45 could lay their hands on.” But he did not recall that "a specific project was approved which was designed for a man to go to point B and actually shoot or poison or do something to Castro." Helms testified before the Commission that “he was not aware of the CIA ever having assassinated any foreign leader. I certainly never authorized the execution of any such operation while I was Director or Deputy Director and when I was Deputy Director for Plans I don't remember it coming forward. I certainly never recommended such an action to the then Director." Helms said that although he had no recollection of any discussion with the case officer not to tell the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, in 1962 about the existence of plans, "I have no reason to cavil" that this was the fact. f. The August 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special ; Group (Augmented) The Special Group (Augmented) was a group of senior AMVdaIT GuOd “aA ATwuaS AHL NOU AdODOLOHA people in the Administration who were involved in overall planning with operations directed against Cuba. Included in that group were the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara; the Attorney General of the United States, Robert Kennedy; the Assistant to the President for National Security, McGeorge Bundy; General Maxwell Taylor; and General Lyman Lemnitzer (who is a member of the Commission), along with sever..1 others. The coordinating HW 53244 DoclId:327112720 Page 49
46 officer of the Special Group (Augmented) was Brigadier General Edward Lansdale. (Robert Kennedy was not present at the August 10, 1962, meeting.) (1) The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer The Phase II case officer said that he was at a meeting of the "Special Group (Augmented) in the State Department in August 1962, when someone brought up the possibility of "liquidation" of Castro. John McCone was at that meeting and, according to the case officer, John McCone “got rather red in the face" and made a remark which "was a clear effort to stop any such proposals, suggestion or any discussion thereof at that meeting within that forum immediately." On August 14, 1962, the Phase II case officer prepared a memorandum for the Deputy Director of Plans, who was Richard Helms, in which he attached a copy of an August 13, 1962 memorandum prepared by General Lansdale. The CIA case officer's memorandum to Helms said: 1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information. 2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four.. words were "including liquidation of leaders.” HW 53244 DoclId:327112720 Page 50 AYVddIT Guod *y aTwagD SHL WOWT AdODOLOHA
47 3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed. Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point. 4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those dissemi- nated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so." The attached Lansdale memorandum under date of August 13, 1962 had excised from it a phrase. The blank space was the approximate size of the phrase, “including liquidation of leaders." (2) Interrogation of Robert M. McNamara According to Robert M. McNamara in a recorded interview, he had no recollection of being present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. "I'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no recollection of it. I do seem to recall that there was such a group, I doubt very much if I was a member of it." He said that he "might have heen a participant" at one or more , HW 53244 Docld:32112720 Page 51 AMVddIT CHOI “UY AIWYED FHL WOT AdODOLOHd
48 meetings. When asked whether or not he heard anyone discuss the possibility of assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader, McNamara replied: "No. I should interject here another point I made earlier, as I have no notes--I did not take.notes of any meetings I attended with rare exceptions, and I have no other basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those years is very bad. I'm not saying this to in any way qualify what I'm saying except that it is a fact that my memory is poor in relation to the period." McNamara stated that "I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated, which seems to me... extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been taken to move in that direction, it would have had to receive the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other officials at that same level, including my deputy, I think, and my deputy never would have approved anything like that without discussing it with me." Secretary McNamara said that he "couldn't imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was known to the President and was not known to Mr. Bundy. I can imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy, not known to the President either because they were not that important or conceivably because it was thought desirable to protect the President from certain knowledge...I can't imagine Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. I can't HW 53244 Docld:327112720. Page 52 AUVdGIT Gdod °Y GIwuao FHL WOUT AdODO.LOHA
