157-10014-10046 Date : 08/06/95 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY ; SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10046 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-04 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : HALLEY TO : TITLE : DATE : 08/19/75 PAGES : 159 SUBJECTS : JMWAVE CIA OPERATION MONGOOSE CASTRO, FIDEL DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 1A CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/31/98 OPENING CRITERIA ; COMMENTS : Box 2 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBocld: 3242393434 Page 1
Report of | ’roceedings JNVENTOMED: pn_3tel?7 ‘ere rtemrrecedeeteteretirrarts Tuesday, Auguet 19, 1975 Washington, D.C. (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 644-6000
(Witness: EXHIBITS Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 EXHIBIT POR IDENTIFICATION No. 2 Lad c=] 3 3 me u Q © 3 a ¢ £ & = z a a 3 e a ~ = = ra x) = *
TASCIOND: amt ‘2 y 7 4 410 Feest Street, 5.E., Wainington, O.C. 20003 5@ ann 2 Prone {Area 202) 844-6000 a 3 < a 4 o « « z .- STAFF INTERVIEW: Tuesday, August 19, 1975 United States Senate Select Committee to Study ‘Governmenta Operations With Respect t Intelligence Activities Washington, D.C. The Committes met, pursuant to notice, at 1:25 o'clock p.m. in Room 608, The Carroll Arms. Staff: Frederick Baron, Joseph diGenova, Professional Staff Members.
PRO Mr. Baron. Mr. Halley, is it true that you are here testifying today under alias, and that Halley is not uctually your true identity? ' Mr. Halley. That is correct. Prone (Ares 202) $44-4000 Mr. Baron. Your true Jdentity will be on file with the review staff of the CIA and available for verification by the i Committee if that becomes necessary? | } ‘Mr. Halley. That is my understanding. Nn 7 Mr. Baron. Let me show you a plece of paper marked 1 “Statement Regarding Testimony and Alias" and ilet me ask you . whether this is the Statement you signed as we were beginning here today which indicates your true identity ‘and which I have n witnessed? a > ¢ & € a & « g ‘a ; Mr. Halley. Yes, that is the correct statement that I ‘have not filled 7 4 Signed today. There is a blank there where we in the Senator's name. Mr. Baron. All right. i For the moment, let us leave that blank and enter it into f “the record as is, as Exhibit 1. (The document referred to Was marked Halley Exhibit No. 1 for identification.) t “4 ‘ 416 First Street, S.£., Wasmington, 0.6. 20003 _TOP SECRET
Prone (Aras 202) $48-6000 410 Frest Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. It igs your understanding, is ut not, that we have worked out an arrangement with the review state whereby the statement will be attached to your transcript as an Exhibit and in a sanitized form, leaving out either of the two raference to your true identity which will only ba available at this Agency. e ae Mr. Halley. That is my understanding. Mr. Baron. Are You aware that you have the right to counse before the Committea? Mr. Halley. Yes, I am. Mr. Baron. Are you appearing here, voluntarily here without counsel? Mr. Halley. Yes, I am. Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that at any point you entitled to cuase answering any questions and consult with counsel if you wish? Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of that. Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all your Constitu- tional rights are intact before the Committea here today, -dneluding your Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent? Mr. Halley. Yes, I am. Mr. Baron. I think we should put into the record the arrangement that we made before we began, and correct me if this is not your understanding of the arrangement, that we are testifying hare today without Placing you under oath hecause TOP SECRET
Prone {Araa 202) $44-4009 410 Fees Street, $.€., Wasrington, 0.0. 20003 there is no Senator availabla for that Purpose, but. both you and I are contemplating having a Senator swear you in and ask you if your transcript is true to the best of your knowledge at some point aS soon as possible as it can be arranged after today's session. Mr. Halley. Yes. The statement that you have just made is my understanding of the agreement that we entered into prior to this conversation going on the record. Mr. Raron. Thank you. Let us: bagin then with ‘some veryi broad questions: about your background in the Agency. Can you tell me what you Were doing in the Agency prior to your involvement with thea -OMWAVE station? Mr. Halley. I became involved with the Cuban affair in approximately February of 1962. At that time, I was in Head- quarters. Iwas Chief of Foreiqn Intelligence Activities for th Eastern European Division. 1 was asked to be released from thos duties to conduct a survey of the Opportunities for running intelligence operations against Cuba. I was released from those ‘dutiesi I did engage in a survey of the Possibilities for runnina intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary operations against Cuba. Mr. Baron. Your position as Chief of Foreign Intelligence for Eastern Europe did not involve Cuba in any way? That was your last position before you became involved in Cuban affairs, TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 J ee) 4 a a o « < x 7 410 Ferst Street, $.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 is that correct? Mr. Halley. That is corract. I want to qualify that. Undoubtedly, there wera some actions that were being conducted in the Eastern European area that reflected on Cuba, but I was not involved in the Bay of Pig Operation. I was not fully focused on Cuban operations until o approximately February of 1962. Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency? Mr. Halley. I joined the Agency originally in 1951. Mr. Baron. In a very general way, can you describe the nature of your activities at the Agency prior to February of *62 Mr. Halley. When I was first assiqned to the Agency, I was an Army officer on active duty. I went through the usual Aqency training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities where IT originally was focused on Polish and German operations. I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 in Germany.‘.In the course of that. service, I spent most of my time working on the Eastern European Satellites, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. In addition, I was involved on occasion in ‘Soviet operations and East German operations. Mr. Baron. Did you have any involvement in Latin American affairs prior to February of '62? Mr. Halley. Yes. In the period 1960-62, I.was‘responsible for setting up operational activity in Latin America that Was targetted more explicitly on the Eastern European satellites TOP SECRET 1
brome (Ares 202} 544-6000 410 First Street, S.€., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003 to some extent on the Soviet Union. This was in a period of tim where the Eastern European satellites were expanding their Presence in Latin America. In my duties in tha Eastern European Nivision, I was responsible for getting this Program aoing in Latin America, so I did have an extensive xposure to Latin America: in the period '60 to *62, as I recall those dates. The accuracy of those dates can be checked from my official travel records, and SO On. Mr. Baron. During that period of time you were actually in Latin America helping to set up this program? Mr. Halley. No, I was Stationed in Washington, but I travelled to Latin America during this particular period of time. Mr. Baron. Did you travel to Cuba at any point during the course of that operation? | Mr. Halley. “Not specifically. I think I transitted Cuba on air Stops being routed to various countries. I think I was at one or two Cuban airfields, but simply in transit, Mr. Baron. Not long enough even to talk to the people at ‘the Station in Cuba? Mr. Halley. No, I had no contact at any time with the Havana Station. Mr. Baron. Did you pick up, during this period of time, 4 general sense of the attitude of Latin American governments toward the Castro government? Could you characterize that TOP SECRET.
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 Y 3 nN ) 2 < & 4 a & < 3 762% 410 First Street, $.€., Wasningten, 0.€. 20003 attitude, if you did? Mr. Halley. I certainly was aware, I think, of the broad political trend in the Hemisphere at that time, my interest was much more narrowly focused at that time on the Eastern European targets, and on the Soviet target, and I was not certainly Specializing in Cuban affairs at that juncture. Mr. Baron. Cuba was not viewed at that juncture as part of the Soviet target, as a Soviet satellite?: Mr. Halley. No, it was not. Mr. Baron. Coming then to February of '62, is that the point at which you joined the JMWAVE Station in Miami? Mr. Halley. No. When I first entered into this survey, it was to do this on a TDY basis, temporary duty assignment, to complete a report on my findings, to report those at that particular juncture to Mr. Harvey who was the head of the Task Porce that was attempting to expand intelligence coverage of Cuba and I was not assigned to the station at that particular point in time. ‘Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the JMWAVE Station? Mr. Halley. Shortly after having completed this survey. These dates are blurred now because the survey soon turned into & permanent assignment. I would have to check the exact dates from my service records, but after having completed the survey report, shortly thereafter I wags asked to go to Miami to become permanently assigned to the station in Miami. I do not recall TOP SECRET \
o Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD a PAUL 0 7 & 410 Ferst Street, S.£., Wasnington, Q.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that that was sometime before the end of May of '62? Mr. Halley. Yes. It was probably before that, but as I Say, there are a couple of weeks gap that we would have to look at my service record to get the exact datas, but Certainly it could have been March, it could have been April: put I reserve, you know, the right to check my record if that is a critical point in terms of what you are trying to astablish, Mr. ‘Baron. Certainly. I should say Generally at this point, 1€ anything we cover today gives you that kind of problem it would be immensely helpful to us if you would check your. answers against. documents that might be available in the CIA, Mr. Halley. Yes, all right. Mr. Baron. In fact, let me ask you if you would check tha One out, because it would be useful to know exactly when you joined the JMWAVE station. During the period of time before you joined JMWAVE, while You were conducting the survey, did you report to anyone other than William Harvey? Mr. Halley. In a formal Sense, this TDY was conducted on behalf of the task force commander, who was Mr, Harvey. While I was in Miami conducting the Survey, I obviously discussed TOP SECRET
matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in charge of the operational activity in Miami. ‘That team was essentially headed by Mr. Al Cox,.who has since died. Prone (Ares 202) $44-40n6 Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station? Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Cox was the head, then, of what woul be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station. * Mr. Baron. Was he the head of IMWAVE until the pint when you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the JMWAVE Station? _ Mr. Halley. That is correct. ‘He was the head of that unit until such time as I replaced him. Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this Survey that you were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-callpd WARD & PAUL Special Group in the White House which was part of the National & C co Security Council structure and used the project namec! MONGOOSE 4 for anti-Cuban operations? 7 Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a “survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General Lansdale and Mr. Helms. This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practica purposes the task force unit which was manaqed by Mr. Harvey. 410 First Street, 3.E.. Wainington, 0.¢. 20003 I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 410 Frese Street, $.E£., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 used, that is Project MONGOOSE, or whatever you said. I do not know the exact words you used. I am not familiar with that terminology. Mr Baron. . During the whole Period of your involvement with JMWAVE, you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as such? Mr. Halley. I am not aware of Project MONGOOSE. I do not recall it as an acronym, cryptonym or anything @lse that was in common usage in my conversations. — Also, you have to understand that during that particular time, Mr. Harvey was subordinate to the normal Agency chain of command. In other words, he had Parallel lines, if you will. There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting regularly. At the same time, as the Task Force Commander, he was reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr. Helms. Mr Baron. You began your survey just about the time that Mr. Helms replaced Mr. Bissell as DDP? Mr. Halley. That is right. “Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the command relationship ‘between the three-man group that you have mentioned and William Harvey as head of Task Force W? Nid that group task Harvey directly, or did Harvey's assignments have to come through Helms and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not includ the DCI? Mr. Halley. “My understanding of it at the time was we were TOP SECRET
Prone {Ares 202) $44-6000 c. cl WARD & PAUL 410 First Ste@et, $.E., Wainingtan, O.C. 20003 really talking about parallel lines. In other words, this three-man group was meeting. Mr. Helms was both a member of that particular group and the DDP. ‘Therefore, when he came back from one of these meetings and issued instructions to Mr. Harvey it was, you know, tantamount to these things coming through two channels simultaneously, one coming from thig three-man task 7 & force and the other instruction simultaneously coming from Mr. Helms who was the DDP. Mr. Baron. As far as Mr. Harvey was concerned, an assiqn- ment or order from Richard Helms .was an order to be taken at face value? Harvey did not hava to question whether it had the Stamp of approval from the DCI or not? Would that have been your operating understanding? | Mr. Halley. That would have been my understanding, yes. Certainly an instruction received from Mr. Helms was a valid Agency instruction. | Mr. Baron. The DCI at this point was John McCone. Mr. Halley. That is correct. Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the relationship ‘between this three-man group and John McCone at that point? Mr. Halley. Not on a day to day basis. Once I went to Miami, I came back on a regular basis to review operational plans and programs. On one occasion I accompanied Mr. McCone to the White House to give a presentation or sit in while the ‘presentation was being made. TOP SECRET.
Mr. Baron. Where was this? What waa the forum in the presentation was made. Mr. Halley. This was a meeting with President Kennedy and Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particula Maeting. Mr. Baron. Was thata Cabinet meeting or, was it a Special Group meating as a sub-unit of the National Security Council? Mr. Halley. You know, that happened in 1962. This is 1975. EX do not recall then with precision as to whether it was a meeting of the Cabinet or whether: it was a meating of the National Security Council, or whether it was & meeting of the Special Group. . | Mr. Baron. That: is perfectly understandable. Do you recal 4 a) Ce < & which Cabinet members were present at that meeting? ae 6 Mr. Halley. | Yes.. My recollection of that was that Mr. McNamara was present, Mr. Rusk was present, Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, was present. You know, I am just vague now at this particular point. Those are the ones that stick out in my memory as being present. Mr. Baron. Was the DCI present? Mr. Halley. Yes, the DCI was present, and he gave a portion of the presentation. As I recall, Mr. FitzGerald gave the other portion of the presentation. Mr. Baron. Who at that point replaced William Harvey as Chief of Task Force W? TOP SECRET 416 Fiest Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Prone (Ares 202) 344-6000 2 5.8., Washington, &.6. 20003 410 Forse Street ret Seb, eins . mee gees ot TOOTS sere rer rene gn ET CLRR AS NMS he cl then FitzGerald, then Screber, after that, Hart. fr Served with all four of those This was a very active Period, you know, to giva you the precisa dates, Mr. Baron. What was the substance of this meeting that they had in which the President Was Present? Mr. Halley. This was a general review of activities that were being Conducted against Cuba, | Mr. Baron. Was thera 4ny Mention of any assassination effort at that Meeting? Mr Halley. No, there was not. Baron. You were attending at that point in Connection Survey you conducted? Agency Spokesmen. ma if I knew the relationship between Mr. McCone and this three-man group. I said NO, On a day-to-day hasis I dia not know the relationship, but that there were meetings that ware TOP SECRET |
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000- | < Be a Qa ce < & 60 7 410 Furst Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 attended by mea in which Mr. McCone was talking ¢t individuals like Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who waa a member of that group. | Me. Baron, Were you aware that that group might have gone by any particular name or dasigqnation? Mr. Halley. No, I am not. Mr. Baron. You are not familiar with the tarm Special Group? Mr. Halley. Yas, I am. aware of the term Special Group. Tt am aware that the chronology of the 303 Committee, Special Group, 40 Committee and so forth, but as I Mentioned to you earlier, that particular time, I cannot distinguish between whether this Was an ad hoc meeting or this was a Special Group Meeting, or what it was. Mr. Baron. Did you assume at that time that the threa-man group that you referred to, including: the Attorney ‘General, General Lansdale and Richard Halms, had a formal relationship to this larger Special Group? In other words, Was that three- man group a kind of decision-making sub-unit of the Special “Group, or do you think it operated entirely independent from the National Security Council structure. Mr. Malley. I do not think I can give you an authoritative answer to that. I would go back to what I previously told you. When I entered into this project in February of '62, the chain of command that I was familiar with was this three-man TOP SECRET
Prone (Araa 202) $44-g006 | 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.¢, 20003 group in constant contact with Mr. Harvey. The second chain of command, paralleling that, was Mr, Harvey Yaeporting to the DDP and the ppp subsequently reporting through his chain of “command to the Director, and that would be the only way that I could characterize that with any accuracy, Mr. Baron. Did those two chains of command continue”... as the channels of decision-making and tasking when you Were -. or during your tenure as Chief of Station.at -JMWAVE? * Mr. Halley. That relationship changed, and again I do not have the date at my fingertips at what time that changed. I know that shortly thereafter I was'in Miami, General Lansdale came down to visit me, to talk with me, about the Progress that wag being made in the operational program. At some point after that, this three-man group for all intents and purposes disappeared. General Lansdale was reassigned; the group broke up; subsequent reviews of the program wera made at the Special Group level. As an example, we would have to Submit every month the number of operations that we were going to run, such as infiltrations into Cuba *hrough what would be ‘paramilitary means, and these Were approved by the Special Group. There was an approval Procedure for setting those up, SO subsequently the three-man group disappeared and the regular mechanism of the Special Group came into play. I am sorry, I cannot give you a precise date for that change, but I am sure it is in the record and 1 am sure you eve TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-8000 - us 410 Forst Street, S.E., Washington, 0.¢, 26003 ~~ Cc & ee fh. @: “= 4 Foor a . ce & 9 N of Material for you. Tt feal that you would just have to gat those dates for the record. Mr. Baron. We can do that. Would you say that every major operation that you undertook at JMWAVE would have been approved by the Special Group or at least they would have been put on notica of the nature of any major operation that you were Planning? Mr. Halley. Why do you not define for me what you consider to be a major operation so we do not get into, you know, a problem? If‘you feek ‘that you cannot.do'‘that ‘tw. Mr. Baron. Perhaps we can‘turn it around and say, could you characterize the kinds of operations generally that you would refer to this three-man group initially, z the Special Group later, for their approval, or at least to put them on ‘“notice,.-. the kinds that you might not refer and instead procee unilaterally? Mr. Halley. Initially, the three-man group was seized with the problem of conducting the Survey of what could be ‘done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed | upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, thx three-man group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is, the Special Group. As procedures. became more formalized, we had to submit a monthly schedule of the kind of operations that TOP SECRET
