424-10185-10098 f . 3 — ‘ Be we Amit, wy ° , . 4 ‘ - — . @ . “ ser eee BY rl er OF BUREAU GRIEVANCES “Ge ——aae é 1. ATTACKS AGAINST BUREAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE ~ 1951) ; Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly signi- | ficant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI. a In October, 1951, General Walter Beddfl Smith, then c Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other BR Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the re existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any A covert hostility ezeinst the Bureau and maintained that there me « was a general feeling of respect for us. -He admitted that aig. there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA Bos must accept its share of responsibility. Sak It is my recollection that the Director and other 8B Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time Bad guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations Bae between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum | Bek of record covering this meeting. (62-80750-1712, 1715, 1716, char 1726, 1728, 1748, 1750) 2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's We encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau~employed personnel, We vigorously pro- tested,and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the back- ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos~ sible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file ‘ of some former Bureau Agent. . cr Te EF =. \ - a se eeeg OE semanas o wernt ® . r Pecyecte. Uk AH i LOR - : Pees raust st en AS 5 BN . “4 a ’ .
JF rm) a») . committee, We were, therefore, unable to interview the subject ‘We considered this most uncooperative and xe protested. (Re; [Sylvia press)\/¢) JFE CCB) 6 4 3. fraxorar mommay) (6) JFEO®) By letter dated May 19, 1954, we protested to CIA for the manner in which the Agency handled the case of the captioned individual, a Soviet defector wha had been placed under CIA control in Europe. . The Bureau had been interested in interviewing [Khokhlov S soon as he came to the United States, and this had been agreéd to by CIA, Withouzg notifying or consulting with us, CIA permitted [thokhlo 6 arrive in the  JFecncs) United States and be placed in the hands of a Congressional in any detail. (Re: [Nikolai Khokh lov48) - JP CIS) 4, CIA EVALUATION OF MOCASE In February, 1954, we complained to CIA because the Agency had evaluated information coming from the key source in the captioned case as emanating from a fabricator. We had disseminated certain foreign intelligence information originate ing in this case to CIA, The source was a key double agent in one of the most impurtazt cases hendled By the Rurean, and the CIA evaluation was not proper or correct as far as we were concerned, (Re: MOCASE) - 5, CASE oF (SYLVIA PREgs] UFE COMO) JEKOjte) $) (s) Sylvia Press} was a CIA employee vhom that Agency con- Sidered to be a communist penetration. The Agency requested an investigation which was then initiated by us. We subsequently learned that CIA had been conducting its ows investigation which even included technical surveillance coverage on the subject. « DR. OTTO JOHN, VISIT TO BUREAU - 1954 Dr. Otto John, a West German security official, defected to the communists in East Germany in July, 1954. A few weeks before his defection, he came to the United States under CIA sponsorship. He was afforded a tour of the Bureau and he briefly met the Director. | ‘It is believed that if all availzble facts were col- lected, the evidence would strongly indicate that CIA did a very ineffective job of assessing Dr. Otto John and permitting the United States Government to be embarrassed by even promoting avisit for him to this country. We could consider this instance an affront to the Director and the Bureau. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont October 13, 1954, "CIA Tours Afforded by Bureau") i “a & £ 3 en 2 mp Sere cp i
7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN ay ORS - 1954 ‘By letter dated October. 13, 1954, a very strong letter of protest was sent to General T. J. Betts of the Interagency - Defector Committee at CIA. This letter made reference to political asylum which. was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government, General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program, We emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation, 8, CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED SEATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955 On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Directer's attention. vas referred lo a mattey Which bad not yet devetonved into « serians situation but if not properly followed could lead to confiicts between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA wersonnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau, The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA") 9, CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955) In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA — a National Academy graduate to utilize his services [in| This approach was made while the graduate was attending Nationa Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate, [fRe: | I S Je CYCB) we GO gO” ok In December, 2 we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agemt operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with o) ebeee hoch had given him some advice and gwidance withou w) yee bt first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA, /(105~-19001) JPEG) © . Se nL ee 2 re a) os eee ene etee ae teed cea ee EEE eee ® . 4 oo . Ma ° . 7 > wt Pee a ° s.