49 imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though to do so would by that action involve the President. I say I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader without the President's knowledge because it is the President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it ever became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest of us, the importance of protecting the presidency as well as the particular president, and particularly protecting his ability to govern." (3) The Testimony of John McCone John McCone testified that he was present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. He said that he objected to the discussion of liquidation of leadership as a possibility of consideration and he later talked with Secretary McNamara and expressed the same view, and he said Secretary McNamara agreed. John McCone testified that at the time of AUVdGIT GuOd *-aY aIwugD AHL wou AdODO.LOHA the August 10, 1962 meeting he did not know of the existence of the Phase I plans nor did he know that. at the very time the meeting was taking place, Phase II was underway. (4) The Affidavit of General Lemnitzer Lyman Lemnitzer, a member of the CIA Commission, was also present on the August 10, 1962, meeting. In an affidavit he declared that he has no recollection of the question of liquidation of Castro or other Cuban leaders being discussed. HW 53244 DoclId:3271127770 Page 53
590 (5) The Testimony of General Lansdale General Lansdale had no specific recollection of the August 10, 1962, meeting although he said that "it is quite possible" that he might have attended that meeting. General Lansdale said that the possibility of assassination may have been discussed at that meeting. He also had no specific recollection of his memorandum dated August 13, 1962, and the words whited out. When asked whether or not those words might have been "including liquidation of leaders" Lansdale replied "I doubt it. I just don't recall anything at all on liquidation of leaders." However, he also said that it was possible that the excised phrase from his memorandum was “including liquidation of leaders," but he stated that this was merely a matter of considering a possibility, one of several alternatives. (6) Additional Testimony of General Lansdale According to Lansdale, during 1960 he was Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. He said he had no knowledge of any discussion of possible plans for the assassination of any foreign leaders. In 1961 Lansdale was appointed by Secretary McNamara as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 54 AMWdAIT Guod -y aIwugqo FHL WONT AdODOLOHA
51 (a) Discussions with and Written Proposals to President Kennedy Lansdale said that he had a discussion with President Kennedy. "I do not recall exactly on that. He asked me if I would think about the situation in Cuba and if I could come up with any suggestions or recommendations from such a study. It was a rather vague assignment by him, but it was to be done for him personally." Lansdale “suggested an intermediary" to whom he would report and Lansdale said the President "appointed his brother, who was the Attorney General." According to Lansdale, he made an initial series of recommendations in late 1961 or early 1962, in writing, addressed to the President, “to see if there was a possibility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their political thinking together to see if there would be any feasibility of a revolution in Cuba.” He says he thinks he gave the written report to the Attorney. General for delivery to the President and that he later saw the paper "in the files of the President...he received it and he had possession of it." (b) Cuban Exile Groups © During the first part of 1962 there were A@iscussions about Cuban exiles possibly going back inside Cuba to harass the regime. Lansdale stated that the possibility of; these exile groups trying to assassinate Castro "might well have been mentioned." However, he said that "I don't recall a HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 55 AMWdaTT GuOd *Y aIwudS AHL NoUT AdOOOLOHG
52 Single instance of any serious action being undertaken" on any plan for assassination. He went on to say that whatever discussions took place concerning assassination related to possibilities rather than actualities. (c) Requests for "possibility" Plans - but no ' Authorization to Carry Out Lansdale said that if there were directions DOLOHA to submit papers, it was an authorization for submitting papers and not an authorization for necessarily carrying out the action. Lansdale admitted that "there might well have been" a request for the CIA to come up with, as a possibility, a plan for liquidation of leadership. ‘If that request was made, he said it could have been one of his requests and that he "quite probably would have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense" and "possibly the Attorney General with whom I was in contact." AUVdaIT GYOd “UY GIvaaD AHL WoUs AGO Lansdale said that at no time during 1960, 1961, 1962 or 1963 did he have any knowledge of the existence of any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader or any other leader. Lansdale testified that he never heard any discussion of "executive action capability." HW 53244 DocId:32112720 Page 56
53 g. Interrogation of General Taylor General Maxwell Taylor said that he was not aware of the existence of any plans to assassinate Castro. He said he did not have any discussions with the President concerning the possibility or the existence of the plans to assassinate Castro. However, "...-in the case of Bob Kennedy and Allen Dulles, we talked about so many things at the time of the Bay of Pigs as we sat around the table I couldn't say--that the desirability of the disappearance of Castro or what would happen if he were assassinated in Cuba--that was not raised, I don't recall." He said he didn't recall any conversations about assassination with McGeorge Bundy or Walt Rostow, "I couldn't say that discussion in the abstract ‘wouldn't it be a nice thing if someone bumped Castro off' that could well have been said, but I just don't recall it." Taylor said that he never knew of any authorizatio for the CIA to undertake any assassination. He also said he xuwaari Quod °Y GIWUED AHL WONA AdODOLONAG had no knowledge of the phrase "executive action capability" or any proposal for the CIA to develop a general standby capability to assassinate foreign leaders. General Taylor, who was at the August 10, 1962, meeting, said he had no recollection of any assassination plan being discussed, although he said that it might have been. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 57
