157-10014-10238 AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10238 “ RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER: 07-M-143 Document Information ORIGINATOR: SSCIA FROM: WALLACH, PAUL TO: SMOTHERS, CURT TITLE : DATE: 07/16/1975 PAGES: 296 SUBJECTS : CIA OPERATION MONGOOSE LANSDALE, EDWARD GILPATRIC, ROSWELL DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: = Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 03/17/2000 v9.t HW 50955 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Docld: 32423676 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information Page 1 ’ Date: W7T2015
AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS HY 50955 Doctld: 32423676 f Date : 08/08/95 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION : SSCIA 2 157-10014-10238 : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE : 07-M-143 DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCIA : WALLACH, PAUL ¢ SMOTHERS, CURT : 07/16/75 ° : 296 GILPATRIC, ROSWELL OPERATION MONGOOSE CIA LANSDALE, EDWARD REPORT TOP SECRET REFERRED POSTPONED IN FULL 01/21/99 {[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 2?
July 16, 1975 To: Curt Smothers From: Paul Wallach Re: ‘Roswell Gilpatric: Comparison of Staff Interview © ~ (7/7/75) and Sworn Testimony (7/8/75) Set forth below are certain observations and comments based upon our July 7, 1975, interview of Roswell Gilpatric and his sworn testimony I took the very next day. . Our initial questioning revealed that Gilpatric — literally has no- present recollection of Operation Mongoose or, for that matter, any U. S./Cuban operations undertaken during his tenure as Under Secretary of Defense with the exception of a vague recollection of sabotage operations targeted against Cuba. Indeed, Gilpatric did not recall either that there was a Chief of Operations for Cuba or a that his old friend Lansdale "directed" Cuban operations = for the SGA. My notes indicate that during the course of our July 7, 1975, interview, Gilpatric indicated that he had HW 50955 DocId:32423626 Page. 3~.—
no present recollection of:* 1. Gen. Lansdale playing any role whatsoever in U.S./Cuban operations during his tenure as Under Secre- tary of Defense. (Gilpatric restated this under oath on July 8; see Testimony, p. 23.) After reviewing numerous he be documents which demonstrated Lansdale's participation, sag Gilpatric surmised that his lack of "Lansdale recollection": et stemmed from Lansdale's “low profile" at Special Group [Augmented] meetings and Gilpatric's preoccupation with other-matters; 2. Gilpatric has no recollection whatsoever * ; PERREEERER of the. term "Mongoose"; 3. Gilpatric could not attribute any special meaning to the Special Group [Augmented]. However, he did recall that there were certain Special Group meetings eee where Robert Kennedy was in attendance. — Despite our reviewing certain relevant documents ene with Gilpatric, his recollection was not substantially t refreshed. After some two hours we reached the determina- tion that in view of his "diminished recollection" his * It is instructive to note that Gilpatric's recollection coincided with that reflected in the Rockefeller Commis- sion's interview summary dated June 3, 1975. NW-S09SSaG0cTd; 3323070 | Baye ae a SN a ee CS
testimony would be of little, if any, value to the Com- mittee. However, in order to ensure that Mr. Gilpatric's recollection (or lack thereof) was made a matter of record, we scheduled single Senator testimony for the morning of July 8, 1975. As I mentioned yesterday, Mr. Gilpatric's recollection of certain of the aforementioned topics was __ substantially greater at his July 8th deposition. Indeed, Mr. Gilpatric recalled a great deal about Gen. Lansdale's participation in Cuban operations (i.e.,: Mongoose) and bes numerous details relating to Special Group [Augmented] activities. Surprisingly enough, Gilpatric's recollection 'was refreshed as to matters that were neither discussed . during the prior day's interview nor set forth or reflected in the documents we reviewed with him during the interview. For example, Gilpatric testified in detail as to operational — aspects of the Special Group [Augmented], the implementation a and various stages of Operation Mongoose, and Administration pressure to "do something about Castro". However, what looms even larger is that Gilpatric -- who only a day prior to his sworn testimony told us that he did not recall Gen. Lansdale being involved at all in Cuban operations -- was able to testify to, inter alia, the following: HW 50955 Docld:32423696 -Paye 5-060 000 veces
Page 23, line 4. Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, going back to the conversations that you -had with Mr. Smothers yesterday, is it correct that before we actually showed you documents —— and refreshed your recollection that you really had no recollection that Gen. Lansdale was in- volved with any Cuban operations. . Mr. Gilpatric. That is right. I had lost track in my own memory of the fact that after he finished up the Vietnam job for me in the spring of 1961, and left off that assignment, that . i he was later on brought back and made Chief of ee Operations. Page 24, line 16. Mr. Wallach. Was it really, then, the function of the Special Group [Augmented] to come up with ideas or to receive ideas from the Agency and to consider them? Mr. Gilpatric. It was generally to stimulate a more vigorous course of action than promsnnsems had been followed prior to this augmentation. . [A]nd Lansdale in his position as Operations’ Director had a large part in stimulating thinking among the group and the ideas that were sent out to the Agency for further study and work. Page 27, line 1. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if Gen. Lansdale had his own staff? Mr. Gilpatric. He had an office with a number of assistants. I don't recall any names except the name HAND which came up yesterday and came back to my mind as a result. a Mr. Wallach. Do you recall how large the staff was? Mr. Gilpatric. It couldn't have been more than half a dozen, because he drew on i the resources of the various elements in the Pentagon, ! including the Joint Staff or the Air Force if he need- ed more assistance. HW “50955. DecId:32423626. Page 6° a Be, ee aie
2 3 Fiend en ie cen 1 Raw aR eta te BO ret at i Le ie alms | weed Page 28, line 24. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what Gen. Lansdale's relationship was with the CIA 'when he worked on the Cuban operation? Mr. Gilpatric. I never detected any friction or any difficulty between them. It certainly didn't exist in the Agency, the same sort of distrust or question about Lansdale as expressed in the State Department, as I explained earlier. Despite our questioning and document review, it is difficult for me to understand Mr. Gilpatric's immensely increased recollection. Apparently Gilpatric did discuss certain of these matters with McNamara over dinner on Mon- day evening. It would also appear that they reviewed McCone's 1967 memorandum. However, based upon McNamara's present recollection, and upon the length of time McNamara and Gilpatric spent together Monday evening, I would not think that the dramatic change in Mr. Gilpatric's recollec- tion can be attributed to an evening with McNamara. 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 7
10 il le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET 3 Senator Baker... Mr. McNamara, tell us who those people were that told you who Lansdale worked for and who they claimed he worked for. Mr. McNamara. Y talked to Max Taylor or Roswell Gil- patric and to Ed Lansdale himself. The three of them, before I called the AP, and the reason I did, I was going to ask the newspapers to correct my statement, what I thought was a mis- statement. Senator Baker. Who did they say he worked for? Mr. McNamara. Well, I would rather Leave it that they said he didn't work for me. Senator Baker. No, no. Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor tole me he worked for hi don't want to draw Max Taylor into this. The Chairman. General Taylor told us the same thing. Mr. McNamara. All right. Senator Schweiker. He has been here. The Chairman. He told us that. Mr. McNamara. I am not trying to broaden the net. I don't want to blacken anybody. Senator Baker. We don't want to blacken anybody. Who else, if anybody? Mr. McNamara. Well, all I can tell you, Max Told me that |Lansdale worked for him at the time. Ros Gilpatric told me 4 that it was his understanding he worked for Max at the time. - eaarbounsen ‘Page 8 | TOO GECDET
10 ll le 13 14 1 16 17 18 19 20 el 235 24 25 M55 Dockd:324235626 Page 9 mums am. erin 22 TOP SECRET a |. program. I don't know whether the memo referred to it as such and I am sure, therefore, that the program in the sense of the original structure and action to consider what could be done to weaken the Cuban regime was authorized by the President. I don't wish to imply that whatever actions we took, and I have lost recollection what they were -- I don't want to imply every one of those individual actions was authorized by the President. I doubt it very much. Mr. Schwarz. ‘Was a program to overthrow the Castro regime authorized? ‘Mr. McNamara. t think one would phrase it somewhat definitely. I think a program to weaken the Castro regime with the hope that it would be overthrown was authorized. I think that was the objective. I tried to recall as best I can what the objective was and I think that is the best expression of it. Mr. Schwarz. There is a memorandum which is dated April 13, "62, it in the Taylor Book generally here or not? Senator Morgan. No. Mr.Schwarz. I can read the whole thing into the record. It is a memorandum from Maxwell D. Taylor for the record April 13, '62. Subject: Operation MONGOOSE, and it refers to you, Mr. Secretary, and I would like to ask you to explain, if you can, what you understand the position attributed to you to be after it had been read into the record.
, 19 23 24 29 10 li 12 13. 14 15 16 a 18 21 22 REM 34423626 Page 10 an TOP SECRET 0 Mr. McNamara. I can't refresh my memory any more than I have as to what Gilpatric said. Mr. Smothers. Let's not make it a tradeoff. My concern is that, going back to that 30 May conversation, you recall you said this guy Lansdale, who did he work for. Mr. McNamara. That is right. Mr. Smothers. And again Mr. Gilpatric said to you what, as best you can recall? Mr. McNamara. I will refer to my notes again. I would like to be precise on this. Gilpatric said that in August of '62 Lansdale was not working for either Gilpatric or McNamara, he was working for a committee that had something to do with MONGOOSE, or what I know called MONGOOSE. He said I think Cuba covert action. Mr. Smothers. Cuba covert action? Mr. McNamara. Covert operation, something like that. Mr. Smothers. You had also testified earlier that you had had a conversation with several other persons in an effort to put together the circumstances surrounding this August affair? Mr. McNamara. That is correct. “Mr. Smothers. And you mentioned General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Rusk. Again recognizing the purpose is not to have you testify or reveal any confidence, I wonder if you could recant briefly for the committee the substance of those TAT CECRET iS Te.
88 una! TOP SECRET This is, as I see it, quite a little different approach. Mr. McNamara. Let me both refer to what I said half an hour ago and if you don't think I am referring to it correctly check the record, then also let me refer to this. ; ‘A half hour ago I don't believe we were talking about the President. What I was discussing was the control by senior of- ficials of the Administration of the CIA and I stated that I believed that there were no major actions undertaken by CIA that, were not properly authorized by senior officials. | Now, I did not mean to imply by that every major action taken by CIA was authorized by the President. I think I very carefully used the term senior officials, and I meant ia particularly the members of the 54/12 committee, and through / them I meant myselt and Secretary Rusk. I did not mean to imply the President himself parti- cipated in a review of or authorization of major actions of CIA. Now, 1 state then that, having said that, I was faced with a dilemma of the kind you are when you tell me that assassination attempts have been carried out by CIA, and I said I have no knowledge of it’ because I believed: that I would have had knowledge of that kind of event carried out by CIA, and I believe I would not have only had knowledge, I believe it would not have been carried out without my author- ization or the authorization of senior officials reporting to 2499696 Page 11 Tris CFACRET
Tab Tab Tab ; ‘ 4 “ 4 A 4 t é a i Tab Tab i i : vt j “4 € * Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab —— Tab Tab Tab 10 ll 12 13 14 1/8/75 1/8/75 10/5/61 undated 1/25/62 3/5/62, 3/6/62 3/12/62 3/13/62 3/13/62 3/13/62 3/13/62 4/5/62 4/12/62 HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 Page i2 INDEX TO GILPATRIC DOCUMENTS Gilpatric testimony, pp. 5,5-49. Gilpatric testimony, pp. 77~100 NSAM #100 to Sec. of State from Bundy re "Contingency Planning for Cuba." Memo to Lansdale re "Cuba Project" with reference | to "Memorandum from your Office for Brig. Gen. W. H. Craig, USA; subj.: "Special Project," dated 17 January 1962." Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 January 1962. Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) on Project Mongoose, 5 March 1962. Memo to Dep. Sec. Def. from Craig re "Comments on the Guidelines for Operation Mongoose." Memo to Special Group (Augmented) from Lansdale re "Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose." Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962." Memo to Dep. Sec. Def. from Craig re "Comments on CIA's Recommended Changes to the Guidelines for Operation Mongoose." Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962." Memo to the Special Group (Augmented) re "Consolidated Status Report, DOD/JCS Representatives, Carribean Sur- vey Group, 4 January-9 March 1962." Memo to Lansdale from Gilpatric re "..meeting of a Mongoose group next Wednesday afternoon.” Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 12 April 1962."
HW 450955 Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Tab Docld: 32423626 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 a4 25 26 eT 6/14/62 1/31/62 8/3/62 ‘undated 8/10/62 8/13/62 10/ 4/62 10/26/62 10/31/62 10/31/62 12/3/62 9/6/63 4/14/67 Page 13 ‘Memo to Martin, Craig, Harvey, Wilson from Lansdale re "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning." Memo to Chief of Operations, Mongoose from Harris re "U.S. Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)." DOD Task #69, "Ideas to beefup course of action B! Unidentified document removed from DOD files. Minutes of Meeting Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, August 10, 1962. Memorandum from Gen. Lansdale to William Harvey, Robert Hurwitch, Gen. Harris, Don Wilson,8/13/62, re "Alternate Course B." Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 4 October 1962." ‘Memorandum for the Record re "Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 26 October 1962." Memo for the Record by Lansdale re "Outline of Covert Operations(describing Gilpatric request ‘for outline re Operations Mongoose in light of current U.S. -USSR negotiations re Cuba) Memo for the Record by Lansdale re "Outline of Covert Operations"(describing what Lansdale did after re- ceiving task) Memorandum for the Record by Helms re "Talk with General Lansdale." Memo to Bundy from Chase re "Exile Raids - Extent of Knowledge Within the Executive Branch." Memo to the Director from McCone.