\ "y 11, ALLEGED FABIAN SOCIALISTS IN CIA ° at SW) Jeu In 1950 (General trudeay} 1 ormer head of G-2,: made available to the Bureau on a strictly confidential basis detailed information concerning alleged infiltration of the Jry~ldsG) United States Government by "Fabian. Socialists." [{frudeay7fS, furnished the names of. many individuals whom he considered to fall into this category. Many of those listed were CIA executives, This item is being listed in the event we felt that _it could be used to justify that as of that period there was reason to deal with CIA in a very circumspect manner. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 11, 1956, "Infiltration of Fabian Socialists into the High Policy Areas of the United States Government") 12. DELAYS IN HANDLING NAME CHECK REQUESTS By letter dated January 11, 1956, our Washington Field Office called attention to extreme delays encountered. in obtaining results of name check requests submitted to CIA. These delays: particularly related to investigations of applicant ma tcers , being handled by the Bureau, (Memorandum Roach to Belmont January 19, | 1956 "Applicant Matters - Record Checks at CIA") 18. WILLIAM P. BUNDY . In March, 1956, Allen Dulles announced that Willian P, Bundy would serve as a secretary for the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), of which the Bureau was a member. Bundy, son- in-law of Dean.Acheson, admitted contributing to the Alger Hiss Defense Fund, At the time of this contribution, Bundy was in the same law firm with Donald Hiss, brother of Alger Hiss. | Although we did not object to the appointment of Bundy, this is another item to be kept in mind in the event we desired to uphold an argument that there was reason to be circumspect ~ {mn dealings with CIA. JE" OCB) ' 14.) DR TSA VEL ABRAHAM coupsurt (5) ~ (S yeete\ — “Ae Goudsms vas a sete. scientist assigned to the@# HBpookhavelt ational Laboratory e{ He had been used as a consultant by such agencies the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and CIA, jin octover, eos met a Soviet scientist and, with the know~ edge of AEC and CIA began cultivating him. oD seme sg eh a 8 . : fos ve “as nig et a Paes gee a acer 7 wo rtye rove mii Me att vt Ue 0 Oe) (S) . . cee 27 2 H
“Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA _ . 4 " & - 6 } SERED oe, us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidance to him, We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in error in making the above-~ described misrepresentation. e otested the CIA official's handling of this matter. (ne ;Xbr (Samuel Abraham Gouasms toy te JFECHKB) 15. f its) Jee Ow | jee CryCe) . , s) On duly 20, 1956, we ) leeentay | Jf, had been in contact with (S Washifgton, D. C, We further astertaine = JEL ML CIA employee. We were informed by CIA o h n fact, had been“in c ct witht @ CIA official concerning his meetings with | fiuicary Attache, We protested and CIA submitted a létter of apology. (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 195 (me | (S) SFE GIB) ‘16, { | Ie JECW AY In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, a Soviet agent, was being per- mitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection, The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above, The State employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative, We were not in 2 position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity. (Re: Ils) Fe CYA) A a € SEEM) . . By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly pro- tested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had intere- viewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was @ well-established. agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any , alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956, 3 S) JeRON GAY * Ptuee Ro Stee eed ee , ao & Tey a? ey rere
bE KU LA) ————— ‘SECRET JFK) C-——q CE Twas a former student at Columbia University yun) Wi th Ww. we had”been in contact because of his association JO” with afSoviet. assigned to the ssi Nations.%)In December, 2eK UA) alt) 1956 17 ade a trip td]Russfafhere he Was contacted by Jel an unidentified individual @hd wa Seer letter indicating C that the writer was| i nd that he was eo) a) interested in cooperating with the Uniféd States. When{____ Cs) YreCea returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to. interview . the subject because of the Agency' intelligence inter= ‘ests. We subsequently interviewed ét which time he J&R CCA) informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinent information to A deni that any such statement was made, (Re: b) sPKCUA)S 19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA~ 1957 ; | The San Francisco Office furnished information - indicating that CIA nad rcoquested a firm in California to fure i nish that Agency information regarding alli foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction, We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction, The Director - did make a notation, "0.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a pretty wide authority to explore such a fiield, KE" (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957,[ "Flow of Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through So-Called Channels”) « 20. 1 _l{sjsrnoy a) On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repre- JFK LIMA) sentatives in the field nad interviewed the captioned{Chinesé7(s alien who had agreed cooperate with the Agency after he yon returned to [Rea China, (cra: conducted this interview withou x first obtaining cleardiice from the Bureau. Such clearance’ was necessary pursuant to an established agreenent. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency. (Re: J- 100~385852)['S) ye So LEK AYA) . Nt te td See SEG oe on c 20 Ft Sate °. be pF Tit mmmer iy oA nt Fa Taare aad
4 : 21, CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR ‘S) EPRESENTATIVES — 1957 — In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several officials who were coming to this country under CIA CIA was told that no_tours would be given to the because in the past a mbassador had grossly insulted the Bureau after we ¥rested the ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge £8) Cv) j If we so desired, we could give consideration to ‘accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we considered undesirable in light of the foregoing. (Memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach_to Belmont Representatives © of ntelligence Service] - Request for Bureau Tour by CIA") 0) Bo) 22, REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN | RELATIONS - NEW YORK CITY =- 1957 Sa Novexber 25, 1987, cur New. York Office was con- tacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be in~ formed if the Bureau could conduct 2 security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located across the street from a building occupied By the Soviet = United Nations Delegation,. The CIA represemtative indicated that his visit to our office was pursuant te instructions received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of ; conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council. It should be noted that the Council included as members many well-known personalities, including officials of the United States Government, 59 (0) Pursuant to instructions, Allen Belles was informed. on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had Seen taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Feadquarters. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council tt on Foreign Relations ) (3-(0)
tot, 23. indicating that | States might defect. | and we kept CIA advised. * “Horkiof protest seule Subject Pe ») eesary c earance from the Bureau, ! | 25, ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE for the B ) > ientists. gO” properly coordinating t @ Bureau operation. (Seen ~ JFEZOICAY () yeeUYAS In October, 19 (Re: a4. fT S) SPE CLAY y letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a 57, we received information from Shientist. then visiting in the_United We followed developments through ‘The Agency was fully aware o \Ysituation and particularly knew that we were in contact with We subsequently received information indicating th a CIA employee, established contact with pepese of developing information concerning e A protest was made to CIA for not heir interests with us, bearing in mind that the action taken by Gdesibly could have jeopardized, L510) y seccirr) Ss) ~ 105-63094) | S Jfe OLA D to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the a.Romanianjalien, without, first obtaining the ne c- oa 105~62486) |G) JFECINCA) On April 23, 1958, we received information indicating that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being vet . with the FBI when she tried to arrange an i 5 Miss in whi he, ‘such representation, 1958, "Unknown Subject; CIA, we were informed that Miss (Memorandum Roac 26. (TY see) an official of th Internatio y Wachinists in Washington, D. C/f% ave “® signed statenenQ = laimed that he had received a phone call from a Upon checking wit o said she was with the F h enied that she had made nterview with nal Association of to Belmont April 25, HD, SVyeKn Ove) first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement. (Re: OT ‘ “ ee eS ee | : Samal Teo od ~ 105-68013) Ye JFE OYA ay aa Lik ‘ Hate vs oe By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested to CIA for interviewing-an alien in the Detroit area without FE GA) JP