é SIO First Street, §.€. + Washington, 0.€. 20003 Prone (Area 202) $44-6000_ would be conducted against Cuba in the Paramilitary ‘Lelds, In other words, if we were going to run an oper tion that Was going to be a cache replacement in the Cuban mati land, that had to be put in, say in our October schedule, that etober Schedule had to be submitted to the Washington Headquarters so they could make 1t avallabla to the Special. Group sometime in September, So I would regard a cache, say the lowest kind of Operation in terms of Sensitivity, and then you could: move up from team infiltrations that had to be approved in advance, resupply missions, Pparamiltary operations against fixed instal- lations would all be approved. Mr. Baron. If there had been any operation with the assassination of Fidel Castro, or other high Cuban government leaders as its objective, would such an operation havé been referred to either the three-man group or later the Special Group. Mr. Halley. .€ such an operation had been proposed . from Miami; it would have had to have gone through that particular process, Mr. Baron. Your answer seems to indicate that only Operations that originated at the JMWAVE Station would be referred up for approval. Is that correct? Mr. Halley. That is the kind of activity that I have firsthand knowledge of. When I became the Station Chief, 1 told you My time at this was essentially February of 1962 through JOP SECRET
either June or July of "65. That was my stevardshipe That was my involvement in the Cuban operation. During that particular period of tima, my firsthand knowled é Prone (Area 202) $44-6000: of these events would be, if that kind of Operation Were to go forward it would hava had to go through this approva “mechanism, it would have had to have been some formal action taken. If it Were something that certainly would ~~ for some reason might not be committed to paper, somebody may have wanted to discuss it orally from Miami, the chain of command would have been from me to whomever was the head of the Task Force in Washington, or later, when the Task Force became Yeintegrated into the Western Hemisphere Division, I would have had to talk to the hiset of the Western Hemisphere Division, who at ona time was FitzGerald. ARDS & PAUL Mrz Baron. But a Plan that originated at the CIA above the level of the Chief of Station at JMWAVE would not Inecessaril £9 cn Cc am A ©: Cc! 38 c sO ia have been referred to Special Group for approval, is that correct? Mr. Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, there- fore I am-trying to restrict myself to those things that I have “personal Knowladge of, In other words, that is the kind of thing that 1 think you should talk to, you know, those’ who were involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr.j Harvey or Mr. Screber or others who would be able to give youra better Perception of that. 410 Furst Street, $.£., Wasnington, 0.¢. 20003 I want to make one point here, that once I want t6 Miami, TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6009 : Xo) os {ang om mw e-. 3 x Cy cs & Cc 4 7 4160 Ferst Street, $.€., Wathington, 6.¢. 20003 : ee I was a regular visitor to: Washington,’ but always or one or two days at a ‘time when there was always a full age nda of events to be discussed that related to the Station in Miaitt. I did not carry here, I did not engage, you know, in idle coliversation wit my associates. Therefore, I was not aware of the. fixstuand situation of how they conducted business on a suste ined basis on items that did not ‘immediately impact on Miami.” Mr. Baron. Do you have.any Personal. no any operation run out of the JMWAVE Station that could De construed a6 €@n assassination effort? Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Mr. Baron. Do you have firsthand knowlédga offany operatio run out of Florida-with cra involvement that could be construed as an assassination effort? Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any firsthand k owledge. You also have to put this in a historical perspective. In other words, from what 1 have read in the Press Since then, obviously I could put certain things together. vou lare asking ‘ me in this timeframe, 1962 to 1965, did I have any firsthand “Knowledge -at that particular time? Mr. Baron. Exactly. Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no, I did not. You also have to put yourself in the historical context of that particular time. Thousands of refugees ware coming out of Cuba, coming into Miami, Dade County up and down the}Florida TOP SECRET
Thera was «@ regular machanism ‘to 8Craan these people. Any number of thase people had plane or ideas for changing the situation in Cuba, among those ideas for changing the situation Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 in Cuba were Plans to assassinate any number of People in Cuba. This was something that wag talked about, you could go down to any coffee house in downtown Miami anda Cubans would be talking a a that kind of languaqe.. So I do not want to leave you with the impression that the word assassination never cama across my radar Screen, ‘bat we n 9 are talking about, and my answer was geared to a Planned opera-.. tion by CIA, 7 Mr. Baron. Or with cra involvement of any sort? @ Mr. Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no operation that n Py] 2 < a -@ 3) « < z was a Planned ‘operational activity, you know, for the sole a Purpose of J28sassinating, you know, Mr. A, Bor Mr. C..This was. -" GenDien® the :allernteof the time. People were talking about these ) 7 things in the refugee community, thease kind of things were being discussed. Mr. Baron. Mr. A, B or C could have been Fidel Castro, es fF i, a re ra ‘Raul Castro? . Mr. Halley. It could have been anyone. This was the mood of the Latin American revolutionary where a coup, you know, is away of life, where restaurants and coffee houses abound ‘with "410 Forst Steeet, $.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 conversation about how to Tun a coup. In the running of a coup, One of the things that People talk about is how do you control TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 262) 544-6000 G « os Cc Cc. ~~ o-: PB] = ~é a cE B (ony io) ~ 416 Fiest Street, §.€., Washington, 0.€. 20003 the leadership which then exists at that time. Mr. Baron. Are you saying that-you are not aware of any“ operation, which. could: have had 4S one of its subsidiary objec- tives, whether the primary objective or not, the assassination of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or Che Guevara, which was run with CIA ihvolvement? Mr. Hallay. I would like fo phrase that question slightly differently, because I think, you know, you have Several things tied together. I would like to answer your question this way. During my tenure in Miami, I did not Put forth any Proposal to mount an assassination Operation. In other words, there was no formal plan, I did not put forth any operational proposal along this line. Secondly, I am not aware of any assassination plans being put forth, you know, by Mr. Harvey or by anyone else at that Particular time. That is the way I would prefer to answer that. Mr. Baron. What kind of problem did you have with the question as it was -asked? Mr. Haliey. Well, you lumped a number of things together. ‘I am trying to separate these out. In other words, you put in A there a Secondary or tertiary consideration, Mr. Baron. Right, I am interested in that. Mr. Halley. That is what bothers me, because I did not put forth any plans. On. the other hand, I do not want to be held responsible for such things a8 CIA heing in touch with a TOP SECRET
Organize a resistance and, unbeknownst to me, might have had Prone {Area 202} 344-6000 their own ideas which were never consulted with us, you know, never discussed with us, through tha communications channels that we had, who may have been thinking, May have planned, and may have attempted, to implement dssassination operations. Ido not feel under the command and control mechanism that existed that r could exercise through the Station over such a situation that 1 could be held responsible for that. Therefore, I cannot accept your question on the Secondary or tertiary Situation because I have no knowledga of those. You may have Some knowledge and you can confront me with some statement by Some Cuban who said that this was part of his mission. I have to look at that at the time. Ch Lon) Cc Ce. RB S: 2 <€ cf a Oe z Cc 6 ™~ Mr. Baron. We will go over some statements, but in trying to recover this ground oné More time, I think it is important to distinguish an attempt to pin the responsibility on you, which I am not trying to do by my questioning ~~ , Mr. Halley. That is a complicated question, . Mr. Baron. The attempt to simply -- undoubtedly, the attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and any awareness that you may have had of any kind of operation that had assassi tion as one of its objectives, and also involved the CIA to 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, B.C. 20003 any éxtent. That is what I am asking you for. TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202} $44-6000 ‘ 410 Forest Street, $.£., Washington, 6.¢. 20003 Mr. Halley. Right, and r will stand by my answer; that is, I put forth no Plans, I know of no plans put forth, you know, during my tenure in Miami in which . assassination was part of the operational rationale. You know, the Only way we can Clarif this perhaps to your satisfaction is to diacugs some specifics, If you are Prepared to talk about specifics, maybe I can deal with those within the framawork of that general statement that i made, you know. tf know how Cubans talk. I know the rumors that have existed over the years. 1 simply do not want to be identified with any action conducted by some group over which I had no knowledge or control. That. is my kay point. Mr. Baron. I think that answers it for now, and cover some specifics later. One more question on this dual chain of commana: On the One hand, the Agency chain of command from the DDP to Harvey to you at JMWAVE, and on the other hand, the three-man decision making group consisting of the Attorney General, Lansdale and Helms. Would you say in the early days that this three-man group appeared to you to be in control of the decision making “before the Special Group stepped in, that decisions were made AS in a less formal way than they were later under the Special Group? Mr. Halley. 1 really could not address myself to that. In other words, I never sat in on a meeting of the three-man group. In other words -- TOP SECRET
te é 410 Forest Street, S.€., Washington, D.¢. 20003 (ain) cS ~~ oe. a 4 ci ce @ z on at ~ Phone (Area 202) 844-6009 What about the kind of reporting that was Tequired of you by tha three-man group &8 Opposed to the Special Group? Mr. Halley. My requirements for reporting Teally stemmed in the early days from Harvey. If there were any special requirements, he was taking “them: from -the -three-man group and ¢ * translating them and, in fact, much of the system of Feporting in those early days was generated by me .and' what«I‘ thought.” Was required to keep Mr. Harvey as a Task Porce Commander fully informed. I think that you undoubtedly know from the Yecord that I worked for Mr. Harvey prior to 1962 and therefore I was familiar, you know, with his Sense. So when I went to Miami, I Organized much of the reporting flaw upward, if you will, from the field unit to Headquarters. Mr. Baron. fad You worked for Me. Harvey in Germany? Mr. Halley. Yes, 1 had. Mr. Baron. In Berlin? Mr. Halley. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. This was on the famous and Successful tunnel Operation? Mr. Halley. No, I do not deserve any credit for the tunnel Operation. That is mr. Harvey's activity. He kept that vary tightly compartmented and in the days when that was going on, I TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6009 2 7 Oo; WARD 7609 410 First Street, $.6., Washington, D.C. 20003 was involved primarily with Eastern European activities. Mr. Baron. You were aware of Mr. Harvey's style of operating? Mr. Halley, Yes, ‘Y worked with him -- I think the date is Somewhere'in June or July of '§4 to Somewhere in ‘S59. I would Baron. But you say you not Only had a close working relationship with Mr. Harvey, but you came to be a Personal friend of his? Mr. Halley. ‘Yes, T would like to say I am & personal frien of Mr. Harvey. Mr. Baron. Returning to your Statements about the chain of command, YOu seem to be saying that mr. Harvey served as the funnel for both of these Chains of command; as far ag you were concerned, you received directives from him, whatever the source may have been Originally, is that correct? Mr. Halley. Correct, I want to make a Point. Insofar as the three-man group was concerned, I would see Helms in his role as the DDP in the three “Man group. I would See Lansdale --~ as I told you, Lansdale cama down to visit me in Miami on one occasion, He cama as part of that. three-man group. But my chain of command during my visit was still from me to Harvey. Lansdale .was down there, I was to be, you know, straightforward, candid, discuss Plans, Programs, problems. But I received my orders and instructions TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 410 Fiest Street, $.€., Washington, 0.¢, 20003 control of money and 80 forth was vested in the Task Force Commander, Mr. Harvey. Therefore, I never dealt with this three-man group as a body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various mutations. ® Mr. Baron, Would you say that the three-man group had a less formal, more ‘free-wheeling style of decision making, “/ there was a real change in the rigor with which you. were require to report after the Special Group took over? Mr. Halley. I would have to say that the total reporting became more formalized the longer we stayed in business. 1 Cannot ascribe this to the difference of Style of the three-man Group as opposed to the Agency chain of command or subsequent with the requirements of the Special Group. This evolved from “a body of experience that was gained as the operation was established and got some experience. So I would not want to characterize that @s being a result of the groups. Mr. Baron. You did not. “have any problem with the propriet ‘of the three- “man group in the early. stages? Mr. Halley. No, I had no reason to believe that it was not a duly constituted body. In other words, the.t. officers tha I reported to,in that particular case, Mr, Harvey, Mr. Helms, Were my chain of command at that particular point, were the Ones who briefed me on the “existence of this three-man body TOP SECRET .
Pnone {Area 202} $44-6000 @ a 4 ~] < “a wo 8 a < < z a 7 64 410 Fiest Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 that body. Mr. Baron. Who. briefed you on the existence of the body? Mr. Halley. My recollection of the initial briefing was from Mr. Harvey. Mr. Baron. Do You recall how he described that three-man group and the responsibilities? Mr. Halley. No. This was 1962, and this is 1975, As .You know from my records, these intervening Years have been very active for me, therefore, I do not remember with precision that conversation in all of its details. Ido recall my first briefing on the existence of this three-man group being from Harvey. Mr. Baron. You mentioned that General Lansdale might | occasionally meet with you Personally. This is in Miami, at JMWAVE Station? | Mr. Halley. I can only recall at this Point one Specific meeting where he came down to Florida in Miami to visit. Mr. Baron. What was the substance of that meeting? Mr. Halley. He was given some briefings by my staff on their areas of specialization, whether it was foreign intelli- gence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether it was paramilitary activities. I spent a lot of time with him. personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making progress in the collection of intelligence, where we were having TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 348-6000 ° @ p 2 3 < a ‘a a “e « = 6 4 416 Fiest Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 problems, and so on. it Was a substantive management. operation, problen-oriented type of conversation. Mr. Barony. . What Period of tima would you place this in? Mr. Halley. Probably sometime. in the surimer of °62, becausa my family was already in Miami at that point, and when I first went to Miami my family was not with me. I think my wife joined me in Miami sometime in the summer of ‘62, you know, I would have to re8earch that. It is obviously available from the records as to when my family movea and a permanent change of station. Mr. Baron: Was there any discussion whether direct or indirect of assassination of Cuban leaders during your meetings with General Lansdale? Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such conversations. You know, I think that from -my point of view, we are off a little bit on this perspective «= I would like to try to focus on the Perspective for you in the historical setting. Mr. Baron. Please do. Mr. Halley. £ think by your questions and your interest, “you are narrowly focused on this assassinatién thing, but let me turn that around a bit, and let me put it in my context at the. time which may help you understand my answers, Mr. Baron. Before you do, can I stop you for one momant? I would like to get back on the track that we originally Started on of asking you about tha JMWAVE Station in general TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44.6900 “ a] on Cc. ™~ eo. < Cc & ce € B ce © ~ | .. Washington, D.C, 20003 410 Frese Street, $.£. and the context at that time. Could I ask Just a: coupie of specific questions before we do that, about the three-man group that you raised, and then give you a full opportunity to pelt pu eub-of what we have said so far and everything that‘will follow into context. Did you have any individual Meetings with Robert Kennedy, who was then-Attorney General? Mr. Halley. You mean individual, one on ona? Are you saying did Ir have & meeting,-~-a# personal, private meeting with othe Attorney Genéral? watt “e.. Me. Baron. Yes. Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no. Mr. Baron. Did you have any meatings with the Attorney General of any sort during this Period of time? Mr. Halley. _t mentioned to you earlier that at this meetin that I went to with Director McCone, the Attorney General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, was present at that White House briefing. He did ask some questions, which I do not remember what the questions were at this particular point in time. I answered ‘some of those questions that were put during the course of that particular presentation. Throughout that whole Period of time, “that was the only, if you will, direct contact with him that I can remember. You know, unless you can show me something. Mr. Baron. During the antire Period that you wera involved with JMWAVE? TOP SECRET
Prone {Ares 202) 544-6000 Loi 0. gs ct < zg 769 416 First Street, $.£,, Washington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Halley. That is right. Mr. Baron. At that meating -~ again, I realize what we are doing is an {solation out of context -- at that meeting that you attended, with the Cabinet Members and the President, was there any discussion either directly or indirectly or by means of any circumlocutions:. of tha subject of assassination? Mr. Halley. Not that t can recall, You know, my Yecollection of that meeting is, we went to it én masse, the first ---you know, Director McCone, myself, Bruce § aver, several other people who went. We went in Several cars. We went to the Meeting, the Cuban issue was the first ltem on the aqenda. As I recall the thing, the Cuban thing was over after this Period of time. We, the technocrats left, the Director John McCone stayed on. You know, during my Presance at the meeting there was nothing discussed ahout assassinations. Mr. Baron. Was there any such discussion between yourself and John McCone or Richard Helms at any point? Mr. Halley. I never recall discussing assassinations with ‘John McCone. Now, in terms of discussions with Richard Helms, these were conversations. in which atmospherics in Miami and problems: like that would be discusdged, “and I am-sura somewhere in some of these conversations the mood of the community, the subject of assassinations undoubtedly came up. This was part of the life of that particular period. TOP SECRET
