404-10178-10012 . ‘ an en 1 07 Anam ote eee + ras , $ eect enecnea canes - ~ - tee - coed t * - oe eos stations although it is expected for him to be resident in Leopgldville. ™ by opening A eh ‘§ 7 shop; and (b) to try to spot persons for a — f ¢ a ( el November. Headquarters noted the-intent to use him as a utility . agent in order to “{a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (a) execute other assign- ments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville. Indeed, he may be subject to call by other African . WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville oa 2 December 1960, His case officer gave him the following instructions: (a) to build cover possihly surveillance team, intelligence assets and paramilitary assets. ° . . © eh Oe oat BL ADORE Se tot Shortly after arrival, WIROGUE ran into Qu WIN, who later told the station that WIROGUE looked like an intelligence agent. In attempting to recruit QU WIN for his “execution squad", WIROGUE exceeded his instructions to avoid making approaches without checking with Leopoldville Station. . a < January 1961, at the request of the Leopoldville Station, WIROGUE was given permission to take flying lessons. By March, he had obtained the position of q a | with ) oh § 7) in that capacity he was used by CIA for the purpose of gathering intelligence on C yaud A By ril, the 7: were trying to use him to obtain arms and j rying
: inatructors in Western Europe, ‘Alss Re was then teaching the ( 2.4 _J He departed Leopoldville in July because he had run into difficulty obtaining & residence permit, and his CIA contract was terminated in September 1961, Africa Division believes that WIROGUE was rceruited for his Conge assignment because of his third country national background in order to establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the _ time the Congo was in chaos, we had few assets there, and the 7 - likelihood existed that the political situation would degenerate * quickly. The Station possibly also wanted to have a latent paramilitary capability. An October 1964 ; assessment of WIROGUE indicates little ! flap potential with him since he knew little about the Agency, He spent i most of his time trying to develop contacts and wag not directly involved in any particular operation, oe & ante ‘ e LRT Se ay epee “ee + wwe we an to me ene ° “ Top ee comme ro
14-00000 ‘eapability to conduct assassinations. RR Eat Cem ob oe Se BR RRS Oe (nO «98 CREED oom a vase ge fon By a . SS eee eg ( Samet tee naw OQUWIN According to’ statements by a senior CIA officer in 1967, made to the Inspector General, the Agency was instructed to develop a Termed an “executive action capahility, “ such a Project was initiated in 1961, apparently: assuming an existing exyptoaym, ZRRIFLE. At the request of the case officer : (the | game officer providing this information in 1967), a clandéstine asset in Europe; QIWIN, was to be used in the project. The tase officer understood that QUWIN-had been considered in 1960 for use in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, but that the proposed operation wag never carried out becayse the designated CIA case ’ officer declined the assignment. The ease officer in charge of ZRRIFLE also was involved in an operation to assassinate Fidel Castro, running from early 1962 to e mid-1963. However, QUWIN was not used in this effort, reliance being placed instead on a Cuban exile leader. QJWIN was never briefed on the Castro operation, according to the officer handling ZRRIFLE and the Castro operation. Records do show that QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo in 1960, being there in November and December 1960, prior to the . tee erty ewe er | iSeGFE atte et a Hea os ae MEERA wetter ae teen one
14-00000 7 "headquarters from ene of the twa officers who subsequently met : “and criminal elements and allude to the posiibilities of finding safe- . +e we * ® ‘xf . . ‘death of Lumumba at the hands ‘of “bongolese. However, there is no evidence to suggest that QUWIN was in any way involved in Lumumba's demise. The case officer who was the-source of the information of ‘the contemplated use of QUWIN i in m such a an activity understood that he - was never used in this manner. The following information reviews . _etig knowledge beyond that summarized above. “AB October 1960 dispatch from’ Ptransmits notes to i ‘Qiwin in Luxembourg. The notes list the names of police officials , 2 . i > e crackers and document-suppliers. Fe, . “ _ + QUWIN was met in Luxembourg on 19 and 29 October 1960 by _. two Agency officers and was asked if he would undertake & trip to ‘Africa, presumably Dakar. (The appropriate dispatch, dated _. & November 1960, lists only Luxembourg and Cee] as addressees. ) a . . . - . . 2 ! __ He was not given the true objective of his mission because of its oo a extreme sensitivity and pending a final decision to use him. Instead, hey was told that the Soviets were operating in Africa among nationality groups, specifically Corsicans, and he was being asked to spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use. He agreed to go on the trip. Cn 2 November QUWIN was met in Frankfurt by an Agency officer, and he accepted an offer to ow | abus bw 2 e PPR m gee OE a a e ete ibaa es ete
