e 107 SECTION 1070 sroutrey INFORMANTS AND conn @exin SOURCES TABLE OF GONTENES L. Index Cards THOFEEOTOHOHEHOSEOECOH ESCHER E HOKAGE HOH OED THE P ODE DEO HEHEHE OKO HE M, Tnformant Files eos seen re aoe be reooneoosnoeoereeoHneosongeoeaeononeaeooeeebeooeer 1. Cr+ ning ooecogccoeoaeooe¢cseoovov, enone cevseoeoce cove navseo vase etsocvoeoe we ce esr naestnee 2s Y. tthly administrative report ocetneceatcoesoercercesoesoonoreroeoeove 3. fv i gnment and ttickler cards ee eosoereroe recor ear asnevnaeeecesoeereerene 4. S:.-files eeconantvdeseeeocweonaesevewcoHnonotoaeaoeceoenuoervaseceetcrpresoosaoecegeonsovaasteseseae 5. Cc. onelizgetion Cece eo oer aed e OHA OOO EERE ELH ECO FOE HOOEHCOHEEEEOS. 6. Channelizing memoranda — destruction of .ccecccecortrvontestocar 7. Dissemination of information wcrc ccessccceccrorevrenscovesecsseace 8. CorreSpondCnCe .icecsecersessercrecoessorecceerovsorserereseecess 9, Maintenance of Liles ..cccorcccescoroncessecccrereteresoersessee 10. Use of informant by Department ~ filing correspondence re ...... ll. Form FD-238 eee ame cee eects e erro eer eee oe eee De ober eeeeeese 12. Bulky material submitted by informant ...cccccoereeerercreerenes WN. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received .ccccceccessvcece 1. No gifts to informants eocoeesooogoroersreceooeoeroseosonooHnse noe eaeans 2. SAC authority to pay informants .cccericcesccocesasceeesccecerese 3. Payments on continuing basis ~ Bureau authority .oosoccceocseces 4. Four—month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority eseooaoceseecoase tov geetcdoewrorzreeoeeeoveee oe ce sGeov,ge soc ceorogaese eee 5. Receipts e@eoeceeseeoearnwvneoeo cow oe ece ose ee Govosoovoc#e ce coe ooceaseono#w# oe ae 6. Tncome tax returns ee oroence oe oasecneeooe ee eooeneeeeaenreocsooeaenoee 7. Stipvilation re payments made to witnesses .rcccssccsevsscvoecnecs 8. Receipt of unemployment compensation socecesccccoccecescouveceoe 9, Handling money and property received by double agents .ossocecece 0. Semiannual Letter on oseeoeseeornnooegnevcnscenoo#xeoeooeoneTGeOeOsoo oO eA P, Signing of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements .ocrccercnecoves Qa. Discontinued Informants eeeseocenvpevanvneoseaoanonsgceoeeces oc oseoeeocooeocescecoenvn ee gevece R. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service INS eeconecesocascoe roe eo oreo oensOoVOFKOF OTC CHEHC OOOO ROBE OTOTHS EOE OH MOO KROES S, Corrective Action on False Information .ecccccscccvcccvseesccssveces T, Classification @eeoecaosecoeoceeosacoer #Gowoevee cee Fb ee toereovewrcevrereeweee ea oe aeaecee Uv, Confidential Sources eet teow #@oceoe @ oe co oc#e @Oceseeoa#e tse nuagcesoee OCoceonan ence wevoe 1. Definition @escoveeeeeceoeodoae#eopceeseceecteoseteeoe*#* oocescocereoeaeeonvaoaoaeecrwvssevaene 26 Assignment of symbols ew coarse oer oer oor oe sone eecHreereesrooeeeoceroever 3. Tndex @eetsnoeoencoeocecec#e#secoceweoce soe ce ee enueeeveeocdveeoe vege ete oe oenevon ; 4, Files eeovo# OF @seeeeveveoevoeoe* ceseocde*eovneveeaesecv*escowenoogoetanoceeovnver ee cooeceer ese vaoane i 5, Utilization @eoeteoeocvoervrc4eoecrseeoceneteoetoevov ene eocccaatcewoegdcodendveetcen y 6, Security confidential sources — certification of stability H ANd PSYMENES Lo cs ccc racscrecresceeeraroesesrcesnrererresevenes i 7. Gifts esooeoeeecaeaovoagoaootce se ov teececocooevewagceenvpeccaoeewe#ecescoagctesvaseonae | 8; Discontinuance eeocecoeoner eer oecnoeeoCoe oer OKOFOe FO OGCHHOSHORDHDHOGO EO HOS. I 8-13-64 ° : MW 55072 Bocid: 323839523 Page 1598
Fy am yy RMW 55072 SECTION 107@szeurzy INFORMANTS AMD comin SOURCES TABLE O} CONPEDMES Aw Definitions... cc csccceccsescrcsccvceovacssens 1. Security informant... ccc eee e cece vccesces 2. Potential security informant. ..cccescececeeons 3. Double agent. .cccccnesccsvecsssevesarsntensetctoerecseeeeses 4. Confidential Source. cr cseveccasccnevescvevesasccseveccetcces B. Sources of Potential Security Informants,...cecccncceccucesccaces C. Interviews with and Development of Background on Individuals Beinjg’ Considered for Informant Purposessecrerevestecoeesscevcsve D. Approval, Indoctrination, Development, and Control of Potential Security [nformants.. ccc cc ec cece eect rere cee ee ess eienressvensee Be Bureav POLLY. ccc ccc cc eevee nse cccer cers cere arcs nssesatensecutesens 1. Development of military personnel....... 2. Contacts by designated Agents...c.ccusee 3. Divulging information to informant...... 4. Recording investigative activity... ccc ece cece ce seveesatennes FPF. Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants. L. Gaution against divulging relationship... ..cecsvecscesevers 2. Developing ad@itional background......ceececececes 3. Handling indications of instability... .cccesceces 4. Contacts by ASents. cc cscccacccscseececcsvssescvcsees Porm FD-209, .c veces ccvevsvesscvsves 5S. Checking reliability... cc cece cee we eee rece rece tanta nen ereeeee 6. - Fingerprints. .covcsscececsesecccecsecee 7. Control — statement of cooperation.....ccscccatoeuecs 8. Execution of party questionnaires. ivecsccesceseecees 9, Informant's activity in organizations... .cersecececs 10. Transfer of informants to other areas...sccsceee li. Action by informant when uncovered. .crccsececceeevccccsceece 12. Requests of informant to help defend others......se0. 13. Preparation for testifying... cc cce ers cesscccenenes G. Informants! LnLormavion.. cc cecccscecc ssc seracrescssesvcraverece 1. General instructions re oral and written information..... 