: SEC @”. SECURILY INVESTIGATION. @ : 87D “s in a key facility, copies of reports bearing the duel character, "Security cf Gevernment Employees; Security Matter - C," should be furnished to appropriate intelligence agencies of the armed 3 services by the field offices 2s shown in sections 69, volume III, * and 87D 7e (2), of this manual. - 3 Specific instructions with regard to all phases of our responsi- Zz bilities under Executive Order 10450, including policy, investi- as gative procedures, and dissemination are set out in section 69, : volume TIT, of this manual. : aa. (7) Individuals who own property or reside in the immediate vicinity 4 . of an installation or other premises under the cognizance of a & ’ branch of the armed services . . 2 Dissemination should be made locally to the intelligence service ~ ‘of the military branch involved. : & (8) Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation gency z ‘i. Federal Aviation Agency issues certifiéates to airmen who are # “" defined as persons in command or acting as pilot, mechanic, or | y member of the crew in the navigation of aircraft while under | . e way; individuals directly in charge of the inspection, mainte— “ nance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft enfines, a propellers, or appliances; and eny individual serving in the & capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air—-treffic‘control tower Z operétor, Subversive data developed concerning persons within “ such definitions sheild be furnished to the Bureau by report or E - letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, together with = cover. communication recommending that such data be furnished to Federal Aviation Agency. Such dissemination will be made only at the Bureau. : . _. Le (9) Security index — dissemination of information to Secret Service Letterhead memoranda are to be disseminated to Secret Service in all security index cases, These letterhead memoranda should contain background data on the in@ividuals involved,- residence, ( employment, anda description. They should contain any infor— mation indicative of emotional instability or any factors indicative of a propensity for violence, as well as any infor mation indicating that the subject is in possession of firearms. The above should be followed by a succinct statement concerning the subject's affiliation with or participation in a subversive movement, They are not to contain any reference to the security index program, — , . . ; mo “0 t 3 S “se ca = £ me vt rae os = a me = a a es % 4 ve = ve Maks i 3 Se Te Dissemination of these letterhead memoranda to Secret Service = . will be made both at the Bureau and in the fielé following & review at the Bureau, Submit in quadruplicate under the 7 individual caption. Instructions regarding dissemination in x the field will be issued after Bureau review, a . _& wake After initial submission of letterhead memoranda in security iridex cases, as changes occur in the status of the individuals involved with respect to residence and employment, advise Secret x Se - : . "Service locally and furnish two copies of the letterhead rns . ' memorandum tothe. Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. ‘Form =e FD-366 may be used for this purpose. The letterhead memorandum = should contain a reference to the previous communication dissem— 2%. inated to Secret Service, ; 7 .- & Pas Fivy { {When reporting changes in residence and/or employment concerning ae . { Chinese and Cuban aliens on the security index, in addition to ‘Z [ dissemination to Secret Service, also advise the Immigration and ° £ { Naturalization Service (INS) locally, and furnish four copies of = _ [ the letterhead memorandum to the Bureau for dissemination at the ¥ [ SOG. Bear in mind in filling out the reference that some Li ( 7 : y & » . a 81 _ x HW_55072 Docld:32969525 Page 653 10-14-64 ‘ 7
cared wie ad ‘ y ” on ¥ » SECURIGY INVESTIGATIONS @ memoranda have been expressly prepared for dissemination .to -Secret Service only and have not been furnished to the , Department or INS; therefore, the copy furnished INS locally and two of the copies furnished the Bureau should reference the last communication to Tis. ] , Sane aaa es fy For instructions pertaining to dissemination ta Secret Service : . in other than security index cases, refer to section 83K, . volume III, of this manual, ap alas Pishighy € et owe Povey Serer as Copies of letterhead memoranda prepared in security index cases should be retained in the individual case files only. a Upon transfer of office of origin in one of these cases, the [old@Joffice of origin is to furnish Secret Service locally with ,: (the subject's new residence and business addressland advise the vee Bureau that such has been done by the submission of two copies wt of the letterhead memorandum disseminated locally. [The new office of origin need take- no action