ITIVE EYES ONLY Vice President Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer, Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alex Johnson, Director of USIA Edward R. Murrow, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard Good- win, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wim Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion, and Mr, Jamison (Agency unknown). At this meeting Vice President Johnson referred to a message from Consul: General Deerborn concerning the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked for details as to the timing and authority for the delivery of the arms. There is no record to indicate that anyone at the meeting expressed awareness or lack of awareness of U.S. involvement in the operation. Another memorandum for the record exists concerning a meeting at the White House on June 7, 1961 chaired by the President at which the Vice President was also in attendance. Similarly, at this meeting there was no indication of Presidential or other high level awareness of U.S. involvement in the operation, The Diem Coup The third Inspector General's report (May 31, 1967) details U.S. policy toward and dialogue with Generals of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces who successfully conducted the coup against President Diem and his brother Nhu. on November 1, 1963. The period in question was from August through October during which time U.S. support shifted away from Diem and to opposition forces, The record of exchanges makes clear that the decision to provide U.S. encouragement to opposition forces was taken by the Presi- dent upon the advice of virtually all members of the bureaucracy with the notable exception of the DCI and the Station Chief, At the same time, there was never any consideration or discussion of providing overt or covert U.S. support for an assassination. There was, however, general recogni- tion of the fact that the coup,werdt to take place,could be a violent one. On the one occasion in which assassination was reported from the field as a possibility, Director McCone issued a strong warning that no U.S. support for such an assassination attempt should be considered. Apart from making clear U.S. support for opposition forces, the IG report also notes that cross border operations were taking place at this time. Summa ry It is difficult to establish perspective over the Administration's position to be taken at this point in the Church Committee's investigation. Prior to the ty *eeg fae HW 53244 DocId:32105882 Page 6
disclosure by the Director on Friday, May 23, of detailed U.S. Govern- ment involvement in plots to assassinate Castro, the Administration's position had been to seek to have this kind of extremely sensitive informa- tion handled on a close-hold basis with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee. The Director's testimony and the subsequent disclosure of U.S. involvement in coup and assassination planning foreshadows severe damage to the foreign relations of the United States in the months ahead, An important collateral impact upon the United States intelligence system will undoubtedly result from the legislative restrictions that may be anticipated on future. activities of the CIA and other intelligence gathering bodies. In addition, a significant threat is posed that public disclosure of the details of these several operations will compromise and endanger sensitive sources and methods. Thus, at least three serious areas of damage maybe anticipated: to the image of the United States abroad and its foreign relations with specific countries: to the integrity of the U.S. intel- ligence gathering system; and to sources and methods. It is doubtful that the Committee would be responsive to an Administration request to limit the scope of their activities in order to limit the damage that is anticipated in these three areas. Unfortunately, it is probable that the only deterring element that will be effective concerns the sensitivity of the Committee to the disclosure of witting involvement in the planning and execution of these operations by Cabinet and higher-level officials of the Government. It is understood that the preliminary report of the Rockefeller Commission establishes no basis for alleging significant involvement in these operations of persons outside the CIA. Nor does the documentation thus far available conclusively demonstrate such involvement. At the same time,it is clear that we simply do not know exactly how the many decisions were reached and to what extent non-intelligence persons were involved. In order to facilitate presenting comprehensive responses to the Committee in this regard, it is recommended that the agencies involved (DOD, CIA, State, yes and the NSC) be tasked immediately to forward 1ents which bear ue in any way on any phase of the operations in question. With regard to the immediate problem -- following up on Director Colby's . commitment to provide the Inspector General's reports to the Committee -- o it is considered unrealistic to expect that this may be avoided. Accordingly, «S$ —— it is recommended that the three reports (on Castro, Trujillo and Diem) accordance with procedures accepted by the Chairman), it is recommended o . ° . Ener eceentex ney -Seuensenenter sc SEEN that the names of sources and unwitting participants be excised from the =o 20m tie Sy, %, Santo, mn a HW 53244 DocId:32105882 Page 7
reports. Further, it is recommended that mention of operations having no relationship to the events being considered (e.g. referencés in the — Castro report to Mossadeq and a) be excised on the basis that Aie ——_ the public disclosure of these references could seriously damage the foreign relations of the United States. Ye Go As a final measure, it is recommended that the Agency representatives responsible for coordinating Administration responses to the Committee's tes —7 request, be-convened“in-a meeting a which procedures agreed upon at the outset of the investigation be reaffirmed. That is, that all requests for information be reported to the Office of White House Counsel and that no response be provided verbally or in writing to the Committee unless cleared by the Office of White House Counsel. HW 53244 DoclId:321058382 Page 6