457-10014-10178 vol HY. 50955 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR: FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Doctld: 324273566 JFK Assassination System Date: 1/7/2015 Identification Form Agency Information SSCIA 157-10014-10178 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE 07-M-83 Document Information SSCIA 00/00/1975 161 CASTRO, FIDEL ; LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION CIA REPORT Declassified 1B; 1C Redact 05/3 1/2000 CC Box 73 Page i
AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS HW 50955 DBocld: 327423566 Date : 08/07/95 Page 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM SD SE ET ED ED SED GS eee a EY EN ety eth ent ND Sh cS GEN EEN GEO OND UND GND GEL fab WHS ESE HOD dene neh nth enh ttc GENIE HEED GED GHD GEIR GAEND GHID CIGD GSTS) GND GSU) SO: vaste stn) aan) att cE SEED GEE EAD cD MED GED Gut ea AGENCY INFORMATION : SSCIA : 157-10014-10178 > MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE : 07-M-83 . 00/00/75 161 LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION CIA CASTRO, FIDEL - REPORT TOP SECRET REFERRED POSTPONED IN FULL 01/19/99 CC Box 73 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED. Page 2
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY = snmp DATE-TIME-LOCATION! August 20, 1975 ~ 12;:30-3:30 p.m. -. Room 608, Carroll Arms | : - PRESENT! Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron noitoa-up ReqrREDY oo Cn ete nin cee ~ soe enn nee MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S) :__ ee cee ee eee es | 7 po a ee ne
HW 450955 ‘MEMORANDUM | = TO: Files FROM: Frederick Baron DATE: August 20, 1975 SUBJECT: Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo Staff Members Present: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron The following is a summary of the contents of an interview conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961) in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo. The interview was conducted from 12:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. today in Room 608 of the Carroll Arms Hotel. | At the request of the Chief of Station (COS), we agreed to - take his testimony under alias. He will be referred to hereinafter as "cos". COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERS COS said that he arrived in the Congo.as Chief of Station in early July (probably the 10th or 11th) 1960. COS said that before he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Tweedy (Chief, Africa Division) about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Soon after arriving in the Congo, COS was asked to return to Headquarters in late July for briefings. He said there was no talk of assassination at those meetings, either. Docld: 327473566 Page 4
HY 4S0954 After his return to the Congo, probably in early September, COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words, "someone I would recognize would appear to give me instructions for a mission I would carry out." Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb arrived in the Congo to meet with COS. COS recognized Gottlieb from the Technical Services Division at the CIA, and it was made clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable. | Gottlieb and COS met in COS's new apartment. COS dated this meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early September, 1960 . COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal biological agents had been developed for the assassination of Lumumba. COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus and probably two other lethal biological agents with him in his bag. But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived shortly thereafter. COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber gloves, a gauze mask, and probably a hypodermic syringe -- equipment for administering the poisonous substances. The poisonous substances were to be injected into food, drink, toothpaste, or anything else that Lumumba might ingest. COS did not remember the appearance of the biological agents themselves, but he did recall that there were approximately three different types of lethal substances provided to him. COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb's assignment to him of the assassination of Lumumba. cos said that he was a junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to "pin down" the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had never Boctld: 3274273566 Page 5
-3- heard of anything like this." COS's best recollection was that he had the following interchange with Sidney Gottlieb: cos: Where did this brilliant idea come from? Gottlieb: The top. COS: Who at the top? Gottlieb: The Director has instructions from President Eisenhower. © COS said that he could not recall the exact language of the interchange, although this was his best..recollection. He said Gottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way to remove Lumumba from the scene. He said that when Gottlieb explained the source of authorization for the assassination plot, he made it clear that the President was the source. COS said it was possible that Gottlieb used a euphemism, but it was more likely that he mentioned either "President Eisenhower" or "the President."' In response to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the import of Gottlieb's instruction to him, COS said that Gottlieb told him something to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highest authority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can." COS said that Gottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place by means of the biological agents he was supplying. COS said that this was not an exploration of the possibility of assassination or the establishment of a mere capability for assassi- nation. 'They were serious about it .. . it was clear that the policy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made." COS said NW 50955 Doeld: 32423566 Page 6...
he was not awaiting any further "go signal" in order to proceed with the assassination operation. | COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connec- tion with the United States if the biological agents were to be employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project. COS said that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the assassination, Gottlieb made it clear that "I was to do it or find a way to do it." COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would lose their potency. Gottlieb said this would happen over a long period of time. COS said that he did not remember exactly what the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his bag, and this would not be surprising because "in those days there were no customs checks in the Congo." COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which only he had access. He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime © later -~ probably after the arrest or death of Lumumba -- to dispose of it by burying it near the Congo River. COS said that he had no | training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons. COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces. Gottlieb told him that it left the traces of a normal disease. COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the poison. COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb, "I don't HW 50955 Docld:327423566 Page 7
-5- think I agreed to use it." Although he also said that he did not tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it. | COS said that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance for the assassination of Lumumba had come from the President and the DCI, he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment of such magnitude. COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a double-talk message, saying that I had met the messenger and re- questing confirmation. I then received a cable containing double- talk confirmation, something like ‘your assumption confirmed. '" COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables. They also said ‘Director’ and I sent my cables with a special slug. My. cables were probably marked to 'Director" which is never actually seen by the DCI. COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy. COS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields. He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with Dr. Lester Houck because Houck was removed as Branch Chief in early fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance. COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad idea, both morally and practically." However, cos said that he may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was so taken aback at receiving the assignment. COS thought that he told Gottlieb that he did not have a good means. of access to Lumumba. HW 50955 DBDocld:327423566 Page @ ~
~6- COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in the context of his (COS's) feeling: ‘Thank God I never had to use it." COS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell as a source of authority or approval for the assassination operation. COS-does not recall that anyone other than the President and the DCI were indicated as the source of authority for the assassination operation. - O'DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGO COS recalled the fact that Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960. COS said that O'Donnell “came to éliminate Lumumba." COS did not re- call whether O'Donnell, recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell. COS said that, in anticipating O'Donnell's arrival, he had the. impression that O'Donnell was coming to aid in the removal of Lumumba. COS said, "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was drag- ging my feet and that I might be relieved." COS said he did not remember discussing his meeting with Sidney Gottlieb with O'Donnell but he simply does not have a specific recollection. COS said he would not dispute O'Donnell's testimony that COS had made O'Donnell aware that a poison virus was.in his safe. COS said that assassination was "not excluded" as one of the means of removing Lumumba that O'Donnell might use. But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was included as one of O'Donnell's tools. COS said that he may have discussed HW 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 9
with O'Donnell a plan to snatch Lumumba from "protective custody." But he does not specifically remember this. COS said that "O'Donnell did not seem to do anything most of the time, and I didn't take him very seriously. He spent a lot of time drinking." COS said that he was not aware of any action O'Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" of Lumumba. | COS said that the assassination plan had struck him from the beginning as a bad idea, so he moved slowly on it. "I showed some action to Headquarters by sending cables, but never pushed it." COS said that he asked-O'Donnell to clear with him any major actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that O'Donnell was in the Congo from September until approximately HW 450955 Christmas. LUMUMBA's ESCAPE COS said that Lumumba's escape from "protective custody" was a surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do with it, although they investigated the incident. COS said "I was in touch with many official Congolese about where Lumumba was and how he got out. But t did not get much good information. It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville. ‘The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the Congolese." | COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect that Lumumba might start an uprising against ‘white devils.' But Docld:324273566 Page 10
HY -8- when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured. I learned from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in Thys- — ville. COS MEETS WITH BISSELL, TWEEDY, AND KARAMESSINES IN ROME In November 1960, while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines (then Chief of Station [ for a briefing session on events in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. (COS remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's escape and of the situation in the Congo, but he dees not recall any specific discussion of assassination. He said, “Perhaps we did discuss assassination, I simply don't recall. I was tired. I had flown all day. And I wasn't in favor of assassination," BRONSON TWEEDY | COS assumed that Iweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination plan. However, he does not recall specifically discussing the plan with Tweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in “possession of the poison. COS said, "I did talk with Bronson Tweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank Cod nothing was ever done.'"' COS did not remember whether Tweedy came to the Congo before Lumumba's death. COS thought that he must have'come later. COS said, however, that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would -have asked Tweedy about the assassination mission. 0955 Bocld: 3242723566 Page il
HY 0955 -9- COS INFORMS DCI. SCHLESINGER OF ASSASSINATION PLAN COS said that in response to Schlesinger's request for reports on "questionable activities" within the Agency, COS met with him. cos said that he informed Schlesinger verbally that he had received instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba. COS said that he did not mention a poison virus to Schlesinger. COS said that Schlesinger did not make a response to this information. COS was unaware of any follow-up that was taken due to his briefing of Schlesinger. OTHERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ASSASSINATION PLAN COS said that he assumed that TWEEDY, BISSELL, and DULLES were witting of the assassination plan. COS said that he did have occasion to see ALLEN DULLES from time to time, but he does not remember discussing assassination in any form with DULLES. cos said, "I might have mentioned the assassination plan to COLBY when he became Director." However, COS does not have any specific recollection of a conversation with COLBY. COS does not think he informed RICHARD HELMS of the assassina- tion plan. | ; COS said that he was never interviewed by the INSPECTOR GENERAL in 1967 in the preparation of the IG Report on Assassinations. COS said that he never discussed the assassination plan with ARNOLD SILVER. PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND AGENT QJWIN rt Pe COS said he never discussed the assassination plan with William Harvey (the Director of Project ZRRIFLE). COS said he never discussed assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey. Docld:324273566 Page 12
-~10- COS did not recall agent QJWIN. He did recall that O'Donnell may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him. He said, however, that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the Congo in the fall of 1960, he must have known of QJWIN's activities. WIROGUE COS does not remember the true name of agent WIROGUE nor why or how he came to the Congo. When his recollection was refreshed by seeing cable traffic, COS said that WIROGUE was a difficult man. to handle. For a short time, WIROGUE became a major in the Congolese Army. COS said that he had wanted ROGUE to pull together a sur- veillance team. COS did not recall discussing WIROGUE with 0' Ponnelt. COS's only specific recollection is of being in WIROGUE's apartment and discussing an assassination squad. COS does not think that he mentioned the use of QJWIN in connection with this “execution squad." COS said that it was conceivable that he had approached WIROGUE with the idea of using him against Lumumba. But COS remembers he came to mistrust WIROGUE and felt that WIROGUE did not know what he was doing. COS also said it was unlikely that he would have sent the cable about WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN in ordinary CIA channels as he did if he thought this related to the actual assassination mission. Instead, it was merely evidence that WIROGUE was out of control. . MOVING LUMUMBA TO KATANGA HW 50955 COS recalled that troops in Thysville mutinied while Lumumba was being held there. COS was in contact with various Congolese Doclda: 324273566 Page 13
~11- officials and discovered that Casavubu and Mobutu had decided to fly to Thysville to put down the munity. COS attempted to con- vince them not to go together. They did succeed in putting down the mutiny. | COS did not learn that Lumumba was to be moved to Katanga until after it happened, cos said his discussions with Mobutu about Mobutu's intentions for Lumumba left COS with the impression that Lumumba might be executed. COS said that was the Acting Base Chief in Elizabethville, and was succeeded by David Whipple, who became Base Chief in Katanga. COS also said that Ambassador Clare H. HW 450955 Timberlake worked closely with COS, but they never discussed with him the general question of assassination. TESTIMONY UNDER ALIAS At the outset of the interview, the Committee staff agreed to honor COS's request to testify under alias. COS, who is still in private enterprise in Zaire, said he would be in personal danger there if he were linked to this story. He said, "They might make me take the big high jump. I've been on the ‘zap list' before." BDocld: 327473566 Page i4
AEFIDAVIL yl om’ FID | ~ : 7 oe CRIED: oo UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INVERT “Spih7 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS: oe aN a | | BY — “ - tT, c. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state: .From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under Secretary of State. During approximately, 35-40 percent of that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter's absence from Washington. Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, had served as the State Department: representative on the 54/12 Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my .@arlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accord- ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert | Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State : Department's responsibilities on the an Committee. — Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com- mittee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations... During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis- cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro. On one occasion in late July or early August. of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet- -ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis- cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great’ variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba’ was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended considera- tion of ‘this subject. With this. one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone. prey “OD era oP OE eT i 4 Dated this A/ ay of May, 1975. sf S10 Oy) fp ld - Z Yb on - on Boligras Dillion ca as armed qi { eo ay ot ZS 2 Subscribed and sworn to before me (at ge Cat \Ce ee this my day of May 1975," oy | . PRO BFC | Note Public ye | \A District of Columbia SONS OATES Bhd BW 50955 DBocld: 32423566 Page 15
HW 50955 MEMORANDUM TO: William G. Miller , Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers Bill Bader Burt Wides Rhett Dawson ‘FROM: © Frederick -Baron RE: Douglas Dillon Interview DATE: August 28, 1975. I spoke today by phone, with Douglas Dillon, who was on vacation oon in Maine, concerning .a paragraph in an affidavit he supplied to the ' Rockeféller Commission on May 21, 1975. The paragraph records Dillon's recollection that "On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a.meet- ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis- cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection ts that a question regarding the possi- bility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly. raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts: against anyone. I explored the subject of this meeting generally with Mr. Dillon on the phone and set an appointment for him to review documents and testify on Tuesday, September 2, at 3:00 p.m. in Room.G 308. On the phone Dillon gave the following background information on the meeting at the Pentagon: 1. This was not a small meeting; eight or ten people attended. He did not think it was a meeting of a small body. He said it was not a Special Group meeting or NSC meeting. . But he was.clear that BDoclda: 324273566 Page 16 7]
HW 50955 “omcewas a high-level meeting du& to the participants. «=O. StH believes the participants included the Secretary of -ocense because Dillon's recollection is firm on the fact that “cut ocmeeting took place in the office of the Secretary of Defense. socicoerion did not remember whether Allen Dulles attended the meeting, scti.v. he said "top CIA people were present". Dillon said Richard ~ourorsell was probably present. Dillon does not recall aman named tro cert Johnson, nor does he recall whether such a man was present ..ine meeting, but he said: that we might be able to refresh his coum diection by giving him more backgreund.on Robert Johnson. wee. did not mention on the phone the nature of Robert Johnson's soocrciimony before the Committee; I simply asked if Johnson Was sent at the meeting.) scon.t. 3. The mention of the subject of assassinating lumumba was ~-~ are in the general context, Dillon said, of Lumumba's visit to ious United States, which had "convinced us that Lumumba was we onopathic, not in a well-balanced mental state. “After his =cIrTLE owe wondered whether there was any way .of changing the scenery : wn the Congo." Dillon’ said the subject was raised in the general son.ext of "eliminating Lumunba" , but the discussion did not wmemoceed as far as mentioning means to be used. | coe J 4, Dillon said that the response of the "CIA representative" ~oc. "not necessarily a .moral objection to assassination but was coon in the sense of indicating that the CIA did not have that 2 of capacity". a Dillon did not recall who the CIA representative was who .e the remark. Docld:324273566 Page 17
ae, Dear Mr, Dawson: I enclose herewith Mr. affidavit, Sincerely yours, cle Larcbyy ate “September 23, 1975, Dillon's ‘Signed and notarized Dorothy de Borchgrave Mr. Rhett Dawson Senate Select Committee - Room G-308 © New Senate Office Building . Washington, D. C. 20510 /.. came) 4} HY 50955 DBocld:324235656 Page 16
) } State of New York £ )lecer ‘en fee} a County ° duly sworn, nt. consist} he gonate jion, peing C. pougias D4 | ed stateme y cane wson, counsel t ith respect Government ;ons es prepared b al Operatt to Study with yersation pt and yatify t Knowledge - fo) my direc t which is true ‘and correct t ‘this statemen Sworn to pefore me day of Septempe™ 1975 CECILIA A. VERDON sicte of New York Notary Public No 131 409513 Qualified in New 07E County - March 30, 197 Commission Expires
