Ohe United States Sonate R577 'NVENTORICD: Report of Proceedings . 949977 TS Bc Hearing held before Senate Select Operations spect te Intelligence Activities Friday, June 20, 1975 Washington, D.C. (Stenutype Tape and Waste turne:! over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 544.6000
TESTIMONY OF Lucien Conein Prone {Area 202) 544-6000 EXHIBITS EXHIBIT FOR IDENTIFICATION -‘Conein No. 1 26 WARD A PAUL “¢ & ¢ Lad o ¢ é 5 4 s AIG Fiest Sterer, St
EXECUTIVE SESSION Prone (Ares 202) 544 Friday, June 20, 1975 United States Senate, Select Committees to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Governmental Activities, Washington, D. C. ul The Committee mat, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 o'clock j lem, in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator John Tower presiding. mi Present: Senators Hart of Michigan, Huddleston, Mondale, i 2 Morgan, Tower (presiding), Mathias, Baker and Schweiker. i Also present: William Miller, Staf£ Director; Frederick ba. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority | waRD ®@ PAUL - ‘Counsel; and Frederick Baron, Charles Kirbow, Burton Wides, . “Michael J. Madigan, William Bader, David Aaron and Patrick ., ‘Shea, Professional Staff Members. Wastenatens, 0. 20004 erat Street. SE asor
“P°R OvC EB B:D‘E:NGS (2:15 Prone (Ares 202) 544-6 Senator Tower. Tha Committee will come to order. Before wa proceed to hear the witness, I think we should have a report from the team that went down to the White House this morning to examine some documents, and I believe thay will report to us and have a recommendation on how the Committee : should agree to handle this material, and shall I call on -- Senator Mondale. IHoward has the notes. Senator Tower. I call on Senator Baker. Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, Rill Rader has the notes. Senator Mondale. Well then, call on ma, I can read them. Se.ator Tower. Mr. Badar? WARD & PAUL Mr. Bader. Thank you, Senator. The documents that wa reviewed briufly at the White House i In the first category, there were copies of the so-called " ;, .Mongoose files. These files contain minutas of the Special .Group Augmented and copies of the rest of the Mongoose files, fo varranged in chronological order. And these holdings are from I ithe files of the Fxecutive Secretary of the 49 Committee and nalon, O.C. 20003 li : o. include the files of the Chairman and the Executive Secretary 4 ys: Of the Special Group Augmented. et Also these trust files are turned over to the Chairman by li 24, lceneral Lansdale after the group ceased functioning, that is, | 410 Fars: Street, S.E.. Wasne
Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 § WARD &@ PAUL 410 Ferst Street, S Fo. Washinatan, 0.C. 20003 1 the Mongoose group. As I looked at them, there were about a 1 2 Inundred documents in this first group. 3 i The second group of documents are CIA's Mongoose files, ‘t .which we have already seen. There are soma six filles, and I Jassume these are the same files, and we have seen them. But of Course, we didn't have a chance to go through them with any ¥ The third group of files were the Rockefeller Commission I ,Papers and files on assassination, and that includes the summary 106 lot facts, the investigation of plans for the assassination of i: “Castro and perhaps more than Castro, the other assassinations, 1% Trujillo as well. Mr. Madigan. Lumumba‘s in there and also a reference to 14 Sukarno. 15° Mr. Baker. That is a some 89 or 90 page document which, as, je ‘I gay, is a‘summary of facts, and this was prepared by David Ve ‘Belin. Le: Senator Baker. It might he important to note here, Mr. Chaimnan, that the White llouse indicated to us that that summary was not a Rockefeller Commission document and did not nacessarilv represent the vosition of the Rockefeller Commission as such. That is the way I interpret their language. I get ths ‘impression that this may havs been a summary that wa Was not accepted for conclusion in the report, therefore there 2: ‘may ba some conflict. : ‘ '
Phone (Aras 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL + Wastenatan, D.C. 2001 AND Fast Streeer SE Senator Morgan. It was prepared by whom? Senator Baker. Belin, the Executive Director. Mr. Bader. The last category, tha fourth category, area some Special Group minutas, that is, a file, it is a tiny file, really, of assassinations and allegations, and these minutes Were culled from Special Group meatings and they are highly iseluctive in the sense that they are documents as they could find them in their search that related Only to Cuba and it is clear that there is a great deal More to come in this category of the Special Group minutes. Tt was just On Cuba. There was | ;nothing on the other assassinations. Senator Schweiker. You mean more that you have not seen » lyet? Mr. Bader. Mora that they have not put together as yet, Wor at least they have not made available to us, and those were ij ithe four categories. It is a little hard to judge just how much work it will " ; "take to go through them. It is, I would say, somewhere around -499 to 500 pages, perhaps. Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would ask Fritz and Bill } to monitor what I'm about to say next to make sure that T reflect ‘ rit accurately. There is a general uneasiness at the White House about _letting us have these documents unrestricted, although pretty clearly they are committed to let us have them, under some
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD @ FAUL 410 Fast Street, S.E., Wasmraton, D.C. 27000) circumstance. | . i It 1s also clear to me that some documents have not yet \ . [been located and supplied to us and that parts of some documents - ‘ 1 ‘nave been deleted. I think we probablv can aet that deleted {information before very long. il The suggestion was made that wa ask the White House to bring those documents up here by their own personnel on Monday ho "30 that we could use them to examine witnesses. If they care id to keep someone here to retain technical possession of the : | socuments, to take them back with them at the close of that dav yan Or any day on which we use them, they miqht do that, and that sooner or later we would have to find a way to utilize those documents, meaning to put certain documents in the record or to read them into the record or to supply copies. Rod Hill seemed to think well of that idea. Tf told him “that I would suggest it to Senator Tower and to the rest of “the Committee, and hopefully Senator Tower or Senator Church would be back in touch with the White House to see if we can negotiate an agreement along those lines. I think we can. I “think the “thite House will agreé to that arrangement. Senator Monlale. There are two points T would like to : make. . Senator Tower. Fritz? Sanator “londal#e. I think Hills was saying, from some of .. ‘the documentation we looked at it was clear «hat we may not yet 2h
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD @ PAUL 2000.4 Wasmenaina, D.C 210 Fast Steet, SE. have all of the documents thet wa ought to look at, and I think they are looking for mora documants. Things we read referred to things that were not there. So I don't think we can be , satisfied yet that the full record is available for perusal. The second thing is, in our quick look it is vary apparent we must have the documentation. I saw some which would been very important in our questioning McCone, which may helped him remember things. It was very central to it. I think wa wasted a couple of hours when it could have been very quickly with one or two documents. I saw, there were saveral other documents that immediately struck me as being essential to our work. I don't think we saw 2 | anything that was revolutionary or that filled in a lot of the ! » Cantral gaps. Senator Tower. You didn't see anything that was sensitive the extent that it might reflect on a4 foreign government, ‘somathing like that? Senator Mondale. There might be stuff in there, honestly, I don't know. But just looking at our work -- Senator Tower. What you're gaying, Fritz, is you don't ! think we need all of it, that. we could select out some of it. is ui is that it? Senator Mondale. What I am saying is I think there is mors available somewhere than we saw, and they said they are still looking. Hills said he wasn't satisfied that it was all
Prone (Ares 262) 544-4000 WARD & PAUL TAO Ferst Stewed, $.0.. Washenqinn, D.C, 20003 there yet, and secondly, wa've got to have it. Senator Tower. Right. Senator Mondale. And we need it for Cross~aexamination and Ilwe need it --+ | Senator Tower. Well, the question is, do you need every- thing that you looked at today, or do you think -- | Senator Mondale. I don't know. Some of the stuff we already have. Mr. Bader. Some, we already have. Senator Mondale. So we don't need that. Senator Tower. Yes. Senator Mondale. The other material, it struck me that "I don't See what we have to lose by having most of it. I think imost of it is historical. al i I |The essence of the suggustion I tried to make was that we have Senator Baker. I think we ought to have all of it, John. ilphysically present in this room all of it, and then we can decide “how Wu use it and what varts of it. : Senator Huddleston. One quastion on the documents. Is that just the material that. the Rockefeller Commissicn has had? Senator Baker. No, the Rockefeller Commission apparently has not had these NSC Minutes. Senator Mondale. ‘They did not have the NSC minutes. Mr. Schwarz. They asked for them and wa were told about
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD @ PAUL ALO Farad Street, S.E.. Wasningtan, OC. 20003 1 |\ten days ago that the White House refused to give it to the Rockefeller Commission for some reason. Senator Baker. Tha's right. Senator Mondale. The interesting. thing, aiang other ‘things, jae tells you exactly who was dt all'of:these meetings. \ Senator Baker. That's remarkable, there's no doubt about ere was there and in most cases who said what. | : ‘| Senator Mondale. The heat was on, there's no doubt about 17° Senator Tower. You'va heard Sanator Baker's proposal. 22 “Is it the sense of the Committee that we should adopt that procedure for now, at least, for -- let's say, what is it, ‘Monday that we want them up here? : Mr. Schwarz. Bundy is coming at 2:99 o'clock on Monday .2 tand we've set an opportunity to meet with him and go over and * refresh his recollection and so forth. Are we entitled to have them for that purpose as well as the actual use of them at the hearing? . Senator Baker. My understanding is that there is to be no restriction on our use of them. Senator Mondale. We not only need them, but we need tham in a way that they're useful to us on cross-examination. Now, as I understand it, the staff will be down there this afternoon and - ‘maybe into tomorrow and the next day, for that matter. Senator Towar. So the staff can sift through some of this?
Prone {Aras 202) 544-6000 WARD & Paul maine OC. 70005 410 Forgt Steeet, $.€.. Wasme ‘ i | Mr. Schwarz. And digest it, and so forth. Senator Mondale. And we should ask that the materials | that are appropriate or relevant to the next witness be avail- I it . . {able to us and that staff have them organized inrorder to help us. | Senator Baker. There is a point there I'd like to vary on a -jldeene. XM I don't want to give the White House an opportunity to pick out of that stuff what they're going to send up here. [I would ¢ i like our request to be to send all of it, and then for us to ’ ..idecidse hers, with the White House concurrance, on how we use it, .' that 4s, do we read it into the record, do wa photocopy it, or . do they supply us a copy of it. 4 Let us make the essence of it that they send it here. + i Senator Tower. The proposition by Senator Baker is that MH My 4 . fwe ask them to bring the documents here, allow the bearer to il tbe present while the documents are being used, so they maintain technical possession and take them back to the White House after we have uSed them in our session or subsequent sessions. ‘Then we can determine at a later time what final disposition we ‘make. Is that correct, Howard? Senator Baker. That's cnrrect. Senator Tower. I was not able to get Senator Church. We ‘is off in the wilds of Idaho. | i
10 Mr. Schwarz. I talked with him last night, and this is Senator Tower. I think this will be agreeable with him, quite consistent with our conversation. Prone (Ares 202) 544-4000 “but I told his secretary that if, for any reason, after he gets jin touch with his office he does find it objectionable that I i would reopen the matter in a subsequent meeting. i | Senator Mondale. Just one question. ; | There would not be a White House staff person here during || someone's testimony? I 4 ‘ ‘| Mr. Schwarz. They'd sit outside tha door. | Senator Mondale. Tf don't think he should be here 45 4 . imonitor. “t WARD & PAUL Senator Baker. I think that's a point we'll have to make clear. I agree with you, Fritz, he ought to be physically ‘present, like guarding the door that we don't run off with it, - but not here. Senator Tower. And we would undertake that we're not going to xerox them or anything while he's sitting out there. a Is that agreed on by everybodv? Is thare any objection to 2° ithat? 7 Then that is the way we will proceed. Senator Baker. Mike Madiqan makes a point that's well taken. It was Mike's understanding that Hill's was telling us 410 Frat Steet, SE. Wathengton, O.C, 20003 there were certain other documents that he had already identifiud but had not yet reviewed and we ought to make sure that we set
RBI Patents | sg fy 1 llall of those as well. | Senator Tower. I think the problem down there is they do Prone {Ares 202} 544-6000 not have enough staff to get all of this stuff together, is that | Senator Baker. I think the problem is they do not want to be taken by surprise. Senator Huddleston. They want to see it all first. Senator Tower. They want to see it before it comes to us? Senator Baker. I don't blame them. Senator Tower. I understand Mr. Kissinger has sone interest : Cin seeing them. Senator Mondale. I think that's why they don’t have enous WARD A FAUL ly jstaff. Senator Tower. Okay. Is there anything else of a housekeeping nature to come re Pup? aa Senator Baker. I might say to the Committee, Fr. Chairman, ‘that you conducted a most intriguing interview with Mr. Angletor. yosterday. Senator Tower. We did. [In effect, we took a deposition wm OC, 26008 from him in my office yesterday, and I think it was very " cy * illuminating, to say the least. Senator Morgan. He looks the part. Senator Baker. He sure does. AND ast Street, SF, Weasrnd Senator Towar. So I would suggest to the Committee
12 the reading of that deposition. rf think it would be worth your time. Senator Baker and Sanator Mathias ware there also. Moone (Area 202} $444000 i All right. i Mr. Kirbow? 1 | Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be helvoful to 4 jhe members if they know that when Mr. Conein is testifying trat ( the has before him what he refers to as an afteraction report, ul i i t Ae, - r lin which both he and the Station Chief before Mr .(fouetenn ue. OG a — . " Richardson, John Richardson, compiled immediataly after the coun 1 took Place in Saigon. . 4 He ia going to limit his testimony Principally, since he WARD & PAUL “ has no personal knowledge of the Washington scene, to Painting ‘for tha Committee, if you will, a picture of the events that _transpired from early May of 1963 on through the time of the a “coup, and he will then be Prepared to answer any questions, -. .Much as we did with Mr. Colby this morning. Senator Tower. He wants to proceed in narrative .forn? | Mr. Kirbow. Yes. » OC. 2008 Senator Tower. All right, we will proceed with Mr. Conein. (Nhergupon, at 2:27 o'clock P»M., the witness entered the 1 Weaanen ‘\ hearing room.) 4G bad Street, St
Prone (Ares 202) $44-4000 WARD & PAUL mn Dt Soe vagt Waste Vi euast Sher, set Senator Tower, Mr. Conein, thank you for coming today. We will be questioning you under oath today, so if you would raise your right hand, do you solemnly swear that the testimony "you are about to give before this Committee is the truth, the lwnole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you Ged? Mr. Conein. .I do, sir. Senator Tower. Counsel will advise you on your rights. Kirbow. Please be seated. Schwarz. Mr. Conein, just a couple of procedural || . You are aware that you have the right to counsel? Mr. Coneain. Right. Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop and 4 :4 obtain counsel in the middle of these proceedings you have Vs " that right as well? 47 ic: Mr. Conein. Yes. Mr. Schwarz..A:.! of course you have all your constitutional rights including your rights under the Fifth Amendment, you understand that? Mr. Kirbéw will question you. Senator Tower. Mr. Kirbow? x
Prone {Aras 202) $44-4000 WARD & PAUL O.c. 20008 Lea smertqtiyn, ALO Feest Sterner, 1 TESTIMONY OF LUCIEN E. CONEIN 2 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Conein, for the record would you please | S | state your. full name, your current eddress, and present s ‘occupation? be) : Mr. Conein. My name is Lucien E. Conain, C-o-n-e-i-n. g il live at 1111 Ingleside -- I-n-g-l-e-s-i-d-e -- Avenue, ” jMcLean, Virginia. & I am employed by the Department of Justice Prug Enforcement | 9 ‘Administration. Ve i Mr. Kirbow. Thank you. Mr. Conein, would you ba good anough to give the Committee a brief synopsis of your background from the time you first became angaged in any government work, either military or civilian? x - Mr. Conein. I enlisted in tha Army in 1941, September of 1941, and in 1943 I graduated from OCS in Fort Benning, Georgia. At that time, I had been asked to volunteer for the Office _. of Strategic Services, which I did, and was sent to England for further training in the Special Operations Executive, which was an organization affiliated with the OSS under Britiah Command. I was parachuted behind the lines in France in 1944, In December, 1944 I returned to the United States and I was sent for training preparatory to going to the China, Burma, tndia theatre which I did in 1945. In March of 1945, the French garrison in French Indochine
Prone (Araa 2627) $44-6000 WARD A PAUL | Wastiersarisny, wiNteen set 21m Fs sl 15 had been attacked by the Japanese and I was asked to parachute into the area to recuperate elemants of the French forces, to || consolidate them, retrain them, go back into Indochina and to t ‘form a base for operations in the northern vart of Indochina. i This I did and later on I was in Hanoi with the Viet Minh [took over in 1945, and I stayed until 1946 when I came back to | the United States and then I was sent to the SSU mission, which ‘| jwas the predecessor of the CIA, to Germany and I served in the | HH i SSU, the CIG and the CIA. : I left Germany in 1953, still in the military, where I “became a desk chief at CIA, and in 1954 I was asked by Mr. [elms if I would go back to Vietnam, which I did, under the ednmand of “ -than-Colonel Edward G. Lansdale and I was assigned to North Vietnam, © I stayed there until the Viet Minh took over in October of 1954. I then went to Haiphong, and in 1955 I came to Saigon. , cand at that time, the operation was to establish a viable government in Vietnam, the government of "Ngo Dien Diem. I remained until 1956 and in 1956 I asked to he relieved from the CIA so 1 could return to the military service. I haa been up to that time, approximately 13 years as a military man with OSS, SSU, CIG and CIA. I left and I joined the Special Forces in the Army and I served from '56 to '59. In 1959 I was assigned to the Assistant ‘Chief of Staff for Intelliqence of the U.S. Army and was sant to
15 jizan where I served for two years. aq I retired from the military in 1961 and returned to the r jcla. I was sent to Vietnam in 1961 and I ramained in Vietnam Prone (Areas 202} 544-6000 “until August of 1967. I left the CIA in 1968, July the 15th, retired from the st : ilcta and military. I went in private business for a couple of ' jyears and in 1971 I worked as a consultant for the White House ‘| ‘for approximately four months, four or five months. val ; I then was a consultant to the Bureau of Narcotics and I : ‘Dangerous Drugs of the Departmant of Justice and I joined the “DEA in 1973 and I am presently working for the DEA. Mr. Kirbow. Directing your attention than to that period WARD A FAUL ‘after you returned to Vietnam after 196) to the period beginning in early 1963, would you relate to the Committee your axperiences ‘in connection with the build-up and the eventual Ganeral's coup and the downfall of the Diem government? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. In Fébruary of 1962, two Air Force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the Presidential Palace of Ngo Nien Dien. oo, D.C. 20004 This was not the first indication that thare was something. wrong, because if you will recall in November of 1960 there was XN ‘another attempted coun. Sreeet, SOF) Meantine, At that time, in Pebruary, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the ALO Fest ot ‘past to find out what was the volitical pressure, what was the
Prone (Aras 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL temperature, was there really some dissidence within the militar ‘ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against Ngo Dien . l bien. ‘| I was unable at that time to determine this fact. There Iwas isolated dissidence within the military structure. This was: ( | reported in February or March in 1962. 7 In the meantime, Mr. Colby had “assigned me to work with the’ Minister of the Interior of the Government of Vietnam, and I was responsible to be the liaison between the CIA and the ‘+ Ministry of the Interior on a program, on & project, which was fealled Strategic Hamlet Program. This was an idea forwarded by Ngo Dien Nhu, the President's “brother and counsallor, to establish security within the hanlets and the villages where people lived so that they could deny access of food, taxes and what have you to the Vietcong. In this position I was able to travel quite extensively it» because I was under the auspices of the Ministry of the Intericr and indirectly I worked for the President's brother who was in charge of the program and by travelling I was able to go to every province, I was able to talk to unit commanders down to and including small sections. Some of thesa people I had known N . for many years; some of them I had known back even in World Ver Il. ‘Some of them were in powerful positions, and I was able ty talk to them on a person to person basis, not as a govarnment official. TOP-SECRET
