4) APR IS "97 G4:55Ph USGOVERNMENT - Sr P.2714 15 April 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR: pavid G. Marwell Rxecutive Director Assassination Records Review Board SUBJECT: CIA Employees (We request that thiga memorandum be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.) 1. (U) Isegue. The purpose of this memo is to relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of the true names of CIA employees that appear in the oFK Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem might be addressed. I. etyual fa] fo) 2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA employees have been ddentified in the JFK Collection. Some of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA ‘will continue to work with the Review Board to release as many of these names 4&8 possible. Many names, however, appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and appear to add nothing to the historical record. 3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to the employee would likély result from guch release. Since these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly clear that the number of names at issue, and, in.most cases, their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to SEK Act 6 11) (5) CL BYP L$ : CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1 | DRV FROM: HUM 4-82 HW 55157 DBocld:32404520 Page 33
.” .APR 15 ’97 4:55PM USGOVERNMENT ; P.3714 Subject: CIA Employees» protect national security information and the Review Board's duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a “sugspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons, even though they might have legitimate needs to protect their identities. , 4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting information on each of them to present to the Review Board will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how and when the Review Board releases information to the public. More importantly, the decision to publicly acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30 years under cover is a critical one that should be made not ‘by default, but rather by careful planning and consideration. 5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy for releasing true names of sources of intelligence information. It was agreed at that time that there would be a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where a source was particularly important to the JFK story and there..was no overriding national security interest, the name would:be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there are gome sensitivities involved with sources that do not apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and operational similarities, which are described herein, that justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting employee names that appear in the Collection, with . — exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are important to the JFK story. — Le ration 6. ~-(U) Ags both covert CIA employees and clandestine reporting assets are types of “human sources" of intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section li(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires release of information, it takes precedence over all other lawa that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong governmental national security interests in protecting the true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is 2 SECRET HW 55157 DocId:32404520 Page 39
APR “15 ’97. B4:56PM USGOVERNMENT P aia —SECREF Subject: CIA Employees ! important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which protect classified information, because they clearly reflect a larger US Government policy to protect coverti CIA employees from disclosure. 7.  (U) By Executive order and statute, the President and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI responsible for protecting sources.~ With the establishment of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section 103 (d) (3), codified at 50 USC §403 (3) (c) (5), requires the DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In addition, §403(3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in the collection of intelligence through human sources are - minimized. , 8. (U) ‘Protecting the identity of individuals working for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, ;Congress specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the publication or disclosure of the: organization, functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers’ of pexsonnel employed by the Agency. “9, (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving or potentially involving Claseified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected the names of CIA employees from public release even in criminal trials where there are- heightened (i.e.,,. constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of Classified information, including the identity of CIA employees who may have 4nformation pertaining to the defense, before it is {introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such as in’a summary.. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the 3 —SHEREF- AW 55157 Docld:32404520 Page 40
“HW 55157 APR’ 1S ’97 @4:S8PM USGOVERNMENT — oo. P.5714 Subject: CIA Employees defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other caseg, the defense was never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General hag the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great. 10. (U)° In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA employees’ by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection | Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of ~' a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a “covert agent" to prosecution and provides up. to 10 years in prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act specifically defines a “covert agent" as including "an officer or employee of an intelligence agency... ." 11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12958 on classified national security information that became effective in October 1995. Although it requires generally that agencies make greater declassification efforts than under the prior executive order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of “dntelligence information, which would include employees, extra protection from the declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and having historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing. the identity of a human source may continue to be protected. 12. (U) The above federal laws show a long-standing practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a “high priority. \ IIT. Operational Considerations 13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may . appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations for protecting their identity are similar to those for sources. Many of these employees have worked “under cover" for CIA. Cover ia used to digassociate entire installations and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to . 4 SECRETS Docld:32404570 Page Al
