ash 25 10 11 12 13 14 15 1? 18 19 20 el 22 23 20 Docld:32423516 Page 28 of all CIA agent recruitments. of academics of open information to the CIA, and I think we that this has continued and it is applauded by the Committee. } will re-instate it this time. | TOP SECREY 25 | | : { : bo -t that I made about ~- at the bottom line, page 69, and carried over where in the last two sentences. at least it says, over’ . Ss SO Oe 60 percent of the CIA agent recruitments within the US. last year were foreign students -At the same time these domestic | | recruitments. of foreign; students represented only 3 percent Mr. Bader. That should say world-wide. Mr. Kirbow. Well, that was the point I was trying to make. I quess it's clear if you take both sentences together. I withdraw my comment on that. | Mr. Maxwell. Mr! Chairman, there seems to have been an . inadvertent problem of leaving out any reference either in the gathering intelligence section in the United States « or in this section about: the Committee ' s decision to amend the oven relationship between CIA and academics and the provision had agreed that there'd be at least a couple of sentences saying Mr. Bader. I think that's right, Mr. Chairman. I did leave that paragraph out. It was in various drafts and I Mr. Chairman, let.me, if we have this laia out now, let me turn your attention to page 75. We do have two recommendg tious there. The first) there should be no subsidy to or distribution of any book magazine or: publication not attributed 7 an nT ee
gon 26 | TOP SECRET ls 1 || to the CIA inside the United States. a. . ; - 2. Mr. Inderfurth. or its territories. 3 7 Senator Huddleston. Thev claim that's the situation now. 4 || though,. don't they? | | 5 Mr. Bader . ves. And the second, the Committee supports 6 | the recently announced CIA prohibitions and the Agency's . | . : 7 || decision to commit this jto internal directives, I think this 8 needs a little language here, to internal directives against 9 any paid or contractual |relationship with. accredited U.S. 10 foreign journalists. | 11 ao This, is the present situation. 12 The bracketed language is, I'm not sure if it was a > 13 “dispute but we put the brackets in just to be sure that the 14 || Committee agrees with this: | | 15) . ' These recently announced CIA prohibitions should, howevey, 16 be established in law. | | 419 | Now I don't believe we came to that decision and that's 18 why. I bring it before the Subcommittee again. 19 Mr. Maxwell. In! '51, it's against any paid or contractu lo 20. relationship with U,S. br foreign journalists accredited to, 21|)u.s. media. | po 2992 - Mr. Bader. Yes., I think we'd better fix that. 23 | Senator Huddleston. Right. That would be more accurate. one | —_ - ‘\. 24 Mr. Bader. Now what about the question of having this 25 established in law? . TAP Fen eT Docld:32473516 Page 29 mo, i
ash 27 10 ‘Li 12 13 14: ‘15 16 18 ~ | 19 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 32423516 Page 30 ; | TOP SECRET on Mr. Kirbow. That's one the Subcommittee should point ou to the Full Committee, that it's an option on all of this that we should decide. ‘Mr. Bader. Does the Subcommittee want to take a positio on this now? Senator Huddleston. I thought we agreed on that. Mr. Bader. I thought we'd come very close to agreeing on it. Senator luddleston. Well, I favored putting it into law and I suggested that we might make some reference not only ' to media but to religious organizations and others. because of / the nature of the organizations, that there should be some legal prohibition in order to maintain the integrity of those organizations. Ms. Culbreth. On the previous draft that we had at the bottom of page 63 we had the comment that. these recently “announced prohibitions on the use of media personnel should be established in law and it was bracketed there, and it was my understanding that the bracket was to carry over. |: oo, Senator Huddleston. What do you think, Gary? Senator Hart. It was my understanding that we recommended that by statute. Senator Huddleston. Okay. Mr. Kirbow. In certain places we recommend that it he enacted bv statute, and| in other places throughout our paper we . A FR UE ee
