14-00000 | SECRET / -104- As for other aspects of his "job description," Nosenko said simply that he did whatever his chief told him to do, and, while he granted that he did from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined above, he denied that he had any such fixed administra- tive responsibilities. He contended that the other officers in the section were not children and did not require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to do it. The outline of the duties of a "'deputy chief" was erroneous, because it was based on a misinterpretation of the Russian word zamestitel, the term Nosenko applied to himself when speaking his native language. When the meaning of this terms was researched in 1968, a clear distinction was drawn between the American and Soviet conceptions of a "deputy": "Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureau- cratic practice and usage is not limited to denoting what we think of as the number 2 in the office, but rather is a broader term which can perhaps most accurately be rendered in English as "assistant." Soviet offices, at least at the higher levels, commonly have several "Deputies"; some may have five or six or even more. In keeping with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does not carry with it the same sense of responsi- bility and authority paralleling the Chief and of automatic replacement as the American term. The Soviet position of "Deputy" is probably not as intimately associated with a specific slot as is the American position of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at all. In addition, the outline of a "deputy chief's" duties can be considered tendentious because it was de- signed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability that Nosenko clearly did not meet. Had the principal case officer examined the validity of the criterion more | closely, he could easily have determined for himself that it was unrealistic. How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be was also brought out in a paper written by certain SB SEGRET
14-00000 SECRET 7 -105- Division officers in January 1969. The following ex- cerpt is instructive: [Officer No. 1] In the absence of a firm informative base, we were obliged to formu- late a stereotype of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) against which to compare Nosenko's information. That stereotype con- tains a variety of quite fixed assumptions regarding the authority of the SCD in the USSR, the extend of SCD cooperation with the First Chief Directorate, and the manner in which the SCD operates. Of particular relevance, with respect to some anomalies found in Nosenko's statements, are assumptions regarding the relative weight the SCD placed on the recruitment of agents among foreigners as compared to the control of foreigners, how much the SCD itself might know of certain events, and how much a specific SCD officer (Nosenko) should have known and recalled. I believe that some of our assumptions are too finely drawn, with the consequence that, at least in some instances, Nosenko's asser- tions have been improperly impugned. (Officer No. 2] The SB Study is, I believe, generally reflective of an exaggerated view as to the overall capabilities of the SCD. There are implicit judgments made that the SCD had to be aware of certain things; there- fore, Nosenko should have known about them in his various positions. For example, there is some question in my mind as to the validity of the assumption that KGB suryeillance of Americans, even suspected CIA officers, is such as to make it suspicious when Nosenko is unaware of certain operational activities these CIA officers are known to have performed. This possibly exaggerated view is also apparent when we question Nosenko's ignorance of inci- dents that we know occurred and which we con- clude, or at least suppose, are KGB-inspired. Finally, and possibly the most important, is the question of control as opposed to SECRET
14-00000 | SECRET -106- recruitment of American officials (excepting code clerks). While these two missions are not mutually exclusive, in either Nosenko's or our eyes, many times (particularly in the case of Abidian) we have faulted him for not knowing information that would be significant only in terms of interest in recruitment. If control was the main interest, as in Nosenko's claim, it would appear appropriate to judge Nosenko's information more in this context (perhaps a comparison with the FBI's mission with regard to Soviets would be help- ful) than in the context of CIA operations against Soviets abroad. I sense that the latter was the case. Thus, largely because of the influence of Golitsyn, the Agency greatly exaggerated the competence and, in- deed, the authority of the KGB. Even though this defector's claims were often extravagant, they were re- ceived with very little reserve by senior officials who in turn applied them across-the-board. On a different conceptual level, this pattern of exaggeration was applied to individual positions within the KGB; since that organiza- tion was conceived as an all-seeing eye, it seemed to fol- low that individual officers within it would partake of its omniscience. Such habits of thought, regrettably, were self-reinforcing in a situation where the objective of CI analysis was not to uncover the truth, but rather to prove that a particular present or former Soviet official was part of a grand plot against the security of the United States. It made possible constant exciting discoveries of duplicity on the part of any Soviet source who came under analysis, simply because he could rarely ever measure up to our expectations of what he ought to have known, accomplished, or said. The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involve- ment of Nosenko therein. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -107- Prologue It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn should have become so involved in the retrospective analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a great deal about it. Perhaps they would not have become thus involved had it not been for the dis- information hypothesis. Some time after 19 June 1962 the principal case officer was given access to tape transcripts of de- briefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who had defected in Helsinki in December 1961. Debrie£- ing of: Golitsyn had been going on for over six months, compared with five relatively short, hec~ tic conversations with Nosenko. ‘In a memorandum written by the principal case officer dated 27 June 1962, the day after his inter- view with Golitsyn, he set forth his views on "Possible Control of [Nosenko]." He opened with a statement: "Detailed study of [Golitsyn's] produc- tion in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the. possibility that [Nosenko] may be part of a major Soviet disinformation operation Implications of the Popov Case Unfortunately for Nosenko he had, at the end of his first meeting with the principal case officer in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I'll tell you how Popov was caught." Feelings ran high over this case, with which the principal case officer had been personally concerned in a minor capacity. Petr Popov was a CIA sourcé within the GRU from January 1953 to October 1959, when the KGB rolled up the operation in Moscow. He was the most important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any informa- tion Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of great interest. ; In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise, he explained that, in January 1959, the KGB had had SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -108- under surveillance a member of the American embassy in Moscow who, they were certain, was a CIA officer--as indeed he was. When they observed this man, |  clandestinely mailing a letter in Moscow, the KGB intercepted the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr Popov, and came to realize that this Soviet was working for CIA. He was arrested soon there- after and sent under KGB direction to make several clandestine meetings with another CIA officer, | Finally in October 1959 the KGB apprehended | |immediately after such a meeting, with material in his possession just received from Popov. The Popov case was over. Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information concerning the Popov case had been slight. As of the time of his defection in 1961, he knew or believed only that: a. There had been an agent leak- ing Soviet military, political and intel- ligence information to the US. b. When CIA officer | was assigned to Moscow, he was going there to handle "a special agent or mis- sion. c. Surveillance e of [J in Moscow then led the KGB to Popov. Nosenko, for his part, said much the same thing but added that the KGB had been,led to through their surveillance of another CIA officer in Moscow, | | Unfortunately, to the principal case officer no statement meant what it purported to mean. Under Golitsyn' s influence,,. his doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides led to the use of an analytical technique that he described as trying "to read the case through a mirror to find its implications if it is bad..." By the time this June 1962 memorandum was written, the principal case officer had decided that the story of the Popov compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area to determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by the KGB. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -109- Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov was compromised, i.e., identified by name through KGB surveillance of Langelle in Moscow in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the name of the officer surveilled. The Golitsyn report was actually completely omitted from a 17 April 1963 memorandum. (Why this omission passed unnoticed is not explained in any records in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn gave a com- pletely different story of the compromise in June 1964, after he had read all the Popov case materials, this story became the Golitsyn gospel and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964 version shortly, but first some additional back- ground is needed. ‘Since Nosenko had said that Popov _was com- promised through KGB surveillance ofl | the "mirror" technique indicated that this was not the case. The mental leap from this postulate was that if surveillance of was not the cause of the compromise, then recruitment of by the KGB was the logical possibility to be éx- plored. | had met a Soviet known to him as Viadimir Komarov, who had spent nearly a year assigned to, the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. reported meeting this Soviet in Moscow. The man called Komarov was known to Golitsyn and to Nosenko as Vyacheslav Kovshuk, a Second Chief Directorate case officer who was chief of the sec- tion working against the American embassy, Moscow. [___——si| documented association with Komarov/ Kovshuk came to light immediately when name traces were run on the Soviet. The same reporting docu- mented his one-time meeting with a friend of Komarov/ Kovshuk's--a TASS correspondent just returned from Washington named Aleksandr Kislov. Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva with whom Nosenko had gotten drunk on several occasions. Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer, Nosenko specifically denied that he was. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -110- A review of FBI reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY in Washington brought to light a close regular association with Kislov, in company with a number of identified KGB officers, leading to a strong circumstantial case that, contrary to Nosenko's denial, Kislov_ probably was a KGB officer. His contact with | _ |in Moscow, introduced by Komarov/Kovshuk, was therefore held to be not a coincidence but: We cannot find a convenient explanation for Kislov's role in this theory, but it appears significant... A further twist concerned Golitsyn's and Nosenko's reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY to Washington. Both sources agreed that it was re- lated to recruitment of an American who had earlier served in the Moscow embassy (speculation by Golitsyn) or reactivation of an American already recruited in Moscow (also Golitsyn speculation; but state- ment of fact by Nosenko, supplemented with specific details that would eventually lead to identifica- tion of the agent). Nosenko said Kovshuk came to Washington to reactivate a code machine mechanic, KGB code name "ANDREY," who had been recruited and had worked in Moscow in the early fifties. In the first Geneva cable of 9 June 1962, in the principal case officer's memoranda, and throughout the second case officer's "transcripts" of 1962, this agent was consistently misdescribed as a garage mechanic, although Nosenko in fact always called iim a code machine mechanic. Thanks to this major error in notes and transcription, the FBI was hindered in its investigation of this lead until Nosenko corrected our misconception in January 1964. The FBI already had located the one possible candidate for this lead but could not actively pursue the investigation until this con- fusion was cleared up. By December 1965, they finally succeeded in obtaining a limited confession from a code machine mechanic who had been at the American embassy, Moscow, from 1952 to 1954, and this confirmed the essentials of Nosenko!s reporting of 1962. “SECRET
