“HW 55355 16 FL Impact of Sane Domes is On 2h April 1965 events took place that resulted in an improvement in the standing of OCI publications in the White House. On that day an uprising waa began against the provisional govermment of the Dominican Republke. The US fear that Communists might seize control of the cpuntry led to the prompt dispatch of Marines to Santo Domingo. ‘President, --28 Aprile- coincidence, xhak the day they landed/was also the day ay elisgence Ot SE that Admiral William Raborn was sworn in as DCI, sneceeding John McCone. Dominican President Hohnsom sautant could hardly get enough intelligence on the Remax situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined to provide the best seririce the establishment of =z possible. The day after he took office, the Admiral ordered/a CIA task force on the Vominican Republic under E. Drexel Godfrey, chief of OCI's Western Area. As directed, it provided "complete and around-the-clock CIA intelligence shpport . Its first task Keech day was to brief Raborn to ta the White House," / 2 put siuspercin readiness to deal with sm calls from the White House .mmxioataygockin §=Periodically throughout the day and night it issued round-up /situation reports, end when necessary, spot reports of parthoular developments, All these reports were teletyped to the White House, end they were read by the _~ Mr. Jobnson, who was described by Bromley Smith as a Persenx President "who eats ay DocId: 32401332 Page 18
- a . . ~* Sion agree pen ee ee ee RSE me 17 up information." GOL, sem ef course, centinued te put out ite ragulan | Dominican publications. It was during the Bextwan crisis that wordx wag received that the President's Daily Brief had taken firm root in the Whibe House. Xiooen on 21 May that Bill Moyers. said/the President read it "avidly." 9/ Chief The increased tempo of intelligence service to the xhikn route Neo Executive prompted further consideration of the proper xiaoamk to Avon. conn (Mey CO" es Se tape SbicRegetimrend DDCT Richar ard | Helns ns \agreed thab bn ow eee, wee: 2 sae eS See ie a "greased channel" through 1Fidweees. Bundy should be established for the PDB and any other reports the DCI wants to be sure the President sees, 10/ on 20 May AD/CI Jack Smith commented/that a "f@reased channel" already appeared to exist ‘for the PDB. 11/ ; 3 should be the place-of- entry for intelligence for Yn.Joknsuny although inf orma- Helms and Cline said ck«-—— - TA 55355 Bocld:324013532 Page 19 copies could d be sent to 0 Moyers and Valenti, Simyomt rns
18 hectic 7 The xecxckiew atmgosphere in the spring of 1965, with the Dominican situation coming on top of growines difficulties in Vietnam, caused the ¥ men in the ¢ White House to ask mobe of intelligence and to A Was RBS BOA Pere -sre 2 i OUse ° react to it more sharply, Bromley Smith said the President has a "very short e) first from official sources and not from the press reaction fuse." He wants’ to hear/about major cevelopments ,famx so rapid dissemination se“éssential: also warned that OCI would soon be asked to report on every coup and to cover all present and potential tropble spots with high precision. He said that in the ura future, OCI's reports would not say that the Valencia regime is shaky, but that "Valencia is going to be overthrown by a coup on the umpteenth duly by X in foonérville." Since this would be asking the impossible in most cases, Richard Lehman, OCI's Assistant for Special Projects, went to see Bill ‘Moyers. He explained that stcmmeporetictentar OCI flout dh wy trite 50 pages of intelligence warnings a day, thereby taking out insurance against any possible contingency, but that the office did not believe thes this would really serve the President. Lehman said OCI tried to be highly selective in varning of minx coups and the like. Moyers expressed understanding of mmr “HW 55355 DocId:32401332 Page 20 ~
WW 55355 19 OCI's difficulties, and the fire died dom, /2/ qnis episode had an amusing sequel about eight months later when Bromley Smith pondered the series of army coups in the republics of West Africa. He said he didn{t think the President wanted or needed to be informed in advance of every threatened coup. "Otherwise," he said, "you could fill the book with that sort of thing." ™ y " a ~ INS 7— for t" “qe belay ee . ne systen n now | Seemed to be woriing satisfactorily. OCI was fairly.’ Gonfident that e PDB was being’ read regulatly by the Piesident;’ writers _on the, .” r ea Seaver al and“Coactions Ham for ey spite, and/xh qroceived yseful sugs sestions sft critdosens/ 5 usually om Brom _ they when + k defivered, the. publiéation each day, ietateithan ian not oan angele the Gh One day in June 1965 xkmxckeR firgt parageaph of the Alead item in the PDB said "Accumulating information suggests that Hanoi is bringing North Vietnam tq a atate of semi-mobiliaatdion," The second paragraph Cxplainel Ssaid. that Hanoi's action was far short of classic mobilization for offensive operations; kherfere OCI max considered the move defens&ve and was therefore : x Badich expec inclined tog iscount the view of one Briton who 1 thought a large-scale attack t . — and Gen. Clifton would soon ba made acress the 17th parallel. President Johnson/at the time —- . . Se ; BPE peor oe Docld: 32401332 Page 21 : ad Es, cor
