157-10014-10102 JFK Assassination System Date: FT2015 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY:  SSCIA ° * RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10102 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-08 Document Information ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: WILLIAM HARVEY DATE: 00/00/1975 PAGES: 37 SUBJECTS : AMLASH HARVEY, WILLIAM CIA ASSASSINATIONS DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: = Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/21/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : ~ COMMENTS : CCBOX 450 v9.4 ] HW 50955 DBocld:327423490 Page 1
Date Page 8/06/95 0 ~1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10102 . RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEER AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-08 : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : ‘ TO 3 TITLE : WILLIAM HARVEY DATE : 00/00/75 PAGES : 37 SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM CIA AMLASH ASSASSINATIONS DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 450 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBDocld:327423490 Page ?
1940-47 1947 1948 1952 1959 1961 February (approx. ) Early. Feb. Mid-April OP SECRET ‘WILLIAM HARVEY Short Chronology* Counterespionage work as FBl agent Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations ‘(which became DDP) Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation) Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries) , _BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey claims Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. Bissell and Edwards separately brief Harvey on the Phase I assassina-— tion plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. [In early February Edwards had the POISON PILLS tested; in late February~early March, the pills were sent into = Cuba by O'Connell through Roselli. ] HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. According to Dr. GUNN (Office of Medical Services), HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor Committee. EDWARDS halts or suspends PHASE I. ba Most of the reference to Cuba or Executive Action came - f¥om the 1967 IG Report. . cz HW 50955 Docld’324273490.
1961 (cont'd) November 15 November 29 1962 February 7 February 9 April 8-9 April 10-14 ' April 18-19 April 21 Late April April . ip WW 50955 Docld?32423490 Page 5 TOP SECRET Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. MC CONE-replaces Allen Dulles as DCI EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute . the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle , ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey _ check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged. Harvey begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase ITI. Harvey says he took over an "ongoing operation" from O'Connell. HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the “tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. Harvey told Edwards that Roselli_ would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/75.)
HW 450955 1962 (cont'd) Throughout May May 7 May 14 June June 21 August 10 August 13 August 14 ‘September October 1963 February Docld ?32423490 TOP SECRET - Intense contact. between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented vy Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. DONOVAN negotiates for return of Bay of Pigs prisoners. ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY said that McNAMARA raised the subject of assassinations at this meeting. General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes planning for splitting the regime, including liquida- tion of leaders" HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND. to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on McNamara's discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10. Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously ’ with VARONA. Page 6
HW 450955 1963 (cont'd) June August 16 October Docidt 32423490 TOP VGECRET HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call _ McCONE. Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends McCONE the Edwards memo of $/14/62 of the RFK briefing. CIA coordination with AMLASH assassination plotting begins. Page 7
~QOP SECRET WILLIAM HARVEY Short Chronology* Biographical 1940-47 ae | Counterespionage work as FBI agent | 1947 | _ Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch 1948 Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP) 1952 Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation) 1959 | Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries) 1960 August 16 7 DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives pox of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21) 1961 Late January EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of (approx. ) POISON PILLS. (2h) February -BISSELL (DOP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE (approx. ) - ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's . notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is priefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37) HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation. against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38) - . Edwards has the POLSON PILLS tested. (25) bad Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA. HW 50955 Docld?32423490 Fage 3
HY 509455 1961 (cont'd) Early Feb. Late Feb. March-Early April Mid-April November 15 November 29 1962 February February 7 February 19 April 8-9 April 14 April 18-19 Docld?’32473490 Fage 3 TOP SECRET According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. (27) — Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27) O'CONNELL. gives pills and money to ROBELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32) Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints ‘Taylor Committee. Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39) - MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI ‘EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40) EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60) _ HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38) HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with’ HELMS before the meeting is _arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to brief MG CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41) HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46) Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46) €s,
1962 (cont'd) April 21 Late April Throughout May May 7 May 14 June 21_ August 10 August 13 TOP SECRET HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and (way as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. 7-8 HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking Lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50) Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. (50) EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)# ‘Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65 HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the “tacit approval” of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42) ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men . to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51) Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the - subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans. General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes ‘planning for "splitting the regime, including ligquida- ~ tion of leaders" * RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a) 8 HW 50955 Docld?32423490 Page 10
