157-10008-10252 v9.4 NW 47129 Doold:32203760 Page 1 2/23/2011 JFK Assassinatio: System Date: Identification | orm Agency Inform tion AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: _ 157-10008-10252 | RECORD SERIES: REPORT W/COVER MEMORANT ‘UM AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Info mation ORIGINATOR: SSCIA FROM: MILLER, WILLIAM TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTE! TITLE: STAFF REPORT ON ASSASSINA fIONS: AUTHORITY AND CONTROL DATE: 07/09/1975 PAGES: 73 SUBJECTS : CIA AUTHORITY INDERFURTH, RICK LEGAL AUTHORITY MILLER, WILLIAM PRELIMINARY STAFF PAPER "ASSASSINATIONS:AUTHORIT"’ & CONTROL” SPECIAL GROUP DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified RESTRICTIONS : ' CURRENTSTATUS:  Redact DATEOF LASTREVIEW: 08/08/1994 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS: BOX 439-2°” 24
rn a ad ~1l4~ Castro's life. The following exchange w:th Richard Helms makes this point: Senator Hart of Michigan. You tell us that it is your impression that nothing done w: th respect to Castro by the Agency was done without aul hority. Do I understand that correctly’ Mr. Helms. It was done within the guidelines of ap- propriate authority. In other words, we felt that we were operating as we were suppi sed to operate, that these things if not specifical: y authorized at least were authorized in general terms. (Helms testimony, p. 61) Senator Baker. Was it in your view the general policy of the government of the United S ates as proposed to be implemented by the CIA to. kill Fidel Castro? Mr. Helms. I believe it was tle policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if killii.g him was one of the things that was to be done in this conection, that was within what was expected. Another witness, Samuel Halpern, re.ated to the Committee a dis- - cussion he had had with Richard Bissell, who was then Deputy Director Plans, concerning a meeting Bissell had .ttended in the Cabinet Room of the White House: Mr. Halpern. Mr. Bissell said he had recently-~and he didn't specify the date or the time--iie had recently been chewed out in the Cabinet Room of the White House by both the Presi- dent and the Attorney General ‘or, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His or.ers to both[__jand to me were to plan for an operation to accomplish that end. amet Mr. Schwarz. Was any content out into the term "get rid of," er was that the term that was sed, and only that term? Mr. Halpern. To the best of m° recollection, that was it. There was no limitation of any kind. Nothing was forbidden, and nothing was withheld. And the objective was to remove Castro and his regime. (Halpe-n testimony, p. 8) ‘It is clear that the U.S. Governmen. wanted to see the removal of the Castro regime from Cuba and that the CIA took steps, including Nw 47129 Docid: 32903766" “Page | 2 en ete ees TOP SECRET
ah oy @> -32- CEGHET Chairman Church. Deputy Direc or for Plans. ; Your record shows that Helms h.d knowledge of the ZRRIFLE operation, which, among other hings, was to develop an executive capabllity--whatever that means. Presumably that means a capability to con.uct an assassination if and when authorized by proper ..uthority? Mr. Breckinridge. That is my t.nderstanding. Chairman Church. Is that your understanding? Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir. Chairman Church. Do your reco: ds show that, or is that based upon what has been revea'ed through your interroga- tion? Mr. Breckinridge. First, let tie go back and clarify, then I will answer this questicn, if I may. Mr. Helms approved ZRRIFLE, wh: ch the record shows has the responsibility| essentially. My understanding, from my inte) views, is that ZRRIFLE had also the responsibility fo: executive action capability. That is a difficult phrase. The record does not show that lr. Helms knew when he approved the project that it hid this dual role. (Colby testimony, pp. 66-67, 66-70) William Harvey confirmed the fact that he had been given the responsibility of developing the ZRRIFLE project by Mr. Bissell. Mr. Schwarz. Now, did you have a conversation with Mr. Bissell at some point in which Mr.. Bissell asked you to investigate a capability for Exécutive Action? Mr. Harvey. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. In any event, sore time in early ‘61? Mr. Harvey. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. What did Mr. Bissell ask you to do? Mr. Harvey. He brought up the question of Executive Action. He said he was concerred about it-~about not only our capabilities, if any, to perform it, but the basic questions of protections, methods, techniques, decisions, judgment as to its aivisability in any given case, and this whole sort of panoply of--again, pardon Docld:32203760 Page
