198-10007-10002 _ ; oe | stain eeinaiaeamenEl JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/20) Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10007-10002 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: . Document Information ORIGINATOR: ARMY FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR. TO: GENERAL KRULAK | TITLE: CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION DATE: 02/14/1963 PAGES: 139 SUBJECTS : . CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : — Secret. RESTRICTIONS: — 1C: 4 CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 02/10/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 1. Transmittal of report entitled "Cuba as a Base for Subversion" from Califano to Krulak. Department of the Army EO 18528 F=! Declassify “I Exclude [ Exempt Authority & Refer To Review Date 12, AIS [5 _By Ltt Cfo. NO STATE OBJECTION TOD LASSIFICAT; N By of” DaTeey/ eg v9.1 : 15 HW 50955 Docld:324273995 Page i
HY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, 0.€. 14 February 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KRULAK: This book.will have to be held .by you on an EYES ONLY basis. The 1700 meeting » with Mr. Yarmolinsky will be held in Mr, Vance's office.. ~ we Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Special Assistant to the Secretary of.the Army Attachment \ Oe SE ]?> 50955 Dactld:327423995 Page 2 i nes
Se a @ap SECRET ~ HO FOREIGN DISSEM : CABLE OF CONTENTS CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION are 85-4 62 (9 Nov G2) Hoxt Atteohked | PROPAGANDA TAB Frence Letina and Printed Materiel — Havene's Intesnational Broadcasting Personal Contact U.8. Counter Effort 2 sums ARONA RRO Sra AO Sole Besort of Evidence Reports ef Cuban Funds for Swbversion Summary Report of Treining in Cabe Program Travel for Training Aetivities Upon Rebar. from Cubs Hiseullancoust te WE as BO bt Methods of Operation “ Reporte of Arua Sauggling hh Eleetronie Communications Becuseats CourLers uae to Reporte of Sabotage 7 Terrorist Activities nD COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA Cuben Relationships and Policies Soviet Activitic£ and Conf liets ta fo bY SECRER . NO FORRIGN DISsEN HY 50955 Doctd: 324273995 Page 3
HY 0955 IBVERSION «. Aetions, whieh may or may net be inimdesi te U8, istereste, dealgied to undexnine the ullitary, econaiie, peyeho- “Rogieal, morale, ox political strength of a. constituted governuent, BDocld: 3274273995 Page 4
4 pwov (96% ‘ Sarie SO-N-OD =O; a | SECRET CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA sis” THE PROBLEM . T'o describe and evaluate Castro’s capabilities, with Soviet nelp, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US com- mitment not to invade. NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw capabilities, - taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin American capabilities for counteraction. SUMMARY A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails through- out much of Latin America is the product of fundamental in- equities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of ¢ ‘Castro and the Soviets. Castro’s efforts, with Soviet help. to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage tiave not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitatic:. «f Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably beer: more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castrcs™in- fluence in Latin America had waned by the time of the missile pase crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them. B. Implementation of an agreement between the US anc. the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be with- drawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom SECRET | oo 1 HY 50955 Doctd: 327423995 Page 5
SECRET: for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and perform- ance of the other Latin American governments and orths,US with |. respect to the Castro threat.. There are many targets in’ the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversicn and sab~ otage, and the Soviets are likely to assist.Castro in reaching them: by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro’s subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to.take determined counteraction. This willingness will probably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to invade Cuba. : Se C. We have examined how Castro’s subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present upto substantially increased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably reduce Castro’s subversive potential, and that the Soviets are unlikely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would ' maintain Castro’s potential for subversive action at least. at pres; - ent levels or actually raise it to the point where he could under- take amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against ee BDocld: 3274273995 Page 6
<= ae SRE IT separa are 8 SECRET THE ESTIMATE ; i. CASTRO’S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS 1 Aims . 1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of | ‘himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. -. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of ' the Sino- Soviet Bloc in, the pursuit of these aims. s Means — 2. Castro began. his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Pan- ama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful ' and he turned to other means. . 3. From the beginning, propaganda has been | one of the principal in- Suess Strumentis on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main trans- DA . missions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great ‘.. deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised. ‘to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected : countries. A major effort has been made through Prensa Latina, the HE Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. — re __Printed propaganda. has also been sent from Cuba into most other Oe " Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel ' have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among ' Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets. ae 4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba; about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla. warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin America and the Bloc. aa a 5. Financial support has been™ provided. by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of-countries, although the cases on which we have reports in) involved: relatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have eas .° Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. oT a SECRET | HY 50955 Doctd: 32423995 Page 7