HY SO955 1962 (cont'd) August 14 September October 1963 February June August 16 \ eo Docla?32423490 Page it TOP SECRET HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to © excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes” on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10. Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51) ‘CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52) HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears ars that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (5h) Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same | day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards. memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)
aERV IEW AND ficitt TING SUMMARY Page 2 of FILE: In 1959 Harvey came back to head Division D of the Foreign Intelligence Staff, which is the unit basically in See FEAT ESS EE , charge of obtaining COMINT intelligence and supporting ' operations related to that field, particularly surreptitiou entries, interception of couriers and other sensitive metho S “of obtaining cryptological information. During all of this period he had many occasions to work directly with Mr. Helms and had a close working rela- tionship with him. | . The beginning of 1961, he was asked by Mr. Bissell to explore the possibilities of setting up a "executive action capability” within CIA. In the Fall he was asked by Mr. Bissell to turn his attention with regard to the general area of executive action to the specific target of Castro and, particularly, to take over one ongoing operation from the Office of Security: Shortly thereafter, but as a distintt matter, Mr. Helms (who was clearly slated to take over DDP, even while Mr. Bissell was still its nominal head) asked “Harvey to set up Task Force W, to be the new working group on Cuban matters. [These items are a, el in more de- tail later on.] UT pn~ Login | “Narvey stayed as head of Task Force W until the spring of 1963,at which point he turned it over to Desmond Fitz- gerald, served about a month on TDY in Rome, and then in June formally took over as Station Chief in Rome. He returndd to Langley in 1966, and then took a special assignment to suyvey the vulnerability of CIA installations to “technical coverage. ahi war HW 50955 Docld:32423490 Page 12
| RW with the Agency and is presently in. private life. to my interviewing him out. there as a prelude to his testimo death of Lumumba. I asked what he meant by credible. evidenc ———— 50955 Docld:32423490 Page 13 _ALERVIEW AND. MERLING SUMMARY. Page In December 1967 he ceased his full time relationship with. the Agency. He continued for a few months to wrap things up and to consult. Since then, however, he has no connection [As an aside for those who do not know, the reason his appearance here has been so delayed .is that when I first called him several weeks ago, he indicated that his wife was i11 and might have to go into the hospital and that he had other serious personal commitments. We had further conversa - tions about his trying to arrange at some point to come in . when he informed me that his mother was gravely ill. We had scheduled a visit by myself out to Indianapolis last week, but his mother passed away. Although he still had personal commitments and obligations in Indianapolis this week as a result, which prevented his coming to ‘Washington, he consente before the Committee next Wednesday. | LUMUMBA I first explored the events related by Mr. O'Donnell in 1960, and Mr. “Harvey's knowledge generally about the Congo and the death of Lumumba. He emphasized that he had known of no credible evidence of CIA involvement with the actual FEeny, and what “looser “Vevidence he had ,and he indicated that he was: referring to various allegations and news stories he was aware of. FILE:
bee stored AWERVIEW AND’ MEETING SUMMARY page ** of He is not sure whether he might not have been in Ger- | pop; many on a special assignment at the time O'Donnell actually spoke to Bissell about going to the Congo. However, he is ro quite certain that both O'Donnell and Bissell mentioned it to him thereafter. He believes O'Donnell mentioned it to him shortly. thereafter and it might have been very close in time. to the conversation with Bissell. His best recollec- tion is that, as” O'Donnell ‘recounted the meeting with ‘Bissell, Bissell. was clearly requesting him to. go on a ‘definite mis - sion to try to assassinate Lumumba. O'Donnell told Harvey | how vigorously he had objected. and also related that “he had. hee Penn Ss ote a as) does not “recall whether O'Donnell said he had gone to see Gottlieb. a | Thereafter, perhaps in the course of the initial request to set up ZRRIFLE, or perhaps at a different time, Harvey clearly recalls that Bissell also told him about the. inci-: dent, and again his impression is that Bissell recounted a that he had requested O'Donnell to.undertake a specific, mission. At this point we talked; however, about the fact that .there would always be the possibility of a no/ go fail- safe ce type proposition, even if a specific mission was involved . fiwecky bi Perv e ue as distinct from theoretical exploration. (DID WE EVER ASK derng eve Wer BISSELL IF HE HAD OBTAINED HIGHER: AUTHORITY FROM ANYONE oR | {PY Freak eb DISCUSSED WITH ANYONE ABOVE HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE LEVEL OR THE pclI THE MISSION HE © ‘PROPOSED TO 0" DONNELL?) HW 50955 Docld:32423490 Page 14
HW 50955 DocId: 324273490 Page i5 whl fo, ne) pug Bea er a Teds LUSRVIEW AND MEBTING SUMMARY ~ Page 5, of nee Harvey is not sure how much he knew of QJWIN's mission to the Congo for O'Donnell, although he thinks that he may. well have signed some of the cables to Leopoldville, since il fas in Staff | D/fand therefore: both were working under Harvey at the time that Silver was lending QJWIN to O'Donnejll © for the Congo mission.) In any event, Silver briefed Harvey about it later when they were discussion WIN as a possible _ ZRRIFLE asset. Harvey does not recall: anything about the WIROGUE; does not recall anything about ROGUE asking ‘WIN | to participate in an executiion_squad, nor does he recall Conner yx anyone about viruses To summarize at the outset, the following is the thrus ever having.been told by getting to the Congo. ZRRIFLE of what Harvey would testify to regarding QJWIN/ZRRIFLE: ‘Harvey regarded ZRRIFLE as the overall project crypt.,under which QUWIN as an asset operation was going forward. He. had discussed with Silver. the general assignment of exploring - executive action capability, and the possibility that eithef QJWIN or ‘that other criminals whom WIN helped to spot might be assets. He never did more than review some of them as “possibilities in the course of his taking an inventory. - However, he did not use WIN or anyone WIN spotted in con- nection with any assassination operations against Castro or otherwise, nor did he even discuss the concept with any of them. He did not stockpile any materials or discuss pre liminary targets or make plans or evaluations premised on particular tentative targets. Essentially, he c¢ assed 7 FAN arene