ash 28 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 417 18 19 20 al 22 23 25 TOP SECRET - 28 recommend that the oversicht committee in conjunction with considering enacting. unless you feel differently of seeing. that we would want to be consistent in our paper. “Senator Hart. Well, I think that some things we. have more evidence on than others. | Mr. Kirbow. You want to be stronger on the ones that vou think should be a statute? — | Senator Hart. Yes. I think a lot of the reason for nassina some of these Laws is that we feel further study is necessarv:. ; Senator Huddleston. That's right, but on this one t think we can say “this. | | Mr. Inderfurth.. _ Number 50 is by statute is going to be inserted there? ‘That by statute there should be no subsidy? “That's just a statement but it doesn’ t recommend “how it should be accomplished. - Senator Huddleston. There is already a statute, isn't there? | | Mr. Kirbow. ‘No, it's just a policy. “Senator Huddleston. oh, the statute: refers to the USIA, does it not? | | | Mr. Inderfurth. That's right. Mr. Bader. Well; I'd be most happy to have it by statute, so if it's in agreement, it shall be done. Let me turn your attention now to 52. This is in TAM CeEebPDET Docld: 32423516 Page 31
ash 29 - 10 ul 12 te i. . 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 235 _ 24 25 Joo TOP SECRET 28 brackets. Not because it's my understanding that it remains in dispute. It was just a question of bringing language to you. ~The Committee recommends. that the CIA prohibitions be extended to include .the use of American media organizations for cover and the use of any American having a paid or contractual relationship with the U.S. media organization, whether he is accredited or not. | “that's what we talked about the other day, which was in a sense the CIA prohibitions plus. It goes to two questions the use of U.S. media organizations for cover and second, the prohibition on operdtional use of individuals who have a paid or. contractual rélationship with the U.S. media organization, whether they are accredited or not. } : . Senator Huddleston. I thought we more or less agreed... Mr. Kirbow. No.” Senator. Mathias excepted on this | point. | | | Senator Hart. On his own behalf? Mr. Kirbow. On his own behalf on that one, Senator. It was not upon a request . through me’ of any absent member. He may have had it from an absent member. | Senator Huddleston: I think we should present that to the Committee in brackets: | | Mr. Inderfurth. Shouldn't 51 and 52 follow the next | section on page 77, the covert use of U.S. journalists in media Docld: 32423516 Page 32
gsh 39 10 11 12 13 14 (215 16 17 18 19° _ 20 21 22 23 25 domestic. If you put it against. the issue of domestic fallout: societv and the use of journalists. TOP SECRET — 20 institutions? You see, you have the two; pages but no recommendatioris after it, and don't these recommendations follow? . Do you see what I mean? Mr. Bader. The reason for that is the question of with. the impact within the United States, it seems to flow from the description of the problem of a £ low-back into American Mr. Kirbow. Wouldn't it make better sense to have \ . both media papers together regardless of where you put your ' . recommendations, instead of having’ the. religious personnel put in between? Senator Huddleston. Just move the religious over behind |. the two. | Mr. Bader. Okay, “why don't we do that? So then we would be able to couple the recommendations. together and put religious personnel at the last section. Is that agreed, Mr. Chairman? | Senator Huddleston. Yes. Mr. Kirbow. On page: 77, Mr. Chairman, there are a few bracketed words, and I don't remember whether those were unknown quantities at the time or whether those were sources and 5 methods. _ 4 1 Mr. Aaron. Yes, the question was whether identifying. TAP LEAR er Docld: 324293516 Page 33
ash 31 10 ll le (14 15 16 1? 18. 19. 20° el. 22 23 ty e4 RO |. ‘ten U.S. news organizatio establish which ones are jin fact doing this. oo TOP SECRET = ss ie Vv ns and | 5 Publishing houses went : too fa specifying ‘which ones, how many you. ought to try’ to find before ne , Mr. Miller. mers are a number: of items in ‘the i] recommendations that deal with precise numbers, sources: and” methods if you're looking at it from. the other side. Vi i What's the Committee! S view as to whether | we "should give t i} our recommendations to the Agency for sources and methods vetting? And if so, at what stage? Senator luddleston. ‘Tt would think after the Full Committee signs. off watt ee idea again that it would go back --] i Mr. Miller. So there should be no discussion or we should not show to anyon | i our recommendations until they are. approved by the Full Committe ' in the Agency” or the Executive. Branch and what the. Full Connittes has decided that they should be vetted? . | That would bea desirable! policy. Senator Huddleston. Well, it. seems to me after the Full Committee acts, if we're going to give them a chance to view this, they would still have to go back. Mr... <irbow. specially in the case of your Subcommittes M Chairman, there will be adequate | time. On the following subcommitte which comes after us it may be more difficult, but clearly, we vould have time while they were dealing with the other subcommittee's recommendations to have this made clear. ‘Docld:324273516 Page 34 - , , be