—— = & QS, ry rer JE¥Q)CR) 27, IVs) yee aya) We received information in May, 1958, that( Ci) a CIA employee, was listed as being employed with the’ Bureau in the records of the District of Columbia fational Guard. The information was developed as the result of an investiga=- tion being conducted by the Bureau for the UThite House. (5) furnished a signed statement indicating that he per- eS Jey ) sonally had no knowledge of the existence of the above infor-~ i) ' mation in the National Guard records, (Memorandum Roach to Belmont May 17, 1958, “Alleged Representation by CIA Employee of Employment with FBI") 28, CORNEL MUNTIU By letter dated June 10, 1958, we protested to CIA for not advising us concerning that Agency’ s interview of an individual who was the subject of a Bureau investigation. We had been corresponding with CIA concerning the subject, and the Agency should have been aware of our interests. (Re: Cornel Muntiu - 105~58749) 29, ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE AND ALLEGED PENETRATION OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES ney 7) By letter dated June 3, 1958, Legst, [Tokyo; i er information volunteered to him by (Colonel dames Rile fo) (SYR Riley]/was very strong in his denunciation of CIA. H ondvontde hat“the Agency was incompetent and that it was penetrating other United States agencies, He also mentioned that when Allen Dulles was in Switzerland, Dulles was intimate with a woman, not identified. " The above is being cited in the event we desire to use this information as evidence for supporting a position of being circumspect in dealings with the CJA. (Letter dated June 3, 1958, from Legat, (Toko "Relations with(S~ CIA") . © ee ee mene ert mr Yes, mee et LE 8
30, (GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN les The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated June 10, 1958, that he had been invited to visit /General Reinhard Gehlen, athe head of the[West German Intelligence Service J@CIA becamé aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative ‘informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the Legat visit with (Gehlen, ur Legat was instructed by the Bureau _ to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position. (s We ‘could evaluate the CIA positien in this matter as being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17, 1958, "Relations with CIA") . 31. CIA INTEREST IN (CHINESE/ALIENS (57° In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning CIA's failure to adhere,,$0 an agreement relating to CIA's recruitment of [Ch [Chinese] iens in the United States for over seas intelligence Oe Ones Under the egrcament, CIA was not to approach any (Chinesé\aifien without first checking wither us, A situation developed in Illinois indicating that CIA allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without first checking with us. We expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958. (Memorandu eeneny to Boardman June 9, 19538, "Recruitment of (Chinesef! iens in the United States for Overseas ‘Sa Intelligence Operations’) 32. CIA OFFICIAL's CRITICISM OF “MASTERS OF DECEIT” Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of_a memo- randum sent to an official in our_Embassy in Tokyo by S) In his communication belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist ‘weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the ‘book pertained only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a small, ineffective, f action-ridden organization. He stated that the author of the book. was not an intellectual but rather @ policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958, "Masters of Deceit.') va
JF¥ is 33, KCIA DEVELOPMENT OF po 7 GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN u) , HE UNITED STATES . In May, 1958, CIA furnished identifying and back- round data conc pain three individuals - | Jee AAS “4nd Ysyall employees of the Government and assigned to the United. States. es had been developed as a source of information by CIA OY) gv 3) in s)Derachman came _to CIA in Washington, D. C. JFE yor and volunteered his services.& had been developed as JFEOYA) a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to ’ the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1958, we told CIA peeled that in the case of “we felt that the Agency should have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could . have considered. exploitation for internal security purposes at the outset, (Re: | Activities ~ i90~2547499/5) JP Cnlyes) 34, Se) JeKi Ce) - -_ ‘ > Jp) (a) The subject, a former member of the Polish inteiligence Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely valuable information. The beginnings of this case include information raising questions concerning CIA .cooperation, sexo) In June, 1958, we developed_information, indicating that CIA May have opened a letter in ' hich had been addressed to the Director by an individual who had FeO ) identified himself as [ [} the wri further ext) indicated that he might be connected with the ntelligence ? Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of the | G)we subsequently. received a copy of the particular communication from CIA, and the contents were such at that time that no action was required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars leading to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the letter, We were confidential informed by an Agency repre- sentative that hel ad opened the letter and then referred the matter to CIA, The contents were such that inves= tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA in Europe. What actually happened at the United States Emba ss is something we may never know. | o 65~65192(S) fo to _ Jee OCA) kv tet eres H Be mE gt le Teeter Oe toe tere i ae 1 rn oe, - pee : . . 2 : mw
JRE Oreo (Sete: . By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concern regarding CIA's alleged interview of a] Chinesé|alien whom CIAG) » was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an approach of the alien had been made. Our investigation contra- dicted the statements emanating from CIA. (Rel HN S) Npureau file J134-5243)](S) IEE : 36. [COMPROMISE OF FBI TECHRICAL SURVEILLANCE coveracs ((s) ;On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for _? permission to [play a recording of a telephone conv rsation) (s) obtained by thé Bureau to (tne , (@kecording) had been developed through our (Sensitive coverage of the Egyptian Embass n Washington, D. C. On June 5, 1958, we had obtained the contents of a {Conversation el aT a — s) The conversation strongly indicated that Yas working _ closely with the \E yptians.¥§)Subse ently, CIA developed , ~ information indicating that] as a key figure ina ~ i plot yyrne objective of which was to overthrow oF | 3 returned to[ and was imprisoned by bbase@ upon information made available through CIA. & ‘denied any implication in any revolutionary activity and he was strongly supported by certain top officials in the (sr Government .& told CIA ppat he was on the Spot and that he needed proof ‘of onspiratorial activity. CIA asked if we would permit the /recording to be played to E petressing that this was the only way | | could be Convinced. ») (s) : | On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that the Bureau positively would not grant permission to [playing of the recording VSWe maintained that if we granted _such permission, our~other feoverage of a sensitive nature] gould be seriously imperiled. v) ~—“¢(s) . On July 21, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation in the filiddle East ®Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then’ told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been placed, we acceded to Dulles' request. CIA was further told that we were seriously conser ans the (termination of all of our technical surveillances cause we did not intend to be placed in such a position In the future. [5% (y mo gee ee, - On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent that he was very much disturbed over. the Director's reaction, He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol +0 €3)(v) mae hie ; ~ 12.