Sse pel The system for supplying current intelligence to xhe Johnson President/was now working better than ak previously. smimodgrinnoinkn keccidenimnss—remting-the-ReRregukarlys <Locmeie Presidengie/ OCI did not benefit fran the steadyJplayback/it under 5 had enjoyed frmm Jom Kennedy. To be sure, OP SOAN DOT 8H OE E11 847 OE ROD On the other hand, sxkmonckterxx OCI was fairly confident that the President was reading the PDB regularly, and the writers om the PDB team received useful §uggestions, criticisms, and reactions~-usually from Bromley smith-~ .when they delivered the publication each day. ,? HW 55355 DBocld:32401332 Page 22
' 20 were at the LBJ ranch, Late in the afternoon, the PDB recdived a phone call from Bromley Smith, who said that Gen, Clifton had called from the ranch, Diy first sentence of the Vietnzamese item sharmehaken-Aiif pon -—whe-wee ele WAS concerned about the whole piece. The President was out on the lake ak and was not expected back for several hours. Clift at first felt he should Summon the President to shore, swith discussed the matter with the PDB writer, Thomas Patton, and there was further conversation with Clifton, who decided ichactockin simply to add the word "but" after the first sentence and coniinue with . Ves & virik the smmmnt somewhat reassuring second sentence, The casd Dilustratda’ agéta- of | the potentiality of the PDB for causing excitement in the White House faxtiys entourage, 7 ,! Foreign developments often Eno provoked aiaxmmbore - spirited reactions from kiucdtickts Bromley Smith, but it was not often that he expressed surprise mexabrirgtion at the kind-o intelligence he was reading, substance apart. One such occasion, however, came when the PDB ran an item: | | . . . is ; ; about dissension betweer{ and the Soviet ee SEK Act 6 (1) (B) HW 55355 DBocld:32401332 Page 23
21 POFK.Act 6 (1) (B) that|_|ana[__ had complained to[ _____]that the USSR acts on J the international scene without consulting its allies, just as in Stalin's time. The[ sj odted the 196Q missile adventure in Cuba and Soviet positions on disarnanent.| | agreed that more coordination was needed. Smith was particularly interested in this item and remarked ediechhoosodititaockartietbooc to PDB writer Archer C. Bush that it was "fantastic" that we could get this kind of information, a Bromley Smith now and then modified or rewrote items when he felt that they might confuse or unduly alarm the President. In December : 1965, for example, President Jonson ordered a halt in the bombing of Nmrtk ‘ t Vietngm te in the hope of getting negotiations started, A PDB item reported that Hanoi had proadeast a tough restatement of its positio, making no reference , a thie would be to the pause in air strikes, Smith, maeceteter afraid that shmcteesitwetx taken xnkexpreken as a rebuff to the President's efforts, reworked the text to ~ avoid this interpretation since the o Bs euphasizexkhakxkkexbroadcast did not constitute official government. statement. HW 55355 Docld:324013352 Page 24
22 gs 2le 10us t re =n Quite clearly, the White House staff cringed at bad news from Vietnam. When the PDB reported in April 1966 that "the political situation a averred appears to be rapidly worsening" in South Vietnamy and fpeezaxt that Ky might soon have to take drastic measures to restore authority or make major concessions to the Buddhists, Smith remarked that the article was pessimistic, | and that . | Hexxsiat he had later information, It was, of course, one of the perils of the PDB operation that the White House sometimes had xakexr fresher reports from the field, Smith handed John Heidemann cables reporting that Ky was going to | | 4S formulate a new constitution and that the State Department looked upon this 2S aml hopeful. Heidemann agredd that’ OCI had written in ignorance of this informatobon, but added that offhand he would not be optimistic. } , A few days Later Smith read that "There was no real improve- ment in the situation today..." and said "You're going to break the President's Oo whole | heart; he thinks things are much bdtter today." When he finished the/dis = | | | i heartening Ss | hextrenixx report, he tobsed the book in the air, whistled, and said, MWe ')1 { ‘ , . HW 55355 DBocld:32401332 Page 25
