180-10131-10322 JFK Assassination System | Date: 10/19/20 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER:  180-10131-10322 RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY AGENCY FILENUMBER: 014723 Document Information ORIGINATOR:  HSCA FROM: MURPHY, DAVID E. TO: TITLE: DEPOSITION OF DAVID E. MURPHY DATE: 08/09/1978 PAGES: 39 SUBJECTS : CIA, METHODOLOGY KGB OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD NOSENKO, YURI, ASSOCIATION WITH OSWALD MURPHY, DAVID E., TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : — Top Secret RESTRICTIONS: Consulted CURRENT STATUS: = Withhold DATE OF LAST REVIEW: = 08/21/1993 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 4 v9.1 HW 50955 Docld: 32277207 Page 1
ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY oy THOMAS/is WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978 . _ «ye ae 4d —_ ee = i { I i t i U.S. House of representatives 6 John F, Kennedy Subcommittee ; of the Select Committee on ; | Assassinations . oy Washington, D.C. | . | 9 | ‘Deposition of | a DAVID E. MURPHY | | : (1 | cated for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee, | { i - : 12 | pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room 3370, a | . . og —& i3 Second and D Streets,, Southwest, Washington, D.C., beginning : io Jat 10:01 o'clock a.m., before Annabelle K. Short, a Notary. 1S | pubtic in and for the District of Columbia, when were present 16 on behalf of the respective parties: i | For the Subcommittee: 13 | _ KENNETH KLEIN, Senior Staff Counsel 19 For the Deponent: i x0 | (There was no representation by counsel.) | & ' | a i é i | HW 450955 Docld: 39277207 Page 2 i f P ‘ r ik R t 7 . . :
ir DhvAci | . 6 sty | Operations Directorate, he was still DDP and I reported through * a> 2 that chain of command and I reported to the Chief of the 3 | Counterintelligence Staff, Mr. Angleton. o @ 4a Mr. Klein.. You stated that in the beginning you reported td - 3 | Richard Helms? 6 | Mr. Murphy. He was DDP. ? Mr. Klein. That was in 1964? 8 | Mr. Murphy. 1964. | 9 | Mr. Klein. When Nosenko defected? ! 10 Mr. Murphy. Yes. : i | Mr. Klein. Now, in the following years, when different | i | people held that post of DDP, was Helms’still involved in the | -®@ 43 | Nosenko case? . | Mr. Murphy. He was but I don't recall any specific pattern. | It: would depend I guess. | Mr. Klein. Can you tell us if you reported to the DDP? A? | Mr. Murphy. Yes. | a Mr. Klein. What did he do? If you, for example, went to ele i¢ | DDP, whoever it might have been, and said we have a decision to : | 39 | make with regard to Nosenko, and you gave him the atternatives, did you have any knowledge of whom eh spoke to, what he did, or) ! | to whome he spoke? | Ly 8 Mr. Murphy. I can't give you a specific instance but the | pattern of operations is that the DDP would then discuss it with ac i the Director and Deputy Direcotr. That would be his chain of | command. ws HW 50955 voora:32077207 Page 7 THe Serery
ivr edbucl Or he would make the decision on his own. . ory ; 2 Mr. Klein. So with regard to Helms, when he was DDP you ‘spoke to him directly. When he became Deputy Director or Direce 4 tor, which eventually he did become, then the chain of command, 5 although you don't know of any specific instances, would have 6 him still involved in the decisions? ? Mr. Murphy. It would. In order to be absolutely correct 3 about it, the DDP as one of the Deputy Directors for Operations 9 made his own judgment as to what he would discuss with the | . . 10 | Director, what he would not discuss with the Director. | - 4d | Mr. Klein. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, 12 when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed in that ; eh . 13 | hostile interrogations began, is that dorrect? 7 [ . is! Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of 1g | the question. . 16 Mr. Klein. Well, elaborate. qa | Mr. Murphy. No, the previous pattern of voluntary discussion ! of issues under consideration changed and Nosenko was not per- 13 | 19 mitted to evade questions or to decide when he would or would { : | | not want to respond. 54 Mr. Klein. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before as far as conditions and how it was changed? 3 a3 | . 4 Mx. Murphy. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much a 44 | permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wante 2 n = his cooperation and we wanted to discuss these things in a i § i | | ! H 1 BW 450955 pocta: 36277207 Page @ THD CEPoCT .
ir oluacs | cs - ; | | \ reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit still for | | 3 which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And 4 the most important apsect I think of the change was the decision to confromt him with inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the: time, | 6 | said and passing it on. | ' Mr. Klein. What about the day-to-day living conditions, cH — were they changed? 9) Mr. Murphy. “Well, he was not permitted to Leave. He was | not permitted to depart? Other than that, in his day-to-day ia | , H treatment, not the actual interrogation sessions, but just his 12 food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time? Mr. Murphy. I don't think so. not that early. I don't | | remember that? | Mr. Klein. The decision to change the eype of interro- 6 | gations, who made the decision? What were the dynamics? Mr. Murphy. The decision was, the recommendation was made to me, it was --- 1a 1g Mr. Klein. Who made it to you? i 29 Mr. Murphy. Bagley, the Chief of the group, because they felt they could not proceed because of the problems I have RD ant \ | | | | | | | ' | | | | | | | | | alluded to, and this was then discussed with both Angleton and | on “4 2 the DDP. | 7 Mr. Klein. The DDP was Helms? acc n> i Mr. Murphy. At that time, yes. And the decision to 3 t HW 50955 Docld:30277207 Page 9 THD Gregory .