HW 50955 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY _ ar ae the technological, human asset, and organizational poten- tials in being,or which might be organized, under the cland- estine services, and came up with a pessimistic report to Helms and Bissell that the possibilities of effective dis- creet action were slim. He also concluded that it was "ridiculous" to try and set up a general reserve capability in being, ani counselled that the one sure way to do it, or at least the only one close to having. a chance at secure success, was to simply appoint a single senior officer to do everything: to -run. the operation, kill the person, bury the body, and tell no one. In regard to Castro, he had used th ZRRIFLE project. as the administrative hook for his billing and so forth, and said that at some times there were mix- ups in terms of the financing offices » SO that QUWIN/ZRRIFL might be used. He did not completely explain why on some of his own bills ha seems to have indicated QUWIN/ ZRRIFLE, but we did not have time to pursue this at greater length, whether he would regard this as his own slip or indicate that to some extent. they were written up by others the bottom line. is that he would swear that QJWIN was never}. aed involved in.an yi ro operation - nor, for example, ever in the United States, although there is a plane trip ticket from Miami to Chicago which is charged to NQJWIN/ ZRRIFLE" (Harvey says it was a plane trip of Roselli! ‘Ss, which was the only thing he ever paid for of Roselli' s.) ed J ore ert oes €s J 4 13 & Bee ore rere) DocId: 32493490 Page 16 FILE:
HW 30955 Docld: 32425490 Page ue freies , “In early 1961 Bissell asked Harvey to explore an executive action capability. Harvey confirmed and said he firmly recalls that Bissell on at least two occasions indi-|. cated to Harvey that he, Bissell, had been repeatedly im- portuned by the White House to explore such a capability. The first time Bissell spoke to him, Harvey thinks, was early on ,and at least one other time occurred which was whe Bissell spoke to him about it, 7 definitely said he had pe BE ees Sh SNE ea cea ane mre been. urged by the White House, but Harvey does not recall ent A TS re eam ae Smetana _whether he mentioned anyone at the White House. Harvey ' thinks that if Bissell had said that he had been directly asked by the President, then Harvey wuld have remembered it even today. His impression is that the implication in _Bissell's conversation with Harvey was that the White House had initiated it; but he said that he couldn't be sure. whether Bissell had said the White louse wanted it set up to be ready. in being or whether the White House wanted the possibility explored. Harvey elaborated that the White Hous might say "create such a capability" ,» or might say "deter-- mine whether it would be a good idea to set up such a capability" or might say "see if it would be possible. to set up such a capability." | | - Harvey is fairly certain that Bissell did not indicate | _whether Dulles knew about this White House request, nor could Harvey be sure whether Bissell had indicated whether it was someone in the Kennedy White House or the Eisenhower CLPOET PILE:
1. JGRVIEW AND MGRIENG SUMMARY Page 8. of FILE: White House who had made the request. Again, he has the impression, although he can remember nothing express, that at the time he received the distinct impression Bissell's conversation at the White House had only been a short time prior to his conversation with Harvey. ' When pressed, he to the Eisenhower White House as having pressured Bissell to set up an exécutive action capability.) On the other hand, he has the strong impression that the second time he was told by Bissell, i.e., in the fall, Bissell again implied that the renewed pressures had been recent, thereby strong] suggesting that, at least at that point it was the Kennedy White House which was: involved. | | Bissell asked him to explore the current clandestine “services capability to make recommendations on how such an operation should be set up. He does not recall Bissell men tioning Castro, Lumumba or Trujillo, although it is possibl that it was at that time that Bissell told Harvey about his approach: to O'Donnell (and as noted above, Harvey definitel remembers that, at some point ,Bissel1 did do that). But Harvey does not preclude the possibility that there was a general discussion of the kinds of situations when that capability might be useful to have, and that this could hav HW 50955 DoclId:32423490 - Page 18
Lo ARVIEW AND MENTING SUMMARY a: ‘ ‘ 1 hea. Lay ae! Pn Se included discussions of Trujillo, Castro and Lumumba... He simply does not remember and does not think they discussed the project in terms of likely specific targets. “Either at that first meeting with Bissell or shortly thereafter, Harvey learned that Arnold Silver and Sidney Gottlieb had been "cut in" by Bissell on Bissell's interest in executive action capability. “Harvey thought this was unfortunate, but it was done. Harvey also thought Bissell should have known better than to discuss Lumumba with O'Donnell, although Harvey understands and fully respects” O'Donnell's. moral scruples against being involved. Also, shortly after being asked to set up executive action capability, Harvey learned. about the Cuban operation involving the Office of Security and understood. that both J.C. King and J. Esterline were witting, as well as O'Conne}1 and Edwards. Harvey is not sure why Bissell would have told Silver about the executive action project. But he has a vague recollection that at some point Bissell indicated to sumably Bissell knew about QUWIN, perhaps from O'Donnell's use of him in the Congo.) _ Tiver, in any event, knew: (1) that Bissell was interested in setting up an executive action capability, “and (2) that Bissell had spoken to Harvey about it. There- after he and Silver spoke about it (see discussion of notes HW 50955 Docld: 32423490 Page i9
Ae al in the file, infra. da Silver’ Ss relationship to the entire PILE: project was _Teally threefold: (1) he was actively running | QJWIN the asset, (2) QJWIN was spotting people whom | Harvey assumes Arnold was considering both for normal Division D type surreptitious entry and code-stealing, and executive action capability, and (3) Silver did explore the general concept involved for setting up such capability with Harvey We next spoke about the portion of the report suggest- ing that Harvey had been briefed about the technical de:. velopments. of capabilities under the Roselli plot. Harvey | said that he does not recall the name and is fairly certain he never met or dealt with Dr. Treichler, the person who actually made the pills in the TSD. He did know both Sid -Gottlieb and "Manny" Gunn fairly well. He said that in terms of his general professional duties as a Station Chief and counterespionage expert against the Soviets, he had made it a point of keeping fairly current in background knowledge on the enemy! Ss capabilities for assassination. » He had therefore discussed the latest state of the art with the Office of Medical Services (where Gunn was) and TSD | .@here Gottlieb was). He said he had also discussed with those offices medical and other scientific aspects of interrogation techniques (e.g. truth serum) and control “techniques (e. g. _post- hypnotic suggestion for controlling agents). He had had general discussions, therefore, with both Gunn and Gottlieb. However, he does seem to recall a discussion of specific techniques with Gunn at one point, although he is not positive this was after he had been HW 50955 Docld:324273490 Page 20.
