December 1965 | . 04-10095-1051 Introduction: After examining the evidence of Nosenko's. mala fides in the notebook, which I assume to be the. best evidence, although not all of it, I am convinced that Nosenko is a bona fide 4 “defector. rT believe the case against hin has arisen and persisted : because the facts have been misconstrued, ignored, or interpreted” | . vod without sufficient consideration of his psychological ‘failings. Pee ‘recommend ‘that the case be reviewed by a new team of CIA officers, 1. _ There are several references in the Nosenko ‘notebook to the ex~ tent and quality of the ‘Intelligence he provided. In ‘the 25 March oo 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of his positive _ intelligence with that of other Soviet Bloc intelligence officers _ a with whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of . | ‘them were consistently better able to provide useful positive intelli- gence than has been Nosenko." Tab D of this same memo states "His | positive intelligence production is practically nil," and later: "viewed overall, however, NOSENKO's positive intelligence production has been 80 meager for a man of his - background, training and position as to cast doubts on his ‘bona fides, without reference ‘to ‘other . criterta." ALL of these statementa are incorrect. Ze There are. three petsons: in the Clandestine Service with the , background and experience to. make this judgment.” ‘Wone. was | ‘consulted ~ “fegarding these: evaluations of Nosenko' 's production ana. access. vALL, agree that they are incorrect. “No KGB officer has’ ‘been able to provide more useful intelligence than ‘Nosenko hass- dntelligence t | : wo bee ween pen eeeiuecsae nacienatie - a on ro ta ‘ Red tent mat Doel
14-00000 usefulness of all KGB officers (perhaps all CL officers) is "practically nil". Golitsyn's was nil. This is apt to be par- ticularly true if a requirements officer is not directly supporting 7 the case officer, as was true in the Nosenko case. Viewed in the proper context, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence production cannot be used in his defense, but neither ean it be said honestly te cast any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides, and the judgment regarding his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counter- intelligence information. | 3. Before commenting on the counterintelligence case against him, I feel there are some aspects of his personality analysis by the psychiatrist which have a much stronger bearing om. the case than is go apparent in the notebook. The psychologist's report is. only mentioned | in passing in the notebook, but it too may shed light on the walidity of evaluations of Nosenko' s counterintelligence | information which bear on his bona fides. The psychiatrist is indirectly quoted (presumably only in part) in the 11 May 1964 status report as follows: "NOSENKO shows significant indications of a serious personality dis- order." "The sociopathic aspect of his character. apparently explains his inattention to ‘objective fact'..." Once these conclusions are reached by competent authority, the interrogator and CI analyst are out of their elements.. It is hardly likely that a person with a serious personality disorder, inattentive to objective fact, will be able to provide the sort of substantial information which would inspire faith in hin. Neither is it conceivable that he would be
14-00000 selected by the KGB to carry out even one of the several vital missions which he is alleged to be on in the West. The substantive evidence that he is not on any mission is given below. / 4. The March 1964 memo to DDP concludes that “Those of us who have worked with Nosenko cannot. accept that he is other ‘than a KGB Plant." This statement is also incorrect. The only officer who worked with Nosenko who has any depth of experfence with Soviet a agents--Kisevalter--does not accept this. ‘Wo doubt. the paychologist and psychiatrist who worked with him would also dissent. Who, then,” accepts this insidious conclusion? Only one of the officers who worked with Nosenko had any prior experience with one of our Soviet agents, and that was not An the field of counterintelligence.. None ‘of the officers was experienced ‘in counterintelligence against “the USSR. The initial judgment that Nosenko was a plant was made by. the officer with the least Soviet experience, a bare two weeks after the initial contact with Nosenko, on the basis of "careful comparison of .NOSENKO's information with that provided by Anatoliy Golitsyn..." ‘ '.This is an incredible conjunction of inexperienced personnel and crucial decision. ‘3. There are. three most important items of information. in Nosenko's 1962 revelations to us. Only two are discussed in ‘the | ' notebook, so I shall begin. my comments on his CI information with . ‘the one which was omitted from discussion: ee C7 ATs eet
14-00000 A. Boris Belitskiy ~ Nosenko told us that this Seviet agent of ours had been under Soviet control since our recruitment of hin. This was startling news to most persons who had worked on this case. We recruited Belitskiy in 1958 and held our second series of meetings with him in London in August 1961. At that time I worked very closely with the case officer and polygraph operator in order to assess =. Blitskiy's bona fides, which had come under suspicion at Headquarters. Upon our return from London, during discussion of the latest Penkovskiy meetings, CSR informed DDP that Belitskiy was considered bona fide ~ by everyone but me. Belitskiy came out to the U.S. in 1962, several months after Nosenko compromised him, but he has not come out since Nosenko's defection. It is inconceivable that the Soviets would build up Belitskiy, get him past the polygraph, and then compromise him. As I pointed out in my October 1964 paper on Soviet disinforma- tion cases, Belitskiy was the first such sophisticated case run against us, and would hardly be sacrificed needlessly just when it was ready , , » "te bear fruit for the Soviets. _B. ANDREY - Nosenko stated that this was the most important U.S. penetration he had heard of in his entire career. . The analysis of - this case in the notebook is very strange, to say the least. The com- parison of Nosenko's information with Golitsyn's shows very clearly that Nosenko'’s information was remarkably accurate and Golitsyn's was entirely misleading! Golitsyn is said in the netebook to have been desk officer for two years on this case! Nesenko stated quite correctly that this agent was a cipher machine mechanic recruited peop te se a or
14-00000 5. in Moscow in 1949-50 and that he left Moscow in 1950; his informa- tion that Kovshuk (alias KOMAROV) had gone to Washington to recontact him in 1955-56 may or may not be true, but it gave the additional clue that Kovshuk traveled alias KOMAROV. It is really surprising that this much information did not lead CI analysts to the agent; the only fact that Golitsyn added to Nosenko's information is that the agent was located in Atlantic. city. | oe The notebook analysis. concludes that there was an agent being hidden by Nosenko'’s information, ‘although most of ‘the evidence giver for this is from Nosenke. The opposite conclusion should be reached by objective analysis of Nosenko's Statements. Nosenko calls the agent ANDREY and Golitsyn calls him JACK. Obviously, the Soviets had two agents and we have found only one so far: even the notebook analysis agrees. Nosenko had no need-to-know on either of these two cases, and it appears that both Nosenko and Golitsyn have mixed them up because of similarities in the cases.. Nosenko's confused version, although less confused than Golitsyn's, is much more important than Golitsyn's, because Nosenko states categorically that as of 1962 the Soviet agent "vorking in the Pentagon at that time provided valuable information on cipher machines and related matters." Instead of hiding an agent, Nosenko is giving information on the agents, one of whom is at large right now! Golitsyn indirectly gave the opinion 7 that the Soviets still have a code clerk in . place when he disagreed with Nosenko about a recruitment attempt in Moscow, but this may be ‘only a dispute about the recruitment time, not the fact. at Se aw ed weed 8, =! Ree
