that commmist infiltration “has not reacned the point of control or domination." The Director curtly commented that "Certainly this is not true with respect to the King connection" (idem). One could now foresee that Dr. King would be closely watched by FBI personnel. | In October, 1963, the Director forwarded a request | ! | to the Attorney General for tectmical surveillance of | Dr. King’s residence and the SCLC office in New York City. . t This time the FBI received authorization for tectmical : surveillance and it was instituted almost immediately. In addition, the FBI had prepared a new analysis on commmist involvement in the Negro movement (Communism and: the Negro Movement, October 16, 1963, App. A, Ex. 12). po? A cover memorandum of this analysis written by Assistant i. : to the Director A.H. Belmont to Associate Director Clyde | A. Tolson reads: | "The attached analysis of Commmism and the Negro Movement is highly explosive. It can be regarded as a personal attack on Martin Luther King. There is no doubt it will have a heavy impact on the Attorney General and anyone else to whom we i disseminate it ... This memorandum” may startle the Attorney General, particularly in view of his past ; association with King, and the fact that we are disseminating this out- side the Department'' (Memo from Belmont to Tolson, October 17, 1963 App. A, Ex. 13). f j -119- | i i i] HW 55509 Docld:32199528 Page 128
To the latter part, the Director wrote, "We must do ow | duty."" Mr. Belmont further said: "Nevertheless, the memorandum is a powerful warning against Commmist influence in the Negro movement ..." The Director issued his feeling to this position and added, "I am glad that you recognize at last that there exists such influence." q Lo s = 7? | HW 55509 DBocld:321995276 Page 129 ,
O io 2. Predicate for the Security Investigation The security investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was predicated on the belief that they were under the | influence of the Commmist Party, United States of America . (CPUSA). ‘The basis for this bélief was that Dr. King relied upon one particular advisor who was tabbed by the FBI as a ranking Commmist Party member (HQ 100-392452-133). This characterization of the advisor was provided by sources the Bureau considered reliable. The task force was privy to this characterization through both our file review and our September 2, 1976, conference with representatives of the Bureau's Intelligence Division. For secucity | 7 purposes the sources were not fully identified to the | task force. Therefore, the veracity of the sources and the characterization are remaining questions. The advisor's relationship to King and the SCLC 4 . is amply evidenced in the files and the task force L | concludes that he was a most trusted advisor. The files are replete with instances of his counseling King and his organization on matters pertaining to organization, -121- ! WWo55509 Docld:327199598 Page 130 —
OQ © finance, political strategy and speech writing. Some — examples follow: The advisor organized, in King's name, a fund raising society (HQ 100-106670-47, 48). This organization and the SCLC were in large measure financed by concerts arranged by this person (HQ 100-106670-30). He also lent counsel to King and the SCLC on the tax consequences of charitable gifts. . On political strategy, he suggested King make a public statement calling for the appointment of a black to the Supreme Court (HQ 100-106670-32, 33). This. person advised against accepting a movie offer from a movie director and against approaching Attorney General Kennedy on behalf of a labor leader (HQ 100-106670-24). In each instance his advice was accepted. King's speech before the AFL-CIO National Convention in December, 1961 was written by this advisor (HQ 100-392452- 131). He also prepared King's May 1962 speech before the United Packing House Workers Convention (HQ 100-106670-119). In 1965 he prepared responses to press questions directed _ ; to Dr. King from a Los Angeles radio station regarding the Los Angeles racial riots and from the "New York Times" regarding the Vietnam War. -122- — Y MW 55509 Docld: 32199528 Page 131
© O me The relationship between King ‘arid his advisor, as indicated, is clear to the task force.” What is not clear is whether this relationship ought to have been considered either a possible national security threat or CPUSA directed. We conclude that justification may have existed for the opening of King's security investigation but its protracted continuation was unwarranted. Qur conclusion that the investigation's opening may have been justified is primarily based on memoranda, summarized below, written during the first six months of 1962. It is pointed out that in October, 1962 the Bureau ordered the COMINFIL SCLC investigation (HQ 100-438794-9). In January the Director wrote the Attorney General and told him that one of King's advisors was a comist. . \ At this time he also pointed out that the advisor wrote King's December, 1961 AFL-CIO speech and assisted King in SCLC matters (HQ 100-392452-131). In March the Attorney General was advised that a March 3, 1962 issue of ''The Nation" magazine carried an -123- — | HW 55509 Docld:32199528 Page 132
} HW 55509 O O article critical of the administration's handling of . _s civil rights. The article was ostensibly written by Martin Luther King but in fact the true author was another advisor characterized by the FBI as a ranking member of the Commmist Party (HQ 100-106670-30, 31). In May the Attorney General learned that the CPUSA considered King and the SCLC its most important work because the Kennedy Administration was politically dependent upon King (HQ 100-106670-58). Lastly, in June, 1962 the Attorney General became aware that King's alleged Commmist advisor had recommended the second ranking Commmist to be one of King's. principal assistants CHO 100-106670-79, 80). Later King accepted the recommendation. | | The conclusion that the investigation's continuance was unwarranted is based on the following task force finding: The Bureau to date has no evidence whatsoever that Dr. King was ever a commmist. or affiliated with the CPUSA. This was so stated to us by representatives of the Bureau's Intelligence Division during our September 2,-1976 conference. This admission is supported by our perusal of files, which included informants' memoranda and physical, microphone and telephone surveillance memoranda, in which we found no such indication concerning Dr. King. -124- Docld: 32199526 Page 133
