y/o BS is Bs, 4 a aa a identi € eA hich ¥Aw A i T he 5 Q's artnet HE rg KES’ och SS er LOncern mood oe ACS & ~the d SEns vty BoumGes a del Co VS [+] (esc Derk Re ines Se nee Vien Wott perpcinits bythe photosurveillance and celephonéc surveillance Thee Or Pen Ca mM SS10dlo yn - 17 =- Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such in- formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.) Himes Howeve!, ii ERE s, espe EEE - @o en FOF protecting 1 eS the CIA's senstived sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty releya re in getting ome information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin . elto-t expressed the opinion that the Agency's egaggEmEy to pro- tect its sensitive sources and methods did Gai =ameeic wh ich emm effect qgmgm the quality of the information to Wiguma@@r the Warren Commission and its. en access. 4: a resulg ew __ ease 8 Si thhe A Domat qscisions ) aneepeaticcriniadgeeninleremnanes| e- access secs camp gear i a1S fegemiag a Commission. (Scekso dep. (Rankin at p. 23) Je j rr od Vhe Agency =i unilateral operations of the CIA's Mexico# city Station effects of 2) As a related consideration ;the* controversy sur-
ro, - 18 - WA rounding™photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man" Each of these concerns will be examined Ugg @rerein. The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was e . f . . . evident from the g@eeception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep. p.158) Scelso further testified: We were going to give them intelligence re- ports which derived from all our sources, in- cluding technical sources, including the tele- phone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone inter- cepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5) Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission nggarding Lee Harvey : Zi dan mene Oswald's trip to Mexico City. ‘(Cite.) Much of the informa- tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report. The"policy Syyamimggep limiting Warren Commission know- ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-
-~ 19 - phone taps, in order to protect your contin- uing 6p$S . Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOLA 498-204, 29Jan1964) The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of | December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal Special TavestigaX lors Group” of the CIA Counterintelligence/§$taff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison mea to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup- ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico. Papich queried O'Neal whether the FBI could wie supply the Warren Commission withsource of the telephone taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveil- lance operations in Mexico City, see CIA §qbr-3/779/510) O'Neal's memorandum mM that he discussed this matter with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote: He (Scelso) was guite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Com- mission at least in this manner--via the FBI- sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald) er oa]
-~ 22 - the form of this presentation J) agemieEeeS DT O- tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques. (CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420~757, 20 Dec 63) Iv. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during af He Gorm $$ por: “§ usssAdk the initial stage. of the CIA's telephonic and photo sur- veillance operations in Mexico city, (euebeiomatoatsis Helms testified: The reason for the sensitivity of these tele- phone taps and surveillance was not only be- cause it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were run- oa ning in conjunction with the [Mexican authori-~’ ties]and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feel- ings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, PP. 51- 2 re Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination. and uring the post-assassination SONI [18 JC) Fa ctheComare 2 eee, AS « os 2 id period of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council? ad rads Director McGeorge Bundy, 888% aware that the CIA had tele- phone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Em- bassy/Consulate$and that through these taps Oswald's pre- sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. ia fe Me Coag piGpes Poo ie St.0 cop Buen
tive operations to the’ Commission. ~ 23 - unwilliage Sy ‘The CIA's mmnall to inform the ‘Warren Commission sfis a source me, ~-s ‘ofconcern to this Committee. “It is indicative of. aA ee le . oo, Pod tos Kh 2S inned Skew initsfarer th roe © tademenntine tere pare ec O Tisai Ck Wa ciA Lalt Srcaeriebl “substance eaeisiniiiiinenaes information ‘mil Provices9 ‘the Warren Commission. (See Scelso aebty “this process _ might well have hampered the Commission's ability to (prom ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, | , Saks _. even thosé which might have meant exposing ‘certain sensi- ‘As noted previously, on January “31, "1964, the CIA "provided the Warren Commission with a ‘memorandum that / chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit¢ during. Septenber 26, 1963 - nae 3, 1963. . That memorandum Series no ention | Oswald's various conver- © =) ° sations with the Cuban and = Embassy /Consulateshad * "been tapped and subsequently transcribed: Furthermore, that memorandum = ndffiention amet that the CIA a had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban’ Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at- oe the Soviet Embassy /Consulate nor was mention made of the ms conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban . At Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.
