{ HW 49061 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM NARA : 176-10036-10282 National Security Files: William H. Brubeck : John F. Kennedy document Control Record : 9/1/1963 By 23 9/10/2000 National Security Files, Box 383: Congo 8/63-11/63. Box 4. Docld: 3276276335 Page 1
ag ¥ cS a i ee THE CONGO: © _ A STUDY IN POLITICAL DYNAMICS (Political Dynamics Study No. 3) . by M. CRAWFORD YOUNG © & Harvard University . 2 > and . 2 EDWARD J. STREATOR, JR. oN ry | | Office of Research and Analysis Ze ny ; for Africa os & Bureau of Intelligence and Research MS HW-49061 DBocld:3262763338 Page 2?
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM DEPARTMENT OF STATE Tue DrmectTor or INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH _ MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY After three turbulent years, the Congo is entering a new period of political construction, The eventual departure of UN military forces will terminate on-the-spot responsibility for the maintenance of order. Au- thority over the entire Congo is now exercised by a government of un- questionable legality. But serious problems remain in the organization of the emerging polity. | To investigate the socio-political hurdles facing the Congo, an INR team, comprising M. Crawford Young, a consultant from Harvard Uni- _versity, and Edward J, Streator, Jr. of INR, visited 14 of the Congo's 21 provincial capitals in June-July 1963. Commenting on this initiative, Ambassador Gullion wrote recently that '"',, .the idea of a Departmental officer working in tandem with anacademic area specialist seems to me a good one. This kind of thing has been done by the French very ef- fectively, I judge from the work of the Streator- Young team that it can be equally useful to us," This Policy Research Study is the product of this collaboration be- tween a Departmental officer and amember ofthe academic community. An abstract of the study accompanies this memorandum, thin L- Thomas L,. | Hu s . SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM | HW 49061 ‘Docld:326276338 Page 3
HW 49061 Bbocld: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM ABSTRACT THE CONGO: A STUDY IN POLITICAL. DYNAMICS 1, A -modern and virulent form of tribalism will continue to dominate Congolese politics. Tribalism lies squarely athwart every dimen- sion of political behavior. But ethnicity in the Congo is: not a phenomenon of the primeval forest, In the cities, tribal origin provided a focus for social organization, The elites ofthe cities extended this renewed sense of ethnic identity to their tribal homelands, where it served to rally support for emerging political movements, Ethnicity and politics fed upon each other and have been mutually reinforcing’ in the first years of independence} Ethnic arguments played the paramount role i in provin- cial fragmentation. In 1960 only four ‘political movements of any significance were:not pri- marily ethnic. Since independence allipolitical | parties have been subject to serious ethnic tensions, 2. The new constitution now under discussion wilh perpetuate unwieldy institutions that ham- per effective government. A parliamentary commission is considering a draft constitution. prepared by UN’.experts, together - with pro- posals submitted by Katanga and a conference of presidents of provincial assemblies, The UN draft preserves the essential features of the Loi Fondamentale, the Congo's present con- stitution which ranks with the most unsuitable organic. laws in existence, Most other African states which followed. classical forms of parliamentary government at have abandoned them in favor of presi- dentialism and single parties, which appear to permit more energetic development policies. The Congo, however, will probably adopt by mid-1964 the UN draft perpetuating a parlia- mentary framework. The draft makes some concessions to provincial demands for greater auconomy, but. does not by any means realistic- ally reflect the present and likely distribution of power between the center and the provinces, It preserves the principle of strong central government but establishes’ an institutional framework which will obstruct exercise of central power. The result will doubtless be to arouse sharp hostility among local leaders toward a central government which will have serious difficulty in supplying needed 1 national leadership, 3. The new provinces are likely to persist as the basis of-internal organization. The creation of 21 new provinces has transformed the character of the Congolese polity. Although independence | i ethnic factors are important, only seven of the new provinces are ethnically homogeneous; and four have one predominant group. In 15 of the 21 provinces there is a single dominant political party, and in many the party has a -strong ethnic identity. Traditional tribal struc-. tures are significant in 11 provinces. Secessionism, a spectre haunting many Afri-. can presidential palaces, is endemic in several regions of the Congo. Although Katanga has been returned to the fold, latent secessionism persists there and in other areas on the coun- try's periphery. : The phenomenon of fragmentation is more recent than the impulse to secessionism, al- though it derives from common roots. The emergence after independence ofthree de facto new provinces and the general breakdown of authority reinforced the movement to. create new provinces. The paternity of the new provinces usually lay with elites in the urban centers whose aspirations for leadership in their’ areas of origin were. frustrated within the framework of the six provinces inherited from the colonial period. They accordingly in- voked ethnic-regionalist arguments to rally popular support for the formation of new provinces. After Parliament established cri- teria for new provinces in April 1962, a rash . of new entities were approved. 4. The new provincial institutions are func- tioning with varying success. Four canbe con- sidered to function very well, Five have reason- ably operative governments. Three function very poorly, and seven are unstable. :The festering problem of territories disputed be- tween.two or more provinces remains to be solved, and several of the provinces show signs of further fragmentation. The budgetary cost of creating the new provinces has been high. About 150 newminis- ters and their parasitic entourages are lined up at the pay window each month. And yet, there are reasons to welcome the new provinces, Before emergence of the newunits, five of the six former provinces had ceased functioning. The new entities are more repre- sentative of local opinion. They frequently have governments of experienced technicians, re- gional pride to defend, more limited area, and imperfect, yet better, ethnic cohesion. Very real benefits in acquisition of political and administrative skills are accruing in the provinces, In many areas the institutions fun- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM - Page 4
HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM > tion quite well with virtually no European technical assistance. ; 5. The Congolese bureaucracy will continue to be handicapped by the lack of experienced and technically qualified personnel; but in the rovinces it provides a strong backbone of local administrative continuity. In the colonial period, the bureaucracy, untrammeled in the exercise of power, penetrated and organized Congolese society. Though the present Con- golese elite was shaped in the subaltern ranks of the administration, it was excluded from all top echelons of the civil service until 19.59, In the.context of terror in July 1960, all but a handful of European functionaries departed. Thus, Africa's most radical decolonization was compounded by the revolutionary. Africani- - gation,.of, the civil service. The result was administrative chaos..The Lumumba govern- ment never really functioned. _However, the Congolese clerks promoted to fill the shoes of departed Belgians gradually came to terms with their new responsibilities as adminis- trators both in the central government and in the provinces, . The Congolese civil, service today is. much better than generally believed--not that its performance is outstanding in any absolute sense, but it probably is not sharply below the norm elsewhere in Africa. The civil servants as a group are far superior to the ‘members.-.of political parties and repre- ‘sentative: assemblies, though this is faint praise. Many have. reasonable norms of recti- tude and discipline. The performance of the territorial administrators, the middle echelon. of the. provincial hierarchy, is superior tothat at the provincial and central government levels. Nearly everywhere the territorial adminis- trators are career. civil servants who have been the. backbone. of the Congo's internal ad- ministration since, independence. In sharpcon- trast to the breakdown of government.at the upper. levels’ during the dark days of 1960-61, the basic administrative units below the terri- torial administrative level,--the circons- criptions. indigénes, also have largely remained intact. Their stability has been a .significant buffer against widespread chaos inthe country- side, An explanation of the lack of revolutionary social credo accompanying the revolutionary power transfer may lie in the bureaucratic origins of most of: the Congolese elite. The administrator is not by nature a radical. Although the judicial system at:the cir- conscription indégene and. territorial levels. functions fairly well, the superior courts were stripped of. trained legal personnel by the Bel- gian exodus. The UN provided some judges, but’ far fewer than needed to assure minimal effectiveness. Some relief will be provided as Congolese law students complete their studies. A better formula is needed. for absorbing li emergent university graduates into the system, Rapidly increasing in number, they are dis- affected by their inability to obtain civil serv- ice positions commensurate with their com- petence, 6. The absence of national political parties and the new polarization of power between. Leopoldville and the provinces will pose seri- | ous problems in elections under consideration for 1964. Political power. in the Congo today is. divided between Leopoldville and the provinces, Parliament and the central govern- ment, like Spanish moss, have.their. roots in the air, not in the hinterland. Power at the center derives from: access. to influence, position, and money. The weakening of links between Leopoldville and the provinces since 1960 means that, until elections are held; the exercise of power at the center remains un- related to the provinces. Leopoldville's alienation has left the -provin- cial leaders relatively free to consolidate local authority, creating separate power structures colle ctively capable of challenging Le opoldville leaders in an election. The new distribution of power has serious implications for the moderates around Prime Minister Adoula who seek to establish a na- tional party. They must deal with provincial leaders who stand astride the lines ofpolitical communication with the electorate, Although the central government may apply certain pressures on the provinces to obtain support for a party under Adoula, the provinces’ re- tain.most of the trump cards, Under these cir- cumstances, an emerging national party would at the summit be, in effect, a loose coalition of Leopoldville and provincial leaders. It is likely that a moderate national ‘party of this sort would emerge with a narrow ma- jority of seats in Parliament. However, an electoral campaign would run the risk ofcrea- ting a serious security problem in many areas at a time when tranquility is returning to much of the country. Further, a moderate party of national scope might labor under the onus of ‘identification with the American Embassy. Conceivably, a radical opposition movement, might be built around an anti-American theme, offering opportunities for Soviet involvement. These risks would be much diminished if elections were to be postponed until 1965, thus allowing time for provincial and central government institutions to shake down further, and for the hard political bargaining ‘neces- sary to launch a moderate national party. If the tide of opinion continues to favor elections in 1964, even-a mediocre moderate national party would at least enhance the electoral’ prospects of moderate candidates. '.7.. The Congolese National Army (ANC) has developed into a reasonably effective arm of central.government authority in many areas of the. country. Though the ANC committed bloody SECRET/NO FOREIGN. DISSEM Docld: 3276276338 Page 5