176-10036-10179 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA ‘ RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : DOS FROM : TO: TITLE : Status Report on Southeast Asia DATE : 7/11/1962 PAGES : 10 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1 —
See SANTICTED VERLIDN PUd-Ri- 335 SECRET ‘ . STATUS REPORT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA JULY u,1962 PREPARED BY: TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECRET -
SECRET | Lo VIET-NAM Current Overall Evaluation 1 “ The general trend appears slightly favorable, with the GVN continuing £é*iwprove its military, and to a limited extent, its political and econc i¢ position, Basic problems are-being eroded but quick and decisive action is rare, There were no major breakthroughs or important victories” . and noreappear likely in the immediate future. The Viet Cong show no weakening in strength or determination despite reportedly heavy losses, On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen continued well, Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities dow (there is — an unconfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however, in which the VC defeated a regular army battalion): This may be due to reorganization and weather rather than GVN successes, The GVN took several good but minor steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and several rural eocfal and economic programs moved ahead significantly. On the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations. Economic conditions improved somewhat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consu- mer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliveries contimed good. Fearing that the prospective Law settlement will facilitate Viet Cong activities and that it may presage a U, S. move to neutralize Viet-Nam it- self, the GUN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and threatens to boycott the conference, President Kennedy has sent Diem a personal letter stressing the importance we attach to a Laos settlement and our determination to continue to help Viet-Nam defend itself, There 3s no response as yet. Progress on Jetion Program 1, We Activity Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with armed attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the period 20-27 Jmxe and rising only slightly to 75 for the period June 27 - July hh. The lack of W aggressiveness is likely due to the rainy season and their efforts to regroup in order to counter the improved mebility and perfor- - mance of the GUN forces, Observing that this appears to be a period of vO reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMAGV ro- ports indications that VO units which previously operated as separate platcons and companies are now being formed into battalions. Infiltration evidently continues, but good intelligence is scarce, MACY Je2 estimates intiltration in May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of June, but this Information is unconfirmed and there ars no reports of infiltre~- tion since. SECRET
SECRET © -2- In spite ef reduced W activity, VC casualties were high and included some main force personnel, For the pericd 20-27 June the VC suffered a reported increaee of casuslties of almost 25 per cent over the previous reporting period. Killed in action for the two week period were 865 VC end 1b1 friendly forces. Reports continue to indicate a critical VC chortage of madical supplies. Unconfirmed reports rsise the possibility thet the VC are attaining an anti- sircraft capability. {(Pollowiog items are keyed to the Viet-Nam drafe action program of Jaly 3) 2. Strengthen populsr suygort. The GVN took several stess to generate more popular Support in the last two weeks. These include the July 7 relesse of 79 priscners in connection with the celebration of the "double seven" holiday (anniversary of Dien's coming to power), a stepped-up drive to root out low-level corruption and abuse of power by GUN officials, and a Presiden- tially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of: Cabinet Ministers both by Committees of the National Assembly and by the National Assembly in plenary session. ‘The prisoners released may include leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his par- ticipation in the attempted 1960 coup. We have urgad the last item on Diem ia the past in an effort to increase the powers and prestige of the National Assembly. Another favorable development is increased emphasis on working with and for the pecple in the current training program for strategic hamlet cadres. Ngo dinh Nhu (President's brother in charge of the stretegic hamlet program) is concerned thet the program win genuine popular support. He favors the election of hamlet officials by secret bellot instead ef by customary show ‘of hamis. This is now being done in some hamlets. k, Seek International Support (=) Cambodian Relations. The GVN replied mildly to the Cambodian note concerning the ARVN border incursions of June 16. but did not apologize or offer indemaities. The note ingists that all precautions sere taken to avoid crossing the poorly marked frontier, admits that ia spite of these pre- cautions the frontier may have been violated. points out that any such inad- verteni crossing wag not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhabitants, and proposes a mixed border con- tral committee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border cooperation. 7 Another source of GVN-RKG friction, disputed constal islands. was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up further trouble between Cambodia and Viet-eNam,
