Nad be ts Slee 6 March 1964 The Honorable McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the President The White House Washington, D.C. Dear .Mac; Dick Helms and I are most appreciative of the opportunity you gave us this morning for a thorough discussion of the Agency's various operational problems | in connection with Cuba. It was very helpful to us and has served to. clarify to a great extent our own thinking on the future of our various operational programs, It might perhaps be well to set forth, in this informal . fashion, a list of the various topics which we. discussed together with the considerations that appear to me to apply. a In the first place, as you know very well, although the Agency appears as the proposer of most covert action programs at the Special Group and elsewhere, we do this only in response to what we understand to be policy requirements and have no interest in either commencing ‘or perpetuating any programs which are not demanded by - policy and which are not geared to the accomplishment of a specific objective, The interdependent program of . actions which we proposed last spring and which was accepted in June was based on three propositions which were accepted at the time: (a) that it was in the U.5. interest. to get rid of Castro; (b) that, in attempting __ to do so, the U.S, did not wish either to employ overt force or to raise the international "noise level" to an unacceptable degree; and (c) that the ultimate objective of the program was not mass. uprisings but to encourage disaffected elements within the military establishment ‘and other power centers of the regime to carry out a coup. DocId: 32423484 Page 81 _ wf. Lyndon B. Joh nson Library
The resulting program represented a maximum covert effort but only a minimum overall national effort which could result in overthrowing Castro. The percentage of ° chance of achieving this purpose was admittedly never too high even had the program proceeded on full blower. In fact the economic part of the program suffered a © - . serious, if not fatal, reverse with the Leyland bus contract and subsequent moves by European suppliers to take advantage of Castro*s improved cash position. The sabotage raids, built into the program as a sort of firing pin for internal unrest and tocreate the conditions for a coup, which was to be the main force leading to Castro*s defeat, ran only from August to December and only five were actually conducted, The effectiveness of these ~ five raids is certainly debatable; there are strong pro- ponents on both sides of the argument. Regardless of how - that debate might come out, however, five rather low-key . raids followed by the present three-month hiatus, the ‘latter clearly noted by pro- and anti-Castroites alike, adds up to a program of a much smaller dimension than originally envisioned which could not be expected to have had the. desired detonating effect. At the present time, as a result of a number of ‘circumstances well known to you, Castro is in a strong upswing and the spirit of resistance within Cuba is at. avery low point indeed. In my estimation, a covert - program at this time designed to overthrow Castro is not ' yealistic, Acceptance of risks and noise level of a greater magnitude than we had in mind in June would be needed to stand a chance in view of the developments since last June, This then raises the question of what should happen now to the various bits and pieces of the June program, I would like to mention these separately _and refer to some of the considerations typical to each. ~The sabotage raids are conducted by Cuban exile groups held and trained in Florida and entirely subject to our planning and control. There are three of these groups totaling approximately 50 men, To place them in position and recover them there requires an extensive maritime apparatus in Florida, which likewise serves intelligence agent infiltrations and exfiltrations. To maintain the raiding capability on a stand-by basis . is expensive but, more importantly, the raiding groups Ca 6 p ra oo “Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld:3274273484 Page 62 —
CUES OLLY ram Na la a bs Le themselves have a relatively short shelf life; if not employed their morale deteriorates and some of the members, usually the best motivated, drop out. Replace- _ments can be acquired and trained but their caliber and morale is in large part determined by the morale of the exile community as a whole. We probably can retain the present raiding groups at roughly their current capa- bilities for another month or two, although the well- _known Cuban volatility is capable of causing sudden and more rapid deterioration, hate eee ener re ER a ERY In short, we will need to know within a reasonable time whether we should continue to effect repairs to and keep in being our sabotage raiding apparatus. The dismemberment of these raiding teams could be accomplished without too much shock to the exile community. It would be noticed, but, if done carefully, particularly if it coincided with the commencement of "autonomous" operations, it should not cause undue repercussions and polemics against U.S. policy. _ .As you know, again as part of the June plan, we are ‘supporting two "autonomous" exile groups headed respective- ly by Manuel Artime and Manolo Ray. In both cases we have gone to maximum lengths to preserve the deniability of U.S. complicity in the operation, Artime, who now possesses the greater mechanical and paramilitary apparatus, has required a good deal of hand-feeding although still within i the context of deniability. He will probably not be ready for his operations against Cuba before April or. May of this year. He possesses most of his hardware and maritime equipment and has negotiated geographical and political bases in Central America, Manolo Ray has been handled ; Z on a much more independent basis. We have furnished him money and a certain amount of general advice. He does not possess the physical accoutrements that Artime has and is - probably not as well equipped in terms of professional planning. Ray has a better political image inside Cuba among supporters of the revolution and has recently acquired, according to reports, some of the other left- wing exile activist groups such as Gutierrez Menoyo and his Second Front of the Escambray. He is said to be ready to move.into Cuba on a clandestine basis late this spring. His first weapon will be sabotage inside Cuba, apparently not externally-mounted hit-and-run raids. a | ee - Copy” = oo Docld:32423484 Page 83 - Pwndan: - Iahnson library: :
( EYES OMY | If U.S. policy should demand that the "autonomous" operations be suspended, we could of course cut off our support immediately. Artime and his group might or might . not disintegrate at once, Manolo Ray almost certainly would continue. Both groups are based outside the United . States and our only real leverage on them is through our financial support but withdrawal of this support would probably be fatal to their operations in time, A cutoff of this support, even though this support has been un- traceable in a technical sense, would have a considerable impact within the exile community. U.S. support is rumored, especially in the case of Artime, and the collapse of the only remaining evidence of exile action against Castro would hit the exile community hard which is what -it in turn would do to its favorite target, U.S. policy. The exile of today, however, appears to have lost much of his fervor and, in any case, does not seem to have the capacity for causing domestic trouble which he had a year -or two ago, The Central American countries in which the ' exile bases exist would be greatly confused, although we have carefully never indicated to the governments of these countries any more than U.S. sympathy for the "autonomous" _ groups. , _ We have a capacity, which is increasing, to sabotage Cuban merchant ships calling at foreign ports, We are ; emphasizing in this program the more subtle forms of '  gabotage as against large explosions obviously stemming from agent-placed bombs and limpets. The Cuban merchant fleet, among the most badly run in the world, can be helped along to a measurable degree by this program, On the economic warfare front, as you know, we have for many months conducted a covert denial program based on limited capabilities directed at very narrow targets. The effectiveness of this program is dependent on the careful selection of items to be denied in terms of their critical value to a key element of the Cuban economy. Despite the virtual collapse of the U.S. overall economic © denial program against Cuba, we still. retain the capacity, using unofficial and covert methods, to hurt but obviously not: to destroy certain bits of the Cuban economy. This effort can be complemented by carefully concealed contami- nation of lubricants and similar actions, Copy” Doctd:32423484 . Page 84. 7 oe “Lyndon” B “Johnson. Library. |
C EUG S OAM ( peeners ae el 5 Our program to get in touch with and subvert members of the military establishment and other elite groups in Cuba continues. Its chance of success naturally rises and falls with the state of morale inside Cuba as influ- enced by the success or inactivity of our other programs . and the U.S. posture in general, Our intelligence program continues at full force, It will be affected by anti-Castro morale but we believe that we can offset the effects of further deterioration in this morale by increasingly tightened and efficient operations. So We are seeking your advice to know which of the above lines of actions we should continue, which we should try to retain as a shelf capability and which to abandon, — (Of course, intelligence collection would continue.) As parts of an integrated national program designed to have at least a fighting chance to get rid ‘of Castro, they seemed to us to make sense; as separate pieces they can serve to exert some braking effect on Castro's progress, but that is about all, . . Sincerely, an \ . ans a Desmond FitzGerald sy | iz } 1 ' | - i i Cao Ce alas St hen Copy Docta:32423484 Page 85 = si sss don «8B. Johnson Library = -
30 March 1964 FROM THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS ‘TO THE SPECIAL GROUP SUBJECT: Status Report on Autonomous Cuban Exile Groups * 1. the purpose of this memorandum is to inform the members of the Special Group as to the current state of operational | readiness of the. autonomous Cuban exile groups which receive U. Ss. Government support and to indicate what might be expected of these groups in the relatively near future. 2. As part of the covert. program authorized in June 1963, | CIA is providing financial and some technical support to two autonomous Cuban exile groups headed respectively by, Manuel Ray and Manuel Artime, fin our judgment, Artime and, to a sonewiat— “3 lesser extent, Ray. now possess: the hardware and maritime 4 equipment as well as the geographical and political bases in : § Central America needed to launch independent infiltration and 3 Both groups also appear to | sabotage operations against Cuba. § have reached a state of training and psychological readiness | which could impel their leaders to launch operations against \ Cuba at almost any time and with little or no notice to the U.S. Government, _ ea . BT oS . oo eiUned pee Serene ee Sa aaea Copy - in ‘pocta:32423484 ‘Page a6 a oe a Lyndon - BL ‘Joh son Li! brary
3, The possibility of imminent unilateral operations on the part of the autonomous groups is brought to the attention of the Special Group at this time since it is related to the question of the future of ClA-controlled sabotage and harasa=, ment operations now under review by higher authority. This relationship was described in Part V of the memorandum entitled "Review of Current Program of Covert Action Against Cuba, " dated 24 January 1964 -otesaeeesesenanneen (that ifa ———— is made to terminate Maman and harassment: operations for the autonomous groups as well as for Ly CIA, it will be necessary to terminate support for the auto— f nomous groups as CIA would not be in a position to insure i =ome 4 : ‘that they would refrain from raids and sabotage even if so # & requested, fin n fact, it now aPpeara Likely tbat neither group will disintegrate at once upon notification of termination of U.S. subsidies, While withdrawal of U.S. financial aid and AT EE A TE moral support would probably be fatal to their operations in time, they: are likely to make strenuous efforts to find other quake sources of supports _In so doing and in order to prove their viability to potential supporters, they would, in their des- \ peration, probably feel compelled to launch one or more dramatic raids against Cuba, Dae tenes x OT BRATS eee ames eae ey ERTS TT “Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library 7 ‘Docld: 32493484 Page 87
arate nienetl eMedia Me me eta e Hp Reet deh ae ee en cee ee ee tee Se ee mt eee TC tae Saver amanead ee ary oO a ee * C2ouP? , > : This document coh 5 of LS: = P2geS aide so) . os : . - 3 Satie oo ‘Excluded from automatio : No] of _ an copes, § aries fa m2: “.. downgrading and . | } : 1 ms ;declassification DEGUBLT=S BOS LTLVS | / Lb 1/ey. . REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF. _ COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA ‘I. + The Current Situation in Guba ‘paring 1963 the situation in Gaba ateadtly voreencd. The ; economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt’ _ the downward curve. Hurricana Flora intensified Cuba's economic problens. Disillusiomment and apathy among tha great majority of the population contimed to grow, and enthusiasa was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were exployed more and more to maintain the rezime's control. § | . Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard comminist prototype fo ae eaused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. eae | His etatuxe in the eyes of many Cubans end Latin Americans suffered ©. =" : _ whith the sealicaticn, in the aftermath of the October miasile crisie, 4, : . . rr that Cuba had been a pawn sad Castro a cupe of Soviet policy. ‘Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to: step acta of defiance against hig regime. Guerrilla activity, _ @ithough scattered and ancoordinated, continues. Spontaneous . '- @ets of sabotage are comion throustout the island. At creat risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols +t escape from Cuba. In this atrosphere, externally mounted ’ gaids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among | the many Cabana dise illustoned with bia regine. During 1963 Cuba's interdationsl situation seemed alzost as. bad es the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the . U.S. policy of economie and diplomatic tsolation of Cuba vas a - belding ep fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly vere cuder . gtvain, Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provides a ~ Ee | mich needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Toh . Castro-type. armed uprisings threushout Latin America failed to “> |. . disgupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potent . embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestimely to 2 Venezuela. These internal and international trends and develop~_ AYES, | Renta’ brought Cuba to a low point curing 1963. | I Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have 4 . given the Castro wegins an inportant political-paychological - ‘Docla: 32423484 Page 38
ue le eee ea er a a ce oe ee en On ae eeeeemee ot nine enn Docld: 32423484 Page 89 | Met ‘they ere? a - e almost $100 million during the ‘year. Be ‘5, ‘ The gevolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro alee had a ae am aad the ‘Potency of his doctrine. _ have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible | " January 22, demons zated a Saviet willinzness te - prises. ‘Tha protocol calls far Cuban-Sovict trade exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on a credit, will increase: ‘by at least 29 per conte — | pressures fren Western countries to expand trade = effects a potential ¢ Cuben suppliers ate 2 siready i |. Gastro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary — Seal * Semmens hed enenstenanee Sal Ries wena enidamenmnemonemammmaries 2" aa atte oS oa ete ‘ BEMKETASENSETAVE | -~25- | The realization in the Cuben Covernnent that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market currency teaerves frem about $20 million to | The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1564, nigned : on January 11, and the Khrnshchevaseurarces of miintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sucer to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet . The distinct possibility thas the Untted States pollcy of econcnic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing | with Cuba, extending credit 1£ necessary, ‘The | British bus deal, with payment spread over a - five-year period, {s.an important political aud psychological trimmph for Castre. its ercsive The xecent rioting and violence da Panna, ga which» | fervor into Castroite activities. In addition, Panama and its afterzath will take the play away from the incident of the Venesuela ams cache, . hand, is beund to imoress Latin America as well ag other unstable areas with the length of Fideh's these SUCRST-SEESITIVE “tyndon | B. | johnson Library”
Docld: 324293484 Page 90 - pottenet and psychological thrust Castro's regine badly | needed, Us now has a firmer base for hia repeated claima < effort-to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to in- ... p¥ess many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, at io -” Gastro now has the possibility of procucing some tangible evidence - _:.- that his regime can restore forward worentum in the economy. : ci. Comsequentiy, the general position of the Castre regime ta _~ peach izproved over that of three or four months azo. . maxicam pressure through all means short of the use of mili-  taey force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty |. - gnd discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in : oe “wa have been earzying cut a program of integrated, mutually . er and satuaily dependent « soursea of t actions. “These CO BAOATE b, WUD TAEVES? By ty UD ~ 30 ‘These recent develépoents have provided the upward that Cuba has survived the full brant of a major United States = Ke Current y S. Poliey and - Yhe altinate u. $. objective 4s the. replacement of the ; t goverrmacnt in Guba by one fully compatible with the _ Ta attain this cbjective, we sre trying, by exerting the military and other power centers of the regine ta bring  gbout the overthrow of the Castro/Comumtat group and tha are -  glimfnation of the Soviet presence in Cubas (b) weaken the. nie ) $ase for subveraion in the Henisphere; and (¢) assist in 51. eevincing the Soviets that they exe backing a dosing ¢ and a expensive horse. In order to exsates the optician situation just dosertbed, The economic, political and osycholonteal isolation - we of Cuba fron the froe vorld “oh, Bental of fropenortd markets ard sotre)ess of - gusphy to Cuba: We nave uncertsken a voriaty or overt and covert activities desisacd to " gedsce Eree-world trade with Cuba and, espectaliy, oa ~ to » deny Cuba access to commodities: critical to