54 h. Testimony of Richard Helms Re Unseating Castro Government and Possible Plans (1): White House Pressure Richard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, testified that "there was a flat-out effont ordered by the White House, the President, Bobby Kennedy who was after _all his man, his right hand in these matters, to unseat the Castro government, to do everything possible to get rid of it by whatever device could be found and that was the reason for mounting this large operation in Miami to work on this very problem. And the Bay of Pigs was a part of this effort and after the Bay of Pigs failed, there was even a greater push to try to get rid of this Communist influence 90 miles from the United States shores. In response to a question concerning "Who might have been the driving forces from the White House in efforts to do something about Castro" Helms responded, "Well, the principal driving force was the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. There isn't any question about this. Involved in this was a group of individuals who were sort of hired and pulled together by Kennedy and Rusk and McNamara and McGeorge Bundy and all those people to get on with this job and as I HW 53244 Docld:321127270 Page 58 AUWdaTT GUOd *uY GIWuao FHL woud AdODOLOHA
55 sit here and start to hink about this, Califano was one of them. It seems to me Lansdale, who had been successful in this kind of operation out in the Far East was brought in for a while." (2). Possible Assassination Plans Ambassador Helms testified that he did not recall “any plans that were approved or that were viable specifically directed at eliminating Castro, but that there were conversations about it, I haven't the slightest doubt." "The business about the assassination of Castro, I have read about this in the papers. I have heard about it from associates. It has been kicked around whether this was a viable proposition or not. I have no doubt it was written into various plans as one of many options but I don't recall any successful effort that was made in this direction and since Castro is alive and apparently well in Havana, the extent to which this was serious I have never ascertained." AMWddIT Quod -Y aIwuao FHL Wout KAODOLOHA Ambassador Helms said he did not "recall ever having heard anything about poison pills or any of that." He did recall that "at some juncture" a decision was reached "that it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the Attorney General " about "various things that the Agency had had to do" with certain Mafia members. He did recall that HW 53244 DoclId:321127270 Page 59
56 the Phase II case officer had taken over the Plans but he did not "recall any special basis being used to try to get them to do an assassination." i. The August 16, 1963 Memorandum to John McCone about Phase I According to John McCone, the first time he learned about the existence of any assassination plans was on August 16, 1963, when he was given a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" prepared for Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The particular events underlying the disclosure to Director John McCone appear to have started on the evening of August 15, 1963. Stanley J. Grogan, an assistant to the Director in charge of press relations, received a telephone call at his house from a man who said he was Sandy Smith, a reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times. According to a memorandum for the record prepared on August 16, 1963 by Grogan, Sandy Smith "said he was working on a story as a follow-up to the revelations by Joe Valachi, who is under close guard at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, who had named a man Giancana as the head gangster in Chicago. The man in Chicago recently went to court to have the FBI cease surveillance of him and his house and lost the decision. ‘ HW 53244 Docld:321127270 Page 60 a aIwadS FHL WONT AdODOLOHa AUWdaIT ayog
57 He said the Chicagoan reportedly at one time was used by CIA to find out what was going on in Cuba, but provided no information of value. Smith said he stated this to the Department of Justice and they would neither confirm or deny.” . | On August 16, 1963, the front page of the Chicago Sun-Times contained a story by Sandy Smith with a headline "CIA Sought Giancana Help for Cuba Spying." The story started with the following paragraphs: "A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times. "It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government official said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959. "What the CIA accomplished--if anything~-by negotiating with the 53-year old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter." Richard Helms gave John McCone on August 16 a memorandum (dated August 16) under the subject "Sam Giancana" which stated: "Attached is the only copy in HW 53244 DoclId:3271127270 Page 61 AUVdGIT God “aA aTWUaO AHL WONT AdODO.LOHd
58 the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year." Richard Helms, when interrogated by the Commission staff, testified he did not have any recollection of the specific events. However, when he was shown his memorandum of August 16, 1963, addressed to John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, he remembered that he had delivered that memorandum to Mr. McCone. Helms did not recall whether or not he had seen the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record sent to the Attorney General before the date he sent it to John McCone on August 16, 1963. HWW 53244) Docld:32112720 Page 62 AYVdaIT GuHOd “A GIWaaS AHL WoUT KdODOLON.
