198-40007-10028 JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10007-10028 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information ORIGINATOR: = JCS FROM: TO: MR. VANCE TITLE: CUBA: THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES DATE: 03/00/1963 PAGES: 19 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : _ RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.1 CUBAN SUBVERSIVES - IMPEDIMENT TO TRAVEL PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT | Secret 1B; 4 Redact 04/09/1998 | Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 11. Report entitled, "Cuba: the Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees. SER Reite., me arment Of the Army EO ; 35. eclassi funea Exclude 3 Exempt = Refer To Review Date, / Sit 3 2 WW 50355 Bocldad: 324274021 Page 1
ad a | : : (Dior an SECRET | Lhd i CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES & . : . “AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES BYPROVED OY THE PLesiOENT — OW & LAR b 3. (SEE STATUS OF LMPLE MEN THITON TAO oe) SECRET HW 50955 Docld:324274071 Page 2?
HW 50955 SECRET  PABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE LI. Tntroduction aaa aaa ween nner ene ceeeere 1 II, Nature and Scope of the Problem, ---2---------~---e== 2 Iii. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations-----"--"-- 6 IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel-- ttn rrr rrr tn 8 1, Immediate Impact Actions -~--- rn r nner nnn nnn nnn 9 ae Administrative Actions---7 rrr tr rrr tnt rn 9 b. Intelligence Actions --~-~ ween ene enter 9) ce, Actions Related to Common Carriers---------"--~ 10 ad, Propaganda Actions-----~*=---- lett ween een 10” 2, Longer Range Actions--------- eo nen woeeee 2-10 a. Political Actions--~--------- eee eee eee eee lL b. Intelligence Actions ----3e3r39~ ae ve oe ci oe LL o. Administrative Actions------------2---7-= --+-- 12 ad. Actions Related to Common Carriers-----------+- 12 e, Propaganda ActionS <n nme rrr 13 3, Organization of American States (OAS) Actions ween 13 v..Aetions Concerning lllegal Travel----- eee ne eneeen 14 1. Immediate Impact Actions-------rc rtm r nt rer nnn ren 14 ag Intelligence Actions-------~--~ wee en eee eee eee 14 b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions----"-""-7 meme 15 2, Longer Range Agtione--------=---oeen eee cael 15 a. Surveillance ActionS-----3t terre ttn n een nnn 15 b. US Military Assistance Actions--------------+-~ 16 SECRET Docld: 324274071 Page 3
HW 50955 SECRET CUBA emneetgineant icra. THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES | Te Introduction The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin American countries. Execution of any one or more of the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them all will not completely solve it. © The practical problems involved are too numerous and complex. : With respect to diminishing legal travel to Cuba, we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes of those Latin American countries through which the’ subversive traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations the direct actions required have strong political and sometimes legal implications - impli- cations which cannot be overcome easily, even when - the leaders of these countries choose to do so, in the matter of clandestine travel, we are confronted not only with the great depth of communist guile, born of two generations of experience in the international movement of subversives, but with the inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in these same matters on the part of the Latin American community. In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside with the communists. Cuba's insular character imposes certain sharp limitations upon personal movement. Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone | wno enters the country must do so either by water. or air, There can be no slipping through the , barbed wire, , . SECRET BDocld: 327474071 Page 4
HW 50955 SECRET On the other hand, this same geographic situation - makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple. — There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpa- trolled Central American coastline, within 175 to 850 miles from Cuba. ‘There are at least 93 airfields, other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and capable of supporting the subversive ebb and flow, number well into the thousands, ‘Even in. the face of these unfavorable factors, a program of direct restraints, selected from among the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable effects, Under the proposed steps some travel would. be stopped completely. More .-— probably much more -. would be rendered difficult. Some hitherto legal - movement would be driven underground, © Previous clandestine movement would be impeded, complicated and harassed to the point where it becomes more. costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, | hopefully, less extensive. . II, Nature and Scope of the Problem We do not know enough about the movement of subversive trainees, into Cuba and - more important - — out of Cuba, We do not know enough about the volume of travel, or the media employed. This is par~-.- ticularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where our knowledge is extremely limited, Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate: SECRET , 2 Docld: 324274071 Page 5
SECRET Legal Travel Into Cuba Country No. of Legal Travellers Country No. of Legal Travellers Jan-Feb - Jan-Feb. 1962 1963 1962. 1963 Mexico holo 969 Argentina 500 Unk Guatemala 80 Unk Uruguay . 415 Unk El Salvador 100 8 Paraguay 60. | Unk Nicaragua 50 ss Unk Brazil 400. Unk Costa Rica 216 ~10 Honduras = «92 21 Venezuela 200 Unk ~—s- British — WO Unk: Guiana Colombia 400 Unk _. Panama 56. eG Ecuador 208 Unk Trinidad —- Unk Unk. Peru 181 Unk Jamaica 593° ‘Unk Bolivia 500 Unk Dominican None Unk_ Republic . ; oO Chile 551 85 Haiti . . Unk Unk * In transit, including about 300 Mexicans While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by - other routes; the great majority passed through Mexico, On the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912 travellers to Cuba during 1962, while the average monthly number passing through Mexico for the first two months of. 1963 is even higher than the 1962 monthly average. Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central. Intelligence Agency estimates that at least 1,500, and perhaps as many as 2,000;,have received ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many SECRET 3 HY 50955 BDocld:32424021 Page 6