gsh 32 h. n . 8 Fnd lb, b 28 10: 11 ‘12 13 14 15 16 17. 18 19 20 el re 23 24 25 recommendation that. the - Findings because of the nature of what because that would at least eliminate one step. draw a distinction hetween the recommendations per se and the do provide the Agericy with an \ opportunity to review the finding findings. or recommendations until the Full Committee has that have no relation to reality. And in order to avoid. that TOP SECRET | oa I just: think if: the Subcommittee could adopt as a | you have in here, should be reviewed for sources and methods, I think -- Mr. Miller. But ‘after the Full Committee has approved be ct _ Senator Huddleston. Yes, that would be my: thinking Mr. Aaron. I think it would be helpful but I would findings which contain factual material. L It would be my recommendation to the Committee that we ae 7 ‘4 | | and indeed, we have in many respects already and they know what's coming. | But it's my personal view that I see no reason we need to share the recommendations. Mr. Miller. I think in order’ to reduce any confusion . with the Executive Branch we should not show them any of our approved them because I: have already gotten strange noises. from Seymour based on things in drafts from an earlier period | I would hope that no one would discuss these things with them until the Full Committee ‘has acted. Is that your feeling? TAP Creeper Docld: 32423516 Page 35
gsh 33 LO 11 “le (“14 15 16 “17 18 19 20 21 Re 23 25 DoctId: 32493516 Page 36. TOP SECRET 7 Senator Huddleston. ‘Yes. Mr. Kelley. Pavia is making: a different point, but we should probably do. the same with the recommendations of the. | Subcommittee, as is done with the domstic subcommittee, and. that's probably a matter for the Full Committee to: decide. We shouldn't show recommendations’ of the domestic | subcommittee and not these or vice versa. f ( - There's the question of. whether all the recommendations h of the Committee will he shown to. the Administration: or not. And we don't need to decide that. | Mr. Aaron. You can decide it whenever you like, but it' my strong recommendation that they should not he unless. you. wish to take testimony oni them. Mr. Kirbow.. Mr. ‘Chairman, I don't disagree that there: should not be an orderly procedure for hoth subcommittees. “What Ido want to stress is that this particular area is in the foreign intelligence principally and is most likely to have the sources and methods information. I think the same weight should be given to whatever section of the domestic ‘covers counter~intelligence because tha is probably the most fragile and touchy area in the whole world -and I think that there, since it involves the CIA for which you are principally responsible in this subcommittee, that your nod recommendations should apply equally there (Or should certainly consider that all of those recommendations he at least furnishe TAR aN t ue t.
gqsh 34 o rw a Ke) 10 iil 42 14 ‘16 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23° 25 Docld:32423516 Page 37 to anyone “before they are published as. they relate principally get into as muth of a security problem there as you do in this area here. stee was to do nothing gould damage that particular area of the Agency's ability beyond reason. is not to undercut anyone remarks, but the other day when I met with the people from|/the DDO. on the cover paper to discuss ‘Rockefeller Commission, hor was anyone else at the Agency ever - methods review by the CIA.” when ‘that document was published it TOP SECRET 34 to the CIA. I onderstan that there is vehement opposition from ‘the general counsel) |to showing the domestic recommendations to the corrective ‘actions in the FBI, but I don't think we Publication of some of this information can almost total destroy a program and if| the Committee agrees with the Agency n do 80, : I think they should know that in the foreign intelligenc area because their recoritendation to the Senate on this ‘Commit- Senator Nuddleston, I think that's the only procedure we can follow, really, is after the Full Committee operates, let’ them take one quick view just from the standpoint of source and methods and not From) the standpoint of the advisability of the recommendations themselves. - Mr. diGenova. In|that regard I would note, and this this problem, they told me that. they were never asked by the | asked to. review. the final’ Commission report. So that report that was published never got a sources an 4 i we yo Re en of ‘ fa)
