* “er 168 - Tur KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION tions coming forward—notably the eptions-sejected or washed out dy bureaucratic compromise and ‘the precise reasons why others were proposcd; 4. to assist the President in his expanded porsonal-role-in-diplomty : speeches, visitors, and foreign correspondence; press contacts and trips abroad; briefings for mectings with his advisers; 5, tare PICRCCHPS UeCiMons=were-executed:—~. oa A man charged with this kind of responsibility ought to be one whose jucement the President would wish to hear, among others, defore he made 2 Ceeision. Kennedy and Johnson cid solicit the views of their special assistants for national security affairs. But the existence of the post emerged ‘rom brute necessity, not as an effort to dilute the powers of the secretaries of state and defense. Kennedy was, from the first, lucid about the mission of his special assistant for national security affairs. He explained it in identical terms to Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and me. He cid not wish us to substitute for the scerctaries of state and Gefense. He was conscious of Franklin Roosevelt's technique of creating overlapp! ng authorities cand profiting from the fric- ton, and he wanted no part of it-Ne-decistorr-intheir-fields"would-be ‘teken-—without—hearine-the two secretaries” ~and-givine~their-advice™ NEARY vyecat, On the other hand, he wanted to ~make-sure-that-he-had-available— a.ihe.pessible.options-before-makang-a-eecisions He was determined not te be imprisoned by the options the bureaucracies might generate and lay defere him. It was the duty of the special assistant for national security alairs to assure that independent statement of the options. Many other functions emerged, but those were our instructions’ in January 1961. Kennedy had initially thought I might take the post of State Depart-: ment planner. For good and sufficient reasons Rusk preferred an old ‘rond and colleague, George McGhee. For ten months I functioned cevaly special assistant to the President for national security aff Tairs. There was plenty for bothCBundy ind me to co. We first. split up the’ crises, He ngorend Bevin, al ‘though I joined in the wacre Goocwin ming + trom the White House end, zt was not an ideal bureaucratic arrangement, especially for Bundy. But the urgency of the tasks, old friendship, mutual respect, and devotion Lo 2.cemmon Doss mace it viable; and there was more than enough for Doth of us to co. [ moved to the planning ‘ob at State when McGhee was wevated to the post of denuty under secretary of state, in a massive reorga- Hon of November 1061, and . Se, ’ reas arse T ELE eS Organization of policy plan- | ‘The Organization of National Security Affairs, 1961 “YT 69 Given the responsib!''ties borne by the United States in the 1960s, T , would guess something much like Bundy’s post would have had to be invented later if it had not been created in January 1961. Jam inclined to thi ink Rusk and McNamara would agree. - _  Bundy’s mission, as it emerged, is to be understood primarily as a substantial expansion of Goodpaster’s role under Eisenhower. He became a major source of advice, as well-as organizer of advice, for the President. But Bundy executed his mission with extraordinary sensitivity to the pre- rogatives of the secretaries of state and defense. He was constantly aware of the need to bring and-hold close together the three critical actors: the President, Rusk, and McNamara. What the bureaucracy saw was the vital new figure, and his livel ly staff, probing, questioning, voraciously gathering intelligence and cables, making sure the President's interests, outlook, and decisions were effecti ively communicated to the bureaucracy. What the bureaucracy did not see was Buncly’s awareness. of the probiems confronted by Rusk and MeNamara, and his quiet actions: to try t to lighten their bur- dens as well as the President's. . A word about planning. As Kennedy came to grips with the ines- capable crises on the national agenda, he interested himself personally in the design of a planning program. Thceplanners-th fonedunctraerstite: with Paul deetser-ane and Robert #& ITC tomate ad gone over carefully and approved a list of nineteen tasks arrayed under five headings, the fourth of which was Kennedy’s own innovation: 1. Problems of military force and policy; e.g., the deterrence of guerrilla warfare. : nw 2. Certain urgent situations; e.g., Berlin, Vietnam. v 3. Foreseeable- problems on which planning and action should beging now in order to exploit the presently available but