ey Leey re dag 202) 954-2385 a 2) hoc. 24094 7 wi ~e rd we [ee) KREPORPREES BUPLDUNG, GASHTHGTON, Cory < Lond anh ° oe ae HW 50955 Docld 232263411 Page 131 ‘126 book which purports to be an account of the writer's career in intelligence, I have no way of knowing one way or another t t i ( whether this was included in the material that you actually read. But I would like to ask you to review those materials | now. For the record the CIA number starts with 11112364 and it ends at 11112371. Please take five or ten minutes to read | through that. 7 | Mr. Angleton. This as far as I know I have never seen. I don't recall seeing this. _ Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that this was among the materials that you obtained hut simply that you 4id not review | it at that time? H H ! 4 i H { Mr. Angleton. You see, the copies that I saw were before | the Xerox. they were what you call thermofaxes. Has this been i retyped from something? ee Mr. Goldsmith. This is not the original or anything. Maybe Mr. Berk can shed some light. Mr. Rerk. It was contained in the files. There were other copies of this manuscript in somewhat edited versions. This seems to be the final form. : i Mr. Angleton. Were the documents in the files thermofaxed? Mr. Berk. I am not versed in the distinction between thermofax and Xerox. Mr. Angleton. Thermofax is a special kind of paper, very | : 5 dark. i
HY =z 72; Mr. Goldsmith. This particular chapter I asked you to re ~ Hf . . = 4 | €@iscusses Oswald's Mexico City trip; is that correct? 5 ig | . Mr. Angleton, This is not the style of the manuscript. = it | wen OEE i = isi Mr. Goldsmith. The manuscript you reviewed? = et ~ if a i Mr. Angleton. It is not in his style because. he was 2 i2 | writing a more novel type of style. = - Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that and I really don't .. = # | intend to dwell upon that manuscript since that is different —_ ol grom what I have apparently shown you today. ys Mr. Angleton. Although the title there must be the same “| one that he had on the manuscript. Would you read that title “i again? | ao Mr. Duncan. "The Foul Foe." i , AAS A ee SeGget f ALDSESSOM REZFORTING COMPSAY 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 132 Me Ld a? E Se? Bee Se Gon is=3 127 Mr. Berk, No, it was not thermofax. 2 Mr. Angleton. It is a heat treatment thing so that ! 3 | unless you are using the original you have a very poor copy and | it is very hard to make a thermofax from a thermofax. | E s Mr. Berk. The paper itself is dark? : 5 5 | Mr. Angleton. Yes. I mean it is dark by having gone _ i E | through the heat process, you don't get a sharp black and wnitd 2 7 Mr. Berk. It did not seem to be that type. | : 3 Mr. Angleton. I picked up an awful lot of materials there : ee as : CASHTRGTON , it |) she would cooperate a 100 hundred percent. The thing comes back to me that I also arranged for the Chief of Mission to be able to see Mrs. Scott after~ards and she sai ' a i t i I dq t f 5 i t
128 , 4 | | Mr. Angleton. that rings a bell as heing the title of | the book. / Mr. Goldsmith. Let me tell you that the committee has | every intention of reviewing this in more detail. This was weed wa it : ~ " | just made available to us very recently. In any event the chapter ° 5 | that you just read discusses Oswald's trip to Mexico City, is m ~ that correct? SY Mr. Angleton. Yes. ooo 8 _ | = Mr. Goldsmith. Does it appear to you, based upon your | = | knowledge of the case, to be an accurate reflection of the ge i = ill = 4 events that took place in Mexico City when Oswald visited there =: jin 1963? ! = 3 , : on & = Mr. Angleton. I can't say that I necessarily have the same Fe . | picture from reading all that. My memory of headquarters, it | fe 4 i = rs i . i = i reads very much like Scott in terms of the actions that he pa Hi . . : = 16 y ~ / took and his feelings. : dl : nm tt ~ Mr. Goldsmith. This then does not strike you as a fictional s | account? : = 33] * | Mr. Angleton. No. | Mr.:.Goldsmith. When Mrs. Scott gave these materials to Zo | you to bring back to the Agency or for you to arrange for ; ~ | the material to be sent back to the Agency did she in effect | imake those materials a gift to the Agency? Was she giving e | them all to the Aqency? as il ; . Mr. Angleton. As I remember it there was no dispute. Fd ALQERSON REPORTING COMPANY HW 50955 Bocld:32263411 Page 133
is-5 129 When I went down there, one, I did not know her modd. ' In other words, Win had retired and he was working I think for i] some international investigative agency which had originally oe been set up by a former employee named Al llmer who lived in = ai London and now lives in Geneva. I think Win, who was a very a 3 powerful man in Mexico, got a number of his Mexican friends = ‘| | “w ‘ 1 i S 7 | to invest in it and I think it failed, went bankrupt. So I | i] , x zoos . | = ~ 4 didn't know what the state of mind of the wife was going to be: J ° | an terms of certain bitterness that Win did feel. | = 4 , = i ; = - | I went down there very open-minded as to what might hap~ | = i oo ; ii pen. I was disturbed because, as I recall, we only had Xeroxes ‘ | or these thermofaxes and there was the whole question of being | - | able to get all the copies and all that type of thing and whether he had sent them out to publishers and so on, So, I was ‘+. a little apprehensive about her greeting. When I went to see | REPORTERS HULEBENG, her, her first words were "Why Aid it take so long? So to S00 7TH SrkenT, 3.0 a speak. When I took her in the side room and said "I had an unpleasant task" -- I put it very clearly --."there are some i want to recover all of them," there was absolutely no oppo- or seme | | | | } \ | papers. If these are published this violates Win's oath. We i / sition. She said, "You can have everything." Whoever was the j iz Lee St ons "\ * y Chief of Mission was with me and so it was arranged that he a1} , & 4 would followup and pick up all the stuff. . ; Mr. Goldsmith. Was the-Station Chief at that time a man named John Forton? # ah ee i ALZTERSON REFORTING COMPaTY HW 30955 Docld: 32263411 Page 134
“RS Ghose ge “het Hos hg a ee | a) 8 regarding this matter the Commission would like to be informed of the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of this picture ; by your Agency and the identify of the individual shown if = CEGhel ALDESASOM REZSORTING Come any _ is-6 130 7 Mr. -Angleton. That is correct. | 4 ; = 2 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the cryptonym | 2 A.M.MUG? : 7 Mr. Angleton. No, I mean not with that -= A.M.? | ; Z 5 | Mr. Goldsmith. MUG, a Cuban defector. : ; 7 Mr. Angleton. It does not mean anything in that way. : S 7 | the "M" as I recall was Cuban, "A.M." or Cuban operations. i i z 34 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you remember a Cuban defector in 1964 I ow i | e * | providing information to the Agency about Oswald's contacts with = i = 2 | ene, Cuban Intelligence? | Pa ; i | Mr. Angleton. No. . . | | 2 i . 2 = ran Mr. Goldsmith. Letus go back to this particular document | ifog : . ! z 2 fat this point. I call your attention to paragraph two of this a : i letter, | 2 3 | Mr. Angleton. I am trying to get the date. - = 7 Mr. Goldsmith. This is 5 March 1964 and that is 12 Feb- : * | ruary 1964, : e Mr. Angleton. Tom Karamessines' address was Acting Director ia ft : | which meant that Dick Helms was away. | | S = | Mr. Goldsmith. To Odum of the Federal Bureau of Inves- | sR" gation, | wR oy "In order to complete the records of the Commission | " | WW 50955 BDocld:32263411 Page 135