noe sr Tne a mT a _VENVIEW AND MERTING SUMMAR Page &/ of assigned the ZRRIELE task by. Bissell. In any event, he can of es remember asking Gunn to brief Gottlieb, as is suggested in the IG Report. | | | We next discussed the notes in the ZRRIELE file. (The xerox of those notes sent us by’CIA is in part illegible. ‘I returned and took down completely that set of notes which specifically ‘discusses the executive action capability and. which is the set Harvey identified as his. “Appended here- to | . oo are’ my notes, but_if Harvey is goin to be questioned about then we would really have to ask CIA for the file copy before next Wednesday. } a - Se The reference to Notes hereafter refers to a package of three sets of notes which + we had xeroxed by the Agency. The first two or three pages which are not in Harvey's handwriting appear to be a draft of what would be the basic project outline used as a cover for the ZRRIFLE project. It does discuss QJWIN as the asset and does indicate that he will be used to spot other criminals for sensitive pro- “jects. But unlike the subsequent notes, it does not discus issues regarding the setting up of an assassination capa- - bility. ‘The next set of notes which are in large writing on pages covered with various doodles are those identified tJ Harvey as his. ‘From looking at them, he judged that they wer notes based on two successive conversations. First, with- Sidney Gottlieb on the 25th of January, 1961 and then on the 26th of January with Arnold Silver. Harvey concluded that the first conversation with Gottlieb ranged across a HW 50955 Docld: 39423490
Page naa JARV IEW AND hls lL y Sure variety of activities which fell within the framework of — PILE: Gottlieb's position at TSD. (Harvey speculated Gottlieb had just, become Acting Director or taken over some other high post in TsD,) His conclusion in this regard is based in | part on references in that first section of his notes- to items which he recalls and which he wuld swear have nothing to do with ZRRIFLE. For: example, there is a dis- cussion of "GE: Basic Sounds Project"translation machine" "thenomena't and "(v with C.B. [then something illegible])". Below that appears “commint gear" and under that is "Anes-_ thesia."' Harvey said that there was a project to develop a new kind of translating machine and also one to translate from the printed word and his parenthetical checkmark is his way of signifying that he wanted to check with "C.B." who was someone he brought. into the Agency and whom he regarded as the best. man in the intelligence community on . 2.84 bs Cadtgy Boy," Re wlele haicts COMINT intelligence, Frank Rowlett, » whom he said had ab- aime). solutely nothing to do with ZRRIFLE. | Above the remarks just noted in the Notes was the phrage. "Eramework. of Sid's job," and under that "ELINT R&D--memo Ledford." Again, Harvey identified this as Dick Ledford, ‘who was an ELINT specialist. with the Agency. ‘The first part of the Notes of the 25th/1 meeting with Sidney Gottlieb is headed "Executive Action." Harvey could not recall what he meant by the phrase "the magic button". but said that he assumed this was a euphemism either he or HW 50955 DocId:32423490 Page 22
NEERVIEW AND megving sucky’ rege [3-of Gottlieb used. for whatever mechanism was eventually chosen. He could not understand the reference to the narcotics BIL: bureau, except that if Gottlieb or he at that point knew about QUWIN they might have been aware of lis initial in- volvement with American intelligence agencies ‘in a narcotic enforcement operation. ~The reference to "RIS 201 cover caution" meant that- if there was an attempt to get a fake 201 file as cover involving the person. allegedly in some operation relevant to the Russian intelligence service, thi had to be done with great caution. Harvey speculated that ‘the word "bankruptcy" referred to the same considerations discussed below -- that there was a. bankruptcy of policy on the part of the CIA or USA if there had to be a resort to assassination. (This might frame an interesting general policy question for Harvey.) | Harvey did not know what "no star" meant. I asked him if that might refer to the star file system, and he said th when he was in the Agency he didn! t know about one or does not recall one now. He thinks the reference to "eyes . _ Jim A. -- contradistinct from U-2" may, have meant that the check of any assets to be used through the cI Division, a normal operating technique, in ‘this case should be done on an "eyes only" basis. through Angleton, He also thought the reference to the U-2— might mean that unlike that operation, | this project should not be fun on such a compartmented basi that any assets to be used were not checked with CI(so that the counterespionage protective resources of the Agency were utilized.) Harvey thinks that the phrase "not a TSD HW 50955 Docld: 32423490 Page 23
JERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY. . Pee 14. of problem” probably meant that he was saying that TSD as a > WILES unit should not be involved in this project, even if some- one like Gottlieb and one or two trusted people were work- ing on. it for him, | | “Harvey said the. phrase “apply brakes" meant that one should be able to have a fail- safe. mechanism if the situa- tion changed, or’ that. it might, have referred to the fact tha one shouldn' t jump into ‘this kind of thing too precipitously, He said that the phrase "last resort. . - beyond last re- sort and a confession of weakness" meant just what it said -- that this w was a last resort and a profession of weakness or bankruptcy of U.S. policy. He was not sure why there was a.reference to "ElBenefactor" but said that this might mean they had discussed situations where such a capability might be used. (It should be noted at this point, however, that later on Harvey said he would swear that-he never had anything to do with Trujillo, did not particularly examine the possibilities of peculiar needs ‘of such an operation, and has no first hand knowledge of any involvement we may — have had in that area.) Finally, - he said the phrase "assumptions . . : examples of three single 'wrong!,," would seem to suggest that several examples were discussed (possibly including Trujillo. as one) and that Harvey though that assumptions: made in regard to- each case by Gottlieb or someone else were erroneous. om ti iP § ES Z ne may ma] HW 50955 DoclTd: 324739490 Page 74