14-00000 - SECRET | -1ll- Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on "Popov Compromise Theory" ‘ Without our going into details on the Penkovskiy case, it is important to know that in October 1962,. only four months after the first Nosenko meetings, the KGB dramatically announced the arrest of another penetration of the GRU--Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. This was yet another blow to CIA, even more serious than the Popov arrest, and a great deal of worried thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's ex- posure, Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions within CIA--especially Soviet Russian Division-- that there must be a KGB penetration of CIA for two such calamities to have occurred within three years. When in April 1963 a KGB officer, working within the KGB as a Western agent, reported that Penkovskiy (like Popov) had been exposed to the KGB through its omnipresent surveillance in Moscow, senior SR Division officers interpreted this report as proof of KGB disinformation designed to conceal KGB penetration of CIA. Golitsyn's 1964 Story In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962 stated that the KGB did not consider running Popov as a double because he could not be trusted. He then went on to give a completely new story of the Popov compromise, diametrically opposite to his original information. ; Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov (first name not given), who had been in the KGB in Vienna during the period Popov was there, sus- pected Popov of being a Western agent and made known his suspicions. At the time, no action was taken by Kotov's superiors. In 1957 or 1958, how- ever, when the KGB received similar information from another source, Kotov was sent to Germany be- cause he knew Popov and was familiar with his back- . ground. (Contrary to his 1962 report, Golitsyn here implied strongly that Popov, by name, was identified SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -112- by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957 or 1958.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated within the framework of the facts that follow. On 21 November 1963, Chief, SR recorded the passage to Golitsyn, through the CI Staff, of all materials passed to CIA by Popov, including English language transcripts of all operational meetings held with Popov in Vienna in 1953-1955 and all operational meetings held with him in Berlin 1957-1958. Thus, by the time Golitsyn was commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise in June 1964, he had become aware of everything Popov had told CIA, specifically what was going on in Berlin in 1957 and 1958. This included Popov's mention of a KGB officer named Kotov, who arrived a week or two before Popov was recalled to Moscow, and another KGB officer named Zhukov, who had worked against the Yugoslav target at the same time that Popov worked on this target for the GRU in Vienna. In view of the fact that Golitsyn's story in June 1964 varied drastically from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate to suspect that he had recreated a story of Popov's compromise based on deductions he had made after reading the Popov transcripts. Thus, the 1964 decision must be thrown out of court. ‘The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated Unfortunately for the course of events in the Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn's 1962 version that was ignored in favor of his "facts" of 1964, which condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962 version had supported Nosenko. ,The reason for this is obvious. . The Popov compromise hypothesis had been feeding on itself for so long that it had come to be treated as fact, with the result that the sub- ject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus paper test of every Soviet source. If a Soviet source reporting to CIA on Popov agreed with Nosenko that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent-- a penetration of CIA--had compromised Popov, then that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever- growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration (s)° of CIA. By further extension, Nosenko's failure to produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been — SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -li2a- compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was interpreted as proof that indeed such a penetra- tion must exist. The acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn guaranteed not only that Nosenko could never be seen as bona fide, but also that all other Soviet sources must be considered suspect if they supported Nosenko's story. The overall result was to distort seriously for a number of years the ability of the Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona ! fides of any defector or agent. SECRET | a
14-00000 | SECRET -113- CHAPTER VI Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and Application in the Nosenko Case There can be little doubt that the handling Nosenko received as a supposed dispatched agent would not have taken place precisely as it did had it not been for the Soviet in- telligence practice known as dezinformatsiya. Furthermore, the timing of Nosenko's defection, some months after that of Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided information on some of the same or similar persons or leads as had Golitsyn, and Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of a dezinformatsiya operation--all these factors combined to preciude "normal" professional treatment of Nosenko. As a defector, Nosenko's bona fides should have been established, or not established, on the basis of careful and sound analysis and investigation of the information he provided under standard interrogation procedures. In actuality, he came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was therefore based upon this prejudgment. Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of long standing that has been defined or described by numerous sources through the years. Two representative definitions are as follows: oe Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the deliberate and purposeful dissemination of false information regarding accomplished facts and/or intentions, plans of action, etc., for the pur- pose of misleading the enemy. Such disseminations may be accomplished by means of the press, radio and television, agent reports and communications, operations, etc. The term also refers to the in- formation itself. Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the term dezinformatsiya is used to denote false, in- complete, misleading information passed, fed or confirmed to opposition services for the purpose of causing these services (and their governments) to reach erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to the USSR. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -114- By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to Golitsyn, the Soviet government hopes to ensure that the policy decisions of a given country will be based on a false impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture. Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world, to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly discrediting, individuals who are considered a threat to the national interests of the USSR, or to weaken or dissolve, create or strengthen certain political parties. With regard to the definitions quoted above, Deryabin, . Golitsyn and others have spoken from knowledge gained as Soviet state security officers. However, implicit in all definitions is the fact that dezinformatsSiya is not an activity that is the exclusive prerogative of the security organs. It has always been carried out as a matter of government policy, as an activity that at times may involve the security organs. Before 1959, there was no separate dezinformatsiya de- partment within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations), although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from time to time. Each geographic component handling foreign intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya work within its own sphere of activity. All such work was carried out with the approval of higher authorities within the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and even in many, instances with the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized within that unit, and not until 1961 that the concept of dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking of CIA counterintelligence officers. The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for CIA by the senior Polish UB officer, Michal Goleniewski, who initially provided information by anonymous correspondence starting in 1958 and later while under interrogation follow- ing his defection in January 1961. The information he provided was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the subject of dezinformatsiya from as early as 1953-.and was in fact not only a ranking Polish intelligence officer but also a KGB agent. While Goleniewski was not the first source to refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to SECRET
14-00000 ; SECRET | -115- CIA consciousness as a technique to be reckoned with in our analysis of the USSR's foreign policy. It was his claim that the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence ser- vices played a major role in the implementation of such policies. Specifically, Goleniewski provided information that was to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer. Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB dezinformatsiya was the protection of Soviet agents by means of action designed to mislead Western security services. He listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya operations those designed to confirm unimportant true informa- tion, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes mislead- ing information to anti-Soviet governments. . Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation might be designed to discredit accurate information of signi- ficance received by the opposition through sources not under Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the veracity of the source or sources of this true information. Goleniewski stated further that the information passed - through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e., could stem from defector damage assessments. One means obviously might be the channeling of information at variance with that provided by the defector. Another means might be the provision of "give away"' material, which neither added to information already in the hands of the opposition nor, by the same token, did any particular damage to the KGB. In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some of their own agent assets in the interest of enhancing the reputation of an agent penetration of one of the anti-Communist intelligence services. (That this latter technique was used to advantage by the KGB in building Heinz Felfe @5 a pene- tration agent within the German Intelligence Service has been assumed in most analyses of that case. Felfe was a KGB agent for all of the ten years he worked for the German Intelli- gence Service, from 1951 until his arrest in 1961. During this period Felfe was able to work his way up to the position of chief of the Soviet Section of the German counterintelli- gence staff. It has been postulated that Felfe's rise in the German intelligence ranks was assisted by the KGB, which was willing to sacrifice less important agent assets to enhance Felfe's reputation and position as their long-term penetration agent. . SECRET
14-00000 ; SECRET / -116- In all its essentials, the information provided by Goleniewski was confirmed and elaborated upon by Golitsyn, who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after Goleniewski. In addition to the general definition of dezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya unit; the latter would search for opportunities to exploit the situation, after review of the probable areas of informa- tion revealed to the opposition by the defector. He indicated in this connection that the Disinformation Department of the KGB maintained extensive files organized on a topical basis, containing all information on a given topic that was known (from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposi- tion intelligence services. For example, a KGB officer assigned to Beirut to work against the American embassy who defected to CIA would be assumed by the KGB Department of Disinformation to have told CIA everything he knew about KGB operations against the embassy and embassy personnel. By reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Depart- ment of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to CIA. On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinforma- tion and by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the West. However, the two men were not similarly received by CIA when they presented themselves as defectors; they received com- pletely different handling, based on quite different assess- ment of the information they provided and their motives for defecting. .Golitsyn was accepted as a bona fide defector in relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected as a bona fide defector, as explained bélow. Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961. Information that he provided relating to the organization and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual and true, at least in part because there was relatively little record information against which it could be compared, but also because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable. In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings were limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to SEGRET
14-00000 SECRET -117- be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these holdings. Finally, he provided a theory of KGB operations that was not only accepted at face value but received with outright enthusiasm. Given the value of his information, plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included an obsession with the evil inherent in the KGB and an emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the KGB," his bona fides was accepted in March 1962. The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in 1964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did not receive standard treatment as a defector whose bona fides would be determined on the basis of the information he pro- ‘vided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves reference to Golitsyn. As explained in Chapter III, Golitsyn himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the trust placed.in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to label Nosenko as a deception agent. This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts with CIA. in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities that was similar to that provided a few months earlier by Golitsyn. Because CIA counterintelligence officers had been warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by false information fed to them through no matter what channels, the "duplication" or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko was viewed with extreme suspicion. This original doubt led to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn soon after the former's defection. The paranoid Golitsyn immediately saw. Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or even assassinate him. Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence offi- cers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an ana- lytical technique that has been referred to variously as "double think"! or "mirror reading."' This "analysis" led to the con- clusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us what the KGB wanted us to believe. Thus, everything Nosenko said had to be “interpreted." If he said that the KGB had ‘been unable to recruit any Americans serving at the US embassy in Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had been quite successful in doing so. If he provided information on a given topic that we had.already received from another source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that particular piece of information, hence the other:’source un- doubtedly was a KGB agent as well. And so on. Facts were discarded or ignored when they did not fit the hypothesis SECRET oo,
14-00000 SECRET -118- that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other sources whose information confirmed, tended to confirm, or dealt with any of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded as "contaminated"--that is to say, they were considered part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko figured. Golitsyn played a major role in this "analytical pro- cess.'"' As soon as Nosenko's defection became public, Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in Nosenko's interrogation. As of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and given full access to the "Nosenko material." The reasoning at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's function as a false defector, was that the Nosenko operation was "the reverse of the Golitsyn.coin" and thus that Golitsyn's assistance was required to pursue it properly. Accordingly, over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at his request was supplied with all available biographic data on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation. On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by Chief, CI Staff, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and Chief, SR Division. The following is quoted from the transcripts of this meeting: Golitsyn: I have made a study of the docu- ments and information which was provided to me about Nosenko and his interrogations. I would like now to make known my conclusions + « « my conclusion is that he is not a bona fide defector. He is a provocateur, who is on a mission for the KGB... to mislead, chief in the field of investiga- tions . .. on Soviet penetrations made mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate to Moscow... Why did they choose Nosenko - for that mission? In my opinion, Nosenka was recommended by Churanov, Kovshuk and Guk* for the mission. Nosenko could have been *Viadimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk. Churanov and Kovshuk were colleagues and good friends of Nosenko's in the: Second Chief Directorate. Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he trans- ferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the Soviet Mission to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva at the time of Nosenko's temporary duty there in 1962. . SECRET
