202-10002-10124 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NOMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TETOE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF DAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS a8 Date 09/14/98 Page 1 JPR ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION: PORM AGENCY INFORMATION GCs 202-10002-10124 JCS CENTRAL FILES DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD CYRUS R. VANCE MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS CUBAN AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 06/26/65 27 FCCCA, ADMINISTRATION PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS ~ CUBA SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS POSSTBLE RETALTIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT PAPER, TER TUOAL DOCUMENT CONE IDENTIAL LA, LC RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 05/15/98 of 15. Memo from Vance to SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. ICCCA report on Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government. JCS Central File, Box 3, 4 JS RE-REVIEW DATE 31 mc 2038 HH. 50955. Docld:327425002 Page 1 OKM 12 PELE: AS DANTON w/eid Cometlluer [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED nnn tn tnt ntti nine in rencenittinninitatiss ni inca cl icici at isnt annssn mica i sna nasi nena tnmndnra as innnnna innit earring iii diacetate ans ersn n_nntlinne anos
_ - 1 December 1963 cin HIS. yo 08 Aah SO CecLAS Spy so pow # MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA Subjects Payehological Programs Subcommittee ~ Guba. L. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee 7 (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in j Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre- announced. Present from 6G Btate were Chairman i yivester, and Montenegro; rom CIA, Tilton and from USIA, Murphy; and the : undersigned. oCie 2. The following topics were discussed: Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Eatin inerice; described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of Left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and comminists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists Xo wrest the Leadership of the fledgling federation from hoe ‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were fo discussed: (1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to . = ascertain the degree to which local (not national) poo oe ee governmental elements will support disruptive and 2 . harassing actions before and during the meeting. (2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be prodane . $0 bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting. Le (3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin poe America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, pT Bast German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions. AE is .to continue black propaganda operations a at ave “in which ABEOSS | “postponement of the meeting. CCUG yweR — BN i ae DOUNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; | \ DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. | pOD DIR 200.10 a OSA, “e Coa stad wma sous nein mune pavaresanel tioned! ae ye co HH 50955 -Docld: 32425002 Page 2 i
i< September 21, 1963 > : MEMORANDUM FOR MR, JOHN H, CRIMMINS i Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Department of State , SUBJECT: | interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban * - - é . a » Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro | Government (U) 7 Bg Poe Reference: _ _ Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs eo ae . +. Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63.0 2 0 t * In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the : @tatus of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed | 0 @pon at our meeting of September 12, 1963, The numbering of the para- graphs below corresponda to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department _ of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist. . a ‘ "A. Actions Against U. S, Targets in Cuba "4. Harassment of Guantaname (a) Cutting off of the water supply" COMMENT: [A reinimn é approximately 20 days supply of water ig maintained in feserve storage at the naval base. Provisioniamade = (~2-<° for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require ' @Yeanimum of elghtcen days and which would be implemented on order ot CINCLANTEL,| Tn addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or lead c an be accomplished if directed, ‘(b}) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute" (-hot/hoee Saslal eo ard ool lees t, Ts 0.2.25 SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED BY JCS Olly___4-2-067/4989--cosroe con gigs mar toe oe # DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED “pod DIR 5200.10 ‘QCOESA 7 21/6384 HW 50955. Doctd:3274275002 Page 3
& ¢ 4 = : i HW SO955 | ized only by Specifically designated commanders, . 4 Bocld: 324275002 Page 4 purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the UY, 3. | lighter aircraft to peach the scens, Ouch overflights may be author =| “5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Garibbeant' . nments subject to U. - | There is also an az gement for the interchange of inforrmati 2 between | ; [the U, S, Coaat Guard and British naval forces with regard to possib’ | Staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bab a ‘“E, Actions Apainst Targets in the US “4. Sabotage ox terrorictic bombings" COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the poper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to cantrol. Theve are militazy contingency plans to protect ageinst this tyoe of activity at a much higher level of © intensity. a ‘2. Jamming of US radio stationg" COMMENT: There ave blanding operating procedures to overcome RGEC eh ora CU. interference and jamming methods employed against military communi « catloria, a ae The summaries of actions sdt forth above are éesentially defensive . Beactions to Cuban iniiatives, There are, of course, existing and related ~- mallitary plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up te and includa a full Scalc military invasion of Cuba, itwas. generally agreed at the veptember 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most Mkely actions of the Coban government are thege which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and imuncdiately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forcea in Latin hee *
REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY | ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT 1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided. "A. Actions Against U.S, Targets in Cuba "4, Harassment of Guantanamo "(a) Cutting off of the water supply" COMMENT |. minimum of approximatel 20 days supply of ater is maintained in reserve storage at th aval base. Provisio , m of e en days and whi pid “\be implemented on order of CINCRANTFE?. } Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hou r less if directed and consistent with national policy. "(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute! COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of/a fCtallored Naval Construction Battalion uni containing necessary skills, the requisite labor 6) |Ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel |with appropriate skills, Critical personnel — \would be transported by air, to arrive within: U8 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT. i noe "(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and “fo.action (roue the disturb- nee, ranging -from no.action [through such measures as the use of fire hoses and lachrymating agents may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, | Guantanamo, "Cd) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death" COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the AL DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; bas, NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. Enclosure UONW 50955. Docld: 32425002 Page 5 ,force, and the possible stationing of a repair | /
circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self » throu by a wounded yc sentry or those assisting him, \through increas (defense conditions, placing personnel in positions \protected from fire, and return of fire if appro- priate and required as determined by the Commander \Naval Base, Guantanamo, The precise nature of. {the U.S. response carinot be determined in advance. ' #osingle shot from an unseen sniper resulting in injury or death to a sentry is one thing,a continued Sniping fusillade from a number 6f persons is another. "Ce) Sabotaginge of base facilities” - COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. — Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action | taken would depend upon the nature of the Sabotage and be designed to assure the continued | functioning of the Base. "B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping "1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage" COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures ‘including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air (Space or territorial waters, Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action . to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. a! qaib or oie) a "C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles: "1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry. "2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory. coe Ahh 2 Enclosure HW 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page 6 ei eins a SN
. ve / AS aaatelle wes a "3, Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial’ waters "4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate" "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the Situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. Ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified ¢ oe ee ee being of foreign registry. \Commanders are not, | authorized to oreanize deliberately a pursuing ' “ force, however ships or alrcrart ordered to the U~ area of the attack may take immediate protective. measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. U.S. “pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S.. pilots are limited to making their HY) presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban ° plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft qu _is authorized only ih those instances where it NTN has been established that Cuban attack is being made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only for the purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene.\ Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders. — "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean COMMENT] With regard to Castro, attacks’on areas saath America, plans exist for the U.S. military to — Z la «respond to requests for assistance-by Latin, 6CWC) « American governments subject to US ment for the] the ‘approval. There is also an-arrangement for 3 Enclosure HW 50955. BDoctd: 32425002 Page 7 /
‘Interchange of information between the U.8. Coast Guard and British naval forces wit. regard to possible Staging areas which my be ed by exiles in the Bahamas, "Ee Actions Against Targets in the US "I. Sabotage or terroristic bombings" COMMENT The level of intensity of such at a much higher level of intensity. "2, Jamming of US tadio stations co Overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications, é. "Any additional pertinent in and "recommenda le raids" was also intensity which the committee agre Likely category, " had in mind by the most likely was that level which would not into taking extensive counterme endanger the Castro "level of intensity" sét forth above, which might be taken under ¢ military contingency plans ‘are essentially d reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retal range up to and include a full se Cuba. Enclosure HY A0055 Docld:327475002 Page 6 a - There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity MMENT There are standing Operating procedures to formation on existing tions, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern- he Castro government were of "the Level of it is inferred that what the committee provoke the United States asures which might seriously regime. The summaries of actions, latory in nature, which ale military invasion of
i e wn : oe 1 December 196 a a 3 cem 9 “un HS pecLss ON TR ee MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee ~ Caba Ll. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee — (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in i | Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. ‘The agenda for the meeting was not pre- announced. Present from , A State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; CW from CIA, Tilton anf | from USIA, Murphy; and the AQNtD) undersigned. ae 2. The following topics were discussed: a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964, Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of Left-wing Labor leaders, socialists, and comminists who | will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that. there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from ‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed: (1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ~ ascertain the degree to which local (not national) <- governmental elements will support disruptive and ‘harassing actions before and during the meeting. (2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought’ “to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting. a (3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin . America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist Labor conditions. (4) CIA.to continue black propaganda operations ae which suggest ‘postponement of the meeting. G G9) PN 2 . aes vena ramee, Tasinsnareanedeocneni DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR ae DECLASSIFIED AFTNR le YEARS. i HOD BIR 5200.10 & sore wearrene Werwentee eee MORE RUN : . ores we “ OQ ea ge a cio sents a i ean a el CaS seinen HW 50955 Docld: 324275002 _ Page 9
we we é a MEMORANDUM FOR MR, JOHN H, CRIMMINS Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Department of State SUBIEGT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban’. é we . . | Afiairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro . 2 Government (Uy) | 7 Reference: - Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs i. oo Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63 weedele a Ace a In respons @ to reference mermorandum, outlined below lg the - etataus of existing contingency plans for those priority situationa agreed ~ |, Wpon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the parae a graphs below corresponda to the format utilized in the attachment to “Ax oo ee .. ®eference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department Pe fe _, of Defense speciiic or related military contingency plans exist. 5 me SS Y MAL Actions s Against U. S, Targets in Cuba : a 2 et “@ Harassment of Guantanamo S SS ‘"{a) Cutting off of the water supply" SS ~ 8 SOMMENT: oe pelooNR In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel 3S Es) ours OF less can be accornplished if directed. & . | x 'tb} Closing access to the base by Cuban workers SS | who commute" S | | WE ORLY ae ee oa ALLY REVIEWED  - - BY JCS : 6T/9980--cssres Copy ghissint car CD noes DOWNGRADED AT: 12 yEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY BECLASS! (FED “pop pir 5200.10 HW 50955 Docld: 39425002 Page 10
