July 16, 1975 Professor Walter Rostow l Wildwind Point Austin, Texas 78746 Dear Professor Rostow: . We greatly appreciate the time you have devoted to cooperating with the Committee's inquiry. The Chairman _ ae has asked me to levy one additional request upon youn To complete the record on the events under considera-- _ tion in your testimony of July 9 before the Committee,. . would you please prepare a notarized, sworn affidavit. answering the following questions: oe 1. What recollections do you have concerning the subjects discussed at your meeting with McGeorge Bundy and Richard Bissell at | the Hay-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961? 2. Do you recall or have a record of any other meetings, whether official or in- . formal, between yourself and Richard Bissell between November 1, 1960 and March 1, 1961? Was there any discussion . between. yourself and Richard Bissell upon any of these occasions or in phone con- versations during the same period that was related in any way to the establishment .- ., , Q£.a@ CIA project which included the capability “og. ° tO-assassinate foreign leaders? What was the  \ gontent of any such discussions? ‘Thanks: very much for your help in this matter. Sincerely, Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr. Chief Counsel HW 55355 DocId: 32423489 Page 4
Biographical Background WALT ROSTOW Chronology and Issues “ 1942-1945 1946 1947 1949-51] ~ 1951-1961 ‘Jan. 1961 Dec. 1961 1964 4/1/66- 1/20/69. ROSTOW was in OSS, Research Analysis Branch (169) State Department, German-Austrian Section | Teaching at Oxford Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, .Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva MIT, Teaching faculty; consultant to Eisenhower Administration DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS STATE DEPARTMENT, Head of Policy Planning Council Appointed by LBJ as U.S. member, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress , Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (in this position ROSTOW chaired the 303 Committee) Chronology of Events 1960 October (Approx.) BISSELL instructs JUSTIN O'DONNELL to go to CONGO to plan Late: '60 1961 Jan. 20 for the assassination of LUMUMBA (O'Donnell's testimony) .on initiative of BISSELL without prior White House approval or knowledge (Bissell, 6/11, p. 55) CIA's BISSELL, EDWARDS , and O'CONNELL had initiated an ‘assassination plot against CASTRO utilizing MAFIA contacts (ROSELLI, GIANCANA, TRAFPICANTE). Lethal cigars had alreadv ‘been prepared and poison pills were: being developed. -ROSTOW! appointed DEPUTY ASSISTANT to the PRESTDENT (KENNEDY) for National Security Affairs. Issues and Questions BISSELL testified that he told ROSTOW "the instruction as to- O'DONNELL was mv initiative.” (BISSELL, 6/11, Did ROSTOW learn any of this? What briefings of new President and his National Security advisers took place? Did ROSTOW make inquiries? What areas of responsibility? 13242734689 Page 5 BDoclId HW 55355.
(Walt Rostow) : : Issues and Questions 1961 (cont) ' Jan. 25-6 BISSELL asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability _ Bissell said that "presumably" (approx) under project ZRIFLE, including the capability to assassinate Harvey's notes are accurate _. foreign leaders. The IG REPORT concluded from HARVEY's notes (Bissell, 6/9, p. 51) that BISSELL was "twice urged'' to do this by the White House. HARVEY meets with SILVER, GOTTLIEB, and HELMS about it. (IG REPORT) Bissell testified: ''There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (6/11, p. 46) He recalls that the conversations would have involved the general capability of perpetrating assassination, ''all aspects-of the creation of the capability" (6/11, p. 50), Bissell said it was "quite possible" that he discussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assassination tarcets. (6/11, p. 59) BISSELL testified that after Jan. 21, 1961 he met with ROSTOW "quite frequently and very informally, " occasionally several times. a week. (6/9, p. 81 BISSELL said that shortly after the advent of the JFK Administra- ROSTOW mentions these sessions in tion, there were weekly luncheon meetings at the State Department — his: book. (169, Diffusion of with BUNDY, ROSTOW, CIA, State people and Defense. No