1-70 2] o @ * | CIA No. 248, which would appear in Volume No. l. 5 Mr. Helms. All right. - Mr. Helms. I do not know. My impression is that they did not, but I am not sure. 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. I would ask you at this time to refer to . | | Would you give me the number again? | | Mr. Goldsmith. 248. | ! Mr. Helms. I have 248. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Please read that document. ! (Pause) | For the record, this is a memo from Mr. Papich of ene Pat | concerning the photo-coverage of the embassies dated 27 | November 1963. io Mr. Helms. Who is this memorandum signed by, or who did | | | | ! | . | it originally come from? Where did it originate, so I can tell | what I am reading? | Mr .. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to answer your inquiry. However, the Agency has made available to us at this time just the first page of this memo so that the author cannot be identified at this time. Mr. Helms; Thank you. I have read the page. wee ee ee @ 22 | : | | e “3 Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that according to thi 24 : memo the CIA and the Mexico City Station at least attempted to os as keep the Cuban and Soviet embassies and consulates under constant pe = 5 hee. DoclId: 322763410 age 71 TAS ClPOCT .
no ia da So On Docld: 322763410 UP BLUME l surveillance, photographically? Mr. Helms. That was certainly the object of the exercise. Mr. Goldsmith. — If the record -~- by the record, I refer to the Agency's record of Oswald's contacts with the embassies, and also the Warren Commission's contacts with the embassies, established that Oswald visited the Cuban and Russian embassies and consulates at least five times, possibly more than six. Would you regard it as unusual for the surveillance sta- tion not to obtain a photograph of Oswald? Mr. Helms. Yes, I thought it was unusual if he has been there five or six times. - | Mr, Goldsmith. In fact, there were, in the record, no int photographs of Oswald that was obtained. Was the Mexico City Station ever questioned as to why no photograph of Oswald had been obtained? Mr. Helms. I do. not know firsthand if they were questione but I would assume they were questioned in spades. I would “assume everyone would want to know why. Mr. Goldsmith. Were you specifically involved? Mr. Helms. I do not remember any more. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym ‘Mr. Hels. ‘No. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether in 1963 or '64 the Agency obtained information concerning Oswald from a Cuban age 72 THD QrreRttT | | | | | d, joe | | : | | | | |
da 24 ag as pocta:32263410 bage TS | Thp CPrort a a eer on Oe monte ate source of concern for this Committee specifically, the fact br wehund i defector who defected from the DGI? Mr. Helms. I do not remember. Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of refreshing your recollec-~ tion, please refer to CIA 1879 that appears in Volume 2. Mr. Helms. 18792. Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, sir. Incidentally, I have been informed that the.memo you were just referring to, CIA 248, appears to be a blind memo, just one page in length. Mr. Helms. I see. Thank you. (Pause) | | | All right. I have read it. Mr. Goldsmith. Before going into this memo in further detail, I would like to know whether you think it should he a that, according to the Agency's record, no photograph of Oswald during his visit to Mexico City was ever taken or obtained. | | Mr. Helms. I think it would be useful if I were to say that using photographic surveillance of those embassies in a foreign country was a very tricky matter, not only as to rela- tions between. the countries, but tricky as far as the public is concerned, and that expecting clandestine technical devices of that kind to work perfectly is quite beyond the state of the art, or was in the year 1963, and there is nothing the Congress
iUF whdcl 1-73> nD i i can do to improve that kind of thing. Either the thing works i aa . or it does not work. But there is very little point in trving | to follow a line of inquiry that is critical of the way the i da Agency conducted those operations, because they were done under ! s | the most difficult circumstances, not under laboratory ) circumstances. Therefore, if they worked or did not work, it -WasS a great deal of matter of luck, often, than good technical 8 | work or good judgment. 9 | Mr, Goldsmith. That line of inquiry is not directed 1G ij specifically at any criticism of the Agency. The mode of analysis goes to, style. z Oswald makes five or six visits to the Embassy. We have > , i to to have continuaus photographic coverage. Even if the photo- a situation where the record suggests that there was an attempt a : ee covemage-.was not 100 percent effective, one would think | if he visited five or six times he would be picked up at i why was it not made available? And that is specifically the i | ; 17 || least once. ; . a From that, the next step would be, if there was a picture, | | issue with which the Committee is concerned. Mr. Helms. I can understand the Committee's concern, and Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this particular document, 1879, | ® , 2. | I wish it luck solving the problem. ; an i : , is your memory now refreshed about a Cuban defector offering aw 2¢ & information to the Agency concerning Oswald, concerning the pocta:32963410 lage T4 The CrCRrT ‘ meee oe ‘ :
