45 could lay their hands on." But he did not recall that ‘ "a specific project was approved which was designed for a man to go to point B and actually shoot or poison or do something to Castro." | Helms testified before the Commission that "he was not aware of the CIA ever having assassinated any foreign leader. I certainly never authorized the execution of any such operation while I was Director or Deputy Director and when I was Deputy Director for Plans I don't remember it coming forward. I certainly never recommended such an action to the then Director.” Helms said that although he had no recollection of any discussion with the case officer not to tell the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, in 1962 about the existence of plans, "I have no reason to cavil" that this was the fact. f. The August 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special _ Group (Rugmented) The Special Group (Augmented) was a group of senior AMWdGIT GUOd "HY GTwUaD AHL WONd AdODO.LOHd people in the Administration who were involved in overall planning with operations directed against Cuba. Included in that group were the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara; the Attorney General of the United States, Robert Kennedy; the Assistant to the President for National Security, McGeorge Bundy; General Maxwell Taylor; and General Lyman Lemnitzer (who is a member of the Commission), along with sever:.1 others. The coordinating HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 49
46 officer of the Special Group (Augmented) was Brigadier General Edward Lansdale. (Robert Kennedy was not present at the August 10, 1962, meeting.) (1) The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer The Phase II case officer said that he was at a meeting of the "Special Group (Augmented) in the State Department in August 1962, when someone brought up the possibility of "liquidation" of Castro. John McCone was at that meeting and, according to the case officer, John McCone "got rather red in the face" and made a remark which "was a clear effort to stop any such proposals, suggestion or any discussion thereof at that meeting within that forum immediately." On August 14, 1962, the Phase II case officer prepared a memorandum for the Deputy Director of Plans, who was Richard Helms, in which he attached a copy of an August 13, 1962 memorandum prepared by General Lansdale. The CIA case officer's memorandum to Helms said: 1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information. 2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four.. words were “including liquidation of leaders." HW 53244 DoclId:327112954 Page 50 AMVddIT quod -y aTwagD YHL WOWT AdOOOLOHA
47 3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed. Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point. 4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I cailed Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those dissemi- nated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so." The attached Lansdale memorandum under date of August 13, 1962 had excised from it a phrase. The blank space was the approximate size of the phrase, “including liquidation of leaders." (2) Interrogation of Robert M. McNamara According to Robert M. McNamara in a recorded interview, he had no recollection of being present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. "I'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no recollection of it. I do seem to recall that there was such a group, I doubt very much if I was a member of it." He said that he "might have heen a participant" at one or more , HW 53244 DoclId:32112954 Page 51 AUVddIT GuOd °Y AIWuaS AHL WOYT AdODOLOHd
48 meetings. When asked whether or not he heard anyone discuss the possibility of assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader, McNamara replied: "No. I should interject here another point I made earlier, as I have no notes--I did not take.notes of any meetings I attended with rare exceptions, and I have no other basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those years is very bad. I'm not saying this to in any way qualify what I'm saying except that it is a fact that my memory is poor in relation to the period." McNamara stated that "I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated, which seems to me... extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been taken to move in that direction, it would have had to receive the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other officials at that same level, including my deputy, I think, and my deputy never would have approved anything like that without discussing it with me.” Secretary McNamara said that he "couldn't imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was known to the President and was not Known to Mr. Bundy. I can imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy, not known to the President either because they were not that important or conceivably because it was thought desirable to protect the President from certain knowledge...I can't imagine Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. I can't HW 53244 Docld:327112954. Page 52 AMWdaIT Guod “WY GIwuaS FHL WONT AdODOLOHA
49 imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though to do so would by that action involve the President. I say I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader without the President's knowledge because it is the President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it ever became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest of us, the importance of protecting the presidency as well as the particular president, and particularly protecting his ability to govern." (3) The Testimony of John McCone John McCone testified that he was present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. He said that he objected to the discussion of liquidation of leadership as a possibility of consideration and he later talked with Secretary McNamara and expressed the same view, and he said Secretary McNamara agreed. John McCone testified that at the time of AUVddIT GUOd “YU AIwuao AHL WOYT AdOODO.LOHG the August 10, 1962 meeting he did not know of the existence of the Phase I plans nor did he know that at the very time the meeting was taking place, Phase II was underway. (4) The Affidavit of General Lemnitzer Lyman Lemnitzer, a member of the CIA Commission, was also present on the August 10, 1962, meeting. In an affidavit he declared that he has no recollection of the question of liquidation of Castro or other Cuban leaders being discussed. HW 53244 DoclId:32112954 Page 53
