157-10014-10072 Date : 08/06/95 8 Page : 2 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDEM PL FICATION FORM cee ee nuCy UNEORMATION oe AGENCY INFORMATI AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10072 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY PILE NUMBER : 10-H-04 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : MCMANUS, GEORGE B. TO : TITLE : DATE : 07/22/75 PAGES : 53 SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CIA DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : iC CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 3 “eeve uch wart HDD th sah tute ype KD ELE EVM NET AUR ADAP OD TS MEAP Roe GY ORL NRHA AER EER) LE GS FLUE CRIA Roe MD eK GEA HE TED OLE SN De a aKa BEE fers eam ous Gram eee wy Hae wea ane rere eee ee Cra aoa cere Har RO SE ROR AIOE ED RIT OORT See ROK Oe ee UR ED OS MED OY HO A STD CE eA OEY HW 50955 DBocld: 327423460 (R1 - IPEM IS RESTRICTED Page i
HW 450955 Docld: 32423460 Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental ‘perations With Respect to Intelligence Activits Tuesday, July 22, 1975 Washington, D.C (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, 8. EB. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 644-6000 Page 2
TESTIMONY OF George B. McManus EXHIBITS EXHIBIT FOR IDENTIFICATION No. 1 7 No. 2 7 No. 3 WARD ® Paiue ~ 3 “ cS ¢ c 4 3 & 3 & z SE ALO Ferst Street, TOP SECRET m at ee Te CEH Tid Eas HET
EXECUTIVE SESSION Tuesday, July 22, 1975 United States Senate, Tl Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, “Washington, D. C. Tha Committee mat, pursuant to notice,. at 10:15 o’ clock a.m., Room 224, Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable John Tower (Vice Chairman of the Committees) presiding. Present: Senators Hart of Colorado, Tower (presiding) and‘ Schweiker. . Also present: Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Paul Wallach, Joseph diGenova, Patrick Shea, Charles Lombard, Rhett Dawson, John Bayly and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Mambers. BIG Fact Street, SE. Wasmengton, O.C 20003 poe a we HW 50955 Docld:32423460 Page 4
WARD & FALE a & ¥ fe] é £ e § é S * z ui wi i a - 5 cy c = @ Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. McManus, we will swear you in, and the testimony will begin, and we may be joined by other members of the Committee. Would you raise your hand? Do you swear that the testimony you ara about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so ‘help you God? Mr. McManug. I do. Senator Hart of Colorado. You maybe seated. Mr. Schwarz, our Counsel, will begin the questioning.
10 c lj ? WARD & PAUL bee a c. 14 c 15 ° 16 ry 17 “ 5 ‘ ° ] af ¥ a " ¢ 20 £ e 5 é€ ey $ eo 4 z ba ape a ar = tye e ra z . € e 24 @ TESTIMONY OF GEORGE B. MC MANUS Mr. Schwarz. Would you give your full name and address ’ to the Reporter? -. - 1 Mr. McManus. My name is George B. McManus, my address is P.O. Box 161, ‘Barnd@tabie,. Massachusetts, 02630. Mr. Schwarz. “Aa I told you, we always go through a procedural matter with the witnesses at the outset, and ask you if you know you have the right to counsel? , Mr. MocManus. Yes, I do know. Mr Schwarz. “And if you want to aston and obtain counsal you have that right. ‘Mr. McManus. Thank you. Mr.. Schwarz. And you have your Constitutional rights. Mr. McManus. That's right. Thank you. Mr. Schwarz. Now, Mr. McManus, you were first employed by the CIA when? ; i Mr. McManus: In May of 1946 by Central Intelligence Group, the predecessor organization. Mr. Schwarz. And you stayed with the Agency until when? Mr. McManus. Until May 30th, 1970. That is, the “predecessor organization after it was orqanized. - Mr. Schwarz. Now, prior to 1962, would you just give a brief, a very brief summary of the things you did for the Cl Group and the Central Intelliqence Agency? Mr. MeManus. 1 entered the Agency as a Naval Officer. ! TOP SECRET ene ae
had been Naval attache in Capetown and was ordered to the Centra! Intelligence Group where I began organizing the thing that is known now as the Contact Division. It is an organization to develop intelligence from the American business community, set up & network so that we could see business people, university people, travellers and so forth, and I was engaged in that operation until 1951, In 1951, I went: to Germany and organized the Defector Reception Canter, the idea beina that wa would process people : ° WARD & FHue 410 Fees Street, $.€ . Wasminaton, O.C 20003 HW 50955 Docld:32423460— Page who were defecting from the Soviet Union and satellite countries, And I then organized a group called the Returnees Bxploitation Group dealing with German ‘Scientists who had been taken by the Soviets | to the Soviet Union after World War IT. We would induce these people back from Fast Germany, interrogate them for information on Soviet scientific and technical devel- opments. | | I left Germany: in Septembar of 1955, September or October, aud I was sent oo as the Chief of Station and [ remaine there until October of 1960, , f returned to Headquarters and was assiqned fo duty in Headquarters until “7 yas, T was on duty in Yeadquarters until -- wall, for a long time, but in December of 196] -- Mr. Schwarz. Then you got into Cuba’ matters? Mr. McManus. This was when I was asked to make a surverv. Mr. Schwarz. I want to coma back to that, but aftar you TOP SECRET
finished working on those Cuban matters and working generally a4 for Mr. Helms, can you recount just briefly what you did in your remaining tour of the Agency? Wall, let me see if I can summarize it for you. You became the Executive Assistant to Admiral Rayburn who was the DCI? . Mr. McManus. Right. After I finished the Cuban show, I went over and took over: the cover staff, and then I went on to Rayburn's office. Mr. Schwarz. As his Executive Assiatant? Mr. MeManus. Right. Mr. Schwarz. And after he left, what did you do hetors you retired? é 3 a a @ o & « & Mr. McManus. Vice-~Admiral Rufus Taylor came in as the new Duputy, because Helms moved up to Rayburn’ s position, and I broke him in and left for Germany, and retired in May, 1979 in Germany. Mr. Schwarz. Now, for questioning on the Cuban period. You first cams into that in December, 1961?” Mr. McManus. Right. Mr. Schwarz. And you lastad in that until after the . Washenatien, 16, 20006 “MONGOOSE program terminated sometime in the fall of 1962, is that right? Mr. McManus. Ridqht. 450 F cect Steoet, SE Mr. Schwarz. All right. TOP SECRET HW 50955 ‘Docld: 32423460 Fage &
gph HW 50955 Do RAR & PAUL G10 Farsi Steet, $F. Wrainengtan, OC. 20003 ae cet eld: 324735460 Page 9 ’Whet. were you asked to do in December, 1961? Mr. McManus. I was asked to make a survey of what was going on in the intelligence collection field in Cuba, and I spent the Christmas week in Miami where we had our Cuban station, and I looked into all of our clandestine activities, the number of reports we received, and how many agents were dispatched, what was being done about the flow of refugees from Havana to Miami. I wrote this report and submitted it to the authorities when I returned. Ag a result of this report, I had recommended a very intensive effort in tha interrogation of this flow of refugees because I felt there were a very qreat number of intellectuals, well-informed people who were coming in. Mr. Schwarz. And somathing called the Sna-Lacka Center : was ultimately sat up? Mr. MeManus. Well, this happened. Then I was told to implement that, so I set up the thing called Opa-Lacka, yes, the interrogation center. Mr. Schwarz. All right. Now, did you attend, in January, on January 19, a maetina’ with a number of people, including the Attorney General “of the United States coucerning Cuha? “Mr. MeManus. Yas, I did. In his offica, in the Attornev General's office. Mr. Schwarz. Would you put in front of the witness, and TOP SECRET
