FOTN Zp ep alec 0 PAD Re DORR ORT AT EGRED EGA © TAO RET AAT oD PORE A RETA SARL R STEERED EER BARD FS SECTION 107 sour INFORMANTS AND const QD eas SOURCES. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribu- tion or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use. “( and not intended for release to public.) NS. Retention of copies of passed material a. ' Handling money and property received by double agents ae ae Quarterly Letters - ~ Be Docld: 32989525 Page i763 ‘Andividual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed writ- True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed. Such material should be apvropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense, It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later ‘date from Government agency or private concern having custody. . Douodle agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception . - - of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). ; Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate. arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute state- ment describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name, _ Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidences in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing ( recollection in event testimony is later necessary. oo ‘ ULILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING Use of students Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau. | Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, ten statement for field file setting forth that this individual. has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact 28 security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources), Include following: {3 Specific productivity 2 Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus (3) Frequency of contact Quarterly letters on allfextremistland security informants or source's should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned, "Utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning.” Include following in cover letter: (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected ( (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants , and sources 24 9-13-71
CAPAC SPS eR mem en ms TT EE OO Oe ES Ee cos NW 35072 SECTION 107. SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES LO7A~G A. DEFINITIONS 1. Security informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current inf orma- - tion on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected. Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value. 2. Potential security informant Tndividual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau, 3. Double agent Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance 4. Confidential source . Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information available through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them. 5. Panel source Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested: 1. Evaluation of a. Complainants or other persons interviewed in security matters b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty ec. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees ad. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts 2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former security informants 3. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA. 4, Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffec- tion on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry. 5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings C. BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES - When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview when- ever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume ITI, and section 105, volume IV, of this manuel, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should . include: 1. Check of field office files 2. Discreet canvass of logical informants BDocld: 32989525 Page i764 3 . . . ReaePALTINA
SiO 72 mw oO Ol > SECTION 107. Decursrry INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENPLAL SOURCES. Tnauiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments,. and business connections. Investigation must definitely establish that individval can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background jnuformation from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by anvestigation, including discreet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him. Check of local credit and arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Tdentifica- tion Division to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. Review armed services record if applicable. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve. . Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details. . Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items. leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days, Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate in- dividual as potential security informant, . APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS Ll. N * When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to des~ ignate individual as Bureav-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. [Submit by secure teletype (usually Witel), Be brief and concise.] Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description. a, If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number off[extremistJand/or security informants , the number of potentialfextremist Jand/or potential security in- formants, and the number cf panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains, After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, fol- lowing matters should be made clear to him: a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is mo coercion or intimidation involved, bd. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or “undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes ‘must be impressed upon him. Gc. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so~ advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if ‘he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau, &@. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relation- ships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements. e. If potential informant is student, teacher, or has any similar relations with school, college, or university, in initial interview and subsequent handling, follow current instructions concerning in- vestigations on campuses. Do not interview female potential informants in their homes or apartments unless necessary and any such interviews should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of superior in field office responsible for development of informants, This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups and there will be no embarrassment to Bureau. 4 9-13~71 Bocld: 32989529 Page i765 . . —- -
SECTION 107. ae INFORMANTS AND courzoan SOURCES. 1LO7D~-F C BE, \ F. NW 55072 6. 7. 8. 10. Except in espionage and forsign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on circumstances, contact potential informants personally at least once every two weeks. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every six months. Sub- mit letters (FD~401) concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization on UACB basis; include summary of infor- mation furnished during past six months and certifications regarding stability and indoctrination against disclosure. Follow form indicated under § LO7L, item 3b, below, except those items concerning: payments. Post record of all contacts with potential informants. During contacts with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts. Informants may raise a question concerning their position if it becomes known publicly they are affiliated with subversive organization. In such case, he may be told that his cooperation is matter of record in FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making facts of his cooperation known-to his employer or to responsible individuals. Before taking steps to advise anyone of potential infor- mant's or informant's cooperation, obtain Bureau authority. From first interview with potential informant through development and until discontinued, use extreme caution at all times to be certain he is not a plant. ; When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, advise Bureau. -° This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence. Individual's background must be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using inform ant as witness, If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safe~ guards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to Bureau, BUREAU POLICY 1. 2. Development.of military personnel . Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reserva- tions, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by Bureau, Contacts by designated Agents Contacts with informant or potential informant should only be made by Agent or Agents specifically designated to contact him. Divulging information to informant No information should be divulged to potential informant or informant concerning any of Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation. Recording investigative activity . All investigative activity must be made matter of record in field office files with all sources of information being completely identified. Agents must not have and use informants known only to individual Agents personally. TNDOCTRINATION, DIRECTION, AND CONTROL OF INFORMANTS 4 oe Caution against divulging relationship During initial development and consistently thereafter, impress upon 4nformant absolute necessity that he refrain from divulging his rele- tionship with Bureau. These instructions must be properly phrased to prevent possibility of Bureau's being accused of attempting to impose censorship. Developing additional background During development of informant, additional data concerning his back~ ground should be continuously obtained from informant, Be alert for data revealing he is mentally or emotionally unstable, or has some personal problem which would make hima risk, Indications of instability - Immediately furnish details of any indications of instability to Bureau, with recommendations as to informant's continuance and comments as to any steps being taken to prevent embarrassment to Bureau. 9-13-71 Bocld: 32989529 Page 1766