104-10103-10359 spel Comments on Book V, SSC Final Report, The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies
14-00000 pereeterer sesepige senate Per epecyereency Table of Contents Summary of Findings Tab A. Tab B. Tab C. Tab D. Tab E. Tab F. Tab G. Organization for and Conduct of the Review CIA Performance on the Inquiries CIA Operations Against Cuba ; AMLASH Operation Materials Forwarded to Warren Commission and FBI Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments PEGE Eqtin®S & Fide
14-00000 . . Organization for and Conduct of the Review . 1. Many years have passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com- mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are no longer in place in the same work. Someof the employees have sigsiasie retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died. 2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A study group was established to consider the size of the problem and to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre- sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of CONFBENTAL~ egmEpa
14-00000 Siaeecgeneny penne ¢ President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached. 3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question ’ were in LA Division and Cl Staff, of the Directorate of Operations, with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security. and the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review of those files is described below. 4. LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the period 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review, covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy and the following year. A research group was formed composed of five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor. An additional four researchers participated in different phases of the research, which continued to mid-May 1977. 5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, - CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL -- 3 -- both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at Warrenton} Virginia. The remainder is held at Headquarters in the files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein). 6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material: a. b. Reference referred to above. Types _and Number of Files Reviewed (1) Operational (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings) (2) Subject Files (186 with findings and 36] with no findings) (3) Cuba Policy Files (4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files (Task Force W Chronos) (5) Official 201 Dossiers Total Criteria Used in the Research 1,729 547 1017 37 100-plus 2,014 As a guide the research group followed the Terms of In addition to the Terms of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest CONFIDENTIAL
14-00000 awdewe esas ar en brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis, and to additional questions raised in the course of the _ study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi-~ nation attempts against Castro. c. Findings and Organization of the Findings Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of those document(s) or findings which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were job numbers, official file numbers, _ inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of information, to the extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing
14-00000 the gist of the document(s) for purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LA Division research group files under the official classi- ‘fication number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings. These records are restricted in LA Division. 7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation of material further extended the time required to complete the under- taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the death of President Kennedy. - 8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject. 9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the
CONFDEN HAL ow §& <= Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com- mission. The so-called “Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes comprising ’ some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy of those documents released under provisions of the FOIA to the public in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series) released in September 1976 and March 1977.” 10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono- logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the Agency's central repository for information and documentation that it holds on: | a. The life of Harvey Oswald; b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964; - c. The testimony by various Agency officers before ‘the several commissions and committees set up to review, the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should be pointed out that this portion of this file is not complete); and d. The point of record for Agency action taken in response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro- visions of the Freedom of Information Act.
14-00000 e* --7-- 11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in ~ the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in order to be in a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific subjects. In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi- gation or gather information," the following files were set up: . a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission; b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren Commission; c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community , particularly the FBI; d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting assistance and information; e. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and f. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the te SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry.
14-00000 joer -- 8 -- 12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by . ‘chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor- mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b), its response to require- ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized to record what actually happened in those instances in which it differs from representations in the SSC Report. 13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one officer to identify material in its records believed to have some possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time of the “Garrison Investigation.“ 14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973
14-00000 GONABENTIAL- The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC Report, is highlighted as follows: "Certainly, concern with public reputation, . - problems of coordination between agencies, possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment, and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge of sensitive operations may have contributed to these shortcomings. But the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information." Page 7. A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal. - The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con- ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President — 2
14-00000 Be: ores ree ad bet © & 8645 Kennedy. This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs. The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at the. time. The. SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring. specific attention. This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in percep- tions. In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the various operational activities against Cuba and Castro. Organization for the Review As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963 and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi- gations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for 3 Fis, Rh & 2 a aw ug. = 2 heh wae PT ER
14-00000 adaznenen eres LAE Ad ., ge ea Aber) Saris Reet 3 Se sce the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following it. It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper. It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations, it necessitated careful analysis of the comtent and nature of the oper- ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to plotting against Castro. . - The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it, Tabs B through G. CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at “the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity ee Bary re
14-00000 (whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make ¥ the AMLASH operation actually fit the theory for which the SSC‘s presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.) We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's: theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones. Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi- dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif- ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con- spiracy to suppress evidence. 4
14-00000 Operations Against Castro The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum, with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. Ata later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity from-its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C. Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1, who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime. The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of (ober “os ai “e, Paes | a | UST SLIT Shs: «8 3 me § we
14-00000 BEES peed President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA ‘Nttserensseomneecere Gotjagreed © to o give ive any support t to AMLASH/1, but had jected his aeencreraartnamcee emma proposals to assassinate | Castro. When evidence supporting this view was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was . dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC _ Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1 was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot. Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the basis for.the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail at Tab D of this paper. - The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There are new considerations that developed in the course of the present review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate, but they do not provide a basis.for taking issue with the judgment of the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C. nee pa wera Sake ig €a mo * 7
14-00000 TERRES Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for - treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in- o ~ vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with . the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as “D". These al- legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight‘from Hexico City, awaiting arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not only was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to the alleged five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before the. alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi- gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially being placed in doubt by cther evidence in the record. In another instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 Hovember 1963 in- quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain named Soviets. The true name of AMLASH/] was given in the Mexico City reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December
14-00000 CONF ERHAL 1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern- ing a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/1 in February and March 1961. AMLASH/1's name could have been omitted from the cable altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about _ persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to AMLASH/1's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is discussed further at Tab D. . Conclusions Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two general conclusions. (First, jthe SSC Final Report contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera- tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents. Second,’ white one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti- Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize it more generously. In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to
14-00000 “FN 9 future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry. While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited . its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served | to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. .It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of President Kennedy. 10 sta
14-00000 a SEpael / 4 AUG 1976 e* & TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses-- (1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility , of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either - there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection program to ascertain all possible information on the subject. Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review. 2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back- ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these general activities were provocative. More specific, however, is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report this to the Warren Commission,.in the context of the provocation theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information. Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in support of the thesis. greece svt ants 8 PRT rine emrereene"® “ence bone 8 ; : met aque se. ‘ ws ep oem snared pont i otra rod ee ncaa i Lp H Beceem cn, “omen toenaerinn?  tctny ann SoD Gee om eS re ial
14-00000 rel . kteeag rey ~~ 3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro- vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un- qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect. a. The following questions are intended to serve as a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission. ntbee (1) What collection requirements were issued to mre the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination? _ (2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964? (3) What form did the follow-up take? (4) Identify and describe the records with regard sane to this activity. cs (5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters! requirements? (6) What dissemination and review was this . reporting given? (7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to the CI Staff? (8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission? (9) What review of Headquarters' material was ordered through 1964?
14-00000 (10) What werethe parameters of these instructions? (ll) What responses were there and where are they? (12) What evidence is there that the "provocation" theory was considered during the Warren Commission enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission? (13) What action was taken with reference to this concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs? (14) What records are there on this and where are they? ‘(15) Were there any efforts made to develop an Oswald/Cuban connection? & ‘ . (16) What form did they take? (17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject? (18) What action developed from these exchanges? (19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they? (20) To what extent were elements of the Agency other than the CI Staff and LA-Division involved in-in- vestigating the assassination during thé Warren Commission tenure? (21) What is the total CIA information on the two flights from Mexico City to Havana? (22) What was done at the time to develop further information on this matter? (23) Can further information be acquired on this matter now?
14-00000 (24) What is the total CIA information on 'D'"? (25) Is further information on "D"' needed in view of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it? (26) What information does CIA have on Oswald FPCC relations? (27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans training activity and was anything provided on this to the Warren Commission? (28) “What is the total CIA information on ''A''? (29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City? (30) What is the CIA information on the 4 Décember 1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba? (31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban assassination policies and programs up to November 22, 1963? (32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's 7 September 1963 statements re retribution? (33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA employees contain anything on the above questions? If so, what? b. On the subject of possible provocation for the assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine any additional relevant information on this plot. (1) What is the total information on the plots involving the criminal syndicates? (2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate operation? ,
14-00000 (3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office of Security officer may have knowledge that was not surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division career agent may have some insights that could throw light on one of the operations). (4) There are a couple of cases based on agent traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of Pigs period to shoot Castro. What is the total CIA information on these? ° BREE (5) What is the significance on the subject of — provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro? (6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly detailed reconstruction from a very complete record, there are points that should be addressed particularly, because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report. For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA peer a contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after sucha long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings? (7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1 when making plans for the 22 November meeting? (8) What was the security of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy? (9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?
