62 level policy maker in Washington, specifically mentioning Robert Kennedy as one of the people with whom he would like to talk, to get some assurance that Washington. was serious about proceeding with this type of an operation." The Cuban also said "that they would need some help in-arms probably~-in getting started, in kicking off the coup." The Cuban mentioned high powered rifles and scopes and said "they felt that they could capture sufficient arms to carry on once they started.” Subsequently, a senior CIA officer travelled to Europe to meet the Cuban and "assured him...that the U.S. and "that Government was serious about this operation... the U.S. Government was prepared to support the coup and that when they launched the coup as soon as they established themselves in any reasonable manner inside Cuba that the U.S. Government would support them." The next meeting took place on November 22, 1963 in Europe. The Cuban contact had requested "some type of esoteric gadget with which he would be able to defend himself" if there were a confrontation directly with Castro. - "He had in mind some sort of a pellet pen or anything that was not a hand weapon that he could carry with him" into any conference with Castro. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 66 AUMVdaIT Guor *y aivags AHL WONT AdODOLOHA
63. Although the Agency did not develop such a device, it did develop a ballpoint pen which had a hypodermic needle inside that when you pushed the lever, the needle came out and poison could be injected into someone. The Phase III case officer showed the pen to the Cuban contact on November 22, 1963. The Cuban contact declined the gadget "because of the close proximity with which he would have to get to a person if anything developed in the form of a confrontation with him." Instead, the Cuban asked for weapons, and the case officer told the Cuban "that a cache of weapons would be put down for him in Cuba." One or two caches of weapons, including high- powered rifles with scopes, were subsequently placed down in Cuba. In addition, according to the Phase III case officer, he delivered money to help the Cuban contact with his living expenses, while in Europe. "It was around $1,000 at one time, no more than that." ‘The Phase III case officer broke off contact with the Cuban in the latter part of 1964 and was reassigned to another task in early 1965. The Cuban contact then was turned over to a Cuban exile group. HW 53244 Docld:3271127954 Page 67 a dTWaaS AHL WOUd AdODOLOHA AAWdGIT auodr
64 According to the 1967 CIA Inspector General investigation report, CIA support was withdrawn from the Cuban in 1965 because too many people knew about him and his plan. In March 1966 a Cuban leader was arrested and confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sites from the CIA to be used for the assassination of Castro, according to a "Prensa Latina” news release. The man said he received $100,000 toward this plan. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State after this news story appeared, the CIA said that the contact was recruited to collect intelligence of military activities and objectives in Cuba. The Agency said: "There is no truth to the allegations that the CIA paid $100,000 or any other sizeable sum of money" as claimed in the Cuban newspapers following the confession of the contact. The Agency also said "the Agency was not involved" with either of the two men arrested by Cuban authorities "in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act..." The-memorandum to Secretary Rusk was signed by Richard Helms and was dated March 6, 1966. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 68 AUVddIT GUOI "YA AIwWaaD FHL NOMI AdODOLOHA
65 6. Miscellaneous 1964 Schemes Involving Cuban Exile Community On June 10, 1964, Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, sent to John McCone, DCI, a memorandum on the subject ''Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders." The opening paragraph of the report declared: "The following report was compiled from information obtained by Agency officers from persons who were parties to the actions described. Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions. Presumably the sources of the report, in submitting this information, were motivated in part by the belief that by disclosing the information they would obtain immunity against legal action should they succeed in implementing the plan." The report then detailed several different reports pertaining to the development of ''... a plan, that was still in the émbryonic stage, to assassinate Fidel Castro''. Some of the plans involved advances of funds with the major payment to be made upon the consummation of an assassination. The funds were to come from either wealthy Cubans or ''Cosa Nostra! elements. The May 30, 1975 letter from the National Security Counsil to the Executive Director had several documents attached which HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 69 AMVdGIT GuOd “AY AIWYID AHL NOY AdOOO.LOHd
HW 53244 66 pertained to the possibility of assassination of Castro by Cuban exiles or the Mafia. These papers included the following: a. A June 18, 1964 memorandum prepared for McGeorge Bundy under the subject '303 Committee Cuban Review." The portion of the memorandum delivered opened with the following sentence; "It seems to me that this meeting might serve to give us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the USA in the next 120 days."' The memorandum referred to 'other groups of adventurers and freebooters who have an unknown capability for trouble.... "We also have these reports of MAFIA plans to perform coup de main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well advised of all impending adventures? "' Attached was the June 10, 1964 copy of the Helms memorandum AUVdGIT GUOd °-Y GIWuaS AHL No AdODOLOHA to the Director of Central Intelligence. b OA "Memorandum for the Record'' dated June 22, 1964 under the subject "Preliminary Meeting with Attorney General, 19 June 1964"! with the "Reference: Minutes of Meeting of 303 Committee of 18 June 1964 on Overall Subject of Cuba'' was signed by Peter Jessup. The portion of the memorandum disclosed to the Executive Director included the following final paragraph: DoclId: 32112954 Page 70
