Date : 08/06/95 Page : Ll JPK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM eee en eoen re mam mse nee cue ren ae om ene once core bam Gea es cna Oe AO TD OR EO EST et ta rue rer ar oem a a ey cane Arte at wee mre UR ee came i eo Sem ie mene cont eu caw ear rant ay winx aes cam eam rom m= Mam er man cure aE wT BEN rE em war HAR Oe AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10044 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-02 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : EISENHOWER, JOHN 5.D. Peleased under the John TO ¢ Kennedy TITLE : WSsassination Records DATE : 07/18/75 Ollection Act of 1992 PAGES : 24 (44 050 2107 Note!. SUBJECTS :. EISENHOWER, JOHN S.D. ase#iNWU 53244 Date: Neé—-14-2017 U2 CASTRO, FIDEL DOCUMENT TYPE :; TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 1B CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/21/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 2 eee we en ere cee ee ee ea ke ee oe a On ee ee Oe en ee Ha fc A A Ne tr ht ek meh rs me thse ae ry am can un at mm ry eas crag ae ERE mE eh lee At HW 53244 Docld: 3242735432 {R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 1
a ol. 2 OF 3 to Criminal Sanctions Ohe United States Senate K56/ Report of Proceedings INVENTDAIEDY e/a Av_._ £9 { ss - | Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Priday, July 18, 1975 Washington, D.C (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 544-6000 HW 532744 DBocld:3242735432 Page 2?
A 8 ° 2 1 CONTENTS i 2 || TESTIMONY OF PAGE F “& John S. D. Eisenhower 2 a | iH . EXHIBITS 5° 4 ~ ll NUMBER . 6 | — - | EBdsenhower No. 1 17 ? | —_ , 9 : f - 11 WARD A PAUL HW 53244 Docld:324273432 Page 3”
shelburne nash 8 EXECUTIVE SESSION Friday, July 18, 1975 Prone [Ares 207) $44 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental . Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D. C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:05 p.n., in Room S. 407, the Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding. _ Present: Senators Church (presiding), Huddleston, WAHD A PAUL Tower and Schweiker. Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Elliot Maxwell, Michael Madigan, Frederick Baron, John Bayly, ‘and Elizabeth Culbreth,:.Professional Staff Members. HW 532744 DBocld:324234352 Page 4
HW 535244 Prone {Area 202) 544-6000 WARD © PAUL Docld: 32423432 ag eyets ade | The Chairman. The hearing will come back to order. Mr. Eisenhower, would you please stand and take the oath? Do you swear that all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Eisenhower. I do. TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER - Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Eisenhower, I understand from your conversations that you want to make a statement, and as I told you, we always go through a procedural matter in the first Place, which is, first would you just state your full, name and address for the record. Mr. Eisenhower. John S. D. Eisenhower, 111 White House Road, Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. Mr. Schwarz. And then the second thing is, as I told you, we always ask all our witnesses if: they know that they have a right to counsel, and so forth. ; Mr. Eisenhower. I am aware of that, Sir. Mr. Chairman, my opening statement or my whole statement is first of all to say how delighted I am and how complimented I am that you all allowed me to come here. My motivation, of course, is that I understand that a lot of the testimony that is before this Committee is getting into matters of a somewhat conjectural nature, and perhaps Page 5
I could throw a little bit of light and make a consideration to it. I am most appreciative to have the opportunity to come, brane (Area 202; $44-6000 as I know you all are busy. I realize that in a situation like this the only prob- ‘lem that I am addressing, of course, is the possible Presiden- tial involvement in any planning, say, the latter part of 1960, planning for the assassination: of any individuals, not : only thinking in‘ terms of heads of states or governments, but any individual at all, Presidential involvement. . I realize that I would be somewhat of a suspect witness in a case like this, being the son of the President at that time. WARD A&A PAUL But I would justlike to give a couple of facts that might have a bearing. The facts are that to a very lagge extent throughout our adult years my father -- is that the correct terminology? -- confided in me to a very large degree. As an example, in July of 1945, the evening he returned from the Pottsdar. Conference to Frankfurt, he told me .about a new bomb they had invented thatmight shorten the war but which might have some terrible consequences, namely, the atomic bomb, which was dropped sometime after that. 7 Of course, you realize that this was secret. Whether ne was correct in telling me things like that or not I don't know. But it is factual. HW 532744 Docld:32423432 Page 6