27 RN we SECRET 7 nn ae -3- . (b) Third Country Aid. The United States has suggested a Saigon, and possibly a later Washington meeting of donor country repre- sentatives to coordinate aid to Viet-Nam. The intention is to stimulate more third country aid if possible, and to make sure that current third country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australia aud New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings, Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are "proceeding with caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of its membership on the ICC. The Belgians. French, Italians and the UK have not yet responded. Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into our MAAG appear near completion. The GVN has indicated its willingness to receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being worked out with Wellington and Saigon. 10. Military Civic Action The 3ist Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of .a Buddhist temple. In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by soldiers to the local civilian population, 35,000 copies of the sheet were also air dropped. Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen. Saigon reports both clear- ami-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction. Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hai Yen area, however, as the military move into WC territory. . Hamlet Councils have been elected in the Hai Yen area, but the Embassy notes a serious problem in the fact that a hamlet Council member receives only 300 piasters (about $1.00) per month for what is theoreti- cally ea full time job. In Operation Binh Minh, an effort will be made to induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set up there. The plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in advance of the move. establishment of military control over the area so that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 deys to accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a very short period for the physical move ). Monta ards. Latest information developed as 4 result of joint surveys indicates the Montagnard situetion is more a long term problem than an emergency. There has in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Mon- ‘tagnard as a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably continue, particularly if the GYN provides adequate food and security. SECRET
SECRET a i a Almost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and re- ceiving minimum food, shelter and secirity. The Embassy comments that while this information somewhat reduces the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problem's magnitude or importance. Difficulties stemming from the absence of a well directed, national Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, ami the Viet- namese prejudice against the Montagnard continue. But the principal and most encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnerd have fled the ve pressures and more may do so. Strategic Hamlet Program. The second ten day training course for ham] ires was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nhu in Saigon July 2. Let ca Future Plans. According to CAS,| [ | (15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance. Village Radios. As of July h, 817 of the plenned 2500 village radios were instetica and operating. Tests of radios for use on trains were started. Defoliation. The Embassy hes proposed a test of the effectiveness of defoliaats against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation Hai Yen. Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops be- cause of the effect on Asian opinion.. Decision and action will be delayed until the Governor's return from Geneva. 20. Agricultural Extension. A pilot training program for > agricuitural efforts associated witl insurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon. One hundred farmers will ‘study farming and stock raising methods for one month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides. ae Anti-Rat wrogren The USOM-supported rat destruction campaign was carried out in ten northern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village. 25. Publicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally. Viet-Nam Photo Service. USIS Saigon is sending out a weekly packet of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GWN SECRET
SECRET . ee — wer effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, imlicating no difficulty in plecing the photos in leading newspspers. 28. Esteblish Network of USIS Sub-posts. The GYN has agreed.to the estsblishment of virtually any nanber of USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotistions on locations and physical arrangements are underway. SECRET
b= THAILAND Current Situation Evaluation fhe RIG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the disputed Phra Viharn Temple to Cambodia. Thai delegates attended the Geneva Conference on Laos, which reconvened on Jaly 2, but the RTG has not yet announced ite intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO Council of Representatives in mid-July. On July 2 the US begen the redeployment of 1,000 Merines from the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thal concern over this move wes lessened by our informing them at the same time of a US- financed progrem to improve logistic facilities in Thsiland (see below). On June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and one in Lempang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports that subversive documents were confiscated at both locations. According to unconfirmed reports these documents originated from| Progress on Action Program 1. Improved Logistic Facilities - We have outlined to the RTG our proposed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand. The program would consist mainly of a POL pipeline to Korat in the northeast, rolling stock, airfield im- provement, storage areas, and prepositioning of heavy military: engineer- ingéquipment. The Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the RTG provide the right- of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation. 2. Internal Security Plan ETE TRE EET We have instructed Embessy Bangkok to cable summaries of those portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in time to reach the Department by July 11. This will permit consideration of the basic components of the entire elan during Secretary McNamera's forthcoming trip to Honolulu. f™
