Classification: Aa) _ (This form is to be used for material extracted. from ClA—controlled documents.) and determined that the files for each of the five (including Oswald) who did not have Ageney bow) files prior to tha | 7 | ee receipt of the State Department inquiry, weremepencddir _Decenber-1+960 . In each case, the slot for “source document" fot ~SpadéwokerendS 16 She-satne Agency component rather than to a dated document. . 2D 4: Even so, this analysis only explain¥ why a file on Oswald was finally opened; standing~aderne it > not explain the seemingly long delay in the opening of the file. To determine whether such a delayed opening was necessarily unusual, the Committee reviewed the files of 13 of the 14 persons on the CIA's Novenber 21, 1960 response to the State Department and of 16 other defectors (from an original list of 380) who were American born, had defected during the years 1958-1963, and who had returned to the United States Classified by derivation: | Ha ne AN RENT,
Classification: > AD Ce (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) _ during that same time period. of 29 files that were reviewed, “Ne 4 “Nee ne on taeda, eight individuals had been the subject of 201 files prior to the time of their defection. In only four of the remaining ~wwemty-ofe cases were 201 files opened at. the time of defection. The files on the 17 other defectors were opened Stee ctondimentn te J from four months to several years after the time~ed defection. .. i . ae? Corr ete UU 4 At the very least, thi-s-£i1¢6 Lew indicated that i , NALS, . during 1958-65 the opening of a file years after a defection a ie. (ee _- was not at all uncommon. In many cases the opening was triggered by some event, independent of the defection, which drew attention to the individual involved. “——"—g) Why was Lee Haryey Gswald's 201 fil ned under F the name Lee Henry Oswald? Lee Harvey Oswald"s 201 file was mistakenly opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald, No Agency witness was able y Classification: E ” | Classified by derivation:
ay . | Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) a specifinaily to explain how this mistake was made, All oe | Agency personnel, however, including the person who initiated the file opening, testified that this must have been occasioned pe ee innocently by bureaucratic error. Moreover, the Committee | received substantial testimony to the effect that this error) would not have prevented ,Oswald's name from being elicited ] from the CIA's filing system during a routine name trace done . under the name Lee Henry Oswald. an ___ 23)} What do the letters "AG," which are written in the "Other Identification" on Oswald's 201 ace for opening form, connote? nw, The form used to initiate the opening of a 201 file for Lee Harvey Oswald contains the designation AG in a box marked "Other Identification." Because this term was considered to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of Oswald's alleged Agency relationship, the CIA was asked to Cinssification: Classified by derivation: tea senda " Lixima? VERE, yy, SUCKS, ROT Tay
Classification: ____- (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA-——controlled documents.) | aS explain its meaning. 4 The Agency's response indicated that "AG" is the OI ("Other Identification") code meaning “actual or potential { i 3 ; wr actectorffco. the East or the SINO/SOVIET Bloc including SN Cuba," and that anyone so described could have the OL. | : code "AG." This code was reportedly added to Oswald's | | opening form because of the comment on the form that he had _ defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. An Agency official who was a DDO records expert and -for many years had been involved in the CIA's investigative efforts concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination, gave the Committee a somewhat different explanation of the circumstances surrounding the term "AG" and its placement on Oswald's opening form. This individual testified that “AG" Fe > was an example of a code used to aid in preparing computer _listings of occupational groupings or intelligence affiliations. Classitication: AAs Classified by derivation:
| i 3 , 2, lo,’ Classification: oneet (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) He explained that these codes always utilized two letters and that in this case, the first letter “A" must have represented Communism, while the second letter would represent some category within the Communist structure. His recollection was that at the time of the . F assassination, the "AG" code was not yet in existence because — there were no provisions then in effect within the Agency for the indexing of American defectors. He recalled that it was ‘only during the life of the Warren Commission that the CIA - realized that its records system lacked provisions for ‘indexing an individual such as Oswald. Consequently, the CIA then revised its records handbook to include authorization for indexing American defectors and established a code for its computer system to be used for the category of “American . . . See _.. ” defectors." Although this Wadividuel did not know when the Classification: Classified by derivation: 4 SRN, f tS
a Classification: L Qe "(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) notation "AG" was added to Oswald's opening sheet, he presumed that it would have to have been following the addition of the American defector code, thus placing the time somewhere in the middle of the Warren Commission's investigation. He explained that it was difficult to determine when any of ' the yt "Nedhtecieet!akite notations on the opening sheet were made, since it was standard. procedure to update the forms whenever necessary so that they j _ were as reflective as possible of the available information. _ . a. Finally, this “indimidual testified that the regulations regarding the use of this occupation and intelligence code specifically. prohibited indicating that a particular person Anette roster was either an employee of the Agency or someone who was used by the Agency. / This prohibition was designed to prevent : i anyone from being able to produce any kind of categorical listing of CIA employees, caer connections. / Classification: if i Classified by derivation:
Classification: a (This form is to be used for material extracted . from ClA—controlled documents.) . om Why does the opening form for Les.Haxvey Oswald's 201 file indicate that the file was_ta be restricted? The form that was used to initiate the opening of Lee Hazuey Oswald's 201 file contains a notation indicating that the file was to be "restricted." This indication was fo considered potentially significant because of the CIA's practice of restricting agents' files to persons on a “need get SS to — basis. anerele investigation, however, revealed that restricting access to a file was not necessarily indicative of any “ relation- ship with the CIA. The individual who actually placed the restriction on Oswald's file testified that this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of any developments that might have occurred with regard to the file. This purpose was achieved because any person seeking access to the file first had to assijication: Classified by derivation: oo as | SOE MLSE prAna Ay seit Ten, a SC ee UTE
a _ Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) notify the restricting officer; ’at that time the restricting officer could be apprised of any developments possibly necessitating access to the file by someone else. This testimony was confirmed by a CIA records expert: ' 5 J - iN * . v ese emt > who further testified that, had the file been permanently ! ch ed "as well as restricted, the possibility of a relationship with the CIA would have been greater. There was no indication on Oswald's form that it had been placed on permanent chafye. é Finally, the Committee reviewed the files of four other defectors weteh had been opened at the same: time and by the same person as Oswald's, and determined that each of their files had similarly been restricted. Each of these other individuals (had been pn the list of defectors that had been exchanged by the CIA and State Department. None of the files & pertaining to these other defectors had any evidence. suggestive Classification: Classified by derivation: PES, - fhe
Classification: ee (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) %, ae of a possible intelligence agency association.. va Were 37 documents missin —)) | | 201 file? Q . In the course of reviewing Lee—Haxyey Oswald's 201 file,. from Oswald's the Committee discovered an unsigned memorandum to the Chief ’ Nace arctoonat. 2 of Counterintelligence, Research and Analysis, dated 20 February 1964, which stated that 37 documents were missing from Oswald's 201 file. According to the memorandum, this statement was based upon a comparison of a machine listing Neamesioe: iy ts of documents officially recorded as being in the. 201 file and those documents actually physically available in the file. latin While the memorandum mentioned that such a machine listing was attached, no such attachment was found in the 201 file at the time of the Committee's review. The memorandum itself aye” bears the classification “SECRET EYES ONLY," and &% one of the A. Ciassification: Cluasified by derivation: _. —
Classification: ay) — - (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) documents that had been fully withheld from release under the Freedom of Information |. In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA advised . that, because Oswald's file was so active during the course of i . . 3 the Warren Commission investigation up-to-date machine listings were produced periodically. On this basis, the Agency stated SA ; . “ Swann 0. aa & : : . cnae YTC must be assumed that whoever was responsible for “maintaining the Oswald file brought a file up-to-date by locating the 37 documents and placing them in the file." Because this response was incomplete, the author of > memorandum was deposed. He testified that once a f document had been registered into a 201 file by the Agency's \ computer system, physical placement of the document in the file was not always necessary. On this basis, he explained ATI, that the items listed in the memorandum were not missing but seis Classification: __ Classified by derivation: OES SEES
ar anacdiceedld. Classification: C2 (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Naeioem ns > ee a . rather had either been routinely placed in a separate file because of their sensitivity or were being held by other individuals who needed them for analytical purposes. He 4 i 7 further stated that in the course of his custodianship of ca i “Oswald's file, he had requested perhaps as many as 100 computer listings on the contents of the Oswald file. While there had been many instances in which one or more documents had been charged out to someone, he stated that he had never discovered that any documents were actually missing. According to his testimony, the 37 documents, in fact, were available, but simply were not located in the file at that time. -—~¥4 | Was there any evidence that the CIA had for some & reason maintained a dual filing system regarding . ass nee 3a ot | YS 3g ne hee-Hasvey Oswald? ance ein aed, er ai ; AR Abthough-the Committee was aware from S&é outset of ~~ uss the possibility that a dual filing system -- wing one lassification: _ : Classified by derivction: S 2 SE, NE QUE. A aie tae
Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ostensibly innocuous file and one which contained the-acteel 4 operational detail indicative of an Kgency relationship with £ CANA ~GaRYcerationship, betweer tyme andthe | Monee Qe ~D | SO | waren’ RoE Te a concern with the discovery @= —- certeain—files-whieh—imiteated that at least two Agency . . ; Pa ° . officers had contemplated the use of cakLiles and forged documents to protect the puxrpose-ofthe ZR Rifle project from Deing~dicclosed. the ZR Rifle prejeet was an executive action (iron assassinatio ) Frooras Vason-bone-ne-nosdeton t the Oswald case. Helms “testified that the assassination ; aspect of this project was never implemented and, in fact, was discontinued. as soon as it was brought to his attention, _/ dak, the implications of ‘this discovery in terms of the ; Classified by derivation: AL % Rak od ee lowe eakea Oswald file{were troub Classification: “ere re, c, Wy evan 5 a SOIT qo seen,
