SECRET | sork-tessGlatsification: a a 7 eo “(This form is to. be ‘used for ‘material extracted - _ from ClA—controlled documents. ). nn a a Purpose and Sor Bo hole a whe “The Central Intelligence agency! 's performance — a [in its role of support to the Warren Commission has been a source. (of controversy, since the inception of. the. Warren Commission. ‘critics yhave repeatedly charged that the CIA, ‘participated _ in a conspiracy designed to: suppress information wee "relevant: to the assassination ‘Of: President Kennedy. a During. 1976 ‘the. ‘critic! so assertions were the. subject of. official inguiry — “by. the’ Senate, Select Committee to study Governmental ¢ Operations (hereinafter’ ssc) . - the ssc, : in. its report regarding “The saveasiieion gh of. ‘the Assassination of President: John FP. ‘Kennedy: ~ | Performance of ‘the Intelligence Agencies" reached The Committee emphasizes: that. it has. . “not uncovered any evidence. sufficient. Se oo, : ; the: following Gonctusion: to justify: a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President. Kennedy . me er ae The Committee. has, however, developed | evidence which impeaches the process:
ae “=cgntrolled documents.) 9 5° ee OER from BAIR She intelligence “agencies are oe (arrived at their Own “conclusions - Sbout. the assassinat -by © .. Which they provided. information: » SVidence ‘indi : fe the tion of President Kennedy from the Warren - “ a Commission. In addition, _the Committee “has wea ether, if the Warren wy : ee ae Commission: Was misinformed or not a faa Q fu tt oop 3 GDS URI,
- SECRET. - . Classification: : (this fort” ‘is to’ be used for ‘material extracted” from’ ClA—controlled documents.) result ofa ¢ conscious, intent to do so by the Agency, or. ats “employees. the ‘Committee has. ‘sought. to. examine: ‘the issue, detailea above. in both an n objective and disciplinea manner ., ‘In. order to accomplish : this. goal the Committee has utilized a. 1977 Report by the ‘CIA' s Inspector General Xhereinafter | om: TGR). this Report, Ewes highly cxfsipal of of : the ssc. “sinaings an “asserted that the ‘SSC Final Report. conveyed an impression of. Limited effort. by the CIA ‘to assist the Warren Commission ois? an’ its work. ‘The 7 TGR was ain | fundamental disagreement with this. characterization of ‘the. : SSC. findings | and noted that "CIA did. ‘seek and “collect | information in ‘support. of the. warren, Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies 7 and submitted special analyses: and reports." wo (7 TGR, Introduction to Tab E. y - oe In. order to demonstrate further the scope. of support provided by the CIA to the Warren ve Commission, the 77 IGR. contained a ‘comprehensive Listing of CIA . generated material made ‘available a NaH.
Classification: _ - e (This form is to be used ‘for ‘material ‘extracted _ from ClA—controlled documents.) to both the U. S. Intelligence. Community. and. ‘the | Warren ‘Commission regarding the: aisissinast 8 | tion of: President ‘Kennedy. | ‘In this respect, = “the ¢ Committee agrees with the 47. IGR wherein : oe oS § it is stated that "This compiliation (of ve rd | CIA generated. material), is: appropriate to | = a wg | consideration of ‘the extent of the CIA effort, 5 : | to the’ extent. ‘that: at reveals something Of. a + the x results of ‘that effort." «77 IGR, | Introduction’ ¢ | to ‘Tab ‘E)- | In examining ‘the. Agency! $ “comprehensive *Sdapeing of: CIA generated material referenced woos the | Committee has: paralled | its” review to the = "structure given. to. these ‘materials by ‘the 7 “IGR. In- ‘this, regard the 77, IGR. details four inter-  pelated compilations of Kennedy assassination ~ material. These four compilations» are: | or Agency. dissemination of information ee ‘to the Intelligence Community (Formal 2) Dissemination of material: to ‘the . Warren ‘commission | . and Informal Disseminations). - - ; 7 4 gooo03 7 lositied by derivation:
“SECRET, Classification: _ | af “this form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) 3) Agency dissemination to: the FBI et al’ - regarding rumors and allegations ce regarding President Kennedy! s , assassination 4) Memorandum submitted by CIA ‘to the _ Warren. Commission on Rumors - and Allegations Relating: ‘to the President s- "Assassination: 7 IGR, Introduction gh oe to Tab EB. } in reviewing these compilations, the Committee - ‘focused ‘upon. ‘those. CIA materials which the 77 IGR documented as, having - made available. in written form to, the Warren Commission. ‘During the course of this study, additional oo "Agency files have: been reviewed. These ‘files have been examined in an effort to: resolve certain ae “Gsgues created by ‘the review. of the Agency" Ss gS compilations discussed in this report. jihere _ apparent gaps existed ‘in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort — to resolve these. gaps. “Where significant: substantive |