HW 50955 da Soh~2305 OQ. (22) 20024 4b b.c, Co GASTITHGTON , REPORTERS HULEBENG , in 3M, «. = o = = cr ~ = ~ c S =“ Docld: ‘-: glip. Xhose are all provable cases of where even though the is-7 13] this information is currently available. Thank you for your | assistance." Mr. Angleton. Read that once more. Mr. Goldsmith. "In order to complete the record of the Commission regarding this matter the Commission woulée like to be informed of the cirucmstances surrounding the obtaining ef this picture by your Agency and the identify of the individ ual shown if this information is currently available." ne i Now I would refer to the second paragraph of Document Number 2139 where you indicate that the Commission has received ! the substance of their request but in effect I think you are suggesting that the Agency wait out giving the Commission the 1 specifics. Mr. Angleton. My only concern would have been the elaborate surveillance and telephonic surveillance, letting that be i known, I want to make one observation. Peonle say, well, the Soviets always know that you photograph them or they alwans know that. their lines are tapped. There have heen too many times in history that an unknown, either an American Army i officer or somebody else that doesn't know, that makes the H Soviets know -- I can remember one case, an emergency situation with one of our agents in Paris on the run, getting to Rome and telephoning the embassy that he is in trouble, et cetera -- i ALSESSON REFORTING COMPANY 322763411 Page 136
sa Qa. BL, 2004 (207) $5u-23945 c3 os SETUC TON , 1, UA RS ~ REPORTERS RUPE EN ’ sy = = = . 4 & o fin ey Hiv 50955 Doacld 8 132 even though they know they try to shut him up but it is too late. That type of thing. Therefore with all the past experience the idea that even have complicated things for the Mexican Government because | Win's relationships with the Mexican Government were at the i | though they knew that, this thing would get further, would | | i | | top, with the President. Therefore the repercussions would ! have been far more than just simply losing.the operation. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the name Louisa Cal- an deron? Mr. .Angleton. I have heard but I can't place it? ry Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to a completely different area ~~~ at this time, on what basis would the CIA staff has occasion | to open a 201 file on an individual? I am referring now to the time period 1959 to 1960. Mr. Angleton. We opened up many files. Mr, Goldsmith. In other words, what would the criteria have i Been for opening a 201 file? I am speaking now with reference | specifically to the CIA staff? Mr. Angleton. It would be anyone who was suspect or who had contacts with the Soviets, I mean with the bloc or with an : espionage net, regardless of how remote, : Mr. Goldsmith. Let me show vou CIA document Number 796. This is a Department of State telegram dated October 31, 1959. f + Let me read it to you. = Pa ALDENSON REFORTHG COMPANY
n af u H 2 4 i a] 3 | 4 4 i | i i via wi Pay > i or iu if = i a 2 | i am Hi ~ - | a 7 i —_ J - | s 4 = 83 HI ~ | ub - i fond 4 : G ! 3 i 5 i od tro me ir 2] | = 2 | i 4 = Hl = ta Fond | = d = | a 4 = ub eis. co 4 me ; - il as Ht we oa 5 i any i ~ ~ i = e | ~ i 1 e i = aa | ) ar | : iu an y + ts b tn ) =| len a a + 133 Mr. Angleton. Let me look at some of the addressees on that, | Mr. Goldsmith. CI is listed on the side. I might add we obtained it from the CI files.. It reads, “Lee Harvey Oswald, { ' i i unmarried, age 20, passport issued September 19, 1959, i appeared at the embassy today to renounce American citizenship.: , | | Stated applied in Moscow for Soviet citizenship following entry i U.5.5.R. from Felsinki October 15. Mother's address and his last address. .S., 4936 Commonwood Street, Ft. Worth, Texas. | i | Says action contemplated last two years. Main: reason 'I am | i { \ : } a Marxist.’ Atttitude arrogant, aggressive. Recently dis- charged Marine Corps. Says has offered Soviet any information | he has acquired as an enlisted radar operator. In view Petrulli case we propose delay executing renunciation until Soviet action Known and Department advises. Dispatch follows. : ! i Press informed.” Mr. Angleton. In view of what? Mr. Goldsmith. In view of Petrulli case. ~My question is whether. the information contained in that telegram would normally lead to the opening of a 201 file? ! Mr. Angleton. Yes. | Mr. Goldsmith. I take it essentially because it suggests. that Oswald was a counterintelligence threat? Mr. “Angleton. Yes. HW 50955 Bocld: 322763411 Page 136
134 -_s fols mhl (| Miss Brady. But ran no operations apart from these contacts? ex of J. 2 Mr. Angleton. No. “he rule was that if they had likely ing Feton 3 prospects of somebody going from any American company that Jot 5 '78 4 ae + | they might contact him to pick up something but they didn't have uA NCE yO | A 5 i a budget for payment. Phey didn't have the rites of security | a ¢ | oaths, all of that. In other words, if it was to become oper- . 2 | | * | = a through the Clandestine Services who might or probably wouldn't 3 7 even consider it seriously. . Db, co Miss Brady. Returning again to the Soviet, do you know what TOU, ~ + WASH ENC investigation w-s done to test Mosenko's allegations about Oswald? i ! i t ' H i i Mr. Angleton. I think it was simply a question of interrg- \ ! gation and reinterrogation and how many files did he read and t } | l | | | | | ational or sensitive in any way then they would have to pass it | ! i | i i é | { { 4 | i trying to press him on detail, detail, detail, detail. I know | REPORTERS HUPED ENG ‘$2 there were some conflicts because at one stage when the Warren : a4, e ‘* | Commission was going to ask the. Soviet Government for, I mean = i = : . % an to request the Soviet Government for information regarding = is} ; ; : *# ‘7 + Oswald hen he stayed there, that we composed a very detailed oF -- | questionnaire that the.State Department turned down on diplo- rexeee $3 matic ground that it would disturb the water. Miss Brady. A questionnaire for the Soviet Government? Mr. Angleton. Yes. Then I know that we had question- naires that we prepared for the Office of Security to use in their polygraphing, which they did not use. In other words, ' HW 50955 DBocld: 32263411 Page 139
is=2 135 there were a lot of things that in our view were testings and all 1 hat type of thing which were not employed. i i 1 i i ee r } 1 “4 i 4 AY a 3 =) ae BS 4s jr everything from the point of view of the typewriters and so rr 4.3 on, if there was on the surface something to be gained by it, if i ' a there were stamps or certifications or whatever. Also, just from a technical point of view they would be interested in the: | 3 | Miss Brady. Did the CIA examine the documents turned over * | by the Soviet Government about Oswald's stay in the Soviet Xnion? 5 | Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that. I know I saw them. | ; | Miss Brady. Do you know whether any assessment was, drawn 5 7 has to whether or not they were authentic? : Ss | Mr. Angleton. I am just remembering my own reaction was ! . | that it was a lot of puffery. It was just filling space with : = 2 | stute of no consequence. | : 2 a Miss Brady. Were anv of the people in the Agency who worked 3 = 2) an the area of foreign documents or Russian language asked to | c i ! 8 : 13 make any intensive analysis of those documents? | = .* Mr. Angleton. I am certain that that was done. : : is Miss Brady. Do you believe that reports exist on that : = | kane of thing from those evaluations? 4 | Mr. Angleton. There should be. Whether they went to the: : | agency on that or whether the recipients, the Warren Com- | = | = a mission --. how they handled that I don't know. All I can say : 5 ts that if we had the originals it would be almost automatic for ame a that to go to what we call our "TSD" and have them examine i ALDESSON REBORTING COMPANY ‘het ‘ HW 50955 Bocld: 322763411 Page 140
