datamatters24/research-document-archive huggingface dataset:
Nw 55101 TOPIC: THE ASSIGNMENT OF FBI AGENTS TO FOREIGN LIAISON POSTS The FBI has had FBI Agents serving in foreign liaison posts since 1940. They are known as Legal Attaches and are regularly called upon to secure in-depth cooperation from foreign agencies on criminal and security matters which are frequently of a complicated and sensitive nature. In order to handle such matters effectively, it is often required that a Legal.Attache be proficient in the language of the foreign country involved and should have some familiarity with the culture, customs and judicial processes. Simultaneously, it is obviously advantageous to have a thorough knowledge of FBI jurisdiction, regulations, and policies. This knowledge can only be achieved through years of experience as an FBI Agent. In order to maintain the cooperation of foreign agencies, Legal Attaches assist these agencies by having investigations conducted in the United States concerning maiters of interest to the foreign countries involved. Several options in lieu of maintaining FBI Agents in foreign countries have been suggested. These include the assignment of Embassy personnel to handle FBI work, to have FBI interests abroad handled by other law enforcement agencies which maintain foreign liaison offices, ~ DoelTd: 32989554 Page 41
xo ® . © @ . and the discontinuance of FBI pursuit of foreign ramifications in criminal and security responsibilities.by FBI personnel and conduct the investigations through direct communications. All of these alternatives pose serious problems including security risks, lack of expertise and knowledge of FBI procedures and policies, etc. The FBI has found it necessary and, in fact, through experience it has been demonstrated it is invaluable to have a man stationed abroad who can insure that prompt and efficient action is taken and that cooperative relationships are nurtured and protected. Accomplishments attained by the FBI through the liaison activities of the Legal Attaches with foreign law enforcement agencies have been numerous, and it is firmly believed that these successes would not have occurred in the absence of personal and direct FBI liaison with foreign police agencies. The FBI currently has Agents stationed in 15 American diplomatic establishments outside the United States. WW 55101 Docld:32989554 Page 42
& f Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall Re: Senstudy 75 62-116395 10:00 p.m. Without the outstanding performance of these 4 young ladies, it would have been impossible for this Division to meet the AG's deadline. It is interesting to note that the Intelligence Division was successful in meeting the deadline and had the necessary material available for the AG at 9:00 a.m., on the morning of 10/6/75. RECOMMENDATIONS : 1. In view of the outstanding manner in which L. Patricia Simmons, Christine A. Weldon, Gerry L. Winslow and Mary E. Dodge performed, it is recommended that each receive a letter of commendation from the Director. 2. That a general letter of commendation be sent the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, for the manner in which Bureau supervisors in the Intelligence Division performed and that a copy of that general letter be designated for the personnel files of those Bureau supervisors mentioned in the first paragraph of this memorandum. we oe Appropriate letters attached /O-22-7S5— Lefafs ra Carcoerl we; +-[P- ayeised Clemenl pmployetS dt Summrs , Ae dors , HO eaes bev ¢ 4 6! [ee “Pod or bd ENEE ae orn prarereefas by buermen Caray NW 35101 Doold: 32989554 Page’ 45
2° Michael E. Shaheen, Jc., Esq. fo, Page Two - 4 ; November’:7, 1975 . . a ‘ In addition to the materials described above; the following materials are also requested for delivery to the Committee: . ry 1. All materials pertaining to the opening of mail to or from Gilbert Stuart and Virginia R. Stuart during the years 1960 and 1961, ‘by FBI agents in or- around the cities of Mew York and Providence, Rhode Island. (This request encompasses materials located in FBI Headquarters, the New York Field Office, and the Resident Agency in Providence, Rhode Island.) 2. All materials pertaining to contacts by FBI and Department of Justice officials and agents with - Committee members or staff members of the so-called “Long Committee" (the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Com- mittee) in regard to that Committee's investigation in 1965 into the use of mail covers and other investi- gative techniques by federal agencies. Sincerely, . John T. ELLif££ ~ i ° Director ° a , Domestic Intelligence Task Force HW 55104 *Docld:32989556 Page 17
ot OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530 NOVI 4 1975 TO: Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service WS rn0x: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr. P Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination SUBJECT: Request from the Senate Select Committee ‘on Intelligence This Office has been directed by the Deputy Attorney General to coordinate all Justicé Department : responses to requests of the Senate and House Select | ._ Committees on Intelligence.’ Attached is a letter and questionnaire from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requesting the Immigration and Naturali- zation Service to provide answers to questions, concerning a certain Thomas Riha, former Associate Professor at the University of Colorado, who allegedly disappeared in 1969. Copies of the Senate Select Committee's two previous requests for information on Riha are also attached for your information. . Please prepare responses to these questions at your earliest convenience and forward them in both classified and non-classified form to this Office for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee. Should you have any questions concerning this request, please do not hestitate to call upon this Office for assistance.” Your early cooperaticn in this matter is appreciated. WE ---9 Po . anasernmenes OSTA IM Auth. BY me ! 3 ll 9) 2 SHS a ‘a Pate ----- f % AS DB Sins yt WN en ars eee as an “ Sama A) pS al) pena. ‘on |ue-e Filed py t---- ; NW 55101 Docla:32999554 Page 28
