datamatters24/research-document-archive huggingface dataset:
HW 53217 Before Gen. Clifton sought the President's approval, Sheldon set up a special operation to be sure OCI wouldn't stub its toe if it got the green light. Although knowledge of the new daily had to be kept to as few people as possible, the production could not be carried out by just two or three because of the work-load and the range of expertise required. Therefore, Sheldon set up a roster of particularly qualified persons who would be charged on a rotating basis with coming to the office at 3 or 4 in the morning to go over the intel- ligence take. They would draft items which Sheldon would review when he came in about 5:30. He would edit some, scrub others as not meeting the criteria, and sometimes ask for additional items. In getting the completed book out on time, he had to have "a very rapid and understanding typist." As with the writers, there had to be several typists on a rotating basis because the hours were difficult. When Sheldon felt he had a workable production technique, he had an issue turned out that could be passed to the . President. It was Saturday, 17 June 1961, when Sheldon and Richard Lehman checked with Allen Dulles, then delivered the would ordinarily be the case im the future. President Kennedy was spending the week-end at his Glen Ora country “house near Middleburg, Va., and Clifton took the PICL to him there. ra DoclId: 327401317 Page 6
Coy Tin sf The PICL was a small book of seven pages, size 8 1/2 x 8 inches. It contained 14 items of about two sentences each, Six notes, and two maps. At the end it was attributed to “The Director of Central Intelligence." The gist of the items was: 1. We believe a special meeting of the Soviet - Party Central Committee opened today. 2. After a meeting of Laotian princes in Zurich, Phoumi announced agreement to form a "govern- ment of national unity." But the Communists renewed pressure on government forces. (Map) 3. Dominican President Balaguer has eased OAS investigators out of the country. 4, The Philippine Foreign Minister is worried over what he feels is a softening of US policy on Laos. %, 5. A Soviet ship arrived in Cuba with 18 crates of a kind usually used for shipping MIG-15s and 17s. 6 6. The French found the Algerians uncompromising at the Evian talks. 7. A Soviet ICBM test at Tyura Tam was aborted. 8. We expect the Soviets to show new types of aircraft and missiles at the Moscow air show next month. . 9. Leftist students will try to block Ikeda's de- parture from Tokyo for the US. . 10. The Soviets will deliver two TU-16s to Indonesia. ll. The Egyptian Ambassador reported home that Sen. Fulbright would help te supply Egypt with grain i and tobacco. ent uee wo “ia HW 53217 DBocld:32401317 Page 9
d. This sort of harassment oe stopped in the spring of 1962 when Soviet leaders became convinced that the US was interested in a serious discussion of a Berlin settle- 8 ment. Moscow may hope that the threat of more of this sort of har- assment will jog the US into talks . on Berlin. ae 5. Iraq-Syria-. a UAR . For The President Only - Top Secret HW 55355 DBocld:32401336 Page 34
HW 53217 a Cooley's complaints about US wheat policy. 13. Because of concern from Commonwealth countries, the British bid for Common Market membership may be delayed. f 14. In the Congo, Gizenga is lowering his price i for coming to a parliament meeting in Leopold- s ville. He is having trouble with tribes in- “ the provinces. (Map) ae . . The Pirst eboh bed heen isiivered. an jas Sheldon remarks, "A good deal hung on what the re- sponse was going to be." When Sheldon and Lehman delivered the second issue to the White House on the following Monday morning, Clifton said, "Go ahead--so far, so good." Sheldon then advised Dulles of the developments. The DCI understood that in view of the PICL's production schedule, he could not play a substantive role, but Sheldon asked him to pass on any ideas he had. And, in fact, Dulles did from time to time call to inquire whether certain subjects or incoming reports had been covered. “His whole attitude on this was very helpful." In a fairly short time, McGeorge Bundy, Bromley Smith and Gen. Taylor, in addition to Gen. Clifton, began to read the PICL. Sheldon took an extra copy for them to read and pass around while he was at the White House. Sheldon would give the President's copy to Clifton, who would return the previous issue, or sometimes several, if they had backlogged. DoclId: 327401317 Page i0
