157-10044-10067 Date 08/06/95 Page 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA . RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10067 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 09-H-08 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TWEEDY, BRONSON TO : TITLE 3; DATE : 09/09/75 PAGES : 76 SUBJECTS : CONGO ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS CIA DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 1A CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98 wee fete sass sans nase cane cane cane Sanh GKS GEXE EXE GK GERD UXO GED GED (EG GED OED CED TED Txt) EEE GEE UN Men Mew tow GOO OOD OOD sage sane sane sane cane cane Minh GED GED) SE SGD SED Me mew fb) EE TED FEN ED ED aD aD aD en "Tah ET eww www eww ew www www wus 0st anes sane sane sane sane cane cane Saas itt SEE GRD CEN SEE [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 Docld: 324235455 Page 1
ater eer tie Seek REE rr pacers Fa rf 7 ee ivrah td ‘2 2. f Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Tuesday, September $, 1975 Washington, D.C (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 416 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C, 20003 (202) 844-6000
3 ea : ; ¥ ‘ sh i Z ts ; : x nis 3 . Pea at ee Reet 4, mm ntaatie— Aiba ae Pie 5 TESTIMONY OF Bronson Tweedy Prone {Arte 20279 3464-4000 EXHIBITS Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit Exhibit “ > 4 6 e Cc a « z {The above exhibits were retained by counsel.) Suoot ts « Washysators, SiG Fost Hieeet, © E TOP SECRET
Prene {Aras 707} $44-4600 ra 2 ¢< & « i?) a € £ van LE mg TF egt Stewed SF 43 ¢: \¢ bay SECRE EXECUTIVE SESSION Tuesday, September 9, 1975 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, DBD. C. The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m., in Room 443, Russell Office Building, Senator Walter F. Mondale presiding. Present: Senator Mondale (presiding). Also present: Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Members.
7, Prone (ree 207) 346-4000 2 > “ “8 € .o & < & HOO tun, DE . Weasner AID Trest Strees, SF "TOP SECRET Senator Mondale. bo you swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Tweedy. I do. Mr.Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have the right to counsel here today? Mr. Tweedy. I am. Mr. Baron. And are you appearing voluntarily here today without counsel? Mr, Tweedy. I am, {At this point, the hearing was removed to Room 608, Carroll Arms Hotel.) tir. Baron. Are you also aware that all of your Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, includ- ing your Fifth Amendment rights? Mr. Tweedy. I am, Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have the right to cease answering questions at any time and consult with an attorney? Me. Tweedy. Yes. J gather that was implicit itn what you said in the Senator's office. fr. Baron. lt was. Now, that we are no longer in the Senator's presence I would like to make it clear to you that you are under no obligation to cantinue testifying, although the Committee TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 702) 444-4000 “ 3 a ‘ @ a t € g “oat a Wasaeghan, £) ALD Deak Senet, would obviously appreciate it if you would. Are you willing to do so? Mr. Tweedy. I have no intention of not cooperating. Mr. Baron. And you are willing te continue to testify to the truth as best you can? Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will. Mr. Baron, Perhaps we should hegin by putting on the record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of the African Division. TESTIHONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY Ne. Tweedy, I came aborad the Agency in the first of May, 1947 and after training was sent to Switzerland. returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs in what was known as the Central European Division, I quess, and went through = a number of different assiqnments at that time, until May of 1953 when I went out as Chief of Station tosyennayR Tse T was there until the middle of 1956 and returned very ~ : briefly to the States, went to as Deputy Chief of Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in middle of 19958 -‘and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in early in October 1959, and I took over the African Division 1 should think somewhere around between the 18th and 1lBcth of November 1959, That brings me up to date. TOP SECRET
Prone (Arso 707) 44-4000 ca 2 « & 4 ¢ x a x Yonns | Weaahenatern, fe a BIG Fovat Nteeet, * Mr. Baron. And how long did you serve as Chie fof the African Division? . . Mr. Tweedy. Until September of '63. Mr. Baron, In that position did you consult frequent with people in policy-making positions at the State Department? - Mr. Tweedy. Well, as I was explaining to you as we were strolling around, the aimple answer to that is yes. These consultations would take many, many different forms. On the Congo, for example, the State Dapartment obviously was just as involved as practically the rest of the U.S, Government and they had a Congolese task force. I would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would attend their meetings. They took place almost daily, sometimes I guess cven more than once daily. Mr. Baron. During what period of time? Mr. Tweedy. oh, Lord, from the time the Congo thin; really hotted up, and I am talking then particularly under the Kennedy Administration, when Mennen Williams organized the task force and Wayne Fredericks was his deputy; those mect- ings were State's meetings, they weren't CIA meetings, they weren't meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the policy was. Mr. Baron. If we could focus our attention on the period between the independence of the Congo in June of '60 and the Mano un RES S SECRET Lumumba in February of
Prone [Araa 202) 344-6600 a 3 < a 4 Fe) « 4 & mnoe aa eS » Wasterel St BGG eget mee 3 Raa a Mr. Tweedy. WAe that the month of his death? Mr. Baron. The month the death was announced. As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his death and the probable cause of his death, AS far as the U.N, investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps January 18, 1961. Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Mr. Baron. What was the nature of your contact with the State Department during that period of time? Mr. Tweedy. My recollection of thia is far less Congo and far more general, 45 I was mentioning to you as we strolled, and narticularly my talks with Jim Penfield, te. whom Joe Satterswate was dedicated. Joe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and Penfield and IT were colleagues in Vienna together. We had the minister. Rut we did a great deal cf talking together about CIA deployment in Africa. I was forming a division both at home and abroad and I had a lot 22. of things to negotiate with hin | [pnd he naturally had his views on a jot of the thin: we wanted to da, and we spent a qreat deal of time arguins these things out, making arrancements and so on and so forth. To be frank with you, I have far less recollection abe intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that particular group than 1 did after 19-what, the beginning TOP SECRET
2 > “ _* @ iJ & « $ Obes ater Sh, Wateratet a the Kennedy Administration. Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were qeared up. Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely. Mr. Baron. Do’ you remember: discussions with Livingstone Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Adminisa- trations? Mr. Tweedy. I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific discussions with him I really do not recall, no. Later on 1 remember having a couple of mectings along with Mr. Rusk. Mr. baron. Nid any of those Meetings concern Lumumba? My. ‘Tweedy. “No, Hr. Rusk, T think they exclusively concerned Portuguese Africa. Nr. Baren. No you remember having any meetings alone with Herter, Secretary Herter, about Lumumha? tweedy. To am not sure I have had a meeting with Herter. tir. Haron. Did vou Aave any meetings with Seeretary Meter or Doualas Dillon or Livingstone verchant? Pwnsdy Never met Mr. Pillon. Yaron. About Congolese affairs? mwonrdy. ever met Nr. Dillon and f do not recal) having met with Livingstone Merchant on the Conga. T may have done so but J really don't reealli, TP had very Little
Prone {Aras 207) 344-4000 < > « ry ¢ = « £ professional contact with Mr. Merchant. I knew him mostly slightly socially. Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with Mr. Satterawate or Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them? Mr. Tweedy. to am sure we discussed Lumumba in the sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa- tion, assessing where Lumumba wag heading, where the Congo was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the African situations, individual African country situations. We would spend a great deal of time, their pointa of view, our point of view, cur perspective, their perspective, but never as an action matter that I can recall, Mr. Maron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba ever contemplated or raised in those meetings? Mr. Tweedy. Never. Mr. Baron, Did you meet regularly in this period between Congolese independence and the announced death of Lumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the White House? Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example, if President Eisenhower had an African representative the same \ way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he WAaB. President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes me. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador and one that I saw most of for a considerable period of TOP SECRET
Prone (Aras 202) 544-8000 if 3 « a 4 rs] = 4 £ Srreet SH uae Uso Foeat time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of Advanced Studies in Princeton. Mr. Baron. During the Eisenhower Administration did you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster with reference to Congolese affairs. You are shaking your head and we have to put it on the record. Mr. Tweedy. I am alsmot convinced that the answer no. am just thinking. I know Gordon Gray quite well. don't recall ever: having: policy discussions with him at all, nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no. Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had attended only two National Security Council meetings in your memory and that those two meetings were both long after the death of Lumumba, is that correct? Mr. Tweedy. I can oniy imagine that they must have because this was well into the Kennedy Administration. wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now. Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John MceCone at CIA? Mr. tweedy. Yes, that is without question. And McBundy was at the meetings. Yes, it must have been well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following year. Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower TOP SECRET _
} Administration when events in Congo were heatingup, after Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in Prone (Ares 207) 344-4000 nN the general attitude toward Lumumba? i i : the Stata Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba, ! i : Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by saying what was the general assessment of the situation in i! the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you ' came down to. is The worry in WAshington about the situation in the | Congo was that here waa the largest geographical expression in Africa that thretened to go up in smoke, up because the Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because @ ; it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that those African countries in their early years were at least WAU A FAL vulnerable to. The only trouble with the Congo was if it happened there the side effects would have been infinitely greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else. Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been? Mr. Tweedy. ALL one culd do was assess those, but it FORO would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring : country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria and if the aame infection crossed that border one was afraid 4 ee teer “.e that thia would go up in smoke and that in effect there was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it At treet, really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis. ayn be TOP SECRET
