HW 50955 Page 6 Cuban affairs during this period leading up to the Bay of Pigs received active high-level attention. Bissell said that, in a continuation of the kind of intense weekly scrutiny the Bisenhower Administration had given the invasion plans (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 13). | "almost from the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, the President himslef and a number of Cabinet members and other senior officials took a very active interest in the operation (s) concerning Cuba." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 16). Bissell "almost invariably" was present at meetings in which the President and other senior officials took an "active interest'' in Cuba (Bissell, 6/9/75, p..17). Bissell testified that he aid not #nform any of them of the assassin- ation plot. : (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 39). | | c. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION EFFORTS ND O INLON Tt ENT i WED i NEORS Testimony was taken by the Committee from all living officials high in the Kennedy Administration who dealt with Cuban affairs.* The theme of their testimony -- which is set forth in detail below -- was that they had no know- ledge of any assassination plan or attempt by the U.S. government before or after the Bay of Pigs invasion. As with the Eisenhower Administration officials, members of the Kennedy Administration also said they did not believe the President's character or style of operating would be consistent with approval of such a matter. (McNamara, p. 4; Bundy, p. 98; Taylor, pp. 45,51). = Most of the testimony from officials high in-the Kennedy Administration ‘dealt with the period after the Bay of Pigs invasion, involving Operation Mon- goose and related activities. (See Section ,infra.) It was during this period that most of the high officials in the White House, ise, State Department , Defense Department, and the CIA were drawn into the detailed planning .of Cuban-operations. During this period, an extraordinary amount of decision making memoranda and other documents were gensiated in response to the Cuban situation. Docld:32423539 Page 124
HY 50955 rape / Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified: "T never had any reason to believe that anyone that I ever talked to knew about had any active planning of assassination underway.’ (Rusk, Pp. 65,49). Likewise, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that he had "no knowledge or information about...plans or preparations for a possible assass- ination attempt against Premier Castro.'"' (McNamara, pp. 7,4). [The question of whether McNamara once raised the issue of assassinating Castro is discussed at Section ,infra. | Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense under McNamara, said that killing Castro was not within the mandate o€ the Special Group which he con- strued to be the weakening and undermining of "the Cuban system." (Gilpatric, ‘p. 28). This was supported by General Maxwell Taylor, who chaired Special Group meetings on Operation Mongoose. Taylor stated that he had "never heard" of _the assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, pp. 72, 7-8). Taylor stated _ that he never raised the question of assassination with anyone. (Taylor, p. 19). Moreover, Taylor testified that he was not aware of a directive for an. assassination effort from-the President or the Attorney General, nor was he aware of a proposal for the assassination of a-foreign leader in any form by anyone to the Special Group (Taylor, pp. 41,45,62). McGeorge Bundy stated that it was his "conviction" that "no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA."' (Bundy, p. 54) Boclda: 324293539 Page 125
raze o Furthermore, Bundy testified that he was never told by anyone at any time that assassination efforts were being conducted against Castro (Bundy, p. 63). Bundy said that Richard Bissell never informed him about CIA involvement in assassination attempts against any foreign leader (Bundy, p. 41). Bundy acknowledged, however, that he had once been briefed by Richard Bissell on the development of an "executive action capability’' at the CIA (see Section , infra) .* | Walt Rostow, who shared national security duties with Bundy before moving to the Department of State, testified that during his entire tenure in govern- ment he "never heard a reference" to an intention to undertake an assassination effort (Rostow, pp. 10, 12-13, 38). ” | Asked if he’ had ever been told anything about CIA efforts to assassinate Castro, Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, replied, "No, I never heard of such a thing." (Goodwin, p. 13) .** | vo \ a * As indicated further below, Bundy also said (i) that the matter of a Castro assassination was "mentioned from time to time ... as something to talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p. 73); and (ii) he had a “very " vague, essentially refreshed recollection" that at some time he had heard to about "poison" in connection with a "possibility of action in Cuba" -- what stuck in his mind was that it seemed "totally impractical because it was going to kill a large number of people in a headquarters mess or something like that." (Bundy, pp. 42-43). Bundy stated flatly, however, that no assassination plot was approved and that he was never informed about the various plots. (Bundy, pp. 54, 63-64). *k As indicated below, Goodwin did on two occasions hear questions raised about assassination. One involved the President, who said he was opposed (see p. ); the other involved the meeting of August 10, 1962 (see pp. ae HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 1276
tran HY 50955 “yape y Presidential Assistant Theodore Sorensen Said that his "first-hand knowledge" of Cuban affairs was limited to the post-Bay of Pigs period (Sorensen, p. 4), Sorensen Stated, however, that his general opinion based upon his close contact with President Kennedy, was that { "such an act [as assassination] was totally foreign to his character and conscience, foreign to-his fundamental reverence for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimen- Sion in U.S. foreign policy to his pragmatic - recognition that so horrendous but inevitably counterproductive a precedent committed by a country whose own chief of state was inevitably _vulnerable could only provoke reprisals and in- flame hostility." (Sorensen, p. 5). lso said that - President Kennedy. "would not make major foreign policy decisions alone without the knowledge or participation of one or. more of those senior foreign policy officials in whose judgment and discretion he © ‘had confidence." (Sorensen, pp. 5-6). Sorensen concluded his testimony by providing the Committee his judgment on the following question: ~ "Q: Would you think it would be possible that ... the Agency, the CIA could somehow have been under the impression that they had a tacit authorization for assassination due to a circumspect discussion that might have taken place in any of these meetings? Sorensen: It is possible, indeed, I think the President on more than one occasion felt that Mr. Dulles, by making rather vague and sweeping re- ferences to particular countries was seeking tacit | approval without ever asking for it, and the Presi- dent was rather concerned that he was not being asked for explicit direction and was not being given explicit information, so it is possible. But on something of this kind, assassination, I would doubt it very much. Either you are for it or you are not for it, and he was not for it. " (Sorensen, 7/21/75, pp. 32-33.) . a a Boclda: 324293539 Page i127
HY 50955 Page 10 d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. (i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT. After the election, in the latter part of November, 1960, Dulles and Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the most important -details with respect to the operation which became the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34). Bissell testified that he did not believe the ongoing assass- ination efforts were mentioned to the President-elect, and that to the best of his recollection they were not. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36). Bissell surmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedy at that initial meeting were: (a) "apparently" they had not thought it was an important matter*; and (b) they "would have thought that that was a matter of which he should be advised upon assuming office rather than: in advance." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35). The latter comment: led to the following exchange: "The Chairman: Isn't it a strange distinction that you draw that on the one hand (as) a Presi- dential designate, as President-elect, he should have all of the details concerning a planned in- vasion of Cuba, but that he should not be told about an ongoing attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro? Mr. Bissell: I think that in hindsight it could be regarded as peculiar, yes. "The Chairman: .(I)t just seems too strange that if you were charged with briefing the man who _* This was subsequent ly repeated by Bissell in response to examination of his assumption that Dulles probably told President Eisenhower about the assass- ination operation: ",..the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance and there were much more. © important matters to talk about with the President." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 25). Bocld:327423539 Page 126
, Nea HW 50955 Page ll was to become President of the U.S. on matters SO important as a planned invasion of a neigh- boring country, and that if you knew at the time in addition to the planned invasion there was an. ongoing attempt to assassinate the leader of that country, that you would tell Mr. Kennedy about one matter and not the other.'" Mr. Bissell: Well, Mr. Chairman, it is quite possible that Mr. Dulles did say something about an attempt to or the possibility of making use of syndicate characters for this purpose. I do | not remember his doing so at that briefing. My belief is that had he done so, he probably would have done so-in rather general terms and that neither of us was in a position to go into detail on the matter. '' (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35). - However, Bissell also testified generally that pursuant to the doctrine of on plausible. denial, efforts were made to keep matters that might be "embarrassing" away from Presidents (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6). : (ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY -ON "'EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY" As explained in the next section, sometime during the early period of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell discussed with Bundy the subject of a "capability" for "executive action" -- a term said by Bissell to include various means of “eliminating the effectiveness" of foreign leaders up to and including assassinations (Bissell, 7/22/75, p- 32). There is some dispute concerning ‘when this occurred and who initiated it, and this subject’ is discussed at length at Section » infra. Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that Bissell did not tell Bund in the course of discussing the executive ‘action capability or at any other time -- of the actual assassination plots against Castro (Bissell, 7/22, p. 31; Bundy, p. 41). . (However, there was some testimony that the _ names of Castro, Trujillo, and Lumumba might have been mentioned in connection Docld: 32423539 Page 129
eateet HW 450955 Page 12 with the discussion of "research" into the capability. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp- 50-51)). (iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY _ Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy convened a “board of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of...[the] failure” of the operation (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp.; 42,45). The members of the board were Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke. The panel examined the Bay of Pigs failure for several weeks and issued its report on June 13, 1961. The ‘Taylor Report" does not mention the assassination . { plots. ; . ; ae Bissell was questioned extensively and appeared to General Taylor to have been the principal person involved in the operation and much more knowledgeable than Dulles who had deliberately kept himself out of the planning and delegated responsibility to Bissell. (Taylor, p. 73). | Bissell testified that he did not disclose to the Taylor/Kennedy Committee that there had been an assassination effort against Castro (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 42). He put. forward several reasons for not having done so. First, "the question was never asked." Second, he claimed Dulles already knew about the operation. Third, Bissell said "by that time the assassination attempt had been called off." Fourth, he contended that the assassination effort was "not germane'' because it did not contribute to the failure of the Bay of Pigs. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 44-46; 6/11/75, p. 39). Bissell hastened to add that he had no reason to believe'' that Allen Dulles , himself a board mémbér, did not discuss the plots with one or more members (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 46). Docld: 32423539 Page 130
HY 0955 Page 13 However, both General Taylor and Admiral Burke stated that neither Bissell nor Dulles informed them of the assassination plots (Taylor, pp. 72-73; Burke affidavit, 8/25/75, p. 3). When asked if Richard Bissell ever informed him that underworld figures had been offered a large sum to assassinate Castro, General Taylor responded, "No, I never heard that, and it amazes me" (taylor, p. 72). Taylor said that during his review of the Bay of Pigs operation no mention was made of an assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, p. 72). Despite the fact that Dulles met with Taylor on the Board of Inquiry thirty or forty times, Taylor testified that Dulles never told him about the plot (Taylor, p. 73). (iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Bissell's testimony that he had not disclosed assassination plots to the Kennedy/Taylor ''court of inquiry'' was consistent with his statement that "T have no knowledge that Robert Kennedy was advised of this (the plot to kill Mr. Castro)." - (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 41). The Committee tested this statement against other parts of Bissell's testimony. An ‘attachment to the May 22, 1961 FBI memorandum (regarding the Las Vegas tap) which Director Hoover had sent to the Attorney, General* had quoted Edwards | as s saying that Bissell in "recent briefings" of Taylor and Kennedy , "told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of © ’ Giancana and the underworld against Castro." (Bissell, 7/17/75, Ex. 3). When first shown this document, Bissell said, * A handwritten note from the Attorney General to his assistant on the face of the memorandum indicates that he had actually seen the: document? This. memorandum is discussed in detail at Section , infra. Boclda: 324273539 Page i131
HY 50955 Page 14 "I have no recollection of briefing those two gentlemen except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member."' (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 27). As mentioned above (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his briefings to the Board of Inquiry did not deal with assassination efforts. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 45-46). Discussing the document in a subsequent appearance before the Committee, Bissell again said that he had no recollection of any such conversation (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56) but he was sure that it did not take place in front of the | Kermedy/Taylor board of inquiry (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 64). However, Bissell speculated, the report quoted Language which "I might — very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld against Castro." - (Bissell, 6/11/75, p..21). - The examination of Bissell on whether he had had any such discussion and, _ if. so, why he used such obscure and indirect ‘language, elicited the following testimony: "Q: Did you, sometime in May of 1961 commmnicate the state of your awareness to the Attorney General in your briefing to him? Bissell: Well, there is a report which I was shown, it was last week, I believe it also came from the FBI, but I could be wrong about that, or - indicating that I did, at that time in May, brief _ the Attorney General, and I think General Taylor to the effect that the Agency had been using -- I don't know whether Giancana was mentioned by name, but in effect, the Underworld against the Castro regime. Q: .Did you tell them -- them being the Attorney General and General Taylor -- that this use included actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?" Boclda: 324293539 Page i132
HW 50955 Page 15 "Bissell: I have no idea whether I did [.] I have no idea of the wording. I think it might quite possibly have been left in the “more general terms of using the underworld against the Castro regime, or the leadership of the Castro regime. Q. Mr. Bissell, given the state of your knowledge at that time, wouldn't that have be deliberately misleading information? Bissell: I don't think it would have been. We were indeed doing precisely that. We were trying to use elements of the underworld against Castro and the Cuban leadership. Q. But you had information, didn't you, that you were, in fact, trying to kill him? Bissell: I think that is a Way of using these people against him. se Q. That's incredible. You're saying that in briefing the Attorney General you are telling him you are using the underworld against Castro, and you intended that to mean, Mr. Attorney General, we are trying to kill him? Bissell: I thought it signalled just exactly | that to the Attorney General, I'm sure. Q. Then it's your belief that you cammmicated to the Attorney General that you were, in fact, trying to kill Castro? Bissell: I think it is best to rest on that report we do have, which is from a source over which I had no influence and it does use the phrase I have quoted here. Now you can surmise and I can surmise as to just whattthe Attorney General would have read into that phrase." (Bissell, .7/22/75, pp. 53-54). Bissell then testified: Docld: 32423539 Page 133
HY 0955 "Q. Was it your intent to circumlocutiously or otherwise, to advise the Attorney General . that you were in the process of trying to kill Castro? Mr. Bissell: [U]nless I remembered the con- versation at the time, which I don't, I don't have any recollection as to whether that was my intent or not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56). Bissell proceeded to speculate that a "proper" briefing might not have included any reference to the assassination plot. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). He gave two reasons for. this speculation: (i) even if he had . "thoroughly briefed'' the Attorney General he would have chosen "circumlocutious" language to tell him about the activity involving Giancana. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-56); and (ii) the. assassination effort had been "'stood down by then." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). Bissell concluded by reiterating that he had "no knowledge" that the Attorney General was "specifically advised" of the. assassination plot against Castro (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 62).* e. OONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GEORGE SMATHERS George Smathers, former U.S. Senator fran Florida, testified that the subject of the possible assassination of Castro arose in a conversation between ‘Smathers and President Kennedy on the White House lam in 1961.** Smathers * Tf the FBI quotation of Edwards is to be accorded significant weight, then it is important to note that another section of it contradicts Bissell's assump- tion that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had been circumlocutiously advised . ' by Dulles of the assassination plot. Edwards told the FBI that "Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards’ contact with Maheu"' in connection with Cuban opera- tions. Bissell's explanation for Edwards' statement was that Edwards was being "pro- tective" of the DCL. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20). But this testimony must be - reconciled with Bissell's previous testimony that Dulles knew of the operation and probably would have told the President about it. ** =Smathers' testimony about this conversation referred to the transcript of an Oral HIstory interview, conducted on March 31, 1964, in which his testimony was based gives an indication that the conversation transpired in 1961, before the Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April... o = ‘It appears from the White House logs of Presidential meetings that there were only two occasions in 1961 when Senator Smathers met with the President alone for as much as twenty minutes. Both of those meetings took place in March. (Supra, p. ). Boclda: 324273539 Page i134
rage L/ said he discussed the general Cuban situation with the President many times (Smathers, p. 6). Smathers had many Cuban constituents, was familiar with Latin American affairs, and was a long-time friend of the President (Smathers , p. 6). | | Smathers had the "impression" that the President raised the subject of assassination with him because someone "had apparently discussed this and other possibilities with respect to Cuba'' with the President (Smathers, pp. 16, 25). Smathers had no direct knowledge of any such discussion, nor did he: Know who might have been involved (Smathers , pp. 18-19, 25). The President did not indicate directly that assassination had been proposed to him (Smathers, p. 18). / According to Smathers: We "... [President Kennedy] asked me what reaction ; As Al I thought there would be throughout South My | I told the President that even as much as I dis- liked Fidel Castro that I did not think it would be a good idea for there to be even considered uf an assassination of Fidel Castro, and the Pres- \e tl yr ident of the United States completely agreed with gic h ¥|. me, that it would be a very unwise thing to do, i the reason obviously being that no matter who did (wr it and no matter how it was done and no matter what, that the United States would receive full. credit for it, and the President receive full credit for it, and it would work to his great disadvantage with all of the other countries in Central and South America...I disapproved of it, and he completely disapproved of the idea." (Smathers, p. 22). |e America were Fidel.Castro to be assassinated. . Smathers further testified that he had said the reason it would work to "great disadvantage" with the nations of Central and South America was because they would blame the United States for any assassination of Castro (Smathers, p. 6). HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page i135
Page 18 | | Smathers said that on a later occasion he tried to raise the subject of "Cuba and what could be ldone"" with President Kennedy (Smathers, p. 22). The President made it clear ‘to Smathers that he should not raise the subject with him again.* : | | Senator Smathers concluded his ‘testimony by indicating that on Cuban © affairs in general, he felt he was "taking a tougher stance than was the President" (Smathers, p. 24) . But Smathers said that he disapproved of even \e Ad thinking about assassinating Castro and said he was "'positive’” that Kennedy b \ of also opposed it (Snathers, p. 16). | | . * One night at dinner with Senator Smathers, the President emphasized | his point by cracking his plate at the mention of Cuba. _Gmathers, p. 22). HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 136
LINED Ne SN Meeting 8/30/75 -l- (pp. 75-80 reserved by Senator Tower) (iii) Kennedy Administration _ The Question of Authorization Outside the Agency During the Post Bay of Pigs, Mongoose | and 1963 Periods This section discusses the question of authorization outside the Agency for the assassinatiom plots during 1962 and 1963 -- the period of Operation Mongoose (the 1962 Kennedy Administration program aimed at overthrowing Castro by an internal revolt), the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, and the subse- quent program in 1963 which saw a more limited covert action program directed .%_ against Cuba. 7 A. Recap of the Assassination Activity After the Bay of Pigs ' During 1962 and 1963 there were three principal assassination plots. 1. In the spring of 1962, William Harvey reactivated the contact with John Roselli and in April.provided lethal pills and guns to Roselli and Cuban associates in Miami. In May it was reported that the pills reached Cuba. '@. In early 1963 the science fiction schemes }— exploding sea shell and poisoned diving suit -~ were contrived and then abandoned. 3. In ‘November 1963 the dissident Cuban who was code-named AMLASH was given a poison pen device. B. The Issue of Authority The fundamental issue dealt with in this section is whether the above assassination plots were. authorized outside the Agency. The issue arises from the differing perceptions /or Helms and his subordinates, on the one hand, and members of the Kennedy - Administration, including the Director of the CIA, on the other hand. ‘While Helms stated that he never received a direct order to assassinate Castro, Helms testified that. he fully believed that the CIA was at all times acting BW 50955 within the scope of its authority and that he believed a Castro assassination came within the bounds of the Kennedy Administration's effort to overthrow Castro and his regime. Helms stated that he never informed ENTE a A Ee sKennedy Fe fl “ el oc i Bocld:324273539 Page i137
HW 50955 -~2- Administration of the assassination plots. .On the other hand, McCone and the sur- viving members of the Kennedy Administration testified that they did not believe a Castro assassination was permissible without a direct order, that assassination was not within the parameters of the Administration's anti~Castro program, and testified that to their knowledge no such direct order was given to Helms. Before setting out the testimony in detail, we discuss below the Kennedy ; _ Administration's 1962 covert action program, Operation Mongoose (as well as the *. events in 1961 leading to that program) which was designed to overthrow the Castro regime. An understanding of that program is essential to an evaluation of the testi- mony on the issue of authorization. C. Events From the Bay of Pigs to the Establishment of Mongoose . 1. The Taylor Review | On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President requested | General Maxwell Taylor to conduct a re-evaluation of “our practices and pro- _ $rams in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla ‘activity which fall short of outright war." The Président hoped that Taylor would give special attention to Cuba. (Letter to Maxwell Taylor, April 22, 1961) Robert Kennedy was to be Taylor's principal colleague in this effort. The resulting review. of the U.S. policy in this area concluded: "We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics. , RAK "It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro." (Report to the President, June 13, 1961, memorandum No. 4, p. 8) coe ayers wena Rant tr Docld: 32423539 Page 136 re ee . eae
It is clear from the record moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of Pigs - had been regarded as a humiliation for the President personally and for tne CIA institutionally. By July the Special Group had agreed that the basic objective "is. to provide support to a U. S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U. S20 (Memo for the Record, July 21, 1961.) Occasional harrassment operations were mounted during the summer but there was neither over- all strategy nor much activigy. | 2. Wational Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1961, , and the a ns CIA tA Intelligence Estimate - The documentary evidence and testimony indicate that in the fall of 1961 the question of the effect of Castro's removal from power and the prospects in that event, for U. S. military intervention were considered by the Kennedy Admini- stration. { : ' Two studies were prepared in this connection. - Pursuant to Hational Security Action Memorandum 100 "NSAM LO0"'), the State Department was asked to assess the potential courses of action open to the U. S$. should Castro be removed from the Cuban scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of Defense for military intervention in that event. The CIA, prepared an "Intelligence Fstimate’” on the "situation and prospects” in Cuba. As discussed below, the evidence indicates that the Focus of these studies . a: Le Tt of action open to the U. S. in a post-Castro Cuba, rather than a fe, hean : ee > de y 3) : “ON gy oF ral neassassi ination NSAM 100 _On October 5, 1961, Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 100 ("NSAM 100") (Bundy, Ex 3).entitled "Contingency Planning for Cuba", NSAM “100 was addressed to the Secretary of State stated in full: "Tn confirmation of HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 139
oral instructions conveved to Assistant Secretary of State Voodward*, a plan is desired for tne indicated contingency." Related documents indicate that the subject matter of the contingency referred to in HSAM 100 was the "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene". (Bundy ix 3A, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, October 6, 1961, p. 1.) The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on October 6, LO61, (the day after the issuance of NSAtH 100) state that the Group was told that in addition to an overall plan for Cuban covert operations," a contingency plan in connection with the pos- sible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene” was in preparation. (Bundy, Bx: 3A, Memorandum for the Record of Special Group meeting, October &, 1951, p. 1.) . ™ addition, a Memorandum for the Record by Parrott on October 5, 1961, states that Parrott informed Assistant Secretary Woodward's Deputy that "what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene”. (Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.) Parrott's memorandum further stated that in prepariny the plan, "the presence and positions of Raul (Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account", and that Genera]. Taylor had told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned" toto Woodward. (Bundy, Ex 33.) Parrott's memorandum also stated that "on rhe to-date repert> covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up- be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is*being planned". ‘ (Bundy, Ex.3B, p. 1.) *Woodward at that time was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.