14-00000 c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection with the investigation? An effort should be made to list these, including consultation with surviving officials to determine not only what they considered the requirement at the time, but what was omitted and why. . 4. In conclusion, these Terms of Reference" undertake to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S. policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which, therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those ‘that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions raised in the Schweiker report Ss. D. Brecinsldse mae O/Inspector General Robert Wall cI a, - Zn Willen Stas ona LA Division —o” Raymon co ‘alsecy ity
14-00000 cee ee eet a Ment een 1 cima darm ne fo a eee ENeeien Meee ante ns nett MLA Soe OFF oy we Nee ce cere were, fee ae canoe nine ines sean MON Re were ee teeter oe CIA PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES
j i { i fe “Nad weesit AseteeAlitaieas RLU e netiot eT er eR then ed ad sa of SABLE AEDs AL vice evs ne OT + tod ace R ris seme ME NR” ~— CONFIBENTIAL CIA's Performance on the Inquiries Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, empha- sizing things that it feels should have been ‘done but which it asserts were not. It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every — theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con- clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the intelligence agencies did -- in the present instance, what was the performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying a pattermof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record. The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in support of its case: | a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as "D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City-for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in- - conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report. CONFIDENTIAL
OE ' ty Lotte : ao cet am ARO 2 rnd # sent hat Badu aathy ate 28 as seccRGTPN cece OA th ponent sete atesine, + rs a Rs wh ob ORE nD Ses eee feel eine a nee ba yD ae 6 22 hm mene eaters 42 aeae aE ON ai oA ate eis OE Oo b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately. The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in | order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D of this report. c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60- 63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report, is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC Final Report. These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions. To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth and to report the findings, whatever they are. Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both on the part of CIA and the Warren Conmission--consideration was given to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the
14-00000 o> 4 : Co Ca mei sa he + dew questions as understood at the time, as wel] as considering those questions that have developed since then. ‘ha= would be the areas of inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject af tivestigetion. Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent to his return to private life from the “erine Croras in September 1959. These overseas adventures were aporopriate “cr Cl" ettention. The first of these overseas trips was when he wert <1 tme Soviet Union in October 1959 from which he returned in June TS6c. The second of these trips was when he went to Mexico City in 'at= Sectamder 1963, from which he returned in early October 1963. In addition to these two areas of otvtcus scecTfic inquiry for CIA, there is the problem of general foreign ints ’Ticence collection that might in some way produce information on the subiect. The SSC Final Report adds to these considerations oserzticns meting conducted by CIA as part of a general U.S. program against the Cesctra regime. These four general areas of inquiry are covere¢ be “saw. I. Travel to and from the USS 7555-1 22 On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent tc Jar“s, ome, Madrid, ' Brussels, The Hatue. Lomcon, and Ottawa giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Tswe7t. [It noted his discharge from the Marine Corps in Sestanber 73£: ami his travel to the Soviet Union in October 1959, including ssxerciy details as to his employment and marriage while in the USS". “se <z35T=2 requested: "any scrap information which tears in 7-esident's assassination....® tad Nf pit ~ CU. be iil Lie va
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with | and London providing additional details on the travel of Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British en CE ee eee journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.) Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although the staff was instructed to “cease looking happy in public," in : conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern their actions by | official attitude of Govt to which they accredited."|_ bn the | same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial responses produced no other information. On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife i from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the United States in June 1962. The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without RE QLhe ids a
| 2 Pao thes, 50 1Or itaRa ee ae, Pau heed oe Khana Fas smgttgen te Bt tated me, ae te age OD hb detailed results although there were some technical operations that produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will not be detailed here. II. OQswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963 | The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get . visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to: Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on 28 November 1963: "We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations and your liaison with Mexicans."
The allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive attention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter, | and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively q | to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations re eemtaes sothanindinattereeetee a eck t by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963: “Pils continue to follow all leads and tips. The question of whether Oswald acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved." Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico. City Station was cabled as follows: tera) ate ee “Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel | - in India had letters sent to [U.S. Government] leaders demanding full investigation of case." On 17 December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico : City Station stated as follows: | "...Mexico City has been the only major overseas reporter in the case. While this j O partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's rm
2 3 Fi ] i H A eee nerdy 2 . TC do rit Anan ana Diaac RBEE 8 hs ABM ARAM ALE ies et EA EREORRAN Bhonta tr Suailaatt wth aa C-bAY eane 3 err life, we have not overlooked the really out- standing performance of Mexico City's major assets and the speed, precision, and perception with which the data was forwarded. Here it was relayed within minutes to the White House, [Department of State] and [the FBI]. "Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing." Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of soviet or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation. | It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit; these are commented on at Tab G. III. General Collection Requirements On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable from Headquarters with the following Statement: LAL Domo me, wa Poe. a wh be 6 of tome tok ad time 7.
14-00000 Fe MER Nhe cheninte ee Bue UaraataN Bethe onan LARTER ara, Gist bcd di View "Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes over the reins." It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi- cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative. It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has been the most limi ted reporting on the subject. Were there relevant or significant information on the subject it would have been reported either in responses to the expression of general interest, or_ spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources. If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously — wun pias i ee 8
j | eet ene yee wee OT, ont PNORRRATT A teri Sen bemndinag hs LOMNIBEY the lave tee Sone ee el bt oases a ee se aa 208 ob R ORE DEMEUCNEM Derry atta mtwhesemedeedeat + met aM AB hho 8 ny + aatreatsrsdissntediace ly wan debhsee Ys « Hm ' Wiiwinaedeik would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken. As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection re- quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect. at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued, but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who- what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above) which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from other stations: 2 | ", . . this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's life. . ." The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10 about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description . of van extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were Sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but _ there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor- mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently was missed -- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report: “ "Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited." This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting 9 Se mg OP aoe my amma ay” #
} 1 i i 3 To eR IU OF neg TNEA REE eon PRS eaten tee amt Late 6 Nie as yaaa oH PeN BE: oat) wi 4i inal requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case officers at the Station during that period have described the: frenetic activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the . United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of page 58. . The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every question. that has been conceived since then. IV “Unpursued Leads" At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's murder ) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported to be aboard those flights. | By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The. flights on 10 ner yi VEAL % Sater
14-00000 22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights to Havana apparently carried some freicht. CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to Headquarters. There was one ‘unilateral CIA surveillance team (LIFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, reporting any unusual incidents and prowiding copies of flight manifests. The Mexican authorities also had a surveillance team of its own at the airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies of passenger lists. Additionally, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY) against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control Office. The 22 November 1963 Flight At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of 300k V of the SSC Final Report, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, 22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from 6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at 10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-encined aircraft, which deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final Report emphasized CIA's apparent fazlure to follow up by inquiring further into the matter. | ee ed ee 1s tes fa LU wid WarisciiiiAL
te oe cecal i ae eae Be we . bow! ry se . . . * . + He jennie» oto dene dle Nitec lie tee UE este h FmaNbiet tlt te Aleit hee eae o Ah REASTBIRS AEA WMS eRe t RC Med rie ata ael ot tate deri hehe eit Bee : 5 3 { t ‘tte got . Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain, at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori- ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject. In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion Of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City times are used in the following discussion. The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the Status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft, one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due at 1630 hours and "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround that would have reduced unloading and loading. time, as well as servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours. The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in the SSC Final Report: | 1. The Cubana Flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not
CONFIDENT. delayed five hours, as alleged. | , 2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight, a ee 9 = which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it allegedly was delayed. ‘ : In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana flight, it is tg Miteatneensmaeere aoe tableau, very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin- engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to follow further. | | The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its Summary of the matter. The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con- siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the SSC Final Report state that: - " , . « one source alleged that. the Cuban-American was ‘involved’ in the assassination." © CONASENT AL 13 : | | 7 |
z:4 1Rlcal Cnn set nena Lo pten PP Race ee aaa oe ee cere e) So ES ee ae CONFIDE NEAL The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI "almost immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi- gation “as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." Further down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi- gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious | travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Commi ttee--FPCC) certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi- gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon- sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report — contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the results of FBI inquiries. | While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will | be noted. Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement at page 104, in the chronology section: . "December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that he "looked suspicious'..." At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed- up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"), 14 CONFIDENTIAL
i 7 cb emt Thet ne eatin. runt te “eel” except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban- American's activities." The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington that the man “looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December 1963, but it reported that the man had “crossed at Laredo, Texas on 23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at a certain time on 25 November, that he chetked out of the hotel at a certain time and departed for Havana “as only passenger on Cubana flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch the same. date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photo- graph, and containing the following cryptic statement: | “Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious." This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI; it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported 15 CUNri DENTIAL
nerve or cr oe Corre A a OK Seana oot teat tite uth eo SEE te ‘ wen e to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way into the more careful statements that usually characterize official reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres- sionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic activity or final conclusions. There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled that a source of a local (Monterrey) "agent of the federal judicial police" had information on a man; the description seems to have the same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement that he “was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he entered Mexico “on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts . that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa, Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time, when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could not recall it. @ epte dh? gd serene basi 16 GR Pe nen ere a
There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre- sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out i i | that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When i t i } H Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63." It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how it should be considered responsibly. Implicit criticism of. CIA's not collecting more: information : on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became i available with such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities. A eee ARORA ne ene 17 PE waa Cee a elt ental Rerctnrah, Mar niP es ate EY erate &.
