cannes ranuarees nate s)/Borreiog ne ha Ab eM BoA AT ARED OSE ont = > tetera cSt Eesttatettetterttresretce Pe "POE Her Bee: “maybe they have “Because theyt-the Foreian Uffice--keep. caly..s Soeaking honeskly, as a human being, I.am concerned that they might fire. ‘her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one thing." The second event bringing NOSENZO to special notice occurred at about the same time that NCSENKO established contact with CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove him to contact Pavid MARK. On 15 3 Yr 1962 {ten days after NOSLNKO approached | HARK) sae petteg Aip : " % Sees his host at luncheon, ieriean Ambassac ‘OL TUBBY, that two sorde from the Ba-Ta-Clan Club, a strip-teaso bar in Ganeva, had come mangge CONSulate apparently seeking visas. The girls two Soviets, one about 30 and the other akout 40, who haé visited the club recently (no date + provided by & a gms. According to the girls, Ree said, the i two Soviets had attempted to pass themselv:s Off as Americans and had spent _fundreds® of francs drinking at the club. ‘The name which Bitar ives gave Anbassador TUBBY for cne of these Soviets "sounded See TTSEDROV.* Fron their descriptions, the two Soviets were almost certainly NOSENKO and iis friend A.K. KIS- LOV.* At his first meeting with CIA NOSENXO said that a week : and a half earlicr he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single naght of drinking and women with KISLOV. ‘the necessity of repaying this money, taken from KGB operational funds, was the immediate cause Of his contact with CIA, according to NCSENFO Secnemenange senepuien eine ttetemgepsern # + i 4 3 4 i A 7 pana a Hpensesbintte AYR} ae i ee Met he t *See Part III.D. for further information on KISLOV.
set eegrmaee te meaty mend oo ~ yg to neo AER ut 8 tee oi tet sy Sa "4, TDY in 1962 - ““Hoasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva (1960 and 1964)" When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva for the first tine on .10 March 1962, he wam listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of ' Foreign Affatrs “export” with the Delegation to the disarmament talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO was asked to oxplain precisely why he had been sent out ‘to Geneva. He repliod as follows: "Right now, I came to pro- vide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation.... There is a special [kGB] department for delegations, a special one, recently created, And-the chief of this department is simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate. He is both chicf of the department and deputy chief of the directorate so that there will be a person who can be held re~ sponsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the directorate [0.M. GRINANOV] hated to sign all sorts of recou- mendations and so on, when someone can run off in Belgium or wherever he may be, This happened more than once, and he was summoned before the [CPsU] Central Committee. Therefore, he decided to create a now position. Tne person holding it is simultaneously chie! of the department and deputy chief of the directorate and persunally signs off on all matters cencerning . exits [from the USSR]. This was in order to avoid being called on the carpet...s0 that blame would fall not on the chief of the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this department and who signed off... “This department," NOSENKO continued, “is concerned with departures abroad, that is, it checks all Soviet citizens who intend to travel abroad, both alone and as members of delegations. Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no delegation is to bo let out without an operational worker, not - a single delegation.., With me it happened as follows: I was not planning to go. They told me: ‘You are going.’ I said: *I can't. I have a Hection. I have 15 people there, ail operating people. Am 1 Supposed to dump them? What can I do?’ ‘No, you are going,' was the reply. ‘And what did the chief order?‘ I asked. The chief [ NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV when he spoke of the "chief".] said: . 'GROMYKO is going this time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer, not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department chief." Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was called in to my chiof, my immediate chief, who is concerned with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission. And I have been here since 10 March." Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that in addition to his sceurity officer functions in Geneva, he had a” cee se re has served in and visited the v7 7) Waate ates on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was _ a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor to the Soviet Delegation.* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact assigned at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He q 4 if 3. t t seep © ws, te vheeeat GAT SH tat LSncetenebath on 4, ‘es = BET nites tease DR a Met Peawbtbente ee wtih eek thant Saeen eeabipand bene
‘with David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer; ” NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that SHAXHOV might be an American aget. NOSEXKO described the . various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was told to perforn countersurveillance tasks during & meeting by - NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, “while other KGB officers checked for signs tiat SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials which had been placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's con- clusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was ab- solutely free of suspicion, and it was his intcntion to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters. tg an . ' " } On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOV had previously served with the Ministry. of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during this period he acted as an agent- recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENRKO named one person whom SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United Statcd, GRRE : = «=SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never ; haa been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to 4 travel abroad when he was suspected of being an Ancrican agent, NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips i eb eat Lie we eh abroad. "There was ne proof, only suspicions," and furthermore, 7 SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the 1 Soviet Delegation, S.K, TSARAPKIN. Sy NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations. His answers were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states: "“GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. 1 think that the fitness report written about me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOY, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the Seventh [Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKGV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who super- vised the work of the Eleventh [Soviet Delegations] Department which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV, BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on sactsbedoabatl Beas easciae b Re TE i, i al TO attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament _ eonferences over the years, and he has attended a number of ses- —_ ' Je ee ceetantreas sions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived 4 in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963. Tre Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that. ; SHAKHOV's face ig familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified ‘him as an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headauarters in Moscow; ~
