[to4-t0703-10068] SECRET CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA PRIOR TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F.° KENNEDY ON 23 NOVEMBER 1963 A. “INTRODUCTION . 1. Agency planning and operations directed at Cuba during the latter part of 1959, 1960 and early 1961 were almost totally devoted to the | development of the paramilitary operation which culminated in the Bay of Pigs invasion on 17 April 1961. During this period, major efforts were devoted to training a paramilitary force, formation of a Cuban exile organization in Miami to direct opposition activities and to provide future Cuban leadership and a propaganda campaign designed to rally op- position to Castro in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. _ . 2. Some of the actions initiated during 1960-61 continued following the defeat of the Agency supported Cuban brigade. For ‘example, prior to the break in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the U. S. on 3 January 1961, CIA maintained.a Station in Havana. This Station recruited and trained intelligence agents and procured and cached communications equipment to form a staybehind net to provide intelligence on Cuba following the break in diplomatic relations. Fol lowing the Bay of Pigs defeat, this net continued to function providing information on Cuba via radio communication and Latin American diplomatic pouches. Radio °  E2, IMPDET SECRET CL BY 055636
14-00000 SECRET Swan is another example of an operation which continued after the Bay of Pigs. It was established in the Spring of 1960 as a component of the anti-Castro propaganda campaign. It continued in this role until its termination in 1968. - | 3. Following the Bay of Pigs and in response to administration urgings to do something about Castro, CIA established a large Station in Miami in September 1961 to continue operations against Cuba. The - operations described below were developed and run by the Miami Station; many of them were still in the developmental stage at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. 4. The Station initiated three major classes of activities: intelligence collection/espionage, covert action/propaganda, and - infiltration/exfiltration actions. It should be noted that there was no clear delineation between these activities, e.g., an exile organi- zation primarily engaged in propaganda on the Agency's behalf might also provide positive intelligence information from interrogation of ' an exile or provide candidates for an infiltration team to perform sabotage. It should also be noted that infiltration/exfiltration ac- tions were undertaken for a variety of purposes such as espionage, sabotage and to assist defectors. Aside from intelligence collection, all of the remaining activities would constitute forms of covert action. ~2- SECRET
14-00000 SECRET. B. COVERT ACTION/PROPAGANDA (1. Agency Supported Cuban Exile Organizations: CIA provided monetary support and guidance td a number of Cuban exile organizations in the Miami area who disseminated anti-Castro propa- ganda. Some of these organizations came into existence through Cuban - exile initiative, but they became largely dependent on CIA to- carry on their activities. a. Directorio Magisterial Revolucionario (DMR) : _ An exile teachers organization im which CIA became “interested in early 1961. DMR produced a bulletin (Magisterio. Cubano Libre) which was mailed to 18 Latin American countries, to DMR members and to press ‘and. radio organizations in the U.S. Radio programs directed at Cuba were pre- pared and broadcast over station WMIE in Miami. Copies of these programs were sent to various Latin American countries and were broadcast over 88 different stations. The DMR also produced seven TV programs which were broadcast over Channel 2 in Miami. The theme of DMR propaganda was the. destruction of the Cuban educational system by Castro. The head of DMR attended the National Education Association meeting in 1962, gave’ a talk . at the meeting and was instrumental in having a resolution. approved con- demning the Castro regime. By the end-of 1962, the DMR was mailing out. 350,000 booklets and‘ pamphlets a year to various Latin countries and France. SECRET
