HW 355355 DoclId: 327401308 Page 32 | _jaction Ss [| [ourect repy | [PREPARE REPLY | | [approval | bispatcH | RECOMMENDATION | [| [comment | rue] RETURN SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI} ATION TOP AND BOTTOM |__| _uncLassiFIED [  [ CONFIDENTIAL | [| SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS a ae Se oe ae ae Remarks: Distribution to other than DDCI and yourself awaits your approval. FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. . Executive Director B81 Dec 62 |__| UNCLASSIFIED | [ CONFIDENTIAL | | SECRET FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40) 2-61 * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 196! O—S87282 HR Seema ane an penton mene RE toe Te Np nkgat et Hem enn ten Lr
28 December 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Friday, December 28, 0930 a.m. Specific Subject : Discussion of Cuba 1. At.0930 Dr. Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great amount of work that had been put into it. He commented particularly on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the changes which had been sent to them this morning. The Director commented on page 90, the final conclusions, and said that he still did not feel sufficient attention had been paid to important indicators. Mr. McCone then said that there were one or two other subjects that he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report. These are covered in separate memoranda. 2. After coverage of the other subjects, Dr. Killian then asked Mr. McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report. The Director, referring to conversation the previous evening, said he had no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his personal position had not been included in the report. He noted that these were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the Board had. Dr. Killian asked if the Board did have this and Mr. Coyne eT HW 55355 DBocld:32401306 Page 33
HW 355355 noted that Dr. Killian had seen it at the previous meeting. Mr. McCone went on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receipt of his cables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis. Mr. Clifford noted that the Director's messages would be of tremendous interest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board should have copies of them. Mr. ‘McCone replied that he realized this and would supply copies. 3. Mr. Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16. Dr. Killian asked the question, which was whether the existence of the Special Group had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose. Mr. McCone replied no, in fact the Special Group had assisted. He noted the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group, with the Attorney General, served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering through increased use of agents, refugee interrogations and third country activities. He noted that prior to Mongoose there had been a hiatus and that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs. In December of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees, no agents and no Miami set up. At the instigation of the President, the Attorney General and himself, all of this had been built up. Mr. Murphy asked why opera- tions against Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological reasons. The Director said it was psychological. There had been investigations and there was general discouragement. Dr. Killian said DoclId:327401308 Page 34
wasn't there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general euphoria and a feeling of success. Mr. McCone said there was a great danger inherent in Cuba. The SAM sites were still there as well as many other things. He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States. This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznet{%ov and by Thompson to Dobrynin. He said that the present understanding is that we will fly two or more high level flights a day, or if weather or other reasons fore- stall these flights, there will be a request made to the President for low level flights. He noted that low level flights could escalate a critical situation. ‘ 4. Mr. Pace asked if there were any prohibitions on intelligence collection on Cuba today. Mr. McCone replied yes. We would like a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration. He said he thought it was important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelli- gence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba. He said he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba, and certainly this was one impression they were trying to convey; or second, that they would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would -want to maintain for subversion through Latin America, and a base of operations. This would involve a control of Castro and while they might not re-install offensive missiles, they will always have the HW 55355 DBocld:32401306 Page 35
13-00000 capability to do so. Mr. McCone said he was inclined to believe that the second alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effort should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions. | 5. Mr. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort to penetrate the’ Cuban government. The DCI said yes, that every effort should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure and that more and more agents should be put it. He noted that only this week a team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy asked how many there were in ateam and the Director replie 6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts to utilize third countries. in-the ‘Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned Fo ae a mee) hnd one or two Latin countries. He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced by discussions with Donovan and Nolan We alre ady know that Castro had a fight with Che Guevar a. Castro also-spent three hours with the captain of a and the captain had indicated that he wanted | to talk to intelligence immediately on landing i in Florida. Mr. McGone said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the fix st of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities. He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time to stimulate an uprising and that all. of our resources should. be concen- trated on intelligence collection. HW 55355 Docld:32401306 Page 36