woudd you mark as McManus Exhibit 1, a memorandum dated January 19, 1962 for the DCI, Subject: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba, and consisting of three tyned pages and then a croup of five handwritten pages attached: (The documents referred to were marked McManus Exhibits No. 1 and *2 respectively for identification.) 4 2 « a é a & « g OOO} 2 WrasPrsgins, OC, S10 Fest Street, SF TOP SECRET id See Ce achanaueaeel peared yar BESS HW 50955 Doct ee sae a:32423460 Page 10
Mr. Schwarz. First, ia that your handwriting, Mr. McManus? Mr. McManus. Ite is indeed, yes. Mr. Schwarz. And the typescript is a typewritten version ; of your handwritten notes? Mr. McManus. With some mistakes in it. Mr. Schwarz. Some-typographical mistakes. Mr. McManus. For example, "not" instead of "now" changes the paragraph 2 in the beginning, changes tha meaning complete- ly. Mr. Schwarz. Which word is that? Mr. McManus. Paragraph 2 of the typed memo, third line 2, “would not attack the Cuban problem," “would now" -- Mr. Schwarz. Okay, yes. 2 ? 4 a 4 ce & € 8 In addition to the attendees who are shown on page 1, Mr. Helms attended, is that right? Mr. McManus. Yes. Actually, I wrote this memoranda for Helms' signature. “Apparently the original is not here with his siqnature, so the I there is Richard Helms. G.€. 20003 Mr. Schwarz. Now on the second vaqe of the typad varsion at subparagraph a, there is a paragraph which reads as follows: _ Wasnengton, “Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problam today carried” and then you indent certain words, and vou put them in quotations, “'The top priority in the US Gov't -~ all else is 410 Ferst Street, £6 secondary ~- no time, money effort or manpower is to bea snarad.'” TOP SECRET WW 50955 Bocla:3274734600 Page il
Now, who is that quoting? Whose words are those that you 2 quoted? Mr. McManus. Those are the words of Robert Kennedy, the ; Attorney General. Mr. Schwarz. Did you understand those words to include + | permission to assassinate Fidel Castro or have anything to do | with assassination? Mr. McManus. I did: not. It never occurred to ma. Mr. Schwarz. Would you characterize Mr. Kennedy, if you were taking a sports analogy, would you characterize he | what his demeanor was like in that meatingd? Mr. McManus. Well, there was not any question that he had called ‘this group together and he really wanted action. WAHO & PAUL In other words, there was no question. He was very vehement ir his speech. He said, we're going to get moving here, he said we have got to be underway. And he was really patting the pressure and heat on. And that came through to me very clearly and I am sure to everyone else in the room, and there wasn't any question that if there was anv problem, all you had to do was qiva him a’ring and he would see that vou got results. I think that is somewhere in the notes hare that tT did not put in the finished material, you know. Mr. Schwarz. All right. 410 First Street, SF. Wasreingtan, D ¢. 20004 Now, apart from the particular words that I quoted tc vou in focusing on the spirit of the meetina as a whole, did vou TOP SECRET (oes oe ag Hee es HW 309355 Docld:327423460 Page 12
understand the spirit of the meeting as a whole to contemplate or authorize agsaseination? Mr. McManus. Absolutely not. I never thought of that. i had no idea that that was contemplated. ‘Mr. Schwarz. Okay. { | i i ' i ' I Now, following this meeting, did Mr. Helms ask you to Play : a role with respect to monitoring or: following the progress of : the task force and Mr. Harvey? Mr. McManus. I was an assistant and dealt solely with Cuban matters. Mr. Schwarz. Assistant to whom? Mr. McManus. To Helms. Mr. Schwarz. To Helms. Noss WARD & PAE Mr. McManus. But: I wad primarily interested in intelli- Gence. After we had the flow of information: beginning to come ‘in from the refugees, it became clear to me that there was a great Soviet threat, and I followed that very carefully. I could see the build-up developing in Cuba, and I thought that was the heart of the matter. That interested me more than any other aspect of the show. . I did write a weekly report -~- . Wastungter, OC 2000) ‘ ‘Mr. Schwarz. Por Mr. Helms? Mr. McManus. For Mr. Helms. 5 410 Fest Stemet, SF It was printed up, parhaps the OCI signed it. -1I don't know what the nama of it was, but it was a special report, it TOP SECRET a Ee : i HW 30955 Docld:327423460 Page 13
was sent to several people in government. It was sent to the White House, SECDEF, State, Attornay General, the Bureau, 'I guess, in which I would summarize the highlights of intelligence gathered during the past week, and i ° then I had an operational summary of what had been done operationally during that week. Mr. Schwarz. And that you obtained from Mr. Harvey, did you? | | Mr. McManus. The operational? Mr. Schwarz. Yes. Mr. McManus. I would ask Harvey to supply that information to Ma. Harvey would qive me the information, I would edit it and out it would go. Mr. Schwarz. So was Mr. Helms looking to you as his a 3 @ a @ fs] & « & principal staff assistant on Cuba ‘to keep generally on top o*f what was going on in the Cuban operations for him? Mr. McManus. Partially, yes. I would say I was assistins him, particularly in the intelligence. field and keaping the community aware of what progress. wa wera making in intelligence gather ing and operations, and I followed all of the traffic cr f Cuba. i. Mr. Schwarz. You ware spending, in a sense, your full . Wasturgion, O.C. 20004 ‘ time on Cuba, weren't you? Mr. McManus. 1 was indeed, yea. 410 Fest Sireet, $F Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Harvey was snending his full time Cuba? TOP SECRET | Voge ee Docld: 32473460 Page 14 Se ae BW 450955
4108 eat Street, SC , Wastimetion, B.C. 20008 Hone (Avda 202) 344-4600 WARD & Pause what your amile is intended to convey. Central Intelligence Agancy. Mr. McManus. Ha was the operational head of the task force who was responsible to General Lansdale. Mr. Schwarz. Your understanding was that Harvey's boss, : Harvey's reporting channel, was to Lansdale to get tasks from . Lansdale? | : Mr. McManus. Yes, Lansdale gave him tasks, yes. , Mr. Schwarz. And he: gave him constantly changing and new and different and confusing tasks? Mr. McManus. Yaa. Mr. Schwarz. You are smiling. The record ought to show 2) Mr. McManus. Well, Fd Lansdale had been picked by the. oo Attorney General as tha man in charge, you see. I am sure Lansdale assumed a8 soon as a task force had bean set up in the Central Intelligence Agency that this was his private sort of Army, that he could task his battalion commander to do this, and he would send him another task, and he'd retreat, advance, go sideways, and as time went on, there were fantastic thinas that came in, do this, do that, write a paper on this, what about the possibility of balloons, and all sorts of pronodant.: ideas, papers would have to be written, just dozens of veopls: working flat out to meat these requirements. And so therafora, you sea, these tasks wera comina from a:; individual outside diractly into a small task force within the TOP SECRET HW 50955 Bocld:327423460 Page 15 1
