178-10003-10387 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE : DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9] ; HW 50955 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information CAR/HARDY 178-10603-10387 SUBJECT FILE BELIN ASSASSINATION DRAFTS Document Information ROCK GRAY, MARVIN E. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 05/22/1975 20 ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS CIA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC GRAY, MARVIN ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TRUJILLO, RAFAEL REPORT Top Secret Consulted Withhold 07/29/1993 Part Il of 2-part draft--Dominical Republic only. Docld: 3241129272 Page 1
oe TOP SECRET ~ a tons nye GRAY/sin DRAFT . 178-10003-10387 5/22/75 Ee “whe Dominican Republic i. | Summary and _Con¢lusion ; in late 1960 and 1961, the United States, having abandoned its policy of nonintervention in the Dominican Republic, sought to bring about the overthrow: of the regime _of. .Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo and the establishment of - a moderate successor government. To accomplish this result several measures were undertaken on the diplomatic level and the Special Group (predecessor of the cy Committec) ‘approved a program of covert action as well. At their ‘direction the CIA. encouraged a group of internal dissidents along with several exile organizations. On May 30, 1961, “members of the internal group assassinated prusillo. @here was no direct american participation in the assassination. The idea originated with the Dominicans; they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they _@id the detailed planning. They were never subject to “*American supervision or control. \ wget ns oy \ HY $0955 Doecld:327112922 Page 2? a GIVYID AHL WOT AdODOLOHAa AUVAGIT aoa
-71- On the other hand, CIA and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assasSination, and they were well aware of the group's lethal intentions. The CIA had told the group of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans; it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of explosives to kill Trujillo. “As a gesture of American support, three revolvers and three carbines, along with Limited supplies of ‘ammunition, ers about two months before the were passed to the plott ft at One of the carbines was reportedly le assassination. . the scene of the crime. Four submachineguns were also sent. to the Dominican Republic by diplomatic pouch. They “were with- apartment held from the plotters because of lastrminute State De “objections. - | | - | It appears that high-level State Department and- learned guns had been provided to AUWAGIT auod "Y aiwago aHL- HOUs- RdODOLOHE White House officials first al assassins some six weeks after the transfer, and potenti to Trujillo! Ss death. A state- about two and a half weeks prior ment of policy was prepared and approved by the President, "ye must not run risk of U.S. association wit 3 , reading as a matter of general rr “political assassination, since U.S. r policy cannot condone nati This last prince iple is “overriding and ‘must prevail in doubtful situations. The preparation of this mossage, and the required coordination, HW 50955 Docld:327112922 Page 3 assassination.
se | ~72- consumed about two weeks. There is no evidence of any effort during this period to recover the weapons or other- % “))~0o wise interfere with the assassination plans. The policy statement was cabled to the Dominican Republic on May 29, the day before the successful assassination attempt. Both the Consul General and the CIA Station Chief in Ciudad 7 Pruj illo promptly protested this change in the policy which ‘they had followed in the belief it had been approved by appropriate authority. Before these cables were received win Washington, Trujillo was dead, ¢ HW 50955 Docld:32112992 Page 4 mit eeet nn mney ener aencenenane werent mg anes abrenenar sntrQe RQ ERR en te ere AUVdHIT Gdod “Y GIWadD AHL WOoUd- KAODOLOHA
om . ; 436 2, (Provosed) General Conclusion and Recommendation The Comhission concurs in the position taken in the policy statement. We: have concluded that there was an improper level of American involvement in the death of Generalissimo Trujillo. — That is so even though the assassins might have been able to procure equivalent weapons £xrom ‘other sources. We also conclude that despite the apparent - good faith of the persons concerned,-there was inadequate q “consideration of the risks of such involvement and inadequate supervision and coordination of the operation. | We recommend that in the future, weapons should be . supplied to plotters of a coup or revolution only in,,the rarest of circumstances, if at all. In passing on such aetivities the approving authority should consider carefully the potential damage to the foreign relations of the nation and the feelings of the american people if such activities become known. In our judgment eventual disclosure is inevitable. The pro quire the concurrence of the Department of State before weapons, ammunition, explosives, and similar items are transmitted by The treaty obligations of the U.S., including « § “@iplomatic pouch. nna Convention on Diplomatic “particularly those under the Vie ation should be observed an@ fulfill Te oA NM BW 50955 Docld:327112922 Page 5 ce ee nent ene ene Ne RN Rt RE AE RRA AA OT cedures of the CIA should be modified to re-~ ed in good faith..con rs) “A GIWAGS WHEL WOWT ARaODOLOHG | . KaWdGT cued:
use of torture and- murder as tools of government, and because '* attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other _ downfall but to identify, develop, and encourage a-.moderate » group which would take power-in the event of Trujillo's death, WAS + “ Po oe Je wee HW 50955 Clearly required by treaty, convinced many Latin Americans “assistance in toppling Trujillo. MT ns 3. The Chronology a. The Background Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Re- public in 1930. By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt. and:. regressive nature of his regime, because of his systematic of his intervention in the affairs of other nations. The country was in considerable turmoil as the result of. several Latin American countries, The policy of the United States at the beginning of Waa Tb NOUS RAOSOTOHE 1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Trujillo's flight, or overthrow. This policy of non-intervention, although KUWAIT ques ‘u-a ‘that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, whose support the United States badly-wanted in connection with operations against Castro, conditioned their support’on U.S, In April the President approved : *- contingency planning for a more active U.S. role in the event’ the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to. ..0 ‘ deteriorate. Doclda:3211279927 Page 6
b. the Rifles Moy In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican Re- Both State Départ- public returned to Washington for consultations. _ ment and CIA files in@icate that he reported the dissidents | i needed weapons, particularly a "smail number of high- powered rifles with telescopic lenses." The Ambassador has no present recollection of any such request. He is confident that he made no serious effort to obtain them, Nevertheless, the request went forward, Near the end of June, according to CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- ‘American Affairs approved the provision of "a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene," and requested that they be supplied at the earliest possible moment, Neither the CIA -officer who obtained this approval nor the, Assistant Secretary, “now both retired, has any recollection of this meeting. AUWAGT'T. dod. .° a... d Twa AHL -HOUd-AGOIOLOHE- RE ed, a Ce . HY 50955 Docld: 32112922 Page 7
Cc, Explosives On June 24, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an unsuccessful} attemot on the life of the President of Venezuela; as a- result the United States and other OAS countries severed diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations were retained. | . The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign service! officer who served as Deputy ‘Chief of Mission before ‘the severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter. lt was his recollection that the dissidents. had no definite - assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of that course as the only way out of the conditions under which | they lived. It was not until early 1961, as he recalls, that the dissidents began formulating specific plans | to Ki UL | “Grujillo. The cables and memoranda of the period tend to confirm this recollection. Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals during 1960 to discuss with the dissidents means for the assassination of Trujillo. ‘A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the \ Gissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, detonated from -a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means , of an | armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary el action, A more detailed proposal. along similar line S appears. to have been provided by the dissidents in December. HW 50955 Docld:3271179292 Page 8 *.- OWED -aH-HOwd—RaOSOLOHE— ae AUWAET1..Ty04 Se es
a77- On December 29, 1960, the Deputy Director for Plans presented the Special Group with a program for covert action - ce | | ‘notion, obtained Special Group consent to have the internal : ; ; ' dissidents furnished "limited Supplies of small arms and other 5 : equipment, " meaning explosives, subject to the condition | - ” that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point g ‘outside the country itself. The internal State Department | a memorandum which led to this proposal stated there would be 2 pact no. thought of toppling the government by any such “minor measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the hands of the pro-U.S, opposition with a corresponding boost to their morale and their opinion of the United States. The station and the consulate were informed of the Special Group .: action on January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower vy Fae Administration. President Kennedy was informed of the Special i Se tet Wan ie a res Group action not later th HY 50955 Docld: 3241129232 Page 9 HHL WOUd.AdO30LOHd—- ——-— Two weeks later, the Department of State, on its ow an mid-February... a
~78-— The Commission finds no reason to believe that any member of the Special Group intended to authorize the furnish- ing of assassination weapons. However, those CIA officials who had been involved in dealings with the dissidents very ~ likely believed that the Special Group had authorized support of the planned assassination and armed uprising. aus i Revolvers. . woe puring the early months of 1961 the CIA Station and the consular officials in| ‘kept in close touch with ‘the dissidents, and they were aware of their varioug schemes “W-QIWUSS-AHE-WOWI-NaUIOLOHS to assassinate Trujillo, Although these officials apparently — took no active role in the development of plans, they did on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the dissidents. In mid-February, two members of the dissidents’ - AVIA quod- "Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination, came to the United States. They met with both CIA and State | bepartment officers. During these meetings they stated repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the ‘assassination of Trujillo. The evidence is insufficient to . permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the © DT State Department. F Rea “ “ eho MS wee aoe 7 HY 50955 Docld: 32112922 Page 10