2. Recording written and oral information. ...cccccsceecs 3. Transmission of Lnformation. cerscereeccsecscccsseeves 4. Handling of lead information. ..cccevecscccvevcorserece 5. Handling documentary material furnished by informants...... H. Passing Information In Double Agent Operations... .ceccererccveces 1. Carefully handle and create basis for acquisition........ 2.° Locating information to pasS.cccscccacceeccececces 3. Obtaining Buregu authority. ccc cece cece cee en esc ccersvectonees 4. Retention of copies of passed material. ...cccseceseseeceecs DL. Symbols... cece scevscnvseccvsessscevesecsece 1. Assigning nNUMbErS. cc cecesscceccceesvesevevstsvesen  veevses 2. Communications — use of symbols......... J. Tndexing.r..cccssvscccvccsncsvcsesccvcese Es Indices. ccc cece ce cee tc cee ee eee enor rere seer reese ee seserseveveses 1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number indeXsrererereceres 2. Index entitled "“Informants and Sources in Other Divisions". 3. Agents! informative indOX., .. cere sccccesecncvessccccerssece 4. Currency and Security. .scccccccccctcverces Ce oe owe ees enone vee unorne CC a eee ere eee vane etrteorerevne eon eererenes Cooeoeeeraeeeosres . oeeoee ee Ce eevee eereereneeecenerevresnse ootee ee eecveveor eeee er eooewnoe eoveecee reece rarer eeosers Ce ed ee Y oe ore tM eovrereoseererees 10-13~65 Doeld: 32969529 Page 15599 . SD oo etree ere rere rer een ene * . * Page ww Www Ww OUWWUWOMDMDWDAONNINNNWNOAAOAGUY &
5. Office Albany Albuquerque Anchorage Atlanta - Baltimore Birming am . . Bostor 7 Buffale Butte Charlotte Chicago Cincinnati Cleveland { {Columbia Dallas Denver - Detroit EL Paso Honolulu Houston Indianapolis Jackson Jacksonville Kansas City Knoxville has Vegas Little Rock Les Angeles Louisville Memphis Miami Milwaukee Minneapolis Mobile Newark New Haven “New Orleans New York Norfolk Oklahoma City Omaha Philadelphia Phoenix | ; Pittsburgh i Portland Richmond St. Louis Salt Lake City San Antonio San Diego San Francisco - . San Juan Savannah Seattle Springfield fm, wo im - YY : hington, BD. ‘o | wo i w J. < Fe NW S5072 Docld: 32989529 Page 1600 Letters should be submitted, ¥ of semiannual letters on criminal informants. SECTION °@ SHCU2TTY INFORMANTS AND CONFI Tas SOURCES CG, 23 11-12-65 Listed below are al? of the Bureau offices and the dates semiannual This list is also applicable to the submission Dates January 15 and July 15 n n ' nw n wR n January 31 and July 31 % te nu % tt At February 15 and August a tt u an ny tt tt February 28 and fysust 31 it it and 15 and 30 and October 15 Rr fl . rs) April 15 n tt nr April 30 and October 31 R te ft . Rn ita it May 15 and November 15 . tt tt wu tt Wt tt nh , n May 31 and November 30 n n bi] tt " . BS 4 id w 15 and December 15 n . t 30 and December 31 n " t tt ba ati n
-LO7P ~ & SECTLOU LO7, @ cory INFORMANTS AND CONFID e@:: SOURCES P, SIGNING OF LOYALTY OATHS, AFFIDAVITS, AND STATEMENTS 1, Every effort should be made to guide security informants away from situations requiring them to sign or fi11 out loyalty oaths or forms. 2. informants shoul be cautioned to keep the contacting Agent fully advised of any situation wherein they might be required to sign such a form, 3. Advise Bureau promptly of a11 such situations which cannot be avoided. 4, The Bureau will consider as a last resort advising another agency of the informant's relationship with the Bureau, together with pertinent facts concerning the informant's activity; however, such situations must be kept to a minimum in view of the obvious dangers to the anformant. -5.: Each such situation must be carefully considered and: Bureau. is to. be advised as promptly as possible, together with an appropriate recom mordation:- for proposed action. 6. In no instance should you permit an informant to sign a loyalty cath in the negative. : Q. DISCONPTINUaAD INFORMANTS 1. When the sexvices of an informant rre discontinued, mark the name card "cancelled," Destroy the symbol c-'d. Never destroy the name card. 2. Refile the name card in numerical o.der by symbol number in the symbol numbex index. If a discontinued informant or a discontinued potential security informant or confidential source to whom 2 symbol number was ouce assigred later is reactivated, remove his name card from the symbol. number index; mark it reactivated with appropriate date, note thereon type of information he will now be furnishing, and refile it alphabetically in the name card section of the index. 3. When a potential security informant or confidential source is discon- tinued and a permanent symbol has not been assigned, destroy the alpha~— betical index card. [ 4, Advise the Bureaufof the date]Jwhen 42 potential informant or informant is discontinued and the reason: therefor. 5, Advise tke Bureau as to whether or not the informant is willing to testify _-in open court or before administrative hearing boards. The identity of all cases of security of Government employees type in which the informant has furnished information must be ascertained and the Bureau advised in compliance with section 69F, volume III, of this manual. 