ww) AW 542714 an input to the total effort. our people meet and we endeavor to reconcile c then, . , “AL - Er, Stratton. How, may I ask. ‘another question, that, would extend iron that, Admiral. How is ‘the ‘defense intelligence agency ‘functioning in your fudgnont? My. inpression is that this agency . vaieh started. out to. coordinate the evaluation and. dissomination of: intelligence collected by tho separate services: is now: ow grad — ually moving into the collection mo a8 well BS. oa evaluation of intelligence. | I would like ‘a frank estimate | as “to. whether ‘the wavy, “and the: Navy's intelligence services felt that, che’ ‘coordinate. job that bus is doing is an effective one? Secretary Korth, Vell, I can say without any hesitation that I believe that ‘the Defense Invertigence - ‘Agency under General Carroll has done an. exceptionally Aine job. ‘They have put themselves together r quickly. During the recent Cuban’ crisis they relied heavily ‘Mpon, the. Navy for. certain © lements of -Antelligence, which HO made ag. Me thought that that worked very well. Now, q would. be frank to say, however, ‘that: as fr transfer more activities, 40. the Defense Intelligence Agency fron’ the services, we feel. at. times somevhat | Docld: 32424094 Page 8900 tt 7
My’. ‘Stratton, ‘One turther question, Agytral, r noticed Admiral Read in the ‘room today, and I recall our “naval reserve group going dove vith him a couple of years ago and having a brief port: of, ‘this’ ‘Unitas, : operation that he was conducting down there’ 80 “ably ad i am just wondering vhether as a “result, of ‘the : political pheavais that have been taking 3 “optice since 1960 in Latin America, the capability of the Latin” American Navies to. ‘operate with our own and: provide tm submarine. defens e and g0 on has improved or has ‘declined, Aduiral a Anderson. * It has ‘improved. : And t. think that the operation of “UNITAS last | fall in connection with the outbreak of the Cuban trouble was a good example of the effectivenes Ss of our UNITAS © operation. - | i. The ‘ask tores was in Peru at the time, 2 and when’ thoy camo. on up to operaie in the Caribbean the’ ‘fact that ‘they. had beonoperating. with “the Latin American, Navies i think contributed greatly 3 to “the respons to) that ‘the Latin American countries made first to. the. resolution in ‘tthe organization of. American States politically, and second, from the one J Nee , otters that . wre, “made of naval forces and air forces to os to assist us ‘in the quarantine. “ ; | . itr. Gavin, ur, Chairman —- LS aoe Mr, Stratton, | May I- asl one further question in ‘that. WW 54214 Docld:324294094 Page 90
Fhe Fil ar 2261, i . . / - Wie. Gavin. And bring iv the tankers, . front the | pipeline. Mr. Rivers.  Anything.. Now I want to asks “you sei ae via oe Bure must concern General Shoup.” | _ is yous “pon litt ~~ ROW i have hod At brought to - me that we have the airlift on the track. = And ‘in the Cuban crisis. 1 think you had to: charter some soalist commitments. Did Lt caus $© you any. concern about « our:  seaiitt, ns to the | present capabilities, or did ‘the | Copan situation bring out any deficioncies in this area.” | a Secretary Korth. r think haniral Anderson Been 4: can answer that oo unless yeu experienced aitticulty . yourself, Mr, Rivers. t would like: for sonething to eu | me eo “sonething about it. “Admiral Anderson. I would ‘Like to say this. We had several problens. cae natn, “The first thing wag getting enough dinphibious.. Lilt ‘for all of the amphibious forces inthe Fight, spot at. the right time. - To do this, we us ed “amphibious forces: from, the. Pacific to come avound to. join up with the Amphibious Pa forces — fromthe Atlantic. ‘This Was in our plan. This was carried out. me HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page. 91
HW 542714 7 follow-up forces. We had a’ plan that was developed which . the chartering of ships. we found that we: needed more: Lorces, “Ary forces, cand: beach lift to provide for the Army tanks. to > goin, at - cost of retaining ; ships for, an indefinite. period ine DoclId: 324274094 Page 92° | Spence eo a eco The second problem was getting enough age. for ‘the a . involved first the utilization of: MSTS ships, and second, oo ab rte This: was an increasing problem because as. we. ) planned, “follow-up Marine forces, 80 We had ‘to arrange for more: her This is commercial type Mitt, or administrative. Lift, ‘The third problem wo had was getting enough’ ‘over the, Oe and heavy vehicles. | | , As "you ienow, the airborne forces, | while en g capabllivy of going. in, they want to have their ‘heavy equipment get in as quickly ag. they can thereafter. L They. can't Lite that, in aimplanes.. They hav 0, get at in. in amphibious type shipping. a : | | So. - we are taking out .of moth balls some ne of our old LST" a, in antiedpation of a future requirenent for’ this. ‘type of Lift. And I think -= I hope that we wild be gfe ‘able to meet the Army’ 8 roquirenent, Mr. Rivers. You, Admiral Anderson. Now the “problem. that we ran “into was cle not ¢ one of boing able to- line up ships, ‘but rather the: So we ‘watched this very carefully, We: Kept at
‘ene 20 8 Tmeerer eo under control. And I am satisfied that wo would have: me’ - the commitments we - hod. to moet. My. Rivers. Well, “now, “why don' & you have: in boing or in your future program -- ‘while those | ‘are not: combatant | ships or craft, wa should have in being : as a: part fleet available craft of this character. oh : Now whether At is the rosponsibility of: “the, mss or Admiral Dennison or whomever ie ‘may be, there tea deficiency there, | . a And you ought to be mindful of it, Tt is not only the @M arines, put you are : responsibility ‘for the Army. | | oe Admiral Anderson. That is what T am thinking « of. ; ie. Rivers. 1 The Cuban situation has given you a ‘breathing spell now. | | | And you ought to take this into” consideration, Admiral Anderson. Ye are bringing, ant Mr. Rivers. i beard all. kinds of stories, | abirt abe Admiral Anderson. We are ‘bringing owt of, noth, balls = eleven ‘1st, and we will have them: in a condition “wtiore they can ‘be used for this purpose ie thoy | are re required, We will have. minimon crews. 7 Mr. Rivers, Are these noth ‘ball, ships: adequate tor modern aay striking? Admival. Anderson. Tor 1 % of the Army tanks; they ° co / 0.- - HW 54914 Docld:32424094 Page 93 - - pe me a Lge etme same esate poe ag oom Hee
Beer 8 . Now members of the’ committee == | Mr. Hebert, “Moy I ask one question? . “The Cliairman. Mx’. Hebert... ~ Me. Hebert. Admiral Anderson, Io ‘gust wait. to ask one’ question in connection with the announcement made on, ‘the ee - this morning on a. television show. — a It was. announced that four Russian ‘technicians had’ drrived in Cuba to assist: in the but lding of the so-calle ‘harbor. . Oo a one Now is there any possibility that these Russians could install a submarine base there without our knowledge, in ‘view of our reconnaissance? | a ‘Admiral Anderson. I did not see that particular announce- ment ‘this morning. — | | oo | But I would | say that with the “reconnaissance that we have; wa are keeping very close track of all devetopnenti an cuba. _ And if. there was any construction of a base ‘there; it would | cone to our attention very quickly. | a Mr. Hebert. That is the reason I asked that. — . § Because» I don't. want to wake up one morning and. find out “they installed missile bases again like they ‘did overnight. Sd We would know now what they are doing? - : _ Admiral Anderson. i have every. ‘contiaence x Gad wou . | wage” , oa ae The Chairman; ‘Are you in_Lposition to advise. the committee HW 54214 Docld:324274094 Page 94.
