: 2 a” ot * > - -SEGREF- s, OIM-97-0010 14 November 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director , Assassination Records Review Board FROM: (U) Deputy Director for Administration Central Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: 4) Required Protection of JFK Act 6 (1) (B) JFK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility 1. SET This memorandum is submitted pursuant to the decision by the Assassination Records Review Board (hereafter “ARRB” or “Board”) to release the term JFK Act 6 (1) (B) in the context of a CIA facility and the Board’s subsequent . decision on 17 November 1997 to reconsider _this issue. It provides additional information as to why JEK Act 6 (1) (B) JEK Act 6 (1) (B) as a CIA facility must be protected from public disclosure and hence the cover of this clandestine facility maintained.* ; a 2. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this document, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, + (S) The documents at issue contain the term however the actual name of the CIA facility a is the : JEK Act 6 (1) (B) In point of fact, even CIA/personnel tend to use the terms interchangeably. : cEK Act 6 (1) (B) CL BY: 0700265 CL REASON: 1.5(c) DECL ON: X1 DRV FM: LOC 5-82 HW 55157 DBocld:32404534 Page 2?
—SEECRE- SUBJECT : SE Required Protection of OPK Ret 6 (1) (By as CIA Facility and to return this memorandum for retention to,Agency | representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations 3. 7:9) As we advised previously, identifiable, and sexibus : damage to the mission, the people and” the very existenc off | could reasonably be expected to” occur as a result of any confirmed affiliation with the Agency. ’ Before examining with particularity the damage that would flow from disclosure, I believe that it would be helpful to. ‘understand /in some detail the activities which currently constitute the[ _}nission and what 7 new, costly and critical activities are being developed for. _] 4. (gf [Jis saat cov na a : for the CIA operating under the relativel: fragile cover of, : pO While it does serve this function, and thus houses at: ‘the site known as[_________]some of the Agency’s most important and sensitive Top Secret Codeword material, it is currently the very heart of the CIA’s worldwide communications effort, a critical © 7 (8) Pursuant to classification guidelines promulgated by the Director of Central Intelligence, this fact is currently and properly classified at the SECRET level. “ - . . 3 (S$) Because of the sensitivity of CIA records, ‘the Archivist_of the United States has authorized the CIA to maintain this| / | |£or both [t—t~—s—SCSCis;i ding ultimate transfer to_the National Archives no sooner than 50 years after their origination. This currently houses nearly[~ ~~ ]oubic feet of records classified up to and including Top Secret codeword and composed of various media ranging from paper to original. imagery. from our national aerial and satellite surveillance platforms. In addition, Also houses the CIA’s[___]which would provide the only basis for continuity of operations should disaster befall CIA headquarters. In addition and because of the security offered, theL__| serves a similar role for the National Security Council and the Office of the Management and Budget. HW 55157 Docld:324045354 Page 3
HW 55157 UPEK Act 6 (1) (B) SEGRE x. SUBJECT: SS Required Protection of as CIA Facility element in our foreign signals intelligence effort, anda principal location for training and conferencing of officers engaged in highly clandestine technical intelligence collection activities. The facilities at ‘in support of these efforts include: JFK Act 6 (1) (B) DoclId: 327404534 Page 4
SECRET SUBJECT : Required Protection of JFK Act 6 (1) (8) as CIA Facility JFK Act 6 (1) (B) e members and staff from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. JFK Act 6 (1) (B) HW 55157 DBocld:32404534 Page 5
HW 55157 [Tena tee Save critical SEGRE SUBJECT: Sr) Required Protection of | as CIA Facility . JFK Act 6 (1) (B)/ ar, As detailed on the attached annotated Pp element for the clandestine intelligence collection m: the CIA and the United States. Whether sending a me covert foreign national asset in Havana, or receivin message from the CIA Chief of Station infor support ii military and diplomatic representatives in Bosnia,| jis” la ke element in that effort. Moreover, it is extremely vulnerable to hysical attack because of the proximity of uncontrolled publ roads and spaces. Accordingly, and as’considered in’ more detai in paragraph 6 below, any affiliation of[ | with the CI no matter how insignificant the individual occurrence or docume release may seem, has the very real potential to jeopardize 1 es, negatively affect the Agency mission, and thereby do harm to the national security of the United States. 6. 5-9) But in’ ‘addition to this established ™m extant risks, there’are new activities at[__ Jin direct support of the nation’s leadership which must be considered specifically, the,’ ‘establishment of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) L__________________]an¢ an chosen to be the primary[___|given its location, communications, information services, and life_support capabilities. Needless to say, the fact ep suport an officially recognized CIA facility adds a dimension of secrecy which will be needed to enable the DCI to continue his work during any emergency situation. Additionally, active consideration is being given to also designating[___ las the 5 —SEEREF DoclId: 327404534 Page 6
HW 55157 —SEECRET . . > SUBJECT : Ww Required Protection of] ~ as CIA Facility Agency’s primary TUPK Act ,6 (1) 1B) f ff Given. the amount of time, money and~ ‘resources which will be expended to insure that the facility is maintained : ‘in such | a way that it will be prepared for any emergency situation, it would certainly be in the best interests. of the US Government not/ to permit any official affiliation, no. matter how. minor, /of land the CIA. 7. ae-9) The preceding descriptions. ‘of! ‘ongoing and planned activities at fpresents, I believe, an intuitive sense of the damage to national security which would’ “follow from a linking of ‘with CIA.. In sum, the conduct of covert communications and support activities as well as the presence of officers who will soon be serving overseas under cover in highly sensitive \ positions can not take place at a facility linked to CIA. But there are some very specific damage . issues that I wish to highlight and they include: e (8S) Serious. and Immediate / ‘Impairment to Physical. and allows _us to maintain a relatively low profile in the community and a very low profile outside of: the immediate area. tfL__]became recognized as a CIA facility, the increased visibility and scrutiny would | place employees, facilities, and daily operations at greater risk. In sum, would become an easy “target of opportunity” for the media, foreign counter- / intelligence agents, terrorist and militia activities, | demonstrators, and emotionally unstable individuals. Facts, examples, and specific concerns include: DoclId: 327404534 Page 7?
