13-00000 _ MEMORANDUM FOR: | EVLEW . 28 July 1975 Se VIA: | _ Mr. John Waller Special Assistant to the DDO 1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee. 2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the dther dis- closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our — | With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper- ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if abso- lutely necessary. 3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist which was pro- | Pp Vi Oo you direct 4, Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency. E2 IMPDET CL BY 055377 SENSITIVE
13-00000 oa a“ a 5. We are also providing you as attachnents B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee. 3 - ' Chief, Covert Action Group Services Staff Attachments, a/s SENTHE
13-00000 , To 7 re 28 July 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: oO Review Staff VIA: —~—«wMr.. John Waller ‘Special Assistant to the DDO SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at Right-Wing Governments 1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is: responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee. 2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the.other dis- closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our. now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper- . ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about > which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might | be briefed, if abso- lutely necessary. a - . cee. . 3. In addition to ‘the attachment A summary , we also approve the. use | (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of which was pro- _ vided to you directly by | 4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it: be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency. : | . E2 IMPDET _ an a CL BY 055377 . ald Bad ol , Srabel
13-00000 ">" Covert Action Of oon érations Coricerning Right-Wing Regimes CATEGORY I . di. —~ - movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative Organizations in The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved. budget for this project from its inception in CY_1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was[_______—'|:« Covert support to the| was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972. 2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly demo- cratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers. 3. | In 1972-73, ] |with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against « 4. | As othe teal Gree discussed ways and means of Cing the In 1967, a modest pro- ject was approved for the support of for e of off ing "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to 5. In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the. _successful efforts to prevent the return to the of |and forestall his leadership of a right- wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections. 6.[______] From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo- plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement. and its[ ——s|counterparts. © : —  ttaeeathdiae Mita sane «ee a i litical movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its ©
13-00000 [ o CATEGORY II 1. | | In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of |to a leading SECRET. 2. | SENSITIVE political figure designed to. encourage the creation of a. new political party. This party was established | The objective was to influence the liberalization of by having a legally constituted party in opposition __| The activity was terminated in 1962. LA project ‘was initiated in 1962 to encourage _ the development of a/ which opposed It was funded through State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of ad was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968. 3. L_____]Im 1963, the Special Group. approved a:covert action. project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis the military leadership following |resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group. , of National. Assembly members. 4. The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural.self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of th it involved — but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government. 5. | | Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering | [program to obtain wide support in Latin America for! | which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area.. Partially as the result_of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned , 6. From the early 1960's through and the assumption of power by the conservative to 1972, CIA supported a oa This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to € movement first by the] d then i an military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972. 2 SECFET SENSITIVE ol Tt was terminated in 1970 as a project,
13-00000 , : «SENSITIVE, oe - 7. ‘During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by | to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors. , an 8. l.In 1963. the Special Group approved a program to train a_year outside of to build an effective cadre o In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen th through supportive efforts with youth, , politic an apor ¢ ements. 3 SEGEET INTC TENE
a 8 SUHEL, SUBJECT: , | Summary of Covert Action Operations 2 & re . = MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Wallor Special Assistant to DDO ‘Against Right- Wing Governuents REFERENCE: © —«-SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975, Same’ Subject. : 1's _ We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the ee ose paragraphs which concern . -13. ile this case is somewhat ' bizarre and esent a productive operation, - We pose no objection) to its being presented to the Senate Select Conmittec. “ & 14] We have no objection to the presentation Or tiese programs to the Senate Select Committee for review although we share concern expressed by SS/CAG that .a leak of this information would be detri- mental to the base negotiations, sigeba/Mitlian W. Wola - William W. Wells Chief, European Division DDO/DC/E/NH 22 Jaty 15) _ Distribution: DO . Orig. § 1 - Addressee _  . 1 = SS/CAG 1 ~ C/EUR 1 - DC/E/NW 1 - E/G 1 - E/IB- “B2 IMPDET CL BY 061414 s nT
13-00000  COSEORETISENSIVE ‘ & 25 JUL 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Regimes 1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated I8 July 1975. 2. In the case of | we understand from your discussions with that. the | | has not been eliminated from your list but that ‘the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman ‘and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets, who have been jailed by thet regime. , 3. |was undertaken * without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, _ asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973. 4, In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of who are former assets under this project, and accusations in E2 IMPDET CL BY 009904 . SECRET SENSITIVE wags nen hee seen teed tes Fpteie dt on wtgne Cikncummnen scat id eo oe oe .