5 | YOu have seen Mr. Gordon Gray, you have seen General | Goodpaster. And when you have me as a third of the trilogy, yau | + Prone {Area 202) 544-4000 | will have all of the witnesses who were staff officers who had | access to the President in the latter half of 1960 on national security affairs. As such, I was told by my father of the U-2 in 1956. This ° i is four years before it went down. From the time of reporting ” to the White House in 1958, as General “Goodpaster's assistant I was shown the flight plans of the U-2 up until the time that the U-2 went down May 1 of 1960. I say all this only to establish that the relationship between my father and I in confidences was. very close, par- ticularly during that period. And that is my first point. WARD A PAUL And’ the second is pure and simple, thatnothing -- and, of course, my exposure to the White House -- can be construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowl- edge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans. I wouldn't say for one moment that there weren't plenty of plans being dreamed up in various agencies. I was a member of the Joint War Plans in the Army Staff, Army General Staff we made contingency plans for all sorts of things. Like the umpire said, they ain't nothing until I call them. “And to the very best of my knowledge absolutely nothing came- to the White House. | | And I said in a letter to Senator Schweiker when I was —¥FOP-SEECRET— HW 532744 Docld:324234352 Page 7
PPB ie RENN Vigne Pima ay Pal OT contemplating requesting this opportunity that I would trust that I haven't gotten so blase over the years that something like an assassination plan would have slipped my memory. Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 That is the end of. my statement, sir. The Chairman. Mr. Sehwarz, do you have any questions? Mr. Schwarz. . Your opinion is that if your father had been:‘told about any CIA activity with respect to Mr. Castro, and specifically with respect to Mr. Castro and the Mafia, that he would have told you, and that your testimony is that he aia not tell you? Mr. Eisenhower. My testimony is that he did not. My conjecture, based on the other things he has told me, is WARD & FAUL that in all likelihood he would have. But that is only conjecture. Mr. Schwarz. I think when we talked ‘on the phone you said something further in support of that conclusion, unless “I am mixing up something that General Goodpaster said, which had to do with your father's attitude toward the control of the Central Intelligence Agency after the U-2 incident. | Mr. Eisenhower. My guess is that you got that from General. Goodpaster. But General paster and I -~- after all, I sat as far away from him as 1 am from you for two and a half years, or 27. months, going in -- either he or I went. in to see the President when we were buzzed for on those things. So, quite logically I think that General Goodpaster's HW 532744 DBocld:32423432 Page a
HW 535244 Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL DocId: 32423432 and my thinking might be very much the same. And, of course, “after the U-2, when you have something. like that, I think it is only natural that you keep a little bit of a jaundiced eye on the organization which has done this. So we made a real point, never to let anyone, even the Secretary of State, get in to see the President unless one of us were there. We were not according this privilege with Secretary John Foster Dulles. Mr. Schwarz. In the earlier years?» Mr. Eisenhower. But those are earlier years than the years we are covering here. When Secretary Herter took over in the spring of 1959, General Goodpaster and I tried an experiment. We tiptoed in behind the Secretary of State when he went into the Oval office and we got away with it. And from that time on we monitored everything. I saw the document we talked about on the telephone, I saw the document that indicated 10 minutes where the Presi- dent was alone with Allen Dulles on the 25th of November 1969. If I had not been made aware of that, or discovered it myself going through those same black books that you have, if I had not been aware of that, I would have testified to the best of my knowledge and belief that the President never _ Saw Allen Dulles alone. Page 9
g < 3 1 3 2 a : . 5 6 7 & y r- - le ony WARD A PAUL if on. Cc € ¢ ‘3 i 3 4 uw ww . @ £ HW 532744 Bocld: 324235432 tea Page 10 7 Mr. Schwarz. We also talked on the telephone about -- I told you the nature of the testimony. We have heard from an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency who said that the had no knowledge of such a meeting, but that he assumed that Allen Dulles would have spoken to your father about the Mafia activity, and that the nature of that conversation would have been speaking in riddles or circumlocutious form. And I believe we discussed your opinion as to whether your father would tolerate a discussion which was circumlo- cutious. It is a confusing question, because your opinion is that no such conversation occurred. But. getting down to testing the way in which the person who has testified described ‘it, and the elements he has put into it, can you cast any light on that? Mr. Eisenhower. Now,. we are getting into an area of conjecture in which my testimony would be suspect. It is very much conjecture. And I would like to point out that if I were in the position of anybody in this type of operation, I would certainly have assumed, rightly or wrongly, that I had some sort of authority from above before I went ahead and dia such a thing. I think it is Only logical that this gentleman who was testifying would assume that he had some authority. That is a pretty big burden to take on yourself. You say, look, it was my idea, and I just went ahea! and did it.
