o . na + e . ' : . “ . , oe . .. ” te - ee ee 1 ‘; . a noe . a” '. wt? t 4 . . v . . . . 2 . . . . ° ‘ . olor tg . ata Me . - eon sa? * an . . : . oT ye so i a e oo . aE . . . Pe a a YO @eele fs . . : => 7 oe ¢ *, rs Because these elements threaten and commit crimes in furtherance of their stated goal of overthrowing the United States Government, investigation of them has often proceeded on a "national security" basis; and because there is no practical, immediate prospect of their accomplishing this goal, the "national security" foundation for investigation of them has, in many quarters, not been taken seriously, and is often suspect because of the latitude that has been allowed in "national security" investigations as opposed to simple criminal investigations. The difficulty is that these domestic "internal security cases lie somewhere between what is generally accepted as "nations. security" matters and plain, simple criminal violations. If one interprets national security to mean only matters which threaten the stability of the Government, either from within or without, then these cases are not national security matters; yet, they pose a threat to the safety and tranquility of the community 3 ~ ‘beyond individual incidents of crime, or even random sprees of criminal acts by an individual or group.’ These cases also have some effect on national and international attitudes towards U.S. standards, morale, government, law enforcement, and the elements involved, e.g., "Why can't law enforcement protect society, and itself, against attacks"; or "These people are victims of a repressive system and attack is their only effective avenue of protest for change.” . Consequently, law enforcement is confronted with a situation wherein it is threatened with criminal acts in further- ance of a claimed political goal, the mere condition of being so threatened often having an impact beyond a completed routine criminal act (although many of these threats are eventually carried out); yet, this condition is generally insufficient to show probable cause to justify a warrant for an electronic surveillance. ; Assuming that there is valuable intelligence to be . obtained from electronic surveillance in these matters t6 be used in attempting to thwart these crimes, how can we fill the void created by Keith? Title IIT has very limited value in this area. Its stated purpose is to gather evidence of crimes that we have probable cause to believe are being, or are about to -be, committe. It 1s doubtful whether the threats of these elements, or even evidence of past attacks, would be sufficient probable cause to Support a continuing electronic surveillance with no specific crims -~ 15 - — HW 55064 Docld:329899541 Page 34
on FIO GA Docld: 32989541 Page 35 on its effect, and how we could proceed, within the Keith - | in immediate view. Title III could perhaps be used in sonié of the cases where the investigation has developed to a point where we Go have probable cause for a specific crime, but the probable cause would be momentary and would expire after the act or probability ‘of the act. Title IIIT also has limited value for continuing intelligence purposes because of its applicability only to specified crimes; the short time period (30 days per request) ; the requirement that the target eventually be given notice and the results of the electronic surveillance (this can be postdoned but not indefinitely); and the number of people who could become involved with and thus aware of a recurring monthly application to a court. After the Keith decision, there was extensive debate within the FBI and between the FBI and,the Department of Justice restriction, in cases where we felt there was a clear "internal security" (which went undefined) threat where electronic surveil- lance would be valuable. It was accepted that Title III would be of minimal value because of the problems noted above. Within the FBI it was also argued, and finally accepted, that FRCrP 41, might be utilized to obtain a routine search warrant to install an electronic surveillance where Title III was inapplicable. Assistant Attorney General Olson and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney disagreed, feeling that Title III was intended to preempt all other methods of securing electronic surveillances, “besides Presidentially approved surveillances. The argument is largely theoretical. FRCrP 41, like Title III, requires a showing of probable cause, so it like- wise is available only when specified criminal acts are believed to be going on or are imminent. FRCrP 41 warrants must also be executed