180-10142-1005 . Qn Vfl ee A "De. “by OS ON, j VA” focuta infi OXML 2270 Lt ; As discussed in an earlier section of this report, 1 the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's production fro . in Mexico City until an advancei/stage in its investiga- tion. The record reflects that Mssrs. Willens, Slawson, _ . SeonCp RSea tea Ci lees € a prac canf and Coleman did not review the production“until they visited Mexico City on April 9,_1964. At that time,. they reviewed a number oF om the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. These , \fincluded one call to the > Soviet Embassy on September 21g believed to have been Ue made by Oswaldy two calls made by Silvia Duran from the Chae Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call =e the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassyq made by an uni- dentified caller. (Cite S4jwson memo of April 21, 1864.) On September 28 thé | -cdoratde Confer ‘by Siti | oo tne sovies VW Maw hs call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet foun : : any Consulate. (Cite.) . \ fA ttn lay On October 1 el weep jpoordd to GOW? calls made by a persok 1a or ified as uee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.) The Commission representatives were also supplied pie th two conversations that d between the Cuban President Dortic@Sand the p ‘* Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations ve | { concerned Silvia Duran's arrest, whether Oswald had been J Ley \. | x fv rt Jt pr + od qo /CL-(Ov5@
fi offered money while at the Cuban Embassy ,and the general state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22, 1964, pp. 45~46). sea etavees =: mma a Seite ariel r Te The Comm ettels eos = review of CIA files Spr gpeement eer ome fandom gihlirg ey poorat€dn ef Slawson's Te crouatiecenpancs proviaea to and reviewed by ths Commission. $2 On-< sugrert Slawson's record iS blind memorandum #@ entitled "Material 1 pi” Lora document, re from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald cr vu File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This Bd we document records that the Warren Commission was shown ‘calls /e Wl made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. These includedthreeotWh nw Corl BsFak pons : iis COI peaRe eee... September 27 listed above, one call of September 28, wre calls of October 1, and one call of a October fe < J a While this”does not correspond to the listing of J 2, : calls: set forth by Slawson, it does independently establish - = Beran | that ino “calls November 22, 1963 were shown to ' is the Warren Commission. : acta “In addition, this document corroborates the showing fn bey ae of the two Dorticas“Armas conversation$o£ November 26, ee Cv Py representatives in an effort to determine if a transcript , of the Calderon conversation was ever shyon to the Warren
provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commis- sion; secondly, wey didn't the Agency reveal to the War- ° ren commission these full knowledge of Calderon's intel- -ligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus. ws -' he first question can be explained in benign terms. ue It is reasonably possible that by- sheer oversight the per conversation was filed away and not recovered or recol-~ etplanaxi See HRS Praarigg's pet tnns thexwpesetbaby a CalAeron 6 COC cuthatever the truth may bo? the conversation did #ex6 - pe and the transfipst was not provided the Warren Com- ¥ riches, ar lected until after the Warren Commission had completed a < f “its investigation and published Posey However, this 4 conversation could have also beer withbeld @ j A has leer nratol.e The Committee . fhe Committee can state, however, that Ne. vot mission. . As for the_question hureddading #4 withholding 7) J of information concerning Calderon's intelligence back- ground, the record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (Cite 5 May memo.) The memoranda which providedmore ex~ tensive examination of -her intelligence background were not made available for the Commission’ s review. Signifi-. Brose Horses au cantly, the May 8 memorandum written by following his debriefing df AMMUG-1 indicated that AMMUG-1
(Cal deren and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed We to be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information S was not provided the Warren Commission either because a there was no basis in fact for the allegation or becaus coun “ the allegation was in fact true. Le the allegation brs were true, the conseguences for the CIA would have been serious, for Tt woul demonstratedthat a CIA operative, Fe | well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed ine pnt 4 formation prior to the assassination regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to Cuban intelligence that Gervices possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. | | ( an § Regarding ge possible association with the CIA, e. maaanerre tam fse—y ev, eercd y f les reveal@ no ostensible connection between Calderon and ye oN Mer the CIA. However, there are indications that such contact | between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A ‘September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Spe- cial Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City states in part: “...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in identify the sister, our domestic exploita- tion section might be in a position to follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement n (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. ( 19935, Sept. 1, 1963) ia Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of — 7 | Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further
An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that: / Wilfredo of. the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear. 1049, July 31, 1965) At the very least, the above dispatcheg evidenceA an interest in Calderon's ‘activities and those of her | family. Whether this interest took the form of a clan- destine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file. The Committee has queried the author of the above- cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be con- tacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section." “David Ronis, the-d+spattirs~artior, was a member of the CIk's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote ‘the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was hen responsible for.recruitment and handling of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field_stations for information or leads on various persons. /-ag¢m%m- he would receive no lak pare ae SS atued hq pubs pp Sheree =
i‘ Y *~ response to these requests. / It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Stafé. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sis- ter. Ronis told the Comm#tee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intel- ligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not. recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis | stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August 31,.1978) Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been asso- ciated with the CIA. The uniform. answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August 9, 1978, p- 136; Rocca, Dep.-p.148, July 17, sarge Interview of August__: Piccolo, Interview of_) | CuilAtror™ Thus , the Agency’ file 7 and the testimony of former CIA employee? fovea tho connection 4 Calderon 2 the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this So file Trae ths An ey eodecoSé hep ir E men G the most glaringemission beingfth® txuacmemismeeem> Cedcsxorr' s heveryptic remarks following the assassination of President Kennedy.