2 2 « a « f+] & € = ae WeasPeration, HIB Faraz Street SE Prone {ree 207} 5446-4000 Were these political Sida effects only that were being taken into account or were thera also fears for American business interests in the Congo that were part of the side effecta? Mr. Tweedy. Insofar as my assessmenta were concerned, and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall with the State Department, American business was juat not a great factor. Tf you want to talk about business, the big factor, of course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to Bucceed reauiting in tha great invalvamune of both the Uitte ans the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there waa that if you put together the Congo without Katanga it was like construct- ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station. Mr. Baron. That is because Kutanga igs the home of most of the natural resources that are in the Congo. Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that country going. Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con- siderations in back of that but these vere political economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is whatwas going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-~’ far as I recall. Mr. Baron. So the primary concern was for political TOP SECRET
2 2 4 6 « 8 g « £ Ponne (Ares 297) $44-4000 PaO 4 S 6. Wasmosatcn the SID Feat Yee, og ge Rot a me TOP SECRET Stability in Africa. Mr. Tweedy, Yes, political stability in Africa. In 4 quick phrase you put your foot right on that. Mr. Dawson, During the summer of 1960 you mentioned @arlier that in the time frame you did not think the Kremlin wae ready to march in there, as that was & fear with you but -- Mr. Tweedy. I don't mean to Bay this was nothing that anybody was worred about but it was not the primary concern, Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest in infiltrating and taking advantago of the situation in the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. T think it would be much more accurate tO say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet intentions with respect to Africa, which ft Suspect in those days like a great many other things about African culture round the globe were il] informed at that point, and un- doubtedly secking their own policies in Africa just the way this country was. It was obviously & worry. Mr. Baron... Waa it also GUT assumption if the Soviets moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba? Me. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have bean little doube in our minds that that would have been the case. Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the general perception at the Ayency and in the State Department was that Lumumba TOP SECRET
fo5M posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mara threat of political inatability because of his closeness to the Soviets or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets? Prong {Arca 202} $44-4000 Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese mora binding but I don‘t think we had any information indicating there was any close umbilicus between the Sovieta and Lumumba but it was potentially there. Mr. Baron. And that potential -- Mr. Tweedy. This increased one's nervousness about the aituation. Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive @ orders? N Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was rd 2? « a a [*] ® < £ through DDD, Dick Bissell and -- Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard Bissell during this period of time? Mr. Tweedy. Regulariy would be a big word. Not necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. To say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. I[t if would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but ~- Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the Raver gine Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook ere any major operation. TO bg Nt Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean by TOP SECRET
© Prnne (Ares 2782) 544-4000 3 < 7 @ 2 t @ & ON ARR he AIO barat Stew tt major operation. Major operation per se, if you are not talking about just intelligence operations, call for in- structions and formalization aither inside the Agency or out- side. Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the DCI, Alien Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels than that. Mr. Tweedy. I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that wags necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc- tions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly atem from conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and funnelled down to me. I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re- ceived instructions. Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above the level of DDP? Mr. Tweedy. I chink I would proceed with it on basie that he was authorized to give me instructions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered to tell me to do. XY couldn't run his affairs for him to that extent, hut TOP SECRET
Prane (Atte 207) 544-4000 Jj 2 « a ¢ o g a z a Maher ete f st SIG Bese Street, by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way dt Was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to Allen Dulles first I would think is nonsense. Mr, Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question Bisgell about the source of authority for BOMé covert: action he was asking you to undertake? Mr. Tweedy. I would have never hesitated to do if I felt that it was necessary to do so. i can't recall having done so, He and I used to have disagreements philosophically on Operations, We were very good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him when I thought he didn't make &ny sense but -- Mr. Dawson. Could You describe that philosophical difference, or is it desceribable? . Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. 1 think Dick was by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was possible, you know, in the Clandestine service, if they put their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case. Mr. Dawson. Thank you. Mr. Baron, Did you ever discuss the question of assasginating Lumumba with Richard Bissell? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing came up in the first instance, I can't remember how it came up except undoubtedly we had a conversation, TOP SECRET
Pane {Ares 2071 544-6000 “ > a ry a c & < & sMasturgr os ft -t St Fegt Gea me? Mr. Baron. Do you recall when Lt came up? Mr, Tweady. No, I don't. ft obviously must have come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960, But I have no way of putting a date to it. Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was one discussion or a series of discussions? Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have Giscuased it more than once, I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully. Mr. Baron. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. “We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station he thinking along those lines as well. Mr. Baron, So, in effect you were asked to move ahead at least as far as developing the capability to carry of an assassination if an order should be given? Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for doing that. TOP SECRET
Prane {Area 207} $44-4000 a 3 a . a co & « g segteen tt at % BLO deat Strat Mr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you “won't be able to put a precise date to thia conversation with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can narrow it down a little bit. Would you assume that it would be after the proclama- tion of the Congolese indepandence on June 36, 1960? Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes. Mr. Dawaon. Would you assume it would be before Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on September15, 19607 Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes. didn't realize he had gone into custody that early. Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the summer or early fall of ‘66? Mr. Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that? Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United Nations force from mid-September until late November and it was in Late November that he left. to go traveling towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops at that point in very early December and from early December until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death was announced shortly thereafter. Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 207) 544-4000 ~ = a a e a @ _« & POND t SEL Meaamemgtan ta PEC Rew Ate wes wag sometime after September 15th, I don't know. Mr. Baron. When you aay "after" -- Mr. Tweedy. After you put September 15 the day he came under, The only thing is X have no recollection that it would have happened as eatly as, say, early August or early September, Mr. Baron, it was in August or early September that Lumumba was Premier of the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a atruggle for power between Lumumba and Kasgavubu going on. ‘ Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question. Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point. Mr. Dawson, It would be whether or not you would have considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody. If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think any More precision in the date would néceasarily be productive. Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would be that only purpose of the exercise would have been to have a plan when he was in nobody's custody. Mr. Baron. That would have been before a Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense to me, September, because -- Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on. In .a moment I will show you some cable traffic that TOP SECRET
Smone {Area 202) 344-4000 PI 2 4 6 a o & “ $ went back and forth batween headquarters and the Congo after he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollec- tion about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at that time. Mr. Tweedy. Yea. Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would only make sense to you that -- Mr. Twoedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me Mr. Baron, -- that this initial consideration of the feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell and yourself? Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have been during the period when he was in effect in power. 1 should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong. Mr. Baron. Did you have any discussion with Bissell where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassina- tion of Lumumba had moved heyond the realm of possibility to an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking steps to carry out. Mr. Tweedy. I cannot recall a conversation with Bissell wherein effect he said, let's move from A to Boor C to D or something like this. I do not recali that. My recollection of the whole interval when this was under con- sideration was that it was a planning interval and at no point TOP SECRET |
