198-10006-10004) JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form st Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10006-10004 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : , See a Document Information ORIGINATOR: JCS FROM: TO: TITLE: CUBA -THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS DATE: 02/15/1963 PAGES: 10 SUBJECTS : COUNTERING CUBAN PROPAGANDA KRULAK COMMITTEE PROPAGANDA MEDIA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: — Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1B CURRENT STATUS:  Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 02/04/1998 COMMENTS : OPENING CRITERIA : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 11. JCS study on the dissemination of Cuban propaganda and possible US moves to counter it. TEE Pecdcssina ya Kecolds Koved 28 Department of the Army EO 135) 'Declassify “ Exclude © Exempt Authority I Refer To _» fo . Review Dat SIEAP- By 1& oe v9.1 HY 50955 Bocld: 32423619 1o> Page i
HY 0955 CUBA MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS te Introduction The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the movement of Communist propaganda materials from Cuba to and within Latin American countries. They complement the basic actions relating’ to control of movement of sub- versive trainees to and from. Cuba,--which actions are gen- erally applicable in the solution ‘of this’ problem as well. As in the companion measures for. control of the movement of subversive trainees, successful execution of the actions proposed below will reduce:the flow of propaganda materials but will not eliminate it: ventirely. Communi st cuba has mary’ “Tegitimate ‘outlets through which propaganda materials flow. As these legitimate outlets are blocked by the initial steps herein proposed, it will be necessary for the Cuban propagandists and their sympathizers elsewhere to turn from the mass exportation of materials to the production and dissemination of the same materials in a clandestine environment within the several Latin American countries. Of the two threats, the illicit production” of ;propaganda materials in each country will be by far the more difficult to abate. In combatting these threats, one of the most power- ful factors is the-influence of our own information and counter-propaganda efforts, which USIA and CIA have in- creased greatly during, thé-past two -years. This paper, however, is concerned :-wholly with direct actions; actions . designed to impede.the movement of propaganda materials to and within Latin. America. IT, Nature and Scope. of the Problem While the castro image has faded somewhat in Latin America, and the attraction of Cuba as a model has dimin- ished, the susceptibility of the Latin American people to communist propaganda .remains high. The basic social and economic factors which have: made this true in the past have not greatly altered, and the variety and quantity of propaganda materials. with which the Latin Americans are now beset are impressive, — as exemplified in the many millions of dollars which the communists are estimated to be investing in the project annually. It is a large pro- gram and it presents..a. continuing threat to the tran- qnsnety of Latin America. SECRET BDoctlda: 3274273819 Page 5
C C SECRET Our efforts to combat the problem, moreover, are complicated by the fact that freedom of thought, express- ion and press are generally highly regarded in Latin America, albeit not universally honored, and any proposals to reduce the flow of Castro-Communist subversive materials must be influenced by this fact. Otherwise the United States may find itself indicted for fostering police- state methods, a charge which could alienate many of the Latin Americans we seek to influence. For the purpose of this paper, propaganda materials include radio program scripts, tapes and recordings, printed | materials, (posters, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, books, newspapers, news service output), motion pictures, dupli- eating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications equipment, and printing. resources, particularly paper stock- piles. However, to be complete, "movement of propaganda | materials" must extend also to publications whtch are hand- carried into a country by legal or illegal travellers for subsequent reproduction. It must also include materials - transmitted through Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic = i channels, shipments via postal channels, quantities intro- duced through smuggling operations, oral transmission of propaganda guidance by individual travellers or by Radio Havana, and the dissemination of communist oriented news by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency, for re-. production by local outlets. Finally to be considered are thematic guidance, which can be reproduced and exploited locally by returning trainees, front groups and sympathetic publications and, in some countries such as Mexico, Argen- . tina and Uruguay, the products of those commercial estab- lishments which regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro- Communist materials as a matter of policy or ideological conviction. Press and Publications There are 326 Communist and pro-Communist newspapers | and periodicals in Latin America, and infiltration of the democratic press, coupled with the non-critical attitudes of some newspapermen, increases greatly the diffusion of the Cuban propaganda line. There are 228 Communist-oriented publishing houses and bookstores in Latin America, serving as outlets not only for 30 different Cuban periodicals, but for a large variety of other Communist printed material. SECRET 2 HY 50955 Doctd: 32423819 Page 6
HY 0955 Co Oo SECRET Every Latin American country except the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela permits these bookshops to operate. Many of them offer publi- cations at very low prices or give away several books: with the purchase of one, and easy credit terms are available. Exeluding TASS and the New China News Agency (NCNA), Prensa Latina is the principal Communist news agency in Latin America. It operates openly, although not entirely without restriction, in ten countries -- Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, © Panama and Uruguay. While most users of Prensa Latina releases are covert or overt Communists, some non-Communist media make unattributed use of Prensa Latina releases. This. is especially true of radio broadcasts. All of this publication activity is essentially . overt. However, decrees banning Communist propaganda have not prevented the clandestine publications and distri- bution of periodicals and books in some countries, and propaganda materials continue to seek entry through the mails. In Panama, for example, postal and customs authori- ‘ties destroy.an. average of le tons of Cuban propaganda per month. Another.ten tons per-month is seized and. destroyed in Costa Rica. This suggests the further quantities, per- haps larger, may be finding their way into these and other countries. Radio Short wave radio is the principal direct mass audience medium used by Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America. The Castro regime has constantly. increased. Radio Havana's short wave. broadcasts to Latin America to a current level of 115:30 hours per week. Cultural Activities Penetration under the guise of cultural activities is a favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin America, where there are now some 64 Cuban binational centers and Friendship Societies. SECRET 3 BDoclda: 3274273819 Page 7
