HW 50955 a SECRET -8- Contigency Planning New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral , political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on , continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance’ of communic ations to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily- trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort. @98 SECRET Boclda: 32276061 Page 22
SECRET © - 8 - Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community, Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily. SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:32276061 Page 23
HW 50955 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1932, 10 a.m.) FROM © SUBJECT: 1. U,_S., Policy Objectives i Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Summary of Coordinator's. Recommendations ‘The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba: 3 a. Docld: 32276061 Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba; Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states; Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states; _ — Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino~-Soviet Communist purposes, Encouraging and supporting any developments. within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Governmert with a regime ‘that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it SECRET Page 24
HW 450955 je SECRET -2- being understood that cur ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States; Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime; Maximizing the politicai isolation of the Castro regime from otner Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. When- ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted. by the Crganization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeonardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere; Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives. 2. Supvorting Actions Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U..S. Policy Toward Cuba."' They include the four point shipping regulations, CAS sanctions, NATO Docld: 32276061 SECRET Page 25
SECRET «3 « saction to incluce Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches .to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other. exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are. recommended for approval and immediate initiation: a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime: b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its - original aims. NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability -to.accomplish objective b. (Removal of | remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because _ taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended. 3. Suban Brigade " Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members. SECRET HW 50955 Bocld: 32276001 Page 26
SECRET ale The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit. and individual members urged to accent civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided. HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 27
= ——— SE RAAMRIRAE ORE EEE EERE TOP SECRET. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF. DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. January 23, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, VANCE SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m.. The revision consists essentially of what is now denominated as "ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supple- mented by the inserticn of the paragraphe marked in red at the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This supplemental material is derived from portions of the text of “ALTERNATIVE If" in the original paper. At-luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed -him the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to include the supplemental material referred to above. He, in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will thereafter be in touch with you. if possible, will you let me ‘know by noon tommorrow where you ‘and he stand with regard to the revised paper. Enclosure SIGH. ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC ce: Mr. McNamara General Taylor Mr. Yarmolinsky - pf seamen ira a RLM NRE CSE aR HAN EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES Nor APPLY ag Ge GASH os / a SECRET COPY 2. OF Ae COPTES. HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 29
PA Na errant Jo | , cae SECRET pay ow Sey FON CE AE ” NM 7 | DRAFT/23 Jan 63 PYF.) O51 DUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE uo GOMMITTEE BAA : Goordinator of Cuban Affaire SUBS ECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba Pr United States Policy Vn November 20, the President sat forth the broad guidelines of United Stateo policy with reopect to Cuba in the following words: "Ao for our part, if all offensive weapons aystems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and oafeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be reace in the Caribbean, And, ao I caid in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggreccion in thic hemisphere’. "We will not, of course, abandon the political, ecencinic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpese and here that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free, But theses policies are Very different from any intent to launch 2 military invasion of the island." ) Objectives ; 8 Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with reopect to Cuba AFG! , , i, Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by acouring that offensive weapons QFE mot reintroduced inte Cuba; Gm SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 30 ‘
ees HY 0955 et q — sp SECRET Romoeoval of remaining Soviet fercos from Cuba; Proventing Cuba from taking any aggreooive military action agaimot ethor Garibboan otatoa; Reducing the capabilitios of the Castro Zagime to direct and oupport oubvorcion and inourroction within the other OAS otateo; . Encouraging and oupporting any developments within ‘Cuba that offer the poosibility of Uvercing the Cuban Governmont from ito Oupport of Sins-Seviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish thio purpece; Maximising the cont to the Soviet Union of oupporting the Castro rogime; Masdmizing the political joolation of the Castro regime from other freo world otates, and especially from “Btates of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S, actions p against Cuba chould be multilateral, prefe rably based upen the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rie Pact} Or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States, The anewly-won hemiophe ric solidarity on the Cuban iscuc chould not be joopardized by cecking OAS actions of morginal value and which might split the hemiophoro. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat clomento and/or logictical Cupport, the wide varioty of military contingencies that may arioe from purowlt of tho foregoing objectives; and; . ; ry BDocld: 322776061 Page 31
2 Q ) ee me ee Ne mR 3 HW 40955 Pata ame: a SS ee O "GR SECRET C) 3 9. Producing comprehensive intolligence related to the above objectives, Our ultimate objective with taopect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Cactro/Communiot regime and ito replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S, and, where possible, sharing the aims x of the Free World, To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing dogroen of political, cconomic, OL* poychological and military precaures, ac appropriate epportunitics prosont themselves or can ba created, until the Cactre/Communist regime is overthrown. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the oxereioe of all feacible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achiove the immediate objoctives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective, Suppo rting hetions | ' The chewing actions chould be imitiated in tee sequence set forth / below: 1, Axyait reoults of Mr. Donovan's imminent nagotiation with Fidel Cactvo for frecing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggrescive U. S, action could jeopardize their release, 2 - If theca negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable: 3, Inform NATO and OAS twelve keuro in advance of the proclamation of the four point chipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the ordoars to go into effect in five days). Theoe orders: & close United States ports to all veosals of a country wheoce vessels engage im carrying OF MO to Guba; b close United States ports to any chip which has carried goods im the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of tho time it ceeko to anter a United States poxt; Sc prohibit all United Statcoo flag chips and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any porto of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and Ge SECRET Bocld: 322776061 Page 32 a 7 oreo me i il