TO: Messrs. Smothers and Wallach Re: Roswell Gilpatric -- Short Summary Date: July 16, 1975 . _ —— Gilpatric waS appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Materiel in August of 1951 and Under Secretary of the Air Force in December of 1951. In May of 1953 he returned to private practice in New York, where he remained until January of 1961 when he was appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense. He held that office from January 20, we 1961, until January 20, 1964, at which time he then return- — ed to private practice in New York City. As Under Secretary he served as Defense's repre- sentative on the Special Group and Special Group [Augment- _ : ' ed). The documents establish that Gilpatric was the most Por ‘frequent attendee at the SG and SGA meetings during the period of "Cuban operations". ~ br fam &- rs Gilpatric also worked closely with Lansdale prior to the latter's Mongoose involvement. In February, March, and April of 1961, Lansdale served as Gilpatric's deputy on his "Vietnam Task Force". It was Gilpatric who at this time brought Lansdale to the Kennedys‘ attention. NW °50955— DocTd: 32423626 Page-14°
Gilpatric's examination should encompass the fol-. léwing questions and areas:* The operational structure of the Special Group and Special Group [Augmented], and the Defense' Ss role in Cuban operations. Was the policy/approval structure employed by the Special Group [Augmented] such that the operational people had authority, albeit implicit, to formulate and/or initiate plans to assassinate Castro or his immediate entourage? . —_—— To what extent were the Special Group [Augmented] Mongoose plans and/or operations authorized by -_ uf or made known to President Kennedy? The extent of the military's involvement in Operation Mongoose. What, if any, plans existed -- contingency or otherwise -- for the invasion -Of Cuba by U. S. military forces? Did the Special Group, Special Group [Augmented], or any other person or entity entertain or approve plans to assassinate Castro or members of Castro's entourage? Pertinent Relationships: General Lansdale Gilpatric was one of the ——en first Kennedy Administra- tion people exposed to . pe Lansdale. Gilpatric will testify that he recommended Lansdale highly to the Kennedys. Robert McNamara As the Under Secretary of . Defense, Gilpatric worked closely with Secretary ; McNamara. Also,.close ; relationship still exists, as exemplified by recent discussions. * See Comparison of Gilpatric's Staff Interview (7/7/75) and Sworn Testimony (7/8/75) enclosed herewith. HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 Rage’ gear
t Generals Harris These were the DOD/JCS and Craig representatives to the Special Group [Augmented]. They also worked out of — the Pentagon and frequently reported to Gilpatric. seepage mamma a nets a BI yee gE et Od te HW 50959"Docla:32423626' Page 16 mer Ses SE re 7 —
SECRET ~ SENSITIVE ca) “2 John T. Connor C. Douglas Dillon Erwin N. Griswold | Lane Kirkland : Lyman L. Lemnitzer : Ronald Reagan LvV)- 3 Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES _ mo Washington, DC 20500 A | 3 June 1975 v Nelson A. Rockefeller, - : David W. Belin, A Chairman . : Executive Director i eC: i, us ‘, rd MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES SUBJECT: Operation Mongoose? Interview with Roswell Leavitt Giipatrick ‘On Thursday, May 29, 1975 at 2:30 P.M., I met with Roswell Leavitt Gilpatrick in his office at Cravaty.. Swaine and Moore, 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York. Mr. Gilpatrick was named Air Force assistonnrsisUtany: for Materiel in 1951. From 1951 to 1953 he was) denise 0 Secretary of the Air Force and from 1961 to lt ye was Deputy Secretary of Defense. 1. I asked him whether he could recall any discussions about actions. to be taken against Cuban leaders during the period he was Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1961 and 1962. He answered that he had participated in a number of discussions with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNamara after the Bay of Pigs failure. He also participated in the discussions held by the 54-12 group. Gilpatrick recalls discussing plans to disrupt the economy of Cuba and other ideas about weakening the Cuban government. The CIA submitted the plans to the 54-12 group and the group would approve or reject them. At no time Gilpatrick said was any discussion or planning held in his presence concerning an assassination of Castro or other Cuban leaders. Gilpatrick was very definite about this. 2. I asked Gilpatrick if he recognized the term "Special Group Augmented." He said he did not and when I explained to him that the "augmented" probably referred to the addition ! of Robert Kennedy to an intelligence planning group, he ‘said that did not help his retollection. Gilpatrick said Kennedy came to the Pentagon frequently and discussed Latin American affairs; particularly freeing the prisoners from the Bay of Pigs. Gilpatrick said Robert Kennedy did meet occasionally with the 54-12 group to listen to CIA suggested projects. SECRET ~- SENSITIVE we HW 50955 Docid:32423626 .Page 1F "go 0 Me mme a
on” SECRET - SENSITIVE 3. I asked Gilpatrick if he recalled a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office on August 10, 1962 at which Secretary McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and General Lansdale were present. Gilpatrick did not remember such a meeting. He sent out to have his secretary locate his diary from the period when he was Deputy Secretary of Defense to see if the meeting was listed in his diary. He discovered the diary had been sent to the Kennedy Library. ..I asked Gilpatrick if the overall planning against Cuban leaders included possible liquidation of those leaders. He said it did not and moreover, he did not think General Lansdale ever participated in any discussions concerning Cuba. Gilpatrick said Lansdale was his Assistant as head of a Special Task Force on Vietnam and that in Gilpatrick's recollection Lansdale had no participation in Cuban matters. Mr. Gilpatrick did not recognize the term "Executive ' Action Capability" and he said he had never heard of Operation Mongoose. 4, I asked Mr. Gilpatrick if he was familiar: with a plan to make an attempt on .fidel Castro's life at the Sports Palace in Havana, Cuba on April 9, 1961? Gilpatrick said he had never heard of such an attempt or a plan for such an attempt. To Gilpatrick's knowledge the Department of Defense . was not involved in such a plan. Gilpatrick said that he was in charge of the 54-12 matters for the Department of Defense and was under instruction from McNamara to be sure the CIA didn't involve itself in any plan beyond its capabilities. Gilpatrick said McNamara was especially sensitive to that after the Bay of Pigs failure. Gilpatrick also recalled he found himself in dispute with the CIA over who would run € reconnaissance over Cuba during the missile crisis. - Gilpatrick said that the reconnaissance operations were beyond the capability of the CIA and Gilpatrick insisted the Department of Defense conduct the operations. that 5. Gilpatrick commented to me/the press had been calling up asking questions about possible involvement in assassination plans against Castro and that he had tried to refresh his memory and think back over that period of time. Of course, Gilpatrick had no files or contemporaneous documents to help him refresh his memory. 1 t SECRET ~ SEVSITIVE 2 HW 50955 “Docld:32423626 Page 18 SO ee wees i ‘pocarcamanessenetete
po _cb Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL ” 610 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 il 12 13 i4 15 16 17 18 19 20 £2 21. Losers Page 19 — om TOP SECRET ; | I returned to private practice in New York City. And in. January of 1961 I was appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense. And I held that office from January 20, 1961 until January 20, 1964. Mr. Wallach. I think you may have misspoken when you said 1973. You meant -- Mr. Gilpatric. You mean after -- Mr. Wallach. In any event, you held that until 1964. And then in 1964 you returned to private practice? Mr, Gilpatric. Private practice. And the only position of any governmental nature I have today is, I am Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Mr. Wallach. What was the exact date, Mr. Gilpatric, that you came on board as Undersecretary of Defense? Mr. Gilpatric. I was sworn in on January 20, 1961. Mr. Wallach. I take it, then, the only experience that you had with the military prior to that was as Secretary of Materiel for the Air Force? Mr. Gilpatric. Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary during the Korean War. | Mr. Wallach. Was Mr. McNamara Secretary of Defense at that time? Mr. Gilpatric. He was, and through the time that I served as his deputy. Mr. Wallach. When you really began toward the end of
_ch 5 TOP SECRET | 5 Cy = al January or early February of 1961, did you have any occasion 3 2 to serve on what was known as the Special Group or the 5412 5 3 Committee?’ | 4 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. The Committee to which you refer 5 had been set up in structure during the preceeding Eisenhower 6 Administration. And when I took office, by virtue of being 7. the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I was the Defense Representative 8 on that Committee. And I remained so during the period I 9 was in office. 10 Mr. Wallach. Was that by Mr. McNamara's own choosing tha V1 he decided to have you do that, or was that a matter of 2 12 custom that preexisted? | & 13 Mr. Gilpatric. The President decided to continue the z 14 || practice inaugurated during the preceeding administration of 15 ||) having the Special Advisor on Security Affairs, Mr. Bundy, 16 and the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of LL? Defense, and the Director of the CIA comprise that group. 18 And that was accepted by the principals, namely, the Secretary : 19 of State and the Secretary of Defense. And later on the group 3 20 was expanded to include the principals, namely, the Secretary 8 : 2] ‘of State and the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney Generali. f 22 Mr. Wallach. Did you recall why the group was expanded : 23 to include those three people? a : 24 Mr. Gilpatric. The President and the Attorney General 95 felt that by including the principles the focus on Cuba and HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 20 Te.8 GEC RET
eb 6 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el ce 23 24 29 TOP SECRET og after the Bay of Pigs would be more sharply focused. And as I recall,. it was largely at the instigation of the Attorney General that the principals were brought into what had previously been just the deputies. Mr. Wallach. Do you know if that is what has been. referred to as the Special Group Augmented? Mr. Gilpatric. Having had my recollection refreshed yesterday through the curtesy of Mr. Wallach, I do recall that name as having been applied to this expanded group. Mr. Wallach. I would like to state for the record, since you mentioned that, Mr. Gilpatric, that yesterday Mr. Smother and I met with Mr. Gilpatric for about two and a half house and discussed the issues we were going to cover here with him today, and also showed him a variety of documents. And at that time Mr. Smothers and I talked together, and Mr. Smothers made the decision that we take Mr. Gilpatric's testimony in Executive Session here today instead of before the full committee. Mr. Gilpatric, were you involved in any way in planning for the Bay of Pigs? Mr. Gilpatric. Only peripherally. I was brought in only in sessions that were held in the Pentagon when some of the paramilitary aspects of that operation were being discussed. Certain members of the military were detailed to review the planning of the Central Intelligence Agency. And when they Docld:3 23626 Page 21 Trai GEFDET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 60955 cb 7 10 11 12 13 14 LS 16 1? 18s 19° 20 al 2a £3 24 295 Docld: 3274273626 Page 22 TOP SECRET 9 came back to report to Mr. McNamara and the Chairman of the _ Joint Chiefs, then General Lemnitzer, I sat in on those meeting I did not attend any meetings outside of the Pentagon relating to the Bay of Pigs. And my only knowledge of it other than those meetings came through what Mr. McNamara told me. Mr. Wallach. Did you remember the substance of the report? Was it a recommendation to go ahead or not to go ahead? Mr. Gilpatric. The decision as to whether to go ahead or not to go ahead was taken either at the White House or the Sta Department. And I was not party to those proceedings. Mr. Wallach. Specifically I am talking about what you remember the military recommending as to the operation. Mr. Gilpatric. Well, the military had a number of reservations about the way in which the agency was setting up to do this, and the amount of cover, the amount of equipment, the resources generally that were being applied. And some of those points came up in those discussions that I heard. And they were ultimately communicated back to the President and to the other top officials, either Mr. McNamara or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. There were no decisions: reached at these briefing sessions which I attended. Mr. Wallach. How do you know that Joint Chiefs or Mr. McNamara communicated that to the President. Mr. Gilpatric. Mr. McNamara told me that he was attending other sessions. And it was my assumption that he and General TO! SECRET
7 > Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 n WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 Ll le 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 el £2 rae) 24 25 BDoclda: 3278736276 Page 23 TOP SECRET | | ; Lemnitzer expressed the views that they expressed at the meeting. But I have no direct knowledge because I was not 'at the meetings. Mr. Wallach. Did the military people who sort of reporte on this to you and Mr. McNamara give you any prognosis or suggestions in terms of percentage or anything like that? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall anything other than a general attitude of skepticism, which was. not unusual when the Agency was mounting a paramilitary operation. The natural tendency of the military was to sort of second guess and question the judgment of the people in the Agency. That happened at subsequent times, but I think it was also, as I recall it, 3 expressed at that time. The specifics about the reservations I could not say. Mr. Wallach. Did you remember if there were any comments along the line of, it was much too big an operation for the CIA to handle? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall those particular words. But certainly there was doubt among the military as to whether the Agency could mount this kind of an exercise without draw- ing more on the expertise that the military felt that they had, and that was their principal line of business. Mr. Wallach. Were there contingency plans drawn up to follow up the CIA sending in the Cubans? Mr. Gilpatric. The word at the time I took office and the aE <i 2 ff Ay CG aie ut, omen mee
2] or: Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL HY 410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 0955 10 ll 12. 13 14 “15 16; 17 18 19 20 21 22 £3 24 20 TOP SECRET a word continually throughout the period of my services as Deputy Secretary was contingency plans for every conceivable: eventuality, including the possibility of an invasion of Cuba. Now, those plans existed before we came in, and these were . constantly being revised and brought up for review at the meetings that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had with the Secretary of Defense and myself. I don't recall any particular changes in those plans that were made in conjunction with this Bay of Pigs operation. “But the plans were in existence with the Joint Chiefs and the Joint staff. Mr. Wallach. Prior to the Bay of Pigs, sir, were you aware of any other on-going operations that were being targete toward Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Were you specifically aware of any other sabotage operation... or anything of that nature? Mr. Gilpatric. Not prior to the Bay of Pigs. Mr. Wallach. After the Bay of Pigs was there any sort of change in the structure of the Special Group or change in the emphasis of the Special Group? Mr. Gilpatric. The change _- and there was a change -- occurred, as I recall it, gradually over a priod of months follow- ing the spring of 1961. I don't recall exactly when this expanded Special Group augmented was set up. My best recollection is that 5412 continued to function in the way it DoclId:32 27626 Page 24
HY cb 10 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 0955 10 1i le 13. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 ae) 24 Zo TOP SECRET | 7 was set up, namely, the CIA would come up with a particular project or proposal to infiltrate some people into Cuba, either intelligence gathering, or sabotage, and that would be reviewed before the 5412 Committee, and either sent back to the Agency, or changed, or disapproved, or if it were approved, it would be passed through Mr. Bundy to the President. Some-~ time during those months that followed the Bay of Pigs the Attorney General felt that more emphasis, more focus, more high level attention should be given to those efforts to weaken the Castro regime and to prevent it from exporting its subversion to neighboring countries like the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. And as a result, the principals, namely, the Attorney General himself, and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were added to the group, and he had a larger body of people who passed on what the Agency was doing, and also tended to press the Agency for more efforts in this regard. | Mr. Wallach. If we could just sort of focus in or a moment on what you described as the Attorny General's emphasis, or the Administration pressure, did you at that time feel that there was Administration pressure really being put on you, for example, to get something done with respect to Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. Not on me, because the Defense Department wasn't the focal point. We were treated as a supporting agency to the Central Intelligence Agency. And obviously if Docld: 39423626 Page 25 Oe aa Se ee
‘eb 11 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20063 25 HW 40955 Doold:3 423626 Page 26 TOP SECRET | . 4a nothing went wrong with an Agency operation, the military might be involved. Ad you say, we had contingency plans in that event. But the focal point was on. the Agency itself, which after the Bay of Pigs was a rather shaken organization, and changes were in process. The director left. In due course the director of operations, Mr. Bissell, left. So the whole thrust of the effort initiated by the administration was to strengthen, beefup and otherwise try to make the Agency' efforts in this regard more effective. But the actual operational activities were to be carried on by the Agency or by its personnel, not by anybody in the Defense Department. Mr. Wallach. Do you know Mr. McCone? Mr. Gilpatric. Very well. Mr. Wallach. Would you say that the administration put pressure on Mr. McCone to get something done with respect to Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. It was understood from the beginning when he came in -~- and I don't recall the exact date in 1961 when he took over -~- it was certainly made clear to him in my presence at least, on some occasions that that was one of the first orders of business, to see to it that the Agency came up with more imaginative and hopefully more effective measures to cope with the Castro regime. | Mr. Wallach. Do you know if there were any limitations made on his imagination in terms of what the Agency could
WARD & PAUL HW 450955 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 aes ~ RO 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 il le 13 14 15 16 L7 ‘18 19 20 el 22 20 24 £9 TOP SECRET la, have come up with? Mr. Gilpatric. Only through this mechanism. But no plan or procedural could be put into effect unless it had the approval of. the President, and it had to go through the channel of this 5412 Group expanded, as we have discussed, by having the principals sit in as well as the deputies. Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, did the planning for the Bay of Pigs go :through the:5412 Group? Mr. Gilpatric. No, not during my time. Mr. Wallach. Do you know if it went through the 5412 prior to your time? Mr. Gilpatric. No. TI don't know whether that was hived off of the 5412 Group or it was under the jurisdiction of that Group, but it was a separate operation at the time the Kennedy Administration took office in January of 1961. Mr. Wallach. Do you know why the Bay of Pigs operation was not put through the 5412 mechanism? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not there were any other operations targeted at Cuba or any other country that were not put through 5412? ' Mr. Gilpatric. No. And I don't say that it wasn't put through, I said I didn't know for a fact whether it was or was not put through. I just know it was handled separately at the time that Mr. McNamara and I and the others in the Kennedy Docld: 334736236 Page 37 TO iD SECRET
cb 13 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 £2 Ro 24 20 TOP SECRET 4, Administration came in. It was treated as a much more secure, sensitive project with a much smaller circle of need~ to-know people by January and early February of 1961. Mr. Wallach. I take it that the Committee you have been talking about, the one that has expanded after the Bay of Pigs with Mr. Robert Kennedy and Mr. McNamara and the Secretary of State, amounted to a fairly large group? Mr. Gilpatric. With their aids. You always had the military, you had General Taylor there, either as special assistant to the President or later on when he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he was always involved in this group. An General Lemnitzer before that. And they usually had deputies. Mr. Wallach. I would like to note that at approximately 10:18 Senator Huddleston left to go to the full committee hearing. I take it, then, we were talking about a group that could have amounted to 15 or 20 people at some meetings. Mr. Gilpatric. Certainly more than a dozen, possibly as many as 15. | Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not there were any highly secret operations that were not put through this group of more than a dozen people during the time that you were there? Mr. Gilpatric. As I recall it, this group was concerned exclusively with Cuba. And we didn't have any other operations Docld:32423626 Page 28 TFA? CKREPRET
TOP SECRET cb 14 5 14 : a a ae in the expanded group. Now, 5412 kept functions as a smaller 3 2 group on various exercises and projects that came up from the F 5 Agency involving other countries. But the expanded group 4 - concentrated on Cuba. And I don't recall-any other 5 | activities that came before that expanded group. 6 Mr. Wallach. Basically at least some of the people who 7 were in 5412 were also in the Special Group Augmented, is 8 that correct? 9 Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct. 10 | Mr. Wallach. And did there come a point in time when the Ll Special Group Agumented was created for the purpose of focusin 2 12 | on Cuba? | ‘a a : 13 Mr. Gilpatric. Right. 3 14 Mr. Wallach. Getting back to what we talked about 15 before as administration pressure, were you aware of any 16 instances where either President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy 17 made requests for actions that circumvented the normal channels? 18 Mr. Gilpatric. That was certainly true in the case of th : 19 counterinsurgency planning activities in Southeast Asia. : 20 They were handled out of the usual channels of intergovernmental 8 E 21 actions. And there was another special group, socalled : 20 counterinsurgency group, set up again as the instance of the : 23 Attorney General, and of which he was a member, and which Cc : 24 tried to pull together all the planning and initiation of ¢ 25 steps to resist the Communist inroads in Laos, Thailand, and HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 29 TO SGECRET
