Date:08/11/93 , Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : DOJ RECORD NUMBER :.179-20001-10131 RECORDS SERIES : CLASSIFIED SUBJECT FILE 129-11, ENCLOSURES, SERIAL #71 AGENCY FILE NUMBER DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : OSD FROM : LANSDALE, ED TO : . TITLE DATE : 02/20/62 PAGES : 26 SUBJECTS CUBA : "THE CUBA PROJECT" DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : WTS RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : / / OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS REPORT WITH ATTACHMENTS; ATTACHMENT H; BOX 65 Docld: 322706917 Page 1
San Ze : das rane hn 2 = ee) —_ =F 7 Fal Pt i an iN a NN Sats Sa a ab ela - i oa : * “TOP SECRET ~ SENSITIVE. | > _ aran 20 February 1962 Program Review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale THE CUBA PROJECT The Goal. In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum _ of 30 November 1961, the United States will help the people of Cuba over- throw the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new govern- ment with which the United States can live in peace. The Situation. We still know too little about the real situation inside ' Cuba, although we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However, some salient facts are known. It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist controls inside Cuba are severe. Also, there is evidence that the repres- sive measures of the Communists, together with disappointments in Castro's economic-dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted - in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which m2'es a resistance program a distinct and present possibility. x Time is running against us. The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast. They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon, They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime. Since late November, we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets. required for success in our task, The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85-62) promises to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with due recognition of the sparsity of hard facts. The needs of the Cuba project, as it goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance. These- will be prepared on a periodic basis. . Premise of Action. Americans once rau a successful revolution. It was run from within, and succeeded because there was timely and strong political, economic, and military help by nations outside who supported \ our cause, Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must ‘now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty. On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies of the U.S. government, in order to provide a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities. The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action. The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action.. The answers also revealed that the course of action must con- tain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance. The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present opera- tional estimates and intelligence. Actually, it represents the maximum target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible. It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October i962. Itisa Excluded from * SENSITIVE . utomatic regrading: _ a 9D Dir 5200,10 a TOP SECRET This document contains pgs 26 not apply. Copy No. << of #2. copies Docld:32206917-. Page 2
Docld:327206917 Page 3 . Bur ee Oo Co. "yee crPReT Co my : TOP SECRET. SENSITIVE series of target actions and dates, nota rigid time-table. The target dates are timed as follows: . Phase I, “Action March 1962. Start moving in. ‘Phase Ir, Build- -up, April-July 1962. Activating the necessary opera- tions inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political, econoniic, and military- type support from outside Cuba. Phase III, Readiness, 1 August 1962, check for final policy decision, Phase IV, Resistance, August- September 1962, move into guerrilla Operations. Phase V, Revolt, first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime. Phase VI, Final, during month of October 1962. Establishment of new government. ‘Plan of Action. Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside -help from the U.S. and elsewhere. Since this is an operation to prompt and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, flexibility is a must for success. Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the ‘Chief of Operations, with consultation in the Special Group when policy matters are involved. Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans, which cover: A. Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba _=éB. Political Support Plan: C. Economic Support Plan D. . Psychological Support Plan E. Military Support Plan F.. Sabotage Support Plan G. Intelligence Support Plan Early Policy Decisions. The cperational plan for clandestine U.S, support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President. A vital decision, still to be made, is on the use of open U.S. force to aid the Cuban people in Winning their liberty. If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The contingencies under which ‘such military deployment would be needed, and recommended U.S. responses, are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense. “An early decision is required, prior to o deep involvement of the Cubans in this program, SENSITIVE TOP SECRET 2 |