HY 50955 Docld 1 | | { i f | | \ 9 iW” oLbdli proceed to confrontation rathern than continue essentially a debriefing in which you permitted the person under debriefingd, in this case Nosénko, to believe that he was being believed when t { it was considered the issues under consideration were suffi- ciently important and the inconsistencies seemed so glaring, the matter and bring it to conclusion. Whereas the other way, no, Nosenko would have rightly demanded full freedom, his regulization of his status, and an office in the building. That was the reationale at that time. so obvious, that it was thought: by..confrontation we’ could resolve | | | | | | i Mr. Klein. Who actually made the decision to go ahead with | | this new mode of interrogation? ; . OO ot You said that Bagley recommended it to you? Mr. Murphy. » I concurreds: ---">- Mr. Klein. You consulted with Helms? Mr. Murphy. I passed it on up the line and our recommenda was agreed to, except with the proviso that Angleton did not | | | believe that we should attempt at this stage to confront him, “ ought. to spin it out for a long period of time. There were practical and legal security difficulties in that. If you pre! tend to a person that he is okay then you have to be prepared | to live with that pretence. | Mr. Klein. Did Helms concur with the decision? ! Mr. Murphy. Yes. Mr. Klein. Now, you told us sometimes the DDP would make 4 i j t -e Jo977207 Page 10 TAD Sr Pory ion
aur ouiili | 10 | | decisions on his own. Do you know if that was one of them? | * ap fe Mr. Murphy. I don't know. 3 | Mr. Klein. Helms made on his own? 4 | Mr. Murphy. I don't know. in Mr. Klein. Subsequent .to April 4, is it correct that 6 Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia ? Division? | 3 Mr. Murphy. That is right. | i — | 9 | Mr. Klein. And how were the particular sub-areas on which | | i0 1 he was interrogated chosen? | : 12 This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision | Vy | Mr. Murphy. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas?. | ! | was made based on what the CIA people thought offered the best | opportunity to get an admission and to break on that. In other | words, I think it was based on points that they had collatoral 16 | on. BY that I mean other information which said what this man _ 7 | is saying is not the truth or this man does not. know about this| ij i and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos~ | session.of information in the hands of the interrogators which | | | then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the | | truth. OO 7 One breakthrough it was felt, as. is normally the case, gives a4 | you other breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be mf ae interrogated was essentially a factor of the tactics of the i | briefing i i ! t i -HW 50955 Docld: 42277207 Page 11 THD SECRET 7
ivr sowie! | Mr. Klein. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the 11 ! | &R) | subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him, 3 | to break him, as opposed to a desire to gain knowledge that | 4 | would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence agency? | s In other words, knowledge of the operation. 6 Mr. Murphy. that is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by the end =of April there was a view that the man 8 | was not telling the truth, that parts of what he was saying wer 3 known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense, and | although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sen +2 | to accept as valid any data he might provide unless you could | } 13 | | be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so | id many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it, | Is the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that | | the information was not considered acceptable. : a Mr. Klein. And by the same token, when Nosenko was asked <-+ 3 this is again all subsequent to April 4 -- when Nosenko was asd 19 | followup questions, say, on Monday he was asked questions and o | | . questions, would that again be determined by the fact that 37 | someone had made a decision that that area had potential for “3 | breaking him and, therefore, followup questions should be 99 | Wednesday he was asked followup questions about the Monday's | | i | | | | t ! | | { { | 24 || asked? a5 Mr. Murphy I believe so. u WF 50955 pocta:42277207 Page 12 The SECOCT