J hebesede RT TD te MR rete et te tr TM SDT D Sr tar tee state te: On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indi- cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commissio Hipr indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephon¢e surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda ten to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willews did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveil- lance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, gE wson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief Scott | of Station in Mexico City wm provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: ry A « Hae, Prior to A ca it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,
~ 26 - 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephon& surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. _(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals ~aiegt the Warren Commission had learned that CIA —=———E's possess tad transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. Portices- Armes Thea? conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, anemmmmmne Concerned Silvia Durfia's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal gsind ba band . Police (cite?). @GR=RMEEMMiey Helms responded to the Com- stadt os mission's request for access, ggguimmmmmmime that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives’ review ae this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964) | tt shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts:~: As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City. (cPe8~ one or the other could well have provided the War- ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray- mond Roqas' testimony as Gited herein (Rocca dep. ) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.
- 27 = Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated CPerce(niss that the tentative conclusions Oswald's that he had reacheg memoranda@® of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, Mexico trip, were derived from CIA and yin addition a Mexican federal police summary G@emof interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote: A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, } an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu-- rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. These comments indicate that safkvson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that salftson had been provided the Duran telephon& intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments conerning the Meiftan police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission,as of March 25 / / had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. 4 ins sort pat The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion Wore. w of he witignm@eias based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testi- 7 Wis yramecan dur ears mony before the Mexican police. no
indication that he hag reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, Csiawsoy had™been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and a a “noted for this purpose. His analysis @Hould havemeflected ither by its corroboration or the fact of this eens’ above REnsst par pawl criticism of the Mexican police summary report. 1964, cone OS ge states that ax pig Westigaite 2 ad not been given S$ Sdawson restenls y he Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not -° suspt® ofa. reference to the surveillance operations, and a hmaryco- lice report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera- tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission H staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem- ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station: Our present plan in” passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here. (CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144) mined a Dal
- 29 - times. He statedgthat this conclusj was based upon his f 3 review of Silvfa Duran's tes ony to gk he Mexican gos ia (Slawson megOrandum, Margy fo 19644 ‘CIA p. ft?) Howeyer, i y * ie - Slawson gies not stat yy Frat hag feonclusiog® were alsgfdrawn sa from rg view of ayy pf the Py fiuction efi the Mexg Eo City statign sux il ance operafi ee 118" ‘FeasoningS dos podicate, however, rt “regaran g Oswald's chag visit to=sth access to. the eS eee production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, re- questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem- ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as aa! the ch had +i c Oswald @ at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, is definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dateSand exact timesof his presence in the Cuban embassy AE established as the result of the telephonic surveillance. Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than-they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts
~ 30 - could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its @boception but as. the record indicates they were not then made available. The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of tele- phoneé intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they articulata#one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agencye (Ambassador ann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Cole manana Slawsen “ Fett: 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa; 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in yerer -all cases where the intercepts Gam to the assassination or related subjects; 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the all@égation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed | _ Cysent . The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephongé intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA Pp. 3223). Necessarily, if Slawson ~atm oUt NEC CSS cg poe cane? the source of the information, he had not. been
- 31 - om) th echt ene provided that source ela ree ah 8. 020 os -gempusirioed + mes | “he first Coleman-Slawson request Gage : tends ts ‘Shes the Gammi Seren — nit een that ee d concerning the assassination (asgt eo ee "saect The second request, {item number three of the above listing] reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies @@# discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts._ ~ @F the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re- ayes oe oD, presentativese (Cite.) "oles. On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access.to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote: fhe most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con- spiracies, etc. took place.
Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA. That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephones surveillance operations and English translations of the same. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances David Slawson wrote: "...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22) Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination>. im mediaktly ~ Scott indicated that his staff queweeppe~e@eet began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. uiaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Golgernacion (pp.. 23-24). Slawson then concluded «imme ~~
AS Kcarrame on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Thomas Karramesines Acsstadt PDP C ttn s,m, rogarding the — rescotuinae circumstances mig this photograph“by the Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin @aaeagyeem told the Commission be g¢ggpigmmemiemmm the identity of the individual reques ted that . , 5 depicted in the photograph if that information eum available. On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone, Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret Sinee Dover se aa, 463 Services that the CIA had disseminated“several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret ssa Service S semmembieacmitinciaraaeeiy! - weaest Sri ews requested copies of these reports and other materials. Tocce ia, cables tame . r) . ates aall4 dt nt, £ <6 concerned waseias the photograph of the individual tppgepeeeee pha hehe Cite S tation of heigeer, Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother. bY Ig REGIA disseminated“ to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR85177), a-Copy-0€whtehowas-tTanrsmEtted@t o theaSeeretServree. That cable concerned the Dor mume-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic ‘ surveillance operations in Mexico City*at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. | John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:
"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?" Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission. Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations. (Scelso deposition, p. 150) 7 Ran dabeaad et aenee ee a weg. the Warren Commission ae meee access to 4 Sau rue se aX eanc€fri sea Vole ‘? fe? telephonic surveillance, production) (as discussed in the Sic: Jacl Ecfaiwh® preceding section), the #e@em of the photosurveillance operations, dae Ete trol eter Caen nelson Mad REGS moe ge iinoeiniivmserpaemms tO Cause concern within the Agency. On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankints request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since Novem ker 23, 1964. Rocca then-stated: "Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous S@X photographs which are not of Oswald..." (Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)
VIII. Luisa Calderon Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attach- ment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) Operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate. During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied ina joking tone: "Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy.” The callerwent on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, “yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassinations that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented: sore
-~ 44 -— We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows Luisa responded: Imagine, ong two, three and now, that makes .three. (She laughs.) Raymond Rocca, [azz PMO te in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Cofmission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments: Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknow- ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15) Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com- ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in- deed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may alsoeggieey be interpreted without such a sinister impli- cation. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assas- Sination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.
