104-10302-10023]. TOP SECRET (Security Classification) NAME AND ADDRESS DATE WINITIAL ACTION | __FDIREGT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL |__| DISPATCH RECOMMENDATIO |__| | COMMENT ee ee |__ [INFORMATION |__| SIGNATURE . CONTROL NO... ¥ coPpy___ ___FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO DATE Handle Via —COMINT Channeis Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions i TOP SECRET (Security Classification)
13-00000 . wwe veers .. yee nee ae ee : FORM HO. iol REPLACES FORM 10-101 t AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED. Oe eet ae
- Cae TOP SECRET : “pens The Johnson Era @2rizs For most employees of the Federal government, work continues unchanged when a new President moves into the White House. Employees of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Labor-Management Services Administration, or the Commodity Exchange Authority all go about their jobs in their ac- customed ways, though changes of administration policy can ultimately have an effect. Even the pattern of most intel- ligence work--collection and the production of finished intelligence for a considerable number of officials--remains undisturbed. But for these who are turning out intelligence specifically for the President, everything is apt to change as soon as a new Chief Executive takes over. How wide- ranging will the new President's interest in foreign countries and in international relations be? Hew much appetite will he have fcr intelligence? * Will large and frequent. servings be in order, or modest portions only as absolutely required? Will he want merely facts, or facts plus interpretation and analysis? Separated or homogenized? Is he willing to read a regular intelligence document, or does he prefer to be briefed? In each of the previous administrations, OCT had established a satisfactory channel directly to the President. Hewever, ibe System had never Carrici ever frem ane ince hy TOP SECRET 5 a
ad ‘ . ; TOP SECRET to the next. Uisenhcwer did not want the personal weekly briefing frem the Director that Truman hed received; the _ rely on the Le ees es weekly General preferred meetings of the National Security Council. Kennedy did not like to use the NSC with any regularity. Instead he found just what he wanted in the personal, daily intelligence Checklist devised for him five months after he entered office. The Checklist system worked so well with Kennedy that OCI and the Director naturally honed to continue it with Lyndon Johnson, especially as it became apparent that Johnson, like his predecessor, was not going to have reqular NSC meetings. Uventually OCI succeeded, hut after many -months cf frustration. Jt was only when he had a firm hold of his administration and when certain foreign situations forced themselves upon his attention that President Uchnson discovered the usefulness of a dailv current intelligence document. ; . For a few days after the assassination of President Kennedy, R. J. Smith took the Checklist to DCI McGone at East Building at 8:30 a.m. The Director then held a staff meeting, after which R. J. Smith versonallyv took the Checklist to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton in the White House. The briefing of Presicent Johnson from the Checklist, however, was done by McCone, who saw the President daily for - ; a . Ue? about three weeks after the assassination. 3/ TOP SECRET ‘ oa
TOP SECPET Although oct had provided more detail and background information than usual in its first intelligence hooks for President Jchnson, McCone on 24 November passed the word through DDI Cline that there should ke rore but shorter items. McCone said the Fresident expected that topics appearing in the Checklist would be followed up in later issues; therefore, OCI should make even negative reports. Ga that day; Cline said that the Checklist should cover wilitary activity in South Vietnam, the fighting in Laos, Soviet ICBM developments, and problems in the Berlin air ‘corridors and Venezuela. Cn 5 December, the President held a meeting cf the NSC eacers Pitre eiteaane ee SON Satis aN eT OC Rak AOD to which the chairmen and of the leading Congressional committees were invited. Most of the guests. - had to be hurriedly briefed on COMINT. Clinton P. Conger, Chief of OCI's Presentations Branch and the office's briefing drafter, put together the intelligence presentation on the Soviet military position, which was presented by CCI McCone. Conger was present at the briefing to handle the charts on ” the easel. Before the meeting started, the President gave a nod and in came his photographer, Okimoto. He began shooting pictures left and right. McCone was aghast, finally ' looking around at Conger, who had ‘managed to turn over a map of the Soviet ICBM sites before the first picture was ~ taken. A week later there was similar NSC meeting on China. TOP SECRET \ ¥ >