agenda. Power) (6/9, pv. 81) BISSELL testified the "two urgings' from the White House could have come at successive meetings of this sort. But in . What was ROSTOW's functional reporting on EXECUTIVE ACTION, he felt that rather than reporting ‘relation to BISSELL? on developments to the luncheon meetings "as I normally operated I would have replied more to ROSTOW in this case's} and he feels that e did report to ROSTOW in this way. (V. I, p. 82-3) 5 baa] April 18 Ros tow attends first meeting on Cuba which concerned BAY OF PIGS a mop-up (Rostow book, 209) n . ; t=) April 28 ROSTOW MEMO TO PRESIDENT . . " "If we can devise a policy for dealing with CASTRO short of a Assassination meets the 2 commitment to remove him soon at our military initiative...world descriptions but it would not: = opinion will support us in a policy of: restraint on CASTRO and be be restraint. i more likely to move with us on SEAsia."' (3) : ; a 2) wi my we i - . noms we : wes ~ wo i ae es . 5
(Walt Rostow) 1961 (cont) May 30 December 1962 ‘Sept. 3 Sept 27 Oct. 1966-69 TRUJILLO ASSASSINATED ROSTOW. testified: "the generalized Flow of intelligence at that time involved reports of plots to assassinate TRUJILLO. ..like once every week. And why’we had to give guns to people who had access to guns in the Dominican military I don't know... .1 can't reconstruct the operation." (Rocky, 178) ROSTOW moves to STATE DEPARTMENT planning Council ROSTOW MEMO TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBA "I have not been following the matter closely over recent months.'' Discusses "Soviet military deliveries to Cuba." Under "Covert, Action'': ROSTOW said that the "limited, U.S.- dominated, professional covert capability against CUBA" does not promise ''a broadly-based political movement capable of challenging the CASTRO regime's control system." (p. 5, #1) ROSTOW's Memo reviews Lansdale's Two-Track Cover Operation: 1. Heightened effort along “present MONCOOSE lines''--inspire conflict within top of regime. (p. 5, bottom para.) -2.. Recruit Cubans, within and without Cuba, to implement “plan of operation which aims at the overthrow of CASTRO primarily from within rather than by invasion from without." Basing outside U.S.; one U.S. adviser "equipped to provide finance, but not monitoring every move." (p. 6, top) Special Group (Augmented) consider's ROSTOW paper. DDCI wants copy. MISSILE CRISIS -- Mongoose digs. ROSTOW 1s SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. Issues and Questions Guns were tightly controlled by DR Army. Was ROSTOW privy to State cable traffic on this? Does this argue for assassina- tion as quicker more direct approach? Or does it imply that the "control system" would out- -live CASTRO, rendering ASSASS LA- tion pointless? 13242734659 Page ? DociId HW 55355
22 8 the Pay of Pigs , and Latin American} Policn CaStTRO: A ROMANTIC REVOLUTIONARY CLOSE TO HOME a eal 4 ENNEDY'S PROBLEMS WITH THE AGGRESSIVE REVOLUTIONARY Romantics in Diakarta, Cairo, | aac Accra. were important; and oan A they involved strategically sign:Seant parts of the world. The un- ake we le aie id! gx internecine tension on the Indian subcontinent was atso a SErOUS metten, diverting, as it did, mifcant talents anc resources from essent: £ , “s of dev clopment on ehait of more than a half-biiton human eines, ete aceess ini prea Cudahy eatin s.erting the political life of two maior nations, and ‘rendering each, “in pr Morent Ways, increasingly vulnerable to externa! influence and ma wae on, But for a working American politician these oreblc en LUICLaAM » were civeiy peripheral compared to the presence of Castro in Cuba Py January 3 1061 C Castro was an acknowiecged pa varia 4a r world, handsomely backed by the Soviet Union and oth vig was actively engaged in sudversive action i: a of the communist irt er communist states. 1 Latin America and was up to the continent a revolutionary so.uis ; its many econe lis, Tae communist base ninety miles from Florida was a Ccirect : eto a vital American interes! Tone: cc “necgcans . \ vine nart of the Ame te 13 ny 1e} ae) ansdg' co o7a cones ate te aS ncorporated in os tap result of Eisenhower's order of March 960 astro, assembled in. Guatemala, were v undergoing the ing for an invasion af Cua, uncer the teadershi- nee af tan “Taltag Gene . Jers OF le OMe wales government, cceawmie cine ili ege pena aeelene ec cere omh s ene pene en as The Bay, of Pigs and Latin American Policy. 