59 4. Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes According to the 1967 Inspector General investiga~ tion report, during 1963 several miscellaneous schemes were developed inside the Agency for possible use against Fidel Castro. Helms testified he was vaguely aware of some of these schemes, which he called "hairbrained." There was no showing that any of the schemes extended beyond the discussion Stage. One of these schemes involved discussions inside the CIA about trying to have General Donovan, who was negotiating with Fidel Castro for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, give to Fidel Castro a contaminated skindiving suit. It was known that Fidel Castro liked to skindive. The CIA plan was to dust the inside of the suit with a fungus producing madera foot, a disabling and chronic skin disease, and also contaminating the suit with tuberculosis bacilli in the breathing apparatus. There is no evidence that General Donovan knew of any such schemes developed inside the Agency. The scheme was dropped because Donovan on his own volition gave Fidel Castro an uncontaminated skindiving suit as a gesture of friendship. HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page 63 AUWdaTT quod °Y GIWYaS FHL Wows AdODO.LOHG
60 During this period of time there were also discussions about preparing a booby-trap spectacular seashell which would be submerged in an area where Castro often skindived. The seashell would be loaded with explosives to blow apart when the shell was lifted. After investigation it was determined that there was no shell in the Caribbean area large enough to hold a sufficient amount of explosive which was spectacular enough to attract the attention of Castro. Also, a midget . Submarine which was anticipated to be used for the emplacement of the seashell did not have a long enough operating range. 5. The Phase III Plan - 1963 - 1965 In 1963 a CIA employee who was fluent in Spanish was assigned on temporary duty with the Special Operations Group on Cuba. The employee is hereafter referred to as the Phase III case officer. The task assigned to him "...was to collect intelligence and to try to organize a group of AUVdaIT GuOd °-yY GIwuyS AHL WONT KdODOLOHA military officers inside Cuba who were opposed to the Cuban regime-the Castro regime." In the latter part of 1963 while on a trip abroad, he met a Cuban with whom CIA personnel had been in contact since 1961. At this first 1963 meeting the Phase III case officer said there was no discussion about any possible assassination of any Cuban leader. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 64
61 Originally, the Cuban contact had been a Castro supporter and had been a member of one of the groups that overthrew Batista. However, "he became disenchanted with Castro” shortly after Castro took over because of "the harsh police state policies that were being carried out." | At a subsequent 1963 meeting, which took place in Europe, the Phase III case officer said that the primary discussion concerned "getting into more detail on the organization of a group inside Cuba which could be used in an internal coup against the Castro government. "The subject of assassination was. never raised by me. It was never discussed in that context. In discussing the coup and how a coup would be carried out, this particular contact did raise the possibility and in his mind the very real possibility that there would be bloodshed, and that somebody would be killed. Their, or his, opinion was that to even get the internal revolt, a coup, underway that the leadership--the top leadership--would have to be neutralized. Specific assassination of any of the people, it was not discussed in those particular terms.” According to the Phase III case officer, the Cuban contact held a relatively high position in the Cuban government. The Cuban "requested a meeting...a high HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 65 AUVdGIT Quod °-u aIwuao FHL WOUYT AdODOLOHd
62 level policy maker in Washington, specifically mentioning Robert Kennedy as one of the people with whom he would like to talk, to get some assurance that Washington. was serious about proceeding with this type of an operation.” The Cuban also said "that they would need some help in-arms probably-in getting started, in kicking off the coup." The Cuban mentioned high powered rifles and scopes and said "they felt that they could capture sufficient arms to carry on once they started.” Subsequently, a senior CIA officer travelled to Europe to meet the Cuban and "assured him...that the U.S. Government was serious about this operation..." and "that the U.S. Government was prepared to support the coup and that when they launched the coup as soon as they established themselves in any reasonable manner inside Cuba that the U.S. Government would support them." The next meeting took place on November 22, 1963 in Europe. The Cuban contact had requested "some type of esoteric gadget with which he would be able to defend himself" if there were a confrontation directly with Castro. - "He had in mind some sort of a pellet pen or anything that was not a hand weapon that he could carry with him" into any conference with Castro. HW 53244 DoclId:327112720 Page 66 AUVdGIT quod °*yY aivwagds HHL WOU AdODOLOHA
63 Although the Agency aid not develop such a device, it did develop a ballpoint pen which had a hypodermic needle inside that when you pushed the lever, the needle came out and poison could be injected into someone. The Phase III case officer showed the pen to the Cuban contact on November 22, 1963. The Cuban contact declined the gadget "because of the close proximity with which he would have to get to a person if anything developed in the form of a confrontation with him." Instead, the Cuban asked for weapons, and the case officer told the Cuban "that a cache of weapons would be put down for him in Cuba." One or two caches of weapons, including high- powered rifles with scopes, were subsequently placed down in Cuba. In addition, according to the Phase III case officer, he delivered money to help the Cuban contact with his living expenses, while in Europe. "It was around $1,000 at one time, no more than that." ‘The Phase III case officer broke off contact with the Cuban in the latter part of 1964 and was reassigned to another task in early 1965. The Cuban contact then was turned over to a Cuban exile group. HW 53244 DoclId:327112720 Page 67 a aIwWugIs FHL WOUI AdODOLOHA AUWddIT dior