eb 15 TOP SECRET 4s 3 co i 1 South Vietnam patricularly. 2 Mr. Wallach. I am trying to get a flavor from you 5 5 really as to how the President and the Attorney General 4 operated at that time. Would you say it would have been 5 || unusual for them to pick up the phone and make a request 6 for some action from Mr. McCone? 7 Mr. Gilpatric. They believed very much in direct 8 approaches to people at whatever level they happen to be in me) the Executive Branch structure, without going always through 10 the head of the particular agency. And in the case of the 11. Defense Department, that was fully understood and accepted 12 by Mr. McNamara and myself. And the request might come throug 13 to me, to Mr. McNamara, or sometimes to Mr. Lemnitzer who “WARD & PAUL 14 was Secretary of Security for International Affairs, or Mr. 15 Vance, who was Secretary of the Army. And that was accepted 16 as sort of not unusual procedure during that period of the 1? Kennedy Administration. 18 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, do you know a General Edward : 19 Lansdale? : 20 | Mr. Gilpatric. I do. 6 e 21 Mr. Wallach. When was the first occasion that you recall : 22 meeting General Lansdale? : 23 Mr. Gilpatric. I met him early on after my installation a : D4 in office, probably by late February or March, when I was . 25 assigned by President Kennedy to head up the first task force HW 50955 Docld:33823676 Page 30 TFA! E€RPfRET
° 16 TOP SECRET 16 a 2 1 looking to what might be done to strengthen the Diem govern- i vf ment in South Vietnam. General Lansdale, who was then a 3 5 colonel in the Air Force, and on’ active duty in the Pentagon, 4 was assigned to me because of his prior experience during 5 the Eisenhower Administration in Indo-China generally and 6 the Philippines, particularly in South Vietnam. And from 7 that time on until sometime in May or June of 1961 General 8 Lansdale, or Colonel Lansdale as he then was, in effect 9 served as my special assistant in regard to the planning for 10 South Vietnam. ; il . Mr. Wallach. Who else was on this Vietnam Task Force le that you described to us? . \eu’ «=O < 16 Mr. Gilpatric. There were representatives of the Nationa 14 Security Council, I believe Mr. Rostow. There were repre- 15 sentatives from. the Department of State. I believe it was 16 Alexis Johnson, although I may not recall some of the names 1? directly. And there was a representative from the Central 18 Intelligence Agency. I think it was Desmond Fitzgerald. And 8 19 there were representatives from the Joint Staff of the Services. G : 20 I don't recall the names of the various officers. There was : 21 a group of about 15 or 20 who met regularly for two or three 3 4 22, weeks in the Pentagon, and ultimately came up with a series : 235 of recommendations which were presented to the President, as YS : 24 I recall, in.April of 1961. And at that time Colonel Lansdale, 25 as my assistant, I believe was present at that meeting with the HW 50955 Docld:32493626 Page 31
eee TOP SECRET 1 2 _ - a 1 President. And the Attorney General was there. & i e Mr .. Wallach. Had Colonel Lansdale been recommended ‘to 3 5 you as an expert on Asian affairs? 4 “Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. He was proffered by the -- whether 5 it was General Lemnitzer or General White, the Chief of Staff 6 of the Air Force -- by one of the principal military advisors, ? Lansdale was put forward as a man who would be useful for this 8 kind of. exercise for which I was put in charge. 9 Mr. Wallach. How in your mind was Lansdale useful to LO you are your deputy? 11 | Mr. Gilpatric. Well, he had had a vast amount of exper- 1 : le ience in sort of quasi military, at times clandestine, - 13 operations, dealing with governments and factions through this 14 area. He worked in the Philippines with Macapagal in handling 15 guerrilla problems there. ‘He had been in Vietnam a number of 16 times. He had formed a personal relationship with the 17 President Diem of South Vietnam. And he was held out, and fou 18 by me, to be a very knowledgeable person in the conditions tha 19 |} then existed in South Vietnam, the different faction and 20 sects that were presenting problems for the Government of el South Vietnam. 22 . Mr. Wallach. My knowledge of history is not the greatest, 25 but wasn't it difficult at that time for Americans to get 410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 24 close to the President of South Vietnam? aS Mr. Gilpatric. I don't know, because I never met him. HW 50955 Docld: 32823626 Page 32 TO. GECRET
cb 18 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10. ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 29 HY 50955 DBocld: 320236276 Page 33 TOP SECRET | a8 Lansdale obviously was an unusual type of military officer who succeeded in establishing relations with other nationals, and gaining their confidence, and if you will, working his “way into organizations of other nationals. And he thereby gained a considerable insight into, say, the South Vietnamese character which I for one and most of those in the Kennedy Administration lacked entirely. Mr. Wallach. Did General Lansdale ever have a direct command assignment where he had men under him that you are aware of? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall. He was primarily a staff officer. Mr. Wallach. Do you know who he reported to at that time? Mr. Gilpatric. I think he reported to either the Chief oer the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force. He was always on a special duty. He didn't have a regular slot in the | hierarchy of the Air Force during the time I'knew him. Mr. Wallach. I think you said before that at least he had a reputation for being involved in quasi-clandestine activit- ies. Did you recall any more specifics about that reputation? Mr. Gilpatric. No, not the specifics, at least I don't recall them now after 14 years. I was just aware of his general experience and background and the knowledge and facili that he displayed in inventing, coming up with ideas of
cb 19 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450945 LO il 12 13 14 15 16, 1? 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 20 pocta:34 423626 Page 34 TOP SECRET - counterinsurgency and antiguerrilla activities, as well as intelligence and counterintelligence type of activities. Mr. Wallach. ‘And he had, for example, a thorough knowledge of guerrilla warfare? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not Mr. Fitzgerald had known General Lansdale and had worked with him prior to working with him on your committee? Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't. Mr. Wallach. I take it during the time that the Vietnamese Task Force we were talking about was in session you did have occasion to meet with either the President or the Attorney General to discuss the essence of what you were working on? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes..« There were at least two sessions with the President, and because of the increasing rather ominous prospects in Vietnam, the President brought in the Attorney General as well as the Vice President for those sessions. So that they had an opportunity to hear directly from me, assisted by Lansdale, what we were recommending and why we were recommending it, and the discussions that went on before the President finally reached the conclusion on those recommendations. Mr. Wallach. I take it, then, that General Lansdale was also present with you at the times you met with President GRR fl | tt, 2S Ce a ee ee
cb 20 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 LO 11 le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 29 TOP SECRET 20 Kennedy and the Attorney General? Mr. Gilpatric. at least some of the times, certainly two or more. Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether oer not the President and the Attorney General had known of Mr. Lansdale prior to his coming on board with you? Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't. Mr. Wallach. Did you make any comments to them about Mr. Lansdale? Mr. Gilpatric.. I commended the work he Had done as my assistant to this group for whom we made the recommen- dations, including the President, and the Attorney General, because I found him to be extremely helpful. And he was at that stage very tactful in his dealings with other agencies involved, the White House Staff, the CIA, and the State Department. And I found him to be in that assignment very effective, and I said so. Mr. Wallach. Did either the President or the Attorney General express any opinion to you about Mr. Lansdale? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Do you know when in fact he was promoted to General? Mr. Gilpatric. Both Secretary McNamara and I recommended him for promotion thereafter. Whether this was the summer or fall of 1961 I don't recall. But we did, on the basis of our Docld: 32423626 Page 35 to Oe) cren ng
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ‘HW 509455 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 2. N | a 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Rl Le 25 24 25 Docla: 32423626 Page 36 TOP SECRET oo experience, particularly my experience with him on the South Vietnamese Task Force, endorse his promotion to General. Mr. Wallach. Did part of the recommendation that you mad asa result of that report suggestion that General Lansdale go over to South Vietnam, or Colonel Lansdale? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall any specific suggestion to that effect, although it was discussed, and we learned that there were certain elements in the State Department which did not favor General Lansdale‘: going out there, on the basis © that he had a special relationship with Diem which, if renewed, would go sort of out of channels as far as the State Depart- ment was concerned. And so there was a reluctance on the part of the State Department to see him go back to Vietnam at that time. Later on Ambassador Lodge did take him out there as his own assistant. But that was after I left the government. Mr. Wallach. I think you said before that both yourself and Mr. McNamara recommended General Lansdale for a promotion. Did Mr. McNamara ever express to you his feeling about General Lansdale? Mr. Gilpatric. No. We saw very little of Lansdale at that time, other than that Lansdale accompanied me and assisted me in presenting our Task Force recommendations. And I think he felt that Lansdale had done a good job. I told him so. And he accepted that, and joined with me in SM lime il Me BRR cit A tm aout
-¢ecb 22 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ad 2 < a & Nae Fs & C4 3 fa) ° ro) 6 N gy a ce 3 a & £ 3 2 wi “i o 2 a gz ra Neer 8 t HY S095 LO il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 “el 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET | 29 recommending him. But at that stage Lansdale had very little contact directly with McNamara. ~ Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara at any time ever tell you that he did not think Mr. Lansdale was very straightforward or up front or readable? Mr. Gilpatric. Not at that stage, because he hadn't had the contact which would form the foundation for that kind of belief. I recall some doubts that McNamara expressed later on when he dealt with Lansdale more closely. And as a result, he, McNamara, never used Lansdale himself as an aid or assistant. Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara express the nature of those doubts to you? Mr. Gilpatric. No, not specifically. He just indicated that he wasn't comfortable with having Lansdale as his own personal assistant. He didn't give him any task or assignment. to my knowledge. Mr. Wallach. when did McNamara have further contact with General Lansdale. Mr. Gilpatric. That arose after Lansdale became the Chief of Operations for this Augmented Special Group. As you - refreshed my recollection yesterday by showing me the docu- ments, he was appointed by the President and the Chief of . Operations for this Special Group Augmented. And from that time on McNamara was exposed to him through the activities of Docld:32023626 Page 37 TD 1) GECRPET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10° 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 235 | 24 20 TOP SECRET 23 that Special Group Augmented, beginning, I guess, sometime toward the end of 1961, but certainly by the early part of Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, going back to the conver- cnn sations that you had with Mr. Smothers yesterday, 1 is s it correct = oe Sinner 2 that before we actually showed you documents and_ xefreshed TT ene ee your recollection, that you really had_no_ recollection _that arte anna SHORT SEES METI! Sneek on es General Lansdale was involved with any Cuban operations? nena Mr. Gilpatric. That. is right. I. had lost track in 1 my pa veenrenre rien eee Lown memory of the fact that after he finished up, the Vietnam TR a ce nen i ea tn ee ae cer ence nen cane ates job for me in the spring of 1961, and left off that assignment, ra Nc that he was later on brought back and made Chief of Operations. I had forgotten that until you showed me the documents which make that very plane. It just had not stayed with my memory. Mr. Wallach. Turning again to the Special Group Augmented), which is the group that was set up after the Bay of Pigs, can you relate to us the substance of the meetings as they took place? Mr. Gilpatric. The general tenor of the activities in the group was to discuss in a general way the types of actions that might be taken to weaken or destabilize the Castro regime with a view toward preventing it from being effective outside of its own borders, particularly, as I said earlier, vis-a-vis other countries. And I remember being specifically concerned about Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, and a whole range Docld: 32423626 Page 38 Terris CEeRPET
cb 24 Phone (Area 202) 544-6006 WARD & PAUL HW 450955 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 mt 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld:3 23626 Page 39 TOP SECRET er’ of possible actions to that end were. discussed, and then referred to the Agency to investigate and come up with some specific programs, project or proposals which the Group would then consider anew after. they had been staffed out by the Agency. Mr. Wallach. Was it really, then, a function of the Special Group Augmented to come up with ideas or to receive ideas from the Agency and consider them? Mr. Gilpatric. It was generally to stimulate a more vigorous course of action than had been followed prior to this augmentation. Whether the ideas came from General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations, or whether they came from CIA people, or whether they came from members of the Grou itself just depended on the course of discussion at the particular meetings. Obviously there was a great range of possibilities. discussed. “And Lansdale in his position as Operations Directo had a large part in stimulating thinking among the Group and the ideas that were sent out to the Agency for further study and work. | Mr. Wallach. Is this something that we refreshed you as to yesterday, the fact that General Lansdale actually was Chief of Operations and came up with ideas himself? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. I didn't recall who was guiding focus on the staff level for this enlarged special group. But the Group did, both from a principal level and a staff
cb 25 Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 20 bocld:3374736276 Page 40. oe i 1 & TOP SECRET 25 level, try to generate projects, programs, and ideas. And I am clear now, having refreshed my recollection as to the personalities involved, that the focal point was the Director of Operations as far as keeping the whole effort going and stimulating thinking and planning. | Mr. Wallach. Was General Lansdale active at the meetings himself, do you recall? Mr. Gilpatric. That was not his nature, to take over and a a meeting. He would come up with his ideas and feed them into the appropriate segments of the. agencies that were supposed to staff them out. And he usually in his work for me ~- and now I am referring to the methodology he employed in connection with Vietnam, because it is clear in my mind -- he would put in writing to his principals, in that case myself, and then the principal would table the. idea, put it forward, and then would be discussed. But Lansdale himself did not, as I can recall, in either of those sessions, either relating to Vietnam or Cuba, act as a discussion leader, or assume a very active role in the meetings themselve as opposed to the preparations for them. Mr. Wallach. Would you describe General Lansdale as a very cautious man in the sense that he would not go ahead with an activity unless it was approved by higher authority or by his superiors? Mr. Gilpatric. I wouldn't describe him as cautious. I. Oe Gl i. i, mm mem
cb 26 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 rae) DocId:3 TOP SECRET 7 think he was a very calculating man, very deep, very sensitive to the power structure in which he was working. After all, he had been working, under the Eisenhower Administration with an entirely different case of character than the Kennedy Administration, and he proved himself very adaptable to that kind of a major change. And’ he always impressed me that he knew what he was doing, and he recognized the hazards, political and otherwise, in how you function in this kind of a setting, where you had so many presidential appointees, and where you were working ona project that had a very high priority in the President's own mind, which was true both of Vietnam and Cuba. Mr. Wallach. pid General Lansdale speak generally about the President's project he was involved with, or was he close- mouthed about them? Mr. Gilpatric. Probably reserved. He wasn't an individual who just spouted forth a stream of ideas and notions. ‘He would think them out, and when he put them forward, as I say, they were usually in written form. And we didn't have what I would call brain-storming sessions with him. .He and his assistants and associates would formulate a scheme or plan and then come back with this and lay it out. It was pretty well put together. It was pretty well put together. It wasn't done in an extemporary or impromptu fashion. That ‘ wasn't his way of working. 23676 Page 41 aw ae ae @! gm ee, oe age
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ou le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 29 Bocld:3 TOP SECRET 27 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Lansdale had his own staff? Mr. Gilpatric. He had an office with a number of assist- | nats. I don't recall any names except the name Hand which came up yesterday and came back to my mind as a result. Mr. Wallach.. Do you recall how large the staff was, four or five people? Mr. Gilpatric. It couldn't have been more than have a dozen, because he drew on the resources of the various elements in the Pentagon, including the Joint Staff or the Air Force if he needed more assistance. Mr. Wallach. Do you know if he worked with the various. elements in the Pentagon on Operations aside from those that may have been going on at the CIA? Mr. Gilpatric. Vietnam and Cuba, as the result of having my recollection refreshed, are the only ones that I can recall, Mr. Wallach. Specifically, Mr. Gilpatric, with reference to Cuba, do you know whether or not there Lansdale made specific requests to any of the military agencies to con- duct operations by themselves, not joint operations with the CIA? Mr. Gilpatric. I am pretty sure that never happened, because the name of the game was to conduct these operations on a covert, clandestine basis, clearly within the province of the Central Intelligence Agency, and whatever Defense or 23626 Page 42 eg re 2D, we aE
cb. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 28 LO 11 Le 13 - 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 él 235 24 29 TOP SECRET on State or anybody else contributed was purely support rather than direct participation. Mr. Wallach. ‘De you know whether or. not General Lansdale met by himself with the President or the Attorney General? Mr. Gilpatric. I do not know whether such a meeting took place. | Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any instances when either the President or the Attorney General put pressure on General Lansdale, aside from the pressure that was put on the Group as a whole, to come out with something on Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. My understanding was, I do not know of it.. Mr. Wallach. From the time that this Special Group Augmented was set up, do you recall any basic change in the operation in terms of the focus, for example, the switch from intelligence to sabotage? “ Mr. Gilpatric. There was a shift from just intelligence gathering through infiltrating teams to positive efforts to disrupt the Cuban economy. And these ideas drew in scope from relatively minor attempts to intercept communications or disrupt transport to something as major as the demolition of a large power plant. That would have to be the most important project that I can recall that came before the Group in 1962. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what General Lansdale's > relationship was with the CIA when he worked on the Cuban vacta:s9p23626 Page 43 TO > SECRET
cb 29 - | TOP SECRET 29 ; 3 8 1 operation? ~ 8 3 2 Mr. Gilpatric. I never detected any friction or any rg o F 5 difficulties between them. It certainly didn't exist in the 4 Agency, the same sort of distrust or question about Lansdale 5 as expressed in the State Department, as I explained earlier. 6. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the name that was given to 9 the Cuban operation? 8 Mr. Gilpatric. You refreshed my recollection yesterday 9 as being Project MONGOOSE. 10 Mr. Wallach. But before yesterday you really didn't recall 11 the name? ; F 12 Mr. Gilpatric. It had slipped my mind. 6 ‘se? z 413, Mr. Wallach. At any time did-.you become aware of any < z 14 project that General Lansdale was working on with respect to 15 Cuba that were not brought before the Special Group Augmented? 16 Mr. Gilpatric. “No. 17 I “Mr. Wallach. Was it your understanding that all operatio S 18 that he was conducting had to be brought before the Special g 19 Group for approval first? : 20 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. The Special Group Expanded or 6 é 2] Augmented was given exclusive jurisdiction as far as any : 20 covert or clandestine actions in regard to Cuba were concerned : 23 That x am clear enough about in my mind. CY : 24 Mr. Wallach. I think you testified before, Mr. Gilpatric, " “06 that you and Mr. McNamara became used to Mr. Kennedy,. Presiden HW 50955 Docld:39423626 Page 44 =F gi a ame oe cee
xv 30 Pnone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 il 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 235 24 £5 TOP SECRET 40 Kennedy, or the Attorney General, going, I think, to levels beneath you at the Department of Defense. Mr. Gilpatric. On occasion. | Mr. Wallach. Would it have surprised you if they went directly to General Lansdale in this instance without going through the Special Group Augmented? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. At any time while you were present at the meeting of the Special Group Augmented was the topic of eliminating or assassinating Castro brought up? Mr. Gilpatric. No, at least I did not recall it. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any restrictions in negative terms that one of :the considerations could not be the elimination of Castro? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't have in:my mind any recollection about that subject at all. I don't recall either any restrictions put upon the types of projects that were enter- tained. The discussion was usually over how effective a particular suggestion would be and how feasible it was. And my principlé concern, after the experience in the Bay of Pigs, was as to whether the Agency could successfully carry out some of these rather grandiose schemes they came up with under pressure from the Attorney General and the Group. In other words, I was concerned about the feasibility and durability, particularly if they involved paramilitary actions. But I Docld: 3473626 Page 45 st oe oe ew 8
o- Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL carl °2 “So ao N g QO € o FS £ x vad at) z ui ra] 7 2 , é See og st vv HW 50955 31 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 © el ee 25 24 29 TOP SECRET a don't recall any restrictions put on the types of things that might be laid on the table. And as I say, I have no recollection of any question being raised about eliminating Castro as a person, assassinating him -or otherwise. Mr. Wallach. Did the intelligence information, if you can recall -- and I realize that we are talking about a period that was quite sometime ago -- at that time indicate that Castro was in control, should I say, by himself, or that there were other leaders that could readily assume control if Castro left the scene? Mr. Gilpatric. Our intelligence regarding Cuba was very deficient. We knew about Che Guevara, or Ortega, and about Raol Castro and other names. We were aware that there was a system, an organization which was responsible for the functioning of the Cuban economy in a pretty effective fashion, with Soviet help. But one of the problems was, we didn't know enough about how the Castro system operated to infiltrate those teams and groups, and they would never come back, we would never get any playback. And there was a real dearth of hard intelligence regarding what was happening on the inside of Cuba that didn't emanate through countries that were in communications with Cuba directly such as Mexico and Spain. Mr. Wallach. When you say the agent teams didn't come back, you mean they were captured or whatever? Docld: 34823626 Page 46 nn