13-00000 . . se ; ao. * ! . * ay . i . the press that the | | received support from the_U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA interest in the potentially dangerous to our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets - nor the have be involvement. An qdmissicn now of CIA Support to or to the- two | lin jail coul e a sentence of death for them. . 5. In the case. of | CIA support to a leading | political figure to encourage the creation of a | remains_a very sensitive matter. The - DO principal agent is still al oe for the | and is a| | of the| | Exposure of the. operation could lead to his identification which would be extremely. damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our govern- ‘ment's relations in| | For these reasons, we believe | . it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this . _ operation to the Chairman ‘and Vice-Chairman of the Select. * Committee only. e i 6. The which was used: to fund the development of a| |] organiza- tion in. was the | _—— : located in | The| and organizations which received funds from were not aware that the actual origin of the funds was the United States Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government involvement where none is known to have existed, was used | to support a number of other covert_action operations in i and elsewhere and exposure of the would have ramifications other than inl The Director should be briefed on|_ land its range of activities on behalf of CIA if he has not already been informed. [ t Deputy Chief, Africa Division Attachments: . As Stated Above
13-00000 SECRET 21 JUL 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller . Special Assistant to the DDO SUBJECT | : Covert Action Operations Against . Right Wing Governments REFERENCE | |: Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated 18 July 1975. Subject: "Summary of Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Governments" 1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our. concern centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to Reference as ‘were mounted against" "right wing governments", None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which took place in and TU MIX (which took place in -- were or should be so described as being mounted against the government _ then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government hand was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing _ advice and support to grass root elements" in an attempt to get these elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking .participation in the governmental process. 2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with opposition elements in| | As noted above, the purpose of this contact.was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its effort to establish a two-party system in | The Agency today E2 IMPDET CL BY 014848 SECRET
13-00000 of Cr SECRET C maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State. po 3, We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations . were to be raised with the Senate Select. Committee. s . . cc: DC/Operations Staff , . C/SS/CAG , ~ . 2 SECRET
13-00000 _ o SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important: -- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroa or purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At | the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of _ SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But i even in countries in which we enjoy a good A liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government. SECRET,
13-00000 _ 6 In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not questyon Station personnel on specific operational etail. It 1s more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide- lines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- opera- tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will Find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter. SECRET
13-00000 | ? No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases. Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
1s” CABLE St) UIGRE RM PY OF Wea PERSON ‘UNIT NOTIFIED REPRODUCTION BY OTit: ISSUING OPFICE 16 PRuHi:. a6 T 126005. E1A165 PAGE 1 IN 620738 TORI3@15012 JUN 75 p20097 S$ EC RET 3011282 JUN 75 STAFF 2 \ “~ To: DIRECTOR, RYBAT REF DIRECTOR 712872 1, IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE» AMBASSADOR TOLD COS ” THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED — IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSJON GF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPRUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF OIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1968'S BY STANDARDS IMor 1975, 2, AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO contact] =n JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE, IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON SO JUNE, IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE ey TO MEE} ON 38 JUNE, sinch | AD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE and aD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN "SECRET
13-00000 - ° ( i LAL bE t DMMB PEF TOVAL COPIEr UR EY . . : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER Ti | S§ &€ C Re 7 (WSVING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT PP HSONSUMIT NOTIFIED ee eee ee es ee . : STAFF — ANCE COPY ISSUEB/SLOTTED BY aT renown Te eg Oe) a ReTION @ a ays 7 126005 ELAL65 PAGE O29b2 | IN 620738 TOR!3013012 YUN 75 a lszeao7 TRIP easwinoron WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME, THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS, k2 IMPDET, SECRET