a. Sey recruited for a mission in the Congo, with assassination being originally “fo taee Se HW 47129 Lumumba The Select Committee has not been alle to determine any direct link between the CIA and the death of Pa: rice Lumumba. It has, how- ever, heard testimony to the effect that an official within the CIA — directed a subordinate to investigate th. possibility of assassinating | Lumumba; that a lethal virus was transfe: red to the Congo (now Zaire) apparently for the purpose of killing Luiumba; that a foreigner was part of this mission; and that President Eisenhower may have ordered, at least indirectly, an attempt to be mace on the Life of Lumumba. Investigating the P: ssibility The CIA official directly involved :n investigating the possibility (Pepa of assassinating Lumumba was Richard Bis: ell, who was, at that time, Deputy Director Plans. The following ex: hange refers to a discussion Mr. Rissell had with Juesin 0’ Donnell, tlen Deputy Chiefof Staff. in the DDP. —_ | | a ‘ Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him :n words or substance to —_— kill Mr. Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. I asked him to i: vestigate the possibility and to make explanation for so doing. . Mr. Schwarz. When did you do that? Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may have it on a chronology here, tut I image that is a matter of record, or that he his testified to that date. I don't remember the date. Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell him this connection with making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb? ~ Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did. | ute ‘aimee “Pocld: 32203760 Page 4
~38~ Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell you lie wouldn't do it? Mr. Bissell. Later he told me that he didn't want to do it. But he also said th:.c he thought it was an inappropriate action, and tl.at the desired ebject could be accomplished better il. other ways. aa Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized yc u to tell Mr. O'Donnell to take steps to move toward a: sassinating Mr. Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. Nobody. Mr. Schwarz. Did you inform tle White House of that? — Mr. Bissell. No. Mr. Schwarz. To the best of yur knowledge, did any- body inform the White House of that? Mr. Bissell. To the best of m knowledge, no. Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr. Lumumba? . pm, Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. I told a member of the clandestine se: vice to make plans and develop the capability to do si. if it were approved” and & ordered. Senator Goldwater. Approved b:- whom? Mr. Bissell. It would have thin had to have approval at the highest level of governiient. The Chairman. Where did the ic ea come from? Mr. Bissell. I don't remember Mr. Chairman. It could possibly have been mine. The Chairman. It could possib: y have been yours? Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rosiow that was your initiative? Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruction as to O'Donnell was my initiative. Senator Baker. How many other: did you plan on, just as a contingency? How many other people did you :astruct to draw up plans te to assassinate? ee “Mr. Bissell. I don't believe i here were any others which went to the point of instructi:.g that a man be prepared. (Bissell testimony, June 11, py .54-55) Meme meat ot eee ne © a Sot Aa et . HW 47129 Bocld: 32203766 Page 5S ans
~39— fr In his testimony before the Select Committee, Mr. O'Donnell & confirmed Mr. Bissell's account. Mr. cou Donnell. - And so he calli:d me in and he told me he wanted me to go down to he Belgian Congo, the former Belgian Congo, and to e iminate Lumumba. I women would also like to add the cau ion that any remarks I may make about Mr. Bissell o anybody else that it is all indirect discourse. When I say, Mr. Bissell said go to the Congo, please dv not include quotation marks, go to the Congo. It's :11 Mr. Bissell said, that he wanted me to go to the Congo. Mr. Wides. What did you understand him to mean by eliminate? Mr. O'Donnell. To kill him am. thereby eliminate his influence. Mr. Wides. What did you say to him? Mr. O'Donnell. I told him tha: I would absolutely not have any part of killing Limumba. He said, I a want you to go over and talk t» Sidney Gottlieb-- — And I went over~-he was Dr. -Bo:tlieb at the time and since--and he told me, I told iim I had been sent isi by Mr. Bissell, and he told me that there were four or five-~and I use the word foir or five advisedly, I'm not just saying three or fuur, as I recall one of the methods was a virus and the others included poison. - Le And I just felt at the time thit with Gottlieb, don't _—_— argue with him. Mr. Wides. He told you there vere four or five what? What did he say to you? Mr. O'Donnell. Let me say letial means of disposing of Lumumba. I then left his o fice and I went back to Mr. Bissell's office and I :old him in no way would I have any part in the a:sassination of Lumumba. Mr. Wides. Before you go on any further, did you or he mention whether there was any higher authority than Mr. Bissell for this operation either Mr. Dulles or outside of the CIA at the Pres dential level? Mr. O'Donnell. No, sir, in no way. I felt--again, ae this has to be tenuous--but I certainly would not Ns — have done it if I thought Mr. ulles was opposed to — ee it. * es we ws , Fas a eo HW 47129 ‘woutd: Seapatee ‘Page e -