Testimony of Bundy — ann | af! os : : " * - Bundy testified that the contingency referred to in HSAM 100 and the related documents was "what would we do if Castro were no longer there", but that “clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination". (Bundy, p. 77.) However, Bundy emphasized that NSAM 190 represented an effort to assess the effect should Castro be removed from power by any means (including assassina-~ tion) but "without going further with the notion (of assassination) itself".* (Bundy, p. 77.) *"T£€ people were suggesting this to you and you were curious about whether it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any fur- . ther with that notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer." (Bundy, p. -) HW 50955 “Doclda: 32493539 “Page 141°
HY 0955 - 4H | : ? Bundy further contended that the President was not considering an assassina- tion, but rather "what are things going to be like after Castro." (Bundy, p. 81.)* / Taylor's Testimony | Taylor testified that he had no recollection of NSAM 100 of the events de- scribed in the related documents set out above. (Taylor, p. 18.) On the. basis of his review of the documents, Taylor testified that "it sounds like purely a political consideration of the sequence of. power in Cuba.""* Taylor emphasized, moreover, that"never at any time" did he raise the question of of assassination with Parrott, or with anybody else. (Taylor,);p. 19) Parrott's Testimony | ~ Parrott, the Special Group Secretary who transmitted the request for the ‘ NSAM 100 study to the State Department, testified that the request for a plan re- flected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the reference in that memorandum to the “contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the t t Cuban scene" (described above, 'p. 18), reflected interest in a contingency study ; ; for Castro's removal, but by means "short of being “iilied." (Parrott, p. 83) | : Lat hasev po Op *Thus, with respect to the desire not to indicate the President's interest in the plan requested from the State Department, Bundy testified: i " J .it was precisely to:insulate the President from any false in- ference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy to confuse the question, what are things going to be like after. Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus atten- tion on the information!he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it." (Bundy, p-. 81) *kTaylor said he was puzzled by the wording of NSAM 100 and the related documents and stated, "I just cannot tie in the language here with a plausible explanation." (Taylor, p. 18) , eR. Docld: 3242935539 Page i142 : wane ees eee
The CIA's Intelligence Estimate The CIA study in connection with the consideration of Castro's reinoval was an intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA's Board of National Istimates (which was not part of the CIA's covert action directorate), entitled "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba"*. The CIA Estimate was pessimistic reparding the chances for success of a Cuban internal revolt, and further found that a Castro assassina- tion would likely strengthen the Communist position in Cuba. a NO SO slow ~  . jton de or oF After a general review of the economic, military, and political situation in Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had sufficient popular hane wfhme Vv and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat. The concluding Craw paragraph of the estimate was entitled "If Castrq were to Die’. It noted that: "lis (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost - certainly not prove fatal to the regime...(1)ts principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the - face of a common danger." (Estimate, p. 9.) # Near! The CIA study further predicted that should Castro die, "some sort of power struggle would almost certainly develop eventually,’ but that whatever re a struggle, the Communist Party's influence would be "sik the outcome (Estimate, p. S$.) *The IG Report apparently refers to an earlier draft of this intelligence estimate. (IG, p. 4.) The IG Report, in reporting that many CIA officers interviewed in the IG investigation stressed the point that Yelimination of the dominant figures in a sovernment...will not necessarily cause the downfall of the sovernnent ," stated: "This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA - draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General fax- well Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little op- portunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control." (IG, p. 4.) The CIA was unable to locate the draft ‘paper referred ‘to in the IG Report. , *xkA cover memorandum by. Lansdale transmitting the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy. stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to be used.to oppose { >. your program" (referring to the proposed overall Mongoose operation). Lansdale's ‘” memorandum criticized the estimate's assessment that "it is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising. could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion of fact quite outside the area of intelligence.” (Lansdale Memorandum to Robert Kennedy, 11/62, p.1) As discussed in detail at pp. - below. Lansdale's basic concept for the Mongoose program was to overthrow Castro through an internal revolt of the Cuban people. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 143
At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szule to meet with President Kennedy the following day (Szulc, p. 25), On November 9, 1961, Szule, accompanied only by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy for over an hour in the Oval Office.* (Szulc, 6/10, p. 25.) “geule recalled that the President. discussed "a number of his views on Cuba in the wake of the Bay of £ Pies, asked me a number of questions concerning my conversations with Premier Castro, and...what the United States could _ for] might do in...either a' hostile way or in establishing some kind of, a dialogue..." (Szulc, 6/10, pp. 25-26). ~ Szule testified that after this general discussion, the President \ then asked "what would you think Lf 1 ordered Castro to be assassinated. x/*/ a eon j (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26; ‘Szulc Notes of conversation with President Kennedy, November 9, 1961). Szule testified that he ceplfed chat ‘an assassination ~ er cae : vle would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban system, and that it was on Szulc's personal view that the United States should not be party to murders / . ya ese and political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26). Szulc testified that Ae | Sra f etry */Goodwin. testified that President Kennedy met frequently with members of the | press and others who were experts in their fields, but that it was "possible" that the meeting with Szulc may have been an occasion for the President to con- * sider Szule fora position in the Administration (Goodwin, p. 29-30). On November 2, 1961 Goodwin had: addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the President and the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what became the Mongoose operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components," including “intelligence collection," "guerrilla and underground," and "propa- ganda."" The memorandum stated: "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szule to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one-- although we should check with /USIA Director] Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell." (Goodwin Ex. 2, p. i, 2). 7 ke] Szulc made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon as he returned to his office, based on his memory of the meeting. President fo onneey’s s question regarding a Castro assassination appears in quotation marks { 3h in Szulc’s notes, which were made the same day from "reasonably fresh" memory. | ieee. (Szulc, 6/10, p.30). HW 350955 Docld:324273539 Page 144°
HY 8 CdR aE ie He 3. Testimony of_ Szule on President Kennedy's November 9, 1961 Question — Tad Szulc*® testified that in a private meeting he had with President Kennedy on Novebmer 9, 1961, the President asked"Szulc what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated," and said "I agrée with you completely" when Szulc answered that a Castro assassination should be ruled out on both practical and moral grounds. Szule further testified that President Kennedy went on "to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons" must not be involved in assassinations. (Szulc, p.27). In early November 1961 Szule was asked by Richard Goodwin, the Special Assistant to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on November 8, ; ~ 1961, to discuss the situation in Cuba. he meeting was an "off-the-record" one which Szule attended as a friend of Goodwin's and not as a reporter. (Szulc, p. 24.) During the meeting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the situation in Cuba following the (Bay of Pigs) invasion (and) the pros and cons : ‘of some different possible actions by the U. S. in that context" (Szulc, p. 25). The subject of assassination was not mentioned during this meeting. (Szulc, p. 31.) *In Hovember 1961 Tad Szule was employed as a reporter in the Washington Bureau of the New York Times (Szulc, p. 24). Szule had visited Cuba in May~June 1961, following the Bay of Pigs invasion. (Szulc, p. 24) During the course of that trip, Szule had a "series of very long conversations with Castro". «(Szule, p. 24.) 0955 a ‘ e la naa | : Sp we! ei ins be Docld: 32423539 Page 145
19 thereupon the President said, "I agree with you completely.'"' Szulc stated further: "He /President Kennedy/ then went on for a few minutes to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination." (Szulc, p.27). Szulc's notes of the meeting with the President state: "JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same way -- he added 'I'm glad you feel the same way’ -- because indeed U. S. morally must not be part /sic/ to assassinations. Szulc's notes of the conversation further state: "JFK said he raised question because he was under terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intel- ligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro murder. sed /sic/ he was resisting pressures." (Szule note of conversation with President Kennedy, November 3 9» 1961). | ng “ Szulc stated, relying on his memory, that it is "possible" Jae and he "believed" that President Kennedy used such words as "someone in ‘the iy ‘intelligence business," as the source of the pressure for a Castro assassina- Ag ny aT tion. (Szule, 6/10, p. 29). The President did not identify the person or ea persons. (Szulc, 6/19, pe 27). V ; | . . Ea — If anyone was in fact putting pressure « on the President, there was no ates! other evidence on this point adduced before the Committee. This was particularly iietiay troublesome since everyone questioned by the Committee, both within and without the CIA,denied ever having discussed assassination with the President, let alone having pressured him. ; 7 -Testimony of Goodwin . ) - | BODE : ; ‘Goodwin attended the November 9, 1961 meeting between President’ ‘in a kennedy and Szulc. (Goodwin, pe 3). Goodwin testified that, after asking we , Szule for his reaction to a suggestion that Castro be assassinated, President Kennedy said "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do.” (Goodwin, p. 3). BW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 146
il Goodwin testified further that several days after the meeting with Szule G OU © > . . > Hho y oodwin referre t > d oO the mention of aSSaASS anatier te ry Ley aats resident > : Kennedy said only "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets''. (Goodwin, p. 4, 11.) 4, The Rejection of. Assassination in- President Kennedy's November 16 “16, 1961 8 Speech ‘A few days after the meeting with Szulec and Goodwin, and some six weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy delivered a speech at. the University of Washington. In that public address, President Kennedy stated: "We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adver- | How y oe saries in tactics of terror, assassination, false por promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." (Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 72) fiw" wf Marg i We discuss in the next section the nature of the program which was initiated against the Castro regime at the end of November- 1961 pursuant to President Kennedy's instruction, and which continued to the Missile Crisis in the fall of "1962. . yew bard HW 50955 “Docld:324293539 Page 147
HY Be" f Nese 0955 Bakes D. Operation Mongoose Ll. The Creation of Operation Mongoose. In November 1962 the proposal for a major covert program to overthrow Castro was developed. Richard Goodwin, a special assistant to President Kennedy, and award Lansdale, a military officer with.experience in counter-insurgency operations, played major staff roles in the creation of Mongoose. Both Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who took an active interest in this preparatory stage and in the later. conduct of Mongoose. On November 1, 1961, Goodwin advised the President that Robert Kennedy "yould be the most effective commander" of the proposed operation. (Memorandum to the President, November 1,-1961, p. ). Lansdale, in a memorandum to Robert Kennedy on November 15, 1961, out= lining the Mongoose proposal, stated that a "picture of the situation has emerged clearly enough to indicate ‘what needs to be done and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba". (Memorandun, November 15, 1961, p. ) | At the end of the month, on November 30, 1962, President Kennedy issued a memorandum recording his decision to begin the Mongoose project-- to "use our available assets . . . to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". (Lansdale Ex. 17, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, Defense, et al., November 30,.1961). | u cy, Py! , ba, Ag eyes? Important organizational changes were made in establishing Operat MONGOOSE. | . a. The Special Group Augmented. A new control group, the Special Group Augmented, was put in charge of Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA con- sisted of the regular Special Group (i.e., Bundy, Johnson of State, a Boclda: 324273539 Page 146
- £9 7 Gilpatric of Defense, McCone of CIA, and Gen. Lemnitzer of the Joint. a . Chiefs) plus Robert Kennedy and General Taylor. Also, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. more frequently attended its meetings than they aia those of the Special Group itself. | | b. General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations of MONGOOSE. General Edward Lansdale was named the Chief of Operations of the MONGOOSE . activities by President Kennedy. Lansdale had developed a reputation in the. Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with revolu- tionary insurgencies in less developed countries. In addition, asa result of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrusted the CIA and believed he required someone from outside the Agency to oversee. major covert action programs. Rather than appoint Robert Kennedy to head Mongoose as proposed by Goodwin, President Kennedy gave Lansdale the task of coordinating the CIA's Mongoose operations with ‘those of the Departments of State and Defense, and made General ‘Taylor the Chairman of the special Group Augmented. However , Robert nennedy did play an active role in the Mongoose structure, unrelated to his position as Attorney General. -c. CIA Organization for Mongoose. In late 1961 or early 1962, William Harvey was put in charge of the CIA's Task Force W, the CIA arr for Mongoose Operations. Task Force W operated under the special Group Augmented, and em- ployed some 400 people at CIA headquarters and at ‘the Miami Station. McCone and Harvey were thereafter the principal CIA participants in, Operation Helis wodse. concerned with Hongodse.. Helms was, however, substantially involved in Honzoose Helms attended only some 7 of 40 Mongoose meet was fair to state that McCone and Harvey, rathet and testified that he "was as interested" in Mongoose as Harvey and IicCene were. fy (ilelms, 7/18, p. 10) HW 50955 Daéclaiyeayssse “Page iag-
ro 4 N Lansdale's Theory and Ohjective for Mongoose In the fall of 1961, Lansdale had been asked by President Kennedy to examine the Administration's Cuba policy and to make recommen- dations. Lansdale testified that, in reporting his recommendations to President Kennedy, he emphasized that "Castro ... had aroused con~ siderable affection for himself personally with the Cuban population..." (Lansdale, p. 4), and that the U.S. "should take a very different course" from the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro up to that time. (Lansdale, p. .3). These prior U.S. operations were conceived and led by Americans, ‘Lansdale informed the President. (Lans- dale, p. 5). In contrast, Lansdale proposed that the U.S. work with all exiles, particularly professionals who had opposed Batista and then - became disillusioned by Castro. (Lansdale, pp. 4, 10-11); Lansdale's ultimate. objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba." anf % ; _ (Lansdale, p. 41). | Hence, after his appointment as Chicf of Operations, Lansdale's concept for the MONGOOSE project emphasized as a first step the develop- ment of leadership elements, and "a very necessary political basis" among the Cubans opposed to Castro, before any large actions began. to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize "cell _ ands; inside Cuba ... who could work secretly and safely.) Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people, and abort any eventual success." (Lansdale, p. 11). pee */ -As Lansdale described his "concept of operation" for Méngoose ‘in a memorandum to the President on January 18, 1962, it was to "help the Log Cubans from within Cuba” to overthrow the Castro regime through a "revolt of the Cuban people." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 2). yo WW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 150
- wo _ 3. Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential Instruc- ne Tv , Lions to Act More Vigorousl But That Assassination Was Not Included. sometime in the carly fall of 5 1962, Bissell was apparently called to the White House and was said to have been "chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing any-. . thing about getting rid of Castro and the Castro ° regime.” a aa. This description comes from the testimony of Samuel Halpern, a middle- - Sa eeall level CIA covert action officer, who said Bissell told him about the meeting, and directed him to come up with some plans. (Halpern, pp. 8, 36~37). Bissell said he did not remember that precise meeting but that he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass about Cuba.” (Bissell, 1/25/75, pp. 37-38). ry , Bissell was asked whether’ he considered such an instruction | to constitute authority for proceeding to assassinate Castro. He said it would not, and that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination action (Id., 38-39). Bissell also testified that there was in-fact no assassination activity between the pre~Bay of Pigs/Roselli operation and his departure from the Agency in February 1962. In late 1961 Halpern became Harvey's Executive Assistant on task Force W, the CIA action arm of Operation Mongoose. lle testified | PP. 15- 16). HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 151
- 16 - a " The January 19, 1962 Meeting at Which the Attorney General Was - Quoted As Saying Cuba Should Have the "Top Priority" in the United States Government , On January 19, 1962, a meeting attended by Lansdale, probably Helms , Helms’ Executive Assistant George McManus, and other representatives of the agencies involved in Mongoose, took place in Attorney General Kennedy's office.* (McManus, p. 6). Notes taken at the meeting by McManus contain the following passages: "Conclusion. Overthrow of Castro is Possible” ~ an a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov/ernnen/t. No time, money, effort -- or manpower is to. ' be spared.'" "tYesterday ... the President had indicated to _him' that final chapter had not been written -- its got to be done and will be done.” Nowe (McManus Ex. 1, Memorandum, January 19, 1962, p..2). McManus Sate the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov/ernmen/t -- no Attorney General (McManus, pp. 8-9). */ Others who- attended the meeting were Brig. Gen. Craig, representing the Joint Chiefs, Don Wilson of USIA, Major Patchell of the Secretary of Defense's office, and Frank Hand of CIA. HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 142
-17- Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere" on which he relied for his perception that assassination was implicitly ‘authorized. (Helms, 7/17, p. 60-61.) McManus, who wrote the memorandum, agreed that Robert Kennedy "was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action" but McManus disagreed with Helms perception, stating that "it never occurred to me" that the words quoted above from Robert Kennedy included permission to assassinate Castro. (McManus, p. 9.) Nor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole give McManus any idea that assassination was either contemplated or authorized. (Tr., p. 9-10.)* 5. General Lansdale's Mongoose Planning Tasks On January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to the agencies parti- - cipating in Mongoose. (Lansdale Ex. 3, Program. Review of the Cuba Project.) Ina memorandum to the working group members , Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a change from the business as usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a com- bat situation--where we have been given full command."' (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62, p. 1.) | The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging from intelligence collec- tion to planning for "use of U. S. military force to support the Cuban popular _*/ With respect to the question of priorities and emphasis in the Kennedy — Administration, there was a great deal of. proof. showing that Cuba indeed had a high priority and the very existence of a high level group like the Special Group Augmented further demonstrates its importance. MacNamara, for example, stated that. "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." (In the same context, MacNamara stated "I d wi believe. we contemplated assassination.) (MacNamara, p. 93). Similarly, General Lansdale fn- formed the members of his. inter- ~agency committee that Mongoose "demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that you a) in a combat situation where we have been given full command." (red ; > Ex. » Memorandum, January 20, 1962, from Lansdale). a <a wt the other hand, Sorensen testified that "there were lots of top priorities, and it was the job of some of /us/ to continually tell various agencies their particular subject was the top priority" and although Cuba was "important" it was "fairly well down*on the list of the President's agenda." (Sorensen, p. 12). For example, when told ed that his first letter to Khruschev in the secret correspondence that lasted two or three years would be "the single most important docu- ment you will write during your. Presidency," President Kenndy said, "Yes, we get these every day over here." -(Sorensen, p. 12).. HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 1570