| Resse Sens - Gig toon 18 be used for materi SRF GE oo Yeon Ca —contrallee deeuments) [ ot a | pea eo - | “sensitive sources. and methods. and the consequent: effects of this concern — and ~ 8) the: substance. and quality of. information | concerning Luisa Calderon passed to the | ‘Warren Commission and. the results of this. Committee’ s investigation. of Calderon, and her significance ‘to the events (of) oe November 22, 1963. ‘upon the Warren Commission investigation; ee { rr: “Belect Comm, tive Shh a a . Commission “gee ciA Post ‘gocestt” anFten. : 7 é | TOC beginning of this s seation coe, 4
| Chi fem is tg be wee for rater axrasied Fam, CA—contreted dgcument ats: ) _ Teo be ines Sea peter “bs section Ir -Z. otganization of ‘CIA Investigation... of President Kennedy's Assassination In his Executive Session testimony before the Select plans during 1963; _described the cra’ s ‘role in the "investigation of. President Kennedy’ s assassination as “follows: | _This crime vas committed on United > States, soil. Therefore, as far as the . "Federal < government was “concerned, the. pris mary investigating agency would have been ‘the, Federal ‘Bureau of Investigation. without . any question. The. role of the. CIA would have. been entirely supportive: in the sense of what material we are (sic) able to . es acquire outside the limits of ‘the United States with reference to the investigation. — wae For investigative purposes, the Agency _ Committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director for oo ; . — | ee 7 |
~ Ghassifcatin: SECRET ts form & te be used for matericl exacted. ah Ch—eanirales decuments:) | | oo had no investigative role inside + the United “states < at all. So when I used: here the | word * "supportive," I meant that in the «Literal sense of the tern. We are (sie) | trying to support the FBI. and support. the "Warren Commission and be responsive to - their requests, but we were. not initiating any investigations of our own or, to. my. "> recollection, ‘were we ever. asked’ to. "(Executive Session ‘Testimony of Richard oa on ian, 8/9/78, pp. 17-18.) . a . “On November 23, 1963, Helms. called a. meeting ‘Of senior evel ‘CIA officials to outline the. Agency’ s investiga- ; tive responsibility vis a vis the assassination. (SSC, - "Book Vv, p+ 25. ) At that time; Helms placed John. Scelso, “Branch” Chief for CER operations i Mexico, charge, of . the Agency’ s initia investigative efforts. (HSCA Class. Deposition, of John 7 Scelso, 5/16/78, PP. 111- 112, “Exec. Session Testimony
a Ty a a aa a ae, wads. Aa + oe Classification: — — This rm is Bee used for mater eri é extracted .. Le con docu uments rom A-—<on rolled Segment nad Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) | | Ue Scelso testified before the Select Committee, - that. he was given charge of the Agency’ s investigation on the basis of two considerations: 1) this prior | esperience in conducting major CIA security. investi- . gations and 2) the observance of Oswald by CIA ets senen ‘in Mexico, (Scelso' Ss operational concern) less. ‘than two months prior to the assassination. (ssc Book vy Pe 25, HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70, pp. 111- 112.” 7 Scelso also noted that | | during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms did not pressure him to adopt. specific investigative oe | theories nor reach. conclusions within a. set period of - time; Executive ‘Session. Testimony of Richard Helms coe /9/78, pp. ‘g- 10)* | Ne yo CIA's Counterintelligence Staff characterized: Scelso' s responsibility not as a mandate to investigate but — ‘rather to “coordinate traffic (code facilitation, - Cc telegram or telegraphic consideration) for working — Ot with the DDP with respect. to what was being done over the whole 7177985. p _(HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, 7.17/78 ,. ~ 9.) 0 _ Rocca referred. £0 “this phase of. CIA: activity as the GPFLOOR phase. (Ibid.). f Raymond Rocca, - -Chie£. of Research and analysis. ‘for es é : 3 | opooit ot ; sf ats 206 1527