13-00000 ~ a er . yg LABLE vio Uibbett BS Ve PEE REPRODUCTION BY OGVHEE Tr ISSUING OFFICE IS PHCriiEIT PEHSON. UNIT NOTIFIEC ; . | | ; ADVANCE COPY ISSUED'SLOTTES BY AT ‘ey a ACTION UNIT i | RA FILE | VR. Q aha Wy «| 4 eu BX ; _ es heron | celAler. B/gle. ph aC o . . | | dealsp 3. T 121509 EJA815 PAGE @1 : IN 649528 TORI271651% JUN 75 4iga4 S—C RE T 2712172 JUN 75 STAFF i is TO: OR, RYBAT FROM REF DIRECTOR 708791 1, IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION UF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS Wisits IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF 1 AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE PARTICIPATE BUT AS QF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY Be I 2, WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF Re SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH | __B ince, AS HOS AWARE, hs bocateD WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE FACILITY! WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG@STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT IS A SECRET
CABLE SEC LISSTM BY PLR pT COPIES RUN BY REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH . : 5 E C R Ek ’ ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT FERSON/ UNIT NOTIFIED oo : STAPF ; 8 ADVANCE COPY IiSSUED/SLOTTED _ BY AT ACTION UNIT } | RF. FILE . VR. yo iN 77s a F | a; , | T 121509. ElA®45 PAGE B2eb2 | IN 619528 | TORI2716512 JUN 75 | l4avos PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING THERE Is Ng ACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A Few SAFE APARTMENTS | ND | PLAN TO @RIEF THE SENATOR ON ACTIVITIES aS PaRT OF TH PRESENTATION, IF THE SENATOR PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION in | appitio] =e URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF, $, ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES, REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES. AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES» BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD, IN AUDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY, 4, WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY | ‘AS SOUN AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED, 6&2 IMPDET, i
13-00000 4 ; _ Loe P-7ERAEG PFs. ’ c { 1 , . CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_o PER TOTAL COPIES x — | RUN B- | REPRODUCTION BY OTHER 1 H S —E C R E tT (SBUING OFFICE (6 PROHIBI PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED | . : ~ sox cary upueocnsornis NEI ar Pe MWS ear PREGELEN ACTION UNIT Hep O86 o1¢, los | : THR Tea Gora Aes PL ACTION r : » ne) hes af SS FF 2 85 65 ETAG92 PAGE O14 IN 619189 7 TORI2744192 JUN 75 | 62823 SECRET 2711122 JUN 75 STAFF | / cite jeezs / TO! IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, : , 4, Le —_ RYBAT REF A, DIRECTOR 7087914 g, STATE 146723 DTD 21 vune (AU * > 6, STATE 150884 DTD 26 wune (KE *™ J 4, We NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP. 2, REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING SeRexewen 28 JUNE DEPARTING. 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY, NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY EXCEPT MRS, MONDALE, REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION, DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS N 26TH VICE 3@ JUNE AND 4 JULY?” 3, PLS ADVISE. €&2 IMPDET 3 NO RECORD IN CASLE SECRETASIAT oo SECRET
13-00000 , OUTGOINS MESSAGE ~ ,) | . | \~ SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY ‘ AGE cot mCP 104 VPE MRO pct OnF oF O o 0 o o 606o CLASSIFICATION 2-408 SECRET sos . OE SSAGE HANDUNG INDICATOR VATE-Tims GROUPS . « ore . . MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER _ STAFF 2522252 DIRECTOR “© °° ?LL7Ub Se con FP _ INFO: FILE C| [ple ji AE pnedlar- wiwex DISSEM BY: ¢” . de, olssajelhsfeqe, QT RYBAT ¥ ; co | L- | . 2% a : REFS: A be701 |IN 6160471 » | NO INDEX rerurnto PER Oo ooo B b2b1S |IN 613590] ¥ | sw AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE — MEMBERS OF THE CODEL- IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS» ( WE HAVE ALREADY reruns ey SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR- ANCE STATUS OF THE. PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S ~~ KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE. BUT KNOW OF NO“ SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN HIM- UWE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT ~ ARISE. WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY. RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING SOURCE NAMES. YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, INPDET end & | DATE: 25 JUNE 1975 | co f ORIG: WILLIAM WJ. WELLS oe , : UNIT: ie EXT: L Ld sa Hh WILLIAN W. WELLS. “JOHN WALLER. SA/DDO RELEASING OFFICER . COORDINATING OFFICERS ENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION | REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE od PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET . CL BY:
13-00000 7:71 MEG. 2/75 | CABLE BEC DISGEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES -_ RUN ‘ay ; SECRET. SSUING OFFICE IG PROMIBITED PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED J ; : STAFF - ACTION UNIT Pa “ s . (Spa dad ex ~ iat ——t —— feu De : T 112809 ETAES? i” PAGE Ba IN 616087 | | —T0R12416222 JUN 75 62704 ~§ EC RET 2444522 JUN 75 STAFF oe | cig ean | | | Wwe 10! DIRECTOR, : RYBAT REF A, DIRECTOR 708794 8, sass (: %13S90) AK 1, RE PARA 5 REF A INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE “THA R ST FROM SENATOR MONDALS } ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MON DALE. _ON 2 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTRO IS EXERCISED OVER ADE IT-CLEAR THAT HE AN Here THE ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT | “SENATOR MONDALE WELL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR ‘JAGUAR REPS, | (3, WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY To GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B. E2 IMPDET es oo GB OR ET
