104-10429-10093 re = 2§ October 1966 ~ MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: =.  —-Yuriy I. NOSENKO 1.. The attached memorandum describes the techniques / used and-the results obtained in the first phase of the Lf | present. interrogation. of NOSENKO. The most significant we. | ‘dtem to. emerge from this questioning and related polygraph ; » | testing. pertained to Subject's story on Lee Harvey OSWALD. - never heard of OSWALD wtil after President Kennedy's . assassination. in November 1963, that he was not an active \. participant in the case as claimed and that his whole ~ story on: OSWALD was prepared by the KGB and given to us at ‘their: direction. | “\e Subject's.reactions to the polygraph indicate that he 2 Other areas (of strong reaction refer to Subject's "suspected. contact with the KGB while. in Geneva in 1962 and (291964 -andyto Abidian and:the Pushkin Street drop (key factor . in. the’ ‘PENKOVSKIY compromise). ‘Subject became very. upset at. questioning: on: this: subject and refused. to-discuss his “own alleged involvement in ‘the case. We also touched upon ~NOSENKO's parental background, periods of imprisonment and homosexuality... His reactions here all pointed to clear- - cut contradictions in the story he has told us. He 3. There: Still remain several areas of interest and importance to be covered with the- techniques used to date, We expect. ‘to. complete this line of questioning by 28 October. Ae ‘This first phase. has enabled us to confirm our analyses. of key aspects of this case. More important is the fact that NOSENKO knows he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrying him because he is not sure how much we know or how we learned it. NOSENKO's reactions have given us hope that we may by this procedure have begun '. to.strike home. We do not know. what it is that keeps this ‘man sitting-month after month in his present situation. We speculate- that one factor may be confidence that the KGB will. get him out. Related to this may be the thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply penetrated that .it would be unhealthy for him to confess. Our current line of interro- gation, expanded and used even more forcefully, might TGP Seene7 EVES LY Fgl- 0351 er \ og Wey
13-00000 break. down some of his obstacles to confession. by showing -us in a different and stronger posture. .Therefore, we now. plan to go beyond. the. limited aims originally set for this phase of the interrogation. We plan to continue the inter- rogation in the hope of getting a confession; written plans will be submitted when they are more definitely formulated. David E. Murphy Chief, Soviet Bloc Division. _ Attachment ec: Acting. DDP (w/attach) Chief, CI (w/attach) Director of Security (w/attach)
13-00000 = a TOP seenry 6 EVES @xly 24 October 1966 1. This is an interim report « on progress to date in _ the -new phase in the interrogation of NOSENKO, which began on 18 October 1966, and covers the first four days, 18-21 October. . - After a break, it will resume on 25 October. 2. Our aims in this. phase of the interrogation have been limiteds in view of the possibility of losing access '. to NOSENKO, we have sought (a) to strengthen our basic report, ' now. in preparation, by testing his story further, clarifying - points of. confusion and revealing new contradictions, and by. polygraph examinations of key areas, and (b) to lead toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our hypotheses about the true background of NOSENKO and this KGB operation, to convey to NOSENKO the impression that we ' know.more than before, that we possess irrefutable. proof of his guilt and that he has no prospects for release. We refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interro— gations but at. this point there seems little to lose. 3S “whe: ‘first four. days have ‘shown that. the method ais useful...:NOSENKO. again -proved:a good reactor on polygraph, “he seemed’ ‘disturbed. by- our: ‘knowledge. and ‘the special. areas of interest. we: revealed, and we were able. to develop im- portant new information, contradictions and indications “Concerning the’ ». background of this operation. be. ‘our. pasic approach has been to question NOSENKO in specific ‘terms.on selected and detailed aspects of the story _ hec has. told’ £9 - date. : We gave him no explanation for our rerlewal ofthe interrogation, nor-has he asked for any. Our. questions have been pointed and detailed and neither require nox. ‘permit - long-winded. answers; they do not seek new infor- mation but.are clearly. designed to check information he pro- ‘wided earlier; our questions are slanted to build up the impression that they are based on data we have learned in- dependently. The subject matter is taken up in a predeter. mined order designed for maximum impact on NOSENKO, Inter=- regation sessions are followed by polygraph examinations on the matters covered in the interrogation and/or other topics, Somewhat more time is spent on direct polygraph examination than on interrogation. TO? SECRET EVES