@ > a Shortly after his conversation with Mr. Bissell, Mr. O'Donnell ee went to the Congo. Upon his arrival, he discovered that a virus had, in fact, arrived in the Congo and was in the possession of the CIA Station Chief. vo a eS ig HW 47129 DoclId:3 Sea BR be att re eat Ne 9203760 Page 7 Ho. TOP SECRET Mr. Wides. You assumed~—- Mr. O'Donnell. I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles in such an importan: issue, but it was not discussed, nor did he purport :o have higher authority to do it. Mr. Wides. Did you then, afte: speaking to Mr. Bissell, speak to anyone else that even.ng about this request and your reactions? Mr.<O'Donnell. Yes, sir. An! I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed to me, and I told him that I would under no conditions do it, and Helms sa .d you're absolutely right. Now, again, indirect discourse He told me that I was absolutely right. And I felt ‘hat then I had a senior man who was on record as far a: my position was concerned. (O'Donnell testimony, June 9 p>». 11-16) The Lethal Vi-us Mr. Wides. Shortly after that did you, in fact, go to the Congo? . Mr. O'Donnell. I went, I woul guess, within 48 hours. Mr. Wides. You were there for about three months, the last quarter of 1960, approxim: tely? Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, that is « rrect. Mr. Wides. The Station Chief .as who at that time? Mr. O'Donnell. Mr. Larry Devl: a, a very fine, dedicated person. Mr. Devlin indicated’ to me that there was a virus in the safe. Mr. Wides. Did he indicate it was a lethal virus? Mr. O'Donnel?’. He did not, but I knew it wasn't for somebody to get' his polio shot up to date. (O'Donnell: testimony, June 9, ;. 16) nea
-4l- —_ The Select Committee has been unabl.: to determine how the virus ae found its way to the Congo and for what .se it was intended. The Committee has reason to believe the viru: was ultimately returned to Agency headquarters in Washington. A Clue to Presidential Involvement The discussion between Mr. Bissell .nd Mr. O'Donnell, as well as the arrival of the lethal virus in the Congo, occurred during the fall of 1960. The Select Committee has heard the testimony of one witness who remembered a National Security Counc 1 meeting in the summer of 1960 in which President Eisenhower made -‘eference to his desire to see Lumumba eliminated. This witness, Rober: Johnson, made it clear to the ute Committee that what he had heard at this meeting should be considered "a clue, rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement." Mr. Johnson. What I am going .o tell you should be understood clearly for what it is--a clue, rather than precise evidence of Presicential involvement in decision making with respec: to assassinations. ; I would be extremely concerned if I felt that this information were to be the bas s in itself for ~ , ‘ conclusions by this committee or af it were other- wise to be made public. As a member of the NSC staff during the Eisenhower Administration, I sometimes at ended meetings of the National Security Council .o take notes on the discussion. See I attended one such NSC meetin:;: in the summer of 1960. TI shoffid note parenthet cally that I have refreshed my-memory as to the prebable time of the meetipg by checking the hi:.torical record of international developments. A that meeting, there was a discussion of developmen s of what was then the Congo, now Zaire. At some time during that discu:.sion President Eisen- hower said something--I can no longer remember his — words~-that came across to me .s an order for the Ea assassination of Lumumba who wis then at the center gies Wee ty, seme ate Foam’ gy the . rot bluse Tervlt nr. ir ced "Le ets i: mi 47129’ “Docta:3903760 Page's EN ER pe