y) we, er, are “authority. Co, a are Senator Symington. i understand. ; oe an Secretary McNamara . I did not wish to éwell on thie page other. than to indicate that it is here; and particularly to ‘call - your attention to footnote b. Perhaps t shonla xead it: without discussing L& at the moment, but I know this Committee is particu- iazly interested in the ‘subject: \ "In acaition to this budgeced expenditure" -- meaning in addition <o the expenditure of $52.4 t billion - a= "the government's - "unfunded ! cost of military retizement for ‘current! Sexvice, Lee. Service performed in PY "64, is approximately $600 million - oe | ‘on the basis of exieting pay zates and: $830 million on the basis. | of proposed pay rates. ‘The total | tunfunded past. Service cost! ~ | of the military xetirement pragram would amount to approximately $49.9 billion at July L, 1963 on the basis of existing pay rates and $55.2 billion ¢ on the basis of the proposed rates." | z mention ‘this at this cime only hecause the Committee has” “inquixea in the. past. relating to this subject. a Chairman Russell. it is not directly pertinent to this ae hearing, Mr. Secretary, but were any. additional expenses incurred in the mobilization when the Cuban crisis was on or was. ‘that, absox cbed in your . currect budget? secretary MeWamara. 1 tneremental costs approximating $200, ~~ milion, mr. Chairman, were incurred, we Believe, ducing ‘the (Cuban “ang 5 m4Od ra  pociESREA «lig..g#8, endeavoring to absorb that. in our approved. budget, |
ee ee S19 a | whether we will be able to do so ox not I cannot say at. the , moment. | - | : | | Chaizman Russell. Tf you do not, you. will have to ask for. 4 supplemental? - | 7 : | 7 a Secretary McNamara. That is correct, sir. rer nay go back to -~ | | Senator Thurmond. What was the ‘amount? eo Secretary Mevlanara. About $200 million. so If I may go | wack to ‘page four, gentlemen, and refer to the * second paragraph on page four, admittedly, the President's pudget. does not include every program desired by the various elements of the Defense establishment. Many of the items deleted during ~ the budget review, although important perhaps from the viewpoint. - | of one Department, were xedundant in texms of the Defense program - as a whole. This: type of overlapping of ‘proposed programs is in herent in the way the Defense is organized, and at is not neces-. oy ol)” sarily undesixable. it does assist in presenting to. the op management of the Department o£ Defense a wider range of alterna-- ‘tives from which to choose, bué it also requires ¢ some hard-headed decisions in the program and budget veviews in erder to prevent a a uneconomical duplication of effort. . ‘Then, there are a large number of desirable, though marginal or . postponable, programs and activities which are always: ‘lest ‘to: : “be screened out ay the Secretary. Aehough this, too, increases cae Boe ‘the workload in my, office, tf believe we can adequately. cope with’ 2 AW. 54214 -Docla: 32424094 * Bage’ (97. Loe a Ph my
; ©. Opponents have erADy extended the range of cont to cover virtually _ every aspect of human activity. And we, together with our allies, must '. carefully allocate our defense effort to ensure that we can meet the ae _ Challenge on every front and at every level. An assessment of the present on ' the Defense program and budget. | B. ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS IT BEARS ON MILITARY erisis, I pointed out that the Defense program we were recommending was lee: ‘the immediate situation as it then obtained. Since that time, the Nation '-.. Government viewed with the greatest concern the sudden intrusion of Soviet ' national security which would have been posed by Soviet nuclear armed . ballistic missiles in: Cuba, or, for that matter, the Soviet military “of the total Communist threat to Freedom. . military power directly into Cuba, the undeclared war against the Government - against India by the Chinese Communists. In Europe, Soviet pressure on -.°. Africa, their efforts to exploit dissension and unrest in the Congo had ’ ‘been temporarily thwarted by the actions of the United Nations.. All of' | me these crises or probing actions are simply the more obvious manifestations’ ” .- Of the Communist drive toward their basic objective of world domination. - And, indeed, there is increasing evidence that the apparent monolithic a and the Soviet Communists seeking to, retain their present leadership. | 47 i and prospective international situation and the military programs of our principal opponents is therefore highly pertinent ‘to any discussion of: _ POLICIES AND. PROGRAMS | Last year, when our attention was focused particularly on the Berlin . geared to our global requirements over the long-term, and not simply to and, indeed, the whole world has gone through. another crisis, precipitated | again by the Soviet Union, this time in Cuba. I believe it is clear from - . the actions taken by the President last October that the United States ; at SETTLES PRESET TP TP EE IY PEE offensive weapons in Cuba, only 90 miles from our own shores. However, as. acute as this crisis was, and the after-effects have yet to be fully aa liquidated, it did not then and should not now distract our attention from‘. the more fundamental and far-reaching challenge which Communism poses to , the Free World. Without in any way minimizing the grave threat to our eS presence in that country, those missiles represented but a small part OFT EEE Lives OT Tae! Even while the Soviet Union was attempting to extend its offensive of South Vietnam continued and a new overt military aggression was launched © the Allied position in Berlin continued unabated. In the Near East, the Communists were seeking to make inroads in the Arabian peninsula. In This objective is held by both the Soviet Union and Commnist a China, but very distinct differences in tactics have become apparent. structure of world Communism has been fractured, perhaps irreparably. There is emerging a bi-polarization of power in the Communist camp, the ©: Chinese Commmnists trying to capture control of the Communist revolution can m,
‘ yey well as human life. The economically impoverished Chinese Communists, oe to whom human life has little value, believe they have much less to lose. =.’ than the Soviet leadership to risk even nuclear war. And, indeed, the a _ Chinese Communists have been quick to take the road of active belligerency. in Korea, in Tibet and now in India. 4 ; _ - and economic instability exists in any part of the world, the Communists © - . ~ themselves with any change in the status quo or with any emerging threat ' to existing authority. , neutral and emerging nations of the world to the cause of Communism. From : 4. | Latin America ‘Although we @ ares some comfort from this @.... out between the Communist giants, the world situation remains perilous, nevertheless. ot The destruction of freedom and free nations is still the ultimate objective %. of both countries, but each is seeking to attain the objective in its om |. me way, and to capture the spoils for itself. Oddly enough, in this struggle for power in the Communist camp, the weaker of the two rivals is by far the more belligerent and the more vo reckless, and therefore, very dangerous to the peace of the world. The ..."... | reason for this difference is not hard to find. The Soviet Union, after § |... 45 years of unrelenting sacrifice and deprivation, is finally emerging from its status as a "have not" nation. Mainland China, however, after 13 years of Communist rule, has barely, if at all, made a start toward os self-sufficiency. Her economic condition is desperate. The Soviet Union... today has a great deal to lose in a nuclear war -- material wealth as It is not surprising, therefore, that the Red Chinese are much more ready . But while war and the threat of war have rightly occupied most of our attention, we must not neglect the fact that the struggle with oy Commmism is continuing through other means. As long as serious political ‘ will have an opportunity to enlarge the area of the struggle. Even now |... they continue to demonstrate their ability to take quick advantage of w any breakdown of law and order in any part of the world and to identify —.. In this regard, there has been no change in the policy of the Soviet Union to encourage what Mr. Khrushthev calls "wars of national liberation" or "popular revolts", and which we know as covert armed aggression, guerrilla warfare and subversion. And the Soviet Union has not diminished its efforts through the more subtle means of economic and military aid, political intrigue and propaganda to win over the Africa to the Near East, from Southeast Asia to Latin America, the pattern is the same. We may expect that the struggle in this area will intensify and we must be prepared to meet the challenge. i Although the Cuban crisis has greatly solidified the unity and cohesion of the American states, the threat of Communism has ‘by no means abated, and a Communist government still rules in Cuba. Our forceful:. |
1g ©: .  -Yesponse to the t@- of armed aggression from oD no doubt bas dimin- =... \>.. -  dshed for the present the military aspect of the threat. But this simply . - =.) means that Communist efforts will be shifted to other areas, and the ne Castroist Communist sabotage last fall in Venezuela is but one of the = °°’. more violent examples of this danger. More important from the longer oe term point of view is the fundamental instability engendered by the . widespread lack of adequate: economic progress. So long as hunger and economic instability persist in Latin America, the danger of Communism - =. will be ever present. Indeed, it is not an overt-armed Communist attack = = that is the real danger in this part of the world, or even Communist _ re ost sabotage and subversion -- the real danger lies in the discouragement, a a3 WAP _ G@isillusionment and despair of the people as a result of the relatively - ae 5: ae slow rate of economic and social progress. . po . FS cee Prior to fiscal year 1962, U.S. military assistance to Latin America | -: f.-\.. was geared to a concept of hemispheric defense which envisaged the direct 2 ee participation by Latin American forces in any large-scale conflict. A “thorough review of the program convinced us that, except for specific -i "+, cases where properly equipped naval and air forces could make a signifi- .. «’; fon -..° * @ant contribution to the solution of the anti-submarine warfare problem, - *, oo, 4 this concept of hemispheric defense was becoming increasingly unrealistic. . °* ."". The main threat in Latin America today is that of Communist subversion. ee and indirect attack, and not overt military aggression from outside the. ; hemisphere. Accordingly, about one-half of the approximately $75 million oF ‘> per year of military assistance which the United States is presently  - ~ providing for Latin America is devoted to equipment and training for internal : “ ‘security purposes, with special emphasis on counterinsurgency training. —. : ji The major portion of the balance is directed to the support of selected ASW ° i") " forees. Although we fully recognize that the problem is essentially ae "i. political and economic, the maintenance of law and order is an essential 0. ‘ prerequisite to social and economic progress. — Saat eens a Oe sonal st OE Fat SF Teed Be ee ee rg sacasencs nsyris ey LS wr — SEE eT A In addition to internal security, our program is also designed to “.. gontribute to economic and social development through what we call "civic ™ " action" projects. These projects, in such fields as agriculture, trans- . portation, communications, health and sanitation, are beneficial to the . people generally. Outstandingly successful programs of this sort have > been conducted in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Honduras. More oo ° peecently we have instituted a similar program in Equador and we are we “"" s"" . guyrently developing projects for other Latin American countries, including. 1 3 "s. El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru. Civic action projects are jointly funded + - "4. ‘py the Military Assistance Program and. AID, with MAP Providing the military « SO  , equipment and related. training. ; But the Military Assistance Program will not in itself solve the ern problem of political instability which arises from the continued economic ~ | os QL pPiculties in much of Latin America, and herein lies the-real danger of aR ““y. .°. -, fixture Communist penetration. It was to meet this more fundamental problem i