Prone {Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD @ F4uL 410 Ficst Steeet, $.£., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 I did wear a uniform though I was out of the Army when I | was in that position because those military. commanders who knew me always assumed that I was ‘in the Army and that T was still in: lhe Army. Therefore, it was much easier for me to travel in i }uniform and special arrangements were mada for me to carry an | conttteatson card as being an active duty military officer. This was done with the permission of General Harkins, and iit was also known to General Westmoreland when General West- iMoreland took over. In that period, I would say that the country team was ‘attempting to get organized so thay could show that they were ‘speaking with one head under Ambassador Nolting,— and we had be committee which the military and also "1 agencies, includina the CIA, were members, and it was called the Truebart Committee . where we jointly made plans to help out the government of . "Vietnam in different programs, whether they be military programs 1 "OK USAID type programs, self-help programs, also programs of ‘which to arm the villagers so they could protect themselves. We didn’t arm them with modern weapons, we gave them shotgums, .12 gauge shotguns. There were very vfew modern weapons available for that type of activity. At the same time, we were interested in the Montaqnard Program and I did work with the Montagqnards -- those are the ‘hill tribes in central Vietnam. We did arm certain elements of the Montagnards, and we dil
Phone {Aras 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL Wantieaton, Da. POON 4 41D Fast Seer SF, keep them up and organize them in paramilitary forces, and these | || forcas were eventually turned over complately to the U.S. Army. ‘ : ' About -~ well, I can say definitely on 7 of May, 1963, ‘ very large meeting of differant military authorities and at that. ( . { time I did not realize what was going. on. { | They had met with the President's brother, Ngo Dien Can, i i! who was considered the war lord,'in a way, and some decisions a made, of which I was not, aware of. ‘Ya returned quite late . I the night of the 7th; though.I wanted to stay, the Ministry of Interior told me it would ba impossibla. I wanted to see celebration of the birthday of Buddha. I wanted to see boats with the candles lit going down the perfumed river, it was not to be. The next day there was an attack by the military forces on Buddhists. Up to that time, the Buddhists, as an entity, not a political force and never thoudht of baing, and wher attack on the Buddhists came about, this was, in my estime- ee “tion, one of the turning points in what was hapoening in Vietran. It could have been salvaged, but this -- aqain, I had 4. | talked later with the Minister of the Interior and I had talks: air or with Ngo Dien Nhu on several occasions when they were trying ‘=: 26 ¢ TOP SECRET _
Prone (Artes 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL D.C. 20003 DLO boest Street, SE. Wasninaton, 19 jappease the situation. Thay were trying to meet some demands i jot the Buddhist leaders. This, unfortunately, did not come jabout. I did not travel too much during the latter part of May ‘or June, and it was quite evidant at that time, to me and to jother people who were there that there was a strong anti-American ‘feeling, and also a restriction put on by the government of J Vietnam about people associating with Americans. The only time that it broke down was on the 4th of July of “1963 when the Ambassador Nolting threw a party for the Indepen- ‘dence pay and it seemed like every military leader and political personality was attending American parties that day. I received a message to meet with General Don, . who was Commander of ICORPS at that time, and it was in a public place, it was in the Caravelle Hotel downstairs where they had sort of a big dining room, a nightclub, anid I was present with General Don and his entourage and everybody from the Diem government was in the same place. The Place was jam packed. It was at that time on the 4th of July that I had the first indication that something serious was being ccntemplatedc when General Don told me that if the Buddhist situation does not get sattled that the military are planning. I reported this fact, and ‘T believe it was around the 8th or oth of July, that more indications -- on the llth of July, Ngo Dien Nhu called the Generals together for a staff meeting at the General
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL 29008 Fo) Wosmeraten, Ou APO Fest Street. 4 21 Staff Headquarters and shocked them by telling them that he i | | knew of some coup planning: going: on:by the Generals. H This scared the Generals and other officers, needless to ‘say, that Ngo Dien Nhu would be completely aware that there ‘was some dissidence in the ranks. ‘| Nothing happened much before the 20th or 2lst of August jot 1963. At that time -- I have to go back a little bit. We had had bonzes - durning themselves, and we had had local Press releases made by Madam Nhu that sometimes were not too weld received by the Americans and also antagonized the population. On the night of tha 21st of August, General Ton That Dinh, as Military Governor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps, had established a curfew. If I racall correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 83:00 o'clock at niqht. Anybody seen after that time would be seen --- after that would be shot. And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that time, later on proving to be elements of the Special Forces, which was the praetorian guard of Ngo Pien Nhu and the colicsa dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saiaqon. Now what was very bad about this, Ambassador Nolting had already been reliaved and Ambassador Lodge was on his way to take over. And Ambassador Lodge arrived on the 22nd or 23rd of August. I am not sure exactly of the date. And he found that Saigon was an armed camp.
1 Now, during this period of these attacks on the pagodas, 2 | Sexe had been many contacts made by a lot of people to anybody Prone (Area 202) 344-6000 io whe would listen to them talking about doing something about idoing away with the existing regime, I had talked with the t 1 ydifferent generals and on the one time in August -- I don't recai1 if it was the 23rd or 24th -- we ‘received a cable which has later been known as the famous Roger Hillsman cable, which | yj Practically gave us the go ahead that this type of thing could I not continue. ! : Il regime continuing as it was. Talking of type of thing, we're talking about the present There was a lot of talk of coups. We had met with WARD & PAUL : "Generals on different occasions. I had met with them, other . people had also. We had mat with Colonels and junior officers. ; And we anticipated that thare would be some type of action taker in the latter part of August. If you will recall, or those of you who don't know, it * aborted at that time. It aborted because, one, they did not , have necessary forces, I am talking about the coup plotters, “aia not have the necessary forces to comhat those loyal to ths . "Diem government, namely elements of the Marines, elements of ee the Rangers, the Presidential Guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the best-armed troors ., ) available. i ALD bayt tenets te Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was payin:
wasn @ PAUL LWashingtes, D.C, 20003 SIO Fiest Street St Prone (Aras 207) 544-4000 1 2 A ba Li 23 off or was paying to have a coup. This was a vary shrewd and jcarevtatins Move on any man on the quality of Ngo Dien Nhu who was a shrewd politician and also a master of psychological swarfare. During the month of September, there was still more talk lof coups and at that time, the month of September, I had been iltold by Ambassador Lodge that. I was to monitor coup planning iH vonly. I was not told to -- that I was to convey any messages. I had conveyed messagas to Big Minh on two occasions, General i + “Khdem -- K-h-i-e-m -- on one occasion. I had met General " Khiem and Big Minh on another occasion. On several occasions I had met General Don and other “military Leaders. In September, the latter part of Saptember, there had heen ‘some Teassessment of what had been going on. I will say this, that I worked for Ambassador Lodge. I reported to Ambassador Lodge and I received my instructions from Ambassador Lodge. If they ware cabled instructions, he had a very good habit of not reading something. He would fold a _piece of paper and what pertained to you for instructions he would let you read that, and that alone so that you didn't \ “know who was sending it or where it came from. He just read that, and he said those are the instructions, do you understand wy; them? Yes, sir; all right, go carry them out. In October -- I'm running over these things in a hurry --
Prone (Aras 202) 344-6000 a 3 < i 4 o « < z 20003 reat Streel, SE. Washengton, 0.C- aro Ff ao ect 23 hea October, the first part of October, I think October the isa or 4th, I was asked to contact Big Minh. I was by myself wand I contacted Big Minh at his headquarters. At that time, Big Minh explained to me that thay had had, lthat there was going to be a coup d'etat, thet they didn't want jenie to be an American sponsored coup d'etat, thay wanted to ba “assured of American backing, specifically in the part where it i jcomes t to military and economic aid after the coup had been “ successful. hy I Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt for just a sacond? Senator Towar. Senator Baker. Senator Baker. It's a terribly fine point, and I don't mean to be critical, but could you elaborate a little bit on what you understood him to mean when he said he did not want it to be an American-sponsored coup d'etat, but he wanted assurances in advance of American economic and military support after a successful coup d’etat. Could you tell me how you make that distinction a little clearer? ‘ Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. I had specific instructions from the Ambassador, and all the instructions I received, Senator, before any meetina, I was told exactly what I would say, and if I recall at that ‘time, I was told to go ahead to the meeting, and I have it here SECRET
WARD &@ FAUL foo 6 oe L Washinton, 4 AiO Bust Streer nt Prone {Area 202) 544-6000 in the paper -- and I hate to rifle through paper, but I could Vanswer it if I could just -- Now, what tha General meant, he did not want actual U.S. al . “participation in tha coup d'etat. He did not want the U.S. ‘government to start the coup d'etat. Ile also outlined three ik general ideas, this was the first time that a leader had [nonttoned the possibility of assassination. This assassination was not of Diem. This was -- if they could not do anything, it ‘would be the elimination of Ngo Dien Can who was the war lord fin central Vietnam and Ngo Nien Nhu. At that time, General Minh did say that one of the altar- native means was to eliminate Can and Nhu and keep Diem. That * (was one of the alternatives. Senator Baker. Did they ask you for any support in 2, eliminating either of these people? if ' it Mr. Conein. No, sir. I ‘had never, and even right up i+ Keo the very end, It had never been asked for any resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual. Senator Tower. This was developed in some considerable detail by Mr. Colby this morning and you might be interested in reading the transcript. Mr. Kirbow. 1 think, having interrupted you, appropriate’. Mr. Conein, could I ask you too, you have placed, or pannec - a paper, made a chronology of all of the events immediatel- : . preceeding and after the coup d'etat.
Prone (Ares 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL m c ° ° oA ¥ c ° s c $ 4 3 - “ 7 cd A - < c 2 a am, Ae Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Mr. Kirbow. Do you have a copy of that there before you? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. { Mr. Kirbow. And you hava looked at the original, which iz hold here? 7 Mr. Conein. Yas, I have it here. ‘Mr. Kirbow. This has been marked, Mr. Chairman, as Conein Exhibit No. 1 and I ask at this time that the entire , document, as best evidence of what transpired at the time, be | pieces in the record for future use by thea Committee. | Senator Tower. Without objection. ; (The document referred to was marked as Conein Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 Fest Street, $F... Washingtan, O.C. 20003 Kirbow. Please go ahead, Mr. Conein, with your ry summary. Mr. Conein. To answer your question on this, I have the document. This is my after action report that I wrote after the coup d'etat. | In this, it says: "Big Minh did not expect U.S. government | il support for himself or his colleagues for a coup d'etat but did need U.S. government -assurances that U.S. government would not 9 yattempt to thwart his plans. Minh stated the nead for continu- 16 Jation of American military and economic aid at the present 1; PE level. “Minh outlined three plans under consideration by the Gen- “Ve  erals: to assassinate Ngo Dien Nhu and Ngo Dien Can and to 14 -ksep President Diem in office. Two, have the military units go into dissiden'oe against the government of Vietnam, encircle i 1e Hand isolate Saigon. Three, direct military action against the i _ umilitary units in Saigon." Mr. Kirbow. Thank you. Would you go ahead with your summary, please? Mr. Conein. Under instructions of the Ambassador, I accelerated my contacts in monitoring Hue and reported back .. pall times exactly what the conversations were. Sometimes 1 had .7 as many as two or three meetings. Primarily my meetings were .:with General Pon, who was the organizer in his position of ‘er getting the commanders of different military units committed -FOP-SEERET-
Prone (Area 202) $44-4000 WARD @ PauL SIG Borst Steet, $6. Wasningtan, 0.0. 20001 to the coup. | You must understand also, gentlemen, that there were not One coup plan. There were several. The problem that was facing | ' i ithe People who were making assessments of this was which one inad the most likely chance of succeeding? We were at the point ‘of no return. There was no chance of pulling back, because there was going to be a coup. The best thing to do was to jronteor and keep the U.S. government advised of who the principal players were and what their intentions were then and in the i ; ~ t . future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this time ‘when it was getting down to the critical element in October, they . ~ had to have assurances, the Generals had to have assurances, that I was speaking for the Ambassador. Several attempts were Li, made to get these assurances, and it was practically impossible “because of security around the Generals, who were already suspect, it was almost impossible for anybody to approach them at a reception, although they had intended to do this. So it was arranged that the Ambassador did give the proper assurances that I wes speaking for him and that I was acting upon his orders. Mr. Kirbow. Now that was done about the 17th of October? Mr. Conein. The 17th, 20th -- it was in the middle of October it was assured that I was speaking for them, for the ‘Ambassador, and that I was carrying out his instructions.
Prone (Area 202) $44-4000 0 & PAVE wa “toe, D.C 20008 to Wastin Mr. Kirbow. Could I call your attention to an entry in that document that we discussed of. 12 October where you er. e On page 5 and ask you to alaborate for the Committee about ithis reference to Secretary McNamara? \ " Mr. Conein. Yes. | it Here it says that: “Captain Nguyen Quang Nguyen, Chief tof Operations, Armor Command, stated he was contacted by two different coup groups during the week of 5-12 October; the second -@oup. group was headed by Lt. Colonel Pham. Ngoc Thao" -- 1 , phan Ngo Thao was an officer, extremely capable, extremely ‘ hprilliant. Unfortunately, he was killed later, about a -year- I Hand a half aftar the coun. He was working with the Chief of . [the Secret Police, Dr. ‘Tan Khiem Tuyen, T-u-y-e-n. Dr. . Tuyen was the head of the President PDiem’s Secret Police, the _teivilian part of the Secret Police, and had been so sinca ..1955, but right at the tima of the coup d'etat, Ngo Diem Nhu "y -becamé highly suspicious ‘of. him and had appointed him as Consul General in Cairo and therefore Dr. Tuyen's group, it was also an important groun, was left over to Colonel Tau, “and Colonel Tau was trying to hold toqether a qroup of dissident individuals who ware also making their plans based upon the :direction of Dr. Tuyen who unrortunately never got to Cairo, but he did get as far as Hong Hong and stayed thers. So there were different elements contacting the sama
Phone (Area 262) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL vest Sreeet SF Wastenaten, D.C. 20004 aioe 29 It was absolutely necessary in the coup that the Armor was tin. It was necessary that the Airborne was in. It was Il necessary that the proper military units, it was also nacessary that the Air Force was in. Now, the opposition forces were the Praetorian Guards, j the Special Forces, and the Palace Guards, very well-equipped yand extremely well-armed and they were in Saigon. This was the danger, because to make a confrontation directly in "that city would have blown the hell out of the city tha way “these people shoot, I'm sorry to say. You have to have a truck of ammunition for each rifle that they shoot. Nr. Kirbow. During this period of October or about that time, were you aware of ths requests that were heing made on the Ambassador and the Chief of Station to attempt to obtain detailed plans of the coup from -- Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Mr. Kirbow. Were you instructed to take care of that? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. The request that had been made -- I assumed, I learned later on, I learned later'on that they were being made by Washington, I learned that they were made by Washington -- was to have complete detail ‘of the military plan, the politice! plan and their ideas for tha future. When I was talking at meetings ~- now, I didn't go to ‘Meetings like here, gentlemen; I had to sneak around and meet “TOP-SECRET
30 31 H may teeth so that they could see that I had reason -- I mean, in a dantist's office and aven had to have some work done on | | 4 Prone (Ares 202} 544-6000 y Shatis an example. I had to sneak around, as I had a very high "profile in Vietnam, sort of cover my tracka of why I was meeting jand talking to these different individuals. And I was told to try to procure these plans. I was | Promised these plans, and they had a coup committee, and I leerned afterwards, I didn't know it at the time, that thare Cwas already dissidence within tha coup group, the people who “were going to pull the coup, and one General didn't like the other Generali. The best way I can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese Generals sitting and talking to you, one WARD & PAUL General would walk out of the room to go to the john, two of them would tell you, don't trust that one and finally the one who would outwait the other two and there would be one left, and he would say, don't trust those two. So it was a very difficult situation, gentleman. It was not one of these thirds that you think just ran along very smoothly. roan It looks good in a report, but the frustrations of tryina | for a to get the man to give you the things that he had promised vgteaes, you, to try to deal with different personalities through one S man or two men, to get, was practically impossible. . Waste Sreeet, SuE In the latter part of October, as I say, I think that the people back here in Washington figured out that I was being AID bovest ‘set up for a patsy and thare was a possibility that it would ba
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 . WARD & PAUL oc 7000) aest foteeet, SEL Me ayereteqrenes, aioF highly embarrassing for the United States government in case that it was found out that I had baen set up @8 a patsy. They made a recommendation that somebody more senior to me and with | extensive military backgrounds should take over from me. 4] : il i Senator Baker. Well, Mr. Chairman, why -- maybe this was covered earlier --. but why did you say you were being set up?_ 4 Mr. Conein. No, somabody back here. | Senator Schweiker. Why? i Mr. Conein. Why? Because they couldn't understand why by was getting all of the information. Obviously, if I'm gettina ‘ ' K “this information of when we're going to plan and what is going 2 to happen, what units are going to be, obviously somebody is -setting me up for a patsy and would blame the United States 4 of , government. ‘ its i i Senator Baker. Who made that determination? Mr. Conein. The peaple back here thought I was being set up for a patsy, so they sent a message to the Ambassador and recommended that a very capable officer and a personal friend of mine, General Dick Stillwell, would take over instead of me. But when this was brought up to General Don and the coup i members, they said, no, we trust Conain, we don't want anybody else. So I continued. There was a plan to transfer me at the last moment. I wish s they hed. I wouldn't be here today, there would be somehody
WARD & PAUL Be Fe008 sngtors, Want AIO Fst Street, SP Prone (Area 202} $44-4000 2 33 Senator Baker. I have a cable to Baigon from McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, I guess it is 24 October. It says: “Eyes only to Lodge and Harkins from Bundy. There may be danger. . "hu attempting entrapment through Don‘s aprroaches to Conein. i} i Peel quite strongly that Lodge and Harkins can stand back from | any nonessential involvement. It seems wise to maintain close’ .control over meetings between Don and Conein.” | . Is that the message that activated the disangagement? Mr. Conein. Yas, sir. Senator Schweiker. Was the other teleqram we heard this te Morning related to this at.all, or was that a different time ‘) ; Sequence, whereby we were warned that we wanted to have nothing : “to do with anything that smacked of assassination? Mr. Schwarz. That is right in the same time period. I Senator Schweiker. Was that part of the patsy concern? i Mr. Conein. Oh, you're talking about that, on the 5th of jv iOctober, sir, or on the 4th. There is one thing that you misunderstand. Thera might be a twenty-four hour difference ,-, because we cross ths international dateline, so I might say 5. Os Kew the 3rd and it would be the 4th. Senator Schweiker. How does that wire fit into what we are talking about? Mr. Conein. All right, on tha 5th of October Meeting . ps - between myself and General 8ig “inh, Duong Van Minh, at his “headquarters, at this point, Minh stated, and I read this over, 1: if
Prone (Aras 202) $44-6000 WARD A PAUL sronaren, Pe 2naet tees, AEN Fast nt 7 8 9 ro! li and outlined three plans under consideration by the Generals to assassinate Ngo Dien Nhu and Ngo Dien Can and to keep |President Diem in office. | time an Acting Chief of Station by the nama of AGI PaSTEN He, jon his own, talked to the Ambassador and made a reference that When I reported this to the Ambassador, we had at that ive should not -- I didn't know this, but that we should not | (eliminate the possibility of the assassination of Ngo Dien Can it band Ngo Dien Nhu, that this might preclude bloodshed in Saigon. H { rn Ne was, if [I recall properly, quite severely reprimanded by then-Director John McCone. Senator Schweiker. Well, McCone wired -- Senator Tower. That is what triggered the Colby wire back there, or McCone, which Colby actually sent. Mr. Schwarz. Are you testifying now from your review of the documents, or from what you knew at the time? Mr. Conein.- I am testifying from a review of my after action report. , Mr. Schwarz. But your after action renort doas not menticn the McCone cable. Mr. Conein. No. In my after action revort there were a lot of thinas left out. It would have to be a book, sir. Mr. Schwarz. At the time, did you know of the McCone cable? Mr. Conein. I did not know, sir.
