030840085] ree tate seer tate @ Ou ATE; 19 DEC. 62 1) + DIRECTOR non, { GENEVA) 137! | TION: C/EE 3 (MR. PINNEY NOTIFIED. AND COP 5 Ee Ge OM Y SLOTTED AT. 1730 NFO: DCI, DOP, ADDP, ¢/Cl, C/FI, c/TFW 2, s/c 2 PRICRITY oO PRITY DIR INFO 0 Gen CITE Gavi & 4625, vo ne pats sapnnren armen ce VYBAT Gonstbor Yrcnns me a REF GVA 4619 Uw 379%) + we Sthpe® 1. FOLL REPORT COVERS TOPICS CITED REF PARA 3A, 32, . 3Cy INFO ACQUIRED a PRAGUE 13 THRU 15 DECEMBER) UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED INFO WAS: OBTAINED FROM, -RAULITO -ROA _KOURT,. a rep ee cpt “CUBAN AMBASSADOR PR ‘PRAGUE’. WHERE “ROA IDENTIFIED HIS SOURCES hacitalonad he edie eee THEY HAVE BEEN NAMED. IN GENERAL ROA DID NOT IDENTIFY SOURCES. HOWEVER | SUBJ. POINTS OUT THAT ROA IS IN CONTINUAL LETTER CON~ TACT WITH HIS FATHER, RAUL ROA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AND oR INARILY ON THE BASIS OF, STATEMENTS MADE BY: RAULITO ROA, SUBJ BELIEVES THAT THRU THESE LETTERS THE SENIOR. ROA KEEPS, , HIS SON POSTED RE: THE SENIOR ROA'S THINKING ON CUBAN DEVELOP- ‘MENTS AND OTHER MATTERS. SUBJ ALSO NOTES THAT ROA HAS cON- VERSED WITH VARIOUS CUBAN OFFICIALS wHO HAVE PASSED THRU, PRAGUE ON TRIPS TO AND FROM HAVANA AND THAT ROA HAD LONG CON- ‘VERSATIONS WITH BLAS ROCA, CUBAN PSP LEADER, WHEN THE LATTER WASTIN PRAGUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO 15 DECEMBER. | | | : , pour t REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE ISRO AISNTEBS Copy No.
13-00000 ~ * to- Il —_ CLASSIFIED MESS | SECRET. "9," BACKGROUND TO PRESENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE WISSILES Gnv) 46-- ae a iN CUBAL. YG a A. SOVIET OFFENSIVE, MISSILES WERE: INTRODUCED INTO. CUBA AS PART ‘OF A TWOFOLD SOVIET CUBAN PLAN WHICH WAS AGREED UPON "SEVERAL MONTHS ago". UNDER THIS PLAN THE EMPLACEMENT OF SOVIET. DEFENSIVE MISSILES WAS TO CONSTITUTE THE FIRST ‘PHASE . IN THE - ; SECOND PHASE. A MAJOR Sov TET “FLEET UNIT SUCH AS THE BALTIC FLEET was TO. a re HAVE, BEEN INVITED TO VISIT _CUBA ON. A. CRUISE... ONC ONCE E ALL PORTS OF CUBA Sones, ome HH WERE SCREENED BY SOVIET FLEET UNITS, THE PRESENCE OF N- CES~Y As ANTICIP ATED THAT. ‘THERE yOULD BE IMMEDIATE ‘Ue S. REACTION, BUT THE ‘PRESENCE: OF nL WEL nn eC es SOVIET, FLEET. UNITS SURROUND ING CUBA WAS CONSIDERED AN EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE THAT THE. U. Se _ WOULD: NOT RESORT. TO IMMEDIATE. “INVASION OR 7 a OTHER: ARMED ACTION. TO. ELIMINATE THE MISSILE THREAT ._ Be. THE PURPOSE OF, THIS ACTION WAS TO FORCE A MAJOR Ep TPN At HEE CHANGE OF POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS CUBA. IT ‘YAS — ROTATED THAT Ue ‘ror BE VIOLENT, AND FROM THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. - HOWEVER, THIS WITHDRAWAL was TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED | . | AT THE PRICE-OF AN AGREEMENT BY THE U.S. THAT IT WOULD END Its HOSTILE | ra ee EE - Up] ATTITUDE TOWARDS CUBA. . eee fe SO Ce SOURCE. CONMENTS ¢ ae 4 icon RAULITO ROA DID.NOT SAY. WHEN AND UNDER WHAT”, CIRCUMSTANCES THIS SOVIET-cuBAN AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. THE: STATEMENT THAT IT OCCURRED “SEVERAL MONTHS AGO” MAY INDICATE, HOWEVER, THAT IT was AGREED DURING THE OCCASION OF THE VISIT TO Moscow. OF RAUL CASTRO eVRLIER THIS YEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, RAULITO- ROA INDICATED THAT THERE HAS BEEN, AND CONTINUES TO BE AT | SECRET