14-00000 Nosenko's conclusive evidence that there were two cases is his identification of Kovshuk as Komarov, which made it possible for us to check visa lists and determine that “Komarov" visited Washington in 1957. Golitsyn's JACK, on the other hand, confessed that the Soviet had recontacted him in 1955. Although Golitsyn did net know specifically why Kovshuk went to Washington, or his alias, he identified "Komarov’s" photo as. Kovshuk. The recontact TOY ¥ officer — in Golitsyn' s story was Yuriy Novikov; the notebook does: ‘not indicate whether Novikov did come to Washington in: 1955. ‘Nosenko was wrong in. one respect--he thought he was identifying one important U.S. penetration, but he actually wag telling us about two! No more time should be wasted in the search for this Soviet agent. C. Surveillance -- The March 1964 DDP memo states that “Nosenko' 8 principal message to us in 1962 and again in 1964 was that the loss of several of our most | productive sources in the years 1958 ‘through 1962 was solely the result of a comprehensive and technically ad- * vanced system of surveillance in Moscow." Presumably this means the loss of Popov. in early 1959 (Nosenko 1962) and Penkovakty in late 1962 (Nosenko 19647). In my opinion this "message" is not nearly as. - important as messages A and B above, although it is important. Although all available sources in our experience testify to the efficacy of Soviet surveillance in Moscow, with special emphasis on Penkovskiy, the notebook chooses to take issue with this Nosenko information. However, no evidence is presented to prove Nosenko oo | Sp sal gl oe came _. Ed
14-00000 poner t a _ wrong. _ The only, argument attempted consists of a ‘grave insinuation about an American: citizen and CIA euiployee, Winters, which was ‘later |, Ghecked and found to be without foundation. The ‘analysis asserts that the Soviet intelligence documents provided by KGB officer ~ Chérepanov in late 1963 support Nosenko' s information about sur- o 7 weillance of sapov. However,- instead of reaching the logical and normal conclusion that these two sources confirm one another, the notebook reaches the opposite conclusion--because they support one con another, they are both suspect. Tf we have no evidence, as ‘is the case “here, what. grounds are . there for contradicting Nosenko? "Presumably the ‘Same as those for. suspecting Winters. -T£ we are Proceeding on. “dntuition at this ‘point, a “it has more than a. touch, of genuine paranoia in it. mS 6. ‘Much is made throughout the notebook about inconsistencies "and discrepancies in Nosenko' s ‘information. This is very ‘important we However, before an experienced interrogator reaches significant et) conclusions about an agent! s bona fides, he must weigh: ‘all of the. “oo payehotogical factors Aavolved. By the time Nosenko' 8 inexperienced _ Anterrogators were: Finished with him, they were of course experienced, oo os but by that time. they were also heavily committed to condemning : “ Nosenko, and the details which ‘they were covering ‘were already so ~ - trivial, antique, or repetitive. that no useful results could be expected. In any agent operation, the case officer must be an i. amateur psychologist, but in dealing with a complex defector, particularly when a professional diagnosis has been made, the
14-00000 ae amateur must step aside. 7. There are several phases or psychological. steps which the Nosenko operation must be divided into. There is no direct relation-_ ship between them, and it is fruitless to compare information from then. The only thread ‘through all of then is the psychiatrist! s assertion that he has a disturbed personality inattentive to objective fact. These primary phases are 1962 meetings, 1964 meetings, and ‘poste-defection meetings. The character of the 1962 meeting is conditioned by whatever motivated him to make contact: the informa~ ..tion he provided is probably couched in terms of his determination to get what he could out of us, but he was not then thinking in terms of a relationship. which would make it possible for us to see through his exaggerated self- ~importance.— The 1964 meetings probably still had some of this attitude behind them, but the positive and negative | ramifications of the contact had been fomenting in his disturbed mind for over a year and a half, and the factors which led hin to actually make the break would probably have disturbed the content and clarity of his information as well. Once he had defected, the disturbed elements of his personality probably were at a crisis level,.as he “had added the need to compensate for committing treason aud to establish himself in: an alien environment; he had not. only to ‘rebuild his entire life, but his. self-respect, ethics, and other aspects of his disturbed personality. When one adds to this the psychiatrist's findings that he is “brutally egotistic", “with no concern for the feelings and interests of others", “undisciplined, narcissistic, and exhibitionistic," it becomes starkly clear that this is not an
14-00000 pone ae come ore cé : individual whose information can be judged by routine standards. 8. Throughout the notebook there is reference to our capability ‘to check on Nosenko's information. It is stated that there has been an “enormous flow to the West. of detailed information on the Soviet - intelligence and security services which resulted from the numerous defections to the West of Soviet intelligence officers and the - successful penetrations \ of the Soviet Intelligence since 1954." The March 1964 DDP memo _ goes so far as to say that “the West acquired so much, information: on KGB personnel, organization and modus operandi that there was very little which the KGB would not consider con- promised in some way..." While it is true that we have had some good defectors in the past, the latter statement strains credulity. If we examine the KGB sources available to us who could have ‘Provided . such information, we find that there were several up to 1955 and then none until December 1961. Since Popov and Penkovskiy were GRU officers, they had little detail to contribute. on the KGB; Goleniewski_ was Polish, so his real knowledge of the KGB was accordingly and under- standably limited. Therefore, as of January 1962, when Golitsyn reluctantly began to. give us ‘information, our enormous "flew of information” on ‘the ‘KGB had been interrupted since 1955, and by far the larger part of it was at least eight years old, as it had come from Rastvorov and Deryabin. Since Deryabin had left Moscow in September 1953, and Rastvorov in July 1950, our best stock of KGB info predated late 1953. Therefore, to say that the KGB would consider almost all of its organization, personnel, and modus operandi
14-00000 compromised to the West from January 1934 up to “Penkovskiy's arrest in October 1962", is a considerable exaggeration. A more balanced Statement is made in the DCI memo of 9 September 1965, which limits the "enormous" reference to 1954. The only defector or agent who might have been in position to provide us any volume of information "on these subjects from 1954 to 1962 was Golitsyn. himself. A better) indication of the state of (our knowledge on these subjects is. Suggested in ‘the March 1964 DDP memo in the form. of a criticism of Nosenko' 8 performance: "...but he has brought out not a fraction (of what would have been easily available to him on such subjects as KGR table of organization, which he knew from 1962 to be of interest to us..." It-is very unlikely that the KGB would equate our 1954 fund of information with Nosenko's 1964 knowledge; the genuinely relevant ‘question is whether they would equate Golitsyn's knowledge with Nosenko's, and that is discussed below. In fact, the March 1964 mémo . later contradicts itself on this point, stating that before the Nosenko defection, we had no contact with KGB officials.over many years. 9. It is not easy to compare Nosenko's information with » “Golitsyn's because the latter broke off contact with us before he was ‘fully debriefed, but the comparison made in the notebook should be valid to the extent that the two men reported on the same subject matter. Most of Golitsyn's service in the KGB was spent in school. His actual intelligence experience consisted of two years on the
