Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 Senator Tower. Will you go back ae , tha Hersh told@m@him that the thing that really bothered him —-- : about this storyéwas that it came fromthe same source who | gave him the 22nd oi ecember, without identifying him, and the fact that when he was ‘going through this business that he had the best sources in the A Bona that was Sidney Gottlieb, ff) Zi > « a e ° € « z _ and here was a scientific adegation, plutonium and the scientist and all the regi’ of the And again, if hefdid have a live source in that area, that means hefwould have a live Solirce across the board. When he asked me about my ‘successor, ; told him that I was not prepated to respond to that, that very new man was entitled va free shave. \ Andéhe says, I know your successor. And I dente think he actually’ mentioned the name. But in this article Ne has jus ky Poa ERIE IC ROI CIA FORT I Oe EEE Old eR comef,out he mentions him with his hiographical sketch Senator Baker. Who was your successor? 410 First Steeet, $.£., wasmington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Angleton. George Kalaris. I had never known him before. TOP SECRET
et cetera.I mean that is m Prone (Ares 202) 544-6008 sof why he was doing all this. Whereas my concerns here quite oe et, words, you are saying yéu° dealt with the %s ba yy Ge > ate. And he pursued all \the matters with some vigor and in-~ Do you think it sdiboss ble that because of that that whatever denial you made of un Scanster of atomic parts of 7600 o@, thestory didn't getacross to Mr. Seulc? q La et cle oh ne Nn Mr, Angleton. No, I think it ‘got across to him. Mr. Schwarz. Can you recall your Words to him that denied the 'fomic transfer? z 7 My chief words to him wad said, do rearing nar a thing like this implies, and what éht would ‘A 13 d@pending on how the media picks it up, in destroying 410 Fornt Steet, S.£., Wasnuneton. D.C. 20003 Mr. Schwarz. But words like that are as consistent with beingtrue as being false? TOP SECRET
ane renee re ks HW 54971 WARO &@ PAUL 410 Fees Street, S.£.. Wasnington. O.C. 20003 “Docld: 32423393 Page 40 Mr. Angleton. They were consistent, but they we gastated in that fashion. They were stated in the fashion that Mann is & person who fits within the Philby, ef cetera, ex in a false story of this sort, which come’s to the mM Who pull out a file on Mann, and theyread down and with me, Mann's aseociation\with Philby, all this a my actions with the [dana me regardless of what the U.S. Government {by tells the British Australians, or the °* ally the basic information if’ would be a confirmation to the based on very high level séd¢pet information, that the story was Ve Senator Tower. fyLet metbur sue just about three ques- tions here. VE —y ; eS fd’ he ask youto confirm or deny that? By Angleton. I can't remember it with prediisely that [aif s typeyof precision. The story that he gave was a venyilucid, \ | straightforward story without any if's, and's and ma Senator Twoer, Did you deny only in part the validity of the question that he asked? TOP SECRET
: ' i 1 Jd 4 : Prone (Ares 202) 544-406 cr cr ct 2 > « a « ° € < z 410 Foest Street, S.E£., Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 Angleton. No, I denied his story ~<@M would like to keep, that ais, his story, something he came an And then when he ee into the other things’, which had to do with technolo een I can say is ait anyone who follows S : oa : closely the ‘Nasser, ‘and then later ,onF Sadat accusations against CIA, it is voluminous Kterms offtheir spelling out the sophis in the last war we Loge? —= and we ¥. don't know the extent of this -- / which we had put (a Ly NS When you say "we", youemean the CIA? Mr. Angleton. The CIA -- the : , ru 7 an When “he say ie the GIA But in there? foFsenator Baker. What installations? Mr. Angleton.The line of sight, electronics -- Senator Baker. YOu are not talking about -- Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the signal intelligey And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in TOP SECRET
Lotti Vetere! eee Lon en! Prote (Aves 202) 544-4 C1 ct ¢ WARD &@ PAUL 410 Fost Street. S.£., Wasnengton, 0.C. 20003 Phere. 2 And Iwant to complete this -- because of the fad So I told een, I said, yes we have always helped them out" than we had, which was #£ueex And they would cain: & and we would get the product. o -- so ni thie is clearcut, there was no attempt to led him on eae nuclear one, because it would be just another of the many rumor And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want & TOP SECRET
_-Prione (Area 202) 544 Z z a e a € < 8 410 Frest Street. S.E.. Warrington, 0.C. 20003 get back to it. After the Six-Day War the Soviets s who had a back- ground in the war. with the Israelis, and had met there and pre- Pared and wre out. all the strategic Part of the Six-Day War. And this i 11 PFIS. And ggere was a tremendous pike Of Soviet materials , never got much into our media, be- cause it is directed ¢ obviously they knew. And, therefore, ey a and so on. "The audty then raised was whether we, penetration was g here or wa’d’ it if | Mri Kirbow. Did you sfabout the use of Dr. Mr. Angleton. Not iat if you -- I said that any things injected in it I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story o TOP SECRET
aR ES ay fo Ben a few times -- and I know him well -- and he Prone (Aree 202) 544-4008 abs@lutely a stoney expression, no expression on hdis; 4 ne Boe something very,.very queer, and th - 5 was initiaibed by him. And that was why I copia. Szulc, a g 6 did he come ne or did you come to him. Senator Baker. Did he come to your, 8 Mr. Schwarz. oS <S 9 Senator Tower. helt me ask yout,6ne specific question, - 08 \, ' fe ~ 10 || yes or no. <a & ~ _ 11 J ’ -~ ? c le : a im : 4 OQ : 13 Cc c <s ~ 19 20 21 Mg/ Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn t4 poi is that’ correct? Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to res 24 to/that, because after all, this was a fast-moving discussi 410 Fest Street. S.6.. Wasnington, D.C. 20003 LL, ecine an awful lot of subject. And furthermore, in the TOP SECRET
Ww 549271 Docld:32423393 Page 45 | | . | 5 cat ctet DD Oa QU > FK Act TFK Act #'K Act Mr. Aaron. What problems were those? "Prone (Area 202) 544-6 ie Angleton. | They were very Sensitive. sproblems, And king about here, Mr. Aarom. Do you recall a conveg & in discussing Os Same matter, you said you felt under * you are Sy Mr. Schwarz in wh ©, obligation 466 either confirm or deny \ this story with Mr. S2uye? Mr. Angleton. ‘Yes, Byiow I used that phrase. There was a denial. and I think fhe Wells would second the fact he. ve ‘ I got down to a lot of the WARD @® Paul, that, there was a denial other’ questioning, my, thinking was to try to lead him around back into the wi with Hersh, NS Yy “ g source that had t6fdo with Sidney Gottlieb, and so on. ahead him back to this senator Abe Are you saying in effect, then, that any questiong he raised with you about the transfer of visual magptial or deeper technology, or manpoyer, for that £eo | ne couched fn \circumlocutry Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator, TOP SECRET
‘sk ; .... 2 I will have to explain we went to the restaufant, he invited us to the restaurant, he was insistent ohiyit. And we fo eople. Hersh was a person who ,had requested a secret P| ls'house, and then rochileed in a restaurant to At It wasSthe Sea Catch, WARO & PAUL The thought crossed my of -- he could hide a lot DA late. And he/tried to get me to come ss his place. And Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup? 410 Ferst Street, $.£., Wasnongton, O.C. 20003 Mr. Kirbow. That this whole Szulc interview, story a TOP SECRET HW 549271 DBocld:32423393 Page 46
Prone (Area 202) 544-4008 ? > < Ly < ] s < z 210 Ferst Street, $.£., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 everything else, Mr. Angleton. I never discussed this w the Agency until we had this lunch, because I on! I think one has to review a loko wile? one has to review it as a dossier, Mr. Angleton. news security file. I thinks He Was one of the journalists, the first one, who nsceleous ign for blowing the whole Bay of Pigs, and so on. And I think the\fact that he is foreign- born, and the alf¥egations and so. And so the Bureau has és a similar files And many of these ‘fies are created -- and routine security check is made. Mi Schwarz. Are you aware -of any eillance of : SZ0lc? Mr. Angleton. No. Mr. Schwarz. Past surveillance? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I am not aware of i As I say, I don't think I have ever seen his file for £i¥e%or ten years. TOP SECRET
Mr. Miller. file matter. edge there were files on Mr. 7 Szulc. ther newspapermen? WARD & PAUL he say -- 7,060 files. Was that right or Mr. Angleton. never cofited them, How many? <A hundred thousa 410 Forst Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 oa our staff was cut in half, and we had the problems TOP SECRET
| _ o| of the Watergate, and we had all of these things, ‘ Great deal of this stuff was there, but it wasn't bé4i essionally worked upon, & atergate twice, i Senator Baker. You have mentioned the w 6 Ca aN shed any light on that per in the. Agency's ? life, the Nyce that the Watergate investigation had or any 8 involvement of the Agency in any of fttie So-called <- -y 2 _— < a a oe: < Ce c 14 What was that Cc 15 Senator Bake fo narrow it. I want to make < 16 || it broad. ~ 17 . 18 One, workings An the -- working with the AGency ie in ydut break-in or the preparation for the co cup or the attBiptea cover-up? Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not. and 24/|Pby that I am separating the midni ny ght channel 26 things é newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well. TOP SECRET