14-00000 ee’ Pee, wa a in OH Ateneo : ‘do sot know and at present are unable to determine what the assignment was. Subsequent cable traffic discusses arrangements for Qrwin to go . fe te Leopoldville and then to Dakar. i close personal relationship with a Yugoslav Air Force pilot. There mh been taken. The first paragraph of this cable states that we “would ‘ike restrict QUWIN to activity directly pertinent his mission (> GT e Bee ma . Oe . m3 and. proceed to Leopoldville. (PPesumably the idea for sending him there originated at headquarters because someone must have considered him qualified to handle a potential operation there.) The : . precise mission was not conveyed to QJWIN, and he was only informed that the mission might involve a large element of personal risk. We : On 8 December QIWIN was ia Leopoldvitie where he cultivated follow suggestions in cable traffic on what approach QIWIN should use | to recrult him. However, 2 special channel FI/D cable of 14 December vatea this target as marginal when considered against the framework of plans for QIWIN and insteucts him to desist if action has not already Leopoldville or forthcoming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere (e.g., Milan) for F1/D purposes. He our only asset of this type and we wish keep him clean of any operational involvement other than that originally planned for him," This cable would tend to rule out - involvement in an assagsination plot, since it is highly unlikely that AEC Berd woo 3 Tear Bie wa
14-00000 * stm, race - rc an individual picked for such a eensitive and dangerous assignment would be burdened with other chores or assignments immediately Lumumba was stil alive, albeit under arrest, as of the middle of Jandary 1961, and it seems clear that QIWIN had left the Congo in December 1960. | A 19 December cable to ‘Leopoldvilte authorizes - his return to Luxembourg on 22 December and instructs Luxembourg ; “to pay him 1000 dollara for December salary, which ia the final "payment for hia services on this operation, Also, headquarters was working out the details of a Congo aseignment. Ana rs] January 1961 headquarters memorandum, which refers to. T/A's dated 21 December 2960, states that the referenced amounts were given to QIWIN by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg. This suggests that QUJWIN was in gluxembourg on or before 2! December. Subsequently, it appears that Quwin opefated i in Europe trying 7 to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency could use in safe- eracking operations, in line with one of the principal missions of FI/D. A 24 May 1962 cable to Luxembourg mentions that a decision was made to kecp him in Europe and that the Leopoldville assignment had been eancelled. A transfer to Baden-Baden i is deemed a good . choice. Also, a 24 April 1964 disptach from Luxembourg, which 4 £ . (Sz eco", rd eo. a? a OF Meme oem ae Ra rem ce etme
74-90000 . ¥ . . ay, emt ; ( csgrcl _ * . _ ren ee | mentions the termination of QIWIN's contfact, refers to the fact that his only assignment since January 1962 has been to establish , over. Agency officers who were handling QUWIN in Europe were almost certainly unaware of the fact that he was being considered ag an asset _ by the senior Agency official who had begun te become active ia An undated “February 1962 in the assassination plot against Castro. S EYES ONLY) memorandum from the Deputy Director (Plans) refers : ‘to a 19 ‘February 1962 memorandum and’ ‘authorizes the retention of “the Services of QIWIN in activities which : we e have identified as coincidential with the assassination plot against Castro. The date of ie ! i - t r the rcference memorandum coincides with the time that the senior - Agency official became actively involved in this enterprise. A "memorandum of 27 June 1963 dealing with the further handling of : QJUWIN mentions that this enterprise has been terminated, except for one precautionary "life line." _ In summary, it is almost certain that QUJWIN had nothing at all to do with the assassination of Lumumba, even though the contents and language of available files are often cryptic and imprecise. If he had been, it is highly unlikely that the number of Agency officers handling The and conternplating assignments for him would have been so large. mm pete : , 3 CL _ 5 eer ey ¢ gbade or mer meta” SRP a
14-00000 CC Seat & me Pacee headquarters division for whom he worked was concerned, inter alia, with obtaining foreiga cipher and code books, and it is reasonable te conclude that QJ WIN's primary and exclusive responsibility wae to find individuals who could do thie kind of job. One of the officers whe . frat met QIWIN in Luxembourg was on a trip overseas to find safe-" H — -erackers and document-suppliers. The I¢ December 1960 cable . : micntions ‘keeping him clean and using him j im Dakar and possibly Milan, : 7 whicn was specifically mentioned in the 13 October dispatch as offering “good possibilities for finding safecrackers and document-suppliers. AYO RN Ne Rate ad ere ee Chee Further, good tradec raft practices would dictate that the last thing that would keep an individual clean would be involvement in an assagsination plot. Although the Chief of FUD coincidentally was oe later assigned responsibility for the Gastro operation, there la Rd De merece net: sone + no evidence to suggest that he was privy to assassination plots prior fo his briefing in late 1962. . While QIWIN was considered for use in the "executive action capability’, there is no information available to suggest that he had ever been approached in this regard, much less used in any of the planning. ; Les Tanne 6 i th og a rhed . istG ee . . e
