(404-10232-10003 1O4-10232-10003 ee ae ae shes + WAS et ag oe crecry whet wae 19 October 1961 Colonel Johnson ee MEMORANDUM FOR VIA : Mr, Ellis SUBJECT : Guidance re: Dr, Miro CARDONA | REFERENCE : Your Memorandum for the Record of 10 October 1961, ; : I, In your discussion with State and MIRO it might be wise, for security reasons, to assume they have little specific knowledge of our operations and certainly of specific individuals who have some connection with C.I.A. For example, when they speak of Conte Aguero, it hag gone too far for us to deny any relationship, but we should firmly insist C.1,A. is not directly in touch with Conte. ~ 2, Realizing the difficult handling problem you have, I am putting down my own reactions to some of the parts fh your memo, which may, Ihope, be of some assistance. 3. Regarding your paragraph 2, item a, Ido not believe we should for security reasons alone] reveal to Miro or State our operations in this area, Much of the time when they raise issues - like this they are simply guessing and "fishing, " Frequently their guesses on our assets are very eroneous, Usually, their forays can be countered by saying we agree that the propaganda "lines" should be discussed or they should tell us what they think the “line* sbould be and we will comr-ent if we disagree. In short, we are willing to covertly try to support them, but we are not obligated to reveal to State or MIRO our specific operations and personnel, which should be in a normal situation clandestine. Accordingly, I would suggest that you encourage the CRC toward diverting some of the million dollars the White House promised them into forming a functioning propaganda commission and suggest they then tell us what they are doing and plan to do, so that if we have assets and approvals from our people we will be in a position to coordinate our efforts with theirs, 4. Regarding your paragraph 2,b, these seem in general sound enough, Tell him.to keep us advised as to what he proposes to de with his funds in this field. Surely he doesn't feel he is giving us | orders ag to what we should do here in our country, SECRET
14-00000 -aupported. Naturally the meang are aecrot. ~2- §, Regarding your paragraph 2,c, you may wish to remind him of his conversation with CLARK and HANLEY in Baltimore where this. was discussed, You may tell him that we aro as agreed endeavoring to provide funds to the internal groups which he indicated should be ‘If he has a partichlar leader or group inside he wants us to try.to support he should tell us, We could suggast sume of his million dollars could be utilized by him alse for this purpose, As to commanie action, the State Department, _ which sets policy, has not authorized any commando operations of any kind and we are accordingly not in a position to organize or support any for the present. 6, Regarding your paragraph 3 on Commando Action, this plan is not yet in Headquartera; however, we have no policy authorisation from State for such an operation. 7. Regarding your item 4, you will recall and he will recall, he took this up with GOODWIN and then with HURWITZ and then with CLARK and HANLEY. He was unable then to say exactly how or even. if he could develop a commo line to Ramirez much lesa how he would get arms to RAMIREZ, or anybody else by air, and in either boat or air operations there would have to be some assurance that he had the capabillty to arrange a reception party in Cuba for the arms, assuming we had the policy authorization to support this kind of operation. You should tell him that as explained by HANLEY to him, it is not enough for him to just say he would like to support a given guerilla group. He will have to have some capability for doing it before we can support: him, assuming we can get pelicy approval for same, 8, Regarding your item 6, although we sympathize with his view, as Mr. HURWITZ and Mr. COERR, as well as My. GOODWIN, have told. him, the U.S, Government haa not and does: fot plan to commit itself to him on the question of sending U.S. tro¢ 8 to Cuba, 9. With regard to your item 7, I would suggest you remind him he agreed in his conversation with HANLEY and CLARK that he would © arrange an amicable takeover of the jurists which he admittedly has not done, We still hape he can exert anough influence over his people to keep the. meas out of the press, SECPET
4 4-0000 Cet a, tee nee ee SR ee ek Ve Mes bn a3e 10, With regard to your item 1, we too would like to see him exert 7 _. some leadorship and induce these groups to unite with him in one way or another, but do not agrea with him that in the long run much can be accomplished by just saying "I control the money, and 1 am THE channel to the U.S. Government.’ He must keep in mind that there are in existence lots of channels to the U.S. Government and by that we do not mean C.I.A. Ii, Regarding your {tem 1], you probably should emphasize to him again that he has taken over the FRD budget and personnel and it is up to him to get them organized and doing something other than drawing . oe relief checks, iZ. Regarding your item 14, I suggest you continue your “coordination” line with MIRO, pointing out these groups are not under complete ; control of C.1.A., that they do many things on thelr own, that we merely support them from time to time, usually indirectly. Accordingly, we are not in a position to "turn them over" to him, even if we wanted to, which we at this point, are not sure they would agree to in any case, He will simply have to get into some working relationship with them, using his million dollars or leadership, preferably the latter, Dietribution: ; Orig & 1 - Col. Johneon l-Mr, Ellla | 1 -DC/WH/4 |! 1-C/WH/4 1 - C/WH/4/Plans