od 3 < a F Nee 4 0 fs 4 2 “ Qo oO So N Vv fa) roa ° a £ £ a a Es ul vi o 2 a Fa Nee o Tt HW 50955 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 2 os) NS 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? Le 19 20 21 22 24 24 20 TOP SECRET 32 Mr. Gilpatric.. Captured or eliminated. Mr. Wallach. So I take it, then, at least in your mind-~ let's take the period from the end of 1961 to the beginning of 1962 .—-- you did not really have any idea in terms of exactly how the country was being run and where the power structure really lay? Mr. Gilpatric. Not in detail, not in depty. We just knew the results, which were that the Cuban economy was surviving, there was no wide scale famine, there was no‘ great shortage. The sugar crop was being harvested and exported. And the general knowledge that we did have -- all of it not _ through the Agency at all, but through completely overt means was -~ was that Castro had been pretty effective in whatever mechanisms he used to run the Cuban system. Mr. Wallach. Going back to the time of the Bay of Pigs, had you been given to understand that there was an expectation that when this Cuban brigade landed on the shore that a popular uprising would occur in Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, we were told that all along, not jus before the Bay of Pigs, but there were certainly a school of thought, a certain number of beliefs in the State Department and the Agency, who felt that there were dissident elements who, given the occasion and the opportunity, would oppose . Castro. I don't. remember any positive proof of that. And none of the developments with which I am familiar bore that Docld:32423626 Page 47 TOs SECDET
cb 33 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 LO ll le 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 al £2 28 24 20 socra:a4 423026 Page 46 Se ale ok TOP SECRET 7 out. That was just a belief of certain people in our government. Mr, Wallach. That school of thought, I take it, contin- ued even after the Bay of Pigs? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. Whether it was a hope or a solid conviction I don't recall. But it was always talked about as a possibility, if we could strike a damaging enough blow to the Cuban economy it might bring into the open whatever underlying dissident opposition existed in Cuba to Castro. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if the Attorney General ascribed to that theory that there were dissident elements in Cuba that were willing to come forward? Mr. Gilpatric. I never heard him express any views on that. I don't recall his own personal views as having been expressed in my presence. Mr.. Wallach. Do you recall who really propounded that theory, at least while you were present? Mr. Gilpatric. Well, it certainly didn't come from the Defense Department, because they didn't profess to have any knowledge. It was either the intelligence people of State or in the Agency or both -- it was either State, the CIA intelligence analysis who advanced those views. It could have been -- I don't want to speculate -- I know that “Dick Goodwin, who was the Presidential assistant assigned to Latin American Affairs, may have been detailed by the State
cb 34 | TOP SECRET g . | 34 S 3 1 Department in some period of time that we are talking about, Ne | 3 2 and he may have had some inputs from contacts he had in 3 3 Latin America. So he might have expressed some such idea. 4 But those are the only resources I can recall for that kind 5 of thinking. 6 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether or not there was 9 any discussion of arming Cubans to go in and get rid of 8 Castro?» fe) Mr. Gilpatric. ‘No. 10 Mr. Wallach. Specifically not just to overthrow the 11 Government? | 2 12 Mr. Gilpatric. No. A number of those projects involved a ~ : 13 inserting armed individuals, whether they were Cubans or 2 14 other nationalities, to carry out these specific projects 15 that the Group approved, principally of a sabotage nature. 16 There were demolition teams and machine guns and other weapons 17 to cover the operations, the people to do the demolition work. 18 But that is the kind of use of arms that I recall as having g 19 been reviewed by particularly those of us from Defense who wer : 20 concerned about how effective these things could be without 2 : E 21 some combat element involved. a D2 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall the school of thought that : 22 talked-about dissident elements in Cuba ever discussing these NO ; 24 dissident elements in relation to the presence or absence of 25 Castro himself? HW 50955 pocla:3 23626 Page 49 Tv) GECDET
eb 35 : TOP SECRET 7 1 Mr. Gilpatric. No. Ly 8 . : 2 . Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether Mr. Harvey from the 3 ‘3 CIA ever attended any of these Special Group Augmented 4 meetings? 5 Mr. Gilpatric. I did not remember his name until 6 yesterday. But when I saw the documents it came back to me that 9 he was detailed by the Agency under a man named Fitzgerald to 8 be the action ‘officer for the Agency as far as the Group was 9 concerned. So he. was at meetings, certainly some of the 10 meetings. | 11 Mr. Wallach. Did he come to those meetings with Mr. J g 12 McCone? 7 13 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. ° 14 Mr. Wallach. Did Harvey have any reputation that 15 preceded him that you heard either from him or from someone 16 else? | 17 Mr. Gilpatric. I only recall’ his having been held out 18 as having had. experience and competence in what might be 19 called the dirty tricks area. He was an operations man in the 20 Agency. He was picked, so’ we were told by Mr. McCone, because 2] he was tough and hard and a good organizer, and was in fact 20 equipped to carry out the kind of schemes that the Agency was 23 ‘putting forward. They held him out as a very effective type. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 24 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, I take it you were in 25 attendance at the Special Group Augmented meetings and involve HW 50955 pocta:3 23626 Page 450 . TO [2 SECRET
CB 46 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll 12. 13 14. 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET x ' MONGOOSE from the time it really began until the time that you left in January of 1964? Mr. Gilpatric. I attended mest of the meetings. I am | not clear at this stage, 10 years later, as to which of the "meetings that I attended were the Augmented Group or the principals in which were the entire Group, the deputy group, because sometimes we would meet in one capacity for one form and sometimes in another. But I recall that up through the time of the missile crisis from the period following the Bay of Pigs I was in on most of the sessions regarding Cuba. Mr. Wallach. Without really focusing on the period of the missile ctisis, and those discussions there, Mr. Gilpatric would it be fair to say that Cuba was not one of your primary concerns? Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct. I regarded this whole effort to undermine the Castro regime as a project for which the CIA was the principal instrumentality. Obviously, since it affected foreign affairs very directly, the State Departmen was primarily involved. And since it had very high president- ial priority, the White House was very much involved. But I felt, and I believe Mr. McNamara felt, that the role of the military establishment of the Defense Department as such was secondary. And I had a lot of other things that I was working on at that stage. So that this did not occupy a major part of my time or efforts. pootas3 423626 Page 51 TO |? GECP ET
cb 37 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 £0 el 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET 37 Mr. Wallach. Did it occupy a major part of Mr. McNamara's time or efforts, if you know? Mr. Gilpatric. I do not think so. He was in the same position I was in. He had been asked by the President and his brother to see that this effort got a lot of public behind it. We were getting needled from the White House, particularly from the Attorney General, to get the thing: _ going, get the whow on the road. . And so we, along with the other departments, kept the heat on the Agency. But it was a sporadic thing with us, not a day to day kind of. involvement, such as we had in some other principal concerns of the Defense Department. Mr. Wallach. When you say kept the heat on the Agency, could you be more explicit about that? Mr. Gilpatric. Well, after the Bay of Pigs the President and many of those around him felt that you just couldn't leave it to the Agency alone. But when it came to a judgment - factor as to how much the Agency could do on its own and how it owuld do it, it needed to be, if you would, in a word, second guessed by others. And the President wanted to be very sure that he didn't have another aborted effort such as the Bay of Pigs. And he wanted the judgment of not only the deputies like myself and Alexis Johnson, and before that, Bowels, but of the principles themselves, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. So our role was to see pocta:3 oa6o6 Page 52 TO “> SECRET
; 3 1 that the moving spirits kept moving, the moving spirits Ne : 2 . being basically the Agency and its operatives pushed and F "3 stimulated by the Group. a |p Mr. Wallach. What was the pressure, Mr. Gilpatric, 5 that either you or Mr. .McNamara, as representatives of 6 Defense, put on the Agency. ” . Mr. Gilpatric. As I recall it, it was simply questions, 8 had they considered this, or had they considered that, could 9 they mount a larger scale effort, and if so, what it would 10 involve, so that it would have more of an impact. It was ll just a question of resorting, persuading, or otherwise trying 2 12 ‘to cause the Agency to exert itself to the utmost toward the 7 13 accomplishment of the objective, which was to undermine the ° 14 Castro regime. | 15 Mr. Wallach. Was there a reluctance on the part of the 16 Agency to have anything to do with Cuba after the Bay of Pigs? 7 Mr. Gilpatric. Not a reluctance, but an understandable 18 caution not to fail again. And with the new head -- John : 19 McCone had been “Undersecretary of the Air Force, and my : 20 boss for a while, 10 years: before, and he had been head of the 6 : 2} Atomic Energy Commission in the meantime, and he was a hard i oe headed type, and he wasn't about to let ephemeral, halfbaked ~ 3 23 ideas get under way. So he was in a sense resisting the idea Ty, ; 24 of doing something just for the sake of doing something. And : 25 it was a perfectly healthy understandable attitude. And HY 4S0954 pocta:3 oseze Page 53 TO. SECRET
Cuoy WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 509455 Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET : 39 obviously there were a lot of differences of views as to whether some of those sabotage projects were really big enough to be effective if they succeeded, or if they were too big to be likely to be feasible, having in mind the capabilities of any external force such as the Agency to get into Cuba and survive and return. Mr. Wallach. "What was the Attorney General really - pushing for at that time? | Mr. Gilpatric. He wanted to stop Castro from doing any more damage. I think he thought it woudd hurt his country, and hurt the administration, because of the Bay of Pigs, and he wanted to do everything possible to hamstring, prevent Castro from continuing what at that point had been a pretty successful course of action in defense of the U.S.; Mr. Wallach. And in this regard I think you have told us before that Mr. Kennedy or the Attorney General put pressure on Mr. McCone to get something done. ; Mr. Gilpatric. Right. Mr. Wallach. Did the’ Attorney General ever take the position that we had to be: very cautious about what we were going to do with respect to Cuba because of what had happened with the Bay of Pigs? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, he shared the general view that McNamara, Bundy and others and myself had, that an overt effort to overthrow Castro, such as by military invasion, woul pocld:3 423626 Page 54 TO LD. GECR ET
TOP SECRET cb 40 40 8 2 1 have such dire consequences from the standpoint of other : 2 relations, primarily with the Soviet Union, and also with : 3 our. own allies in Europe, and that that had to be avoided. 4 So we never talked about a moment that I can remember employ- 5 ing any of these contingency plans of a military nature, 6 which the military always had on file there with the Joint 7 Staff. 8 ; Mr. Wallach. Are you talking specifically about an. oper- 9 ation such as the Bay of Pigs that would be conducted by LO the U.S. forces, or an actual invasion of Cuba. Li Mr. Gilpatric. That was ruled out for higher policy 1 : 12 reasons. And the kind of actions that were considered were . é 13 limited in this sense to covert, clandestine operations, 14 with which the U.S. could deny attribution. 15 | Mr. Wallach. Did the Attorney General ever tell you 16 that he wished he could go ahead and mount this sort of 17 invasion? 18 Mr. Gilpatric. No, he was never for invasion, never. g 19 Mr. Wallach. Are you talking about after the Bay of ° 20 Pigs? : Pal Mr. Gilpatric. At no time did he ever think that was a z ul 22 solution. : 23 Mr. Wallach. Di you recall whether or not he voiced ro : PA any objection to the landing of the Cubans at the Bay of Pigs? 25 Mr. Gilpatric. I was not privy to any position he took HW 50955 5 ae 23626 Page 55 TO Rg SECRET
‘cb Al Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 450955 TOP SECRET 4 on the Bay of Pigs. I never heard him discuss it myself. I never heard him invest himself. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Lansdale ever talked to you about military invasion of Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. No. That was not his field. He was a specialist in concentrated undercover operations, not direct military actions. Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, did the fact that Castro held prisoners from the Bay of Pigs in any way effect what the Special Group Augmented could do with respect to Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. The matter of obtaining the release of the prisoners was handled separately. It was handled primarily through the Department of Justice, and mechanisms were set up there. And it never’ came directly into the discussions, because as I said, the theme was, whatever we did through the Special Group and the CIA in response to its approval would be nonattributable, and therfore wouldn't affec whatever steps were being taken in regard to the prisoners. It had to be covered and not recognized as a U.S. approved or a U.S. inspired operation. The two things were on separate tracts, sabotage to undermine the regime, and the efforts to get prisoners back. | Mr. Wallach. Didn't the fact that any operations had to be first approved by a group that was so large affect the question of attributability one way or the other? 23626 Page 56 Trees CrP Ar rw
. cb 42 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ad me] < <3 & \wer 4 & ¢ 3 om oO Oo o Nw i) a) c o a c ££ wa Ll 3 ul rm) ¢ é a ra B \ os vt WW 50955 TOP SECRET _ \ Mr. Gilpatric. Well, what I am talking about is attri- butions, people get caught and are sent in. Could they be supplied sufficiently with a cover so that they wouldn't ‘be directly identified as agents or instrument of the U.S., that is the kind of nonattribution we are talking about, not trying to protect the leak. within the Executive Branch at that stage. 8 Snr. Wallach. Were there any suggestions by General Lansdale or by the CIA that were actually discussed and an approval given that were not forwarded to the President? Mr. Gilpatric. No. The general impression was that it was a reviewing body, but without the power to make executive decisions, to reject or revise our recommendations to the President. Every kinf of project, clandestine or of a cover nature, had to be received before it was implemented with the Presidential approval. 17 DN - Mr. Wallach. In other words, the President, if asked 18 19 20 el ee 23 24 25 directly, would not be able to deny that he knew about it? Mr. Gilpatric. Well, unless the Special Group, whether -it was the initial smaller group 5412 or the Augmented Group, decided to approve and recommend the proposal, the President might never hear of it. It is possible that the Attorney General could have told him, or Bundy might have mentioned it. But he wouldn't be likely to come to grips with a project unti the Special Group had acted on it and referred it to him for Docta:3 23626 Page 57 Tbh) GECDPET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 ° WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Bocld:3 1OP SECKET 3 approval. And that was a very rare situation. Mr. Wallach. For example, where specific sabotage actions were actually approved and planned to be conducted, those were at least sent to the President for his. review? Mr. Gilpatric. Right. Mr. Wallach. Would he send back to you approval or. convey it through Mac Bundy? “Mr. Gilpatric. Mac Bundy -- or if the President would inform him that the President had disapproved or changed, or whatever his change was in his particular action, we would be told by Mac Bundy. — Did Mr. Bundy play a very active role in the Special Group Augmented? | Mr. Gilpatric. Well, Bundy was not one to remain silent or stay out of things. He was a very active partici- pant. And he was after all the President's principal advisor as far as the White House was concerned on CIA matters. In other words, all the contacts between the Agency and the President came through Mac Bundy. And you had the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, but that was purely a staff operation. And even that I think was under Mac Bundy. So he was the focal point as far as the staff of the White House was concerned. Mr. Wallach. Did he ever put pressure on the Special Group Augmented to get something done in Cuba? 4236276 Page 56 . TOW SECRET
cb 44 Phone (Area 202) 544-6006 WARD & PAUL Nea Ne HW 50955 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 LO ll 12 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al Le 23 24 29 TOP SECRET a4 Mr. Gilpatric. I. don't think he was an instrument of pressure. I think he was also -- he was inclined. to question very closely all aspects of operations, particularly from a political or foreign relations point of view, whereas we in Defense, as I said, would question the feasibility as a practical matter, particularly having in mind the use of military measures, sending arms as well as demolition teams. But the chief need-to-~know certainly was the Attorney General. Mr. Wallach. Prior to the time that he became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in October of 1962 was General Taylor on the Special Group Augmented as the White House Represen- tative? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. Mr. Wallach. Was he actually the Chairman? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall who chaired the meetings. It was certainly no designated irman, as I remember. Obviously the Secretary of State was the highest ranking officer among the Group, he took precedence over the Secretary of Defense. And the Secretary of Defense was number two. And then the rest of us -~ of course when General Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs he was one of those ranking officers. But I don't recall: when any one individ- ual ever took the chair regularly. Mac Bundy did in the case of the smaller 5412 group, he in fact ran that group. But I am talking about the larger group where you had those pocla:32 736276 Page 59 TOW CECBDET
co 45 a ee | 45 ® i ‘principals present. And there I think they acted as a é fe Group of peers without anybody beine more equal than the F nos other. 4 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if General Taylor had any oe specific type of input into the Special Group? 6 Mr. Gilpatric. Well, General Taylor, whatever he was in, a he had something to contribute. He was an extremely intelli- 8 gent, able officer. And having been out of the military 9 for several years before President Kennedy brought him back, 10 he had a lot of insight and perspective gained since he 11 | retired as the Chief of Staff of the Army. And he was in a . le the midst of every discussion. He was a very active partici- ‘ee 15 | pant at all times, both in the counterinsurgency group and 14 |. the Special Group Augmented. 15 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, when you left your 16 position in January of 1964, was the Special Group Augmented 17? still functioning? 18 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall that it. functioned after : 19 the Cuban missile crisis actually. I think after the Cuban : 20 | missile crisis you had set up a different intent which was : 21 called ExCom. It was something that the President set up 4 22 during the missile crisis. And that kept going from the : 23 time, October of 1962, until the President's death in November. No, : 24 22, 1963. That was a different group, and it had the Secretar 25 of the Treasury, Vice President, and the Attorney General. TO? SECRET HY 50955 Bocld:327423626 Page 60
_ cb 46 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 il 12 13 (14 15 16 18 19 20 et ae 235 24 29 VOPR SECRET 46 And it had kind of a moving base. But that was the group that functioned in the way that the Special Group Augmented had prior to the missile crisis. Mr. Wallach. Is Mr. McNamara also an ExCom? Mr. Gilpatric. ‘Yes sir. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who also was? Mr. Gilpatric. The Secretary of State and George Ball, the Assistant Secretary, Governor Harriman, and Mr. Nitze, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mr. ' Taylor, and myself, the Deputy Secretary, and Mr. McCone, Vice President Johnson, and Secretary Dillon, those were the ones. Mr. Wallach. Is it your understanding that whatever was done with respect to Cuba after the missile crisis was done through this body; ExCom?, Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. Mr. Wallach. And I take it that you did not participate in the ExCom meetings? Mr. Gilpatric. Oh, I. participated in the ExCom, I was a member. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall what activities ExCom really ran with respect to -- Mr. Gilpatric. For example, the major effort after the missile crisis was to get those IL-28 bombers out of Cuba. pocta:32 23626 Page 61 TOP SECRET
oS) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 J 5 < a & - QO Neer ind < 3 7 So a o N v fa) ¢ ° D a £ el = wi wt Pt a a e = oO ~~ a Lo HW 50955 a 10 ili 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 235 24 25 TOP SECRET ‘7 And the ExCom designated George Ball and myself, along with Jack McCloy, who had formerly been Assistant Secretary of War, and we went up to New York and we worked on negotiations with the Russians, participating with Adlai Stevenson, who was the U.S, Representative to the U.N., in an effort which finally succeeded in getting the bombers out of there. And that was all originated by the ExCom under the President's direction. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall whether or not ExCom approved sending in any armed exile groups for raids into Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. I ‘have no recollection of any of those activities after November of 1962. From that point on the Cuban operation had really been made part of the Soviet Union/ U.S. overall confrontation conflict. And it seems to have been folded into that very major international security | problem rather than being treated as it has been heretofore, that is prior to the missile crisis, aS a separate operation. Mr. Wallach. I think you mentioned to Mr. Smothers and myself yesterday that you had spoken with Mr. McNamara and possibly others about the question of whether or not assassination was ever raised as a viable alternative. I don't mean to paraphrase you. Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall ever discussing the matter. Mr. Wallach. I am talking about within recent months, Mr. Gilpatric. Docla:3 423626 Page 62 TO iD GECPET