regarding dissemination to Secret Service until such time as further changes occur with respect to the subject's status.] (10) Dissemination at the Bureau : There are some situations in which dissemination is made at the Bureau instead of in the field. In the majority of instances, information received by the FBI should properly. be furnished immediately to some other agency within the executive branch of _ the Government so that the responsibilities of the other agency might ‘be fulfilled properly. Care must be taken, however, not to disseminate information to any field branch of another: Government agency where such @ procedure is deemed inadvisable because of the inadequacy of security measures in that branch, In these instances the data should be brought to the immediate attention of the Bureau for dissemination at the SOG. An : example of the latter is, of course, the Atomic Energy: Commission, _which receives reports only through the Bureau, as noted in section 87D 7o (3) of this mamel. Information relating to foreign travel plans of security subjects is disseminated to interested agencies, including the State Department, only at the SOG, as set out in 87D 6b (4). Dissemination is also made at the SOG to the State Department, unless it appears undesirable, in those cases in which subjects have been indicted for violations grounded on subversive activities. . Dissemination in these cases is made to preclude these subjects from utilizing the fact they obtained 2 passport to refute y tem ted Ba LOS a é tee Stee poe ey me ak = a a3 yoke cacti gacn shady 4 fs wat al .2llegations of subversive connections. The State Department, ae therefore, will be in possession of data concerning a defendant c should he attempt to utilize this tactic in such an action. e be. Data developed concerning individuals who are not within the Bureau's 7 : . investigative jurisdiction 1 RB (1) Members of the armed forces . . ee . The Delimitations Agreement between the FBI and the armed forces ad ‘*] intelligence agencies States that the responsibility « assumed by — ae one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and directly with -other. subscribing organizations all information of mutual interest, . - ae eee Bla NW 55072 Boblda€: 329995299 Page 654 10-14-64 ca
. we 4 87D -- SECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIUL.ALTONS , - Thus, in discharging our basic responsibilities in the internal security field, it is imrerative that information concerning member of the military services be referred imeediately to the anpro- priate branch having primary responsibility for its personnel. This procedure is mandatory, even though the security aspects of the data have not been fully resolved or verified. It should be specifically pointed out in such instances that the infor - . mation has not been verified. , - . Section 87D 5b of this manual instructs that if it is determined . : a security subject is a member of the armed services the investi- : gation must at that point be discontinued imeediately and reported to the Bureau, The basis for such instruction lies in the fact that the subject is no longer within our investigative juris-— diction, In addition, dissemination of pertinent reports must be made locally 3 in the field to the appropriate intclligence agency. . / - ONENESS Our responsibility with regard to military porsonnel’'is ‘not con fined to those who have been the subjects of security investi- gations, It extends to any subversive derogatory deta developed against a member of the armed services during any of our investi-— 7 gations of either individuels or organizations. For instance, a Af it is determined that a member of the armed forces has been &- in contact with a security subject or with any individual or group raising security implications, the appropriate intelligence . service should be immedisetely advised locally. This sheuld be “ done even though the security aspects of the contact have not been . resolved, so that the military services may be in @ position to dis— —_ . charge their .responsibilities, It must be pointed out to them , oO : specifically in such instances that the data are unverified, and pertinent developments must be transmitted to them thereafter immediately upov receipt. . ty AN te Oe wee an si wis Section 87D 6b (1) (h) provides that during the course of security : . " dnvestigations it must be determined whether the subjects have | any close relatives in the ermed forces, Our responsibilities require that such asseciations be called to the attention of the appropriate military intelligence services, together with per~ : . tinent data, including reports, on the security subjects involved. “hs 2 5 The evaluation of these associations lies entirely within the - . ee ~: province of the intelligence services, but for the reasons stated * + > +." previously herein it is incumbent upon the