i J Me emertat tee Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) In the Oswald case, there=wexe Wao Liawe Wichixeceive ener a Seca SC Ry because they were potentially indicative of a dual oe he of him filing system. The first involved a photograp that had been taken in Minsk in 1961) and the second concerned a . C5 2D ol copy of a letter that had been written to Biff by his mother during his stay in the Soviet Union. At the time of President Kennedy's assassination, both of these items were in_ the CIA's possession but neither was in Oswald's 201 file. The photograph of Oswald taken in Minsk shows him .- posing with several other people. According to the CIA, the picture was found after the assassination as a result of a search of the Agency's graphics files for materials potentially -relevant to Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union. _/ The Agency advised that this photograph, as well as several others not related to Oswald, were routinely obtained in Classification Clesiified by derivation: 2 FELON air ¢ 7 La screener, SEPT Ts, SEPT PO, any
FLEE So oe np Arete tie meadiey inact? inwnsion” Fal eel PTT Co~Y . Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted . from ClA—controlled documents.) ) 1962 from some tourists by thé CIA's Domestic Contacts oo ab tpe tte Division, a component that frequently sought information on a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad in Communist countries. See meat eee Committee interviews with the tourists in question . <, _ confirmed that the photograph, along with 159 other site ‘ a photographic slides, had been made routinely available to the ~Ageneyts Domestic Contacts Division. Neither tourist had Cremation TES SRE OP heard of bee—Harvey Oswald prior. to the assassination or even knew which photographs had been of interest to the Agency. CIA records indicate that only five of the 160 slides : initially made available were retained. / Committee - interviews with the two CIA employees who had handled the | i” Slides for the Domestic Contacts Division established that ¢ a 2 ° e v Oswald had not been identified at the time that these os Ciussiicatio fe v Classified by derivation: Pair my AGI
ERE hbase ise cater — a — Classification: __. ~ (This form is to be used for material extracted . [- mf from ClA—controlled documents.) psn photographic materials had been made available. __/. One of these employees stated that the Oswald picture had been retained because it depicted a Soviet intourist guide; .the other employee indicated that the picture had been kept" et a NN ; ; , 8 ° ¥ weac because it showed a crane in the background... / The mnt ae “A employee yho. worked at CTA headquarters cénfirmed\ that the * a Nn ek SS photograph Of Oswald had not been discovered until a post= assassination search of the Minsk graphics file for materials pertaining to Oswald... Accordingly, this photograph ¥%@ not evidence that the. CIA maintained a dual filing system with respect to Oswald. The picture apparently was kept in a separate ei1e(miy)anein 1964 when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its subjects. The Committee's investigation of a letter concerning Cinssification: Classified by derivation: FH 5 AY uh X Oy, ETN OTT, | barat TM
Gt. aed | | Gv) Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted — from ClA—controlled documents.) va Oswald that was in the Agency's possession similarly did not result in any evidence of a dual filing system. This letter, a dated July 6, 1961, had been sen son, butwas intercepted as a result Of (+0) Marguerite Oswald to her ' i & CTA madden t, ; D . 0 NTs A AAterieiiotana ann program(  / ‘ghiscpaogeam,, } known as ee Sigiehy Poem i _ to intercept letters being sent between the ‘united States and GE é Russia in an effort to obtain beth-pesitixesintelligence and ‘counterintelligence information. _/ Typically, intercepted letters and/for-tretr envelopes would be photographed and then . returned to the mails. In response to a Committee inguiry, the CIA explained a 7 KANT? Liege Dn , | that because of ; extreme sensitivity, all materials generated as a result of mail intercepts were stored Hod file Whith was maintained by the in a separate proj a counterin igence staff.  / Consequently, such items were ent nee ge & i SSCS i y Classified by derivation: AT Pet Sy” Fe et a Peter nes
eRe sbaseer Ae? ee nnd epee cnaisatie vin 5 “S%) 7 Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) e oe a not placed in 201 files. This explanation was confirmed by — ie) Qe ee a the testimony of- a senior officer from the counterintelligence f staff who had jurisdiction over the HT-Lingual project files.* / Was there an evidence that bee—Hasvey Oswald had staff project? , ‘The Committee's review of HT-Lingual files pertaining “to Oswald** resulted in the discovery of reproductions of four Se ae ‘Ca index cards, two pertaining | to Lee Harvey . Oswald and two — yor , %*Since Oswald was the subject in approximately communications ee during his stay in the Soviet Union, the Committee also Y.*. questioned why the Agency ostensibly had just one letter in its possession directly related to Lee Harvey Oswald. ~ In essence,,this may be explained by the fact that HT-Lingual 8 only operated four days a week,and, even then,onl we sampling basis. / . \peocietel > **Although the Agency had only one letter in its possession directly related to Oswald, after the assassination the HT-Lingual files were combed for additional materials potentially,- SPanT, | related to him. Approximately 50 pieces of correspondence were E discovered... None of these were ultimately judged to be of any 9 Significance. These materials, however, were stored’ ina separate Oswald HT-Lingual file. Lo : ve ce é v) [7 ¥ Classified by derivation:
aah iste” Seen Pier SEE ASlaay Aes hee Sailnet MIRE | Classification: = assification (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) pertaining to Marina Oswald; which were dated after the assassination of president Kennedy. The pages containing the | ‘reproductions of these cards Wee stanped “Secret hyes Only." | The first card regarding Lee Harvey Oswald, se dated 9 November 1959, dnd states that Oswald is a xecent defector to the USSR and a former Marine. It also bears the notation "CI/Project/RE" and some handwritten notations. The second ~ ecard on Oswald places him in Minsk, USSR. It contains | background information on him and states that he "reportedly expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions." This card is dated 7 August 1961 and also bears the notation “WARCH LIST.” “these cards, particularly the reference to "CI/Project/RE," raised the question of whether Lee Harvey Oswald was, in fact, involved in some sort of CI project. The Committee questioned former employees of the CIA who - Classification: Classified by derivation: __. ree a 1 Set TT, A a Laramie Dr)
(Go) Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Neto may have had some knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual program in general and these cards in particular. Some of . ‘these employees recognized the cards as relating to the H g “4 a ? i ? HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identify the meaning of the notation, "CI/Project/RE." ae / However, one Bp testified that the "CI Project". was "simply a name of convenience which was used to describe (ae eae eae neg - the HT-Lingual project") another pesmsen testified that "CI Project" was the name’ of the component wheth ran the . This prean olge . € HT-Lingual project. The-battex explained that "RE" represented y “the initials of a person who had been a translator of foreign . language documents and that the initials had probably been \ placed there so that someone could come back to the translator if a question arose concerning one of the documents. _f . é Another employee testified that the “Watch-List" notation on f Be & ¥
* pace ae { i a id Da Gy) = Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) . . —, : the second card. referred to a-bieteet persons who had been identified as being of particular interest tnothesigenay — with respect to the mail intercept program. The Committee requested the CIA to provide an explanation for the terms "cl/Project/RE," and "Watch List," e and for the significance of the handwritten notations appearing on the index cards. In addition, the Committee requested a description of criteria utilized in compiling a "watch list." In regard to the meaning of the notation “CI/Project/RE, " the CIA explained that there existea an office within the Sounterintelligence staff that was known as "CI/Project," a cover title that had been used ‘to hide the true nature of the office's functions. In fact, this office was responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by the HT-Lingual vA 2S) <2.) : ee Taine hh st a ents project. The response further explains that "RE" represent OR SSTN ¥ RT ate f esd 13, * Classification: __ Classified by Garivation: “" ¥ OT a - LR LOSER SE co ae
Nene tea wn aN | Classification: QW (This form is to be used for material extracted ‘the initials of a former employee (who is presently retired under =/ from ClA—controlled documents.) . a ot Nee” = = Sor cover. In responding to a request for the criteria used in compiling a "Watch List," the CIA referred to a section of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities 5 within-.the United States, which states: ~ Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest (one should also add counterintelligence interest) were specified in Watch Lists provided -to the mail project by the Counterintelligence Staff,. by other CIA components, and by the FBI. The total number of names on the Watch List varied, from time to time, but on the average, the list included approximately 300 names, including about 100 furnished by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of United States citizens. Thus , the full meaning of the notation is that on CA, wea Dears We Pa to A Awd hha 5} 9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the “Watch List" for the HT-Lingual project for the reason stated on the card +- ' that Oswald was a recent defector to the USSR and a former Marine. Classification: Sean Classified by dzrivation: 4 oe POSS - er er a Lom % ARE On RES a
ao eee tern even wee ett eeree oe wee week as Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The response to state that the handwritten number, #7-305, which also appears on the first card, is a reference to the communication from the CI Staff to the Office cL Stoll of Security expressing the Sexmextks interest in seeing, any mail to or from Oswald in the Soviet Union. Finally, the ; other handwritten notation, "N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59,". signifies that a name. trace run through the central records register indicates that there was no record for Lee Oswald as per he ct hf A fier whe append th Onell ror Al The Agency's explanation of the meaning o pe card 3 that on 7 August 1961, BRS Oswald's name be placed on the as ie because of that aate.* requested that \ Oswald's expressed desire to return to the U.S. as stated on the card. The handwritten notation indicates, in this instance, that Oswald’ s name was deleted from the “Watch List" on 28 May 1962. 1 oy Mee ahye ¢ ae te > { tae “. sre Gt - ; 4 Togs eee Classification: fed Mp ks, f Lo sss, ol Cow heny fe phe peau, ‘ a At cood berber te” im cha pe eS ¥ Classified by deriyc! ons eraen te o- We & be any Ta RIE
{pire Liege plagrons fran +h | 3 Cadncér nt a« borin Om JIS vewrbar Fob