Docld: 32423484 Page 91 economy. Propo osals for expanding and intensi- - fying these activities are now being presented. — _. political costs and risks that ara entailed. - legislation, acd the threat of additional legis- _ 4amve te countries with ships in the Cuba trade, . . Maintained diplocatic pressures on free-world — eceuntries baving, or wishing toa establish, air . _to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to reread The execution of these additional measures depends . basically on a decision to incur the considerable » The reduction of Fren-usrid shi inosine ‘ in the Cuba | trade: We bave maintained diplomatic pressure on fzea-world uations to reduce and eventually = elininate their ships in the Cuba trade. we have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ; ships in the Cuba trade (HS44% 229, as amended). z To the same general end, wa have employed existing .. lation, restricting economic and military assist~ | ao The reduction of free world, end the containment | ef Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba: Ve have service ta Cubs. We are invoking recent legis- '. lation cenying assistance ta countries whose ts ships and aircraft carry comodities to and from _. Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on frce-varld countries to deny their — facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines _— gerving or trying to serve Cuba, ox harass such aizlines. a The Uaitetton of Ereq-unrid diplemtic relations with Cusaz: as opportunity nas etfercd, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-worid countries. Prevent the establisimentief such relations with © 7 Efforts to méerming the Castro ¢mare abroad and to frustrate Coin attemets to ieeeee that fr: 1383 By meana of diplomatic, propagendz and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the... weaknsss, fallurea and betrayals of the Castro . a “Lyndon | 8. Johnson Library” |
ne ran} ce teeaa we Neale ren ae oe ett) ee NN aN EO 2 CIRM oO cle ete ed OR SICKLT-SEMSITIVE uy “Qa. Wiehtin Cobas As indleated above, all cur efforts ae . ta bring abeut disorganication, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended te weaken the Cudan base for Castro/Comunist subversion. 9. Outside Cubat Se. ‘altilateral: We have seucht, throush the ons, | : Tat ts obtain general Latin Acerican recognition . of the sexrlousnesa of the subversive threat — and approval of recommendations of measures - '. $9 Limit travel te and from Cuba, and the '. transfer of funds and proparanda. At the == present tine, we intend to expand and intensify. , this effort through actions to be taken by the - ree O45 on the basis of the Verezuelan ceoplainet | an . @gainet Cuba. Beyond the activities in the ae 3 "| we have made epecial efforts with the Centrah Anerican countries and Poagma to have then tighten controls on the activities end movonent — ef subversives, to deveicp inland aad inslore / a surveillance capabilities, to qreute effective . . | intelligence orcanizationa and to establisha = =| systea of intelligence exchange. my be Bilateral: Tarough | training, material assist=~ 8 _. anee and exchange of intsilizence, ve bave 2 wosked to improve the internal security . capabilities ef individsal esuntrics. wn oN Re a Sar em te eae A cae Be Unilateral: In addition to mltilaterat and ; ee piintessi ‘upasures, we have continued to . _ maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity ‘o£ Cubs, ta isprove cux own commualcations .  eystems and to develop our own intelligence .- expabllities against subversive activitios ut Docla:32423484 ‘Page 92 . : Lyndon BL ‘Joh ison
GEARS YT eSENSATEVE =~6<) The recuction and eventral elinination of the Oo militer presence in Cb - We bave maintained diplonatic pressure ou the Sovicts | $0 continues troeopswithdrawals and we have warned the _ Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet a forces dn Cuba to suppress popular MpEising. | _ The collection of tntelligerce We have maintained and inpraved our overt and covert collection of intellisence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirecents but also operational requires | ments connected with our covert activities within Cubase | We have maintained perfodic high-level overtlichta 4 supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. - : We have warned the Soviets and Cubans F Bgainat inter= - ference with these FLightse. . 4 Of detatied discussion of the covert slecents of ar | ve | program appears in Section TL. oar . i Sh | A@ stated above, all these courses of ection interaet and - ' > me interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial |. <. : @perations are designed to reinforea and ba reinforced by our “. @vext measures of economic pressuvay Doth tyres of activities. oo @dgested against the economy are intended to aggravate existing oy: @eememie difficulties and thus te increase the level of dis- . iS @€€ection not only in the porular mass but particulerly in .: the power centers. of the regine, This disaffection enhances “qe ability to establish meaningful contect with figures in US ge mbiditary and other power centers and to develop intelli~. . “-! gemee sources, Thia disaffecticn is in turn intensified by . the evidence of wulnerability to outside attacks provided : By the succasa of covert sabotage and harassment cetivities., : Docld: 324293484 Page 933
Docld:324273484 Page 94 . oe within the regime, particulariy in the arsed forces, to carry | SEGRET@SZMSLTLVE . La wy By the sacs token, the failure er elimination of one of these. oO: mgtnally supporting courses o£ action jeopardizes the othera woe ead thus compronises the entire ‘program. "Throne 1963, these courses of action were having & a measure J able positive impact. Wa are now confronted, however, by a dk (7. gendes of developments, described in Section I, which threaten a "cl, 82 @yxest oF even reverse cur forward movement. The situation =) .» £@ particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of ovr “+ @eonenie pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert vO operations particularly timely and important. 7 ZII. Concept of the Covert Action Prosraa oe ‘The CLA covert action program aims at maintaining all. ee feastbie pressires on Cuba and at ereating and exploiting |. gituations in Cuba caleulated te stimulate dissident elements» ... Que a coup. The objective of the eoup vould be to renove “os the Castyo/Commmists from the regime and to eliminate the ~ @utire Soviet presence from Cuba, Recognizing thac the U.S. =: “ 48 engesed in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ~§ — > —@lly toe obstruct the consolidation p£ Castro's regine at hong . ad to prevent. hia from achieving his anbitiozs in Latin . - Agerica, we set the time frane for this program at about | ... @ighteen senths from June 1953. TE Aa originally conceived and approved 4 in June 1963, ¢ the | .) egvert action program was basad on the assumption that U.S. “.. pelisy preclades a military invesion or a@ full bisckade of |... ‘GQeba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Unions *- "Im addition, the covert action program was and is predicated “o @m the thesis that its chance of success would denend heavily (2:5. @@ @ sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, parti-- o” @glarly the overt economic dental.and political isolation oo") programs, by all elements of the United States Goveracent. . “a They, the inter-eetion of the overt and covert effort egainst - | Guba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if€ there - ca ‘fate be any hope of. aecompliching | the overs mission. oo
. oo. - 7 tf ate " ~ “tna ha caereent ects mown remenscemantiatelation area sibedvatai we th naremime— 2s Dotie-: diet deeihane. waa x. Me SECRET-SENSITIVE tbe mata integrated covert action program consists of the . : following interdependent courses of action: — Covert collection of intellivence te mect ES Se. national security requirements and to support _ eurrent and plarmmed cavert operations. It should ” $e noted that clandestine maritime cperations ara aa integral part oZ intelligence collection, Pronagenda actions to _stimitate. Lloweris’: sixple gabotare and other forms of activa and passive ‘resistance against the regime. Economic denial actions in support of govern ywide overt official US. econcale dsolaticn . ‘measures. . sploitation and stimnlation of disaffection armed f£srees and other noeer oontere of the recine to encourase these elements to carry out @ coup against the Castro/Commmeist factions. CLA. 4s identifying, contacting and attempting ts es-_ tablish channels of comamication with these Indi- _ viduals. General eabotecn and hovasanent 3 a3 an econonie wezzen and aa a stimulus to internal resistance, As an - ecoremic weapon, it fs designed to supplement and | pitppert the overall econesic denial program by dansging econonicaily dsapertant installations and to add to Castro's stecenic problexs by fercing hin to divert money, mangowes end resources from econenic. to internal eecurity activities, As a stimilus to | sesistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations ©): provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existenc@ °°. ead capability of organized resistance asainst the 9 0.3 regime, To the extent that these cperaticns are | suecessful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban; populatica and elite groups the vulnerability of the ” regica to militant action, It is recognized that no | gingle act of sabotage by itself can materially Sect. ; the econony oz stimilate resistances, but we believe - the to s ECRET <SEISITIVE Docld: 32423484 Page 95 ae “Lyndon - "B. Toh nson ‘Li brary |
SECRET-SENSITIVE = 9s “| that the comlative psychological and political ~..  dempact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations =: _ . d&g @ necessary element in the eccompliaiment ¢ o£ car co -Bisaion. --' prong. These operationa are intended to provide B ‘: a deniable activity, a meana of supplerenting and oe expanding our covert capability end a mens of taking 9.0) . @dvantage of untapsed political and resistance resources <2). of the exile commmity. The program now includes tvo ae _ @utenemous groups whose credibility as to eutonony, is , strengthened by the facts that: i They ara led by wen whose prominenca and status -.. 4m the Cuban exile ccomzmmity makes plausible their - ' gecess to funds, equipment and manpower suite 3 ine ©: | dependent of the U.S.} oa . Both are based in the Caribbean area outaide o£ - o U.S. cerritory; .. Both have naturel, willing allies in power in ; several Latin 4zerican countries; 7 ‘Beth are Caban and exploy Cubes nationals exclusively}; . Every item of finenctal : and logistic support bas | been bandled in a manner as to provide nmasimm ae protection against Proce cf CIA ox U.S. parti- ao : tke initial ain of thase cpersticona is to , strengthen a -.-. the will to xesist by increasing the tempo of subw =. version and sabotage largely maintained mtil aw |. by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight .. fron the coastline to the interior of Cubay: ‘The disacventace of our autonoucus. cporations is _. that ie is necessary to accept a lower order of effictency and ecsanctrol than would: be considered acceptable in CiAjrun. operationse ECES s: ET-Sis SITTVE: wese epee ayer oman seers 73 Docla:32423484 - Page 96 ne Lyndon B. "Johnson ‘Library — an “ i
; SPURL L“OOMOL SVE On ‘te os the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, ftens - a (2) end (2) are in train and no policy problems revarding them co’) me expected. Item (3) is the cubject of another paper which | iv. d= being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4} ».. & the essence of cur program and is dependent for its success © _@ the results of 311 other overt and covert courses of action. ou Dope (5) haa been the subject of continual review since the ~ioception-of the program and ig the primary subject of this 8 Consideration of Item (6) (automencus operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and haresocment (Item 5)..::. , hase latter two itens are discussed in nore datail in Section Vv, 4 7 Lows. US Be know af at least. 80. acts of tnternsi eshotage and 60. 2. @@med clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents. — iit" gfinee 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not a pate of & coordinated progran} they are acts of individual .. oo". | ge mall group defiance. They area stimulated by rony factors, | -. @ad no one facter can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage a . fneideats, which includs a high proportion of suzar cane ee  bimmings, have a tendency to ba geasonal, a fact which further: ° -: gbseuresa statistical analysis. Althsuch it is true that fren _.., @ low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 - _ Jl. : there wos a heavy increase during the fall (following the . - -n eoumencesent of our raiding activity), we believe thee cleaxer ./).. Might 1s shed on the effects of our harassment program by the _ lc > statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba : ae and by the acts of the Cuban rezins itself a - pea by “Since ‘1 Apeust 1953, five sabotage raids have been. nae attempted.) ‘All were successful. There was substantial . damage to the terset; all participants vere safely recovered. _ “ , aad the pusnsible ‘deniability of the operations w was not 3 “a tack wee 1. Annex I sontaing a brieg review of these operationte. = Fee SECRET-SENSITIVE. ‘Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld:32423484 Page 97 seeps . pee aes That cd
Fee BE O: Pa “i soe! “L a. -1l< - The lack of proof of U.S. involvement cid not prevent Gastro from charging the CLA with responsibility. indeed, J.:, almost evary act of defiance against his regime has been . Jeno): Castro's emptional reactions to real or remored security _ “=. ¢hreara point up hia aeute sensitivity to internal resiatance - -. gad suggesta that be feels his regime to be far from secure | |... om external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, _ “jag reasted to the sabotage raids with such less vigor and — "blaster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, 8 o" agide from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air ." gaids during Anguet and September sponsexed by Cuban exile .. ‘greeps operating from Florida and for which the Agency had -.. f@ Tesponsibility.s. They did no real damage, tnt they did . . | demonstrate that the Cuban air defense systen eould be =. ’. preached, and they added substantially to the psychalogteal —.  Smpact of oor first two raids. . : oo, a, Al. Gbe Agency sabotage raids preduced some very specifics resulta, For ezecple, in the political and psycuolozical vealm, Canadian Acbassador Kidd reported in late Augube that the incidents that month, Including the Santa Lucta _ gad Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of censoli- ” dation and treqaaiiity which the Castro regime had succeeded - fm eresting in recent months." He reported that tne Cubans ~ were uncertain and apprehensive over the posgibiliry of a | QS. campaisn of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's ‘.:  walnerability te such @ campaign due to the “low ebb" of c\... @athusiasa for the Castro regime among the people. Ha also. "3. gtated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed i “e J. tg the regine” and that “dispirited opposition bad xeeeived a cos FY a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that 9 © cl ge "most demediate effect of such attacks is tha psychow -. Jegieal blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime.  gith consequent beost in oppesition,” Low morale and ED jection in the counterrevolutionary ranka of sous months = woe tg _— € : cena ' "Lyndon 'B. J Docld:32423484 Page 98
- DEANE b OLIN & A & Ye : wiz ; ago, be said, “nas given vay to a wave of optinica that tha ” Wasimum Loader ig no longer necassarily a permanent fistrre.” . ‘Ambassador Kidd alse reported that Che Guevarra had indicated - pe concern that the raida would divert much needed manpower - Oy a a Fesources from the economic to the military gectore nei Oa & September a reliable clandestine sources in Cuba ee ‘geported that the xeaction of the averase man oa the street in - *: Pavyana to the news of thea attacks on Casiléa and Santa. Lacia a “was "aatounding.“ Prior to the Cuban government's announces _ ment ef the raids, the average man on the street seemed oe \ apathetic, depressed and in a lew state of morale, Follewing - 2 the emmouncement their mood changed to ome of pleasure, joy, cT7aad hove,. The observations of this source were xeinforeed oo". by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived ia the U.S. a _ shortly after the Cuban amomement of the raids. ae ‘. & former Major in the Cubah Rebel Asay whe broke with a - Castro reported after his ezfiltration from Cuba in January o* -» 2964 that che 23 December Siguanea raid which cestroyed @ eae Pah petrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected ‘Cubans. A Cuban Lawyer with extensive connections anong ‘Cuban 7 nt officials end in the Western commmity in Havana Bas jast reported that the "horale effects of the recent sabotage operations axe good among enti-resima scgnents of =~ “the population. Sach acts, to them, indicate that the. outside © “| world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight con= - _ tinvea and suggests s possible prelude to some mfélitary. action | against Castro. Opposite morale effecta are noted anong te - Feeeaine seguents who have tended te remain notably _ about the regine aster successful sabotage operations.’ as ae a Cuban commmicstions technician explozed, by the Coban . a coversaent. ‘reported on 1 January that tha “act of sabotage . @gainst the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very succcss~ . fal in the opinion of the people and,for sare, public opinion = / Baeded soncthing to stimulate it, hat happened at La Sigcummea < had cach an effect. Although at times failures are suffercd  - - which depresa the people, ‘Shay ore sxcious tox scaething to 2 pocla: 32423484 Page 99 | | 7 ‘Lyndon B. “Iohnson Library