14-00000 SEGRET ~119- named or recommended by them and the KGB gave these people a chance. They are very energetic--all of them. And, of course, they discuss things among themselves. Many of them had made mistakes--they had told too much. They were, therefore, in the damage report (on my defection) and for them the only way to act was to suggest an operation against me in order to save their face, to save the situation. It ‘can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests: (a) to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of pre- eminence as advisor to CIA (and other Western intelligence services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to promote his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the Soviet Union.in political and strategic matters, and thus to enhance his position as advisor to governments on overall Soviet political matters. Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When he defected, he brought with him some 23 classified docu- ments from the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, which he made clear he wished to discuss with President Kennedy and the Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them to what was going on and to measures needing to be taken. Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other US government agencies underwent changes from time to time, depending upon whether his demands for access to and inter- views with specified ranking officials of those organizations . were granted. Golitsyn's chosen role as interpreter of Soviet policy and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all of CIA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing CIA with an "interpretation" of the latter's role. In any event, the idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn's hammer- ing away at this theme that we-were being "had" by the Soviets, particularly by being penetrated as a result of clever KGB counterintelligence operations, and that Nosenko had to be “broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet machinations. Further, it was deemed expedient not only to proceed with efforts to "break" Nosenko but also to study past SECRET
14-00000 | SECRET -~120- operations known to have been Soviet-controlled to see what could be learned from these cases about how the Soviet in- telligence: services had carried out their activities against the West through the years. This study of historic Soviet cases, designed not to explore a hypothesis but to prove an already-accepted thesis, produced information about an awe- some “enemy,'' cunning and complex, lavishing money and man- power on operations that were almost invariably successful. The fact that many of these cases were primarily of historic interest, undertaken at a particular time to take advantage of or exploit a particular situation that no longer obtained or had little or no pertinence to Nosenko's defection, appears to have been discounted. On the contrary, since the cases included in the study were considered to have been hugely successful in duping or deluding the Western intelligence services and governments, it was concluded that we were con- tinuing to be deluded and duped. It was reasoned that, as CIA and other Western intelligence services became increas- -ingly aware of and informed on the Soviet operational tech- niques being used against them and changed their operational tactics accordingly, the KGB simply adjusted to the new situation and continued to outwit us. With Shelepin and succeeding chiefs of the KGB as members of the Central Com- mittee, it was assumed that those KGB operations that could be (or were) classed as dezinformatsiya were not only important per se but took on added importance inasmuch as the KGB, through its chief, was: involved in the policy making body of the Soviet Union. Consequently, any operation as important as the one that involved sending a senior KGB officer, Nosenko, to the West on a dezinformatsiya mission must have been an exceedingly important one, involving high- level staff coordination. Any other agents who provided confirmatory information or whose information could in any way be regarded as suspiciously coincidental had to be part of the overall operation. Given the importance of the opera- tion, Chairman Khrushchev was undoubtedly directing the whole thing himself. , No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known case of a KGB officer's ever having been sent to discredit a previous defector in the eyes of a Western intelligence service. After brief consideration of the notion that Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all, it was decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn. SEORET
14-00000 ° SECRET : -121- Conclusions In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that (a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent defection, no information has ever been developed to sub- stantiate the charges made against him either by Golitsyn or by the “"mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent; and (c) Golitsyn himself as the architect and sponsor of theories presented has not been able to support his claims, despite the wealth of information made available to him for analysis. The following is quoted from an unsigned paper, dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims: Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet leadership in 1959 developed a "New Policy” (peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics, united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable as a statement of the "Right" strategy developed during the mid- and late-fifties and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow “Manifesto. Golitsyn's depiction of this policy as, in toto, a "misinformation" operation rests upon his extremely broad use of that term: ‘"'special deliberate efforts of the communist governments to mislead Western studies and to direct them in wrong directions" by means of official Soviet speeches and Party documents, offi- cial press and propaganda outlets, travel controls, diplomatic activities, leaks, etc. His vocabulary and general handling of this new Bloc policy gives the strategy a con- spiratorial quality not justified by its essentially open and public character. The role of the KGB in the execution and coordination of this policy-is constantly alluded to, but no evidence is provided to define the precise nature of its role and no actual "covert" disinformation operations are cited for the years from 1959 to the present. Golitsyn provided factual evidence for "politicalization" of the KGB in 1959, but its new role may also be interpreted to cover routine operations of covert propa- ganda, political action, recruitment of oN __ SEGRET
14-00000 SECRET -122- agents of influence and specific "disinforma- tion" operations without involving the KGB (or the Bloc intelligence services) in any broader role. SECRET
14-00000 ; SECRET | -123- CHAPTER VII Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: <A Comparison Of Their Handling By CIA The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differ- ences in handling by CIA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this study, since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain theories regarding Nosenko as a dispatched agent that helped to establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when he walked in some months after Golitsyn. It is also material, since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko. Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows. a Interrogation The defections of Golitsyn and Nosenko cannot be con- sidered directly comparable, since some five meetings were held with Nosenko about eighteen months before his actual defection. There had been no similar contact with Golitsyn before his defection. However, the following statements can be made. Golitsyn was brought to this country within days of his defection in Helsinki in December 1961. Standard interroga- tion procedures were initiated, which included his systematic debriefing regarding his own biographic data, family back- ground and career, and his knowledge of the structure, organiza- tion, personalities and operations of the KGB. What he said was checked against CIA files and formed the basis for his acceptance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a bona fide defector. In Nosenko's case, he cannot be said to have been inter- rogated at all, in the strict sense of the word, during initial contacts with him in Geneva in June 1962. For one thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that time but simply offered certain pieces of information that he thought would be of interest to CIA, in exchange for a specified sum of money that he claimed to need. Also, time with him was limited. When Nosenko actually defected in February 1964, he was interrogated in a manner that contrasted sharply with that applied in Golitsyn's case. In the interim between initial ‘SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -124- contacts in 1962 and his defection in 1964, as previously explained, it had been concluded that he was a dispatched agent. Voluminous papers had been written during this period "proving'"' that such was the case, and because of the accumulated "evidence" it was decided to attempt to "break" him as soon as possible. Accordingly, and because it was also believed imperative to act quickly, Nosenko's interrogation took place in various pre-planned stages or phases, ranging from ostensibly friendly to hostile. In Nosenko's case, then, the entire effort was to force him to admit to CIA's accusations rather than to obtain in- formation from him in any logical or systematic fashion. Efforts were made to "trap" him or "throw him off balance," by indicating that CIA had "proof" that he was lying, that . his only option was to "confess" that he had been sent by the KGB, etc. His denials of charges or refusals to "con- fess" only resulted in increasingly hostile treatment. While his statements did contain inconsistencies, and there were questions for which he gave no adequate or consistent and ‘logical answers, the manner in which he was questioned was in no way that afforded the usual defector. Moreover, the pressures put upon Nosenko contributed to the creation of a climate not conducive to proper interrogation. It was not until October 1967, in fact, that he received a proper in- terrogation. Polygraph Examination As with other phases of their respective handling, the account of Nosenko's polygraph examinations is in marked con- trast with that of Golitsyn. Golitsyn was given two polygraph examinations, on 27 and 28 March 1962, by a polygraph operator of the Office of Security. The tests were administered under special ground rules that were established initially during discussions held on 16 March 1962 between Deputy Chief, SR Division, and Deputy Director, Office of Security. It was agreed at that time that Golitsyn was to be regarded as a "special case"; his "flap potential" was regarded as high, because high US government officials were aware of Golitsyn's allegations that the US government and CIA were penetrated at a high level, and these allegations had been accepted to that point by CIA without reservations. Also, Golitsyn himself had reacted adversely to the idea of taking a polygraph examination and had consented only after it had been brought SECRET —
14-00000 SEGRET -125- home to him that the test was an absolute requirement for ‘receipt of resident alien status in the United States. The unusual manner in which the tests were conducted is illustrated in the following quotations from the report later submitted by the polygraph operator: The undersigned had a series of prepolygraph conferences with [Chief], SR/CI [a] CI Staff officer, and [an officer] of the Office of Security. The general consensus of the interested parties regarding what areas should and should not be covered during polygraph testing all reflected the fact that Subject [Golitsyn] should be disturbed as little as possible by the questions asked during the polygraph test so that he would not feel personally offended and as a result become "sour," unmanageable or uncooperative. Furthermore, that no indication by given to - [Golitsyn] during testing that there were any doubts as to his reliability or defection motivation. . [Polygraph] coverage was to deal with questions pertaining to whether [Golitsyn] was a dispatched KGB agent, if [Golitsyn] had a mission in connection with his defec- tion, if [Golitsyn] was intentionally mis- forming his [American intelligence] inter- viewer, whether he had any secret prearranged means of contact with Soviet officials, if he had a concrete plan to return to the USSR, as well as questions dealing with his motiva- tion (the latter to be asked as discreetly as possible so as not to disturb). . . It was also pointed out .. . during the pre-polygraph conferences .. . that re- gardless of how [Golitsyn] reacted specifi- cally, even if there were consistent specific indications of deception to the questions, under no circumstances should [Golitsyn] be made aware of the fact that [we] had conclu- sive polygraph evidence which reflected that [Golitsyn] was attempting deception to the pertinent questions. — SEGRET
