(104-10214-10034 TABLE OF CONTENTS ood cy w 4 So ow Re FE Tee ascussingifon . 2. 6 6 6 ee ee eee ee wt ee ee - Cvert knowledge of 0.5. Goverment involvement Recollections of CIA officials . 2. - 6 + + © © © © 2 eo ee ee tw t in u ro ® . 4 ® ® 4 * fp pet * , . * 5 . ‘ ° . ° . mS ONY ie Aporeatn toe Trougi t " lark Ore ration Lan we ee ee eee tee we we OU i State asks Farland if he could engineer a ccus 23 i 2L Farlend says the dissidents need guas cee Tae U.S. is prepared to assist in overthrowing Trujillo ...... 2 Ruvotiem asks tat oniper rifles be supplied the dissicents 25 Acting DCI approves air drov of 12 ¢ “ela rifles .. +0 20+ & Spestal Group approves suall arms for dissices Q a ar my 9) mete kas Sentete pet oe idea CCS asks thab one wesepon ce sent in sefokg Si a  ! ©) : ‘ = Learborn learns of plan <6 assassing ey intercepting auto 33 i ( oe asks for sumachine guns Yor plotters . +--+ e ee ee HF : ~ “Pearborn asks for <hree 35-caliber pistsis for dissidents 3 . . The plot to kill Trujillo at his aistress' apartment . 2 2 +e ees 36 : COS protes’s restriction om poucking weapons 39 .k .S LS z : Hqs @aidance cable on policy and objactives . 2. + + » « « Station asks permission to pass three carbines to dissidents 3 Hgqs approves passing carbines 6 6 6 ee ee ee ee ee es ko Trae carbines are passed to the dissidents uO Request for pouch waiver ref pouching summachine gunS . + - + + + « bl Sucmachine guns pouched ho Pleas from dissidents that submachine guns be passed to them . . + « he 4 -Hgs informs the station not repeat noc to pass submachine guns . 43 ost-Bay of Pigs standdom cable . 1 ee ee ee eee ee te ee My Station aclmowledges re:eipt of sutmachine gums tee ; ; Draft cable (not sent) approving relesse cf? subcachine guns ..... 47 State Departcen+ disapproves passing sucmacaine guns Tre whereabouts of the three carbines . 2 ee eee ee et bee BG Special Croup confirms rot passing submachine guns to dissigents 52 ; Tne dissidents' ingticn plans are firm... ee ee ee eee GL , U.S. policy css ‘condone assassination 5L : Deartern and 2 rOTeSE wn ee ete we ee ee ee «8B Critic Yo. lon sinationa 53 3 Vice President Johnson asxs a — > Ae arco BBE CR we eg ae x d Discovery of U.5. involvement hb assassination group 55 Recepitulation vf arms passed or consicered for passing +. +. + + « + 59 The rotivations of the assassins . 61 +, Sone ee oa Bs tet
74-000080 + Bae aay: fae ihe oer ee ad emt ace Cs ay ( ‘ P ou, custem to visit one of his =letresses at bis ranch at fan Cristobal about cuce a week. Cn most of his travels he rode in a Curysler ey a Q ae i o by oe ristobal and substituted a nigal; stereotyped pattern o after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed inta a khaki uniforn; aad set out for San Cristoreal in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet, always driven by the same chau?leur. On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on a four-lane highvay on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by efent armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins, and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. Cne was never caugat and vas eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed ‘while resisting arrest. The others _..were arrested, confessed, . and were later executed be?ore coming to trial. About eight or nine otters, woo vere in on or mew of the plot but did not perticizate pole n the actual assassination, were killed while in custcdy, walle resisting arrest, or by sufcide to avoid arrest and torture. (Note: We use the term r to all of those involved in this attezpt to overthrey Trujillo. “Assassins” refers the small group that act S ) on pert nmarantene ae ee a ee Ase, cela tbe atu weed hab del! cafe bite ; a ? tga en ue +e rag oe Mea tte ty eo ea bes we
we feo, w Se ea ee i Tnere were reports in Cluded Trujillo av the time tnet the U.S. Consulate had teen in some way involved wite the plotters. Bventually, after the surviving plovters were granted amnesty, any Of the details came cut. Forman Call, a reporter with the The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L. frujiilo was carried out with assistance from the US Central Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the 69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highwayahear his capltal were smuggied by tne CIA into the country at the request of the assassins. Tne CIA began shipping arzs to the Dominicen Rerublic in late 1950, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry Dearborn, Chief Political Offtcer John Parfield of the US Consulate, and Luis Ariama Tio. Also involved in the plot was Antonio Imbert, who had been Covernor of Porto Pleta province. A3 Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened, talks continued between Deardon, Rarfield and leaders of the anti-~Trujillo conspirecy. Toward the end of 1960, contact vas established between Amigaa ang a CIA agent who named Plato Cox. 7 « « WAS * The key link between the assassins and the CIA in wae arms shipments was‘’a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise mow as "dinpy," who operated @ Supermarset in a fashionable neighborhood where frugillo also lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the silling but was later allowed to leave the country. - The weapons vere imported in srall parts, to be assembled dater by the plotters, anong the roucine grocery snittents ?or the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The ~-2. PPAET Fira aly ° . SEDREI-E TES Wig i f ! arent wee ees cnet ote ee nen eS eee Ne Sprit mes ante tt J corti sacri Taper
AGB PRIA WAY Loatebed ALIEN GR AE GAOT AR GEE, ARR AL I ati Pe a tes charade ete eee: ered Bushing « or instisa cating.” Zsterline e, like King, recalls that ‘the | abiy- rarked Tood. cans, gun parts encvered the Republic In spect col. .spirators waiich were later turned over to the Plans Zor the intended assassination were worked out durizg the same- period: in.weich the. abortive assault. on. Cuba .was. being. prepared. Ecwever, when the CIA-crganized April 17>. 1961, - invasion at tse Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was” focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a post- ponement of tre attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because of the embarrassment enotner such failure might cause the United States. “Bus the order, to hold up came too late. The “needed weapons were already in. the nanas of the conspirators; who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barrield to Gelay the assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportimity. This came on May 30; when Trujillo end his chauffeur drove out » nto the coumtry in an. unescorted. 1957 Chevrolet fora rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with Trujillo's 2)-year-o.d mistress, Mona Sanchez. It can be reported on excelles st authority that close | associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within a few days following the killing. . Dearborn, Barfieid-and Berry rad meanwhile been rushed out of the Dominican Republic: by -US officials. oo ce wo Gince the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry “Jieny") has returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket, where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, 4S if Trujillo. had-:never. Lived... : Chief, We Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations, wa Division). King recalls the Agency" s role as ‘being Limited to mont to ring internal plotting against the Trujillo regine “but. not chs ieee peraeree an . . . We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then |
crpney_ eutitime: furnishing of weapons ws 2 tangible evidence of U.S. Support. role . 45. being. somewhat. more. post: tive ¢ MA ead os and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's. role as one: oF giving surport “ty ; to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S. terest. Ee described the affair es "a fairly somal operation involving meetings, discussions, and i forsal approvals." We ds not have fire information as to whether or not any of the weapons supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo. Both Esterline and King. relieve they vere not. Bissell, nowever, bas | a vague inpressicn that oae of them was. The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters are now widely. scattered. | vo was chief of station until October 1960,. ts now retired. [sto was chief of station at the time of the assassination, is. in | Jresignea in 1964 and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico.| t the head- quarters branch chief, is in We elected not to call 23°8p or * _ back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able
> “The Dominican Republic assigned hia to its embassy -in Ottawa in ta furnish minor details that are pissin: i@rem the written records, + na ) 2 ry we think it. valizely that fey, would: “bert leto add significantly... 23 the quite complete recora that appear. sin tne EMDZED operatioral “files. tiles aizre Vea ne Agency activi “HE. . assigned the cryptoaya EMDZ=D. One ze 2 at. replacing the Trujillo regine were ent of ES Was known as ce om the cryptonys for the - violent action. =é Operation to resove: ‘Trujillo by t en ae nave reviewed the. voluminous EMDEED files. Most o? this account is drawn frog then. Many of the more significant documents vere hot put iato the EMDEED files ‘but were kept ina private file ‘by J.C. King. He x made that file availnble to us. We also have studied another: particularly usefut document. The Dominican Military Intelligence Service investigation of the (SIM) officer put in charge of the/Trujillo assassination Was a navy lieutenant named ‘Ortiz: - ‘November 1961 when the Trujillo family's attempt to regain power fatled. The New York field office, of the Fal held extensive interviews with hiss from 6 April through 10 May 1962, The result WAS & massively-detatled, 162-page report on, the plot and on ‘the assassination as reconstructed by the SIM. trea its interrogations of. ‘the’ persons it apprebended.