i l Jj { \ | i WARO & PAUL 410 First Steeet, S.E.. Wasnington, O.€. 20003 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2) 22 x» Angleton. I am aware of what was i f ae woe? And vaur | oN Helms. Mr. Angleton. didn't kndéw" N ff Senator Baker. I belLeve’sgo. Mr. Angleton. In any¥évent, I can say that Gaynor's Senator Baker#/In connection with Watergate? ea aN a} He left much earlier. tS y), ‘ Mr. Miller. He being McCord? Mr. Angleton. Yes. Miller. Why did he leave? | V vnareron. I don't know. And I was really Wdrprised 2 thatdne didn't come by and say goodbye. eo, 0 Angleton. He was not. TOP SECRET
HW 54991 DoclId: 32423393 Page 51 gused him twice, and one was a pretty llowed instructions to the lette thim. There wasn't any difficulty e equipment that was used, I am told, was a fairly Prin sort for ye of operation. Does that agree with your appraisal Me him? Senator Baker. & u 7 vat Guia ring everything. So, instead of using anybody in the clandestine
“| at aa te ete atte Prone (Ares 202) 544-4008 2 2 < s ‘ ° t < z 410 Forst Street, 5.€., Wasninaton, O.C. 20003 it, And that is why I can iin tokn what they have stat Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away fro the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing wha if any information you can:give us about the Oswald situation. For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it hav a file on Lee Harvey Oswald? | Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy. And then there is a lot of undigested material that was brought out after the Warren Commission. Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you have any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent? Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. I know the time factor, I will try to shorten this. But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should not be -- that there should be a statement to the effect that the Commission, in the life of the Commission -- that these are TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL 410 Foest Street, S.E.. Wasmington, O.C. 20003 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the door, that it would really mean the investigation would be pursued. Senator Baker. John McCone, as I remember, was queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of certain people, including Oswald. Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko. Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in cate~ gorical terms? Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Comnission we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko going under the record, on a question of bona fides. Senator Baker. Why? Mr. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides. Senator Baker. What did you regard him as? Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who was sent to mutilated the jeads. of very high grade Soviets whom we had acquired prior to that. Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy TOP SECRET a
HW 549271 ae roonn@), 145 WARD & PAUL 410 Feest Street, $.£., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 Phone (Ares 202) $44-6008 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 DocId: 32423393 assassination? Mr Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents, pssALe ty, the British agents, and many agents in France, a alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera. Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice? Mr. Angleton. He did, except that I underatood that a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this Scl nt interview recently with Shor, I called his executive officer Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff. And he said, well, I will give it to you. And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall. Senator Baker. I am sure he does. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was : infact a Soviet agent? Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way. I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too| . : { many leads that were never followed up. There's too much in- formation that has been developed later. | For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograp Vents {iy a yy 4 of a man called Alexiev, real name Shettov, KGB, with the first TOP SECRET t Page 54.
HW 54921 7 hf 0 nN o@ | ! V3 7 WARD & PAUL : i z E 410 Ferst Steet, S-E.. Wasninaion, 0.C. 20003 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican police arrested Castro as a student, they found in his note- pooks the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico. Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for Soviet citizens abroad. It is a bible,75 percent KGB staff. Photograph of Brezhnev, Castros Alexiev, Leontov. Now, we had a double agent after the assassination, who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was 4 superior of Leontov. Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on a stat visit. And he pulled an American journilist aside, and totally out of context, expressed the view that there was a con- spiracyr and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S. The thingwas totally out of context. And he planted this bug in this fellow's ear. WE had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of their personnel for six months on working on the assassina~ tion, and had concluded that an American Right wing pusiness under Johnson was to succeed in power. And I am not talking ‘About petty informants. I am talking about men whowere ascer- tained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite. And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have never been followed up. one is because of lack of’ manpower. Two, the general problem in Washington and the government TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL 410 Forst Street, $.0.. Wasmenaton. 0.¢. 20003 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 1& 19 that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the intelligence community.of a counter-intelligence nature. I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody, to whom you can go.with the information and talk to the Soviets and re\ pull the bureau and ourselves and everybody together. Senator Baker. Could you give us at your jJeisure a memor- andum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might be constituded? Mr. Angleton. It would not be a pleasant one. I have _. submitted -- and I don't think it is breaking any confidence ~~ such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted a personal letter to the Vice Prsident. And my whole plea was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and . ' beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as vice President he had a rare opportunity the first time these Le gee a EE matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's deati}, and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the - counter-intelligence forces. And this added thing of Hersh has about dealt the final but can you make an evaluattfon a d K Le clan ES ‘ Tip_particularly its counter-f. | \J ‘
HW 54971 ron00M@ 11 aas /> Prone (Area 202) 544-6008 WARD & FAUL 410 Furst Steeet, S.£., Wasnengion, O.C. 20003 Mr. Angleton. Very, very poor. ervative, I have put in there, and I think it is very that it has put us back 20 years. But I think i, ay where we ry intelligence service in the Western Wo ing together, and 5 d -the leadership and we pulled cv 6 where y have looked to us for guida and for traces and ‘9 for understanding, that we have lost rh of our prestige. 8 Two more qu questions, and I will 9 yield my turn. | 10 11 12 13 14 va es 15 |} and so on. Andéthat is inclusive ofall the American life, 16 and in partie rly visits to the Soviet Union, and so on. 17 || Thereare céiinuinications intelligence nor: sensitive which was is broken aiding and after the war, KGB connuliSgtions, New York 19 20 cr “gr of which a small percentage have been br And they relate to Hiss and many things. And most of those cases will not be subject to prosecution, becaus would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems
we this common denominator of the military and other save Snone (Ares 207) 544-6 NSenator Baker. Do you know of any ey “penetration of a Congressional. “C_ TZ PS Mr. Angleton. No. But my nop { because I ~S re you that it is théftast thingI have A been concerned wi in some months. /But I have seen these allegations in the paper, I voneny be surprised. And this is ‘the second time in my Nee, yi third time, I have ever been here. To _come here ‘and@s'ee how this whole set up is is quite a shock. 2 > < a. 4 a 3 < 3 Senator Baker. Whafjs;about Communications intercept, Congressional cnverepos are youNaware of any methodical effort by the Russighs or the KGB vis- s is Congressional tele- phone conversatiofs? me Mego tely. I think -- I ame gsuming. now that the peopid in i are correct, they usually \ that the telephone, Aste formal telephone company traffic oN ntly, without the knowledge of the caller, is quickly shift Ne microwaye That runs into hundreds of thousands of vont shone Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the 410 Fest Street, $.€£., Wasnimeton, O.C. 20003 fetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it TOP SECRET HW 549271 DBocld:32423393 Page 53
4 4 a 4 A 4 q 1 a 4 a “WW 54921 Da Prone (Area 202) 544-6008. WARD & PAUL 760001145) ys A410 Feest Steeet, S.E., Warmington, O.C. 20003 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 29 ‘ds a fingernail, arm and body affair. It takes an awfulll! beyin to know much &Y coupies it. ‘@VYephone conversations, mostly related to governmental officials, and transmitted them ¢ to the Soviet Union, a  keptédndividual files on them, would you confirm that for me? Mr. Angleton. I would State that that is absolutely in 3 . 7 my view correct. “pe SadYy that the man who technically would be Dre could respond to ay Lou Tordello, a retired fil now, I think, 11 a consultant there. Chief of NSA ff And he is ray amore ropnsatscatelgrson to relate the pro In ot words, we have to narrow the size of theg and expel that 105,