nd da i is DoclId: 322763410 ave we wiid i assassination in general? Mr. Helms. My xerox is so poor here. Is this the one you are referring to as AMMU? | Mr. Goldsmith. ves. Mr. Helms. 1 had forgotten about this defector report or, if I knew about it, I imagine it was brought to my atten- tion at the time, certainly, I do not recall anymore. Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the middle of the page, the ‘part of the paragraph labelled as "Comment," would you tell the Committee what the term WH/SA/CI? Mr..Helms. SA, I am not sure anymore what that would have been. I do not know if that was Special Activities or just what. I am sorry. Wait a minute. No, I cannot help you. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether SA referred to the Cuban. Task Force? Mr. Helms. If it referred to the Cuban Task Force, I would have thought it would have been SAS. I thought that what was normally referred to, the Special Activities Staff, and it was therefore referred to, or would have been referred to, as WH/SAS/CI, if that is what it was. Maybe this is correct. I do not want to say you are not © correct. Obviously, you know a great deal more about this thes days than I do. I can only sayI thought it was usually referred to as bage 75 TOP SECRET | ee ee ee ne we a Dee —--
fur eLuaAci Ww Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information concerning —— pee cae the assassination AMMUby provided? da Mr. Helms. No. SS Se SS On that Oswald visited the Cuban. Embassy on two or three occa-- sions. Then it says, before, .during and after these visits, 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what information he provided | concerning Oswald's contacts with DGI?. ; Mr. Helms. I do not. I just know what I have read on é | the sheet. 9 | Mr. Goldsmith. The first paragraph of the sheet indicates 16 | 1 | 2 | Oswald was in contact with DGI, Cuban intelligence. | | | | | | | | What follow-up, if any, do you recall being done with this particular issue? Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not understand. | i i i 16 Mr. Goldsmith. Having received this information, what 4 a 17 | was done with it? ; in Mr. Helms. I do not know. I do not know what could have 19 | been done with it. So he was in touch with Cuban Intelligence. 26 | What would we do about that. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told about it? | eo 22 i Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought they ae 3 | would have been.” ; | 24 | Mr. Goldsmith. Here is an example of a situation where — the Warren Commission maybe did not have knowledge of this _Bbocld: 322763410 tage 76 TH QreorrT
Docld: 322763410 Page Tf? aa VF WEVA I incident, would not have specifically asked you about it. So this would be an example of the CIA's initiating information to the Warren Commission. Mr. Helms. It seems to me, having interrogated a defec- tor and developed information on Lee Harvey Oswald and his contacts with the Cubans, that the Agency would have volun- teered this information to the Warren Commission if, indeed, ‘the Warren Commission was still sitting on 5 May 1964, which I assume that it was. Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, would you please read CIA No. 1906, which is a memo dated 12 May 1964, directed to Mr. . Rocca from Mr. Angleton. Mr. Helms. This is from Angleton to Rocca, right. (Pause) I have read it. Mr. Goldsmith. It says, "I raised with Mr. Helms the “nature of the recent information you are processing that originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source? That would be AMMULL "T informed him that this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission,” et cetera. “What new factors, if any, would the AMMUD case have raised with the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms. I am sorry. In 1978, I haven't the foggiest idea. TOP SECRET
(Ur SLuKei 1-77 Mr. .Goldsmith.- Was’ there-any reluctance on the part of the Agency to disclose this information to the Warren Commis- sion because of the sensitivity of the source? aa Mr. Helms. Did you not just tell me he was a defector? Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, he was a defector. 6 Mr. Helms. And was a defector at this time? ? Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | g Mr. Helms. I am not entirely sure why this great question 9 | of sensitivity, unless he was a secret defector and the 10 —— ESE ee ee Cubans did not know he had defected. That might make it sensitive. I cannot figure out what else would have been sensitive about it. I simply take the word of Angleton who wrote the cee eens memorandum that there was-something sensitive about it. ~~ a Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Mexico City station ever tasked s |e pursue the leads generated by the source? 17 | “Mr, Helms. Ido not know. ; 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, are you familiar with the is | ease of the Soviet defector Nosenko? 20 | Mr. Helms. Yes, I am. | a) Mr. Goldsmith. What role, if any, did you play with @ 23 | regard to the handling of this case? ; to. + =. | | | - Mr. Helms. I assume -- and I have to use the word i assume, because my memory does not carry me this far. I assume | as i that I was, in one way or another, involved with the Nosenko DoclId: 322763410 Yage 7a THAD QtPoleT