64 According to the 1967 CIA Inspector General investigation report, CIA support was withdrawn from the Cuban in 1965 because too many people knew about him and his plan. In March 1966 a Cuban leader was arrested and confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sites from the CIA to be used for the assassination of Castro, according to a "Prensa Latina" news release. The man said he received $100,000 toward this plan. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State after this news story appeared, the CIA said that the contact was recruited to collect intelligence of military activities and objectives in Cuba. The Agency said: "There is no truth to the allegations that the CIA paid $100,000 or any other sizeable sum of money" as claimed in the Cuban newspapers following the confession of the contact. The Agency also said: "the Agency was not involved" with either of the two men arrested by Cuban authorities “in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act..." The-memorandum to Secretary Rusk was signed by Richard Helms and was dated March 6, 1966. HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page 66 AUVdaIT GuYod “YY ATwago AHL Nour AdODOLOHA
65 6. Miscellaneous 1964 Schemes Involving Cuban Exile Community On June 10, 1964, Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, sent to John McCone, DCI, a memorandum on the subject ''Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders. nt The opening paragraph of the report declared: "The following report was compiled from information obtained by Agency officers from persons who were parties to the actions described. Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions. Presumably the sources of the report, in submitting this information, were motivated in part by the belief that by disclosing the information they would obtain immunity against legal action should they succeed in implementing the plan. "' The report then detailed several different reports pertaining to the development of"... a plan, that was still in the embryonic stage, to assassinate Fidel Castro''. Some of the plans involved advances of funds with the major payment to be made upon the consummation of an assassination. The funds were to come from either wealthy Cubans or ''Cosa Nostra!'' elements. The May 30, 1975 letter from the National Security Council to the Executive Director had several documents attached which HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page 69 AaWdaIT Gdod "Y G1wuao AHL NOU AdOOOLOHd
66 pertained to the possibility of assassination of Castro by Cuban exiles or the Mafia. These papers included the following: a. A June 18, 1964 memorandum prepared for McGeorge Bundy under the subject ''303 Committee Cuban Review." The portion of the memorandum delivered opened with the following sentence: "It seems to me that this meeting might serve to give us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the USA in the next 120 days." The memorandum referred to 'other groups of adventurers and freebooters who have an unknown capability for trouble.... "We also have these reports of MAFIA plans to perform coup de main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well advised of all impending adventures?! Attached was the June 10, 1964 copy of the Helms memorandum AYVWddIT GYOdI °"Y GIwugaS AHL Now KdODOLOHA to the Director of Central Intelligence, b. A-''Memorandum for the Record! dated June 22, 1964 under the subject "Preliminary Meeting with Attorney General, 19 June 1964" with the "Reference: Minutes of Meeting of 303 Committee of 18 June 1964 on Overall Subject of Cuba'' was signed by Peter Jessup. The portion of the memorandum disclosed to the Executive Director included the following final paragraph: HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 70
67 "In regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General indicated that the Department of Justice would look into the matter." c. <A portion of a memorandum for the record, also dated June 22, 1964 and signed by Peter Jessup, under the subject ''Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 18 June 1964" showed as present McGeorge Bundy, John McCone, together with ''Mr. Vance, Mr. Johnson. Mr. Mann and Mr. FitzGerald were also present," The opening portion of the memorandum contained the following: "A general discussion was held on problems arising from increased activities on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and the general edginess and instability on the island, "None of these present appeared to feel that it was either realistic or practical to sever connections with or to withdraw support from the two principal emigre organizations, those of Artime and Ray." HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 71 AUWdaIT Guod "ad GIwago AHL WONT RdODOLOHA
68 The remaining portion of the memorandum was whited out, except for the final paragraph: "A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders, Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including: Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforce- ment,'! d. The Executive Director also received a "Memorandum for the Record" dated July 31, 1964 under the subject 'Minut es of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 30 July 1964" showing Bundy, Vance, McCone and Thomas L. Hughes present as well as Desmond FitsGerald of the CIA, Only two paragraphs of the memorandum were disclosed to the Executive Director, as follows: ‘The proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August 1964 were approved. Mr. FitzGerald then addressed him- self once more to the ever present problem of operations by auto- nomous groups, While under our cognizance, they are not controlled, he said, HW 53244 Docld:3271127270 Page ?T2 AUVdAIT auod -u QTWuaS AHL Wows AdODOLOHd