. soos - XN : : VEURSTHOSLMOATAVE ‘See EEne «13 - ca... The raids also had an {mpact on the Cuban military and . security forces, Certain areas and ports were placed on  gpect2i alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive “a positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently '- Jaumched ox intensified; and defensive positicns in indus “or agricultuxal couplexcs are manned to rzet the real or imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with xoutine © . training bot also with work on censtruction and > ageteultaral projects which use military personnel. Baul = Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incicent. .. °\ Ba addition, Castse expanded his coast watching network . fem 46cobservation posts at the end of June to 103 at the ce. @pd o£ October. These posts have radio comunications and are ot, ‘ammed by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. Ina furtser effort “LiL ta seal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations co, have been established since Janae & and wa have lea teetaatal tenta- ; coe aan Gastro’ 3 fear of vising dtaatdenc’ end insure geney ‘le 0 eeflested in his initlation of a widca variety of repressive — _.] geasuxes. Uauy are bound to have adverse political, psycho- . .» Legical or economia repercussions insido Cuba. Ee has con- ~".. @geted alaost constant “anti-insurgent operations involving i gmite ef up to 2,500 men. Alr, naval and eround force ) @lementa have been put on special alert, either cn a local "or island-wide basis, on at least 36 cccasions curing 1963 So” ge @ resule of romored or actual mayitine operations. Resi-_ vs dents in areas of querrilla activit% have been forcibly. ."". gelocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation | cole os suspect sreas,- In Aucust 1963 a new internal accurity “\ feree, the Locha Coutra fivatas, waa formed to attexpt ta = © 2). eope with off-shora raiding parties. In September now training -< gouxses were initiated for comand cadres of “popular defense - . _(*" qandgs," The parpose of these mits 1s to organize the people vcr |. . S 8. - @g defend themselves against enemy attack and te protect = ao 13 BS, industrial centers and ieehea ahmed fron sabotage. a a - Bespite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive “ __sapability agsinat raids, we have contiaved to improve car =. ae ra infiltration teckniques and are still able | te > penatrate ; a3 SEONRI-SEUSTTEVE, 3 Thee Docld: 32423484 Page 100 Oo : Lyndon 8. Johnson Library”
-<” » Gsba’s defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of — 8.4) this sort, however, always present risk and we mist assume = thet captared Cuban ugsnts will reveal U.S. involvement ae they have dore in the past giving Castro the cpportimity to make... ‘yociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, _ .. @itheugh Khrushchev has not mada Agency harassing raids the — | gubject of special protest (as he did in tha case of the a exile air raids in August and Septenber}, a majox step-ug © 4m the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on 7 _ ao @' major economic target such ag Matanzas or Santiago, might = oat —- bring about a Sovist protest. The chance of a physical A"  <ggteltation by Castro as, for Instance, an attack upon a S ., B.S. iastaliation in ths Caribbean, ateheagh unlikely, . one -_ cannot be entirely discounted. . wee “Le Castro is te ba brought dowa without overt L military. “aetion the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba. "li. We believa that there is sufficient evidence to show that —— . ru" g@betage raida, despite the risk involved, are a necessary = oll. 6 gtdeales to internal action which will need to be continued for _ - Joo @ eonsiderabla perlod to perale the tempo of internal ects to “8 woe waach 3 * point where it ean become solf-suntained. J : of Cesnation o oe tims: OPER Bogease of the wistbie and dramctie nature of sabotage . - g@perations, their cessation vould soon be noted by all — _ .) gntemested parties te and observers of U.S/Cubtan relations. “o> The cessation of these raids, houever, disclaizsble by the ‘ . ° %,S. the raids themselves may be, would probably bs inter- _ i. preted in Latin America and certainly Inside Cuba as a switch “: (2) @£.U.S. policy fzom one of dlacreet encouragement and support - cet Gk aggressive action against the Castro recine tao one of .,. “eoaxisterice”™ and eventual accosnsdation with a castro /Cammist “ Gaba, Without constant and visible signs of offensive actica - wns against Cuba, a weakening procesa would be set in motion S LAS whieh could well lead the countries of Latin America to drow . - “.".. ¢hedy ewm conclusions from these indicators and embark on as os geconmdation policies of their mms. Those govermucats in -. Latin Americas already threatened by ‘Castroites in their own ~- “eegatries Srelifiely to be sabjectad * to even s stronger: domestis oo __Peassemess oS rs an ae : SECRET SENSITIVE -
Eo ey Docld: 32423464 Page 102 } \ ' 4 1 | os Ag this belief spreads, Western Europeaa and athey free . Jo werld countries eager te trade with Cuba will cone to feel. ‘“ ghet they may safely ignore and avade, to &n even greater ' @xtent thea they co now, U.S. appeals for the ecoromic and —- =. “political isolation of Cuba. 4n important additional econonte . ' effect would be the relecse inte normal econonic activity of .- " wanpower and funds now tied up in defense against raida. os. | Fimally, and most important, thia development in tize — co" d= bound to have a severe donoralizing effect on the internal " ggadstance against Castro. The Cuban exils community and ol) particularly its militant and articelate elenents would. be =. @gately sensitive to & cessation of raids and ean be expected - @9 react veclferously, Judsing from past experience, we : @a@& expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on : the part of the mmeroug Cuban exiles who have political... within the U.S. i" . Ta phe event that it 4s decided to tem=inate CIAw Ss. q@gsumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater - - “oi. @enfability of thelr actions, could take over entixely the | " getgsien of furmishing proof of visible resistance to Castro - ~ gad inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks ~ - ">. pecessary to set a coup in motion, Autonomous groups 4r@- J.) fe yot ontasted in their capability to conduct successful > gaboetage aad harassment operations om a sustained basis. °° 3g £3 unlikely that in the next months tha autonoacus groups . ‘ol’ wd develop the ability to match ClA-controlled operations, | ‘\ @ither du quantity or quality. a Bo os  wheme the autonomoua groups have been mest actives = we ae + Fa: ‘ a “a ate | ¥@ sabotage end harasszent operations were to be temicsted. : fey the autonomous greups a3 well as for the Agency, ite se a “+e to the autonomous groups mist alse be terminated: Bo - gompletely as otherwise wa would not be in a position te. - dgeuxe that they would discontinue vaids and sabotage. > Sech ternination would compound the effects of the cessation ~ ef our own raids, particularly in those aress in the Caribbean
BEAL ALODAD LILY -%- AS ‘Ja the event it 1a decided te abandon the core of the ~ eovert program, wa will be obliged to fall back on essentially ‘overt courses of actioa which are already operating but which oi? aa be refined and intensified, provided the political risks ; -). @ad costs ara judged acceptable and we receive adequate - ‘, Saoperation from our allies. ; ew Ag Action acainst free-vworld economic ties vith Gabe —_ Because of the recent erosion of cur efforts in thi« sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to © 22.- expand Cuban economic relations with the free world,.a series -- i -. @& xecommendations to intensify this course of action has been | 7 tuade and fs now being presented. The basic issue inthe |= -. Fecommendations is cur ability and willingness to incur the — -- political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure - ! would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted - =-. gompletely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts | . tg eurtadl Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. | - Qn the other hand, if the actions and commiteents included . .in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certaloty tha; under present circumstances, our economic pressures will -): be reduced to inaffectiveness.. Im any ease, it mist be clearly reeopnized that no emount of economic pressure can by itselZ | bring drum the Castro goverment, at least as loag as the . Saviets ara prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy, The » eaxtallment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the ’ £xee world ean only contribute, and then only over time, to | he creation of the optimm situation we are trying to deve lop. ..° The ef€setivemess of this contribution would be at icast Be sharply iupaired by the relaxation of the pressure created - by covert operations. Beyond these considerstions, ve can | gever bave assurance that a foreign goverment ccoperating - im the economic program will not pull cat and virtually . " gellzpse the prosran. Entire or even important reliance. ' @@ ecorcenis pressure as a substitute for the covert progran » . weald be to deliver the fate of cur policy into the uncertain _hands of governzents which do not share our convictions” and “eens of Petowity wita respect we Cubs.’ Ce poota:32423484 “Page 103 a “Lyndon B. “Johnson s ib
vis DN a cut Stel een ele inate Spare cncninmeasmcticg””  ammbttdibcsy rere iwelimesh en ee _B. OAS Action oa ES he PY renult of the Venezuelan charges azatnat Cuba artaing | ". #eom the arus cache discovery, we hava been considering a series - , @€ measures which we would seek in the OAS, It should be noted - that the atmosphere for O48 adoption of strong meayures has oh _ Sateriarated aaa result. o£ the Panamanian erisis. . - The measures which we have been studying include S os eg A break tn diplomatic relations oo 7 “The princinal effects of this measure, which would ' pean action by five countries, including Zracil, -“. Ghdle and Mexico, would be to provi de rather dranatio J... ewidence of Castxo's isolation and te deny the Cuban - ... wegime subyersive facilities offered by its renaining °  <qaissiona in Latin Acerica. The measure would meet — me nals fzon Hexteo, Chile and parthewlarly . A breate in economic ¢ relations oo - ae v Although this would have little practical effect . economically, 40 would have some utility as a means o- -  @& moral pressure on other fxce~world ecunties Min ‘trading with Cuba, e | aA als ate a £ —— cation over tine this would lead to a reduction in the o -: > ‘GQsban ability to rove subversives to and from Latin | - Joerieas.: It would be useful as a means of morak ss; pressure oa other free-world countries having, er wishing to establish, air services with Cuba... : the negative side it would mean the terporary los . ‘o£ intellipence facilities and would have on adverse 5 '. e€ect on Cuban exile morale by closing : ea ‘Smiating aan ‘escape Fonbe fon persons inside Cabsy “SECRET. gum Sit ; . Docld: 32423484 Page 104
-18- TACT 2 etd against movement of arn3 and men - | The singles most damaging AS action to Castro would be \. @@ authorization for the use of force in connection —: With the movement of arms and men. The chances of _ : getting a politically acceptable majority for such | aa Was estimated to be less than even before the ~ _ @venta in Panama and the prospects have dicinished .. since then. Such 04S acticn vould almost certainly . _. @gamatize the Cuban issue domestically and inter= __ -., nationally. At the present time, it appears that the _ purveillance systea which might be authorized by the CAS would involve the use of force only in che : i! texxdtorial waters of the countrias for which the .... Offending shipments are degtined. Thus the question “os. 98 OAS authorization for the use of force on the ; > Baga seas wiil not arises: €. Gekncms he Cae tee : This would be 8 pro Zor action, > wish ety Mntved ; i. oho Ge Reaffirmation of previous OAS mensures on contro calling ae fe Guben=based and sustorted subversion oe . This ‘vould be of valze es a weans of relnforcing a a *  pepewad effort in this sector (sea ¢ below). Ie da, . he Kowevers 4 a | purely cofensive measure. — ee Boy — Ta: sum, “this geries ‘of cas measures would s certainly be aa helpfal.and weuld constituts isportant mlttlateral DYOEKESS «| a The serenas however, are primarily pevebo logical and as 4 eee ‘Wee ‘can probably 3 increase and expand Gur malttlateral, _..~, Dilateral and unilateral efforts t> increase the ability of <. ee \ Latin America to resist subversion.: Such efforta are purely ~ - Sefensive aod eatgrael to Cobas “Ea certain: resulta canbe .. abe aeiees ee Docld: 324293484 Page 105
+ We can intensify our measures in this sector, including ox policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other - | “<< gemlor otficers of the Goverment. The efficacy of such : '. efferta ia entirely dependent, however, upon the substance. ‘behind then. A propaganda offensive would be procuetive oo). @mly £2 there were credible evidence that our words vers oe > being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors. =. ‘i ') The residasl program set out above {2 substantially == _ for attaining cur ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/ | _. Gessunist regime, which have been by no means certain even oo v gndex the present program, would be very measurably diminished. _. ‘meer the residual progrem., The elimination of the core of >. the present covert program, especially i€ eccempanied bya = \- Wejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of econcaia | | pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the necd - |. te examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or VATE, Recommendation ae That the covert progran ba continued in at least ies pocld: 32423484 Page 106 | oe / “Lyndo
5 tive eabotage aida xan by CLAS le Gn 18 August the POL atorage tecke ay Castida, Las | Villas Frovince were attacked using 4.2 moxtares — One tank car waa destroyed and one atorege tank - -, breached, causing considerable fire damage. - On 19 Aneust the culphorie acid plant at Senta lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked... There was considerable fire damace and fuel lines were broken, We have reports that acid found its way into the turbines aa 4 Fesule | _ of the raid causing additional damage. "On 30 September a lunbermill at Bahia de vias! Maravi, Orienta Province, a minor installation — of local econonic sproxtances wae JO per cank _ destroyed by a raiding party. on 22 October an undecwater demolition team os | attacked a dredge in tho harbor at La Tsabaldj,, Laas Villas Province. The vessel was suri. 4 Qa 23 Decenber an underwater demolition team | » @ttacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the " Signenea, Iale of Pines, naval base. The - . patrol bear was seriously dazaged and may have ° . punk. Thres Cuban naval personnel were killed — _ ead 18 othera injured in the explasion. : “‘Docld: 130493464 Paye 107”
t a 21 February 1964 | SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement | that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United . States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can 7 Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of accepta—- bility of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency , to overthrow it. COURSES OF ACTION A. Can Live with Castro. 1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recogn on oO 8 regime and un e rade between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of Efe detente would endeavor to Secure from Castro com- - mitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. .He would also endeavor to reduce or eliminate, as & result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of 4 peaceful Latin American island republic. No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compat— ible with our relations with a neutral power. . DocId: 32423484 Page 108 _ 7 i yndon | B. Johnson Library. 2s
t t Advantages —_. | Disadvantages If the plan works, this '  @&. As plan almost sure not would represent a satis-~ to work, it would have grave factory solution of the — ‘consequences throughout _ Cuban problem, especially Latin America as well as if the Soviet presence serious domestic political could thereby be elininated. _ repercussions, b. Even if plan ultimately successful there would — be short term domestic political losses and — short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America... Do nothing. No ‘specific efforts will be made to avrance a rapprochement with Fidel but we would remrzin receptive to any advances made by him. No _ covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence. operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba, It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a aatis- factory detente, Advantages —— “Diengvantages As in 1, above, . a. As in 1. above but less ‘short term domestic and Latin American losses, b. Even leas charice of success. a The resent level of intelligence oO rations, - Ancluding y 3 see are would be tgenee oper Black marit rations a c=) rations of agents and caches of intelligence gear would continue but no action operations would be conducted. We would be "keeping an --eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development. pocta:32423484 Page 109 Lyndon B. “Johnson ‘Library
Maximum effort would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign’ target countries, Advantages. We would be maintaining a clean hands attitude towards Castro and our policy would be more compatible with that of our major allies, Disadvantages Evidence of American inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American coun= tries and would further demoralize the exile. conmunity. b. . We would be in effect | helping Castro to con- solidate his position at home and establish his image abroad. 4. In addition to intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial - rogram employing diplomatic efforts and the coopera— on Of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage. against selected Cuban imports: (e.g. contamination of lubricant additives). Advantages A carefully targetted . denial program with effec- - tive subtle sabotage is capa- ble of at least disrupting ‘-the timing of Castro’s economic efforts. It may have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic source of economic strength - sugary. -. -taadvantages We will remain at odds with our allies on Cuba trade... We may delay but not prevent ' Castro's progress. 5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4, above, - engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral / agreements with individual countries in Latin America, ' guch surveillance to be accomplished without the use of - force in international waters and the use of force in national waters. . : “eta i B. ‘Johnson Library Docld: 32423484 - Page 110°
Disadvantages Does not attack prin=e cipal problem of Castro's subversion in Latin America. Castro may return to policy of non~shi pment -of arms, Probably will not result in apprehending arns . carriers, Expensive. Advantages ‘a. Probably feasible - @. within OAS, — ; b. . Surveillance com . pletely legal and low noise level, b. Cc. a... 6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5, above, engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting “autonomous exile groups and continue to encourage. . leaflet campaigns. ' personnel not used. Advantages Sone economic advan- a. tages and limited encouragement to anti-Castro senti- nent, .  b, Deniability by U.S. as U.S. s0i1 and Cc. ernal acts of sa age by means of radio, press and Disadvantages Results commensurate with limited skilis of exile groups. Though fact of U.S. support carefully guarded, Castro will blame U.S. anyway. ‘Some noise level. . 7. %&In addition to actions in 3,, 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA~-controlled Caban groups against selected targets and at spaced "intervals. Advantages Yore professional —§_—- Be operations that are targetted and con=- ‘trolled. DociId: 32423464 Page 111 Na mt al of U.S. eee ee a ee serene yt aa Disadvantages ' Constant. danger of proof involvement. > Se a Copy” ‘Lyndon 8 Johnson Library.