o O | oa é&. prohibit any carge sponsored by any department or agency of the United States Som bolag shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who om or control vessels engaged in the trade betwoca Guba and the Soviet bloc. * 4, , Ae the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference im Bl Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Calle, Mexico and Brazil co convey to Chem €ne importance President Keamody attaches to maintaining | | hoalspherie solidarley by oupporting the followlag vosolutilons: a. An OAS resolution condesming Cuba for Les netions which’ continue to endanger the peaco, deploring vefusal ce allerw inspection, econdcmaing the presence of Soviet troops, receunending continued surveillance and \ continued vigllance against subversive activities, aad cerminating tha imvocation of the Ris Treaty on the missile exisis, cogether with b. An OAS xecsolutioa which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade oxecpt food and medicine (fall back position: extension ef ames embargo to all etrategie items); 2) prohibition of AR ships €com transporting eabargoed items and deay use of ports to chips ia Blee-Cuba crade; 3) dental of Sovilat over-£lights ‘and ceonsie rights for flights to Cuba; amd 6) a call om ether states to take similar ACELOD 0 8, Acer obtaining the waximun pessible cupport Of the key countries of Mexkeo, Gaile and Beazil, the ethor OAS mcwboro will bo approached in Washington eg HY 40955 BDocld: 32276061 Page 33
HW S0954 4 6. 7. 8. Sp 8. O 6 | TOP SECRET, a5e and in their respective capitals, gimulcancously Zt should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within cen days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the vesolutions, We will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATC include Cuba on the List of countries CoO which shipment of COCcOM List (strategic) items is prohibited. . After NATO decision on our CCCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations co prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment Co Guba, not on the COCOM List. in addiction to four point shipping resolutions, ‘and action under Sect LOF ek the Foreign Assistance Act, concinue te precs Pree World nations to keep their shipping cur of Elsc-Cuba trade. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence ecilection, radio proadcasts, veeruitment cf Cuban cfficials as agents, support of the Cuban Revelucionary Ceuncil (CRC) activities, and infilcraticn= of propagarcs materials, the following are rocommended for approval and immediate imitiation: a. intensify to maximum degree possible jatelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba; b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original. aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that che Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause qe SECRET Docld: 32276061 Page 34
oe HY 40954 a CATR OU ee pa SECRET <:ceeae oe Qe A a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or »rovincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence; Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability nas been established. Docld: 32276061 Page 35
‘ In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize Opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise , either as a‘result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, asa result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/ Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal / ‘ conflict within Cuba, We should-prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations, ' ? i | . : \ Our contingency planning should include preparations for large- scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including | both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of : embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of | sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as matericl, advi 2s0rs, training, and Special Forces support and, if neces sary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for 2ccigt=nra from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which de:-nonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S, t ‘ To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against | Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans | and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort, (a SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 36
te , tesa ee ils 7 MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL an (Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m, ) = os - a FROM: Department of Defense Representative. on: the Inter Mee ; . _ departmental Coordinating Committee « on ‘Cuba : wo ae ‘°° SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba ; - Policy x — Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the |, aa Jf. we overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement - “by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S.. and, where 7 pos sible, sharing the aims .of the. Free World, . . To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees, of . _political, economic, psychological. and military 5 pressures, as . “ appropriate opportunities pr present themselves or can be created, _ . until the. Castro/Communist regime is overthrown, Our immeciate 7 - objectives are to isolate the Gastzo/ Communist + regime from the Free * : World and from the Bloc; waaksi tt: economically; promote internal. a ° Gtasension, erode its domestic political supports frustrate ite sub- - Pe * versive activities; negate its influence in. the hemisphere: increase the cost to the Bloc. of eustaining the regimes and ol obtain. the withdrawal | ‘s ers Es. vie Sof Russian troops from Cuba. i ROIT al Sg 0 BERTIE oo os oy a "_ EXCLUDED TRO AUTOMATIC p EECRIDING, ie a) SECRET “DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APFL HW 50955. |“ Docld: 32276061 | Page| 38
. ° 5 4 e Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist ' ie ‘regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, Ae psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives ; . and could create propitious conditions. in Cuba for further advance ‘toward our ultimate objective. We should be ina position to. respond with open military sup- : oo “port (to include such items as-material,. advisors, training, and : “Special Forces. support and, if necessary, up to. the full range of ‘military forces), toa request for assistance from any anti- Castro/ ‘Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability” : to survive, which threaten the. present regime,” and whose aims are poms wi those of the U. S. — | _ é Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished OE oS : ‘from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should ‘not be. undertaken. in the absence of aggression or or ‘other Castro/Communist. ‘and/< or Soviet. actions that threaten ‘the peace: or security'< of the : hemisphere, This does not preclude appropriate Ue s. retaliation or isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ Communist or Soviet forces. HW,50955. Docld:32276061, Page 39 Qe
‘To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces. employed - against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained * free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations a — desirous of participating in the U.S. ‘effort. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence — o ae gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified aga primary objective ag es * ° of the national intelligence effort, Whenever possible, U. S, actions against Cuba should be 7 multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal . , Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization - _ es of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity. on. the. a cons vs 7 Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking, OAS actions. of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere, | : Overt and covert annexes. of specific actions in support 0 of | ‘ ..... this policy will be. prepared. Discussion - The. active pursuit of our, ultimate objes ective involves: a. Ga a ae te aT aE a al ee ee a . - HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 40,0 “0 JS