3 | 136 | 4 i i quality of paper because one of their jobs was to make paper icok @ 2 | like Russian paper. il Miss Brady. I know that many of the documents contain | as * | names of Russian officials who either had occasion to see . | i Oswald or work with him. Would there have been traces or ‘ H ' 1 t i , t i followups on those individuals? qas 20094 (202) S5u~24K5 normal job for the Office of Security -~ I am sorry, I will H no correct that -- for the Soviet Division. c ~ i : Miss Brady. Did the CIA have any independent knowledge of t i | | Mr. Angleton. I am certain of that. That would be the | i | tA i | | the Minsk radio factory where Oswald worked? , } i i Mr. Angleton. I don't know. t | Miss Brady. Was it normal for some type of evaluation | i t i om : t i te { of installations like that in the Soviet bloc countries to be : iso maintained? . REPORT EES SULELDING, HMASULHCTON, 1 Mr. Angleton. I think that in those days any information : * 7 lon any Soviet factory regardless would be maintained. that would : 'S | Be again where the "00" or the Domestic Intelligence people | a _ . . = 3 produce volumes of material on that because they would inter- : 5 # | rogate so many American businessmen who had different kinds i . ae of jobs and so on. It was really a very productive inexpensive Seas ; operation. a> 4a Miss Brady. What investigation to your knowledge was conducted about Marina Oswald? ‘ © 4 pal ios Mr. Angleton. . I think she was checked out against all the 4 4 WW 50955 Docld:322763411 Page 141
3 fe ol “= = = a ~ ~ ~ i wt a) 3 -~ = ? “~ , ed ~ Pl o = me as Y I ~ = “ tr = me) = = ~ = 74 as be _ a = = = iar Vide « cS = = a ‘~ ~ = = lA 4 Pe = 4 = ie > imo = ve ize) — = LA - “* te - ad = i) Ww = ig = 7 =~ = = ~ a of ~4 at Se ona oe nO ee ae uu OS - oo an am y ow “dg 5 a an ae HY 50955 Daocld: soa Ss t Py 4 137 | y files and records and relatives or whatever she gave on her application. All that type of thing would be automatic. | i Miss Brady. Did we have some way of verifying or lived with? Did we have resources to do that? : t L | | | | H | i | checking if, for example, she gave the name of the uncle she { | Mr, Angleton. No. All I would say is that if somebody | | | found in the 00 or in the computers that some traveller had i P . i lived in Minsk or had this or that, it is conceivable that there { i might have been a request levied on 00 to see their contact. i Miss Brady. Given the lack of resources to go into those kinds of areas about Marine Oswald, do you have any opinion j tigation was or are there still remaining questions as far as | ' . . . * 2 2 ' about how thorough that part of the Warren Commission's inves-: my i { | you are concerned about Marina Oswald? | | Mr. Angleton. My only concern I think is the concern of everybody. It is the facility with which she was able to leave the Soviet Union. I have known one case where a man, an American, was recruited by the Soviet intelligence in order to get his wife out, a prominent man. He lived and died before we dis- Miss Brady. He did return to the United States with his * bride? Mr. Angleton. I don't know == I think he got her out as ia result of making a deal. | | | | covered that he was a Soviet agent. | | | | Miss Brady. How close was that in time to Oswald's ALDEASON REFOCRTING COMEARY 322763411 Page 142
4p eo5 +8 138 stay in the Soviet Union? i © - : Mr. Angleton. It was a long time ago. In other words, aad this is the whole history of "oviet espionage making use of be t hostages, people in the immediate family as a wya of control and : j | ‘| { i 2 a as a leverage over agents. In other words, agents who were “ “i ideologically opposed to them, yet they operated very effec- | ~ i ia . Ni i e 7 oN : L | tively for them by virtue of hostages in the family, and even | = “ 1 some famous agents who did high grade work for KGB did it only; 2 f by virtue of the hostage situation. | 3 ai Miss Brady. Returning now to Golitzen, did you have any. = i = ord . one . ms . = - : knowledge during the initial briefing of Golitzen about a ee |  : 4 story or allegation about him that the KGB had a plot in exis-: (i = “| tence priot to the 1960 election to assassinate Nixon if he were. - | elected? Se 7 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I heard this before. I = aan don't think that is the way, to my memory, the way he put it. | = | ! ut an ! ie i That is again the trouble I find with the Hart testimony, = | the inaccuracies of making those kinds of statements, whether he =’ | said this as a positive fact. What he did say was that through the reorientation of the KGB as a part of the .... aoe / Ge-Stalinization of the KGB, of bringing it in as’ an integral - RN j part of the government, because under Stalin the GB had 22 | a | | deteriorated to an instrument of personal terror to preserve | ta | 4 me 4
is-6 139 ' Government as such across the board, that is the reason he had: 4 Chiefs and executed them, chiefs and executed them, and so on;! I dq f e. | i i | . ; SO part of the ce-Stalinization was to raise the XGR -- and i | t ‘ [ Lt took several years, six years, before this was culminated “7 ge 7OH24 €202) $5n-25n5 1 to where it was restored to the same role it had under Lenin, ; namely as a integral part.of Soviet policy and as a part of a full-fledged member of the Voviet community, !iwhich by impli ae a pod we emt nee ee ada cation would mean that every.action would have a political objec- on “dp { it . i : ; tive and would therefore advance the cause of Communist strategy. = Hi 5 In describing all of that it got into the fact that even | G = tro: | = foreign leaders who stood in the wav would he executied. In | s , 3 ' - 7 ; other words, Department 13's role was in effect to remove obsta- & i = 124 ; | = i Cles in the West.: = i | Bota fj n i Miss Brady. So, your recollection of the story of the 5 “i allegation is that it was that general and not specifically 7 a i ! = te 4 ; ! z -| related to Nixon? A 17 , - ; Mr. Angleton. All I am syaing is that having talked thou- = i oe ia; ; . . = | sands and thousands of hours with him I don't remember his | ~ i saying that to me about Nixon. All I am trying to say is that: ” | that would have rung a lot of bells. Maybe he did say it. Tf fa : i ato aos | he did I don't think he ver said it to me because you had to keep : “NN "gn mind that when he first came to the United States he was in: the hands of the Soviet Division. Then there were a lot of misunderstandings, and fauling out between the Divison and Golitzen. HW 50955 Docld:32963411 Page 144