209 THE BAY OF Pigs: ONE MAN’S EXPERIENCE AT 7 AM, on the morning of Tuescay ,-Anrit 18, 19644 T-attended . my, + meeting-on Guba The Bay-of-Pigs.operation aad Deegan ine Gay Detore. As Lcame to work carly I met Ted Ciifton, the President's miitary aide, in the White Eouse Situation Room and asked him how it was going. Fle said badly. «ates McGeorge Bundy asked me to come along fo aemeeting, i ia neinnnaE + the far end-of the table were the three senior officers’ of the CIA: Avion Baltes, Pearré Gabel!, and Richard Bisse. The Psesident, Bundy,” Gtiftormand I were the on!y others present. Dulles reported the operation was failing: the men were trapped on the beaches and Castro's forces were moving systematically against them. Thad oid anc close ties to the three men reporting the incipient debacle. Duttes I had known a! from wartime OSs days, but well and warmty since IOSI. With Caise!! iM Thad shared wartime years as a planner for the American air forces in Eurone Bisse was a‘friend -ofvsome thirty -vearst0 wom Fowed'my Tetqrt-as -an-economis Ros into his ucminis- teing OUF : tration, he was about t to confront unmitigated disaster. They were wholly professional, Kennedy commetely calm, But al were evidently shaxcn. After the meeting I asked Bundy if I could help in the mop-up. I did not know how my fri ends had gotten into this: situation. | had no sense of hoher wiscom or virtue. But I thougat a fresh man might de useful, Bundy atest —and then Kennedy—agreed. I T went over to the CLA operat: tonal headquar- aes es ‘ocated in a temporary building along the Potomac, to monitor the on. a he reports coming in chronic! ed the closing in of Castro’s forces on. the beachnenc. The moriie of the Washington team engaged in the onerat ifr progressively disintegrated. This was not the Frst tactical defeat Americans had ever sufered, nor even the worst that I had observed: but it was na nfufte see their composure breax up . Bissell, however, remained col ilected as Bh men around him begged that | he ask the President once morc to throw Ange tary power into the balance. As the situation on the bea iches move: ‘can mi to Sinal disaster ie tring the night, he asked that i call the President, who ve abe congress: ‘on lreception, anc arrange meet: ne! Its purnase was ta in fda ! Kennedy and perm him to exercise such options as we © avail te. 1 didac lt was a session in ther@vnhOlrce no one resent is ikely to forgel _the-Presidente Pst and Mtchtarrara: tre witite: tier General-lsy yman “Lemme vegeicm sede a APE TRE in full uniform with medals: the stark hur fragecy of the mencen the beaches and reports pi tes Maanct enini¢al denvraw: Riggall coo ey inview out the options,
219. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION Tha [nite aect dt ; ; Phe l'mits and dilemmas of power—the relationship of ower to the fate of “vamian 2eings——-was never more cicar or poignant, mennecy wes deeply anc personally concerned with the fate of the men on the beac! H ti the battle and reverse his 8 fur ndamental nosition-that this was a conflict seiwees Cubans, not a war between the United States and Cuna, The possi f the men moving of the beaches into the hills was woe, IL became star re iv clear (to me, for the frst time) that the-eption.o! mowing frome ty fon-to-e-auerrilia operation-was-nreciuded sy" ROORP ATTY andthe choice-ofsthe invaston-beach, Kennecy decided to permit a limited vuovoer of fighter sorties to protect the hand’u. of old bembers onerating in rart af ve operation, The purnose was te buy time in the hone th nt at vostsome of the men might De withdrawn. Ho ordered American naval cr ra "2 gee mc.ose for the same purpose. Rusk pointed out that we would thereby ¢ decaly commnutted. Seanedy raised his hand iust below Ais S nose and ty ot We're aready in it unio here, al sone Inetea? + Sti, Was instructed to inform the entrapped men to cisengage as best wy ',cither to boats or inte the ceun trysice. AS B: ssoil wvomedy toid him to keen hischinu AdoipRerle-endykrthurSeh esmgerwere then dispatched from the mect- ission ef a form “te mem hers 7s ae ieft che room, Tan ta tha harcdact