157-10014-10100 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: WH2015 rem ht nnn errr e \ AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Agency Information SSCIA 157-10014-10 100 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE 07-M-06 ma . . v9.1 ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE : DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Document Information SSCIA SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR. NOTES ON GORDON GRAY 07/04/1975 72 ASSASSINATIONS CIA TRUJILLO LUMUMBA, PATRICE GRAY, GORDON REPORT Declassified 1B; 1c Redact 05/05/2000 CCBOX 450 HY 50955 DBoctd: 327423486 Page 1
Date : 08/06/95 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10100 - RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-06 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR. TO : TITLE : NOTES ON GORDON GRAY DATE : 07/04/75 PAGES : 72 SUBJECTS : GRAY, GORDON ASSASSINATIONS TRUJILLO LUMUMBA, PATRICE 1 CIA DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT ’ CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA :; COMMENTS : CCBOX 450 aman ents isseUs60. cass. esss) eo Sh Ge CEES GESED ICNP SIEND nM GEM ED CHD ESD ED SENEH ‘UD Hh sotth chs sens ane seer eset GAG EHUD NG SG GH GEGE GEE GISTE AS GED END EOS SE GENES GED GED EE HEL MED END GED ED GD ETD GENES EO mth sNey SANED URN HONEY NED KEN eERD Hele GEEH GITEE SER Sem WEY SER Gee GE SEE GND GND SnD GED Gu cm OE ([R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 DBoctd: 327423406 Page 2?
Tokum fuk Files From: Frederick @ 1 ce Re:. Notes on. GORDON GRAY Date: 7/4/75 © 4 ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY | Page Subject pr en a 7162 aiographicel background ~ REEBX cone @@eGx ..___. ot - 2268 Opinions on PFIAB generally 2272 © Never heard of Executive Action _ 2273" - "T know of no plan,plot, operational organization that 2273 tn 1960, Eisenhower “approved a four point | program, xako: and the xh training of Cuban refugees" 2274 There was one we "well known individual” on PFIAB who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you 2275, "I know of no (assassination) plan or operational level. of government’ capabtitity that has ever been authorized at any high (2276 B2umettem At a meeting with Gray and a representative ofthe CiA—in—1956,"" the -President—_told me-that—he—wante the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all. activities of this —--__ governanent—_which—_impinged—upoen_the_sovereignty—or—the—— people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was kinds of operations." very-sensitive _to-thenecessity of having the top—people in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon — the widdom,—and_in_some cases, feasibility of those ———— 2278-9 Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint ‘Congress: _a@l goversight committee because of danger of leake 2281 Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence office: (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for In 2292 RS BRUSERLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's _ report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Bom. Rep. .wan high powered rifles with telescopic. scopesx and subseque! a received authorization to provide them by_ the Assist. Se: of State through the DCI. — 22930 Gray did not Fecall’ Special Croup aeetLage at “ender Ete. hower Admin. 111291605 1/12/61) at which it 1 was agreed — --"T would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, Wad with béifus of asetetance to the dissidents, and ‘not assasssination, or that kind of activity." HW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 4
Tokzx Buk Fi From: Freder Re: Notes on Date: 7/4/75 Page - 2262 an REKBX Saeax - 2268 2272 2273. 2273 2274 les ick Bart ,. GORDON GRAY ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY Subject Siographical.-background ce , . . oa a ‘Opinions on PFIAB generally Never heard of Executive Action: "I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that ever came po tresident Eisenhower with respect so any __ assassinations," #H#H (2272-3) In 1960, Eisenhower “approved a four point program, sakms sabotage, stepped up economic Sanctions, Propaganda, _- and the xke training of Cuban refugees" There was one we "well known individual" on PFIAB who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North , Vietnam", fhan€ikmanthemxmg Gray says that "Agency policy was against assassination on the ground that it didn't™ >> > 2275 2276 2278-9 2281 2292 2293 ~e 4 HW 50955. Docld: 32423488 accomplish anything", "I know of no (assassination) plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government" . ee a ; Lo. a - £ Rmugeinem At a meeting with Gray and a representative of the CIA-in 1958, “the-President told me that he-wanted -~ the 54/12 gropp to’ pass upon all activities of this - Bovernment which impinged upon the Sovereignty or. the... people of some other nation....President Elsenhower was" the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations." Gray is unenthusiastic about Proposal for Joint Congression al goversight committee because of danger of leake Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer" - (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.) E FRUSELLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's 7 report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. .wanted* high powered rifles with telescopic Scopesx and subsequentlL' Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen- hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it Was agreed to furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep.. . --"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, and not assasssination, or that kind of activity.” | Page a.
Tokex Ruk Files ‘From: Frederick Bau a . Re: Notes on GORDON GRAY Date: 7/4/75. ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY Page Subject. 2262. 8lographical background RERRX @8egx a 2268 Opinions on PFIAB generally 2272 Never heard of Executive Action : 2273 "I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that i ever came to President Eisenhower with respect fo any | assassinations," ¥KH (2272-3) 2273 In 1960, Eisenhower “approved a four point program, sma Sabotage, Stepped up economic sanctions, Propaganda, _ and the ke training of Cuban refugees" 2274 There was one we "well known individual" on PFIAB ~ who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you = " considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North | \ Vietnam", fhen@iamantieyxmg Gray says that "Agency policy _ Was against assassination on the ground that it didn't” accomplish anything", 2275 "I know of -no (assassination) plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government"! . 2276 Emzeinem At a meeting with Gray and a representative - of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wanted..™ the 54/12 Sropp to pass upon all activities of this i government which impinged upon the Sovereignty or the. . people of some other nation....President Eisenhower wags. very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people in government from the appropriate agencies Pass upon the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations." 2278-9 Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression al Roversight committee because of danger of leake “2281 Gray recommends creation of a “chief intelligence officer" - (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.) 2292 & FRUSELLO: “Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's ; report. in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. .wanted*: high powered rifles with telescopic Scopesx and subsequentl™- received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secy ™™ of State through the DCI, 2293 Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen- hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was apreed to furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. , ~-"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of - concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, wae and not assasssination, or that kind of activity.” _. | - : 7 ; BW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 6 — ne
r a pe, fh a i : ta These documents were pulled from a Special Group file by John Bayly. They should be replaced after we xerox those minutes we intend to | use as exhibits for the Gray testimony. a 1h Peme ph be Up) Page 7 ‘Docldaf3?493488 HW 50955
d a "1902-1947 GORDON GRAY Chronology and Issues Biographical Background 1949-1950 1950-1951 1951 1952-1955 1955 1958 | 1958-1961 1961-1975 U.S. Army (Private to Captain) , ' Department of Army (ultimately Secretary of the Army) Special Assistant to President TRUMAN Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological Strategy Board, which involved close contact with intelligence community ' President, University of North Carolina Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) Director, Office of Defense Mobilization SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT ( EISENHOWER) FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC) Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelli- gence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK 7] Chronology of Events 1959 November Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba - Propaganda Project" for use of radio trans- mitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project would meet with high level approval" provided it was acceptable to the President of Mexico. fare ner ck a Me BARE ea ae " July 8, 1975 SECRET ot 2 bess Tssues and Questions GRAY represents President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings. Page Ff Docld*? 324293488 ‘HW 50955
1960 (Cont'd) February le February 17 March 9 March 1h April 7. A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day: The only record of this meeting in the NSC minutes states: "On instructions from the Executive Secretary no memorandum Was written." (NSC Minutes) Special Group approves evaluation of agents for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed this matter with his associate" (Eisenhower) and reported two tactical objections. (SG Minutes) GRAY tells Special Group that any covert. action like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken only after overall consideration of “whether and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO." - (SG Minutes) At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that: a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral BURKE suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a_ package deal, since many of the leaders around CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO." (NSC Minutes) At a Special Group meeting, after a paper titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" was read, there was "a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban. scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO. and CHE GUEVARA should disappear simultaneously." (SG Minutes) "GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO -ean be kept out of the Dominican Republic.” Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military, inter- vention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes) Issues and Questions Why were no minutes written? Does context show that phrase "his _ associate" refers to President EISENHOWER? Did such consideration involve assassination plotting? Was this "package deal" the simultaneous triple assassination plot. that was mentioned on November 3, 1960? Does this simultaneous disappearance plan refer to assassination planning? - Is there a connection between this _ Special Group discussion and the NSC discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan to remove Cuban leaders? . Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents out of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the Dominican Republic? Page 9 Docldr32423456 - HW 50955