7400800 | the EMOSED coerattior. we can trace the orl viles) - 5anS ang the course of : ' U.S. policy, with respect | to the overtarow or Tr mujilie. We a130 can “ascertain from the files the rature “and the extent. of U. S. support mp oh ees CURE ras LANE the platt ws eluding the ssing trem oF yeapons out of the ef che plotters, “ine wding the passing baa) pon ut cf the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujilic. What we cannot discover from the au files, despite quite massive documentaticn, is how the coup group wes organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly : accurate, is in a hook by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in the story is its failure to identity the individuals with whom the F g { U.S. ‘Goverment was actually working. Excerpts follow: ad qhe plot was organized on the basis of two groups of - ’ conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group had its purpose and its separate personnel. fhe function of the Action Group was to assassinate Trujillo and immediately present proof of its Succes, 4 in the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the Political Group. The latter would them launch a coup, -; taking over the machinery of the goverment and the Armed - Forces. . the Action + Group consisted of eight ren. ft appears to “have been organized originally ty General Antonio Inbert '  Barreras and Salvador Estrelle. .... . They were joined ' by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, 4 member of the military - | @orps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio . - @@ la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been killed by the goverment because of kis invol venent in the * + Robert D. CrassweLller, Trujitio: The Lite and Tites ofa - Caribbean Dictator (New Yora: MacMilian Co., 1905) Ht
Galintez case; Ruasctar Teseda; Roberts Pastoriza; Ped: Livio Cedano. The eizath member, Manuél Caceres’ {, was in ‘ Moca O35. tne iigat of tae 30ta ane sav none of the action. fhe Political Group had a. less G@istincs membership. :t “tneluted Luis Aniaza Tis, Modesto Digz, Ceceral Juan Tezes Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support £ General Roman Fernande:, Secretary of State for the Arced Forces, and his brother Bibin. . . « .. « : The over-all autnorit ty appears to: have centered principally ° : ; ; ” ' a : in General Diaz, ‘probably the only onze wero had sufficient . : mo i ; prestige to command authority. . .« . « « i 4. ‘fhe Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When inforzation in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going to Gxrive ty Estancta Fundacion .. . Garcia Guerrero in the Palace would infora the others by personal MOSSAZ2. 2 + 6 6 6 Tue expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace came to the patient plotters at seven o'ciocs on the evening of May 30. They were not fully prerared and coordinated at this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza threatered.to act by himself if the others lagged... in.any. event, the plan went into execution. . .. . » Each of then had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his owm saved-off shotgun and two M-l semiauteratic rifles. . » « « « tes The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened preseturely to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it , Poe now afflicted with vad luck and ineptitude. Imuediately after , a _ the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to The Political Group of the conspiracy ever took up its. - pleamned role. The Acticn Group scattered, leaving a trail as. wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of Ee ‘de la Maza's car, parxed in the gerege of Ceneral Temas Diaz, | ee ; go. where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators. a} EA were all hunted down very quickly, except Zor Anlana end 7 : "Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for moaths until ; ; Tee be a the canger had passed. , ; So | Fe if th fe nS eae CPN. & ‘ akin Gab Sordi
14-00000 AAP RAL TEA BS “ gepese_ ps3 a tad UA es) BaRy Tne Fal report of 3 interviews of Ort iz, the > SIM investigator, he 5: ME .. @ives.an excellent account of way the plot fell upart t after the - ' a6sa ssiration took place. ‘One ‘of the aseassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, 2 was ‘cerlously wounded (probably. by | fire from his own companions). .All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the killing. One of then called a friend, Dr. Robert Reid Cabral, to treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would Bs be required. Reid ard two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital. . & ... . While in delirium he mmbled the names "ée la Maza” CT Tomas.” The police immediately picked up two brothers of Antonio de la Maza. Feither was personally involved in the plot, but both knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General Diaz, Antonio de la Mam, and Lieut. Gercla Guerrero vere killed . 8 Bo, resisting arrest. Aniama and Inbert went into hiding and survived. The rest vere caught ard interrogated folloving torture. AlL ; 7 ead ardal. confessed. : The confessions lea to y fdenti fication * n Of pe persons who were fe in a oo or on the fringes of the Political Growp: General Roman and his . 7 brother, Amiama Tio, General Garcia’ Urvaez, General Guarionex : , Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Anzel Baez Diaz : LCC between | the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not PRE Nan 1 Ss aaa Bear es gt ets
14-00000 . 4 “ CE CONES eee ow ong fo eptey element eaneneennnemnmnnts + have known ct Althouga the identities and the intention of the Action Gr were fairly widely imown to persoas not actuall: wembers 5 . appears to have been exteliens comparimentation between the Political 4 4 : and the Action Grouns--perhans too much compartzentation. .The i i : ' A assassination Ltsel.? sar well planned. General Diez vas in over- ' . t 2 all charge of the Operation, but de la Maza was the one who ata all j He 4 C engines rebuill so that the cars could reach speeds of 120 mph. j | He had possession of the weapons from the U.S. Consulate, plus i several of his own. Ee and the other Farticipants took the cers | £ to the site selected for the xXilJing and conducted dry runs each : night. Everything wes reedy end the assassins vere lying in wait ii of the work. Fe took three cars to a local garage and had the 3 for Trujillo on the nignt of 23 May. At the last ninute ke decided not to go-to San Cris tosal because he wasn't feeling too vell. The assassins conticued thei~ czy runs each evening. After the assassina- tion was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the cous that was to folloy failed--in part because of bad luck, in yeart because y Of poor plarnizg, and in part because of too much compartmentation. oe Sheuetanten paertii pan rater te eget tt faa - hese . e 1 Oa NOBUO RP are. » * % g : - ce AES & faa» FES r ct tte Nan Be nee I ter OF ty a
RIES A Te PYRE EER (sake eee watt! 88 UN te a i ceteris nna nanny on ancionerettace! 40 pms’ TUE acetate te tin ed MAES an area aon ata ETAL BALI» sehatbinteteaine oe _, death, was not, told that the assassination was to be attexpted on °° “** “Slam and then drove to the hase of General. Rouen to alert hia, .He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination, General Romana, «ho was. to wake Over the goverment after imajillo's May. 30th. Afcer the ela; ing, General Diaz tried “to ‘telenzore General Ramana but coula not reach hin. Diaz thea teok the car with Trujillo: S body still in its tromk end drove to Ranan'’s house. He saw'so many soldiers iq she vicinity that he Gave up and returned hone, leaving the car in the driveway with the body still im tre trunk, where it wes later found by the police. What had happened was this: Former general and former head of the SIM, Arturo Espailiat, happened to chance upon the scene while the assassination was taking Place. He was out for a drive with his wife dnd was Passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. He stopped at a drive-in restaurant and almost immediately heard. shooting ahead, which ‘he suspected involved Trujillo. He @zave to . the scene, saw what was haprening, turned around, end sped back ee into town. He stopped at a military installation and gave the arriving simultaneously with the police. The police found Trujillo's chauffeur, who was vounded but still alive. Ronan and Espatliat then vent to the hospital to try to question the chau?feur. ZQUS y General Diaz could not reach General Roman to infors Ronan that
Trujillo *had been xilied and that it was tire for Renan to make his . move to take ove: the ‘Government. Romas xrnew only that there had been a shooting involving Prajiile and-t that | Tens 2110 WAS pissing - He did He ‘not mow whether Generel Diaz! ‘group was involved in it or not. was reluctant to move until ke was sure that Trujillo was dead. By the tice Roman concluded that Trujillo must be dead, it was too late for hin to act; Hector Trujillo acd Joazay abbes had already taken atep aa EAD charge. Roman did -nake’a couple of feeble tries at engineering a Felt an prea pts take over, but it is apparent that he had 2 no real advance plan nor Renz any appreciable chances of s succeeding. The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took place against a’ background of interzaticzel activity in. opposition to the Trujillo regime, with both the CAS and the U.S.. taking clear- cut stands. ‘These are scme of the highlizh<ts wy 62 5. Venezuela brought charges in the OAS that the Deuinican Republic was "in flagrant violation oP re 7 .., Buman right, freedcn, and democracy” following the mass arrests in the Dominican Republic in January 1950. A committee of the
74-00009" . SEPM TS | Biaststio » OAS aasigned - to investigate the charges regorted. on 8 Juae 1550 -. that the Deminicaa goverment vas guilsy as: charged. - . b. A near-miss assassination atiexpt against President Betancourt on 2h June 1950. killed. ‘tuoi in nis entourage acd . injured hin and several others. The Yerezuelan governpent ennounced after capture of most of the assassins that the . i . ~ Dominican goverrment was responsible for the attempt on Betan- ; i: court's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the ; i Lo OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under ic of : _., Secretary of State Dillion, testifying before the House Agriculsure Committee ‘on 24 August in support of a request by President Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Repudlic's sugar quota, is reported as having said that it vas hoped thmt economic sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's aictator- : ooge ship and its replacement by @ noderate and free regize. The United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republi fc on 26 August 1960, elthough consular relations were . . continued. CRUEL A SR cron ino eR? nas! ct Misco Reinet seaane: Ae eeieaeme oe SRT Nene arthaeton Set Se Ne Sag Ee BGR atin carer ee ee
