The Committee's initial review of the materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during the course of its review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That. file made reference to A-l. Included in this file was a. memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by . Joseph Langosch. which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. (CIA boc. FOTA 68-290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this file were the A-1 debriefing memorando of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA #687-295, attach's 3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the ‘Committee requested access to all CIA files. concerning referring to A-l. From review of these materials the Committee | has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably. had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.
Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that, the Director consent to an interview before the © Warren Commission on May 14, 1964. (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren . . Vol Zz ’ . Zé . Commission Report,“ P2i72e)(CIA Doc. FOIA 689-298, Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton also wrote: I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the. sensitive Western Hemisphere source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number OF new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the. Conmission prior to the Director's appear- ance unless we have first had some pre- liminary: reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implica- tions since it.could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP- stated that he would review this care- fully amd made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.)
Undoubtedly the White House source referred to in Angleton's memowas A-1. This conclusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which was quite close in time to A-l1's defection. “In addition, Rocca's staff prepared . prior to DCI McCone' S appearance before the Warren a “Brief Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission W- outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64) At Tab E of this brief it states: Within the past week, significant infor- mation has been developed by the CIA re- garding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in. Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on. the Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab BE) On May 15, 1964, the day of McConeé's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-l. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64) However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-l by his real name or cryptonym nor did’ the Agency indicate that the source of this information
was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (Ibid.). The May 15 communication did state that the Agency had ‘established contact "with a well-placed invidivual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia." (Ibid.) Attached to.the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of - May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro- bable contact with ‘the DGI in Mexico ity. The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment) As set forth in the section of this report concerning: Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which ‘the informa- tion set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the questions nor the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector col- laborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64).
. Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant | information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically of Nov. 22 details of her her conversation ana“@ssociation with Cuban Intelligence were withheld from the Warren Commission. This information as described above, was derived from However, debriefings of A-l. from the Committee's review of the A-l] file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1l to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that ao specific document referenced in the A-1 file is” not present in that file. - whe missing itemis of considerable concern to the Committee. It is a debriefing report of A-1_ entitled "The Oswald Case." (CIA Doc bispatch UFGW- | 5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-~l debriefing reports. (Ibid.) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report. is the handwritten notation "ST." A CIA employee who has worked extensively with the Agency files
system told a Committee Staff memebr that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component , ere mere Avge , CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum datea2* , the CIA has adopted the feotteweng pos: ion amon Seen debriefing Report No. 4U.15 @ . up lication, of the a . ginal Kangosch Me rn oCandeem o& Me Ss, \aG4, Concerning Ammu-s<'s knowl 7 of Lee Harve Os edeha's possible cared wi tin thre z RB «o* Ke Cif meme Farddden sede +e ee oes! When Ct Sré& jearned of Aram: REE K ion Gr Co nsidvvred We possi abt woe ne Wa Pew Some ino of Whe OS 8a Came CIS ta suite rr Weed oa (ist o- ct qucttiss re uset C Peter itimisgAdr“n) So 6 dtie ti Eine, ay Wott desk recordc ratle DT Wheater Amr wer few ecit ede A HN RY Ce IY this west & CNN 16, LB ec rse he Aypsicly thi oy dsoatk CORE LAS. arch led as ta, SENSATHAR prc der , tere < ores) The Committee has questo med A-L's case officers regarding additional information that A-l may have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch, when interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived fron A-1l's de-~- briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph ‘Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also Interviews of Hildago & Piccolo) He also stated that he does not recall that A-1 provided any other information
on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for. that set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as discussed herein. (Ibid.) In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that A-1 provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to locate A-l. The CIA has also attempted to locate. E820" peladjonship @ /s ambrguens A-l, whosd SPR rent with the Agency wes—terminated SAPEPT _, but has been unable to determine his _ present whereabouts. The we ntti to igette A-l has been a source of concern to this Committee particularly in light of his long association with the Agency. | | ‘Thus, gaps do exist regarding information A-1- may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. However ,with the > exception of the Calderon episode and on the basis of the CIA's written record it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1 information of investigative significance. A separate question remains however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commision that A-1 was present in the Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled ae fA Apt is7e C1A Communic Atom re pe “ Since is 197E nen (4 P- rp) nas net peen am Vohred 1 oa eng CA © peraktion Ca Mian or w ke where. Tose Weces is atvas of «CIA re ple cenkakive whe persed Ae rie&s Caml) A ; nm personalities oO 5 of thea Pel. There ig no othe wy “ GZo7E9D C/A 202447 loSneR Lo ite COR PEGE 2 ete tn BF ee ?) over the, FB reach: ~, A-l stukes i
conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for. protecting its sources, the fact that A-l1's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record:tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option. “In light of, the establishment of A-l's _ bona fides, . oo a a his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of “Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been ccnsidered by the Warren Commission. The AMLASH Operation During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an
Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA | cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to’ assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). Asa. result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965.as the result of security leaks. (Ibid. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his . conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to “twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110). In its examination of the AMLASH operation ‘the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. 80)
The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving . . him an assassination device for use against CASTRO. " (Ibid. ) oe The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The | 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was tried in Havana, press reports of Cuban knowledge f <siiaacinta | oO of AMLASH's association with the CIA weredated from won November 1964, approximately one year after. President "Kennedy's assassination) (Ibid. p. 111). | The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation. in great detail. (ssc, Book V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Church Committee concluded: . \ The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commision work than the early CIA © assassination plots with the underworld. Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH
operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH' s proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told ‘of | the AMLASH operation. No one investi- gated a connection between the AMLASH ‘operation and President Kennedy's | * assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti- Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not. conduct a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p. 5)