That is one part of the conjecture. The other part of the conjecture having to do with my ne (Area 267) 544-6000 father's way of doing things, I think I could say with a ome certain amount of assurance that he was never cute, cute was one thing he was not. And being circumlocutious and saying one thing and winking at you was not his way of doing it. Something might get past him. But that is not the way you make decisions to mount assassination plots, and especially the details of it, no way. “Mr. Schwarz. Do you have an opinion from your knowledga of your father as to how he would react to any suggestion that the U.S. ought to employ the Mafia? Mr. Eisenhower. Well, highly negative. I would say WARD A HAUL this, that his viceral reaction to the Mafia -- he didn't care for that kind of thing. ‘Now, if you have to do something -- I don't know whether that would stand in the way ornot. I have in mind -- look at Darlan in November of 1941. There was nobody more despised in the Western World than Narlan was. But Dad had to deal with him for a short period of time in order to get the French to stop fighting in North Africa. I don't think I could really contribute much to that question. Mr.. Schwarz. I just have one final question. We have been wrestling with certain language in minutes. HW 532744 Docld:324234352 Page 11
f And this is one minute of -- were you shown this minute? Mr. Eisenhower. Yes, sir. Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 Mr. Schwarz. <-- of a minute of a meeting on September 2, 1960 of the National Security Council. And you were present in your capacity as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, I think. Mr. Eisenhower. That is listed here, yes. Mr. Schwarz. Now, on the 15-page of the memo there is a discussion of Mr. Lumumba in the Congo, in fact it starts on the 14th page. And at the end of the first paragraph of page 15 there is this language: "Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and WARD & PAIN. remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of". I suppose you don't have any recollection of that meeting? Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't have a direct recollection. I remember in general terms that the U.S. position was very much anti-Lumumba, there is no question about it. Mr. Schwarz. Focussing on those words, do you take the words “disposed of" as intended to mean an assassination? Mr. Eisenhower. No, I don't. And I wouldn't be too surprised -- in other words, I have no quarrel with this document. This document fits in pretty much with any recollcc- tion of the atmosphere. Now, I would not be surprised if the words “disposed of" HW 53244 DBocld:32423432 Page 12
10 are accurately reported, that those were the words that Mr. Dulles used, I would not be surprised by that. But unless ane (brea 202) 544-6000 it is some Freudian, I would not conjecture that the words >. “disposed of" meant an assassination, if for no other reason than that if I had something as nasty as this to plot, I wouldn't do it in front of 21 people -- I counted the number present before the meeting -- and I wouldn't have quite that broad an audience if I were talking about assassinating some- body . The Chairman. Any questions, Mr. Smothers? Mr. Smothers. Is it your testimony that between you and the General that all activities of the President were monitored, that you were monitoring both phone calls and Py 3 « ‘ < c z < 3 visits and everything that went on in the Oval office? Mr. Eisenhower. Essentially, yes. I think I so say -- unless you could find some little exception some place, any-. thing having to do with national security, which would involve State, Defense, AEC, CIA primarily, USIA, anyone from any of those departments or agencies that went into the Oval office, either General Goodpaster or I went. Mr. Smothers. Let me take it a step at a time. First of all, if there was a phone call, did you monitor the phone call? Mr. Eisenhower. No, sir. But Mrs. Whitman did sporadical:: AS a matter of policy, she monitored the phone calls. She HW 532744 DBocld:324234352 Page 13
ll didn*t catch them.all, they might have been doing something else. Prone (Area 20?) 544-6000 Mr. Smothers. That is what you mean by monitoring, she listened to the phone calls and gave you a memorandum or transcript? Mr. Eisenhower. She didn't give the transcript to me, she made it for herself. And Mr. Kelley can give you more details on this than I can. He has been looking in Abilene. She would put in the files a day's phone calls -- Cliff Roberts called from Augusta National and he said this and. that. And then this might be an official thing on that, which makes it difficult to clear the papers out of Abilene. I WARD & PAUL would not say that her records are complete, but they were as complete as she could take memoranda. The Chairman. Did she do this pursuant to the Presi- dent's instruction? Mr. Eisenhower. Oh, yes. AS a Matter of fact, that is not an unusual habit, I don't think, in government. Mr. Smothers. I wasn't suggesting that there was anything unusual about that or your going in to the President. But was it your feeling that no one talked to the President L Meats about national security until you were fully aware of the Sk e contents of that discussion? Mr. Eisenhower. There would certainly be leaks in th» S10 Fast Stree system, no question about it. For example, after the Presiden: HW 532744 Docld:324234352 Page 14