(EAT ERR HW 54971 eee men nee es Docld: 32423393 Page 60 Prone (Aras 207) 544-4008 be 6 || out any Cor N ? are living aaa qa aq FRK Act nd that statement, official stateméht7 was put out with- rselves. So, we ms of Soviets, and tim acigus ll the fallation kind of is short, it isdetente, and it “discussions and ars on the subject. We have come to detente as done to the intelligence 4 3 < cS 4 tC] « < z 14 15 services, p only a shadow of what it 16 || once was. is t any Beal internal security protec- 17 tion. 18 19 fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a And they said, we put him to bed. LOLust_Street,.5.£.,.Wasnngetan,.O.€,.2009, him. And I am still up there. TOP SECRET
10 ll 12 13 / 2 < e a ) € < z 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 410 Furst Street, $.£., Wasmingion, O.C. 2000) HW 549271 DBocld:32423393 Page 61 we worked together for tim@gof the Spanish Civil War. And we had him stakaifout 1 A Ohio under an alias, and they found out about it Rocca and myselfitand Mr. Hood, all of us at fehe same time, to successors or to organization or as EF anyening. Senator Baker. Mr. Angleton. Mnflood was an yprociate of mine from the beginning i a in the military. Ang he left for his own reasons, which e pr Mr. Schwarz. At the same ime as you? ve. it was financial. And he pronounced that he was going to les Rocca left with me simplybecause we shared common beliefs fa 4 Senator Bakers, article of December 27? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. Mr. Colby has not Gdnf ide: in me. Sehator Baker. Did he fire you? ‘He offered me a job, as he had done so And I refused, and took a certain positio TOP SECRET
Lhe tee nee eee ane taeda Pnune (tee 202) 444-6000 ALO Fant Street war. HW 54921 Doc# under the CIA, and so on. ut’ five i | | SBut he said, I have got to run, and it was abou | past civedgand I asked him if he understood in wcghee vnat | he was doing Nghe implications. | And he sais And I said, our successors? And we were about thet: J And he introduced the reaction to him universadY¥y was,\he was to be the successor : A . And he said, that Moomerning IW “ have to negotiate. And I said, what#;do you mean negotiate And he vata Ae wits talk about it next week. Le, na shook hands with him and wes out. ot, iG So, Ig TOP SECRET .
HW 54921 Prone (Area 202) “Co TR (> WARD & PAUL 410 Fuest Street. $.£.. Wasmengton, 0.C. 20003 the Presidential apparatus? “ Mr. Angleton. Never, Seffators ‘So Senator Baker. i am speaking of anyone who mig penetfated the taping capability in the Oval Office? Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that Senator Baker asked you about Oswald? . What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's pocket when he was arrested in Mexico? Mr. Angleton. There is an allegation. Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald? “r. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets. Mr. Schwarz. And was Leontov then in Mexico, Or ~~ Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent whom we believe was actually controlled by the Soviets, TOP SECRET Docld: 324273393 Page 63
Prone (Aras 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 Forst Street, SE, Wasnenaion, OC. 70003 Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any implication with Oswald. Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources the information that the KGB had spent some six months ~~ Mr. Angleton. We, only acquired the hard stuff of six months and what they did from one man who was very high in the | KGB. | Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was, when did you acquire the information? Mr. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts. Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had reached its conclusions? Mr. Angleton. Did you have any such information during the life of the Warren Commission? Mr. Angleton. I think the only thing was the Nosenko -- Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom? Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived | at a very brief time after the assassination as a KGB defector Senator Baker. And he is the one that you think now as a planted agent? Mr. Angleton. Yes. They thought he was gent on -mission. Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom? Mr. Angleton. Suppressed from the Warren Commission. TOP SECRET
HW 54971 Prone (Areas 202) 344-6000 WARD & PAUL 5.£ . Wasnenaton, O.C. 20003 410 Fost Street, Docld: 32423393 Mr. Schwarz. You aaid that Nosenko, one of the reasons you suspected Nosenko was a double agent, or a planted. agent, rather, was because he was saying things that were contra-— dictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had been giving you information before Nosenko came- to this country? Mr. Angleton. That is right. Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality person had given you? Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little more sense. In December 1961 a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected Cone SYN : to us. His name is Golitzen. He has never been in service, except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it, alleging that he had stated there was 4 plot to assassinate Nixon. He did not make such a statement. | Mr. Kirbow. Do you think this statement should be on the record? Mr. Angleton. I don't mind it being on the record after the Anderson article. They have been looking for him. Now, his is probably without any question the most major defection since World War II as far as Soviet intentions, Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned. And the reason, among others, that it was so important was TOP SECRET Page 65
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 2 > < € <€ fo] « < 3 410 Foest Street, SE. Wasnenaton, 0.C. 20003 he had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961, if the opportunity ever arrived. And therefore he used those many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB in order to acquire the kind of information which would be mos valuable to the US, and to our allies. Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried to always remain in headquarters and get himself appointed to investigative commissions and other things of this sort which would get into everybody elses's business. Among other things he spent many years in the training schools for people who came back for six weeks from different parts of the world to brag about their achievements. And he absorbed all of this information. And among other things, he stated that he gave the erytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations throughout the West. And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their people after his defection. And as is normal in a case of this kind, the big problem is to write a damage report, which means the whole service would come to a standstill. And the objective would he to review all paper files ad everything that, showed his initials. And you usually would have three categories of information: you would have information which he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did not have knowledge of, and information which you are not TOP SECRET
7 Rh Aan n@ | t At } Prane (Area 202) 344-6000 WARD & PAUL 210 Frat Ste@et, S.E.. asnnalon, 0.¢, 270003 “12 10 11 13 14° 15 16 ro) @o 21 | N Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant a Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approxi- mately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to, although that after his assassination, in a search of the quarters, the Bureay, or whoever did ‘the search, found six of my letters to NSA relating to information from Golitzen. Mr. Mr. Mr. charged, Mr. tt” . In any event, the 1969 Golitzen reports to NSA were in a plastic bag, as I recall, in the attic. And there was 4 question of whether he passed them before or after. Mr. 1 you testified earlier -~ | 1 Mr. enormous to the Western world because we immediately moved on ~ pe a HW 549371 Docld: 324233393 Page 6 Senator Baker. Did you speak of the assassination? | ceratin about. he may not have had. And it is interesting to note Syn Angleton. What did you say? Miller. Did you say Mr. Dunlop? Angleton. After his suicide. I am sorry. Miller. You used the term assassination. Angleton. I meant suicide. Miller. The word is interesting, because it is as you know, that he was assassinated. Angleton. Maybe I was thinking out loud or something J hr Schwarz. Now, what we were on was, I was asking you, | ae a) Angleton. I just wanted to say colitaln was sO TOP SECRET
65 those cases which were perishable, the French, the British, and ourselves, et.cetera. And we had never had a second Chief Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet, defector in our Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 lives, and all of this out of the blue, and no contact as in re. Geneva six months after the defection of Golitzen. Mr. Schwarz. And the date is when in relations to the Kennedy assassination? pecs JAN Mr. Angleton. Well, this was a contact, this was not a defection. He came to us once for information prior to the assassination. And then in Moscow the Soviets ~~ and I am not going into a lot of names, 4 member of the Second Chief Directorate, gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the Second WARD & PAUL 0 Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating .to how they got ch (Riank) , and others of our agents, which showed ad Ros they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got P\ blank) it through a on our side. . oP. So the leads rant into the thousands from Golitzen, and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interro- _0.c. 7000) gation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in turn would refresh his memory on other courses. And out of _ Meas nenaten that ceme the finalization of the case of Philby. Burgess, and all that, the vassily case in the British Admiralty. and some wast Sre@et, SE other cases, and many cases in France and so on. aiot Mr. Kirbow. pid Oswald show up at that time? TOP SECRET WW 54991 Docld: 32423393 Page 66