exile maritime raids and air strikes agains £7 NS oe oars went! Improvement of morale b. among internal anti- Castro elements, | Better domestic poli- tical position as result of increased noige level, Continued exacerbation of Castro without chance of delivering a mortal blow, 8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7, above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban » territory. Advantages Improvement of exile a. B. Matanzas power plant, (Sts., ' morale and internal resistance spirit. ‘Can't Live with Castro ba from Disadvantages General ineffectiveness against targets. . Obvious employment of U.S. soil. Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response. (It 1s asaumed that maximum intelligence collection _ will be continued.) 1. Engage in ClA-control led as well as “autonomous” covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher Tiok targets Sick se Santiago refinery, only. : DoclId: 32423434 Page 112 Advantages ‘This essentially minimum a, pian evolved June 1963, but never permitted to’ develop, having some b. chance to overthrow Castro... Ce. _ Soviet response. Measurable economic impact ' and strong encouragement. to anti-Castro elements. a” te wwe. . Ses arate a este : pore cent rer, Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library employing Cuban personnel Disadvantages High risk of capture and exposure, High noise level, Possibility of some
aracey cer] 3. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a _proslsines Liat" under the Trading -with the Enemy Act together w other feasibie actions, overt and covert, to deny to Cuba itema critical to its economy. — Advantages Disadvantages a. Considerable increase a. Multiplication of U.S. in Cuba's difficulty in . problems with major allies procuring key. imports. including possible loss of allies’ support of U. Ss. db. U.S. obviously “doing dollar. Do, something about Castro." . / b. Loas of trade. | c. Will not assure overthrow a . of Castro. Engage in sabotage operations as in B,1l. above other nationa eg inc 3. us «8. Soidier oO Advantages | ‘Disadvantages Improved operations : and a. Technical deniability greater economic damage. only and very high noise level. b. Will not assure over- ' throw of Castro, | 4, Engage in violent large-scale non-deniabis sabotage activities, using v8. service personnel where necessary, such as mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone surface craft, aneak air attacks on key installations, etc. - Advan eo Cl oe Disadvantages Much more effective operas a. No deniability. ne tions and real scononic a . oo de damage. re ob, Very high noise level, ane ce... If does not resuit rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of critician. aya ab BLUIE 4 padin m4 _ owed i | “| 4 ; | et “. Copye pocra:32423484 ‘page 3 mG - . - Lyndon +B. ‘Johnson Library”
a 5. U.S. unilateral close-in rantine of Cuban ae PRIDE, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing Oxport of arma to Latin Anerica with the aim of humi-. liating and degrading Castro, Advantages Proof of U.S, intention a. to stop Castro, | c. Disadvantages ‘Will probab ¥Y not catch contraband, If vigorously pursued agfinst all Cuban shipping, may provoke Soviet response. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro, . 6. Cutere of all communications (except radio) into and out of Giba including a clandestine cutting of the Jamaica cable, | a Co | . Advantages Will at least for a . a, ‘period disrupt Cuba's diplomatie and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts, db, Disadvantages _ Considerable outcry — froa Burope and Latin America. Not fatal to Fidel, re ar Presidential public declaration making clear > that the U.3, considers the cont inued presence of the " . Castro regine as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encourag Clements within the . Very effective inside. Cuba | _ and encouraging to Latin - America, > os _DocId: 32423484 Page 114 . ing anti-~Castro/communist dissident ’ armed forces to carry out a coup, Disadvantages Must be followed by some forn of effective Action. _ ae et Alen See ae 27 oe _ Copy’ ve
eawet ; ( obu: ina t | | 8 | 8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "fostow Doctrine"), Advantages sit Disadvantages a. May force Castro to a. May provoke Soviet stop hia subversive | response either before actions. or after retaliatory action taken, . . -b. Whether retaliation by .the U.S. is required b. Difficulty in pinning or not, it will have down clear-cut viola- profound effect on tions by Castro. anti-Castro. morale. ec. Difficulty in avoiding . civilian casualties. 9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union. through. eve plomatic channels that furtner sub= version by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and > that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A, Advantages . Disadvantages ‘a. Proper basis for a. Difficulty of clear future actions. proof, b.. Possible deterrence b. Possible Soviet of Castro. | . :... reactions. e@. Best method of mini- i mizing Soviet reaction. 10, After having established the appropriate basis” for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba. Advantages So Disadvantages | The most effective method § Possible Soviet reactions. of bringing down Castro. cee me . aa Be —_ _ Copy” oS Docra:32423484. Page 115. oe - Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library
et .o er Aw eee ae dey ol San ~ amg 5 Yl, After having established the appropriate basis for such action, invade Cuba, Advantages Disadvantages Will bring down Castro. a. Possible Soviet reaction, | b..- Probable heavy casualties on both sides. c. Increased difficulties. in post-Castro Cuba. QennsyT ar eves pmprem tag gan TEA? eee rane oad ago a nr _ Copy pocra/azs2sae “Page 1160-5 °—~—O - | : “Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library
Scenario for B-9 This doctrine is based on the proposition that the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of subversion and ‘aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts. i. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a “blank check" resolution. Settle - for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support. 2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolu- ‘tion, vote against the watered-down version. ‘3. %«If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed ‘to 5. below. | . . 4 «iXIf watered-down resolution passed over our | i protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents . gn adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the “United States mist unilaterally declare (see 5. below). 5. Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable | to the ‘United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the nature ‘and magnitude of the Veneauelan Docld: 32423464 Page 117-
arms cache, the U.3. will take such measures against ‘the Castro/comminist regine in Cuba as it deems appro- | priate in the circunstances. . | .6.. Explain carefully through diplomatic ‘channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/coumnist regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in ' Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts. of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion. er other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit the U.S, te live peacefully with the Castro/communist “regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained. ‘from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort _ by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a feilure to resolve the Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which the U.S. has pursued of net exerting pressures upon the  goviets’ European satellites. Make it plain that the U.8. - desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet Uniden to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro. DocId: 32423484 Page 118
; ‘ ; ~~ \. . casa ( ’ . : wee a 7. Decide upon the type of action on the part — of Castro which would trigger action on the part o? the ‘U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would  -yepresent serious, realized or potential, danger to the | stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion - 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American country might. The judgment can be untlateral and Subjective on the part of the U.S... 8. Formulate a program for a post-Castre Cuba. giving full weight to the real changes which have taken place there during the past five years and full Fecog= nition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished revolution into constructive lines. | | The above scenario should not be commenced unless it. is recognized that, although these actions are | primarily designed to deter Castro fron his present: course, _ he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circunstances the U.5., having publicly embarked on the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences. — Docla:32423484 Page 119° tyndon. B.. “Iohnson ‘Library’
( ‘ ‘¢ - ; THe WHITE House . , WASHINGTON ba, Bim ch Fon Gabel & GC: . | Copy ; d:32423484 Page 120 © a. “Lyndon ‘B. Johnson Library
\ . c ——s) ; ( ee | | | THE WHITE HOUSE a | WASHINGTON March 23, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY | ; | SUBJECT: Cuban Policy -- April to November, 1964. 1, Irefer to your request that I try to pull to-. gether Cuban policy over the weekend and put it in the framework of the President talking to the Government. 2. Attached is a very rough first cut of how I think the President might reasonably look at the problem. On this first go-around, in an effort to see the whole problem, I have tried to inject a realistic dose of domestic politics; accordingly, this is not the type . of paper which should be distributed very far be- yond the White House. On the next go-around, we might want to frame the problem in a sanitized NSAM or in a sanitized talking paper which the President could use at an NSC meeting. . | ! 3. Please let me know how I can help. GC Gordon Chase ; | , Copy Docta: 32423484 Page 121 a Lyndon ‘B. Johnson Library
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY © - | 3/22/64 | DRAFT. U.S. Policy Towards Cuba April to November, 1964 I. General The minimum objective of our Cuban policy will be a Cuba which poses ; no threat.to its neighbors (militarily or subversively) and which is nota Soviet satellite. In moving towards this dual objective, we will continue ~ - to reject the options of unprovoked U.S. military intervention in Cuba and of an effective total blockade around Cuba - primarily bécause they would risk another US/ USSR confrontation. Instead, we will continue to engage in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions and pressures, both defensive and offensive, which . stop short of military intervention/ blockade. The application of these actions and pressures will be tempered slightly bg’ the domestic political situation; while we do not want to appear as “coexisting with the Soviet satellite", insofar as possible, we will apply pressures against Cuba in such away that, in the absence of unusual occurrences, we will Nkeep the lid on" Cuba and, maintain a low temperature in the Caribbean. ‘It is axiomatic that we will continue to be prepared and plan for the unusual - e.g. a revolt against the regime, a U-2 shoot-down, a Castro decision to eject the Russians. Here are some details of our objectives and of the measures we will take between now and November. ~ “TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Cony, poctd:32429404 Page 122 : “Lyndon B. Johnson Library ee,
Docld: 324234654 Page 123 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -2- II. Objective -- Containment of the Cuban Threat We will try to insure that Cuba poses no threat to its neighbors, either militarily or subversively. To this end we will continue to take a number of defensive measures which aim at three primary targets. A. . Cuba, the Military Threat -- We will continue to insure that Cuba does not become again an offensive weapons (e.g. missiles) threat to the U.S. or Latin America. To this. end we will continue to collect intelligence from within Cuba and to conduct intensive air and sea surveillance around and over Cuba. In this regard, we will make it clear to the Cubans that dire consequences will ensue if they interfere with our air surveillance of Cuba. We will also make it clear to the Soviets that we do not intend to tolerate a shoot-down of a U-2 -by the Cubans; itis in the Soviet interest to do everything possible to prevent the Cubans from acing this. | ' To discourage possible Cuban military attack against its neighbors, as appropriate, we will continue to put ourselves clearly on record that any such Cuban moves will have extremely serious consequences for Cuba. B. Soviet Military Personnel -- We will continue to try to effect the re- moval of Soviet military personnel from Cuba. To this end we will continue to make it eminently clear to the Soviets that we cannot tolerate the per- manent assignment of Soviet military personnel to Cuba. As appropriate, we will tell the Russians that they do not need a military establishment in Cuba to prevent the Cubans from shooting down a U-2. TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy | “Lyndon B. Johnson Library”
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY . C. Subversion -- We will continue to do everything we can to impede and, it possible, to stop Cuban based and supported subversion in the Hemisphere. To this end we will make a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direct Latin American attention to and to assist (materially where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problems of controlling internal insurgency and of controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin America and Cuba. Appropriate OAS action on the up-coming arms cache issue can take us a long way in our. effort to strengthen our counter-subversion program. Specifically, we want the following. 1. We want the OAS resolution (Article 2) in flexible and general language, to warn Castro that the OAS will not stand by idly if he continues his sub- versive efforts. .This language will be cognate with a possible Presidential | statement along similar lines to the U.S. public and with a stern private warning to the Russians that Cuban subversion is leading to a highly dangerous situation. Hopefully, this language will deter Castro from further subversive actions; among other things the Russians may find it in their interest to control Castro more closely. Also, such language will provide a juridical umbrella for, and preposition the OAS and/or the U. S. to use force against Cuba in the . future if it is deemed desirable to do so. | While such warning language is highly important and will be tough to get, we will not bargain away the rest of the proposed resolution in an effort to get TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy DocId:32423484 Page 124 ‘fundan R® Inhnenn lihrary.
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY . -4. 2. We want the OAS resolution (Article 4(c)) to call for the suspension of all air and sea communications between Cuba and OAS countries. This will considerably increase Cuba's difficulty in exporting subversives, es- pecially if the Cuban/ Mexican air link is cut. This article of the resolution is of high priority but may not be tough to get. 3. We want the OAS resolution (Article 3) to call for the establishment of a surveillance system which will permit the stopping and searching in territorial waters of all vessels suspect’ of carrying arms and subversives; a similar air surveillance system will also be established. While there are . some negative aspects to such a resolution (few, if any," arms will be found), | there are good reasons for having it. First, since an arms cache is involved, we must at a minimum make a bow towards the problem of controlling arms shipments. Also, the resolution will be viewed as a tightening measure, and the fact that no further arms shipments occur can be interpreted as a result of the establishment ofa surveillance system. Second, it will possibly deter Castro somewhat from sending men and arms to Latin America. Third, it will provide a peg on which to hang closer and more effective bilateral cooperation which may be called for in the future. For example, ‘the U. S.. and Venezuela may want to work out an arrangement whereby U.S. vessels can enter Venezuelan waters to assist in the seizure of a suspect vessel. Fourth, while it will give us an instrument to harass Castro marginally, it has no significant escalation implications. TOP SECRET - EYES Oip'y y, oo Docld: 32423484 Page 125 5 . ~ Yyndon BL Johnson Li brary.