forthwith, and notice must be given to the target and he must be served with an inventory of the items seized. Given a case which falls within both Title III and FRCrP 41, Title III procedures are preferable because they are less restrictive and - more clear cut since they deal exclusively with electronic surveillances. . Title III is fairly broad in specifying the crimes for which electronic surveillances can be authorized under its sections. It is difficult to think of a threat to the internal security so Significant that acts in furtherance of the threat would not involve criminal violations specified in Title III. Of course, the FBI would be limited to basing its requests for electronic surveillances on Federal crimes enumerated in Title III, and the weeps ~'16 - ee eee eee a. eo
. > . ean x “ = < po va ny 3 .¢ . . au - wf “he . - . es ze at ‘ - 2 “oe . . . . ‘ ° ‘ ° . roe ’ 4 . " ° . fes® + . . at . te ws > . . woe . " et oe . ".* e cn . .* Lo " to, ' yo threatened destructive acts might involve solely local offenses, e.g., murders of policemen. Title IIT provides for local authorities to use electronic surveillances in such cases. ~ Even assuming that there was a case falling outside of Title III, but within FRCrP 41, the FBI is still limited to using ‘search warrants obtained thereunder to seize evidence of Federal crimes; if the threatened act is a local violation only FRCrP 41 is of no value to the FBI. Without a showing of probable cause of an ongoing or imminent crime, it is doubtful if either Title III or’FRCrP 41 could be used to secure an electronic surveillance. It is beli an ongoing intelligence-gathering electronic surveillance based on indications but not probable cause, that the target might engage in purely domestic criminal activity, for the purpose of _ thwarting that activity, no matter how potentially destructive, will require enabling legislation. Mr. Maroney in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure stated that the Department of Justice was not requesting such legislation at that time, but that if it became evident that a void clearly detrimental to United States security interests had been created by Keith, the Department of Justice will seek new: legislation. . (D Chance for passage of such legislation at this time is probably nil. . . . -~ 17 - _ AW 55064) Docld:32969541 Page 36
> ~ Pon . wh. 7 pppENprx VALUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES A. Foreign Electronic surveillances provide positive intelligence regarding the positions and activities of foreign nations, and ' thus are of value to United States Government policymakers and - «+  . @iplomats, and also provide information of assistance in our OS ‘ counterintelligence efforts against foreign intelligence services operating against the United States. cae : NRK Act 6 (1) (Cc) i. Positive Intelligence \ Examples of positive intelligence obtained via ‘ electronic surveillances, not directly related to our counter intelligence responsibility, are as follows: ~ At 7: 40 p.m. on August 207° ‘1968, the New_York oftice seusité to inform that our wiretap on FoR EM cence ___ _ |Jwas intercepting an inordinate WigarieM “amount of traffic, approximately 40 intercepts in the preceding 30 minutes. foo ‘were calling representatives of many — of the delegations to the United Nations stating they had a message which they desired to deliver urgently, and would meet the representatives anywhere, even on a street corner. The Headquarters duty supervisor thought this activity might relate to a recently completed full plenum of the Supreme Soviet on the Czechoslovakian question, reported on the UPI ticker. He relayed this information to Mr. Hoover, the White House Situation Room, and the State Department. . Classified by E. S. Miller ° so, ; - Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3 Date of Declassification Indefinite ’ SECRES : NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION ~je. Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctiong eH cel OR Getcha hls ep AE Birth rerensecr epee sane eneaanl
