198-40007-10029 / JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: —198-10007-10029 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information: ORIGINATOR: CIA FROM: CC. TRACY BARNES TO: TITLE: REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA DATE: 06/25/1953 PAGES: 15 SUBJECTS : RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : — Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1B CURRENT STATUS: = Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/03/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA. , EK Rovian Department of the Army EO 13526 C¥Declassity — Exclude “I Exempt Authority, [I Refer To Review Date 2/615 By bah Pel v9.1 38 HY 50955 DBocld: 3247402727 Page 1
HY 50955 7 SECRET Security Information 25 June 1953 MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below) | SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA lo We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadeast= | ing in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report . aa recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated . 5 Wey 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcast~ ine by CIA", -(Operational information and other sensitive matter con» _ tained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be sep~ arately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.) 2. The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved by the; Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions: ao Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their penetration, where feasible, or an explanation \ where it appears not to be feasible. bo Develovo and submit, in collabcration with the appropriate personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting overations. co Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency and économy, material derived from escapee interrogations and ether intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all UoSe ‘propaganda efforts. do. Develop and recommend, in collaboration with area divisicns, an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy “guidance to. the field. \ - Bo Prepare ‘and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland, _& project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic intrusion into Commnist broadcasts 3 to develop special techniques for their uses and to contime research and development of cther unconventional methods of breadeasting suitable to our migsione je Chief of Op: rations, SECRET. Docld:329474099 Page 2 ;
WW 50955 SECRiT Security Information 6 Be Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of the attached material with the request, that -you cooperate in the carrying out of the Dn/P's directive. Particular attention is called to item 2. ao aboves — ; ; 5 eects he Mr. C. Lloyd Egner, assisted by Mr. Stanley P. Riclardscn, huve been assigned the resvonsibility for staff coordination of these matters on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning anc suonorting broadcasting onerations. /s/ Co Srag Barnes, C. TRACY LARNS Chicf . cs Political and Psycholorical warfare “Attachment As stated above | Distribution. | NYP eb | * ADCO = 1 . Cirdefs, All Areas - 1 ea. Chiefs, Senior Staffs - ] ea. C/T oe 1 Pr /C/OPE = 1 rP/ CRY -1 . rr/c/Pap ~ 1 : r/Mr. Femr = 2 Ri =] ‘ a a 7 SECRET Bocld:32424022 Page 3°
HW 50955 SRCRET Security Information 15 May 1953 MEMORANDUM FOR: CHITF, POLITICAL AM) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. SUBJECT «Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as & cold war weapon. It is grouped into the following sections: - - le Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADTO AS A WLDIUM IN THb COLO Ung. Et shous in the nein. that the countrics having the most to tear fro Commnism are doing the lcast to counter its radio propacanda . 2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPARTLITIFS. It embraces a. discussion of the techniques available +o CTA. 3. Section 3, Pare 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our - current and nlanned activities arainst them. ho Seetion li, Page lh, deals with the principal PROELEMS peculiar . to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution. 5S». Section 5, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATTONS for a body of principles to govern over«all CTA volicy In Its préscnt and future activities in this Pield. (For a detailed statement, of present CIA radio broadcasting assets, reference is made to CP¥ to CPF memorandum of 25 February 1953, entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS €6569.) - (The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Breadeasting. By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953, TS 8F.465-) : (The data on broadcasting hours by countriss was ebtained from FBID and VOA, that on available receivers from OSI/ORR and VGA, and that ~. on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.) i t [sf Go Lloyd Egyner — €. LLOYD BCNER Attachment, as stated. _ — eg PP/CLEsha i] tt OO t “3 Docld: 32474022 Page 4
| HW 0955 SECRET Security Information 15 May 1953 REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA le Hadio As a Medium in the Cold War a. The USSR. and its satellites, including China, broadcast te countries outside the Orbit 15395 hours per week of aggressive psych= oleyical warfare s The free world ‘responds with 1,028 hours per week o Lo ‘This gives the: enemy & numerical, advantage of approxinetely seven to five, In reality, the Communist advantage is much greater becanes of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by. as much, if not more than, 50 percent. An illustration is that the Commnists devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broad- casts. There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts. to the Western world, nor any restrictions on Listening to them. ; ds Only the English speaking world holds its owm numerically in the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BRC and Canada togethor broadcast 238 hours per week against the Orbits whereas the Orbit countries combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North America, the: United Kingdom, and the Pacific ALeBo @e In the rest of the world, the balance is drastically in favor of the Commmists. They broadcast 1, 173 jamefree hours to all other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a mere 261, hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by, non-English speaicing nations of the free worlds f. Of the total of 1,015 proadeast hours beamed by all the free world to the Orbit, CIA, through TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine stations, breadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles from Commsuniss dominated areas. .. fe The greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in Western Europe. France, which receives 29 hours of broadcasts per week from the Orbit as-a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy receives 97 hours from the Orbit but broadcasts only li to it, Spain 9k | to 12, Greces &9 to 9,.Turkey 3. to 7. Even relatively aggressive Vigoslavia receives 19l brcadcast hours from the Orbit against its outout to the Orbit of only &9 hours. - : ho The one-sided Boctlda: 3274274032 Page 5