13-00000 Review Staff: 75/1009 24 June 1975 "MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence — SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk to QUWIN While Traveling in Europe This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former: agent while the senator - is traveling in Europe - The agent is QUJWIN. . He was first approached -in 1958 through the head of the| At first_he was used mainly to spot potential agents in various, __——«d| countries. Later he became the major asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made.a brief ..visit to but took no actions. - On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QUWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the -time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since. me, - We have heard that David ‘Raron of the ‘Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains . "unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill. Miller. - It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service and ‘of. the host government who might wonder abou e propriety _ of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens. “In any ‘event, an approach of this. nature “would be of i interest to the Department of State, and. the senator might wish to consult with the Department before Proceeding. . 4 het g, helo. ; Walter: Elder. CB: 007789 | E2 IMPDET | SECRET we cae TEE lag acne ne eh net eet ear eteamancsnnnmare te hi cereeeee ee a ee
13-00000 SECRET — Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His s Proposed Contact With Qs WYN Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. . Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local govern- -ment and harassment from the media. ‘Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have __ -further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from dis- closure.. Contacting an agent.under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship. 7 Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in - liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA. : It is possible that the local government involved might _ a lodge a formal protest to the-US mission ‘protesting the © unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee — ‘interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty _ without requesting formal permission. . SECRET - salen nena veeemtneeanacttahl eaten teentad ature arabe carplemeneets teed niesebl fate npatnaentl etn tndenatnareeneannsitnteans MESS
13-00000 va ) SeoRET 20 June 1975 Review Staff: 75/868 | MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence » This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent ¢ of ours while traveling in Europe. , You should know that we “have been told that tha . Senate Select Comittee staff has alraady been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they > oo. learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select. Committee staff of a potential problem.area in connection with such a. proposed. meeting... The agent in. question is, of course, — a subject of interest to. the local intelligence service. and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct .such. investigations | within its territory without . clearance to do. SO. - Ce En any event, an. ‘approach o£. this nature would be i of interest: and. indeed. of concern to the Department of - State and the-senator. might. be well advised ta consult,  . with then. before proceeding, — co ‘For your information, the agent referred to is powers and. we ) have not been in touch with him since ree 1981. . pay Walter Elder. EE Der. 7 a a 7 BE 097789 -E2 IMPPBT © 0.
13-00000 ie 00 } MEMORANDUM. FOR: Dot M0? = Lot mh tha pT | wmkittos | ) we ate ae Man FORM NO. jay REPLACES FORM (47 1 AUG $4 | WHICH MAY Be uses. . no ; mo,
13-00000 C6 Peg PoSED DOD Se I CHANGES SHOU oo. ; ; . ; - HERE, pp oi én, s | pormi THe HEAVY” BRACKETS, | _ SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND ' THETR STAFFS WHILE .TRAVELING ABROAD » ‘There have been already and there will continue to be members a ef the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who. wish to travel abroad and - talk to U.S. enbassy and ‘intelddigence personnel. ‘It is essential , that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security. problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable. I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE . | ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING 1 U. S. INTELLIGENCE . INSTALLATIONS. Most of these installations, including all CIA stations ‘abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are naintaining 7 a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of ; protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need ‘maximum protection. Ther mere visit of ‘ssc. representatives could be noted as evidence of U. S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U. Ss. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to 7 avold the potentially grave political repercussions that wo! OF dest Wev bh tye 2 june — do oS \ SoH, é cov pova ny pened storys “yf? DoD.