cob 48 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 29 TOP SECRET 18 Mr. Gilpatric. Oh, I met with him last night. I have talked to him recently, since this began to appear in the press, references to the August 10, 1962 meeting. And we each asked each other whether either of us had any recollection of the subject having been discussed. And that is the time we had the discussion I referred to yesterday. Mr. Wallach. And what was Mr. McNamara's comment? Mr. Gilpatric. He doesn't recall ever putting forward the idea, and if it was discussed, his recollection is that he was opposed to it. He does not recall putting forward the idea, and I don't recall hearing him. Mr. Wallach. Have you discussed the matter of assassin- ations recently with anyone elsé? | Mr. Gilpatric. No. Only Mr. McNamara. Mr. Wallach. I take it once again, though, prior to your refreshing your recollection yesterday with documents, that you really had no recollection of an August 10 meeting -- Mr. Gilpatric. No. I didn't think I was present at that meeting. When I read about it in the paper it didn't register as to my having been present until you showed me the minutes of the meeting showing that I was present, I had no recollection of it. Mr. Wallach. Did there come a point in time in 1963 when you again recommended ‘General. Lansdale for another promotion? Docla:3 493626 Page 63 TO uy CECPET
" TOP SECRET ts 1 de Mr. Gilpatric. No. The only connection I had with his 2 promotion was in 1961 when he was made Brigadier General. Re) When he became Major General I don't recall, I had nothing w Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 to do with it. 5 Mr. Wallach. I would like at this time to have marked 6 a couple of documents that we showed you yesterday and 7 a couple of other ones. Do you want to take a two minute 8 break? 9 (A brief recess was taken.) 10 11 12 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16— 1? 18 19 20 el ee £95 410 First Street, S.E., Wasninaton, D.C. 20003 24 £5 HW 50955 Docld:32423676 Page 64 Treats CFF R
WAbdee U TOP SECRET 7 77 Cc 3 1 Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, I would. like you to just sort 3 a of glance over these documents. I do not expect you will have F “3 time to go through them at this time. 4 Some of them you saw yesterday and some you' did not. In 5 any event, I.do not expect you to know the contents. 6 ot would like you to keep them before you. I have a coupl ? of questions on each of them, and I will refer you to the 8 || appropriate document. 9 | Looking at 1-A, sir, which is the attachment to l, the 10 | memorandum dated November 30, 1961, do you recall ever having 11 |} seen this particular document before? ¥ al 3 : Og 12 . Mr. Gilpatric. No. ( ‘ a a : « 13 ‘Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at the outset of operation 3 ; 14 MONGOOSE whether there was a question as to whether or not 15 || the task force concept would be kept or just be put into a 16 | trial period? 1? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall this two-week trial period 18 | that is referred to in 1-A. 19 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall who at the Department of De- 20 fense was designated to assist General Lansdale in these MONGOOSE 21 operations? 22 Mr. Gilpatric. No. There are references to several 23 || offices in these papers, including General Craig and General C 410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 og || Harris, but I think they were representatives of the joint 25 staff. HW 350955 DBocld:324236276 Page 65 TO ed SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL HW 450955 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 10 Ll 12 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 29 TOP SECRET 78 The only name I recall is thename you mentioned | earlier, a man named Hand. Mr. Wallach. Is that Frank Hand, do you remember? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. Mr. Wallach. I have no questions on two. Will you turn to Exhibit 3 for identification. I will « ask you whether or not you recall you have ever seen this docu- ment before? Mr. Gilpatric. It is not familiar to me. Mr. Wallach. As a. general matter, did General Craig re- port to you on MONGOOSE operations? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Do you know who he reported: to? Mr. Gilpatric. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to my recollection. | Mr. WAllach. Would General Craig speak for the Department of Defense? | Mr. Gilpatric. No. He would speak for the joint staff or the Joint Chiefs to the extent he was so authorized. He was a staff officer assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, -and detailed apparently to the Cuban project, as it was then called. Mr. Wallach. Maybe I don't understand the relationships of the Joint Chiefs myself or not. In the first paragraph it is stated: "As requested in the referenced memorandum, the Docld:32623626 Page 66 ‘ TO ‘id SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 li. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 above" -- that is above in the document ~- “the Department of with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemi- ‘OP SECRET 79 position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors," I am not going to go through these factors. But at least there it appears that he is stating a position of the De- partment of Defense and not the Joint Chiefs. Is that common? Mr. Gilpatric., Well, what he means is that the Secretary of Defense has proved his position, which was put up to him by the Joint Chiefs at one of our. weekly meetings: “this is the type of action that the Chiefs would ask the Secretary to concur in, and if he did, it became the position of the Department. Mr. Wallach, Mr. Gilpatric, turning your attention to the second page, paragraph 4, do you recall that at any time either the Joint Chiefs or anyone in Defense expressing the opin- ion that is set forth there? And I will read it: "In view of the factors set forth Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible sphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the u.s." TOP SECRET Docld: 32423626 Page 67
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 LO Lil l2 13 ~14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el £2 £5 7 24 25° IOP SECRET - Now, going back to the first part of that paragraph that I read a portion of which states: “The Communist regime in Cuba; isn't compatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hamisphere", do you recall that opinion being expressed? Mr. Gilpatric. It was always held by the Chief, but itwas never held by Mr. McNamara and myself, unless the Presi- dent so ordered. Mr: Wallach. Would Mr. McNamara have had to approve this memorandum? | Mr. Gilpatric. Not this particular piece of paper. He knew how the Chiefs felt. They never shifted the ground. They always wanted to move in on the Castro regime with military mea sures, Mr. Wallach. Turning to the fifth paragraph on the third page which reads: -"The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State or any U.S.. approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, personnel and bases", was that the supportive role that you generally talked about before? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, that is right. Any approved program we would support implied actions within our resources. Mr. Wallach. Mr. Gilpatric, do you recall discussions about creating pretexts for military invasion of Cuba by the U.S.? | Mr. Gilpatric. None comes to my mind right now. TOP SECRET Docld: 324273626 Page 68
Phone (Area 202) 5438-6000 WARD & PAUL RW 509455 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 | LO il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 20 £5 24 25 TOP SECRET “gl Mr. Wallach. “You don't recall ' general discussions to that effect? Mr. Gilpatric. I just don't have any recollection on the subject. | Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to the exhibit which we have identified as NO. 4, the minutes of the January 25, 1962 meeting, that indicates that you were present at that meeting. - Do you -have any reason to believe that you were not, Mr. Gilpatric? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Your diary, I take it, is in fact in the Kennedy Library? Mr. Gilpatric. Correct. Mr. Wallach. Turning to the last paragraph on the first page of these minutes it states: | "Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establish- ment of the Lansdale Group, higher authority had directed State and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He” by that it means Johnson -~ "said a great deal of work has al- ready been done along these lines, and that this should now be directed into the channel of an integrated political military plan to cover any contingency". | Do you remember any plans for military intervention in vemndene Page . TO i» SECR ET
wlio TOP SECRET 82 8 = 1 the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene, \ 4 é & || or as compared to those for supporting an uprising? 2 5 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I remember there was.a series of 4 planning efforts, and on different hypotheses and assumptions. 5 And this obviously is one hypothesis, the one that is referred 6 to by Alexis Johnson in this paragraph on page 4. 7 Mr. WAllach. Do you remember any specific discussions 8 || as to how Castro was going to be removed 9 from the Cuban scene? 10 | ‘Mr. Gilpatric. No -- other than that the general thrust ll | of the whole effort was to undermine or weaken or over- a 2 e l2 || throw the Castro regime. f 4] Nw . . z 13 Mr. Wallach. I take it by that that you are saying < 14 |} that the removal of Castro ‘from the Cuban scene, looking 15 back now, would mean to you removal of the Castro regime 16 from the Cuban scene, 17 Mr. Gilpatric. Right. 18 Mr. WAllach. Turning your attention to the second para- 19 | graph on the second page, without my reading the entire para- £0 || graph into the record, would you just read through it. 21 || There it refers to the Castro regime being overthrown without eo U.S. military intervention and not Castro. 23 Mr. Gilpatric. I don't attach any significance to that 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 || change in phraseology. I think that the two expresssions have’ 25 |} a common meaning,. at least that is my recollection. HW 50955 pocta:32 236276 Page 70 Tere hd CEfPRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 Docl 9 15 16 L? 20 Calkok | 83 Mr. Wallach. Just looking at that paragraph -- I don't want to paraphrase what apparently General Taylor said, but it to the effect that more than contingency plans were required for military intervention, and as far as possible ‘he wanted to get authority to undertake major moves which might be required. Do you know if anything further than military contin- gency .plans developed? Was there ever an actual state of readi mess for an invasion of Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. Not until the missile crisis. Mr. Wallach. Skip over to Exhibit 6. Exhibit 6 is a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of De- fense fromGeneral Craig. Would that have been to you? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any discussions with General Craig where you expressed to him a need to inject a sense of urgency? Mr. Gilpatric. Not specifically with him. As we said before, he was the officer detailed to work with this “group. And I am sure I: had a lot of contacts with him. But I don't recall giving him any specific instructions. Mr. Wallach. I think he is identified here as the DOD 'JCS representative to ‘the Caribbean survey group. Was that another name for the Special Group Augmented? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, I think that must hav been an earlier d:32 - Page 7 T¢3t} GECPRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 123 lo4 rc 410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 | Hl 120 GQligu TOP SECRET . terminalogy. Mr. Wallach. With respect to Exhibit 7, was General Lansdale actually in the office of the Secretary of Defense? Mr. Gilpatric. No, not physically. | Mr. Wallach. Do you know why he was writing memoran- dums on the office of the Secretary of Defense stationery? Mr. Gilpatric. Since he had been assigned this project by the President, as indicated by Exhibit 1, he must have used this stationery simply because he was not operating either as a part of the Air Force or as a member of the Joint Staff. This stationery, office of the Secretary of Defense, was used by everybody who wasn't either in one of the military departments or in the Joint Chiefs, but it was just generally the work: of the Department of Defense. The term covered a great deal of ground in many individuals. Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether Guantanamo was ever used as a training facility for Cuban exiles at any time? Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't. There was a lot of discussion about Guantanamo and how important it was and what could be done. And my recollection is that the military always felt that we shouldn't compro- mise its position under prior arrangements for the Cuban government by using it for CIA purposes. Mr. WAllach. In other words, you don't know one way or th other whether it was actually used? HW 50955 pootlt:32 23676 Page 72 TO p> SECR ET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, 5.£., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 ae) (5 Oo i299 —_ | TOP SECRET 85 Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't. Mr. Wallach. Going back to Exhibit 6-A for a second, "Guidelines for operation MONGOOSE', paragraph l-a, which is attached to the memorandum which General Craig sent to you, I note there that he has stricken out General Lansdale's use of the words "Castro Government" and put in "Communist Government of Cuba" in the sentence reading “tn undertaking’ to cause the overthrow of", he struck out “Castro Government" and put in “Community Government of Cuba. Do you recall any discussions with him as to that change at all, as to what the difference was as between the Castro government and the Communist Government of Cuba? Mr. Gilpatric. No. It was just a legal system employed by the military. Mr. Wallach. Okay. Exhibit 8. I really have no questions with respect to this document except that it reflects that you were present at the meeting along with Mr. McNamara. Do you have any reason to think that that is not correct? Mr. Gilpatric. No. I am sure it is correct. Mr. Wallach. Is it your recollection that once the Special Group Augmented was formed Mr. McNamara attended as of- ten as he could with you, or was the function divided between you and Mr. McNamara? scales 23626 Page 73 Tov)? GEC RET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL ‘ea 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 14 a TOP SECRET 86 Mr. Gilpatric. ,I certainly went regularly. And my. recollection is that he may have been less regular, because of other duties. As I indicated yesterday, my memory is blurred as to what meetings were called Special Group Augmented and what were just 5412. . My recollection is that whenever the Attorney General was going to be present, Mr. McNamara came. Mr. Wallach. Was there an agenda that was sent out to your prior to these meetings, do you recall? Mr. Gilpatric. Sometimes papers during this time we. were discussing these guidelines, as exhibit 8 shows, there wer a number of papers that had been tabled before the meeting, and they were discussed. There ass no agenda other than the circulation of papers beforehand that I can recall. Mr. Wallach. Exhibit 9, the memorandum from General Craig to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And I want to establis again that that was a memorandum to you. Mr. Gilpatric. Correct. Mr. Wallach. And that just concerns the guidelines for operation MONGOOSE. No need to go over those here. Mr. Gilpatric. General Craig was regarded as the proper channel for submitting any kind of defense point of view as goin through me as the top civilian. Mr. Wallach. Just looking at the first paragraph there where General Crais is commenting on the CIA's proposed changes pocla:32 23626 Page 74 TQ 5D SECRET
adn3g ye TOP SECRET . 3 { : | 4 to paragraph 2, which in fact were eventually adopted, it : 2 | says: 3 (3 “The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during 4 ‘the coming three months would be the acquisition of -hard intellil i 6 gence on Cuba". 6 I take it the coming three months would be from March on? 7 | Mr, Gilpatric. Yes. 8 Mr. Wallach. The memorandum was dated March 13. Ig : In any event, do you remember that that was in fact the 10 || case, that there was a point in time when strictly there was il] | an attempt to be an intelligence gathering operation, MONGOOSE. 12 Mr. Gilpatric. As I stated earlier, we were confronted WARD & PAUL 13 | at the threshhold of our work with Cuba by the absence of 14 | hard intelligence. _So it was natural to give the acquisition 15 | of such intelligence top priority at the beginning. ‘16 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall if the Attorney General hy ever expressed any opinion on whether or not this intelligence 18 gathering should be terminated and actual sabotage or other 19 types of operation should be undertaken? loo Mr. Gilpatric. No. He was frustrated, as the rest of us ‘O71 || were, by the fact that we didn't know enough as to what was i929 || going on down there. He didn't regard this particular activity 23 || as exclusive, pre-empting all efforts of other activities. 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 Mr. WAllach. Looking back, Mr. Gilpatric, at the 25 || program as a whole, would you say that it was a successful HW 450945 poctd:32 23626 Page T4 TO tg SECRET
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL “a 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 123 | lo4 25 aasY TOP SECRET program against the Castro regime? | Mr. Gilpatric. No. It never really accomplished very much, Mr. Wallach. Do you have any thoughts as to why it really didn't accomplish very much? Were there certain re- strictions on it? Mr. Gilpatric. I think ithad an inherent weakness. It depénded for accomplishment of its objectives on covert activities. And under the circumstances that then confronted this country, we didn't have the capabilities, or at least we din't discover them, through this effort in the CIA to be effective. | Mr. Wallach. Did General Craig do most of the sort of, can I say, leg work, or background work, or writing for you, on some of these proposals? Mr. Gilpatric. He called him the DOD representative, but He was really the military man in the Pentagon who staffed all these papers. and went around and got ideas from different services and from the Joint Staff. Mr. Wallach. Was there someone who you delegated a certain review to? Mr. Gilpatric. No, I didn't have any assistant. Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to Exhibit ll, sir, --: I believe it is the next exhibit, I have skipped 10 -- I am sorry, it is No. 12 -- which is a one~page memorandum signed Docld: 32 BS 2 Fane: ie" Hansa ley ant 9 the be be pb Be your signature,
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 CO Pn 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 295 1OP SECRET 89 Mr. Gilpatric? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. And Tf am sure I dictated this myself, Mr. Wallach. On the bottom line it is stated: " some- time before the weekend T want to talk to you about Mr. McCone's ‘liberation plan'", ‘Do you recall what that liberation Plan was? Mr. Gilpatric. No, I don't. Mr. Wallach. Was it usually your duty to notify . General Lansdale of the meeting of the Special Group Augmented? Mr. Gilpatric. No. We had executive sessions, and if he wasn't present, I would be the one of the members of the group who would communicate with him. Mr. Wallach. Did mr. McCone ever tell you that he was either Planning or undertaking activities for the CIA that actually did not come through the Special Group Augmented? Mr. Gilpatric. No. I understood that all his activities, unless they related to overt activities or diplomatic activities, if he had any ideas, would all come through the group. Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to 13, sir, the third paragraph reads: "Mr, Gilpatric felt that it was neces- sary to achieve as high a posture of readiness as possible, For example, PT.boats and other material necessary for our ac- tive operations should be acquired. In addition, more Cubans should be inducted into the U.S. Army. In this connec- tion he" -- and by that he. refers to Mr. Gilpatric -- "pointed HY 50955 socrisealosen Page TT TO U SECRET
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL iL? 18 119 el 22 ‘DO C 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 jo4 20 thild Lb 90 TOP SECRET out that the restriction on service of such Cubans outside of this country has been lifted.. The Attorney General concurred in Mr. Gilpatric's comments that a more imaginative approach toward enlistment of Cubans can be devised". | Mr. Gilpatric; what did you mean there? I realize that is only Mr. Parrott's notes on what you said. But by as high as posture of readiness as possible, do you recall what you migh have meant? Mr. Gilpatric. I was concerned again that the military would be in a position to react quickly if some of these CIA mounted efforts were in danger of aborting, or surfaced ina way that would involve some risk or peril to U.S. property or nationals, and they felt that the military had to be on the alert any time that the CIA activity was going forward, in case something might fail in a way that we ‘would have to do something. Mr. Wallach. Wouldn't the military having to come in have created a situation similar to the Bay “of Pigs in terms of publicity for President Kennedy, and an operation by the CIA having failed, the military having to bail it out? Mr. Gilpatric. Yes. But it was a question. of the lesser of two evils. And if U.S. personnel were involved, and under service as a U.S. activity, we at least didn't want to have the consequences that the Bay of Pigs had. Mr. Wallach. I thought that would be of the prime emphasi BW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 78 TO gp SECRET
>) 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.c. 20003 HW 50955 WARO & PAUL ra) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ie] 10 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Docld: 32423626 Operations, dn42 Mr. Gilpatric. Mr. U.S, Army? Mr. Gilpatric. n that, -Mr. Wallach, TOP SECRET contingency Proposal, security or loyalty was wrong, them in the Armed Services, were not attributable to the U.S. That is correct. 91 Of the Special Group Augmented was to have activities that This was purely a Wallach, Do you recall whether or not the President had expressed a desire to have more Cubans inducted into the I don't recall the President's Position I felt that the attitude of the military heretofore in not wanting Cubans in the services for questions of and that we ought to include Calling your attention to Exhibit 15, the first Paragraph states: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff 10 June 1962, subject: gency Planning*", and Mr, "Spontaneoud Revolts in Cuba, Gilpatric have approvec the attached Plan prepared in response to your memorandum of Contin-_ That memorandum is from Benjamin Harris to the Chief of Operation MONGOOSE, which was General Lansdale. Did Benjamin Harris replace General Craig? Mr. Gilpatric. Mr, in Cuba? Page 79 That is my recollection. a O™ te Still discussion going on of a Spontaneous: Wallach. Do you recall if about this time there was revolt occurring
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 18 19 21 I22 i23 24 { 1 1 lo5 ( 410 First Street, §.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 20 | a TOP SECRET 92 Mr. Gilpatric. There certainly was planning against that eventuality. I don't recall ever thinking it was going to be likely to happen. But as was the case of every otherpossibility , the military always wanted to have a plan for it. Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to Exhibit 16, which bears the date August 3, 1962, and the title DOD Task No. 69, is this an usual format, this type of sheet? Mr. Gilpatric. No -- I don't recall. It doesn't look like a JCS paper, in spite of it being titled "DOD Task No. 69". It looked to me as though this came out of Lansdale's office. | Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to 17, sir, which is not only undated, but it is unsigned, do you know whether or not you have ever seen this document before? Mr. Gilpatric. I never saw it until you showed it to me yesterday. Mr. Wallach. I think you stated yesterday that this looked like the Joint Chiefs paper, but you can't really attribute it to. anyone, I take it? Mr. Gilpatric. . That is the closest I can come to specu- lation as to its origin. Mr. Wallach. In any ‘event, in the:sixth line from the bottom, which is partly wiped out, the language is "Assassinate Castro and his handful of top men". HW 50955 DocId:32423626 Page 80 Trvip CLECHNRET