Prone (Aree 202} $44-4000 WARD A PaUK Whee AO 6 SAPTAA PE AS aa eas 34 Mr. Schwarz. The substance of it was not transmitted to you either? Mr. Conein. No, sir. i Mr. Schwarz. So to make that perfectly clear on the I: t |Lecord -- Mr. Conein. The substanca of my stating the options, that i | Senator Schweiker. The substance of it was not? Schwarz. You knew that had been communicated to us? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Senator Schweiker. But you did: not know what option had eliminated? Mx. Conain. No, sir. le Mr. Schwarz. You were not told? 1b Senator Schweiker. And yet you were the key guy in the oy M te # Coup? ‘Mr. Conain. I was not told at that point. I was told later on about assassinations. I can't recall if it was around the 20th of October or when. Mr. Schwarz. You were told by whom? Senator Schweiker. What by whom? ‘ir. Conein. By Ambassador Lodge that we would not tolerats or would not condone any assassination. : Senator Schweiker. Was that within the same timeframe? Mr. Conein. That was within a two-week timeframe, yes, sir.
Senator Schweiker. And they were your instructions then? Mr. Conein. They were my instructions then, sir, Ph +ne (Aras 202) $44-6000 Mr. Schwarz. How did he convey that to you? Did he do it by showing you a cable, or orally, or what fashion? Mr. Conein. No, he told this to mé on a subsequent meeting [erat I had with the Generals, sir. | Mr. Schwarz. Did he instruct you to tell the Generals that the United States Opposed assassination? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Senator Schweiker. And dia you? Mr. Conein. /Yes, sir, Senator Schweiker. And what was their reaction to that? Mr. Conein. Tha reaction was just, okay. We're not talking now about a businesslike way of doing | things. All right, you don't want it like that? Well, we'll “do it our own way anyway. They didn't say that, you know. Senator Schweiker. That's what you got? aa < a a Cc, N 4 @ : €« < a z c c: c Ra i Mr. Conein. They conveyed it, all right, you don't like it t ‘We won't talk about it anymore. Mr. Schwarz. Does your after action report say that you Passed that message on to Big Minh?  Wanteonutie, 0.0. 20004 Mr. Conein. I don't recall -- no, it ‘doesn't. I think . that -- all right, the report -- I did not pass it to Biq Mink, .:I passed it to Don. ALO baeyt Street SE Mr. Schwarz. Does your after action report say that?
‘Mr. Conein. No, it does not, Mr. Schwarz. Does your action report describe the meeting | Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 ywhich you had with Don in which you say that you did. pass it ; to him? ny ‘ Mr. Conein. It describes a meeting which I had with Don [watch I believe was on the 24th in which this was brought up. |rt was in the airport at 9:00 o'clock in the morning which uconfirmed that General Harkins had been informed -- had told | ! . tinea told, that they would not support the coup and Don told | .- ‘me that all plans ware complete and had been checked and { ' General Don or told the Generais, I don't know which one he “rachecked, and it was at this point that I said, you know, they "don't go for this knocking off, WARD ® FAUL Mr. Schwarz. Well, the action report has about twenty-five -, lines on that meeting? : Mr. Conein. No, sir, it has about fiftean. Mr. Schwarz. Page 7, area we looking at the same -- Mr. Conein. We are looking now at page 6. Yt was at .that Point. Now the second meeting of that day was when I was pressing General Don, I was more interested in the political plans thar I was of the actual goings on. This was a request that had been levied On me by Washington, and what I wanted to do more than anything else is get before it happened what their politica! a1 410 F yt Srreer Se, Wasnuvatee, BC, 20001 ‘plans were. can
Prone {Ares 20?) 544-4000 WARD & PauL “OV Se septen VO Fast Stemet, SF | Westie Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Conein, ia there any doubt in your mind that you in some way, conveyed to either non or Big Minh the Ambassador's position regarding assassination? ‘| 4 Mr. Conein. Oh, I conveyed it to Don that they didn't go 4 yfor it. That is all. ii | Mr. Schwarz. Why didn't you put that in the action report Jwhich you made up in 1963? Mr. Conein. I nevar thought I'd come up here, sir, I'11 tell you truthfully. I never thought I'd come up here and be Hasked that specific question, -so there are some things left i I wout of my after action report, such as when we drank beer +» “together or Something like that. I left a few things out. But this -- I never thought I would he here answering that i, ,8pecific question. If I hada known that then, I assure you it would have been in there in capital letters. 1 i Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, can I ask one general ques- te “tion? Senator Tower. Senator Baker, Senator Baker. I apologize, T am sure that this must |have been covered in previous testimony, but Mr. Conein, what did you conceive your job to be in Vietnam at this, time? Mr. Conein. My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and the instructions from my Ambassador to the :., People who were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals ‘ . | who were planning the coup, to get as much information so that
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 a > < ‘ a fe) £ < z vest Street Sf atue “oy NR RS ak rie tee ae ee opt ema Re REYES, Cur government would not be caught with their pants down. Senator Baker. Did you, in fact, agree not to thwart |the coup and in fact to supply economic and military assistance i ie the coup succeeded? i | Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, I did. Senator Huddleston. May I expand on that’ just a moment? | ~ Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston? i Senator Huddleston. Did you conceive your objective to Ibe to encourage or promote the coup? Mr. Conein. No, sir, 7 i Senator Baker. Did you conceive it to be to promote a *; coup but to preserve deniability? Mr. Conein. No, sir. I did not See that I was to promote + .a coup. The coup was going to happen. Senator Huddleston. You were just an observer? Mr. Conein. I was an observer and I was a liaison between my government and the people who were Plotting the coup. Senator Mondale. Did you discuss the possibility of discouraging the coup? Mr. Conein. No, sir. Senator Mondale. Why?, Mr. Conein. Because in the monitoring of an incident, if you start in a negative.--I dia not, for example, encourace 2. “them nor did I discouraqe them in the sense of answering es byour question, sir. But I did not go in and say, oh, I think
49 this is bad, oh, I think this is awful on everything that they a because I would then be cut off and be blinded. Prone (Aras 202) $44-4000 Senator Mondale. I understand that, but when you met with “them as you did -~- Mr. Conein. Yas, sir. i Senator Mondale. -- when you assured them that were there i? coup they would be assured of support, were you not in fact i I | | i ' ancouraging the coup even though you say you were neutral, but Iie you do it, these things will happan? | » Senator Schweiker. Senator Mondale, you missed -- there : was a wire this morning clearly aStablishing the State Pepart- Ment passed on instructions to go ahead and have a coup, and that was the order of the day. WARD & FauL Senator Tower. I think to clarify this -- Senator Mondale. Is that the Hillsman -- Senator Schweiker. The Hyannis Port wire. Senator Mondale. " May I look at that wire? Senator Schweiker. Just show it to Senator Mondale, that's ’ LO 20005 Senator Tower. What was brought out this morning was that sagtee, the CIA ani DOD took an official position in opposition to Late topple Diem, but the State Department took a contrary view thet. diem had to go and their function in carrying out national policy was to inform then. AID Fasyt Stemet SE Incidentally, we had lifted PL 480, the
Prone {Area 202} 544-4000 WARD PAUL mt « 200n2 septa RST ALO Deegr Spent, St 40 commercial import program to show our displeasure at the Diem government. What they were doing was telling the plotters that i they were successful that this would be restored. Is this essentially correct, Mr. Conein? Mr. Conain. Yas, sir. Sir; when I did receive the information on the 24th or 26th, I forget the date, August, which was the famous Hillsman cabla, I conveyed the points of that message to the coup , Plotters. I did not taka those back at all during any time. Senator Huddleston. One other question that Mr. Colby nswered this morning, but I'd like your opinion, if there hai Le » been no interest in the United States in deposing Diem, would ’ there have been a coup? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Senator iluddleston. You think they were going ahess? Mr. Conein. I think there would have been, sir. The - catalyst that started that was what havopenead between the Buddhists -- Senator Schweiker. Who started the Buddhist thing? Which -- Mir. Conein. The Diem government. Senator Schweiker. And why, knowlng what you assessed, which was they were a neutral element and ail of a sudden they're antagonistic politically, why did they do it? . Mr. Conein. This I never could understand. I was up there
Prone (Area 207) 344%%000 WARD & PAUL O44 7POOnL Wastes the day before. Now you're asking for my opinion. 2 My opinion was that they had a chance to get out of it & and gat out of it very gracefully within the. first two weeks 4 Jaftor the 8th of May incident in Hue by Meeting the demands of 5 paying off the families of thosa people who were killed when «| military attacked the pagodas in Hue. If this would have 7: ;/been done, I think that we would have been much better off. 8 Again, this is my personal opinion. 9 Senator Schweiker. If I can interrupt for one more 10 minute - Senator Huddleston. Go right ahead. “ i Senator Schweiker. ‘You said that you thought this was a I key, did I understand, sort of the turning point of tha war? : Mr. Conein. No, sir. This was the turning point of the tpolitical situation, sir. it f Senator Schweiker. I see. Mr. Conein. Not the war. Senator Schweiker. But it could have subsequently affected the outcome of the war by messing up the stability of the “political establishment, is that right? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Senator Schweiker. Thank you. Senator Huddleston. You mentioned that Madam Nhu had deen .. Making some inflamatory statements that Were unsettling to the . fpeople. Were you referring to the people of Vietnam or the | ft I !
Prone (Ares 202) $444000 we A PAUL Po Wostengten, 24 29008 ALO Fst Steere, People of the United States? | I recall some very anti-Buddhist statements that she was imaking, something to tha effect, why not let them burn ' themselves up, or whatever? | Mr. Conein. Yes. Senator Huddleston. Very unsympathetic. Mr. Conein. Very unsympathetic. This upsets -- the reasons 4 ‘being, the Buddhists are not -- Senator Huddleston. Are you referring to the Vietnamese ' people? Mr. Conein. I am referring to the Vietnamese people. The people themselves, they claim to be 80 percent Ruddhist. What happened, people who had never gone to a paqoda after she started making statements to tha effect that she'd like to 7 . furnish some muetard at a bonzes barbecue, or something to “that effect, this made peopla want to identify themselves ; “against the regime and so they would go. Senator Huddleston. And this was the principal reason that the United States felt that they had to get rid of the reqime, or one of the reasons? “Mr. Conein. Oh, I don't know what We were thinking back ‘here. I was out there. But it was an intolerable situation where you had a President who had a Catholic regime and I <. happen to be Catholic myself, sir, but who were being oppressiva <: ‘against another religious group in the middle of a war.
‘\ Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD @ FAUL LWastredtin, O © 20004 wet Wteret, SF aine . 43 44 Senator Huddleston. And you think that was the catalyst that got the coup started? Mr. Conein. This was the action I think was the catalyst that brought down the Diem regima. \ Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Conein, was it the general opinion amona you and your associates in the Agency and the State Department officials thera, the country team, so to speak, that the true power in the government at that time was the brother and his wife or tha two brothers and not Dien? : Mr. Conein. Well, yes, sir. What had happened was, it ll was becoming obvious to those people who were keeping abreast it ‘of the situation, not only within the State Department, but : “also within USAID and JUSPOW and other government ‘entities - out there that Diem had been out of touch with reality and was ry pmot getting the true facts, that everything was being channeled il HT _ through his brother Nhu. The control of the Republican .. }Youths, which was based on the Hitlerian Youths, with nice -. “blue uniforms, Madam Nhu was the Chief of the Womar's Solidarity ‘Movement, they had the Female Republican Youths, thay controlled “the civil guards, they controlled the praetorian quards, the - Special Porces, they controlled a vast Secret Police mechanisn ; Hand all of this, including the police, wag all under one man's contrel. This was Ngo Dien Nhu. In central Vietnam, Ngo Dien Can, the brother of Nqo Dian I" . . ., !Diem, was the actual war lord and nothing happened up there
Prone (Aree 202} 544-4000 PAUL WARD A Wastes sont SE 410 Fostte 1 without his personal approval. S50 what you had, you had a Catholic regime superimposed jand running all of the political, economic and military entities “in the nation and then suppressing what, quote/unquote, was ‘ considered the majority religious group in the country. i Senator Schweiker. The Buddhists? - Mr. Conein. The Buddhists. " Senator Tower. Weren't tha Buddhists themselves fraction- lj alized? I eeu Mr. Conein. Sir? Senator Tower. Weren't there two or three different principal sects of the Buddhists? Mr. Conein. Oh, there were many principal sects of the Buddhists. There were three or four different sects, of course. Senator Tower. Was this just one sect they were dealing with, or all of them? Mr. Conein. Once this happened that there was an attack on the pagodas in Nue and followed up by an attack in Auqust on the pagodas in Saigon, this consolidated all the factions of the Buddhists, so they became a political entity which they ‘\ ‘had never been before. Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, we have a vote in progress. Senator Mondale. Can I ask one question? Your background in Vietnam went back many years. You knew TOP-SECRET -
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 WaRD 6 PAUL »Waseeagton, D.C, 20007 AIO First Stemet gt 1 {Many of thease later leaders, Generals, you were working with jmuch earlier in their careers, Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. i Senator Mondale. And you spoke Vietnamese? | i Mr. Conein. yf spoke it very badly, but rx spoke it. j]SPoke French fluently. | Senator Mondale. But you were Picked, 1 gather, for this H Matebn work because of this unique, longstanding Personal 9 I relationship with these -Peopla. 6 i Mr. Conein. 1 assume 80. I hope things work that way, ; Senator. Senator Mondale. Wall, that was the idea, and then you Met with them frequently? Mr. Conein, Yes, sir. Senator Mondale. Were discussing their feelings about Diem and those around him - .€nd the need for change, the coup and 8O On, did they bring UP @s8assinations as a possibility? Mr. Conein. No, sir. Senator Mondale. They never did that? Mr. Conein. The UP Was at the meeting I had with Big Minh as one of the options that he was considerina, in October of 1963, Senator Mondale. ‘as that the Oné where he was considering Nhu and SOMeOne else?
Prona (Ares 202) 544-6000 2 > « ry a a « < by 2 Wasmisgtae, 0.0. 20003 AID Forst Street, AF Mr. Conein. Yeu. >. - Senator Mondale. But not Diem? Mr. Conein. Not Diem, yes, sir. Senator Mondale. But they nevar once B8uggested : assassina~ of Diem while you were there? Mr. Conein. No, sir, not at that time. Senator Tower. Gentlemen, why don't we suspend and all go and come back? (A brief recess was taken at 3:26 p.m.)
