ie ww de 2 = - | ~ H \ } a 2 | a 4 S 7 | aad jt ~ "i E | { : 3} S t = K = . | = iz] oy i = 13 | rand tw i : Hi . —= ‘yp = ,, i 7 | x i = 13 | oe | v1 17 | mn : = | a ~ e ! e 39 | al - { i { ca wo \ fia: ® oe 2) Co) nw me a wiy i | | | | i | | . | Docld:32263409 Page 257 stand the weight of the interpretation that you have CONFIDENTIAL 254 ! done this -- lots of people get out of the armed forces for various reasons. I don't think that alone can really suggested here; taken together with the meeting with presumably the Cuban, whoever it was, that Delgado describes, | the Schweitzer correspondence, which apparently should be looked at again in terms of whether or not it was really a screen, because if it was, then it shows a degree of deliberateness which associates itself with the request for compassionate departure from the Marine Corps. It. tends then. to accumulate points on a line that this was a deliberate course of action. | ! But. even when you put all of that together, you are far from anything that would exclude any contrary hypotheses, and that is what you are trying to get out of analysis. For that reason, as I said yesterday, you have’ to be very, very careful in drawing conclusions. Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me. (Pause) | Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated yesterday that. you did not have any memory of the Gutierez allegation. Mr. Rocca. I was unable to do any kind of reading: ! in the report, or in. the depositions to the Warren Report. last night, so it still is a vague and hazy affair. (Pause) c ON PIDENTIAL ALDERSON REPORTING COMPFAN'S, INC.
255 fe) QO wi hy IDENTIAL Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any responsibility with regard to the CIA's handling of the Nosenko issue? | > Mr. Rocca. During the time of the.Warren Commission? | de Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. i | | z 7 - Mr. Rocca. None at all. 2 ‘| Mr. Goldsmith. Which unit was responsible for | _ | E 7 | Nosenko at that time? ! ~ | : 2 | Mr. Rocca, The handling responsibility was SB ! uF “Division. : = oy Mr. Goldsmith. Does that stand for Soviet Branch? : ni Mr. Rocca. Soviet Branch, Soviet Division -- Mr. Murphy . : 12 In the staff which would have had an interest, the components e A i | concerned would have been Ops, the Ops component, it would | . = ad have been Mr. Hunt. ! : is | Mr. Goldsmith . What's Mr. Hunt's first name? | = : = | Mr. Rocca. James Hunt - not Howard Hunt. “ 7 | ‘And, perhaps even Mr. O'Neill and SIG, although I : 5 . cannot say on this. : 7 | = a Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever have any involvement | : t 5 *| in the Nosenko case? coer Th Mr. Rocca. Later. | Mr. Goldsmith. When was that? i : Mr. Rocca. In 1966 - 1967. | * Mr. Goldsmith. What was your role at that time? ' 4 Mr. Rocca. If it's relevant to your interest, I mean =- : : CoN PIDENTIAL dl SOM REPORTING COMPANY, INC. i . ALOCERS Docld:32263409 Paye 253
CONFIDENTIAL 256 is because of the manner in which Mr. Nosenko was handled by to j . Mr.. Goldsmith. The reason that it would be relevant the Agency vis-a-vis the information that was. given about him | to the Warren Commission. It requires the committee to look | wn | | = oy into both his treatment in 1964 as well as years subsequent | 3 s | to that time. | | x | Mr. Rocca. My entry into the Nosenko case -- I am | ~ : a perfectly wiling to discuss this -- I think it enters into | oe fo S zz certainly Mr. Marcucci's indication -- was in connection , c ; = o | with the review and appraisal of the final report prepared, , = ny or: the first draft final report prepared by the Soviet | ~ a Division on the case, and their proposed recommendations : @ : 3 | for the handling of the case which, as I say, took place : : is | I was asked -- by that time, in other words, the case = i : 18 | had reached a concrete stage of, a pile of, a report that 7 | was nearly a foot high. I was asked to read it. and to comment : 7 upon it and its recommendations. = aa Mr. Goldsmith. What was your assessment of that report? € 7 Mr. Rocca. My assessment of the report was -- and this | see is on the record, and there is a report, and I defer om ee e ya ft i my remarks here to that paper, because the question is a “3 | complex one--that the report should be cut down by at least aa | half; that it was too long, and that the overall diversity of the report, which included a lot of other elements that TON FPIDENTIAL ‘ ALDERSON RESORTING COMPANY, INC. Docld:32263409 Page 259 ALDERSON RESORTING
CONFIDENTIAL 257 were not related to the Nosenko case, concerned other 2 aspects, like the Golitzin case, be cut out of it, because they simply encumbered it; that overall, the appraisal that : de was made that he was a dispatch defector -- and that certain | i | HI i =  ~ | action should be taken by the FBI to confirm this or to review = i ” 4 ! : : : . : i “ a it and to take further action with respect to his stay in x. s i < i . . ~ i the United States -- should be looked at with great care 2 : : because he had rights under the circumstances, % 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Who made the actual decision to detain - a i . 8 < s + | = re i Nosenko under hostile conditions during the period in which = ¢! 4 he was in CIA custody? ~ 8 Mr. Rocca. The Chief of SB Division, to the best @ S iad | of my knowledge. “ Mr. Goldsmith. What input did Mr. Angleton have o i , : = ‘~ 1 on that? * of Mr. Rocca. I think he was opposed to that. ” 7 | ‘Mr. Goldsmith. What was Mr. Angleton's suggestion - | 3 i for the way that Mr. Nosenko should be treated? il 4 400 7TH STRELT, = Mr. Rocca. This is not within my competence to | - 19. il | oI answer because I don't know the thing. It concerns -- in i 2 i . ° . paar i other words, you are asking me questions that deal with the period that was antecedent. to the time that I came into the | case. | Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Angleton ever discuss that | with you? cf ON FIDENTIASL TM SEPCRTING COMPANY, INC. Q Docld:32263409 Page 260 _ SESS
2 rv in oa | es) | 300 7TH STREET, SoU. REPORTERS BUTEDTHG, WASHTHCTOH, O.C. 20020 (202) 594-2345 7 Docld:322763409 Page 261 i CONFIDENTIAL 258 Mr. Rocca.. On the basis of hearsay, then, discussions Mr. Angleton would have wanted a much. longer period of interrogation based on the actual materials that had been accumulated before anything like hostile interrogation was undertaken, if at all. In other words, to my recilection, in my recollection, there was a significant difference on this point. But it was ex post facto;-the;decision had already been taken and made and that was irreversible at that time, Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what role Mr. Helms had in making that decision? Mr. Rocca. I do not. Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to discuss with you briefly ! a hypothetical, and I am aware of the Agency's position regarding Nosenko today. Hypothetically, if it could be established without any doubt that the story that Nosenko gave to the FBI and the: CIA regarding the manner in which Oswald was handled in the Soviet Union ~- if it could be established that that story was completely untrue or completely unbelievable, what significance would that have on the question of whether Nosenko was a bona fide or a dispatched defector? Mr. Rocca. have much significance. He could be a bona fide defector who had been fed ; CON PIDENTIAL SOM SEPORTING COMPANY, INC. ALOSSMsci It might have no significance, or it might j