J". "" 2, NO FOREIGN @, semmarionr0 Dessay ABROAD mts pene | £8 oy rent TE Aot 6 (1) (Ch. Later in the evening State. Department A coxned us that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had visited the/President that evening, left, and State npting to locate him. Via our wiretap on “we were able to inform State that Dobrynin was with the Romanian Ambassador at that time.. The first indicator the CIA received of abnormal activity regarding the Czechoslovakian question was a telephone call from the White House Situation Room at 9:30 p.m., August 20, 1968. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred August 20, 1968. . There was a great deal of intercept activity during the days following the invasion, which reflected on various governments' positions and reactions. This raw material was j 7 relayed as fast as it came in to the State Department and the White House Situation Room. This example indicates the potential value of such intercepts in extreme national security emergencies directly affecting the United States, e.g., by indicating withdrawal of official and diplomatic personnel from the United States, - movement of foreign nationals to certain areas of the country, or hostile intentions against the United States. Such infor- mation is a priority requirement of the United States Intelligence ' Board. psi TE geo & ul : tin the United States provided = eT earions y many indicators as-to the intercepted parties' relative positions ‘. - and sympathies, and consequently. assisted State Department | and the White House in its. dealings with these nations on that issue. 7 Pg Via an electronic ‘surveillance we obtained information - concerning the location of Soviet. Ships. removing missiles from Cuba in 1962. . Py NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD | ~ ii ~ JFK Act 6 (1) (C)
mos NO ponsxciG@ ssenanarron/xo Drs DISSEMIN; ‘ 2. Counterintelligence Electronic surveillances assist our counterintelligencs efforts by providing personality data and information regarding the contacts and activities of known and Suspected foreign intelligerice officers. This information assists in planning counterintelligence activity, assessing. ‘defection potential, analyzing routines and patterns, conserving manpower, and in directing sources against these officers. .? SES (Tv LoREtGN INTELL cEw wee INFORMATION j ; There are currentis | ‘known and Isuspected Soviet intelligence officers, and L_|known and [_] suspected Soviet- :bloc intelligence officers in the United States. Examples of information obtained via electronic surveillance of value to our counterintelligence responsibility | | . are as follows: | An individual was detected -in contact with a hostile -intelligence service in September, 1972. He expressed a desire. to defect and to offer information regarding United States naval intelligence to which he had access. Although the interception did not give us his name, it provided sufficient information to conduct an investigation which established his identity, con- firmed that he had been engaged in very sensitive naval communications intelligence, and disclosed that he was a fugitive. wanted on local charges. He was arrested on November 23, 1972. In one case, electronic surveillance furnished infor- mation, within four days of its installation, of a contact between an official of the Soviet Illegal Support Branch and ah individual who appears to be a Soviet illegal agent. \ Electronic surveillance furnished information con- a cerning an attempt in 1969 by a United States serviceman to ” defect to the Soviets. An example of the value of electronic surveillance coverage in foreign terrorist matters involved an Al Fatah leader formerly in the United States. In the Summer of 1972 he departed this country for a visit to.the Middle East.. He later applied for a reentry permit which was denied. In late November, 1972, a telephone surveillance disclosed a contact by an individual suspected to be the Al Fatah leader. An a ° SRERET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD ~ iii - 054 Docld: 32969541 Page 39 satthtadidielatiahattish-talatetietn, ithtahitichlindhin ate 1s abndnetnd- i, Uninedmnindt tahetnoaat xin naman nia aeons eaten ackaanatedn: conamnemtneneees
Tea . ABROAD = . * . « Mi es “oy : ° 7 . qe eet investigation was initiated and a second electronic surveillance revealed the Al Fatah leader had reentered the United States using a variation of his family name. This information enabled his arrest by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. B. Domestic The- primary value derived from intelligence gathering, as opposed to evidentiary, electronic surveillances in this area is in obtaining plans for carrying out threatened criminal acts, evidence of foreign influence or financing, and information which assists in planning apprehensions of wanted individuals with less risk to the lives of officers and bystanders. . Examples: Via electronic surveillance of the Black Panther Party, Cleaver Faction, in New York City; Huey P. Newton in Oakland, California; and the Los Angeles Black Panther Party, the following