HY 50955 SECRET of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to: their homelands; some by legal means; some probably by illicit means. . There is no reason to presume, moreover, that the travel to Cuba of the remaining = 3,000-3,500 was entirely consistent with the best .. interests of the hemisphere,,. Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans | . ; travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commenciad. a airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered: (foe Cubana flights. Some travelled to Trinidad or. Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or KIM flights to Havana, Others travelled to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial... | flights to Havana, With the cessation of service .-. to Cuba by Pan American, KIM, Mexicana, and Iberia airlines in October, the regular Cubana service ‘between Mexico City and Havana. remained the sole direct and regular airline connection between Cuba and the remainder of Latin America. The Cubana service between Havana ‘dnd Mexico: is scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only a. single flight is completed per week. Aircraft now employed are British Britannias — an obsolescent: model. Cubana has requested, but has not yet received, . Mexican approval to substitute Soviet IL-18 transports” oo for the old Britannias. Delay by the Mexicans in u granting this approval can have the favorable effect . ‘of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition, If, in addition, the British and — ‘Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of oo spare parts, the planes will soon become inoperative. .. Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly flights from Madrid to Havana on ll February. This flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana. , ; ’ ST KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles, However, it is now con. sidering doing so, In this regard it is concluded that resumption of scheduled flights by a United States carrier could serve as an encouragement to KIM and | others to do the same, SECRET 7 4 Boctld: 324274071 Page 7?
HW 50955 SECRET Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop regularly at any other Latin American country, though: the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and received permission from Brazil to land at Recife, enroute to Cuba, Some Latin Americans may have travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and, . should Brazil permit this arrangement to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new ‘order of magnitude. A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying _ - both material and personnel. The Canadians have been. “unresponsive to our efforts. to obtain identification - of the passengers, There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers: operating between Latin America and Cuba. However,. a number of trainees from British Guiana have travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant: vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana to. Cuba. Clandestine sources report. that transit of Latin’ Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illicit | ~ procedures, The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides . the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with _ special Cuban entry papers;.no entry is made in their = passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel out of and into Mexico, This procedure is obviously designed to impede any effort by the other Latin = American governments subsequently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveillance over their... activities upon their returns Evidence at hand portrays a dovetentiaa tbe of travel by legal means. This must be countered = .Girectly. Beyond this, and perhaps of greater importance, is the problem of illicit movement both. into and out of Cuba, which will undoubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at. present most limited, Elimination of this intelligence void: must be accorded ‘high priority. SECRET . 5 Doclda: 327474071 Page 6
HW 450955 SECRET III. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations Success of many of the overt actions proposed in the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders — the restraining actions must take place. Presented briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors of ITatin America in terms of participation in a coordinated program of travel © control, As a general matter, the imposition of controls on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin. American country. This, coupled with their current lack of full awareness of the danger represented by. Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the willingness of some governments to impose controls unilaterally. This is especially true since they . recognize that unilateral restraints will have little . effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also taken. It is likely, however, that most of the Latin American countries would respond favorably --. albeit in varying degrees -- to US leadership in seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training. The Central American countries are more acutely aware of the danger posed by Cuban-inspired sub- version than is Tatin America at large, and can be .. expected to react favorably to proposals for re- ducing travel to Cuba which President: Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential meeting. . However, their ability to carry out commitments which they may make will be limited by domestic legal and political considerations, as well as by their | countries! technical incompetence in such matters, Since Mexico is currently the principal hemisphere transit point for legal travel of sub- versives to and from Cuba, its attitude is of great importance, Mexico, to date, has taken several significant steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and Cuba. It has instituted close SECRET 6 Doclda: 327474071 Page 9