\ wo ating whether or not the frecordin Ghould be used. It was recommended that the Liaison Agent foll the matter for the purpose of determining if the frecordingt as to be used by CIA, The Director's notation was, "No. The fat is in the fire now and it is useless to waste any more time on it. We will probably hear of any details in Pearson's column. #." 55.0) ‘anybody's head and he further cingehos that he was deliber- The strong position we took in resisting the dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign government was fully justified, (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission to{Play Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan" asees att, el ee) oe (v er a *e nn! SFEOYE) We expressed our displeasure to CIA in [September odes) Case because of that Agency's unauthorized investigation in n the ited States of afRomanianjcitigen mas in here. in connec- Zu tion with an exchange progran.. The{Romania indicated to an American friend that he was interested in staying in the Unite States, but was not meady | for actual defection because of a ° i ; ~ oe - a ~ fee ODA) . . _. . ret Na tee ae ap gt wae s . | : iste # ip “ ; a? 44 . i
possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to estab- lished procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. t was later established that CIA was the other agency. (Re _| Bureau file _Eesrsa2} ©) areca 5 4? AF ROMS 39, CIA ACTIVITIES/IN ow) The Legal Attache, Tokyo, reported by letter dated un Se tember 22; 1958 fthat Gs JFeb | | was a paid, Righly regarded, and yery sensitive source of CIA This information was ven to the Legal Attache by (SXeoionet John B. Stanley G2 Hedyin Japan. According to (Stanley]S - CIA did not want this ifformation to be known to other agencies} particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing. H." (Letter from legat, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1958, "Investigations in Philippines") ; . a SFO) @B) During the period October ee 1958, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which ¢ was given by the U.S. Air Force. ;ejAmong the activities was a 40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE Yen) lecture given by of CIAS* Subsequent to the JF briefing, General [Millard Youngpf. the Air Force confided to Bureau representatives and oreo sed his displeasure with the briefing given by He was particularly critical of $) fs reluctance o furnish certain information, using the @o- excuse tft the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General _ (GJ keund|stated that the position taken a only ang@< excuse for incompetence on the part of ° ¢s This item is being cited in the event we desire to use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were ebliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum October 28, 1958, Roach to Belmont, CiJoint Strategic Pianning)(S) tee") Orlando Air Force Base ’ Orlando, Florida, October (20-25) Gs) 1958” i i 41, CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA PRIOR TO OVERTEROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT The overthrow of the Batista Government on January l, 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised oo questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intel- oo +s Jipgence,. Alien Dulles indicated that future developments would tle
SEG i ‘ ‘ i show that many more people were involved in the Castro organi- gation than the U.S. Government had realized. Information coming to.our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly. The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency ot [ata in Cuba.] This coula gs) (>) be useful if we wanted to justify thé existence of a Legal © Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor ‘coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States. ‘ By letter dated April 25, 1959, we voiced our @ objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for the purpose of developing him as a double agent.;\fhe individual involved was Jo a ‘well~known ,expert in the field of D) =o medicallresearch as applied to pace flying. wis also a contract agent of Yinipr d.occasion to handle sensitive matters for that Agency.”] InfMpril, fi9s9, was preparing Ss) to make a trip to Moscow, C priefed him on matters as they applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance tof _____]concerning( 5) us. is contacts with the subject without first_consulting with e Bureau file ae 43. ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ABLEN DULLES In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the -National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One of the professors handling the Seminar was critical of Dulles. He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the communist problem. The above is' being cited in the event we desire to ‘utilize the information in justifying a position that it was necessary to be circumspect with CIA, (Memorandum W. C, Sullivan - to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National War College, July, 1959") 1 + rf 44, tpRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE — SEPTEMBER, 1959 , In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an article captioned "Allien Dulles: America's Global Sherlock," which included information of a derogatory nature concerning .‘the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis ra 115 A TERR OEE, Lar etmenR emp ee open y Ep cme ty te rms
1s c% ais Jeet) See which led to an almos\. - _ . the Bureau and CIA, The article was writte _-wul McCarry who was connected pane with the International. _- vrganization in Geneva, Switzerland, ' The article 6 ry toward CIA, Ine autnor de reference to relations between the Bureau and CIA and quite clearly indicated that they were strained. He claimed that the CIA took Agents from FBI; that Agents did not remain in the Bureau for an extended period; and he related a story very critical of the Director. We learned that the author had been in contact with CIA when he_was preparing the article, We were told that (Lyman (S) Kirkpatrick] a CIA official, had read and approved the article prior to its publication, As a result of this information, gfe mepatric) becane persona non grata with the Bureau, The Liaison Agent had conferred with both Dulles ($?. and Kirkpatrick) concerning the matter. We took the position that based upon the information made wailable CIA had promoted, condoned, or possibly even authored the article, Dulles denied _that this was so and then ripatrich produced information indi~ eating that he had been knowledgeable of the author’s article before it was published, The,jauthor had contacted (Stanley ) Grogatiy) one of (Kirkpatrick's ubordinates, and had discussed the matter with him. The author allegedly had raised the question of strain relations between the two agencies and at that time G (Groesns eportedly told the author that rela-= tions were not strained, but were satisfactory. Nevertheless, _the final draft of the. article included the derogatory infor- mation and the facts available to us indicate that (Kirkpatrick) és> - had the opportunity to alert the Bureau to the existence of the article before it was published. He did mot do so. He told us that this was an oversight. . Consideration was. given to severance of liaison relations, It was recommended and approved that liaison continue and that we keep Dulles and CIA on the string as to what coursé of action we were going to take. It was suggested that we not ' immediately answer letters,which had been sent to: the Bureau by Dulles and Kirkpatrick in connection with this particular matter, It was also recomme 3 and approved that we cut off . att contact with [Kis (Kirkpatrick. i By letter dated sec vor 11, 1859, to Dulles, the Director expressed his keen disappointment because officials of CIA, when they had the opportunity, had failed to voice any con- cern or objection to "True" magazine, and furthermore, had failed BE of ae - 16% f [oe