Mr. Schware. By the individual, you mean Lansdale? Mr. McManus. From Lansdale to @ task force that was. set up under Bill Harvey, and Bill Harvey wasn't really even part of the clandestine service. In other words, here-waa' Helms, the Deputy Director of Plans, Gandestine, and here ig Mr. John McCone up here as the Director. So all of this was going right down into an organization, back and forth, courtiers going, meetings being held. It was odd organizationally. Mr. Schwarz. It was odd organizationally? Mr. McManus. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. And perhaps odd from tha point of view of the personalities involved as well? Mr. McManus. Rather, yes, rather. a 3 @ a @ 8 & 4 8 Mr. Schwarz. We have seen some of that. Now you were spending full time on Cuba and Mr. Harvey was spending full time on Cuba. What proportion of Mr. Helms’ time want into Cuba? Mr. McManus. I would say very little, as a matter of 70003 fact, except for responding to questions from around town an‘ what the proqress was, and what do you think the future’ holds. Otharwise, he was rather removed from it. I mean, he had the . Warrington 0 ¢ whole world to supervise from the clandestine point of view. Mr. Schwarz. And you said something interesting that ! hadu't understood before or heard before. You said Mr. Harvey ALG Fast Street, & & ‘was not really a part of the clandestine services. What did von TOP SECRET HW 30955 Docld:327423460 Page 16
1 mean by that? 2 Mr. McManus. Well, organizationally, if you look at the 3 Clandestine service, you have divisions and you have staffa, and he was not in a division and he was not in a staff. A special force, a task force, had been set up, so that organiza- tionally he was the man nominally over them, and he was ‘receiving his orders, not from someone in the hierarchy, but he was receiving them from a man outside of the organization who had been picked by the Attorney General to be the commander of this affort. | Mr. Schwarz. In other words, Lansdale. Mr. McManus. Ed Lansdale, General Lansdale. Mr. Schwarz. Okay. 4 3 « a 4 f*) & « & Now, did you, after the Cuban Missile Crisis had been daale with and MONGOOSE was coming to an end, did you write a memorandum about. MONGOOSE, looking back over it and saying whet lessons wa can learn, and so. forth? Mr. McManus. Yes, I did. ‘4x. Schwarz. And who asked you to write that memo? O.c, 20001 Mr. McManus. I don't think I was asked to write this Pisce of paper. I was talking to Helms about problems that | could foreseé in the future, and we were discussing this, and T said, you know, I ought to sit down and put this on a piace | of paper. It would he much better if I-would out it on 4a riece 430 Fees Street, SEF. Wanengtor, of paper. So I just wrote a think plece. I didn't address it TOP SECRET WW 50955 Boclad:3274734600 Page i?
to anyone, I just wrote a piece of paper. 2 Mr. Schwarz. Okay. Let's put in front of you as McManus S || Exhibit 3, a three-page memorandum with your .siqnature at the 4 end dated November 5, 1962, with some handwriting on the front § page, and stamped at the bottom 01110 to 01112. 6 Is that the memorandum we were just talking about, Mr. 7 || McManus? | : — 8 Mr. McManus. Yes, that ig the paper. That is the little — | g || think plece I wrote. wo L ans 10 (The document referred | Cc 11 , to was marked McManus — 2 . , Rxhibie No. 3 for identification. } 2 o § WARS & FALE 410 6 sest Street, 6 , Wathengte, O<.0. 20008 TOP SECRET HW 50955 Bocld: 3274273460 Page 18 +
1 . Mx. Schwarz. And you gave that after you wrote it, and 2 you have recounted the conversation you had with Mr. Helms. Prone (Area 202) $44-000 Did you give it to Mr. Helms? Mr. McManus. I gave it to him.- This is what I think, yes. “Mr. Schwarz. And is it your understanding he then sant a ‘dt forth, sent it out to Mr, MeCone, the DCI? | ‘Mr. McManus. I think he either took it up to Marshall’ 9 Carter or perhaps he took it to John McCone. (I think that is 10 || what he intended to do after he read it.’ il “Mr. Schwarz. But you don't know that One way or the a R _ i other, that is just your impression? {5th of November, and it. is my recollection he gave it i . | Marshall Carter. I WARD & PAUL: Mr. McManus. I don't think Mr. McCone was there omne) 4 4 Mr. Schwarz. All right. 7 | Did Mr. Helms make any comments to you about substance ‘of the memo? Mr. McManus. No, he did not. He just thought I had some interesting ideas in here, and. there are some fairly sharp : comments, but I said that was my honest opinion, and I was “li. - ; ; also. making recommandations here about organization’, which I felt was very important. Mr, Schwarz. All right. 410 Fest Street SF. Washinatas, OC. 20001 Now, part of the memorandum deals with your understandin-+ TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32493460 Page 19
of what happened, or what had been done during the MONGOOSE program? Mr. MeManut. Right. Mr. Schwarz. Let me read to-you the first sentence of: Paragraph 4, "During the past year while one of the optiona of the project was to creata internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policy makers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals." | . sg First question. Who did you mean by policy makers there? Mr. McManus. I think when some aspects of MONGOOSE began to be reviewed at a higher level, you know, ail tha wav to WARD & PAUL Bundy and across that level ~~ 4 Mr. Schwarz. Maxwell Taylor? ” ee n Mr. McManus. Yeah, that's ridht. 5 ry Mr. Schwarz. Robert Kannedy? 7 Mr. McManus. They felt that MO'IGOOSF, vou know, the intefnal dissension and all is fines, hut we're not qoina to 20008 commit any forces to invade Cuba, and ths other aspect was that they didn't even like the idea of a lot of sabotaqa, because there were so many Cubans, for example, even in Flori. and -hera we had a big Strategic Air Command base down south c: Miami, T mean, there could he all sorts of rataliation problem... So generally the feeling was, we are going to qo short of anv SEG.F rat Street, & F | Washington, 0.0 Serious consideration of military intervention, and thev were TOP SECRET HW 30935 DBocld:327423460 Page 70
1 not very keen on sabotage operations. i 2 Mr. Schwarz. I interrupted your answer to try to see who . j 5 you meant by the policy makers. You said persons on the level, 4 I think, of Bundy. : 5. Mr. McManus. Well, I've got, to be careful in. saying, I'm i 6 | not -~ it is difficult for me to name, but I would say certainly ““) vi | people who ware concerned with these matters, the ganior. paopla 8B in, government. , , . a n:) Mr. Schwarz. The senior people in government who were -_ lo || Concerned with these matters, who included Maxwell Taylor, Cc 11 / McGeorge Bundy, Robert Kennedy, McNamara -~ in = et Mr. McManus. “ALL of those people, but I go on to say here, a “ ¢ 12 , it was only Taylor ~~ if you could read the next. sentence -- c ; lé Mr. Schwarz. WYes. Will you read the next sentence into © 16 ; the record and explain what you meant by that? if . : “ 1€ i" Mr. McManus. Yes. I say, "The only senior official ~ Wy ; involved outside of the Agency who thought in terms of military 1 3 fa : action was Maxwell Taylor." 3 a Mr. Schwarz. - 1 quess that speaks in terms sufficiently u . ° , °.for itself. | : : G : Mz. McManus. That's right. : be Mr. Schwarz. What did you mean by the sentance that i Le follows that? Maybe you cculd read that into the record and oo : Le exPlain what you meant by it. | a: ; Mr. McManus. I[t is difficult for me to put myself back TOP SECRET