on Oare Sern cae VEAL TL ay ": to meet with the Revolutionary C Council j Hts Within which Xenredy was pre- ” ‘Anni 2 melrend al Somenow, i was difcult to co home that night. Some of us stayed four in the morning. Gay dy cay, the full measure of the failure, with its reper- ead, ! nounced ron Kennedy and his ad ‘tun aness, except for Kennedy who moved “ he nation en str 12 was "eoking at the Was nator “News, “vhose : cap ture OF the expedition. Then he let the paper crunin thout a wore, , redy met with his advisers at length in the afternoon, by the fve o’ciock arrival of the lead ers ofthe Revaiue. Cruel Tea a ompating « Counc, it was 2 meeting at once pa . necessary, Agere point, ~aterneea, the President ; room for a few ” ws ane. Robert Kennec y sooxe in anguisn. Re ‘ have Ae act a rec Paper gers dv Vascow. We ‘ust cou! é. no orsita and teke it, the . assembled around the Cabi net cable ought to de ab’e to ron of a] we awaited the President's return, ‘Acnreey perore: VC MOVa! De Lore sme ken serious! V to him. ft asked tion and “we coud step out of the aAmamoent Oe tha nartian aane tha Dace Taecan * tale sins es. Out he was not about to throw the full strength of the carrier- “Bundy. It began in'much the spi The Bay of Pies and Latin American Policy “ 2rt that if vou're in a feht and ect knocked of your feet, the most dangerous ty ect hurt, Now thing to do was to come out swinging, Then you could real s atime to dance around until! heads clearec. We would have amme opnertunity tO prove we were ner ‘gers n, Soutneast Asia, and sewhere. This was atime to pause and tiink. He rOOKCU up expressionless. He finaly said: “That's constructive.” The next day he came back.to me and.nosed the question: If we shouldn't act now, what shouid we do wbout Cuba? He said } had a duty to come up y 4a plan. I promised to collect and set down my thoughts, On deprikee Kennedy devered his defia nt speech to the American Soct- ety of Newspancr Editors and the nation knew ‘t had a leader who could absorb 2 severe blow and maintain command. It was the speech of a fighting Irishman. As Lworked through those !ong days with my colleagues, Twas troubled, hawever, that the obsession with Cub ba would divert thought and energy from he paths of action on which Kennedy had begun. “-therefore wrote’ 1” ‘long PeN bet ’ te faced scmorandumiehin on Agr hat7and circulated itto ReskeMeNontar, and it of | my talk with Robert Kennecy: Right now the greatest probiem we face is not to have the whole of our toreign poticy th: “own of balance by what we fecl and what we Co about Cuba iiself. We have suffered a Serious setback; but tat ‘set back will be trivial compared to the consequences of nat very soon ing momentum along the lines which we have begun in the rege nast t three months.? Over the weekend Cuba was temporary pushed off the front, pages. De Gaulie was at the peak of his troubics in Alger \. There was a threat that issident Srenen paratroopers would descend on Paris. © “¢ Gaw Near neated to the French peonte to block a coup d'état, On Sunday, Apri aN Kennedy, called from Glen Ora and asked me to come into the White House quictly to 1 monitor what was happening in France and to keep him vaformed. | settled cown in the White rouse “shelter, where there was both communication. ment and a bunk. The only news ‘available, in fact, came from David CE S broad casts from Paris. [ eradually became apparent that would not take place; an Tused ‘the time to try my hand nosed | by Cu as Robert Kennedy hac lescent on 7%: ata new apprescn te the, proc cucnested, 7 Tt had begun to 5 how the Bay of Pigs - contro’, a viscera! reaction developed | come with which the. United States covid not live. Eisenhower shared this feeling, as his memoirs make clear, although his sentiments about Castro ‘ction of want he would have done about the othe moment of ¢ tan. The fears were in clear to me from Tuesday morning to Suncay night communist ‘come about. As Cuba emerged ‘ander covernment that this was an out- cannot be translated into a prec rnd . Povol Pies nlan if tie h decome to 1324273459 Page 3 DoclId HW 55355