"this trip because SHAKHOV, who was. suspected of possibly being. be in the delegation. When the Eleventh for a case officer to make this trip hief of section because of the serious~_ a Western agent, was to Department was looking Hf Gee RN: they wanted to have ac ness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the as- - signment. There was no background or neighkorhood investigation Lg 4 conducted on me in connection with ny being approved for this ; 4 trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, F i a by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by . po oh the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central i “43 ; 5 3 Committee of the CPSU." . NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to maxe this . trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the a American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season, and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go as a “treat." Fon le Al case dhag ob, AIL. During interrogations of Octcber 1966 NOSENKO was ques- - tioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as 4 security officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only, TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington ard in Moscow in what appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who ‘ served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the —_ NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY, a member ; ermanent Soviet Delegation) mnee ‘ during this same conference. i wc , ¥ the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962 and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an offi- ; cer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of iol the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according to NOSENKO, was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria~Germany- .Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and was used in operations against the West German Embassy there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational : % contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILA- TOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs,official and stated that he is “definitely not an intelligence officer." mn soot Wh riper te wet. ne enteabehioew sin, - wee NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations on his investigation of SHAKHOV.. After saying on the morning Ce he of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the ib EB utes Asin aibtle ia ce. a ot, rap R 8" WOSENKO has said that in 1960 he wa turned down’ for a’ per= manent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drink- | . 2 om ing. (See Part V.E.¢.a) _ ; : 2 a
eteemamtpitime ft 6 te vaya ot oa PHS ity “Chief of ths Sevond Chie? Directorate that” the SHARHON investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: “My main task was to- check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV, You can't. separate these tasks." — In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier inves- tigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations De- partment of the Second Chief. Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had conducted investigations.of SHAKHOV in Geneva -in 1961, but SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen. "to finish things up." Before leaving Mos- cow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOY ; case with: SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Dele- gations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he also read various materials-on the case, including an investi- gative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO' s description of these followed: Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962? NOSENKO: He was working with different delegations at different conferences and, being in Geneva, it was noticed that there was something which can be described as a connection with David MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also, little, little, little things before. Question: When did SIHIAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did it begin? NOSENKO: In ‘60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK. I don't remember who reported it. The report was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was known to the Second Chief Directorate as the Rezident and it was cone sidered he must be the All the KGB officers going there were told to pay attention to him. Question: What about the report? NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the 7 toilet. Maybe there was.a contact. The file said “maybe.” I was sent to Geneva to carry ¥A SitaLlec e2 E Bann we nots Bo = sate ox Tere fag OE tae Cerat att Belgreen 9 Pb Ree SE 20 venti noe nated Aa Eis be eaktate ones 2 4 4 “4 4
’ gut measures to check... There were many little, little things. MARK maybe turned his head a... - certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.]-- GOLUBEY, formerly of the Fourteenth [Counterin- tell‘ gence] Department, was in the Soviet Delo- gation with SHAKHOV.*® He noticed Little details. 2k When the officers in the United States decided og to terminate SHAKHOV [as an agent], they wrote a a report on him which said he was liking life . OY in the U.S.~-American products, money. He was. os pictured as not good and, in addition, he was uO not wanting to work as an agent. emt - aaiebitens pi 23 2. The 1964 TDY ro NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Dis- armament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSENKO reported that he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEY, an inter- preter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 ard 1961 and who, ___the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by hinself. Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities were general in nature. ‘ eee, «|OUR NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on . 26 February 1965 states: "GRIBANOY had absolutely nothing to i do with my assignment toe Geneva in 1964, The fitness report \ i on me for this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of tho : CPSU was required for me or for any other members of ‘the dele-= ~ gation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was my own personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the question with [V.D.] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received i his agreement. I had also talked about this with {M.V.] . KHLOBUSTOV::s and [G.] PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations Po Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in he about the beginning of January 1964, [N.T.| ZUARIKOV, the Chie? of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be ‘required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and 4 [A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's immediate supervisor] supported me for the assignment as a ‘personal favor to me.” With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge pf his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he q feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said, . “co :-"What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was ; ; eo for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRI- SEE BANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact, weet ennb aan wheat ee a amianin Seabee tke knew anything about it. * . We ' *GOLUBEV was also identified as m-raret Chief Directo- _ : a : rate counterintelligence of . rding to @gze%ghe was , oa one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United . ee --. dn 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO.. There is no re- - cord | that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.
