Gord tomes a — Gd Gad inl gaas Care) L [tostoz09-to0t2j~ e (SEVENTH PEPARTHENT - June 1955-January 1960) Operational Activities (1953-1960) Denutyv Chief of the Arerican-Sritisn Commonwealth Section According to NOSFEKO, the Seventh Uepartrent was reorgan~ ized in June 1958, and NOSEIIO's section, which theretofore had been concerned with operaticns against foreign tourists from all countries, was split into two new sections, one concernec with tourists from the United States ane the Eritish Commenvealth and the other with tourists from Eurepe, Latin America, and all other ccuntriecs. NOSENKO claimed that at that time he was proroted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-Britisn Cormonvealthn Section, “the most important section of the Seventh Department" In September 1958, ne claired to have personally recruited Gisella HARRIS. It was also i id, that he super- + visec the sexual entrapment of although Seventh ; Department Chicf DU3AS made the”actuaT approach. Reginning prt in the spring of 1959 he saic he directed his age and VOL::OV in a series of successful entrapments- and } NOSENKO stated that he also used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising “I American guides at the Sokolniki Emhibit, and Finally, NOSENKO said. pe recrnite Salta ahd Yeprésentative of the HOSENKO claimed that NTIS” 6péFaticnal Success Airing earned him a commendation from the KG3 Chairman. {He has since retracted all claims to any awards carned during his RGA service.} It was because cf his positicen as Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonvealth Section, MOSENKO said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OS'ALD. NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among foreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal mission, the detection of "“lestern intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union. In line with that counterintellicence mission, on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENXO Document Number \549- 497 FEB 1978 127 for FOIA Review on ; . 1S No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —! ! | | é
Top Secret * (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ June 1955-January 1960) 1963. BKOSENKO insisted that he met ut once -in Odessa and once in Moscow in tha | ___fetains that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, WIG Ih Odessa, while visiting ree put, and peris Comment: NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. Ne freely related the details of the summer 1962 and February 1963 meetings with in the USSR. His acco activities is consistent with fersion, except as noted above. Lee Harvey OSUALD (1959-1960) For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's- alleged involvement with OSALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963 are described elsewhere. (See p.303.) According to NOSENKO, he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. In that capacity he participated in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union. | ; , 4 - 1 1 4 bad Comment: NOSENKO's information on his involvement with OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as evidence confirming or refuting his claimed service as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department in 1959. 143 @ o TS No. 197124 ae we . Top Secret Copy 1. eo oN vacate eee ~ ee . Cae
14-00000 SPS enhntnte Ob Rats tee, <a10 inl Ease WEE A inA nn DI ST atte a BPC Baath Wile wet ntti! Gitimsmaeit in ater SRA St Santis Timmettiend tent ~ | ! Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARIMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) Was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chicé £ the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist Operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about 100 KGS officers, was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSINKO Claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as — Deputy Chief or otherwise, of a number of KGS operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD. MOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB posi-~ ““tlon~during this period his knowledge of an Anerican GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re- turned to Geneva for the second time, and defected. Ree ree | Ans _.. ee ate Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY ' NOSENKO's Information In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, Seventh Department case officer Ya.N. NOSKOV, the management @f KGB agent Alexander SVEXNCHANSKIY (cryptonym “ANOD"). SVENCHANSKIY was the president of “Afton Tours", a travel agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian- language bookstore. There was originally some suspicion that SVENCUANSKIY might be an FHL informant, and the KGB was also concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG per- sonnel in New York City. NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1969 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. SVENCHAN- SKIY's cooperation was secured against KGB promises that Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel agency. ere Ot SVENCHANSKIY’s task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviét Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form. mt ® 292 . TS No. 197124 : Top Secret Copy hp Ep pee
Lid BA Bd kb Bad kd Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMONT - January 1962-January 1964) The OSWALD CASE NOSENKO's knowledqe of the KGB's interest in assicnments. He asserted that while Deputy; Chief of the American Section in 1959 he participated ain the ESB determination that OSWALD was of no operational interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Departrent, ne was informed of OSHALD's visit to the Soviet Erbassy in Mexico City to apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KG3 records of OSWALD’s stay in the Soviet Union including the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD. For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSEV:KO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case (1959-69 and 1963) are discussed here. The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD case 1s significant if it substantiates NOSENKO's claired positions in the KGB and confirms the validity of his claim that he knew the extent of KGR involverent with OSWALD. NOSENKO's Information Residence in the USSR Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief _ Directcrate determined that he was not of sufficient importance to justify any special interest by the Seventh Department. Not until about October 1959, when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department. All available materials on him vere thereupon collected and examined - the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters‘ reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check ef KG8 Archives. NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to stay in the USSR, Top Secret “Copy —__. pee ee |
