Date : 07/14/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : NSC RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10260 ollection Act of 1992 RECORDS SERIES : (44 Sc 2107 Note). AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 50. asex: NW 54214 Date: DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : NSC FROM : GORDON CHASE TO : MR. BUNDY TITLE : MEMORANDUM DATE : 03/04/65 PAGES : 2 SUBJECTS : SPECIAL GROUP MEETING--CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/17/98 OPENING CRITERIA :;: COMMENTS HW 542714 DBocld: 32977083 Page 1
LY — THE WHITE HOUSE , WASHINGTON 7 | 7 March 4, 1965 . MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Special Group Mecting - Cuba Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba. because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also:take a somewhat reluc- tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For eximple, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep @ dialogue going over the cours. of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced. 6 _ 1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to,cut off Artime, large:. ~ On this one, ‘I am inclined towards the DOD view. Pesticides The CLA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange IG - _ to ilute uban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose tlb LL Be &e) one for ‘stich reasons aS the folféwing: First, it will mean going to the Dutch LR : ‘<) Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the ‘odds are high that we will be turned down. Sige there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides|phich were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchan: )b hird, it wo e highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one < the many bases that would have to be touched. I don't like this one either. 3, Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not : start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed th: position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the HW 542714 Docld:32977083 Page 2
2 = Y Siainaetlig aes aa ee Mr. Bundy . -2- ° ’ March 4, 1965 - attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com-— promise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you Si. . aid to Artime?). State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning dowh RECE, we give them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked. I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; lI agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off. 4, Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having Keating (1 understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing. While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con- traption. Iam against it. 5. ClAts Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. l agree with State and DOP that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again ina very short space of time. EC Gor don Chase