¥a s) ACR oe eat we think it Cia useful ‘to idensity the Deopte £ ae whe involved, especially ‘since officers of the Departaent of State played a very prominent role. gta Rh Washington ~ Devarttent of State tattle tl Saale ance nd Roy R. Ribottcn Assistant Secretary of State for inter-Anerican Affairs ’ Frases Devine oe Special Assistant to Rubotten * John C. Hill ; Special Assistant to Rubottow Chief, Wi Division et ois Chief, Branch III, WH Divisioa are *" Cludad Trujillo - Departzent of State Joseph S. Farland Anbassador until 28 June 1960. Itis . 7 Cot oe pertinent to note thas King and Ester- : line attribute U.S. aca CIA invoivemeat
Henry Dearborn -John D. Barfiele Ciudad Trujillo ~ CTA eee a Breas Seer iocaet MARTHA D ADR CRESS Bentler e SeIT MI ot panehe actin Rou pts a ap afes with tke plotters in the Dontatcan | Republic to Anvassedor Farland, his ag ze former FBI ea WhO considered hinself quite a : Esterline descrite 7 Clandestine. who later rer, called hin{[ operator. uader him in| direct dealings with a number of the key » Plotters... oe Counsellor of Embassy 1960 and Cansul Cere with the plotters. until 25 August ral therearter, rre spondence ‘Second Secretary until 26 A and a consular offt CIA cryptonys: ugust 1960 . cer thercafter., . * te Chief of Station until October 1960 frem 20 January until Code name used Chief of Station & Jime 1961. with the Plotters . . Key Dominican Plotters onan ammmea ad fen] Poh Saeane rahe, 4 tS Code names: SWORD and EL CHtCO . + Code Names: Mr. X, ABC, and YACUATE Code name: SOCRATES
fF 4-O0000 chi tatig joe ag. pay. 4 ( ‘ whee Jit d aot led eivwe d Two documents provide a usefel point of cepd cure, Trem an historical point of view, One is a seni-official letter from Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republi: to Assistant Secretary of State Rubotzan. / C 16 November 1959 . nr g _ Ambassador Farland wrote an “Officlal-Informal” memorandum to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today 3 than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime.” He described the - principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said: 5 . * . « » Within this group there is growing militant anti- fs American feeling based on the premise that the United States y should actively aid the Dominican revoluticnary (sic) for the 2 overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on 2 this subject show an appalling leck oP uncerstanding of the position of the United States and its adopted doctrine o? non- © intervention. .... . This group is in possession of 5 Clandestine oroadca sting equipment which will go into operation 4 when the strike is made. has been informed and Joins with 8 me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King.” Bo ~ 16 - ib Vee ie MEO MLE ROEM on ty MO ete TS oe ae vl: Sete tae Sot ee ee om —— ~ 7 oF Lam Oy say aes cepHERRAR OS ee - Rt nee 1 atrmenge and f£ Salient soar ede | t i } i : ! j oe re tmee es apre ety pee sree etimnretartae 8
4-90000 ’ - * : an} _ i | H { os ca & 1 a 15 Fetruarr 1940 | ee . | i A CIA scar? Feper, addressed to Cate?, WH Division, eiscusses ; ere 1 . @ plan for improving intellisonce coverage of the Domirtcan Re publ yee : : i in the event of Trujillo's renoval from poorer. The objectives CU vee Stated in the paner vere to easure orgerly transition in the event co t . i } : f : Trujillo abdicatee or was deposed and to preveat a takeover By | \ } . “, ! : forces. | : i , i 4 | . { é ! . 10 March 1960 : s TTR eet reer eth ens REE + a | one originator of the dreft . r) . ‘As not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower : : ® . from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the Presigent from their years : % of military service. ‘The Plan was for Clar* to approaca Trujillo, ; u ta with whoo he had been on good terms in the Fast, and attempt to | is : ad 7 4 persuade Trujillo to retire. If #aS to de pointed out that there was i 3 \ ra ‘ bo i 5 ~ 17 - | : | : | F CLPITT Eve? gays ; i eholsih asd mein Ui.b i oO k Sypeen neces ememmen nai tics MER TR GED ong “te hee we wha: ee ee a ; 7 « wer eee on “ t - : Foo] e PH ‘ cd ~—s om
al _ met with Trujillo on 27 March. mgs @ eo, to» nO c4¢ Who could succeed co protect his fasily ana to preserve his image as Fl ZtOr, ne should step down and allow asylum to be erranged for him. His fteniiy would have the wealth already outside the Demiaican Republic, and the fortune inside would be placed ig trust, to te edninictered /internationally. known personages for the venefiu of the Dotiniean people. This proposition received high-level atteation in Washington, including that of President eisenhower, Secretary of State Eerter, and Allen Dulles. In epproving Clark's aporcach to Trujillo, the President specified that Clark shcovld travel asa representative of the State Departzent, rather than as e personal emissary of the “President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and . By the time of the meeting it appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented 88 merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was doze. The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official U.S. Goverment hand tn the Proposal. O? course, nothing came of the _ meeting. * 22 March 1960 Ambassador Farlard, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottam, forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's averthroy - 78 - we ae > =) a me g? > ry t o . teed ii3 | wiih, me 4 bz, ul ne Loo. Fe pet OR ee Pee Bene ttre, I ne Rm ae AIS ag 3 RNIN NS Bia ew Beare tentctomamnenans MRE ge Tw Bet APRESS Ta Tea } t anime oo em cnet sie teee er nmEneen ranma ® retewse m4 we aN NRT AER is Vieiea cp
14-00000 « a fee we of sD A) 8 hee ‘4 oy tt YY ao qo o har fe nace "Onerat to leave the country. ive hin 12 or i8 ours to €o it." It would te made clear that a7 if Trujills refused, a border would be Zolloved by "collective "He tells it plainly end decisiv i) be te a 3 io . bal fe }~ incicent would be contrived, whieh intervention.” Assuming Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatun, the vlen then outlined stens By e ay for transition co an operating would be reduced in size. representative government. Tae ary ‘ A caretaker government would prepare for free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these ccomenits of nis ow to Rubottoz: ee - « » this segment of the dissidents is psychologically conditioned to a point where it will tae any step excent the ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they exnect United States assistence. . eo es # «6 "Dick, I think the tine has ceme Por certain agencies of our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement 3 a definite covstructive program to in the Dominican Republic. and Allen Dulles emphasized or this type of approach. . 30 March & 7 April 1950 influence the course of events My conversations with the Secretary the problems and the possibilities rf es 8 &© «& The Special Group considered actions that might be taken In the SAMPE owe Asst: M, aoa ay wf - wd dd ited 2a ds wiih Ste on ae nt cme BT ant eT 7s oem ~ sda Bay Ldert es sas ee Mp t PH t + semen mppesepreme emecpee 2 nee enegew Opin peat ne erence ane ean ato en a vee einaninons eon smact Peers ced fiat sm wee wen Fe
soe way, Pads PAS te Foe BE “t Baca * event o oninivan epublic. ry is) t, \5 3 i fol hy | coil b ct % Go re) that Cuba misht be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.5. civilieas fron Guantanano. There was also discussion of the land entrence to the Dominican Republic from Baiti and of the problem of providing asylum Zor Trujilio. On 7 April, there was further talk of country if Trujillo fell, and an ap tre chances of his leaving ns f i a u 2) 5 ay i ) = willingly: 7... it is evident that Trofillo will not consider neking any arvangesents fer orderly succession to himself, but that be will either nang cn to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, a la Betista.” 9 April 1950 State sent a cable to Farland fron which the following is an extract: "Could you, if so instructed, meke appropriate arrangements within rext few weeks with eppropriste civil and military d@issicent elesents to take over the GODR? You would be authorized to indicate to-them that as soon as they had seized power they should ismediately request United States recognition, and ask for United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored invasfions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro or pro-Commmmist elesents within or "Weat, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements prior to takeover .. - * BEG if ord te mm me RR e a Se Pec hAr, uae > on rd ee a a aS ae outside Dominican Bepublic ... ARES IOS CELE TS to IE - SESE TINO THRUETORRTOO TP. PRICE RITCRIE sams eee epee series Ta Tet meets, weg FSR Wwe TT Ce SRI GRE NCTE, WAGEERE OW, as OY SRI Ee QT EE REL T AE MER  BD AL TT sceonoe inteeggrermeanr et + ongh nese either ince eireney eget ces een poet +» ape ssoerenegreeemita age re Ln seeps renetnngt a eee 5 a Abs tee
ee heme ae 4 ae oes whee ‘indications reflect Demir: eo . e caathine umres & Mamican dissiden poorly armed » loosely organized and lac mitiiary ai issidents, will find it aifey Over of GODR without existence one or ¢ Following develoments (which we sma (1) Clandestine arss shiments, (2) an invasfion to Serve aS a signal to the Ppulace. (3) Inpleseatation of the dis side (yf (5) "In ancapacitation or assassinati pnts! “Operation Lancet On of Trujilis.® (5) 4 careryl stap-} oy-step plan for tne tae coup and for yertod Preceding the period foil, Owing it. cocreration” fran Dominican “Suc make to Terared to assist ccntributions U.S, aa » ALPAAT ker Viegy Shu “aot Tels fe ye - . mE PU ba id db h : eel as dh ou et etgte eee eee ae x 2 ote RE! Peer ca eee © oe Meee