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTHMENT ~- January 1962-January 1964) Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because “this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surverliance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSVALD was not anterviewed by the KG3 in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information whach had been rceceived concerning OSWALD. The momorandun cited reports by G3 informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance, with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by tha Inturist interpreter to whon OSWALD rade nis anitiral request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in “SOSENKO's section, From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded _that OSWALD was of no interest to the KG8, and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat “abnormal.” For this reason NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD throuch the Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a permanent resident through normal channels at the Sovict Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next SNOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily from self-anflacted wounds. After hearing of this incident from KRUPNOV, NOSENSO then reported it to K.N. DUSAS, Chief of the Ceventi Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chicf Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSZNKO's original decision that the KGB should not become anvolved with OSWALD and that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR. There was no attexpt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn’t normal.” OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an auto- biography. 304 ° . TS No. 197124 a ate ae WP LE ry a oy ee ' i \
14-00000 wom s 7 te SS 9 ent ll Bh ttn nmin tnt is ships SEN eta Barr AARP EO OO ~ . Top Secret boot «nana ce eee = cane eemerennpnnee em (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) BOSENKO did not know who eventually granted OS#ALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR 3 or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Ped Cross or the 4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decisior to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventn papartment updated ; his file, and at was sent, along with a cover letter pre- H pared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk. : KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically in- etrucsted local authorities there to take no action con-~ cerning OSWALD except to observe his activities “passively” 4 to rake sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent on temporary “sleeper” status. NOSENKO read this letter, 1 and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could d be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was ROSENKO'S opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his | place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and : associates, and coverage of his maii. After OSWALD's threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB “washed its hands of him" and that even though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a “sleeper agent," KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk was “practically nil." Reauest to Return to the USSR The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned with OSWALD’s return to the United States in June 1962, by which tame NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh e a fepartment. No further word on him was received at KGB ee ne ee ree ge cee Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico Caty in September 1963 and requested a visa to return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Leqal Residency reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, re- questing information. The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of the Farst Chief Directorate’s Service Number Two (Counter- antelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD, the Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department, ‘3 v.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the in- quiry ¢o Seventa Deparcment Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO. { 305 TS No. 197124 r - Top Secret Copy __7_
Top Secret 6 (SEVENTH DLPARTMNNT - January 1962-January 1964) ROSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OS.ALD's beckground, including his suicide attempt anc the fact that he was net considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALUKSHYEV relayed this information to the First Chicf Directorate. ROSENKO did not know -to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSUALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere, Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his . (apparently overt) contact with a KGR officer under Consular cover at the Sovict EmLassy there. NOSENKO orivyinally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department Chicf&, K.M. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head= quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSDNKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR e and that the cable specified that OS'VALD had dealt with Soviet Forcign Ministry personnel only. 306 ® . TS No. 197124 ; Top Secret Copy —___ ee ee eS - oT FT dd ere ® oe Mm "eo O°