pra Tyr KennNirpyY ADMINISTRATION . in part iccological, in part an ancestral sense that the Monroe ' been unacceptably violated. On the other hand, there was no sasis in American for gn policy, OAS doctrine, or in international law that ted the United States coing to war because a Latin American nation had zone communist. It had clearly! happened because of the internal dynamics of Cuba. not because communist 2 arms and men had moved ‘ilegally across ‘nternationa! frontiers , Simuntaneously, however, a way of esca ‘ping the diemma appeared to 1 : of his comrades in the July 26 emerge. Cut of Castro’s auite real Movement and of the humane democratic societ ty they sought, there had come to the United _Oraes not Batista reactionaries, not mercenaries, but men ‘ives fo undo the pervers! on of Cuban aistory Castro prepared to give their nad brought 2b sat, Ty gyre anpeal 9 ‘he circumstances, “taste an apnea} “strengthen ‘ed, perhans, by the successful CTA a kee evertarow of President Jacobo Arbeny in Guate- mela some seven vears en s ‘tevolved, accuired, of course, a momentum of qature, incapadie of deing handied on a clandes- strategic surprise and was teciinically inade- of which are summarized below. But the fav in the failure to distinguish the kinds of rican President cou'd or could not x its awn: and mena basis. i it appears to be a characteristic of American hist ory that this nation cannot’ be effective in its military and foreign polic y umiess it ocleves that both its security interests and its commitment to certain moral prin iDies require the nation to act. . When icealism alone scemed to be the basis for pos-tons taken the nation did not back its pay... . Equally, the nat ion A has not deen effective when confronted ov situations where its power interests ‘meht be involved but where a persuasive moral basis for American action was net present.t A covert t operati on, by definition, cut. across the “morn! 2asis” for the eneage- + of American for ees, And, before the event, ennecy nad crawn a s} Lop “19 potween suoporting Cuban dissidents and sending American forces into  Taile. Nevertaeless, as Lobserved the derovement of the oneration on Tues- not helm fecline. that some of the men yolved had come to in the iast analysis iCennedv would be unabie to hold to the policy pressoc reneated ly, in public and orivate, before the event; namely, navi vhis was acon™ict among Cubans and reeviar United States forces woud mee A CL + ee wale fliem, one 2, Was the Pernaps the * rn vw * a™@ amiant t annedy si mo iv crowd not ford to let it fail. Tt feweee aerore res kee fa j oO ty i?) ae ct seas sere! nee vIn the United States in tre Vorid Arenal hac yet eve ¢ men would have—of going to. the h The Bay of Pigs and Latin American Policy 273 ee, - was not only the men on the beaches who, until the end, had “an unshakable conviction that they would not be let down, Tt was inconceivable that they ToS would be stranced. But Kennedy did hold to his policy. The operation had failed. And Castro had to be dealt with in other terms. Sitting in the White House shelter, I seen Py listing on a yellow pad that might arise from Castro's the sperine dangers to the American interest agents and guerrillas; the ly Cuba: the training and infitrating of subversive invasion of neighboring states with Soviet arms: Sovi et mis: 12 United States: an attack on Guantanamo or the Panama Canal; commu- ist radio propaganda; and an example of economic and social development that would prove attractive in Latin America. For each I suegested lines of action legally and morally open to the United States and, “especially, to the hemisphere acting in concert om tie principle of coliective se!!-defense. Ic called Robert Kennedy from the she!ter and told him ! would be readv to respond to his question Dy morning. The next day } went to Mi ckory Hil for an early brea “fas t. As we walked around the groundss) : funct iona:, overt, !eea! anproacr to dewiit Ing Wi Castro. Tee Te cveG int a CONC PT uban policy had bee overnment, This } id with coordinating pol- formulated and he urgec me to ain ‘ulate it in the through the committee, headed bv Paul Nitze, charged ic, coward Cuba and thé fate of the Cuban refugees in the United States." yr Tye BAY OF Pics: A RETROSPECTIVE EVAL UATION THERE have been a good many retrospective evaluations of the Bay of Pigs operation, oublic and private.” Evicently, itwas flawed in terms of politi cal a and