| | yr ghbuis il | | 412 t | Mr. Klein. As opposed to a desire to gain information | | | & 2 || C£ intelligence value, and that might be another reason why you would follow up? | 4 Mr. Murphy. well, the people at the time, I mean the juagt 5 ment at the time was it would-not have been of intelligence value because you couldn't put any trust in it. In my cases, Or could check things, not necessarily that you would use the information as valid intelligence. 7 information was sought to enlarge the base against which you ' an operation designed to break? | | ' | i | Mr. Klein. But, basically, subsequent to April 4th, it wp | : - Mr. Murphy. It was CI interrogation, it was not an informar | i 4 i ! | | tional acquisition exercise. | j 4 t i | ! 1 1 | s i Mr. Klein. Are you awae that many if not all of the | 1s | sessions with Nosenko were tape recorded? | 16 | Mr. Murphy. I know I thought most of them were after April! 17 _ Mr. Klein. And do you have any knowledge of how, if anybody, a listened to these tapes or read the reports of the interrogators 3 | about each day's interrogation? Mr. Murphy. Well, the daily take was read by the Chief of | im the CIA group, Pete Bagley by all the officers, and in reporting f periodic reporting which. went to the DDP, extracts or excerpts SE as SS | } { | from these tapes were included, all of which I saw.) Mr. Klein. How close were you to this operation? Mr. Murphy. Well, because it was the kind of operation it | { i | | HW 50955 vocta:do277207 Page i3 THD Creary a | ans
ivr DLudci | i3 | | was, I had the forward and I did forward regular continuing per! * © 2 || dodic reporting, so I was aware of what was going on. 3 Mr. Klein. Were you involved in every major decision made | 4 | at this time? . | ; 5 | Mr. Murphy. Well, there were times when I wasn't there, 6 obviously, but I don't recall any major decisions of which I ? would not have participated, at least in the discussion. 3 Mr. Klein. Basically what I am saying is, would anybody have had the authority to make any kind of a significant decision con- \ | - 10 cerning Nosenko without coming to you and letting you know | | | | | | about it, would Bagley for example have had that authority? Mr. Murphy. He would have had that authorityif I weren’t | | if i € i3 | there. ~ 7 i idl | ( 1§ 3 6 | a | 3 | | HW 50955 pocta: 42277207 Page 14 TiS Creory . 7
THOMAS:msl  , 1 dr whuisi fls is | 1 Mr. Klein. You mean -- | Mr. Murphy. If I were on TDY, I was away on TDY, a great | ; 3 || deal on trips. 1 | Mr. Klein. When you would return, would you be briefed on § what went on? | b i Mr. Murphy. Yes, and I know, of course, since this never on] occurred to my knowledge, he must have kept both Angleton and 3 | Fitzgerald, DDP aware of what was going on, becuase they would 9 | have required regular reporting. 10 | Mr. Klein. But I am more interested in your knowledge. an! Would it be fair to say that you were close enough to this that 12 | if a decision was made of ny note you would know about it, if 13 | not when it took place, afterwards?  _ --& . ‘Mr. Murphy. Yes, I would become aware of it. i Mr. Klein. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko | i j | 1s i | i 16 had to say bout Oswald? 7 Mr. Murphy. From the very first. I mean, when 13 the first said it back in February or March. 19 | - Mr. Klein. Do you recall now the substance of it? 20 Mr. Murphy. No, not exactly, anything I said would be 2] polluted by so much back anf forth. I know that the thrust of 33: [the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet aq |intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by them, and { ' a } i i a4 (4 can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the | - se i tt i ‘ : (t i BW 450955 Docld: 32277207 Page 15 TRS SECRLT affair. There is more detail but I can't really pin it down.
BW 4509455 Mr. Klein. 2 personally. ivr webu’ Did you accept this statement by Noesnko, you 3 | Mr. Murphy. I did not. I did not believe that it would | be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have 7 remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moseow of a 7 former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an | 7 active U-2 operational base. I found that to be Strange. It. | was only later, I.think that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it seeme to me that the 10 | Oswald story became even: more unusual. : 4 | I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost 12 | to°-have been tacked on or to have been added as though it 3 | didn't seem to be part of the real body of the other things tt td that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand is that Nosenko was +> much of what he said was true. 16 Mr. Klein. You are talking about other areas? Mr. Murphy. Yes sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much dependent on not 3 =e _— — o “G a ~ te et eee oe ne me Ee relationship and it seemed to be so totally — just one coincidence but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and all that sort of a, | thing. That is what I mean. & ond i) ne ‘Mr.. Klein. Do you recall any other specifics about what =3 | bothered you about the Nosenko statements on Oswald? For 24 example, what incidences bothered you? Mr. Murphy. as Pd Doctld: 3b977207 Page 16 Well, I didn't remember this very well, but TOP SECRET i | | | | | | | | | | | | | : | | | | { { | | | | i | | !