HW 450955 SECRET security Information he The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison of the broadeast output of the USER alone, without the satellites, against Europe. It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for instance, to 10 hours of broadcasts per week, The combined broadcasts of these three countries to the USSR, however, mumber only 19 hours per week. France and Turkey who, together, receive 6); hours per week from the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR. - i.e Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows that the Commnists are outslugging the free world, and that Western Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it. should in the radio propaganda battle with the Orbit. 2. Capabilities Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission. & Overt international broadeasting on fixed frequencies under cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique normally would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and the use of miltiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations. Se eR HR He . bo. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or "captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on listeners and presents special vreblems in avoiding interference with ‘broadcasts of friendly countries. - oe a a €o Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Commnist, religious broadcasts,e © % 7 + . d. Through covert nenetration and/or support, the marripulation of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) streng= thening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (2) influenc= ing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-liestern attitudes in their domestic services. . This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no problems concerning a 2 SEC8 tl T Doclda: 32742740279 Page 6
HY : SECRET Security Information probleng concerning bases. ‘and management, ‘and requires relatively eal] investments and. @XPCHSE 6 Tt would be advantageous beyond the _ Sumediate PP field. In such a post an. agent could observe commnist infil tration, spot forthcoming political changes by observing changes dn government prepaganda directives, recruit agents with reliable cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for denial of the facilities to an encny in the event of hostilities. | Me believe it should be the agency's established policy te carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can be created. A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the | immensity of this field ‘of potentialities, both as concerns the ~~ countries on the peripheries. of the USSR and Communist China is - Furops, the Near East and Far Easts and in Latin America as well. ° We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area _ Divisions, on a country-by-country survey of possibilities in this . area and that action be taken toe achieve. penetration wherever this Sindy indicates it > may be Foasinles a ia He te a ae # 685, Use ‘of purchased or free tine through covert channels oo on existing radio systens in friendly countries. EM - fe Electronic penetration of enony -proadeasts. fi mples- the “Ghost” Voice operations of World War 11). This techni que is. discuased in: para. Gato(6) below. - Be To exploit ‘the amateur ([Prant7 broadcasters, large numbers of whom Giiist in Russia. * ¥ 4+ A Drojeet is being’ drafted to explore the possibilities ef this technique » he) Broadcasting from airplanes. This has been carried out experimentally in two areas with disappointing results due primarily to operational and equipment.linitations which make. for limited aude ~ dence coverage at best. It is, moreover, very costly and alse vre= gents special gecurity problems. Tt is not recommended, ‘except for . possible hiteand-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used ‘on occasion to similate messages from agents inside the USSR or sat= . elites. This is a deeevtion technique rather than broadcasting’ but 50955. shouldy we belteves | be explored. “ WSSReesRadio 4s the only consistent edium for. pisre= oO ing the Soviet ‘von curtain. It.is estimated that there are approxie “mately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSR, of which 75 to 80. per . cent are believed to ve equipped with frequency bands capable of receiving ‘foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of them. readily -Teveive Long | and medium wave signalss - Now all of these receivers are in the hands of DocId: 32424022, Page 7 ” ss E “oer BP. i
HY 0955 | SECRET | Security Taformation in the hands of private individuals however} and the’ number of those having aceess to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly ° decreasing due to Soviet efforts to,increagse group listening by means of wired networks. | Nevertheless, at would appear that there will be a. sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three ‘ware bands for some time to: come. One indication of this is the fact that at vresent the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 hours per” day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own peoples — _ ' Many of these. transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which lie  . within our transmitting capabilitics. Car assets: for exploiting this potential audienee, Aneluding projects still in the Planning Stages are far from adequate. a Be ‘Communist China.=-Liie the USSR, the Communist government — ef China relied heavily om radio broadcasting for commmnication with whe peoples It utdligés more than 50 ftational ‘and regional .stations _. for this purpose, operating chiefly, on medium and long ¥ wave put te : Some extent, also, on shortwave. a # He me me dee eR ge ge ae be < casting estorté are cent ean , Satel Lites seoThe preponderance of CIA broad= peared His area, i % % , 7 de The Free World.--Many countries afford opportunities : for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration. of - indigenous broadcasting systems and use of free or Purchases. times * ah (See, Para. 2 d.} ‘he Problems Of Covert Brondeart ing ; ae Cover : (1) a radio transmitter » that ean 1 be heard eannot be hd dden. Put another way, there are no known methods. for concealing © fron technical monitors the ‘peographical : gource of broadcasts, although the non-technical listening public can te ‘and often is deceived. Cover for brosdéasting operations, therefore > presents a formidable. problem. Autonomous emigre organizations, which offer the most . eredible cover, generate. factionalism as well as ‘control, security. ; and mamnacencnt problems. - ese difficulties ‘ould, however, be minimized by positive agency y control through a compartmentalizati on whieh separates the cover organization from program and transmitting operations and lays down strict requirenents on security, budget control, and high professional standards./ See Charts Ayinex IT. (2) Religious broadeasting presents few cover head= . | aches, but is of doubtful Propaganda Values ) The best cover DocId: 32424022 Page 8 SECRET?