Pnane [ares 707) 444-6060 < & s = « # can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was go~able. or anything really very close to it. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should eccur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency at which somebody would have said something more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say go to it. Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far. Mr. Baron. You didn't have any action plang for assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of? Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere. Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was -done? Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of aceers one might ever have liad to Lumumpa tor whatever purpose. Yt was thia kind of thing, as best {I recollect. Mi. Baron. Bid you send cables raising the question of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him? TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202} 5444000 Pi 3 * a cf a a « z BLD Faget Nee pe TOP SECRET Mr. Tweedy, I suspect that was the first cable ever went out. In other words, the first cable that ever eo nme oo a errr went out to Larry Hedgman. He must have realized, he would have been perfectly clear on hia end, the way one's minds were running even though it was purely a contdhgency. Mr, Baron. I am sorry. I don't think I understood You say the first cable that went out. Mr. Tweedy. That was the first way that Hedgman was ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in Washington, was via our cable. Iam sure he waan't back in the States over anything of this kind, Mr. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent? Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distinct- ly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that it was & cable which asked him to be thinking of that. Mr. Baron. That was pursuant to your conversation with Mr. Bissell? Mr. Tweedy. That was. Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell \ sand that cable. Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable I wouldhave written and probably released by him, Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable? Tweedy. God knows,I don't, TOP SECRET
Panne {Asea JOP] 9446000 3 4 & ¢ © « g TOP’: SECRET Mr. Baron. “Or the effect of the language in the cable? Mr. Tweedy. The effect of the language in the cable would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along thease lines. Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose? Mr. Tweedy. It would have been the aventuality that we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally. Mr. Dawson, I# that language you think might have been used or that is how you think it might have been done? Mr. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the cable, Mr. Baron.: Did you send s number of such cables to the Chief of Station? Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there werea few over a period of time. It was not an intansive correspondence as I remember it. Mr, Baron. It wouldn't be thenormal practice to have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject, would it? Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever had one but If have had very sensitive subjects,operationally sensitive nubjects that I have dealt with in extensive cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this nature whatsoever. Mr. Baron. | Were these cables from headquarters to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 207) $40-6008 a 2 « 6 € 5 @ « § restricted. channel? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are gant in various types of restricted channels I am gure you aware. Mr. Baron. This channel even more tightly held and Closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would flow to the Chief of Station? Mr. Tweedy. That would be a very fair atatement, Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in- structions to destroy it after reading it? Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal. Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this such an inatruction would have been given? Mr. Tweedy. It would really be up to the Chief of Station, I think. Tt would be up to the Chiaf of Station what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he needed to maintain a record for quick reference purposes in the future, But, he was pexfectly capable of keeping a file which would be accessable only to him and the station and if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't think this would have been a problem for him,but to answer your guestion I don't know what Hedgman himself did. Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville? TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 207} 544-6000 : 3 2 LY © 3 £ « 6 Mr. Tweedy. It was a serious anawer. I can't do better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn’t argu- mentative, I guess it started to diacuss, not the pros and cons of policy,at least I don't recall it did, but “what it was that he might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply to an inatruction from headquarters. Mr. Baron. Did he mention any specific means that he had of gaining access to Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. IT don't recall now. I don't recall. I think ha said it was certainly not beyond the question that moans cauld either be developed or might arise but I certainly do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in the firat instance. On that IT am afraid I am terribly hedgy. Mr. Baron. At the time that you were requesting the Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of climinating him, was this access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of. personal access that would be ‘needed? Mr. Tweedy. I am sure that must have been covered at some point,i.e., in perhaps 4 series of types of accesses. Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries? Mr, Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered. Mr. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of -- TOP SECRET
seen YOP SECRET finding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simply snatch Lumumba from custody,this was Clearly access to assassin- ate him, is that correct? Prone [Ares 202} 544-4000 Mr. Tweedy. That would certainly be my recollection. Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even considered,at least I don't remember {t, Mr. Baron, In your discussiona with Richard Bissell about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to you that he had had similar discussions withfustin O'Donnell Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of Justin o'Donnell's role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to you and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgotten that qlustino'DonrelL played any role whatsoever and now that it has been brought to my recollection I recall it. ? « a « a & ¢ # I recall it almost in detail. I remember being told that he had expressed reservations or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and J think my response to you was if he said that 1 would believe him but £ didn’t recall it. Mr. Baron. Pid Richard Bissell ever indicate te you tae te that he had asked (Justin O'Donnell te go to the Congo to assassinate Lumumba? Lasting Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told me that he was going to ask O*Donnells to go to the Congo to a “— oa ™ examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever GHeat Street OF TOP SECRET.
TAN Ne ee ert ae SATE AN ITU ne TOP ‘SECRET saying, I am going to send .O'Donitel'l sto ’ going Bonney, the Congo to knock off Lumumba, not in those words. Mr. Baron, When you BaY examine tha thing on the ground Prove {Aras 2027} $44-4000 you mean he would send o' Donnell to the Congo to take a first-hand look at the means? Mr. Tweedy. Yee, conceivably I suppose this all’ re might have resulted in a climax there but at least my recollec- PR O'Donnell. to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words but that he, I am sure the Philosophy was that if anything was done you would want to keep it as separate from the station as possible and thus a man from the outside, It was Bissell's idea that Q.Connehl might be the man. Sipe * % Mr. Baron. The man from outside? WARPED ® PAUL Mr. Tweedy. Outside the station. Mr. Baron, The CIA station in the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. Right. Mr. Baron. That such a man would be necessary to out an assassination operation if one were to be mounted? Mr. Tweedy. That if one was mounted it would obviously he desirable to do it under auspices which would are! protect the security of the station or involvement of the f . Weaate station. « e That I am sure was the philosophy behind it, DN gt eres Mr, Baron. But it is your recollection that Qupomrent, TOP SECRET
Bmore three 202} $44-FO00 5 € a e a -# « £ eee OE Ate ate LO Parse & was sent to the Congo to assess the possibility for assaséinating Lumumba rather: than to mount some sort of xid- napping plan to draw Lumumba out from the U.N. guard and put him in the hands of Congolese authorities? Mr. Tweedy. That-is certainly my recollection but 1 would not want to put too high a value on it. I just don't recall kidnapping as a factor is all. Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bussell ever mention to you that lethal biological agents had been developed in the CIA laboratories for possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumum- ba? Or they were available for such use? Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD probably had the capability or had the agent or whatever ico wag. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I heard that, yes. ; oe . ta. ” ~ se pcos AE epee ey Mr. Baron. Would this have been under [sianey: Gott} igh’ s auspices or direction in TSD? Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would have been. I don't recall. Was he? 1 think he was. Mr. Baron. . Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you re a oe directly that/Sidney Gottliehiwas involved in developing ™ —_3 poisons that might be used for aasassination? Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all. Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons TOP SECRET -
© & Pain Prone {Brea 207) $444000 wate Ce cee ee hr a comé up 48 one means that was being considered and which the Chief of Station should axplore? Mr. Tweedy. Ioam sure it must have, After all, there are not many waya of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities. Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station ever make a response to you via cable which indicated that he was ex- pioring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible use of poisoning -- purpose of poisoning him. S Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he must have done that. I don’t recall specifically, but that éffect is what he was charged to do in the first instance, examine the possibilities. I would be very surprised if Hedgmnan didn’t come back and in effect comment on this but the nature of his comments I really don't recall. Mr. Dawson. when you and Bissell had your conversa-~ tiona, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest authority to undertake. to assassinate Lumumba? TOP SECRET
Prone {Ares 267) $44-40600 3 < a "4 a = « k : . 1 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, no. I gueas I was under the impression when he talked to me that -- © don't know whether this is fair or not ~= I honestly don't know what my impression was at the time whether this was something that Bissell had in effect sucked out of hia own thumb as a contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and because it was contingency planning I don't think at that stage I was particularly concerned. But to anawer the question I just don't know. Mr. Dawson. You stated earlier you knew Gordon Gray very well. Mr. Tweedy. I didn’t say that. I have known Gordon Gray far better since than I did then. 1 knew Gordon Gray very slightly indeed then, and I am not sure IT ever had a -- while he was in office -- that I ever had & personal conversa~ tion with him. T have seen a lot of him since he was on the President's Board. Mr. Dawson. That answers ‘my question, Mr, Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation to you one way or the other as to whether he had approval from any authority higher than DDP for this consideration of sssasginating Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not recall so. Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you that he was directly in contact with the Chief of Station in TOP SECRET