I cannot remember a specific data, you know, some time at which that was discussed, and you know I never received any instruction from Helms to mount an assassination operation, Prone (Aras 202) $44-6000 ° Mr. Baron. Again, I am not trying to unfairly pull these kinds of :conversations out of their historical context. Before we flesh out the historical context, do you have any recollectio * of the manner in which assassination might have come up between yourself and Helms? Mr. Halley. Again, I put it in this overall context of the times. We “werg.running Foreign: Intelligéihéeccollectton nt operatlonswagainstcGuba with élasSical agent-méans.: We wate: sur, ing ‘collection against Cuba through paramilitary teams. We were involved in paramilitary operations that could be described as commando raids. Those were the kinds of activities. We were dealing with exile groups, we were debriefing rom oC Cm nm 3 ce @ ce 3 GS ay RB refugees and in all of thisconversations of assassination, the Cuban penchant for it had to come up. I cannot pinpoint ~- Mr. Baron. You do not recall any reference of means to be used or people to be involved? Mr. Halley. No. Even such things as discussions of various kinds of weapons, you know, People, as you probably know from this experience, every individual who deals with weapons has a different view on what is the ideal weapon. If you took a squad of ten men and gave them the free choice, I 420 Ferst Street, §.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 am sure all ten of them would come up with a different weapon. TOP SECRET
Therefore, when we were standardizing Weapons to our paramilitary teams, things like that, weapons would be discussed in terms of, you know, muzzle velocity, rate of.fire, .weight -~ Prone (Ares 202} 544.6900 of the weapon for the Cuban to carry, because many of them were quite small. In this context, peopla would discuss what is the range, can a guy use it to shoot somebody at a particular Yange? Is this an assassination weapon? Is this a qood weapon for close combat? } Therefore the term assassination was just a part of the lif ’ of the fabric at that time. That is what I am trying to get across. I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than that, Mr. Baron. I think you are being quite eloquent and 4 a ow: < & extremely informative. You mentioned that the phrase assassina- q tion would be used in the discussions about the kinds of weapons 7 4 that would be used for commando raids or equipping your operatives. | Mr. Halley. . Paramilitary teams, right, Mr. Baron. Was the capacity of a Weapon to be used as “an assassination weapon among other uses a desirable capacity? In other words, was that phrase used positively? Mr. Halley. No, it was not. It is the kind of thing that weaves itsalf into, you know, a conversation. 410 Fiest Steeet, §.6., Washington, 0.C. 20003 For instance, if you are planning a commando raid against “something like an oil refinery, you have to think about how are TOP SECRET
Prone (Aras 202) $44-6000 O70 Aon 2 < “Be <) a & < B 60 7 410 Fiest Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 you going to get across the guard“force that is around a vefinary® One of tha questions you have, cf course, is if you bypass them,you are successful to get in without a trail or any kind of a struggle, that is great. But what happens if you are implanting your starget and the guard stumbles on you, you know, the guard force then becomes an immediate! risk to your operation a : so and usually there is a fire fight. Therefore, this becomes a question of weapons. In othar words, what weapon is going to give the highest muzzle velocity and make the largest amount of \ nolse. Therefore, ke you have two weapons of co-equal cyclic rate of fire and one made less rate of noisa than the other for that job you would pick the weapon with the lowest noise, You might even silence it. You may make a silenced submachine gune out of it. These are the kinds of things that go into these discussion of weapons. Mr. Baron. “The technology of assassination and targetted shooting, are you referring te -- when you say assassination Weapon -~ to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting? Mr. Halley. In this particular context, I think most ue People felt that the Cuban penchant for assassination, for discussing assassination, was the kind that would have to be done from a long range. You know, I think that it is generally an accepted thesis that a group of dedicated men who.are prepared to give their lives TOP SECRET
410 First Street, $.€., Washington, O.C. 20003 Prone (Ares 202) $44-4000 can in time assassinate almost anybody. Now, the Cuban was not that kind of a Person. That-was- not his. psychological make-up. He tends to want to live, to enjoy life, to talk about his accomplishment. Therefore, while they Wers brave and dedicated, they were the kind of people who would Probably engage in something like this in the context of using the sniper weapon 4S a vehicle for assassination, long distance, Therefore, in this context you are talking about range, you know, one of the kay factors becomes what is the accurate range of a weapon if firea by. an expert marksman. Therefore, that is the kind of thing that would go into, you know, discussions of weapons. Mr. Baron. When you wera discussing weapons with high ) range and low muzzle Velocity, was this ever discussed in the context of shooting Fidel Castro or other key Cuban leaders as opposed to targetted shooting on a commando raid. Mr. Malley. focan recall, you know, no conversation in which it was narrowly focused on the question of Fidel Castro. ‘Mr, Baron. Let us go back, then, to putting this all ‘into historical context. Tam going to ask you if you can explain more about the structure of the JMWAVE Station, both the channels wupward .« from you to the Agency and the Special Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives, if in the course of explaining the structure, you would like to make some comments about the historical context, that would be TOP SECRET
3 410 First Steeet, $.£., Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 Prone (Avea 202} $44-6600 7 appreciated. Mr. Halley. I think what I would like to do is to try to put this into some perspective. The perspective really starts with the failure of tha Bay of Pigs Operation. After the failure of tha Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy Administration wanted another look taken at the problem of Cuba. In order to get that other look started, the Kennedy Administration created this threa-man task force or this three- man group and wanted to See what else could be done against Cuba, and that is when I cama into this problen in February of *62. Mr. Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that you are referring to is actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwel} Taylor Board of Inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs Operation? Mr. Halley. This three-man group stemmed out of that inquiry. What its relationship was to the inquiry, I do not know, . because I was not involved and I never had an opportunity once I plunged into this job, to go back and read those historical ‘documents. You know, I am sure there is a Maxwell Taylor Report, and so forth; but I have never read it. All right. Therefore, my first task wher I became involved in this was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what kinds of intelliqence could be collected in Cuba, so that by TOP SECRET _
Phone (Aves 202) $84-6000 rs Cc: hN o-: < a a cy z Cc ae ™ 420 First Street, S.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 collecting this intelligence, an assessment could be made based on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro. In other words; the difference here was that people thought that the Bay of Pigs operation was not soundly grounded in intelligence. Therefore, this was an attempt to start the collection of - intelligence to sea what could be done. -° In order to collect intelligence at that particular time, it was believed that all avenues of approach should be used, so that meant classical foreign intelligence Operations, counterintelligence operations, the debriefing of refugees, and the usa of paramilitary means to put teams into Cuha to collect ‘intelligence on that part of the island that could not be covered by what you would call the More classical means of foreign intelligence collection. | As the program was started essentially by me or accelerate by me, we in fact got caught up with the Cuban Missile Crisis - that is, the advent of the Soviet intervention into Cuba -- and our whole effort shifted to covering that Soviet bulld-up in Cuba, and this was an integral part to our having datected the “Soviet build-up and the United States government taking the actions which they did, that is, to verify this. ~ there Was a great problem for a while when we were all talking about hard intelligence, the ‘President, John Kennedy, was telling ‘Us, give us hard intelligence. We thouqht wa were giving him hard intelligence. What he Meant, in his definition TOP SECRET
Phone (Ares 202) $44-¢000 210 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.0. 26003 of hard intelligence, as it turned out to be, waa a U-2 photograph. He never articulated that to ua in those terms, uThen..wa: got caught up into the aybball to eyeball confron- tation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we got caught up with the Problem of monitoring. the disengagement of the Soviet presence in Cuba. That took us up through sometim into early '63. Then we took a look again, because wa knew an awful lot more about them than we had when we started in February of "62, to see what could be done against Cuba, and it was clear at that point that no external invasion was going to be possible, because that was something that was excluded by the Khruschev- Kennedy agreement and then it was not feasible. In any event, therefore it was a quastion of what could be done. So we Were collecting intelligence to continue to stay on: top of the Situation. We were attempting to establish contacts with the military establishment in Cuba to see if thera wag any. force that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment that would be used to alter the situation and continue to see “whether there were any economic Pressures that could be brouqht “Cuba that would accelerate the whole problem of creating an environment in which a resistance could be created on an island. Mr. Baron. Were those the two primary tactics used at that point when Castro had consolidated his strength - and -- TOP SECRET AN
Phone (Araa 202) $44-6, S10 Ferst Street, $.€., Wasninaton, 0.6. 20003 when the United States and Russia reached an agreement that no external invasion of Cuba would take Place, did you turn primarily to the ways and means of finding a dissident group within Cuba that: might be capable of overthrowing Castro, number one, and number two, of finding means of undermining the economic strength of the Castro government, Mr. Halley. In addition, we were continuing to support certain elements of resistance, you know, that were still there that were not in the Army. Mr. Baron. What kinds of elements Ware those? Mr. Halley. These were paramilitary forces that ware in Cuba, that we had put in or established contact with, or people who were already in the bush who we had already established contact with or they had established contact with us, and we Were providing them with food, weapons and so forth so that they could survive. So that it was a multifaceted approach at that particular time. That went on from the middle of ‘63 until the middle of ‘65, and these are two distinct phases of this operation. In “effect, One, 4 Survey, and two, the Missile Crisis and its post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of intelligence collection, the working or taking the sounding with military dissidents, economic Pressure, and working with | natural dissident elements that were still on the island. I think you know that all of your questions have to be put TOP SECRET -—
into these various timeframes. When you talk about, was there ever a discussion of assassination, you know, when people Were coming out and being interviewed, ¥és, some Cuban refugee Prone {Aras 202} 544-6009 © - would say, by God, I would like te go back and shoot, you know, X, Yor Z. It might have been Some commandante in his particu- lar area; lt could have been Fidel Castro. This was just part of tha fabric of the times. Mr. Baron. Can we turn now to tha Structure of the JMWAVE Station and explain that a bit? How large was the Station? What was the command. structure within the Station? Mr. Halley. The Station started expanding in whatever 79 timeframa it was, somewhere after the Survey was completed. PAUL 9) must have started expanding sometime in March of 1962. You n WARD a know, by the time that 1é& was at its peak, which was probably 0 somewhere just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, July, August ) 7 of 1962, it was either the largest or the second largest ~- my recollection was that it was the Second largest station in existence at that time. I would not want to be pinned down on a particular number of People on any particular day. Nr. Baron.. Could you give some idea as to the number of employees at the Station during its peak? Mr. Halley. fr would Say Somewhere in the neighbordhood of, you know - | You know, again, this means staff and — contract employees. 410 Farst Steeet, 5.E., Wasnington, 0.¢, 20003 Mr. Baron. What do you cover with the term contract TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32424444 Page 42
annie employees? Mr. Halley. These would be, for instanca, maritime casa officers. We hired People who had specialized skills, that is, Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 that they could manage a serias of vessels for us, -but they Were not longterm staff employees. Thesa would be people who would be used, if you will, in a management organization, basic o implementation of the program. Mr. Baron. Did you have other agents or Operatives amonq the Cuban community or outside the Cuban community that were affiliated with the Station although not employed by it directly? Mr. Halley. I think we are going to have to define some 9 b terms. ‘ee 2 < a e a a «< E Mr. Baron. What I am trying to do now is simply geta n Picture of the Scope of the Station's Strength and im its activities, how many People the Station had to call upon for its activities. | ° Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to give you an answer, because I think we are going to get into a semantic Problem here. When I talk about tha Station, as such, I would say that. is roughly in the neighborhood of peop te, and that lo | was those people who would be involved in the management effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing 430 First Sireet, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 out from that were people whom we would call agents, that is, TOP SECRET
People who ware not knowledgeable necessarily of whom thay worked for or whera the cover offices were located and so forth. Let us say, in the maritima part of the Operation we might have Prong (Aras 202) $444006 had at any one point in time, you know, up to five hundred People involved in maritime activities, you know? Again, if you pick a date, I am sure we can research it. The records are still available and you know how many people we had, but let us take these five hundred, What am I talking about? Thesa would be essentially Cubans who Were. the captains of the vessles that were used in infiltration operations to put people on the shore of Cuba, and there were a variety of techniques. In other words, you might start on with the mother 6 ue WARD & Pa ship, which would be an LCI -= I am not sure how familiar you AN are with various kinds of vessels. rf Mr. Baron. What is an LCI? Mr. Halley. Landing craft kind of vessle, or a patrol craft, a PC, 110-foot vessle, that would be a mother ship. This is the kind of ship that would take fuel supplies and water, so that other smaller vessels could be serviced by it. “So you might start with an Operation of a mother ship towing a smaller boat, or having it on its decks and going down to fifteen or twenty miles from Cuba, putting the smaller boat Over the side, which was a faster boat, lower silhouette, less likely to ba picked up by Cuban coastal radar, and then that 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 would take tha team in close to the shore where we might finally TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32493434 Page 44
Prone (Aree 202) $44-6000 J c3 < a an a z ¢ Cs GF 7 410 First Stewet, $.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use a silent outboard motor if the surf was high. Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly? They might be agents, aven non-paid agents? Mr. Halley. No, they were not pald. For instance, they might work for a particular cover dompany. In other words, I am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of the Station, if you will,and the ABC Shipping Company ran maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy- five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them 4 -was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I would have to go and look at each vessel. Does that give you a feel for the size of the problem? Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with .personnel or with equipment? Mr. Halley. We are talking about all of these companies, they probably went up into the hundreds. I distinguish between companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed ‘to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms mean different things to me. The nature of. the Agency's TOP SECRET
Prone (Ave 202) 344-4900 i Cu 3 < c @ : 9 "WARD — i 410 Forest Street, $.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 fon an involvement in-each ig different. I am having a little trouble -- . . Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of companius you were receiving halp from at that point, and about how many of each there might have been? Mr. Halley. I do not think I could do that. We are talking about hundreds of companies that wa used during that Period of time. Soma of them might simply have been a company Set up and registered and run out of some attorney's office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership ‘the. small boat. Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even I had access to the files to answer your question, it would take me weeks to’ pull all that together to give you an answer. I don't think there is an overview statement. Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had coopera- tion on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private enterprise.in tha Miami area, or in Southern Florida? Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had extensive cooperation — I do not like your word “grand” -= that we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of this clandestine mission. Mr. Baron. “Did you also have extensive cooperation from TOP SECRET
Phone (Aren 202) 344-6000 416 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 civic officials and law enforcement agenclas in baing allowed to operate frea or the law? For instance, were you allowed to put vessels onto the water which were not proparly registered, or which could be held immune for inspection by the Coast Guard or other maritime authorities, and were you allowed to send Peopla through the streets of Southarn Florida who may have bean armed or violating local law in some other way, who were held immune by arrangements that you had with law enforcement agencies? Mr. Halley. You hava asked me, in essence, threa questions. | Mr. Baron. Right. Mr. Halley. Let me try to divide that and deal with each question separately. Let ma first deal with the vessels. Every vessel that we had was appropriately registered. There were no short-cuts: insofar as the U.S. Coast Guard was concerned. That is, any vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate safety standards and so forth, so we were not putting any ‘vassels into the water that any citizen could not have put into the water. That is we are talking about ten, fifteen, twenty foot boats, thirty foot boats, thirty-five foot boats, things like that. These hoats were owned in’either a.corporate. name or by a private individual who had to register them with the Coast Guard and pass normal Coast Guard regulations. TOP SECRET
1 202) 344-6000 Prone (Are Q ~ cy € ct. a cr z c 410 First Steeet, $.€., Washington, 0.C, 20003 (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. To continue with this, I understand that saflaty regulations would have been complied with, but -was there some sort of immunity from inspection, say inspection for carrying armaments aboard a vessel that thea CIA had arranged with maritime authorities, or local law enforcement authorities? Mr. Halley. When we had operations going, these were coordinated with the Coast Guard in terms of their knowing that, you know, at a particular date, tima group, that there would be a rendezvous between two vessels which wera our vessels, and this was coordinated with the Coast Guard. Mr. Baron. Would you return to the second part of that large question? Without reference to vessels, were CIA employees or agents on the streets of cities in Southern Florida immune from Search or arrest by local law enforcement authorities? Mr. Halley. They were not immune. Let me ask to dispel one myth that I think has developed which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to ‘insure that nO Weapons were issued to anybody until the men were on the vessel outside of the immediate waters of south Florida, and we were meticulous to insure that when they came back from a mission that they were met at sea and all the weapons were taken .away from them. So, when you talk about a group moving around in Florida, TOP SECRET.