Many years, but I think at the time I had reached the conclusion, §f = you know, after the Missile Crisis was all over and I looked back on it, I felt that a tremendous amount of the activity that had 2 been carried on, intensive activity of all kinds, waa really almost gameplaying, you know, it really wasn't that serious. I mean, if you look back in the period, you will find that a lot of people were eriticizing the government: for inaction in Cuba, not doing something, not sending the Army in there, not doing ail these kinds of things. So Lansdale and his group were active as hell in getting, you know, keeping a frothy operation going all the time. You know, there were things in the Paper about. Cubans doing this, and wa were erying to do that about Cuba, - Actually, not very much was accomplished. P 2 4 @ @ & & € Fs What I. was worried about, on the intelligence sida, was the Soviet build-up which was coming to me through intelligence which is clear as a bell that this build-up was gradually getting more intense, the Soviet presence was increasing, and ' this was what -~- you sea, it wasn't this flaw. It was those ?00n5 Ruskies who were coming in there and solidifying their position while wae were carrying on all these balloon operatiu::- and Lord knows what. » Washington, 1 © Mr. Schwarz. And the froth, as you dascribad, that is your characterization of the MONGOOSE proram? Mr. UcManus. I would say that is what If thought at the AG 8 998 Strewt, OF time I wrote this. Tf think that was what was going through 7- TOP SECRET ae HW 50955 Docld:37473460 Page 22
head. This was my honest opinion. Mr. Schwarz. Based upon your review of the project over the months you were associated with it? | Mr. McManus. That is right. Mr. Schwarz. Thank you. Senator Tower. (presiding) . Aré you through? Mr. Schwarz. Yas. ‘Senator Tower. Mr. McManus, in this think piece that: you. did that we have been referring to.-- ‘Me. McManus. Yes, Sanator. - Senator Towar. On page 3, the top of tha page, "Practically everyone at the operating level agrees that Lansdale han lost a 2 « ry € 6 & @ 8B his value. Bundy and Taylor are not impressed with him. pill Quinn and company obviously have his number, as do we.” What was General Quinn's job? This is the only document I've seen or looked at closaly in which Bill Quinn's name surfaces. Mr.. McManus. I believe Ganeral Quinn at the time, to the best of my recollection, was than running the Defense Intel): gence Aqeancy. 8111] Quinn had been in OSS and had been with the CIG many years aqo and SSU. I know Bill OSuinn audte well, . Warttengion, f9¢. 7000 t and I think he was in tha Neafense Intelliqance Aqancy, or “-.. 2 41 Fest Stemer 4 oe I cannot remember what tha orqanization was at that time, hot he was the boss, Senator. ¢ Senator Tower. 1 sue. So he was not necessarily directl: TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32493460 Page 23
involved in this Lansdale operation? Mr. McManus. Oh, no, sir, not at all, no. But I felt that over there in the Defense Departmant there were other Prone (Area 2027} | People who shared the view that we had, I mean there werg some other senior people in the Department of Defense, Bill Quinn being a man I had greatly respected and had worked for at one time when I was a younger man. . 8 | Senator Tower. So actually what was happening was that 9 Lansdale was, in effect, through back channels, tasking Harvev 16 | directly, is that right, but no reference to this paper. li |i. Mr. McManus. What was that, sir? Excuse me? Senator Tower. Was Lansdale, through back channels, or at least without going through the normal chain of command, Pa 3 4 e : @ 3 € . 4 $ wag directly tasking Harvey, is that corract? Mr. McManus. This was the way it was set up and it was- authorized. I maan, he wasn't cutting through any hierarchy that he wasn't supposed to. This was set up that Way. re was oa most unusual organizational. set uP, but that was because the Attorney General was running the thing, and this was the way Oc. 20008 he wanted it. He wanted Lansdale as his man to be in charqe, tc run hard over this group, and that is what he did. He ran her? over the group. Senator Tower. Well, that, of course, | dont think there's anything terribly unusual about that. I deal directly with S10 6 oat Street, SE. Hayhongtan, subordinates in my office. TOP SECRET a. sae pay BW 50955 Daocld: 3274273460 Page 24
I yield to counsel. Mr. Smothers. Mr. McManus -- Senator Towar. Excuse me.. os tea Prone (Area 202} rae] 4 i Seritor Hart? 5 | Senator Hart of Colorado. I have some questions, but go _- 6 | ahead. a, . . _ 7 9 Sanator Tower. I'm sorry, Gary. 7 8 Senator Hart of Colorado. Not at all. LC i 9 How large was Task Force W? : ae ~ 10 | Mr. McManus. I can't give you the figures right offhand. oc: VW 7 Senator Hart of Colorado. Roughly? ~ ve Mr. “McManus. ity recollection is that there must have beer. between four and five hundred men in it. That is my recoliec- . WARD & PaUY roy Pod | i fl c. i4y tion. — | . < 1s Senator Hart of Colorado. All under Harvey's direction, a 16 # immediate direction? , 0 i Mr. McManus. I can't remember whan Harvey left. te : Senator Hart of Coloredo. But when he was there. § ae : Mr. McManus. Huh? u ; : c 5. Senator Hart of Colorado. When Harvey was there, ware : i c* ths four or five hundred men under his direction? - ce Mr. ‘icManus. Yus, yes, sure they were. 5 : 7 H Le Senator ilart of Colorado. How many of those were in : rea : Wshhington as opposed to South Florida? > - a ' ¢ oF | "Mr. MeManus. Well, you've got me there. This ia onlv a é TOP SECRET Dp pipe tee nite feet ye DoclTd:32473460 Page 25 BW 50955
guess, and I may be wrong. Let's split it fifty-fifty, two hundred and two hundred, mybe, or it might be a little higher in the Miami area. Senator Hart of Colorado. Since you were involved, at least to some degree, on Mr. Helms' behalf in this whole Cuban operation ~~ ! Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. Senator Hart of Colorado. Were there ever Washington meetings of Task Force W where these 200, roughly 200 people would get together and Harvey would lecture then, or anything like that? Mr. McManus. I know that Harvey would hold staff meetina- of the senior people. ; ; ‘ WARD &@ PAUL Senator Hart of Colorado. And that. would be about how many people? Mr. McManus. would say five or six, probably. Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you attend any of those meetings? Mr. McManus. never attended any of those meetings, no. Ssnator Hart of Colorado. To your knowledge, did the Attorney General ever pick up the phone and call directiv int’: Mr. Harvey or any of the sunior peonle in Task Force W? ry “Mr. AcManus. I really have no knowledge as to whather b«= did or not. 810 Fett Street, $F, Wasmengtas, .C F004 Senator Hart of Colorado. But you don't recollect HNarvay TOP SECRET HW 309355 DBocld:327423460 Page 76
J 2 « a _@ +) & « B 410 Ferst Street. S.€ | Wasmingtan, 0.C. 20003 ca eee é HW 50955 Bocld: 3274273460 ever saying to you, I just talked with the Attorney General, or anything like that? Mr. McManus. No, I don't. No, I do not. Senator Hart of Colorado. Would Mr. Helms ever have attended any of these senior staff maetings? Mr. McManus. No, no sir. Senator Hart of Colorado. But te pursue Senator Tower's question, the link between Ganeral Lansdale and Mr. Harvey was an institutional one? It was established that way? Mr. McManus. Correct, that's correct. | Senator Hart of Colorado. It was Taylor to Lansdale to Harvey? Mr. McManus. That's right, that's right. Senator Hart of Colorado. In MONGOOSE. And what role did Mr. Halms Play in that link? Mr. McManus. He really wasn't involved in that link directly. He was much off to the side, because was really an employes of Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms was his senior officer, but again, on the other hand, he was takina his direction from someone outside the orqanization. | Now I think you spoke, Senator, about Taylor, Lansdale, et Cetera, as I remember it, it was more the Attorney General, Lansdale. I think Lansdale had a very sort of close relation- ship with the Attorney General, and I think -- T sort of brins that out somewhere here. TOP SECRET Page 27