HW 355355 wenn A 7. Mr. Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo. The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo. He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations, and we got caught, Castro could mobilize world opinion against us. Dr. Killian said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or not. 8. General Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba now. The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present, but if the weather is bad and our program slips, there is authority to fly additional daily flights. General Doolittle asked how frequently this gave complete coverage of the island and Mr. McCone said that it worked out to about once a week. He nded that some areas such as harbors were covered more frequently, and that COMOR had worked out a system of priorities for aerial reconnaissance. 9. Mr. Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for operations. The Director replied that we had made no such study. 10. Mr. Pace then inquired about restrictions on U-2 flights during Wo September and said that apparently effort was made to penetrate critical areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have explored using Guantanamo. Mr. McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a Crom Goamtantn » series of agent infilitrations in August, but that this was not approved. Nobody at the policy level, including the JCS, would approve these operations. DoclId: 327401308 Page 37
HW 55355 6. ll. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case. Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if [_ purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and | referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick who read from[ in their expanding activities in June, noting the additional positions were activated in June and the fact that/there some ie stablished near Santiago de Cuba. 12. _Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between Mongoose and Mongoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties. He mentioned that there were 100, 000 informers organized on a block and community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four different levels of activity. "A'' was the most violent, directed toward precipitating a revolution. ''B" involved extensive sabotage. ' B plus" was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem DoclId: 327401308 Page 338
HW 55355 7. is the question of United States policy. He did not wish to put CIA in the position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U. S. policy would commit troops to back the uprising. He noted that on August 10, when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense, he had discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively. Dr. Killian asked who chaired the Special Group. on Mongoose. Mr. McCone said he wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to Mr. Kirkpatrick, who didn't know. 13. Mr. Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles. He said he wondered ' whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates. Mr. McCone replied that, quite to the contrary, there was no instance where NPIC failed. He said that, for example, the. September photography of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment. In retrospect we know. it was for developing missilesites, but the photography could be interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes. 14, Dr. Killian said that he was very concerned about the clear implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better camouflage techniques. This, plus the lack of resolution in the photography, might pose considerable difficulties. Mr. McCone said that this was a different story. He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of coverage of the Soviet Union. He noted that the targets for coverage were reviewed repeatedly, but at the present time of year the light was poor and the coverage was bad. He noted that there was a certain margin DoclId: 327401308 Page 39
HW 355355 allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might not have been seen. The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly. He said obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the Soviet Union. 15. Dr. Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union, and that this was obviously the wrong way. Mr. McCone said he agreed that this was definitely wrong. Mr. Murphy asked whether the government was putting out this information. Mr. McCone said he didn't know and that he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense budget drastically. Mr. Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should _have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia. Mr. McCone said that in his presentations to Congress he specifically made the reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn't know. Dr. Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an erroneous impression; e.g., that nothing is there. Mr. McCone acknowledged that this was a danger. Dr. Killian asked whether Congress, the President and the Secretary of Defense understood this danger. Mr. McCone replied that he always stressed it, and he also stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute dependence on photography. POA Ane one DoclId: 327401308 Page 40
16. Mr. Pace commented that since November there had been 72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of tire there had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more | important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in | our knowledge on the USSR. General Doolittle said it was even wor se than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence ‘on Guba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so that low level reconnaissance was needed. The Director said this wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed ~ to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have dis- covered the missiles. 17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said - that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive research program MOEK Act 6 (1) (B) 18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in Y the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He | noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban HW 55355 Docld:32401306 Page 41
10. crisis. Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in the State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2 and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having a recapitu- lation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might interest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented from {~~ — geht covering China, North Vietnam and North Korea. He said that a second tte. . a - U-2 had been sent.to[ ———_jand that the wraps had been taken off GPE Rct~-6..(4) (B) reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there was an overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephone calls. \ 19. Dr. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to be with them. Mr. McCone replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had concerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters, there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn. : 20. This session was campleted at 10:40. an B. feck trick LBKirm Executive Director Orig - DCI ECC Eras ba cy2-DDCI CeernQYU: cy 3 - DD/P cy 4 - DD/R cy 5 - DD/I cy 6-1G HW 55355 DBocld: 32401306 Page 42