-and military actions. .Such actions might include leaflet dropping; | propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; - m psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of. 7 . Cubans in. the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive - a air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed. toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also | have.the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping - coo the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appro=.. - 4 be priate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of. : - Cuban officials.in other countries; severance of communications. to — : Cuba; major acts ot sabotage on ‘shipping destined for Cuba and on .- ; key. # installations in” Guba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, aoe _ | a oe the use of Ue Se “military forces... ‘ oe . ; In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut. of carefully timed political, economic, ‘psychological and covert actions, ee ; : ‘such a as OAS sanctions,” Caribbean eevee atrangemente,intnafiod ee os surveillance. of and publicity concerning | Castro/ Communist subversive” i Bde activities: in ‘Latin America, application of Four Point shipping r restric- - tions and other economic: sanctions, and : a series of actions. s. designed ad ‘to. obtain, | to. the greatest, extent possible, multilateral approval of and | a a ac re ee ce ae er : participation i in. ‘the campaign to unseat ‘the Castro/ Communist regime, me. rate HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 41
° . ‘It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure This course of action has the advantage of attaining the _ ; ; objective more rapidly and. under more controlled conditions than. * the alternative stated by the Coordinator. | ‘Indeed, this may be the ips '. only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. . ee 7 _ o£ money and material and far greater numbers of personnel, From the standpoint © of international politics, t the U.S. : : uncommitted nations. It. is difficult to predict | the reaction of “ the Latin. American governments. They may attack the U.S. for “intervening” or they may react: favorably (as they did during the - / -missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations. 7 % “throughout the world, “and particularly the Latin American nations, : will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For 7 a example, there may even be advantages to. the fact that our active i : policy and the coursed of action under it may eventually become _ Impossible to conceal, If properly handled, ‘the overt aspects of : _from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, oa “increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/ Communist Cuba. Me yp te et HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 42. : will probably be subjected to criticism for: aggression from the = oe “this policy may serye 1 not ; only to ) mitigate any unfavorable reactions
The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that os the U. Sy. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in . ; “the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the _- - more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from © 7 ’ the Sino~Soviet Bloc elsewhere, As we increase the pressures ‘on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment. to overthrow the regime, U. ‘Ss. prestige becomes more deeply | a ; 7 oo oy involved. . The further we Progress along this route, .the more a ‘significant: will be the loss of U. Ss. prestige if we dlter or ‘abandon ie me The successful execution of this policy will require careful oo : timing and coordination of our actions , and the development of, detailed | wee plans. While such plans would t be- designed to bring: ‘about the over=" oe . throw ‘of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be suiticiently flexible to. ) accommodate. a changes to the international, situation. an ~ In any. case, at. crucial points along. the way it will be neces~=" oe EEE RECEDING SST sary for: the highest levels of. our Government to review ‘the actions - . “already. taken and those contemplated and to asse. ss the advantages’ a . aos oe é LE TEE ERS SITLL NEN . of continued and escalated activity against the, disadvantages and smb, it dangers of such activity, “HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 43
Commitment to this course of. action does not exclude the oS possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the ‘Castro regime - from the Bloc. a 7 SF , . ' * * _ Coordinator's Recommendation I do not.concur in the policy: ; recommended by the Coordinator. | | The objectives stated in the | ‘Coordinator! 8 paper do not sufficiently © “commit the U, S. to the overthrow of. the Castro/Communist regime. ‘The Coordinator’ 8 paper depends too much upon events outside the oe an ‘control of the U. S.. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate . oa the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the. Castro/ ; Communist regime. — The specific actions recommended in the Coordinator" 8 paper are » consistent with the policy recommended in |. SO - this paper and, in many, cases, would be among the initial steps that ; “Es would be taken in executing ‘that policy. : ~ Recommendation cede “unites States pole ¢ toward, Cuba. HW 50955 DocId:32276061 “Page ‘44:
. x : . wo, Skee Mee cham HY DRAFT/23 Jan 63 MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE 0955 COMMITTEE FROM : Coordinator of Cubam Affairs SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba United States Policy On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba im the following words: “As for our part, if all atfeneive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere’. "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free, But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island, ” Objectives | a Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are: , i, Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba; BDocld: 322776061 Page 45
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; 3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states; 4, Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states; , 5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposés or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose; 6. Masimiging the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting _ the Castro regime; 7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric. solidarity on the Cuban issue should net be jeopardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere, — 8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of os appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical Oo support, the widd variety of military contingencies i that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives: and; @OP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 46
HY 50955 oO +R SECRET | O 3 9, Producing comprehensive intelligence related to tho above objectives. \ Our ultimate objective with reopect to Cuba remains the overthrow | of the Castro/Communict regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where pocoible, sharing the aimo of the Fxreo World, To achieve thio objective, the U.S. Govermment will be prepared to apply increacing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, ag appropriate opportunities presont themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime ic overthrown, YTsolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communiot Le regime through the exercice of all feanible diplomatic, economic, poychological and eovort actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could crento propitious cenditioas im Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective, Supporting Actions The following actions should be. initiated in the sequence set forth below: 1, Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S actien could jeopardize their release. 2, If these negotiations fail, or whem the prisemers are recovered, - proceed on the following Hmetable: 3, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four poimt shipping orders, (The proclamation calis for the orders to go into effect im five days), These orders: a close United States porte to all vessels of a country whose pessels engages in Carrying QFERO to Gaba; . a be close United Statoo porto to any chip which bas carried goods im the blec-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it secks to onter a United States port; ie. prohibit all United States flag chips and ali ships owned by United States nationals or residents from of entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and G9) SECRET BDocld: 322776061 Page 47