4 1 ! the one when Oswald tried to commit suicide, Nosenko happened | > 2 to be on duty or something, and what is how he knew what | 3 | happened. This is very vague, in my mind, but that is one | i * | other thing I recall. _ | 5 | Mr. Klein. Do you recall any other specifics about what | ‘| you could not accept in Nosenko's statements about Oswald? ? Mr. Murphy. Yes, that they just -~- this is part of the | g | first one -=-no contact was ever made,that he went up to Minsk | 9 | and lived happily and well with no contact. The Soviet Union 10 with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person. | al Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, | 12 | what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive | _& . 13 : debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It - oe 14 | G@idn't seem to be possible. | 18 Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constir i } 1é : tute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange.. | 17 | Mr. Klein. Would you distinguish between first the fact 12 | that nobody debrieFe@Oswald when he first came to the Soviet | 19 | Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew as a Marine, as | 20 ! a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they decided a1 | to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he | | was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA? | . + Mr. Murphy . Yes, they would be two different points. The’ a ® , 24 first point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply _ | i i a chap arriving with this background and no -one taking the time | | HW 50955 Docld:32277207 Page 17 Tho OtPettT
; ivr dcbiasi bee 417 just from a military intelligence technical point of view, ! telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000. - feet what did the blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators handling operational traffic 7 that although the KGB knew Oswald was a Marine, they did not 8 bother to question him, and because of that never knew that he 9} Was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which 0 the U-2s took off and landed? | | | | | | $5 | involving U-2s. | 6 | . Mr. Klein. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko | | | | | | Mr. Murphy. I think it would be strange. | | My other point, going back to your first question, that | is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial | arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here | | that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, §.~ 16 there is no. operational interest in a defector. GRU would be | | | : properly the outfit that would want to be talking to any Marine. | | 13 | They will talk to a Marine about close.orcer drill. You follow, a 19 | me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a radar | 20 | operator or that he be known to have been a -~ they would talk é i | | 2] to him about his military affiliation: just as we would. : & i - i } 2 | I realize that there is a body of thought which says that | a “3 | some. people think the Soviets are ten foot tall. I don't believe } i . ¢ - } : Sneed @ 9g | they are. I think they are very, very, very much the other way 4 se ; What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is that Lo | HW 50955 DoclId:4P277207 Page 18 TAD LQELCOSTT
in i AW 50955 Docla: me tr oe ae ee wines a 2 Sst a ee ee ence t 2277207 Page 19 TAD CLPOIT iUr SLuaci | they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border | Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully acessable to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell the things that made, or many other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere of dis- belief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't | | | | | ! | | all. I guess I found it difficult to belive this is one of . | | | | | | understand it. — i t Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to believe. “Mr. Klein. Have you learned anything since then? Mr. Murphy. No, I have learned nothing new that would account for that, and I don't know whether he said anything new. I presume what youare saying to me, it was a hypothetical, was that a hypothetical? Mr. Klein. Well, I wanted you .to just comment on that situation. I vo How many years have you been in intelligence work? How
6 | ivr evil | \ many years did you work for the CIA? os © 2 | Mr. Murphy. I joined CIA in 1948. Before that, I worked 3 for two years for US Forces Intelligence Division, US Forces, 4 Korea. Before the Korean War, from '47-48. So I would say $ before that, I was in Germany, a liaison officer with the 6 | Soviet forces. | ? Mr. Klein. Over 20 years? 8 | Mr. Murphy. Almost thirty. Thirty years I would say. 5 Mr. Klein. | And on the basis of your experience and know- 10 ledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you n trouble with Nosenko's statements about Oswald? 12 - Mr. Murphy. And other things. . eS) | Mr. Klein. Do you know of comparable situations where ; ts 1 somebody wasn't questioned like this, was just left alone, as 15 Nosenko says Cswald was? 16 Mr. Murphy. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not 7 | aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is, ! 12 | thos officers concerned with this case, were handling it 19 | directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence 40 | officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about 31 || this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone 22 | did, I never heard of it. | . “4 | Mr. Klein. During this interrogation period, beginning 7 ~~ | | a 44 | in April of 1964, would it be fair to say that the questions , os, a5 relating to Oswald and the problems which you have just been ; i HW 509455 Docld: 32277207 Page 20 . TR. Gthory