information was obtained. bo On November 6, 1971, plans to kill New York Police Commissioner Murphy were discussed. On September 14, 1971, use of police radios to monitor - New York City Police Department activity was discussed. . On April 26, 1971, electronic surveillance identified Robert Vickers as the assailant: of a New York City police officer ‘killed April 19, 1971. (Although this information was also ‘evidentiary, it identified Vickers as a triggerman for the group who could be used in the future.) \ — On December 28, 1970, electronic surveillance reported that Newton received $1,400 from a Swedish group. fr" On September 20, 1971, electronic surveillance reported a communication between Newton and the President of Tanzania. On September 28, 1971, electronic surveillance reported Newton's travel plans to China, and on October 19, 1971, it reported details of his visit. . -SECGREP Z NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD | AW 55084 DocId: 32989541 Page 40
; - ‘ oe ee ) SHERET GD. . Tk NO Ponszcg senissanionne a ABROAD L . 4 ' ' . . m% oe » a Yas During July, 1971, a conversation was intercepted, and when pieced: together with previously monitored conversations and other background, enabled us to apprehend, without injury or incident, two Black Panther Party members wanted for the murder of a policeman. . Physical surveillance of a meeting to plan the murder of Black Panther Party rivals, the meeting site having been learned of via electronic surveillance, resulted in the . apprehension of two fugitives. The apprehension caused a gun battle, however, the electronic surveillance information allowed for advance planning which cut the risk to arresting officers and bystanders. Electronic surveillance of the Students for a Democratic . Society Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois, provided information on plans for the "Days of Rage" violent demonstrations in Chicaco . @Quring October, 1969. This advance information, relayed to - Chicago police, enabled them to anticipate, to some degree, Gestructive activity, and to concentrate their force where need=i. NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD -~-yve- . acs .
- es rae September 14, 1973 - 3p... . ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 1, | | The Problem: Use of electronic surveillance falls into three broad areas: criminal, domestic national security, and foreign national security. Little policy consideration need be given to use in criminal cases. Such use is prescribed and proscribed in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, has been upheld by the courts, and has been used to great advantage under the current procedures and policy. In short, there is no policy problem in this area. "Electronic surveillance in both domestic and foreign national security cases is primarily used for intelligence purposes, not evidentiary purposes; however, it often produces information of evidentiary value. to The only Congressionally approved electronic surveillance is for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence of stated crimes (Title III). Foreign national security electronic surveillances produce a good deal of positive intelligence value to U.S. foreign policymakers, a good deal of information necessary for counterintelligence activity, and, _ rarely, information of evidentiary value. Domestic national security electronic surveillances produce ‘information valuable to law enforcement in thwarting murders, serious injury to persons, and extensive damage to property, and also, rarely, information of evidentiary value. Electronic surveillance in domestie national security cases which was previously approved by the Attorney General for the President utilizing his Constitutional powers has been prohibited by the Supreme Court in the Keith case, i.e., held illegal without prior judicial approval. > i | your v6 semi- This document is ‘prepared m response to ‘your request and is nit for gine om aM nation outside your Committee. Its use %3 limited i 0 Sotho reso your Committee and: thé content. mag .not be pees Ou nel without the express approval of the FBI- HW 55064 Docld:329899541 Page 42