. (This. form is to’ be’ used: for: material extracted - from ClA—controlled documents. yo - $celso described in detail to the ‘committee’ the ‘manner in which : he conducted the Agency’ S investiga 7 tion: So | | | : . «practically my whole Branch participated a in.the thing. We dropped almost everything Oa o 5 else and I put a lot of my officers to work in tracing names, analyzing. files. Dl We were flooded with cable traffic, with. .. Keports, suggestions, allegations from all” ae ae ee “over the world, and these things. had to be os en _Ghecked out. We were checking out just Fiat and dozens of people all the time.. (HSCA Classified i Deposition | of John Scelso, BLAGLI0 P- 131) * eee | “During” the course. of the agency" s invetigation, Liaison with the. FBI was handled for the cIA ‘by Birch ot Nea 5. (reid. B. 80. At ‘the: ‘time of the assassination Mr. -o! ‘Neal, og a former FBI agent, was chief of) the ‘Special, Investigations group of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. (SCA Classified “f 7 “Deposition of Birch QO! ‘Neal, 6/20/78, Pe 7, 52. 7) Mr. OF Neal |. characterized his functions with _Fespect to. the Agency. Mo os, - ce my ee as “follows: . me | “(ghis footnote -- Footnote */ -- continues - ' on bottom of page 5) me a oo f ~ Classification: lee lassified by ‘derivation: ES
- lassfieation: | This fem ig $8 be used. fer: aren entaetes om Cok — Sane aBeuRERtS) _ Scelso. stated | during: his. testimony. that CIA: fe field stations worldwide were alerted to ‘the. Agency" s investigation "and ‘the key stations were receiving - tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not a send out: instructions Saying: everybody participate in ; the investigation." (ibid. ‘P. 133.) It was his : - Bi = J ; recollection, however, ‘that ‘throughout his ‘tenure as: ee coordinator | of the Agency’ s investigation, the’ Mexico pas jon)was the only CIA field ‘station directly _ Footnote” % —— continued from Bottom of ‘page Ae I knew. that we (at CIA). dia not. have. the. basic responsibility. for. investigating’ “the ™ assassination of the President. If there was. a crime commited in the course of this activity, 9° | sic) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that — _. it was our. responsibility to give the fullest — nee cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, © you understand,. and at the same time giving them - cooperation, and I was in close contact. with Mr. Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully co- oe operated, ‘and he always fully ‘cooperated withthe. ¢ . (Ibid. Pp. 52. _) oe, Q' Neal noted that his office (cr/st¢) at the direction of | the Chief of counterintelligence, James Angleton, was designated the central point for collection of: assassination- related information. made available to the FBE. (Ibid. pp. 52- 53. ie ie Te ngina an ee us sate. es R059
-- Grassification: — SECRET is form ig te be wed for peter ented FIM, cra—entiales aeeumente) “involved i in investigatory activities. related to. ‘President - oe (NYE an Kennedy’ s° “assassination. (abia.) , , Pi Scelso : issued a. summary ‘report which described Oswald's activities: in Mexico city from September 26, 1963, - October, 30 1963. Scelso’ characterized ‘the: summary Popes as. incomplete ‘by comparison 4 to assassination-related © information then available to the FBI. but not provided a to: ‘CIA vuntil late Dec. 1963. (qbid. Be 1s 115. y* (CIA "Document Report by John Scelso to c/cr, Airbec. 63. ye Following issuance of this report, Helms shiteed "responsibility for. the CIA‘ s investigation of. President” % a . cay . Kennedy’ s assassination to the Counterintelligence as stage. (HSCA Classified Deposition of John ‘Scelso, ee ee an .  n < wm 5/16/78, “136, cf. HSCA Classified Deposition of «palma i Rocca, ‘1/11/78, “15 wherein Rocca states that a "responsibility shifted from Scelso ‘to cr state on 8 Be! a: January ‘12, 1964. .) Helms testified that this shift in * Approximately two days after President Kennedy's assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report, . provided to President Johnson by.Helms. This ‘report adopted the position that Oswald probably was a lone ‘assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet. or Cuban intelligence though such ties could not be. excluded | oe a: tore Pp. ‘il4. on a 00014 f ci ya ee 4
