a Sal 5 ‘ = ~ 9 . Ciassifleatien; Se REE (is form is fe be used for aotanial eatenatel fem ClA—<entrelled documents.) *The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered . by the Agency related to its investigation of possible. Cuban involvement in the assassination: Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection. Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated ~— looking at it from my point of view. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti- Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President? Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side. The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic) _....~ within -- it was an-enigma at the time. They were just” getting started. This was WH's area. This was. Win Scott's area of proficiency. So the defectors had only _ ~begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban defectors. So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time. My The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated? Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate. oe 72 gm we ae Grssstisatigns——___ 900018 . Classified by derivation: Classified by derivation: | WOR © ~wBesiagit, é is P eh ‘ "« cee ae
2 <ctte, trea ao - 9 Ciassi#leation; (Tis form ig te be used for matacicl extenctad wem ClA=<entrelled documents) *The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered by the Agency related to its investigation of possible. Cuban involvement in the assassination: . Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection. - Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated -~ looking at it from my point of view. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti- Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President? Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have- simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side. a The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic) ..- - within -- it was an-enigma at the time. They were just” getting started. This was WH's area. This was, Win’ Scott's area of proficiency. So the defectors had’ only _ ~begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban ( defectors. , So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time. oy . ° The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated? Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate. e727 ee pe pet Sa if * a 900618 Classified by derivation: Classified by derivation: Gigsstisstion: \yoraem ve pee “UE é ae : a 2 Pr eh , {
vata aenecoy yas uO53 - 1 Classified by derivation: Elassifisation: This form is te be used. for motesial exteested m €lA=conirelled documents) Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the Agency provide -- Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly didn't do it. Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me? Mr. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R & A. Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not -- Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all. This was something left to the people who were concerned specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation. Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier -we established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information pertinent to the assassination was to go through your office, correct? Mr. Rocca. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent to the assassination went through your office, I take (it) you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would be relevant for the Warren Commission to see. SBR, Is that correct? Mr. Rocca. Well -~ ‘ Mm. : Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew? . Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes. = Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the - position, it would seem, to know what information was being generated in the field that was going to the Warren Commission. Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis. and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (did). _ Glassificatisn: SERRET gpa Classified by derivation: _
, oO - 9¢ = Ciessificatien: (itis form is te be used for material sxteactad €\A==contrelled decuments,) Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans. Sn ee te ay ee ete _ Mr. Goldsmith: “tet's go off the record. \ (Discussion off the record.) geen : ee fost mony on . veep once reve Tener ees iw ar Tt eam TTS “~Mr..Goldsmith. Let's continue. _, Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this. This was the great concern. Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. There are different -- Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WH: do you have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in this kind of thing. There was extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised to try to clarify that side. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility of an assassination plot by Castro against the President was adequately investigated? . (Pause) Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hind- WHat. ERED. URS, sight, I could say probably not. But at the time i seems, , to me that they gave due attention to it -- within the information that I had at my disposal. Le ; . & **In fact, BHO spent 2 years, 8 months in the. Soviet Union 8 October 1959 - June 1962 & an ase - ; Classified by derivation: RAGS 0433 Classified by derivation:
Cessification: —_—S==22=— fi farm ig t8 be used for matetigl sxtactad rom Cla=eenirelled decuments) Fy) because the people he was in touch with in (oe Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB people. They were under consular cover and obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular job in those earlier contacts. (Ibid., p. 33) However, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects of the CIA investigation were not ignored "because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans." (Ibid., p. 44) Mr. Helms also testified that the possibility of Cuban involvement in President Kennedy's assassination was a source of deep concern within the Agency. (Exec. Session Testimony of R. Helms, 8/9/78, p. 21) Nevertheless, Mr. Helms stated that development of informa- tion pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participati@n * in the assassination was very difficult to-obtain. (Ibid., p. 138) Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis that during the second phase of the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its resources Oe bai tna Bassible Soviet influence on 0 Q 9 G2 3 3 . — derivation: — Elassified y sci ivation: NMR RRO ee: 4 Z wef abe a. rai, EE. EER a Sieur