Prat on thee a ec 5% : ce The issue of the legality of warrantless, Presidentially approved electronic surveillance in foreign national security cases has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court; this issue is now pending in two Cireuit Courts of Appeals. me . 2 Re ee . Thus the specific problems with regard to domestic national security electronic surveillance are that it produces information of value F not obtainable by other means; it has been prohibited without prior . oy judicial approval; there is no mechanism to obtain prior judicial approval. _Consequently, we conduct no domestic national security electronic surveil- : * lances. . . . . ; aaa i ” , yr . The specific problems with regard to foreign national security electronic surveillance are that: it produces information of value not _obtainable by other means; the legality of the President to authorize its use without prior judicial review is being challenged; if it is held illegal there probably will also be no mechanism to obtain prior judicial review; current court procedure requires in camera disclosure of the existence - ‘of national security electronic surveillance in criminal trials and if found illegal, disclosure of the content of the intercepts to the defense, which for overriding security and foreign policy reasons can usually not be made. °°. Present Policy Domestic National Security Cases: We do not conduct electronic surveillance in these cases. * Py Foreign National Security Cases: a Pending Supreme Court consideration of the "legality" of ‘electronic surveillance in these cases, they continue to be approved by * the Attorney General, and utilized without warrant. 3. The Issues ° The main issue in both domestic and foreign national security electronic surveillance cases is the right and need of the Government to obtain intelligence information in cases involving (1) U.S. foreign policy considerations; (2) threats to our security as a nation from without; and (3) threats to the tranquility and safety of U.S. society from within, versus 4th Amendment rights and the right to privacy. ; HW 55084 DocId:32989541 Page 43
a - é e : - A % t, s : S . “ . Pas * . - , ave * : : ae | r ey ee erie a at . ° ,, ’ The specific issues with regard to domestic cases are: (1) Is the threat to the safety and tranquility of U.S. society posed by certain domestic groups of such magnitude to justify electronic ‘surveillance as an intelligence-gathering device to be used against them? (2) If so, is the threat of national, i.e., Federal dimensions, or is the threat primarily to local or regional interests? (3) If this coverage is needed, has Keith presented obstacles; and if so, how can they be overcome? (4) If enabling legislation is the answer to (3), should the electronic surveil- lance intelligence-gathering authority be given to the: Federal or local government, or both as in Title III? What should enabling legislation '" entail? (5) Is there any option other than enabling legislation? The primary issue with regard to foreign cases is: Is Presidentially approved, warrantless electronic surveillance in cases involving a "significant connection" with a foreign power constitutional, 0 or "legal." On the resolution of this issue hangs all else in these cases, viz., admissibility of electronic surveillance evidence in court; degree of disclosure to be required in criminal proceedings; and if held illegal, the judicial review procedure to be proposed in order to continue such surveillances, if they are deemed of sufficient importance to continue them in the face of additional risks inherent in a judicial review. 4. Options for Future Policy The chief issue for future policy consideration is, will the Department support the argument for the need for intelligence electronic surveillance? In foreign cases? In domestic cases? i If so, then the discussion centers on Department policy é regarding the means to effect such surveillances. Foreign national security cases: ; ee eS ‘Hopefully, the examples of intelligence value set out in the classified appendix of the attached study carried the argument that electronic surveillance in these cases is highly desirable, if not essential, - to our counterintelligence efforts and to our foreign policy considerations. Even without specific examples of value derived from these surveillances, the bottom line argument is that electronic surveillance of foreign intelli- gence services is at least an inconvenience to them, and makes it more difficult for them to carry on their intelligence activities. HW 55064 Docld:32999541 Page 44