HW 450955 c oN @:: < court n WARD n 7 6 410 Ferst Street, 5.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 Docld: 32423434 We did work out through the entire state, and I did not want you.to feel that I wag being lass than candid with you, and you keep saying south Florida, I want to say to you that we Operated in the state of Florida, man moving around armed under our control in the state of Florida, ig just not correct. This was all carefully ‘controlled and they did not hava their weapons when they came back, wea .took them before they landed, 80 they were not immune. Mr. Baron. You dia have general arrangements or agreements with law enforcement agencies throughout Florida for the treatment of CIA operatives who were affiliated with the JMWAVE Station? Mr. Halley. We did have, through our Office of Security, a continuing dialogue with & number of law enforcement agencies in Florida, If & problem developed, we would then contact them and look at the issue within the context of what had transpired. Certainly there was no immunity. In other words, this has to be looked at on a case by case basis. For instance, you know, we had a training site in north ‘Florida, as an example. If somebody came off of that site that was drunk and disorderly in town “and could not Speak English, the local authorities did havea number to call to raise this with us to see whether this was somebody that was of interest tous, and then we would havea to go and Settle that particular case, TOP SECRET Page 49
her ROOST Prone (Area 202) 344-6000 79 © Y WARD a PAUL” ny 7 6 9 410 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 poclda: #2494434 Page 50 Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operative Or employees who worked undarneath you at that Station, would | it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station ultimately were Channeled out through you? Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you know this Station went through several mutations in organization during its existence. 1 guess the organizational Structure that existed for the longest ‘period of time was something lika I am going to describe to you. There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a Deputy Chief of Station for Operations. That is the gentleman who is now retired, I think he is still alive, by the name of Moore, Robert Moore. I had a sacond Deputy Chief of Station and he was for Support Patterns. ‘That is a gentleman who is also Yetired, a Mr. Corris. Then the rest of the Station was Organized into a number of branches. Each branch was Organized along functional lines. Lat me give you an example. “There was a Foreign Intelligence “Branch. These were people in, what in my terminology would be Classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to recruit a .Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with, you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might live in some city like Navana and have a legal job as a baker or TOP SECRET
butcher or something but had a radio sat in which they could communicate with us, through which they could communicate to us. Then there was the Paramilitary Branch. This was the Prone (Area 202) $44-60900 group that ran the commando Operations. This was the group that ran, and put people back into Cuba, into resistance groups, or established contact with resistance groups. This was a group that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people, either paramilitary foresas in Cuba or agents that were being run by the Foreign Intelligence Group. All right. Then there was a Covert Action, people who dealt with exiled refugee groups that were involved in radio activities, publications, that kind of thing. Then there is a whole panoply of == then there was Maritime, in terms of finance, and so on. Security was a branch. ‘Obviously, under that kind of system, no executive, whether he is president of a corporation or a Station Chief, can See every single piece of Paper that comes in or out, but Clearly there was a review Procedure whereby program reviews ware conducted, individual Operational reviews were conducted. Mr. Baron. By yourself? Mr. Halley. By myself. I do not want to leave you with the impression that I knew every single thing that was going On every minute and could account for the activities of three 3 hundred employees on a daily basis. 410 Forest Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. . In talking about the Personnel affiliated TOP SECRET . ws HW 50955 DBocld: 324273434 Page 51
Prone (Araa 202) 544-4000 430 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.6. 20003 with the Station & moment ago, I think-we may have created a:. misimpression that the only people involved in CIA operations were People who were paid by the Agency. Isn't it also true that there were Many members of Cuban exile groups in Florida who participated voluntarily from time to time in CIA sporisored Operations? ° o Mr. Halley. I think that you may hava to sharpen that up for ma. I am not Sure what you really maan,. ‘If you are talking about foreign intelligence collections, you know, the people who wera producing =< Mr. Baron. I am talking now about the paramilitary Operations. Mr. Halley. No. I do not know of any People that were involved in paramilitary operations that ware not in some way paid. Mr. Baron. By the Agency? Mr. Halley. By the Agency. Let me make sure that we understand each Other, because during this period of time there were a lot of independent "Cuban groups who Claimed that they had sponsorship from the Agency but did not, and were operating, and there was 2 period dn time when these groups could not run their operations from Florida without running the risk of being picked up by Customs, Immigration, Coast Guard, the FBI, or if we had information on it, you know, we might pass the information to the Coast Guard TOP SECRET
Phone [Ares 202) 544-4600 : 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 Seperorey: so that they could keep them from going. If that is what you are referring to, somebody like Alpha 6 or Commando L or somebody like that, they were not & part of the CIA apparatus. Mr. Baron. Although you might be aware of their activities Mr. Halley. We would be aware of their activities, certainly: Mr.. Baron. Can you explain if there is anything to add to what we have already said? The chain of command, apart from yourself as Chief of Station, to Task Force Wand to the Directorate of Plans within the Agency? You would report directly to William Harvey? - Mr. Halley. William Narvey was Chief of Task Force W, later FitzGerald. My chain of command was from ma to them. You know, they had a subordinate staff who helped them monitor the Station's activity, so that it just was not the fact, you know, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. FitzGerald were totally dependent on what I told them.: To have.an appreciation of what was going on in Miami they had their own staff that was following “individual operations. For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and © might say we think that the Station has overextended itself this month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the weather during this particular month of October. Wa do not TOP SECRET
y | think they could do it, We think they should be guided to run po { only twenty, fifteen, something like that, So they ware not 3 totally dependent on ma, Prone [Area 202) $44-60900 © 4 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of tha split of responsi- 5 bility between Task Forca W and JMWAVE Station? 6 In other words, were there certain Operations that were . e 7 {| Fun directly out of Task Force WwW? 8 Mr. Halley. Also, you have to Put this into a historical time. What Period are you talking about? Mr. Baron. During the period of your tenure. If there were changes during your tenure at JMWAVE, why do you not 79 explain those? Mr. Halley. There were. Each one is different... Let me A give you a couple of examples. n WARD p Washington, Task Force W, essentially dig not run wi pny, paramilitary operations where they took command and control for sending People to Cuba. For instance, Lf Task Force W in Washington wanted to ‘plant a.radio in Cuba which was torbe:. pickdd up by foreign intelligence 4gents who could Yeport, they would ‘task us to implant that radio in a cache in a particular area in Cuba, for‘ instance; Oriente province. We would know simply that it was a radio ‘pertiaps.. Wa would then put it into Oriente province, writs up the site, give them the rip cord. 410 Furst Street, $.£., Wasnungton, 0.C. 20003 They would communicate to the agents: in Cuba who’ would go recover the cache. TOP SECRET HW 50955 BDocld: 32423434 Page 54
Prone {Ares 202) 344-6000 420 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.¢. 20003 So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign intelligence to them so they had collection “assets that were Yeporting to them along the same lines that we did. They ‘dia Work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a couple of groups -=- in other words, they had contact with Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of dJarger exile groups. The Task Force also specialized in much more economic activity than I dia. That is @ question of looking at such things as| us exports from to Cuba. (3,| Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary Operations, if an uSsassination Operation had been run by Task Force W, would you have assumed 48 Chief of Station in Miami you would have been aware of such an ‘operation? Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that. Mr. Baron. ould it not have been sound managerial Practice to let you know that there was an operation that might “have been run through Florida into Cuba? Mr. Halley. No. You know, the Agency is a highly compartmentad mechanism. You know, Let us dispel one thing very Promptly here. If you are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with the Mafia -- and I think T can tell you frankly at that tima I TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202) 844-6000. 1" 2% ’n a) & PauL 410 First Street, $.£., Wasningion, 0.C. 20003 con o Ce. ® x ™~ was not ~~ Harvay would come, you know, to Miami, to visit me to review the activitias of the station, and while thera would go off on his own and make his contact with whomever he was Meeting. I knew he was meeting somebody, but it was not up to me to find out with whom he was meeting or why he was meeting them or what he was doing with them. e Mr. Baron. My question really was, I think more innocent than that. Was ft strictly one of involving what correct management techniques would be, or what kind of knowledge the Chief of Station of JMWAVE would have to have in order to do an effective job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations into Cuba? You seem to be saying that it would not be _. necessary to run an effective job to have knowledge of every other operation that the CIA is running against Castro? Mr. Halley. JI think what I am saying during that particu- “lar time. -~ I do not want you to come to the conclusion that Iowas knowledgeable of everything that ‘ran in from or through the state of Florida, because during that Period of time, for ‘instance, Mr. Harvey in particular was a very compartmented gentleman, and it would be keeping with his style to run an Operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida and I would not know about it. Now, that would be an unusual thing, but it is not Preclude Mr. Baron. Let us turn for a& moment to following up on the TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) $44-6006 410 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20603 nature of your contacts with William Harvey in reference to any Operations ha may have in running unilaterally against Castro, Do you recall aiding Harvey in an Operation that he was in charg of and that was not affiliated-with IMWAVE? Mr, Halley. Ido not recall anything, I do not recall anything specific. fn other words, the pattern was in terms of a” command and control, I would come to Washington on a regular basis to review activity with Harvey after wa submitted our Paperwork. Harvey was also a frequent visitor to Florida. We would. have operational discussions. He would talk to th Branch Chiefs, he talked to People. He also went out on his Own, and he was meeting somabody, it was clear to me that he was meeting People. But it wag frankly in the way that the Agency is run and managed, it was not a concern to ma whom he: Was meeting. Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper of you to inquire of him whom he was Meeting? - Mr. Halley. No, it -would not haves been, Mr. Baren. Did you have suspicions or speculation about ‘whom he might have been meeting or for what purpose that he was having these meetings? Mr. Halley. No, not for what purpose. There is a whole, you know, panoply of things going on at that time. You know, frankly I was a very busy guy; when Harvey was there, it occupied one hunk of a lot of my time. T[¢€ he wanted to go off, you know, TOP SECRET SN =
Phone (Aras 202) $44-6000 — so wed) Pe] € ct a ce < z cc 6 7 410 Forst Street, 5.€., Wasningtan, O.C. 20063 do somathing else and was going to maat someone alse, that was fine with ma. It enabled me to get back to my immediate and mora pressing problems. . In this business you just do not ask your superior, what are you doing? That is just not cricket; that is not the way the game is played. Mr. Baron. Do you recall a*time when Harvey asked you to: procure arms and. equipment to be passed to a: Cuban exile? Mr. Halley. To a Cuban exile? Mr. Baron. Let me strike thea reference to a Cuban exile. Do you recall a time when Harvey asked your aid in procur- ing arms ari equipment to be given to a man named Tony Varona who was a contact of Harvey's? Mr. Halley. I know Tony Varona. He was in the period -- prior to the Bay of Pigs, he was part of the consejo. Frankly, if you've got something that you can sharpen that up, I think you need some basis, that I think that can trigger my memory here. I do not remember frankly Tony Varona being in Harvey's -- Mr. Baron. In contact with Harvey? Mr. Halley. You know, I may have procured. something for Harvey, some kind of equipment or done some kind of. operational support task. . Mr. Baron. Let us make it more specific. Do you recall helping Harvey load a U-Haul trailer full of TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 262) $44-6000 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 about $5,000 worth of arms and equipment ‘to be left in a parking lot and picked up there by a contact of Harvey's? And this would be in approximately April of 1962. 5 Mr. Halley. I. do vaguely remember something about a rented truck. Quite frankly, I do not really recall all the details of this at this particular time. I do not remember, you know, personally procuring any material, but it is conceivable that I did get a request from Harvey, that I did go to the logistics apparatus, and whatever he had requasted from official stocks he was provided. Mr. Baron. During that same period of time -- Mr. Halley. I do recall something about a truck. I do not recall anything about a trailer. My recollection of this truck incident seems to be -- I do not remember what it was. We did do something for him logistically, I do remember a truck being involved with some logistic material in terms of.a ‘parking lot. But frankly that is about all I can recall of it at this particular time. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of hearing of + e . 2 s ‘poison pills in any connection during your tenure at JMWAVE? Mr. Halley. No, 1 do not recall -- poison pills? Poison pills, the only kind of thing I can recall occasionally when people were talking about. being on mother ships, you know, what would happen if they were captured. This was a discussion occaSionally of whether any kind of drugs should be issued to TOP SECRET
Prone {Ares 202} 544-6000 410 Forst Street, S.E., Waininggon, O.C. 20003 the people who wera manning these vassels #0 they could do themselves in if they were to be captured, things like that, but we never issued any such pills but there were discussions of that kind of a problem. I do recall specific agents who were sent back to Cuba to run a collection or to go back into the bush and so forth who asked for som& sort of pills which they could kill themselves with if they were captured. But other than that -~ if that is what you were referring , to, I think they are called L pills, or something, as they ‘were referred to in those days. | Mr. Baron. Why were they called L pills? Mr. Hallev. Everything has a number or nomenclature, I do not know. - Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of poison pills to be used in assassination operations against Fidel Castro or other Cuban leaders? Mr. Halley. No. Is that referencing to this material that I might have provided for Harvey? Because if that is the case, I can dispel “that quickly, because I would not have had access to them. Mr. Baron. You would not have access to poison pills? Mr. Halley. No, I would not have access to them. Mr. Baron. Why not? | Mr. Halley. I did not have them in my inventory. That is j not anything that I have, you know, command and control of. Tha TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 44-6600 410 Ferst Steeet, $.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 is. why -- Mr. Baron. They would have had to come directly from Technical Servicas Division at CIA? | Mr. Halley. _ That is what I'm trying to clarify what it is that you are trying to establish from me, In other words, if you are saying -- Mr. Baron. Let us move further, I think we can be more specific now. We have a document that. I am about to show you. I just wanted to clear up. the background of it before we discussed the document. Mr. Halley. Let me just make this point. If you are talking about drug pills, I had no source of such things, so if that is the nature of your question, I can say I had nothing to do with that. If you are talking about, you know -- ~~ Mr. Baron. Arms and equipment -- Mr. Halley. -- weapons or something, yes, that was in my inventory. I could have issued that to Harvey, you know, guns, ammunition, plastics, that kind of thing I could have had ‘access to, yes. That is why I am trying to sort out really where the thrust of your questioning is. Mr. Baron. There were two prongs: to the question, you have picked both of them up. One is whether you had ever heard of poison pills in connection with an assassination operation against Fidel Castro, and your testimony would be that you had TOP SECRET
ALO Ferat Steeet, $.E., Washington, O.C. 26003 Prone {Area 202) $44-6060 not, is that correct? Mr, Halley. That is rights I would not have had access to those pills myself, nor did the Station. In other words, if I had wanted something like that, I would have had to corres- ponded with Washington in order to have had access to it, if in fact it existed. ; o Mr. Baron. You never had any such correspondence? Mr. Halley. I never had any correspondence that I can recall. Mr. Baron. The other problem was the supply of arms and equipment to which you already replied. Have you ever read that ‘Inspector General's Report of 1967, prepared at the request of the DCI to fill him in on any assassination efforts to which the CIA may have been connected? Mr. Halley. No, I have not read the report. Mr. Baron. Before you came here today you were not shown any excerpts from this report to refresh your recollection at the CIA? Mr. Halley. The IG Report? Mr. Baron. Yes. Mr. Halley. No, I havs not. Mr. Baron. Were you shown any other documents at the CIA today to refresh -- or in preparation for today's session -- Mr. Halley. No. In preparation for today's session I have had several TOP SECRET
430 Forst Street, $.€.. Washington, 0.C. 20003 Prone [Area 202) $44-6000 - conversations with Seymour Boultin -< . Mr. Baron. Walt Elder? Mr. Halley. I talked to Walt Elder on the phone. You know the people who are involved in this thing. I have asked for that, I talked to our attorney, Clarke ~-- Mr. Baron. George Clarke? Mr. Halley. Yes. ~~ I talked to a number of people, I asked to sea the | newspaper clipping from the Miami Herald on the McGovern activity. Yes, I have looked at that kind of thing. But I have not looked at the specific IG Report. I have not read it, “I have not seen an extract of the IG Report. Mr. Baron. Were you given any specific instructions as to the kinds of things that. you could say or not say here today? Mr. Halley. . You know, nothing beyond what you and I touched on which you have already put on the record. Mr. Baron. Which is not to mention the names of CIA officers who are still operating under cover? Mr. Halley. Right, or agents who would still be viable “that I know of. Mr. Baron. Right. Then let me show you a document which we will mark as Halley Exhibit No. 2. _ (The document referred to was marked Halley TOP SECRET
Exhibit No: 2 for idantification.) Prone (Area 202) $44-8000 2 AN TA wd 2 < e 4 re) x < = 8) 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003
Prune (Area 202) 544-4000 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. Which is an excerpt from the Inspector General' Report of 1967 at paqes 49 and 50, and I will ask you to read the portions that I will bracket which daal with a report of a Meeting between yourseif and William Uarvay involving the supply of arms and equipment. (Pause) “ o Mr. Halley. I have no reason to doubt this. I may have provided this support. I do not recall sitting in a parking lot} observing -- Mr. Baron. For the record, wa are discussing the passage that begins, “When the pills were given to Varona through Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the operation. Roselli passed the request to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of [Mr. Halley}, the chief of the JMWAVE Station, procured" .0-- 50+, Continuing.--And then it continues to say a large shopping list of arms and equipment, which cost about $5,000 and were supplied in a parking lot of a drive-in restaurant in a rented U-Haul truck. | | ‘Would the cost of $5,000 have been an unusual expenditure at that time at JMWAVE Station for arms and equipment? Mr. Halley. No, $5,990 would not have been an unusual expenditure. | Mr. Baron. Not unusual enough, in fact, for you to have a particular memory of the event? TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 544-6600 - 410 Forest Street, 5.€., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Halley. No. Now that I read over this thing, I do recall, as I told you earlier before you showad ma this document something about a Yreanted truck and being involved with Harvey in providing him some logistical support for an activity. I do not recall this | specific list of equipment being-involved,- you know, sowewhere you got this and if I could check it against the files, if there are any files available, I could verify whether this is correct or not. Mr. Baron. Whether or not the particular list 1s correct, you would say that these couple of passaqes from the IG Report generally characterize yout involvement with Harvey in this One incident correctly? Mr. Halley. I would want to sharpen this up, because you have one, two, two paragraphs here. In the first paragraph there is a reference to some pills. JI had nothing to do with any pills. I have no recollection of any pills. Mr. Baron. Let us jump then to the very last statement and let me ask you if this confirms your own sense of your knowledge The report says: “Harvey says that [Halley]" -~ here I am using your alias ---"“never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what purpose. [Halley] was merely called upon to furnish support: for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded." Does that generally characterize correctly your point of TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 344-6000 ~ 7 ON a) af a < a 6 a & < z 40 7 416 Frest Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 involvement with this activity? Mr. Halley. I would say that is corract. IT want to go back to these other points, though, because I want to be meticulously corract here. I do not recall the specifics of this inventory of equipment. I do not recall, you know, sitting in a parking lot survedlling any kind of a vehicle. On the other hand, I do recall having been involved with Harvey in some sort of an effort with a U-Haul truck. Now therefore that last sentence you have read is correct, I knew nothing about any to furnish support for a was otherwise excluded. Mr. Baron. You are sat near the parking lot picked up? Mr. Halley. I have Mr. Baron. One way of this delivery.and I..was..called headquarters operation from which not denying, are you, that you may have and surveilled the truck until it was no recollection -- or the other? Mr. Halley. No, I would say that my sitting in a parked ear with Harvey survellling a parking lot is the kind of thing “that would have stuck in my mind. I do.not recall ever doing. that and that is the thing that has me a little perplexed here and I am having trouble matching this thing up with my own memory. It would have been damned unusual for Harvey and I to have sat in a parking lot, and I just do not recall that. I do have a vague recollection of being involved with him TOP SECRET \
Prone (Area 2023 544-6000 . x 2 3 < a cs a & « F 3 410 Forst Street, §.€., Wasinington, 0.C, 20003 in some sort of caper involving a U-Haul truck. Mr. Baron. At that time, if Harvey had made a request of you to supply $5,000 worth of equipment like explosives, detonators, .30 caliber rifles, .45 caliber handguns, radios and boat radar, would you have supplied that equipmant to Harvey or to anyone he dasignated without asking him what the purpose e of the operation was? Mr. Halley. Yes, I would have supplied dt to Harvey or to his designated representative, devending on how that person identified himself to mea with the equipment that he requested. That was my chain of command and, if he had told me that he had wanted this material for any operational activity, I would have seen to it that it was issued to him. That is the way the Agency functions. | Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure ina paramilitary operation to procure equipment that would not have been traceable to the United States as the IG Report indicates was done in this case? Mr. Halley. It depends. It depends on what was the . Sponsorship that was trying to be conveyed to tha paramilitary group. In other words, let us say there was a Venezuelan business man who may have been giving some assistance to a Cuban exile group. If somebody had gotten in touch with that Venezuelan businessman and he was saying I brought weapons into Florida TOP SECRET.