/ Oo SECRET also been reported, but the evidence is unclear as to-quiantities shipped and the extent of Cuba’s role in these transactions. We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana. 6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamen- tary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists. ry Evaluation 7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolu- tionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the effort seems to have been relatively - small, and ineffective. Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro’s influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries— notably Venezuela, Brazil, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Cas- troism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally. 8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist assertiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advantage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important influence in the Latin American situation than Castro’s other subversive activities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a ‘force to be reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries. Certain govern- ~ ments felt obliged to move in the direction of neutralist and leftist posi- tions. This influence waned, however, after Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless, the appeal to Castro’s move- ment continued to be a source of major concern to almost all govern- ments and seriously restricted their willingness to associate themselves, at least publicly, with the US. 4 oo SECRET BDocld: 3274273995 Page 6
HY SECRET Il. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE AFTERMATH OF AN AGREEMENT .UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES AND THE US GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA . “9 Gastro’s subversive capabilities—and his disposition to use them— will be enhanced by the sense of security provided by such sophisticated weapons as are retained in Cuba after the withdrawal of, Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-—28 bombers, if retained, and other modern equipment noted in Annex B, would be important in this regard. A US commit- ment not to invade Cuba will further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost certainly encourage him to intensify subver- sive activities in other Latin American countries. Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Base Crisis 10. Castro’s supporters throughout Latin America, with few though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrations. Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, including deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects, a condition’ of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the anticipated US invasion. _Moscow’s apparent failure to provide guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judgment, however, that the response to Castro’s appeal for attacks on the US. and its friends indicates that his power to command revolutionary — action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base crisis, is limited, Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future 11. The range of Castro’s support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist.’ Rev- elation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Min- ister under President Goulart and an author of Brazil’s nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican officials have publicly expressed their disenchantment. 12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force on which Castro can now count, but even their support has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet rela- tions with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties. — SECRET y 50955 Daoctd:327423995 Page 3
SECRET Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity . _ 13. Arms. (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores.of arms inherited . from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been ham- . .° pered in his efforts ‘to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his disposal, however, 11 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubana airlines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circumstances. The IL-28’s now in Cuba are in- appropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for, infiltration of men and arms. The 6 Khronshtadt subchasers, 16 P-6 motor torpedo boats, ‘and 12 Komar missile boats-obtained from the Bloc could also bé used - for arms deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers— ; both Cuban and Soviet—could be used for arms deliveries. If Soviet ,” / submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ports, they, too,’ could be used in support of subversive activities. We see no evidence that Cuba has or is. developing a sophisticated amphibious warfare capability, and all the means of delivery of arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary measures by Latin American mil- C _ itary and naval forces. 14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro’s propaganda machine remains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both be- cause of new ‘precautions by local governments and because of a reduc- wwe fion-in the numbers of cooperative _ volunteers outside the organized Communist groups: nd? 15. Money and equipment. Despite differences wlan Castro and the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we believe that the ‘Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equip- _ ment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications. , 16. Organization. The organization of Castro’ Ss subversive assets . throughout Latin America was shown by. the recent crisis to be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make. a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will continue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus, both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activity such: as Mexico City and Montevideo. nae . 6 | : SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423995 Page 10