13-00000 pl ve 1s CLASSIFIED MES@ pr PAGE a PPESENT REGULAR, LETTER CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PREMIER R > KHPNSHOHEY AND CASTRO. _ THIS CORRESPONDENCE Is CARRIED BY OURTERS WHO HAVE TRANSITED PRAGUE. THIS LETTER CORRE- | SPONDENCE HAS BEEN USED: BY THE TWO LEADERS TO KEEP EACH OTHER IN PERSONAL TOUCH RE: vaRIOUS “PROBLEMS: OF MUTUAL INTEREST . a o-3) RAULITO "ROA GAVE NO INDICATION THAT HE OR CUSAN LEADERS. WITH WHOM HE MAY WAVE HAD CONTACT, NAMELY HIS” ee FATHER VIA ‘CORRESPONDENCE, HAD SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIETS. HAD ANY MOTIVE .FOR IMPLEMENTING THE, ‘ABOVE PLAN OTHER. THAN ee THAT OF EFFECTING THE CHANSE OF THE U.S. POSITION. TOWARDS CUBA WHICH vas DESCRIBED. -FOR INSTANCE THERE WAS NO INDICATION: IN RAULITO ROA‘ s CONVERSATION THAT. HE SUSPECTED THAT THE SOVIETS. MIGHT HAVE INTENDED. ‘TO USE THE PRESENCE OF THEIR | ‘MISSILES IN CUBA To FORCE CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS “OTHER AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE RE' BERLIN. - RAULITO ROA APPEARED TO BE GENUINELY CONVINCED THAT THE PLAN. was AS HE DESCRIBED ‘IT. : HE ‘DID NOT STATE THE” ULTIMATE SOURCE OF. HIS INFORMATION. ‘ De THE DECISION TO ACCEDE TO U. Se DEMANDS RE THE - EVACUATION: OF THE | OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WAS TAKEN UNILATERALLY. BY THE SOVIETS WITH NO PRIOR WARNING ‘TO OR CONSULTATION WITH “CUBAN LEADERS. DESPITE THE. ‘PREMATURE DISCLOSURE. OF THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO WAS SO. - CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIET FLEET WAS GOING TO ARRIVE IN CUBAN WATERS ACCORDING TO PLAN THAT - WHEN HE HEARD THAT PREMIER | MHRUS SHO HEV HAD AGREED ‘TO ACCEPT AMERICAN DEMANDS RE THE | EVACUATION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM CUBA HE CONCLUDED » THAT THIS STATEMENT ‘OF AGREEMENT MIGHT WELL BE A KHRUSHCHEV TRICK
13-00000 a} Tye 8 ok, CLASS IF FED’ MESS( T0 GAIN TIME FOR THE FLEET TO. ARRIVE. WHEN HE LEARNED THAT THIS nanan nnn ne 20-I1(Gnyh 4603 SECRET. Be pace tT MNS. NOT THE CASE, HE WAS EXTREMELY. DISAPPOINTED AND VERY ANGRY. “3. CUBAN REACTION TO THE SOVIET FAILURE TO ADHERE TO. THE. SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN OR TO CONSULT LEADERS ON THE SOVIET _ _ ASSENT TO U.S. "DEMANDS. oO a a, CASTRO ON ar toeatye Tur caviet nici ee IMPLEMENT THE, SECOND PHASE OF THE SOVIET-CUBAN PLAN BY NOVING THE SOVIET FLEET INTO PLACE, AND THE SUSSEQUENT FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH CUBAN LEADERS BEFORE YIELDING TO U.S.’ DEMAND DISMAY, ANGER AND DISAPPOINTMENT. THE REACTION OF THE CUBAN LEADERS was ANGER AND DISAPPOINTMENT: FOR THE MITHDRAYAL OF OFFENSIVE MISSILES WAS ONE OF CONTE NTRATED FAR MORE ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BROKEN THEIR WORD RE THE MOVEMENT OF THE SOVIET FLEET INTO CUBAN WATERS AND ON THE SOVIET UNILATERAL ACTION IN ACCEDING TO AMERICAN DEMANDS, THAN: IT WAS.ON THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD CAPITULATED: TO THE AMERICAN DEMANDS -PER SE « _THE CUBAN LEADERS ‘CONSIDERED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD BESMIRCHED an St ITS OWN HONOR AND THAT IT HAD OFFENDED THE PRIDE OF CUBA. AT PRESENT THE CUBAN LEADERS CONTINUE TO POSSESS STRONG FEELINGS oN THESE POINTS. oo 3. THE ANGER OF THE CUBAN. LEADERSHIP AGAINST. a TRE SOVIET UNION FOR THE ACTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE IS. care eaerensnemetanatth amas STRENGTHENED BY THE FACT. THAT. THE LEADERS BELIEVE THAT THE MANDS WAS UNNECESSARY. THE CUBANS | FEEL THAT HAD .THE SOVIET FLEET PROCEEDED. TO ITS - Ao ° SOVIET. CAPITULAT Ee CUBAN STATIONS ACCORDING TO PLAN, THE UNITED STATES WOULD - i : i SECRET