narrowing range of choice; e.g., reappraisal of our relations with Nasser. ” Ea 4. Potential points of strength where purposeful action might be effective in consolidating or improving our position; e.g. , Turkey 5. Areas ‘re! ating to possible future negotiation with ‘the Sovicf, _ Union; e.g., scientific cooperati on. . pa | Assignments were made to named individuals, in an effort to avoicdg the anonymity and dilution of committee products; and target dates scP for each repor t. The ists were revised with the flow of events, special tashin forces emerging, for example, on Bérlin (under Acheson) and Soutti Korea. By the end of May the list had been expanded to some fift itemsia with eleven subiects se! tected as high priority, which might call for NS
170 THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION treatment or some other form of Presidential decision within two or three menths. The general image of Kennedy’s first days as President is sometimes projected xs one of light-hearted improvisation until the sobering experi- fairs, it was a sober—even somber—time from the beginning, although confronted with a certain visceral good cheer. He once greeted Bundy and me as we came into his office: ““What’s gone against us today?” But it was also a time of planning, of iooking ahead to better days. Some of the planning exercises launched then ran into the sand; others laid the foundations for maior lines of action. Trecail in those eariv days running into a party of four late one cold night, between the White House and the Executive Office Building. The two lead characters plodding through the snow could be identified by the glow of cigars at markedly. diferent levels. They turned out to be the President and his shorter companion, Charles Bartlett, accompanied by a par of men from the Secret: Service. Kennedy, evidently in a cheerful mood, asked way I was working so late. I told him I had a tough boss. riefly sericus, he said he wanted to make sure we in the White House got on top of planning and stayed there. Kennedy, in fact, did enter into ine planning business more deeply in those early days than any other postwar a 3 President. | Military, Arms Control, and Space Policy _BUDGETS AND DOCTRINES ILITARY AND SPACE EXPENDITURES LIFTED SHARPLY IN KEN- nedy’s first year (fiscal 1962). and they continued to rise latter. H \ ts : . oe vt an Ye —siowly in the former case, rapidly in the Space Research National Defense and ‘Pechnology (in billions of collars ) FY 1961 47.4 7 FY 1962 S1.1 1.3 Pe FY 1963 a 2.3 2.6 ™ FY 1964 53.6 - A2 . iy move efense budect came on March 28, 19Gq. a ape vial mes ne ‘ he Con ress roposing changes fr when he sent a special message to the Congress p posing ses FY 1962 outlays. These refiected the bipartisan consensus of the late os : te latel r att + lig } . \ (which McNamara’s initial study of the miitary establishment confirm ns ‘as well as his vigorous new civilian management of the Pentagon! 5 _ The proposed net increase of $650 million reflected somewhat overs billion dollars in new outlays and proposed savings for the coming year B! spout $400 milion. ca McNamara moved swiftly to bring the military budget towarcs greagh salie . ~ aes:  eoste F rationality by using two Gevices: the program packages; anc cost beng! analysis applied to each major component of expenditure within th packages. - oy | E
HW 355355 Docld?32423489 Page 23 To: Files From: Frederick Barce.« Date: £44k" 7/7/75 7 July 75: ROSTOW PHONE CONVERSATION Rostow confirmed our meeting at 4:00 at Cosmos Club. Rostow advised that. we read his book: DIFFUSION OF POWER IN the following parts: a) pp.160-170 (Organization of National Security Affairs) esp.169-170_. b) pp.208-221, including his comments on his approach to the second Punta del Este congeeence, which is his post Bay of Pigs approach. On BISSELL: Rostow said he is a close social £hxmm friend of . Bissell's. I asked him to check his personal papers for any references to conversations with Bissell between the election -and late February 1961. He said he believed that his social caldndar would show that he had dinner with Bissell once or twaice trifiamex during that period of time. But he is ux sure that he did not discuss EXECUTIVE ACTION with Bissell. Rostww said that the only. professional contact he had with Bissell during this time involved asking him to write a planning paper on how to & organize the government. fnemx Bissell was a part of the Organization of Planners (@eorge McGee and other planners) with which Rostow would meet.
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