got back to the second floor of the White House in the even- ings, his telephone calls would not be monitored. So some- Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 body could sneak in. If somebody was going to make a plan to assassinate somebody over the telephone at six o'clock in the evening, at the cocktail hour, my conjecture is that that is not very realistic. | Senator Huddleston. Maybe that is where this plan was hatched. Mr. Smothers. I assumed that maybe you didn't go to the golf course -- or maybe you did? Mr. Eisenhower. I was there most of the tine, but not all. But Allen Dulles didn't go. Mr. Smothers. Are we saying, then, that -- I ama little 2 2 < a e c c < 3 bit disturbed by the notion that if anybody did it it was Allen Dulles, and he must have come in at a time when the office wasn't covered I think as I understand your testimony the gist of it is that this is not the kind of thing that your father would have had agreed with, and to the best of your knowledge there was no opportunity at least for any extensive consideration of this kind of option. Mr. Eisenhower. There could have been none, extensive -- Mr. Smothers. To eliminate all would, of course, require us to have some control of every possible contact, and I don't think you are doing that, are you? Mr. Eisenhower. We had it pretty well plugged up, but a HW 532744 DBocld:324273432 Page 15
not perfectly, pretty well plugged up. Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Tower? Prune (Area 202) 544-6000 mo, [im 4 ' Senator Tower. No. a , b, The Chairman. Senator Huddleston? _—_—e 6 Senator Huddleston. Just a couple of questions, Mr. i ” ; Eisenhower. . & ; To your knowledge, did President Eisenhower ever call yy the Director of the CIA and give them specific instructions + on any subject or any operation? Mr. Eisenhower. You say do I recall it? No. Senator Huddleston. YOu -do not recall it? Mr. Eisenhower. No, I do not. WARD & PAUL Senator Huddleston. Or any other person in the CIA? Mr. Eisenhower. He would have dealt ‘only with Allen Dulles or General Cabell. But the nature of the CIA operations is such, or was such, that it is not the kind of thing that the President dreams up and says, well, we will get the CIA to do this. Maybe that is in conflict to some of the foes? oe things that have happened since then. But I have no recollecs- tion of any time in which the President took an initiative olf. Weysminge asking the CIA to do anything. Senator Huddleston. But you would say that it would be ~ inconsistent with perhaps, number one, President Eisenhower's T1O Furst Streen SF. characterization the way he would operate, and inconsistent HW 53244 DBocld:324273432 Page 16
HW 535244 Prone (Area 202) $44-6000 4 2 < ry < oO: 4 «< z DoclId: 32423432 i | with the operational procedure that prevailed at the White. House for him to directly call the CIA direct or any of the Director's subordinates issuing any kind of an -- Mr. Eisenhower. That would be inconsistent with his habits, yes. And also an operation of this size, or this significance, I can't imagine that being done without consult- ing with the Secretary of State, or somebody. One thing, his philosophy, which .I know quite well, was that no man is indispensible, and so killing somebody off is not going to change the situation that much? For example, when we were on this 11 nation trip in December of 1959, the Presidential aircraft had to go through a little 80-mile corridor between the Soviet Union and Iraq. And Iraq was extremely unfriendly at that time. And there were some people saying, isn't it a little dangerous for you, President, to be tightrope walking through this 80-mile corridor? And he said, the silliest thing in the world they could do is knock off the President of the U.S. He just’ laughed at it. He didn't regard assassination as a feasible way of doing business, because somebody else would step in, and maybe the fellow who has been assassinated becomes a party. .Senator Huddleston. Prior to the U-2 incident did the President ever express to you or General Goodpaster any concern about activities of the CIA whether or not some of Page i?