SECRET Other Factors on Which Castro’s Subversive Capability Will Depend 17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement stated - in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked before the , missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have most of the arms as enhanced capabilities provided by accelerated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same, or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow Castro than they had before ‘the crisis—almost certainly not more. Unless Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and economic. problems, there is no reason to believe that anti- Castro activities-aré any more ely to jeopardize his position than they did before’ the crisis. a 8. Situation in Cuba. Castro’s ability to engage in subversive: activ- a '. ities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his a . position at home. Heightened political and economic difficulties in , , Cuba would restrict Castro’s subversive effort, while the more secure — ‘ he is at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and re-establishing his prestige and in- fluence. Castro’s position in Cuba will depend in part on his own _. policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets. 19. Alternative Soviet policies. There are several courses of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of. economic and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe, however, that ' the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet center in Latin America is still too high to abandon. The stake in Castro as a person, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did make a decision to with- ‘draw support either from Castro or. “from n Ciba we" Bélieve that Cuban. capabilit 4 y for subversion in Latin Ame America would” be’ “greatly r reduced, | “at Jeast for a time. This capability would be reduced more in the case of the Soviets” “withdrawing support from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone. . 20, An alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue to _. extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could range "all the way from {he amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its present condition, inchiding. support of the expanded military establishment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably reduce con- siderably Castro’s internal problems and thus give him additional free- dom to engage in external subversion and sabotage. Additions to Cas- _ tro’s stocks of small arms would not in themselves change his capa- an bility for subversive activity, as he already has supplies of surplus arms. ; However, if the Soviets were to provide substantial additional air and ° SECRET 7 rape re er rete mtr eran and equipment which were delivered in the post-July buildup, as well - HY 50955 DBocld: 32423995 Page ii
SECRET sealift capability, the Cubans would be able to mount large-scale subversive interventions in neighboring countries. Furthermore, what- ever degree of success is achieved in improving Cuba’s position and in expanding its physical resources, Cuba’s net capability for subversion and sabotage will in the last analysis largely be determined by the. overall situation in Latin America. 21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet foresee what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long term on their rela- tionship. The crisis has probably created difficulties of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can readily solve, however determined they may be to do so. Castro may have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of the Soviets to consider modifying his relationship with them and seeking to improve his rela- tions with the OAS and possibly even the US. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find feasible ways.of reducing his dependence upon the USSR. The Soviets certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising control over Castro. Furthermore, -his re- peated assertions of continued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism make it unlikely that he is seriously contemplating a restoration of relations with the OAS, or that he could succeed if he tried. 22. Policy of other American nations. Castro’s subversive capabilities will be greatly influenced by the policies.and actions of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since 22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sentiments. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for countersubversive action by Latin - American States, on their own and in conjunction with the US, are im- proved. Many responsible Latin Americans will have interpreted recent events to mean that firm. and united action can be effective against 7 the Soviet threat from Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be less willing to take coordinated action against Com- -} munist inroads if the US commits itself not to invade Cuba. : Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage 23. The extent of Castro’s capabilities for sabotage and other clan- destine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious - targets are: a. US missions and personnel. US missions and personnel all over Latin. America were designated as targets for attack in the various . calls for action which went out during | the-recent crisis. Action against ; : ; : “ — ; | 8 ao “SECRET AW 50955 Docld: 3274273995 Page i2
SECRET such targets has a primarily political and propaganda value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US policy. It is also rela- tively easy for Castro to promote attacks against official US installations in a crisis situation and to get help from all the various elements which are opposed to American influence in the area. Future attacks may be anticipated in situations in which Castro feels that the public resent- - ment of US policy exists or can be stirred up. b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort. Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and business installa- tions in which there is a large proportion of US capital, which are other- :, Wise associated with the US, or which are so important -to the local _ economy that damage to them would create difficulties for govern- : ments which are anti-Castro and cooperating with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and water pipelines to the’refineries on the Paraguana Peninsula, and similar facilities are likely to be chosen . as targets for Cuban sabotage. Installations for the handling of Vene- zuelan iron ore are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama might be attacked. _ €. Port and communications facilities are generally vulnerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are cooperating with the . US and whose communications media.are taking an anti-Castro line. | Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facilities, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and transformer stations, are poten-— tial targets. Selection of targets for sabotage will depend on the im- portance of particular facilities but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to them. d. Political targets susceptible to exploitation. Political instability throughout Latin America, in almost every case characterized by pres- sures from below upon relatively conservative and generally anti- Communist governments, provide Castro with opportunities for sub- versive political activity. Particularly unstable situations include the following: (1) Venezuela, where Communist-inspired disorders have been kept - in check by the government, but where continued Communist and leftist violence may lead the military to take control. In a country such as Venezuela, where the stability of an anti- Castro and anti-Communist government depends heavily upon oo, one man, assassination is another danger. *.. (2) Nicaragua, where Communist-led groups, in anticipation of -' +. goming elections, may seek to incite or exploit violence against the Somoza regime. ; ' (3) Guatemala, where President Ydigoras’ position is weak and uncertain. , SECRET Ce 9 AW 50955 Docld:324273995 Page 13
Cc | seCRET oy eo (4) The Dominican Republic, where the problems of political recon- struction after a generation of dictatorship have proved almost more than the caretaker government can handle, and where |. a some political groupings amenable to Castro’s influence are . al - ' seeking to gain a footing. ' (5) Bolivia, where the struggle for dominance within the ruling MNR Party between the moderates and those on the far left is ready-made for exploitation by Castro. (6) Brazil, where Communists have penetrated the government and military to some limited extent, the tide of nationalist and anti-US feeling is strong, and depressed socio-economic condi- tions and inefficient government administration provide Castro many opportunities, especially in the northeast. oe 10 - SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423995 Page 14
De a ee cere TSP RR OLINER Foe EO a rr ar _ PROPAGANDA Sines 1 Jamuary 1959, the Cestro/Comm pleeed g greet emhedia on ite propaganda offerte the ad wetlscted in the quantities of persomel and obvious enountes funds devotes to this enterprise lets hnve hace discovered in Cuben diplematie powshes in Meeleo, Pentim, Chile end Argent “ae Te, Avmends Rert, Mindster of Eiaw: quantities of thie printed material. Persoual representation 9? gtect part in the Cestro/Commniet propaganda Cuba fox economic, political end cultura] metings are indoctrinated and ere provided material for further program. Trevellera to. nriion upon return to their home countries. Student, Js WER, ad profesdionsl oxgendeations ation, Diploustie and economic reprodentatives heave cultivated le¢al eon Serve ag a medium for prongs dbecent Sta, influential leftiste, government Giecidents througa perschal contact. Radio plays mely inportent part in the Castro/Comunist | thin Cubs and externality. | propeginda arfort. nS % organize de snd press conieel and an ftem tliuetreting Cuban efferte te 9 | | This tab conbadue ® detellied aummary of Cuban efforte HY 50955 DBocld: 32423995 Page 16
HY 0955 ant gumsry of Hevens's broade. ating program wands Inciting revolt in Latin Am ieiae four seperate items indicating tn greater devel the tyses of bronieert information ox ‘ently being Glaseminsted., dipicwatic ixfluenc @ in Bolivias (2) A tabulation of rex evtemling a recent Comores im (iba (by profesaion, cow setions vepmedented); (3) An Lien on pro: wadantatives try, end organt~ ed liber orgentsation (ECR); ond (4) Am cxample of prepagenda ough & cultural organtantion with faferved comeetions to an inter. ional, organization strong] This teb ointeins a fedent ms & move detatied tien on USTA vadie brondeasting to Latin America. Docld: 324273995 Page it
HY 0955 SECREB. No ror a EB, No Foreign DISSENY The following deseription of the Cuban Govérnment'a measures this past year bo organize propaganda and press contral is based uson the 25 Geptenber rveport of an official Germen tervice supplemented. by Aaguat 14962 information from a felrly relieblée inde pendent sonuree. in carly 1962 the ORE decided to opteblicn « Comite de Orientecton of the Cubsh Government and for cendorship of the presé. Cesar Retalante, en old-time Communist, a menber of the ORT Netioial Directorate and brother of Anibal Beeslante who wa later “pirged” by Castro, was appointed head of the COR and thud given control over the entire Cuban prove, radio, and televieion, By August, Ceset Hecalante was reported to have « personal Steff of 15 workers, moat of whom verd Communist. Party menbers, and to be Hold ine wagidly brieiing sessions vith editere of the four large Hovena newspapers, arivusting eenéorship to these editors. Tn inte June 1962, the ORE set up a committee te be in ¢ coordination of Cuban propaganda throughout eatin Amevies, This committee was eubordin: Mintetry of F te to the COR, end consisted of representatives from the eign Relations, the Preves Latina news agency and the COR, The divedtor of Prensa letting wes the news egenty's representative on this committee, The repre sentetive of the Foreign Minist ‘y, believed to be Ramon Fenate y Molina, were said to have actual) @he redrgonizetion of Prensa Letina ds deoeribed as Beenlente's niet. dmportent accdmplisimint, Since mid-July 1962 the news agency hee beén increasingly amployed ac an instrument of the Cuban Foredan Ministry end is. servi: g co tte propaganda mediun in these countries with ogtRE No FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 324273995 Page i9
HY 0955 ~ SECRET, NO Foreign DISSE ins diplomatic relations. Cesar Facalante now controle Prenga Letinats activities beth in Cube and abroad. He 1¢ assisted by Ramon Caleined dovdille, also « vetermn Communist and National Directorate, who eete ae siden offielal with the Comamiet pa menber of the ORT tiiea of letin America. Caleines bas bean reported a8 being also a divédtor of the Cubsn Institute af Peiendsnip with Peoples (f0aP) vith which Prenge Detine muinteine elese relations, ‘The steff of the Preuss Jatina center in Havana, is to bé enlarged from 150 employees to elmost 1,000 by Janiery 1069. The center algo employs about 250 salaried peraomel in lietin América in additien to tumerous free-lance correspondante. The letin Ameriesn section ef the given to “edboagenetei working in cowityies which have broken diplomatie velations with Cube, The sub-agencigs im several letin American capitals ' ere to be enlarged as operational eentera for certain areas - for exauple,. Hogete will be a egordinating center for Coléubia, Venezuela, Panama, Coste Rica, and Mearaguas end Mexieo City for Mexico, Honduras, EL Salvador, end Guaterals | The 10G-Kilowatt VF tranamitter of Radio Mavens is of special importance for inévessing Cuban propsgenda adtivities in Latin Amertoaz et the end of propaganda broeddasta the station reportedly also transmits epecifié directives to Cuben agents abroad, The manager of the radio stetion ia Baldowero Alveres Rios, preaident of the Cuban-Chinese Priend« ship Comittee, who maintains close contact with Shen Chien, Communist Chinese eubassador to Cube, Communiet China 1a said to have condiderable gnla activities. a SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 324273995 Page 20