14-00000 SECRET -126- Although the operator was fluent in Russian, the test was given to Golitsyn on 27 March 1962 in English; Russian was used only when Golitsyn failed to comprehend the full and accurate meaning of a question. Golitsyn raised no objections to any questions asked, but the operator did not consider the day's testing conclusive, because of the dif- ficulties that had arisen owing to Golitsyn's poor compre- hension of English plus a malfunctioning polygraph. A second test was therefore given the following day, 28 March, in the Russian language, during the course of which Golitsyn was asked the same questions as on the previ- ‘ous day. Before the test could be initiated, however, Golitsyn again had to be ‘convinced of the necessity for taking it. He stated that he had thought over the ques- tions he had been asked the previous day, and he considered them "insulting." He resented having been asked whether he had been sent by the KGB, whether he had a mission connected with his defection having to do with misinformation, his motivation for defecting, etc. In the operator's words, he resented "all in all, any and every question which may have reflected that he was not accepted 100 percent on the basis of only his own explanations and assurances." Nevetheless, the test was finally conducted. Upon its completion, the operator informed Golitsyn that he (the operator) had con- cluded that Golitsyn was substantially truthful in his answers and that, as far as the operator was concerned, the results were favorable. Six months later, the Office of Security reviewed the polygraph charts, as well as the questions that had been posed, the transcriptions of the interviews, and the final report. On 19 September 1962, a memorandum was prepared for the chief of the Interrogation and Research Division of the Office of Security. The report containéd the following initial statements: ° A review of [the operator's report on the testing of Golitsyn] reflects everything except a clear-cut statement of whether or not Golitsyn lied or did not lie to any or all of the questions. The report states that the first day's testing was inconclusive. The results of the second day's testing is not set/forth. The re- port is rather remarkable for this reason. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -~127- This review indicates that the first day's charts showed that Golitsyn was very nervous during testing on that day, but considerably less so on the second. No partic- ular interpretation was placed on this lessened apprehension, other than to note that Golitsyn knew what to expect in the way of questions and procedures on the second day, and also that on the second day he was tested in Russian rather than English. Of more interest is the reviewer's conclusion that, while the charts for 28 March show no noticeable reactions to relevant questions, they also show no noticeable reactions to any other questions: the reviewer was unable to determine which, if any, of the questions were designed to be "hot" or control questions that could provoke a response indicative of deception; thus, the reviewer concluded that the questions were not well conceived. In addition, it was noted that Golitsyn was not asked any detailed questions on his personal biography that might have indicated whether he was withhold- ing information. The ultimate conclusion was that the charts, with the limitations noted above, did not show reactions in- dicating that Golitsyn was a dispatched Soviet agent. How- ever, the report also contained the following conclusion: This should not be considered any definitive [polygraph examination]. The conditions and limitations placed on the [polygraph] of fi- cer as reflected in the body of the report imposed a set of conditions that preclude and make impossible any unequivocal state-_ ment that a conclusive [polygraph examination] was conducted. k % & & & The use of the polygraph in Nosenko's case contrasts sharply with the way it was used on Golitsyn. We shall not go into detail here, because Nosenko's polygraph examinations are covered at length in Chapter VIII. It is relevant here, however, to make the point that those polygraph examinations of both Golitsyn and Nosenko performed prior to 1968 were all invalid. Access to Classified Information With respect to their relative access to classified information, the cases of Golitsyn and Nosenko could not stand in greater contrast. SECRET
14-00000 } SECRET -128- Practically from the moment of his arrival in this country, Golitsyn began to demand access to CIA files. He largely achieved his ends and was soon being given transcripts of his own debriefing sessions as well as what has been described as a "valuable library," including reference publications classified up to SECRET. Starting in November 1963, voluminous information was made available to him, including: A. Thirty-two documents concerning the Penkovskiy case. B. Biographical sketch on, and all (83) reports obtained from, Nikolay Artamonov, a Soviet naval officer who defected in 1959, C.  Voluminous documents pertaining to the Popov case, including secret writing messages, meeting transcripts and contact reports. Hy D. Copies of the first four substantive cables from Geneva relating to the circumstances of Nosenko's contact with CIA in Geneva in 1962. The cables included details of the first meeting with a US Foreign Service Officer. E. Transcriptions of all meetings with Nosenko in Geneva in 1962 following those noted in the cables described above. F., Transcriptions of meetings 1 through 13 with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964. G. Material requested by Golitsyn in connection: with his “work on the Nosenko case'’: biographic information provided by Nosenko before he underwent hostile interrogation; a copy of the documents and handwritten notes that Nosenko brought out with him; a resume of the first week's hostile interro- gation of Nosenko;*Nosenko's comments on Yuriy Krotkov's manuscript entitled Fear (Krotkov was a writer and KGB agent who defected in London in 1963); and a nearly complete collection of photo identifica- tions made by Nosenko as of that date. H. Sanitized copy of a cable summary of Nosenko's reactions to Yuriy Krotkov. SECRET
14-00000 } SECRET -129- I. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and CIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow, with a list of operations in which he was involved. J. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and former CIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow, with a list of operations in which he had been involved. K. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and former CIA staff employee who had served as Security Officer of the American embassy in Moscow. L. ‘Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA during the period of his assignment to the American embassy in Moscow, plus a list of opera- tional actions carried out by him for CIA. M. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA during the period of his assignment to the American embassy in Moscow, with a list of opera- tional actions carried out by him for CIA. N. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA affiliation. O. Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA affiliation. Golitsyn was provided with a copy of an interview of him conducted by US govern- ment security officers (mot identified as to agency affiliation). P., Biographic sketch of a US citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American embassy in Moscow at one time. He had no CIA affiliation. . Biographic sketch of a US citizen and _ CIA staff officer at one time assigned to Moscow. R. Information on a Russian-born American citizen employed as an interpreter by the United — SECRET
14-00000 | SECRET ! -130- Nations in Geneva who was the object of a KGB recruitment attempt while on loan to UNESCO for conference work in Tbilisi in 1968. S. Biographic information on CIA-connected personnel mentioned in the Cherepanov papers. This information was additional to sketches on the same persons given to Golitsyn with the tran- script for Meeting No. 12 with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964. . T. A nine-page summary of the status of the Nosenko case, including information on the results of Nosenko's 1964 polygraph examination, on his confrontation and subsequent interrogation, on his life history, on CIA conclusions ("daily support for our conviction that Nosenko was sent on a KGB mission"), on CIA plans for future handling of Nosenko (continued interrogation), and on Nosenko's circumstances (confinement under observation, without cigarettes or reading material). U. Copies of two reports on the subject of KGB audio-technical operations, one prepared on the basis of information provided by Golitsyn himself in 1962 and one prepared on the basis of information brought out by Nosenko in 1964, with notation for Golitsyn that recent sweeping oper- ations in the American embassy in Moscow had located all the microphones identified by Nosenko and a number not mentioned by Nosenko. V. A repeat of Nosenko's commentary on Krotkov (identified above), expanded to include identifications Nosenko made of thé KGB people involved with Krotkov. W. A list of questions that Krotkov had suggested be put to Nosenko to confirm and clarify information given by Krotkov. X. .Biographic sketches on Vladimir Kovshuk, Yuriy Guk, Aleksandr Feklisov alias Fomin, and — Igor Ivanov. Kovshuk and Guk were KGB officers known to both Golitsyn and Nosenko; with Vladimir Churanov, they were credited by Golitsyn as having SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -131- recommended to the KGB that Nosenko be sent to ‘the West to discredit Golitsyn in the eyes of CIA and other Western intelligence services. Feklisov was a KGB officer who visited the United States as part of Khrushchev's party in 1959 and later (1960-1964) served as Counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. Ivanov was arrested by the FBI in.1963 in connection with the case of John W. Butenko, an electronics engineer who was arrested as a KGB agent. These reports were given to Golitsyn as his request. Y. <A chronology of the case of Boris Belitskiy, a KGB-controlled CIA source. Golitsyn had asked to "re-read" the file on Belitskiy, whose status vis-° a-vis the KGB was first reported to CIA by Nasenko. Golitsyn was also given a background sketch of Belitskiy and transcripts of "all four contact periods." _Z. File summary of the case of Mikhail Fedorov alias Razin, a GRU colonel who served as an illegal in France in 1958-1959. AA. Case descriptions of two operations ser- viced by CIA personnel in Moscow. Both were KGB couriers dispatched on emigre operations into West Germany, where they were apprehended, agreed to work for American intelligence, and later returned to the USSR. BB. Responses by Nosenko to questions drafted by Golitsyn on: recruitable Soviets (by name and background); American double agents; the Popov case; recruitment of US intelligence personnel; KGB operations against US embassy (Moscow) personnel; surveys or studies done by the KGB Second Chief Directorate about arrested American spies (including Popov and Penkovskiy); KGB awards (including those given to persons who participated in the investi- gation of Penkovskiy, Popov, Stashinskiy); the Penkovskiy case; Golitsyn. CC. Charts indicating what Nosenko had reported on KGB operational interest in specific persons (i.e., operational "leads"), and what CIA had been able to develop on them through investigation, with SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -132- CIA comments as appropriate; an outline of infor- mation provided by Nosenko on the structure and personnel assignments in the KGB as he knew them; a chronology of Nosenko's life "in varying ver- sions." By contrast, the CIA position with regard to revelation of information to Nosenko is indicated by the following state- ment taken from a memorandum for the DDP prepared by Chief, SR Division, dated 30 March 1964: - « . I think we should make absolutely sure that Subject [Nosenko] does not learn a single thing from us that we do not want him (and eventually the KGB) to know. I think CIA has to take a very firm position on this issue, otherwise the FBI might urge a delay in confrontation while they present case after case to [Nosenko] in an effort to learn more from him. For information on Nosenko's deprivation of reading matter of any sort for long periods of time, much less intelligence files of the sort given to Golitsyn, see Chapter III. Physical Confinement Golitsyn cannot be said to have been physically confined at any time. The following description of the protective custody afforded him and his reaction to any type of control is quoted from the 1976 Counterintelligence Staff Study (No. 3) on Golitsyn: Golitsyn always felt the need for protection against possible KGB retaliation, but quite obviously believed he alone was the best judge of what this entailed. He wanted guards around, but not underfoot. The record is replete with his complaints against the , guards and his attempts to isolate them. This became a key issue in the adoption of the codicil to the Statement of Agreement in July 1962, when Golitsyn moved into his own house and was given complete personal control of the guards, their hours of duty and their responsibilities. From that point on, Golitsyn was essentially unguarded. His SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -133- wife also railed against her "companions" in the early days. She made frequent trips into Washington to shop or attend movies, theater or ballet. At these times, she would dismiss her chauffeur for lengthy periods. On two occasions she took the bus alone to New York for the day, and Golitsyn also visited New York in November 1962, at which time he roamed the city unescorted. Golitsyn's behavior from that time on followed a similar pattern. He suddenly left the United States for the United Kingdom in December 1962, and while in England he lived where he wished and had no security protection. The British asked Golitsyn to keep his whereabouts to himself, not to stay in one hotel for any length of time, and to call when he wanted to meet. According to the study quoted above, this loose method of dealing with Golitsyn probably helped in maintain- ing a cooperative attitude on his part; it also apparently set a precedent for his attitude toward the manner in which he would live upon his return to the United States in July 1963. Upon his return here, he was given complete freedom to set his own pattern of living and working, following the British example. He obtained his own: residence in New York, moved several times, developed the concept that he was the best judge of his own security, and at times lived "almost under the eaves of the Soviet Mission" in New York while simultaneously refusing to talk to CIA officers because CIA was "penetrated." Nosenko's physical confinement and deprivation of even minor amenities from the time of his defection in early 1964 ‘until late October 1967 stand in stark contrast to the treat- ment afforded Golitsyn. This matter has been covered so fully in Chapter III that it requires ng further comment. Conclusions If summation is needed, the following can be stated with respect to the five areas dealt with above: A. Golitsyn controlled his own interrogation, withholding information if he chose, refusing to - answer questions according to his own whim, and on occasion refusing even to talk to CIA officers. Nosenko was not really listened to (or even talked to for long stretches of time), much less properly SECRET
14-00000 | SECRET | ~134- interrogated, for several years after the date of his defection. B. Golitsyn was given a signed agreement covering the conditions of his cooperation with the US government, which met all of his demands. Nosenko was specifically denied a. written contract, on the grounds that an oral agreement was the “"bureaucratically correct" manner of handling his relationship with the US government, until five years after his defection (1969). C. Golitsyn's polygraph examination was admin- istered under ground rules imposed by SR Division. These rules produced inconclusive test results, but full assurances were given Golitsyn that he had passed his examination. No further attempt was made to establish Golitsyn's bona fides. Nosenko, on the other hand, underwent three separate series of polygraph tests. Two of the three were conducted in such a manner as to prejudice the re- sults against Nosenko; under the ground rules im- posed by the SR Division officers on the polygraph operator, the latter was under instructions to "find" evidences of deception in the polygraph charts, whether they were there or not. D. With respect to access to information, Golitsyn was provided with literally safes-full of classified documents, including files on cases that were regarded as highly sensitive within CIA -and to which only a very small number of CIA staff officers had access. Nosenko not only did not see any intelligence material but was denied access to newspapers, books, radio, or even personal contact with other human beings. E. As to physical confinement, Golitsyn was simply never confined; the thought of confining him did not even arise. Nosenko spent virtually all of his first five years in this country as a prisoner, given fewer amenities than he would have received in most jails or prisons within the United States, or in some form of protective — custody. ‘ SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -135- It seems self-evident that these two defectors should have received the same treatment, that one was as suspect as the other until completion of all appropriate processing aimed at determining bona fides.