vote 6 HY . Ge De Docld: 32276061 ao bd prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department er agency of the United States frem being shipped on vessels cwmed or controlled by persons who own or contrel vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Sewliet blee. 4g cho commination of tke U. 8. Eniaks ef télootea ConZoromea im BL Salvader oa Jaauary 28~30 Aseistant Seeretary Martin will visic the Presidents ef Calle, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches te malataining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions: Go Am OAS resolution condeming Guba for its actions which centinue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allew inepection, condeming the presense of Seviet troeps, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilence against subversive activicies, and terminating the invecation of the Rilo Treaty on the missile erisis, together with Aa OAS resolution which would recoamend — 1) extension of arms embargo to all items ef trade except feod and medicine (fall back position: extensica ef areas aabargo co all - etwategié decns); 2). pxchibitien ef An ''ghips @eem transporting ambargead items and deny use o£ ports to ships im Bloe-Cuba | evade; 3) demial o€ Soviet over-flights aad transie righte for flights te Guba; and ~ 4) a call om ether states to take similar action. After obtaining the maximum pessible support of the key counteles ef Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the ether GAS mesbers whil be approached in Washington Page 48
HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 and in thelr respective capitals, simultaneously. Ic should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within tem days. Prior te formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will imform our NATO allies of the impending OAS ection. “At tha Cirst RATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO imelude Guba om the list of countries to which shipment of COCON List (strategic) items is prehibicod. Agtoar NATO deelolen on our COCOM request, we will seck to get agreement from Free World industrial noeLons te prevent shipping of critical spare parts 2eAPmEmE EO ‘Guba, RoE CB tae © COCR URGE 0” La. addiedon: €o four point. shipping resolutioas, and. action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Aet, ‘eontinue te press Free Werid nations to keep thelr shipping ouc of Blos-CGuba trade. In addiction to current covert programs sueh as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support , of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the £ollewing are recommended for approval and immediate initiation: / ; a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence eoverage e€ Cuba; b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are agsociated with the original aims of - ghe 26 July Movement and wae believe that .« ae Caste cogime can be everthrowa. fren within iu order that they may: 1) ° cause Page 49
HY S0954 Docld: 32276061 oO L SECRET a6o | a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or »rovincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence; Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying | leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established. Page 50 aS]
_ HY S0954 SECRET 7 In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime, These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/ Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations, Our contingency planning should include preparations for large- scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarragsing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other: countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces. We should be in a position to’respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), toa request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist we group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans and by the armed ferces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating/in the U.S. effort. Le j ! | GOP SECRET | Docld: 322776061 Page 51
=~ 7 « ALTERNATIVE If United States Policy a , 1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Commnist regime and ‘its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, ‘psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can-be created, until the Castro/Comminist regime is overthrown. .. 2 Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba. 3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective. 4. We should be in a position to respondwith open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S. 3. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet G@@® SECRET HY 0955 BDocld: 322776061 Page 52
HY 0955 - 8~ Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ Communist or Soviet forces. 6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort. 7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort. 8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon théeTTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Ric Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The ‘ newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere. Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in @ support of this policy will be prepared. Discussion The active pursuit of our ultimate objective in- volves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might inclgde leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psycho- logical operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward suyveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect @e? SECRET BDocld: 322776061 Page 53 £
| HW 50955 effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Gastro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, ag appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of commmications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces. In addition, this course of action would involve a -. broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psy= chological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime. This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater visks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel. A. From the standpoint of international politics, the ‘U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for ‘aggression from the uncomaitted nations. It is difficult “to, predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. ~A, They may attack the U. S. for “intervening or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a jAarge extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the “world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly theee actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may if @ee_ SECRET BDocld: 322776061 Page 54
ge SECRET ~10s eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but alse to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/ Communist Cuba. The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. &. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sine-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castre/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment te overthrow the regime, U. &. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be. the loss of U. 5. prestige if we alter or abandon it. The successful execution of this policy will require eareful timing and coordination of our actions and the development ef detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate ehenges to the international situation. In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Covernment to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity. Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc. Rone | SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 545