nee Distribution: Copy No. 2. 10. 1d. -12, Docld: 32206917 Page 4 Co Wp SECRET TOP SECRET SENSITIVE The President The Attorney General General Taylor The Secretary of State (through Deputy Under Secretary Johnson) — The Secretary of Defense (through Deputy Secretary Gilpatric) The Director, Central Intelligence Agency The Director, U. S. Information Agency | (through Deputy Director Wilson) State (Mr. Goodwin) Defense (Brig. Gen. Craig) CIA (Mr. Harvey) | | toe Chief of Operations (Brig. Gen. Lansdale) te na SENSITIVE TOP SECRET “TOP SEER a) ea] ‘
OPERATION IN CUBA MARCH a. Establish three ''pathfinder" agent by CIA, OPERATION IN CUBA APRIL. a. Establish up to five more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA, 0 ~ wwe Wet WEL A A OV A. BASIC ACTION PLAN INSIDE CUBA PHASE I (March, 1962) PURPOSE ‘ Explore operational conditions and re- quirements. Report on potential and active resistance elements and situation for exploitation by resistance teams. Lay groundwork for bringing in additional agents and teams as conditions warrant. CONSIDERATIONS Agent operations must stay alive, make "useful contacts and communicate securely with CIA, Risk to the personnel is sub- stantial due to lack of intelligence, but mission is essential to planning and _ operations, PHASE II (April-July 1962) PURPOSE Report on resistance potential and lay | groundwork for additional agent opera- tions. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS These additional teams should provide cur~ rent reporting on major Cuban areas, so broad political action program can be planned. Risk to teams will continue high, but mission is essential. Cod fa fk Docld: 322706917 Page 5
O OPERATION IN CUB APRIL (cont. ) b. "Voice" of Cuban movement goes on the air. MAY c. . Re -supply agent operations as necessary. , ’ valid. ee ee ee A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE. II (cont. ) PURPOSE Establishes vital psychological assur- ance to people that a movement exists to overthrow the regime. Deliver supplies to satisfy needs’ developed by agent operations, if TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Preferably, the ''voice' should be from mobile transmitter inside Cuba. Broadcasts can be brief ones at first: - identifying music, slogan, and short news. News to include reports on "resistance'' acts, taking credit for all sabotage. As daily broadcasts are established, "criminals against people" should be named and promised swift justice, two names per broadcast. If operational judgment dictates, trans- mitter can be aboard submarine for early broadcasts, asa strictly tempor- ary measure, It is vital to take risks by having it inside Cuba; a second transmitter and crew should be moved in if the first is lost. The agents will have to prove. to local partisans that outside support isa reality. Thus, as arms, ammunition, and equipment, etc., are needed to equip resistance groups, we must be able to respond effectively to these needs. Maritime and, as feasible, air re-supply will be used. This capability will have to expana as resistance is developed. dl es) os | Docld: 32206917 Page 6
ee kl BE ve ~. OO OPERATION IN CUBA By June establish 12 more agent operations in key areas selected by CIA. JUNE By June, introduce three resistance teams in areas under initial ''path- finder" surveillance, if situation is favorable. Establish bases for guerrilla ope rations, A. BASIC ACTION PLAN _ PHASE II (cont. ) PURPOSE. Mission is the same as for previous "pathfinder" operations. _ This will test acceptance and use of: the more highly trained.teams that must guide development of the popular revolution within Cuba. This also will check emphasis and timing of program from viewpoint of Cuban situation, To have focal points, with some viability to stockpile for defensive needs and for future attack operations. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS These will be the last agent operations infiltrated into key areas from the out- side. Further expansion by "pathfinders, "' after these teams are in, can be done from groups inside. It is likely that some of these last ''pathfinders" will be replacing casualties, Cc” Very minor resistance actions by im- portant population elements such as labor must be tried and groundwork laid for broader anti-regime program dJeading toward firm uprising program. Realism. of political platform can be tested, These b ases are to be selected after on-. the-ground surveys by the teams inside Cuba. Some may exist already. These will also be logistical bases, for caches and stockpiling of arms and equipment to be used by the resistance. The p.a. teams will need not only supplies for active resistance, but also should be able to provide some welfare aid (such as to families of resistance members, families affected by plants shut-down by sabotage, etc. ). Docld: 32206917 Page 7?