Docld: 324273454 Page 1276 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY . 5. This article is of medium priority but should be relatively easy to get. 4, We want the OAS resolution to encourage further steps within the Hemisphere to counter Castro/ Communist subversion. We wanta condem- nation of the Castro regime (Article 1), a renewed call for alert against Castro/ Communist subversion and an endorsement of the Lavalle Committee recommendations outlining specific measures on controlling travel, funds, and propaganda for subversive purposes (Article 7). These articles of the resolution should be easy to get, but are of. low priority. | _ If. Objective -- Removal of the Soviet Satellite from the Hemisphere We will continue our attempts to break the Cuba/ Bloc tie-line and to re- move the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. | A. General Description of U.S. Approach -- Generally speaking, we hope to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere by a series of offensive measures which will intensify Cuba's already serious economic difficulties;. which will increase the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets of maintaining Cuba; and which will stimulate directly and indirectly, internal resistance to the regime. ‘This effort, complemented by our defensive measures, hopefully will lead finally to one of the following three eventualities, each of which constitutes a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. 1. Overthrow of the Castro Regime -- By exerting pressure on Cuba, we might be able to bring about a degree of disorganization, uncertainty, and | discontent in Cuba which will predispose elements.in the power centers of Lyndon B. Johnson Library TOP SECRET - EYES ONY
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY _6- the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/ Communist regime and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; at some stage of the revolt, it is likely that direct or indirect U.S. support will be needed to insure its success. . Theoretically, the Cuban people, tired of economic hardship, lack of freedom, and isolated from their Latin American brethern, will embrace the revolt. 2. ‘Accommodation with Castro on U.S. Terms -- Our present policy could lead Castro to agree to break his tie-line with the USSR and stop his subversion efforts. It is samt conceivable that such factors as (1) U.S. isolation and covert measures; (2) further Cuban economic deterioration in spite of Soviet aid; 3) distrust of Soviet intentions; (4) the psychological and real impact on Castro of the OAS resolution: and (5) the realization by Castro that he can never be the man he wants to be and that Cuba can never be the place’ he wants it to be until he comes to terms with the U.S.; will lead Castro to. the accommodation option. Indeed, there is a substantial body of evidence that Castro may  aiveady be thinking along these lines, although there-aze-also 3. A Soviet Decision to Quit Cuba -- A Soviet decision to quit Cuba cannot be dismissed categorically in view of such factors as (l) the lack of real Soviet progress in making Cuba a "show piece", (2) the obvious U.S. deter- mination to make Cuba a ''dead end'! in the Hemisphere (no more Cuba's will TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY- - | Copy” , “Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld: 324273454 Page 127
( | TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY 7. be permitted) , (3) the magnitude of Soviet aid to Cuba, and (4) the extent of the USSR's own present economic problems. At the least, these factors would appear to have a bearing on how the Rus sians would view their ejection from Cuba either by the overthrow of the Castro regime, or by a Castro decision to accommodate with the U.S. on U.S. terms. Relief would con- ceivably be mixed generously with Russian grief, especially if the Russians could find a vaguely credible fig-leaf, | B.- Specific Measures We Will Take -- In iuomeans the tough, nasty, but ‘no military intervention/ blockade policy, which probably lays the best ground- work for bringing about any of the three eventualities which would constitute a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere, we will take the fol- lowing measures. 1. Political Isolation of Cuba -- We will continue our efforts to isolate Cuba politically; we will continue to demonstrate that Cuba has taken a "wrong _turn't and is condemned for it by the Free World, and especially by Latin America. One reason for this dimension of our policy is that there are numerous indications that political isolation wounds Castro deeply ona psychological level. ‘Conceivably, the desire for acceptability by the West eventually will be an important factor in Castro realization that he can't have it both ways, and in an ultimate Castro decision to eject the Russians and make peace with the West. Another reason for this aspect of our policy is that political isolation hampers Cuba's subversive activities; for example, it TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy Docld: 32423484 Page 128 Oo : Lyndon B. Johnson Library
'. TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -8- fa gebyperaces denies him the use of diplomatic missions in target countries te-premote ‘Appropriate OAS action on the arms cache issue can further our policy of political isolation; accordingly, we want the OAS resolution to encourage the - following steps: First, we want the remaining five OAS countries, which maintain diplomatic and consular. relations with Cuba, to sever such relations | front Tin i, Af acid), (Article 4(a)), Second, we want the suspension of all trade, except food and medicines, between Cuba and the OAR's (Article 4(b)). Since such trade is already very small this step may have greater political than economic signif- icance (although, on the economic side, it will demonstrate OAS solidarity on ‘the question of trade with Cuba). Third, we want a general call to Free World countries to cooperate with us in our effort to isolate Cuba economically and politically (Article 5).. NOTE: In the context of the whole resolution, we regard the breaking of diplomatic relations as a matter of medium priority; furthermore, we recog- ‘nize that it will be very tough to get. The priority of the suspension of trade | and of the general call for Free World cooperation, is treated betew in the following section. 2; Economic Denial Program -- Generally speaking, we will continue in our efforts to keep Free World/ Cuban trade, particularly in critical com- modities, at a low level - through overt and covert, legal and extra-legal, . diplomatic and private means. To this end a special effort will be made over the next few weeks to obtain NATO, and particularly British, cooperation in TOP SECRET - EYES s ofepy ‘pocld: 32423484 Page 129 oO Lyndon. B. Jonnson Library
Docld: 32423464 Page 130 ( | ( TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY this over-all effort, especially with respect to the extension of export credit ~ guarantess to firms wishing to trade with Cuba. | Also, we will: pepare now for the eventuality that our further efforts to obtain voluntary Free World cooperation will not be successful. First, Pe a matter of very high priority, we will push for language in the wp=econesag OAS resolution which will provide a basis for pos sible unilateral U.S. action to | reduce Cuban/ Free World commercial relations le. g. the proclaimed list) and, more importantly, which will encourage as many OAR's as possible to join us in our effort (Articles 4(b), 5, and 6). It should be noted that such language will not be difficult to get. | 7 —— At present, one of the major obstacles to our effort in the field of economic denial is the non-OAS Free World argument that the U.S. is the only country in the Western Hemisphere which is really concerned about Cuba. To counter this argument, we must demonstrate clearly that the Hemisphere regards , Cuba as a threat, that the Hemisphere supports the isolation policy, that the Hem-_ isphere looks with disfavor upon traders who do business with Castro, and ‘that the Hemisphere intends to take appropriate action against such traders. Second, sometime before the OAS consultative meeting on the Venezuelan arms cache,. we will complete a study which will project the level and type of Free World trade with Cuba for 1964. This study will take into account our present efforts in NATO, Third, “sometime before the OAS consultative meeting on the arms cache, we will complete a scenario of actions we can take to | increase the effectiveness of our economic denial program, in the event this is TOP SECRET - EYES ONBE py — Lyndon B. Johnson Library _
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ~-10- deemed necessary. This scenario will include, but will not necessarily be limited to, a plan of action which will result ina meeting with hard-line “OAR's (e.g. Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Sal- vador, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador) to devise means of implementing the economic denial language of the OAS resolution. Such. means, which may. differ from OAR to OAR, should make it clear to Free. World firms that they can't have it both ways and that they must choose be- | tween Cuba, with a population of 7, 000, 000 and selected OAS countries whose populations. total in the hundreds of millions. In selling this proposal - to the OAR's, we will point out, inter alia, that they will not be forced to ; few sacrifice much in real terms since there will be relatively/Free World traders who will ultimately choose the Cuban market in such circumstances. ‘Indeed, only Cuba will be seriously hurt. | 3, Free World Shipping - We will continue our efforts to reduce Free World shipping to Cuba. First, we will try to ensure that the Lebanese finally effect their proposed shipping legislation. Second, we will continue our efforts . with HMG and individual British shippers to reduce British shipping to Cuba. Third, we will continue our efforts to ensure that no new Free World faces | enter the trade to pick up the slack which recent withdrawals have left. Fourth, we will keep in mind the favorable aspects of the OAS resolution | (Article 4(c)) which will not permit Free World ships to call at OAS ports if they are proceeding to our from Cuba and which will therefore further discourage Free World shipping to Cuba. > TOP SECRET - EYES ONL&g py. — DocId: 32423484 page 131 ; . : | Lyndon B. Joh nson Li Dra ry
Docld:32423484 Page 132 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -ll- 4, Air Service to and from Cuba -- We will continue our efforts to reduce, restrict, and harass Free World and Communist air services to and from Cuba. Passage of an OAS resolution which suspends air communication be- ‘tween Cuba and OAR's (Article 4(c)) will be helpful in this regard. 7 5. Covert Program -- Our policy of pressures against Cuba will include a modest covert program; at the same time, this program will be consistent with our intention of "keeping the lid on'' Cuba and of maintaining a low temperature in the Caribbean. First, we will continue to collect intelligence. Second, ClA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media, directed at Cuba will continue to encourage low risk, simple sabotage, and other forms of active and passive resistence and to stimulate tension within the regime and ; between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. Third, CIA will continue to work with State to deny to Cuba the commodities it needs. Fourth, CIA will continue trying to identify, ‘seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Com- “munist elements in the power centers of the regime. Fifth, CIA will continue to a’ Rtonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals. Of utmost importance in these autonomous exile operations is that U.S. involvement must be clearly deniable and that these operations will not lead to an intolerable escalation in the Caribbean (e. g.a Cuban air attack on Nicaragua). If it becomes apparent v.S. that this is not possible, withdrawal of support will be considered. ~ Until further notice, CIA will not direct any further sabotage efforts against Cuba. In this regard, CIA will disband, as discreetly as possible, its sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida. TOP SECRET - EYES NGS py Lyndon B. johnson Library
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -12- CIA will keep on the shelf its capacity to sabotage Cuban merchant ships calling at foreign ports. | | 6. Contact with Castro -- We will establish a deniable contact with Castro and delicately inject into the very tenuous and marginal U. S./ Cuban dialogue an option which Castro presently may not think exists - i.e. that we would consider assisting Cuba and guaranteeing Castro's existence if on his part he would stop his subversion and break his tie-line with the Bloc. (If consummated, such a deal would constitute a magnificent victory for the U.S. - the ejection of the Soviets from the Western Hemisphere after the penetration had been made.) There are a number of arguments in favor of talking to Castro. First, while it is obviously a long shot, Castro could conceivably buy accommodation on U.S. terms. There is a substantial body of evidence | which points to Castro's unhappiness with the present state of affairs and to. his eagerness to negotiate a settlement. In this regard, the OAS resolution may have a special impact on Castro. If it turns out to be a tough one, the door which is now slightly ajar for Castro (deterioration of our isolation policy) and which is giving him much comfort and psychological lift, will be slammed shut. Second, talks with Castro will tend to intensify Cuban/ Soviet tensions. Third, U.S. / Cuban talks will tend to keep Castro cool during a time when we want the noise-level low. For example, between now and November we will be especially concerned about the possibility of Castro shooting down a U-2 and causing a pre-election flap in the Caribbean. From ‘TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY , — | | Copy Docld:32423484 Page 133 . Lyndon. B. Joh nson Li brary
Docld: 324273454 Page 134 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -j3- past experience it is fair to say that Castro will probably act with a certain amount of restraint if he feels there is a chance we might come to terms with him. Fourth, the disadvantages of talking to Castro appear minimal. There will probably be no leakage in view of the fact that it is also in Castro's interest - to keep quiet. If there is leakage, we can probably deny it credibly -e. g. “This is. too funny for words. Castro accuses us daily of trying to destroy him and hatching heinous plots against him. Many of our close allies (including Senator Fulbright) tell us we are being too nasty to Cuba in our isolation efforts. We are constantly being accused of.moving faster than the OAS. This is the most incredible charge yet.'' In the highly unlikely event that there is leakage and we can't deny it, we can take the line which is essentially true -- e.g. "Castro wanted to tell us something and we agreed to listen. We would be derelict in protecting the national interest if we refused to listen. “Our policy is unchanged. So long as Cuba continues its subversive efforts and maintains its ties with the Bloc, there can be no easing of tensions. " ‘In going ahead with U: S.:/ Cuban contact, we will follow at least*the _ following basic guidelines. First, we will not, in any way, relax our present pressures against Castro. These are our bargaining levers. Second, we _ will ooze confidence. Castro should get the feeling that we are in no hurry and are content to continue on our present course. “However, we are reasonable men and are not after Castro's head per se. ‘Third, we will spin the negotiations out; this will not be hard in view of the communication difficulties. | At the TOP SECRET - EYES ONLYC 9 py | | - Lyndon B. Johnson Library
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -l3a- same time, however, we will stay loose. If, per chance, it appears that we can eject the Soviets and, at the same time, believe it will benefit rather than hinder the Administration in November, we may want to speed up the : time-table rather than wait to collect the dividend after November. (It might be noted that a deal with Castro before November might not necessarily be unmanageable froma domestic viewpoint. Obviously, the President could not live with a headline which reads ''U.S. Accommodates with Castro."' On the other hand, he might live superbly with headlines which read "USSR Ejected from Cuba" or “USSR/ Cuba Tie-Line Broken."' The loyal opposition would not be in a perfect position to complain. After all, they permitted the | establishment of the tie-line and never could do anything about it via soft methods _ before mid-1960, or by hard methods -- after mid-1960. ) Iv, Objective -- Planning for Contingencies We will continue to prepare for contingencies which may occur in Cuba. We will also review all contingency plans which are in existence to ensure they - TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY | Copy Decka: 32429484 page 135 Lyndon B. Johnson Library
Docld:32423484 Page 136 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -]4- are current. V. Objective - Containment of Cuba as a Negative Election Issue _ The measures we will take to contain Cuba as a negative campaign issue ' will detract little, if at all, from what our policy would probably be in the absence of an election. These measures will be essentially mitigating in character. Here are some pertinent elements: A. Public Posture -- The picture we will portray to the American public will be one of confidence, strength, and determination: First, the U.S. is no longer directly threatened by Cuba. We are firm in our resolve to maintain - this position. Second, the real Cuban threat is subversion against Latin America. While we intend to aid the Hemisphere as-much as possible in the fight against subversion, the control of subversion is and must necessarily be primarily the responsibility of the target countries; in this regard, we and. other OAR's are confident that we can contain the Cuban subversive threat. be | Third, "another Cuba" in the Hemisphere will not/permitted. Fourth, we are doing everything reasonably possible to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere by weakening the structure of the Cuban.economy and by increasing y | the Soviet burden of supporting Cuba. These economic measures also increase _Cuba's difficulties in finding the resources to support its subversive efforts, _ B. Keeping the Lid On and the Noise-Level Down -- We will avoid actions which appear to be only marginally advantageous to the furtherance of U.S. policy and which are likely to lead to an increase of tension and temperature in the Caribbean. For example, CIA will not conduct sabotage operations, which TOP SECRET - EYES ONES py” Lyndon B. Johnson Library. N { ) \ .