Prone (Area 202) 544-6066 7% @ ) aon > < a CT] a & “€ z 416 Fiest Street, $.£., Wasnengton, 0.C. 26003 or equipment which I will give you, then maybe under’ that kind o a circumstance we wouldn't want anything that would clearly ‘identify it with the U.S. government and then that would be the normal thing to do. I would hava to know the sponsorship. Mr. Baron. This request would not hava been extraordinary" either, to provide "sterile" equipment to a contact of Harvey's? ! Mr. Halley. It would not have attracted my attention to make it seam out of the ordinary. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the presance of a CIA officer named Jim O'Connell in Florida at that time? Mr. Halley. Nol ---*> eee Mr. Baron. Had you been'aware of any operational - involvement that Jim O'Connell had with anyone in' Florida. at any time? » i. 2 Mr. Halley.. I do not know Jim O'Connell. I have seen references to Jim O'Connell in Jack Anderson's columns and things like that.since I have been reading the Press, but I do not Know. Jim O'Connell. If he-walked into this ‘tcoom,-I---- wouldnot recognize him because I do not think I ever met the ‘man. I do not know who he is. I asked several of my colleagues when I first saw his name appear in the Press who it was, and nobody could describe him in a way that would enable me to remember ever having Seen or met the man. Mr. Baron. Had you heard of the man in connection with operations against. Cuha--- TOP SECRET \
Prone {Area 2062) 544-6000 m ? x au! t } & a Ce < F3 410 Fast Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 26003 Mr. Halley. I had not. Mr. Baron. -- before reading it in the newspapers recently? Mr. Halley. Before reading in the newspapers and I do not know what year I first read this, becausa somewhere in the back of my mind is a Jack Anderson column “= Mr. Baron. And a Drew Pearson column before that. Mr. Halley. <-- a couple of years ago in which it was obvious that this was obtained from a military assignee to the Agency named Brad’ something ~- I cannot think of his name right now ~~ and that he was the source of that information. T think somewhere in one of those articles, his name had appeared Several years ago. I frankly do not know who the quy is. | | | Mr. Baron. At any point.in your operational relationship with William Harvey in connection with Cuban affairs, did you suspect that an assassination operation was being run out of Task Force W-against Fidel Castro? Mr. Halley. No. Mr. Baron. I would like to run down a list of the names of some people who were involved in one way or the other with an assassination operation that was being run out of Task Force W, and I will represent to you that there was indeed an assassination effort or a series of efforts run out of Task Force W beginning --.and out of the CIA -- baginning in October TOP SECRET
of 1960 involving connections between CIA officials and people who have been characterized as members of the Mafia, of the gambling Syndicate who had interests in Havana and which involve Pnone (Area 202) $44-4000 the passage of poison pills to people inside Cuba purportedly for use against Castro in the restaurant that he frequented. And this plot by William Harvey's own admission was directed by Harvey during Harvey's tenure as the Chief of Task Force W. Mx. Halley. I take due note of what you are saying. I have no knowledge of that. I will be glad to comment-.on any ef-the names. My commenting on names is in no way to reflect any knowledge on my part of this particular activity, because I have no knowledge of it. Cc ) a < & 4 Mr. Baron. You have already stated that you have no ie) “warp knowledge of any assassination effort involving poison pills? Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of any assassination: schemes which may or may not have been put into effect involving exploding sea shells that Castro might pick up by scuba diving? Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall any exploding sea shells “while Castro was scuba diving, but the problem of Castro being an avid scuba diver is well-known’ to me. As I recall, somewhere in this thing there was a refugee group or Cuban exile group or somebody at one timé in this whole activity who had focused on the question of whether Fidel Castro was vulnerable at the 410 Farst Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 26003 time that he was scuba diving. T have heard that. discussed but | TOP SECRET 7 - X) ae oo : :
Prone (Area 202) 544-4000 a10 First Street, $.€., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 frankly I do not remember in what forum, and your reference to the scuba diving has triggered that response. Nothing about exploding sea shalis. Mr. Baron. You do not recall ever hearing Desmond FitzGerald mention that subject or hearing that Desmond FitzGerald was involved in exploring that possibility, planting an. exploding sea shell? | | Mr. Halley. The exploding sea shell is enough of an off- beat kind of thing that I think I would have recalled it. I don't recall it. | I do recall Castro's scuba diving, and that representing a vulnerability and somewhere in the recesses of my memory, that does strike a bell with me that some exile group, somebody was talking about Fidel Castro being vulnerable while he was scuba diving. Mr. Baron. Did you! ever hear of a plan to present Castro with a skin~-diving suit in which bacteria injurious to his healt would have been cultured, bacteria that would have produced tuberculosis and would have produced a dreadful disease? Mr. Halley. I have never heard of any bacteria approach to the problem of dealing with Fidel Castro. I do want to come back to this that I do recall something about scuba diving, you know, on the range of Fidei being vulnerable at the time he was scuha diving, but I do not recall exploding sea shells or bacteria. TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202} $.44-6000 410 First Steeet, $.€., Warmington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to the list of name -- Mr. Halley. Wait a minute. Just let ma make a note to myself. (Pause) Mr. Baron. .Do you have any knowledge, acquired directly or indirectly, of any involvement-of John Roselli in Cuban operations? Mr. Halley. Other than reading the papers -- Mr. Baron. ‘Other than what you read recently in the papers did you acquire any knowledge during your period as Chief of Station at JMWAVE of John Rosellits involvement in Cuban Operations? . “Mr. Halley. No. I had the impression from Harvey going off that he was meeting with somebody, and at one point in time I came to the impression that he was meeting a guy by the name of John. Who John was, I had no idea. Wea were involved in an attempt to try to find two Soviets at one point who were of interest. The fellow who provided the lead to that. had been a member of one of the casinos in Cuba at some time. Mr. Baron. Do yeu remamber who that was? Mr. Halley. No, I do not. I do not remember the man's. name. It may come to me. You are asking me things that happened, you know, in 1962. As I have told you, I have been ina lot of places. Anyway, when we put in a request for a trace on the source TOP SECRET \
Phone (Aras 262) $44-€600 . a 2 < a ai [3] = ¢ z 416 First Steeet, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 of this lead, hg was surprised with the speed with which we got a response back on this man and the details run down that we got on him in terms of who he was and where he worked and so forth, and I think I concluded at that time that somebody knew this fallow very well and somewhere in the whole labrynth, eithe Justice or we or somebody had. accass to somebody who could give us a great deal of insight into people who had been involved with the gambling establishment in Cuba. Those are the only two things that I can say to you that I knew at the time. Obviously I have sinca read the papars and I have put together in my own mind by deduction that the John that I was aware of that Harvey was in touch with must, be John Roselli, but r cannot provide to you -- Mr. Baron. Would ‘this. person’ with contacts with gambling interests in Havana have been Santos Trafficante? Mr. Halley. I would have no way of knowing. I know who Santos Trafficante is. Mr. Baron. How do you know this? Mr. Halley. This is like asking me whether I knew where ‘7th Street is in downtown Miami. Santos Trafficante is a name that constantly was discussed among Cuban exiles and he was a well-known figure. You could not possibly be involved Mr. Baron. Did you know of any involvement that he had in Cuban operations that were connected in any way to the CIA? Mr. Halley. None that I know of. To the hest of my TOP SECRET
Prone (Aras 202) $44-6000 a > < & é ) & < B Cc 6 7 410 First Street, $.£., Washingion, O.C. 20003 recollection when I was in Miami, Santos Trafficante was in the Tampa area and that is my recollection of it at the time. I also think that there was some large scandal, when I was in Miami, that was played up in the Press. I forget, some Federal agent who was somehow involved with tha Mafia and with the Syndicate and there was gome* Linkage in the Press between Santos Trafficante, Cubans and the Federal agent; .but I do not remember the details of it. Mr. Baron. ‘The Federal agent was not a CIA employee? Mr. Halley. No, he was not. My recollection is he was Narcotics or something. worl ao Mr. Baron. You would “make the same statement about John Roselli that you had no knowledge of his connection with any CIA sponsored operation against the Cuban government or against Castro personally? Mr. Halley. At the time that I was there -- you know, I want to caution you that I have read the Press. If I have trouble sorting this out, I want you to understand that -- Mr. Baron. I understand that clearly. Mr. Halley. -- that this is a dilemma for me. Obviously I told you I made my own deduction that John, the one that Harvey was in touch with, must have turned out in. the context of 20/15 hindsight to be John Roselli. At the time, I did not know that. Mr. Baron. What about Robert Maheu? Did you have any TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) 44-6000 |° | a 410 Forst Street, $.€.. Wasmington, 0.C. 20003 4 knowledge that he was involved with Cuban operations affiliated with the CIA? Mr. Halley. No. Again, at the time I had no knowledge of Robert Maheu. I have since read about Robert Maheu in the Press, allegations: and so forth. The name is familiar to me now. Mr. Baron. The same question for Sam Giancana. ’ Mr, Halley. Again, I say in answer that at the time that I was involved in ‘62 and '65 I did not know anything about Sam Giancana. I have since read in the Press about him. Therefore, the name is familiar to me today. Mr. Baron. Did you know at that time that Sheffield Edwards, who was then Director of the Office of Security, was connected in any way with those efforts against Castro personall or against the Castro government? Mr. Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me as Director of Security. That is all. I had no knowledge of his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro ina personal gense. Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my staff in Miami. Therefore I would periodically go to him about the performance of his officers who were on my staff. So during the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs, yes, I did see him, yes, I did talk to him about Cuban affairs in Miami, the performance of his officers on my staff, but nothing about anything TOP SECRET
Phone (Aras 202} 544-6600 7 9n fy ] 2 ¢ ry cs a « & 3 Aan 410 Freesat Steeet, S.6., Washington, O.C. 20003 that he might be doing, you know, against Fidel Castro. Mr. Baren. I will represent to you that we have testimony from Edwards and from .3im.0!Connelt who was an officer working in the Office of Security undar Edwards that they were involved in the early stages of an assassination plot against Castro which was run out of the Office q@ Security and later transferre to the DDP. But you are saying that you had no knowledge of any such operation at that time? Mr. Halley. I had no knowledge. As I told you before, I did not even know Jim O'Connell. Mr. Baron. Do you know 4 man by the name of Juan Orta? Mr. Halley. That. name is familiar to me. Itisa name that has appeared, you know, across my scope. I cannot tell you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace run, .you know, and look at the results of the trace. But the name Juan Orta is known to me. That does ring a passive bell in my memory. Mr. Baron. Do you remember William Harvey having any direct contact with Juan Orta? Mr. Halley. No, I Go not. Mr. Baron. You do not have any specific recollection of Juan Orta's point of involvement in operations. against Castro? Me. Halley. Juan Orta, no. It is a name I am familiar with. I think you will find, you know, that there are a number of names -- you asked me to look at that other thing -- a number TOP SECRET
Phone (Aras 202} $44-6000 J PAU “~ 4 = Qe F 3 ) s) 7 430 First Street, $.E.. Wasnington, O.C, 20003 of names that do ring bella with me.’ I really would have to have back-up material to clarify why they ring a bell.- This is One that happens to ring a bell with ma, but I have no way of linking it to anything, and certainly I do not link it in any way in my memory to Mr. Harvey. Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever hearing of a Cuban contact. Cd . e of William Harvey's who went by the name of Maceo? Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Mr. Baron. He also used the name of-Garcia Gomez -and ° Godoy? Mr. Halley. The only name that rings any bell with me in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy. Is this the same man? Mr. Baron. We do not have the first name of that alias. In what connection had you heard of Arturo Godoy? | Mr. Halley. My racollection is I've known Arturo Godoy is that he was the fellow who was active in the Cuban immigre community in Miami. That is all I can tell you at this point. I would have to go back. | Mr. Baron. You do not remember what group he was connected Mr. Halley. No, I do not. But it was a name that obviously, you know, frequently referred to in reports. ‘You know at one time we did monitor the Cuban community as to what was going on in terms of these various groups and what they had been doing. For some reason, Arturo Godoy rings a bell with TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 4210 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 me. As I recall, ha was soma sort of an activist in some Cuban exile group. To give you a definitive answer, you know, I would have to get the name, trace him, ‘hdve.‘a.run'onuthia tfellow and try to put it together in some kind of context, but that is the only Godoy that rings any bells with ma. Certainly in my relationship with Harvey, this has no meaning to me. Godoy and Narvey just do not ring any bells. Mr. Baron. One more name that wa already discussed, that is Tony Varona. Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Baron. You said that you did know Tony Varona? Mr. Halley. I know of Tony Varona, that he was leader of the consejo, the revolutionary counsel that had been set up. to sort of administer the Bay of Pigs operation. In the post Bay of Pigs era, Nua Cardona and Tony Varona were people who ‘still appeared on the exile seene and were prominent. We had some dealings with Nua Cardona, officers in the Station had dealings with Nua Cardona and Tony. Varona to pay off, you know, injuries to peopoe who had been suffered during the Bay of Pigs, ‘things like that, widows and so on. I kaow who he is and so forth, the name is very familiar to me. I never personally met with Tony Varona. Mr. Baron. Were you aware that William Harvey had an independent line of communication with Tony Varona? Mr. Halley. No, I am not. TOP SECRET
Baron. Would it surprise you if that were the case? Halley. Tha Tony Varona thing would surprise me, I think I would not -- I would be surprised, yes. Prone (Area 202) 344-6000 Mr. Baron. Why is that? Mr. Halley. Wall, because here is a-case where the guy was 4 prominent exile figure,. essentially residing in Miami, and I knew of no contacts or had “no reasons to suspect any contacts with this kind of an exile figure, though once it specifically appeared, I was aware of and it was discussed. This was done under FitzGerald's stewardship with the Task Force. I was aware of that. I would be surprised if someone was in touch with Tony Varona and I did not know about it. If you told me that is what happened, that is what Harvey has testified to, I accept that. I am surprised by it. Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the CIA relationship to Artime? Mr. Halley. Wall, the Miami Station had no direct: relation ship with him. . As to the nature of the project, you know Artime ran'’from the Agency, from other people who actually worked with ‘him on a first time basis. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a project called AMLASH? Mr. Halley. Let me make sure we are talking about the same thing. Mr. Baron. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) TOP SECRET 4106 First Street, $.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003
Pnone (Area 202} 344-6006 te 4 @ 410 Fiest Street. $.£., Washington, 0.6. 20003 Mr. Baron. Wa have just gone off the record to straighten out the fact that we are both talking about the same Cuban’ high military officer who was known to the CIA by the eryptonym of AMLASH. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Halley, that you and I agree that we are referring to the same person that we have identified off the record? Mr. Halley. Yes, we have. Mr. Baron. Were you awara of contacts betwean AMLASH-l, as he was known, and Artime? Mr. Halley. I think at the time that this was going on, I do not know whether I was or I was not -- I was aware that the CIA was in touch with AMLASH. ; Mr. Baron. Did: you deal directly with the case officers who ran AMLASH? Mr. Halley. I did not. My recollection of this AMLASH case is as follows. -At.some point in time; I-had.a conversation with Desmond FitzGerald in Washington during one of my ‘periodic visits to Washington from Miami. We discussed at that meeting ‘the nature of our approach to the military establishment in Cuba. In the context of that conversation, Mr. FitzGerald asked me if I thought whether it would be a good idea for him to meet one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently identified to me the personality he was talking about was AMLASH-1.
Prone [Ares 202) 44-4000 7M a4 a? ow 410 First Street, $.6., Wasnington, 0.6. 20003 od > < a Ca f) 4 Ree My advice to him was that it would probebly not be a good idea for him to meat himy and the only thing that I could see coming out of that kina of a contact would be that he, Mr. PitzGerald, would get a personal feel for what makeg some of these people tick, in human terms, and that that Probably was too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong, an individual as prominent in Washington 48, both within the Agency and the social world in Washinaton, would ba exposed in the Press. ‘That would create a flap that I thought was not worth what would be gained from that Meeting. Mr. Baron. Would this have been in the fall of 1963? Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the time. Subsequent to that, Mr. FitzGerald told ma that he had indeed met him and that he had had an interesting conversation with him. I subsequently recall that this gentleman was met in Spain at some point in time -- Mr. Baron. This gentleman being AMLASH-1? Mr. Halley. This gentleman, being AMLASH-1, was met in Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that ‘I read a Prass article Showing that he had been apprehended and I remember reading the publicity of that particular activity. It is also my recollection that we put in a cache for him. That is about the sum and substance of it. Mr. Baron. .Do you recall what the purpose of that cache TOP SECRET \)
aid was? Was it a cache of arms? Mr. Halley. It was a cache. I think that you could ’:1: ovtothe record to establish what was in the cache. I do not Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 - recall specifically what the material was that was in the cache. Mr. Baron. At the point that you were having these . & conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, though, in the first instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1, in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH-1 do you recall FitzGerald mentioning to you the fact that AMLASH had requested assurances that‘high ‘officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him if he undertook operations on behalf of the CIA? am cI rea & < x n Mr. Halley. I do not recall this at the time. You know, I also want to say, as you probably know from the record, I was later Chief of the WH Division from 1972 to 1973, and I did read some of the files. I am familiar with the case. But at the time ~-- I am. trying to be schizophrenic, you know, to put this in the time sequence in which we are ‘talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know that. | Mr. Baron. It would then be your testimony that Mr. FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a representation to AMLASH-1 that Robart Kennedy or other high 410 First Street, S$.E., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003 officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him? TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) $44-4000 PAUL ? 4 a « < z 416 First Stewet, $.6., Washington, 0.6. 26003 Mr. Halley. I do not recall that kind of a conversation taking place with FitzGerald in this timeframe that we are talking about. Mr. Baron. Do you recall any such conversation at any point? Mr. Halley. No, I do not, in the timeframe that we are talking ahout. . Mr. Baron. When I say at any point, I mean at any point. Since’ 1962. Mr. Halley. Well, you know, in tha period 1972-73, I did look at some of. the. files, I did read some of the files. I am familiar that such conversations took place and that there were a series of meetings. You know, I know who the case officer was and so forth. Mr. Baron. You never discussed the subject directly with FitzGerald? Mr. Halley. With FiteGerald, no. I can only say that my knowledge of that is secondhand fron having subsequently read the files. 7 Mr. Baron. Was it your impression at that time that one of the objectives of the contact with AMLASH-1 was the assassina tion of Fidel Castro or other high Cuban leaders? Mr. Halley. No. I never had the impression that assassina tion was a thrust of the activity. In other words, we were working across-the-board, both in the context that Desmond TOP SECRET
Prone {Ares 202) 544-6000 — 410 Feest Street, $.E.. Wathington, 0.¢. 20003 1 || FitzGerald and his staff were working on what I was doing in 2 |) Miami to try to establish contacts with the Cuban military. 3 || In other words, we saw this as a multi-faceted approach. First, we wanted penetrations of the Cuban military so that we could 5 |) collect intelligence. What were their strangths, weaknesses, what was their mood, where were things going? Secondly, we wanted from these sources operational intelligence. Who -- in other words, who in these groups were dissatisfied as Fidel consolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter- 10 || Movement against Fidel? Ll We were looking for people, once we had identified them, jle2 || to see if we could establish contacts with any of these leaders 13 || 830 we could see whether there was a basis for working toward 14 || an overthrow of the Castro government. “You know, those were 15 || the basic steps. 16 Now as you got down to talking about how you overthrow ~ 17 Castro, obviously the question comes in of how does a‘group who 1g | Wants to run a coup or take power take power, and obviously 19 || One Of the things that has to be looked at is where does the re 20 || existing leadership going to be during this event, who has 21 || control of the various units. So our discussions were all in eo || that context. 23 Mr. Baron. Would it have surprised you or would it DA surprise you now to learn that at least part of the contact 25 with AMLASH would have involved Planning for an assassination TOP SECRET
Pnone (Area 262} $44-6000 le 410 Fuest Steeet, $.E., Washington, 0.€. 20003 attempt against Castro. Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the *72-'73 period, saving any evidence of that in the file at the time. Mr. Baron. There are fourteen folders in the AMLASH file. Did you read all of those files? Mr. Halley. No, I did not. Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that was in the AMLASH files? Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry ‘at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or discussing it with my staff and so on. Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the. objective of the contact with Artime? Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime? Mr. Baron. Yes, | , Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Artime thing was looked at as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to see if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some equipment, some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know, TOP SECRET ©
