| R-15594 0. 1h4az |S ECRET EYES ONLY 1414492 FM CIA TO STATE EYES ONLY FOR RUSK, HARRIMAN, BALL, HILSMAN, HUGHES OSD EYES ONLY FOR Mc NAMARA, GILPATRIC, TAYLOR, KURLAK, MR WILLIAM BUNDY WHITE HOUSE EYFS ONLY FOR Mc GEORGE BUNDY. ” BH T SECRET EYES ONLY CITE CAS SAIGON 2441 ie FOR STATE , DOD, JCS AND CIA —e ©) HONOLULU FOR CINCPAC AND CIA “' JOINT EMBASSY, MACV, CAS MESSAGE . REF! DEPTEL 570 1. THIS IS THE FIRST OF THREE MESSAGES IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE AND DEALS WITH IN-COUNTRY PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS, 2. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN COMPLETED FOR THE TURNOVER : “ BY CAS TO MACV OF BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND MOUNTAIN SCOUT ASSETS. oy i | ' THIS MESSAGE DEALS WITH THE REMAINING IN-COUNTRY PARAMILITARY e ‘OP. ATIONS SPECIFIED IN DEPTEL 570. THESE ARE THE COMBAT INTELLI- - GENCE TEAM PROGRAM, THE CILIVIAN AIRBORNE RANGERS, AND THE GOL) | BRITISH/MALAYAN TEAM, [A] D Se IT IS JOINTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THESE IN-COUNTRY PARA- - MILITARY ASSETS BE TURNED OVER TO MACV FOR SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE. 4. THE COMBAT INTELLIGENCE TEAM PROGRAM COMPRISES SOME 65% INDIVIDUALS OPERATING IN TEAMS OF APPROXIMATELY 18 MEN EACH. : IT PARALLELS IN EVERY WAY THE MOUNTAIN SCOUT PROGRAM, THE ASSETS OF WHICH ARE NOW BEING ABSORBED INTO THE CIDG PROGRAM, HOWEVER, ‘J IT OPERATES IN NON-MONTAGNARD AREAS AND IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF ~ ETHNIC VIETNAMESE, THIS PROGRAM ORIGINALLY CAME UNDER THE SUPPORT : _ OF CAS SINCE IT WAS BASED ON A STAY-BEHIND PROGRAM WHICH WAS - ACTIVATED WHEN THE NEEDS OF THE INSURGENCY SITUATION SO DICTATED. THE 2 ASSETS HAVE NOW BECOME OVERT, MACV HAS THE CAPABILITY TO ABSORB THEM AS A PART OF THE CIDG STRIKE FORCES. THIS ACTION 2 WOULD ENHANCE U.S, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THESE ASSETS. Docld: 324295003 Page?
ie THE CIVILIAN AIRBORNE RANGERS, COMPRISING THREE COMPANIES OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MEN EACH AND A REPLACEMENT COMPANY OF 92 MEN, WERE ORIGINALLY INTENDED AS STRIKE FORCES FOR OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND NORTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS SUPPORT OF SPEICAL INTELLIGENCE  & OPERATIONS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, THEY HAVE, IN THE PAST, PERFORMED — THESE MISSIONS TO A LIMITED DEGREE AND HAVE ALSO BEEN ATTACHED TO REGULAR OPERATIONS WHEN DESIRABLE, VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES . . ARE NOW UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF AND MOST EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF THESE FORCES IN CONJUNCTION "| WITH OTHER OPERATIONS BEING CONDUCTED ACCORDING TO THE NATIONAL _ CAMPAIGN PLAN. THEREFORE, THESE UNITS SHOULD BE INTEGRATED _ WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES, THE GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT OF WHICH IS ALREADY A MACV RESPONSIBILITY. MACV i | WIL) SEEK TO RECULARIZE THESE GROUPS BY THEIR INDUCTION INTO ARVN AND UTILIZATION ON OPERATIONS IN THE SAME FASHION AS OTHER SPECIAL FORCES. THE UNITS ARE WELL TRAINED, FLEXIBLE, AND AGGRESSIVE. 6. THE BRITISH /MALAYAN TEAM COMPRISES SIX BRITISH OFFICERS bo iQ). AND 14MALAYANS WHO HAVE HAD PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN COUNTER- INSURGENCY [F] OPERATIONS AMONG MONTAGNARDS BURING THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY, o ' BECAUSE OF THE UK'S POSITION AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION, fl. "THE OVERT COMMITMENT OF THESE FORCES IS NOT DESIRABLE; HOWEVER, “THE BRITISH AND MALAYANS DID DESIRE TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO [F] as THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG, THROUGH CAS AND THE GOOD OFFICES ; OF USOM, THE BRITISH/MALAYAN TEAM, INTENDED TO CORRESPOND RoucHLy  [F | _TO A UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES "A" TEAM, WAS INTRODUCED IN { VIETNAM UNDER USOM COVER AS A MONTAGNARD RURAL AFFAIRS ADVISOR Docld: 324295003" ‘Page 3
ee "PLATEAU G BUT SO FAR HAS NOT BEEN ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS DUE To | DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE DONE LITTLE TO ASSIST THE TEAM, BECAUSE OF THIS AND BECAUSE OF " THE CRISIS SITUATION IN MALAYA, THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE MALAYANS FOR COMMITMENT IN BORNEO, UNDER THE NEW SITUATION AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT, IT MAY ] BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE MALAYAN GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE ITS DECISION, PROVIDED THERE 1$ SOME STRONG INDICATION OF INTEREST IN THE TEAM ON THE PART OF THE NEW VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. THE "BRITISH AND MALAYANS HAVE AGREED TO DEFER WITHDRAWAL UNTIL SUCH | EXPRESSION CAN BE OBTAINED, IN THE EVENT OF A MALAYAN REVERSAL 4 OF THE DECISION, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE FIELD OPERATIONS OF oe THE /EAM SHOULD BE HANDLED AS A SPECIAL FORCES "A" TEAM ENGAGED IN A CIDG PROJECT AND, THEREFORE, UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF MACV. COKE . LF] eC au THEY | WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR USOM COVER, CAS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE RESPONSIBLE ‘? -. FOR INTER-GOVERNMENT LIAISON AND COORDINATION. 7s IF THESE TRANSFERS TO MACV ARE MADE, MACV WILL HAVE OF THESE IRREGULAR UNITS. 8, IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT CAS WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY FUNDS . AND MATERIAL TO MACV FOR THESE ACTIVITIES AT NOT LESS THAN THE _ CURRENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT THROUGHOUT FY 64. FY 65 FUNDING WILL BE HANDLED BY MACV, HOWEVER, CAS CHANNELS MAY BE UTILIZED FOR THESE FUNDS IF SO AGREED BY DOD AND CAS HEADQUARTERS. DocId: 32425003 Page 4 UNIQUE SUPPORT AND CONTROL OF OVERT IN-COUNTRY PARAMILITARY. ASSETS AND WILL BE IN BETTER POSITION TO SYSTEMATIZE COMMAND AND SUPPORT
