HY 0955 . Se ea ti ES 5 Pony pom 7 the Cuban economy and in Cuban morale, with consequent serious implications for Castro's position. But US pressures mat be intensified if the deteriorating situation within Cuba ig to result in the everthrow ef the Castro regime in the foreseeable future. 3. Despite whatever problems he hag been having in Cuba (or perhaps because of them), Castro has recently intensi- fied actions aimed at fomenting violence, subversion and revolution throughout Latin America. Given stable political conditions in this region, Cagtro's limited subversive capa- bilities would pose no immediate threat to US interests. But since political conditions are highly fragile in many Latin American countries, the threat from Castro ig real and disproportionate to his own meager agsets. His urgent need to achieve some early triumph has impelled him to shake off his recent caution as evidenced by the Cuban arms cache dis covered in Venezuela, his call for violent revolutionary action to take place in Peru, Brasil, and Panama, in December, and his threat to cut off support from his followers in other countries unless they initiate early action. While we believe that these actiong are evidence of some desperation and that they may even backfire, they nevertheless demonstrate Castro's determination to pursue an all-out campaign of revolution. The key questions then, are how mich time does Castro have and, in this time, can he set dangerous revolutionary fires throughout the hemisphere. A corollary question is whether present US policy vis-a-vis Cuba and Latin America neets _ present US requirements. Our view is that the peace ig slow. and ig allowing Castro a dangeroug latitude in hig Latin American program of subvergion and revolution, We believe that Castro's recent activities in Latin America now provide us with our opportunity to pursue a more openly aggressive retaliation approach against the Castro regime, both unilaterally as well ag in collaboration with the countries of the OAS for joint action designed to remove Castro. III, COURSES OF ACTION A, Invasion 4. A successful invasion of Cuba would provide the most direct, simplest, and expeditious way of removing Castro. This courge has been shunned up to now largely because of concern for world reactions and the possibility of escalation into global war with the Soviet Union, which is at least morally committed to defend the Castro regine. However, several new factors have become apparent since the gains and costa of an invasion course were last thoroughly examined over a —_— <a . GROUP 4 tomatic ACE cluded fram aut ae 3 . : ou) SSG Gates Leccopeenr errors BDoctld: 3274273815 Page 3
HY 0955 & yoar Og and we beliove that o roapprainal io pov WAFrontod . The USSR ia having ceonomic Gdiffieultioo, tho Sine-Soviot FALE bas vidomed, and tica among tho Eastora Buropoam catole litoao have leoocmed = all of vhich might hove a moderating inx¢luonco on Soviet reactions to a move agninat Cuba. Ac for Castro, hia @Gireieultios at homo ond bio behavior abroad may wenkon bin ability to defend his island vhile at tho same time encourage other Latin American governmonts to undortako moro Agercssive actiong. 5. Regardleas of any of theso recent developments, we must recognize that an inyrgjeion of Cuba carries great risk of a US-Soviot confrontation (probably in Berlin rather than Cuba), Tho risk of such a confrontation would bo less if an invosion was clearly a result of a unanimous OAS decision and if the invading. forces were genuimoly multilateral in composition than if the attack on Cuba wag strictly a uni~ lateral US action, In fact, anything more than a unilateral US action, sven though substantially less than an OAS action, would take some of the edge off tho rigks implicit in an invasion, The risk of confrontation would be substantially lesa if multilateral OAS action wore coupled with unrest neide a tending to a coup. Yn any cage, however, the USSR would probably atép up tensions sharply in Berlin and we should be prepnred for straing among our NATO allies. This will be especially true if the invagion were undertaken without prior NATO consultation. 6. Finally, 4t should be noted that the President told Mikoyan on 26 November that the US wag not planning to invade Cuba. A US invasion in the face of the President's remarks might reflect on the good faith of the Pregident and the credibility of future US discussions with high Soviet officials. On the other hand, Mikoyan asserted that "Ciba was too emall to subvert anyone;" clearly demonstrable evidence that Castro was, in fact, engaging in subversion would provide sufficient justification to warrant a reversal of any commitment, explicit or implicit, that wag made to Mikoyan, If an invagion were an OAS affair, (or even undertaken by several Latin American countries who were conspicuous targets of Castro's subversive activities) so much the better. B,. Blockade 7. A complete and successful blockade of Cuba, including all Soviet Bloe shippin could be ex ted to brin wD Castro from within, short of an actual invasion, Buch & move, centct | Docld: 3274273815 Page 4