STATEMENTS BY C: DOUGLAS NILLON TO RHETT DAWSON ON SEPTEMBER 15, I, C. Douglas Dillon, statement . 1. On September 15, Counsel, With Respect to Intelligence Activities; me to be document ' dates: Exhibit 1. s of the National Security Minutes of 1975 do wish to make the following 1975 [I was shown by Rhett Dawson, senate Select Committe f° Study Governmental Operations what he represented to Council of the below the 451st Meeting the National Security Council Exhibit: 2. “Exhibit 3- Exhibit 4. Exhibit 5. Exhibit 6- HW ‘ : , 50955 ‘Boora:32423566 Page 20. Thursday , National Security Wednesday, held in the Cabinet Room of The White House on Friday, July 5 - y 5, 1960, 9200-11; 00 ene (Approved by the President on Fuly 19, 1960). Memorandum of Discussion at the 452nd Meeting of the National Security Council, a , Thursday, July 21, 1960. Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council, August 18, 1960 Minutes of the 456th Meeting of the Security Council National the Cabinet Room of The held in White House on dine Chugust 18, 1960. 910032 F560 (Approved by the President on Rugust 24, 1960) Minutes of the 458th Meeting of the council held in the Cabinet Room of The White House on din the Cageptember 7, 1960. 2:5) 22h, Dims Cipproved by he president on September 15, 1960 Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting of the National Security Council, September 21, 1960
2. The documents shown to ame do not in any way refresh my recollection beyond the statements contained therein as to events related to the © Congo in ‘the summer and early fall of 1960. I still do not have an n independent recollection of any specific conversation regarding the assassination of Patrice ‘Lumumba other than that described in my affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission and in my testimony before the Select Committee on September 2. — 3. Lwas informed by Mr. Dawson that Me. Robert Johnson has testified that he recollected a statement by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting which | he construed as being an order for the assassination of Lumumba. After seeing | ‘the documents listed above Iam. of the opinion that it is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 i is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson. Although the record shows that | was present at that meeting I have no personal recollection of any such statement oF order by the President. 4. lI note that as to the Memorandum of. Discussion at the 456th Meeting _ of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960 (reference C, above) a page or pages immediately before the second page of the exhibit seem to be missing. 5. [tis my understanding that the six exhibits noted above, will be appended to this affidavit for filing by the Select Committee. Prepared by me on this 23rd day of September, 1975. Rhett Dawson, Counsel Senate Select Committee fo Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities HW 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 24
MEMORANDUM To: The Files INVENTORIED: From: Frederick D. Baron on 3fayf17__. fa) Bt Date: September 5, 1975 Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case. I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961. Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates. . I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting {at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi- nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely to have attended such a meeting. Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he “never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even on anyone's mind,” he said. .Pentagon Meeting Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but he has’ no recollection of it. Special Group Meetings Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter- national Security Affairs during that period. Douglas said that Irwin was "more actively in contact with the State Depart- ment and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing law in New York.) Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting. HW 50955. .DocId:32423566 Page 22
Memo to Files September 5, 1975 Page Two I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of September 8, 1960. -Douglas was in attendance at this meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped that CIA people were "fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the discussion to which it related. Note : I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter. Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September 29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago). cc: Rhett Dawson Burt Wides Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers FDB/dsm HW 50955  Docla: 32423566 Page 2300 2 oe,
MEMORANDUM To: The Files INVENTORIEO: From: Frederick D. Baron on 3] 3/f17 __. Ac BY 4. Date: September 5, 1975 Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case. I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961. Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates. I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting (at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi- nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely to have attended such a meeting. Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he “never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even on anyone's mind," he said. . Pentagon Meeting Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but he has no recollection of it. Special Group Meetings Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter- national Security Affairs during that period. Douglas said that Irwin was "more actively in contact with the State Depart- ment and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing law in New York.) , Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting. HW 50955. Doola: 32423566 Page 24
Memo to Files September 5, 1975 Page Two I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of September. 8,.1960. Douglas.was in attendance at this meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped that CIA people were “fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the ‘discussion to which it related. _ Note: I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter. Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September 29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago). ce: Rhett Dawson Burt Wides Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers FDB/dsm HW 50955  DocId:32423566. Page 25...
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN i" CC JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN ao | a . PHILIP AL HAaT, MICH. . HOWARD H. BAKER, an x, * oe . ; . . ~ WALTER wee TAONDALE, MINN, BARRY GOLOWATER, AW “ . ay 7 WALTER D. HUDOLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MOD, . ROBERT MORGAN, NC. RICHARD Ss. SCHWEIKER, PA. e ROBERT MORGAN Mnitea States DHenate WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR FREDERICK A. ©. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL, CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL, © SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY. GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 946TH CONGRESS) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 1l October 1975 INVENTOR IED: , , i . an___2/3)/77 Mr. John N. Irwin IL a 7 On Patterson, Belknap and Webb oo 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10020 Dear Mr. Irwin: Thank you. for sending the rewritten version of your affida- vit. All of the changes you have made are perfectly satis- factory and accurately reflect my understanding of the state- ments you made ‘on September 22. I am enclosing the statement with my signature so that .you may .proceed to sign and swear to it. Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, it. would be appreciated if you will not retain a copy-of the affidavit. A copy will remain on file at the Committee and accessible to you at any time. I look-forward to receiving the sworn statement. Once again many thanks for your cooperation and careful attention to this matter. Sancerety, Fe, Predenich D. Baron “7 Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel nnn _ re nen OE, HWY 350955 Docld:327423566 Page 276
STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN II TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975 Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Administration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense: .for International Security Affairs. My current business | address is c/o Patterson, Balknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020. | -l. On September 22, 1975 in my office I. reviewed with Mr. Baron the following documents in-an attempt to refresh my recollection on discussions that took place at certain ‘governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group. meetings of June 30, 1960 and August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC - Meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. These documents indicate that I attended all of these meetings except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, which Mr. Hadyn Williams of ISA attended. I also reviewed the affidavit of Cc. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, toa meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960. 2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no ' direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize. WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 27 &
HW 50955 I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to, -the United States Government during the entire course of my government service. I do not recall ever hearing of the.CIA adopting any assassination plan, nor do I recall ever hearing the President make a statement that could be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. 3.0 In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group Meeting of August 25, 1960 is sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a ‘discussion of assassination: It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "con- sideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting. 4A, In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the NSC Meeting of September 21,°1960 is. sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of assassination: BDoclda:324273566 Page 26 7
Mobutu appeared to be the effective power | in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba. was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not dis- posed of. However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor dol have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting. | | 5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the substance of the NSC Meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have any recollection of such a report, nor do I have any other recollection of learning by another source of any of the substance of the discussion at that meeting. | 6. It is possible that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. How- ever, I do not remember if I were at this particular meeting; nor do I remember attending any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised. 7. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion it would be improper for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake an assassi- nation operation without an express directive from the President. a, Oo . : - (ao Prepared by me on this jth day of Octrter , 1975 we t > OC a Frederick D. Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study © Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities HY 50955 DBocld:327423566 Page 29 C
HW 50955 SEL CoM Pile: September 23, 1975 Mr. John N. Irwin IT Patterson, Bellknap & Webb 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 16020 Dear Mr.- Irwin: Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I prepared as a result of our recent discussion. Please feel free to make any additions. or correc- tions in the statement. It would be appreciated if you would mail a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon _ as possible. Thanks very much for your help in this matter. Sincerely, Frederick D. Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Enclosure FDB/do bee : rei Qnesiny Docld: 327473566 Page °30
HY 0955 STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN IL TO FREDERICK.D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975 ‘Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Admin-~ istration, I served -as Assistant Secretary of Defense. "My current business address is c/o Patterson, Bellknap. & Webb, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York. 1. ‘On September 22, 1975 in my law office L reviewed the following documents to refresh my recollection on discussions. that took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. As indicated in these documents, I attended all of these meetings except the NSC “meeting of August 18, 1960, where I was represented by Mr. Hadyn Williams. I also reviewed the affidavit of C. Douglas Dillon ‘dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960. 2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing “the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct recollection of the. discussions which they memorialize. I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to the United States government during the entire course of my Bocld: 3242723566 Page 31
government service. I do not recall whether I ever heard of the CIA adopting any assassination plan; nor do I recall whether I ever heard the President make a statement that could be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice: Lumumba. 3. It is my opinion as a former member of the Special Group and as a participant in the meeting of August 25, 1960 that the following language from the Memorandum for .the Record: is broad enough’ to cover a discussion of assassination: It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not. necessarily rule out "con- . sideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba, . However, I do not remember . any such discussion. I do not have any direct. recollection of the substance of that meeting.. 4, It is my opinion as a frequent participant in WSC meetings and as a participant in the meeting of September 21, 1960, that the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination: Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting. ~ 5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the . substance of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have HW 0955 Docld:32493566 Page 32
any recollection of: such a report nor do T have any other recol-_ lection of Learning by another source of: ary of the substance of the discussion at that meeting. . | 6. It is likely that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. However, I do “not remember if I was at this particular meeting; nor do I re- member whether I was present at any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised, 7. It is my general opinion that it would be improper for the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an assassination operation without an express directive From the President. Prepared by me on this 22nd day of September, 1975. Frederick D. Baron, Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect. to ‘Intelligence Activities HW 50955 DBocld: 32423566 Page 33
State of New York SS:. Ne Sn Sp -. County of — JOHN N. IRWIN II, being duly sworn, deposes and says: -T have read the attached statement consisting of three pages prepared by Frederick D.-Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee te Study Governmental Operations With Respect. to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 5, 1975, and I hereby adopt ‘and ratify this state- ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge. John N. Erwin IL Sworn to before me. this _ day of September, 1975.. Notary Public HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 34
MEMOPAKDUM OF CONVERSATION eS WITH ROBERT JC SUBJECT s ASSASSINATION OF LUMUMPA PARTICIPANTS s MR. JORESON AND MR. WILLIAM G, MILLER DATE: JUNE 10, 1975 Mr. Robert Johnson whe is now at the Overseas Development Council for the cumner, telephone 234-8701, was a member of the National Security Council staff working on Asian effairs in the last two years of the Eigenhower Administration and the first year of the Kennedy Administraticn. He said that on occasion, when people were on vacation, he wes assigned the task of taking notes at NSC meetings. In July or August of 1960, Mr. Johnson hed the task of note teking. After a review of world evente, by Director of CIA Dulles, which included a description of Mr. Lumumba "s activities in Africa, Eisenhower turned to Dulles during the meeting in the full hearing of all those in attendsnce, and said something to the effect that Lumumba should be eliminated. According to Mr, Johneon, there was @ stunned gilence for about 15 seconds and the meeting continued. He eaid he wrote the notes and that if they still exist, they are probably in the Eisenhower Presidential papers. He said that notes generally in presidential papers, official documents of the KSC, remain with the NSC. He said that the impression at. the time was one of great shock. He eaid he had heard of nothing like that eince, He said a&t was uncharacheristic of Eisenhower to speak of anything of substance during N&C meetings, reserving judgment to private meetings. He dces not remember exectly who wae at the meeting beyond Herter and Dulles, and possibly James Lay, Gordon Grey end Robert AMory. NW 50955" DoeId:32423566 Page 35 ws
Dun { asked if he would be willing to say this under sworn testimcny >» Re said that having gone this far he would, but he cautioned that 15 years hed passed and he could not youch for the exnet wording, although his memory of the tmpact of the paecting 4g firm. Myr. Johnson called one hour after the meeting saying that upon ne | was absolutely escential. He fears retribution, saying that such testimonies in the past have plackballed people who were anterested in working for the government. Again, he cited people who hed testified for the right cause such as the Dodd case- He gaid he would testify if it were deemed to be absolutely necessary but he dit cant to raise this question. i HW 40 . OA Docld: 32424566 Page 36 reflection, he yould prefer not to testify if at all possible uniess it
HW 50955 3-4 MEMORANDUM ‘ PREV ESET SLE: To: The Files From: Frederick D. Baron pe "AC Date: September 5, 1975 Re: Interview with Robert Johnson regarding the Lumumba Case, I interviewed Robert Johnson by phone this afternoon to supplement the earlier interview (June 10, 1975) and examination (June 18, 1975) that the Committee conducted with him. At the beginning of the conversation I explained there were a number of questions raised by his interview and examination that needed to be answered on the record. Because it was inconvenient for him to make a trip to Washington in the near future and because of the limited amount of addi- tional information he was able to provide, we agreed that I would memorialize the important points of our interview in the form of an affidavit to which Mr. Johnson would swear. ‘The following points are related as faithfully as possible in the manner in which Mr. Johnson made them: Ll. I never heard of a CIA plot assassinate Lumumba with lethal biological substances. 2. To the best of my recollection, President Eisen- hower turned toward Allen Dulles when he made the statement relating to Lumumba about which I have testified. 3. After the meeting at which I heard the statement by President Eisenhower which I described in my testimony on June 18, 1975, I must have consulted James Lay (Executive Secretary of the NSC) for advice on how to treat the President's statement in my memorandum of the meeting. Mr. Lay was meticulous about including in the record some form of reference to every major subject that was dis- cussed at NSC meetings. So we probably included the President's statement in some form, but in what form I do not know. In general, these memo- randa would be as complete as we could make them. Nevertheless, on something as sensitive as this, we may have decided to handle it with euphemism. 4, The NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 is probably not the meeting at which I heard the President's Boclda:324273566 Page 37 t
HY 0955 Memo for the Files Page Two Docld: 32423566 September 5, 1975 statement in reference to Lumumba. Based on Mr. Baron's representation that I am not listed (either by name or position) among the participants in the memorandum of record, I am convinced that I heard the President's statement at a different meeting. After hearing Mr. Baron read portions of the minutes of the NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 to me, I do have a recollection of some of the subject matter that was discussed at that meeting. This would not be unusual, however, because as a member of the NSC Planning Board I received a debriefing on the sub- ject matter of each NSC meeting. I do not, however, have a recollection of the statement by Mr. Dulles as related in the minutes of the meeting: “Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. Page 34
, INVENTORIES: . | STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY on 3/3}191. TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975+ Co on nr, Z Il was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851. | lL. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary’ of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or. decisions relating to. Patrice Lumumba ‘in NSC meetings during this period. | 2. I. cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assas- sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings. .3. I do‘not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba. | 4, 7 do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan ‘or attempt in which the United States was engaged. 5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of. the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and if HW 30955. Docld: 32493566 Page 39°... 2
HW 450955. . revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval. | 6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official WSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes. | According to my recollection at this time, there was no fixed procedure for recording the. discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance. Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full record was drafted by me and my deputy, 4g he attended, and cireu- lated by hig ehly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly con- trolled distribution. Prepared by me on this 8th ey § of Septenber, 1975. “Frederick D. Barot D. Baron _ Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Docld:32423566:. Page 40. .
