datamatters24/research-document-archive huggingface dataset:
FD-36 (Rev, 5-22-64) ®@ <q FBI [ Date: MARCH 25, 1975 () 0 Transmit the following in copy (Type in plaintext or code) Via ___ TELETYPE J NITEL | (Priority) | a= ee TO: DIRECTOR, FBI FROM: SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-NEW) ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975. MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF FIVER AND ONE HALF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY, THERE ARES AGENTS WORKING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY. END. C4 L~ it LEA POLTS Bien ERS 2A, OO Sad weteceecenn Wise Serinlizog.— 7 (i) Indexed Ty - Approved: } fr —_ DVIS (7 M Per tel) Special a in Charge HW 54927 Docld:32989477 Page 5 * U, S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O ~ 346-090 (11)
PERSONS/ENTITIES: CIA 9/27/63 IX-C-2-a ..MEXTCO CITY SOVIET EMBASSY / OSWALD, LEE HENRY OCCURRENCE: the Warren Commission Report cites a memo from Helms to Rankin. in support ef the finding that Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy in 9/27/63. Helms writes "  . .Kostikov one of the Soviet officials with whom Lee Harvey Oswald is believed to have dealt during his visit to Mexico City on 9/28 - 10/3/63." (emphasis added) The memo, as printed in the Warren Commission exhibits, does not provide any indication that Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy on 9/27/63 as the Report pruports it does indicate. SOURCE? Warren Comm, Ex, 2764 (Vol, XXVI). Memo from - Helms to Rankin (1/64~9/647? ) FILE: 10/19/75 — PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES : CATEGORIES: MEXICO CITY - SOVIET EMBASSY ¢ OSWALD, LEE HARVEY - MEXICO CITY 9/27/63 | IX-C-2-a - OSWALD, MARINA a MEXICO CITY ~ CUBAN EMBASSY ¢ 3/3/64» OCCURRENCE: The Warren Commission Report cites the testimony of Marina Oswald as evidence that Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy on 9/27/63. Marina testified. that Oswald told her he had visited the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Embassy on his trip to Mexico City. (Her testimony, as cited by the Warren Commission Report, does not indicate any specific discussion of Oswald's visits .on 9/27/63 to either diplomatic establishment. . SOURCE: testimony of Marina Oswald, 2/3/64, Vol. I, p. 28 | STAPP: Dwyer , DATE: — 10/20/75
ash 9 TOP SECRET 9 is to inform the public and I think that was done quite well. Senator..Huddleston. Shouldn't that also come there in this first. section before we get to the general facts? Mr. Aaron. Yes, I helieve that's correct. “I would suggds that we' just get together and try to redraft three or four || pages that would capture all those points in some logical sequence as an introduction to this. Senator Huddleston. I still have my Same suggestion relative ‘to the second complete paragraph on page 2 where we find that there is a need in the future. I still think the sentence is a little out of order. there. I think I suggested the other time that we say the Committee finds there is a continuing need. And then the next sentence gets into the future that there willbe a challenge for the foreseeable future. So we would strike out in the future. in the first sentence and put continuing need. Mr. Aaron. We. have a funny fragment of a sentence at - the bottom of the page. It has over the past 35 years -- | Mr. Maxwell. The bottom of page 4, the last sentence which carries over to Dage 5 should probably be,. the failure of Congress as a whole to monitor the expenditures of | intelligence agencies. | Senator Huddleston. In other words, you want to exonerate the Committee's -- TA 2mm om Docld: 32423516 Page 12
= PRLS (Rev. 2-14-74) r é Transmit the following in NW 34951 Doocld: 32909405 Page 6 FBI Date: (Type in plaintext or code) (Precedence) PAGE TWO NF 175-50 CLEAR (NORFOLK REMOVED SERIALS 183 THROUGH 195 OF 188 SERIALS. AND PLACED THESE SERIALS IN NF 100-7488 TO FACILITATE HANDLING OF THE BUREAU REQUESTS UNDER BUREAU FILE THERE ARE TWO (2) SUB-A SECTIONS CONTAINING 100-106670.) PHOTOGRAPHS OF JAMES EARL RAY AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED. THERE ARE NO BULKY EXHIBITS, NO TAPES, NO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE LOGS AND/OR TRANSCRIPTS IN THE NORFOLK FILES. (NORFOLK FURNISHED XEROX COPIES OF THE NORFOLK MURKIN FILE, NF 44-268, INCLUDING SERIALS 189 AND 190 BEFORE THE TWO SERIALS WERE REMOVED AND PLACED PERMANENTLY IN NF 100-7488). THIS COMPLETES THE PROJECT IN NORFOLK. Approved: —_._ Gent MOR Special Agent in Charge GPO: 1975 O - 590-992
