|. DEVELOPMENTS - cont'd These["____]stated, “are wondering whether the Cuban. Government would be so stupid as to send to Venezuela arms withthe inscription ‘Cuban Army' and the N insignia of Cuba engraved’on them" indicated by the Vene- “zu aphs shown at the These delegates believe, : went on, that if Cuba had actually sent the arms MN to Venezuela it would first have removed any i “their origin. This account indicates that the . and the others of whom he speaks are apparen y unaware at considerable effort had, in fact, been made to erase all evidence of the Cuban origin of these arms. The 31 submachine ° guns. found in the cache had-their serial numbers and other . identifying marks recently ground off. Venezuelan technicians, . using a highly technical process, were able to raise the serial \Amumbers and the Cuban shield on some of the weapons. In inde- _ pendent tests, US technicians were able to raise the numbers and shields on three of these weapons. The numbers. correspond \to those of. weapons known to have been delivered to Cuba from Belgium in 1959 and 1960. Similarly, in the case of the 81 light automatic rifles of Belgian manufacture found in the cache, all identifying marks had been obliterated. In this case, one-fourth. inch of molten brazing alloy had been used to. cover the places where the numbers had been ground off and it was. not possible to restore the numbers. However, Venezuelan military authorities have noted that these weapons are unique to those. manufactured. expressly for the Cuban Government by Belgium's Fabrique “s/of fro 1959, when Cuba ordered 22,500 such weapons. (NSA 3/0 T2041-63, 6 December, TOP: SECRET DINAR; background data: -— ET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) personal, urgent, and confidential" message to his on 6 December expressing certain misgivings as to the attitudes of members of the special fact-finding committee with respect to the Venezuelan charges against the Castro regime which the committee was named to investigate. The ambassador reported that he had just received “strictly confidential information" that the pre- vailing opinion within the committee is that it must investigate the entire subject of Cuban subversive activities in Venezuela, not limiting itself to the evidence on the Cuban origin of the } arms cache found in Venezuela last month. dispatched a "' -8- HW 55355 DBocld:32401327 Page 13
a | |DEVELOPMENTS : - cont'd ~~ The committee members, the ambassador stated, insist that it is essential for the Venezuelan Government to "pre- sent proof. of the general Cuban conspiracy" against the Vene- ase against Cuba is to be proven. . The added that "one of the most important members of the committee" had stated that the Venezuelan evidence on the Cuban origin of the arms cache is not airtight and that the. arms could actually have- ‘been resold by Cuba to someone else -some_year ome ‘ am Cuban arsenals. The] a 'then stated that the editor of a "very_important US magazine” had asked him in all serious- ness on 6: December whether the arms could not have been planted in Venezuela ‘by the CIA, as Castro has charged: The editor , added that this. question had been asked of him by “im persons" with whom he had.discussed the problem. The 1 “ Pused thisto emphasize to his foreign min- aster at he” believes” “the Venezuelan Government must not dismiss this suspicion. lightly. He pointed out that important persons in the United States, both. in government and the press, have pointed out Venezuela’ s> evidence on the arms cache may provide "the first opportunity" to confront the threat of Cuban subversion in the hemisphere. These j may be critical of the Venezuelan: Government, the [ Jvarned, if its sticks to its demand ‘that. the inves igation be limited to the arms cache evidence. ‘(NSA 3/0J 7514-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR) NS NS rf} the|__|was informed of his country's position on e investigation of the Venezuelan arms cache, according to a 2 December intercepted message. ' The Foreign. Ministry informed him was to "avoid any attitude which might seem to Leave] Ssola tod is a posi- tion which could be interpreted as one o Sympathy or exces- sive understanding in relation to Cuba." On the other hand, he was instructed not to "openly state the opinion..that the matter falls exclusively under the competence of the. Venezuelan security authorities." The delegate was advised to delay his departure "until the situation is clarified." (NSA 3/0 T206-63, 6 December, TOP SECRET DINAR) } SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS: Fidel Castro may have been in Moscow about 15 November for talks with Premier Khrushchev, according to a civil aviation expert who is apparently passing on a rumor he heard in Cuba. The source reported as background that Castro has not appeared on Cuban TV and did not meet people he ap- parently would have met if he had been in Cuba. -9- FOP-SECREF—-DINAR HW 55355 DBocld:32401327 Page 14