HY 0955 SECRET No rorrien DISSEM A Diveekly periodical, Panorama Beonomico Latinoamericano, which is distributed thre ughont Latin America, ie to be given wider cirouletion an@ published additionally im an English-lenguage edition. Permando . Coline, editor of the periodical, is sada to be planning a cempaien on “the economle tragedy of the Latin American peoples.” (CIA €8-3/530, SECRET ‘NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 324273995 Page 21
harpoon. 2 wv cea Ont RT i ir io NN iD) IE (5) a Ty ET 1 ue SOIR i ENTE OUR RAV AGE OURS PIR Ae, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information affecting the National Defense ef the United States within the meaning of the Eepionage Laws, Title . 18, U.S.C. Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an ungvtherized -person is. prohibited by lew. Sac RET co i NO PORETGN DIssint ie ee ‘countey “ Mexico/Guba REPORT NO. CS.2/536, 706 | —— Be are: ary 1962 is ABJECT Return of Cuban Propaganda _ DATE DISTR. S February 196 To the Cuban Embassy by the oe mares Mexican Post Office . ~ NO. PAGES od . | RD "DATE OF ; ~ INEO, al January 1963 ; : i PLACE & . a - _— _ ; | DATE ACQ. Mexico, Mexico City (21 January 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-6958 ; SQURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. - ‘ source: Person (F) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in \ Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 3. | EE I a = _ . . a . | io _  . Recently Mexican. postal authorities returned a large amount ' of Cuban propaganda to the Guban BEnbassy with the stamp "no such address." Herberto Jorrin Munoz, an employee of the Cuban Sabassy, commented that with such tactics the Mexican Post : Office "is sabotaging the Cuban Revolution." . : a : . _ Field Comment. TDCS-3/526,575 reported that on 26 October 1962 , : - Wexican authorities had refused to accept a considerable volume of airmail from Cuba which was destined for countries other than Mexico and ordered the mail returned to Cuba. : | —_ A wf | . HY 50955 DBocld: 32423995 Page 22
O HY 0955 OFFICH LL USE ONLY _ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION DIVISION OFFICE OF OPERATIONS SPECIAL MEMORANDUM: Docld: 32423995 1 JANUARY 1963; I. HOURS ON THE AIR _ Tl. SAMPLES OF RADIO PROPAGANDA " IMCITING TO REVOLT IN LATIN | AMERICA” Properod for - ’ Infermation Cepy fers OFFICIAL USE ONLY a Page 24
HY 0955 & “Radio Free Dixie’ is .a one-hour weekly transmi .. Carolina Nepro who fled to Cuba to avoid prosecution for -napoing, is the . -OFPICISL USE SOY me oo/F 31D 3) Janucnry 1963. HAVANA'TS TSTCRUATICNAL BROADCASTTIG ‘t, HOURS ON THD PIP The Cuban Government uses three vehicles. for its radio propaganda to audiences in other countries: ‘tpadio Free Dixie,” "The Friendhy Voice of Cuba;” and "Radio Habana Cuba .™ ssion.in English to n tne United States, broadcast over the facilities of Havana's tuork of eight Williams, the North ( allezed kid-~ director and chief commentator of this. program, which is heard every Friday night at 10 p.Me EST. Using “jazz” terminolozy and frequently crude languares “wLliams tells his "onpressed North American - prothers" that they .are going to have to "fill a lot of jails anc a Lot: of graves» and not just with black boys» either," in order to achieve "freedom and social justice." Assisting Williams are newscaster Carlos Moore and "musical nostess” (disc jockey and commentator) Jo Salas _ "Radio Free Dixie" is heard very well. in southern Florida .and can probably be heard in many arees of the southern United States without elaborate technical Facilities. Negroes, .2 S0-kilowatt transmitter "Radio Progreso" and its née relay stations situated throurhout Cuba. Robert F- & “The Friendly Voice of Cuba,” formerly 4 popular Havana radio station known a3 W?WRadio Mambi ," began broadcasting in Nay 1962. Although this powerful station does not So announce, its transmissions are apparently intended for Listeners in the United States» “The Friendly Voice of Cuba" proadcasts from 6:00 in the morning to 1:00 ‘aem,. EST. All of its Programs » except for four seven-minute Soanish news shows, are in ; Enplish. Its approach is a shade more subtle than that of "Radio Free Dixie." It is heard best in southern Florida, but can also be heard in many. parts of the southern United Stateso ‘3 The official international service called “Radio Habana Cuba": is con- sidered to be the. chief external radio propaganda Sutlet of the Cuban Government. More commonly known as "Radio Havana," this station broad- casts weekly 4 total of 187 tours and 50, minutes of propaganda ‘in languares which include English, French, Arabic, Portuguese » Spanish, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Vestern Hemisphere. "Radio Havana" is under the supervision of ‘Marcos Behemaras » deputy director (for international proadcasting) of the Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusion. In addition to the normal infor7ation ‘OFFICIAL USE ONLY "page I-k se ROTORS ANY ata go Docld: 3274273995 Page 25