13-00000 could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure -of such Liaison. [Several foretgn governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strongyneutral or anti-U.S. foreign oO policies; continuation of such agreenents-exchanges is. therefore ‘dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in ‘the loss : Of: unique strategic Antelligence, and alternate collection methods are - either not available or are prohibitively expensive. § ‘To help maintain the discreet nature of, the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than ssc business could be: given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No . deliberate contact should be made with the local. press, nor should comments on ssc matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity | pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all . cases be distasteful to the host government. In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, . discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are - contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon’ his ‘return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.
13-00000 It. 7 - a i iit LAr THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARCE | OF THE VISIT... All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because _ of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U. 8. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE - CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational . details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements” oo will only discuss operations in general terms~-operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational | “environment , relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, a ‘ete. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. . Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to - see texts of or general notes on ‘intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered | by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and | operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL. Foreign agent personnel frequently. are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members
13-00000 / would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were - to ‘be ‘revealed: to Members or staff of the ‘SSC. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES - . WILL BE CO IN_EXCEPTIO1 . _ Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the ..88C politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard . that their relationships with Uv. Ss. intelligence activities, the © information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given . then, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the ssc. The | very fact that. such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence . activities. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection. ‘ sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such
13-00000 *- a vwisit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the’ host country in advance. Senate Select Committee principals and staff should -- . understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence . installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence . installations or foreign intelligence installations supported "py the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of ‘the U.S. Anbassador; access to the ‘latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government " _ involved. , vits. AN: ORTENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS: AND: STAFF, PRIOR TO- DEPARTURE. ‘This briefing will be conducted ‘by the DCI and other epresentar tives of the Intelligence Conmunity (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, ete. ds. as appropriate. ‘The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted: at each - location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities | in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion | ‘of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment. _ Members and stafé of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their. activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.
13-00000 ee ey, | rs . i) - campesc cissan ay 2A per * PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA) ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIEITRE al? pa EY t *) 5 ACTION UNIT ACTION # ¥ 105767 Eraaes rice BE a IN 613590. | | | _ToRVgos924e au. ae | vet gE. ¢ R eT 2047652 JUN: 75: thre Ort i et oe i j j I | 4 { | i i { i 4 { i i i i | | | i < REF A, DIRECTOR 707518" Be DIRECTOR 708794 | CO ots THANK YoU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S PROPOSED VISIT) AND AMBASSADOR “AND: MINISTER HAVE ‘BOTH BEEN ALERTED, - ee ee 2, IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF Ay COS PLANS 70 BRIEF SENATOR “.MONDALE ON STRUCTURE - IND “THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS 0 * ON THE. GROUND RULES. ‘GOVERNING ‘OUR RELATIONSHIP, COS WILL ALSO a 4 COVER THE STATION'S. ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND. THE GENERAL | “KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, 17 WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE = | “ANSWERS TOA NUMBER oF SPECIFIC aves TIONS THAT OCCUR TOUSs : ; Ay WHAT: CLEARANCES, Do. SENATOR ‘MONDALE AND HIS TWO: STAFF . | | ASSISTANTS feet 8. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THe. SENATOR BEEN INFORMED ! ABOUT AGEE CASE, “AND IN WHAT pe Tail ‘SHOULD TH THIS case. BE COVERED | oy WITH HIM AND HIS THO. “ASS ISTANGTS 7 ee to WHAT ‘EXTENT, ‘sHouLD : SECR & T ae