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 410 Fist Street, $.€., Washington, B.C. 20003 and if you have not, you should talk to the People who ran the Artime operation,. when this was set up, I think I partiéipated in giving Artime some tutorial training for a couple of weeks when this operation was first established in ordar to familiariz him with some of the problems of trying to manage a large operation against Cuba because he had been out of things for a couple of years. Mr. Baron. Were you aware that. he had bean supplied a weapon which we already agreed could be characterized as an assassination weapon? Mr. Halley. You say "we." You and I? Mr. Baron. Yes. -Mr. Halley. Which weapon was that? Mr. Baron. A high-powered rifle with long-range and low muzzle velocity. | Mr. Halley. I am aware of the fact of this project that Artime was involved in that. he got a number of weapons, any number of which could have.been used for sniper type activities. I am aware of the fact that he had a base in Nicaragua to ‘have vactivities, so I would find it hard to sinqle out a weapon. My recollection of that that he was given a large number of weapons. Mr. Baron. Was one of Artime's objectives to have been to assassinate Fidel Castro? Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of. TOP SECRET
Phone (Araa 202) 344-6000 AO Fiest Street, $.E., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. Did you aver haar any discussion to the effect that the Agency was attempting to achieve through Artime indirectly. what they did not want to achlave directly ina fashion that would be attributed to the CIA, namely the assassination of Castro? Mr. Halley. I think that you have tied two issues together there and I do not think I can answer. the question that way. I would like to separate the question into two parts. Mr. Baron. Go ahead. Mr. Halley. The first part, as I mentioned to you earlier the CIA did establish a. relationship with Artime and he was given funds and other support to run his approach to solving the Cuban problem. He was one of two such activities that were run at the time. And therefore I think that your statement is correct that perhaps he was set up so that there could be no direct attribution in his activities to the United States, because he set up a base in Nicaragua, and the story as I recall it was put out that he was receiving assistance from the | Nicaraguan government, and therefore there was a part of the ‘whole cover story, if you will, for him. So, yes, there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel track or a separate track. That does not follow from that, in my perspective, that was qeared towards an assassination operation, because that was a fantastically large operation involving lots of people, you know, with substantial amounts of TOP SECRET
money. I was opposed to it at the time. And once it wags set up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an Prone {Area 202} 544-6000 - awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up, you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period, ‘and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledg . > of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had occurred. | . Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating Castro? | | Mr. Halley. No, not for the specific purpose of assassina- ting Castro. a 3 a & Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH~1 a WARD on was a reliable agent? Mr. Halley. y really’ do not know that much about him, you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Madrid, newspaper ‘articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe. Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling | Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational purpose including the intelligence gathering? 410 Forst Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Halley. The only casé that I recall is this case that TOP SECRET \)
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 ° "y “PAUL a) a a Ce z a) i fy 7 7 410 Feeat Street, $.£., Wainington, &.C. 20003 I mentioned to you earlier when we were in touch with an individual whose name I cannot remember who had been involved with one of the gambling houses in Cuba who came to us ‘with leads to Soviets from a missile site who wanted to defact. That is the only case that I know of. I cannot think of ‘the Man's name. I can give you a physical description of him, and so forth. I honestly cannot think of his name. ‘Mr. Baron. You are not aware of any other use of people with gambling interests in Cuba for intelligence gathering? Mr. Halley. ‘Not that I am aware of. If you have something specific that you want to pursue, if you can give me some otherr clue than that, I just do not, out of my past memory, I simply do not recall any other case but that one. Mr. Baron. Are you aware of any contact between the CIA and Meyer Lansky? Mr. Halley. No, I am not aware of any contact between the CIA and Meyer Lansky. Mr. Baron. Was Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban operations during the period of your tenure at JMWAVE Station? Mir. Halley. Howard Hunt was involved in the Bay of Pigs Opsration. After the Bay of Pigs Operation wss over, he did not participate in the Cuban activities that I was aware of. You may know something that I do not.know, because, you know, you have asked me a couple of questions here of things that I am not aware of. You may know something «that I do not, but TOP SECRET |
certainly he did not come across my horizon at the time that I was in Miami. Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard the phrase Executive Pnone {Area 202) 344-6000 Action? Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Baron. What does that signify to you? ¢ * Mr. Halley. Well, Executive Action is some sort of a euphemism -- to eliminate somebody, I guess is how it appears in the popular jargon. | | Mr. Baron. Did you hear it in the Agency? Mr. Halley. No, I think that this is a term that has been bandied about in the Press that has come about in the Press to @ ba synonymous with killing somebody or something like that. ia) a 5 < J Cla ry ra ri E 3 Mr. Baron. It is not, as far as you know, a euphemism in a + c t common usage within the Agency? Mr. Halley. No. Mr. Baron. Had you ever heard of the ZRRIFLE Project run by William Harvey? Mr. Halley. No, I do not know what it is. Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of --~ Mr. Halley. I want_to maks sure here that I am accurate, you know. You are asking me ZRFIFLE. That is a cryptonym for something. Mr. Baron. Let me explain further. Mr. Halley. I want to sort of say, in the last thirteen TOP SECRET
years I have Sean literally -- (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Halley. Let me go back. You asked me about ZRRIFLE. Phone (Aras 202} $44-6000 This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms. Every day I read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask me do I know what ZRRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of my head no. I have tried to be helpful. I have asked you Several times if you could give me a steering tipo or show me what direction you are going, I might be able to try to comment on it, but ZRRIFLE as such means nothing to me. You really could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these things that come across my dask. mn “WARD & PAUL & Mr. Baron. That is absolutely understandable. I want to ra in) try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed recollection from you, then I will go back over these two, especially the next one, QUWIN. Do you recall a CIA asset who Went by the cryptonym OJWIN? Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Knowing the system, and so forth, normally it would have something to do with Spain. It ‘does not ring any balls with me. That is all I can give you, a sort of Pavlovian response. You flash QJWIN on the screen, I am telling you now {f£ do not know, but it probably has something to do with Spain. Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the development of a capability of carrying on assassination was TOP SECRET S10 Ferst Street, $.£., Wastongton, O.C. 20003 With
Prone (Aree 202) 544-6000 4 3 < Aa -@ a « < z 410 First Street, S.E., Wasmington, O.C. 20003 run by William Harvay? Mr. Halley. To develop the capability to carry on the assassination? | Mr. Baron. Yas, Mr. Halley. No. I have no knowledge of Harvey heing focused on a project or-given the capability of carrying one o out. Mr. Baron. Harvey has testified, as has Richard Bissell, I will represent to you, that instruction was given by Bissell to Harvey to set up, to develop such a capability in early 1961 and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capability in coordination with an asset in New York named QJWIN and I think that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and WIN was involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal under- world in Europa and might be used for any number of dirty deeds. | | Mr. diGenova. It should be emphasized that the Executive Action Plan that you are referring to has had as its goal the incapacitation of foreign leaders, one possibility of -incapacitation being the ultimate weapon, assassination. It was just not assassination. It was a spectrum of activities that could be used to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere from illness, chemical warfare, and then including death. Correct me if I am wrong, but it was not just assassination. Mr. Baron. Noes that ring any bells? TOP SECRET
Mr. Halley. No, it does not. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection that the ZRRIFLF Project involving the development of an Executive Action” Phone {Area 2062) $44-6000 Capability would have been tied in in any way to an operation against Cuba? Mr. Halley. No, that’ does not ring any bells, none what- soever. Mr. Baron. I would like to introduce as Halley Exhibit “y 3 an article from Harper's Magazine entitled “The Kennedy y Vendetta," subtitled “How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against Cuba," written by Taylor Branch and George Crile ITI. Let me show you this article and let me ask you whether you have read it? i c at WARD & PAUL Mr. Halley. Yes, I have read the article. if (The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 3 for identification.) 20003 S.€.. Warmington, O.€, 410 First Steeet, TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202} $44-6000 310 Fust Street, S.E.. Washington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. Let us pick out some epacifics and discuss them briefly here. Near the beginning of this article, it mentions that JMWAVE Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of $50 million. Would that be accurate to you? Mr. Halley. .I do not recall whether that is an accurate figure. We would have to go back to the records. You know, as I-explained to you earlier, the start of the operation taking place in March and escalatéd:up, to’ a high’ point! and.then dropped off. In the budgetary cycle, we are dealing with a mass of figures, and I would not want to give you an inaccurate answer. That is something that could be researched -- we have the files -~ rather than speculate for youon the buildup and reduction in the operation. I do not feel that is usefuly Mr. Baron. As a ballpark figure, would you be able to place the annual budget of the Station in the neighborhood of tens of millions of dollars? Mr. Halley. No, I would not, because of this transition, ‘you know, period, the costs were very high in the beginning to get a start-up operation, brought to a certain peak, and then tapered off and starting to be peeled back. I would not want to draw a figure of -~ Mr. diGenova. What would the start-up cost? .Mr. Walley. In terms of what they involved or dollars? TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 mr. Cc E @. C * WARD & PAUL ~ é [ 5 7 ‘ 410 First Street, S.E., Wastington, 0.C. 20003 _Mr. diGenova. Dollars. Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the dollars. Mr. Baron. Would you say that $59 million would be in the right ballpark for your activities at the peak? Mr. Halley. I just have no recollection of the dollar figure. You might want:to get that figure when you can retrieve it in the filles. It is available. Mr. Baron. Ware the operations of JMWAVE coordinated with other Latin American CIA Station's, as the article indicates : here? Mr. Halley. I think my recollection of that phase is that Cuban activities with other Latin American’ stations were coordinated with JMWAVE. Mr. Baron. Coordinated with JMWAVE? Mr. Halley. With JMWAVE. Baron. Who had the central coordinating responsibility Halley. Washington. Baron.. Was that delegated by Washington to you? Mr. Halley. No. Essentially Washington had the overall ‘coordinating responsibility, but that needs some elaboration. Let me say that we would become aware in our activities in Miami that a number of interesting people had come in ona flight to Mexico City. We would send a cable down to Mexico City with an information copy to Washington, outlining who we were interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to TOP SECRET
Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operational opportunity in conjunction with the Station Chief in Mexico City. So wa were in some cases a clearinghouse. The final coordination authority rested in. Washington. will say that if Miami wanted to-do something and for local political reasons in Mexico thé Mexican Station Chief did not want to do it, that would be adjudicated, not by Miami, but by Washington. Mr. Baron. Let me quote you 4 passage hare and see if it comports with our discussions earlier of Special arrangements you may have, the JMWAVE Station may have had, with law enforce- ment authorities in Florida. The article says: “All the boat missions to Cuba were tech yy nically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws, a: eo] < a ‘4 o « « & and Immigtation statutes, so that the Station had to work out special acrangements with Customs, Immiqration and the Coast Guard.” Is that generally accurate? Mr. Halley. I think, as I described to you before, there ‘was coordination with the Coast Guard in terms of vessel departures. The other is Immigration? Mr. Baron. Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard. Mr. Halley. Immigration, there would not have been 410 Ferst Street, $.£., Washington, 6.c, 20003 coordination on a particular, you know, boat dispatch. On other hand, let's say if a mission aborted for some reason TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 rs “3 PALL ny ‘a o « «< z 2 430 First Street, 5.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 a small boat could not recover its position and get back to the mother ship to be pickad up and it was’ adrift or came in to one of the islands or came in to tha Florida coast anywhere and was Picked up and picked up by Immigration’ inspectors, then they would ask to have their case referred to a particular individual It may have been a code number, a color code, it May have been phrase. But then Immigration would get in touch with us and say we have this group, here is what they say, what is your interest in this particular group, and then that would ba adjudicated at that point. | Now the third group was Customs. Customs did hava a number of patrols and at times when boat loadings were conducted off the Florida Keys in particular, those Wére coordinated with the Coast Guard so they would not be expending their Manpower to run down groups that were extricating with us, in fact the Agency was doing. Mr. Baron. The article continues to say: “Tt was illegal for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic explosives in the cars, as they often did. The Station had to ‘establish liaison with seventeen Police jurisdictions along the Florida coast and into the Keys. The result was that any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released." Ts that accurate? Mr. Halley. I commented on that before, and we are on the TOP SECRET 1 Page
, fy So on C wARD bh PAUL Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 210 fest Steeet, $.E., Wasningion, D.C. 20003 record on that as saying that wa aid not drive around, there were-no vehicles moving, manned by thase Cubans with arms and weapons on them. In other words, you ara coming back to the same point, becaussa as ‘I explained to you, the weapons were only given to them on the vessel and taken back from them when they came back from a mission, so that the statement is not actually correct. Mr. Daron. What about the end of that passage where they say that the result, and I understand that you would disagree as to whether it was a result of this kind of a practice which you say was not carried on at all.-- Mr. Halley. It was not. Mr. Baron. Did a situation exist where any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released. Me. Halley. I have to go back and divide your question into two parts. There were no firearms -- Mx. Baron. I am not saying firearms supplied to them by the CIA for a CIA mission or any agent travelling down the ‘street in Miami who happened to have a Saturday Night Special in his car or who happened to he @runk while driving. Would such a parson be released right away or once the CIA connection surfaced? Mr. Halley. My answer to thet is no. In other words, if he had a Saturday Night Special and was picked up by the nolice TOP SECRET age
Prone (Areas 202} $44-6000 Y f : ‘ & PAUL i a « < x 20003 4310 Ferst Street, $.E., Warmington, O.C. and detained, and if he then asked to be in contact with us, the case would ba looked at at that particular point and if he had a Saturday Night Special, you know, there would not be any intervention on his behalf because it had nothing to do with his task on the behalf of CIA. | I did mention to you earlier ye had training camps in vario. parts of the State. If somebody came out of the training camp and did get drunk and was picked up and did not speak English or something and the police jurisdictions did have a way of getting in touch with us and we might intervene on a case of disorderly conduct. | | Mr. diGenova. How was that established, the relationship of liaison with these jurisdictions. Had it been set up with JMWAVE directly through Washington and down through the FBI? How had that been done? Mr. Halley. It varied. When we started expanding the Operation, you know, there had already been a Station there and there also were two security units in the greater Miami area. In some cases the existing contacts at the Station were ‘expanded, the same with Dade County. In other cases, the security of personnel who had established contact with other jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction. In some cases, we had our security people who were on my staff go out to these jurisdictions and identify thumselves simply with a badge and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they were TOP SECRET
pegs "SECRET interested in so that there would not be a cross ‘of ‘problems with these jurisdictions and therefore a liaison was opened on that basis, a multiplicity of approaches. Prone (Area 202) 544-4000 Mr. Baron. The article discusses the fact that regular commando raids were run out of JMWAVE Station to the shore of Cuba, and that those commandog-were equipped with .all kinds of explosives and armaments. Is that generally a fair statement, that we were running on a regular basis commando raids to Cuba? Mr. Halley. Yes. There were a series of commando raids run from the Miami Station against targets in Cuba. Mr. Baron. Were assassination weapons, that is, high-powerpd rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights, supplied “WARD @ PAUL to those commando teams as a matter of course? oo t. cont C Cc. Mr. Halley. .No, they were not. For most of those commando teams, you were looking for a different kind of a Weapon. You are looking for a weapon with a high range of fire power over a short distance to deal with an emergency situation rather than the kind of, you know, weapon that we are talking ‘about. In other words, you would find that type of a group armed with a submachine gun, as for example. Mr. Baron. If an assassination weapon as we have described it was supplied to a commando team, they would have 410 First Street, $.E£,, Waimington, O.C, 20003 to have a specific purpose in mind for its use? TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6006 “20003 430 First Street, $.E.. Wasmington, O.C. Mr. Halley. Yes. Also, again, all of these weapons were controlled, the weapons that were issued at the time of the mission on the mother ship and picked up on the team's return to the mother ship, so there was accountability for the weapons. Mr. Baron. ‘Would it have been unusual to supply what we have called an assassination weapon to a commando team? Mr. Halley. Well, that depends on the mission. For instance, let me use an example. Most of the missions that were run were run aqainst targets wthat were in fairly close proximity to the shore. Lf you are going to put a party to attack your objectives, let us say the objective was a petroleum storage tank, if you were going to do this by putting charges up against the’ petroleum storage tank that meant that you had to have a group infiltrate close énough to put the charges on the tank. Some distance away from them you would give them a second element of the commando team which would be providing covering fire for this. group in case they got into trouble and cannot handle it on the ground. “This covering fire group might have had a light machine gun, a Belgian weapon. They could have these kinds of weapons and they did have these kinds of weapons’ which in the definition you are using could be used as a Sniper weapon or whatever, but the basic reason for having that weapon was.to provide fire support for the other members vf the commando team. And therefore when TOP SECRET ™
ne I ita Laas: aba 1 BC “TOP’ this mission was over and they returned, those weapons were taken back from them and accounted for. They wera shaken down so that we did not have weapons disappearing out of our Pnone (Area 202) $44-6008 control. Mr. Baron. Such weapons, hidh-powered rifles with telescopic scopes, conceivably with silencers, were Supplied with some regularity, but they were kept under tight control? Mr. Halley. We had high~powered rifles. I cannot think no of a case where thera was a sniper scope attached to the rifle. I can think of no case where there was a silencer attached to a rifle in any of these commando raids. There were a number of 7 ' raids conducted, some of them involved teams of fifteen or : @ & PAUL ~ t twenty men. I am not prepared to say that no man ever had one, WARD but I do. not recall one. You know, if you gave me an inventory which are in the files, for each of the operations and say here is the operation plan, does this list of equipment fifteen years later look reasonable to you, I would be able to tell you yes or no. . But off the top of my head, I do not recall a sniper scope or a Silenced rifle. Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Rolando Martinez? ‘Mr. Halley. Of Watergate involvement? Mr. Baron. Yes. Mr. Halley. Yes, I know of him. I have never met him 430 Ferst Steeet, SJE., Wasmington, O.C, 20003 personally. -I know of him. Ne was’a member of our boat TOP SECRET
Prone (Araa 202) 544-6000 410 Farst Street, $.£., Wasningion, O.C. 20003 infiltration team. He was a UDT man. Mr. Baron. In the Harper's article, it says that Martinez indicated that "More than once he was given personal charga of weapons drops in which special rifles with silencers and tele- scopic sights were left in designated inland spots." Do you know of a factual basis for that statement? Mr. Halley. Martinez is undoubtedly factually correct when he says he put caches on the coast ofCuba that contained weapons I do not know how he would be able to tell what kind of weapons Were in the cache. The reason I say that is that when one of these missions were planned, the cache was put together and packed by our logistics group and once the cache was put together it was brought on board the vessel and the cache was then turned over to the team for infiltration so he would never have seen the contents of the cache, he would not have opened it up because it was always in a sealed container. It is conceivable that in the pre-mission briefing that he got hefore he went down that he was told that we are putting in a cache containing a radio or putting in a cache containing ‘weapons because that would influence what he selected as a cache types. In other words, if it were a radio, we would want it higher and drier than we would a can containing weapons that were wraped in cosmolene and so forth. He might know that they were weapons, but he wouldn't know that they were silenced and they had a scope. I must honestly say to you I doubt that. ~TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202) 544-4000 af 2 < & 8 a © < g 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. Did you know of any weapons drops that were mada for the purpose of supplying someone insida Cuba with a weapon for the assassination of Fidel Castro? Mr. Halley. No, not for that clearly stated purpose. As I told you, we put a lot of weapons caches in. The weapons were multi-purpose weapons, could he used. I know of no cache that went in specifically for the task of playing a contributory role to assassinating Fidel Castro. Mr. Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy directives under which you were operating at the time to supply such a weapon to someone inside Cuba who might have access to Castro? Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been. For instance, I can remember several resistance.groups that'we had that had tw three hundred men that we were supplying on a regular basis. Mr. diGenova. Inside Cuba? Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba, that were essentially living in the bush to a large extent, whom we did supply weapons to and got ammunition to them and so forth. And that was why I was ‘very careful when you mentionad this linkage before to saying that I could not be a guarantor as to what these men would do with these weapons once they got their hands on then. They Were free agents. Mr. diGenova. This is an interesting point. This has up before. We are aware of our reading of the record that TOP SECRET