qsh 35 [> ge seCRET 35 was made strictly vend sectasn that that ‘was going to) be published regardless of sources and methods. They ‘were never. consulted and Mr, Isenstead, who was the chief of cover | commercial emphasized eke he was grateful for the “opportunity to do it. | | | _ | j . So there is precedent at least for not having them give a Final view but E'm not saying that it's the wisest way to proceed. | | i Senator Huddleston. Well, the: Full Committee might have some thoughts on that. Some of this where we get into specific fi }* nufibers and so forth may||raise a question and maybe we could " write around the various. numbers and be just. as effective. fp Mr, Kirhow. | Mr. thairman, - I don't think they have to “adopt the recommendations, but I think that in showing this to them and getting | theif! opinions on. the record further demonstrates the high integrity type work that this Committee has tried to. pursue the Gntire. year and not to just go off helter-~skelter. Mr. diGenova. In this. same area of academics, Bill, it h d goes hack to your paper. There should be a reference back to - page 36 where - ‘we deal with FRD penetrations in American companie . : That's the same akea that we took testimony on the other day. Tt! sa bracketed section. —™ Mr. Aaron. And ‘i reason it's bracketed is that we ., ; \ are waiting for a ee ar sentences to ‘describe the situation P SECDET | Docld: 32423516 ‘Page 36
-gsh 360° T@P SECRET _ 36 od hased on that testimony || and it will be a factual statement \ I} ‘ee 2 of where we stand in that regard. Gl Let me just draw our attention ‘te one other recommendati I 4 || on page 45 which may or may not, the Committee may, or may not 5 want to include. It stems from our discussion. largely in the. ; if 6 context of the academics ‘and others concerning the way in which 7 the CIA operates domestically and it' s recommendation number 27, @ which is not as precisely stated as it might be. 9 Mr. diGenova. Twas just. going to ask, does it have 10 a reference to a particdiar 4 interest group which is being 1l || protected because it does not appear to. prohibit anything? 12 Mr. Aaron. It relates to the Domestic Contacts i yoo Qe 13 Division and so I should say the use (of overt ‘contacts of the = 14 Domestic Contacts Divisii n for operational support or operation L 15 || purposes. 4 16 Mr. Miller. Of the Deb? | ! “19 Mr. Aaron. ves. In other words, it goes ‘to the long — 18 discussion we had over witting versus unwitting use of 19 “individuals by, not just the foreign resources division, the 20 man under alias who goes to ask if he can.put a thing up on 21 a bulletin board, but: actually the man who presents himself 22 overtly as a CIA person iand says, our relationship 1s completel 23 above. board but who in fact in some unwitting fashion uses. 4 oO 24 |} an- individual to further isome operational objective. 25 ~ Ana I took it and ‘I may have been wrong, but it was my TN OF ee Docld: 32423516 Page 39
an ae TOP SECRET ” 1 understanding from that — that we want to prescribe > | - that kind of unwitting ak by | the so- ~ealled overt ‘side of the ; 3 || house. , . ‘ 4 Mr. Maxwell. I Uc question with David about 5 that. My understanding fas that the Committee was concerned 6 about this “but felt that there were sorie unresolved questions, oy i. e., whether | a pcp individual w who was talking or debriefing 8 an American. businessman iho came back from the Soviet Union, ‘9 whether that, something phrased like this would = prevent ‘the 10 NCD person from simply: saying would - you be willing to oroviae a cover to an American repyesentativ of the CIA, ‘because the 1p difficulty we were having was essentially with the control of oy , 13 the information which ‘wag enormously useful and has to be gotte | , 14 somehow, and the Conmittes was voncerned that that would have’ 15 to be covertly, which won mean FRD- people going around under 46 cover trying to £€ind theif same information that was available. 4. | Mr. Aaron. I frapay don't think that those concerns 18 are raised by this provigion 1 because A, rit does not deal with 19 ‘information, B,. it does not deal with witting relationships, 20 or witting, use, so that ie you go to a man n coming back from 21 ‘the Soviet Union and ask" him what he has done or suggest + ‘that oo | the next. time he goes tne he does something, all: that is. 2% certainly possible and réasonable because it! S:  witting and abov Le ga ‘board. | . | | : | - Moreover, it does not qo to. the information. If he colle ts " ; a al a Ha) Oe Ar FR He ara Docld:32423516 Page 40 re gh