iUr BLuAci 1-78 case from the time that contact was made with him in Geneva aq | > 2 | through his defection and then through the period after he ' . defected and was held by the Agency and I was probably in and | oy @ 4+ |) out of the case -- and by in and out, I simply mean that at in periodic.intervals I would hear some aspects of the case, or 6 ! about the case -- until the time that he was eventually resettled. In other words, by “resettled,” I simply mean he was led out of the Agency's custody, found a place to live. I thought he was given a new identity and assumed a life in American society in the public domain. But Twas in and out of it all ow “aj 72 the time. How many decisions I was involved in during this period I do not recall anymore. @ I do not want to duck any of them. It was an ongoing case:of great sensitivity, great legal. complications, and that is the best. way I can answer your question. 1S Fane Be ne ae SE ee i7 Mr. goldsmith. I take it that, as DDP and. then DCI, you 13 | were involved in the decision-making process concerning Nosenko%4 19 | Mr. Helms. That is right. 0 | Mr, Goldsmith. Have you read the three major agency 2] | reports that were written in regard to the Nosenko case? Specifically, there was a report in 1968 issued by the Soviet 72 as Russia Division; another report later in '68 called the TAI, Report; another, a third report, in 1976 referred to as the a7 as noe Hart Report. o Docld: 322763410 bage 19 | THD QEPatT
bUr Shuahci 1-79 1 Have you had occasion to read any of those reports? 2 ! Mr. Helms. It is a cinch I have not read the Hart Report 3 | because I had left the Agency long before 1976. As to the . ‘ @ | 4 other two reports, I do not recall anymore whether I read them, | nr I cannot imagine that I would not have been told what was in : | | | | Mr. Goldsmith. During his defection in 1964 and at his | | ! | | | | Mr. Goldsmith. By what legal authority do you recall was 3 arrival in the United States, was he in the custody of the CIA? 9 Hl Mr. Helms. Yes. 10 ! The procedure was that Soviet defectors, or defectors a who were accepted by act of the Inter-Agency Defector Committee ; 19 were handled by the Agency and the United States, and Nosenko | 2 | was no exception. | | | | { it 1s | Nosenko in CIA custody? You made reference to normal procedure, - | Mr. Helms. I do not know whether the NSC directive have | | : the. power of. law or. not. I. am not a.lawyer. . Oo . i I simply know that it was an agreed-upon device in the 13 | 19 | United States government for handling defectors. | Mr. Goldsmith. How long did Mr. Nosenko remain in CIA | | | | | { | | custody? I - | . . | | Mr. Helms. . Two or three years, I imagine. Mr. Goldsmith. If the record would indicate that he was | | | ; | in custody. until. October '69,.at which point he was admitted . ; ! ! as a resident alien to the United States, would you dispute . | | | nocra:32263a10 Kae 80 | TAS Orr RtT
ia DoclId: 322763410 sor ee ee ee ee ee: Sr ee = ) - ae tur SLuAci that in any way? ~ Mr. Helms. Tf would ‘have thought -- I see what you mean. Excuse me. I do not think I understood your. question .properly. Let mé go back. | I have no reason to question the fact that he was in CIA ‘custody. until 1969. I was referring to the fact that he was under interrogation for, I think, two or three years and then he was in the Agency's custody under different surroundings and under different circumstances I believe. Mr. Goldsmith. ‘Fine. We understand each other. What unit within the CIA had the primary responsibility for handling Nosenko in 19642 Mr. Helms. “My recollection was that he was turned over to the Director of Security as far as his handling and housing ! and so forth was concerned; that his interrogation was handied © by people provided by the Soviet Russian Division, or whatever the division was:known as at that time. 7 The citle of that division, Mr. Chairman, changed through the years, and I am not sure what it was called in 1964. Anyway, it was the division that was attempting to run opera- tions against the Soviet Union. | Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying initially the responsibil- ity for questioning Mr. Nosenko was given to personnel from the Soviet Russia Division? Mr. Helms. The interrogating responsibility, yes. age 81 TAP SECRET { ' . . ene URL ot a A re nena aneenenet ent sae ‘ : i .