1960 (cont'd) April 14 April 14. June 30 July 1 duly 5. Issues and Questions At an NSC meeting presided over by Vice President NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious. . {he] thought further attempts will be made to kill , Were these U.S. attempts to kill TRUJILLO? or oust TRUJILLO." Under Secretary of State , DILLON said "if TRUJILLO could be removed from DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.5. power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO . had an active interest in removing TRUJILL( elements were prevented from. seizing power in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that ' . What did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"? . getting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable development for us." (NSC Minutes) Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that | ‘Poes this show that assassination was not ' one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO a favored alternative because it would was an assassination that would make CASTRO produce martyrdom? a martyr. (NSC Minutes) GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about General atmosphere of vehement opposition all that it can afford to take from the to CASTRO. CASTRO government." (SG Minutes) . Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemis- ; Was the Special Group aware of this action phere Division to the Acting DCI recommending ; Was the President aware of the plan? delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic Purpose of weapons? scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The ‘memo said: “approval for delivery of these arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM." President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of State HERTER and others to discuss the Dominican Republic. "The President thought we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to starting a revolution." (Conference Memorandum) . Fr Page 10 Docld! 33423498 HY 450955
1960 (cont'd) suly T July 21 Allen DULLES reported to the NSC that the Venezuelan government wants, the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with. TRUJILLO. DULLES stated: The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, — condemn and cause the downfall of TRUJILLO. . [Because] they have convincing evidence that TRUJILLO was responsible for the assassination attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuela] ~ . . BETANCOURT believes another attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it [his government ] wants a showdown without delay." (NSC Minutes) "Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and. the intelligence community agrees, that the problem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the ‘problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, even though CASTRO is the greater threat." (NSC Minutes) The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT was told that the U.S. cannot act without ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor. The U.S. will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of . Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to TRUJILLO. President EISENHOWER suggested that a government in exile should be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes) GRAY said “his associates" would favor the “development of sabotage operations in CUBA. (SG Minutes) Issues and Questions -The U.S. was under pressure to move against TRUJILLO. Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT make him "fair game" for assassination in the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S. Did the U.S. determine a successor? Did the U.S. "act"? "Associate" is the euphemism for Eisen- hower. Does sabotage imply the further steps of assassination? Bocld 32423468 Page 11 BW 50955
i coe ee ad ’ 1960 (cont'a) ‘July 28 August 12 August 16 August 25 August (approx) _ ‘President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting: “Until TRUJILLO is eliminated, we cannot get our Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO." In this regard, "the President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation, we would be the loser." (NSC Minutes) BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget for Cuban operations which was to be laid before “higher authorities" for decision. (SG Minutes) ‘Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison for use against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21). After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined ‘would be sufficient to accomplish this ... . It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA.” (SG Minutes; emphasis added) - At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS ‘suggested that the U. S. might “throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful means." (NSC Minutes) BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation Issues and Questions ‘Does “elimination” mean "assassination"? Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or DCI DULLES aware of this? Is this circumlocutious order for assassination from the President? An indication that at the least, assassina- tion was within the range of acceptable means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"? Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES aware of this? Was it authorized by Doclaf32423488 Page 12. HW 50955
1960 (cont'd ‘September 8 September 21 ‘October 2h a November 3 During brief discussion of CONGO developments, “GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling. in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added) Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that “LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained a reat danger as long as he was not disposed of." (NSC Minutes) At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reported that "five Congolese soldiers had attempted ' to assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th of October, The U.S. had prior information of this attempt and had warned MOBUTO ... (NSC Minutes) At a Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT “asked whether any real planning has been done ‘in taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL and CHE GUEVARA. He said that without these three the Cuban government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously." The minutes further state: "General CABELL pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in_conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cuban. He felt that, _ particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion is beyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes) Issues and Questions Against LUMUMBA personally? Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of" LUMUMBA by assassination? . Did. this information prompt the U.S. to plot the assassination of LUMUMBA . in retaliation or to protect MOBUTO? Was MERCHANT referring to an assassina- tion of Cuban leaders? m a] Shortly before this, CIA had made the s assassination contract with the Mafia. o Was General CABELL unaware of this CIA S contract? Was General CABELL expressing “% a traditional CIA objection to assassina- 4 tion proposals? If so, on what other a occasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIA objection? HW 50955
1960 (cont'd) December 29 1961. January 12 Late Jan.~ Early Feb, At a Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the TRUJILLO - regime, but "he also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves - bring about the desired result in the near. future, lacking some decisive stroke against. TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes) (Source: Minutes, December 29, 1960, by T. Parrott, of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960, 02752) Special Group approves the State Department proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." 5G Minutes; emphasis added) DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project . GRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by the White House” to establish such a capability, including the capability to assassina- ate political leaders, Issues and Questions neSles ang uestions TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30, 1961. Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group propose to approve aiding Dominicans who might assassinate TRUJILLO to effect such a "decisive stroke"? Were these assassination-type weapons? If not, was this Special Group action ~ used as implicit authority for sub- ‘sequent provision of weapons for the. ' assassination of TRUJILLO? Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis tration? Docld? 32473458 .Page 14 HY 450955
HW 50955 GORDON GRAY: Short Summary ' Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects wwere discussed: "any particular kind of activity which might contribute '. to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; 2 and detailed planning for "how the U. S. wishes to move against CASTRO" Gray' s testimony should involve the following questions (see attached list of exhibits): _ CASTRO 1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meet- ing when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab E) 2. Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke: at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14 Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should cisappear simultaneously"? (Exhibit: at Tab F) — 3. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960, the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab 0) 4. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960 | Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R) 5. At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether plan~ ning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that Merchant's suggestion “is beyond our capabilities") square with the fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V) TRUJILLO l. Was Vice President Nixon “yeferring to assassination.at the April 14, 1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H) , Docld: 32423488 Page 15 ead
