404-10227-10103 fos 19 Cetober 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD “y+ PARTICIPANTS: Masers, Coorr, Wollam, Hurwitch, | Ba o Colonel Johnsoa: a SUBJECT : Meoting in Mr. Coors « a office, 1100-1230, 13 Get 61 1. Colone! Johnson gave a full account of his two meetings with — ‘Der, MIRO in Miami oa 5 and 6 Cetober, following in detail the Memo- randa for the Record propared by Coleone) Johnson of these meetings. ' He aleo outlined the items Paula had give ag the budget for 1961 pr Gn the basia of thoir receiving $100,000 for that month. That outline, ; it was remarked, appears to be largely the same as tha old F RD budget. . - . All present felt that this budget appeared to be well-padded and. largely i poe - ‘for salaries. R. was: ‘remarked by Colonel Johnson that there seemed | vf to be a vory. good. possibility that some of those on the salary Mat may. f. a "alee, be ‘receiving. support from HEW, Colonel Johnson remarked that. ‘ | he would be seeing. Dr, MIRO on Monday, 16 October, at which time . he expects to clarify some of the budget mattera and alee to get from i CIA's Miami station some niors details from Mr Paula. 2. Mr, Coerr raised the question of what was the cover to be used by Colonel Johnson fin his contacts with Dr, MIRO. Colonel Johnson said that the cover question had not yet been resolved, that it was a questionable how long any cover would bold up, particularly with the : _ press, that the cover of public relations consultant, the cover of & : . research mag or teacher in Miami, and various other possibilities were : i under consideration. Mr, Coerr commented that the astute press rep< resentatives might soon learn the identity of the CIA representative with MIRO, particularly if opposition leaders like PRIG, who, he re- marked, already secme to know, should become angry and report in - the preas what thoy know. Mr. Hurwitch stated that MIRC had told him that PRIO, cr a representative of PRIO, had saldtoe MIRC, “I under- stand that you have a Colonel Johnson as your representative with the U. &. Government.’ MIRO also declared to Kir, Hurwitch that only : : he, MIRO, and his secretary, ARAGON, had. reason to know of ‘ , Colonel Johnson's role. There was some speculation on how PRIO had . learned of the matter. «
. \ OrGRS ae ” \ 3, Mr. said that there was need to, clarify just who Celene] Johnson represented to Dr, MIRO, that A:IRC had been told he would have a Fepresontative who would havo frequent contact with Mr, Goodwin in the White House and Mr. Woodward and others at the Department of State and would also be in contact with the Agency, and that it wag accordingly the understanding of the Agency that : Colonel. Johnson would therefore represent of be the Mnk between Dr. MIRO and the U. 5, Government, at least in the Adami area. He remarked that this certainly had some bearing on the cover matter and ite security aspects. Mr, Coerr romarked that it seemed Celonel Johnsen was simply an overt representative of the Agency. Me. remarked that this was hardly pogaible and still have any. security or deniability. Mf he was overt, he was automatically Bh representative of the U. S. Government. Mr. Hurwitch interposed ' that he considered Colonal Johnson to be solely the representative of the Agency. . He said that Mr. Goodwin had said that he, Goodwin, only wanted to be consulted. on tha most important feoues and that MIRO's normal contact in. Washington for policy guidance should be with the ' Cuban. desk in the Department of State. In Miami, Colone! Johnson would then work out with MIRO the Agency support of these policies. 4 Mr, Hurwitch continued, expressing ‘his view that Colone! Johnaon should have the authority from the Agency to discuss and approve Dr. MIRO's operational plane ouch ao tours to Latin . America, support of internal gruups and the Hke and, if certain plans were approved by them, to sit down with MIRO, the military advisors ané representatives of the internal groups, aad work out final details for actually running operations in support of these elements. Mr, countered, "It ie by no means as simple as that. This is a lot more complicated than just having two or a dosan people alt down in Miami and agree of something, Take, for instance, the simple matter, relatively speaking, of sending to Latin America a person on a speaking tour. Did you know that tha Immigration and Naturalization Service and the FBI require all requests for support from them to be sent back here to Washington and then their people ‘in Miami have to be instructed by their Headquarters here in Washing- ton to facilitate such travel, thus, in effect, the final control on travel is up here in Washington and it doesn't even reside in the Agency. Each individual has to be so handled.’ Myr, Hurwitch said he thought that this could be worked out so that it could be done entirely locally in Mami, Mri | expressed some doubt and said that somehow
he had the impression that MIRO had Uttle-asgete but thought that if he could acquire all the facilities of CIA as a Z0vernment ontity placed at hia disposal, he could do something. Of course these facilities and the authority of C1A simply could not be turned over to Dr, MIRO, 5.. Colone] Johnaon said that he felt there was a ‘considerable . area in which we could support Dr, MIRC and he. reforredtothe ~~ State Department's propaganda plan, "“Cperacion Gricta, * which Dy. MIRO said he had received during his viait to Mr. Hurwitch and Mr. Morales Carrion. Mr, Hurwitch explained that this waa in no sense a Dopartment of State plan but rather a suggested draft by ’ Morales Carrion and pagsed to MIRO as merely an indication cf the sort of propaganda operation in Latin America that might be effective, 6. On the subject of propaganda and the activities of the “collateral groups" like the FORD, the DRE, ete. outside the CRC, both Mr. Wollam and Mr. Hurwitch said they believed it wou'd be possible to tranafer these groups and their activities in their entlrety | to Dr. MIRO in accordance with his desires, hr. | | said he sympathized with MIRC's position but doubted that It would work, Mr, Hurwitch said that if.we had some doubts on thie matter, he won dered-why theac doubte had not been brought up by Mr. Bissell in the - discussions with Mr. Goodwin. Mr. Hurwitch then claimed he had a Goodwin memo saying tho DRE, FORG, and all internal groups must be financed through MIRC, My. Hurwitch woadered when this new position had developed in the Agency, - Mr, stated that tho | Agency had had long experience during the past tuo years fh dealing with the various Cuban elements both in and outside Cuba, and that these types of probleme had existed (rom the beginning and although they may seem new to Mr. Hurwitch and Mr. Wollam, who had recente ly come on the desk, they certainly were not new to Mr. Coerr, who | weadily agreed, Mr, point:d out that, in the early stages of 1960, attempts were made to form some sort of coalition of the misceNaneous Cuban groups. Finally the FRD was born and much’ later the CRC, responsibility for which was then transferred to the White House and the State Department alter the Invasion, In the first or early stages mentioned, relatively little had come of our attempts to generate meaningful activities through Cuban-controlled channels such as tho F RD, that the Agency, to achieve any real degree of succega in developing propaganda and cther activities against Castro, had te form miscellaneous groups, political and collateral, and then try to ro ~ ow
14-09000 ‘activities are sometimes very unrealistic. CCPPET Be _shove them one way or the other under the umbrella of the FRD. - He pointed out that the rnost telling criticloin made by the prees and by members of the State Department, too, at that time was that ; we were forcing these various groups through monetary control into . joining the FRD, -He atated furthor that this had been discussed In -Baltimore. last month in detail with Dr. MIRO, who at that time. -' geemed to agree that if. Ds. MIRO and the CRC were te succeed in '. gentrolling tho other groups, both collateral and political, it ideally * should be by leadership rathér than by exercising financial control. ---, 7. Mr, then brought up the question of just how far should we go in support of MIRO and the Council, and how are we going te justify some of these expenses, Considorable discussion followed, . at the conclusion of which Mr. aaid he would like to throw out on the table some. apecific points imply ae an indication af some of the problem areas which he felt had beon at loast touched upon by the . discussion and to which in the coming weeks some consideration would: _ have to be given, although certainly this meeting | should not try te. arrive at any definitive anewers: ; Oe -.@. RB should be clarified whather- or not, tn fact, some of those’ persona Neted as receiving salaries from the FRD are aleo ree ceiving economic aid from the HEW, ; b. EB should be noted that Dr. MIRO's request” to engage in For example, at one point Der, MIRO wanted to take over the Swan Island operation and wanted: to put up a $2, 000, 000 radio atation at Key West te beam propaganda ~ to Cuba and‘also te jam Cubaa broadcaste. ; :  @e ‘The proposal to have round table diecusstons including De. MIRO, hio military. commission, and representatives of the internal groups to decide on sabotage and commando-type raids is rather un- realistic for a variety of reasons, including security factors and the ‘question of whether or not thie would be acceptable to any or all of the. internal groups. or a De, MIRC has apparently the idoa that he can use his million dollars for whatever he desires with little or no advance ap- proval, and above this figure he may ask for unlimited funds for operations. This ares certainly needs clearing SP.
‘that, if weapons were given to them, they could muster 100, . 1 o, Dr. MIRG has requested that the / gency turn over to himn the funda, the control of the bank accounts, and the entire : mechaniom for making the ‘dependent paymento. " This ie a rather hey item related to past history. Mr. etated it wae his personal opinion. that this should not under any circumetances be turned over to the CRC to administer independently. f ff, Relative to MLAO's request for aid to the Escambray. resistance group, ‘Me, tated that ke had discussed this matter vory thoroughly with Ur. MIRO, and i¢ appeared from that convorestion that MIKO had had only ono indirect contact with this | ‘group, Dr. MIRO ‘had merely a plece of papery signed by RAMIREZ. and saveral others allegedly in the Escambray, stating that there | were some 30 of them in desperate astraite and in need of support and. Dr, MIRO was at that point not even sure how the paper had got to — hirn and had no means whatsoover of communicating with RAMIREZ, | | He proposed the use of a boat to get the supplica to the North coast of Cuba, but had no idea how to get thom from the North coast to the Zecamboay. Ag an alternative, he suggested an aly drop by a plano. from Florida. q@; With regard to. the: financial ‘aid that MIRO had spokes ‘to both Mr. Hurwitch and Colonel Johnson about, i.e., the $76, 000 méathly to be sent into Cubs via tho| | Mr pointed out that tho | when contacted by an Agency representative, @ atated that he, for the time being, did not want his Ernbasoy utilised further in this type of transaction, that of the $70, 000 given MIRO, apparently only 340, 000 was sent into the and, of this, a large portion went for the needs of persons in asylum in the Embassy rathor than for aupport of Cuban interns! resistance elements outaide the Embassy. In at least one instance, the Agency, through separate channels, had, in fact, ‘arranged to send funds to “the principal intornal group. which wae supposed to have received-- but didn't--a portion of the $49, 000. Certdinly we could not give further support to thie activity without a yood deal of clarification of exactly how future funds were to be sent in by Dr, MIRO, 8 Mr. Hurwitch then eaid that, with regard to Dr. MIRO's pro- posal for the Council to establish itself on Cuban soil via a commande operation and then got U. S, military support, thie had been brought up sye7
repeatedly with Mr. Goodwia, and Dr. MIRO had been told fatty not te count on a U.S, military operation against Cuba. Mr. Hurwitch , gaid that MIRC now seeme to ba making the same proposal agaln through Colonel! Johnson, and that he should be discouraged from making any plans for such an operation, - 9, Mr. Hurwitch said that he balleved something could be done for the three Cuban residents of the U. S. who had fought at Playa Giron, but who now couldn't get aid through the Hefugee ‘Council or Social Security. He offered ‘to take care of any euch matters with HEW, Accordingly, the names and. data were left with Mr, Wollam for Mr, Hurwitch's uae, Mr. Hurwitch added that Mr, Wise at the Refugee Center in Miami might be a good contact if CLA wanted to handle there matters iteelf in Miami, DC/Wwit/4 DC/WH/4| liga (19 October 1961) Distribution: . Orig. & 1 - C/WH/OPS 1 - C/WH/4 1 - C/WH/4/ Plans ye C/WH/4/PM 1 + WH/4/PA-Prop Attn: Cel Johneds Mr, Ellis