“State of Virginia ) --County of. fg. ) JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have ‘read. the attached statement consisting of two pages pre- pared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to. Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 8, 1975, and. I hereby adopt and ratify this state- ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge. James Lay Sworn to before me this Jb ih day of September, 1975. Notary Public MEZCOMMISSION “EXPIRES “A GUST 20,51977 HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 41 |.
4 SEL COM File: arn ete tan ONAN AE Arete NE September 23, 1975 Mr. James Lay Route 2, Box 273-A Stanley, Virginia 22851 Dear Mr. Lay: Enelosed please find a copy of the statement I prepared as a result of our recent discussion. . “ Please feel free to make any additions or correc- “tions in the statement. it would be appreciated if you would mail a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon as pessible. oe Oe ‘Thanks very much fer your help in this matter. Sincerely, Frederick DBD. Baron Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Enclosure bee: Rhett Dawson Fritz Schwarz FDB/do HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 42
STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975_ I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851. | | | i. L-am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequent Ly of the. United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker.- I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba. in NSC meetings during this period. | 2. I cannot recall whether there was. any discussion of assas- sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings. | 3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a remark at an NSC meeting that could ‘have. been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba. 4. Ido not. recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged. | 5. ° In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper-at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and HW 50955 Docld: 39493566 ‘Page a3 , PB
revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval. 6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC. meeting, it was, sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying. the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be- made in the NSC minutes. According to my recollection at this time, there was no fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in/a very limited attendance, — Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need’ to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circu- lated by highly classified memorandum to each’ of the NSC members for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly con- trolled distribution. Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975, Frederick D: Baron “Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 44 —
HY _ day of September, State of Virginia | SS: County of JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says; IL have read the attached. statement consisting of two pages pre-. “pared by Frederick D. Baron, _ Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to ‘Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him ‘on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state- ment which is true and, correct to my direct knowledge. James Lay . Sworn to before me this 1975. ; Notary Public Bocld: 324273566 Page 45
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| | J Wy Be heneing g Lier; [Satie ec, woe fee Lhe Cote 4 Lotir, af Lhe Pahiwt om — fi_bicarcailicrr of Cl t WSC by eoling | dg Se pk Lobe 24, Joi hatitl oo ~ £4 cous Chal Tak (pee ieee HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 49
STATEMENT BY "ROBERT MARANA" coemnnniey “TO FREDERICK BARON ON NOVEMBER 14, 1975") ],) ilo , . : a mM. ae an | oe I ama current employee of ‘the Central Intelligence Agency. My current address is c/o Review Staff, Central In- ‘telligence Agency, Langley, Virginia. | | | 1. In 1960, I was ‘employed by the CIA and one of my responsibilities in the course of my employment was to serve as the case officer at Headquarters for an agent who operated under the cryptonym "WIROGUE . "OT read most of the cable traffic re- lating to WLROGUE until the. point - of the termination of his re- ‘lationship with the Agency. . . | | | | 2. To ‘the best of my knowledge, I participated in all. training that WEROGUE received in preparation for his assignment to the Congo in 1960. 3. WIROGUE was not trained in medical immunization in my presence. I am not aware that he was provided with any such training. | . | 4. I have no knowledge of any CIA plot to assassinate _ Patrice Lumumba, i have no knowledge that WIROGUE was ever connected to a plot to assassinate Lumumba, nor have I heard "any hint or suggestion of such a connection, 5. 1 hereby affirm that "Robert Marana" is an alias which is registered at the CIA along with my true identity. My true signature is affixed to this affidavit. The Senate Select WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 50
~2- Committee will receive a copy of this affidavit from which my true signature will be deleted. This statement will remain on file at the CLA and will be available for verification purposes for not less than five years. : ' aa et. DD. ett OD See Frederick D. Baron, Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities ne HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 51
HW 50955." Docld:32423566 Page 52 INVENTORIED: MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES er ON ait . From: Gregory Treverton /] [- August* 295-419-454 - Subject: Kennedy Library Tape Recording of March 13, 1963 National Security Council Meeting On this date, I listened to a portion of the tape of the March 13, 1963 meeting of the National Security Council (President present). I listened to it several times in order to check it against the Library trans- cript of that meeting. The relevant portion of the statement by John McCone reads as follows: "With respect to Cuba, the thinking in the Agency is... we have to first get rid of the Soviets’...troops, and as stated ((several words garbled)) and use every resource we have available--political, diplomatic, otherwise--to accom- plish that. Once that is done, then we believe that the monolithic structure of the Castro regime can be broken up. Maybe we'll have to catalyze it a little bit. But we think that there are enough indicators of distress within the military and within his political organization so that once the Soviets are out some...military coup can be.. will be brought about which will remove the Castro government, and with a strong possibility of replacing that government with a government more favorable to our interests in the Western Hemisphere. Now, this is... there's a lot of ifs connected with that, but it seems ‘to use, after having thought about this a good deal, that some such action as that is a more probably course of action that would be successful than to try to out..to envisage an uprising on the part of the population in the absence of the military...With the military and security forces on behalf of Castro, they can very easily frustrate and defeat any civilian uprising. I think, as time goes on, that our principal problem is going to be dealing with the future of Cuba and the future of Latin America. I think the problems of the Bay of Pigs and the October incident and the missiles will disappear, and more and more attention is going to be brought on the part of the people on the Hill...is going.to be...is how we're going to dispose of this problem." Then the President speaks.
nee ee -. orternan .—__| NATIONAL SECURLTY INFORMATION rg ) GE ARET Unauthorized “Disclosure Subject . & aa SIE EGE fl Vol.l OF 3 to Criminal Sanctions a The United States Sruate K/ O1s INVENTG RIE: Report of Proceedings Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Tuesday, September 2, 1975 Washington, D.C. (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 } f ed (202) 544-6000 i i . H oa a SO0955 Boclda:324273566 Page 53 KG ital
SHELBURNE: lyn . a A TOP SECRET 1 Saat intay CONTENTS P) Testimony of: Page z Cc. Douglas Dillon 2 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 9 Exhibit No. 1 10 Exhibit No. 2 35 Tyh ih ; 11 Exhibit No. 3 37 12 Exhibit No. 4 44 13 ExXhibit No. 5 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 él £2 £5 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 TOP SEC HY 50955 DBocld:324273566 Page 54
SHELBURNE: lyn h - ee - 1 o 8 1 EXECUTIVE SESSION 3 : & 3 Tuesday, September 2, 1975 & 4 ~—- 5 United States Senate, 6 Select Committee to Study Governmental % Operations with Respect to 8 Intelligence Activities, 9 . Washington, D.C. 10 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock Ll p.-m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart ; 12 presiding. 2 ; 13 Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding). Q < 14 Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, 15 Professional Staff Members. 16 ~ . 7 Mr. Baron. Would you state your name and address for the Pa 28 | record, please? 19 | Mr. Dillon. My name is C. Douglas Dillon. And my address g gi is Far Hills, New Jersey. 3 20 a ¢ 21 Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, we have a few formalities that we | E 22 must go through with every witness. 3 23 I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have i 24 the right to counsel here today? Z 2 Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am aware. < 25 TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423566 Page 545
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Bocld: _ TESTIMONY OF C. DOUGLAS DILLON 7 2 TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering questions at any point to seek advice of counsel? Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me. Mr. Baron. And are you vuluntarily appearing here today without counsel? Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am. Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have all of your constitutional rights intact here before the Committee, including your Fifth Amentment rights? Mr. Dillon. I am glad to know that. Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, could you please give the ‘Committee a general idea of your position in the Government from, say, late 1959 until March of 1961? Mr. Dillon. In late 1959 I was Under Secretary of State, which was the number two position in the State Department. And I continued in that position until 1961. My duties as such were two-fold. One was the position as the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting Secretary in his absence from time to time, in which capacity I nad to be fully aware at all times of moreorless everything that was in the ken of the State Department, so I could fill in for the Secretary of State as necessary. And in those days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time, because there were travels abroad, ‘and various reasons. I think I mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting Secretary at least a third of the time during that period. TOP SECRET 9423566 Page 56
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 Bocld: TOP SECRET My other duty, which was a more particular duty, was to be in charge of the economic side of our foreign policy, which included economic areas of the State Department, and also included oversight and general direction of the ICA, which was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency. And I had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the Foreign Aid Program, and for getting the Legislation passed each year, for not the detailed operation, there was a directo of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And also a military program, which was not under the ICA, but which was run through the Defense Department, and I was the senior State Department official involved in that area. So I had those two aifferent functions. And for that reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been prior to that. Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the Under Secretary had always ahndled that. Mr. Herter, who was my immediate predecessor, handled it, and Mr. Hoover before. When I became Under Secretary I became so under a new law that had been passed in 19538, at which time I was promoted to Deputy Under Secretary to the new position, which was called Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, which was the number three job in the Department. That legislation provided that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, as I was, or an Under Secretar TOP SECRET 4734566 Page 57
HY Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 0955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Bocld: i TOP SECRET for Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be the under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the eocnomic area, which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first appointed as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, but then when I became Under Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities. So The number three fellow was named Under Secretary for Political Affairs. It was Mr. Murphy first, and then Mr. Merchant. And they handled in each case all the details of the Special Group. Mr. Barron. And the liaison with the CIA? Mr. Dillon. And the liaison with the CIA. That was not handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political Affairs. On the other hand, when things were really important, I was notified, because I had to know about them if an ‘emergency came up whilte the Secretary was out of town. But that was not my particular problem. Mr. Barron. So you would be kept notified of major developments in the Special Group by Mr. Murphy or Mr. Merchant? Mr. Dillon. Yes, major developments. And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionall on meetings that I presume were on that. But they all dealt TOP SECRET 4273566 Page 586
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 11 12 13 14 16 16 1” 18 19 20. el 22 29 24 20 TOP SECRET with economic assistance to the various political groups in different countries when they needed help. Mr. Barron. Did you attend National Security meetings regularly? Mr. Dillon. I attended National Security meetings quite regularly whenever I was in town, eith in -- (Off the record discussion) Senator Hart. Mr. Dillon, ao you swear that the testimony you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you. God? Mr. Dillon. I do. Senator Hart. Just:for the record, you also understand that alli of the testimony you have given will be covered by the oath? Mr. Dillon. That is correct. Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised you of your constitutional rights? Mr. Dillon. They have. Mr. Barron. Would you read back the witness' last answer? «The witness’ last answer was read.) ur. Dillon. Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of State if the Secretary was out of town, or as one of the Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it was TOP SECRET BDoclda: 324273566 Page 59
TOP SECRET important that I be fully aware of everything that went on at 8 8 1 | ¢ National Security meetings. And they took place as you know, “ at that timé on a regular basis every Thursday, I think it was. q 3 g morning. a a 4 Mr. Baron. And:twhere.did. they take*place?.:: 5 Mr. Dillon. In the Capitol Room at the White House. 6 ; Mr. Baron. Were you in a position as Under Secretary of 9 . State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a 8 foreign leader or a foreign government? Mr. Dillon. I think if there were any such things I would 10 assume that I would have been aware of them. 11 Mr. Baron. Would you have also have been aware of any le 3 ‘communications or orders running from the President to the 3 13 a Director of Central Intelligence? Sua Mr. Dillon. Only if they had been .given.in my presence “15 and. t had heard of them. I wouldn't necessarily be aware of 16 , ; them otherwise. If the President had wanted the State 1? . Department to be aware of it, -~- and they usually did, there 18 was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Special 2 19 . or a . g Assistant and iwould: keep-evetybody notified. But that wean o S 20 ; 3 wouldn't necessarily mean that we-knew of every particular E 21 ,; 2 thing. g 22 . G Mr. Baron. In what manner were you made aware of major a 23 ga Fy CIA covert activities? : 24 = Mr. Dillon. I think if they were major they were all om] + 25 TOP SECRET HWY 350955 Docld:32423566 Page 60
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO Li Le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 rt, 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 29 HWY 50955 Docld: discussed at one time or another in the National Security Council, or they at least knew about them at that time, becaus the major activity that was just getting underway at that time was very much aware of the development of the capability to move against Cuba. Mr. Baron. And what was the nature of your awareness of that development? Mr. Dillon. We discussed it quite frequently. And it was the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban exiles, and the development of plans for their use. They were rather. general in nature, but 6f which I was aware of in some detail. But at that time we all knew that those plans would not be ready and the capability wouldn't be ready until soneti next year. So if a decision was to be made to use #1}: them, it would have come in the following Administration. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of any CIA plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro? Mr. Dillon. No, not at all. Mr. Baron. Did you hear any discussion of that subject? Mr. Dillon. Nonezwhatsoever..n:  2.ene us “cM Barons /So4al though -you-were: aware: of CIA: covert, activities against..thé:Cuban régime, :you:were:completely unaware of tany..assassination.effort against Castro?) 1. esi .Mxy-Dillons icThe major -activity-was-the-building up ‘of. this: capacity..among.the :Cubah:exilés.,, .orisupposed capacity, SECRET 473566 Page 61
HY Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 0955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ae) TOP SECR to invade:.Cuba and cause a change in regime. Mr. Baron. Turning back to your position in the Government, isn't it true that shortly before the change of Administrations you resigned from the State Department in contemplation of resuming Government service in the Kennedy Administration as Secretary of the Treasury? Mr. Dillon. Yes. I might as well explain that in some detail, because it was an unusual situation. That fall, I think it was in October, just prior to the election in early October, due to some mishap in London, the Bank of England failed to support the price of gold ata given moment, and it shot up from the support price of $35 an acunce to maybe $49 or $50. And there was great perturbation in the financial markets over this, the first time that it had happened since the thirties when the price had been set. And there began to be an outflow of gold from the US at the ©» rate of over a $100 million a week, which seemed very big in those days. And it was very disturbing. That continued through the election. And if anything, it intendsified after the election. | During the election, of course, as a member of the Republic Administration while the State Department was not involved in the election campaign, it was specifically exempt from having anything to do with it -- I was obviously a TOP SECRET Docld: 3274273566 Page 62
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll 12 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election at that time. Nevertheless, about two or three weeks after the election, about three weeks after the election, I received a telephone call one day in my office from Pierre Salinger, whom I @id not know. And he told me on the telephon that Senator Kennedy -- whom I knew slightly, because he was on the Foreign Relations Committee -- would like to come and see me that night. And I said, that was very foolish. I am at his disposal, I will go see him. He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants to come to see you. And r said, very good. I will be home all night. So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 o'clock. And he told me that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and the lack of confidence in the financial stability of the US and the world. And he wanted to rectify this. And nobody trusted him because the campaign had been made on the basis that he was going to disrupt everything, and didn't have anything about finances. And so whatshe wanted was to appoint someone whom he thought would carry weight around the world, and yet who was sympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving. And he had read some speeches Iv had made at one time or another in my economic capacity with the State Department which oP SECRET Docld:32423566 Page 63
10 3 pretty much paralleled his thinking. And I had been quite 2 . 8 a ¢ contrary to Vice President Nixon's campaign on that issue g 2 “ where he talked about growthmanship and the path to push our q 5 | @ growh.° And I mentioned, I believe, in the Rockefeller Report ° & 4 , that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year 5 if we wanted to produce and not have unemployment, and so 6 forth. 7 ; o ° * And I had seen Kennedy's economic speech which he made in 8 Philadelphia at the end of October, and I thought it was just 5 | | great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of 10 course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to 11 it. And I don't think he had ever given it, but it had been 12 3 released, he had been there and madesa speech and said some of a 13 4 | 2 it. And it was very carefully prepared, and was quite dull « 4 14 ; oan dry as a result. It was written largely or suggested 15 largely, I found out later, by Professor Samuels, who was the 16 : “ : Dean of all economists at that time. And I couldn't find 17 : : anything wrong with that. L . 6 And he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn't a 9 . . , 3 1 doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he g 20 thought it was absolutely essential to safegard the currency ¢ = 2 a1 and all that. * ae Well, this came as a great surprise to me. Tf had made “ 23 | | 3 all my plans to go back home. a 2 a4 To make a long story short, I talked to various people, o + 25 TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423566 Page 64
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 Li le 13 14 215 16 17 18 19 20 el ee £5 24 295 TOP SECRET ~ including Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury And he said IE: should do this. And quite a few people did. And’ also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did do this he would work with me, and I would be his top economic advisor, and if there were any differences in economic advice that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was serious enought to lead to a parting of the ways. And one commitment that he wanted from me was that if there was that it would not be a silent parting of the ways. And that was a very easy thing for me to agree to. And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed, at which I had been a leading negotiator, early in December r had a call from him when I got back that morning saying that he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do this if I would agree. So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator Kennedy -- which he didn't like very much . And I saw him. And we talked about certain financial things that might be a problem, which I told him about, which they turned out not to be. And he then right away, that morning, much to my surprise, went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and too me out there with Robert Kennedy, whom I had never met before TOP SECRET Docld:327473566 Page 65