42 EAR -~42=- A pe - MEOHET of political conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on. I remember my sense of that monent quite clearly because the President's statement came as a great shock to me. I cannot, however, reconstruct the moment more specifically. (Rotert Johnson testimony, June 18, pp. 5-6) By Concluding Remzrk In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Colby had this to say about U.S. involvement in the death of Patrice Lumumba: Mr. Colby. There are a series of other charges, Mr. Chairman, about assassination that have been made about CIA in the past, of Mr. Lumumba. There is no question about it that at one point there was a low level discussion that maybe that would be something that should be dore. There is an in- dication that a foreigner was recruited to go down mr there, but our records very clearly indicate that his function turned entirely irto other activities an | and things of : that nature, and there is no irdication of any ae a attempt by us to engage in an <essassination of Mr. Lumumba. He was actually zssassinated by some Congolese forces. Clear, that we have absolutely nothing to do with, so the Lummba case I think we can absolutely say we had nothing to do with the Lumumba case. (Colby testimony, May 15, p. 65) @!. HW 47129 Docl@i32203760 Page 9°
TOP SECRET -58~ f : October 6, 1961: McCone Cable tegarding Assassination & Mr. Kirbow. The record before the Committee indicates that reported that he hal recommended to Ambas- sador Lodge that "We do not se: ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle which couli rip the army and the country asunder." Mr. McCone directed by cable t> Saigon of 6 October-- "McCone directs that you withd-aw recommendation to Ambassador concerning assassinition plan under McCone instructions as we cannot be 11 position actively con- doning such course of action aid thereby engaging our responsibility therefor." Senator Schweiker. Would you :xplain what that means? Mr. Colby. What that means?  t means we don't want to have anything to do with an assassination plan. Senator Huddleston. You are eliminating that as an alternative? . a f Mr. Colby. That is part of ou: concept of what to deo. son. Ga Senator Schweiker. Didn't tha: contradict what you were saying a few minutes ago? Didn't you say we were in essence-- Mr. Colby. We were looking to the overthrow of the wie government. a s é ional Senator Schweiker. I see what you are saying. Mr. Colby. But not the assass nation in this case of the brothers Nhu and Kahn. Senator Schweiker. The other vent forward? “See Mr. Colby. The other program -c:ontinued, yes. (Colby testimony, June 20, pp. 12-14) U.S. Involvem-nt President Diem was assassinate. November 2, 1961. The CIA . was not involved in the actual murder. lirector McCone's directive ‘\ noel against participation in any assassinaticn attempts or plots, sent to _ NW 47129 DovId:32203760 “Page 10°
~4h- if ere 1 art VECREY Mr. Colby. This is a memorandi:m written after a debriefing of our Ambassador tl.ere. And the de- briefing apparently covered th: conversation, which indicated that the dissidents cid need guns and ammunition from the U.S., and varticularly they needed a small number of high-owered rifles with telescopic lenses. @ > The Ambassador said he saw no ;roblem in the pur- chase and delivery clandestine: y of the arms for the dissidents, but he said, o. course, this raises the question of whether the U.:. Government wants to engage in this activity. And our officer said that this is, of course, a policy decision, the CIA could deliver the arms, if this is the group we want tc support. Mr. Schwarz. In June of 1960 .id the government State that policy decision, am. state that the government of the U.S. was prevared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujil..o regime to the following extent: al “To provide a small number of iniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?" . Mr. Colby. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. And who made tha. decision on behalf of the U.S. Government? ‘ . Mr. Colby. Well, we have a meiorandum that in- dicates that that was told to -he Chief of our Western Hemisphere Division by |’ Mr. Schwarz. Who was then | ee Mr. COL Shams | Mr. Schwarz In July of 1960 lid General Cabell, the Acting BCI, accept the recommendation made by the CIA staff and concurred in by Mr. Richard Helms, that 12 %S. rifles, model 1903, with telescopic sights, be sent to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic? Mr. Colby. Yes. The proposal was to procure 4 and deliver them by air, paraciuting them into the country. ®\ Soe calle Ne Sb es ee Ta 2203760 Page TE 8 0 Ce TO ATT I iN ee He stp pea ' nr cd at : “ee eae tees NW 47129: DecId:3