co - 47 - Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence ain Mexico City was first reported by the CIA'on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City SbStion and to the Chief of the CIA's» Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis- patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's @ommercial Office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report. On September 1, j a Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI reco Thad by ~ irst sep@@et MP the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that Soser hang oS cA 1 tine, ww Wemen,n, Chief of Counterintelligence for the ; ; Tepe! real . Special Affairs Staff, reseed the results of his de- was briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that ammuc|thad no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-
a ~t —_ 48 -_ LB@S . telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1~“"ier eefh asked if Oswald #as known to the Cuban intelligence ese services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told ——"e, — me Chat "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, \y Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. Cote Mans nbn band) oScA sep, thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch 2 ) (Ae traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure , Matai On May 7, 1964, ee corded additional informa- tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memoran- dum stated in part: "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not per- formed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are ‘ high. b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known-as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.
~ 49 = Kangoo On May 8 ~Gammemems further disclosed AMMUG's know- prareos 4 ledge of the Oswald case. =m paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows: I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned. about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI althought she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in “Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al- though Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan- dez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine- professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald... On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum tA to Director Richard Helms regarding the information eot had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that “the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis- cuss the AMMUG/1 sitaftion on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this
sd - 50 - ‘takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writ- ing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments). On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi- tivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of ==: May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of pol, foot Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez ane set apt onthe, forth. -However, that attachment hake s no reference. what- soever to Luisa Calderon. Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, vyvbéeiNvet the questions used in S—zmmmma' s interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Gounterintelligence Research and Analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw Gotu" 3 May 5 memorandum. The only mention of gideron was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about ‘ six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964. However, Willens was not shown the memoran- dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible
Oot A bat ay, ty wa Va Oa : Let As discussed in an earlier section of this report,. the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's production from its telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City until an advance#/stage in its investiga- tion. The record reflects that Mssrs. Willens, Slawson, . FeomcpR Suave Cilbecnts-€ «pw conf and Coleman did not review the production“until they visited Mexico City on April 9, 1964. At that time, they | : elepant) : reviewed a number of)Gntercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. These intercepts included one call to the Soviet Embassy on September 27g believed to have been Ue made by Oswaldj two calls made by Silvia Duran from the] Chas Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call from i the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassya made by an uni- d dentified caller. (Cite saison memo of April 21, 1864.) On September 28 the intercept operation recordéda Ctafor ing call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet EN Consulate. (Cite.) | | | \ Aten ‘On October 1 the intercept operation recorded two \aowrey, calls made by a person later identified as Lee Harvey | Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.) , / The Commission representatives were also supplied Po] \ C. ys . v'with the CIA intercepts of < two conversations that (p% transpired between the Cuban President Dortic@Sand the p ‘* Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations . ye . { concerned Silvia Duran's arrest, whether Oswald had been . a &
offered money while at the Cuban Embassy ,and the general | state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22, 1964, pp. 45-46). , T he Comm rttee’s db  @ review of CIA files .eujfemmegertEtepemaet corro- 4 . ? . ome randuum Marks 1g op borat@Gn of Slawson's Saco? the telephone inter- yuo cepts provided to and reviewed by the Commission. im One ye po rrieeSlarson's necerd | yu ' CIA document. ys bling memorandum i entitled “Material ; v _ mw ~ from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald y “ File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This a document records that the Warren Commission was shown calls (Pe made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. These included three ofWh nwo Corts SaAk ion S : ren. September 27 listed above, one call of September 28, two calls of October 1, and one call of nti . October le - < ~Jacum ‘While thiS”does not correspond to the listing of calls set forth by.Slawson, it does independently establish le ree pied Scare | that no “calls -mede~en November 22, 1963 were shown to he Warren Commission. In addition, this document corroborates the showing * of the two Dorticas~Armas _conversation$of November 26, | representatives in an effort to détermine if a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shyipn to the Warren eee