; | to notify the, Bureau. A letter dated September 16, 1959, was also sent to KirkpatricH nd he was told that the Bureau was disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection to the article and had not alerted us concerning the impending attack against the Bureau. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock, "True' Magazine, September, 1959"; and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles") 45, ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - 1959 We received information in September, 1959, that the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American businessmen in the Boston area, which déalt with meetings between. the businessmen and visiting [Soviets) CIA reportedly was inter- ested in developing positive Poict ence information, ut it so happened tha at,one of the {Soviets Yas involved in afdouble agent operation) being handled by the Bureau. Bureau already had notified CIA of our interest in the (& Goviet By letter (3+ dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the in which CIA had handled this, Gel f] Burea S file [134-8493)] /S 2 |&) 46, APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE . HOUSE COMMITTEE. ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) — 1959 .On November 6, 1959, information was received indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA advised us that it had contacted the State Department who, in turn, had conferred with CIA, Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee © _and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security instructions. The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority to make a defector available to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency | ' Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not called a meeting, but the chairman, a,CIA official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but a& that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no objection to making Tisler available. wee nee Tre : wey . Q 4 “a * POE ee my ow amtemen we ne TE ee ee ee dr a Sepa es rt A 4 ee ee lpeen Fe oe . 3 i . 2 ied res ‘ chan
rr Pr oe On November. 13, 1959, CIA representatives were informed that we were opposed to making the defector available to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing HCUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration, it did not feel that Tisler could be made available. — By’/memorandum dated November 14, 1959, the develop- ments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request. . (Bureau file 105-38958) . ; . ; . er og . mo: 47, CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR if 28 - On April 11,, 1960, (Ray Tanner, President)of Reicco . ompany, Caracas, Venezuela,] informed the,Bureau that he recently eld a conversation with ab official ps the U.S G— sree) Embassy in Caracas 6 was ; ok exception to complimentary statements made by/Tannerfconcerning the Director heceye) and the stated that the Director should have retire five years ago fof the good of ali concerned. A protest was nade to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, Apr] 21, 1960, [ "Herschel F. Peak, ar..") |6) JEKG)LBD » | s) a 48, (ROBERT AMORY,) CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING | ; RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA ~ 1960 , ; ($) In February, 1960, (Dr. Frank Barnett, Director of Research) for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information concerning statements allegedly made by Rebert Amory, a top CIA official. (anoxY) allegedly advocated recognition of Red China. ‘ EERTS This matter was called to the attention of Allen Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent that, he had, onducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording of fmory's)t 1k, and was satisfied that Lnory had not made the statement attributed to him, — >. TRE T GRA See I , The above -is being cited in the event we desire to i ' dispute the position taken by Dulles, If the evidence clearly “established that fAmor 2d made such a statement, we could use . the information to support a position that we would have been warranted in being most circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum | Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, (Robert. Anory" Is) . 49, ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S. 4 PREMISES ABROAD BY CIA rare et tease eit neanme ae TEC CECA NERA TEE TEENA ES TEE ESL ETD i rr A State Department representative informed the Bureau | that a microphone had been found in the &@&S. Embassy, Mexico City; that ‘it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allegedly : yey Oana e ah eye at TU iat
if 4 had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication was left. that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies ‘through technical installatiors, Inquiries developed informa- tion indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office of Security in State Department was contacted in an effort to pin this down in a more specific manner, We were told by State that their records did not contain any information concerning the microphone, Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical installations which may affect Bureau operations, (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1960, “Installation of Microphones on U.S. Premises Abroad by CIA") 50. (1 (Je JEEOY) ’ We received information indicating that the subject, a (former Cuban jintelligence agent and_the subject of a Bureayp 0») SEK investigation, had planned to defect | We EF “gyre? nermitted a CIA representative to contact the subject in order to orient him so that maxigun propaganda effect would be derived through neyspaper publicity >We were told that the CIA repre- {o JP) sentative had been instructed by his headquarter to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.5. Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency. a had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. JEKOY. (Memorandum. L'Allier to Belmont, September 30, 1960, [i | PIO Je i | (S) ) JFKOXB) in the of Miss a CIA employee, obtained afsy sition as a secretary fice of []UPrior to receiving this job, checkeé Lr ith the Bureau. ThevLiaison Agent subsequently learned that KEKE had informed that she was leaving her job Oss | he inquired if she could recommend somebod else. Bey i) Shé "gave them the name of another CIA employee, Miss JFRONC Sry (8) - . The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was out of line by net first checking with the Bureau before recom- Jute? mending to that the Bureau was intereste S) in.developing intelligence information which might be useful ~ to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with “ ™" ¢he Bureau. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960, = 19 = " ' . ‘ : ane - 2 Neen, tye ea eg <a ny “ . oe OER sented - Wye ty a wer ome s : errr nt te ~  ¢ Pertant teen oe 5 : . : + : - . . . Ce . -
