JFK Assassination System + Date: 8/27/201 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: ROCKCOM RECORD NUMBER: — 178-10003-10047 RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR: CIA FROM: FITZGERALD, DESMOND . TO: DCI TITLE: Released under the John F. Kennedy Lesassination Records Collection bet of 1992 (44 Usc 2107 Note). . rases#:Ni 53244 Date: 06-13-2017 DATE: 04/12/1963 PAGES: 4 SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES CIA CUBAN EXILES DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified RESTRICTIONS : — Consulted CURRENT STATUS : Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/01/1995 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.4 ASSASSINATION MATERIALS--MISC, ROCK/CIA (11) Document Information 80 HW 53244 DoclId:32204566 Page 1
-  478-10003-10047 a Director of Central Intelligenca > Deputy Director (Plans) a oe . SUBJECT. = tffects of the Curtailment of Exdle > nay tit and Rua Raids hd - 4, This paper :3 for your information only. The decision of the U.S. Coyernment to stop “hit— and-ran" raids by he Cuban exile groupe will have o variety of effects depending upon from where one is viewing the decision. - ; %, Y toe ux belief that he | 3, From Widel Castro's view 2ou will haye mixed feelings. Mis iirst will be elation at our having gropped tne majority of these yaids, but he will coon ‘yecognize that we “now they nave been mers spectacular than . damaging. Fidel will, we think, recognize that this oxdex will not atop a few determined Cubans just as such 33 jnjunction did not deter him in his fight to oust Ratista, Toa degree Castro will view this order with apprenensios., Ie will probably wonder what wo plan instead, Castro ris¢alculate the effect of this order for he may believe that the basic motivation and dr ed Cuban is actually . ive. of the exil that of the U. S. and not the Cuban pimgelf, He may expect to Bae the entire exile effort against may well KUWaGIT awoa - | Od ‘Y GIWYID FHL WOYd AaODOLOHA him collapse. We believe me anti-Castro element inside Cuba ’ 4, will be seriously disheartened, This U. policy will he laimed aa a victory for Fidel, and interpreted and loudly proc a farther accommodation to the existence oi Fidei in Cuba. rar effort to wgeruit or defect officials of the Castro Covern- raent zhould be exp ectal to become even enore difficult. A HW 53244 DoclId:322045668 Page 2?
‘ ° . ~ Dees Ar ram Maw , ' — pe | 1 a Y fe AANA? io . . : . . . anaes: Cis DP adte ; 3 * ~ few disillusioned individuals on tha inside who haves long awaited U.S action may now be convinced that it is not coming and finally leave a regime they cannot tolerate. 5. The effect on the eles and their activi ies will be varied. Basically, their motives are, first, 20% tally to exmbroil the U.S. A, on their side, secondly, to sotablia’a their own personal reputation aad thus assure a Significant povition Sn tha future government, 2nd thirdly, an honest desire to removes Castro and hia governmmenz. The order will cause the non-activiat type Cuban exile wherever he ia to conciude thar the U.S. is wnwilling to permit "Sreetancing” Cuban exiles to forces or create U.S. policy in the Caribbean by their ‘ actions, Coupled with this thought will go the conviction that the U.S.‘is convinced that these raids cannot bring Castro down and short of a full.scale military invasion, Castro ia presently invulnerable. This leads him unhappily to the conclusion that the U.S. has no immediate, dyrarnatic plan for tha restoration of democracy to Cuba. They will use the bard term veo ' existenca’ to deseribs our policy and some will call i "appeas pment, it Many Cubans will concluda that the B. S. is right gad that t they cannot do that which the U.S. judyes cannot be done, Some will at long last pacie their bags and may |zave Miami for various destinations inthe U.S. and Latin America, (oF in just afew cases they may ask to zo home. 6. The activist” Cuban , exiles will probably not be Geterved by the order. They may even profit by the decree. Tt will now ba a greater honor to engage in operations against Pidel. The double jeopardy arising from the threat of detention by U.S. agents and the chance for martyzdom at the hands of Fidel will be an even greater challenge. Actually the suoply of recrijis for such hit and run raids may run challow } buz aot dry. _Anothar advantage arising from tae scrutiny of U.S. agents will. etter Clandestine security AUVdGIT quot -y QTWaa5 GHL Wows AdODOLOHA “be the improvement in control and & practices on the part of tha exiles. But as the U.S. reatrists and apprehends these men, confiscating zoods and funds, the loci of power will bave a tendency to Tnove back to its traditional the eiled-monied interests such ag the Sosches, © Yrlos, conte Batiaras. It must ba recognized that the clamp cowa will doter a ecttrty HW 53244 DoclId:32204566 Page 3
‘ ey ring" operator and soan @thers, x (UF Foe uncoordinated raida will yalds and eliminate the ‘ahoe-3t bet it must be expected that occasional slip througa any cordon. 7, Politically the exile most apt to profit from thia pronouncement? will be ajanolo RAY of tha Revelutionasy Junta {Junta Revolucionaria - JURE) It has long been RAY's con- tention that tae Cubans themselves canst, inthe end, iree Cuba and the decisioa to stop exils raids raay have the immediate effect of firmly convincing many anti-Castro Cubans that the freedom of Cuba is alter all their problem. — ‘-  §, Prom the standpoint of our agents inside Cuda, we ally be seriously disheartened. They had dreantd thai thase rajds vould Increase, keep Fidel off balance, encourage resistance internally, and eventually blaw the spark  juto a contlagration destroying Vidsiisme. Sobering a9 the thought of no immediate help from the ouiside will be, ws beliave our continued contatt and support of these men will proves to them that they have not been forgotten and taat our determination to free-Cuba has not changed.  “—beltave geome will initi it ig too s00n actually to state definitively what the w recruiimeat program, umber cf recruits, but their edueated, hungry are slways 9. effect of thia policy will Rave on oF {he Agency's problem ja not tha a The nnemploeyed, poorly duo0d. "a ATWYaS AHL WONT AaODOLOHA quality. sith us. Some of tae mors discerning type Cuoans wilh avoid jncipal reason for are convinced that a pz fights Castro in order to assur oy reerpitment 23 they the U.S. action ia to conrrel who who will sucezed him; however, others will desire ta work for u rezardless of this factor. The preliminary reaction of our WAVE station was to doubt that the order would have any effect on our yecruimment efiorts. co { i tented Pted-a ied os . sorts aos Co re ns fede war Deamond FitsGeralid Chief, Special Alfaizs Staff ec: DD ct ops HW 53244 Docld:32204566 Page 4
DOP/SAS:B. B, Cheeveriel (3 April 1963) ao “Distribution: - Orig &l ~ Addressee | 1 - DAD/CI (Mz. ebb) 1. - Signer a 0b. ff -—— £ h KatMDOLOHa Q- * = m3 . — a o> iS nae | . Kn = “ vil =o ” ot iZ* { \t o 4, e « hy to ~ rH o> WW. Ql wy ~ « m7 2 . £ “Se, a Pl ) co ~s . . 33 2, > +, 3 - HW 53244 DoclId:32204566 Page 5