13-00000 a a en |. PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED ACTION # | eT MEG. 2776. TOTAL COPIES RUN YC” oS BO RET. CA@LE SEC DISSEM BY PER REPRODUCTION BY OTHER - . (S8UING OFFICE Is PROHIB STAFF asta ce apuiatara——_——__a1—_ es | ee RE . FILE. . VR. . : : 7405747 ElA@@5  +~+~«PAGE O2-022=~C~*~C“‘«*~“*‘“‘“‘C;*‘CNCO SOC | | os Tan gonve42 JUN. 75 [stats “ speciFic ¢ CA PROVECTS BE DESCRIBED, “ASSUME THERE 18 NOT. OBJECTIONS - TO POINTING ‘ouT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASH INGTON TO: TOMANKBIT, aS A WAY, OF. DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR ‘SECURITY IN: THE 7 COURSE OF THE SENATE LNVESTIGATION. Dy IF. THE STATION | | 1s. TO BE RESPONSBIBLE- FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, WE WOULD. APPRECIATE: BEING sO, INFORMED. 2: IMPDET. | Co ee. L704 2A bona | > Vy \ }  # sl \
13-00000 “= QUTGOING-~MESSAGE SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY je AGE cor” Ace > ea Tre MnO omF o o§ Go O8 a % Oo re 1 , S E C R E T o. ouP , ene MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER STAFF : 1017332 IRECTOR ?0874h < , } 0 moex DISSEM BY: CONF: c Geo R& le FILE el, P lav, i an 9 oO, 4 NO INDEX , cl? 6 | EG ay yo) loy Lc, ”—o hes nerurnvo PER TO: RYBATY | . - REF: DIRECTOR 70-7518 {NOT or ncenea nt ¥ L. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES-} ¥ e- SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL arrive] | ON 30 JUNE: FOR TWO-DAY STAY ‘THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT | COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO ? JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY “THEN TO} | <u Day anDL__ ka DAYS}. NO DECISION CDEC Y an YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED ERaED " 3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS. TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE- HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING _ SPECIFICS. ¥ Y.. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS. AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER “THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE ‘TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL DATE: oo ° ORIG: : UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER . ‘ COGROINATING OFricERs . ‘ . AUTHENTICATING orrcen CLASSNICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED = E 2 IMPDET a cL BY: “ALAALL
13-00000 em oS 6 QULGOING: MESSAGE. 4 7 sienavcenrenusson / : . owF O Oo G6 @© OO BB oO FF toe 2 SECRET oo oe | STAFF ee DIRECTOR rn 0 wwoex DISSEM BY: CONF: INFO: FILE 0 no moex ~ “to anh, O servavro PER - : a iP FILES # ;  AIRCRAFT-¥ | 7 oe, -_ 5| MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH urtH| ; | BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. - SENATOR MONDALE HAS — ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS | jE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR-¥ 7 SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTAC | 7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP. MR. AARON SAID THAT IN | [te SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/UEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. mf | THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INT JRELATzONS AND “MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE) pAcTLITY. IN THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. ¥ ee 8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT. TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT | YET BEEN INFORMED. E21 IMPDET«d — | aaa bates «4? JUNE 1975 2 a ORIG: WILLIAM W- WELLS  &- .H. KNOCHE Libs . unIT:  C/EUR or EXT: 101 , je UT TAM Ws WELLS.» C/EUR Jousl| ul SALDDO CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S PaomisiTeD —& 2  IMPDET CL BY: core RE T
13-00000 te SECRET MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION DATE AND- PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100 Room Z2E-45 SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed Trip to Europe 1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines: a. 30 June - 1 July: | b. Monday, 7 June: , for one day c.| hough the order has not yet been _determined, the stop would be two days and the top, one day. In the period between the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki.. The purpose 6 7S part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need 2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions, —4 etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control". It had occurred to Aaron that| would be a good example of a Station which concentrates on “East - West" operations (read third country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized |was a liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to E2 IMPDET SECRET | GF BY bes6s6
13-00000 [___|he felt. would provide some understanding of "third world" operations. he felt, would be a good example of the inter- relations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service. 3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought outL sd of the| requesting that contacts be arranged in Wi @ appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices in order to discuss the experiences in “command and control" Aaron is also interested in how the works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron stated that! had not been enthusiastic about the idea but promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to work directly with _____} whom he claimed to know,than to involve the * Agency’ § go-be tween. 4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the| Embassy. 5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign - governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with — foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others. 6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations. 7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence". 8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.