69 "It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would contact Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement.'! | An August 19, 1964 memorandum from John A. McCone to McGeorge Bundy on the subject of ''Status of FBI Investigations re Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders"! was also included in the material delivered to the Executive Director | on May 30, The memorandum summarized the FBI investigation to date and FBI reports were summarized. 7. Summary The foregoing facts show that the CIA was directly involved in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro of Cuba. There is conflicting evidence concerning whether or not the CIA was directed or encouraged by higher authority to make an actual attempt on the life of Premier Castro or whether this was a matter developed from with the Agency or whether it was a combination of both. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 73 AUVddIT Guod "UY AIwugS AHL woud KdODOLOHA
70 C. The Dominican Republic oS eth can REpuo lic Ll. The Chronology a. The. Background Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Re public in 1930. By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt regressive nature of his regime, because of his Systematic use of torture and murder as tools of government, and because of his intervention in the affairs of other nations. The country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other Latin American countries. WHS FHL WOUd KaODOLOHa The policy of the United States at the beginni 1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Trujillo's downfall but to identify, develop, anda encourage a moderate group which would take power in the event of Trujillo's death, flight, or overthrow. This policy of non-intervention, although clearly required by treaty, convinced many Latin Americans AUVddIT quod -y aq that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, whose support the United States badly wanted in connection with Operations against Castro, conditioned their support on U.S. assistance in toppling Trujillo. In April the President approved contingency planning for a more active U.S. role in the event the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to deteriorate. 4 HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page T4
71 b, The Rifles In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican Re public returned to Washington for consultations, Both State Depaz ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents needed weapons, particularly a "small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses." The Ambassador has no present recollection of any such request. He is confident that he made no serious effort to obtain them. Nevertheless, the request went forward. Near the end of June, according to CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs approved the provision of "a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene," and requested that they he supplied at the earliest possible moment, Neither the CIA officer who obtained this approval nor the Assistant Secretary, now both retired, has any recollection of this meeting. AMWdarT quod “a GIWadS AHL WOUA AdODOLOHA HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 75
72 Cc. Explosives On June 24, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an unsuccessf attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela; as a result the United States and other OAS countries severed diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations were retained. The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign ser officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission before the severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter. It was his recollection that the dissidents had no definite assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of that course as the only way out of the conditions under which they lived. It was not until early 1961, as he recalls, that the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kill Trujillo. The cables and memoranda of the period tend to qadod °Y GIWYaD AHL WoUd xa0D0f0na confirm this recollection. Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals dum) AUValId 1960.to discuss with the dissidents means for the assassination of Trujillo. A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the \ dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, detonated from ‘a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means of an armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary action. A more detailed proposal along similar lines appears to have been provided by the dissidents in December,
73 On December 29, 1960, the Deputy Director for Pla presented the Special Group with a program for covert action to bring about Trujillo's overthrow. A portion of the program called for Agency and consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo to continue to work with the internal dissidents to promote an uprising and the establishment of a moderate pro-U.S. successor to the Trujillo regime. The plan, as initially ‘approved by the Special Group, contained no provision for supplying arms or explosives to the internal dissidents. WOUT AdODOLOHA. Two weeks later, the Department of State, on its motion, obtained Special Group consent to have the internal dissidents furnished "limited supplies of small arms and other equipment,” meaning explosives, subject to the condition that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point outside the country itself. The internal State Devartment memorandum which led to this proposal stated there would be no thought of toppling the government by any such "minor AMWddIT GYOI °Y GIvwYaD AHL measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the hands of the pro-U.S. opposition with a corresponding boost to their morale and their opinion of the United States. The station and the consulate were informed of the Special Group action on January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower . Administration. President Kennedy was informed of the Special Group action not later than mid-February.