om FR ot my wre nee S24 aaseg we EE awa te £ ae mem oe wee emg 9 May 1569 A mexorandum vritten of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads, in part, as follows: “The dissidents need gms and armnmition fren the United States. In particular taney ceed a snail number of high-povered rifles vith telescopic lenses. ‘he Ambassador said that he say nO problem in the purchase and Gelivery Clandestinely of the @rms to the dissidents. But he Saic, of course, this raises the question of whether the U.S. Goverment wants to engage in this activity. “Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. Ha said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want to support. ee eee a ctemenn soa 1 rom monet staemyyonmimn ns anager titan on atentetttepenn ne een ppt enncernianmttns
an B4-00000 , . fs Fa wre . * BPP AT PUT yee Ee oe TRE ‘ese 1 : + mee nem cheney memyee:f sy . ot a (Cument: Farland was in Washington for consultaticns. tegpeece Althouga he is listed as having cerved as Anbassador vuntl: 23 A. Te ? June 1900, it appears that he 412 not actually return to duty in Ciudad Trujille. his successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated ; 13 June, but he never took the post.) ; \ 3 June 1960 . ( Farland met wit 1] the Dominican desk officer Pll in WE Division. to see if th : : Farland had been dealing. Farland “¢ said, "Those are the boys all right.” memorandum of the j ~ meeting includes this ccarent: : “Farland then told me that the underground cpposition are j : Planning to assassinate Trujillo. Ee said that it is placed to } - : . , use a powerful bemb which could be planted along the route of ‘ ‘ 5 : 4 ‘ haan Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by & remote. ‘ & : control firing device, He intimated that this plan is pretty ‘ . Well along and could be executed at any time." 2 . Undated Working Paver (filed between papers dated 25 Mey and 13 June) ¥ The author is not identified nor is there any indication thas | by the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "fo i ; precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regine by 1 Ausust or as . } 4 ; soon as possible thereafter.” It provosed that the U.S. becese a : . 4 ‘ price motive force against the Trujillo rezime. "In the event Grujillo * é 1 a PO ae . i ar od “ i A] a i} aoe 2 Rk ? Ne af Pe ee at I as eet Ve mObe eee on tT 2 stom mahi fe eZee a am a ay
8 wre de ee ee : t ~ om, ay Me aoe Geadline of 1 July was proposed for cenpleting arvanzements. . x propo rz ne aha Se rwy ears 17 June 1960 denry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence , , ‘ ueried State [pct Zor cenirmation on certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident deader, He stated his understanding of the U.S. position ri a. Tae U.S. is not prepared to take overt action ageinst : me , i the Trujillo goverment while it is in full control. b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition Clandestinely to develop effective forces to accamplish Trujillo's overthroy. c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional goverment which controls a substantial section of the Doninican Republic. 20 June 1960 Dearborn, ‘asked Rubottom and Farlard if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy ina meeting with | another dissident leader. Farland replied “ in the affirmative. wae NL oom § f> = i ri cr. Sar nl ’ Ba elt a EO oc ae eon wee = . 7 a Teme " 7 ° . ‘
14-0000 (cc 26 dune 1959 Dearborn cabled the-results of his first meeting with l {|e aid tha felt that the time to concentrate on, icr planaing purposes, was the period extending through the “incapacitatilod' of Trujillo; too much planning for what would follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he egreed. . Aliso on 28 June (although the first written record we find is & Summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.c. } King that the Govermment of the United States was itrenared to -_ eo participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the Pollowing ( i : all extent: "to provide a srall number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal.of key Trujillo people from the scene. ....." ol Rubottom edded that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary exmerts to assist the " undergound to accomplish a revolt. ‘ 29 June 1960 . ; Dearbora cabled the results of his meeting with [dd ze - said that [| __Joaa recommenced a temporary standdown on "action _ toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while cetermining Venezuela's reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt. #44 4 ee "np ae g Bear! Her Fer errr: eR me pre epee one 2 a pone watenn pasar nee wet Stabe ee oe cece ty ola seamen sts, Tea te
14-00000 aw PERIL) BO tet tee ome pA nn an RES sk TOD tke Sas EAE te Bat bearbeom reported that the dissicenats had a oe eollity for picki ; a4 in airdrop site. 1 July 1950 A memorandum addressed to ithe Acting DOT recommended approval for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents. “It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Repuclice 12 sterile U.S. rifles, Mod=1 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, tozether wits five hundred rounds of ermaunition for came. . . "Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottan, who requests that the aras be placed in the bands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment. The memorandum was signed by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was epproved by C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI. — : Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to airdrcp twelve 30.03 Springfields, with exmunition, and with sights "fixed and sighted.” Thre cable asked for the coordinates of @ suitable drop site and for a four-man reception tean with flashlights. The cable £ et, 4 nO On t mtn seo Ln ERO ea eT ae eh Te ere Rea gd nite a a EEE, CREM ie cee arn ce arate recat + phones areca Sem EER yet ert
14-00000 g oy ion oO fae ct ES er ay bet ee, i 1. ty fe 4 o foe a Ie ee 8 * 3 <t D © a pos a to rou Ne og we eG a cee ee epaeyertiinn ae perenne cae esployed simul cCaneousl and what is needed in oe pee e ood o emeatation PS of plan of action. Of p i r impor i extent of military participation in preparations. In spite or [7] aprareot lack of aoe of opposition organization, most logical that he is actin lleoorating with a group that : must have some plan and bility for action which will assure . ttable interin covartment after en co? Trujillo. ..... a In your cpinton arel epee: menoers of sane group me ; or If not could the two groups te merged? . .... " 6 2 8 September 1960 : The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department A ete terme timate of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 5 September) uo proposing that he step dow. The DCI (Mr. Bull les) doubted the wisdcen , of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal e oa ° appreach. The Group concluded that a rersonal approach would be : aw 1 a + a _ best and discussed William Fawley as a candidate for the job. ' t e 18 October 1960 am NE : eth: ampere nemneme mee i Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandim summarizing epprovals | # Uy 3 - 27 - Seed : ny - a SPOT PTR ayy ; | SEoRE fig ely i} t iu t 7 ~ per el einen eee Tae mone NM nee ce ee AT ae Temper Se seme ame cree Soe = Ts meee cmang ee oss i wes
14-00000 a © r ? ¥ on re) - haus apr TTY END EI rm obtains] for actioa in Support of the Dominican internal opposition. * he text states that the summary was “provided in response to your Mees verval request on Lb (al October 1069..." ‘his 1s the memorandum Sn tome m EN Ly to which refereace is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960. 29 Tecember 1960 The minutes of tae Special Group meeting of this date read, in part: ; . "Biscal gave the broad cutlices oF a two-pronged plan i , for proceeding with certain lini overt activities «irected against the Trujillo regime. He mphasized that although ~ support would be given to the Figueres “group there is no intention of establishing 2 peranilitary force as such ..... He also exphasized that the proposed actions would not of theg- selves bring ebout the desired result in the near future, jacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself. "4. es » It was noted thet Mr. Pawley feels thet overt Intervention in the Deminican Fepublic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban Operations. . . » » « it was egreed that the plan is worth beginning at this tine . no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be." a FE Arata AORN Sere OT MRED 2 TAREE SAE MOD SLE He wi ee AoE eee, eer cee Et wp (Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with such a "plan." We foun@ no other reference to any specific plan of about this date.) . 12 January 1961 At ene ann a ener om The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the ena omens net I : SEbuLIT Life Velb - . ‘ | ; . a ‘ } a t \ . f atte re ee ay at ies:
wrt, 4 De Fs % - r - Se. 98 ar A Leiba 3 ai Group on ¢ js abs Se 4 av. Merehant explained the reeling of the Penartme: + of £ i State that limited supplies of gsall arms ord other metertal . : i. oa - shoule te made available for dissidents inside the Dominican ¢ r Repudlic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be ranaged i | securely by CIA, and that the vlan would cali for final trans- nod portation into the group ue ssidents , being provided by the di themselves. The Croup appr " i oved the project. 19 January 1951 a7 vane to. , ; "For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable, : : authority hes been given Hqs for dalivery to internal froas i ~ of limited supply of szall arms and other material on condition ; ; - that introduction of saterial into LonRep te ePrected by Doms. te se » » » Above coordinated with State.” i etm Sept a cnet Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEPD by ( : . - members ef the CA Staff and of WH Division: q | “ "It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by prone) that the - | a Special Group now has approved that a ‘limited supply' of e small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to. | aA a the Doniaican resistence elements with whom we have been : = . dealing. Tois was additional to the Special Group's apvoroval : ; on £9 December 1950 of. our Cperational Proposal." ! z ae ' te . i a (Comment: As noted io the entry for 29 December, we “now ‘ a none of the specifics of this Cperational Proposal. } ; : eibaliT kidd biiny . . | e . { | ST i ee eee Pe lee as ES ee ee ee eer eS a TN a ee tae pepeenseee woe @ . | i . fe j