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 a > « a a ° « « 3 5.£.. Wasminaton, O.C, 20003 210 Forst Street, TOP'SECRET ye Angleton. No, not from coittsdn. when the assassination took place -- Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy assassination? Mr. Angleton. ‘When the Kennedy assassination took place, colitzpn called me immediately and stated that the modus operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet Union required that he go through processing by the 13th Department of the KGB. Mr. Schwarz. Which is their assassination department? Mr. Angleton. Which is their assassination department, which is called their Affairs for Executive Action. And there are two reasons for it. Number one was, to find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have had that would be of use to them. And number two, whether it was more valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army for future activity. Mr. Schwarz. Of the nature of assassinations? Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or intelligence, or whatever. AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military defectors. Now. when the Soviet Government turned over to the US all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating processing by Nepartment 13. Then after the assassination TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 2 > < a a i} & < z reet, S.£., Wasnenaton, O.C. 20003 210 Foeat St Nosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow. And in my view he would have never come back on the scene HE RE PANOV because they brought this Cheraponov thing {in to have the locu shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct means of counteracting and mutilating the leads and the importance of Golitzen's defection. But the tourist gave the documents to the American Embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted on giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be appropriate. Mr. Schwarz. These are not the official documents deal- ing with Oswald but the documents that ‘the man tried to pass in Switzerland? Mr. Angleton. The Second Chief Directorate, he took all of the documents out of the FBI Soviet gection and gave them to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.. So there is the assassination. Cheraponov allegedly was chased to the Turkish border and shot. And in my view this is a myth, because in 1948 Cheraponov was stationed in Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time tried to establish liaison and contact with the Birtish MI-6, at a-time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning -that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and TOP SECRET
then he reappears in the early 1960's as a member of the Second Chief Directorate. That is enough of Cherapanov. But it is important only Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 from the Soviet point of view, the best laid Plans fall apart. And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and tells us he wants to defect. Mr. Schwarz. ‘And he provided information which was inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent? Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that. So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing he tells us is that while he was in_the Second Chief . 2 > < a ry o ry < z Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went over his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally if went down to one volume and a small sheaf of papers. Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and : therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuff of this sort. And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetra- tions, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging of the Embassy, all of these different sorts -- Nosenko had 410 Foest Street, S.E.. Wasmongton, O.C, 20003 something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And TOP SECRET
54971 Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 Furst Street, 5.£., Wasmiagton, D.C. 20003 Docld: 324273393 of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet G “er in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in contact with Nosenko, which may have meant the assassination of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko wags one where logically you would bring them in and have two bodies, one from the First Chiéf Directorate, that is, Golitidn, the CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they ha to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the 2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of 1959, presided over by Shelepin and atténded by many members Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence operations has a political objective. And this is a part of the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him unwittingly chronologically through his career, he : omits all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test things, where their damage report would not show that Golitzén had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no evidence that he had sufficient knowledge. Mr. Schwarz. And so Nosenko looked funny to you, he TOP SECRET © Page
we abit alata VWettawan- piers: > Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 / > < S a ) « < 3 410 Foest Steeet, S.E., Wasninaton, O.C. 20003 oT p SECRET” looked wrong to you? Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you? Mr. Angleton. Precisely. Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided to you was that Oswald was a mental case and was a bad shot? Mr. Angdeton. Right. Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenko --~ Mr. Angleton. Golitzeén -- from Golitzén -- information that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13, which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assassina- tions, to interview miltitary defectors. And -we had observed that when the Russians transferred documents concerning ) Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such debriefing by Department 13. And another important part of it is that there was a man who was handling George Blake from London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin. But he was there under an alias as a civilian. He was the Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it. Mr. Schwarz. And -what was his connection with Oswald? Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department 13, and was head of Department 13 at a time -- I mean, he had a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of TOP SECRET
prone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD ® PAUL 310 Fervt Street, S.E.. Wasnenaton, O.C. 20003 HW 54971 Docld: 32423393 ET PSEGRET — Page Department 13 and this is 4 point I think I should make, that the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination department. The Soviets have always had an assassination department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the organization. People from the outside kno very Little about what goes on in that. People career-wise stay in there. And they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who ‘in turn report to the Politboro. And therefore it is an entirely sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action, whether it be sabotage ~~ an illegal sabotage or what, an illegal directorace which is independent of the rest of the KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders in West Germany. Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes more significant the absence of any reference to Oswald becaus you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, oF did you recount it because there is a more direct connection with Oswald? Mr. Angleton. This ig related to what I told Mr. Dulles, I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the goor on the’ life of the Commission, and instead there should be a statement that.we are not in a position -~- that on the fact available to \ us during the given period, these are our conclusions. And TOP SECRET