12/16/2014 National Arcl Hits 1-1 of 1 _ JFK Full Results § ‘s and id Records Adminisfration st ues oi Hit 1 of 1 ORIGINATOR: FROM: — FO°: TITLE : ~~ DATE: PAGES : DOCUMENT TYPE: SUBJECTS: : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS. : CURRENT. STATUS: : DATE. OF LAST REVIEW : COMMENTS =: _Heisobinaiibtinenuninninioniniionains Hits 1-1 of 1 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORDS SERIES : ining nisin inanin sree tna nse mt iu nao soins ene iin vo nneednntn AGENCY INFORMATION JCs 202-10002-10125 TAYLOR PAPERS DOCUMENT INFORMATION ICS DAVE GENERAL TAYLOR REPORT ON DELIBERATIONS OF THE US- ON SOUTHEAST ASIA (1953-1954) 06/20/1964 60 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT US POLICY -. SOUTHEAST. ASTA™ - -1953- 54; US MILITARY ACTION - LAOS; US POLICY - SOUTHEAST ASIA - 1963, 1964; ASSASSINATION - DIEM AND NHU; HALBERSTAM, -DAVID; SHEEHAN, NETL3 AMBASSADOR LODGE; DE GAULLE, CHARLES TOP. SECRET LC RELEASED. WITH DELETIONS 07/01/1998 Taylor Papers, Box 12... Multiple memos and cables re: U.S. policy in Southeast Asia in the 50's and 60's. Audit history.for this Record Identification. Form erase xin omnia sewn essai einai eli alertness mimi
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, THE JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON D.C,- 20301 bm Gag fo P ytrar arming 4 ts din, Ran wo mine mw [ VAS, praiTns wit se4pbl A France tana. Prdle- Use cate Ji 4, Doclda:32425003 Page 6
Downgraded _to-Gunreiirtat THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, B.C. 20301 J~5 (PLANS AND POLICY) DIRECTORATE THE-JOINT STAFF me MEMORANDUM’ FOR. THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAE Subject:.- Report. on Deliberations of the US on Southeast. Asia~ (1993-1954) -(v) le The attached report. is submitted in accordance with your oral request of 1 June 1964 for a review of the US position toward Indochina in 1953-1954, e. A summary of the attached report is as follows: a. The US. position during the period 1953-1954 with fespect to French Indochina was contained primarily in NSC 124/2, approved 25 June 1952, and NSC 5405, approved 14 January 1954. In essence, NSC 124/2 called for: (1) Assistance to Southeast Asia non-communist countries, (2) A warning to Communist China to stop aggressive actions, but such warning was contingent upon Frenen and United. Kingdom agreement to act militarily. with the US against Communist China if she did not heed. the warning. Such action would: involve US air and naval forces: with token allied support plus French and indigenous ground forces. (3) A Naval. Blockade. b. NSC 5405-reiterated the above and stated that the Loss of. Indochina to communism would have ‘the most serious repercussions on US and Frée World interests in surope and elsewhere." It flatly opposed any idea of accepting a cease-fire. prior to opening negotiations with the communists. cs The US-supported the French throughotit the war with military and economic assistance, as well as on most political issues related to the war. Disagreements centered around: Downgraded to CONFDENTIM ay as ™ ere mi oe sotto dni tts Docld: 323495003 Page 7
a (1) french lack of aggressiveness in prosecuting the war. (2). French (and UK) reluctance to join the US in warning the Chinese communists that further aggression would result in retaliation on Red China itself, (As a result, Such a warning was never given). (3) US insistence on independence for the Associated States (Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia) as a prerequisite to furnishing troops, and French desire to hold on to colonial possessions. d. Areas in which State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff held divergent views concerned paragraph 2.a. (2) above. At State insistence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff softened their position and decided to "take action against Communist China in the event of further aggression.” There was also a difference of opinion between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of what the US would do if France gave up the struggle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted the question resolved and the Secretary of Defense backed by the National Security Council and the President Sidestepped the question. e. Other factors influencing the resulting situation in Tndocnina stemmed in part. from: * (1) A deteriorating political situation in France, (2) The fact that the American people and Congress had not been prepared for unilateral American action in - Indochina, f. The US noted (rather than signed). the Geneva conference declaration, and presented a unilateral statement to the last plenary session on 21 July 1954, e. US Military assistance was halted when the decision was made to divide Vietnam. Materiel withdrawn from: North Vietnam was used. as much. as possible to equip the Associated States forces, he Few. US policies toward Southeast Asia have changed Since 1954, For example, air and naval action was advocated in 1954 but the use of indigenous ground forces only was Docld: 32425003... Page 8
contemplated. The statement made by the Joint Chief's of Staff that the loss of Indochina to communism would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences for the US, is still valid. Likewise the question of whether or not to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of large scale communist Chinese aggression has never been completely resolved at governmental level. - 4 “y GR ck Py Ss EMRICK Major General, USAF Director for Plans and Policy PREPARED. BY: Colonel Harry Wilds, USAF P&SHA Branch, J=-5 Bxts. 5'7043/73242 é - Docld: 324295003 Page 9