Mr. Klein. Who in the Soviet Russia Division made the a discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for  & q guestioning and interrogating Nosenko? a Mr. Murphy. Probably not. | ‘| Mr. Klein. Why would that have been? 5 Mr. Murphy. Because there were many other areas which 6 | posed equally interesting aspects yet about which we knew much , more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral 1 knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the | Soviet Union. | decision as to who would question Nosenke, subsequent to 12 | April 4th? | a & 13 : Mr. Murphy. Bagley, Chief of the Group. oO ta | Mr. Klein. And do you know of any criteria that he used | ts | to pick his interrogators? | ; a Mr. Murphy. Some knowlege of Russian, as Nosenko's | ! English was not good, the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try | i | not to use too many people because you then lose. In the i ; i first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy n> —~ a an ron oO on ~ eee ee ce 21 who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union or’ return to the | i other side, and so you don't want to propose too many officers, | plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of i i ! people in. You have to have people who studied the case. and “| 32 tn became in depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use : 5 2 | } HW 509545 poctd:32277207 Page 31, i fe SEGE a |
da a n WW 50955 Bactld: ‘point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of tame mee TOP SEGRE L. = os 0 EUR ODE, the officers that they had available and there were a variety of criteria. | Mr. Klein. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a weeks ago, it is our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell us? Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background | in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn't sure of the us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time. Mr. Klein. Two points.-- Mr. Murphy. The reason that the chap was chosen was becasus he was levelheaded, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since ! i | then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer. Mr. Klein. But wouldn't -- | Mr. Murphy. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't, | what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don't know. Mr. Klein. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical 1
o oUF oLuncd | situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald { knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from nD 3 . t Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not ge * | have, if not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew > about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough, from A to 4, | 6 | | was unusual, they didn't do that? | i everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think htat | t i | ' 3 Mr. Murphy. I would certainly think so. 9 7 Mr. Klein. The second question, part of my question was to the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, is 1 that to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the par- | > ticular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is ~ | | { gained from all that, it is possible that since I have not = | seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be i 4S | exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is | | that he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, wl and my question is would that be -- | 1S oy Mr. Murphy. That wouldn't surprise me because there were | 19 | ywery few people, relatively few people, in the Division or 20 || indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience. | | | 2) | We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either | . : t abroad, might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't aquads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced interrogators. ‘ 4 : i t i i i +
| 10 UF SLYAL § | Mr. Klein. One thing I would point out to you is that I | | | | 2 | : | 7 © | have listened to a number of tapes, and all of the ones I have | 3 | | listened to were totally in English, there was no Russian. © foo. Mr. Murphy. Yes. : | 5 a | | Mr. Klein. My question. is, was Nosenko, the questioning | 6 of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964? | Mr. Murphy. It was an important operation, an’important | g | case. ’ Mr. Klein. And yet there was nobody with interrogation | 9 | experience who could be used to interrogate him? Wo 12 | Mr. Murphy. I am sure some of the people had interroga- | tion experience. I mean Bagley himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald except —"s in | what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing that we thought we were going to get through on, because | i an | we were weak in that area at that time. | 13 | Mr. Klein. You say at that time. Did you become stronger '9 | Later? ' t Mr. Murphy. I think everybody became stronger later, so | much has been said about it. That is what I meant. | & yO 22 One of the things that I am sure you are aware of is that | A iL - oe 3 | the investigation, primary CIA contribution to the post- | @ . a assassination investigative activities and background was | 7 ed 1 : 4 HW 50955 Docld:32277207 Page 24 “~ i coordinated by cr ‘Staff and a lot of things that are spoken
" 1UT Ocbie gy. a | knew then. ‘| about today everybody seems at awe about, the Mexico angle, ‘@ 2 ] we knew nothing about, particularly involved Cubans. If it | | involved one Russian case it was because of the coordination | ‘| collection was done by CI Staff. They made information ‘| available to the Warren Commission and it was not lateral, met 6 is what I meant by saying, I know more about it today than I | | { | Mr. Klein. In 1967, the decision was made to allow Bruce | 9 Soley to in effect reinvestigate Nosenko's bona fides? Mr. Murphy. Yes sir. Mr. Klein. And eventually he wrote a report? Mr. Murphy. Bruce had participated in every way in the. : _s A , RS nl SS case from the beginning. He monitored many of the debriefings : i , my i i Ox interrogations, I can't tell you exactly how many, because I don't know, but I know he was involved, I know I had many | discussions with him about the case, and some of the other ont ~ for the Office of Security and for CIS management to pick if | leads that developed from the case. So he was the logical man | they wanted another look taken of the case. Mr. Klein. You say that you had many discussions with ¥a tn 21 him? | - | , oo 22 i Mr. Murphy. Well, naturally a dozen over the years. | i 73 Mr. Klein. What was his general viewpoint prior to 1967 | a a4 | when he got this assignment? What was his general viewpoint : -, | : on Nosenko? Sam HY 50955 DBocld: 32277207 Page 245 i Ww