23 have fun tonight. But that's no reason for not writing it as you see it." Smith had cakse for unhappiness again when the PDB had ; a to-repprt that/Pakistan officialz felt that bis country was sembattingziiv. _temporeariiys~drifting part from the US and would probably establish closer PDB writer . relationships with the Soviet Union. Smith told/Allen Valpey that this article was a "shecker" and that Walt Rostow would be ‘disturbed bx it. (Rostow had replaced McGeorge Bundy ax in April 1966.) eh: de: beige —_—— Although 36% Jokm McCone had not taken up ome that the President's daily give occasional coverage to CIA activities, R&r Admiral Raborn as DCI did adopt this practice. Bromley Smith reacted negatively to these reports, however , apparently believing that President Johnson - did not }ike them, He particujerly chjected in 1946 tea PDR Annex explaining mee iy ; how CIA used a portable ultra-violet light device jn Vietnam to detect a guerrillas who wexm had recently handled weapons before mingling trreoeerrb-— with inno-enf villagers. Sat did nok won the Boer en A. : He belreret Phar. |e “dutwgtises® m tO PDS, ae fa ao lr chetel be informed at Sint CiA- aethwi tres, tte ‘Das She L& HW 55355 DBocld:32401332 Page 26 {, ),
HW 55355 Docld: 32401332 Page-2? 25 2h thes tee RIGmcth wat DDI, EiOrerel Gadérey wes D/oel 4 ~ oO ‘ Te 4 then cond. te Poe writers _— Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith said that he had some ideas about the PDB and would like to get together with all the writers.) He-met-—yi+h.. See antes building on 3 August. He prefaced his expressing his satisfaction with the way remarks by sa He explained, however, PLRIME Ven K AME AKAM RA ZS the President was being serveds fle had no criticisms. anon”) hkowayexy that while the President "tolerates" amaxmnymous documents, he is much more x responsive to a personalized document. He wondered whether the ‘Rew 0SI, . Brief could be signed by Mr. Helms, {Then thm it would become a personal link between the President and the firector. In regard to content, Smith said the _PDB did not have to alert the President to impending crises over which he would have no control. Rather, Smith thought ik the PDB could be most useful renderm ; . by qderying- ites that—give-e pithy Judgments situations with which the President is or will be faced. Hm Smith said these judgments would be accepted; OCI did not have to support them with argumentation or evidence. Smith emphasized that the Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should — adequatel$ read presidential speeches, He felt the President is kept/informed of
HW 355355 Docld:32401332 Page 28 25 Vietnamese military developments by other means; the PDB should carry more Vietnamese political and economic items. xKSmith urged that the Brief. have more coverage of m Europe and said that Panama was another ‘subject high on the priority list. 13/ OCI promptly set about adopting Smith's suggestions as to » Soon . content, and Smith,commented that he ‘id noticed the change. 1h/ Cwhie thew Helms Cro ne te & >) ° Back po HMernmr elivers atleast A major hanes in the PDB system occurred at the end of February 1967. Seemingly all that was involved was that President Johmson decided that he would rather get the Brief in the morning than in the evening. . time However, this change in delivery/forced other changes. The President wanted the Brief at 6:30 ame, just before he began reading the newspapers. This meant that OCI's closing time on the book was 5 a.m. Nonetheless, the PDB had to
26 be written in full knowledge of xkm what was in the morning press. — As/E. Drexel Godfreyx commented, the schedule put "the highest premium’ on making the publication up to the minute."  15/ Because the for now had to be delivered to the White House Situation Room by 6 aeme, the PDB writers weak no longer had a member of the President's staff up and available to receive the book and comment on it. ce having make This meant that there was no point in/the writers making the trip to the ” White House. From this time on, the PDB was delivered by couriers. To make up for the loss of the morning conversations with Bromley Smith, an OCI staff member would visit him occasionally to check on how things were going, and there was also communication by phone. af . fa He PDB Shortly after the changeover to the newpichedulg; commenting on the Presbient's reaction, Bromley Smith, xadibomtexes Pack kak said emphatically that "we are much more certain now that he's reading it." He alsh made a * point he was to make several times subsequently, which was that he disapproved of annexes to the Brief. He was afradd that if the Brief were burdendd with an Annex, the President would put it aside for later reading--and then not. ‘ HW 55355 DBocld:32401332 Page 29