HY 0955 SECRET surveillance over travellers, to include stamping. passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA). These actions .. all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even | further cooperative steps, particularly on an un- publicized, bi-lateral basis, wherein the ‘political . hazards of taking a public OAS position are not. involved. In this regard, the Central American Presidents would probably agree: individually to seek - the participation of President Lopez Mateos. of Mexico. | in specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow | a of persons to Cuba through that country.” Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit travel to Cuba, but the regulations have J gendered — public resistance, and are not enforced. The : Dominican Republic prohibits such travel. Haiti has no established policy, but passports and exit permits are reportedly issued only on the personal approval of President Duvalier, Colombia could legally impose restrictions by executive decree, - but has shown no inclination to do so. Other. countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central 7 American nations, plead the existence of legal or - constitutional barriers which preclude the pro-- hibition of travel to Cuba, but thus far, they have made little effort to remove. these barriers. | Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, — . Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic © relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to | the left and gives little evidence of modifying its | tolerant attitude toward the Castro government. —. Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises -no- restraints on travel to Cuba , either direct or | via third country. The elimination of all legitimate passenger service to Cuba from Latin America could be SECRET ve Bocld: 3274274071 Page 10
HY 0955 SECRET achieved through invocation of the Ric Treaty, but it is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree . to do so in the absence of some major crisis similar to that involving the Soviet missiles or a case of’ direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American. country, Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would probably create a growing willingness to take action oriented in this direction. In this connection, © however, it is concluded that resumption of regular passenger service to Cuba by United States companies would render more difficult our efforts to persuade Latin American and other free world countries to take a grave view of the situation, and to partici- pate in dynamic action. Virtually, all the Latin American countries would be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their return to home countries, once they put their new training to use. The efforts of these nations will not be dramatically effective, however, since, in the area of internal security, all of them suffer from deficiencies in tecnnical skill, training, equipment and sometimes from a lack of a sense of urgency. The United States can provide essential leadership in eliminating all of these deficiencies, Iv. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel Listed below are specific actions contemplated to impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba, Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose, as travel on recognized public carriers, openly arranged and involving travel documents. which are presumed to be in proper order, Certain of the actions, it will be noted, are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS ~- wholly or in part - by its Special Consultative Committee on security. SECRET 8 BDocld: 3274274071 Page it
SECRET or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected. information promptly to the host government, as consistent with our own intelligence pro- gram, and the requirement to protect our sources. (2) Intensify. current efforts to introduce covert, U.S. - controlled agents from each country into the Cuban training program. Actions Related to Common Carriers’ _ ek it resum mh of air- oe so - cubs ») ecarri in orde ave) prove ea. fave able ekanpd to other Lonse 7 (3) Bo Sfla y,, request | Latin A ips See fro r departing fo barking oF disem- batking passeng a ; (4) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to deny their ports to ships of Cuban registry. d. Propaganda Actions emeaab Adalat campaign “7 to expose the scope and ‘purpose of Cuban training of the nationals of other countries for sub- _versive purposes, in order to discourage pro- spective trainees and impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba. 2. Longer Range Actions The following actions should also be undertaken © - without delay. Their ultimate results may be of far- _ SECRET 10 HY 50955 DBocld: 3242740271 Page 13
SECRET reaching importance, put probably will be longer in realization. a. Political Actions (1) Renew apd intensify pertiteral negosGE ions with the € Latin Aperican governments which . have ‘done so teSever diplomadét | with 0. (2) Through bilateral negotiations press countries with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such travel and providing severe penalties for evasion. Recommend that rewards be offered for identification of evaders . (3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate the need for full and effective ; cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bi- e laterally among the several states, in the inter-_ change of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive activities. (4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of ministers of Government of the American Republics to review the. implementation of steps taken by them to combat movement of ~ subversives in the Caribbean. (5) Urge other Latin American nations to -negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to en- list cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba. b. Intelligence Actions Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, : _ nature, and dugg se implications, of Cuban sub- versive activities, as consistent with the require- ment to protect our own intelligence program. SECRET ll HY 50955 DBocld: 3274274071 Page i4