-79- In March matters took an active turn. Ina cabib ; on March 4, a letter on March 16, and an airgram on March 22° the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans | : for Trujillo's assassination.were coming to a head. He : requested additional authority to supply the pro-uU.s. 3 ‘dissidents with weapons. | I . Similar requests were made by the CIA Station : ‘Chief of his headquarters. Three times headquarters responded : that it could not comply with these requests because the 8 restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the & introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by _ ” "Americans. me | g | : et HW 50955 Docld:32112992 Page 11°
, ae. a tne CIA met wi stating » introdu RNS eet pe tae Soe =B0- roh 22, representatives of the On the same day, Ma th the State Department officer who served as their point of contac’. with the Department's Bureau of Interm American Affairs. Three days later, on March 25, the Deputy Director for plans cablec the station setting forth United States policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and that the revolvers and ammunition would be sent by in the near future. diplomatic pouch ing in either CIA or ‘state Depart~ - Phere is noth ment files to indicate whether the Departmen ‘aecision- The memories of the participants are hazy on the | matter, but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the ction of handguns into the Dominican Republic,,and believed it obtained approval . phe then Deputy Director for ‘plans testified that as the rerritorial restriction on delivery of weapons was initially imposed at the request of the Department of State, he would have considered the State Depart~ ment's willingnes to waive the rest turned to the Special Group for and probably would not have ret served that the member formal approval. He ob s of the Group or their staffs might have been advised informally. wy HY ! 50955 Doclad: 32112922 Page 12 t was consultes on tha riction as adequate. authority AaWda * | _ IT aquoag “wu aitwax95 wats WOUS_KdODOLONE- : :
revolvers were. 1 . : The CIA files indicate that the passed to the dissidents, and the Department of State files in- dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and, the other two “py Agency officers. Neither the Consul General nor the former Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter. | e+ Carbines On Maxch 26, the day after CIA de nish the revolvers, the station cabled that it had found three M-1 cided to £ur- carbines in the consulate, left behind by departing naval personnel. It requested magazines for the weapons and : - permission to pass them to the dissidents, On March 29 the oe. _. Assistant Deputy Director for Plans responded that he was pouch ns. the > magazines: and that eadquare was “inclined to co Fle BS rd wa cae Lelio BN be a Se? HY 50955 Docld: 32112922 Page 13 AUVdaIT GUOd *¥ awag9ana-howa-nacoonoHa!
. place. +82- favor" passing the weapons and ammunition. Another meeting was held with the Department of State on March 31. The State Department memorandum makes no mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director for Plans granted authority to pass the carbines the same day. Both the State Department liaison officer ,- who prepared the memorandum of the meeting, and the Consul General are clear in their recollection that the State Department ‘in Washington ‘did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul ' General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took. Nothing in CLA files indicates that this decision was ‘coordinated in advance with the Department of State, It is “possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization -with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well. It is also possible that CIA deciced the Special “Group restriction on importation of weapons did not apply, as the carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic. . A reassuring reply from the Consul General was received two Meese pe oe wo Etat . re aes . whe Se te 50955 Docld: 32112922 Page 14 ~~ -AUWdGIT GuOd- “a- @IVHTD ANT WORT KAOVOLOHa
ee sion to provide the carbines was inadequate. It is impossible - to determine from this evidence where the fault lies. “tion in had been informed that the assassins in- - tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress- -83- Jt is clear that the coordination on the deci- £. Submachine Guns As early as March 20, the consulate and the sta- 4 oe substantially the plan followed some two months later, Although the plan originally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress’ residence using silenced weapons, the group requested five M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self defense in case the assassination plans went awry and there was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces. In its March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was prepared to provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the capacity to receive them at sea or in a cache on the coast, © HY 50955 Docld: 32112922 Page 15 | Bk: - (eomin ste aneemee ss np esi meee om emer ces
| but that for security reasons they could not be sent | . hy | , bY pouch, re oA. GG at j - _—eeseennnnurrvevven ven yyiinnnninnnnnnennnn _ j\ - | - : — | | te | i: | | 3 | | Po ' ho The files show that there was no coordination Fe ‘with the Department of State in Washington. Because of the 3) -- Bay o£ Pigs landing on April 17, the station and the consulate Z “were never given authority to supply the weapons to the ay dissidents and they never did so. . a On May 2, as the result of repeated entreaties H . rt from the station and the consulate, the: Deputy Director for Plans a approved a cable for the DCI's release, stating that as it 5 appeared the Action Group was prepared to act whether or not _ the submachineguns were provided, the station was authorized to pass them for the additional protection of the group. , .i Apparently someone decided this decision should not be made : i without the consent of the Department of State, for on May 3 od , c : | . : Nat ' “4 &. en * ” a pees eee : P “4! ~ 2. wer’. «oh 2%. we TA enna y 4 Leo ot, ae: - wate Oe 2 er ' HW 509545 ° Doecld:32112922 Page 16
