HW 49061 Docld:32626338 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM _were inferior.to the Mongo. Therefore we are discontented when people try to degrade us... ." . The Mongo movement then extended to Coquilhatville, a Mongo-dominated city be- lieved to be situated on Mongo ancestral lands, During the urban elections of 1958 and 1959, Mongo disunity resulted in the election of Coquilhatville burgomasters from the Ngombe tribe. The essence of. Mongo cultural "nationalism" is ably summed up by Father Boelaert, a Catholic missionary who was deeply attached to the Mongo. He wrote, "Objectively speaking, the Mongo present all the characteristics of a people... . It seems to me evident that, in an ethnic community which does not form an administrative entity or state, national consciousness is natural, but remains latent as long as it is not obliged to externalize itself before internal or ex- ternal dangers.'' Thus, the seeds of renewed ethnic self-consciousness were first sown in the cities, but in many cases they fell on fertile terrain in the ethnic homelands. Another fundamental aspect of awakening ethnic consciouness is the catalyzation of hostility toward other urban groups. A re- current theme is an assertion of hegemony by one group and a violent reaction to this claim on the part of another. The claim to superiority may .arise from the geographical situation of a city on what are considered to be tribal lands,4.a numerical’ majority of the urban population,5.or a clear.advance in social prestige and economic status. The last factor has proven the most combustible, Examples of the Successful Assertion gf Ethnic Solidarity For the Congo as a whole, the three tribal groups most successful in collectively ad- vancing their ambitions have been the Bakongo, the Baluba, and the complex of riverain peo- ples (Bobangi, Lokele, and others) who have been labelled ''Bangala" in Leopoldville. These three groups, although they represent nomore than 20 per cent of the population, almost definitely have furnished a majority of uni- versity students. Since World War II the advantages of entry into the modern sector have become abundantly clear to virtually all ethnic groups, and those which found them- selves outstripped by others became intensely frustrated, Groups with an established elite provided the schoolmasters and company per-. sonnel directors. Tribes with less influence or less favored could find daily corrobora- 4. Bakongo in Leopoldville, Mongo In Coquilhatville, Bashi in Baka- ' ‘vu, Basanga in Jadotville, Lulua in Luluabourg. 5, Bakongo in Leopoldville, Buluba in Luluabourg or the southern ~ Katanga towns. 6. Baluba in Luluabourg and. southern Katanga. tion of their inferiority in many petty ways: e.g., the expulsion of a child from school, the promotion of a clerk, ., Factors particular to the sequence of po- litical developments in the Congo served to enhance the importance of the ethnic element in political behavior. Until 1959, political or- ganization was not tolerated. A channel of communication between the mass and the elite operated only within the framework of the tribal associations in the cities, The Congo tribal association had little competition. Trade unions were very weak, and all other types - of urban’ organizations suffered from the surveillance and controls of the paternal ad- ministration.?Thus the political process, without political parties, was first introduced in the large. cities at the fulcrum of ethnic tensions, , The first elections in the Congo were held in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Jadotville in 1957, followed by others in Luluabourg, Stanleyville, Bukavu, and Coquilhatville in 1958, In most cases the electoral campaigns and/or the exercise of municipal offices by the victors served to heighten ethnic tensions, A curious paradox placed in the vanguard of militant nationalism an ethnic movement, the Abako organization of the Bakongo tribe. The first overt nationalist act occurred in 1954, when the Abako publicly nominated a - Mukongo for the post of Chief of Leopoldville's African quarter, based on an alleged authority to speak for '80 per cent of the Leopoldville population,''8 In 1956 the Abako issued the first demand for immediate independence, and in 1959 was the first tolauncha civil disobedience appeal, Thus. the Congolese nationalist move- ment bore ethnic birthmarks because of the .exclusive tribal character of the Abako. Other groups could not join Abako and were forced to found other, opposing groups. Belgian ''Tribalism" . There is some relevance also inthe fact that Belgium differs from other former major colonial powers in being culturally plural itself. Colonial contact between Belgium and the Congo was between two ''countries,'" ‘neither of which was a nation.''9 Britain, France, and Portugal possess a highly inte- grated nationalism based upon centuries ofhis- tory and common experience. Belgium as a separate country was born in 1830, only halfa century before the Congo Free State. The Bel- 7. See also Chapter VI, “‘Politics and Parties.” 8. A considerable exaggeration; the Bakongo element in the Leo- poldville population, although by far the largest single component, _ could hardly have exceeded 50 per cent. ‘ 9, J. Gerard-Libois and B. Verhaegen, Congo 1960. SECRET/NO.FOREIGN DISSEM ~ Page 15
HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM gian national image is schizophrenic; tension between Walloon and Fleming is highly visible and was recognized in the Congo when an in- digenous elite began to emerge that was equipped to remark that Europeans were not simply an undifferentiated and distant ruling class, Indeed, the movement for Flemish cul- tural autonomy, which Congolese studied under largely Flemish missionary teachers in the secondary schools, could not fail to win.the sympathy of the Congolese students. "Progress! through the Belgian prism stands in sharp contrast to the unitarian message of the French Revolution—"la republique, une et indivisible''—which had been transmitted as the meaning of history to the ex-French Afri- can elite. The Abako, in one of its appeals for a federal system, invoked the Belgian ex- ample: "It suffices to observe. the perpetual mis- trust and misunderstandings between Flemings and Walloons to convince oneself of the danger there is to unite men of different qrigins. We don't want to meddle in the internal affairs of our Belgian friends, but we can't help saying that if the union between Flemings and Wal- loons were conceived on a federal basis, the almost interminable quarrels which have often broken forth between these two tribes would have been avoided,'! Ethnicity as a Political Expedient The dangers of the ethnic appeal were less well appreciated in the Congo than in other countries, where nationalist political goals and methods were more carefully elaborated. The abrupt collapse of Belgian resistance and the tumultuous contest for power by a headless and fragmented Congolese nationalist move- ment were an inevitable incitement to follow the shortest path to success, the ethnic appeal. The atmosphere of crisis and insecurity in which the 1960 elections took place added impetus to ethnic self-awareness. Times of emergency and violence tend to shift frames of reference to ethnic and raciallines. There was in 1960 a crescendo of uncertainty in many areas. A number of groups, both African and European, began arming. The future for all posterity seemed to be resolving itself in a cataclysmic contest; elections were to settle whether Mongo or Ngombe ruled in Coquilhat- ville, whether Baluba or Lulua dominated Kasaj, The ethnic pattern had thus been established, and thereafter politics fitted the mold, Ethni- city and politics fed upon each other and have ’ been mutually reinforcing in the first years of independence. By early 1961, the debate on the formation of new provinces was in full swing. Although by no means all of the 21 provinces are ethnically homogeneous, ethnic arguments, true or false, played a primordial ‘it was rhetorical. Now that the new provinces 7 ‘has disappeared, role in provincial fragmentation. In most cases, the demand for fragmentation arose from the. political leadership rather thanfromthe mass; however, once the ethnic question was asked, exist, the festering problems of the marginal, disputed territories keepthe ethnic issue alive, In 1960 only four political movements of any Significance were not primarily ethnic: Par- ti_Solidaire’ Africain (PSA), Mouvement Na- tional Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L), Centre de Regroupement Africain (Cerea), and the Parti National du Progrtés (PNP), The PNP and the others have been subject to serious ethnic tensions. In the PSA, a split in Kwilu provincial leadership, between Kamitatu and Gizenga, was per- ceived at the base in ethnic terms. Gizenga's support was derived from his own Bapende tribe and from the Bambunda followers of his lieutenants, Pierre Mulele and Gabriel Yumbu. The Bambala, Bangongo, and most of the smaller groups rallied to Kamitatu. In the MNC/L party, even in 1960, the vot- ing support in the areas of Maniema, Sankuru, and Tshuapa was based on the ethnic soli- darity of the Ankutshu-Anamongo group, of which Lumumba's Batetela tribe was a part. And in Stanleyville, where MNC/L support in the first instance had been genuinely pan- ethnic, the sectarian policies of the local boss, Bernard Salumu, resulted in a sharp split between Salumu's Lokele tribe, the larg- est single group in the Stanleyville popula- tion, and the rest, Another example was the breakaway of the areas of Uélé and Kibali- Ituri from Stanleyville, and the formation in 1962 in Stanleyville of a "Cartel des Cultiva- teurs,'' whose purpose, we ‘were told by one of its its founders, was to "anéantir l'orgeuil des Lo- kele'; the significance of party name lay in the fact that the Lokele were a riverain fishing people, whereas the rest of the Stan- leyville population comes from farming com- munities. In the case of Cerea, a party in Kivu, the political evolution resulted in a polarization which was perceived and de- scribed, not entirely accurately, as a tribal dispute between the Bashi (Kivu Central) and the Bakusu (Maniema); MNC/L became referred to there as MNC/Bakusu. Thus the tensions born of competitive mod- ’ ernization in the urban.centers created a new form of ethnic identification in the Congo, The insecurities. and divisions of urban ex- perience were catalyzed and deepened by the nature of the political process since 1957, Ethnicity as a central factor in Congolese political behavior is far more profound than being a simple anachronism or retreat to traditionalism; rather it is’ a dynamic element, begotten by the forces of modernization. Just how it will evolve in the coming years is difficult to forecast, The one safe prediction is that it will not simply disappear. SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 32626333 Page 16