WW 54989  Docld:32989512, Page 123 _ en cGosg2 9811828 FL — CHICAGO RR HQ ar 2? i2 30 PH°78 DE CG ; R 2218282 MAR 78 FM CHICAGO (62-7385) TO DIRECTOR (62-117298) ROUTINE  AALINPORMATIONCOMAIN-D SNR ESS ENT SariED : ee age UNCLAS E FT 0 ATTN: CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY UNIT, RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION | ; HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS CHSCA) (BUDED MARCH 24, 1978) RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA DATED MARCH 21, 1978. DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY , 1967, THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1968, THE FOLLOWING AGENTS'WERE ASSIGNED THE INVESTIGATION OF THE UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA CUKA) (CG FILE 157-490) IN CHICAGO. | JANUARY 1967-JULY 11, 1967, SA THOMAS E. BURNS, JRe, CURRENT ASSIGNMENT KNOWN TO BUREAU. JULY 11, 1967+APRIL 3, 1968, SA JOSEPH P. MC CABE -) ae DHE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED CHICAGO OFFICE. (> -_ re ‘ N a . am A anther ot » lh ‘ ee eee oF
JFK Assassination System. Date: 7/7/2015 Identification Form , Agency Information ‘AGENCY:  SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: —_157-10014-10128 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER: 07-M-34 ~ : Document Information ORIGINATOR: = SSCIA FROM: : TO: TITLE: DATE: 03/15/1976 . PAGES: 76 SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY COMMITTEE BUSINESS DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 03/22/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 324 v9.1 Docld: 32423516 Page 1
PAGE TWO CG 62-7385 UNCLAS E F T 0 APRIL 3, !968-DECEMOER 3, 1968, SA KARL L. MARKS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED CHICAGO OFFICE. Br. a“ |, so Docld:32989512 Page 124
ra o? - » , . . Xu U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE See TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA) W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any telephone calls intercepted between Martin-Luther King, Jr. and the Attorney General of the United States during the period of time he monitored the telephone. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any calls intercepted between Martin Luther King and the Attorney General of the United States, SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any telephone calls to the Democratic Convention in 1964 by Martin Luther King, Jr. that were intercepted during the monitoring operation. SA Benton advised he did not have any knowledge of any intercepted calls made by Martin Luther King to the Democratic Convention during 1964, SA Benton was asked at the time he was assigned to the monitoring of the King telephones by the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Field Division did he question his assignment. SA Benton advised absolutely not. SA Benton was asked that during the period he monitored the King telephones did he ask to be relieved of his assignment. SA Benton answered absolutely not. SA Benton was asked at this time does he question his assignment to the monitoring of the King telephones and SA Benton answered absolutely not. The interview was terminated at 10:32 A. M. this date, July 22, 1975. - 6% - . NW 54959 Doold: 329894958 Page 102
HW 34989 Doold: 32989512 VZCZC HOODIE PR AT BH CG LA ME NO DE HQ GG96 08 19332 ZNR UUUUU R 21G@237Z M'R 78 FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-117290) TO FBI ATLANT’ ROUTINE FBI BIRMINGHAM ROUTINE FBI CHICAGO ROUTINE FBI LOS ANGELES ROUT INE FBI MEMPHIS ROUTINE FBI NEW ORLEANS ROUTINE WNCLAS FBI. CHICAGO Bar 7! ALLINFORMATION CONTAIN 3 36 PHB Coe LOOTED) ov pues ASSASSINANLON OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE HSCA DESIRES TO DENTIFY AND POSSIBLY LATER INTERVIZW CASE AGENT (S) WHO HANDLED INVESTIGATION OF THE UNITED KLANS OF AMER ICA CUKA) DURING 1967-1968 IN THE ABOVE OFFICES. IN RESPONSE TO THIS HSCA REQUEST, RECIPIENTS FURNISH DENT ITIES OF SASE £GENTCS) IN UKA INVESTIGATION FOR PER 1ep="—~ — | Page i125 ae Aree elf b ene emer, SEPEALIAESY ye i é
-s fy OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL | ‘ WASHINGTON, D.C, 20530 ‘ Ye-2-3(FBL) Da > FEB 27 1976 Honorable Frank Church, Chairman United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities Washington, D. C. 20510 Dear Senator Church: Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request of February 19, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee staff seeking delivery of all Bureau materials pertaining to a "voice recording" referred to in a Report to the President from Director Hoover dated ; November 23, 1963. Sincerely, Wed C cht JR MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination wy * a) a Yor N * . . PLG 27 1976 EE fie ja he er ee ee ey : x re aie Saad, Seer ao = ag A BA i en Oo a er I Agent yet Sa oy RO are Bills hee MO etapa oe fy ay Aue eg AP Sie aera near as Haak ale. Seems Pen ‘a ge fee ee, Litt ya lI ae ON ‘ deat oar wat Rar re ALG | Deere sar sie Page ,
