Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) , photographic materials had been made available. _/ One of these employees stated that the Oswald picture had been retained because it depicted a Soviet intourist guide; the other employee indicated that the picture had been kept because it showed a crane in the background. _/ The employee who worked at CIA headquarters confirmed that the photograph of Oswald had not been discovered until a post- assassination search of the Minsk graphics file for materials pertaining to Oswald. Accordingly, this photograph is not evidence that the CIA maintained a dual filing system with respect to Oswald. The picture apparently was kept in a separate file only until 1964 when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its subjects. The Committee's investigation of a letter concerning Classification: | Classified by derivation:
Classification: . (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald that was in the Agency's possession similarly did not result in any evidence of a dual filing system. This letter, dated July 6, 1961, had been sent to Marguerite Oswald to her son, but was intercepted as a result of a CIA mail intercept program. / This program, known as HT-Lingual, attempted to intercept letters being sent between the United States and Russia in an effort to obtain both positive intelligence and counterintelligence information. _./ Typically, intercepted letters and/or their envelopes would be photographed and then returned to the mails. In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA explained that because of the project's extreme sensitivity, all \ materials generated as a result of mail intercepts were stored in a separate projedrs file which was maintained by the counterintelligence staff. _/ Consequently, such items were Classification: , | Classified by derivation:
Classification: , (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) not placed in 201 files. This explanation was confirmed by the testimony of a senior officer from the counterintelligence staff who had jurisdiction over the HT-Lingual project files.* / g) Was there any evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald had staff project? The Committee's review of HT-Lingual files pertaining to Oswald** resulted in the discovery of reproductions of four index cards, two pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and two *Since Oswald was the subject in approximately 50 communications during his stay in the Soviet Union, the Committee also questioned why the Agency ostensibly had just one letter in its possession directly related to Lee Harvey Oswald. In essence, this may be explained by the fact that HT-Lingual only operated four days a week and even then only on a; sampling basis.  / ever participated in a CIA counterintelligence f **Although the Agency had only one letter in its possession directly related to Oswald, after the assassination the HT-Lingual files were combed for additional materials potentially related to him. Approximately 50 pieces of correspondence were discovered. None of these were ultimately judged to be of any significance. These materials, however, were stored ina separate Oswald HT-Lingual file. Classification: | Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted oo. ¢ from ClA—controlled documents.) pertaining to Marina Oswald, which were dated after the assassination of President Kennedy. The pages containing the f reproductions of these cards are stamped “Secret Eyes Only." The first card regarding Lee Harvey Oswald is dated 9 November 1959 and states that Oswald is a recent defector to the USSR and a former Marine. It also bears the notation "CI/Project/RE" and some handwritten notations. The second card on Oswald places him in Minsk, USSR. It contains background information on him and states that he "reportedly ¢ expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions." This card is dated 7 August 1961 and also bears the notation “WATCH LIST." These cards, particularly the reference to "CI/Project/RE," raised the question of whether Lee Harvey Oswald was, in fact, involved in some sort of CI project. The Committee, questioned former employees of the CIA who Classification: = “SA “HEE. | Classified by derivation: f
RPE AED ARB A GP Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) may have had some knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual program in general and these cards in particular. Some of these employees recognized the cards as relating to the HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identify the meaning of the notation, "CI/Project/RE." However, one person testified that the "CI Project" was “simply a name of convenience which was used to describe the HT-Lingual project"; another person testified that “CI Project" was the name of the component which ran the HT-Lingual project. The latter explained that “RE" represented the initials of a person who had been a translator of foreign : . ‘ Abate LANES DEP PR cnet bane tare npn oni eet an A AE : language documents and that the initials had probably been placed there so that someone could come back to the translator if a question arose concerning one of the documents. _f Aon apres mma aters thie MeCN. . Another employee testified that the "“Watch-List" notation on Classification: é | Classified by derivation: EGR RA Is CORRE Lat Tm seater Or ACPA ATE BAS HR ALITA AO ToL