6. Review the informant's file to determine if any copies or summaries of _ correspondence between the Bureau and the field relating to the Depart~ ment's interest in using the informant for testifying when he becomes available as a witness are contained therein. In those casesin. which it is evident the Department has indicated a desire to consider the inform— ant further when he becomes available, advise the Bureau in each such . substantive case, except in those cases in which it is obvious the statute of limitations has run or the case has been adjudicated, This exception does not apply to sec- ity of Government employees cases. When all above action is compl. '" 2a, advise the Bureau. “ - .7, A statement shall also be made to the effect that the measures to con-— trol informants, set out in 8 below, have been considered and recommenda— tions shall be made when it appears that such are warranted. 8. When the services of an informant are discontinued, maintain close con— tact with him so that the inforuant will look to the Bureau for advice and counsel prior to taking any action which would be against’ the Bureau's best interests; When an informant is discontinued, determine whether he has plans for writing a book, magazine or newspaper article, or ather-— wise publicizing his activity. If so, he should be impressed with the- desirability of coming to the Bureau for assistance and guidance rather than making other arrangements. If an informant insists on engaging in 24 4~13~64 - NW 55072 Doocld: 325989525 Page 1601
o SEC2TCH 107. SEGCURTTY INVORMAHES AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES L074 ~ DEF INITIGNS ; 1. Security informant Tndividued actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor— mation on secucit:for intelligence ]matters exclusively for Buresn and whose identity ‘must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a suiversive orga anization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such @ sosition relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U, S. on behalf of foreign . principal, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information . of vatuc;for furuish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis. ] . 2. Petentiel security informant intividual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on-behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith,[or is in a position to secure pertinent foreign ‘intelligence data, land is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish curren’ information to Bureau. 3. Doudle agent . : A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance, 4. CGcnfidential source An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him threugh his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephcne company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort con behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available toa them, SCURCES OF PCPENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS . . Informants sheuld be developed on all organizatic and individuals that are jJnimical to the internal security. Experiens: :as shown that 7: tential informants may be cbtained through alertness in the course of nor “ investi- gative activity. Live informant ceverage depends for the most pa~ spon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs, For .zgistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: 1. Evaluation of a. Complainay'4 in security matters b, Persons i °.rviewed in connection with security cases oc. Subjects «| security investigations looking for indications of aisaf— fection, aisgruntlement, loss of intere: . inactivity, financial hard- Shiv, or other repudiation of party loy “y ad, Bureau applicants as possible informants e, Personal *-iends and contacts of Special Agents and other Burean _ employee. : f£, Sources :/ information, confidential sources, and contacts on con- tinuous Yesis . Revi-*s of closed security files on individuals Reva... of reserve index Ascersain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, Deleted ‘ Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA. Consultation with present informants regarding indie-tions of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of cc. ‘se, Should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. 8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating vhe acquaintance of party members. . NO UF DB W DD e 12-13-65 NW 55072 Doold: 323989529 Page 1602 i: . . so.
40/7B —C SECTION 107. Qeor INFORMANTS JED coma SOURCES - 9, Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries : 10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed _ personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members . of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ~ ees who might be willing to infiltrate 2 subversive organization, In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plantts making avail— able the services of an employee who already is an.informant of the manage— ment. . . a ll. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist—dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions, 12, With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact. 13, <After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an indus— triel plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dis-— missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Burcau of his past activities, Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered. 14, Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ-— uals merely registered but never became active 15, Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact. 16, Officizis ani employees of foreign establishments in the U. S. 17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat . 18, Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. 