' percent of the state) are irtelligence officers, The take fu LIVCY continues to be of prime tactical ralue to _ 14, the conduct c?-such. operations as ANROD and JMROD, It ensties us to -" KnowW how to tise our various moves, gives us the Opportunicy to know .. where the opposition. figures are and gives us tha general saccground we need to manage these operations properly. So importazt ts thie “coverage deesed that-.carbons of the primary targets covered for JMROD and -ANROD are regularly forvarded to Headquarters at Hesds-arters uy Wedue@st eo that/it-1s possible to keep in touch with detaiis of de-~ ~ Velopaents in. Mexico: 6n'the tactical level, On the stratesic level, ‘' LIENVOY coverage ‘continués to provide one of tho largest misses of | -ganeuver of necessary. fact for use not only in AMROD/JMROD yut also in other operations of a statler nature mounted against tarcets outside Nexico fron base points often outaide Mexico 26 well, The six lines against the Cuban target are fully transeribed by ‘LIENVOY transeribérs. ani delivered by Armald F, AREHART to Robert %, RIGGS each morning. Lengthy conversations sometimes require adiisional tine for transcription, A 'earben copy of each transcription is pwuched weekly to- Headquarters for use cf WH/C. ‘the original is’ recained by the Mexico Station. A third copy is retained in the intercest center chronological Mies... LIRAMA does not read these transcripts unless aome significant item appears in the "resumen" which causes Rin to ask to see a fuller transeript or to Listen to the tape. Coverare of the Cuban Embassy target. yields a goad picture of daily activities, re-. sidences, personal habits end weaknesses of Cuban officie. personnel in Mexico. This is usel by Station Case Officers in seleeticn of tarveta . for recruitment end in cheezing on activities of avents slresiy re- crulted who. are working ingide the target or who are in cortest with. Cuban offtetals., In July 19€6 LEPSKPO sources reported detention by ‘Nexican police of a Cuban diplomat in connection with emiceiics of amis through Mexico to Guatemalan guerrillas. The Cuban Rmhassy as well as Mexican Government reaction was monitored through this Pte Nae coveragge 2. Soviet Eubassve The Scviet Government has over fifty ofNelals ; peruanently stationed.in Mexico (the laricest foreign embassy in Mex{ea except for the U.S. Enbacsy), Thirty-riva of these Soviets {fO The five lines under LIENVOY previde details en the activities of most of these Scriets, | These Lines are: 15 6055 Soviet Conculste and Chancery. This Line ts ussi ey fifteen krcen or sugsect KGE or-GRU officers. It {s also used ty foreigners in Mexico attempting to make contact vith ' the Soviets. When identifying leads appear ani the comacts suzrest clandestine meetings, the station arranges for untlateral surveillance and has iientified “many contacts in this manner,
14-0000 old ted das Sata 4 15 61 55 -Soviet Chancery. This line fe used pri: marily by the Ambassador and provides more tnformation on protcenl contacts than léads of intelligence interest. Hovever, it gives the Station « pietur: of the personalities being cultivated ty Savlet diplomats and of | ‘Moxican may vho are seeXing ccntact with the Soviets, ets en OF Soviet Commere tat office, Tho Comercial Office ts used . ; by both the KUB and GPU as cover and of the eight present nen staffers, seven are considered to te intelligence officer. .. The volume of trade between Mexico and the USSR still does not justify a commercial stafr of this size, The ‘: Mexico ‘Station has had some success in running double ‘agents against | these officers. LIENVOY provides a« helpful check on these eases. The take from LIENVOY also identifies = intelligence officera ag. escorts for trade, scientific, commercial and tourist delegations who continue to travel between tho USSR and. Mexico, either on visits to Mexico or to and-from other latina - American countries. Once these groups arrive in Yezieco, ‘their movements usually become known through LIEMYCY. 51264 Soviet Films Office. This leads into the residence and office of the-distributor for Soviet Comercial Piixzs da Mexico who is a suspect intelligence officer, There -. continue to be a number of calls sugsesting Clandestine _ contact with Central Americana, When identifications are agade, the appropriate WOPACT Central American Station is notified imnediately, 15 69 87 Soviet Military Attache. This line is seldom tised by anyone. The cilitary ataff presently consists of (3) GRU colonels.and (3) civilian GRU officers, It continues to be the Line used by Amer icans, particularly servicemen trying to maze contact with the Soviets. : As reported. previously, the Soviet information is transcribed by the LIENVOY transcribera in the same way as the Cuban traffic except tzat the reels alao contain @ considerable volume of Russian language cen- versations. This requires that the reels be picked up daily and de~ ‘livered to an outside (unilateral) translator (Starf Agent Douxlas J. FIENGLASS) who translates ‘the Russian conversations into English. From these transcripts it:.is apparent that the Soviets are not avere - that their conversations in Russian are being overheard and understood. These deily exchanges between the Soviets and their wives (who also vork in the Enbassy) provide a good picture of personal habits, grievances, marriage relationships, and weaxnesses of targets of interest to #CGPACT. a 7a me . ¥ 4 2