{1078 ~C¢ _ EO Pe ees ee Ww 55072 — 10, 11. 12. 13. 14, 15, {16. 17. 18, 19, ECLTION 107 i INFORMANTS{AND CONFIS ¢° SOURCES] Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ-— ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization, In the past such ‘contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail~ able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage ment, Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions, With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than heve an Agent originate the contact. After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an indus- trial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is fecing the possibility of dis-— missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant, At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered, Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ— uals merely registered but never became active Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable, Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact, fficials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. 8. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed init: U, 8. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to 2 foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105X%,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)]j INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL [ SECURIT TY ] INFORMANTS When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant pur-~ poses, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the 1. 2. 3. SAU a Doold: 325895259 Page i381 ° : 5 following: ; Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of 2 subversive nature Biscreet canvass of other informants to ascertain if the potential inform ant is known to current informants of your office Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain infornation concerning the individ wal'ts personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and pa employments, and business connections, Background investigation must | definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or wnreliability. Securing background. information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation, . : . , Check of Local credit and arrest records, Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi- fication Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant, Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran Cheek draft status or status in the armed forces reserve, Demestis. status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained. 4 2~12--50
. . a . Sn eee ees {107B ~ Cc SECTION 107. o:) INFORMANTS [ AND a | SOURCES] . ‘ow - 9, Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with . Communist Party functionaries 10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed ) personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ~ ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization, In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail~ able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage ment. 31. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist~dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions, 12. With régard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather - than have an Agent originate the contact. i ‘13. <After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an indus— 7 ' trial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants ! when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dis~ missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At 'y such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that i the person advise the Bureau of his past activities, Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered, : 14, Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ “t . . uals merely registered but never became active _: ~15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform- . i. - ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to ! furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact. { (16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. 8. t i7. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat [ 18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the J, S, . [ 19, (Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are { in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who 3 { Will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the 4 [. Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.)] {C, INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL[ SECURITY ]INFORMANTS When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant pur~ poses, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following: ° -1. Ghesk of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature 2. Discreet canvass of other informants to ascertain if the potential inform ant is known to current informants of your office 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individ— ualts personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotisn, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past enploymernts, and business connections, Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassmeat due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established ‘by the investigation, 4, Check of Local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for , the completion of an FD-~9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi- fication Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant. 5. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran, 6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve, 7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be . obtained, SEL irene ? al 4 . ; ; Nw 65072 ‘Deela: 39989509 "Page 1382 ™ . , . Jt in ve . _f .
SECTIEN 107 ECURITY INFORMANTS AND CORPID | {TAL SOURCES 107¢ — D 8. Potential securi informants in espionage and forcign nationality cases many times present special problems which Limit or govern the scope of é . the initial investigation, (See instructions re contact cases and ‘0 . deseco program, section 1L05¥,6b and Sh, volume IV, of this marvaal,. ) However, where practical the above items should be covered, Leads to odtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices . within 30 days. . , 10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant. ce) e ? D. %INLTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS 1. Then background information obtained as described under subsection C, ; transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out f in subsection C, and request authority to{designate Jindividual as a[Bureau-~ [ approved potentiel}|security infeormant[and proceed with his development. ] 2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy. 3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Burear. Lo . . .- 4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants, This instruction is not applicable where active investigation ‘has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau, . 5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants should be contacted personally at least | once every two weeks in the same manner as informants, 6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months, | Letter’ concerning potential informants who are not being paid on ( Bureau authorization should -be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informantts stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure. These letters should follow the fori indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation, 7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent. +. . 8, During interviews with potential informants, if it develops” individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts, 9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field. 10, (If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing : to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he - - . places himself ina position where he may be able to obtain information of value. In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if-he sub-. scribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which,if developed, would be the means whereby he could obtain information. 11. (Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such ; assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that - , : there is no coercion or intimidation involved, . . 3-15-65 MW 35072 Doold:32969529 Page 1363 .. ‘,
woh 9. 10, 1. Ww . 4, qi. NW 35072 Doold: 329895259 Page 1364 re Potential seeuri many times present special problems which limit or govern the scone of the initial investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and @eseoo program, section 1O5%,6b and 6h, volume TV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should ve covered, Leads to obtain background date must te handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days, . Investigation as oublined above must be completed prior to any request guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant. D. INTERVIEWS £ND DEYELOPMEN? OF POTENTIAL SECURIUTY TRFORMANTS When background information obtained as described under subsection Gy transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individueld as a security informan “SECTION 10 ) SECURITY INPORMAN?S AD CONT 1» betan SOURCES 107¢ ‘By informants in ecSpionage and Tureign nationality cases to When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he shovlid be made aware of Bureau policy. Carefully plan initial interviews eas to time end location to prevent any embarrassment to Burean. an Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless 4 necessary and «ll such interviews in their residences shou by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants, This instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there Will be no embarrassment to the Bureau, . Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters whe-: contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circum. ’.+ness of the oase, potential informants should be contacted personally 2t least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants, Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four mouths, Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on 2 UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during part four months, and must include certifications regarding potential ini: antts stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disol: Be These letters should follow the form indicated under section 1.’ ° 3b, but shovld omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1, «9. omit reference to any payment recommendation, Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases’ will not become delinquent, During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual. docs not have the necessary capabilitiés, discontinue efforts. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field, If individual does not have pote .tial as above described bu- = willing to cooperate, consider i-cdicating to him he can be of assis: :e if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain «. formation of value, In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires; also, it may be mentioned that if he sub- scribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which,if 4 evsloped, would be the means whereby he could obtai: *-~“ormation, Inform potential informants who agree to -.8t the Bureau that such assistance must be striotly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved, 6-13-62 sarantts Pheiaan wDAMA Uwrtnatawemniinde ettet hat MARE ND nape rokrm msne De 2 9 oo et