14-00000 a s - CONFINED Tra. fa by Wn THE ALLENDE PROCESS - HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED “Allende's treatment of the Opposition media and hia utilization of the Pro-Government media offer revealing insights into the unique Claim that Chile will carry out a Socialict revolution within the frarne~ -: work of traditional bourgeois and democratic institutions without Social cost, ° ... Any Chilean Government possesees wide Powers thet can be ernployed “to control and intimidate media OppGnertes piven sufficient will power and ‘¢ynicism to do’ so, despite the fact that redia freedoms in Chile are twice-guaranteed, both in the 1925 constitution and ina statute of ' Constitutional §uarantees apreed to by Allende's Popular Unity coalition and the Christian Democrats (PDC) asa condition for PDC Support for - Allende in the congressional run-off held eubsequent to the Presidential election in September 1970, What are some of these powers ? Any Chilean executive under ~Provisions of the State Internal Security Law May establish emergency » zones by decree herded by military cermrnanders empowering the State ‘to enforce news censorship and to restrict 2cC€5s to newsprint supplies, A law on publicity abuses empowers the sovernment to petition the courts to suspend access to news and infor mation, (Laws on the books that pose potential threats to freedom of radio information-are more severe and more frequently utilized, See Section IN, B. Radio, } . Furthermore, through the judicious Parcelina out of advertising from. State and @utonomous State firms any government can discriminate Against opposition media by denying or reStricting this key source of revenue, mc , ; , : Unlike predecessor kovernments which utilized existing laws and accepted practices to reward political 468Sociates and benefit business partners, the Allende Government has consistently and frequently applied these measures to harass, to intirnidate, and to undermine the "morale of political and class Opponents in the media, These tactics . are applied throughout the country. ; : CONFIDENTIAL TAL R-4-73 February 27, 1973 5 eee ala a eR TI RR A 2 eas tee ae enreanete gr are oh enmmnren  _.
_ CONFIDENTIAL . A basic organizational technique for the UP coalition has ‘been the ‘establishment of UP committees (CUP -- Comité de Unidad Popular) -- “composed of newsmen who are militant members of parties Belonging to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies -- in newspapers, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies, The CUP's -have been most active at the anion levels: demanding exorbitant wage increases, insisting that UP employces Le given the right to express their opinion on editorial pages, disrupting legitimate union \ meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company data to the leftist press and to the Government. ; " The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freedom of the press was most explicitly and revealingly atated by the organizing committee for a conference of leftist journalists which was held in Santiago in April 1971, The committee issued the following statement prior to the conference: ae ...we believe that we must fight for true freedom of the press, which will only be possible when there is “true economic independence, We maintain that Chile will have true freedom of the prese only when the means ef mass communication are part of the area of social property, that is, (when they) belong to, all Chileans, . The press, radio, television, and the theater must be tools at the service of liberation and culture of our people and not 4 private business, an ideological battering ram of the national and foreign minority {the capitalists) as is presently the case, 7 (under- lining added) { Another statement said "the mission of journalists is to support and defend the People's Government (the UP) together with ali the workers," The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen for "“Viet-Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism, " and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina agency for its “objective” reporting of the Chilean phenomenon, Allende himself lent legitimacy to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conference when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the “vanguard! of the revolution by “elevating the political level of the people. " Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende ° asserted that his Government would respect freedom of information — while at the same time he lamented his Government's "excessive tolerance" for the opposition media. ; CONFIDENTIAL R-4-73 February 27, 1973 6
34-0000 CONFIDENTIAL A, Press ~ In the key Santiago me :tropolitan area, there are five major opposition daily newspapers and one iniportant neutral A daily, La Tercera de la Hora, . TABLE.2, MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTRAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS oo, Estimated Political Title *. Circulation — Orientation . ’ “El Mercurio ' 160, 000 Independent, conservative Las Noticias Ultimas _—‘120, 000 Part of the Mercurio chain La..Prensa 25,000 Christian Democratic (PBC) La Segunda —_ 60, 000 Partof the Mercurio chain La Tribuna 25,000 National Party (iid) interests La Tercera de la Hora 190,000 Independent A favorite target of the Government and its propaganda apparatus has been the conservative, independent daily El Mercurio, dean of the Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential newspaper chain in the country. Tarred regularly as "pro-U,S," and aga ‘gringo newspaper written in Spanish" -- potent accusations in Chile -- El Mercurio has borne the brunt ofjevery conceivable kind of pressure short of “outright seizure, : On numerous occasions the paper has been implicated along with other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in cancert with foreign (i, e., U.S.) interests to overthrow the Government, Advertisers have been "requested" not to.do business with the Mercurio chain, ?which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by tax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own staff, and by Allende himeelf at public rallies, Allende, too, periodically reacts’ to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the Presidential office have been "insulted," that the Mercurio chain indulges in “libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history, ' CONFIDENTIAL R-4-73 February 27, 1973 7
