D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 The decision to "de~fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's _ Ns 4 .! . | ps October 17. ret espns that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. i (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA/"False - . \ \ ae Flagger") and Viaux's on October 18, the Agency was in- formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc- tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." (Santiago 568, 19 October) An “emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21) ~ As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter * for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts. 4g a CIA overview statement in Track II stated: Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty militar feroup led by General Valenzuela and Admiral shad always seemed more promising than” the capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the abil-~ ity and resources to act providing they de- cided to move and organized themselves ac~ cordingly. ; (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5) By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction. On the evening of October 17, (Colonel Wimertmet with the Army d the Navy They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades, *fwo coup plotters, Generals nd made one last attempt to . persuade General Schneider to Change his =Coup position on October 15.° The Station reported that the meeting turned out: to be a “complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General hGeloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament™in maintaining his non~involvement stance.” (Santiago 548, 16 October) 4 at pont po snag
-37- . ‘three “45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy C 4 Ae] jsaid he had three machine guns himself “but can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to r use them." (Santiago 562, L8 October) (colonel Wimert Jand the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider. £3. The fact that the weapons were provided the pan the Navy a ve ‘ [ nd that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not involved. The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo- matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was ms puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them ew but find our credulity stretched by Nav eading his troops { with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will try send them whether you can provide explanation or. not." (Headquarters 854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the arny | . af, ‘ _— and the Navy] } late in the evening of October 18 and con~ sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.* * As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.-- rather than Viaux.~GAn example of this sbif in focus was the decision to provide the Army and the Arny he tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action: ; - Station plans give six tear gas grenades to A, oe Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forces AS officers (deletion) instead of having (False a Flag Officer) deliver them to Viaux group. i Qur reasoning is that Wimert)dealing with | i ro active duty officers. Also’False Flagger) — leaving evening 18 October, and will not be ( i: replaced but(Wimert) will stay here. Hence ‘ important that( Wimert/ credibility with Armed Forces officers be strengthened. (Santiago 562, 18 October)
ep = 38- ‘ aa ne : _ ‘ \+ °. That same day, General Valenzuela informed/Colonel Wimert) that he, va 4 H 4 / General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General’ were prepared a” \ “ “f0 sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner being given for Schneider ,* after which Schneider would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral[ _ |\voutd head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports: - General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physftian. Will be Seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military will not admit involve- ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be 4 blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October) ( ™ The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his. official car, and his police guard failed to be withdrawn, but the aray Pp sured fiotone! Wimert [that an- other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October) \ Colonel Wimert| was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 “which was the price rem ae . . agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors," a ‘ © * The("False Flag Officer'/ who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan was given to’ Colonel Wimert) apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated: Q. Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out? Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending. (Sarno testimony, p. 37) ve,
oe oo com, Ty et ya tia Be ES Stee eee 2 pa Taper. ee eh cee ok! ma a ee Tt oe ® , 4 4 but/Wimer money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) assured Colonel Wimert) that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) t)insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the ao -39- x failed and the Task Force concluded de OD Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having | considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October) E. The Killing of General Schneider \ In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), /Colonel Wimert ) in an isolated section of Santiago. * “although The second abduction attempt on the 20th also At the same time General Valenzuela livered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the aray{_] f ps \ (Colonel Winer g's testimony and the cable traffiec-d t clearly establish the identity of the group to which the tie the was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track weapons, and therefore thd to the Valenzuela er ac ---The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub~ machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22) -..Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valen- zuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans. bo . (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from th President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975) Dall oup: r Fe. e f we :
ms we rN con ~40- 1 . . 4a. . Lo , At about 7 am that’ day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army { : or the Navy ere there. Shortly after 8 am,General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing. The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schmweider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and “Assailants used grease guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed(Col. Wimer tj to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests ' that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen- zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters: * The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts. In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being “author of the crime of kidnapping which re- sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con- spiring to cause a military cgup. Also convicted on the latter charge (were) Generals Valenzuela Ca They received sentences of three ‘years in exile. ot EAS 0955 Docld: 32202487 Page 133 = ge ig a a Re EC " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating
~41- ~/' ‘Station unaware if assassination was pre- “Lt ‘4 meditated or whether it constituted bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of Senior Armed Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. ,We also near certain th aduicall fr tray 9 ree ond es ac and involved. ave reason fo eing that General Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightests, set Schneider up for execution or abduction.... All we can say is that attempt against Schneider is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela's scenario... (Santiago 598, 22 October) PF. Post October 22 Events The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara- tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile°* Task Force to make the following initial judgment: With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack on General Schneider has produced developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently the plotters’ positions have been enhanced. (Chile Task Force Log, 22 October) On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track EI: it was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved, and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to them. (Task Force Log,~24 October)’ | if be wa
A. September ici eb ecReT September 18 ane Vey Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms’ notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a .. plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA —_— records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September) The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con~ x cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit." September 21 The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar ; ppesirs confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair- man, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired-~is that the a meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines neeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa~ tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred. September 22 , mm AE 0 om Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behing eet cg a 0 ‘Gort baal ge &Tle ob Se 4 >, is ‘oan meeting called to discuss Track I. The two bee iigeussea Hicace rr actions, Bos as _[eecsaty the contacts with then- Chi lean-President Fret.) According to eign EE Sa? fie gree ap Seg LPO, been ee a
, £ Kissinger told Karamessines that "our andling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we wera doing fine and keep it up.”. (Memorandum for a C the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines) B. October October 5 A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals -frrats,) Valenzuela /and named in a cable of September 30, (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such aa meeting had taken place, aithough he had no specific memory of it, (Karamessines testimony, Pp- 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 46 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee. . ail October 6 . ‘The Station reported that General Viaux was “ready to launch golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October," (Santiago 472, 6 October. 1970) “In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one “with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri- ous action.” The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970) Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux pian, Supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of ‘ an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) pope ‘4 makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kigsinger testinony, p. 24) if : ae 4 eer
It seems to me, although the records don't re~ flect it, that there was a meeting in September ,. a very brief one, in which I must have been an told that there was a Specific program going mo, underway. That Probably would have been by — Henry (Kissinger) and-perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12) October 10 Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General pa Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number Ke. of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from ali." (MemorandumAMMBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970) _— Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th. ae Be His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation. ceaeaal I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a’ progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a nega- “ tive progress report, that they were just not com a ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12) ‘Se A. 6 = . oo we i eg egal a pies eyo ar ff iang } « hee be Sa 44 ty gat \-3 H "
I am quite confident that, given my Own concep- — tion of my role at that time, that I would have conveyed that information to Henry,... (Haig testimony, p. 13) Ra Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr. - Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of 3 latitude did you have concerning what you would w Pass on to Dr, Kissinger? — General Haig. At that time I would consider I had no degree of latitude, other than to convey to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15) October 14 a A cable to Santiago for Colonet Winert} ostensibly from General pmmnee Bennett, suthorized(Wimert) to select two Chilean general officers and 4 convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington _ has authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven- tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to prevent the election of Allende on October 24,..,," (Headquarters to _ Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in this case "high authority” would have been Kissinger or the President, for no One else could have given (Wimert) such broad authorization. Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at : least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91) » However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October l4th ; cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on re ' Pome an the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the vo ul 4 7 {
- 49a - Molltabo sg ON. So October 15 Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis- cuss Track ITI, According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on viawe {ane fe “the general situation in Chile from the coup~possibility viewpoint.” It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in Cwenty-~perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues: 3. It was decided by those Present that the Agency must get a message Co Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our mesSage was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other frierids can do something. You will continue to have our suppore." 6. After the decision to de«fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc- ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main+ tain the capability for Agency Operations against Allende in the future. 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pres- sure on every Allende weak spot in sight~-now, after the 24th of October, after § November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply. (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970) TE bd S ov iad ( Oe * wey
‘ i 4 meeting .o wee ‘ 4 such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53) - ia October 14 H The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile. (Karamess October 15 “A Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White Ho cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversat Save a run-down on Ysaun [pan an “ehe genera Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." rr was conclude did not have more than one chance in twentye-perhaps less--t¢ Successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting co . 5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our “s, message was to state: "We have reviewed your Cc plans, and based on your information and ours, -“ we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future, Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch, The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to C have our support." \ak ‘ 6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup Ss 4 plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and Securely to main tain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future. 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pres- Sure on every Allende weak Spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new narching Orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply. : (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970) BERS Sr BR TS Re Ak eT Rn thee Fp Bay TG EET ™ * n the .l5th_(see below) to have discussed the results of the ‘ ijl POctober 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any 1 & Be . é ines calendar) ed use to dis- ion, Karamessines s. 1 situation in d that Viaux Oo launch a repercussions ntinues: (epeemenee ‘ r - Rare va Dad