Bureau to disseminate - ° this information immediately upon receipt, — ray Taye AOS aw» ' T Terral tal aganta1/ tiie disci hants’ cchadteae dinaland ices Sit ok Lele dation ta Mens to Adel + Abate tes curd hey raetas Coat BE Any subversive contacts or information developed concerning , Lt _, Military personnel must: be set out in a letter to the Bureau, . . ye together with a statement as to the local dissemination made in sa -— = . the field, Such letter should be accompanied hy afletterhead] _ . . memorandum setting out with particularity the’ ‘subversive data in.a form entirely suitatle for dissemination. ny PTO LP PEN RTH ITE ON zs a Lary a etaa eM chee cidade andes oat . - go ‘ . Hw 55072 Doold: 32989525 Page 655 aan 4-10-59 na
s Wan ‘ : : nos ‘ . NW 35072 mie 53) ° 7c \ i \ 87. SECURITY THVESTIGATIC @ . 87¢ Annual Communist Party, USA, organizational and member ship survey Each office is instrusted to initiate by February 1 of each year a detailed and ana lytical survey of the organivation and membership of the Communist Party in its territory, results to be forwarded to the Bureau by April 1. Set forth in deteil the complete organizational structure of each Communist Party district or state organization including district and county committees, together with the identities of officers from the club through the district level, Identify each Communist Party club and section in the district, together with the identities of individual club members and most recent date cach member ‘waS so identified. Where identification of an individual is tentative, this fact should be indicated by placing the word "tentative" after the individual's name. Note the informant coverage in each club, as well as on district and county committees, by setting forth the symbol numbers of the informants. In those instances in which no. informant coverage exists in a particular club or on a district or county committee, this fact should be noted. In addition, summarize the over-all findings by setting forth the estimated Communist Party membership in the field office territory, together with the number of members who have been positively and tentatively identified as such within the immediately preceding 12—month period: Charts and maps should be used in setting forth the geographic distribution of the Communist Party whenever feasible. Offices which are auxiliary offices in investigation of a Communist Party district should furnish the required information to the office of origin for inclusion in its survey by March 15 of- each year. . Following the organizational breakdown, each office should critically appraise its knowledge of the Communist Party organization -within its -division and set forth its comments and recommendations’ concerning - investigative activity to be undertaken to eliminate any weaknesses detected. In those instances in which the @isclosed weakness is that of lack of adequate informant coverage, advise in detail of the —~ . number of Bureau-approved potential security informants being developed in the particular area, as well as concrete plans to obtain #2dditional informant coverage in the future. Communist Influence in Racial Matters, Internal Security ~ C (code name *CIRM"), Bufile 100-442529, office of origin: New York. a. Quarterly reports (to reach the Bureau by February 1, May. 1, August i, and November 1) should be submitted by each field office for the purpose of reporting, in a centralized manner, 211 available information bearing upon the communist influence in racial matters.- Included - should be information developed under the -title of a variety of matters, such as CPUSA, Negro question, communist influence in racial matters; communist infiltration ef various organizations, such as the Congress of Racial Equality, Student Non-Violent C: vdinating Commit~ tee, and the like; investigations of subvérsive in..ciduals active in the racial movement; investigations of communist fronts and other miscellaneous organizations; and racial disturbances and other racial matters investigated under the racial matter character. Information should be included in these quarterly reports, notwithstanding the fact that it will duplicate reporting in the other substantive matters referred to above, These. reports shall be designed to precisely spell out the full extent of the communist influence in racial matters, They should separate words and intentions from actions; mere partic~ ipation from direct influence; and. the bona fide communist from the mere "do-gooder," They should not include information concerning legitimate efforts in the racial movement where there is no communist taint. 12a Doold: 32989529 Page 656 9-18-64 A y ' f, BR cag esate ype 9 ok Seg vt Va tegke of. ay * poral eadandeny Pp BOR tel et ee Aecky baR A Bs + fat? ot ges Cy. i “ Sr ce oT Eee m rediht eB TAT aeage beds ie Pe Aaah ad yf. % * Snipa een : 3 %. TE, e