HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM » Noire en France (FEANF) in Paris. However, at the Second Congress of UGEC, held in August 1963, it was evident from the anti- American resolutions that the Soviets have made some headway in infiltrating the or- ganization. There is also an ineffectual yquth federation ‘which is a member of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), but it has little significance in the Congo, ; Political youth groups attached to various parties were a volatile force in the 1960-1961 period. They were originally organized as paramilitary auxiliary groups to serve as weapons of intimidation and violence, Political leaders have become disillusioned with these organizations, however, as they have proved very difficult to control and a great public nuisance. They are less ideological groups than bands of disoriented, unemployed persons seeking a violent outlet for their frustrations. Political Communication Means of political communications are very limited. Thus, the Leopoldville government is -handicappéd in projecting a favorable image in the interior. As a result, Adoula is largely unknown to the mass of the population. ,His anonymity could prove a drawback in possible elections in 1964, One can hardly speak of any ''mass media,!! Press and radio now reach only a restricted audience, Only in Leopoldville and Elisabeth- ville is there a widely circulated daily press. The largest newspaper inthe country, Courrier d@'Afrique (Couraf), has a circulation of no more than 15,000, mostly in Leopoldville. The Couraf staff is mostly Bakongo, and of a Catholic coloration. The Adoula organ, Le Progrés, circulates less than 10,000 copies. There are printed newspapers--in nearly all cases organs of the provincial governments -- in the following cities: Coquilhatville, Bukavu, Kindu, and Kikwit, Although circulation figures are not available for these, it is doubtful any prints more than 1,000 copies, | There are radio stations in each of the six former provincial capitals. The most powerful is that of Elisabethville, There is at present no political content to the programming; news broadcasts are controlled by the central gov- ernment, The number of radio sets in the Congo is considerable, Estimates vary from 100,000 to 600,000, although the latter figure seems much too high. Many. of the radios are battery-operated and are now not func- tioning because batteries are in short supply. By far the most important means of com- munications is by word of mouth, through the marketplaces and along thetransport axes, News spreads with amazing rapidity from city to country by the "bush telegraph''; however, the reverse is much less true. 32 ‘In a number of cases, provincial officials travel widely within their provinces, However, this is rarely done by central leaders. Adoula - thas failed to use this means of making him- self known to the country at large. Travelin the interior by deputies and persons in op- position to the provincial governments has been closely controlled. Political meetings are prohibited in most sections of the country. Incentives to Elections’ The Loi Fondamentale stipulates that elec- tions must be held by June 30, 1964, to re- place the present Parliament andthe provincial assemblies, However, the deadline is not sacrosanct, since a two-thirds vote of both houses of Parliament suffices to amend this or any other clause of the Loi Fondamentale, Moreover, Article 67 and 76 of the Loi Fondamentale and the debates at the Brussels Round Table in 1960 appear to indicate that = completion of the new constitution is a pre- requisite to the holding of new -elections. Congolese sources predict adoption of the constitution by late 1963 or early 1964, While possible, we hold this unlikely. However, by mid-1964, work on the new constitution could well be completed. After it has been pro- mulgated, pressures for new elections will be very strong, since the legal basis for the’ present representative assemblies will no longer exist, The contentious issue of the disputed ter- ritories would also have to be settled prior to elections, There are at least 15 areas claimed by two or more of the new provinces,’ Though the central government had planned to hold referenda to determine the future of the territories, it has avoided to date opening any of these Pandora's boxes, -The leaders of the new provincial govern- ments share a sense of isolation from the sources of power at Leopoldville. Although some provinces have surrogates in Leopold- ville, including several with ''native sons" in Adoula's Cabinet, most feel their represen- tation in Parliament inadequate, largely as a result of the failure of the parliamentarians elected in 1960 to maintain contacts at the pro- vincial level, Thus, the provincial govern- ‘ments anticipate elections as a means of re- placing incumbent parliamentarians with representatives owing allegiance to the new provincial regimes, With this new blood, the provinces hope to increase their leverage in Leopoldville and their share of central govern- ment patronage. The impulse to elections at the provincial level is virtually unanimous. There is as well surprising depth of attach- ment by the Congolese elite to precepts of Western democratic theory. The Congoleseare well aware that their country has been the SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 3276276338 Page 41