14-00000 one oe on . ~ ee | a, ws ( Ay Pre sy Based on available evidenté 2 ik seems clear that the Agency was in no way involved in the assassination of Lumumba. However, in the course of our research, two aspects of the Lumumba story surfaced that indicate Agency involvement in a plot. “In the one. eter mtn cee ogee instance, our 1967 source mentioned the name of an Agency officer _who was designated as the case officer for an assassination plot “against Lumumba, but reported that he had declined the assignment. That officer ‘ was the originator, of a 19 December 1960 cable to. “Leopolavilte in which he authorized the return of QIWIN to Luxembourg « on 12t December to await further instructions and the ‘payment of 1000 dollars to him for his December salary by the Luxembourg Station. The last paragraph of the cable advises Leopoldville that headquarters is working out the details of a Congo assignment for QJWIN. The same officer was the originator of a § ‘ _ } 31 January 1961 memorandum dealing with payments to QUWIN. “a 7 December 1960 cable from “In the "second instance, Leopoldville deals with the activities of a newly recruited agent, WIROGUE, whose mission was to try to spot persons for a” surveillance team, intelligence assets (with emphasis on Orientale Province), and paramilitary assets. The second paragraph of the cable mentions that he resided in the same hotel as QUWIN (although ne 7 neither knew of the others CIA connection) and that he approached ri ? SP Pm wre Re eee oe ew Ceri Meret ent tar nee ome sae, aes we ae wr te
14-00000 Fete nw re me tor weweor ‘ae : < a : op ernnen emme o nenemnnepmeecremine scare hapn wineedaeclang whe wins aus eves « 1 the latter on 14 December with's wi bce bf 300 douars per ‘month to . " / participate in an intelligence net and to be a member of an “execution squad." When QIWIN said that he was not interested, WIROGUE are, added that there would be bonuses for special jobs. The cable mentioned in paragraph 6 that the Station was concerned with the free 3 wheeling of WIROGUE, his lack of security, his imability to handle o ; Snancen, and his ‘unwillingness to follow instructions. The Station was willing to keep} him on n probation, but believed his-recall would ‘En an attempt to reconstruct (events, “Africa Division was apprised of the above and was asked to search its records in an attempt to . clarify what WIROGUE was up te in the Congo and his reference to an "execution squad." The research did not clarify the matter to any great extent, although some assumptions can be made on the basis of ee * circumstantial evidence. On 19 September "1960, two members of Africa Division met with WIROGUE to discuss an operational assign- ment in that division. In connection with the assignment, he was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization. In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated that he was being prepared for a deep cover assignment to arrive Lcopoldville late i : nso Perry . 8 shot Lk ] 1 : a emg Fe mm ge oe - we wee, ee ey 6 LH ie a a f 1 $ &
14-00000 ae He, os ‘Sper ey a - ( a hee \ November. Headquarters noted the-intent to use him as a utility . , agent in order to “(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assign- ments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville. indeed, he may be subject to call by other African . “tations although it is expected for him to be resident in Leopoldville. " WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on 2 December 1960. ‘His case * elficer gave him the following instructions: {a) to build cover r possibly by opening a Giga chop: and (b) to try to spot persons for a - surveillance team, intelligeace assets and paramilitary ; assets. : Cr ret eer Shortly after arrival, WIROGUE ran into Qs WIN, who later told the station that WIROGUE looked like an intelligence agent. In attempting to recruit QIWIN for his “execution squad", WIROGUE exceeded his instructions to avoid making approaches without checking with Leopoldville Station. Sow . 4 Oe nn: i In January 196 1, at the Fequest of the Leopoldville Station, WIROGUE was given permission to take flying lessons. By March, he had obtained the position of | | with in that capacity he was used by CIA for the purpose of gathering intelligence on| | By “7 ~ ee — April, the[ were trying to use him to obtain arms and , ad “* = @ aces e ow 9 iv Fem oe oY) al = . » *® o CEES en anenaetennenemmmmnnmmalinantnn tod “ ase ee
14-00000 rane vj : : ° Tors F : vee * pat instructors in Western Europe. Also, red was then teaching the [| he had run into difficulty obtaining a residence permit, and his CIA He departed Leopoldville in July because contract was terminated in September 1961. Africa Division believes that WIROQGUE was recruited for his Congo assignment because of his third country national background in order to establish a support mechanism in Leopoldville. At the —_ _ time the Congo was in chaos, we had few assets there, and the a - likelihood existed that the political situation would degenerate | quickly... The Station possibly also wanted to have a latent paramilitary : . : capability. “An October 1964 assessment of WIROGUE indicates little flap potential with him since he knew little about the Agency. He apent most of his time trying te develop contacts and was not directly involved in any particular operation. Bic Cy 10 SEESET a sen ee 20e Ge EES Conte Eee et