a i a a a en nT ee ; : . PANN, Classification: ___ — (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) \—1-Feference to the two cards on Marina Oswald, the Agency stated that her name was first placed on the "Watch ; | | “. Dist" on 26 November 1963 because she was the wife of Lee ~ 3 . ' a : Harvey Oswald. The second card served the purpose of adding the name Marina Oswald Porter to the "Watch List" on _# ; 29 June 1965 after she remarried. Both names were deleted from the list as of 26 May 1972. Thus, the statements of former CIA employees were corroborated by the Agency's response regarding the explanation Ee ¥ of the index cardsin the CIA's HT-Lingual files pertaining to Oswald. The explanations attested ‘orcthestime:, that the references on the cards were not demonstrative of an Agency \ relationship with Oswald, but instead were examples of notations ie 5 routinely utilized in connection with the HT-Lingual project. y, ie “ Classification: ' ‘ Classified by derivetion: Cee, ants “gs : Rasta ony re
aged ER Ripa ID LEE. OS COTE Leeda?” Conemenientinds amhegeteory em ewe eens Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) po a eF Did the The CIA has denied ever having had any contact with. Gee~Hespey Oswald, and its records are consistent with. this position. Because the Agency has a Domestic Contacts Division wheek routinely attempts to solicit information on a. nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad, the. absence of any record indicating that Leectaewey Oswald, a returning defector who had worked in a Minsk radio factory, naa(nod been debriefed has been considered by Warren commission critics to be either inherently noncredible (i-.e., the | ie | record has been destroyed) or indicative that Oswald had been contacted through other than routine Domestic Contact Division channels. After reviewing the Agency's records pertaining to this issue, the Committee's initial point of inquiry was to interview Classified by derivation: of lt py
G) | Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) the former chief of an Agency component responsible fox research related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union who had written a November 25, 1963 memorandum ‘whieh indicated that, Orta officer ‘had considered "the laying of interviews fon him/ through. e upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union, /the Domestic Contacts Divison/ or other suitable channels." ‘This individual indicated that Oswald was considered suspect because the Soviets had appeared to have been very solicitous of him. For this reason, 4 nonclandestine contact, either by the Domestic Contacts Division or other "suitable channels" ; } | | f such as the FBI or the. Immigration and Naturalization sexvicgy £ A «The memorandum indicates that the possibility of an Oswald contact was discussed during the summer of 1960, but the author indicated that the conversation actually took place during the summer of 1962, shortly before his transfer to a new assignment. During the summer of 1960, the author was not on an active assignment. Ci Bae aisgsificanion: . . ea ee Classified by derivation: ee ee ee ee i SEF
—ofN Classification: rs ' (This form is to be used for. material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Nemes eh va was considered. The officer stated, however, that to his knowledge, no contact with Oswald was ever madeyY moreover, if ‘ “UREREA, Miny a debriefing had occurred, the officer stated that he would Sie aN have been informed. Finally, he stated that Oswald was considered a potential lead, but only of marginal importance, ETE, and therefore the absence of a debriefing was not at all . unusual. The Committee interviewed five other Agency employees who were in a position to have discussed Oswald in 1962 with ; | oo _ E the author of this memorandum, including the person who ; . ° g replaced the author of the memorandum as chief of the research = section, but none of them could recall any such conversation. UN, Interviews with personnel from the Soviet Russia Division's clandestine operations section, the American @egal travelers program, and the clandestine activity research section failed NTT, Classification: a areas
ern SPIE Pe AE er yurrt A LIF cht” Pai PAG S) Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA——controlled documents.) to result in any evidence suggesting that Oswald had been contacted at any time by the CIA. QI, The author of the November 25, 1963 memorandum also EPRI informed the Committee that the CIA maintained a large volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which Oswald worked. This information was stored in the Office of Research and Reporting. _/ Another former CIA employee, who had worked in the Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised the Committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence regarding the Minsk Radio Rlant. In fact, this individual ATU, clain’that during the summer of 1962 he reviewed a contact an report from representatives of Goons ! who had interviewed a former Marine who had worked at the Minsk hia Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This defector, Classified by derivation: REET T,
Serre meme abeen nin “that file. . an eT Cass i” soay . Aaa" aay” belay Classification: (This form is to- be used for material extracted  - ; from ClA—controlled documents.) whom the employee peliovelKay have been Oswald, had been living with his family in Minsk.. _ ee of The employee advised the Committee that the contact report was filed in a volume cdkeownatg. the Minsk ‘Radia Rlant- | which.should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch, | then a component of the Office of Central Reference. Accordingly, the Committee requested that the CIA provide both the abevre=« aGesesthed=contact report and the volume of materials concerning the Minsk ‘Radio lant. A review by the Committee ._ of the documents in the volumes on the Minsk hadio Riant, PP. however, \revealed that no>such contact report existed. in "> € | aaa ll 3 ot a ee The CIA kes stated to the Committee that, between 1958 and 1963, it had no procedure for (they systematic debriefing EO. é overseas travelers, including returning defectors. Instead, ee fr, Classitieation: : 5 Clossified by derivation: __.