C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENXO — qe Introduction eo NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in Poy the KGB, hig standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his ‘4. «family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence gn 1962 and to defect to.the United States in 1964. He initially told CIA that he had been. unusually successful during his ten- j year career as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest : | friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the. ; : . | ' wontette lib eae Bestia +. swale KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO ‘family held a high social position, and.their economic situation was "luxurious by. Soviet standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and harmonious. He spoke with fondsess and pride about his two daughters, of his wife's: tolerance and understanding, of the companionship she gave him. He. expressed love and a sense of ; : " responsibility for his widowed mother, who heavily depended i upon him after the.death. of his father in 1956. The elder * NOSENKO won his son's admiration for having worked his way up | from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of - ; Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO name is hcnored in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has beén erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoy~ able career in the KGB. evetesauebetbing bite na teed ANIA» ‘2. Collaboration in 1962 At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give de- tails on the KGB Second Chie’ Director-te and other operations, and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in 1962, with NOSENKO providing edditional information on the KGB. ) He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety , was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to American j Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency in Geneva and his disaffection fer the Soviet regime. eae eden aoe f wee Lb MniBin a a During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he realized, even before talking to representatives of American intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two items of information alone--~he expected them to insist on more. ' He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the sane \ day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue , { i { a. Readiness to Report to CIA . — . |. ‘eee _ ns ney ini Debbie Rand eStart a took place: . wees - NOSENKO: You see, I am not planning to be your agent... and don't think that I am going to work with you in Moscow. No. No... Case As you have’ said, I am-an intelligence officer , 4 Officer: as are you. And I think that we will understand . a . one another. NOSENKO: You want to place our relationship on an agent so basis. peal snemnce cnet ¢catniopsa toy aoe . yes at
Case Of course. Officer: NOSENKO: Never in my life I will go in contact [with | CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life. I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know this matter.. When it was abroad it was fine, . but when you decided to meet him in Moscow... 5 You want more than I came with the intention of saying. You want to change this to a long- “ _term relationship. Understand me. I am now . 3 the chief of a section. Before my departure . . . {from Moscow] a decision was being reached-- Ss and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow-- I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a : department. Do you understand what this is? i { acbaie hai sme ect sete nccnennidbeababibe Case Why are you telling me this? Officer: : wen e ateeteaty td beni wi a BE thet NOSENKO: Because I wanted to come [to CIA] only for a business deal, to give you these two ca%es, to receive money for this, and that's all. : F Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come : i abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps i 4 I will give you someth‘..7. God knows. But : I don’t want to do this now. I don't want : to and I am not prepared within myself for this... i ‘ I am giving two interesting cases. The most , . interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the ‘ two most interesting ones. in the first of them ["ANDREY'**], I took no part. In the second { BELITSKIY***| I took part, even here. se athe cabsaehaty Case I want you to understand that these two matters Officer: that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great importance to us. But I don't have to tell you that. You know that. But we are not going to oo, play like children. You know nerfectly well . | ce ta ntetlandacln ctrl that it is worth every franc... What I want to tell you is this: of course I will ask you more, and of course 1 want to know as much as you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your business. : « cathiviname ald NOSENKO: I will tell what I am able to tell. What I : know, I will tell. Of course, you yo wself . : understand that there are things concerning our internal system that I cannot report to you. You yourself understand this. . . rote . aoe . : : wane ‘ eg tap de nRae Goan y 2 Aiddinedenen le 6 a 2 neki ea *The compromise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, is an an j _ discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.' woe an eee ee ae to tere eens ene na able ot _. **The case of “ANDREY," the KGB eryptonyn . for the agent Dayle . SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b. ‘¢**BELITSKIY, a | KGB-controlled double. agent, “4s discussed in Part VI. D. 6 Akaike AY x
scimrioeueWhen,.the.ClA.officer said the. he understood NOSENKO had been further prompting gave a detailed statement of his own personal — past and his professional career, ‘In tunis statement he described his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB ‘and generally the functions and operating techniques of the various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerg. NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.* The question of his further assistance was then raised again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the. Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agree~ ment involved only two pieces of information and ignoring the fact that he had already given considerably more: NOSENKO: I have told you enough for this day, and I vill tell you only these two cases which I wanted to tell you, and it is enough for this day. Case How do you imagine that this is enough? You Officer: know that we work much the same way. NOSENKO: Yes. Case You know what interests us, of course. Officer: NOSENKO: I know it. Today I gave only two things. Let's meet one another [again]. Case Good. But let me say this: What you tell me Officer: ‘Issyour business. I am not going to try to bring any pressure at all...There is no argu- ment about it. I am not going to say: ‘Please see us in Moscow.’ I don't want to see you in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is completely impossible. That's it. No more on that subject. NOSENKO: I said to David [MARK] before meeting you that I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone. Case All right. ‘Agreed. Officer: NOSENKO: In another place. I don't know whether I will eome back here in a month or not...I personally don’t want to, either, because my wife will be moaning at home. But-I am afraid they will make me come, because I know ‘the delegation. I know *Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts V.D.$.b. and V.EB.Co, “i, Kespectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time. <o. TOP SECRET 7 ata te eit ane Cap the Bese a a Me - in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without™ =" scree ctenpem nies $ 2, edamintitlhes aantratane tbe nade ote 2
_ everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because _thing. But not today. ‘I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not ‘person was responsible for the compromise. . Next time.* ' contin mse syn one Sent In that case we can mee t. Case . .\: You know that I would not bring any pressure. . Officer: That's something we understand because we are Bs eo. ": both in this business. ‘You and I are in the - ~~  % game business, so you can't-- NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so ; now? So that I will say something. more to 4 you. I said: ‘Let's meet again.' Maybe I an will tell [more]. Now I will give you only “ot these two items because we have made a deal. oe ee a iG I will tell you about these two cases. Let's meet again, if you insist. I understand that you want more. Well, I will think a bit about what I know. , Case That's all right. . 4 Officer: . : 4 NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must i ; t understand me. This has not .come to me simply. I had time th think for a long time. I thought for a long time. You see, it's very difficult for me, very difficult for me. and after I go it will also be very difficult for me. eae et ees Case But you knew_that when you came. Why cid you Officer: come to us? | : 3 NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong... You don't have to explain to'’me. I know what makes me go. ‘I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step ‘ forward has already been taken. I won't re=- fuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have to be there with my own [people]. ote ee geen te intl dh bmoome im ied se debian tree terest This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the "ANDREY" cases. ° ee RTS Vwi Sos Semen As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime. He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get aemerlornamenntin tam epan eee vache, syste Sere SM, a e of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent re- cord of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell you. anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you some=- L LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another = = =~ 4 Pape OME OTE GAL SES aes, a (eieabe i Ete Remakes
"ov Of the degree of this cooperation Was Never frais Ege Me aan "the very start of the second meeting;~~ on if -dune;~he- said wenn “7 OF am tortured all the time by a single thought. | Everything ae . “now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move co. “by your people and it will be the end of me.* Although he sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO expressed his primary personal concern as being his own secu- rity vis-a-vis the KGB. b.. Attitude Toward Defection = _ While willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused to consider ~ - @efection except in circumstances where his personal security would be endangered. Wis devotion to his wife and children, and the probability that the KGB would take reprisals against them if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this ‘vefusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on ! another cccasion that he would not want to leave the USSR even { On a permanent KG3 assignment and accompanied by his family.) i Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence a 3 ¢ { in ro: eee dedaas andl ts sttade teksto on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done. Qld sringete eo ce. ‘Motivation a ; i . NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to contact American Intelligence becalse he was in trouble over the loss of KGB optrational funds, for which he had to account prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money, NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was. willirg to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210, and this was the price asked for the information. deteeans& tem ease eh NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers during subsequent meetings are given below: svbatcite hie BL Ain Piniglowcisds . 9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NO- SENKO asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly re- . peated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his opera~ tional funds. The case officer remarked that there must be i. something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not, in fact, his main motivation: “I have been working in this business for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have heard more than is written [in the newspapers]. A reorganization has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is pre- ‘mature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams . and our industry is at the point of collapse because this re- ; ce be eaten sara « organization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not a just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my father's friends, and I hear what they are saying: :And how much 7 _ Goes a worker earn? 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80. ‘And he doesn't sense any improvement [in his position] within the 4 total population. These are empty words only. We have exceeded ee os . the United States in per capita. production of butter and milke 000 00 ":.\ But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are wok a tetbibeded ertiyenpte ne amet
7 ternal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes have been permitted, that management as a whole is somehow off On the wrong track. Aluo, look at the serious Situation in Czechostovakia now, in Gecmany--in the GDR. It is very se¥ious. Ih Poland they nave just had a poor harvest. Everywhere: there ' they have had floods. These rains are also very sertcus, It means that the system, the whole socialist System cannot [cope?-- one word on the tape cannot be distinguished here]. Do you understand what is wrong? Paith in the future is being lost. Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason for what has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me. God knows." ll June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself raised the issue of motivation. His case officer had just said that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particu- lar request when HOSENKO said: “Speaking of respect, how can there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communiqua of the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes, I can't: see them [the successes]. No, excuse me, I know somewhat more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this System. I can see what is being dcne and what is not being done. Lies, more lies. This was my mood, I say, ‘How much is it pos- sible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can you go?' Our people are very poor. It is somewhat difficult to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my people. How often can you say that things will be good; how often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where are they? Show me them, I can see no trace of them. ‘This is what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you under= stand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say that this is nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there, I want to be with my family. That's all. But I feel that not only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are faults throughout the entire system of socialism. ‘'Inat I mean is ‘that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Po- land, things are bad with KADAR [in Hungary], they are starving in China. This means that there are great mistakes. Well, that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?" At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: “My name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand? It would be the end of me. I am not afraid of this. The devil with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father, everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because I am resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment? ‘I do not believe in what is being done. I do: not believe-in this. Listen to me. Let me speak honeatly. Have I not had the chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He had a.dacha and a state-owned automobile... I have my own Volga fautemobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life. It's ~- luxurious. Her apartment is enormous=-150 Square meters. For America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We - tterd-¥ou-knowy-you~feel-thigs ‘ Fon te aeons mone rene betbnnee Rie Reg 1 he anach (AEE Sab nd snenntel stnthey? Sardis tabi $55 ba eaebae toe aS bee abe Pb pastas see a ehh ben
a 15,000 or 20,000-plus--25,000, There was much money. She is “a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovskiy, Makovskiy. Even if she had insufficient money, she could always sell her posses- sions. What do I want to. say? That I've never wanted for money. Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not money, but this great, great resentment.* 14 June 1962: The subject of motivation was not discussed during the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final .session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequi- ties existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for cooperating with CIA,. his basic sympathy for. the American people. _ NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for _. Headquarters. toe, coming to us, his need for money, was "not good," Before he and his case officers parted, NOSENKO said, he wanted to em- phasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had "always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people." He explained that it was not the technical progress of the United States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of living of the American people. It was rather the openness and directness with which the Americans whom he had met and seen handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in . Geneva. ’ , Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situa~- tion in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate these remarks specifically to nis motives for volunteering to CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total state- ment on motivation during the 1962 meetings. 3. Decision to Defect (January 1964) On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immedi- ate motivation seemed to have nothing to do with this. NOSENKO explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would oe *:w opportunities, ‘if any, for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind.’ He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the “next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, care- fully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, m@ he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet so-” : ciety, no harm would come to them. . Whereas. NOSENKO declared his intent to defect immediately, the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this; and . 6econd, arrangements for his transfer to arid reception in the United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA RST we at eee ope be rae at ae ere tanh pn cetornt AO Re eS nid os ways_had.a_totof.money,..especially.during.. the..wared& .ealaxy. — wi © Ayvae «at SRG “rH Dobbs uit Bailuiip tidls es. stand, aa ale A aca Ka mm arebee wn + note mutate rae ahd dirtnet bokionntien te a
14-00000 —_ { _ Of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future |: -. prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel- - _ligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he ne * Be ERS ER rage Sept gon aS “During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request _ in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and ‘recruiting other Soviets. , *. eck The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively to debriefings on the activities of the KGB Second Chief Direc- torate. Althorgh his impending defection was mentioned, his reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the mean=- : time, NOSENKO's first CIA handler #lew to Washington for dis- to cussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically, NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that time. The answer was that NOSENKO, “after coming back and seeing that there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize the opportunity while he had it. Asked apout this, NOSENKO con- firmed that this was his reason, and added: "I may never have another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to 2 consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NCSENKO again 3 mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about , i deserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult to adjust to a new life in America] and know that for some time 3 I will be sick within. And I know that a certain pericd of 3 time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you bluntly about my [financial] security. I am absolutely un- mercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or ‘ wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family. , : Fee ne perth atee eb Seth athe sete’! This is the nost basic and most difficult spot of all. And I . 3 know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over 4 expect to have a new family there. Of course, I don't know-- but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a strong liking for children~-net only for my own, but for all children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know one can get used to almost anything.” 3 this. For this the enly and the best doctor is time. I don’t Hi + At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 Febru- ary was selected for the defection. NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not- mentioned for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Ar- riving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been or- : dered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had : wows a gtht to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons formally in an asylum request, written at the time: 0 Balle see that "This decision was made by me, not now, at the moment I write this r2quest, but several years ago. Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing ' more than the average soviet citizen about the policy of the Soviet government, about the direction which this government has chosen to take, and about the law and order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that