13-00000 -3- 9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively. 10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party. Distribution: 1 - Mr. Knoche 1 - Mr. Wells 1_- Miss Page SEGRET
7 te F-F ahG e to of | CABLE SEC DISSEM BYU per rota. copud 5 — aus ey _ . SECRET. STS Cote 2s PRORERE PERSON/UMIT NOTIFIED__ — _ _ — DVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY M z saliel | Soe en oe ferme } at ans oles lors Apadrc Ce 7 o02ae, ~~ E1aeea PAGE @1 _ IN 686574 SEC RE T 1668532 JUN 75 STAFF CITE |26077 TOs DIRECTOR. a, er 7 RYBAT | 4) vv? WE | REF: DIRECTOR 797516 a oo WW : de ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION PRIMARY TARGETS: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS. CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS. WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HOS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF, 2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE | SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENNANT GOWMANDER. ! 3. ‘NO FILE, E2 IMPDET. | = : SECRET
13-00000 TO: SUBJECTS "THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA, TO EUROPE TO EXAMINE AGENCY, COMMAND AND. CONTROL IN THE FIELD- “SENATOR, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR: 4 i} . v we WWIs WIKODALE. | | La | oor ; | SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY oo | LT 1 ; OMF op “py o 0 ‘oO. o Q | 4a ; Lo -_ . : crassisrcanen ; 7 . oe, gin . . SE cRET 7! SO MG 6040 8 HANGING MMR ARSR ° ot , _BATE- TING GRGUP - . ore . : Doe MESSAGE REPERERGR MURSER oo. STAFF — MWLBSEZ | DTRECTOR, 707528 O woes . DISSEM BY: 28 CONF: e/mre G INFO:. FILE bez, Dloex, DAO, lesheF, ORC, 0 wo moan . rerun vo . PER  offlen, poolso, eleilo _ 0/oPs cleswha ° 9 werenes FC CAT THE END OF THE: MONTH. a a oe. THE SENATORTAL PARTY, WrsHes To VISIT CIA ‘FIELD STATIONS | MONDALE, UTE WISH, TO TALK TO ‘you ABOUT: Hou STATIONS OPERATE ‘AND THE RELATIONS BETUEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY - PRESUMABLY oo : THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR a8 RELATIONS. 4 2. SENATOR: MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE. MR- DAVID AARON. WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTI~ GATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. “WILLIAM BADER: A SECOND STAFF MEMBER. oe 3. HEADQUARTERS WILL sheeerro SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE “USE. OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR er ge HIS TRAVEL IN HIS. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS: WE DO NOT KNOWS oe HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE.¥ | eo oe ' DATH: ORIG: - UNIT: EXT: AOLRARING OFFER : ‘ COORDINATING OPNCARS ‘ AUTHENTICATING OFRMCER . CLASSINCATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE Is PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET .. SECRET | oo | GE BY? gy agen
Be - ” giaicaL conten use ONLY oe _— “ OMF oF ooo of i en es GLASEIMCATION soos SB FB ERs et “* : . oavi-vurtaneur, ; . 7 - , eve 7 . a : | wreasar onvanenceranen® : - . - STARR. es DERECTOR ae DR. oa Be O worn DISSEM BY? = 0 asvuan vo PER whtepimin oe oduct ne eae - YOU: ‘SHOULD ADVISE THE ‘AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S ° ; INTENTIONS ro. VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. LEASE. ASK THE AMBASSADOR 10. ‘RESTRICT. HIS. ‘CORRESPONDENCE TO. “WASHINGTON “ABOUT THIS, ‘TRIP TO, EXTHE LATER | RESTRICTIONS NAY BE FORTHCOMING. DEPENDING ON HOW. SENATOR ene, DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. 4 = co a Be THE CODEL' s TENTATIVE ITINERARY Is AS FOLLOWS: Sct ow “BRIEFING THE: “SENATOR: y ane ~ oe mea You CONSIDER A Sao Jet &- HEADQUARTERS. WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE | or) HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. £2. INPDETH Y MoRE specific. guidance on opeestional discussions 76 | Follow. an EH “NOCHE cn PATE: 49 “JUNE 1975 ORIG: ATLL AM Wd. WELLS ier C/EUR (hs ormeaa' AAS MIMCATION ‘ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED “ j . CRCRMINATING OFFIGERB Meee .
13-00000 rs t D La a SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important: -- Members of the SSC and members. of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for urposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government. SECRET
13-00000 : 4 In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not uestion Station personnel on Specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide- lines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- opera- tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact With members of host country's reese or security services. any services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter. SECRET
13-00000 a 7 SEEKER | No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. i intelligence agencies. Exceptions can : perhaps be made in special cases. -- Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives. pe oC hosed 6 bd
13-00000 SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important: -- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for urposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, ail of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting. the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good | liaison with the host country's security : ' service, there remains a need to be discreet. i Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or i parliamentary exposure of the relationship. { Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.
13-00000 we erp ep entnetneren gee ieee etme eat € In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not uestion Station personnel on Specific operational detail. it is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide- lines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- opera- tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if. they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's ee ae or security services. Many services wl ind contact with the C politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of . cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
13-00000 No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases. Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed. to access by Congressional representatives.