14-00000 SECRET -136- _ CHAPTER VIII Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko Case Nosenko was first polygraphed on 4 April 1964, in a series of six tests. That the procedures followed were - somewhat unorthodox is indicated by the following quotations from the report of the polygraph operator: During the pre-polygraph conferences with representatives of SR Division, the under- signed was informed that the polygraph interview was part of an overall plan to help break [Nosenko] and elicit the truth from him. SR Division's instructions were that, regardless of whether [Nosenko] passed his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his polygraph interview that he was lying, and .had not passed his polygraph interview. The question of [Nosenko's] willingness to participate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previ- ous- occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether [Nosenko] would con- tinue with the polygraph testing, if he was confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Consequently, in order to preclude the possibility of [Nosenko's] terminating the test prior to its completion, it was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be wsed during the polygraph testing, specifically to ensure that a polygraph record of [Nosenko's] reactions to all the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on any significant polygraph deception indications his charts might reflect. Because of the extenuating [sic] circumstances of the case, this plan was followed throughout the polygraph inter- view. . « When [Nosenko] arrived for his test, [the fact that he had been drinking] was SECRET
14-00000 | SECRET | -137- evident both to [the operator] and the examining physician who checked [Nosenko] prior to [Nosenko's] polygraph testing . . Although [Nosenko] had used both alcohol and some unknown drug prior to testing, there is mo question, based both on analysis of [Nosenko's] polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that [Nosenko] has attempted deliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas. [on which he was questioned]. According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with [Nosenko] polygraph- ically. Challenge of [Nosenko's] reactions was indirect and "soft." . . . Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dis- patched agent. - After completion of the interview, the SR representative at the safesite was informed, in front of [Nosenko], of [the operator's] opinion that [Nosenko] was lying and was a dispatched Soviet agent. [Nosenko] was taken into protective custody and escorted to his new place of residence. A second series of polygraph tests were administered to Nosenko between 18 and 25 October 1966. Although by this time the operator had transferred from the Office of Security | to SR Division, it was desired by SR that he conduct the new polygraph tests. He was allowed by the Office of Security to do so, as an exception to the rule that all polygraph testing be performed by Security personnel, on the basis of Chief, SR's statement that, for Nosenko's porygraphing, use of a person Ofhis "temperament" was essential. The following is quoted from an interim report dated 24 October 1966 (i.e., before completion of the new polygraph series), which was attached to a memorandum from Chief, SR to the DCI. Our aims in this phase of the interrogation have been limited: in view of the possibility of losing access to Nosenko, we have sought SOR
14-00000 SECRET ~138- (a) to strengthen our basic report, now in preparation, by testing his story further, Clarifying points of confusion and reveal- ing new contradictions, and by polygraph examinations in key areas, and (b) to lead toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our hypotheses about the true background of Nosenko and this KGB opera- tion, to convey to Nosenko the impression that we know more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and that he has no prospects for release. We refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interrogation, but at this point there seems little to lose. . . . [Regarding his identity]: Nosenko was questioned extensively on the polygraph con- cerning his identity ... He was also given a series of tests asking for the first letter _ of his given name. The whole alphabet was covered, and the polygraph charts show that he became increasingly tense, culminating at the letter S (or perhaps T) on both runs. While we recognize that testing of this sort — may not give valid results, it certainly gets over to Nosenko the degree of our doubt and may even help us determine who he really. is. Nosenko's becoming "increasingly tense" during this 1966 polygraph examination must be evaluated in the light of certain facts that were not brought out in this-report. Let us begin by giving a schedule of the hours during which he was under continuous polygraph interrogation: Date and Times _ Hours and Minutes 19 October | 1330 - 1530 2. 20 October 0930 - 1215 2245 1530 - 1910 3:40
14-00000 SECRET -139- Date and Times Hours and Minutes 21 October 0930 - 1245 3:15 1645 - 1810 . 1:25 25 October 1350 - 1545 1:55 1630 - 1805 1:35 26 October . 1000 - 1320 3:20 1755 - 1925 1:30 27 October 1020 - 1345 . 3:25 1700 - 1913 2:13 28 October 0955 - 1020 225 1024 - 1125 1:01 Total hours of continuous polygraph examination 28:29 When queried during the present investigation about the advisability of such long sessions of continuous polygraphing, a responsible official of the Office of Security's Polygraph Branch stated that such sessions are counterproductive and contrary to their organization's policy: The long confine- ment, plus operation of certain of the polygraph sensors, may result in pain as well as artifactitious reactions. Re- sults of a polygraph examination conducted under such condi- tions are not dependable. In addition, it should be pointed out that during this period the days began early and ended late for Nosenko, be- cause when he was not being polygraphed he was being intensively interrogated. The record shows that in addition to the approximately 28 hours of polygraphing, he was subjected to 15 hours of straight interrogation. The dividing line between SECRET
14-00000 | geerer ~140- polygraphing and hostile interrogation is not always clear from the record, however, because the polygraph operator participated in both. For example, at one point the typed record reads: [The operator] told [{Nosenko] he is a fanatic who was told too little to support his legend and that his future is now "zero." It is also probable that Nosenko's physical movements were restricted for long periods of time during this whole period. In a report he wrote on 16 November 1967, the Director of Security stated: . . [Nosenko] was left strapped in a chair between periods of interrogation for as long as four or five hours at a time. As you know, the role of this Office in the Nosenko case during the past three years has been one exclusively of support under the direction -of SB Division personnel. None the less, I have consistently instructed my personnel who were guarding him that I would not con- done or support any treatment involving physical abuse. I have confirmed this one example of what I consider to be physical -abuse and regret that it was not brought to my attention. Nosenko's final polygraph eXamination, conducted under the direction of the Office of Security, was quite at variance with the first-two. Initiated on 2 August 1968, it concluded on 6 August 1968. The tests took place after approximately 7,000 pages of transcripts and related materials had been compiled during the course of Nosenko's new interro- tion undertaken in late October 1967. About 60 questions of a pertinent nature were covered in the interview. Nosenko was completely cooperative, no problems were encountered, and the conclusion of the polygraph operator was that Nosenko had been substantially truthful in answering all relevant questions put to him. In the course of the present investigation, the Office of Security was requested to make a further reevaluation of the Nosenko polygraph charts of April 1964, October 1966, and August 1968. The resultant report, dated 30 September 1976 and signed by the Director of Security, states: SECRET
14-00000 ~ SECRET -141- This memorandum is in response to your request for a review of the polygraph charts of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko obtained during polygraph interrogations in April 1964 and October 1966 . .. [and] in August 1968... ; oo After a thorough review of the charts obtained in April 1964, it is our opinion that the polygraph charts obtained do not contain sufficient technical data on which to base a conclusion of deception or to Support that Mr. Nosenko was a dispatched agent of the KGB... Finally, the polygraph patterns produced to pertinent questions during the August 1968 polygraph examination substantiate that Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers. It is our opinion ’ that the examiner in that testing was correct in his chart analysis. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -142- CHAPTER IX Psychological and Medical Findings A small, but nevertheless key role was played by two Agency specialists, respectively a psychologist and a psychiatrist, in the handling of Nosenko. Like so much else that occurred in this case, this aspect is edifying mainly in the negative sense of demonstrating how the ser- vices of such professionals ought not to be exploited. In sum, the psychologist and psychiatrist principally involved in this case were given enough misinformation about Nosenko’s ‘bona fides to prejudice seriously any chance of an accurate personalit y assessment. We now examine in some detail the roles played by the psychologist:and the psychiatrist. In doing so, we have very much in mind the fact that both these gentlemen are members of organized professions, both of which impose explicit standards of conduct upon their members. We must therefore look for possible conflict between demands the Agency made of these professionals on one hand, and their professional standards on the other. A. The Role of the Psychologist The psychologist's role will be dealt with first because, to judge by the written record, he was the first to assess Nosenko from the psychological point of view, by means of a brief interview and test administered on 23 June 1964. His initial report is dated 9 July 1964. In addition, he interviewed Nosenko at length in 14 ses- Sions during the period 3-21 May 1965. He then wrote a chronicle of Nosenko's life and an dverall psychological evaluation based on these interviews. By way of background, it should be said that the psychologist is an extremely insightful person with clinical experience acquired both before joining CIA as well as during his CIA service. He has developed his own system of interpreting. the Wechsler intelligence tests (Wechsler-Bellevue and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), which he calls the Personality Assessment System (PAS). It is PAS that, for over two decades, has been the main resource used by the Clandestine Service in the assessment of personality for operational purposes. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -143- Like any other scientific practitioner, however, a psychologist can only function properly on the basis of valid data. If you put a cube of ice in a patient's mouth before inserting the thermometer, you do not get an accurate temperature reading. If you provide an examining psychologist or psychiatrist with erroneous data regarding a defector, the findings of his examination will inevitably be in part erroneous. Personality assessment instruments, or “tests,” also have their limitations. They yield results that should be read only as statements of the statistical probability of the presence of a given personality predisposition or characteristic. In other words, the results give the psychologist a suggestion as to what to look for in a person, as he collects further data. In the case here under consideration, the personality formula that the psychologist derived from his administra- tion of the PAS test to Nosenko suggested that Nosenko might have the characteristics of a sociopath. The psychologist's task was then to evaluate this datum within a framework that included the following elements: 1. His judgment of the validity of his own test results. Note that he depended on a single, English-language measurement instru- ment when he examined Nosenko on 23 June 1964, 2. ‘Personal interviews. He had time for only a limited interview at the time of test- ing, and it was conducted without benefit of an interpreter in English, a language Nosenko spoke with far from idiomatic fluency. _ Lengthy interviews were conducted later, in May 1965, long after the original diagnosis had been made. They also were conducted in English. 3. Collateral data, obtained from senior SR officers, which were uniformly prejudicial to Nosenko. The latter was described as one who lied and changed his story constantly, and who had been sent to the United States on a mission for the KGB. Doubt was even expressed as to whether Nosenko was the person he. professed to be. SECRET
14-00000 : SECRET | -144- Subsequent events have revealed that Nosenko's falsehoods were in fact minor ones. But the psychologist did not know all this; told that Nosenko lied constantly and knowing that manipulative lying is part of the psychopathic syndrome, he diagnosed Nosenko as a psycho- path. - ; Lo. The term "psychopath" (another term used inter- changeably is "sociopath") itself deserved a word of explanation, because its connotation is misleading. Like so many psychological terms, it evolved out of the fact that psychologists tend to be involved primarily with people in trouble, very often with those who end up in prisons: and mental institutions. A survey of psycho- logical literature reveals, not surprisingly, that the one quintessential criterion of a psychopath is that he is habitually given to criminal or delinquent behavior. The critéria that psychologists use in distinguishing between psychopaths and non-psychopaths have been developed almost entirely from studies of juvenile delinquents, criminals and mental patients, and thus the term is really only applicable with any certainty to in- dividuals belonging to one or another of those groups. Despite this fact, testing of many people who are not delinquent or criminal may yield a score or profile of scores suggesting psychopathy. To illustrate the point, let us take an example. On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (one of the most widely used clinical testing instruments in this country), the profile that suggests psychopathy has also been generated in testing persons who turned out to be good WACs in World War II and others who have been predicted as. likely to succeed in the life insurance business. Yet, good WACs and life insurance agents are obviously not groups to whom we would ordinarily apply the term "nsychopath.'"' Thus, the fact that you have a predis- position to psychopathy does not mean that you necessarily ‘become one; the psychopathic profile on either the MMPI or the PAS test is merely a warning signal of what you might do under certain adverse circumstances. When he tested Nosenko, the psychologist was not fully aware of all the pressures under which this defector was functioning. He was unaware of the manner of his sudden confinement after glowing promises had been made of rewards for-defection; of the falsified polygraph results, and the fact that Nosenko had been informed SECRET _ 7