HW 49061 DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM object of world ridicule. For this reason, elections become all the more important as a redemptive process, © ‘Postponement of the elections will become ‘increasingly difficult, and there seems no pos- sibility of introducing a formula of indirect elections which would pose less of a security problem, Despite thé excellent access which the United States enjoys to many top leaders, and their willingness to receive politicaladvice on many issues, we doubt that the Congo gov- ernment could be dissuaded from holding elec- tions in the next two years, short of a total ‘breakdown of law and order ona scale which: made them physically impossible. To seek a different formula for legitimating the organs of government. would be to confess inability to enter the civilized world on equal terms with other states, The broad alternative of centralized authori- tarianism appears to be unavailable, given the weakness of the central government and the limited administrative and security capa- bility of the ANC, Also, the ANC leadership shows no disposition at present to assume the unwieldy burden of political responsibility in the Congo, Finally, the UN relationship with the Congo creates unusual requirements for democratic legitimacy, which can be ex- pected to persist for some time despite any reductions in the UN presence, Provincial. Etectoral Experience since 1960 There have been since independence local elections in the city of Kikwit (Kwilu) and the province of Cuvette Centrale. Two fea- tures of these elections are important: 1) In both cases, the elections were carried out peacefully. In Kikwit calm was maintained in the face of a heated political contest, This suggests that elections may not be a serious threat to public order in areas where pro- vincial institutions are functioning reasonably well. Kwilu and Cuvette Centrale are two of the best- -organized and most ably ad- ministered provinces in the Congo. 2) In both cases, the elections resulted in strengthening control of the provincial administrations, This. suggests that, in prov- inces with functioning governments, elections will operate to consolidate the position of the incumbents, ; Prospects for a Moderate National Party In light of possible national elections in 1964, there has been considerable recent dis- cussion on the desirability, of forming a national party of moderate persuasion. The ‘principle arguments advanced in favor of such a movement may be summarizedas follows: 1) Stability in most African states has been 33 ‘with the “major achieved through the mechanism of a single dominant national party, which performs the key functions of national integration and con- tainment of disparate local and ethnic loyalities. 2) The Adoula government has the desirable characteristics of moderation and respon- sibility, However, it lacks any structure cap- able of engendering popular support for its policies; there is no linkage betweenthe rulers and ruled, except through the administrative structures of the state, This could be supplied through the organization of a national. party committed to the same principles of govern- ment as the Adoula regime.. 3) The Adoula government is subject to continual harassment ‘and is frequently para- lyzed by a fragmented and irresponsible Parliament, It is argued that the creation of a solid national party could assure the govern- ment a firm and disciplined parliamentary majority, while permitting the kind of energetic leadership necessary to restore order to the public finances and to ''get the country moving again," Careful analysis of these arguments re- quires first an understanding of efforts now . underway to establish. a national party, a look at its possible organization, and a survey of the risks involved, The idea of a national moderate ‘party is not new, The Belgian administration sought to form a similar movement in 1959- 1960, the Parti National du Progreés (PNP). Indeed, the decision to accede to the demands for independence was partly based on the cal- culation that universal suffrage would operate in favor of a moderate, administration-backed party, rolling up overwhelming majorities in rural areas to compensate for the loss of the cities to more militant groups. The cir- cumstances now are vastly different, but a brief review of the major reasons for the humiliating failure of the PNP still provides material for reflection: 1) The movement was immediately identified colonial administration, and dis- credited as the 'Parti des Négres Payés.!'! 2) The party. lacked dynamic, determined leadership prepared to get to the hustings and to contend with the more radical movements on their own terms. 3) As the campaign proceeded, the PNP's prospects began to look so unpromising that interest groups, such as the large sought to reinsure themselves by making substantial contributions to the radical movements. Ironically, despite clear Belgian sympathy and support for the PNP, a party such as MNC/L enjoyed greatly superior resources by the end of the campaign, 4) 'Moderation'' does not constitute a dynamic political program in an electoral campaign, 5) The PNP was not a coherent national companies, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 4?