27 Ow 4g Phew bo ee aon Chee (Cen Kom he ste : Gre £- A Su rn marr ve Tle Cone Lup irme on "Sm octane © Va Sine Cote P, (6/7 get back to it. In Bemxteytexxtx Smith's view, the PDB should be of a It would be oe length which the President could whip through quickly. Sichegrkictmmonkerigi&x Be : be better if annex-type reports were sent down separately, hirer Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then gx ixangeapexkex about the words and phrases they employed in the PDB. He admitted that jhet it was hard to know whefe to draw the line, but he tauttoned—het fiocthex . the-stafi-should:be-earefni-ateut did not like "hopping mad," nor, As a rule of thumb, he said the writers should avoid seeming frivolous or light- Tee tee ee, hearted, a om another occasion,did he care for a description of India as an "unwilling bride." hy 7 : ag = At the President's fequest, OCI on 7 September 1967 begah dealt to attach to the Brief a Special Report on North Vietnam that smrtsbciesk mainly a F with the effects. of the war. ‘The only capx to go outside of the Agency was : / adoressed: "For Bromley Smith ~ Eyes Only for the President," Beginning with. the issue of 6 October, this Special Ropart carried a new sectitn on North Vietnamese treatment of political attitudes toward the war, expressed in state- VP ments and demons trations. Hw 55355 DoclId:32401332 Page 30 i :
£ In Nevember DOT Heims taiked wifh Drexel Gedfrey and Richard Lehman about the PDB. Meimm The Director expressed greatsatisfaction | the | with both the Brief and/Special Report. He said the latter ix was "really hitting the mark." He urged that OCI try harder to presmxkx come up with items Ibins Savd, on the personalities of men familiar to the President, who] thinks in terms of pebsonalities, Helms also asked that the PDB give more attention to coming visits of worldx VIPs to Washington and to each other, No major changes in the PDB were made during President } wt ~~ Johnson's time after the introduction of the Special Worth Vietnamese—— epers. To alla appearances, the Brief had evolved into a document satisfactory to the President, amd it kept serving its purpose throughout the rest of the administration. , } ; All OCI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar in the White House mx holding _ with a photograph of President Johnson sitting/with Lady Bird and/his first grandson. In his hand is an issue of the Rresident's Daily Uricf, -wiiniee— | $ —eppesrs=to-he-reaming-eimmiz This homey picture epitomized the position khak OCI hoped the Brie the White House. And perhaps it did. HW 55355 Docld: 32401332 Page 31 , ‘ , beg RR pe!
The importance to a President of a steady flow of first-class intelligence is self-evident. Whatever scope and depth of in- formation-he can obtain from the public media, he still needs the intelli- gence that comes from the utiligation of sensitive technogical means and clandestine operations. He is entitled to objective appraisals based on all sources, public and governmental. In planning American positions and actions, ~ Satks Neve th pers Me tevel Aad basle de lopmen oF he-wyfaix the most souhdly based estimates o ) ow foreign situations are-tkehy” HOHE” CIA and its predecessor, the CIG, have met these Presidential intelligence needs. what they have furnished the Presidents has been determined o? by ne interplay between the intelligence organization and the White House. learn what each - The Acency has been pxrepaxrenxant eager to prectimodmakxkhe President wanted in terms of subject matter, timing, format »/styley por the-noet_pertit——__ Ap mee & the re ‘Te pe aks. eseerens HW 55355 Docld:32401332 Page 320 a EE
ow |&R . . ie!) : , 30 * od . : - +; 4 4 TS oo vrel a 4 ‘’s (ian tone PANS Ae ae “ a , caw : ee . | : “ Derr her roo SH A ave: has.-not. been-foreseon_and-raquastad. he.mustuhave,-eren if. 2 Trary eater or y—O So ~infermation.—- There has probably never been complete agreement between C CIA and the White House on what the President really needs to know, but a degree moakitiome of muthal toleration usually prevailsx so that a President will Adeepr ; , poad/Sone things he isn't particularly interested in and CIA will xepmrk carry on certain lynes of reporting simply out of regard for a President's 3 Presi : . idiosyncracies. In serving Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and wart Ale hh t— Johnaon, CIA's Office of Current. Intelligence re rcnvany fireett Guiefaeeentive its metrese a7 ek oe, LGL prety — EO hea vA - oes at ea one a oy ya -—- - although the method was adjusted to accord with each President's prefetences. WW 55355 Docld:32401332 Pade 33