O O = The Bureau provided us with no documentation that the SCLC under Dr. King was anything other than a legitimate organization devoted to the civil rights move- The Bureau files that we examined lacked eny infor- mation that the alleged Commmists' advice was dictated by the CPUSA or inimical to the interests of the United States. Indeed, in early 1963 the Bureau learned through reliable sources the principal advisor had disassociated himself from the CPUSA. His reason was the CPUSA was not: suffi- ciently involving itself in race relations and the civil rights movement (HQ 100-392452-195). > | | 3. King-Hoover Dispute The flames of Director Hoover's antipathy for | Dr. King were fanned into open hostility in late 1962 when Dr. King criticized the Bureau's performance during an investigation of a racial disturbance in Albany, Georgia. Efforts to interview King by the Bureau were not successful (AQ 157-6-2-965) and the matter lay dormant for a time. The controversy was publicly rekindled’ in early 1964 | when the Director testified before a House appropriations subcommittee that he believed commmist influence existed -125- — — — ee HW 55509 DBocld:321995276 Page 134
——— O O in the Negro movement. King countered by accusing the Director of ahetting racists and right wingers (HQ 100-3 116-1291). During November of 1964, the Director told a group of Washington women reporters that King was "the most notorious liar in the country."" A week later, Director Hoover referred to "sexual degenerates in pressure groups" in a speech at Loyola University (HQ 162-7827-16) . Dr. King and his immediate staff requested a meeting with Director Hoover to clear up the misunderstanding. The meeting was held on December 1, 1964. Hoover claimed that "he had taken the ball away from King at the beginning," explaining the Bureau's function and doing most of the talking. On the other hand, King apologized for remarks attributed to him and praised the work of the Bureau. Thus, an uneasy truce was momentarily reached. (HQ 100-106670-563, 607.) However, the controversy flared again when a letter was circulated by the Southern Christian Educational Fund (SCEF) which referred to the criticism of Dr. King by the Director and urged the recipients of the letter to write or wire the President to remove Hoover from office. Ina memo from Sullivan to Belmont on December 14, 1964, Sullivan stated: -126- HW 55509 DBocld:32199526 Page 135
© "In yiew ef this sicuation, reslism makes it mandatory that we take every prudent step that we can take to emerge completely victorious ly in this conflic t, We should not take any ineffective or half-way measures, nor blind ourselves to the realities of the situation," (HQ 100-106670-627.) We believe the persistent controversy between Dr. King and Director Hoover was a major factor in the Bureau's determination to discredit Dr. King and ultimately destroy his leadership role in the civil rights movement. 4. Technical Surveillance Our review of FBI Files and interviews with Bureau personnel substantially confirms with a few additions the findings which have already been reported by Mr. Murphy and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with respect . to the electronic surveillance of Dr. King and his associates. We found that some microphone surveillances were installed in New York City against Dr. King and his associates which have not thus far been reported. These installations were as follows: | Americana Hotel (HQ 100-106670-2224, 4048) 4/2-3/65 ( sme | 6/3-3/65 Cs - 1/21-24/66 (no 2 bol), Sheraton Atlantic (NY 100-136585 Sub-Files 7-8) 12/10-11/65 (symbol) New York Hilton Oy, 100- 136585 Sub Files 11-12) 10/25-27/65 (symbol) -127- 55509 Docld:32199526 Page 136
oe © All of these installations with the exception ‘of = the placement at the Americana Hotel in January , 1966 appear to have been unproductive either because Dr. King did not reside at the hotel as planned or the recordings made did not pick up any significant information. The installation by the New York Field Office at the Americana Hotel on Jammary 21, to 24, 1966, caused some consternation within the FBI hierarchy and is illustrative of how the Bureau apparatus could, on rare occasion, continue to fimction even contrary to the wishes ' of the Director. The installation was made at the Americana on January 21, 1966, pursuant to the request of SAC Rooney in New York. Assistant Director William Sullivan authorized the coverage. Bureau files indicate that ‘Associate Director Clyde Tolson, upon being informed of the coverage, wrote back on the same day in a rather perturbed fashion to have the microphone removed "at once."" Tolson advised the Director that "no one here'' approved the coverage and that — he had again instructed Sullivan to have no microphone | | installations without the Director's approval, Hoover | confirmed Tolson's directive. (HQ 100-106670-2224%) . No symbol number was ever attached to this coverage as was the standard practice. This was apparently due to the strong disapproval voiced by Headquarters. Yet, despite " . =128- i HW 55509 DBocld:32199526 Page 137
Hoover's orders, the coverage was, maintained and a good deal of intelligence on King's personal activities was obtained and transcribed. These activities ‘are ‘reflected in a six page memorandum. (HQ 100-106670-4048.) . Irrespective of the level of Bureau approval which was required for electronic surveillance installa- tions during the King years, ou review reinforced the conclusions of the Senate Select Committee that the purposes behind this intelligence gathering became twisted. Several instances of Bureau correspondence are instructive. Section Chief Baumgardner in recommending coverage of King in Honolulu urged an exposure of King's "oral wealness"’ so that he could be "for the security of the nation, com- pletely discredited" (HQ 100-106670 June File, Memo Baumgardner to Sullivan, January 28, 1964). Ina similar meno from Sullivan to Belmont recommending coverage in Milwaukee at the Schroeder Hotel, the expressed purpose was to gather information on "entertainment" in which King might be engaging similar to that "umcovered at the Willard Hotel" (HQ 100- 106670 June File, Mano Sullivan to Belmont, January 17, 1964). Director Hoover, upon being informed of the results of the surveillance, ordered that they all be immediately transcribed despite DeLoach's recommendation that the tran- scribing be done later (HQ 100-106670-1024). As each of the ~129- ae | HW 55509 Docld:32199528 Page 138