gsh Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 WW 54955 he Ww ht LO 11 12 13 End 2 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 25 2477 Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the past. Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring to but I would think your statement is proper. Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies The question that I'm really concerned about is.as we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide range of threats, how do we control what happens within each of those actions to keep them from going beyond what was intended to begin with? DocId:32989494 Page 190
Fo Po Tet: 92489498—Pege—Lo3 7/24/75 ATRTEL TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62~116395) (ATTN: INTD, W. O. CREGAR) FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (62-2854) SENSTUDY 75 Enelosed are the original and seven copies of seven LHH's prepared at Atlanta and captioned "U. 8S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)," subcaptioned and dated as follows: 1. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) W. John Benton by SSC Staff Members" ~ 7/22/75; 2. "Interview of FBI Spacial Agent (SA) 0. Richard Hamilton by SSC Staff Members" ~ 7/22/753 3. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Robert W. Thomson by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75; 4. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Donald P. Burgess by SSC Staff Members" ~ 7/23/75; 5. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Aiden F. Miller by SSC Staff Members" ~ 7/23/75; 6. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Charles T. Haynes by SSC Staff Members" ~ 7/28/75; 7. “Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Edward A. Shea by SSC Staff Members" - 7/24/75. The FBI representative who was available in the Atlanta FBI Office for consultation during the interviews was Bureau Supervisor SEYMOR F. PHILLIPS. 2-Bureau (Ene. 56) _ SEARCHED ‘Atlanta L SERIALIZED tna) ‘ f eke ey a —e
PAGE THREE Oh-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TG ASSIST EITHER CURREMNT OF FORMER KMPLOYEnS. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEVEES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE DURTKG AN INTERVIEW, THEY WAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY CIF IWERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. G.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WR. We Re WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECIION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR. THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES, FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORHATION, I AW WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORWER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THEM, YOU WILL BE KEPY ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD. ERD er W FLS HOLD FOR ONE HORE S4959 Doold: 32589498 Page i152
GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF ARMS TO VERNONA en Late April, 1962 VERONA requested arms and equipment: HARVEY obtained explosives, detonators, rifles, radios, and boat radar from TED SHACKLEY, head of the JNWAVE station. The equipment was to be used in the assassination effort and to aid Cuban guerrillas. HARVEY and SHACKLEY delivered the equipment to a park- ing lot in a U-Haul truck rented under an assumed name. HARVEY gave the keys to ROSELLI, who arranged to have the ttuck picked up by an unidentified contact. This arrangement was used because ROSELLI did not yet trust HARVEY. O'CONNELL and ROSELLI together staked out the truck. . en GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS AND ARMS TO CUBA May, 1962 ROSELLI kept HARVEY informed of developments. Sometime in May ROSELLI reported to HARVEY that the pills had reached Cuba, and that he believed the guns were inside Cuba. Comments we gta 12 Docld: 324235435 Page 276
seein TRUER oe mee ee eee NW_54959 Docld:32989498 Page 195 IiG6S YA CODE 985 Fa GITEL 9/17/75 WEB TO ALEXAMDRIA JACKSORVILL « WEY YORK ATLAUTA . KNOXVILLE RICHMOND BOSTON LOS ANGELES sT. LOUIS DETROIT WEMPHTS SAu DIEGO JACKSON WEW ARK SEATILE PROW DIRECTOR (62116395) FERSOUAL ATTENTION SENSTUDY 75 REBUTELS WAY 2, 1975, AND vEPLLMSER 4, 1975, TO ALL OFFICES AND BUTELS SEPTEMER 3, 1975, TO SELECTED OFFICES INFORMING LATTER THAT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (Ssc) HAD REQUESTED IDENTITIES OF ALL SUPERVISORS AND COORDINATORS FOR: COINTELPROS IN SELECTED OFFICES Fox (1) NEV LEFT AnD BLACK EXTREAIST, 1967 THROUGH 1971, AND (2) FOR WHITE HaTZ, 1964 TERCUGH 1971. S5U ALSO REQUESTED LOCATION OF PERSONS NAWED IN FIELD RESPOUSES 10 REFERENCED SEPTEMSLR $, 1975, TELETYPES, Alo LATEST INFORMATION IN FBIHG FILES HaS SEEN FURNISHED To Ssc. pda a a
: 7 ; , ' “PAGE TWO v THAT IF A REPRESER waTTva OF A CONTACT: 8 BUREAU EviPLO RESPOWw TO augst10 NS POSED To 43 HEAD QUARTE ERS srr NW 34959 Psoold: 32989498 ER OF \ 7 i r : ‘ \ ! 4 \ 4 ' , ° ny ’ . 4 . Page 252 Kis PLOVER AND AD Vi 3 x 7 eoStonai” covii' rey yy was Cy Tk, SHOULD . i \ “f x Ane ' L 4 me