HW 50955 3 ran Dillon Exhibrt S — weptember 21, 1960 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting — of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 21, 1960 Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce j Htens 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett) Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import Bank of Washington (Items 1 end 2); and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Als& attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intel- ligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Secu- rity Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin,II; Mr. Robert Packard for the Department of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency; the vee House vatt Boone tery) the A Assistant White House | Staff | Secnstans NSC. There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken. 1. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM (NSC Action No. 2050; Memos for NSC from Executive annem same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC 6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August 9 and 29,and September 19, 1960). Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filled in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum). At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects for petroleum production in Libya. He had been told that the Libyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He asked TOP SECRET Docld:32473566 Page 66
Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 30954 10 Ll 12 13 14 “15 16 17 18 19 “20 21 22 23 24 29 Bocld: 12 untile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary of the Treasury. That rather limited my capacity in the State Department. But I did continue for two or three more weeks to wind things up and make a proper turnover. And then I resigned from the State Department in January and continued that preparation for the new job. And that is how that happened. Mr. Baron. So you left the State Department -- you said earlier to me on January 2nd or 3rd?-. | “2 MéyeDiflon.: Or! 4thoor: 5tho;.sometime:in .the!.first: fours. 6r-fivee*or:six days: ‘And aftér-that one thing I ought to make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles had probably dominated President Eisenhower in some asptects, which I don't think was an accuare description of what happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time. So he wanted to take over this very much himself. And so he put in some new people there. And we came to be very close, and worked very well together. And I had the greatest admiration for him. He never at that time or later ever asked me anything abou my experience at the State Department or any foreign policy TOP SECRET 2423506 Page 67
13 TOP SECRET thing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all. 8 : * Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan? : e Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me. : ° And I think I might. have been of some: help to him if he had, 5 . . * because i had. been:aware:of-it':right up through January, and i ° particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at ° the time, that there was always an ultimate background in the q use of our naval air if those peopbe got in trouble. And I 6 don't think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy. 9 And that was too bad. And when it was made clear to him he To reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would i “have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this 5 ie much about it. a 2 1s Senator Hart. Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings, did 5 14 you have contact with the CIA in any other: capacity on a (is routine basis? 16 Mr. Dillon. No, not on a routine basis. a Senator Harts. Occasional basis? 18 Mr. Dillon. Yes. Because, for instance, I went back -- 3 19 when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions, : 20 for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department, 2 a1 or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by ; ae the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor, j #5 he was then a colonel, at the White House. So I did in that : 24 capacity a couple of times, as Acting Secretary, have to clear : 25 TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 724273566 Page 68
HY Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL $10 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 0955 10 Ll le 13 14 ~ 15 16 L?7 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET “ those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so from time to time there were those moreorless informal contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secrétary and they needed something from the State Department. Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of questions by the Staff on this sequence, but we may want to get some questions on your experience during the US situation on the Doctrine of “Plausible Deniability”. Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal to say about. Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially. Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for advice on your State Department expertence. Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive Committee. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay of Pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he called me in right at the beginning, and I had a: very active role in this period. Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Admini- stration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo Bocld: 324273566 Page 69
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO LL 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 “15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 15 TOP SECRET affairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo? , Mr. Dillon. No, nor any other foreign policy, except as ite fell under the monetary area, with one exception. And this was economic entirely. That is, the President, because of my past experience in the handling of this matter, asked me, moreorless as a favor, because he didn't believe the Treasury should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the US effort or set up the Alliance for Progress. And there was going to be a meeting down in Uruguay, Puntal del Este. And so I did do thta. And that was the only foreign policy job I did. And that was economic in nature. Mr. Baron. Let me show you now a copy of your affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other things a meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the Congo was discussed. First, let me ask you if that is a true copy of your affidavit? Mr. Dillon. It so appears. Mr. Baron. Do you recall this meeting where, as you have affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of © TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 70
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 TOP SECRET 7 operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassina- tion attempts against anyone." Do you recall this meeting now? Mr. Dillon. Yes, I recall just what I said there. And I think probably should expand on that a little bit, because in looking at it it is not as clear as I would like it to be. When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not necessarily limited to ~- or it might have been CIA personnel. It also included encouraging one of the many factions that ‘might not like him there to take action on their own, with CIA encouragement. Senator Hart. What kind of encouragement, material support, financial support? Mr. Dillon. That, or moral support, if they did the US would recognize them if they became the head, and would help them. Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can recall of the passage o- weapons? Mr. Dillon. No, no detail like that. This was very brief|, very general, and just turned off by the CIA people at that time. Mr. Baron. So this mention of assassination could have included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt? Mr. Dillon. It could have, yes. TOP SECRET BDoclda: 324273566 Page Fi
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li 12 14 WARD & PAUL 15 16 L7 18 19 20 él 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 13° 17 Mr. Baron. And it was a more general reference -- Mr. Dillon. It was a very general way of getting some-~ where. In one of those other papers something was said about getting rid of Lumumba. That was really moreorless the objective, not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but just to get him out of the Congo and away. Mr. Baron. Your:.clear impression that the suggestion contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of Lumumba? Mr. Dillon. As a possibility. Mr. Baron. And let's fill in some of the context of the meeting. Do you recall where this meeting took place? Mr. Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the Secretary of pefense. I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other day I called Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense at that time, and who was a friend of mine then, and has continued to be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particula meeting. And he says he did not. But I do think it took place in his office. And I don't recall whether he was there or not. It could be that he wasn't even there. But I think it was in his own office that it took place. Mr. Baron. When we spoke before you said that you thought he probably was in attendance. Is that still your feeling? Mr. Dillon. Well, because it was in his office. I don't TOP SECRET HW 350955 DBocld:32423566 Page f2?
Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 LO il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 ae) 24 290 18 TOP SECRET remember him being there or saying anything. All I remember is the location, and the fact that the subject came up, and the fact that there were a number of people there -- I don't remember who they were -- and the fact that the CIA people, whoever:. they were, were negative to any such action. Mr. Baron. About how many people were in attendance? Mr. Dillon. I would say five or six, because I saw them sitting around the desk, I would say five or six, or it could have been seven or eight, no more. Mr. Baron. Was this the meeting of any official body? Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. It was not a veshic. - note-taking type of meeting. It was not sitting around the table with somebody as the Chairman. Senator Hart. It was ad hoc, in other words? Mr. Dillon. It was ad hoc. Senator Hart. Would you be able to characterize the. nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement, violent, casual? Mr. Dillon. No. It was just more orless silent, and "there is nothing we can do." It wasn't moral. Senator Hart. There was no policy objection? Mr. Dillon. It wasn't stated in that way. It was just saying, no, it is not a possible thing. Mr. Baron. You mentioned on the phone to me that rather than acsméral objection, as you have just said, it might have TOP SECRET Boclda:324273566 Page 73
HY Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 0955 10 11 12 13 14 165 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 | 24 20 Bocld: 324273566 Page 4 TOP SECRET | been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have the capability to perform such an operation? Mr. Dillon. It could have been, it may have been just something that they couldn't do, and therefore there is no use talking about it. Mr. Dawson. The subject matter of the meetingwas probabl something which the Secretary of Defense had a leading! role in designing a policy for, right? Mr. pDillon. I don't recall the details of what was ahppening at that time in the Congo. But I do have a basic recollection that over this period of time it was a pretty difficult Situation, with UN forces in there, and all sorts of troubles down in the southeastern part where the copper mines were, and trying to get people out so they wouldn't get killed. There was always contingency planning, whether we would have to use any of our forces for another evacuation or something else. So it was a vary mixed up and sort of a hot situation at that time. So certainly various people in the Defense Departmen would be interested. Mr. Gates, when I spoke to him, said that he personally had not given primary attention at any time to the Congo. He said it might have been Jim Douglas, who, as I mentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of those meetings. And I don't recall exactly what his title was at that time, but he had been, I think, Secretary of the Air TOP SECRET
20 TOP SECRET Force, and maybe still was at that time. : 1 Mr. Baron. Was it a regular occurance to convene such ¢ ; g a meetings at the Pentagon? é 5 Mr. Dillon. We had a very close relationship between the i 4 State Department and the Pentagon at that time. And it was 5 not unusual, because of the fact that generally there would 6 be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present, and they were 7 both over there, and if for any reason it seemed reasonable, w 8 would do that. Now, usually I think the man who was responsible 9 would be this number three person in the State Department, he LO would go to the Pentagon for many of*the meetings, the 11 briefings and things like that which would be in the area of : 12 the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. He was there a great deal. ‘ 13 | I wasn't there in my capacity. Q < 14 Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea why you were in © 18: attendance at this particular meeting? 16 Mr. Dillon. It might also have had something to do with 17 the thing that -I-was talking with them about all the time, a 18 totally different subject, which was military aid. That could 9 19 well have been. ; 20 Mr. Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at oO 8 21 the meeting? E 22 Mr. Dillon. Not by name. ; 23 On the telephone you.:asked me about Bissell, whether he : 24 “might | have been there. And I answered, in all probability he £ O58 might have, because I knew him, in fact I have known him for HY 50955 Bocld: 32423566 Page 74
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 21 TOP SECRET many years, all my life. But when I was down here at that tim I knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in charge of all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetings. there, orzeven at the White House. He was an advisor.:to Mr. Dulles. So I say that is very likely. | Mr. Baron. By this sort of stuff would you mean covert actions? Mr. Dillon. Covert actions or anything that was important enough in that general field to involve Mr. Dulles, The CIA, the President. He was a person there, one of the people that was talked to about it. There were three people. There were: really at that time Allen Dulles, General Cabell, and Bissell. Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that this was a high level meeting -- a sufficiently high level meeting so that Allen Dulles might have been in attendance? Mr. Dillon. He could have been. Mr. Baron. And are there any other people who would have been likely candidates to have been in attendance at the meeting? Mr. Dillon. I imagine there must have -been some represen- tative of the military there. But I don't know who it would have been. But there must have been someone else if the Secretary of Defense. was there. Now, Erwin, since he didn't allow these things, he might have been there. That is just supposition. TOP SECRET BDocld: 327473566 Page 76
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECR . et Mx. Baron. And I believe you had said to me before that despite your absence of a clear recolleciton as to which CIA people were there, it was clear to you that some top Level CIA people were there? Mr. Dillon. Top enough, so that something like this could be raised and moreorless dispdsed of without evens thinking of it any further. Senator-Hart. Let-me insert a question, if I might. This is a philosophical question. First of all, factually, in any of the dealings, formal or] informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, did the subject of assassination ever ‘arise? Mr. Dillon. As far as I know, as I recall, in dealing directly with either of them, no. Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower, and as a Cabinet Officer uncer President Kennedy, I think the Committee would be interested in your view as to the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders? Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult, thing to speculate on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence Docld: 32473566 Page 77
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003 HW 450955 nue) Ll le 13 14 “as 16 17 18 19 20 él 22 235 24 25 23 rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle. That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy of the US, generally both of them were very much opposed to it. Senator Hart. Off the record just a second. (Off the record discussion) 1 Mr. Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at the t Pentagon, I wonder if you could fill in the nature of the discussion that was taking place on the Congo before this . . ! prospect of assassination was raised at the meeting? Mr. Dillon. I don't recally recall it, except that it was bemoaning the general presence of Lumumba and the difficulty of working anything at with him, or the impossi- bility of working anything out with him, and the exploration of other possibilities. Mr. Baron. Did you date this meeting by any particular event which took place? Mr. Dillon. Yes. I dated it only because it must have taken place after, and presumably shortly after, Lumumba's visit to Washington, because the impression that was left was that it was very bad, that this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time. 1 don't think it would have possibly have occurred before he - TOP SECR BDocld: 37473566 Page 76
HY Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 0955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 29 TOP SECRET . came. We hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to better understanding with him. Mr. Baron. why did he strike you as being impossible to. deal with in any way? | Mr. Dillon. Well, what I really recall was the impression he made rather than the individual things he said. When he wa in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the Secretary in my presence, he spoke in a mannter that seemed almost messianic in quality. And he would never look you in the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the particular things that we wanted to discuss. And it was just like ships passing in the night. You had a feeling that he was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only characterize as messianic. And he was just not a rational being. Mr. Baron. When we talked earlier I believe you charaterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that right? Mr. Dillon. That is right. Mr. Baron. So that after he departed from the US you and others at a high level in the State Department were, extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position in the Congo? TOP SECRET Bocld: 3274273566 Page 79
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 LL 12 13 14 15 16 ay 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 25 TOP SECRET Aw Mr. Dillon. That is right. Mr. Baron. Do you recall who raised the question or the prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting? Mr. Dillon. 4 don't. It very likely could have come from somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly from the Defense Department in the international affairs areas, someone just throwing out this question. Now, I said the State Department. There was probably someone there besides myself. Because it wasn't usual to just.be alone talking about this. Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether this was raised as a guestion or as a suggestion? Mr. Dillon. No, as a question. Mr. Baron. And who was the CIA representative that you mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that this was not within the capability of the CIA? Mr. Dillon. That I don't recall. But I imagine it would have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly Cabell, but I think most likely Cabell. Mr. Baron. We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960. Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of this conversation? It would be’ shortly after Lumumba's visit. Mr. Dillon. Shortly after his visit. And that must have been it. And the record that you had must have been the TOP SECRET Doclda: 324273566 Page 60
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 oO 26 TOP SECRET record of the meeting that I attended that I referred to earlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit were supplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after his visit. So they looked up when his visit was, and that is why they put this in. All I recall of the place and date is that when I saw him off at the airport it was very hot. So it must have been the summer, July or August. Mr. Baron. Let me fill you in on*a-few other events that were happening from mid to late July, and ask you if this refreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency that might have existed at a meeting such’as the one you attendec = in reference to getting rid of Lumumba. It appears that on the 12th of July the US had sent a carrier, the Wasp, to the Congo, although we had refrained from sending troops to the Congo. Then on the 20th of July Ambassador Lodge indicated that it was the US position that the UN would be urged to do everything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo. Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-year contract with CINCO, a large American resources company. But that contract was disavowed by the finance minister of the Congo the following day, on the 26th of July -- I am sorry, it was disavowed on the 26th of July, which wasn't the following day. And it was in’ that setting that Lumumba then came to Washington. | While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herter pledged aid to the Congo. And Mr. Detweiler, who was the Docld: 32423566 Page 61
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21° £2 ae) 24 25 -- T think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits righ in with that sort of general recollection, that it was ‘remember this particular contract with this company. In fact, 27 TOP SECRET Head of the GIMCo Company that had this huge contract in the Congo, met with people at the State Department to discuss the situation as to whether the contract was going to be performed or not in the Congo. | | | Do you recall any of that background? And does that refresh your recollection about the urgency of the:situation at that time? Mr. Dillon. No. The only thing I recall is that there were -- which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informa conversations ~- that there were talks at the time about the possibility of using US military force in one way or another something that we were very worried about. And I don't I don't think I have ever heard of Gimcéo, Mr. Baron. Did you have an independent recollection of the ordering of the Wasp to the Congo -- or to the shores of Africa? Mr. Dillon. Not of that one particular thing. But I do remember that there was consideration of the use of military -- I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and things of that nature,too, at that time. Mr. Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe CIMCO, C=I-M-c-0, stands for the Congo International “oercccue. TOP SECRET Boclda:324273566 Page 32