13-00000 Highlights to Date ‘5. OSWALD Case: The opening session was. a polygraph examination conducted by Nicholas Stoiaken, whom NOSENKO recognized as his earlier polygraph operator. The question~ ing was devoted entirely to Lee Harvey OSWALD and NOSENKO's rele in the OSWALD case.” We hit this point before any other in- order “(a), to permit clean polygraph testing on this key matter. without having disturbed him with other questions, and.(b),.to get over: to NOSENKO the gravity of our concern on this matter of highest: state interest. ._The operator's. conclusions Weres ae Subject was not personally or actually ine volved in the OSWALD case from 1959 while OSWALD was _ in the Soviet Union. © be Subject received special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell Ame erican authorities about ite Subject's alleged association with the OSWALD ease “both “before and after" the Kennedy assassination was partly for the purpose of supporting and sub- stantiating Subject’s cover story “legend”. da. Subject heard of OSWALD (as a case) only after Kennedy's assassination, however he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably htefed on the case by a KGB officer. be Geneva Meetings: We devoted several hours of inter- rogation and: polygraph testing to the Geneva periods, June 1962 and January-February 1964. We hit this point second in order because there are clear signs of important deception behind it and it offers us special opportunities to suggest inside information which in fact derive from observation and deduction. Among the high points were the following: as Pavel SHAKHOVs NOSENKO's story of his "investi- gation" of SHAKHOV, a Soviet delegation member whom he sald was suspected in 1962 to be an American agent, was covered again in detail. The new data we obtained tend to. confirm that this is a serious part of NOSENKO's EVES a?
13-00000 _ TOP SECRET = EES Ui LY message. SHAKHOV" 3. ‘background in fact suggesta that -he is actually a. KGB officers his contact in Geneva ; ‘2a former CIA cooptee in Moscow, \is at the canter of NOSENKO's story. We slanted our questions to suqgest knowledge that SHAKHOV is a KGB officer (not a KGB investigation suspect) and that we may know of some of his important operational contacts. NOSENKO was inconsistent in his story and reacted significantly under polygraph examina- tion. We are currently tracing new names and data and are re-examining the significance of this matter. be KGB Control in Geneva: NOSENKO reacted very ‘strongly and consistently to the question of whether or not he had been sent to Geneva by the KGB to cone ~ tact CIA, whether he was receiving KGB direction there, and on related questions, including some re- lated to his ostensible investigation of Pavel SHAKHOV. ec. U.S: Personnel and Installations in Geneva: NOSENKO was interrogated on his earlier story that he had seen in Geneva in 1964 the file on KGB activity against American installations in Geneva (KGB cryptonym *SKORPION"). His version this time conflicted with his 1964 version but contained the same message, that the weak and understaffed KGB in Geneva had little interest, limited facilities and no success in opera~ tions against the Americans and had practically no idea of the identities of CIA personnel there. In addition, NOSENKO reacted to polygraph questions related to whether the KGS had told him the name cf his CIA case officers. On the other hand, he did not react to the names of the then COS Switzerland and COB Geneva, which suggests that he was not told them (these names were buried in lists of names). dad. KGS Personnel in Genevas NOSENKO's answers to questions concerning Alexandr KISLOV conflicted with certain details earlier reported, including KIs- LOV's role in the AECHITCHAT case. He seemed disturbed by the questioning on KISLOV and finally said he saw no reason to answer any more of them. However, his polygraph reactions did not suggest that he was as sensitive to KISLOV as to other individuals and matters covered in the same series of questions. We also asked, _with the polygraph, whether he was withholding anything TOP SECRET EVES: GLY