14-00000 11 American CI desk from 1951 to 1952, about 6 months on the Emigre CI desk, two years in the field, since August 1955, has been as NATO Reports Officer from September 1959 to April 1960, and CI officer on the American desk from that time through his tour in Finland and defection in December 1961. He left Moscow PCS in August 1960. His significant information dates primarily from his service as a reports officer. Nosenko, on the other hand, is unique as a source Of information on the KGB. His entire 12 years in the KGB has been in Moscow, except. for short TDY trips to Europe and considerable TDY travel through 1962 and 1963 to outlying KGB posts in the USSR. Most of this time he was a CI officer working against tourists, except for 1960-62, against the American Embassy. Therefore, his information on KGB Headquarters is. almost four years later than - Golitsyn's, and should be correspondingly better. 10. A number of assumptions are made in the notebook about "that specific area of knowledge which NOSENKO should have possessed LE he had occupied the particular KGB positions at the particular times he claimed.“ As outlined in the paragraph above, our insight - Which would even theoretically permit such assumptions is dated 1954 at best. Does this give us firm grounds for reaching reliable con clusions about the access afforded by a KGB position? The most difficult problem for analysts in the Soviet sphere is to translate themselves into the Soviet environment. Outside the Clandestine Service it is rare to meet an analyst with a realistic concept of the USSR; most of them go on the assumption that American analogies
14-00000 . states, “loss of ops funds is a terrible offense in Soviét eyes...' 12 are applicable to the Soviet scene. From our own operational experience we have learned to be quite wary of assuming knowledge of specific aspects of the Soviet target. Since our basis for making assumptions about Nosenko's job is ten years old, that would suggest that Deryabin or Rastvorov would be as competent as any of us to judge Nosenko, KRowever Deryabin betrayed his prejudice when he made the snap judgment that Nosenko was "phony" after he had been “briefed on the mere facts of the Nosenko case..." Such horseback | judgments do not inspire confidence; Deryabin's competence to sit in judgment of Nosenko [is further analyzed below. Another example of faulty projection into the Soviet situation in the notebook concerns the $250 in operational funds which Nosenko misappropriated in Geneva in'1962. In the March 1964 memo it is stated that the amount of money was “only about! $250 and he could. certainly have made up this deficit through either of two close a friends (another is added elsewhere) who were present in Geneva at the time..." Aside from the fact that the notebook tries to prove elsewhere that neither of these persons was really a close friend, the weakness in this assumption is obvious. As the March 1964 memo ? “Does any of us consider $250 to be a paltry sum? If we had. misappro- priated such a sum would we want our best friends or superiors to know about it? Even in an emergency, most of us would probably go to extremes to avoid embarrassing a friend by such a request, or exposing our weaknesses to a friend. However, the psychiatrist has already given us evidence that Nosenko was not the kind of person
14-00000 Pad an ee tate I 13 who makes friends, so the notebook is probably correct in its ‘alternate finding that the persons in Geneva were not friends in the best sense of the word (the money-lending sense). Nosenko had no place. to turn, ,particularly when one adds his need to indulge himself, which has been confirmed by the psychiatrist, Golitsyn, our own experience with hin, our knowledge of Soviet VIP sons, and his own admission. Our ignorance of the specific background is another factor in weighing the significance of the ops funds vulnerability question. How many times had Nosenko misappropriated funds previously? How had he made up the deficit before? What would be the rationaliza- tion of the situation in the case of a disturbed personality such as b.: his? | | Throughout the memos and other documents in the notebook there is a stream of consciousness discussion of Nosenko's career, first ‘providing evidence and conclusions that he had certain positions, ~ later evidence and conclusions that he did not, and so forth. This uncertainty even goes so far as to suggest, even to conclude, that , Nosenko is not even Nosenko! Gradually, the case was built up again that-he is in fact Nosenko. There are several ways to read this confusion, but the psychiatrist's findings show the path’ to the correct understanding of it. It is very difficult to deal effectively with a disturbed personality, and it is not surprising that the SR ‘people working with him found him confusing. “However, Golitsyn confirmed that Nosenko worked where he said he did, even that he was a "skirt-chaser", many of his agents confirmed his employment in the
14-00000 * 4 Become a} 14 KGB, and Artamonov could have confirmed that he was Nosenko if he had been asked to do so. The inability of our personnel to see the facts through Nosenko's stories which were “inattentive to objective fact" is not necessarily a reflection on them, but neither can it be _ used with confidence to support serious accusations against Nosenko. The evaluation of an agent on personality or "eyebali~to-eyeball" grounds is extremely precarious. In fact, the one Nosenko interrogator with Soviet agent experience was involved during the same time period with just such a judgment on another agent, in which he, and another of our best and most experienced case officers, as well as the polygraph, proved to be absolutely wrong in their assessment of the agent. Many of our Soviet agents and defectors have been unbalanced. This observation applies to Penkovskiy, it applies to Nosenko, and it applies to Golitsyn, and to Krotkov; Deryabin's long siege with alcoholism shows that he was not entirely exempt. Treason is indeed a grave decision, even if committed in » steps, as Nosenko did it, and the defector does not become 100 percent ‘American and 0 percent Soviet when he crosses the border. | The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona fides, as the notebook indicates, must be based on his production--how,much did he hurt the Soviets. The evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet intelligence effort more than all the other KGB defectors combined. The specific elements of this damage are as follows: A. Belitskiy~-The evidence is stated above; this was the pinnacle of the Soviet disinformation achievement. Once Nosenko had con- promised it, as I pointed out in my October 1964 paper, all other
44-0000 15 similar agents are unmasked. B. ANDREY-JACK--Although Nosenko‘s information was precise on one of these two agents, and Golitsyn's was largely incorrect, Golitsyn is inexplicably given the credit for our discovering the agent. This agent was no longer active, but this is small consolation, as he had been a cipher machine mechanic, and details of. cipher machines have value well beyond their date of manufacture. oe More important, Nosenko assures us that another agent is still providing the Soviets such. information. All the wrong data Golitsyn ” provided may actually apply to the agent who has not been apprehended. CG. Vassall--Nosenko is given credit for the apprehension of Vassall-- _ this alone is sufficient to establish his bona fides. Information on Western naval matters, particularly Polaris submarines, is undoubtedly top priority for Soviet intelligence. It is completely out. of the question that a source with any potential for reporting on this ‘subject would be terminated even an hour before he had to be. The only substantial clue that Golitsyn gave us on Vassall was that - British Admiralty documents were being received in the KGB Reports Office in 1959. It is not surprising that CI officers did not dis- cover Vassall on this slim lead, since it could have beeh assumed that the documents came from the Lonsdale-Cohen-Houghton net com- promised by Goleniewski. It borders on fantasy to reach the con- clusion that the Soviets would compromise Vassall to us over 6 months after Golitsyn defected on the assumption that Golitsyn had con- promised hin. In fact, it is fantastic! oor oe S peat
