(1o4-10246-10139] one ’ i i ee an oe 3 Va etree a hone Me Poerenenninditmeies Phiten Aik om » CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/JAT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DODS, WE 5, WH 6,SR 4]' Ox OISTaBUTES [ rcesinee february 196: PJ DISSEMINATION | XJ ROUTINE BASED ON (ru. at.. pao a) SAS/R__| 5) SAS/SI |__1WH/PACY IWE/57R |_a] LX-797 BAS/Int{ "2 SAS/WAVE ISR/RR | WE/MADH 1} | — NP(CASAILOR-10, BAS/EOBI 3/ SAS/SO/HHICI/SPG|_IWE7R | ~3} J AMNICK~1) Liaison * i i | | | : | | a le RRs IRIE, A BE oh ES neat ty, Peal been Loe poo Tigh | NO FOREIGN DISSEM i SECRET (veers Pep wap Sheed (= OBCUTE PeRGUS EoMCNS
14-00000 wr a hed, 2 ie aa + TRIPE GE ke Tp teem ee cates aan, meee them 2, THE RUSSIANS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF TURNING OVER COMMAND i ° . NO FOREIGN DISSEM 2 SECRE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY @ ROUTINE. i A ° ° ; j | Intelligence Information Cable i COUNTRY CUBA/USSR TOCS ~3/573 022 { OATEOF JANUARY TO EARLY FEBRUARY 1964 DISTR. 13 FEBRUARY 1964 ; {1. POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF SOVIET SUBMARINES TO i CUBA DURING 1964 i 2. CUBAN CONTROL OF LAND-TO-SEA ROCKET SITES PLACE & i f | DATE ACQ. (9 FEBRUARY 1964) REFD~ACQ-03298iN ; ‘ ; TDC SDB-3/659 , 020 | F SOURCE FIELD REPORT NO. b APPRAISAL: A CUBAN MERCHANT MARINE OFFICER WHO IS AN HONEST REPORTER AND WHO HAS SUPPLIED GENERALLY ACCURATE INFORMATION IN THE PAST. HE RE- CEIVED THE FOLLOWING FROM A CUBAN NAVAL OFFICER WHO IS ASSIGNED : i TO THE KOMAR-CLASS GUIDED-MISSILE BOATS. b f 7! F 1. IT IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD BY OFFICERS OF THE CUBAN NAVY a ~~ THAT THE CUBAN MILITARY WILL RECEIVE TWO OR THREE SUBMARINES FROM : u THE SOVIET UNION DURING 1964. DURING 1963, MANY MEN WERE SENT To 7 z J, | THE SOVIET UNION FOR ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE TRAINING. IT 1S ! : UNDERSTOOD THAT THOSE SENT FOR NAVAL TRAINING WERE MOSTLY YOUNG : MEN TO BE TRAINED IN SUBMARINE HANDLING AND MAINTENANCE AND THAT ; : UPON COMPLETION OF THEIR SCHOOLING THEY WILL RETURN TO CUBA IN ; : THE SUBMARINES, : OF THE LAND-TO~SEA ROCKET SITES TO CUBAN SOLDIERS. ONLY A FEW Fekete oe TPM, Material cantains information « “ting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Kapianage Lawn, Title 18 USL, Gece. Ta and TH. the wan-c. ton oF revelation of Which in any manner to an unauthorized person ta prohiuited by ise: aa SECRET. NO FOREIGN DISSEM ipwsen-te SEASE/ING BIA 8=ARMY/ACSI NAVY ARM SECDEF NSA 8 FOX USIA «= OCh ONE 6 6OotE oe oO FB I : NPIC T&NS TREASUR.  REPCiNCiANT DDI USCS ww: a “Ea gheasks NNER ei at cathe os lite. hat, anh we bsg ta leon 6 oe
14-00000 CLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTAOLS SECRET IDCS -3/573, 022 NO FOREIGN DISSEM TECHNICIANS ARE REMAINING AT THE SITES TO INSTRUCT AND ADVISE THE CUBAN FORCES. | 3. IN JANUARY 1964, RUSSIAN OIL-DRILLING CREWS STRUCK OIL ON CAYO FRANCES; THE STRIKE IS PRODUCING 300 BARRELS A DAY. TO GUARD THE INSTALLATION, SEVEN OR EIGHT YACHTS HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED To ! | f PATROL THE AREA OF THE KEY AND BETWEEN 200 AND 300 MEN ARMED WITH BAZOOKAS, MORTARS, AND RIFLES HAVE BEEN MOVED THERE. MANY OF THE _ RIFLES ARE EQUIPPED WITH SNIPER SCOPES rm ~ 4. AS OF EARLY FEBRUARY, THERE WERE RUMORS TO THE EFFECT THAT A CONSPIRACY WITHIN THE MILITARY WAS BEING ORGANIZED. ALLEGEDLY THE TALK OF SUCH A CONSPIRACY IS THUS FAR CLOSELY GUARDED BY MILITARY GFFICERS. THE GROUP BEING ORGANIZED IS SAID TO BE COMPOSED OF ARMY, NAVY, AND POLICE OFFICERS OF HIGH RANK AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ; . SOME SMALL ARMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED SECRETLY . . . CASTRO ORDERED THAT WORK ON THEIR REPAIR HUST TAKE TOP PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHER MILITARY WORK. HOWEVER, REPAIR CREWS ARE EXPERIENCING ne DIFFICULTIES MAKING THE NECESSARY REPAIRS, SINCE THEY EITHER CANNOT REPLACE THE DAMAGED PORTIONS OF MACHINERY BECAUSE THEY LACK THE NECESSARY RUSSIAN SPARE PARTS OR CANNOT MAKE THE REPAIRS BECAUSE ; OF LACK OF KNOW-HOW. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE , CL. SSIRICATION SE ooo RET No Gk DISSEM USE PREMOUS . . BEG. 2-63 Meta of *, Nea NTINUATION. GC? TOCS INFORMATION REPL f om armen eG egg ins TE aan te ee wate nes eee gitwane 4 + RSD
14-00000 Rees ae CLASHIACATION ~ DISSEMINATION CONTROLS. NO FOREIGN DISSEM PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THE EFFECT OF COMMANDO RAIDS ON CUBA IN TDCSDB- 3/659 ,020, DATED 15 JANUARY 1964.) 6. IN THE RECENT ATTACK AT SIGUANEA, ISLA DE PINOS, THE CUBAN GUARDS DID NOT FIRE ON THE ATTACKERS BECAUSE THEY WERE AFRAID THEIR SHOTS MIGHT SET OFF EXPLOSIVE CHARGES UNDER THE ROCKETS. THE PORT OF CABANAS, ALTHOUGH REINFORCED SINCE RECENT ATTACKS, WOULD BE AN EASIER TARGET FOR A RAID THAN THE ISLA DE PINOS AREA. THE PORT IS PROTECTED BY ONLY A FEW GUARDS ON SATURDAYS AND SUNDAYS, AND IT IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE BETWEEN THE HOURS OF NIDNIGHT AND 3 A.M. 4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO. END OF MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION — INSEE 8 T/Cay eaNTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM ’ CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT een CORRS ESE ARORA TI R.A Ee he Za eC FEED edetenta ate Te legs, ves oth “oe ee og ~ mat “Sage 8 EA SBIR EES clade 2 he teen, Ot 28e bam Gm, Fb archaea Tal ah acterBae Se Entra peed hie Med tR  ea RH