| i ! t t oy see ay RET ERR COMA a Ree cstreatnaties se Sf etRabeat sat abide hte 6 eehee eo ana dhe eceRey CIA Operations Against Cuba The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for Specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times; it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However, to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of evidence that must still control how the findings are treated. It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962. (see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro- vocative. | Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations, Cro | a ortand rea mamong
2 Sean AATE ERLE AA en At Oe 4 wt te ah wt . ete SECRET economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re- ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963 President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major | policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban: | revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what "White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban ! people to overthrow the Castro regime. - | The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who conducted their independent operations against the Castro government. Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from private sources. With or without official U.S. Support these exiles spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, oo whether CIA was involved or not. _ We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took j ' what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of 2 onuHET. . a ecalt”
{ | ot Panett cathe tata Fhe tal Sedona? Aetna 06s oe ach S Ene AN BEM, Ati e Vamoa setmacrtiaraatin ince «5 Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request was S not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel- ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its — staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the -murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation. The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of. the intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention in considering the question. _Implicitly it accepts the theory that there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro- voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life. However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it had “seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern- ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba." . In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the
| 4 | | | ey AEE ates OR AN a A tad. 0 SRAM RTE N S I ERE Beant BOs. emetic Ayaan dey 4 SECRET organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security. ' Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in- quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is.a matter of record. For instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera- tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of those activities that may have related to the assassination of the President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way. While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary -- which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con- spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities. SECRET
Comaat Soa oe EER R Ln a mee =~ AO oa SANT me Me SECRET Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's | death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some | are dead. The SSC, for instance -- in its attempt to capture ele- | ments of the past -~ seems to have led some employees into expressing : opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues, today, on a responsible basis. | The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called Sahat eee ew AML ASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was j dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, al though ; | the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten- sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the Point of an under- OES lO altiala iO Males valnivnme eb tumad wis oe taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this discussion. Pe Lae et ee oO 5 Fa ‘SECRE 4 tem edna ait aa at ceeaty
CL er 2A RE Rae on Bates saab ete ae yd ee tt 2 PLANNIN, SNe So” Be RAE i TN ER SH AS mmm onal [iinet tineed aced parc SEG: vt Cisse: In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report, it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964. The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not possible to predict the form that information turned up by this inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort. In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review, it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements of the provocation theory, or throw some further Tight on issues already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry. The areas of operational activity noted above can be described briefly as follows: 1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK) . 2. Operations involving the criminal underworld. 3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro. EUG yt: Mom wt td om b
9 rae itanhaaae ss AR, BS Hk Go at Wht whch dents, A sata ARR wet ata as Rat he rine Wee. webire nat Leo = 1 AERA ot ahtbalay. Sey ve ry wt a au ' ” tH ee va ig Operation AMTRUNK There is one other general activity that was considered in the course of the present research, which is discussed below. This activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop: a capability for Splitting. the leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it | never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity, because of its failure to ever develop. substance, is not really rele- vant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed, by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis of the SSC Report. In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an oper- ational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public figure in Cuba, who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception of the plan. Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in the anti-Batista movement.
14-00000 5. Ae On I le ag nea 9) mee ae earthy ee alate re ae oe ae ee therein tet atte tt mer rn onetianasbesea tes Stay of Moreno defected to the United States in April 1961, settling in Miami where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. “Among his associates was Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky, a Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Volsky had been in prison in the USSR in the 1940's, and enlisted in the Polish Air Force during WWII under the British Air Command. After WWII he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961. Cayardo and Moreno discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He, _ in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Witold Szulc, a reporter with the New York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to the Times Washington Bureau in April 1961, where he claimed to have an entree to the White House through his uncle, Ambassador John C. Wiley. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con- tact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that the Leonardo Plan. gained government-level support and approval. In early 1963 Szulc arranged an. interview in Washington with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szulc then met with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State, who presented. the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AMTRUNK.
{ ! i i Ba oan Whe athe ubeiniaedlen so estat) enon a abk oat wee Nedeebert Ma tetaee ed Oa ete » ebastnet stub cht ane sstas witcha hedh A bea AS Ble ET we A t . SECRET AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per- sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled . certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be ; used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain eee security constderations, he felt it best to fund the operation | gen- erously tn order for it to proceed independently. On 17 April 1963 Szulc informed Hurwitch that the Miami Station had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA intentions. a In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto. One of these sources, Guin, was reportedly close to AMLASH/T, a man with whom CIA was dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer -- but at SECRET
“| + © ence Seret eA EOE ERODE oo memes} RARE Ys, xakin: -econs'a eatecpnbateh bent Secpdahanactes Aiartapen ca. Aen totetiae tt SPARE EDE TCS ore ce TT TN Oe RETR ere le Beem ee oo ante tee amie ceasing SECRET that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational ap- proach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is discussed at Tab D. . | 7 It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation be- cause of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrange- ments were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in con- — nection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through Volsky and Szulc to the President. . In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had success- fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac- tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur- ity became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re- lations with it. Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz and AMLASH/1. 10 SECRET
4 : i 74 tke ee renee nucatoheta Malina aot ea 25 1 rin ate bleteat kagealt ate Leontine tenis ace then DW at nll eek Ag etcmnnttabh at ae es bs SECRET The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses from the beginning. Szulc and Volsky are considered to be highly ‘Suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became involved in the activity. a. Tad Szulc. Szulc has been suspect since 1948 when the FBI recorded reports that he was a communist. Re- portedly he was in frequent contact with communist party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Sus- picions about his motives or possible connections with foreign intelligence services, have never been proven. Nicole Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid communist. Philip Agee's Inside the Company: A CIA Diary credits Nicole Szulc with having “obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." She is be- lieved to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad Szule are unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin Szulc became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a-special bill of Congress. . b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish origin. He and Szulc became acquainted in 1959-1960 in 1] SECRET
‘= $hwt eelamotatne BMA aaRAEOE ents ew rs +b Tee + tere, . 0 . 5 PVA Me 8 the it ent hima heonaNe NIL eantea heiress wate (AS eateries 8 we dette abet ett  w TRADERS en oie Me Serine: Ted Let 6, re SECRET Cuba. A CI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared by a JMWAVE analyst, makes the following statement: “Volsky's knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the pos- sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or Stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of these suspicions. Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen on 10 April 1969. c. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the son of a native born American citizen. He was educated both in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept | moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a patternof changing alle- giances. He enjoined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952 first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batista and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mis- sion in Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. During his 12 ScGRET
| . CITE | See entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956 when. he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprison- | ment he returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers. : In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became involved with | | the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group. | Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural Housing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being. recruited by JMWAVE Station where he was used in AMTRUNK activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba ‘ * . . . . : eco! + shane He anes ne ARC NNNARIR ih nae alr ne koma i he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that eMieRle see cnen al omy RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven. | In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access = a dra ted tn ditind Lacerta Key uel a EE tbe fe ol at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of Oo emen vit * 2 e te wim we one df B + AA se SORA a EERE te DIY NEOUS nd
aves em ans netetrr a mo . cas " . ety woe 4 * a et rye, vee +t Ma. Mebard nae, catia ectauabh echasltenstintes tenia natbaiattatetittnmrernthenm attire ai = 1. AAs sm AR Mtl A PORTER ASUS  emecentreatenss bs se eT NO READ eA Bl MO ae St Ca individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime. Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of ’ Szule and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelli- gence. | | Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress, although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965. An attempt to build support that might eventually have the capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog- . ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. ‘New Considerations on the syndicate Operation In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because 14 rang 73a e | Fy cme wt Prey
al Te ‘ 6 Aalst eA AA EER net fF even atte TE LE TR open ot HE Oe Thee VS 2 sahara SUE Thee se ther tm one ort ee of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows: "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. 'I had access to the Prime Minister's office,' Sturgis said. ‘I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the embassy (American Embassy in Havana). ** Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military . and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's takeover. Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959. Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water- gate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation- ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency. The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta was, “ah om we Se
} 3 : - SECRET, in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro. Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961. Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for Sturgis’ assertion that he recruited Orta to work with the embassy, CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was re, reported in early 1961 as being used in the ClA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on the Cuban leadership. The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of intended assassin. Sturgis’ identification of Orta in this capacity, prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could
am | A Smt, DETTE Weta Mt und ot ay aeRO Aw, mpm a ete cs aL ns ee tener ey] : i Cae G cawacke dy have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life. Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of information. However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975 indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statement in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach to the reliability of newspaper stories. The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another story by the same author on 13 dune 1976, refer to possible relation- ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New York Daily News stories, noting that there was a connection between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections V7 — ra ey
j { i i H 1 saat SAREE Mat Rec IE Ss ATUSRAD MEARS Ne eas oC ANAIRI Ae bee, Sena hn vont so mn i i ‘ Free eT ARES re AN RTE RN SETA I NUYS GEN ATR et yl me nA Mat kt eof ce oe mE ge Eth Ri tO oy ee na te pete ee with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling organizations. The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also ‘been mentioned in the 1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that “soon after her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters .... to -kill Castro..." In the news story she claimed that the plan involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face cream; they dissolved and could not be used. On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA Deputy Director for Plans: | "During recent conversations with several friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When. doubt was expressed regarding this state- ‘ment, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be ena NE ee we’ of os nel :
{ H i ‘ i Poet aa " ¢ + . . ‘ 2 Aaa anid a etneieithennnieeteeetattneimEnee Mik mantis dasten SEGREI on three occasions . . . Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the ‘assassin’ had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a ‘pill’ in some drink or food of Castro." This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own. . Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta, . Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter- mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received Support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. . In fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal SELRET 19
terete ee a Ratan OS Re Laren sae tee dhemannrmnome, CTT _ . wired | underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who 4 | would kil] Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre- _ Sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an | explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the 1967 IG Report. The operation with. the syndicate had been called . _ Off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something Me 8 REAM Ae ET ee thine ne Chwede bene sew 8 already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations PatedeA 5 that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have sought on its own to eliminate Castro. Ina sense CIA may have been MO, don detente. ty. piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri- BAER ORBEA ON Son tt butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction. eC ee es mi we em A eaten atte hI A Stee,
SECRET What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing i @ the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be listed as follows: nee trent 1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde- pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve- ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con- tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs, being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan in April 1962. ‘». The syndicate operations could have activities such 6 ot hte ithe pin cone te ean as those that are reported in the New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976. 3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he was not a member of it. He could well have-been used by the syndicate in its activities. 4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his statements are treated with considerable reserve. He probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba. He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the RODE on Lua s. anattinenbiasDaahsonweny Aran Mt MRL un a Mee a), ahi mbemciat Matsehhanhaa te ARIAS oe bcbeiteinanenais st mmrthads wnalether eran soit suse men se “ath :
