JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION . Peleased under the John AGENCY : CIA. _F. Kennedy RECORD NUMBER : 104-10331-10090 RECORD SERIES : JFK AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PROJFILES-CORRES PONDENCE WSsassination Records Ollection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). DOCUMENT INFORMATION ase#iNW 53217 Date: hg6—22-2017 AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA FROM : JOHN F. PEREIRA TO : DCI -DDCI TITLE : MEMO: JFK RECORDS-POSSIBLE NEGATIVE PUBLICITY FOR CIA DATE : 04/07/1993 PAGES : 5 SUBJECTS : JFK ASSASSINATION JURE PURCHASE DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER CLASSIFICATION : ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRICTIONS : 1A CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/30/03 . COMMENTS : JFK-M-16 : F2 : 2000.02.08.14:23:06:043054 . HW 53217 DoclId:32404220 Page 1
2000 | CSI-0118/93 7 September 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence VIA: Executive Director . Director, Public and Agency Information Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence >a FROM: John F. Pereira Chief, Historical Review Group SUBJECT: JFK Records-Possible Negative Publicity for CIA 1. In our review of the JFK assassination records we have identified a document, that could generate publicity about: possible CIA involvement in an illegal incident in 1964. The document is a draft version of the published report of the House Special Committee on Assassinations and is to be released by the National Archives. 2. The document describes an attempt by the CIA-funded Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), an-anti-Castro exile group, to purchase $50,000 worth of arms from a California company for shipment to Florida. The purchase was illegai. ‘The Treasury Department apparently planned a raid on the arms company and asked CIA if it had any knowledge of the purchase by JURE. According to the draft, CIA denied any involvement and advised JURE to arrange the shipment outside the US.. 3. The published report described the arms purchase and the planned Treasury raid but did not mention the imterchange with CIA. V4) Liberec John F. Pereira Attachments: A. HSCA Report B. JURE Draft DoclId: 324042770 Page 2?
SUBJECT: JFK Records-Possiblé Negative Publicity for CIA C/HRG/JFPereira/30373 (7Sep93) Distribution: Original - DCI ~- DDCI - ExDir ~ ExReg D/PAI - D/CSI - HRG Chrono PRPRPRPR ' HW 53217 DBocld:324042770 Page 3
Hse (depo, Jal. x _ yUL. JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA CUBANA (JURE) ” (966) In a Miami press interview on July 23, 1962; Manuel Ray Rivero announced the formation of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta JURE), an anti-Castro Cuban exile group designed to unite all the popular splintered_factions outside Cuba into an effective working or. nizations.(7) Other key leaders involved in the new organization included Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Ramon Bar- quin and Justo Carrillo.(?) Although Ray felt the Cuban Revolu- tionary Council was no longer effective, he attempted to receive finan- cial assistance from it until JURE gained momentum. (3) (267) As its opening promotional salvo, JURE issued a “Declara- tion of Principles.” Tt called for free elections, the restoration of hu- man rights and social justice, new economic development programs and agrarian reform, breaking relations with the Soviet bloc, restora- tion of legitimate property, proscription of the Communist Party and yelease of political prisoners. (4) 968) Ray’s group was considered an “autonomous” anti-Castro Cuban group by the CIA.(5) The concept of autonomous operations was conceived by Walter Rostow, State Department counsel.(6) Ros- tow proposed a “track two” approach to Cuban operations to parallel regular CLA-controlled Cuban teams. (7) This approach would enable fnancial aid, advice and guidance to Cuban leaders such as Ray.(8) ‘Autonomous operations were approved June 1963. (9) (269) The rule under which the operations functioned set forth the following guidelines: 1. Operations to be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals dedi- cated to the idea that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist re- gime must be accomplished by Cubans inside and outside Cuba working in concert. 9. Lf the effort to overthrow the Cuban regime became too costly in human lives, the United States would withdraw financial sup- ort and would not consider resumption at any future date. 3. All operations had to be mounted outside the territory of the United States. 4, If ever charged with complicity, the U.S. Government would publicly deny any participation in the groups activities. 5. U.S. presence and direct participation would be kept at an absolute minimum. An experienced liaison officer would be assigned to each group to provide general adviee, funds and material support. 6. No fixed time schedule would be aiven to these operations. (7) (270) Possibly because of this loosely structured control over JURE. the day-to-day activities of the group were closely monitored. A JURE member, for instance, was in frequent. contact with an individual and supplied him with a variety of confidential information about JURE. This source provided information on Ray’s meeting with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in September 1963;(1/) Ray’s . (77) 42-944—79-—_6