J\ Classification: {This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) , 4 the Agency relied upon the FBI both to make such contacts and report any significant results. To investigate this question further, the Committée reviewed the files of 22 individuals (selected from an original i; ‘list of 380 possible Soviet defectors) who were born in America and appeared to have returned to the United States between 1958 and 1963.* Of these 22 individuals, only four were ‘interviewed at any time by. the CIA. These four instances tended to involve particular intelligence or counterintelligence needs, but this was not always the case. Based upon this file-review, it that, in To the CIA did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter *An effort was also made to review only the files of American- born individuals who had defected during these years. , Not all of the 22 individuals, however, met -this criterig, A Classified by derivation: ican ETT, UREA SES
=\) Classification: Seam aeynire? SPL, (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ¢ ares on of standard operating procedure. For this reason, the absence Of any Agency contact with Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union cannot be considered _ ££ 5 fs a S fe fo) STN SUPINE, particularly since the FBI did fulfill Its jurisdictional obligation to conduct such interviews. steantinnenstiantnt The Justice tment's Failure to Prosecute Leauhawmey sheer Oswald for Offering to Give Inte igence Information to the Soviet Union =) When Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959 for the purpose of renouncing his American cittzenship, he allegedly offered to E f 5 give the Soviets information that he had acquired as a \ , E Marine Corps radar operator. _/ The Committee sought V to determine why the Justice Department did not prosecute £ . i ¥ Oswald for his offer to divulge this kind of information. Classified by derivation:
‘ “neaet or tet oe de 7 aN Classification: ae - (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) A review of Oswald's correspondence with the American embassy in Moscow indicates that on February 13, 1961, the embassy received a letter from him in which he expressed a . "desire to return to the United States if...some agreement /could be reached/ concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against /him/." _f/ On February 28, 1961, the embassy sought guidance from the State Department concerning Oswald's potential liability to . criminal prosecution. _/ é The State Department, however, responded on April 13, 1961 that | it was "not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his E ‘desired return to the United. States he may be amenable to - prosecution for any possible offenses committed in violation of the laws of the United States..."  / . On May 10, 1961, Oswald wrote the embassy demanding a WED, "full guarantee" against the possibility of prosecution. /-— Cisssification: Classified by derivstion: _—_- SL SUSY RBS aya Tey Sy AS SER” Ae ¢
Ao es tee eam, Ne ant a eaten, — MwA Z 2 ROLY Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) He visited with embassy consul’Richara Snyder on July 16, 1961, and denied. that he had ever given any information to the Soviets. / Snyder advised Oswald on an informal basis that, while no assurances could be given, the embassy did not — perceive any basis for prosecuting Oswald, icc-an-ottanse - involuing—any severe punishment ——_/ there is no record that the State Department ever gave Oswald any assurances that he would not be prosecuted. Upon his return to the United States, Oswald was interviewea twice by the FBI. On each occasion, he denied ever yiwang —— any information to the Soviet Union. _/ In a response to a Committee request, the Department of. Justice indicated that prosecution of Oswald was never considered because his file contains no evidence that he had ever revealed or offered to reveal national defense information an a 7 gaa ep a gs eFPTE Rite mrngeh tagean oe or I, QT REST TI, ROEM, NIP,
Classification: Nee (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) to the Soviet Union. _/ In a subsequent response, ‘the Department acknowledged the existence of some ‘evidence that Oswald had offered information to the soviet Union, but stated that there were, nevertheless, serious obstacles to a possible prosecution: It (Department file) doés contain a copy of an FBI memorandum, dated July 3, 1961, which is recorded as having been received in the Justice Department's Internal Security Division on December 10, 1963, which states that the files of the Office of Naval “Intelligence contained a copy of a Department of State telegram, dated October 31, 1959, at-Moscow. The telegram, which is summarized in the FBI report, quoted Oswald as having offered the Soviets any information he had acquired as a radar operator. The FBI report did not indicate that the information to which Oswald had access as a radar operator: was classified. Oswald returned to the United States on June 13, 1962. He waS interviewed by the FBI on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth, Texas, at which time he denied furnishing any information to the Soviets concerning his Marine Corps experiences. He stated that he never gave the Soviets any information which would be used to the detriment of the United States. In sum, therefore, the only "evidence" that Oswald ever offered to. furnish information to the Soviets is his own reported statement to an official at the Classified by derivation: f BAN
# Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) U.S. embassy in Moscow. That statement, _of course, was contradicted by his denial to the FBI, upon his return to the United States, that he had ever made such an offer. In the prosecution of a criminal case, the “Government cannot establish a prima facie: case solely on a defendant's unsupported confession. The Government must introduce substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish.the trustworthiness of the defendant's statement. See, Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). Accordingly, in the absence of any information that Oswald had offered to reveal classified information to the Soviets, and lacking corroboration of his statement that he had proferred information of any kind to the Russians, we did not consider his ; prosecution for violation of the espionage statutes, 18 U. Pe 793, 793. as 4 Based upon this analysisy~these—i& no evidence that Oswald received favorable treatment from either the State Department or the Justice Department regarding the possibility of w criminal prosecution. &. Oswald's Contacts with Americans in the Soviet Union © Cy ap Priscilla Johnson McMillan | cal ra ae ne . Priscilla Johnson McMillan, author of Marina and Lee, became a subject of the Committee's inquiry because she was Classification: ’ Classified by derivation: SERIE, TOF RN yee +
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ¢ one of two American correspondents who had obtained an interview with bee-Harvey Oswald during his stay in Moscow.in 1959. The Committee sought to investigate allegation that Ms. McMillan's interview with Oswald had been arranged by the CIA. John McVickar, a consul at the American embassy, d ceca aD. ‘testified that he hadVOswald's case with Ms. McMillan, and uh that he choughtYohe might is us . communicating with him and help him in dealing with what appeared to be a very strong personal problem -if she were able to talk with him." _/ McVickar stated, however, that he had never worked in any capacity for the CIA, nor did he believe that Ms.- McMillan. FURIE £08 oreet, SE Re RECT, SunepretAR, RETRAIN, TNT OMI, “rire 77, Fs oietal STEP had any such affiliation. - The Committee’ Ss review of Me. a eee —_ 1 McVickar's State Department and CIA files ‘confirmed ‘that he had An Zyt d. 7 “bots at aN on ‘ never been associated with the CIA. ; fc atta cenit Classification: Classified by derivation: a LY TE SY EB
ae wee ee Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Accoxding—te Ms. McMillan‘s\testimony about the events ad _ surrounding her interview with Bee=Heswey Oswald, in November 1959, she had just returned from a visit to the United States . where she covered the Camp David summit between President ‘Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. On November 16, 1959, she 3! went to the American embassy to pick up her mail for the first time since her return to the Soviet Union. The mail pickup facility was in a foyer near the consular office. Consular Officer John A. McVickar came out of this office and welcomed McMillan back to the Soviet Union. They exchanged a few words, and, as her hotel was Soviet Union. Speak to “any was a woman. she was leaving, McVickar commented that at ‘an American who was trying to defect to the McVickar stated that the American would not es . . of us," bat might speak to McMillan because she She recall that ‘as she was leaving, McVickar ant nm at cy . . LAMSSITICOTION: Ciassified by derivation: SMT, ba eakiitsp UTM, SUT ep oy AES ASE bl
"Ne wate teh no on el . ma ) : 7 Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) told her to remember that she was an American. INS, Yanan proceeded to her hotel, found out the American's room number, knocked on his door J and asked him for an interview. The American, Lee Harvey Oswald, did not ask her into the room, but he did agree to talk to her. in hey’ room later that night. - xo emesican’ government official arranged the actual interview with Oswald. - she met with oswald just once. She perieveyCnat McVickar called her on November 17, the day after her interview with Oswald, and asked her to supper. That evening at supper they discussed her interview with Oswald. McVickar indicated a general concern about Oswald and felt that vem y the attitude of another American consular official might have pushed Oswald further in the direction of defection. -McVickar indicated a personal feeling that it would be a sad thing for Oswald to defect in view of his age, but he did not indicate Classified by derivatisa: 7 of f Sf “RUT, SETH,
Classification: sa) (This form is to be used for material extracted o from ClA—controlled documents.) that this was the U.S. Government's position 6 2077 mo\itan also testified that she had never worked for the CIA, nor was she connected with any other federal government agency at the time of her interview with Leesiemvey Oswald. According to’an affidavit that Ms. McMillan filed with the Committee, her only employment with the federal government was as a 30-day temporary translator for the Joint Press Reading Service, an organization that was operated by the American, British and Canadian embassies in Moscow. Finally, Ms. McMillan testified that because of her background in Russian studies, she applied for a position with the CIA in 1952 as an intelligence analyst. The. application, a - c Pett cat Ym was withdrawn ; but. the CIA _completed - its “security chétk-on., ao ae tm aoe her and denied her a “security clearance. She acknowledged being debriefed by an Agency employee in 1962 after returning Classified by derivation: atD Ermey Oey, nea Ree IM apie ety ATE PT,