Prone (Aras 202} 544-6000 WARD &® FAUL ?o008 We eel, SF Weasteatan, ret St a1oF: PRUE Sa Senator Tower. Let ma suggest to the Committee that wa ‘ | allow Mr. Conein to proceed with his summary and then, before } jwe ask questions, because I think some of the questions might i | business in a little more orderly fashion. be in that summary and. it might allow us to get through our I So if you would proceed, Mr. Conein. | Mr. Conein. Thank you, sir. i In the latter part of October, specifically the 28th of October, I was-informed by Ganeral Don to convey to the a llanbassador, Ambassador Lodge, that they were ready to havea | 1 “coup and that one, that I was to stay home and await further ‘orders, that the coup would be accomplished before the 2nd ;O£ November. - At that time, Ambassador Lodge was preparing to return 1 to the United States for consultation with the President of i . ‘l the United States. Ambassador Lodge made that known to me that : jhe was coming back to the United States. General Don requested that I convey to the Ambassador that he do not change his plans to leave on the 3lst of October to ‘come back for consultation to the United States because if he ‘did change his plans that this might ba a signal to the President ‘and Nhu that something was qoing On. I don't know why, but the plans ware changed and Admiral Felt, CINCPAC Commander, came to Vietnam and landed and hac an “interview with the President that morning, the day that the coun
Prone (Aras 202) $44-4000 PY a < a Py ° « « z 10 Forst Street. SE, Wasmimatan, 6.0. 2000) 53 was going, or coming off, The coup started I believe here on the 3lst. It was the 1 . . fiat of November in Saigon. At approximately noon on the “Ist of November, I received an emissary telling me that I am to ‘Imove. Iwas changing into uniform when the second emissary came ! . land said that I was to proceed immediately per previously arranged plans to the Joint General Staff Headquarters. Hi , I had at that time a military jeep, a Vietnamese driver, two radio sets, a bag, an extra-large briefcase, and I was ij u “ “armed with a .38 revolver. This was for my own personal " protection because it was a short-nosed revolver, and you couldn't hit anything further than two feet away from you. My driver, who was a Vietnamese Sergeant who had been detailed to ma by the military, was armed with a 245, We proceeded from my residence and about 1:00 o'clock the afternoon and on the way to ~~ or the moment I got the signal that the coup was on, I got onto my radio sets and alerted the Embassy through a voice code which I had and another ' voice code which had been prearranged, to lat them know I was safe. I proceeded to the General Staff Headquarters, and there was firing going on between the Special Forces unit that was right next to the General Staff Heedquarters and some of the elements, the troop elements, at the General Staff Headquarters. I arrived at the General Staff Headquarters approximatel:
Prone (Areas 202) $14-4000 4 2 « . ¢ a i ¢ « z .Wasteares, OC 29004 SLO Fist saeeet st 3:30 in the afternoon. The coup was than on. At the General Staff Neadquarters there was General Big Minh, General Little Minh, General Don, General Khiem, General | Le Van Kim, Colonel ‘Lam. --~ wall, a lot of Military officers. i j| Most of them wera of the General Staff and no unit commanders | themselves. Upon arrival I was with the Generals and they told me, ithey were in doubt of who had not committed themsalves yet, but + Henat it was in progress. They started the attack and it kep+ ion going about 4:90 o "clock in the afternoon -- 1 have it here : in my notes, but I'm trying to recall it without referring to “My notes -- our first call came in, Maybe %:99 or 4:00 o'clock _in the afternoon, when they called Prasident Diem and asked A him to surrender and if he would surrender that they would give Y him Sanctuary and allow him to escape from the country. This was refused. About the same time or @ little afterwards, there was the communications batween Ambassador Locaea and President Dien. was in both radio and telephonic contact with the Embassy and keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what “was transpiring. I was to convey, one of the first messages I Was to Convey was that they did not want any U.S, military . officer Or advisor with auy of the attacking units. They did ‘not want any American participation within the coup. ‘i
Panne (Ares 202) $44-6000 4 > « ry « a & < z eoons . Mosmnaran, OC. 1 Fees: Sieeer. SE They automatically closed down the airport as they always 4 i yao in a coup and proceeded to attack the Central Police ‘Headquarters, take over the radio station, and get into the PTT which controlled the communications. This was very unfortunate, because when they did this -- ‘prior to the coup they had taken out the, f don't know, the ‘telephone terminals and in the process, instead of leaving my ‘telephone into my home open they had disconnected it. They would only leave the Embassy lines open so therefore I was not : warned until practically the last minute to proceed. They had heen trying to get ahold of me since about an hour before thev finally got in contact, with me. And the coup, different units or differant elements, had committed themselves and had progressed. Wa were not sure til} about 1:00 o'clock the following morning that the coup had been successful. At that time, it became quite obvious. There had been three or four communications between President Diam, Ngo Dien Nhu, with the General Officers, each time Diem refused to speak to Big Minh. And on several occasions I woul? warn the Embassy that certain shellings were going to take Place, or bombings by * aircraft was going to take place at a certain time, to alert American personnel who might be living around the area to watch Out or stay under cover because thay were firing 195's in the Center of the city.
52 | We had no American casualty, wounded or killed, during this | coup. I am talking from the American Side, now. The Vietnamese | Prone (Ares 207) 444-4000 suffered about 100 daad. At about 6:00 o'clock the following morning -- this is the most important -- about 6:00 o'clock in the morning just as dawn was coming up, all of the officers that were in the coup and soma |hangers On who, I don't know how thay got there, they were all \standing out, including myself, we were Standing out on the vatio lot the Joint General Staff Headquarters. At that time, there ; thad been some discussion going on among tha Generals and 1: .Colonals who were there about what they were going to do now. I only heard of one officer who was quite adamant about WARTD A PeUL the climination of President Diem at that time. This officer, _ Who is now dead, a General by the name‘of Le, L-e, who was a ; ‘former Chief of Police under Diem in 1955 or ‘56. He was for the killing of Diem. NI Co At about 6:49 or 6:30 or 6:40, a telephone call came in from Diem. We still assumed that Diem was at Gailonqd Palace -- G-a-i-l-o-n-g. And it was at this point that Diem talkad to Oe Fon Paereegtues Big Minh for the first time. \ He asked for full honors if -- he wanted to capitulate, but he wanted to have full honors. Biq Minh replied to the . ‘President that he could not quarantee ful] honors, if and > » ‘during the time that Vietnamase were still killing one another. ~TOP-SECREF—
Prone (Ares 202) 5444000 * ‘ f : yy ? WARD & PAUL 3 eat + i z . c . oS t. ; ¢ ie ? ‘ Fs 3 - vw . 2 ~ t 5 .  ] < = oe Nn It . :aide, Captain Nhung, got into a sedan and with MTS Corps went Diem, something to the effect, said that he would order cease fire at tha Palace. My recollection is it was about 10 {minutes to 7:00, mayba 10 minutes to 8:91. Now i had been up ! 4 . - ‘all night long, I had been working with this for a long time, 480 I can't say the time exactly, but it was around that time. There was a cease fire. and the people quit firing. At thig _stage, there were four armored cars and 113's ar escort of “military police proceeded immediately from the Joint Ganeral Staff Headquarters toward Gailong Palace. Rig Minh, with his out the back road from the General Staff fleadquarters toward the back of the golf course and took a different road from the armored cars that went down Conq Le. The armored column was commanded by a ‘“ainr Bang -- B-a-n~ g -- who had been a former Province Chief at pa Lac Province. They proceeded to the Palace and they started searching the place. About an hour later -- and this is the part that is important -- when Rig Minh left, General Non and General “hien and Le Van Xim were still at the Ganeral Staff Headquarters; suv was I. At this noint, they proceeded to take the pictures of Diem down, cover the statue that was out in front of the Senere) \ Steff Headquarters and they took all teleohons lines out and} reVerted to radio communication, and I wonld Jike to put one thing into place. Batween the telephone call at 6:19 or 6:29 in the morning and the second telenhone call which came at 1%
Phone [Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL mnqree, O Las t AiO Furst Street. minutes to 7:00 from Diem, I was asked by Big Minh and Don to 2 liget an aircraft. I callad the Embassy -- I still had telephone 3 communication -- I called the Embassy and I spoke to me (gee O6 4 ppetssen a was then Acting Chief of Station and who had been up 4 5 jall night also. And I told them that it looked like Diem and 6 | pe ware going to surrender and that I needed an aircraft. ! “| 8 intuntion of immediately recognizing the new regime, or the I was reminded that the United States government had no 5 ! junta; secondly, that President Diem would be taken to the ne yo Wedest country that offerad him asylum; thirdly, that they did yl not want the aircraft to land in a country other than the country that was going to give asvlum. For example, and I am just setting this as an example, assume that France was the first country to qrant President Diem asylum. They did not wart an aircraft thet would have to land, say in Melhi, or Carachi or Teiran or anyplace else where Diem would get out and start forming a government in exile. Senator Baker. Was there any airplane that would fly shat Mr, Conein. Yes, sir. We had C-139's. They could not fly that far. We had KC-135's, and Tt was told that thev coul? not get an aircraft for twenty-four hours, therefore it was Ut. and the nearest KC-135 was in Guam, and thay could not det er aircraft for twenty-four ours. I informed both General “Minh and Genera] Non that T coul?
1 |jmot get an aircraft for twanty-four hours, and -- so when Big 2 ||Minh had gone, General Don was preparing for the reception of S |/the President and his brother. We started -- I wasn't doing it,: Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 but we got troops in and wa cleaned up the whole araa, policed |e out and brought in a large table with green felt on it and [ene were preparing to call in the Press so that they would have || coverage of Diem rasigning. Vice President Tho -- T-h-o -- was to be the new Premier lot the government and he was to accept the resignation and he I would then become the head of the government. Mt z The thing, the most important fact that they were afraid oof was that they would not be accepted to other qovernments, WARD & PAUL « kwould not be recognized, so they wanted a legal transition. ,Also. they prepared to house both Diem and Nhu in the General 1, istatt Headquarters under proper security. That was the way it 16! swas at the time I departed, when they said -- General Don told w) lime they were bringing in the Press and I saw movie cameras an’ “everything coming in, and I said this is the time for me to-aet out, and I went home. I jot home, by then my teleDhone was re-established and ?: got 4 telephone call, come to the Embassy. I want to the : Embassy and I was informed that ft had to find .Diem. I was tizsst and fed up and t said, who gavz those orders. Thev let me know that thoss orders tame from the President of the United States. DLL cesd Sateen te So I went back out to the General Staff Headquarters,
getting there about 10:15, 10:30 in the morning. In the meantind, | they had moved thea group from the General Staff Headquarters to Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 the office upstairs and the Officer's Club at the General Staff y . . , “Haadquarters which was right off of the entrance to the Ganeral jStafe Headquarters. | The Ministers of the former government were all, excapt 7 *Fone, present and had turned over to the junta, and they were in 5 "the process of haing talked to and the questioning them and what ii g have you. I walked in and I saw General Biq Minh -~ I saw all “ ; ‘ithe Generals, everybody else, but I saw General Big Minh's aid, because General Big Minh and Le Van Kim ware talking to Minis-~ ters, to former Ministers of the government. want A PAUL I told the aide that I wanted to talk to ig Minh and he said, what it is about, and I said 1 wanted to know where Disn ‘was. Big Minh came over and I explained to him that it was "important to the United States government to know the location of President Diem. Big Minh told me they committed suicide. I looked at him, and I gaid, whare. Wa said they were in the Catholic Church at Cho Long, and they committed suicide. I think I lost my cool at tha point, because I think ! told Big ‘inh, look, you're a Ruddhist, I'm a Catholic. If “73° committed Suicide at that church and the priest holds Mass tonight, that story won't hold water. I said, where are the?’ ie said thev are at the General Staff Headquarters, behin® i! the General Staff Headquarters, did T want te see them. An?
said no. He said, why not? And I said, wall, if by chance ona lof rt million of the people believe you that they committed | | | suicide in Church and I see that they have not committed suicide ; Prone (Ares 202} 344-4000 - and I know differently, then if it ever leaks out, I am in ‘trouble. I refused to be a witness to it, i They had been killed. I returned to the Embassy and so reported and & message “was Sent back to Washington immediately that they wera dead, | nat they were at the General Staff Headquarters. Mr. Kirbow. Excusa me, Mr. Conein. Did you report that » they had committed suicide as they had told vou at the Embassy or did you renort what you actually knew? Mr. Consin. I reported exactly was I said, that ‘I was Pd P] « a € c a < z told that they committed suicide but [I refused to witness how thay had died, because I didn't want to get myself involved in their death, period. Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I'm not quite sure how vou can confirm or deny how they could hava committed suicide in J000¢ the church if their bodies wera at the General Staff Nead- »O¢ quarters? Mr. Conein. Well according to the original story thet 1 Maa teeption gave out that they both committed suicide in the church -- Senator Raker. How conld you have told or not tolu by reat Stewet SP looking at the bodies? What difference would it have made? aloe Mr. Conein. I know the Vietnamese well enough, Senator, —TOP-SEERETF—
Prone (Area 207) $44-6000 Z > < . € Q « < x 10 Forest Street. SE. Woshseaten OC 20008 | | 4 st ‘ iY Oe eR ars a ae ee that they leave a lot of Marks on people. Senator Baker. So you don't have any doubt in your mind? Mr. Conein. Oh, no, sir. Mr. Kirbow. Did you later see the pictures of the body? - Mr. Conein. I saw the pictures in, 1 think, a few days afterwards. I saw the pictures of it and then there were the pictures of it being handed around. ° Senator Mondale. Dia they tell you that they had taken poison? Mr. Conein. Well, no, they just told me that they had * committed suicide. I didn’t want to dalve into it. Nr. Kirbow. Would you tell the committee the nature of the 4pparent deaths from the photographs? Mr. Conein. Oh, yes. Diem had been shot and he had a 7: : Bloody face and his head was turned over to one side and it was obvious that his harids had been tied behind his back. Ngo Diam Nhu had multiple wounds and’also you could tell that he had been stabbed many times, besides heing shot. You could tell, and by the running of the blood. Mr. Kirbow. Did you later determine in some manner to your own knowledge how the deaths actually’ occurred? Mr. Conein. Yus, sir. Mr. Kirbow. Would you tell the Committee? 4x. Conein. This is something I swore I would never te)). It appeared, first of all, when Diem and Nhu were qoing tz:
ymake confessions at the church, they were using a telephone line t jwaich they could contact, through the Palace ewitchboard, so it would appear that thay were still in the Palace and someone, I Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 ‘don't know who, reported where they Were. Senator Tower. So they were actually in the church at i/cho Long? i Mr. Coneain. Yes, sir, they were in the church. As you go in -- you don't know it, but Ngo Dien Nhu was a chain smoker, continuously smoking, and he was out in the yard, the little [courtyard they have around the church, and ha was walking around “ FI : tand he and his brother were walking back and forth, they had One aide with them. Mr. Schwarz. Not in custody of the Generals? ‘ys 2 « a ¢ 0 « « z Mr. Conein. Not in touch with the Generals, but somebody - reported it. ; First of all, you must understand -- now this is specula- “tion on my part now; I'm not saying how it happened, because I don't know how this part happened in fact, but they had so man pictures of Diem hung up on public buildings and in every office ‘and his picture was all over, like Ho Chi Minh's picture was all over Saigon now, it was all over, so therefore, he was ver” . “Well known, plus people had seen him, they know him, so it was:'t very difficult for anybody to spot him and make a report. General Mai Huu Suan and then-Colonel, later General, ADEE RT Stewart * ‘Duong Ngoc Lam took off with armored cars and want to the chures.
Prone (Area 2027} $44-6000 4 > « e « o @ <a z BD. foo! * a 2 Mav tatane, Street, SF BED Geese 1 2 | There is a little bit of difference of opinion as to exactly 4 H met happened, as exactly what happened at the church. ‘ Mai Huu Xuan reported to the Prasident, saluted and told “him to qet into the armored car. Ngo Dien Nhu protested and j asked for a sedan, and this led to an argument. Anyway, they lwere shoved into the armored car and were told by the commander jof the column, who was Colonel Lam, that they had to use the ;armored car for their Physical protection. i , Senator Tower. Was that Colonel Lam, Was he later ICORPS n é { “Commander? Mr. Conein. No, sir, this was a differant Lam. Duong _Ngoc Lam was a fat little guy who wore a moustache who used to command the civil guard, later becane a General, yes, sir, but he was not the ICORPS commander. He's also dead now. Anyway, they were coming hack with the column, who were “tn radio communications with Big Minh and his antourage and when they found out, when Big Minh found ont that they were prisoners, he gave an order co his aide, Captain Nhung, and Captain Nhung killed them, in the armored car. The bodies were taken directly to the General Staf& Headquarters and later on in the afternoon they were removed from tha Genaral Staff Neadquarters to Clinique St. Paul. Senator Towar. Were they killed right after they were pnt into the armored car? Mr. Conein. No, they wera killed on the way back, when
61 Big Minh's group, with his aide, crossed the column, halted it, and Captain Nhung stepped into it and killed them. Prone (Ares 202} 544-6000 Now other people who ware in thea armored car, I assume -- I jae not know who did the stabbing wounds or anything elsa. I do ; Il know the two were killed by Captain Nhung. We knew this within a matter of hours, exactly what i ndppened, and I reported it and it was reported back here at i Haadquarters exactly what happened. 9 | That is the story, sir. 1G | Senator Huddleston. Do you know that Sig Minh qave the ]; {order that they be killed? 4r. Conein. I have it on very good authority of very J > « ry « fe] & «< 3 ‘Many people that Big Minh gave the order, not only of -~ one thing I can say, Senetor, is that i kept contact with the jure “until the day that the United States officially recognized tha ‘South Vietnamese government. There were Several countries that . r ‘recognized, and I was acting as the liaison officer for the Ambassador to the junta during this period of approximately ten sanas days or two weeks. me Senator tluddleston. Is it true that Bia Minh and the Generals had made a definite appointment with the Ganerals to ete : come to the Palace, at which time President Diem would surrer- t der? a Mr. Conein. No, they didn’t make a definite appointmer«. DLE Brad treet Senator "Nuddleston. They didn't go to the Palace expecti:s:
Phone (Aras 202) 3444000 a a 9] WARD & PAUL 20003 Of. 410 Ferst.Srreet, SF) Washimatae, ''to find him? a | Mry Conein. Yes, Big Minh went by himself. He had Phen INgoc Tau who knew the Palace the best, Major Bang -- Bra-n-g --~- who was in the armored column. I can say ‘that about an hour jafter thay left, Major Bang came back and I asked Major Bang, jwhom I had known up in Hanoi back in 1945, I asked him, I said, jwhat were your orders? And he said, the orders going through ‘the Palace was that we were not to fire unless we were fired hupon. And I said, well, did you find them? And he said, no . we didn't find tham yet. They had not known at that time where t they wore. Senator Huddleston. They expected him to be at the Palace? Mr. Conein. They expected him to be at the Palace. Fverv- assumed, including myself, that they ere at the Palace. Senator Huddleston. Is it your, judgment that at that time they had expected to take them peacefully? Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Sanator Huddleston. And to sand them out of the country? Mr. Conein. What was going to transpire was that thev wer+ going to take them peacefully. 31g Minh himself, as the leeter of the junta, was to take escort them back to the General Staff Weadgurters where they would have the qreen table anc President Diem was to sign over power to the Vice President. They were going to ba held until I could qet the aircraft, an! ‘then they were going to be flown out of the country, because FO P-SEECREF
immediately after the signing that Diem would get through the Ceremony of turning over the powars to the Vice President, Tho, Prone (Area 202) $44-4000 | he would ask for asylum and this would be broadcast. Senator Huddleston. Then what reason do you believe that ‘Diem left the Palace? Was it to go to the church, or was he li really attempting to slip -- i “Mr. Conein. No, sir, we didn't find this out until i ‘ afterwards, because it was very baffling. I don't know how “they got out. Everybody talked about secret tunnels; thare it * “were secret tunnels. There was a passage, because the Gailong “Palace -- now you have to understand that the Doc Lap Palace, D-O-c L-a-p, was the Presidential Palace before the new one was ‘made, that belonged to the Emperor Bao Dai. The administrative 4 3 « s e c & < z the French Governor General's palace was in Gailong Palace. When the Palace was bombed in February of '6?2 by the two Vistnamese Air Force pilots, they moved out of that Palace an: took over the Gailong Palace. The Gailong Palace was right behind the Saigon City Hall, which was then, when it was constructed, was run by the French. Well, between the Sovernor Seneral's Palace, which was the Gailong Palace, and the City Hall was about a half a block. What they had was a passage underneath, just like you have here, temel wt so that. servants won't have to go out in the hot noonday sun and get a paper signed, they could go underneath. DLA Porat hy and what: President Diem and Nhu and his aide did was to 70 —+OP-SEERET-
down through that, walk out in front of the City Hall, got into an automobile and drove on up to Mai Tuyen's house in Choldlon. Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 | Senator Huddleston. What I'm trying to determine was what itheir motive was? Were they in fact trying to evade being iapprehended, or were they going to church? i | Mr. Conein. Sir, there are a lot of things net: in this report jone of them is the Operation Bravo, and I hate to get into this i} thing, Bravo I and Bravo II. ij | | ‘to avoid -- Senator liuddleston. All I want to know is were they tryind Mr. Conain. No, sir, because first of all, thay thought, ‘when the coup started, that it was their coup. ra > a ‘ « oa « « 3 Senator Huddleston. Well, according to other i4 information ~~ Senator Schweiker. Wait a minute. - You lost me. Senator Huddleston. According to other information -- ‘Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Senator Huddleston. -- they had made an arrangement with Big Minh that they would be at the Palace at a certain time, O.4 7ponns .and that 3ig Minh should come and take them and that they woul! peacefully surrender and that they would be given passage out LM seta, of tha country. reet  S4 Now as I understand it, Bia Minh ane the column that vou ALO feet Gt talk about, the armored cars, went to the Palace with that 2: “assumption they were going to be there.
