476-10037-10414 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : : Kent, Sherman TO: TITLE : DATE .: PAGES : ' SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : FROM JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM _ IDENTIFICATION FORM NARA 176-10037-10414 ‘ Personal Papers of Richard Goodwin CIA Director, CIA _ Memo RE: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba 11/3/1961 11 9/10/2000 Goodwin Papers: Cuba, General, 11/61 & Undated Box 4. Box 7. 5 A PS EY ES DED es eh DEP EE ED 80 ED rE EE e-em DEP EY Sm Em ea DED EAD a A HEH sD eet
SAniP tea VAada KRL Do; SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGEN IG CE OFFICE GF NaTIONsAL ESTIMATES 3 November 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR _ SUBJECT: The Situation and Prospects in Cuba Summary le The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The contrast between its roseate promises and the grim actuality is. producing disillusionment and apathy. Some specially notivated elenents have recently dared to demonstrate their disapproval. The bulk of the population, however still accepts the Castro regine, or is at least resigned to it, and substantial nunbers’ still support it with enthusiasm. At the same tine, the regine's ' eapabilities for repression are increasing nore rapidly than are the potentialities for active resistance. SECRET .
The Econonic Situation and Prospects , @e The Cuban econouy. is now feeling the impact of three revolutionary changes: (a) the loss of nost of its experienced middle and upper level managerial talent; (b) the imposition of elaborate state controls; and (c) a drastic shift in the trading pattern, from priuary dependence on the US to prinary dependence on the Soviet Bloc. The US enbargo has produced some econonic difficulties through the dental of spare parts for previously acquired equipnent, alnost all of. which was of US origin. Never~ . theless, the production of sugar, the principal export crop; has been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit, the other leading exports, has been uaintained. Although Cuba's free world trade-and foreign exchange reserves have declined ‘sharply, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough. consuner goods and wachinery to keep the econouy goinge 3. The donestic production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and the inports obtained fron the Bloc and elsewhere, are together not sufficient to compensate for the loss of former in- ports from the US. Fersonal consunption has declined, especially in the cities, and nost drastically in the case of the upper and middle classes. In some rural areas, however, especially in
SECRET centers of sugar production, living conditions have been sub- stantially duproved, particularly in terns of housing and sani- tation. These examples of the tangible benefits received by sone keep alive the hopes of many others. he In addition to trade, the Bloc has extended to Cuba some $357 million in eredits for industrial developuent. However, only a few of these development projects are yet underway, nor is couch ~ likely to be acconplished for another year or nore. 5.: In general, the Cuban econony is characterized by uajor shortages and a high degree. of disorganization. This state of affairs will continue for soue tine to come, and nay indeed get sonewhat worse. In view of the availability of Bloc assistance, however, we do not believe that the econony will deteriorate so far as to bring about Castro's overthrow, or force him to wake basic changes in his policy. on the contrary, the situation wiil probably begin to improve within a year or so, as the new Communist-type organization takes hold, managerial experience inereases, and foreign trade is adjusted to new channels. Popular Acceptance of the Regine 6. Initially, almost all Cubans hailed the triumph of the Revolution with enthusian, Disillusionnent, however, cane quickly | -3°¢ SECRET
SECRET to the urban niddle class, urban organized labor, and the landed gentry. It has since spread to small peasant proprietors and even to hurler folk, who are beginning to appear in significant nurnbers in the flow of refugees from Cuba. 7. The severe internal repression which acconpaniea the de~ feat of the April invasion stalled, for a tine, all nenifestations of opposition within the country. By Septerber, however, this effect had worn off sufficiently for Catholic crowis in Havana and other cities to dare to defy the regine's prohibition or certain public religious observances. This was the first occasion on which the regine had been forced to use’ gunfire to disperse hostile public denonstrations. It was therefore indicative of a significant change in the psychological situation. 8. There have also been sone increase in small-scale guerrilla and sabotage activity and a considerable increase in such passive forns of resistance as absenteeisu. However, nost disaffected Cubans now think prioarily in terns of escape. In nld-Septerber, sone 15,000 had completed legal arrangenents to leave the country which were then cancelled by the govermnent, and sone 500 were in asyluri in the several Latin Anerican embassies in Havana. Illegal departures ocecur alnost daily. ~ ho SECRET
' “SECRET 9. Despite these manifestations of disaffection, the great pulk of the population still accepts the regine and substantial nunbers still support it with enthusiasn. ‘The sprawling revolu- _ tionary bureaucracy now eubddies a new class with a very definite personal stake in the regine. Castrolst Political Organization lO. The regire is now in the process of a complete reorgani- zation of the for of government in Cuba, and of the organization of a new totalitarian political party to operate and control it. The Communist model is apparent in both instances. ll. The traditional provincial and municipal governments are being replaced by juntas (soviets) for "coordination, execution, and inspection" (JUCEI). Already established in each province of © Cuba, the JUCEI's consists of a "provincial congress," representa-~ tive of all najor econonic entities in the territory, which neets occasionally; a "plenun" of the congress, which neets every few ’ ponths; and several sualler bodies which meet frequently and actually direct the provincial edoinistration. The primary func- tion of all JUCEI is the local iuplenentaton of plans received fron higher authority. SECRET