REPORT ON DELIBERATIONS OF THE US ON SOUTHESST ASIA (1953-1954) ssbaanc i. The purpose of this piper is to review US policies with respect to the Indochina situation during the period 1953-1954 to include areas in which the French Government was supported by the US and the views of the US Government departments and agencies with respect to US policy. é@; During 1952 four important trends develoved in the Indochinese War with respect to United States policy. a. Washington was taking its place with Paris and Saigon as a center of political and military strategic planning for tne.war, b. The US Government was beine drawn into closer cooperation with the British and French on the vroblems of the area. The Joint Cniefs of Staff, fearing tnat this tendency might Lead to a-combined command of some sort, or to increased American responsibility in the. Indochinese conflict, sometimes protested against it, though with little success; ¢. The threat of Chinese communist intervention was beginning to dwarf other factors in the Southeast Asia picture, especially for the French, who seemed obsessed with this danger. a. France was beginning to ceack under the triple burden of the Indochinese war, European rearmament, and the chronic inetability of its own government, 3. On 25 Cune 1952, President Truman approved a comprehen- sive US policy* toward Indcchine. For the purpose of holding the entire area this policy provided that, with respect to southeast Asia the United States should: a. Continue programs of economic anc technical assistance designed tc strenethen the indigenous non-communist. govern- ments of the area. b, Seek agreement with other nations, including at least France, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, for a joint warning to Communist China regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggression against. Southeast Asia, the issuance oii * NSC 124/72, 25 dune 1952 “Ne te CORBDERFAL Docld: 32425003: Page 10
Downgraded to conn SS CREE of such a warning to be contingent upon the pricy agreements of France and the UK to participate in the Sollowing minimum — courses of military action, either under the auspices of the UN or in conjunction with France and the UK and any other friendly governments: (1) A resolute defense of Indochina itself to which _the US would provide such air and naval assistance as might be practicable. (2) Interdiction of Chinese communist communication lines including those in China out avoiding targets near the USSR boundaries, - (3) The US would provide the major forces for task (2) above, but would expect token forces from France and the UK and would expect France to carry the burden of providing, in conjunction with the Associated States (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos), the ground forces for the _ defense of Indochine, oe ¢. Seek UK and French agreement. in prineiple that a naval blockade of Communist China should be includéd in minimum eourses of action set Forth abevea, d. Strengthen covert operations designed to assist in the achievement of US objectives in Southeast East Asia. e. Encourage the spirit of resistance among the people of Southeast Last Asia to Commins Chinese aggression, f'. Make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast Asia t6 the security of the US, g. Consider taking unilateral action in the event the concurence of the UK and France to expanded military action against Conaunist China is not obtatned. 4, Following a Tripartite conference (UK, France, and the US} the JCS took issue with the UK and French pesition which opposed | action against Communist China outside the area of aggression, —_ At State insistence the JCS softened their position and decided— to take action against Communist China in the event of further  — Chinese aggression.* * History cf the Indechina Incident, Historical Section, JCS, pages X 20-2) by it aT w { ‘ ‘te 4 TOP SECRET 94 fe Docld: 32425003 Page 11
TOP SORE TT. Downgraica w CONDENRAL OS SECRET 5. The foregoing policy (NSC 104/2) was the most important develop-s ment in the US policy toward Indochina in 19652.  Thé US continued to keep Fett ks for the war in the hands of the French, refused to be. drawn into a mbined military command in Southeast Asia nd. side-stepped any Sonma Gent to participate in a purely local defense of Indochina. However, the US was backing. the French position in the UN and was expanding and publicizing its military aid program for Indochina, 6, As the war progressed the US received more and more requests for military assistance but the JCS found French plans deficient in aggressive spirit. After considerable prodding by the US, the French "Navarre Plan" appeared to offer sufficient promise of success to warrant increased American aid. The French — Government had indicated that such aid was the only alternative to withdrawal from Indochina. 7. The Ics recognized two conditions under which French — withdrawal. might. take place. ~ intervention by the Chinese | communists or political deterioration within France. . Hopefully the JCS considered that French withdrawal might not occur until the expansion of native forces had reached an advanced state. in that event the US might be able to forego the commitment of ground troops and achieve results by providing air and naval Support or logistic support for the Vietnamese operation. | If Red Chinese aggression drove. the French to withdraw there were no feasible courses of military action that the US could take in Indochina to prevent communist forces from overrunning the country.* Preventing the situation from reaching so serious a state as this was a prime objective of American policy. The US Government had encountered continued French and British reluctance to subscribe to a joint declaration advising Red China that any further acts of aggression would call forth a united retaliation that might not observe geographic Limitations ‘such as those imposed on the Korean action,** 8. In issuing a unilateral US warning*** against further incursions in Southeast Asia Secretary of State Dulles suggested that retaliatory actions might not be limited to Indochina. ‘The — JCS concluded that such action could not be so confined. oo * JCS ovo, 28 October 1952 **® Doc D=9 State Dept Press Release No. 160, 28 March - 1953 *#* Doc D-39. State Dept Press Release No. 469, 2 Sept 1953 Docld: 324275003. Page 12