HW 49061 DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM movement, but a weak coalition of numerous local movements, It was not capable of ef- fective, united action. Recent Efforts to Create a Moderate . National Party The need for a national party is felt by a large segment of the present Congolese leadership. Several efforts are underway: 1) Defense Minister Jerome Anany has been travelling extensively in recent weeks, es- tablishing contacts with local leaders, Anany was born in Lisala (Moyen Congo), but his parents were from Kivu. He was elected as Senator from Kivu in 1960, on a non-party list. He considers Moyen Congo his bastion, but there is reason to doubt how much genuine support he has in-that area, or whether he is accepted as a "native son.'' His choice of Kivu as an electoral constituency in 1960 would suggest the contrary. Anany's prospec- tive party is the Parti Démocratique Congo- lais '(PDC)--already dubbed by its enemies the "Parti des Députés Corrompus." His position as Defense Minister is a key one, It is not yet clear whether he considers the PDC "his'! party, or whether his efforts aré on behalf of the Prime Minister. 2) Adoula has not yet firmly committed himself to the national party project, but he clearly views the scheme as one he would lead, For all his fine qualities, Adoula does not seem to have the magnetism necessary to make his personality the central feature of the party's image. It seems unlikely that he would lend his active support to the effort to develop a national party unless he were the acknowledged leader, 3) Sareté Chief Nendaka has also been travelling extensively and seeking to mold his security police force into an effective weapon for the political campaign. Nendaka wants to’ be elected as a deputy from his Aketi home district in U€@lé Province, and then move to the Ministry of the Interior. It is not clear to what extent Nendaka's efforts are coordinated with those of Anany. 4) The "Binza group" feels that it, or its members, should be the ‘organizing com- mittee for a national party. The strength of this caucus derives, however, from its power linkages in Leopoldville, and not from its mass support. It is not clear whether Nen- daka's efforts are on behalf of the. ''Binza group'' or himself; Anany is not a member of the consortium. . 5) Kamitatu, leader of the Parti Solidaire Africain/Kamitatu (PSA/K), and his top par- liamentary lieutenant, Felicien Kimvay, are very interested in the national party project. Kamitatu is a highly ambitious and very able He conditions his participation on a leader. satisfactory place near the center of the po- litical constellation. He recognizes, however, that his source of political strengthis regional .(Kwilu), and he probably has no illusions that “he himself could organize a national party. 34 The recent PSA/K Congress in Kikwit (June 1963) was explicitly designed to renovate the party and to recreate its rural apparatus, looking toward the electoral campaign. 6) Alphonse Kithima, leader of one of the major labor unions, Confédération des Syn- dicats Libres Congolais (CSLC), has initiated the Mouvement pour la Defense des Intéréts du Peuple, based upon his union organization, This structure probably does not have enorm- ous potential, but reflects the tendency of the diverse elements. in Adoula's entourage to anticipate the formation of a national party by launching their own movements as quickly as possible, It appears that Kithima has Adoula's approval of the project, which is likely to become a link in any national party under Adoula. Numerous other lesser organizations need not be catalogued. Individually, they are of very little significance; collectively, they are im- portant symptoms of the strong potential for fragmentation inherent in the Congolese polity. These scattered efforts to achieve anational party may indicate that Adoula has given his tacit assent to the simultaneous pursuit of several initiatives. If so, this may place him once again in the position of the in- dispensable broker between these groups, clearly indicating the nature of the leader- ship which the ''party'' is likely to have. It is not the manner in which dynamic and success- ful national parties have been created else- where in Africa. The Bargaining Power of the Provinces In organizing a national movement from Leopoldville, one comes hard against the in- controvertible fact that, in most areas, access to the electorate must pass through the groups and "bosses"! entrenched at the provincial level, It would be unthinkable to seek to or- ganize a party in competition with the Abako in Kongo Central; an organizer sent into U@1E without the authorization of President Mambaya would be summarily dealt with. Therefore, the only possible procedure is to undertake negotiations with provincial ,au- thorities and solicit their cooperation, Col- laboration would come at a price. Provincial authorities will certainly demand substantial . concessions to their list of provincial needs. Further, the cooperation probably would be in the form.of an electoral alliance, rather than. absorption into a national movement, which would:then be able to communicate di- rectly with the masses. The kind of national SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 43