Prone {Araa 202) $44-4000 # « . @ 3 8 < & COUR D poms Ded Laan B1Q F osat Stewes NE you? Mr. Tweedy. He always said that any DDP, of course, that has the capability, and right, it was never my impressioc Bb ee we ee ce that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay it, he certainly had the right and capability to go into it. Mr. Dawson. Can wa go into how tha right was able to be eaxercised? Mr. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable, He could establiah hia own channel to Leopoldville with his own set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division, He has the right to do that. Mr. Baron. It would not be improper for a DDP to send a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another country? Mr. Tweedy. I wouldn't comment on the appropriateness. He obviously had the authority. "My relationships with Bissell were such that I do not believe it. I never had the impression that he ever had any inten- tion or desire to go around me on matters of this kind. Mr. Dawson, Who else other than the DDP or pcr would have such authority? Mr. Tweedy. I don’t know. TOP SECRET
@ 4 3 «< & ¢ S$ & < g PRons (Arne 207} $44-6090 "ued af. Waeemington faa F150 Passe Stree, Mr. Baron, Would the President? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but he would Probably have to come to the Agency to fina out how to do it. imagine the Presi- Gent could send a personal representative, I am damn sure he would?.have no way of knowing how to send 4 cable out there, He would make a muck of it if he did. Mr, Baron. Did you learn at any point that lethal bio- logical substances were actually in the custody of the Chief of Station in Congo? Mr. Tweedy. This was mentioned when X talked to you and Mr. Widea and my answer was that I don't recall it, but that it was perfectly possible for them to be sent there. Mr. Baron. How would they have been sent? Mr. Tweedy. They could have been Bent one or two ways, they would have been sent through the pouch with the whole thing wrapped in ard addressed in such manner that it would be opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way it could be done. Mr. Baron, Do you have any knowledge of a meesenger from CIA headquarters having t6 go to the Congo to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba ,if possible, and also pro- vide him with the tools to Carry out such an assassination, namely, poisonsand medical equipment for administering them? TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 544-4000 < 2 a . é o « < z Mr, Baron, Let me represent to you that we have testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that & messenger would arrive in the Congo and would be someone that he would recognize and this messenger would give him instructions that he was to carry out. Bid you ever know of such a cable being. sent to the Conga? Mr. Tweedy. I should be very surprised if I didn't, but I certainly have mo recollection of it-whatsoever. Mr. Baron. And the Chief of Station further testified that shortly after receiving such a cable he received & visit WEE who arrived in _Leopoldville and made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of : . “che ate, Station said that he immediately recognized COCM@any, as an officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this cable referred to. ma Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had meetings rr i recocolen in his apartment in Leopoldville where OH | ee nee 2 Bey... him instructions that he aaid came from the headquarte ers to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and also, according to the Chief of Station, gave him lethal biological substances and medical equipment with which to administer them. TOP SECRET.
Brine (Arad 7207} $46-4000 ~ 3 a e @ ° & < Hy .astungrens f+ at LOT eye Nie owt, Were you aware of that chain of events? Mr. Tweedy. That sounds far more definitive than any- thing I have any recollection of at all. ¥ Siete, ¥ pommel If I understand what you said waa, Gottilebiwould have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their conversations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters? Mr. Baron. That is -- Mr. Tweedy. If that is the case I don't believe it. Mr. Baron. That is the essence of the testimony that the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious to carry out an assassination mission. He daidnit think it was practical or wise and he probably would have gone back to headquarters to consult with them if he thought he was in a position to move immediately to carry out the assass- ination plan, but it was his opinion that the policy decision had been made and that he had authority to move ahead although he doubted ~=- Mr. Tweedy. My recollection doesn't go anywhere near that far. Mr. Dawson. He checked that authority by! immediately cabling back to headquarters saying,this guy has made himself available to me as well as he has delivered something and has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority TOP SECRET
Prana {rag 202} 544-6000 vi = a 6 « & 2 « 53 a Mashengtoe. f Ti Sasat Street SE in the land to order me to do what he go ordered, which got another cable back through the specially slugged cable saying yes, what he told you is correct. Mr. Twaedy. i don't recall that, which surprises me, because once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't have been privy to those. Mr. Baron. If a request such as the plan Mr. Dawson outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, 4f it had said almply I have seen your messenger and received instruc- tions and request confirmation that I am to carry them out, would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had seen such a cable? Mr. Tweedy. I can’t be at all sure it will refresh my recollection but if you and Hedgman say that such a cable was sent, I am not going to gainsay it. Mr. Baron. Would that be the manner in which confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested? Mr. Tweedy. I don't know because I never saw one be- fore or since but it sounds highly reasonable to me. This is the way, this would be the way I should have thought -any two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking about and, of course, you don’t have to use unnecessary words but beyond the likelihood of this I can't aay that ia what TOP SECRET
Prone {Aras 202) $44-4000 Pd ? * ry @ o & + @ z Pata SOL Meahirgtion, 17 € ADO Farad Steamer, Mr. Dawagon, This leaves ue with one or two alter- natives,either the Chief of Station whe has appeared and testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were: not privy to what was going on. Mr. Tweedy. Or I literally don’t recall it. This is my problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things -- Mr. Dawson, It is 15 years ago. Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this. had to be reminded of so many things about the things that T recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were basically the things I was basically concerned with all the time which was putting this division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start getting fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terns, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. I spent days in a row not even giving Lumumba one single bloody thought. This is my problem. Mr. Dawson, Let's try to jog your memory on this. Do you recall any time during that period of any dis- wet ot é . BS e i
Prene [Area 202} 544-4000 rl 2 « a a a & 4 & No. Mr. Dawaeon. All right. Mr. Tweedy. But if he went as a courier, I will bet I knew it, but I don’t recall it. Mr. Baron. Having heard this story, would it be your assumption it is moreiuikely to be true than not? Mr. Tweedy. Well, I put it purely this way. Mr. Baron. I am asking you for your expert opinion here as someone experienced. Mr. Tweedy. Expert opinion. Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible for promoting this Chief of Station or at least appointing him Chief of Station, I assume? Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His appointment was already in the works when I came aboard and I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which, if I remember correctly, was in Brussels and he came to Lon- don to discuss an operational matter with me which had nothing whatsoever te do with that and we had a very good discussion. It was only, I think, when I got back to headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division that I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no exception whatsoever, but as a number of assignments may be made before I came they had to be they couldn't wait for me TOP SECRET |
: 1 to get the word. 4 2 i Mr. Dawson. Have you ever had any occasion to doubt | i . his veracity or integrity? ; ‘ Mr. Tweedy. I have not. Mt or Casa I think when I say yes to your baaic queation, it would be that I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his gs, Bat integrity. Mr. Baron. We don’t question it. Mr. Tweedy. All of this happened pretty much the way you gave it to me. ' Mr. Baron. That would be your -- a ; ; Mr. Tweedy. The aspect of it I find very difficult to q oS] : believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of ‘ le 3 “3 ' these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very s < g 14 : difficult to -- I do not recall and I find difficult to believe and I believe implicitly the reaction he gave you which was, reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure as hell would have referred again to headquarters before he did it. te Mr. Baron. Why did you find it difficult to believe re guch an instruction would have been given? " Mr. Tweedy. That way I would have said in such a _ Waarnglon, matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a. oe ’ Yast word up to the last minute. ay : . Sabie ae 678 “ ., Not one of these things that Goreliekyruns off to the 20. AUD Feeat Stee: TOP SECRET
Prune (tes 207} 5444000 “ a « ‘ ¢ c x < z aq TUG Scrat Kroes TOP SECRET Congo and by the time he has found Hedgman, given hia inatruc- tions and all of which could have been four or five or six days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it even then set about his leisure to do it or without further reference to headquartera that is not the way my organization has ever run operations. x ba eae ve Mr. Baron. Was it likely at all that qh GSeLrres. would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the Congo to deliver them to the Chief of Station? Mr. Tweady. I should have said quite impossible. Mr. Baron, Without an instruction from the DOP at least? Mr. Tweedy. That is quite impossible. “  t ~ , ww oe Mr. Baron. Would (Pr. Gottliebfhave proceeded to the Conge in the way the organization normally worked if the +g v4 DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission? Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid 1 don't quite understand. Scho: sar Mr. Baron. If the BCY had given instruction to go to the Congo and deliver poisons to the Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting with the DDP? Mr. Tweedy. I suppose so. But I don't believe it. I don't believe ic ever happened. To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a personal private instruction from the DCI, and was ‘inatructed TOP SECRET
brome (Araa 707) $44-4900 4 3 « a ¢ a 8 € s arated 2 ee SLO Barat Stree nF TOP SECRET. to proceed without reference to anybody else he would pre- sumably go ahead and do so. Mr. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this assassination of Lumumba had been Giscusaed, this was not such a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circum- vented? Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the person with whom the division first discussed the matter an- tirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen Dulles. I am sure when I say I am sure I assume Bissell dis- cussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter which was between the DCI's office and the Leopoldville station insofar as 1 was aware, and to this day I don't believe it ever was, Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about earlier when I think we were jumbling two Guestions together, it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowl- Crean edge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that sao ates Sink, ee time that the testimony, the ‘basic testimony we have received obovate about poisons being delivered to the Congo by {5r. Gottiiebywith instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, would be true testimony? i Mr. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr. Baron, is to say I see not the slightest reason and do not believe that you would have been lied to on this point, TOP SECRET.