13-00000 i ! i ae? : SUBJECT: Guidelines for Mernbers. of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad : There have been already and there will continue to be: members of the Senate Select’Committee. (SSC) who wish to travel. abroad and’ eo. talk to U.S. embassy: and intelligence personnel... It is essential that we agree On. guidelines to. avoid s serious. diplomatic. and. decurity. problems: ‘The following. specific guidelines are applicable: I, MEMBERS AND: STAF Fr OF THE. SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR ; sexe) BE ABROAD FOR SOME: PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE. “INVESTIGATION OF U. S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. a: Most of these. installations, including 2 all CIA stations abroad, for are example} 2 are unt ler: some: > form of: cover, or are maintaining a. low - ‘profiles Certainly 2 all have and need varying. degrees of. protection ; from exposure. “J UA. one _ extreme are U.S. intelligence activities. behind the iron castatn. These clearly need maximum, ‘protection. The ‘mere visit of SSC_ representatives. could be noted as evidence | of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. ' Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from closé liaison with the host government, care.is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions
13-00000 that could result to U.S. and host country activities. from exposure © of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public _ exposure of such relationships. ‘Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by ssc members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature .of the visit. ‘No doliberate contact 7 should. be made with the: Yocal press, “NOT, should comments: on SSC matters be. supplied if investigating. officers are: contacted by t the ~ press. Local press publicity y pertatning to.an SSC investigation. abroad. would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government. 7 In sum, ‘except in. the. casevot especially sensitive areas » arrangements can be made for SSC- visits to certain U.S. intelligence - activities overseas on a. case by.case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSG ember 1 not. “Publicly. declaring. himself to be on ssc business. at the ¢ time of the visit or upon his. return, and his proceeding on a . 7 basis satisfactory to the Ambassador:: THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT. All arrangements and contacts. will be made by him, and because of his . knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding. .
13-00000 - Tit. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL . SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS, | It is more fitting that Washington be the. place where operational _ details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will. only discuss operations in general terms _ operational priorities, . the kinds of ‘operations conducted, the operational environment,. relationships with the Embassy and. defense attaches, etc. | Ta all cases, such. discussions.will only. be conducted.in. physical surroundings - which meet appropriate security standards. / Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes.on intelligence agreements between the U.S.. and the -host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, : and cannot be. divulged without-the consent of the: host ‘government. - IV.) MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL, _ . Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service ° scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be
13-00000 to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and. motivation if their identity were. to. be - revealed to. Members or staff of the SSC. .- MEMBERS OF ‘HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR. SECURITY. | “qnvIGES wits BE CoNEACTED sty D( EXCEPTIONAL CASES. . Many foreign intelligence : services. will, find contact with the ssc . politically difficult and. will avoid: it. They further regard that their - SO relationships with U. 1S. intelligence activities, the information they a pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. a ‘Regardless. what-assurances are given them, they would find it a . difficult and awkward to. discuss these matters with members or . relationship with U. S. i intelligence activities. 7 staff of the SSC: “The very fact that. such matters were under investigation could well cause: the host: ‘service to reassess: the , desixability of a - a TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INS STA LLATIONS. In those countries in which we operate joint.technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional . repre sentatives,. especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered
13-00000 essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host’ country . in advance. - vi. AN. ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED. ALL MEMBERS ' AND STAEE, PRIOR. TO DEPARTURE. | This briefing will be* conducted by the DCL: and other representatives : of the Intelligence Community (Cla. NSA,. DIA, State, ete.)y as. we appropriate. . ‘The purpose of this. briefing is to familiarize the _ visitor with the: types of activities. conducted -at each location, the | _ restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and . a the considerations which preclude-the discussion of operational details,’ names and terms in an overseas environment... : Members and. staff of the ssc. should bear j in mind at. all times that. : they. and their activities are ‘matters of: great interest to opposition. intelligence “servings: as well as to the-press. “Gomumittee and staff. a : members, particularly those who are publicly prominent,.can hardly: 7 travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.
13-00000 SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important : -- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme dare Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But > even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.
13-00000 In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not uestion Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide- lines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There ‘is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs. should not discuss operations in general terms -- opera- tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country’s intelligence or security services. Many services will Find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter. SEGRET
13-00000 i 1 tl i ‘ i Co eAget ( za ae wed No matter what assurances are given then, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases. Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives. SECRET