we oe ~ submarines on station within reachof most of our bomber bases. 2 76 ae, In addition, by 3 chat. time the Soviets could have operational Teas with ranges long enough to attack the United States: -£2OM _ the south, where we presently have no warning system, or with power enough: tovarzy very high yield warheads. such warheads, “iz detonated at high altitudes above che bomber bases, could catch ‘the B-52 bonbers before they have time to clear: the destructive “ area of che burst. I whl discuss: in the: next section of my - statement the measures we are taking to improve « our defenses i against such attacks. | . oe ‘The inereaging missile threat unders scores both the: import ance of maintaining our on-thé-shois aixborne alert capability and ¢ the value of the special provisions contained in the section 512b of the Fiscal Year 1963 Dofense Appropriation Act. This. ie ‘the section which authorizes the Secretary of Defense, upon detcrmination by the President that s such action is necessary, to. provide for the cost. o£ an airborne alert as an 1 excepted expenses. This provision, we believe, should be retained in’ the: tae Although we are planning to continue the present limited airborne alert _ program of 12 training sorties per day (plus oS | ‘maintaining an on-% the~shel£ capability, to fly one-eighth of the S ny force ror one year), we must always be ready to increase promptly f the ‘scale, of this operation. Indeed, during the early phases of te the Cuban crisis dast year, we aia jus 5%. that. We may be. able to 2. ; Se finance. the - additional cost of that action from our current. HW 54214- DocId: 32424094 ‘Paye 101° -
— SASO von TD } 7 I ee | oo, _SE 6@T, 98 ms20 | , | | aren | + + headquarters for SAG, that lt won't be long before we will have | to have one. for the- -rest of 4 the Department of Defense. | Secretary MeNanara . I think that 1s a bare ass umption,. aaron Mr, Chairman, I doubt very much that we would be justified in expending these funds for a hardened communications and. command center for SAC uniess we had a. hardened communicat tions and command center in Washington at the coy ther end of the ee . dine.. | . | We have this in mind. As General Taylor said, we are i ‘carzying on & series of borings at the present time to determine . thé soil conditions: in this area. = was our experience during . the Cuban crisis, and qt think that we anticipate that future” ae erises would take the ‘saine form, ¢ at it was impossible for. the key decision nakers to move out. of the Washington cra . ‘Chairman ‘Russel... That was I believe in consideration of 'gome mass of stone mountains , Like che Black Hills, where tt. seems to me ar you “puilt under Some miles of "rock, 16 # would. save a good deal. . . _ Secretary McNamara . I think it isan undersivable : accommodation for the Washington personnel, ‘but it is not’ prohibitive from consideration for ‘SAC, Asa ‘matter of fact,” aan _- one of the alt cernative sites ‘being considered for this sac. . Lees underground at the present time is a deep ming in Cotorado. oe es has. ‘tHe ereat advantages. | oe 2 aw ‘ga21a- Dacia: a2a2dOne, babe ae2partially excavated, ‘and. therefore ‘peduces. the”
. 7 a ; ig year's appropriations, in which case we may not have to resort to Section 512b this year: provided, of course, that no new | crisis again forces as to expand our aixborne alert operations. Senator Symington. ‘May I ask what the. amount of money in-*. - . volved in. chat Section 5126 is, Mr. Secretary? Secretary McNamara. Te is an unlimited authorization to. wh carry out a one-eighth airborne alert. Senator Symington. There is no limitation on the money? | Secretary McNamara. No, six; I do not believe there is. Senator Stennis. That was put in the appropriation bill, ©.” was it not? Secretary McNamara. That is correct. Senator Stennis. That was a compromise on the way the. argument was met there about the unforeseen possibilities and need for an alert. secretary McNamara. a aia put a one-eighth alert in effect in the Cuban crisis, as a mentioned earlier, we hoped — to be. able to cover the cost of all. the incremental costs associ- ated with the (Cuban crisis in our regular buaget | without a deficiency appropriation. ! Senator Symington. I undezstood that, and I remember when _ it came up before the Appropriaci ons Subcommittee. Buc it eat “3 “incurred: deficiencies, and I was wondering if there was any \ wo |. Limitation on the deficiencies you are allowed te handle unless. there was some formal recognition of ‘troubles - “aw! si2ua Docta: 32424094 | Page’ 403
ps5 _  @xamination of this. . ; co oe ope ne co Senator Goldwater. i have a very open mind | on this.. oe Tt has not been completely filled with ‘two or chree questions. oa IZ will not belabor the pointe here. You can supply us with a proper briefing on it. I still have questions that f have a raised and have had communications, and x think we ought to. put into the record the proper information. ” secretary McNamara . We will be quite happy to discuss” ie, . : | Chairman Russell. Since apparently we will not get through hexe, “I have a question or. two on this SOsuUS while: we are @ at ite We have these stations at she present came. scatie red. throughout the Atlantic au azound Cuba. ‘Just what ‘par ct do these stations play in locating Russian: submarines. and shipping in to Cuba? Just what part, how were they utilized to keop up with che Russian chips and the Russian re submarines? Secretary NoMlawara. . Perhaps General Taylor would Like © - to eply. Mr, Chairmen. ~ General ‘Taylor. E aid not hear the question. Secretary MeNamaza . What part aia the sosus. ‘stations 5 play in locating the Russian submarines auring the Cuban crisis? General Taylor. I really do not have the details on that, a Senator. _ “ge ‘think Admiral Anderson. ‘should | ‘answer Ate I think SHW. 54214. Decld:32424094 — “Page: 104: operRe ce
is channeled’ for analysis. . We claim we Saw, located, a number of submarines, Russian - submarines during the ‘Cuban crisis. “Sast what part dia all 19 coe it was as usual a combination of the many detection systems which we apply in trailing the submarines. Chairman Rugseil. The men who operate thom claimed at those stations ‘they can dacvect a “ship: and telL whether | ak 8 is a ‘submarine or a tanker or something even by 3 its size. General Taylor. My impression is -- | Chairman Russel. That has been challenged a number of | times. It has been extreme. ‘Bue they Bay they can, and aoe have all of these people watch ing these things like cardiograns,, "continually making notes on a little piece: of pape x, and some chap. is reading them, and he will say; “Here is a ship at this “, | point," and he will wire into Norfolk where all the information — We ‘know: that the Russians were sending a great many suréace ships down there of various sizes, we know that. .. this sosus outsié have in that. Did they help in locating the submarinos?. (Did we locate then - ‘£com devices: on: other submarines | (or ‘rom, helicopters: or desteoyers? We have - got all kinds of electronic devices. ‘Gonoral Paylox - ‘E think most of them were located ©2200 ' eutside of the ‘vange of sosus. We knew about ‘them before. > they * came an range of S0suS. ft have ‘no doubt | that sosus gave. fe sate” pocrateedcica tion gh, these ‘boats. ‘once they came in range. But these
. > ps? a were non-nuclear submarines, they had to come up on surface. ye We saw them. | : Secrotary McNamara. SOSUS was not the primary source of detection of the Cuban crisis submarines. ee _ Chairman, Russell. I was rather sold on | the Sosus last. year . £ talked to you, and you indicated then you thought. ae 7 was very erratic, a very erratic. system, and ler very mach: ae .to be desized. pe — secretary MeWomsva . I believe that ‘today, Me. Chairman, and I. do not titgh in: any wey to deenphasize, the Amportance: of the probl Lem, but simply to indicate that we have ‘not solved ix by any. means nor have the Soviets. _ a | -Chaizman Russell. These ‘People who operat te them think a they do pretty, well. ‘They say there } are certain places | in the: ocean, for example, one is down at the. Bahamas, maybe it is ome Barbadoes, and they say that this place on Cape Race, wade a must be. two or three. ‘thousand miles off ‘€rom there,. where they - can: pick up > anything, but there are a ‘number of aveas inbetween where they draw ‘blanks and © cannot locate these ships. ~ oy . it seems ‘that the shelves and mountains ‘hoxe that rediect sound almost Like an echo in somo ‘places that are very far ’ removed érom ‘the location o£ the devices, and in other cases. noe they cannot tel. at: all. Secretary Mowanara And ‘the water temperatures, i think | they wil agree, Play 3 a. very important part in affecting | the © ; < HF 54214. Decid: 32424094" ‘Page. t08 oo
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO ® @ ‘THE SECRETARY OF STATE . RECEIY E 6 be u DEPARTMENT OF STATE GF OIN&T:ON & RE ree qd FFICE WASHINGTON Fee2l 2 o8 PME} | OFFICE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY February 19,.1963 ear Secretary Vance: At the request of McGeorge Bundy, I am sending you a copy of my statement on. sub- version in Latin America, which I gave yesterday to the House Committee. . Sincerely, Arr onol . Edwin M. Martin Assistant Secretary Enclosure: Statement on. Subversion in Latin America. The Honorable ‘Cyrus R. Vance, . Secretary of the Army. Ne ial 54214 Docld: 32424094 Page 106
HW 54214 DoclId: 32424094 Page 109 STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY EDWIN M, MARTIN BEFORE THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN THE HEMISPHERE . February 18, 1963 INTRODUCTION 1 welcome this opportunity to appear before this Subcom- ‘mittee to testify on the important problem of communist sub- version in the hemisphere. In recent months public attention has focused to such a degree on: the Soviets’ arms buildup in ‘Cuba that it has tended to overshadow communist subversive activities throughout Latin America, aided in many ways by “Cuba and other bloc countries. The problem of extra- ~continental totalitarian powers trying to. subvert established governments in this hemisphere “4s not new. During. World War II the American Republics faced “the challenge. of fascist subversion sponsored by the Axis | powers. Through individual and collective action they success-. fully dealt with this threat. Since 1948, in the aftermath . ‘of ‘the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the © inter- -Anerican community has been- dealing with the problem of ‘communist subversion promoted by countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc, now supported by Cuba. . I mention this at the outset to point out that the American Governments were confronting this issue long before ‘there was a communist Cuba, and I expect they will be doing $0 after ‘Cuba is free again. DEVELOPMENT
.. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNISM i PRIOR TO CASTRO The ; establishment of the communist parties in Latin “hnertea has taken Place in at least five waves or phases. During the first of these, from 1918 to 1922, parties were formed in the five countries where the industrial revolution had made the most headway and where. the labor moyement had begun to acquire national prominence, While the, five original communist parties were butiding on socialist or anarchist foundations during the 1920's, entirely new communist and |-eommunist-orlented groups were emerging ina majority of the fs other Latin American republics. In each case, the communist: organizations in the second wave had to contend with more _ @erious obstacles than. their predecessors had initially faced. - ‘These handicaps included the almost. complete absence of labor ‘ organizations, little or no tradition of radical political move - ments, and suppression of opposition groups | by regimes ‘that were , a either highly authoritarian or outright: dictatorships. | 7 At the sixth: congress in 1928, the Comintern adopted the line that Soviet historians have since identified. with the s0- ‘ealled "third period" of the Communist Intérnational. This line 7 called for communists everywhere to ‘declare themselves as “such, tO cease cooperation with "bourgeois" and "leftists reformist" | elements, and to establish purely communist organizations which ; should strive to. foment and seize the leadership, of proletarian revolutions. WW 54214 DoclId:32424094 Page 110
HW 54214 revolutions, Repercussions were felt in every phase of communist | . activities in Latin America. With respect. to their political | “apparatus, the Comintern directives made it clear that in — , “eountrites where communists operated within: other parties every” _ effort should be made ‘to convert these parties ‘to ‘full- fledged “communist organizations. ‘During “1929- 1931, three new “parties 7 were also. organized, bringing ‘the number of countries. with "communist parties to seventeen, The fourth wave of communist organizational activity in _ Latin America, from the mid-1930's to. the. mid-1940's, can be " subdivided into three periods, each corresponding to a distinct ‘episode: in the annals of the international communist movenent. These were the periods of the Popular Front, which had begun in — datin America by 19355 the Hitler-Stalin pact, from August 1939 to June 1941, and the “remaining years, of the Second World War, “During these same years, half a dozen parties abandoned the communist label without changing. their political orientation, ‘while communist parties were also established in the remaining three Latin American countries which did not already have them. a The fifth and current phase deserves a fuller treatment, ineluding a discussion of Soviet bloc activities, of some | real importance for the first time. Soviet Docld: 324274094 Page 111
. s Soviet Bloc Offensive in Latin America in ‘the 1950's ao During this post-war and pre-Castro period, Soviet relations with | Latin America, which seemed to be entering a 1 period of ex- pansion in. the aftermath. of World War II, were qut. back sharply a from 1947-52 as ‘one. “country after another. suspended ‘relations _ with ‘the Soviets: at the same, tame that they were taking strong. ‘NW 54214 measures against ‘the local communist parties. Soviet operations ae in the area entered on the present period of expansion beginning in’ 1953 with overtures: to the Perdén Government for increased trade. ‘The post-1953 Soviet offensive in the area was part of a ‘worldvide operation keyed to the underdeveloped countries, — and spearheaded by trade and aid ‘programs. As of December 31; - 1958, the. European communist bloc countries had 20-0dd trade : and payments agreements with five ‘Latin American countries, (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and Mexico). One or more of the. ploc: governnents at this. time had resident diplomatic missions in these same Latin American countries and also in- Bolivia. Soviet bloe trade with Latin America rose from $70 oe million in 1953; only 0. 6h. of Latin America's trade with the world, to $275 million. in 1958, or 1.7% of Latin American trade. The. peak was ‘reached in 1955; reflecting trade with Argentina under the Perdén regime - $340 million or 2. 5% of Latin American trade. During the period 1955- 57, fourteen Latin. American . countries were visited by bloc trade missions, and seven of these DocId: 32424094 Page 112
HW 542714 these countries sent missions to the bloc. In addition, during - the 1950's travel between Latin America and the -bloc reached a fairly high level, and bloc radio broadcasts allotted more and more time to Latin American audiences. . ' But the Soviets failed to gain any secure foothold through: their diplomatic and economic offensive in these years. What 7 apparent trade successes they achieved were based on ‘the. need of various Latin American countries to sell surplus raw materials | and their willingness to take Soviet goods in exchange. In Argentina and Uruguay, the main theaters of Soviet operation during this period, the Soviets made no lasting political gains. | | In general, this first phase of Soviet operations in the area: was primarily one of probing for opportunities. | Latin American Communist Parties in the 1950's | The/ Sb tanaing success of the post-war period before the Castro takeover was in Guatemala in the ‘period 1950~ 5h, where 2 the communists came “to dominate the Arbenz Government and. estab- lish. effective control. over the country's labor and peasant. organ “izations. As the Soviets! ‘power and status reached new high levels “an the late 1950's, the communist leadership in Latin America. | 4 gained new confidence, but the area was still isolated from the centers. of international communism and the. local parties were unable to translate this growth of Soviet power into greater capabilities for influence and penetration in the national societies: DocId: 32424094 Page 1153
HW 542714 siaedees ad eo -  ©@ i. "societies of Latin America. ‘The membership strength of ‘the - communist parties and their ability to. influence the political system was “largely confined to their continued hold in labor ~ organizations and among intellectual ‘and student groups. | Seldom ee were they able to make common cause with non-. communist parties commanding a mass following. They, therefore, generally remained on the defensive, ‘As of the end of 1958 just before Castro seized power in Cuba, it. appeared that the climate for communist: activities in . Latin America was improving. The swollen, ill-paid urban popula- - tons seemed to offer an especially promising field for radical "agitation ‘of all kinds. Reacting to periods: of dictatorial rule . a in various countries, leftists party leaders, students, Journal~ oe ists, and other intellectuals were voicing an insistent, but “uneritical, demand for the extension of liberties ‘that promised to remove from. the ‘communist parties the legal impediments placed : in their way by more conservative governments of ‘the past. The | ‘communists ,. by their energetic denunciations of economic and ~ “social injustice, were in the: eyes of many of the superficially educated, intellectuals and leaders of the left proving - themselves * ‘the true champions of democracy. In. terms of communist party membership, the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, Cuban and Venezuelan parties represented in 1958 all put a small part of the total, or about 215, 000 of an estimated 250, 000 party members in the area. These parties + had sizeable non-party followings and substantial. influence among other political groups in their countries. DoctId: 324274094 Page 114 oo cance ng ener nnene eacaaer enero atte net ee age noe Mt ot ane encarta et i eg ~
COMMUNIST EFFORTS SINCE THE ADVENT OF CASTRO Since 1959 the general pattern of communist subversion in the hemisphere shows a continuation, though on a much stepped- -up scale, of the tactics of infiltration, popular front action and insurgency, put with a marked shift toward more violence, Local groups have greatly benefitted from the receipt of far more outside help, especially from Cuba, than heretofore. This has coincided with the advent of Castro and the sharpening of differences between Moscow and Peking on the tactics to be followed in pressing forward the communist campaign of world ‘domination. The Soviets undoubtedly regard Latin America as an area offering unusual possibilities, but they themselves have been cautious in their tactics, except where special opportunities have developed, as in the case of Cuba. On the other hand, there is no evidence that they have in any way restrained Cuba or local communist parties from violence of many forms. “The Strategy and Tactics of the Castro Regime ‘The strategy of the Castro regime from the beginning, despite fall the disclainers, has remained one of exporting its revolution-- of converting the. Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the - Americas, “as, Castro. Stated in 1959. ‘In its tactics ‘the Castro regime has . been changeable. During. the first six month of 1959 in’ the flush of victory it sponsored armed expeditions against several Caribbean HW 542714 countries, None of these was successful, ‘They served only to arouse Docld:32424094 Page 115
HW 54214 ~ four ¢c arouse suspicions and ‘generate action by the OAS. Castro _ then shifted tactics, following a more subtle, indirect approach. The Cuban efforts~ have been channelled in four main directions: vie. the formation of front organizations in the United ‘States and ‘the Latin American countries in the ‘form of eriend- ship societies or committees for the defense of; the Cuban. Revolution. 8, an intensive propaganda campaign using: printed materials, news services provided by Prensa Latina, and newly constructed, - powerful radio facilities. 3.6. covert material support, largely financial, to sub- versive groups. 4, indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin Americans in Cuba, including training An. sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla tactics. . | I ‘believe some specific examples of activities in these ; ategories would be of interest to members of the Sub- . committee. | . . | On the: formation of front ‘organizations, we do not have to go far afield. All of you are familiar with the Fair Play “for cuba Committee and its pro-Castro. activities in. this country. I would like to read the following. excerpt from the annual report for the fiscal year 1961 of the FBI: | "The Fair Docld: 324274094 Page 116