| yp Sesh | JWERVIEW AND MESLING SUZ anny! ee Page 15 ,0f [By the way, I asked Harvey if 'ZRACORN' and 'ZRRAG- FILE: TIME" were crypts for projects or were sensitivity indicatoks, routing labels, or other control, indicators. He said he could not recall the projects, but thought ‘they would have been projects and not indicators. He said, however, they might -have been generic labels for a category of projects and not referring to a specific project. This possibly contrasts with what the [G's office told David Aaron and myself, namely, that they were some sort of sensitivity and control indicators. We can pursue this. The second part of the two sheets of Harvey’ Ss notes” “which he said were from a conversation with Silver are fair ly self explanatory. The notes on the right hand side- "Max 2/3 to. B-WKH-AS-Sid-resev-substitute-[illegible]" we did not discuss, but I strongly presume this means a maximum of two or three persons with Bissell, Harvey and Silver already involved, the possibility of Gottlieb being “included, but with some reservations as a member of the group. | Harvey and I aid discuss item 8, which refers to a principal agent, the possibility of using QUWIN, and then says "AF proj. draft ~~ LCH -- tested 1500 from NB -- mask spot [spat?] rqm still AF project. {name illegible]." Harvey said the initials probably did refer to-Lester Heuck, but since he had never “discussed ZRRIFLE with Houck at that tim or later, he assumes ‘that this referred to the fact ‘that oxy & HW: 50955 Docld: 32423490 Page 25
Heuck might have been familiar with QUWIN's role in Africa) yp; _ We also discussed item 12 which refers to a cover file created to prove RIS [illegible] and point 13 which notes that there was a danger of RIS counteraction if we tried to put the blame on tle Russians. I did not discuss with Harvey all of the consideration “listed on the two pages of notes which appear immediately after his in the file. His best ‘guess was that they were. notes prepared by Arnold Silver, either as a result of the conversation between Silver and Harvey or simply based. on Silver's preparing a paper at Harvey's request after they had talked. Harvey said, however, he ‘thought he recognized}, some of the concepts expressed as his own. I did ask him about the reference to “our own experience (Bangkok and effect on pop)", After some thought, he said it. might have referred to some incident in Thailand, but he could not remember it. I asked him if he remembered the Killim case; it refreshed his recollection. He said he had heard about it; he did not know any of the ‘details but thought that! s probably what the reference was to. I also asked him what he thought. the first sentence of point number three in this WW 50955 Docld:32423490 Page 26 Page 16: of
| UERVIEW AND Mai ING SUMMARY 2 a ue Set of notes meant: "Maximum security, KUBARK only PILE: (e.g. what does Siragusa now know?)'! He said that since. the first part means’ it obviously should be handled within CIA, the question was what Siragusa, a leading BNDD man who often worked with the CIA, knew, possibly about QIWIN if he were to be an asset(because of WIN's earlier work on narcotics cases, supra. ) We then discussed the last sentenc of point three which is a question: “DCI officially advised? Harvey said this would have been a legitimate policy point,at least to raise for consideration. In effect, it was extending the notion of plausible deniability down one level to protect the DCL in case there was a flap. He does not recall any decisions on this point, but simply that it was a policy issue. to be laid on the table.. (Compare his ‘arguments in regard to why McCone might not have been _ apprised of the Phase II operation.) HW 50955 Docld: 32423490 Page 27
“At this point Harvey reviewed the rest of the file — memos I had brought, “With regard to the accounting againpt QUWIN/ZRRIFLE for some. of the activities he engaged in with Roselli, he. suggested that. he always thought of ZRRIFLE as the overarching crypt within which were the QUWIN operation and the ZRRIFLE:* ° . | exploration of executive action He said that he used QJWIN/ZRRIFLE sometimes in connection with the Roselli activities, but only. after there had been sgn Initial wixup by the finance section which’ resulted’ in his general ZRRIFLE activities and QJWIN operation being “slugged the same combined crypt of QJWIN/ZRRIELE. With regard to a note that refened to | . Harvey. did not know why his name was on notes in the QJWIN file, except that he was a highly talented narcotics: expert who worked both in the Justice ‘Department and the CIA and who might have been involved in the evaluating of or check- ing on potential assets whom QJWIN had spotted in Italy. (The file does reveal that QUWIN spotted assets in Italy. ) With regard to the small note in the file that simply says "John Ralston ~~ John Roselli -- William Walker." HW 450955 - DocId: 32423490 Page 26