hd « 3 a - wa = g * - ~ 1 ve] 2 A a ie 3 on oN ' = ed be : od ~ a ~ : a ry al ty Z = p=) * ia) = the = gS om Ht? ao = A x = 1.4 Me @ . . pera = tw ‘et ~ = 4 me we bone te Po io = x te is = = an tt af = ia = 41g oc Bea 4 4 Y 43 aa HW 50955 Docld: sR ate! a DE as Then he left the country and went abroad with his family i i and Broke the ties with the Soviet Division and then eventually’ } there were negotiations by the foreigh country he was in and | it was finally negotiated that he would be prepared to come | back as long as the Counterintelligence took him over from the Soviet Division: So he had tremendous numbers of sessions | with the Soviet Division before finally they deteriorated j | | totally. ; In other words, there was a tremendous amount of material | which had accumulated, transcripts and all of that. i Miss Brady. So, the initial debriefings were conducted | | by the Roviet Division? Mr. Angleton. That is right, and also with the partici- H i pation at times by my men, namely Rurch O'Neill and I think aman. called Jean Evans. In other words, these two men would i t : ‘ get into see him on special questions of a counterintelligence | nature, compartmented on certain agent cases and so on. Miss Brady. Why was a decision madevultimately to turn the Nosenko case over to the Office of S-curity and roughly when was i that decision made? Mr, Angleton. The Office of Security had a right to defectors in terms of their own needs as heing primarily respon- sible for the personal security and physical security of instal- lations. So they had maintained with the Soviet Division very : close relationships in terms of daily visits back and forth on. u Saf 4 oa j ; fo Wage The or Sk ie ® ALOGSSOM REPORTING COMPANY 32763411 Page 145 iS
is-8 . 141 Nosenko. It became then a question that the person handling that in the «Soviet Division, Rruce Scolie, gradually took the position that Nosenko was bona fide. 4 Miss Brady. Is it correct that that was after an early Z | assessment that he was not bona fide? : : 7 Mr. Angleton. That is right. I think the polygraphic | 2 7 | test showed that he wasn't and so on. So that when the soviet | = 7 Division failed in breaking him through hostile interrogation, | : 7 and obviously his relationship with all those people had evap~ : 6 | oratea, it was not illogical to let -= I mean if you are | : ii going to have sugar-vinegar -- the Office of Security pick it rere | up from there and sweeten the situation, particularly because they helieved in him. Then they had a keen interest in arriving t ‘ f at all the information he could volunteer and being able to pres | sent cases to him and handle him. ‘ i REPORTEYS SUELBIHG, UA - i So that is what took place. I didn't give you a date x be because I don't recall the date but it was in Hart's testimony. = ‘8 | I don't know whether that date is accurate. in = an Miss Brady. Is it fair to say at that point that the < i : = +" | Counterintelligence staff was of amind that he was not bona fide? a Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way. To my knowledge I! ui never have ever stated, in other words, I never took the position in extremis, a flat statement. If I had had to give it without any further -- I mean if I just had to stand still fa and look at everything, I would have had to say that he was ALDESSON REPORTING COMPASY HY 50955 Bocld: 32263411 Page 146
a dispatch agent. But again since I have a different philos- 2 Gq i ophy of modus operandi, which is to give rope and never informing H i =~ : fk ~ i Nosenko that I doubted him, I would have continued to milk him, ' i and. milk him. I would never have hired him as a consultant $e $96 ~25N§ as to the Agency or FRI, giving counterintelligence lessons and | i seeing people and personnel and having freedom of movement and! I that type. of thing. You see, under the National Security Act} : . i 20070 (2702) ee) | | { | { | | ! \ ! | | | | { : | of 1974 you have the implementing directives of NSCIDs, National | t i | } | i | | | oh Security Council Intelligence Directives which control and i : govern the interagency relationships. t | i { j ! Under that there is a NSCID specifically on defectors. For example, it advocates that vou must preserve the climate of t defection and so on. It goes on down and charges the BUPEDEING, WASHTHGTON, Ble, Central Intelligence Agency with the rehabilitation of aefec- | tors. Therefore, I would have rehabilitated him but without, REPORTERS one, giving him any information, I would work him out of his own nou, material, not give him anything new, I mean anything that | wasn't worked out of his own material. I would continue to i test question him and financially look after him and all of 300 PTH STRENT, oO that, but with nothing to be gained by learning anything about the Agency. f 4 Now in that same directive there are provisions made for i an inter-agency defector committee so that all components in the government have a right to use that asset for their own purposes. But the rehabilitation is strictly on the shoulders of the my ES oy NR i ; a SP TA dee 4 ALSESRSON RESORTING COMPaSY BW 50955 Bocld:322763411 Page 147 ari
re ba wi = 2 = a 4 = ~ ' wt . wt fo] -~ “ ' a * a / eer na =_ oO 2 = we oS ™ . * S + - foo = tm — iW S ad < — H 1 = : eee al f. = ws le ior] pad “ 3 = a we oma = . = ta io t = 7 on iw on iS ~ = wt + wt 17 ad Se ta Pd “e re = 19 ~ i pa “= oy 29 Ee hire: tS ite 2 ot aa ett : ne - ie a4 : ow aa HW 50955 Bocld: is-10 143 Director who also is empowered to do certain things with the Attorney General in terms of the status, citizenship, and bills in Congress and so on. | I will put it this way, the PBI was disseminating his reports.- I have to backtrack on this. It is very difficult to explain it. When McCone was before the hearings of the Church Committee he made the statement in an interview with Daniel Schorr that the material had not:.gone to the Warren Commission, or words to that effect, because there were doubts | t as to the bona fides of Nosenko. Rut that since then he had been i é i assured by the Agency or had been told by the Agency that the 8 bona fides had been established. When I heard this on television I immediately called the Agency and raised:a serious question | on how they could make a statement that his bona fides had been established. There was a lot of waffling on this. They said that had Heen accepted when Security took over, or words to that effect. So. 4 i , I called Tom Karamessines. I said, "What is your understanding of the status of the man Mosenko?" te said the man's bona : fides had not been established. So even in the PRI report | information disseminated by him was sourced as information from a KGB, or whoever they might put down there, whose bona fides had not been established. So that this was a determination hurried up by Colby and | i company because they had another embarrassment on their hands. , ' ALDESSON REPORTING COMPAMY
4 4 tet = 5 oN i ae wt 3 ~ ~ ZF oe mM . « apy 7 fond ~ 08 = co) te = ty — 4 a < = 32 z ; a 3 = = is ia a ae tome oe - . 2 = 3 a is ends = ° ~ hl fols -¢- o “ry oi ew HW 50955 DBoclId is-1l 144 They hac one journalist, TV commentator in Moscow, who had been named Sam Jaffee whose uncle was the famous Hollywood actar, i . } he was a great character actor. Nosenko had accused him, had | man in Moscow, and named his case officer. Jaffee got on this business and couldn't get jobs and therefore challenged the | ! Agency as to whether he was bona fide or not. So, Colby sent | him a letter stating that he wasn't a Pussian agent, et i t | | | | made the statement that he was a Soviet agent while he was a TV i H t | i | | | cetera. | i But the Bureau refused to give him such a letter. He is still running around. He has been on the Tomorrow Show anda |, lot of other things. So he is still in the woodwork. 1 Miss Brady. The next area I would go into would be the whole i initiation of the Hart report. I think at this point I am going to defer again to Micky and then we can arrange our own time, Mr. Angleton. Fine. Would you make a note there, that last questionnaire, to go back gain, because I want to make it more | cogent than it remains at this moment. 232263411 Page 149 a
