107W SECTION 107. Mou sscnary INFORMANTS AND oe SOURCES $ AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET —- NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" be Control ~of information foreign intelligence services obtain; ~of recruitment, by creating Bureau-controlled OAs; ~of foreign operations, by keeping foreign intelligence services ; occupied handling our OAs. Ce Collection of evidence for prosecution d. Deception (Disinformation) Passing inaccurate or accurate information designed to cause foreign intelligence services to draw conclusions or initiate action to their disadvantage and/or to U. S. advantage. ee Neutralization: to provide basis for persona non grata (PNG) action, exclusion, arrest or other disruptive action. f. Collection by OA of personality characteristics data on foreign officials for purpose of defection analysis. 3e Individuals to be considered as OAs . ae Foreign officials in a position to furnish information of intel- ligence value. An intelligence officer (IO) is, of course, the most valuable OA. An official who is not an IO, while of lesser value, is still a highly desirable OA because of the positive intelligence and information on the personalities and activities of ‘other officials that he can provide. be Agents of foreign intelligence services. When these individuals are identified, and the prospect and value of recruiting them outweighs any prosecutive potential, they should be seriously considered for development as OAs. | ce Contacts of foreign officialse When contacts of foreign officials are identified as being of interest to a foreign intelligence service, we should attempt to enlist their cooperation and direct them against that intelligence service. © d. Individuals who are particularly attractive to a foreign intel- ligence service. Our objective is to determine the specific interests of foreign intelligence services or individual IOs, and to then recruit asset(s) who would appear to that service or IO to satisfy their needs. Such assets must have potential for operation within a reasonably expected period of time. ee Former assets who currently offer potential for exploitation. 4. Restrictions FBIHQ authority is required prior to conducting detailed background investigation of any of the following individuals as an FCI asset, whether IA or OA. Of course, some investigation must initially be conducted, without disclosing our interest, to sufficiently identify the individual and generally assess his potential, so that FBIHQ can conduct a meaningful indices search and make an intelligent evaluation of the risks versus value involved. ae Individual under 21 years of age be Official or employee of the United Nations or other public inter- national organizations of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature ce Official or employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or ‘| government "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" © | 26 10-15-74 , cel By OCIA: 32985525 Page i77i
[eee ee ee ce ee a | er er RE | MW Sa072 SECTION 107. [INTERNAL ISECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES; d. Ce f« Be he ie je k. After FBIHQ authority to conduct detailed background investigation has been received, and investigation completed, FBIHQ authority is @ @ AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" Faculty member of an institution of learning Labor leader Federal, state, or local government official News media employee Prominent entertainment figure Prominent religious figure Member of the U. Se Military U. S. Government employee also required to conduct initial interview of the above individuals, whether IA or OA. 5. Development of U. S. Military or other Ue S. Government Personnel Whenever it becomes desirable to develop a member of the U. S. Military or an employee of another Government agency as an FCI asset, FBIHQ notifies the respective military service or agency of our interest. To facilitate this notification the office desiring to develop such an individual should submit to FBIHQ 5 copies of an LHM setting out: ae be Doeld: 32989525 Proposed asset's name, rank or position, and current place of assignment. Area of FBI interest in the asset, in general, and the foreign intelligence service, and official, if known, against which it is anticipated asset will be directed. Extent of anticipated coverage to be provided by the asset, ie., describe the services he will provide. The last paragraph of this LHM should read: "It is requested that no further dissemination of the foregoing be made without prior reference to FBI Headquarters. If you agree with our contemplated use of the above individual, please return a copy of this memorandum with your acknowledgement." Members of the military: estimated time period within which you wish to utilize the asset; desirability that the asset remain in his current area of assignment for a specified period of time. Upon receipt of clearance from the military, FBIHQ will select code name for future use in identifying the asset. This code name will be furnished to military intelligence component at headquarters level and to FBI field divisions. Every 6 months thereafter, as long as the FBI has continuing operational interest in the asset, an LHM captioned with code name should be transmitted to FBIHQ, by routing slip captioned with informant's symbol number. The LHM is to contain a statement that the asset continues to be of operational use to the FBI, and a statement detailing any difficulties encountered in control or direction of the asset or a statement that no such difficulties exist. NOTE: Generally, the U. S. Armed Forces may not be utilized to enforce the civilian criminal law; however, they may be utilized for foreign counterintelligence purposes. In foreign counterintel- ligence investigations in which there is a possibility of criminal prosecution, use of military personnel as assets might jeopardize successful prosecution, and all such cases must be discussed in detail with FBIHQ prior to utilization of such military assets. "SECRET ~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 27 10-15-74 Page L772