A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE II (cont. ) JUNE (cont) . OPERATION IN CUBA. - PURPOSE. .. CONSIDERATIONS g. Establish clandestine leadership Organize internal direction and con-.. _Leadership will have been emerging and head juarters with means to com- trol of the popular movement. ' this is about the earliest date possible municate with all resistance a to establish a clandestine headquarters, elements. , oo, vo It should be of a bare, field type, in the : * — _ securest area possible. This can be- . ‘ come the meaningful source of political- psychological actions, to develop Cuban will to resist and fight. h., Collection and use of psychological - To provide documentary.and photo- The resistance teams will use this material action material. -_. _ graphic evidence of tyranny of regime with timeliness inside and get it back out- to awaken world opinion and fan fire side so that it can be exploited fully in Latin of revolt inside Cuba, for use by sup- Americz. and elsewhere, building official tog port operations and by resistance teams © and public opinion in support of the inside inside. operation, . oe JULY i, By July establish up to 5 more Mission is.the same as for the first Experience of first resistance teams must ~ resistance teams in areas prepared resistance teams (A II e above). be considered in preparing these additional C ) - . by "pathfinder" operations, as oe teams for operations. Security of person- operationally feasible.’ nel is very important at this point, as the operation expands, / je Basic organization of underground -To prepare the means for sabotage This requires ground surveys, selection wo in vicinity of airfields and communi- against military aircraft and key of sites for caching of sabotage supplies, a - cation centers. communication links of the regime's _and recruitment of local underground, in- \. security forces. cluding members of military and communi- co — . a cations employees. Popular support must £ ve . oe be prepared by resistance teams. Docld: 32206917 Pa aan oe | TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
OPERATION IN CUBA JULY (cont. ) k. Expand infiltration points along coasts, 1, Low-key resistance sabotage, as a continuing and expanding program. ‘A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE II (cont. ) PURPOSE To obtain maximum security for ‘Stepped-up infiltration. To demonstrate public disaffection with the regime and give examples which will prompt similar actions by many others. To build attitude and morale of the Cuban people to become activists for their cause against the Communist dictators, CONSIDERATIONS Original ''rat-lines'' need to be expanded into a functioning "underground railway"! to pass more infiltrees into interior. Means of quick alerts to danger, delaying defenses, multiple routes, coastal watchers and receivers need to be organized and activated. Actions under resistance team guidance can include: 'Runs"on State food and clothing stores and ransa¢k where possible (prompting similar acts by those who want to get enough to eat and wear). Sugar in gas tanks of public buses and local official cars and trucks. Ice-picking tires. Removing receivers from telephones. Harassing telephone calls to officials. Throwing stones with threatening notes into homes of officials. Disrupting rail switches and sand in gear boxes of trains. Swiping spark plugs and distributors from vehicles. Housewives complaints on shortages of food, medicine, doctors, etc. Public contempt campaign against Cubans in regime's puppet organizations, includ- ing effigy burning. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Docld: 322706917 Page 93
©) 5 see - OPERATION IN CUBA AUGUS m. Final check on resistance elements, in Cuba. a AUGUST n. Symbolic work slow -down. AWD. shud ib We ht Vd. A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE III (1 August. 1962) PURPOSE To have a final look at the situation and at the means in place before . giving the signal to initiate actions leading to full-scale revolt. PHASE IV _ (August - September 1962) To give workers a feeling of parti- cipating in the popular movement, without immediate reprisal. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE . CONSIDERATIONS This is a last-minute pause, to be cer- , tain that the resistance has a possible organization in key places which will act when needed, that the significant portion of the Cuban people are in sympathy with the aims of the move- ment and will join in when given the chance, and that the movement will be . . ee) able to gain an area of Cuba as its own , against the regime's military forces, 5 as a minimum “aE 12 August is the anniversary of the over- throw of dictator Machado. The resist- ance should link the Castro-Communists with Machado and call on workers to lose one hour by slow-down methods on 12 Aug. to commemorate the overthrow of one dictator. Workers should be asked to give either one-hour by slow-down or one act of sabotage. The ''Voice" of the movement should thank them the next day for their splendid response {to shame those who didn't participate by making them feel alone). . Docld: 32206917 Page 10