14-00000 SECRET b. Union Deportiva de Cuba Libre (UDCL): A sports oriented organization established by CIA in October 1962. Led by a well known Cuban sports figure and a’ prominent Cubari sports writer. Purpose of UDCL was to expose Cuban abuse of international sporting events for political propaganda purposes. UDCL leaders attended the IX Central American and Caribbean Games at Kingston, Jamaica in August 1962, disseminated anti-Castro propaganda and were in part responsible for . the defection of ten Cuban athletes. A similar operation was launched at the II Ibero-American Games at Madrid in October 1962 with less success. Propaganda was distributed and two defections were induced. Pamphiets were also distributed at the IV Panamerican Games at Sao Paulo, Brazil in January 1963: No defections were induced. In 1963, the UDCL is credited with obtaining a temporary suspension of Cuba from Olympic competition and changing the site of the XVI Amateur Basebal1 World Championship from - Cuba to another country. c. Comite DeOrganizaceones Juveniles Cubanas in el Exilio (COJCE): A youth organization headed by a former Cuban Boy Scout leader. © CIA began support to this organization in December 1962. Starting in July 1963, COUCE published a monthly bulletin with a distribution of several . thousand copies to Latin American and European youth contacts. Purpose of bulletin was to furnish information on the effect of Castro-Communist policies on Cuban youth. -~4- SECRET
14-00000 SECRET d. Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE); | Led by several former Cuban student leaders. CIA support to the DRE started prior to the Bay of Pigs. The DRE was primarily a para- military organization and prior to April 1961, 21 DRE ‘members were “trained and infiltrated into Cuba to create resistance and guerrilla units. This DRE apparatus was destroyed in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. Subse- - quent paramilitary operations also ended in fatiure and CIA withdrew its _ paramilitary support in December 1961. In January 1962, the DRE turned _ to hemispheric propaganda operations. ’ DRE sponsored students were placed in Latin American universities where they carried on anti-Castro activi- ties. This so-called student project also engaged in such activities as drumming up support for the U.S. position at the 1962 Punto del Este Con- ference and carrying out successful operations at the Helsinki Youth Festival in May 1962. Starting in 1962, the DRE began broadcasts over *NY shortwave radio station WRUL six days a week and Miami radio station WMIE once a week. The DRE also published an international. bulletin which was mailed to contacts throughout the hemisphere and a pony edition of 4,800 copies was mailed into Cuba. . | _ e. Frente Obero Revolucionario Democratico Cubano (FORDC): Established by CIA in October 1960 as a rallying point for middte and upper echelon trade unionists in exile. Led by former Cuban -~5- “SECRET
SECRET labor leaders, FORDC publ ished a weekly circular letter which was mailed ‘to Tabor organizations throughout Latin America, Prior to 1961, FORDC . " sponsored a daily program over Radio Americas (Radio Swan). Starting in December 1961, FORDC broadcast a daily program over Station WMIE. In addition to published and radio propaganda, | groups of FORDC Jeaders 1 were » sent on ‘trips throughout Latin America to maintain contact with hemi~. ” sphere Tabor leaders and to sample attitudes toward Castro. _ FORDC also” maintained contact with international labor organizations. 7 f. Unidad Revoluctonaria (UR): | | a | | "Originally established in Cuba in December 1960 as a clan- Bae destine resistance movement. Its leadership was largely put to death or imprisoned as a result of the Bay of Pigs. The organization was re- established in Miami in August 1962 with CIA support. A paramilitary - - arm was established in April 1963, but no effective paramilitary action was ever carried out. Starting in March 1963, UR sponsored a daily radio program over WMIE targetted at Cuban farmers and another daily program exposing Cuban internal security service activities. In duly 1963, UR initiated a shortwave broadcast from station WRUL, New York. The. UR utilized nonobjective, lurid propaganda themes. -The UR was also a prolific producer of propaganda pamphlets. During 1963-64, 1,442,500. items were mailed to Cuba and other Latin American countries. On a -6- SECRET