Calderon and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed Te to be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because ) Lor H J o there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because jou the allegation was in fact true. If the allegation 4 Anes were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been Lo f serious, er Tt woul demonstratedthat a CIA operative, . Fe, pe well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed in-ww! | formation prior to the assassination regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to Cuban Intelligence; and that’ Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate | President Kennedy. be ar Regarding $9 possible association with the CIA, evs ered Vv Eles reveal@ no ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA. However, there are indications that such contact eo? between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A a September 1,. 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Spe- cial Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico \* City states in part: ra ..-Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in aa Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of q Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further “5 identify the sister, our domestic exploita- \F a tion section might be in a position to follow Xo up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. (HMMW/1935, Sept. 1, 1963)
~ § -— An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that: Wilfredo of. the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear. (HMMA 21849, July 3l, 1965) At the very least, the above dispatcheS evidenced an interest in Calderon's activities and those of her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clan- destine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file. The Committee has queried the author of the above- cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be con- tacted by the CIA's “domestic exploitation section." es oo the-dtspettirs~erther, was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was yen responsible for recruitment and handling of.~. of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. | when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. | recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. |-&¢s%.» he would receive no
response to these requests. / Tt was| recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division might have been reguested to locate Luisa Calderon's sis- ter. | _feora the Comm#tee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intel- ligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, m.[ | stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August 31, 1978) Various present and former CIA representatives J were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been asso- a - ciated with the CIA. The uniform. answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August 7 bnnrz? Sek yr 9, 1978, p. 136; Rocca, Dep. Pp- 148, July 17, 1978; —cessmmen , Interview of August__, Paceolor Interview of _) ; wl cere v- Thus, the Agency’ file'% snd the testimony of former ie CIA employees Yeveartho connection 7 Calderon -6& the CIA. Yet; as indicated earlier, this jason ingompletey a 28 the most glaringemission beingftha hayeryptic remarks following the assassination of President Kennedy.
; AGEMUG/1 a Hf tor from the “Cuban Intelligence Services provided the CIA with significant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter) .* ‘CIA files reveal that A-1 defected from the DGI on April 21, 1964 in When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned over to the cra.{ [an 68894, 24 April 64) Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H. Langosch, went tol to meet A-l, debrief him, and arrange for A-1's travel into the United States. (See supra cite.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langeesh's debriefing of A-l were forwarded to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff from the Chief of Station inf fo] Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with the CIA for Operational purposes. (Contract Approving Of- ficer memo, 6 May G4) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: \ There is no question in my mind that, AMMUG-1 *It is now known that A-1l did provide significant leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon. It is further apparent that little of this information was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission. Therefore, the possibility exists that A-l had provided other information to the CIA that was relevant to the Warren Commission's work peethat wAt cb was not properly reported to the Commission.
is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (Langosch memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964) As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal wor Section B IN 68894 24 April 64)... Phis-seetien — was responsibile for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El. Salvador. (Personal Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964;| fn 68894 24 April _ j dent Sad Goc the ClA A-1l knew-who-were the Cuban ‘intelligence officers assigned to Mexico City. In this regaxd he intially : Pens thd apts Re ce : quer ws anil : 4 : identified Alfredo MizabaT, Manue}_slé a are Rogelio-Rodriguez and the Contiercial atbaché as DGI offigers posted at the Cuban Emb: "in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described A-1l's knowledge of DGI. operations in Mexico as follows: In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul ,Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intel-. ligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debrief- ing of A-1, 30 April 64)