lh : letter which described in detail how these people, live in this country and work for the welfare this goversant ——EeEE———EeeEeEeEEwe 4. The Letter of July 1964 | The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his motives for first contacting CIA andélater defecting to the. United States is contained.in a letter to his CIA case officer in July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of all those reasons and roct causes which led to the decisicn to leave the Soviet Union” and further explained that “every- thing put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser details which to a greater or lesser degree played their role.“ Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this ietter. “to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the decision was born, grew, and hardened within m2 to completely alter the course of my life.” This letter is preserted below in its entirety. Most of the biographical and operational details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other parts of this paper. , "lL. My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the positicn of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking foe anything. And the only difficult periods of my life (before the death of my father) were: study in -the naval schools in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; and the beginning of my working life, the pericd in the Par East (1950-1952), The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vaca- tion in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and be= came something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better. "2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he . said, and everything he did,were completely axiomatic. The arrestSand trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the people who suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937, 1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN. Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain ; document given me by my father. This was a secret . .- letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the '. ®"gase of the doctors;' it was not. addressed to all -*, communists but only to members and candidate members ' of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this oe abla ghana To Paty ws the ee See mete: RARE ape ey ney anton Aenea ge aes eenaaeeamanenaid ty Bi nay nai aby « oe eon tte end SE tate A eae tHE ate fom Le Mets abd Ede 6 i 4 { i
ee eet ab ae tba oe ed COMORES a EIS ad important “specialists in the field c of medicine, were J ‘ brought to such a condition that they condemned then- got ' tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain deci-— selves; that is, they confessed to things which had never happened, to things which they had never done. They were sixply fotced to give the evidence which was needed by the ‘investigators. ~The secret’ letters-on | “the cult of STALIN and: ‘mich that I heard in the KGB i - i about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and i forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to : i look at everything more critically. Already I no | longer had faith in all these ideas which for years | had been pressed into my head. | i "3. The new leaders (KURUSHCHEV and Company) used the same methods but already diluted with the water of democracy, with playing up to the people : and attempts to convince them that a new era would | arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party } was always going to concern itself with the welfare : of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and the use of all. means in this struggle,“even j microphones (they listened to the conversations of ! BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and others). -KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about suc- 7 cesses, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA ir the produc tion of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available cnly infrequently. The endless promises ; i of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this similarly forced me to re- evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire adeology of the Party, its external and internal course. pale settee opel etek seca ' 84, The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this popular indignation was suppressed by trocps with many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages. me aociiuctinbdes tds Eb ik + Fee suited or wnriiials erases. "5S. %I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, | about his complete illiteracy in engineering techno- logy and industrial economics, about incorrect deci-~_ sions in regard to many industries, and this was not te eR: OLA) only the opinion of my father, but also of other impor- tant leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV, VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But-no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father oe dR tio tot iced alan sion would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff, | . ee oe from KHRUSHCHEV that he was profoundly shaken and in rE EE ae: 55 the opinion of my mother this brought him to his ill- ‘ a ness in.1956 and his death in August 1956. ;
Bungary sh - that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I he-events in-Germany~and especially. in... x90 owed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy - of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was: — a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the’ entire people who could no longer @ndure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these coun~ tries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (1 saw for myself how people live in Czecho~ slovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union). _ "9, The split of the international communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a.given stage of life and that in reality full material wel- fare would never be enjoyed by the people but cnly by the leadership and the Party and the government. “8, Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the positien of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (1 was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the ‘politics’ of the Soviet delegation.) "9, My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, hew much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the ‘heavy exploitation’, and the ‘un- believably difficult life’ flew immediately out of . my head. And that which I met with in my work, the i sending of Soviet citizens abroad=-who gets sent where ; and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my acquaintances~~-GUK, CHURANOV and others-- think back with great pleasure about life abroad. "10. I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without ‘thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and: . I became a Komsomolnik like all the others. — It was — different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party "dn 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was ene a working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father Party I would never move ahead and would not have - success in life. But I myself understood and saw continually inststed on this, saying that without the . Oe ‘eg a member of the party....And_if.I worked somewhere °. Tay else, I would truly never move ahead in my career °° FY coy oat jaaaa eB pe 4 et Mew op a hee Rasa te Taye aati diay “3 ‘2 i 2 eee emyereners mepmepapenrne be pate: bas ORT STATE ee altace. pine mb ab stdin ea ventas ae s, at Seda cant eh. de tho PAB came of «apenas a on aeitl dion
