_f co IUf dLbic! 2 4 Be Ambassador Willauer noted that there is one military contingency clan which will have to be ready for use if Castro should start slaughtering 4mericanse This would be a purely military plan end would include militery occuration. General Gray noted that such a plan already exists and is being revived, Ambassador Willauer noted that the hardest political problem was that the Cubans would not work tcgetier. Mr. Barnes then noted that the tabs to the paper give full details about the individuals, names, background, etc. Secretary Irwin at this point left the meeting. Ambassador Willaucr then read the paramilitary section, number 5. Hr, Barnes comsented on the conmumication teams in Cuba. He first noted, however, that sco far the activities have not developved any cracks and crevices in the Castro structure. There is still hope that these might become visible during the next sixty days witn increased cropaganda, supvort, and other activities. He indicated that at one time there were ten cormunications teams active. For varicus reasons these have noWbeen reduced to six. There is ne indication yet of Cuban DF capability. In contrast the Asency with Nevy help feels that it kmows every movement of amy Cuban ship and has. good . information about the ground forces and secret police, and does not have mich information about air activity. Ambassador Willeuer then continued reading in the varamilitary section through the sentence ending "and carry out sabotage." At this point lir, Noel” was asked to comment, since he just recently came from Havana. lir. Neel ‘indicated that the various elements of the oprositicn are coovereting with each other in sabotage activities. Recently, tuere has been a decrease of such activity ceccuse of the Frivel-inspired invasion scare, the militia activity, anc the introduction of death penalties. Some of the sabotese teams have been picked uo owt some are stijil in existence, wiiling and able to act however, more material is necessarye Ambassador Willauer noted the need for labor to cut the cenee Nre:Hoel continued ov noté@ that the sabotare units can be coordinated with any landing. Some details of the supply drops were - reported. fir. Sarnes indicutec_tnat of tie six missions flown within the past ten days, (ut of a totel”ort ten suply drops}~five were suvoly missicnse Of these, two were fully successful, one vas oartially successful, one was mechanically successful cut the maverial was lost subsecucnt to its recelnt by the people to wrom it was destined, anc the fifth was not goode itr. Barnes indicated that better results will ce cossible in the future, nowWthat there 2 on-site cormunications units in ection. “nbassador Willauer noted in rassing thet with a collapse of the Castro regime after successful efforts, it may te necessary to orovice certain facilities, sucn as electric poWer or conmurica= tiens, particul:rly in a piece such as favena, if the sabotage efforts are as successful as is hoped. Thus it might be wise to earmark early some aval ship with this thought in mind. , re The final paragraph of the paramilitary secticn was read. aAmbassador Willauer noted the Faul Kennedy article in the liew York Times, which he indicated as ziving prevty accurate information about the training and asked whether anyone recuired additional information. Ambassador ‘illeuer indicated that it still way be possible tc neve U.S, strive bases; that this matter nas not yet been finally decided. He alse mentioned the question of contract pilotse Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HW 56629 DoclId:32105822 Page 6
. _s fur Yui 3 Pilotse He said that the idea of air Strikes beginning three days before Deday has been killed, and that a strike beginning the day before Deday has now been accepted. He noted that it is Dossible that Cuba may have a jet air force based on the vilots being trained in Czechoslovaliae AS yet there is no evidence that there are eny jet airvianes in Cuba, However, Ambassador Willauer raised the Droblem oz’, if Castro has a jet air force, how would it be possible to explain the use by the FRD-of a jet capability. He susrested the possibility of a volunteer group, to acquire and provide the jet pilots and planes. Arbassador Wiliauer indicated that he hoped the Defense Department would include in its estimates some indication of what might be reauired to counteract a Cuzen jet air force, and some estimate as to how soon Cuba could have effective jet capability after delivery of such planes in Cuba. Following Mr. Barzes corment that there is no magic to any specific number we of days before Dedzy for a pre strike, and that sufficient facts are not now on hand to reach a