67 'lIn regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the matter." c. A portion of a memorandum for the record, also dated June 22, 1964 and signed by Peter Jessup, under the subject Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 18 June 1964" showed as present McGeorge Bundy, John McCone, together with ''Mr. Vance, Mr. Johnson. Mr. Mann and Mr. FitzGerald were also present." The opening portion of the memorandum contained the following: "A general discussion was held on problems arising from increased activities on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and the general edginess and instability on the island. ‘None of these present appeared to feel that it was either realistic or practical to sever connections with or to withdraw support from the two principal emigre organizations, those of Artime and Ray." HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 71 AUWdaIT Guod *Y GIwugo AHL woud AdODOLOHd
68 The remaining portion of the memorandum was whited out, except for the final paragraph: ''A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders, Mr, MeCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforce- ment, "! d. The Executive Director also received a "Memorandum for the Record" dated July 31, 1964 under the subject ''Minut es of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 30 July 1964" showing Bundy, Vance, McCone and Thomas L. Hughes present as well as Desmond FitaGerald of the CIA, Only two paragraphs of the memorandum were disclosed to the Executive Director, as follows: 'The proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August 1964 were approved. Mr. FitzGerald then addressed him- self once more to the ever present problem of operations by auto- nomous groups. While under our cognizance, they are not controlled, he said, HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 72 a GIWYIS AHL WOYT AdODOLOHA AYVdGIT aquyod
69 "It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would contact Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." | An August 19, 1964 memorandum from John A. McCone to McGeorge Bundy on the subject of ''Status of FBI Investigations re Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders" was also included in the material delivered to the Executive Director . on May 30. The memorandum summarized the FBI investigation to date and FBI reports were summarized. 7. Summary The foregoing facts show that the CIA was directly involved in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro of Cuba. There is conflicting evidence concerning whether or not the CIA was directed or encouraged by higher authority to make an actual attempt on the life of Premier Castro or whether this was a matter developed from with the Agency or whether it was a combination of both. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 73 AUWddIT GuOd °-Y AIwuqo AHL Now AdODOLOHA
70 C. The Dominican Republic aS ean REPUD LAC 1. The Chronology /a. The. Background Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Re public in 1930. By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt. regressive nature of his regime, because of his systematic use of torture and murder as tools of government, and because of his intervention in the affairs of other nations. The country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other Latin American countries. The policy of the United States at the beginni: 1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Trujillo's downfall but to identify, develop, and encourage a moderate quod "a aTwaa5 HHL WOW AdODOLOHA group which would take power in the event of Trujillo's death, . tr flight, or overthrow. This policy of non-intervention, although clearly required by treaty, convinced many Latin Americans AUWdd that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, whose support the United States badly wanted in connection with Operations against Castro, conditioned their support on U.S. assistance in toppling Trujillo. In April the President approved contingency planning for a more active U.S. role in the event the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to deteriorate, HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 7T4
71 b. The Rifles In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican Re public returned to Washington for consultations. Both State Depar ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents needed weapons, particularly a "small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses." The Ambassador has no present recollection of any such request. He is confident that he made no serious effort to obtain them. Nevertheless, the request went forward. Near the end of June, according to CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs approved the provision of "a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene," and requested that they be supplied at the earliest possible moment. Neither the CIA officer who obtained this approval nor the Assistant Secretary, now both retired, has any recollection of this meeting. AUVdaIT Guod “ad GIWaAS AHL WOYT AdODOLOHA HW 53244 Docld:3271127954 Page 75
72 Cc. Explosives On June 24, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an unsuccess? attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela; as a result the United States and other OAS countries severed diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations were retained. The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign ser officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission before the severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter. It was his recollection that the dissidents had no definite assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of that course as the only way out of the conditions under which they lived. It was not until early 1961, as he recalls, that "a GIVUID AHL woud AaoDofoHa the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kill Trujillo. The cables and memoranda of the period tend to confirm this recollection. 8x1 auog Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals dum a AW. 1960,to discuss with the dissidents means for the assassination of Trujillo. A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the \ dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, detonated froma a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means of an armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary action. A more detailed proposal along similar lines appears to have been provided by the dissidents in December.