an44 TOP SECRET 93 . s 1 I take it you don't recall that ever being promulgated? 3 z 2 Mr. Gilpatric. No. E o Mr. Wallach. 10. 4 - ' These are the minutesof the August 10, 1962 5 Special Group Augmented, meeting on MONGOOSE. I take it 6 that this looks like, :at least from the records we have, a 9 fairly large number of people present at compared to the other 8 || meetings. 9 Do you recall if there is any special significance for 10 | this meeting? 11 Mr. Gilpatric. Tt was unusual to. have Ed Murrow and 2 < 12 || Don Wilson. ‘present from USIA. Otherwise the conditions were a | & 13 lousy because there were more people from State than usual. z 14 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anything about any meeting 15 that was really special where more people were called in to 16 come? wae I realize you can't pinpoint a specific date for me. 18 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I don't recall why Murrow and Wilson : 19 |} were there. And the question of whether there were five people ° 20 || or two people from State just depended on whether Mr. Rusk : 21 | and Mr. Johnson wanted in the way of assistance for a particula z W 2° || session. : 23 Goodwin is listed for State, but he was actually a presi- Ne ; 54 | dential assistant. 25 Mr. Wallach. In the third paragraph -~ I am not HW 50955 Docld: 33823626 Page 31 Treks Creer rr
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 end nash ll cb fols a 12 & ‘ Oo “ 13 3 14 15 16 17 18 3 19 a : 20 é 21 = Wl 22 3 23 E a) 24 25 HW 30955 Docld:3 Meadca ww YOP SECRET 94 going to read that verbatim ~- it just refers to Mr. Rusk -- it brings up the blockade of Berlin. Did Mr. Rusk often talk about Cuba and the blockade of Berlin together in terms of an action the Soviets could take? Mr. Gilpatric. I don't recall it coming up often. It was generally accepted that our operations vis-a-vis Cuba should not be such as would touch off crises or threats in other areas. So that it is not surprising that he mentioned this here, particularly at this juncture, when we had had one Berlin crisis. 23626 Page 82 TA CECRPET
a! ox Pnone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 YOP SECRET _ - Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to the second page, sir, the fifth paragraph, which says: - "The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we can not separate the building up of agent assets in Cuba from the actions that would hurt the U.S. in the use of world opinion". It. then states: "This lead to the discussion by General maylor that we should consider changing the overall objective from one of over- throwing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure". Do you remember as a constant theme at this meeting that Mr. McNamara stressed the building up of agents inside Cuba? Mr. Galpatric. No. I only recall the concern that surfaced continually over effecting our relations adversely with other Latin American countries. We appeared to be intervening in the internal affairs of one of them. And I think that is the point that Mr. McNamara must have had in mind here. Mr” Wallach. Sir, I call your attention to Exhibit 19.. And I would like you to look at that in conjunction with Exhibit 20. That these are two documents that. you saw yesterday. Exhibit 19 is a two page memorandum from General Taylor to his various people at State, the CIA and Defense. And you will note that in the next to the last. paragraph, the second line of that paragraph, there is a portion that Docld:3 423626 Page 83 TO i? SECRET
cb2: Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, §.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 28 24 25 TOP SECRET , is whited out, is that correct? Mr. Gilpatric. That is correct. Mr. Wallach. It is under Mr. Harvey. Now, referring to Exhibit 20, sir, which is a memorandum prepared by Mr. Harvey and dated August 14, 1962, paragraph two states: “Reference is made to your conversation on 13 August 1962 concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were, ‘including liquidation of leaders'". I believe that the penultimate paragraph that Mr. Harvey is referring to is the four words that are excised in the August 13 memo. In the next paragraph Mr. Harvey states: “The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at.a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in Secretary Rusk's office on August 10". I take it you testified before that you did not recall Mr. McNamara's bringing that topic up, is that correct? Mr. Gilpatric. Right. Mr. Wallach. Was the meeting of August 10 in Mr. Rusk's office, if you recall? Mr. Gilpatric. I believe so, Mr. Wallach. Could that have been the reason why so many pocld:3 23626 Fage 4 Trsath) @EFECREFT
ae TOP SECRET 97 é a people from State were there? aa : 20 Mr. Gilpatric. It could have well have been, there ; "5 could well have been a connection. 4 Mr. Wallach. Was it unusual for the meeting to be held 5 there? | 6 Mr. Gilpatric. Yes, because as I said before, 9 Secretary Rusk was the ranking officer, and we usually went 8 to his office. We never went to the CIA. And except for a 9 few meetings that were held in my office very early on, I 10 think all the meetings were held in State. | 11 Mr. Wallach. Looking again at Exhibit 20, the third 2 12 paragraph, after Mr. Harvey states that the question of a 13 assassination was brought up by Secretary McNamara, he goes ° 14 on to state: "It was the obvious consensus at the meeting, 15 in answer to a comment by Ed Murrow, that this is not a 16 subject which has been made a matter of official record". 7 | Do you recall Mr. Murrow saying anything to that effect?- 18 Mr. Gilpatric. No. g 19 Mr. Wallach. I take it you wouldn't bacause you don't : 20 recall the assassination? © : 21 Mr. Gilpatric. No. I don't recall the conversation on ; 22 the subject at all. : 23 Mr. Wallach. The fourth paragraph reads: “Upon receipt _ ; 24 of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, ° 25 in his absence, point out to Frank Iland the inadmissibility MW 50955 Docta:34403626 Page 85 TOvt> GECBDET
cb 4 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ll Le . 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 “18 19 20 Nae 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 TOP SECRET 58 and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense and U.S.T.A. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so." My first.question is, did you ever discuss with Mr. Hand the excising of this language from the document? Mr. Gilpatric. No. I never saw either document. Mr. Wallach. Did you ever discuss with Mr. McNamara the excising of certain words from this document? Mr. Gilpatric. Not this document, no, because I never saw it until yesterday. | Mr. Wallach. Were there references to assassination of Castro in any other documents that Mr. McNamara had, do you recall, just proposals? Mr. Gilpatric. No. The only thing I have seen is a memorandum in 1967 that Mr, McCone dictated at that time after he was out of the government, and following some story of Jack Anderson in which the subject of assassination came up. Mr. Wallach. When did you see that memorandum, Mr. WW 50955 Docia:3 4936296 Page 86 Trald GECRET
cb 5 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 © HW 50955 10 il 12 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 el Re 25 24 29 pocta:3 oss Page 87 TOP SECRET last night that the chrolology of events was quite dim, as j TOP SECRET 99 Gilpatric? ‘Mr. Gilpatric. I saw it last night. Mr. McNamara showed it to me . | Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara tell you how he got a copy of the memorandum? Mr. Gilpatric. McCone sent it to him. Mr. Wallach. Had a discussed assassinations or plannin for assassinations at all with Mr. McCone? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. McNamara comment on Mr. McCone's 1967 memorandum? Mr. Gilpatric. Well, he wasn't sure. He said to me the McCone memorandum stated, being five years after the event. Mr. Wallach. Did he tell you whether or not it was in fact correct or incorrect? Mr. Gilpatric. He had no recollection of ever having brought the subject up in his position then. And he says now he was against the idea. Mr. Wallach. Does he remember it being discussed? Mr. Gilpatric. He doesn't remember it being discussed at all. Mr. Wallach. Did he tell you that he ascerted a positio at. that time that he was against the idea?
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL BW 450955 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 10 1l le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 29 iWwr SEGKE I 100 Mr. Gilpatric. He said it was his position. Whether he expressed it he doesn't recall. But he asked McCone if McCone had any recollection after the statement to the press began appearing several weeks ago during early June. Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard any discussion of using the Mafia for any purposes in the MONGOOSE operation? Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Or using any hoodlums or anything like that: Mr. Gilpatric. No. Mr. Wallach. Turning your attention to Exhibit 21, which reflects a Special Group Augmented meeting on MONGOOSE on October 4, that indicates that you were present also. Do you have any reason to believe that you were not? Mr. Gilpatric. No. This is before the missile crisis. Mr. Wallach. The first paragraph of that memo states: "The Attorney General opened the meeting by saying that higher authority is concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE . program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General said that he wondered if a new look is not required at this time in view of the meager results, especially in the sabotage field. He urged that 'massive activity' be mounted within the entire MONGOOSE framework", Do you recall the Attorney General stressing this, or is this just one time in many that he was pushing? TO! SECRET Docld: 32473626 Page 68
eee a, i eae tate ig : Pai ota gto pete | OR gt +c tin 362 NRO A 239 He Rage ee ER oO . WASHINGTON Pp Y . October 5, 1961 NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO, 100 TO: The Secretary of State SUBJECT: . Contingency Planning for Cuba . In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba. ‘ McGeorge Bundy cc: The Secretary of Defense Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Richard Goodwin cc: Mrs. JTuincoln Mr. Bundy's Files 4 Mr. Bromley Smith won ESAAr C-O-P-¥. Qehsd Grats luda ; SMe . 4a Melee 7 IS PSE
CF Oe 'RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL 5 October 1961 * MEMORANDUM FOR-THE RECORD SUBJECT: Cuba In accordance with General Taylor's instructions, I talked to Assistant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he would be heaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Wymberley Coerr, would have to take this project on. I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him. I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the presence and positions of Raul and Che Guevara must be taken into account. We agreed that this was an exercise that should be under the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of this requirement. Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right away. As to timing, I said that I did not understand that this was a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed. Ile then sect Monday as a target date for a first draft. I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the President's interest in this matter, before General Taylor had told me he preferred this not be done. Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr,’on the assumption that Mr. Woodward would have already told him. I asked that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture. He under- stood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an exercise emanating from his own office. I said I would leave this up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General Taylor. On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be re- lated to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement. Thomas A. Parrott RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL . : HWY 350955 Docld:3274236276 Page 90
[. § Getouber 165 fo. /. PCBAIGNE LOR CHR EECORD a SUNJACgrs Cuba co: . ‘ Tn decoudance wlth Counval Faylox's lnstwuctiors, DT tallied to feolsteni Sacnetany Veedward yestordty about the womebresont Seg tha mrapsehfon of & corhipsency blon, a told ma oa tha hedegy ore ha noutd La lewiag feu tvo ceela and, thevafore, bis Daputy, Uyolarley Couey wentld beava ca tebe chia project on, Yerbhen oat with bir, Coors and outlined the pogelee ont Co him 7 paid that wnat usa varted wad a vien acadyst the cent Lageney that agtro ueald in coma vay or other ba vemvoeved firen tha Cubcn seri, eed thet ag uadeveicuddus weg the tenis of c thig eden sheuld ba aultca Re ws woongeend, poevenes em pogsitterg of Taal and Cha Cuewnn: reequitiy, Una goexaed cast (uo Us en ceed e tre digoceden of Steere with pavitetoniden by Ms Algo petncad oun to ty. Coone that fee Coody ha thin voquteovent. Bar, Coane edd ba won shad ¢ 2 his poeonke serviced en hia wvinhe wrny, 25 £0 i teaiver Koendd iy at q dsd wot uidexatnel taoek hints was Voeonerho pvegyer beg fhec Lt should 1 ngcecnad bth cotsouible cuaad, Pa thea cin deme.y ds a teveak date for a firek cpath. < ied roautdoucd co bn, Vooduaud che Jee dae clig matter, befera Cenaral Yaylor had taldora be mit be dona, Toorefoxve, I fol it uecesenvy co cal. cssuveilen that lu. Uoacw. tian gbig Aepest pa honk cet : : : chood thts rad, my and volinieuns d ch ae “Us ‘could ba PROC emeaveton eocpeipag Siren dels oyna officer, Toecndd To yoold lee ave tills iy bo inten lab diwna onulectly all wight to mtexiheuce de to Gone Yiyloy. fai rha covert side, L tulhed to troey Parnes G1 Gta sivtooetoal thee ea up-to-date werorte be Cuxnished as seoa as peceibla ea work is poler cn ard wine io botue planved. fo eahed that thig ba xe- feted fo the bread plan that vag arpeeved by tha lpectal Group aud avthbowity In feencth. “L dtd nat tell ie. Puscon of seeary (edie Cha tite thot Doped ben wid gona Ey. Cootuha who led todd loa ahaut a ra n i My . \ ance A, Larne ‘ cf | HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 91 pine ee te gs ot ee + neem
ul ele he Cy ? At 45 7S whe MBMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL #. G. LANSDALE Ac Chief of Operations, Cuba Project. pp” Subject: Cuba Project t Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for ’ BrigGen Ww. H. Craig, USA, usubj: "Special Project", dated’ 17 Jan 62 1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has been determined based upon the following factors: a. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC curing ~~ the meeting of 9 May 1961, | b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in Cuba, c. Operations against the Castro regime will be covert, at least initially. ‘ d. Time favors the Castro government. 2. The basic wilitory implications of Castro's Communis government are as follows a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national | | vulnerability and defense costs as forces are agevelooed or shifted to meet this threat. b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout tne western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additional Latin American countries will core under Communist control. Elinination of this base would demonstrate to the other nations of the worle that the United States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in: OC S4LS | | | PHUPERIY Ut . THE WHITE HOUSE Ol HW 50955 pog ih $4236 fPhab ¥2 CMP APNE MARAE RAE A RYE EPA
“ (1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other nations of the Western Hemisphere. (2) Increased Communist capability for spreading Communism throughout Latin. America. (3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, tralning areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources of str nategic materials necessary to our military capability. (4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage, 3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist “government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemispnere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists ‘* are considered: a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air bases in Cuba. b. The Soviets could provide castro with a number of ballis tic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads. * 4, In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere, The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it.is believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail: : 4 {) x O24? PRUPERTY OF HE ‘ 1arAn _
a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance | from a government representative of the Cuban people. b. If it is announced incident to the overt military action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability to maintain order without further on — assistance from the OAS nations. | ec. If the military operation is conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum, d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as‘an incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this event, - applicable portions of a, b,; and ¢ above apply. 5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular movelnent inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation, * personnel and bases. PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Madey Lu HW 50955 rock lddazsede’ pads \ “SS a= <= coca =
po ; ; LB hy Be a “ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD . SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 January 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Helms and General Lansdale were a present for Item 1. l. Cuba The Group considered General Lansdale's paper "Cuba Project," 19 January 1962; his paper "Task 33," 19 January 1962; and the CIA paper "Cuba Projecc," 24 January 1962. In addition Gencral Lansdale circulated, but retained, copies of a paper on actions taken to gain ‘popular support for the U.S. position in connection with the OAS meeting, and another outlining actions taken on the spot, in Punta del Este, After a lengthy discussion, all agencies currently involved (State, Defense, Joint Staff, CIA) agreed that they accept the tasks e., - assigned to-them, In the case of State, this is subject to con- a currence by the Secretary upon his return. February 20th is recog~ nized as a target date to take a searching look at progress up to that point and to recommend new lines of policy if appropriate. General Lansdale commented that it appears that some clarifica- —" tion.might be in order as to exactly what is intended in the planning papers. He emphasized that there is agreement that external support of internal operations should be provided for and that it is recognized there might be an internal revolt which could lead to a Cuban group's requesting U.S. intervention. He also said he had met with the JCS and that the latter had responded strongly to the idea of preparing for external action. Additionally, he had met with the intelligence estimators and it had been noted there will be some delay in the NIE because of’ the need to acquire more intelligence and to digest a sizeable input from the State Department. Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establishment of the Lansdale group, higher authority had directed State and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He said a great deal of work has been done along these lines and that this should now be directed into the channel of an integrated politico-military plan to cover any contingency. _ rae WHITE HOUSE UFFG HW 50955. Docld:32423626 Page 95° _
| Mr. McCone made several points: (a) The NIE of November 28, which was commented on in General Lansdale's paper, was based on all ~ available intelligence and dealt with certain operational aspects. - a The latter had been doze at Mr. McCone's direction. (b) Clandestine operations are noc susceptible to rigid scheduling and must be approached on a atep-by-step basis. Therefore, schedules will have to be reexamined pericdically. (c) Sabotage, sanctions and economic warfare can all be attributed to the United States. The Special Group should recognize this as a possible consequence. (d) A popular — uprising within Cuba could be brutally suppressed in the manner of In such an event, unless the U.S. is prepared to give overt Hungary. portunities to unseat the Castro government . assistance, future op would be lost. . In commenting on Mr. McCone's last point, General Taylor noted that the CIA paper of the 24th appears to question the feasibility of the basic objective of overthrowing the Castro regime without : overt U.S. military intervention, and that it suggests the need to accept in advance of implementing the Project the definite possibility ; of having to use U.S. forces. He said that in his view more than contingency plans are required and that, so far as possible, authority ™ chould be obtained in advance to undertake major moves which might, be | required as circumstances develop. He conceded that it may be im- ge porsible to get such a firm determination very far in advance, The ' Group agreed, however, that every effort should be made to line up : various situations that might arise, and to formulate recommended policy to capitalize on these.situations at the proper time. It was aopreed that no action should be taken before February 20th which could have possibilities of involving the U.S. in charges of overt acpreaaion, Ceneral Lemnitzer noted that military contingency plans now in -betng provide enough American strength to accomplish the job without {neernal help. He said that while these plans are up-to-date, it will be necessary to build up a number of them based on varying anpuzptiona, He also warned that planning for operations of this hind nhould not involve a firm commitment to a time schedule, as veo the ctse ta the warlier unsuccessful operation, Finally, General Lansdale noted that task number 33 (a) has been vithdraen, The other: under 33°will not be put into execution unetll future cxaminacion and approval. PROPER EY oF THE WHITE HOUSE GE FIC. HW 0959 Docld:32423626: Page 96 |
f~ : , . 5 March 1962. - MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT:. Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) on Project Mongoose, 5 March 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Rusk and Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Heims and Mr. Harvey. 1. After considerable discussion, the following was agreed: a. The intelligence-collection program presented in General Lansdale's paper of 2 March was approved. General Taylor emphasized that this should not be interpreted as a completely rigid plan, but should serve as a general outline at this stage. Any actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the Special Group for resolution. b. We ‘cannot afford to concentrate on the intelligence f aspects to the exclusion of preparations for other eventual actions, during the next five months. Accordingly, General Lansdale will prepare a phased plan for circulation before the next meeting to provide for possible actions which could lead to an internal revolt and eventual U.S. intervention. Ce In addition certain preliminary actions can be begun in the very near future, involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents. As the danger of blowing our plans by doing this is recognized, the Special Group (Augmented) must keep its hand tightly on these preliminary actions. d, The Guidelines prepared by General Taylor will be examined by all members, with a view to concurrence at a meeting a week from today. These will be shown to higher authority, but in the context of information rather than a request for specific approval. The Secretary of State felt that the Guidelines should make it clear ° _ that, while Mongoose is concerned: with covert operations, the U.S. is simultaneously pursuing an overt course which may contribute to the same end. He added that the covert operators should keep in touch with the overt programs. pRurekty Ut THE WHITE HOUSE 9 RICE HW 350955 DBocld:3274236276 Page 97
2. In making the above point, Mr. Rusk pointed out that if ~ it should be possible to prove Castro's involvement in efforts to subvert other Latin American countries then this might present an oS Led cygiPxcuse! to intervene either unilaterally or multilaterally. He said Pipe e that Cuba could be viewed as the "East Germany" of the Western Hemisphere. le added that the Department is looking into the _ possibility of enlisting the aid of other Hemisphere countries in establishing mechanisms for patrolling and controlling movement of Cuban operatives in the Caribbean area, — Mr. Johnson was asked to have a list prepared of various situations whicn: would. serve as a [plausible pretext! for intervention, 3. It is recognized that many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba would be of an all-purpose type; that is they would be trained in paramilitary skills as well as those of exclusively intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S. although every effort will be made to attempt such control. It was noted that the ' scale of this covert intelligence effort is about the maximum that can be supported within the framework of assets available, unless there is some dramatic change for the better. Thomas A. Parrott No distribution ~ = ey FLO. PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HW 350955 Docld:3274236276 Page 93