FO Ke HY 50955 movement'' and developing an “operational schedule for sabotage actions inside’ Cuba." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 5, 7.)* In focusing on intelligence collection, propaganda and various sabotage actions, Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strategy of Mongoose to build gradually towards an internal revolt of - the Cuban people. (See p-. above.) ‘Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Robert Kennedy on January 18, 1962, with a handwritten note stating 'my review does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you; I felt you preferred informing the President privately." Lansdale testified that this did not refer to assassinations and that he "never took up assassination with either the Attorney General or the President .""** ‘Lansdale | testified that he could not precisely recall the nature of this "sensitive work" but that it might have involved a special trip he made under cover to meet Cuban leaders in Florida and to assess their political strengths. (Lansdale, p. 30.) *There was testimony regarding one Lansdale plan that a witness thought. was an example of Lansdale's "perspicacity"' in planning operations. Parrott, the Secretary to the Special Group Augmented, testified: "I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity. He had a wonderful plan for getting rid of Castro. This plan consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro (who) was anti-Christ. And you would spread this word around Cuba, and then on whatever date it was, that there would be a mani- festation of this thing. And at that time--this is absolutely true--and at that time there would be an American submarine. which would surface just over the horizon off of Cuba and send up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of the Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown..." , "Well, some wag called this operation--by this time Lansdale was something of a joke in many quarters--and somebody dubbed this Elimination by Illumination. (Parrott, p. -) **Harvey testified that he never received any instructions from Lansdale to under- take assassinations, although as noted below (p. ), in August 1962, L asked Harvey to consider the feasibility of a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders. (Harvey, 7/ /75, p. .) = Docld: 327493539 Page 154 — I ee
“a9 - ~. Lansdale also referred, in a memorandum to the Attorney General on “January: 27, 1962, to his feeling that “we might uncork the touchdown play" “independently of the institutional program we are spurring.' ‘(Lansdale Ex. 4, pl). Lansdale testified that in this memorandum the phrase "touchdown play" was a "breezy way of referring to “a Cuban -revolt to overthrow the regime" rather than to a Castro assassination. x , (Lansdale, -p.45) The examples of such "plays cited in the memorandum “*/ The “testimony was as follows: "The Chairman: What precisely dideyou mean by "uncork the: touchdown play independently of the institutional programs we are spurring?" ~ "General Lansdale: Well, I was holding almost daily meet- ings with my working group, and -- in tasking, and: finding how they were developing plans I was becoming more and more , concerned that they kept going back to doing what I felt were : ) 7 pro forma American types of actions rather than actively ex- ploring how to ret the Cubans into this, and to have them undertake actions. , Mme me, the touchdown play was a Cuban revolt to over- throw the repime. I did not feel that we had potten into " the real internal part of getting Cubans into the action, and I was concerned about that." “Senator Raker: ‘In the same context, is it fair to say that the name of the game was to © get rid of Castro or his regime .. might have been used for that purpose?" "General Lansdale: Yes." "Senator Baker: All right,. now what was the touchdown play that you had in mind here?" "General Lansdale: Well, it was a revolt by the Cubans themselves ... a’ revolution that would break down the police controls of the state and to drive the ton people out of power and to do that, there needed to be political actions cells, psychological proparanda action cells, and eventually _ when possible, guerilla forces developed in the country in KD a safe place for a new government to set up and direct the revolution that would eventually move into Havana and take over. (Lansdale, pp. 45~ 28). te HW 50955 Docld:324939599 “Page 155 ""
HY 0955 _warfare means. (Lansdale, p-. 29). Lansdale testified that the plan in- (e.g., "stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba," work through “ethnic ron language groups , youth elements," or families through the Church") do not contain anv indication of assassination.. (Lansdale, Ex. 4, p. 1.) On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional task to those assighed on January 18. This "Task 33" involved a plan to. "incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by the use of chemical volved the use of non-lethal chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and keep them away from the fields for a 24-48 hour period "without ill effects." After initial approval for planning purposes (with the notation that it would require "policy determination" before final approval) the plan was ; o > ultimately cancelled after a study showed it was not feasible and before de- bate by the SGA. (Lansdale, p. 2°, Special Group Minutes, 1/30/62, p. 1.) Lansdale's 33 tasks were approved for planning purposes by the Special Group on January 30, 1962 (Minutes of Special Group meeting, 1/30/62, p. 1). Thereafter, on February 20, 1962, Lansdale detailed a Six phase schedule for Mongoose, designed to culminate in October, 1962, .with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." (Lansdale Ex. 11, Program Review of the Cuba Project, 2/20/62, p. 2). As one of the operations for the "Resistance" ' phase proposed for September, 1962, Lansdale listed "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders.” (Id., p-.- 151). Lansdale's plan stated: "It may be a special effort which professional labor ~ operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. JIt.may be through ethnic- ~language groups; Spain has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming—up we of the always lively youth element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families resisting the disciplined destruction of social justice by the Communists. It’ could be an imaginative defection project which | cracks the top, echelon of the Communist gang now running Cuba. Boclda: 324273539 Page 156
HY 0955 killing of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur in -~ i - "This should be a ‘Special Target' operation Gangster elements might. provide the best recruit- ment potential for actions against police -- G2 /intelligence/ officials." (Id., p. 151). _*/ Lansdale testified that early in the Mongoose opera- tion he had suggested to the working level representatives of the Mongoose agencies that they get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelli- gence and "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba. (Lans- dale, p. 104). But Lansdale conceded that his proposal to reeruit gangster elements -for’ attacks.on'"key- leaders": contemplated the targeted Bs the course of the revolt itself. (Lansdale, p. 107). These 33 plans of Lansdale were, however, never , approved for implementation by the Special Group Augmented. As discussed below in greater detail (see p. . ), the Special Group Augmented tabled Lansdale's, six phase plan altogether in February 1962, and directed Lansdale to plan for and conduct an intelligence collection plan only. (Memo, 3/2/62; Minutes of Special Group Augmented Meeting, 3/5/62). - a. lLansdale's Rejection of a Suggestion That a Propaganda Campaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be Explored On January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs on the Mongoose Working Group forwarded for Lansdale's. con- sideration "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban Communist Hierarchy" (Lansdale Ex. 1, Memorandum, 1/30/62, from Craig to Lansdale, p. 1). This concept, titled Operation Bounty, was described as a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists." (Id., p. 2) Under the concept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards, which ae 7 n earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appeared in a CLA memorandum for the Special Group on January 24, 1962. Commenting on Task 5 of Lansdale's original 32 tasks (which called for planning for "defection of top Cuban government officials"), the CIA memorandum note that planning for the task will "necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries" and listed "crime syndicates" along with other grouns as possible intermediaries. Boclda: 324293539 Page i57
were proposed as-ranging -from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100,000 for “sovernment officials." A reward of "“2¢" was Listed for vastro nim- self. (Id., p. 3). Lansdale testified that price was designed "to deni- grate --. Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, Tr. 26). | Lansdale testified that he "tabled" this concept when he received it, on the ground that "I did not think that it was something that should be seriously undertaken or supported further." (Lansdale, p. 26). Lansdale did not bring the proposal before the Special Group Augmented. 6. The Control. Svstem. for, Mongoose Operations. In establishing the Mongoose Operation on November 30, 1961, President Kennedy had emphasized that the Special Group should be "kept closely informea" of ‘Mongoose activities. (memo- randum by the President, 11/30/62; Goodwin, Pp. ). In practice, as Samuel Halpern, Harvey's Executive Assistant on . 7 } the CIA Mongoose Task Force W testified, this resulted in the submission of "specific. detailed plans for every activity carried out by the task force." (Halpern, p. 16). Halpern testified that those plans were sub- mitted "in nauseating detail:" | "It went down to such things as the gradients on the beach, and the composition of the sand on the beach ‘in many cases. Every single solitary thing was in those plans, full details, times, events, weaponry, how it was going to happen, who was going to do phat y - the full details of every single thing wel oN E . (Halpern, p. 17). oe Harvey similarly characterized the contrel process (Harvey, 6/25, p. 123), as one which required the submission of "excruciating detail” and where it was understood. that the Special Group Augmented was to be given HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 1459
~ 23 - an opportunity to debate and decide after weighing the strengths and weaknesses of any given proposed action. (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 11h, Leh). a. The Documentary Evidence The documentary evidence illustrates the tight control pro- cedures sect out for Mongoose by the Special Group Aupmented. For example, as discussed above (p. ), Lansdale initially cubmitted 32 specific tasks with his "basic concept” on January 18, 1962 for consideration by the Special Group Augmented. (Lansdale Ex. 3) After consideration of Lansdale's concept and the 32-tasks in February. the Special Group ro ; , Comm on Augmented ordered Lansdale to cut back Iris plan to limit it to ay ow WL AT... intelligence collection program for the Narch-May 1962 period, rather ~ than the five-stage plan to culminate in an October “popular revolution" as originally conceived by Lansdale. (Nemo 3/2/62, by Lansdale) In approving the intelligence collection: program, the Special Group Aug- mented pointed out that: " any actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the pro- “ject progresses, will be brourht to the Special Group for resolution." (Helms:Ex. 1, 7/18, p.1l) prior approval of important operations: "The Special Group (5412 Aupmented) is respougithas “ for providing policy puidance to the (Hongook) project, for approving, important operations and for monitoring. . - progress. (Guidelines for Operation Nonsoose, March 1h, . 1962, p.2) , oO Further indication of the Mongoose control process is the request given HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 1459.
HW aN 50955 - #4 - to Helms a month prior to Harvey's trip to mect Roselli in tiami. Pur- suant to the discussion at’ the Special Group's meeting on March 3, Helms was asked to estimate "for each week as far into the next twelve months as possible . . . the members and type of agents you will establish inside Cuba . . . (and) brief descriptions . . . of actions contemplated. (Memo to Nelms from Lansdale, March 5, 1962) | Moreover, the approved plan for Operation Mongoose, as of the time of Harvey's meeting with Roselli in Miami required that any proposal to supply arms and equipment to’ particular. resistance groups inside Cuba “be submitted to the Special Gtoup for decision, nt - ad hoc | (Lansdale Memo to , April J1, 1962, p. ), And the Guidelines for the Mongoose program emphasized that, after specific tasks were approved by the Special Group Augmented and given to participating agencies by Lansdale, normal command channels were to be observed. As the Guidelines stated: During this period, General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on .the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority."_/. ‘Guideline for Operation Mon- goose, March lh, 1962, p.2) _* The initial draft of these. Guidelines had referred to the President but was later amended to read’ "higher authority."' (Draft Guidelines, March 5, 1962, p.2) The minutes of the consideration of these Guidelines were also amended with respect to the manner in which the Guidelines were approved. On March 16, 1962, a Memorandum for Record of “Discussion of Operation Mongoose with the President" of the Special Group (Augmented) stated: “In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MON-~ GOOSE. The guidelines dated March 14, 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a. # prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and ‘risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Aug- mented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines. (footnote cont'd.) Fe eee ag cette ee ane eet ay aan NS are Ea aS eR ene rGag Sena nEE mang rsd Semen Doclda: 32742735539 Page 160
- Shea - os In a Memorandum to MeCone on April 10, 1962, Harvey recognized that the Special Group Augmented control. process required advance approval of "major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence." But Harvey stated that these "tight controls" were unduly "stultifying:" "Po permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the right controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing pro~ cedures should, if at ali possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying." (Memo, April 10, 1962, . Harvey to McCone, p.4) * Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis approached, and the pressure to ' : -act against the Castro regime increased through a “stepped up" Mongoose plan, the Special Group continued to insist on prior approval of sensitive operations. Thus, when the Special Group Augmented on September. 14, 1962, approved in principle a proposed set of operations, otnote cont'd). . — However, a note at the bottom of this memorandum, dated March 22, 1962, stated: , This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was , given by higher authority. The members of the Group \ - asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the ; . °Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines. ae os “ aoe HW 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 1s
f 5 Ssaomel HY 50955 Bundy, speaking to the Group, " .. made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket approval of every item in the paper. and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis.” (Memo of Special Croup Augmented meeting, September 14, 1962, p. ). Helms and the members of the ‘Special Group Augmented differed on whether or not these control requirements were consistent with Helms' per- ° ception that assassination was permissible without a direct order. We discuss that testimony below at 7. The Pattern of Mongoose Action. The documentary evidence and the testimony reveal that the Kennedy Administration pressed the Mongoose opera- tion with vigorous language and although the collection of intelligence information was the central objective of Mongoose up until August 19¢G sabotage and para military actions were conducted. Spey ye Oe “ag ‘a a Be major sabotage. operation aimed at a large Cuban seer an Soh sabotage operations. As Lansdale described them in his testimony, the cahotace acts involved ‘lowing up bridges to stop communications and blowing up certain production plants (Lansdale, p. 36). And during the Missile Crisis in the fall-of 1962, sabotage was increasingly urged. _*/ In early March, 1962, the SGA recognized the need to begin ' ‘preliminary actions ... involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents" but the Group agreed that it must "keep its hand tightly" on these actions. The Group saw, however, that such control Might not be completely effective and recognized "that many of the “agents infiltrated would be of an all- -purpose type; that is, they would be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively ‘intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although every effort will be made to attempt such control." (Minutes of Special Group meeting, March 5,. 1962). Docld:32423539 Page 162
-~ 26 - At the sane time, however, the record shows that the Special Sroup Aug mented turned away from proposed gabotage and similar violent action throughout 1962, including the period of the Missile Crisis. (See p. above.) Thus, Helms noted in a memorandum of a meeting on October 15, 1962, that Robert Mennedy in ex- pressing the “general dissatisfaction of the President" with Mongoose, "pointed out that Giongoose) had been underway for a year...that there had been no acts of sabo- tage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice”. (Memorandum by Helms, October 16, 1962, p. 1.) Similiarly a memorandum to Helms by his Execu- tive Assistant (who spent full time on Cuba matters), which reviewed the Mongoose program in the aftermath of the Hissile Crisis, stated: "During the past year, while one-of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. (McManus, Ex. 2, p. i, McManus , p. 11). L 4 Harvey testified that this assessment of the Special Group Aug- mented's position was. an accurate one. (Harvey, 6/25, p. ). This is also borne out by the record of Mongoose activity. For example, after Lansdale's initial six. phase plan to overthrow Castro by the fall of 1962, the single phase approved for January ‘August.1962 was described by Lans- dale as "essentially an intelligence collection” effort. (Memorandum, April ll, 1962, by Lansdale). Indeed, the guidelines for aes goes HEA A elcoming: months. (Taylor Ex. 3,-p. 2, Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962). approved on “March 2» 1962, stated that. the. acquisitionso® int - wor A the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts i The Guidelines further stated that although other covert actions would be undertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were to be, on an a stale "short of. those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" in Cuba. | (Id., p. 2). And the Special Group stipulated that Mongoose action beyond the acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Memorandum, ‘ 3/2/62, Lansdale, p. 3). HY 50955 DBocld: 324273539 Page 163° ~
Se” HW 50955 -~27- With the scheduled conclusion of that intelligence collection phase in August 1962, the Special Group Augmented considered whether to adopt a "stepped-up Course B plus," which, in contrast to Phase I, was designed to inspire a revolt against the Castro regime. (Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented, 8/8/62, from Lansdale, p. 1). Initially, the Special Group Augmented decided against this course and in favor of a "CTA if variant, at a meeting of Special Group Augmented principals on August 10, 1962. (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, August 10, 1962). The tf "CIA variant," which was proposed by MeCone on August 10, posited more limited actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought not Castro's over- throw, but a split between Castro and “old-—line Communists." (ta., p. 2). The onset of the Missile Crisis caused an initial reversion to the ‘stepped-up Course B plan, but ultimately, however, an order was issued on October 30, 1962 to halt all sabotage operations. (Lansdale, Ex.8, Memo by Lansdale, 10/30/62) , . Thus, on August 20, Taylor told the President that the Special Group Augmented perceived no likelihood of.an overthrow of the Castro govern- ment by internal means without direct U.S. military intervention, and that the Special Group Augmented favored a more agressive Mongoose program. | (Memo from Taylor to President.) Shortly thereafter,.on August 23, McGeorge Bundy issued NSC Memo Number 181 to Lansdale and Taylor stating that, at the President's directive, "the line of aetivity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with ail possible speed.” One week later, on August 30, the CIA was instructed by the Special Group Augmented to submit a list. of possible sabotage targets they might | propose | and it was noted that this list could serve as the limit for action on the Agency's own initiative: "The Group, by reacting to this list, could define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative." Special Group Augmented Minutes of August 30, 1962.) Docld:32473539 Page 164