| HW 55107 DBocld:329895535 Page 65 mm ) SECRET & ype . UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE _FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 5 N,D.c. 20535 In Reply, Please Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C ° File No. - November 16, 1965 ; Towe MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL C RE: . FRANK A, CAPELL ESPIONAGE - X For your information, the technical surveillance on the residence of the subject, (no number) School House Road, Zarephath, New Jersey, was discontinued on November 10, 1965. The technical surveillances on the residence of Robert E. Manuel, 8901 Beauchamp Drive, Alexandria,,. Virginia, and on Manuel's office, 105 East Holbrook Avenue, Fairfax, Virginia, were discontinued on November 10, 1965, and November 2, 1965, respectively. Respectfully, ohn Edgar Hoover err Director ces (32>. ray file if - B/& joe 0c g 1985 SECRET GROUP I ‘ SL \. Excluded from automatic downgrading and oe hn declassification 1 y NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION De o4 ; 43 55 Z | Unauthorized Disclosure wR ‘Subject to Criminal Sanctiong
° ° ° 4 ¢ ¢ n = q ° a s& © = ¢ ~ eo S é WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 55109 10 i 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23. 24 25 DoclId: 2512 kill me, that just means one thing. Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you. Mr. Kelley. But you are disagre@ing with me. You're sayin on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where ; we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that we should act independently because maybe we don't have the judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do think that we should report it and thereafter see what can be done. Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of our discussion the standard on page 5. On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat. Mr. Kelley. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible threat. Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat. Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right. Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to prevent the person from carrying out: his activities, other than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have in mind? 999559 Page 69
CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION In addition to its use as a training aid by law enforcement, closed-circuit television has proved to be an invaluable investigative tool, particularly in connection with physical surveillances. Bureau policy regarding this technique varies with the individual circumstances. Where the units are being installed without trespass (such as those covering bank entrances, phone booths, and the like), the only requirement is that permission be obtained in advance from FBI Headquarters. In these instances, no authorization is obtained from the Department. Where there is trespass, however, some sort of court permission is required. In the case of visual observation alone, court authorization under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure will generally suffice at the present time. [If oral interceptions are desired along with the visual coverage, permission must be obtained under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (which means obtaining a court order and permission from the Attorney General). ALL INFQRMATION CONTAINED HEREIN 4S BNCLASSIF pare LULIO ORAM LP C2- yy gq~ 1234 HW 55107 Docld:32989556 Page 13
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 2 m Gi on 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 HW 55109 DoctId: LO | 25° , 2513 Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing. Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or -- Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be. Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion. Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps. Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening an investigation into da domestic group, could you live with a standard which said you would have to have an immediate threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal crime involving violence? Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation. Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from what you think would be an acceptable standard. Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to do it the next minute. In that’case it may be necessary for you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able to do anything except put him under arrest or anything. Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course. And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action. Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either. 999559 Page 70 SSS Sila SS herd
é | OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530 12-23-75 \é i TO: John vfs z, Assistant Director , Legal & ifs Division ee vreau of Investigation FROM:, stolen K. Blackhurst SB pest: Spécial Counsel for Intelligence & Coordination SUBJECT: / “Senate Select Committee letter dated December 16} 1975 De Memterhin ammerine tre BO a Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting delivery of certain materials concerning electronic surveillance and surreptitious entries. Please arrange for an appropriate response. My initial view is that the Senate Select Committee should be given the same excised versions of the authorizing documents that the House Select Committee was given in response to its quest. I would oppose giving the Senate Select Committee a Bru to the unexcised version of these documents for security read ons. With regard to the November 21 letter referenced in John E11iff's letter, we propose to give John E11iff access to the unexcised versions of the documents but would prefer that the Senate Select Committee be given delivery of excised versions only. E1Lliff's letter appears to accept this arrangement. With regard to the request for materials concerning any surreptitious entries, the Senate Select Committee is referring to what was described as a surreptitious entry not related to a microphone surveillance in 1972 against an "Arab Terrorist Acti- vist". This surreptitious entry was listed on an FBI memorandum dated November 5, 1975 which was in response to a request from the House Select Committee. This memorandum was delivered initially to the Senate Select Committee by mistake. Because I have not Y P8620 1/6 2757 Jade Pn ee a ce: Paul Daly ‘yd as case s JAN YF 71973 — our Ath Vet nIRORMEATION SEN TAINED v a, fly i KEANE ise BEEN Bo 6 2989558 “Page 3 vi &, 5 Se
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WASHINGTON, D.G. 20530 seen the materials requested I do not know what an appropriate response to this request would be. OWTIOn, 8 &, %, % 2 2 3 = gag? HW 55107 BoclId: 327989558 Page 4
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL WAJH'NGTON, 9.C. 20530 1D-2E-TS a” TO: John A. ‘Mintz, Assistant Director Lagal counsel ‘Division Federd (1°Bureau of Investigation PRO Steven K. Blackhurst Special Counsel for Intelligence a Sh he Coordination “ SUBJECT :," Senate Select Committee letter dated December 16, 1975 « Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committee requesting delivery of cértain materials concerning electronic surveillance and surreptitious entries. Please arrange for an ‘appropriate response. s My initial view is that the Senate Select Committee shouid »)e@ given the same excised versions of the authorizing documents ‘that the House Select Committee was given in response to its swe- cuest. I would opoose giving the Senate Select Conmittee adcess? - to the unexec’ sed version of these documents for security reasons. With scesard to the November 21 letter referenced in John El1icrt's Letter, we propose to give John EL1iff access to the enexcised versions of the documents but would prefer that the Senate Select Commirtee be given delivery of excised versions only. Elliff's letcer appears to accept this arrangement. With redqard to the request for materials concerning aay surreptitious entries, the Senate Select Committee is referring to what was described as a surreptitious entry not related to a waicrophone surveillance in 1972 against an "Arab Terroris. Acti- vist". This surreptitious entry was listed on an FBI memoranduy dated November 5, 1975 which was in response to 4 request rrom the House Select Committee. This memorandum was delivered ini*.ally | to the Senate Select Committee by mistake. Because I have not oh, ec: Paul Lolly =o -~ Ly / EERE CARRIED y v0 ; ra ‘ Nees 7 fel? see ~ ict 4 ‘ a he ue , Swe Te ans we 7 oe, wos Mt Eg HW 55107 Docld:32989558 Page 5 , a ree oe oe ee ee ng re ee
a cen Leahey ea REnanE nd destroyed it, This, etonsst einaly enijad with Epstein adnieting ¢ that he hed no facta fo support goch an allegation. Am you are ‘axe, we normally furnish the Lepartaent mesoranda reporting the remilts of SSC interviews of current and former FSI employees. However, because Teloach vas — ciabla to more Sully appiten us, wo ere Liniting ott aivice , to you in this instence to this communication. 1 ~ the Deputy Attorney General ‘attention: Michael Z. Shaheen, je. Special Counsel for | Intelligence Coordination - NOTE: _  DeLoach's comments were given telephonically to Supervisor Ss. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. “85104 Docld:32989556 Page 27
Serial Scope: / 2/7 LS SS eS cn Sse DO NOT DESTROY FOIPA#_V/4
n ¢ NR@G@11 DE CODE JUNE ——~. ‘ seustupy’ RE BUREAU TELETYPES DATED NOVEMBER 25, 1975 AND DECEMBER 16, 1975. DETROIT UNABLE TO LOCATE ANY RECORD REGARDING DISPOSITION OF TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE LOGS MAINTAINED IN NOVEMBER 25, 1975 BUREAU TELETYPE END. HOLD eG my “ 2G _G ed 4-9 owe § APD: 2) Ore AW 55106 Docld:32969557 Page ? FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Asst. Dir: 6258 PN NITEL a 1975 LP COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Comp. Syst | , 10: ee R (62-116395) NEC. 6 FROM: DETROIT (62-5146) maw? ce JUTE IN ENVELOPE ae ba -. RECIB 6 2 -/f6375 — 2/ . Dep.-A.D.-Adm.= 4 : Dep.-A.D.-Inv.— § Ext, Affairs — | Gen. Inv. ——-—— } Ident. -.-.--——-—=-# Tnspection, --cimcerd Intell. Hesse ee | Laboratory fm Plan. & Eval, — Spee. Inv. —--— Training Legal Coun. ———~ f Telephone Rm. £ . = dee ye Rl Ea arene. th Rad : ie DEC 29 1975 wc issaded - enmmmaasi \ a\ <@ et
