" | Doc ID: 6598324 Date: 12/09/97 PaGEe:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : NSA RECORD NUMBER : 144-10001-10205 RECORDS SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : NSA FROM : DIRNSA 0 : DOD GC TITLE : PENDING CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS DATE : 01/05/78 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY NSA RELATING TO CUBAN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM LASS = CURSE NR Thee : ie DATE OF LAST REVIEW : §7/01/97 OPENING CRITERI ORIGINATING AGENCY” § DETERMINATION REQUIRED COMMENTS ; -[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Released on 11-01-2017 under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2017 Note)
Doc iD; 19598324- NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE ' FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755 Seg Serial: Noo15 a me 5S January 1978 MEMORANDUM .FOR THE HONORABLE DEANNE SIEMER, GENERAL COUNSEL, "DEPARTMENT OF eaP ener: SUBJECT: "Pending Congressional Requests | REFERENCES: — (a) 15. Hecembar 1977 letter from Senator George McGovern to Secretary of Defense (b) Undated letter received on 20 freaembeur 1977 .from Congressman Louis Stokes to Director, NSA ' (c) 16-December 1977 letter from Mr. Ira Nordlicht to the Honorable Deanne Siemer ' ie Referenced letters iterating FEGHESEE for information | from the National Security Agency present two common issues: _— namely, whether signals intelligence information is to be pro- vided to Congressional Committees which exercise no traditional oversight over intelligence matters; and, if it is to be provided, ‘how it is to be done. NSA Charter legislation, now in draft form,. ' would obligate the Director to keep the Committees of the Congress, having Jurisdiction over the Agency, fully and currently informed of the Agency's activities. Provision of information to other committees would be responsive to policy developed within the a 2.. We anticipate that requests for information, as illus- trated by the three referenced letters, will continue to increase . and can present difficulties in maintaining good relations with '' the Congress. While this Agency has been fully responsive to the needs of the Intelligence, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees, we have treated requests: for information by other committees on. a purely: case-by-case basis. Several times during the past two years, Committees of the Congress which do not have jurisdiction for intelligente’ oversight have approached NSA directly for foreign signals intelligence information. In each case it has been our undérstanding that the SIGINT information. NSA has provided to the requesting committeé is being used as background information in assisting that committee in formulating U.S. policy matters. On these infrequent occasions, NSA has responded directly to the requesting committee providing either access to SIGINT product or briefings, as required. Qlersitog » ? . . : . - : alls Aes RNSRICHOSS (sa/ossee 123-2) . DOWNGRADE: TO CONFIDENTIAL YS, EO 11652, Cet 2 HVCCO UPON REMOVAL OF INCL Dexte sif . ry Pon No! iReation by the Salginctay leaner Zi Tess go when PSR peta reece - Released on 11-01-2017 under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2017 Note)
DocdD: 6598324 Y “should deal with non-oversight committees. Once that decision coh Sh 7 Serial: woos B's Regarding these three specific requests, inclosed for your information is a summary of NSA's contacts with Senator McGovern's Subcommittee, on International Operations.. As indi-- cated in the summary ‘and as discussed previously with Mr. Andrews of your staff, we have not shown nor discussed any material with Senator McGovern's staff representative pending the drafting of an approved memorandum of understanding by your office and the execution of such an MOU between the Executive Branch and the Senator. & 4. In his letter “received by NSA on 20 December, Representa— tive Louis Stokes, Chairman of the House Select Committee on ‘ Assassinations, requested certain information from NSA relating to the Cuban intelligence network during the period 1959 - 1964. Chairman Stokes also certified that access to any NSA material would be restricted to those staff members with a TOP SECRET security clearance; access to NSA material, of course, requires indoctrination for SI as well. No response has been made to Chairman Stokes' correspondence pending resolution of how NSA is made, we recommend that any SIGINT information selected’ for the Select Committee on Assassinations be provided only by the DOD or DCI as part. of a larger submission of data and that the SIGINT ee properly sanitized. 5. Mr. Ira Nordlicht' s 16 December letter to you requested information from NSA on the flow of oil to South Africa and “Rhodesia. At the time of his initial telephone call, Mr. Nordlicht: had a TOP SECRET clearance. It is our understanding that he has since been indoctrinated for .SI/TK by DIA. While any SIGINT pertinent to Mr. Nordlicht's request may contain unique informa- tion, it must be emphasized that SIGINT alone may be incomplete or misleading unless it is examined in the context of all-source intelligence information. In this instance, after the execution of a suitable MOU, we recommend the requested information be furnished by ‘the DCI combining the SIGINT with other materials ‘available to him. You may recall that earlier this year the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Economic, Policy requested and was "provided information on Arab foreign:investments and the lifting and ‘sale”“of Saudi and.Iranian.oil...This is the information which was provided specifically to: Mr. Jerome Levinson, then counsel of the Subcommittee, and which subsequently formed the basis for a 20 June 1977 letter from Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Subcommittee, to the Secretary of State citing mo, a substantial discrepancy between CIA and NSA estimates of Saudi crude oil - exports in the first quarter of 1977." This charge was repeated