is a bona fide defector or that-.he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (Langosch memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964) As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B }s 68894 24 April 64)... Phis—seetien . was responsibile for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El. Salvador. (Personal Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April 64) Ue Che dont Med foc - A-1 krew-who-were the Cuban ‘intelligence officers assigned to Mexico City. In this regaxd he intially ers identified Alfredo MigabaT, Manuel, (md Rogel édriguez and the ComitSrcial attaché as DGI officers posted at the Cuban E Fin Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described ' A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows: In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intel- ligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debrief- ing of A-1, 30 April 64)
y° ~5- for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (Brief, May 14, 1964, FOIA 695-302A). _ oa. x ‘At Tab E of MeGenets brief it states: Within the past week, significant information has been developed by the CIA regarding the re- lationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intel- ligence personnel in Mexico,City and the reac~ tion in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in . ‘the course of being briefed on the Cuban as-~-. pect (cite supra May 14, 1964 FOTA 695-302A). The significant information referred to therein is the information A-1 provided. The conc (urory On May 15, 1964, the. day of €me Melones “interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communica- tion regarding A-1. However, the Agenfty did not at that time identify A-l by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the. source of ‘this ‘information was. a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. _ (See May 15 Letter from Helms to Rankin FOIA_). The May 15 communication did state that in (& the Agency had established contact "with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direcion General de Intelligencia." (Cite) Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 re~ bee Trttere t {
garding A@1's knowledge of Oswald's probabl@ contact with the DGI in Mexico City. (Cite above.) The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI ~— Digufilarce | | As set forth in the section of the report concerning | Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the information set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the questionsSe the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a de- ETERS re fector collaborating with the CIA: (cite Arthur Dooley Reno, | LI. pfs Jr memo, 19 June 1964, FOIA 739-319). f Ld pater Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Com- mittee has determined that(Significant information wegard- ing Luisa Calderon was withheld from the Warren Commission (Cite Calderon section). This information was derived se from Jon. debriefings of A-1. (Cite May 7 and 8 Langosch memos.) From the Committee's review of the A-1 file pro- vided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible auton > evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1l Jing to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that fare specific documents referenced in the A-1 file 7 not present in that file. One S ; He missing item“of considerable concern to the Committee ;
C'A HAS No | DECLASSFiga re ON TO EOF THIS acu r Ar rifhact — -7- hs is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case." intepatcf 035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-l debriefing reports. (Cite supra.) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report ‘ is the handwritten ration "SI." A CIA employee who has , | pat A a Comm te worked extensively with the Agency files system heddorwed Chath rn Cm ae * sat ita Sy mba l Ava f jen oer as this notation +6 stand—fer the CIA component Special In- [fe ~ telligence. ornexccrarrepresentativespebieved, che pbb ok __tion.te—stand—for_theCiA-camponent—Seesiatinteltagente. f ad Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a re- oe ference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In oD . apt a CIA memorandum dated , it as stated om oy Quote Barbara's memo. vel to , . . 2 av spare . ee The Agency has been unable to Locate this document _ and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the substance of the missing materials. The Committee has queried A-1l's case officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied boys Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August . 2k, 1978), he did not have contact with the Warren Commission I and does not know what information derived from A-l's de- briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (Cite also Nie eta eee poeen ine ARNE PE RNONRO TET TIO ONE OO LT OR § BPE OY Peed hemes RTP AS. Aten AO NE AO Naan ooh RUHR MER PD Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does not
~-<1A HAS NO OBJECTION TO . LASSIFICATION ANDIOR Cee ASE OF TH DOCLIMENT Wr ~ 8 - recall cha eget provided any other oak berths gepaid's fertin sth D6 era "es contact with the DGT other than ord atte nosSne Cite€ anterview. ) Ina _— effort to clarify the substance of informa- A—! - tion that-2eese provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the ' a _ «Committee has attempted to locate hak. The CIA has also _— aia “ “yattempted to locate akuee (give date of separation from CIA) ue cat ‘but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts. ade A Thus, gaps do exist regarding information AMMUG may Ormation investigative significance #fa broader question remains however. The Agency, as noted earlier did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-l was present in the Washington, D.C. area and under controlled conditions ,accessible to the Le tf. / jv yrs tne Coons herdheoan Commission. Even—-eonsidering. the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's status was 40,8. as ee not disclosed oraclosed. the Warren Commission from exercising a a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 wae : ws ¥ . as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On vO uh , a Sane *" this issue, as the written record tends “to shows, the Agency ve Pe asso lty exe casas “ut yw unilaterally rejpcted theP® nT tion Ne chould-not ee aw? . Boa d-not~fabfyrin ASL" S7 Case, the ar Sbkems weston isha ee it-ata-wirth Noserko. . light of the establishment of A-1's bone fias* (Cite Langosch's quote supora), his proven reliability and aS ae his Hate of peselt Rau of Cuban intelligence ctivities ). PASE - Fo Opa 7 ay whe lh card |.08.,, Coe Bi if bos, NU war ro ; . ate ON RGHe adi Ulery Lent vio oppo ORG BY Foe TG