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 11 Le 13 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 el 22 295 24 25 TOP SECRET . Management Corporation, which was a US corporation. And they had signed a resources development contract in the Congo. Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just formed for that purpose or soemthing, it sounds like. Mr. Baron. Do you recall a visit from Ambassador Timberlake, who was at that time the US Ambassador to the Congo, to Washington shortly before your meeting at the Pentagon? Mr. Dillon. No. But it think it would have been normal, with Lumumba, who was then Prime Minister, coming here, and our concern about the situation, for the Ambassador to come back prior ‘to Lumumba's visit or simultaneous with it, to. brief the Department on the latest developments there. That was sort of standard operating practice. When the head of a government comes usually the Ambassador comes with him to do that. Mr. Baron. Would it fit with your memory that the CIA Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to Washington shortly before Lumumba's visit in preparation for his visit to report upon events in the Congo? Mr. Dillon. It is not my memory, because I don't remember that. But what I can say is that that would have been standard practice, and I would have been surprised if they hadn't. Mr. Baron. What kind of reports would you have been TOP SECRET Boclda:327473566 Page 33
HY Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 0955 10 11 le 13 14 / 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 Pape 25 24 295 TOP SECRET . getting at that time from the CIA Chies of Station and the US Ambassador? Mr. Dillon. Well, we would have been getting whatever reports the US Ambassador sent, the reports from the Chief of Station would go to the CIA, and we would not get those except in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us. Mr. Baron. Did you receive urgings from the US Ambassador from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets? Mr. Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced . by the Soviets. But my impression of seeing him was that he certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else, he was so far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an individual. I don't recall any patitular urgins from the Ambassador, although I think they would have been natural, because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there, and if he had been not warning against something, that would have been very unusual. Mr. Baron. Aside from the recent visit of Lumumba and the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and the Secretary of State, there were other reasons, were there not, to have a sense of urgency about removing him? Mr. Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that I TOP SECRET Docld: 3274273566 Page 64
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 ane) Li 12 13 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 el Ze 25 24 25 TOP SECRET _ don't recall. But there were those problems down around the copper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down there of sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo at that time. Mr. Raron. Do you recall anything else about the language that was used in raising the question of assassination at the meeting? Mr. Dillon. No, I am sorry, I don't recall really anythin but what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came up generally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA. Mr. Baron. Would the manner in which the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have served as sufficient authorization for the CIA to proceed to develop the capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting? Mr. Dillon. Well, I don't think they really needed any authorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't use them. And certainly it would not have been enough authoriza- tion by a long shot for them to start doing that. But I thin they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability in this area irrespective of this, just by knowing the concer that everyone had about Lumumba in the area. That they could have done. They wouldn't have to tell anyone about that. That is just developing their own internal capability, and then they would have to come and get permission. Mr. Baron. Would the same thing hold true for the TOP SECRET Docld:327473566 Page 85
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 30955 LO Li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 205 24 25 TOP SECRET ~ development of a generalized assassination capability at the CIA -- that such a capability could be developed without specific authorization from authority outside the CIA? Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would think so. Mr. Baron. But it is clear to you that the discussion at the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in itself have served as an authorization for an actual assassi- nation effort against Lumumba? | Mr. Dillon. Not at all. Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Actionf during your entire tenure in Government? Mr. Dillon. No. The first time I ever heard it, I was on the Rockefeller Commission. Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA undertook a projec ‘which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means for carrying off an assassination if required? Mr. Dillon. No, I didn't. tir. Baron. And your first knowledge of any such project was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission? Mr. Dillon. That is right. Mer. Baron. Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson, who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and serving until early 1962. Do you recall whether Robert Johnson participated in this meetingat the Pentagon? Mr. Dillon. : No, I don't recall. I wouldn't think so, | TOP SECRET Doclda: 324273566 Page 66
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 il Le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 20 24 25 TOP SECRET - because I wouldn't think there was necessarily anyone from the National Security Staff. And as I said also earlier, I don't personally remember Mr. Johnson myself at all. Mr. Baron. As I represented to you earlier, Mr. Johnson, in testimony before the Committee, indicated that he was present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker, at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated to Mr. Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of Lumumba. And Mr. Johnson said there was a silence -- Mr. Johnson himself was shocked, but no one at the meeting reacted explicityly, and the meeting simply proceeded. He places this meeting in the summer of 1960, and said that it happened at some point before the coup in which Mobutu took power on Septemb er 14th of 1960. Were you present at such a meeting? Mr. Dillon. If you mean was I present at a meeting where a recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba, I don't remember such a thing. But I think that I was probabl present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time. It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly for a vacation, and I might have missed one. But otherwise I would have been there. It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself, we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. TOP SECRET Boclda:327473566 Page 37
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 Ll Le 13 14 715 16 L? 18 19 20 al £2 £95 24 25 ‘TOP SECRET - I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others present may have interpreted it other ways. But I am pretty sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him, shoot him or something -- I just can't conceive of him doing that. But I can conceive of him saying, let's take action and get this situation rectified, which is moreorless along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me. Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the President make such a remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take action right away on this? Mr. Dillon. I don't remember that. But certainly this was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it. Mr. Baron: So although you have no recollection of being present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts, you would find his testimony at least plausible? Mr. Dillon. It is possible. But I would think anything like this was not a direct -order to have an assassination, but let's take some.action to get rid of Lumumba, get him out of office. Mr. Dawson. Would that be adequate, implicity authoriza- tion? Mr. Dillon. It would have been up to the CIA as to what they thought. And they could have well thought that. That TOP SECRET Docld: 32423566 Page 88
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 11 12 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Bocld: 34 TOP SECRET is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it | is Lumumba or Castro. And You won't be able in the Castro area, or particularly in this area; to run .it down, because the people aren't here anymore. But the person who really mad that decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles. Mr. Dawson. I guess I was asking for your expert opinion on the command and control structure as to what adequate, implicit authorization would have been? Mr. Dillon. I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization, because he felt very strongly that we should not involved the President directly in things of this nature. And he was perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I -think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles. Mr. Dawson. And you were aware that that was the way the system worked at that time? Mr. Dillon. It was the way he workéd; because he had a very strong feeling of protecting the President from getting too closely involved with anything that was unpleasant and of this nature. Mr. Baron. Soa from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it is conceivable that he would have taken Presidential language such as, get rid of Lumumba, and translate it into an TOP SECRET 4734566 Page 39
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 Li le 13 14 “15 16 i 18 19 20 el en 29 24 25 Docld: 423566 Page 90 35 TOP SECRET authorization for an assassination within the CIA? Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with Castro, when that came:-along the following year. That is perfectly possible. Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I would like to show you a series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward the Congo in the summer and fall of 1960. The first, which we will call Exhibit 2, is dated 30 June 1960. (The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 2, for identification.) TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 nae) LL 12 13 14 “4s 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 29 24 29 Doclda: 374273566 Page 91 36 TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. and this document refers to the election of Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo, and recounts a report by General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo financially and "may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual." Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made? Mr. Dillon. -No, I don't think I ever did. Mr. Baron. Do you recall having a report of this meeting from Mr. Merchant who would have been State Department representative at the meeting? Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I don't think I would have, because this wouldn't have seemed to me to be important enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention. Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a signi- ficant figure in Congo politics? Mr. Dillon. I don't recall him at all now. Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you, to refresh your recollection, that in September of 1960, after Lumumba was taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu, he was replaced as Prime Minister of the Congo by Joseph Ileo. Mr. Dillon. I didn't realize that. Mr. Baron. Do you have any refreshed recollection now of the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo? Mr. Dillon. No. Mr. Baron. Generally speaking, would you have been ‘TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 Ll 12 13 14 | 1s 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 Bocld:: 4273566 Page 92 oo S se 37 TOP SECRET notified by Mr. Merchant or Gordon Gray about what transpired at a Special Group meeting? Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job. But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be something that was of enough importance that it might be something that I would have to act on or know about in my capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose. Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the US was supplying financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate" polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba Mr. Dillon. Not in detail, but certainly the general fact that we would be doing that, yes. Mr. Baron. Let me show you now minutes from a Special Group meeting of 25 August 1960. Which we will marke Exhibit 3. (The above referred to document was marked Exhibit No. 3 for identification.) TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO ll Le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 “1s L6 L7 18 19 20 21 22 29 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. For the record, these minutes refer to a report by Thomas Parrott, who was the Secretary of the Special Group on CIA activity in relation to the Congo. Mr. Parrott outlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use of trade unions in the Congo and include the prospect that a vote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged. Following that report by Mr. Parrott there is a paragraph which describes the action of the Group as follows: "The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associate had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had takent he comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of inter- preting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that ..: planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out ‘consideration’ of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba." Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting? Mr. Dillon. No, I don't, that particular meeting. But you would have to ask Mr. Gray about that. I don't know who HW 350955 Docld: 32423566 Page 93
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 29 HY 50955 Bocld: - TOP SECRET. 7 they referred to as his associate, that is the key point. He worked for the President. Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes. for this meeting and © other Special Group meetings, that when he used the phrase "Mr. Gray's associate or Mr. Gray's friend," he was referring euphemistically to the President. Mr. Dillon. That is what I would moreorless have assumed. But as long as you have that testimony, my assumption is probably correct. And it follows the same way, that Mr. Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously. And then he talks about those as instructions and the same thing. And it would seem to be that. And that must refer to the same meeting that your friend Mr. Johnson testified to, which I presume took place before this. They are talking ‘about something that happened before this day, where he had said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the matter, and Mr. Dulles said he would take the comments referred to seriously. Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. Dulles had heard comments by the President previous to this meeting? Mr. Dillon. Certainly. Mr. Baron. Comments which called for "very straight- forward action?" Mr. Dillion. Yes, I think that is certainly what this T TOP SECRE 24255606 Page 94
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 14 ' WARD & PAUL 45 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 20 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 50955 Docld: 4734566 Page 95 TOP SECRET said. So I think that whatever records there are of NSC meetings before that, that they may not have kept such records in detail. And that meeting -- if you can find any meeting that Mr. Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, that is probably the meeting. Mr. Baron. So you would assume that the language used by the President, heard by Mr. Johnson, which indicated to Mr. Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptable means of getting rid of Lumumba, is probably the language referred to here by Mr. Dulles? Mr. Dillon. It would sound so, seems so. Mr. Baron. And would you also assume, from your knowledge of Special Group meetings and the way the minutes were written up, that very straightforward action could be a euphemism for assassination? Mr. Dillon. No, I wouldn't necessarily think that. It would just mean strong action to do something to get rid of Lumumba, it could be a revolution, it could be anything. I think it comes here that they would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular activity. I would think, if they were really going to mount something, they probably would have come back to the Group. But they might not have. And again, getting back to Mr. Dulles, I do not think he would have gone back to the President and said, now, I have got the capability to assassinate Lumumba, and I am going to do it TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 il 12 13 14 L5 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 - 24 25 Bocld: 41 FOP SECRET next week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't have done that. Because where I particularly remember this, or get the feeling particularly strong, is dating back to something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident. Allen Dulles' strong desire was to take the whole responsi- bility for that, and resign, and be fired in disgrace, publically, in order to protect the President... But the President totally refused to accept any such way of handling it. Mr. Baron. So that says something not only about the character of Allen Dulles, but the character of the President? Mr. Dillon. Of both, yes. Mr. Baron. That the President would be inerested in taking responsibility for the orders that he had given? Mr. Dillon. Yes. He was very strong that way. And Mr. Dulles was so strong in wanting to protect the President that he was willing to go out in disgrace, public disgrace after ten years or more of service to the Government, just to pro- tect the President, although there was nothing that he had responsibility for, primary-responsibility. Mr. Baron. From your knowledge of Special Group meetings and minutes, it is your reading of this sentence that "it was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba’® 423566 Page 96 ¥ P SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 | 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Bocld:: 4273566 Page 97 TOP SECRET ° -- you would read that sentence to indicate that an assassina- tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might be used to get rid of Lumumba? Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would. Mr. Baron. And you were commenting before that Mr. Dulles might be expected by, say, some members of the Special Group, to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being mounted? Mr. Dillon. Not only that, but anything being mounted, I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba, I think he would probably come back and say what we are doing. Mr. Baron. But it is also your statement that, due to the mode of operating of Allen Dulles, and his character, it is quite conceivable that he wouldn't have returned to the Special Group with such an operation? Mr. Dillon. That might be, although it is more likely that what he really said was that he wouldn't return to the President. Mr. Baron. In order to protect the President? Mr. Dillon. In order to protect the President. I think he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite different from the President, all of the, in other words, as expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and do things totally on his own. And his whole idea was to protect the President as the public representative of the US TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 LO 11 12 13 14 “4s 16 1? L8 19 20 ai ee £3 24 20 Boclad: 30473566 Page 36 TOP SECRET * from any bad publicity in connection with this or any other Similar thing. | Mr. Baron. But based on the discussion at this meeting you would assume that the CIA would have the authority to proceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba? Mr. Dillon. ‘No, I said that they would certainly have the authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything just on their own. I think they would have checked back at least with the senior people in the State Department or the Defense Department. Mr. Dawson. Would they have done that in such a way that it would be available to appear on the public record at any time? Mr. Dillon. Maybe not. It might have just been a call From the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, or possibly the ‘Secretary of Defense. Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection ~~ Mr. Dillon. -- and Gordon Gray. I think they would have kept him notified, pecause he was sort of central in this thing, they wouldn't do anything without his at least knowing about it. Mr. Baron. Did you have any independent recollection of being made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO ll 13 WARD &® PAUL 14 1s 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 50955 bBocld: 12 2423566 Page 99 \P SECRET been discussing before you saw the minutes today? Mr. Dillon. No, I did not. Me. Baron. Let me show you now what we will marke as Exhibit 4, which is minutes of the Special Group of September 8, 1960, and point you toward the passage on the second page that refers to the Congo.where Gordon Gray indicates that "there is top level feeling that! vigorous action would.not: be - a mistake." (Theabove -réferred:.to documen “was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 4 for identification.) TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 £5 HW 50955 Doctld: 45 ‘TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recolleciton of being made aware of this meeting? Mr. Dillon. No, I do not. Mr. Baron. Is this consonant with your understanding of the policy at the highest levels of the American Government toward Lumumba at this time? Mr. Dillon. It fits ints with what I understood was the general policy that we were very concerned with. Mr. Baron. Do you recall that at this period of time, in early September, Lumumba had just been deposed, and there was a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power which culminated in-a coup on September 14th by Mobutu and on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective custody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville, do you , ‘recall that chain of events? Mr. Dillon. .No. I knew that at some point there was a change in government. I don't recall the detail of it at this time. Mr. Baron. Are you aware that in early September Soviet planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville? Mr. Dillon. If you tell me that is the case, I think it does refresh my memory, because I do know ~~ I do remember that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the Soviets. | Mr. Baron. And were you aware that Stanleyville was the 423566 Page i100 TOP SECRET |