14-00000 and that the chain is Heaithful to ita tr: dition of infamy, ' CONFIDE The Government Propaganda apparatus follows suit, The PDC organ La Prensa and the Nation: al Party tabloid La Tribuna are secondary tarpets for the UP propagwnda apparatus ecause their circulation ia limited. Pressures cinployed apainst these dailies are aimed generally atthe political partion behind them in contrast to the Mercurio chain where presiures are intended as a warning signal to the ! Gree" media as an institittion, ‘Independent La Tercera receiven diatinct Lreatme nt, The Government exerts miniinal pressures on the paper in return for favorable editorial treatinent of Allende policics (see Scction VI, A, The Opposition Media Reaction), This taetic ‘has paid dividends for Allende and for Ver cera! $ owner, Germin Pico Gaénas, Allende obtains favorable publicity in a mans-circulation paper that maintains comparative objectivity in its news columns, thug lending credence to Allende's claims that he will respect traditional Chilean freedoms while making the transition to Socitlism, Freed frora the necd for the strident partisanship so charactcristic of the rest of the press, some Tercera steadily builds its circulation with a public seeking relief from the verbal civil war, As a reselt Pico, who has been head of the Chilean newspaper association, hag defended the Allende Government's press policies in international forums, The under- standing with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera is not sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal party in the Government coalition, B. Radio Radio continues to be the most important medium of communication in Chile, The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV Handbook give Chile a total of 137 stations, including 29 in the capital city, Santiago (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at 3 million, or one for every third person, Ina country 2600 miles long radio's strategic importance is understood by both Government and The Government has resorted to a varicty of devices opposition. requests by Allende . designed to intimidate epposition radio stations: advisers that opposition Stations hire designated leftist commentators; threats of violence; favoritism in the diatribution of necded government advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by CUP committees. CONFIDENTIAL R-2-73 February 27, 1973 8 oo ORE GENE A MENS ON FEN SE * ey RRR I OG TREO Seg UTNE Loire Yn Que OE AT
14-00000 CONFI DENTIAL TABLE 3, IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS ‘ Political Station Orientation . Radio Agricultura ‘National Party {PN) Christian Democratic (PDG) PDC with PN clements Radio Balmaceda | Radio Cooperativa! Radio Corporacifa Socialist Party Radio 25M" : Csiversity of Chile stritss mE i: ; controlled’ by Marxists - RadioxLuis Recabarrea Chilean Jaboe federation (CUT) © Station; Communist-controlled (See Note No, 10) Radio Magallanes Communist Party Radio Minerfa Independent with PDC and PN elements, Radio Pacifico Radical Party (UP) Radio Portales ; Socialist Party Radio Santiago Catholic Church interests '' Radio UTE State Technical University station controled by Cornmmunints Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations must rest with “bourgeois” radio owners, Long before Allende became president the Chilean businessmen and politicians wha owned radio Stations — made it a practice to hire leftist commentators because they believed that leftists were superior professionals aad helped to increase listenership, When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source of manpower, In addition, the Government frequently utilized existing regulations to gain its ends. Radio concessions are granted by a Government entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior Ninistry, The same entity can cancel or transfer such cancessions, Regulations promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject to the rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt," Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were placed under an obligatory Government network -- not an unusual practice for the Allende Government -- when a modified martial - law was decreed in 21 of Chile's 25 provinces during.the Octobere CONFIDENTIAL R.4-73 February 27, 1973 9 SVN ITS eR A OF os a 5 net ee BON em whe ny et a ge Wet Tee eter wee a Fe Ou mace owe om ou ee we ews emtenrs ee ee aod
14-00000 4h Opposition) in ConcepciénGe well ap ‘ CONFIDENTIAL a ae ne e November 1972 track drivers strike (See Mote No, 18), Another regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their tranaminsions whenever the Interior Minister judges it to he necesnary in the interest of the internal security of the State,’ Still another repulation authorizes the Central Bank to control the iinportation of equipment and spare parte for radio, television, and the press, The Government moved quickly after the 1970 precidential . election to obtain control of key stations, The Socialist Party gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most populir station, and purchased Radio Corporacion from Til Mercurio (Portales haa ; subsequenily afipped ia populirity), The Communist Party purchased Mapallenes, an important Santiago station, The Cormmunist Party recently also purchased Radio Simdén Bol{var (formerly pro» four other stations in southern Chile in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973), The rightist National Party daily La frihuna quoted the former owner as Gaying that "the aye of privately-ouned massa media {in Chile) io over" with only the Government, Strong cconornic consortiums, and the most powerful political parties capable of La Tribuna says the Cornrnunist Party Sustaining media operations, . la now the most powerful (single) broadencter in southern Chile, . .PDC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have - .to date successfully resisted Covernment enticements and pressures “(see Section VI, A. The Opposition'Media Reaction), Palmaceda «« a radio station which over the years had carned a reputation tor objec. tive newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the radio field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio facility. The station was shut down, for’example, !7 hours in June 1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the State of Emergency decreed after the asaa BBination of Perez Zujovic, a former interior minister in the Frei Government. At the same time a UP station, Portalea, received nothing more than an admoni- tion for transmitting “alarmist” news more acceptable to UP Propagandiste. - During the August-September 1971] period Radio Balmaceda wae ehut down on three separate occasions under Similar pretexts (see Note No, 10), . . CONFIDENTIAL Pinata Daietictelitaade R-4-73 February 27, 1973 10 bd (~0 wer enema en EA Te eee cn tp enaniesteememenrs oT WIR WITLI cr CMI UYD coyer con Ma" eth «aro « momimaneepennT INE ERO?