VASE A LIS) 1 ae TOP SECRET ~~ Downg, . POP SECRET ——— Seey cian tr) if plates VOMOCNTTAL 9. In redrafting the 25 June 1952 statement of American objectives and courses of action in Southeast “Asia (NSC 124/2), the Planning board of the Netional Security Council in late 1953 made an assecsement or the probable consequences of a French dofeat in Indochina, In -June-1952 the securLlty Council had - agreed that the lose of any Southeast Agila country would probably lead to the rela- Clvely ewift. realization of conmuniet domination over the whele area, But in November 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency would go no further than to say: "A Viet Minh victory in Indochina would re- nove a Significant. milltary barrier to a communist sweep through southeast Asia, cxpose the remainder of that-region to greatly -. inercasced external communist pressures, and probably inecrcase the capabilities of local communists., ." However the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff resistered a dissenting view: "The establishment of communist control over Indochina by military or other means would almost certainly result in the communization of all of Southeast Asia..,."* Accordingly, the Planning Boards redraft contained the statement that the loss of Indochina would have "the most serious repercussions on US and Free World interests in Europe and elsewhere," Drawing upon Korean experience, the Planning Board also recommended that the US flatly oppose any idea of accepting a cease-fire prior to opening negotiations because of the probable result - irretrievable deterioration in the French Union military position.** 10. Since the Board needed military advice the JCS directed the Joint Strategic and Logisitics Plans Committees to review an earlier study*** on the subject. As in the earlier study, the committees assumed that: The US could take over French responsibilities in an orderly manner at the invitation of the Associated States, ll. The committee reaffirmed the conelusion that the successful defense of Indochina was essential since loss of the aréa would have critical psychological, political, and economic. consequences for the US.**** > The course of action offering the. US the greatest assurance of success was to support and step-up the development of native troops and to deploy American and Allied forces to Indochina for operations that would have the objective of reducing communist elements to- seattered euerrilla bands, le, The board foresaw that the threat of French withdrawal might take two forms. There was, first,’ the possibility that France might seek peace unless America offéred to participate * SE-52, CIA Sp Est Probable Consequences in non-communist « Asla of Action Possible Developments in Indochina before mid 1954, 10 Nov 1953 ** NSC 5405, 10 Jan 1953 ESO real a in 4##% JOS 1992/2027, 22 Jan 195300 HET bes ¥#¥¥® JCS 1992/262, 24 Dee 1953 oo TOP. SECRET 4 Docld:324275003 Page .13
A) 20) ap TOP-SECRET’ in the war with military forces. Should thie contingency arise, two choices would be open to the US, Either the US Government might do nothing to prevent the loss of Indochina or it mighs provide the forces needed to keep France in the war. The second threat. foreseen by the board was even more ominous. . The. French Government might refuse to ¢ontinue the Struggle even if the US did agree to commit troops. Under these circumstances again the US might write off Indochina. © 0n the other hand, it could consider taking the course of action that had just been evaluated ty the Joint Starr (para 11 above), The board submitted this Study for NSC consideration in December 1653 ag the Special Annex to NSC L177. The Jcs agreed;* in general, with the board's position cn 6 January 1954, 13. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee recognized that if the French withdrew in spite of American intervention, the worldwide situation might oblige the US to accept the logs of Indochina. Nevertheless, the US should be prepared to do what it could to offset such 4a deve lopment. Therefore, the committee recommended that the Special Annex be revised to reflect the followins views: "Should the French make an arbitrary decision to withdraw from the conflict in Indochina despite all offers of US assistance, the US should jn any event, and as a minimum urge the French to phase their withdrawal over a protracted period and to take all practicable measures to prepare the indigenous forces better to assume the responsibilities of their on cefense. Additionally, the US, preferably in conjunction with +¢s Allies, Should provide such military assistar.ce to the indigenous .- forces of Indochina as is determined to be advisable and feasible in the light of conditions then prevailing, and as is consistent with US objectives both with respect to Southeast Asia and world-wide ,** ~* JCS 1992/7257, 4 Jan 1954 *#* JCS 1992/267,-4 Jan 1954 Docld:3274275003... Page 14
TOP-SECRET Downgrauey Te GE ATCENTIAL i 18) i Sy C RAE, i wn 14, Admiral Carney (CNO) sugzested chat if US forces were to participate in the war, they should do sv in sufficient strength to insure an early and lasting milltary victory. He also wished to strengthen the arguments in favor of the most vigorous alternative course; supporting native troops while deploying American and Allied forces for operations which would reduce the communist to scattered guerrilla bands.* 15. At a meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 7 Jan 54, Admiral Radford indicated that the JCS had hastily prepared some comments on the Special Annex to NSC 177. However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roger M..Kyes did not address himself to tree principal problem at hand - that of being prepared for a French request for intervention. The Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, supported Mr. Kyes and decided to request that the Special Annex be withdrawn from further consideration. In addition, the Department of Defense suggested to the Security Council that, in the future, requests for military advice, such as that contained in the Special - Annex; should be addressed to the Secretary of Defense, not to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** 16. On 14 Jan 54, President Eisenhower approved the Planning Board's policy statement toward Southcast Asia, NSC 177 which was Later atrculated as NSC 5405 and buéame the charter for US action in the wonths to come, assuming the Fronch fought ony’ However, the Secretary of Defense and the council had sidestepped the question raised by the JCS, of what the US would do if France gave up the struggle. 17. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the continuing deterioration of the French position, Vice President Nixon took action of his own to test public opinion. Asked what the country should do if the French withdrew from Indochina, Mr. Nixon replied: Wooo 4. there was no reason why the French could not stay on and win, but on the assumption they did withdraw - an assumption he did not accept ~ Indochina would become Communist in a month. The US as a leader of the free world eannot afford further retreat in Asia. It was hoped that the US would not have to send troops there, but if this Government could not avoid it, the Administration must face up to the situation and dispatch forces, "*** * JcS 1992/268, 5 Jan 64 #* APPC Advice of Action, US Objectives and Courses of Action with respect to SEA (NSC 177) 11 Jan 54. ¥*#* New York Times 4 May 1954 Page 4 wt Docld: 323425003... Page 215
Singraded 0 CONANT > SCR ET Public reaction was so unfavorable shat the: Depurtment.-: of State took pains to point: out that the Vice President had been addressing himself to. a hypothetical question. 18. With public opinion ‘and the Cong “Yess obviously still unready for unilateral American. action and the British unwilling to internationalize the war, the only course open to the Administration was the use of moral suasion to keep the French from selling out at Geneva. : 19. Meanwhile a ceasefire was being discussed at Geneva. iIn- assessing the Indochinese situation, the JCS considered that. the US should adopt the following as its minimum position: "The United States will not associate itself with any French proposal directed toward cease-fire in advance of a satisfactory political settlement. The United States urges the French Government to propose that negotiations for a political settlement be initiated at once. During the course of such negotiations, French Union Forces should continue to oppose the forces of the Viet Minh with all means at their disposal in order to reinforce the French negotiating position. In the meantime, as a means of strengthening the French hand, the United States will intensify its efforts to organize and promptly activate a Southeast Asian coalition for the purpose of preventing further expansion of Communist power in Southeast Asia. If the French Government persists in its intention of entering armistice negotiations or accedes to immediate ceasefire negotiations, the United States will disassociate itself from such negotiations in order to maintain maximum freedom of action in taking whatever measures may be feasible for are extension of Communist control into Southeast Asia" 20. The obvious answer to Geneva was American intervention, but the French seemed to dread the cure fully as much as the complaint. Twice during April the French Government had sought American intervention to save Dien Bien Phu and both times had been unwilling to pay the price of independence for the Allied States. Mr. Dulles made this requirenent clear when he stated: Ne fi/ virnly believe. that it is essential /to/ remove any taint of colonialism order to attract vital Asian support and forestall. | opposition by other Asian and Middle East countries",* ee “*¥ JES 1992/3003, 6 May 54 (as amended on 7 May 54) ** Msg SecState to Amsmb (Paris) | NIACT Hood, 13 May 54 NO Pore UE EE “4 NOR Ss eis: Docld: 324275003 Page 16
Downgraded to” SONATE RE 1 eee 23, When the diplomats at Geneva formally agreed to partition Vietnam, the Defense CLepartment immediately suspended all shipments of materiel to Indochine. Setween 1950 and the suspension date of July 1954 such essistance had amounted to 2.7 billion dollars. Subsequently, the US adopted an interim policy of sending to Indochina only items directly alleviating suffering, preventing disease and assisting in the evacuation of military forces and refugsss.* It was the US intention to use as much as possible of che. materiel rescued from northern Vietnam to help equip the native forces of the Associated States, This disposition of the equipment was in line with the idea that the non-communist nations would have to build up their own forces for internal security. This initial equiping of native forces was the forerunner of the more extensive MAP in effect in 1964. el. In deternining the degree to which the US might be willing to be associated with an agreement which might be reached in Geneva, the US issued a statement to the effect that it was not prepared to join in the conference declaration, Instead, the following unilateral declaration** was presented by Under Secretary Smith to the last plenary session of the conference on 21 July: ‘The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a) the France-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (b) The Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of VietNam and of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that (1) 1t will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern * History of Indochina Incident, Historical Section, JCS (Page 1, Summary of the Aid Program) #*® US Declaration on Indochina, Under Secretary of State -. 21 July 54, State Dept. Bulletin VOL XXXI, No. 788 (2 Aug 54) ; eed ®OR_ SE Gras Boones ROP ey 19 ee Docld:3274275003... Page 18