W ie Wid CY id Cm Yb ld the udidsucdey ya! 4 bv Wed OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE i? Se WASHINGTON 25, D.C, 9 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Comments on the Guidelines for Operation Mongoose 1. In conformance with our conversation and for such use as you may desire, I am transmitting herewith my views concerning General Taylor's "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose", I have incorporated my views into the attached revision of General Taylor's "Guidelines". This paper has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of staff. 2. Essentially, the changes recommended are designed to clarify the command channels and responsibilities and to inject a sense of urgency. 3. I have indicated specific deletions of General Taylor's wording by striking through the word(s), and gm, a indicated additions by underlining. Loy 4 Ve hg 0 UE BAA WILLIAM H, CRAIG va Brig General, USA" DOD/JICS Representative Caribbean Survey Group Enclosure: Guidelines of , Ga | BACT icky Poot ae FATIC ; RECRALLC: 72 DID DIR 9290.10 DOS ROT APSLY eT rae err erg ry eae) DIAL WANDLING = ROPORE PROPERLY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF FICE HW 50955 Docld:32473626 Page 99
sen hl STS vn POR nemye eas 7 ' # Onereas o ar as & NOFORT ro Wad ft Sela ye TOP. SECRET. GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION MONGOOSE a OSE 1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions: /@. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the Gas tre-povernment Communist government of Cuba, the United States will make maximum use of Cuban resources, internal and external, but recognize that final success will require decisive US military intervention, and that this should be accomplished before Soviet military bases are established in Cuba, b. Such Cuban resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and Justify this intervention, and there- ‘for to facilitate and Support it, 2. The immediate primary objective of US efforts during the coming three months will be. the acquisition of hard intelligence on the conditions inside Cuba. Concurrently, other actions Generaliy~pelitieal-and-eeonomie- dn- ehavaeter may be taken as necessary to develop credible intelligence concerning: US sup ort; leadership otential; sike ly areas for the development of resistance and insurgenc and to test the appeal of proposed political platforms; provided © that £key these actions are relatively inconspicious and consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and of * ~ IOP SECRET HW 350955 DBDocld:324236276 Page 100
Deed ‘ ma) rar neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The Joint-Chiefsof-Staff-will-earpy-ferward~-the-necessary piannings The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive US military capability for intervention. At the - “J end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program. 3, During this period, General Lansdale will continue as. Chief of Operations, calling direetiy on the participating departments and agencies- through their respective CSG representatives and the established working groups for. rr | Support and implementation of agreed required tasks. The heads of departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to the President. The Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating the combined plan- ning and execution of tasks by the Caribbean Survey Group "and reporting to the President through tte Special Group (5412 Augmented). e OGASG HW 350955 Docld:32423626 Page 101
TOP SECRET 9° 779° OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 35 12 March 1962 SENSHIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale > Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, necding resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency. l. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals: on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will'be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem anda departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. = Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations. There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S, Government properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltration into Cuba. 2, Arming of Cuban guerrillas, CIA needs a policy determination on the supplying of arms and cquipment to deserving Cuban guerr illas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface, as the intelligence- collection effort is increased, and it is Qc? | BYCLUDED PRCH At} TOMA PLC REGRADLUG: DOD DIR §200.10 ~ . DOES WOT APPLY SENSITIVE TOP SECRET — Copy You” of J eopies. Series PROPERTY Ot THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE eee | HW 350955 DBocld:32423626 Page 102
HW 50955 logical that the number of requests will increase as the operation proceeds, guerrillas ( There is a need for clearly defining the limits of arming for self-defense, for training, for purposes short of _ Open actions in revolt), to permit Operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, in Phase I.. 3. Use of U.S, military personnel and equipment. CIA has. requested Defense assistance in air and sea capabilities, including supplying equipment and supplying U.S. military crews to operate the equipment. Included in these requests are 2 LSD's (or similar ships) to lie off the coast in support of CIA maritime operations, with U.S. Navy crews of 200-300 depending upon the missions, 3 USAF cargo aircraft with 'sheep-dipped'' USAF crews for air re-supply, @ amphibious aircraft with ‘‘sheep-dipped" USAF crews, and 2 sub- marines for black broadcast operations. (This is in addition to CIA requests for 6 PT type boats, 3 Helio aircraft, 2 82-foot Coast Guard cutters, and arms, communications equipment, etc.). Again, where U.S. military personnel and equipment are involved in Phase I, there is need for a policy determination which will permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, as wellasa need for rules of engagement. Distribution: Copy: 1 SO Om A Ww bh Docld: 32423626 To: General Taylor The Attorney General Secretary Rush/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson Secretary McNamara/ Deputy Secretary Gilpatric General Lemnitzer (through General Craig Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey) Chief of Operations a4 SENSITIVE TOP SECRET 2 PROPERTY OF ay ane c , THE WHTE WOULt ay Fick Page 103
. a - HAVE Y +2 3 - eC pulreey, Jo a 5 EIS - : 13 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey , Ll. The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some of this language. In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under’ a the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific Po” proposals for approval tothe Special Group, which involve policy considerations. 2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Insti- tutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved, The sections headed Phase II were deferred. 3, The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions made: a. Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation. b. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas. The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be ‘made to the Group. (This decision did not deal with the actual iieans of supply, which i's covered in c below.) PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HY 50955 DBocld:32423676 Page i04
HW 50955 c. Use of U.S, Military Personnel and Equipment. The Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re- supply operations will probably require U.S, military personnel and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will be included in tho Guidelines. General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air Supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next week. In the meantime Preparations should be begun for the selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries, such a "sheep-dipping." ‘The Air Force will be asked to come up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide one or two aircraft for us@ in initial Operations, In connection with small boat Operations, the Secre- Cary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be established. It was pointed out there are no PT boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired, CIA will present. a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days. , 4, Mr. McNamara then raised the Possibility that a decision may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel, He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should rem < flect that, in the covert phase of this Operation, U.S, personnel, bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that would exist in the face of a Prohibition against such use must also be studied imnediately. 4, At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of Sabotage or other means of | destroying the Soviet boats which have been Or will be delivered to Cuba, 6. The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent. . 7. It was agreed that the Group should give a status report to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general principles and guidelines, Thomas A. Parrott No distribution Ceca, PROPERTY uy. TU verter cis Dbocld: 32423626 Page 105
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE . WASHINGTON 25, D.c¢, <7 V4 at bee Go > a 7- o~ “FS 13 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPutYy SECRETARY oF DEFENSE Sub ject: Comments on CIA's Re commended Changes to the Guidelines for Operation Mongoose CIA's proposed changes to paragraph 2 of the "Guidelines" Paper are acceptable if the Pollowing changes are made (deletions are indicated by Striking through the word(s) and additions are identified by underlining): "The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming three months will be the acquisition of hard intellirence on Cuba, Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be under. taken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within Cuba, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as POSSible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro and of centralizing his en influence in the Western Hemisphere, {The JCS will ss Plame pard- the-neeessary-planning continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure ) a decisive U.S, military capability for intervention. \ At the end of this firs€ period, or earlier if conditions } permit, the Situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the Program," st Uf / WA, . oA CO ; . Mey C7794 SS CECH anna H. ‘CRAIG Vo cpa Brig General, USA OCR a DOD/ICS Representative Caribbean Survey Group EXCLUDED Ror AUTOUAP IC RECRADING: pop orp 5200.10 DOES NOT AppLy v- SO Te ere tt tere eg 3. | nc TR Ae cee oe ae et mere geen YO res or ererctiemrD re ° a et if IOP SECRET SpEepay WANBLING NGFepN PROPERTY OF HW 50955 Docld:324273676 Page 106
14 March 1962 I> Guidelines for Operation Mongoose 1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions: ae in undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous re- sources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S, military intervention. b. Such indigenous resources as-are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and there-~ after to facilitate and support it, 26 The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area, Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calcu- -lated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible,-will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengage- ment with minimum loses in assets and U.S, prestige. The JCS will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure Ps Cy / of 10 Copies 7 Ot Bq PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 107
HY 50955 -2- a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention, At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program, 3. In order to get the covert phase of this program in motion, it will be necessary at the outset to use U.S. personnel, bases and equipment for the support of operations inside the target area. However, the CIA will concurrently expedite the development’ of non-~ attributable resources in order to reduce or eliminate this dependence should it become necessary after the initial phase. 4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads _ of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS, The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress. Note: Mr. Johnson has copy number 2. CIA (llelms/lMarvey) has copy number 3. General*Lansdale hascopy number_4) All other copies, except the ones filed herewith (1 and 5) have heen destroyed. " wt rie BIO leo PROPERTY of THE WHITE Hates perigee Doclda: 32423626 Page 108
16 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD Subject: Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE with the President In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE, The: guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines. 22 March 1962 This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the Group asked that the minute’ be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines. ° al AS A i , JEGd Geese, PROPERTY OF HW 50955 Docld:3242736276 Page 109° ‘ THE WHITE HOUT! OF tere
buy Ube Y ab 244 . , a poe 7 ae ee A -“” ‘ 4 : ' : . . ’ . : aa Ga f : 13) Mareh 1962 ) MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meuting on Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962 PRESENCE: General Taylor and Nr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. MeNamara, Me. Gilpatrie, General Lewnitver and Ceneral Lausdale; Me. Kennedy; Mr. MeCone and Mr. Tlacvey « ~ Ls. The Croup (with one exception) agreed to accept the changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DON/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr, Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some or this lanpuage. In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Narvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and fo promise resupply to infiltrated agents. Tt was apreed that under en the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific proposals for approval tathe Special Group, which invelve policy considerations, 2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Insti- tutional Planning Operation Mongouse,' was then discussed. ‘The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved, The sections headed Phase II were deferred. o 3, The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions inade: a. Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation, b. Arming of Cuban Cuerrillas: The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under the cireumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any inajor operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be ‘nade to the Group. (his decision did not deal with the actual means of supply, which is covered in c¢ below.) , . PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 110
Use of Hiditary. ‘sonnel _and Equipment. The Group agreed that it would have to accepe the proposition that re- supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel and equipment to include airerafe and seacraft. This point will be included in the Guidelines, General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next week. In the meantime preparations should be bepun for the selection of personnel and aireraft for necessary preliminaries, " such a "sheep-dipping."! the Air Force willbe asked tO cue up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide One or two aircraft for use in initial operations, c. Use of U.S, In connection with small boat Operations, the Secre- tary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requiresnent wight be established, It was pointed out there are no PT boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired, CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days. 4, Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision eon may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S, personnel, He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming thac such personnel ean be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should re- flect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S, personnel, bases and equipment would be available bute that the situation that. would exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also be studied immediately, 4a, At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or ether means of destroying the Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered to Cuba. 6. ° The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent. 7. It was apreed that the Group should give a status report to higher authority this week, to include discussion Of poeneral principles and guidelines. a Thomas A. Parrott No distribution Re a PROPERTY uo THE WHITE HOUSE G:C HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page Lil
“7 TOP SEGKET SPRUE HAMBLINS © B@FERN ( vara 2! op OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ., , Washington 25, D.C, Ht plree be yp 7-f- 7) on 13 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GRoupP (AUGMENTED ) Subject: Consolidated Status Report, DOD/JCS Representatives, Caribbean Survey Group, 4 January - 9 March 1962 . 1..On 4 January 1962, Brig. General William H. Craig, USA, was designated as DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean Survey Group (CSG). Four officers from J-~5, Joint Staffyswho had been working on the Cuba Project, were authorized to continue ona full-time basis. 2. On 18 January, Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, presented his program review to the SRG. As a result of this review, 10 tasks were assigned which were the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense. In order to accomplish these tasks, General Craig's Working Group was enlarged by the addition of full-time representatives of J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, Joint Staff, and the Defense Intelligence Agency and necessary office space and clerical personnel obtained. : Also, full-time representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the ~~ four Military Services were designated to work with the Group. Tasks were assigned to members of the Group. Action, to date, on these tasks is as follows: a. Task 1 - On 8 February, the JCS forwarded a proposed position paper defining the Stake and Role of DOD in the Cuba Project which generally subscribed to full Defense Support in terms of personnel,mmteriel and bases. This position was approved by DepSecDef on 8 February, and for- warded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project. b. Task 29 - On 7 March, the JCS approved a planning paper which outlined the total involvement of the DOD in the Cuba Project and indicated specifie situations which would tequire the use of US military force. This document is now being considered by the DepSecDef, c. Task 29 (2) - Determine how to reduce CINCLANT's reaction time and yet provide adequate force to quickly take Cuba. CINCLANT and Supporting commanders have reviewed CINCLANT's contingency plans and made Study of prepositioning steps required if reaction time is to be drastically reduced, Although three initial ana separate messages pertaining to reaction times were discussed and cleared by the JCS supported by only those personnel cleared for or a part of the CSG (WG), “- it has become necessary to place subject of time reduction factors in open channels in order to cover the myriad of recommendations, possibilities and required decisions with adequate staffing. ad. Task 29 (3) - Be prepared to brief DOD's immediate capability to respond to a request from insurgent Cubans for military assistance, Existing J~3 briefing on the Jcs approved CINCLANT contingency plan is considered adequate for initial brief, Additionally, the concept of a proposed "Quick Reaction" Oplan togather with an analysis of the avallability of US forces with reactions times on an accelerated, piecemeal basis and with regard to the calculated risks involved is being developed, o Pe EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADINC Gt Ls. : ~ DOD DIR 5200.10 DORS NOT APPLY. PROPORTY OF THE WHITc HOUSE OFFICI HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page Liz
“TOP SECRET. SP =] = CIAL HANGLINS = N@FORE e. Task 31 - DOD Policy for Support of CIA and Stdte - completed and approved by the JCS on 23 February. Signed by the Chairman, JCS, 27 February, and by the DepSecDef on 28 February. Letters were dispatched by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director, US Information Agency, stating that DOD would support fully on a high priority basis, requests for assistance received in writing and containing sufficient information to permit a determina- tion of the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission, _ . - f£. Task 31 (1) - DOD Support for Caribbean Admission Center, Opa Locka, Florida ~ completed. DOD provided 26 military personnel as interrogators, report writers and supervisors in two Increments in close coordination with CIA, Final increment completed CIA orientation and training course on & March and began infiltration into Miami area, 9 March. All personnel scheduled to be on board on 14 March and Center fully operational, 15 March 1962. g. Task 32 - Defense to submit a plan for special operation: use of Cubans enlisted in the US Armed Forces. Recommendation on that geographic restrictions on use of Cubans now in, or to be taken into, US Armed Forces forwarded by JCS to the Dep SecDef. Plan for use of these Cubans, under the assumption that the restrictive policy would be changed was also approved by JCS on & March and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, on 9 March 1962. h. Task 33 a - Prayers for Cuba by Cubans in US Armed Forces - completed 2 February. Task as assigned visualized prayers being offered for Cuba by Chaplains in US Armed Forces units having Cubans enlisted with photographs being made of Cuban soldiers at prayers for publicity purposes. ° On recommendation of the JCS, no further action was taken by the Chief of Operations. i. Task 33 b - Plan for Incapacitation of Sugar Workers - completed e@ February. Task as assigned was to develop a plan for incapacitating large segments of the sugar workers by the covert use of BY or CW agents. Study revealed the idea was infeasible and it was cancelled. j. Task 33 c - Plan for a C&D Air-Sea exercise in the vicinity of Cuba. Task 33 d -'Alternate plan for C&D exercise. a Plans prepared using cover of scheduled exercises as proposed military C&D exercises, Both plans approved by JCS on 16 February, however, the advantageous position of Plan 33 ¢ noted as opposed to the elements of risk inherent in the less desirable alternative Plan 33 d. Plans for- warded to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, on 19 February with JCS recommendation that only Plan 33 ¢ be considered for ultimate possible execution. 3. On 12 February, General Lansdale requested a survey and evaluation of DOD Psychological Assets in the Caribbean area and a plan for improving their use. By proper sanitization of the request, the Joint Staff was requested to prepare the study with a deadline date of 10 March. The Joint Staff response was received on 9 March and the document is now being studied with a view of responding to General Lansdale by 15 March 1962, - oC “4 Ol QI 2 PROPERTY O8 THE WHITE MOUSE HW 50955 poctalsddoaede Bae aie CMR PEAT FEA MRT EMA MAT OT Py