~28- Thus, at a-Special Group Augmented meeting on October 4, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about progress on the Mongoose program and feels that more priority should be given. to trying to mount sabotage operations". And Robert Kennedy urged that "massive activity" be undertaken within the Mongoose framework. In line with this proposal, the Special Group Augmented decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken , and that "all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the pos- sibility of getting rid of the Castro regime". (Minutes of Special Group Aug- mented meeting, October 4, 1962, p. )*. On October 30, 1962, however, the order to stop all sabotage operations was issued (Lansdale, Ex. 8).** ~ 4 a i %, ave * The SGA also decided on October 4, 1962, that Robert. Kennedy would chair the Group's meetings "for the time being." (Id. > P- ). Subsequently, at a meeting on October 16, ‘1962, Robert Kennedy stated that he was going to give Mongoose "more personal attention" in view of the lack of progress and would hold daily meetings with the working group represen- tatives, i.e., Lansdale, Harvey, and the other Agency members. (Harvey, Ex. 12, Memorandum of Meeting, October 16, 1962, by Helms, p. 1). Helms testified that he did not recall any such daily meetings with the Attorney General, but he had the impression there may have been several at first, but then they ceased. (Helms, 7/17/ » pp. 54-55). _ “sHarvey testified that he had a "confrontation" with Robert. Kennedy at the. height of the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that agent teams be sent into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. mili- tary operation that might occur. MHarvey stated that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to. this order And [aay a yesule. ieCqne, « ny . ordered Harvey to stop the agent operations. (Har, eg! 7/Al, oO+ oe ‘ 3 Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, simiilcky ckeccived hed. ‘inedi= i | “= dent and stated that, although Harvey had attempted to get” guidance’ \-! iy HS from top officials during the Missile Crisis, Harvey "earned another black mark as not being fully under control”. (Elder, p. 34-35.) MW 50955 Docld:327493539 Page 165
HY a wer 0955 -28a-_ As Sorensen (a member of the Executive ‘Committee established to deal with the Missile Crisis) testified, even though Cuba was the "'No. 1 priority" dur- ing the Missile Crisis, and "all alternatives, plans, possibilities were ex- haustively surveyed" during that time, the subject of assassination was never raised in the high-level. National Security Council Executive Committee (of which Helms was not a member) that was formed to deal with the Missile Crisis. (Sorensen, 7/21, p. 11.)*** There are references in the Special Group Augmented records to attacks on Soviet personnel in Cuba. The record of the SGA meeting on September 9, 1962, states: , "Tt was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered." (SGA Minutes, 9/9/62, p. ). Earlier, on’ August 31, 1962, Lansdale had included.a task "to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel-to exacerbate tensions," "in a proposed projection of actions for Phase II of Mongoose. (Memo- ‘randum to SGA, 8/31/62, from Lansdale, Action No. 47). The Special Group thereafter decided, as a means of "emphasizing such activity" to replace that task with one to "cause‘actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel," and to note that "consideration will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel." (Memorandum to Taylor, Rusk, and MacNamara, 9/12/62, from Lansdale, pp. 1-2). Boclda: 324273539 Page 166
~ 29 ~: This section discusses the evidence as to whether there was authorization from outside the Agency for the assassination activity that took place during the Mongoose operation. TR. T/17, p-4) As discussed below in detail, both Helms and the Kennedy Administration officials agreed that no direct order was ever given for Castro's assassina- tion and that no one outside the Agency (including McCone) was informed about the assassination activity. Helms testified, however, that he believed the assassination activity was permissible and that it was within the scope of the authority given to the Agency. McGene and the other Kennedy Admini- stration officials disagreed, testifying that assassination was not permissible without a direct order and that a Castro assassination was not within the . authorized bounds of the Mongoose operation. ‘4 In April 1962, when the poison pills were given to Roselli in Miami, Helms was the CIA. Deputy Director in charge of covert operations and reported to MeCone, the CIA Director. Helms had succeeded Bissell in this job, following Bissell's retirement in February, 1962, as a consequence of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Helms testified that, after the Bay” of Pigs, "Those of us who were still (in the Agency ) were enormous1y anxious to try and be successful at what we were being asked to do by what was then > a relatively new Administration. We wanted to earn our spurs with the President and with other officers of the Kennedy Administration.” (Helms As set forth below, Helms testified that while he doubted whether ne was initially informed that Harvey gave poison pills to Roselli and. did i 3 not recall ‘having authorized a Castro assassination ‘in that form, nevertheless, Helms had authorized the 1962 assassination plot because “we felt that we BW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 167 Soe serene me ten poo rmees ss ns
HY ate 0955 - cya om were operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things if not specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms. (Helms, 6/13, p.61) bd lave , e€ oe a. iis Perception of Autnority / Vv (RO One (Gut Be Helms testified that based upon the ‘intense’: pressure exerted by the Kennedy Administration to overthrow Castro it was his perception that the CIA Bd a wes at all times acting within the scone of its authority with respect ry _ aa nd di dreot! ‘oragt Te assassination activity.* but, Helms testified that here B “assassinate Castro from anyone, including the President ‘or the Attorney General. Yea (ielms, 6/14, p. 83.) (This point is discussed in detail infra p._, ) Gielms, 6/13, ‘p. 137: ilelms, 7/17, p. 62, 7/1i7,.p. 4-5.) Helms testified that this authority, as he perceived it, was implicit in the U. S. policy and attitude towards Castro. (Helms, 6/13, p. 165.) As Helms testified: “T believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if killing him was one of the things that was to be done in this connection, that was within what was expected." (delms, 6/13, p. 137.) *The extent to which pressure in fact existed "to do something about Castro” is discussed in detail in the section immediately above dealing with Operation Mon- goose, its strategy of causing an internal revolt of the Cuban people against Castro, the strict control system established by the Special Group Augmented, and the pattern of intelligence collection and sabotage activity actually authorized and undertaken. Docld: 32493539 Page 166°
Helms testified that "I remember vividly (the pressure to overthrow — Castro) was very intense.” (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.) Helms stated that this pres- sure intensified during the period of Operation Mongoose during late 1961 and throughout 1962, and then continued on through much of 1963. (lelms, 6/13, p. 27.) As these pressures rose, "obviously the extent of the means that one thougnt were available, obvious increased too."’ (ilelms, 6/13, p. 26.) Helms ‘stated that during the Mongoose Operations period "it was made abundantly clear...to everybody involved in the operation that the desire was to get rid of the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro...the point was tnat no limitations were put on this injunction.” (Helms, 7/17, p. 16-17). In Helns' testimony, the following exchange occurred: . "Senator Mathias: 'Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A. Beckett. was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man. He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that. Nat, "Mr. Helms: ‘That is a warming reference to the problem. ' "Senator Mathias: 'You feel that spans thé generations ‘and the centuries?! "Mr. Helms: ‘I think it does, sir.' “Senator Mathias: ‘And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?! "Mr. Helms: ‘That is right. But in answer to that, I re- alize that one sort of grows up in [the] tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we're hired out to keep those things out of the oval office.' - "Senator Mathias: 'Yet at the same time you felt that some spark had been transmitted, that that was within the per- missible limits?’ .— ' "Mr. Helms: ‘Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not have been unhappy.'" (Helms Tr.- 6/13,°pp. 72-73) HW 50955 Docld: 32403539" Pays "Les ee — Hone MLNS a ee MN! Ree a ate
_ 30a ~ Nelms said that although he never was told by his superiors to hill Castro (ilelms, 7/17, p. 15), there was at the same time never any injunction laid down -by the Fennedy Administration that proscribed a Castro assassination: ‘No member of the Kennedy Administration...ever told me that (assassination) was proscribed, (or) ever referred to it in that fashion..." (Helms, 7/71, p. 18.) "Nobody ever said that (assassination) was ruled out..." */(telms on p. 43, deo, | Helms stated that during the Mongoose period, the live of, Bre assassination of Castro, “with all the other things that” were going on at that time...seemed to be within the permissible part of this effort." (elms, 6/13, p. 99.) “In the perceptions of the time and the things we were trying to do this : . i . : was one human life against many other human lives that were beinz. lost." (Helms, 6/13, p. €4.)%*/ ~*As Helms declared: "In my 25 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, I always thought I was working within authorization, that I was doing what I had been asked to do by proper authority and when I was operating on my own I was doing what I believed to be the legitimate business of the Agency as it would have been expected of me." (Helms, 6/13, p. 30-31.) *kkAs set out above (p._ ), Helms stated: '"...people were losing theirualives oN in raids, a lot of people had lost their life at the Bay of Pigs, agents were { being arrested left and right and put before the wall and shot. (Helms, 6/13, p. 64.) HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page iva
b. Helms! Testimony That He Had No Direct Order to Assassinate Castro and Did Not Inform the President or the Special Group of the Assassination Activity “elms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro. tie said that his perceptions of authority did not reach the point where he could testify that he had specific instructions .to kill Castro. As he put it: . "I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere “of the time, what I understood was desired, and I don't want to take refuge in saying that I was instructed to specifically murder Castro. . .'"' (Helms, 6/13, p-.88). On the question of whether the President was informed of any assassination plots, Helms pointed out that "nobody wants to embarrass a President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of. foreign leaders in his presence" (6/13, p. 29), and that the Special Group was "the i 4 mechanism that was set up. . .to use as a circuit breaker so that these ate esta at Re. ae MF agi on was ever authorized oh, things did not explode in the President’ s face and that he hae responsible for them." (6/13, p. 29). Howeygr act oy : that he had "no knowledge that a Castro assas by the Special Group (Augmented)" (6/13, pp.28-29). In addition, Helms said he never informed the Special Group Augmented or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time.” (Helms, 7/18, p.18).*/ Helms also stated he never told Robert Kennedy about any assassination activity and my "presumption: is he wasn't informed" (Helms, 6/13, p-58), and that "Harvey kept (the Roselli pill plot) pretty much in his back pocket." (Helms, 6/13,pp.57-58). Helms further testified that although Robert Kennedy was "constantly in touch" with him in 1962 and 1963, Robert Kennedy never instructed Helms HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page i7fi
aot to assassinate Castro: "The Chairman. 'Since he was on the phone to you - repeatedly did he ever tell you to kill Castro?’ ‘Mr. Helms. 'No.’ "Me Chairman: 'He did not?! "Mr. Helms : jot in those words, no.'" (Helms, T/1T, p-13)2/ ® lelms immediately reiterated after this exchange that his perception of authority for a Castro assassination. rested on the pressure exerted by the Administration against Castro. ‘The exchange between the Chairman and Helms continued as follows: ‘Whe Chairman: ‘Well, did he ever tell you in other words . that clearly conveyed to you the message that he wanted to kill Castro?! "Helms: ‘Sir, the last time I was (before the Committee), I did the best I could about what I believed to be the parameters under which we were working, and that was to get rid of Castro. And I don't, I am sorry to say .. . see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassinating would become part of a large group of people sitting around a table in the United States Government. I can't imagine any Cabinet officer wanting to sign off on something like that. I can't imagine anybody wanting something in writing saying I have just charged Mr. Jones to go out and shoot Mr. Smith." (Helms, 7/17, pp. 13-14) mn, p uy BW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i172
HY c. Helms Testimony that he. Doubted Whether he had Authorized a Specific Assassination Attempt or was Informed of the Passage of the PilTs There is some doubt whether Helms ever authorized a specific attempt at. Castro's assassination, or. was informed of the passage of the pioson pills to Roselli in April, 1962. Although Helms testified that Harvey regularly reported to Helms on Harvey's Mongoose work (Helms, 6/13, p-95), and Helms "would have thought” that Harvey would have reported to Helms the: transfer of the pills” into Cuba. (Helms, 6/13; -p-105), Helms does not recall Harvey. ever telling him that the pills were delivered to Roselli. (Helms, 7/17, p.22). . | “Thus, as indicated above, Helms, tesfificd he never informed the Spectal Group Augmented or any member of that Group that ilarvey had given the pills to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time." (Helms, 7/16, p. 18.)* And with respect to the pills, Hélms testified that, C3 although he agreed to the i is a implicit authorization for assassinatio activity). he: ‘béstified call having okayed the killing of Castro myself in that form." (Helms, 7/17, p. 9.) da. Heims' Perception of Robert Kennedy’ s Position on _a Castro Assassination In testifying as to his perception of authority, Helms emphasized the particular role played by Robert Kennedy in pressing for progress and results */ Helms' testimony that he may not have been informed that the pills were delivered is corroborated by Harvey's testimony. Harvey testified that when he returned from Miami-he reported to Helms on his contacts with Roselli. But ilarvey said that he only "briefed Helms generally", on the subjects of Harvey's takeover of the Roselli operation, the prospects. of the operation, and the fact that Harvey had dropped Maheu and “Giancana © from the operation. (Harvey, . 6/25, p.65). ae . Noe 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 173° ~
Robert Kennedy often talked directly with Helms and other CIA officials working on the Mongoose program, outside of the Special Group Augmented 4 channels. (Helms, 7/17, p.13; 7/18, pp.60- 61). As Helms stated: "I can say absolutely fairly we aré constantly in touch with each other in these matters. The Attorney General was on the phone to me, he was on the phone to Mr. Harvey, to Mr. Fitzgerald, his successor. He was on the phone even to people on Harvey's staff, as I recall it." (Helms, 7/17, p.13). Helms said that although he did not know whether a Castro assassination would have been morally acceptable to Robert Kennedy, © Helms believed that Robert Kennedy "would not (have been) unhappy if (Castro) had disappeared off the scene by whatever means." (Helms, 7/17. p.17-18). And Helms stated that Robert Kennedy never told him ‘that a Castro assassination was ruled out. (Helms, 7/17, p.21). However, Helms further testified that although Robert. Kennedy was "with Helms and their exchanges were marked by de~ “constantly in touch DY _ tailed, factual, and highly specific discussions on anti-Castro operations. i Robert Kennedy never raised the subject of a Castro assassination and never instructed Helms to assassinate Castro,** Helms further testified that he had no knowledge that Robert Kennedy "was ever asked to specifically approve an assassination plot." (Helms, 6/13, p. 57.)- “Af RTT ee Peo ote * Q: "So it was _your impression that jhe was sort of setting Engst One for A the group's action or activity.” "Oh, yes. ” there wasn't any doubt about that. “He ta wry muth interested in this and spent a great deal of time Oh 6/13, p. 22.) ; **The telephone records of the Attorney Generd i {indicate frequent contact between the Attorney General: cam: ‘elas” and’ Hélins stated that his conversations with Robert Kennedy were! "ognd id! and that "he and I used to deal in facts most of the time. (Helms, 6/18, p.63.) Helms testified as to the level of detail in his talks with Robert Kennedy: "For example, we had projects to land sabotage teams.*/ Well, (the Attorney General would ask) have you got the “~ team organized, did the team go? Well, no, we've been a delayed a week because the weather is bad or the boats , don’t run, or something of this kind. It even got down to that degree of specificity." (Helms, 7/17, p.40) HW 50955 Docldad: 32473539 Page 174°
And, as stated above, llelms also testified that “Harvey kept Phase 2 (the Roselli pill operation) pretty much in his back pocket" and that al- though Helms stated “I do not know this for sure," he testified it was” his “presumption” that Robert Kennedy was not informed of the PHase 2 operation. * (Helms, 6/13, p. 57-58.) e. Helms! Testimony as to Why He Did Not Obtain a Direct Order . Helms testified that assassination "was not part of the CIA's policy" 7 or a part of CIA's "armory". (Helms, 6/13, p. 87-88 ) And, in his own view, Helms said that he "never liked assassination”. (And, in fact, banned its use years after he became CIA Director.)  /(Helms, >) ~ Moreover, Helms testified that he had serious reservations regarding the CIA working with underworld figures. (Helms, 7418 p.3l). When Harvey i \ developed, Helms "had very grave doubts abou underworld figures. (Helms, 6/13, p.33; 7/18, p.31). Despite these reservations, Helms did ‘not seek approval for bin. the assassination activity because he said assassination was not open a subject that he felt should be aired with higher authority. Gielins , 7/18, VIGk pp.31-32). With respect to the question of obtaining express authority i “‘% Hielms based this presumption on a review of relevant documents at the time of his testimony. (Helms , 6/13, p.58). HW 50955 Docld:32423599 Page 175 —
from the Special Group or Special Group Augmented, Helms stated: "... — I didn't. see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassination would become a part of a large group of people sitting around a table in the United States Government." (Helms, 7/17, p. 14). And with regard to informing the President or obtaining explicit authority from him, Helms stated that "nobody wants to embarrass a: Presi- dent of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence." (Helms, 6/13, p. 29). Thus, in the following exchange ‘Helms stated that it "wouldn't have occurred to me to ask" for clarification or express authority for assass- . ~ ination activity from Robert Kennedy or the Special Group: "Senator Huddleston: "...it did not occur to you to inquire of the Attorney General or of the Special Group or of anyone that when they kept pushing and ; asking for action...to clarify that question of oo _ whether you should actually be trying to assassinate?" "Mr. Helms: "I don't know whether it was in training experience, tradition or exactly what one points to, -but I think to’go up to a Cabinet officer and say, am I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate . Castro or to try to assassinate Castro, is a question it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask." Ra "Senator Huddleston: "... (because assassination has such serious consequences) seems to fortify the thought that I would want to be dead certain, I would want- to hear it from the herse’s mouth in plain, simple English language before I would want to undertake that kind of activity. - (Helms, 7/17, pp.51-52). Helms also pointed out his reason for ngt, in the following exchange: | "Senator Morgan: "In light of your previous statement that this is a Christian country and that this Committee has to face up to the prime moral issue of whether or not .« killing is...acceptable...don't you think it would have ‘ . taken affirmative permission or authority to kill, rather , ; than just saying it was not eliminated from the authority or you were not restricted...?" HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page i76
~ 36 - "Mr. Helms: "...killing was not part of the CIA's policy. It was not part of the CIA's armory...but in this Castro - operation...1I have testified as best IL could about the , atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired (and) that this was getting rid of Castro, if he had been gotten rid of by this means that this would have been acceptable to certain individuals...I was just doing my best to do what I thought I was supposed.to do." (Helms, 6/13. pp.87-88). When asked why he did not seek clarification from. the Special Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy whether it was “in fact, the y policy of the U.S. Government fo actually kill Fidel Castro,’ Helms answered "I don't know..." "| There is something about the whole chain of episodes in conncection with this Roselli business that 1 am simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion. And there was something about the ineffectuality of all this, or the lack-of conviction that anything ever happened, that I believe in the end made this thing simply collapse, disappear. And [I don't recall what I was briefed on at the time. Maybe I was kept currently informed and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember it...But I do not recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life. And since I didn't believe any attempt had been made on _. Castro's life, IT saw no reason to pursue the matter further." (Helms, 7/18, pp.31-32). f. Helms! Perception of the Relevance of Special Grou Controls to Assassination Activity 7 The evidence concerning the control system established by the. Special Group for the Mongoose Operation is discussed above (see >.) Helms stated, however, that the control system established by the Special Group for Mongoose was not intended to apply to assassination activity. (Helms, 7/18, p.2l). Thus, with respect to the Special Group Augmented's decision on March 5, 1962 that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence must’ receive advance .~approval,.Helms-—, i; 4 stated that this referred to "rather specific hat Group had on its agenda" from the outset of Mongoose. (Helms, 7/185. p.21). Since assassination was not among such items, Helms state. 7 HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page iT?
