HW 532 178-10003-10335 178-10003-10320 178-10004-10217 178-10003-10297 44 . ep aE aren ar ~ - OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON ‘25, D.C. 31 October 1962 FOR THE RECORD By Brig. Gen. Lansdaie&StL Subject: Outline of Covert Operations My other memorandum on this same’ subject today describes the tasking by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and the handling of this highly sensitive information. The acquisition of the information is noted in this present memorandum. After Deputy Secretary Gilpatric gave me the requirement last night, I talked to Bruce:Gheever (who was acting for Bill Harvey while Harvey was out of town). I sketched in the purpose, which was to get a fix for Gilpatric as one of the U.S. negotiators with the Soviets on wnether or not all actions (sabotage, etc.) had come to a stop. I meniioned that this was-a sensitive point brought up by Adlai Stevenson when he talked with the U.S. negotiators in New York; he didn't want the U.S. embarrassed and Gilpatric wanted to be sure of this. @héever commented that he hoped my memorandum wasn't going to be shown to Stevenson, I reassured him that I was writing it as an"'eyes only" for Gilpatric, but it must be correct. I asked about covert operational assets both inside Cuba and outside, if they had stop orders on actions. {Bruce said that they all had such orders, but pointed out that some of the Cubans were quite emotional about stopping actions against Castro and he wasn't | certain that everyone would hold to the orders. J then asked about assets inside Cuba, did they only have the | two action teams there? How about any psychological operations? sBruce: said he believed there were only the two teams and would check further to be sure: He knew the teams were supposed to be collecting intelligence. As for psychological operations, all CLA assets had been turned over to USLA.for operational use. lasked about the balloon operation. He said that this was not in being yet. tw ees ee DoclId:32113008 Page 2? “ad GTWaaS AHL WOWT AdODOLOHd ~AaWdaTT Guo
This morning I talked to:Briicé again, checking the points in my memorandum. He said that there were only the two action teams, a small one (Central Cuba) and the big one (200-manin Western Cuba), but they definitely were on intelligence collection. I asked if all others were under control,’/no boats going out, etc. He said yes, but again pointed out that the Cubans were restive. I then asked if any incepvendent groups were in motion. He said CIA couldn't guarantee any groups not under CIA control, but that the word had gotten around to stop actions at this time and none were known to CiA currently, although maybe there was one not known to CLA. I commented again that any action would embarrass the negotiations, which was why 1 was asking. #Bi¥ii¢e said he understood. . I then checked with Don Wilson, USIA, who confirmed that all CLA psychological assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use and were being used as desired by the President. I checked with Boo Hurwitch, State, to see if he knew of any actions in preparation or on the way; he saidno, everything appeared to be ata halt. I checked with General Johnson to see if any U.S. military activity might have a Cuban action group. | He said no, there are firm orders holding such actions. I then wrote the "eyes only’ memorandum to show to Mr. Gilpatric, on "Outline of Covert Operations." HW 53244 DoclId:32113006 Page 3 “ad GIWaddS AHL WOUI AdODOLOHd AUWdGIT dAod