+ ‘ 2 SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS — cont'd SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd There have been no reported Castro appearances around 15 November. On 7 November he talked with a group of students at Havana University and on 19 November he reportedly visited a PURS meeting in Matanzas. However, between these two dates there is no current evidence that he appeared on Cuban radio or TV, and Hoy carried no reports of his personal appear- ances in Cuba. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that he was indeed in Cuba in mid-November. (CIA IN 75946, § December, SECRET) BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS: Warsaw has assigned five merchantmen with. a capacity of 44,000 tons tothe Cuban -~ Central American trade, according to an announcement by Havana television. The ships, one of which is refrigerated, will be operated by CUBALCO--the Rostock-head- quartered joint company chartered by Poland, the GDR, Czecho- slovakia and Cuba to carry goods between Cuba and the northern satellites. In the words of Havana television, "the enterprise will be responsible for guaranteeing supplies to the first socialist country of America, thereby contributing to the defeat of the US economic blockade against Cuba." (CIA/FBIS, 7 December ,- UNCLASSIFIED) ; Soviet air defense and Cuban civil air voice communica- tions on 7 December reflected the arrival in Cuba of a Soviet-— made AN-12. (See Daily Summary, 6 December). The following day, Prensa Latina announced that "the Cuban air force" had acquired a four-engine, turboprop craft with a 14,000-ton freight capacity for use in a service between Moscow and Havana. Prensa Latina said that the plane would be used to carry freight between the two capitals and "three or four stops at cities not yet announced by the Cuban consolidated aviation enterprise." . , The references to the AN-12 being acquired by the "Cuban Air Force," followéd by statements attributed to CUBANA offi- cials as to its future employment, raise confusion as to whether it is to be used primarily for military or civil air purposes. As pointed out previously, however (see Daily 7 Summary of 3 December), the AN-12 can be used interchangeably ‘} in both types of service. Its employment in bringing mili- ' tary cargoes to Cuba from the Soviet Union would be hampered, however, by range factors which would require it to refuel at two or more nonbloc airports between Cuba and the USSR. At these airports the aircraft could be subject to cargo in- spections. (USA-71, 2/DG]___/R-853-63, 7 December, SE- CRET KIMBO; CIA/FBIS, Havana, 8 December, UNCLASSIFIED) SPK Act 6 (1) (B) -10-— “TOP SECRET-DPINAR HW 55355 Docld:32401327 Page 15
0 ; “TOP SECREFT—-PWAR- NON-BLOC RELATIONS: The Moroccan foreign minister has received a three-man Cuban "good-will" mission for the second time and the Istiqlal's Nation claims that a resumption of formal diplomatic relations 1S imminent, according to the US Embassy in Rabat (see Daily Summary for 29 November and 6.December). According to a semi- official account of the meeting, which took place on 4 December, the Cubans reasserted their desire to normalize relations and professed a lack of hostile intentions against the Moroccan Government--which severed formal relations after Cuban “"techni- cians" arrived in Algeria on 22 October. "Informed sources" in Rabat claim that the government is considering the Cuban ‘demarché with "attention." The Nation explains that the Cubans now recognize that Morocco has not been the aggressor in the Algerian conflict and that they are "repentant" over their pre- cipitous action in aiding Ben Bella. (Am Emb Rabat, 866, 6 De- cember, .LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) tHe Prestdent~or[—___] declined an invitation to attend sapere oe .. (the 1 January anniversary ce ebration in Cuba |__| te conversation of 3 December. he MSR in received the invitation from his Cuban counterpart; however, the president declined because he said it was “hardly possible" for him to be in Cuba in January. “ It is not-clear if will designate an official representa- tive to the celebration. 6/12/1963, 6. December, SECRET SABRE) CUBAN. SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY: The[__] ambassador inl sd informed his govern- ment, in an intercepted 2 December message, that he is con- vinced of the accuracy of the Venezuelan Government's charges of Cuban subversion in Venezuela. He pointed out that the . heavy voting in Venezuela's 1 December national election dem- onstrates that the legal opposition in Venezuela is not impli- cated in the violence and terrorism. He also stated that the Castro regime is so thoroughly repudiated by Venezuelan pub- . lic opinion that the Venezuelan Government has no need to use \ artificial means to stimulate anti-Castro feeling there. The | ambassador pointed out that many Venezuelan Communists } _ are ‘in Cuba and from there "they permanently incite rebellion" in Venezuela and Cuban propaganda supports their efforts. (NSA 3/0/Z. T104-63, 7 December, TOP SECRET DINAR NO FOREIGN DISSEM -ll- HW 55355 Docld:32401327 Page 16