‘Doc,ID: 6598324 eee Serial: N0015 by Mr. Levinson in an article by Seymour M. Hersh appearing .in the New York Times of December 25, 1977. Mr. Nordlicht stated his present request is not related to the previous inguiry. , o> I a Smears ingle committees mentioned above has severely hampered NSA'S ability to be responsive to the Congress. We urgently recommend ‘that an agreed procedure be developed between the Executive and Legislative Branches which would set forth the terms and condi- tions on which sensitive cryptologic or other intelligence information would be provided to the non-oversight committees. In the absence of such an agreement with both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Select Committee on Assassina- tions, we cannot respond to these queries. We also recommend that your office so advise Congressman Stokes and Mr. Nordlicht ‘and also determine a proper response to Senator McGovern consistent with the President' ‘Ss instructions. B. R.\ INMAN Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy Director, NSA/Chief, CSS Incl: a/s | Copy Purhished: ' Col. Stephen Harrick OASD (LA) = 3
Boesb: 4508324 3 : a ~~ —— 7 @ qateenees Me of foreign nationals here in the U.S.; on behalf of the intelligence agencie “phone that NSA brief him on information NSA may have ‘SUMMARY OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS | - OF SENATE” FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE . ..- DISCUSSIONS WITH NSA ST May ~ NOV 1977 On 6 May 1977, Senator George McGovern, Chairman/of committee on International Operations, Senate Forei the Sub- Relations . Committee, sent a letter to NSA informing the Agengy of the Sub- committee's -pending., investigation into matters r the activities of ‘intelligence agencies of forej4n nations in the U.S. and foreign-sponsored surveillance, harassment or intimi- influence official U.S. Government policy. We understand that a similar letter was sent to the Secretary on 15 June. Sines that time, Mr. Michael Glennon,/ Legal Counsel for Senate Foreign Relations Committee : visited NSA on 15 June to explain in more detail the scope of the g of item (1) above: (a) whether intelligence agencies of foreign nations are engaging in harassment, intimidation and surveillance (b) against whom these activities are directed; (c) who is pdrforming these activities ; (dad) how often it occurs and what form it takes; (e) where th¢se activities are. conducted; and (f£f) to what extent U.S. intellig nce and law enforcement: agencies may be "cooperating" with gr “acquiesing” in. this activity. This information will, according to/Mr. Glennon, help the Committee evaluate the extent to which intelligence agencies of foreign nations can conclude that their activities are condoned. He Stated that it was his intention tp talk also with the ED eer DIA, and CIA, and we understand he has /done so. NSA made ho substantive cont; iembion during this: visit since ' Mr. Glennon did not hold an SI clearance. ‘on 14 September 1977, Mr. ennon naquested by secure tele- 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D)} (iii) Clessitied by DINNSA/ Exersp! from Gods, “ ppeeo s i ES fectagsify Upon Neupests: wren Army ne nescy FF ‘4 er eae — ey TAD wavs os
"Doc, ID: 6598324 - Mr. Glennon did not ask for information on efforts by gored git interests to influence U.S. Governmant policy at this time and no search was made for SIGINT on this. aspect of the Subcommittee's> 7 ADVES Tana. . : The Hineetor, “Nsa,  vewtewad these reports on 17 November and said they were not to be shown to or discussed with Mr. Glennon until the memorandum of understanding betwéen the Executive branch and Senator McGovern on behalf of the Subcommittee on International . Operations is executed. Mr. Glennon was so advised in late November and again: in early December. © A Although the Senate Select Committee on Tnteliigence has been conducting a similar ce January 1977, they have — -. focused primarily on None of the product records pertaining to Mr. Glennon’ s EquUESE* have been Jae anbEe the SSCI.. * [q0SC2 1076) OVD) (iii)
Doc 1D:'6598324° ae oo @ Serial: NOO15. cc: DIR | oy _ D/DIR G DDO - - EX REG Exec DDO ~  G227 ADLA NCRDEF M/R: a. On 17 May 1977, the Director proposed in a memorandum to the DCI that the DCI assume responsibility for acting as the focal point for requests for intelligence information from any Committee of the Congress which does not have direct oversight _responsibilities. This proposal included the recommendation that the channel of communications for such requests should be through a designated individual on the IC Staff and that responses to the Congress should flow back through the same person, providing the DCI, on behalf of the President, the oppor- tunity to review what intelligence information is made available to the Congress. The DCI has never responded to this memorandum. b. Instant memo recommends that an agreed procedure be developed between the Executive and Legislative Branches which would set forth the terms and conditions on which sensitive _ cryptologic or other intelligence information would. be provided to the non-oversight committees. It also recommends OSD GC assume action on R/S 5507 and provides background information on two Congressional requests (references a and c) for SIGINT information now pending in OSD. c. Deadline on R/S 5507 response to Ms. Siemer extended | to 4 January per Col. Steve Harrick, ATSD(LA), and Mr. Bob Andrews, OSD (GC). d. .Mr. Yeates, Exec DDO, and Mr. Brady, GC, concur. oa reviewed ha Mr. Michael Levin, D4, Vita Sqft he angen U2, ie 4 Jan 78, bj ;} J Fy a GI ‘