-~7- eS T isa debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case." (Dispatch UFGW-5035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a- CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Cite supra. ) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten ration "SI." A CIA employee who has worked extensively with the Agency files system Tacit amen: Saat rn Cn sak bn au mba l Cal [enamrne &S this notation +8 stand—ferx the CIA component* Special In- . [Ye ~ telligence. Oerex CIB representatines pebieved the pS Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a re- ference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated , itc&s stated Quote Barbara's memo. 2 vo pen . ; ple} The Agency has been unable to locate this document and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the substance of the missing materials. The Committee has queried A-~l's case officers regarding alee yes additional information that A-1l may have supplied r : Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed: by the Committee stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August ; ponds 1978), he did not have contact with the Warren Commission i } and does not know what information derived from A-l's de- ane Bd AL briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (Cite also SR tne re APO ESE PELE NOE SELES ITE Fee TERRES Wirt ELIE 2 IES SC REESE A  OE ME E SETS BA BAO Se Ot ZS pa se ET ME a] Hidalgo and Piccolo. )} He also stated that he does not t ane rel ad A . , AES
A-/ recall that@@g provided any other co eaten Oswald's ny, Conk. Kua Ss Le Nowy é contact with the Det other than. ena get ote ; CLBA Se sonst heraine (Cite interview.) In a — effort to clarify the substance of informa- A tion that -BaMee provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the (i Committee has attempted to locate high. The. CIA has also. phi yy pert [but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts. — A! Thus, ‘gaps do exist xegarding information AMMUG may ap ae fe basis of | Col attempted to locate peut (give date of separation from CIA) (Aig Ly have supplied the CIA we ss Ud hh j (cori tion. ; q investigative significance #A broader question remains however. The Agency, as noted earlier did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-1l was present in the Washington, D.C. area and under controlled conditions ,accessible to the CS preg Aer tumns,decndion Te “ / Commission. Even—censtidering the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-1's status was not disclosed @sraclosed. the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 Vo, ps it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On Penis issue, as the written record te ds ‘to nck, the Agency UP obaoecntn rejected the poser" option. i Ana ae BORD Le-not fatima “AST S™ Case the PE eae, a fF. ra ao et light of the establishment of A-1's bone fides U y 4 (Gite Langosch's quote supora), his proven reliability and Jey ‘ cn depth of knowledge of Cuban ee AGO toes the ¢ ctivities,+A/ "tly Zor - tel TS vile Ot CoS ALLELE isaceé Qe a bara) Lasoe Vbe Vere, lenst 1 had vie oF Pre See ety i
-17- - -Mr. Rocca, as’ the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit ene A te anrb'uouy its information to the Warren Commission, after such in-/ ¢ i formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep. fle a {y> 34 pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.) ema tve | ack Hi res | AAT onde However, 3c s, ape — ts wD Conthicn Pet protecting 1 t5 prt Ng eee the CIA's senstived sources and methods, caused fh cmos t, the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty : C1A TF « . _ rebiwa , ar in getting #88 information than when the :protection of reont fe such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin prsee~ “a7 expressed the opinion that the Agency's eg pkep on fe o, tect its sensitive sources and methods did g===eiimae pagent ph . 5 wm gffect ummm the quality of the information to @agme@r a = H a the Warren Commission and i tenntenstted vo en , 5 Te fs at tan, Py - ray (Rankin at p-23) Js a fro ai a Agency woumiwitmmmig= unilateral decisions ememeneningguainieeoene)] c— VTS BM accesStocsA ts , 3§ avy ameep gM materials tpaag wemattinem che Comission. [scebso eee Y Ste . iat “ wo he ‘ ft rite Po & Cu : prt. s Yor fF 7 we . $En0 a ies s Laie i Sra 3 vi U“a¢e > $20 3% 4 ete wee Ts ware ay tet Ds layer Temaesang-sonneguag iis ENS) nian en iigs yea SH lei ,. ,Brtkks LAB CROERUDA SH tum Hee leg ee BA By 8 peqpuhits bthe photosurveillance and telephoné& surveillance j ae . ca operations of the CIA's Mexicos City Station ~ eflecks of he 2) As a related consideration ,the*controversy sur- ‘ tw ft wae (A Lite phere dcney Also, + F&F CaAc def. clk WorS Thas Coammettee Kas ae ~ he
-~ 18 - WA rounding™photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man" Each of these concerns will be examined® @eerein. The CIA's concern for revealing the existence -of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was 6 : A) . ‘ : evident from the ggeception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep. ° \ p.-158) Scelso further testified: e We were going to give them intelligence re- ye ¥ ports which derived from all our sources, in- Y 0 cluding technical sources, including the tele- ; phone intercept and the information gotten *) from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for ap a4 example, which corresponded almost exactly of with the information from the telephone inter- & cepts. (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5) a Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey , Bt dan mene ‘ Oswald's trip to Mexico City. ‘(Cite.) Much of the informa- tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had. been deleted completely from the report. A . mnebolicy limiting Warren Commission know- ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-