Mr. Conein. Yas, sir. Senator Huddleston. When they arrived, they were not there, Prone [Ares 207) $44-6000 Mr. Conein. That's right, sir. Senator Ituddlaston. They did not know where they were? Mr. Conein. No, sir. Senator Huddleston. The conclusion I draw is that this ives a breach of faith, and that it. angered the Generals, and 9 ‘because of that, when they did find then, they killed them. i 11 tow is that accurate or not? Mr. Conein. Tha* is a very accurate way of describing it, the reason being is that, if I can make a personal ohservation, Pa] 2 < a « o e « g Big Minh is a very proud man and those of you who have heen to 1, Southeast Asia know that face is vary important, and at the 1 jlast moment when he lost face, when he was going up there in a}l a tof his splendor with a sedan and everything else to receive them, this probably was one of the thinas that ticked him off and he gave the order. Senator liuddleston. Is it your opinion that if they hae carried out the pre-arranged plan ani had surrendered that th- scenario would have been much as you “lescrihed? That they wou}? ’ ’ ¢ ze; ‘have nae the Press Conference? Mr. Conein. If they had carried it out and if Riq Mirh would have found then there would-have been too many people DAE Oat here o: ‘Present at the Palace for them to even attempt --
Prone (Ares 202) 544-4000 a 2 < a « o z « g “a Senator Huddleston. That thay would Probably be alive today? Mr. Conein. They would probably be alive today. TI might also add that three days afterwards I was instrumental in gattins Ngo Dien Nhu's children out of the country. Senator Tower. Senator Hart, do you want to proceed? Senator Hart of Michigan. I think that clarifies it. Senator Schwaiker. Mr. Chairman? Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker? Senator Hart. Well, let me ask, the understanding that “at no point in the climactic days so far ag you knew, was there “any discussion of killing Diem? Mr. Conein. No, sir, there had never baen any discussion of any tima about Diem himself beiny killad by anybody. T will ‘Make Oue statement that many peopla -- and I'm talking about the General andother people -- wanted Diem to be around. They could ‘not stand Nhu and Madam Nhu. This was an Opinion of the people. The Generals themselves wanted legal turnover of the government. They wanted international recognition of their coup. They did want that. Senstor Tower. Senator Schweiker? Senator Schweiker. You made a point I didn't understan:. Yeu seid that it was Diem's own coun that he thought was unfol ling? Mr. Conein. Yas, becausa I -- T actually hate to get in the-,
os | | because it is in this report here. It is a very complicated thing “ind you have to understand the devious mind of an Oriental,| i and I'll tell you what, I spent many years out there and I still: Prone (Ares 202) 5444000 [don't understand it, but I can understand why they do certain || things, but don't ask me why. | In August of 1963, General Ton ThatDinh. had been Military ilGovernor, had been appointed Military Governor of Saigon and | commander of the Third Corps. General Dinh was therefore in power and working for Ngo Dien Nhu and Ngo Nien Diem directly lo in August of 1963. l When the military curfew and Military Governor of + r ' te Saigon's powars were taken away on the 1&th of September of 3° 1963, Ton That Dinh considered himself the hero of Saigon. He WwaRD A PAUL . _ saved the Diem regime in August. He also, during that time, had made plans to have what we eall Bravo I and Bravo IT that Diem -- or Nhu -- would have his F 17 “own coup, Diem and Nhu would go down to Vung Tau as if thev “were eScaping and there would be immediately a countercoup put by -- all instigated by Nhu -- a countercoun put on by ‘Diem ‘the same time and bring back Nhu and Diem by popular acclimation. So, in the beginning of the coup, Ton That ninh, who was sometime erratic -- or, he's still alive: T don't want to se” he's erratic -- or sometimes a little funny, very devious, he date ., (had convinced Ngo Dien Nhu that he was going to go throudh < I. . { i"
68 this plan. So they assumed, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon when troops were moving and everything else that it was their Prone (Aree 202) 544-4000 7 jeore- This was Ton That Dinh's plan... What they didn't know was Ton That Dinh was the military h iicommander of Saigon for the coup. Senator Schweiker. Double agent, as we say. Mr. Conein. Well, he was triple about that time. Senator Morgan. Where is he now? Mr. Consin. Sir? Senator Morgan. Where is he now? Mr. Conein. I don't know. I do act know if he escaped ; “this last thing or not. I don't Know if he qot out. He was a “Senator. 2 > < s « f°] & < z Senator Huddlaston. That explains it. Senator Schweiker. That's why he was a triple agent. Mr. Conein. He was a Senator, an elected Senator of the Vietnamese and he ‘was the military chairman of the Senate tor Military Affairs Committee in Vietnan. Senator Mondale. You had a substantial amount of money i. 0.c. 20003 | piasters in your private safe which you wera asked to bring with you to the Joint General Staff Headquartars, -riqht? Hr. Conein. I had, and I don't recall exactly the amount of money. There is someplace somewhere an accounting of the money and also the signature of General Don who received gone 410 Fst Street, $.0.. Wasnisqtan, "of this money. I don't recall -- and I'm telling you
Prone (Ares 2027} 544-4000 WARTD A PAUL LAN at erptenes Steeer Na & 9 truthfully, I don't recall if If had 3 1/2 million or 5 million jester: I said I brought a little brown bag; it was one of | these diplomatic sort of courier bags and it was stuffed with ‘) money. I had made some certain contingency plans for my own | protection because it became obvious to me that if anything | happened that my family might suffer, and also that if the | Diem government found out that I was involved in a conspiracy, il _ if we may call it that, that I probably would have a very i lc t efficient Vietcong incident -- in other words, I would be ho, blown up or assassinated or something like that and it would he blamed on the Vietcong for doing that. Therefore, I took certain precautions, I had made arrangements to have one FA Special Forces ‘€eam available upon signal to protect my house when the coup ‘came off. I had also made arrangements to have a military jeen with proper type of communications equipmant so that I would, ne matter what happened, I would always be in communication. I also -- Senator Mondale. Was your family with you in Saigon? Nr. Conein. Yes. I had just had a Gaughtar born three months before, and one of the things 1 wanted was, they could kill me but I didn't want my family to pay for what I did. Therefore, I had one completa FA twam of the Fifth Special Forres ‘at my house during the coup.
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD A PAUL I had made a contingency plan for funds. Now the amount 4 yof funds ~- like I tell you, I don't recall exactly how much, it was 3 1/2 or 5 million piasters. | i Senator Baker. How much is that in dollars? Mr. Conein. About $70,000. Now this is roughly, I'm ll figuring it up now in my head, I'm not a mathematician. And iz took this money and put it in the baq, the brown bag, the | “reason being that for the first twenty-four hours there were t ‘ C 1two things that were vitally important. There were certain ‘units that would be diverted at the last momant. These units ‘Were going to be put into a situation they did not know of, so therefore they did not have the rice and the bread. That was the most important thing, rice and bread. The second thing was that we did not want, under any _’ circumstances, of any Personality who would be shot or killed during the coup that there wasn't a gesture made to pay off the family immediately. This is something that you gentlemen probably don't know, but there are no insurances in Vietnan in the oroper sense that we know of, so there's always, when some: body is killed, there is a sum of money Jiven, The other thind was, we had to hava volunteer medical facilities available in addition to the military facilities. We wanted to be sure that there were certain medical facilities so that we coul:l! take care of our own wounded. Well, these thinys have to be prepare, gentlemen, anid ther:
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD A PAUL ee ee eRe 71 1 jwasn't a lot of money ~~ it was a lot of Money in pilasters. 2! All of these monies have been accounted for, they were “ accounted for by Me, they were signed for by the General, and - 4 |for each payment. Now, I do not know whera those receipts are. 4 "t 5 j Senator Mondale. Could I? I'm not Getting at -- there's “4 6 iIno implication, 1 hope, about the management of money. I'm just 7 ‘trying to find out what the money was for. | : RB: Mr. Conein. It was to pay for food ~- G8 Senator Mondale. In Other words, you have something like i 10 $79,000 in piasters, give or take whataver the arithmetic, and : oe “how long had you had that money? Ar. Conein. I had had that money since approximately, 1[ would say around the 24th Of October. I had that ina safe in 74 My house. Senator Mondala. And did that Money come to vou through -* ‘the CIA? Hr. Conein. 1 requested it from the Pinance Of fice, yess, Senetor Mondale. He provided you the Money, you brought it ont and Kept it in your hone aad then when was the fist cal? XN for the monev? Was that the dav -- Ax. Conein. 1 took it with me, Senator Mondale. Yoy had it in your homa? ‘Ir. Conein. Yes, I had it in my home, and when I changed ‘into uniform ta go out to Seneral Staff --~
Prone {Aras 202) $44-6000 WwaRD & PAUL Senator Mondale. But they asked you to bring money at ) | ythat time, did they? | i 4 Mr. Conein. I had made arrangements that I would bring a icertain sum of contingency funds. Senator Mondale. With General Don? t Mr. Conein. With Ganeral Don. ‘ i I ! | i . ~“ 1 Senator Mondale. He asked you to bring tha money, didn't i jhe? Did I understand you to say bring as much money as you could lay your hands on? i i Mr. Conein. No, not as much money as I could. -If it ware that, I would have taken a b-bag full. But the thing of it was, Jit was only for a small sum of money, a contingency fund for .4 twenty-four hour or thirty-six hour period, which I did not know at that time. Senator Monlale. What did you understand that money to b« - -for? For what purposes? ‘ Mr. Conein. The money was to pay for those units who, at the last moment, when their officers would qive the order to march, who had no timz to qet their food, to draw the supplies. Senator Mondale. Anything else? Mr. Conain. To vay for medical -- Senator Mondale. Expenses. Mr. Conein. -- expenses. Senator Mondale. All right. Anything else?
Mr. Conein. To pay the death benefits for any person, jyou know, killed. | Prune (Ares 202) 544-4000 Senator Mondale. Did he tell you that's what he wanted it ifor, or did you know that that is what it was for? Mr. Conein. I knew that's what it was for. Senator Tower. I would like to bring up at this point, {Director Colby has testified about this. Mr. Schwarz. Not in the same detail. Senator Tower. Not in the same detail. Senator Mondale. Well, I'm sorry. Yr was not here this morning. Senator Tower. That's all right. 4 a ry « & < g Senator Mondale. So in that sense, we were bringing, through you, assets which they would use to help carry out and pay tha costs of the coup. Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Senator Mondale. All right. Now, was there any discussion about wheather it was risky for you to be personally vresent at the JGS or anywhere else with these Generals at or near the time of the coup? .. Did you have any discussions about that? ‘Ax. Conein. There were several discussions about my Personal security prior to the coup. There wers also discussio:.: with me because I’ was worried about my family in case ~- Senator Mondale. Wall, it was clear that this was very
Iknown, to the coup? Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 Mr. Conein. No, sir. Senator Mondale. Because I think you mentioned you got “out of it fast when you saw newsmen. Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, I was scared. Senator Mondale. Mr. Conein. No, You didn't want to be seen there. sir. You didn't want to Senator Mondale. be geen there, because you didn't want our association, whatever it might be, with this group known to the public? Mr. Conei:. I did not want -- WARD ® PAUL Senator Mondale. Is that correct? That's in here? Mr. Schwarz. Yes. Senator Tower. You, were ordered in and ordered out, weren't Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. 2o00l. Senator Mondale. Well, you left vourself? Mr. nO Concin. I left myself. aye Senator Mondale. ‘Jithout any orders. L Waar Mr. Conein. At the momant IT saw that they were aqoinag to ~\ bring the Press in, for the capitulation of President Diem, was at the time that they told me to qat tha hell out, General Don ALM barst Street. SF said, tet the hell out, we're brinqing in the Press.
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD @ FAULK 410 Fiest Steeet, SE, Wasnington, D.C. 20001 Senator Mondale. So were there discussions about the Iwigsdom of having you there at all at any time; or did they need he liaison? - E Mr. Conein. No, air, it wasn't a question of a discussion jin the sense that you're talking about, Senator. You must understand the relationship. I was part and parcel of the whole | sonspiracy, so if something went wrong, they would go down the drain with me. We were all going dow the drain together. : Senator Tower. Can we suspend at thia point? Hi H Let us go Vote. (A brief recess was taken.) Senator Tower. Phil, I balieve you had thea floor when we suspended. Senator Hart of Michigan. I have no questions, Senator Tower. All right. Pritz? | Mr. Schwarz. To go back to the telephone conversation. about “airplane. Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Hr. Schwarz. After you obtained the word that you couldn't a plane for twenty-four hours, was that word passed on to Ngo Dien Diem? Mr. Conein. No, sir. This was a telephone conversation; because President Diem talked to Big Minh and to General Don and it was the first
time during the whole coup that the President had had a chance to 2 jo to Big Minh. Up to that point, he refused at all points to Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 \talk to Big Minh. Mr. Schwarz. And in any event, you are quite sure that the word about the plane being available but not being available |for twenty-four hours didn't get to Mr. Diem? F Mr. Conein. I am positive, because the reason being it was ; il ; jatter the conversation with President Diem that both Generals. | iDon and Big Minh came to me and asked me about gatting an air- | 5 | plane to get them out. It was after thay had hung up, and this twas when I called the Embassy and spoke to « Ey OG Mr. Schwarz. And he gave you then three raasons, or three WARD @ PAUL ae | comments, about the airplane? la gave you those right over the Phone, or did he call you back? iF { . emitted that message back and I don't recall if Big Minh had Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, right over the phone ard I trans- “ “walked out but I know that General Don had been told by me : * exactly that it would take twenty-four hours. Senator Tower. Senator Mondale had the floor when we ‘suspended. Senator Mondale. Just one quastion. 4 ot How did you arrive at the fiqure of money that you had in " : “your possession with your local office thera? How was that fiqure idetermined, was it just a ballpark amount? ALTON boat Somer, § F., Wasningtos, O.C. 2000! Mr. Conein. The amount of money?