STEW EI gg ep En ” OPERATION IN CUBA AUGUST (cont.). o. Symbolic signs painted on walls: "Machado One" p. By August, have actions to penetrate and subvert the regime, q. Cuban paramilitary teams infiltrated to bases inthe hills. ~ r. Guerrilla bands activated in key areas. LUO ODA 1 OINOL Li YY io A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV (cont. ) PURPOSE To commemorate the downfall of one remembered dictator and give .a symbolic pace to the resistance, To weaken and frustrate organized actions against the popular move-. ment, . To provide a trained guerrilla cadre. upon which to form guerrilla units. ~ To build a military striking force for the popular movement inside Cuba. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Timed with the symbolic work slow- down (A IV n above). Spaced a few _. days apart, the signs should have lines added to them to read: "Machado One Batista Two Castro Three."'! These are actions on officials of the regime, including the military and the © _ police. Some should be defected in place. Others should be defected and helped to escape to the outside world to tell the inside story of the regime's tyranny, to evoke world sympathy with the freedom fighters. The paramilitary teams must be capable of initiating minor harassment and reprisal actions, as well as organizing and training guerrilla units. Popular support is essential. : ‘Recruits will be coming in after the sym- bolic harassment and reprisal actions, They will be screened, organized, and ‘trained for guerrilla action. The regime's security forces can be expected to be very active. Anti-tank.and anti-aircraft tactics are necessary. Increased popular support is a must in this phase. Doclda: 322706917 Page il
- OPERATION IN CUBA SEPTEMBER 8s. Commence expanding underground to every locality in Cuba. Step-up of guerrilla actions. Activate larger-scale "black" opera-_ tions on bureaucracy, as penetration assets permit, 7 Start entry of volunteer "freedom fighters" from Latin America and elsewhere. A, BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV (cont. ) PURPOSE To have a truly revolutionary organi- zation throughout Cuba. To season the guerrilla forces with larger scale raids. To overburden the regime's adminis- trative machinery by false orders, increase the amount of paper work by adding new forms, issue regulations to discredit superiors, and sew sus- picion and friction between bureaus. To let the Cuban people know that they are not alone in their struggle ' against tyranny, by the physical presence of foreign ''freedom fighters, '! TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS The guerrillas are the open arm, but the popular movement must have mass sup- port, which requires intelligence collec- tion and clandestine activists in cities _ and towns throughout. They will surface when the revolt needs open support. ‘Actions will be to seize police files, kid- nap officials as hostages, capture local militia arms stores, increase road ambushes, and destroy fuel supplies and transport by raid actions. This will require intensive preparation, including detection in place of some per- sonnel, intimate knowledge of current procedures within bureaus, and means of producing material which can pass as official. A "Marti Battalion" might be formed for foreign volunteers. Recruits from Latin America, from refugee groups (such as Hungarians, Poles, etc.), and Americana, need a controlled means of entering the good fight. Some veterans of the Huk campaign could be a gesture and a practical one, Doclda: 322706917 Page 12
SEPTEMBER (cont.) . J OPERATION IN CUBA a w. Attack on the cadre of the regime, _ including key leaders. © x. Operations liberating political prisoners held by regime, if possible, y.- Start blocking assistance from the Communist Bloc. ee a ee A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV (cont. ) PURPOSE To express popular anger against the regime's tyranny and to give harsh reality to the listing of "criminals against the people, "' To liberate prisoners for impact upon popular support of guerrillas and general resistance program. To shut off Bloc assistance to the island of Cuba by all possible means from the inside. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE tions. CIA defector operations are vital | the best recruitment potential for actions _ prisoners, encourage prisoners to have. a “mining, sabotaging transport aircraft, CONSIDERATIONS This should be a "special target'' opera- \ \ i here, Gangster elements might provide i / ! against police-G2 officials. Bloctech- / nicians should be added to the list of i targets. CW agents should be fully considered, This requires a physical survey to obtain precise information on feasibility of brib- ing guards, breaking way open to release & hope that tyranny of regime will be over- thrown, etc. From these hard facts, decisions can be made on which prison or prisons should be targets for liberation actions. Bold operations are called for; the psychological impact will be very high. While appealing to the free people of the world to help shut off Communist ship- ments of anms being used to kill the Cuban: people, the resistance must act on its own inside Cuba - striking against ships deliver- ing Bloc supplies, denying harbors by destroying B loc supplies in warehouses, and acting against Bloc technicians, Docld: 32206917 Page 13 |
