404-10308-10307 ~ . Lv re CO CLASSIFIED MESSAGE “pate: 953 bo, | SECRET c TO + DIRECTOR eh ne. fig oe | FROM  (ceneva) '7-"| Day pteg | Ufc, Da NOV 1 2246Z 62 ACTION: EE 6. | ‘OS Kecorail) bE e€ Comp Lp. INFO + Cl, ‘DOP, nop/s11 3, apop, soo_5,_o00s/m gt “pons, PRIORITY -spoc, ca 2, ca/pec, ca/erop, ca/o 4, ci, ct/ors, cific 2,-Ft, Fifo, Ft/int 2, iw 2, wes 2, sR- IN 10713 WH 7, TFW.5, oo/1, av/ci 2, ao/ne, s/c 2. rs yocs We~’ ec : 15-[8 20-1 <$ DS ¥ES2.0\\ PRITY DIR INFO (@®ERN) CITE (GNVA)'4398 ‘aed X War G) INTEL. PBRUMEN ON, o>. | 2o- II SUPDATA: ZRWAHOO, REF PARA 2 (enva) 4397 (IN 10705)* FILED: 01201 REPORT CLASS: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD | CONTROLLED DISSEM (ESQ 696 = COUNTRY: USSR/CUBA/SOVIET SATELLITES . SUBJ: EACTION OF SATELLITE OFFICIALS TO CUBA CRISIS DEVELOPMENTS ~ QURING 27 - 31 OCTOBER PERIOD. DOl: 27 - 31 OCTOBER 1962 APPR TWO (REPORTORIAL ACCURACY) | 5 | SOURCE : (UNOFFICIAL (C) OF A. ORBIT NATIONALITY) WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE DISCUSSIONS DESCRIBED. C/S Comment: ¥*27.Oct, discussion occurred at Czech-sponsored book exhibitio - 31 Oct. discussion at a diplomatic reception at the Austrian Embassy. IW COMMENT: tHe ATTACHED TD PORTION OF THIS CABLE HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE AGENCY PENDING RELEASE BY THE ACTION UNIT. = TDCS PRECEDENCE a —s | ROUTINE ee ee | ; _ PRIORITY RELEASING IWO: ~ DATE DISTRIBUTED: BASED ON: LIAISON: ORC Lassi rion REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No. sa ate (eRe a nT
TECRAM | | CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Thit material containg information affecting the Nations! Defense of the United Stotes witha the meaning of the Espionage Gews, Ville (8, USC Sees i743 end vee, the transmission of revelation of which in any manner fo ea unauthoriued person is seohibited by law CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS "SECRET | | (When Filled In) UNTRY -_ SO REPORT NO. TDCS i BJECT . a . DATE DISTR. . PRECEDENCE “TE OF oe ; REFERENCES in. 10713 FO i ACER ig, TE ACO. ; ; “PRAISAL ‘ FIELD REPORT NO. = ~ THIS 1S UNEVALUATED. INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. “URGE . ae FIELD COMMENT: SUBJECT REPORT 1S JUDGED TO PRESENT AN UNUSUALLY GOOD PICTURE OF THE MOOD WHICH PREVAILED IN SATELLITE CIRCLES IN GENEVA DURING THE PERIOD CITED. | 2, 27 OCTOBER SEVERAL SATELLITE OFFICIALS STATIONED IN GENEVA DISCUSSED AMONG THEMSELVES DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS. THOSE PRESENT IN THE DISCUSSION INCLUDED CZECH MINISTER AND RESIDENT DELEGATE IN-GENEVA MILAN KLUSAK,. EAST GERMAN RESIDENT OBSERVER AT THE UN EUROPEAN OFFICE WALTER BELING, AND RUMANIAN SECOND SECRETARY OF DELEGATION MARIN OLTEANU. AT THE TIME OF THE CONVERSAT : PROPOSAL — OF DISMANTLING OF OFFENSIVE MISSILE SITES IN CUBA IN EXCHANGE FOR _REMOVAL OF AMERICAN BASES FROM TURKEY HAD BEEN PUBLICI CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS . ss “Grou | as : . . seluded from avtamany SECRET dengan on dseclassfieaton TK 0 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. iLi-20)
13-00000 SECRET ‘(When Filled in) nee a ne + nee te CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS IN 10713 3. THE MOOD OF THE OFFICIALS PRESENT WAS ESSENTIALLY ONE. OF UNEASE AND FALSE BRAVADO. THE MOOD OF PREVIOUS DAYS IN WHICH SATELLITE OFFICIALS HAD SAID THAT NO WAR WAS LIKELY TO BREAK OUT) HAD VANISHED. THEIR STATEMENTS - MADE IT CLEAR’ THAT THEY EXPECTED WAR MIGHT VERY WELL ° BREAK OUT... KLUSAK REMARKED THAT “CUBA IS AS IMPORTANT TO THE USA AS .7T0 THE USSR". AND THUS CONFLICT WAS INEVITABLE. THE OFFICIALS REMARKS __ INDICATED THAT. THEY EXPECTED PRES KENNEDY TO REFUSE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL “IN QUESTION, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THEY THOUGHT ‘THAT KHRUSHCHEV WOULD WITHDRAW THE PROPOSAL. OLTEANU POINTED QUT THAT THE ORBIT HAD GAINED A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE THROUGH THE FACT " THAT THE CRIS!S HAD CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL DAYS, SINCE THIS HAD PERMITTED _ ORBIT FORCES .TO REACH A STATE OF ALERT. OTHERS PRESENT AGREED THAT PRES KENNEDY HAD MADE A TACTICAL ERROR “IN NOT SIMPLY INVADING CUBA WITHOUT WARNING. THEY DID NOT IMPLY THAT THIS WOULD H V THE tl IKEL 1 HOOD. OF UT_WERE_S4MPLY~POTNTING—TO-AN-AMERY-GAN-MIL-LTARY — ADVANTAGE, LOST. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE IMPRESSION WAS GAINED THAT THESE OFFICIALS WERE SIMPLY MAKING REMARKS FOR THE RECORD OR [FOR THE _SAKE OF HAVING SOMETHING 1 TO. SAY, AND “THAT-NONE~OF—THEM HAD | EM HAD ANY. REAL INSIGHT INTO SOVIET It INTENTIONS, ) kh, ON 29 OCTOBER, AFTER THE SOVIET DISMANTLING OFFER HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED, EAST GERMAN RESIDENT OBSERVER WALTER BELING, WHO HAD ON 27 OCTOBER EXHIBITED PARTICULARLY STRONG SIGNS OF ANXIETY, WAS FULSOME IN HIS PRAISE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S WISDOM. HE STRESSED THAT HE FOUND SECRET |
13-00000 ee ten 6 eter es CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS 10713 SECRET (Whei Filled In} " DEVELOPMENTS*WONDERFUL" AND MADE PARTICULAR MENTION OF PRESS REPORTS THAT THE RELATIVE DETENTE MIGHT EVEN LEAD TO RAPPROCHEMENT OF SOME “SORT RETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, HE ADDED THAT SUCH AN@ ACTION WOULD GIVE A PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE TO EAST GERMANY, SINCE “IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AT LAST WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE WITH EAST GERMANY, > 5. AT A DIPLOMATIC GATHERING ON 31 OCTOBER, CZECH OFFICIALS, | INCLUDING MINISTER MILAN KLUSAK AND DEPARTMENT CHIEF IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE KAREL SVEC, CONTINUED PRIVATE DISCUSSION RE THE EFFECTS OF THE CUBAN CRISIS. THEY ALL.STRESSED THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD HAD GREAT SUCCESS HE HAD AVOIDED INVASION AND SUCCEEDED IN PREVENTING THE OVERTHROW OF THE FIDEL CASTRO REGIME, AND HE HAD AVOIDED WAR, THEY UTTERED VAGUE AND OPTIMISTIC: BANALITIES WHOSE GENERAL TENOR WAS THAT SOMETHING GREAT WAS GOING TO DEVELOP OUT OF KHRUSHCHEV'S HANDL ING OF THE AFFAIR, SVEC COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE JUST BEGINNING. TO UNDERSTAND THE FULL SCOPE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S "COUP". THIS, ME ADDED’ !RONICALLY, WAS UNFORTUNATE “IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO OUR ADVANTAGE HAD THEY REMAINED UNAWARE FOR A LONGER PERIOD" KLUSAK SUB- "Aor enecnsmtemntnatpeeneter—annnnneeeadnnaaeet teen? SEQUENTLY REMARKED THAT "WE" - HE ADDED THAT THIS MEANT NOT JUST "THE en ngage en “SOCIALIST CAMP" BUT ALL THE EUROPEAN NATIONS - HAD SHOWN UNDERSTANDING ee OF " "KENNEDY AND HIS SHIPS, WE WILL LET TH THEM UNTIL THE ELECTIONS, BUT AFTERWARDS HE WILL HAVE TO PUT THEM AWAY AND NEGOTIAT SERIOUSLY" .. _ {SOURCE COMMENT ONCE AGAIN IT SEEMED CLEA CLASSIFICATION == DISSEMINATION CONTROLS >ECRET
= 6 c. a . ' . CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS SECRET when Filled Inj OFFICIALS HAVE NO CLEAR INSIGHT INTO SOVIET INTENTIONS, OR INTO WHAT _ THE REAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CUBA WILL BE. THEY WERE TALKING TO REINFOR THEIR FAITH.) . | oo . 6. NONE OF THESE OFFICIALS MADE ANY MENTION REPRISALS IN BERLIN OR ELSEWHERE. (SOURCE COMMENT TO HAVE DONE SO WOULD HAVE BEEN o “IMPLICITLY TO CONTRADICT THE THEME THAT ALL THAT HAD HAPPENED WAS DUE + TO. KHRUSHCHEV! S- WISDOM AND--FS -FOR-THE GOOD OF THE ORIBIT.) (7. FHELD DISSEM AMB ONLY, END OF MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION == DISSEMINATION CONTROLS SECRET wd . °