HY 4509545 Mr. Murphy. He didn't know why Nosenko was saying the mn) things he was saying, but some of the things he said he though i were true. | Mr. Klein. The first part you have elaborated? a Mr; Murphy. He didn't understand the motivation under- ‘| lying the many contradictions which were evident in what , | Nosenko had to say and yet he said, some of the things he has 3 told us are true, they are leads to people who have indeed 9 | been Soviet agents and who have been rolled up and arrested 0 and, therefore, we should simply take it for what it is and n | as far as the basic resolution of the why, that is your proble 2 Mr. Klein. How? ss” ; 13 | Mr. Murphy. I don't mean, I am not being sarcastic. He td | was concerned with leads which had to do with American securit 3 | and there was a lot Nosenko had to say in those leads which | was valid. The purpose of those leads, if you looked at it. | fron the point of view of CI Staff and the CI Groups or Divisions, was that they were not leads which went anywhere | because the people had already lost their access, they were | already out of play, and that is what I mean when I said that: 22 was saying, if there was a pattern, was up to CI Staff and | the SR Division to figure out. They were the operational | people. They were the DDP people. The Office of Security : was interested in taking whatever he had to say. I don't mean Sass j ; ; Docld: 32277207 Page 26 ell to ra | the deeper underlying motivation, the pattern, for what Nosenko, H : f | Ah é # t + 1 i i i H 1 j 1 ' : { |
Hv 4 + 5 i ' i 4 i 1 1 | | | 7 TASB ATrAnrs S0955 DBocld: 322772707 Page 27. qT ( ° < L f Ht T. H ' ‘ } | when Bagley went overseas, I don't remember the exact dates, 13 ad BVEUTIL §. that just exactly as I said it. Mr. Klein. Were you surprised that Soley was given the assignment that he was given in '67? Mr. Murphy. No, I was not surprised at all. I thought that the fact, I was not surprised that the responsibility for the case was transferred to the Office of Security, as a practical matter, because I discussed with my deputy at the time, in hte winter of '66, I mentioned this before, I said -- Mr. Klein. Who was your deputy? Mr. Murphy. He wasn't there very long. He was replaced. He was deputy during, I think, part of '67, that really isn't important. The thing that is important is_ I said this case is not going to be resolved and something has; to be done to find a mechanism for dealing with it, and so | - the solution which was proposed, and I was not a part of the . ) discussions, but I didn't have any great sense of -- I wasn't | unhappy -- I also was anxiously thinking about getting overseas | again. myself, but I think the fact they gave it to the Office of Security and Bruce Soley became the leader of that reinves-| tigation made sense. } Mr. Klein. Were you surprised at his ultimate resolution | of the matter, the fact that he found or concluded in his report that Nosenko was bona fide? Mr. Murphy. Well, I never read his report and I. have ~
4 ob a Bhd | ry ee | | never read it to this day. So I just don't -- @ 2 | Mr. Klein. The conclusion you do know? a Mr. Murphy. That he was totally bona fide, there were no | ee , | caveats? I mean, r just don't -- I would be surprised if that | | | were the case. I have not read it, I don't know. If the ‘| statement were made this guy is absolutely bona fide from | , | every point. Bona fide doesn't mean he is not a dispatched | ‘| agent. It is’a lousy term, frankly, bonda fide. It means | 9 | either personality problems, are there quirks, are there 9 aspects of the man's baékground which he has attempted to hide, n , which, therefore, have produced contradictions? But on balance 2 | we do not believe he was dispatched by KGB with a mission a . 13 against the United ‘States. Those are the kind of conclusions | i | is lz would expect Bruce's report to have. — . I don't think Bruce would ever end his report with the conclusion he is fully bona fide. I haven't read it, but I — — On [vay cent eee erty ee don't think that would be the case. I think there would be some attempt to explain why some of these, you could blame, I suppose you would have to deal with some of the strange contradictions which were evident, quite apart from whether you SE 9 -; BD ~~ — Qa ie) oo think he was dispatched or not, and those could be explained, and in a conclusion I think by personality, I don't know. en |! nnn i _ “3 I am just saying, I don't know what he said but I can't believe ! Hl it would be stated as baldly as that, as simply as that. I i) tr think he would have to make some general conclusion about the { | HW 50955 Docld: 32277207 Page 26 tay t A
| as UP S2bHGa | man, the personality, then come up with a final decision, . | . a 2 | which is the most important one, whatever the reasons for inconsistencies, discrepancies: and contradictions. da If that is what you are saying, I would not be surprised ira with that conclusion. oy Mr. Klein. Why wouldn't you be? 7 | , Mr. Murphy. Because we never were able to develop any | hard legal: proof which would support the fact he was a Soviet ; | agent. 0 Mr. Klein. Let me ask you this. If you have a situation " where you can't develop any hard proof that somebody is rane dispatched and at the same time --  &b 13 Mr. Murphy. You have reservations. is | Mr. Klein. You have reservations. Is there any kind of | \s precedent or any kind of criteria for what the intelligence 16 community or what the Agency would do in a situation like _ | vl that? 18 | Mr. Murphy. I cannot cite a specific case. It seems to | 19 | me —~- and this. is on the basis of general background as opposed 20 | to a specific case -~ that in similar cases but not nearly as 2) | spectacular, the level of the personal or the data, in many i ; i 22 l cases, the defectors have been talked to, there have been | - 73 difficulties with them, there finally has been sort of an | inconclusive determination, not sufficient to impede their stay in this country, but there would always be a residual HW 50955 Bacld: :
view, generally in the CI Staff, in the file, that certain | | aspects of this man's backgroundwere never resolved, we suspect a this may have been the case. That is all you can do. da _, Mr. Klein. What would be your reaction to learning that the reservations which you and others had concerning what Nosenko had to say about Oswald, were not resolved in any way , | by Bruce Soley and yet he reached an opinion which, whether 8 . | i an Mr. Murphy. I can't comment on that. 10 Mr. Klein. Well, do you think from your knowledge of the | . case, assuming that there was no additional information or investigation into the statements Nosenko made about Oswald, ~~ RO — _ nothing new came up, say in 1968, that you didn't know about StL RS ae ee in '64, could this issue of whether he was bonda fide be | | it is qualified or not, found Nosenko to be bona fide? | | i { | | | | | | | | i resolved without dealing with this Oswald question? 16 ! Mr. Murphy. It would certainly seem to me to be difficult, | a7 to make a final judgment without dealing with that question. i | Because of the fundamental importance of that question itself, | 9 | quite a part from its utility sas a tactical interrogation 20 | device. | va t | Mr. Klein. What would be your reaction to a scenario | in which the only way that the Oswald matter was dealt with ey ba Ne | “3 | was to list three or four reasons why Nosenko would not have | | | | been sent to give false information about Oswald and then leave: | _ : rt BW? pe 4 a the subject without’ ever dealing with the substantive content i | 4 { ‘ | ; ee Ory a : = : HW 50955 Docld:32977207 Page 30 : re 5 C A} ET i | |