74 i ad. Revolvers. During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch with the dissidents, and they were aware of their various schemes to assassinate Trujillo. Although these officials apparently took no active role in the development of plans, they did on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the dissidents. In mid~February, two members of the dissidents’ "Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination, came to the United States. They met with both CIA and State Department officers. During these meetings they stated repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the assassination of Trujillo. The evidence is insufficient to permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the State Department. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 7Té AUWVdaIT quod “a GIVYIDS FHL WOUT AdODOLOHA
75 In March matters took an active turn. In a cable on March 4, a letter on March 16, and an airgram on March 22: the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans for Trujillo's assassination were coming to a head. He requested additional authority to supply the pro-U.S. dissidents with weapons. Similar requests were made by the CIA Station Chief of his headquarters. Three times headquarters responded that it could not comply with these requests because the restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by Americans.. , On March 22, the CIA Station Chief renewed his request that headquarters send him three .38 calibre revolvers a ammunition by diplomatic pouch. He stated that without AUVdEI TATION “ad aTWYIS FHL WONT AdODOLOHAa some show of support the United States would lose the dissident group entirely, while if it supplied weapons it might have some control over the timing of their use. HW 53244
76 On the same day, March 22, representatives of the CIA met with. the State Department officer who served as their point of contact with the Department's Bureau of Inter- American Affairs, Three days later, on March 25, the Deputy Director for Plans cabled the station setting forth United States policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and stating that the revolvers and ammunition would be sent by diplomatic pouch in the near future. There is nothing in either CIA or State Depart~ SWoud AdODOLOHA ment files to indicate whether the Department was consulted on decision. The memories of the participants are hazy on the Matter, but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the introduction of handguns into the Dominican Republic and believed it obtained approval. The then Deputy Director for Plans testified that as the territorial restriction on delivery of weapons was initially imposed at the request of the Department of State, he would have considered the State Depart- “XYWddIT Guod “uy atwya9 FHL ment's willingness to waive the restriction as adequate authorit and probably would not have returned to the Special Group for formal approval. He observed that the members of the Group or their staffs might have been advised informally. HW 53244 DoclId:327112720 Page 60
F7 The use of a diplomatic pouch to send weapons for such purposes was prohibited by regulations of the CIA's Clandestine Services, and it is also illegal under inter- national law. The Deputy Director of Plans approved the waiver of the internal regulations, There is nothing to indicate that the Department of State was informed of the use of the pouch, and the fact that the March 25 cable instructed the Chief of Station not to advise the Consul General of the use of the pouch suggests that the CIA acted unilaterally in this regard. .. The CIA files indicate that the revolvers were passed to the dissidents, and the Department of State files in- dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and the other t by Agency officers. Neither the Consul General nor the former Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter. e. Carbines On March 26, the day after CIA decided to fur- AUWd@IT GYod “a agwagyo FHL WONT AdODOLONA nish the revolvers, the station cabled that it had found three M-] carbines in the consulate, left behind by departing naval personnel. It requested magazines for the weapons and permission to pass them to the dissidents. On March 29 the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans responded that he was pouching the magazines, and that headquarters was "inclined to . HW 53244 Decld:327112770 Page 61
78 favor" passing the weapons and ammunition. Another meeting was held with the Department of State on March 31. The State Department memorandum makes no mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director for Plans granted authority to pass the carbines the same day. Both the State Department liaison officer, who prepared the memorandum of the meeting, and the Consul General are clear in their recollection that the State Department in Washington did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took place. Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was coordinated in advance with the Department of State. It is possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well, It is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group AUWddiT GuOd “ay GIWeaS FHL NOU AdOQOOLOHd restriction on importation of weapons did not apply, as the carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic. CIA cabled its Station Chief on April 5 to request. the Consul General not to comment in his correspondence with the Department that the arms and ammunition. were being passed. A reassuring reply from the Consul General was received two HW 53244 Docld:3271127270 Page 62
days later, The CIA Station Chief, who would not have been involved in any coordination at the headquarters level, speculated that this injunction may have been designed to keep the State Department from knowing "officially" that the weapons were being passed. It is clear that the coordination on the deci- Sion to provide the carbines was inadequate. It is impossible to determine from this evidence where the fault lies. £. Submachine Guns As early as March 20, the consulate and the sta- 5 FHL WONT AdODOLONA tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed that the assassins in- @TWag tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress--substantial®: the plan followed some two months later. Although the plan originally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress’ residence using silenced weapons, the group requested five M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self AUWdaIT quod *y defense in case the assassination plans went awry and there was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces. In its March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was prepared to provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the capacity to receive them at sea or in a cache on the coast,