military, intelligence. It could not be k pt seerct before the event and, there was no strategic surprise: no coordination with dissidents in Cuba; am underestimation of the cohesiveness and stre ‘eneth of Castro's ground and a © Aus ity to round up and neutralize his opposition. TL wag forces anc of his a \ Fawed tactica ally by the failure to provide sufficient air power and to prote with its critically important ammunition supply. (Technical the opera on ended with an ammunition shartage.) And the option Kennec& he invasion { failed rsd ~ i] Q a < an as \3¢ eld: ‘was, in fact, foreciosed by the choice of the landing site. The basic strate gic Mow was, of course, poli teal. [some fifteen handref men were [0 SCrv s catalyst in. the overthrow of Castro, the burden of 1 eTort would have to 5 be borne bv those already inside Cuba who were prety pa ad to ciugse for this result. And that meant ore UNization, leadershifa ilities may have existed, bit planning, and close coordination. Suc they were not bulltinto the enterprise. =
ENNEDY ADMINISTRATION 1 to have been an effort beyond the capacities of the v. And in such acovert entertrise, it was impossible nes ¢ nd resources of the American government (ee) hone a, wee neve been relevan . ree hat the pan was inherited from a previous administration by new men ne TT oe ones roio, Al sand his pcopic were respected profess! onals ard so were Lemnitzer and the Joint Chiefs. Tt was hard for the new men to “ coatcence against thelr oreaecessors’; although the vauly Grew the hard line or his own DY refusing to engage recular also niaved Nidement y c forees to salvage the enterpr Fist if the And there was e oruic p WDA WAS part of Amer Senmiecy nad ist position uring the in Guatemala wor ‘quid out. Cennedy Dect an enterprise that Eisenhower | hac prepared te would sech harged with b “nate comm un “sm Prom Curbs bythe action of srave Cubans. Sorensen pay st t Kennecy regretted not having catied off the orked closely‘ With the Presicent in the nost-Bay 1 ' “v and, altho o” Pigs cays, I have noe evidence to cha Tenge that assessment. Clearly the short-run consearenecs Of revoking the plan could hard'y y have been as pain- © th ta debacle. dobac reer sense howev ror, there ma elv sour nesistan® | in the: cone nc ed ecdae ame ‘ght ina ment of the (event from a rather L worked as a speci sion for 194519 940, came to Washincten later in fe spring, Fie greeted me g g. gree ted me g aid | thought so, but wer waceyvt vet Cone muciy to oreve - Das sked vi what nd fo nis assessment, 4 ie WOt 1 Comn ’ 1 v ov announcing we | nave freed s.centinued existence in Cuba was Cue re to plan. But if he nad engaged American “orces to satvage 2 ition, he would have been ruined abroad. at Castro’ ~conhow er’s Now, sugeested ; Kennedy could go And “conned was Ge rormined to go on. Tatking abor atn my memorandum “Amelia he said the United States could simply not afford to bread or sulk ‘a protracted debate or passive introspection. Britain. had gone aol 2 hase over Suez, France over Algeria, And freedom coy secnuse each represented oniv 6 or 7 pereent of the free world’s ‘ rye mower, Tut the United States was 70 nercent of that power, Lf v> our persnective, Howe cid not centinu rium of nower ir the wore would come unstuck. xammc, Kennedy brought ee Con of the executive branch, Vow Kenney and = “yo for the Cebac pureaueratic entities, There was no The Bay of Pies and Latin American Policy — 2Is our business, Bundy wrote a reflective memorandum to Kennedy which was ad ever read in government, his OWN Wity. itary and fore! en poucy asked: What went as fine a piece of paper as t each of the others engaged int wrong, what must we now do to avoid further error? Kennedy brought in “iaxwell Taylor toc conduct a formal inquest. He also told Bundy and me to up the Sow of information to the Situation Room: and Bund y was aske ift from a comfortable, high-ceilinged room in the Executive OMe ng toa small office in n the White ouse west basement close by the Now a Mic, (Remembering s, Lresisted all elforts to have that oMice redone in White House ‘modern when T occupied it in 1966-1969. f felt it should remain as spare as a city editor's office. ) -In getting back on our fect we had an asset. We had all scen, in one context