73 On December 29, 1960, the Deputy Director for Pla: presented the Special Group with a program for covert action to bring about Trujillo's overthrow, A portion of the program called for Agency and .consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo to continue to work with the internal dissidents to promote an uprising and the establishment of a moderate pro-U.S, successor to the Trujillo regime. The plan, as initially “approved by the Special Group, contained no provision for supplying arms or explosives to the internal dissidents. WOUd AdODOLOHA Two weeks later, the Department of State, on its Motion, obtained Special Group consent to have the internal dissidents furnished "limited supplies of small arms and other equipment," meaning explosives, subject to the condition that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point outside the country itself. The internal State Department memorandum which led to this proposal stated there would be no thought of toppling the government by any such “minor AUWdGIT GuOd *-Y ATWado FHL measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the hands of the pro-U.S. opposition with a corresponding boost to their morale and their opinion of the United States. The station and the consulate were informed of the Special Group action on January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower . Administration. President Kennedy was informed of the Special Group action not later than mid-February.
74 . i d. Revolvers. During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch with the dissidents, and they were aware of their varioug schemes to assassinate Trujillo. Although these officials apparently took no active role in the development of plans, they did on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the dissidents. In mid-February, two members of the dissidents' "Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination, came to the United States. They met with both CIA and State Department officers. During these meetings they stated repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the assassination of Trujillo. The evidence is insufficient to permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the State Department. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 7Té AUVddIT quod “ad GIWAAD FHL WOUT AdODOLOHA
75 In March matters took an active turn. In a cable ’ on March 4, a letter on March 16, and an airgram on March 22 the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans for Trujillo's assassination were coming to a head. He requested additional authority to supply the pro-U.s. dissidents with weapons. Similar requests were made by the CIA Station Chief of his headquarters. Three times headquarters responded that it could not comply with these requests because the restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by Americans.. On March 22, the CIA Station Chief renewed his request that headquarters send him three .38 calibre revolvers a ammunition by diplomatic pouch. He stated that without AUWAEITZCNOd “ad GIWUaS AHL WOYA AdODOLOHA some show of support the United States would lose the dissident group entirely, while if it supplied weapons it might have some control over the timing of their use. HW 53244
76 On the same day, March 22, representatives of the CIA met with. the State Department officer who served as their point of contact with the Department's Bureau of Inter- American Affairs. Three days later, on March 25, the Deputy Director for Plans cabled the station setting forth United States policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and stating that the revolvers and ammunition would be sent by diplomatic pouch in the near future. There is nothing in either CIA or State Depart~ Swoua AdODOLOHA ment files to indicate whether the Department was consulted on decision. The memories of the participants are hazy on the matter, but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the introduction of handguns into the Dominican Republic and believed it obtained approval. The then Deputy Director for Plans testified that as the territorial restriction on delivery of weapons was initially imposed: at the reguest of the Department of State, he would have considered the State Depart- “KYWdaIT Guod “uy aIwuRo aHL ment's willingness to waive the restriction as adequate authorit and probably would not have returned to the Special Group for formal approval. He observed that the members of the Group or their staffs might have been advised informally. HW 53244 DoclId:32112954 Page 60
HW 53244 77 The use of a diplomatic pouch to send weapons for such purposes was prohibited by regulations of the CIA's Clandestine Services, and it is also illegal under inter- national law. The Deputy Director of Plans approved the waiver of the internal regulations, There is nothing to indicate that the Department of State was informed of the use of the pouch, and the fact that the March 25 cable instructed the Chief of Station not to advise the Consul General of the use of the pouch suggests that the CIA acted unilaterally in this regard. .. The CIA files indicate that the revolvers were passed to the dissidents, and the Department of State files in- dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and the other t by Agency officers. Neither the Consul General nor the former Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter. @. Carbines On March 26, the day after CIA decided to fur- AUWdAIT Gaor -y agwaao GaHL WOU AdODOLOHA nish the revolvers, the station cabled that it had found three M-} carbines in the consulate, left behind by departing naval personnel, It requested magazines for the weapons and permission to pass them to the dissidents, On March 29 the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans responded that he was pouching the magazines, and that headquarters was "inclined to DeclId:32112954 Page 61
78 favor" passing the weapons and ammunition, Another meeting was held with the Department of State on March 31. The State Department memorandum makes no mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director for Plans granted authority to pass the carbines the same day. Both the State Department liaison officer, who prepared the memorandum of the meeting, and the Consul General are clear in their recollection that the State Department in Washington did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took place. Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was coordinated in advance with the Department of State. It is possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well. It is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group AMWddIT GuOd “WY GIwugo AHL WONT AdOOOLOHd restriction on importation of weapons did not apply, as the carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic. CIA cabled its Station Chief on April 5 to request. the Consul General not to comment in his correspondence with the Department that the arms and ammunition. were being passed. A reassuring reply from the Consul General was received two HW 53244 Docld:3271127954 Page 62
