Rook 7, F 3 | CIAHAS NO OBJECTION F9 a BECLASSIEICATION APIDY OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT SDE OF THIS DOCUMENT DATE JanlO, 1978 TIME 2:30 I. Identifying Information: Name Central Intelligence Agency Telephone * Address Langley, VA __ Telephone Type of Contact: _X Person Il. Summary of Contact: Reviewed the 1967 IG Report. See attached memorandum. It should be noted that I reviewed the Report on Jan 5 but I did not receive my notes until Jan 10. a, \ mn) NN ee na CO Recommended Follow-up (if any): Obtain and Review an undeleted version of the report and, if possib: obtain and review the memoranda referred to in the report which are underlined in the EES attached memorandum. - | . Signature: afoo af. wocth voxm 5 Background Use Only : o Not Reproduce. -
To: G.B. Blakey From: Leslie Wizelman Date: 1/10/78 Re: Notes from the 1967 IG Report The 1967 Inspector General's Report begins with the statement This Reconstruction of Agency involvement in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro”°is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operations being discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main events or were put on paper from memory years afterward... The Report states that "We can identify five separate phases in Agency assass- planning..'"(p2) and “Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime."(p3). The Five phases are: l- Prior to August 1960 during which all "identifiable schemes" with the possible exception of onere, were aimed at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behavior or altering his appearance. 2-August 1960 to April 1961-plots were “aggressively pursued." 3-April 1961 to late 1961- a major scheme begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and remained dormant for several months, “as did most other Agency operational activity related to Cuba." 4-Late 1961 to Late 1962- The August 1960 scheme was reactivated 5-"Late 1962 until well into 1963"- Aug 1960 scheme was terminated Two other plots originated but impractical and ' ‘nothing ever came of them.' On page 4 the Report makes 3 points: J- The elimination of a dominant figure may not change the government. This point was stressed by an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961. 2— The bringing about the downfall of a government always risks the the resort to assassination. 3- Synecdoche- the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa, meaning when"the getting rid of Castro" statement is made, the speaker may not mean the assassination of Castro, but may mean a change in the government of Cuba. Semantics. y The report implies this has led to some misunderstandings. Page 6 discusses the delivery of the pen to Cubela. Page 7 discusess a meeting of the Special Group (augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on August’ 10, 1962 when McNamera brought up the "liquidation of Cuban leaders. Followed by the preparation of the Project Mongoose Scien nas sconce 9 mess THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE. oe al
yt page 2 Another meeting was. held on July 31, 1964 to duscuss a Cuban exile plot. The Report states that the CIA refused funds and had no involvement. On page 7 the report states that the CIA twice (early 1961, early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. ganbling syndicate members. When the plot was aborted in 1961 the pills recovered. In 1962 the pills were passed by a gambling syndicate representative to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, who had been them sent to Cuba in May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader (Verona??) reported that a team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation. Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August 1960 A. March to August 1960- During this period there were three or four schemes. The Report states that "None of those we interviewed who was first assigned ot the Cuban task force after the Bay of Pigs knows of any of. these schemes." The Report does not specifically state who was interviewed. -J. D. (Jake) Esterline was the head of the Cuban task force prior to the Bay of Pigs. One project discussed was an aerosol attack on a radio station, but nothing came of it. Consideration was also given to"psychic energizers." The contaminated cigars project was never carried out, according to Esterline, because of the "danger of blowback on the Agency." The use of a dipilatory was also considered. B. Gambling Syndicate operations- The Report states that "The first seriously pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception in August 1960" and involved the gambling syndicate. There were two phases: August 1960 to late April or early May 1961 and April 1962 to February 1963. Phase I a~ In August 1960 Richard Bissell- DDP— asked Edwards, Director of Security if he could “establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba. " The objective was stated as "clearly the assassination of Castro." b- the idea originated with J.C. King ; c- Maheu, Robert-— contacted by Edwards. Maheu was described as a “private investigator wha-had done sensitive work for the Agency." He opened a private offite in D.C. in 1956 after being a special agent for the FBI. arranaged to subsidize Mahue to the extent of $500/month. The report states that "Over the years he has been intimately involved in providing support for some of the Agency's more sensitive operations." At this point the report notes that they are "struck" by the fact that many of the names appearing in this report once worked for the FBI and lists » Maheu, Harvey, O'Connell, and E. Morgan.
Page three The Report states that "Maheu was authorized to tell Roselli that his "“olients' were willing to pay $150,000 for Castro's removal." (p16) d- September 1960- O'Connell was Roselli's case officer and met with Roselli and Maheu in New York City on September 14. Roselli agree to introduce Maheu to "Sam Gold." At this point the Report refers to a memorandum prepared by Edwards, dated 14 May 1962, re money not paid to Giancana or Roselli. As of late September, 1960, Edwards, O'Connell, and Bissell were the only ones in the Agency who knew of plan against Castro involving the Mafia. Edwards briefed Allen Dulles and General Cabell. Bissell committed $150,000 for the support of the operation. On September 25, 1960, O'Connell and Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced Maheu to Ciancana at the Fountainbleau. O'Connell never met Joe (Trafficante) or Sam. The Report referes to an Office of Security Memorandum to the DDCL, dated 24 June 1966 which contains a summary of the operation. This memo is also referred to on pages 28 and 29. e- Key dates- Jan. 7 1959- Casinos closed Jan.13 1959- Casinos opened for tourists Feb.17 1959- Cabinet (Cuban) authorized reopening Sept. 30, 1961- New York Times announces the last of the casinos were closed. Fall and Early Winter 1960- On August 16, 1960 the Chief of OD- Office of Medical Services received box of Cuban cigars to treat. reported the cigars were ready for delivery on October 7, 1960. His notes show delivery on Feb. 13, 1961 (p22) g-January-February 1961- Pills were chosen to kill Castro. The Report states that "Trafficante was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as who was then of the prime minister (Castro). The=gangsters said that (Orta) had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income, and needed money." (Page 25) Page 27 is missing On page 28 the report states (Comment : lost his position in the Prime Minister's office on , while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington. He took refuge in the Embassy on and became the responsibility of. the Embassy when broke relations with Cuba in : . Castro refused to give him a safe conduct pass until when he was allowed to leave for Mexico City. He arrived in Miami in early .