14-90000 cea nyse te wantin es sane a en eat MeN te ok wae witha LCP SOREN TT. tawny med sates ane nee een unless I entere ty. ginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I Lecame the deputy chief of the section, the chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the department, because then I had to speak at these meetiags. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedi-~ cated to the Party and its course. "11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries were already filled out, the photoes had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of the KGB hegan to protest against my gokng with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a a@runken condition and on this ground had quarrels witn my wife. A tour abroad with my family was neces-~ gary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel wuld not let me go abroad with my family. "12, Knowing many officers in the FCD, 2 began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute ‘cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance 4s to his limitless dedication to the Party and the “government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good reiations with the kadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel. "13, I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude to- wards my delays at work and also when I would be de- layed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love.my.children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial ‘security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money setenv bitin nt ita ental ett eT Rf SS TT ayy Fst Eg «Gest a mROLL SANE ts RG ‘ s fast i : the Party. "Bue from’ the Very Des I a oe wo toh ont Sate tty anche Sa nema BASAL retlilesl n detae betas wed cpreteepe parties eetegiinaersan racine Sic te cane enn bien ng af ait ae nee meme eernstmegae ee mem wntted Mettige ond Le it oe sored bck ead as i | | 1 wet gi tres B.ctteete  f . a.
“that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. y mother many "times offered to divide-all this: ino" three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I. suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the, property and the money will be given to my children.: . Doe “14, If the defections of =PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular , thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLIT=- SYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great. strength of will. And already IT put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me? "15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. Tf would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to ’ borrow from (at this time GUK was’ nimseif in finan- cial difficulty and at the same time he was already preparing for his return home). To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what cir- cumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth. "16. To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I under- stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the - decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip. - abroad. “17, Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of ‘baggage’, that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which _ would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment |, to- the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Depart- “ment in-July 1962 gave me a greater. opportunity than - before. But at the same time this assignment almost _ Fae 2 Rene CRE 2S povetiibelice Fug Ga PO ae ei at piel * at Sh deat ate tancdle bbe AGT. we hen btn
Sema cra ennte EES  cen sutnees ne same snmanerimern muneasiclnme ‘out one more series of treatments; that this trip TP SEE uded the possibility Of a trip abrosd and“ ie" vse™ m@ly with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to con- f vince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince : i BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO. In this i i advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the — money (in foreign currency);. that the medicine which foe, I bought for my daughter had proven very successful © . & and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry - would not be a long one and that since I was already the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able to travél abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was gaid at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which : deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms ' with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which - when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had prought him a number of presents. cee eset 2 Rak me teint a nb bende F, "18, The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VYASSALL case put me on my guard since in the ; newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the ; leadership of the FCD,as I iearned from GUK, CHURANCV, : and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the FCD was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This ar- ticle in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, T began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my con- tact with you. This article deeply ‘interested’ the KGB. ; , ; cheeks oat se kee Mame ' : tei al got: a pass in the Second Department and went in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds hinself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his ap- pearance and I understood that everything which had. been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of. greater confidence in the correctness of the deci- sion taken by me to leave the Soviet Union. : fl - s ; . . ao i : ; webb Bie. 85 tne cet ’ . 4 3 “19. During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I : | t 26 July 1964 Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"