HW 53217 There was immediately great interest in the publication. The President read it, and frequently, as a result, issued instructions to various officials. He also asked for source materials, estimates bearing on items that attracted his attention, texts of speeches, and OCI memoranda giving fuller details and explanations. Sheldon recalls, "It became apparent from occasional hints that Ted (Gen. Clifton) would let drop that the President had actually used some of our action data to tickle the Secretary of State and the Secratry of Defense." Inevitably, then, these secretaries asked the White House for copies of what the President was reading. By December Gen. Clifton passed the word to OCI to put the secretaries on the subscriber list. For the Secretaries of State and Defense, OCI adopted the scheme of having two puches, which were hand-carried . n every morning to the designated senior assistant of each secretary. Each day the pouch containing the previous day's PICL was exchanged for the pouch containing the new issue. Sheldon: feeling is that OCI's performance with the PICL was accepted by the White House with approbation. MO I don't remember any criticisms at any time, nor do I recall anybody saying “My word, I didn't Re DoclId: 327401317 Page i1
TOP SECRET DINAR Western Hemisphere _ VENEZUELAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ON 1 DECEMBER aL Ta ae ity “abr Saat on sag ' lan voters will go to the polls on 1 December to elect a successor to President Betancourt from among seven candidates. .The main issues in the campaign are national pe- troleum policy, acceleration of reform programs, and unemployment. Casting a pall over what other- wise promises to be a colorful event--for the benefit of the il- literate, each party has sought to associate its ticket with a dis- tinctive color combination-~-is the rising tempo of Communist-—inspired violence aimed at disrupting the elections. There also remains the tacit threat by military leaders to intervene if the electorate choses an unacceptable candidate. The front-running candidate is still Raul Leoni of Betancourt's Democratic Action (AD) party. Leo- ni's chances of victory are based more on the AD's excellent party organization than on his lackluster personality. As president, Leoni probably would continue existing policies, but without Betancourt's imagination or skill, Leoni's chief rival is Jovito Villalba of the Republican Demo- “fore than 3 nillion Venezue. | cratic. Union (URD) | “the AD'S erst we while coalition partner. Villalba ‘% is a popular candidate of moderate socialist tinge, who is backed by a party machine second only to that of AD. URD leaders have at- tempted unsuccessfully to induce ‘ other opposition candidates to pull | out of the race in his favor. Al- © though the Communists have vowed to boycott the elections, they might vote for Villalba should they come to believe that their support would turn the tide against Leoni. Independent Arturo Uslar Pie- tri is in third place, thanks to , an unexpectedly effective campaign, He is considered a rightist be- | cause he does not favor nationaliza-—: tion of the oil industry. He may carry Caracas, but he has little hope elsewhere. Regardless of who wins the presidency, no party will have a majority in the new congress, Thus, the viability of the new government will depend primarily on the future president's skill in creating and maintaining a working coalition. (SECRET) “eRe 2 VENEZUELAN ELECTORAL PATTERNS 1958 Presidential Elections 1958 1963 -. . Condidote Votes Percent Congressional Presidential Condidate Rau! Leoni Jovite Villalba Gutierrez Rafoel Caldera (Disenfranchised) Arturo Uslor Pletri Romulo Betancourt Wolfgang Lorrazabel ** Rofoe) Caldera*** 1, 284,092 903,479 423, 262 Nationa! Action Movement (MAN) “Before the 1960 split into AD - Government and AD - Opposition. ** Also supported by the National Independent Electoral Movement (MENT) and the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV). ***Also supported by the Socialist Workers Party (PST) and the Republican Integration Party (18). ****A coalition of nine minor porties. The leaders hope that other groups will join the FUN and back Uslor. eles 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 24 ~TOP SECRET DINAR— HW 55355 DBocld:32401316 Page 36
HW 355355 Muon Sing ‘{Sayavo | yaboury eMuang “6 Pnrae awe ~ a 1 ~ “Muang Phitsanulok | 2s 50 47 9M “om PB \ Num tiew Naniuhe duane Pratard nf Phou™- Knoung oF ao Kha A. ~ 7: \\ a. ° 5 Wa viene ? “VIENTIANE in Thane: Udor any i L Aj Internat-onal Doundary Province boundary National capital Province capital Railre 1d Road Track or trait so 75 75 IOC Kilometers Mites UNCLASSIFIED ‘Samot - -oGhachoengsao 4 Prakan . DocId: 32401336 Page 46 ~£ onl . Sam Neva» iy HOUA PHAN ° AN\NTm sing doe ters Seng Se xnousng KHOUANG ~ ™ Bano Ta Viang puny owe ov Seno avannakhet . Muang | ‘oYasothan | pfu Lang Thuong Hoa Gay oO SHarphong ive CAC BA e SAVANNAKHET SARAVANE “han Tnateng on ; Musne U ube > gi F _ = Wann Chamray  Attopeu ATTOPEU Boundories ond names “ore not necessarily <ogarz. IS.G
