _ Possible violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948. nation, ae The above standards for institutions of investigations of individuals _ are not to be interpreted as all-inclusive. Where there is doubt an individual may be a current threat to the internal security of the the question should be resolved in the interest of security : and investigation con nducted. from os, MW 55072 Docld: 32989529 Page 537 to _ The categories specified as a through f above: ane . to be. Gisting guished nN Membership or affi liation- eH Investiga- RUHR I dort whe testa ls dee? aes wea a Me, tS Bt bike 4 Cae Meg Wo ¥ i >, oh £ f 4 MLE ret 2 a Ri PS be Pea othe, Vhs a raion IT, by L
87D Se API NW 35072 sxc 7. SECU, “LY INVESTIGATIONS r ) - . . . the oriteria io pevern the addition of subjcets to an. retention of sub~ . jects in the scov..ty index, set out in 87D 7u (3). iavestigation should be undertaken whe cases fall within the preceding categories, even though f under existing criteria the subjects woud not be placed ia the security index on the information available. ‘The cases should thereafter be ' investigated actively to determine the scope of subversive activities in which the subjccts have been engaged and to fully develop ail aspdeots of the cases in order that a determination can be made with respect to security index status, a rer Complaints alleging subversive activities of individuals which are received from anonymous sources should not be disregarded provided the allegations are sufficiently specific and of sufficient weight to warraat investigation, : Such allegations should receive same consideration as if the identity of . - the source was known, Do not open cases for investigation based on non’ . specific or vague allegations which do not fall within the standerds for * opening investigations. - ; _ . - . . , - . 3 Do not institute investigations because of membership in organizations which. : do not advocate the use of force to bring about changes in the existing’ . Goverment, €.8., the Socialist Party, the Socialist Labor Party, the _ “ Independent Workers of the World’ and the’ Independence Party of Puerto : nn “. Rico (Partido Independentista Puertorriqueno), etc. . : £ Security-type cases aleeady existent must be continually and carefully * evaluated to determine that we are fulfilling -our responsibilities in a the internal security field. Subversive information received regarding . any individual should be channelized to the jindividual's main file. If -? no main file exists, one should be opened. Cases not warranting further a investigative action should be promptly closed and should not be permitted to continuo endlessly without a definite objective. a Restrictions upon investigations of individuals 2, Investigations of and interviews with individuals cotnected with . institutions of learning . a { a (1) Subjects connectéd with institutions of learning < The following restrictions apply to employees and students: of , colleges, universities, and elementary and secondary | schools 3 supported. by private or public funds, Students and employees * of schools, such as the Jefferson School ef Social Scien nce, the 2 California Labor’ School, and others founded by or supported by 2 revolutionary groups, ao.not come within the meaning of these aan Sa instructions, . ; , y (a). Prior Bureau authority to institute investigation & Ie Faculty members  e " Bureau authority is necessary prior. to initiating ‘a . . security. investigation of a faculty member. . ey Ii, ‘Students and nonacademic employees ns Bureau authority is not needed prior to initiating 3 ° a security, investigation of a student or nonacademic = employee provided no unusual circumstances exist which would require advice from the. Bureau prior to initiating the investigation, Each SAC must see that thére is a - _ sound basis for initiating security investigations of . such individuals, . - IIIe Requests for Bureau authority When requesting Bureau authority to conduct a security| “investigation of an individual connected with an institution of Jearning, the letter should set forth the identity of the subject, his position, and the basis for the investixzation, - - “ A Boold:32989599 Page 538 (24 ; . - RAw137-67