8S. 19, Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau, (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.) [C. [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUALS BEING { CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES ] When a decision is mete to consider a particular individual for informant [ purposes, background investigation must be conducted. [Extensive background [ investigation should .ot be conducted, however, until the individual has [ been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the [ Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau anthority to interview whenever the restrictions { imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, : >! section 105K, itea 6b, [ (10), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Fs jround investi‘stion { shouldlconsist ‘of the following: [ 1. Check of field office files for derogatory infs:mation [ 2. Discreet canvass of logical informants to ascertain if the[individual ] [ is known to[them] ; 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individ~— ual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, prescnt and past employments, and business connections. Background investigation must i definitely establish that thefindividual]ean be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. . [ Securing background information from thelindividual]lis not sufficient; [ {his]lbackground must be established by the investigation, [including discreet [ inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him.] 4. Check of Local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to -L:s Identi- [ fication Division to obtainfany]record [he may have. ] . - . 5. Armed services vs.cord should be reviewed if the individual i. reteran. 6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve. 7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained. oe -L0~-13~—65 . WW 55072 Doecld: 32989525 Page 1603
SECTION 107. SECURTYY INYCRMANES AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES A DEPINITIGHS 1. Security informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor-— [ mation on se:urityfor intelligence Imatters | exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such «#. position relative to a subversive organization, or esvionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. &. on behal? of foreign princival, that he is able to obtain and does provide current information ei, [ of value;[or furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on @ regular . [ basis. ] 2. Potential security informant ° Individual in a position to become active in a subversive orfanization or eSpionsge or intelligence activities in the U. 8, on behalf of foreign { principal or can become closely associated therewith,[or isin a position [ %o secure pertinent foreign intelligence data, Jand is maki <‘ affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be - a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bure... 3. Double agent A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service. and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance. 4. Ccnfidential source An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him threugh his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain andi furnish information readily available to them. B. SCURCES OF PCTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Informants should.be developed on all organizations and individuals that ave inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential { informants may be obtained threugh alertness in the course of norm:?: investi~ gative activity. Live inf--mart ceverage depends for the most pe:- upon Fox’ .s8sis tance Ritiative and resourceful -.:s of individual Agents and SACs. n-obtaining potential inicvmants , the following is suggested: « Evaluation: of : . a. Complainants in security matters >. Persons interviewed in connection with'security cases co, Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of tisaf~ fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard— - Ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty ad, Bureau applicants as possible informants e, Personal friends and contacts.of Special Agents and other Bureau employees ££. Sources of information, confidential Sources, and contacts on con tinuous basis, Hee eae 2. Review of closed sécurity files on individuals . 3. Review of reserve index . 4, Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, 5. Deleted .6,. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA, ‘ 7. Consultation-with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. -They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the pnauiry. ° 8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for indi “4uals whe have been associated with only one or two fronts or who atte:. ° only a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innoc =: of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members, WW 55072 Docld:32989529 Page 1604 12-13-65 . . -