~ 19 — phone taps, in order to protect your contin- uing 6p3 . Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOLA 498-204, 29Jan1964) ‘ The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandun, Birch O'Neal Special LrvestigaX! ons Gfoup* of the CIA Counterintelligence/ Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison mem to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup- ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of Decmeber 9, 1963rSubmitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico, Papieh—queried O'Neat whether the FBI could whcr supply the Warren Commission withsource of the telephone taps. (The FBI had knowledge of CIA's telephone surveil- lance operations in Mexico City, see CIA §qe1-3/779/510) 7 s ; wy O'Neal's memorandum a that he discussed this matter np with Scelso,who ,in turn, after a discussion with Helms, \ \ was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed > 2 / _, a to the Warren Commission. | O'Neal wrote: tof. | He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the + og Agency's desire to make available to the Com- por mission at least in this manner-~-via the FBI- Be pe sensitive information which could relate to b [° telephone taps (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, & 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)
| pk Ld ~ 22 - Hast ussa( the—form-—of-this-presentation saith oe DY O- 2 tect’ the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques. (CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec. 63) | hea obec : Arfto. Mp». IV. Telephone Taps and Photo Surveillance Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during os fhe Gana $s poe’ § SSA / ‘ the initial stage of the CIA's telephonic and photo sur- veillance operations in Mexico City: Qeimrmensr amihascalmecacazatamcte The reason for the sensitivity of these tele- phone taps and surveillance was not only be- cause it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone_taps were run- , ning in conjunction with the [Mexican authori- Qt cee tied) and therefore, if this had become public knoWledge, it would have caused very bad feel- ings between Mexico and the United States, ”' and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session ¥ x aa Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to a the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations we | prior to the assassination_ and @uring the post-assassination ara) Sp if crs Leer) se feet Fact Comare ad Ee, ' \e , ‘7 of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council? ; ad bacn mada Director McGeorge Bundy, al aware that the CIA had tele- phone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Em- bassy/Consulategand that through these taps Oswald's pre- sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been orroborated. Joi fe Mc Cong Opes Ya Me Gee oy Buvntod o
- 23 - anwilbagness The CIA'S eggignmemaggs- to inform the.Warren Commission : of the above-described surveillance operations Wis fis-a—source ofconcern to this Committee. pt is indicative of es peiiee designed Peked ini tS vor the Petes god Wen Self cncomebartubl e substance etm@Ege=ee yee information Sa provider Da the Warren Commission. (See Scelso debcy This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro- ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, cventhosdWhich-might haue_noant—exposingcertsit” sensi "i se Creme, tive operations-to-the-commtssion. ell hae ef re, WO Wwe prs caging {oe As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA Comp (ete rey ft he, oom provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that /? Atl; FILS chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit@ during ~* ¢/4¢ in FTE September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum ‘» aid ; thot ' ; fr queee nOoYnention exitumgegimmemmmiogs Oswald's various conver- “tc sations with the Cuban and” Sovpti Embassy/Consulate$ had © hy been tapped and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, Lv c. yy) did - ee that memorandum segue nd enticn eximmpmmamiemme that the CIA ion had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban. An 4 tvt Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at ae pice wes the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the toe : : wo conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban 3/20 . t 4 : 4a” Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and fla a wo transcribed.
/On February 1, 1964,Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memoran- dum of January 3/ , 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that Ais weiting Qt AS Of tpmmereeeeeeense , the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephone¢surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and trans- cripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb- ruary 10, 1964 [2tter whether Oswald's direct communica- tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in gq of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com- mission had been informed of the telephong surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. Ga od- aor Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com- mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquar- ' ters in Langley; Virginia and had been shown various trans- cripts resulting from the CIA's telephon& surveillance operations in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren £ . ek Commission earned of these operations.