Rs at rere to Ms. McMillan .corroborated her testimony. There was no Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ‘from her chAija trip to the Soviet Union, but’ explained that this contact was in some way related to the confiscation of her notes by Soviet officials.* The Committee's review of CIA files pertaining indication in the file suggesting that she had ever worked for me: ae identified himself as a C.I.A. employee and gave his name as either Donald Jameson or James MacDonald. I agreed to see him . in part because the confiscation of my papers and notes had utterly altered my situation -- I now had no hope of returning to the U.S.S.R. and was free for the first time to write what I knew. I was preparing a series of articles for The Reporter which would contain the same information about which Mr. Jameson had expressed a desire to talk to me. Finally, during the latter part of my 1962 trip to the U.S.S.R., I had been under heavy surveillance and the K.G.B. knew what Soviet citi- zens I had seen. Many of those I had talked to for the Reporter articles were Russian “liberals" (anti-Stalin and pro-Khrushchev). What reprisals might befall those whom I had interviewed I did not know, but since my notes were now part of the K.G.B. files, I felt that it might help them if the C.I.A. knew that which the K.G.B. already knew. My meeting with Mr. Jameson, which occurred at the Brattle Inn, Cambridge, was a reversal of my usual effort to avoid contact with the C.I.A., and the subject matter was confined to my impressions of the Soviet literary and cultural climate. Classification: _ Classified by derivation: RC or all are jormucdly af kf Clnbuu adage se § oe *In November 1962, I had a conversation with a man who a A &
wt ctrl wee ae a re SEE Fe al MtciineT Me MER ME Pe: we ee, Clo) Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) a the CIA. In fact, there was some evidence suggesting that the Agency was reluctant even to debrief her after her trips to the Soviet Union. An interview with the former Agency official who had been deputy chief and then chief of the american legal travelersfrrogran during the years 1958 to 196T, coReienda that’ “ ee, ne Ms. McMillan had not been used by the CIA in that program. There was information in Ms. McMillan's file indicating that on occasion during the years 1962-65 she had provided cultural and literary éexype information to the CIA. None of this informatian, however, was suggestive in any way of a clandestine relationship. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Ms. McMillan ever worked for the CIA or received - the Agency's assistance in obtaining an interview with Bee=iteemey Classification: Classified by derivation:. GREED. NEN, | NUE. “EE NE ERM, A CLL Snes
i ! : i 3 eet Oo Classification: net Trey (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA——controlled documents.) NN ' “SEERA Oswald.* & Richard E. Snyd: Yr Richard E. Snyder was the consular official in the United States Moscow embassy who handled the Oswald case. It was Snyder with whom Oswald, mets 959 when Oswald sought to rerfounce his American citizenship. Two years later, when Oswald initiated his inquiries about returning to the United States, Snyder again became involved in the case. Warren Commission critics have alleged that Snyder was associated in some way with the CIA during his service in the Moscow embassy. NY In his Committee depositon, Richard snyder acknowledged f that for an wk, month period during 1949-50 he worked for JOU CIE Qe *Nor is there any basis, based’ upon Ms. McMillan's testimony, CIA files, and anaffidavitt provided by McMillan's publisher, Harper and Row, to support the allegation that the CIA financed the book Marina and Lee. Classification: Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted _ from ClA—controlled documents.) the CIA while he was on the waiting list for a foreign service appointment with the State Department. Snyder testified, — however, that, since resigning from the CIA in March gf 1950, he has had no contact with the CIA other than a letter written in 1970 or 1971 inquiring about employment on a oF contractual basis.* The Committee reviewed Snyder's files at the State Department, Defense Department ) and the CIA. Both the State Department and Defense nopar NE consistent with his testimony. Snyder's CIA file revealed that, at one time prior to 1974,it had been red flagged and maintained on a segregated basis. The file contained a routing indicator \ whtelr stated that the file had been red flagged because of a *Snyder also denied contact with any other intelligence service while active as a foreign service officer. Classified by derivation: SF” ESS” NOTIN SNP, sqUeT NETO, ROM,
Classification: ___ CVO (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Jones' knowledge, neither the FBI nor any law enforcement agency > ever requested a copy of the Military Intelligence file on Oswald. To his surprise, neither the FBI, Secret Service, CIA nor Warren Commission ever interviewed him. No one ever . : ; : . yf directed him to withhold any information; on the other hand, he never came forward and offered anyone further information relevant to the assassination investigation because he "felt that the information that /he/ had provided was sufficient and...a matter of record...” a i _ Communications ee oo \ Jones’ contact with the FBI office in San Antonio is reflected in a teletype message sent at 4:25 p.m. on { f | 4 November 22, 1963, from that FBI office to the FBI Director and. the Special Agent in Charge in Dallas. a Classification: i Classified by derivation: 7 eke AS oF tN ' CANIN, WATT, ITO, cones NUTT, Sess, at PS ae