_ Force on Latin America. - pre _ approximately a year, the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency Task According to Berle's memorandum of the interview, confirmed by one of the witnesses, the initial sentation stated the group wished the arms in order to overthrow Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined lan was to assassinate Trujillo, and that the that the real p Berle responded that he guns were wanted for that purpose. could not care less for Trujillo, but that the United States ‘did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. The Agency officer,. who had been in a supervisory position with respect to this effort for told Berle he felt the same Waste Tt may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over- rmed the station that a high-level - “ruled; on May 5 a cable info State Department decision on the submachineguns was pending. Nothing in the files indicates what this cable might have 8 the station was informed ‘referred to. In any event on May that the State Department had disapproved passage of the submachineguns, and this ended the matter. MY. 50955 Docld: 32112922 Page i? AMVdGIT dod .°a- atwaHS- 3HE- WONT KaODOLOHa
-86- The Polic Statement g. Ini mid-May, as a result of increasing indications , oY a. . i that events in the Dominican Republic were Teaching a climax, . the White House requested situation reports and contingency plans. This exercise was overseen by a member of the National Security Council Staff. A CIA briefing paper prepared for .this purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal . defense "attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo.” The report implied that both the revolvers and the ammunition had been in the consulate with the carbines, and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization ba technically did not apply. The CIA liaison officer at the State Department called to his superiors" attention the fact that weapons had al- and apparently submitted a memorandum outlining | “ready been passed, - , the reasons why the United States should not be involved in this activity. Among them were that the United States Government should not lend itself to direct political assassination, that the moral posture of the United States looul@ ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world, ¢ that the United States would have encouraged the action, HY 50955 Doecld: 327112922 Page 18 ~AUVEIET: UOT “UY -CIVATD- IRL: .WOWT AGODOLOHA
_~87- supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen, and that the United States could not afford a precedent which might convince the world that our d@iplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons. On May 15 a joint CLIA-State Department memorandum was sent the President’ s National Security Adviser informing him that the plans of the pro-U.S. group were well advanced in the direction of ousting Trujillo "by any means.' This: memorandum aid not call attention to the fact that the united States had supplied ‘weapons to the group. In the midst of these discussions, the Consul “ General, who had been in Washington for consultativny cabled on his “yeturn to the Dominican Republic that the dissident group planned to "execute action against Trujillo" that evening. The Department replied that it would consider this. taming particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of ‘the ‘Consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom. . | ‘This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer. The state of the covert action program in the é i.  pominican Republic was discussed in the Special Group on May 18, ana@ again on May 25, ‘The Commission has not had access to ’ belt . ‘ . wo Fn oa “the minutes. — HW 50955 Doecld: 32112922 Page 19
-~88- On May 24, the State pepartment liaison officer draft cable, stating that provided the Under Secretary with a the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter-_ vention, and even more so from political assassination, overrode the need to secure credit with the Dominican dissidents and with Latin America generally. This draft was approved at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was sent to the White House for President Lal review. After some redrafting in the White House, the final version in another stated "We must not run risk of U.S. association with ' hand, ‘as a matter of general. political assassination, since U.S, policy cannot condone assassination." This versionswas approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican Republic. It arrived the. day before Trujillo's death on May 30. On June 1 the State Department instructed its-Consul General, ~ if he could do so "most inconspicuously to destroy any records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related matters. HW 50955 Docld: 32112922 Page 20 ~@TWUIS- AHL WO AAOIOLONT —_—— soe ee ee RUE. Or
.. ‘ : -~B9- ‘j Tp Ny 74 A por Ul Deb ital ssassina~ Fr, Conclusion ord has fixmly announced that as president F ‘kyon is not and should never be a tool of United States policy. The Commission joins in this statement. Tt is against the constitutional and moral principles for which this republic stands for ‘there to be any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United States Government in any plans involving t the assassination of any person in peacetime. | BW 50955 Docld:3271129272 Page 21 "a OTE. d-Kou . kaWdGIT quod | a 1S