HY 0955 Phone (Ares 202) 344-6000 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2) 22 23 24 410 Fest Sireet, $.€., Wasnington, 0.0. 20003 25 what you have said is a concern of not only yourself in terms of realizing that it was a possibility but: of .padple’ like Dean Rusk and Mr. McCone, who also said, you have to realize then once thes# agents are in another country and are supplied that there is little if anything we can do to control those weapons after they receive them. It would be safe to say that that, of course, was understood that there was a lack of control, and to the extent that it was a problem, it existed and had to be tolerated because of tha nature of the operation, would that be correct? Mr. Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it exactly as you have in terms of this lack of control. Our mission in dealing with these groups was to first, to put them in areas where wa did not have other intalligence covers. Their first task was to collect intelligence. The: second task was to organize a resistance which would take armed action if we ever got a total package put together that gave usS an opportunity -- that was the first and secondary missions. Once we issued the weapons to the team leader, if ‘you will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants anybody he wanted to. If he gave the peasant a weapon, there was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that peasant would not do something that we did not want him to do, To even shoot a militiaman, YOU could have an argument, you know, over a woman. Any number of things. TOP SECRET Docld:32493434 Page 106
Phone (Ares 202) 844-4000 ? ) AVE € fe] -@ —€ g 20003 410 Forst Street, $.E., Wasnington, O.C. Mr. diGenova. Ware there any restrictions, once, for example, those weapons caches were dslivered either by land or air -- and we have spoken to Mr. Murray who was in the Havana Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who was haad of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that they were aware of the weapons drops and .were intimately familiar with where they would be. Mr. Halley. That wus all before my time. I have no knowledge of that. During my time, we mada no drops by air. Mr. diGenova. Were there any limitations that were placed of how the weapons would be used that were delivered into Cuba to these internal rasistance groups? Mr, Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are addressing. Mr. diGenova. During your period. Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued essentially as self-protection for the people who were living in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they ‘were to be used for self-protection if they conducted reids, ambushes, sabotage operations. Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in this article that I would like to ask you to comment on. He iS quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some of them were very special weapons for special purposes. They TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 210 Fsest Street, §.Z., Wasnmington, O.C. 20003 were powerful rifles with sophisticated scopas, Springflalds with bolt action, rifles only used by snipers. They were not sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits. Everyone in the Underground was plotting to kill Castro and the CIA was helping the Underground. I was with the Underground as wall as the CIA, so you can see I was involved in, the plots too, but that is also obvious." You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the air about assassinating Castro. Martinez seems to ba taking that a few steps further, saying that there were actual plots underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and that people who worked with the CIA were awara of those plots and were aiding them in effect by the weapons they were supplying. Is that an accurate statement? Mr. Halley. No, I do not think I can go along with that statement. Martinez’ role as I described it to you, he is accurate when he says that weapons were put-in-and that he participated in putting them in. “I again question how he would know what was in each cache. I just do not see that, and I would have to accept that as a sort of secondhand statement by him because: of the way that the caches were put together. I just do not ses his knowing that. Now I don't want to exclude, however, that any particular kind of weapon did not go to Cuba. Maybe bolt-action TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 nN ; ‘ & PAUL ¢ WARD 310 First Street, S.E., Watnington, O.C. 20003 Springfields did go in. Mr. diGenova. Could he have found out about this after the fact from people that he knew in Cuba, members of the resistance in Cuba that he knew of who would have told him the nature of the items that they would have received in a cache delivery? Would that be one way that he could have found out? Was he that intimately involved, to your knowledge? Mr. Halley. Ha was not at the time. This is the period that I am familiar with, ‘62-'65. I do not know. Maybe some of these people have come out since then, and mabe he has talked to people who have come out in '68, '69, things like that I cannot exclude that. At the time, I do not think, however, he would have had that kind of firsthand knowledge, and therefora I have trouble with that statement and I cannot identify with it. Mr. Baron. The Harper's article says: “By the end of 1961, several men affiliated with the CIA had already been foiled in attempts to kill him" ~- meaning Castro -- “among them, Luis Toroella, executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, still in -prison; William Morgan, executed; and Antonio Veciana, escaped to the United Statas. Wad these men succeeded, their efforts would have been tied to the U.S. only indirectly, if at all." Let me show you the passage I am reading from and ask you whether you have any knowledge of the ccnnection of any of those men named to the CIA. TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202} $44-4000  , 9 a nm “4 2 < i “é fe} ‘tf < x 410 Fiest Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 "SE (Pause) Mr. Halley. No, there igs no connection that I know of between these names and CIA. This guy Luis Toroella does not ring any bells with me. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo was a leader of Alpha 66. He may have been in Cuba in '61. During the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs he was in exile for -- he . o was in Miami for -a long period of time. Mr. Baron. Can you explain what Alpha 66 is for the record? Mr. Halley. Alpha 66 was a Cuban exile organization that was engaged in a number of raids against the Cuban government. They claimed to have attacked Cuban shipping, fishing boats, and claimed to have an organization in Cuba that was a resistance organization. Gutierrez Menoyo was therefore a well-known name to me. Wa had no direct contact with him. William Morgan is also a well-known name. His activities and exploits in Cuba are well-known to anybody that has dealt with Cuban affairs. Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a connection ‘batwean any of these people and assassination attempts against Fidel Castro? Mr. Halley. I have none, no connection between these names and CIA and attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Mr. Baron. The fact that they ars listed here as having been involved in assassination attempts whether or not they TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202) $44-6000 410 Forest Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 were connected with CIA is naws to you? Mr. Halley .. Well, no, I would not say that. If you had Gutierrez Menoyo sitting here and if he ware to say in 1962 I attempted to shoot Fidel Castro, that is Gutierrez Menoyo did this, I would have no reason to doubt. I would have no basis for proving it, either. Mr. Baron. You have naver heard of these alleged assassina+ tion attempts before? Mr. Hallay. No. Morgan's name I would have to do a file trace to get myself back up to date. Morgan did gat himself in trouble with Fidel over some issue,, as I recall was in prison. I do not recall, remember if he was executed, although this says he was executed. Mr. Baron. What about the last nama on the list, Antonio Veciana? Mr. Halley. That is a name that rings a bell with me, but T do not attach anything to it. In other words, it is a name T have probably read in various and sundry kinds of reports. [ remamber no operational relationship with him between the Miam Station and this man during my tenure in Miami. Mr, Baron. During your tenure, would you have been in a position to know that these people had led assassination attempts against Castro, if that were indeed the fact? Mr. Halley. Not necessarily. I would say that the odds would have bean high that we would have, particularly, say TOP SECRET
Phone {Area 202) $44-6060 410 First Street, $.E., Wasningion, O.C. 20003 P. Gutierrez Menoyo. We did have a steady stream of reporting on” the activities of all axile groups and Alph= 66 was high on the list of groups that had a capability of doing this kind of thing. Therefore, they received quite a bit of coverage from us, from the FBI, from Customs, and others. They were on everybody's sort* of watch list. Mr. Baron. Let us turm now to a document that we will introduce as Exhibit 4, which is a report by Fidel Castro on alleged attempts to assassinate him that ne connects to the United States government and especially to the CIA. (The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 4 for identification.) TOP SECRET ce
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 410 Farst Street, $.E., Wasningion, O.C. 20003 familiar to me. I do not know whether that was from the VE Mau OUr a MEO pe aoe: . rete eo shi Saat ety Aare te Rs eee ea Mr. Baron. Which was released recently by Gsorge McGovern, to whom Castro had sent this report. Mr. Halley, is it true that I had asked you to review this report before we began our session today? Mr. Halley. Yes, you did, you did ask ma to look at the report. e Mr. Baron. Can you point to any names or incidents in this report that are connected in any way in your mind to actual assassination attempts against Cuba. -- Castro? Mr. Halley. No, I cannot point to any names that in my mind are attached to an assassination attempt against Castro: You asked me to look at this originally to see if any of the names were familiar to me in any way. I made a list of some of the names that rang a bell with me, for various reasons. One name is Humberto Sori Marin. I recall that he was activa, he was active with the DRE. Mr. Baron. At what page is that? Mr. Halley. Thera is no page number. For instance, here's a name, Humberto Sori Marin. That is i reporting showing that he was in prison, you know, we constantly got reporting on, or why, it is a name that I recognize in the counterrevolutionary sense, that it is something that crossed my desk, to See tha name. All right. The other name that is familiar is Tony Varona. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 & PAUL ot a & _ ¥ 410 Ferst Street, S.E., Wasmangton, 0.C. 20003 That was a Cuban exile leader. We talked about Tony Varona. I told you I did not know that tony Varona had any connection with Mr. Harvey. There is another name in here, Manolo Ray. I mentioned Manolo Ray to you. He was one of two exile leaders who had a relationship with the Agency. You know, I told you Artime was e One; Manolo Ray is another. Ha is familiar to me as a result of that. | Mr. Baron. You did not know of any involvemant of Manolo Ray in an assassination aeffort against Castro? Mr. Halley. I do not. ‘Here is’ another name mentionad in the same paragraph, Aureliano Sanchez Arango. That is a name that is familiar to me as a prominent Cuban exile. | Mr. Baron. You have no more specific recollection? Mr. Halley. I am trying to be responsive to your question, | telling you which names ring a bell with me as I run through this. Mr. Baron. All I am trying to do is clarify for the “record the exact nature of your recollection of each of these names. Do you have any recollection of a plot alluded to in this report to shoot Castro with a bazooka at the Havana Stadium? Mir. Halley. No, I do not have any recollection of that. According to this, 1€ this is correct, it took place in Octoher TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-5000 PAUL .@ [s] ¢ < z 410 Fiest Street, $.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 of "61 which I would not hava had any knowledge of becausa I was not involved in Cuban affairs until, as fr told,you, early Pebruary 1962. Mr. Baron. The same would go for the shooting of a bazooka towards the Presidential Palace? Mr. Halley. I have no knowledge. - & Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of any efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro run out of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base? Mr. Halley. No, I do not. As you know, Guantanamo had a number of Cuban exiles in it, people who had taken refuge in the base at one time or another.:- During the’ time that I was the Station Chief in Miami we did have contacts with people at Guantanamo. We did use them for intelligence collection purposes, but I do not have any linkage between that intelligenc project and assassination. Mr. Baron. Were paramilitary operations run out of Guantanamo Bay? Mr. Halley. They were not during my time as Station Chief in Miami by CIA. There was an office of ONI, Office of “Naval Intelligence representative on Guantanamo. I have no knowledge of what they may have been doing during various periods of time. I am talking about CIA. Mr. Baron. Any other names that struck a chord with you in this report? Mr. Halley. Well, you have a name here, Mario Salabarria TOP SECRET a \
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 “a 3 € & @ (2) ve < z 410 First Steeet, S.£., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 Aquiar; that name rings a bell with me, for what reason, I do not know. You know, we would have to run a name traca.to get & rundown of what is in the files and what is in the central index for me to be able to comment on it. As I told you earlier I know that the Agency is doing all these traces after they are completed and you get them and you want me to take a look at it, I will ba glad to do so. It may trigger some response. This name, Ramon Grau Scerio, it rings a bell with me. It is quite possible that he may have been a collection agent, just as is written here. I am making a deduction, but again, I would have to look at the name traces, but it is a name that rings a bell with me. Mr. Baron. ‘You do not remember him in connection with an attempt to poison the Prime Minister in June of 1965 as it says there? Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Then the next name that is on here, that is familiar. Here is one that we discussed, that is AMLASH-1. We already went over that one. The other name was Manuel Artime, whom we have talked about. Mr. Baron. Right. Mr. Baron. The last name on here -~- I cannot find it -- the other name is Antonio Cuasta Valle. I cannot find it now, but that is the last name that rang a bell. TOP SECRET .
Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Cuesta 2 | Valle's specific activities with the CIA? 3 Mr. Halley. No. I would have to run traces on him and Prone (Aras 202) $44-6000 take a look at what the information is. Mr. Baron. Was Frank Sturgis connected with the JMWAVE Station? Mr. Halley. He was not. .Mr. Baron. Not under the name of Frank Fiorino either? Mr. Halley. No, he was not. This is again ona of these great myths. At this whole Cuba thing, Frank Sturgis was a soldier of fortune, was constantly involved on the periphery of the Cuban exile community. He was involved in free lance fy Operations against Cuba. He was somebody that the FBI, iy Customs, CIA, everybody, reported on. He was a household name, ‘4 > < a& “4g fr) & < z but he was not. on the CIA payroll during tha period that I was involved in Cuban affairs, that is the payroll of the Miami Station. I remember name traces being run on this guy and so forth, and the Agency had no contact with him during that period of time. Mx. Baron. Are you aware of his evar having been on the payroll of the CIA? Mr. Halley. I personally am not aware of it, and I think, you know,if you had gone to the Agency that they must ‘have ‘given you all sorts of traces on this fellow and_told you the same 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, 0.C, 20003 thing. TOP SECRET \\ *
Prone {Area 202) $44-6600 410 Feest Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 Baron. Ara you aware of the AMOT program? Halley. Yes, I am. Baron. How"was that spelled? ‘Halley. AMOT. Baron. What was that program? Mr. Halley. That was a program involving a Cuban emigre group that was used as an operational support mechanism to support the Miami Station. Mr. Baron. What kind of support did they provide? Mr. Halley. They were interviewers of refugees who came out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate the Spanish language publications that were of interast to us. They provided information on the various mainstream activities that were going on in the Cuban exile community. Mr. Baron. Did they provide ‘support for paramilitary operations against Cuba? Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they thought we should interview or look to or see if they would fit into other paramilitary programs. In other words, they had the contacts .in the Cuban community. Say we had a require- ment for a diesel engineer. We would say to the AMOT organiza- tion, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel engineer who has a first engine's license, and they would go. through ail of their contacts until they would come up with one, a weak or ten days or whatever, having identified ': TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 410 Forst Street, S.E., Wainingion, O.C. 20003 the fellow, where he was, what he was doing. ‘Wa would then send somebody around to talk to him indepandent of them and pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities. It was that kind of operational support. Mr. Baron. People who were part of this program were not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they operated under the aegis of this program. There were some of them who may have been in the paramilitary program and then . left it and were subsequently picked up in the AMOUT organiza- tion. Could we go off the record for a moment? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Halley. Ne are now back on the record. The AMOTs also worked with us on a common project, which was monitoring Cuban naval traffic, things like that, so they ‘were used across the board for operational support tasks. Baron. One more general question. the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationship FBI? “4r. Halley. I would not “= Mr. Baron. Was the FBI involved in supporting your activities in any way? Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language, because I think ~-- Mr. Baron. Go right ahead. TOP SECRET
Phone (Aras 202) 344-6600 410 Frest Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 2 Mr. Halley. (I'do not know if your question means the same thing to me. I would prefer to say we had a liaison relation- ship with the FBI, that {s, on matters daaling with counter- intelligence matters. There was a regular. exchange of data with the FBI. There was an exchange of name traces on people that they were conducting investigations on, for’: countérintelli gence purposes,We would trace certain individuals and with the FBI there wersa a couple of counterintelligence cases that we discovered that were turned over to the FAI, So this is in the context of the normal CIA-FBI liaison that existed between the two agencies. Mr. Baron. ‘But the FBI was not involved in supporting paramilitary commando raids to the shore of Cuba, is that correct? Mr. Halley. 1 do not know what you are driving at. there. I am having a little trouble with that. Are you saying that the FBI dispatched paramilitary teams to Cuba as an organization? Mr. Baron. Were they involved in paramilitary training “of any of the CIA operatives? Mr. Halley. No. The FBI did not train any CIA personnel during my tenure in the Miami Station. Mr. Baron. Did the FBI at any point provide with you links to people who had gambling interests inside Cuba? Mr. Walley. .No. We covered the aqambling thing previously. TOP SECRET
Pnene (Area 202) 544-6600 a ~ < a & C.% z cy ) 410 Fiewt Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 The one case that I mentioned is thig-mah {who ‘gave us‘ the ..- lead of the two Soviets from tha missila site, and that did not come to the Miami Station through the FRI. Mr. Baron. Were you aver mada awara of a CIA attempt to secure the aid of a pilot, a Cuban pilot, to arrange for an “accident,” to occur to Raul Castro when he flew on a Cuban plane? Mr. Halley. I read this somewhere in the record in post years, but I was not aware of this at the tima, at the time I was in Miami. . Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had been given to the tactic of assassination at CIA Headquarters during your period of involvement ‘with Cuban affairs? Mr, Halley. No, that is in the period 1962 to '65.when I was the Station Chief in Miami, I was not aware of any serious you know, program operational effort towards assassinating Castro. Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had been given to’ the tactic or to the use of the tool of assassina~ ‘tion at CIA Headquarters prior to your coming on as JMWAVE Station Chief? Mr. Halley. No, I was not. aware of any, you know, planned program effort at assassination. Mr. Baron. If we limit it an Mr. diGenova. What. do you mean when you say that? TOP SECRET aN
Prone (Ares'202) $44-6000 || 410 Fiest Street, $.E., Wasmington, O.C. 20003 eae ee ee Mr. Halley. I went through this before before you came in and explained to Mr. Baron that the subject of assassination was constantly being discussed in the Cuban community and was a part of the fabric of the times. Mr. diGenova. That I am aware of. You are not the only One who has eaxpressed that knowledge that they were all saying let's kill him, let's get together: °- | Mr. Halley. There was a lot of discussion of this kind of subject of assassination and that is why I keep trying to be precise that there was no programmatic operational program that I was aware of to assassinate Castro. Mr. Baron. Although the context in which we discussed the talk that was in the air of assassinating Castro was coffee shop in Miami and conversation among Cubans as opposed to conversa- tions among high CIA officials back in Headquarters, were you aware that there were at least serious discussions of the use of assassination against Castre at CIA Headquarters? Mr. Halley. No, I was not. We are plowing the same ground that we covered before in this. As I indicated to you, people would come out of Cuba and discuss these kinds of things. ‘Some of these were reported in, you know, traffic back to Washington. People would discuss what are the prospects of somebody assigned to assassinate Castro. In that particular context, yes, discussions on the assaSSination of Castro took place. That is why I keep coming TOP SECRET
P +. y WARD & my t PAUL 410 First Street, $.6., Wainington, O.C. 20003 _ Prone (Area 202) 544-6006 il 2 3 10 li 12 13 back, Lf you are saying that if anybody outlined an operational Plan to me, aid I help construct the plan, did I make a contri- bution to a plan, my anawer is again no. Wa talked earlier, you asked me about those exploding sea shells of which I said I had never heard of but I had heard discussions of Castro's vulnerability because he was a scuba diver. And you asked me e about bacteria, I said I had never heard of an introduction of bacteria, but I had heard again about Castro's vulnerability in this context. Whera I heard it, as I told you before, I do not remember. | Mr. Baron. I realize we are plowing some of the same furroughs again. I am trying to be meticulous in the way you were before. You just now said that the subject of assassina- tion probably came up in the context of G&iscussing the contin- gencies of Castro's death. Did it come up in terms of discus- sing whether or not a plan should be put together to assassinate Castro, whether or not an operation should be mounted -- Mr. Halley. 'I cannot recall any such discussion, but in “any state where there is a leadership dominated by one man, it ‘is always a discussion of succession. That question has come up, you know, if something happened to Fidel Castro, if he is thrown over, if he doss something foolish himself or if somebody is successful in assassinating him, somebody who decides sudden- ly to take his machetti and just get out in the sugar cane field, again, the question was, who replaces Castro, and we TOP SECRET .