13-00000 Ba or os concerning his alleged, ‘agent. Oleg GRINEVSKIY, an - 6€£ielal of the Soviet delegation; his reactions _suggested. that he may genuinely be ignorant of at the time... He had earlier at: his ‘daily access to the KGB Residency in 7 “Geneva. in. 1964 was due.to his frequent contacts with . Mikhail S...TSYMBAL; this time he said that he only . . gaw ISYMBAL twice in Geneva in 1964 and failed to '. ‘mention a-Sunday meeting with TSYMBAL which he had _ reported to us at the time it occurred. This leaves “open the whole question of how NOSENKO can explain ‘his daily access to the Residency, which he himself now says - evidently on the basis of what he has learned from: our previous. interrogations - is not “ normally permitted. This will be covered in further . questioning. | . 7.Matt ! to the PENKOVSKIX Compromises noua wots smebuaus vase to the Pushkin Street Deaddrop: NOSENKO reacted with special sensitivity ne ‘intensity when asked in a polygraph test whether he had been instructed to tell CIA about ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin. Street deaddrop. In addition, he refused for the first time to discuss his own perticipation in the incident, adamantly claiming that he does not remember when or even whether he visited the drop or whether he read reports on surveillance coverage of it after ABIDIAN's visit. (He had earlier said he visited the drop at least twice,. immediately after ABIDIAN's visits he des— apibed the location and. named the KGB officers he went with.). In sharp contrast to his reluctance to diseuss his personal role was his unhesitating and confident response to other aspects of the Pushkin Street drop story: ‘he reiterates that ABIDIAN was under full time, double-strength sur- | veillance throughout his tour in Moscow and that. ABIDIAN was surveilled to the drop. He now adds, for. the first time, that the KGB concluded that the ‘Grop had been initially found by a U.S. tourist or Gelegation member and that ABIDIAN was merely check— ing out its suitability for some eventual use. (In fact, PENKOVSKIY proposed the drop and ABIDIAN went there only in response to the agreed telephonic signal triggered by persons unknown, not by PENKOV— _ SKIY. ) - TOP SEeRET BB Cy
13-00000 NOSENKO was again queried on gged restaurant meeting with cer, whose name he gave as in 1964. He could not clarify why he had confused the names. Since we now know _ through Greville WYNNE that the Soviets were inter~ ested as late as early 1963 in clarifying PENKOV~ “<*s allusion. ina bugged conversation in 1961 | (eo. we believe that NOSENKO's 1962 version - Was: a. KGB. fishing expedition. However, NOSENKO 2 didnot react to a polygraph question concerning the name | and he may not himself know that he was given ° a. wrong: name for the | officer, nor. ways . Ge ‘Ramiral VORONTSOV: rt had been apeculatea that when NOSENKO mentioned in June 1962 meetings the name of his “big friena"® in the naval GRU, Admiral VORONTSOV, he may have been fishing for ' comments from us concerning Marshal VARENTSOV, -PENKOVSKIY's protector. Gueried this time about _ Admiral VORONTSOV, NOSENKO said that he had never - met him and-had-no personal or similar connection? he seems to have completely forgotten ever “having claimed. ; a’ (Personal Felationshipe . bs | - HOSENKO ‘was. asked about : iter claimed to have handled in 1960-61 in. Moscow as ‘an -agent.against thi -NOSENKO again: said he first met .in1960.... We- told. ‘NOSENKO that! told us ‘that ‘he: had: mot met NOSENKO: until.1962, NOSENKO denied this. -We.then- added to his concern: by telling him (umtruth- fully, but ‘with.a reasonable estimate of the true situation) also said that ‘the KGB had told him to say he’ first met ‘NOSENKO in 1960. When polygraphed NOSENKO re- acted strongly..and. consistently to questions on the subject. ‘These reactions.and our follow-up may well bear on the ques- tion of wheths was actually recruited by the KGB, an’ issue we ha with the FBI. NOSENKO must be concerned | ‘because. he now says.that the ease was primarily “GRYNAZOV's, not his own, althoug OSENKO, "supervised" it. Thus disappears the sole case that NOSENKO has claimed. as his: very OWN» Pe Identit and Personal Backgrounds One of the basic questions underlying this operation is NOSENKO‘s real identity _ and personal background. There are many indications, reported . TOP SEeRET