— @ e @ SECRET c. Administrative Actions (1) Encourage Latin American governments. to insti- tute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of. passengers to Cuba. (2) Request governments of Latin American countries | which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations _ with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel docu-- ments by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as re- quested. a (3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin . American countries in improving immigration and @ customs controls. d. Actions Related to Common Carriers (1) Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines oS service. If unable to do so, seek to persuade’ Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet~made air-. . craft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling into disrepair. (2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and any other potential supplier that they cut off the. supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft, (3) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Cahada and Spain to persuade those countries to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of. other Western Hemisphere countries normally pro- viding terminal service for any of the airlines in- volved, such ag Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying . pressure, SECRET “y2 HY 50955 DBocld:324274071 Page 15
@ SECRET e. Propaganda Actions f1) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discredit- ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities. (2) Identify returned trainees who are dis- satisfied with their Cuban training experience and exploit their capabilities for provision of intelli- gence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities. (3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout ~ Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities for movement of persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive purposes. 3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions In view of the important political, psychological, and; hopefully, material benefits to be derived.from any success achieved through the OAS in combatting Cuban subversive activity, the following measures should be undertaken by the United States in that body, at times and under circumstances which give regard to the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, and give recognition to the fact that progress will probably . be slow. plomatic travel of > and at the gy to other re SECRET 13 HY 50955 DBocld: 3274274071 Page 16
SECRET b, Propose recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the: proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific recommendations set forth herein, ec. Once the initial comprehensive program in b. above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consulta- tive Committee on Security. d. Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution, Va binding upon all member states, to terminate ‘ regular air and maritime carrier traffic with Cuba. , : V. Actions Concerning Illegal Travel As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, one of the results will be to force _the hitherto legal travel into clandestine channels. It may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede illegal movement will acquire steadily in- creasing importance, The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the preceding section, in terms of immediate impact «pro- jects which promise early and visible results, and longer range projects which, while of great importance, cannot be expected to mature as rapidly. 1. Immediate Impact Actions Ae Intelligence Actions (1) Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and oe SECRET . 14 eo oo | HW 50955 Doclda: 32424021 Page if
° : “ . ~ SECRET determine routes and methods employed. Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our own intelligence program, to host government. (2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat. traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade governments concerned to institute surveillance and other control measures, b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions _ (1) Continue current US sea and air sur- veillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba, (2) Continue the development, at high priority, of US communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities. (3) Establish intelligence centers at ¢Tud? ' _ Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier pil Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemi- eel S nation to countries concerned via the American D i Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement - Aw mn of subversives. 2. Longer Range Actions a, Surveillance Actions (1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean sur- veillance system involving: (a) Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by US forces, (b) A US military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American ee a SECRET 15 HW 50955 DBocld: 32424021 Page i186
whe SECRET Ambassadors to countries concerned through rintelligence centers at. Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of Ahn the Atlantic Command, tut My ¢ ehh (c} A unilateral surveillance and inter- a eeption effort by each country in its own territorial waters. (a) US assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon reques’ by the country concerned. b. US Military Assistance Actions (1) Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean and Central American area, with the necessary small patros craft. oma none and roe est ecat support, enable these countries to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts. Provide necessary funds in addition to present programs. (2} Provide US Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard training assistance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military forces..:..ThiSumay: . take the form of a Canal Zone training activity, “employment of mobile training teams, or a com- bination of both. (3) Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine departures and apprehending returned trainees. Provide equipment, training -and advice as required. & 7 > SECRET 16 HW 50955 Docld: 32424021 Page i9