14-00000 *Matarazzo, J. D., Measurement and appraisas of Adult Intelli- gence. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1972. Page : SECRET -145- that the examination showed him guilty of deception; or of the fact that the principal case officer had told Nosenko that the latter's information (later to prove of great value) was all "crap."' Given these factors, we would have to conclude a priori that the resultant PAS personality profile was likely to be partly spurious. The exact extent to which the psychologist's test results were inexact cannot be determined, but one example is illustrative of the possibilities. One part of the profile suggested that Nosenko was endowed with. a well-below average memory. That his memory was functioning at less than average level at the time he took the test cannot be doubted; but it has already been made clear that he was functioning under extremely. adverse conditions, and, since the Wechsler subtest that measures memory span has been experimentally shown to be vulnerable to so-called state (i.e., temporary) anxiety,* this aspect of the personality profile must be considered spurious. From Nosenko's performance during extensive debriefings since he was released from confinement and began to receive normally humane treatment, we know that his memory is in fact exceptionally good. We can only conclude that, if it functioned badly at the time of test- ing, this was largely owing to anxiety induced by treat- ment received at the hands of CIA. As to the psychologist's characterization of Nosenko as a psychopath, the limitations of such a diagnosis have already been made clear. Since his re- lease from incarceration, although he has certainly shown himself to be an emphathic person, winning and charming when he wants to be, he has not shown any of the unde- sirable traits associated with psychopathy. Quite to the contrary, as of this time at least, he has since 1969 comported himself with both dignity and discretion. The psychologist's evaluation contained a section entitled "Vulnerabilities" that was, once again, clearly based on the premise that Nosenko was dissembling, when he denied being under continued KGB control. The psychologist wrote: 4 SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -146- Under prolonged pressure he will admit almost anything to get relief. Another vulnerability is that he will "break" in order to get relief. Care should be taken to continue pressure for some time after an initial break is secured to allow for vacillation and modification. Long periods of isolation after these breaks may be useful in evaluating the reliability of his information. In general, it is better to give him slight rewards (e.g., Cigarettes, baths, etc.) for no apparent reason than to tie them to periods of cooperation, etc. The psychologist's last major involvement in the case appears to have been the series of debriefings having to do with Nosenko's personal history, conducted during the period 3-21 May 1965. These led the psychologist to the following conclusions and recommendations: 1. Nosenko's story was consistent with the previous diagnosis of a "bright sociopath" (i.e., psychopath). 2. The psychologist was "totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was as- signed. 3. New approaches were necessary, as described in the following paragraph:. I have few specific recommendations. The first is to consider q pentothal sodium [sic] interview . . . Second, he can be hit with a hostile, or a better term would be a needling, in- terrogation on his psychological weaknesses. His reaction to my mild needle on him running away from a bad Situation suggests he may be highly vulnerable in this area. Third, some consideration could be given to turn- ing him back to the Soviets. The publication of his life story with SECRET
14-00000 | SECRET -147- the proper editorial changes-- emphasizing the class distinctions and privileges in a classless society could be most humiliating to the Soviets. In addition, we could take the gamble of demonstrating that de- fection is an honorable act of moti- vated men. The US has no room for the misfits and failures of the Soviet system. The above findings were still insufficient for some of the SR Division personnel, who then drafted a series of very specific questions to be put to the psychologist. Of these the first three will be quoted, together with the psychologist's answers: 1. This man's story is full of demon- strable lies. Often these lies seem point- ' less--no matter from what point of view they are studied. When challenged, he will sometimes retreat from one of his stories; in other instances, he will cling adamantly to one even when it is clear to all that he is lying and even when he has an easy way out. In other words, his lies, distortions and rationalizations are harder to under- stand than those of most "normal" people. In your opinion, when he lies, does he do so: a. because he is a compulsive liar; (Answer: No.) b. because he seeks,to bolster his stature and ego for his own reasons; (Answer: Essentially yes.) c. because the KGB told him to. (Answer: Perhaps.) Z. Do the incidence and nature of his in- accuracies and distortions add up to a behavior pattern that might reasonably be called "normal"? If not, how can it be described in layman's terms? (Answer: Not a "normal'' personality but legally normal and not hospitalizeable.) SECRET
14-00000 | SECRET -148- 3. If his behavior pattern is not ‘"normal,'' could it be counterfeit, either for personal reasons or because he was briefed to comport himself this way? Could he play such a role over a considerable period of time? ; (Answer: Absolutely not.) When at long last, in February 1968, SB Division concluded its long-awaited study of the Nosenko case, the findings of the psychologist were included in the following abbreviated form: Nosenko is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dis- sembling for personal reasons. He is not a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for effect, however, and- he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions." Nosenko's rationalizations are not the pro- duct of derangement. The most notable quality of this summary is its selectivity. For example: 1. The summary nowhere mentioned the diagnosis of Nosenko as a psychopath/sociopath. The fact that psychopaths generally try to evade the penalties of their misbehavior by adaptive role-playing (e.g., sudden religious "conversions" to win sympathy and "prove" they are changing their ways) could’ have served dangerously to undercut the thesis that Nosenko was sufficiently dedicated to persist in carrying out a long-term KGB plot in face of the sort of treatment he had received since 4 April 1964. 2. By the above-cited omission, it tends to establish a dichotomy between the "insane" or "psychotic," who suffer "delusions,". and ‘normal people, who tell the truth. It carefully skirted the existence of a middle SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -149- ground between normality and psychoticism in which people do not behave "normally" but are not insane. Yet this distinc- tion had been drawn specifically in answer to one of the SR Division questioned quoted above. Enough has been said to make clear that the psycholo- gist was put in an impossible position. On the basis of the "facts" provided him, he was frankly puzzled as to how Nosenko could have been selected for a KGB mission in- volving extended dissimulation. The psychologist was not sure enough of his ground to stick to his guns. As a psychologist who had dealt previously with a number of Soviet defectors, he had a great degree of insight. On the other hand, he knew that he did not have all the facts, because Chief, SR had specifically told him so. Insight is of very “tittle use when not based on adequate data. Helms tried to help. When told by the psychologist that the latter did not have all the facts necessary to make a judgment about Nosenko, Helms called Chief, SR and instructed him that the psychologist should be fully informed. This instruction appears to have been disre- garded. We can only conclude that the psychologist did what could legitimately be expected of him, within the con- straints of the Agency's command structure. The weak- nesses that in retrospect we can perceive in the psychologist's diagnosis and recommendations can be as- cribed directly to his being asked to make professional judgments based on inadequate knowledge. The propriety of the Agency's employing a professional in this manner should be carefully reviewed. The Role of the Psychiatrist The psychiatrist's role in the Nosenko operation was more extensive and of longer duration than the psychologist's. In addition to physical examinations, it included giving advice on how Nosenko should be treated while in confinement, advice on special interrogation techniques such as the use of sodium pentothal, and an assessment of Nosenko's personality. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -150- The psychiatrist has stated (in discussions with the senior author of this report) that he had been told when he was first assigned to the case that Nosenko was concealing information of great importance to the US government. That he worked throughout the case under this assumption is evident from the total context of his reporting. On the other hand,: there is no evidence that either SR Division or CI Staff shared the reasons for their suspicions with him to a sufficient extent for him to have evaluated their ‘claim, even had he been qualified by professional _ background to make such an evaluation. He knew and accepted his limitations in the latter regard; for example, in a report dated 23 February 1965, after he had spent an hour observing an interrogation, he remarked: [Nosenko] comes off [in] his responses to questions (at least when I saw him) in the same fashion as always though I am not competent to judge the content of what he says. [Underlining added.] Yet, even though the psychiatrist was not an "opera- tions officer" according to normal Agency criteria, during his long association with this case (which included 34 examinations of Nosenko in the year 1964 alone) he acted in more than a purely medical capacity. Not only did he check on Nosenko's health and endeavor to safeguard it, he also advised the operational component of the Agency on certain aspects of their own specialized activities to which his medical and psychiatric knowledge appeared relevant. In this latter capacity, the psychi- atrist's name was invoked frequently in operational ' correspondence, generally without his knowledge; for example, in a 27 November 1964 memorandum to the DDP, concerning arrangements for forthcoming interrogations, Chief, SR stated: Given . . . the assessment by both [the psychi- atrist] and [the psychologist] that Subject is a compulsive talker, we are hopeful that we will: make some progress. By implication, this and other similar references evoked the recondite expertise of the psychiatric and psycholog- ical professionals to bolster claims of impending success. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -151- It should be made clear that throughout the Nosenko affair, the psychiatrist was entitled to feel that he was acting properly in line of duty. His component, the Office of Medical Services/ Operational Services Division, was specifically charged with providing assistance to the operational components of the Agency. It had long been Agency practice, both at Headquarters and in the field, for medical doctors to function in a partly opera- tional capacity, even though they were not neces- sarily cognizant of all aspects of the operations in which they became involved. The assumption was that senior operations officers knew what they were about and that, within rather vaguely defined limits, a doctor of medicine could accept their authority as guaranty of the rightness of what he did to assist them. Thus, it was only natural that the psychiatrist, having been told by senior Agency officials that Nosenko was consistently lying about his true mis- sion, should accept their views. Unlike the psycholo- gist, he did not even have the advantage of having systematically debriefed Nosenko on his life history; ‘had he done so, he might have shared the psycholo- gist's suspicions that the SR Division opinion of Nosenko was not beyond legitimate challenge. Nevertheless, the anomalous situation in which ‘the psychiatrist was placed had two unfortunate consequences: 1. Because he was led to assume that Nosenko was systematically lying, his diagnosis was somewhat distorted. . Ze The same assumption led him to | play a quasioperational role in the handling of Nosenko. -Let us look in greater depth at the first consequence. In so doing, it is not our purpose to second-guess a qualified psychiatrist; rather, it is our purpose to ascertain whether this particular professional, well known to his colleagues for his devotion to duty, was in fact given a fair opportunity to make an honest evaluation. SECRET