pom _ HW S5072 8 Doold: SECTION 107. [INTERNAL ]SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES 5 LAND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | a “ "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" Development The development of assets depends on the individual circumstances of each situation. No rigid procedural steps or contact schedules can be imposed which will uniformly apply to all cases; however, the development should proceed with the objective of obtaining valuable results as quickly as feasible, consistent with maintaining the asset's security, credibility, and confidence, and with developing the asset's potential to its fullest. Opening of asset files Open a 134 file for all individuals at the time they are first con- sidered for development as assets. This file should consist of two parts: a main file which will contain all identifying data, results of back- ground investigation, personal status data, and administrative data; and a subfile which will contain at least one copy of all information provided by asset. The asset is not to be identified, beyond his symbol number, in subfile. Maintain files of all active assets as pending. Utilize FD-238 as unserialized top document in main file. Assignment and tickler cards must not reflect name of asset; use symbol and/or file number. Maintenance of FCI asset files and indices Maintain ali FCI asset files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, or employee designated by SAC. Files of FCI assets will be included in calculation of delinquencies in monthly administrative report. FCI asset indices will be maintained according to the administrative instructions set out under section 107 J, part I, of this manual. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 28 10-15-74 32989525 Page i773
SECTION 107. rel ssomaey INFORMANTS AND co@Mpnnerat SOURCES; LO7W AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | @ “SECRET -— NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION 10. Symbol numbers Assign a symbol number to all individuals when first considered for development as asset. The symbol number is to consist of two-letter prefix identifying the office, a numerical sequence number (which will never be reassigned to another asset or informant), and suffix which describes the type of asset, eege, NY 1001-OA (or IA). The numerical sequence is to be the same as that used for all other informants, eeg., potential security informant, security informant, criminal informant, etc. The suffix may change if the nature of the information provided changes, e.g., from IA to OA. Submit identity of asset and symbol number assigned to FBIHQ via coded "Nitel''; this is the only communication ever in which both asset's true name and symbol number are to appear together. Assets must not be informed of their symbol numbers. 11. Captions In administrative communications dealing solely with asset, indicate in caption the character and the country concerning which the asset is reporting, eeg., NY 1001-OA, IS-R (Russia). 12. Background inquiries and interviews ae Informative asset Based on the type of information the IA can provide, the nature and extent of contact with him, and the IA's relationship with the target: (1) Conduct sufficient background investigation to satisfy the SAC as to the IAts stability, suitability, reliability, and potential. For example, a more detailed background investi- gation is required for a social or business contact than for a doorman or building superintendent. A minimal background investigation should include appropriate police and field offices! indices checks. (2) Request search of FBIHQ indices. | aE Se seed meet OS anes ees eens | ee Se ee | a Oe Se eee ee et et se (3) Check NCIC. (4) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as IA on FD=165. Also utilize FD-165 to place stop. (5) Outside of the restrictions set out in 4. above, interview IA prospect on SAC authority. be Operational asset When an individual appears to have OA potential conduct the fol- lowing background investigation commensurate with OA'ts security: (1) Obtain pertinent data on OA's personal history (date and piace of birth, nationality and citizenship, social security number or other identifying numbers, family status, names of immediate family, past and present residences, employments, etc.), and other data such as physical description, patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, reputation, and business connections. (2) Check appropriate police and field offices! indices. (3) Request search of FBIHQ indices. (4) Check NCIC. . r "SECRET ~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" | 29 | 10-15-74 } | MW 55072 Doold: 32989529 Page L7?4
107W SECTION 107. (rMes isscunery INFORMANTS AND co Moers SOURCES ; AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" (5) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as OA on FD-165; and also utilize FD~165 to place stop. (6) If applicable, check armed services records, both at Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, and at Defense Central Index of Investigations, Fte Holabird, Maryland. (7) Canvass logical sources, commensurate with OA's security. (8) Upon completion of above investigation submit results to FBIHQ via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel," and interview UACB. ce All leads to auxiliary offices must be sent and replied to, via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel,'" under caption utilizing asset's true name, followed by "IS-(country).™ Do not set out asset's symbol number. Do not send copies of such leads of IAs to FBIHQ. Leads must be covered within 45 days; office of origin notify auxiliary offices of this time limit when setting out leads. 13. Authority to operate assets IAs are approved and operated on SAC authority. Inform FBIHQ via coded "Nitel" when SAC approval given, and type of information IA can providee OAs are approved and operated on FBIHQ authority. After interview of OA submit results of interview via coded "Nitel" requesting FBIHQ approval to operate. Detail OA's potential and your contemplated use of OA. in exceptional cases, when the results of the interview and details of the OA's potential and contemplated use are voluminous, the practi- cality of "Nitel" and the relative security of the mails should be balanced against the sensitivity of the information and the security of the asset. Where the former factors prevail, submit summary by "Nitel" and full results and details by letter or airtel. 