HW 49061 DoclId: 32626336 - SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Il. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAME-WORK: ‘THE LOI FONDAMENTALE AND LIKELY SUCCESSORS The Loi Fondamentale A scissors-and paste digest of the Belgian constitution, the Loi Fondamentale ranks with the worst organic laws in existence, It was a by product of the extraordinary haste of power transfer in the Congo. The Brussels Round Table Conference of January-February 1960, which decided upon independence for June 30, started with an intellectual tabula rasa on.the sort of government the Congo needed, The Round Table provided some general mandates, and turned over the task of drafting the Loi Fondamentale to a group of young Congolese and Belgians, After a cursory examination of other constitutions, the drafters found the Swiss, Nigerian, and Belgianthe most suitable. They prepared a document in six weeks which parroted the Belgian model down to such maverick features as co-opted senators,!with apparently little serious thought by either Belgians or Congolese about the long-term problems of stable government for’ a complex and underdeveloped polity such as the Congo, they endowed the country with a bi-cameral legislature, a parliamentary regime, anda double executive comprising a chief of state and a prime minister. . It would be naive to suggest that an inade- quate constitutional framework is at the heart of the Congo's difficulties. But given the prob- lems this political community must overcome in- governing itself, the added burden of a woe- fully inadequate legal framework is a heavy one. The Belgian tradition is highly legalistic. "Legality" remains a hallowed political value in the Congo, no matter how frequently honored in the breach. An attachment to legality is surely an ideal to be fostered, yet it is diffi- cult to sustain when careful observance leads down blind alleys. Principal Defects in the Loi Fondamentale The present constitutional structure has several major defects: 1, Parliamentary power. A parliamentary regime would make sense in the Congo were there meaningful political groups represented in the legislature. But the utter disorgani- 10, A provision under which the Senate itself elects a number of ad- ditional members of the body. 8 zation of all parliamentary delegations, ex- cept those of the Abako party and both wings of the PSA party, renders the body incoherent and essentially negative, The disappearance of party roots in the interior after 1960 made Parliament irrelevant as a mechanism for legitimation of government decisions. The most potent single unifying factor within Parliament has been the special privileges of the body (e.g., salary and parliamentary immunity), Such a corporate guild provides few innovating impulses. : No matter how large the Council of Minis- ters, there seems no waya secure majority can be assured for a government, There is no doubt that the level of parliamentary de- corum and efficiency has risen substantially since 1960, as shown by even a cursory ex- amination of the debates. Yet placing the locus, of power in Parliament, rather than in the executive branch under a presidential regime, really means that the government often is either paralyzed, or it acts in defiance of the letter of the constitution, Either is excessively high tribute to pay to literal application of classical liberal democratic theory -to the Congo. , ' 2. Dual executive authority. The very office of chief of state is an anomaly. It derived from the Belgian hope, later shown hollow, of reserving a constitutional niche for King Baudouin because of the Belgian dynasty's particular associations with the Congo. The chief of state-prime-minister confusion come to an early head September 5, 1960, when President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister ° Lumumba. This action was based on Article 22 of the Loi Fondamentale (''The President names and dismisses the Prime Minister."), Kasavubu's act, although defensible politically, created a nearly insoluble constitutional im- passe that lasted almost a year. Since the in- vestiture of the Adoula government, Kasavubu . has been content witha quasi-monarchical role - of largely ceremonial dimensions. A more ace tive president, however, could find himself in constant conflict with the prime minister. The duality of authority has grave latent dangers. 3, Legislative review. No clear way is sug- gested for obtaining a definitive interpretation of the law. Article 51 provides that ''authori- tative interpretation of laws belongs only to Parliament," but adds, ''for the interpretation of the Loi Fondamentale, the Parliament can solicit the Belgian Parliament's interpre- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page i7
