TOP SECRET “SPECIAL HANDLING. REQUIRED LIMETED DISTRIBUTION ce. The direction of the: . Pregident that, the Central Int selligence ‘Agency, with other acparlinents, ‘Bhould make a cotalled study ‘of possi le weaknesses, and vulnerabiligies in toe elements whieh exe: t ‘contral in Cuba, was noted. 7. For adgi tional facts, 1€8 Bne]osure B. DISCUSSION 8. For discussion, see En :losure Cc. CO ICLUSIONS G, The basic military Amp LLeations of Castro! s Communist goverwne. ure as follows: | &. ic exposes the West :rn Hemisphere to an increasingly “hreat to its security. Tnis increases our nebo? vulnerability ani defense costs ag forces are SX -V3alelead or. shifted to met this. threat. DB. Lb proven - the Soviet Union with the most effective nag Useay heve over had for” “spreading Communism throughout ie Wescern Hemisphere. hig in turn greatly increases st toe ocogi bility that addi sonal: Latin American countries vill eome under Communist control. Elimination of this rane would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United States Whit nos tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of addi sional countries would or could result in: | (1) Increased Commirist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere; ° (2) in reases Gonmy 14st capability for spreading 6: (3) me logs ‘¢ of | gxtating ani /or potential bases, training areas, peste and. clehts,’ as. well aS sources ‘of © romano TOP_SECRET | 2 TOP SECRIBT RW 47874 DBocld:32276301 Page 199
ety. ky F st oR, wipe POP SIC RIE TOP SECRET | SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — . NOFORN LUTTED DISTRIBUTION (4) An inereased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal throv 3h subversion and - sabotage. LG. Phe urgency of the recuirement to remove the Communist » governnent from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly ‘ . inersasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for ¢ preading Communisi throughout theinisphere. This sence cf urgency is gr encly increased if courees of action within «the capability of tne Communists are considered: , i. CEEaS Soviets cout establish land, sea and/or air bases cue Soviets could | rovide C2stre with a number of “albietie missiles with iuclear warheads; or they could Sausnieh the missiles and maintain joins control of the fad Les wantenae. . Li, Un vhew af aha factor: set forth above, the Department , of Defense. holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incowzatiite with the minimun security requirements of the + 7) a) 3 a tamiancere, The. Devartment of Defense is prepared to oveclly sujypert any popular movement inside Cuba to tne extent of eythane the Communist re ime and installing a government aceenuabs.: to the United St ites. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than Cuba is recognized, it is believed shat the project objective can be accomplished without precip .tating general war, and without serious effect on world pubiic opinion if the following four conditions prevail: a. If the impression is created “that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba _ and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from a goverr sent ‘4. representative. of the - Cuban people. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOFORN TOP SECRET 3 : TIMITED DISTRIBUTION S) et Cc be te "A RW. 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 200
TOP SECRET ; SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED . : NOFORN LINTTED DISTRIBUTION: ‘b. If it is announced srior to the overt military action - that ‘the United States an i/or other members of the OAS are. mov ine into Cuba for the ourpose., of restoring order and _ holding free elections, aid that they will, Amnediately withdraw as soon as the naw governnent advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further eugistance from OAS naticas. Co . e. If the military cpe ration is conducted as quickly ae possible and with suff iclent force so that the Communist Bhos te acililty to take effective counter -ineasures in ‘support er San castro regime is reduced to a minimum. a. oy if the Cuban regime comults hostile acts against Us Lowes or property which would serve as an incident Vgon which to base overt 0S interventions. In this event, aoviiceble portions of a,b, and ¢ above apply. Ln Pra Uenartment of Defense is also prepared to covertly Provide suort co OTA and £tate, or through these agencies, to any US approved popular r ovement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, sranep:ortation, personnel and bases. . RECO! MENDATIONS LS. It 28 recommended tha: : a. @he menorandun at Imclosure A hereto, which reflects the above conclusions, bi: forwarded to the Secretary of . befense. | . | b. This paper NOT be ~orwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands. 7 | ¢. This paper NOT be .‘orwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. | a . d. This paper NOT be ‘orwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Natiois Military Staff Committee. “SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOFORN. SSS : | LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ‘TOP SECRET oo y NW 47374 Docld:32276301 Page 201 / i.
OP SECRFT. ENCLOS JRE A MEMORANDUM FOR [HE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Cuba 1. Pursuant to the objective of the Caribbean Survey Group, ‘the Department of Defense was re quested* Lo construct a firm position with respect to the Department's stake’ and role in. ‘the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the attached 7 proposal be adopted as the offictal DOD position and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project. *Memorandum from BrigGeneral E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for BrigGe.eral W.H. Cwaig, USA, subject: “Special. Project", dated ol Jan 1962; not on file in Joint Secretariat As amended by JCS at 5 meeting < on: 7 Febraary 1962 TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDL NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 202