THE AMLASH OPERATION . During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (67 IGR pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation i involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA . cryptonym AMLASH/1) who | CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate during 1962 while meeting with a be Fidel Castro (1967 IGR p.84). As a result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency sub- sequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material Cc  Suppert—designed ised liminate Pidel Castro. (1967 IGR Jat pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the yer CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks (1967 IGR we . pp. 104-106). During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators pl + were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. 4on AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (1967 IGR pp. 107-110). | | | | In its examination of the AMLASH operation #9 the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and in- “direct support for AMLASH's plotting (1967 IGR p. 80). The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of sup- port to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states:
“pregreemeneets py it is likely that at the very moment Presi- dent Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meet- ing with a Cuban agent in Paris and givinghim an assassination device for use against CASTRO. (1967 IGR p. 94) The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the MRLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Report adés note that, in 1965, when AMLASH was tried in “Havana court, November 1964 was given as the Ao oS tse . Sa tiare~etbowieteeh AMLASH's ACtionS. wesentdwede to CIA saxppert . (1967 IGR p. 111) The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC, Book V, pp.2~-7, 67-69) The Church Committee concluded: “the AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission work thadyj the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots, the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation: could clearly be traced - to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investigated a
~ 3- connection between the AMLASH operation and President Kennedy's assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation of questions of AN Cuban government or Cuban: exile involvement in the assassination. (Church Committee, Book V, Final Report, p. 5) - In 1977, the CIA issuegea a second Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report ,in large part ,was in- tended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states: The. Report (of the Church Committee) assigns zt (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2) The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot and that the treatment of the issue by the church Committee was both imprecise and misleading. sore rh (19771 IGR Tab D, p. 28) 7 : a - Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:
It—shertd-be-notedthat Richard Helms, ofia regular basis, to be an assassination plot (Richard Helms, it would have served to reinforce the credi- bility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenue of investigation). The CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most then saw in general terms~-the possi- bility of Soviet or Cuban involvement assasSination because of the tensions. time. It is not enough to be able to erroneous criticisms made today. The should have taken broader initiatives well. That CIA employees at the time as they obviously did--that the activities - about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (1977IGR p. 11) level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation te—heyve~been relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, , 389-391, 2) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before theifConni ttee that the AMLASH operation was not designed sion testimony, 8/9/78 pp. 26-27), A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph bangoseh who in 1963 was the Chief of © Counterintelli ence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (hereinafter SAS). During 1963, the Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations di- wap rected against ‘the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intel- ligence Services (HSCA Affidavit of Langosch, as the highest testified to the Rockefeller Commission Executive Ses~
1978, p.1) The Special Affairs Staf¢ was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible for the AMLASH operation (Church Report, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) Langosch as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Af- fairs Staff was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly » the Cuban Intelligence Services. (HSCA staff, r supra) It was Langosch's, recollection that the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA. Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and . that the information upon which Langosch based his conclu- | sion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials including Desmond Fitzgerald. (HSCA Langosch Affidavit p. 4 supra) However, the issue before this Committee is not: simply whether the AMLASH operation was an assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more Significant issue, as the 1977IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission.