~ 2- Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960, by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo Opponents? (Exhibit at Tab YZ) When President Eisenhower was reported at the July 28, 1960, NSC meet- ing to have said that "until Trujillo is eliminated . . .", was he referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M) On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available "small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. Were these assassination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights | ‘referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12 meeting) Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of - Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)_ LUMUMBA When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to ‘assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P) When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960, that “he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba? (Exhibit at Tab S) oS , COMMAND and CONTROL What was the command and control system for covert action operations in the Eisenhower Administration? c Pertinent Relationships President Eisenhower Gray was the President's liaison to the ; intelligence community and the National Security Council (including the Special Group). . DCI Allen Dulles. Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group. DDP Richard Bissell - _., Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate Castro and the Executive Action capability. FB/RKK (7/8/75 HW 450955 Docld: 324234@g.. Page 167
TO: Frita Schwarz and Curt Smothers SECRET FROM: Frederick Baron - ’ DATE: July 6, 1975 GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARY Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal Security Affairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed: ‘any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA;'' provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in: the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO" Gray's testimony should involve the following questions: - Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO? - To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders . authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER, Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole? - What were the general command & control practices? Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents: Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960. - Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960. -. Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division: to the Acting DCI. . - Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961. PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS President Eisenhower oO | Gray was the President's liaison to the intelligence community and the National _ Security Council (including the Special Group). DCI Allen Dulles | Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group. DDP Richard Bissell its Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the . ; CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTRO and the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability. | President Truman Gray was Secretary of the Ammy and Special Assistant to the President Livingston Merchant _ Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs representing the State Department at Special Group meetings. HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page i7
EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY Castro* Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960. Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960. Lumumba - Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960. Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960. Trujillo — Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI. Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960. Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961. HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 18
‘3 November 1960 | eS MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale : 1, Cuba Co a ood Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter. | From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, yo supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant; expounded the idea that © | perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities | of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. | Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt | on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so weil. The —- latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job. OSS Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to. Nelean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to-mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt) sae i me gy ee eel reo nv Tard ESS NVC? Ts “HE WHITE HOUSE te Fi! | SRLLED TL ba Pidons bo. gd . ame TAT Tee ™~, t HW 50955 Docld:32473488 Page 19° a 7
. intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the General conclusion of which was that Such action on our Part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war, Mr. Gray said that he had had order to be able to arrive ata top-level decision on this very point, ‘7 He thought it essential that the Policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any Overt Cuban act would. be met with a previously-agreed-on response. _ Mr. Merchant Stated thar,. apart from any attack on Guantanamo, | he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting _ was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that itis not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in Overtly and "clean up the mess."' He Pointed out that if Castro's Support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S, would be met by a hostile Population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria, 7 oo . _-Turning to the immediate Problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general Proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the ‘reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the POSSibility of ULN, investigation in Guatemala and the increased Scope of the Program, which has been brought about by the increased Strength of the Castro regime, All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be Kept at all secure. Mr, . Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the Proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our Operations entirely on foreign soil o+ associates at the same time Tibet is discussed, Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a Survey has -been made of the POSSibilities of keeping operations in the U.S, unrevealed, i. fom f be cig | d be or ey vei TRE WHITE Hous. g HW 50955 Docld: 32473488 Page. 20.
Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable. Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. “He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be Fa a necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed _- HW 50955 Docla: 3242734686 out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. Ee felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is hevond anr canahiliteas. QLONTT - ma fan PROPERIY (4 Cn Lae lo be oo Page 21 a THE WHITE HOUSE Ui Fut
oA | +4, Supply Drops - Cuba Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because ‘of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed . ———— that the Group had no objections. The members so signified. /5. U-2, Cuba Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results ona priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage. Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not-be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction. ot: “6, Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles a a Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; - that is, the FBl needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA. The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at firsthand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements for this. J 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape Canaveral 7 Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum 4 ds! ue om 4 oe ¥ R a A ep earey . _—em a Lee. .d4 HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 22 —
a eked Rie tee nas ted Vw b en this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on 20 October 1960. , a “en | | THOMAS A. PARROTT 2 _ . ‘ Oe. ni ao opae fog ~ 5 | Be AD oe Are reas 4 : : oe ee i - | : tsb Wintiih dye [a HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 23
: SET TYE OA Eyed Gal 12 August 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - II] August 1960 PRESENT:. Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell , , we, i . “ : tiie loatad lea ee Vode : ‘ “2. Budget for Cuban Oncrations: Mr. Bissell summarized the. budget which bad been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year, The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter rnillion dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an estimated value of 1,6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency - inventory. Since 2,5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds. have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr, Dulles — stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since © there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs . will: turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major sub-headings as follows: Political Action poe NT$ 960, 000,00 Propaganda. 2,152,120,00 Paramilitary 8,055,753,00 Intelligence Collection | 833,200.00 Counter Intelligence 325, 400,00 Communications Support 229,420.00 Support 731,718.00 $ 13,287,611,00 Total THIS Nos ares PROPEL ES | mma G5 As ia THE WHITE HOUSi UF Five | Byes ald . IN Ch Rg Te _. Nahi , QAO - . . - . . ~~ HW 50955 Docld:32493488 Page 24
gee ij é It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that the amount did not seem unr easonable for activities of this scope and scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at, Following further discussion, it was_ , "agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher . authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions” involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward, <<a Webs te Ded? RICHARD M, BISSELL, JR. Deputy Director. : (Plans) AW 50955 Docld: 32423468 ‘Page 245
