480-10442-10154 ‘as a. yy Reproduced from the holdings of the National Archives HSCA cre 4 G. 233) vt 2° de bar ay 20024 €202) S5%-29n5 wf BoC. o WASUTHOTOU, i ain REPORTERS WSR ERS , Sie, ’ 9A Pr STRENT, oO ET LU LL ataete oTalicat Sememamen 0a wpentinenthnkatatiy oon anele 18 a emaes te mee “lon Soe fda poe mew oan at eS Wt ee 1S a4 Se A telling Headquarters, for some reason, of the 9/27 contact. I do not mean to suggest that the reason is sinister or innocent, but according to cable traffic, the Mexicg city station, anyway, is not telling you about it. Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA number 211. Mr. Scelso. What was the nature of that 9/27 contact? Mr. Goldsmith. If you would like, you can review the transcript again. Essentially, it was a conversation between ajc we tbe . Sogtet Duran and Soviet Embassy, or consulate officials in respect to Oswald's obtaining a visa and the problem of obtaining a visa. Reading through CIA number 211, can you identify that? . Mr. Scelso. I suppose this was We ed nee eb eee Se tamn Mr. Goldsmith. Correct. -Why. do you think that, in paragraph 3, the person send~ * 150% ras aware of Oswald's contact to be important? The fact that he was aware ing the cable consideréd the fact that{ ti of it, and passing the information along would be important? Mr. Scelso. You get into a psychological question. Tre Chief of Station is called in to speak to y ; | There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador | got there -- no, it wasn't that. It was a very peculife Situ- ad wEpRanUcEe contac 1 eke Va 0186. SEBEL TOG DARL 101U2-/o (S4Y
“any (RG 223) Reproduced from the holdings of the National. Archives HSCA 20024 (202) $56-234$ REPOWTEES SUCLOENG, VASE HGTONI, 9, ¢, Sv, TAO PTH SPREE, s. | rhis caused no great problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten. | 3 | + 4 Mr. Goldsmith. Thomas Mann? s : Mr. Scelso. Yes. He was a very fine guy and recognized. 5 | the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador, 7 | Mr. Friedman, tried to cut ‘Winn Scott out of contact with}:the . | a | whereupon ¢ | in Winn Scott: and said, I want you to send a cable tol€h ‘HOUSE ]eelling them I am not ‘going to deal with this jackass, © I want to deal only with you. So, the result was, eventually, Winston Scott and Ambassador Friedman went to[the White House bina talked to [ President Johnson Jana straightened the whole thing out in favor of Winston Scott. So Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that. is aware of our ]. Mr. Goldsmith. Heshould have been since it was a Mr. Scelso. Yes. But you do not always know whether a1 | he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. nite is just significant that the person calls you in and says, 23 | here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing. { 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 210. Would zs : you please read that? 49 01865 SiGe ; ALGIZSOM ZTFSCRATING COMP ote
a 7 ray Reproduced from the holdings of the National Archives Hsca (RG 233) 270024 (202) $54-2 405 Hoe, "On, ~ ® Lea enn PPO Tees HOTLD ENG, WV, S. Sane, 340 7TH wr) ds eRe oa tse bbe tomy LS SL SUA ceed hecho seams hal g Sebel tem Stat bE ns iSh Seelnles tend dete Zale bh otc lace atime sondage tds Sane ntti et Sy wy Seas nt Sinai aeeninmenmetnts nin inonn cha enamine we fas inno . : wo ovo ba ceueaaiane © 6 sya a amet me ee Sates Si tl Tea hate cle Sol tl oo ale SSS a enentn aeertecre: de tebeainneetcteeerard at poe ~85 (Pause) Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Would you identify this document? Mr. Scelso. This is a cover sheet for the cable from the Mexico station. Mr. Goldsmith. The cover Sheet to the cable we just ‘referred to? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Winn Scott here indicates, due memo } Mr. Scelso. It is addressed to this person who is of my meeting with supposed to write a memo on it. Mr. Goldsmith. Scott? That is Scott's signature. Mr. Scelso. Yes, he writes it back to himself and reminds himself to write a memo on it. Mx. Goldsmith. Did you ever see the memo? Mr. Scelso. I do not think so. Mx. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Scott about his meeting with[Zitensor? | Mr. Scelso. I do not recall having done so. Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, by this time, the Mexico City station still had not informed Headquarters of the 9-27 contact? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA 213. Would Pt BE SEGRE! ALC TIR SON ZLEORTING SoMa
Gab ba iar 3 tay meme crete 2 tet BLE Re EEE hee cement fn 4 tow nets ates pmo om ens aha 20024 (202) $5n-23n$ <> eee ae ee ee fee eee oe et a sme pene nite eee tS oad 3 Be Acres aes Sel ache eS bem ess ema nabs ant me meonEINED I Gy epeteie space hic, TOU, . * CASHIN By Reproduced from the holdings of the National Archives Hsca (RG 223) a REPOMPTERS WOELDEME, “i, S. Oe ae . os Bae Wk Leena Setermcmneteinny einen nial GAN atte Cota oe ote ew 290 yr STREET, (Pause) Mr. Scelso. This was all on the same day. Mr. Goldsmith. The cable traffic was pretty neavy on that day, I would imagine. Mr. Scelso. Right. Mr. Goldsmith. This cable is the first time that the Mexico City station informs Headquarters about Oswald's 9/27 contacts. | Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that there is any connec- tion between the fact that this contact was recorded after the Mexico City station became aware of the fact that] Litenser knew about Oswald's contacts? Mr. Scelso. I would imagine that there were probably | many -~ several Mexicans [transcribing reels transcribing things and some got finished before others. Mr. Goldsmith. This was months ago. The conversations. have been transcribed and reviewed months earlier. Mr. Scelso. What are the numbers of the various cables: They were all going out in a series. They may have had several analysts in the Mexico Station working on them. One said you take this one and write a cable and the other said you take that one and write a cable, and so on, and they went out and went into the COMM Center and the COMM Center sent them out in some order. Here. : : 101867