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL In radio aa in the press the Government has uscd CUP committees to formulate exayperated ware demania, to férnent | strikes, and to form rump unions, CUP unions at Radio avifico, © for example, forced the owner to sell out fo a cooperative iuvined: by employees when waye demands cuuld not be met, The radio Station gubsequently wan purchased by the Radical Party -- a member of the UP coalition, ' The principal Government weapon, however, is its control over public gervice advertising, which traditionally has provided — the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations, The Government hae dangled the prospect of udvertisernents in return for favorable “news treatment, but the bait has not been picked up by the major. opposition radioa which recognize that their independence is at atake. The economic squeeze. makes. the future of Chilean independent radios appear bleak, Cc. Television Since ita inception in Chile in 1962, television has made great arid, but the medium atill lags behind radio, especially, in the provinces where technical conditiona for viewing are poor, Accord-. ing to the beat estimates availablé, there are 350,000 sets in Santiago and a total of 500, 000 sets in the country, Chile is ‘served by the following television channels: 1) A national network with some 21 oxtlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic, University - channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in Valparafso; and 4) the University of Chilg channel in Santiago The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction of an Allende , confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected member of the ultra-lefe MIR «- Movement of the Revolutionary Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition, — Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations intended to amear political and class opponents, and a steady drum- ; fire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming became standard fare, oo, . CONFIDENTIAL R-4-73 February 27,1973 oy | eee RST SG == + epee oe na ss ne
CONKIDEN TIA L At the game time network authorities made iidiffieutt under a variety of pretexts for opposition Spokesimen to air their views in ; ‘ Contravention of the State television statute, For example, the , authorities frequently Obliped all televinion channels nd radios to Carry official Staternénts and denied Oppovition sporerzmen equal tline, Fedsorting to the legal fiction that the officias Blatements were tranernitted voluntarily, . nA Po t at show "A Tren Bandas, "in which opposi- tion Fepresentativey freely debated UP representatives (the only such show carriad nationally), wag cancelled in August 1972 after two years of UP agitation Against it, The Government delended the flep by alleving that the Program had poor lintenership and by Pointing: to a ruling ranting all political partieg equal time to express their ‘Views on twice-weekly 20-minute Slols, The Original chat show format Provided several hours of Open-ended and frequent face-to- face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government, A popular political ch ' The University of Chile station has Consistently asserted the Marxiat line Since itg inception, but the two remaining University Channels have Successfully fought Government Control is date (See Section yr, Cc, University Confrontation and Televisior Freedoms), None of the universit; Chiannets, however, Tp Nutonadl op =cope, D. Magazines and Rook Publishing S equipment ‘Early in 1971 the Government Purchased the plane and of the PDC-controlled “igeZLag publishing empire -- one of the most modern in Latin America, The GOC Announchd the Purchage alter Prolonged Negotiations, Provoked Originally by the CxXCEBEive demands of a Comrnunist-led union, Under the terms of the accord the Government Purchased Zig-Zag's plant and equipment, the company's national line of comics, and Several magazines while ZiveZLay retained several M458-Circulation Magazines (Ereitla and Vea being the moat important) under a two-year contract with the Chilean Treasury, ‘The Zig-Zag infrastructure forrned the basis for the newly-established Covernment-owned Quimantu National Publishing . . Enterprise, The accord with Zig-Zag has been Scrupulously Observed to date, CONFIDENTIAL eae ne eenehdchiedl R-4-73 February 27, 1073 12
ee Re Er ED ae Set et ee eee eke CONFIDENTIAL Quimantu quickly beran turning out magazines, comic books, and textbooks pushing UP policies, Comic books like Firme were desifned for mass consuniption and aimed at adults with low cultural levels, while others like Ramona were aimed at the teen-age market,. Cabrochico, anotherrcamic book, was peared to pre-teens, The format of seme Quimanta products closely resembled ‘competing Zig-Zay products, The weekly Ahora, for example, was. designed to compete with Ercitla. After eight months Ahora collapsed, rejected in the market place oy Chileans who were turned off by heavy- handed political propaganda, x 4 E. Films The Government's film production company, Chile Films, became the UP's principal propagandéa arm in the film field, Rival Chilean private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production costs and discriminatory tan and exchange rate treatment that denied ‘them needed equipment and spare parts from abroad, Chile Films Signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban Cinematographic Institute (ICAIC} (See Section V. C, Exchange of _ Persons, Visitors, and Exchance Agreements). ; a er ana Chile Films also initiated agreements with the experimental film institute (leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Govern. ment information office, the film department of the Communist« dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trajabadores -- the major labor organization), the national television netcora, and the University of Chile television station. The. stated purpose of the accords was to “develop the new Chilean film industry. " Its products are intended to glorify the reles of workers, peasants, and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and attack the "bourceoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an intense publicity buildup, hawever, few films actually appeared in the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to be pieced together from newsreel film taken curing the Allende presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies, CONFIDENTIAL R-4-73 February 27, 1973 13