in part by. the. establishment of the Warren ‘Commission. _ Rocca added: : Seon - Tis om ig fo E yal or i clers Sass ram Cla—contre ed ggcumn ments ‘responsibility wa was: a logical development. because the” - investigation | had. begun to take on broader tones. — 7 | (Executive Session Testimony. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, . p. 14,. ‘see. also. HSCA Classified Deposition « of John» - Scelso, | 5/16/78, ps 138.) | a Helms" . reasoning. ow apa upon by. Raymond “Rocca. = “who. “testified before: the. Committee that ‘the . shift | in responsibility described by Helms was caused - (BSCA’ Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, PP. 12- “13. ) rey ‘was. ‘entirely. appropriate. ‘in? ‘the - GPFLOOR | phase that he (Scelso) would | . have that. (responsibility for the- Agency. _. investigation. ) --But the minute you had. a commission. set up outsilde the line. - : obviously. had to be the Director, and from Kt, the Director to his Chief of Operations - overseas, because the spread involved a all of the divisions. Here you had. _(Scelso). being asked te off on: aq it would. . administratively . simply a hybrid monster. ee a) . Deposition of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 12. ). . _. James Angleton supported Rocca! s belief that “the spread (of. investigative responsibility) involved... 4 000015 | ma] mi
- Gascon: - 4 is om ig tg re) B used. ig at EMSS acted om —=<Contro eq gcume nts) rom Conroe ~ alt of of ‘the “(eray divisions.” 7 Angleton testifed to this. Committee that the Agency's efforts to | - gather and coordinate information related to ‘the: assassination underwent a metamorphic > transition. ‘Initially, Angleton noted, the — Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs: and. - (Case - Officers approached Warren Comission ‘requirements in a a piecemeal. fashion. However, Angleton + testified the Agency was | eventually © “able to. focus its resources to avoid “duplication. of. effort and provide a system for the central ‘referencing of assassination related information as. such information was ‘developed. (HSCA ‘Classified Deposition, of. James Angleton, . 10/5778, pp. 16- 17, see also HSCA Classified a ‘Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78, " p. 23.) . i : | “ci i,
- Ses r= SECRET rm mis is is e as iat i erigl extracted ‘om Qcuments : rom OR 53 e cuments | : The: record: -geveals that: auring this second: ene Jot ¢ CIA information: collection. efforts in support of the Warren Commission investigation the concentration. of Agency resources. shifted in emphasis from exploration .Of Oswald's activities. in Mexico City to: his residency | in the Soviet union. during 1959~ ~i262- and possible “association with: the. Soviet intelligence apparaens. + SBP EE) (tbid. pp. 32- -33, 44, /Executive Session of Testimony of | ea Richard Helms, 8/9/78, Pe 23. a AE corkingly, Rocca ‘commented (that « during this phase primary interest in ‘support of ‘the - Warren’ Commission’ was, to follow-up on Soviet leads: | 2a the assumption that a person who spends “ates “four years** in the Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of. "specific interest. to. Soviet. State ‘security and their collateral | authorities. (SCA Classified Deposition of - ~ wk Raymond Rocca, PP. 32-33.) Cseep 1& fee I ° % Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended we, to concentrate on concerned the Soviets: | "dea ed by devin — . ae
“ Cesifieation: (iis form is te be used for eesti ete! rena ClA—centrelled documents.) .*The ‘following exchange between Mr. Rocca. and Committee _. .Counsel sheds further. light. on the difficulties’ encountered. . . by the Agency related to its investigation of Possible ao Cuban, involvement” in. ‘the | assassination: =... 7 a Mr. Goldsmith. “Earlier, when I asked you. | which - » areas of the case received. emphasis, ‘I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis. was _the Soviet connection. . say dominated ~~ looking at. it. from my point of. view. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you. known about. the anti- - Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would ' you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the... ._, possibility of a | Castro conspiracy. “to: kil ‘the | President? - Me Rocca. Again, I say that it would have | simply intensified it, that there was ‘attention. given... - con the Cuban side. — — The organization of their. service and their. — operation -in Mexico was something. entirely entirely (sic) within -- it was an*enigma at the: time. They were just getting started. This was WH's area.. This was 1 Scott's™srea of proficiency. So the defectors had on “‘bégun to come out and | they came out | later, the. (Cuban _— ' defectors. : : . So,.I can't.-- I really can' t say that. (a) the: Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. ‘The Dy ‘Press: was” filled with it at the times: . =. oo : The Harker interview should: have been undoubtyily, ‘given greater attention in a generalized sense; -but it was given specific attention, I. was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing. investigated? _- Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don’ t know this. That Side of the report strikes meas being inadequate. SECRE T | Geet od Classified by derivation: ne Classified: by derivation: Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that r ‘would a8 to it, not. particularly by the staff.” ‘Thad no capabilities ff Mr. Goldsmith. In what vay was’ the Cuban connection | : cm . as ' ee . gots