gsh 38 10 | 11 12 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21° 22 25 720) Docld: 32423516 ° Page 41 OO , : what it is. have any concern 1 about that, what the purpose is (of the first €ull sentence on the top. of page 36 at all in the report? that's witting and the exploitation of these relationships and finding that supports the recommendation. TCP SECRET er information some place that turns out to be. of operational utility, why that's just information, that! s of operational utility. This goes to the question of unwitting use of a relations of trust that has been established on-the basis that it is. Mr. Kirbow. Would you explain to.me then if you don't Mr. Aaron. Page 362. Mr. Kirhow. ‘The Committee is concerned with this blurring of the line between overt collection of information for operational purposes. Mr, Aaron. That's correct. That's in effect the concer ‘ of i Mr. Kirbow. I. find it inconceivable that we would be considering cutting off from the CIA the operational use of American citizens who” are | simply ‘because they happen to be in business or otherwise witting would not furnish information on “another person in their. company. Mr, Aaron. This has nothing to do with what this thing says. This talks about ‘unwitting use, unwitting use. I certainly wouldn't Tesowend Set there be no use. Mr. Kirbow. It gays the Committee is “concerned with thi | TA creamer
bs ‘oO gsn 39) blurring of the line between overt collection, which is the debriefing of the man when he comes back into the states from the Soviet Union, of information from willing American citizens. Okay? So that is the businessman who has just returned from Iran and is over there from the major aerospace corporations doi c ‘business there. - | Now the very next sentence,. the remainder of that sentence, unless you want, to prohibit that particular interview e . | Oo - and the interviewer from having some further conversation about. the possible use of that particular concern in Iran for operational purposes, why do: you say it unless you! "re “trying ‘to prevent that? | | Mr. Aaron.. would like to take up the two issues separately. I would Like, to take up, if you want to discuss this we can discuss it, and if you want to discuss the recommenadation on 27, we/can asscuss that. ’ + ‘But I don' t think it helps: our conversation here to. talk about. them ‘both » at the. same’ time. Mr. Kirbow. Then I would ‘not want to overlook coming back to that because it' Ss one. we mentioned the other “day and the’ bracket did not carry) over to this, and it! sa particular concern that would not prbhibit the CIA. from utilizing American ‘businessmen + who are wittiag and willing » to furnish either as_ | “a corporation or individual. Mr. Aaron. And l “night say that that is the problem. W re! CRA EF “Docld:32423516 Page 42
gsh 49 ite ul - 12 i 13 | 14 15 16 17 18 “as 20 21 22 23 «> 24 25 TCP SECRET to are on two pages at once. I would recommend that we look at page 45 and look at recommendation number 27 which says the regulations of the CIA should prohibit unwilling use of overt contacts and please strike in there of the Domestic Contact Division for operationa Support or operational purposes. | | Now this does not prohibit operational support or: operational purposes of contacts at the pep’ as long as they are witting relationships. | a It does not permit unwitting use of covert contacts - for operational support. It only goes to. the question of -- ‘Senator ftuddleston. If you went back to 36, then, and put it willing American citizens and the unwitting exploitation of these relationships, what you're trying to é6ay there is. you don't want to exploit these kinds of relationships without the knowledge of the person who supplied. the information. Is that correct?. Mr. Aaron. That's correct. And that would be a more precise support for the particular finding. “I think initially, though, that sentence was oriented towards expressing that concern plus the concern of an organization that had in effect two missions. ~ In other words, the nen, having both the responsibility to build up an overt relationship of trust as well as the responsibility sometimes to try to.move that relationship beyond Docld: 32423516 Page 43 .