LASFRANCE :msl ils is 4.3 4 ve) = = ow] we ot { a P wt GQ -~ ws , = 7 Sd 3 & a ~ : * “3 ¥ = . tA = ne; S ie = 7 _ a a = 1 1 ao = TA Fa te ae i) > = te ” re} Ate t See 13 n = 19 ~ nog “ -& 29 a cpeme el oe Sais mn sae wo, 4" io ae | a? an HW 450955 Booctld: i v i t t ' i it | } | ! i i i ? } | 32263411 Page 150 145 Miss Brady. What was the general purpose of the CI/SIG unit within the CI Staff? Mr. Angleton. The purpose of it basically was that the : | Office of Security has jurisdiction, the Director of Security | has jurisdiction over the physical installations of the Agency! i j and has sole possession of security files and is responsible for the security clearance of personnel. That is an exclusiv jurisdiction, ce Dn In any intelligence organization the most sensitive thing is the security file, particularly the CIA. It isa very | thorough thing from birth plus everything that every hostile | neighbor might have to say about somebody. Now, I set it up in 1954 for the purpose of, one, that | no one in the Counterintelligence, which is part of Clendes- tine Services, would ever have access to anybody's security. file. I chose an individual who had been ex-FBI and who had worked in the Office of Security as the man to run that com- ponent. So that I never had access to the secuirty files nor - dia anybody else. ; a , | But in the event that there was an allegation about an | employee, he could review with the Security Officer the entire file. But all that he would give to me or to any of my sub- ordinates would be purely any relevant extract from that file | Which pertained to the lead as a way of sanitizing, I mean of : ' | keeping inviolable the security file. Now, that was one of COMPANY
b > us CI/SIG make reference to these various organizational functions? . 146 | their functions. | © 4 Second, prior te this there was no place in the govern- | 2 | ment where you could find a list of defectors from the United 4 | Staten Normally that should have fallen on the FBI to keep 2 5 | a list of all defectors and so on. So when I took over the | Z s | Counterintelligence, my whole thing first was to build up a : 3 | data base and all those gaps in government that one could x : | find where you should have counterintellicence coverage and | “ +i that was, for example, among other things, all the German | : 13 captured documents. : a 7 | Miss Brady. Have you finished with your answer? : 2 ‘2 | Mr. Angleton. No, I am just saying -- you were asking 2 1 for the functions of the SIG and I was tryina to explain what : 5 = rs they are. | : al Miss Brady. Yes, I asked for. the functions in general | : té , terms and your answer was responsive. - : >. 7 Mr. Angleton. It is not responsive because it had many - i ia duties that had to do with other categories of sensitive cases. : : involving Americans and other things which were not being : a | handled by anybody else or just falling between stools and | so on. : Ma) 22 " Miss Brady. Would the organizational cnarter of the a 2 Zi Mr. Angleton. It would probably in fairly camouflaced H OED RE. i . ALUERSON RESCRTING CCMaaNY HW 50955 Docld:32263411 Page 151 3
147 terms, yes. It was not a unit, however, wiose duties were in other words, explained to people. I mean, in training school > i) is Miss Brady. Let me show you a number 758. This is an ' e _ opening request form. Byt that I mean it is a form to request’ the opening of a 201 file. I ask you to review that particular | 34 and so on it was very much fuzzed over if anyone was laying 4 ; i 4 out the CI Staff... ; | | = 7 Miss Brady. Can you state with certainty that one of a i , a 5 | the essential functions of the CI/SIG unit was to maintain i | ~ > | . . . S 7 | a current list of American defectors to other countries? | ~ i ; e ai Mr. Angleton. It would fall within that but there was 3 34 never, it was only until after the assassination that the = rg | major effort was done to try to get all this. It was also Ss i H e 7 | = | to do all the defectors from the Soviet Bloc which had never aa i a a | : = a been done. = re Miss Brady. Prior to the assassination this was not one ¢ Zou f of the general purposes of the CI/SIG unit? bad ‘t : £ ois) Mr. Angleton. I can't say that for a certainty. I can't = Ie say it for a certainty because it had so many duties. This “wT f time you are referring to -- to come back to reality, the - a : : = 43 | heaviest burden on them was Mr. "X", Golitzin, because there a4 i ‘ = 3 were bodies of sensitive intelligence that as far:'as I know ~ if : i < 30 | have never been disclosed running into thousands of pages of | . , ewe 1 | hard documents relating to Soviet intelligence, and they were Sa 22! also primarily responsible for that. i i i HW 40955 Docld:329963411 Page 159
148 form. Mr. Angleton. Yes. ir] t.3 Miss Brady. First, I would like to ask you the following question. According to this document the file was opened be Z 5 in December of 1960. Earlier I showed you a State Department | 5 4 telegram reporting Oswald's intention to provide the Soviets 2 ~— 5 7 with military intelligence. That document was dated October | 3S 5 31, 1959. It has been alleged by critics of the Warren : : 7; Commission that there is something unusual about the delayed | : '¢ 1 Opening of the 201 file. : E } : In your opinion, is there anything unusual about the | = i : 2 delayed opening of the 201 file? | 2 19: Mr. Angleton. That date again is what? : = 4 8 Zou | Mr. “Goldstith.October 31, 1959. ! : ss Mr. Angleton. What time was it received by Egeter? | g 1é Mr:'Goldsmith. the earlier telegram is dated October 31,. ‘ 17 | 1959, This is dated December 1960, more than a year later. | : iad Is There anything unusual about that apparent delay in the > : : 19 opening of the 201 file? | | é 22 | Mr. Angleton. Was she the only recipient of that tele- : H i 318 gram? : re : , ws - oa. , aw 22 i Mr. Goldsmith. The telegram does not indicate who was the recipient. In fact, I think it went to the Security Office. Mr. Angleton. Normally there is a cover sheet, a 2 = i registry. When that telegram comes in ~-- let me see that HW 50955 Bocld: 322763411 Page 153
~ de Hv Ww = § = = aN t 2 P wa 3S ~ ~ cond oa 7 ad iad a = - = ms . 5 2 7 oS * a = ee) oS < = 4 4 < = 12 te <3 = = = 12 2 a) ‘eae - = = ta a a ed 4 = le ee) re ‘at = 12 bee = > = 4a = S a pony iz £ 1 ~ c « a 29 “7 Etre aa Bt nee. i ae) ene = 50955 Bocld: 149 telegram again. In other words, the procedure, when that telegram came in from Moscow that would go to the Soviet Division who should: have the action on that telegram. It would have probably gone to the Office of Security simply because of the relation-' ship between the Security Office -- Mr..Goldsmith In fact, this document was obtained from the Security Office. Mr. Angleton. I am trying to reconstruct what the internal dissemination was. It micht well have gone to liaison of some sort. We had a lot of liaison. But the action on that telegram would have been the Soviet Division to open a 201 file. MrsGoldsmith. Again, my question isiwhy-would it have taken more than a year to open the file on Oswald. Is there anything unusual in your view? - Mr. Angleton. I don't know the circumstances. I don't understand why it would take that long. In my view that should have hit the Soviet Division pretty hard. Mri Goldsmith. Why would CI?SIG have responsibility for opening the 201 file on Oswald at this tine? | Mr. Angleton. That is what confuses me a bit, and I am confused here because if there was anyone more meticulous that I ever ran across it was Miss Egeter. | : i Mr. Goldsmith. Let me give you some bacxground information.: 322763411 Page 154