Phone {Aras 202) $44-4000 4 > « a e a g « z Bec 20001 910 Fest Street, SF. Wosnenaton, Senator Mondale. Yes. 1 ' i ‘ Mr. Conein. That was all that would fit in this briefcase. | | ana I wasn't going to haul two briefcases. Senator Mondale. No, what did you -- go to the Director land say, I'd like this much? I ‘| Mr. Conein. No, sir, I had asked for a cartain sum but 1 Gould not put it all in this briefcase. This is why I cannot i ii answer you really, if I spent 3 1/2 or 5 1/2. : ‘the packages of 250,000 piasters had fallen over the back end I do know that when I went back to check my safe, one of of the little guide rail, you know, that keeps the safe drawers -- ard one of those packages had fallen back and I remember taking ‘that and I said, look, I've got some left, and I turned it bac in and got a receipt for it. So this is why I cannot tell you ,axactly the amount. They know, and I would say roughly it's in the $70,000 figure. Senator Mondale. Thank you. Senator “Morgan. I have just one question. Senator Tower. I believe Mr. Colby testified this mornina it was 5 million piasters. ‘Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, but I didn't spend it all. Senator Tower. Sénator “Morgan? Senator Morgan. I just have one cuestion, Mr. Conein. No you have any reason to balieve that thare was any undus delay on the part of the Fmbassy in making a plane available?
a8 Mr. Conein. No, sir, the fact being that an aircraft of that size, it would take -- because it would have to come from Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 Guam, sir, then the pilots would have to brief and all the thing! on how to go. Now you must understand also that the airport was i ; closed down at that time. No aircraft were coming in or leaving 1 | without special permission. i Senator Morgan. Would it havea come to Tan Son Nhat? | Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, Senator Morgan. Now did I understand you to tell Senator | Itondate that General Minh never knew that it would take twenty- ; "€our hours? : ° Mr. Consin. I don't know wheather he knew it or not. 1 : ‘Say that I know that I told this to General Don. I can't recall. 4 3 « ry a Q « < z . ‘this was all -- everything is over with, you know? Senator Morgan. But the main thing in my mind, in your — opinion there was no undue delay in making the plan available? Mr. Conein. No, sir. Senator Morgan. Well that was the question that was in my mind. Senator Tower. I think wa were all a little confounded by that this morning, but I think the explanativn of that is that .the airplane had to fly directly to the country of assylum and couldn't stop anyplace alse. That would require longrange aircraft like the KC~135. You couldn't make it in a C-47. 410 Frest Street. SE, Wasnenaton, OC. 20003 ‘Senator Morgan. Which would not normally be available on
4 2 «< r « o @ « z Prone (Area 202) $44-€000 2000% o.c $B. Wastiagtary. 410 Forst Street, iy -t ERR EN Taiwan? Mr. Conein. No, sir, it was not available outside of Guam or Hawaii at that time, sir. Later on they were available ‘in Subick Bay and Clark Field. Senator Tower. Senator Baker? Senator Baker. Thank you. . Who laid on that requirement that it be a nonstop flight to the country of asylum? Mr. Conein. This I do not know, if it was the Ambassador or if this was just an assumption of the people who knew the Ambassador's thinking. This I do not know, sir. I do not know if it came from the White House or the State Department. 1 do not Know. Senator Baker. Do we know from other material? Mr. Kirbow. We assume that McGeorge Rundy might know on Monday. Mr. Schwarz. We don't know. 6b Did you have an assumption from the conversation with Mr. Wthat he was prepared for your quastion? I maan, he came back with an answer that had three rather complicated points. Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. I assumed that tha moment that | would get the go ahead from the junta that thev wanted the aircraft that I would levy the requirement and the Fmbassy an! the military were prepared to levy the requirement immediatel::. Mr. Schwarz. No, but did you assume from your conversati::.
Prone {Area 202) 544-6000 4 3 < a a fo] « < z S10 Furst Street, S.6.. Waytengina, 0.0. 20003 I ith Mr pearl he was prapared for your question in light of| the complex answer that he came back with? Mr. Conein. Sir, I don't know. I- would assume that he had | I NS been FDepared and obviously if he was Prepared that well that i ijsomabody must have talked to him. I wasn't there. I was at ltr other place, | . Mr. Schwarz. Just to make sure tha-record ig Clear on it, but for those rules laid down in the telephone conversation, jthere were airplanes that the United States had control Over Iwhich could have been used? | Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. i t : If -- for example, sir, let mé point out one thing, that - oat z lie it had been Philippines Islands that granted asylum first that we would then not have had to use a c- 135, we could have used General Harkins' C~130 which was a converted VIP plane. : But at that time and under those circumstances there was ino way of knowing which country -- assume that it was Japan, we did not want’ the airplane to land in Taiwan. Mr. Schwarz. But that was a matter of choice? Mr. Conein. A matter of choice. Senator Baker. What do you msan, “we didn't?” . Mr. Conein. We -- according to my instructions, were that the airplane was not to make a stop. Senator Baker. What do you mean, "we"? You said lyou didn't know who laid on that requirement. Was that your
Prone [Area 202) $44-4.000 a > « a e a « « z 410 Fiest Street. $.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 wish? Mr. Conein. I say wa don't know. I'm talking now, we the United States government, I'm assuming, because the gentlenan Ihas asked me a question and I assume that he had talkad to ithe Ambassador. i Senator Baker. Any further questions, any members of the a Committaa? | I reckon that's it. | Mr. Conein. ‘Thank you very much, sir, | Senator Tower, Thank you, Mr. Conein. wWe appreciate your i testimony. We will ask you back to discuss the matter that Senator ié ‘Baker brought up. Mr. Conein. At your convenience, sir. (The questions by Senator Baker follows:)
Senator Tower. Let's go back on the record. Prone {Ares 202) 544-6000 Senator Baker. Mr. Conien, while we're waiting for the | other Committee members to return, I have a few questions on t other matters and we can arrange the transcript so that it [win not interrupt the flow of your other testimony, if that's ‘i all right with you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Tower. All right. Woolston-Smith? Senator Baker. Are you acquainted with a man named A. J. 4 Mr. Conein. A. J. Woolston? No, sir. Senator Baker. A private investigator in New York City? Mr. Conein. No, sir. WARD & FAUL Senator Baker. Do you have any information about the « involvement of the CIA, the DEA or its predecessor ~- what was vg ithe predecessor? Mr. Conein. SBNDD. Senator Baker. -- in any domestic assassination? Mr. Conein. No, sir. Senator Baker. Do you have any knowledge of any assassine- tions or any attempted assassinations of versons related to |. Wasninatan, O.C. 20003 J international drug traffic by persons connected or affiliated with the CIA or the DFA? Mr. Conein. No, sir. 410 Forest Stemet, SF Senator Baker. None at all?
Onone (Ares 202) 544-6000 s > < a ‘ fe] « < z 410 Forst Street, $.£.. Wastengion, 0.C, 20003 Mr. Conein. No, sir. i Senator Baker. Do you have any knowledge of any CIA linvotvenent in any drug traffic for profit in Vietnam? Mr. Consuin. No, sir, I do not. Senator Baker. Have you ever been involved in or had any iknowledge of the purchase or the manufacturer or sale of jassassination devices to or by a Federal government agancy? Mr. Conein. Sir, I think you are referring to something that was asked by Senator Weicker one time when I was looking Nat Title III equipment, which is bugging equipment for the ‘Drug Enforcement Administration... I was shown some, without sOlicitation, I was shown some devices, that were booby-trap type devices. I would like to make ita part of the record that the Secret Service has been completely informed of this and also the Alcohol, Tobacco and Pirearm. know of these devices. And I also furnished a completa brochure of all the description of these assassination type devices to the Secret Service. Senator Baker. lave you got a copy of that brochure? Mr. Conein. No, sir, I do not. Senator Morgan. Senator Baker, would you yield on that? Senator Baker. Yes. Senator Morgan. Would you repeat that name again? I'm r sorry, when you say non-related, I started reading the paper. FOP-SEERET—
Prone {Ares 202) 544-4000 WARD & PAUL Ow. 2000) S10 Fast Steeet. SE. Wwasmenaian, Would you give ma that name again? Senator Baker. The name? Senator Morgan. Yes, sir. > Senator Baker. Mr. A. J. Woolston-Smith. ‘ | Senator Morgan. Was that somewhere around Alexandria 1 |nere? | * Senator Baker. Well, he's been hare, and he's bean in New York City, he's been in St. Louis, and I understand at one _ he had an office on the Wast Coast. 1 Senator Morgan. Would you add to that the name Paris. | theodore, with regards to any kind of assassination davices? Mr. Conein. No, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Who did show you the assassination devices? Mr. Conein. This was, I think, Senator Weicker asked me “specifically in January, I don't recall the date, that he had “a report that I had seen assassination devices. I had testified " " personally to the Senator with an attorney present, and while there I told him that there was another one of my staff members had been present and had seen tha same devices and he called ~ for. the staff member who verifiad averything that I had said, and I did not open my mouth during the questioning of this ev other member of my staff. Mr. Schwarz. Who showed you the assassination devices. Mr. Conein. Sir? Mr. Schwarz. ‘Who showed you the assassination devices?
m g ~t S ° ~~ Pt) a z ws re) © 4 At ea e ~~ pay rT) 3 ror a ba a o z b* | el fo oO OG Senator Tower. for a moment? INwa DT OneM £OOOT "IQ “Vordurusran HS OVS Wd OTE ku bvguev
Prone {Area 202} 544-4000 WARD & FAULK » Waseungtan, OF.0 20001 S10 Favst Stemet, SE 2 no ND Senator Towar. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) ee | Senator Baker. I will refrain from asking the question, "but I wish the next time that we ask, Mx. Conein t1 [to come back here and bring with him the paraphenalia, the devices, and any brochures that he has. Senator Tower. Do you have any of the devices? | | Mr. Conein. No, sir. Senator Tower. Do you have the brochure? } | Mr. Conein. Yes, sir, I have a copy of the brochure that I fI furnished the Secret Service. Senator Baker. I might ask this one thing, or mention « "this one thing, rather. You might be prepared to describe to : “us how you came to have the brochure, particularly with referencg ito whether you solicited it or were solicited and whether this :Was the only one that you ever had, and similar material. Mr. Conein. Yes, sir. Senator Tower. Anything further? All right.
Be ee ee ee Ue ee es Sige . Prone {Ares 202} 544-6000 2% this time} -the Committes:issadjourned until Monday afternoon at 2:00 o'clock. (Whereupon, at 5:04 o'clock p.n., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock | p.m., Monday, June 23, 1975). WARD & PAUL . 3 3 o ™ 8 a 4 8 2 - s é £ a z w wi a Fe ° s '
rool pay rh ~ TOP SECRET — FORE OS THY VIREOLNTSE Gin Core o2 3/2 Novenher 4, Without analyzing the various cow) plots advanced to CAS prior to the 3 Mav 1965 Nuo lactdeat. tu eaa le stated at the autset that subseauert to this aveut, tae coutiuulag Buddhist crisis presented both a svringboard nad u coalescent facto» variously used by both leng-standioy and new crities of thse Mier Hegima for intunsizied plowisey, vacging from a pola: soup to direct military actioa for sioleat cverthroy of taa tagime. Througa sarly July, the virvcLous plots of waien ve becune avare could not be aestousty fdudeud with the exception of the 3 duly dudication that Goseral ‘un Yas Don, then o.2nmadar of the Army, dz coasert wits all but a few of the grrveral ovficors, had pleas for tha avervthroe co? the goveriawt to Lpciuce tha sevoval of tha eatirve Uno family from uyvee. Ceuoval Noa an wel as several ovhev yoaeral effiuzes had Yor a period of a yates of mere vexyin-erad disq satisisstion aver various Lolicioo aad inutsyuactesd of the Vien Ragine, hut at no tine did these aypeaxe geuch pianning in eepth 65 warrant serious consideration of the proLubility of actions, Toe 3 July casort, however, walinZereed by statomeats from yuvious niliteary scurces, including nS duly revart fron Genera Le Van Hgales that a coup would avon cecus, warranted close sad careful eremination of the intaunk and ability of a ccmotzxcloa of the genaral officers te tnke action agninst the vigiee., Ferbaps the most sigatficeant. and without a deubi ncgt adversa fantor milituting agninst ew military coup to ocr ta the pre-21 August pericd was the coufrontetioa by Ngo jiu Niu on Lt July of the wen2eni officers which in. retrogn2cs aust be seed as fn Anspirea pover move ta clearly izdicsio tha regine's awarencs:3 of cove vistting, to Jesue Q cleats Warning against action, and ss3t Lesortaul. to coatuse and divide taa genera officers. 2, “ps most erriavs gkeguent to snosze fren this perica Was Wa Stroy svectiation thas Xgo Dhah hu was clottiag a 4 powar 3. agyansé Presiceac Olen, Tsis was cubs wraantly wPLAI >: iby the content of the eulopies peepurcet lor the ? "eS ascevlance of thy geand loud seshio of ‘ Ac that tins, sowaver, sue. & snacu- ived only fren resorted roviurks to cle -aneral ne Ampliesticus of Nhatve anieeced us of the CLA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR ae RELEARE OF THI8 DOCUMENT cette | . Cwagradiag gag a - — Gectasuinesitia seeeects sqensee swore §  Semmmqeusosaen
Regbiaaa Youth Movereat to support tie ducwayties of power by sealeaation. "a2 Pivst chapter of the Budéehist ¢riats quiminating an the taracion of martial Jaw on 22 Avyust i252, provided an ov ez upon wiich various progessiovnl digsi:ents could hoaag vocalization of dissidence, cryntallised latent alsa action among newly arisen opussitioen igcolgs. . pad cunviseed pasy af the prozessiona}. abiitsrys that tho war apadnins the Vist Cong could not ba vou 4f thy 991) tleal BAtUn LO wore alloved to deterlorata. 4. Pas coup d’atat plotting between 23 aad 5). August 1963 fur entreupact Appears as 2 Gomawhat coupetits: mavg by the gororal officers to take action agains? thea Dian Regine, An oraiveds of this coup phot polats up savarat reasons for eg faiiera to materialize, the most significant of wuich are as follows: (2) Contact und krovloedye anony the Anerican coumtly ‘3 too prolivernted and muss bv considcved as havita: ndvarsely agfeated che geeuvity of tha ocerucion; Ch) Ab go22 point, thera occurred p faoricated ox Lenk to the GVY watch resulted in local press attacks Chs sud foretga adventuryrs; (ce) Rt no téae dic the coup pinnszera eantrol gugfieloat trees strength to parait rapid aad aiticiant tokeore: of tha palace or other key instailatioas, tae ferces ayallabis to the coup prancipais wore coapletely outelasied by those forces wundor the control oF the GYN with thao qirtaia wenlization of 2% blood hath if precip. cate actiog wver2 Lanackhed; fd) At no tine did the coup principals indicate an 349 S72 poldsicel strategy raquired 49 de ao. than 3229 tag inewabents du the palace: Althcvsgh there y - “9 932 scene recognition of the daglvabiiaty o2 2 wwlitieinns participating in whatever gov rmnaent .. uyea kalg we3 camitied when Cenaval Kuors Yaa Uloh : ata nilitasy juats was laevisabdle fo. at loast thpvlod adtes ‘the cous o'etas. There ‘Us no no nokia alliances batwveea a pucely xy -iitieal sit nilbsayyvy. diy nn sane token, thess vas not Glontios. dugteg that pertaud that tia dissarduat t+ had say oisitorn of walemms of dnaavitic is oO: mw aset wher Tha 8 ecatlavation oF w.7o¢ Cony! f__© gE _j-- man nn ee fp eemes ee ciara £07935 ee a u
NIG Tea peciod bewveen 2 Seotender. tha (Least overt 12 tha Birnes of Vietoan Pannes asxllico story v naaett wT larbaa Uo Dt tet', sad i Novembar CL2b.y characterized by tas Tollovtars: - os jee te va i - th be ” pe Sore ow poe 3, ” te (2) Toe Dien Regime launshed a consigtent and epleulrsed solhicy of confrontation with CLS. USHS end various other svheaawts of the 0,5, Gcvernaent; . Cb) She Diem Regine pursued a policy of réarcching for altevontivasa to USG add and @ bult-tightoniay «co ita own econeny;: {e) Ths Diem Regine at no tina curing thia period drponstrted eveaa the Aost stparfictal ayarenasa ay the proluslicy of disatiectilon and dissidence zmeng the articulate end opls on-foralag soumeatts of the urban population; ‘She JEG pursued a policy of graduated prassures Au the tcoudgmic Sron cauleuisted to torcos tha Dien Kagime to gvteet La} PONS mms necessary for the 3uce2zssful conduct of the vs “nt the Viex Cong and to vin popula: support for the oi sua@d by Diem; (a) Tne actearcazion of tae coartlict ktetween the VHC and tha GYil by the continued vuplle one haa bey statenants of Madians MHxo Cink Nbu. keth whites che ras ln & L. Viletnuaia ang duehig oes visit to Selgvade, Rone, Paris ona. he Unitod Stakea; thease statanuents wera woul replayed in the vernoscular Qadi international oxvess (2) 7 tha dntorrnation he heightening hostile ‘sorld cyintor fanned by eh press; (z) The inability or failure (tho forrer is most libely) of President Diem and Conesslics Khu te retralice or micdaste the dissldert genorsl officers. _ th) ‘The dateriovation of the economic et soLlity oF tha mahi. v woltumised Sy ¢ta2 Tiuctuatics value ¢ 22 curregacy. Blak marta ting. rias da prics3: of cuit consyunor Wag mashed decliaisa Gf Anpestsa, aa Cusapaeayaace tip mavbit. . Sentinusd Sotieimsclations by Dacéchash bonwes, dstortorating golbtior. sad seoacunica qeqoud chanter of the Uwweradigs cong /P 0! 1297935 ee ee Rn Se AP SD ee SNE §6die 124 ae nt aw f COMIN.