HY “a a 0955 that the Special Group would not have expected assassination activity to come under this particular policy. (Helms, 7/18, p.2l). And with respect to the Special Group Augmented's desire to "keep its hands tightly on preliminary actions" leading towards sabotage and other actions beyond intelligence collection, Helms stated that was the kindof injunction "that appears in all kinds of governmental minutes of meetings." (Helms, 7/18, p.l7). Helms said he regarded these as "general enjunetions: rather than an "all inclusive injunction™ to keep the Group informed of all matters. (Helms, 7/18, -.17). Helms said he recognized, however, that there were limits on permissible activity during Mongoose. */ (Helms, 7/18,p.9). ‘Thus, "no Limitations" on actions Helms stated that although there were to remove Castro during Mongoose, there were restraints on sabotage operations and he did not understand the absence of specific limitations to authorize more drastic actions, such as committing the U.S. military to an invasion of Cuba. (Helms, 7/18, p-9). In addition, Helms testified that he saw no need to inform the Special Group of the Harvey-Roselliv operation because that operation was characterized by ' ‘ineffectuality" and a “lack of conviction that soysnire ‘e ever happened." (Helms, 7/18, p.32). ‘Helms stated he did nota 5 AY étings in Miami with Roselli. (Helms, 7/18, Pe oe enn a re tirana TEE EE x] Helms testified, that. although loss of Ii! was implicit in the Mongoose operations, "T think there was an effort made not to take tacks that would recklessly kill a.lot of people and not achieve very much. I think there was an effort, if you had a sabotage operation, not to throw a lot of hand grenades into a city, but rather take out the power: plant which would actually damage the economy of the country. There was an effort made to find devices that would seem to have a useful end. (Nelms, 7/17, p.63-64). Boclda: 324273539 Page i768
2. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority ; a. Harvey's Perception of Authority Harvey stressed that at all times he was acting as a line officer re- porting to his immediate superior within the Agency, the Deputy Director for covert actions (first Bissell, then Helms.) * (Harvey, 6/25, p. 83). Similarly, Harvey also pointed out that his information with respect to authorization from outside the agency came from the Deputy Director: "(a)t no time during this entire period...did I ever personally believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or end-running or engaging in any activity that was not in response to a considered, decided U. S. policy, properly approved, admittedly, perhaps, or through channels and at levels I personally had no in- . volvement in, or first-hand acquaintance with, and did not consider it at that point my province to, if you.will, cross-examine either the Deputy Director or the Director concering it." (Harvey 6/25, - p. 83.) . . pein ee” vl HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 179
HW 50955 39 Thus, Harvey relied upon his superiors within the Agency for authority. Indeed, Harvey indicated that his perception of the. authorization for the 1962 assassination activity may have come from the period when Allen Dulles was DCI. As Harvey stated: "But I had every right to believe organizationally, humanly, whatever way you want to put it, that nothing that was being told to me by Bissell had not in fact come to him from /Allen Dulles/. But Harvey made clear that this did not imply that McCone knew of or au- thorized the assassination activity: Bocld: "The Chairman: 'That doesn't necessarily mean that be- cause the previous director had knowledge that Mr. McCone had knowledge. It is not like a tovenant that runs in ‘the land." "Mr. Harvey: 'No, of course not, and they don't always brief their successors.'" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 85.) 32493539 Page 180
os b. Harvey and the Special Group Augmented a Harvey testified that he never informed the Special Group Augmented, or any of its members individually, of the ongoing assassination plots. As we described earlier, the Special Group Augmented and its Mongoose program began its Cuba activities in late 1961 through 1962. Harvey attended .many of the Special Group Augmented meetings as the CIA's representative. ' He testified that at no time was assassination discussed at any of the meetings, except for the August 10, 1962 meeting. * we ANY Cr 2 We took substantial testimony covering the April/May 1962 period when sonia the underworld contact was reactivated, the pills were passed to Roselli and / delivered to Cuba. Harvey had been appointed several months earlier as head peg 7 of the CIA's Task Force W, which operated under the Special Group Augmented as. mney the CIA's action arm for Mongoose activities. | oT wie OO In the latter part of April, Harvey went to Miami where the CIA had its large (at least 200 persons) JM/WAVE Station. As Harvey testified, in addition to his meeting with Roselli and the delivery of the poison pills, Harvey's trip. had other totally unrelated (in Harvey's view) purposes as well: .this was one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of reviewing in toto...the actual and potential | operations at.the Miami base...and this covered the whole && gamut from personnel administration, operational support 6" in the way of small craft [and] so on..''(Harvey., 7/11, wee Bie on The Special Group Augmented expected to receive a aes his April trip to Miami. On April 19, 1902, while told the Special Group Augmented that: "Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific information on the status of ayent training and operations should be made available.’ ‘(Memorandum for hee * This meeting and the testimony concerning it is treated in depth in the section, infra, pp. HW 50955 Docld:32493539 “Page” 1ar° ~ . ‘ eee
‘the Special Group, April 19, 1962, from Lansdale, p-_____—+?d). «=On April 26, 1962, the Special Group Augmented was informed: by Lansdale that Harvey was in Florida “initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would return to Washington on April 30. (Memorandum for the special Group /Augmented/, April 26, 1962, from Lansdale.) At the Special Group meeting on the same day General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meet- ing and report on agent activities." (Memorandum for the Record, April 26, 1962, by McCone.) The next day, April 26, 1962, Harvey was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request as well as the fact that McCone wanted to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to dis- ' (Memorandum for Action, Elder to Harvey, cuss the Task Force activities,’ April 27, 1962.) Harvey did report to the Special Group upon his return but did not mention his meeting with Roselli or the delivery of the pills and the weapons s . arn Harvey testified that when he reported to the Special Group, Augmient td on his trip to Miami, he did not inform them or, indeed, any i oR S outside the Agency, that he had given the pills ho Rogeqit. , Wh RARE ry p. 16.)* And when McCone asked Harvey to brief him.on what Harvey had done. in Miami, Harvey did not ‘tell McCone of the pills,As indicated above, Harvey did not believe it was necessary to do so. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 17.)* * llarvey testified with respect to why he did not brief the Special Group Augmented, - in the. following exchange: — "O.5. Did you believe that the White Ilouse did not want the Special Group to know?" "A: ‘Well, I would have had no basis for that belief, but I would have felt that if the White House (tasked) this (operation to the CIA) and wanted the Special Group to know about it, it was up to the White Ilouse to brief the Special Group and not up to.me to brief- i them, and T’ would have considered that I would have = ae - been very far out of line and would have been subject to severe censure.'* (llarvey Tr. 7/11, p. 77). HY 50955 Docld: 324293539 "Page War ee Syne ee wera ae et eg ne ae ce one ane re
-42- The minutes of the May 3, 1962, Special Group Augmented meeting make no '_/ mention of Harvey's above-related plot activities. The minutes of that meet- ing show that on his return from Miami, Harvey gave a progress report to the Special Group Augmented on "agent teams'' and the "general field of intelli- gence", (Harvey, Ex. 3, Memorandum of Special Group Augmented Meeting, May 1962, p. 1.) Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated and that 72 actual or potential reporting sources were also in place. (Harvey Ex. 3, p. 1.) | | | | Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor went to see the President to give him what he called a "routine briefing" (Taylor Tr. » p- ). General Taylor's memorandum of his briefing of ‘the President similarly makes no reference to Harvey's contacts with Roselli or the delivery of pills and - guns. (Memorandum for Record May 7, 1962, by General Taylor.) Taylor testified that he had never heard of Harvey delivering pills to poison Castro, or of any assassination attempts. (Taylor Tr. _» pe. 42.) HW 50955 Doeld:32493539 Page 183
3. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Officials In addition to examining the actual nature of the Mongoose operation (discussed ; above at p.- __), we took considerable testimony from Kennedy Administration offi- cials on the question of authority for a Castro assassination in the Mongoose period. Set out in the section below is the testimony of the Kennedy Administra- tion officials principally involved in the Mongoose operation and the Special Group Augmented, all of whom testified the assassination plots were not authorized. These were McCone, the Director of CIA and a member of the Special Group Augmented; | General Taylor, Chairman of the Special Group Augmented; General Lansdale, Chief of Operations for Mongoose ; Special Group Augmented members Bundy and Gilpatric; Secre- tary of State Rusk; and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Their testimony focused on the principal issues raised by Helms, including? (1) whether any authority for a Castro assassination existed; and (2) whether they had knowledge of any Castro assassi- _ ivity.* nation activity. . why Pre9 In.the succeeding section we discuss the August 10, 1962, meeting where the subject ~. of a Castro assassination was raised. a, Testimony of McCone McCone testified that at no time during his service in the Kennedy Administration as DCI (1961-1963), did President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy or any member of the Cabi- - net or White House. staff discuss with him any Castro assassination plans or operations. (McCone, p. 44, ) ° As discussed above in greater. detail, McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence and Helms immediate superior, testified he did not authorize and was not informed © about, the assassination activity. (McCone, p. 3.) | In addition, the Committee questioned the Kennedy Administration members as -to the likelihood that. an assassination order might have been given to Helms by Robert — Kennedy through a "back channel", outside the normal chain of command; however, Helms subsequently appeared and testified that no such order was ever’ ‘given, by” Robert Kennedy. (See p. __ above. ) HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 “Page isi"
ed ‘and discussions of the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 62). McCone pointed out that althougn the Cuban propiem was discussed in terms of "¢ispose of Castro," or "knock off Castro", these terms were meant to refer | to "the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba". and not a Castro assassi- nation. (McCone; p. 44; McCone Ex. 4, memorandum April 14, 1967, to Helms.) MecCone further stated that "it is very hard for me to believe" that Robert Kennedy would: have initiated a Castro assassination activity without consulting with the Special Group Augmented. (MeCone, p. 52). b. ‘Testimony of Taylor , - | Taylor served as Chairman of the Special Group Augmentea during the Mongoose Operation (Taylor, 7/9, p. ). In addition, Taylor also served as President Kennedy's Military Representative and Intelligence Advisor after the Bay of Pigs until his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1962. (Taylor, 7/9, p. ; Bundy, 7/11, p. 25). Taylor testified that a Castro assassination plan was "never" submitted to the Special Group Augmented, either orally or in peeepe tn writing. (Taylor, p. 41). Taylor further testified that he and the Special Group Augmented were never told of the passage of the poison pills to Roselli in April 1962, and that the passage of these pills without the knowledge of the Special Group Augmented was "entirely, completely out of /the/ context and character of the way the /Special Group Augmented/ operated or the way it would accept" that an operation was properly authorized. (Taylor, p.. 43). And Taylor testified that although the Special Group Augmented was "certainly anxious for the downfall of Castro" an "assassination never came up" in the meetings oo aR oe aA ao™ ft ' With respect to whether President. Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have bypassed the Special Group Aug- mented to deal directly with Helms or CIA officers to assassinate Docld: 3234233539 Page 165
Castro, Taylor testified that this would have been "entirely con= tradictory to every method of operation I ever saw on the part of ™ the President and his brother." (Taylor, p. 5). Taylor stated "the | President and the Attorney General would never have gone around" the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 49). Aithough Taylor acknowledged that Robert Kennedy frequently pushed for more direct action during Mongoose, Taylor stated that "there was no suggestion Jot] assassination” in these urgings. (Taylor, p. 67). Taylor testified that Robert Kennedy dealt directly _with Lansdale outside Special Group Augmented channels "only for the purpose of imparting his own sense of urgency” but "never" would Robert Kennedy have done so on substantive issues: "Senator Hart of Colorado: But on substantive issues, he wouldn't, in effect, been dealing behind your back?" "General Taylor: Never. Never. That was not his way." on (Taylor, p. 53). _*/ c. Testimony of Lansdale Lansdale testified that he "was very certain” that he never discussed a Castro assassination with either President Kennedy * The evidence showed, however, that there were occasions, when the _ Attorney General dealt with those concered with Mongoose without of consulting General Taylor. or example, as discussed in greater dew, tail (in the section on Mongoose operations) on January | 8, 19625 ° aN Ns, _ General Lansdale sent a copy. of his program review to Robert. Kennedy.a attached to which was a cover memorandum indicating that other 'sénsi- tive work" not in the review was to be dealt with. only between the President, the Attorney General, and Lansdale. The nature of that work (which Lansdale testified involved political contacts in the Cuba exile community) is discussed at.p. above. HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 186
HY 0955 or Robert Kennedy: "The Chairman: You do not recall ever having discussed with the Attorney General a plan or a proposal to assassinate Fidel Castro?” "General Lansdale: No. And I am very certain Senator, that such a discussion never came up...neither with the Attorney General or the President." ~ (Lansdale, p. 18. )* Lansdale further testified that the plausible deniability concept had no part in the fact that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy or the Attorney General.** . Lansdale testified that he "had doubts" that. assassina- tion was a "useful action, and one which I had never employed in the past, and dur- ing work in copying with revolutions and I had considerable doubts as to its utility and I was trying to be very pragmatic." (Lansdale, p. 31.). When asked if he thought the President was not aware of efforts to depose Castro and his government by any | means including assassination, Lansdale answered "I am certain he was aware of ef- forts to dispose of the Castro regime. I am really not one to ‘guess what he knew of assassinations, because I don't know." (14., p- 32.) With regard to the Castro assassination attempts, Lansdale testified that Harvey "never" told him that Harvey was attempting to assassinate Castro. (Lansdale, p. 24.) Lansdale stated: "T had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no infor- mation at all that such a thing was goinre on by people who I have now learned were involved with it."- (Lansdale, p. 58). */ 7, ‘Thus, when ‘Lansdale was questioned about. the "touchdown plays” (discussed in detail above at p. ‘yy there was this testimony: Nes j3enator Baker: Now do you completely rule out the possibility that the touchdown play had to do with the possible assassination efforts against Fidel Castro?" "General Lansdale: Yes ... I never discussed, nor conceived, nor: received orders about an assassination of Castro with my dealings * with elther the Attorney General or the President." woe Sat % **/ "Senator Baker: Is that ‘the redson you didn't, because ; _of the> principle of deniability?" ae "General Lansdale: No, it wasn't. The subject. never came. up, and I had no reason to bring it up with him. mate wid Woe », Boclda: 324273539 Page 187
47 As discussed-below in detail at pp ___, after the subject -. of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10, 1962 meeting ‘of the | Special Group Augmented, Lansdale directed Harvey to prepare a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders. However, no such plan was ever prepared and, as the IG Report concluded, the August 10 meeting was “unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination." (IG, p. 118). With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy might have by-passed the SGA and Lansdale to deal directly with Agency officials on a Castro assassination, Lansdale testified: "T never knew of a direct line of communication between the President or the Attorney General and Harvey apart from me on this...." ~ During the course of the Committee's investigation into these allegations of assassination efforts by the U.S. government, \ however, General Lansdale spoke with several reporters concerning the subject of a Castro assassination plan in 1Y6Z. Lansdale's comments LU the reporters are dealt with helow in connection with the August iv, 1962, meeting of the Special Group. erg A eg EL TEINS SSD _*/ "Senator Huddles ton:. You never had any reason to believe that - the Attorney General had dealt directly with Mr. Harvey?" "General Lansdale: JI hadn't known about that at all, no...." "Senator Huddleston: ...You have no reason to believe that he might have broached (a Castro assassination) with the Attorney General?" "General Lansdale: I wouldn't know that -- I certainly didn't "Senator Huddleston: You had no ‘reason to be Ve. “that there: was any kind of activity going on in relation stosCuba= outside = Cy of what you were | proposing or what was coming betokel the Special aed Group?" \s "General Lansdale: No, I was supposed to know it all, and I had no indication that I did not know it all (except for one _ operation by Harvey unrelated to assassinations)." BW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page Tar” ~~ Ene Be tree on a cme nee te ne oe ae ama erm carne ma gg nas nnn stent et
d. Testimony of Bundy Bundy served as President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs throughout the Kennedy Administration. (Bundy, p. 2). In addition, Bundy participated in the planning that led to the creation of Operation Mongoose and was a member of the Special Group Augmented. (Bundy, pp. 34, 87). | Bundy testified that the matter of a Castro assassination Was "mentioned from time to time" over the period 1961-1963 but "never to me that I can recall by the President." (Bundy, p. 73). Bundy emphasized that the question came up "as concthing to talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p. 73.) | _ Bundy testified that it was his conviction that "no 7 one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House ... ever gave “any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort — to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54). Bundy testified that he knew and worked on an intimate basis with both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration, and testi- "fied that it was "incredible" that they would have authorized a Castro HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 189
assassination, either explicitly or implicitly as a result of pressure they exerted in the anti-Castro effort: "The Chairman: Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during that whole period, either one of them would have authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?” "Mr. Bundy: TE most emphatically do not ... If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his style to keep the government active in looking for ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you, as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the matter most closely as having essentially been inspired by .the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone. Let me say one other thing about these two men, and ‘that is that there was something that they really wanted done, they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I would say about their character, their purposes, and their nature and the way they confronted international affairs that I find it incredible that they would have os ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassi-~ ‘ nation of Castro. ‘I also feel that if, contrary to every- thing that I know about their character, they had had such a ‘decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in any doubt about it." (Tr. 98-99). eegia Bundy was asked "have you any way to explain to the Com- mittee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he...had no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop schemes, but to engage in active attempts to assassinate Castro?" Bundy replied: "T have no explanation of that." (Bundy, pp. 99-100) - Bundy further testified that despite the extreme sense of urgency that. arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro's assassi- nation was never discussed, and it was "totally inconsistent" with the policies and actions taken by the President and Robert Kennedy in that HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page i190
HW 50955 = 5U - crisis for them to have authorized a Castro assassination. (Bundy, p. 95, 97-93) .* | Bundy further stated that he was never told by anyone that assassination efforts were underway against Castro, that underworld figures were hired by the CIA in this regard, or that Harvey was engaged in Castro assassination ac- tivity. (Bundy, p. 63.) . ; “ "Some time in the early months of 1961". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 4.) Put since Bundy testified that he heard about the concept of "“exccutive action” Ww yl this was presented to him as an untargeted cangbility only he did not '"dis- courage or dissuade" the person who briefed him on this. (Bundy, p. 4, 7, 10.) When asked if he had any recollection of any specific covert plans that involved polsons in conjunction with activities against Cuba, Bundy stated "T have no recollection of any specific plan. I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection that I heard the word poison at some point in connec- tion with a possibility of action in Cuba. But that. is as far as I have been able to take it in my own ; memory. (Bundy, p. 42). Bundy stated further that this recollection relating to poison involved a proposal that seemed “impractical” because it was going to kill a large group of people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort." (Bundy,p.42-43). '_¥/ Bundy stated: weg % IT Moris that " J. the most important point I want to make I find the notion that they separately, privatély encouraged, ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally incon- sistent with what I knew of both of them. And, as an example, I would cite -- and one among very many -- the role played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a quarantine or a blockade.” (Bundy , p. 98). vat. Docld:32423539 Page 191°
