198-10007-10001 JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form A RR ET ht Ah eee EEE nena pe eeepc, AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : se ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : v9.1 HW 450955 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Docld: 324239994 Agency Information ARMY 198-10007-10001 CALIFANO PAPERS Document Information JCS V.H. KRULAK SERVICE, OSD, JOINT STAFF CUBA, THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - FIRST DRAFT 03/13/1963 14 COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - INTELLIGENCE SHARING PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Secret 1B Redact 02/10/1998 Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. First draft of paper on the exchange of intelligence concerning communist subversive activities. FB fevied Department of the Army EO 13526 Wideclassity — Exclude “ Exempt Authority, 1 Refer To Review Date /AAUe15 By edad CU. Page 1.
HY 0955 SECRE . o> \S0 SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBA SUBVERSION w\D 63 13 March 1963 TO SERVICE, OSD, AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS: This is the first draft on the exchange of intelligence. Section II on the Nature and Scope of the Problem possibly should be shortened. Your comments are requested by 0900, 14 March 1963. V. H. KRULAK Major General, USMC GROUP-1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC SECRET DOWNG@RADING AND DECLASSIFICATION BDocld: 3274273994 Page 2?
HW 450955 SECRET FIRST DRAFT CUBA THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES I. Introduction In combatting the many forms of Castro-Communist subversion now pursued throughout Latin America frem the Communist base of operations in Cuba, there is a funda- mental requirement fer intelligence -- a requirement which 4nvolves not only the timely acquisitien and processing of information, but also its rapid dissemination, on a select- ive basis, to those who need to know. Efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems. Success thus far has been limited. This effort must be vigoreusly con- tinued. It is not with this preblem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with that of exchanging essential information among those who need te know it. A greater degree ef Inter-American cooperatien is required in this regard than has hitherto been achieved. SECRET Doclda: 3274273994 Page 3
SECRET II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem 1. Limiting Factors There are many legitimate inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved. Further com- pounding the problem insofar as Latin America is concerned is the divisive influence of the long -. history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and dis- putes which have characterized relations among the many nations concerned. The wounds of past con- flicts among pairs and groupings of nations are by no means completely healed. For example, there is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war in which Ecuador oy he lost a vast area of its territory. hije and RA Bolivia continue at odds over theme \s XG pute, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of Costa Rica. Gould hardly be expected that these countries ROR . . would be prone to exchange intelligence .c, _ SECRET | =“2= | HY 50955 DBocld: 32423994 Page 4
SECRET An additional impediment to intelligence exchange is the low level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, and the complete absence ef adequate security systems. [security consciousness A is not a Latin American characteristic. The lack of security safeguards must necessarily limit the ex- change of intelligence obtained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection. The governments of some countries, of which Guatemala is a good example, have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, ‘many Latin American intelligence services display a tendency to yield to the temptation to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing SECRET he HW 50955 DBocld: 327423994 Page 6
SECRET _— government. These considerations limit the possi- well bilities of large-scale multilateral cooperation ~ ae in the intelligence field. ee ‘5 2. Current Exchange Arrangements G At present there is little or no organized ex- change of intelligence among the Latin American na- tiens. There is a limited amount of informal ex- change, often on a basis of personal relationships of government officials having a community of in- terest with respect to a particular matter. The Central Intelligence Ageney has established working liaison arrangements in seme Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to pe in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert eperations or through contacts with another intelli- gence or security service. This inhibits the pass- age of such information to agencies of a third coun- try. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. SECRET ~5- HY 50955 DBoctd: 32423994 Page 7
SECRET In 1962, for exdimple, CIA received information re- ports from{ _|services. with which liaison is main- tained in Latin America and released reports to [| recipients. Intelligéhee items exchanged iricluded collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports. The U.S. Army , through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving pilateral ex- changes of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. th- formation provided by the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities, communist infiltra- tion, weapons movements and related matters. Re- ciprocal intelligence received has been of minimal value. The Army also provides selected informa- tion on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, although there is no recip-_ rocal arrangement. The attaches of other U.S. Services practice limited exchange on a selective basis. Some information has been released from time to time to Latin American countries by the Commander-in- Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the Military Groups. SECRET -6- HY 50955 DBoctd: 327423994 Page 6
SECRET As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree Since the United States y Nig BA 2 yaacauisition capabilities, possesses the g as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (current- ly in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral ex- change offers the greatest possibility of achieving the results desired. United States experience in ‘the matter of intelligence exchange in Latin America and in other areas of the world has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as © those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO, Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an aware- ness of the need for intelligence exchange. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward on numerous [occasions st OFS x, SECRET —T- HY 50955 DBoctd: 32423994 Page 9
Te aane eT Sp GPP oe Ga PURER on aE ap aI ERE cs : ( : Proce ure inter-Anerican meetings, but haa not been implemented, largely for the reasens set forth in seetiem T1.k.  . Under the Punta del iste decisiens the OAS members were urged te cooperate in strengthening their capacity te counteract threats ot sets of sguressien, subversien ox ether dangers te pence and security. The Council of . the OAS 48 charged with seintainiag vieilance ever Castro-censunist subversion and = "Special Ceasultative Committee oa Security (SCCS)" is established ta give technical edvice ta gevernmments and the Council on request of Batters relatiig te subversion, All Aweri¢an governments heve bean agked te furnish infermation on Castre-Communist activities te serve es the baste for | studies and recomendations by the Council ef the OAS en. how te countersét them, fince the Pusta del Este meeting the OAS hes bean gaking slow, tat steady, pragréss in Hrkin pk wr 443 2¥ rtvadanrm | AM pies fisle chien the Latin Leo Horta Sua da | £O regard a¢ primirily one of demeatic jurisdiction, | This triexk sumsaary sorves to illustrate that there | 414 Buch Foes for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange errangements asong the Latin HY 50955 DBocld: 32423994 Page 10
- SECRET and other Inter-American meetings, commencing with the Inter-American Conference at Bogota in 1948, At Punta del Este in 1962, OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. More recently, the Council of the OAS established the "Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS)" to consider the specific resolutions on security problems adopted at Punta del Este. The ScCcs has requested all American governments to furnish in- formation on Castro-Communist activities to sérve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the OAS on the nature of the threat and means of dealing with it. . These actions by the OAS have yielded little or nothing in terms of concrete results. The in- dividual Latin American countries have shown little inclination to proceed with implementing actions pursuant to the resolutions adopted. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral in- telligence exchange arrangements among the Latin SECRET : -8- HY 50955 DBocld: 32423994 Page ii
HW 50955 SECRET American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange be- tween the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to egpbest the possibili- ties of a multilateral approach within the recog~ nized limitations involved. TIT. Actions Recommended 1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of in- telligence conducted by CIA, DOD, and other US Agencies where it is found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for the exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements. 2, Establish intelligence centers at Caribbean Com- mand and Caribbean Sea Frontier headquarters for fur- ther dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with the Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination et Mee ligence on subversive activity directly to the countries concerned through the American embassies therein. SECRET ~9- Bocld: 327473994 Page i?
SECRET 3. Increase and expedite the existing flow ef in- telligence on subversion from CIA and the other ele- ments of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquariers for ‘further dissemination as appropriate. 4. Increase the dissemination to Latin American governments, by all US agencies concerned, of unclassi- fied studies, reports and other non-sensitive informa- tion concerning Communist subversion. 5. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in v bilateral exchange of intelligence Si Communist sub- ( versive activities. 6. Continue the development at high priority of U.S. communications in Latin America. 7. Increase emphasis on the provision of U.S. in- telligence advisors to Latin American countr 8. Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA, and Military programs for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence ser- vices. Establish such programs in additional countries where it is found to be in the best interests of the United SO deanna. (be to the aw concerned. ' Caw 6 SECRET BW 50955 Docld:32423994 Page 13
HY 0955 2. U, Undertake action in the GAG to stixuiate 8 geveraments te keep the Council and the SGCS fully informed on a Continuing basis of the nature and incidence ag subversive activities tn their respective auumtrics. a ah }e Docld: 3274273994 Page 14 wb
HY SECRET 9. Undertaké action in the OAS to. establish a standing committee of representatives of inte} ligence and security services for the purpose of receiving, processing, and givseminating information on Cnban- Communist subversive activities. (It is visualized that this committee would perform, én a continuing basis, functions similar to those undertaken by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS), but would not serve as an intelligence center for the immediate processing and dissemination of intelligence). 0955 SECRET -ll- Docld: 3274273994 Page 15