GVagsia groelesd tha generais wlth taa eliwattoa they required to ness lavas trety niauning Jor a coun diecast, unm ivjectiva tuez did were abandoned cut tad merely ciurtattlen. wf. “3 OF SIGMLISICANT RYENTS CoMracTs fe Tn 2 Coes St PMA S es 2 isda, —eee eer Conein/General Don meeting at Nhaterag with the Minh degivad a privace converndattisa with Convin; (b) Genoral Yon Ghat Dinh (Commaaciis; Generar, Irt Qarps) realized he had baen duped hy Diem Govera- meat during his tenure na Hilitacy Cavernor of Jaivea patveur BL August and 26 Septanoer 1963; (sc) Geureals, Gurdieg tha uowth of tencember 1963, uupaitiod a vequast to Prasiduat Caca to accord thea soultions in divferant iini3trios waich they did mot expest Dian co boner; (2) fon mtatead that the Generals now hava 2 plan; (3) prior to Genova) Dink’s yraes3 conZereice of “9 August, an unideatizgied Viatnasese cividlan told Counseller Neo Dink thu that tha Anericaas yer coutacting vnrtous Vieturmess da ocdax to 90tot vaga 2 couo = Dea was called by Vou and shown 2 inst prepared hy Nha sawing Auevicans engaged Lo coup plotting; Conetia’s a2ane tas not ou the list. habaszador Lodge noprtoved Coaein's reeting with Geasr3ai Ousay Yan dian Tonei2 aad Ganersl Dieu Vau Mina met at Le Van Duyet Weadquartcers: (a) General UWini. saquestad to know USG nosition with respact to & change ia the GVM 4a tha nenr Yuture; (do) Minh adic. aot expact USE scpport Joy binself or his coileagues foe o coup aietat, Inve cid nesd UGG assurencys that WSG vould not atteapt to tivart bls nlens; (ce) Mira stated used tox nelauation of Aservlean military agd economle ¢ % tas present level; (dad) Minh wvi.tioa by tae adsuygabaase ad hn Neu aad to hao Yraclive Dien in of ficse; rnbkts wo dato Cinszideace aysinss ung de0kase tealigou; (3) divact rr Tmilinecy units fa » 23 to rhe Malen Khiea tat Genel or £07933 Copy (J ot)
awele Vole devine che lusuat (£5 tina Menersiu had to act WAY Ve: : ., avitelion aad WMMIA Gis OTS day sa ser ure. tie cenp with, 42 were Ahowkive t ADH Nwnee ce ifs XvOQi: Vau Dron, —roa Van ite AC lertaise s ‘yasseador Lodge testructs C&S uot to tnitiatia cont, at vith General Minb or Cenerat Nan, but if wk: Qawmaredg luitiate contnet. sue: contaets vere euthovicod; in the course of neetiays with Low or liaaeh, Srauvances wera ca be Glyen taeh the UGG will not tawarc a chanyve of goveronint or dery aecorouts ve mbabitary asglutanc.2 to a ew xegine tf feaeared eineple of innsoistay effentiveness ef a’fors, assuriug pomulan Bippert to win Bad gn rrovins vendre Tolaticnus with the ayn fang Nauyen. Catel of Oparvatioas, ata ted NO 7.23 “outsole. py tue sup Sur lag Taz week o® &-32 3 SUR _U2S RGBSA fade fui. Votored aa Tac vibe fi tad al oper bo we ws hy Lose? £uG Seers tary webaunea who bad i i = WHER OBUE Thuy cm (Ms uon- stone} thao etluvean malay; Neuy on waiecn grows ie wil’. support. 2yelle SJotel and oN ofiaces cho was 2 ee, dia to sus- i anvotvensat in Noviubazx 19:0 coun plot. an fapagssy offscer xtter 4 yoeclal een? ino ibe ders to establish coctuact with niiitasy office Gusrgantes by Ambassador Lodge tHko part Le caakt Zdontiel ¢igcuesious, Huss AwareG ue Was *epronenting sco Vishiausese Boral end cther officers who wantal te talk to . Ame Ack&n olltvary citicer EGOWe tas situstion Bouts Vietnada, Lan Higoc mauun, [anager of Car =, tin Canara aad Magn hy: ery gq Cesdinag wich Mus weadirut: a £5; BOR. En Las ta csatres hid raed a mesa. sam he. Lines Bt f veesotast a elven te Ps tonsGcoh Lacy wopecauh che # woud Cie CONS sles tor weuled TNL Use we 2 = ‘0 tt “Og ?
gveparcd Yor 2 feces nesilng ontuida “23 LR proiganEg GC redisase and dia surels Mink and Daw pestis 32 Voohkdns fa We : ecnerhs Thaugn Saramsacoe Gecerals. none roatlourd Comet, Cercarn} Naa maqvosted Casein to mest hin at J5S PT aAGVaetaess View Qted wae cmeral ¢t2icers aaa coniei btue tad ceee ten tO Auten cto take ndyapiage of the 26 Octobor National 2; ay ia o-eder 2 Et 3 A coup Within o week; wu agabes of Geagral Mo's gB£arf. Colongsl Mguyen Kiraong, hed leakad to Jou, uuthorities that a anus is to ocsurs on or 27 OQctobev; Uhuevgta overtures -o the Asericans thie? tie GALEve acd as a weanls Presidant we ordased the Sth aad Tth Bivtnions, wateh Vave hey Gveanenita dn the Sutpos arsa ior the coup, fg fo on extend operatinvas Gatside faigen; Dosa thimwadeag fo hnow tau auswars 3.2 previous avestions PETA sso t ot: BUS Acca tiie teum a aA cous; : eA ai =. truceions, toda hou taat the 2 SG CHa 28a 92 (overnma: Of dppy Poa GSSagenne? te to iow reglus semsaale OF inact: ising ai factivenens uy SgSurLIx bopulay aaigport to wis wad iingvows tek yoxkirg belLocions with Ton confizied that be tac utcanpted to Coaeis ‘sherota’s Wy. Huan; Come a asked way tha AIS BIsKsh To _ fe BEseACor Lode at the vecspizoa; Lon stated tent security would AQ approrch to the Anbessasior siney other the : ward a Len ueculsed ag ‘ slitea to give potliseal plac gar th Anbasaador's MIGUAZIS meeting in ineathovn a ~~ t: e. ws re a al “3 rad 5 Ooix ~ 3 rs + 2 4 vat ed ar? ars ry Peer Pa MRA uaad Waa had Pee oak 2 Datietiete vad eam t Mies Deal SUEY God Ro} Now Gale cte ad Comgte thud tteab Wad Thea rheced ond tO Mau’: the 297935
: at ’ ore erat eedee accuse witiin the uset weak and ds no cls? ita) 2 November; Don vecuosted # noeating ernluzg it a duntiate’ss o2lice 4n dowatowno A Gate se. A wenext was received at Brorvoxinately 1250 hours tant Lt, Coloael Phan Ngoc Terao can picunicg a coip acheduled Zor 1360 hours; the coun fn4led to wrierkivliae., Later, Thee adelited thet the coup fCCS Liatked teaaanoertatton. obieewiser the cour y x would have pegua as wenssted, ed Cato se - Conuein and Don met a* 1230 hours; (a) fen did not vecelva pertalssion gran thee: “Ond Ccenuiriee to turn (OvaT the cobitical phan; (5) Now had ivan Aatnorizsd to outline the political thinking of tha ow comnittee ~ (1) the “ascruding povecnnent wand Da civilian and ao meabar of tho coup comaitioe Would hold a ssateye pesttion in the hor government; C2} tha ney govarnnent would. S5 coon «a posslbdle, Zv2G@ Ronecomiwalst polities yrleenaru, hoeid frae Clustiongs, and pernis oseration of cave sition Ppawties: emecot fur che Vies Cung; there wilt De eeuplete troaadem of -OQligioa aad Wins clon. shewn jovard any Gead; (4) the new poverunms wailed be pro-ieast Sal aot 2 pawa ef the U3G; (5) the new govermoaat Would sarry the war avadast the Viet a4ceesslur conehusion wlth Vesnorn. pv U3G, haley (e¢) Don caid that Consin weald be in elese sentact with ccup headquurters to insure a close lice of concunieation becreen the coup heutquarters an the Ambassador; (a) hoa stated tant once the coup etarted, 12 vould de-no good for tae USS to atteupt te stop it; (e) Dor. was aware G2 coun plottiay oa the port of Lt, Colnnet Pha gow Taas; (£) the acuy coauittee wey tn coutact with Thao, but Thao does not have the reressary fosee to carry out his pina; ¢€s) Tho ssaerala‘ coONnp committes had cone to the cenclusies that She entire Ngo Jeaily hag to me ehjekinwcad Zroa the potitical scane ja Sent> Vi2tien;, (Cb) 1. aew mask WAS Seheduled fox 2o Getover, Canerat Den asspronnlied snbasszidos Age wh Daas sper es mi the ecersiia: , a or Sasiedaat Plea nid dupessades Ly 5 2 caedr Meoiwrn 7 Gaigon cud used a2 Cosein eres wnanklay for ihe fusbacciates; Avbuassadoy Led hylaed la th rai) os fo = 1935
+95 scaonld tna ah? Viites und . Van aat duo dewatorn on 2% Sas zarned that he “ind tal? Did vouehexn! Ror Consin: tb) Lon ; t tod that the grerans! conmel bte3 VAUHSG to nied @sarisans! Anvroiversare ln the ca c- Sed Viajes ied thas other Us. pergonns. way tasking i¢ colonagls aad majors Aout Say coup action; (c) Don was taformad that AnbASsAder Lode waa echedvlec to ile perce Sazgon Chuoor L2eun Sl Oetener; (a) Gor cms toteresteé in Cae seeds thas tae &abagesdor hat nda to dapart ci 3. Ustohes, statiag trast he Ne she Anbassader went ust can ge ais schedule ins 2 onanve magat I BMI hed, by the GUN; (2) Lon states that tre wag Aeaverg on 2) Cetokar co Cuordlaa ca Lland plans wikia € winds lo Can and Wray xa Eran; fe) Non Wyle te Mbhlo to wetkin at toma froa S93 Octobdur ‘ AUYtaer Notlsa; C5) Consia questioned x x Cenesol Ton Veau Civats participation i) sadedog, Pez Sested toast Dick was not % Siang dn tite wiansing aid than che cous wen esau Syevataizera ned Geaaieh Clon continuously gxrrounced and nad ineteuctloun to glinicate Dian fo he chowed say siya 02 goasvonlslne tae coup; Ltheugh olutt: ; ENA be wAS not tg an aha planatsy of the units bo woubd partichsat: : # Goug, travad that 4 Hae nesnhags ox the coup couat ae ihe knew of Lioving unites CaeHe rad of th rhorae 2 Dattalsoas of warding, 2 fF the Air ny Mua Hien, - om, 4 an Me fi : 2 excedoatloa Coionet sue wutles Shh, 7t snd Rigen Savisiona. halt of LOvd Divas .Ha 31: od tha 94a Division. ‘the O ipaand Foun 2 coup wontd ha Joint wid Otady Headcuaste: Sig dy tp 7. a t ae Coaain wa ‘ boy Waataba lisa, aide G2 Cary ‘ : 5 heager Sant Caaaicr Seviona aug, Caseda OV Aug Out ricnad ¢eae fa
Rake ea teea doyartod. Rats peak: ; the Cavitst whose err eo Pow aoa bine f Weel 2t Copetatis twee “len nthe G megsage thet Gsuute tiny imaeliately to JaS headquarters, Ma Aan tha coup was ia svoeress. Conan Bad vial radio nes wsdng & orrenrcesos ad yoice code had to the Yar Reon ab JG iunidevarters, ware Gaumesahs Luong Vaa Lika. at Yan Con, Chiou. “Gras Vhiea Kalin, “vau Van Minh, an ‘tiene Lo. wad Waa Avan, Le Vaa X22, Tran Tu Ueuyean Van Ga. firuyen Glace yo. Trin Ngoc Tan, Beas em; Colonais Lo Mau, Aquveaa “Anuoeng, ‘ete Lan; Majocs La Wruyes Knuexz, So Caae wal, deus gied Juaise offtearvsn, an Bou stated to Genein th a ait Comair, 2b tae laste? ss re aad 9 Cne a2useevead. Ad: Caonalsts telephowe vas ou 1% Vou hid tried to enidence since before ales cuheadls revenated ho? odes. Tonelin <d thet he wiu3s to beep 4 fetleorshoae Line cpen sssides Ledz2; ton invoumed Congia that faloavis “3 Guang fuage GIR Goxelui Forcos Commaadsr) Muyrhn five Hien CAtetoree Somuardrss and Coloael [20 Yaa Yien (Ceananday of the Jicbovcae Srivade) vere Merested; wsahk Colonel hiouy ges Lina (Tomaander on tha Civii Guard) and Lit. Colonel te ilgeven Konor (Commander of the Jarine Brigade) Wes saeder guerd ard aot vat declared anc considered tieuhral, Cofonei Puag was croughs Sa ubcey ADIEd guard and fercad at sumpeini to order & chasadivs between the mpechal Yoraas vnits aljacent CO SG5S Beadquarters and tye pinteens of the Sia Division. ace the cezga ive had been declarad betresn Seueial Forces and GUS, tharty~ tye cimorea personas! carriers Loaded with creeps La combac gene aiucted moving + Tewicd Sabwvou DLODs: Lr oe AetrS apreysr aay MO Sk COUP PRINQE DA tener Ame oe moe eee net nes retin one ree oe ee PLYShH peshe aac chu initia conscious Daca ae oP oe Dy 23 2 UN Weapge 2 sensting b a : RNID ‘oh Fhe3t eu bows ay a 2 EOS i ted ta moka hist Shy fesvar yuaed ro > Zt tis rnhiGa te aawvelos “ untae, of © 207935 CoE y & bt ft
to furan Sha belansce TL bable wah rau . fies we on Re a : we Va Chit peobabiy the Last satotligent “wk the WY SplraA axa, b mi Fespon nsibie fir Aithalng narienalist Se WS. OM mawhies: and for davelusase 3 BO2b leas winning, visa ‘can bem woiieats cola ims to lusus aces sary ovdars and te oat 2 of State to General Wink dusty the plotvticg anal tis ‘etnal Otuexr general of flea:s cuch s.'3 No Cao Tri Ww Nerovim "2g infoeriagd of the coup plopetos tue did not eegidyed ¢ Yabit ty ; 0 any Of tha acteat virci-aus. General fou ‘Mra: 7 : smeral of ZIT Cores, wan bundled ocak eis. : 2 ny ether offfcau. Division CoQ 2e welt eoautneted “by Ceaszcal Dou dleratliy ac vere coyneslsi ta atoear at the Jozat Cernersl tert Ehoa their teilataiy gts phon conealitod ov waeo visiiu gm, One of ier manda ct: ove waar affected tie coup wat wtston to ra president Diga., Tae wajgerit r the officers, duit, Geshloed Presideat idan to irava honossvle wha uolivier.L sotac din South Jbu and ago Dinh Csa. theve vis teens disgsensien. toast fheir daowtiu, aleug viuh deniaue Nge Bish veloouad, Wuyna Yan Cao, Cownsodixg General o2 IV Corns, into the coafliieece of tie coud nelacipals. preferred fo vevk wlth Coieonel But Buu Whoa, els% [dtvigion., With the 7th Diviuten and the a consplratows dealt with coyinentul comaanduts divasion commaugers., Tule netic Applied also Grigata ang the Alytorna Briiade and, to a lesser rnos Command, falgoa Carevisoa trcons, lucisding suspoert trocps much 328 rinE teraae tes, Signal. enpinears. RIES ‘4289 contuctad tivteurh sadigicual conmaniers. Viecutness Scenial Foreas, Meecatee: of Les dubdeus role as the essecutice ain o? tha secret on , Laver contactad buh wee aivaya cousidessd by the belay cowpleruly Toyli to frosieens Qiial OA the éicmants of ths Ovegidenttel Foacsd Wad beva contaci ad rao aayly degvowicus Guidry thi faptudag. Pha Ranwsy Ga% coubncted slace Asaser Unlis wae ooedsaee to elotns and divisleagy, Chuse tssigaad to ceup wits gee OD ue a. Peter a spi dee ol on Vodeag PTT at . 9 be Loved fo chat writ, Pag ARV Bavee was 207935 x At the coup plockaris wAth Cli: cea a sch Cezy Slot [ :
atiileus. ai mataae AI, oe nainarod tad LT: P. : fear Gkeone. din gave wee : rier, O Vagos uy tthiva (etvcescice), who rund thar G eseust Captala “Ho “qva Guyon, Tcamanding Offices of the Raval PONCE billed fae Capcoin grjcr to 1200 hous. oo" 2@ LRA, VYortunately, Jaa: vraag. dva shhy : yoeseentabl one ao one koey of his * aba oot tae vals fs “he facsers loyal LO titensa, , , \ 9. Govaral days vefore the covp was to taye wlace, General Don saat inagad tha binak plon with Generals Ou Cao Cri and ey tt ank and wiea tra Commauciayg Ofcicee of the HWLLitacy Academy 3t Daint. Tie signal to stauct “he soup was based on a yreviluns cecr3a issusi oy Brosidseat Dlea which stuted that acter | lovanver thera vould be no shesta oad there would bs oaryy eho Luach period, By vadio and caleohene, the eooo wes cipal aad isgund instructlous ta ceup particdpants that : PL ovecvet dag bones vowtd begin et 13380 Gtr i. “oat O730 hours over Astesctlons wera trans- aie ne uaios Lusthess away trom Saigoa, t.o., Hue. and in tine SO tune The Yorees wiazch very to ahcack Saizon wocia: ta dy positd mab 229 pours. Gna untt of tue Tth Division recoty si Ats iestractions to move at 1320 bours nat actually 4925 nuue3. This Aiso ves one of tae manor incideats wiy upset ths coup am there was frac that thls would ‘ad by the Zorses loyal co Disnu, &. There was a leak to tae Bresident prhor to the actual coup oeiig launched. cteacenus2 of thia, the President ordered na 4ist Manger Es.ttelion to move into Saigon and ies take the eTT aad io garround ore Vince, Taig caused anotnor atunbling olock fa tha guaerals! : Thay wera eceaiecaly taken by takes aagenve £ hae to nesotiata vita rhea the Patt on to wliadray nis unit, ethon used by tha generaig to newtealige opposl- Lay s2ul offteacs was to bald pw Lanchzon feeder otgisers an the Saigon 2 oy Grd ta the fon Ghat lan) and 232 coanass lara of wnes avery ove ul these officals sad agpeared Menus Tacs And wets stated Gubes the Coz y Io f {_ 207935