sa ta DoclId: 322763410 Ur Btunc i 1-81 Mr. Goldsmith. “pia they continue to have responsibility for him until he was released from CIA custody in 1969? Custody.in the sense that you referred to earlier? | Mr. Helms. We switched terminology here. The Soviet Russian fellow were the interrogators. The housekeepers, administrators and handlers I believe, if I am not mistaken, came from the Director of Security. I believe that they con- tinued this on through during the time that he was in Agency custody. Am I wrong about that? Mr... Goldsmith. I am afraid I cannot respond to you at thi time concerning that. You are certainly correct in terms of personnel who Haridled him with regard to interrogation. | Mr. Helms. All right. “Let me just rest on what I have said. Mr. Goldsmith. So initially, the personnel that handled the interrogations came from the SR Branch or Division. Did _ they continue to have this responsibility until Mx. Nosenko- was released from custody in 1969? Mr. Helms. I thought the interrogation period was sort of over when he was. turned over to Bruce Soley . and Seteyy was the fellow who was supposed to take care of him and talk to him and so forth. My recollection:=may be wrong. It may be fuzzy. I thought that there was a change there. age 82 TAD CerertT SE (CAO ce ES ! } tt
. eur Bou | | 1-82 3 At the time that he was released from the active or hostil O... w he could assume some kind of life in American society. interrogation, an effort was being made to get him adjusted so Mr. Goldsmith. Why was responsibility for handling in Nosenko in terms of questioning him transferred from the SR | - to Bruce Sey? | L | 6 -Mr. Helms. My recollection of the circumstances was ay or had a problem as Director and it was a serious problem -- 9 | that was what to do with Mr. Nosenko. After all, we held him 10 against the laws of the United States for a period of two or 1 | three years. Even though we had consulted with the Deputy 12 Attorney General as to what to do about the case we got no “N particular help from him because there was no legal precedent 1 | for these things. In fact, as far as I know today, there has been no effort made to set up a legal context in which a case like this could § 17 | be held. 12 : I was not interested in continuing this any Longer than | it was felt necessary to get as best we could to the bottom of | the Nosenko case. 7 | So. after considering all the factors, the decision was | _.°.29 | made to get him out of what I can only refer to as Durence : ad a | file and get him into different circumstances and make an effort not only to resettle him, but find out.whether pleasant a¢ and cordial. treatment he had any. different things to say than Doclda: 32263410 bage 83 THe CErory .