on | TOP SECRET 1 its initially stated premises, which is that I meet you, this | 2 is an above-board business. But at some point down the line 5 |r start talking to you about other subjects. 4 Now I. realize this is a difficult area, and ‘I certainly 5 || would not want to prohibit the use of Americans for any operatio 6 purposes. I think as long as we're going to have a CIA, 7 | this is one of the things that ought to he allowed. But it's 8 || the question of the two somewhat contradictory functions of the’ 9 DCN. 10 That sentence was trying to cover both of these points, 1 and maybe that's a source of some of the confusion. 12 The recommendation to move the NCD back into the overt e - 213 intelligence directorate was in part based upon trying to creat 14 the incentive for this organization that it is a largely overt 15 character and not clandestine. 16 || _- Mr. Kirbow. I make the same point now that I made 17 earlier on the: same recommendation and the discussion is | . 1g |] exactly on the same point. They're talking about problems whic 19 they are drawing problems from no problem area. that has been 20 || called to the attention of this committee. . | a | tt is apparently in the minds of certain of the staff. - 22 || members somehow wrong that during this conversation with a 23 returning traveller by @ certain segment of the CIA, chat if he a" \ a 24 || com2s across a willingness to do sométhing operationally, that 25 he has to withdraw at that point and go get another side of the PF NR re em pre pot are Docld: 32423516 Page 44 - ar
qsh 42 LO 11 12 14 15 16 1? 18 ig » 20 21 22 49) That is the important aspect of that. TOP SECRET 2 House to come do it. We're talking about: an agency operation and unless’ in some way we have a record before this Committee that doing that would inhibit the returning traveller from continuing to cooperate and there's still 109, 000 that. do it ‘every, year, and I don' t think the record | indicates at all that there’ s anything v wrong with having an individual that is doing the | interview at the time trying to get what information he can - from pursuing other matters which have to do with the interest of the Agency on behalf of the Agency if the person is willing to talk about it. | I just don' t see how it muddies the situation at all, “nor does it blur it. I don' t think that we have to decide that - there be within the npo. out there a clear distinction between those two divisions unless | we see some infringement on the rights of the American that he is interviewing. And I don't think our record shows anything to indicate that there has been any infringenent of those people's rights. And that’ Ss the reason for ‘my concern about the position we take on the top of page 36 and the recommendation. | Mr. Aaron. I think the reconnendation and the position the top of page 36 are different.. We can make them coincide by striking in. the word "unwitting" exploitation of these relationships. The recommendation goes to unwitting use. TAT rw Docld: 32423516 -Page 45
gsh 43 10 11 12 || ‘ee 13 14 15 (16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 , Bg 20 ‘Docld: 32423516. Page 46 TCP SECRET 43 Mr. Kirbow. May I give the Committee an example of what actually could transpire at one.of these meetings, that if you leave this in here and say, unwitting exploitation, it will prohibit, probably, a third of that Agency's action on ‘the information that it gets. Do you think that they ever ‘go back and. tell the witting ‘person whom they debriefed when he returned from Russia . that during the conversation that they had with him they picked up the name of one Mr. X and. that they subsequently .go to Mr. X and establish. a full working ‘relationship with him? |: Maybe they find that L by his returning briefing they. find all sorts of sources and methods. which they can exploit. ‘certainly you don' t want to. encourage or require. by law that they go. back to ‘this man, who has.simply kind:-of emptied out his travel to Russia to the agent and tell him, well, now, so that you'd be witting to. this we picked up the name of one Charles Kirbow: during your discussion and we subsequently | have developed a working relationship with him and we plan to use “him when he goes to Russia next month . Mr. Aaron. I think that's a misrepresenation of what witting | use is. Mr. | Kixbow. Witting is knowledgeable. -Mr. Aaron. If I may respond. -The point here is not | thet the information is not used for any purpose. Ifa guy comes back from the Soviet Union and has some information of TeT eR mr Pw ,
ash 44 10. 1l ‘12 14 15 1? (18 19. 20 21 22 25 TOP SECRET us utility in the formulation of policy or the kind of clandestine operations, he has told his story, that information is available to the entire government. and it would be acted upon -perhaps by thousands of people he doesn't have any relationship with or any knowledge of. - There's no question but that that is certainly a legitimate activity. The knowledge and the information that is acquired in this overt way, the source is witting of the fact that it's going to be used in some fashion. That's not the issue. The issue is different. The issue is whether he is asked to perform certain tasks or drawn into certain kinds of relationship or any number ‘of ways in which he might be exploited in some unwitting fashion. | Now if the argument is made that unwitting use of Americans is desirable and useful and. should be performed by this organization that represents itself as completely above board, then that's another recommendation that can be made. But I think if we are going to try to draw some lines here -and we are going to try to reestablish some measure of trust in.this Agency, it ought to be. prepared to accept that it is. what it is when it says what it is when it deals with Americans. “Now this does not preclude the Foreign Resources Division from taking all sorts of clandestiné ‘steps and: measures. We step up to that issue in a different. part of this report. This is dealing with the ‘so- -called open. arm of the government TAN A me Docld:32423516 Page 47°