14-00000 SEGRET -152- The psychiatrist's diagnosis of Nosenko, which he labeled "Psychiatric Impressions," was dated 20 December 1964. It read in part: Psychiatric impression is that of an individual who shows .an above average intelligence capacity, is shrewd and perceptive. While he claims to have desired to cooperate and work with US officials, his antisocial behavior was destruc- tive and self-defeating to the aims he claimed to pursue. His own needs and desires are of paramount importance to him and he manipulates those around him without regard to consequence in order to satisfy his needs. As such he tends. to be selfish, ungrateful, narcissistic and exhibitionistic. In satisfying his own desires there is no concern for the feelings or interests of others. There has been no evidence of a sense of honor or of shame. He has seen nothing wrong with his own behavior, being unable to view this from another's viewpoint. For most of his adult life, it is reasonable to expect that he has operated in this manner--without conscience, without guilt and has directed his efforts at satisfying his own needs. He may at times give the impression of being a reliable and steadfast person, but after gaining security for himself and the confidence of others, can shrug off major obligations easily. As with many individuals of this personality makeup, his disregard for the truth is remarkable. Whether there is a good chance that he will get away with a lie or whether detection is almost certain, he shows no signs of perturbation and can coolly maintain his position. While com- mitting the most serious of perjuries, it is easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye. Alcohol certainly catalyzes his tendency to uninviting or destructive behavior ... Emotional attachment is shallow. Although he may give at times the impression of being cordial and affectionate, beneath this is an. astonishing callousness. As a youngster, this man might well have been looked upon as a juvenile delinquent with SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -153- constant brushes with authority. As he grew older this behavior most likely continued in the same pattern with occasional brushes with the law and perhaps some punishment. But the effectiveness of his ability to manipulate and protect himself by personable appeals may | ' have kept him in circulation in society on the fringe, so to speak. His reaction to his restricted environment is not unusual, as some such individuals come to accommodate to some limits imposed by authority while at the same time not accepting the seriousness of their situation and believing that, as in the past, they can talk their way out. This man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively. With this view of his personality, it seems unlikely that he could have achieved much stature as a staff intelligence officer. He could, however, have been effective in various types of intelligence operations. On 1 October 1976, the above evaluation was discussed with the psychiatrist in the light of facts previously unknown to him. Inter alia, he was given (in writing) background on the following aspects of the Nosenko case: 1. CIA promises of substantial monetary rewards and an opportunity for Nosenko to work with CIA on a salaried basis. 2. The conclusion of the Director of Security, as of 30 September 1976, that "Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers." 3. Acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides by both FBI and CIA. The memorandum of conversation dictated by the senior author following the above discussion reads in part: [The psychiatrist] agreed that his 20 December 1964 memorandum, as well as subsequent psychiatric SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -154- judgments which he had made, were all heavily dependent on "collateral information" which he obtained from representatives of the SB. Division. He agreed that, had he known the facts as stated in my memorandum, his psychi- atric judgments might have differed from those he actually made. In connection with some of the specific points raised in my memorandum, [the psychiatrist] made the following observations: [1]. He was not aware of the financial or other promises made to Nosenko, and perhaps assumed that Nosenko, like most defectors, was _ angling for large rewards. [The psychiatrist] mentioned Golitsyn as among the precedents which he probably had in mind . [2]. In regard to Nosenko's alleged lying and deception, he was totally dependent upon the judgments of SB Division personnel as well as that of [a polygraph operator]. [The psychiatrist] stated that, until he read my 1 October 1976 memorandum, he had never known that Nosenko had contributed valuable informa- tion. He had also never received any informa- tion concerning Nosenko's behavior since his being released from incarceration... We are thus justified in conciyding that, in the psychiatrist's case as in that of the psychologist, a professional was not given the proper "collateral in- formation" on the basis of which to render a sound profes- sional judgment. More explicitly, because neither the psychiatrist nor psychologist was accurately informed even about such basic aspects of the case as the promises made to Nosenko (which could not possibly be considered to have had sensitive security implications), neither man had an accurate criterion for judging the appropri- ateness of Nosenko's behavior in seeking better treatment. SECRET .
14-00000 SECRET ~155- Given the apparent consensus among the Agency's leadership that there were good and sufficient reasons for incarcerating and trying to "break" Nosenko, it is’ not surprising in hindsight that the psychiatrist offered judgments and advice extending well beyond the bounds of conventional medicine and psychiatry. Since his quasi- operational participation in this case has been covered to some degree in Chapter III, we need only reevoke a few examples here: --His judgment of 24 February 1966 that "things are bound to change as far as Nosenko is con- cerned--he is either going to stop faking or things will get worse." --His judgment, reported on 26 April 1966, |. that reestablishing contact between Nosenko and the interrogators would be a serious mis- take because it would constitute a "relief." --His opinion, offered after monitoring the 6 July 1966 meeting between the principal case officer and Nosenko, that “the way in which the interview was conducted would very effectively slam.shut another psychological door." Admittedly, the above comments come to us secondhand, via memoranda written by others. Nonetheless, they are consistent with everything in the psychiatrist's hand- written reports of his visits to Nosenko in confinement. It will suffice here to illustrate our point with one example, quoted from the psychiatrist's 14 July 1964 re- port of a visit to Nosenko: ‘ a Subject was seen for [the] first time in over two weeks. His general physical condition is satisfactory and his weight is now 170 Ibs. There is evidence however that he is reacting psychologically to his detention and is show- ing increased tension, anxiety and is misin- terpreting various stimuli in his environment. More significant is his conviction that he is being constantly photographed in his room and in the "privacy of his bath." The latter is most disturbing to him especially being SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -156- photographed totally nude. He describes hearing the sound of movie cameras especially in the bath and was quite disturbed over having pictures made without his "panties." (This is the exact word he used.) I asked how pictures were being taken in his -room and he got off the bed, walked over to the door to his room and pointed to pin holes on each side of the door through which he was being clandestinely photographed. He said he had taken photographs of people in compromising positions for operational use in [the] KGB and he understood the reason for this. But he did not understand why the guards continued to take pictures of him--especially in the bath. . In the guard log is a notation last week about a request from him that picture taking be stopped. This sequence, I am convinced, was not play acting. The nebulous situation he finds himself in is beginning to take its toll. From the psychiatric standpoint this is viewed as first sign of disintegration of personality and loss of contact with reality. It may progress or it may remain at this level. It is interesting that this first indicator centers around his "privacy," being in the-nude and is concerned with sexual identification and his underlying concern over this area. At this juncture I do not recommend any changes in his manage- ment [underlining is ours] other than those previously suggested, i.e., reading material, writing material, chair and table in his room. He has been given reading material and I understand from [the principal case offi- cer] who is aware of the above visit, that chair, table, and cigarettes in the room are forthcoming in the next day or so. Although the psychiatrist later changed his mind — and expressed the conviction that Nosenko had been faking his signs of psychological deterioration, the reasons behind his assurance are not evident, at least to the lay mind. There have been ample studies of the effects: of isolation and sensory deprivation on human beings, triggered in large measure by the demands of the space SECRET
14-00000 SEGRET -157- program. They are only partially relevant to Nosenko's situation, because no experimenter in the non-Communist world has ever attempted to impose social isolation or other forms of deprivation on experimental subjects for more than a few days at a time. (The Soviets, who are bound by. fewer restrictions than we, have employed durations of up to 60 days.) Nevertheless, while vari- ous researchers have obtained diverse results, there is ample evidence that certain psychological, physiolog- ical, and behavioral impairments do indeed result from severe restrictions being: placed on physical activity, sensory stimulation, and social interaction; and this generalization seems to apply to Soviets in much the Same way as it does to Americans. The psychiatrist's judgments were not doubt based-in good faith on his clinical judgment, but the question remains as to whether the latter was not distorted by his apparent commitmerit to the cause of "breaking'"' Nosenko. Thus we are led inevitably to the problem of whether such a commitment is appropriate in the case of a doctor of medicine. Conclusions The senior author of this study spent 1972 making a study of Soviet agents-in-place. Two of the conclusions of that study are worth requoting in part four years later: . - . We have not always used our Agency psychiatrists and psychologists to best advantage. When we deal with computers, we know that we have to call on specialists to help us, but we have a false self-confidence in dealing with people. This self-confidence is allowable when we are dealing with people who are normal, but unfortunately many Soviet defectors and just about any Soviet who is willing to serve as an agent-in-place are not psychologically normal. They therefore require very specialized handling ... . . . An operational death wish seemed to overwhelm us, as we insisted on ascribing every aberration of the agent(s) to some Sinister design of the enemy. Granted that SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -158- we must always keep in mind the possibility of an agent's being under opposition con- trol, as long as there is a change that he is genuine we should never let him become aware of our suspicions. We have missed some major operational opportunities by violating this rule. In the Nosenko case, the problem lay not in our failure to make use of the psychologists/psychiatrists but in out gross misuse of them. CIA officials in charge of the Nosenko case until 1967 sought assistance of professionals from this field, as they did from similar people in other fields, only to help shore up certain conceptions. For their part, the psychologist/psychiatric professionals were not of as much help as they could have been. They had become accustomed over the years to playing a subordinate support role to the operators and had developed a "you call--we haul" _ attitude that is inconsistent with the independent- mindedness legitimately to be expected of a professional. In addition, because of the doctrine of compartmentation, the knowledge that the Agency's psychological/psychiatric professionals have had to contribute has, at any given time, been much less than it could and should have been.
14-00000 C: grep C -177- CHAPTER XI Methodology and Leadership Lack of Counterintelligence Methodology We accept without question the necessity for counter- intelligence, as a category of the intelligence process concerned with the activities of hostile powers’ covert and clandestine activities against the United States and our allies. But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic methodology. Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no such thing. We are forced to conclude that, in the 1960s , when Golitsyn; Nosenko, and —__.. contacted CIA, the Plans Directorate and its Clandestine Service were intellec- tually, technically, and procedurally unprepared to handle them. A useful study entitled [CIA] Counterintelligence Interrogation was published by CIA in July 1963, but the handling of Nosenko gives no indication that any of the Agency personnel directly involved had. profited from it, if indeed they had read it at all. Insofar as we can ascertain, in respect to Soviet nationals the Directorate lacked: 1. Explicit written criteria to be applied in evaluating the bona fides of a defector or prospective agent. | i 2. Explicit written procedures for the collection, analysis, and evaluation of the counterintelligence product of a defector or prospective agent. 3 3. Explicit written procedures for psycho- logical evaluation of a defector or prospective agent. 4, Any broadly-based systematic data base (or systematic written procedures for employing it, had it existed) regarding the relevant psychological characteristics of Soviet agents. There did exist some psychological data’ regard- ing defectors, but they had not been collated SEGHET
14-00000 SECRET -178- and analyzed, nor were they objectively applied to the cases of Nosenko and Golitsyn. The latter was himself never even tested. B. Influence of Chief, CI on Methodology The predominant influence in the counterintelligence field within the Agency until 1975 was the then Chief, CI. His reputation for expertise rested on his purportedly unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political role. In truth, no one could compete with him as an expert on this subject. His analyses, based on fragmentary and often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than systematic and therefore neither easily comprehended nor replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike the Emperor and his imaginary clothes, Chief, CI's fantasies were never . vulnerable to objective examination, simply because he surrounded such data as existed with a wall of secrecy. His "facts"' were available in full only to a minimum number of trusted apostles; to the rest of the intelligence com- munity, both American and foreign, he doled them out selectively-~-seldom in written form--to prove whatever point he was trying to make at the time. Chief, CI's preference for oral over written communica- tion is worth emphasizing. During his incumbency as its chief, the CI Staff, though it supposedly had in its possession information concerning a horrendous hazard to both the United States and its allies, never committed to paper any complete, written, documented report on the sub- ject. Therefore, the threat could never be systematically analyzed and evaluated. Only when Chief, CI finally departed did dispassionate analysis of CI Staff's data holdings finally become possible, and these have consistently failed to support his central claims regarding the KGB's massive influence in world affairs. C. Impact of Faulty Counterintelligence on Positive Intelli- - gence Collection There is an important interrelationship between coun- terintelligence, as it was conducted in the 1960s, and the collection of positive intelligence from human sources. Only if this relationship is spelled out can the full im- pact of the events we have been describing be comprehended. SEORET po?