14-00000 i MoT NSE NTL retest ck anne TER ee eg rem ee peep CONFIDENTIAL AEN EAL ‘The Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972 elections for top poets in the Communist-domisas COT tabor federation also darrnaged Government Credibility, Phe Opposition media scored heavily ina barrage of charges of ivrepularities and vote fraud with a public that takes justified price iv Clean elections, B, The Papetera Confréntation | EON . oot . ; ' The Compaftis ?tanufacturera de Panelea Y Cartones {known as the Papelera), Chiles Major private producer of Sprint, became another propaganda battleground cast by the opposition in terms of "freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism, ". - In October 1971, the Government, carrying oct 4 long-standing Pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Bevclopment Corporation) had opened négotiations to buy out the Panclera through the purchase of its stock, The oppasition media izetnediately launched 4a Campaign to warn the public that the free press would be crippled _ if newsprint distribution were placed at the mercy of Government : argued that newsprint production was essential ¢ Suppliers. At the same time, the opposition meéiz pleaded with Private shareholders to refuse to sell to the Governr:nent. In addition, a "freedom find" was created enabling private persons to buy up. Papelera shares to prevent the company from falliny into Government hands, : - ne For several months Pro- and anti-Governmer: media carried out. daily an intensive Propaganda battle in advertiserser:: » news Stories,. and editorials, Both sides resorted to the familizr numbers game; the pro-Allende media claimed that the Governmert was besieged hy willing shareholders eager to sell out; the Opposition asserted that Shareholders were resisting temptation, Governmnen: propagandists t22 State and must Q _ be controlled by the State; the OppoSition said Pacelera rust remain ee in private hands as a patriotic duty, « Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Pasetera shareholders, : . mae atateemeeter tet . _the Government has not hesitated to use ather Measures -= price ‘Controls, labor-induced Production Shortages, anc strong-arm tactics a. Sn ae oa U i ‘to prevent the delivery of raw material to the plant, The Government press also circulated rumors that Jorge Alessandri {former President CONFIDENTIAL Ser np entrnns ee . R-4-73 February 27, 1973 26 TRO ae 8 rae oe ene wen TS en em a a a ee gree ar!
14-00000 CONFIEGENTIAL = pment ete a as 4 et of Chile and.a leading shareholder and board chairman of the Papelera) had made a deal with Allende to pive the Government control’over the Papelera to weaken the will of private sharcholders and their supporters, That the Papelera still withstands these combined pressures-a year | later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the Papelera employees, and to an aroused and alerted opposition media, a SO 7 . , \ The battle for control of the Papelera will continue and the odds are not good for the campany, Lepeatcd rcquests for price iricreases sufficient to absorb cest increases «- forced on the firm in part by Government economic volicies -- were not met, and the firm declared in September 1972 thar it could not meet loan payments due to the ; Inter-American Developrnent Bank GDR). Finally, in December 197¢ the Government authorized new price increases averaging, 15 per cent, which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint. The Papelera gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the Company are certain to continuc, The price increase itself may be viewed as a form of pressure. The battle has spilled over into the talls of the Chilean Congress. Partly to protect the Papelera’s independent status, the PDC spansored a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social - ‘property by the Government, (The Papelera is one of the firms appearing on the Government's origina Yist of 91 firms to be absorbed ‘by the Government as social property.) The aincndment -- stilla . bitter bone of contention between the Gavernment and the opposition <- would, among other points, declare nall and void CORFO's attempted purchase of Papelera stock in the absenée of Congressional approval, C. University Corfrontation and Television Freedoms Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the University of Chile in April 1972 and dy stiffening opposition attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over effects in television programming at two channels run by Catholic University. Increasing opposition effectiveness even raised the possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel: for the first time in its existence might be odliged to inject some objectivity into its output. . H . CONFIDENTIAL R-4-73 February 27, 1973 27
14-00000 incumbent University of Chile Rector’ Edgardo Bocninyger, an i independent with Christian Democratic Sytopathies, gained 51.9 per cent ; \ . of the vote for rector in April against three other contenders repre. - senting the UP coalition MIR. An independent-P Marxist-controlled ’ . . . 4 e ee Marxist tololiterianisnn, in the process Mector ; . j ro of the opposition media and a ByrnLol of of Government efforts to impose its will on ; I 1 i ‘ plurélisin ove Boeninger became a he b& "democratic" defiance media terms it becam university TV channel, @ Catholic Univers Channels. their opponents, are proceeding cautiously Hyainet then, A rnore signific permit university tele throughout Chile, Opposition!s most recent attempt to obt such an extension by vetoing exlected items ina PDC-introdeced bill, nt claimed that its own bill -. peading before Congress and allowing universities to establish stations only within the territory in which the seat of each university is located «- would Create a national network for all recog "equal and non-discriminatory" basis, What the Government did not Say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's PoSition as the only Single channel thal can be viewed by a national Presumably the Government bill also would Permit the Communist-dominated State Technical University to operate a television station in Santiago in comp . Catholic University channel which, according to available public is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the The Governme television audience, Opinion surveys, capital's audience COLFIDENTIAL 0 orate ve ey . ~ and leftist eplinter groups, including the DC state alco pained control of the previously | superior Normative Council, The victory wan \ billed by the opposition median as another victory for democracy and ; . ' an independent university, The opposition's rallying cry becarne “Deferd a democratic and pluralist univereity," Translated into e "We want a democratic and pluralistic Rallying behind that Slogan, Opposition supporters at the two ities (Santiago and Valparafso) bepan to case out a leftist influence in the news departments of the two univernity UP Supporters, however, remain at the technician level at the Santiago channel and can be expected to create proLlerns for Opposition authorities who now control the channel ant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to vision stations to extend their networks . In Septernber 1972, President Allende hlocred the : ain legislative sanction for nized universities on an elition with Santiayo's : . CONFIDENTIAL R-4-73 February 27, 1973 28
