1 HW 542714 the U.S. trade embargo, denial of bunkering facilities, increased port security, and control procedures on transhipment, technical data, and customs inspection. Diplomatic means were used to frustrate Cuban trade negotiations in Israel, Jordan, Iran, Greece, and possibly Japan. Under Resolution VIII adopted at Punta del Este, the OAS has established a special committee to study "the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade with Cuba to other items (than arma," State has prepared a program to be submitted to this OAS committee in the future. The evidence in that Cuba's economy is suffering. Trade with the Communist Bloc and others has kept it limping along, despite scarcity of U.S. goods, the bad drought limiting agrarian crops, increased worker non-cooperation and the regime's bungling of economic control measures. Critical spare parts still arrive in Cuba, including shipmerts from British and Canadian firms. Chartered shipping from Free World sources still plays a major role in Cuba's trade, and the U.S. has little hope of cutting this life-line to Castro. Guerrilla. CIA had the main responsibility for assessing resistance potential inside Cuba and to start quietly organizing such resistance as feasible. The CIA plan has been to set about doing this through introducing small teams into the Cuban countryside, "over the beach" from boats. Each team is tasked first to stay alive, while getting established in an area. Once able to live in an area, it then starts a cautious survey of potential recruits for a resistance group. Names of such recruits are sent to CIA for checking. As recruits join, they are trained on the ground by the team, and then continue the survey. This is slow and dangerous work. ‘ , CIA reports that 11 teams will have been infiltrated by the end of July and that 19 maritime operations have aborted. Of the teams in, the most successful is the one in Pinar del Rio in western Cuba; its success was helped greatly by a maritime re-supply of arms and equipment; the fact that it is a "going concern" and receives help from outside has attracted recruits. Its potential has been estimated at about 250, which is a sizeable guerrilla force. With equally large guerrilla forces in other Cuban provinces, guerrilla warfare could be activated with a good chance of success, if assisted properly. However, the teams in other provinces have not been 50 successful; our best hope is that we. will have viable teams in all the potential resistance areas by early October. Bad weather, high seas, and increased security patrols will make the infiltration of teams and their re-supply from small boats a hard task. 5 TOP-SECRET DoclIda: 32977057 Page 6
HW 54714 an - Sabotage has not taken place, ona U.S. -sponsored basis. Planning for such action by CIA has been thorough, including detailed study of the structures and vulnerabilities of key targets. Sophisticated actions, such as the contamination of POL has been frustrated by lack of cooperation of nations where POL would be vulnerable to action. Commando type raids would take maritime means which now have priority use in support of CIA teams being infiltrated inside to survey and create a guerrilla potential. CIA has reported that there is now some capability inside Cuba for sabotage action, that target selection has been under further careful review, and that’a proposal is forthcoming to be submitted for policy approval. Intervention Planning. The JCS were given the responsibility for planning and undertaking essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba. This "Guidelines" objective has been met, fully. Also, U.S. military readiness for intervention in Cuba has been under continuing review within Defense, being improved wherever feasible. In addition, rumors during June of a possible uprising inside Cuba led to further planning for a contingency where a non-U. S. inspired revolt might start inside Cuba; inter-agency staffing of U.S. planning for such a ‘Cuban contingency is being completed, under Defense leadership. Assets. Whatever we decide to do in the future depends, toa large degree, onthe assets available to us. Our own U.S. assets in organi- zation, personnel, and equipment are sufficient to liberate Cuba, given the decision to do so. Assets. among the Cubans, to liberate themselves, are capable of a greater effectiveness once a firm decision is made by the U.S. to provide maximum support of Cubans to liberate Cuba, and the Cubans © start being helped towards that goal by the U.S. There are enough able- bodied and properly motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to do the job. There is wide-spread disaffection in Cuba, with strong indications that economic distress and demoralization of population is causing real concern and strain for the regime's control officials. Firm U.S. intention to help free Cuba is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational asset for Operation Mongoose. At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban people. Rightly or wrongly, the Cubans have looked and are looking to the U.S. for guidance on what to aspire to and do next. They wonder if we are not merely watching Cuba closely, as 6 “FOr-SECRET. DoclIda: 32977057 Page 7
a matter of our own security, undertaking some economic proscription, and isolating the Castro/Communist gang from contaminating the Hemis- phere. Along with recognition of our humanitarian sympathies, this seems to be the fear among Cuban refugees, although they are still hopeful. If Cubans become convinced that the U.S. is not going to do more than watch and talk, I believe they will-make other plans for the future. The bulk of Cuban refugees in the U.S. are most likely to start getting serious about settling down for life in the U.S., dulling their desire to return home with personal risk involved. The bulk of disaffected people . inside Cuba will lose hope and incentive for futile protests against the regime and start accepting their status as captives of the Communists. Some Cuban activists will not accept the loss of their homeland so easily and may seek release from frustration by liberation operations outside U.S. territory and control. The recent wildcat Cuban scheme to bomb Habana from Central America is an example. Our probes of the guerrilla potential inside Cuba have been hampered by similar morale factors. Cubans sent to risk their lives on missions inside Cuba feel very much alone, except for their communications link back to the U.S. They are unable to recruit freedom fighters aggressively by the time-proven method of starting an active resistance and thus attracting recruits; U.S. guidelines to keep this short of a revolt have made the inten- tion behind the operation suspect to local Cubans. The evidence of some intent is seen in the recent maritime re-supply of the team in Pinar del Rio. We brought in extra weapons, for which there were immediate recruits; if we were to exploit the evident guerrilla potential in this province, it appears likely that we would have to furnish supplie= by air and probably open the U.S. to strong charges of furnishing such support to Cuban resistance elements. Therefore, we have been unable to surface the Cuban resistance Ry potential to a point where we can measure it realistically. The only way this can be done, accurately, is when resistance actually has a rallying point of freedom fighters who appear to the Cuban people to have some chance of winning, and that means at least an implication that the U.S. is in support. Word-of-mouth information that such a freedom movement is 4 4 afoot could cause the majority of the Cuban people to choose sides. It ' s| would be the first real opportunity for them to do so since Castro and the Ker Communists came to power. There was little opportunity for the Cuban <a Or ys oy people to join an active resistance in April 1961; there is less opportunity ax” °° “today. If the Cuban people are to feel they have a real opportunity, they eee must have something which they can join with some belief in its success. HW 542714 DBocld: 32977057 Page 6
PROJECTION (PHASE I). As a help towards the making of a U.S. decision on a future course of action, the Operational Representatives developed working statements of four possibilities; at my request they have commented on the positive and negative factors worth considering for each possible course, and it ‘is suggested that these thoughtful statements are worth reading in full. The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are as follows: J a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and oe other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or 6 c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or d. Usea provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist ‘regime by U.S. military force. RECOMMENDATION. It is recommended that this review of Phase I be considered by the Special Group as providing the operational basis for guidelines and objectives for Phase II. Itis a matter of urgency that these be arrived at by the Special Group, to permit developing specific plans and schedules for Phase Il. 4 Attachments "Eyes Only''! copies to: Special Group (Augmented) 1, General Taylor 4, Mr, John McCone — 2. Mr. Alexis Johnson 5. Mr. Robert Kennedy 3. Mr. Roswell Gilpatric 6. General Lemnitzer Ope rational Repres entatives 7. Mr. William Harvey (CIA) 9. General Harris (Defense) 8. Mr. Robert Hurwitch (State) , 10. Mr. Don Wilson (USIA) , ll. Chief of Operations TDP-SECRET HW 542714 DBocld: 32977057 Page 9