14. Contact with assets Contact should be maintained commensurate with maximum productivity, security, and development of asset's further potential. If an asset has not been contacted for a period of 45 days, a memorandum to the SAC must be directed to the asset's main file stating the reason(s) why no contact was made. 15. Confidentiality of relationship Emphasize to all assets that the effectiveness of the FBI's investi- gation, and in some instances his own personal security, depend on both sides maintaining the confidentiality of the relationship. If the asset feels he must disclose this relationship to another, eog., wife, parent, employer, etc., or circumstances develop in which asset requests FBI to disclose the relationship to another, e.g., to an employer threatening dismissal of asset because of his affiliation with certain individuals or groups, notify FBIHQ with recommendation to disclose relationship and continue under these conditions or to terminate relationship with or without disclosing relationship, and reasons for recommendation. Do not disclose to asset any information not essential to his operation. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 30 10-15=74 NW 35072 Doold: 3259595259 Page i775
© i ! iM 55072 16. 17. 18. SECTION 107. (nl oscars INFORMANTS AND cope eran SOURCES; 107W AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" Reliability of assets Reliability of all assets must be constantly checked. If any doubt exists concerning asset, give consideration to use of various inves- tigative techniques to insure asset is completely reliable and is furnishing accurate information. Assignment of pseudonyms In sensitive cases, where necessary; if asset will sign reports or receipts; or if asset is an OA receiving operational funds from a foreign intelligence service or payment from the U. S. which requires bookkeeping records, assign pseudonym for these purposes. Recording of information received from asset When recording information from any asset in a communication prepared for dissemination, characterize the asset either as one "with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability," or as one “who has furnished reliable information in the past.'! ae Oral information (i) Information pertaining to asset's personal status is recorded in 134 main file, e.g., marital difficulties, change of employment, change of residence. (2) Information pertaining to operational administrative matters is recorded in asset's 134 subfile. When this data, e.g, location of meet sites, times of meets, any data which tends to identify asset, is furnished to FBIHQ, it should not be included in communications prepared for dissemination, but in cover pagese When the asset is a member of the military, submit, in addition to the communication for dissemination described immediately above, a communication for dissemination containing all operational administrative details for the information of the asset's service. (3) Information of intelligence value should be submitted to FBIHQ via appropriate communication, and, if of interest to other U. S. agencies or friendly foreign services, should be sub- mitted to FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination. (4) Execute and maintain form FD~209 in asset's main file concern- ing contacts with asset. If contacts produced information of intelligence value, record only date of contacts; if negative, record as such. be Written information (1) Written information prepared by asset, or by FBI SA for Signature of asset, pertaining to operational activities (not a written report passed by asset to his principal) must be dated at the top of page one and signed at the bottom of each numbered page by the asset using his pseudonym. This material may be maintained as an attachment to a serialized memorandum in the asset's subfile (punched holes are allowed), or in a la section of the asset's 134 subfile. (2) Information received in this manner should be devoid of FBI identification, block or time stamps, serialization number or other administrative markings. (3) Only the original need be maintained; asset must not keep a copy. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 31 10-15-74 Boold: 32989529 Page L776
tor SECTION 107. (aD: Isecmrry INFORMANTS AND coo rarerar SOURCES 3 AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" (4) Any corrections, changes, erasures, additions, or deletions on original must be identified by asset using his pseudonym initials beside it. (5) Handling FBI SA must not make any changes on the original or permit his name to be recorded therein. (6) Written information pertaining to operational activities should not include administrative matters pertaining to asset's personal status. (7) Handle recording of written information and contact with asset in same manner as detailed under recording of oral information. 19. Channelization of information of intelligence value received from the’ asset Important factor in channelizing information of intelligence value received from the asset to substantive case files is the security of the asset. Limit information in communication sent to substantive file to only that necessary for that case; iee., do not send one comprehensive communication to several substantive files if to do so might compromise source or other individual. (Be aware that some of our documents are being made available in response to subpoenas, and the court is some- times not allowing excision of material not pertinent to case in question. Consequently, other individuals or operations can be. "blown!" by revealing one such comprehensive memo.) j ae Extract information of value received from asset and channelize to substantive case files either inter- or intra-office by separate communications under substantive case captions. be A copy of all channelizing communications must be maintained in an- asset's subfile. 20. Passage of documents, written report or oral information, to hostile foreign intelligence . Type of information to be passed depends on circumstances of particular 4 operation, interests of involved foreign intelligence service, the | i credible access of the OA and the time element involved. Great care should be given to the selection of information to be passed to insure the operation accrues to the overall benefit of the U. S. ae Authority for passage FBIHQ authority required for passage of all classified information and unclassified information prepared for limited use by concerned Federal and local governments, not intended for public consumption. { Above FBIHQ authority applies to passage of documents, written | reports, and oral information. SAC authority required for passage of material prepared by commer- cial concerns, Federal, and local governments for public distribution. Examples are: mewsSpaper and magazine articles, pamphlets and brochures, photographs, background information on companies and organizations. If there is any doubt that material selected to be passed is not in the best interest of the U. S., submit material to FBIHQ for clearance; e.g-, see Example (1) following. Creo rae fe | Le ee ee | [oes a ee ee | ee ee | ee ee ee ee eee | eee see] | rennet Deena Dem eee eee eee | | eet et eet eee eee | eet ee | ee ee | "NSECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 32 10-15-74 MW S5072 Doold: 32809529 Page i777