- game CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had AIO, 52, CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT On March 30, 1961, the Liaison Agent contacted Allen Dulles concerning CIA's failure to obtain Bureau clearance for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document. No known damage had been done, but the Agent stressed the sensi- tivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence of such errors. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961,.. "s010") gy Oy» 53. "SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL MONAT In July, 1961, our Chicago Office received galley proofs of the book “Spy in the U.S.," written by Pawel Monat. A review of these proofs disclosed several references which portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable light. Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA, It turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of the book, We were told that steps would be taken to protect Purceu interest, The nublishers had indicated to CIA that they would cooperate on changes. . Although some changes were made, the book still came out with some information which was not entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file 1005-40510) - 54. CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE, | [L 1961 esc) . ‘ On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache,{ co received information indicating that the[Czech Embassy fin that (v city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S. Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the jee been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected to these tactics. It was important to him to w the facts so he could be ae iB, 1961, Wceeet (Memorand 'Allier to Sullivan, October 18, 1961, \"Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Activities)=- h (5) 55. CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES =~ 1952 ; FRENCAY - When he defected in December, 1961, [ 7 5) furnished information concerning alleged penetration of American intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer, was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on February 9, JFKO)®) 1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the investi- gation, . : — | : - 20 - mea
> gt ess ‘ TPA Fm e onys emmmpmpmanemrmetnonmarsiem or tok * ‘ — rae see P TTS te, + omen, ' 1 . ee i On February 7, 1962, LOEURET a serseta Edwards, Director of Security, CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information, He stated that this information came from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled, As a resuit of a discussion with Edwards on February 26, 1962, it nes apoartadped that CIA had maintained JFKQ\®) a technical surveillance on over an extended period. Edwards explained that he had beén reluctant to identify this ‘source at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to . CIA maintaining a capability such as technical survelillances. It was made emphatically clear to Edwards that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, further- more, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage, The Director made the notation, ["ZI.only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number, Yet, there exists wistful belief that the ‘leopard has changed his spots.' H." (Memorandum Branigan to’ Sullivan February 27, 1962, ["Unknown Subject; KGS Ageat Kaowa as [le 56, f-____l9 JFKGVA) ‘In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly indicated CIA had failed to Keep’ us appropriately informed of developments, The Bureau's original interest was initiated Ala 4 iw) | as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that cd _ city. tempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were hegative. On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately satisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan, February 27, 1962, and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau file[i [105-999475] © 57, CIA WIRE TAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES Sometine prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients of this plan was to be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums; CIA _ established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who served as the intermediary in dealings with the notorious hoodlum, Sam Giancana. cea oe std ot Ahi s Doe, Se "wham ” { a 0 . a ety a cr ee «21 oe r re pt mee — ere x on . 2 meester scenpnstetetqnatangnnnteeptr een tenetemnterrrcttnenstienenera acer Mee -
. Wath CIA") The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that Maheu was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada, Potentially, there were elements for possible viclation of unauthorized publication or use of communications, However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA. (Arthur James Balletti, “Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memo- randum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962) 58. | KS In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction. Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling. (Memo- randum Beene to Sullivan, October 29, 1962 f © . Doe, - : - . ‘On April 23, 1963. CIA requested: that the Bureau, o> establish coverage on “8 visiting national, ¢ immediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States, CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject,. On April 29, 1963, a strong protest was lodged with General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA... (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, [| iS) ys 60, ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN McCONE ., We received information in December, 1963, indicating that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded manner, McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and - Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy, The story attributed to McCone appeared to be related ‘to information which had come from one Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan national. Interrogation of Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone, There~ fore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and Pearson, it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to. — ridicule the Bureau, The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963, McCone vehemently denied the allegations. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, "Relations “a dt re
‘ ue 61. fom NOSENKO (Ss) The subject is, Soviet national who first made_ contact with CIA in {{962/e%pressing a desire to cooperate. He openly defected in {196 ya he is currently in the United States, He has been the source’ of’%considerable controversy because of questions raised pertaining to his bona fides. Early in f1964_\ Cs.) CIA took a very strong position indicating that [Nosenk6) was ¢s>) a plant. The Bureau did not make a commitment on bona fides. In the meantime, (Nosenko} lthough controversial, continues to furnish voluminous. information. Yt is possible that at some future date the issue of bona fides will be conclusively resclved and the action taken by the Bureau so far will have been justified. This is important to be kept in mind as far as the future is concerned, C5 ' Jf it is finally concluded ‘that (Nosenkol is a bona fide defector, CIA could be charged with gross mishandling of — the subject over a period of years. (Cruri Nosenko,\ Bureau file [B5-68830) : 62. A(S) On April 13, 1964, the Liaison Agent protested to CIA because the Agency had failed to notify the Bureau concerning the past utilization of an individual as a double agent in an aa operation. directed rving. ag%en oviets{i Mexico.s} The individual in this case was serving as#an in Texasfiin 1964 (Ss and because CIA did not notify us concerning the past, our interests could have been jeopardized, bearing in mind that the S) - could have been in contact with the Soviets without our knowledge. CIA had severed its relationship with the prior to his(.s (5) assignment in the United States, but Cid, nevertheless fay ad an obligation to give us proper notification. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 7, 1964, [“Jose Rafael Suarez~Arcos")]| (6) 63, “CIA COVERT ACTIVITY | {- 1965 (EXCL) JFROYCA) JEKUYY We received information in June, 1965, that certain were representing themselves a v) | | a We’ ascertained that this activity was being(&() 5 performed in behalf of CIA, who had issued credentials to the, 5 » We protested, bearing in mind that the cover being used could cause embarrassment to the United States and could impose a ~:. problem for the Bureau because we would become the recipients.