14-00000 le omy ee ee ee ee 16 D. Johnson--Nosenko is quite right in asserting that this is one of the best leads he gave us. If it were not for him, this agent would still be operating against us. The memo to the FBI makes a strenuous effort to demonstrate that this was a troublesome case for the KGB and that there were security weaknesses in it. That is the kind “ of trouble we would love to have--this agent had access to some of the highest-level information available in NATO, which is to say, U.S. plans for war in Europe. His rank, experience, clearances, and tradecraft ability qualify hin as the best possible type of agent. The KGB undoubtedly had great hopes for his future access. If the _ complication of his wife's disturbed personality had constituted. a genuine threat to the operation, the Soviets probably would have arranged for her to have an "accident". They may well have con- sidered this and concluded that she was a valuable component of. Johnson's motivation. The only straightforward reason that the memo to FBI gives for the Soviet willingness to compromise this - Operation apparently is Soviet fear of its being blown to the French. Isn't this pretty weak? “of course. Nosenko's knowledge of this case is questioned on the grounds that it is a violation of ‘the “usually effective KGB ‘Security compartmentation", yet we have said earlier that most of Golitsyn' 8 valuable information consisted of things he “had no right to know". _E. The KGB--The March 1964 memo states that "Nesenko's production has been most useful in those areas which the KGB must consider already compromised (KGB organization, general methods and
14-00000 Bere ae techniques, Headquarters personnel) or expendable (names of per- sonnel who do not work abroad, etc.:)..." After considering the five cases cited above, it is impossible to agree with this. This sentence is also contradicted by the facts given above on the unique nature of his access and the paucity of reliable information on the KGB since 1954, excepting Golitsyn, who served in an entirely different directorate from Nosenko. In fact the memo states that Nosenko's information on his directorate was far more detailed than Golitsyn's,- and most of the 240 names he gave us were previously not known to us. To assume that the KGB would ‘consider Nosenko's information con- promised is to find them unaware of their own defectors or grossly ' wrong about our knowledge of the KGB. The criticism that he does not know (or remember) enough about CIA personnel in Moscow in- corporates another large assumption; perhaps we have made some - progress in concealing our people from the KGB. They may make errors in identifying AIS officers just as we do on the RIS. F. Foreign agents--No Soviet defector has identified as many Soviet agents as Nosenko. He identified 73 past, present, or developmental American agents and 97 foreigners in the same categories. The arguments ‘ employed in the memo/deprecate Nosenko's list of agents Uo not provide evidence that he was wrong or that it: is incomplete, but: lean heavily on the fact that we knew most of them or that they are not important. Thank God for something. However, the fact that we may have known or suspected most of them is irrelevant, particularly when our basis for suspicion was derogatory information. If this were used as a
14-00000 whether the Soviets would be willing to give them all uy- '1962 info can be judged remarkable, it is only.in the gen we primary basis for suspecting people of being Soviet ages**- eeveral thousand more persons. could qualify. The significant epeeeee 2n evaluating these agents is whether the Soviets knew thay #* *©7% already aware of these ‘agents. The. next logical step 1# judge GaSe way of looking at this aspect is to assume that’ they are our #2*9%5 in the USSR, rather than theirs in the West, and then calculate 2O¥ many of them we would be willing to compromise to the guvv7#tF- Out of the 170 on our list, I doubt that we would surrender #+** than half a dozen. Unless they are going out of business, ne i EREe would the Soviets. On the basis of the table in the memo, there 41% evidence to indicate that “only about 15 of 170 were cereatnr7 known by the KGB to be compromised to us. The old argument, peat colitsyn said it first, is repeated in the memo in respect to Nosenkn’s 1962 information: "There was a remarkable correlation between tHe EVO. sources, giving the distinct impression that NOSENKO was 74 fact — reporting from the KGB" 8 damage assessment on GOLITSYN’ # Aufection.' The same claim is not made about the list of agents which xesenko provided, as only 8 of the 170 were confirmed by Golitsy# "2 informa- tion. If the correlation of Golitsyn's information with “gagenko's pat Nosenko reported useful details correctly while Golitsy# a6 COR sistently wrong. This is understandable, since most of thse 18 points of information fall into the category of things G4 ERE YO yA fet “had no right to know" > and which therefore probably wot
14-00000 ‘discovery of the large number of mikes in the Embassy. Once again, — 19 G. Microphones in U.S. Embassy--Of the 3 points of the 18 on which 'Golitsyn provides better or contradictory information, one concerned Golitsyn's desk directly and was logical for him to know. The other two concern bugs and SIGINT equipment in the American Embassy. The major contradiction deals with bugs, Nosenko stating that the new. wing had none and Golitsyn stating that a lot of money had been spent arranging audio coverage of the new wing. Examined carefully, -these statements are not contradictory. Lots of plans end up in the trash. Golitsyn goes on to say that Embassy bugs were still active. in 1961. It is clear ~ that. this statement does not refer specifically to the new wing. which was built in 1960-61, and not occupied until 1962. Although Nosenko was the third source to identify a microphone in the minister-counsellor's office, it was his specific information on locations of | numerous other mikes which ultimately led to the . ‘ his was the information which was critical to our security, but he does not get the credit. In fact, once he had given us the key data, a all other embassies in Moscow with which we are friendly could use ‘our experience to detect ‘mikes in their embassies, thereby denying “the Soviets additional intelligence. The Soviets would hardly sacrifice all this! Although we.found a few more microphones than we knew of, they were all compromised as soon as we found the first cable and followed it around the building. Nosenko stated that there were no mikes in the renovated north wing, and he was right. Whatever we found in that wing resulted from his information. Nosenko's service in the American Embassy section from 1960-62
14-00000 i in oy 20 should have made him knowledgeable at least of CI aspects of this subject. The mikes were not the responsibility of his section, nor was the intelligence produced. So far as the entire 18 points _ go, Nosenko's information is unquestionably more complete and accurate in the main. The Cherepanov papers, delivered to the American Embassy in November 1963, are said to support Nosenko's story of his career and he vouches for them. Logically, they are both valid, but this is not accepted. Along with considerable anuendo and insinuation, the March 1964 DDP memo calls the papers the “Winters Papers". Since Winters was examined and cleared after this memo was written, the arguments against the validity of these papers lose cohesion, at least, and should be redrafted if they are to make any sense at. all (if not for sake of decency). The only other serious argument given against the papers relates to KGB resources for writing and _ handling documents. Since only Nosenko and Golitsyn are accessible and knowledgeable on such procedures in the modern KGB, Golitsyn's ' comments would be appropriate, but the comments used presumably are 10 years old, from Deryabin. The conclusion that the papers are of no value to us is irrelevant, as long as the individual tho gave them to us thought they were and believed he was hurting the Soviets by handing them over. Penkovskiy's views on the value of what he gave us were often inconsistent with our own. Whatever Nosenko told us, we could not, and did not, pretend to know the identity of every Soviet agent in any country, including the United States.