HW 49061 DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM tation.'' This article arises from the Belgian constitutional notion that only the legislator can know his intent in the formulation ofa law, and therefore he alone can resolve a disputed interpretation. However, the Congolese Parlia- ment has taken advantage of the ambiguity in Article 51 to assert its right to give authori- tative interpretation to the Loi Fondamentale and has used this clause to justify free-wheel- ing parliamentary actions. Fondamentale provided for the establishment of a Constitutional Court, this requires a special law, which has yet to be voted. Were the Con- stitutional Court in existence, its powers likely would be limited to judging whether new laws conform to the Loi Fondamentale, arbitrating central-provincial conflicts, and hearing charges of administrative torts, Nowhere is ‘it suggested that the Court would be empowered to interpret the Loi Fondamentale as such. 4, "States of exception." Among other conse- quences of ambiguity has been a highly ir- regular procedure under which a chamber of Parliament adopts a resolution establishing a 'state of exception" in a province, in effect seeking central government assistance to over- throw the existing provincial government, Should the executive branch fail to implement the resolution, the weapon of interpellation and censure could be invoked against the re- sponsible minister. Although the ''state of ex- ception" procedure has at times been justified, in other instances it has been irresponsible and damaging. ; 5. Censure votes. Another example of am- ‘biguity may be found in the Gizenga case. Al- though Parliament stripped Gizenga of his im- munities by an overwhelming vote in January 1962 and he was later imprisoned, there have been several votes since December 1962 calling for his release. Finally, in June 1963, Parliament voted to, restore his immunity. Justice Minister Justin Bomboko brilliantly de- fended the. government's argument that this was interference in a case sub judice, which only awaited parliamentary creation of a tribunal competent to try him. But nothing could have stopped one chamber from enforcing its own interpretation by simply removing the minister in a censure vote. 6. Amendments. Another crucial defect is a loophole in the amendment process. Though a complicated procedure was specified for fram- ing a new constitution, provision was made for amendment of the Loi Fondamentale itselfbya two-thirds vote of both houses. There are ‘therefore no entrenched provisions beyond the ‘reach of amendment, Anumber of changes have already been voted, including a complete al- teration of the ratification process for a new ‘constitution: The requirement that elections be held in 1964 similarly could be removed L by parliamentary vote, ‘ \ Though the. Loi’ 9 ‘stitutent assembly in September The UN Draft Constitution The Loi Fondamentale was intended to be only a provisionalinstrument, The Belgians and Congolese believed in 1960 that only the Con- golese could define their basic law, and that its content should not bea subject of bargaining with the colonizer. ' The UN assembled a group of experts in early 1961 to initiate preparatory work ona draft constitution. At the same time, the Con- golese. College .of Commissioners charged Marcel Lihau, the first Congolese law graduate, - with initial drafting efforts on behalf of the government,-In early 1962, another UN group of three constitutional experts, led by T. O. Elias of Nigeria, was at work onthe final form of a draft constitution. Another Congo govern- ment commission, again under Lihau, beganin January 1962 to draft a document embodying the accords reached at Kitona between Adoula and Tshombe. In the course of the ''dance of the cranes" which constituted the Adoula- Tshombe negotiations, there were extensive suggestions from both sides-—as well as from the UN and other interested observers—es- -pecially on the provincial-central government ‘relationship. Finally, in February 1963 the presidents: of the provincial assemblies met in Coquilhatville and prepared an extensive series of proposed amendments to the UN draft. ; ; Shortly thereafter a parliamentary com- ‘mission began to discuss the UN draft, pro- ceeding methodically article by article. By June 1963 they had completed consideration of about 40 of the 212 articles. The com- mission work is continuing during the parliamentary vacation of 1963, and Parlia- ment is scheduled to.reconvene as a con- 1963, Parliamentary sources maintain that a draft will be complete by early 1964, It is likely to conform largely to the UN draft. Proposed Organization of the ‘Central Government Much concern has been expressed over the central government-provincial relationships outlined in the UN draft constitution, but very little over the structure of the central govern- “ment -itself, Generally, the application of cer-- tain European procedural concepts of demo- cracy to the organization of the central gov- ernment seems excessive and insufficiently adapted: to Congolese needs, Specifically, the parliamentary system provided in the UN draft appears to disperse the authority of the central government too greatly for effective direction of the country. It is ironic that much ofthe pressure for re- taining the parliamentary system in the Congo came via the UN from other African states SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 18