= -~45~ If they could not be delivered by air, they were planning for a way in which thse weapons could be delivered by sea. And ther: was a considerable discussion of ways to get it iu. Mr. Breckinridge. There was no delivery. Mr. Colby. And there was neve’ a delivery of those particular weapons. Mr. Schwarz. Going back to th: reference to the Assistant Secretary of,dtete wl.o authorized the delivery of the rifles on beha £ of the U.S. Govern- ment, who authorized his makin, that statement? Mr. Colby. I don't think we ki. The Chairman. Under your proc: an order from the-Assistant Se send rifles into a Latin Ameri other foreign country, for the discussed that the record disc ficient authority on which the action? a Mr. Colby. No, I don't beliew. it is not under our present ru: that time it is really quite wi that that approval could have | Ag®tsrent Sdcretary’ acting alo acting under a general delegat: approve details of a larger idk cussed even orally at the senic Now, I don't think we have any cussions. Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any « OW > dure, if you receive retary of State to an country, or any purpose that we have oses, is that a suf- a CIA would then take it is. Certainly | RE es. And I think at Likely, in my opinion, een given by the e unless he was on of authority to : a that had been dis- aot ry levels. record of those dis- oubt that the policy question referred to and the q estion "Whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity" refers t@™te use of such weapcns for the purpose of killing people, assassinatiig people? Mr. Colby. “Killing people, ye:. Assassinating is another werd, unfortunately. The Chairman. Killing is the letter word. eee te . e : ~ . rar a NW 47129 — Doctd: 32203760 Page 12 —
> e> nw‘ 47129° “Decla: 32203760 Bage’13 ~° *  P “as. FUP SECR” Mr. Colby. Yes. But assassin..tion has a slightly different meaning. But I thin!. that in particular quotation of page 22 there is ery clearly reflection of the thought process that I vas explaining, that the CIA could do it if it had . policy approval to do it. And we don't know wher: that policy approval actually came, except from the Assistant Secretary. (Colby testimony, June 4, pp. -7~40) January, 1961: Special :roup Decision Mr. Schwarz. In 1961, January 12, 1961, did the Special Group approve a recomm:ndation made apparently by the Department of State tha: limited supplies of the small arms and other materials to be made avail- able for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic? Mr. Colby. Our records do indicate a memorandum that the Special Group did explain, did approve that on January 12th-~- Mr. Schwarz. January 12, 1961, and January 24, 1961 confirmed? Mr. Colby. The 24th, really, [ think it was discussed on the 12th and-- - Mr. Schwarz. They approved it on the 12th and con- firmed it on the 24th? Mr. Colby. Right. The Chairman. The Special Groip being-- Mr. Colby. The predecessor of the Forty Committee. I can't tell you exactly who wis a member at that time. Mr. Schwarz. Now, recognizing the difficulty you have been having with respect to whit is an assassination as opposed to what is help to dissidents, are you capable from the reeords here of testifying whether the Special Group--testifying which branch of that Special Group thought they were approving? Or is that something that you cannot_tell from these records? Mr. Colby. This record merely says, limited amounts of small arms, a limited supply o: small arms and related equipment. I do not know whet .er| | for instance, attended the Special Group meeting. It was the pattern at that time for tie action officer of the CIA, the Division Chief of the area, and frequently the Assistant Secretary of that ar:a, to attend that kind of a Forty Committee meeting wien a subject in their area was being discussed.
Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to sa: from the written record as presented in the 196° Report that one cannot tell, up to this point, whether the Special Group approved merely the send ng of arms to dissidents in a sort of genera. fashion, or ap- proved the sending of arms to J‘issidents in a target fashion for use in an a;sassination? Mr. Colby. No, you cannot tel., except by the knowledge of possibly the Assi itant Seeretary - of State. (Colby testimony, Jine 4, pp. 41-43) March, 1961: The Purpose of the Weapons Mr. Schwarz. It is perfectly -lear, is it not, from the written record that a: least by March 17, 1961 that any weapons that wer.: delivered were de- signed for the purpose of assaisination? Mr. Colby. That any weapons wiich would be delivered would probably be usi:d by the dissident group in an attack on Trujillo Mr. Schwarz. And that means the assassination of Trujillo does it not? Mr. Coliby. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. It is clear, is .t not, looking at the cable of March 17, that th..tc weapon is for the purpose of an assassination, aid the CIA headquarters was so informed? Mr. Colby. Yes. The whole discussion of the va: ious kinds of weapons was aimed at providing the dissident group with the weapons that they cou'd use against Trujillo and those around him. (Colby iestimony, June 4, p. 67) ° SSE March, 1961: Weapon: Provided Mr. SchwaszZ. Following the in: tial turndown of delivery by the pouch, did the Agency in fact ship the revolvers sometime after Merch 25th and were authorized by Mr. Bissell to dc so? Mr. Colby. I don't think we slipped the revolvers. What we shipped, were carbines. ee te ge OTD Seog Coen 14 NW 47129" Docid: 32203760 "Page