Mr. Schwarz. At the bottom Gf page 2 == Mr. McManus. Yes, I see. Some people sort of. thought he was a mystic, you know. Senator Hart of Colorado. How did you gather this relation- between Lansdale and the Attorney General? Was this representations that Lansdale made to you? Mr. McManus. Well, my first impression I had in this meeting in the Attorney General's office, you know, you just senee people, that there's sort of a relationship, you know, there's a special relationship of some kind. And I could feel that, Jeez, almost in the air, as far as the Attorney General and Lansdale, and I knew that Lansdal a _3 a & @ 8 « « & after hours and all, I knew from him, he would spend quite a bit of time with the Attorney General, so I knew there was more just a relationship of a qenaral officer in the Pentagon and the Attorney General. There was a close personal relationship in. which Lansdale hed, I would say, a lot of influanca, some sort of influence. S000 8 That's why I say when some of these -- that's why I sav ; " Oe when some of these people thought he was a mystic, vosrhaps I don't gat my point over to you, you know, but that. is what I LPR aa igtae thought. That is why I put it in there. IT just wrote down what I thought, as I was writing it up for my orqanization, and } wouldn't put anything down but. wha® I thouqht was the truth. ALO fest Stemet, 6 Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you aver hear of the TOP SECRET rey my eieseaet HY 50955 Bocld:327423460 Page 26 AOU bobs Aceon og
Special Group (Augmented)? Mr. McManus. Sure, yes, sir. Prone (Aree 202) $44-4000 Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you ever attend any of those meetings? Mr. McManus. No, I never attended any of those, Senator. Senator Hart of Colorado. Did you ever hear any discussions whatsouver concerning the assassination of Fidel Castro? Mr. McManus. Senator, I never heard any discussion of it at all, never. I never heard any discussion of assassina-~ tion, at any time, any plana, discussion or thinking of assassinaticn. Never, + Senator Hart of Colorado. fase! upon your experlence in ] 2 « a _@ is] @ @ 8 the CIA, could such planning or discussions have bean conduct ed at the Harvey level without your knowladqe? ‘ir. McManus. I'm not quite sure I understand that question, Senator. | | | Could he have discussad it? Senator Hart of Colorado. Could hea and his senior Task POO) Force W peopla have been planning this or discussing it withous you finding out? Mr. 4cManus. Oh, I think that was -- yas, he could, if | Wavhingten, OC that was what he wished to do, but knowing Harvey, I don't think he would have discussed it with varv many people. T BIO F ceat Gteoet & F mean, he's not an articulate individual as far as ravealtiny what he has in the tack of his mind. TOP SECRET HYW-50955 Docld: 324273460 Page 29
(General laughter) @e Mr. McManus. I do not think “he would discuss it. Prone (Ares 207) 544-6008 Senator Hart.of Colorado. You gaid five or six people. Mr. McManus. I don't think he would discuss it with one of them. No, I don't think he would discuss it with them. This is what I would call a need to know, a one man need to no. | Senator Hart of Colorado., Area you saying it's impossible for five or six people in the Agancy to plan assassinations without: it getting out? Mr. McManus. No, what I'm driving at, Senator, is that 1 don't think that if ha was planning assassinatnion, he would not have that many people involved in his staff. te miqht a > € LS @ (*] g « bg have a special little inside group who probably wouldn't know way they were doing scertain things. You know, he could give them: orders to do something, and they would carry out the Order. They wouldn't know what the end result would be. Senator Hart of Colorado. And that could be done amonq those few special people without others finding it out? Mr. McManus. -I suppose so. I'm just thinking in my ~ ordinary life, I ask people to do things without their knowing why or what my motive is, you know? You could utiliza individuals. Senator Tower. Let me pursuea Senator Hart's question 410 Fest Street, SE. Warengter, OC 20003 just a step further. TOP SECRET a HW 50955 Docld: 324273460 Page 30°
Was it standard operating procedure within the Agency to compartmentalizea to the extent that vary often people did not specifically why they ware doing certain things? Perhaps one person knew or four different people were doing something, but these four had no knowledge of how it all fit together? Mr, McManus. I think that could be said on a need to know basis, Senator Tower, that vary often that something very Bunsitive was going on, that people would have to carry out certain orders without really knowing tha honest reason for it, you ses, what the objective was. Senator Tower. During the course of your career in the CITA Ware you evar tasked to do things without fully underatanding why you were doing it? P] 3 « a é a € « 8 Mr. McManus. Personally I don't think that IT ever was. I happened to enter the Agency in a fairly senior position &8 4 young Man, and stayed there. | Senator Towur. Mr. Smothers? Mr. Smothers. If we might, Mr. McManus, can we go back for a minute to General Lansdale and your characterization of him asa mystic ‘along with a discussion of the orqanizational anomaly here of ‘Lansdala's direct tasking of the Aqdency. , Waesriengtan, 1.C. 20003 Would it be a fair statement of the situation to say tne? apparently, based on a closa relationship that Lanadate hac either with the Attorney Genaral or the Attorney General ALO fost Steeet, SE President, that he had been nut in charqe of a working aroun, TOP SECRET oi HW 309355 Docld:327423460 Page 31
er ‘ph working group which Mr. Harvey represented CIA, and that it was the view of the Agency that Lansdale’s charter allowed him Prone (Aros 202} $44-6006 - to task Harvey direct? | Mr. McManus. Wall, there wasn't any question in my mind that Lansdale was able to charge the task force with whatever he wanted them to do. In other words, Lansdale was a General without an Army, if you took Task Forca W away. When you out ia Task Force W, that was his Army, and Harvey happened to be, if you call him a battalion commander or whatever he was, that. was it. And Lansdale gave the orders. Mr. Smothers. Okay. ‘Mr. McManus. Excuse me. I must -= excapt insofar as the WARS & PAE. | . In the normal ~~ i { i organization and the task, forca would be running in a normal way a lot of clandastine onerations, putting people ashore ir. boats and so forth, you know, a continuing standard clandesti:.4 infiltration. Mr. Smothers. Then in order to task Harvey, it would ne* eoghay # have bean necessary for Lansdale to go through the DCI or * Oo, through Helms? Mr. MNeManus. No. He -- as I remember it, sir, there wer L Washington, couriers running back and forth between Lansdals's office an?) ’ Harvey's office continuously. IT think the corraspondence T Seen, you have correspondence in the file which shows they w: BIO Dye Keeoee NE writing to one another back. and forth. ‘TOP SECRET HW 30955 DBocld: 327423460 Page 32
Mr. Smothers. Let me then draw on your ..general experience, “Years of experience with the Agency and your familiarity with both the method of operation of Helms, DCI and the other principals at this time, to raise a few hypothetical questions with you, if I might. One, let us assume that Mr. Harvey had, in fact, been tasked by General Lansdale to davelop assassination plans. ia it your opinion that this. information would have been shared | with Mr. Helms by Harvey, and ha would have gone to Helms and said, this is what they've asked ma to do, should I do it? Mr. McManus. Well, I really cannot answer that. Mr. Smothers. Based on the onerating procedure at this time, as you knew it? ] .3 € ae 4 & & a 8B Mr. McManus. ‘That would be difficult for ma to answor that question, really. I really don't think I can answer that or give you a reasonable answer. Mr. Smothers. Let's trv it this way, then. Do you believe that Mr. Harvey would take steps to carry out an assassination without informing Mr. Helms? our. McManus. I really cannot answer for Harvey, but ! think he would be a damned fool if he didn't. _ ix. Smothers. Okay. Let me focus, then, on the relationshin betwaan Mr. Helis 410 Ferst Steer, SE . Wasmengion, OC. 20003 and the Director, Mr. McCone, as you knew it. Is it your opinion that Mr. Helms kant Mr. McCone fully TOP SECRET * BW 450955 A " BDocld: 324273460 Page 33