13-00000 earlier, that he has spent time.in prison and that he is not in fact a KGB officer. similarly, his stories of his — early school ‘and military service are inconsistent and _ - unbelievable.'..We-are‘trying in this interrogation to clarify this ‘important point. Among the points: ‘covered sO. far are: the: followings oS . oo Iden entity: NOSENKO™ Was questioned extensively On: ‘the. 5 polyoranh concerning his identity. In one - gerles: ‘o£ tests, for example, he was asked whether ~  -Mindster of Shipbuilding Ivan: NOSENKO wag the father  -Of ‘Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO and was then asked whether '. .Ministex NOSENKO was his. father; similarly with | .., Qamara NOSENKO, his: ostensible mother. NOSENKO did - .mot-.react to-the question phrased “Yuri Ivanovich ‘NOSENKO",. but. reacted consistently when asked if these were his own parents. He was sensitive to - questions concerning his marriage. (There is reason. to. believe he is not, in fact, married.) He was also  given.a series of tests asking for the first letter of his given name. ‘The whole alphabet was covered, ' andthe polygraph charts: show that he became increas- - dngly tense, culminating at the letter S$ (or perhaps T). on both runs. While we recognize that testing of this sort.may not: give valid results, it certainly gets over to NOSENKO the degree of our doubt and may even help us determine who he really is. We will pursue this further, covering his patronym and fomily name:as well. Ce Imprisonment : In view of the strong indica tions’ that. NOSENKO has spent considerable time in prison (as reported in the past), we questioned him on this. He reacted strongly and consistently to the question of whether he had been imprisoned in the USSR. We then. ran a series of tests to determine his relative sensitivity to various types of imprisonment, various ~ erimes for which he may have been imprisoned, various areas of the USSR where he may have been imprisoned, IGP SECRET AB OnLy
13-00000 Cj WP Ser BS gy . and various. years of imprisonment. He. seemed con— sistently sensitive to correctional labor camps ag the type of prison, and to several possible . causes Of imprisonment: particularly homosexuality, desertion. and felony. Interestingly enough he was not sensitive to questions concerning imprisonment for: self-inflicted wounds despite his story that he . had shot himself in. the hand during the war. He - -geemed more consistently sensitive to Siberia as . the area of imprisonment but the results were not as clear as on other aspects of his story. He seems - particularly sensitive to the years 1954-1956, which - dmmediately preceed the period from 1956 onward, when he began to. appear in KGB operations. TOP seeper
13-00000 24 October 1966 supyscr® “Polygraph #xamination of Yuri Ivanovich. MOSENKO _Concern!ng Les Harvey - OSWALD. on 18) ‘October. 1966. “peckaroana Subject of: ‘this report is a “thirty-eight year old 1 married male. who, .on. 4 February 1964, established contact with United States: suthorities in ‘Geneva, Switzerland and. asked for. political esylume “Subject: was ) initially polyaraphed on: 4. April 1964 ata covert: security ‘location in Washington, D.C. suburbs (see IRD’ Report..#67491, dated 8 April 1964). The purpose of the 1964 polygraph. interview was to establish whether Subject was @ bona fide defector, or if he was a dispatched Soviet agent serit: by: Soviet -Intelligence on a specific mission. The con- clusion arrived at during the 1964 polygraph testing was that Subject was attempting deception; that he was not a bona fide | defector, - but a Gispatched | Soviet agent. . During ‘the ‘interim, april 1964. « October 1966, subject has. undergone additional interrogation during which an attempt was. made to obtain the truth from Subject, and to clarify the many inconsistencies and discrepancies which were evident throughout Subject's version of his personal and professional background history. Subject admitted to lying and falsifying about some phases of his background only after long and tedius interrogation and after confrontation with irrefutable facts which Subject could not argie against. Subject has admitted to exaggerating his own personal participation, his KGB rank, | and certain areas of his personal background. He has not, hovever, admitted deception concerning two main elements of his KGB operational history, even when confronted by logical and factual contradiction in his story. Purpose: The specific purpose of the 18 October 1966 polygraph > test was to: Be. Attempt to establish whether Subject was in fact actually involved in the OSWALD case while OSWALD was in the Seviet Union, or if his association with the OSWALD case was only part of his cover story legend. . “TGP SEERET Li : EE Gul