HY 0955 «°° OPPICIAL USE OULY ond ontertainment, it transmits special programs--"sponsored" by so-called exila groups--the evident intent o€ which is to encourage subversion of the incumbent governments of Peru, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. Programs with similarly subversive intent were formerly beamed to : Nicaragua and. Honduras; these were discontinued in September 1962. Although first observed by FBIS monitors on 14 March 1961, the Cuban inter- national service. was not officially inaugurated until Nay Day of that year, when it began presenting a relatively modest schedule of programs in English, French,:- and Spanish for Europe’and the Americas for a total . "ef 42 hours a week. Since then, “Radio Havana” has grown by leaps and bounds, finally emerging as Latin America’s number one ‘international - broadcaster. Its time on the air-is as follows, in hours per week: Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hours 15 minutes Haitian Creole to Haiti _ s. 9 hours . - Enelish to Europe.” +.» 9 hours 20° minutes English to the Americas « ° iL? hours 30 minutes French to Europe «gs ‘> 9 hoérs 20 minutes | French to.Canada - ' +» 3 hours. 30. minutes French to the Mediterranean = 3 hours 30 minutes” Portuguese to Brazil = = - 7 hours _Snanish to Eurgoe: & the Mediterranean - 16 hours 55 ninutcs Spanish to the Amoricas- ' » 108 hours 30 minutes The technical facilicies of "Radio Havana" are at a tnangmittor site about 23 miles-southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave. transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five: .- have been observed on the air at thd same time. These transmitters range | {n power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling "Radio Havana" to be heard ali over the world. Programs are sent from studios to the transmitter sito. by means of microwave relays. ae 1 , In additign to the regularly scheduled international service, these trans- _ mitters have been known to broadcast special programs in order to. tako adventage of particular political situations. Whon serious disorders broke out in tha Dominican Republic in late 1961, for cxample, broadcasts emanating from a: self-styled “elandestine” station callad "Radio ‘Revolucion dol Movimiente Catorce de’ Junio” demanded the overthrow of. the Dominican government. The station wont off the alr aften about a week, _ but not before direction finder (DF) bearings and other technical clues + indicated that the Bauta transmitter site was the point of origin. “Radio Havana" announces: that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American nations so that they can beam programs ne aes TE semanas nn Docld: 3274273995 Page 26 OFFICIAL USE ONLY ts Pago.I-2>
°°. OFFICIAL: USE ONLY er back to their homelands. These prograens area now broadcast as follows : The Peruvidh Anti-Imperialist Strugplo Movoment (Hovimiento Porueno de la Lucha Anti-Imperialista) broadcasts the "La You dol Peru . Rovolucionaria” prograia to Peru on Sundays at 7° to 7:15 pom, ESN; . . twansmite the “"Morigaje a Guatemala” .proqren to Guatemala on Tucodayo and Saturdays at 9 to 9:15 pom. ESTs oo — ’ Tho Doniniesa Liboration, Movement (HovimLento do Laboracioa Doalnieana) broadeasts tho “Patria Libro” program to the Dominican Ropubiie or Wednesdays end Fridays at 9 to 9215 poto EST. ‘ Sinilar propraczs woro bocmed to Niearcava end Honduras, but wore droped Sa Soptomber 1962 in favor of a “Radio Havena” program calicd “Srinchera Aworhecna,” now hoasd nightly from 9:30 to 9280 pido EST. Thio propran 39 more Ploxible im that ic attacks tho roginos of cay Latin Amorieaa mation, chenging ita target from night to night according to tho |: owlgencies ef any givon provailing political situation. . qs OFFICIAL USE ONLY = (wsCéBeg Be HY 50955 DBocld: 32423995 Page 27 Fho Guatemalan Information Committoe (Comito Guatemaltacs do information) | wp te ec re ee | sae
UNCLASSIFIED IIo. SAPS OF PROPAGADA niTEING TO REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA Reproducsd beldw is a selection of ‘some’ of the more “inflamatery statements that have appeared in Havana broadeasts to Latin America as ‘a whole, (Section A) and in special ‘programs tailored for listéners in Pera, Guatemala, and: — " the Dominican Republic, (Section B). chronological ondat'. ' Most of the statements are taken from programs broad- cast within the. ‘past two months, with a sampling from the spring of ‘1982 included for purposes Of comparison. Péssages not indludad in quotation mak axe paiephinezes r-) A Broadcasts for Latin Ayerica in General (Radio Havana in Spanish to athe. pnarices), 23 January 1963: , . The Paople" 8 “animosity agairiet Betancourt "has been prowing . ’ with each passing day. Already there has béen an claboration ef xevolutionary tactics, the application of which is cause: ing the very foundations. of the spuricus government . to . -tremble, The National: Liberation Front ia turning out to | ‘bo the most affective executor of the will of the Venczuelan poople at ‘this time.. The slogan of the people as "A Complete Change ef Governnent}*™ . 22 January 19633. Hho gituation in El Salvador is dinastrous in every rocpoct; the people sre on the verge of a complete collapse or .a . ' lolent reaction. The mora the Salvadorans aro oppressed, the more they strike back fom their liboration, particularly since the Cuban revolutioa.o.. ‘The masses-are acquiring a. groat avareness: of their strength and the possibility of Aes effective use, thanks to maasurcs like the United Revolutionary - Aetion Front, which declares itself to be the organization ereated by. ‘the " Beopie to carry out the revoluticen the paopies need.” 2) oF De - UNCLASSIFIED 2 “page Wek. HY 50955 Docld: 327423995 Page 26 ‘the quotations axe arrenged in reverse
HY O 0955 : ‘ UNCLASSIFIED. -° 0} 9 January 1963: "The Paraguayan poople are now determined to eat rid’ of the government, which has ignerod the most elemontary rights , which has turned the country ever to tho insatiable voracity . of the monopolies, and which is proparing an eloctoral farce ia order to romain in povor againat the people's wishes. ‘Hovover, the poeple of Paraguay havo decided t6 acquire ‘tholr - Secedems at ali costs, and tho erimos commttod by Streqsonor te |: _ @issuade them will bo usoless." eo 8 95 Dacenbar 1962, quoting a statamant attributed to Eovadoran coimunists: "'tho demastie political eriois is worsening. Aéninistrative inoptricss 6¢ the dominating clasces:is boeoming momo glaring.” | 'Centradietions ameng tho deminating class aro tacxoaging, Aad cowvility to Yankee imporialionw is gproading. - ‘Tho real solution to this eriois ia? .To etranpthen tho poopio of all - socters-in thoir stéugelo for their rights, to croato a solid front with tho passes;: to overthrow the impordadinte and - oligarchs from powor; and to cot. up a people's. authori ty ablo te-carry oat a program of radical rofemio.'™ 23 Deecaber 1962, frow a speech by. Education Ministor Ammendo saete Ho vane ovory Amoriean nation and ovory man in Latin Anorlea ‘to fight for hia country, fight for hig nation, <igne for’ ‘nis natiezal independence.’ This is that wo vant cad wnat, . wo dosira, and this is what dmporlalism detjs net want, &¢ dees not want it because it knows that. sconor or lator this ' gtruenlo will lead to Uiboration from imporialian, and it wag the liboratien from imperialism which guided Cuba’ to secialism, beeause liberation from imporialisn naturally loads to socialign; What wo want is for tho poaplo af. Latin Amarica to. fight for their. country and for the ron of Latin America to fight for their country." a a . ‘ 2% Noveatbor 1962: "Yoraguojan evonts in recent dayo havo lest noao or thoir intensity. - Givon tho vigor of the clashes hetween tho . Venozuelan . patriote--perfeetly organized for action in the fields and in the cities-oand Romulo Botanceurt!o traitorous forces, decisiyo episcdes should be cupeetcd within a fou days, Venezugla is the weakost troneh in the - Smporialise front in the Americas. Let it not ba forgotton +, . that the traitorous regime in Caracas, despite all apgoargnecs, . &6 undor Sire from a great popular offonsivo.” - — Lo " UNCLASSIFEZD.- 17” pono “LLe2 ° Docld: 324273995 Page 29