days later. The CIA Station Chief, who would not have been involved in any coordination at the headquarters level, speculated that this injunction may have been designed to keep the State Department from knowing "officially" that the weapons were being passed. ~ It is clear that the coordination on the deci- 3 a Sion to provide the carbines was inadequate. It is impossible 8 ie) Ce) to determine from this evidence where the fault lies. < "ej mS ; | a £. Submachine Guns = ‘ Le As early as March 20, the consulate and the sta- = tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed that the assassins in- a tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress-~substantial§: the plan followed some two months later. Although the plan originally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress’ residence using silenced weapons, the group requested five M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self AYVdaIT quod -y defense in case the assassination plans went awry and there was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces. In its March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was prepared to provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the capacity to receive them at sea or in a cache on the coast,
81 the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Latin America. According to Berle's memorandum of the interview, confirmed by one of the witnesses, the initial presentation stated the group wished the arms in order to overthrow Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo, and that the guns were wanted for that purpose, Berle responded that he could not care less for Trujillo, but that the United States did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. The Agency officer, who had been in a supervisory position with respect to this effort for approximately a year, told Berle he felt the same way. _ It may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over- ruled; on May 5 a cable informed the station that a high-level State Department decision on the submachineguns was pending. Nothing in the files indicates what this cable might have referred to. In any event on May 8 the station was informed that the State Department had disapproved passage of the submachineguns, and this ended the matter. AUVdGIT GuOT -Y GIwagD AHL WOU XdOOOLOHA
HW 53244 82 g. The Policy Statement In mid-May, as a result of increasing indications that events in the Dominican Republic were Teaching a climax, the White House requested situation reports and contingency plans. This exercise was overseen by a member of the National Security Council Staff. A CIA briefing paper prepared for this purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal defense "attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo." The report implied that both the revolvers and the ammunition had been in the consulate with the carbines, and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization technically did not apply. The CIA liaison officer at the State Department called to his superiors' attention the fact that weapons had al- ready been passed, and apparently submitted a memorandum outlini the reasons why the United States should not be involved in this activity. Among them were that the United States Government should not lend itself to direct political assasSination, that the moral posture of the United States could ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world, that the United States would have encouraged the action, DoclId:32112954 Page 686 1 | RUWd aS T quod *aY aIwudo gHL woud RdODOLOHA
83 Supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen, and that the United States could not afford a precedent which might convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons. On May 15 a joint CIA-State Department memoranduf: a) VOD was sent the President's National Security Adviser informing hind that the plans of the pro-U.S. group were well advanced in the direction of ousting Trujillo "by any means." This memorandum did not call attention to the fact that the United States had supplied weapons to the group. In the midst of these discussions, the Consul General, who had been in Washington for consultation, cabled on return to the Dominican Republic that the dissident group planned to "execute action against Trujillo" that evening. The Department replied that it would consider this timing particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of the AUVdaIT GHOd “UY SIVURD AHL Nowa AaGo Consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom. ‘This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer. The state of the covert action program in the Dominican Republic was discussed in the Special Group on May 18, and again on May 25. The Commission has not had access to the minutes. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page a7
84 On May 24, the State Department liaison officer provided the Under Secretary with a draft cable, stating that the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter-~ vention, and even more so from political assassination, 3 overrode the need to secure credit with the Dominican dissidents and with Latin America generally. This draft was approved re at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was 3 Prat a hare: "lt news. mie LIRR te 3 . fi xedrafting in the White House, the final version in another oO hand, stated "We must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S, as a Matter of general . policy cannot condone assassination.” This version was . approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican z Republic. It arrived the day before Trujillo's death on May 30. 2 On June 1 the State Department instructed its Consul General, y if he could do so "most inconspicuously", to destroy any records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related matters. HW 53244 Docld:3271127954 Page 66
85 2. Summary The investigation disclosed no direct American participation in the assassination. The idea originated | with the Dominicans; they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they did the detailed planning. They were never subject to American supervision or control. on the other hand, CIA and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assassination, and they were well aware of the group's lethal intentions. The CIA had told the group of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans; it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of explosives to kill Trujillo. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 39 AMWdaIT GuOd “WY GIWagS AHL WoUd AdODO.LOHA
86 D. Conclusio President Ford has firmly announced that assassina- tion is not and should never be a tool of United States policy. The Executive Director of the Commission joins in this statement. It is against the constitutional and moral principles for which this Republic stands for there to be any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United States Government in any plans involving the assassination of any person in peacetime. ad GIWudS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA hy ° 5 a be S Fy me HW 53244 DoclId:32112954 Page 90