or another, what tactical defeat lookec like during tye Second World: (Tn my case, it was the dangcrous and frustrating days of 1942-1943 when it apr pneared quite likely that daylight bombers, in which America had invested vast resources, would fail to penetrate Ger: man antitireralt and ‘ahter defenses without un accentabdle losses.) We had known what it was take stock, make new dispositions, and ect on with the | vy wife caught s mood one night. Loame home at three in the morning. She was sitting t in bed and said: “P’ve not seen you for years more creeitul or elective, You're an odd lot. You’re not politicians or intclectuats. You're the jumor oficers of the Second Wor Id Wer come to responsib Th remains 2 not had characterization of the Kennedy administration, > [o} a Q ron “< Trt TWO PUNTA DE sL ESTES KENNEDY'S - post st-Bay of Pies policy*toward Latin America, emerged. {wo mectings at Punta de! Ested ugust, 196 rand PLanuary: 19 G29 T They deait i ythe ideologica! and security chatlen nees posed by Castro. wo Tredissinvarforn ’ rer thee nters”merican-Econemic > ond Soctate ONHO TT Twas the climax to the series of initiatives that had my begun when, in 1058, President J: uscelino Kubltschex cof Brazi roposed a Operation! Panamerica as a kind of equivaient to the Mars! or La rf America. Proximately, its purpose was to give ‘substance to ons speech St of March 13 formally launching the Alliance for Preeress as 2 common efor tN to move Latin America into sustained economic and socia! progress, 4 Vhe goals defined and agreed on et Punta de! Este touched the whole 4 spectrum of: Latin America’s endemic oroblems: housing, sand reform, ¢ - cotton, See'th, fax reform, Cemestic price stability, export prices, economic: integration, re an Fundamentally, however, the Charter of Punta del Este was a commit-2 1 v w hat economic and mentof the Latin American governments to their neome S ete 2
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION we) Tormulate a commrchensive and wel!-conceived national program for the sionment of its own economy.’ ted Statesswas te suppiv-from-public-am private-sources;-some 20-bi-~ for is wvostment-in-Latin-Ameriea-of-he S100. billion eshimaced-as-necesen cary to achieve an-average anual § vercent-erowin an-GNP. r . onnedy s rhetoric—the rhetoric of Cemocratic revolut! hreak through the crust of Latin Anterican pet ‘ies to strengthen and hea art tin America cecicated to these purposes. The offer of enlar rae Amorican assista nce was to nrevice not me ey resources and increased \evrrican matic leverage, oe t uso a means of increasing the domestic aut thority of those who, ine serious measures of self-help, increased: loans from nublic 2. a = ¢ “rose in Lat eas mre their nations to oanedy was not naive catout the Iength of time this effort would require Law A nénel 6h r Sow deen-secitd the oreziems ef Latin America were and how ro action ratner than h these men anc women he sought to make comm raaty inthe initial focusing of ¢! at Washington could and would prov Can rar . “ ye rn } a] . we angerous oecause it encouraged the Ulusion that the resonssion of merica’s arosiems coule come from outside the area. by some kind ~ American ma nd monev. it was unreal! because, at most, | on reseurees required coulda come from the United and a much smoler‘trorertion of the pol itical, institutional, and con e®ort that was even mere important. - became apparent. therefore, that the rOSFCSS SA th danger enc un hea. or Progress around (Sor cedy rile aN, -u¥ ‘n eC rc mnt O: the mo" e machinery of the Alliance for Abe altered so that, in image and in fact, it would be more a enterarise. of Latin American ¢ coneration and less an aid program run ‘rom sngton. As eariv as Apri rOK2 Ru Sk underlined the abicing truth that ons United States could be 0 ‘ v “er ra) } tae ra ior partner” in the Allance for Prog- sight, shared among thoug Latin Americans, led to eh srontion of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for. Progress sa even. der 1963, a develorment Kennecy erected with some enthusiasm n statement on Latin Ame ica, in Miami, on November 18. ation of the Alliance for. Progress belongs later in this book 224-426, 429-220). In Kennedy’ s time it was plagued by “crnesses. As the Inter-American Committee