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY | ce Do | can be convincingly traced back to us. Or again, we will not take 2 actions against Cuba purely for the sake of needling Castro and which bring us no concrete reward le. g. stopping and searching Cuba ships on the high seas; non-return.of Russian helicopter). While there are excellent national security reasons for talking with Cas‘ro, these talks, as noted above, will also tend to temper violent Castro reactions to unforeseen events which are bound to occur between now and November. C. Keeping the Pressure On Cuba -- Domestic political considerations ' reinforce our national security decision to keep a reasonable amount of pressure -’ on Cuba - pressure which is still consistent with our decision against military intervention/ blockade and which is still consistent with our decision to keep the lid on Cuba. Also, we must recognize that. such things as the extent of Free World com- mercial relations with, Cuba have w= become; Sol late symbols to the American public of U.S. resolve not to coexist wi'h Castro. “Therefore, while ‘the limitation of Free World/ Cuban commercial relations is important on national security grounds, it takes am added importance because of the domestic political situation. © Be | Copy |  Docld: 32423484 Page 137 oe “Lyndon B. Johnson library” oS
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET “EYES ONLY April 7, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR | MR, BUNDY SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Program talked to John Crimmins about the meeting J ous on Cuba's covert program. John felt that one point may not have come up sharply enough -- the President should understand that | even though sabotage operations are on the shelf, it is still possible that other covert , activities will create noise. For example, — oo oof-ups in our infiltration/exfiltration pro- ayia have caused noise level | problems in the past. ol Gordon Chase SECRET - EYES ONLY | TR IR TOES ETN ‘Docta:s2a2gaea page 130 =—st—st=C*é«—S snd Bh nso Library oa
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON . TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY April 10, 1964 -wsZEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY ‘SUBJECT: Cuba - Miscellaneous _1. Autonomous Exile Groups - You might want to glance over the attached _ memorandum for the record which Peter Jessup drafted after. your meeting . with Dick Helms and Des Fitzgerald. The memo implies that we can expect | OK to see some activity in the near future and indicates that you will ensure that the President fully understands the implications of autonomous exile group activities. , Z. Talks with Castro - Ihave given Des Fitzgerald and John Crimmins a rundown of the Bill Attwood/ Lisa Howard activities. Using a "need to know" criterion, I gave Des a minimum dosage. He read the longish memorandum — covering my New York conversation with Lisa Howard. I also told him that we have not replied to Castro! s message to the President via Lisa Howard. I gave John Crimmins a pretty full treatment. He read the Bill Attwood ° chronology and several memos regarding my recent talks with Lisa Howard. -John and I talked about the desirability of reopening the dialogue with Cuba ‘while Castro is at a low point. I pointed out the advantages of a slow dialogue whose timing we could control. Among other things, even if it didn't lead to the ejection of the Russians, it might prevent Castro from doing something rash between now and November - such as shooting down a U-2. John was surprisingly receptive and noted that Castro will be feeling very low during: this time-frame as a result of the trial of Rodriguez, the revolution in Brazil, and the OAS resolution on the Venezuelan arms cache. He did not commit himself, but seemed more receptive than he was several months ago. J 3, OAS Resolution - Ward Allen estimates that the chances are better than. even that the Venezuelan arms cache will be taken up at a C/OAS rather than. at an MFM (attached is a cable which gives a flavor for the problem). Ward said that a C/OAS resolution can come out just as strongly as an MFM resolution. He guesses that we probably will be able to get about 75% of what we want. The warning article may get watered down and we probably will not get a recommendation regarding the breaking of diplomatic relations. ' How- _. ever, we may get just about everything else. Ce Gor don Chase 7 TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Copy Docld: 32423464 Page 139 - “Lyndon B. Johnson Library
. 9 April 1964 ‘ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD A meeting was held at 1015 on 9 April Sy Mr. Bundy, Desmond FitzGerald and Richard Helms to discuss the problem of independent action by Cuban emigre groups headed by Manuel Artime and Mariolo Ray. The following points were made: VSS ASION we [ieececaia stated that he did not believe any verbal diseussien had any chance of success with Artime in his determination to mount an operation from Central America. Those present agreed that it was possible to block the operation by an air-sea search and by the use of U.S. Navy destroyer but that this was a drastic step. Mr. Helms pointed out that this could write finis to use of Cuban emigre groups and would radiate con- siderable fallout elsewhere. Mr. Bundy capsuled the problem by saying his worry was whether an Artime attack would’ give the U.S. a hypo- critical image when out of the other side of its mouth the - U.S. was. .plumping for votes at the OAS to outlaw subversion and armed attack. : - He further said that he wanted to be clear as to whether higher authority fully grasped the implications of the auto- nomous exile group activity as discussed at Tuesday's meeting. This: he was going to check. Mr. Bundy felt it would be extremely useful to regularly publicize Castroite guerrilla activity both in Argentina (thus far played only by the Christian Science Monitor) and in Central America as a contrasting backdrop to possible Castro slurs against Cuban exile activity. Copy. pocra: 32423484 Page 140 - ; Lyndon B. Joh nson Li brary. .
— i THE WHITE HOUSE a WASHINGTON - Pree. eter Th. r TOP SECRET ft SENSITIVE Cc ~. April 17, 1964 7; ; : en Or MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: JCS‘Views on Cuba nn You may not have seen the attached memorandum from the Chiefs responding to your request that they examine (a) possible ways of obtaining greater sup- port from the OAS, and (b) additional ways of bringing pressure on Castro beyond those presently authorized. The Chiefs don't come up with much that is new, and our best hope for effecting a basic favorable change in the Cuban situation still appears to be one of con-~ tinuing what we have been doing all along, with steady pressure on our friends" like the British, not to give us the knife. . We will be reporting in the next day or two on the latest crane case. ' TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Docld:32423484 Page 141 - . Pwndon B. Johnson Library
a wig 74 c YOUF! ~~ -) 32 hee THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF © WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301 JCSM-253-64 21 MAR 964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Possible Actions Against the Castro Government (C) 1, At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 4, 1964, you directed them to concentrate their attention on possible ways of obtaining greater support from the Organization of American States (OAS) in carrying out a program directed at the eventual overthrow of the Castro government. Also, you asked that they examine additional ways of bringing pressure upon Castro beyond those presently authorized. 2. With regard to possible actions by the OAS, ‘the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States Government should seek the cooper- ation of the other OAS members in obtaining the complete isolation of Cuba. from other American States. Further, the United States should, if possible, secure broad authority for a wide range of actions under _ Article 8 of the Rio Treaty, including the possible use of armed force against Cuba, should OAS members, individually or collectively, deem such action necessary to prevent further intervention and aggression by Castro. With these possible objectives for OAS action in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the text of the proposed OAS resolution which the United States has suggested that the Venezuelan Government propose for the consideration of the OAS member states. They consider that if sucha resolution is adopted essentially in its present form, the United States Government will have sufficient basis for action directed at the further isolation of Cuba and for military action against Castro in case of further aggression on his part. Hence, for the time being, — _they have nothing additional to suggest in this field. 3. With regard to measures designed to put additional pressure on Castro beyond those presently authorized, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vv recommend a resumption of the program (which is presently approved c “| 7 but on which no actions are currently being taken) involving the employ- * gh ment of covert assets to conduct interdependent operations, including , py__#_02_-2”_ Copies each - WP SED REL Cy cf ‘eZ pages series "AS ox EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC -.vinoticn of this document in hole. REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 ano pact i3 prohibited exeept with eyorur NOES NOP APPLY pezcuission of the issuing office. SEE Lo enrememamumememenees sors cere | oe | Copy Docld: 32423484 Page 142 7 Lyndon B. ‘Joh nson Li brary -
Docld: 32423484 Page 143 (OP SEGRE the covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions, economic denial actions, and externally mounted sabotage operations against Cuba. As this program unfolds, they would favor expanding and intensifying it while maintaining a continuing evaluation of the reactions of Castro, the communists, and the Free World. Concurrently, they -favor the development and conduct of a hard-line propaganda campaign, integrated with the foregoing actions, to estrange the Castro regime , ‘from the: Cuban people and the remainder of the Free World. . “4 eG 4; The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate United States objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. However, they have difficulty identifying promising actions against Castro which have not been previously considered, and in some cases tried, It is a hard fact that little remains which offers promise of real effectiveness in removing Castro short of a blockade or an ascending scale of military action up to or including invasion, They will keep this problem under continuing review and advise you should any new and Promising courses of action be uncovered. For ‘the Joint Chiefs of Staff: are) MAXWELL D.. TAYLOR . Chairman Joint Chiefs of. Staff IOPSEGRET = Seige “Lyndon B. Johnson. Library
THE WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY . ‘April 21, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Possible Luncheon Meeting Items - Cuba Here is a suggested Cuba menu for today's luncheon meeting, which you may want to use in full, in part, or not at all. % «. 1. Contingency Plan for Shoot-Down of a U-2 -- In view of the most recent ‘| Cuban statements (Castro on Sunday, and Dorticos on Monday) you may eo want to brief the President, if he hasn't been briefed already, on our con- — - tingency planning in the event Castro shoots down a U-2. The plan is at- tached at Tab 1. oo | . ‘ 2. Talks with Castro -- You indicated that you might want to discuss with oo. the President and the two Secretaries the question of resuming the tenuous ss" and marginal dialogue with Castro. This track may have special significance “in light of Castro's Sunday speech; one of its attractions is that it might tend ‘to keep Castro's temperature low and "the lid on'' over the next six months. Attached at Tab 2 is a recent staff memo which points up some of the dimen- sions of the problem. Attached at Tab 3 is a possible scenario for resuming the dialogue. ae 3. Rules of Engagement -- If you think it appropriate, you might see if the "|. President has approved DOD's Rules of Engagement covering a situation in ae” - which the Cubans attack friendly foreign military aircraft or ships operating in the area around Cuba. An answer to DOD is over-due. . 4, Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba -- You may have handled this one "already. I'm not sure, however, and put it before you again, primarily in ¢ ‘4 deference to Alexis Johnson; on two occasions he has suggested that the . ‘|, President be informed of the existence of the plan (on one occasion, he sug- gested that the two Secretaries be present), Attached at Tab 4 is a staff memo aaa which briefs and covers the package from Alexis Johnson regarding contingency planning for’a coup | in Cuba. i ,. | oC Gordon Chase TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY oe a - Copy “Lyndon B.. Johnson. Library Docld:32493484 Page 144°
THE “HITE HOUSE ° : - WASHINGTON SECRET - EYES ONLY , May 14, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Special Group - Cuba | 1. Continued exile raids are going to make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba between now and November. This is just the sort of thing that evokes a highly emotional response from Castro. As things stand, he seems convinced that ’ se are tied into the raids -- as indeed we are. \ 2. There seem to be two things we can do. (a) We can make a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says that this can't be done, I wonder if that's true. For example, the cessation of assistance and pressure on countries like Nicaragua to cease providing facilities might do the trick. , This step is a drastic one and could lead to angry charges (in the U.S. and elsewhere) that we are lending pos fitive support to Castro. It is probably a step “we would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which we _canit control, were propelling us to the brink. (b) We can cut off all our ties with these ecile groups (e.g. money, equipment, intelligence information), The exile grapevine is a sensitive one and the word - will get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully, this word will get to. Fidel and he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles rather than on us (specifically, a U-2). In sum, at a minimum, we might want to be impregnable to the charge that we are connected in any way with these exile activities. 3. This strikes me as an urgent problem which we should grapple with now. More- over, there may be a good deal-of support in town in favor of doing something. My (aise at State indicate that Alexis Johnson, Tom Mann, and John Crimmins are - I tas an stn root 71 chy MEN Het BALMS bier [A O/WEY be also unhappy about the presenttrend of events. [ 4. You may want to initiate a discussion of this matter at the Special Group meet- ji ing today. oo . uf , LL. on ase ideo y; x Lt) a fod, jan pT omen og be <tr |. SECRET - EYES ONLY cis Jota. Lh, ~~ | 7 SO Copy. pocta: 32423484 Page 145 - . oe “Lyndon B. Joh nson ‘Library. ee eee a ere agen ne NE SMe mee 9 ame
. Mexico and Chile favor a C/OAS. SUBJECT: British Guiana and Cuba _ The apparent reason is that she was frustrated because she had no concrete control over the police force, which, by the way, is predominantly African Indians to stir up more trouble. ' Thave been needling State to get on with some contingency planning in the event . fwe decide that the level of trade for 1964 looks as though it may be intolerable; THE WHITE HOUSE , WASHINGTON SECRET. - EYES ONLY June 2, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR.. BUNDY 1. British Guiana - Janet Jagan Quits Post -- As you have probably read in the cable traffic, Janet Jagan has quit her post as Minister of Home Affairs. (1300 out of 1500). . It is not yet clear what the significance of her step might be; it could turn out to be a negative for our side in that it may encourage the East The situation in British Guiana does not yet seem to be excessively grim, but we seem to be watching 1 it closely. 2. Cuba - OAS Resolution -- State says that soundings on whether to hold an 4FM or a C/OAS are running in favor of an MFM. Frequently expressed reasons are {a) that an MFM meets Venezuelan desires, (b) that an MFM enhances the importance of the resolution, and (c) that the legality of sanctions taken under a C/OAS are questionable. , 3. Free World Trade with Cuba -- State informally guesses that a projection of Free World trade with Cuba for 1964 would show exports at about $180 million; this compares with about $110-120 million in 1963. State is now in the process. of doing a paper which might prove interesting. One idea, which is short of & proclaimed list, would be to get OAS governments not to buy from firms which trade with Cuba in significant quantities of goods. This is an interesting thought since much purchasing in Latin America is probably done on © government account. 4, Execution of Anti-Castro Cubans -- Attached is a ticker indicating that the Cubans have executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents.. CIA tells me that we did have a connection with the executed Cubans but that it is ‘ompletely deniable, ‘The Agency is still checking on the other two. SECRET - EYES ONLY... “Copy” Docld: 32423484 Page 146 : ae Lyndon B. Johnson. Library
SECRET - EYES ONLY -2- 5, Congressman Rogers - Evasion of U.S. .Radar System -- I spoke to Congress- man Rogers recently about the alleged evasion of U.S. radar on May 25. He said that while he was not sure that there actually had been a flight, we should ge tO explore the situation thoroughly. I assured him we would look into the matter. Aside from the public relations problem, which is probably manageable, lam still not completely satisfied myself as to what can slip through our radar system and what cannot slip through. I intend to get a DOD briefing and to obtain the results of a study which JCS now has underway. I will keep you informed. , (Aa Gordon:Chase ‘SECRET - EYES ONLY a Copy | Dood: 32425484 Page 147 - Oe Lyndon. B. Johnson | Libra ry
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Ve a . i- : S-E-C-R-E-T ; . NO FOREIGN DISSEM/COnsROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABnOAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY 7 | CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 goo y rt 10 June 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence . SUBJECT | : Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate , Selected Cuban Government Leaders 1. The following report was compiled from informa- tion obtained by Agency officers from persons who were parties to the actions described. Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions. Presumably the sources of the report, in Submitting this information, were motivated in part by the belief that by disclosing the information they would obtain immunity against legal action should they succeed in implementing the plan. 2. A Cuban exile was approached on 2 March 1964 by an acquaintance who wished to discuss a plan, which was still in the embryonic state, to assassinate Fidel Castro. The acquaintance was described as a businessman and a shipowner who owns at least one ship which sails under the British flag, and who also has a legally sanctioned interest in distributing and placing slot machines in gambling houses. The involvement of the acquaintance in the slot-machine business brings the man in contact with elements in the underworld, primarily through his partner who is a former police officer from St. Louis and through whom there is a tie-in with elements of "Cosa Nostra." . The "Cosa Nostra" elements are alleged to have numerous contacts still available to them in Cuba, and they have offered to assassinate Castro for $150,000; no advance funds were requested. If the mission cannot be accom- plished, or if the plan is unsuccessful, an amount not to exceed $10,000 would be paid for the travel and living expenses of five men involved in the mission. The Cuban exile commented that he believed he had been approached with this plan because of his family's wealth; he told . , GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassificatios oo. . S-E-C-R-E-T - NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY en , Copy” Docld:32423484 Page 149 ; Lyndon B.. Joh nson | Li brary -
S-8-C-R-E-T - Co NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CON:OLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABhvAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY his acquaintance that he was not interested and suggested that an approach might be made to Someone who has much more money. 3. Another Cuban exile reported that Byron Cameron, owner and operator of the M/V CAYMAN HOPE, whose address is Caribe Trading Co., Ltd., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, met with several Cuban exiles on 3 March 1964. Among the © persons attending the meeting were Teofilo Babun Franco, co-owner of the Antillean Marine Shipping Corporation, Miami, and two of Babun's employees, Oscar Fernandez Viego and Eliseo Gomez Fernandez. Babun and Cameron are friendly shipping-buSiness competitors in the Caribbean area, During the course of conversation at this meeting, Cameron mentioned that he was in contact with an unidenti- fied group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash; specifically, the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara.. 4, After a preliminary discussion at the 3 March meeting, it was thought that the amount of $150,000 for the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus $5,000 expense money, payable in advance, was too high, and Babun felt that this situation was just another attempt to swindle ‘patriotic Cuban exiles. Another meeting was then held on 5 March and a counter-offer of $100,000 was made for ‘the assassination of Fidel Castro, plus $2,500 for ex- penses, payable in advance. Cameron promised to check with his contacts after returning from a trip to the -Caribbean., _ -5, During a meeting on 15 March attended by Cameron and Babun and his associates, the following terms were agreed upon for the assassination of the Cuban officials: Fidel Castro, $100,000; Raul Castro, $20,000; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, $20,000; and $2,500 for expenses, payable in advance. The time-limit for the proposed mission would be 90 days from the date when Babun could verify, to the satisfaction of Cameron, that he had $100,000 at his. disposal for the payment. The contract for payment ~2- — - §-E-C-R-E-T . NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY : Copy | — Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld: 324234684 Page 150
NU FOKEIGN DISSEM/COnsROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSZM ABnJAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY would be honored only upon the presentation of evidence that the three Cuban officials died at the hands of the assassins connected with Cameron's contacts. © 6. In early April 1964 Eliseo Gomez Fernandez met with Jose "Pepin" Bosch. Bosch agreed to advance $100,000 | and Babun and his aSSociatesS would advance $2,500 for : expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York, subsequently agreed to the terms, provided that his name was not involved. Accordingly, Babun gave Cameron $2,500 on 25 April. Cameron then advised his group, and on 25 April he reported that his group had already called its man in Cuba and told him to proceed as planned and that "their other. man" would be heading for Cuba shortly. The final comment was "we hope to have some good news for you between 20 and 25 May." Lobo planned to fly to Miami on 19 May to arrange for the transfer of $100,000 to a safety deposit box, the keys to which are to be held jointly by Cameron and a confidant of Lobo. 7. The identities of the persons in the Cameron group and how they plan to proceed with this mission are not known. Babun's associates are reluctant to make any unnecessary queries because they have invested - $2,500 and because Cameron made it fairly clear at the beginning that the Mafia was involved. Cameron re- vealed during the negotiations that his. contact was a police officer in the St. Louis, Missouri, Vice Squad who was about to retire and who has numerous connections in the Mafia. Cameron implied that "the other man" in question is in Spain. Cameron knows that he could be. indicted for conspiracy and that if there is any treachery on his part, Babun and his associates would not hesitate to sink his ship, the M/V CAYMAN HOPE, 8. In late May 1964 a prominent Cuban exile who Spoke with Jose "Pepin" Bosch reported that Teofilo Babun and Eliseo Gomez had a plan under way to assas— Sinate Fidel Castro for the payment of $150,000. Bosch claimed that he had committed himself to furnish $50,000 and that he was hoping he could get the balance - 3.- | : S-E-C-R-E-T | : NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY pecra:szazciea Page 351” Lyndon B. Johnson Library | “4
( S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CON1 ROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABKOAD/BACAGROUND USE ONLY of the money from the United States Government or from other sources. Bosch indicated that he believes that a quick change for the better in the Cuban situation can be brought about only by the physical elimination of Fidel Castro and that his elimination is well worth $150,000. In pursuing his attempts to raise an additional $100,000, Bosch is planning to ask Julio Lobo to con- tribute at least $50,000. Archon tbl Richard Helms Deputy Director for Plans S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM. ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY | _ Copy | Docta:32423484 Page 152 . “Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library.
S-E-C-R-E-T { "NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CON1 ROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABKOAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY CSDB-3/661, 653 Orig: cc; NO FOREIGN DISSEN/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM f ABROADsBACKGROUND USE, ONLY a The Director of Central Intelligence Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Assistant Secretary--Inter-American Affairs ' Department of State The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Department of State The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency “The Attorney General The Department of Justice The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director for Intelligence -5- S-E-C-R-E-T © Copy “poota:32423484: Pagé 153 7 . a “Lyndon B. Johnson Library
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET . _ June 16, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY a | SUBJECT: :, Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations l. Attached is 2 copy of Dez Fitzgerald's "A Reap- praisal of Aut@mous Operations." It was apparently - . instigated by Tom Mann's expressed feeling that.if we mean what we say under the warning Paragraph of | | the OAS resolution (subversion is aggression), we. a should keep our own hands clean and cease support of autonomous exile operations. The meat of Dez! paper begins on page 5 (at the paper clip); much of his logic and conclusions, frankly, leave me stone cold. 2, In essence, my own view differs from Tom Mann's ' in that I dislike the raids primarily for a different reason -- i.e, because Castro now appears to have the capability to shoot down a U-2 and because I regard Castro as the type of man who can react highly emotionally and irrationally when excessively provoked. The corol- lary of this view is that the raids would be somewhat more tolerable (though still troublesome between now and Novem- ber) if we could somehow remove Castro's shoot-down Capability -- i.e. find an alternative to the U-2. Cel Gordon Chase SECRET | Copy “Lyndon B. Johnson Library Docld: 32423464 Page 155
_ aoe C ( 7 s, . -_ . ; if . ats We sik. | . wee UUBJECT:. A Reappraisal of Autonomous Crerations. I. Origin of Autonomous Operations The. lotegrated Covert Action Pregran for Cuna, epproved . - by Aigner autbority in June 19c2, provited for ‘sucpert of 2utonomous sati-Castro Cuban groups to svppleneut and assist ; in the execution” of the other courses of action approved = Le. under this progran. The concept of antonomous groups darived rom Wr. Faiter Rostow's proposal for a "Track: Fuo™ approsch - _to Cuban operations. Pursilei to the reguiar CiA-cantrolled and digciplined Cuban teams, CIA would omtead financial aid and : & minimun of advice and guidance to indssenvent anc uncontrelied Cuban leaders such ag Manuel Ray. Implicit in toe autonomous concest is the understandciag that the leasersalp would possess an dogree of operational peif-daterminatioa whicn in certain ~ circumstances, such as during the recent overflignat crisia, could conzlict with U.S. security intersets. a io “Yn addition ta a number of informal conversaticas between | _ . “tate Department and CIA efficers conearning the rractical aren 7 snplication of the autonomous concept, Heszrs. Alexis Johnzon. | joa Kewin Zartin indicated to Hr. Aichard Helms. on [6 Lecemcer 19362 their desire that CIA proceed a8 soon 25 fensiblie to. rrovide ‘Track Two" assistance to Hr. Manuel lay. - as dacorporated into the June 1905 program, the fallewing “rales of engagement” were set forth to govers the conduct of theee autonmsous operations: . — ee re te {1) It is tae keystone of autenoaous operations oF that: they will he execoted exclusively 5 Cuban nationasiga =. = motivated by tre conyiction that the cverthroew ox tae | Castro/Commusist regize mcst be acecrplished by Cutans, both taside and outsidce Cuba actiag in consonance. a | | | (2) Tae effort will probably cost suny Coban lives. > op  * 32 tnis cost ia lives becomes unaecaptable to the 7.8.00 9 conscience, autonomous operations czn be effectively $=. - halted by the witndrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, . * $¢ cannot be regueed.  - Te a ht | | (3). AlL autonamous operations will te mounted out~ | . gide tne territory of the United States. — Se co ne . (4) The United States Governvent acst ne preparvd to | ed  geny publicly aay particioution in thea? acts Bo matter a - oO how loud or even how accurate may be tae yeports of U.S. “Copy _ Docld: 32423484 Page 156 n Li brary _ a :
. 7 _y™= a .* ( SE pation in the operatiscn would be kept to an absolute ‘winimum. Before entering into an operational ralation- ship with a group, the U.d. representative will maze 4t clear thst his Governmant has 2o intention oz inter~ vening militarily, except to counter iatervestion by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer vould be assigzued 25 work with the group in a lizisoa ezpaeity. Hea woud ~ provice general acvice as requested as weil as frods and necessary material support. He may be exrected to influence but not control the conduct of operations. Lo ot -.- | | (5) The United States presence and direct partici- oe | (6) Tnese operations would not be undertaken within ga fixed tine schecule. - ee . my a3 . - 3m a letter dated 6 Harch 1963 to Mr. HcGeorgs Buady ; reviewing various operational problems ia consection with cuba, #4: Mr, Desmond vitsGerald made the following ebservatiors pertain-. ing to autonomous operations: — De. “As you knoy, agein as part of the dune plans, re are supporting two "autenezous" exile grou,s headed yespectively by Kanuel Artins and Manolo Ray. In both cases ve have gone to uaximm lengths ta preserve the denitability of U.3. complicity in tae operation. Artias, sho acy possesses the greater mechanical and paramilitary apparatus, haz required a goed deal of uand-feecing = although still within the conteat of A@eniability. Ue mt will probably not be ready for 513 operations against — Cuba osfore April or way of this year. oe parsesscs nost of his hardware and maritize equiypsent anc has aegotiated cy . geographical aad political pases in Central Anerics. _ Manolo Bay has been handled on & much more indersacent Be pasia. we have furnished him money and aA certain omcunt Po , of general advice. He does not pesreas the physical to accoutrements tnat Artime has and is probably not 23 wali equipped in terns of profesaional planning. Ray has a | " tetter politiesl image insice Cuba among supporters of t the revolution and o348 recentiy acquirec, according to  yeports, sone of the otner left-wicg ezile activist groups such 28 Gutierres Menoyo arc his Second Front of the  Escambray. Ha is maid to ve ready to move into Ciba oa a clandestine basis late this eprins. iis first weapon ’ will be sabotage inside Cuba, apparently not externaliy=-  sounted hit-and-run raices. St ; po ey? U.S. policy should demand that the “autonomous” 1 operations be suspended, we could of course ent osf our gupport. immediately. 4rtine and his group sight or migh at ! | ot v4 Docld: 32423484 Page 157 . . . no,
~. oe lis ‘a to -3- not disintegrate at once. anole ‘Bay alnost certainly - would continue. Both groups are besed outside the United States and our oaly real leversce cn thea is through our financial auppert but witadraval of tais support vould probably. be fatai to tieir operations in tine. <A cutofl of this support, even thougn tris Support has been untraceable in a technical sense, would have a considerable impact within tne exilo community. U.S. . support is rumored, especiaily in the case of Artizs, and the collapse ef the only remaining evidence of exile action agninst Castro would hit the exile community zard wuieh ig whost it in tura would do to its favorite tarzet, G.38. policy. The exila of teday, sowever, appears to Have lost much of his fervor and, ia any case, docs sot seen %t3 have the capacity for causing domestic trovble wilen ne had a year or tyo ago. The Central american coustries in wnich the exile bases sexist would be ersatiy confused, although woe have carefully never indicated to the govern- ments of these countries any more thao u. 5. syusabhy tor the “autonomous” groups.” This letter, including the parasraphs oites por” yea wabe: mitted to the Special Group on 30 March 19564. On the sama Gate, anotner menorandim entitled “Status Zevort an Autcnoacus Cuban Exile Groups” was presented to the @pecial Group to alert that hody to the fsct that both the Zay and Airtize zroune nad reacned a stago of operational readisoss in whith actioss against Cuba could be exrectsed at any tizs. The cemrandire aiso advised tse Egecial Group as follows: oy "The possibility of imainent unilateral oneratioas on the part of the autenomous creuns is brought to | the attention of the Snecioi Group at this tine since it is related to the question of the future of CrA- controlled sabotage and harassment osersaticns sow uncer | reviey dy higner authority. This relationship gas des— cribed in Part ¥ of the monmvrandum entitled “Review of Currant Frogres of Covert Action Agains$ Cuba,” dated — $4 January 1364, submitted by tha Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group. The paper alizo noted that iz & policy decigion ig made to ternizata satetage and narassmeat operatioas for tae autonscscus grovyp iz veil as for CIA, it will be angtcessary to terminate support. for the autonomous groups as CIA would not te ta 2a povition to insure that they would refrain from raids and sabotacy even if soa requested. In fact, it cow agopears ixely that neither group will disintegrate at cuca Span notification of termination az U.i. sub] idion, While witadrawal of U.S. fdasncial aid and aoral supyort would probably be fatal to their operations in time, bull Copy’. yacterseuzsios vaye 8 . “Lyndon” 1. ‘Johnson Library ~
o™, " . : : GiUiied thay are likely to make strenuous efforts to find other sources of support. In so doing and in order to prove their viability to potential supporters, toey would, in their desperatioa, probably feel compelled to launca one or more dramatic raids against Cuba.” On 13 May the Port of Pilon in southern Oriente "es struck by one of Artine's commando groups. Warshouzes rere stverely damaged end, according to an official Cuban announcement, approximately 70,000 tong of sugar valued @% about one ailiton dollars vere destroyed. Ye understand that Artime ia planning a another raid on two radar installations eariy in suse. , ‘“Yannel Ray departed en 13 Say for Cuba amid a. major publi- city campaign sparked by the Sew York Tines. Ray's exact en _whereshouts are not known as o3 tuis writidg, but it ts believed ' that ne baa not yat landed on Cuban soil. _ = ee; Docld: 32423484 Page 159° - ~ Lyndon ‘BL ‘Johnson Library ee
i Tt. Current Status Against this background, the question Gi cor, tinued 0.3, ‘guprpoert for these autonomcus srours bas once again been raised. It has bsen suggested that a reappraisai of? sutene-_ fous orerations would be in order if, as 3 resuit of an O43 resolution en the Yenezuclan aras cache, azgqressien ig to be redefined to include subversion. It ig arcued that the U.3.. should, 42 it is to explicit the CAS resolution, not. itself engage in the proseribed activities. The U.S. weuld have to ‘accept a “clean hands” position vis-a-vis Cova end tits state of cleaalinesea must be usintained indefinitaly if the 3.8. is to rewain in a@ pesition to apply sanctions against Castro should he again be caught red-handed. itl, Considerations Affecting U.S. 8. Support to _Autonescus 1s Groves 12 is assumed that it reenins U.S. policy to get rid of | Fidel Castro by araccentable aenns, If this premize ia t > georrect the firs? task of the policysaker in exunining the  dissveg herein presented is to balance the two courses of ection propesed =~ i.e. (a) a continuation of sutoncsous operations ard (>) an exclusive reliance on OAS sanctican <= a ia teras of their effectiveness in achieving cur basic. CS | Purpose. - ee sane tee Aen UN oe nee NEE eer atiRTE SE ter ne . When the June 1963 progran, of which sutonoxons operaticss are 2 part, was approved by higher authority, it was agreed : that thia programs presented the maximum that cenuld be cone po aleng covert lines; taat each part of the procram supported euch other; and that the eventual miccess of the prograa would yest on the sinmultaneous application of all wf tre conrrer of action agreed to, including sabotage and herassment, ami their _ interaction en each other. Although mo ascesanent cf chazsce of success of this prograa could be presented on a porcentile basis, it was understced that the erties would not “nave been appropriately tested if not siven a $211 i8 sontras to TUBe Ie January “3984 ‘undlaterally controlled. sabotage epera~ GS tions were stecod down, but this partial erosion of the progras | | bas been in some measure compensated for, at least in Fe ea oS logical warfare terms, by the recent widely reported activitie of the autonezous groups which resched a clinax of sorts ¥ ith the Pilon raid and Ray's reported ceparture for Cuba uscer dramatic cireungtances. Docld:32423484 Page 160
. Deapite the truncated nature of the prograa, it appears — to ws that there have been many indicetiens of success, Yo have been able to establish a dirsct correlation between th series of minor sabotags operations during the latter part of 1953 anznd a rise in internsi resistance and sadctage. The _ Balen raid and news of Bay's plans to return to tuba has. ' ggain set off military alerts 2nd other internal xezsgurea not observed in Cuba since the Octcber 1962 oiasile crigis. The fect that Castro waa willing uader such slim prove cation ta strip his factories and cane fieldm vould incicate © @ Gegres of psycrological threat operating on his regiae far cut of proportion to the physical threat or risks taken by us. - eee a HE Ee RT RE er eneee eee” The legal path inyolvesa reliance upon sone form ef CAS reaolution applying future sanctions sgainst Cube ia the oa event she is once again caught rod-Randed in subversive aod activities. In the final analysis the epplication of these , : sasctiona will reat with tho 0.3. after further consultation oI : with the OAS. Clearly the punishment contemplated is thea 0.8. | 7 uso of armed force whether it be by way of Dicckede, invasion. . or selective destruction of Cuban targets. Will tae U.S. pra- t pose such action and will the CAS in the final analysis epprove os it? . : PO 7 It is submitted that a clear choice need not be aade between thess two alternatives. Yaving aiready denied cur . selyes unilaterally contrelled raiding actions ane oaving | taken precaution not to leave provable fingerpriata on the autoaoacus operations, may w@ not proceed aicng totk tracks in their current direction, denying stoutiy our invelyenent Lo in the tlilogsl activities and theredy grentiy tacreasing the odds cf achieving our national purpesa? te are certain to be accused of resyensibility for others exila activities in which we are not involved, Cur innecence will be as difficult te establish as would be our invoivenent in the case of cur autonomous operations. 1¥, Consequences of Toruinating U.S, Eupport for Autoncacus Te an a econscquence of following the “legal trach” it is 7 felt that 0.8. support to autonesous groups should ceage, the. following considerations should be weighed in reaching a fira decision: n, Co Docld: 324273484 Page 161 ,