13-00000 cs SOK + * * - CLassiRtep Mes” MOT MAE UNDERTAKE ANY MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST cuBA OR So~ tt. (GN by yfo3 SECRET] IN 38 Po PAGE OD AYE PLACED A NAMAL BLOCKADE ABOUT CUBA.. THE CUBAN LEADERS ARE. 59 STRONGLY GONVINCED THAT THEIR VIEWS ON THIS POINT ‘ARE CORRECT THAT CURRENTLY THEY ARE MAKING A STRONG. EFFORT TO |. LEARN. THE "TRUE STORY" BEHIND THE ‘SOVIET DECISION TO BACK DOWN IN THE CUBAN CRISIS. , : . e C. SOURCE COMMENT: AT ONE POINT IN. THE CONVERSATION RAULITO ROA EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ? THE. NEW SOVIET POLICY * | IS ONE OF CONCESSION TO THE UNITED STATES". TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE | CHRAN SEARCH. FOR THE “TRUE STORY" CITED ABOVE, ‘THE’ ROA STATEMENT “AY BE AN, INDICATION THAT, CUBAN LEADERS SUSPECT THAT IN THE CUBAN CRISIS CUBAN INTERESTS VERE. DELIBERATELY, SACRIFICED TO ‘SOVIET " RIGHER INTERESTS", | D. ‘THE ANGER OF. THE’ CUBAN LEADERSHIP AND OF SENIOR CUBAN OFFIGIALDON CONCERNING THE SOVIET ATTITUDE | IN THE CUBAN CRISIS “HAS BEEN CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS CUBAN OFFICIALS STATIONED, ABROAD AND THE ~ we ere rer en rc neintey eames met erst re “SOVIET OFFICIALS. WITH WHOW THEY ConE_ IN conTacr. DURING HIS DECEMBER TRIP TO PRAGUE FOR THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS BLAS ROCA DID NOT HESITATE TO CHARACTERIZE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO PRAGUE, MIKHAIL.V. ZIMYANIN, AS "A CLOWN AND AN INBECILE™ IN THE PRESENCE OF A SPANISH-SPEAKING MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. “OF THE CZECH CONMUNIST PARTY. 00 | - a --E, “SOURCE COMMENT: “BLAS ROCA‘S, CONNENTS: WERE NADE IN THE PRESENCE OF AN UNIDENTIFIED SPANISH- SPEAKING | weMcER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CZECH COMMUNIST: PARTY... APPARENTLY, ZIM YANIN HAD RAISED SOME POINT oF PROTOCOL ne | . SECRET, Upper
GNVA 4 3 so CLASSIFIED. ness | SECRE scene r | oo PAGE __ 6 <SIPLCUATIC OR SOCIAL) IN A CONVERSATION WITH . oe BLAS ROCA.  SURSE QUENTLY. ROCA REMARKED THAT ZYMYANIN APPEARED | TO MAE § IMPERFEGILY PI GESTED A BOOK OF ONTMODED PROTOCOL, | ROCA ADDED THAT ZIMYANIN WAS NOT A REAL COMMUNIST SINCE - | COMMIINESTS DID NOT BELIEVE IN ALOT OF PROTOCOL IN THEIR RELATIONS, ~ ROCA REMARKED THAT “MANY SOVIETS ARE. CLOWNS” AND THAT “ZIMYANIN ‘IS & CLOWN AND AN IMBECILE™. WHEN RAULITO 208° SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED TO ROCA’ § ATTENTION THE FACT THAT HIS REMARKES. HAD BEEN OVERHEARD BY THE SPANISH-SPEAKING CZECH ANY THAT: THEY PROBABLY “OULD BE REPORTED TO THE SOVIETS, . ROCA RETORTED THAT HE ‘HAD MADE THE REMARKS ‘ON PURPOSE . BECAUSE HE WISHED: TO HAVE IT REPORTED THAT HE HELD A LOW OPINION | OF ZIMYANIN AND OF, CERTAIN OTHER SOVIETS. 74. SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV APOLOGIZES FOR SOVIET FAILURE TO CONSULT THE CUBANS DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS. A. D DURING THE, FINAL DAYS OF THE CONGRESS OF . THE CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY - Iw PRAGUE IN DECEMBER RAULITO 208 HELD A LONG CONVE RSATION WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID . PREZHNEV, WHOM. He HAD KNOWN IN MOSCOW. DURING A TWENTY- | ; | MINUTE PERIOD WHEN THE TWO MEN WERE ALONE AND: WERE DISCUSS- © ING: MATTERS IN RUSSIAN (ROA SPEAKS RUSSIAN: WITH SOME | FLUENCY) BREZHNEV APOLOGIZED TO ROA FOR THE UNILATERAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET ACTIONS DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS PREZHNEV STATED THAT ‘DURING: THE PERIOD FOLLOWING 22 OCTOBER - SOVIET | LEADERS, INCLUDING PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV,. HAD epeif HANyY NIGHTS WITHOUT SLEEPING. THEY HAD NOT RETURNED | TO THEIR HOMES. BUT HAD SIMPLY. TAKEN NAPS. ON. THE, COUCHES. IW: es ' SECRET ,
13-00000 ee . - CLASS IF IED: es | SECRET. a ___ PAGE 7 + ail a be THE LY OFFICES. ALL OF THEM HAD PE COME EXTREMELY FATIGUED. . PREM TER xuRUSHCHEY HAD PERSONALLY COMPOSED THE LETTER TO | re TO yr qr ene ee eee cee PRESIDENT _KENNEDY PROPOSING AD DEAL. CONCERNING SOVIET MissILe BASES Js CUBA AND ‘AMERICAN BASES: IN TURKEY. AT THE TIME KHRUBHCHEY HAD COMPOSED THIS LETTER: HE. WAS. SO -FATIGUED THAT IN CONTRA ST: TO HIS USUAL CUSTOM ‘OF WRITING IN LONGHAND “ThE TEXT OF THOSE PRONOUNCENENTS TO WHICH HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE HE, ‘Had DICTATED THE TEXT TO A STENOGRAPHER. aR. TALIING CONCE -RNING THIS INCIDENT. BREZHNEV INTIMATED THAT | OA | XHRUSHCMEV -HAD BEEN SO TIRED ‘THAT -HE HAD NOT FULLY GRASPED a THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HE HAD WRITTEN. BREZHNEV.IMPLIED ~ oo THAT SUBSEQUENTLY, AFTER THE LETTER HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV HAD REGRETTED TH2 PHRASE OLOGY: WHICH -HE HAD.USED, AND FURTHER HAD REGRETTED THAT .HE HAD’ | NOT CONSULTED WITH CUBA CONCERNING ITS VIEWS PRIOR TO THE DISPATCH OF THE LETTER. | > a oe Bs . SOURCE. COMME NT, \ ROW. RAULITO ROA'S— : DESCRIPTLON OF THE ABOVE INCLDENT AND IS’ COMMENTS S con. CERNING IT IT APPEARS THAT. BREZHNEV MADE No REFERENCE .TO | THE FAILURE oF THE SOVIET- UNION TO CARRY ‘OUT ITS PART OF | THE SOV IET- CUBAN "JOINT PLAN". (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE), NOR DID HE INDICATE THAT THE: SOVIETS REGRETTED THAT THEY HAD ACCEDED) |, TO U.S. DENANDS CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF OFFENSIVE, | VEAPCNS FROM CUBA. 7 oe a 5. ROA COMMENT RE NIXOYAN TRIP. oe rs A ROA STATED THAT. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT. DE PUTY PREMIER ANASTAS MIKOYAN HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO CUBA -
13-00000 7 ; » Fog!) CLASES IF ici MiSs i SF CRE tT in ae 204 PAGE 8 . 1 aN e eee FPORL CASTRO Ea Toate tar TO - MIN FUE SNE Sone SE GF acPTON iN THE CUBAN CRISIS. ROA ches pare) PRESS accounts THAT CASTRO He) MADE CLEAR TO MTXOYAN HIS. ANGER ANP Nis PLEASURS AT THE VARIOUS FAILURES TRY PART OF THE SOVTRT URTON HER LNG TH= CUBAN CRISIS, Be SOURCE COMMENT: RUA DID NOP FENTION ANY OF THE 4 = PEVELOPYENTS AFTER WINOYAN'S ARRIVAL IN CUBA, NOTABLY THOSE ‘ICH VAD RESULTED IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SOVIET IL-2 AIRCRAFT FROM CUBA. a | 7 END OF MESSAGE - SIGNAL CENTER NOTE: *BEING SERVICED FOR CONFIRMATION. of