SECRET 12. The new totalitarian political nachine is to be the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, a nerger of the anorphous 26 of July Movenent (or what is left of it) with the well organized Conmuni st Party. Although Castro is of course to be the suprene head of this party, the nan who is pushing the project is Blas Roca, the Cornmunist Secretary General. Party membership is to be ‘linited to the elite of the revolutionary struggle and prerequisite to appointnent to any important polit- ical or econonte position. 13. A significant arn of the Castroist political organization is the paramilitary Association of Rebel Youth (AJR), derived fron the previous Cormmunist youth organization. These teenagers, of the . type that would be found in juvenile gangs, are a terror to their parents, their schoolmates, and the general pubiic. They have charge of indoctrination in the schools and have been active in the formation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (see paragraph 38). Active participation in the AJR is to be prerequisite to educational and eventually political advancenent. The Castroist Security Apparatus | 14, The forces now available to the regine to suppress insurrection or repel invasion are:
SECRET? ae The Rebel Arny (32,000) b. The Rural Police (9,600) c. The Rebel Air Force (2,000) d. ‘The Navy (2,000) | e. The Militia (250,000, including 83,000 wouen) f. The Rebel Youth (150,000, including 10,000 girls) ge The National Police (9,000). h. The Moritine Police 15. The administrative and command structure of these forces is extrenely Loose; the improvisation of ad hoc commands including ‘ disparate elements is the common practice. Confusion and lack of coordination are therefore likely in any emergency situation. 16. The arny has been strengthened by the receipt of Bloc arus and is being instructed in their use by Bloe personnel. However, it has had little. or no combined arnes or field training. It displayed great tactical ineptitude at the tine of the April landing. 17. About a fifth of the aruy are veterans of Castro's guerrilla struggle against Batista. The remainder are early ad- herents. In tine, however, Castro came to doubt, with reason, their loyalty to the course the Revolution had taken on achieving -Te- ot Le ' SECRET
SECRET power. The uilitia were therefore established as an alternative armed support for the regine. The original units were ccuposed of Castro's nost ardent followers. In tine, however, the nilitia was so greatly expanded by recruitnent under pressure that its _ revolutionary zeal was considerably diluted. Castro has there=- fore transferred his favor and reliance to the newly organized Rebel Youth, who are now his nost fanatical followers. 18. In general, the militia and the Rebel Youth, both part- tine forces, have only light arms which are issued to then only on occasion. They are not capable of sustained conbat, but are ef~ fective for controlling and coercing the general public. In addition, sone selected units of the wilitia and the Rebel Youth are specially arned and trained and are, in effect, aruy units specially dedicated to Fidel Castro. 19. The capobilities of the air force have been greatly enhanced by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of personnel frou training in the Bloc. There are now about 35 MIG-15's and MIGel19's operational in Cuba. 20. The navy is unreliable and distrusted; nost of its personnel were taken into custody at the tine of the April -~ 8 « SECRET
SECRET landing. Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few profes- Sionally trained and technically qualified men. - al. Recently, the professional security agencies of the - governnent -- Army G-2 (the Secret police), the National Police, and the Moritine Police -- were transferred fron the Ministry of the Arned Forces to a newly created Ministry of the Interior... This change is likely to enhance their effectiveness. It does not-in- dicate a reduction of Raul Castro's power, since Raniro Valdes, the new Minister of the Interior, is one of his close associates. ' Valdes is a Communist, formerly head of Arny G-2. 22. A network of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution is being established to provide an additional agency for political surveillance ana control. What these cormittees lack in professional . conpetence, they cake up for in pervasiveness and zeal. The Rebel Youth have been particularly active in pronoting their formation. The onnounced goal is 100,000 committees with over a million nen- bers covering every community in Cuba. If Castro Were to Die 23. Fidel Castro's personal prestige and popularity were indispensable to the regine in the earlier stages of its developnent.
SECRET None of his lieutenants could have inherited the personal authority which he then exercised. His loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would certainly have an unsettling effect, but | would probably not prove fatal. The Revolution is by now well institutionalized; the regine has firn control of the country; its principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a connon danger . Indeed, a dead Castro, incapable of impulsive personal interventions in the orderly ndnini stration of affairs, night be nore valuable to then as a uartyr than he is noOW . 2h. The fact remains that Castro has had to control tensions, jealousies, and conflicts cf interest and purpose anong his prin- cipal lieutenants: Raul Castro, the head of the arned forces; "Che" Guevara, the director of industrial developrent; Nunez Jinenez, the director of agrarian reforn. There could be a falling out anong then at Castro's funeral. There would alnost certainly be a struggle for power anong then afterward, which night break into the open. - 10 « SECRET
SECRET 25. A coordinated estimate of the Cuban situation and prospects, NIE 85-62, "The Situation in Cuba," is scheduled : for USIB consideration in January. FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: Chairnan # li - SECRET