104-10330-10060] . en SECRET a 15 October 1996 Memorafoum FOR: Assassination Records Review Board FROM: John F. Pereira Chief, Historical Review Group SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information (We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.) , 1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position on the review and declassification of foreign government information that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK Board of| \documents. The Agency believes it is important to address this issue at_ this time because this is the first instance that this type of document has been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a'United States Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination - and declassification of foreign gevernment information ibut wills also addaréss the specific issue of the six. 2. (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the information in these six documents, but is only concerned about protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency does not object te the release of the four CIA documents in the re sed by the Board. With regards to the the Agency has no authority to unilaterally agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign government prior to declassifying their information. However ,) for reasons_described heréin, it~is not possible to éven séek the) (consent_of at this time, nor@would it Be 1ikely~ that would give it. Rather than going_to, the. (eel nrarrree Ls atten jtgmene ner chan going.te, the *~ Ne eles cot ee ome TT > 2 = ° CL BY:\2224130 « CL REASON: 1.5(d) DECL ON: X5 DRV FM: LIA 3-82
13000000 tt SECRET SUBJECT: Foreian Government Information ee ee. ne APY ‘esident to agree to the unilateral. declassification of foreign’ government information, : CIA proposes that the release of the ant documents be either ~Rostponéd” for a short time or that‘ . Smee te ate EA me ER ~- ution be Mmadegr Ne Rites ot ne seemtiomd 3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including (1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information and/or the source of the information, are to be held in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign government, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in confidence. Id., at §1.1(d) 4. (U) Foreign government information is subject to a classification determination under E.O. 12958, section 1. 5(c). When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O. requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id., at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the . originating government. Id., at 4. 2(g). 5. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the anes. ence community to protect all classified information from unau rized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information. Intelligence obtained from another government or from a combined effort with another government, may not be released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6 attachment -3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at c.5. 6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and government components is classified SECRET unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such infa@amastion may be declassified only with the mutual consent of the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1. 2 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1. 7... (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of suchcéordination with foreign governments prior to the release of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or for that matter any (USG) agericy fail to coordinate where required, not only would it ‘be a violation of the aforementioned E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government “information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives. 8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein, CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to the public FBI information located in CIA files without coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or information in its files. cman mage meen™ Om ane aaa nal itoenee aee ea || “As two of the documents. _ ’ 9. (S) Coordination. * at issue here are letters , | N CIA is legally obligate y ESO. an 3 : "“Bareement withl to seek the consent of the . rior to their release, even in redacted form. The ’ssué GF coordinating with the| is a timely cone. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to i ij ‘the foreign government and seeking their consent for declas- ani sification. However, several events that have occurred in the po last few months depict just how seriously lconsiders any | ; | findication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their . | 4 ‘classified information. Based on the incidents described “below, it is CIA's position that even asking the po _ consent to release would threaten the current relationship. \ : iy ‘ £ e Within the last year, a demarche was made oa os bt government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas-— Voa ; — sification legislation expressly spell out that no information 14 provided to the USG by be declassified . ; a wath®ut its permission. A copy of this deémarche is provided ro for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting N | |_Ebat this demarcate ne ee —4 my eee mete FN ee me cn canned ES mk cat nearer Toe wk ns en ere ed 3 SECRET ne tT A TT