aa , 9b - = - Classification: SECRET. a form iste be used: for tal ane m ClA—eantralied documents)» Mr. Goldsmith. | Well, when. I said to what. extent * _was the Cuban .connection > investigated, ‘I don't mean. by the Warren. Commission. | T. mean - to. what. extent did” the. Agency. provide mt Oe Rocca. That x can't anavers” 1 éactgiagy didn't do it.- a a a Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me? | Mr. Rocca. We certainly. didn't, in R & A. - Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not. -> “Mr. Rocca. Go into. the. Cuban. side of. it fat. all.” this was something left to the people who were concerned: specifically with (Cuban | intelligence and ‘Security: operation. Mr. “Goldsmith... But I believe earlier weloue pe established that Mr. Helms ‘gave’ orders that: ‘information’ pertinent to the: assassination \ was to, go through: your = office, correct? © _ - Mr . Rocca: ‘Yes. a. Mr: “Goldsmith. “And | once information pertinent — to the assassination went through your office, ‘I. take. Gt you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would - : be relevant for the Warren Commission ‘£0. see. te": Is that correct? Mr. ‘Rocca. Well -- on Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew? Bg Mr. Rocca. well, everything would go, yes. - Mr. “Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in ‘the position, it would seem, to know what information was being generated in the field. that. was going to the Warren Commission. Earlier T asked you which area received: emphasis a and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (did) . | Gsetcation _ - ope6us a se 0832 a : we . wat : i . Classified by -deriyétion: _ ae ee: : ds A oe Oe wh qo Clossitied by | derivation:
- 9c ae ~ lessifcction: : ee is fo be used fer reel enka Gih—contralied decuments:) ae : Mr. Rocca. Primarily; primarily. - But. I didn! eo. _ mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because. there was a lot of. ‘material ‘that came through. and: went : ‘to. ‘the: . Commis : komm cerned the Cubans.” (Discussion off the record. ) Mr. Goldsmith. Let! S continue. Mr. Rocca... My recollection is that at the time _ the. great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who.) _ __. were in touch with CIA had been somehow. involved in this. his This was. ‘the great concern. . n *s eee Mr. Goldsmith. ‘That! s another’ ‘possibility. ae _ There are different. a=. : Mr. “Rocca. - Questions went, down to WH: do ‘you 7 have anybody who ‘could possibly | have gotten involved in a this kind of thing. a! ‘There was: “extraordinary diligence, 1 house, exercised to try om clarify. that sides.” oa oo Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that. the possibility © of an assassination plot by Castro- against. the. President. was adequately investigated? =. a - (Pause) | ot a Mr. Rocca. With the | advantages of 20- 20- hind=-9 5. ~ sight, I could say probably not. But at the time it seems. .to me that they gave due attention to it o~ within See 6 information that Tt had at my disposal. oe **In tack 2H0 sbent 2 years, 8 months. in the. Soviet Union _ October T9359 - June 1962 | | sein: — 1, “Clossified ‘by derivation: . ~ |. “ Classified by « derivations,
— Gassificaion: — neg | resources “aan Soviet influence 2 on. - —& (oom is tebe. used for rete a estate es on ela—entralled GBEURERIE) cs “because ‘the peopte he = was in touch with in. Mexico had. ‘traces, prior traces, as. KGB. “people. “They were under consular. “cover and obviously could have been doing and were . undoubtedly doing a consular. job in those earlier contacts. (Ibid., Pe 33) oo However, Rocca aia indicate ‘that Cuban aspects of the CIA investigation were not: ignored “because. , there was a lot, of material that came through and: went to ‘the’ Commission ‘that concerned the Cubans." ~ Mr. “Helms: also testified ‘that the ‘possibility of ‘Cuban involvement. ‘in President Kennedy ' s assassination was a source of deep concern within the Agency. (Exec. Session Testimony of R. Helms, 8/9/78, p.- 21)- Nevertheless, Mire | Helms stated that development ‘Of informa- tion pertaining to ‘Cuban knowledge of or participatiaa | in the assassination was very difficult to- obtain. (Ibid., p. 138) | a Angleton was . sin agreement with Rocca’ s analysis that. “during the ‘second phase of the Agency' s ‘support. role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its: oogo24 t S$ a f 5 r S Sf “tf bees DA ee RET | | ea . sca - erento