look as though Moyers and Velenti were amkeakkg taking the documents to the Presiddnt. plans to spend a weekend i On os March the President's prepxaxaiconnieex Jt in Texas comment un g utxthexeurnek prompted Gen. Clifton to may that Mr. Johnion readg his intelligence while wiser at the ranch hese often wemend-thwet- by i as 8:15 a.m. aggHasking for it) But it. der hard to catch him in Washington. . The next day Clifton said that it was not necessary for the OCI representa- tives to meet him at 9:30 Some, he book did not move upstairs that fast. | He ge asked that the meetings take place at 10 in the future. , DDI James Ce Graham, Acting AD/goI, took up with/Ray Cline the possibility of has inviting, Moyers to CIA headquarters for lunch . finer and a briefing. Cline wanted #aexkto discuss the White House problem asked Greha Sic — | with McCone, but fimee—Wwearted—a little memorandum on how things were going. op (OCI ism drew up a statement for Cline making the principal points that ~~ XN ut Yount meeting kexauxazee had no way of knowing whether Wor wore—aRiKINE the President's i . . needs because wé“had no feedback from him, in contrast to the situation OC's , under Kennedy, The reason for this was that contacts at the White House HW55355 Docld:32401332 Page 11 6 |
10 did ..°-9 1.06 deal directly with the President on intelligence matters. OCI wondered how it could establish close links to the President's immediate staff. 6/ HW 355355 DocId: 32401332 Page 12 _
& evatuase d Thihgs remained in en-wnpredictabi¢ state fer the only next few months, with/occasional indications that OCI's presidential Comnaenkd a publications had hit the mark. Clifton ‘remarked’ in May that the Review ; re Sas was the best means of reaching the President, althonxgh \tne PICL registered at times when Valenti was interested in an tome, One day when the Sieh was heavy on the side of bad news, Clifton saidy "It's no wonder the President doesn't want to read this stuff—-it annoys you." |There were == cee inn emeremmeee one ae —_— Mme ee wees me nee tee “gays when the President read and initialed both the Review and the PICL. me eee eee So Cena ’gn - From mid-year on, sim® Mr. Johnson made frequend polisiedi-- trips around the country. Clifton, who was usually with him, said he had more luck getting the President to-read his intelligence on the return flights than on the way out, when Mr. Johnson was reviewing his speeches. As the election neared, Secretary of State Rusk expressed some concern to Mone about the security of the Checklist and seemed to prefer that dissemination be limited to. the President, Me Grue passecl tHe ward down Secretary of Defense McNamara and himself, The-DDE—wes-esked—be-feiLow—ap—. AW 55355 DocId: 32401332 Page 13
HW 355355 Docld: 32401332 Page 14 i Py ) ey myproeeeeee 12 ak also Conveyek his On ne tt fets that the President should read the Checklist daily, mk or have it read to him, and should not depend on the semi-weekly Review. 7/ q Avie R. Je Smith responded in a memorandum of 5 November 196) #e- hele ved! (the Gkhhrmnpithe-Dile. Sutth He fet that the Agency would have a graceful a readers way of dropping some of t&x the Checklist mammxxrtherx if the publication were to undergo a transformatio in Which it would adgyuire @ new name, & new cover, and a new format. It would become President Johnson's publication, specifically designed to meet his needs. To increase the paix chances of its being read by the Chief Executive, it would be mmtthrermdix produced Ark wert qQ , to conform to the President's working habits me delivered in fer-lLate afternoon, Smith noted that the Review, which Mr. Johnson "usually reads," was : rt for his evening perusgl. Smith also noted ‘the importance of finding -a way to establish direct contact with the AW~L thus avoir yn President so that OCI could get feedback -se=thet—ttuneetd not write-in avacuum, 8/
yb HW 55355 DBocld: 32401332 Page 15 The ?OR Aprenrs Smith's proposal for a new publication was accepted and was rapidly put into effect. The last Checklist was dated 30 14u4 . | November, and the next day the first issue. of the President's Daily Brief (PDB) was delivered to the White House. In substance it resembled the PICL, but it had.a fresh appearahce, and it max came out late in the afternoon instead of early, morning. Jack Valenti sent this first issue back to McGeorge Bundy saying that the President read it, liked it, and wanted it continued. Dissemination was cut back, so that the only persons the , receiving the PDB outside the White House were/Secretary & and Under Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and one Assistant Secretary, the treasury Secretary, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Gen. Carroll. . The semi-weekly Review was dropped, but by 16 December Ve Gigi Bedaagpiiey ee a ac/s the DCI ordered that she summary xerkimnx of “the Current Intelligence Weekly Review be included in each Friday's PDB. The summary, titled Highlights _of the Week, lasted only until 26 February 19654 prombey—pertth