But, there is nothing in my experience with the Agency which would really bear on that point whatsoever. Mr. Baron. Did you travel to the Congo shortly before the independence of the Congo was declared? terme (Arte FOF) 544-8000 Mr. Tweedy. That was my first visit to the Congo as I recall, it was two weeks before independence. I made a long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flew from Sambura, I guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville and that is thefirsat time I ever saw Leopeldville. Mr. Dawson. Do you know whether Mr. Hedgman was there at that time? Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Hedqman I am almost sure was not. His predecessor was there. He had many children, I 3 a ry @ fo} z « & can't remember his name. Mr. Baron. And you left the Congo before independence was declared. Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was only, there for, 1 suppose f was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventually I had to go up to the Ivory Coast to settle an unexpected problem. LC Mathatgteet ! Mr. Baron. For the record would you agree with me Kremer SF that independence was declared about June 30, 1960? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. 5G Base TOP SECRET
irons {Ares 207) 444-6000 Waets mw POUL wer ree ON Na eqtie tye ro] as 6 tat, ane - Lumumba? TOP SECRET. 40 Mr. Baron. Bid you make another trip during which UTP Te ee you visited the Congo at some point before the death of eg ret af Mr. Tweedy. Yes, well, it is this one that I regurgi- tated finally which must have been as near as the early ; part of December and which had started with a visit to Rome in the latter part of November, followed by a trip to Nairobi followed by a brief visit to South Africa, then I think Congo, then briefly Brazzavilie and home via Europe. Mr. Baron. And this meeting in November ‘60 in Rome was a meeting of Aftican -- Mr. Tweedy. South - Northern African Station Chiefs. Fand these would have been chicfs of stations of Me Mr. Baron. And the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. No. Mr. Baron. So the Conge Chief of Station would not normakly have been -- _ ; : : Mr. Tweedy. If he came up he must have come up to see “Bissell. sar. Baron. Richard Bissell was traveling with you on this -- Mr. Tweedy. No. Mr. Baron. -- tour to Rome and Nairobi? Mr. Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose
Penne theres 207) $44-4006 3 « 6 s Foy & € ¢ Waster sy 1 BEM Saege Were? of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of our new Chiefs of Stations in Africa and rather than make a trip around Africa, which he hardly hud time, he used a device which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at a central point to which these people could have ready access and, therefore, it was easy for people on the north Mediter- ranean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to procead to Rome, and the same way it was easy for East African Station Chiefa to preceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there, each one two or three days, I suppose. Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station in the Congo attend the meeting in Rome? Mr, Tweedy. I am sure he would not, In other words, if he saw Rissell he would have merely come to Rome and have seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a man who didn't belong in the North African meetings and merely raised the question whether Hedgman was there. Mr. Baron, What region in the CIA organization chart would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to? Mr. Tweedy. We change amsund there. We had in those days, we had the(Noren African branch, we had the AGREE NET Igen branch, we had a gsGuthen Af Figg branch, which included south AFrica PRG SS, probably gkomeudquese Africas maybe the Congo in those days. Later on the Congo was sort TOP SECRET
Prone [Ares 703) 344-4008 « a e z “ z rest Steet tot of Sui Generis but in that early time I suspect it fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutely sure. It might have fallen just in French-speaking West Africa. We always had aCBrenchyWest” Africa, an(ENglisim=speakings Mr. Baron. We have received testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that point that he did came to Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he belives that he also met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines' house. Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mr, Karamessines. Zt would only be because Mr. Karamessines was host as Chief of Station in Rome. But I am sure he was not discussing any policy problems with Mr. Karamessinesa who had absolutely no jurisdiction over them in those days whateoever. Mr. Baron. That was his testimony, but it was incidental, but if, as he has testified, that he met with Mr. Bissell and yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony? Mr, Tweedy. Absolutely not. Mr. Baron. And that would be due te the intensity of activity in «he Congo at this point and the intensity of concern over that activity? Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. It was obviously becoming more and more of a commitment of both the U.S. Government and thus the agency. I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this TOP SECRET
tanne {Arse 202) 3444000 < & @ co] z 4 £ “TOP SECRET | ‘ i waa the main reason that I am sure I went to the Congo | at that point was the fact that it obviously was going to become a major personnel drain, if you like, on the Division and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the field, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over. Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about this meeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you were together? Mr. Tweedy. I can only assume that some of the things that we discussed by cable traffic were diacussed. The other thing I am sure must have been diacussed was what I would call the general assessment of the Congolese situation and what the station might be required to do, thus the sort of support headquarters was going to have to give the Station. Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination of Lumumba or the prospect of ~- Mr. Tweedy. I would he immensely surprised Lf it wasn't discussed but I don't recall) in what context it was discussed. In fact, I don't believe it wasn’t discussed. It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at least I assume it was, at that point. Mr. Baron. The prospect of assassinating Lumumba con- tinued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that TOP SECRET
Lumumba was actually dead? i : I f ! ‘ Mr. Tweedy. I don’t recall. You probably are much more knowledgeable on that than 1 am. I don’t recall when in Beane (Arma 202) 544-4000 effect we no longer considered it or dt no longer was a factor. I just don't remember. Mr. Baron. But, just now you were assuming that that would have the case? Mr. Tweedy. If it was still On, it was atill on the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it. If it was off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember. Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable traffic between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N. é o] 4 6 a & 6 « s custody. In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N. custody -- Mr. Tweedy. Okay. Mr. Baron. -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the Cirector. La (The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for DIM Bree Seewer Gt identification.} TOP SECRET
tryne (Aloe 207) 444-6000 « a ¢ 2 a t “TOP Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were sddressed. I see he sent one specifically to BCI. Mr. Baron. off the record. {Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. Onthe record. Let's turn back now. I believe while we were off the record and axamining this cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that this cable was not sent from Leopoldviile to the Director but rather it was sent from headquarters to Leopoldville; is that correct? Mr. Tweedy. Correct. Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation "Allen W. Dulles“, at the top of the telegram, that this was a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chicf of Station. Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off. Mr. Baron. And let me direct your attention to the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high office the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous conseyuences for the prestige of the U.N. and for the interests of the Free World generally. TOP SECRET
ried ae whe yee tee g 2 c i WAHO & PAUL saan PIA Cage eee Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing condit:: this should be a high priority of our covert action. Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. I do. Mr. Baron. And why would three L's have been used in the cable? Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission? Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don‘t know, Now, that isn't the normal way to do 4t at all. 1 honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice. Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion that LLL does refer to Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed. Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency anc State Department? | ' Mr. Tweedy. Tt accords much more with my recollect:- of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situatic: the Congo than it does on he personally, but he obvious!-+ Was adiways in the bacxground. Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under TOP SECRET
Prans (arts 707) 544-4060 WARD KR FALL — ~~ it ’ exieting conditions thie should be a high priority of out covert action, close quotes, ~~ is that consistent with the policy towards Lumumba ag you recall it? In other words,that Lumumba's removal was a prime objec-. tive of the covert actions of the Agency. Mr. Tweedy. We would have givan our eye teeth to have Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would agree with that. Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated September 16, 1966. (The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)