14-00000 His position in the Counterintelligence (Second) Directorate of the KGB certainly would not afford him such access, since the primary intelligence effort of ‘the KGB is in the Intelligence (First) Directorate for which Golitsyn worked. The aspect which Nosenko could observe ws the narrow one of Moscow, with an occasional incidental, illegal insight through the compartmentation system, which Golitsyn demonstrated to be rather leaky. Krotkov, the agent of Nosenko's directorate who defected in - London in September 1963, has little bearing on the Nosenko case but is mentioned here because it is cited as evidence against Nosenko, although it also supports Nosenko to some extent. There. appears to be good reason to believe, as Nosenko said, that Krotkov was a "ittle crazy". ‘The book which Krotkov wrote gives evidence of personality disturbance, and the hypertension from which he suffers could not be faked, but could well be organic evidence of mental imbalance. The approach of the KGB officer, Lysov, to the FBI in September 1962 also lacks conviction as circumstantial evidence against Nosenko. If a KGB officer were in financial |\straits ~.. involving mishandling of ops funds, the actions of Nosenko and Lysov presumably are characteristic of the primary steps he would take to extricate himself. There may be an operational suggestion here for us, as well as a warning which is echoed in the Dunlap, _ Johnson, and Whalen cases. Another question is posed in the memo concerning the Soviets whom Nosenko has recommended to us for recruitment, particularly V.P. Suslov. There is an obvious answer CAAA wes
14-00000 new operations have been conceived since, such as fiyryPHooN ig to this question, however and that is'to recruit Suslov. The objection that this may be a provocation by the Soviets is not valid, since we are already running a Soviet disinformation agent in the UN. The point is made and emphasized in the notebook that the KGB Disinformation Department was formed in 1959.. This is avery mis- leading fact. As Rastvorov and Golitsyn have reported, there was a . Disinformation Service in the KI, and Golitsyn confirmed that the function continued after the KI dissolved in'1951, although there was no separate element for it. Most of the Soviet disinformation agents known to us were run against us before 1959, and the most sophisticated ones, Belitskiy, (ASbACRON, . and probably [AmeL00, were conceived and $ ~~ executed before 1959. The establishment of a separate Disinforma- tion Department, therefore, appears to have followed the heyday of the disinformation operation, rather than preceded it. . Certainly s ona [Aguasx | and probably others, as indicated by our memos to CSR. on fABDARING and [aghrwes, but the days of the disinformation agent probably have been numbered since Nosenko's exposure of Belitskiy. | . There are a number of references in the case against Nosenko to unidentified "knowledgeable sources" who are quoted making damaging assessments of Nosenko. It is apparent from most such references that the knowledgeable sources meant are’Deryabin and Rastvorov. However, neither of these two KGB officers can genuinely
..be said to have knowledge of the KGB which is applicable to the ‘Nosenko case,since one left Moscow in 1950 and the other in 1954. The most serious assumption affecting Nosenko's assessment are. . those which involve his production. The argument against hin falls apart completely without the continuous application of the assumption ehat he has told us only what. ‘the Soviets knew was already ain our gon hands. ‘This. assumption, in turn, rests” “entirely on our. estimate of ch "the damage assessment which the Soviets ‘probably wrote on 2 Goldtayns This is where ‘the argument loses ail of its force. We have no basis” ” ghatacover’ for making a. reliable itemization of the things which are’ Ww included in the KGB damage assessment ‘except for the ‘documents which | Golitsyn brought with him. We can guess. that the ‘diet includes ae | ‘gist of all documents which Golitsyn ‘gaw while in Finland for the 17 ‘months before he defected. It would be impossible for the Soviets to say precisely what Golitsyn remembered of KGB organization, personnel, ‘and activities since he had left Moscow. It would be absolutely impossible for the Soviets to know what Golitsyn had learned. illegally ' by word of mouth, either while he was in Moscow or after he had gone to Helsinki. The March 1964 DDP memo stated that Golitsyn learned ‘many details about sensitive operations. "which he had no right to know" in this way. ‘Just as it would be impossible for us ‘to make a - . parallel itemization on a CIA officer, even with the complete honesty of all persons who knew him. The. most serious part of the KGB damage assessment probably would have related to Golitsyn' s service as a reports officer on the NATO desk. From what he has told us, it ig apparent that he did not know the names of most of the agents whose ‘ ae : 3 i RA tien ten” 0S ot
i : oe ee ee Glib ete a, “24 reports he handled. He was able to describe subject 1 matter and had — _managed_ to pick up some other operational details, many of them wrong, as in- the ANDREY- TACK ecases.. While the RGB would probably try . to nininize the damage assessment in their report, to: ‘higher sasterters othey would probably maximize it among themselves, but it defies logic. to conclude that: they would send us an agent who. would be able to. ; provide the details which would lead to compromise ‘of producing assets. ‘Neither would We. We would move very “carefully operationally, or even. stand down on, cases where we thought there was danger of comproniee, “but ite our agents survived ‘for a few weeks, or even months, ‘we would | ‘conclude that the storm was ‘past. And the KGB is. ‘probably considerably more coldbloodea than we are when it comes ‘to collecting intelli- gence even in the face of perils. to their agents. Hosenko summed it up accurately when he said that ‘the KGB “would not really know the extent of my knowledge," "It will take many months to look.into these matters, so nothing will change for a long time," and when discussing a case: “they: won't have any way of knowing r know. ‘cer-. tainly the. people who told me won't volunteer the fact.™ ‘The problem | / of the damage assessment, here or there, could not be stated better. Since Deryabin was employed in the Personnel Directorate, he would ‘normally know and remember more about personnel forms and. procedures. than would operational personnel. The latter generally consider all forms and procedures a nuisance and spend : as little time and thought on them as possible. If organizational errors are to be used against Nosenko, they can also be used against Rastvorov,, ag he was one year off on both the ‘formation and dissolution of the KI and, just as
ore: Foie | 25 “Nosenko did, left out the GULAG and other extraneous units when drawing up the organization of ‘the KGB, although he had only been away from the. Center four years when he ‘defected. The evidence which 1 Deryabin uses to support his assertion that he’ can “deny the” “truthfulness « of. ‘various aspects of ‘Nosenko' 8. “story consiete of the kind of trivia on “which few persons could score. well. . Since | Deryabin was engaged in actual intel igence work for less than ‘two years. before his defection in February 1954, and had been: in. the field for the siz ‘months just prior to his defection, his tests of Nosenko _ involve facts at least 11 years old. ‘They are fairly £resh. ‘to - Deryabin' Ss mind because they relate to his last experience in the USSR, but Nosenko" s considerably greater depth of experience naturally has placed so many layers = of information over the. 1952- 53 era that he could not reasonably ‘be expected to: recall ‘the things that Deryabin can. This would become clear 4£ we were toe have a current CIA CI officer debriefed on the same period in CIA by a former CIA FI employee who resigned in 1953. . It has also become clear in a hurried comparison of Deryabin's original reports with his present criticisms of Nosenko. ~ For example, one. of Deryabin's trivial points is that Nosenko claims -his working hours to have begun at 1030; Deryabin agrees with the other details Nosenko gave on working hours. but insists that 1000 was the starting time. Rastvorov confirms in his reports that Nosenko is correct; Deryabin's ‘own reports in 1954 stated that the “working hours were 1100-2100, although he now agrees with Nosenko
14-00000 © **~ asserting that there was a “tenth directorate of the KGB in agsd? 1947, and the combined directorate was ; designated the 9th pireg? ‘could be farther from the truth. When the system was first. that 2400 was closing time. Considerably more interesting is Deryabin' s accusation that Nosenko made an “outright mictakel st - which was called ‘the Directorate. of the Kremlin» ‘Commandant. os Deryabin assures us| in his eriticien of Nosenko that "This — directorate had actually merged with the. Guards. Directorate “in - ea near in 1952, (and has remained so to this day)." However, Deryabin: again contradicts himself in his. 1954 reports as follows: | “thé rt: sah Kremlin Commandant Directorate existed as a separate organizat until August 1953." ” He made this statement at least three time his 1954 debriefings. Deryabin thus disqualifies himself ag a Le knowledgeable and objective. exaniner of Nosenko. With. all the y" a wp HO Deryabin spent in the Guards Directorate, this is a point one we expect hin to remember. These contradictions, and others which’ would probably turn up in a careful examination of the rest of Deryabin's case against Nosenko, are in the area of Deryabin's supposed greatest competence and usefulness to us. It is only logical to find that Deryabin ie also on shaky ground when he- pretends to have knowledge which he never had. The. most obvious” example is his comment on the fact that in giving his military” mailing address, Nosenko included the town name with the field — i ad post number. Deryabin says: “This is yet another mistake, sin-” military postal security procedures prohibit linking the milites” unit number with the location of the unit on the envelope." No*
, 27 _ ~established in 1942, this was the concept, but it soon deteriorated, _. “and almost all Soviet internal military mail after the war contains: both the FPN number and the: place name. Tf Deryabin really, knew the Soviet FPN system, he would have been able to say that the EPH g- | were assigned in blocks at first, and that the 901xx block ‘from vhich “Wosenko! s FPN in’ ‘Sovetskaya Gavan was taken was in a naval ‘block. Te: he had this. ‘real knowledge, he could then say that military Antelli- gence FPN' s connonly contained a zero as one of the five digits. He. could then have concluded that the number Nosenko gave was “in fact a naval intelligence unit. It is. admittedly somewhat easier for us to _ make such an analysis, as we know from an incontrovertible source Meow | that the FPN Nosenko gave was assigned to a naval intelligence unit: in the Sovetskaya Gavan area at the time Nosenko said he was there. Deryabin is not an experienced Soviet intelligence officer. He less than : spent/two years in intelligence work, 17 months at HQ and 5 in the field, two years in military cr at the end of the war and sub- sequently served as a personnel security officer; this is not “much more than a familiarization tour. He is, of course, qualified to comment on Soviet realities ‘in general better ‘than any of us up to . 1954, and to a. gradually decreasing extent ‘since - that time. He is an se adequate, but not fluent, ‘translator. He is a thorough researcher |... to the extent that he has access to. information; his research has” the same limitations as any research--what is written in books or reported by. agents rarely coincides with the objective facts of “human behavior.