HY 0955 C) O SECRET Films Feature films and short documentaries produced by the Cuban Institute of Motion Picture Art.and Industry play a_ direct propaganda role. These films are shown primarily in binational centers, pro-Communist labor and student groups, and in private or clandestine meetings. It will be seen from this brief review that Latin America is the target of a broad-scale propaganda program, comprising not only propaganda materials but including also the ideas, the. knowledgé: and the resources which are necessary to make those matérials effective. TII. Direct Actions to Impéde the Legal Movement of Propaganda Materials — Presented below is a summary of actions contemplated to impede the legal movement of propaganda materials from Cuba. to and within Latin American countries. For the pur- pose of this paper, legal movement is defined as movement by recognized private and governmental carriers and communi- cations,.as well as postal systems and diplomatic pouching. These actions offer promise of achieving early and effective results in-some Latin American countries, but they do not have universal application, and those which may be feasible in one country may not be necessary or feasible in another. es ; 1. Political Actions a. Induce news media to diminish the utilization of Prensa Latina. . b. Persuade,.those governments which receive Cuban and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain close surveillance. over the propaganda activities of the Communist embassies with.a view toward prohibiting abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive purposes. c. As applicable and ‘feasible, induce Latin American countries to: ‘ SECRET ae 4k BDoclda: 3274273819 Page 6
SECRET (1) Adopt adequate internal security legislation to provide severe penalties for any person engaging in dissemination of Cuban-Communist propaganda which inspires terrorism or proposes the overthrow of the legal government by force and violence. (2) Preclude attendance of Cuban delegates at international meetings held in Latin América,. (Delegates are propaganda disseminators. ) 2. Intelligence Actions as Continue U.S, intelligence efforts in each country to identify individuals, organizations and facilities involved in propaganda importation, _ reproduction and/or dissemination; make available to each country selected intelligence concerning these individuals, organizations and their activities. b. Encourage each country in which the Communist Party is illegal to offer rewards for information leading to interception of Castro-Communist propa- ganda and, in countries where the Communist party is legal, for conviction of persons supplying or. disseminating propaganda materials considered dan- gerous to the country's tranquility. ec. In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, urge full and effective cooperation, with the appropriate organs of the OAS and bilaterally among the several nations, in the interchange of information concerning movement of propaganda materials. d. Persuade Latin American countries to report. promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country concerned, the identity of any national of that country who arrives from Cuba and who is discovered to have been carrying Communist propaganda materials. 3. Covert Actions a. Disrupt the reproduction and distribution of propaganda materials, and the procurement and delivery of related supplies and equipment. SECRET 5 H¥ 50955 Docld:32423819 Page 9
HY 0955 \ SECRET be. Séeek opportunities to induce Latin American printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint Castro-eCommunist propaganda in the process of re-~ production, ec, Disrupt Castro~Communist sponsored labor and youth congresses, industrial and agricultural exhibits in Latin American countries. d. Maintain or increase pressures on media owners, local advertising agencies and film producers and/or distributors who accept Communist materials. e, Dissuade US and local business firms from advertising in Latin American media which carry prosCommunist materials; provide informally to US firms, for information, lists of such media in order to encourage their support of a non- Communist press, . f. Inhibit the spread of Cuban and Bloc binational centers and Friendship Societies in Latin America by. an active program to expose their subversive activities and objectives, @, Where it can be determined that expenditure of the funds is clearly justified, provide financial support to selected non=Communist news media requiring assistance in order to compete with Communist- aligned publications which have significant cir- culation or impact. he Induce Latin American countries to organize surveillance over in-country sources of newsprint and related supplies, and deny or inhibit the use of these supplies for printing Communist. materials, IV. Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement of Propaganda Material Many of the actions outlined in Section III related to the legal movement of materials will serve also to restrict illegal movement, Additional measures designed specifically to impede clandestine traffic are enumerated below. SECRET a 6 Docld: 3274273819 Page i0
_* € eo * * ‘ C) » . * * ~ " SECRET Ly. Intelligence Actions as Use penetration and other intelligence techniques to identify efforts to meve propaganda materials from Cuba to and/or within Latin Ameriean ‘countries; deter-- mine routes and methods employed; report selected information, consistent with requirements for protect- ing our own intelligence program, to the governments concerned, b. Utilize the U.S, intelligence community to determine the nature and extent of clandestine air- craft and small boat traffic ~ between Cuba and other countries in the Carlbbean and Central American area, giving particular attention to Mexico, Honduras,. . Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republie. Use the evidence obtained to induce the governments conéerned to. initiate surveillance and other control measures aimed at interception of propaganda materials, 2. Surveillance and Reporting Action Exploit the mechanism of the Caribbean surveillance System, approved by the President in the study on movement of personnel, for discovering and impeding the movement of propaganda materials by illicit means. 3, , Political Action - Where legally feasible to do so, induce each Latin American country to improve its police procedures designed to expose the subversive Communist propaganda apparatus in that country; and to detect and eliminate corrupt officials who permit illicit shipment of propaganda materials, 4, Technical Assistance Actions a. Provide technical assistance, where requested ~ to enable Latin American governments to locate clandestine transmitters, b,- Assist in the accelerated improvement of the capabilities of Latin American internal security forces, especially those patrol and intelligence activities whose funétion is the prevention of eclan- destine propaganda activities. Provide equipment, training and advice as required, ° SECRET vi HY 50955 DBocld: 32423819 Page ii