“ a zi = wa = x a = ™ 1 a 4 wi ~ ~ : = 7 — x Fi os 3 ~ . a *S ? « tA = by = =~ a pel vd ~ vi = = ay “a = “ Mae « int 74 eh : : on a ke te a a > _ x od rE ls = - = = 13 a = 13 Pa i, ~ = J an 5 29 val ene atl Sp A cS o- aN, 34 ~ a? a? i os _ HW 350955 DBocld: or 150 According to the record, in late October of late 1960 the Agency received from the Department of State a list of defectors. I am referring now to CIA number A-21 and A~22. A-22 has Oswald's. name on it. You might want to read this letter, A-21, skim it. Mr. Angleton. I see that. » Mr.. Goldsmith. Now, this information was all routed to CI/SIG apparently but until today -- Mr. Angleton. Is there a routing slip? ‘xr. Goldsmith. I am sorry, Mr. Angleton. For that document! you are looking at right now, we don't have a routing slip. I guess you will have to take my word for the record. Mr. Angleton. All I am saing is that we had so many cifficulties with Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans that I am amazed it actually came to us. Mr.siGoldsmith. According to the Agency's records, these letters were routed to your office in 1960, late October 1960. Approximately. a month later the file was opened. However, until. you testified earlier, no one hac really indicated to us that one of the purposes of the CI/SIG was to monitor defectors. Mr. Angleton. It was to build up the most sensitive cases on Americans. I have to explain two things hwere which | I don't think are clear and are the most sensitive of all things. Number one, are the tarnscripts of thousands of pages: SsGael ALIGSSOM REPORTING COMPAALY © 32969411 Page 155 a
151 of the Golitzin interrogations which included the interroga- i . . ; . tions by fove to seven other services, Foreign Services, the . i i id condition of their having access to him was that they give us | da. copies of all of their own interrogations. So we are running | & ire] ts record here ~~ Mr.: Goldsmith. Sure. off the record. 3 (Off the record discussion) | 7 into thousands of pages with only a few personnel, very few : 5 6) personnel. : 8 7 In addition to that, there were several thousand of the : x 2 most sensitive kinds of documents of Russian origian with | ~ 3 | cryptonyms of agents in which part of their task with another | - | person was to try to make identifications of these people who | S 4 E Hn | were Soviet agents both here and in Western Europe. ! 2 | So that this was totally unknown, let us put it that : 2 a | way, unless the people had special clearances. But the action = 4 £ = ta of anyone, whether he is a defector or not, qoes with the | : al geographic area. In other words, the person who is supposed ; : 7 to open up a 201 file is supposed to be the person whose . a 7 geographic area it pertains to. = 4 a ‘Mr.’ Goldsmith’. SR, for example? : 2 ae Mr. Angleton. Yes, the persons in Moscow. They are the : | ones who have assets. They have people in the Embassy. Ours | eet rode piggyback on everything else that everybody else was | ES 2! doing. Also, if we had an intercept -- can I go off the | | erps ALISA SON BEEORT “a NG a oil FREY HW 30955 DBocld: 32263411 Page 156
152 Mr. .Goldsmith. On the record, By opening Oswald's 201 file and marking it restricted | é would that normally mean that if someone else in the Agency ae requested access to the file, Miss Egeter or someone else ho ta : 7 in the CI/sIG unit would be notified? | 3 3 Mr. Angleton. It is not a question of marking it : S 7 restricted so much. It is a question that if she entered, i “ z | without knowing any of the circumstances, if she opened up : ; 9 a 201 file with her name and her extension and all of that, : : 2 it would be there so that anyone in registry could call to | 2 Wd her attention the fact that the Uganda Desk did or whatnot , 2 tn was asking for the file or had submitted something. . | . = In| Mr..Goldsmith.Would that be done as a matter of routine ! O 5 td ‘Or only if she marked the file as restricted? : “ a : is Mr. Angleton. I can't really. answer that question. There : ee is a book about that thick on registry procedures. Sometimes . 7 | there is a notice in there, a piece of paper which says any | : 7 inquiry on this should be reported to so and so on extension : : 19 so and SO. So the case officer can then call that person and € ‘a | say "What is your interest in that case?" That is the only - poe 2! means of making sure that someobyd who is sitting way up in | OSS - #29 22 | this section immediately is notified of some new information that the case has been working on that no one was believed to know about, that something has hit registry. bh Mr.. Goldsmith. Would a 201 file always indicate the fact ay WW 50955 BDocld: 322763411 Page 157
« i 3 4 = wy a = = s pool - ~ t wt 3 ~ ~ : o me 7 See oe R e or ~ . A ian) 7 - = . af = iQ = = = S pra ry pany ba = a aie = .“ 4 ae ic = a be em = = ba * on . & 7 = ta 2 ce ”_ o = 4 - = “oT « Sad et +, Sia wn = 7 = o * S 20 aN we fe i BW 50955 Doctld: 32963411 Page 158 153° of an Agency relationship between an individual and the CIA | if in fact there was such a relationship? | Mr. Angleton. It could and many of them do. The general rule is that the hard file, the file kept by the case officer / would be the file that would show any relationship to the . | Agency. Mr.: Goldsmith. That is the soft file, is it not? Mr. Angleton. No, the soft one is the 201, unless I am getting my terminology confused. | Mri Goldsmith. The hard copy would be the official Agency copy whereas the soft copy would be the one maintained by the | case officer? oe | Mr. Angleton. Right. In other words, I kept thinking of soft in terms of not as important. “tn any event, I always thought the soft file was the one with a lot of material missing. That is what I am trying to get. Mr. Goldsmith. We need not spend much time on the distinc- tion between soft and hard. Let us talk in terms of the one that the case officer ‘Maintained and the onethat is maintained in registry. The one that is maintined in registry, I take it, does not have all the materials, is that correct? Mr. Angleton. Not where there is a special interest in that person, I mean where it is still an active case or where | somebody has a particular interest. % i 4 Nee: Sa can id ALIDEM.ZON REPORTING COMPARLY
10 154 Mr..Goldsmith. That information would be in the file main-~ : tained by the case officer? bo as Mr. Angleton. That is right. Mr.iGoldsmith. How would someone actually get access to de I would like to refer you to the card on the top of the page | which is marked “Secret Eyes'Only" and has Oswald's name on | Z 3 the file maintained by the case officer? : S | Mr. Angleton. By registry telling him that "TE you want : 3 7 to know anything more you have to call so and so on extension S 3 so and so," and there may be a lecitimate interest and he | os a J 3 would permit him to read it. It might be a superior interest | : 3 and the file gets transferred to the next fellow. ! i i Mr." Goldsmith. Let me show you CIA 943. This is a xeroxed , 12 copy of some index cards that were found in Oswald's 201 file. i i I i ¢) it also. It makes reference to CI project/RE. The date is 4 aa REPORTERS BULLDING, WASHINGTON, © November 1959. Do you know what that would be referring to?: “ FS Mr. Angleton. These were in. what? : 13 | Mr..Goldsmith. Oswald's 201 file. The Cormittee is speci~ | a so i z 15 | fically interested in whether Oswald was the subject of any 2 é 29 : CI project. By that, was he actually a participant or was he | ; eee 7 under surveillance by any CI project? eal i : i Mr. Angleton. I wouldihave to go back into all the symbol's t & RK 43 that they used down there to understand "RE" unless it had i something to do with defectors. 3 ’ “> 4 Mx. Goldsmith. Was there a special project group in the ‘ OLEES3ON REPORTING COMPANY HW 50955 Bocld:32263411 Page 1459