on th 1c Atiance nin a report of Nov ember TOGA: gress is now completing its third vear. Given was inevitad'e that or ocress be relatively Este was agreement that ar of the countries of Latin America es and Latin American ‘Policy 217 oO The Bay of Pr ocial policy ces time Lo stow in the initial stage. Past patterns “of economic and cannot ve suddenly halted and sharply reversed. it ¢ develop nationa! plans and programs which are not mere aspiration and priority out which arc eBectively ‘in both concept and exccution, to specific projects and tasks in the sectors of the economy. It taxes time to formutate, legis and execute pro- crams of fiscal and agrarian reform, and to gather the fruits of ex- panded educationn, health, housing, and. community development mos . programs. Lt faxes time te prepare ‘projects ‘and negotiate loans for el financing; but it takes even more un ‘ects and to put to “affective use the requisite | funds. s. Tt takes time to assene’e ary to implement te the men and to build the institutions necess economic and social odiectives of the Punta “del Este Charter. It takes time to convince men and women throv 1whor ut the Hemisphere that (ie Atiiance for: Progress is a serious, susta! ined venture worth the com- -  omitment of their minds and he sarts, and worthy of their confidence Morcover, the years 1961-1962 were marked by a continuing in America which reduced Coterioration in the terms of trade for Lat For all these reasons the over-ai ng erowtn cic not acueve in ‘9f V2-19H3 the & hough they approximatec ithe Ponta de! m the spec ite situation | ‘yn two matoar count The two maior countries were Argentina and Brazil, caught ina stom stage of the stop-and-go peticies that marked the’ inflationary pattern of their economics. - ; ‘n addition, as with ATD as a whole, Kennedy took more time than he shou'd have in getting the administration of the Alliance for yr Progress into effective order at the Washington end. In one of the oddest sessions with a tent Tcan recall, Kenne edy once found himself enmeshed with the prob- lem of recruiting ‘secretaries and mobi! lizing typewriters Wi hen he assembled around the Cadinet table. the working-level officials and tried to get to the my bettem of the initia: burea aucratic confusion in the Latin American AID ofce. The result was that American resources, even those ce ammitted as Latin America at the promisce rate in’ the rene) — ioans, were not flowing out. first two years. Nevertheless, from. 1961 Latin America, out of the inter play of its own: dynamics and Kennedy's leader snips was aff ona new course. “. Cuba wvas part o! if, Are ‘Che Guevara undeubtedly en! roye ed his roie at Punta del Este in August could credit Castro with generating t the Alli ance for Proaress (a hal etrath) “and explain why it was hound to fail and give wav to the mode! of the communist revolution in Cuba. Kennedy was dee opty . ties of Cuha as a showcase. He did not see how, fail to become concerned with the poss: n in net annual Soviet eid, Crpa con with some $300 m " American Policy "219 anand a formal dintomatic canter- Pay Osvaldo etings tovk mace, Mt one he American Seo: ew i midst of ficers returned the courtesy and the way at American policy; but he was s sneering references to the Bay of i at the cartier Punta del . rexciuceEubefrom.ihc OAS ancite \S-institution) sto -deale with Cian overtly embroiled with Castro, “ent bevond anything an Ameti- foreign minister: produced-the liver h rmed that the I racy and that absolute He acknowlee True. democra cracy was eh ‘ute n monarchy: com- nivalent af absa ly ‘acompatib Te with the g, leagues, Ruske sought with every hue age wu! imous resolution, In the beessary twe-thirdsanajority of Fours ey btes-of-Argenting,, oraz, Chiles-ang le Cecisive fornmila, abstained on the further compiex legal i procedure was by expr these: reserved pos: Mu end! ess patience, and round-the- “Pag on, There was anunces as wer c, sim 409 | olitiea! strain in the four countrics 24> ressure from its two great neishborg t as often in the past, toa largegy tority. The fourteenth vote wig resumed American support forsee th. for other reasons, never came to 13: Was iin earnest and ser: ously mene their Comestic politics, democrat atone with the weieht of Castrie