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 “15 16 L7 L8 19 20 21 £2 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 50955 Docld: 2423566 Page 101 - ; 46 TOP SECRET stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters? Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that. Mr. Baron. Dut you do recall that at that point there was concern at higher levels in the State Departmentvover the connection between bumumba and the Soviets? Mr. Dillon. Yes, very much so. Mr. Baron. Let me Show you Exhibit 5, which is "minutes of the National Security Council meeting of September 21, 1960. (The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 5 for identification.) T SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO LL la 13 WARD & PAUL 14 1s 16 17 18 19 20 el 2a 235 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 29 HW 50955 Docld 292423566 Page 102 TOP SECRET " Mr. Dillon. Yes, I seecnow that I attended this as Acting Secretary of State, this particular meeting. Mr..Baron. And do you recall the discussion reported in those minutes of affairs in the Congo, that there was the fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation on the part of Lumumba, and that there was some pressure being brought to reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba? Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall any of the details of this meeting. I don't recall the meeting itslef. But it fits right in with the general feeling about the problem, the way you looked at the Congo problems. Mr. Baron. The minutes refer to a visa application for Lumumba. Would that have been in connection with Lumumba's desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the Congo Government before the United Nations? | Mr. Dillon. It would certainly refer to his desire to com to the United Nations to get out of the Congo, where he had been deposed. Whether he cared much whether we recognized him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt. I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized. But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this was a way cf getting out. And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big complaint there. TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 L7 18 19 20 él 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HY 50955 bBocld: 42743566 Page 103 mo 48 TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. The last paragraph of those minutes quote Mr. pulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situatio Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of." Did Mr. Dulles make those remarks? | Mr. Dillon. TI don't recall those particular remarks. But he could have. But again, there my own interpretation, "disposed of" wouldn't necessarily only be assassinated, it would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was neutralized and couldn't come back in, and you could be sure he was done with. Mr. Baron. But assassination would have been one of the means of disposing of Lumumba, that would have been acceptable Mr. Dillon. I guess the word "disposed" could mean that. But that strikes me as rather surprising, because I would think once he was out of office, our concern would have been deescalated to some extent, it would have been more to find some way, which should have been perfectly possible, of getting him out, or locking him up, or anything. Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that the report of the United Nations investigation of the circumstances surrounding Lumumba's death, which was not reported until February of 1961, indicated that at this time, in late TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 li 12 ‘13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 ig 20 al 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HY 50955 Dactrd: TOP SECRET September of 1960, Lumumba was in the custody of the United Nations troops, who were actually protecting him at his residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving, but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops | who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his residence. Mr. Dillon. I think I recall that now, because it is rather unusual circumstances. Mr. Baron. And then apparently in the middle of October the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese army, who had come with:an:.arrest warrant for Lumumba. Is it your understanding that during this period of time, even after. Lumumba was in the protective custody of the United Nations, he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force in the Congo by the US? Mr. Dillon. I would imagine so. And I would not be at all surprised if the then rulers or officials of the Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned about it, because he had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and starte to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes. Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headquarters for the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba's escape from UN a i 423566 ow 104 T P SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 “45 16 L?7 L8 19 20 él 22 Zo 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 \ HW 50955 Docld: 50 TOP SECRET custody, and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army, where the CIA officer's expectation was that Lumumba would receive a trial, and probably capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese Army. Does this mission of the CIA officer seem to conform to your own idea of US policy at that time toward Lumumba? Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think very much so. Mr. Baron. Now, we also have testimony that the CIA Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological agents and the equipment with which to administer these substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that he, the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission, which obviously he never carried out successfully. Have you ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation? Mr. Dillon. No, I never have. Mr. Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with | the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those Special Group meetings? Mr. Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one document you have showed me -- Mr. Baron. The August 23rd meeting? Mr. Dillon. Yes ~~ if assassination is a real possibility as that indicates, this would be a way to do it. But I never heard of it at the time, and I didn't realize that there was 2423566 Page 105 T P SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HY 50955 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el Ze £9 24 25 51 any such capacity for the use of biological things. I read about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission ~~ with Castro, but not about this. Mr. Dawson. Would you expect to be told about the operational detail? Mr. pittbn. Not in detail. But I am rather surprised that it went this far and in my position I didn't know some- thing about it. It may be that they felt that it was so tight that there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of State. I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it. Mr. Baron. Would it be possible that the CIA would feel that the "plausible deniability" would have covered someone in your position? Mr. Dillon. It could have, if they felt that they had a clearcut -- Mr. Baron. -- mandate to proceed with an assassination operation? Mr. Dillon. It is possible. That is just supposition, but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr. Dulles’ decision. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any connection between the CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba? Mr. Dillon. No. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government DoclTd: 3423566 Page 106 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 “45 16 L? 18 19 20 ee 20 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 HW 50355 DBocld:: el TOP SECRET . in mid-September of 1960? Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that. Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army? Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that. Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I would like to follow up on some of your statements about Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I think you made a very interesting and forthright observation, that he was very interested in keeping the President protected from things which may cause embarassment to. him. Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is Just because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA, it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond “2: eunn: personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should not be involved in this sort of thing. Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that that was his way of operation? Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known 423566 vee 107 T Pp SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 “aL 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 20 in mid-September of 1960? Mr. Dillon. Wo, I was not aware of that. Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army? Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that. Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I would like to follow up on some of your statements about Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I think you made a very interesting and forthright observation, that he was very interested in keeping the President protected from things which may cause embarassment to him. Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA, it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should not be involved in this sort of thing. Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that that was his way of operation? Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known TOP SECRET Docld:324273566 Page 108
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, D.C. 20003 BW 50955 10 Li Le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 29 TOP SECRET “ him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and also in the State Department. But it was highlighted because this experience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I was Acting Secretary of State, and IT had to bear the brunt of a lot of that mix-up. Mr. Dawson. Was Mr. Dulles generally a responsible individual in whom the President placed great trust? Mr. Dillon. Very much so, great trust. Mr. Dawson. In his relationship with the President do you believe that President Fisenhower was aware of Mr. Dulles' desire to protect him, President Eisenhower, from a great embarrassment? Mr. Dillon. I would think so. Of course, the U-2 thing made him aware of that, because it was not only Mr. Dulles' view, but it was also the view of the State Department that _ this was the correct procedure, that the President should take whatever action was necessary eithér with Mr. Dulles or with senior officials in the State Department, and blame them for both, but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothing happened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that. Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in Turkey, and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urge this on him, to warn him before he did assume responsibility himself. But to no avail. Hagerty was very strong for the President taking responsibility, because I think he had a TOP SECRET Docld: 32423566 Page 109
54 TOP SECRET : 1 3 little different view of this. I think he had a view that 8 z the press looked on the President as someone who was not in é 5 full charge of the State Department at time, and he thought é 4 this would contribute to that, which would be very bad for 6 the President. So we were thinking of Lt more from the 6 international aspect. We had the contrary feeling. 7 Mr. Baron. Did the President's trust in Allen Dulles 8 diminish significantly after the U-2 affair. 9 Mr. Dillon. No, because there was nothing wrong with the 10 u-2 affair, except that the President had authorized it il specifically, it was flying on the day after he authorized it. Z le The only bolix that came was in the after events, where this < : 1s silly press release announcement was put out by NASA, I guess f 5 14 it was, that this plane had just been sort of flying around an@ 15 got lost, or something like that. And we really had a very 16 difficult time about that at the morning meeting where the i” news came to us, which was out in the Virginia hills. The 18 President had a meeting of a restricted nature afterwards, 2 19 including me and Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, and S : 20 Colonel Goodpastor. : a1 Ana he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, and £ = ee gave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed on W Z re all the cover stories or anything of this nature. And I : 24 went back to the State Department and was working diligently : 25 on this and talking to Mr. Dulles as to what we would say. TOP SECRET HW 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 110
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 29 24 u wi TOP SECRET And the next thing we knew suddenly the President told Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended from the State Department. And the next thing we knew the statement came out from the US from NASA which made no sense at all. And of course what had happened was that HNagerty -- that had been the routine thing, and when it came up Hagerty was to refer the press to NASA, and NASA, if they were referred, had the cover story. And Goodpastor -- I never quite found out what happened in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn't get to Hagerty or Hagerty didn't pay any attention to them, either way was more likely, because Hagerty was way senior to Goodpastor at that time, and they had done this, and he didn't know, he had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't know that it was supposed to be in the State Department. And that got everything off upside down. So we were trying to explain how the US Government had put out this silly statement which bore no relation to the facts, when we knew the facts. And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it followed electronically. And but it was because of this White House bolix that htis had happened. Mr. Dawson. The basis for Dulles' willingness throughout TOP SECRET WY 50955 Bocld:3274273566 Page iii
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 L7 18 19 20 al 22 Zo 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 TOP SECRET this period to protect the President was also -- I guess there was some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where he felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President and so forth, which we felt would not have been the case otherwise. So this didn't change Mr. Dulles’ at all, it made him even stronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knew the President was difficult to protect. Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisis you saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence operations? Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National Security Council meeting. The format of the meetings were that the meeting would be called to order by the President, and then. he would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing, which was the first item of business in all those meetings. Mr. Dawson. on those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt to tell the President enough where he would have some idea of wnat was going on, but not tell him directly what was happening? Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence what other people were doing and what was happening. And it TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 112
57 8 1 would only be exceptional when they would deal with what we ie] $ e 2 were doing ourselves. 8 s 5 Mr. Dawson. Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles : 3 4 wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how did he a 5 go about achieving that or gaining that approval? 6 Mr. Dillon. I don't really know. I do know in regard, 9 to the U-2 flights, which had a very special procedure set up 8 whereby a piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the 9 Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the 10 Secretary of Defense, ar Acting Secretary of Defense, and then 1 taken to the President and approved by him before the flight 12 could take place. And that was handled by General Goodpastor 5 a rather than through Mr. Gray. F 13 a & 14 Mr. Dawson. Did that change after the U-2 crisis? 3 15 Mr. Dillon. Wo, that was the procedure. 16 Mr. Dawson. He knew what he was approving very clearly? Mr. Dillon. He had been right up to this time and that Ll? 1 was the case with the U-2. After the U-2? crisis there weren't any more U-2 flights, and that procedure came to a sudden end. ” 19 be 8 Mr. Dawson. In other intelligence operations which you 3 20 fa) 5 : : : = brought up which were required to be brought before the 8 el A 5 Special Group -- FS 22 i Mr. Dillon. I don't recall that there were any. But if < 25 3 & it was needed, I don't know who would do it, but it would be ra 24 it . ° : through the person who would know the most about it. And t 25 ; TOP SECRET BW 50955 BDocld: 32423566 Page 113
Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 10 Ll lz 135 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 1s 19 20 él 22 28 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 58 TOP SECRET that would be General Goodpastor, because he was very close to the President, although he was a relatively junior officer at that time, he was a young colonel -~ I think he may have even been a major when he started there in the White House. But he was sort of Staff Secretary to the President on all those relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the State Department. If you wanted to see the President on something important, it was generally through General Goodpastor rather ‘than through Gordon Gray. And Gordon Gray handled most of the detailed mechanics of setting uv meetings, and that sort of thing. He was not as much a personal assistant to the President. And that job was held by General Goodpastor. Mr. Dawson. But in circumstances where the President was going to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government, in front of a number of people like the Special Group of the National Security Council, were you privy to some of those occurances? Mr. Dillon. I don't ever recall one. Mr. Dawson. You don't recall instances where an attempt or discussion to overthrow a government or anything more sinister than an assassination was brought up? | Mr. Dillon. No, except the discussion of preparing a capacity to invade Cuba. That was considered. “and we have the minutes on that. That was considered a number of times and reported a number of times. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Bocld: 32423566 Page 114
Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 LO il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 L5 16 1? L8 19 20 el Ze 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 59 TOP SECRET _Mr. Dawson. After an intelligence operation blows, in the sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Govern- ment of the US is found, are you aware that oftentimes a routine order goes out to estand down intelligence, to take positiveactions in that area, are you aware of that standard operating procedure? Mr. Dillon. I don't quite understand what your question is there. Mr. Dawson. After the U-2 crisis did we for a period of time stop agressive intelligence actions against the Soviet Union? Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that was natural. Mr. Dawson. That was my question. That is a routine matter? Mr. Dillon. That was a natural thing. Obviously we stopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacity to shoot them down, and so it was no use doing it again. And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronic flights along the coasts of the Soviet Union, and kept them further away, or disconinued them for awhile. Mr. Dawson. Are you aware of a similar stand down order having been issued after Lumumba was captured? Mr. Dillon. No.. Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that you might have been away from Washington in August of 1960 when TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 115
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li Le LS WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 a5 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 20 60 TOP SECRET this Special Group meeting took place on August 25th, is that correct? . Mr. Dillon. Yes, there is a possibility, because August was the month, if one was going to take any time off in the summer, it was likely to be in August. Mr. Dawson. It was best to take it off during August because of the miserable summers? Mr. Dillon. Yes. And my family had a summer place where I had gone since childhood in Maine, and it was easy to get tol. I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of times when I had to get hack for a Security Council meeting and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of Maine. I recall one time, it could have been this year, or it could have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those summers for a few days. And it could have been in August. Mr. Baron. In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me before we began this testimony today that from what you have read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the CIA representative at that meeting which, as you have said, in effect turned off the suagestion of an assassination attempt against Lumumba, might have been made simply because the group was too large for such a discussion? Mr. Dillon. It might have been -- I said that because of what I have learned since, and I have learned more today -- TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 116
HY Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 50955 Docld: TOP SECRET but they did try to develop such a capacity versus Castro. But as I have thought about it since we talked, I think that is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in August. Mr. Baron. So wittingly you have been present at the creation? Mr. Dillon. The early stages, yes. Mr. Baron. I have no further questions. I would simply like to say that the Committee is extremely appreciateive of your coming here today. This is obviously a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss. And you have been tremendously informative on it. So thank :vou very much. Mr. Dillon. I wish I could be more so. But the details of what happened at that time, the day to day details, have really departed from my mind. It is only those few relatively unusual things that I still recall. And any way I can help I am glad to. Mr. Baron. There may be one way you can help right now. I know that before we: started today Bill Miller, the Staff Director of the Committee, indicated that the Committee would be interested’ in hearing you out at great length on policy recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both from TOP SECRET 423566 Page Li?