ng HW 542714 throughout the hemisphere. pig” Fair Play for Cuba Committee is one of ' the main outlets in this country for pro-Castro _ propaganda. Many of its members are United States ‘nationals. This Bureau during the 1961 fiscal year - determined. that certain funds used by the Committee to pay for a newspaper advertisement had come from a _ Cuban official assigned > to the United Nations, a + a fact later ‘admitted by a Committee member in testi- “mony before a. congressional committee. FBI. investi- "gations also have shown that the Fair Play for Cuba ~ Party and “the Socialist Workers Party, and that these ‘-" Parties have actually organized some chapters of the _ Committee ." - Similar groups have been “established in 1 practically cevery other country of ‘the hemisphere, such as the "Legion of: Volunteers: for the Defense of Cuba" in Peru, the "Move- ment for Solidarity with and Defense of the Cuban Revolution" ain chile, the “Society of Friends of Cuba" in Brazil, and the "Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution" in Costa Rica, | to name only a few. Their “function has ‘been to propagandize and - whip up enthusiasm for the Castro regime and repetitions . , of its revolution through rallies, demonstrations,” “propaganda, and all “the: paraphernalia ‘of communist front. groups. | “AS part of. its propaganda campaign, the Cuban Governnent. ga its: news: service Agencia Prensa Latina to spread its” "distortion of. news events, throughout the world. Theve are 7 four] Prensa: ‘Latina offices in Latin America, These offices: serve n not only as news gathering . centers’ ‘forkGaban propaganda. network, but as’ a means of contact with. subversive | BrOUpS | The Cuban Docld: 3274274094 Page 117 '- Committee has been heavily infiltrated by the Communist
1 HW 542914 — erate weighing 1800 pounds , and sent by the Cuban Government @ . : -10- - @ “the: Cuban Government places great emphasis’ on. “nadto: _ propaganda to further its subversive ends, It beams to the “United States two English language programs , Radio Free . Dixie “and! The Friendly Voice of Cuba,. intended particularly to: arouse See eee racial antagonisms. ‘in Negro audiences. oF ‘Radio Habana is the chief propaganda vehicle of the cuban "Government, for other countries. in May of 1961, Radio Habana _ produced ‘a modest 42 hours a week for Europe and the Americas. ‘Now it puts. out some 188 hours a week, with almost 60 per cent | of that time devoted to Spanish language proadcasts to the Americas.. In good part, these proadcasts contain the usual virulent attacks against specific democratic governments and their leading person- ages, such as treet President Betancourt, and call on listeners. to follow the Cuban example of revolution, Radio. Habana also makes its. facilities available to such Cuba-based groups as the Dominican Liberation Movement , the Peruvian Anti- Imperialist Struggle. Movement and the Guatemalan Information Committee, to broadcast systematic and hostile propaganda designed to bring | about. the downfall of the governments in those countries. “Bo: estimate the amount of Cuban printed material that is smuggled into the. other countries of the hemisphere is im- possible. But we can point to a few glaring examples where they have been caught ‘red -handed. Last October ‘in Chile, a. large to its Docld:32424094 Page 118
to its Embassy at Santiago, was documented as "samples of Cuban products. And cultural. and ‘commercial material", Upon being opened by Chilean authorities, the packages found inside the pox contained Cuban propaganda addressed to. various Chileans who | a few months pefore had visited Cuba. The Chilean Govern- - ment addressed a stern protest to the Cuban. Embassy in the face ; _ | of this outrageous effort to introduce Castro propaganda into Chile surreptitiously. Similarly, in Mexico injFebruary 1962, Mexican customs authorities seized a large quantity of Castro- communist propaganda that the Cuban Minister of Education, Armando “HART: Dévalos, prought with him. to Mexico and tried to introduce _ into the country during an official visit. - Another, form of support of subversive activities ~ and | "one which is difficult to trace - is the furnishing of funds | to. subversive groups. Castro reportedly donated recently $15, 000 'to'a ‘violent, extremist group in Colombia called the. United Front for Revolutionary Action. The Cuban Govern- i - . ment has also given financial aid to the leftist subversive _ activities of the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean a Youth (URJE), which has: been involved in guerrilla. activities oe “an Ecuador. The Quito radio on ‘January 29 broadcast a letter sent to. them by Pablo PAEZ, a young member of URJE who had \ recently been expelled from the group, in which he publicly : | acknowledged that two other individuals of the group, whom po So he named, | HW 54214 DoclId:32424094 Page 119
HW 54914 re? Y-4 can he. ‘named, ‘made several trips to Cuba and returned with: money. reel for the ‘support of the Ecuadorean guerrilla movement, One . of these Same individuals, he said, also received funds directly 28 from: the- Cuban. Embassy at Quito. - a a ooh is estimated that. between. a, 000. and a; 500 ‘persons. ‘from other Latin. American. countries travelled to Cuba. ‘in. 1962 for | © Adeological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare; training. “Most of these trainees are- young » mostly in their ‘teens or twenties. 7 Ostensibly in. Cuba to pursue. normal studies of agricultural, “industrial, or ‘other techniques , — students also receive heavy ‘doses of. indoctrination in Castro- communist. ideology and guerrilla warfare; Returning | young, men, from Cuba have stated that they go through’ simulated offensive and defensive guerrilla exercises, are: taught how to. survive in the ‘jungles, are given map and ‘weapons | instruction, as well as other training every good guerrilla ~~ should have. They are also told how to penetrate student, labor and other: groups in their own countries. Venezuelans seems to be the most numerous national group among these trainees, and we do not, consider it sheer coincidence that Venezuela's demo-. _ eratie government and the Venezuelan people are: - being subjected “most heavily. to the terrorist and guerrilla activities of the - Castro-communists in that. country. “In. the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, the Castro regine has shifted the emphasis. of its campaign in Latin America to one of open encouragenent of terror as a principal weapon, _. @ move — DoclId: 32424094 Page 170
a move dictated by the loss of popular support as a result of the crisis and the fubliity of continuing popular front, . ‘mass movement, tactics. Violence has been the only refuge of : the very small minority throughout ‘history, 7 | On November el, 1962, in a speech closing the so-called. "Week. of Solidarity with the Venezuelan: People", Cuban Minister of Education, Axmando Hart, said that it had become evident — that "an Latin America the conquest of revolutionary power has to be achieved necessarily - ~ at least in a great number of the countries - through class struggle carried to the level of “armed insurree tion by the proletariat and peasant classes", A week later, in an interview with the Habana correspondent of the Londen, Datily Worker, Cuban Minister of Industries. Ernesto Guevara Is quoted as saying: "The Cuban revolution has’ shown that in condi tions of imperialist domination such ‘as exist in Latin America, there is no solution but armed - struggle", Castro himself on January 16 of this year stated that ' ‘what is needed in Latin America. are experts on changing the: situation, experts on Leading peoples in revolutions" “Gritiedzing those who shrink from violence, he said let the imperialist theoreticians preach conformism, but let the revolutionary theoreticians preach revolution without fear. Significantly, 7 “AW 542714 . Docld:324274094 Page 171 ae
Significantly, the "old" communists have recently also . picked up this theme. Veteran Communist Party leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, now President of the Cuban Agrarian Reform ‘Institute, in a speech on January 23 said: "Following the. _ example | of David, they are realizing in time, that revolution te the road--revolution which represents the. definite change “trom the. decayed“structures which imperialism maintains in our America: revolution, which means the expulsion of imperial- ist and monopolistic wealth, supported by the trai tor latifundists ; and by the cowardly, timid representatives of a bourgeoisie which feels the blows of imperialism without trying Gor divert them to oe realize that this revolution is possible, that this revolution is achievable, that this revolution may have aifferent roads for achievement but. that there is only one road on which it can advance with confidence: the determination to struggle, to | resist, to, fight." Another veteran communist, Blas Roca, on January 24 praised the Venezuelan terrorists, saboteurs and guerrillas for their activities during the missile crisis, call- ing this "proletarian internationalism" and promising "We shall HW 54714 continue to give our. support, each day in greater proportions, to. the Venezuelan people." Earlier Fidel: ‘Castro himself ina "speech marking the fourth anniversary of the Cuban revolution had. this to say about the tactics of violerice in ‘Venezuela, during the” missile crisis: : Docld: 32424094 Page 17272
| /-15- " .ethe Venezuelan people struggled and gave extra- ordinary evidence of revolutionary spirit, led by : _ the glorious Communist Party of Venezuela and by the valiant militants of the Leftist Revolutionary "Movement. The imperialists were given evidence of what revolutionary solidarity is, and active soli- darity of. revolutionariés who do not sit in their. ‘doorways | to. wait for the corpse of their enemy to pass by; of revolutionaries who understand that the duty of all revolutionaries is to create the revolution." a - sO | These statements are a clear indication of the i continuing ‘interventionist purposes of the Castro regime -. and point to. the ‘direction in which we ‘can expect it to. channel its subversive activity in the hemisphere in the ‘months to come. Soviet HW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 123
HW 54714 -16- ; Soviet Bloc Efforts in “Latin America since > 1959 / Over the past three years, efforts by: ‘the ‘Soviet bloc countries, cher than through Cuba, to establish | further ‘their presence ‘in Latin America, and promote “the fortunes: of: local communist parties. have. not generally met with any outstanding successes. Only the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR -and Brazil and the promise of increased trade between them may de said to represent a clear plus for the bloc. Otherwise, diplomatic relations continue to be maintained with the same few countries in Latin America as before (Cuba, Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico) and ‘no significant expansion of trade has taken place. One may cite as a clear setback the case of Argentina, where little use has been made of the $100 million credit exténded by the USSR in 1957 (because of the unavailability or inadequacy of merchandise) and where the Soviet and other bloc embassies have been forced to reduce the size of their staffs at Argentine demand. They have succeeded in attracting more students and other persons. for training and: indoctrination of all kinds. Attempts on the part of the bloc to introduce propaganda into the various Latin American countries | continue to have varying degrees of success. Some governments (e.g. Mexico, Uruguay) seem lately to have ' $ightened Docld: 324274094 Page 1274
17 | tightened control over the importation of such materials, but the amounts distributed in certain countries remains a’ most disturbing fact. | | Impl ications of the Sino- Soviet Quarrel in. Latin America To date the Latin American communist parties seem. tio have been reluctant either to admit the existence of basic differences between the USSR and Communist China or to take sides even-when the differences are admitted. Castro has clearly played both sides while appealing for a reconciliation. One might suggest that his heart is in Peking but his stomach is in Moscow. Castro's tactics in winning power in Cuba have: nevertheless provoked among those parties sharp discussion very similar in its subject matter to the discourse between ‘the Soviets and. the Chinese Communists. Principally involved ‘is the question of the right strategy to the successful conquest of political power. In virtually - all Latin American communist movements there is a deep division of opinion as to whether to take the violent path to power--similar to that allegedly followed by the Chinese and the Cubais-or the slower, “united front" path of alliance with leftist forces which is-called the "via pacifica." In general, the Soviets appear to favor the latter course of action as one surer of success in the long run and less liable to result in debilitating defeat \ HW 54714 Docld:324974094 Page 125