informed of the DDP activities? | Mr, McManua. I alwaya assumed go when I Wag ~= Mr. Smothera. Well, you noted here that your Presance at the January 19th Meeting was for the purpose of making notes so that the Director could be kept informed by Mr. Helma. Was that the normal course of activity? Mr. McManus. The reason Iwent along with alma was that IT had already written a report about our current activities, what had to be done.to improve tha intelligence gathering, and the Attorney General apparently was aware that this was done, 80 I want alonda to represent this new idea of intelligence gathering. On the way over, Helms said, you'd better take é 3 € a a a & € g some notes. I said, fine, I'll take the notes. So I wrote un this memo of the meating, and a8 soon as we got back, I had it drawn up -- Mr. Smothers. You wrote the maemo for Helms’ signature, didn't you? “Mr. McManus. That's right, so he could take it to Mr. ‘AcCone immediately. Port Mr. Smothers. Was this consistent. with Heims' normal method of operation? Mr. McManus. As I remember it, yes. I always thought that he informed the Director. [ always tried to keep the Director informed. ALD Toest Street, SE. Wathenginn, O.C. Mr. Smothers. Realizing again that we are in a hyoothetical TOP SECRET HW 50955 Bocld:327423460 Page 34
Hy P > « a _« @ @ « 8 . Warromgeas OC 20004 B10 Crest Stemwet SE 50955 Docld: 324239460 situation, and assume that there ig, as there has been some testimony to indicate, a conversation between Mr. Harvey and Mr. Helms regarding the question of assassination, and the implementation of assassination schemes, would it be your opinion that after determining an assassination scheme should be implemented, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. Helms would agree not te inform Mr. McCone? Mr. McManus. As I said, IT always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the Nireactor fully informed:of any activity that he thought was sansitive or should be brought to his attention, a you know, any sansitive activity, any Information that was ‘developed that. was important, a8 you would in any good oraantz.- tion, disciplined organization. T mean, I just assumed that any man in that position would keep the Director, who has the responsibilities that he doas in this qovarnment, fully informed. I mean, I would just assume that. There is only one reason that I think he might can think of, and that would be if someone told him him. Mr. Smothers. —T£ somsone told him not to tell Director? Mr. McManus. Tf someone tola him, -now look, I don't want you to bring John MeCona into that. Who that someone is, I don't Know, but it occurre?d to ma that this could happan. Mr. Smothers. In your opinion, is that the only cirenunstance TOP SECRET Page 35 ; ‘
dn which Mr. Helms would not inform the Director? “Mx. McManus. In my opinion, yes. Yes, sir, that is my opinion. ‘Mr. Smothers. All right. As you knew the Operation MONGOOSE Cuba aituation, who would be in a position to advise Mr. Helms not to inform Mre McCone? Mr. McManus. I don't know. I really honestly don't know, “Me. Schwarz. I thought he was going ‘to finish his answer. Mr. McManus. TI was searching my inind for why he wouldn'’+ inform Mr. McCone. I can't think of any reason for not inform rd 3 € e « & .- « g ing Mr. McCone unless someone whom he thought was higher authority told him not to. Now, Mr. McCone is one of the finest Directors I ever knew. He was a broad-gauged, sincere, morally strong individual, and I think that if a matter of that kind had been brought to his attention, he would have 70008 reacted violently immediately, and Mr. McCone had a qraat love for the President 0’. the United Statas, and he sort of looked at him in a way a3 an older son or a brother, 4 very .. Washeongtan, D.C. protective sense he had about the President, Prasident Kennel. SE and McCone would have immediately said, Jesus, this is a no-. ballqame, number 1. Secondly, as an individual, he would have ALG Foret Stree, found it morally reprehensible, saa. So ft think that that TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423460 Page 36
about summarizes my thinking on this. Mr. Smothers. Let me understand this, then. Under most circumstances, and indaad, under all circum- Stanse: you ten fmadina, Halmsa would hava told “ecane, with the exception of a situation in which Helms had been told by higher authority not to tell him. Are we correct that far? Is that a correct statement, or @ correct summary of what you have said? Mr. McManus. Let me just repeat, if I may, what I said. I said the only reason I could think of that he would not inform him is that someone instructed him not to. Obviously, it would be someone more senior in gQvernment, someone whom he ! felt he ouqht to obey his orders, and who that is, I don't . és 3 « & @ 6 & « 8 know. Mr. Sinothers. Well, understanding Ganeral Lansdale’s position now as coordinator, his ability to task the CIA, and understand Mr. Harvey's position and his ralationship to “Yr. Nelms, is it your opinion, even if Mr. Helms had received a 20004 very claar directive with regard to assassination from Genera: Lansdale or anyone on that level, anyons on the level below higher authority, or below the Cabinet level, that Mr. elas _ Wastengten, Ob. would have considered that sufficient basis to proceed with th- execution of an assassination scheme? \ Mr. Me4Manus. I reallv can't answer that, gir. really AIO tt seat Street, & & don't -- TOP SECRET HW 309355 Docld:327423460 Page 37
Mr. Smothers. Well, didn't Mr. Helms have access, regular access, substantially higher than General Lansdale? Mr. McManus. Well, I mean, Mr. Helms used to go ovar to all the time, you know. Hae was always in and around the White House. Mr. Smothers. Well, do you think he would have taken Generali Lansdale's order to assassinate Pidel Castro without checking it out, without seeing ie Lansdale was correct? Mr. Mevanus. Do I think that. he would take Lansdale's order? No, I don't. think he would take Lansdale's order to assassinate Castro, no. That's my opinion. No, I definitely ‘don't think he would have. Mr. Smothers. Understand now, we are qoing on your cd 2 @ & @ 8 & « 8 underatanding of the way things overated at this time, as wall as the operation of the Agency. > . t All right, let’s look at Nr. Helms’ contacts, then. Did he meet regularly with the President? . _Mr. McManus. Did he meet with the President? Yes, he one Met with the Presidant.a lot. I've been in the office when the President would call. him on the phone and say, Dick, what the hell's the story on this, T'm qstting some 1. Wasminaion, O¢ boilerplate from some other Devartmants. And we would look into it and revort to him precisely, imnmadiataly. Mr. Smothers. These reportinas to the President, did th-> BLO Fast Street, SE somstimes occur on Mr. Helms' initiative, or did he wait for TOP SECRET REISS ea cients NAS EEE v & Be WW 50955 Docld:324273460 Page 36