With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy ; may have authorized assassination outside of Special Group Augmented channels, Bundy stated that although Robert Kennedy did spur people to greater effort during Mongoose, "he never took away from the existing channel of authority its authority or responsibility." (Bundy, pp. 47-48). Bundy further testified that there existed be- tween Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor (the Special Group Augmented Chairman) "a relation of real trust and confidence.” In view of this relation, Bundy stated it was his opinion that Robert Kennedy would not have by-passed Taylor to develop a “back-channel” relationship. with someone else to assassinate Castro. “(Bundy, p. 87). e. Testimony of MacNamara MacNamara served as Secretary of Defense throughout HW 50955 Docld: 3274934539 Page 193°"
Hw SO955 McNamara stated that he had no knowledge or information of any vroposal for the assassination of Premier Castro coming from President kennedy .o2 Robert Kennedy. (CicNamara, 7/11/75, p. 4.) "le did note that "we were hysteri- cal about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter, and that there was pressure from (President Kennedy and Robert kennedy) to co something about Castro. But I don't believe we contemplated assassination. We did, however, } contemplate overthrow." (McNamara , p. 93.) There occurred during McNamara's testimony an exchange which is appropriate to set out in full because of the manner in which it captures the dilemma posed by the evidence on the question of authority: "The Chairman. We also have received evidence from _ your senior associates that they never participated in -the authorization of an assassination attempt against . Castro nor ever directed the CTIA to | undertake such attempts. We have much testimony establishing the chain of command where covert action was concerned, and all of it has been to the effect that the Special Group or the Special Group Augmented had full charge of covert operations, and that in that chain of command any proposal of this character or any other proposal having to do with covert operations being directed against the Castro regime, or against Castro personally, were to be laid before the Special Group Augmented and were not to be undertaken except with the authority of that , group and-at the direction of that group. Now, at the same time we know from the evidence that the CIA was in fact engaged during the period in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro. Now, you see what we are faced with is. this dilemma “e Bocld: 324293539 Page 193
HY 50955 McNamara further stated that "I find it almost inconceivable’ assassination attempts were carried on during the | Konnedy Adninis trey aTag - Yo 7 some secret channel circumventing the whole structure | of command by which the CIA and certain officials in the CIA were authorized to proceed with assassination plots and assassination attempts against Castro. Or the third and final point that I can think of is that somehow these officials of the CIA who were so engaged misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of authority. Now it is terribly important, if there is any way that we can find out which of these three points represented what actually happened. That is the nature, that is the quandary. Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would assist us in finding an answer to this central question? Mr. McNamara. I can only tell you what will further your uneasiness. Because I have stated before and I believe today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization, fully under the control of senior officials of the govern- ment, so much so that I feel as a senior official of the government I must assume responsibility for the actions of the two, putting assassination aside just for the moment. But I know of no majoy action taken by CIA during the time I was in the government that was not properly authorized by senior officials. And when I say that I want to emphasize also that I believe with hindsight we authorized actions that were-contrary to the interest of-the Republic but I don't want it on the record that the CIA was uncontrolled, was operating with its own authority and we can be absolved of responsibility for what CIA .did, again with exception of assassination, again which I say I never heard of, The second point you say that you have, you know that CIA was engaged in a series of attempts of assassination. I think to use your words. I’ don't know that. I accept the fact that you do and that you have information I was not aware of. I find that impossible to reconcile. I just can't understand how it could have happened and I don't accept the third point, that they operated on the basis of minunderstanding, because it seems to me that the McCone position that he was opposed to it, HPs. clear recollection and his written memo of 1967 tffac ‘lawas strongly opposed, to it, his statement that Murrow opp Se fall should eliminate any point of misunderstanding. piety ean't | reconcile. (TR. 38-41) — we Kae Oy 7 a 2». ee Boclda: 324293539 Page i194
25 4- days without the senior members know it, and I understand the contradiction that _ this carries with respect to the face." (McNamara, p. 4.) lle further emphasized that for the President or Robert: Kennedy to have approved a Castro assassination was "totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men." (McNamara p. 90.) £, Testimony of Gilpatric Gilpatric served as Deputy Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Admini - stration. (Gilpatric, p. 5; Gilpatric Ex. 1, p. 5.) In that capacity, Gilpatric represented the Department of Defensé as a member of the Special Group and the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose operation. (Gilpatric, p. 5.) Gilpatric testified Chat he understood the mandate of the Special Group during Mongoose was not to kill Castro, but to "so under- mine, so disrupt the Cuban system under Castro that it could not be ae effective."* (Gilpatric, p. 28). Gilpatric emphasized that ‘it was the system we’ had to deal with" and words such as "get rid of Castro" were patric, p- 29). - , Lo eps, * Initially in his first appearances before the Committee Mr. Gilpatric was unable to recall any of the events or characters involved in Operation Mongoose. He failed to recall that General Lansdale was the Chief of Operations for the project, or Lansdale's involvement in the Special Group Augmented even though Gilpatric recommended Lansdale for pro- motion to Brigadier General. Gilpatric testified that the lapse of time, approximately fifteen years, had impaired his memory on these events. (Gilpatric, pp. 6-9.) (Insert possible proposed additional language by Smothers.) ae HY 50955 Docld:32493539 Page Toy" ~ wes ; co : sate part aes
HY 50955 _*/ In Gilpatric's testimony, there was the following exchange: Gilpatric said that he knew of no express restriction that would have barred the killing of Castro. But Gilpatic testified that he understood "There were limits on the use of power" and that these pre- cluded the use of assassination. (Gilpatric, p. 31). Thus, while Gil- patric said that it was “perfectly possible" that one might reasonably have inferred assassination was authorized, nevertheless, the limits on action set down by the Special Group Augmented would have required that specific efforts be made by one receiving general instructions to clarify whether those instructions authorized assassination.*/ He added that "within our charter, so to speak, the one thing that was off limits was military invasion." (Cd. p- 45). In this context of the ilonsanse charter, Gilpatric, when asked whether th® "killing of Castro by a para- military group (would) have been within bounds." he responded, "I know of no restriction. that would have barred it." (Id.) In response to a ques- tion as to whether there was any concern for the limits on the activities of personnel involved in these raids ‘and infiltration efforts, Gilpatric said:. "No, to the contrary. The complaint that the Attorney General had, posit oo | if we assume he was reflecting the President's views on it, /was that/ the steps taken by the CIA up to that point, /and/ their plans were too petty, - were too minor, they weren't massive enough, they weren't going to be ef- fective enough." (Id., p. 47.) However, as discussed above at p. : on March 5; 1962, the Special Group Augmented had agreed, with respect to a "action-type"- agents, that it "must keep its hand tightly" on these agents’ activities, and although once such agents were inside Cy ay“they could not be "effectively controlled," the Group would make "every effort...to attemps: such control." "Senator Huddleston:...It's on the basis of these words that.” everybody admits were used, like replace or get rid of, on mp. the basis of these kinds of conversation alone that /Helms/ ra was firmly convinced and that apparently went right down _ through the whole rank of command, firmly convinced that he had the authority to move against the life of a head of: state. (Footnote continued on next page.). Docld:32493539 Page G96 9°70 0 0 mm eee Se
Gilpatric testified that “it was not unusual" for Presi- dent Kennedy and Robert Kennedy to deal directly with people at various levels in the Executive Branch. (cilpatrie, p. 58). With respect to Mon- goose, Gilpatric said that Robert Kennedy was the "moving spirit" (Gil- patric, p. 11). But Gilpatric stated that Robert Kennedy's role was "prin- cipally to spur us on, to get going, get cracking.” (Cilpatric, p. 47). Thus, although Robert Kennedy frequently complained that. the plans of the CIA and Mongoose weren't "massive enough" and that “we should get in there and ‘do nore," Gilpatric pointed out that Robert Kennedy was not making specific proposals in these urgings, and the result he desired was a general one Hy ~ "to limit the Castro regime's effectiveness," rather than any specific measure. (Gilpatric, p. 747). g. Testimony of Rusk Dean Rusk served as Secretary of State throughout the Kennedy Administration. Rusk participated in a number of Special Group Augmented meetings during the Mongoose operation. (Rusk, p. ). (Footnote continued from previous page.) Now this disturbs me, and I don't know whether our councils of govern- ment operate that way in all areas or not, but if they do then it seems to me it would raise a very Serious question as to whether ocr not the troops are getting the right orders." "Mr. Gilpatric....T thought there were limits on the use of powe - ' that was one of them. “Senator Huddleston. “And going beyond that would require that sdine: body make a specific effort to make sure he understood precise ely*wlrate they were talking about, would that be your interpretation?" : "Mr. Gilpatric. It would." © (Gilpatric, p. 31). BW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 197 “~~” ST : oe , 2 ems
Rusk testified that'he had never been infcrmed of any os, Castro assassination plans or undertakings and had no knowledge of any such activity. (Rusk, p. 52). oot Rusk further testified that he found it "very hard to believe” that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy would have, in the course of urging action against Castro, sanctioned the use of any measure against Castro.*/. Rusk said that, while it was "possible" that a person, in good faith, might have thought specific courses of action were authorized from if the emphasis given to taking action against Castro, nevertheless Rusk testi- fied that with respect to a Castro assassintion, "Tt would have been an abuse of! theePresident and the Attorney General if somebody had thought they were getting that without confirming’ that this was, in fact, an official, firm policy decision. (Rusk, pp. 98-99). With respect to whether President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have communicated directly with Helms or Harvey on a Castro assassination effort, Rusk testified that, based on his experience and the manner in which foreign affairs matters were handled, I don't see how it could have happened." (Rusk, p. 99).**/ */ "Senator Huddleston...(Do) your contacts with Robert Kennedy or Presi- dent Kennedy, indicate to you that they were agitated to such an extent about Cuba and Mongoose: progress that in a conversation with someone urging them to get off their rear-end and get something done that they might convey the message that they meant anything, go to any length to do something about the Castro regime? -"Mr, Rusk. I find it very hard to believe that Robert ‘Kennedy standing - alone, or particularly Robert Kennedy alleging to speak fo Ppresident Kennedy, would have gone down that trail..." . **/"Senator Mondale...We asked Ceneral Taylor yesterday whe thet ies thought ~~ something of informal, subterranean, whatever kinds of communigat ions from the highest level to Helms would have been possible without his (Footnote continued on following page.) HW 50955 Docld:32473539 Page i196
h. Testimony of Sorensen Sorensen served as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration. Sorensen was a member of the National Security Council Executive Committee that dealt with the Missile Crisis, although he was not involved with Mongoose. . Sorensen testified that in his daily personal meetings with the ' President and at all the National Security Council meetings | he attended, there a a Sued HY 50955 was "not at any time any mention -- much less approval by him -- of any U.S.- sponsored plan to assassinate any foreign leaders” (Sorensen, p. 4). Based apon his close contact with President Kennedy, Sorensen stated that it was his opinion that: "such an act (as assassination) was totally foreign to his character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy and his concern for his country's reputation abroad, and foreign to his pragmatic recognition'that so horrendous but ‘inevitably counter-productive a precedent committed by a country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable. (Sorensen, (Pe 5). (Footnote continued from previous page.) knowledge, and he said he felt that was. incredible, he didn' t think it was possible. mie Do you think that it would be likely that an informal gider around channels, say to Helms or to Harvey-- ! . The Chairman. Over a three-year period. co ’ Senator Mondale. Over a three-year period would have been possible | without your being informed? L Mr. Rusk. Theoretically, Senator, one would have to say it (is, possible. Senator Mondale. But based on your experience? aa Mr. Rusk. In terms of practicality, probability and So forth, 1 ‘don't =. see how it could have happenéd. a You know those things, in these circles we were moving in could not’ be limited in that way. You know the echoes would come back." Pe as ee Bocld: 32473539 Page 199°"
y, The August 10, 1962 Meeting oo, As indicated above (see p. ), the question of a Castro assassination 2 | | eee was raised at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented on August 10, 1962. rat 7 Thereafter, on August 13, 1962, ‘Lansdale directed Harvey to include in a hunts AL @vte proposed plan for ‘Phase II of Mongoose a plan for the "Liquidation of leaders" racf oro hi as an option. We took considerable testimony and examined the documents relating to the August 10 meeting, the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassination, and Lansdale's subsequent request for a contingency plan. . pe we At the outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony ay eece showed that discussion of a Castro assassination at the Agust 10, 1962 meeting hy fie y had no connection to the assassination activityeundertaken by Harvey and Roselli, or any other Castro assassination plans or efforts. As the CIA Inspector General found: "The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised cee at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is i} unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination. It did result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning liquidation of leaders. (IG, p. 118). The finding of the Inspector General is supported both by the chrono- logy of the Castro assassination efforts and the testimony of Harvey. The chronology shows that it was three months prior to the August 10, 1962 meet- ing that Harvey gave Roselli the poison pills for use against Castro, and that shortly thereafter (and well before August 10, 1962) Harvey was informed . that the pills were inside Cuba. (see Pp. _. above). Moreover, after the August 10, 1962 meeting there was no Castro: assassination activity during the remainder of 1962. (see p.- above). In addition, Harvey (who attended the August - 10, 1962 meeting. and WW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 200
HW 50955 recalled that the question of a Castro assassination was raised) declared that the discussion was not related to his assassination activity with Ro- selli. (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 48-50). Harvey further testified that he did not view the August 10, 1962, discussion of a Castro assassination as authoriza- tion for the Roselli operation because “the authority, as I understood it, for this particular operation went back long before the formation" of the Special Group Augmented. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 49): 1. The Contemporanesus Documents , 4 a. Lansdale's Aucust 13, 1962 Memorandum Following the August 10, 1962 meeting, Lansdale sent a memorandum on August 13, 1962, to Harvey and the other members of Lansdale's interagency working group .*/ (Lansdale Ex. 15, Memorandum from Lansdale, August 13, 1962). The Memorandum began by stating: "In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1). 4 Lansdale further set out his concept] of what was required: "I be- _lieve the. paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the heading of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1). * In addition to Harvey, copies of Lansdale's August 13, 1962, memorandum were sent to Robert Hurwitch (State Dept), Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense Dept) and Don Wilson (U.S. Information Agency). (Lansdale Ex. 15.) In his testimony, Gen Harris identified a document drafted by the Mongoose Work- ing Group. in the Defense Dept shortly before the August 10 meeting. The document listed a number of steps that could be taken in the event of an intensified Mon- goose program that might involve U. S. military intervention. One such sté€p was "assassinate Castro and his handful-of top men."" (Harris Ex. 4.) Gen. Harris stated that this was "not out of the ordinary in terms of.contingency planning... it's one of the things you look at. (Harris, p. 37.) There was no evidence that this document was distributed outside the Defense Dept's Mongoose working group. Bocld:324273539 Page 201
Lansdale's memorandum then assigned to Harvey papers on the following ‘~ subjects by the means of the following passage, which contained a deleted phrase: "Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, [words deleted/, Economic, (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary.” (Lansdale, Ex. 15, p. 1). ; According to a memorandum .by Harvey to Helms the following day, August 14, 1962, the words deleted from the above-quoted passage were "including liquidation of leaders." (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum by Harvey, August 4, 1962, to Helms). b. Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum =~ When Harvey received Lansdale's’ August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrote a memorandum to Helms attaching a copy of Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, anc noting that Harvey. had excised the words “including liquidation of leaders." _— (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum, August 14, 1962, from Harvey to Helms). Har- vey's Memorandum stated: » "The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub- ject which has been made a matter of official : ‘record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comménts or study on this point. (Lansdale Ex. 16). - Harvey's memorandum further stated that, on receipt of Lansdale's memorandum, Harvey had called Lansdale’s office and pointed out "the inad- missibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such HW 50955 Docld:327473539 Page 202
a document," and that the CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it."" (Lansdale Ex. 16, P: 1). c. The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting The minutes of the August 10 meeting contain no reference to the sub- ject of a Castro assassination. (Memorandum for Record, Special Group Aug~ | mented Meeting, August 10, 1962, by Parrott, hereafter referred to as the "August 10 Minutes"). Parrott, the author of the August 10 Minutes, testi- fied that he did not recall a discussion of assassination at that meeting, but the fact that the minutes do not reflect such a discussion is not an indication that the matter did not come up. (Parrott, p- 34). Parrott pointed out that his minutes "were not intended to be a verbatim transcript of everything that was said," since the purpose of his minutes was "to interpret what the decisions were and to record those and to use them as a useful action document." (Parrott, 34-35). Parrott testified: “we had 15 or 16 people (at the August 10, 1962 meeting)...all of them well informed, all of them highly articulate. This meeting, as I recall, went on for several hours...Now I'm sure that particularly in a group like this that there were a great many ~ proposals made that were just shot down immediately." (Parrott, p. 34-35). Parrott further testified that he did not record proposals that were - quickly rejected at the August 10 meeting. (Parrott, p. 35). Parrott stated that, although he had no recollection ofa discussion of Castro's assassination at the August 10 meeting, he would infer from the related HW 50955 Docld: 32493539 “Page 203 ~°
HW 450955 62 documents (the Lansdale and Harvey Memoranda of August 13 and 14) that the subject was raised but "it never got off the ground....Therefore, I did not record it.'' (Parrott, p. 35). The documents and testimony of Parrott suggest séveral possible in- ferences with respect to the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting. First, as indicated by the Lansdale and Harvey memorandum, it is possible that a contingency plan was requested but that it was decided not to make this "a matter of official record." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1). However; if it had been decided to commission a written 4/ ee aanb OE contingency plan, as Lansdale requested Harvey prepare, it is difficult to dems iamrim ET eee see how this request could have been reconcilédewith a decision to make to written record. / fe 7 a Core STINT Second, it is possible that, as Parrott's testimony indicated, the de ah z subject was raised but quickly rejected. This inference is apparently con- y) ' : , . lye f sistent with the fact that the subject did not appear in Parrott's minutes, fowsr 7 and perhaps, although less so, with Harvey's August 14 Memorandum. Harvey's -/ Memorandum states that the Special Group Augmented “is not expecting any OT written comments cr study on this point." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1). Be . Before turning to the testimony on these questions, we discuss the context of the August 10 discussion of a Castro assassination as reflected in the minutes of the August 10 Meeting. d. The August 10 Meeting The August 10 Meeting was held to decide upon a further course of action to succeed the intelligence collection phase of Mongoose which was scheduled to conclude in August. (McCone, p. 34). As a policy meeting, there were in Docld: 39495599 : Page “ota . ae ON Eaten nee tage ne peek ee RTE EGER DUET COHE EF ERI EE RE TURAL tae A OU VINARNR OUEHTE ME RE RI