eam eer rman ae eae Be Beale 9 8 Fate Oh ES matic cokers outdated ‘Stoner role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have been in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975 newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it was not CIA's; it could have been an earlfer operation of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate, whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami community after Orta settled there in 1965, 5. If the syndicate was conducting fts own operations, that would tend to reinforce the thought that the details of its operations would have been characterized by discre- tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960. The authors of Book V of the SSC Final Report felt that the Nie “be feanbiiy Named Seat HY untae adam an operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe- sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated: ". . . it is unlikely that Castro could have re — €r5 berg g2 Perry eee |
navi abeceBataiede sabe vaste. ASML LENE ot hd Meth SENIDOORIEA LG rections amy tams ‘naa o, 2 ‘ Semana “oa cae O | distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA." In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination of President Kennedy. Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another are not within the Agency's capabilities. As noted earlier (see Tab B, _ page 4), a 27 November 1963 | report records statements by a British journalist that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos" who was in. jail where he was visited by another American gangster type named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that "Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in 1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante. 23 cman SEs Bens habe
SEGRE If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material consideration, as there are reservations about both sources. It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but there is no further known relevant information in the Agency on the matter. ; | The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963, removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signi- ‘ficance of past assocations or contacts. _ Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's 1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned. 24 PE mA aye . ye ba rer ae
Ae ee Fiche baat me eet oe tte F + PRT hs Adan GEM, eet RR ma Whe ate oe Be gece. However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late 1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true. Other Reported Assassination Proposals There were other references to possible assassination plots against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. They are summarized briefly below: | In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter. As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement. On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966) he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro. He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas post. The details of his actual role a@ unknown to the Agency, although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the course of this research effort. ‘ “OFAnS 25
Ww ae carseat nein hk neem tnd Atadetntene, Case Bae eae OS dana wus wettest 4 doh, tea Set tanta cate wn Le Pete et SURE hk URN Bat oe Se ers Sane eee Tn Agent Messages in 196] Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro 1. During the investigations tn 1975 five agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation, the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged with serving as an interface with the congressional committees. Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is summarized again below. I . 2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents, and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated 27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency asset, AMBRONC/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on a proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that this could be coordinated “with attempt against Fidel in public appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that 26 SESRET
@ i | i 1 Soot PIERO carn one VE Beet SECREL an “attempt against Fidel (is) tn accordance with general plan." There is no record that this message was answered. Two days later, on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an “assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." General anti-regime developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was answered on 30 March agreeing that a “major effort should be launched Havana on date you selected." [t recommended contacting other named persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed the general issue, making no conment on the proposal to kill Castro. A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent, reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arms for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric company and "possibly attempt on Fidel" would be carried out 9 April, he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a clandestine organization in Cuba; “your military aid fs decisive. If it does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has been found. | 3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The four agents in question are conmented on briefly below:
! | ‘SECRET a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages out- lining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against ' Castro. (1) 201 file opened 15 July 1960. A POA was not tssued until 18 December 1961, and an OA on | 31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November | | 1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed | that he had been in touch with people who had plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February 1961. . | | (2) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again 3 March weet ee saree tee oe on, 1961 and exfiltrated again 19 June 1961. This covered the period of his messages and the Bay of Pigs. His sole mission was to organize resistance . groups. | ce | (3) AMBRONC/S was infiltrated again on 19 December 1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same mission. . | - | (4) AMBRONC/S was infiltrated finally 2 May 1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed RY te Or oa es 30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting a that he was a CIA agent. His name is not one of those 28 Stel 2 eR ADRAC
in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing those claimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against his life. a b. AMCOAX/1 was one of those AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan for April 1961. (1) POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He in- filtrated in February 1961 and exfiltrated in July 1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered the above messages. (2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same | _ . organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August. 1961, | and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears in the book given Senator McGovern. ! c. AMPUG/1 was another of those AMBRONC/5 was told to 4 contact for his general plan in April 1961. | (1) Recruited in September 1960, he was in- filtrated that month, receiving airdrops in December 1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following the Bay of Pigs. (2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the mission to organize resistance groups and conduct +8 Th tes eemecterestetinaiotetie ad slate phe tate tah ee MALO TES hake ee ety, sabotage operations, he was arrested in July 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those © in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro. BPM Ry 6 Ee AAD Sone EDEL SEE S 29 SEGRET
SEGRET d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan in April 1961. (1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960, a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (although there was a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance groups fn the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas. | (2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested 23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His - name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro. (3) Records relating to this man mention his in- filtration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA). His "mission" during that period is mentioned tersely as being "to organize resistance groups . . . for mounting sabotage operations . . . and assassination of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro entourage . . ." The records refer to “his own | personal objectives" during this period and criticizes \ how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August: ' to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return, which was to develop sabotage operations. We were able to contact one of his two case officers, who has retired —
SECRET (the other had dted), to ascertain hts recollections. Stating that at the time the focus was on developing organizations for operations, he stated that an assassination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7 on his earlier time in Cuba, not only was not authorized, - but would have compromised the effort to organize. Any such assassination mission, the case officer states, would have been at AMPANIC/7's éwn initiative. i 4 Pl | +4 4. It is clear that AMBRONC/5 envisioned a general uprising in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected pessimism, and the fact is that the operation did not come off. While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on Castro. 5. The fact is that the 9 April 1961 operation did not come _off; and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset. — Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern | by Castro. The other men, none of whom had a mission of assassi- i nation from the Agency, are now serving thirty year terms. That their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge.on the facts Wor enobdie.t + .saadivbett Aare Git tle Mkuts + eaty,
Fe See yc enelater reat iiltemetentt teller noe cecORERR th OC mtou dab anne reo . ‘ OTe ars TOLeE Te SETS SRO OE an TAS PRR Dae NEIN Ee ow One Vad a et Al Pte ee Matt salt eRe rather than to report what he truly believes. They were not executed, a consideration that may support this view. 6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs. The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent infiltrations into Cuba. There jis no record that any of them had a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the act in 196] -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was a CIA agent, and is not listed among those Castro reportedly believes had the mission of his assassination. II 7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy, who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who “have plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and that Morator? was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator of the agent message cannot be identified from present records. 32 eteser couveagl
SBE Itt 8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1961 from a member of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said “will: try to kiJ] Fidel today." reply ‘to this message dated 4 told the agent and his companions to “lay low" for the time bein » and "Will advise when operations can resume," There were no follow-up messages on this subject fn the records. The agent who sent the message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not been identified. Sate sate hE Te iat ta a at 33 ScCRET
i 74 net nee meee + PE et ae ey ee ET SECRET I. AMLASH OPERATION: Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta- tion in Book V of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated ina unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report. ~ The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79), which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively, the Report suggests that AMLASH/1 was sO insecure in the conduct of his activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to ‘Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75). Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. We believe that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for | *See pages 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 29, 31, 35, 36, 59, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, and 86 of the 97-~ -page text, and pages 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the eight-page chronology following the text. hd Pw
| i i | en eet cna CE vere Se tim ates «a abet 8+ gonads Hatem eee dis 6 AMLASH/1] to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro. Whether one is inclined to see AMLASH/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak. | i a In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH 6bperation is intended to present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity. Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed. It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per- spective for judging the actual substance of the operation. | Ahhh RRR RRR EE As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba. ' At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment and that if he "...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill Castro himself." | Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/1 was met in Mexico City by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/1's presence at the leftist-soonsored Latin America Conference on National Sovereignty, Emancipation, and Peace. The meeting was arranged by AMWHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961, giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in euy
SEGRET Mexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows: . the Station made an unsuccessful ‘aporoach' to (AMLASH/1)...the 'approach' consisted of a . ‘friendly’ talk between a case officer, a mutual friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/1) did not | pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently did not report the incident to his superiors and the ground work may have been laid for a similar action in the future." | Later in March there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil- tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/1's intention and plans. In August 1961 AMWHIP/1 reported plans by AMLASH/1 to attend the Cath ew end be Ma ates mith ent ut Han! French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1 wanted to meet with a “friend of the Mexico City case officer's. The files do not reveal that such a contact actually occurred. In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/1 would be travelling via Prague. to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from Helsinki he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet AMWHIP/1. The FBI, 2 Re Se ARIE OR let, HGR te elena wtbr anlbntes 6 ut which was aware of CIA's association with AMHHIP/1, met with AMUHIP/1 in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA if he should mated etd 6 gee 8 C contact the Paris Legal Attache. "te i Ade entree wt in PCa Lar | ~~ J tn me) tome
: i t ! } i j : Ae emate O  e  Ree aet ee ate Oe eee CEDOTT Sadia’ In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/1, who made known his dis- satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/1's "planned defection" in Parts in August 1961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and AMWHIP/1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else necessary in an attempt to bring about AMLASH/1's defection. . The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held in Helsinki on 1 August 1962. The original objective of his defection became one of recruiting him in place. AMLASH/1 was reported as feeling that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there." AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oi] refinery and the execution of a top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro himself. The case officer's report stated: “While we were making no commitments or plans, we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that ‘schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information- collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans." (Emphasis in original). : The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to — further meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen. AMLASH/1 was next met on 16 and 17 August in Paris where AMHHIP/1 and the case officer were joined by another case officer. AMLASH/1 was given SH training and supplies. On 20 August he was taken to the south of France for 4
i i ! : : eA Seed SSD PMA Ay Shan os! on Mises ete Adee tee 2+ aaah yen odes ararnsen)Maitaobantns m tatttoantlinas ih srenees oy a demolition demonstration. He refused to be polygraphed. The case officer reported on 17 August: "Have no intention give [AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated: "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given [AMLASH/1]." “On 29 August 1962 AMLASH/1 left Prague by air for Havana. This was the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September 1963. COMMENT: It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever for that matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA rela- tionship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress, although he was viewed as an operational contact with potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the critical period, for purposes of this paper, is there- fore between 5 September and 22 November 1963. AMLASH/1 attended the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil from 5 through 8 September 1963, as a representative of the Cuban
i ‘ i { i i i Serepeen ta aera et HOON Ce tse ates otk Se Bebe eelg Ra catind SeaiabeAtataol oi 6 abit hel Oud ahead lat LR, terean ets t ; _ mT Ce dee Government. He was met there by AMWHIP/1, and by the CIA case officer who was to take over the relationship with him. | AMLASH/1 said that he had written two SW messages (only one had been received). He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because of Cuban postal censorship. . | It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears: “ . . . the CIA took steps to renew its contact with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. The CIA's previous contact with him had been sporadic; he had not been in contact with the CIA since before the missile crisis of October 1962. The exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination operation." ° | The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September 1963. If it is narrowly correct to state that the "exact purpose" for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the SSC Report, . it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this point, not only was there "no evidence (that) . . . an assassination operation" was intended, it is quite clear that it was not under consideration. The problem at the time was how to deal with the man. At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting toc TEAR : “8