ee? SECRET ai] ew COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION SN LSTA RSENS cen belie stonanaNNeeiRCRA i recommend approval of Alternative I, STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE EASTER CT ED a ASE RESOURCE I do not concur in the policy recommended by the. _ Coordinator, Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. § in addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended fn Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken im executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II. e HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 56
: , en Sir wel. hie " MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ‘COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE iE - @repared ‘for the > Meeting of Thursday, January, 2, 1963, | 10 D ame) a , FROM ae “Coordinator of ‘Cuban Affairs” bunsecr: “United States ‘Poliey | Toward cuba eo Lo% There | are "submitted ‘for your consideration two “alternative " ve statements of policy and related courses of action with respect . -to Cuba. . Alternative I was prepared by the Department | of State. a Alternative | Il was prepared by the Department of Defense... The | *. Coordinator? Ss Recommendation | that Alternative I: be approved, oor “oi, and the Department. of Defense. ‘non-Concurrences ‘appear at the. nk “end. of this: papers : i : “United | ‘States Policy Sa sg 8 OS : 7 oe ‘On November 20,. “the president. ‘set “forth ‘the ‘broad guides | “Lines of United States Bolicy » with respect | to. Guba. in the. following. words? “ an tp BS Oy tas ‘for | our part,. ‘tf ‘all offensive. ‘weapons - ‘systems “are removed from Cuba and kept out. of ‘the hemisphere - “dn the future, - under ‘adequate verification and safe- - guards, and Lf Cuba is:not used for the export of - ot aggressive communist. purposes, there will be peace in oo. the Caribbean. : And,. as [. said in ‘September, . ‘we shall os neither: initiate. nor ‘permit aggression in this oo hemisphere’ tes ; We will” not, of gourse, abandon. the political, =" ‘economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to. a halt subversion from Cuba, | nor our purpose. and. é sie
BR SECRET ' Sand hope that. the Cuban people shall ‘some day be” truly free. But these policies are very different =. - . from any. intent to _deunch a militery. tavasioa, of the: oo island. " ne cet ek eee oe Gbjectives : coe : Accordingly,’ t the’ objectives of ve. 8. ‘policy with: respect, to Guba are: . oa. Protecting the security of the United States and. - >. the other states of the Organization of American. . . States (OAS) by assuring that offensive. weapons . gl are not reintroduced into Cuba; coe - Removal. of renaining Soviet forces from ue 3.) Preventing: Cuba. from taking : any aggressive aflitery, action against other Caribbean states; > Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime t ‘to “direct and support subversion and insurrection within | » the other OAS states; ne ABE BY ”. Encouraging and supporting any developments. ‘within . Cuba that offer the possibility of. divorcing: the “Cuban Government from its support of. SinoeSoviet - Communist purposes or replacing’ ‘the. Government with | oa regime. which. would accomplish this purpose. Maximizing the: ‘cost: ‘to. ‘the Soviet ‘Union of. Supporting | the Gastro regimes - re Maximizing the political: isolation of ‘the. -~ Castro regime: from. other free world states, vend especially from ! states of the OAS; -- Be. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of -;° appropriate U. ‘Sq: ‘combat. elements and/or logistical ‘support, the wide variety’ of/Céntingencies that ; ae arise from pursuit | of the foregoing objectives; HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 agg oe oeppuen
er ae ee Producing comprehensive intelligence related Ri _ to. the above objectives. wage te “supporting Actions. | The following actions should be initiated in the * Sequence set forth below: lls with Fidel Castro. for freeing the 20-odd American - i... prisoners, Prior ageressive U, Se action: could pereee jeopardize their release. i By ae recovered,. proceed on the following times- 3 ete Form NATO. and OAS ‘twelve ‘hours in advance ‘of “o> (The proclamation calls for the orders to.go into. ; effect: in five days). ‘These. orderasis ree ” ag> elose United States: ports ‘to all vessels '.: o£ a country whose vessels engage in “* earrying arms.to Cuba; 6 69°) o ,° close United States) ports, to any chip - which has carried goods in the bloceCuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks | to. enter: a United ‘States ports. “prohibit. all ‘United States flag ‘ships and “all ships owned by United States nationals or. residents. from entering any ports of "Cuba and “from carrying any goods bound to 08 from Cuba;, and or rn ar ee @MP SECRET se CNW. 50955 - DocId: 32276061. Page 60... °° > ea. Await results of Mr. Donovan? s . inminent™ ‘negotiation . ott these negotiations fail, ‘or: when the: ‘prisoners ere “-* the proclamation of the four point shipping orders...”
bs ele . - d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United a : States. from being shipped on vessels Woe Tag . owned or controlled by persons who “0° -' ” gyn or control vessels engaged in the --tyade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc. 4, At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission | _ "Conference in EL Salvador on January 28-30. -o* Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents ’ of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the De os importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining - “. hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following ‘a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its »y actions which continue to endanger the peace, © _ deploring refusat to allow inspection, me ~~ gondemning the presence of Soviet troops, “oo eecomending continued surveillance and _ “continued vigilance against subversive... “Aetivities, and terminating. the ingocation Coe - @£ the Rio Treaty on the missile-crisis, . “together with - ). 7) An OAS resolution which would recommend |. — L) .extension of ‘arms. embargo to all items of trade except food and wedicine (fall back ‘position: , extension of arms embargo to all ' gtrategic items);. 2). prohibition of AR “ships from transporting embargoed items ane deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba “trade; 3): denial of Soviet. overeflights and » _ transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar actions oe 5, After obtaining the maximum possible support of - the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the -. other OAS members will be approached in Washington re HW 50955: Docld:32276061
7 SECRET - and in their respective capitals, simultaneously.. it should be possible for this consultation and OAS” action on the resolutions to be completed within _ ten days. Prior to formal COAS’ approval of the __ ek - 3°...) 0 xesolutions, we will inform our NATO (allies of, the ee yes 8 impending OAS actione - an oo ‘ wo EB * 6§,. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action - Sp , ssl, On the resolutions, we will request that NATO ° ; a , include Cuba on the list of countries to which ’ shipment of COCOM list (strategic) | items is. prohibited. Te ; co, 7.° After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will “. geek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping “Of critical spare parts and equi ipment to Cuba, not on | the COCOM list. LogIn addition to four’ point | shipping resolutions, -.and action under Section 107 of the. Foreign. Assistance > -.. Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep | 3); their shipping out of Bloc-Guba rade e Rt In addition to current covert programs | such as: ., intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, ne ! peexultment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Con uncil. (CRC) activities -and. infiltration of propagenda materials S, the — ‘following are recommended for: epproval and immediate“ initiation: Sha Pose "Intensify: ‘to maximum: degree possible * intelligence. and counterintelligence coverage a Cuba; ” by SY Support, the ‘efforts of certain. Cuban exiles, _ who are associated with. the original aims of » the 26. July Movement and who believe that _ i «the Castro regime can be overthrown from . within“in order that they may: 1) - cause Co MM SECRET moe red oa e or. ad “HW:50955 DocId:32276061 Page’ 62"