; A, BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE IV (cont. ) CONSIDERA TIONS mo . . -OPERATION IN CUBA ; PURPOSE co SEPTEMBER (cont. ) z. Commence active sabotage of To hamper the ability of the regime's More sophisticated sabotage devices, military aircraft, ground trans- security forces to strike at the resist- contaminants, etc., should be in target . ance movement as it emerges into area by this time. port and communications, 4 .mpre open guerrilla bands, . PHASE V ee | : (FIRST TWO WEEKS, OCTOBER 1962) ae) OCTOBER . E> a. General strike by the Cuban To make public the popular support of Strike must tie-up transportation and " workers. the militant revolt, signifying the pass- communications, The resistance teams ape . . ing from underground to open rebellion. must have set the readiness of the workers - for this defiance of the regime. Arms must be available. Military cells will be activated. Funds will be needed ‘o _ Lo help the workers hold on and to bait C) * mo, defections of groups. a -b, Anti-regime demonstrations. Same purpose as noted above. {A V a) for The resistance teams must have set the ( - the general strike. readiness of all population elements (youth, , farmers, Church, etc.) to openly defy , . ~ the regime. Arms must be available, ; -" ~ including anti-tank weapons. Military \ cells will be activated. he c. Declaration of the revolt. To initiate the hour of decision by Since the aims of the liberation will have . calling on all Cubans for open support. been publicized previously, this is the "go" signal, All Cubans and the world . need to hear it. —_ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Docld:32206917 Page 14
OPERATION IN CUBA OCTOBER (cont. ) d. Open revolt by the Cuban people. ” e. Return of Cuban refugees who are qualified and want to help liberate . their homeland. a. Establish a new Cuban government, +, Which can be recognized by the U.S. A. BASIC ACTION PLAN PHASE V (cont. ) PURPOSE To overthrow the Communist regime. To start a more open movement back to Cuba of those Cuban refugees who - are able and willing to risk their lives in overthrowing the Communist regime, PHASE VI (DURING OCTOBER 1962) To give legality to the moral right of the Cuban revolt. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS This is the combat phase, fighting to take and hold ground. Cuban refugee organizations will be tested with a "put up or shut up" pro- position, Those who have ability to contribute to the popular movement | inside Cuba should be given a chance to go home and act. Their screening and infiltration will have to be con- trolled. It must be a joining-in, not a taking -over of the inside movement. _ When the popular movement is holding meaningful territory in Cuba, it should form a provisional government. This should permit open Latin American and U.S; help, if requested and necessary. A military government situation will exist for the initial period and we must insist-upon realism in this interim period preceding reasonable civilian control. Docld: 322706917 Page 15
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN. (cont. ) _ ACTIVITY — PURPOSE _ CONSIDERATIONS 4, Use U.S. diplomats and staffs in . To influence attitude of political Personal influence upon foreign officials is vital official and other contacts. leaders favorably for the Cuban to build sympathy and support for Cuban revolution , people and hostile to Communist _ against Castro regime. Can lead to independent », ° dictatorship. To influence key actions by other nations to build the case for the staffers of foreign leaders along Cuban people.. Latin American nations are most “same line and, as appropriate, — important, but NATO also important. Official influence leaders in intellectual attitude of Spanish government can be key to and major population groups. operational values in homeland ties to Spanish colony in Cuba. (State responsibility, with sup- port by others as required. ) 5. Activate Latin American leaders, . Commit national prestige and Timely and sirong public statements will be en- -s ' government and public. power of Latin political, intellec-. couraged, Maximum publicity at country of origin, ¢°5 ~ tual, labor, youth, religious, other key countries and into Cuba by ClA assets. ene military leaders to cause of Cuban . (State responsibility, with support by CIA and ae . people against Communist regime. USIA.) | For own public impact, international support,and morule of resistance within Cuba. . O 6. Activate labor leadership in other © To lead major population groups in Contacts under CIA will be put to this vital task. countries, especially Latin Ameri- -opinion formulation and in actions Crash enlistment of additional assets is required, can area, - impressing upon political leadership along with reorientation of existing long-range | a demand for support of the Cuban uses. Labor contacts must polarize other dynamic . people against their dictator regime. elements such as farmers and students. Labor To counter and steal the Communist leaders can piay key role in impeding supplies and \. oO : . _ maneuver using labor to defend the communications Communists in Cuba must have. pe . Cuban grab and launch other take- (CLA responsibility, with support by others as - overs, To employ any contacts with required, ) ‘ working class in Cuba as a means to help generate the resistance and revolt. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Doclda: 322706917 Page 16