14-00000 4 "“OPficial-Informal” letter fron Dearborn <o Devine in State “With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been mace. hope that lt will net be necessery us play cown too long the cuestion of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and too great tardiness on our Fart would only lead them to question our sincerity.” i ‘ i : ' : 6 February 1961 Cable from headquarters: : as, i Pom, "1. Realize details not now available but Eqs would i “C ba! appreciate (Gissigents'7 reaction to offer of armed assistance i . to include- [dissidents] current plan... ' , ‘ : "2. Also request initial assessment _ %, [eissidents'7 capability carry out plan of action once linited t 7 armed assistance provided.” i ; 10 February 1951 ee The station cabled its reply: ; oe "Ho solid reecticn except joy as of 9 Feb. ie} ct ct iy 8 3 2 i . ."Initial assesment is ana | - 1d carry out plan. But with access , vis : appreaching point when will betteF Be atic Sevatuate greup ; 4 potential for acticn. We some weeks away frou being able : | ; make solid preliminary assessment. : 1 * { I t “« “Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one szall | CO - 30 - i ia / "ky, } | atk 5 we em psy) es . Geis hike a ) ited - - i wl ! A ? toe - . ; . ea Se i a ee TR ay mn me am ctmayey meth 8 we ei Tate ene meme Hi
74-90000 directic: ; * « » &Sked that a Semorandium be prenared for higher authority on the s; Oject of what plans can he made fora t Successor government to Trujillo.” 7 ‘ a coe ) (Coment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandig ! in CIA files.) a 29 voruary ays. vieteeneg peenernaneery pe renee + the headquarters branch cnter,/ | i : memorandum record of the meetiag follow: | a "oa ed Played dowa scnewhat the necessity for { eo. delivery of arms, @lthsugh he did Say that it is desireable H * and should be a part of the Planning. Ee ssig that members of i « —— the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small guani tities Ox arms froa Army contacts . + + but that Gay arms SO odtained ss . would have to te used very quickly before their loss is : : i . ' discovered. For this feason, he said 1+ would te Cesireable to i bd i : have aras delivered by us that could be Stored for use at any | bs nemeat desired. i —<= ‘ Said that the object of ebtaining this Kind of help ras : eayway is the elisiration o7 Trujilic and instead of using arms 4 Oc grenates he began to Spe2x of more exotin “Aateriels and methods “. . soe + @ peverDul cemb that could be Planted along the route of Se Trujillo's evening walk and could be Getonated fr. IQ wy y wail . Ly Dit paretr anes metered pe bn Sane RS Oe To Ne Oe rd fry + nreminertren memmaante sont avinretinaren my ore arte iti neeaian eel mee pemeron annie a i} fa pe 4 et gale eee ee are sete nt bce
14-00000 2 3 é : Ej F ; r . ! electronic device .. , (or)... the possibility of polsoning the dictator's food or 9+ putting poison capsules in bottles : of certain medicines trac th citvator is lmowa to take i. regularly. 2... 0, 4 - 2 Bore practical plan that they pet forward WaS One that they said had alreacy been planned at one tire : 228 5 before. Th ey said that when the dictator leaves his office for : his hore there are three automoniles in his procession with the - t : i tomobile end the bodyguarts in : : dictator himself in the first autor the following Wing two. The ides that tes been discussed internally is for several truczs to block tae progress oY these cars a given intersection at which tine young men who telong to the ; action groups woulda leap out of the trucks with fire areas and .6renades to finish off the dictator." we 4 March 1951 aren Lsol S C oem Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of | tesorendim ! ae On | March, the chief of station > cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage I 4 and kill him with guns and @renades;: : rc : 42 é : pa ‘ idea . . . slrost certain fail if applied. That : = type atteck is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified Hf cope with. Their defense mitern and displacement vehicles e . plus police ctice Cetour traffic blocks Sway from entourage a uake idea fatally childish view." . *: : ° : (Comment: The assassination was actually carried out . ‘ through a variation of this Scheme. he assassins detected and ‘ f took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's novezrents Pe in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled higwsays.). i ° enre, ee + meteor t picobaanilen pune meinen meuniere aes istety Sige ten conectememian ae ss i$ bow . . 7
14-00000 Oe, i a Tres "e —_, og eof woe 8 : { : : ‘ Toe station cabled headquarters on 4 Maren: ; “oo. « Af cpport . pro-US group mot to be Lost, H : . . ~ oan ¢ . believe . . . imperative make sure arms with amso ready for | # . inzediate entry DemRep .. . if necessary at air drop sites...” { : 5 March 1951 | : - - : i ; As & follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication i : | i from| i "Ye pave in our hands chance to speedup i . events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be { i : assured as much és human fallibility permits. .... - * | i _ 7 March 1961 | : Headquarters cabled the fiel2, in part: i } “Existing authorization precludes introduction amms into | Peet Don Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans for possible alternate delivery method, wean 22St station determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned o « » « « Request type and quantity ams desired. . . . « « ear bes Poe td che we gormmet one eti eeh 8 March 1951 Cable from the station: Jexs ting his =] at point near depends on Trujille traval ... mot awar bas told us but interesting that Charge’ Papal Tihmciatura also aware plot exists but possibly not of personnel involved.” PSTD, wk > 2 ’ eee Fee Ob SN ERIE RNS IP Sep er group vian try kil it Riad, WERE JO Sear aren ove Ee ee ‘. ( / Ms Poy é #3 . *, rivet i bad tad t | eeterten sc ceatrenneaeenmenteteeteeene teers # sot 4 KRTAECTL OTTO wm ee eh RR Tl iS Sn OI Po SRS A, gat dag = AUR eeevtmemne rartitemnen mest ie oF ie a en, Sa ie sete. Hebe Nome” +e
74-00000 N a : Greeny re. 4 Wie wil, SO goes » foo Le He: dquarters cabled the station: . requested .....,.% 13 March 1951 Eeadguarters cabled the station: mn ¢ . © See wom St a, 15 March 1961 oe Cable from the station: ; ies y i. smal supply fregmentation Grenades ‘Por use in next we2k or so.! . By nove, | tne chie? of station checked back with and . learned the dissident group must do eit Trujillo/ this * month or drop it as number o? vr.nae persons with “loose mouths i are appereatly aware renewal plan... .. asxed for five = 4S mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or Sizilar, 1,500 rounds armo for mn fe . . nue * . LMS ee, omer me ween mative tH sae ge i Re spf Settee Nemes Set aS le a Faye WE dee a bie 4 ‘e chor. ru Fe anne we che Ne RMU oy an weSbastigne 804 ater Wertarae gta seme peewee oe STO Sa UAE ye Nelle WKLY Eee 2
* t ed fare, . . . 50 fragsentution grenades, . . . tan Gem tank rorwets. 2... 6..." z 16 Maren 1951 Headquarters cabled ifs reply: "Eqs exploring possibili advise ASAP. Meanwhile, reques I [maxing request on own ink LY March 1951 ‘ Cable trem the staticn: : t : : “For issue to several fof the dissident group/ Consul f ° 1 Nee “General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesacn Special pistols or similar and three szall boxes cartridzes. Pp £ 3 If sending emmo complicates problem, advise and we will t get from Marines. pouch one small size high fire power veapoa/ as Deartora increasingly concerned lest momentim whic group nas now for {assassination decline result lack tangible or too slow action . ‘ on arms by toe U.S. Govermment. Also security these people " increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day : more involved in [the operation/. Loss of one of key peosl - thru capture could lead revelation details ODYCKE/SMEEED we ‘ activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend thenselves against Sr4." 18 March 1951 ce SA Aen mameme oreo arena tag SR eee ee a a df. fe a7 ae ee - "Chief of Station reiterates suggestion. /to send in each { ! wbtbeciewi © Latte | ! ; mk oe tes peerame "ee et Vistar iia
14-0000 ewe 4 ss in capital. bes es her a ae ae S her apartse rently has someone “in tullding woo “Tee essed as aray officers, small group > to entrance, distract veal with pretext, dispatch hin bem in silence, enter apartment and try do [essass inatios/, 2 i i “s t. "Zo do they need five M-3 or comparable mechine guns and 1509 rounds eso for personal defense in event firefight. Will use Gulet weapons for trasic GOD. . 2. 6 e ~Lod Stna positicn was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch, or similiar means. Evident he actually worried that deli very by ; ; other means would ceuprestise entire project. Obvicus he can’ : ! a count on only one group both receive arms ard do fassassination/. a ‘ expects and willing risk chacs for period ao of ubtelerminged leagin after fe ssassination/ mainiy because for Sai Security reasons his group cannot appreach military ena hepe ta . - _ get decisive agreenent support before (essassination/. ‘ _ 20 March 1961 " oo tte tenth ene leelg ae gaan Ae we ) Headquarters cabled the station: "Regret no authori cation exists to suspend pouch re tions Sgainst shimment of arms . a | if this feasible. , Coordisated with State Department.” et cece tesa anne nae a yo 22 Maren Le61 ‘ SEBS Agok fhe station replied, in part: ‘ « « » We realize permission does not now comes Chief of Station mmows that ref eR via pouch for worthy Purposes, s0 it can te done. Judging ?ron os _ ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so the ' 5 CAREW Ree a enna INRA en Wade yeti gin hy mat Re teen” «eee encase tm ne a en RO coro UE ee at aatten 9 vg genie oe