WW 54214 Docla: 32474094 Page 176 “18- defeat for communist forces. However, the Soviet attitude toward the violent path, which involves in most cases the use of a guerrilla movement, is- shrouded in ambivalence. The Chinese communists on the other hand. are urging this path on the Latin American communist movement through all the avenues open to them. There is a coincidence of strategic views between much Latin American dissident communist thinking and that of the Chinese communists. Our evidence suggests that the older communist leaders. in the area tend to favor the Moscow viewpoint, while the younger, hotter-headed elements in the communist. movement find themselves leaning toward the:Cuban-Chinese communist strategy. As time brings less and less prospects of success via the "peacefyl, path" there seems good reason to think that. more and more Latin American communists will incline toward violent overthrow as their only. possible means to gain power 4! This) does not necessarily mean capture of the Latin American parties by the Chinese; ‘they do not appear to have the capability to provide the necessary material support. It would appear that on balance the Soviet and Cuban_ images and effectiveness, as distinguished from those . of local parties) have suffered a setback largely as a ep the result of the crisis of October 1962, but ‘also/increasingly effects of disorienting / the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Conditions in certain
HW 54214 DoclId: 32424094 Page 127 -19-— certain areas of Latin America, however, continue to be conducive to the growth of communist influence and consequently to pere tration by Soviet bloc states and parties. The lack of spectacular successes in recent years should not be taken as a Sign that either external or internal communist forces in Latin America have given up their attempts to overturn the existing order or are unable to do so. ; Balance Sheet on Communism in Latin American since 1 So far I have been talking primarily about activities or influences brought to bear by the Soviet bloc and Cuba on Latin America. But the Communist parties there have a life and force of their ‘own and are not wholly. ‘dependent on outside nourishment or guidance by any means. Their strength and activities are matters of major interest and must now.be analyzed in some detail. The communist apparatus in Latin American made Significant progress during 1959, 1960 and 1961 and came to have greater self-confidence and optimism than at any time since the end of the war. ‘Rather than in. terms of membership.or electoral success, this progress > appeared. in better linkage with the international communist movement, partly througn Cuba, and in the improved atmosphere for operations in many countries. Especially during 1959 and early 1960, this was closely related to the appeal of the Cuban revolution. Even after disillusionment with Castro began to set in among mary
5 WW 54214 re day | many Latin American leftists, Cuba provided an important regional headquarters which continued to provide: valuable | ‘Support and services to the Latin American communists. ‘During this three- -year period the communists made headway. in finding indigenous leftist and nationalist groups disposed to make common cause with them. Up until 1962 they made significant gains among students and intellectuals and to a lesser degree in urban trade unions. With heavy bloc support, propaganda activities were sustained at a higher level than ever before. Although 1962 was one of the most active and eventful ‘years in the history of the Latin American communist movemerit, it closed with little if any net overall further gain for the communist parties in terms. of. mumbers or influence. In fact in some countries there were some at least temporary losses. The highlights of a year-end balance sheet look something like this: In, the climate of change and crisis that prevailed — during 1962, the noncommunist forces of the revolutionary left rather than the communist parties themselves appeared to be the main gainers. The communists had . little to ‘show in ‘terms of gains in party membership or: -vote ‘following, and internal factionalism increased sharply» in part because many old line leaders responded only -feebly to their opportunities. Nevertheless in an overall situation DocId:32424094 Page 128
neers ERNE TESA tne nea mest te i ome ne - HW 542714 situation not unfavorable to revolutionary. appeals, the communists in 1962" were pitduing vigorously with : TheTi cA some success ali three of their. standard Reekee> | Lines, - adapted to the: Local situations in. which each seemed to offer ‘most. promise ‘of - success: infiltration, popular ws fronts and» terror. “Infiltration succeeded best in Brazil. ‘Communist- backed candidates. in the October 1962 elections, while they did not fare exceptionally well in the country as a-whole,. won important victories in certain key states. On the. other hand the outstanding division in a communist party in Latin America during 1962 took place in. Brazil where the Communist Party (PCB), was confronted by an organized rival party. Tuiz Carlos Prestes has for the . last eight years led the PCB on a "soft" line and concentrated upon the quest for legality. During 1961 a leftist dissidents, led by three, ex-members of the PCB presidium and five other former central committee members, accused Prestes “and his associates of revisionism and . rightist deviation. Expelled as divisionists, the. dissidents organized early in 1962, taking the name Communist Party of Brazil and claiming to be the legitimate PCB. Dedicated revolutionaries who are -convinced that they will come to lead the communist movement in Brazil, the dissidents, who so far are relatively Docld: 32474094 Page 129
relatively small in number, have actively sought . recognition from other communist parties. and the Castro "regime. Unlike the Prestes PCB, they are actively preparing for guerrillawarfare. a . The peaceful, popular front road to power has been followed by the communist movement in Chile more faithfully than by any other party. The well-established Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) had good reason for this policy because its prospects for coming to power through success at the polls by popular front groups to which | it belongs remain considerably brighter than those of - any other Latin American Communist Party. Allied for years with the Socialist Party and other leftist elements in the Popular Action Front (FRAP), which narrowly missed electing its Socialist candidate president in 1958, the PCCh obtained nearly 12 per cent of the vote in the March 1961 congressional elections. With their eyes fixed upon the 1964 presidential elections, again with a socialist candidate, the Chilean communists give top priority to maintaining the FRAP and avoiding any actions which might jeopardize the legal status which the PCCh regained in 1958. a | Even so, during the past year ideological and - tactical differences between the communists and the socialists bécame more evident than in the past, and _ strains HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page 130
HW 542714 223. strains: ‘within the FRAP became acute. At the same time ‘yoices within the PCCh advocated developing guerrilla capabilities against the eventuality that’ ‘force might be ‘used to keep the communists from en joying the fruits of electoral victory. Thus the PCCh, “Like most ‘other. Latin American communist parties, is “confronting. the choice between the peaceful road and violent revolution or guerrilla warfare, and tries’ to make its choice in the light of relative prospects for success. The ‘ambivalence in many parties . ‘stems from disagreement ‘dnong party leaders over jast this point. “THE choice: of violent action showed most dramatically in Venezuela,’ “put also in Peru and to some extent in Brazil. I will discuss this increasingly important trend more ‘fully later on. In Bolivia the orthodox Communist Party (PCB) so far sees its road bo power through continued successful infiltration of the Lett Sector of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNE ) . The Guatemalan Labor (conmunist)Party (Por) has officially adopted a policy of preparing for any. form of: struggle. ‘In El Salvador the party undertook some guerrilla training on a minor scale during 1962. In Ecuador there has been a shift in tactics following | the diplomatic break with Cuba in April. It became apparent DoclId: 39494094 Page 1531
apparent ‘that further gains through peaceful political . means. were unlikely, and at the 7th Ecuadorean Communist Party. (PCE) Congress strong sentiment in. favor of early "violent. reyolution became part of ‘the official. PCE line. In Mexico the communi st movement was already fragmented. Dissension over activism was only one of the divisive factas which worked during 1962 to split the communist movement in Mexico into half a dozen feuding factions, none of major consequence. On the labor front in Latin America there were few major changes in the political orientation of the leadership in 1962. Those which took place were mixed “in character with gains for democratic trade unionism somewhat outweighing losses. On the positive side, | we “note the failure of the communist unions to form | a Mmeutralist" Latin American Confederation of Workers in Chile in September 1962. We may also cite the elimina- ‘tion of comminist influence from ‘important unions in Venezuela and Mexico, defections. from. communi st- controlled a union organizations in Bolivia, the launching. of. a. : - aemocratic national confederation of labor in Ecuador and the emergence of a strong anti- communist federation as the dominant factor in Dominican Labor. | ; The appeal of communism’ for Latin American university” : students as a shortcut to the solution of all problens a seems ‘HW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 132
eR een ent ee { t i t i 4 HW 542714 ee eee _. gents: on balance to have declined. during the year. In several important universities a reaction apears to have | ‘set Any reflecting disillusionment with communist excesses at home and. ‘abroad: by. ‘extreme leftists formerly disposed | to. accept comiunist views and ‘actions uncritically; and "greater: activity, and unity. by ‘the ‘noncommunists, everywhere “the. great ma jority numerically. For example, in Mexico. | a liberal- -moderate slate was elected in the November student elections at the huge National University, which has been a prime communist target ever since the Communist Party found it could not capture the labor movement . For the first time in recent history, the communist candidate was defeated: in student elections at Mexico City! s important National Polytechnic Institute. ‘The Communist Party was reported to be "extremely unhappy" over. these developments. At the University of Buenos Aires almost half of the communist dominated "Reformist" student organization. defected to form the “Independent Reformists", depriving communists of their claim to be sole champions of reform. As a result of this split, the. moderate "Humanists" won three of the five student seats, on the University Council. in the University of. Cordoba, Apgentina, the moderate student: organization tripled in size in six years to more than 6000, while the leftist Reformists split almost exactly in half, as DoclId: 324274094 Page 133