ees ewe) “So e7o Pry Gro ow Poy — 7 4, Additional actions to achieve the objective of the CSG, but not directly associated with any assigned task which have been accomplished to date include: a. Preparation of detailed initial Essential Elements of Information (EEI) required for planning. These EEI were levied.on the Intelligence Community through the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, on 15 February. Tirst responses specifically identified with the EEI were. . received, 28 February 1962... ‘ b. Preparation of a secure room in the JCS Restricted area for use as a Special Operation Room for the CSG. This room was completed on 23 February and is now available for such use as the CSG may desire to make of it. c. On 22 February, received a request from CIA for use of Avon Park Bombing Range, a USAF facility in Florida, for use as an exercise area for training agents. Request was staffed, approved by the JCS on 7 March, sent to the DepSecDef on 7 March for policy approval, signed by the DepSecDef on 9 March, and CIA notified of approval on —_ 9 March, provided it was National policy to train Cubans on US military bases. d. This office has received and processed several other requests from CIA involving personnel, equipment and facilities of a minor nature. All specific CIA requests to date have been handled expeditiously by the Military.Services. e. Began preparation of a Civil Affairs/Military Govern- ment Plan for implementation on order. Also, a Communications Plan, in support of the CA/MIG Plan, based on the assumption that existing communication facilities would be destroyed _ or inoperable. Target date for completion, 15 March 1962. f. Requested the Chief of Operations to levy a requirement on CIA for preparation of an estimate of the hostile resistance other than organized military forces which might be expected > if military operations were conducted in Cuba and of the results of a truly free election if such were held. g. Reviewed and commented informally on the Interrogation Guide: Cuba, a Joint CIA-DOD-State project, handled by CIA. Purpose of this Guide is to provide interrogators at Opa Locka with a starting point when interviewing refugees processed through the CAC, This Guide will be revised on monthly or as found necessary by experience. h, CIA submitted a request to DOD on 5 March 1962 for the use of certain personnel, supplies, equipment, facilities and bases including, but not limited to, aircraft, boats, submarines and landing ships dock (LSD's), plus the use of US Armed Forces to furnish Air and Sea Cover, for CIA sponsored activities. The National policy decisions involved concerning the execution of this task are as follows: {1) Whether a policy of non- attributability to the US Government will apply to all projects in connection with the activities of the CSG. (2) Whether US bases and facilities should be utilized for the training of Cuban refugees. 3 OCLOE roy fl possi Vue Wotle Ouse oe HW 50955 Doctatsbhoseos’ Page iV4 ARNT EAL § BEA PMO ARR APOIO Aa
HY 50955 Boclda: 32427936276 Page 115 aon a A Lt galice Gre tr | T-§ “7S THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C, April 5, 1962 Lye MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE There will be a meeting of the Mongoose group next Wednesday afternoon at 2 o'clock in the.Secretary of State's Conference Room (the hour being subject to adjustment in case the Secretary of State has to go to the White House). You will be asked to give a progress report at the outset of the meeting, after which the group will go into executive session. ; . The Special Group today decided to ask you to brief it bi-weekly on Mongoose and to furnish the members with weekly written reports in the style of the South Vietnam reports, that is, the participating departments and agencies would file with you separate reports and you would prepare for the principals a highlight summary along the lines of Secretary Harriman's reports on South Vietnam. Sometime before the weekend, I want to talk to you about Mr. McCone's "liberation plan", PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF fit
™ HW 50955 ECE pute Oy 7 (3 pT 12 April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 12 April 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, - Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone . Mr. Bundy joined the Group later for a sunmation of the discussion. 1. The Group discussed the major points made at yesterday's meeting, particularly the views of the Secretaries of State and Defense, 2. Mr. McCone reiterated his belief that the operation as presently conceived may not accomplish the desired purpose. He said that activities in addition to intelligence (e.g., guerrilla warfare teams and sabotage), should be authorized in order to permit operations to move in the direction of the original objectives. He felt that if only intelligence is to be involved, then the present scale of CIA effort may be too large. Mr. McCone also urged that the U.S. be prepared to accept a greater degree of attributability than it perhaps now is. 3. Mr. Gilpatric felt it is necessary to achleve as high a posture of readiness as possible. For example, PT boats and other materiel necessary for more active operations should be acquired. In addition, more Cubans should be inducted into the U.S. Amny.. In this connection he pointed out that the restriction on service of such Cubans outside of this country has been lifted. The Attorney General concurred in Mr. Gilpatric's comments that a more imaginative approach toward enlistment of Cubans can be devised. 4, It was agreed that the guidelines do not require revision at this time. Instead the operation as presently conceived, with the stepping up indicated above, will be continued until August. At that time a review will be conducted of progress made and of the long-range objective, Lt was noted that the effect of any increased training ‘connected with the new activities mentioned by Mr. McCone, would not be apparent before Auguste. PROPERTY OF ‘Docld:324293626 Page 116 were wuiTe HOSE OFFICE
De Mr. Gilpacric agreed to look into the status of the under- water reconnaissance operation which had been approved at the meeting of 13 March 1962, and which has apparently been the subject of some misunderstanding by the Joint Reconnaissance Center. General Taylor called the Group's attention to the JCS paper “Justification of U.S. Military Intervention,’ which most of them had not yet received. Mr. McCone said that he would probably make additional recommenda- tions for action within the established time-phased schedule, and that he would also examine the effects on the motivation of agents, which might result from an extended period of activity within the current framework. Thomas A. Parrott os No distribution, except General Lansdale ~ by jubroyt alq\ea- fae HY 50955 Docld: 3242736276 Page Li? PRNPFRTY OF
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.c. -) \ 14 June 1942 — etl 2 ISHIVE SMOBANLUM FOR BIIM MAY REIN, STATE | WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA | We DONALD WIL 50N, USEA SULJECT: Spontancous Revolts in Guta, Contingency Planning This conlir-ns the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency planning. The Defense operatioual representative is ressonsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions ina situat Open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba. This contingency is seenasa noneU.S. -initinted cituxtion, sirnilar to that rurnored ag activated for mid-June 1952. U.S. actions are scen as i the use of U.S, military forec, The State oncrational re preseniative is rosponsitle for the pre- paration of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of onen revolt in one or a few Incalities in Guba. This counting gency is secn aganon-U.S. -initiated situation where the people in one Cuban locality (or several neishboring localities) openly defy-the Communist regime, are being Suppressed with force, anc ULS. Iielp is requested (by the Cuban revolters or Latin American oninion). ALL we Lopartments and Arencies porticinatineg ia Oneration Moncoose will ascist in the preparation of these plans, ag required, Plans should incluce a Coocrintion of the assuviec continsency situa ~ tion, coecific actions to be taken and by whom, timina required, and an indication of post-action re Quivercents, Althouch cuerent onevations tivke priority, itis ermpected that working drafts of ties: cunt inpency plang wil be ready by 14 July. nen eel A working racetine of operational recreesatatives itl then ready these plans for sul siscion to tie Special Croun (Ave sented), : A < S Re ase ocase BAniARD © Lt | Se Meiaciny c. neat eas 4 Chief of Operations 4 ~. . PGi CLETUS “Ui : General Tayl Hi cc Cenera aysor ; [SPE FE ECIAL _ HANDLING aul en HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 116
SD me aoe ee] i | EFD- <a is lool Tl od >, Exo pera a aaa) Ci cow [ tm.) 3 med = ss a = Ts Poach] i) e wee [ a ane) 12.3 Nex on. [ aie ~ “A OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.c, 31 July 1962 Nes MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE Subject: us Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S). 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr, Gilpatric have approved the attached plan prepared in response to your memorandum of 14 June 1962, Subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning". 2. This completes our action on the Specific respon- . Sibility assigned, However, should the plan be approved by the Special Group (Augmented) and disseminated to task agencies, Supporting plans will be required, eAJAMIN T, HARRIS srivz Ceneral, USA DOD/JCS Representative Caribbean Survey -Group Enclosure: Plan t EXCLULED FPOM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5209.10 DOES NOT APPLY TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANBLINE NUP GRY HW 50955 DoclId: 32423626 Page 119
% OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C, 31 July 1962* MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGCOSE Subject: Questions Concerning United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S) 1. Pursuant to your informal notes the following is ‘submitted: _ ’ ae Page 8 (bh) Phase TE - The policy referred to has not been established as yet. CINCLANT now has a State Department Political Advisor (POLAD) permanently at- tached to his staff. This is the present liaison link with State. In developing military plans it has been recognized by both CINCLANT and State that an additional POLAD will be assigned to the staff of Commander, Joint Task Force 122 during the initial assault. This latter POLAD and his assistants, if any, will shift to the staff of Commander, Joint Task Foree Cuba during the ensuing groimd operations and subsequent anticipated period of a military occupation/government. It is considered that approval of United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba > (S) by the Special Group and the assignment of the tasks delineated in the coordinating instructions of sub-paragraph 4.c. (page 15) would levy the requirement for the development of political policy upon the Depart- ment of State. This same approval would then require this policy to be included in the supporting plan to be. developed ia accordance with the instructions of sub- paragraph 4.d. (page 15). F b. Page 8, last 3 lines - The intention of the State : Department to ultimately assume the responsibility for the civil administration of Cuba logically siould also be a part of the State Department plan required in sub- paragraph 4.d. Recognizing the time that was required before State Department assunption of responsibility in Europe following World War II, the military ts prepared to. establish and maintain civil affairs through a US Military Government. The existing military con- tingency plans direct that the civil affairs units be ; mae EXCLUDED FROM AUTCHATIC ~ OC isu REGRADIKG;.DOD DIR 5200.10 pons WOT APPLY ES earn ngage meme gt + ere fe ee nee pie Bae ee eee (OP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING eran >, 93 Lag PROPERTY OF CSEWEC TRE VelurTe unger Arrine | 5 HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 120
prepared to retain this responsibility for at lLeagst 6 months. As it is known, however, that the US mili- ~ tary cannot indefinitely support the indigenous Cuban population from military supplies, military. contingency plans stipulate that State must be ready to assume responsibility for the humanitarian feeding of the population within 30 days following the commencement of hostilities. The question as to what Cuban govern-~ ment will ultimately be recognized by the State Depart- ment cannot be predicted, however, State's intention should also be ineluded in the agency plan. 3 . c. Page 10. para (5) - Again, this policy is depend-~ ent upon ‘the development and issuance of a Department of State plan which Would be required under the provi- Sions of paragraph 4.4. (page 15), d. Page 12, para (b) - The Cuban government discussed must be assumed to be one friendly to the United States. The paragraph itself is considered "compatible" in that the Department of State may or may not act as the middle- man in the actual turnover of government. It might be that pending the establishment of a new Cuban government acceptable both to the United States and the Cubans themselves, the US military might be required to retain operational responsibility for military government and civil administration; this civil administration, however, to be in consonance with State Department policy and the required coordination. In any event the turnover should be accomplished as rapidly as possible consistent with the Cuban capability to assume responsibility. e. Page 12, para _(2)(a) - Approval of the US Cantin- gency Plan No. 2 would task USIA with the provision of the subject informational specialists and for in- °. clusion of the planning therefor in the USIA Agency Plan. Since USIA has been created subsequent to any major combat operations involving US military forces, there is no past experience in this field. However, availability of these informational specialists to augment Defense Psywar units should not be overlooked, M Page 13, nara (3)(a) - Again, approval of the subject contingency plan would assign the task out- lined in this paragraph to USIA for development and te . (Paares ree an ae TOP SEGLET SPEGIAL HANBLING NOFA TUC MANTE LACS arcing we HY 50955 - DocTd: 32423626 Page i2i
who HY 50955 Load a Boclda: 324273626 Page i132 inelusion in the USIA Supporting plan. ‘It is antigipated that the individual questions posed would be the subject - of coordination between USTA, Defense, JCS, the Services, CINCLANT, and all of the other possible subordinate participants and contributors, Provision of the trans- mitting equipment should be included in the agency plan and if not available in on-hand stocks, can be obtained on the open market, 2. Although not noted as a question the comment out- lining the "transmittal" is considered adequate distri- bution of the subject contingency plan. _ a ° 23 QL. Oe eae a / Vota KiTAMIN T. HARRIS skig General, USA DOD/JCS Representative Caribbean Survey Group Ove in eX Cbd P SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING Nergan THO WiTe UAlee AcciAR 3 Fee ee ee pm cen He eee
& ot sg Q oa a ‘ wy . . 7 coy a ES aan ED E vLUEL . Vi VEE bieehi Ula. y bila Wbaded 5 va (. 3 August 1962 . 4 © DOD TASK # 69 . “ - Ideas to beef-up course of action B, DIPLOMATIC 1. Encourare Dom Rep to table its complaint on Cuban instigated subversion NOW.-~ to the UN later, 2. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission limited documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics, 3. Third state pressures should be enouuraged ~ e.g., asylum, 4. State openly that Guantanamo will be used as a place of asylum for bonafide political refugees, ECONOMIC 1. Stop the tranist of Cuban sugar by anyone through the Panama danal. 2. Publication of contraband list of items which we will stop - remove from ships - ££ known to be going to Cuba (hard goods, war making potential). 3. Pressure the IMB, IMF, and CATT to restrict Cuban credits (S), loans, ete, Insist that US Allies demand cash payment for goods = no barter, 4. Preemptive buying and dumoing sugar on world markets, 5. Dump "soft! Cuban currency at discount prices, 6, Announce prohibitive tartifs on any items (tobacco primarily) of Cuban manufacture, 4 7. Announce fines and punishment for any importations of Cuban goods, 8, Introduce cheap marijuana into Cuba . PSYCHOLOGICAL a 13 More small joint exercises in the Latin America - Caribbean ~ southeastern US area with appropriate publicity, 2. Announce closure of Panama Calan to Cuban vessaks or vessels berthing in Guba. - 3. Announce sea search of all vessels (actually selective and limited to Sino-Soviet and Cuban vessels) to stop "illegal" arms importation into Western Hemisphere, 4. Shut-off civilian employees in Guantaname, De Announce a misfire of a missile in Atlantic MigSile Range "near" Cuban waters, 6 - increased naval patroling of the Windward Passage, 7, Step-up radio broade,sts - hit island from four sides sivultaneously Wht clandestine boeadeasts. QO gh O30" &. Drop puru-dummies in selected areas. 9. Make high altitude passes over and violations of Cuban air Space. 1O, Bxpteit Dew Pen mhemson of Cuben interventior, £ 11. Ineresse nublicity on fuban navesbice trads in US. and atner ceuntries, 4 . 3 ra 12. Provide open publicity on aefection of Qubangs to Gunnibeanano, and an | harrassment of the workers, PROPERTY OF en pen CO Fo FiGk eerpmeD FROM GDS HOUS! PXCHUDER - ror ep,  THEWHUTE Beh my eae a a ce oO " 1 cee fr hom me we ry — em ene Pethy ORANG GCGUPEAE Eating soe FREY é a ATMA Tp ede i y 6 we a, oon be. : so sot HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page 123
(Uk ditrisn. wh hubo. tabs ron ic aed i ee ; é cer _ j-4-7 08 We believe Castro can be overthrown only by the user of considerable external military support. The objective of Operation Mongoose is the overthrow of the Castro regime. | If course of action B were pursued vigorously and the __resistance elements in Cuba were stirred to action without US military support, then the assets presently in Cuba would . probably be destroyed by Castro's effective means of repression. If, however, course Bis followed with the intention .Of providing US military Support, when required, simply not telling the Cubans, the following things could be done: (Cubans would do better tho, if they knew). | Greatly increase VOA broadcasts to Cuba. Supply more arms and equipment to Cuban guerrillas. Exert all possible influence on Mexico, Brazil, Chile, , Bolivia and Uruguay to severe diplomatic relations with. Cuba. Exert all possible influence on ali friendly countries to stop all trade with Cuba, Increase program of information to Latin American countries on the evils of Castro's Communist regime and threat to themselves, Take all possible steps to assist other Latin American countries in economic progress, to increase contrast with on Cuba, Drift sanitized floatirg mines into Havana harbor, Pay Cuban employees at Guantenamo Naval Base in pesos, Disseminate Maribu seeds ‘in agricultural areas to cholre bere an out beneficial products. COs re ee es ee ee ee sos EO eg Land more resistance-trained Cubans. Encourage Criendiy nations te “top charcering ships typ Ty ea tet ne Oy rs rae vet CORN YMACU LOL Wm ee Ne 8b wb og as Intensify erforts to introduec damasing cheintcals into petrolcum chipments to Cute. ayn an wet vp VAG ee? i Bee ge TE ag Ba Pee wpe POR tue epee ee Sa ( : ' t ‘ . 7 a , i . : ” HY 50955 ‘ Docld: 32423626 Page i124 pepe » Ubi toes
bing | mevey # & ee —— B - — 4. TS a . MONGOOSE =” 10 August 1962 sae MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962 PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwitch White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy Defense/JCS: Hr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale CiA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey USTA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson 1. Mr. MNeCone said that the conclusion of the Board of National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro a regine fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. HMcCone said that he believes we must face the fact thac Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his per- sonal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MR3M base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB. : 2. At Secretary Rusk'’s request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possibile courses of action outlined in recent papers. lie then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase [, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential. 3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility: that in the event of a blockade of berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shippiag, sete. He suypested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency piaas should be closely meshed. Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying. ‘that he did noc believe limited retaliation of this kind would con- stitute an adequate response Lo a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide _ harrassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter. PHO-CRTY GF HW 50955 Docld:32493696 Page 125 yur WHT! HOUSE OFFICE
HY 0955 4.. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting co create a split between Castro and old-line Communists, He pointed out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial Co U.S, interests no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize 4 valid pretext for U.S, military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen, However, should reasonably viable resistance develop to the extent for example that some provinces might Oppose the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support to such provincial officials, In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at the moment the’ previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a temporary rapprochement between Fidel and toscow. He indicated that this of course may be temporary. le said that there has been some Success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work ror the U.S., and that there have been some defections. 5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr, McNamara questioned whether we cannot Separate the building up of apent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suge gestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of: overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure, In this context Mr. McCone then Presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been Prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is Prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S, uilitary force. Mr. McCone said that a Sltepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a llungary-type blood bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a Situation would be created which would require intervention. On the other hand, the CIA variant hOW proposed would, in Mr... McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger Cuba in the future. PROPERTY OF “ £ are Td:324236276 Page 126 THE WHITE HOUSE OF CF Bac : Lge
6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Spectal Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under oo plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U, 7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does ‘not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chicfs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view. 8. fc. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictiy “disengaged” basis; in other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they could generate ou their own. ‘ 9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive. 10, Action to be taken: q CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wesnesday, August 15th. Thomas A.. Parrott cc: General Lansd¢ f ow hts Gey. ay 3s Men: Attachment - Agenda for Meeting PHUPERTY OF ease OFFICE HW 50955 Docld:32423626 Page 127 yur WHITE HOUSE ina
u ue. ae jiUP GeOREI-NUFUAN | CFECIAL HANDLING NC Seer onze OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTCN 25, D.C. ; | | 13 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE -< NN LON WILSON, USIA ‘From: Brig. Cen. Lansdale Vk Subject: Alternate Course B In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Ogeration iiongoose, we will produce an‘outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper “Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)’ will be used as the starting basis. Since this is to be a bare ontline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the papet need contain only a Blatemeni of objectives and a liut of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headines of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Poaychological, E ‘aramilitary, and Military. We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1460 hours, Tuescay, 14 Aurust, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts, Papers required irom each of you for the ‘Luesday meeting: - .4r. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, -/ }, Economic (sabotaze, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any sugpestions for inclusion in other sections of the paver. Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. POORER tee tt anand EXCLUDED FR 70m Gs rmoxanie | vULo a oR Mey SA CLARET EAD TGP Scone y-hOi PORN 7a Tpat Ay pes ey at. This document eentains "pate. of So Poli has : ; _ “ ’ 2 pcleses cee ng eves xem fab i Peis Te Copy No . ey re , Le . as — wy é ‘ soe PROPERTY Ut THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE | RW 50955 Docld: 3242736276 Page 126
. . @ 3 : SPECIAL HANDLING _ SPECIAL AY Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HY 50955 Bocld: 324236276 “Page 129