HW 49061 Ne Docld: 32676338 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM - party likely to emerge bears many resem- blances to an American political party. It would be a loose coalition at the summit level of a series of provincially based power centers. Possible Coercive Instruments of the Central Government Leaders The central government possesses certain potential instruments of coercion ‘in the prov- inces which might be of some use to national party organizers. These include: 1) The ANC, The ANC has sufficient level of discipline and effectiveness as a consta- bulary in most areas for it to be a potentially decisive force. Mobutu's concept of the ANC's role in the elections is not clear. He has tried hard to preserve the "apolitical" tradition of the ANC, and this approach is shared by most of the senior officers, Accordingly, he will probably resist requests for overt commit- ment of the ANC to one side or. the other, However, the army probably would prevent or limit the use of intimidation and violence by opposition groups in the campaign. In some areas, these techniques played an important role for parties like MNC/L. The ANC could be important in provinces where political frag- mentation exists, depending upon how it chose to intervene to halt likely disorders. 2) Streté. In Nendaka's hands, this is an overtly political instrument. The Sireté has the power of arrest and clandestine means of intervening in local situations. It is ef- fectively under central control, The caliber of the Streté agents, however, varies sub- stantially from very good to mediocre. 3) Subsidy, The major-part of the pro- vincial budget comes from the central: gov- ernment, although this will change somewhat under the new constitution. Theoretically, the’ threat of a subsidy reduction should be a potent “weapon, However, anagreed, automatic formula for calculating the subsidy level exists, and there is not much room for central government manipulation. In general, experience to date shows that, rather than using its financial leverage upon the provinces, the central gov- ernment permits those provinces which levy the most effective demands or make the most fearsome threats to extract the largest shares, 4) Import quotas. At the moment, these are centrally determined, There is more room for arbitrary decision and manipulation, but the above remarks apply as well to import quotas as to subsidies in general. 5) Patronage. The central government theo- retically could reward well-behaved provinces with attractive public works projects. The budgetary situation limits the potential of this approach, unless large new infusions of for- eign aid were received. As to employment possibilities, the central government can offer 35 . commissioners _ the new institutions. In Stanleyville and Bukavu, jobs in Leopoldville to meritorious political workers, but in fact controls very few appoint- ments in the provinces, The central Civil Serv- ice Ministry still controls the promotion and ranking of civil servants, on which basis pay scales are calculated. There is, however, no way of stopping the provinces from making their own promotions and paying the persons concerned from their own resources. 6) Judiciary, Pending adoption of the new constitution, the judicial system is still con- trolled by the central government. In many ' provinces, highly incriminating dossiers ona number of political figures are in the hands of the judiciary. The Minister of Justice (Bomboko) could decide to pursue some of these cases. The judiciary values its neu- trality, however, and would resist becoming a conscious political instrument. Further, there are a good many moonlight entrepre- neurs within the Leopoldville establishment, The corruption issue is a two-edged sword. 7) State of emergency. The central govern- ment can declare a state of emergency in a province and install a provincial government more to its tastes. A prerequisite for this procedure is access to a faction in the pro- vincial assembly, Where there is near unity behind provincial leadership, this ploy is ex- cluded. Unusual opportunities for intervention existed at the time of the creation of new provinces, The central government appointed to serve as midwives for for example, this power has been used ef- fectively. However, all but a few provinces now have governments, and central govern- ment leverage will probably correspondingly shrink, 8) Disputed territories. It may be possible to play one province against another in reach- ing a decision concerning the fate of the numerous territories disputed between two or three provinces. This, however, is a danger- ous game. In rewarding one province and gaining support from its leaders, one incurs corresponding losses in the other.. The Electoral Law The 1960 elections were organized under the electoral law of March 23, 1960. The law established the administrative districts as electoral units for the Chamber of Repre- sentatives, with the number of seats in a district ranging from 4 to 12. For the pro- vincial assemblies, the territory served as the electoral district, with an average of 3 or 4 deputies elected per territory. The choice of a proportional representation sys- tem of voting for several seats for each elec- toral unit was dictated in part by the ex- ' perience of the 1957 urban elections. They had . SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 44