Johnson did rot have a large number of NSC meetings, but ‘when he did they ncermallv began with. an intelligence briefing, usually prepared by Conger on the basis of - materials frem OCI, OSR, and OER, as appropriate. “&7/ Around the middle cf December, when McCone stopped seeing the President daily, the White House staff tried to get _the President to read the Checklist. They were largely unsuccessful, although McGeorge Bundy was able to do some oral briefing, Checklist in hand. On 16 December, Gen. Clifton told OCI's John Heidemann, "If we can't penetrate this sort of wall today or tomorrow, we'll just have to try something else." Cecasionally things went well. On the 18th, Clifton said that the staff had finally managed to get _the President to read "the books"~~probably two or three issues. . At Christmastime, the President went to his Texas ranch and shortly after Christmas had Chancellor Erhard as a visitor for several days. The PICU was cabled to the ranch each day. The report was limited to notes covering important developments and any information that micht be useful in the: talks with Erhard. The President returned to Washingtcn or. 5 January, and the next day Gen. Clifton, who had been at the ranch, told leidemann that he had been able to get the Checklist to the President with some regularity once Erhard ae had gone. TOP SECRET
13-00000 . ae TOP SECRET On @ January, however, Clifton was having difficulties _ again--the President had not read the intelligence document — since leaving Texas. Clifton thought there would be a little let-up in the press of business after that day's State of the Union speech. He asked Philip Kennedy for a special report, briefly treating important and still-current: problems that were covered in the bcoks the President hadn't read. Clifton thought, in fact, that it would be good to try the system of giving the President a summary of signi- ficant intelligence twice a week. OCI auickly put together an experimental President's Intelligence Review, covering the period 4-9 January. This was taken by Richard Lehman, Assistant for Special Frojects, to Gen. Clifton on 9 January. Clifton thought the Review was the best solution to the problem of the President's — intelligence reading. He and Bunay were agreed that the President would not accept a daily intelligence briefing. The President had instructed Clifton that the DCI was to see him whenever he wished but that otherwise the President relied on Bundy and Clifton to stay on top of the intelligence. Because the President was likely to ask them with no warning for the latest word, the daily Checklist had to continue. Clifton suggested that the Checklist periodically include a : ‘ a ° 2 | ‘special blue~ or green-bordered page containing an operational ro $2 report. 2/ we
° ‘ a RSs TOP SECRET The next morning Gen. Clifton called Lehman to report that the White House was very pleased with the Review, and wanted it continued. It had been tried on the President at breakfast ana it ha¢d "worked like a charm." By Because the President was not reading the Checklist every day, DCI McCone wanted it sent to a few more high- levél officials beyond the small circle of readers in Kennedy's time--the Secretaries of State and Nefense, McGeorge Bundy at the White House, and the Chairman of : the Joint Chiefs. Therefore he cbhtained permission in February to extend the dissemination to four additional top officials in the State Department, two mere in Defense, ‘one on the Joint Chiefs staff, plus the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General. ‘¢/ Besides doing the semi-weekly Review and the PICL, . OCI was writing memoranda in response to reauests from the White House staff, and DCI McCone was briefing the President from time to time. The Checklist writers still took the publication to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton each_morning™ and received their comments, plus occasional playback from the President. When unusually interesting items in the PICL -eaught his eye, Clifton would make a point of bringing them to the President's attention. on 21 January, for example, he was taken with an item featuring quotable statements by oa TOP SECRET :
13-00000 ~ _ . TOP SECRET Khrushchev. (For exarple, the Soviet chairman had been bragging about new rockets, but said, "All the same, you cannot put a recket intc soup.") A few days later, when it looked as though war would break out on Cyprus at any time Gespite a strong US mediation effort, Clifton instructed OCI to keep the White House "un to the minute" on develop- ments. "Hours will make the difference," he said. Gen. Clifton told James Hanrahan on 28 January that he had talked with the President about the Intelligence _ Review and Mr. Johnson had saic it was just fine. He found it a very valuable supplement to his occasional briefings from the DCI and he wanted it continued without change. On 25 March the President's plans to spend a weekend in Texas prompted Gen. Clifton to comment that Mr. Johnson read his intelligence while at the ranch; he was often up and asking for it by @:15 a.m. But it was hard to catch him in Washington. The next day Clifton said that it was not necessary for the OCI representatives to meet him at 9:30 a.m, the book did not move upstairs that fast. He asked that the meetings take place at 10 in the future. Early in 1964, the President drew his ‘aides Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti into the intelligence picture. He wanted one of them present when he read the Review at breakfast and he was reported occasionally as discussing Checklist ~ items with them. Although the PICL writers continued to ae) ’ TOP SECRET