HW 50955 c h HU attendance a larger number of officials than usually participated in Special Group Augmented meetings. The Meeting was chaired by Secretary of State Rusk (and held in his office), and attended by a total of 15 officials, including the principals of the agencies taking part in Mongoose, i.e., Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and USIA Director Murrow. At the August 10 meeting, General Lansdale proposed that a "stepped-up Course B" be adopted for Mongoose, (August 10 Minutes, p. _). ‘This plan involved operations to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychologi- cal, and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." (Memorandum for Special Group Augmented, August 8, 1962, p. 1). However, the Special Group Augmented decided against consideration of the "stepped-up Course B, In the discussion of Lansdale's Course B proposal, Rusk "emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between | Castro and old-line Communists". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). In addition, McNamara questioned whether the practice of building. up agents. in Cuba would not lead to actions that "would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion”. (August 10 Minutes, p. 2) (A remark which seems inconsistent with McNamara ™ logs 17 at the same Meeting raising the question of assassination in any sense’ of pro r ; . ty J WAL advocacy). The Minutes state that McNamara'’s concern "led to the suggestion. WA oe by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall objective , <] oh pn /of Mongoose/ from one of overthrowing the Castro regime” to one of causing oP . : pro its failure. ‘(August 10 Minutes, p. 2). eee Hence, in lieu of Lansdale's "stepped-up Course B', the Special Group his cunldwe lbw + Ww eel Docld: 32423539 Page 205
HY 0955 Augmented chose a plan advanced by McCone that assumed Castro's continuance in power and had the more limited objective of splitting off Castro from "old-line Communists".* (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). The decision and "action" of the Special Group Augmented at the August 10 meeting was stated as follows: "The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thurs- day's meeting of: the Special Group. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split." (August Memorandum, p. 2). ke * "Action to be taken: CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15." (August 10 Memorandum, p. 3). It was therefore in this context that Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum to Harvey stated that "in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B. “Indeed, pursuant-to the August 10 decision to adopt McCone's proposal for.a more limited plan that assumed Castro's continuation in power, Lansdale's memorandum stated that a CIA paper titled "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort) will be used as the starting basis." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1). The August 10 Minutes show that McCone pointed out that the stepped-up Course B "will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary type blood bath if unsupported". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). McCone "emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of military force”. (August 10 Minutes). The August 10 Minutes further stated that, in McCone's view, the CIA variant “would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising" (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). a - Docld: 32423539 Page 706 ~
HW 450955 ‘In view of the issues raised by these documents we took testimony from the principal participants in that meeting. In particular, we discuss below the testimony as to whether Lansdale's request for an assassination plan reflected the desire of the SGA or was contemplated by the SGA's decision to proceed with a plan of "reduced effort" that posited Castro's continuance in power. 2. The Testimony As set out below, Harvey, McCone, and Goodwin recall the question of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting.* We discuss that testimony, first with respect to the August 10 meeting itself, and, -~ second, with regard to the action that followed that meeting. a. Testimony as to the August 10 Meeting (1) . Testimony of McCone McCone testified that the question of a "Liquidation" or removal of Castro and other Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in the context of "exploring the alternatives that were available" for the next phase of “Mongoose. (McCone, p. 33). McCone testified that he did not recall who made this suggestion, but that he and Mr. Murrow took "strong exception" to the suggestion. A memorandum of McCone's recollection of the August 10 Meeting, written in 1967,**/states: */ Other participants (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and Gilpatric) did not recall the August 10 discussion. ee] On April 14, 1967, after McCone left the CIA, he dictated a memorandum _of his recollection regarding the August 10, 1962 meeting. The memoran- dum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist, Jack ‘Anderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination | (Continued on the following page. } Docld:32473539 Page 207
HW 50955 "T took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG (U.S. Government) and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds." (McCone Ex. 4). McCone testified that there was no decision at the August 10 meeting that assassination should not be part of any program, but ‘that "the subject was just dropped" after his objection. (McCone, p. ). | McCone'’s 1967 memorandum stated that 7 ; _ | db A Wh. "At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy." (McCone, Ex. 4). , (2) Testimony of Harvey Harvey's testimony that the August 10 discussion was unrelated to any , actual Castro assassination activity is discussed above (see p. ). With i { ~ | 1 1 1 i 1 i i i . i : P : toe | . : respect to that discussion itself, Harvey testified that it was his recollection that the question of a Castro assassination was raised by' Secretary McNamara. (Harvey, p. 30). Harvey said it was his impression that McNamara raised the question as one of "shouldn't we consider the elimination, or assassination" of Castro.. (Harvey, p. 30). , | With respect to the reaction of the Special Group Augmented to this. _ (Footnote continued from the previous page.)- 7 , ai with Anderson on the telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dic- _tated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated that at one of several Mongoose meetings on August 8, 9 or 10, 1962, "I recall a suggestion being made. to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro." (McCone, Ex. 4, p. 1). Bocld: 32473539 Page 208
HY 0955 UU suggestion, Harvey testified: "TZ think the consensus of the Group was to sweep that particular proposal or suggestion or question or consideration off the record and under the rug as rapidly as possible. There was no extensive discussion of it, no discussion, no back and forth as the whys and wherefores and possibilities and so on." ‘(Harvey, p. 30). (3) Testimony of Goodwin Goodwin testified that he had a recollection of "limited certainty" that the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting .*/ Goodwin testified that "I am unable to say with any certainty who it was" who raised the subject of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting. (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8)**/ i eA SE */ In a staff interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin recalled the date of the meeting at which a Castro assassination was raised as falling in early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. . (Memorandum of Staff Interview with Goodwin, May 27, 1975, p. 2). After reviewing the Minutes of the August 10, 1962 meeting and.the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of August 13 and 14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had “misplaced the date of the meeting in my own memory.’ (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 7). In placing the. incident on August 10, 1962, Goodwin stated "Now, of course, you know, it may not be. That's the best recollection I now have. It's a little better than the earlier one, but it's not certain.” (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8). **/In a magazine article in June 1975, Goodwin was quoted as stating that at one of the meetings of a White House task force on Cuba it was McNamara who "said that Castro's assassination. was the only productive way of deal- ing with Cuba." (Branch and Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers, July, 1975, p- 61). In his testimony on July 18, 1975, Goodwin stated: "that's not an exact quote" in the article, and explained further: (Footnote continued on following page.) Docld: 324293539" Page 209
wes, + io y HW 50955 ~bij= (4) Testimony of McNamara McNamara testified that, although he had no recollection of the question of a Castro assassination being raised at the August 10 meeting, he did express opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke with McCone several days after the August 10 meeting. (McNamara, p. 7,8). McNamara's testimony with respect to his conversation with McCone is dis- cussed below with the testimony as to actions after the August 10 meeting. b. Testimony as to Actions After the August 10, 1962 Meeting (1) Testimony of McCone McCone testified that he called McNamara after he received Lansdale's = August 13 Memorandum and, “insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn because no decision was made on this subject, and since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite out of order in tasking the. Central In- telligence Agency to consider the matter."*/ (Footnote continued from the previous page.) "T didn't tell (the author of the magazine article) that it was definitely McNamara, that very possibly. it was McNamara. He asked me about McNamara's role, and I said it very well could have been McNamara." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 33). If Goodwin's recollection was as uncertain as he swore it was in his testimony, it is difficult to understand how he could have spoken in the terms he testified he did to the author of the magazine article, particularly in view of Goodwin's statement that “it's not a light matter to perhaps destroy a man's career on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence that he might have said at a meeting without substantial certainty in your own mind /and/ I do not have that." (Goodwin, pp. 34-35). */ McCone's 1967 Memorandum stated: "Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because Operation Mongoose~~an interdepartmental affair-~was under the operational control of (the Defense Depart a. ment)... (McCone EX. 4). Bocld:32423539 Fage 210
HY 50955 ‘ Pocld: 3394934539" Page 317° (Ue MeCone also testified that McNamara agreed that the Lansdale Memorandum should be withdrawn for the same reason expressed by McCone, 1.e. because the topic of a Castro assassination had not been given consideration by the Special Group Augmented. (McCone, p-. 39). (2) Testimony of Harvey As discussed above (seep. ___) Harvey's Memorandum of August 14, 1962 states that upon receiving Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, Harvey demanded that Lansdale excise the words referring to "liquidation of leaders." Har- vey's Memorandum further stated that “the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." This latter passage raises the issue whether Harvey meant to state that the Special Group Aug- mented authorized a Castro assassination plan or activity but that no written record should be made. In his testimony, Harvey clarified this point by stating that the Special Group did not express a desire to proceed with the ‘suggestion of a Castro assassination: "Senator Schwesker:...was,it understood in an ia : . cumwritten way that (assassination) was to pro- ceed? hoe rey | "Mr. Harvey: t to my knowledge, no..... TO. %A If there was any wnwritten understanding on - . ams the part of the members of the Special Group A f~ concerning this, other than what was said at the meeting, I do not know of it..." (Harvey, pp. 30-31). | Harvey further testified that shortly after the August 10 meeting, McCone told Harvey that he had called McNamara to state that assassiantion should not be discussed and that he had told McNamara that if he was involved in such.matters, he might be excommunicated from his church. (Harvey, p. 25). mata rates pape marae Wa va
-{1- (3) Testimony of McNamara McNamara testified that he did not recall any discussion of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting, but that he did express opposition to any assasssination attempt when McCone telephone him after Lansdale's August 13 memorandum was brought to McCone's attention. (McNamara, P. 7,8). McNamara stated that "TY agreed with Mr. McCone that no such planning should be undertaken." (McNamara, p. 8). McNamara stated further that "T have no knowledge or information about any other plans or preparations for a Castro assassination. (McNamara, p .-7)- (4) Testimony of Elder Elder, a career CIA officer, served as McCone's Executive Assistant from May 1962 until McCone's departure from the Agency in April 1965. Elder oy ‘ testified that he was present when McCone telephone McNamara after the August 10 meeting. Elder stated that McCone told McNamara "the subject you just brought up, I think it is highly: improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss, and I intend to have it expunged from the record. " (Elder, p- 23). Elder testified that.this was the essence of the conversation but that he remembered "several exact phrases, like "would not be condoned': and ‘im- - proper'". (Elder, pp. 23, 24).*/ */ Elder,.who stated he heard both MeCone and McNamara’ 'S pact of the tele- phone .conversation via a speaker phone, said that McNamara "just more or less accepted what Mr. McCone said without comment or rejoinder.’ (Elder, p. 24). \ _ ; a £4 HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 2120.”
~ [om When Harvey later received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, McCone my spoke to Harvey in Elder's presence, and "McCone made his views quite clear in the same language and tone...that he used with Mr. McNamara." (Elder, p. 25). Elder testified that Harvey did not tell McCone that Harvey was engage in the Castro assassination effort at that time. (Elder, p- 25). Elder also described a meeting he had with Helms in Elder's office shortly after the August 10 meeting to convey to Helms McCone's views re- garding the subject of assassinations. Elder stated: | “I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Harvey that assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be unthinkable to record. in writing any consideration of assassination because it left the impression that the subject had received serious consideration by governmen- tal policymakers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, 'I undérstand.’ The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assasination. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension | about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation." (Elder Affidavit, 8/_/75, p. __). (5) Testimony of Lansdale Lansdale testified that he recalled that the subject of Castro's assassination surfaced at the August 10 meeting, but that the "consensus was oe PACERS O! _..hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction." ‘(Lansdale, p. 20). Sey . AAG tm a eI A TN, With respect to why he asked Harvey on August 13 for a Castro assasination Ig 97 ; ° Me fre - plan, Lansdale testified: . “/t hye : .  €Y fee ry "Senator Baker: Why did you, three days later if they all said, hell no, /go/ ahead with it?" ‘ xg HWY 50955 Docld:i 384939570 Page SIF"
“ead HW 50955 Sa ted "General Lansdale:...the meeting at which they said that was still on a development of my original task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of a regime. At the same time, we were getting intelligence accumulating very quickly of something very different taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which was the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the possibilities of Soviet missiles being placed there... At that time, I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as /assassination/.' 'x/ (Lansdale, p. 21). —_ Lansdale stated that he had only one brief conversation with Harvey after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would look into it... see about developing some plans" but that was the last Lansdale ever heard of the matter. — (Lansdale, p. 124). Lansdale stated that with the develop- ment of the Missile Crisis, Mongoose "was being rapidly shifted out of con- sideration" and thus “TL wasn "t pressing for answers. it was very obvious that another situation was developing that would be handled quite differently in Cuba." (Lansdale, P. 124). Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that a discussion of a Castro assassination plan or proposal never came up in his discussions with Robert Kennedy or with President Kennedy, and that he had originated the request to Harvey for plan without discussing the matter with anyone: ““Q:...Why, if it is true that assassination ‘idea was turned down on August 10, you sent out your memo of August 13?" "General Lansdale:...I don't recall that thoroughly, I don't remember the reasons why I would." "Q: Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting turned down assassinations as a subject to look into, and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to look = into it?” - "General Lansdale: 1 guess it is, yes. The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why. I did it. L don't: know." (Lansdale, pp. 123-124. Docld: 32423539 Page 2714
HW 50955 "Senator Baker:...did you originate this idea of laying on the CIA a requirement to report on the feasibility of the assassination of Castro or did someone else suggest that?" "General "Senator you laid "General anyone." "Senator "General "Senator "General Lansdale: .I did, as far as I recall." Baker: Who did you discuss it with before on that requirement?" Lansdale: I don't believe I discussed it with Baker: Only with Harvey?" Lansdale: Only with Harvey.” Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?" Lansdale: I might have, and I don't believe that I did. I think it was just with Harvey.” ' "Senator Kennedy?" "General "Senator "General Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Robert Lansdale: No, not that 1 recall." Baker: With the President?” Lansdale: No." (Lansdale, pp. 19-20). Docld: 32423539 Page 215
c. Testimony of News Reporters as to Lansdale's Comments on a the August 10 Meeting During the Committee's investigation, news reports concerning the August 10 meeting and Lansdale's request for a Castro assassination plan appeared in the press. Two of these reports were based on statements made by Lansdale to David Martin of the Associated Press and Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington Star-News. In view of the apparent conflict between Lansdale's testimony to the Committee and what Lansdale was reported to: have said to Martin and O'Leary, the Committee invited these reporters to testify as to Lansdale's statements to them. Martin testified under a subpoena issued by the Committee pursuant to Senate,Resolution 21. O'Leary appeared voluntarily but stated the policy of his newspaper with regard to disclosing news sources precluded him from any comment going beyond that contained in a prepared statement he read under oath. O'Leary's statement declared that fy his news report “represents accurately my understanding of the relevant in- formation I obtained from news sources." (O'Leary, page 5). We discuss below Martin's testimony and the news reports as they compare to Lansdale's testimony. -(1) The Martin News Report . Martin's news report stated, in its lead paragraph: "Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale said Friday that acting on orders from President John F. Kennedy delivered through an intermediary, he developed plans for removing Cuban Premier Fidel Castro by any means including assassination." (Ex. 2 to Martin Affidavit) ' Martin testified that this lead paragraph was accurate and that it was a conclusion which he drew based upon the totality of his interview on : May 30, 1975 with Lansdale. (Martin, pp. 19~20) In contrast, Lansdale Nef BW 50955 Bocldad: 32423539 Page 216 ~ ; 0 mee seen eee
ey HY 50955 -16- testified that, after reading Martin's report in the press, he told. Martin "your first sentence is not only completely untrue, but there is not a single thing in your story that says it is true." (Lansdale, p. 65) As discussed above (see p. __), Lansdale testified that on his own initiative he had originated the request to Harvey without discussing the matter with anyone and that a Castro assassination plan never came up in his discussions with Robert Kennedy (or with President Kennedy). | . . : in view of Martin's testimony that the lead paragraph of his report was a conclusion based on the totality of his interview with Lansdale, it should be noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that Lansdale was ordered by President Kennedy ‘or Robert Kennedy to develop pians for a Castro. assassination. The report quotes Lansdale as stating "TI was working for the highest ‘authority in the land...the President” and goes on to state that Lansdale said he did not deal directly with the President but ‘vorked through” an intermediary more intimate to the President than Bundy.*/ It can be noted that the phrases "working for" and "working through" are not the same as the lead paragraph's conclusion that Lansdale was "acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassination plan. in addition, subsequent paragraphs in the Martin report indicate that Lansdale said’ the decision to include. assassination in his planning was Lansdale's own, as he testified it was to the Committee. Thus, the Martin report states Lansdale said that assassination was "one of the means he {tansdale/ considered," that it was Lansdale's . belief that assassination would not have been "incompatible" with his assignment, and that Lansdale said ny just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities." */ The Martin report states that Lansdale refused to provide this intermediary's name for the record. In respecting the confidentiality of news sources, the Committee didnot seek to ask Martin what was said. off the record to him in the course of his newsgathering efforts. (Martin, Pp. ye. - Boclda: 32423539 Page 217
-11- Moreover, in his testimony as to the conversation with Lansdale on 8 May 30, 1975 that was the basis for his report, Martin said he did not ‘specifically ask Lansdale if he had acted on orders with regard to an assassination plan, nor did Lansdale say he acted on orders. Rather, Martin asked Lansdale "who were you working for?"*/- When Martin did specifically ask Lansdale in a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975 if he had acted on orders, Martin testified that Lansdale stated that he had not. In this subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin said he asked: Lansdale specifically, "were you ever ordered by President Kennedy or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?" (Martin, p. 21). Martin testified that Lansdale replied "no" and that his orders were "very broad." (Martin, pe 21). Martin further testified that in this June 4 conversation he asked Lansdale whether "any assassination planning you did was done on your own initiative," and that Lansdale replied "yes." (Martin, p. 21). Martin stated that it was his belief that his June lt conversation was at variance with Lansdale's statements to him : on May 30, 1975. (Martin, p. 21). It may also be the case, based on Martin's testimony as to the differences between the questions he posed to Lansdale on May 30 and on June 4, 1975, that he and Lansdale may have ; ; rR misunderstood each other. ; ; ent ow ee Etna nEnEnadnannSineennentnmesienenecemnanennansenaa’ / Martin testified that his conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975 involved two subjects: 1) “what were you (Lansdale) doing in August 1962" (Martin, p. 16), and 2) "who were you working for." (Martin, p-. 17). Martin stated that in the first portion of the conversation dealing with Lansdale's activities in August 1962, Lansdale stated, according to Martin, "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities" and that this included "assassination" as well as other means of disposing a of Castro. As to the second portion of the conversation, Martin stated Ne he asked Lansdale "who were you working for" and Lansdale replied “on that - project I was working for the highest authority in the land." (Martin, p. 18). HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 2196