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 410 First Street, $.€., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 S generally focused on Raul. ‘There was talk of a collective leadership. These are all kinds of things that are always done. against that kind of a one-man state, whether it is, you know, a Communist state or whatever you want to talk, call it a military dictatorship or a dictatorship of the Right or the ° a Left. Mr. Baron. Again, discussion of what to do upon the contingency that Castro dies, by whatever means -~ Mr. Halley. Non-Agency induced. Mr. Baron. As opposed to this, which ig my ausstion: were you aware of any kind. of a discussion at CIA Headquarters on whether or not the CIA should induce the death of Fidel Castro? | . | Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such discussion. That is why I have gone into all this background to try to axplain the mood of the times and that is why I keep referring to, in my Sense of the word, asa professional intelligence officer, -. of an opsrational plan, I was not a participant in any discus- ‘sion in which an operational plan for the assassination of Castro was discussed. That is, I think, the heart of the matter . Mr. Baron. I have no further questions. Joe, do you have any? Me. diGenova. Mr. Halley, who was your: immediate superior TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 844-6000 .- a > < a é a © fe z 410 First Steeet, $.€., Wasnington, O.C, 20003 in terms of reporting fron Miami? Mr. Halley. Could we go off the record? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. diGenova. Mr. Halley, we have just had a brief discussion here about some of tha things that were covered before I arrived by Mr. Baron and*you. I do not want to cover any more of that ground. it is my understanding in discussing the structure of JMWAVE's relationship with Headquarters, Ganeral Lansdale's name Came up, and that on ons occasion, General Lansdale actually, came down to Miami to visit the Station to qat firsthand knowledge of what was transpiring. Is that correct? Mr. Halley. That is correct. Mr. diGenova. Do you have any idea when thet was? Mr. Halley. No. I stated earlier it was in 1962. It probably was in the summer of 1962 because it was after my family arrived in Miami. I do not remember the exact dates. It could be established probably from records of the Agency. I do not recall it specifically. Mr. diGenova. To your knowledge, did he-travel by himself or was he with compatriots or aides? Mr. Halley. My recollection of that was that he came down on a special airplane. There may have been other people on the plane with him, I do: not recall, hunt hea landed at Homestead Air Force Base. As I recall, we picked him up from there. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 — WARD 4310 Fiest Steeet, $.£., Wastington. 0.C. 26603 1 2 Mr. diGenova. Did General Lansdale travel under his own name or under a covar name? Mr. Halley. Throughout the time that he was in contact with me and the Station he was operating as General Lansdale. Mr. diGenova. Did he have contact when ha was there with * some of the assets themselves? Mr. Halley. ie had no contact with any Cubans that I am aware of. He did spend the night that he came down with some friends at Homestead Air Force Base, but I do not recall, I would have no way of knowing what he did that evening. Mr. diGenova. For the time that he was at JMWAVF he was with officials such as yourself who had a supervisory capacity at JMWAVE Station? Mr. Halley. That is correct. Mr. diGenova. I have no further questions. Mr. Baron. On the record, I just Want to thank you for your testimony here today. It has been a long day and we have gone over a lot of things quite carefully and it has been most informative. I would also like to ask you, if you would, to pursue for us that one name of the man who was connected with gambling interests in Cuba and supplied somé intelligencs to JMWAVE Station. . (Discussion off the record.) (Whereupon, at 5:90 ‘o'clock’ the hearing was concludéd.) TOP SECRET
FON Pee believed he “2s teins supported oy U.S. wucinesomen with panera Roselli needed Giantans and Trafficante n tne first phase ac 4 means of establisning contacts inside Cuba. lle did not need them in the second phase, because he had Varona. However, it vould be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate tnat he i red to te the private domain was working in 4 territory consice of semeone else in the syndicate.) Wren the pills vere given to Verona through Nom LiL, Varor3. d equipment needed for tna Su rt of his end of the suppor = requested arms an operation .- Roselli passed the request to Earvey- Durvey, with the the chief of the OMWAVE Staticen, rocured nelp of Ted Shackley, explosives, @atonators, twenty .30 caliver rifles, twenty we5 caliber nana guas, tro yadios, and one ~oat radar. Hervey says that the “snopoing list” included some items that could be obtained only frem the U.S. Goverment - Harvey ooitted those itens, tecause Roselli, posing 25 4 representative of private business interests, would not gre cost of the arms and equipment, have nad access to sucno equipzest- azout $3,000, was p/atd to
aes n 78 4 athe a Ng BE 5 the. Bon ae. OE Sel yd OS oleh 0 ° > 4 ia) é i) ei to Varonz, or to Yarona's son-in-law. eacn otrer. ; fearing an double-cross, cach independently to ausure himself that the equipment reached the pve! hands. After parking the truck, Uarvey and Saackley kept the parking lot, under ns i urveillance until the ress was completed. Roselli, accompanied cy O'Connell, did the sane. ligither pair Wmew that the other was watching. Eventually the truck was picked up and driven away. was returned later, empty, and with the key unger the seat as rental agency. Harvey Harvey returned it to the never Knew to whom Gelivery was sade ner for wha merely called uron to furnish suppor headquarters overation fren which he was otherwise excluded. 1962 Harvey and Roselli arranged a system of telephone communication. ra rVve ¥y by whica Rarvey was kept posted on any cevelorments. Uarvey, us “pay phone, could call Roselli at the 5s Club in Los : 3 Angele could rhone farvey 2 hours, Los Angete tho eveniag. taurant reportedly eae) penton il
62T ahed PFOPLEPZE Inteligencia(CIA) do el papel -- ve wae za c wm jot fu a a Gu 3 ‘ un ~ [o c ena el territorio cusane Sino n contra muestras representaciones e inte reses en paises ¢ tranieros O en aguas- nuestro pais, se destacan por Su peli-- grosidad, los reiterados planes dirigi- la eliminacién fisica de los prin 25 dirigentes ce la Revolucién y,- ecial, contra la figura ce nuesto aportanos evidencian -- Las pruetas cue gue, desde 1959, éste na sido uno de sus objetivos principales, mediante el em-- sleo de los mas variados métodos técni- cos de precisién.£n los casos de agen-- e n el extecior, les han - The United States Central Intelligence Agency vayed the leading rele in the his- aggressions against Cuba ,premoting, financing, and, in many cd g uban territory, Lut alse against ou t v © representations and interest in foreign coun- € tries, or in in rnaticonal waters. In this wide variety of activities carried -- out by the CIA and by other United States --- subversive bodies against our country ,the --- reiterated plans teward the physical elimina- tion, of the principal leaders of the Revolu- tion, and specially, against our Primeyx Minis. because of their dangerousness. NS ter, stand out The preofs we provide, evidence that, since - 1959, this has been one of its major ains, by using the most varied technical precision --- methods. In the case of agents living abread, they have been given means of transportation- and communication. Re det tid y
£ O£T aheg Prag he bers FEFEGEE fate "| las innumterables- -cadas cer te CIA,- e3 US uno de los ob3 ejecucién de sus planes, mentos contrarrevolucio a Lzaco ele 1 en el interior y exterior Gel -- pafs.No sélo ha tenido como coleborado- res a los desplazados del poder, sino - pién a elementos de distinta proce-- incluyendo a expenentes~ Tan. dencia social, de todo tipo ce lacras. Igualmente, no han tenido reparo en re- clutar a destacados jefes y elementos ~ de la maffia norteamericanaé, 4 quienes- les han conmutado fechnorias a cambio de Su participacion en los planes de aten- +aco contra nuestros dirigentes. Ho han vacilado tampoco en trater de -- . . ayy ejecutar sus acciones en. lugares pCbli- cos, conde el numero de victimas inocen tes hubiese sico incalculable, como fue los atentados planificados en el - Plaza de la Re ron: Stadium Latinoamericano, It is worth noticing that, in the innumerable infiltrations orgenized by the CIA, using <--> 4 "S uw vembe of caun one of the permanent goals has also been physical eliminetion of Commancer in Chief,- 4 a Fidel Castro Kuz. S a The CIA, in orden to carry out its plans, has- used counterrevolutionary individuais inside- the country. It has had as..colla- those who had been shifted and outside porators, not only fron power, but also individuals of different social origins, including samples of all types of viciousness. * In the same way, they have had no objection - recruting well-known leaders ands members= ffia, to whom they have - in exchange for their- to from the American ma sarred their offences, participation in Nor have they hesitated in trying to carry ~~ out their actions in public t victims would have been -- places, where the number of innocen incalculable, as were the crimes planned to - ace at the Latin American Stadium, the the University of Ha--~ take pl Revolution Square and the plots against our leaders. Rs ey Gq =, A a he Ake ye
FEFESEGE TEL a6heg. ty ton informes rencidos por la liamada - coninién Rockefeller y la presidida por - rs ank Church, pera las investi pacienes sopre las actividades ilegales - cuedado demostrado de forma a carecarica lo antes expuesto. Un ex-agente hizo pablicas ceciaraciones- sotre je participacion de Gicha agencia - en el criminal atentado perpetrado contra el vapor francés "La Coubre", donde mas - ue un centenar de cubanos resuitaron muer tos y alredecor de 200, heridos graves. vinda detalles pormenorizacos sobre su - realizacién,tratando de "Sustificar" esta matanza por un desperfecto en el mecanis- zo del equipo explosivo utilizadeo. vities, entral Intelligenc tion of the e Agenc the elaboration and execution of the c nal plans. In the reports of the so-called Rockefeller- Commission, as well 4s the one headed by --- Senator Frark Church, for the researches on - the iMegal activities of the Central Intelli gence Agenci (CIA), all shat we have stated- above, has been undoubtedly deménstrated. A former agent made public statements about- the participation of this Agency in the eri- minal act carried out against the French --- steamship" La Coubre", where more than one -~ hunered Cubans were killed and about 200, -~ were seriously injured. He offers details -- about his accomplisments trying to"justify"- this killing by blaming a sii oa 3 ht damage in - + which rae c =a Of mo te bee mn as weak ee Laren bh Le tiat oO ow id °C} the mechanism of q was used.
PEPESPEL ZET aheg. informaci6én --- Resguita significative La apoertaca por el columnista Jack Anderson en el diario "Tne Washington Post" sobre da gatervencién del ganster Jonn Rosselli de atentaces contra el- adel Castro, algunos de vyenenamiento con pasti- or le CIA. Posteriormen llas entregacas P segun la propia prensa norteamerica- na, Rosselli acmitid ante la Comisién de tateligencia del Senado su participacién cia en varios complots para o Cubano. con esta Agen asesinar el Primer Ministr Funcicnarios, senacores, Paulatinamente, sg de la CIA, les y ex-agente jefes,. oficie lumnistas de la -- asi como conocidos ¢oO prensa norteamericana, han hecho cate go- ricas declaraciones, ave ecinciden con - s denuncias cormuladas ,oportunamente yo a por el gobierno de Cuba. er rejlacionar todos los pla-- Sin pretend exponemos a~ nes ce atentados fraguedos, algunos casos, que en su =~ continuecion sido de conocimien casi totalidad no han te to pablico y prueban ta diversidad y rei teracion de la participacion de la CIA y otras agencias subversivas en estos ‘:e@-- eee ne the infermation given Dy- + Jack Anderson From" Tne Washing Sout the gangster Jonn Rosselli's- vericus plots against Prime- somo of them by means~ of poisening, with pills handed to him by the CIA, Afterwarcs, Rosselli, according to the American -- sefore the Senate --~ press itself, needed having parti Intelligence Commission,co cipated with this Agency in various plots for sinating the Cuban Prime Minister. assas Senators, chiefs, offi- Gradually, officials, as well as weil cers and former CIA agents, press journalists, have- known American press made categorical statements, which coincide-- with the cenounces expressed, apropos, by the- Cuban Government. g to mention all the plots~~ Without pretendin ose some of them the majority attempted, “e e*P of which have not been publicly known. The epve the diversity and recurrence of -- y P y . the CIA as well as other subversive agencies participation in these actions:
FEPEGPZE EEL aheg rio Tauler Sagué,miembros de la orga- y ia nizecién contrarrevolucionaria”ba Cruz" ,- se infiltraron por 1a zona ¢e Punta de Hi cacos, Matanzas. nto gansteril, junto a- rauler Sage, eleme Cubria Ramos tratan la misién de realizar entado a nuestro Primer Minastre,asi a rismo. Para cumpliria fueron- s vor la CIA ee gran cantidadc- e ° e material pélico y equiposs lcs que fue a In mid 1¢60,the counterrevolutionary Armando - Gavnia Fanos and Manse Taulen S605) Cubria Ramos and Mario Tauler Sague, members -— of the Ta Cruz) counterrevolutionery organiza tion, were infiltrated through the Punta Hica- cog zone, in Matanzas Province. “Tauler Saguésa gangster, together mith Cupria - Ramos, were instructed to carry out 4 plot --~- against cur Prime Minister, 4s well as tO -7-7" commit various sebotage and terrorism actions. for accomplishing this, they were given great quantity of warlike material and equipment by- the CraA,wnich were taken from them when arres- ted.
FEPESPEE FET avg =) traicor Humberto Sori Marin, con cua tro contrarrevelucionarios mas, ¢e@ in-- a de 1661, por la cos- objetivo - a +a norte de La Habana con él e reegrupar a ias organizecicnes con-- trarrevolucionarias realizar un atenta- @o al Comandante en Jefe y desarrollar- +ndo tipo de actividades subversivas pa ra apeyar la invesién de Playa Girdn. Para tales fines fueron entrenados y ar macos por la CTIA, ocupandoseles gran can tidad ce material bélico y otros equipos al ser detenidcs. Entre los principales encartacos figura ban: Ropelio Genzalez Corcno,Manuel Lo- renzo Puig Mill&n,Nemesio Rodriguez Na- varrete, Gaspar Dominguez Trueba Varona, Lufemio J. Fernandez ortega y Rafael Daz Hanscons,responsables de diversos grupos y organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias dirigidas por la CIA. four cther ted in --- fe) east or Havana, - with the purpose of greuping the counterrevolu- tionary organizations assassination of Commander in Chief and of ceve loping all type of subversive activities in --- order tu support the Playa Girén invasion. For this purpose, they were trained and armed-- by the Central Intelligence Agency. A great --- quantity of warlike material and other equipment were taken frem them when arrested. mong the participants were Rogelio Gonza cho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millan,Nemesio Rodri-- guez Navarrete ,Gaspar Leminguez Trueba Varona,- Eufemio J.Fernandez Ortega. and Rafeel Diaz Hans. cons, heads of varicus counterrevolutionary ---- groups and organization directed by the CIA.
>TO PEPESEAE GET afeg traia la orden de 1 Comandante en Je ‘cha accién fueron desig- an Basigalupe wornedo, Higir.io- az Beltran, Guillermo Coula Ferrer egandoseles dinero para su- t astos de ia operacién. oa El plan consistia en situar cos jeeps <r con bazoonas en el garage, sito en las - Avenidas de R.ncho Boyeros y Santa Cata- ina, y un panel por la Ciudad Deportiva “ cen nembres pertando granadas. Al pasar- nuestro dirigente obstaculizarian el --- riendo fuego. Al ser detenicos, Guillermo Coula Ferrer e Higinio wenéndez, acusaron 4 la CIA de- ser cl principal director del plan. Los- encertados mantenian econtactos a través- de la Base Naval de Guantanamo y la Emba jada Suiza, con miembros de la CIA y auto ridades norteamericanas, quienes les pro plish this action, Juan Basicalupe - ticinio Menéndez Seltran, Guiller= Coula Ferrer and others were appointed, and they were given money to meet the expenses - of the operation. The plan was to piace two jeeps with bazookas in the garage which is at PEcho Boyeros and ‘ Santa Catalina Avenues, and a light truck at the Ciudad Deportiva (Sports City) with men 7 carrying grenades. When our leaders would -- . s}o¢ —_ pass by, they would werk the traffic and open fire. When they were arrested, Guillermo Caula Fe- rrer and Higinio Venéndez accused the CIA of being the principal director of the plot. The indicted kept contacts through Guanténano__, Naval Base and the Swiss Embassy, with members ee) . of the CIA and American authorities, who gave them means and instructions to carry out --~
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