14-00000 | atte, 8 TS en gt ad nr mote waonenssauitiiiAle* 2 28 oe, No doubt the motivation, or r thel evolution, of, the motivation, ~ “whieh led osenko. to. defect: is very complex, in. keeping with his’ 8 “personality, disturbance. The same was dramatically true. with, es “Peakovekiy. The 6 same elements which the rational, normal, Person” a “would weigh ‘carefully béfore taking the: ‘road to ‘treason. were Fs  Aenorets fortunately ‘for Us» by: both Nosenks | and Penkovekiy, and 2 “ol perhaps. by. ‘the x rest ‘of the few: important agents and defectors we have, ve ‘Both of ‘then were Protected by high- ~level- general: officers oe and had - i1lustrious family names; both appeared, ‘to be devoted, ‘to ns “their families. ‘This does not mean ‘that. their motivations + were. at Bs “all alike, only that’ ‘the obstacles to changing allegiance. were: roughly | similar. | Nosenko" s° real motivation must: be ‘sought. in his eee | formative years, when, ‘Like. the sons of most Soviet leaders, “beginning with ‘Stalin! s own on, the world | was his for ‘the! ‘asking. a and he took all he ‘could ‘get. ‘Yet, there is a ‘motivational element | a relating | to ‘the “gather in both cases--as an anateur paychologist, T. submit that Penkovekty, was ‘revenging his father, and Nosenko. defected: eee as the ultimate act of rebeilion against his. fe | Assuming that the Soviets were to conceive an operation against oe oe which davolved an ‘RIS officer, what would that officer be ‘Like and. “how would they. prepare him?” “Our experience. with “ttetatcemation agents indicates that they would not prepare him at all in the ‘sense f: _ Nosenko is said to have been prepared in the notebook. - “They would - sélect aman who could not compromise anything, but who ‘also ‘aid not | oe have to invent any significant period or chapter of ‘his: Life. The oe
“wery fact ‘that Nosenko appears: to be. fabricating his past from — Veindergarten, days is ‘the best. evidence that he. is, not a- plant, ares a and good evidence that ‘he ‘ts not fabricating anything at all except * what | is required by his. aisturbed personality. re disturbed per . ae sonality cannot ‘be controlled, so he. is. not. a candidate for 2 dis~.. ©" gnformation’ operation. The candidate would have to. be a legitinate | “officer, for otherwise the KGB would not be. ‘gure that we did not have. a8 penetration of. ‘the KGB or Soviet, governnent who could. tell us all we about the operation, or that we would ‘not soon: have a defector who’, i could tell us that. Nosenko's story was ‘fabricated. “Actually, one. of our best Soviet. agents told us that Nosenko was a legitimate - boo defector and | knew more damaging information than Penkovskiy,. 0 at! Joh 4s remarkable that the case against Nosenko has gone this far. As far as the ‘preparation of the KGB officer disinformation ‘agent: is concerned, it would be thorough and complete.” This rules out aa Nosenko immediately; as he was not able to pass the polygraph oy successfully. , As stated above in the. Belitskiy case, a ‘known dis~ ) dnformation, agent, he, passed the polygraph successfully, ‘in 1961; so it is quite unlikely that the most important disinformation agent ov | wound be sent out unprepared for the polygraph. There is surely a need to study why the known agent: “passed” the polygraph and the _ valid defector (Nosenko) did not. What point would there ‘be in “resistance to interrogation” and “how to conduct ‘himself in. - _ detention” if. he is not trained to beat the box? Another flaw, a serious. one, in the. theory that Nosenko. was prepared by the KGB, particularly on the basis of Golitsyn's ‘information, concerns
7 the tourist (ops document which ‘Goliteyn had brought out with him. SS Wesenko knew that coliteyn: had. taken. this document, but was. not | familiar, with. ate. ‘This would. not be Possible if he had been /) prepared t by. the. eB. ‘Naturally: ‘Nosenke dia not ‘know, Blake. had + sontrdbuted, ¢ to. this. “document-—he_ had no need to y know Along’ with “the” “tendency to: Adentisy Nosénko’ 8 ‘detractors as. © wowiadgeabie sources" ‘there isa corollary whieh casts ‘doubt on Pork _-, sources: who help to: substantiate his | story.” Five of these are vos padd to confirm Nosenke! 's identity. Some. of these: are cited above. S 2 another: significant one” is ‘the 1959 naval defector, Artamonov. “The. language used to describe Artamonov' s comments: on Nosenko is. os | - decidedly hostile, but there ‘is no evidence at all to ‘suspect. bo. Artamonov. Artamonov. ‘made a major contribution to U. Ss. inte1li-. can gence; is highly respected by senior U. Se naval. officers, and is, | the’ most. imgelligent and. vell-adjusted Soviet defector in the ‘west. 7 He was Goliteya! s best friend while Golitsyn: was here, and Goliceyn called hin several times from England, having left both his’ dog Saann “amd: color television with Artamonov. We have: found, Artamonov to 0 be  paghly cooperative with persons: who ‘understand the Soviet system. a “ana completely impatient with those who pretend to such toivtatens = “ge ean ‘probably make much more useful and valid comments on some of (the, points which. Deryabin: was asked ‘to reviews - : Something should be said about Nosenko' 8 memory. All. memories _. are selective, depending on personality, interests, requirements, and other factors. In a sense, nothing is ever. forgotten, but in - practice we can recall only Limited amounts from the sub-conscious.