HW 55157 SEGRE SUBJECT: {J Required Protection of JPK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility maintains security through a low profile.’ In the past in the United States, identification of CIA facilities have led to a number of surreptitious entries, bombings, and physical disruptions. Simply stated, CIA is a target for both hostile individuals and organizations;° e On the individual level and in the past three years,[__]has_ experienced an increase in_securit incidents including. a physical breach - off d compound security, two ‘suspect package incidents,,. and additional unsolicited contacts _and | "gate turn-around" incidents;’ “OPK Act 6 (1) (B) , Y) As detailed on the attached annotated photographs, the array of communications equipment and its proximity to public spaces and _roads_is clear. For example, JEK Act 6 (1) (B) 8 A8f The current Kasi prosecution provides ample evidence of the risks posed by the public identification of CIA domestic facilities. Any individual intent upon seeking retribution for perceived wrongs quite naturally seeks a target providing the largest possible public notice and while CIA headquarters is an excellent target, a covert facility is even a better target, anda covert facility supporting the foreign espionage activities of the CIA is the best possible target for a political and public statement. ; 3%) The breach of compound security was by an out-of-state vehicle which followed an employee through a remote gate and the driver had no credible. explanation for their actions; the incident is considered suspicious and ‘unexplained. The suspect package incidents include a box which was placed (not dropped) next to our facility which we believe was intended to test and thus observe our response to suspicious packages. Gate turn-arounds number 8- 10 per month and include only those vehicles which ignore clear signs that they are entering a classified government facility but proceed in any event to our gate; it is instructive to note that, very few of these individuals state 7 _ SEGRE DoclId: 327404534 Page 6
HW 55157 SUBJECT: if) —SEGRET Required Protection of JEK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility JEK Act 6 (1) (B) Moreover, in the past several years, th federal government has had a heightened~ ‘awarenes of the violent domestic organization” threat’ ‘posed by: the self-styled “militias” which have a sta ed intent to destroy government communications capabilities and facilities. We know, from information provided by federal law enforcement au that the target list of such organizat ons includes federal communications centers and By way of ‘examples in this’ ‘regard, i June of this. year, the Sheriff of fd i reported to information regarding, first, a local militia group, and, second, "unusual" comments from individuals living near [7 denat we were communicating with UFO's; Any higher profile’ would “realistically and seriously threaten the: physical and personnel security of L___ ] And;/as evidenced. by the. attached map StL] such threats do not need to penetrate the fence Tine: Agency officials are of the opinion that a bomb commensurate with the one which exploded at the Oklahoma ‘City federal building could do substantial damage to the Agency’s communications equipment and could kill numerous federal employees at[___|from outside the fence line in circumstances we do not control and- could not prevent. or imply that they know that[ is a CIA facility and, hence, it would appear that our cover, DoclId: 32404534 in fact, is quite good. Page 9
HW 55157 SUBJECT: {8 Required Protection of JFK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility $6) Likely Future Compromise of Covert Employees - in Overseas Assignments: As discussed above, numerous CIA employees involved in communications, technical intelligence collection, and human intelligence collection train and operate at[___}for the’ exact reason that it provides a secure environment disassociated from the CIA. We know from ample evidence that foreign intelligence services have as a primary “goal the identification of US citizens who appear to be ordinary public servants or private business people but are, in actuality, clandestine intelligence officers. x0 Simply stated, the identification of this facility with CIA will label any and every individual associated’ asa likely intelligence officer and thus substantially negate their operational ability if not place their dives in jeopardy. -- whether they be for. the President or Cabinet officials -- have value only as long as their identity is secret. The public disclosure of the fact that[ _|would serve as such an -- which could come from a general compromise of asa CIA facility plus subsequent visual surveillance -- would negate Agency planning in this regard, vitiate expenditures, and leave the Agency witha few realistic options for survivability. We must assume that any MI We know from captured STASI (the former intelligence service of East Germany) and clandestinely-acquired KGB files that substantial resources have been directed at such identifications. Typically, a suspect American will be. surveilled for some time in order to identify his or her target and cooperating foreign nationals. To identify a communicator is one of the highest priorities since it provides a possible entrée to cryptographic compromise as well as an opportunity to “roll-up” or identify the numerous human intelligence collection officers who rely on that particular communicator to transmit information back to the United States. DoclId: 327404534 Page 10
