“-106-. approval if an assassination operation were. mounted (Dillon, 9/2/60, pp. 42-43). ‘Richard Bissell stated that in his opinion the language of the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960. indicated that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general strategy at. the NSC and within the CIA for removing Lumumba . from the political scene (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 29, 32). Bissell added: . | The Agency had put~a top priority, probably, on a range of different methods of getting rid of. Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him -physically,incapacitating. him, or eliminating his political influence. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 29.) 2 oe Bissell pointed to the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 as a "orime’ example" of. the cireumlocutious. manner ‘in- which a topic like assassination would be discussed by high government officials: Bissell: When you use the language that no particu- lar means were ruled out, that is obviously what it -meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room. Meant that if it had to be assassination, that that was a permissible means. | You don't use language of that kind except to mean in effect, the Director is being told, get rid of the guy, and if you have to use extreme means up to and including assassination, go ahead, (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33.) , Bissell added that this message was, “in effect", being given to Dulles by the President through his representative Gordon Gray (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33). (iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until . "Disposed OF In the course of his intelligence briefing to the NSC HW 50955 Docld:32493524 Page 345
HW 50955 -107- on September 21, -1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as’ Premier and was in UN .- custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, éspecially in Light of reports of an impending reconciliation between Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government : | ‘Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet. disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC. Minutes, 9/21/60.) - : . Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a personal cable to’ the Chief of Station in Leopoldville which - included the following message: | . WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING - .LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL - POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING ' HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60. ). On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment from CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60) , provided ‘the Chief of Station with poisons; instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for this mission (see Sections 4b) - -4(c), supra). Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy, Executive Secretary, who wrote the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination: Docld: 32423524 Page 356
HY 50955 -108- TL have -examined the memorandum (which: I prepared) ‘summarizing the discussion of the Congo at the — September 21, 1960 meeting of the NSC. I recall the discussion. and believe it is accurately and adequately summarized in the memorandum. ‘IT have no recollection of any discussion of a possible assassination of Lumumba at this meeting. With specific reference to the- state- ment of the Director of Central Intelligence. . [ believe this is. almost a literal rendering of what Mr. “Dulles said. My own interpretation of this st’atement was that Mr. Dulles was speaking. in the context of efforts being made within the Congolese government to force Lumumba from power. I did not interpret it as referring to assassination® (Boggs affidavit 10/10/75,° pp. 2-3.) . Te Boggs was not, however, in a position to analyze Dulles’ remark in light of the actual planning for covert operations ‘that took place during this period ‘because Boges was not privy | to most such discussions (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2), C. Douglas Dillon, who attended this NSC meeting as Acting Secretary (of State, said that he did not recall the dis- cussion (Dillon, 9/2175, Pp. 41). Dillon said that the minutes . "could mean that" assassination would have been. one acceptable means of "disposing of" Lumumba, although he felt that "setting him out lof the Congo] or locking him up'"' would have been a preferable disposition of Lumumba at that point since he was * NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who was also present at the meeting of September 21, 1960, stated: "I cannot recall: whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba’ at any NSC meetings. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1.) Boclda: 324293524 Page 357
-109- already out’ of office (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 48).* | When reminded of the fact that Lumumba's movement and communications were not. restricted by the: UN force and. that the Congolese army . continued to seek his arrest long after the NSC meeting, Dillon - acknowledged that during this period Lumumba continued to be viewed by the United States as a potential threat. and a volatile force in- the Congo: . . He had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and: started to talk to a battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes. (Dillon, 9/20/75, p. 49.) John N. Irwin II; who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated that although he had no recollection of the discussion, the language of the minutes was "broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination". (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2). Richard Bissell testified that, based upon his understanding .of the policy of. the NSC: toward Lumumba even. after Lumumba was in UN custody, he would read the minutes of September 21 to indi- cate that assassination was contemplated "as one possible means" “* See Section 3,supra,for discussion of CIA cable traffic indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable.. of taking over the government after he was deposed.and that pressure to "eliminate" him did not cease until his death. WW 50355 Boocld:32423524 Page 356
-110- of ‘disposing of"! Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 70.) Bissell was not present at the NSC meeting (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60). | ‘Bissell's opinion stands in opposition to that of Gordon Gray, the President's National Security Advisor, who likewise testified that he could not remember the NSC discussion in which he participated (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57)... When asked to interpret the reference to "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray said he “put it in the same category as. ‘get rid of! ‘eliminate'" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57). Early in. his testimony, Gray stated that "assassination . could have been on the minds of some people when they used. | iW these. words eliminate’ or ‘get rid of" (Gray, 7/9/75, Dp. 17). Nonetheless, when asked to comment on the minutes of the NSC meeting of September 21, he said: "It was not my impression that we had in mind the assassination of -Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, (p. 57).% * John Eisenhower, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, said that he had-no “direct. recollection" of the discussion but he found the minutes of the meeting consonant with his "recollection of. the atmosphere” ‘at the time: "the U.S. position was very much arti-~Lumumba" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 9). He said: I would not conjecture that the words “disposed of" meant an assassination, if for no other reason than if I had something as nasty as this to plot, I wouldn't. do it in front of 21 people . . . the number present [at] the meeting. (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p~. 10.) HY 50955 DBocld:32423574 Page 349
-111- ~ db) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of Assassination . The two.members of President Eisenhower's staff who were tesponsible for national ‘security affairs--Gordon Gray and Andrew Goodpaster--both made general disclaimers of any knowledge of Presidential consideration of assassination during their tenure. -” Gordon .Gray served as Special Assistant to the President. for National Security Affairs, in which capacity he coordinated the National Security Council and represented the President at Special Group meetings. Gray testified that he did not recall President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated killing Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 28).* When asked to inter- pret phrases from the minutes’ of. particular NSC and Special _ Group meetings such as "getting rid of" or "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray stated: It is the intent of the user of the expression or the phrase that is controlling and there may well have been in the Central Intelligence Agency plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but... at. the level of the Forty Committee [Special Group] or a higher level than that, the National Security Council , there was no active discussion in any way “planning assassination. I agree that assassination could have eee A pee rater * At the outset of his testimony: on the subject, Gordon Gray acknowledged that he did not have a-.clear, independent recollec- tion of Lumumba's role in the Congo (Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 25-26). HW 50955 Docld: 324239524 Page 360