14-00000 . Cop MEN VEAL RS TOE «8 PC eB ROO BEDE HK Me ee HTT Eek Oke HE ORC | Minn meres Sie eon, Erecilla October 5, 1972 2 coe Ne hee lena ORE cone i oe Se a ANN A A ea was pn 9 8 Ran oe a en ' Demenstrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bill Permitting > University (Santiago) to Eiatend Its Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile, in subsequent developmentsithe Catholic University at Santiago as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepcion retropelitan area, third mort important in Chile, via a television epeater in Talcahuano, Phe Government has ordered that the epeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under 1983 law to function in that area, he University has refused to ompiy, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which — uthorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the ovetaing statute and that it needs no additional concession to perate in any part of Chile. . Meanwhile the repeater is still anctioning (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political) ebate continues, : e CONFIDENTIAL 24-73) February 27, 1973 29 ; ‘ : / e ape emer wn ee
Vy orld-attention has moved away from Santlago’ since the bloody cverthrow of Salvador Allende tast September, but the questions that were raised at that time still need answering. Where should the .primary responsibility. be placed | for the tragic events.-on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevotution aided and abetted by the. |. forces of imperialism? Was it, as the’ Right asserts, the only available response to Allende’s -attempt to ‘establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile-and force? Did it mark the “death Of a-dream" of the-establisnment of socialism by democratic mzans, and-was it thereby one more demonstration tnat Marxism must use force to ac- ‘complish Its goals? Were there internal_and external political and economic factors which made it im- possible for Aliende’s experiment to succeed, or. was the downfail of the Unidad Popular (Popular: Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of Ideologically-influenced analyses and mis- | taken policy choices which, if they had been differ- ent, might have nroduced another result? A review of the course uf the Allende government with the ald’ of the considerable new material that has be- come available In recent months may help to answer these questions. Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out | that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race.’ What they do not mention Is that In the congressional run-off between the two ere remnant © Mr, Sigmund is Professor of Politics at Princeton University, Among his published works are Models of Political Change in Latin America, 1970, and The tdcologies of the Developing Nations (2nd rev. ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since 1963, most recently in January 1974 to do research an a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics. front-running candidates he was elected president ‘by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. Ha received: the support of the centrist Christlan Democratic Party (POC) in the run-off in return for his agree- ment. to the adaption of a Constitutional Statute of Ocmecraic Guarantees protecting freedoms of ex- pression, education and religion, and guarantecing the independence of the military from political con- trol. The text of the statute, which was added te the Chitéan Constitution shortly after Allende’s elec- tion, reflected the fears of non-Marxlst groups that the new Marxist President would use the consider: able power of the Chilean exccutive to undercut and eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist take- over, Political and Economic Strategy When he took office, Allende promised that he would follow a “second model” of Marxism—the via Chilena to socialism, “with meat ples and red wine." To prove that this model was “anticipated by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from Friedrich En on the possibility of Bes . 4 peaceful evolution from the old society to the new In countries where the representatives of the ere EPrints eh EEE § Allenda’s supporters in tha Popular Unity coalition consisted of AIS Gwn Sociatst Party (Partido Socaisia-—PS), ine Communist Party (Partido Comunista—PC), tha main body of Ine Rad.cal Party (Partido Rad.cai-—PR), the leftist Caimolic “Movement of Popular United AcChoR" [Movumento de ACCION Popuiar Unido—MAPY), and two olfter smailer groups. The largest Oppos.ton groups ware Ihe centrist Caretian Oemocranc Party (Partita Democrats Cr.stand— POC) ord tne rightist Matonst Party (Partito Naciongh—PN).. in retrospect, it is ironic tnat the Chitean Sensio never acted on & Constivlonsl amenament proposed garty in 1970 to estadiien @ SOCOnd- ound Popular election, BACH wcuki Nave proved tag President thus elected (prepably the fighLa@ing Cendaiaie, Jorge Algesand) with @ Clear popular mandate. %
(people have aif power ‘and: in accord with the consti- tution can do what they desire when they have the énajority of the nation behind them,* Yet it was precisely the.question cf majority sup- port that was Allende’s central problem in his: de- sign to carry out a peaceful transition to “socialism with democracy, pluralism and liberty.” The parties - in his coalition -were in a distinct minority In the / Congress, and although there was rio doubt about the Jegitimacy of his election by that body, his victory had only been possible because of the conditional support of the Christian Oemocrats. The POC, it’ should be noted, included both Radomiro Tornic, the party's. 1970 presidential candidate, who had gone to Allende’s. house to- conpratulate him the day ‘after the popular election, cicarly inferring his -future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan “de. Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party to prevent It from voting for Allende’ in the run-off. in the Immediate aftermath of the election the POC” was controlied by the Tornic forces, who claimed to be In favor of "communitarlan” socialism, nation- -alization.of copper, acceieration of agrarian reform, and reduction of Chile’s dependencia on the United States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his. acknowledged goal of majority support for the transition to socialism would have been to try to arrive at an understanding with the Christian.Demo- crats on the points in his program with whieh ‘they were In agreement. This might have provoked the- secession of some of the rightist members of the POC, but If an accord had been reached with the party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende a majority In the Congress for at least part of his program, Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to terms with the party which he had termed “the new ‘| face of reaction” during the campaign, Allende chose an alternative strategy. The next congressional elec- tlons. were not. scheduled to take place until March 1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in the event of a conflict. with the Congress over the text of a constitutional amendment, the President. could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course. adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popu- lar support for his coalition and then propose a constitutional amendment which, in accordance with the. Popular Unity electoral program, would replace the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral § Gi Mercurio (Santiago), feov. 6, 1970, p. 23. | Salvador Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in January 1971, three months alter his election as President of Chile. =Phote by fenti Visolll for Photereportess. house, kobe elected immediately following the ap- proval of the amendment. The Congress would be certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende had the support of a majority In the country, he could win the plebiscite and secure control of the unicameral legislature that would then be estab- lished.  * Allende’s strategy for the expansion of electoral "Support was an economic one which drew as much from John Maynard Keynes as It did from Karl Mars, The Chilean economy, already operating below Capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a resuit of Allende’s election, The response of Pedro Vuskovic, Allende’s Minister of Economics, was ta “prime the pump” by adopting a deficit budget, in- creasing public expenditures, and redistributing in- come by skewing the annual wage readjustment for the preceding year’s inflation (35 percent in 1970) in favor of the low-income sector of the population (the lowest income groups received 3 40-percent in- crease), The utilization of unused industrial ca- pacity, combined with strict enforcement of prize controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and re- fusal to devalue the Chilean escudo in relation to the dollar, were expected to contain possible infla- tionary pressures which might result. (The Allende government also had a cushion of nearly’ $400 million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei government as a result of high internationat prices for copper, Chile’s principal export.) The strategy also contained. a Marxist element— 46
accentualion of the class strups that appeals were made t6 the pocketbooks of the lower-class Chileans, there was also to be an etfort to increase their. class consciousness (eanclenti. use of the media to remove the elements of “false consciousness” institted by “bourzedis" propaganda. Expressing the diametric opposite of a claim often voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende said ina press conference just after his installation, “I am not president of alt Chileans." And in his first “State of the Nation” message to the Congress he sserted: : «++ the People’s Government (Gobierno Popular) is Inspired in its policy by a premise that fe antitidially denied by some-—the existence of classes and social sectors with antagonistic and Opposing interests.* Allende’s économie advisers anticipated an addi. ‘tional source of revenue for the government from the “exploitative” Profits of the industries that were to be nationalized by the new government, The par. tially American-owned Copper mines were ta be taken over by a constitutional amendment—toth to lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of the Frei<Chileanization agreements of 1967 and 1969, and because a general consensus in Chile favored nationalization, Other companies were to be nationalized afer 4 controlling interest was gained by the government development agency. The fatter course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price of shares had been depressed since the elections, and further economic pressures could be created by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise in prices. The legal adviser to the Zovernament, Eduardo Novoa, also Gullined other “egal loophcies" in existing Chilean jaw which could be used for “temporary” takeovers of companies, inciuding “intervention” because of labor disputes and “vequi- sition” because of a “breakdown in Supply of an article of prime necessity.” ~ § Salvador Allende, “The Crnean Way to Sociaiiem," in Paul é. Sigmund, £4., fre fdeologies cf tng Gevetoping Nations, 2nd rey, ed., few York, Praeger, 1972, 9. 889. . . 4 Frel's Cnileanization Ologram had tnvelved the Purchase by the Critean state of » controling interest im ene farge coocer mines Sened by ine Kennecott ang Anaconda companies. Tne agreements Rat 8150 prowded ghar Chue’e Gayments to tne Amencan companes © were to be invested in ine €20anecn of copper Proguchan ang fet.ning in Chis, earning ine country Sdd:tional revenue in ine 39706 to Pay bach the toang contacted to finance tne Bur nases, c. At tne care time zacién) through povernment publications and ‘the: through the purchase of shares on the open market | | industry and trade, a3 premised in the Popular Unity PICerom, was thus seen as an essential part of an | economic and political strategy aimed at achleving and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid acceleration of aprarian reform (again using existing icgislation—the 1967 agrarian reform law——but ex: | plaiting provisions Such as one aulhorizing the espropriation of “abandoned or badly-farmed land,”. with One percent payment in cash and the rest In bonds), the plinned takeover meant that even if the effort to create a unicameral teft-domlnated Yepistature falled, the Allende Rovernment could destroy the economic base of the “capitalise” oppo- citian through a series of “Irreversible” faits accom. plis (hechos consumados) which would give the cr i esp WOMA pa RECEAVA fsa pstaa |  PLGTAS . A Chilean peasant &uards the g3te of a farm south of Sahtiago which Was Seized from its Owners on the pretext that it was “operated unproduttively” (mal explotada). . - .  —Phete by Moga Casreflee, Ihe takeover of large sectors of Chite’s basic