— _ | fig LAOS Current Situation Evaluation fhe principal remaining issues before the. ‘Geneva Conference ’ , including -SEATO, having. been resolved. it is anticipated that the new Accords may be signed next week. There is nevertheless one serious stumbling block, which endangers the satisfactory conclusion of the Conference, i.e., the possible refusal of the GYN to sign. The GYN's position stems from its belief that so many concessions have been made to the Communists that the security of SUN is gravely threatened. We are, however, hopeful that Diem will still be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for Lacs and that we stand firm on our commitments to SVN. ess on Action Fro IBF rams There has been little progress on our. action program. We are con- centrating at present on the following problems : 1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos awaits the visit of Souvanna Phouma to Washington, tentatively scheduled for July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing Souvanna with the material assistarice he requires ‘by enlisting contribu- tions from other Free World nations. 2. RLG Diplomatic Relations. The RLG's decision to recognize 5 bloc countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses a major problem with respect to the GYN. GRC, Federel Republic of Germany and the ROK. Further action by the RLG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laos. In the in- terim wo are attempting to assist the pro-Western countries involved in establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos. 3. ICC. We have asked our Geneva delegation to request the ICC to prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be prepared to meet quickly our share of the requirements. With regard to the essentis] heavy equipment - helicopters and light aircraft - we are taking steps to make it immediately available to the ICC. lh. MAAG Withdrawal. With the signing of the Accords, we will seek Canadian cooperation in utilising to the full the 75-day period for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. This will give us the maximum possible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are. carrying out their undertaking. SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL -8- BURMA Current Situation Evaluation The internal situation remains unstable. This fact. was highlighted by incidents on July 7 ard 8 when student demonstrations led by pre- | Communist organizations were ruthlessly repressed by the police ard arny. These incidents could well lead to increased public disaffection with the Ne Win regime and to a rift between the regime and the opportunistic leftist groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian political supporters. Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate, though not dramatically. A epecial Government amnesty offer expired June 30 without preducing significant response from the insurgents. Progress on Action Program 1. Political It has been confirmed that Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolutionary Ceuncil will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably in late July, although precise dates have not been determined. 2. Economic (AID) No new develcpnents. a. The Burmese are ready formally to accept. the FY 1962 military "gales" program. State and DOD have agreed to accelerate deliveries of Mz carbines as requested by the Burmese, to the extent production facilities permit, in order to contribute to planned post-monsoon counter-insurgency operations. This action will alse, hopefully, earn some political credit for the United States. b. Embassy Rangoon has confirmed that United States training for Burmese officers will be continued under the FY 1962 program. 117 prospective students heve been processed for the coming year. CONFIDENTIAL
A | CAMBODIA Current Situation Evaluation Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet-Nam continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia . Thai moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely,. and it appears likely that if the announced decision to respect the World . Court's award is. mot implemented by September the matter may be brought by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA. The dispute between Cambodia and. Viet-Nam over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come to the fore again, with the GVN rejecting a Cambodian protest against Vietna- mese naval movements near them on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nam. Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites , celebrating the World Court decision.. New evidence of anti-Sihanouk plotting in Bangkok has developed. Progress om Action Program 1. BKG-GUN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The GVN reply to the RKG's pro= test, egainst th violations is not entirely satisfactory, but Phnom Penh believes it may allow progress on the border commission proposal and has raised this possibility with the Foreign Ministry. 2, Force Increase (Mil. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval of the request for a force increase of 3,18), for MAP support only, is one of disappointment that military budget support was not included. 3. New Aircraft (Mil. 5). Four To28 aircraft, first increment of six teen, have arrived’ in Cambodia. Formal turnover awaits the arrival of Ambassador Sprouse. . lh. Highway Repairs (Econ. 9). Invitations to bid have been sent out, and the rep: contract is scheduled to be awarded by August 15. Contractors would be scheduled to commence work November 1, under the proposed contract. SECRET