Ar ete ery The present policy is to support the legality of the President's authority to conduct this surveillance without warrant, to restrict disclosure of the existence or contents of such surveillances, and presumably, to support the argument that any evidence obtained from such surveillance is admissible in a criminal proceeding. These issues are discussed very well in the Government's . petition for rehearing in U.S. v. Ivanov, attached. Also attached is a classified memorandum summarizing the case up to the petition for rehearing. Until these issues are resolved, consideration of future policy options would be speculative, and may be unnecessary. Domestic national security cases: The FBI Intelligence Division feels there is something of intelligence value to be gained from electronic surveillance coverage of some domestic groups. The opinion of former Assistant Attorney General _ Olson and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Maroney is that there is no ‘ need to utilize this type of electronic surveillance and therefore no need to seek enabling legislation at this time, but that if a need does appear the Government will seek such legislation. The examples set out in the classified appendix to the attached study show the value that can be derived from intelligence coverage of ‘domestic groups. Is information of this type worth the financial man- power expenditure (which is considerable) to obtain it? Is it worth the task of trying to write enabling legislation (providing for judicial review to satisfy Keith) to allow intelligence electronic surveillance in domestic cases? Is it worth the fearsome battle such a bill would cause in Congress? Does such a bill have a chance at this time, or in the foreseeable future? Upon reconsideration, the blanket pessimisim on chance for passage of such legislation in the attached study seems extreme. It is believed that the Department and the FBI should attempt to write a bill, with as restrictive judicial control as necessary in order to obtain Con- gressional approval, to permit intelligence electronic surveillance against domestic groups which threaten death or "extensive damage" (to be either defined or specifically enumerated, e.g., plane hijackings, bombings, HW 55084 Docld:32969541 Page 45
murders of officials or police, etc). A restrictive enumeration of specific acts which if threatened, but not to the extent of producing probable cause, would justify appeal to a court or magistrate for an intelligence - electronic surveillance, might have some chance for passage. The judicial review would satisfy the 4th Amendment requirements; and a specific list of acts limited to major contemporary concerns would allow for item deletions and additions as conditions change. Such a specific ’ section to the bill would allow for not only effective judicial review, -but also effective Congressional review. , - + «or - . . . or Such a bill, in our opinion, should avoid mention of contro- versial and difficult to define terms such as "domestic national security ," “internal security," "threats to the existence or structure of the Govern- _ °° ment," and all terms with political connotations; and should use terms emphasizing the aim of preventing serious criminal acts which threaten. “- Jife and limb (without mention of motivation, whether political or otherwise). : In our opinion, such a bill should make intelligence elec- ‘tronic surveillance available to both local and Federal agencies. It is envisioned that such a bill would cover purely local groups which, e.g., _ threaten murder of local police officers, and groups national in scope, 7. @e Bes Black Liberation Army. As discussed in the attached study, Title III and FRCrP 41 do not seem to offer practical alternatives for this type of coverage. sy at s fee : eo. ens 2 poet ~ 4 . . - ‘ HW 55084 DoclId: 32969541 Page 46 ‘
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at of the further evi Bene ce and encire existing recora. if “G20: ty wos = - are rict Cuz Sear anenaninateeaammmmtantl ‘gieeweun Le ~ iv) a na- an, or ae wu! ALonougsnN there was @ surveillance in violation of one-or more of the petitioner's Fourth Amend- ment rights, the conviction of such | petitioner was no vhe use “of evidence so od 12 enter * new Pinal sudements. Zon of3s . 2 ‘ON the existing recor LOMmancsd, “ian py its further findings, by pre- * Serving to all effected p s tne Further app: ate 394 U 5-8 i os phe ett anny ring that one Set of elect: ronic sunvedLlan . se ey feces ° > . as, Bota, Logs designated HOoL-5* an nd: 1 2002-8", violate .  Amendne t righ -..7 (20952). A taint nearing ba tt “Court that a "Sd 'd (D ~ aa) “fs eh, de, 3 hr 4 iant's ‘conviction was not . “end that finding was unanimously, uphe 1a ‘by this 'c spp. 12, 22). . nee “, . ‘ . a ‘ second set of Logs, designated Governnent mxhi _A-3. The Government represented that these log tained by the Department of Justice in the ex . Gent's right to.obtain foreign intelligence info HW 55084 Docld:32989541 | Page 50 . , a ; .