oe ba el = = = ~ me ' wn : wa co] ~ ~ : Fad ° os i tet sid a 2 3 ~ . “ SS ? — ~ ts = 4 S el = fi a i = n “a = 4 ia ~ ce = cong 4 a iS | z inal Pas = & 13 = iw = > = ts 1S = = cad = ., = i2 ad 7] = is = i? ~ ce 7 34 = Zid AT gs Ore aac naan OSS fe SET py er.) Womens os oN am a ae =e ire) aes HW 50955 DBocld ba 155 CI Staff? Mr. Angleton. I think that was another name for SIG at one time. Mr... Goldsmith. To your knowledge, was Oswald ever the subject of any CIA project? Mr. Angleton. No. Mr.’ Goldsmith. Do you know R E ey Mr. Angleton. Yes. Mr.’ Goldsmith. Do you know what responsibilities he had? Mr. Angleton. Yes, mail intercept. Mrs: Goldsmith. Now, this card has the initials "RE" on it.” cept. Mr....Goldsmith. H. T. Lingual program? Mr. Angleton. Yes. That explains a lot because he probably passed that to Egeter. Mrs. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Agency ever had had experience with case officers setting up ficticious 201's, fake 201 files? Mr. Angleton. When you say fake what do you mean? Mr.*Goldsmith. For example, in the case of a project file you might set up a project file indicating that the project was intended to serve one purpose when it was actually intended to serve another, by way of example? eTpRr organ! LUOTEP SON REPORTING COMBAALY 232263411 Page 160 Mri--Goldsmith.. It could be, it is probably a mail inter- | i Is it possible that it is making reference to that individual?) |
12 4 156 ; 2 | Mr. Angleton. That is possible. ii i ae 2 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any projects. where that r - | was done? 4 Mr. Angleton. I can't off hand think of them but I know | = 7 there might be cases where the sensitivity of the case was | ~ | ; 5 5 | so that you either would not open up a 291 file because the : ; | very existence of the name of the person in the file would : x :! disclose ~- say there was an illegal that had been identified, ; 3 the very fact that you have a file with an illegal's name ! : ra | has destroyed your case. | S g no! Mr’. Goldsmith. So it was, I take it, then, accepted Agency 2 - EYractice under certain circumstances to either not open a : od file at all or if you were to open one, oven it under some- | what misleading circumstances? Mr. Angleton. I think so. Wey KEPOMUTEES RULLDING, é Mr.: Goldsmith. Were you familiar at alliwith YR RIFLE 1s 4 47 | program? | a i oe = iB Mr. Angleton. Only from listening to testimony on the | = 13) radio. é 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any active involvement | , . ! ‘ . : ; : 21 with Mr. William Harvey in regard to that program? fey IDS Mr. Angleton. No. 8 av) ti Mr: Goldsmith. Did you know Harold Swensson? 24 Mr. Angleton. I know who he is, Hal Swensson. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you consider him to be a reliable i Sas eR fh eel dON REPORTING COMPAR + HW 30955 Docld: 32263411 Page 161
KB a 4 = A > rey = = o - fiat t wo et =" os . a = me / et = “ a Pond co ow . “4 rans ? om = oA = he S ao SZ = ft ran a = wy < = 7A 4 oe = pet ied 2 ed o_ _ ~ = ta i - raat & rs Fowl lw 3 = rood = Tan iz?) ~ ~ a iF a ia = & ad oat = 1g z= 7 ~ a = oc oy Ss 0 “ é} ni aaa *} States tae can Ls, ey 22 ao aA aw mE HW 50955 Bocld: 13 individual? Mr. Angleton. City station? Mr. Angleton. — Mr” Angleton. Mr.. Angleton. Mr. Angleton. bit of a romantic. forward fellow who 32263411 Page 162 friend of Harvey's and well reaqarded. business with him. Mr. .Goldsmith. What were her responsibilities in recall, and to Bill Harvey. may have been ex-FBI. I am not certain. He was a great Mr. :Goldsmith. Did you know Ann Goodpastor?: Yes. She was very close to Win Scott, as I imers. I can't tell you exactly, but there was bound to be someone very sensitive. Mr...Goldsmith. Do you know if she in fact was Win Scott's right hand person in Mexico City? . I don't know. I know tuat she is, I personally have had very little dealings witn here but my men had had a lot of dealings with her. She was always in on very sensitive cases. Mr... Goldsmith. Do you know David Phillips? Yes. “'. What is your opinion of his reliability? I have always regarded him as a little I think he is a very honest, straight~-— is not really much of a professional. I I never had any real the Mexico Mr. Angleton. He was down in the Argentine. I think he | ? j } I mean, she knew'a lot of the ‘old ‘
158 think he is a very decent, upright, forthright person. But I don't think any subtleties of the business ever penetrated, > Cee) Mr.iGoldsmith. Do you know an individual named Maurice 4 | Bishop? “a I = 3) Mr. Angleton. No. * 5 | Mr.: Goldsmith. Have you ever heard reference to the term j : = 37 “Black Tape 201 File? 2 ws 3 | Mr. Angleton. No. co 4 Mr.’ Goldsmith. Did you know Paul Harman? : io | Mr. Angleton. Very well. = rt Mr..Goldsmith. Will you give us your opinion as to his => ow i reliability? 2 i = in Mr. Angleton. Very high. Paul is a person who fell on 6 = oot | bad times when he was running operations in the German Divi- = 1; | sion or something when I salvaged him. = | Mr. Goldsmith. How many years did he work on your staff? : i ; “ iT Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It seemed like eternally = ia | but it wasn't. It was many years. I regard him as a very = 13 | unique individual. < 23 | Of course, Paul was trained by Rocca to begin with and | : _—_ 71} that is very important because he learned everything from ea/7 2 Rocca. He is the only man I ever knew in the Clendestine bh 4.5 Service who never failed you on tracking down something or finding it, whether it is a system in the Library of Congress; & é G as -in other words, he made discoveries which had been there had ECRET Se RON ORTING COMPAN HW 50955 Bocld: 32263411. Page 163 " Oo col ag? tua RE
15 159 the Agency ever known it was there for anyone if they had the | 2 | imagination, the drive, the tctal dedication htat he had. ; | Therefore, he made tremendous breakthroughs of bringing us i | the efforts and labors of other people in government at no > zs i cost. i i j a 5 | Mr. Goldsmith. Did he have a good memory? - 1] S | Mr. Angleton. A tremendous memory. : - | . . - . | a a Mr.°Goldsmith. was he a record retrieval expert? = i 2g i Mr. Angleton. He was. He was a bird dog. _ na Mr.’.Goldsmith. Mr. Angleton, that just about exhausts my = 1; | Questions. I would like to thank you very much for your ‘nn ; ; : $ 2 | assistance today. a H = a) Mr. Angleton. Thank you. 8 z ta Mr.. Goldsmith. I also would like to add that normally when : = i ; a ots | the Committee takes a statement from a witness at a hearing, z 1 at the conclusion of the hearing, the witness is given an 4 aoa Opportunity to make a statement. This is not a formal hearing: - = 13 | and the same procedure does not autimatically apply. However, : = 19 | if you would like to take advantage of the opportunity to make: e 30 | a five minute statement for the record, please feel free to om head i] . 31 do so. : “ee 20 Also he is coming back another day to finish my questions, | By 23 Mr. Angleton. I simply want to recapitulate this would z+ 1 have been the end of my session had it not been for the surprise witness, John Hart. I don't think I can let 31 years: BW 50955 Bocld: 32263411 Page 164