© Bitar Can efx Ere ACTIVITY Use OAS and its organs. Use United Nations members and U.N. organs. Use US officials and news releases at Washington level. | TOP SECRET SENSITIVE. B, POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To reaffirm strong official condemna- tion of Communist. rule in Cuba. To influence Latin American and world opinion against Communist grab of Cuba and favorably:toward Cubans recapturing their freedom. To enlist world opinion for plight of Cuban people under domination of a foreign sponsored government. Build hostility to Communist regime and a favorable attitude to people's revolt. Develop basis for outside support of _Cuban people. Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.S. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people vs. Com- munist dictatorship. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 4. CONSIDERATIONS. OAS members must be firm and open about this being a regional] concern. OAS must build support for the cause of the Cuban people against the Communist regime, by statements and reports about the police ‘state methods and foreign domination in Cuba. This will require official and per- sonal diplomacy with a real sense of mis- sion, and must be an effort by Latin Ameri- can as wellas U.S. officials. (State responsibility, with CIA and USIA support. ) Statements of world leaders for humanity and justice can come from speeches and comments about misery of Cubans under Communist political-economic program. Plight of trade unionism, religion, health, education all fall within UN interest. Phoney Communist maneuvers about persecution of Castro regime. can open way for a challenge to a UN inquiry team from OAS states re the true status of popular support within Cuba. A challenge to hold free elections under UN monitor could be timely and place Cuban Communists on the defensive. for Cuban poverty and health" would be sound move to highlight situation, responsibility. ) A UN "aid {State Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches can keep pressure upon Castro regime directly by timely statements. This also supports similar attitude by leaders of other nations and helps spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people: is a goal. (State has responsibility to lead in this very important line. } | Docld:322706917 Page 17
10. Use exile Cuban labor leaders. Use exile groups under Cuban Revolutionary Council. Use exiles as touring teams for political action in Latin America. Special news coverage for Latin America, to generate political action, 4 lic leaders. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN (cont. ) . ‘PURPOSE To help develop labor assets and actions in Latin America and to assist main operation by communi- cations and infiltration of personnel inside Cuba. . To maintain a significant symbol of special groupings for contacts with- in Cuba and impact upon Latin Ameri- can public opinion; To give personal witness against the Communist regime and ask support for the people recapturing their - freedom. To arouse public and official sym - pathy for the suppressed Cuban people and to sharpen appreciation of the Communist threat to other Latin American countries. Will provide leads for popular actions such as public pressure through . petitions to local political and pub- TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS CIA contacts with trade union leadership in Latin America will help exile Cubans join in. . Special groupings such as students, youth, = og foees professions, women are under the CRC and And must be used with care and avoid political — é3 imprint of CRC to maximum, en Teams of students, lawyers, ex-~Castro e3 associates can tell impressive story that is newsworthy. Cooperative news media will be employed by CIA. Bi-weekly news guidance is scheduled for all CIA stations in the area, providing current material about Communist mistreat- ment of the workers, students, and Church within Cuba. Economic ills and public re- sistance will be fully played. Special publica- tions, such as hand-outs, pamphlets, and posters will be focused upon key population groups. | DocId: 32206917 Page 16
ACTIVITY ll. Radio programs for Cuban political activation. 12. By October, official U.S. and Latin American policy support. PUP SmUKG 1 OLINDLLILV iu B. POLITICAL SUPPORT PLAN (cont. ) PURPOSE To inform and keep basic interests within the Cuban population. To provide a positive basis for more open support of the people's revolution, possibly a foundation for military assistance upon request of recognized new government, CONSIDERATIONS Religious programs, interviews with exile workers, students, fishermen, families to help keep Cubans in touch with the way of life they must recapture from the Com- munists. CIA capability for daily and special broadcasts exists, noting Swan Island station, and arrangements with private stations in Miami, New Orleans, and some 75 small outlets in the Caribbean ‘area. (Use of printed materials for dis- semination inside Cuba is possible through mails and drops,but hazard to receiver too great prior to climax.) (CIA and USIA responsibility. ) The policy line for recognition of a revolu- tionary government is involved directly at this point. DoclId:32206917 Page 19