| e ‘- —,r [et ee eee] [ee ee ee ee) ee ee ee ee ee | wr Vv Le ee coer Lt ee ee eee ee eee ee | eoO.,re eres [ee ee ee eee | SECTION 107. INTERNAL ISECURTTY INFORMANTS AND . oe SOURCES; 107W AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET -— NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" be. Clearance requirements for information to be passed under FBIHQ authority Submit original and 9 copies of LHM to FBIHQ bearing appropriate classification via cover communication with appropriate caption. Leave LHM uncaptioned; FBIHQ will insert code name caption. The first paragraph of the LHM should read: "It is requested that clearance be granted for passage in this operation of the following items to a representative of (name of foreign intelligence service)." If the information to be passed is a document, set forth an adequate description of it in the LHM. Examples: (1) Article entitled "Moon Rockets," prepared by physicist John Doe, January, 1972, issue of " 3’? publication of American Rocket Society. (2) Air Force Training Manual captioned " 3" dated July, 1972, classified "Secret." In addition, also submit to FBIHQ, if possible, a true copy of document for review which will be returned after clearance by FBIHQ is obtained. If the information to be passed is a written report prepared by OA, set forth report verbatim in the LHM. If the information to be passed is oral, set forth oral information verbatim in the LHM. If more than one item of information in any form is to be passed, number each item in the LHM. The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the sentence: "The above data should not be further disseminated." Upon receipt of LHM, FBIHQ will submit to appropriate authorities and request clearancee Reply will be promptly furnished to field. ce Notification to FBIHQ of passage of document, written report, or oral information which required clearance After passage, submit original and 9 copies of uncaptioned LHM bearing appropriate classification via cover communication with appropriate caption. FBIHQ will insert code name caption. In LHM refer to LHM which requested clearance. LHM should merely state, "On (date) our source transmitted the information detailed in referenced memorandum to (name of foreign intelligence service)." If referenced memorandum detailed more than one item, do not list the items unless one or more was not passed. In such an instance list only those items that were passed. The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the following sentence, "The above data should not be further disseminated." "SECRET —- NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 33 10-15-74 j | MW 55072 Docld: 32989529 Page 1778
[107W SECTION 107. [INTERNAL ISECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES; [ AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET — NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" d. Administrative handling of documents, written reports, and oral information selected for passage (1) Documents and written reports Field offices should retain a copy of document or written report passed which would be identified by OA as a true copy of item passed by him. No other marks, identifying data, staple or punch holes should be placed on field office copy. When submitting document or written report to FBIHQ, identify it, in cover communication, as the actual item which will be passed or a copy. To insure that the actual document to be passed is not con- taminated by fingerprints of FBI personnel, maintain in plastic envelope when being handied in field office or when submitted to FBIHQ. Documents obtained by FBIHQ or other field offices from com- mercial concerns or other government agencies which will be passed will be handled in similar fashion. i If copy of document is maintained on permanent basis by preparing concern or agency and available at a later date, no need exists to submit copy to FBIHQ or to maintain in field office file. If copy not maintained on permanent basis, a copy should be retained in field office file. (2) Oral information Oral information passed must be recorded in a signed statement © Purpose for preserving documents and written reports is for evidence in event of prosecution, persona non grata action, expulsion, etc. 21. Oral information received from debriefing asset Oral information received upon debriefing an asset (i-e., not necessarily pertaining to information passed) must be recorded in a signed statement or FD=302. 22e Coverage of OA meets with foreign intelligence officer, co-opted worker, or agent. Coverage of these meets is required except when prohibited by security or other overriding factors. ae To cross=-check the OA. We must be as certain as possible that the OA is reporting details of his meets accurately. be To verify identification of principal or agent and to gather infor- mation about modus operandi. .Ce Consider use of photography and other technological surveillance techniques to provide data for improving future CI operations or improving chances for success of official actions, e.g., prosecution, persona non grata action. Be aware that these meets are often covered by the principal's intel- ligence service using photography, radio intercepts, and possible electronic surveillance. [ee a eR ee ee eee eee ee ee ee ie | ee | Ccerors r a ace eee cero 1 F eee’) Let ee eet eed eee | (ee ee ee ee ee "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 34 10-15~74 NW 35072 Doold: 3259595259 Page i779