Harvey said that that was a note he left for Helms when he | pour: went to’ Rome so that Nelms would be alert if anything came. in either for himself (he was William Walker) or for Rosellf or relating to Roselli (tho was "'Ralston"'). Harvey again summarized ZRRIFLE as follows: (1) A search for what assets and capabilities might be available; (2) No recruitment of anyone in general or for specific targets; (3) no preliminary targetting of any victims, even in a general way; (4) no stockpiling of lethal equipment or "nerchandise". | , | He said that he kept both Helms and Bissell generally _ informed of his progress. He had briefed Helms on the assignment shortly after being given it by Bissell because Helms, 2s ‘number 2 in DDP, was too Likely to see something something coming in or to be working on an independent pro- ject in the same area or related with someone else, and he thought it was important that Helms knew generally what Harvey was working on and that he had an assignment to do it from Bissell. ; | | . | Bissell. did not talk too much about why. Edwards was in charge of Phase I of the mob operation. Harvey thinks that Bissell may have indicated . some question about whether they should have gotten into it with Edwards and O'Connell. | | Before describing Bissell's instructions to Harvey in . November to turn ZRRIFLE to Castro, llarvey jumped ahead and we discussed the setup of Task Force We He made clear that ra he was instructed to do this by Helms, not Bissell. It was HW 50955 DocTd:327473490 Page 29
2% be rad clear Bissell was on his way out. Helms asked Harvey to FILE: do it. As his condition,Harvey got a promise that he could put in totally fresh people and not take anyone from the old ‘Latin American division, which did not please then. ‘this setup of Task Force W was something that he undertook in December. earlier, probably in November, Bisse 1 had suggested he direct his attention regarding executive action capability to Castro, and specifically asked him to take over the Office of Security operation. Warvey PRE _ emphasized that the destruction of Castro was the top priority ‘Seems en nesta eee caer item fa.the Kennedy administration in foreign affairs at ° that time. They wanted him overthrown at all costs, on the| one hand, but on the other hand, insisted that it be done by clandestine weansy Haxvey said he told his superiow tha he. could produce a provisional government for a few days on the island which could ask for help, but that was really all that he could guarantee and that then the U.S. would have to send in assistance -- which the Kennedys were un- willing to do. As a result, he says, there was a great sense of frustration and an effort to try to comply with — Kennedy's wishes to topple the regime clandestinely. He says that. Bissell reiterated.at that time the statement that he was being prodded by the White House to explore the questions of executive action capability. (It is not clear from my notes whether Harvey was Saying that this time Bissell said the push from the White House was for executiv action capability against Castro, or still ina generas sense. Obviously, this should be. nailed down. ) ie 2 pad scl HW 50955, Docld: 32423490 Page 30
of the actual specifics of the plot, or the day by day " pursuing executive action against Castro, but not -knowing Harvey said that he recalls Edwards briefing him on Edwards' -not remember what Edwards said, or whether Edwards said HW 50955 INLERVIEW AND MEBTING SUMMARY Fege 19 of When I asked Harvey whether it was en all Bissell had said in the fall was that the Kennedys wanted to topple Castro's government, Harvey said, "No." Bissell clearly said that the White House had reiterated its interest in executive action (i.e. assassination) capability. We. | discussed whether it was not inconsistent or at least incongruous for the White House to ask for a general capa- bility to be explored, if the President in fact knew of the ongoing Maheu-Roselli plot. Harvey said that if: the White House had. authorized the go-ahead for Phase I initially it would not have been good form for Dulles to have told them account of its going forward. Therefore, he said, it was possible the White House merely knew they had approved CIA how it. was coming ,and, therefore, in the fall. asking the’ people to pursue generally the possibility of using assassiha- tion against Castro. | | | - Harvey said shortly after Bissell had asked him to tur his attention to ‘Castro, Bissell authorized and Harvey re-. ceived a briefing from Edwards on the Phase I project. Shortly after, Harvey in turn briefed Helms in general on the projeqt. 4 later and Houston's conversations with Kennedy (RFK), But he does that Kennedy had been upset in regard to the Mafia use with Docld: 32473490 Page 31 ,
out his knowledge or the assassination effort without his. . knowledge. Harvey does remember Kennedy was angry. Nor does he recall whether Edwards. indicated they had told RFK it was a finished operation or not. oe | Harvey indicated that he had spoken with Helms prior to having Edwards introduce him to Roselli. He did not know if it was then or at a later time that he and Helms discussed not briefing McCone, but he agrees that definitely did take place. He gave a variety of reasons. The first, again, was that it did net."happen on McCone's . watch," so why tell him about a potentially messy situation or involve him in it? The second argument was that he, in fact, did not think much of the operation, was skeptical from the outset as to whether anything was really going forward in Cuba, or was just a lot of third and fourth hand “allegations of accomplishment, ' In general, thought the whole setup stank. He was taking time to sort it out and see what it really looked like before abandoning it and in the meanwhile it was going forward but did not seem worth discussing with McCone. He also mentioned the question of plausible. deniability for the DCI as a possible, why he migh have urged on Helms that McCone not be briefed. In any event, he says it was definitely Helms! decision. into Cuba in the late spring, although he again emphasized TAT NL MRR mec, . that all of the information on this project was third and ° ‘quppintettommnemamenetertracrt en eeettsti fourth hand. He recalled the van of equipment given to Verdna HW-50955 Docld:32423490 Page 32