14-00000 SEC R ET. weekly basis the UR published a list of free world ships visiting Cuba. ‘This was consistently picked up by the Associated Press and Agence France Presse. Throughout its history, the UR was wracked with internal bickerings and power grabs which detracted from its impact. 2. Agency Supported Individuals: Aside from utilizing various extle organizations for propaganda purposes, CIA also supported several prominent exiles who prepared propa- ganda materials. Zig Zag Libre was a successful satire magazine in Cuba prior to the Castro regime. The Agency supported its former editor who published an edition for mailing into Cuba. In the 1963 period it was a Shee considered an effective weapon for ridiculing Castro. CIA also supported a former prominent student leader, and one of the former directors of Prensa Libre, a leading Havana newspaper. These individuals produced a . daily radio programs for Radio Swan and prepared propaganda materials. for publication. These individual efforts tended to be more effective - and to receive better audience response from Cuba than the organizational . broadcasts described above. . , 3. Agencia de Informaciones Periodesticas (AIP): AIP was a news information service financed by CIA. Agency sponsorship was. an open secret. It was designed to fill the gap in coverage by the regular news media. It was accepted in the hemisphere -7- SECRET
14-00000 | tributed to hemisphere radio stations. was smudged considerably as a result of its use in the Bay of Pigs opera- ; SECRET | 4 as an accurate and objective reporter of events. It prepared four news bulletins a week which were distributed to 1200 Latin Anerican news outlets’ and prepared radio tapes based on the bulletins which were dis-._ . = Radio Americas (Radio Swan): An Agency-financed radio station; the transmitter was located on Swan Island with broadcast studios in New York initially and later. Miami. : Started broadcasting in mid=1960 with entertainment programs purchased _ from Pan: American Broadcasting interspersed with news programs and propa-_ a ganda. CIA sponsorship was an open secret. Its image and credibility tion. Most audience. “response was received from Caribbean countries out side of Cuba. . | 5. Mailing Operation: . | Most propaganda mailing operations were directed to Latin American countries outside of Cuba. This project, initiated in 1963, was designed as a mass mailing operation into Cuba to encourage subtle sabotage, re~ sistance and harassment. Utilizing names and addresses from Cuban tele~ phone books, letters with fictitious return addresses were mailed to 7 Cuba from various Latin mer ican countries and by insertion into inter- _ national mail transiting the U.S. From refugee debriefings, it is known ~8- SECRET
_ SECRET 4 that some of this mail was delivered, but like most of ‘the operations de- ' scribed in this section, it is unknown if the program was effective in increasing Cuban resistance. C. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION/ESPTONAGE | | 1. Refugee and Defector Exploitation: Cuban: refugees were entering the United States at the 1 rate of 1700 per week during 1961-62. The Imnigration. and Naturalization Service (T&NS) = recorded basic biographic data on all incoming refugees. Cards, containing : this data, were provided to the Miami Station to conduct a file check, for __ counterintel ligence purposes. In reviewing the cards,, the Station identi- - fied refugees who might be used for operational purposes and arranged . "interviews which, Frequently, also provided positive intelligence infor- “mation. . - a | CIA's Domestic Contact Division (Deo) had primary responsibility. for obtaining positive intelligence information from refugees. DCD inter- viewed refugees of positive | intel Tigence interest at the Caribbean: ‘Admis- . sions Center (CAC) in Opa-Locka. These interviews were documented ‘in — Preliminary Information Reports (PIRs) which were provided to the Intel- ligence Community and to the Mian? Station for. review to obtain opera- ' tional leads. . | | Prior to the Cuban Missile crisis in October 1962, the flow of -9- SECRET.
