or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan. (2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary] (out maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fait] In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action . to forestall a concerted md drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan. (3) US Military Reaction. / jor warning and with eighteen (18) ays of preparation a co inated airborne-amphibipus assault could be executed whith, it is anticipated, would gain control of key milita installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. ! (db), A requirement to reduce gignificantly the pre- assault period would necessitaté incremental commit- ment of US forces as they co A be assembled and em- ‘ployed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US milita control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US mili- tary reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air ang naval forces could attack in support of the rebe} Cubans with little delay from She times gectsion is made. an ait assault " wa eculd be initicoteid wv gu] etant (8) pours ex. _sirborne assault could Necinitiated a an (5) aay) ans a Vavy/tarine ampn us. force could be count tted| three (3) days later “he | 7 “ARH CrPANFT anrniat We kIMeAin AArARA HW 54914 DIP, SEGOE Tage GDEPIAL WAMNIINe | 8=6otA can
~ epartment of Defense Operations. (1) When directed by higher authority, or as tne . situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatdzy actions for US military inter-— vention in Cuba. Th&se actions may include pre~ positioning forces and quipment by execution of current cover and deception plans, (2) Upon final decision\of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct, execution of military SSM re oe _, intenvention plans for Cuba (3). In concept, initial military operations commence j with a blockade, concentratéd air strikes and coordi- air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as « possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and nated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy anti-air Capability. 4 (a) In western Cuba airborne and amphibious assaults will be condhcted by a Joint Task Force with the initial objective of seizing the city of Havana and obtainihg control over the seat of government. Army airborne units will secure the major airfields in tha area as well as major port areas required for follcw-on forces and logistic resupply. Navy/Marine mphibious forces will secure a beachhead in tha vicinity of Havana and Ollow the Marines over designated Army units will the beach. The Marine amphibious forces will be prepared to re-embark for furthe operaticns as directed, Me, (b) In eastern Cuba, Guantanamo wilh, be re- iaforced by air-. ani sea-lifted Marines for derense }/ we sacra DAP SERRE Tg GDEPIAL WAMINIING =o wArAnM
[ fthe_base. Additional Navy/Marine amphibious forces wil @ employed in operations against Cuban forces in the § tiago de Cuba complex or in other operations in easteha Cuba as directed, (4) Subsequent to the Seizure of Havana and San- tiago and the Successful defense of Guantanamo, operations will be conducted o defeat remaining pockets of resistance, Additidnal amphibious and airborne operations may be requjred. The most likely areas for such operations are: Matanzas, Nuevitas, Ntearo, Trinidad, Bahia de Coc nos, and the Tele of Pines. a ‘ (5) At such time as essent al US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and mili- - tary government will be gives priority and undertaken in accordance with policy egtablished by the Department of State. This includes pr vision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such func tions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly| manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isohated, contained and destroyed ble. US military combat turn to the United Or captured as rapidly as pos units will be scheduled for early States consistent with security conside ras Cc. Department of State Operations. (1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States. in as broad a maltilateral context-as poss ible. (a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. 10 WW 54714 TAB. SEROET page QUPTAI LAIMA GE tha anrarma,
or not the President's decision should be sought to implement this plan. (2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary (out maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt tail.]| In the event that the revolt spreads aS a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted md drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan. (3) US Military Reaction. swish suey ver and with eighteen (18) ays of preparation a co inated airborne-amphibious i assault could be svewttet wh » it is anticipated, would gain control of key milita installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimup US and Cuban Casualties, ! (b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre- assault period would necessitaté incremental commit- ment of US forces as they coud be assembled and em- ployed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US milita control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US nili- tary reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air ang naval forces could attack in support of the rebe Cubans with little delay from hem Release, vhe time s ¢acisicn}is eculd be Initicte3 HW 54714 DoclO:A21 AFA N OXe 5S ORPNIAL PR RERETREA MIArFAME
lepartment of Defense Operations, (1) When dtrected by higher authority, or as the situation dems S, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatdry actions for US military inter- vention in Cuba. Thase actions may include pre- positioning forces and ‘equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans. (2) Upon final seers the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct; execution of military aeavention plans for Cuba, ne 54214 pod DoaRbRRETe cQCDECIAL WANNIING WACNDM
iS) At such time as essentfal US military control is gained in Cuba, matters og civil affairs and mili- tary government will be etvep priority and undertaken in accordance with policy egtablished by the Department of State. This includes p bvision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judictal control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly; manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist buban government, armed forces or other groups will be iso ated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early Teturn to the ‘nite? States consistent with security conside c. Department of State Operations. (1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States in as broad a multilateral context as possible. . (a) Inmediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. : 10 WW 54214 pod PosK ELD EI. ZCDCPIAL UAMNIINSA NArTADA