81 the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Latin America. According to Berle's memorandum of the interview, confirmed by one of the witnesses, the initial presentation stated the group wished the arms in order to overthrow Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo, and that the guns were wanted for that purpose, Berle responded that he could not care less for Trujillo, but that the United States did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. The Agency officer, who had been in a supervisory position with respect to this effort for approximately a year, told Berle he felt the same way. It may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over-~- ruled; on May 5 a cable informed the station that a high-level State Department decision on the submachineguns was pending. Nothing in the files indicates what this cable might have referred to. In any event on May 8 the station was informed that the State Department had disapproved passage of the submachineguns, and this ended the matter, AMWddIT GuOd -Y GIWNID AHL NOUT AdODOLOHA
82 g. The Policy Statement In mid-May, as a result of increasing indications that events in the Dominican Republic were Yeaching a climax, the White House requested situation reports and contingency plans. This exercise was overseen by a member of the National Security Council Staff. A CIA briefing paper prepared for this purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal defense "attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo." The report implied that both the revolvers and the ammunition had been in the consulate with the carbines, and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization technically did not apply. The CIA liaison officer at the State Department called to his superiors' attention the fact that weapons had al- ready been passed, and apparently submitted a memorandum outlini the reasons why the United States should not be involved in this activity. Among them were that the United States Government should not lend itself to direct political assassination, that the moral posture of the United States could ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world, that the United States would have encouraged the action, HW 53244 DoclId:3271127770 Page 66 AuVdddT GNOd “a GTWuaD FHL woud AdODOLOHA
83 Supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen, and that the United States could not afford a precedent which might convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons. On May 15 a joint CIA~State Department memorandug was sent the President's National Security Adviser informing ning that the plans of the pro-U.S. group were well advanced in the " direction of ousting Trujillo "by any means." This memorandum did not call attention to the fact that the United States had s supplied weapons to the group. Ps In the midst of these discussions, the Consul : General, who had been in Washington for consultation, cabled on : return to the Dominican Republic that the dissident group ” planned to "execute action against Trujillo" that evening, g The Department replied that it would consider this timing C particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of the : od Consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom. This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer. The state of the covert action program in the Dominican Republic was discussed in the Special Group on May 18, ana again on May 25. The Commission has not had access to the minutes, HW 53244 DoclId:32112720 Page 67
84 On May 24, the State Department liaison officer provided the Under Secretary with a draft cable, stating that the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter- vention, and even more so from political assassination, : overrode the need to secure credit with the Dominican dissident® and with Latin America generally. This draft was approved M at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was g Illa i : : ee a a Ae au! a Ed Si redrafting in the White House, the final version in another O hand, stated "We must not run risk of U.S. association with : political assassination, since U.S. as a matter of general 7 policy cannot condone assassination." This version was ns approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican z Republic. It arrived the day before Trujillo's death on May 30. 2 On June 1 the State Department instructed its Consul General, : if he could do so "most inconspicuously", to destroy any records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related Matters. HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page 66
85 2. Summary The investigation disclosed no direct American participation in the assassination. The idea originated | with the Dominicans; they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they did the detailed planning. They were never subject to American supervision or control. on the other hand, CIA and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assassination, and they were well aware of the group's lethal intentions. The CIA had told the group of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans; it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of explosives to kill Trujillo. HW 53244 DoclId:327112720 Page 69 a GTWYaIS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA AUVdGIT quod
_TQp-SEGRET— 86 D. © Conclusion: President Ford has firmly announced that assassina- tion is not and should never Be a tool of United States policy. The Executive Director of the Commission joins in this statement. It is against the constitutional and moral principles for which this Republic stands for there to be any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United States Government in any plans involving the assassination of any person in peacetime. a aIwugS FHL WOUd AdODOLOHA ry ie) 6 7. a % my os HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page 90