} Classif ~ 1 SECRET assification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) debriefing of A-l were forwarded to the Chief of? a Pispe te a OO 4 Station in| (CIA Doc. + ee 7763, cevitr the cmn ts on May 1, was under contract” with the CIA for " Operational purposes. aa ‘f » CIA Doc. Contract A rovin “Officer Memo TE 6/64) to og © ean pec. ontract ApPro g 1 6/6/ / By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1l would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: There is no. question in my mind that A-! ammuG-I is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, y Oo and agents... (CIMBSéé,— yangeseh- Memor SLACK Mtry Directer—ef—Security, 6/23/64) As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of | 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Dora§ ae a of TK ido VN a OL Illegal Section B (CIA Doc. IN 68894 4/24/64 which was responsible for training agents for 7 : assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi~ bility pertained to handling of agent operations ee ge a idee I sree in El Salvador. Kern Doc. Personal Record “WaeseLoR=) en eee mE: eh, Peal. on i {naire 6/4/64; CIA _Doc. [dim 68894 4/24/64) _ wer © a eel aac a een A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli- gence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows: iy é a 2 00635 sf Classified by derivation: Classification:
MT To LT LT LT MT a - 73 - Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (‘I might say that some_of..these=-names,_ a 2.0 of are familiar to_me.)(Langosch debriefi iGé Qf A-1/""4730764, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64) .) ee arf eon OE RE, venteapetna ge - a ooaret A aetna rane set a TN Thus, A-~l was able to provide the CIA soon _ after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City. w En Sect Fam pla The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-l. This. examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining to the assassination of’ President Kennedy;: and 2) whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information were made HEM, ‘available to the Warren Commission. Es, Classification: Classified by derivation:
(This form is to be used for material extracted ; ; from ClA—controlled documents.) The Committee's initial review of the _ materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during the course of its review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made reference to A-1l. Included in this file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by | Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. icra, Doc. “FOIA 68= Fon agen FAR, SPEAR IRIO ct ABC Ldigosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) _Also contained within Sot ove cramer POA on ye reaps cree this file were the A-1l debriefing memorando. of anmsannereetmitanet URN mei net na REN Ie nt a Calderon.” CIA Doc. FOIA #687- 295, attach's . ul 2 and §) Ollowing review of the memoranda, the May 7, and. May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard "206 } Committee requested access to all CIA files - ; or - concerning referring to A-l. From review of these materials the Committee has determined that the Warren Commission did learn i) See during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probabl had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City. Classification: fe 8 Classified by derivation:
an, (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<entrolled documents.) he Waren CommiSSivn Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the: CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter- ; intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee | Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that. ‘the Director consent to an interview before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on oO =o FF that date -PELOE to McCone' S appearance) >“sai¥en~ Commission Report, See resep) cra Doc. FOTA 689-298, Streep F eemacere LF tan. ames~Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton also wrote: ; I discuséed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere| source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of-new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appear- ance unless we have-first had some pre- liminary reaction or made sure that the > Director is fully aware of the implica~ tions since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this care- fully amd made (sic) a decisten ¢ as to- ay, HK the question of timing. /(Ibid<) y “— _ Classification: | Classified by deriv if}: -§-9 3 — Se.
MT KS £7 £9). 7 47 a Classification: _ Sey (rhs form is to be. used for material extracted Ul t unadt SBeed Ty he Seeds source referred to in Angleton's memo was A~1l. this conelusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which was quite close in time to A-l's defection. In addition, Rocca's staff prepared prior to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren a "Brief Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission a outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative. efforts and assistance to the Pee eh AL tn a a Neg ge es weet pes Commission \ (cra 1 Doc. FOIA 695- ~302-A, 5/14/ 4)}3 PERRO HCR FE Inn A IMRT NB BH Of oe soe eT at aan arcs pape At Tab E of this brief it states: gore Ores aes Within the past week, significant infor- mation has been developed by the CIA re- garding the relationship with Oswaid of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to. the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff ‘ot 1 O Cuban asspect. (bid. , Tab E)) an eae 7 Seaiamige irons SS On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal > Y/ communication regarding A-1. -"(GIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64) However, the Agency did not. at. ‘that time identify A-1l by his real name or - eryptonym nor did one es een wet ee the Agency indicate that ‘the source of this information ‘omeransennen £° ea} ht Classification: Classified by don WOG99 - Em. HB. | .
_ Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) — ae was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. The May 15 communication did . state that the Agency had established contact "with a well-placed invidivual _ who has been in close and prolonged contact with | ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia." . Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro- bable contact with ‘the DGI in Mexico City. The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. — As set forth in the section of this report. concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa- EA. tion set forth in the iiemo was elicited. Neither the questions nor the memo shown to Willens made Lo reference to the source's status as a defector col- — ‘ “2S laborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-316, 6/19/ 64). . a Classification: ee 090109 : | Classified by derivation: an & a3
Se “eT EF MF LP ka -~ 79 - Cre page 78) Classification: 4a | (This form is to be used for Brick from ClA—controlled documents.) ‘Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon , Specifically of Nov. 22 w,details of her her conversation and~2ssociation with Cuban Intelligence pote CNA VOLS WRRenehe from the Warren Commission. This: information as described above, was derived from However, debriefings of A-l. from the Committee! s review of the A-l file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-l to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that a as : specific document referenced in the A-1l file is not present in that file. ‘The. missing itemis of considerable concern to the Committee. It isa debriefing. xeport of. Age solo oe PD prpakeed NO entitled "The Oswald case." “(CIA Doc Bispetch-tPGw- Att i SN nse rape masa te enlig Fae 3/23/65) n March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records—thé transmittal of the report, along. with “217 tpfa) Next to eleven other A-1l debriefing reports the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "ST." A CIA employee ; who has worked extensively with the Agency files Classification: "A Classified by derivationg) 1 1.0L
interviewed by the Committee, stated that-he did not er 4 ' he does not. reca snot This frm is te be used for matsiial sntats em cla—sentrelied documents.) ~80—- system told a Committee staff member that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component . 4 known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA . representatives believed the notation was a ‘| reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. IN a CIA memorandum dated September 27, 1978, the CIA has adopted the position that 4 debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964 | concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey Geers! abenk ) ORE ene possible rem with the Det. * rerthe (ess, + é ys & 7 srt hoe re Spat (tS (ip Botieta mie nshetes > a Feariebins Rupe ‘ Ae be a ic. & ca the’ Committee” fas Bet ES ns oe memorandum. officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-l's de-_ briefings..was_. supplied to, the _Warren Commissio (HSCA gai on wont Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite al Interviews of" Bildago & piceoio) “He also stated that —sSrided any other information Glassification: 000102 4 ed dpeivation: —C-—Berk ssified fassift
a -Y a a 47 2 a ae 4 | Classification; ss __ This fam is te e.g! ar awit? rom ClA—eeniralled &SSHmEHts)) *The CIA memorandum states in part as follows: When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's defection and considered the possibility that he might have some knowledge of the Oswald case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing AMMUG~-1...WH desk records reflect that AMMUG=1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive matter, it was dictated directly to a CI (Counterintelligence) stenographer on 5 May 1964. /Note: A-1 was debriefed on several subjects on 4 May 64. ‘The procedure was to assign each subject discussed a debriefing number and they were written up in contact report form by the WH case officer. The instructions from CI staff were to handle the Oswald case debriefing é very closely and not to keep any copies in | WH Division/. - The "Oswald Case" was . logged in the WH notebook log as debriefing report number 40, but the report itself was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly to a CI staff stenographer. There would be no reason to include the number 40 on the report of this special debriefing for CI staff, since it was their only debriefing _Yveport. We are certain it is the debriefing > report (#40) becausé: the date is the’ same; it is the only debriefing report on Oswald - listed in AMMUG-1 records; and it it (sic) the only AMMUG-1 debriefing report in Oswald's 201 file. % Class p-fie & (CIA Doc., Memorandum for the Record, Regandéng g001033 ep. ty aE —_—————
Glassification:. This form is te be used for moter Satiagted om €lA—cenitrslled decuments:) ~§il- on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 Gia.) a> 2/7 as discussed herein. a to /locate AY The mens seepmete’ © to é vocate ani /whose present relationship with the Ag enck is ambd< uousy but has “been ufable A to detefmine his prégént whereabouts /* Thé CIA's. PA é a inability to losies Awl has been 3” sourre of | concern to’ this; ‘Committee, particularly in light of his long association with the jtency- Pre rnauas tacomplaie witae ens aan wa awa Acomariema~ 1 v TT pS, may have supplied the CIA about’Oswald. However, dith the exception of the Calderon episode and on the basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1l . information of investigative significance. A separate question remains, however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A~-l was present in the a fi. o Pe ® oe x a aA 0090194 | clea By, rit: —excBerk _ i