5 2 ¢ i WARD &® Pau my My. Baron. This contains references to the fact that “the station wa flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup". And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N. troops had interferred with Congolese troopa and prevented them from arresting Lumumba. Now, thia cable was sent to the CIA headquarters : from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu coup where Mobutu took over the govarnment. In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency it now reads: "Station advised two moderate Congolese politician try work with key Congolese contact in affort eliminate Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity to arganize counterattack. Only solution is remove him from scene soonest", WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point, as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a threat in the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. I don’t really recall but I think the chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody might very well result in his early release or his ability sci: to control matters. I should think that ia very probable. Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be TOP SECRET
tt te ty. + cr bes on 210 foes Gtewes St TOP SE thie fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was protected by the U.N. == Me. Tweedy. ° Yes, that ig probably true. Mr. Baron. Ae Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated September 20, 1960, which ia sent -~- off the record. - (The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for identitication.} (Discussion off the record.) TOP SECRET
See ees Hak eee, SEO Fooge Greet 60 Waasesaran, HW 50955 ¢ WAM R Fay HOARE Prone (Aras 707) 544-4008 . ae e be be mn a TOP SECRET ot Mr. Baron. Back on the record. Although the top of this cable does not indicate where the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking at the designations that this cable must have been sent from Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy? Mr. Tweedy. That is correct. Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to Paragraph 7 which saya: “Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba reconcilation. Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he moat apt come out on top", Doas that indicate to you that the Chief of Station ‘in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned that Lumumba should not be allowed even &-minor role in the government of the Conga? Mr. Tweedy. That is what it gays. Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated January 19, 1961. {The document referred to wag marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4 . for identification.) TOP SECRET | an
H i é WARE &@ Pau, Pal Sra | Meant SIG Favret Qereet Gt 1¢ Mr. Baron. This was sent from the Congo to -- 1 Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville infa headquarters, information headquarters, Mr. Baron. 80 that headquarters. would have received a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Elizabethville . to the Station Chief in Leopoldville? Mr. Tweedy. Right. Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of thia cable says: "Thanks for Patrice. If we had known he was coming wa would have baked a snake". Do you have an independent recollection of this cable? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason of that phrase, which ia another way of gaying, a lighthearted way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived in Kutanga and he had no idea he waa coming. Mr. Baron. «. So this cable does not indicate that there was any connection hetween the CIA and. Lumumba‘’s eventual death, the actual causes of his death in Kutanga? Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? { am not quite ‘sure I understood that. Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that ;: the CI was knowledgeable of the actual causes of Lumumba’s death at the point when it occurred? a ey tae comme neg 8 In other words, that they were connected to the people t TOP SECRET | _
ere tet ia shuiend ts Prone (Aras 202) 344-Gixos nS 9 1 16 WARD & PAUL bee ~ non ‘| ats at who cauged his death? Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the queation. This means that Lumumba arrived under the Congo- lese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the bage at Elizabethvilie didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't know very much, didn’t presumably know very much about what eecurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard. Mr, Baron. Let me put the question in context. On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Mr. Baron. And later United Nationa investigations coz: cluded that it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba was actually killed in Kutanga. I was asking you before whether thia cable would indi- cate that the United States would have been involved in bringing about the death of Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely in- dicsates that thia part of the Agency, 1.@., Elizabethville had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate except these few phrases that he put down here and would imp: although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignoran: Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter. We didn’t know how all this was occurring and were not able to follow the event except after the event. TOP SECRET
x Py} ™ * HY < 2 H a WaPD & Paue Mr. Baron. Was the CIA connected in any way to the i ! « } events that immediately led to Lumumba's death? : 5 Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever. : Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly 6 Lumumba from hia previous place of imprisonment in Tyaville 6 | out to Kutanga where the authorities were known to be so 7 hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there? 8 {i Mr. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely 9 | an African avent,. . ; Mr. Baron, At what point did you learn of Lumumba's death? , Mr, Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the world did. No one had a beat on this. : Mr, Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu in- 7 F tended to fly Lumumba to Katanga? o , Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am sure the cable 4i¢ traffic would reflect it if I had. Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do you recall an asset who was sent from Europe, where he had heen recruited rm FOS to the Congo in the fall of 1960? Mr. Tweedy. I think Iwas reminded of this when I talked to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago. Mr. Baron. This would be an asset who went by the cryptonym of QJWIN. Mr. Tweedy. So I waa reminded then, which was a cryptonym i TOP SECRET
Pe eT a cia TOP SECRET 84 | I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number g 2 of cryptonyms when reminded of them. | i 3 : Mr. Baron, Aside from the cryptonym, do you recall (97 : ; A there was an asset who had been recruited by| jin 5 | Furope and who was gent to the Congo to perform some mission 6 | in November and December of 1966? | 7 Mr. Tweedy. I was generally reminded of it by that 8 i conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that 9 my recollection doesn’t go any further than that. ‘ . Me! But unlike some of the things I have been reminded i . : of, I think recalled that asset of had been . involved. That ia just as about as deep as my recollection oO : wt goes. ° : - Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollecticn, ve first, by relating to you the testimony of wurecuneo Donnell : tl who said that he did make use of QUWIN in the Congo as a kind of “alter ego® of hia, a general operative of his. Does that remind you at all of the nature of the mission that QJWIN had in the Congo? onnys _Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn’t. sip ete neler ob eth Raph ine mits emptaena irene et Et 6 SA HY item oat a . Mr. Baron. Have you heard the phrase axecutive ac- ‘ tion? t “ ot Mr. Tweedy. In the newspapers. “4 Mr. Baron. During your tenure as 4 CIA official you never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of a ATQ Fant stemer SE TOP SECRET. 4
oe ree ena ree ies tren nena ita wate TOP SECRET — i a CIA program or plan. § 2 Mr, Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington 3 3 terms of executive action. j at Mr. Baron. Meaning adminiatrative action? 5 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. 6 | Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to ” ! develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of & ji @ foreign leader, if required? 9 | . Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that? ie ! Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project .- , which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the mea: es pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassin- ee : , ations if required? ; ‘ 16 Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically? a. Mr. Baron. Yes. ¢ Mr. Tweedy. No. ve Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating | Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the : - Agency about assassination capabilities? ; Mr. Tweedy. Never. ‘ os Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with the Agancy into the discussion of the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in Congo? ALO Fant NorMet, SE. Braatenstas, & hi tr TOP SECRET