13-00000 ( . yap eraar 4 , isi Chis - Hg ne . De Determine if Subject was personally active — in the OSWALD. case in 1963 after President Kennedy’ s assassination. Co ascertain if subject received special instruc-. tions £rom the KGB to pass on to the American Government ‘regarding the OSWALD case. - Procedure: ‘The undersigned polygraphed Subject at a covert security location on. 18 October 1966 between the hours of 1305 and 1810. ' The testing was.conducted in the Russian language. The specific area covered during the 18. October polygraph interview dealt with questions concerning the Lee Harvey OSWALD case and Sub-— ject's knowledge and association with the OSWALD case in the Soviet Union. The series of questions asked of Subject about the OSWALD case was’ based entirely on the information Subject gave. regarding OSWALD. Subject: immediately recognizea the undersigned. as the polygraph officer who had administered the previous polygraph test, and recalled the specific date of the test, 4 April 1964. Subject was told that he would again participate in another polygraph. ‘interview. Subject‘s. polygraph patterns. revealed a certain amount of muscular. movement during some of the phases of testing, however, not withstanding this evidence it is the opinion of the undersigned that there are polygraphic indica- tions. of. attempted. deception: by the Subject to some of the . specific.questions asked of ‘him (see conclusion). «hen Subject was ‘challenged and sécused of . deception, he would repeat that he was telling only the truth now,. anc was telling the truth. during: his°last polygraph test. «hen he was confronted with the fact. that: he had lied to specific questions during Bi his . 1964° polygraph, | ‘and ‘that these lies were subsequently clusively proven'to be lies, when he himself later (1965-1966) admitted that hechad fabricated about portions of his back~ ground story,° he admitted that this was so, but that the lies were minor and. regarding: personal. areas.of his background only. He justified his past deception on the ground that he did so only. to embel lah hia. | Personal background to improve his image in our. eyes: Discussion. which. took place during the polygraph testing and Subject'’s additions to and revisions of his previcus statements are incorporated in the 35. report. 15D SECRET ES ey |
13-00000 oe eee | | O a Er. ‘analyziag Subject's polygraph charts, polygraphic evidence or indication of deception was considered. from the standpoint of | consistency | and. significance (atrength) of the reactions: 0... ‘Reactions: found. ‘to. exist on norm Or ‘unimportant. lead-in questions, especially . if these reactions are inconsistent, are. not noted’ as: such in this report. There is no logical explan- ation “f6r. ‘Subject 's. sensitivity to this catagory of questions . other: than | ‘the: possibility that some of these questions may be more’ meaningful. to Subject. than we are at present: aware, ox: “that: ‘Subject is: ecquainted ‘with the polygraph technique and is attempting to create false, controlled reactions to . - lead-in’. and harmless mestions: da ‘an. attempt to. mislead | Poly- ‘graph analysis: a ; However, subject 's 1 ‘reactions to important questions when noted. as. “reaction" are, in the opinion of the undersigned, definite | indications O£: deception. ‘The following are questions: asked during the polygraph testing, ‘Subject * s answers. and his reactions to the questions: : Series No. 2 oe | oe | | Le das Lee. Harvey OS4ALD. aver in the Soviet Union? , |  paaweirs Yes. (No: weaction) ae Was’ OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 19539 to 1961? answers Yes. (No reaction) 3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case? Anewert No. (Reaction) 4. Did you personally meet OSWALD? answers. No. (No reaction) 5. ‘Waa OSWALD. recruited by KGB as an agent? “answer: No. (Ho reaction) | 66 ‘#ere you glad that President Kennedy was killed? answers Ho. (Reaction).
