104-10413-10423 aa i t ‘ Ne ~ poe 7 POPC SURLY OcHOH TE Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Guban Embassies (1963) - 1. SUni lateral Coverage: | — | From the time the Mexica Station was opened in April (1949 untit the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in{T9553 the Station had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from. the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation. Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by an employee of the local c~tetephone conipany-who- was} handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post _ nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican- - American recruited agents. Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer ~ --assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC ‘and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Em- bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en- trance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the E2, IMPDET yr CL BY 004645 “ae
13-00000 ee ae a ee 1 i i i | ot vt | i | SO ais Ha SEGRE L/SENSHINL ‘Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Sta- tion received word that the photograph of the “unidentified man" was being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photo- ' graphic base. It was located in an upper story of an apartment building on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of | the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet - Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a . row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a re- cruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then de- veloped and printed into 8 xX 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was originally processed in the Station but in early (195%, due to the resig- nation of a technician, this film like that of LIMITED and LILYRIC was processed on the outside by a recruited agent. 2
13-00000 ( | } t i Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. “‘Thése two officers organized a surveillance team of Six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for identification purposes. The Station also conducted aqnrateral;mail intercept operation, | LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. (A récruited> Mexican agent, who had_a semiofficial status, obtained selected letters from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system. 2. <ebaison) Coverage: tiaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the SeTean Seneca at that time. The Mexican Direction pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This-Ministry was principally occupied with political Unvestigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were 33 et, and corrupt. * Station j <officertrained a numberof them_in name tracing and —travelccontrot comes iy) <1958, ,-at—the_instigation_ofa- diexican_ “official, 3 a Joint telephone » tapp @peration=came into exis tence,—The- operation, whith became: known asp
13-00000 y CETENVOVS aids “runby~a Mexican office. The listening post had 30 lines ga connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by ‘Mexican cAemy officers. In 1961, xbecause*of mismanagement: by=the-MexTcan—pr in-~ a : — I ee ae — , gcipats3 the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A _ Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also an American technician inside the listening post. 3. Oswald Coverage: In mid-1962, the—Mexican-officer—in-charge of LTENVOY (thé) goint-tap operation) .asked-the-American officer—at_the LIENVOY listening ee we post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Em- bassies dn-anticipation_of—possiblecoverage. The Station immediately disconnected—altof ‘the unilateral telephone taps~on these-Embassies” $6, that they would not be discovered-when the Mexicans “hooked-up” their (taps. The Méxtcans, soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian 4 SEPRET cEMeITL ve Or Cr ne Ce Te OLUALL SLESHTTL
13-00000 “ea language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location ~ for translation. and typing. Mr. Boris Tarasoff did. the Russian transla- tions but because of. the volume of Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation. As soon as the Station learned that an American identi tying him- E self as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the: | ’ . Station started. screening all photographs. (However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film, did so on a night-time basis. Further, ‘photographs were not made: initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera at the end of. each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. | vA - The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours) and to oe . : photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with | foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical dif- i ficulties. . Oswald came. to the attention of the listening post operators from a tap of the Soviet line... It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris
13-00000 Tarasoff for translation because the caller was -trying to speak in. Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the | photographs with the typed transcript. AN] transcripts were made in 7 either Spanish or Engl ish since the Chief of Station could read only - ; these two languages and because he personally screened the transcripts for operati onal leads. 6 SEGRE IL /SchSi Ne 2