HW 53244 50 (5) The Testimony of General Lansdale General Lansdale had no specific recollection of the August 10, 1962, meeting although he said that "it is quite possible" that he might have attended that meeting. General Lansdale said that the possibility of assassination may have been discussed at that meeting. He also had no specific recollection of his memorandum dated August 13, 1962, and the words whited out. When asked whether or not those words might have been “including liquidation of leaders" Lansdale replied "I doubt it. I just don't recall anything at all on liquidation of leaders." However, he also said that it was possible that the excised phrase from his memorandum was “including liquidation of leaders," but he stated that this was merely a matter of considering a possibility, one of several alternatives. (6) Additional Testimony of General Lansdale According to Lansdale, during 1960 he was Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. He said he had no knowledge of any discussion of possible plans for the assassination of any foreign leaders. In 1961 Lansdale was appointed by Secretary McNamara as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. DoclId: 32112954 Page 54 a dTwazS FHL Wows AdODOLOHA AUVddIT aor
51 President Kenned (a) Discussions with and Written Proposals to President Kennedy Lansdale said that he had a discussion with President Kennedy. “I do not recall exactly on that. He asked me if I would think about the situation in Cuba and if I could come up with any suggestions or recommendations from such a study. It was a rather vague assignment by him, but it was to be done for him personally." Lansdale "suggested an intermediary” to whom he would report and Lansdale said the President "appointed his brother, who was the Attorney General.” According to Lansdale, he made an initial series of recommendations in late 1961 or early 1962, in writing, addressed to the President, "to see if there was a possibility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their political thinking together to see if there would be any feasibility of a revolution in Cuba." He says he thinks he report to the Attorney General for delivery gave the written to the President and that he later saw the paper "in the files . he received it and he had possession of it." (b) Cuban Exile Groups During the first part of 1962 there were of the President. discussions about Cuban exiles possibly going back inside Cuba to harass the regime. Lansdale stated that the possibility of: these exile groups trying to assassinate Castro "might well have been mentioned." However, he said that "I don't recall a HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 55 AUWdaIT GuOd *Y AIwuqo AHL woud AdODO.LOHG
52 Single instance of any serious action being undertaken" on any plan for assassination. He went on to say that whatever discussions took place concerning assassination related to possibilities rather than actualities. (c) ‘Requests for "possibility" Plans - but no wy ' Authorization to Carr Authorization to Carry Out z Lansdale said that if there were directions to submit papers, it was an authorization for submitting papers a and not an authorization for necessarily carrying out the z action. Lansdale admitted that "there might well have been" ' a request for the CIA to come up with, as a possibility, a 5 plan for liquidation of leadership. B “If that request was made, he said it coulda S have been one of his requests and that he “quite probably 2 would have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense" and is "possibly the Attorney General with whom I was in contact." Fe Lansdale said that at no time during 1960, > < 1961, 1962 or 1963 did he have any knowledge of the existence of any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader or any other leader. Lansdale testified that he never heard any discussion of "executive action capability." HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 56
53 g. Interrogation of General Taylor General Maxwell Taylor said that he was not aware of the existence of any plans to assassinate Castro. He said he did not have any discussions with the President concerning the possibility or the existence of the plans to assassinate Castro. However, "...in the case of Bob Kennedy and Allen Dulles, we talked about so many things at the time of the Bay of Pigs as we sat around the table I couldn't say--that the desirability of the disappearance of Castro or what would happen if he were assassinated in Cuba--that was not raised, I don't recall." He said he didn't recall any conversations about assassination with McGeorge Bundy or Walt Rostow. "I couldn't say that discussion in the abstract ‘wouldn't it be a nice thing if someone bumped Castro off' that could well have been said, but I just don't recall it." Taylor said that he never knew of any authorizatio for the CIA to undertake any assassination. He also said he xuvaart quod °“d GIWYaS FHL NoUd AdODO.LOHA had no knowledge of the phrase "executive action capability" or any proposal for the CIA to develop a general standby capability to assassinate foreign leaders. General Taylor, who was at the August 10, 1962, meeting, said he had no recollection of any assassination plan being discussed, although he said that it might have been. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 57
54 h. Testimony of Richard Helms Re Unseating Castro Government and Possible Plans {1)- White House Pressure Richard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, testified that "there was a flat-out effort ordered by the White House, the President, Bobby Kennedy who was after all his man, his right hand in these matters, to unseat the Castro government, to do everything possible to get rid of it by whatever device could be found and that was the reason for mounting this large operation in Miami to work on this very problem. And the Bay of Pigs was a part of this effort and after the Bay of Pigs failed, there was even a greater push to try to get rid of this Communist influence 90 miles from the United States shores. In response to a question concerning "Who might have been the driving forces from the White House in efforts to do something about Castro" Helms responded, "Well, the principal driving force was the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. There isn't any question about this. Involved in this was a group of individuals who were sort of hired and pulled together by Kennedy and Rusk and McNamara and McGeorge Bundy and all those people to get on with this job and as I HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 56 ad GIWYdS AHL WOYT AdODOLONaA AYWddIT aquor