. Cy . PP a im the absence of an actual declaration of war, would almost eortainly result in a substantial reaction againgt the bleekaders (whether the UB alene or the OAS in its entirety) and considerable o ition even among our clesest allies in Western Europe, gapec: iy 2£ it were a prolonged blockade. The intermatioaal reaqtion gm pilecks ak : reduced if the blieckade wore: a. Selective (1.e., limited te POL and munitions); b. A quarantine of covert shipmenta of ares, equipment, and personne] between Cuba and hatin America (see paragraph 11 B (1) below). ec. An operation in which there were very substantial participation by other OAS countries; d@. An action following a clear and convincing ease that Cagtro was engaged in subversion through- out Latin America. @. Of short duration and resulted in the overthrow of the Castro regime from within. &. Ags in the cage of an invasion, Soviet reaction will probably be more likely to take place in Berlin (where their strategic position is ag faverable to them ag ours in Cuba ig to us). Thus, if this course were pursued, it should be done recognizing that a counterblockade of Berlin and incidents involving Soviets ships in Cuban waterg will almost certainly be an immediate consequence. C. Actions Shert of Invasion of Complete Blockade 9. Both an invasion and a blockade are high-risk actions which would represent a major change not only in our Cuban policy, but in our international policy as well. For thia reason, dowestic political as well ag the broadest strategic i military and fereign policy considerations would be invelved. There are, however, certain courses of action which could be directed against Castro in Cube and Latin America which are leas risky than either an invasion or blockade, but would involve a gubstantially higher “noige level" and risk of con- frontation with the Soviets than those presently in effect. | | Some of these have been considered in the past, but have been rejected, usually either on grounds of excessive riek er lack | of feasibility. We believe it is new appropriate te reconsider J { 1 i 4 a ‘ wow ‘ ° { 2, : wes ‘ : ied HY 50955 Doctd: 32423815 Page 5
ad ee ey these and other actione designed to step up the intensity and paces of overt and covert actions whose purpose is to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime in the fore- seeable future. The statue of current programe and recom- aendationa for future action are discussed below. 10. CIA Activities A. CIA'e Integrated Covert Action Prograa ‘foward Cuba, approved by higher authority in mid- June 1583, consists of the following interdependent courgea of action and has ande progreas as indicated below: (1) Covert collection of intelligence, both for US strategic requirements ag well aa for operational requirem¥vnts - covert collection of intelligence utilizes all collection techniques both within Cuba as well as against Cuban ingtalia- tiong and pereonnel abroad. The quantity and quality of this intelligence continues to improve, although @etill far from our goals. (2) Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forum of active and pagaive remietance - ClA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba en- courage low-risk simple sabotage and other forss of active and paggive resistance. These uedia also s@eek to stimulate and exacerbate tengions within the regige and between Cuba and the Soviet Blét, taking asdvant*aa of Sino-Soviet tensions. The program includes both mailing and radio operationa. (3) Economic denial actiong - government-wide overt official UB economic sanctiong in conjunction with covert ecomomie denial operations are causing @ marked adverse effect on the Cuben economy. (4) Exploitation and stimmlation of disaf- fection in the Cuban military and other power centers - we are undertaking an intensive probing effort to identify, seek out, and establish channels of comminication with disaffected and potentially diesident non-Communist elementa in the power ceaters of the regime, particularly in the armed forees hierarchy. The objective is to stimulate an internal coup which would dislodge Castro and his entourage. We curreatiy are in direct contact with eral individuals ingide Cuba who may be of dovitl nee fer thie progran. | ie 50955 Docld:32423915 Page 6