i oe “2 (1yY It aust be assumed that suspension of support. [ - to sutonogcus groups will come asa a bitter olow to the - 4 - leaders who will lose no time in making sublic their a. views and Laterpretaticns of this action. The cessation of support will bo interpreted as a furtner indication: that tbe U.S. is no longer interested in tae active Liberation of Cuba and ia anving in the diraction of rapprochement and accommedation with the Castro regine. So Thue effect of this will be to demoralizse furtier tre | . '  anti-Castro Cubans both inside and outside Cuba ond to 4 : gap what resistance spirit still remains. Ve have had — many reports to the effect that highly placed persona ingids Cuba now feel that Castro's greatos? nistake was his break with the 0.8. Ferhaps even Fidel believes this slso, A cessation of anti-Castro raids and other == | operations would immediately be read asa signofJv.S. = *. detente with Castro and a consequent prestisge~-restoring _ victory for Castro’s tigat-rope policics. | . Yt mast almo be expected that the significance | of ceasing support of these groups will be exaggerated and oo misinterpreted in Latin America and Burope, thereby setting . r off another round of diplonatic, political and eccnomic noves toward an accozmedation with the Castro regizs. in» my this atmosphere, it is possidle that even the eredcibizity — of the O48 regolution may be adversely aZfected, Cne : e2n only guessg at the domestic repercussions of this oublicity, but it is likely that ant in-acainisiration @lenments will atteapt to exploit the situatica to their . political advantage, particularly if it comes tefore the November elections. = = - a, oe (3) The governzents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, ce | efter deing assured by 0.8. officiaia that surrert of Aytine and Ray would not conflict with U.5. foreign re licy, have affzorded these groups base facilities on So heir soil...If it is decided that 0.5. support for - gutenomous groups should cease, it follows that tne U.5. a -- gould have to advise these covernments that their con] o  timiesd suppert of the groups has becoue. datrizental to eit U.8, policy. Without such advice these governments wou ld Oo continue to support the autonomous grovps. = Se °"" (3) Ag pointed out in the 30 March memorandus to * ‘the Svecial Group cited above, it appears likely thet ‘3°: neither one of the autononcus groups sill cisintesrate iunediately after notification of termination of T.8. . Copy Docla: 32423484 Page 162 . __lyndon . Joh nson Libra ry Es:
aid. In order to desonstrate their viability to potential supporters and contributors, these groups — are likely to feel compelied to coatinue and perhaps atep tp these raids, in defiance of U.S. vishes 12 necessary. It is possibis that the fruatration sad indignation that would flow from a terzination of support would lead to a choice of activities on the part of these groups that would brave a higher "noise I level" than at prewent, including revelations of fast = ee (4) Adoption of the “legal track” as a basis for ae dealing with the Castro problem and the attendant — application of the “clean hands” theais would have ranifications for covert activities directed against. cane Cuba that go far beyond autonomous raiding operations, ad Infiltration and ceching operations for subversive © a | purposes such as those presently being atteapted by Ray would alse be included, The principle of “clean . hands’? aust algo be applied to ali covert maritize = infiltration/exfiltration operations for intelligence collection purposes as well aa caching operations for internal intelligence and resistance operaticns. This | would reauit in a reduction in our intelligence collec= tion and suppert capabilities. To exphasize this point, 4t im yorth recaliing that the “fex incident” in October | 1963, one of the most widely publicized and comsented= | pon eperations in the past two years, involved enly oo an inziltration and caching operation. Ho aabotage or otner form of violence was contesplated for this missions, Yet the exposures of the sother ship ani the resuiting DS publicity constituted as euch a violation of the “clean §— hands" principle as any sabotage migsion. Thus, littic - useful purpose would be served in terminating support to autonomous groups in order to adhere to the "legal track” and “clean hands" concepts while other covert operations, equally susceptible of being exposed as re oe “supversive’ ia nature, involving zaritine infiitration ane end eaching, contizue ae before. er rs ¥Y. Conelusions — a  ‘fernination of U.S, support for the autenozceus groups mS will not necessarily assure the cessation of exterraliy~ ne mounted cemmande raids on Cuba. In fact, 4t ta likely that | the first reaction of the sutononous grouge will be to conduct higher “noise level” activities than at preemt, | Docld: 32423484. Page 163 ohnson Library
{neluding, perhaps, revelations of past U.S. support. ‘There 9. may also be exile raids with which we hare no connection, 9.. the SINS or Alpha 66 — for which the U.S. would eutcastically  ~. pe blamed. 7, a BO 7 Adeption of the “legal track" would have ramifications for covert ocporations extending far beyond autonomous raiding actions, Haritime infiltraticn/exfiltration for intelligence = and caching operations, both autonozeus and unilatera2i Cia, ne would baye to be included in the tan if the “clean haads” | ao principle 413 to be applied in 2 consistent and seoningful = . The cessation of autonomous commando operatioas -<— the a only remaining external sabotage activity since unilateral ne} - CIA operations of this type vere stood down in dnnuary 1354 — would effectively kill the resaining chances of carrying out oo the objectives of the Integrated Covert Action Frograa. ee 4nitiated in June 1963. _ Oo 2 EES “nile the cost would be high, it might yell be worth the | sacrifice if the U.8. is prepared for armed intervention in —. | Cuba and if the O48 will unequivocally support Ate nes ‘Docta:32423404 Page 164 “Lyndon” B. Johnson Library.
? THE WHITE HOUSE SECRET - EYESONLY =~ WASHINGTON June 18, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY SUBJECT: Special Group - Autonomous Exile Groups I understand there will be a general discussion of autonomous exile groups at the Special Group meeting today. Here are a few points which you might ' find useful. 1, There are a number of disadvantages in the status quo. First, at best, these raids will make it tougher to keep the lid on Cuba between now and November. This is just the sort of thing that can evoke a highly irrational response from Castro. As things stand, Castro seems convinced that we are tied irto the raids -- as indeed we are. Second, at worst, these raids could touch off a U-2 shootdown and a first class Caribbean crisis. As a matter of fact, is is probably more likely that autonomous raids will produce a shoot- down than that they will produce an overthrow of the Castro regime. Inthis | regard, it can be argued that even without autonomous raids, the odds against a shootdown are not all that good. Third, Tom Mann would probably argue that ~ the continuance of autonomous raids would make more difficult the enforcement of the warning language in the OAS resolution -- i.e. our own hands should be clean. 2. Assuming we don't like the status quo (I, for one, do not), there seem to be . the following courses of action open to us. (a) -We can make a real effort to stop the raids. While CIA says this can't be done, this may not be true. For example, the cessation of assistance, in- . creased U.S. surveillance of the Caribbean, and pressure on Nicaragua and Costa Rica would probably do the trick. But this is a drastic step and would lead to angry charges in the U.S. and else- where that we are lending positive support to Castro. It is probably a step we would not want to take unless it became clear that these exile raids, which are -out of our control, were propelling us to the brink. (b) We can search harder for an alternative to the U-2. With Castro's shootdown capability removed, the raids would probably be somewhat more tolerable -- though still troublesome between now and November. (State and DOD are still-looking into the possibilities of alternatives to the U-2. Preliminary reports, however, are not particularly hopeful.) . SECRET - EYES ONLY | _ Copy” “unset Docld: 32423484 Page 165 . . “Lyndon B. ‘Joh nson Li brary.
SECRET - EYES ONLY ~, -2- (c) Using our support as leverage,’ we can try to discourage the exile groups from making raids of the higher noise-level variety -- e.g. externally- rnounted raids are bad but internally-mounted raids, which smack less of U.S. involvement, are O.K, | (d) We can cut off all U.S. ties with these exile groups -- e.g. money, equip- ment, intelligence information. The exile grapevine is reportedly a sensitive . one and the word would get around that we are really not involved. Hopefully, the word will also reach Castro, and if further raids occur (as CIA says they will), he will keep his eye focussed on the exiles and not on us. In cutting off support, we can take the line with the autonomous groups that we have been disappointed with such things as highly colored press conferences; misinformation about intentions (Artime told us he was going to attack one place and he attacked another); and indiscreet conversations (Ray with Tad Szulc). After due consideration we have decided in favor of a "hands-off" policy. We ‘wish the exiles well, but they are on their own from here on in. ' One argument against this course of action is that Artime and Ray will blab to the world that they had been getting support from the U.S. This might not be an insuperable obstacle -- e.g. we survived'a similar and more potent situation in _1963 when we cut off the CRC's water. . 3. John Crimmins tells me that-the Special Group may be faced with some decisions this afternoon. Manolo Ray recently asked the U.S. Government for three things -- (a) a special grant, (b) our influence with the Puerto Ricans in getting them to allow Ray to move a boat from Puerto Rico, and (c) our assistance in getting the Dominican Republic to allow Ray to establish a base in that country. As I_see it, we might be able to meet 3(a) and 3 (b) without excessively prejudicing A actions to change the status quo. 3(c), which involves talking to a third party, seems another story, however. We might not want to tie our hands in this “way until we are certain that we are not going to change from our present course, i Gordon Chase SECRET - EYES ONLY | | : Copy Docld:32423484 Page 166 ' on. Lyndon B. Johnson Library. '
22 June 1964 Memorandum for the Record ' Subject: Preliminary Meeting with Attorney General, 19 June 1964 . Reference : Minutes of Meeting of 303 Committee of 18 June 1964 on , overall subject of Cuba. | le - ; In accordance with the decisions made in paras 4 and 7 7 of reference minutes, the undersigned, at the direction of Mr. Bundy, met with the Attorney General for what he 4 ified a preliminary meeting... CANE a In regard.to Major Oliva, The Committee had reached the conclusion that the Attorney General was the person with the most prestige and influence who would be likely to dissuade subject from- seeking support at this time for large scale, high noise level operations against Cuba. When this.-proposal was made to the Attorney General he indicated his high? regard for the Major and stated that he was not willing to reject sSsertures unless alternatives were offered. It was | pointed out that,since Oliva was an activist and a man of strong purpose, he was jot likely to accept alternatives. The Attorney General stated that he would be willing to discuss the matter at a- forthcoming 303 Committee meeting. . , In regard to the memorandum to’ the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Gstro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee"s £i ine that this was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General indicated that the Department of Justyce would look into the matter. | Beg A & a nes PETER “JESSUP we tee DocId: 32423484 Page ry ne Lyndon B. Johnson
Docld: 324273454 Page 166 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. | ig August 1964 “MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs SUBJECT: Status of FBI Investigation re Plans’ by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders / 1. This memorandum is for your information in response to a 303 Committee query of 30 July 1964 regarding the status of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate Cuban government leaders. a 2. The following is a summary of the investigation to date. 3. Subsequent to CIA's dissemination of information regarding "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders'' (report disseminated by CIA to the 303 Committee and selected key officials as CSDB-3/661, 653 dated 10 June 1964), the Federal Bureau of Investigation has interviewed all of the people involved in the plot except Byron Cameron. Cameron is now in Mexico on a business trip; he may possibly return to Miami on 7 August at which time the FBI plans to interview him regarding the plan. The FBI has not decided if it will interview CIA's other source or if it will re-interview all of the people involved in the plan. 4, The FBI, as a result of its investigation, has disseminated a total of seven (7) reports regarding this matter. A summary of these reports follow: _ Teofilo Babun Selman specifically denied to the FBI that he had any involvement in; or knowledge of, any plan to assassinate selected Cuban government officials. He admitted contact with Julio Lobo Olavarria, but denied discus sing the plan with him and stated that Eduardo Garcia Molina was present during the meeting with Lobo and that Garcia could verity his statements. - a Copy Lyndon B.. Johnson Library eee ecuh
Docld: 324234684 Page 169 b. Eduardo Garcia Molina advised the FBI that he knew of the plan and that he was present when Babun discussed it with Lobo. _e. Julio Lobo Olavarria advised the FBI that Babun had told him of the plan and of Byron Cameron. Babun had asked him to con-. tribute funds for the plan and he tentatively agreed to furnish funds, but later declined. Lobo also told the FBI that he had discussed the ' plan with CIA. d. Jose M. ''Pepin'' Bosch informed the FBI that he had heard of the plan in general terms and that he had reported it to the ' CIA, He denied that he had 1 agreed to furnish funds for the plane e@. Eliseo Gomez Fernandez informed the FBI that he had no. knowledge of the plan. ~ .f, Ceferino Oscar Fernandez Veiga informed the FBI that he had no | knowledge of the plan. g- Major John Doherty of the St. Louis, Missouri, City Police Department advised the FBI that he is now in charge of the Field Operations Division. of the St. Louis Police Department and formerly was connected with the Vice Squad of this department. Doherty stated that he had no idea as to who would be involved with the Mafia and who would be in a position to participate in plans to carry out executions of Cuban government officials. h. All other people interviewed by the FBI denied knowledge of the plan. JOHN A. McCONE Director vo | Copy” - Lyndon ‘B. Johnson Library