13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information co i en Re TL yo oe - rather between (ee pe -- it was literally delivered by «= ; to the National Security Council and _| = EEE |. &khe manner in which the io treated the demarche demonstrates that the ox ; £ classified information is receiving top priority Saeed XK } in. the[_ government and is not just a concern of ‘ aA their intelligence community. F — = on 7 _' On two recent but sepdrate occasions a passed to CIA information indicating that there would be assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA oy requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but | refused. They argued that the information was oa j e- £6 not specific “efiough and would endanger a source. The | stated that if they believed_theé information was . useful, they would pass it themselves. | were | . Jy concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on this information, : ,) og and queStioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to ~ DPE, “ji ~ share their information with third parties. Finally, they af 7 ok stated that the easiest way to protect their information was + — _ simply not to..pass it to CIA anymore. 7 |: 4 Just this month, a senior official of | a 2) “approached the.CIA with accusations that a former Agency s —_ [7 employee allegedly_may have disclosed their classified f i ‘\ information. believe that this disclosur@="—— 3» | 4 may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources soe | -._, in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI a on promised | | to launch an fo — ° = a ee pe recently expressed grave concérn to CIA : . about a book published by~an American USG official which one] ( | 2 alludes to a relationship between the CIA and/| | - } i, LL] Even though-this book was not an official CIA ST o \ -acknowledgment| ; ’ this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect : : that relationship. fe 0. (S$ nder the circumstances, it would be an affront to to be asked for their consent in light of the | above events which have all occurred in the last year. The> : would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would 34 yCeE ny their consent. Should deny their } consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of othe n®ormat ion and would be obligated to do all. it_ ‘could to ; prevent disclosure. It is crucéal not only~to CIA's mission but ; Fa Fr a RR et ge ot ena £ - mee pee i ie’ ce a \ - ne es — poo ere ais ~ Vo) mL 4 SECRET
13-00000 € ys “negative reaction from | in its deliberations and” Py summary..o£ documents for immediate release. This = Le would hide the ract that the letter came from the | but would reveal what the subject of the , 4 etter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the im to seek their consent, which we would have.to do even a in the case.of, redactions. “hal eee BOTs oe goa ens genie am FeN we | | SECRET SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information bp _ [ee gore EOE Tn TT ran pine a cen oF pore need nT 7 noe one a % also’ to the conduct _ of US foreign relations that the USG is seen u “as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as “well as well as its ; fee § 7 own laws on 1 the release of information, —— rs = —=S i  . ae (8) Finally, the importance of maintaining good | . relations with] | cannot be overemphasized. As ‘a | “fesult of our valuable relationship with our counterparts, the USG.. receives .a large volume o nishe I. intelligence. Due to our shrinking resources; “much of this C information would not be available to U.S.. policy makers were it not provided Additionally, we work together ~ aroun é- world on joint collection activities that cover the full spectrum of USG.-intéTligence priorities. Finally, there are several’ critical collection es | ra! “, collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely _ " entirely on the continued good will of | Ito provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S. \ policymakers ' needs. “(S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the 7 following two proposais for the Board's consideration. First,-—~ the Board could postpone these two documents from release for aS short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can q | ° yeassess its relationship with | It is possible that the relationship with CIA and ;could change so that -/ 4 it would be possibte to seek their consent for release in full. -—~'| t fh However, .-should we seek-the consent of at a | @ Ph Fh ° a ae h +1 fete “(tT o | ced ¢¢t oO a OE @ + “co A Q) gf i] ty @ iB "8 is ° ct on 8) < @ -_ a @ @ i) ct KH . Os @ ct Oo | et Ld tf future date and| | object *to the release of the documents, we would ask~that the Board seriously consider any af abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to - coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of oneal ee A or NE se TTth aoe, Ff ee Ses oo | 13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually | agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any | approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its | obligations and commitments to foreign governments would | seriously undermine the vigorous.and healthy diplomatic as well |as intelligence relationships that we current ly enjoy. | ene oh a a er aaa CoS" (Sy with redard“to the remaining four documents | iis are CIA documents and with the redactions proposed by the, oe o 2 - _ oe eo Te . PO gS tt 8a, ew op ememenen mare GN a en ee wen wo Se PON eet om 5 | SECRET
13-00000 ; eo SECRET SUBJECT: ee Government Information fgovernment . ‘As such, CIA consents to the release of these - \ decuments. with the redactions proposed bye the Board. ; i 15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to: any weer foreign government information that may exist in the ;% { files, CIA proposes that it approach to ‘request their consent in the release of their information when it would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with | frake it impossible for CIA to approach them at this \ \ . Terme; iS may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it would not be possible to request the consent of the service, cra] \ ot proposes. that the documents. either: be- postponed | from release “or ‘ that CIA “and Board ' s staff coordinate a summary. ZA, 2 Ye rete So ‘Sohn F. Pereira f Attachment 4 rt, 6 SECRET