da DoclId: 32263410 i | | | | | | | } | | | : ! t ! i { = _— —<—— = Rae SS DS ee ES tur whuAZs i he had under hostile interrogation. I want to emphasize the point. I am not trying to anti- cipate your questions, Mr. Goldsmith; it just seems to run right along here -- that my motivation as Director of the onan Agency was to get that man into a status where he could handle it in some way that was “proper and legal and all of the rest of it and get him out of a status where we were obviously in violation of the law in holding. him. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall how long a period Mr. Nosenkd { was held in custody or corfinement under violation of the law? 4 - ‘Mr. Helms. I think it was two or three years anyway. : Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall which individual specifically had primary xesponsibility for interrogating him in 1642 To refresh your memory in part, would David Murphy have been one I of those individuals? _ | Le Mr. Helms. That sounds good. : _ Mr. Goldsmith. Can you recall anyone else besides Mr. | - Murphy? , | y: ' Mr. Helms. ‘I do not recall whether I recall this name | from my recollections as to 1964. It seems to me that Bagley | was another fellow involved in the interrogation of Nosenko. Mr. Goldsmith. bain sorty, Mr. Helms. I do not compre- hend fully your response. Another individual may have been a involved in the interrogation? Mr. Helms. An individual knowned as Tennant Bagley. | sso ‘FOP SFPRET ;
DoclId: 32263410 age 65 THD Crrory . Ur Sluice i 1-84 Mr. Goldsmith. I understood that. The record is clear on that. My question now is was another individual who interroga- | ! | ted Mr. Nosenko known as Thomas Ryan? _ L Mr. Helms. | ::-That name, I-am sorry, does not ring any (eee te bells with me. rs | Mr. Goldsmith. What position did Mr. Bagley hold with | the Agency? : | somewhere. | Mr. Goldsmith. How were these individuals selected for | handling, Mr. Nosenko?. Why, in particular, were these | individuals chosen? | | Mr. Helms. I do not know. I would have thought that | | the Chief of the SR Division would pick individuals who knew = the most about Soviet intelligence, soviet intelligence | . | methodology, how things were done in the Soviet Union. In | }- other words, would have provided the most expert interrogators | . we could have. | | Mr. Goldsmith. How much expertise, if any, did the i individuals have 60 the Oswald case? Mr. Helms. . I do not know. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. When Nosenko was questioned about Oswald, was any effort made to have the interrogator have sufficient ag {§ expertise concerning Oswald and the JFK assassination?
Ur efudzi 1-85 Mr. Helms. I do not know. I cannot imagine he would what would be the purpose on the part of the interrogation? an What we were trying to do was find out whether Nosenko was telling the truth or not. This would have been an important part of finding that out. “| not have briefed himself on these things. In other words, involved with the questioning of Nosenko were, in fact, | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you also think that the individuals | | experienced interrogators? | Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know what experienced interro- | io 7 - - | gators are, really. In the American vernacular, a man who has been doing anything for two weeks has become experienced, a Sen a -SO I do not know how you evaluate that term. t certainly experienced in Soviet Russian matters. Whether they in were experienced interrogators or not, I do not remember. The ww nN oe _— ~~ —s Oo ey rev) ~ = oe ee ee 1 | But people like Murphy and Bagley and so forth were . | i word interrogator is something from World War II. If you were | - an interrogator in a prisoner of war camp, you kind of got that rubric hung around your neck and that gave you a certain status I have never quite understood why, but nevertheless it did. Whether these fellows ever had that kind of interrogation instruction or experience, I do not remember. Mr. Goldsmith. The Nosenko case was an.important one, nD te was it not? wd tO ee Mx. Helms. Very important. ee en ee ee en ey n= DoclId: 322763410 age 86 TAD SECRET
in “NI 9) DoclId: 322763410 gyr weal i 1-127 that I believe on one occasion some people wanted to try and use aids to interrogation in the form of drugs and I said I _ wanted none of this done. I believe my wishes were carried swear to it. Mr. Goldsmith. When did this incident take place? Mr. Helms. I do not remember. Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the individuals involved? ; Mr. Helms. It seems to me that some of the interrogators who were involved in talking to him wanted to try truth serums or something of that kind, sodium penathol or whatever those drugs are which are considered to be aids to interrogation. Mr. Goldsmith. Was that Mr. Bagley or Mr. Murphy? Were they of the feeling that drugs should be administered? Mr. Helms. I would assume it was someone like that. I am not sure who brought the question to me anymore. I do have in the back of my head the fact that this did come up. Mr. Goldsmith. If the Agency did administer drugs to Nosenko, would there have been a record of this fact? Mr. Helms. I certainly would have thought so. Mr. Goldsmith. Would you dispute testimony to this Committee by Mr. Nosenko that he was drugged by the CIA and then interrogated? Mr. Helms. te would have to demonstrate. that this was the case. age 128 TAP CEPRET 7 out. I have never heard anything-to.the contrary, but I cannot _ a ne ee rn ne a