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) the second card referred to a list of persons who had. been identified as being of particular interest in the Agency with respect to the mail intercept program. The Committee requested the CIA to provide an ‘explanation for the terms "CI/Project/RE," and “Watch List," and for the significance of the handwritten notations appearing on the index cards. In addition, the Committee requested a description of criteria utilized in compiling a “watch list." g In regard to the meaning of the notation "“CI/Project/RE," / the CIA explained that there existed an office within the Counterintelligence staff that was known as "CI/Project," a cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the 4 office's functions. In fact, this office was responsible for ; the exploitation of the material produced by the HT-Lingual ( project. .The response further explains that “RE" represents Classification: _ f | Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Ss the initials of a former employee who is presently retired under cover. f In responding to a request for the criteria used in compiling a "Watch List," the CIA referred to a section of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities SSeyeb EN He Sresigent by ene Commission on Cla Activities within the United States, which states: Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest (one should also add counterintelligence interest) were specified in Watch Lists provided to the mail project by the Counterintelligence Staff, by other CIA components, and by the FBI. The total number of names on the Watch List varied, from time to-time, but on the average, the list included approximately 300 names, including about 100 furnished by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of United States citizens. Thus, the full meaning of the notation is that on 9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the “Watch List" \ for the HT-Lingual project for the reason stated on the card -- that Oswald was a recent defector to the USSR and a former Marine. Classification: | Classified by derivation: i~ @ @ @ fw fw wae
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted ; from ClA—controlled documents.) The response goes on to state that the handwritten number, #7-305, which also appears on the first card, is a reference to the communication from the CI Staff to the Office of Security expressing the former's interest in seeing any mail to or from Oswald in the Soviet Union. Finally, the other handwritten notation, "“N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59," signifies that a name trace run through the central records register indicates that there was no record for Lee Oswald as per that date. The Agency's explanation of the meaning of the second card is that on 7 August 1961, Mrs. Egerter requested that Oswald's name be placed on the "Watch List" because of Oswald's expressed desire to return to the U.S. as stated on the card. The handwritten notation indicates, in this instance, that Oswald's name was deleted from the “Watch List" on 28 May 1962. Classification: | Classified by derivation: i a a oo @ & {
LE LE LF LF LT LF LF £7 ~ Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In reference to the two cards on Marina Oswald,. the Agency stated that her name was first placed on the “Watch List" on 26 November 1963 because she was the wife of Lee p : Harvey Oswald. The second card served the purpose of adding the name Marina Oswald Porter to the “Watch List" on 29 June 1965 after she remarried. Both names were deleted from the list as of 26 May 1972. Thus, the statements of former CIA employees were corroborated by the Agency's response regarding the explanation of the index cardsin the CIA's HT-Lingual files pertaining to Oswald. The explanations attested to the fact that the references on the cards were not demonstrative of an Agency ‘ relationship with Oswald, but instead were examples of notations routinely utilized in connection with the HT-Lingual project. Classification: = ~ = “=. a “a. Qa so “a, | Classified by derivation: i wf fe ff ff ie
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) 4. Did the CIA ever debrief Lee Harvey Oswald? The CIA has denied ever having had any contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, and its records are consistent with. this position. Because the Agency has a Domestic Contacts Division which routinely attempts to solicit information on a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad, the absence of any record indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald, a returning defector who had worked in a Minsk radio factory, had not been debriefed has been considered by Warren Commission critics to be either inherently noncredible (i.e., the record has been destroyed) or indicative that Oswald had been contacted through other than routine Domestic Contact Division channels. After reviewing the Agency's records pertaining to this issue, the Committee's initial point of inquiry was to interview Classification: f . , | Classified by derivation: bh
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted ¢ from ClA—controlled documents.) the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union who had written a November 25, 1963 memorandum which indicated that, upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union,* this officer had considered “the laying of interviews fon him/ through /the Domestic Contacts Divison/ or other suitable channels." This individual indicated that Oswald was considered suspect because the Soviets had appeared to have been very solicitous of him. For this reason, a nonclandestine contact, either by the Domestic Contacts Division or other "suitable channels" *Phe memorandum indicates that the possibility of an Oswald \ contact was discussed during the summer of 1960, but the author indicated that the conversation actually took place during the summer of 1962, shortly before his. transfer to a new assignment. During the summer of 1960, the author was not on an active assignment. such as the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, ‘ Classification: | | Classified by derivation:
ee ee ae eee Classification: | (This form is.to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) was considered. The officer stated, however, that to his “knowledge, no contact with Oswald was ever made; moreover, if 'a debriefing had occurred, the officer stated that he would have been informed. Finally, he stated that Oswald was considered a potential lead, but only of marginal importance, and therefore the absence of a debriefing was not at all unusual. The Committee interviewed five other Agency employees who were in a position to have discussed Oswald in 1962 with the author of this memorandum, including the person who replaced the author of the memorandum as chief of the research section, but none of them could recall any such conversation. Interviews with personnel from the Soviet Russia Division's clandestine operations section, the American legal travelers program, and the clandestine activity research section failed Classification: _ A. USCC. | Classified by derivation: a ww wf ff ff fe
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) to result in any evidence suggesting that Oswald had been contacted at any time by the CIA. The author of the November 25, 1963 memorandum also informed the Committee that the CIA maintained a large volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which Oswald worked. This information was stored in the Office of had worked in the Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised the Committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, this individual claims that during the summer of 1962 he reviewed a contact report from representatives of the CIA's New York field office who had interviewed a former Marine who had worked at the Minsk Research and Reporting. _/ Another former CIA employee, who ; Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This defector, Classification: = { | Classified by derivation: all ae LT ke 4 BO
Classification: | (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) whom the employee believes may have been Oswald, had been living with his family in Minsk. The employee advised the Committee that the contact report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch, then a component of the Office of Central Reference. Accordingly, the Committee requested that the CIA provide both the above- described contact report and the volume of materials concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. A review by the Committee of the documents in the volumes on the Minsk Radio Plant, however, revealed that no such contact report existed in that file. The CIA has stated to the Committee that between 1958 and 1963 it had no procedure for the systematic debriefing of overseas travelers, including returning defectors. Instead, Classification: ‘ | Classified by derivation: fe ee
Classification: | (This form is to be used for material extracted from CliA—controlled documents.) the Agency relied upon the FBI both to make such contacts and report any significant results. To investigate this question further, the Committee ; reviewed the files of 22 individuals (selected from an original list of 380 possible Soviet defectors) who were born in America and appeared to have returned to the United States between 1958 and 1963.* Of these 22 individuals, only four were interviewed at any time by the CIA. These four instances tended to involve particular intelligence or counterintelligence needs, but this was not always the case. the CIA did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter *An effort was also made to review only the files of American- born individuals who had defected during these years. Not all of the 22 individuals, however, met this criteria. Classification: Based upon this file-review, it appears that, in fact, ' | Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) of standard operating procedure. For this reason, the absence of any Agency contact with Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union cannot be considered in any way unusual, particularly since the FBI did fulfill its jurisdictional obligation to conduct such interviews. 5. The Justice Department's Failure to Prosecute Lee Harvey Oswald for Offering to Give Intelligence Information to the Soviet Union When Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959 for the purpose of renouncing his American citizenship, he allegedly offered to give the Soviets information that he had acquired as a Marine Corps radar operator. _/ The Committee sought to determine why the Justice Department did not prosecute Oswald for his offer to divulge this kind of information. Classification: ae ae ae | Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) A review of Oswald's correspondence with the American embassy in Moscow indicates that on February 13, 1961 the embassy received a letter from him in which he expressed a "desire to return to the United States if...some agreement /eould be reached/ concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against /him/." __/ On February 28, 1961, the embassy sought guidance from the State Department concerning criminal prosecution. _/ Oswald's potential liability to The State Department, however, responded on April 13, 1961 that desired return to the United States he may be amenable to / prosecution for any possible offenses committed in violation of the laws of the United States..." On May 10, 1961, Oswald wrote the embassy demanding a _/ it was "not in a position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his f "full guarantee" against the possibility of prosecution. Classified by derivation: Classification: | lel