APR “1S ’97 4:59PM USGOVERNMENT - ‘ P.6/14 Subject: CIA Employees certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent embarrasament to host foreign governments, and to permit plausible denial of CIA's presence and activitieea in foreign countries. ee . . 144. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or "friendly" country, should the local service become aware of who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance ana make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it becomes known among the locals that certain US Government officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert employees and their families would face increased risk to their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our employees could face some personal risks as well as risks. to ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among an otherwise benign local population. In any of these cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from. the field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in an operationally and physically secure location. Thus, maintaining cover ig important to a case officer's effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA. 15. {87 Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important to cover providers. The Review Board will recall. from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United State overseas, can work under “official" (e.g. cover or "non- official" covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of... ‘the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also 7F negatively affect the governmental or business mission of - the cover provider, especially those who provide non- =. official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a-host country and possibly in other countries could. have a negative impact on the [CCC“‘“‘CC*#i Antherests and activitiea... It would alao cast suspicion on chat| employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community. 16. (8) Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA axe 5 SECRET “HW 55157 Docld:32404520 Page 42
APR’ 15 737 @S:GGPM USGOVERNMENT P.?7/14 Subject: CIA Employees not diminished. Similar to sources, many. former’ employees still do not want their past affiliation with’ CIA revealed. Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional © 7 relationships. Some former employees still live overseas where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can threaten their business interests and personal safet ep One example of an employee in this category is. i apparently appears only once in the he currentl 8 a consultant business and frequently travels tof] Release of his name would jeopardize not only his buginess but perhaps even his safety. A similar example is| j lwho also retired under | cover. He is now working in[ and several [__]countries for a private firm. He does not want his mame published, becauge it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status. 17. {8 Even if a former employee agrees to the revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals recruited by the employee and still providing information to the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations where. the employee worked throughout his career, including some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and may have believed they were legitimately providing information to a US corporate representative would be upset to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government. 18. (U). Finally, the identification of case officers by their own service would have a chilling effect on prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to enter into a clandestine relationship with American. intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even its own staff employees from public disclosure. iV. Proposal 19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions made for those individuals who are important to the story of the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a 6 —SGECRET HW 55157 DBocld:324045270 Page 43
- APRS ’97 @5:G1PM USGOVERNMENT . P.8/14 —SHeRET— Subject: CIA Employees substitution: for the true name be used. If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout the records, a particular identifying. substitution’ can be used for a particular employee. ~ ff ff 20. {8) CIA believes that this approach will not | undermine the Review Board's. obligations under the JFK Act. A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84 -of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals’ identity can add anything of significance to the historical . record; yet there may be some security concerns’ still : associated with these individuals. For example, ‘Yetired under cover and is currently living in © Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in the JFK Collection and was subject.to public release, he told CIA that he was opposed to’having his name released and - believed such a release could pose personal ‘and security problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name even appeared in the Collection, since he had no recollection of being involved in anything related to the assassination. 21. (8) With regard to the approximately 500 names that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast majority of these individuals played almost no role in the -JFK story. One example of this is former DO officer Citis name appears approximately. 20-30 times.in the Collection simply because he signed off on name trace requests. we. [was a covert CIA employee and retired under cover. The public release of his name would provide the public with _no additional significant information about JFK. [_________—ijig# another example of a covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but has little or no connection to the JFK story. retired under cover, is living in_South America, and objects to the release of his name. Mr.[__]recent letter to CIA is also attached for your convenience. 22. {8% The Agency, of course, recognizes that some -namea may be particularly important to the JFK story regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee. In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose names should be releaged to the public. These names would carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result 7 SECRET “HW 55157 Docld:32404520 Page 44