HW 55355 yy JFK ASSASSINATION SYST IDENTIFICATION FORM Date: 11/29/99 Page: 1 EM AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORD SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS AGENCY INFORMATION CIA 104-10302-10021 JFK CIA-DI-FILES DOCUMENT INFORMATIO CIA OCI/CIA DAILY SUMMARY 11/25/63 7 JFK ASSASSINATI Released under the John Kennedy Wsesasaination Records oOllection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note}. : ase#: NW 55355 Date: ~ ine eee ee eee 1-28-2017 -- N PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET 1B RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 09/22/98 JFK-M-02:F2 1998.09.22 .15:31:00:390120: ARRB REQUEST. CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT DocId: 32401329 Page 1
tee See, | ‘ ~! AA Ea VW SAA AA QV AOA , en (Security Classification) ROUTING NAME AND ADDRESS DATE JiNITIAL n IRECT REPLY ISPATCH REPARE REPLY ECOMMENDATIO ETURN IGNATURE CTION PPROVAL OMMENT ONCURRENCE : RKS: sola} o = silmo|o = rvy Ye) NFORMATION CONTROL NO. a EM a COPY__.. CO FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE Handle Via Channels . Access to this document will be restricted to s those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Dh a (Security Classification) we. ‘A “
HW 55355 ‘put in his pocket, though the thought of having sensitive material handled failed to arouse presidential interest, In the ensuing weeks and months, OCI was naturally watching for indications of the success or failure of the restyled PDB writer daily for the President. On 13 January, /Thomas Pattonyxttibookiang Col KEM noted that Bromley Smith wrote "Fhe President" in the upper right noe Copy ko. 1. Patton asked whether Smith would like OCI to type this on. » Nencrachix<Start tie No, said Smith, Putting it on in long-hand gave it a human touches. On 19 January, the format of the Brief was changed as a result of discussions between McGeorge Bundy and Ray Cline. Bronley Smith said he-wax liked the new format snd he thoug"t the South Vietnam item was “exactly right." The President was not interested in the names of generals and ministers and didn't follow such details, page size - Further experiments in fmxmak. followed | a talk McCone had bat noth: Me Cre ef pkewn, with the Presidents( There was even a sample Brief “that the President could this way made Bromley Smith groan. DoclId: 32401332 Page 16 cr
In mid-February, Bromley Smith said that the Vietnam Zituation Keport, which OCI had begun sending to the White House daily at 8 a,m., was proving to be very useful; it was going up to the President every morning, _ Y mornings deys “Ute rede ed aren? tansackes Weir bugmess ( Occasionally thére w ‘a “certain amount of commotion ix around Brome@’y Smith's of fice/because of people coming and going to different meetings in the White House. One day Smith closed his door, explaining that NHMNAYXHREKEX Bundy might be able to work this way with all the Indians charging in all the time, but I gan't, espec- dally since I was here till after 11 last night waiting for the President to leave. i. S| Fi _one day cake Smith unburdened himself /about_ abouts ~ a 0 OO 0,0 P Aa OE 148: problems ‘ y/) for elf and the val ‘One of them was the occasional flow of raw glandestine information directly to the President, who "eats up inf orma~ i } / Sx; +t 7 Ceegn: 1. Sf Phe mb of aa ce VEO ne totl: One AL 7 A / ; the-eesdnoer Pevside, BO Bk FS, ike fo tion" and has ‘tyery short: reattion fuse. 17 ribe-n | A ca con Binlle flew PhawlkL Finfle J 4, (/s timely "city oars somewhere who Could make a/package of auf the many ‘types of / ’ / / to PDBer Joseph 0. Matthews information, including the/ operational. j At another time, he’ e reiterated show / short the reaction & times had become at the White House. ‘He also HW 55355 DocId:32401332 Page 17 mo Tatas Povey