the things they did had a- high risk potential or might get the country into trouble, or might get the Presidency into Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 trouble? Mr. Eisenhower. No. To the best of my recollection, I don't remember his saying anything like -- for one thing, on the U-2, he may have said something like, this thing is not going to go on forever -- he may have, I don't know. He did have -- and I am sure that you have all the reports of the,Committee -- an intelligence monitoring committee, or whatever you call it. I. remember Mr. Leavitt was one of the members of it. They were former public servants -- they were sort of a advisory committee, and they met with the Director of the CIA. And they had recommendations for the im- provement of CIA procedures, namely, improvement in adminis- - P] < a 6 fe) « < 3 tration, because an administration outfit like that really: means that A knows what B is doing, which did not seem to be always the case. And I remember ver well that the Committee was critical of the CIA operations, and the recommendations were completely rejected by CIA -- | Senator Huddleston. Does that preface what the state of mind. or attitude was? $.F.. Wasminaton, OC. 20C07 Mr. Eisenhower. His attitude was that the CI could be doing better, but Mr. Dulles is so indispensible that we have S10 Furst Street, to do it that way. That has to do with the administration. . HW 532744 DBocld:324234352 Page 13
But the administration is part of the operation. Senator Huddleston. So he relied heavily on Mr. Allen Dulles? Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 Mr. Eisenhower. Yes. Senator Huddleston. And he had great confidence in him? Mr. Eisenhower. Yes. Senator Huddleston. Maybe until the U-2? Mr. Eisenhower. Yes, I think the U-2 was injurious to. that confidence. The Chairman. Any questions, Senator Schweiker? Senator Schweiker. Just one, Mr. Chairman. John, after your father left the White House -- 2 > < a e (e) 4 < z we have talked about now mainly your time and his time White House -- after your father left the White House, ever give intimation or indication to you or to any of friends or associates about in retrospect any attempts against either Castro or Lumumba, ever discuss it in any way as far as assassination is concerned, now? Mr. Eisenhower. Senator, I can't recall any of those Mc. Poon! foreign assassinations, I can't recall his ever commenting significantly on that. Fo. Waster, Senator Schweiker. The other question is -- that was the general question about discussing it in any way -- he <b Stemet, G, specifically never, after he left the White House, gave any A110 For indication to you or any of your associates that there was HW 53244. BDocld:324273432 Page 19
any activa participation by the White House or approval by the White House of any kind of an operation? Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 Mr. Eisenhower. In his time, no, certainly. I was just trying to figure if he had any. opinions when Lumumba finally was assassinated, or anything like that. But as far as his own activity was concerned, absolutely not. Now, there is one meeting where he and Lord Hume did some joking, if I remember. I was there. But it was’ all just a big laugh -~ I hope somebody pushes this guy off a bridge or something like that. And as Iremember, Lord Hume said, it so happens that we have lost the technique of old-fashioned diplomacy. And I discount that. I was there. That was during the meeting with the British Foreign Secretary. WARD A PAUL To summarize, with all these caveats and so forth, my testimony is still pretty simple, that I feel if anything like that had been going on, I believe, based on the other confidences that my father had given me, that I would have known about it, and I could testify and he knew absolutely nothing about anything. The Chairman. Thank you very much. (A memorandum was marked for identification as Eisenhower x Exhibit No. 1.) eat Gtrnet, SOP. Wasmepaton, OG 20003 AIN Fs HW 53244 Bocld:32423432 Page 20
The Chairman. The Committee will reconvene at two _o'clock for the completion of Mr. Goodwin's testimony. Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 (Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the Committee recessed, reconvene at 2:00 p.m., the same day.) WARD B& PAUL ¢ ¢ é oe Py) c c & z +3 € rd 3 3 w “ 3S 7 > re ° a HW 53244 DBocld:32423432 Page 271 ,
WW 435244 DoclId: 32423432 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT; Discussion at the 460th Meeting ; of the National Security Council, ; Wednesday, September 21, 1960 Present at the 460th NSC Meeting vere the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); ‘the, Secretary. of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Cotineil Actior’s below vere the © '. Secretary of the Treasury; ‘the Director, Bureau of the ‘Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce { Then 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Pennett) Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for.the President, Export-Import Bank of Washington (Items 1 and,2); and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intel- ligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Secu- rity Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Taczard for the Deyartrent of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency; _ the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White livuse Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC. ; ; There follows a summary of the discussion at the Mecting and the main points taken. 1. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE FAST PETROLEUM (NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, seme subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28,°1960; Nsc GOl1; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August 9 and 29,and September 19, 1960) Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Ertefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this -Memorundum). ; At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's -presentation, tie President said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects for petroleum production in Libya. He had been told that the Lifyan reserves execeded even the Cuhara reserves. He asked ALIA mY COUNCIL Page 2?
kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested departments and agencies to ensure that it ecrves the j}urposes of retarding the growth of the war potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its unity. Noted that, with respect to paragraph 11 of NSC 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materials, equipment, technology and services as can be untlater- ally controlled by the United States may be inposed not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European Sovict Bloc, tut alco to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially With regard to technology and services. —. NOTE: “te action in ‘b'above, as approi subsequently. transmitted. to all: 5+ SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY - Mr. Dalles said -he would first summarize developaents-in ‘the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts. _ to save Tumimba. 3 “7 SEED 3.05 scr is urging. ; y Ghana, and Guinea to concentrate their forees in Leopoldville and bring pressure to ucar for the malntenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister.]Mr.Dulles resarsed that the tvulk of the UAR forees now in the Congo hed been placed advisedly in north Equateur -ProvinzefSile the ° ginea forces were in the northern part. £ Inopolaville Province. . Masser had asked. that | a couneL ville .consisting of the diplomatic i representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The UAR Anbassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Murocco to atte to per- suade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Limenba On Sep- tester 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached fo egreement with Lusnuaba but the latter had later. displayed a piece of paper purporting to be an agreement with Kasavubu. Szeretary Dillion. reported that Lumunba. had requested a Visa fur travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to the Ui and had also requested a visa as an official of the Govern- ment of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. How- ever, if Liununba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a privnte eftiren, wae would have difficulty in turning hla down.Mr.Dtlion added chat “the ‘Congo. Government declares: it will arsest Lumumba he atteapls to iguve the country. . ; , a0 aa HW 53244 DBocld:324273432 Page 23
i @ Mr. Dulles said he believed a.warrant had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears to be the only wan in the Congo able to act with firme: I recent ottempt to ascoosinate Mobutu had failed. Gaim develoyment has been Mobutu's creation or & council of advloers, most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have been turned out of office and their offices have been taken over for the. council,- which is intended to carry.on for a temp- orary period. |: UAMr S Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered a severe: “blow: ‘to its: prestige in the Congo. However, he had — been’: ‘ourprised ‘at. ‘the’ ease with which the Soviets were forced , out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats,after deyarting. from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked r whether the Sovicts were really quitting the Conyo. Secretary Dillon’ said the Soviet press has not yet admitted that the | ne Sovlets shave quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplo- ; oo mats indicated. to the press before leaving “that they would be ne back. - ‘Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets —_— a had not elven up in the Congo.. Mr. Dulles reported that the o Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet  » mirkings which they painted over the Congo markings on their ~~ planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the c ‘Soviet ships off the African coust were apparently awaiting c , a cluriflcation of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the _ effective. power in the Congo for the moment but Lumunba was | id not yet disposed of and remained oa grave danger as long as c.! he was not disposed of. —— Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Inos was still C confising and that little progress had been made toward the settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening situation in Sam Neua Province, hovever, had been quieted as a result of the dispatch of Leotian parachute troops to that area. The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forees could intervene at any time. The problem of the conflicting povernments in Laos is no nearer a settie- ment... The King has requested that General Ouane and General Phawal eall upon him. A sktraish between MhuumL's forces and Vientiane forees has been reported at Tux Sane, tut little vloudshed -resulted. Apparently, Thoumi has adopted tactics of csrrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has Veen fLring across the Mexong River into the eclty and Phount opjarently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile, WP SECKET HW 53244 DBocld:324273432 Page 24
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