f-evo’dgs vith PASE Pin Negpain$$ & ~6- In the case of the AMLASH operation thg$ determina- tion is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objecitves. Based upon the presently available evidence it | is the Committee's position that such information, if made . , t aha available to the Warren Commission, mey have stimulated the Commission's/investigative concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. — As J. Lee Rankin commented before this Committee: ...when I read...the Church Committee's report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to,be met and then either blame the rest oft on somebody else or not tell any moré or polish it off. TI don't think that could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better change of getting to the heart of it. It might have only revealed that we are involved in all these things and who is involved in it and who approved it and all that. But lI think that would have at least come out. (Rankin p. 91) The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed gto the Warren ¥ rte mniSS12T Wan ie OX Commission, t"mey have been Sble to foreclose the, specu; met rater MATA OGLE in SHR lation and conjecture that a Bs e'! footnote to the turbulent relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.
I. Scope of Study . Dv, iow otha she bre the: Berk - Write-ups phe | aa of fe a att, pees ron trv aboot propery ar ovfhiw + On April 23, 1976 the Senate Select Committee FO Abwieod og Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC) issued its <t report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination cee : of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelli- \ gence Agencies." This report set forth a limited study of those federal agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, that provided assistance to the Warren Commission in its investi- gation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. In particular, the SSC examined the relevancy of certain information pertaining to alleged assassination plots by the CIA against Fidel Castro and the withholding of this information from the Warren Commis- sion. The SSC conclusions pertaining to these alleged CIA sponsored assassination picts have generated additional public and private inquiries regarding the substance and quality of information reported by the CIA to the Warren Commission. During 1977, the CIA issued a report prepared by the Agency's Inspector General (hereinafter 77IGR). This report was intended to be, in large part, a rebuttal to -the findings of the SSC pertaining to alleged CIA sponsored
assassination plots. The 7ifter response concluded: 1) That the SSC Book V final report "contains nu- ‘merous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected operation (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it 'pre- sents"; 2) "While one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept, Book V of the Senate Se- lect Committee Final Report went to such lengths in its treatment as to detract from the point ~ at hand. It is difficult to characterize it more generously.* (CIA 77IGR, p. 9) The 77/tGR further concluded that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of limited effort by the CIA to as- Sigt the Warren Commission in its work. The 77/IGR was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the ssc findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect in- formation in support of the Warren Commission. ' Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports." (Introduction to Tab E of 77t6R) . * The 77 IGR comments regarding Warren Commission lack of . knowledge of anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. government will be addressed at lenii: in another section of this report.
“ ' ypu , In order “t furthe: demonstrate athe scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77fGR com piled a comprehensive listing of CIA generafited material provided to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. In this eespee u. Committee agrees with the 4 77 IGR wherein it is stated that "This compilation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveal$ something of the results of that effort." ° (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab EB) Therefore, in order to examine the broad issue of the CIA's scope and quality of support to the Warren Com- mission in both an objective and disciplingwpf manner, the Committee has reviewed in detail the 77 IGR's listing of <j spaces TLE ATT RN A ct SO ARN ng as information’#ertaining to the assassinatiog provided the Warren Commission and the U.S. Intelligence Communit The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, whether the misinforming or withhold- ing of evidence from the Warren Commission was the result of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employes,
Ca h pores ove / Jos a, Te eM Chae te an : val has wbenpreparea which illustrates the flow of written in- . bn ; : ; formatio ; 's assassina~ ee — tion ko the Warren Commission and the U.S. intelligence community. Thisephart eee the CIA' s sme desig- © grchdocumerts réts the - nation ™ggand subject matter of each document, t the date of enel, doeiurvertts » thechartalso jndfcat vamowmimmns. d¢sseminatka waa “whether Jame was nade available aka OITOT to the Warren Commission ag) the U.S. Tatelligence communityerloeth , " Sec onhnky F Purgest oF we 1S re #his chart sim @ indicat&hsem for selected subjects the volume of information provided to the U.S. “Intelligence community as opposed to the Warren Commission, During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the re- 4 view of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising approximately ninety his volumes. pave been, examined and analyzed by +i Commi tt ce, Hr prep coring semste The findings set forth herein are subject to modification due to the following considera-