qsh 45 ad Gl oa lo 11 12 -13 14 15 16 a7 18 19 20 21 22 25 TOP SECRET 4s and it may make as | much a operational use of Americans as it wishes so long as it is. so informing them. | Senator Huddleston. I think what you're asking here is that the person being advised is ‘he! s advised, first of all -- that. whatever information he ‘supplies to this Agency might be useful to this Agency in ‘different types of operations. In other words, he might be made ‘aware of the fact that while a good part of the information ‘they! re seeking may relate only to economic information or something else, that it > might also be helpful to the Agency in its operations and that he ought * ‘to be advised that if that's the case the Agency will use that information far that purpose... Secondly, if the Agency wants to approach, him on the idea that because of his contacts they'd like for him on his next trip to look for specific types of information and again, he ought to he advised that. the purpose of this is to provide» the Agency with operational information that might result in thea Agency becoming involved in a covert or clandestine type of. operation because of the information he supplies. Now is that the kind of thing? . Mr. Aaron. Yes, I simply feel, and by and large that's “the way it's done. Mr. Kirbow. It's done like that to my specific knowledg Every time, even if it's the same man debriefing you, he ‘tells you every time and |:ind of forewarns you like the Miranda TAP eFener DocId: 32423516 Page 48
qsh 46 10 11 i212 tas 14 15 16 uy 18 19 20 el Re 23 1. 24 25 TOP SECRET) —_ ts. ‘rule of what your rights are and that they plan to use this thing. ' They also,. Mr. (Chairman, use these returning people as” one of the best sources of initial contact for the company to gain cover in sensitive areas overseas of any of the records: -- ‘Senator Huddleston. | What's wrong with saying that? - Mr. Kirbow. Well, in many cases you would not want to ‘tell the returning head of the foreign sales division that you: find that just in debriefing him that that particular company would make an excellent cover company because of their activities in the foreign area. They go to the head of the company and they tell them, and the man never knows maybe that | ‘two of his salesmen are later, or sales positions are later picked up. That's the decision of the management of the company. and not the returning traveller. Senator Huddleston. You don't have to tell him that . specifically of this requrement. Mr. Maxwell. I think the problem with the phrasing with regard to that, I think Elizabeth pointed out also that there wouldn' t be a problem with that. “The problem is that the finding was unclear that that was based on because it did blur. two different things. I think you can work it out So “that it does, in fact, make the point you are suggesting. Docld:324273516 Page 49
ash 47 Ter SECRET a7 1 {. Mr. Kirbow. My point is is the Committee really concernad 2 about this and if they're jnot, we ought to leave that out. 5. || I don't think. there's any evidence before the Committee that 4 || creates the concern that the staff appears to be recommending 5 || to the Committee. | 6 | Senator Huddleston! Let's bracket that and move on. I ” personally would feel that it would be appropriate for the 8 || committee to say in a more pesitive way than this sentence 9 indicates that exceptional care should he taken in dealing with 10 || thee6e people, that they be |fully aware that information. they 11 are providing might form the basis of further operational | 1 “use within the Agency. | | 13 i Ms. culbreth.. Mr. Chairman, in connection with this 14 whole section, my earlier draft. indicated that there were 15 several sections here that were bracketed, and I thought that 16 was to be carried forward. — | ito ‘Senator Huddleston. There are some other brackets aroun 18. page 36. | | | | | . 19 Mr. Aaron. Do you have some brackets, Liz, that did not 90 get in? | - | 21° Ms. Culbreth. Yes. .On page 45 my notes indicated that 22 ‘the recommendation that is now recommendation number 26, which 23 || was recommendation number 24 before it got changed, and we “. 2A ‘got the whole thing bracketed. 25 - * Mr, Aaron. Who had it bracketed? | 7 . TAR CF eee Docld: 32423516 Page 50