14-00000 se PUTT ot a pees ey - St ey is Poss ee . FY tae * on oa Fi 4 “—— ete oe “4 . Ronde Toe a é please continue try get authosieation for air drop of... arg . +. Or inport ams by /Other/ means. Completely negative plea 7 for arms, whatevs:r delivery cethod, will ends + bob and protably oy | |. : i The above excerpt is the most significant int in the cable, but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the & amet cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P LA) Wid y “4 Oo fe) i~ wo WN ia) nent eareterreta inpatient eran eatsncrnnvarmnanenecentte: te teeatefaah Tsien (Bissell) undertoox to set|__|straignt. Tne cable gives a fairly complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and off oe responsioilities. It is summarized here. We Support a program to replece the Trujillo regize; we wish to avoid precipitate acticn if e pisoning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine @ums and armunition will te supplied to demonstrate good will to the dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action By a aod 2 ro f 1 1 sa een ceenen genset ons c gutegene seen eran woe ce eemeens one wee the dissidents that migaot result in the forming of a new goverment é I é , "If above clarifies .aqs position, | jsaoula proceed accordingly. In event major noints renain uiclear, State Depeariment preparing z . orcers permit return for consultations.” . : (Comment: We do not know whether [__|reptiea to this cable E or not. We do not find a reply in the files.  daza EO to headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot cet ee sak ote oe * {2 is apparent from the EMDZED operational files that no ams were ever air-drovped Ba Maa oat Say I aa + "Cnet mene et eenet eh © F-einenetnnegaR amtn ese os anne mene? a : fete teem ne ee nee eran me on ee ere oh Me TOR AR eboney FR er Adee oF - ne 5 enix *y . aaron
74-06000._ 2 eer suney iit FH SU establish that the trip wes a direct result of this cable. Tae re is some eviceace that suggests that the trip may. have beea in Sm I Ath ENTE CR Raat ON BE RETO a “connection with a } Teguest from the dissidents for sulmachine + ‘guns. Dd 26 verch 1961 . ; ‘ ‘Cable. from the station: “ “For Jrequest permission puss three semi- - automatic M~l carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which avaliable 3 : consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need fram Hgs & nine 30 cartridge magazines for weapons. Kequest. prompted by = ue. [ote 25> March which says he canuol hoid group : en together beyond. April 15 without arms delivery... . » «: " Ce. oo ; _ (Ccmment:. It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology at this point. As we will later explain,.these carbines were : - , actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of oe Antonio de la Maza, vho worked out the details of the assassination "and vas the lead figure in carrying it out. They alaost certainly were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have o co ERR Ne arate Se kh Re Pe ALT a ese) evidence that any of them vere actually fired during the shooting. The little evidence ve have suggests that they were not actually -- used. These ‘three carbines are ‘the: weapous referred to by various sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no | aa ' evidence of any other weapons having been passed. ) Sift tbuenton Wyte esuecton MeN Aan aU OSE MARTY
27 March 1951. Headquarters cabled tre station: "PY, ref nardvare /the three pistols the station asked be © - pouched/ makes fairly sizeable package if limped single shimmest.. Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one paczage; or whether split shipment preferable.” .- (Comment: We find no indication in the files that these ‘ revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not, because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.) : 29 March 1961 Wa. Eeadquarters cabled the station: , re * . « « Has inclined to favor passing] side? . ae carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installatioa™- § imventory, thus_regui riwors which may olow CIA's . o ultimate use?. e - they being made available to Dominicans quixe a Consul General Dearborn's concurrence... Advise... . 2» «- : FS Pouching ... nine magazines... ® - : . Etral any mt a . _ 3L March 1961 ¢ ab ev Pet ser afi ‘The station replied: [TA officer cepending on what a. steps seems best here, Dearborn concurred ia request and in this ee message. We cannot emphasize enouga that we must make gesture of
Pet The oeSTA ETD a 3 good will td Invw. These items sre not what he rr or asked for but they are an invesasent in operational continulty. 4 & ‘ Headquarters cable to the station: "/Passing. the three carbizes/ approved. Advise Hqs vhea . passing.of this equipment ccomleted. , ‘{Comment: This cable was released by the 0D/P (Bissell).) “AROSE DAS Ds Mee NIE: oe Re OR 7 April 1961 j @able from the station: ee _ Boi '  ° .. “ffhe pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines] * ee contained 15-bullet magazines rather than j0-bullet magazines , as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type Mel carbine magazines.” 9 April 1961. I Cable from the station: . - a passed yo ie fire three carbines? to April 7. Ho complicatioas." SuSE ES CERT Od ca RU TERNS bea 1 a AEE PRR esa 1S OTST ARIS BAR: 8 TRY _(Comment::.-The files.do not contain an accoust of how the carbines were actually passed. As ve vill leter see, headquarters subsequently poucked submachine gus for passing to the dissidents.. Headquarters asked for the station’s plan for securely passing the subsachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose ~ oe Do fotes use essentially same technique as that for [zoe three carbines/. : ro ; Fert sr
ot Bp BER BAP AISI LEG Hh ms _ rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action decease Ne NAN aN SEE SAAD SENN es A ORE A EMT RNS PER NRID CSL eA SRN April 1961 , . "|... Chief, WH Division, sutmitted to Chief, RI, a memorandus requesting waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request iis submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo hes ‘requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240 ¥ group to be used for self protection.” -* (Comment: The entry for:18-March 1961 refers to a request for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station. Tnis pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station sas ; . :
34-90000 7 os Bek ish at nheatdyarters for consultations, I: is protedle that he wade the plea in person... As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so- 2 4 i " culled " srease guna” of World War II) were poucked tut approval was hever given the station to pass them to the plotters.) . od Zeadquariers cabled the station: PRP LT OP RL LES oh ee EU ARR ETRE weet, “Equipment for ae guns/ which subject of Chief of Station Gonversations gs being pouched . .. 14 , April. Prior to Passing equipment, advise Has what scheme of ; a et ééUivery proposed.” ‘ SE a et — : (Commant: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on ; a ae Rr es ie has BEE e Se ( A the 9 April entry.) me — b ; 13 April 1961 : | ene An extract. from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn fron: es . °. ."The three Leica cameras, model M-1 [the three carbines/, _ With their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day. “Or tw. 2 2 6 ys With the *small emomt of equipment which. they ~ @re receiving they can only take action at a few specific places and therefore the probabilities are consicerably reduced and : the time factor, considerably extended accordingly. With the © mest_of the equiment (four Leicas, nodel 4-3) /the sutmachine | gens/ the possible places of action are multiplied and the lost tine greatly reduced.” i “Uh Apri. 1951» oa Extract frou a no RECURS CA ash ‘ ' } 3 trom esas] ona ¥ EE A ABO Fre ata come tore
14-00000 ra See ~ - feoasul General Dearterny: : wéasOrles are im the hands . of ney need more cameras é in order to do a 3 “We hope that the meno We seat two days in Wasa. in this regard." . DsLta [®eardora/ : . "The last word *@ in the matter of cameras: ¥ ‘ CRISTOBAL says that with the 3 Leica : cameras alrescy’ celivered t+ is OSsible to do tha bislugreagnic Re job. Ye needs to have the rest of the equimment (the k m3 ; ° oo Leicas) before he undertakes the gob. The ones already delivered od : he sees them as good ccmplementary equirment (defensive) but he if Ae needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is ry . belier that the ones already delivered have served a psychological Be Purpese also: the ten involved have always been in doubt the good faith of your people in wash. ‘Their feeling was that in Several months all they have obtained were promises. Wow they See that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing - 48 waiting for the reavy cameras.” 17 Avril 1961 —— — " Headquarters cabled the station: + ts ss 08% important /the susmachine guns] not/Se passed tof Pw teout additicnal ligs approval. Please advise vhen equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of delivery." , A ny ae Bers bor as } ant . o) MSC ente tee Ey SERS Ten mmcic, gihaet atl tein ates Ritidens a re eae te ae ee ne er en So oe Somer BN See 3 ea OT, eRe eres Spe “ss g ae - . . reveat not te | t. i | it ft } ]
20 April 1961 Hesaquarters: cabled the Station: " [Bubs ehiine ges] s should be held : ia 1 station ¢ further notice and not repeaz not be pascéd to This Hqs decision based on judsmeat that Pilling vacuum created Dy. {assassination nes bigger question than ever:view unsettled = ; condi tions ; vin Cariobeen area. : :stody till SI MISL trea: x) went Th "Reqiest station provide fol: info socness ea) Eave - [the three carbires/ been delivered to (b) 7 Details on an alternate plan to @eliver /sutmackine gas) (Commer.t: It might be noted that this cable wes. sent just three days after the failure uf the Lidirg at the EBay of Loe ‘Note to DELTA /Dearborn/ fros YAGIATE and SOCRATES: ; "The officers that were to co the photographic job are not only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery of the other leicas. ‘They have decided to give up the plan and ;- disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing.” . 20 April 196. Cable from ‘the station: : * Submachire guns} here 19 April with no-entry problems bahay ‘whatsoever. Excellen* lmeans station's plan can: be sinpliffed even more. ‘re! | the” and the chief of station can share delivery direct to drop. Request Hgs advise when ve may begin.” 20. April 1961 ” - : |
“(ce zrent: -The trecise nature of-this poe not further clariftea in the. f2 e+: Nomea writing in ‘ » the weapoas' ware 2 April 1961 Cable from headquarters to the station: "Submachine guns/ should be held in station_ further rn notice and not repeat not te passed to The station replied to headmarters! query of 20 April “regarding disposition ‘of ‘the three carbines: I has siven /the three carbines] to internediary who holding unti 1 |picks UP » « o