56 the Phase II case officer had taken over the plans but he did not "recall any special basis being used to try to get them to do an assassination." i. The August 16, 1963 Memorandum to John McCone about Phase I According to John McCone, the first time he learned about the existence of any assassination plans was on August 16, 1963, when he was given a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" prepared for Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The particular events underlying the disclosure to Director John McCone appear to have started on the evening of August 15, 1963. Stanley J. Grogan, an assistant to the Director in charge of press relations, received a telephone call at his house from a man who said he was Sandy Smith, a reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times. According to a memorandum for the record prepared on August 16, 1963 by Grogan, Sandy Smith "said he was working on a story as a follow-up to the revelations by Joe Valachi, who is under close guard at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, who had named a man Giancana as the head gangster in Chicago. The man in Chicago recently went to court to have the FBI cease surveillance of him and his house and lost the decision. HW 53244 DocId:32112954 Page 60 AMWddIT GuOd "Y aGTwaaS FHL WOYT AdODOLOHd
57 He said the Chicagoan reportedly at one time was used by CIA to find out what was going on in Cuba, but provided no information of value. Smith said he stated this to the Department of Justice and they would neither confirm or deny." | | On August 16, 1963, the front page of the Chicago Sun-Times contained a story by Sandy Smith with a headline "CIA Sought Giancana Help for Cuba Spying." The story started with the following paragraphs: "A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times. "It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government official said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959. "What the CIA accomplished--if anything-~-by negotiating with the 53-year old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter." Richard Helms gave John McCone on August 16 a memorandum (dated August 16) under the subject "Sam Giancana" which stated: ."Attached is the only copy in HW 53244 DoclId:32112954 Page 61 ad aQTwag5S FHL WONT AdODOLOHA AUYWdadIT ayoa
58 the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May 1962.) I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year." Richard Helms, when interrogated by the Commission staff, testified he did not have any recollection of the specific events. However, when he was shown his memorandum of August 16, 1963, addressed to John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, he remembered that he had delivered that memorandum to Mr. McCone. Helms did not recall whether or not he had seen the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record sent to the Attorney General before the date he sent it to John McCone on August 16, 1963. WH 53244) Docld:32112954 Page 62 AUVdATT Guod ‘WY GIWaaS AHL Noud RdODOLOHA.
59 4. Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes According to the 1967 Inspector General investiga- tion report, during 1963 several miscellaneous schemes were developed inside the Agency for possible use against Fidel Castro. Helms testified he was vaguely aware of some of these schemes, which he called "hairbrained." There was no showing that any of the schemes extended beyond the discussion Stage. One of these schemes involved discussions inside the CIA about trying to have General Donovan, who was negotiating with Fidel Castro for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, give to Fidel Castro a contaminated skindiving suit. It was known that Fidel Castro liked to skindive. The CIA plan was to dust the inside of the suit with a fungus producing madera foot, a disabling and chronic skin disease, and also contaminating the suit with tuberculosis bacilli in the breathing apparatus. There is no evidence that General Donovan knew of any such schemes developed inside the Agency. The scheme was dropped because Donovan on his own volition gave Fidel Castro an uncontaminated skindiving suit as a gesture of friendship. HW 53244 Docld:3271127954 Page 63 ua aTWaagS AHL WOT AdODOLOHA AMWdaIT ayor
60 During this period of time there were also discussions about preparing a booby-trap spectacular seashell which would be submerged in an area where Castro often skindived. The seashell would be loaded with explosives to blow apart when the shell was lifted. After investigation it was determined that there was no shell in the Caribbean area large enough to hold a sufficient amount of explosive which was spectacular enough to attract the attention of Castro. Also, a midget submarine which was anticipated to be used for the emplacement of the seashell did not have a long enough operating range. 5. The Phase III Plan - 1963 ~ 1965 In 1963 a CIA employee who was fluent in Spanish was assigned on temporary duty with the Special Operations Group on Cuba. The employee is hereafter referred to as the Phase III case officer. The task assigned to him "...was to collect intelligence and to try to organize a group of AMVdGIT GdoOd “UY AIwugo AHL WONT AdODOLOHA military officers inside Cuba who were opposed to the Cuban regime-the Castro regime." In the latter part of 1963 while on a trip. abroad, he met a Cuban with whom CIA personnel had been in contact ~ since 1961. At this first 1963 meeting the Phase III case officer said there was no discussion about any possible assassination of any Cuban leader. HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 64
61 Originally, the Cuban contact had been a Castro supporter and had been a member of one of the groups that overthrew Batista. However, "he became disenchanted with Castro” shortly after Castro took over because of "the harsh police state policies that were being carried out.” | At a subsequent 1963 meeting, which took place in Europe, the Phase III case officer said that the primary discussion concerned "getting into more detail on the organization of a group inside Cuba which could be used in an internal coup against the Castro government. "The subject of assassination was. never raised by me. It was never discussed in that context. In discussing the coup and how a coup would be carried out, this particular contact did raise the possibility and in his mind the very real possibility that there would be bloodshed, and that somebody would be killed. Their, or his, opinion was that to even get the internal revolt, a coup, underway that the leadership--the top leadership--would have to be neutralized. Specific assassination of any of the people, it was not discussed in those particular terms." According to the Phase III case officer, the Cuban contact held a relatively high position in the Cuban government. The Cuban "requested a meeting...a high HW 53244 Docld:327112954 Page 65 a AIwaaS FHL WOYd AdODOLOHA AMVdGIT qyor