tions. During the course of the past fifteen years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system, certain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. Whether these docu- mentS@ ave Gerely zither as the feat been filed incorrectly or destroyed, stage , gaps ae bart any tr en ce fo rher 2 xf fe, Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of relevancy . +h eat and this Ceri mittee , regulation ox(individual whi = de in the written’ record gf still exist. adopted by certain files requested by the Committee for — review have either not been made available by the Agency t or have been made available to the Committee in a sani- w/ tized fashion. Therefore, to the degree reflected by the hn Agency's denial of access and/or sanitization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the aeckOnu, best evidence available to the Committee though this may not be all rele$vant evidence to which the Agency has access. One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance of these discussions, briefings, and meetings Tey ge not always reflected by the written record made the
subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session stkt andme mers hearings with key Warren Commission and former or present felue fem ems hat ag CIA representatives in an effort to at eddrssred | phe wetter dg: “by emai-means—of—communication. The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject for discussion herein. Lr ma II. ayn Warren Commission relationshi Re RNaN Nannies with CIA regarding in- ation made available b CIA. to Warren _commissio cae criti Bae St oO oe ueaetemrene 2 TT a rat The Committee has, Gaeried both representatives of tn a ~~-—~the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of { oS _the CIA. who played significant roles in providing CIA gen- x eratedinformation to the Warren Commission. the-Géneral ult consensus of choge<queriea | was ‘that: the Warren Commission ee J° 9 and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship dur- ov Reakin Ww : ae we ing the course of ‘the Commission's investigation Get! > He Yor | may ro wa Depo of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18) William Coleman, a senior bo staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely on ; . ae) with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawsong on phen matters which é qe the CIA's Gist resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. (See HSCA staff interview 8/2/78). Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's
cooperation and quality of work. (Executive Session Testi-_ mony of W. David Slawson, November 15, 1977, p. 17, see also JFK exh. 23.) J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Com- mission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured that the Agency would cooperate in its ‘ work. (HSCA deposition of J. Lee Rankin, August 17, 1978, Classified, p. 4). John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA deposition of John McCone, August 17, r. McCone testified that he was personally esponsible for determining whether Lee Harvey Oswald was Vi) ran ever associated with the Agency. Mr. McCone was esrenety \? responsible for ensuring that all relevant matte were : . fa im conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commissio (McCone a . 7 deposition pp. 5-6) Mr. McConevfturther>testified that: +e t . Guo The policy of CIA was to give the Warren Com- Lege mission everything that we had. I personally 7) asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my of- phe fice and took him down to the vault of our fea building where our information is microfilmed core and stored and showed him the procedures that ; we were following and the extent to which we NO 7 were giving him--giving his staff everything Cent toy he. that we had, and I think he was quite satis- fen. fied. (McCone Deposition p. 9) ee re ——en
Mr. Raymond Rocca, one of the CIA's key represen- tatives to the Warren Commission during its investigation, also characterized the Agency's role as one of full sup- port to the Warren Commssion. Mr. Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA recalled under oath that Richard Helms had directed thats '/4~ phe [ifhowres Brabve: All material bearing in any way that could be SURE of assistance to the Warren Commission should es be seen by CI staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded indications--they were verbal in so far as I know--that we were to leave no stone unturned. (HSCA Deposition of Raymond Rocca, July 17, 1978, p. 24) Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms’ orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. 64 (Rocea deposition, p. 24) Mr. Rocca concluded, pit a $07 On #81 basis, pire CIA was to turn over and to develop any be re * [eT information bearing on the assassination eA r that could be of assistance to the Warren on hee Commission.” (Rocca deposition, p. 26) y Post -A somehwat different view of the CIA's role regard- ing the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commis-~ sion was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation and who was directly re- sponsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Rocca dep. p.23), testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as pos- M sible to Warren Commission requests. (HSCA Executive Session ri ee,‘ | ye ee Sd Sh ye. he eo AS ; \ Q oon” ? ye ” "\
~ JI - testimony of Richard Helms, August 9, 1978, p.10) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Com- mission. . He stated: An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com- mission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Helms hearing p.10-11) It was Mr. Helms’ recollection that the CIA pro- vided information to the Warren Commission /on the basis meaerly of the Commission's specific requests. Under me he supported this proposition: Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to speci- fic requests by the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms: ‘That is correct. I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which some- thing different might have occured, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them. As far as our volunteering informa- tion is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not. Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a'case by case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren “Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's
