476-10010-10002 JFK Assassination System : ; Date: 5/5/2016 Identification Form .. Agency Information AGENCY: NARA RECORD NUMBER:  176-10010-10002 RECORD SERIES: ' POF AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information ORIGINATOR: WH FROM: TO: TITLE: MEMO , DATE: 11/08/1961 PAGES: 4 SUBJECTS : '  ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret RESTRICTIONS: IC CURRENT STATUS:  Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 05/08/1998 OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW COMMENTS : POF:CO:Cuba, Security, 1961:Box 115
fap te eee pee tee we ten i fees se ee Sorrel i. ber - b : ; ea ee SL y © ee _ 8. November 1961 TYPES OF COVERT -ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME 1 _ Non-Sénsitive Activities: A variety of non- sensitive political warfare . and propaganda activities are being conducted outside Cuba. These include: (a) working with the Cuban Revoluntionary. Council and the number of other Cuban groups in Miami in an. effort to. improve their comipetence to undertake action on their own and also to minimize the effects of disunity among the _ Cubans; (b) efforts to induce thie ‘defection of prominent Cubans from the Castro | . Begime: (c) black operations with the  Sbjective of having Castro's diplomats’ Qu : declared BNG for having additional countries break. diplomatic relations with ‘Cuba: (d), speaking tours by teachers, ‘student, labor, jurists, and women! s ; 7 “groups throughout ‘the hemisphere; (e): support of publications and < distribution . ; of Bamphlets; (f) the support of anti-Casstro radio programs on some 60, a f , th fa “Latin. America stations and 3. stations | in » Floridai (g) the operation ‘of Radio” es, ‘Swan: (as the. ‘use: Sof a 2 broadcasting chip fox intruding radio broadcasts on. . . ‘Cuba ‘tev. channels. There - ig: ‘believed to be. little risk: that these activities. 7 _ . * . toe os . . “3 Yee will give rise: to $ political embarrassment, except for that resulting. from the _ ; jealously « of various Cuban groups and‘ ‘criticism by one of alleged Support to mS 4 - - another. . ‘The following parderaphe constitute a list of politically n more ‘sensitive iypes of activitigs: progress or contemplated: . : x,
a et op tet eer ener RETR cn + Foe ey ge at Sepp het me gr ERR RR AT EY tn tenes eons «fe Teo ta ¢ Contact. operations involve a meet-at-sea with gCuban, fisherman, ora . Cuban’ -eratt’ * FART oo nr.) 2. . Agent Training: ‘There are currently some 90 Cubans already trained or now in training as activists who can be infiltrated to organize.the resistance and to develop sabotage activities. In addition there are some 22 Cuban students in training for infiltration to conduct. Agit/ Prop: activities. _For the most part the training is being done in Florida. The men are trained in compartmentedssmall groups; the largest single unit, already. trained, numbers 35. No subsequent group will be as large. The candidates are ofcourse: a ‘volunteers and:are. from a number of the political groups with which we. are in’ ~ . 3. tnfiitration/ Exfiltration: We ‘maintain and. employ for training and - re .- operational purposes a fleet of some 7 craft. They 2 are used primaiily for’ the. te , infiltration and ‘exfiltration of individuals and, if and when feasible, of arms: & oo “ Cirrently, infiltrations are apt to inyolve ‘no- more that 3 to 5 individuals’ at a. sachs fk . ce ‘when this becomes feasible. No. Americans are 2 allowed on any erat that 4 is. poe going within the 42- mile limit around Cuba Many. infiltration/ exiiltration” 4. | ‘Building an 1 Intelligence and Resistance. Organization: “Gontact : is BtilL . maintained chiefly by secret writing, with 28 agents i in. Cuba, " Theik, preset : «hy vo funétion. is restricted to the furnishing of iiteligence and i in gome cases the. ‘maintenance of. communication with internal resistance: leaders. Byery effort. : will be ‘made. to: infiltrate additional trained agents: and ‘communicators ‘ ‘as rapidly ‘as; possible for the purpose of building: an. internal ‘resistance organization, cand SEAT).
27 . establishing effective ‘secure communiéation with internal resistance leaders. The objective will ibe to. develop one or more neté of aependable sympathizers and the means of communication: both th among themselves and to the outside. In the first instarice such internal assets, to the extent ‘tow which. they a are “subject to control. from outside, ‘will be used for intanigeice collection, ; farther clandestine recruiting, assisting. in infil/ exfiltration operations, and ‘mounting 1 low ‘risk sabotage of operations. They will be aeliberatety réstrained “in this phase from a exposing themed ves by operations involving igh risk | bo or the assembly 3 in. one 2 operation of any sizeable number of the resistance, 3 5. _ Accelerated Resistance Activities: In parallel with the: gecessarily time consuming , effort: to build a secure - underground organization,” “it is: now. - ° planned to support in the next few months larger seale infiltrations of meh - / and arms for: sabotage and perhaps ultimately guérrilla activities when. well- noe conceived operation are ‘Proposed by. Feputabl opposition, Leatieré now outside , ann . the country or ‘or are s requested by- the résiatance leadership from within, “In most cases the’ sponsorship and ultimate: ebpoqetbiisty for ‘such operations will : ‘rest with: Cubans. and the. Agency’ 8 role will be that of furnishing support 5 in the form of f funds, ‘training; equipment, communications, frequently. the “facilities to conduct the actual infiltration its eit, and resupply | following. infiltration if required and feasible. These will necessatily be higher risk : operation in whieh some casualties ‘must be anticipated. it will be-impossible . to coriceal U.S. geographical origin. but. every effort will be made’ not only oS, BY OY
Yemen ey EET Ee a ey ep EEE Te PI A BY 0 Pg wept § wep : . . bombing raide’. One successful leaflet mis¢ion.wae-retently conducted!by t / in its sitect-on the Cubané:” ~4- possibly to forestall identification of U. S. Government support but also - to avoid any appearance of U. S. Government control or ultimate responsibility. What will be impossible to disprove is that the Cubaris responsible obtain - help in the U.S. 6. . Air Operations: If the internal resistance grows, it will be. desirable at some point to undertake air resupply missions. These would be conducted ‘by Cuban crews using common types of commercial aircraft. They: will. be . night mis sions and would be undertaken only if reception parties had been identified and.were in possession of agent radio sets and, hopefully, bedcoiis ‘so. that resupply could be carried out with reasonabie efficiency. _ Aside fom, 7 " aefased. “such operations rather infrequently carried ‘out. may have: a 1 Uaeful ” morale effect. Up to the present time -it has ‘been. felt that’ air. boring, ae