i 1 i ; H i z i Nemechek ther me ine te ede reethmoteis eee 8 tibet eta. vente adits lhe enable Le omBerete ct ss te enone Obi Cle tae, Sues cet et REED, 8 in September 1963: " , . » may have been to gain intelligence and to cultivate him as an asset for covert operations .. ." A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report, provides an insight as to how AMLASH/1 was assessed at the time, as well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers of how to deal with him in the future: | “AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always be a control problem . . (he) will not take time or have patience prepare or receive constant stream S/W messages, let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain. . ." CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part: wo. - Based on what little feel we here have for subject however appears he is hopeless. as intel] performer and is best approached as a chief con- spirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among “whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert disciplines... " The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/1 may put together. Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, requiring careful. but long-range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue. fe ;
Page 14 of the. SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963 ' cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows: "AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the i ‘United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an "inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting : a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added). | . This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro himself. That may have seemed implicit to* the authors of the SSC Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently: "AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of action." ~ COMMENT: At this point, after a year out of touch with a man with whom there had been no working understanding, i AMLASH/1's views were of interest, but were very general, as might be expected after such a long time. The actual _ reference to an “inside job" did not specify Castro, as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards > anette nett aun blaves 1 awe tnevarad ated De Orr as the more general question of how to bring about change. It was offered alternatively, in the context of con- sidering both external and internal action, and not with Neth ew aN + aa the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation. Se et COP Oe es
| | “teat SECRET The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left AMLASH/1 “awaiting a U.S. plan of action.” There was nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things were left very much up in the air. Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that “characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination operation, which begs the question of what it was for “this phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba." (Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V, itself describes the very general nature of the approach by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra). Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the SSC Final Report. The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed 9 SEGRE,
against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.S. leaders. The intended inference, as is known from discussions with SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri- zation is even more explicit at. pages 3-4 of the Summary and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter- pretation as categorically as though it were fact. | The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever ’ i i é i i 3 i may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing. cet Uae gba tence tou Nand A ake ne dn AMLASH/1 flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro re ean ny ea _ after the fact. On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1 that he did not “intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to the CIA case officer. On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already eM his ay ae 6 in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed. On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the “necessary people and equipment inside ‘ . ™ oo yee ob oe . ? Bat meh wo tla "10 ‘nq Pasaliasei Neal te weetieanii che I iandedatehes TAD ek 8 ie coebe
| | SECRET [Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1 was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that the request for a meeting: __ ! "be given highest and profound consideration as feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that he determined attempt op against*® [Castro] with or without [U.S.] support." | A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added). Desmond Fitzgerald, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1. The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows: j , "Fitzgerald will represent self as personal | representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1] and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (Emphasis added). Og Cutt NAO NR AAACN On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris, representing Sel afald, are mmhatuaats dats oot. himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter. nat SRA to AORBNY Beet co tee ore
SEoaET On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high- lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows: “Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader- . ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after a whe real_coup has been effected and the group involved | fo is_in_a position to request U.S. (probably under : OAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated Fao Woe uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished in a matter of hours if the present government is still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup period, the U.S. does not desire that the political © ‘ Snir MOWRTEI TE A neta th clock be turned back but will support the necessary economic and political reforms which will benefit the mass of the Cuban people." At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re- Path R ah ih DOT ARE Ron cette hE Ne Tae eat Sahel EPS TBE 80 018 Fb ehief . Fe ce | oo eatin, e Gime.
chee AO tee alle AARNE aE Abels Let atmos we ne latin AONE sera on ate eeninnssenetease stem al ABR Sette tt nad AN bait este scene odtn, hI: me Unt thene ‘sm abe : Ties aS ETN MaRS, ROEM NEE © SECRET called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer, although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum stated that: . oO ° | | “Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him." On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in New York City. He reported on AMLASH/1's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as follows: | "The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high Tewels of the Government concerned with the Cuban problem satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con- cerned, but. he was not at all happy with the fact that he stil] was not given the technical assistance | for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1] said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly om this point. =~ i3 SECRED
Py mea noes He could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to [AMWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels. strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date." COMMENT: | . At this point it is important to note that Agency documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told, and what he was told, which matches a later report of what he understood. In essence he was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not Seema very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a government, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18) to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 inter- preted the put-off by Fitzgerald. 3s 14,
| , SECRET Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/1's understanding is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1 was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance -of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the | date of the report is June 1964, this particular information “dates back to 29. October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F. : Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera- 4 tion. While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional clear confirmation that AMLASH/1] understood that he had been turned down at the 29 October meeting. of Following the 14 November meeting with AMWHIP/1 CIA reviewed what could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963 Fitzgerald “approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache could, if he requested it, include ...high-power rifles w/scope..."_ LAMAR Nes OPPO rate BINT ta neat AcotaR Se tt On 19 November AMLASH/1 told a CIA officer that he planned to return to Cuba. On 20 November Headquarters cabled Paris requesting | that AMLASH/1 "delay departure...(to) permit one more meeting which Phiten setacns AMLASH/1 requested." On the same day (20 November) in response to 15 gat Ga ie goad iS i come 1 eR TR EN Ne. RBS et AHL S08 ‘ }
i H H H i i i Ah wtleael ameha read on tone ent vant ae Shee Tce ce lt EOE ee ar ert ea + BABIN, f } Menpseet FMI Be etter RHO See Ti — SESREI a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure “if it is something interesting." The case officer told him that “he could not assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH had requested." The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person in the room. , The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief and cryptic telephone conversation into the “first indication that he might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and quite significantly,. the Report acknowledges that no specific support had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence. The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of 22 November and met with AMLASH/1 late that afternoon. As they left the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot. Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kensedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro.
3 é i i i 2 ot ne Raneatehert nated morn Sebi bait TA Ad tenet ne? ante nerf tiettien emma sees A+ Shes bs someiyis ire uSbea ain sh Rie HN TS Suerte aN» eghivar. stoudion deta ERRNO oa, t i SegaeT Il. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC_REPORT Section 1, B This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies) Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states that the report "details these operations to illustrate why they were relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been examined by the Warren Commission. | | | The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as follows: | “The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission's work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat of retaliation for such plotting." As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly 17 SFARET
| ~ SEDRET unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1 prior to the death of President Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal." There was no agree- ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned t i ! of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat" --as noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time. . | This viewpoint .was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publica- | tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations | involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence : of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission. The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68 as follows: . | “,..it is unlikely that Castro could have ; distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA.” Whihe naceiaaets { 4 Saueet | | a 18 | | SECRET ©
§ i j 4 7 4 i E 3 208 ibn erbetere Weatobedem, SOBA ‘ SecaET The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final Report may seem anomalous. qt places CIA in the position of con- testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry-- | that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities. | . | keke kk kkk kk ke & At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having: "stated the United States would support a coup." Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald: "also gave general assurances that the United States would help in bringing about the coup.“ : The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match — 19 SERRET
: i 4 4 i t “4 : i a ater SRR erence at +H + todas eet latina ssoc rth ionnc SS Heat 2 AGAR RE, 04 9 Qeaneet § ahi the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time.- In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots: "Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and promised him that the United States would support a coup against Castro," citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting. An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows: "3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated: ‘Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1 and giving him assurances of full support with a change of the present government in Cuba.'" (Emphasis added). | The underscored portion--the word “with"--in fact read in the actual document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what: Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made (as discussed at pages 1] and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1 understood (as discussed at pages 13-15). | wkeke &® *& ** ew & & At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible orate “s Rv ate ad & va] ' 20
: i 3 { i t i { aut tareraey + vlan an one ne abdns atedtchliRentid as 0 a ba, SIME AS Ca ON ot ert CREA mRE NBO MeneeMmettCtNEY veuteeuenerateneant one on ' t i | SESRET for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it jis likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was. Re k eRe Ree ERE At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the fol lowing statement: ° | “According to the 1967 Inspector General Report, CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi- nation and to return to Headquarters." This statement fs at least a literary extension of the statement of the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows: "[The case officer] states that he received an OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off." | The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited, apparently despite suggestive prompting, that: - " . . . he recalled receiving such a cable, but could not recall whether it made specific mention 21 SECRET
140000 of the President's assassination as the reason for breaking contact..." | It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event, tty the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version. ahkhhanhens Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation, AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1. Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships with CIA during this period, and how little he had. to tell others were ~ a acterettanattesmumdeihaanitune : post : peo a ol he inclined to do so. Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind. To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey - assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things that in fact had been denied him. It was-not until much later that the question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA © to break relations with him. sesthotlnnas Actus 4: Rbnst:l HOME sCtOR rans) Tet tadaNedvre SL. « ewan maisonette Maamnd cinsnednneranomerameyenee ec ces 4
t $ i q j “i s j Tee PRES meratr ae 2, 1 Qt at RRM he Pelee ota SECRET Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, although we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 1961 to November 1964. An interesting consideration is that when Castro pro- vided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1] was among those included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this earlier period. . | . kRhak kkk kkk kkk tk At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to assess their activities. The SSC Report states that: “AMLASH's real name was included in the list of names on the Mexico Station cable." This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification of the AMLASH operation. | The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of 23 ecraet
“ : SECRET the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in December 1960 -- about a press conference planned for AMLASH/1 tn Mextco City in February and March 1961. It was not a report of a contact between AMLASH/1 and the Soytet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In | any event, the December 1960 date preceded the fnauguration of | President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any | relevance to the subject. There was no-reason to check the name. : The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead- ing on this point. ‘ek kkk dk k kk ee ee Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con- cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states “that the purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages 14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that “there is now under discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro“ (July 1964) it badly mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry. CE ih cde Ot EMRE R EE ca bess en tn inher sw ne rela detrei Mncectadebraranette eye . Fe ncn a Ta ae One TON < ‘ 4 ©) | 24 SECRET
sia ; | ibe oho abe nee te melee hg abt et cnr «73 rel Pee ee ee At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief, SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact ‘time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks of his "vague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless gives this opinion full play despite the extensive qualification as to its reliability. . a At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA - employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot. throughout, ‘and overlooks’ the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period in question. There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is noted in the discussion above. In the present instance the uncertainties were recognized and clearly recorded, as well .as the limits placed on positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. It is important to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as presented in the SSC Final Report.