Mr. Rankin was sponsibility was simply to respond to questions that Dy Aen nt es were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission. Mr. Rankin testifiedy #4: [rtbes: [check Atk be} ros Gre Ale fit a thet prtcels « cotan, Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission com- municate; with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right , questions and then we would not have the informa- tion and that would be absurd (Rankin deposition p. 4) . Ran kin 's Mr. Slawson added support to 3@™® position testi- (Yar en Copa mission fying that # requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made intially that they give us all in- formation pertinent to the assassination investigation." +2 ad (Slawson Dep. p.29) The unfortynate, consequences Gam SE ions ees gq vere FRY poray @uee@ of not asking/the right questions «mm graphically ger raf illustrated by the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti- oo meinly Po Fe d.O% i ical f= Castro assassination plots (SSC Book V). no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investiga- Nol rf Zev a Ae tion of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. (Rocca gut lind | ls - ee iv OX Dawes p Ww , Lechor. x t nad
kes peanecee pee | +. <4 wht 3 iy at oo | ry) PIR. pins : te oma WSs preret Tesch AN ay doe Picedwee. fypesabstunkil ys a 7 gy Rtvemaskion Cae Reeendaly pad be Castes & SSaS3i ages ore “3 rat qe S : ested to sess oat aban te we off Gihe CIB deck or= ficer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr. Helms to investigate for the CIA, Lee cee eanoknenlent aeTTes ote. : and the assassination of President Kennedy. (Sata deposi- ; tion of John Scelso, May 16, 1978, p.73, 111-112) Mr. | vt Scelso testified that, had he known of such assassination plots; hue. topeils { Marwny «hon world. dave | 4 enn fahen : "we would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would:have had him poly- graphed by the best operative security had to see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, in- forming Castro about our poison pen things, and so on., I would have had all our Cuban sources queried akout it." inve, gtigated Arsthe record witk Baa C1 , these plots | were known by few, <a Mr. Helms’. testimony regarding these plots reveals that the ‘Agency compromised its relevent | _ ec #4 information to the Warren Commissiong this fol icy McCone and General Counsel Rankin had believed“to be in
effect. The following exchange between Committee Gounsel _ ayit and Mr. Helms illustrates the acutesaxea ve the Agency's compromise: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Hams , I take it from your testi- mony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were rele- vant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti=Castro assassination plots. Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations. Mr. Goldsmith: Ifithe Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it. Is that not true? Mr. Helms:. Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I.to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees to to any- place else without the Director's permis- sion. Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whe- ther the Warren Commission should be in- formed of the anti-Castro assassination plots? Mr. Helms: I did ‘not, as far as I recall. Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)
at howled ra Ay? 6S - ty in gg fe eas eth He some , Cohen asked ¢& @ whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarassing the Agency or causing an international tbo wngle + .cris@§ he responded yer rh / Jr "I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot an- swer that question. I have never been satisfied - as to why they withheld the information from me. ee (McCone deposition, p.16) aad kK Thus, the evidence indicates that, @® Helms #empeme to discuss pv formn ts 4 Ye “approached McCone \er' °° ei Warren oo, of past anh on grin cin OMMLSSLON <tyeg 7) ime anti-Castro assassina- deste We Q [nis jobe iam informédsMcCone that plots were still being - _considered by the Agency J Bux sar itelms estimony aa my _ Regarding ‘the © je levanc of such plots to t HERA. Warren Commis $iencourrsil as FS meusson anh have been reported to the Warren ar a Commission.“{See also Spectonn .P- 46) (But see Liebeler depo. yy pt7}) it Rocca testifioa th Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti- “¢ Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the pos- sibility of a retaliatory assassination against President w Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated: v & . Ww I Sy yo ",.-in light of what has happened a completely Po - vy A different procedural approach probably would b dary . x yp yand should have been taken. I. mean, there nent ( hee | a Y are any number of things that one can say in f pee Oo. oe oN ed Lech aa ee Fie Soeur
the light of history. What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep., p.45) ; John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Ken- Ly nedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission: al Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots? Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly re- prehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (Scelso dep., p.153) Agnup conan. fr tk senckily ff Ifil. Introductory Section/SS+M sirroguctory section/SsS+M The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information has been shown to have been dependent upon 1) the availability of information:, ama 2) the complexity of the issues pre- oak Bs) TH ectet te Vt pS t Neb one sented by the request, On ae, point, Mr. Helms testified 1-4o4 est ° ar an an that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission re- f Gna vRV!E a cya quest, the CIA would then send a reply back: age I, "and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others. For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country. Obviously, one takes longer to’ per- form than the other. (Helms Exec. Session hearing, p.25)