. -50- “A Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat C more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to “stand down and preserve your assets," Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as — recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the — meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maxi- mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp- 55-5@) The October L6th order - indicated that Track II had been reviewed at “high USG level" the previous t day, and stated: 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much prefer- - able to have this transpire prior to 24 October “ase but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date.... 6 4, There is gr band von ing interest in the . activities co Valenzuela et al _ and we wish thém optimum go0d fortune. (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970) a , Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as “turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony. The conclusions of that meeting were that we had t- better not do anything rather than something. that was not going to succeed....My ‘general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized." ° - ; (Haig testimony, p. 13) ire. . wn ee Pe ne Loaye rurther warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus civing the ‘kiss of death’ to its Friends" (Cable, Lodga to Harriman, 8/26/63), . TET ET Sy Geo na ee ee anes ot | WY-S@855 Docld: 32202467 Page 141
In a cable on August 25, CIA |chief of |Station | John Richardson\ reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True- heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", {(I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government. Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids. and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated Suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212) .* Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and [Spera| were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (sarc 0304, 8/26/63). A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho- rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated: *In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had “complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating “the possibility of the generals' effort achieving. surprise." Lodye further warned that “the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus civing the 'kiss of death' to its Friends" (Cable, Lodge to Marriman, 8/26/63). HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 142
Tn : Mead at at against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be ( identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly * approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-}16) On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American Support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which vas the assassination of Sien's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63). O34 Bardia pdgesitten)\ cabled on i . the (Acting Chief of the cta\station, October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that “we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63). A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that: eee “(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial know- ledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands of€£, lowever, ,ye naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan," rrr rr et errr ervmcemmcnonanenanenent eee * The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units. ** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified: "Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas- Sination?- ( “Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57) Docld: 322024687 Page 143
-9. C McCone testified that he met privately with the President and / the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but Co not attempt to direct it" (McCone, Pp. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a “hands off attitude" (McCone, Pp. 62). MeCone testified: | "L felt that the President agreed with my position, des- pite the fact that he had &reat reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was Saying that, ( in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed nee it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.) McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather “whether we should let the coup go Or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his “hands off" recommendation ie <> Pee 1 (McCone, PP. 62-63). MecCone cabled SEE on October 6: "McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively con- doning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, [DIR 73661,| 10/6/63). In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters: “Action taken as directed. In addition, since pc Trueheart was also present when Original recommendation was inmade, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's instruction was Also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge copmented that he Shares McCone's Opinion." (Saigon to cra, [sarc 1463,\ 10/7/63) ao) | Dookd: 32202467 Page 144
-14- None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.* * It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable /No. 2036), 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane.. Between 6: ey and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked®onein, to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to (Szehigomeey, Acting Chief of |Station at the Embassy, who replied that 1t would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately avail- able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p.. 54). 4 Gees 8 Doclkd: 32202487 Page 145
United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters. d. Lumumba The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot. The juxtaposition of discussions concerning “disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action” against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles’ cable to the Congo, -— Bissell's representation to o \¢ soteHieb| about “highest authority" and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba. Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "olue” about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President.'s national security advisors. The fact that both the( Chief of | Station and \Goetlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 146
oy ws Oy Siac u id =~ this impression was derived solely from) Gott lieb'sl meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither (cott1ieb [nor the(Chief of | Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when. this occurred. The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCL Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty f in the evidence. HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Fage 147
aa rere C First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a “circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed. The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moréover, it is inconsistent ( with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest te both Eisenhower and Kennedy. * If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circuulocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet /Gottlieb™s| testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told ‘of Presidential autho- rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles. : HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 148