14-00000 C, SECRET ©, -179- At the time CIA was established, the primary mission of what was later to become the Plans Directorate's Clandestine Service was conceived to be the collection of strategically-significant intelligence from clandestine human sources. How successful was the Clandestine Service in fulfilling this mission? Agency claims of success in .the human-source col- lection field have often been so phrased, whether inten-. tionally or not, as to give the impression that our achievements stemmed largely from the process called “development and recruitment." The impression that we "recruited" our best Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources fol- lowing a period of orderly development must be dispelled, before there can be meaningful discussion of previously described deficiencies. In most major Soviet cases prior to 1970, it might be more nearly correct to say that the sources “developed” the Americans. In the case of Penkovskiy, to cite an extreme example, US officials made even the latter process so outrageously difficult for him that he had to write a letter to both the Queen of England and President Eisenhower in order finally to achieve a clandestine working relationship with the British and American intelligence services. If our most significant positive intelligence and much of our most significant counterintelligence from human sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact nationals who volunteered their services, why did we fail to systematize their handling more fully? Even more to the point within the framework of the present study, why would we not give such persons the benefit of every reasonable doubt rather than treat them with suspicion and, in the cases of Nosenko and - — ( outright inhumanity? What Went Wrong? There are no easy or certain answers. Nonetheless, a retrospective glance at the intellectual preparation of those who led the Clandestine Service may shed light on the problem and permit the formulation of constructive recommendations for future action. The leaders of the Clandestine Service in its first quarter century were, for the most part, people who had
14-00000 SECRET -180- emerged from World War II, oriented toward action rather than contemplation. Chief, CI was almost unique in his interest in long-range analysis. Within the Clandestine Service, his generation was in general suspicious of theory and ill-prepared in most cases to cope with it. On the other hand, the best of the Service's leaders --and there were many good ones--were successful because they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called com- mon sense. Its value should not be underestimated. For example, when Penkovskiy was producing strategic intelli- gence that remains of value to this day, it was the com- mon sense of these other leaders that led them to resist Chief, CI's allegation that Penkovskiy was a “disinforma- tion agent." Nevertheless, senior Clandestine Service supervisors of the period 1948-1970 had seldom themselves been trained in rigorous analytic techniques, and thus they seldom were in a position to demand high standards of analysis of their subordinates. Until the massive outflow of retirees in recent years changed the demography of the Service, most senior operational supervisors had received their higher educations before systematized analysis be- came routine even in such "soft" subjects as political science (for which a knowledge of inferential statistics is now required at most universities). Many, probably most, of these same gentlemen were also educated during a sort of interregnum in academe, when the study of classical logic had passed from vogue but had not yet been replaced by emphasis on scientific method. In the realm of. technology, almost all senior executives. in the Clandestine Service before 1970 had finished college before the first digital computer, an invaluable analytical tool, became commercially available about 1951. , There also have been, of course, a number of bright spots. Some of the Plans Directorate's divisions and staffs had subordinate components that specialized in sub- stantive intelligence and built up great expertise on specific subjects over the years. From time to time there were also bursts of enthusiasm for the use of psychological evaluation techniques in the assessment of prospective agents. But these cases were exceptions; primary reliance within the Clandestine Service was on judgments that, though sometimes bolstered by impressive figures and arcane terminology, were nevertheless essentially intuitive and non-systematic. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET ~181- Such systems and criteria as did exist were largely in the heads of various individuals, and there is no evidence of any appreciable long-term consensus among the latter. Every defector case tended to be subject to the vagaries of the momentary line-up of CIA leadership. The existence of an Interagency Defector Committee, subordinate to the DDP, introduced some uniformity of approach, but its concerns were limited for the most part to superficial administrative and procedural formalities. Summary If we seem to have wandered far afield from the » nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies, we have done so because the unfortunate handling of Nosenko was not an isolated event. Rather, it was symptomatic of some fundamental inadequacies of the Plans Directorate. What this means to us is that the long-needed improvement in our conduct of counterintelli- gence activity, now well underway, must be carried on within the framework of a searching reexamination of the analytical techniques employed by the Directorate and its Clandestine Service. Whatever the course taken, however, we believe that the last quarter of this century is going to be even more exigent, though in a different way, than the past twenty- five years. We therefore sum up the implications of this chapter by posing a single question: How can we ensure that the upcoming generation of Clandestine Service leaders is-better prepared intellectually to meet the challenges that face them than were those who ran the Service in the sixties? ‘) SEGRET
14-00000 SECRET -182- CHAPTER XII Conclusions and Recommendations A. The Letter of Instructions General guidance for the preparation of this report was contained in a Letter of Instructions, signed by the Deputy Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It as- signed the following tasks: You are tasked to write an analysis of the Nosenko case which will address the following Matters: {1]. The bona fides of Nosenko. [2]. The value of Nosenko to the United States and allied govern- ments. [3]. The relationship and significance of Nosenko to other agents and operations. [4]. The identification of unex- ploited Nosenko penetration leads and information. ; [5]. The nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies. We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather liberally, because the ramifications and implications, of the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we, and probably the framers of the above letter, anticipated. Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs a. through e. 1. Bona Fides Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of our own making. Had the job of initially assessing him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating the intelligence he had to offer, been handled SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -183- properly, he could have been declared a bona fide defector as readily as have many other Soviet in- telligence officers. This is not to say that we can be certain of the genuineness of any defector. It will always remain hypothetically possible that the Soviet government, acting through the KGB or some other instrumentality, will attempt to plant an intended “disinformation agent" or prospective penetration of our government on our doorstep. But the useful- ness of the Soviets' doing so, in the manner as- cribed to them in the Nosenko case, is probably as Slight, as is the feasibility. Soviet success in using native-born citizens of other countries to spy on their own homelands has been considerable. By contrast, there is no record of the USSR's suc- cesfully infiltrating the government. of a major non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged Soviet citizen, least of all one whose career has been spent in a Soviet intelligence or security service. We therefore conclude that Nosenko was from the beginning a bona fide defector. Value of Nosenko Nosenko's contribution has been summarized in Chapter IV. He has been of great value, but he probably could have been even more valuable had he been properly handled. Relationship to Other Agents and Operations As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the Nosenko case, through no fault of the defector him- . self, had a most unfortunate effect on all clandestine operations in the Soviet field. Identification of Unexploited Leads We have not felt that this subject was one we ‘could feasibly or properly investigate. To do so would have meant delving into the past and current operations of both the SE Division and the CI Staff to ascertain the extent to which there might have SECRET
14-00000 SECRET -184- been "exploitation" of any of the hundreds of persons whom Nosenko identified by name. Time would not have permitted us to accomplish this task, nor would our doing so have been consistent with the principle of compartmentation. Methodology It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the variety of techniques used in handling Nosenko did not conform to any generally accepted sense of the term "methodology." Recommended Action Most of our recommendations for action have been previously stated or implied. In the following para- graphs, we recapitulate them, with such supplementary remarks as seem necessary. 1. Examination of the Role of Professionals We recommend that the role that can properly be played within the Agency by members of the organized professions--medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law, and others--be given careful study, within the con- text of (a) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills to the best possible use, and (b) refraining from in- volving them in matters not properly within their professional purview. Improvement of Intellectual Standards We recommend that the Operations Directorate, and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps are possible to ensure that the intellectual caliber of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the future. We realize that the present personnel selection system sets high standards for those entering on duty at the professional level, particularly as regards 1Q and education. But the standards presently in force do not by themselves guarantee that future selections will possess independence of mind, analytical ability, and objectivity. SEGRET
14-00000 4. ~ SECRET -185- In the case of personnel already on board, it should be kept in mind that we live in a rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented civilization. Knowledge and intellectual skills adequate at this time may be inadequate a few years from now. For an intelligence or- ganization, we define "inadequate" as anything that is less than the best. We suggest that a board of expert consultants be established, drawn primarily from research in- stitutions, high-technology enterprises, and the academic world to recommend a program of screening new entrants and improving the analytical skills of those already on duty, with the aim of achiev- ing and. maintaining a high level of intellectual excellence throughout the Operations Directorate. Detection of Deception We recommend that high priority be accorded a program to develop new methods of detecting deception. Some steps are already underway in this regard, but they should be extended and given greater emphasis. Present methods, based mainly on the use of the polygraph, are clearly obsolete. Specific criteria of bona fides will follow naturally from improved methods of detecting deception. Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent Handling and Personnel Selection ‘We recommend a multi-track program of psychologi- cal research, geared specifically to the Operations Directorate's needs, to develop a new generation of personality assessment techniques necessary for both defector/agent handling and selection of DDO person- nel. This program should be under direct DDO control. A surprising amount of relevant expertise now exists within the Agency, and some valuable research is underway, but it is not being geared to DDO's needs to the extent it could be. Instead, it is - being handled by another directorate, which currently accords it a low priority. SECRET
14-00000 . SEGRET -~186- It is theoretically possible to establish, within the reasonably near future, certain measurable physiological correlates of a number of personality types. It is also theoretically quite possible, though not yet demonstrated, that by establishing such physiological correlates we could take much of the guesswork out of personality evaluation. We would thus substantially reduce the threat that the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities poses for the Agency, and particularly for the Operations Directorate.: Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors We recommend early, systematic psychological evaluation, by clinical psychologists using standardized measurement techniques, of all denied area agents, as well as defectors from the denied areas. We recommend against dependence on psychiatric examina- tions, unless the psychiatrists are willing to use the same standardized instruments as the psychologists would. Although few, if any, of the Soviet or Soviet Bloc agents to whom we have had direct and continuing access have ever been tested as long as they remained in agent status, we do not accept as valid the reasons usually given for not testing them. Implementation of this recommendation would, if the other programs above-recommended are also car- ried out, contribute substantially toward authentica- tion of agent sources and information. SECRET