~ 25 — On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indi- cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did ( rb re, : net revealthe source of this information in its response to the Commissiongpr indicate’that it‘would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). 9 j op ae | f- Cw fee b4 in tf LA -L.J 02 4 sw 4d et f ~ T Hl - Shoei : apt” During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephon¢e surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tendto support the Committee's belief — iw47 ee een . that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, 14,43 and Willeys did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveil- & lance materials until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, Bly BO son and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief prand. of Station in Mexico City provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject:: is Heer, Prior to Apes it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,
- 26 - 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephon& surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals ~wiem@ig the Warren Commission had learned that CIA === possess tah transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. Portices- Armas Thea? conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, anime Concerned Silvia Durffa's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal pe Crm a Police (cite?). @GaaN@aRENRG@ey Helms responded to the Com- Shri 4 mission's request for access, ggguuieummuweme that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commissions representativeg* review @& this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964) It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas intercepts.-- As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City. (cPe8 one or the other could well have provided the War- ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray- mond Roaqas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep. ) lends. some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative. weer
Mexico trip, -~ 27 - Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated : . Preernies that the tentative conclusions manent, Oswald's that he had reacheg memoranda@® of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, were derived from CIA land ,in addition a Mexican federal police summary Ggprof interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote: A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned en they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic3 an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu- rate as Mrs. Duran'’s testimony to the police. These comments indicate that safson placed limited Yeliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that salfison had been provided the Duran |/telephon& intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments conerning the Meifktan police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission,as. of March 25 / / ‘had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ag insert pa: The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) | wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion WrAe. wes he Wweisisim@mins based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testi- 7 Wis rrapneran due pear’ mony before the Mexican police. no
_— Ot ee ~ 28 — indication that he. hed reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, m(slawsoy had™been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis igtould have reflected the fact of this reat ither by its corroboration or ocx PFnsetpah criticism of the Mexican police summary report. _ fad not been giv aWceSs to the Duran transcr S. he Commission had been Lae * Lomi forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did | S$uspror sto. reference to the surveillance operations, and ‘summary, po~ lice report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for lover three months in not exposing the surveillance opera- tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. AS was stated in the CIA cable of Decem- ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station: Our present plan in”“passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave -ODACID here. {CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)
- 29 - ; ¢ times. He statedffhat this conclus analy wwas based upon his . 3 oe review of Silvfa "Duran! s tes he Mexican pot ™e. Poail a . | (SLawson meyOrandum, NarefeT 1964¢g "CIA Pp. L972 ) Howeyer, . & ye Slawson | dies not stat gy hat his g€onclusioyg# were alsofdrawn from r@iew of Gf the PY fltaction eh the Mex gh f0 City ince operafro: so istatid su eil AySON does fndicate, Sere Oy eB farew howevdr, i Anal je-¥easonings PESTO ‘regardi i Qswald's aa ” z ae visit to. the ‘Cuban-mibassy’ > access to the telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some jambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy ¢f re- |questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was [.+& determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem- ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate 4s wd Av stating that an American, fdentified by CIA analysts as Oswald @ at the Cuban Embassy. tntti s ished that Oswald ha visited the Cuban _Embassy—on—at—least—two-occastons. Moreover, the specific dateSand_exact—times-of his—presence inthe Cuban Embassy ager established-as_the-result_of the. \ | tetephonic—surveiilanee. Had this information been made | available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established | than they were as of March 27, 1964. These-transeripts
- 30 - c ission — @ at—itsgdnception. but—as_the recont-imitcates_thesuwere not then—made_avablable. The record supports the Committee's finding that as Of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not Va been given access to the above-referenced series of tele- uv pad y 2 ‘Jana Slawson, the 4° a ye two requests for information from the Agencye (Ambassador phoné¢ intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman A ht bw POF of oné question to the CIA and Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Cole man ane Dies Aw SON MH Cote! Fat 1) What is the information source referred to in / | the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended ; Soy bey pe to settle down in Odessa; LO asl 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in : refer all cases where the intercepts @aemw to the assassination or related subjects; 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allégation that money was passed v J ) at ban Embassy is discussed VV SY rent ——= 4 Us The question y posed’ in the above-referenced \ | . \ + Hemorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephoné intercept 7 Waa of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April P 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Gesessarily, if Slawson ~see SOUMit FD neceserpde cease a _ the source of the information, he had not. been en a
| . PT SRN I Ra ob ais pode onal soa < apts ob vere < cw y come rs GE meen. Slawson request & = 7 tends “re oe an the Commi seren fee cthat tem Se’ J 2% WP given access, @= =r +t ¢ ae Pe ER 5 ms err 0 concerning the assassinagpion (as; pode cokes Nala GLa rnsrsi $6 im aon ahkey ” RPS Pe ef ctl event ce arr koxp a, ecetof Yer Tae UE =BeeN Gi Ker Aptessabor Rhy UL Me Sub} the Second 2equest, {item number three of the above listing? reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which’ the passing of monies @& discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos~Armas transcripts. _ -  @F the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re- he non presentativese (Cite.) ~ichis ; apne On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson artieutated their concern for receiving complete access: to all material®S relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They-wrote: The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con- spiracies, etc. took place.
Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA. That same day during a meeting. between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephone surveillance AC LOvapenced rs en 62 larsyerly PY pe farpucgs operations arm@ English translations ©f the same In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances David Slawson wrote: ",.-Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22) Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination, immediakel | Scott indicated that his staff qsmemememmmet began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents ovo . Wea immediately been put under surveillance following the
"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis- closed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit." (p.24) 7 . fe flat Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results “< of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes deal¥exclusively Fa) ‘yy with the telephonic intercepts pertaining s@,-xespectiveiy? “the v mek /  1Ge Duran and Oswald conversationsSorifhe perish Sept a7- Oct / ) 1963. It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's cs denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's A CUAN reasened, ability to draw*conclusionsjregarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico ote & of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren k | Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace ; the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities | in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise cots have baer sich materials weme available for analysis by the Commission. eregey
VI. sure llan ce 7 Kf rhe precy recties GPL Ltd pebg ow aa phe rey eGrint 29 we Keene of Rte eilhnn. We Ly save 2 AIA aL ‘ . Thus, the Agency's “Garly policy of not providing. the Commission with <i vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation, : ‘ that might have been more seriously considered had this =" ° ° Q ° cepta tobe EARS . agg ere te material been expeditiously provided; (e.g.,; Cuban involvement aan a (hella f La Catron At be ry Fm, . - a meee ~~ aA Gir “ma HON > Mexico City Mystery Man On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son®” THEE photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files fn in an effort to locate information on Oswald. This photograph fon -MdroLee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn en before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to | oswara. ( cick Helis 66) derek: in WER) On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that wt Rat ? she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153)
th Ae Kcrramel on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote omas Kourramesint$ Acsstack PDP vaty foeh OC THE | aah eis the A Ch Sigg dota ind this photograph“by the On that same-day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,, Wrenn wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret 4 ; Gintee Noy é s. , re Services tha the CIA had disseminate everal reports or £ read communications concerning the assassination to the Secret fy owas S domenica xe ety Sy a TE requested copies of these npeeports and other materials. Tes sin Cables (tiesyee em, weir ied vases the photograph of the individual menus saetaenee City Stadion aS Pe errr ie se | Oswald vn eneegeen shown to Oswald's awe ~ us Lod Lod bof Aken fe ey vn ie “7 7 \¥ ne hy weray A) disseminated“to the Secret Service was a November 26 cae ws a dissemination (DIR85177), a- to a tices . ey thenwkeerer=Seryvrre. That cable concerned the Dorj@mem@—Armas 4 conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic ee surveillance operations in Mexico citftat the time of the r °, assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:
- 37 - "We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?" Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission. Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations. (Scelso deposition, 150) 7 Febraty e146 Mt, the Warren Awd eae POF ANCL tonrh Commission Weegee TEEN access to A SOUL e OF banct(A te the Clt. telephonic surveillance production) (as discussed in the ¥ +h Sit OT 3 ee tagarre trclemy ws Lt fovrw neh Yh al the ~tegam of the photosurveillance operations, te thn Lol Adm ComnKSS tran no Met Bagit c Lovee. adse ; . . ~ . te : jepses tO cause concern within oe the Agency. On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin*s request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since Novemler 23, 1964. Rocca then stated: ae "Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer vy YA a to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by ay pes 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 v on \ letter). If they come back on this point he feels a that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to xe Ma go over to show the Commission the material rather than ra § pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these . yw vy items are of new substantive interest. We have either pare . : passed the material in substance to the Commission in . es, y esponse to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous s@x photographs which are not of Oswald..." mae AW (Reves memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250) DINED,
~ 44 — We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's’ say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows 7 Luisa responded: Imagine, one two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.) Raymond Rocca, £m roe pata a UARTAT fo a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban ‘conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments: Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex ‘post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination: that contains the suggestion of foreknow- ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15) ‘Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com- ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may .in- deed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may also =. be interpreted without such a sinister impli- cation. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assas- Sination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.
- 47 = “Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, HMMA21612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City séStion and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis- patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report. On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of et o#€ Station in Mexico City (Dispatch HMMW 11935) HP ins Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, Harold Swenson, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his de- briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum states that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In- to This AispecteAly peportea WAX: aot Cover) ¢
- 48 - telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson, as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. Swenson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch | traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, dams. Evin | 164 ct . pe for Cuba. On May 7, 1964, Swenson recorded additional informa- tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memoran- dum stated in part: "a. Luisa Calderon, Since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not per- formed any services. Her home is in \ the Vedado section where the rents are high. b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence. sse@erry
- 49 = ‘ On May 8 Swenson further disclosed AMMUG's know- ledge of the Oswald case. Swenson paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows: I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI althought she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al- though Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something Similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan- dez should be spelled. It could have been “Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine- professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald... t On May'll, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis- cuss the AMMUG/1 sitaution on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this
- 50 - takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writ- ing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments) . On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi- tivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of Swenson's May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez ame set forth. However, that attachment IS no reference. what- soever to Luisa Calderon. Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested , Ber are es ‘as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to~teek-et the questions used in Swenson's interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw Swenson's May 4&.memorandum. The only mention of gPlderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa calderon to the. DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early a\} in 1964. However, Willens was not shown the Swenson memoran- dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible