176-10031-10069 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER RECORD SERIES : . AGENCY FILE NUMBER : G ARRed Be ae oe Fok oe THERE ER TAD OD EH ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : DATE : PAGES : : Cuba SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : : 9/22/1998 DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : ~ JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM NARA : 176-10031-10069 Goodwin Papers Memorandum for the Record 5/12/ 1961 6 Memoranda : Secret 1c Goodwin Papers: Subjects: Cuba, Covet Action Box 4, Document 3A Thee
ee ee ee ce 6 ee ae NE A = NR ee EN RR NS ks a a tale Senet on oe dos re $943 Cent , gat - dae. sya. 8. # #e2 $ maid yy , RE (assy BYES Sb : 8a . SECAET: ” , 12 May 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT - : Meeting with Ing. Manuel Ray PARTICIPANTS: Ing. Manvel Ray ~ Ernesto Betancourt _ Rogelio Cisneros i. Ray did not return to Washington until early morning on Friday, 12 May 1961. He called me at 0700 from the airport. He was unable to fiz a definite hour for us to get together due to the fact that he was — expecting an appointment with a person he did not name some time during the morning. He later calied a number of times from the Hotel Ambassador to advise me that he still had had no word on his appoint- ment. At 1145, Mr. Betancourt called to say that he was with Ray and “Eugenio” (Rogelio Cisneros) and could we get together. I sug- gested they drive out to the Clarendon Hotel Court on Wilson Boulevard ‘where I had taken a room for helding our meeting. They arrived in ‘Mr. Betancourt's car at approximately 1230 noon time and we first went to the nearby Hogate Restaurant on Wilson Boulevard for Lunes before we got down to the business of the prospectus. 2. During lunth we did not discuss the plan but I did take the op- portunity to stress In a most serious way the need for absolute secrecy concerning our discussions today and any future discussions or devel- opments which might take place in the future with respect to our relation~ ship. All agreed on the need for tight security. 3. After lunch we drove to the Hotel Court and from approximately 1330 until 1730, we discussed the prospectus. Using Mr. Barnes’ out- | line as a general guide, I stressed the impertance of being able to present Pure p BS GAY SEC SEG ne
eee te A tt en ne re eH ee NN A ce A Ne oe wr rt mee ati wee ee eee EYES CULY _ SECRET. Ze to the proper , people at the earHest possible time a carefully thought- out plan of action which would set forth clearly the objectives «- what the project hoped to achieve; a statement of the problem; the strengths of the Castro regime following the ill-fated invasion; the status of the underground and its morale and capabilities; the extent of intexnal _ ‘support for and discontent with the regime, ete. » etc. 4. 1 also spoke of the need for describing the kind of activities which ‘the. Ray organization planned to engage in and the assets and capabilities which they have or can a¢quire to do the job. The need for explaining the relationship and coordination of the plan with the Revolu- tionary Council was discussed at some length. 5. I suggested that he include in the plan an itermnization of the kinds of support which he would expect us to supply immediately as well as the kind and quantity af support which would be required of us as the project developed. 6. lalso suggested that the plan include their views on how U. S. liaison and coordination could best be worked owt; how funds would be funneled into the project; what commo and other training would be re- quired; whether U. &: "real estate” would be needed, etc. 7. Ray outlined some of his thoughts regarding his proposed plan of action. According to him it contemplates action in three broad fields: (a) Underground activity oo principally sabotage = in the urban areas. come, f>) Gradua) buildup -- largely through clandestine infiltra= tiens of small bodies of men ~- af guerrilla forces in mountain- ous and defensible areas. te) A psychological warfare campaign within Cubs and abroad dimed at discrediting Castro and at the same time providing the people of Cuba something to fight for, 8. It is Ray's intention to depend almost entirely on maritime opera- tions for the infiltration of personnel and materiel into Cuba. He aleo fules out of his plan the creation of another invasion army but does con- ‘template the training of groups of perhaps ‘up to 150 men in other friendly - os Fr ° a % Yes OL y SECRET:
countries of South America (he mentioned Venezuela as a possibility) and said he would explore the possibility of basing maritime operations  in'non-U, S. ports. 9. Ray said some means, other than Swan Igland, must be found _ for seaching the Cuban population by radie broadcasts. He spoke of .the possibility of short wave broadcasts fram Venezuela and utiliza- _ ‘tien of a commercial station in Miami which he understands can be , clearly heard in Cuba. 30. “Ray apoke of the desircability of stimulating the organization of "Pro-True Cuban Revolutionary” student groups in many countries of Latin America (he said a successful organization has been formed ' in Puerto Rico) and of sending qualified representatives to those Latin American countries where there is Soviet diplomatic representation to contact student and laber groupe and leaders in an effert to present to them the true picture of the sorry state of studenta, workers, and intellectuals in Castro's Cubs. 11. Ray is also interested in the possibility of putting out a “News Letter" under MRP sponsorship which would discuss various aspects of . the Cuban picture and set forth plans for Guba after the fall of Gastro. ' He thought such a news letter could go a long way towards correcting mistaken irepressions among American university professors and in other circles ace to the true nature of the Castra regime. He pointed to the recent letter from 63 Harvard professors which was recently . published in the N, Y. Times as a "horrible example" as te how mis~ informed even university professors are on present day Cube. 14. When the discussions get around te the aced for conducting operations at least “under the umbrella” of the Revolutionary Council, and the need for obtaining Dr. Miro's concurrence before the U. 8. would be able to support any operation, it was obvious that neither Ing. Ray nor Mr. Betancourt holds a high impression af the Council. _ Beth feel that there ia a strong possibility that the close public identification of the Council with the recent invasion may well have discredited the Council to such an extent that it commands no support or Feapect within Guba. For the sake of argumont they were willing to concede that the political advantages of maintaining the Gouncil far the purpose of forcing
rt Seem - unity of the various exile groups may well outweigh its other obvious shortcomings. However, both feel, and Mr. Betancourt was quite emphati¢ on thie point, that the Council as a body is not capable of directing clandestine actions against Castro and as a matter of fact is opposed to any further efforts at overthrowing Castro by sabotage and other subversive actions since they are completely “sold” on - the thesia that Castro can only be rémoved by direct U. 8. military — action and therefore a continuation of Guban underground activities. can only result in needless and futile loss of life. Im the fact of thie attitude, Ray said he does not expect to receive much encouragement for his plan from the Council, although he ie fairly confident that Dr, Miro‘'s approval can eventually be ebtained. Mr. Betancourt thought that a workable solution might be found to their problem if the Council would agree to concern itself exclusively with (a) the current task of unifying the opposition, and (b) planning for ite future assumption of power as the provisional government. Under this arrangement, operations aimed at the downfall of Castro could be entrusted to those leaders and groups {suchas the MRP, MRR, and possibly the MDC) which have both the assete and the will to do the job. Mr. Ray thought that it might be feasible to create an operations planning board or command among the groups with demonstrated asseta and thus avoid unneceseary duplication and confusion and make possible overall planning.. It was obvious, however, that he would prefer to act autonomously in the execution of his program. me Mr. Ray was very critical of Artime and claimed he was in possession _ of sufficient "facts" to convinee him that Artime, in collusion with ele- . ments of the camps, were planning to eliminate the MRP and its leaders from the picture, when the invasion succeeded. He said he “knows"™ that Artime was being financially supported by wealthy ex~-Batistianos of the Miami area... 13, Ray hinted at various times that the MRP may at some point find itself faced with the necessity of withdrawing from the Council and going it alene. He says that the Council is composed of "geod men" but they have no assets or significant followings and “have nothing to offer the people of Cuba" and although the proclamation of the Council, aa finally dvafted, was a good one the “progressive aspects of the proclam- ation were forced on the Council by the Americans and do not represent — the true feelings of the majority of the Council members, He said the _. SECRET.
ee ee tes pt ene we - SESRET os & aw Cuban people are not likely to want to risk their ves on the basis of promises made by the present membership of the Council. Ha feels ' that acceptance of the Council would be improved by adding to its membership two or three more people whose names would be signi- ficant and meaningful to the Cuban people. He did not name any specific candidates. (44. Myr. Ray let me read a 13 or 14 page report which he had just received fram the MRP coordinator in Cuba (Reinol Gonzalez) which painted a dreary picture of conditions. in Cuba since the failure of the invasion; wae critical of the inclusion of Batistianos and “ninos bonites" in the invasion force; conveyed the strong feeling that the Cubans had been betrayed by the Americans; and indicated that while the MRP organization was still pretty much intact physically, morale was almost completely shattered, Mr. Ray said he would provide me # sanitized copy (there were some operational and personal detafls) of the report for cur information. 15. In view of this report from within Cuba, Mr. Ray eaid that he will wish to defer submitting his plan for our consideration until he ia able to receive word from Cuba concerning the capabilities, willingness and feasibility of carrying out some of the activities he has in mind. He said it ie useless te submit a program of action if the human elements to carry it out are lacking or completely demoral- ized. He thought he might be able to present his prospectus within approximately ten days, He said naturally he will not give the people inside any indiZation that he has been dtecussing @ plan of action with us. 16. lurged Ray to consider submitting at least a preliminary and admittedly tentative proppectus at this time based on the assumption ‘that hie assets are still intact and will be willing to cooperate in order that it may receive early consideration. However, he stuck to his ‘belief that this would nct.be practicable and reiterated the need for prior evaluation of the strength and morale of his following. 2%, Ray asked concerning the detainses at McAllen, Texas, and wondered if they have been released, He was told that as far as I know they are still under detention. He said Mr. Goodwin had taken their names and promised to look inte the matter. Mr, Betancourt EYeg ONLY ~ "SES RET:
eves GLY SECRET -6- said he would check directly with Mr. Goodwin re their status. 38. linvited Mr. Ray and/or Mr. Betancourt to call me over ‘the weekend in case either should want to discusa the matter further. I had the feeling that Mr. Betancourt was personally in favor of sub- mitting new a plan covering “short term" needs of their organization and it may be that such a paper will be submitted after he has an opportunity to ) talk with Mr. Ray in private. Distribution: | me Original & 2 = A/DDP/A 1 - C/WHD 1 ~- AC/WH/4 & circulate } - Manuel Ray 291 Hrd