SECRET wba a split in the leaders! rip. of the regime : . at the national or provincial levels 3 and, . .. 2) ereate a political base of popular - ‘ . opposition to the regime; and, 3): secure ara intelligence; co a ‘le. Assist Cuban exiles. in developing a oS capability to launch balloons carrying . leaflets and other propagenda materlals from cow.  - > international waters into Cuba. Launch . .'  ..:. propaganda balloons after an operational os -eapabilit ty has been established. aes! . tye wae Te “HW 50955. Docld:32276061 . Page. 63° 7
tinete objecnive. OW of t the ‘stro /Communist : “4 econ nomic, TOS) as appropriate - 2. Our immediate obje Castro/Communist regime from the Bloc; weaken it economi; dissension, erodc _ fxustrate its sunversive act : “in the hemisphere ; increase the cost “sustaining ‘the regime; and obtain + ravps from Cuba. 3. Isolating, undermin: Castro/Communist regime thre. - feasible diplomatic, economic , and could create propitious conditions in “Gaba for further advance toward our ultimate objective. 4& We should be ir a position. to respor: y support (to neiade such items as mat: +» tvaining, and wil Forces support. S2acy, Up to ths ‘ange of military foveas}, equest for agsir som any anti-Castro/Commmis: groups in Cul. :; demonstrate an ability to 8 n threate:: che present regime, and whose scipet ible with those of the U.S cy Lon of Cuba be U.S. mili: MLvCes, as Eve Liktary suppert. BPOR seek c S$, should net be un idertakes BDocld: 32276061 Page 64 - eeanenstronerny
HW 450955 emp ioyed against NE | militarlly-trained, free Cubans and by the, armed ‘ _.. of, those Lavin’ Asierican nations desirous of particcrya in the U. Ss. effort. 7. Intens ive, comprehensive and continuing. + gathering in depth ow Cuba should be identified as a ‘pe objective of the mations? ince slligence effort. ise actions against Cuba. ‘erably based upon thelTreaty Pact) | or on resoiurions -. 3. Whenever. pow “should be miltilateral, of Reciprocal Assistanc _adopted by the Organi newly-won hemispheric should not be jeopardize: marginal value and which ‘alght split the Overt and covert annexes of specifis support of this policy will be prepares: Discussion The act pursuit ef our ultimate objective ta- ‘volves a phased and contvolled series of polit economic, psychological. and military actions. actions might inelgde leaflet dropping: props sabotage, strikes, and opposicion to whe reg» ‘logical operations urging derectiona: large # ‘of Subans.in the U.S. ave! the use of such Cuba: ‘Cuba; extensive air activity including both hig level flights primarily, directed toward surveili. collection of ‘intelligences and which ey also + effect 2 itas Docld:32276061 Page 65. °° °°
are a ee ne ne 4 in addition, this cx “broad gamut of carefully t chological and covert 2ctic Caribbean Security arrange: shipping restrictions ‘and other “economic sanctions, and a series of actions Jicsigned to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, ss:itilateral approval of an particin«tion in the campaign to snsvat the Castro/Communist regins. This course of 2 ction has the advantage of attaining the cbieclive more rapidly and under. more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of actine that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It invo greater visks; and , in the short run, # greater expssditure of mone ey and material end far er: - mumbers oS personnel. 4 rs From the standpoint S. will probably be | sub sgeression from the u oe predict the reacti flonal politics, the eriticism for tioas, It is difficult wi American governments. They may attack the u. S. for exvening™ or they say react [evorebly (as they did during the missile crisis). large extent, the zeactio on of the nations throughout ae Letin American nations, 7 eee acticns are handled. ovenple, sévantages to the fact thr. sur _getive p. urses of action urcer it may oh , BP SECRET fir AG frye tie \HW 50955 Doc Tg: 82276061 Page 66
HW 50955 DoclTd: 32276061 Page ‘67 ele If properly 2 overt aspex “policy may serve non wely to mikcigate any iniavowsble reactions from other eonnex vies, but also to gain, verticularly in Latin éverica, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/  Comauni st Cuba. The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear thet the U. S. will not permit the maintenence of a .. communist base in the hemisphere. rom the standpoint of ‘military posture, the more active approach may be ' subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc ° elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist - Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, .U. S. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further . we progress along this route, the more significant will be '.the loss of Me S. prestige if we alter or abandon it. The successful execution of this policy will require cereful timine a nd ccordination of our «cctions and the development of detailed plans. While ; plans would be desisned to bring about the overthrow cf the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they _ would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate -- Changes to the international situation. : In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will 7 be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to ¢ the actions already taken and those contemplated and ess the advant ages of continued and escalated | ty against che disadvantages and dangers of such y . en . ; & fa ore tf a is pty fH pe LF) 3 $ act & Bes bets fe "Gemma PAU FPR OURTS,
NATGOR! SS COMMENDATION "=~ T xecommend -approval of Alternative I.) oa. “7 CAR Ain Co AES oLATEMENT UF DOD REPRESENTATYY4 _aionemaeinceman meet nt eg tS SE : . I do not concur in the policy recomended by the - | Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S.. . dn addition, Alternative 1 does not sufficiently . --contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the cownfall of that regime. The scecifiec actions” | recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the.” _. policy recommended in Alternative if and, in wany cases, «would be among the initial steps that would <«. : . in executing that policy. I recommend adoption. . - Alternative II, . . . e Py Paes ematesdiss i ne {MW 50955 DocTd = , “ ¢ 32276061 Page 68°
a ee ee ~ ersten ’ HW A355 BDocld: 32276061 Page 69
e - @fii SECRET «s—«s«éDra #23 Jan 63 MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday _, January. 25, 1963, © B.m.). FROM : Coordinator of Cuban-Affairs: © *~ - | SUBJECT: United States Policy. Toward Cuba United States Policy | On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words : | "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in _ the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace, in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall-neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere. ' "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic: and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion -from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion. of the island.@ . - Objectives . Accordingly, the objectives f U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are: HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 70
4 ty SE os ae SECRET e 1. Protecting the decurity of the United States and the — other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuripg that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into-Cuba; - | 2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; 3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against; other Caribbean states! Np Bkd leet aia Sate Sided wate iy Labilanhel Solace A cached wl iat Site, Sig tet melt ead oes lies caecum Biocon ass wind Ae Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct ~ and support subversion and insurrection within the Hemisphere other BAS states; . 5, Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban . Government fvom its support of Sino-Soviet Communist : purposes; ° | a - 6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban | - a Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet /Bloc, it being understood that our | ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by = OM. | . | one fully compatible with the goals of the United States; | 7. Maximizing] the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting _ the Castro) regime; — HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 71 . . - 8.