COMMENT: Provision ia made for the introduction off i a | "ie} Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" COMMENT: © Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, # — | and ¢: location of the disturbance, sansing from no action V—_ “(d} Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or | death" COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, , “4e) Eaboteging of base facilities" j/ COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such / -gabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantaname., The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be . designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base. ~ . "S, Actions.Against U. S, Alrerafe and Shipping "lk, Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Pas gage" . COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ofdered to Fe | | | | Bocld: 324275002 Page il
esp aa sata a Ea “ é 2 a ~— s the area may take imm cllye monaure "G.. Actiong Against Cuban Exiles . | ee "1, Shooting down, of pirate planes, possibly of US reglatry. i at 42, Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high | -  $eaS OF another country's territory. ~ "3. Hot pursuit of or are on raiding boats on the mgs seas. of another country's tervitorial waters, "4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial watera." COMMENT: itis meted that itis contrary to national policy to permit . voids on Cubs originating frorn U. S. tersitezy, however, at the time aUhip or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack if may be diffie a cult to identify it as a peat” ‘raider, "mother ship" or “exile raider, | even though this, in fect, may be the case, All the situations, set forth above, ate covered, at le: ast in part, by the rules of engaserment which have been approved by the bichest naticazsl authority. However, the action guinmériged below le authorized only in the case of U.S, ships and air~ _ -_ Sait and those not clearly identified as being of foreign repist ry. it a: % yas HW 509455 Docld: 327425002 "Page i2
- oe ] "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in g : | abe COMMENT: (4 . | “E. Actions Against Targets in the US “i. Ssbotage ot tervoristic bombings't COMMENT: | The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paver ig net considered to exceed the capabilities of a lew enforcement agencies to control, There ave militazy contingency plans ta protect againet thie tyse of activity at a much higher level of intensity. rs stig “a. Jamming of US radio stationg" COMMENT: There are standing intesforence and jamming methods cations, operating procedures to overcome ecaployed against military comuuni« The siumummsries of actions et forth above are essentially defensive — reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, vetallatery in nature, which range up to and include a full ecale military invasion of Guba. . . it was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the moet likely actions of the Cuban government are thoae which would not provoke United States retaliation geriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forcea in Latin # 2 am : HW 509455 Docid: 324275002 Page 13
REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT i. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided. "A, Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba "4. Harassment of Guantanamo | "(a) Cutting off of the water supply" 7 | 4 cuation ~essential personnel in fe) r less if | directed and consistent with national policy. "(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute" COMMENT provision is made for the introduction ot CC) sensor sis "(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gatés" COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturp- ance, raped no fro) We "(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death" COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the ernkTh DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; LAL NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. Enclosure HY 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page 14
circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him,‘ at” “"Ce) Sabotagine of base facilities”: - COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base. "B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping "1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel , Florida Straits, Windward Passage" COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective MEASUT CS. m.. "C,. Actions Against Cuban Exiles: "1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry. "2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory _ a 2 Enclosure BY 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page 15
rei "He Actions Against Targets in the Us "1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings" COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions ecatemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exeeed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity e | | ' | | | | | "2. Jamming of US radio stations" COMMENT There are standing Operating procedures to Overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications. 2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing Or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern- ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retallatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the rost likely category." It is inferred that what the conmittse had in mind by the most likely “level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives, There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which none up to and include a full Scale military invasion of Cuba. 3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America \. Enclosure | BW 50955 Doclda:32425002 Page 17
than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declara- tions that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration for the "inevitable® Latin American revolution. Whereas an inflamed American public Opinion over the killing of even a ~ few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo. Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange. While such items as, “the harassment of air traffic into and out of Guantanamo," or ‘ithe harassment of US aircraft operating in the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list, it is considered that specific provocative actions are less likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support to subversive forces in Latin America, Such action not only is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support “national liberation movements of Oppressed peoples" but may be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus, they are considered as of that level of intensity which places them in the most likely category as well as being in the category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the United States. 5 Enclosure HY. 450955 Docld: 32425002 Page 16