HW 50955 (2) The O'Leary Report O'Leary's news report read as follows in its lead paragraphs: "Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has named Robert F.. Kennedy as the administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to work out all feasible plans for "getting rid of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro. "Lansdale, in an interview with the Washington Star, never. used the word “assassination” and “said it was not used *y Kennedy, then the attor- ney general. ~ But he said there could be no doubt that "the project for disposing of Castro envisioned the whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to assassinating him." 'Q'Leary's report also stated that "Lansdale said he was contacted "In his. appearance before the by Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962.... Committee, O'Leary pointed out that this reference to the mid-summer of 1962 modified the reference in the lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary, Pp. 13). In his testimony, Lansdale said he submitted a statement to the Washington Star stating that this report was "a distortion of my remarks." (Lansdale, p.61). Lansdale testified that he stated .to . the Washington Star that "perhaps someplace in the planning there is something about what to do with a leader who would threaten the Bocld: 32423539 “Page 219
HW 50955 ~(Y- lives of millions of Americans fwith Soviet Missiles /...but I can say I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from Robert Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally." (Lansdale, pp.61-62). Lansdale further testified that ne told O'Leary that he did take orders from Robert Kennedy, but made clear that “it was on a very wide-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, p.62). Lansdale testified as follows concerning his statement to the Star following the O'Leary report: "After the story appeared, the... Washington Star ‘asked me what wide-ranging things were you talking about? , "T said there were economic matters and military matters and military things and they were very wide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Leary was thinking of was assassination. I was thinking of far wider than that." (Lansdale, pp.62-63) O'Leary's report makes clear that Lansdale did not state that Robert Kennedy instructed Lansdale to develop an assassination pian. The O'Leary report states: "Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy's instructions to him did not include the word "assassination." He said the attorney general, as best he could recall, spoke in more general terms of exploring all feasible means and practicalities of doing something "to get rid of" Castro. In view of the above, it appears that although he may have been imprecise in his conversations with O'Leary and Martin, Lansdale never- theless did not tell them that he was ordered to develop an assassination plan by Robert Kennedy or the President. As discussed above (see p. __); Lansdale testified that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy .or with. Robert Kennedy. Lansdale's reported statements that he was ordered to plan to "get rid of Castro by all feasible means” -is also consistent with Lansdale's testimony, as well as that of the other witnesses, with respect to the objective of the Mongoose operation. As Docla: 32423539 Page 220
=e discussed above in section , however, it was the testimony of all me, witnesses except Helms that such statements aia not include assassination. Lansdale's statements to O'Leary and Martin appear consistent with his sworn testimony that it was his own idea to request an assassination plan from Harvey and that he did not discuss this idea with anyone except Harvey. (see p. ___ above). With respect to this latter point, however, it is a fact that Lansdale's request for an assassination plan followed almost immediately after the August 10 meeting, where the question of a Castro assassination was raised. Hence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the raising of the question of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting prompted Lansdale to request an assassination plan (although it was the finding of the IG Report as well as the testimony of Harvey that the August 10 meeting had no relation to the question of authorization for the 1962 assassination plot). HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 221
Ree ee wen porate Helms testimony on "9/12/75) - The Question of Authorization for the 1963 Assassination rast 1. The 1963 Assassination Plot for the delivery of ‘the ‘poison pen to AM/LASH on November 22, 1963, and reviews certain policies of the Kennedy Administration during 1963 which are relevant to: that question. */ (The facts relating to the poison pen plot are set out at pp.. ‘ above). 2. The Issue of Authority | .Much of the testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members dis- ‘cussed in the preceding section (see pp. ___ to i) is relevant to the question of authorization for the 1963 assassination activity. Once again there was no evidence that anyone above the Agency was informed about or specifically authorized the plot. As in the case of the 1962 assassination ‘plot, however, Helms testified that he believed the 1963 assassination activity was permissible in view of his” perception of continuing pressure exerted by the Administration to overthrow Castro /and: his perception that there were no limits placed on the means that could be used to achieve Castro's downfall. (Helms, 9/11/75, pp. 11-13) ./ The testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration menbers on the issue. of whether the pressure to overthrow Castro made assassination permissible with- out a direct order is discussed. in detail in the preceding section and is not re- peated here. Before. turning to Helms! specific testimony relating to AM/LASH- (including his view that AM/LAsh was not seen as a potential assassin) we | discuss below the Kennedy Administration Cuba policy in 1963. In . */The evidence showed that the "science-fiction" devices of an exploding sea shell and a poison diving suit were abandoned at the laboratory stage within the and that no authorization was sought for their development or eventual use.” tence, the focus in this section is on the activity involving the delivery of the poison pen to AM/LASH.. 7 on . H. ™ ‘ HW 4509455 Docld:327473539 Page 222
ae” HY 50955 general, the 1963 covert action propram and pressure was less intense than it had been in 1962. 3. The Kennedy Administration's Policy Towards Cuba in 1963 - (a) Organization ~ | The Mongoose Operation was disbanded following the Cuban Missile Crisis. An interagency "Cuban Coordinating Committee" was established within the State Department with responsibility for developing covert action proposals. (Bundy, 7/11/75,.p. 148.) The review and approval function was taken from the Special Group Augmented (which passed: out of existence) and was placed under the Special Group, chaired by Bundy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.) U.S. policy towards Cuba in 1963 was also treated in the National Security. Council's Standing Group, the successor to the Executive Committee which had dealt with the Missile Crisis. Members of: the Standing Group included Robert Kennedy, McNamara, McCone, Bundy and Sorensen. We discuss below four aspects of the Kennedy Administration's 1963 Cuba policy. These are: (1) the Standing Group's discus- sion of possible. developments in the event of Castro's death; (2) the Standing, Group ' s discussion of policy options; (3) the covert action program approved by the Special Group; and (4) the - diplomatic effort to explore the. possibility of reestablishing re- ‘lations with Castro. The first three of these took place | in the Spring or ‘early Summer of 1963; the fourth aspect -- the effort to communicate with Castro -- took place at.the same time as the -1963 assassination activity. “Docla: 32493539 __ Page “223
‘ ~ (b) The Discussion, of the Contingency of Castro's Death In the Spring of 1963, the Standing Group discussed con- tingency planning in the event of Castro's death. The documen- tary evidence and testimony indicated that Castro's death was discussed as a contingency which might occur independent of U.S. action. The Group found that the possibilities for favorable developinents to the United States should Castro die “were "singularly unpromising”. (Summary Record of Standing Group Meeting, May 23, 1963, p. 1). The discussion stemmed from a memorandum by Bundy which > discussed "possible new directions" for U.S. Cuban policy. (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1963). The memoran- “y dum distinguished between (i) events which might occur indeven- dently of U.S. action and (ii) steps the U.S. might “initiate”. (Bundy memorandum, p. 2.) “When the Standing Group discussed the Bundy memorandum, . Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shoot- ing down of a U-2." (Bundy Ex. 6E, Summary Record of NSC Stand- ing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963, p. 2). The downing of a U-2 ‘had been listed in the Bundy memorandum as a subject for contin- gency planning under the category of steps for which the U.S. ‘must “await events" as distinguished from “initiate actions”. Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda for a further Stand- ing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed the ‘subject of a ae pene TOT Meters Stet A ENIAC Rm RETIRE MEWS ANN UMP ete EN ETE RE Te eS ee HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 224
Castro death contingency under a category comprising subjects not involving U.S. initiatives, e.2., "occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of. Hungary”, attributable inter- ference by Castro in other countries", and "the reintroduction of offensive weapons". (Bundy Ex. 6-G, 4/29/63). | After the meeting of April 23, 1963, the Standing Group ‘assigned to CIA's Office of National Estimates*/ the task of estimating possible developments if. Castro should die. (Bundy Ex. 6-H, Memorandum for Members of the Standing Group, May 2, 1963). | The resulting paper analyzed the various forces which would come into play in Cuba after Castro's death, including the likely behavior of Castro's top aides, Raul Castro and Che Guevara, as well as possible Soviet reaction. : (Bundy Ex. 6-1, Draft Memorandum by Office of National Estimates titled "Develop- ments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's’ _ Death", pp. 2-5, hereafter called the "ONE paper"). The ONE Paper concluded that "the odds are that upon. Castro’ Ss death, his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control" .**/ */The Office of National Estimates is the research division of the CIA: responsible for analyzing foreign intelligence. The Office is “not part of the CIA's covert: operations orfanization. **/The ONE Paper also saw little chance that a government disposed “Eowards the United States would be able to come to power without ex- tensive U.S. military support: 'Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would _ Yequire extensive U.S. help.in order to win, and probably U.S. military. t } adntervention." (Bundy Ex. 6-I, p. ii). : Ne . . are? pts al vo ; PEWTER me RENEE SANA CART IN ER RATNER AT TAINED A Pu ENTE ALOPIASOEERE NSEPTOETONMRERRIR SAOON “ETE MEH eS RT NT pA HA AN aN HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 225.
"se In addition, the ONE Paper warned that the United States would most ‘likely be blamed if Castro should die by another's ‘hand. “If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the U.S. would be widely charged with complicity, even though ic is widely known that Castro has many enemies". ~ (Bundy Ex. 6-1, p. 4.) The ONE Paper also identified a number of possible U.S. actions in the event of Castro's death, ranging along a spec- trum that included no U.S.. initiatives, action to support a povernment in exile, quarantine and. blockade, and outright invasion. (Bundy Ex. 6-L, pp. 7-12.) On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group discussed the ONE Paper. ‘The Standing Group found that "all of the courses of action [open to the U.S. should Castro die] were singularly unpromising™ (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1). | | Bundy agréed that the Standing Group "certainly posed the question" in the Spring of 1963 as to what would happen if Castro died or were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130.) But he testified _ that he had no recollection of a Castro assassination being on the minds of Standing Group members when they discussed this contingency. (Bundy, 7/11/75, po. 14.)*/ */As indicated above’ D.- ); Bundy did ‘recall that over the _ period 1961 and 1963 "the subject of a Castro assassination was «. ;  } mentioned from time to time by different individuals", but said that HY 50955 “he was not aware of "much discussion in the Spring, of 1963, Phe that subject". (Bundy, T/L/N5, p.. 140. - con - Se ee ar eR NRE SET NOE REACeL E A terre rate contin WRN mA Docld: 32423539 Page 226
Bundy testified, however , that one reason for getting an estimate of this kind was to get it on record that we should not be "fussing" with questions of assassination and that it | was not a sound policy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 142.) | Bundy further testified that it was not untisual to assess the implications of a foreign leader's possible death, giving the cases of Stalin and DeGaulle as examples. In the case of Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent to attempt to assess the question of-a post-Castro Cuba ‘since Castro was | such a "dominant figure". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 145.) (c) The Standing Group's Discussion of U.S. Policy “Towards Cuba Sf The Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to assume the desirability of harassment, but recognized there were few practical measures the U.S. could take that were likely to achieve Castro's overthrow. , | In his April 21, 1963 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives" Bundy identified three possible new alternatives:. (1) forcing; "a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necéssary means", - (2) insisting on "major but Limited ends”, or (3) moving "in the direction of a. gradual development of some form of accommo - ‘dation with Castro". - (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1963, p. 3.) These alternatives were discussed at Standing Group meetings on April 23 and May 2%, 1963. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 227
Sorensen, who participated in these meetings, testified that the "widest possible range of alternatives" were dis- cussed, but that "assassination was not even on the list” (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 4.) He said that consideration of possible options such as forcing "a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means" did not encompass assassina- tion: | "Tthis] could not have included or implied assassina- -tion. Instead, it: expressly referred to ‘the develop- ment of pressures' and ‘gradual escalation of the con-— -frontation in Cuba' to produce an overthrow ofthe regime, including 'a willingness to use military force ‘to invade Cuba’. Such a course was obviously not adopted by the President, and in any event expressed an approach far different From aosassination” (Soren- sen affidavit, (7125/75, P. 4) .* The record of the first Standing Group discussion of Bundy's \ memorandum shows that a number of alternatives were discussed (none ‘of which involved assassination) but no “conclusions were reached. On May 28, 1963, the’ Standing Group met again. | McCone argued for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented by sabotage to “create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting * «/ The Bundy memorandun . also used the phrase "all necessary measures’ ‘to describe the steps the U.S. was willing to take to "prevent" a di- rect military threat to the U.S. or to. the Western Hemisphere from Cuba. Sorensen explained the meaning of this phrase in the context of the April 23 discussion of Kennedy Administration policy. "this phrase] could not by any stretch of semantics -or logic have included assassination or any other initiative. It reflected the purely defensive posture x _ - implemented six months earlier when long-range missiles” Ny _ and other offensive weapons were placed in Cubay roy ae (Sorensen affidavit, MISITS pe kph sg 3 HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 228
to overthrow Castro". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1.) McNamara said that sabotage would not be “conclusive” and suggested study of "economic. pressures which could upset Castro." Robert Kennedy said "the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though we do not believe our actions would bring him down". (id., p. 2) In conclusion, Bundy summarized by stating that the task was "'to decide now what actions we would take against Castro, acknowledging that the measures practical for us to take will not result in his overthrow". (Ia., p. 2.) : | Cd) The Special | Group" S Authorization of of a Sabotage Pro- gram Against Cuba . During the first six months of 1963, little, if any, sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.*/ However, on June 19, 1963, following the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba _ policy in the Spring, President Kennedy approved a Cuba sabotage program. “*/ (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63, p. 1.)  */ At an April 3, 1963.meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no sabotage operations were then underway because the Special Group "had decided . . . that such activity. is not worth the effort expended on it.” (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63, p. 1). sexe / The sabotage program approved on June, 19, 1963 was directed at "Four major segments of the Cuban economy" (1) electric power; (2) . petroleum refineries and storage facilities: (3) railroad and high-. way transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memoran- dum for the Special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1) Operations under this program were to be conducted by ClA-controlled Cuban agents from a U.S. island off Florida and it was to complement a similar effort de- -» signed to “'develop internal resistance elements which could carfy out a sabotage.' (id. , p. 2. z HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 229
g ee patterns t ‘ . ; A In contrast to the Mongoose program, which sought to build | toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action program had a more limited objective, i.e., “to nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to. significant defections and other byproducts of unrest". (Id., po 2.) | . ‘After the initial approval, particular intelligence and sabotage operations were submitted to the Special Group for ‘specific prior authorization. On October 3; 1963, the Special . Group approved ine operations in .Cuba, including several sabotage operations. “And on October 24, 1963, thirteen major sabotage operations were approved to be undertaken in the period November 1963 through January 1964, including the sabo- Sweat tage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery, and a sugar mill.. (Memorandum, July Ll, 1975, CTA Review Staff. to Select Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba."). (e) The Diplomatic Effort to Explore. an Accommodation With Castro . ee - ee | As early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to President. ‘Kennedy that the possibility of communicating with Castro be ‘explored. ‘(Bundy Ex. 6, Memorandum to the President, January 4, 1963, p. 3.) “Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" to the Standing Group on April 23, 1963, also listed the "gradual de- velopment of some form of accommodation with Castro" among policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, p. 3). etm, ( HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 230,
WW 50955 a Docla: 32423539 “ ‘page 237” kee ete Levene seein eae woe tee And, at a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed. - it would be a “useful: endeavor" to explore "various possibili- ties of establishing channels of communication to: Castro" (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, June ‘6, 1963, p.-2). In the Fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor - to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3.) Atwood testified . as that during the period of September -November, 1963, he held a series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss opening negotiations on an accommodation between ' Castro and the United States. (Atwood, pp. 5-9.) Atwood testified that at the outset he informed Robert Kennedy, who told him that the effort "was worth pursuing" (Atwood ,» .6). Atwood said he: regularly reported on the talks to the White House and to. his superior at the United Nations, Adlai Steven- son. (Atwood pp. 6-7.) Atwood further stated that he was told by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards "an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into normal". (Atwood, p.7-8 .) Atwood stated that he believed the only people who knew of his contacts’ with the. Cubans were the President, Harriman, Steven- son, Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Bundy 's assistant, and journalist Lisa Howard. | Howard: had initially placed. Atwood in contact with the Cuban Ambassador after reporting to Atwood that | during a trip to Cuba she had learned Castro was anxious to establish
communications with the United States. Thereafter Howard served as an intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with the Cubans. (Atwood, pp. 4, 18)). Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel ,. to visit the White House prior to. Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, p. 19.) (According to an article by Daniel in December, 1963, Daniel met with President Kennedy on October 24, 1963. They discussed the prospects for reestablishing U. Ss. ~Cuba relations and President Kennedy asked Daniel to report back to him after seeing Castro.)*/ | Atwood's efforts reached their high point on November 18, 1963, when Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's ‘staff in Cuba. (Atwood, >. 3). Pursuant to White House in- structions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the “U.S. favored preliminary negotiations at the U.N. (rather than “in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the U.S. desired to work out an agenda for these talks. (Atwood, pp. 8-9). | After receiving Atwood's report on this conversation, Bundy told Atwood that after the Cuban agenda was received, President Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and (New Re ublic, , December 14, £963). Daniel was with Castro when Castro Lg received the — report of President Kennedy's assassination. Daniél, = ‘\ 4 .When Castro Heard the News, (New Republic, December 7, 1963). a a */ Daniel, Unofficial Envoy: A Historic Report from Two Capitals, Sanaa a aa mores cnn re Ra RE GES et RR EER ne eR oem re eter oe as HY 50955 D Docid: 32423539 “Page. “232