HW 355355 ]Adoula "= “Will finally announce this morning the expulsion of 4 all personnel of the Soviet and Czech embassies. | This move has been hanging fire ever. -gince security officials turned up evidence several weeks ago im- + plicating persony of these embassies in anti "a - __ Peiping has been quick to exploit the — opening provided by Barghoorn's release. To the Chinese this affair is an object lesson in how t Khrushchev knuckles under to US pressure without getting. a thing in return. og ae vas See ak aot gets USSR-Cuba | ‘The five passenger ships we mentioned ‘in “last Thursday's Checklist have docked and departed. Scme of them brought in rotational troops and all of them took out Soviet personnel. We cannot strike a [firm balance on the basis of the evidence. we now. have, but it is possibl hat as many Soviets went out as came in. (Cont'd) For The President Only - Top Secret DoclId: 32401336 Page 93
7 8. Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that the proposed sabotage operations could be Gontrolled but that when the autonomous groups started operations this might cause some problems due to the acknowledged lack of tight control. Mr. McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and fore- cast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking. 9. There was a brief general discussion of the need to expand naval and/or air coverage of shipping in the Caribbean area to identify possible Cuban arms ship- ments. 10. H.A. then specifically approved the sabotage operations against Nazabal wharf and Canete sawmill scheduled for the weekend of 15 November. In addition State was directed to do something about Canada, Great Britain, and Spain with respect to implementing the Economic Denial Program. : ll. The meeting ended at approximately 1115. oo . i " 5 doe Dre AN PRAM NaN Bruce B, Cheever Deputy Chief Special Affairs Staff HW 53217 DBocld:32401375 Page 13
HW 355355 the program, if permitted to go forward as planned, would at least have the advantage of hindering Castro in the con- solidation of his power, He pointed out that the noise level of the raiding operations had not in fact been very high, He would advise resuming raiding operations following the resolution of Secretary Rusk's points, General Taylor said that the Joint Chiefs favor the program in its entirety, that they believe the program has never been given a fair test and that we should move forward with it in the interests of making Castro’s life as hard as possible, Mr, Bundy said that the CIA covert program is the only matter to be resolved today, that the matter of our negotiations with the British on the economic program and sugar support would be ready for discussion next week, 10. Secretary Rusk recommended to the President that we keep the raiding assets in being for the next two : months and that the question be discussed again following the resolution of OAS events and the Cuban use of the SAM Sites, ll, The President accepted this recommendation, \ Gerald Desmond Fit Chief Western Hemisphere Division SEE ATTACHED ADDED NOTE BY DCI | CON ee Bate tee - 2 er sheet tinnae auuhatadhiieinds aanee vemictnaeeen te’ at AOS ARB pl RON eta rr EE DoclId: 327401362 Page 30
8 April 1964 Dictated by Mr. McCone: McCone went on to say the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy as outlined in the 8th June paper and also less specifically in the paper circulated in the meeting by Mr. Bundy, or abandon the basic objective of bringing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective. Specifically McCone said that he could envisage such issues as extreme economic distress caused by sharp drop in sugar prices or other external factors arising which might cause Castro great pain and, ultimately, his downfall. In summing up his position McCone stated that the actions favorably looked upon, that is, intelligence gathering, propaganda, economic ‘denial and surreptitious acts against Cuban ships all would have some effect but definitely would not accomplish the stated objectives, JAM/mfb HW 55355 Docld:32401362 Page 31
29 October 1963 MEMORANDUM 1. Diem-Lodge discussions produced no movement in the direction of political action to satisfy our wishes. Also Diem insinuations indicate his knowledge of U.S. officials familiar with coup planning. 2. Knowledge of Generals' coup planning by at least two civilians outside of government would indicate sufficient talking in Saigon so that at least some of the plans ak are known to Diem and Nhu. 3. The security measures are an improvement. 4, Analysis of SVN forces in Saigon area indicate three groups; “neutral, pro-government, which is probably the largest and pro-coup which is smaller but still a larger force than in August. 5. Discussion <‘toassesse «! prospects of a coup. Miiteprobable that action will be postponed. from time to time for favorable developments. On the other hand a coup attempt could be nm de momentarily. 6. If successful political difficulties will follow and confusion ‘will exist for a protracted period. HW 53217 DBoclId: 32401375 Page 20