13-00000 Te 8. Se answer Ho. (No reaction) 9a. 9b. Other than what you told me, did you “actively participate ‘in the OSWALD: case prior to 1963? answers Bo. | (No reaction) pid you see a photograph of OSWALD in 19637 Answer Yes. (Reaction) Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB? Before her marriage to OSWALD? Answers. No. (Reaction) after her marriage to OSWALD? answer: No. (No reaction) Did..you. personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA? Answers Ro. (Reaction) of the’ ist ‘Chief Directorate? 12. Did OSWALD have. ‘any kind of contact with the 13th Otdel | answer? Ho. (No reaction) “pad KGB. prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations? oe answers. Ko. (No reaction) Kennedy? _ Was OSWALD prepared | (trained) by KGB to KALL President answers Ho. . Wo reaction) ‘24. ; Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy: Ss. assassination? .. - aAnswert Yes. (Reaction) subject's most significant. reactions on this test series were » to questions 3 and 24 - other reactions of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10. ‘ re a ie : bist ed dca F
13-00000 ( ra aay : 5. Series Hos 2 7 20. Is. the. name, OSWALD. familiar to you? . Anawers Yes. Qo reaction) pia you ever, read the OSWALD case? - inswers | Yes. Wo reaction) Was! this the full and official KGB cage on. OSWALD? - . Answers -¥es. : (Reactica) “pda 3 you give: us. any kind of information about OSWALD? - © Answers Yes. (No. reaction) Dia: you hear of OSWALD: (case). prior: to President Kennedy's assagdination? oanswert, Yes. " (Reaction) . Did you ‘hear of- OSWALD (case) only after President ; Kennedy* ‘3: -death?. - answer: Instead of tha usual yes or no answer, Subject 25. 26. 276 answered “Before and after". when the question was repeated, he again answered "Before and after*, Only when the question was asked a third time on a subsequent test did he answer "Ho*, (Reaction) (Subject reacted when he answered “Before and after" and when he answered "Ho", Did KGB consider OSWALD almormal? Answer: Yes. (So. reaction) As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy? Anawers Wo. (No reaction) To your knowledge Gid OSWALD talk with a KGB officer in Mexico? Answer: No. (No reaction) 722 eraney has earn ES bald
13-00000 29. pia OSWALD. return. to the United Stetes in 19617 7 " Answers ° ‘Yes. “(Re reaction) - subject's reaction to this question was inconsistent when he answered “Yes“, hence the (No reaction) ‘notation. However, it is. noteworthy that Subject did not attempt to correct the date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S. - ' OSWALD returned to the. U.S. in Juns 1962 and not in 1961. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your _ legend (cover story)? "Answers No. (Reaction) ‘Did you really take. part in the OSWALD case in 19597 answers Yes. (Reaction) subject's most significant reactions. were to questions 22, (29: and 30. sdaitional, ‘pertinent questions” includea among - those already asked tn Series. No. 1. and Ho. 2: 16. Oo material ‘on. OSWALD? _ pid you. personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to collect - answers Yes. (Reaction) “948, Did'y you. personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk vabout the OSWALD: ease in 19637 answers Yes. (Reaction) Were you. instructed’ on the OSWALD case by one of the “KGB: operational officers? | “answers No. (Reaction) ‘Did the ‘KGB> instruct. you to tell Us - OS aaLD 7as a bad newer: Ho. (lo Reaction)
ce aoe eye ek ae | Te Te 18. ‘Do -you know | ae€initely that OSWALD was not of 7 Operational: interest to XGB? -  answart Yes. (Reaction) - Ge, DIA. Kes. give. the OSWALDs any king of ‘help in 20 peheir departure: from: the ‘Soviet Union? answers - Ho. “Qo. reaction) Bab. pda you receive special instructions fron KGB ero BRoUte” what to. tell ‘the anericans about OSWALD? answers: Wo. (Reaction) subject's -aactions. to ‘the: questions: 80 indicated were about equal. an consistency ¢ and . 1 pigndfacance. conglusion: , on ‘the’ ‘asia ‘of an. “analysis of. the polygraph charts obtained during. Subjects. polygraph interrogation and testing. during the 7 13) October 4366. session, ‘At is the undersigned’s opinion t that: ne » Subject was ‘not ‘personally or actually ~ gnvoiyea dn-the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while - OSWALD: was" di ‘the Soviet Union. Be. | Subject heard of OSWALD only after ‘Kennedy? 3 assassination, however he was not an active partici- pant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probebly Deleted on the case by a KGB officer. a Subject received special instructions. (from KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tall american authorities: about it. | Nicholas P. Stoiaken