‘ . | | ff of impersonation complaints. CIA was requested to take immediate steps to correct the undesirable situation. We were subsequently informed by CIA that the credentials had been withdrawn and that : the cover would no longer be used. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, June 21, 1965, "Central Intelligence Agency - Operations In Augist, 1965, both the Bureaw and CIA had an interest in assessing the potential utilizztion of the services | wa of a Haitiantexile residing in the United States 6% JFKO ‘) We were interested in (____]b@tause he potemtially could furnish@) ' \ information concerning/Haitianl[exiles in this country and theSsjy | ovo) Agency wanted to utilize xeaanl overseas intelligence operations ce) 3 We informed CIA that[ _|would notbe made available to the(S) Agency. CIA appealed and asked that we reconsider our position pecause of the potentially high value of in the proposed(S) CIA operation. While we were negotiating™with CIA, we determined that the Agency was already in contact with the subject and was conferring with him. We subsequently protested to the Agenc JFECOG who claimed that it had not been out of line in contacting { _ So) ' because the Agency had maintained a relationship with him in the past. We did not accept this e Lanation., (Memorandum Bronnan to Sullivan, September 2, 1965, . Is) JLF CIA) 65. INSECURE HANDLING OF ornad] inworsari0n (S.C) JF“ LYE) ($ f : ' By letter datedfDecember 2, [1965,(CIA informed use ey) that one of its representatives had notified the U.S. Ambassador in(Burmd| that the newly designated (Soviet]Military Attache i (s\.Rangoonyhad coo erated with the FBI prior to leaving the Unite Statesfan 1965)fahd that he had remained in contact following - his return to pecn jranete all pertained to a sensitive Bureau source who had been fransferred by the [Soviet/Government fro nw) Co Moscow] to (Ene Soviet|[Embassy in[Burma?] By letter dated December 3¢ 965 Twe made a strong protest to CIA charging that Agency wit Co violating an understanding relative to[ the Tophat operation 08) jeeare Admiral Raborn, then Director of CIA, Te ephonically contacte the Director, made reference to our communication, acknowledged that his man had been-out of line, but did express concern that the Bureau's displeasure had been placed in writing. The, Director made it crystal clear that he was not happy with the unauthorized action taken by CIA and instructed that no further operational activity be taken with regard tofTophat]Juntil we 3} (v) determined what CIA planned to do concerning the matter. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, fBecember 2, (1965, "Tophat Ty vl yl init aechs igget cra requested coverage on a visiting\ , iResticiat of the vernment |bécause of information developvedt - y the Agency indicating that the as working for the KGB, Y | - SS REED) oe , 24 = me at Aer capes sae om won, ee Upp ee
eA OV re | | ' 4 Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in New York City that CIA allegedly planned to make a recruitment approach, The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the reports we received on CIA_intentions. (M morandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 18, 1966, (5) JPZUYA) 67. PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO SENATOR ROBERT .C, BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE - 1966 In September, 1966, we developed information indicating that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by CIA. The matter was discussed with the Director of CIA and the ypK Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established Ore) that one of its employees, had_submitted(S a name check request to the Bureau concerning one Zs yee? who was the subject of the material in question. t that time S had a responsibility of handling name check requests for CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check Section, He admitted that he iristituted a name check on an "off — the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named {| (Omiane> it is my recollection that one or buth CIA employees were subsequently fired © or asked to resign. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, September 21, 1966, "Leak of FBI Documents Concerning to Senator Robert C. B ra") Pole ma J8 * tv) 68, [ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT (») an (an March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connection with a matter relating j our mutua, nterest ina S connected with orporationAj ewark, New Jerse (v) We were utilizing as aCouble agent in an opera ion fssy directed against YwsCiA had established a relation~ ship with the same person or the purpose of acquiring positive intelligence relating to the field of Sour[Newarkl@Scty) Office received information indicating that a CIA office without authorization, compromised our relationship with’he by discussing the matter with the president of th (2) firm. (Memorandum Sullivan to Deloach, March 15, 1967, ("NK 2264-S, IS - a") ](S) 69. | I IuO)Y . . In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a communication which a Cuban exile, residing in the United States, | had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular . communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations © - 25 -
for the handling of an intelligence assignment in the United States. CIA claimed that the exile had been reluctant to operate in this country and CIA then instructed him not to respond to the communication received from Cuba. We took the position that despite this reluctance on the part of the exile, the Bureau had been entitled to have had the opportunity to make its own assessment. (Memorandum Brennan | Sullivan, July 20, 1967, | Is = Cuba as “Ug JFEOYRS 70, CIA AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LEGISLATION DEALING WITH THE "ERVIN BILL" On June 5, 1969, information was received indicating that Richard Helms had sent Senator Sam Ervin three proposed amendments to the legislation being proposed by the Senator, | ‘all dealing with the protection of the constitutional rights of Government employees. We had been following developments relating to this proposed legislation because the provisions had a very definite bearing’on Bureau operations, The proposed amendments made by Helms included exemptions from certain provisions of the Bill for FBI, CIA, and the National Security - Agency, These amendments, were suggested by CIA without prior consultation with the Bureau. The Director made the notation, "This presumptuous action of Helms! is astounding." (M. A. Jones to Bishop memorandum, June 6, 1969, "S. 782; Protection of Constitutional Rights of Government Employees to Prevent > Unwarranted Invasion of Their Privacy") 71.. CIA COVERAGE OF BUREAU LEADS Historically, CIA's coverage of Bureau leads had been decidedly spotty from the standpoint of delivering -gatisfactory content and servicing the leads within a reasonable period of time. It would be necessary to review hundreds, if not thousands, of files to document what we consider delays in following our leads. It should be noted that CIA, organizationally, has never maintained an atmosphere of discipline in any way comparable to that of the Bureau. Matters are not followed as promptly and responsibility is not firmly fixed, This evaluation is made in Tight of standards followed by the Bureau. We continually prod and push CIA for responses. To develop all of the evidence to explain these delays would require an inspection of CIA operations, CIA has given the following types of-responses: hazards of adverse operating conditions in backward countries; limited personnel; undue exposure to hostile intelligence, police, and security services; pressures placed on the Agency on priority af t t ny ate WERE,