HW 55157 SUBJECT: 9) Required Protection of JFK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility (1) (B) entity which had the willingness and Gapability to attack the CIA would be inclined to- 4nflict the maximum damage. Identification of[__]even as a generic CIA facility poses an unacceptable risk to this key aspect to CIA continuity of operations. —a ° (8) Potential Compromise of Classified Communications or Technical Collection Platforms: In addition to the foregoing payescas threat to our communications facilities (e.g., the potential to destroy towers, satellite dishes and transmitting facilities by terrorist act), the disclosure off jas the / ‘transmit and receive _ site for CIA classified communications to sites as well as ‘in the field presents a significant opportunity’ for any number of foreign nations to enhance their signals and communications intelligence efforts at our expense. While the scope and classification levél of this memorandum does not permit a detailed discussion, I am convinced that this disclosure would make[ Ja target of hostile foreign intelligence services. : JFK Act 6 (1) (B) a se The official term for such procurements is JEK Act 6 (1) (B) which means that the tangible items purchased cannot be traced to CIA -but only to a non-sensitive_government _agenc For example, if an officer is assigned undercover to JFK Act 6 (1) (B) then it would be most imprudent to carry a personal computer and a cellular telephone which could easily be traced to CIA At a minimum, that officer would be subject to foreign counter-intelligence surveillance and all of his or her contacts compromised (i.e., identified.and neutralized). 10 DoclId: 327404534 Page 11
—SEGREF SUBJECT: SBI Required Protection of JFK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility If the[ cover is eroded due. to affiliation with the Agency, past procurements. could be retroactively compromised while subsequent procurement activity would necessitate involving. head uarters elements, indirect delivery and forwarding’ tol] The. loss of response time would negatively ‘impact on the operational capabilities fo) fL___|tenant organizations. is often used as a conference facility not only by Agency groups, but also by other us Government organizations. For example, Secretary of State Warren Christopher's pre-planning session for the Bosnian Peace Accord Talks was held at[____]based’ on the need for a discreet location in which Department of State (DoS) officials, to include two ambassadors, and the military could secretly discuss strategic planning: without undue attention (media coverage). If/CIA affiliation is acknowledged in any way,[____]value to the entire US Government is greatly diminished. Additionally, its value to the Agency is also diminished in that personnel from OED and other operational elements who use this facility would be running a greater risk of exposure and “ cover compromise if they visited iSince access roads can be monitored and registration lists,and/or luggage tags can be obtained at hotels used to accommodate some of these visitors, their association with the CIA would be much harder to. protect. e ‘#° Heightened Scrutiny of Classified Mission: For more than 40 years,[__ | We have been a good "neighbor" and have developed close working relationships throughout the town. To confirm what many have suspected but could never prove (or what a few “knew” but willingly protected) will have a negative 11 HW 55157 DBocld:32404534 Page 12
HW 55157 —SEECREF- SUBJECT: {8} Required Protéction of JEK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility impact on our credibility and will create an “open season” for the local media and others as they quite naturally attempt to learn any and all aspects of our mission -- those clandestine officers who could come and go previously with little notice will now be a highly = visible target.” is an integral part of their concerns must also be taken into consideration. They have_advised of their. significant concerns that a_loss of[ wid lead to the mis-identification of[__|communicators * as CIA officers. They have stated that it’ is: the fact of the current cover which. permits them to: train[___]communicators alongside Agency. communicators at a very efficient- cost .~.The only ‘solution to the’ loss of cover would be to move the communications school to. another location, a very costly. endeavor in | both time and money. - Lf 8. {8J In summary, it is my considered judgment that the’ release of the term ewhich will create an affiliation of and the CIA, would cause »major disruptions to CIA operations, possible physical harm to CIA facilities and personnel, and hence identifiable and serious damage to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Board defer release of such information. In doing so, I am mindful of the Board’ s mission 12 er It is not unreasonable to believe that the loss of cover © tor[ wou require a five fold increase in physical security personnel vee fo and even then security could not be ensured given the proximity of the facility to public spaces and roads. 12 DoclId: 327404534 Page 13
HW 55157 —SECREF- SUBJECT: (S) Required Protection of JFK Act 6 (1) (B) as CIA Facility and the necessity for the American public to have the fullest possible disclosure regarding the assassination of President Kennedy, however, I believe that this reference is not relevant to the public’s understanding and that disclosure would cause harms significantly disproportionate to any public benefit. . 9. (U) If the Board should have any questions with regard to this matter, I have asked Lee Strickland, who serves as Chief of the Agency’s Information Review Group, to be available to the Board in order to provide such additional classified or unclassified information as might be required. Richard D. Calder (S) Attachment 13 DoclId: 327404534 Page 14
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