4 > < ry ry fe) « < 3 TEA BS 85 then to spell out in detail Department 13 and its organization -- and the burden of proof shigts. But not only the burden of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on the entire story. |) Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of Department 13. You have recounted the significance in your mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US. And you have recounted the strange nature of the information. provided by Nosenko. Mr. Angleton. Correct. Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you another line of questions about each one of these items. As to the Nosenko information, you stated that that information was suppressed from the Warren Commission? Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the right word because, : will be very honest with you, I was told the other day that the information was given classified, and it was given to Helms or somebody, or Mr. McCone, who passed it as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I haven't seen it. | Mr. Schwarz. Why did you say 4 moment ago that it was suppressed? Mr. Angleton. Because I never knew where it went. When TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 2 > < a 4 io} « < z 410 Foesa Street. $.6., Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 Lah. eres “TOP SECRET” sitting in the. position as to where that information go, I was opposed to it. And my pfficital position was And I ghought until relatively recently that it never And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of deed stuff. And Mr. Rocha, who was the point of record of the Agency's dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying. Now, his role was not one of the executive nature. Actually it was simply because he was a great scholar and a great many other things, and therefore he had the most catholic background to handle something as eomplex as the Warren Commission, not in exercising executive power, but working on behalf of the Director and all the Directorates and everything pertaining to the Warren Commission. He isa tidy individual. And in fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the Commission's business, and he is the one that ‘had done all the digging for the Commission, and so on, on a whole series of matters that I am not familiar with. But my point.to you -- and this is very difficult to explain -- is that the question of Nosenko created a very great division in the life of all counterintelligence as to bona fides, as in all questions of when you are dealing with double identification agents, there is always dispute. But let me just line up the order of battle here. Our TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202) $44-6000 WARD A PAUL .. Wasnenaran, O.C. 20003 AIO Fast Street. SE Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted the fact that the man was a provocation. Mr. Schwarz. Do you mean provocation, or providing false information? Mr. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur. I said he was false. My man said he was false. And it isn'ta parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And Golitgén, who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that because of the enormity of his defection they would send a provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads. So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko. Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is no longer there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector General went into all this -- he is today the NIO dealing in Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named \ Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the two Admirals Bagley, ‘ and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through these other people who have been dispersed. But the record will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individuals TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 / 3 < e « fo) « «< 3 210 Farat Street, $.£.. Wasnington, 0.C. 70003 4 TOP. SECRET was that Nosenko was sent on a mission. Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information? Now, is it your current understanding that what was provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration. brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you have recounted that he was providing false information? Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commission was ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of colitadn or Nosenko. Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no, it is your understanding now -- Mr. Angleton. Well, the word suppression isn't the right word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed by higher authority that the information shouldn't be -- Senator Mathias. there was a value judgment made as to the usefulness of the material? Mr. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which as to give it prominence and have it come out as an official part of the record and documents and articles, and so on. Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the information was provided? Mr. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in TOP SECRET
; ; j { t ! i ; ! i \ Prone (Area 202} 344-6000 Z 3 < ‘ 4 fo} z < z 20003 410 Forst Street, S.£., Wasnematon, O.C. Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the Commission? Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion. Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it was false information? . Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in spite of our feelings, either Helms or McCone made a presentation of it. Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings, certain experts thought that it was false? Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know. Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that information provided to the Warren Commission? Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. But all I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents, secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history, the way they falsified the official record, they had it with TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-4000 J 2 < e a o « < 3 410 First Street, $.£., Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 the. Italians in 1923, Constatinople, and cases on diplomatic issues, the complete thing was fabricated, and so on. And 1. there is no way of testing them, the security is such that they can't be tested. So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to state that he went through the 13 Department, which asked him the following questions, Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goes there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission was fooled? Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I pre Ca didn't follow the Warren Commission, Rocha followed it, and he wag running over there all the time, and so on. Mr. Kirbow. Let me ask you. There would have been no reason why anyone on the Warren Commission would have known that as a matter of everyday business that they did in fact run every defector through Department 13? Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them. But you see, Allen Dulles -- that is what I am coming to ~- I used to see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an advisor officially to him on a lot of headaches, and I dida lot of leg work for him. And I regarded him.as a very personal friend. And I am Executor of his papers, among other things. But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL Al Ferst Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C, 20003 FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and so on, so that he would be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director, that were no longer germain to his position on the matter. Mr. Schwarz. Was there a connection between the FBI and Oswald? Mr. Angleton. I don't know the full ‘FBI story. I know there was a tremendous flap in the Bureau. And one of the bes men they had in my view is a professional a man called Burt Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Burt Turner was one of the finest men on Soviet KGB activities in the US, one of the analyzts. And he was in the Washington Field Office. And it is my understanding -- and this is basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources -- that Burt Turner was handling the Oswald ore’ related matters at the time the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was some confusion that the Bureau had not turned over, or had not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the informa- tion on Oswald to the local police. I had been told that there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit, or have it be known to his children, that his negligence was responsible for the death of the President. And he was pretty forceful about his position. And as a result, this was expunged or something to that effect. And that is the reason he went to the Washington Field Office instead of staying in TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 > < ‘ < fo} £ «< z ALO Frest Street, S.E., Wasmengton, 0.C. 20003 TOP SECRET. Headquarters. toe And then he retired. And I think his retirement had something to do with this fact. But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service seizing on:facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send it to Texas. What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic. And we know enought about the Second Chief Directorate and the controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returne automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an operational directive to put him on tap, check his mail, to do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him. There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that. There would be tctal encapsulation of that individual until it was ceratin beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was not sent back as an agent. Mr. Schwarz. A moment ago in talking about the line-up, as I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the views of a number of people. And you said that one person had changed his mind or recanted. subsequently. And you made a reference in that connection to an Inspector General's TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-4000 a > «< a ‘ [e] & < 3 410 Fiest Street, $.E., Wasnengian, O.C. 20003 What was that report? Mr. Angleton. At one stage in all of this -- and it was much later, after all the dust settled -- Helms got the Inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word inspection, it is too authoritative -- to go into the Nosenko matter and see if there is anything there that he should know, because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole question of bona fides, and it bothered him, hecause I had brought him in touch with Golitzen, and he was fully aware of all my activities, and travels and so on. And so this person who was chosen began to interview everybody and reopen the whole thing. I mean, there were 21 safe leads of stuff if you really got into all of the Golitzen and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as I pointed out. to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has happened, of 27 years of experience of myself and my two colleagues, that these are the facts, that there are 20 cases Mr. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission. You mean Rockefeller? Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, Rockefeller. There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence officer in our busienss should know before he even begins to get his feet wet. TOP SECRET