DocId:32425003 Page 19 Ne dhe oe oe CP ay —_ and as seriously threatening international peace and security. In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Viet-Nam my government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: '- In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.' With respect to the statement made by the representative of the State of Viet-Nam, the United States re‘.terates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this, Nothing in its declaration just — made is intended to or does indicate any departure from this traditional position. oe os We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia, — Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future." 25, The US Government might have been able to stave off the | consequences of the Geneva Conference if, as the Joint Chiefs — of Staff were prepared to do, it had committed its own forces _ to the struggle. But the National Security Council postponed — decision on this step in favor of an attempt to raise inter- | national support for united action. The National Security Council never met the question squarely, and certainly the ee American people and Congress had never been properly prepared > for fighting alone, or even with allies, in Indochina, The | principal shortcoming in the establishment of US policy regard- ing Southeast Asia was the reluctance of Washington to face — squarely what action the US would take if the Chinese Communists became involved in the conflict. Then, as now, the use of large contingents of US ground forces in Southeast Asia was viewed unfavorably. At the same time, it was recognized that air action with conventional weapons might not be adequate, This poses the question which has not been faced squarely and answered by all branches of the US Government concerned, Would the US resort to nuclear weapons? 10-
i CONTROL -NUMBER el REGISTER OF PERSONNEL HANDLING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT bees _ a . 22 June 64 _ RETURN TO: Office, Chairman, JCS UoWwhe . a) ee Room 2-E 865, The Pentagon raed lo £0 VENTE DOCUMENT NUMBER ier EE BOS UNE HAL J=5.-M 622-64 Orig w/encl es 20 June 64 OE | SUBIEC T: enon voi Report on Deliberations of the US on Southeast Asia (1953-1954) The above-described docutient has been received in this office, Cilscalation of this document will be limited to individuals indicated-below. . The document will be returned to the Administrative Office for record ‘prior to dispatch to another office, or other disposition. THrs FORM WILL NOT BE REWOVED FROM SUBIECT DOCUMENT. INITIAL REMARKS. GMAIRMAN, JOS ae EXECUTIVE SPECIAL ASSISTANT (Policy) fait CHAIRMAN’S STARE GROUP SD.0.349 Docid: 32425003 Page 20
~- SSO GABLE -- IMMEDIATE 28 May 1964 FROM: General Maxwell D. Taylor, CICS Copy Ye Sec Dek TO: Admiral Felt, CINCPAC Me. Me Maw ten General Harkins, COMUSMACYV CITE JCS- 2624-64 EYES ONLY DTG: 2815057 May 64 1. In addition to items for discussion at Honolulu conveyed by State CS fate te Sargon 2 09S) to Ambassador Lodge, SecDef desires to have views of CINGPAG and COMUSMACYV on following questions: | : | Part tl a What military actions might we consider to strengthen the situation in Laos? What should be done about reequipping Kong Le's forces? b. What military actions might be taken in ascending order of dhavity to impress Hanoi with our intention to strike NVN? ¢. What are time factors and force movements involved in achieving readiness for action against NVN? d. What should be the purpose and pattern of the initial air strikes against NVN? e. What is your concept of the actions and reactions which may arise from the progressive implementation of CINCPAC 37-64 and 32-64? How may NVN and Communist China respond to our escalating pressures? f. If at some point Hanoi agrees to desist from further help to VG and PL, how can we verify fulfillment? How long should we be prepared to maintain our readiness posture while awaiting verification?
TOP. SECRET g» What help should be sought from SEATO nations in relation to the situation (a) in Laos? (b) in SVN? Part Il a. Reference CINCPAG 270805 Zulu. What is your view of providing 4-man advisory teams at once for each district in the seveh selected provinces? (State-Saigon 2095); in all 239 districts? It is sesumied mission of teams would be to supervise unit training, operational performance, and operational planning of the paramilitary units in the district. b. In addition to these district-level advisory team; in what other ways could military personnel be used to advantage in forwarding the pacification program in the seven selected provinces ? c. What are your views with regard to relocating the headquarters of General Khanh and COMUSMACV? d.. What is the current status of the following projects: (1) Proposed increase in regular and paramilitary forces of GVN, including expansion of VNAF; reorganization of paramilitary forces; increased compensation for GVN military forces, | (2) Formation of an intelligence net of US advisers reporting on conditions in RVNAF. (3) Development of a capability for offensive guerrilla operations, see Fe TOP SECRET. fl : ‘Page 2 of 3 pages. BDocld: 324275003: Page 22 Cet neal aim aan
“TOP SECRET (4) Progress under decrees for national mobilization. (5) Progress in detailing and carrying out operational plans in implementation of clear-and-hold (oil-spot) operations, 2. Discussions are desired in groups.of minimum size formed on basis of need to participate. . Page 3 of 3 pages. ‘i as TOP SECRET | Docld: 324275003 ~ Page 23