© HY 0955 UNCLASSEFIED ee - he folloring quotations are teken ere broadansts in ‘tro oprisr of of 1982: a i May 1962; ‘peach by: Exneatd Gusvatas | oo | ; MSenotknod som ecnrade aa ‘atin Anothea aske we what’ ue ‘ehduts ef this or that place, how chali tho preblem bo faced in this or that place, Ye always, answer that thoro is ne Set way to .geizo power and that the- working eless, helped and stranethonad | by ‘the -poasant class, must navor soak the moat bleedy battio, - boeause it wild cost "eheusands and thousands and miiisens of livas ef thelr sens. . But the soleurc ef pover by tho vorkdag: . class is a historic necessity. and né_ ono em eppase histeryoooe The yoars°ahcad, coarades, wild bo tho seane La add ef keorded of constant, ‘fratrididal atrudelese” . 8 Apral 1962, commentary on Boisdon: ‘WAS oF eoday , Areseriona, the poeple « arc rising ur in ama against you, your infamous coalition covernmont, tho reaevicnary olomonts' of the army, the bosses, tho poverful, the oxpleiters, and above all, imperfalion, in order to Sylei Lh the sledans that yeu pros laimod and botrayed: ‘land rofera, tax rofoma, and natioaal. shea ty« The poopie, Arescncna, nover forgot tholr word.” me is Grad 162: "the “present government OF Yaieonco’ Fuentes must BO foreod to .abandon offico, and the Conagross, coapesod nalnly ef doputios:’ who held office ha a rooujt of fraud and impesiti€a , muct ba. _ dissolved.” a . 2 Mauscn 3962, tee _ ®Cuba ‘has. cata, and has repeated a ghousand eines , that it is not necossary - &o expert rovolution, bseauge cach ef tho , cligarchical, - tyramiical, and despotic: ecveranonts undor which Avoriea’ suffers is itself preparing tho conditians - necessary for tho people to riso-ur against ¢, And tho peoplo wio-curter those proimperialist , bloody govormmants do not mead ‘to have parachutigts drop into thciz mountainc. They thene _ selves seek. solutions for their prébiems, ‘tha only thing of ° which Cuba can be accused is of havine oponod: the way, of have ang won its freedon fighting in pucititia warfaro against a: . cruel dictatorship.” ee ; : my " UNCLASSIFIED 7 gage BEa8 Docld: 324273995 Page 30
© HY 4S0954 Bo 1 ToPew 0 os. ne ms (21 Jexuary 1963:" | 7 January 1963: 2 April 1982: 26 18 Janvary 1963: a Svecial Sreadeasts ’ abuse; trike aeainst violations.... Tho strike ic the mest tion represents a hone for us and for ali the nations of America. _ to demonstrate its repudiation of the allesed visitors (two UNCLASSIFIED "“Qur standard must be a national Uberation, a transforming liberation, a transforming revolution.... The people of Peru know only too well - that elections will not solve their problems, because Peru needs a complete ‘chance , -a radical ‘ transformation of its economic, political, ‘and. secial - Structures ores, Therefore we must continue to fight, not for small or partial victories but for a tranaformation of Peruvian society, for the . destruction of capitalism.” “The military rvovernment junta Ray rest ‘conpletely assured chat there will be revolution in Peru and the people will’ take OVEPo.ee Ye wonder if among the members of the armed forces there is not & group of truly honorable and patriotic mon who love the people of Peru and are ready to place their weapons at the service of the people....- This is a year which will mark the beginnine of a nev era in Peru.. Ndéw is the ‘tline to vagist with ercater forces and vizor, Strike against . "povorful weapon. ‘The strike cam de more than cen rifles and "the Peruvian people know porfectly wall that the Cuban revolue- It is not oneugh to. éall oneself a revolutionary or support the revolution; it ‘is hocessary to: adopt a rovolutionary attitude.” -"- . ; fo the Dominican Republic: ®Tho Dominican Liberation Movement ‘ealla on the entiro nation U.S. warships), which are comine to outrase the country and to be, Suspiciously , present precisely when the poople are filling the streets in their strurele against the iinpe- rialist U.S, Government. Everyone, forvard to tha fisht for freedom, for national independence, and social progrecs!" -UNCLASSPIED * page Tr=4 Docld: 324273995 Page 31
aS HY 0955 ‘UNCLASSIFIED - “5 yanuary 1963: - "fhe: paople must come again into the streets and domand that _ the emergency law be revoked immediate ly ooos citiazens, all - to the fight to end the’ repressive ma antidemocratic measures!" : . 31, December 1962: “ghe experience of this year wakes obvious to all the need to a carry out tho national antifoudal , anticimperialist rovolution > - _ Te carry ‘out this, revolution means to gostrey the roastlonany > antinatienal, and despotic power of tho Jarpo lendowmors and the great bourgedisic in league with foroipn japerialism." " 96 Decenber 1962: “The situation can be chanecd only by the grassroots nobilizac .. zion of the popular masses, which wilh brine about the proper - conditions to carry out an anticinporialist » anvigeudal revoluc -eion of emancipation." - 3 April 19623. . . “the time wild, comescand i¢ is seoner than you. thinkeovhen the popular. masses of our country, the nagsacred, torturcd, etarvine, and ipeidentist masses, will know how to sottlo ‘accounts with every one of their epprassors. ooo fo the ; streets! _ To arma! Down with tho $llowal. Trujiliista Council » of State!” a ows 21 March 1962: . ‘Ngo Peujidliota Coimeil of State is net ganpotont to Pos0lvO on . the serious naticaal problons in tho gnrorest of Sha countzyo ‘That is why ig mst be overthrown aad woplocod by 2. goverac mont of the people whose hand will not treinblo ia Ubdratiig the country from feudal extortion and Yankee importalict ‘°. donination .” Fe Bo oo 3. -To Quatemala: ~ "1g Janwary 19632 ~ is . 8 , . ' . ° . eet 4 . "The workers arid employees, by means of strikes, and the peasants y by starting a big resistence movemont OVCHYYNOKS » ‘must make their strength felt so as. to acconzuatoe tho popular © nature of the struggic and pave the way to movelutien. ‘The Guatemalan people repudiate Ydigores and His elftaue.” ‘@ . yHCLASSEPTED “nage 12-3 Docld: 32423995 Page 32 a
