& THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 9 July 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE STANDING GROUP OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SUBJECT: Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights -- Contingency Plan (submitted 28 May 1963) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this plan, and offer the general and specific comments and recommendations set forth below. 2. General a. The proposals in the plan are considered only a segment of the spectrum of possible provocative measures that could be taken to incite the Castro-Communist regime to take actions which would justify U.S. reprisals aimed at the elimination of the Castro regime. It is understood that other provocative measures may be considered which would provide an equally just and credible frame- work for overt military action on the part of the U.S. to achieve . the same end result. _B b. It must be recognized as probable that there would be a £28 requirement for CINCLANT Op Plans 312 and 316 to insure the 8 Sg \ elimination of the Castro-Communist regime. SEED \ Bae | 28 S 3. Specific FE ZEW ges a. Subparagraphs 2d, 4a, and 7b(1); the Joint Chiefs of Staff SR25 a disagree with these provisions for medium altitude overflights. sae ' They consider that the military feasibility of such flights is a gees matter which should be evaluated at the time. i hag " S5ES8 . aa2- b. Subparagraph 3a: while the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree £ © & that response to Cuban provocation is the "most feasible'' means <4 ae of action, they would not rule out unilateral actions without | provocation should circumstances so indicate. CIAHAS NO OETA OS B: we, 7G) (Ben on DECLASSIFICAT WS REOBSTE RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 2 BbunFF g GROUP-l Jd é Je a /4 $ EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC gin DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION SENSTPETTE ; 2 ; HIS DOCUMENT Copy ...-4....- of Copies RE WHOLECOR IN PART is PROHIBITED TOP SECRET semies “A” EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE 3 ISSUING OFFICE. Page a of _7...... Pages HW 54214 Docld:32424985 Page 2 D663 55 |
c. Subparagraph 4a: the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this paragraph be revised to indicate timing, i.e., how soon after the incident occurs the actions described in subparagraph 4a are to be taken. (Comments 3a and 3f of this memorandum also apply.) d. Subparagraph 4c: the parenthetical phrase '(DEFCON 3 for SAC)" should be deleted, as all U.S. forces would be placed in. appropriate states of readiness. e. Subparagraphs 6b(5) and 6c(2): in connection with these subparagraphs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the paper should be expanded to include consideration of the possibility of building up in advance a potential for revolt within Cuba. f, Subparagraph 6c(1): the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with the provisions for intensification of reconnaissance as a provocative measure as contemplated in this subparagraph. In this connection, the exclusive use of reconnaissance flights to this end is not considered the optimum use of this resource. Other methods of provocation, involving aerial (e.g., armed flights flown under the facade of "yeconnaissance") and perhaps other operations, which do not unduly place into jeopardy American lives and highly clas sified equipment, should be considered. Reconnaissance should be intensified only if such flights can be justified by operational requirements for military intelligence. g. Subparagraphs 7b(1) and (2): the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these subparagraphs should be clarified to indicate whether the actions contemplated are intended to be taken before an incident occurs or at the time the incident occurs. If the former, they believe that the proposal should be reconsidered in light of the costs and disruptive effects that would result, and that, in any event, the nature, timing, and duration of the prepositioning envisaged by the proposal should be indicated. h. In order to avoid any implication that the consideration of reconnaissance flights for other purposes connotes a reduced need for their intelligence contribution, a statement should be made at an appropriate point reemphasizing the requirement to conduct aerial reconnaissance for the purpose of insuring an adequate flow of information for intelligence purposes. ss EE REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT Copy -..------- ee Copies IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE 2 3 . ISSUING OFFICE. Page ......... of ........ Pages HW 542714 DBocld:32424995 Page 3
stanton i, In view of the gravity of the matter, more detailed analysis should be made of the question of U.S. -U.S.S.R. confrontations likely to result from the proposal in Cuba and elsewhere, the impact of possible Soviet reactions upon the time phasing proposed, the possibility of escalation, and the capability of U.S. forces to cope with simultaneous crises, 4. It is recommended that the Contingency Plan be revised in accordance with the foregoing, and made available for further review when revised. A. JZ GOOD TE Major General, USA Spec. Asst. to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff SENSEP EE ln REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT Copy .......... of 2 Copies IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION OF THE 3 3 ISSUING OFFICE. Page _..2 WW of 22. Pages HW 542714 Docld:32424995 Page 4