HW 549271 Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 7562008, 1435; Docld: 32423393 410 Furst Steeet, S.E., Wasninaton, O.C. 20003 4 an Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing all of these things of manaement by objectives, and synergisti and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms whic we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians in.to take all the safes and figure out the linear footage of every safe drawer, all the way on through, and to computerize how long it would take the normal case officer to come up to this elemental stage of being able to be launched. That was sort of a preparatory business. And they figured it out and they said it would take 22 man years, we it would be 11 meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, man years. And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and Colby, who had never been in counterintelligence, of what all this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring people back and forth and all the rest gf it. And I nver chos Crys anybody in that job as a rule who had “éither been in the FBI or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence. And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business -- I had men who stayed with me for 1l years, Rocca was with ? me for 31 years, even though they went into operational situa- tions abroad and returned, and so on. And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany | where we used to have two or 300 new people -- TOP SECRET Page 54
eee ae me ae Q Dp ome ct Prone (Area 202) 544-60 4 3 < . < fo) « «< z 20003 410 Forst Street, S.E£.. Wasnengion, D.C, Mr. Schwarz. Was this Mr. Ermine? Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought. He was Gordon Stewart -- and he is retired -- a very able man, and a fine executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the ‘really top-notch men. ‘But he as to undertake this burden. And it was a farce in terms ~- so he would talk to people and get their views and so on. When went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division, who was tnenf and this is only hearsay, I never read the report -- the former Chief of the Soviet Division stated, when I look back it, perhaps I have given too much latitude to my subordinates. And he wouldn't say yea or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past pa energ ee that this man was an agent provocateur. Mr. Schwarz. Did the review concern in any way the handling of the matter with the Warren Commission? Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge. I mean, this may be something. I don't think I have evern seen the review -~ in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever put in the paper. But I mention it simply so that you don't get the c idea that it was just the cup state that had this view. This was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had dealings with Nosenko. And I think the greatest authority of all is Golitzén himself, who was in the KGB, and who knew TOP SECRET
Hy bs Q Prone (Area 202) 544-4 WARD & PAUL 40 Fest Sireet. $.£., Waimenaton, O.C. 20003 L) ( ) 3) | everything. And he lived there for 16 or 18 years of his life. ON Mr, Schwarz, Earlier you mentioned that you put Mr. Harvey in touch with the[ ——_auring the Cuban business. And we have hada lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, so we are moderately well aware of his activities. Mr. Angleton. I am Sorry. Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvy is and we have had a fair amount of testimony about some Of. the things he had done. what was the connection between him and the[ ___ [during the Cuban business? Mr. Angleton. I will put it very briefly -- Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically? Mr. Schwarz. The witness used the expression Cuban business. ‘y guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the ‘. Shad - Cuban business, and second, was is the connection between Mr. Harvey and the on this matter? Mr. Kirbow. You are. really asking, what is the importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to Cuba? Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the Clandestine Services activity into Cuba. Now, what struck me, not having had any part of the Bay of Pigs, because of differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being TOP SECRET
cn ence eee AAO cae aman ee a ot Prone (Area 202) 544-601 4 P] «< Ly ‘ o e «< z 410 Fost Street, $.E.. Wasnington, O.C. 2000) | Mr. Kirbow. Helms knew because he was “ga Planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and it was foredoomed. Mr. Schwarz. Through the exile community in Miami? OMe. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything, and.so ony there was no cover or second investigation or anything. | So wtien Bi11 took over in the Cuban business, then I decided that since we were very close friends that I would try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown to everybody. And I went to mel | And I had them assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he was ~- and the communications were from him in a one time pattern, I mean total security, from Havana tf] to me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence or his identify, except Harvey and myself, and of course, Dick Helms. Mr. Schwarz. McCone? Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether -- yes, McCone would have know, but he wouldn't have been interested. What I am trying to say is, he knew. ‘ TOP SECRET
ry N a Q Mr. Angleton. He Knew, because even before I went into this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and one {Area 202) 544-6( “so on. “And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point is, I get the radio tol ana to Havana and then put it someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and such a place and find the radio, and then have some men come in and call some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust the whole setup. So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly. \is individual established his cover. They only had two or WARD &@ PAUL three people in the Embassy there. He would go to a Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go. 6 would spot one of the waiters or a headwater who was [prs it wouldn't be long before he would say, you are from tref and pretty soon one thing led to another, and his production was without question the greatest production’ there was. Well, it got so complex in names and geography, and so on that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey together secretly with this individual, the only person I put in touch was anf __in this context. So later on the Soviets come out with the statement, is Bill Harvey on the era a nn i a ne 410 First Street, $.£., Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 TOP SECRET HW 549271 DBocld:324273393 Page 66
with. It looks big today to you, but when you think of what the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Miami base with all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 rest, a little thing involving one man was not a thing that you went up and made a fuss to Mr. McCone about. Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Mr. Harvey pretty well, was he someone you knew? Mr. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just him the other day, his mother died. Mr. Schwarz. I heard that. Did you know anything about his usé of underworld figures in connection with Mr. Angleton. I know the allegations. WARGO & PAUL Mr. Schwarz. At the time did you know of that? Mr. Angleton. I only know one incident. Mr. Schwarz. Okay. Mr. Angleton. Simply the Bureau, the FBI, rana surveillance. And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer of the FBI, who is now Head of the Criminal Commission in rift / Mexico, was at my house around 10 o'clock at night. And the Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich at my house. They were absolutely boiling, because they had | ; surveiled the Mafia all the way from California to National Airport, and he had got off the plane and was met by a man who 410 Forst Street, $.E.. Waanington, O.C. 20003 was the physical description of Bill to a tee} And they TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 a P] « ry 4 o € < z ALO Furst Street, $.€., Wasmington, O.C. 2000) thought it was Bill. And they were checking with Papich. what to do. Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it? Mr. Angleton. I think it was. Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill Harvey? Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey. So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them. And I told him -- I made a motion to put his hand over the phone and not to let them discuss it. And I said, tell them not to do anything until they hear from you. And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on this and I will be back in touch. And then Bill told me the whole story in detail of how he had gone over from California and followed him in this thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off. Mr. Schwarz. That was in 1973 shortly before Mr. Harvey went to Rome? Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, it was, I think quite a long time before. So then I told Sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on this -- because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection with the Mafia and all that, but I aid know him well enough to know that he was not a frivolous man, and that this thing happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public opinion, were not very much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 2 P) < ‘ ‘ [°] t < 3 410 Fest Street, $.