the President to call him? Mr. McManus. I-think he usually waited for the Presidant to call him. I remember one amusing incident when we had picked up some machine guna and I think it was the coast of Venezuela, when Castro had landed there, when he was interested in stirring up trouble in the southern Hemisphere, and someone sent one of these guns up to Headquarters and Helms was going lover to see the Attorney General that day and he put the gun dn a little box he had thera and took it over and showed the Attorney General, and I think the Attorney General called the President and said I'm going to take Helms over to see you, he's got a piece of equipment he wants to show you. [ think you'd like to see it. WARD & PAUL So they all knew Helms there, the Secret Service and all, you know, and, Christ, he walks right into the White House with this thing and into the President's office, and the President took him and put it up, you know, aimed around in the office and said, Jesus, he said, Dick, you know, it's a qood thing 70001 you're a loyal subject. So, this is the relationshin. I'm just trying to qive . Wasangion, OC, you the relationship thera. It was a close relationship betweer. the President and Richard Helms. ’ i ‘“4r. Smothers. Would you describe the relationship betwe:::. Me. ielms and Kobart Kennsdv? 410 Furst Stree & FE Mr. “McManus. IT really can't. FI tell yeu, [ really do.'t TOP SECRET MY 8 eon TR eB, HW 50955 Docld:324273460 Page 39
WARD A Fae , Ravrangion 19 C. 20008 SF BET cent Qt cee, that much about it. I was never present at any other meetings. I don't know what the relationship was. Mr. Smothers. All right. Let's raise a question regarding some other actors involved here. You have indicated in your memo that the opinion of Genera}: Lanedale was not terribly high in the Agency, and you s¢@em to ; infar that he was simply tolerated by other persons based on the fact that the Prdsident, or the President and the Attornay General, had laid the mantle on General Lansdale for the purposes of heading up the working group on Cuba operations. Mr. McManus. Yes. Mr. Smothers. You mentioned as one of the versons who was trying going along, Mr. Gilpatric who was then the Deputy i Secretary of Defense. What was your understanding of Mr. Gilpatric's involvement in the Cuha opaations? Mr. McManus. I cannot answer that, but I just -- at the tima -- it is. hard for me to recollect, but somshow or other TI gathered a lot of this informetion in the Pentagon and Over at the “White House and around, end I had 4 pretty good idea o* what puopls, how people had sized up Lansdale, and if I put in a phrase T would say they thouqdht he was a wild man, you 8es3, and they had to qo alony with him because tha Attorney General over there was pressuring them, you saa? You damn wel! have to cooperate with Lansdale. So he was tolerated. Tt wasnt: TOP SECRET
WARD & FAaAUL “0003 . Wearmengtan, OC. GED Fest Steowt, SF le ay . 4 just within the Agancy. Excuse me. You see, i¢ wasn’t just within the Agency, and the: veagon I wae making these recommanda- tions is that I wanted to protect our own organization. Mr. Smothers. How well did you come to know the wild man, General Lansdale? Mr. McManus. Well, I met him on the day I went over to that meeting, and I used to see him from time to time, and peeple from the task force would come up to me and say we have this paper from Lansdale. I don't know what the hell to do. And I'll say, well, I'll give you a hand, I'll help -you write it,. write a report for him. Mr. Smothers. In your opinion, was General Lanedale doin: things inconsistent with the desiras of the Attorney General? Mr. McManus. I cannot answer that question. I do not know. Mr. Smothers. Well, you mentioned your observation of the relationship batween them, and you mentioned the fact that the Attorney Ganeral was apparently Dleased with General Lans- dale. “Mr. McManus. I don't know how Pleased he was later on, but I think he was enamored of him in the gense that he thous he was a man capable of a lot of terrific activity that I suppose embarrassed Castro. I really don't know what ha thows's at the and of “MONGOOSE, T raally don't know. But Lansdale cartainly had his backing. As T say, Bobby Kennedy was fidhe.3 TOP SECRET
4 2 a a @ 8 8 4 8 foot ma _ Wastengtin, ALO Barat Steeet NE Docld: 324273460 hia battle. Then I say in here, as recently as two weeks ago. Mr. Smothers. To tha best of your knowledge, were any of Lansdale's wild schemes or pokey schemes, as you described ‘them, ever specifically called off and pulled back by the Attorney General? Mr. McManus. You see, I would not know about that. Mr. Smothers. Well, you apparantly formed some opinion, though, about the amount of backing Lansdale enjoyed at the time of this memo, at the time of your think piece, and if we could go back to that time, is it your recollection at the time of this think pisce that General Lansdale still enjoyed the confidence of the Attornay General? Mr. McManus. “Well, I think I say in paragraph 9 on the bottom of pade 2, “Absolutely no attempt on our part should be made to unseat Lansdale. Remember that the Attorney General was y fighting Lanadale's battle as recantly as two weeks aqo.” So that, I mean, obviously I felt that there wasn't a thing we could do about Lansdale, but organizationally, we could protect a lot of our people from his depradations. Mr. Smothers. Now this think piece is in November. You first exnosure to‘ Lansdale is in January of 1962, Mr. McManus. ‘That's riqht, Yes, sir Mr. smothers. Based on your recollection of tha times, and the state of mind or the conclusions that you apparanti” drew at the time of the Novamber mamorandum, would it be vour TOP SECRET Page 42
You sea, I. really o- opinion that in August of 1962, General Lansdale aid, in fact, Well,-I would assume aoc. enjoy the confidence of the Attorney General? McManus Mr. a @ ~ ie] a : @ r ba 8 _ be J ° = H I don't know. can't tell you that. He was fighting his battles in November. { Thank you. Mr. Nothing further, ‘Smothers. Do you have any more, Fritz? Senator Tower. Schwarz. I do not. Mr. We Thank you vary much, Mr. McManus. Senator Tower. appraciate your appearance. 18 o'clock a.m., the hearing recessed.) - (Whereupon, at 11 Whee | Gey fj = TOP SECRET 7 dan Aeste Rin ree ME akeqee teevatt 232473460 Page 43 40955 Docld
_MEMORANDUM FOR: The DCL e SUBJECT : Mecting with the Attorney General of the United States concerning Cuba lL. attended a mecting at Ll AM today in the Office of the Attorney General which was chaired by him. Others present were: Brigadier Gen. E. S. Lansdale (OSD) Major Patchell (OSD). Brig. General Craig (JCS) Mr. BD. Wilson (USIB Mr. Frank Hand (CIA) and, Mr. George McManus CIA. (The Dept of State was not represented although invited) 2. The Attorney General outlined to us "How it all started", findings as they developed and the general framework in which the U.S. Government would net attack the Cuban problem. : 6 ed . Briefly, these were the main points (a) After failure of invasion, the U.S, Govt relaxed and became less active on the basis ''be the to lay low". (b) However over tbe months the complexion of the refugee flow changed (ie upper classes out first then middle classes dropping to lower middle class cte which, he stated, ‘indicated a strong {ecling of opposition to Castro within Cuba. (c) Progress in Cuba toward a police state and Conununist state was more rapid during this period thanthat made by any country in Eastern Europe in OUS1S