16 160 of my life go down the drain listening to Hart: So that I will be back when I have annotated what I regard to be one of the worst torpedoes that the Director has launched into the depths and has missed the target and it may make a U turn. fay 1 | “ 2 . M4 = g I use nautical terms because he has been launching a lot of ny . | a ¢ | torpedoes in a very brief career. HI ~ i = if ; 2 * ° , < 7 4 So I will go on record with all my observations regarding} Hi “ 3) that and I want to point out first, so that you will under- = = 3 stand the depths of my feeling, that I was not notified by i or) the Committee and I was not notifed by the Agency that Mr. Hart was going to appear and therefore I had a great deal of ; i { 5 ' i i t { i personal troubles that came about as a result of that surprise testimony which I had not heard. It involves the reputations RUTELDING, WASHTUGTON, 2D. €. ef a great number of men. Number one, the CI Staff did not have any jurisdiction dar REPORTERS ~« ever Nosenko. The CI Staff was never involved in any of the | fe) a a administrative details, payments or whatever. Contrary to = ia) Hart's statement, I never saw the installation or visited the ; = 19 |} installation with the Chief of the Soviet Division, which he : é 29 | states as a categorical fact in his testimony. 1 : cone iI onever was consulted regarding hostile interrogation, ESS" : ean > od 22 | to which I am very much opposed. I don't mean by that torture b> as i ' Ox anything else. I mean alerting Nosenko that there are 7 | suspicions regarding his testimony. That is totally contrary : | | } f to my philosophy of counterintelligence. So that it was a COME aS Y HW 50955 Bocld:32263411 Page 165
1? 16] frolic of others. But I do not stand aside from those others | 2 because all those decisions went up through the channels of iF 8.3 command and were made and therefore I stand by what the 5 | nl | ultimate decisions were. ae ' i} i | | i ' i i = : But he coalesced this into an accusation against the S 5 | Counterintelligence that has no foundation whatwoever. He was i s 7 | permitted to give that testimony in public and in that way he - & | has hurt a great number of people. I won't go into the big 3 2 impact it had on my personal family and friends. Therefore, - = 19 | I want to be responsive to that. ! Ss , | My hope had always been with the Church Committee that oc CoG a = 2 | these matters would be pursued as they said they would be : i “e : ited a ; = 2 | pursued when they turned the files over to the Senate . | 8 z 4 Intelligence Committee. It was to be a continuity of. these i i . = tg | matcers that would be followed up. There has never been. = ra7 ‘I’might also add if the Admiral had any judgment in my | _ if a 7 | view, he would have called together people who were familiar S 13 with these cases, with Hart present, and he would have hada . = 1g il normal discussion or conference with them and I don't think he = 20 | would have put Hart up there for testimony. Because I ~~ 2! ; question, one, Hart's qualifications, his first job having cal 72) been as a very junior subordinate under mef I know | 4 t , : 22} his career. I have been on all the senior promotion boards from the very beginning and therefore, his file has crossed my path many, many a time. a LEED oMP any HW 350955 Docld:32263411 Page 166
tap $e ws = Bt ~ 2 aN \ ro) ’ st g Caml ~ — ” oe f od os 3 om = o yy . a £3 a . a ~ [9 = Pal Ey o =~ ' oy “. = 74 Me, . isd = i 12 = < = Z ts wi i + Fal cad 4 S a m= ay ro) Ts vi 7 - = 4. ‘ 13 ~ ice = 1s = 3 = o S 20 ay fw ! ee ad ES rm! i Lae 37 ae ess fae HW 50955 Bocld: 32263411 Page 167 162 He was a Colby man when he was put in. He was put in i by Colby's successors. He was brought in a case for which he aid not have the slightest qualifications or knowledge. Therefore, those are my feelings about it. I never have brought attorneys to this meeting or consulted about attorneys) in terms of my original meeting with Miss Brady until all ! these doors were opened. Now, it is a question of who is going to close those doors because there is also Mr. "x" who resides in this country who listened to the stuff about his psychiatric conditions and whatnot, his paranoid condition. I think the Bureau showed great wisdom when they refused to send somebody because these are all continuing cases. Just! gecause there is no directory, no chief counterintelligence has changed, it has changed none of the basic counterintelli- gence functions and the counterintelligence challenges that exist today. They didn't show me the Colby manuscript but they shewed it to everybody else before they cleared it. Had Tt seen it I would have given them information which Colby omitted from t d his book and they would have seen that they could not clear his book because it was a distortion of classified information. So there is a whole series of things which I may find necessary to take up with the President's Oversight Committee | before this is all over. © |
q oe Hl 4 HT 2 if | $ 4 if ~ | i I ! 2 | 7 wo = s s ~ if : he = if wt o y wt ior | h ~  . ft oS 7 ou “~ f if u eg] = ~ 8 ~ : ty . aod @ cant : i fend i 4 = en — oil = H Soop: i — bo i = ! > ra it tae { ts y = i eee te _— ta] ~ il = u = 44 ay iW = i Sos 4 S +20 il Pomel iow H 2 : dome . = me rf = i H A - iH od iu = 5 ie oy = | in ra i = 2 4 tee : i ™ i | < 4 ae 25% ay : a! ay / fF BY a HW 50955 Bocld:32263411 Page 166 IH oO 163 I don't want to end by throwing an apple of discord but I really do say that the judement factors that have been involved here are open to very serious question. “Mes Goldsmith. Thank you very much for your statement. I am sure that Miss Brady will give you an opportunity to communicate on the record your opinion on this matter. Mr. Angleton. Thank you very much. Whereupon, at 5145 p.m, the taking of the deposition was recessed, to be resumed at a time mutually agreed upon between counsel.)
Hy “ a 4 s ww = E. pay ~ ~ t wt wt fo} a ™~ Fond - ~ é ee ™ 3 Femad we cand ™ . a a y ~ = « ta = a = ~ GS = rt ay ni oy oom = 32 <2 = oe 1s Pad te toe = nod Toa os a - 13 = bw Zo, Lie ~ > in ~ 7TH STREET, ta id a aan > ed oni ee nd fe 2 as 4 SOS55 6 a} a} dag Doctld: t fl t t 32263411 Page 169 Angleton on this 164 have read the foregoing pages 1 through 155, inclusive, which | contain a correct transcript i of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded. Signature is subject to corrections. (Deponent's signature I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that I am notarizing and witnessing the signature for the deposition of James day of ie Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia My Commission expires hel Sw Sa Ek ALDERSON REFORTIN tes ete ST oe as C3 , ' i ' i ' : | i
HW 50955 4 & wt 2 g S - ™ i. wt * wt o ~ ~ oS a a / Sea nN 3 = 3 land oN . _ Cd ¥ a = ta = ad S & = of) a < = = iy . = hoe ¢ o_ bw Sal = = = ra = = Ff 1g = Aw n = ta x 4 3 — = aA ott j « ~ = 14 - at ~ ta = i? ~ ao a S 20 BDocld 21 165 CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC: I, Albert Joseph LaFeance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was | taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and there- after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said deposition is a true record of the testimony give by said witness; that Iam neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this ceposition was taken; and further that I am not.a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the out- ! come of the action. Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia My Commission expires November 14, 1980 232263411 Page i70