14-0000 7 a , 7 So + emnne . 5 : . . Pe SaaS , so Sg . Wan ib °, As Nosenko said: “There are. different types of memories." ‘When © a we consider, that Nosenko has identified uP to 200 leads. for. us, “over 400 KGB. officers and. agents, and 127 of 173 Americans in the “ot Se Enbassy in 1960-62,. we ‘must, ‘admit that he has exceeded most’ of. “us in memory ‘capability. In addition to these, he undoubtedly has es “the usual fund of information centering on his family and ‘non~career . ‘lite. ‘et, in examining his production and his statements; we expect’ “him to add all manner of trivia to the immense amount of “information - he has already provided, and we. expect bins to. have it right. = "then. his memory of flying in lobster and vodka for agent projects “4s called “little details." We have not asked as “much of. any other "defector: ‘Ef we did, we would throw them all back. ° Although + we eo . have no place near the agent stable in our past that Nosenko has . ddentified, rt would not be ‘able to come close to ‘the number of oo " ddentifications Nosenko has made, and neither could anyone else. _ Unfortunately for him, what is trivial to him on the inside is "far from trivial to us on the outside, and the same no doubt applies oan the opposite direction. _ Another. ‘factor ‘which affects our evaluation of Rastvorov and Deryabin as judges | of ‘Nosenko is their conclusion. that Nosenko" s . history is such that he could never have ‘been employed by the. KGB. Times have, changed since. they were there, since his employment. is confirmed by Golitsyn, independently by one of our best agents, *- and a number of agents whom he handled. Another curious remark, fo apparently ‘made bY both Goliteyn and Deryabin, is that ‘Nosenko -
, seemed to be giving sarcxmation from the CIA reports they had provided \ ue<. gues 2S. curious on several counts , . because” we ao not show defects zeports: to then, so they would have  ouble t knowing, just weer, ‘they had told us. “ie is also gurdousy ae accepted. at face elses because it would be additional evidence i. phat Nosenko was | provides | accurate: information, to the extent” . that Golitsyn's “ani perzsoin' s reporte agreed with one , snoeast te fact, ‘however, “as reryabin. pointe | out correctly, in part, " Nosenko"s menory 16 ns eS complete: as Deryabia’ 8, so he ‘does - ' not report as aceuratel7 on the KGB up to 1954, ‘when all three: of these defectors weré serving in the KGB concurrently for a few _, montha. Comparison of: sosenko! Ss. and Golitsyn's “reporting shows pare chete reporting overlaps in some respects, but that Nosenko' tg: ts superior in every respect. except French agents and First : _o ‘Darectorate organtaetens There are a number ot contradictions and discrepancies in the notebook analyst? of Nosenko, some of them. quite significant. yo the October: 1964 status report, for example, . makes’ the assertion that “since NOSENKO" # fnisely-clained service ia the American Embassy Section. coincides fairly. closely with the “perted covered " by the “xeB-concocted CHEREPANOY | papers on the same ‘Section’ Ss activities, and nince GOLTTSIN was ‘aware of certain successful or impending operatson® there in this period, the conclusions reached here Amphy tat both the CHEREPANCV papers and the NOSENKO. information are tntanded to cover up penetrations involving personnel stationed fu ihe U. S. Embassy, Moscow _ during the period
14-0000) Fy . ont LTTE ate fea He | eer tee e, 33 from approximately 1957-8 to 1963." The quality of Golitsyn's knowledge has been discussed above. The key word in this very .-eritieal and final Judgment ie "coincide". ; Tt is completely - “false.” The’ Cherepanov papers cover the period 1957-8, to 1960, _— ee while Nosenko' 8 service ‘in the ‘Aneriéan Eabscey ‘Section was. from 3960 & to 1962. ‘Possibly some. other word, was. meant, ‘but ‘the ‘fact. : remains, ‘Cherepanov and Nosenko. did not work ‘in the Section ‘during | the same period of time. .e in fact the ‘two events did coincide, one would have to consider. then both more seriously; it the Soviets _ had sent. Nosenko out, they probably would coincide. As. it is, the Soviets cannot hope to convince us: with some "worthless" papers about surveillance that there were no Embassy penetrations for three years and then feel obliged to send out an agent to convince . us there were none for three more years. .Another case concerns - the assertion that Nosenko tells "pat" stories. — This ‘is not illogical for someone. ‘who is relating gossip or someone else’ S jokes. In the March 1964 meno, ‘some 15 such stories are cited “And the oda thing is that practically every time. he tells the "story, regardless of. the. context or angle of approach to ity, the story comes out in exactly | the same form, with exactly, the same a details given in exactly, the same ways no more and “no less." This is strong language. However, “just a few pages ‘later, with _ equal vehemence, his stories are described as follows: "However, the number and type of contradictions within ‘NOSENKO's- stories go far beyond ‘what could be considered normal." Now, strictly . speaking, these two violently opposite assertions could be true,
144 00000 enact iueabd, | 34 | ; -when an individual is telling different stories. ‘However the ANDREY story is. given as an example in both cases! (One * ~ ae an 7 i. I a 2 pends te to lose a little confidence “in the analysis. at this oS ~~ point, and perhaps. doubt ‘ts objectivity a bit. “Later on,” we Ses ” the STORSBERC “ease, which ‘was. included in the list, ‘of mpae™ CP geottea, is, said ‘to have been told 50 times Meith) at least. one ae “contradiction each telling." “What are we to ) believe? ne * dhe same question of objectivity is raised by the adoption of | : |. the stereotyped | ‘Phrase "Liar" 8 face". | This is a subjective i . "observation; all persons have certain: standard facial ‘expressions . under various circumstances. There | are even personalities os which constantly employ “false faces," people who are alvays acting.” It is dangerous to allow such a stereotype to enter a in ‘and corrupt, or replace, judgment. a oo ae oe oe In effect, Nosenko stated the case for his own defense - very well: . "He would lay the. blame on. his interrogators, saying “that h he knows better ‘how things are done tn the Soviet Union ooo than we do..." I trust that none of us intends to argue ‘this a  point—Pentovskiy 4 told us this constantly, and it: ‘is quite ‘correct: © . wo ethat we were twisting his story ‘and. making things look aif- 7 gerent; that we had dlready decided that he was "false! “and. weren' t listening objectively." ci believe ‘the: evidence ‘piven above supports Nosenko on these two points; especially when we recall that the meno which labeled hin a “plant™ was written ‘gust two weeks after our first meeting with him in 1962.
a "Finally, he would. stress the e quality and importance of his _ basic information, telling us that, because his. basic facts — were correct, it was’ “unimportant: how he learned them, whether oe “dates: and. other details were wrong, or whether we already a ‘hed. the Anformation from other “sources.” Nosenko has an 2 egeellent: argument here; when ‘the facts: can be: checked | | independently, as his: can. ‘be, “and have been, ‘the. sourcing details that one tries to inculeate in a recruited, ‘trained ‘agent pale "to insignificance in comparison. Let's take the wheat and ~ . Leave the chaff. | : | oe | } oe Having examined ‘the various menos and. status reports in the Nosenko notebook, I am. satisfied that Nosenko is a bona ' | fide defector. The case agéinst him consists almost entirely of assumptions, subjective observations, unsupported suspicions, innuendo, insinuations regarding, his supporters, steady repeti- . tion. of charges against, hin, . relatively trivial contradictions in his ‘reporting, and negative conclusions about his bona fides: _ whitch actually are derived from evidence of his disturbed : personality. . I have analyzed many Soviet disinformation cases and many fabrication cases, and have identified a number of both correctly, both before there were any negative operational | indications and in. the face of operational evidence that the . cases were bona fide, but I cannot find a shred of solid evi- dence against Nosenko in any of the memoranda or other documents in the Nosenko notebook.