» AUP SEGHEE ay of what Nosenko says about Oswald and the difficulties which |  @ 2 | you have discussed which arise from that? a Mr. Murphy. What do you mean by scenarios? - Mr. Klein. Everything else as far as the bona fide ; | question. In other words, you have a question of bona fides, 6 you determined that he is bona fide, be it possible with some ? | qualifications, that is the rest, anything else we have 3 been discussing, that question is faced by Bruce Soley, and 9 ) what would be your reaction to a situation where he faces that | 10 question, comes to the conclusion that it is qualified, Nosenko i . OU | is bona fide and only deals with the Oswald issue by listing | three or four reasons why the Russians wouldn't send him to | mislead us about Oswald, but never goes into the substantive i$ | content of what Nosenko said about Oswald? =| ° Mr. Murphy. It is very difficult for me to comment on . . | 16 that. It is a technical professional matter. It seems tlo me VW what is being confused here is the overall question of whether | | . 13 | Nosenko was sent by the KGB, for whatever purpose, and the 19 individual issue of whether part of or indeed thus the sole 20 | reason for his having been sent or fed the information, or ya : whatever, related to the Oswald case, very difficult. | 2 Dl 22 \ . Mr. Klein. Can you pass on that question? _ 3 Mr. Murphy. Thatois all I can say, it is a tough one. 24 Mr. Klein. Okay. Off the record. HW 50955 Docld:33277207 Page 31 3 rE h t 4a 43
j 18 fur etbhga | , | vores 31 (Discussion off the record.) . @ Mr. Klein. Do you know who made the ultimate decision 4) to reinvestigate the case in 1967? | as. Mr. Murphy. No, I do not. I assume the ultimate decision — must have been made by the Director, but as I told you, this have for you? 6 | whole aspect was never discussed with me. 7 | | Mr. Klein. If it were proven that Nosenko lied in the 8 | facts that he gave about what happened to Oswald in the Soviet | Union, if that could be proven, what significance would that 10 4 | Mr. Murphy. Better wait a minute. | Mr. Klein. You want to go off the record? ! | | | | | ‘Mr. Murphy. Yes. (Discussion off the record). Mr. Klein. In the situation I have just give you, let 16 me make it clear that when I say if it could be proven that 17 | he lied, I don't mean a situation where he himself admits I 18 | have lied, but where external facts prove that he lied in his | 19 | statements about Oswald? . 20 | Mr. Murphy. Well, if such facts were to be found or | t | were to exist, it would seem to me that at the very least some | . { effort should be made to determine the true story, because on | i ce a4 his own case, his bona fides, but indeed, the way the Soviets ae fF reel # looked upon or their attitude toward the Kennedy assassination, | . . — oe Bs) that would hinge extremely important considerations for both... ! | | ae TAR Oraarr | Hi 50955 Docld: 38977907 Page 32 He a 1a fF i, 1 i . wate” ae
AUP SkbHE “If, for example, Oswald, the Oswald story, were concocted by Nosenko to enhance his own importance, that would be one s a nN da 1 thing, and would have little significance in the context of | what I just have spoken of. be important for us to know in terms of the way in which the ; On the other hand, if Nosenko had been given this informe | 7 . 6 | tion by some third person, in the KGB, even though he did not | 7 | admit that he had been a dispatched agent, it would certainly | 3 | | j | t I $ : Soviets looked upon the assassinaticn case. { ' 10 Mr. Klein. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs? i. | Mr. Murphy. Not to my knowledge. . | V2 | Mr. Klein. Were there ever any conversations in which | you took part about whether to give him drugs in order to get | | | | him to tell the truth? - | : Mr. Murphy. There were many, nay conversations all the i time about various things that could be done, all the tech- _ | 7 | niques that are known, to get him to talk, but as far as I i | | know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled | the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt | | | 20 : made to use these, because none of them appeared to be likely | | : 2] | to produce results and they all would be very harmful and, | therefore, not produce results. i i . - 3 Mx. Klein. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control | . | @ tA i over the case, in those years, is it your statement that if u . : | i 25 | any drugs were given to him, to get him to tell the truth, HW 50955 DocId:34277207 Page 33 § 4] | 3P 47 i;
| 20 Mr. Klein. fa § o | Mr. Murphy . ” ‘ Mr. Klein. 8 | { . 9 | for example? j 1G Mr. Murphy. 4 | of it? : Mr. ~Kledin. Mr. Murphy. division. Mr.-Klein. Mr. Murphy. Mr. Klein. the record? Mr. Murphy. \ » b us . & 24 Mr. Klein. i ©@ 2 | Mx. Murphy. | AV | not be done by us. | | UP sibie you would have known about it, That is correct. Is there any doubt in your mind that somehow an order could have been given to give him drugs which never would have been transmitted to you? ‘It would certainly surprise me. Does the CIA have any procedures when it I assume so, but I have no personal knowledge does administer drugs to subjects, record keeping procedures, Do you know? Because it would be done by the technical What I am getting at -~ It wouldn't be -- the record keeping would Is there some kind of procedure used by CIA 19 | whereby you could simply go to some records someplace and 20 | check the dates. involved and you could know beyond a shadow 2] | of a doubt drugs were not administered since they are not in i} if I don't know that. Would you dispute testimony given to this id A iE Comms ELeP by Nosenko, to the effect that subsequent to April and no such thing happened?