‘HW 54214 ' as. in Buenos Aires, and maintained a static combined membership of about - 4000 over ‘the same period. In “Colombia, progressive Catholic ‘groups have won strong - followings: in: ‘provincial university: ‘centers, espedally | in Barranquilla, Medellin and Santander. Tm Chile all the major student federations ‘are now ‘controlled by” the Christian Democrats. ‘On the other hand most of the Peruvian student groups are dominated by communi st-supported groups. Among both student and ‘faculty groups some real gains have been made in Venezuela. Docld: 32474094 Page 134
‘Increased ‘Trend Toward Violence . - . ‘As ‘noted earlier, ‘there is a | marked trend toward “violence in “certain areas- in Latin America, reflecting Cuban urging as. well as the necessities of ¥8cal movements which” find themselves more and more isolated. Nowhere’ is it more “evident than in Venezuela where, since January of last year, the communists have made a determined, but unsuccessful - effort to overthrow the Betancourt Government. During 1962, under communist leadership, the terrorist and guerrilla .units. were reorganized into the "Armed | Forces of National Liberation" (FALN). In the interior they have attempted to’ i -. “establish guerrilla bands with not much success, largely because of the vigilance of the “Venezuelan armed forces and the cooperation of .the rural population in whose welfare President Betancourt has taken so much. interest. In the cities - especially Caracas - they are waging a campaign of : ae sabotage and terrorism. Homemade pipe ‘bombs are placed about ‘the city; hit. and run raids have been perpetrated in - - guns from speeding cars. Attempts have been made, some these activities, police and law enforcement officials have been killed or wounded and bystanders have. been frequently | | —_ De, a a oo - . wounded HW 54714 Docld:324274094 Page 135 pO an which -houses and sometimes policemen are shot with submachine , “successfully, to burn warehouses of ‘foreign ‘enterprises. in
ee re en MME ee My mene pine eee Att a ‘HW 54714 . . te + - wounded in crossfire or: by. bomb fragments. “Foreign-owned _ oil installations in. the. interior have been constant: targets. The extremists carried out their most spectacular act of _ sabotage in October 1962 when they blew up four ‘strategic _transforner stations belonging to the Standard Oil of New _ Jersey Lake Maracaibo complex. Testimony taken by the Venezuelan Government from two of the saboteurs who were “captured clearly demonstrates that it was done on orders of “the Communist Party in Maracaibo. And this week we-had the spectacular boat highjacking by several communists, a publicity stunt, pure and simple. Throughout this campaign the democratic government of . President Betancourt has demonstrated détermination and an ability to deal with the situation. Press accounts have perhaps given outsiders an exag gerated impression of the .Caracas scene, where life. goes’ on “pretty calmly. I an reminded of the popular impression of Chicago. in ‘the early "30's S, an impression greatly exaggerated for I lived there . and like millions of others never came close to a shooting In Peru. we have another dramatic example of the increas- ing: tempo of communist- inspired subversion and violence. For. ‘the past several ‘months, in an agricultural area of, the “Andean Department of Cuzco, communist agitators, ‘many of whom were trained in Cuba, have been able to foment an. armed | peasant DocId: 32424994 Page 136
ee hae et eer eee aa ee neal fe rn le etre te Se Aetna ve a ME it EN ee ae ence ere ne nec Be eR A te el et HW 54714 | <29-° peasant | dissident movement that has been responsible for the. forceful seizure of lands, armed attacks, and considerable bloodshed. Last December, Castro- -communist agitators sub- verted a ‘strike at the ‘smelter. of the American- owned Cerro. Corporation at La Oroya in the central ‘Andes, seized control of the installation, and caused about $4 million worth of _ damage. Early in January, following a strike that had been settled between the management and the legitimate trade union leaders, communist agitators persuaded workers on two Peru- vian-owned sugar plantations near Chiclayo on the north coast, to damage installations and fire cane fields - about a | million dollars of damage in all. These were the most ASES CA _dramatic cases, but there were many other icesdewt s of Castro- -communist-fomented incidents by workers, peasants, and _ students. C In the face of this growing pattern of communist-inspired violence and subversion, the Peruvian Government on January 5° cracked down on the communists and Castroists, arresting about a. thousand of then. The Government announced at the same time the discovery of a Castro- ~communist plot, master- -minded from abroad, of which these incidents were ‘only. ‘the first steps in what was to be an increasing rhythm of - disorder, ee terrorism, and revolutionary activity. After screening those arrested. Docld: 324274094 Page 137
Oe ee BOE - arrested, the authorities have announced that they plan to “bring to trial 212 persons. | | | In Brazil there have been periodic instances of vio- “Nene dl in ‘the: Northeast during the. past year or ‘so, several. « of which. have been directly or indirectly. linked to the "Peasant Leagues led by Francisco Juliao. Communist involve- ment in this activity has been indicated. Among other things local police officials discovered a large number of pamphlet translations of Che Guevara's booklet on guerrilla warfare. | Persistent: reports of smuggling and stocking of arms -have also been received. In one recent instance, a cache of arms was reportedly seized at Dianopolis in a remote ' region of the State of Goias and some 26 persons arrested © for alleged subversive activity. In. another instance, Rio de Janeiro police arrested one Clodomir Santos do Morais, a ‘lawyer for the Peasant Leagues, while he was transporting a clandestine shipment of arms from Rio to the interior. Morais was also in possession of the calling card of a Soviet diplomat assigned to Brazil -- ‘which card reportedly bore. an inscription from the diplomat to Juliao.. Finally, there | is the well- publicized instance of the documents found in the ‘crashed Varig airliner outside Lima - documents which are said to contain detailed reports of activities in Brazil 54214 Docld: 32424094 Page 1536
‘HW 54914 re -31- - Brazil to give guerrilla training in connection with peasant -violence. The documents reportedly reveal that these | . activities, although relatively small ‘scale and inefficiently executed, received the help and guidance ‘of Cuba, In: Colombia we witness a. continuation of the Violence which has plagued that country for a decade. IT mention this - only to point out that this violence is not primarily communist inspired or directed, although there is reason to believe they are attempting to take advantage of the situa- tion. Violence in Colombia is banditry rather than insur- gency. Docld: 324274094 Page 139
HW 542714 STEPS WE ARE TARING TO COMBAT COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 'In the face of the communist subversive offensive in the hemisphere, there arises the question of what the U. Se. oo and the other American Republics are doing to meet it. . Success in combatting this offensive will, of course, depend greatly on the will and ability ot/Ahe American ‘governments to act and to coordinate their efforts with ' each other. It is important to keep in-mind that what | ‘we are concerned with are problens and situations which - exist. in. nineteen independent; severeagn| nations, as properly jealous of their independence as we are. Although we are inter- dependent and. allied by geography, common | origins and ‘the regional security system of the (OAS, we are alt also firmly committed in inter-American treaties to the principle of non- intervention in each other's internal affairs. Indeed, the: violation of this principle by: the Soviet and Castro- directed communists creates the problem we are talking about. From this it is “evident that, so Fars as ‘the US| is concerned, "neither the problem nor the remedies are entirely within our -eontrol. It means that. the steps ‘the US take mast be in full agreement, free cooperation cand. partnership with ‘our. Latin American allies. While promoting increasing cooperation, a the US, in all its. efforts, continues to respect the principle | of sovereign independence. We cannot. and will not ourselves, 7 in combating. violation of, ‘this principle by others, des troy | the very principle we are- trying to preserve. Docld: 324274094 Page 140
HW 542714 DBocld:32424094 Page 141 We are channelling our direct attack on the problem a of comminist subversion in two directions. One is to isolate. Cuba from the hemisphere and discredit the image of the Cuban revolution in the hemisphere. The other is to “"" amprove the internal. security capabilities of the countries ~ : - concerned. | Even more important over the long term, will be the 7 achievement of ou® goals under the Alliance for Progress, a partnership of twenty countries of the inter-American - system. A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in implementing “programs designed to assist the governments of Latin America to deal with this insidious threat. Their individual activi- ties are carried-on as a part of an integrated US effort to strengthen country idternal security capabilities and to promote sound political, economic and social structures through democratic processes. Each of the representatives of the other agencies at this hearing will be able to furnish you in more detail information about their efforts and the achievement of these objectives. 7 Coordination of all of these activities takes place in the weekly meetings of the Latin American Policy Committee. In these meetings, senior policy officials of all the con-— cerned agencies meet with me to discuss their programs on the basis of prepared staff papers. We examine in some detail the activities of each of the agencies in the area + « aL
HW 542714 34 - at each weekly meeting and agree on @ program§for periods - in the future ranging from six months to a number of years, depending on. our ability. to foresee what is needed. If ‘the conclusions. of the Latin American Policy. Committee. oe oe such as” “to, require. higher” ‘Level decisions, they: are promptly: submitted to higher authority for review and ~ approval," ‘including; where appropriate, the President. | . These Policy and program decisions are then carried out as an integrated effort by the ‘country team in the field and a by “day-to- day dialogue between the country desk officers . of the. various agencies here in “Washington. . Between meeting there is, of course, continuing and. “frequent: informal contact at all levels between the concerned agencies. LA a . ‘While subversion has been, as we have seen, a Long- term effort, its. strength is unquestionably affected by the posi-. . tion, prestige. and stability orf Castro and his regime in a Cuba. We have: had a ‘considerable measure of success from "our: ‘efforts to. isolate Cuba and discredit the. Castro Govern- | nent. In this - regard, the. missile erisis proved to be. of | “ Gnestimable value in uunmasking the, Castro regime, previously ' regaraea Sk a ane a for a new Latin American-type, revolution, as. just one more tool of Moscow. The inept tudeot Cuban 7 leaders, coupled with the success of our. efforts to deprive Cuba: Docld: 3274274094 Page 142