ro ACTIVITY dL. Persuade-QAS, NATO and countries friendly to freedom to desist from. trading with the Communist dictator- ~ship in Havana. 2. Stop trans-shipment of U.S. items to . Cuba, especially via Mexico.and Canada. 3. A"positive list" for Latin America subject to licensing procedures for other parts of the Free World. 4, Harassment of shipping destined for or arriving from Cuba. . “ Obtain cooperation of National Foreign / } Trade Council in delaying or refusing - charters to vessels calling at Cuban Ne ports, by mid-March. 6. Introduce counterfeit currency into Cuba, if feasible. Obtain by mid-March the cooperation of ° U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the “ National Association of Manufacturers - + to influence U.S. firms having sub- | sidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic boycott of Cuban | regime. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE | ‘Cc. ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To build.anti-regime feelings among Cuban people, by economic squeeze. To reduce supply of items and parts critical to the Cuban regime's economic program, To reduce supply of special interest items, To delay and reduce supplies Cuban regime needs in economy. To reduce supplies the Cuban regime must have to keep economy going. To disrupt Cuban economy. To harass Cuban economy. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS The regime may be weakened as the Cuban dollar market is depleted through loss of credit line. Requires full cooperation of allies and friends. (State responsibility with CIA and Commerce. ) s Target is Cuban sugar economy, power petroleum, communications, transport. (State responsibility with CIA, Commerce, Justice.) (Re sponsibility of State with Commerce and CIA participating. ) Union leadership can help in this. Security or administrative reasons can be used for actions if a reason is reguired. (Responsibility of CIA with State, Commerce, Defense, Justice, Labor and Treasury participating. ) (Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CIA participating. ) (Responsibility of CLA with Treasury and Justice participating. ) (Responsibility of State, with Commerce and CIA participating. ) Doclda: 32206917 Page 20 | iF
O ACTIVITY By June, rumor campaign against: Cuban items in free world market. PUP DBURD 1 OGINOLILv is Cc, ECONOMIC SUPPORT PLAN (cont. ) PURPOSE To discourage sales of Cuban produce and to further deplete Cuba's dollar market. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Tropicals, tobacco, and sugar could be tar- geted. (Responsibility of CIA with State and USIA participating. ) | Docld: 32206917 Page 21
ACTIVITY 1, Create atmosphere of a "crusade" for human liberty" 2. Ready broadcast means for "Voice" fen of inside Cuban movement, to com- Coed mence broadcasting in April. 3. In March, commence visits of 4 , prominent U.S. and Latin American : personalities to Cuban refugee camps in Florida. Publicity for selected defector from Castro team, Lo of Cuba. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE D. PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To set the deeply-moving tone and motivating force for the liberation To ensure maximum effectiveness of broadcasts. To demonstrate concern for ‘plight of refugees, particularly parent- less children, To demonstrate Cuban regime's failure to live up to promises of original 26th of July movement. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE & CONSIDERATIONS | All media. This means maximum use of < spiritual appeal {such as the prayer for Cuba _- by Bishop Boja Masvidal who has a genuine Cuban revolutionary background), recapturing the ideal of Marti by taking use of his memory away from the Communists (even to issue of commemorative U.S. stamp), and popularizing songs by commercial recordings. (USIA and CIA responsibility. ) . These broadcasts entail considerable work and risk to mount. They have to pay-off every second while on the air. They. need identifying music (by guerrilla instruments such as guitar or harmonica), identifying slogan, and a format worth risk to the listener inside Cuba. If opera- tionally required, initial broadcasts can be taped and transmitted by submarine. As soon as feasible, portable transmitter(s) must be established inside Cuba. (CIA responsibility, with support by ; Defense and USIA as required. ) Mrs. Kennedy would be especially effective in visiting children refugees. (One camp near Miami has about.1,000 children who came out without their parents. ) Her impact upon Latin Ameri- cans on the recent Presidential visit to Venezuela and Colombia suggests this. (USIA responsibility. } Feature stories, documentaries, etc. (USIA re sponsibility, with help of CIA, Justice, and State. ) s | Docld: 32206917 Page 22