qsh 48 10 au 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 y pg 25 - se] TOP SECRET “Ms. Culbreth. Tt was bracketed in this text in the brown| notebook . | Mr. Aaron. It was my understanding that the Conmittee aqreed on that. | Mr. Inderfurth. It was bracketed because there was as question of moving it over to the State pepartment and it was resolved to keep it within the CIA. Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, obviously this book was just — made available this morning because it was being retyped over the weekend and I would like the opportunity at ‘the staff level to go through our earlier draft and if there are brackets here which we either reserved on for the minority or whigh were from the record not decided for the Committee, we'll mark them and call them to your attention. Senator Huddleston. yes, I think that would be helpful. ‘In fact, it would be helpful for me to have my own book in which I have notes to compare with this. - Okay. Let's move on. Mr. Inderfurth.. I would like to raise a matter. On page 28 there’ sa reference | under econmendation 18 which I think faithfully represents what was discussed but I'm not gure if this is the best way to state it. The second paragraph under recommendation 18, the term current provision regarding - the status of the DCI should be’ extended to cover the PCI's and both deputies. At most, two of ; lam ae oe oe ‘ “Docld:32423516 Page 51
ash 49 |  - TP SECRET | as 1} the three could be military officers. 2 © “I'm concerned about: that becatise’ that would allow.the are) ‘Der and the man in charge of the CIA both to be career military 4 officers allowing for the third,. the deputy director for the 5 | pic staff to be a civilian, and I think that's going against 6 || the grain of what was originally considered to he a concern 7 of those writing the '47 act that at least one of the two 8 individuals in line responsibility for the CIA be civilian. 9 But this would allow both the nel and the person running the. 10 || CIA to be military. | | 11 | | I would recommend that at most one of the three could 12 || be career military. 13 Mr. Kirbow. This is not the decision, I think, that 14 || the Committee took. What we should do is go back to the origin 1 15 | language so that if the DCI is a military man, that neither of 16 the other people can be military. If he is a civilian, either 17 or hoth of the other people could be military. It's what the | 18° law currently is today, and I think that's the way -- it has 19 || worked very well that way and I think that's what we should 20 | adopt... | | | 21 | Senator Iuddleston. This would include retired military “22 || too, isn't it? 23 . Mr. Aaron. Yes, that's in the 147 Act. 24 a Mr. diGenova: You could just say only one of the three 285 could he career military. | | - TAR CrRener Docld:324293516 Page 52 |
gsh 50 VL a Aw) 6 7 End 2A, bh 2B —@g 10 il 12 14 15 16 17 18 -19 20 21 22 23 — 24 25 exactly what Charley said because under his rule if you had a civilian as you had, you could have two military. ‘that Agency are going to he military men. where he comes from? Mr. Aaron. I.might agree with that-but that is not Senator Huddleston. “Is that the way the Act is? owe. Kirbhow. Today what it really says is that if the .DCI is a military man, the deputy must be a civilian and they make it just that clear. | If he is not, the deputy may be a civilian. Mr. digenova. But that's the. problem. If you have both deputies being military men under the new arrangement one of them will run the CIA while he is the Director and that means” that the two subordinates who are going to bein charge of | Mr. Kirbow. Maybe. “Mr. diGenova. But they can be. That's the point. Now that is not, I don't believe that that is what was intended by the-Congress in the 1947 Act. | Mr. Maxwell. I think it should be said that the questio is whether the Committee wants to do it rather. than. the ‘47 Act. And. the other part is whether the: Committee wants to hind successive Congresses and the President in’ their choice because both could be nominated and confirmed. - | Mr. Miller, Isn't the principle that we are trying to. achieve throughout to get the best possible person no matter Docld:32423516 Page 53
ash 451 10 | il le 14 15 16— 17 _ 19 20 el 22. 235 25 TOP SECRET s Mr. Kirbow. Yes, except there was always a genuine concern that it be taken over by the military and if that were the case, Bill, all three of them could be senior active duty military officers at the time they _— serving. And I don't believe that is the intent of the Committee or the Congress. Mr. Inderfurth. I would suggest saying only one of the three. | Mr, Miller. Why don't we just .say one of the three? Mr. Kirhow. The other thing is this. If you're trying to hinge it on the man who runs the operation, if he runs: it and he is a military man, then L think that you should try to prohibit the kind of, maybe the next key individual and here you make it the man who is the principal deputy and maybe he must. be a civilian. And under those circumstances I do strongl feel that if the DCL is military, maybe the other man should be'a deputy also. | | | Senator Huddleston. But under your plan, if the DCI were civilian, ‘then both deputies could be military. ’Mr. Kirhow. But if he were military, both deputies would have to he civilian, and I think that's how we ought to couch the language. | Mr. Aaron. The: only ‘problem is that, and it's a small one, is that in the absence of the DCI, it's possible for the -first deputy who is military to really have line responsibility over the other deputy who is military, and I assume that’s not oe TAN Re oe Docld: 32423516 Page 54