: . . & TPOMORABDUL POR: Aeting Director of Central Intolligance | Visas Deputy Direstor Alona)» SUBUEST  . Glundestine Dolivery of tras to Oppoaitton Leadership . 4n tho Dominican Republic. é 4. ‘This nenzorerds: raco-monta action by the acting Dircetor of Central Intelligence, uch rocounonda tion is contained in pora §, 2. allo smtansador Yarlend was in tag Doainicon Republic, a par ite Qipal lester of the onsceition requested thet a listed mrmebtar of ares ha made available waich could be used to peeatpatate txs overthrow of tho rezing of Coneral iwrcel Leonidss Trujillo. These arms presumably would ‘ba. used aguinat kay renbera of the trujillo resins. Within rocent tonths, the Torys rocine hee becons inerensinaly wistable due to prowing opposition within tho professional and riddle . Glasnoa to the excesses of tho dictatorahio. #alitical oprrersion of those groups has brow:ht about severely straiued relations betsweon the Catholic Church and the Trujillo reqize. iiost knowloceoable sources have been prediating that tha fell of the recine iu dmincnt. — Sineo the fall of the Trujillo reriza unosra Inevitable, ia to the _ intercat of tua U.S. that our relationa with te opposition be aa close Qu porainlc, rrovidiug the arma as requostad would contribate ‘olgnifi- . eently toward this end. 3. It 48 proposed to precime and deliver to undorgroursl opposition forcer in tha boninican Republic twelve (12) sterilo Veoe rifles, iedel | 1903 (Soringficld), with teleaconde sichte, together with five hundred — (500) rounds of cxumumition for sase. “fms ond axumition are immediately avallatle at aonoty anvroxinate cost i6 22706, It isa planned to coliver those voapana by air throuch by) fecilities provided orrancacents can be worxed out with the opposition for thoir recestion. Uf they cannat _ be delivered by air, plisna ore curreatly boing stuniied dn the UA star’ for delivery by c¢4.° - . 4. Approval for dolivery of thess orrs has boon piven by Anusistent i/ Socrotary of State doy Rubottom, who reguerts that the arms be placed ia the hands of tho opposition et the cerlicst posaible noreate i ef Wf, gt Swans ° THE va HOUSE © or FI: ‘i ChET HW 50955 Docld: 32423433 Page"26 =
Lo SC rs Z Page Bue 5. It 4s recemomicd that the opposition in tho Dosinican: Pepablia le provided the arna as requeatede t ° , Chief ~ | Veetern Lemiechere Divistow cat DoCr CQicwuze ‘Deputy PLrostor ‘Date The recommendation contained 4n _ Gans) a oo paragraph § 4a approveds , Sieh ; Direstor of Gentral intielliyence Date 2 JUL jasn DDP/WH — -sklb (1 July 60) Distributions ; Qrig & 1 = Addressee 1 — DDCI 1 — DDP 1 ~ COPS 1 = CAD rit apa Ta mirc THE YATE 3 MUSE OFF Fics aan ‘y ., ) : ‘ HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page" 27 =
_ 29 December 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell y . 3, Air Drops - Cuba ‘Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in . a the next three days. | é t oo : _— 5. Dominican Republic . ; Se Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a para- military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of _ requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself. The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it oe — should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that a “Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic. should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent. However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be. “6. Cuba Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points: - (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with , other countries, some time before January 20th. THE WHITE Hous. HW 450955 Docld: 32423488 | Page. 26
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 12 January 1961 SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, PRESENT: Messrs. Mercha Ww 4s, Delegation from 12 January 1961 the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front Mr, Dulles reported the information r Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned a eceived from General | group reportedly. will visit Washington on Saturday. ” u\ ¥5, Contingenc Planning for Cuba. - . Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives to draw up contingency plans covering the possib overt U.S. forces. All members agreed th Mr. Gray asked that 4 preliminary report of th of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff . at such planning is for the meeting of January 19th. é pat PRs ¥ / 7. Capture of Supplies in Cuba_ _ In answer toaq : government's capture © 50955 Docld: 32423468 Page 29 oo anacmt PET ON uestion, Mr. Barnes £4 { materiel from two ai le eventual use of an ess ential step. e task force be available a ve details of the Cuban rdrops pilus one cache.
7 f 9, Dominican Republic Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made . available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott oe . Baid that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that — _ the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project. V41, U-2 Flights - Vietnam a, oo Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the three successfuj IJ-2 Sights.over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not been.covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission to cover that area as soon as the weather permits. The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after January 20th. They also requested a brief memo Summarizing resuits, for the meeting of the. 19th. ) | | | i aranry pyre ely _ toe. .  OYARET ETC LY * : ae L si | ed ket a Vso 3 | — PRUPERFY 05 HW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 30 —
3 November 1960 6-5 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale ¥ lL. Cuba -_ Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the Srate Department group which. has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter. . From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, ' ' supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that , perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CLA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The non latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion: would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the Same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by tne middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur 4 point in time beyond which covert ‘ intervention would not do the job. fife lea Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up! the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the ClA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt | . Tirg CONTI 6s , . . A sc Te ee PROPERTY f° eenerT TR AM I 03 Mi terean | ’ anne on PEL, , at sda ete dh de eee nd CHE WHITE HOUSE G2 210! Coie TW bese Le Paton 19. 28S me MAP Nota av ~, WW 50955 Docld: 32423488. Page 41... oe en
Se er ee oe rr ra) ‘intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo _ this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had “the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive ata top-level decision on this very point. -~ He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response. Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant © that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and ''clean up the mess.''! He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.’ , ‘Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept atall secure. Mr. . - Merchant said at one point, that although this does not representa final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; thatis, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention. Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his © associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this.is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed. In this: connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization ~ either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations. . pad lo fe t be J nt “nagt sy nt th ee we Nae ab he oat Docld: 324235408 Page 39. ° no ce eee
itd fat dw ite Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific . ‘Jocations that would be suitable. . . Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been a, done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. | “He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be | , S leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be ~ oa ' necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed A out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous’ - in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous © action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion ie hevand aur canahilities. ’ “4 fe fr fe Fagin d bee a Lave THE WHITE HOvoL ber ut Rest na Mas te gs HW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 33° Tia Rese a 21S ROR Mame tere an: Gat ceed varety
A) HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 34° °° ° |* +4. Supply Drops - Cuba_ Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. ‘He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed _that the Group had no objections. The members so signified. | /5, W-2, Cuba Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results ona priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage. Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with . him since he ''would certainly not-be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week," The other members appeared to have the same reaction. V6, Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA — representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if | necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, ‘that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA. . The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at firsthand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements for this. ‘ , / 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape Canaveral Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum PROPERT So tT {i a esi} peso era yet os wm et N gos -i we — Bel es .
on this subject, which had been discussec with the rest of the Group SC on 20 October 1960. for -THOMAS A. PARROTT OO &. os ay ; oa heh Bien we wise - Ry bw 3 Uae . a HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 35.
ty THE WHITE HOUSE ERAGE HWY 50955 DBacld: 32473458 Page 36 . NESS “ YE MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, SECRET bail 12 August 1960. SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs, Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell ~ en eee eso ; t i re | not A ‘ 4 rere any.) a Boe dw a a “2. Budget for Cuban Onerations: Mr, Bissejl summarized the budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year, The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an- estimated value of 1,6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quar stated that a release of ten million w ters million dollars. Mr, Dulles ould be requested at this time since there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs -will turn out to be, sub-headings as follows: Political Action Propaganda Paramilitary Intelligence Collection Counter Intelligence Communications Support Support ae nye ye ke Mr, Bissell stated the amounts required by major 960, 000,00 2,152,120,00 8,055, 753.00 833,200.00 325, 400,00 229, 420,00 731,718,00 $ 13,287,611,00 Total Cg an & IS —— = ; ; PAPI ts rane [ 0.
. It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that HW 450955 the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and acale but it was understood that Messrs, Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at, Following further discussion, it was agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward, oS RICHARD M, BISSELL, JR. , Deputy Director - a | (Plans) — PE ey DocTd: 32423456 Page 37 , “f.