£., Wasinengton, O.C, 20003 the FBI. So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill around? And she said, no, he is out to dinner-tonight. And I said, look, we have some very serious trouble. Would you please tell me where I can locate him. And she said, he is at Duke Zeibert's. And I called Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him. “And I turned the phone over to Papich, because I did not want to be on the record showing that this was Angleton, et cetera. And Papich talked to Bill, and actually I didn't hear the discussion. It was something about, I will see you tomorrow. And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over. And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what Anderson and everybody else has stated. Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had in Havana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down there, or try to get any help out of him in that regard? Mr. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat. Mr. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire contact with ee “JFK Act 6 (1) (A) Mr. Angleton. Yes sir. JEK Act © (1) (B) FK Act 6 (3) TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $444 (7 2 > « a 4 io} 3 < $ O.c. 2000) 410 Feest Steeet, S.E., Wasmenuton, Senator Tower. We will take a recess for minutes while we go.up and vote. (A short recess was taken) Mr. Schwarz. Schwarz. I don't have anything more. ator Tower. You have read this, and Szulc hoe in this gall Penthouse: fniiclear enterprise 1956 Suez war, the E nhower AdminiStration resolved to en ae i provide Israel with all egy in developing an atomic weapon. The Israelis had‘ héoretical knowledge, but. they . . ‘4 ‘needed technological rN their Dimona nuclear research Os 8 center in the Negev Desert) jence sources, the CIA was the Israelis." a Tower. "“--Angleton directed the eff er. Angleton. False. Senator Tower. That it totally false? Mr. Angleton. That is totally false. TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202} 344-6 ©! Z > < “ 4 ° « « z 410 Forst Street. 5.0.. Wastunatan, 0.C, 20003 Sena Yer . And this meanéysent by the CIA, as If ‘ f Qs, Me Mr. Angleton y British-born physicist, now an ites to the CIA." 2 AN The allegation is false. a “Persons ,cVose to Angleton have aw this account in recent a Reflecting Ang leton “g:town position, howeve they havef;denied assertions from other sou as : : : team made fissinoable material -- plutonimum 2 the 1S%aelies from United States stocks." sittdtement right or wrong? of A Mr. Angleton. I am saying, when he says deny it f Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that TOP SECRET ’
cca Rental en mene at ae Prone (Area 202) 2 | 3 <4 LS a fe) c «< 3 O Forst Street. 6.0... Wasminaton, 0.c.? “33 second paragraph, is where all the questions are raised. Really, the CIA would be hard put to eransterSi fissionable materials without the knowledge otgpne Atomic oS Energy Commission, would it not? ; a Mr. Angleton. Sir, I can assure yousthat the CIA ~~ I ' ally know what the word fissionable means anymore . VA There is SO, much use of the atomic ,@nergy. We have atomic battery —7 4Jon't categorically ~~ in my whole ed fissionable material ‘Or, speculations regarding leakages issionable,. materials independently} fixngleton. No. fAator Tower. And therefor “materials except through the knowledge oO Mr. Angleton. That is right -- I hate to nity : Vv, want to simply state that there was a problem in thepagency once where you have, Sayr somebody simply approach you AN state, I have access to fissionable materials, and there foy if it is a covert thing, and it raises a big policy question TOP SECRET
Prone (Aris 202) 544-66 d 3 < ‘ a Q « < z 410 Forst Steeet. S.£.. Wasnmaton, O.C. 2000) be if -. the diplomatic pouch, and thergfpte thousands of Bh ARES questions. ‘And it did happen in the Far Ease. aN ‘ \false case, confidential case. bp %, & lleges that either Dr. Mann being present or somethindé:s oo And it was a But it sad happen. There was an offer to sell Se atomic fissionable’material or something. Ar ie) But my point is, mee never been initiative to my 3 d *: knowledge, or an intere wanting. any fissionable ma teed! Senator Tower. Mr. Aaron. effect Mr. Angleto Mc. Mann's name, FA Of my mind --.after I I toldgyou -- and maybe I didn' “ae fs, at that fs what bothers me -- 7 In ant that should I surface &. s ‘en But in left you -- waggwhat I think es t tell you, a told Colby, ahs sei) have an open espionage case in which a report 7 someone tried to cut his throat in Philby's house in TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-660 by 2 > < ‘ a fe} € < z 410 Forst Street, $.€., Wasmington, O.C. 20003 we had the report or not I don't know. So I ama littKe Fonfused as to that statement. Because I don't think#the Bi fed, for phrases, British, Fre they would haveg ann and Philby, et cetera. Mr. Aaron. Let me@guus t reldd one other segment of his testimony: transfer of atomic techno¥ogyem of Angleton said that he wis ratheketaken back by this informatio fe ea said that in effect#ne could conf ata it with corrections: es one, the ey wrong, that it but indeed the’slate 'S0's after the Sue #war, and number two, xs that as farfas’ he was concerned there was overs by the se “4/ to his knowledge any fissionatje material such E of = fESnium or other material." Angleton. I don't follow that at all. Ye Aaron. Did you make those two corrections) Angleton. I don't understand what you aré Sayi Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 3 < a ‘ o « < z 41Q Forest Street, $.£., Wasnington, O.C. 2000) Senator Tower. He is reading -- actually what he; that you did not agree with his story, that you nd you read it. Mr. story. Mr. Angleton#//This is fal + on page 40, from line 8, "Mr. Angleton £614 me that essenti - this information was & correct," that is absolutely false. nat I could confirm f .o SA - lyneés 19 and 20, “Angleton said he wags greally taken back And bhover made any such statement fa es thes < . in’effect he could confirm the two corrections." That is Aaron. I think that covers it. Angleton. And this is false:
*, Cc ou Cc nm Prone (Ares 202) 544-60C 4 2 < ry rT ° « < 3 S.E.. Wasninaion, D.C. 20003 410 Forst Street, Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question. Mr. Angleton, When I say technical assistance, tt x Angleton. He knew what .I was staging was this. ‘stuff s. a yy that has came out in volumes of Sadat'sgresume of CIA's help to the Israelis, which was accurate. a Senator Tower. By technical £G5i stance here, as I understand it, nears technicaty assistance and nuclear weapons development. Mr. Angleton. on his part a misstatementhot the fact. And that is what I am trying to say. Senator Tower . ite did admi “y terms of intelligence? ey if i Mr. Angleto By fs, : “the whole field of a No, it wasn't a men of my admitting, I told him that it was well-known that ink ELINT andgmany things, that we have worked yeneres Tower. But not specifically, assifstance and nuclear weapon deve lopment? of this story could be alleged operations by the TOP SECRET
i 4 3 4 : 3 } 4 WARD &® PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 with some people, t i f bed at 3 in the morning. the subject, ne woutdn efor aot home before -- that is the first thing. ed Ags “And he said this Israeli ) fellow said something about, ok I don't discuss, or words to that effect, can't remembér that part of it. that doesn't exclude — Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instanees TOP SECRET
HW 54921 Prone (Area 202) 544-606 ct S ~ © 760900M%;, 15455 410 Fust Street. S.£., Wasnenaton, O.C. 2000) ‘Docld: 32423393 Page 100 vIn your Qt ever come to your attéhntion -- did you \ #4 secrets? Mr. Angleton. I have to respondxto that? Mr. Kir Would you like to go off ‘h@yrecord a Be at] 4 moment, Chairman. a -eSenator Tower. We can go off the record. Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that perhaps we defer that subject for the moment. I am sure we will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again. Senator Tower. Then, too, we can. get the FBI matter in the meantime. I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate it if Mr. Angleton would give us his evaluations as an expert on. And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy assassination. As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassi- nation colitzgn on his own initiative communicated with you and advised you that it was normal practice for a defector who had a military background to be processed in Department 13? TOP SECRET ¥
Prone (Aras 202) $44-4000 o J > « a < Qo e «< z AYO Forest Street. $.£., Wasninatan, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Angleton, Interrogated, Or processed: Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through this process, and that therefore at least that he might have been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that right? | Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying to say. His English is such that it ig very difficult. Senator Mathias. I understand. But then some years later -- my recollection is that you said it was in 1967 or 1969 -- you learned that the KGB had spent six month of employment of their top operators in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind negate the implication of the. original colitzdn call or that they were involved? Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that man is a man who is also a suspect of Nosenko. Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967? Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are treading on, Golitzen gave us informatian regarding the penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work. And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we TOP SECRET