LeRVIEW AND iE TING SUMMARY Pave _21 of as his price for involvement and that some firearms were involved, including possibly sniper-scope rifles. He also recalls a report that three men were going into Cuba later in the early SUMMET but did not associate this in his mind . with the possibility of using the pills, as distinct from the possibility of using firearms against Castro. He also | | reemphasize/ that it was taking “him a while to sort out. the project, get a feel for the © people, the credibility, the. security problems, and so forth, which is one reason. why he kept on, even though | he had low hopes for it from the outset... : with the missile crisis imminent --- and we did have advanced knowledge of at least a general military buildup -. Harvey said he was unwilling to toss away any assets that might be useful against Castro, and the plan was generally kept in operation through that time. But he said that as soon as the crisis was over, he indicated to. Roselli he wanted ‘the project to be cut off, albeit gradually so ¢s ‘not to engender hard feelings or other side effects. Shortly thereafter the plans to. end the project were cut, although the relationship continued on and was only gradual y- ended over the first part of 1963. (There are expense sheet for Miami as late as April 1963.) HW 50955 DBocld:32423490 Page 33
ATERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY V voxt we discussed. the MONGOOSE materials and partic-— FILE: ularly the August 10, 1962 Special Group Augmented meeting. Harvey remembers McNamara tossing on the table the possi- =. ; “ * (2 ec carn ART er TEES aseaneants "bility of Killing Castro -- not by way of simply underlin- | we ‘ing the futility of paramilitary plans -- but, it appeared to Harvey, as a real suggestion. McCone immediately re- sponded in the negative and Murrow then picked up the question that it shouldn’ t be discussed at the meeting. A day or so later -- but in any event prior to Lansdale's memo - McCone was chatting with Harvey and said that he had felt so strongly against McNamara! S idea that he had- called] the Secretary of Defense after the meeting to reiterate Harvey then confirmed the story in the IG Report, apparentl from himself, about MeCone's concern that he might be excom- municated. As for Lansdale, Harvey indicated . | .that he often suggested he was expressing Bobby Kennedy's views or speaking for him and that there was always some question there. (1 don't know how strongly Harvey would testify along these lines, however. He is generally very hesitant to poor-mouth anyone. ) Harvey said that he knew . of no basis for Lansdale to have originally put the refer- ence to Liquidating leaders as a study item in the memorand m which upset him so. He said that whenever Lansdale thereafter. tried to raise the subject with him he did, as the 1967 study indicates, simply turn off the discussion{ as he turned aside some suggestions for assassinations as a possibility by WW 50955 Docld: 324273490 Page 34
TERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY ap ih members of Task Force W. (that is lower level staff). FILE: With regard to Phase II, and the actual operations, ]|- | Harvey said that all the stories about Roselli being invol ed» in boat trips to Cuba and other heroics were a lot of "cra - although he is quick to defend Roselli's patriotism and his contribution as the middle man in this operation. He also disclaimed any knowledge of other plots against Castr a toe He. said that he knew nothin about plots to assassinate Castro coming out of Guantanamo any involvement of Barker, Sturgis, or any first-hand know- ledge of the Cubella plot, although he later learned of it.} Our final reprise was on the question of the general policy of the period,. ~~ He said he wanted to emphasize that ,given the Kennedys' strong commitment to getting rid of Castro and their contemplation of violent overthrow or “attack, he thinks the entire situation Could be summarized that (implicitly, even if they had not specifically auth- orized Phase I and Phase II) the - shooting of one Cuban, even Fidel, by another Cuban, was not a major change or ‘new departure in U.S. policy that would have required ‘additional approval. HW 50955 Docld:327473490 Page 35
OUR ten epee sae re ane HW 50955 BDocld: 32423490 Page 36 1 NEPEAN itt nt ites BANE GEO Y 1 imre-eh ye hee ee lilt inet . , \ SEGHET 7 eyaros Ky | re ‘14 May 1962. ¢ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SUBJECT: John Rosselli 1. In early April Mr, William Harvey asked me to arrange . a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged. _for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would | take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.- — 2. In the interim I have kept Mr. ‘Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central - Intelligence.. oe 3. On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future, shelf a Resta Director of Security