an equivalent period of time. Hence, because of the rapidity of advance, immediate action was necessary. (d) With these factors in mind Attorney General - . had discussion at White House with President, SECDEF (Taylor?) and Lansdale. SECDEF assigned Lansdale to survey problem and he‘ Lansdale reported to Pres, SECDEF and Attorney. General in late November concluding © 1 Overthrow of Castro regime was possible Il Sugar erop should be attacked at once lll Action to be taken to keep Castro so busy with internal problems (cconomic, political and social) that he would have no time for meddling abroad (in Latin America U.S. Govt was precluded from destroying the current sugar crop (1) we were late and overly optimistic and (b) “the assets of U.S, Government were not as great as we were led to believe": . {e) Accordingly a solutién to the Cuban problem today carried , "The top priority in the US Gov't -- all else is secondary -- no time, money effort or manpower is to. be spared" (f) Yesterday (January 18, 1902) the President had indicated to him “that the final chapter on Cuba had not been written -- its pot to be dune and will be done. “(g) Therefore the Attorney General directed those in attendance at the mecting to address thernselves to the "32 Tasks" (Sce program review The Cuba Project dated 18 Jan 1962) unfallingly he said "It is not only General Lansdale's job to put the tasks but your's to carry ow with every resource at your command, O..S20 « 4 ee: ? * HW 50955 Docld:324273460 Page 45
: J ss in establishing a refugee interrogation’ ‘conter at. Miam!| ‘and was “informed that this would be ready to start functioning initially by 15 Feb 1962 «« the target date. With respect to interrogating the back log of Cubans we agreed that. we would attack this problem by getting at the more recent arrivals first and work toward those who Have been here longer. It was made clear to the Attorney General that one could not relate in time the _ establishment of an interrogation facility with placing agents to live in Cuba -- in’other words a body of information would have to be developed over a period of intensive interrogation of many sourccs. 4. lt was General Lansdales view that there were several tasks amongst the 732 outlined upon which action could be taken without ‘awaiting this detailed intelligence information. He noted for example-- the defection of top Cubans as being within the capabilities of the C1A. HW 50955 Docld: 32493460
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sident, in his letter to Khrus chev gave “assurances against invasion of Cuba! in consideration of the: Soviet removal of offensive weapons in Cuba under UN supervision,’ Operation Mongoose was on its deats bed. When the President stated in his letter of 23 Octobar to Khrushchev, "I consider my letter to you of 27 October and your reply of today as & {firm unsdertakiag.on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out" Cperation Mongoose dixc. 2 oi these agreements ard ‘carried out it seems clear that Cuba will be dealt with as another Genied area in a manner diffsring not gready from that ia which CLA hancles other denied areas, LU the agreements are not carzied out, military action cannot long be delayed, In either event the Mongoose structure a3 ithas rouw existed in Government ia througa. 3, Looking back to the origins of Mongoose one finds the Attorney General and My. MeNamara sceking primarily to semove the political stain left on the President by the Bay of Pigs failure. Both the A.G. and the Secretary of Defense felt it necessary for political rsascns that some acticn NauXes be taken with respect to Cuba to insure the President's future. Jn a nutsaell, they were out to.dump Castro or to mae him cocserate. or e BO Boat 7 nA 4. During the past year, while one of the options ci the project was to creatw interaal dissension and resistances leading to eveasual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not cnly shied away from the military intarvention aspect sut were generally apprs- hensive of sabotage proposals. The only senior official iavolved, outside the Agency, who thougat in terms of mllitary action was Maxwell Taylor. Others lice the Attorney General, McNamara, Gilparric, Jehagon aad later Bundy viewed the project in a strictly political lignt. Hindsight must row reveal to others, as well as it hay tous, thata Chief of Operations {i.c. Lanadals) was never 8 as Ne s @ 4 : “7 “oad aan Eel Phide” Lf. 4 sy bed pee af Pos } e ry actually neeced. 5. At present uo senior U.S, Gov: vat official arcund town s interssted in a future 'Cubaa Aifaira : Sundy has Ge ileeady suggested tas eeation in Sinte of aa 'Orfie Cuvan Exie fates" or "Free Cuban Atraisa" whien in itveli is a move outvides tng Mon suede slrucire, edi clandestine wetivities on tue pactof ‘ 7 ot ford ow yAIG HW 30955 Docld:327423460 Page 52
through "resurrection, '! . . a 6 Given these circumstances and in the light of great pressures elsewhore is the world CLA, internally, should move with great rapidity to distance Task Fores W from any external access, Thiy would iavolve regularizing or institutionalizing TFW in order that this unique group whica has been available to Lansdale ay a “whipping boy" Decomes a normal part of our monolithic Agency structure, By Such a move, neither Lansdale nor anyons else could get at these , resources without noisz through regular chaanels. Within CLA we would retura Cuba to the Western Hemisphere and treat Cuba aga dealed urea and relate it to over~all WH problema. (Throughout Project Mongoose, this is precisely the manner in which State has handled the problem. <As a result Lansdale never felt that he had troops in State as he did in CLA.) 7, In accomplishing this, the only unalogy l can think of is a Corporate one. We should not go %! rough baskruatey which would have to be announced, but rather paay TFW through an unsublicized . , receivership and reorganization. Tho need to realinn manpower aud assets for demands in other arsas would be oufficient reason in jtgedl. The current stand down is a perfect Setting for such a change in . Structure, 7 8, Concurrently, the De! should endorsy Bundy's Suggestion nd ke should encourage the immediate estadlishment of an Office of Cuban Exile Affairs in State. This would relieve CIA of one of the most Qnnoying and insoludle problems we have faced, This would ‘place problems of proposed Cuban Govarnment structures, provisional Governments, platforms, exile poliscs,and the like right where they beloag - in the Dezarsmest of State, % « Absolutely no Oiemst oa cur pact should be rnade to unseat ber that the 4.ttorney General was figating Lansdaleta te. emer ‘ ely. a t)y aa ey epstcty te Seeendl: M(eNeern ve ae eathe aa recently au ocwo wee'cs ago. secondly, MeNamaca and wislh look unoa Langdale au yomethin gy of arnystic and are
Rekobos fd MEORRey 48 General!’ Practically ¢veryon Ope aag level agrees that’ Lansdale has lost his value.’ -Bundy and Taylor are not impressed’ ae with him. Bill Quima and company obviously have bis number ‘as'do- we. With a political aolution to the Cuban problem in hand reflecting great credit on the part of the President, the A.G. will drop Lansdale like © hot brick. Therefors, while awalting the outcome of the Cuban talks, we must at ones deny Lansdals zectaccess to TE. Laasdale can have access as to all other CLA components through ° > the OCI curing the stand dowa period. . me 10. Lanadale's reaction to any reassignment is aptto bea violen: ons. He undoubtedly realizes that he never again will be ' in the position of a special advisor to the two most powerful men in the country. Therefore, if we don't close ranks within CLA and put TEW beyond ais reach without delay (axcspt througa the DCI) he ‘might be able to inflict sezious damage to CLA's standing befors his eventual demise. . , li, To summarize, the following action 13 required: a. Internally, institutionalize TFW. Graty it into WH, (Defense will thea look to DLA for intelligence and DLA to us.) db. Push (tearough the DUl and Gundy) for the trmedinta establishment of the Office of Cuban Exile Affair Departnent of State. HY 50955 Bocld:327423460 Page 54