Aoqd: NPA Rca 21 yf Viuiy 4. bo 34 4th and prior to the summer of 1967, he was drugged by the  & 2 CLA? 3 | Mr. Murphy. That. is his perception. 4 | Mr. Klein. Would you? | | Mr. Murphy. I don't gree with him. 4 | Mr. Klein. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie 7 detector test in '64, in April? | - Mr. Murphy. Yes sir. | Mr. Klein. Do you know the result of that test? Mr. Murphy. It indicated he was lying on several key points. “Mr. Klein. Do you have any reason to believe that test ~~ — KR — Perea ore 1 was invalid? Mr. Murphy. No. | Mr. Klein. Are you aware that he was given a secondly 18 lie detector test in '66? 7 Mr. Murphy. Yes. 13 | Mr. Klein. Do you know the result of that test? 19 | Mr. Murphy. Same thing. 20 | Mr. Klein. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid? | nD a Mr. Murphy. No. I believe the operator gave him the | "3 | test in '66 was the same operator who gave him the test in RD Pp 1964. a) nr Mr. Klein. That is correct. . @ —_ _ e HW 50955 Docld:32277207 Page 35
j 22 7 y r vil “i ; : 35 | Had you worked with that operator prior, or not prior but any other times other than these two tests? Mr. Murphy. I knew he was a fluent Russian speaker and but I don't recall -- I knew his record, I think he had been in GErmany, I don't recall that I worked with him on any case, ) . Sa (oe) nd - — ene ene ee tt mo: | | that he was adept and flexible in his use of his machine, { | | | | | ; | I simply knew he was a good guy, appeared to be a good guy. é Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that in the second 9 | lie detector test there were numerous questions concerning | | H 10 | Oswald? 12) Mr. Klein. Many more than, say, in the first lie detecto " Mr. Murphy. I don't remember. | test? Mr. Murphy. Yes. t { Mr. Klein. And I wondered if you knew of any reason why 16 f Oswald should have been given much greater emphasis in the | AT | second test? Oo 18 | Mr. Murphy. I don’t recall the reasons for it. | 19 | Mr. Klein. Was there ever any discussion about these | . 20 | tests prior to giving them, that you took part in? | | : a Mr. Murphy. The only thing that occurs to me is that 7 | . | the second test concentrated much more obviously than the first t | test on areas of greatest doubt, greatest suspicion, greatest ; ; 1 . 24 | areas of contradiction or inconsistency or what have you, and | ® | since, although as I said earlier, we knew less about the At 4 { i { i i i P HW 50955 Docld:32277207 Page 36 4 4;
» dUP Sebaeg as Oswald case in the Soviet Union, it was surely one of the oY nD areas which would fit those criteria, it was not a topic which | we believed he was telling the truth. 4 Mr. Klein. Do you have any statement that you would like 5 to make at this time or anything you want to say? 6 | Mr. Murphy. No. Mr. Klein. The time is 11:14 and on behalf of the Committee, I would like to thank you very much for taking this time to come here and give us this deposition. oo «. 3 : Mr. Murphy. Glad to do it. Ju | (Whereupon, at 11:14 a.m., the deposition was concluded.) ro) mn zai: ? & 4 4 HW 50955 Docld:32277207 Page 37
24 pUP SLune gs | | | .CERTIFICAT OF NOTARY PUBLIC @® I, Annabelle K. Short, the officer before whom the fore- going deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness | : 3 “ | whose testimony appears in the foregoing depositions, was duly . 5 . sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken | 6 by Robert A. Thomas; stenotype reporter, and thereafter | reduced to typewriting by him or under his direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of 7 the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, 4 and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the : i i -@ ‘~ : action. 1S | Notary Public in and For | . the District of Columbia 16 a i | 7 | | } My Commission expires November 14, 1980 13 | | t 19 | | i | 2] i" 22 4 a4 : ) nm : ta yes YO tn HW 50955 Docld:32277207 Page 38 4 ne ae Aq! i :
da ire AW 50955 DBoacld:3 | 2 fUP Stoned CERTIFICATE OF STENOTYPE REPORTER I, Robert A. Thomas , stenotype reporter; do hereby certify that the testimony of the witness which appears in the foregoing deposition was taken by me in stenotype and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this @eposition was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, or financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. _ Stenotype Reporter a cay Py ras) ry “33 roy rassscl