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li 1L2 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 el 22 £9 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 20 62 TOP SECRET your experience in the State Department and the Treasury Department, and also your recent service on the Rockefeller Commission. But I wondered specifically, in reference to the assassination area, where we faced the need to tie up our investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some recommendations as soon as vossible, do you have any specific suggestions? Mr. Dillon. Wo, I don't think so. I think that the recor has shown that this is the type of thing that the US Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage in. And I doubt very much that there will be any repitition of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties, which I guess was predicated on the belief that something like that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its being surfaced and being connected with the US. And I think even those who believed that such action was morally proper and might have been in the best intersts of both the US and the world would think that the costs were too heavy if it was ever traced back to the US. And the record seems to show that it does get traced back. So I think that there will be a general agreement among those who are the type of people who would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be though of as US Policy. Mr. Baron. Are there any institutional changes that you would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 116
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO LiL le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 L?7 18 20 al end neh Ae ae) 24 410 First Street, S.€., Washlaaton, D.C. 20003 19 25 63 TOP SECRET of foreign policy? Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just what institutional changes are really necessary, but there should be the clarification that the Special Group, or whatever name it is given for the Committee, would have to approve any action by the CIA, whether it is assassination or military action or anything else, in writing. I think that would be fine. I think it is naivete to have the idea that the President has to approve anything like that. I tend to agree with Mr. Dulles that you shoule not c#t the President personally involved in details of operations that might be right. Ff am not judging just about {o) 3 ce 0) Xs Q rt) (e) ry ‘$ oY + Fe res) assassinations, but in any covert operation. The law now is that the President has to approve any covert operation. I think that the result now will be that there wouldn't be any. I think there may be times when we will need them, but not violent ones. I have in mind such things as financial help and such things as that. But IL don't think the President ought personally to sign the checks. Mr. Baron. Thank you again. (qhereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Committee was adjcurned, subject to the call of the Chair.) TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32473566 Page 119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS: I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state: Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under | { | Secretary Herter's absence from Washington. | 5 Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, ie had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12 ashe Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accord- ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee. Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com- mittee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations. During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis-~ cusSions or.decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro. On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet- ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis- cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended considera- tion of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone. ; | - Dated this A/ day of May, 1975. / fit Cbg gen C. BDotgfas ni Subscribed and sworn to before me this-gy day of May 1975)° oqorts EES wot / S me, a O's EA Zz OY ee a ene Notary Publis = yo : a a2 , } District of Columbia (1) 0 . floey Tew tes nee More rep tt BW 50955 Bocld:32423566 Page 120
Nf wed | ~, Dien Ohhto- 30 June 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, d&. bane 1960 a \ PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen. Cabell Sf a en fb ~ 4 : : 3. Congo _ Gen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the election of Joseph Ilea to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted him financially. He indicated that we in no way intend to claim full . credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close contest, we might have had some effect; and in any case we may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual. \\ /7. Cuba In an informal conversation after Gen. Cabell's departure, Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that the U.S. has taken publicly about - all that it can afford to take from the Castro government; that public opinion both here and abroad is probably beginning to feel that there is no limitas to how far this country can be pushed around; that this may encourage other small countries to take a similar tack; and that the longer we delay with effective economic and other action the harder we may make it for ourselves. Mr. Mexchant and Mr. Irwin agreed, with the stipulation that the United States should not take affirmative action until it is prepared to follow through on a substantial scale. \ : ~ Lalli wie | THOMAS A. PARROTT CY | o wn poveme ey, . THE WHITE HGU on Gris. a Soe d Lydd Gd WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 121
to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views. Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be piven adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the Support - fiscal and otherwise - of anew Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up. 2 %y f oO THOMAS A. PARROTT & 5 OP Ee pile ¢ ve 7 | ne aera . E. Bad Ne we WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 122 on
know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.) In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. ‘He said that he was ata loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comrnents on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country, On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a cood deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly oe as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as ___. to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans! point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do 60. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as appropriate, - _ Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical URE pe reas ere : Pat See geen: i pele 4 %, ~ k ‘ } 73 be 2 - { i i \ i H we we df t wot aft uo b HW 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 123
BW 50955 V4, Cuba ’ The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilitics {after this action had been cleared with the Special Group). . He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of " approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating ‘the tactical combat phase. Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into. *' One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups. ) The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not 3 PRODLEEY OF oo 7 eon GEEEC 7 . YHE WHITE HUUSE GEFEGE ot Beat rere : : at an beet 2 - - . ree ri? p oR es My 2 ee ne a fof ates een a oid i sed ella FE Docld:324273566 Page 124
outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful. Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate. ¢ ~ fpeereuperase s woe e —- po aan “ SIT ee mata ma TE EGUSS Ls oe Btw ta vee Li HW 30955 Docld:32423566 Page 125
., ‘ . " , : wo tae Hl aes ae moe gl » so ‘ ” . 25 August 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles ‘l. Congo Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti~Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a| Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alieged -leader of certain independent labor groups. Hie emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual. The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much: in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necess arily put himself ina position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration! of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not Pyare: | one eee) DO HOT DEET.AOY— HW 309355 Docld:32423566 Page 126
“4, Dominican Republic Mr. Dulles inquired whether Mr. Merchant wanted. to discuss the proposal to dispatch a letter to Trujillo suggesting that the latter retire’ from otfice. At Mr. Merchant's request, the DCI stated his opinion, which was to the effect that he had considerable reservation as to the efficacy or wisdom of sucha letter. He said that it seemed to him much more useful to make a personal approach,which not only stood a chance of being more effective, but also could be denied. He pointed out that a personal approach had been attempted some time ago, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it off. He suggested that the approach might best be made by an unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a better bet than the previous individual. Mr. Merchant said that he realized his own name had been suggested, and that he was far from enthusiastic about the idea. He said further that he has a visceral feeling against asking a Chief of State to get out of office - either through ‘Re medium of a letter or personal contact - particularly when we do not know who might succeed him. Mr. Merchant conceded with good humor the validity of Mr. iray's cwxry common t that Mr. Merchant's ethi 4 Gray's wry comment might bs somewhat intertwined, es and his nranomatism) cS and mis afis rr — ia “= Mr. Gray said that he was entirely opposed to having any U.S. official sign sucha letter. He thcught that an unofficial letter might be a different matter. The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth the effort to get Mr. Pawley to attempt a direct approach to the Benefactor; it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even, but that no great harm could result. “5, Congo (ore cerre ci cents There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully awareof the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss. wo unk Porn « THOMAS A. PARROTT . WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 127
=~, Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. Mr. Dulles then reported that we had attempted to provide Mobutu with funds but that the guards protecting Mobutu had relieved our messenger of the funds. We cannot get funds to Mobutu because he does not have complete control over his guards. A new development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers, most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have been turned out-of office and their offices have been taken over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temp- oreary period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats ,after departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary Dillon said the Soviet press has not Yet admitted that the Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplo- mats indicated to the press before leaving that.they would be back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet omen markings which they painted over the Congo markings on their planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. oe ee Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still confusing and that little progress had been made toward the settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening situation in Sam Neua Province, however, had been quieted as a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to that area. -‘The situation remains troublesome because Fathet Lao and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settile- - . ment. The King has requested that General Ouane and General Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Phouml's forces and Vientiane forces has been reported at Fak Sane, but little bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Fhoumi has adopted tactics of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has .. been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumt apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile, 15. TOP SECRET HW 309355 Docld:32423566 Page 126
kept under continuing serutiny by all interested _ departments and agencies to ensure that it serves the purposes of retarding the growth of the war potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloe and reducing its unity. ~ Noted that, with respect to paregreph 11 of NSC 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materials, equipment, technology and services as can be unjlater- ally controlled by the United States may be imposed not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially with regard to technology and services. NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 570h/3. 5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFEC'PING U.S. SECURITY Mr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts to save Lumumbe. An intercepted message between Egypt and Ghana indicates that Nesser is urging the UAR, Ghana, end Guinea to concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to bear for the maintenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Mr.Dulles remerked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had ~~ been placed eadvisedly in north Equateur Province, while the Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province. Intercepted messages also indicated that Nasser had asked that a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to per- suade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On Sep- tember 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no egreement with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper purporting to be an agreement with Kasavubu. Secretary Dillon reported that Lumwaba had requested a visa . for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Govern- ment of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. How- _ “ever, if. Lunumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private eitizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down.Mr.Dillon added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumbe if he attempts to leave the country. Lh. ‘TOP SECRET HW 50955 Bocld: 32423566 Page 1295
8 September 1960 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group-Mestinge, 8 Seprember 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles . \ 1, Supply Drop to Cuban Dissidents Mr. Parrott outlined the proposed supply drop to Cuban | dissidents in the Escambray. After brief discussion, the Group approved the project as presented. Mr. Parrott asked whether approval could be granted at this time for continuing missions of ; a similor nature to this group or other bodies of dissidents. The be c+ 0 “Seccia! Cle awn sae Peveee Sep me QO (2 ion et Oo ha mks, as ring tna members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of \ convening a meetin wm 5 ee ee HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 130
! \ we VI. 9 Mul 75 CUBA ~ ae a4 PYDEL CASTRO INPERVIEVED WY DAGENS IHR ee a 7 Stockholm DAGENS NYWETER in Swedish 3 Jul 75 pp 1, 12 LD Longer Wants To Assassinate Het] fexcerpts] Havana, 2 July--For a man who has for many years been on the CIA death dist, Cuba's leader Fidel Castro Looked remarkably unconcerned. Ue sat on a sofa in the Swedish Embassy a few hours before Olof Palnets departure from Cuba and when he was questioned.about the CTAts repeated attempts to assassinate him, he raised : both hands to the eciling in a gesture of resignation: i I | | | i ‘ Ty | (vats Holmberg interview with Cuban Prime Minister Castro: 'The United States Ho "hea said. "We have known all. that for a long time. It seems a little "Good Lord, "to hear todav of disclosures of new assassination plans when ridiculous," Fidel said, here in Cuba we already knew of them. "vet what is now being disclosed in the United States is only a small part, “te could deseribe a dozen similar assassination plans and we will also do so when the U.S. investigations are over.' “put he did not belleve that he ran the risk of being assasninated by the CIA any longer. - "Tf there are such plans today, we at least, do not know of then,” he said. "FE Delieve that the United States Is no longer so interested in assassinating me--and J believe that it has accepted the Cuban revolution as a fact and that sooner or Later it must come to an agreement with us. "But no one can be absolutely certain," he said. .. Raised Eyebrows What Fidel Castro said while seated on the Swedish Embassy sofa will cause some eyebrows to be raised in many countries which Cuba has accepted as international allies. One of the key phras es of Olof Palme 's Latin American trip has been “a new cconomtic > yorld order." Jt is a term which embraces small countries! rights to control their natural resources, and in both the o4] pover, Venezuela, and the potential oi] pover, Mexico, Olof Palme's hosts have adopted the concept with enthustasm, When Fidel Castro explained his om skepticism concerning talk of "a now econamte world order" after dinner at the Swedish Fmbassy, he did so ina violent attack on : the world's oll-producing countries. oy He believed that a new world order could not be created by the introduction of new \ "privileges for a new group of countries. materials," he sata. "ALL privileges are created at another's expense, and today {t is not "the Andustrtalized countries which are affeeted by the of1 countries! The Poor Are Affected \) a RGM: insuffielent to demand that all countries have control over their own raw Lt but the poor countries which do not have oll. profits WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 131