~ of t of JURE;(12) secret JURE meetings; (79 tovernor of Puerto Rico was purposely side, INS investigation of illegal arms possessed by animosity toward Manuel Artime and th, sation of JURE training bases.(16) imself was personally critical of the CIA ang te that he thought CIA agents “. .. were mon ennedy administration.” He maintained that, istration would end but CIA agents alway, ory was longer than the memory of elephants r forgave.” (17) RE meeting in Miami in August 1962, Ray ad arsenals in Venezuela and the Dominican lane, territory available for training in Costa through indirect means from the United toan FBI report, JURE was considered one of yups with clandestine assets (79) and the US, ‘sted in the group because of its potential. (20) size and Ray’s dynamic leadership, JURE »le of some importance in the anti-Castro move- set a target date of October 31, 1962 to raise vould be used to recruit new members, begin n against Castro and purchase arms and sup- ar, JURE had membership delegations in 12 ates, a chapter in Puerto Rico, and 12 delega- ies, mostly Latin American. (23) 3, JURE planned to sabotage a powerplant in v requested that certain high explosives and Je Cuba or San Juan. (25) It was recommended inted in order to test Ray’s capabilities (26) 27) Ray acquired a 25-foot boat for infiltration es and expressed a desire to purchase another » him to extend operations along the south coast le to deliver military equipment to JURE that ted into Cuba. (29) The operation, originally r 23, 1968, was moved up two days.(80) The 31) The JURE boat failed to make the sched- Ray offered no satisfactory explanation for (33) Ray claimed the vessel was low on gas, ation, as the vessel arrived at its destination hysically scheduled to be cn the boat during his activities during the latter part of 1963 ut this time. conferring with Attorrev General 1e Cuban situation(38) and traveling exten- | u seeking support for JURE.(39) | on has been found to substantiate the success | [URE raids or infiltrations-during this period. | e organization had gained enough strength to | ban exile organizations to merge with it. (40) | soups were the Ejercito Libertador de Cuba ‘Puerto ‘tinuous bombings of strategic -attempt. (47 } HSCA perk, Val. 79 ELC) and Cuba Libre. (47) The ELC’s union with JURE brought — ‘ranization former veteran rebel army officers in exile and had oe Moeential of ‘eiving JURE the best military expertise and support ire exil rity. (42 ; Ms 3) entrarlos Zarraga of Cuts Libre became the JU. RE chief of sup- Orel 43) and was responsible for acquiring most of the JURE arms Pad the large supply of explosives which were stored in Miami an ae infiltrate Cuba 7 Manuel Ray again began formulating plans to ra u (" m rch 1964.(45 ) He planned to accompany two teams of commandos nto Oriente Province and, once successfully inside Cuba, initiate con- ti and nonstrategic targess. (46) Ray $ $ ‘4 ere delayed and a new target date of May was set. 380) Ray's Ceriousness of purpose was open to question at the time \ cause he permitted persons from the media to observe infiltration Fs Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-Life snagazine, planned to accompany Ray, (48) as did Tom Duncan, then a ‘Life photographer. (49) Rogelio Cisneros received word on May 30, 1964, that the JURE boat to be used by the infiltrators had developed motor trouble.(60) Ray’s group was arrested by the British near Cayo Largo and taken to Nassau, (61) (281) Ray’s failure to infiltrate Cuba severely damaged his credibil- ity within the anti-Castro community. Some exiles felt his grand in- i icl idered it a ‘ation scheme was a publicity stunt and others consi joke. (52) JURE members were confused and undecided over how to “defend Ray. (53) (282) Another episode on May 1964 compounded JURE’s problems. “Rogelio Cisneros had obligated $50,000 of JURE money to an El Monte, Calif., arms manufacturing company for weapons to be .shipped to Florida.(64) ‘The Revenue Division of the Treasury De- partment considered a raid on the arms company.(55) JURE (283) At this point, there began a general disintegration é gus membership. (56) Rogelio Cisneros announced in August 1964 tha be was resigning from the organization. He contended Ray was incapa) e -of directing both political and military activities. (67) Then another key leader, Carlos Zarraga, resigned in September. her to De- (284) JURE received $75,000 during the period of Octo or. to . cember 31, 1964. The money was intended to underwrite J UR s relo- cation of its activities outside the United States. (68) Ray’s liaison -oflicer noted at the time: “If Ray is successful in Cuba, he will no need our help; if he is not, our help won't do much good. He is honest and at least he assumes it will be largely spent for the purpose he wants to achieve. Whatever Ray may ever say, he was treated the way 6 asked to be treated. We have played the game in a manner beyon eproach.” (59 Re 5 Un continued in existenge until August 1968(60) but was relatively ineffective in its latter years. (61 ) Submitted by: Garton J. Fonzi, Investigator. Exnizaneru J. PaLMenr, Researcher.