Ex 3 Mr. Tweedy. The only other person who was aware of it . 2 | was my deputy. Mr. Baron. That would be? tyi Prane (Aree 202) $64-6600 if Mr, Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that a> 5 | sense. 4 6 : Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in realtion to that 4 ? i plan or consideration? 8 i Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of thig kind he 9 would have been my alterego but he was aware of dt, that is 10 all. Mr. Baron. Do you know William Harvey? Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't bs seen him in a long while. RAD & PRU tar rot ts Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey £ ; was in contact with to develop the standby capability for carrying out assassinations? Mr. Tweedy. I don’t know anything about it whatsoever. Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo? Atsielen Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember, Mr. Baron. Let me show you 6 document now that we will Mark Fxhibit 5. SWoaamiegte ma (The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for identification.} TOP SECRET FIO First Street. 6 & *
SRLS IEDC Rte T RON EI iN RL oe” 70 os ¥ 3 5 Ne: at 4 4, * . ok tI ae 4 ham i ee . . Sgt mye CR | 57! wow TOP SE g } Mr. baron! This is a dispatch from the Chief of : > || KUTUBE/D, which I believe is == | 3 4 | Mr. Tweedy. That is Staff D. } 4 t Mr. Baron. In'the Foreign Intelligence Division, is ‘that correct? 6 | Mr. Tweedy. Yas. } AW 7 | Mr. Baron. Written to the Chief of Station i and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AP and & | 9 } Chief WE. iG ‘Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African | Division? Mr. Tweedy. What ia the date? ‘ ©: Mr. BAron. The date is November 2, 1960. +e Mr. Tweedy. I would have been. a Mr. Baron. And William Harvey would hve been Chief of - : _ KU2D7 MY Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was Chief of Staff D0, in which case he could have, that is to what he would have been then. g Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the ; . record you have had a chance to review thia document and : ; teil me some things about it I would like to repeat on the 3 tn - record. ! . First of all, on this copy of the document there is 3 a4 ct "typed the words Danuel M. Pressland, under the space for TOP SECRET
SEY Sate oy eat att ke 58 , officer'a aignature, and you said to me a moment ago that | @ ! : ‘ 2 you are almost 100 percant sure that that is the pseudonym | : ; of William Harvey, is that right? } ‘ Mr. Tweedy. Yea. | 6 Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to -- é : Mr. Tweedy. Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief ‘ a of ID at the.time. He certainly was Chief of ID, You teld | & | me he was Chief ef ID than, I put those two together 9 i and say I em pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was | Me Harvey, I can't awear to it, but I am virtually sure. Oy - : Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollec- - tion of the subject matter that ia discussed in this document? © F Mr. Tweedy. None at all. It doesn't ring a bell ke 3 - &t all. z 1s a Mr. Baron. Even after reviewing the document Me » do you have any recollection of what QUWIN's mission in the q - Congo would be, would have been? Mr. Tweedy. No. , ; E « . _ Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo -- i . Mr. Tweedy, You told me he was going out there to a : ° work with O'Donnell and whoh. O'Donnell went out there I 4 guess he was going to look into a number of things for ; 4 3 ae , a aad headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters. When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't N DER baat tee a recollect by any emeans what the full auspicas of O"Donnell's “S : | ‘TOP SECRET
Prone {Araa 207} 344-4008 RARD &@ PAUL vaso ae a Se PLO big Nereer NE visit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QUWIN was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he waa going to work for him and act aa his general assistant. Mr. Baron. That was the way ‘Mr._0!Donnell.described it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently pracedes the dispatch of QUWIN to the Congo there is no mention ofi ME. i @Hoyponnel2. : ’ Mr. Tweedy. thia I don't think necessarily has anything to do with o:pannell}s miseion whatsoever. This, I think, is generic mission, seams to indicate that he is going to muck around with Corsicans. I don’t recall Corsicans, I know oybomaett in the Congo at all. Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the Chief of the African Division? Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather from this -- you see there is also a reference here. I don’t know what the reference is about. But f gather that Dakar is brought into this activity because they wanted to act ina support capacity to this headquarters activity. Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was con~ cerned “with? Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary. TOP SECRET
ve aR ON Raa A nent . RNE A tl eee i Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of Staff BD to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without os going through the African Division although keeeping the African Chief informed? Prone {Aree 7207) $44-E608 avy t fr ; 6 ; Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive. { 6 You can't have one without the other. To answer your first ” , question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have eceurred il & * that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station i ii : } 9 | without the African Division being informed. This, however, t makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terma of headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate RAND A FAA this with the Division and if the Division had perceived any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it . i i“ : before the dispatch went out. Also I noticed Dakar ia also invited to find problems with this, if it did, and say so.” Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time? Mr. Tweedy. Well, you know what the role of Staff DO was. LAeawmem ate thee LY : Mr. Baron. This would be obtaining codes by surrepti- tious entry. Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals FLO Pseye Sheem ts TOP SECRET ee HW 504
Prone tres 207) 944-6000 WAM A Fa BID Faye Mee eet 8) &: oo 1G intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely. | 1 Mr. Baron, Would it be surprising to you that QUWIN might. have been used in some manner in connection with an assassina- tion plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised by William Harvey without your knowledge? Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn’t occur. Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities. Mr. Tweedy. Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly I hadn't heard before. Thie sounds as if he was going to have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those two together but I know nothing about it at all. Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, “In view ef the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do.” De you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that QUWIN was asked to do? Mr. Tweedy. I do not. Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it gays: “The operation we have in mind is too sensitive to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets must be conducted with truly" -- which is underscored -- “minimum risk”. TOP SECRET. apace CELI ee on
an : ts, fe - TOP SECRET 1 What would these assets have been used for, what was the search for aseets all about? } Mr. Tweedy. I just do not know. Prone (Area 207) 5446-440G N Mr. Baron. Let'a turn now to & document ..that we will mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which ia a memo : an F 6 for the FN Division from William K. Harvey, Chief of FI q 7 : Division Db. ; 4 & In thie memo I will direct your attention to the 9 sentence that gays in that cable COS Luxemburg wae told es t to TA/A all QJWIN expenses to headquarters since QJWIN waa : aa being used for FI/D purposes.” 4 . Do you know what FID purposes QJWIN was being used for? .. Mr. Tweedy. I don’t know. WAR & Pa Fy Mr. Baron, The memo goes on to say that: x , Le "QJIWIN was sent on this trip for a specifically sensi- tive operational purpose which has been completed”. oo frien e ta aot Were you informed by William Harvey that QJWIN's mission was completed? “esrae Mr. Tweedy. I don’t recall that at all and don't recall any aspect of the mission or its completion. an Mr. Baron. Okay. ae Woarhorgtes Did you know of an asset of the Chief of Station in the stort NE Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after re- SIO bees ceiving plastic surgery so that he wouldn't be recognized by TOP SECRET
Prone (res 2027) 546-4008 ; « . € c & < £ TOP SECRET his fellow Europeans who might be traveling through the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. I de recollect that and you brought it to my attention, when you and Mr. Wides and I discussed this & couple of months ago. I de remember the cryptonym and remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent a3 a sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought if we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be helpful and he was recruited on that rather ganeral basis, and when you discussed with me a later alarming exchange of cables which indicated that he landed running and made some rather frrespon- sible remarks and we commented on them to the station. My best recollection is that in the long haul he stayed on in the Congo and I think became, I believe he became a somewhat useful intelligence source, but Hedgman would have a much better recollection of that. But I do remember quite well his diapatch. He had been seen by two or three members of my Division, including my-deputy. I don’t recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo. If I did I just don't remember. But I remember he was assesserl, as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on & general purpose mission. Mr. Baron. So, he would be viewed as one of the major assets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point? Mr. Tweedy. How major I don't know. He was an TOP SECRET .