decision, Ambassador Willauer commented thet with the Present Cuban air force one cay before Deday is sufficient. Mr. Devine . ' Noted that one of the problems of activity prior to D-day is what will be happening during that period in the U.N. and the OeAeSe . Ambassador Willauer then finished the reading of the waver with the miscellaneous section, “ptr Captain Spore then commented at length on the sea lift problem, He gave a rong down of what vessels the -lizency now hes indicating that it would not be sufficient for the numbergrinvolved. He said that the Navy is auite concerned asout the problem of selecting a beach. He also said that heretofore calculations had been based on an unopposed landing. If an opvosed danding is @ possibility, there will be a recuirement for naval Subpdoert and the vessels _ in hand have no armament, He also expressed Navy concern over the actual landinz and transcortation without Casiro's orior knowledge from port of embarkation, Amoassador wWillaucr noted the possidlity of a pre-darm strike, Thee Ambassador Willauer then explained about the timing problen, indicating that the next reetinc of the Grcup is early Tutecay morming, and that this working srcus Aas been instructed to ebtain the third oreng document from Defense before that meeting, He sugsested that the next working group meeting be Hcnday when scne tyne of procress revort misht.be helpful. Ceneral Graz raised scme ceneral questions, Specifically asiae— if the vlan just read is valid. He noted that tnere are so many contingencies raised, the plan does not seem tc have yet veen determined, émvessador Willauer indicated that the Srecial Group could not go beyond the voint which tke Ambassador has Cescribed in stating whet the United Stetes policy will be. This will be Something thet nas to be determined and set by the new acministretion. In the meantime the Group does recuire from Defense a statement regarcing the questions he, the Ambassador, has raised, General Grey and Ambassador Willauer then discussed the nature of the job to be done vy Defense and what is required. —_ General Gray Bre TS eT e lur veuiie! Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HW 56629 Docld:327105622 Page Tf
7 wt General Gray then attempted to sum up what he understood was needed, He said (1) the Group seems to want an estimate of the tire to organize and train a Cuban indigenous army, including an estimate of its chances; (2) What U.S. support would be required for the 750 men in terms of air and naval pewer; (3) What U.S. grcund forces will be required to support the action. A separate paper, he said, would deal with U.S. unilateral. intervention to protect U.S. lives and vroperty, involving ground, air and naval forces. He weuld.contemplate this situation arising so quickly that there would be No possibility to inter mix it with the plan. And (i) the use of U.S. and indigenous forces on a planned basis. ib ye dutel Ra There was considerable discussion by Captain Spore, Ambassador Willauer, General Gray, and lr, Barnes on the need to work on ‘the assumption that the 750 men may not be cole to do the job unassisted. At one point, Mn Noel estimated, on the basis of observation of visa applicants, thet in the group of 70,000, there would be less than 1,000+availeble for training for military duties. Ambassador Willauer sugzested th:t General Gray note, as a prcblem in connection with training Cubans, the cuesticn.of who pays the trainees, who pays their dependents, and who would pay indemnity in case of their death. lr. Barnes noted that the study would not be complete withcut consideration of the timing factor. Jor without consideration of two further points, namely, cocrdination with action vs. Trujillo, and an estimate of why an embargo, including activity which amounts to acts of war, will not work. Ambassador Willauer noted that there is perhaps insufficient time to do all this in the final report, nowever, he suggested that the desiracility of also dealing with Trujillo showld be noted, anc thet the Agency might include an evaluation of the effects of a complete economic embargo. It was also considered thet at some point the ssency will heve to prepare anc out uo for the reaction cf the Special Group, its assessment of the vossibility of success by the 750 unaided. .There would also ve required an assessment of the political feelinz in the ccuntry which it is hoped misgnt be ceveloved between now and the end of Februarye The next meeting is on the calendar for Monday at 1600 hrs. DO NOT FILE PLEASE RETURN BY HAND M:ECCurtis/ck _ 1-13-61 eo TO. ROOM 4509 MS/z OR CALL EXT. 4134 = £ TGP SECREy ree oa Photocopy from Geratd R. Ford Library HW 56629 DoclId:321058272 Page 6