25 August 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles “1. Congo Mr. Parrott outlined broadly. three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them ''2 1/2'') operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the oe the planned attempt of o arrange a vote of —_—— no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alieged , ieader of certain | | He emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process \ of assessing .the bona fides and capabilities: of the individual. vos The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had oe expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very —_—-- straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether . i. the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself ina position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out ''consideration" of any particular _ kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba, Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. : In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been ome NOT DEST hme. ® made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope ~ the . ge . assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not panes ta Oy [oat eeet an frhig ate ee ~ aD PROPERTY Ca A SOROS NLS WCE THE WHITE rib | ba oh Siays tons . Crenet yee PTY PAPER £9. X20 _ La! . aS pray ai HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 38. nt
eyh ost yg og a i on . ; of ee | har S cae lad Let dui # outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, ut that he is obviously -well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful. Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate. ‘ aad SUERTE ~ a my en RF hee de ae - 50955 -Decld:32493488 Page 39°
\ V4, Cuba ‘ The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which aac had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group). ”. He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by Novernber. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways ‘of initiating — the tactical combat phase. * Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that - he would like Gray to look into. — (kg 8! One of these had. to.do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received 'no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups. ) . . The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not PROPERTY OF HW 509545 Docld:32423488 Page 40
WEURLE “Liid wav know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken _with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.) _ In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first ’ point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was ata loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable.length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V ‘for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself,. without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country. © , On the secord point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had- issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as — to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans! point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future ' and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as . appropriate. , , Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the. political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical ; pRopenty 8 HW 50955 ~DocTd:32423488° Page 41.0 °°
WW 50955 of the present one. .Docld: 32423488. Se aL | to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views. Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barres and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise - of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up. Le we THOMAS A. PARROTT | & PATE aN! te, ane Y Prure finthe. & Page 42
| SURREY LRYRN ENLY 0° , nie 7 EYL Gaul | While agreeing that the Government could not take an official stand, Mr. Merchant.expressed his personal opinion that ifthe companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any - economic crisis that might be: precipitated in this Wwaye. Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the 7 sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of __ this kind’should be made only after an over-all consideration of : whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro. i Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it — wa's possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any. concerted across-~- the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in ' It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be held on Monday, March 14th, to consider what might and should be done in Cuba. It was agreed that in addition to the regular members, . Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps . Colonel Lansdale shouldattend, = oe 3 There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to Mr. Merchant. It developed that the attachment to‘this letter has now been given the status ofa JCS document but that it hassnot been forwarded |. — to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS paper would not be considered apart from State's comments. Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on whether a black radio could be established on U. S. territory, probably in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed through the Scott office. \ eRoPEnty re TMA THE WHITE HOLS* HY 30955 Bocld:324235488 Page 43
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 7 April 1960 SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 7 April 1960 PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell 3e Dominican Republic 4 Mr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add on the situation in the Dominican Republic to what had been covered by himself and the Secretary of State that morning at the NSC meeting. General Cabell rephed that he would only like to add the comment that it appears evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for an orderly succession to himself, but that he will . either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, & la Batista. . Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo, specifically how Castro can be kept out of the Dominican Republic. General Cabell commented that so far no worthwhile opposition to the Benefactor has been identified, and that in his opinion it might well become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, openly identified as such, to the country in the immediate aftermath ‘of the demise or flight of Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his preliminary thoughts were that there would probably be a good chance to get OAS support for a move of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other hand, we might expect some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. forces because of the “memory of the Marine occupation. "Mr. Merchant added that Mr.. of a plan to seal off the land approac Rubottom was thinking seriously hes to the Dominican Republic ‘via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable Castro. effort to be an amphibious one.. He said that this plan has not yet been formally an ° 4, Cub goo Mr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational arrangements for interagency groups - development of the Cuban situation. considering the continuing In this connection he expressed some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or conflicting lines with respect to radio. General Cabell assured him that the top people in USIA are aware be no crossing of wires. : HW50955 Docld:324293488 Page aa s and th hould of C1A plans an exe, should. | THE WHITE HOUSE Girlie a Fe
\ athskos 28 April 1960. . , MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Se SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 2& April 1960 “Le “PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, Dulles Mr. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an obseryer. yo 8 Sua Mr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the organizational entities within the U.S. Government which have been = established to ‘deal with the Cuban ‘situation. He noted that a number of different groups and committees, with varying interests and objectives, are concerning themselves with this situation and that there seemed to him to be no ''chief of staff!! to whorn all could look as a central point, He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that Mr. Dillon should assume this function, but that in Dillon's absence, oe Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and should inform himself __. of the general outiines. of what has been going on in the Government. | Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential to have such an official available over the coming weekend, because of the expected May Day troubles, and that since this official: should be of such a stature as to permit access to the hignest levels, Mr. Hare had been ‘decided upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability. ; a In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought up to date at an appropriate time on the status of covert operations with respect to Cuba. os cmc oo Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at statements and actions by UAR officials with regard to Cuba.. Mr. Hare explained at some length his conviction that Deputy Foreign ; Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali Sabri) is largely responsible for geese this kind of thing, and that it does not represent the feelings of - Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's background and described | him as a "twisted personality. " PROPERTY % 4 / _ ; THE WHITE be . BW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 45
secon ey ar ere FOND BT _ 1 nn ee 4 uC - * : : Cg cet dt aiee ee oe : - : \ . | ie 19 November 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen, Lansdale; Gray; Dulles and Bissell $2, Cuba Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than ‘that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U. S., but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly if an increase in numbers is contemplated: Therefore, the only solution, would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries; this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists _with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a govern-- ment in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some training in the U.S. . , mien 4 oe at rT vo oy penny HW 50955 -Docld:32423488 Page 46
1 ne 4 post Ga. +! he | QSun gl Ls ta ceuks be, dom Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embar- rassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of Guatemala, and conceded that OAS Support would be required to carry out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would . be acceptable, particularly in the U.N. - Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investi- gation, but that this is nota satisfactory answer to the problem,: ‘He 7 said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same way as Guatemala. po Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate future and some over a period of longer range. They include: a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly — designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles, This story could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long or how. effectively. - b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This ‘ could be handled more securely, but the existence of an area where peculiar things are going on could not be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be private: property such as the King Ranch, but this would take longer to arrange than a military base, ¢. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already trying to get the U.S. Marines out. PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF Ftc: HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 47_