~112-, been on the minds of some people when they used . these words ‘eliminate!’ or ‘get rid of’ . ..1- ‘am just trying to say that it was not. seriously considered as a program of action by the Presi- dent or even the Forty [Special] Group. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17.) BS Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary to” President Eisenhower, said that he and Gray were the "principal channels" between the President and the CIA, outside of NSC meetings (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 4). Goodpaster was xresponsi-. 7 ble for "handling with the President all matters of day-to-day operations in the general fields of international affairs and security affairs" (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 3). He regularly attended NSC meetings and was listed among the participants at = the NSC meetings of August 18, 1960 and September 21, 1960... _ When asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort - during the Eisenhower: Administration, Coodpaster replied - unequivocally: Lo at no time and in no way did I ever know of or hear about any proposal, any mention of such an acitvity. . . . [I]t is my belief that had such a thing been raised with the President other than in my presence, I would have known about it, and... it would have been a matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that . . . I would have recalled it had such a thing happened. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 5.) | John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Good- paster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, stated that the use of assassination was contrary to the President's philos- HY 50955 Bocld:3242355274 Page 361
-113- -ophy that "no man is indispensable" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, >. 14.)* As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended dis- cussions in the Oval Office relating to national security affairs, John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his atten- : ‘tion in his experience at the White House Mean be construed in’ _my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 4). oe — * Douglas Dillon testified that the subject of assassination - never arose in his ''direct dealings with either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 22). He was asked by a member of the Committee; however, to speculate upon a the general philosophical approach that Presidents Eisenhower ae and Kennedy would have taken to decisionmaking on the question of using assassination as a tool of foreign policy: Senator Hart (Colorado): I would invite your speculation at this point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisen- hower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think the Committee would be interested in your view as to the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say, the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders? ° Dillon: Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way, most likely, simply weighed the process and con- sequence rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle. . That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy of the U.S., generally both of them were very much opposed to it. (Dillon, | 9/2/75, pp. 22-23.) o Dillon served as Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration and as Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy. HY 50955 DBocld: 32423524 Page 362
~114- « Other Eisenhower Administration officials who, were active in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of © Defense John N.- Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political | Affairs Livingston Merchent, and Deputy Secretary of Defense _ James Doug las--stated that they did not recall any discussion about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, PP. 1-2; Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75) .- (ec) Richard Bissell Testified That, ‘Des ite His Lack of - . @ Specific Recollection, He “Strongly Inferred" That.the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles Richard Bissell" s testimony on the, question of high- level authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is. prob-_ lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection .o£f receiving such authorization. and that all of his testimony on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began‘his testimony. on the subject by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed Justin 0’Donnel1 to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based on his. inferences from the totality of circumstances relating to. the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was: that an assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60- 62, 65). HW 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 363
~115- As discussed above , Bissell testified that the minutes. of fieetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that. assassination was con-. templated at the Presidential level as one acceptable | means of “getting vid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii), . There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station. in Leopoldville on August 26, which called for ‘Lumumba! Ss removal and authorized - Hedgman to. take action without consulting headquarters, was a direct | outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell a was “almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12). Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of the means of removing Lumumba from the. scene that is contemplated within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32): It is my belief on the basis: of the cable drafted by Allen Dulles. that he regarded the action of the Special Group as authorizing implementation fof an assassination] if favorable circumstances presented themselves, if it could be. done covertly. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.) Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi- - dential authorization for him to order action to assassinate Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62): HY 50955 DBocld:32423574 Page 364
HW 450955 -116- ~Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower ~ wanted: -Lumumba Killed? Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't. Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously | ' through this kind of cable? om Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33. ) AS. for discussions with ‘Dulles about the source of autho- rization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell stated: I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p- AB, ) ; . ; ; When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa- tion of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had {fsuch] - authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62). When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said that despite his absence of.a specific recollection: I would strongly infer in this. case that such an authorization did pass through me, as it were, if Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the Station Chief. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.) Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40). Doold: 32423524 Page 365
-117- Bissell did not. recall being informed by Gottlieb that Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed Gottlieb. to carry ‘poison to the Congo, “there was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc- ‘tion without authorization. from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). | Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower. | (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion . that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were fully authorized:. Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that point? Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 65) Bissell further stated: Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instruc- tions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.) With respect ‘to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give HW 350955 Docld:32423524 Page 366
-118-_ O'Donnell this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he said that this specific assignment was made in the context that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho- rization above. the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; see also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62). HW 50955 Docld:324273524 Page 367