[ NW 55072 13. 14. 15. 1é, 17. 18, 19, SECTION 107. SECURITY INFORMANT? AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES " Investigation eo” communist petition sizgners who are acquainted 1.1.th Communist Party functionaries Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed persannel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau, concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ— ees whe might be willing to infiltrate eae subversive organization, In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail~ able the services of an employee who already is an “informant of the manage- ment, ‘ Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist—-dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their ponitions. : With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if ~c:sible, the official shovléd suggest to the potential informant thai “- contact the Bureau rather then have an Agent originate the contac After the Bureau has notified the armec “ces of a communist in an indus—_ trial niant having armed forces contrac’ ', the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and i. facing the possibility of dis— missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureav of his past activities. Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ— uals merely registered but never became active Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact, Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U; 8. | Employees of the United Nations Secretariat Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S&S. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social-.status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who. will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this menual.) ~s, INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACKGROUND ow INDIV< DUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR -INFORMANT PURPOSES . When a decision is made to consider a particular indi: 3ual for informant purposes, background investigation must be conducted. “xtensive background investigation should not, be conducted, however, until the individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictians imposed in section 87D, item 6b, (7), volume III, and section 1LO5K, item 6b, (9), jvolume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the follew’ ag: Ll. 2. 3. Check of field office fies. for derogatory information . ~ Discreet canvass of Logical informants to ascertain if the individual - is known to them . Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individ- ual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connect: ..s. Background investigation must definitely establish that the individual can be utilized without any. danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by the investigation, including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with him. “Check of Local credit and arrest records. Obtain nec: i1sary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transm ‘ted to the Tdenti~ fication Division to obtain any record he may have. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is.a veteran. . Check draft status or status in the armed‘ forces reserve. ¢ status and if any marital difficulties all details should be Bocld: 32989529 Page 1605
10, il. 12. 14, 1. 2. ( | t r 4, SETTION 107, D oes INFORMANTS AND CONFIDEVYLAL SOURCES 1075 ~ U Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dis semination of such information to follow the instructions set forth abLoves AU so) ©6cset up a co trol file regarding this corrective action, and upon ec pletion of sam: submit to the Bureau a final letter under the in- formant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication, This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been teken in each instance. If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be request2d to submit summary letters show- ing what corrections have been made, It is imperative that all information from the informant be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done. Occasionally, an ex~informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was 4n informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the information attributed to that individuel in the absence of a definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant, Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part II, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, . fT. ° CLASSIFICATION ~ 134 U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES Definition See page 3 of this section. Assignment of symbols a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be saved, b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished. ec. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra—Bureau communications for confidential source;[e.g., "Richard Roe, CS."] Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g., Is -— R for Russia, d. When a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.g., CS NY-000-S. é€é. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of numbers used for your security, racial, and criminal informants, Index a. Index cards on form FD-348 like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index, racial informant index, or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished. b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on inform ants, , c. Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the - criminal informant index, racial informant index, and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of value in these types of investigations. Files When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification’ file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinued. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a2 manner identical with that for handiing criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC. 27 7-14-64 NW 35072 Doold: 329895259 Page 1606