caes a 1/2) sysertatie3) sacs1(t. BaAyay-8) SACSAL,(14~6/9) Teaeto, i ee wiicc/DD0=1(16=11) pean) jek PB, 87 Iie OF INWHOATE: <E] COLECT - : ; fal CHARGE.TO. “ mats Renae } ( TOP SECRET AC e ‘ Jwiey ad. cae Peite ; ~* Ores ACTION Aneubass iy S 4 ee My . cys gsi " « Snot a Dad es dpe on tna: Wr aieiries SANT 3 Ses sis ChEsany FOR Shee Seat lide ee Sos ae Gu ee ee — oh eae aey stom, Se EE ey ality om gti, “He TA, on ex Se yew yes oh eo SRESLOCHC Gh Deceevaly the we MEPs aS BULLS Ware ho ee VS Go A ig st é ie eres (ow erg @ Sa gigs ay ate ascisions are in fron at of 1 us and ot her goverrments about free a i i i * ne ee 4 os 2 Boy * ae St flo qs fe Lae gy omy youl : © world's interest in ond commitime nt to security of Southeast Asia. ° cre ye woe jugs . < ¢ ont, ie yur point of departure is and must be that : jay SO og hp et wins Go Tay wy ent re E s4 wet everrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanol ana fs t discussti oft these decisions fen x frank discussion of these decisions with yo a yes ees Siren eres seed eno telu mec cing 8 SS3 SEI ee Se —s 5 PA eee ES TERCIE RES Pat Gao Bi Erhenn BY Gener u Scoen IONE : svar xX ALRSS POS Se See. E03 Je ees ae 4 We € are pleased y Be SISIE 2 ESE Meelis 2 . . be a wy ole So sae june 1, and Secretary is arranging his hom@ward. schedule. from * 9 2 : as a - Be, New Delhi on that basis.  -. 2 President ee Deatied. : " — ee 5 f 27/6é bes Talographic ‘transmission and ” ¥, earences: FORM we Ay ons ne Docid: 32425003 aveS/VNsWiSullivan:mda ? The Acting classification approved by: e Seeretary. S/S © Mr. Read i REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY 1S PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” Page 24
Page2___of telegram to SAIGON TOP SECRET President will continue in close consultation with congres- onal leadership (he met wit h Democratic Leadership and Senat ga Se serge gets oS Ne a ge tS pope LF ee ects and risks of escalation. At thet point, there chree States and to the Free World? , ’ eqs PES LS ig tt ae wl ee & oo aye eye “eo ae fa, strengthen = “= 2 ing Sn Se porce see = f woes ets PF i att ea din he & CULe oe Skate re Ne EAL ae? cormunist wo voy tA ey os COOP a SUS AE oy he i Sout Me aide thea oagn HO arse ‘ SSN ok aM we or yerthsLlees, in. Honolulu, “om eli
Docld: 32425003. Page 26 “heb wlansnninntinnnansianaiionesnicinnninimunnrinsnsannsnraosinnsinninonnshrweniiqanntnnanicnmennneshisnttin arms sonny anette ninemsn mtnionninminathrcengnat Lol alt “ _ ~ # ae iy aie Ses Bee 5 * se aw bape chon at & at Aga “eat oa ire, Bey. utente. “Bosse a ad 2» ea RENE bos en Si gata as cng HE o's tee Hapa Bb wie Ste Na Sie Mowe vows Bint Sa ood See oe sme le ee ee Ng it al a Saal <a Beg Sanco, + eel ee saath ges Ca Yoel a: ee wn i cs See Va is” Cae Sa "Rea ads “tow e 3 ght Soca ah i wm, Ok i " . : ae wee ene fo ws . se ce ay SP ages im a By ss ee * ° ‘n wt o 5m: 8 ny hy a ‘gots, 8 BeSegagny Bee grey one, «08 : th ae Faves oo dh aha Ooo ede ual da RE 5 eg aS vs ase Ja 8 . a aN
Page 4 of telegram tow SAIGON - TO? SECRET | Lunction to work in the provincial administration, and insofar as it is fcasible, down into the district level of administration. On the millvary side, it would mean the introduction of mobile training bee LS EE ch QabgobLee: soposempmstap SESS) to 4 ters, Seiicca, and improve the. status of the Vietnamese paramilitary seie operational lanning. _ oy LOLS ae Joint Chiefs of Stat have already sené a message to | Ge avkinus asking his views on this mobile training team concept. ! Bi cur proposal suggests that. ‘the ‘propaganda and information : no La these selected provinces similarly be enhanced by the : clement of US civilian and military personnel to train, guide and work with Vietnamese counterparts in that field of action. 4 in order to test the utility of such a proposal, we wuld suggest : that jem provinces be chosen for this. purpose. We would offer the provinces of Long An, Dinh Tuongs | Rien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Hau Neiah, which are five exiti ical provinces in | immediate’ vicinity of Saigon. Additionally, we would propose Quang Ngai, because it is a critical ovovinee considerably removed from Saigon, and finally Phu Yen, because it is a province in which significant pacification has already been. acnleveds Tt would ( é TOP SECRET — Docld: 32425003. Page 27
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‘ Page Gof telegram tol SAT OON LO? snc cont the Honolulu talks can best be used to accomplish any of the other stabilizing actions which you have been seeking to achieve over the crew weeks. We cont ime gravely concerned about the differences between Khanh and the Generals, the tOb . religious differences, both Catholic end Buddhist.  (Destel 2086) IV. Finally, we wish to consult with you on the menner in | ch we can male to eliminate the business as usual attitude in e view that the US community should set .the from Honolulu you may wish Pow to institute such specific measures as the elimination of cocktails paxvties, black-tie dinners and other dispensable social customs. We will also wish to examine the best means of reducing the problem of descendents and otherwise clearing the decks for action in the American community. Vo. Before the Honolulu meeting certain diplomatic actions will have been sét in train and we will report further when we meet. _ énong doe ot ws these will have beén the consultation with the Canadians, on which I think cur views arte very close and which I hope will result in the early despatch of the new Canadian Commissioner to Saigon preferably no later than next week. Docld: 32425003... Page 29
208! DTG:  030429Z November 1963 FROM: HARKINS, COMUSMACV TO: ‘TAYLOR, CJCS, WASHINGTON INFO: FELT, CINCPAC SECRET MAC 2081 EYES ONLY 1. Saigon is quiet and orderly and all evidence indicates revolutionary committee has situation well in hand. Some troops still positioned throughout city and police also in evidence. Martial Law continues with curfew hours changed to 1900 to 0500. vee 2. With ref your JCS 4279 intend to press the new government for same military improvements which we have been endorsing in the past, specifically: A. Direct chain of command. B. Subordination of Prov Chief to Corps and Div Commanders in (got pee military matters C. Emphasis on training of units, including hamlet militia. (and militia squad leaders). D.Operational use of general reserve E. Operational use of special forces under JGS and Corps commanders . (now reported accomplished). Cees F. Better use of military engineers. G. Better use of navy and civil guard boat companies in Delta. H. Lifting of restrictions on aircraft armament. I. Increased tempo of operations with emphasis on those types of operations which augur success of desired objectives. Docld: 32425003. Page 320.