14-00000 a buna @ . ey ® pe (3 yt a ae a a me a a 3 a Ng emo nee | oem em ene Fat mo nem sen ame eetemeny aging gr oo Ee =: Top Secret (SLVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) PontvAssassination Review of KGB File NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result of President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours after President Kennedy was’ shot, NOSINKO was advised of this fact in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the President had died. Aboyt two hours later, NOSENKO was told that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After establishing OSWALD's identity from KGH files and learning that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB office in Ninsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictated over the telephone a summary of its File on OSNYALD. This summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk had attempted “to influence OSUALD in the right direction", GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's efforts because it had been given specifie instructions to carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the meaning of the statement about influencing OS"ALD, be flown immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of this statenent and thoroughly reviewed OSYALD's file when it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M. FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary memorandun for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKO read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, and Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee and to Khrushchev concerning it. OSWALD's file from Minsk contained no information to indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Head- quarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner. 307 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy.____
cece \ quent eit ee salt SE RN AE Ale LE ARIEL pL REN RMON EE + OS a ae 8 Bt nee ne me ne meme antes + Tek son em ase ceameghe vn ees «5 amutaner ¢ cunems mn me - AEG AAR TEDOM BS « ~ ® ° . . * ‘ Taterte Bie deo set ge + she”, ta pe apenRe Py? anakdche a - reenn eentunmmectnaeentns Srntinncrnene mits Reina enc = Gratien? Tee TNO oe ahs tench D nan in enti ed ) . AY i Secret t| Top Secre . A [ “(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT - January 1962-January 1964) ; ss OSUALD never received any KGB training or KGh assign- he Rents. If any other department of the KG or the GEU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had tu secure r. permission from the Seventh Department, which originally ax Opened his case file. In view of OS"IALD's apparent nental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particu- im larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotaas) L Department, would have considered using him. KGB Head- quarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Ninsx, as it would have done had OS'IALD been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on OSUALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him. The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSYIALD; all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file. There was no indication in OSVALD's file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States. pt ot ey ey Py Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he “only skimmed the f1le* and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSINKO added that he never met OSVALD personally. NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief - Directorate first learned of OSYALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The consular file turned over to the U.S. Govern- ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of February 1$63 and a letter of July 1963 from OS'IALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had Prt Py FF BF 303 ® . TS No. 197124 ; Top Secret Copy ___ le A ret ie Ce EF ao
pec mute we ete ante vet oan ecg St BET OTS” GATOR binant, (SEVENTH DEPARTNENT - January 1962-January 1964) Comment: (Continued) earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the file, one of 9 NovemLer 1963, OSUIALD advised the Soviet Embassy in Yashington of his travel under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact with an official (whom CIA identifics as a KGB officer) of the Soviet Er:voassy in Mexico City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate _and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Sovict Embassy there. “ithout regard to possible carlier correspondence, OSWALD's request for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require the Washington Residency to report the matter to Hoscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico . City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent ‘ ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his claim to ccmplete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSUALD. en The CHEREPANOV Papers Comment: On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA ~~ employee claiming to be one CHERFPANOV, passed to an American book-buyer a package which he requested the American to deliver to a trust- worthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy officials found the package to contain a bundle of typed or handwritten dcecuments which appeared to have originated in classified KGB files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy for possessing classified Soviet Government documents, Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. : 309 1S, No. 197124 Top Secret Copy re rf if 4 ‘ Seale cee ee Te ee Se COTE ee ee! : Top Secret : | \ | | nt an el meager
fe came ee eemare meneemmemannes ceiaee roca 1 ip esmemanaemon naan Top Secret _ (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: Summary To substantiate his claims to havina served as Deputy \ Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO ~ describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVPNCHANSEKLY, i the arrests of KOYEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery”that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENXO learned of the operations as he cescribed and they were as he described (there are substan- tial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's on Gescription of Seventh Depart- ment operations, They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENNO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier . assignment there in 1962. lMNOSENKO has asserted that he was { not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the scnicr KGB positions which he claimed to have held. Lastly, his credibility is diminished by his assertion that he invented the recall telegram (nevertheless apparently confirmed by SCOTCH) to prompt immediate CIA acceptance of his defection. KGB Counterintellicence Overations Anong American Tourists 1962-1963 Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to 326 ° . TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy gene