-Glassification: mre (This form is 19 be used for material extracted am ElA—centreted decumeantsy) ~8la- *An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding A-l states in pertinent part: Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved om in any CIA operation in Miami or elsewhere. hep, JSeseph-Nerris is the alias of a CIA representative who periodically debriefs (A-1) on personalities and methods of the. . is n other CIA involvement with yg ey al€ (CIA Doe... 9807602;-CiA_ BOR4ET, LT E ‘ih Vol. 4, A-I File 1) However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning the Agency status of A-1 states: Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that (A-l) is still an active contact, not receiving any salary, but could be paid if and when used in an operation. No problems here. SPOB will k his, eontract in an . active folder. (CIA oo “Handwritten Note, iS 15 April min contained in’ Vol. 4 of A-1 file. & tient 2 ovo1es f : | Clossified ° derivation: SB erk | ivation: Giassificatign: aU ING S3
~ 82 - Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted . Washing torfronDCtA—eontesllednepcumentel controlled: conditions, accessible to the Commission.’ Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-l as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option. In light of the establishment of A-l's kona fides, . - 7 ee 7 , his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might | well have been considered by the Warren Commission. . Ah ; ire The AMLASH Operation Cte be ince cee code ake or itreisan Ae During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA~Mafia plots and an sp RET Classified by derivation: Classification: 909106
a SEER EL ~ Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted , ‘ from ClA—controlled documents.) Agency project referred to as the AMLASH pat operation, (CTA 1 Inspector General Report 1967 ae ‘a pp. 1-74, 78-112)" The AMLASH operation involved Sorter Ex, official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting oo with a CIA representative expressed the desire BO ns Gres & goer assassinate Fidel Castré (Ibid., p. a4) ) As a result of AMLASH's expressed-OBSSGEIVC and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro pp. 80-94), The AMLASH operation was, terminated _ 5 by the CIA in 1965 as the result. of security leaks. anne (Ibid. pp. 104-10 During 1965, AMLASH and his ; conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against! Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced ae twenty-five years tapstaonment\ (abid. xp. 104 pp. 107 wie. ‘ . In its examination of the AMLASH operatic Gperation 4 the 1967, IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both - Classification: J 009107 Classified by derivation:
MT OT I 7 LF ~ 84 — Classification: : (This form is to be used for material extracted , from ClA—controlled documents. ) The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." we wer ry f gots bas The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when—AMLASH—was tried-iwavarepress reports of Cuban knowledge of AMLASH's association with the CIA weredated from November 1964, approximately one @ year after President The Church Committee in Book V of its Final aan > Kennedy’ s assassination, ~“(Ibid. p. iwi) y< ae lke, Book.V, pp. 2-7, 67759) The Church Committee ee Waa Ri par RADIAN fA IY SORTER a concluded: ort. examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. ¢ , The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commision work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH Classification: 0108 Classified by derivation:
of the assassination; unlike the earlier operation and President Kennedy's “assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti- Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<controlled documents.) operation was in progress at the time plots, the AMLASH operation could Clearly be traced to the CIA; and ° f unlike. the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's | assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) “was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investi- gated a connection between the AMLASH Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation of questions OD of Cuban government or Cuban exile 7 @ involvement in the assassination./( (Ibid. p. 5) \ Classified by derivation: ~ gogie9 ?
ey _t. _ ‘ Classification: (This form is to be used: for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) os In 1977, the CIA issued a. second-Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA oo f Sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states: - The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassina- tion of JFK in order to support the SSc . View that it should have been Eeported. +k 23 4 wae to the Warren Commission{(” (1977 IGR p. a) The 1977 TGR concluded that pF (<) aa assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH Operation was not an assassination plot. Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did. Prate: fe Warren “CommisSion) ena broader view aL ave e of = fspeci c terms® then saw in neral térms-- he pos ibilit of Soviet or Cuban “involvément . if the assassination because ofthe tenSions. of the time. It is not ‘enough’ to be able to point SE. » Classification: 900110 Classified by derivation: -