1960 November 30 December 28 December 29 “1961 January 12 Late Jan.- Early Feb. —s ee eee 2 Se on ee a nn whe GRAY'S "associates stand ready to deny U.S. activity based in Guatemala" (training of Cubans). GRAY'S "friends" want to fodus the organization cf Cuban operaticns: Ambassador WILLAUER, on overt side and BARNES, on CIA covert side, were chosen. (SG Minutes) GPAY tells Special Group that "his associates" want a special meeting on Cuba on January @. BISSELL outlines two- pronged covert activities plan “directed against the TRUJILLO regime ... He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive strcke against TRUJILLO himself. SG Minutes GRAY was present. Special Group approves the State Department proposal explained by MERCHAITT "that Limited _supplices of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. SG Minutes; emphasis added) DDP BISSELL esks WILLIAM HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under projec ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by the White House" tc establish such a capability, including the capability to assassinate political leaders. 255uUe5S ana UeESLIOLIS With the President? Was CIA or the Special Group planning or supporting an assassination of TRUJILLO? Were these assassination-type weapons? If not, was this Special Group action used.as implict authority for subsequent provision weapons for the assassination of TRUJILLO? Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project iniated or authorized during» the EISENHOWER Admin-= istration? of Docld: 3274235435 Page 43
THIS FILE CONTAINS SPECIALLY DESIGNATED INTELLIGENCE MATERTAL (COMPARTMED NTED) rmation in this file is to be read only. [It is not to bé extracted, od, paraphrased, or discussed with another person without specific y. If you have a question, or a requirement, speak to the Control who gave you access to this file. t TE OF PERSON WAVING ACCESS t FROM TIT YSU BY SECURTTY BY. TIME PBS ENR ee HW 50529 Docld:32423562 Page 2" . fF
1. Advantages . ‘ - Most emphatic method of signalling a change to "harder" policy - Possible tie-in to need for intelligence on Cuban capabilities for delivering arms to Latin “America - Possible beneficial intelligence side effects, 2. Disadvantages me) ~ Risk of escalation (Cubans on formal record . concerning reaction to low-level flights) - Possible reaction against high-level flights - Possible negative effects on Soviet withdrawal of military personnel -. Possible raising of public and Congressional apprehension that offensive weapons systems have been reintroduced | E. Free-world shipping (Examples: extension of NSAM 220 to cover all ships owned or controlled by a firm with ships in the Cuban trade; denial of commercial, as well as U.S.-financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in Cuban trade) ee ee “1, Advantages CoB . Cee Us eRe Boe ' ' ' I t) ‘ ? HW 542714 DBocld: 32977084 Page 6
Inasmuch as the Dallas agents who listen- ed to the tape of the conversation allegedly of Oswald from the [deletion] and examined the photographs of the visitor [deletion] and were of the opinion that neither the tape nor the photograph pertained to Oswald... . On November 25, 1963--some two days after Dallas cabled the Bureau that the tapes had been erased--Bureau supervisor Burt Turner cabled legat stating: If tapes covering any ‘contacts subject with Soviet or Cuban embassies available forward to Bureau for laboratory examination ‘and analysis together with transcript. Include tapes previously reviewed Dallas if they were returned to you. As noted.previously, Legat replied later that day to the effect that the tapes had been erased. It is unclear as to how Shanklin learned on November 23, 1963, that the Oswald tape had been erased. CIA documents a reflect that. it was not until after 5 p.m. on November 23, 1963, that Agency headquarters cabled its station in Mexico City ~ inquiring as to whether the original tapes were available. David Phillips recalls that this inquiry precipitated CIA sta ‘tion's search for the tapes which confirmed the fact that they had been erased. Agency headquarters was so informed on November 24, 1943. | Neither Gordon Shanklin nor Elbert Rudd [the Special Agent then assigned to Legat, Mexico, who personally delivered the alleged Oswald ‘photograph to Dallas on November 22, 1963] recall ever having been aware of a tape recording (alleged or otherwise) Docld:374293556 Page 6