14-00000 oF X. SECRET ~*~ < refugees was large, and it was relatively easy to obtain information on current events in Cuba and Cuban exiles that could be utiltzed opera- — tionally. Following the crisis, the flow of refugees decreased signifi” cantly. As a result,. the Station established a section to exploit | . refugees more intensively. to centralize files on refugees, and to pre- pare. studies on extle groups ‘operating in the U. S. ~. 2. Anonymous Organization Group: . oo oa During 1960-63, this Group ‘consisted of between 50 to 100. Cuban exiles who constituted a structured intelligence support group for the ‘Station. It performed a variety of functions for the Station, and it ot BSE was. the Station's prime source of information on. Cuban exile activities. : it is considered the Single most valuable operational activity under- taken by ‘the Station. Tn summary » this Group: a. Infiltrated exile groups: and reported on their. activities. - b. “Maintained extensive files on Cuban exiles, exile groups and Cuban Government personalities. | . c. Monitored Cuban radio broadcasts and summarized content. | | | | | | d. Produced intelligence. reports and special studies. e. Debriefed refugees. een . Recruited infiltration agents.. “= 10 - SECRET
14-00000 SECRET 3. Intelligence Net: In mid-1962, the Agency recruited a former Cuban politician to establish an agent net in Cuba. This individual recruited a member of the presidential entourage, a Cuban working in a foreign consul, and a third individual. These individuals recruited an extensive net of 150. subagents and informants which was very productive in reporting informa- tion of intelligence interest via the diplomatic pouch of the foreign consul. The high living and immoral behavior of one of the principfes) attracted the attention of the Cuban security service. This individual was arrested and interrogated prior to Christmas 1963 resulting in the arrest and conviction on espionage charges of all of the members of the net. . 4, Juana Castro: Juana Castro, younger sister of Fidel Castro, was one of the more significant CIA agent recruitments. She was a strong supporter of her brother until she realized he had led the revolution not on behalf of the oppressed Cuban people, but on behalf of the Communist movement. The wife who was working as a CIA agent, Se EO eC EEE ET AOL . convinced Juana to cooperate with the Agency. She was recruited in Mexico City by a CIA officer in September 1962, briefed extensively and trained in intelligence tradecraft. She worked as a resident foreign -Tl- SECRET
SECRET  — .! “intel Tigence agent until 1964 when it Was determined that she would be more valuable in a defector role. . i So D. INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION QPERATIONS =. - | AS noted earlier, inffTtration/extiltration operations, which started in mid-1962, were ‘undertaken for a variety of purposes, such as: ca. Emplace arms and comun cations caches for use by agents and a resistance groups. . 2 a ob. Infiltrate agents to recruit agents for espionage Purposes. oe Exfiltrate agents who had completed their missions. or for . "further training, or to obtain reporting. a . od Exfiltrate significant political defectors. | e. Commit acts of sabotage. . Each of these operations were approved by the Special Group « or its “succes-"~ sor. the 303 Conmittee. ‘They. were a major preoccupation, of the ‘Miami Station and large amounts of money and manpower were devoted to then. | They were executed with varying degrees of success and were Frequently aborted because they encountered resistance From Cuban security, forces or rendezvous were missed. ~ — | | These operations were supported by a smal] maritime force which, in 1963, consisted of three mother ships and Six smal ler vessels. During 1963, 88 operations were planned of which 15 were cancelled. Of the -~12- SECRET
SECRET operations carried out, four involved sabotage and ten others encountered - contact with Cuban forces. Thus , during 1963, the Castro Government was | aware of at least 14 operations involving infiltration’ of Cuban coasts and ce harbors, and it would be logically assumed that the U.S. had a hand in - these actions. During 1963, a CIA trained exile paramilitary, group committed two acts _ of sabotage which inflicted some damage, caused a great deal of commotion and attracted a lot of publicity. On 31 August 1963,. this group attenpted oF to destroy a POL dump in Casildo Harbor using an 8mm mortar and a "75m recoil legs rifle. Unknown to the team, the Harbor was under an air de~. 7  fense alert at the time. Shortly after opening fire, the team came » under " heavy enemy fire. The team inflicted some damage on the POL dump, and hastily departed in two smal] boats. This attack was reported in the . Cuban press. On 30 September 1963, this group conducted a commando raid against a. a large sawmil} on the coast of Oriente Province. The sawnill was destroyed . and no enemy opposition was encountered. ‘The mil was a main producer of "railroad ties. Its loss was felt, and noted ina Castro speech, when a a hurricane destroyed most of the railroad's jines in part of Cuba several weeks later. ~ 13 - SECRET Te THESE