Wa Nemo he an a a RS ate a TA ee wher cite ee NS Mle a a eS - 4 5 2 3 ‘ E i 5 5 6 7 & 9 Warm & Pat ast asset. been. of things in the Congo by Hedgman. qualified have bean an assassination mission against Lumumba? Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Diviaion, not by me personally, Glenn Fields person- ally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the Diviasi thing. side of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known -- tion of Lumumba was being considered? that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it through me or training of this asset to other people in the Division than Hie was thought qualified to perform one of a variety Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy. on. The Division knew nothing about the balance of this Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Baron .- Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Baron. TOP SECRET Only time would have told how major it would have Fields. TOP SECRET ... Would one of those things for which he was As I told you previously, told you and Mr. You are saying that Division personnel out- To my knowledge. -«- would not have known that the assassina- Considered at all, that is correct. And -- If they did learn of it I never knew The fact that you left the recruitment and
Sone [Mes IO?) 344-4000 m FAD wae Pay es ye aft TOP SECRET yourself and Fields would indicate to you that he wasn't being considered at that point for an assassination mission? Mr. Tweedy. Iowiil put it differently. As far as I know he was never considered for an assasaination misaion at ali. He thought he was presumably being sent ouf for deeds of daring in the PM “ield and began to talk rather lusty when he arrived, but I think he was soon put etraight. Mr. Baron. PM ia paramilitary operations? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document we will mark Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is a cable to the headquarters, marked to Director fromLeopoldville dealing with WIROGUE on an approach.he made to agent QJWIN. (The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7 for identification.) - TOP SECRET
mane {Ores 207) $44-4000 > a 6 ¢ rf a & TOP SECRET Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This ia the one we dis- 66 cussed two montha ago and this happens all the time. Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QIWIN's report that"WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to par- ticipate in intel net and be member" .~-1 am sorry -- “member ‘execution squad’*, Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this aa a result of your having previously brought it to my attention and I recall it, 4t was a typical example of an agent or asset full of piss and vinegar exceeding his brief and he was Certainly put back on the track very early on. But in this business do not confuse axecution squad with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or any- thing else. It had nothing to do with that. Mr. Baron. You are saying even though you would assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination coming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE made to QUJWIN was probably not a part of that mission. Mr. Tweedy. it was quite specifically not a part of that miasion. There was a chepter of accidents. You have seen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times be- fore, two people who are periphically involved in the same thing and run into each. er and one smelis something on the other. TOP SECRET
Preme (eee, 207) $44,6000 4 . « . 5 TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. Again, why are you ge sure that this would 67 not have been connected in any way to the agssaasination mission? Mr. Tweedy. J thought I made that clear because this man went out up to a point through what I would call the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been handled that way. Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr. Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination mission as part of his general duties in the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. It i8 purely a speculative question. He could have been but Hedgman would also have been required and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him. That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally in the PM field. Mr. Baron. Bid this report create a flap at headquarters at the tame when the cable was sent? Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all. Mr. Baron. it would have been considered a fairly Mr. Tweedy. Jt is not. TOP SECRET
Peis (Atha 202) S24-EOC 3 4 6 @ 2 « ¢ TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. c~ example of free wheeling by an operative? 68 Mr. Tweedy. It ig the sort of thing that can happen. What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem. The problem must have lasted 30 minutes. Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo rane? an ‘ aE nee me 9 ; te with Sidney _GottlLeb?: 7 ml eens? 7% ' Have I ever discussed events in the Oe edhe 6 2 heen I can only assume I must have seen Sid\during this period, during this period, but I don‘t recall any discussions. - ee. Sew In fact, if there had been any discussions withgSidney~Gottay. . t . ~ . SYebyon the Congo it would have been at that time. Mr. Baron, Why would that be s07 wewe Mr. Tweedy. OtherwisefSidney Gottlieb would have had no interest in the Congo. Mr. Baron. So you’mean if there had been any dis- ” _ oes una mer. . cussions between yourself and Sidney Gottlieb it probably SB eerie ae re eee age would have -- Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events. Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological sub- stances in his Laboratory? - Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because Sao I think that would have been Sidney GOCeLYEb"Srbusiness as . | Saenteemenestetcmntnntrendnrtattet * what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest pre- sumably would have been was there anything in his inventory TOP SECRET
Brine ‘Ares 297) 568-SO00 TOP SECRET that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something. Mr. Baron. You might have had at least an exploratory conversation with him on that subject? Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprisad if. I didn't. Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then 1 followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that probably the first conversation would undoubtely have been / pt aaa ao at . held between Dick Bissell and@sidney Gottiteby but this is mercly - —_ what I would suspect was the way it occurred. I don't say that that is the way it occurred. But ¢ “aehe +05 bal . than that no conversation with iSidney Gottlieb on the Con- er = all. Mr. Baron. T am at the end of my questions on specific facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leadina dp to Lumumba’s death which, as you know, is the narrow subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want to say that I appreciate tremendously and know ‘that the Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and un- pleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble. 1 wonder if you have any facts that you would like to ant to the record that you think are neccessary Lo put our dis- cussion today into context? J Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest recollection about TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo -- let's leave the balance of Africa out -- and U.N. and U.S. involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen Prune (Brea 207) 344-4000 an element of the Agency 80 totally involved in a matter which clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo. Mr. Baron. There was an extreme sense of urgency at that time? Mr. Tweedy. Not only an extreme senae of urgency, . the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. What the Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly State, the White House. I must say the Fxecutive Department ‘ ’ € & 4 e was very much working as a team during these days. AGain for- get Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off in- to left field or that I didn't know the way the White Wouse was thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking about things, and the National Security was thinking about things, and I have no reason to believe they ever felt that tnev didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. Tt was an extras ordinarily Close thing. I remember Mennen Williams trying to form a Congo club. When I retired from the African Division I was TOP SECRET
Prone [Ares 207) $44.6000 TOP SECRET given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one, which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather typical of the way the government worked on this thing and 1 personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been & total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed, and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it a chance to move the way it has. There are going to be ups and downs with the things but that is the way it is. I feel very stronaly about it. Does that somewhat answer your question, does that help? Mr. Baron.I simply wanted to give you a chance. Mr. Tweedy. I felt that very strongly and no other assigqnu- ment that I have ever had was this kind of government team and cooperation ever teally required. because we weren't engaged or I wasn’t engaged in that kind of activity. Mr. Baron. Is this government team efforts that you are talking about one that was primarily put together to earry out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the latter part of the 60's, °62, ‘63, Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over what- ever activity the United States Government felt it needed TOP SECRET
Ewe m tehr aa FOF) Ad SOO 3 « L @ « % Sr (ey rata Seneca Pie Rees cee re Se TOP SECRET to be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as 72 purely policy questions of what the Ambaseddor to the U.N. might say to the Secretary General of thea U.N.or what the President might want ta say conceivably I suppose to the Chief of the Belgium state on such matters, Everything certainly didn't just involve what CIA was going to be involved in. It was the whole Policy ball of wax with res- pect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit. Mr. Baron. Did this high degree of organization and intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba or had it gotten rolling? Mr. Tweedy. I think -- Mr. Baron, After the Congolese independence? Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government was thoroughly seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating Congo that started in the earliest days of independence and continued and, of course, when the Tschombe-Kutanga thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N. was there, then, of course, that was it. Tn other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S, concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could read them in the press just continued and continued, hut one thin: was perfectly clear, was that the U.S. was quite determined ‘ to see this thing through. Nothing had been clearer than TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET 73 the way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings. He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but Omer e hens FOF) $44 4000 he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he was continually geosing his staff to @o just that , but in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer, Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and analysis in the intelligence community yenerally and there may be other members of the Committee staff that would like to ca!} upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long * a 2 a « z experience in Agency activities. But IT want to thank you now for your complete coopera- tion and the tremendous amount of information that you have provided on this one subject that has been very helpful? Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you thing I can do to help the Committee in other areas I will be glad to do it and if I don't think 1 can help be- cause I don’t think I know enough about the subject I wikb jis Say 80, Gtherwise I am not afraid te put in, two bits in. Mr. Baron. As far a8 your two hits goes, we would be interested in your two bits WOOL ott pOLicy recommendations in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make, TOP SECRET
~*~ Brae {fees POP) $88 -4000 4 > « e € 3 2 « t and we will take that up at some point in the future. But you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy level in the Agency and we like to take advantage of that. That ie all, thank you. Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much. (Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)