HW 55109 DBocld: 32989559 Page 71 ° 2514 sun & 4 ¢ % 1 Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening N ° N - g - 2 of an investigation into a domestic group. i. . E 5 Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the 4 test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving 5 violence? 6 Mr.Kelley. To open a domestic security case. ” Mr. Schwarz. Yes. 8 Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist 9 activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities 10 | under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States. 11 Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where 12 it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic 13 group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious WARD & PAUL 14 federal crime involving violence? 15 Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and 16 | they have been well defined as to what is the possible 1 opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been 18 discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances, : 19 but there are other criteria that are used, yes. : 20 Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be? $ z 21 Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations cf 22 || over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the : 2z || most used of thebasis, and then you have, of course, some : 24 intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of z 25 ‘short duration. If there is no showing of this into action
5 5 rr} r 4 4 o =~ N ° wi a © i c§ ~ 2 ¢ é LO il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 ne or a viable intent. Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're Looking for in the intelligence investigation? Mr. Kelley. . By intelligence investigation, yes, you are looking to prevent. Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined with an intent to take an issue? Mr. Kelley. And the capability. Mr. Schwarz. And the capability. All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and I appreciate very much your time. Mr. Kelley. That's all right. Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti- mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the political views of a person on the other? Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex HW 55109 DBocld: 37989559 Page 72
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000, | 10 Li La 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 25. 2516 lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would ‘say ordinarily it's not. and so far as political views, yes, I think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the government. Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two Limits on political views? | Mr. Kelley. What? Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence or advocants of overthrow? Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging, but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's a member of some other organization. Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection.of sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything might be relevant, but don’t you think that as a function of balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's justifiable to collect that kind of information on American citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes? Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been included in some reports as a result of the requirement that that is what is required by our rules, that when a person reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar HW 55109 DBocld: 37989559 Page 3 ee
° ° ° 0 c < < p>) ~ nN ° n J eo is < = 2 < 2 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 55109 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 2517 as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later, I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether or not this is something we should retain, and we would not object to anything reasonable in that regard. Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question. Taking the current manual and trying to understand its applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group or organization, an investigation can be opened." | Now, .I take it that is the same standard that was used in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in the 1960s, so that invéstigation could still be open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual. Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil- trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the benefit of the country. Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be Docld: 39969559. Page T4
° o 3 P-) c z < i) =~ x ° “ a o - cs = a c 2 10 Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 2458 demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI. The Congress and the members of this Committee in particular have gained a great insight into. the. problems confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields, problems which all too often we have left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress itself. As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even to the Executive Branch. The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised. An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum participation with the members of that Subcommittee. I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history. One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that HW 55109 DBocld:32989559 Page 16 noo