Docld: 324235544 TUR Suet Pay nay EYES bo \ was selected as has been briefed to The Attorney General. Ten thousand dollars was passed for expenses to the second principal. ' He was further furnished with approximately one thousand dollars worth of communications equipment to establish communications between his headquarters in Miami and assets in Cuba. No monies were ever paid to Rosselli and Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods that he was in Miami. After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through Maheu to Rosselli to call off the operation and Rosselli was told to tell his principal that the proposal to pay one hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion of the operation had been definitely withdrawn. 4. Inall this period it has been definitely established from other sources that the Cuban principals involved never discovered or believed that there was other than business and syndicate interest in the project. To the knowledge of the undersigned there were no "leaks" of any information concerning the project in the Cuban community in Miami or in Cuba. 5. Ihave no proof but it is my conclusion that Rosselli and Giancana guessed or assumed that CIA was behind the project. I never met either of them. a 6. Throughout the entire period.of the project John Rosselli was the dominant figure in directing action to the Cuban principals. Reasonable monitoring of his activities indicated that he gave his best efforts to carrying out the project without requiring any com- mitments for himself, financial or otherwise. . 7. In view of the extreme sensitivity of the information set forth above, only one additional copy of this memorandum has been made and will be retained by the Agency. ‘ > {ee ee ee a ees e 3 of 3 pages eae ene i mnt ¢ ha Page 31
. 1, Advantages . ‘ - Some limited reduction of number of free-world vessels in Cuban trade . - Heightened appearance of forward movement because of Congressional and press sensitivity to shipping question 2. Disadvantages SD - Relatively small practical returns = Political costs with maritime nations e - Possible legal: difficulties involved in some. ¢ unilateral measures — Il, Bilateral A. . General ; / Essentially, the effort in the bilateral field siould represent a continuation, sharpening and . intensification of programs already in effect. Measures of a bilateral nature, outside and within the Hemisphere, would be strengthened and facilitated by OAS decisions and recommendations emerging from the Venezuelan case, Wherever possible, the OAS reso- lutions would request the cooperation of other countries, : .basie: COPY pknecmerme «= ™ HW 542714 DBocld:32977084 Page fT
~6- \ any such instruction, and I would have been only the chan-— nel to give such instruction. (13) ...I would have had to - take the matter to the PRESIDENT, because I had no indepen- — dent authority." (16) " BUNDY testified that as far as he could recall, he did not take the mat- ter to the PRESIDENT. (16) BUNDY's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction," not "seeking authority." (15) BUNDY does_not ae recall who told him of the Executive Action project, but "it surely — might have been" BISSELL (15), or some other senior CIA official. (14) BUNDY said that he worked on the assumption that he would be told of sensitive covert operations, such as an assassination plot, but BISSELL bene never mentioned such a thing to him. (41) BUNDY said that he did not prey take steps to dissuade the person who briefed him on the assassination ' capability or to pursue the matter in any other way (19) because he was satisfied a "that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, - that there should be a decision to move against the indi- ro ; vidual." (7) . BUNDY rated the chance that the conversation about Executive Action took place before January 25-26 as "near zero" because of the problems with which he was preoccupied in the first week in government. (9) HELMS: HELMS recalls Executive Action (ZRRIFLE) as "a tiny little thing" (52) which nonetheless had as one of its purposes a capability to as- sassinate foreign leaders. (54) He remembered that there was a single —
HW 50529 -2- 2. A.- FBI furnishing,in 1966, White House with "dossiers" . ; on critics of Warren Commission. B. Tom H. Boggs, Jr. | . Claims that his father, in 1970, gave him FBI furnished dossiers on Warren Commission critics. a Facts: A. At the request of Marvin,Watson in 1966, the FBI furnished him with background memos on seven writers critical of the Warren Commission. Included as part of this transmission was a photograph of one of the seven writers in a situation best described as_ "well, uh, private," perverse and utterly without any value, save the - sexually deviate. ' (The SSC staff refused to even look at ‘the picture, but has received verbal and written description.) B. In January 1975, Tom Boggs , son of the late . Congressman Hale Boggs, disclosed that in 1970, his father received similar dossiers and the picture. The FBI and Boggs documentary material (the FBI denies a dissimination to Boggs) compare only slightly and two similarly typed dossiers are dated differently. We a await information from FBI on further dissimination. Documents: Attached s@h tiesto Docld: 324273562 Page 4 K2S4¢0 Q