Attache to receive itfat the local tever JEXCv) a am \ SEG targets quite often dealing with political crises in foreign countries. Although CIA has not ventured to emphasize the point, it is believed that in many instances it has not pro- duced satisfactorily and efficiently because of the absence of reliable sources. - 72. LACK OF PROPER ORIENTATION OF BUREAU. RESPONSIBILITIES AND JURISDICTION. Although there has been decided improvement in " yecent years, the Liaison Agent continues to note a definite lack of knowledge of FBI responsibilities and jurisdiction on the part of CIA employees. They do receive some training in this regard, but the impression is left that such training could be much more extensive. The Bureau's Liaison Agent has lectured to hundreds of CIA employees in the last few years and this has produced significant signs of concrete benefits. CIA employees encountered the Liaison Agent on a very regular basis and asked questions pertaining to our responsibilities. ‘Nevertheless, there is room for much improvement. 73, CIA POLICY REGARDING DISSEMINATION TO OUR LEGAL ATTACHES . here has been a sore spot in connection, with CIA policy relating to its_dissemination of information| at a local level in our embassies.] This policy allegedly has applied th8C09) all other agencies and includes our Legal Attaches. CIA has maintained that unless the information it develops or receives is in the immediate jurisdiction of a particular agency, it will only disseminate at the Seat of Government. As an example, if CIA received information concerning the existence of a U.S. criminal fugitive in a foreign country, it would disseminate to the Legal Attache. However, if the information falls within the area of intelligence, which includes subversive activities, the Agency has stated that under its system the information is considered to be "raw material" and that it must be evaluated at headquarters and reviewed in the context of what has been received from other countries, and then disseminated to inter- ested customers. We have not raised an issue, but dissemination regarding political conditions in a country where the ‘Legal Attache is assigned could be useful because it would further orient him in his dealings with foreign officials, There have been exceptions where the CIA/[chief in an area, on his own initiative,] has given such information to our Legal Attache (% After CIA disseminates at headquarters, we are in a position | to communicate the information to our Legal Attaches. This helps, but it would be_ much more convenient for the Legal ‘ ace We “ay eet : f Sf be i ~27- ¢ . ; o : em ~ . - 2 A i ol ok
an issue. ~ a“ \SEGREL There are situations where CIA offices abroad receive information regarding a subject, such as an alleged spy traveling to the United -gimply-has ramifications in CIA has followed a definite furnishing such information disseminating to us at Seat States, or the case abroad this country. In these instances, pattern over the years of not to the Legal Attache, but of Government, Here again, CIA 74, has maintained that its headquarters must review the data and make the decision regarding dissemination. We have not raised We could by claiming that the Legal Attache could be useful in evaluating the case and being in a position to follow Bureau interests as soon as possible. However, if we pushed for a change in current conditions, we should consider that the Legal Attaches possibly could inherit responsibilities abroad which might present risks or operational headaches. (Fo ral years there existed a coordinating mechanism in headed by CIA. This was a committee headed by the Agency and composed of representatives of other U.S, agencies, The committee reviewed espionage and counter- espionage developments in[ | which had a bearing on U.S. interests. If a problem of operational jurisdiction arose among the U.S. agencies, the committee mechanism was used’ to establish an agreed~to operating agreement, Quite often various responsibilities were divided among the different agencies. |F5}(v) It is my recollection that the Bureau has not been intereste in becoming a part of such a committee, If we did, we could end up with responsibilities not entirely agreeable to us, SOME PAST HISTORY WHICH IS VERY RELEVANT When evaluating our relationship with CIA, including " our grievances, it is believed that we cannot overlook the for the Bureau. relevancy of the serious differences we experienced with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. The seeds leading to the establishment of CIA came from 055. William Donovan, who was the head of OSS, has been referred to as the "Father of CIA," There were instances when OSS blatantly ignored FBI jurisdiction and failed to coordinate on numerous matters. There asa number of CIA ‘officials who obviously had a definite dislike The loose administration of O55, its employment of known. subversives, its alleged penetration by the Soviets, .- and its attitude toward the Russian Government at the time posed serious problems to the Bureau, At one point OSS was actually giving serious consideratien to establishing liaison with the { , . yea + Kg ie eR anypaees Fite wt pup te perite ght ag 2 : cenmee ob ge - . . . t 2 ee ) SECRET - | ie : ‘
NKVD. Because a substantial number of OSS officials subsequently became important figures within CIA, it would be logical to assume that the FBI was justified in being most prudent, if not circumspect, in dealings with the Agency. When evaluating its position in 1970, the Bureau rightfully cannot forget the troubles with OSS. At the same time, it would be most unwise if we neglected to examine the role played by the Bureau when we disbanded our SIS operations in 1947. In a matter of hours, we destroyed hundreds of files in our SIS offices abroad, and we did not turn over to CIA a large number of sources and informants. There have been many ex-Agents who had been connected with SIS, who were familiar . with the file destruction operation, and who later became -connected with CIA. It is possible that the Agency could argue that the actions by the Bureau were detrimental to U. Ss, interests and impaired CIA's early efforts to establish desired coverage in Latin America. st &