pec vegecmce eens pe wiae eras eartegtense Ae Bee we be bead alr bats cant onantnen beams Dedrd elt tet te mat oF oo SUL BA ISIE vie 9 dub 75 , Q2 CURA i . rane “tow can you compare cocoa and 011?" he asked; Mihat benafit is 16 to countries like Sri Tania and fansania that all countries control theiv vaw materials when all this” | | a is neans to them is that they must pay more for both oii and industrial goods? ; ; . "Y an not speaking for myself," he explained. "We receive oil from the USSR on favorable | fo terms, -But if the of] coumtries demand solidarity from the Third World, they uust Pt concern theuselves with the problems of the Third World, ‘They are, 35 yet, reluctant : to do this. i ‘' ; "hero has the oil revenue gone?" he asked, and he answered the question. "Tt has been deposited in the economies of the industrial world and has been used for | : aras purchases. The industrialized countries will emerge from the economic crisis stronger wed than ever. It will be the developing countries which will be affected." | Se Thay Do Not Dare _ Fidel Castro fell silent and he looked at the Swedish journalists with an expression of “o genuine alarm, © Ss ae ee, “De you think I am speaking too severely?" he asked worriedly. "Bub you must wnder- - ‘ ptand that someone taust talk about this. There is no one else who dares, Since all are hoping for loans from the oli countries.” - oo : ee, a And he gave those wno sat next to nim.a comforting slap on the back. In varions TaAtin Amarican countries Latin America 1s deseribed today as a changing ve continent, and in both Mexico and Venezuela Olof Palme listened to the revolutionary ve and anti-imperialist diatribes which are increasingly:part of both these countries! oo, . official language. . : ; ; a 7 ; pos Pidel Castro did not appear especially impressed by this change. Ne did not mention a Mexloo and Venezuela at all when he was asked about tha prospects for social revolution — ; 4 in South America--but he did mention the military governments of Peru and Panana, — re : Better Than Nothing oe , ; ; a "No path toward revolution can be ruled out," he said, "and we aro watching the progressive regimes in Peru and Panama with great interest, Ib is memringless to diseuss whether an armed struggle is necessary for revolution--all that can be aalid ig that a revolution must be based on real force, whether it be in Chile or Cuba." Ho smiled sadly when asked for his opinion of the governments {n Venezuela and Mexico, which, by theie own assurances, are revolutionary, and he thought for a long time before answering: "It is better than nothing." Someone asked if it is true that Cuba is receiving economic aid from the USSR in conflict with its own ideology and that it his its "stomach in Moscow and its head in Pelcing. " : Fidel Castro was ooviously upset by the question. ; 7 . trived the Cuban revolution," he said, "it was us, But the and we cannot forget that. We have not com- and who else could have helped us? "rt was not they who con USSR helped us when no one else would, . promised with either the USSR or anyone else, The United States?” HW 50955 Bocld: 32423566 Page 132
SHE EVENING STAR (Washington) , Monday, S September 1963, Four Star E@Gition, Page B 4, Columns 4 — 5 “Goldwater's Toughness Challenged by Castro" by Daniel Harker, ap Staff Writer ee Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Mr. Castro said: 7 ‘We are Prepared to fight them and answer in kind. u.s. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe, - "The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to Promises made during the October crisis. They nave been broken as can be seen with hew attacks... . . "But I warn this is leading to a very. dangerous Situation that could lead to a . worse crisis than October's... : _. [From an. impromptu interview given by Castro at a Brazilian Embassy reception this week. ] ‘ ey aR a ma AOOaUE nels WLUEN. fa a . ju 14 1975 HW 50955 Bocld:32423566 Page 133
wanU PICAYUNE, New Orleans, Monday, 9 September 1363, ‘page 7, wo Columns-~5 - 7 "Castro Blasts Raids On Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders ; imperiled by Aid to Rebels." This item was introduced by an editor's note referring to the fact that Castro had turned ' up ata Brazilian Embassy reception Saturday night (7 September) where he had submitted to ~@€n impromptu interview. Harker’s account of _ the interview reached New York Sunday after-— noon. “Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: ‘U.S. leaders would be i ny attempt to do an danger if they helped in a | aWay with leaders of Cuba.'" "Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said:. 'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. .u.s. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will - not be safe." . _ 7 “...-World affairs ... seemed to be -entering a more peaceful climate a few days _8go, but now this trend has changed with attacks." , re ""The U.S. is always ready to negotiate end make promise S which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks. | "But I warn this is lea Cangerous situation that cou Crisis than October's ms ding to a very ld lead to a worse iv AOR ETD REGED EY MUL 14 1915 CLA . 5 , . \ * oman rum 1 HW 50955 Bocld:32423566 Page 134
Pata ee ao Kad eat ua 4c Lion Peper my et tip, fangew troup. Tau -_ . ~ Wes Seogya tt ened "ho Crus" coun preva Tue! GAPS Sroup, fevler Sague. @ "ganstar, ‘ 4 c 7 tot Cate pane ree fhrough § vunta Hieaecas zone cin Matanzas an Pyne stot ac et Castre ond niher Lerrorism and sabotage. TNT, PEYO s, and aukomatic pistols, a high-powered rifle, and large quantities oT tied by the OTA. March, 967, rrayolubionary groups were trained and armed by the CIA, and heouch the nertn of lavand, to assassinate Castro and Suppur Bigs invasien. Bumberto Sori Marin end four other individual directed by the CIA Inside Cuba. Weaponry countarr ray’ a tic weapons, High-nowered riffes with scopes, ammunition, inciused autor and explosives. ENE al S He infiltrated te coordinate the activities of various . iats u June, 1961, the “Frente Revelucionarto Democratico" (FRD) met with individual infiltrated into Cuba with imstructions for a plot against Castro. veeps . with bazookas were placed in @ Garage at an inters ection in Havana and a truck with grenades was placed in sports city. Plan was to ambush Castro and other tTeaders. Two narticipants -- Guiliermo Caula Ferrer and Higinto. Menendez -= said when arrested that the CIA was in charge, and that contact was maintained through Guantanaio and une Swiss Embassy. In qulys 1961; after Bay of Pigs, CIA vorked to consolidate counterrevolutionary groups ing Pujais Had 8 y the “Unidad Resistencia (Yatted Resistance) organization. Jose ros made an undercaver isit to the United States to meet with CIA 0 =e afficers dim Bender (or Boulding}. ‘Harold BA shop and Carl dich. There Mederos was anpointe at eed of CIA operat icns in Cube in place of the arrested hldredo Izaguirre. Pro ans included “selfaggression" against Guantaniino to justify counter-attacks an cher eerie es to provoke war against Cuba. (4) ‘October infiltration of FETA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero 26, 1961, through tha aro (Srandy, Adalfo Mendoza (Raul) and Jorg o Garcia Rubio (Tony). and others, the United Pasistance arcup developed a not “against Castro during the 26th of July celebration fn Oriente Province. duly 26, 19651, the same group miamned another plot tne same day against Castro during a ally at Revo Tutt ron Square. Meetings ware held at the saterial, including targe quantities Guanterane Neval case, whare way of small arms, was supplied by nase commender Captain Carl &. Schenweias. July, 7967, plotting against Castro was undertaken by representatives 30 de Noviembre, © “Mow niente aayelucionaria cel Puebto," and “Frente ol uctonarts bemocratice.’ The assassination attempt was to be carried | par the home ef Celiz Sanchez Manduley tn Vedado. CIA tnstructions cai the rough contacts abroad with Tony Varena. Manuel Ray and Aureliano Sanchez range, and through aginieal Burke and CIA agents on Guantanaino. pons included explost ves. nortars. migh-powered rifles, ana 30-caliber i ‘ne CUTS i! ~ wo fe mh uy Q a ) SS 6) above, in contact with the Movimienta de -k ecuperacion | Reva lund ionarta! WER), lea by Juan Jose Martore Silva, made an attempt on the life of ye. cart os Rafael Rodriguez when he was returning fram Matanzas to havat They worked with a CIA agent in Matanzas and a counterrevotuts onary ‘and there. Weapons included ¢ automatic handguns, machine guns, and a high-powered rifle with telescopic site. September 13, 1961. the sate groups listed in ( Me than 4, 1961. the MRR and "IT Fr ‘ente dei Eseambray,” under CIA direction, agreed upon a plan for Savotage: In Havana, timed to coincide with the return of Cuban President Osvalda Torre 19 from Punta del Este. A bazooka was to be red toward the President at the former presidential palace Tram a nearby ada rtinent eine: with the with divas | covered by launching grenades against £ the pubhd Weapons recovered included autumatic rifles and grenade launchers. 4 HY 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 1345
HY 50955 (9) In early 7962, with CIA instructions through Guantanamo, Jorge Luis Cuervo Calvo reorganized several groups into the “Union de Unidades Revolucionarias" (UDUR). A meeting was held to plan an uprising and discuss arrangements which had been made te receive equipment through Guantanamo. CIA was pressing both attempts against Castro and staged acts cf agression against Guantanamo. Calvo outlined "Plan Z" -- a scheme to kill Foreign Minister Raul Roa, and then attack other Cuban leaders who would attend the burial. ‘The authors" of the plan are listed as Cay Hernandez and Cay Gispert and members of the DRE organization headed by Juito Hernandez Rojo, listed as a CIA agent infiltrated into Cuba. Weaponry included a double-barreled shotgun, explosives, grenades, and demolition timing devices, one labeled "Block Demolition, M5 Al." In 1963 another consolidation of groups was carried out with CIA direction from abroad through agent Nino Diaz. The umbrella group was "Resistencia Civica Anticomunista” (RCA), and it incorporated the "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" (ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperacton Revolucionaria" (MRR), and “Agrupacion Montecrist?," among others. The overall objective, as instructed by the CIA, was to create the impression of a strong internal resistance to Castro, and to inspire a decision for armed intervention at the meeting of OAS presidents. Again, instructions came through Guantanamo. (10) March 13, 1963, the RCA initiated a plan to assassinate Castro from a house near the Univeristy of Havana, by firing a mortar. People arrested included Samuel Carballo Moreno, identified as a CIA agent. Attacks were to be made ~- simultaneously on the Committees for the Defense of the Ravotution and on National Revolutionary Militia sites. Bazookas, mortars and machine guns were taken. — (11) Apri? 7, 1963, the RCA developed a plan involving sixteen men armed with pistols and fragmentation grenades, who were to attack Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Those arrested were Enrique Rodriguez Valdes (known as "Mulgado"), Ricardo Lopez Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo, and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles. (12) July 26, 1963, the RCA grouping planned to assassinate the Minister of the Armed Forces, Raul Castro, at Revolution Square during the 26th of July celebration. Leading those groups involved in the plot was Ibrahim Machin Hernandez. (13) September 28, 1963, another group was formed through a relationship with CIA agent Pierre Gwen Diez de Ure, who was a French citizen living in Cuba. Their plan was to dynamite sewage pipes under the presidential palace. de Ure confessed that he had been working for and giving information to the CIA for a period of two years. ° (14) March, 1964, a plan to assassinate Castro by Mario Salabarria Aguiar, a "gangster." who had contacts with the CIA through its agent Dr. Bernardo Milanes Lopez, who sought support in Spain from Tony Varona and Juan Bosch, listed as friends of Salabarria. The CIA gave Salabarria weapons and “great sums of money" for a scheme which invelved installing a 30 or 50 caliber machine gun th a vehicle and waiting for Castro to pass by. (15) Mid-1964, another plan to assassinate Castro was formulated by members of “Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional," part of the RCA block controlled by the CIA. The effort involved CIA agents Alberto and Ramon Grau Sferra, members of a network headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who attempted to poison Castro in 1965. The mid-1964 plan called for throwing grenades at Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Nine men were involved. September, 1964, members of "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" (ELN) and "Frente Interna de Liberacion" (FIL), who had been engaged in intelligence for the CIA, began, under CIA instructions, to seek unification. Boclda: 324793566 Page 136
{16} Gne af the members of this gireup . Memesto Cubilles Perez, told Angel Miguel Arancibia ¥iran, he lands Geldus Renzole and others of a plot against Castro to occur at di Sh. Vedado. Julio Gnar Crug Secitia, Fermin Gonzalez (17) In early 19055 counterrevalubioneries Carbatio and Glraids Kevnaido Ulego Salanc -- members of an RCA sub-group knowin as "ejerclte de Liberacion Nectanal? ~- were working on a plot against Castro tn Santiago de las Veqaz. This pian was dropped in favor of a plan a0) hte Castra at oe Latin fume ican Stadium, with another group in a nearby butiding set up Fire machine guns imte the crowd to create panic and facilitate the e s5cap?. (18) In dune, 1965, there was an arrest of the group Beaded by Ramon and Marta Leopoldina Grau Aisina (see (45 } above), waich Was part of tne "Rascate" and "Movimiento Anticommuniste | neveluctonario" (MAR} grougs sponsored by the. CIA. Maria Leopoldina Grau had received { CIA ines ructions for poisoning Castro at the Havana Libre Hotel. dasus Companiont Souza and Santas de la Caridad Perez Nunez manbers of MAR, were to carry out the poisoning. When this attenot fatied, ancien 509 cap syne boztie of poison was sent by Tony Varona. arta Alstna, atse kaawn as “Polita," also recatved weapons with Silencers and special assassination srojectites from the CIA. (19) in July of 1965, there wes an arrest of a gra up watch represented another CIA athemb: to organize counterravelutionar te: 3, this time under the name "Unidad Resistencta." This group developed a dlan to assassinate Castro with a Thomson submachine gun at Vita houve's restaurant, firing also at the Ministry of Interlor across the street to create confusion and permit the escape. Equipment included weapons and communications gear. (20) Also in 1965, there was an arrest of former Cuban commander Rolando Cubela Secades. Cubele was recruited during a trip to Madrid by CIA agents Manuel Artina, Jorge Robreno ("The Magtctan), Luis Enrique Trasancos. and Carlos Tepedine. The pianning alsu involved an offictal at che Cuban Embassy in Madrid, dose Luts Gonzates Gallarreta, and Alberto Blanco for "E1 Loco”). in Madrid, eel proinisec boats, weapons and inen for an invasion of Cuba within 72 hours sugport the assas Sination of Casira. bere are returning ta Cuba, Cubsia meee ved from Gallarreate a vifle with a telescopic site and silencer, (21) In mid-1965, twa groups with CTA connections and contacts in tne United States, the “Commendos LY and the “Movimiento 30 de Noviembre,” planned to invtitrate Cuba. That effort was given up, and Instead they Fired from qunboaks at the "senelarship gone" tn Miramar and at the Riverta Hotel, in the direction of the presidential residence. ‘ ‘ i ‘ be were dnflltrated into the Monte Barreto sion of aoSassinating Castro. In the action i i yone in Hayana wi of { were killed. and (22) in Mav, 1966, these sane write Arigande Romero Mr vende 15 Herminto Diag Bare i. Erert nr { nf =~ Anten do Cuesta Va Land Euyen iri que: Zaldivar ardanas were arrested, nego | wen had ‘been trained | in ae o Rico by the \, and some had been tuvelyed in the hombarciacrt | he “San Pascual," rercnant vessel ancnorec at the Catbarien Part in nas WV tas Province. a i, ‘ ue de CF Ca OLE a i » three Infiitrators fram the United States -- Felix iifrade Martinez Naz and Gustevo Araces Alvarez -- were 4 to land by Cayo rragoss. Thatr planned activity (23) an o> poms ey ~ : — u im — owkes 1g . o} =~$ D Ut fxs oT =. won t a and conduct systemactc sabotage to create the image apis ing» “be help countarreva lu icionary grouss in the United icial backing. These peanle had been trained by the CIA 1," "RECE," “Los Pines Nuevos," !Comandos L." “Alpha-6," and 4 4 49 a7 ~h & K through "M- other orgary izations. They had automacic rifles, boats, piastie explosives, and cammuntcal na eCuipeent. HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 137 20
HY 50955 (24) In 1971, a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a visit to Chile. The main protagonist was Jesus Dominguez Benitez, known as "The Islander," who had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for promoting terrorist actions inside the United States. In 1970 he had participated in an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate Cuba through Oriente Province and had sought refuge at Guantanamo, where he was arrested for bond violation. Nonetheless, he _-was free in 1971, to participate with the CIA, Chilean fascists, and Cuban -counterrevolutionaries in a scheme to assassinate Castro using a gun concealed 45a television camera. He obtained Venezuelan press credentials from Cuban exiles in that country. The plan was aborted. Those involved in the plot feared for their lives because the plan did not insure their escape. Bit Boclda: 3242793566 Page i136 Pg
HY 50955 \ CLOSING STS DMENG FROM CUBA DOCU IMENT PAPE MEN GE PROM CUBA BOCUREM We consider that the analysis of the informations we offer, | the publicly known, and the onea that the American authorities possess and have not besn published, allows ug to affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, aspecially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterated policy of the United States through its subver- sive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, U.8. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuais, inside the country as well as abroad, without taking into congidera~ tion the victims that would result from these actions. With this purpose, they have provided the participants with a great number of weapons, explosives, technical means of transportation and communication far the accomplishment of their plans. These are some of the connoted and proved facts of the numerous subversive activities that the CIA hag carried out aimed to the assasgination of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba. Boclda: 324793566 Page 139 18