4 | i | 2 aah dy RADNER oe ere te 9062 etn itRSS wo fan faatettem A a sled ete + © SECRET Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum- stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps — on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final Report did not accord the subject that treatment. | , eee At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made it clear that “A" was unaware of AMLASH/1's 1963 associations with CIA. This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an irrelevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his
aos Coe mye . o aot iris : = tema ett Mer de atts a ge karts a det be Sa A AER RCRA Hah eae so aPracapaehe onc Radcnaleimeenabiehent. sus eae ve SAedhaaneres. an , 1 é gecnel assassination also contained no reference to that period, although AMLASH/1's later activities were cited. eeee kek eee eee It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection, which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was determined that it was best for him to go it ‘alone, developing his own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his own program before he could expect support from the U.S. Eventually -- but not until after the death of President Kennedy -- firmer indications of support were offered. Even then the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a man who claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside (Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow. . ." The nature of the relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964 (page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1 that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While One can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those directly involved structured their thinking differently. 7
i - SEGRET The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC Report is both imprecise and misleading.
14-00000 | Sb Sepp dine Sha AO SUR athe ey tet Wile Pe dR He AEP OT dae 6 came atti ae ese etter . Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report, CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports. The following pages list. reports and other papers submitted to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation) and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort. The lists fall into the following sections: E.1 Dissemination to the Intelligence Community E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission
14-00000 SECRET AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI_AND THE WARREN COMMISSION Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis- seminated to appropriate agenctes and departments as soon as possible after receipt. The following list of some 100 cabled disseminations, CSCI's, and memoranda were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al. The listing covers the period from - 10 October 1963 through September 1964. ' AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE Hn COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISSEMINATIONS ble; I il | III #10 October 1963 DIR 74673 _ (WH/3/Mexico) "On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source . in Mexico City reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, | contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City . i Recipients: FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. (Warren Com- ’ mission] *24 October 1963 DIR 77978 (WH/3/Mexico) Request for two copies of most recent photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipients: Navy. [Warren Commission] 23 November 1963 DIR 84915 (WH/3) Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep- tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI I - Document Date II - Document Number III - Originating Office * . An asterisk indicates that the. document was also made available to the Warren Commission. SECRET
: 3 * i a tt ihn 2 ot PREC NNER Fata ote ° SECRET 24 November 1963 TDCS-3/565 ,829 Subject: Cuban Precautions following Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR, ORR, 00, EXO. 25 November 1963 DIR 84950 _ _ (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. . ° Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 “DIR 84951 (CI/SIG) Agency requests information relating to OSWALD‘'s Activities in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI 26 November 1963 CSCI- (WE/BC) - Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,826 (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. Encloses transcripts of tele- phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and ‘3 October 1963. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 . CSCI-3/778 829 (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. (Encloses transcripts of tele- phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD between 27 September and 3 October 1963). NB: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of the document in CI/SIG file No. 568. Recipient: FBI. SECRET
i + + } FSR DAE At ARES ale As oe tt Rael REA aed Uh Seattle ely oe OHM Eat SECRET 26 November 1963 DIR 85069 (WH/3) Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress- man to Texas on 26 November 1963. Recipient: FBI *26 November 1963 DIR 85089 . (C/WH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 that "on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey» OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy ,in Mexico City". Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 26 November 1963 DIR 85176 . (WH/3) Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (information volun- teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed REGGAB studying in West Germany). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 7 26 November 1963 DIR 85177 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Telephone communication between Cuban President DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro to ‘Mexico. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. . 26 November 1963. - Unnumbered . (CI/SIG) Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816. Recipient: FBI. 3 SECRET
4 a 4 j i 4 | i i i Amer ee Ate ASLAN ee 4 ‘. A Ade atte SECRET 27 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,881 _ (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963. Recipient: FBI. *27 November 1963 DIR 85182 .  (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding latter to a close friend in Bern. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 27 November 1963 ‘DIR 85195 — (C/WH/3) United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. McCONE, and Mr. HOOVER. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 27 November 1963 DIR 85196 ~ (C/WH/3) According to information from Nicaraguan Security Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963. Recipients: FBI, State, White Houses Secret Service received copy. *27 November 1963 DIR 85199 (WH/3/Mexico) Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. , Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. tWarren Commission - 27 November 1963 DIR 85222 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. ‘SECRE & bas
SECRET 27 November 1963 DIR 85246 —. (WH/3) Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service | received copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.) 27 November 1963 . DIR 85471 (C/WH/3) Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 DIR 85573 . (WH/3/Mexico) Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) - Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele- phone to S. PAPICH. Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered _ (CI/SIG) Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH of the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to OSWALD's presence in New Orleans in September 1963. Recipient: FBI. 28 November 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3) On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em- bassy in London indicating that an "American gangster- type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. “SECRET
SECRET *28 November 1963 — DIR 85662 (C/WH/3) Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] *28 November 1963 - DIR 85665 (C/WH/3) The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963, a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy. SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. LEE [sic] who murdered President Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission 29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,893 -—«(WH/3/MexiGo) Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipient: FBI. *29 November 1963 DIR 85666 Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation and investigation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. (Warren Com- mission] . 29 November 1963 DIR 85668 (WH/3/Mex ico) Hight ights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House- *29 November 1963 DIR 85670 - (C/WH/3) Sensitive sources ... have reported that when the 23 November arrest of ‘Silvia DURAN became known to the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great deal of discussion. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] - Neel a . vo . NO ‘ a ARN NOAA ETR Iceni 5 ARBAB FP AERY ee OEE OD CIEL A ST Ge He READ LI ALN AOS Ck RTE HEN os Ca ohmenet bn tee 6 i 1 '
i i { 4 i : > : ee eC ee eee Ae ROR AML SUA Plate Niet Aer Cae SECRET. 29 November 1963 . DIR 85676 . " (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers. Recipient: FBI. *29 November 1963 DIR 85691 . (C/WH/3) Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. . 29 November 1963 DIR 85714 (C/WH/3) Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. *29 November 1963 DIR 85715 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959 to May 1962). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85744 ~ (C/WH/3) Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. ; *29 November 1963 DIR 85758 (WH/3/Mexico) Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission 7 SECRET
| sdebeneiray ditattebes ass te games ~The CONS a there Fah 2 ‘ SECRET. *29 November 1963. ~—=“~DIR._—- 85770 —. (C/WH73) Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that Oswald had made a bank deposit. 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum  (CI/SI&) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH relaying the Director's suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas. 30 November 1963 == CSCI-3/778/894 Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination. . | Recipient: FBI. *30 November 1963 DIR 86063 (C/WH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 3 December 1963 DIR 86496 (C/WH/3) Information relating to’ OSWALD's presence in Mexico. > Recipient: FBI. ; *4 December 1963 DIR 86702 . (C/WH/3) Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife, June 1962. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]
+. . A * 9a pit m 56 NE eB PRATT Et erty cn Dealt CBN Ied MPa ahi? aware emabimnteasinamamelsttanabdannnndees 4 se we casunueen ts opus teen i i i ; - . - SECRET 5 December 1963 DIR 87189. (C/WH/3) Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi demanding full probe into assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. *6 December 1963 DIR 87520 (C/WH/3) Correction of DIR 87502. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] — *7 December 1963 DIR 87667 . (C/WH/3/) Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission) 9 December 1963 DIR 87731 (WH/3/Mexico) Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with Cuban Embassy, Mexico City.. -_ . Recipient: FBI. *9 December 1963 DIR 87796 (WH/3) Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging assassination arranged by Communist Chinese. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902). a Recipient: FBI. 11 December 1963 TDCSDB 3/658 ,408 Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding (a) Moscow views on international situation following death of President Kennedy, and (b) resumption of disarmament talks. - Recipients: General distribution. 9 SECRET
a a t q r 5 4 te nde a Satta ORL A We eI NE det Ak athe Bote Be RANA AER LAA I he Atle PE ve SECRET 12 December 1963 ~  €SCI-3/779,048 _ | (C/WH/3) Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON, John; WILSON, John Hudson. ) Recipient: FBI. #12 December 1963 DIR 88643 Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi- dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com- mision] 12 December 1963 DIR 88682 ~ (C/WH/3) Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not to comment upon the assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 12 December 1963 DIR 88747 (C/WH/3) Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. *13 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,136 (C/WH/3) Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission 16 December 1963 CSCI~3/779,135 (C/WH/3) Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination. Recipient: . FBI. -*18 December 1963 DIR 89970 (C/WH/3) Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 10 es HET
rs ene ctmencone on arts ntrents mmm er ~ 2 tee etched ascites «my apserenthe at! Bi ghin diott ABS Pay Rios “1 mo SECRET *18 December 1963 DIR 89980 Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 19 December 1963 ; CSCI-3/779,225 Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 19 December 1963 CSDB-3/658 ,870 . (WH/Reports) Subject: a. Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and Rauo ROA y Garcia. _ b. Probable Future Plan of Action for Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez. Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified. 27 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,297 | Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese). Recipient: FBI. 3 January 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964 regarding newspaper article appearing in E1 Caribe on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November. Recipient: FBI. *10 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,482 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 1] SECRET,
SECRET -14 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,510 (CI/SIG) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of information from CIA.) Recipient: FBI. 27 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,729 (cI/st¢) - 5 j } Fy i "Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. | 30 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 ° (C1/SIG) Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 4 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,817 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names, addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the Soviet Union.) Recipient: FBI. 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0860 . wt . ony ae . ' e a Sacto meonnoneRahe tenet denneonaeb tity oo atenEte vito smears Sa ' Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy. . Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] a 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0861 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of i Investigation. Subject: Assassination of : President John F. Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0862 Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service. Subject: Assassination of President ABT WMA Ate nee ok Cee CO oan a ed Pr ae) me : a3 eat rr Se |
: : i } i i é 4 t , i . one econ ettehnemen seinmmemeaeitententatin: 6 tne Mam ents tna hte mamntar store eines scoot Rivaaartetenane« Been etcieel talon | Fem ott ened. 6 AOA cet 5 ce. © SECRET John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.) Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0864 Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy - . Verification of Entry in “Historic Diary". Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission] 20 February 1964 CSCI-3/779, 988 (SR/CI/R) ® Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding SETYAEVA. and RAHM. ) Recipient: FBI. 22 February 1964 DIR 03101 — (C/WH/3) Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan Student Mohamed REGGAB. Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service). 11 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,344 Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 20 March 1964 ~ CSCI-3/780,612 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. atte ia of an individual closely resembling Recipient: FBI. 16 April 1964 CSCI-3/780, 996 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Recipient: FBI. 20 April 1964 , CSDB-3/660, 704 Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination. Recipient: FBI (?) SEGRET
nels dim eilew om balck ereat lea tue oe tossed na AE ns AO LAP CORED NABER ANIA = Hl bie OS Da One em bane ete en “seactitace water trey be Sac eetiedtn 7 22 April 1964 CSCT-3/780,881 © (SR/CI/R) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.) Recipient: F 30 April 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI /SIG) Telephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 November advising PAPICH to contact SOLIE of the Office of Security for information. 8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI. 1l May 1964 CSCI-3/781,172 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book belonging to Marina OSWALD.) Recipient: FBI. 13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,282 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification ' of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.) Recipient: FBI. 15 May 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DUP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service -to the Assassination of President Kennedy. 14
i i 1 "ene ERLE 2A TaeN ee a AR IIe LUE META, Neat RSNA NA 0 BLL, ll Sane nde vite ka vt sek apt co ‘SECRET 13 May 1964 | CSCI-3/781 ,351 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified . Information about the U-2. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444] 19 May 1964 | CSCI-3/781,386 | Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK). Recipient: Navy. 5 June 1964 ~ CSCI-3/781 543 (CI/R&A) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla- tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROASRIA Milina. 10 June 1964 CSC1-3/781 ,841 (CI/R&A) Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby. Recipient: FBI. 29 June 1964 CSCI-3/782, 058 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 2 July 1964 DDP 4-3401 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 6 July 1964 DOP 4-3470 | Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 1§ SECRET
Ee - of i | : . eet aaa wetnntstbiesees Ae 5 rie Mian malate 68 teats vette 462 AR th sete Naas APCs WAU LL bob we wanda SECRET 27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64 Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union. Recipient: FBI. 3 September 1964 DOP 4-4600 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 1 October 1964 DDP 4-5110 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Joachim JOESTEN. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 6 October 1964 CSC1-316/01446-64 Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 23 October 1964 CSCI-316/01709-64 Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE. Recipient: FBI. 2 November 1964 ~ CSCI-316/01779-64 Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in the Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. 23 December 1964 CSCI-316/02545-64 Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of Cuban Involvement in Assassination. Recipient: FBI. SEGRET
| oo Steer oo, f . a A | : : | 2 March 1965 CSCI~316/00925-65 i | Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi- i gation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD. { Recipient: FBI. | 8 April 1965 ~ CSCI-316/01398-65 Subject: Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico | Rec Ypient: FBI. [Copy to Secret Service] | 30 June 1965 CSC1-316/02654-65 Subject: Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. 2 September 1966 CSCI-316/04482-66 — ‘Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist Guide in Moscow. , | Recipient: FBI. 9 May 1967 CSCI-316/02153-67 Subject: BEAUBOVEFF apparently to be used as a pawn by Jim GARRISON to show that OSWALD was a CIA agent and was to be used to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. GARRISON alleges he has letters signed by CIA representatives or by Senator Robert KENNEDY authorizing certain Americans to work with Cubans for the assassination of CASTRO. This memroandum is intended to record that such letters never existed and therefore could not be in GARRISON's possession. Recipient: FBI. ; 14 June 1967 _ CSCI-316/02669-67 | Subject: Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding Mario GARCIAS et al. Recipient: FBI Nhe onsarae 2 © | 17 {SECRET Ne Sec REAR 1 Bs I Ne AY A PDN, cole HE Pe
14-00000 SECRET 24 July 1967 CSCI-316/03243-67 Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman, that OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. CONTRERAS’ statement of dubious credibilitys information passed to Mexican authorities. _ Reciptent:, FBI. 7 May 1968 ~« €SC1-316/01678-68 ‘Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged Assassination Conspiracy of JFK Written and Mailed by Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim -GARRISON's Allegations. Recipient: FBI. 16 September 1969 CSCI-316/03323-69 Subject: Charles William THOMAS. Recipient: FBI. \ DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by. cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad- ~ ' ditionally, cables disseminations were released by CI/Liaison.: Copies were, therefore, available to the,Staff. Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordinated on short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's DISSEMINATION QF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION . 13 December 1963 {Commission Document No. 100] Memorandum Subject: Analysis of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination. (Supplied by A. W. DULLES.) 18 SECRET
SECRET 21 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 300] Note from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Attachments: a. Recent Soviet Statements on Lee Harvey OSWALD. b. FBIS-28 on OSWALD case. 21 January 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Draft Questions for Submission to the Government of the Soviet Union. 22 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 691] i i i Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Suggested Questions for Marina OSWALD. 25 January 1964 {Commission Document No. 321] ; Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Stay in ; the Soviet Union. | Alphabetical List of Persons in the Soviet Union Who Were Known to or Mentioned by Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife. 31 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 347] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963. 5 February 1964 . Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN. Fourteen attachments including recent Soviet State- ments on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964). 5 February 1964 [Commission Document No. 361] — Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN forwarding three copies of Appendix B, a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives. © . | — 19 SECRET OE NALA R ARI Bare ALN EEE ee te le a Rate a tare
~ SECRET 8 February 1964 (Commission Docjment No. 1182] Letter from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN regarding Soviet weapon mentioned in one of - Lee Harvey OSWALD's documents. {Information passed to FBI.] 18 February 1964 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi- nation of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for information which might be helpful in interpreting available materials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad. ) {Copy to Warren Commission. ] ; i 74 H 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0860 ' Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: . Assassi- nation of John F. Kennedy. (Request for information relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide. ) (Copy to Warren Commission. ] 7 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0861 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi- nation of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for copies of 47 photographs found among the effects of Lee Harvey . OSWALD. ) : [Copy to Warren Commission. ] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0862 Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service; signed by Richard HELMS, DDP. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide. ) (Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.] SECRET abet matttatits, xesterers. -atbytion a i.
of 7 64 drmartemth 8 oo pets npn pence LRReLe Enon a NEE rem ene Stree PRS Ne ots Aa RBM Pi SRA Ad a Mend SO” 2 Ae HB 2 Gow tak PRMUIDIRNRO ce) oa ealonte tha sth shih g SS RMRIRRE EECA! ADS ea ee iced se i ' SECRET _7 April 1964 DOP 4-1786 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Mohammed REGGAB. 20 April 1964 DDP 4-1997 [Commission Document No. 817] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: BND Report Pertaining to Allegations Con- cerning Anton ERDINGER. 21 April 1964 Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN. Attachment: CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and French Publishing Firms to Publish the Thomas BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President Kennedy. ) — 24 April 1964 ODP 4-2099 [Commission Document No. 844] ‘Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD. 29 April 1964 ~ | DDP 4-2160 {Commission Document No. 871] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. — SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD. 4 May 1964 DDP 4-2256 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. 6 May 1964 “PDP 4-2296 = [Commission Document No. 902] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: . Criteria for Dissemination of Information to the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection. 8 May 1964 . DDP 4-2351 {Commission Document No. 911] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. C3 ra CRET o ?
oe san matin oy os mee ennai a Ae oe MATE Ba Din Oa teh nee ae oh ot ahaa, Ron MAMA ERDG ons AABOIAS Le A thee: tN IGRI at SEL Cnet 608 ‘ SECRET 13 May 1964 DOP 4-2444 (Commission Document No. 931] Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Informa-. tion about the U-2. [CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission] 15 May 1964 _ (Commission Document. No. 935] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service . to the Assassination of President Kennedy. {Copy to FBI] . 19 May 1964 DDP 4-2533 [Commission Document No. 944] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates; Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas; Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens’ Travel to and from Cuba. *19 May 1964 DDP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. 943] Memorandum from Rixhard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. | Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S.— Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi- dent Kennedy. Attachment: OUT Message No. 85770, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. . *22 May 1964 DOP 4-2624 (Commission Document No. 971] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States Embassy in Canberra, Australia, Relative to Planned Assassination of President Kennedy. Attachment: OUT Message No. a5691, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 25 SECRET,
i i | $ 4 | q i Seek anaatte te eA Meher RED BOoabe toat S .SEGRET, 27 May 1964 ; DDP 4-2688 {Commission Document No. 985] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy. . Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 27 May 1964 DOP 4-2692 [Commission Document No. 990] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEYV and Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD. 1 June 1964 PDP 4-2741 (Commission Document No. 1000] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. . OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. OUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963; subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. 3 June 1964 DOP 4-2764  [Conmission Document No. 1007] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by the Soviet Government. 3 June 1964 DDP 4-2770 {Commission Document No. 1012] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject. George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT. 26 “SECRET
t 3 ! i i 4 | to Fee mand eae oe 3 é i H : ; 3 } a i SECRET 4 June 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. § June 1964 DDP 4-2844 [Commission Document No. 1041] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Allegations Regarding Intel ligence Training School in Minsk, USSR. 10 June 1964 DDP 4-2922 (Commission Document No. 1054] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates. *12 June 1964 DOP 4-2988 [Commission Document No. 1089] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 19 June 1964 © DOP 4-3169 [Commission Document No. 1131] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques. 26 June 1964 DDP 4-3366 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques 29 June 1964 DOP 4-3347 (Commission Document No. 1188] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Investigation of AVTegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. (Copy to the FBI.] 27 ISECRET
4 se etn ar atl after af * . awe 1 Seeman 0: tie. atnccemten tte andutentetettehinabereisabetieth on Adsorbhc sein meen: st e trae nes 8 i bo ees Fracture tee wert ede Od 61 octet sin. 1 SEIN A ARONE I Va ERIE eet. 19 AB. 0rd hah ld cbetichane detente eto ' : ‘ : ‘SECRET 1 July 1964 DOP 4-3389 [Commission Document No. 1201] — Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki on 10 October 1959. 2 July 1964 a DOP 4-3401 [Commission Document No. 1216] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV). [Copy to the FBI.] 6 July 1964 | DOP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. 1222] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD and the Assassination of President Kennedy. [Copy to the FBI.] 22 July 1964 DDP 4-3712 [Commission Document No. 1273] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Apparent Inconsistencies in Material Fur- nished the Commission by CIA and the Department of State. 23 July 1964 ss ppp 4-3769 ~—s [Commission Document No. 1287] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circum- stances of a photograph of an unknown individual ryrntshed by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November 963. a 23 July 1964 DDP 4-3770 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Attachments: Translation (original documents included.)
! | ; : i 74 fn Santen Danette oe. Dene eek eet cece? Ce eS Cree e+ Oe se le cee ant oi oe i - | SECRET 31 July 1964 DDP 4-3916 [Commission Document No. 1358] | Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964. 7 August 1964 , DDP 4-4037 (Commission Document No. 1356] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies. 28 August 1964 DDP 4-4479  [Conmission Document No. 1443] Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY. 31 August 1964 ~— DOP 4-458] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City. 3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600 [Document No. 50, List 2] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government. [Copy to the FBI] 14 September 1964 DOP 4-4775 [Commission Document No. 1483] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Wester Europe in 1964. 11 September 1964 ' PDP 4-4793 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency. 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4794 [Commission Document No. 1479] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Depart- ment Files. (Revised) (Attachment to CD No. 1479) 29 SECRET,
“od Bo, \ . ers FE eo eee meteiste meliloti tne n-ne shapeentninnsenetintntter ae i ar ane heen tt cena eat we shee dleas aren USUI at de ee 6 ae AOD IND ey Ans Fa a a t SECRET 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4795 [Commission Document No. 1479] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies. (Revised) (Attachment to CD No. 1479.) u September 1964 DOP 4-4796 [Commission Document No. 1479] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964. 15 September 1964 . DOP 4-4801 [Commission Document No. 1493] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates. 17 September 1964 DOP 4-4823 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates; Procedure and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas; Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from Cuba. 17 September 1964 DOP 4-4838 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: State Department Files. 17 September 1964 DDP 4-4893 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, ‘to J. Lee RANKIN. . Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. | 17 September 1964 DDP 4-484] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Regarding Agency approval for the publication of memorandum, dated 2 July 1964, concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD. Not authorized. } 30 "SECRET
| | Fh see WCE Se seacat seh Ar toe Ceatea s ete wo RE Yinwantnttamlisin a onan pilin CUES E a t+ SETI ed Ub © . SECRET. 18 September 1964 DOP 4-4847 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: COmmunications from the Department of State. 18 September 1964 DOP 4-4848 - Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Departure from the USSR of Soviet Citizens Married to Foreigners. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4850 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. | Subject: Passport and Visa Office. 18 September 1964 DOP 4-4873 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4882 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee . Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4886 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the USSR. 22 September 1964 DOP 4-4921 Memorandum: from Richard HELMS, DDP; to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Silvia Tirado Bazan de DURAN. 17 September 1964 DOP 4-4922 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City. 31 SECRET
‘SECRET coon 26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,829 Subject: Same as above. (Comment: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to | be the correct one, according to a copy of the docu- ment in CI/SIG file no. 568.) | Recipient: FBI. oo. crt as Cyt nT | 26 November 1963 DIR 85069 | Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress- | man to Texas on 26 November 1963. : Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Communist, pro-Castro deputy to the Costa Rican National Assembly, will try to gather data in Texas to use in pro-conmunist-pro-Castro propaganda in connection with the assassination of | . President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 DIR 85089 | | Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 [sic - 25 November 1963] that “on 18 September i 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand | five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban ‘ Embassy in Mexico City." Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received a copy. [Warren Commission] 26 November 1963 . DIR 85176 Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (information volun- teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed REGGAB studying in West Germany). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 26 November 1963 DIR 88177 the sapien rtiedth anid ae RAT BEE EF oe, Subject: Telephone Communication between Duban Presi- dent DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Am- bassador to Mexico. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 1 9e weaba acta eemastbRaR IANS patie eee i o~ 34 SECRET ry 7
; i | { i Phe ceased eRe teeetineee Shes tae Tn munedientaanthee std thet AIOE TSU AT Ane ELE ut, Matin BS elias dorenrsectimte Son SECRET. 26 November 1963 _ Unnumbered Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the White House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico City on 18 September 1963. ) . Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,881 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963. Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 DIR 85182 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding latter to a close friend in Bern. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] _ 27 November 1963 DIR 85196 According to information from Nicaraguan Security Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service . received copy. 27 November 1963 DIR 85199 | Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 35 {SECRET
} * i a athe bienseh estes cine: sandeeee init Si ACe acti ae ‘uO Pte BAe ab 6 ART RDNA MARE bee a neue Mk PROBE SONAR Om costa scoped sinaal edi Siat ne h NiO fact 4 SECi nET 27 November 1963 DIR 85222 Subject:. Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 DIR 85246 Dr. Jose GUTLLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.) 27 November 1963) DIR 85471 Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 '  OIR 85573 Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Am- bassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered _ Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone to S. PAPICH. . Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico city passed to S. PAPICH of the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 28 November 1963 DIR 85657 on 26 November a British journalist named John WILSON- HUDSON gave information to the American Embassy in 36. enare eoTeer figs
| i j Fee nal AMET Hee cena oe eet SECRET London indicating that an "American gangster type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 28 November 1963 DIR 85662 Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. (Warren Commission] 28 November 1963 DIR 85665 The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963, a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy. SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. Lee [sic] who murdered President Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,893 ‘Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipient: FBI. 29 November 1963 DIR 85666 Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation. . Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85668 Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 29 November 1963 DIR 85670 . Sensitive sources . . . have reported that when the 23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to 37 fe
34-0000 t 7 SECRET the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great deal of discussion. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commisstfon] 29 November 1963 DIR 85691 Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate President Kennedy. ; Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85714 Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85744 ‘Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85758 | Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85770 ene EEN LAE oe ene ae freee fat sae nee 8 tne epee? Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] Santini anaatee OK 6. 29 November 1963 Unnumbered memorandum Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor ‘that OSWALD had made a bank deposit. Recipient: FBI. 38 i SECRET. . » fo . . ba neat ata NAAN me, LLNS SIRENS ys ot Bale aaa Men Renn ‘ : : . ‘