(Coment: Tats “iatemediary" appears to have been | wane cigaificacce of this end tne security probles it Bs “posed will become apparent fram ore of the later entries for — 31 May.) — 25 April 196k se wo oO gk "Foll from Dearborn: “I belleve political consequence of not delivering /cutmachine guos/ so serius I plan go Vashingtes wit next few days for discussion with Departrent and CAS Eqsi” , "96 April 1951 Ne tegen Cable fron, the station: told Chief of Station. . . Antonio de la : Maza plans try assassinaticn between 29 April and 2 May. ~ possibly not yet aware plen. No sslid info och { members aseassiration effort but. General. Juan-Tomas Diaz. protabd’ will aid. Will use the three carbires plus whatever else can: ; get. De la Maza asks edd the suumachine guns if possible « se 30 April 1961 Following from Dearborn: April 28 and| | callea on ze with foll info: ... main missior jwas plead with me release sutmachine guas they believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3 carbines, 4 to 6 12-gidge shotguns with 120 rounds and some saall arms... . .- « »« Action entails roudside ambush near San Criszocal ‘: rea AO Rent sok neti foe cee wee a erat nee Bepnicaeet caterer sate M6 tt tar OR AP get 5 ae a
and few a2iitional weapons cou be jisporcant. oe a ee T had ro suvmachine guns under 2 rol and that any U.S. controlled items which might be in Dom a Rep could only be released -@n specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that : Slnce the. three ccarsines were sade available Cuban incident had | occurred and hoped zroup could unger stand this is period of ‘study and assesaent. . 2... 2 Cable from the station; " ote + eo SUZZeSt Has review: decision not pass sucmachine Ate ance ‘ guns. Deterninatioa of group to 58 anead wita vias eo ees Oa overthrow o or "the Trujillo “regine.” 2 May 1991 .. ‘Draft cable prepared at headquarters: " «+. . Since it appears that|___|group has committed - itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with fact. that the carbines already made available to them for personal defense; station autnorized pass’ suomacnine guns’ to: for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . .". ... _. (Comment: This cable vas never sent. ‘Tt VAS authenticated a J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordina tea on te It-was forvaried to the DECI for release: General-Cabell attached a han@written buck-slip: "Retur to: Chief, W.H. Div., - unacted upon.) a rs f es 4 Stee ot a LY _ aoe aan gehen
e k May 1952 The Director,. ata ceeting of tae Special: Group, reported aoc new “aatf-Trujillo plot, saying that we never mew if one of these would work or not. a a 5 May 1952 | Headquarters cabled the staticn: "Regret delay but release fof the submachine guns/ avaits bign level State Deparunent decision.” Headquarters cabled the station:... "State Department has disapproved passing /submachine. guns/. 16 May 1961 (Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incompretiensible a "memorandum in the EMDEED files.. It is dated 17 May 1951 and concerns The trensaittal dispatch maxes. a AIP eas em one an 9 AS ia a ia
18 Mey 19351 ‘There vas discussion at a Special Group meeting. of planning vith respect to the Dominican Republic. “Chester Bovles sata he thought that an internal State planning ‘paper outlining an ambitious paraatlitary plan (and alleging Special Group averoval) exceeded a the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that inpression. The following is an excerpt fram the minutes: ; . “General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were FO ot pressizg for the release to them of certain small arms. now in , ot rn U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. Ee iaquired-whether the = = °°; feeling cf the Greup remained that these arms. should not be - passed. The members showed no inclinat: ton to taxe a contrary ; ee position ¢ at this time.” * : oy, ~ 2 vay196l Oo | The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed . éiscussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts with - @issidents.” The minutes of the meeting, hovever, mike no mention a a "Department from Dearborn: ‘May 26 I had long talk with © 2h ins | oe ee made’ no request for arms which indicates group has accepted Tact Lt must do with what it has. aS # The small arms to. which General Cabell referred were the suomachine’.' By ‘guns, which were pouched to the station but were rever. Passed to tae
@- His only statement on this subject was that group bas aras but is sozewhat conc vemmed dwnatser enougn. oo "He stated-detion group planning overthroy-Trujillo for» ': past 3 weeks and representing anti-cormunist pro-deno: ratic elerents cf watch ke member rerains on brink final performance and detercined as ev er. Said he could give me no cate because a:tion depends whea Trujillo, follows awaLlted pattern which ; not known .in advance. . Group ‘has arrangement for being informed sufficiently in advanze to get into assigied positioas once sigzal given. He asked if United States prerared assist pro- United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overtarow ‘Trujillo. "I replied . » - speed with which assistance could be ~ given would be increased considerably if we could have prior — . info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities involved anc identity of. proposed junta... .. . He replied ete. participants were not prerured give tidy nunes until afterward my and could not give tice for reasons stated earlier. « « « « « "Re timing [___|stressea event could happen any day, and eoulé in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that necessary juxtapositicn of forces did not materialize.” . 29 May 1961 os "Ror Dearborn from State ..... . We must not yun risk ae “or ‘U.S. association with political assassination, since U.5S.. - as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. Th? -last- ‘principal is overriding and must" ‘prevail “in doubtful situation. ... . . You cust request and receive further ; De specific instruction for any. specific covert activity. At the. Ce present time we are unable to transfer arnus to Gissidents. « » « «- a Por : , (Comment: Both Teardorn and the chief of statioa sent * cables commenting on this guidance cable. Their cables were filed
ae a Awana. an cent * Ulawiare in Ciudad Trujillo.on 30 May but were not received in Washingtoa until the early morning hours of 31 May--about efzht hours “after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.) 31 Mav 1961 — "State from Dearctorn.... . If attempt is made by U.S. friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against us and best we can do.is see there is no proof. Greatest danger : ~. point i He was given small number arms by -Gissident agent several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained these items from consulate. toid me .. - Same and I have informed him this cannot be true or T would know ~ om, . ‘and when he requested re supply arms through him for dissidents : i ‘ . I told him this impossible. ..... | | “Aseume /the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn/ is final word on present policy| Isust be based. This for practical purposes retreat from -previous policy.. However Hqs aware extent to which U.S. Govermment already: associat?2il with assassination. | a must bo withcrawn DOW. . . . « « tried and not successful, | ib} .
Memorandiss, for. the record ‘Sigzed. by. J. D. Esterline; ‘in part: . , “Phe evening of 2 ‘June, it vas decited to immediately oe '. move out of the Dominican Reputlie che Station Chief[_jand Case O-fAicer It was aiso 5 deciaed that Administrative ssistant sbould rot retica to Trujillo. Accoré-. ingly, an Operaticcal immediate cable was sent to the station the afternoca of 2. June issuinz avorovriate instructions." a t ‘ 9 June 1961 Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject: "High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part: -"The meeting was held at 1600 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room 7514 of the Department of State. Ascng those ‘present were Vice’ President Lyndon Jahnson, Secretary: MoNanara, General lemnitzer, Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secre: tary” “Alexts: ‘Johnson, Mr. Ed Murrov, Colef, USIA, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Rickard Goodwin, Mr. Ted ¢ Achilles, Mr. Wis Coerr,.Mr. Morales Carrion : "Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred: to another message ~ | from Consul.General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to the possibility of implicating the United States ‘in the delivery of arms to the dissidents. ‘The Vice President then asked what. : . Was the ‘timing and authority on the Gelivery of arms." , | (Comment: The message to which Vice President, Johnson.. referred is not in the ‘EMDEED ‘operational files. We did not 7” : finda copy in. @ search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake. Esterline, wao appears to have ridden herd ¢ on post-assassination planning, does not recail having heard of Vice President Johnson's
§F pw eek guery. Tre record s ‘3 that ha knew of it bit doesnot Petey i URGES renenver. There is an unsigeed memorandum in the EMOTED Pele eo a dated 6 Juae GSE (the day efter | the reeting at State), ‘subject: Views On. Passege | of. ATES to Dominican Dissideats.” ‘and returaed the nemorandis cof Tals suggests to us... ers it had been directed to ‘Cla, he would have made vention of that fact in-his record. or? the meétizg. “> | ~~ of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The meeting” The menorandum summarizes State . Departzent-Consulate involvereat in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. ‘The routing and record sheet attached to the -emorandws sows it vas originated by | sna3/orau, and was furvaréed to C/O?S/aH_ (Esterline).. Esterline initialed the routing and record. sheet r that J. C. King, upon returning from the nesting at State, asked" | Esterline to have a simary pulled toget ther. + Jd. C. King remembers the meeting. at which the Vice. President asked about the delivery of arms. He does not now recall the specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting leads him to believe that the Vice President's question vas directed to one of the State representati ves. Ee feels that, A venorandum for the record prepared by J.'C. Firz of a Walte House meeting on the Dominican erisis 6a:'7 June 1961 makes no mention was chaired by the President, and Vice President Jonnson was present.