eo _ Lge rd eo: Cuba of access to the industrialized markets of the free oe world, ‘has brought about serious economic deterioration an | the: island. - 7 | | In the political field a major reduction in the ~ ~ influence of fidelismo in the hemisphere has been achieved. ‘The Castro Government has been suspended from participation in the. OAS. Fifteen American, Républics no longer have diplomatic relations with Cuba. Last October during the missile crisis the American Republics achieved complete — hemispheric solidarity on OAs action to protect the peace and security of the continent. “As a result of economic | deterioration, Soviet domination and political ostracism, “the: Cuban ‘example. has become increasingly ‘less attractive to Latin American peoples. | | The facts about what Castro has done to, Cuba and its | ‘people need only to be known in order to convince. Our. COPY. is readymade for US, but it must be gotten to the - millions in every Latin American country, nearly half of “them illiterate. USIA is waging a battle for men's minds in telling this story of the betrayal of the Cuban revolution | “. and what ‘conditions in Cuba and other communist countries ac aipe Like today. Through radio, press, books, ‘television and films, this message is being carried daily to the Latin oo American public. To cite a few examples: (a) 4500 hours of USIA- HW 542714 DBocld:324274094 Page 143
HW 542714 of USIA-furnished radio programs are being broadcast over ‘some 1,500 Latin American stations per week; (b) some 10,000 words of news and commentary are being sent daily via teletype to all Latin American posts to be made avail- able to the local press;_ and te). a. weekly. fifteen:minute video taped show is being televised re gularly. in forty-two. cities of eighteen Latin American countries, with an estimated 10 million viewers. In addition to this mass approach, USIA has greatly expanded its efforts. to make contact with special groups such as labor, student bodies, and intellectual and cultural elite who are the priority targets of the communist efforts. The Department of Defense is also making anti-Castro and anti-communist material available to the armed forces | in these countries for use in troop information and education programs. | | . A gauge of the success of our efforts to discredit and isolate the Cuban regime is to be found in the inability of the extreme left to organize anti-American public demonstra- tions of any significant proportions during the critical | days of the missile crisis. One is reminded of the oft- repeated boast of the regime of how the hemisphere would rise in defense of Cuba if measures were taken against. it. The record showsotherwise. Only in Bolivia and Uruguay were popular demonstrations of any size mounted and only in Venezuela BDocld: 3274274094 Page 144
HW 54714 Venezuela were there any effective sabotage efforts. “Minor” - protest meetings, student marches , and bombings were reported from other countries, but were regarded even by “the communists themselves as faiiures in terms of generating popular opposition to ‘the action of the United States. In Colombia it appeared that the immediate reaction of the communist party and other extremists was defensive, and, rather than attempting to organize demonstrations, they avoided hostile action. In.Chile there were only small, limited demonstrations, despite much propaganda and planning action by the extreme left during the preceding months calling for demonstrations and strikes if the United States ‘were to act against Cuba. Pro Cuban elements in Eeudaor made a major, though ~ somewhat uncoordinated, effort to protest United States and ‘OAS actions. These efforts were almost totally unsuccessful. Despite vitriolic attacks by extreme leftist publications and the exhortations of party leaders, there were only minor demonstrations in Guayaquil and pean In Peru, front Sta organizations organized anti-United/rallics. ‘Other ‘than one . at the University of Ica, which degenerated into a bloody | brawl, these rallies were notable for the small attendance. In Montevideo, Uruguay, a communist-organized demonstra- tion was attended by some 7,000 students and workers. The ‘demonstration was peaceful and broke up after a few anti- United States speeches. ‘The organizers considered the demonstration disappointing. The Central of Uruguayan . t , Workers BDocld: 324274094 Page 145
+ HW 54214 ® ie ® Workers twice failed in efforts to stage demonstra- tions. In Bolivia, the pro-Castro demonstrators were met -by an equal number of pro-United States demonstrators who did not hesitate to clash with the extreme left mobS.. In Mexico and the Dominican Republic there were only minor demonstrations. In Brazil, Haiti, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras and Paraguay there were no demonstrations. | | This was not a record of which Havana or Moscow, let alone Peking, could be very proud. But we would be unwise to count on this as a permanent decline in influence and - relax our vigilance. DocId: 32424094 Page 146
" “United States Internal Security Programs United States internal security, programs, it should be 7 made clear at the outset, are only” undertaken at the request of the Latin ‘American governnents and can only be. a modest | Og ddi tion to. their own efforts.” ‘They and. their peoples’. must oes] oe “deciae what to do and. do ‘it, ‘must sonetiines Ki 11 and be. ‘killed, HW 542714 - for ‘this is. a: ‘battle to ‘the death, Whereas the problem for the United States in “strengthen- ing Latin American cooperation towards hemispheric security | . had, until the advent of the Castro movement, been largely one of developing the capability of the Latin American countries ‘to make qunaaip a QED contribution to collective defense, "the primary problem has now become the maintenance of | internal law and order against communist- inspired violence. } It became apparent in 1960 with the - avowed intention of the Castro regime to promote ‘Che overthrow of Latin american _ governnents by indirect aggression and ‘subversion, that the - security of nearly every government in the hemisphere would ‘be jeopardized, in varying degrees, In anticipation that many countries would be confronted with communist-inspired disorders, terrorism, sabotage’, and possibly guerrilla operations, a careful and intensive assess - ment was made by the United States, in cooperation with the countries, of the potential security threat to each country with the DoclId: 32424094 Page 147
HW 542714 - = 4Q- with the view a immediate development af implementation a of tee United States military assistance and training programs ' reoriented to this new danger, Where critical deficiencies in the capability of local security forces were found, we. thus” were able to respond rapidly to requests to provide appropriate _ materiel, training, and services: under our military assistance and public safety programs to make up such deficiencies. | This assistance is being provided for the control of communist-inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance and control of movements of subversisés and arms inside those countries and across their borders, and for the maintenance. of observation _ and patrol of rural areas for detection and dispersion of guerrilla movements. During the past two years increased emphasis has been placed on training selected Latin American military personnel in riot control, counter-guerrilla operations and tactics, — intelligence and counter~intelligence, public information; psychological warfare, counter-insurgency and other subjects _ which will contribute to the maintenance of public order. and the support of constitutional governments. These courses are given at United States military schools at Fort Gulick, Canal _ Zone and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In assessing the internal security situation in Latin America , we found that the civil police forces in many of the countries wanted assistance in police administration, | training BDocld: 3274274094 Page 146
ede boa : . ; . . as ran : tee : training and operational techniques and partloularly required greater mobility and more adequate systems of communications, largely related to riot control and other threats to. public “order. Consequently, the public safety program which is an integral part of the AID Program is designed to meet these requests. In this connection, a regional Inter-American Police Academy was established last year in the Canal Zone to which we _ invite selected members of Latin American civil police forces for training in organization, administration, riot control, Tecords, and investigations, ° Closely allied to and an integral part of our internal “security p programs are civic action. programs “which are designed to contribute to economic and social development and to establish a better rapport ‘between the forces of order and the civilian "population. If the Latin American military and public safety forees are to win popular Support for the measures that may be necessary to curb such violence, they must establish themselves an the public mind as a constructive, economically responsible. HW 542714 element in the national life. In essence, our programs are designed to assist the Latin ‘American ‘countries to develop the capability to insure the ‘stability and internal security which are: necessary for carry- ing the Alliance for ‘Progress forward. Docld:32424094 Page 149°
ga STEPS BEING TAKEN. 1 THE oas 70 COUNTER COMMUNIST SUBVERSION - \ As. t jfhoted at. the. outset, the struggle against extra continental subversion is not. a: new experience © Wort ® War’ In with, the activities of axis agents. To-  peip t the: governments deal. with it, the Third Meeting oe ~ Foreign Ministers (Rio de Janeiro, 1942) established "Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense." | this Committee functioned until the end of the war, oe pondering | a most useful service to ‘the inter-American communi ty 1 by assisting the member governnents to iden “centers of Axis propaganda, espionage and subversive activities and to develop suitable control measures. the: danger of international. communism has been a ‘for | the: ‘inter- american system. “The problen arose during oe of the tity ‘topic of discussion ard action in major Inter-American "forums from the outset of the Cold War. Beginning wi the. Ninth Inter- American Conference in 1948 to the th present, the OAS has demonstrated a steadily growing "preoccupation over this threat and readiness to assis ‘the: governments to deal with it. tI shall not attempt in this presentation to trac e e. the history of OAS action against the subversive activ- ities of international communism. A good resumé is contained in the Initial General Report of the Specia 1 - Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS), a copy of which was given to your staff last week. © HW 542714 DBocld:32424094 Page 150
‘HW 54214 At ‘the same time I don't want to leave the impression we have given up. The training in, Cuba. of party. members is: a particularly important contribution about which it should be possible. to do something. K number of “suggestions are made on this matter’ in the. recent Sccs. report. While the actions must be taken by our Latin. American associates, we will certainly wish to. be helpful in any way we can. Docld: 32474094 Page 156