| — esin: - (ae form is te be used for material extreates Om cta—contralled dgcuments) a Oswald. (Angleton, P. 86), ‘He stated “for the record with regard to: the Warren ‘Commission’ ‘Ss investigation (with the CIA' s support) of possible Cuban involvement - in the. assassination: » I. personally believe that the United States- ‘intelligence ‘services did not “have the capabilities to ever come to. an adjudication (of the Cuban aspéct) . a: don't think the capabilities were there. | (HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, - 10/5/78, pe 93)” a | ey gO rid on | SS on of af Nw _Glesscaon a cs 2 20608: 49° — . ne 7 | . ssiied rE erivation:: seri ivation:
- Classification? - GFhig form is t9 Re used far astra ext? om ClA—eentralled ESEMRENE) OR As. noted above, the Cr ‘Staff assumed responsibility “in late December 1963 _ early January 1964 for. the _ "coordination of CIA. efforts to assist the Warren Commission: in its investigation. “At that time, Raymond was. designated ‘point of. contact with the Warren ; "Commission. (HSCA Classified Deposition of dames - Angleton, 10/8/78, p. 77.) Rocca's Research and 7 Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for Cl Staff, — ff | Analysis component was concerned with: . — oo \ (st a . "analytical intelligence, ica’ Hv in . brainpower, which meant(all source; all — “\ @vert source comprehension; .a study of cases that had ceased to occupy opera- . - tional significance, that is,. closed. cases; >. _ .to maintain: the. ongoing record of overall: quality and quantity of counterintelligence | being performed by the entire DDP operation LZ 4 component;... the Deputy Director.for Pla <— . : (HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, - _ 8/17/78; See also HSCA Classified Deposition | . Of James Angleton, 10/5/78, Pp. V7: y co ce Mee “Rocca testified that assassination-related oO - information generated by CIA components was directed to his staff (as designated point of ‘contact with the. ‘Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day to day —
oe i = == ae fee —SECRST This form & '9 ss for yale Sus set mca ontro ist $4 . —controlle documents : research and search man for ‘the U.S. “Intelli ence Community. and its resources), and“Arthur Boole (who had | transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of | (years prior to the assassination) (Ibid. p. 17.) 7 During the course of the Warren Commission investi- gation, Hall, Hartman and Dooley worked with those * CIA divisions producing substantive information ‘related to ‘the ‘seeeesinasiony (hie 0 : | Rocca testified. that even though’  CI/REA was ‘the “Agency' Ss. point of reference with regard to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the cI staff in general displaced the direct relations of Mr. ‘Helms or any other concerned Agency official with . “the Warren’ ‘Commission. (Ibid.; Rocca testified ‘thatageigher | _ @ . CL Staft nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet. | Division (represented ‘by David | Murphy, Chief of the o90024 S| “ell wt tc
°. 13 - cetacean - hig farm is t9 be used ler a aneiteial sate €lA=centrelled documents) a SR division and his assistan its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/REA ar displace John Scelso in his contact with ‘the Warren =a Commission. ) Rocca testified that in some instances to. Helms. with requests, and in other instances David . Slawson, | a ‘Commission Staff counsel, "conferred directly a (with 9 Tom Hall of ‘Rocca’ s staff. (tbid. P. 36. )* ae - The record reveals that on certain issues of particular, sensitivity Rocca was not. permitted to act. / as the. Agency' s point of contact with the Warren Commission. He. testified that “compartmentalization was observed | - Te Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly _ a f notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level point. of contact." (asca Classified Deposition of Raymond <n rare tee a Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct superior during the course of the Warren Commission — investigation, he did not participate.on a regular basis in the Agency's efforts to. ‘supply ‘substantive — information. to the Warren Commission nor did he’ dea on a direct basis with Warren Commission representa- tives. (excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis; — .HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78,- p. 17-187. HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 78.). However, Angleton. testified: to this, Committee that he did attempt to keep apprised of. developments as the investigation progressed through | consultation with Rocca. oat Classified Deposition of James | “Angleton, 10/5/78, « 81) | Gestion ” 2 Ses y, derivation: ee fe derivation: ceninamsamanmunownng 20% We 083