Liane ref flected on thors vit. or tore} ; General - “+ Pitenoll, designe ced Gow ernzent Bxhibit B. . ‘ copy. of. the Ee . vit was made available to “Ivanov.” Upon review “of “th * . . . . . ve ond ad ie ¢ . . the District Court made the folloving Pindin 83 . rn that the surveillances ‘here under abides were oo “expressly euvnorized by the Attorne ey General shown in the, °C bp the defendant. rienov a 2 Pres: - saws Loe hligh enat se fd surve eillances were directed ezainst - “Ut eertain’ promises in window Evan had pe dahil We decbannien . - - eke oa . .such surve eillances in the national interes and oe te ete i . . : * . oa eee : ra ve . . : ) 3 .* 6, that at would prejudice the nation 121 int (Om ty 0 un ct ch (@) | - ., r e . ” make a- ‘disel losure of the varticular facts concerning said surveillences. (20a) Doh PRU Vw Ress e ° Based on these findings, the Court concluded q that
. . oy ‘ e » 4 ’ . « °¢ . . 4 ° bs ie 8 we . Pat ° Ad , e Na . . . 2 . ot ow . . . Fat . bar} iy ore 7 se gt et . e*t ’ : : - a4 . y . eed o% “fs ny ° of “3 a Rs . . ” . as x ae ee ee : - “ts ‘oe tee. « . . ¢ ‘° ee : . eee % . we Z ‘aS ww ve , e ° e . * @. e e - ° e. e es « Ad . oe vo ot wore Las ae . ve i / . . 7° ful and not in violat tion of any 3 Fourth Anghdnent ri ghis oz wen Tvanov (208). Althouga not direc cted to do. SO, By the ‘Suprens _ eae Court's mandate, the Court ‘a'so condlude that disclosure Was as “not recqui ired by reason of th Le prov visions of the ‘Communications Jat, Act of 1934, 47. U. s. c. § 605, because, ‘that Act was inapplicable tc she the situation aigelos sa by the witnneia material (23a). - _ + % aa sree . a : 2 we a - . . - ty fon appeal, this. Cou rt, revers d ‘the ‘District Court hoie- tat sls 2 ad or) -? oe - - “98 fn ing -in g suntt eettsion (pee v Aldisert, 3. ) that AT U.S.C, § 605 inte barred "any “use of ‘the’ inte cepted mate rial beyond the confines “ 7 . - “OF the Execuviy fe “branch” "(Opinion 2 20- 21 ), thet, in t “procedural. ‘posture: of th e 2 case, "it ‘mus t be. assumed thet the con End versa tions of Ivanov overheard | ‘on the ‘wiret : s led ‘to evidence . used at this ‘trial (ov! inion. ‘De “33. 2 and , the refore that appel- Pe pent is enti tied: "to disclosure or an ‘eviden elary hearing” (Opinic: i. Pe PL )e, in reaching this ‘conclusion, the ‘a2. “On gf tae cl A 2 Q° mae) 'd cr is) Qs .v a for purposes of enalysis,. the proposi iti on thet te interceptions ee were & lawful xercise of ‘the Presidential pover vested by ketioie ee: of the Constitutio - (pinion Ds 15) COE IR Ae os . a ‘The ne jority aid not even consi der the quéstion of -_ whe ther Tvandv's Fourth Amendne nt ‘rights might have been viole 2a. In dis sen nt, Juase Adams concluded both shat the proposition ac cepted by the mejority for 4 purposes of poste was, in Fact, "4. Correct and that Ivanov's Fourth Ane ndzont rights were not viointt Hi 55084 Ddeld:32989541 Page 52
se * ° : . owe wou . s 4 : . . . eo. ; . 8 . 4, PS . - . fo ee, eT eee vs ‘ . . cog ’, tte ote . oe 8 mote 3O Pres gi anthy 5 tands , 2. : a « 2 ota ft vt.) als Con gun of the issue which ene, Sux te 4 oe, 2 aver rmined end discl sure = £ the legal necessity for es “BRC MENT 8 20 RS pln, ABS SUMING THE CORRECTYESS oR a :, CONSTRUCTION oF UF U.S.C. “IS HOT EWZITLED TO. PES DIS _ BURVEILEANCE TGGS OR TO. an RYTDENEIARY HEARTHG WITH RESPECT THERETO In venanding this case the un ikea States Suttexe ComrS eful ne very “specif fic ‘ss £0 the scope of its 'nictate. ay xe réered the Dis strict