APR “LS °97 @5:2PM USGOVERNMENT ‘HW 55157 Attachme é A. letter P.9714 Subject: CIA Employees from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate searches to determine whether release would pose national security concerns for the US Government or personal safety concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review of the sequestered collection. 23. (U) It ig our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not undermine the important principle of protecting thoge who work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience. * EK Act 6 (1) (A) JFK Act 6 (1) (B) Docld: 37404570 Page 45
4 APR+15 797 GS:G3PM USGOVERNMENT _ P.18/14 Subject: CIA Employees DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97) OGC-97-50971 Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 - Gc 1 - Lit File - LDGO0021 1 - LCC Signer 1 - RDC - FYI 1 - OGC Registry “HW 55157 Docld:32404520. Page 46
‘Key Figures (A) List Release: . FNU Connally FNU Feinglass Daniel Flores Lorna McKay George Misko David Wilsted 2. For the remaining 38 names on the lists, we will provide evidence supporting their cover status and the need for continued protection as available. By 7 July you should have either specific evidence or a status of search statement for each individual. Barry Harrelson Attachments: Cover history printouts (3) [available in CIA SCIF] HW 55157 DBocld:324045270 Page 46
~ JFK Act 6 (1) (A) , a JEK Act 6 (1) (B) . Lae . | a, SA. hm. oe i “SECRECY AGREEMENT il. I understand that upon enter- ing on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a posi- tion of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the Presi- dent and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the security of the United States of America. I understand that in the course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency. 2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title 18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure “of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter. 3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to disclose any classified information relating to the Agency without proper authoriza- tion. I.undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it. 4, I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal. 2+ I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature of a publication or which would reasonably be: expected to result in pub- licity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for-my dismissal. FORM NO. 368 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS : 1 DEC 55 HW 55157 DBocld:32404520 Page 49
- oo , (When Filled In) oy . : . t * 6. I understand that for all grievances and complaints there are estab- lished procedures within the-Agency permitting appeal by any employee of _the Agency and to carry any such grievance or complaint outside the Agency will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in paragraph 3... If the appeal procedures are inadequate. in any situation, I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any employee with a legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint. 7. I further understand .and agree that my employment by the Central In-. -telligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto. 8. Inasmuch as employment: by the Government is a privilege not a right, in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or participate in the publication of any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific prior approval by the Agency. 9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in con- nection with my official duties with the Central Intelligence Agency ‘remains the property of the United States of America, and I will sur- render, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Agency or upon separation from the Agency, any material relating to such information and intelligence in my possession. 10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion. a4 Zz Li a 5 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 7 day of . Diels _» 1962. | Seal) “SEK Act 6 (1) (A) i B Witness: JEK Act 6 (1) (B) ag JUL 1962 Date HW 55157 DBocld:324045270 Page 50
> “A. DEC 11.795) 113140M ‘AW 55157 a Docld: 32404520 ‘Page 51 V.E—& R ; SHE T Tos "Mr. Burry Hanelion Far: (703) 351-2114 Date: December 11, 1995 Pages: 3, including this cover sheet, The types of information that the Board needs to know about each of the truc nomes on the attached list for which CLA seeks continued protection are listed below: - 1. Is the individual a current or former CIA employee? If so, in what capacity did that individual serve, and did he or sha serve overtly or covertly? If currently a retired CLA employee, did the individual retire under cover? 2. Ifnat a CIA officer, did the Individual serve CLA a6 an agent or asset of in any other capacity? 3. Is the individual alive or dead? If alive, where is he or she regiding, and what is his or her current activity? 4. What specific and campelling danger would release of this individual’s true namc pose to him or her at this time? Of course, you do nnt need to do anything other than identify those individuals whose true names CIA no longer seaks to protect. Fram tha deck of... Noete C. Gray Technical Assistant bor Reasearch and Analysts ‘ Assaccination Recorda Review Board |, 3600nd Floor ~ See cet Attack ment
55157 *\ | DEC 11 °9S 11:18AM o DoclId: 3274045270 Page 52 104-10017-10042 a “T0015+10163 Riefe Ld 104-10016-10006 104-10015-10138 TOE-THN9S-10001, Milly Rodrigues, Jane Roman Tom Ryan -104-10018-10096 104-1001 7-10042 104-10017-10031 TOET0015-10143 Mr. Swensoa Oo 104-10015-10233 104-10015-10163. Dr. Stanojevic 104-10017-10001 Boris Tarasoff 104-10095-10001 104-10018-10062 104-100 (Sams es 104-10017-10035 1) 104- 10004-10257 Franklia Anthony, Whealack Garcia 104-10015-10192 [| ~__ 104-10017-10056 JEK Act 6 (1) (A)° JEK Act 6 (1) (B) -SEERET
“ wwe 24 DD . dd swrwi Charlle Flick 104-10018-100R9 104-10095-10001 104-10095-10001 eS 104-10015-10043 men en Lorn _ Peter Burana ve John Harvey 100016101 104-10015-10158 _104- -10016-10033 °° 104-10018-10062 . Willlom Johnson 104-10017-10052 104-10015-10396 . (“Johnson” released in 104-1005. Leona Couer 10375) 104-10018-10099 ~ ‘Tim dung , — OF tonts-10962 Tom Keenag : 104-10095-1000{ ‘104 ors on9 104-10015- 10160 10-1001. 10053 ppp 104-10015-10110 104-10015-10305 a = 10015-10339 104-. “10017-10042 104-10015-10155 —SEERET- . HW 55157 Docld:32404520 Page 53