Elassification:: | This fern is 19 be used far matesial sateen em lA—centratied aeesRER) Rocca, 8/17/78, pe 1a) Rocea cited by way, ‘of example . the. case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca | testified that he did not attend any. of the Agency. discussions. Pertaining to Nosenka' S case (Ibid. y: ' Rather, (as it affected the Warren Commission investi- gation) responsibility for the Nosenko casey assigned’ te (David Murphy; thief of SR 2 Division, in addition to Richard Helms Crbid) © Rocca described the cr staf mail| intercept program, HTLINGUAL, as a second example of an Agency matter es about which he: had no knowledge nor: input vis a vis the Agency ' s. support role’ ‘to the Warren ‘comission: (Ibid. , Pp. 19-20. ) “Rather, James - Angleton an Birch a material (HSCA Classified Deposition of J. Scelso, we 5/16/78, (P. 113, wherein Scelso states that CI Staff. ; including ot Neal, was: ‘repository. of HTLINGUAL intercedts? . jouk See HscA Class Dep. o€ Birch O'newt ,7{20/ 74 tree whertin Olaeal strodes the he. Aik not Sig) Warren Comm i ss len had know | ot the HTLIVEIAL | Poonam bRcans® ce das not ABs res pessibil to proweds Phe Warten Comms ShIOnN WIth makeri als BQO ¥ Eten Whe WTAIMSUAG pregmm as Randled | the disposition’ of: this particular eR a | tri © ad Pri | Gleeson =, st, —
“hie fom is "7 ke ised fr asi! ars 3m ClA—eantrated SSCHmEE) — “In summary, it | was’ Rocca’ Ss. ‘testimony that an’ ) internally decentralized information reporting function best "characterized the organization of. this second phase of the. Agency ' s investigative efforts to assist. the. Warren Commission. “(abid., ps 10; “HSCA. Classified "Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, Pe 75, 80. _ See. also. CIA Doc. Rocca Meno for Record, 1 April, 1975, mo a “subject: ‘Conversation with ‘David We Belin, April 1 | /anerein it. is stated that Helms remained senior 7 official in charge of the overall Anveseigation, cee cr staff acting | as, a coordinator, and: repository | (of information collected. )- ne 20 MS 09 _ Se % —— Secor _
| Cetin re is m is 8 for sat aqreriaag @xX resis jie a to aa ater os ex ft '. from contol non OA, Opinions. of: Warren Commission and CIA, Representatives See Regarding Warren ‘Commission-cra. Relationship - she ‘Couttae’ has contacted both | representatives of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of ‘the CTA who played significant roles cin providing cIA- _gerierated information to the Warren Commission. The. "general consensus of, these representatives is that the Warren ‘Commission and. the CIA enjoyed a. successful "working relationship during the course’ of the Commission’ s investigation. — (HSCA Class. Depo. of. R. -Rocea. Witte, p. 18) (Gee. also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,- Pe 24. ) William Coleman, a’ senior staff counsel for the Warren Cominission who worked closely with Warren ‘Commission staff. counsel WwW. David» Slawson on matters: which utilized the CIA' s. resources, characterized ‘the’ CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and. intelligent. - (See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman, 8/2/78.) Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality - ue | ection: sna | Sid by ditions SoBe
Secret ssification: | assification: - oe (this form is to be used for: material extracted ' Rb CPE totale YR yBeirighanetore extracted from. ClA—controlled documents -10- of work. = (Executive Session Testimony of w. i Davia Slawson, 11/15/77, ‘Dp. 17;,see also. JFK | Bdhubit 23.) a. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the aires Commission, testified that: the Warren | Commission, and. its. staff were assured by the CIA ce ‘chat the. Agency would cooperate ‘in. ‘the ‘commission's oe got s | (SCA Class. Depo. of J. ‘Lee ‘Rankin, | 8/1/78, | Pp. 4i -HSCA Class. _ Depo. of John McCone, _ (8/17/78, Pe. 2) Ce Jobn McCone, Director, of. central. Intelligence at the ‘time of President Kennedy", s assassination _and during the Warren Commission. investigation, "supported Mr. Rankin! s testimony in this regard by. characterizing the CIA' s work vis-a-vis _ ‘the: Warren. Commission as both responsive and» ae a , comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John : = ° ae McCone, 8/17/78, P- 5) Mr. McCone was _ responsible _ for ensuring. that all relevant matters were 000028 a ) Clussitiiontion: Secret | a oe ; Cc. Berk