14-00000 government control of the economy and of the Bytes, profits that the private sector had used for usury ~ consumption or had sent out of the country as profit t} remittances to.foreign companies. At the same tirne, | the fact that the policy remained within,the letter, it not the spirit, of the law meant that interserition by the military was unlikely. — “ Allende’s constitutionalist and- tepalit: strateny | was not universally accepted within his coalition. | Most of his own Socialist Party—bepinning with its | newly elected General Secretary, Senator ol! i i ‘Altamirano~-and several other groups further to the left, such as the MIR (Movimiento de la lrquierda Revolucionarla——Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the VOP (Vanguardia Orpanizada del Pucblo—Organized Vanguard of the People), ware openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying cn elec- tlons and “bourgeois legality” to achieve power and advised preparation for an armed confrontation with the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as. irevi- table. Allende’s effort to portray the transition to | socialism as peaceful in character was not acsisted | by the publication of his conversations with French revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971. ln these, Betray declared that “in the last analysis ao3 until further notice, political power comes out of Ihe end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated that his aitferences with apostles of violence like Ché Gursata were only “tactical,” because the Chilean siwation required that he observe fegalily “for the tiene being.” Allende himself organized an armed personal bodypuard, the so-called GAP (Grupo de Amiga; Personales), and—we now know—as carly a Gecember 1971 received reports on the illegal irnpzriation and distribution of arms to the Min and {9 his bodyguards.” . While there were thus Intermittent hints of rev0- lutianary alternatives, Allende’s basic economic “vategy was “socialist consumerism,” * combined with a rapid expansion of state control in industry, brace and agriculture, and his basic political sirategy Sieg Mags Debray, Tag Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Buare@, tea 04s, Random, 1971, oo. $2, 77, 91, and 97. Ef Mercurio firtar rates Ctiteand feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces tre regret, SaeVE 1A Lem Dleeviertial patece. Sin yee tecasumarizm see Paul €. Sigmund, “Two Veare of beer di Lins,” Probiems of Communism (Wasnington, OC), Stoner Caceember 1972; op. 38-41, A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency—in the foreground, 2 picture of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara. i orth | =Phote by Claus Meyer for Block feos. . 48 . bral al Eo. a fm
14-00000 was an expansion of the ei.ctoral base of the Allende when the regime's repularity was at its highest coalition by an appeal to the material interests and | point,’ but_in retrospect it does not appear at all | the class consciousness of the tower classes. It was | certain that he would have won—particularly since the interaction of the various elements of this politi. | by the time that the constitutional prerequisites for cal and economic strategy that finally produced the | such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and breakdown of Chilean constitutionaticem and the | political situation would have been much less favor. abie, ; intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left ; of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along. The period after the municipal elections naw ap- a ; * | Pears to have been crucial for the long-term survival of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the Christian Oemocrats. had elected a compromise leadership which was not committed to either of the “party's wings, and the short-run economic and politi. |. cal indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking action on the economic front to stem the loss of foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pres- surcs——and on the political front to prevent the movement of the Christian Democrats into an aili- “ance with the right-wing opposition parties—the regime continued its Previous policies, confidently assuming that in the long run “the people” would Support it and ignoring the warnings of “bourgeois” economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the ex. ‘pansion of. demand, and the sharp decline in invest- mont would produce disastrous consequences in the following year. ; Initial Success ; an een inti oe At the outset, the new economic policy was astoundingly successful, although it had within it the seeds of future disaster. Income rediétribution stimulated demand, while price controts and an arti. ficially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971. the Sociedad de Fornente Fabril (Asscciation for the Development of Manufacturing), representing Chilean business and industry, admitted that produc. tion had increased by 6.3" percent over the figure ‘| of 12 months before, and by May that figure had reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Eccnomics of the University of Chile later reported that unem- ployment In the Santiago area dropped from 8.3 Percent in December 1970.to 5.2 percent in June 1971 and dectined further to an unusually low 3.8 ‘percent by the end of the year, The Consumer Price ; ; | Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970 : . . and had only increased by 6 percent by the time | The hardening of the Christian Democratic posi- af the municipal elections of April 1971—its lowest | tion began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June tise In many years. At the same time, salaries and | by the assassination of the former Christian Demo- Wages increased by 27 percent in reat terms. cratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by This wave of economic Prosperity—combined | extremists, at feast one of whom had been released with the absence of the political repression that | from prison by Allende upon his accession to power. Some fightists had predicted would result from a | A month later in a by-election in Valparalso, the victory by the Marxists—ted many, particularly in | victorious Christian Democratic candidate received low income groups, to vote for the candidates of the | the Support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the Popular Unity coalition in the April municipat elec- Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight tions. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its elec- | deputies and a number of other party leaders to form toral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by | the pro-Allende hequierda Cristiana (Christian Lef). Rearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22 | This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the percent of the total), and the candidates of all the | other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of barties supporting Allende received about 50 per. | the seven Radical senators (including two former cent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent | presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies which the President himself had received only seven | left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the Partido months before. Yet, ratifying as the results were, | de fa lzquierda Radical (Party of the Radical Lefe— th Coalition was still a fow votes short of the abso- | PIR) in protest against the Alarxist orientation of a inte majority that Allende required to win a plebi- ; scite on a canctitutional amendment. He was later 7 See, #8. Paul M, Smeezy, “Chile: The Question of Power,” . Criticized for not Calling the plebiscite at the time | mentniy Review (New York, Longony Decemzer 1973, Pe. Lt, 49 oo Political Polarization
14-00000 | Continued to support the Allende government, but _f trol over the. expansion of the.public sector by voting ‘inv favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the PR policy resolution Y which the dissidents ‘described as “completely removed from the characteristic and distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to “the interest of the middle social strata” whom the. _party had always represented.* For a time, the PIR within a year it had entered the ranks. of the opposi- tion, in July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voted In favor of the constitutional amendment national- izing the copper mines, but from: that point forward, the pattern was 6ne-of polarization of Chilean politics and saciety into two opposing blocks. The Allende | forces controfied the executive and pursued an in- creasingly vigorous ideological purge of thase who were not entirely sympathetic to the government. The opposition controlled the legislature, and in October 1971 .the Christian Democrats and the rightist parties attempted to assert legistative con- use of the intervention and requisition procedures and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises : to the “social” or mixed sectors be carried out in accordance with specific legislation adopted by the Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an amendment on the “Three Aréas’‘ of Property,” be- | came the focus of a continuing deadlock between | the President and Congress that’ lasted - until Aliende’s overthrow in September 1973. ; Allende's refusal ta accept the amendment or to ¢all a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the Congress appeared to the congressional opposition to be a decisive indication of his determination to bypass the legislature In carrying out the Popular Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of the amendment onward, began to cooperate with the rightist parties in- op- posing the executive. One method was to impeach ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforce- ment of the law. The first of many such impeach- ments took place in January 1972. Another method was to present a united electoral front against the government. informal cooperation between the rightist parties and the Christian Democrats: led to Striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972, and a month iater these groups formed the Demo. cratic Confederation (Confederacién Democrdtica— CODE) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congres- sional elections. A third area of cooperation was in 6 £4 Afercuro, Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37. 50 the Christian Democrats- the most fercus of “which was the March cf Empty Pots in Decernber 1971, in which theuzands of houséwives, mostly of middle-class background, marched, tarzing pots to protest food shortazes. Those shortages had developed because the pre- dicted ecoremic difficultics resulting from the _Muskovic gclicy began.to emerge in late 1971. The balance-of-:ayments surplus had been depleted at such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit of $315 miilicn, while in 1970. there had been a surplus of $91 million) that in November 1971 the Allende goverricrent called a moratorium on payment of its foreign cebdts. Chile had already experenced difficulties in cecuring foans from the Inter-American Developmer:t Bank, the World Bank and the Esport- Import Barz 25 a result of its failure to compentate the Anacorea ‘and Kennecott copper comcanies for the naticnalization of their major mines. The debt moratorium was bound to make it cansicératly more difficuit for Chile to secure foreign credits, particularly far the short term.’ In December 1371, fhe Chilean x9 “ernment finally permitted a cartial devaluation of the Chilean escudo $0 as to cecrease the distortions created by its overvaluation, but tris created pressure on prices of goods manufactured with imported components. Shortages of certain focd sigily cooking oil; detergents, suger, . items—espes ‘toothpaste, and cigarettes—were ascribed by the government to upper-class hoarding and to increzsed ‘consumption by low-income groups; however, the dislocations in the countryside ‘associated with the very rapid esparsion of the agrarian reform (Allence took over almest as much land in his first yéar in office as Frei mad in six years) clearly had something to do witn the problem as well, and the Situztica could be expected to get worse ‘with the harvest in early 1972. A 1G0-percent increase in the money supply as a resu!t of the government's deficit scend- ing was also beg zinning to produce inflationary cres- sures now that the unused capacity of Chilean indus- try had been taen up by the 1971 expansian. hic important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said it had declined by 7.7 percent, but oppesition economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent) ‘meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in 1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972. Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was met ee 8 On the inaccuracy cf ine tern “invisicie Blockade” to dercro6 the Allende gz-e-nments credit protiems, see Pact E Slgmund, “The ‘invisi@le Boceace’ and tne Querincce of Allende,” Fore §7 Affairs (New Yorn), January 1974, oe. 322-40. »