d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift. . e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost - certainly know where they were. Mr. Douglas said thata military base could be made available, such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has _ been contemplated to date. Gen, Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel were of the same opinion. Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was different than itis now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be.. Mr. Dulles | pee acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if Pana the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt oo that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps within the militia itself. Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a . decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general connection, Mr, Bissell said that even if itis finally decided that overt U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued in any case. oe ‘ Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph, PROPERTY © THE WHITE HOUSE | HY 50955 DBDocld: 32423488 Page 46
hago a “ rae nae a en 4 a a) he 5 3 \ fo te a ot 7 - Goats w vie # The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined. - _ V3, Advice ‘to Assistant Attorney General Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested advice ta Mr. Yeagley in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that | Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer, but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. ‘In answer to a question, Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that-he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who. . had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley, urha annaared satisfied with the aral onidance. }. petmummanesere / 5, U-2 for Cuba . Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.) (° ae ee any i | «) PROPERTY oF Ce ad a wD hieehe THE WHITE HOUSE oFe:c: H¥ 50955 Docld:32423488° Page 49°
HY 23 November 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE SUBJECT: Minutes of Special.Group Mecting, 23, November 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and Bissell “2, Cuba Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the ' meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees, He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that it is believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation plus two roundtrips by C-124s, These we would request the Department of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small - commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else. The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinkin He urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once. Gen, Lansdale agreed, Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras be informed. ‘Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S. _ Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that we have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much ‘support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt will take -piace.sm the reported time schedule, or indeed at all, but emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others, so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition, he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines. Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt. Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage ; Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic ‘Billy Graham) to carry out activities in Cuba. i ’ 50955 Docld:32423488 | Page 40 gare a ereneronmrne o
Kren c_ ler (omema) whos o + 4 on - al Poe is] ( ) yf yooe 2 : ' 30 November 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960 . PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray; [ . Dulles and Bissell ae Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving ata ; consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a ‘result - —_ of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were agreed: a. Mr. Gray's associates stand ready to deny U.S. activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to” make it possible to deny plausibly). b. If the program is enlarged, additional facilities may be obtained, but at this stage notin the U.S. No training of Cubans: will be conducted in the U.S. under present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala. ) c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness, (Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's noes 13 ‘HW 50955 Doclda:32423488 Page 51
notice before any OAS committee actually visited Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to | avoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissell said that if we do have a week, evacuation could be carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is required DOD assistance might be necessary. Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary refugees should be kept in mind.) Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked at ; the next Presidential press conference-and that we should be prepared —. “with a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discourage . revolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to have a draft prepared along these lines. In this connection, Mr. Parrott reported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for guidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator of General Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have no operational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice's pursuing the case, Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed with poser investigation, but that it is by no. means certain the case will ever come to trial.) co ; eenete ~ Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends' desires with respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort. He said that the principal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal point for diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet with Mr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should be available to deal with the FRD and to talk to other Latin American governments, . After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of the Group was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handle the overt and the other the covert aspects. They would work together on a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in mind, but responsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to rest with CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official, preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Department of State. There should be a sort of "board of directors! to oversee all aspects of the operation, This should be the Special Group plus Secretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered. (Mr. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two-' man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether mm HW 50955 Docld:32423488. Page ‘52 °
Loe HW 50955 there were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own organizational integrity.) There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and availability of a‘number of individuals. It was finally decided that, taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice. On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recog-~ nized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's ‘associates. Mr. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and must be done »y the Agency. As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government status. Mr. Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mr. Pawley's talking to President Prondizi.. . Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his friends about a representative of the FRD who had apparently just ‘returned from a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said he would obtain a written report « of the trip, for passage to Mr. Gray's associates. Mr. Bissell reminded Mr. Douglas of the outstanding request ‘to the DOD for thirty- eight NCOs and officers for service outside the U.S. Laden THOMAS A, PARROT T ea vs t THE WHITE HOUSS Us. 1U: eee ee ae ‘Docld:32423488 Page 53
bad toe Ma A eee MEMORANDUM FOR THER 17 Febriary 1960 ECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting. - PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, Dulles LU. Eebruary 1960 - Mr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer. \ /\, Cuba The project providing for covert spotting and assessment of potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills was discussed at some length. Within the limits outline a would be initiated uncer the terms of any meeting, but rather that approval would co and evaluation of assets - the Group expressed Mr. Dulles reiterated that he w to proceed with operations. Mr. . Douglas were enthusiastic about the project, It should be presented to the Se discuss it further. cretary of State an d-thatis, that no action approval reached at tnis ver only the identification general approval. as not asking for approval actually Irwin stated that he and Secretary was agreed that it d that Mr. Gray would _ (Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter with his associate. The latter had made two po ints: a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action, mG feéling that if it were § the Castro regime whic uccessful in denying money to h coulda otherwise be used for subversive activities, the Cuban government could obtain offsetting funds from other sources b. He would not ag ree to identifying assets for this particular sabotage operation. He would agree that the - o spot and assess potential agents Agency could proceedt for a variety of possibl PROPERTY OF ; _ THE WHITE HOUSE orries HW 50955 DBocld: 324234396 e tasks. He said that.once this : “ Ley we Td oom im ee ant : a ve. .
Ghidtad 7 bin wiih | wag done and a comprehensive program of suggested action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval it should probably then be discussed with him. It was stipulated that in any case no action should take place until his return from the trip on which he is about to embark. ce Mr. Scott’also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point as outlined in b. above.) 2, Dominican Republic There was a brief discus sion of the situation in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most interested in determining whether or nota sort of Third Force can be identified. . . PROPERTY a3 THE WHITE HOUSE Gr Pa Te ranry fre OM HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 55 _ a See: poe eT
4 i > a Fy E 28 December 1960 ‘MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD , / oo a SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960 - PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles Mp, Special Meeting on Cuba . ; Mr. Gray said that itis desired to setup a special meeting on Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January. His associates wanted particularly to make certain that everyone concerned ''clearly sees the sequence of events. '' He also said that Mr. Pawley had hada recent conference in the White House. Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Dougias determine. whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said that © Mr. Willauer-wowla also be on hand, Finally, he asked that the Army colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who. had given such an enlightening description of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for the meeting. It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, but the ' DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting. aay PROPERTY dF THE WHITE HOUSE OF Fick oe oo IN CS HISTORICAL _ 7 PAPER KO. 220 ereney PE [- f DO NOT DestnUt— HW 50955 ' Docld: 32423488 Page 56°
(SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE CONCLUDING REMARKS You will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need ; for a viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within its charter. I believe that the present furor about C.I.A. is impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our country will be served. I believe that we will continue to need effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be undertaken in the interests of our National security. Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, while at the same time péople seem not to be equally concerned about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially through its very many KGB agents here. I would hope that a Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate this most serious matter. a HW 50955 Docld?32423488 Page 457
-.* PERSONS/ENTITIES: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLAS DILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTER DATES: CATEGORIES: July 5, 1960 { TRUJILLO OCCURRENCE: On July /5, 1960 President Eisenhower met with Secretary of State Herter ,\Secretary of (che—Fweeseuwy Dillon. Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and General Persons. The memorandum of the conference stated: "With regard to the Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with troops on their request if need should arise. In so far as the question is one of internal: intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The -Prestdent-thoughlwe.-should=knock™out~of~ any~“documents-on..file..any reference to. Starting,.a..revolution." SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAPF: (Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) ~ Ab,tewe. DATE: Kelley ——=July 6, 1975 FILE: PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY, March 14, 1960 CASTRO © DOUGLAS DILLON , | MONGOOSE . OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dillon said: . "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba...there is no. apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover." - "Mr. Dulles reported that a plan:to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admtrai--Burke~suggested- that- any-plan-for-the-removal- of Cuban’ leadersy should-be~package-dexe, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro." STAFF: ° Kelley SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting, March 10, 1960 ~ Aloilene FILE: DATE July 6, 1975 Ss Sse nS IES ESD ERS SUD) SRS TESS ASS) BSE SSE SED GSES) SESH GEER, SESE SG SSDS SES GED EES GEER SSSR GEE STS) SLE GIES ES EES SEEN ED SED SS GE GT Shes SEE GE ES GEESH SED SEN AE GE SEED GED ED GE ES GO GD ENS GU GN GUY ale GREP RY GE SD GED GE a GED GE OE A ORD OND PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: - CATEGORIES: | VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS April 14, 1960! DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY TRUJILLO ecurity Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice President Nixon presiding, ' ': ‘Mr. Dulles reported..Trujillo's position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious... (he)- thought-further. attempts: will be made to-kilL.or.oust-Trujille." So “Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect.. .46—Fru}++le-could- be- removed Lron-power—in-the~ Domititcar- Republic while pro=Castro-elements—were-prevented from- $eizing-power—inthat-country,—our anti-Castro-campatgn throughout—Latin- America would recetve..a-sreat-—boost, The Vice President-agreed-that- getting Tid-ofTruiillo ‘wWoutd-be-a-favorabte development for ts." SOURCE:- “Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, Apri 14, ||. 1960) — Ab e . i Kelley PILE: slew oc ;DATE July 6, 1975 STAFF: HW 50955 . Docld: 32423486 Page 54
a PERSONS/ENTITIbS: © VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS "DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY DATES: CATEGORIES: April 14, 1960 TRUJILLO OCCURRENCE: reported that aj _ . a oo 7 _ from Cuba and predicted three outcomes with respect to Castro: ( / thet-weutt=make~Castre-e—mertyn, (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure © ’ -of the Cuban experiment and (3) a trend to a socialist dictatorship and a Batista terror regime. - fy _ ; 3 ; lay mo fi fle be, fo att f Cas} Ara. wef s jae voted’ Ae Otis vat 7 Ae, ory ay. fa MN 683 | fh AQ af poo . ; if <= ! V7 ; A Moyet fob, 2 A XN PIC vee ‘ SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14 STAFF: Kelley pATE uly 6, 1975 FILE! ~ Ay lewe aan nnn ne .PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESI- | July 7, 1960 } TRUJILLO DENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN | CASTRO DULLES | ' MONGOOSE OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1960 Mr. Dulles Stated: ''The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo. An important reason for the vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact the have convincing evidence that Trujillo was responsible for the assassinat(On ——_ attempt on Betancourt /President of Venezuela7#** "Betancourt believes attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without ° delay.'' Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with Trujillo and that Betancourt wants a meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem. SOURCE: STAP Presidential Papers of Pwight [isenhower _ (Whitin File) (NSO neat Lig ROK TOR, THOT NSC meet dag, het bay . ly 7, (on DAY Ih O,- 1025 Wh bewe rn NS et Sw A Ga) Pep HA OI soe ow hee mer um com pap Ft ne Oe SD HS EE OE Os HEE IO Py tm On He GO PD at ee ets eh ty mers ob ok oe et oy fle ee ke ee | PERSONS/ENTIVIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN DULLES | July 7, 1960 | TRUJILLO CASTRO MONGOOSE On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting “Mr...Duddeg eves; “‘the~ intel] genee-communi ty-agrees;—that-the~prebten- -of_Trujillo_must._be—sett e¢-before-the- probbem-ef-Castre-can-be~deakt-with-even~ theugh-Castre-is—the-greater-threat ." The NSC minutes further state that the United States told Betancourt of Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to Trujillo would be. The U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor for Trujillo. President Eisenhower suggested a government in exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's downfall. SOURCE: ce J STAFF: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower -  Relley (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting, ply :7, 1960) ; — Abilewe HY 50955 DBocld: 32423486 Page 459 \ | DATESuly 6, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER July 28, 1960} CASTRO | | TRUJILLO Be fT i is nt Gees ee | frtends-te-reaeh~a..ps pfevet-of titi piia ton in-derTiny aStTo. "It was noted that Venezuela was trying to separate the Cuban and Domincan Republic prob- lems in OAS forms. On this matter, "The President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would be the loser." ‘ ‘Deas ¥ 28 Ln ae “ potter: ae) atten” ] STAFF: Kelley PATE Suly 6, 1975 SOURCE? presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960 ILE: Abilewe PERSONS/ENTITIES: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE STANS, MR. GRAY — . DATES: | CATEGORIES: Aug. 25, 1960 {| LUMUMBA OCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council meeting that day state: ''The President suggested the United Nations might re- cognize Katanga. Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means." (page 15) enna SOURCE: STAFF: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whit-man File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of August _ Kelley FASE 1960 ~ Ab,lewe DATE July 6, 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY, | Sept. 21, 1960! LUMUMBA On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles Said: "A-reeent-attempt—te-—sesessineate-Mobutu-hed=ferked. ***Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for. the moment, but Lumumba.was-ne¢ SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAFF: (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960)} Kelley PILE: — : ~ wos . , 2 ? HW 450955 pocrassadatieh ¥sGe 60 an “ew | DATE July 6, 1975
CATEGORIES DATES: — | LUMUMBA Oct. 24, 1960 ' PERSONS/ENTITIFS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY r x On October 24, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. message indicated that five Congolese soldiers utu on | the 15th of October. OCCURRENCE: Dulles reported: "An intercepted sme assinaté had attempted to ass Meee re cpp ranged — wg STAFF: Kelley DATE: eit Duly 6, 1975 Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower SOURCE: (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting, yer 24, 1960) PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: : GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGS Feb. 12, 1960 LUMUMBA ; CASTRO . . - . | TRUJILLO OCCURRENCE: On Febrauz—-dpui968 a ‘special National Security Council meeting was held, and Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting Executive Secretary. The only record of this meeting appearing in n_the NSC meeting series of 1 minutes is a one- ©-page | notation which states: . rerueSerons fT : Fe cated it Qocemed TAFF: Kelley t Eisenhower DATE DATE July 6, 1975 Presidential apers 0 Dw1 CATEGORIES SOURCE: (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series; special NSC meeting, Feb. 12, 1960. PILED Ab lewe, a PERSONS/ENTITIES Hemet STAFF: | DATE: SOURCE: PILE: Page 61 Docld: 3242954388 HY 50955
To: Files From: Frederick Baron Re: DELETION IN SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 3, 1980 ‘Date: July 7, 1975 In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House, Wilderotter assured me af that after the line "beyond our gg capabil- ities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by | Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo), followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals | with Southeast Asia. Oo 'Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on page 3 that related to KCuba. HW 50955 Docldl’32423486 Page 63
- EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY castro* Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960. Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960. Lumumba . | Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960. Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960. Trujillo Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI. , . Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960. ‘Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961. * The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and. (2) The fact that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was President Eisenhower. , HW 50955 Docld:424273488 Page 64
‘Hw 0955 mo MEMORANDUM i ee 7 . , oo F: FO: . Files FROM: Frederick Baron DATE: July S, 1975 SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY GENERAL. BACKGROUND 1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower! Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the DCI to the President during the Eisenhower administration. Allen Dulles was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray. ° Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the same subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning; Goodpaster was responsible for spot. work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he kept cach other "intimately informed". However, Gray said that any covert action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President.'' Some covert action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower. . "TY didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action of Eisenhower's," 2. Special Group Function At the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest, that was my role." BDocld: 32423488 Page 65