-“)i- “uyen wae Bac Leen kiltads, Goaeral Minh 26 20 Sa ane Gow? ul Glrdenrs aay ghay to (4 fee povertment by fove2, At thi; ths a eootten oz ; Mato the sou, A re akeu Qamed wit sub-emachine 2uUGe .oagked fou chase officers tho aa: ‘Llclee to go ca Sha coun to staed un, Ee told than aa," would ba he Le nore axvound Ganeral Stair headquarters tut were not to lesve the comand post. Those tho did nos join the coup were Yeeeah: poahy 3 ued puder arrent and nut ungee famed guard. Once pon ers iad peea taken RVCY, Canteved ink ordered -GGNar brought to the comand Post ut wade tine be praclemation end objectives: of the coup plotters which Was rreurded, We then asked euca o2fficer vho hid igreed to particrsate in the coup to soak his nace invo she tape Peecerse, evel tapas wera nage vren the origionl aad distetinesd dn different parts of the eity in preearraajged hiding -lxces so that io the avent the coup Jazied, no officer tavily participated ia the Once’ the coup had started, Colonnd Kiiaay oY tha mee and Colonsi Lan of the Civil Guard decided to coup, Colone: Lam at thie tlie recordnd Jastructions wecordar waich was to ln later brendenst to all Civil -ti ordering them to cnororate ulth the Geserals' - sey Committaa, Lt, Colerel hang, Coumander of the stcink Veigace telepaened his uals com:auders not then partici- vating 32 “he coun and ordered them te eupport the coup. cHeaod of the Aly Force tas giver to Coloual co Knac Mai vice Colonul Hien, Too command o?2 the 7th Livisica wa ygivea te Cosucal Reuven Van Co, Temnornry comand of the IV Corps was given te Colonel Rud uu Nhon. Cornand of Srcops in Saiger wag given to Gsnernl Ton Thet Dinh. Jader General Dinh's OF2VAl2 cownsnd were Saigoa support trccns, the karine Brigads, tad Alsborne Brigade, 40,tenks gvom tho Armor Courand, the 5th and 7th Divisions, supported by the Air Forea and tae Thu Due Githeer's raining ‘Base which joined the coup uader the coaneed 32 Colouel Laz Son, 9. ‘She backgreunod to General Dinh's Jodaing the coun surtér Ia particularly important. During tbe veriod besvaen f i2 Gad the Iifting eof wartint Jinv on 1G sertempec, Geasral hay eoasidsred hinss1!2 the hero of Yioticom one the > jae Olen Rewtma. Wie acuiocs Guriog tbis nerdiold ag Poa. i.e Governov did not endear nin te tho payubiikeou ex ths Gio offloure, Diah, on épprontmtely 31 Auzash. hac tie Copy Df ot L_ 207935
btu Le Oo. Uris: BOL 3a3: ME Te 1 Jésidan Veny “Tha yoann. tan “nd de Ager 20: bk bees ed Nihon: 34, Cenidinas waite age ae 1. 5 ah eb I2LNe- DR2a - 43 326 “Goel tial ; Ain thot ia te. have Pe TenT! thane Bron lis re oe DAwasts : vy GoPGrs.c bo Cho vp < trad Diuh be ¢ outa ask fos DbOehinved chaz Noa Bon ated. da ®aet.. 52a his Boy aera ssh ae would have bee ghway in a mivdian Bath Naat ah cs Tetervi Vera .U T87. tt ast atid t> ‘ ado ative and aad . mae TMP 3M way! PIB, an ~ we s Pee ES ew Urn ar a ao on w pes fy sae i 2 iF to coeur wu rare 4 ro oo hls Ua nind vhneed bes fs ye Maan to at. -t setu! nus eri 1 Casa eon tes ‘ay of? 2eREr ¢ “Tea eT Jaa kbevo by Diew and Tact that . “3x Mal: sytel 20h Danhve ine Ministry Shay oF INVBCBIR Wd BVsal &. the proposal . Diem av tht cna be thougit LfhG ite ritstary be 2 Stitt, did not iiged that — It is wi th lobar that * ou spoaised hin 29 pBliniaute srads. Cink LUuUSS 1 day miander and cuspire to 13 President tae cour. the gererals! Diem that ce, subd ba given uiaa “120 2 ovhass 2S ae te 3 ad Chet . a Va 4 Wena Yow oS :
vieldent Diem, Mit Pies Sat) bust “v9 ihe “i Balgeon tor rivet and erates ce issue “DEsopranto ordars Ggeeoved 5 27 Move units Pavareyte to the. Cou inirsuy "yy tateistg. o? “Saagon “OG Also to move wadts, suck &3 the zecial Forras, away fron Saigon, | ‘RUS, Oy tha PAQGUVEYS ceRerd i: 2. ®ve, the POM ELT Srcatod the mos: favorabdlo POBGibia EAlsasg Gz Ferees fn thease: ‘Ravor aud by attack Sing curing the odeaste. Jour, CVeuled the lenst posst‘le loua of Jiza @ADONg Uns chvigian bepulation, > a oo DER- ACTION CURGN CI .CSY OF OS BAGS cL OS ASTER LOYAL ABD er ees i oie" aa 33777 or ee cee L Fevswbar ls Hardoc3s nowe into Baigon fram the Girection of Hien Men; inies lnateatead to be from ines Praag Pen ko Ceavtay, CAS tattzlod tha¢ coep An preproes. * SOllomaz have bean s@inad by Marin ry: Taleeos sunicationg Centex, eAnistry of rok) ao Yard Dirvcterata Genersl of National rolics wionstry oF RWtLourh Def 2p HLit tay Escurliy Servles UG Chiceked) Iresideutial Glave bara “ks cr Pes _igutavard ce lor red; Sacenacen ntly eurrerdered g2tax 272 thog, . f ter arg +1 Yleoteraes: : , ‘ 4000 cass ay Ti ving on ch yr can ‘ ” wt Bdout 240 tra: teed | 33 Srvoeeet cages PIvatg Suva! the
~e Saw han ades 40.a¢e Cow cen dar ge, Ql Compa. ate mes [ ee en i fe be my yet ca nt ~ a ony Upes Len, oar Maz Tvion, Feputy Chie! oJ : VHSE, Gought ae SeaSeee, , wey haha Io Van BONG ON tas Neve, uatled o2 2 Noveaous, FHIwALS Are unsbis to coabact tue pelace by phosa wlowaee gant £2 Diem whl vesign i:nedhe: shy, trey SUAS TIAGQ GALS Aegartice to DBlen aud thi: othervice, pale USL) Da attacked by 1550 honra by cha Ai+ Sul Abaor, - ~, oor OW me ae = c 2 Neliaiies tava talen asydss vd th veda: guyen ink GWatwon. DPuissldeacy Veayen Luene, hiin: tices Shee Thach, . f22¢ Dinh was fag sey; whe: be agreed, sign River of trosos had crogsad Bleu Yo. bridge by 4 and il Corps and thy Blak Division that 2 DHeN Attenoted in Ba 4i wih taa ine DaVe baa arrsn sen. aod oosaluiy Teta ahljs of7 OE: ee ae Oe Sc ee
BProwvesterna 3° Than yolitic £ O35 whth oonesrls; WELL Rand Wey clvad cereegaceuyg: Ito wiidtece yer. agl mevernseat worvich EGthh)LLehed sudor cist xt Me Bins : suhest tg 4 hentar Bt only: ones thus £67 i ‘ ves his ney Eovsyenuers. Tedie VWeYN is urdsr coup contron: typed broadeast rondy: bet tac soley peatne tid beon blown, x “he following generis fre at IGS: M/Geuerai Juong Yan “anh, Mititars advigur te the Prosident W/Gonaeeal ran Yaa Mish, Permanent Sacratery Ganera?.. uD. H/Geaceal tran Thieu Naien, Cnutef of Stars, Joint Conersl Staft. B/Genuvsi Le Van Kio, aD B/Grwesil Neoren Ngoc Le. Muscetor, Corer /Oivil Guitd ywoswuratl Phar Zuan Cuteu, folivving avo cluimed slso to ce seaverting the wou RyGeaeral Nguyea Fhauh, Commanding Gorers., Corns I ‘Saaernki Ko Gao Tra, Conniuedas, bs neo ba2aaen 2 ALL guicst. Lee2l conmmancens fra mastic. fhyravoved vehnlele has Guus ccaived oy tesar ut the eiznart. We WALCE E£YO S thes som: ighou, Ostona. : au Mags nudkea, Colonek M n Van rtes yo then, Colwell . ial Bn. € » Colenal Ff, sang Tita y SLO. Lt. Goteneh, Pguyen ote plan (Diab dias : ace Tod the ..3 te tn
aries oo visi Poa eI?) mre shir x Baboon Angst ou Feats igen. aor, ASmEarant yanwers Tore: Cnr: olimtasod.. tu Gs 21, hie, Wau yey Mink told thenvet as t.0.. v5 44 $0 bours, Radio © eno wwaion oF P ara) Jolue thine i ENLOTE at teat Lf te and Diz, to the coup forctu wv. tae palaces goa ¥ilatary Povolutsonary Co : ME vae tre gwovernnent, G «iits. md nok’ of gc uhuz, Thea Yori wits mou dastas Bl PERLMESY to jets eneg7h estod 22 TOA LeUus B-28 Ty =. fatty: Gen eT2” ew Spare) may pues A ALL rot resiga wi: "ye athe aba tusr View winules “Louk QOonLad, tnt cose igka an fond 1 a} na
AMER “OV Ont hoy Meaney inestioxr give in the vieianiety o: hy Zour pore PGS banduypver.tecu ar Prumidepblal Guinw z 9 Weava artij.lery, finn Jn Datan tren, Balgen; ieee in > + Sargestid on 2h hesdquarters, Presidestiel Cunard capitulated; coup forsem acuing palace Cubic cane fram JGR end is BOLE. waelesc soa Troops are moving on *he palsca and empeet co tuke posessaion by 1900 hours. but sre propnred for sou.ter wove \ae generuls hova for gurhy Vecouih sno by aaa United Staves aid other vastern powas, Cavilfan contend to D3 tiaplete within a week. When the coup La corsletec. pveaunmably on Cae night of Noveuber 1, Govesals wii cone to ta3 8.5. Enieissy and ask Trl Cuan Co gean the cui goveraniat. bus vill rot force hia, Diem calueal to cavituiate anc the snlacy sill “on trincblouds ay VYietaisess acndlay dewa Vio toward Coens f ited aad creciairing ths cavsk 2.00 fi Cubesn bia : : a by ceap fotos. au iVeek vo a3: sing tas WwztI 2. heniaae FOwT Joud sielsaloas heasd dn. 3 slece, Mina giveg Dien another surracles CHANCE; if be TeiVses, he will be binsted “oft the 2ucs of the gsurth™, Minn invornad that émbassndor Lodge w1)1 receive toe generals after the couy to over, signed by Geoarved . wea Trane: Leaflets prochaining the nay goveranes aad rp WSDut Se; weir gad peenic assem to ba ht : ‘polices hawt rtars c mac province chie? idazce ata vuder wtl@liaar contral, fee ond Vasgane: ALL mudet with Paeressed eoewonts 4 au the vicinity of the Pos liah ena tne etsddian poklitiectacn usorising + 07900 /
erorsel Shen le Eycarearely vs 25 wg . » . ar OVS vast cuaur ad Can Fs six] x en hs loadiag Ju Gaveesieng;, artillery audto1e Troons «2 Adororime tel? TINGAS Hrul or Yoot rlowg Palne 2, B/Genernl “eugec. Van Cao, Comsseddag o:nes May Navir Joalaed the coyvp, Ceveralo sanecule ao 2 Novenias, . Genasrr~k Crd azacuounces bis supper Cola) Phas Nece Thao, Ss brow Lt. for Cowrselloc Meu, MALAtac eml brAmesd 2 am ts ds whois et JS ere roundlagy Qo .4,.. oo3 3 it Alrnorna Brigade Cormmaader, Colacel Bree to Suoordinate ceouwatnders via aanouecs tielr surport of the coua, break duwn 2a8 ofzoer to turn cn als YNISS COMULCM Ds woe rd y aac bo: ' bla ceoudlog Nas fete a med, £V Coses, nee TUG hous wea DBP ot Holle. oe litical fLardacs Mguyas wyse The aVh, da la unt Flex, de abiswved to SLEDAOe, Shiga apveed is hacdgai. to Gu Hiaa whe gaid Ylen would be avedad te conehove ta: thehs Retin? a ees against tha Viet Coes and hls would roc ta held neadast hia. Dien 2 tspaaal ons “we oto 6th r an Be rh ad One ute asp ude nda Lf, ed ZPo dee ty @ p@lace aren tua auvay we tho Lise Ryda . ne ne the SGU do to Abteesss lo eects foe oo ava, Joust iinaes sy myers wt
es Sai Saas aa ii an Ns 20m Ba tyag poebat. but Mina ae pbahw cecunted by - bork gata, WAnedors in aseac near the palace az eras 2323 fas all chrsectier toward Sia palsc?. Arts3 Vex y kitted; ° Yorcas. eet wei iopronds2tel 7 Rana and luge: vreaeda quiot, Praysic rasidenca 1a Bua ds truciciozndg af troupe givses3s Are tmety. Add@ltiow2l battalion ly deplored tron paises, ” yiesca ae Gann rod vino tioms fn Vuh: GD Aen. auuesey 2 Canis ga3. 0 qa aval Wey To uaa B/Genarri Do C20 2, Comwaudes, ZF lerrs support of “he Yadenzaihan Consul General Lnveraus Aobnzgades Lodas HNinister of Puolic ‘iorss, Nyuysa 7Ra the hows of the indenasian Consul & Annroxinatoaiy ly tasks aad 400 troocu tho malice gxeucds to gagage 1,CU0 on Demetltion sayeci.al iy tank charges to Dhow Rtaltoss . t ‘ arelva ‘45 caisan aundaxe corn oF Dlsd, sOugIs Garraeai , , a: 2 vo fo B23 Ost “Ae 1L13 49, atwen frea iy JER - NAVA MasleBad te Dind Vauaa,- Sactetary ox sideaor aad Boaonky rials s2 ease, i Vu, Leong. Su {02 Guise Rea Rdeaa hh,
WeAadhny geoug Geduntiad 4 Diow itty tla Yow the Paiage Coase cada hed jotoua a on thes fh SDA ett, bese id 3. fare ret hy hoa there colimues, FOuw pth sive da ow thas £2 Ue tanc : Tornes Chie? of Bart ne soe ide Y de :2aosenerals are caonfigeet of victoxy Beizot for Le Vaa Kin, 228 Canlinge with cilvilina POLL theLaes che are hace ling save pceatlemd Alu the new GOVeIYBaent, ly  dsetded that be MWe grove rng VIL) inns: rane fe mitatas « aquaty wht ad vivilion oasticdipation but ‘ett Xipacd turnover to Puiticns, kia tu preparing a yeocltuation Cer broadcast, 15 dering tely an Wtrol ani Tisolvas all The ywenetals apa Ho Guacist ULaiater of “sunitien, rupee fpoang ‘Ivan BO fae Qive Latled, Pregidant dsntpeaun Nee ho slse hea not seen Located, “Yon VYna ytows, | Gee ao laAcyag mliten G by Fav ITAL canmetoat StaLf for No, MR Aa Generar re Laoh~o Aan Amosusador states that “ty: isteca Thuan, Luong , GAYE Veperted to the JUS DF teheanonye ta rasnonse a, fren the coup ene ne ware not IVa bue tole they ady ve needed for on tala meraisg of 2 Novanbas. “hag lo subsecueativ tae ted coat lasy bad chacked in Ahoy wits Hinister Quai Rural Avtaiern, es aa it 2 G ts 9 Ee | nt ie i Fs i; ig en onc 322 daployed toroush- 43 guardaa by iad hy barbed ivi te 43 otherwiae
SOS SRS oe a ee e a ate Tove of the ovaortlglisnat Grverqseak « BURUL Bhoseeutlon ot tag mar den “An? Hdalster ~ Mruyeaa Mos Kio (non wootey PMelne Mintaters - Pham try Jar gt Wadster gor Matioaal Duvense - Ue Saneral Te sSlintstaoc of Interior - BiGenerst Yoa tieat plat. M’nister of Xeformation - P/Geaseal “reu Ps O34 (201 Director cL Pevehelcetass. Yariora) ‘ Piatataroov Fouth sud tkethene) ‘Relueaiten RAS 3078) “ran Van Anh inister tor Yoresien Aftaira - iu tain Mew tinister tor Public Vora = Tras ha ‘uengs Case Aagrioultural Navorm), GQsaers not selected, ‘guyan Niee Tho Aus contacted JGS and és aate, _Genarel Gish fs negotiating at the galsee for thy tioa of the aagey battalion amd ta Qeesta@astiel Viea frenddsat Tho at éG3 Palace is ucder heavy attach List cf officers iavolved fo the axvsp: 1 wenetal officers except Genernin yri Yan Cao, Saud Guang Mourne. zu BO “olonels: Lay Van Fant Po Nau, Chiei o® Wibiiary jeours ty Nguyen ifau Cea Nguyen Yan Chuan. Jel dGe /Nesyen fouang:, Cyto of Gtat ek ter intantre Yeeo Vink Haye Bul Huu thon, co, Gast fuiai Lvisien Dueoug Rirac Lr. Diew na Crerxrd and ge: ht. Colonels: Bo : Air Torvee Nguven Coo ky, oa, Viuccumesa Alt
roel ad Cle saes. dick Gan odavad Lace ; taken at aay cost, UW seserad vehlvies Wy Euhasnsy wook., Apmoordsitety ova wlietsa moving wo Faeteur bawcd the” cas mt fae nos accaptad position as trine bininter. tad Ganecnl Doa at JG3 wlth currendrst the and Man waat ony aafs sancucl’ to euwe froma taerca te an vis¢asclried ghildrea ar? set at laa palnce. Oesidest Dieals offers, Ullah ia mn cemneliza at toa paisce where heavy serad the salsce. Peinctipal Lightloz tayzvd tas Prosideatials CALA TG unc other units cou) Yoress 49 tTaat ciuay uv AV} ‘os veinmstatal la re ru) ary qihiing to continue to £43 zat sgalast the for ta suerecder yee rsone lly: Vrapgidential Gusria to cease palace to plei: up Dien aad will cagugst preterance as or the couatry dandgnaced, a5 fox his vresidonse and will the mecnios. Anuunitioa Falsaed of calace, horomghenk
vad gnges ithe fess aucemh opdeatva dor ohyie Action basacualh Polneys Qiersator Nguyen Troagran “Van VW. allo es yet hieral Bad lisa vuoen is ogpointed Diructo: Geaoral of Aonah foltea, aap aid Shit ave wesertad av 768. Mie ia ucszontfioaed, lee Bates we are aha Cloves hoAt Eka aid Nuc have sseaped, wevValie muah aceus @iee eontinwes, fiveagmaces, Lads. choered enavonte ca the Chine sry. Matis a a 4 3 euupy Ag osthisimd as cowpleted aad : ape2ul. RBrowurces ara Coleneh Pawn Pyoc Sanaa satd that oe and Als forces ered Gin Lorg itiaces duving the eavly sovniag hours to sovh Dea aad tiku to tha JGS after thuis sucrender., pesaiwen vYovealad they ‘yers mot ar the palace mand had not end ehera duydne tha coup. Tsao xaeptrtad ovsx to the JIGS. au Saigon 0 ty Weer gaaicel. ~ a Caslon knewa to be usad iv the Ngo ee ‘ae VWaneral Mad fuw Kuna Lad the den: which Aocated Dien hu 2h aw vias wned to the 7 thiog ds ual 2 on Prune oe ; neaet aa Cuodon, suan. CS vata the iJ. Umaga of death at own, that Drew sad Nau covid girma che Choloa eo GS Lous
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