Prone (Aras 202) 544-6000 -. 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 769700@;,;555 1E hi 19 410 Frest Street, S.E., wasnenqion, B.C. 20003 wo] advise that you send it to the Army. And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X" was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept that. And in 1967 a Soviet -- on whom we had a dossier on thi thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore we knew who he was, and all the rest of it -- with an unknown coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man, we had years of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he THT alleged -- and he was 4- TDC, temporary duty in Washington here -- and he established contact with the first Mrs. Helms. - And eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefectio or the return to the Soviet Union of a many and that man was the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent. And he went into the whole background, that this man was one of the highest grade illegals that they.had ever had, and he was in our Agency. So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because he was one of the two interrogating officers. And I can't talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt. So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know about George Blake? TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 4 3 < a « ) e < z 410 Ferst Street, $.€., Wasninaton, O.C. 20003 And then his response was, he Says, we thi he is dead. ee ‘Now, hwere is a man who is 8upposed to be Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of Nosenko's father. And Golitzen had told us that men chosen for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their father and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union. So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is dead. Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the Non exfiltartion plans of George Blake, which would have been -) ‘ simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TOC. So we handled him for six or seven weeks. And some of the most telling parts of the interrogation was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have / access to archives. And what was on our mind, and what Cryptonym that we wanted him to work up -- and this would TOP SECRET
>? ‘ Cc “a @. oo) CG Cc c ~™ seas! Prone (Ares 202) 5 Z > « a 4 o « < 2 110 Fort Street, $.€.. Waininaton, O.C, 20003 relate to the third part of the damage part on Golitzen -~ what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew? What agents in the West could be under our control as a result of Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things? And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of almost getting from our man those four or five. crytonyms, which would have told them what they wanted to know, because there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn't know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on. So he Wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was Sort of medium low level stuff, you couldn't call it chicken feed -- but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity, because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American Department of. the KGB. And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he state there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to acquire all the information Possible on the whereabouts of Golitzen and Nosenko. And I was actually in Wisconsin. And I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any proposal put up by that individual that. would expose -- and I use the crytonym name of Golitzen -- don't. A week later is when he got to Moscow and he sent a cable to tell us that he can give them word on everything on TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 z P] < ‘ a fo] e < z 410 First Street, S.€.. Wasnmaton, B.C, 20003 Golitzen. Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus Paper and with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a Part of the thing to confirm Nosenko'g bona fides, and the build-up. And he is the one who gave the full description of the fact that for six months the Place was immobilized for thi investigation, of all the high level all over the works, is the way he put it. Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russian treat a returned defector, ahd the way we treat them. And in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every interrogated when he teturned from Russia? | Mr. Angleton. I don't know -- I Probably would know, but I don't know whether the military -- normally that would fall within the jurisdiciton of the military, since he was a military man who defected. So I don't know' the :answer to that Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba? Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that. Senator Mathias. Or at any time? Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him. Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA? Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no. Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did? Mr. Angleton. That is. just my sensation that they did. Senator Mathias. We will follow that up. TOP SECRET
Prone {Aras 202) 544-6000 ° 2 > < ‘ a o « < z 410 Ferst Street, S.E.. Watmington, O.C. 20003 This is the very last question. You referred to files that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to pursue that in a personal way. About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of record? + Ne Embassy, then my answer would. be yes. tor Mathias. My recollection is, he came w; Ss a oViet came here he was never, man was suspe@t# or there is a reason. sena4i ower. Excuse me. You are talkin : ; Vsovierhaon visiting members here on the Hill?
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 . Z > «< e 4 fe) « < z 410 First Street, $.E,, Wainrngton, O.C. 20003 At this point my question is on purely ae I plan to go next week with the Senate uy which is Senator Matha. Is that the kid of thing that -- Mr. Angleton. a are not ae a very ideal world in the Agency. We oe Oy Mass the hard material. Senator Mathias. iirc ss a hypothetical question, let me make it even -more hYBSthetical. Let's say our mission, : tae # Sh . instead of visiting Moscow, visits Rome or Paris or someplace, ay an where it is very easy 4 Abr you tO@soperate. And there were a . , . . meetings with Rus signs who were known to have visitied me in fe po Washington. Wou that be the kind SE, thing which would get to a Congress ira file? ay : eS Mr. Anggeton No. I imagine the Birftish MI-5, though, because of#the Russians in London, would Pass through liaison to us, a was something suspicious, woh pass through a regi on the meeting. And we have examplesWwhere Czech a told us about a member of Parliament, SOuiet agent, vi what the cryptonum was, and how he was recruited %& Wave got
Prone (Area 202) $444000 fact -~ Ayers name on it, it would Sere Soviets, and ate; you would be buried in the file, which#would probably be that S&S PZ thick, of that soviet activity of US. And there would be the fact that he was Here, and that he went to New York, and “he did this or that. Senator Mathias. ena wouldn't show up in Mathias’ file, that would show up AR an Arbatov file? Mr. Angleton. PF > «< . « fe] € < z supposed to be. file. But tha wouldn't be at the initiativs would be General ,fan 0.C. 20003 the Congress who would be contacted and notified, .e on. And i think Mr. Hoover's practice was that he would ay is what they say 310 Forest Sureet, S.E.. Watnenqton, And I think this is the way he handled it -- he would simply TOP SECRET
fae eee ren te Prone {Area 202} $44-4000 J > < a « ) ® < 3 410 Ferst Steeet, S.E., Wasnengton, 0.C. 20003 notified, et cetera. He called me once when thesé/wasn't gh time factor for him to send a letter té fhe. He said, rmal part goes on regardless, , a if a person, regardl of ho he is, is involved, or is passed a document, or come’s.up in a telephone tap, or any number of things, thei £s record on it. +e. Senator Mathiasiy In other words, you are saying what a political friend of mine once s , that you don't get news i. unless you makefgynews? Mr. Angleton. That is one way Gf£Slooking at it. Senator Mathias. That is all, Mr .SChairman. Musy Angleton. I want to commend you again on that n, because that fixes several things. * thing I regret abaut leaving the Agency, fiinresolved cases. And that is one of the biggest, Betause we ¥ know so much about that person when he was in India. was the most sophisticated, cultivated, high level intel person. TOP SECRET
ae ke (an) Cc Cc x ~ J > < « e 0 € < z 430 Forst Street, S.€., Warnnaton, 0.C. 20003 Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to aS to rehabilitate the Agency in particular in counterintel1i- gence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating, Raynat things in particular would you do? Angleton. My feeling is that the ye has to go : g/ let all the Nbreical repercussions V4 place, and if you go to purgatory, my View is, the bigger the fires, the better. Ae So my view is, let ae come out. And let people take the oy consequences. I am notya believer that an agency can have ie two fathers. And I don' iNielieve in inferiors reporting on their superiors by dire Civ&% And I don't believe that the Agency below the Director has to, be responsive to two authorities. ao, you know about Chile, mypview is that on Chile would oe ask the White whey can come back with Colby after tne Exeeutive part ha tector to respond to a question on Chile, gives hi is always in that dual position. And something doesn't to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, evelayto TOP SECRET