HY 0955 SECREB) No rorEian-vissem ber of direct Havena radio ineitenente to revolt aplous to Letin Amerigen coumtedes recently, apparently veflecting the tnoreased references te the need for other Latin Amerleas countriee to follow Cuba's example whieh have been noted in recent spéechea of reginé Lead saying that “after Cuba the American revolution will ¢leanse the other coumtries of this dirty blemish of ignorance, maintained purpos ereated groups, Now America bas only one way to ao + the way of revolution that began in Guba.” A late Decenber Gleimed that “a pow i broadcast dhowt Pera erilla movement Le growl the musleus for e future national, itberation army." A 9 January report on the meeting of the Uruguayar Commnist Party quotes ite first secretary @8 saying: “The next phase will be one of hard battles, A sharpened cles@ war may break out et eny time and wunleadh the revolutionary storm ... There is no other way but to forge the social forces of the revolution step ty Step, shaping the unlty of the enti-1: perialist forces whode nucleus i¢ the left-wing Liberation front." A specially beamed “Dominican ligtin" to the Dominican Republic on 31 Deceuber quoted a communique of the "Donindoan Liberation Movement” as saying: "fhe expertence of this yesY mikes Obviews to all the need to carr teudal, anti-imperialist revolution.” On 3 damiaxy, Havens radio attacked Presidant-dldet. Bosch of the Demin out the neti mel, anbi~ ean Republée fox prepering to sell his country to the "American monopoliste." The radio alse repeated instructions from a Cuba-based Dominican exile group urging Dominicans SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 3274273995 Page 33
HY 0955 to mobilize in ¢upport of striking workers. Ten leadin, Sastre exit Czech plone, (PBIS Special wekly report. to the Dally Sumaxy, 4 Jemmery, OFFICIAL USE ONLY) lest sentence above SECRET NOFORN) Docld: 3274273995 Page 34 * Bominiean pro+ Se rocently were trensported to Cuba from Europe aboard a
HY 0955 deaste to Latin Amorics continue to teke the Line that Cubs. "is not expertizig revolution,” but to stress the necessity and inevitability of internal, arn ad leftewing revolution in individual Latin American countrice ~ ealling for a “aolid from’ of the masses tn aupsort of such Pevolutiona throughout the hemisphere, and indeed throughout the world, wituue to receive epecial Broadeasts of 23 aud 86 Decanber galled the Dominican elections a “s: wee", and made the point that such elections are no aubstitute for armed revolutions « such as “the heroie Venezuela revolution which has stirred the vhole continent,” A 97 December brosdeatt. on the Vonécvelen aituation as auch sald: “the workers, Students, inmpeliectuels, and men end women of Venesuela fight ively. Meuberd of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left and of the Demeratic Republican Union, Commmistse, abd other patriots, «ivilien end militar ‘Ys have: fought and still do fight egeinst the treiterous end faselet regime of Betancourt.” ‘The eoimentator aid thet patricta have the: moun teine end lilies of Venasuela; and that the guerrilla movenént tenad nea achive In verlous regions of Venesuale. (FBIS Special Report te the Dail: ry 20 Deceuber, OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Docld: 3274273995 Page 35
Radio Havana's regularly sohedulad program to Para on 7 January wed partioulerly strana in tte appeals to the "Peruvian people” to - tonbinue their revelutionary struggle. The progrom, Like othere directed te several other Letin American countfies, purp sets to be directed by a group of exiles living in Cuba, The 7 Jamuary broadsast to Peru urged continuetion of the struggle ‘gine we already have a good pert of the read behind us." The revolution may be Lengthy, the proadeast states, but "it 1¢ too Inte now to contain the ustoutainsble...the more brutal the represtion, the greater will be the force of the people in their struggle..." Young erny officers were urged to side with the people and, at the right moment, to “lmow whére to direct your rifles." . Broadcasts of this type have béen directad in recent mnths to a nunber of countries, tnoluding the Dontnican Republic, Guatemala, Hondwias, and Nicaragua, lete last mouth, Radice Havana bégan broad-. Gasting dally programs to Haiti in the Creole language. (PRIS Daily Report, 9 Jams OFFICIAL USE ONLY) yg and FSIS Operetdional Develomasats 371, 4 Jemary, Docld: 3274273995 Page 36
A Havana. radiobraadcast 10 January quoted the Central Conedttes of the Venezuelan Comminist Perty as calling President Betencourt'd government the “principel enemy of the Venemielan weopte totey,* Tt called cn the people and Commmist Party of Venesuelé to “master and use Gil forms of eombat needed to achieve Liberation and metional sovereignty." A 7 denuary broadesst ‘begmed from Navena to Pera add thet “the militery-govermment junta may rest completely ageured that there will be revolution in Peru end the people will take over power," ond it concluded = "Now ie the time to resist with greater force and vigor; strike against abuse, strike ageinst vieletions...the strike ie the. most powerful. weapon. The strike ean do more then rifles end bullets,” “ (FBES,. Special Report to Daily Sux ery, OFFICIAL USE ONLY) HY 50955 DBocld:32423995 Page 37
/ wes s AROEIOENT DEC 62 _ LA ‘PAZ poLivin*"") - nUNPDA/DA WASHDC | “nuSo RULPO/CINCARIB) JUL gases \ecafl |  USATGIA | DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY i _ STARE COMMUNICATIONS - OFFICE! os AT 12 YEAR as a ¢ * mg cat TALS; MATICALLY DECLASSTRIED . DOD DIR. 5200. 10 RUBANE/GAIRC ~RULPAK/ jSARCARIB © a TOP AUTO: 7 re j, RUEPDAYDIA WASHDC DIVE Nt po . ee A | ‘eGUeEgree Gis NF ID EN TL A L//TDTG 0745 352 IM USARMA LA | ‘PAZ SGD UIERT. E CxX-59, DA’ FOR ACSI. USARCARIB FOR G2. 7 ' RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS THAT OF. CARABLKERO GUARDS RECENTLY PLACED 0 ERAL , AMBASSADORS RESIDENCES, THOSE - ‘REPORTING TO CUBAN WINED AND DINED INSIDE tage : Aud OBS ERVED LEAVING. EARRYING ARMS. FULL OF “PROPAGANDA, ARMA CHEC CED. AND FOUND. THIS: TO BE TRUE. CAS ALSO INFOe ‘ -DCSOP, 0sD, cs, AF, NAVY, CMC, DIA, iaCaa) DA IN ‘975i boo oo REPR’ SDUCTION) _ PROHIBITED “HW AOO5S5 DocTd:32423995 Page 39° wey