Vd, On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S. support if he is successful in a real coup against the Castro regime." He was also promised arms which will have to be furnished through JMWAVE's operations. A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE on December 6, 7, and 8. Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE authority to drop a cache of arms in Cuba. Then Headquarters called off the operation. In DIR 87615 of 7 December, it is noted "major top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which should provide basis for decision." .f JMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8 December. JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher. author- ity but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be de- layed and not run in December. Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure was to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority" even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation. "This procedure will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirma- tion needed when previously relaxed. operation finally mounted." Head- quarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others. "Believe by January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal assets." BRAN of 13 December ,@Paeuey reported that Amlash left Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December. The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December 1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information relevant to the October-November activities. Nevertheless, in red pen on the cover page appears: "Dec 1963 Not to leave this office onfNesy «(Sanchez orders." followed by initials that appear to be "GM." One later document in the Amlash file contains more information about the November 22, 1963 meeting. That. document, a rough draft of a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found) appears to have been preparediin 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest for a later plot against Castro. It states: "22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald Rand. MreSanchezyassured subject that this Agency would give him every- thing he neédéd: (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). The situation changed when(-Mr.'Sanchezand#Mr.. Fitzgerald left the meet- ing to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because .of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this NLD . PEt HW 53244 - Docld:32202181 Page 6°
Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This included the following. "We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro." is message was communicated to Amlash Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966. Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September- _ November 1963 Amlash operation. Several such documents report informa- tion received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be with Cuban intelligence. [PAanigssZQ@8ito DIR in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intel- ligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban “ exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important opera- tions. Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one re- port rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro. One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given a poison pen for self-protection. - That document reports that Amlash, | and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for self-protection throughout their travel in Europe. 2 cee coe Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA . files to determine what other operations Castro might have been re= ferring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates that some coastal landings of supplies in August were the only other CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period. HW 53244 ©. DoclId: 322021381 Page 7