2 08/ J. Freeing of ARVN elements from static security missions and reduction isolated outposts. - 3. All of the above have previously been discussed with military leaders who were responsive to the nead for such improvements and I anticipate that they, functioning under the new government structure, will be inclined to institute desired changes. 4. As concerns the effect of the change in administration on the province chiefs I do not have at this time details on country-wide reaction of these very important individuals, Am in the process of assembling info on this point and will report in detail soonest. As a- general résponse to your query and based on info presently available, A. As a general rule, with some exceptions, we have been satisfied with current line up in so far as their military duties are. concerned. os, é . oes B. Do not anticipate any wholesale shakeup of present incumbents. C. Agree that it to our best interests to prevent removal of effective or experienced chiefs, and to experience the minimum of changes. D. Several Prov chiefs have to date declared their allegiance to the new Government. Consolidated List being assembled and will be forwarded ASAP. E. Have received information of temporary replacement two (2) Prov Chiefs in I Corps. 5, Senior advisor IV Corps advises that Gen Cao has been replaced as CG IV Corps by Colonel Nhon who continues to function as CO 21st Div. Docld: 32425003 Page 330
a : . oS SSO MACV % oe CRITIC « Secret 8 2 November 1963 OR/08b2T 2) FROM: SSO MACV JO: Dir, NSA A. Indicators of coup success ie The initial objective of the coup group has been abbained.. - Open resistance to. the coup forces has ceased leaving the military: in full control of the apparatus of government. ] 2. Deaths of President and Counsellor, protective custody of Can, would appear remove only significant symbol around which supporters . of former regime might rally. a 3. From all outward appearances there is strong public support of the Armed Forces and the new government those forces have established. The mood of the population is jubilant, by Vietnamese standards; rapport between troops. and people is excellent; everywhere, people are bringing Pood to troops. - Be. Status of public order : 1. During morning hours there were numerous large, spontaneous end enthusiastic demonstrations. As of now (mid-afternoon), it is quieter, but the streets are crowded; this is, of course, Saturday and a holidey to boot (Memorial Day for VN War Dead). 2. There has been some sacking and looting but, thus far, it has peen highly selective. -In addition to the palace, the targets have been holdings of the Nhus (Times of Vietnam; Book Stores; Commercial concerns; Hg. of Women's Solidarity League); residences of Minister Hien (Civic Action), Luong (Interior) and Trinh (Education); and Home of Senior Republican youth leader. In all actions, student groups have been in Vanguard « 3. Few civil police in evidence, many having discarded uniforms and jobs yesterday, those on duty are making little or no effort to influence crowds. Military have reacted quickly to the Incipient danger of crowds getting out of hand. Military police and some line troops are deployed at critical locations and handling situation in relaxed, effective manner. Notably, Minh, Don, and Dinh have been personally moving to reported trouble spots to supervise. Reconstitution of police force is a first priority task of regime. : 4, All public whilities continue in full operating condition. , 5. Martial lew in effect, country wide. G. Personalities in new government i. Following changes to initially reported. Lineup: A. M/Gen Duong Van Minh is Chief, Joint General Staff. B. M/Gen Tran Van Don is Minister of Nation Defense. GC. B/Gen Mai Huu Xuan is Director, National Police. D. Do Khac Mai, promoted to Colonel, and named Commander, VNAF. 2s Promotions: A. Ton That Dinh, IIT Corps Cmdr and Minister of Interior designate, promoted to Major General. He is currently responsible for military security of Saigon~Cholon area again. Doclda:32425003 Page 34
Page 2 CRITIC-Secret os 2 November 1963 FROM SSO MACV ».» M0: Dir, NSA Bs To ‘Brig. Gene Do Mai, Chief MSS Ce Co, now CG 7th Div. Ae Thieu, now CG 5th Div. : 3. B/G Nghiem, formerly I Corps Cmdr, has assumed command of VN Special Forces. D. Threats to US Nationals a 1. No report of US casualties as result of cowp actions =~ 2s Rapport between US and VN military continues excellent. — Whe is notable is new warmth of common man towards US personnel. 3. Condition yellow remains in effect, with intention to relax: : to grey tomorrow. | Sean eee ee "Ee VC Reaction to Coup oe rel 1. While it cannot be directly Linked to. eqpicabaticn of situation, unusual pattern of VC attacks reported in Vinh Long. After daylight this morning, VC aggregating 200, attacked 6 strategic hamlets. VC described as clad in blue uniforms. ee 33rd Ranger Bn has flushed estimated 300 VC in Ho Bo area, ye - Binh Duong Province. 3. No evidence any direct VC participation in minor disorders (para B2 above,) in Saigon. F. Effects of Saigon events’ on SVN forces and their operations against ve il. Understandably, as the result of nationwide military interest in coup developments combined with a national holiday, the tempo of offensive operations slowed drastically today. 2. It recognized here that ib will take several days to refocus the attention of the new government on priority military tasks. ‘The attention of the entire higher command structure is now centered upon the most pressing of all immediate problems: the establishment of viable government. There is also an impacth woon field commanders, particularly sector commanders who face, in varying degrees, personal and political reorientation. : G. Steps being taken to form new government 1. Nothing substantial to report. 2. Coup leaders are making determined efforts to maintain order and at the same time, transform popular exuberance into political support. For example, Generals Minh and Don were reported as being well«received this morning as they shook hands with, and moved freely among the people of Saigon. Docld:32425003 Page 350
DIG: 1209452 November 1963 FROM: .. GENERAL HARKINS, SALGON TO: GENERAL TAYLOR, CJCS, WASH D.C. INFO: ADMIRAL FELT, CINCPAC AMB LODGE, SAIGON TOP SECRET MAC 2168 EYES ONLY 1. Your attention invited to Neil Sheehan (UPL) story datelined Saigon November 11. 2. Greater part of story is speculative in nature and not factual with respect to specifics cited, While it portrays me personally, my Command and the Defense Department in Washington in an unfavorable light it is also detrimental to the US national interest and is viewed with concern. This concern is over certain parts of story which indicate without doubt that. Sheehan has by some meane obtained information concerning the existence and content of most highly classified and extremely sensitive messages. Such leaks can only yesult in erosion of the best interest of the U.S. Docld:32425003.. Page 36
* } | Page” of telegram to___Amembassy_ Sal sees ee TOP SECRET abreast . in Paris, I imagine that you have kept. General Khanh/agscusy of our efforts in Paris, After we see. the Yesults of the Bohlen approach you might wish to sound him out on Paris visit by you, Were ‘Ss Su GP+l _ RUSK Docld:324275003 Page a7 ee