Nw 34965 Docld:329399503 Page 166 ® 4 - e course, recourse to a court for a judicial warrant is in most circumstances required. But the temptation is to extend the use of warrants into areas where warrants are not constitutionally required. For example, as you know it has been suggested that the FBI ought to obtain a warrant before using an informant. Extending the warrant requirement in this way would be a major step toward an alteration in the basic nature of the criminal justice system in America. It would be a step toward the inquisitorial system in which judges, and not members of the executive, actually control the investigation of crimes. This is the system used in some European countries and elsewhere, but our system of justice keeps the investigation and prosecution of crime separate from the adjudication of criminal charges. The separation is important to the neutrality of the judiciary, a neutrality which our system takes pains to protect. There is another, related consideration. To require judges to decide whether particular informants may be used in particular cases would bring the judiciary into the most important and least definable part of the investigative process. Even disregarding the problem of delay to investigations and the burden that would be placed upon courts, we must ask our- selves whether the control of human sources of information-- which involves subtle, day-to-day judgments about credibility and personality--is something judges ought to be asked to undertake. It would place an enormous responsibility upon courts which either would be handled perfunctorily or, if handled with care, would place a tremendous burden of work on federal judges. |
In drafting statutory changes, it must be remembered that rigid directions governing every step in the investigative process could sacrifice the flexibility that is necessary if an investigative agency is to adapt to the diverse factual situations it must face. Rigid statutory provisions would invite litigation at every step in the investigative process. Such litigation could very well be used by clever individuals to frustrate legitimate law enforcement efforts without achieving the measure of control for which the statutes were enacted. As Lord Devlin has said, "As soon as anything has been codified, there is a lawyer-like-~-but sometimes unfortunate-- tendency to treat the written word as if it were the last word on the subject and to deal with each case according to whether it falls on one side or the other of what may be a finely drawn boundary." These considerations do not in any way mean that Congress ought not act to clarify the FBI's statutory base. I want to emphasize my belief that Congress should do so. The problems I have mentioned are surmountable. The Department of Justice is ready to work with Congress in drafting statutes that will meet the issues that have been raised about the responsibilities of the FBI. The proposed guidelines are part of our effort to cooperate with Congress in meeting its legislative responsibility. Some of what has been proposed in the guidelines may be useful NW 34965 Docld: 32969503 Page 167 r
@ -¢- e in drafting statutes, Other parts of the guidelines may best be left to regulations or Executive Orders, As I said in my earlier testimony before this Subcommittee, consultation with you and with other Congressional committees is an important part of the process by which these guidelines can be perfected. There will not be complete agreement about what has been proposed--indeed, within the Department of Justice there is some disagreement about some provisions--but this is inevitable and is a necessary part of the road we must travel. We welcome discussion, which is also essential. Let me then briefly describe the four proposed guidelines that have been substantially completed and have been provided to you. Others-- which will cover criminal investigations, use of informants, counter-intelligence investigations and other areas--are currently being drafted by a committee within the Department chaired by Mary Lawton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, and composed of representatives of the Civil Rights and Criminal Divisions, the Office of Policy and Planning, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Attorney General's Office. As new guidelines are drafted in these areas they, too, will be made available to you. When I testified before this Subcommittee last February I described a number of incidents which occurred in a period dating back more than a decade in which the FBI was misused for political purposes. I noted that in most cases we discovered where the White House was involved Nw 34965 Docld: 32939503 Page 146
>." e@ the initiation of an improper request was made by a White House staff member--acting in the President's name--to a counterpart in the FBI, These requests were often made orally. White House staff members in a number of different positions were involved. As you know, the FBI conducts background investigations of persons being considered for appointment by the President either to positions in government departments or agencies or to the White House staff. The FBI also checks it files and sometimes conducts further investigations of persons who will be in contact with the President or who will be given access to classified information. The guideline concerning White House inquiries sets up a procedure--which is already substantially being followed--which requires that requests for all such investigations be made in writing by the President or the Counsel or Associate Counsel to the President. Under the proposed guidelines the request for an investigation would have to certify that the person to be investigated has consented to the investigation with the knowledge that information gathered in the investigation would be retained by the FBI. The consent provision is important as a mechanism for preventing investigations in fact sought for political or other purposes from being initiated in the use of background investigations. It is also important as a protection of the privacy interests of persons to be investigated. There are provisions requiring 54965 Docld: 32989503 Page 165
e -8- e that access to information provided to the White House be strictly limited to those directly involved in the matter for which the investigation was initiated. Custodians of the files in the White House would be required to keep a list of all persons who were given access, The proposed guidelines concerning congressional staff and judicial staff appointments take the same basic approach as the guidelines concerning White House inquiries. In addition the White House has been following the practice, which perhaps should be embodied in the guidelines, of directing through the Attorney General's Office all requests for investigation or for material from Bureau files except routine background checks. This was not the policy in the past. It reflects the Attorney General's role, which I described to you last year, as a lightning rod to deflect improper requests. The proposed guidelines on the White House inquiries and on other matters accept the proposition that FBI files should be destroyed after a reasonable period of time. The deadlines for destruction of files have not yet been specified, however, because for administrative reasons these deadlines must be coordinated throughout the FBI file system. The last time I appeared before this Subcommittee many members were concerned about the handling of unsolicited derogatory information received by the FBI. Unsolicited MW 34965 Doold:32899503 Page i70
. e a @ information can be very valuable in law enforcement, as you know, but the concern has been that allegations about the private lives and habits of individuals have found their way into FBI files where they may remain for great lengths of time as a silent but troublesome invasion of individual privacy. In my testimony of last February 27, I suggested that on balance it would be desirable to devise some procedure under which some information in Bureau files would be destroyed. The guidelines concerning unsolicited information set up a procedure for the early destruction_of such information when it does not relate to matters within the jurisdiction of the federal government or does not make an allegation of a serious crime within the jurisdiction of state or local police agencies. The draft guidelines provide for destruction of such unsolicited information within 90 days. The period after which other files would be required to be destroyed may vary. Information collected in background investigations might be retained long enough to avoid the need to repeat investigative steps as an individual moves from job to job within government or out of government and later back in. On the other hand, destruction of files developed in preliminary domestic security investigations may be required quite quickly if information indicating criminal conduct is not developed. NW 34965 Docld:32999503 Page ifi eee eee eee |
e - 10 - e Finally I come to the proposed guidelines concerning the controversial area of domestic security investigations. I have already testified about these guidelines before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Since that testimony, several changes have been made in the draft. You have been provided with the latest draft of these guidelines. There are several important features I would like to describe. First, the proposed domestic security guidelines proceed from the proposition that government monitoring of individuals or groups because they hold unpopular or controversial political views is intolerable in our society. This is the meaning of the warning issued by former Attorney General _ Harlan Fiske Stone, as I read it. Stone said, "There is always the possibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free institutions, because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power which are not always quickly apprehended or understood. . .It is important that its activities be strictly limited to the performance of those functions for whichit was created and that its agents themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach. . .The Bureau of Investigation is not concerned with political or other opinions of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct and ‘then only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. When a police system passes beyond these limits, it is dangerous to the proper administration of justice and to human liberty, which it should be our first concern to cherish." MW 34965 Doocld:329599503 Page i172
NW 34965 Doocld: 32959503 Page i173 . eo * @ The proposed guidelines tie domestic security investigations closely to the violation of federal law. I realize there is an argument as to whether the guidelines tie domestic security investigations closely enough or too closely to the detection of criminal misconduct. But the main thing in my opinion is that the purpose of the investigation must be the detection of unlawful conduct and not merely the monitoring of disfavored or troublesome activities and surely not of unpopular views. This is accomplished in the guidelines by requiring some showing that the activities under investigation involve or will involve the use of force or violence and the violation of federal law. I must admit there is a problem-- in part a drafting problem but perhaps more than that--of how to describe or set forth a standard which further specifies what is meant by "some showing." Because investigations into criminal conduct in the domestic security area may raise significant First Amendment issues,the proposed guidelines provide for compendious reporting on such investigations to the Department of Justice. In general the guidelines provide for a much greater involvement by the rest of the Department of Justice and the Attorney General in reviewing FBI domestic security investigations. The emphasis upon departmental and congressional review is important, but it must be recognized that the Bureau must have primary responsibility for controlling itself. The guidelines attempt to strike an appropriate balance. Periodic reports by the Bureau of preliminary investigations would be required. All
@ - 12 - e full investigations would have to be reported to the Attorney General or his designee within one week of their opening. The Attorney General or his designee could close any investigation. FBI Headquarters would be required to review the results of full investigations periodically and to close any when it appears that the standard for opening a full investigation is not satisfied and all logical leads have been exhausted or are not likely to be productive. Each open case would be reviewed annually in the Department of Justice and would be closed if no longer justified under the standards. The personal approval —_” of the Attorney General would be required when such sensitive techniques as Title III electronic surveillance or preventive action are to be used, and the Attorney General would be required to report to Congress periodically on the instances, if any, in which preventive action was taken. Preliminary investigations--which would not involve the infiltration of informants into organizations or groups or such techniques as electronic surveillance or mail covers-- would be authorized only on the basis of information or allegations that an individual, or individuals acting in concert, may be engaged in activities which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and the violation of federal law for one of five designated purposes. Those criminal purposes are: (1) overthrowing the government of the United States or the government of a State; MW 34965 Doold:32899503 Page i74
- 13 - @ | @ (2) interfering, in the United States, with the activities of a foreign government or its authorized represen- tatives; (3) impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. government policies or decisions: (a) the functioning of the government of the United States; (b) the functioning of the government of a State; or ‘(c) interstate commerce. (4) depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; or (5) engaging in domestic violence or rioting when such violence or rioting is likely to require the use of the federal militia or other armed forces. Preliminary iivestigations would be limited to inquiries of public record and other public sources; FBI files and indices; federal, state and local records; and existing informants and sources. Interviews and physical surveillance undertaken for the limited purpose of identifying the subject of the investigation would be allowed, but interviews or surveillance for any other purpose would require the written authorization of the Special Agent in Charge of the appropriate Bureau field office.. NW 34965 Doocld:32999503 Page i745
@ - 14 - e The draft guidelines provide that such intrusive investigative techniques as infiltration of informants into organizations and use of electronic surveillance and mail covers may only be initiated as a part of full investigations. The guidelines set out the following standard for the opening of a full investigation: "Full investigations must be authorized by the FBI Headquarters. They may only be authorized on the basis of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or individuals acting in concert are or may be engaged in activities which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and the violation of federal law for one or more" of the five purposes I mentioned.earlier. A provision is also included to allow the FBI to investigate for limited periods of time in situations in which domestic violence or rioting not violating federal law is likely to result in a request by a governor or legislature of a state under 10 U.S.C. 331 for the use of federal troops. You will recognize that the standard for opening a full investigation proposed in the guidelines is the equivalent of the standard for a street stop and frisk enunciated by NW 34965 Doocld: 32959503 Page i76
r - 15 - © the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, There the Supreme Court wrote that in justifying a street search a police officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." In his summation of the holding of the Court, Chief Justice Warren wrote: 54965 Doold: 329689503 We. . .hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a police- man and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. (emphasis added) (392 U.S. 1, 30) Page iT7
t - 16 - t This standard was adopted because it requires a strong showing of criminal conduct before a full investigation is authorized. I should point out that a change was made in this part of the guidelines since my testimony before the Senate Select Committee. Originally the standard had required a showing of specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the subjects of the investigation are engaged in activities that involve or will involve force and violence and the violation of federal law. The change to the phrase "are or may be" brings the.formulation of the standard more closely in line with the Terry standard. The previous language of the guidelines proved to be too close to the arrest standard--that is, too restrictive as a standard for the opening of an investigation. The close correspondence of the revised draft's standard with the Terry language gives the guidelines’ formulation a foundation in the Supreme Court's analysis of an analagous constitutional problem which, while it involves a different area of law enforcement, does provide a definition for the standard which is to control Bureau activities. The proposed guidelines go on to require an additional consideration before a full investigation is opened. The guidelines state: [T]he following factors must be considered in determining whether a full investigation should be undertaken: (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm; MW 34965 Doold:32899503 Page i176
(2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by a full investi- gation. This listing of factors, which has been added in the latest draft, gives the standard a dimension and explicitness it did not have in earlier drafts. For example, the balancing of the factors would require officials of the FBI and the Department of Justice to close any full investigation even if there is clear threat of a violation of federal law if the threatened harm is de minimus or unlikely or remote in time. Finally, the draft guidelines provide a procedure to be followed in emergency situations when action by the FBI to ‘intervene to prevent the use of illegal force and violence may be required. This section of the proposed guidelines has proven to~be controversial, in part for fear that it seeks to allow the FBI to engage in activities of the sort that were involved in COINTELPRO. As I have said many times before, the activities that went under the name COINTELPRO were either foolish or outrageous, and the preventive action section of the guidelines was not intended to legitimize such activities, nor would it do so. It was included in the draft guidelines in the recognition that emergency situations may arise in which human life or the essential functioning | aw S4965 Docild: 32989503 Page i79 ne
© - 18 - @ i of government may be threatened, In such situations law enforcement officials would be expected to act to save life or protect the functioning of government. Indeed, law enforcement officials would be condemned if they did not act. The preventive action section of the guidelines was designed to provide a procedure for the Attorney General to authorize and report to Congress such activities. It was designed to set up an orderly and careful procedure to be followed in the case of emergency. It could be supplemented by further rules developed by the Attorney General. Under the proposed guidelines the Attorney General could authorize a preventive action only when there is probable cause to believe that illegal force or violence will be used and that it threatens life or the essential functioning of government. The Attorney General could authorize preventive action only when it is necessary to minimize the danger, that is, when other techniques will not work. In the latest draft of the guidelines several specific prohibitions were included. to make clear that new COINTELPRO are not to be sanctioned. Prohibited are the commission or instigation by the FBI of criminal acts; the dissemination of information for the purpose of holding an individual or group up to scorn, ridicule, or disgrace: the dissemination of information anonymously or under false identity; and the incitement of violence. It may be that Congress will choose to prohibit any FBI efforts to intervene to prevent force or violence. But to do so carries with it a risk and a responsibility. MW 54965 Doold: 325989503 Page 160
The proposed guidelines are still in the process of revision. They are tentative. As the guidelines have been developed they have been shown to the Chairman of this Subcommittee. We must enunciate the differences among us about the best words to use and then seek to resolve those differences. But the main thrust of the guidelines is surely the most important thing, their recognition of the need for a program for destruction of files in the interest of privacy, their requirement of consent from the subject of background investigations, their requirement of progressively higher standards and higher levels of review for more intrusive investigative techniques, their requirement that domestic security investigations be tied closely with the detection of crime, and their safeguards against investigations of activities that are merely troublesome or unpopular. Upon these main themes I hope we all agree. The Department of Justice has undertaken other steps to meet some of the issues of concern to this Subcommittee. We have created an Office of Professional Responsibility to investigate allegations of improper conduct by Department personnel and to review the investigations done by internal inspection units of agencies within the Department. We have been trying to work out a legislative proposal to bring national security wiretapping and microphone surveillance under a judicial warrant procedure. On June 24, 1975, I MW 34965 Doold: 32999503 Page i161
@ - 20 - provided the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee with statistics concerning the use of national security electronic surveillance instituted without prior judicial approval. Before the Church Committee I recounted the history of national security electronic surveillance since 1940, revealing a year-by-year count of the number of telephone and microphone surveillances. The latest figures in this area show that in 1975 a total of 122 telephone wiretaps and 24 microphone devices were used to overhear conversations. We have tried to be cooperative with this and other committees of Congress about other aspects of ‘the past history of the FBI and other agencies within the Department. We have tried to reveal as much as possible about the past out of a sense of comity and a feeling that the past problems must be discussed in the process of creating new policy. But we have tried also to recognize that the past is not always the best guide to the future, As we review recent history we may be so overwhelmed by it--and by our failure of memory about the social and political forces that shaped recent history--that we will read. its lessons more broadly than we ought to. If there was a lack of humility in the past about the perfection of our vision of what was proper, I hope we cannot fail to recognize the flaws in our vision about the past and the future today. 54965 Docld:32989503 Page 182 __ Se
mote ) - 21 - @ It is a challenging and interesting time, and I hope together we can prepare ourselves wisely for the future. We cannot escape from the responsibility of looking at the problems we face today and are likely to face in the future. When I testified almost one year ago I stated to this committee--and I want to emphasize most strongly again today-- that I have both a personal and official concern for the issues which face us in this area, Those issues are close to the basic duties of the Attorney General to protect the society--its values, and the safety of its members. I am sure that Director Kelley will agree with me that we must clarify for the present and for the future the kind of course to be followed, meticulously and candidly. I believe we have already made considerable progress in this regard. Together with Congress legislation can be worked out and wise policy achieved. DOJ-1976-02 HW 34965 Doold: 32969503 Page 163
¥ OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR . a * ¢ 5 ty @ 3 % * RANK UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 STATEMENT OF CLARENCE M. KELLEY DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ae prs at, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY we ym we ork eh meh omit J U, S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WASHINGTON, D. C. . sic FEBRUARY 11, 1976 1 3 RE UTR A Co, ELMIRA . Ses. Supt, Gu . r JasmesT oun | SERIALIZED OLEAN ROCHESTER I4useof ~~ MW 54965 Doold:32989503 Page 184 ry
rd \ MW 54965 Docld: 32999503 Page 165 . » ® As the Supreme Court has observed: "...unless Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered." As a practical matter, the line between domestic security work and investigations of ordinary crime is often difficult to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. I want to emphasize that these investigations are not undertaken for the purpose of collecting information on _ those who hold unpopular or controversial political views. Their focus is on conduct, not ideas -- conduct that involves or is likely to involve a violation of Federal law. But the important distinguishing characteristic of a successful domestic security case is prevention -- they are undertaken primarily to thwart illegal activities, not to prosecute. As a consequence, intelligence work involves the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose is to insure that the government has enough information at its disposal to either frustrate or minimize the consequences of
I wish to thank the Committee for the opportunity to contribute my views for your consideration on legislative policies and guidelines for the FBI. My understanding is that your primary concern at this time is the FBI's investigative responsibilities in the domestic security area. We must consider first that these investigations deal with activities posing a threat to orderly and legally constituted government -- interests which the government has a special obligation to protect. MW 34965 Doold:32899503 Page 166
. NW 54965 Docld: 32999503 Page 167 fA activity in 1975 -- an average of seven a month. That was 6 6 the intended harm. As the Supreme Court put it, "the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency." If we are to accomplish these objectives, the FBI must initiate the investigation in advance of the crime. The ability of government to prevent criminal acts threatening domestic security is dependent on our anticipation of their occurrence. Anticipation, in turn, is dependent on advance information -- that is intelligence. Moreover, the interests involved are too important for the government to wait until the crime is imminent or an attempt is made before it begins its investigative activity. Let's consider, for the moment, the problem of terrorism. _Terrorist acts are increasing globally; but more to the point, terrorist activity is growing in the United States. There were 89 bombings attributable to terrorist almost double the number in 1974 (45) and more than three times the number in 1973 (24).
Eleven people were killed in terrorist acts in- 1975 -- six of them in bombings. Seventy-six persons were injured in these bombings. Property damage amounted to more than $2.7 million. Who is responsible for these brutal and destructive --The New World Liberation Front, a revolutionary group operating primarily in California, boasted of committing 19 bombings. A public utility company was its primary victim. -~-The Armed Forces of Puerto Rican Liberation, or FALN, claimed 18 bombings and one unsuccessful attempt. The group's favorite targets were government and corporate facilities -- especially banks -- in New York City, Chicago, and Washington, D. C. The FALN took credit for the bloodiest terrorist bombing last year, the explosion that killed four people and injured 53 others on January 24, 1975, at Fraunces Tavern in New York City. Fraunces Tavern was where George Washington said farewell to his troops in 1783, and it is the former home of the New York Stock Exchange. The FALN's destructive capabilities were amply demonstrated on October 27, 1975, by its claimed responsibility for its coordinated, simultaneous attacks on government and Nw 34965 Docld: 32939503 Page i156
ee ro O¥ =  ©@ e - business buildings in New York, Chicago and Washington, D. C. The explosions marked the observance of the first anniversary of the FALN's existence. --Other destructive bombings were claimed by the Continental Revolutionary Army, Red Guerrilla Family, George Jackson Brigade, Emiliano Zapata Unit and the Chicano Liberation Front. The Weather Underground claimed three bombings and one attempt in 1975. One of the blasts was at the State Department in Washington; an attempt fizzled at a Department of Defense facility in Oakland, California. Four recently published issues of the Weather Underground's newsletter, "Osawatomie," contained this threat regarding our Nation's Bicentennial, July 4, 1976: "The rulers have set the time for the party; let us bring the fireworks." It should be obvious from this appalling list of violence that we are not as successful as we would hope to be in dealing with such matters. But there have been numerous cases where information gathered in domestic security investigations made it ‘possible to thwart or minimize violence or to make prompt arrests, preventing further incidents of violence. Let me give you a graphic example. NW 34965 Docld: 329899503 Page i169
In August of 1974, a bomb was discovered at the United Nations. Two days after the occurrence, the Louisville FBI Office received information that an attempt had been made to recruit a resident of Kentucky to participate in a crime to be committed at the United Nations. Information gathered during a prior domestic security investigation made possible the identification of the individual making the attempted recruitment. As a result of continued investigation, this same individual was convicted and sentenced to serve 25 years. In addition to terrorist groups, we are also faced with individuals or organizations who are dedicated to the eventual violent overthrow of this government. I know there are those who feel that the government ought not to concern itself or expend its investigative resources on the prevention of what might be a remote or highly unlikely occurrence. Reasonable people can differ on the proper governmental response to these situations. Suppose an organization doctrine, that is to say, the use overthrow the government. But it take immediate action, or if they openly espouses revolutionary of force and violence to is clear that they will not did, that they would not be successful. In the meantime, they actively recruit new members, NW 34965 Doold: 32999503 Page 190
cat, + and attempt to strengthen their financial resources ~- and wait for the proper moment. I recognize that advocacy alone is not a violation of Federal law, nor am I suggesting that we make it one. I am aware also of the special constitutional problems that are presented by these cases. As Justice Powell put it, the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such matters, but "so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech." It has always been my philosophy as a law enforcement officer that the government should strive at all times to meet its obligations for the maintenance of security with the least possible intrusion on the affairs of its citizens. But what would you have us do about the presence of revolutionary organizations in our society? Should they be totally ignored on the premise that somehow government will receive an adequate warning that violence is imminent and will be able to take the necessary measures to prevent the crime or at least to minimize its consequences. Where is the warning to come from, if not even the most preliminary and minimal kind of inquiry is permitted? As the head of the principal Federal law enforcement agency in the country, I feel that I would be remiss in my duties if I were to ignore any group that advocates violence to NW 34965 Docld: 32959503 Page i191
accomplish its objectives. Indeed, the Congress has passed a number of Federal statutes over which the Bureau has investigative responsibilities, all of which are designed to secure the internal security of this Nation. It may well be that the government's investigative response in such matters should be carefully measured and need not be as exhaustive or intrusive as our investigations into completed crimes, particularly those of terrorist groups. But I submit it would be unrealistic to prevent the government from obtaining information needed by the executive for sound judgments about the nature and extent of the threat posed at any given time by such organizations. However secure we may feel today about the strength and durability of this Nation -- and we have every reason to feel that way -~- no one among us can claim any special knowledge about what tomorrow will bring. Legislation adopted in today's climate which severely limits the ability of government to respond effectively to such matters may well prove too restrictive to meet the needs of the future. I recognize that Congressional concern in the area of domestic security investigations has been prompted by past mistakes or errors in judgment. My own view is that there is NW 34965 Doold: 32999503 Page i192 kL. _ _ ee ee _ Oe
no institutional mechanism that can guarantee integrity in government. In the final analysis, we must place our trust in individuals. But I realize that more must be done -- it is not enough to rely on self-restraint. We have made a commitment to review past FBI procedures and practices. Investigations in the domestic security area have been reduced significantly since July 1973. As you are aware, the FBI is participating with other representatives of the Department of Justice in the drafting of guidelines to govern various areas of FBI operations including domestic security investigations. These guidelines represent a positive response to the need for a delineation of the FBI's proper role and will provide for control’and review of the FBI's performance. Those portions of the guidelines dealing with the jurisdictional basis of domestic security investigations are an appropriate subject for legislation. Other sections might be put into effect by regulation or Executive Order. Views may differ on the precise form or content of the guidelines. Whatever the outcome, they represent a conscientious effort to deal with one of the most difficult and complex areas of our investigative responsibilities. WNW 54965 Docld: 32999503 Page 193
™ =e « .« * a? The resolution of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful deliberation by the Congress. In that regard, I pledge the complete cooperation of the Bureau and assure you that we will carry out both the letter and spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact. ~ 10 - MW 34965 Doocld:32959503 Page 194
NW 34965 Doold: 32989503 F1-358 (Rey. 11-11-75) q . ra (Mount Clipping in Space Below) No Case for Spe sal Prosecutor Sen. Frank Church is most uncon- vincing with his hasty proposal that yet another investigation and possible prose- cution of alleged wrongdoing by CIA and FBI personnel in the past shouid be han- died by a special prosecutor and not by the Justice Department, This seems a wholly unnecessary de- parture from normal procedure. Sen. Church chairs the select Senate commit- tee that is winding up a months-long probe of FBI, CiA and other intelli- gence activities. Such investigating com- mittees customarily turn over any evi- dence of suspected illegal actions to the Justice Department for appropriate fol- low-up. But Sen, Church says this weuld be unwise here, since the FBI, as one of the targets of his probe, is @ bureau within the Justice Department. That is true enough, but it does not mean that the Justice Denartment is incapable of performing its normal law enforcement taHEtiOns with sill end devotion to-re Page 195 ee Most of the eviderice cited by Sen. Church concerns events that long predated the tenure of the preseni- attorney general, Edward H. Levi. He was confirmed by the Senate only a year ago and no cne.has suggested that he has any personal conflicts of interest. Quite understandably, Atty. Gen. Levi has described the Church recommenda- tion of a special prosecutor as an ‘‘at- tack on the integrity” of the department since it assumes that the “ordinary law enforcement mechanism cannot be trusted.” With Sen. Church, ‘we believe that anyone responsible for iNegal acts on which the statute of limitations has not expired should be prosecuted. But this should be done through regular proce- dures, with those responsible for han- dling the matter held strictly account- able to Congress and the American peo- ple. To remove that job from the Jus- tice Department would be to undermine confidence in it without compelling oféasons : Loe mo Met ane pester 8 er aa (Indicate page, name of . newspaper, city and state.) 12 UFFALO EVENING NEWS falo, New York owed em } cS ad 1 - 80-1876 Date: Edition: Author: Editor: Title: 21S M. C. Browne SENSTUDY 75 Character: or , Classificatién: Submitting Office: Bul C7} Being Investigated
. FD-38C (Rev. 7-16-63) 6 (Moust Clipping in Space Below! TEEPE EB UrLu & President Ford’s move to ‘revamp the U.S. foreign intelligence system pre- Sesses to lay out objectives which in themselves are sound: To restore con- didence in and rebuild the responsibility and effectiveness of the nation’s intel- ligence operations overseas while at the same time to guard against abuses abroad and a repeat of those that have ceeuired against our citizens at home. Ful MW the odlectives sound solid, the mechods by which Ford is moving—and the poteptist resulis—are frightening. For instance, the powers that he pro- poses tn give (by executive fiat) to new CLA Director George Bush (a former Resublican nalional party chairman) to ccitrol the buagets of ali other foreign intelligence agencies in the government, incluaing those of the Cabinet-rank mili- tary departments, are simply too vasi and too potentially destructive of the, pursestring rights of Congress, In one seyse. Ford is breaking faith with his eld promises cf co-operating with Con- gress, The CIA. of course, was chartered bv act of Congress in 1947. The road that Ford now proposes to take invites further abuses of the governmental sys- tem instead of prevention of abuse. How can Congress possibly go along with the major parts-of a scheme that really is a design for added secrecy, for expanded executive power and the further erosion of a congressional over- NW 34965 Doold: 32989503 Bad-Paith Spy Agency Pi Page 156 sight that has been at best pueriie and . ° enly lately reawekened? ™ While we could agree that there shouid be one single, joint congressional oversight committee—and we trust RB will be shaped with firmness and a high sense of responsibility—-we see no im- provement at all in Ford’s designation of ancther so-called independent cver- sight hoard (responsible only to him) made up of persons with Jougtime. sym- pathetic—and therefore biased—atiack- ments to the CIA establisamert-—~ While we do find same value in some of the presidential edicts abou! flegat . burglaries, drug tests and wiretapping at home, these are vastly outweighed by the extensions of dictator-like powers to open mail and generally fo deenen the dank recesses of governmental secrecy. 1 As we've said many limes, the na- tion needs an effective, responsible in- telligence-gathering apparatus. But it has to be accountable, in the final analy- {Indicate ecge, name of newspaper, city and state.) 7 oe 12 COURIER EXPRESS Goffalo, New York sis, to Congress and the people. It was i- 80-1877 the lack of meaningful cangressional oversight which permitied the abuses of the past—tand which even resulted in some of the blunders of the congres- pete: 2/20/76 sional investigative committees thern- | Edition: Four Star selves). The problem was—and still is Author: —ihe behavior of these agencies wutside the statutes of law; Congress ought tobe insisting on solutions that are under specific laws, on stronger congressional review, And it ought to be standing up against any further usurpation of its checks-and-baiances responsibility. + or AAELll a eator: Douglas L. Turner tite: SENSTUDY Character: > a Classi fication: 62-2665 -_- Submitting Cifice: Buffalo CJ Being Investigated (SEARCHED INDEXED... 6 SERIALIZED SLED rsemrrcmeern EB 2)0 1976 eeetmaaires,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OFERATIONS U. S. SENATE WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 26, 1976 own & iJ ‘MW 54965 Docld:32989503 Page 197 : = = _ = _
I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before this Committee concerning a most important issue -- that of oversight. For some months now, the FBI has undergone a most exhaustive review of its intelligence operations, as have other members of the intelligence community. This review has covered both domestic and foreign intelligence operations of the FBI. . And I- am hopeful that the results of these extensive reviews will be helpful to the Congress as it considers practical recommendations for legislative cversight. _ MW 34965 Doold: 329859503 Page 1596
q HW 34965 Doocld: 32959503 Page 159 The FBI has in the past recognized and, indeed, requested a clear delineation of its intelligence responsi- bilities and authority to conduct investigations in this extremely sensitive area. We realize that Congress faces a difficult task if it decides to draft oversight legislation that will be of lasting benefit to the American people. Many issues are involved, and most of them are not easily resolved. The primary responsibility for correctness of FBI activities rests in its Director -- a responsibility I readily assume. I would like to offer for your consideration some of the basic questions-I believe must Le answered: {1) Should Congressional responsibilities for oversight of the FBI be consolidated? (2) Should Congress become actively involved in the decision-making process of the administration of the FBI? (3) What is the proper degree -- and mode -~- of Congressional access to FBI information? (4) What- clearance procedures and controls should be established for staff members of a@ Congressional oversight committee?
| MW 4965 Doold: 329689503 Page 200 As I have previously testified before a Congressional Committee and mentioned here today, the decisions in the FBI are mine and I assume full responsibility for them. I think the point merits reiteration.. Some of the mistakes in the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities ‘outside the FBI. We have welcomed Attorney Generali Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his own words, "as a ‘lightning rod' to deflect improper requests," Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the request, I believed presented the appearance of impropriety. I can assure you, also, that in my administration of the FBI I hring to the’ attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including those that arise in my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and candidly so that the Attorney General can dischurge his responsibilities with regard to the FBI. There is no question in my mind that the basic Structure of the FBI is sound; but it would be a mistake to
think that integrity can be assured only through institutional means. Integrity is a human quality. And the integrity of the FBI therefore is dependent upon the character of the Director of the FBI and every member of the FBI under him. It will always be so. . I am sure you are aware the Attorney General created a committee of Department and FBI representatives to draft guidelines governing FBI investigations. These quidelines have been discussed with various committees of Congress and although not finalized at this time, they could prove beneficial in the administration of the FBI. EZ would like to comment briefly on the matter of determining the degree and method of access to FBI files granted to a@ conmittee having oversight responsibility, I believe such determination must carefully consider the questions raised as to the protection of the integrity of such matter aside from privagy considerations. : Much of the information received by the Bureau is furnished voluntarily, not only by individuals but by cooperative foreign governments. They do so in return for an express or implied promise of confidentiality. The FBI regards such promises as binding. . MW 34965 Docld:32959503 Page 201
eo. @ The establishment of unlimited access could seriously jeopardize the flow of volunteered information which is the lifeblood of our investigative organization. As the number of persons having access to highly sensitive materials is increased, the chance of an intentional or inadvertent disclosure also increases. A perfectly well-intentioned person who legitimately comes into possession of sensitive information may well forget, at a later time and in another position, the circumstances under which he acquired the information. Law enforcement in this Nation is largely dependent upon citizen cooperation. ‘Should citizens no longer have any assurance their identities will be protected, the very foundation of cooperation upon which the Bureau is so reliant will be shaken. Our legitimate concern in this area is borne out by the fact courts continue to recognize the special legal status accorded informants in the law enforcement community, in that their true identities are protected. Should the identities of informants be jeopardized by the unnecessary proliferation of information, there will be a severe impact on the ability of the FBI to discharge its mandated responsibilities. | NW 54965 Docld:32989503 Page 202
. | NW 54965 Docld:32989503 We are also concerned about the countless public-spirited citizens who come forward voluntarily with information essential for the FBI to function effectively. Other extremely valuable sources of such information are cooperative agencies in this country and abroad. Should the FBI bé required to relinquish, over our objections, information of this nature, it denied such information in the The Select Committees is quite likely we would be future. have received unprecedented access to information from the FBI, within agreed limits; but we Must ask whether the same degree of access should be allowed, or is essential to, an The Select Committees came into atmosphere. Issues were raised Most of them have been resolved I must point out that the endeavors of the Committees ongoing oversight committee, being in the Watergate that needed to be resolved. with regard to the FBI. our diligent cooperation in stems, in part, from our own commitment to review the actions of the FBI in the past in order to better judge the proper role of the FBI in the Future, An excellent example of this commitment is the fact we have reduced the number of our domestic intelligence investigations by 64 percent since July, 1973. Page 203 es = 5!
q NW 34965 Doold:32989503 Page 204 As of July 31, 1973, we were handling 21,414 such investigations. By October 30, 1975, we had reduced that total to 7,686 pending domestic intelligence cases ~- a decline of 13,728 cases. I think this is solid evidence of our responsiveness even prior to the drafting of proposed guidelines for such investigations. It isn't necessary for a house to fail on us --~ much less two houses. So I feel compelled to raise this question: Will the good of the country be better served by continuing an extraordinary degree of direct Congressional access to FBI information, or will it be better served by placing emphasis on requiring the FBI Director to be fully accountable to an oversight committee through sworn testimony? I think the Congress and the FBI can perform their respective tasks with the most advantageous results by the latter means. Now, also, I would strongly suggest that consideration be given to the employment of a permanent, professional staff -- to the extent necessary ~-- for any proposed oversight committee, with stringent cléarance procedures. This would allow the staff members to become thoroughly knowledgeable concerning the FBI's procedures and practices and, thereby, facilitate the work of the committee with proper security.
As we seek to define the proper degree of oversight, or review, of FBI operations, we must consider the administrative burdens such oversight involves. I should point out that in responding to requests of the two Select Committees, the FBI at its headquarters alone expended 3,976 days of Agent personnel and 1,964 davs of clerical personnel from April through December, 1975 -- manpower diverted from investigative duties. In dcliars and cents that represents a cost of approximately $640,500. Additionally, the cost of conducting background investigations of committee staff members had reached about $393,699 through last month. Now these figures do not take into account personnel utilized in responding to requests of other committees of Congress, which have substantially increased during the past year. Many of the requests we receive from Congress are duplicative in nature. Though we diligently try to respond fully and accurately in each and every instance, it is a time-consuming and costiy chore. And I feel strongly that the interests of the American people would be best served by Congress consolidating its oversight functions. The marypower of the FBI is limited. With the increased burden placed on the Bureau by Congressional Committee |. MW 34965 Doocld:329599503 Page 205
requests, and Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act requests, we have reached the point where the Bureau's ability to perform its normal investigative functions has been impaired. So I would urge you to consider these matters in your deliberations concerning oversight legislation. I assure you we will continue to cooperate to the best of our ability. And I can further assure you that under a Director heid fully accountable and reporting at intervals to an oversight committee, the FBI can perform effectively . and honorably. Thank you. - G - | HW 54965 Doeld: 32969503 Page 206
QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELL id Y; QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: i NW 34965 Docid: 32989503 y 4 @ Testimony beforesthe Committee on Government Oper ons, 1-26-76 : QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR RIBICOFF Mr. Kelley, Do you believe that there shouid be a Congressional Oversight Committee handling intelligence matters? . I believe in oversight, Senator. I do not know whether you mean one which is separated from the criminal activities performed by the FRI or not. If it be fragmented, I do not believe that such should be done. I subscribe to an oversight of both the intelligence activ- ities in the domestic and foreign security and the criminal. I do not think it is anyone's intention in the oversight committee to take care of the day- to-day problems that the criminal oversight has domestically, but in the conunterintelli- gence field, do you believe that there should be such an oversight committee? I do believe that it is necessary that we do have oversight. Mr. Colby testified last week that, in his opinion, after reporting to eight committees, he feels that the sooner such an oversight committee is created, the better off the intelligence community would be. Do you believe with Mr. Colby? Zr da. In your stazement on page 3--I quote you--you state that “Some of the mistakes in the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher . authorities outside the FBI.” Could you please tell us what mistakes and which higher authorities you are referring to? I am referring to the requests, the orders that have come to us from members of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and these stem from the installation of some of our electronic surveillances and from programs that we have followed which have been with the authority of, and approval of, those in this area. There are not~--I do not have a complete outline of them, but we da have instances where the FBI did not initiate these. The orders came from outside our organization and from, of course, The White House on Some o¢casions. Page 207
Hw 54965 QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: Doold: 32989503 Do you believe that such requests have been improper under the authority of the FBI? ZT do not think by any means that they come under the purview of the FBI. What should a director of the FBI do if he receives an order from the President, or the Attorney General or someone in the White House staff that you believe contrary to what your responsibilities and authorities are? What should a Director do under those circumstances? First, I think that he should deliberate and talk with the Attorney General, if it be one not coming from the Attorney General and get his determination. if it be one where there is some doubt, he should get it in writing. If it be one that he does not under any consideration nor as a result of deliberation wherein an effort is made to convince him, but he himself does not feel that it is advisable then he should withdraw, he should resign. And as I was once told by Senator Byrd during confirmation, it is noped that in such an instance that he would come to the oversight committee of the Congress and consult with them about what should be done under these Gircumstances. Of course, that is a matter which the Director himself has to arrive at, and I am already committed to, and still subscribe to, the proposition that I am not going to give way just because it comes from higher authority. If the President of the United States makas @ request of you that you believe to be improper, and ci course, he is your boss, you would feel honor-bound uncer those circum- stances to resign as Director of the FBI? TE it came to the final crunch, yes. Bo you believe that an FBI Director should have a definite term in office? IT have been asked this before. I am not uncom- fortable under the present system where my term of office is from day to day. I do not believe ' that there should be any greater tenure than that. Insofar as a limitation on how long he can be Director, ¥ feel that nine or ten years is suificient. I do subscribe to that. Page 208
QUESTION: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: ® @ You say also on page 3 that when Mr. Levi became Attorney General, he instructéd you to report to him any requests or practices which, in your judgment, were improper or presented the appearance of impropriety. Have you made such reports to Mr. Levi? Yes, sir. Are they confidential, or could you describe generally the nature and frequency of such improper requests? Most of them have been in the area of Cointe Programs which we have discovered ourselves some of our file reviews. I can remember another where we determined that there were certain mail openings which we did not know about until we accidentally discovered them. It was not a failure to inform us, but they thought that this was an ongoing program that had been: given official approval. There was no thought that it was something that should be hidden. -We did discover them in the top echelon of the FBI and, therefore, the thought ls they were new to us--they were also new to Levi and we informed him about them. i in In your testimony you stated that the Bureau has reduced a number of pending domestic intelli- gence investigations from 21,414 in 1973 to 7,686 by October 30, 1975. How do you explain this? Were there too many investigations bein conducted two years prior? Senator, when I first came in, I talked with the man in charge orf our Intelligence Division. That is the one where we handle the security matters, and it was our opinion, together, that there were too many investigations being conducted in the security field. I asked him to review the bases on which we conduct our investigations. Obviously it became apparent that some of our fields of attention could be under close scrutinv. I felt some undue extensions of our investigatory capabilities and this was a contin- uing process, and the reduction was not something that was immediate, put extended from, I wouid say, the latter part of '73 when we dot ourselves lined up, right through to October, as it says in my statement, cof '75. We looked over why 1329699503 Page 205 MW 34965 Doold
. 4 are } doing certain things, an@« might a well pe, as is many times true in investigative circles, that you might get a little too concerned about something that on close scrutiny May not have been quite as alarming as it first seems. This is not at all unusual... It is, however, unusual that it comes from within and yes, as a result of the realignment of our goals-~realignment of our procedures--our basis for investigating matters, we did bring about this reduction. : MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Senator Percy? QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. Kelley for his demonstrated desire and wiliingness to work with members of Congress and to help us fulfill our responsibilities. Former Attorney General Katzenbach testified last week that he often did not know what the FBI was doing. What is your own working relationship with the present Attorney General? Do you keep him informed of all the major activities that the FBI is undertaking? Does he participate in deciding whether or not you undertake major undertakings? MR. KELLEY: Senator, we certainly keep him informed of any Major program. I would say that perhaps we may, on occasion, over~-inform him. We may tell him about things that are antici- patory as far as problems are concerned. We try to keep him fully informed. For example, if there happens to bea something we learn about that may cause press inquiries of him, we inform him of that. Many times they are made. I just point this out inasmuch as we are trying valiantly to keep him informed. QUESTION: When do you anticipate new guidelines for the FBI being finalized? MR. KELLEY: I cannot give you this response. It has been several months in preparation. I know that it has now been thrown back into the hopyer for re-evaluation. I cannot tell you--perhaps Mr. Levi can give you better information in that regard. NW 34965 Doocld: 32939503 Page 210
QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: _ Ww 54965 Doold: 22989503 As . 2 on that first, qu®@tion, to be certain that I complete the record on it, can you think now in retrospect in anything in your term of office as Director of the FBI that you really should have advised the Attorney General of that you maybe subsequently did, but did not at the time? I cannot think of anything, Senator. I asked that, because Dean Rusk said that he subsequently has now learned of certain things undertaken in foreign countries by, say, the CTA that he thought at the time he knew everything going on, he now learns he did not know, and I wanted to complete that record. You talk about unlimited access to your files being dangerous, and I do not think anyone contem- plates that whatsoever, but I do not think either that you should be left in the position where just your word is the only thing that an Oversight Committee has. What do you think is proper in this respect with respect to reference to files? I think that there should be a working arrange- ment between our people and whatever group might have oversight, and there is a strong requirement that there not be presentation of material which would first compromise a source of information, whether that be a citizen, a government, or an informant. The confiden- tiality of the work done by the FBI is an extremely important thing. Names are not just all that reveal the identity. It may be that certain circumstances, when revealed, may pinpoint what might be the source of information. There might be also too great : & proliferation of information about some activity of the FBI. . For example, we have, of course, warrantless Wiretaps. We feel that there should be confidentiality of that. These have been authorized through the approval of the President through the Attorney General's delegated authority in this regard. I would say generally that if there be a reasonable basis whereby we can explain that it should be maintained confidential that it be so maintained. On the other hand, we should extend ourselves in the spirit of Page 211
mw 54965 QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: coophMtion to inform and to reyM#@t on measures, and if they want a review that we extend ourselves to let them make such review. You have been able to reduce your domestic intelligence investigations by 64 percent Since July, 1973. Can you tell us how you have done that? By a review that we started in mid-1973 looking over the bases for our investigatory needs and our intelligence operations, and generally to take an inventory and say which should we continue, which should we now perhaps give additional emphasis, and we culled out, in other words, those which we did not feel were strictly productive insofar as meeting our commitments. Did you find that you eliminated some cf those, Mr. Kelley, because they were illegal, in retrospect, as you look back and decided that the FBE shonld not, as a law enforcement agen should not engage in illegal practices in investi Xe] yO You know, when you speak of illegality, we have great difficulty. Sometimes, in the context of the time, you may open matters which later are determined to be perhaps possible civil rights investigations, invasions of privacy, or other background objections. I do not know of any which, I would say, were actually iilegal. 1 just do not recall any that would meet that classification. Were some eliminated because they may have been borderline, and in retrospect in numerality, you decided not to go ahead? I would say that that is a possibility. In a strict classification or interpretation they may be termed an invasion of privacy or rights or something of that type. Were most cf them eliminated because you felt they were not productive, and to use a phrase, they were not really cost-effective, for the amount of energy and effort put into then? They would not have paid off? ~~ § = Docld: 32989503 Page 212
MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: NW 54965 Docld: 32989503 Page 213 a Os say that those would piv great and major reasons. With the workload declining 64 percent, has there been any decline at all in manpower? Have you shifted manpower to other Division-- «.-person power, excuse me; man or womanpower-— have you shifted it to other divisions? There has been some shifting; much of cur so~called overload of manpower or investigative attention by this Division has been picked up by the terroristic activities investigations. Of course, we have had a great rise in that: doubled each year. And, strangely enough, during 1975, it even increased more than that. We had more terrorist-type of bombings in 1975 than we had in 1974. You mentioned the burden that has been placed on the FBI by the Congress. I présume that there is not any question that the CIA could rightfully maintain that a tremendous burden has placed on it by the Congress now. I think, in retrospect and in fairness, a part of the burden is unfair, unwarranted, and not cost-effective. But a large part of the burden is placed simply because we have recognized that we failed the American people in the past, and no one has more clearly admitted this than the Majority leader of the Senate, Senator Mansfield, in his opening statements before the committee. 650 that we have to rectify that. We may overkill, in a sense. I hope we will not. I hope that we will go a prudent, moderate path and not overreact to the situation. But a large part of that burden is because we simply did not perform the function in the past and the American people know it, they are holding us accountable for that. I wonder if you could for the recora, however, just give us a sense of your own personal burden, which worries me, both about the Director of the CIA and the Director of the FRI. How much of your personal time, since you have assumed office, do you think you have devoted to preparing for, giving testimony before Congressional Committees, and then following up on the testimony that has been given, cr looking at the testimony being given by ethers?
MR. KELLEY: SENATOR: MR. CHATRMAN: SENATOR: os Be} I Ms say that about 25 vero of my time is consumed in going over testimony, reviewing Material, acquainting myself with the progress of the various committee activities, in pre- paring myself for testimony, and in testifying; and I think that the others in the top echelon of the Bureau who are involved in this type of thing may have even more than this devoted in their time. It has increased my work day considerably, and I find myself many times reading until the wee hours of the mornind. I am not complaining about it. I assumed this. Much more time is devoted to doing my job now than ever before, again, about 25 percent of that time is in this area. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Are we going for one more round of questions? If there are more questions. I have just a few left. I would like an answer to how much time you think is appro- priate for you to spend on this activity, I will wait until we come back. QUESTIONS NOW FROM SENATOR BROCK QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: MW 34965 Doold: 32969503 a ve ena ve UI Onn aa Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you clarify for me something you said earlier. With regard to the oversight function, I thought that you said that the oversight should include all FRI activities. If that is the case, you might be in some disagreement, with those that say we should separate the oversight of the domestic operations, primarily FBI, from the international oversight function which would more relate to CIA. 75 percent to 80 percent of our time is on criminal activities. There is, on the cther hand, a great interrelationship between our security people and our criminal investigations. We may have a case where we need additional people in a security matter. We will call on some people in the criminal activity section. It is true, on the other hand, we will have a big hank robbery or some big fugitive case. We may call on security people and have them do it. We have difficulty in setting aside Page 214
1. QUESTION: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: MW 34965 Doocld:32959503 Page 215 | tcha@rortion of our budget whi D goes solely to the so-called intelligence activities. [In the area of intelligence, we have quite a bit of work in the intelligence field in the criminal work. We would suggest that it not be fragmented, and would hope that we could present all of our difficulties to one committee. I realize that there is the thought that this thrust should be just toward security matters foreign and domestic. We have problems other than this. I can see where it would be very helpful to us to have an overall oversight which would take care of both of our branches The reason I asked the question, there has been at least some indication among members of the Senate, that they would like--at least some members would like--to separate the intelligence from the criminal aspect, and give the oversight committee which this committee might create, jurisdiction over all intelligence, counterintelligence, domestically and international intelligence but to leave to the Judicial Committee, the principal oversight responsibility for the FBI. I gather that you would not find that a very happy end product? We report to the Appropriations Committee, and they outline our programs. Under this possibility we would be reporting to an Intelligence Committee, we would be reporting to the Senate Judiciary Commitise on general oversight. Right away we have three within the Senate. TE we did give this committee full and complete jurisdiction, would you also suggest that they have jurisdiction in terms of appropriations as well? In other words, you would limit the oversight to one committee. It would have both authorization oversight and appropriation authority. Senator, I am not really prepared to give you an opinion on that. I would say that probably this should be reserved to the Attorney General. Personally, of course, it would probably give us a closer definition of oversight and might be that such a committee certainly coulda become best acquainted with our work in ongoing programs, but I Go nat know that I can answer well that particular question.
QUESTION: I x sure that we can eith® As a matter of , fact, there are some of us that feel that rather than trying to define this thing too precisely, we should create an oversight committee and assign to them the responsibility of a study of the extent of the jurisdictional question. That may be the best thing that we can achieve at the moment if we are going to get any response. Let me ask you one or two more questions, again in this same area, I am reluctant to limit the right of an Over- sight Committee in terms of access. I think that is almost something that we can do by experience, as we have with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There the experience has proven to be good, and I think, healthy for both Sides, Executive and Legislative. I am distressed by the leak of information that is ongoing now. I think it is extremely dangerous yet I find it difficult to find a way in which we would limit an oversight committee which may need some access in order to reach this definition of responsibility. I do not know how we would do what you are suggesting, essentiaily depends upon the Director and his testimony before the Committee. MR. KELLEY: Under our recommendations, we conclude that there should be investigations and clearances granted to members of staff, that their numbers, as well as others for the Committee, should be as limited as possible. We feel that matters that might compromise our sources of information are those that are most important. I think, Senator, that probabiy we could start off in such a rela- tionship being a little extended insofar as our own desires, we can be a little more open, and see how it works. I would hope that it would be sort of an open-end type of thing so that we cah get some history cf experiences. [I do not want to foreclose the right of review in this regard. E think, as a citizen, I am compelled to say that there should be a better flow of infor- mation than has been true in the past. I am willing to at least explore such a possibility. -10- NW 34965 Doold:32989503 Page 216
m QUESTION: That is really what I am reaching for, and If ° appreciate it. We are treating this as if it is going to be de novo every six months. It is not. You are going to create an expertise in this Committee and its staff a knowledge of the general | problem area, and I think these matters will begin - to settle up as it gains maturity and experience. : XZ am reluctant to eliminate it now because I think we may create an adversary relationship which I do not think is helpful, where, as an alternative, if we kept it fairly open, I think a development of that experience would lead to a good relationship, as we have done with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy earlier. ee ee MR. KELLEY: There are misunderstandings about why we think things are confidential. Take for example, a small thing, a release of our telephone directory. It is not generally understood that, by virtue of the release of the telephone directory, you therefore list the identity of our Agents. They are listed in the telephone book. There- after, they get a lot of crank calls. I never did release my address, and as soon as it was listed~-and it was listed cf course in the Congressicnal Record-~-I am not complaining about this-~-I started receiving crank mail at my home and some of it was on post cards, some of it my wif& read, it wes not the best thing. People do not realize that we try to protect it for reasons that we could possibly explain in an atmosphere of cooperation with such a committee, and I would look forward to that opportunity. We have not communicated properly, possibly. ff it is determined this is too far fetched, ail right, we will drop it. We' are willing to discuss it. QUESTION: Thank you. My time has expired. I think what I am saying is that there is a clear distinction between a one~shot investigatory committee which is trying to get short-term information and a continuing over- sight committee with a developed relationship on a maturing basis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MR. CHAIRMAN: Senator Weicker, while it is your turn, since Senator Percy has used up his time, he has requested a few more minutes, if you would yield to him. WHICK ts 3 I yield, NW 34965 Doold: 329599503 Page 217 a
L * ‘ NW 34965 QUESTIONS NOW n® SENATOR PERCY QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: Regretfully, I have a witness upstairs in the Foreign Relations Committee. I was anxious to follow up, Mr. Kelley, what proportion of your time do you think is appropriate and proper that you should devote to Congressional oversight? In other words, we have the same objective to reduce the burden on your Department because of the duplicative activities of the proliferated committees. What proportion do you think is appropriate for you to spend? ; I have never really considered it, but I would say that during my ordinary, everyday operations, I should keep this in mind and should review each program with the thought prepared to discuss it with an oversight committee, maybe 5 percent, just a ballpark figure. That is a goal I am not sure we will ever achieve but certainly if we can cut if in half, it will help, because your principal duty obviously is to administer a very able department and agency. The thought has been orbited--I threw it out originally--to just try to cut in half in area of intelligence because of the tremen- dous amount of knowledge a person has to gain to properly authorize in authorizing legislation, and yet the law--and we are not specialists in this field; we are dealing with specialists in the law enforcement field-~to cut it in half to see if possibly we can consider in this one oversight committee, giving that committee both authorization and appropriations authority so the service would only have to go before one committee in the Senate and one in the House and have his job done with and thoroughly inform, say, a group of nine Senators that would rotate in that position. Would that, in your judgement, be of material assistance and help if we could work it out internally? If we could, Senator, in one committee, I feel this would be advantageous. I have long proposed that the Attorney General he taken out of politics and not be permitted by procedure or precedent, just as the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, has not participated in politics as such. The Attorney General has -~- 12 - Docld: 32989503 Page 218
' MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: NW 34965: Doold: 32989503 veo politically oriented or Oe, many times being the campaign manager. Do you feel that the Director of the FBI is not a political position and it should never be permitted~-do you think it would be a good idea for the Attorney General not to engage in party politics while he is holding that office? I have never had experience with it since I have come here, in any dealings with me or with the Bureau by the three Attorneys General under whom I have worked. There has been no indication of political influence. Do you suggest consolidation of Congressional oversight of the FBI. Should that be done by the same committee overseeing agencies dealing with foreign intelligence in your judgment? In my judgment, all of the operations of the FBI would advantageously be joined in one committee. One committee? Yes, sir. Could you explain in layman's term the difference between foreign and domestic intelligence in criminal cases as managed administratively by the FBI? And I ask that with the understanding that criminal activities involving foreign powers are not necessarily handled in the FBI's foreign intelligence division. For example, if another country were to finance terrorist acts within the United States, the entire case might be handled in the Criminal Division. Therefore, it would help us in our understanding if you could differentiate between what activities are handled by each of those bureaus. If yon would like to do that for the record, to make it more complete. I would certainly accept that. I would prefer to prepare this in a response to you and will do so. Mr. Kelley, finally, FBI activities seem to be at the heart of one of the gray areas of oversight. i think we are in general agreement that Congress should create a committee that would oversee the CIA and NSA. What aspects of the FBI that should be looked at by this committee is another matter. What are your views on this? Could I also give you that response~-may I respond to that in writing also? -~ 13 - Page 219
| Nw 54965 oe « ' SENATOR: ves Qou certainly may. I cni Denar that winds up. I woujid simply like to say having known Attorney General Levi for a quarter of a century as a trustee at the University of Chicago, I think the tone and attitude that he is establishing, the relationship that he has established with you and which has been a cause of great concern between the FBI Directors of the past have not been fully satisfactory and fully cooperative. I think thet relationship that has been estab- lished has been an outstanding accomplishment, and I think your testimony to that effect here is very important indeed, and I certainly - commend both you and Attorney General Levi, because a great deal has been accomplished already. MR. CHATRMAN: Senator Weicker? SENATOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. QUESTIONS NOW FROM SHNATOR WEICKER QUESTION: I notice in your statement you make mention ef the fact that since 1975, or April through December, 1975, a great amount of time, effort, and money was expended on responding to Gongressionali inquiries, et cetera. I think we both might also allude to the fact that that is directiy attributable to the fact that there was no Congressional inguiry for many years before that, and what in effect you have seen is an extreme reaction to an extreme sitvation. As a matter of fact, as IT understand it, and prior to the impeach- ment inguiry neither the House nor the Senate Judiciary Committees held any hearings on FBI oversight. Is that correct, to your knowledge? MR. KELLEY: =F do not recail this, Senator. QUESTION: Z believe that was before your timé, but that is the record. MR. KELLEY: I am thinking only during the time that I have been here. I do net recall just when we first reported to the Oversight Committee. It was during the time that Mr. Saxbe was Attorney Ganeral. We appeared three times. Prior to that I do not know. - 14 - Docld: 32989503 Page 220 ean tte
— A Pee ee fh ta ae . € * . QUESTION: * I tigmk it is important to poirM¥out that I am sure the American people are just as appalled about your being overburdened with Congressional inquiries as they are with no Congressional inquiries. But that is the record. There is nothing in between. I think that is important to point out as we try to devise some system, some apparatus, to bring balance to all this. We need the FBI. As I said the other day, we need a CIA. There is no reason why a choice has to be made between 0 and 100 percent insofar as it is using up your time, the CIA or any of our law enforcement agencies. My concern, believe me, Director, is not that you are going to be overburdened with oversight. As I have indicated, unless this Congress acts very shortly, the whole thing is going to he forgotten and we are going to go back to zero again. That is a far greater danger in my book than your being overburdened. I would suggest to you, it is very strange to say, that I would hope that you, along with Mr. Colby and others in the law enforcement community, would fight very hard tq see this oversight legislation implemented, because on that depends the survival of your agency, an that depends a restoration of ‘confidence as far as the American people are MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: NW 34965 Docid: 32989503 concerned in the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. I fear the bureaucratic footdragging is going to go on around here two years, five years from now. We will be right back at square A, except the next time that any other abuses get uncovered, that is going to be the end of your agency. There is going to be no way of coming back in the room to construct something that makes. sense. That is my concern. I went on record during my confirmation sponsoring oversight, and I still feel that it is a very viable and proper precedure. I have no objection to it whatsoever, and I welcome it. I notice you say you favor a new oversight committee. Is it your feeling that the present oversight mechanisms are not adequate? I hope I have not indicated that I am critical of the present oversight. I hope that we can have a centralized oversight whereby our intelligence and our criminal investigatory responsibilities are best included in this one. Under the projected possibilities, the Bureau would be fragmented, we would have an oversight of the security of the national cownterintelligence field and -~ 15 - Page 221
QUESTION ; MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: LEY : Bj ti MR. Ki NW 34965 Doold: 32989503 the @ minal field maintained Qire present oversight system. I would hope that it wouid be together. We do report to the Appropriations Committee and we do report to the Judiciary Committee on Oversight. If it were fragmented further, we would have three oversight committees. Do you feel that the present svstem of oversight as embodied in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees should be supplanted by a new Oversight Committee, or are you satisfied with the present system? I would reserve the final determination to consultation as I would want to do, of course, with Mr. Levi to get together and do this. I would say, primarily, our goal is to have it centered not in any particular committee. I think that is the responsibility of Congress, actually. What we want to do is not fragment it, not proliferate it, but to have it so that we can have one group to which we can go for considera- tion of our problems and outline our procedures. I can appreciate, Mr. Director, that you still have to work with the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and obviously we don't want to ruffle any feathers. We want to pilot a future course. We are not trying to find out how we can live with the past. The difficulty is, as I perceive it, not that the mechanism was not there for oversight--it was there. The problem was that it was a secondary function of the particular committee, in this case the Judiciary Committee, something down the line. Do you feel that your agency and its activities are of sufficient importance that that should be a full-time job, rather than a secondary job, for a Congressional committee? I responded to a question asked by Senator Perey about how much time I thought I might be devoting to the oversight requirement. I thought about 5 percent. That is just a ballpark figure. I do not think that that would necessarily mean that one committee would be set aside for just that type of deliberation. I think that if it were to include all of our activities, criminal as well as security, that it might take a little more, but still, I do not think that things come up that frequentiy where it would be a real heavy task for any committee. - 16 - Page 222
. QUESTION: QUESTION : You Orerstana what we are cont rating here would be a committee whose intefition would be directed toward the FBI, the CIA, the law enforcement intelligence community? It ; would not just be the FBI; it would also be the CIA. What I am saying, I think what others are trying to get across is, is this sufficiently important to this Nation, to its life and to its Constitution, that that is a full-time job and not a secondary job for scme other Committee, be it the FBI which is a secondary function cf Judiciary, or the CIA, which is a secondary function of Armed Services. This is a primary function. At least, I do not find it a primary function of law enforcement intelligence. That is why my question to you, whether you are satisfied with the present system, which obviously has not worked in the past, with a warning could work, or whether we are best just having one committee that would work with these law enforcement intelligence agencies and start from’scratch and once again try to rebuild confidence. It really does not make any difference what you think or what I think or what Senator Ribicoff thinks or our colleagues here think. The fact is that the American people have lost their confidence. That is the group we have to reach. Whether I am satisfied that you are a fine man with great integrity and a fine Director, it does not mean anything, and your opinion of me, that is not important. What the American people think is what is very important. That is what is jeopardizing your Agency now and, indeed, the Congress. I would construe anything which is developed by Congress as something which we would certainly try to work under. We will not complain, You will not have any beefs from us, I told Senator Brock that I would certainly work as best we can with the system that is devised. I repeat that to you, too. I am not going to argue about it. =I would like to work with you just as closely as we can. I appreciate it. I am not trying to lay all of this at your doorstep. I think Senators Brock and Ribicoff were talking earlier, we were talking earlier, I was talking earlier with Senator Brock, we are gcing to try to pry these things loose _ NW 54965 DocId:32989503 Page 223 caeenm mre rrrmr ee er ee ena ee eee |
MR. CHAIRMAN: SENATOR: CHATRMAN: SENATOR: ‘ CHAIRMAN : MR. KELLEY: in @ Congress. They are the @: that do not want any change. That is why I am trying to get all the help we can publicly. Please understand what I think all of us here are saying. We are not against your agency. We want to see it survive, but it cannot survive unless the American people feel that they have a handle on this policy. Thank you. Thank you very much. Senator Nunn? I have no questions. Senator Brock, do you have any more questions? No. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. It may very will be, as we proceed to mark up this legislation, that we may have occasion to talk to you and your staff. I would hope that you would be available to us in the future. We will be available. ~ 18 - NW 34965 Docld: 32989503 Page 224
7 (Rev, 22 ‘ 1 ¥ ev, 2-14-74) @ y “ ¥ f FBI Transmit in. Cn Airtel __ (Pyne in piciniext or cade) (Prace tence? -- eee ae ee en | aan | mo: Sac, Alb 2720-78 | TO: . PAC: Albany Time ; fig . | FROM: Director, FBI ad = nr ios P BUREAUWIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM, 76~-7 t j | nqeneainae | TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS U. S. SENATS, JANUARY 26, 1976 Enclosed for your information is one copy OF ‘ the Statement I delivered before the Committee on Government Operations of the J. S&S. Senate on January 26, 1976, as well as a transcript of the question-and~ansver -{ session that followed. The Latter cen be used in answering = inquiries from newsmen and others but should not be fur- =| nished to any outsider. & 4 . ; . s She snolosed material may be of assistance to “| you in casvonding to inquiries you may receive from the &| puolic or the press. g] = I 2 | { | | Bnelosures (2) | 1 - All Field offices - Enciosures (2) | i - Fach Legat - Enclosures {2} | t i TEMES ~~ (Do not tyne beisi tits Gne.) > as JAERETIO AN 3 p 1 | ‘ 3 | se roo ee TS . : meses cre ee msm pe Se A, OO A = ” — ' FO-2sY2 srg migetd/ NW 54965 Doold:32989503 PaGé 225 : Dancer tenance WAI TO ee RL NNR ER MO bg AEDS OEE Bay OBA OE IE ICE ALON OI Eg Total SUOMI RONEN EOI SR OTERO TEMA EL ETT REYOND TIS ATARCIN, } FEE ed Cyne
FD-359 (Rev. 11-11-75) | | NW 54965 Docld: 32989503 © From Probe. to Without carefully looking over the de- - tails, Americans cannot finally sudge the considerable reforms announced by President Ford Tuesday night for re- vamping the troubled’ Central Intelli- geace &zency. But in concept and struc- ture, the President has responded con- structively both io legitimate concerns of the American public and to several maior findings of recent, separate offi- cial investigations. In its interim report last November, the select Senate intelligence committee appropriately condemned assassination as a policy tool and: decried the ambigui- ty, the blurred links of responsibility, in the decision-making chain of command within the intelligence community. Certainly responsive to all these’con- cerns ig the President’s plan to create separate exécutive boards — one to make broad intelligence policy and the gther, under CIA director George Bush, to manage that policy — with distinct functions and clear accountability to an elected President. Also, the President vuies out assassination of foreign heads of stale as a policy, at least in peace- time. Most Americans couldn’t agree more ‘with that. ‘ ——1 %’ ok * Last June, another CIA investigating committee, this one headed by Vice President Rockefeller, criticized the lack of effective oversight of CIA activities by both Congress and the executive branch. . it suggested a joint congressional over- sight committee and said “a new body is needed te provide oversight of the agen- cy within the executive branch.” Now the President has emphatically endorsed both ideas. On the joint oversight panei in Congress, he recognizes that this is a“ decision for Congress to make. But ta provide oversight within the executive’ branch, he as named his own special independer:t pane! of three citizens to, - oversee all intelligence operations and report directly to him. We hope that board will receive strong powers aud, beclking-to do its job, whigh is. extraordic, Page 22 (Mount Clipping in Space Below} 5 Ac ston on n CEA narily important because of the neces- sary secrecy of the work it is overseeing. Also welcome is the President’s pian for public guidelines, for both CIA and FBI, and for stringent controls to protect citizen liberties against such past abuses as secret mail openings and electronic surveillance, Especially reassuring is the idea ef requiring judicial warrants be- fore such surveillance, even for national security reasons, is undertaken. We will be interested in details of many of these changes, especially con- cerning the agency guidelines and Ford proposals to Congress for making disclo- sure of information a crime, 2 sensitive area that must be scr unulously limited in a free society. - , a ee “As the President and the Rockefeller panel have rightly said, the object must be the difficult one of maintaining an effective intelligence capability while simultaneously protecting the liberties of individuals and democratic safeguards in an open, free society. This isn’t easy, but it must involve clearly pinpointed ac- countability. The public should not know the details of-covert intelligence opera- ete tions abroad. But it must know what offi- . cials are responsible, and therefore pub- licty accountable, for the management, and policies influencing those aperations. This principle is impressively imbedded in the Ford plan of a policy-making bady, a management body, a still-to-be-issued set of public guidelines and a new over- sight unit — ali directly responsible to an elected President. But these proposals compose only part of the solution to past mistakes. In our check-and-balance system, Congress must debate and decide how to organize its own vital oversight role most effec- tively. After months of probing, Wash- ington neads to act — thoughtfully, but decisively — on its information. The President has now wisely and compre- hersively mads his own move from investigations tu conclusions and actions. Coayress should not lag far behind:——o . ob (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) UFFALO EVENING NEWS falo, New York 1 80-1876 Date: Edition: Author: Edito: M,C. Browne Title: SENSTUDY Eas Character: or Classification 62-2665 : B7. Submitting Office! a. {__} Being Investigated 2 FEB £)9 1976 FEI-BUFFALO “4 ) (A N }
FD-950 (Rev, 7-16-63) (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) 23 COURIER EXPRESS ~ Buffalo, New York AMHEES Re rept tee een be te eFC a cals enc teases Malta samnicrineemor tute ines te Path NETS RAE Kanner aden foe jexpectation ; ifactua 2/28/76 Date: . Edition: Four Star Author: Editor: Title: SENSTUDY noe 62-2665 --4g¢ Character; or Classification: Submitting Office Buffalo | Being Investigated iso] 5 SSN meR NST TT: Merete Te: cnr in nrtnn eee renee tapes pee me ere
FD-I5U (Rev. 7-16-63) fs. we ee Bo {Indicate page, name of newspaper, ctty and state.) 10 . COURIER EXPRESS Buffalo, New York | | TE ASE TT ‘ Date: 2/29/76 Edition: Four Star Author: \ ; Editor: Tile: SENSTUDY Character: or Classification: Submitting O ffice [7] Being Investigated NW 34965 Docld: 329399503 Page 226
-FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63) (Mount Clipping in Space Below) (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) BUFFALO. EVENING NEW ._ Buffalo, New York | pate: 3/4/76 Edition: Late City . Author: Complete . Editor: , tine: SENSTUDY — Character: or Classi fication:
FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75) wwe @. (Mount Clipping in Space Belew) my Fil ane IRS is Documentec. Associated Press WASHINGTON, March § — Women's libbers, Com- munists, militant blacks, the Ku Klux Klan, the Jew- ish Defense League and citizens protesting against taxes were among the targets of surveillance by government agencies, a Senate panel says. The Senate Intelligence Com- mittee released nearly 1000 pages of documents Monday, detailing FRI wiretap and sur- > veillance operations and Inter- nal Revenue Servce undercover spying. A March 1971 memo, written by W. Raymond Wannali, for- mer head of the FBI's Intelli- gence Division, said the pur- pose of the electronic spying was “production of intelligence relating ty activities of domes- tice criminal-subversive individ: | uals and organizations.’ One memo snows the FBI used jnformers during 1969 ard 1978 to keep track of the women's liberation movement in New York, Baltimore, Karsas City, Mo., Calumbia, Mo.,, and Lawrence, Kaa., put never tummed up any evidence of revolutionary or violent ac- tivity. ao ek 1 een er Wh eR ete SRG re renee tne ee eee ne A A Pe eel ! MW 34965 Doold:329599503 Page 230 ie 3/9/76 | (indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) 1 BUFFALO EVENING NEWS Buffalo, New York Edition: Author: Hditor: Tile: SENSTUDY City Character: or ; ClassificgtGn: 62-2665-— ! Submitting Office: Buffal 6 {_) Being Investigated
54965 Doold: 32989503 _ COMMITTEE documents ‘preventive action” .to thwart aisu-showed the IRS uS€d potential violence. Mr. Levi undercover agents to monitor activities of tax protesters in Los Angeles and Chicago. One memo suid an IRS undetcover agent in Los Angeles gave the Justice Department advance information on the legal strate- gy planned by a person facing trial for refusing to pay his taxes, by obtaining a copy of his legal brief several months be- fore it was fied in court. The memo said the advance data gave the IRS time to ‘‘do additional research in order for the U. S. attorney to prop- erly answer this motion.” which sought dismissal of one of the charges. In its effort to “expose, dis- rupt and otherwise neutralize” radical groups, the FBI wrote an anonyinous letter to the wife of a Ku Klux Klansman, saying that her husband “has been commiting adultery” with a woman who had “lust-fifled eyes and a smart-aleck fig- ure.” \ ~ Rg ff ANOTHER GOAL was “to prevent the rise of a Messiah — such as the late Rev. Dr. Mar- tin Luther King Jr. ~— who could unify and electrify, the black ‘nationalist movement.” said the absence of the rule would not prohibit the FBI irom taking steps to block yio- Jent acts if such tactics wers justified im specific cases. * « & CRITICS SAY the “preven- tive action” clause would legal- ize the same harassing and dis- ruptive tactics the FBI con-_ ducted for more than iwo dec- ades against political dissidents. - The Senate committee also released documents. Monday showing that: —President Lyndon B. John- son demanded a secret ‘“‘coni- plete rundown” on former Asst. Atty. Gen. Herbert J. Miller and four Treasury Department. Officials after learning that Mr. Miller had authorized wiretaps and bugs in the investigation of onetime Johnson aide Bobby Baker. Lnmenneelommns? An FBI memo vutlining the request from Johnson aide Marvin Watson said the renorts should “specifically poim, out whether any of these individu- als were close to Bobby Kenne- dy,” a Johnson adversary. —The tate FBI Director ‘J. Edgar Hoover either circum- Another memo said wiretaps} vented odrers by Justice De- were used at Black Panthers Party offices in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oak- land, Calif., New Haven, Conn., and New York City. Both a tap and a bug were installed in the San Francisco home of Black, Panther leader Huey P. New- ton, it said. Taps against the Communist Party and the anti-Communist Jewish Refense League were installed in the groups’ New York headquarters. Meanwhile, Atty. Gern. Ed- ward H. Levi said Monday he Jhas abandoned a proposed rule permilting the FBI“ take Page 231 partment officials to curb ac- tivities or kept the department iH-informed about what he was doing. * x * IN 1960, the FBI, without in- forming the Justice Depart- ment, compiled a fist of educa- tors, labor leaders, writers, entertainers, lawyers, cortors ard others with alleged ‘“sub- varsive associations and idec!- ogy” who might be danyerous in time of national emergency. — Western Union supplicd the IRS with microfiims listing senders and recipients of all money orcers fur $1099 or more sent by the comnany during 1963 for checking against t>x- pavers’ records. ~A top aide to then-Vice President Huber: H. Humparey asked the FBI for a “special team” of agents {o use at the 1965 Democratic convention. Humphrey aide Bill Connell tgid therFPt Assaciate Direc- tes C. D. BeLeach that Nir. Juhnson had tid Mr. Hua phrey of the special FBI teara he used to pather polities] tid- bits during the i264 party ~ SHTVETTUON, caentwreniataees™ L
£D-350 (Rev. Li-11-75) @ (Mount Clipping in Space Below) | _ MW 54965 Doold: 32585503 $ . FA oe oe os wm te # Ryka of a, Dbistontimued Hibi a . eat ae $s #. my SECU Ly ILAS re plc WASHINGTON (?~As recent- ly as 1972 the FBI maiutained an “unrealistic” list of more than 15,000 persons thought to pese a tineat to the national securty, according to an internal FBI memo, . A Justice Dept. spokesman Said on Tuesday tliat the so- ealled “administrative index,” or A-dex, is no longer in exist- ence and had been “pared down cousiacrabiy”’ to about 1,200 names bs the time it was dis- continued Jast December. Tre dex, described by the author of a September 1972 memo as “ioo broad and all- encompassing,” was maintained “for the purpose of being able fa quickly identify versens rep- resenting a threat to the na- tional security,” the memo said, Use Projected Although it stated that persons on the list “would not be subject to detention” during time of war or national emergency, the memo alsa made clear that A- dex would be ready for use in the event Congress enacied “emergency legislation permit- ting apprehension ard detention of persons who threaten exist- ence ef the government.” _ The eight wage doeument ‘eritten by Thomas J. Smith, head of research for the hareawrs.cdomestic inteiisenss 1; SAC Zz 2. ASE: ed As asa 1 we oo Page 232 division, was among hundreds of decuments released on Mon- day by the Senate Intelligence Committee as exhibits to the transcript of its public hear- ings, Criteria ‘too Broad’ The Smith memo said that the “aviteria for designating indi- viduals for A-dex are too bread and all-encompassing. As a re- sult, {rere are some individuals now included in A-dex- even though they de not realistically pose a threat to the national security. ’ tenet ca Including persons who have merely “exhibited a revolu- tionary ideology” represerited “an unrealistic concept of in- dividuals constituting a tbreat fo the national sccurity”’ and could “ieave us in a vilnerable position if our guidelines were to be scrutinized by interested congressional commiilees,” the memo said, As described by the memo, A-dex was created in 1971 to repiacs the bareau’s Security Index, a list of persons to be lacked up under fhe FBI's Fmergency Detention Program, which has been terminated as.a result cf repeal of portions cf the Infernal Security Act. Sup- porting documents indicated that A-dex was a consolidation af the Seurity Index and another Listdensen“as the Resetve-Brien, | : ) | (Indicate page, name of newspaper. city and state.) bs COURIER EXPRESS Buffalo, New York - pure °C Date: 3/10/76 Edition: Four Star: Author: Editor: ‘ Title: SENSTUDY Character: or
FILER (62-1827) 4/20/76 SAC RICHARD D. ROGGE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOUN FITZGERALD KEMNEDY | NOVEMBER 22, 1963 | DALLAS, TEXAS HISCELLANEOUS — INFORMATION CONCERNING This is to record that at 4:26 P.u., 4/20/76, I returned a call to Unit Chief RICUARD J. DEILY of the Bonbing-Anti-Riot Lavs Unit, Intelligence Division, in _ connection with above-captioned matter. He advised that Sen. | CHURCH from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence | desired to interview SAC on Tuesday, 4/27/76, at approximately 10:00 A.H. Mr. DEILY instructed SAC to make travel reservations and advise him, and that after report directly to Room 3659 of the new FBI Building when arriving in Washington, He stated this would be done. | At approsinately 4:55 P.1l., DEILY was advised | SAC would depart Buffalo on Flight 677, United Airlines, | :35 A.M. and arrive in Washington, B.C. at 8:25 AH. | SAC has return Flight &98, United Airlines, leaving Vashington | 8:00 P.M., arriving Buffalo 9:03 P.M. DEILY stated that SAC would be @briefed prior to his appearance before the above committee. GD- 62-2665 (SENSTUDY) | RDR:cas (2) SEARCHED | INSEXED SERIALIZED 77 prey aoe ae ee neem £ APR 20 1978 ta FOE + BUFFALY NW 34965 Doold:i32989503 Page 233 —
t I _FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-83) LY a a a eT! : (Mount Clipping in Space Below) a to aye tg He NOR nn a wen 5 Little Sense: Shown~ In Intelligence. Report “ By. JAMES.J, KILPATRICK: * . The Senate’ Intelligence. Committee disgorged its. - 651-page report last. Monday. By Tuesday night, we- may: . be certain, the report was being gleefully dissectéd in. ‘the. Kremlin. In “the‘ annals. af ‘stupid. congressional - stunts, this massive piece. of. ,, ee folly will rank exceedingly high.- the’ “Congress has ‘forfeited’. .- - . What is-the first accomplish: Whatever confidence one ‘might. ment of thé committee’s long. have ‘had in its discretion. How investigation and report? It isto belittle the. CIA, to. stigmatize ‘the’ honorable men who have served: it, -and to maké-the: -agen- ey s' successful ‘perforniance vastly. more difficult. ‘The .com- qhittee's- disclosures “blow the cover" on; sensitive operations; many-of ‘the: ‘comimittee’s. recom~ ‘mendations would «treat + thre: ‘agency ‘as if it were imerely-’ another ‘government. ‘bureat-a : crop reporting service, or & ‘ue! reau-of labor statistics. ~~ ee a a long will it be before the “unex- ‘purgated edition’” of the con ; mittée. report is leaked to Jack- Aridergon- and-the Village Voice? | . ‘True, that: particulaz sf : notice” . Fecommendation: ‘th. S.: ‘been dropped—temiporarily, i. at. Jeast—from oversight legislation.- now: béfore’ vthe. Senate: ‘Rules. Committe Even" 80, the think ing behind : ithe” vecanimendation. persists. es eee IN ‘ONE ‘of its lip-service | i .- ments, the report ‘acknowledges: ‘CONSIDER, IF you please, one that, espionage directed Against legislative. recommendation. that the. United States: is. “extensive | provides an accurate indication and. rélentless.” By the FRIs: of the. tone. and approach of the estimate, gore than. 1000 Soviét NW 54965 Docld: 32989503 Page 234 sunshine addicts ‘in’ the: ‘Senate, ‘Their idea is to ‘prohibit virtual- ly “all covert actions; : only in “extraordinary , . -eifcutnstances -involying -grave threats to the U,. 8, national “gecurity’" ‘would ‘they’ tolerate a secret operation, And then, mind: you, the com- mittes's proposed’ statute would: require prior disclosure to, an ' " congressional oversight commits. ‘tee before any funding. could be " provided. That ig marvelous, is jt not? The director of the CIA Would’be , required: to travél- to Capitol, ‘Hill, hat ‘in hand, and spell out his ‘most , ‘sensitive recommenda- | tions ‘before a. gaggle | Of. loose. ' ‘ jawed ‘senators or congressmen. -Why not, one wonders, require - the: ditector to hiré a-sky-writing ' ‘ girplane and. Spell his. plans out -in_milé-ligh letters.over Wash- ' infgton? Ber the past 2 years, agents are on permanent assign- ment'as spies against us, y “at, is.childish;.or 's0.it.séems:to, tie, to strike: ‘the virtuous poxe- that we. must never, never: ene late the Communist techniques: Tt is:not. wise, it is. stupid, to sug- gest, that the ‘United States - should-go. abroad:in. a- dangerous. world, “accoutered: like Little. Lord: "Fauntleroy, to play ‘pat. ticake with gangs.who fight with, switchblade: knives, . It will be a long time bette.’ the damage done ‘by: this eport- cai ‘he undone, | before: truly” -Corripetent and dedicated sere vants-can be attracted: ariew to-. the CIA, Sehe Barry” Goldwater ; -refused to. sign thé réport. {This is a-report,” he.said, “that prob- : ably should never have been. iwritten”” He shad the last and, tritest Word, . - g ey Washington | Star Syndicate . j Ww . OVE CPCS SRR csc on Fa = PERERA Bom core OFS a pape fe yee PUN PLLA SE NIL CEE Eg MI IG PST LRAT ala lee AL (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) jae BUFFALO EVENING NEWS _ Buffalo; New York | Date: 5/3/76 Edition: Late City Author: Complet e Editor: Character: or Classifications Submitting Office Ruffalo {_] Being Investigated
FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75) (Mount Clipping in Space Below) 3 Intelligence Reports-Evade Real Issue— It is essential to its national interest that the United States maintain an in- ‘telligence and counterintelligence capa- bility, including a-covert one. i: * The requirements of democracy tend “to conflict with the need for secrecv. Thus fhe Senate Select Committee on’ “Intelligence Activities, which recently issued voluminous reports on foreign, “military and domestic intelligence, has - properly recommended that secret’ ac- - ‘tions should be consistent with publicly © defined foreign-policy goals and “should -be reserved for extraordinary circum- “stances when no other means will suf- ‘fice? _. We agree, too, with the committee's recognition that oversight of the coun- try’s intelligence functions by the execu-. tive branch and by Congress has been «historically weak, and with the recom- -tTiendation for tighter supervision. . mittee nor its House counterpart (whose investigative report has yet to be pub- licized) has as yet come to grips with the real problem: The violation of laws aud the subsequent coveruns. Despite all the intelligence-agenev abuses docu- “mented by the Senate panel, including violation of Americans’ constitutional rights via break-ins, illegal surveillance and harassment of individuals and groups, and drug tesls on unsuspecting persons, the Justice Department has not made a single move to prosecute the violators. There is no place within our legal structure for the kind of crimes that have been committed and which have gone unpunished, The cougressional oversight role could best be served by a single perma. - nent conunittes, but it needs ta be one endowed with broad legislative and budgetary powers, unlike the weak sis- 2" reowever, neither the Senate coviz ~~tét voted by the Senate Rules Counnittes. MW 34965 Doold:329599503 Page 235 (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) 16 COURIER EXPRESS Buffalo, New York 1 = 80-1877 Edition: Four Star Author: Edito: D. L. Turner Vie: SENSTUDY Character: or Classification Submitting Office: (_] Being investigated y May) any7e | FER-BUFFALO Py
FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75) . . ; ¢ - , . i y “ . . . , ‘ we (Mount Clipping in n Space Below) Daw WwW D: 2 ay th The Niagara Falls Bar Association cate “ates s Law oe Day today.with an observance on t the theme “200 Years | | i | i ' q i i t 4 i | 1 Stee i “aS " ” pam “page ail ys ages 7 - tg or of Liberty and Law.” We don’t know, as this is written, what the lawyers. ‘and their cu rests are going to.say on this theme e, bul our own thought are glum, - ae . ; ! (Indicate. page, name of ; newspaper, city and state.) a itis true t tha atthe nation has suevived for 209 years and so have many of the liberties of its citizens. But the v 1 liberties j promised tc all citizens by ihe Constitution and the Bill of Rights are by no means secure for all citizens al present, and we can’t heip thinking the Constitution itself is in jeopardy. 108 Niagara Falls, N.X. JUST THE OTHER DAY, for instance, the Senate Intelligence Committee released its. report on the Ceniral Intelligence Agency (CIA). Onca the Committee had agreed to censor out such controversial data as the CIA budget, the report was greeted with what amounted to a yawn. Observers believe Congress will do nothing this year (7 ever} about reform of U.-S. intelligence operations, ang of course President Ford, like his edecessors, is quite content, £0 keep full authority over . the CIA in his own hands. We find this troubling. The Senate and. House Com- mittees, anid cther investiga itions as weil, have revealed Lj =: 80-1873 many instances in whieh the CIA has abused the rights | of American citizens and has acted abroad in ways that sare deeply inimical io American waditions, -. few days | from now, the Senate Commilfee wil IDate: "EF 3h publish its re is alreacy vr et peorton domestic intelligence opsravions. It Edition: ad 1s do CuIney ted that the F the ; Author: Inditor: “of, Hare supposedly Tide: . SENSPTUDY on a and the PS GApect ae for reform 2 ot domestic Character: CTA. or oe is true that he FBI have h 8s calves Of abuses ICS } SHOE agencies to abuse NW 54965 Docld: 32999503 Page 236
WHAT SEEMS TO BE at the bottom of this © congressional and presidential lethargy is an unex- pressed contempt for the Constitution and the law: because it is sometimes inconvenient to observe them. One would have thought, for instance, that “‘executive privilege’ would have been thoroughly discredited after ex-President Nixon’s abuse of it. Yet President Ford has been invoking it again and this pernicious doctrine — which has neither constitutional nor legal foundation — seems to be accepted by Congress, the President, and even (with qualifications) by the courts. There seems to be a consensus in Washington that the convenience of “executive privilege’ is more important than law or Constitution. In similar fashion, Congress and the President seem ’ willing te overlook the transgressions of the CIA and the FBI because it is convenient to let them do as they - ‘ please. It is convenient, in other words, to let official lawlessness flourish. ~“Thereds reason to be glum this Law Day. a ” NW 54965 — Doctd: 32989503 Page 237 _
$< hevabiancts see senTurevan bak mRUsLA ty pram, sanminemanind eenniene  yanteinanenanne’ Went fteremattenlasYrinemacamenamitt# semen pasties stents enene eee ne Yttfetttl ne AERA RO © Ae nememene Puree om ht oo <4 [YQ Tr QE ST FD-350 (Rev. 11-11-75) > rej wy 3 3 as ms oak WY Zi aa Oy By BURT BLAZAR Elitor Big Brother seems to have been alive and well in this country for lo these many vears—and duesn't that ay you es well as scare you? “Tt dass me, ~Th? story has been leaking out for rounths in dribs and drabs. Nev the Senate Select Committee on In- %. conee has climiaxed a lo-arnth study oy baring activities of the FDI, CIA, IRS. Army Intelligence and aihers, Those agencies have created files on ipore than naw 3 malvon Unued S.ates citizens, avered nearly 254,- Gf pieces oof Rrateloss mez, mmitored mbions of telezrani iw 54965 Doeld: 32969503 Page 236 (Mount Clipping in Space Below) = ile Baar at 8) val © el soniatye ent Py, BS 26,00) citizens for cctentien in a na- fienal emergency end subiected many private citizens to secret ha- rassment and  {@ programs Gesisned to disrupt their lives and destroy ther reputaliocas. ~ Incredible. Maybe it’s not quite as bad as George Onvell sotirized in his’ 1829 novel, °18S4,”’ when he envisioned a Big Brothor wotehipe all of us wherever we w ere. But for ceric’: creups end individ: has ben close For some of us, it eens fhat our bruinwashing hes finally been re- paired. . That began fer my middie-ar.d ¢ 3 wees, al generatiom with history beck» that, susgesicd the United States was the one realiy free country in the and overseas teiephone calls, fisted ae word. Vee abvays wore the ickoss’ (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) h STAR~GAZETTE Elmira, New York c pares 80~1875 fi Edition: Metro Author: Editor: BURT BLAZAR Title: SENSTUDY Character: or Classification: Submitting OQirice. (_j Being Investigated en te ee re ere pan Mw 1 BUFFALO
tt mm * warte-hais; the others wore > ‘black ones. Everything our government - did was for the protection of its citi. zens. Police states? Russia, of course. And later China and other Conumu- nist countries. Full of spies. Checks on the individuals. Phone taps. Seerst files. Covert political activities to keep the present ad- ministration in power. Bul not the holier-than-theu gov- ernments of the United States. Keser. We were too pure, tog ethical, tco faithful to democratic ideals. ven when some people began complaining about surveillance and harassrnent back in the late IMs _and 1990s, my generation scoffed. “They're fantasizing,’ we said. “They're making excuses,” we sail. “Tenore them,” we said. But now the Senate committee Says we were wrong, that it hap- pened then and was still happening until just a short time ago. ‘Che-ESI and the CIA have been MW 34965 Doold: 32969503 hurt most, particularly the FBI. Until Watergate, the bureau had been considered the most pristine of all law enforcement agencies. - From J. Edgar Hoover on down, FBI agents were regarded as being like TV’s Untouchables. Uneorruptible. Above the mundane details of politics. The rock of the anti-crime crusade. Now the bureau has nearly hit bottom. n, An effort is being made to polish the- image, and hepefully it will succeed. But. it’s going to take time, and that image will never be quite the same again. The reason is ubvious. We have been burned. . No one apparently was immune during the height of surveillance activitiés. The National Association for the: Advancement of Colored Pecple and the late Dr. Martin Luther King were targets for as long as 25 years. So were such diverse ele- ments as the Ku } Jun Birch 2. iat, ‘the feminist Page 239 lux Xian, the- 2 movement, senators former President Nixon. Not only that, but a lot of the ha- rassment seems to have been instigated by presidents or their aides. And if that didn’t destroy any illusions we had left, then nothing Will. Where do we go from here? The Senate committee has suc- gested restricting investigative activities of the IRS, CIA and FI, among others. That prebably will be done in time, and the sooner the beter. - Beyond that, we need a change in attitude among dgencies wha have operated in a vacvura apart fron the rest of us. Maybe even above us. Those agencies must recagnizc that they are the servants, not the masters, and -that this is not a police state. They moust reaffirm that they wil not abridge any: rignts, no mutter who orders them to. ‘Chen—ard only then-—will «e have taken our first step towerd cleansing the stain on our sduiviye" and,__ever
“. -FD+380 (Rev. 7-16-63) : ; , (Mount Clipping in Space Below) . i (Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.) 33° BUFFALO EVENING NE. _ Buffalo, New York pate: 5/5/76 Edition: Late City — Author: Complete Editor: title: SENSTUDY Character: Classification: 7 62-2665- er Submitting Office Buffalo . Cj Being Investigated NW 54965 Docld:32989503 Page 240 a . ee