__ERVIEW AND MESTING SUMMARY _— Pye y.0f William Harvey Indianapolis, June 19, 1975 Interviewer - Burt Wides. FILE? I flew out to Indianapolis on the evening of the 18th "and interviewed Mr. Harvey from 7:30 until approximately (12°30 on the morning of the 19th. a | | We first reviewed Mr. Harvey's career outline. He was with the FBI from 1940 until 1947 and worked on German and Soviet counterespionage cases, including'‘the Elizabeth Bentley case and several ofthe major cases involving our us of Nazi agents as double agents during WWII. In 1947 he wor ed ‘briefly for the Central Intelligence Group and then its suc~ cessor, the CIA. | | | His first position with the CIA was as head of ‘the Sovie Intelligence Branch in the Soviet Union Division. This was | the unit in charge of counterintelligence against Soviet intelligence services at the inception of the CIA. Harvey was shortly thereafter given an additional hat while retaining the first position. The additional job was the coordinator for the clandestine.services on communications intelligence. In the summer of 1948 he became the Deputy Assistant Director| of the Office of Special Operations (predecessor of DDP) in charge of counterespionage. From the fall of 1952 until 1959 he was Station Chief in Berlin. ‘During the early to mid-50's he was in charge of the fainous Berlin Tunnel operation, which tunneled under the East German telephone junction points from West. Berlin. HW 50955 Docld: 3274273490 Page 37
- ek SECRET/EYES. ONLY . KO 5 ee on. MA WIE i CATS Review Staff: 75/1024 1 July 1975 Mr. Frederick A.-O. Schwarz, Jr. Room G~-308 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D. C. 20510 Dear Fritz: In response to your telephone call of 27 June 1975, I offer you the following based on my memory of certain events and the atmosphere of the times: (Please note that my records on this era are not all that precise. My memory is vivid and. may be biased. However, as a close observer, here is what I recall, for what it is _ worth.) a You should be aware that this Agency felt itself ‘to be under very strong pressure in the early 1960s to bring about change in the Cuban regime. This pressure was strongest after the Bay of Pigs incident in April 1961 and although it dissipated somewhat after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, it has never really completely disappeared. In any event, when Mr. Robert F. Kennedy accepted the proposals by General Lansdale which led to the formation of the MONGOOSE Project, it was clear to the DCI, Mr. John A. McCone, that the major tasks in. this broad covert action program would fall on CIA. McCone in turn made it clear to Agency officials that this task was very much a direct charge on the Agency. It should also be noted that from the beginning, there was little hope that the program as conceived would actually achieve its purpose which was to bring about the removal of the Castro government.and to replace it ' with one whose interests would be more compatible with ' American interests and the interests of other governments in the Western Hemisphere. William K. Harvey, who was placed in charge of the Agency's Cuban Task Force, has, as you know, a very . special type of personality. Both his manner and his . oe — Ciassifled by OO7789 ; : J Exe froin goneral ATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 11915 declassificetion cehotuia of £.0, 11652 NATION : SECRET/EYES ONLY cation echaduia of £.0 Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to ; A extn ea se eciasertied » (3} Criminal Sanctions. { Date [mpossible to Determine — ms H¥ 50955 DocldY32423490 Page 38 *
method, in my opinion, and time-consuming. SECRET/EYES ONLY tend to be thorough, comprehensive, Because of the nature of his assign- ment and because of his personality traits, his personal relations, particularly with General Lansdale and with the Attorney General, were never very pleasant to begin with, and tended to deteriorate steadily. A climax of sorts occurred ata meeting of the Special Group Augmented during which the Chairman asked a specific question, noting that he had ten minutes in which to hear the reply and wanted a crisp answer within that period. Mr. Harvey was not forthcoming, and the Chairman left the meeting after ten minutes expressing strong dissatisfaction with things in general and Harvey in particular. “After this meeting it was clear to McCone that Harvey had broken his lance and would have to be replaced. In due course, he was replaced. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, when it was virtually impossible to get access to top officials in the government and get their guidance on day-to-day affairs; Harvey, who did indeed try to get such guidance, on his own concluded that United States policy was headed toward a full-scale invasion of Cuba. He ordered a number of agent teams to be dispatched to the island for intelligence collection and to be in place as assets to support a con- ventional military operation. General Lansdale claimed this was done without his knowledge and authorization and ‘there was a confrontation in McCone's office. McCone concluded that unless these teams were being sent to satisfy specific requirements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that they should be recalled. Since there was no such requirement, they were recalled. In a separate meeting, McCone reassured Lansdale that he was in fact Chief of Operations. As a result of this, Harvey earned another black mark as not being fully under control. I trust the foregoing will be of some value to you. , AW 409545 Docld#32423490 Page 39 | Sincerely, Walter RECEIVE! f ae “Mi -2- a eS 1 1978 SECRET/EYES ONLY —s—i(w ¥ | A