Court + to determine whether or 20% rere ae “hiss been any el ectronie surveillance which violate: iguellent's os ‘ Pourth Amendment rights. it aia not ask the District coket So 7 a " eonsider whe ther or not“ there may-heve been eo Vidlatics of fons. pth OF feny other federal statute. “reds in thig'dontest eat the can Court! iS language as to disclosure must be ‘undérstezs “scaucs There ones no precedent Which. reauires the United states te tine ores eh the 1 Logs of a foréign intelligence surveillance wherd such suctect- “lence has not violated any Fourth Amendmons rights of < defente—. g 2 cdfentsc. ne .* The necessity ror the Gisclosure of the rescrds of ne electronic surveillences only arises where such disslcsure is * « .- necessary ,bo-prot ect a defendant! s Fourth vender TEontS, ~ , Alderman v, United Stetes, 39: U.S. 165, 280-85 (252¢15 gezkes ‘curring opinion of Stewart, Je, in Giordsno ve. Unita Tintes, 7 - 3394 U.s. 3210 (2957) , the opinions of Douszies, J., in mrantins _NW_5084 Docld:32989541 Page 53 , Oo,
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“. *. . ayy eo. we ete ¢% . . roe Violate a because. to Go othense “would reveal informetiin In UL e the surve eiilance valueless in ‘the £ ubire, oe * Bo | con clude otheriiise’ would "be to put ‘the Govarnmescs . vedtgte —e * .2 - "y . 1 Re woe Dec arse. nabie election, It would, heve to elect betuesa PS pee . io oe hn ligerce operavace, en the disclosure of a vital and proper intel : Bae. one henid, and _prosecittion of 2 eriminey who may have viundereé. _pimselt on the others “si seh @ construction WolZs co aed a * wweeel® R g steps to ensure énat "a | Sonieeoitl of a foreign intel] card during the : POINT AD) | re PRIOR JUDICIAL: CONSTRIOTTONS OF o he U.S.C. § 605 REIEFORGE THE ge TT on - CONCLUSION HAT DISCLOSUR tS OF MIE, SL, / SURVEILLARCE LOGS IS HOT REQUIRED |. oon pan Tots CASS ttt - The correctness of the conclusion thet diszlssute “As inapproprite te in et scunsténces” where there has beer ma Fourth . . ° ‘menanent viol ati ion is further reinforced by the’ consitsersetiorcs oa w. ; “wich underlie prior judicial constrictions of WF 7 sen those Cases, Courts have me ade it clear th _whreter svidencs : and “tts fruits are to be suppressed only in those instances whites the wireta ep was ubiliz ed by aN. _enforcenent of ficers ic>roperi- . . . . . . . oo:
NPC. Ven Cy mi) a iy 2 > ~ a Ne a rs ~ OR ep bROO 0 f* & eyond caval, y “that, in constr oS a § 605 to ber, eines test eimony. 25 té the | contents of an inter- *. a “eepted convers ateon rot 2 derivative tise of” en intercesved _ ans - > a e oe, . tee ste ee : woe ae. “" eon yersat ion, ‘to obtain evidence, the Stipzeme e Court aid So, solsix . on - on “to aeter" law ent orceme nt -pérsonne el fro om utd Ti zing wiret easping - : a rn - wot . . : -< oc fats “as, & mee 1S of obta ining evidence, Nardone ¥. United Stetes, . . . ony wt oe . 302 t U.S. 389 (1997); Mardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 .{(ist2 .- (Nardone 4). (ge: Mee See POE ea - 4 . . . : . + =- 32 tn th mentee! - ee “In Nexrdone I Court held that the Conmunics ‘tions Act. of To3h barred testi imony by feder al agents as to-the 2227: . of rie: saages intercepted’ by wiretaps by eppligation of the:princisi | of statutory consts netion Nena the sovereign is embracsa by - general words of a statute intended to prevént injury end wroms - it 302 U.S. at 384." Bhs Nain gu md and i rong" whnica the Court perce. vs: . AY rjogeoda1 © “page 5B re sf