aot nn tener oer ST The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly docunentary account of U.S. _ Goverment involvement with personas plotting. the actual assassination. the overthrow of Drajilie | ‘carries through ¢ Early in the report we explained. way the cou chet was to ‘follow the assassination never. took. place. Anotaer essential. pare, of ‘the story is the roll-up of the essassination group and the discovery of U.S. davolvement with then. The censulate cabled. (i Joa 9} December 1961 that the 7 Decester iscue of the Deaini can 2 newspaper [8 La Nacion carried: a- story to Judge of “Instruction that Wimpy (Loreazo A. Berry) - ‘ provided the caliber 30 M-1 Garand autowatic carbines used to kill Trujillo.” ; a = SS ad . based ca Huascar Tejeda Pinentel's statement * ea Anterrogations of ‘the captured ‘assassins. The following summary . is drawn from the Fair's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the. SIM officer who peaded- ‘the inves tigation ‘of the assassination. Imediately after the slaying, all ‘of the assassins “assembled at the house: of General Juan Tomas Diaz. Dr. Robert Reid Cabral _was called to treat the cost seriously wounded assassin. eg
in belsg called asa Poysician learned the identi General Diaz Said be could not @llow Dr, Ref: mish refuge int Reld's house for four | “Dias forced. Dr. Raia to ‘of the assassins (Ceneral Diaz, Antoato de la Maza, Salvador . oe Li Estrella, and Roberts Pestoriza). ‘The otrer assassins vent their a separate ways. Withia hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz ’ and his three coupenicns began to panic. {it might be noted here ‘that | the assassins were sO Sure that the coup would follow and they . would all be national heroes that they haa made absolu tely know plans for hiding or escape. ) De’ la Maza called for Mrs, Reid and LO: e ordered Dr. Reid Gut of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs: Reid in the presence of his cerpasicns, Pastoriza and Pstrella \ were is . “highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after a near-fight and a@ draun~-veapons confrontation. Estrella left after . me , ot & few hours. Diaz and de le Maza left later and were killed in a. _ Sunfight while resisting arrest. Both Pastoriza. and Estrella were captured, tortured, and confessed. The following are excerpts trom “the FBI's report of its Interviews with, Ortiz, the SIM investigator, " . . . after Pastoriza left Generel Juan Tora a telegran addressed to President Rogulo Petancourt of Venezuela, which said, ‘We who kaye Killed Trujillo urgently need your help in order to flee the couatry. Signed General Jvaa Tomas Diaz." 3 Diaz composed
< % + £3 PP AN oy cng tee Wedtech ; Mom eee ye see ya ’ % a9 FE Me sarestio'd 7% . i? we met IG t tue basis that he regtely in ~ a) 3 a y ales + CO Tine Tis t a. Pee Wt SN oe then said that if ae a but that he would not deliver the telegram to « - » the scurce menticned tha @ conspirators xno mentioned tha were involved, they vere all asxsd to id » but more of the conspirators these officials oy name and mentioned only tha pean inh uO functiosaries of the United States Department of s s State only name of any American official which wes disclosed du ~ ST - ‘ Gra ee An met SNR EEN LOR not OM Em cammaeae be Sar conmanemeenernen, ee eee t t ' i fe cternasperemeure peyton ne net Rance tne scott Hans oe +p ART tet ARI ROL er Se mtn tig Be soremgmene polaron poet - fare ege0
14-00000" these connection vt we Consul Hil ‘ Reid's house themselves dic nis eR: ae cS. Department : the disclo i : ent... was } i simply a method b ict Lacs < Roman to give his | : approvel to 2 rogators opinion . i i at that time thet iavolved ia this plot, the plot would have teen guch ter organized and the coup would have succeeded.) | " . . . by the latter part °° June 1961, the lavestization i ae, had pretty well established tre identities of all the individuals : f ‘ - involved in tne plot, many of whem had been arrested and | : f ge” interrogated. The only ones not accounted for sere Luis Aniama | Pos sO Tio and Antonio Imtert Barreres. As Previously related, General . Juan Tomas Diaz, Antonio de la Maca, and Lieuterant fraeda | a Garcia Guerrero were xilled shen resisting arrest. {At this | in . point the source related that if General Diaz, Lieut. Carcia, a . . ce 12 Maza, Amiama, and Incert bed been captured, and tade to ; - tals, it is certain that many many more prisoners would nave & ; . been taken.) : "As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who ‘ were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who * 2 * . + f my a! were orougnt before the courts were Tavares and Generel Roman. . 4 oe . As far as the source is aware, no other ind‘vidual arrested in : . connection with this plot wes brouzht before any Dominican _ : i ; | I . ! 1 agd tit > Mees sittarnenmernes ome 7 SORA Rte He Sait IEEE Ne Tb al gtk Tome acne re Fm ee me eer Sen mee ee ~ diene aed a ae a oe nye TAL ine + oe %
14-00000 e. | Lt i i : ncn aes a To recap: &. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. €. King 7 . on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Goverment was prepared to partici- pate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of providing a small somber of sniper rifles for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting DCI, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Springfield rifles to ° | .. . the Dotinican dissidents by air arop| The rifles - : were never delivered. b. On 10 February 1961 the chie? of station cabled a suggestion that one ezall-size, aign-fire-pover weapon be . forwarded in each pouch. This suggestion was not acted upon. ae weet eemeetettens geee ome ¥ i Crd ¢ v2 wd one] oot ot ‘ . epee ee perenne pen eeeeiseste ge” a fa] fa Boo ny
SEOs ta gence TERED REIT LI a c. On 17 March 1961, |@ request of | Consul General Dearbon for the pouczing of three 38 caliber - Smith and Wesson spectal pistels for Gelivery to ke key members. of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch the pistols ‘but aprarently did not do so. ‘There is no indication in the EMDZED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pis vols appears to have been overtaken by a subsque nt request ror sutmachine guts. ’ d. On 26 March 1$61 the st tation cabled a- request for permission to pass three semi-autonatic Heol carbines plus ~ ammunttion to ! The carbines and ammunition . were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel. - . . The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Head- quarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and: ‘pouched the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines’ was a . released by the w/? (Bisse11). The station cabled that the on 7 April 1961. [dat the request of the dissidents, gave the cardines to| | ror we “temporary safekeeping. | Jratex recovered the carbines from [ena gave them to Antonio de Ja Maza, who reportedly kept ve carbines were’ passed to | 1 ‘ ; . 1 . havdipvelpeGibch-de-tredeongtne-+neonavtanaate srunter Truncate
Ed Viale them in the trunk of his automobile: It is probable that at least ong of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination by de ln Maza, but we have no evidence thet itiwas actually used in the shcoting. Ortiz, the SLA investigator, ‘tola the FBI ‘that the assassins who were apprehended and interregated spoke only of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols. -e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April 1041, Chie? of stationf ____—_~*d| evidently prevailed upon | headquarters, to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammmition “> ‘te the station. ‘The submachine guns were pouched and arrived “at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station” on 17 April. that the submachine guns were not to be passed to the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite + bay weber Ak saue | fe SESE B ; repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass them. We think it is safe to conclude that the. submachine guns were never passed to the dissidents. . - > A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not know the motivations of. men-such as| | Aniama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters it captured revealed that they were not greatly smotivated by a desire
to live in a free and democrat put to5% OF them were seehing vengeance or personal gain. Ceneral Pomaa, who wis to have taxen over. and form an interim government, adnitied ‘that ke bad had no intention’: of permitting free elections. He had plaszed to establish himself - as the naw Dominican. Mstrogman” replacing: Trujillo. - General Juan Tomas Diaz was bitter over haying teea publicly disgraced by Trujillo and then cashiered from the arsy. Antonio de la Maza also had a "personal grudge. ULs bro .2er, Octayic, had been killed by tre Trujillos to conceal his and thei> participation in the slaying of Gerald Murphy.in the Galindez case. Host of the others also bad personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead. af a naaone EN id aD Ar eB Ta Feta RAAT 8 mc OO