(Security Classification) CONTROL NO. COPY_....s—tsi—‘“(t;C‘COPF Handle Via Channels Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: a NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions of! OR-SECRET- (Security Classification) HW 55355 DBocld:32401332 Page 2? \ SON
TOP —-FEGEET For most employees of the Federal government, work continues unchanged when a new man moves into the White House. Employees of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Labor-Management Services Administration, or the Commodity Exchange Authority 7 ee all go about their jobs in their accustemed ways, mmm though changes of Even administration policy can ultimately have an effect. /the pattern of “most intelligence work--collection and the production of finished intelligence undisturbed, _ for a considerable number of officials--remains watferted -. But for those who are turning out: ‘AnteVLigence specifically for the President, - eS Aww AS ~~ ay 2%. ea anes aul ao OE tiew Chief Executive scitlatieseeet of — asain How wide-ranging will ke the new President's be- ons/? wf foreign countries and in international relati larse. interest in feeigmoatfatrs?x How muchyintelligence? he on order re ctce f . gece and evequent wervinag or modest portions only as absolutely miosoa? reerel Will he want~oaiy- tacts, or facts plus interpretation and analysis? _ HW--55355— Bockd:32401332 -Page-3 ~~
Separated or homogenized? Is he willing to read a regular intelligence document, or does he prefer to be briefed? In each of the previous administtatdone, OCI had establaahed a satisfactory channel directly to the President. However, the system i had never carried over fram one incumbent to the next. Eisenhower did not want the personal weekly briefing fran the Director that Truman had the General received; im/preferred to be briefed ‘in the setting of weekly meetings not of the National Security Council. Kennedy did/like to use the NSC ' with any regularity, Instead he found just what he wanted in the Checklist personal, daily intelligence sxmmemk devised for him five months after he entered office. 7 r' ‘The Checklist system worked so well with Kennedy that OCI’ and the Director naturally hoped to continue it with Lyndon Jonson, especially as it became apparent that Johnson, like his predecessor, was not going to have regular NSC meetings. Eventually OCI succeeded, tks was but Cniy after many months of frustration. It was only when coubedir AW —-35355-°- BPocid: 32401332 Page 4
he had a firm hold of his adminiatration and when certain foreign situations forced themselves upon his attention that President Johnson discovered the usefulness of a daily current intelligence document, President _ For a few days after the assassination of 25kx Kennedy, Wersmratiyx aEXGhodiertkk «=8R, J. Smith took the Checklist to ¥@ McCone at East Building at 8:30x a.m. The Director then held a staff meeting, after whi ch Rede personally , Smith/took the Checklist to Bromley : Smith and Gen. Clifton in the White The > briefing of President Johnson from the checklist ’ however y House. was done by McConey who saw the. President daily for about three weeks Krsrhsiebewpurpese cf abriecing after the assassination. Y ; / Fe: - Although OCI had provided moré detail and background information it than uaual in its first intelligence books for President on 24 Woven Sen Kir wheel he Johnson, McConefpassed the word through DDI Cline thane wouldulakento- gee more but shorter items, (a te ater rae ttm expected that topics appearing in the Checklist would be followed up in later issues; therefore, OCI should make even negative reports, 7 i ee HW 55355 DBocld:32401332 Page 5
Cline, presumably reflecting the Director's wishes, said that the fhecklist that day should cover military activity in South Vietnam, the fighting in Laos, Sum Soviet ICBM developments, and problems in the Berlin air corridors and <® Venezuela. Around the middle of December, hem -meM®6¥S“cl—the WHITE” when McCone stopped seeing the President daily, the White House staff tried to get “‘hiw to read the Checklist, imtywere largely unsuccessful, although McGeorge Bundy wa° able to do m some oral ‘briefing, Checklist in C's "hand, €n 16 December, Gen, Clifton told diteckitstef Johm Heidemann, timk "If we can't penetrate this ‘sort of wall today or tomorrow, we'll just have to try soncthing elses" In this clpudy atmosphere, the sun came out occasionally. On the 18th, Clifton said that the staff had finally managed / to get the President to read kh "the books"--probably two or three iosues. At Christmastime, the President went to his Texas xark ranch and shortly after Christmas had Chancellor Erhard as a visitor for several days. the PIOL was cabled to the ranch each days. _The report “AW 3393595 “Dovid: 327401332 Page 6
was limited to notes cbvering important developments and any information . : that might be useful in the talks with Erhard. The President returned to Washington on 5 January, and the next day Gen. Clifton, who had been at the ranch, xatit told Heddemann that he had been able to get the Checklist to the President with some regularity once Erhard had gone. On 8 Januaby, however, Clifton was having difficulties : not again--the President had/read the intelligence document since leaving Texas, hme Clifton thought there would be a°Eet-up in the press of business after Whert-wes—evicentixhappening-was—that—the-President-fomnt time f ores that day's State of the Union speech. He tpS-Ghepklist only when-therg-Waen!t~a press-of-other businasss"Uliften asked Philip Kennedy for a special report, briefly treating important | and still-current : | probtenxx ' problems that were covered in thet books the President hadn't dinette read, in that ; Clifton thought, it would be good to try @ the system of giving the President a summary of significant intelligence’ twice a week, HW 55355 DoclId: 32401332 Page 7