10. -above objectives. @ tk ; oe . & | fli SECRET Maximizing the’ political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS, Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, _ preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by. the Organization of American States, The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal - value and which might split the hemisphere. Being prepared’ to meet, with the emp loyment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and; Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the 4 Supporting Actions A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern- A ment will be prepared to increase the political, \ economic, HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 72 psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities . @@P_SECRET | oo
; ee Ola opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would ‘be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations= HW 30955 for further actions based upon the re- examination of existing programs and upon “the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming. 1. In addition to current covert program,. such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) ‘and other. exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda | materials: | a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime; | b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of . the 26 of July Movement and who believe that - the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that, they may: 1) cause ‘a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; anc#2) create Docld: 32276061 Page 73
@@R SECRET ~ -5- a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence; c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established. With RESPECT T0 THE ACTONG LISTED BELOW, THE 2. )Aeatt results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Wie for freeing the 20-odd American SHQYLIV BE ASLER TAINED: | prisoners /| iens—tiste » ft bee - . oO toe ghey . tetine vee taken before the conclusion of the, negotiations, could jeopardize them release ho, £ eb CeAHNG 3. If these negotiations fa¥l, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable: 4, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders, _ (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into — effect in five days). These orders: a. close United States: ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba; a | a b. ccs - B® SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 74
-  @ —  @ b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried. goods in the bloc+Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United SA LING DRE Ape TEES ESE STEED e nne enaie reme “States port; c.* prohibit all United States flag ships and all ' ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba. and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and ah rz WW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 75
@® SECRET d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc. 5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later dateg dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another: representa- ‘tive of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil. to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric _ solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions: a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions '. which continue to endanger the peace, dep loring | refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance -and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with be An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms. embargo to all items of trade except food = SECRET HY 450955. Docld: 32276061 Page Té
|. : | | @@ SECRET I and medicine (fall Back position: extension of arms enbargo to ‘all ‘strategic items); 2) prohibit- {ORS Geember Stolen ion of og ships from transporting embargoed items é oe and deny use of ports to- ships in, Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar . action. 7 | | ° 6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action. . 7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the * resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment. of COCOM list (strategic: items is prohibited. 8, After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page FF as . . . mains OD COUT
at 50955 - | oO 4 OTT I to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment | to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. Ane 9, In addition to, four point shipping resolutions, and ‘action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free ‘World nations to keep their case eee goa SOT LTE, ‘shipping out of Bloc~Cuba trade. Be. Co ntingency Planning New v opportunietes for accomplishing our - objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other: parts of the world; as a “result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro- -Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or “internal conflict within Cuba. | Our contingency planning; which will be undertaken immediately; should include preparations | for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and. economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are nop/ inside Cuba; more extensive air activity “including both high and Low level flights primarily directed toward " gurveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping  \ the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as ' appropriate, including the. imposition of a POL blockade; harrass- DocId:32276061 Page 78 > SECRET
| } | SOS 55 free. Cubans and. b: ment of Cub ‘communication against Cuba sho (| QB SECRET an officials in other countries; severance of s to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined. for Cuba’ and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, » the use of U. ‘S. military force. To the extent. feasible, U. S. military forces employed uld be accompanied by Ue S. “militarily trained y “the armed forces of those Latin Anerican nations. By desirous of participating in. the Ue. s. “effort. , . Docld: 32276061 Page 79
rere eocee seen te eet a __-HIDORANDUM FOR THE es aa CURITY COUNCIL"S EXECOTIVE COMMITTEE — FROM Coordinator ° cuban Affaire: | (SECRET a Draféz3 Jan 63 seam United States Poltey Toward Cuba . ‘United States Policy — On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines ‘of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the fol lowing words: | “As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemlaphere in | the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not: used for the export of aggressive commynist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, ae I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate | nor permit aggression da this hemisphere. ° | “le will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to hait subversion from Guba, nor our purpose and hope thet the Cuban people . Ghali some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island. | | ‘Oblectives | | . a ; .7 . Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to | “Guba are:
Protecting the security of the United States and the __ other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring, that offensive weapons are not reintroduced. tate Guba; Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against. other Caribbean states} Redscing | the capabilities of the Castro regime to ‘direct and support: subversion and insurrection within the . Hemisphere. - other ORS erates; ; Encouraging and. supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Covernment from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist t purposes; Encouraging and 1 supporting any developments within Guba that offer. the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with @ regime that would break with the . Sino-Soviet Bloc tt being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals ‘of the United States 5 - Maximizing the cost #2 the Soviet Union of supporting ' the Castre regime; _
Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other. free world. states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preSerably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio. Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States, ‘The newly-won » hemi spheréc solidariey an the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized. by. seeking OAs actions of. marginal value and which might split the hemisphere. Being. prepared. to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat. elements and/or logistical support, the vide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing ¢ ob jectives; and; | Producing comprehensive intelligence related above objectives, Supporting Actions A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern- ment will be prepared to increase the political, .economic, e psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities~ : = SECRET i
~ opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the. sequence set forth below. Recoumendat ions: for further actions pased upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the deve lopment of. new programs related to. the feregoing objectives will be fortheaming- 1, In addition to current covert program, euch as “{ntelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as. agente, radio broadcasts, support of “the Cuban Revolutionary Council | (cnc) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propagands materials: a) continue to Antenstfy covert collection of Intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime; ) | Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause & aplic. in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels} and. 2) crests -