ere Ty bee an 36 . The 30. ). Apri 1965 memo status report states: “subject “has repeatedly challenged. us to produce proof, of his guilt and "to try, tae Nosenko. has another good argument here—the ease | would be thrown, out of ‘gourt . for lack of ‘evidences, How- - ever, what, do we lose by taking hin up on. this? ‘if recommend | that we appoint a new judge and jury for the Nosenko’ case and | danstitute a change. of venue. The participants should be per- a sons not. involved in ‘the case 80 far, but with experience “pertinent to the | case, ‘such | as “the following: — A. " Peychtatriot | or psychologist as full-time consultant . . Be Rod Kenner of 1G CSR experience, objectivity) as judge. He’ 8 also. a lawyer, by the way. . , - C. Dick Stolz (Moscow experience) De" Disk Kovich (xcs. defector handler and Soviet agent experi-- E. Bob Lubbehusen (G5 years continuous experience with produc="~ _ tion from every. Soviet agent and defector, especially KGB) F. “Ba Juchniewicz: (Soviet agent and cL experience). Ge (spectalier: in Soviet technical collection and equipment) — The detention of a defector is a serious action, but the detention. of a ‘bona fide defector on false charges has implicit _ explosive potential. “It is not the. question of. justice to an individual, but a larger question. First, the > handling of his information as "dieinformation contaminates our CI analysis. now,
nar Saar Odes ‘ak hoinaranca, ‘ . 37 in past cases, ‘and for a _ long time in the. ‘future. Rather than & “cs being. disinformed, by the enemy, we are deluding ourselves. | ae oe 5. we are afraid that word of our: suspicions might get back to. . Moscow, we should be even more ‘concerned | that word of our. * aetantton | of. Nosenke will, also. ‘How many ‘more: Soviet wea “gence c officer defectors, or even agents, can we “thea expect? | since[amkpocze knew, KGB officers, and probably GRU as weths . have the advantage of knowing that Nosenke isa bona fide. - defector, but they will not have much respect for: us or aectze ‘to. come over “to Us, if they learn how we have dealt with him. | ' The review, of the ‘Nosenke case will have to take into account the KGB aims which we “have theorized ‘for Nosenko as a. . . “disinformation agent. These are stated. in the notebook as ; - follows: | | a | | . | - : A. Penetrate CIA and FBI -— One wonders how the KGB would expect this to be done... 3 it can be assumed ‘that they have some e know- ledge of the treatment of RIS, “defectors in the uv. 8.5 then they } know that euch ~ defectors are hela at arm's s lengths Only in the past weeks have: we 7 “dnitiated a a program. to brief ‘RIS \ ‘defectors even on our dead cases and their production, although Deryabin has been used on some aspects of N non~sensitive cases the last two years. 2e 9g sy OP
14-00000. + » 7 Nosenko were a "pilant!"—the Soviets could make charges at any OT bien {pias rT: Most RIS defectors have little qualifications for, ot interest "Lam, work other than fatelligence, Be the desire of Nosenko | .to aid us _ ts normal ‘and. should. be accepted: to” “the extent that we are using ‘the: ‘others. B. “Redefect, discredit vw. 8. intelligence, and generate unfavor— able publicity about us—If this is the Soviet aim, we ‘have given | them a magnificent opportunity! Imagine what would happen if moment pointing out that. Nosenko had been kidnapped by US, -! aided by the Swiss and Germans, and that he was now being held against” his will. What ‘could we do or . Say? One wonders if. CIA. would survive the subsequent. furor in the Press, Congress, and - "abroad. Who would believe our -protestations that the goods had been planted « on us——the- boy: with his hand in the cookie jar is. seldom considered a reliable witness in his. own defense. ae 0 > <) Wosenko w were a plant, the Soviets can get bin back whenever they "want him, at our expense. vo Cc. ‘Discourage other defectors—How can he do this? Tf he dia not serve in the KGB, as the notebook claims, RIS officers will” know that, and what we do with him will not affect their own intentions to defect. If. we are wrong (which I am sure we are), and Nosenko did serve in the KGB, the knowledge of the double game he is playing would: spread among his past, present, and:
\ ore OFAN Serats wank: rae 39 future KGB colleagues and likewise have no effect on future os ” "defections. The only ‘way the. KGB could ‘hope to “discourage: ae - future defections. through Nosenko would be for us’ to: detain him rk false ‘charges and ‘for that fact to “become known in the RIS. ae other words, Nosenko: is a bona: fide defector, put we have made”, ge possible ‘for the ‘Soviets ‘to gain. an unexpected windfall . by our, ‘treatment of him. There is no ‘other - rational explanation - of how they could hope to achieve this theoretical ain. De Protect. existing Soviet agents in the West: oe There is nothing “quiting about Nosenko! s ‘List of 200. agents in the West, particu- larly the key cases eited above. Nosenko! s background and exz- t..- perience provide him no basis for reassuring us that no. Americans have been recruited outside. Moscow, nor does he try to do so. He goes so. far as to ‘point out that ‘the most important cases even - in his own directorate are taken out of the hands of the working level and handled by the directorate chief personally. How, then, could he conceivably mislead us. about the agents recruited in - Moscow? We have no evidence that he has—it is Golitsyn' s disturbed personality that confuses the cases ‘most, not Nosenko’ 8, including the ANDREY-JACK case on which Golitsyn is said to have . been desk ease officer for ‘two » years! The only suggestion of” evidence that Nosenko is misleading us is Golitsyn' s hearsay from a section chief who was 99 percent sure he was about to recruit an American code clerk; ‘Nosenko said such. a recruitment was tried and failed. Who. accepts this as proof? Nosenko told. Ae
ae toes att mi be 40 us that the Soviets were still receiving code machine informa~ . # tion in 1964—what more’ do. we need? -Is this concealing an Me 7 ~g agent? Quite the opposite. There is- no evidence to support ‘the "protection of agents" theory. We are fortunate: ‘that ‘Nosenko’ ~ could tell us that they still have a. high-level. agent—it was surely not within his need-to-know. Q Ee ‘Lure us into operations in the. UN—O£ all the theories, this” one is the most far-fetched. . Since we are already running a disinformation agent in the UN, and have been since 1958,° the Soviets” ‘- gould pull the plug on this one at any time, and could have done : so in the past, either while the agent was on TDY in New York, ‘or by assigning him, PCS. If they want to move the UN, they have other means. Since ‘it has’ proven so useful for their own. intel- ligence operations in the past, it is safe to ) say that they will leave it in New York for a while. Considering all the agents . they have run out. of the UN, it is not tikely that anyone would . take their protest seriously just because we _were running one agent there. _ So, it is, after all, unreasonable to on aoe would justify sending out an experienced intelligence officer as a “plant,” Whatever purpose one might theorize, there are better ways to accomplish that purpose. Whenever the Soviets have set out to mislead by giving information, or by giving us agents who are without information, they have succeeded only . because they follow the simplest. possibie formulas, including an
14-0000 ‘The all-accomplishing Great Plot is still generations ‘in the 41 | absolute mininun of fabricated legend, and the maximum base of objective fact which is still consistent with their modest aims. # future. What will it. take to “convince all of us that Nosenko is bona fide? Nosenko expresses the: wish. that we will soon get . another KGB defector who will vouch for him.. So. do tT. ‘He can say this confidently because he knows ‘that if we 2 already had a KGB penetration that penetration would vouch for his bona fides. | ' Did we tell him that: we. have no such penetration? | Tf not, he can oS only know it because he is innocent.. It is beyond reality ‘to argue that everyone in the. KGB will vouch for Nosenko’ s story— it-.is not enough to alter a few organizational documents. The truth comes from life, not from the archives. If we call all that and all those who have already vouched for Nosenko "suspect", everything and everyone vouching for him in the future also as "suspect," what do we have left? This way lies madness. What: kind of proof do we need of his innocence, when we call him guilty with none?