Gray said that shortly after the BERLIN TUNNEL, Eisenhower said, "T want the 54/12 committee to consider any action that impinges upon. BE Mind . Ke sk al ' j el { (AEE 4 i Ed GY Li aN oA Halos all Gray said that in almost every case, a proposed covert action would the sovereignty of another country." have been discussed with the State Department and would have been. staffed out before Special Group meeting. ‘Most of the rest of us did not have a chance to reflect before the meeting." Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12 (Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings. Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, he asked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not be washed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for the protection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the President the chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassing to him. The President's representative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has the right to object to an action and take it up with the President. The President . has a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, and- through his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President would have a chance to say ‘no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presence of the Special Group would protect a President trom operations such as assass- jnations. 3. "His Associate" Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in the. Special Group minutes 'Mr. Gray's associate" or "His associates" te Gray's first reaction was that “his associates" would probably refer to members of his NSC staff. “HW 50955 Docld: 324234868 Page 66
-3- oo, - But after seeing the minutes of the Special Group mecting of February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes u / ‘his associate't referred to President Eisenhower. Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate", that was Parrott's phrase. Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time in those minutes and couldn' t, without reconstructing each minute, be sure it referred to the President in cach case. He said that when he attended the meetings ,he would refer to "the President" directly. (Note: Since the phrase ''the President" is never used in Parrott's minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to "Mr, Gray's associate" are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.) NSC_DOCUMENTS. Gray recalls that. the President called him, and perhaps Allcn Dulles, -into his office shortly, after Gray's appointment and said that "no minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that - Dulles was not present at this ineeting. He knows that he would have told Dulles shortly afterwards. Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings. Although he did defy the Presidential directive in, one specific: instance, by. deciding | to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating - to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas. ¥ Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the “Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the WW 50955 BDocla: 3274273486 Page 67
HW 50955 -4- meeting for their review. Gray prepared the "records of action" for the NSC, along with Jinmy Lay, Gray's assistant. Gray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting at which it was reported that Gray commented that “his associates had expressed | extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action" in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember LUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking with Eisenhower about LUMUMBA. However, Gray does remember that ''we were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted to see him removed from his position of responsibility." In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutes of the meeting, Gray said that "when I said ‘straightforward action’, certainly assassination would be one possibility.'' Gray continued to say that Allen DULLES. was consistently in opposition to assassination and "he was probably - saying to me that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do." \ With reference to testimony received by the Select Committee from Robert JOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy Planning | Council, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the summer of 1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUMBA or said words to that effect. Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBA with TWEEDY. t Cy balo ois u Docld: 32423488 Page 68
HY 0955 TRUJILLO 'T am sure there was no discussion with EISENIIOWER about the _ assassination of TRUJILLO." "T don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group.. The DCI should have taken a suggested course of action to the Special Group _after checking with State." _ Gray said: ''A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would © connote to me that it would be used for the. purpose of assassinating an individual." CUBA Gray said that President E{SENHOWER would frequently remark at meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all. 4 Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17, 1960, Gray’ said that at some point during that period. of time, Allen DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President SISENHOWER, who listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think | sabotage of sugar mills will do something significant. Bring me a complete plan."' Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program: propaganda; economic sanction; sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles. ~ GRAY said the President approved this nemo. (Note that Gray also said that he made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.) id Docld:3242734368 Page 69
HY 0955 - ~6- After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential meetings on Cuba, Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos ‘and - ‘brought them to Gettysburg. Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the - ‘memos, Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in reference to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military planning. EISENHOWER suggested that the page should be retyped to change the word "planning". Gray said they did retype the page. | . Gray said that although in his mind. and LEISENHOWER's, there was no military "planning", definitely ELSENHOWER knew that Cuban exiles were being trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba. President EISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile among the Cuban community. But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle among them- selves who would constitute the leadership of such a government. Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960, Gray remembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban operations over. 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paramilitary operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the memo to laying, this budget before “higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to President EISENHOWER. Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960, at which MERCHANT asked a question about whether there had been planning ''for taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said Docld: 3242734868 Page 70
“AW 50955 -7~ _that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, howéver, that. the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included aussassination.'' Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such action would be beyond CIA capabilities, was the “usual DCI reaction". Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said that ''the special mceting'’ mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President. Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the =~ President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray memos in Abilene). CASTRO/GAMBLING 5) SYNDICATE, OPERATION, PHASE I Gray said that he was completely unaware of any conversation between Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts for the purpose of an assassination attempt on CASTRO. Gray also said that. he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars. Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO. Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS. Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President." Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this Docld: 324233466 Page fi
HW 450955 -S- matter. Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recent news stories which indicate that there was assassination planning against CASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd never heard about such things. EXECUTIVE ACTION "I never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it to me," ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLY ; Gray said that he remembered two mentions of assassination: (1) When NASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said "we ought to bump him off", But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. . Assassination was. not an option that went to the President. (2) At the PFIAB meetings, one member consistently would ask the CIA "about bumping off the leadership in Hanoi", Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said the member who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide the name to us. "T followed closely any covert operations I was interested in." Gray said that 'if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called" the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any such attempts. Docld: 324273486 Page 72
HW 450955 interview Questéons For Gordon Gray TRUJILLO 1. MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C. King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting DCI @aketk recommending the delivery of arms (high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO. The Memo says that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM"., -~Kwemkhem Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have record of any authorbzation until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes) -~If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed their authority? -Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administratior for handling the approval of such a project? -Could the DCI approve it under his own authority? .~Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority by not requesting?@? receiving approval foom the Secy of Stat -Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted? . L 2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 1962. GRAY was present. The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside the Dominican Republic” oe -~Do you Emam remember this event? Are the minutes accuragte? -What was the policy behind the approval? -Weren'’t the weapons intended for use in assassination? DocId: 32423488 Page 73
HW 450955 To3. Files From: FDB Re: NOTES Date: 7/5/75 ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75) Biographical Background 1951-62 = National Security Council staff member 1962-67 State Department, member of Policy Planning Council Chronology of Events Summer, 1960 Docld:324234688 Page Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that discussion, President EISENHOWER said something -- I can no longer remember his-words -~ that came across to me as an order for the assassination of LUMUMBA...There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on.” ~-~Johnson said he might have omitted the statement from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity. ~~ J. said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Rook). --The formal record of decision by the NSC ts. unlikely to contain infommation on this subject, he said. : -~-~The memos which Johnson did on the meetings would be with President Eisenhower's papers. (10) "I was surprised x...that I would ever hear a President. say anything like this in my presence or the presence of a group of people. I was startled." Fa