a political “base of. populer opposition to | the regime;, and, 3) secure intelligence; Co Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons, carrying leaflets and sther. propaganda materials from International waters into Cube, Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established. 2. Await results of. Mr. Donovan’ @ imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-0dd American . prisoners. “Any of the actions Meted below, if taken before the conclusion of tre negotiations could 3 an jeopardize their release, If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the. following timetable: 4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the | 4 proclamation of the four point shipping orders, (The proclamation ealls fer the ordera to go into (effect in five days). These orders: a. clese United States ports to all vegsels of of & country whose vebRels engage ix carrying arms to Cuba; Dd,
@.- fete hae . ” . pect ove im sae ET Pate we Ge b. close Unived States ports ‘te any ship whieh haa carried. goods ‘in the blossCuba trede within 122 vot 7 days of, ‘the! tine ie seeks te enter a United States pores, oa . prohibit all United States ‘flag ships end all. ships owned by United States nationals Ox reaidents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any” goods bound « te or from Guba; and
as a a cad jab cet be € yt SG cy et r oeqa tay oe od it “? end re wb Ann jn ates he be de sk BY upport 3 Co ty howe Me ne de be “ & Ft Dec OMMns i ! 2 o : ' ‘
Goh SECRET B= and medicine (fall Back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); -2) prohibit- ion of AR. ships from transporting embargoed items | and deny use of ports to, ships in Bloc- Cuba trade; © 3). ‘denial, of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for. “flights. to Cuba; and 4) a call, on: other states to take similar ection, After obtaining, the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, ‘the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. it should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will infora our NATO allies of the impending OAS action. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the. list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (sveatesie) items is prohibited. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek.
to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical | spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on. the cocoM list: 9. dn addition to: four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press, Free World nations to keep their . shipping. out of Bloc~Cuba trade. B. Contingency Planning — | New opportunities for. accomplishing | our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a ; result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by ‘the Castro-Commmnist regine itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. | | Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased miltilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are nop’ inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward | aurveillance and. collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as | appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-
@@ SECRET 1 QO ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba: intensive ‘ naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force, To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces emp Loyed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American natio desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.
— nn cn OS eg. (uit Revisiows) re Cone tOENETAL | CL0RET “NCLOSURES) Fe. Co (WITH TO? January 22, 1963 . M - NDUt: FOR: Tae Honorat e@ Mete.w. ce faimey te . . Po oy Te 2 All Members of che NSC Executive Committee ones ae _ 3 CUBA - Back-up vapers and a Summary of Recommendations of the Coordinator of Cuban /ffairs he enclosed navers are submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs. : 1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations. 2. United States Policy Toward Cuba. | 3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization ‘of American States. 4, United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade, — 5. Current Problems. Concerning Cuba. It is understood that the recommendations will be considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a. m. on Thursday, January 24. Enclosures: .As stated. CONFIDENTIAL | (WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSUR:S, HY 50955 Doecld: 32276061 . Page 91
RY 0955 . * SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1733, 10 a.m.) FROM SUBJECT: Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations 1. U. S. Policy Objectives The following are the objectives of the U. 8. with respect to Cuba: Be. Docld: 32276061 Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba; Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states; Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states; Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino~Soviet Communist purposes; Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it SECRET Page 92
HW 450955 j- SECRET Dm being understood that cur ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States; Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime; Maximizing the politicai isolation of the Castro regime from otner Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. When- ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should , be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere; Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives. 2. Supvorting Actions ., Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO Docld: 32276001 SECRET Page 933
HW 50955 3. SECRET -3- action to incluce Cuba on the COCOM list, and aporoaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation: a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime; b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement tc its original aims. NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended. Cuban Brigade Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian. and military program for Brigade members. . SECRET Bocld:32276061 Page 94.
The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accent civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided. SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 94 o
HW 450955 8 | e & SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Prepared for tne Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.) FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs SUBJECT: United: States Policy Toward Cuba United States Policy On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide- lines of United States policy with resnect to Cuba in the following words: "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kent out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere. ' "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. -But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.” 3 SECRET Doclda: 32276061 Page 96
HW 50955 Gat SECRET =2-= Objectives Docld: 32276061 Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are: . l. Page oO? Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba; Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states; Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemi sphere states; Encouraging and. ‘supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino- Soviet Communist purposes; Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
HW 450955 10. ce SECRET ~3- Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime; Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization _of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere; - Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives. Supporting Actions Docld: 32276061 A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further SECRET Page 98
@p SECRET whe actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs telated to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming, L. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infil- . tration of propaganda materials: a. Intensify covert ¢ollection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime; b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles ,. who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime.can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime dat the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence; c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an ‘operational capability has been established, SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:32276061 Page 99
HW 409545 Docld: 32276061 @ SECRET ~5- With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should: first: be ascertained. If these actions were. taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the ‘Americans. Page 100 If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable: Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders: a. Close United States ports to all yessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba; b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc- Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port; c. Prohibit all United, States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and- SECRET
HY 50955 DBocld: 32276061 Page 101 (ee SECRET -6- Prohibit any carge sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions: a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); u SECRET
SECRET © -8- Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community, Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily. SECRET HW 50955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 116