hird (ev They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of "audibility" and "visibility" apply directly in conside ring the handling and use of this dynamic refugee potential. As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the ‘understanding that any real political program must be developed by the Cubans themselves. Psychological. Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U. S. government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly; USIA disseminates any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service) fand.generates "gray" or non-official information (5 million cartoon books and thousands of Spanish books on Cuba disseminated in Latin Ame rica); CIA passes information appropriate for "gray" and covert psychological channels (radio, mailings to Cuba, and dissemination inside Cuba) -| . eed Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the. Cuban people, but short- wave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S. competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference of U.S. commercial brpadcasts over a fet ly wide area of the U.S. Ciandeatine broadcaetaf fim a eshmastigf eppearing as broadcasts by _ Cuban guerrillas insidé"Cuba) have been ‘iffitiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and get passed among Cubans b ord-of-mouth. ‘Dissemination of leaflets and propaganda. inside Cubd fy balloon orfaircraft}has not received policy approval. ont Economic, State has the main responsibility for developing economic actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated HW 54714 Docld: 32424899 Page 2°
I HW 542714 r3 (cor They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of "audibility" and "visibility'' apply directly in considering the handling and use of this dynamic refugee potential. As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the understanding that any real political program must be developed by the Cubans themselves. Psychological. Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U. S. government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly; USIA disseminates any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service) fan fand. generates "gray" or non-official information (5 million cartoon books “and thousands of Spanish books on Cuba disseminated in Latin America); CIA passes information appropriate for "gray" and covert psychological channels (radio, mailings to Cuba, and dissemination inside Cuba). | tae Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the Cuban people, but short- wave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S. competition in medium-yave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference Clandestine broadcasts me appearing as broadcasts by Cuban guerrillas insidegieiiba i 5 fitiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and get passed among Cubans b ord-of-mouth. Dissemination of leaflets and propaganda. inside Cubd fy balloon orfaircraft}has not received policy approval. ‘cok Economic, State has the main responsibility for developing economic actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated © FOP SECRET Docld:32474699 Page 3