, ; " APR 15 ’97 @4:58PM USGOVERNMENT . P.5/14 we eee HW 355157 —SEGRES- Subject: CIA Employees defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other cases, the defense wag never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified . and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great. 10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982;°50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of ~"~ a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a “covert agent" to prosecution and provides up. to 10 years in prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act specifically defines a “covert agent" as including “an officer or employee of an intelligence agency... ." 11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12958 on classified national security information that became effective in October 1995. Although it requires generally that agencies make greater declassification efforts than under the prior executive order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of intelligence information, which would include employees, extra protection from the declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and having historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected. 12. (U) ‘The above federal laws show a long-standing ‘practice by thé”US Government to protect CIA employees from disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a “high priority. nal Congidera 13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations for protecting their identity are similar to those for sources. Many of these employees have worked “under cover" for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installations and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to 4 —SECREP— DocId:32404069 Page 5
HW 55157 “APR 15 ’S7 @4:S9PM USGOVERNMENT . . P.6/14 Subject: CIA Employees certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign countries. 14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or "friendly" country, should the local service become aware of who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it becomes known among the locals that certain US Government officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and @iplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert employees and their families would face increased risk to their personal safety. Even in “friendly” countries, our employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among an otherwise benign local population. In any of these cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in an operationally and physically secure location. Thus, maintaining cover is important to a case officer's effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA. 15. (8S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important ‘to cover providers. The Review Board will recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United States a overseas, can work under "official" (e.g. cover or "non- official" (e.g., cover. “Disclosure of a covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA. but would also negatively affect the governmental or business mission: of ‘the cover provider, especially those who provide non- official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in other countries could have a negative impact on the interests and activities. It would also Cast suspicion on that” employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers. could affect the recruitment and coopération of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community... — ‘. 46. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational. ». considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA-are “PK Act 6 (1)(A JFK Act 6 (1)(B —SECRES— DoclId: 37404069 Page 6
HW 55157 threaten thelr” business interests and personal _safet * APR 1S ’97? @5:@GPM USGOVERNMENT P.7714 Subject: CIA Employees not diminished. Similar to sources, many~ former” employee still do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed. Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional © A relationships. Some former employees’ still live overseas where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their personal safety. Other former. employees’ travel overseas on - business, where a revelation ofa past CIA affiliation ; can One example of an employeein this category is a “whose ‘name apparently appears only once in the ; nn Collection. [_—ijretired under(L_ Cid COV; he currently has a consultant business and frequently i travels tobe “Release of hig name would jeopardize not only his business. “but perhaps even his safety. A gimilar example is| ‘who also retired under cover. He ig now working inL___—and several ‘countries for a private firm. He does not want his name p ished, because it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status. 17. (8) Even if a former employee agrees to the revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals recruited by the employee and still providing information to the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations where the employee worked throughout his career, including some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and may have believed they were legitimately providing - information to a US corporate representative would be upset to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government. 18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers by their own service would have a chilling effect on prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to enter into a clandestine relationship with American intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even its own staff employees from public disclosure. LV, Proposal 19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions made for those individuals who are important to the story of the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a 6 —SECRET— DoclId:327404069 Page fF
“APR 1S ’97 @S:G1PM USGOVERNMENT P.8/14_ ' Subject: CIA Employees substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can: be used for a particular employee. fp 20. (S) CIA. believes that. ‘this approach will not undermine the Review Board's: obligations under the JFK Act. A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84 ‘of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals! | identity can add. ‘anything of significance to the historical - - yvecord; yet: there may be some security. concerng ‘gtill —_ moe associated. with these individuals. For example, pop . @tired under cover and is currently living in Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in the JFK Collection and was subject. to public release, he told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and . believed such a release could pose personal and security problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his. name even appeared in the Collection, since he had no recollection of being involved in anything | related to the assassination. 21. (8) With regard to the approximately 500 names that appear more than once in the Collection, ‘the vast | majority of these individuale played almost no role in the ‘JFK story. One example of this is former DO officer | Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately. 20- 30 times.in the Collection simply because he signed off on name trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and retired under cover. The public release of his name would provide the public with _no additional significant information about JFK. [___—siss: another example of a covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but. has little or no connection to the JFK story. retired under cover, is living in_South America, and objects to the release of his name. Mr.[_____—irecent letter to CIA ig also attached for your convenience. 22. (8) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some namea may be particularly important to the JFK story regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee. In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose names should be released to the public. These names would carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review ‘Board that harm would likely result 7 Secret HW 55157 DBocld: 32404069 Page @