(1) (A) (1) (B) From the Desk ff NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson es" FROM: aan DATE: 26:36 PM SUBJECT: Memo re Mexican Liaison (S) cu sy[ CL REASON 1.5 (d) DECL ON X1 DRV FM LIA 3-82 The folowing isa draft memo for Jeft.[ lis looking at it now so there may be more changes. Please let me know if there is anything incorrect here. { have a feeling Jeff will want a meeting with me rather than just the memo. Also, knowing him, he may want to deal with Tunheim on this directly since he was involved in this. { will let you know. 1. Action: That you advise as per paragraph 7.. 2. Background: You will recall that you spoke with Chairman Tunheim of the JFK Board about the attached cable and the importance of protecting the phrase :"with Mexicans" because it gives away Piaison involvement ina tel-tap operation. At» its 16 April meeting, at which I was present, the Board reconsidered its initial decision, but determined that the phrase could be released. 3. It had just come to HRG's attention that this same cable was released in full by the Board, with no objection by CIA, in September 1995. CIA probably did not contest this release because an excerpt from this cable, containing the phrase at issue, had been inadvertently released even-priex-to-that. It is,. therefore, no longer possible for CIA to argue before the Board for the protection of this phrase in|the current cable or to appeal this release to the White House. to the Nehonal Archwes a Aug 73 4. CIA is now in somewhat of an embarrassing position because it has strenuously argued that the release of this phrase would cause "clear and convincing damage" to the national security only to find that this phrase has been released with CIA acquiescence for at least seven months,w j ; Conceivably, the Board could see this incident as a justification of their second-guessing our damage assessments, and could give us a much more difficult time in the future. “HW 55157 DoclId: 324045271 Page 7
—SteRET- 5. on the other hand, CIA could use this situation as a way to highlight the problems HRG has had with the JFK review ‘process - that documents are being reviewed and released to the ey ‘Mexican sgwere: National Archives in such quantity and’speed that it is difficult for CIA to focus on any one document and, more importantly, how seemingly innocuous information in one document can actually be quite significant in relation to prior or subsequent releases. Since September, when this cable was originally released, the issue of protecting #Mexican Viaison has become increasingly important because of other releases on this subject and because of your appearance before the Board in February. 6. Furthermore, this prior release should not impair our ability to continue to protect the fact of Méxican involvement: in | this tel-tap operation. Although we e ed to the Board/~.lu a ne this phrase .. twithyMéxtcansitgives that relationship away, 5a ee “Aoes not -—brecfercst. directly do so. In fact, the reason pce len ace the Board's insistence that this phrase should be released was the-very—fect=that«-the cable did NOT directly state that the Ve@min:thestelstap. We should be able to use their arguments to continue to protect the liaison relationship. 7. Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Board that CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this cable has already been released in full.. We should, however, maintain our position that we believe this - information, wis , damaging especially in light of releases to National Archives have been on® documents going to the Board to mekersure—thee ne HW 55157 , and that we never would have acquiesced to the release in September if we knew then what would be released on this subject in the ensuing months. Although this message does not necessarily need to be conveyed by you to Tunheim and could be handled by John’ Pereira and David Marwell, given your past dealings with the Board on this issue, you may prefer to do this. 8. In order to avoid problems like this in the future, HRG is immediately dedicating several personnel to the task of reviewing pores. eh documents and determining what our releases Subjects. HRG will also be double duplicates of | prior releases axe—beinmg—-sent. You should be aware, however, that. there is only a rudimentary CIA computer index listing our, Cot ( 8) o-aceurate” _ releases and that it is impossible to a computer searches about our releases on specific subjects. Although HRG personnel are extremely knowledgeable on what has been released, with over 220,000. CIA documents currently in the collection, it ' is suprising that mistakes like this have not happened more often, GAvdéno chsorlule assurances s cow’ + Vac ppeen AQa VN - cc: Docld: 3274045271 Page &
HW 55157 _15 October 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR: ‘Assassination Records Review Board . FROM: ‘ “John F. Pereira . Chief, Historical Review Group SUBJECT: rexeign co? Government ‘Information (We request that this memorandum be feturhed to CIA once the 7 Board has completed its deliberations on. the issues discussed — below.) 1. 2) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA' s position on the review and declassification of ‘foreign government information that appears in the JFK , ‘collection. This issue has come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK Board of documents. The Agency believes it is important to address this issue at,this time because this is the first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has been reviewed by the Board and itv is possible that such information will appear again in’ CIA's collection. This memo will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States | Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination and declassification of foreign government information but will | also address _the specific issue of the documents" (documents: 2. ABP Conclusion: “CIA does not object to the release of the information in these[__]documents, but is only concerned about © protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two the Agency has no authority to unilaterally agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign government prior to declassifying their information. However, CL BY: CL REASON: 1.5(d) DECL ON: X5 DRV FM: LIA 3-82 DoclId: 32404571 Page 3
SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information ms we ene ernnree WUORK Act’ 6 (1) (A) oo JFK Act 6 (1) (B) HW 55157 3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including (1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information and/or the source of the information, are to be held in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign government, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in confidence. Id., at §1.1(d) ’ 4. (U) Foreign government information is subject toa classification determination under E.0O. 12958, section 1.5(c). When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O. requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification that shall ensure a degree of protection at Jeast equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id., at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the originating government. Id., at 4.2(g). 5. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the intelligence community to protect all classified information from unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information. Intelligence obtained from another government or from a combined effort with another government, may not be released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6 attachment § C.3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at § C.5. 6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and government components is classified SECRET unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such information may be declassified only with the mutual consent of. the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1. DoclId: 3274045271 Page 10
oe | : - * SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information ocr Tg (1) (A) JFK Act 6 (1) (B) the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10~-1. 7. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of such coordination with foreign governments prior to the release of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives. 8. yet According to its legal obligations described herein, CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to the public FBI information located in CIA files without coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or information in its files. JFK Act 6 (1) (B) HW 55157 Docld: 32404521 Page 11 ; A