Fee gfe ae haste AAA EEE EE Eee nena eneaSueeSeneeR ne eE SaDueDON NTT ae —nepencuce macmeape nit OgENKO*g- Roe kyliehoo ha €sagyg “meena sce cinema tora . RS 41. Introduction ae The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for meetings with CIA in Ceneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed hers in connection with his stetements about the KGB duties assigned to him for these trips, his visits to the XGB Legal Residency, and his personal association with other Soviets. Although NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his days and nights ; in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed | of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to | | | do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his freedom of movement by saying: "I can come and co as Ipleags at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows who I am, almost the entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pre- tend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know that IT am not a Ministry of Foreign Affai:s man (at the conference sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this ; i reason I can leave the conference at any time, er I do not come at all and no ane will sev a word to ime." vila we beet tae nee 2. Official Duties in Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the ; 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and 4s ‘ such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the : entire delegation.* To assist him in carrying out these security officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of ceopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delega- tion, In addition, ROSENKO had the specific mission of check- ing on suspicions atteched to one of the delegation members, P. F, SHAKHOV** but cy the time he established contact with CIA, he said, this assignment had already been completed. In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to handle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet delegation, as he had done in 1962. There was no specific mission such as the ome concerning SHAKHOV in 1962. NOSENKO nas described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but ; he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks : of other delegation members in 1962 and 1964, or that he re- : ceived any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from 3, Visits to the KG3 Legal Residency Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEY, would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself. nO * I.S. MAYOROV and 4.S. TSYMBAL also acrived with the delega- ete tion in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO ' 4 j concacted CIA. : , Bet shes rf Ss | _- && SHAKAHOV is discussed further in Part Iii.3.%. % | beg . 3 pegs! a i : 1D 3 wd La . re gaanl]
_ GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, “and shortly after hiss abe ival-in-Genevain- March 196 2;~-NOSENK: _ gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAYRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on ‘the part | of. the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates wefe brought together to hear NOSENKO. (In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform counter-surveillance on. several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHZV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and, carry out other private errands.) Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO Stated that it was his close relationship with-M.&. TSYMBAL* which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. "“Aecording to the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, “an officer in a status such’ as mine chould not even go to the Residency. In this case it is only because I.am deputy chief of a department and GAV- — RICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than | his), and because I have such a sympatnetic personal relation- ship with TSYMBAL." He then went on to say that TSYMBAL “sort of escorted me to the Residency. They could have simply said: ‘You are here on a mission, we have our own mission, and we have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was not. the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention. 4. Association with TSYMBAL At the second meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this relationship. In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship was close, explained that it was TSYMBAL (acain in Geneva at the same time) wno gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL went to Bern and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome. NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 er 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose background would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Director- ate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the . human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for seme reason. We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall: or in the dining room. He used to say: 'Stop in and see me,' and I would answer:''Well, it's kind of awkward for me to - hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to he doing here?' He would say: ‘Oh, comeon, stop in.' But I 1 aoc TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under .the last--nane alias GOLITSYN reported in.1961 that TSYMBAL was . Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief 4 Directorate.. . TOP SECRET Leptin ward ae OM oy gt RI po Be Fem ey RT Mebak oe Rahal die mettle cideclbiies . mebeb seh bbe Meme eee + Theat bales wae bene ES de
: teenttSee Parts II.B. -Gidn't." NOSENKO also times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had * suggested that he might fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficulty with 0. Mo GRIBANOV, Chief of the TSYMBAL's efforts in 19 leaving the impression in Geneva) had agreed t Questioned in April NOSENKC stated that he days before their depar said that TSYMBAL had asked him several be assigned to the United States. In Second Chief Directorate, cysvirtue of | 62 to have NOSENKO transferred and his with GRIBANOV that NOSENK9O (who was still o this action, 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL, met TSYMBAL for the first time several ture for Geneva. Besides saying again that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and that TSYMBAL's assistan dency, NOSENKO reported several times a week to joined by I. S. MAYGOROV, section), and sometires interrogations, NOSENKO on a daily basis in 196 when TSYMEAL travelled and later when NOSENKO 5. Association with Ot NOSENKO said in 196 ce enabled him to enter tre Legal Resi- that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were * sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next the two ate alone. During the 1966 said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL 2, he saw him only twice in 1964. once to Geneva from Bern for ore or two days saw TSYMBAL off for Rome from Lauranne. her Soviets. 2 that the other Soviets he saw most often were A. K, KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSETXO was one of the four mem at the Hotel Ariane in American Section of TAS the 1962 meetings with not a KGB orcficer and m affiliation with the KG bers of the Soviet delegation staying Geneva, and was said to be head of the S and a genuine correspondent.*** During CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was . ade no reference of his having any B. NOSENKO did say, however, that he had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY* information on Soviet d pass this information t numerous references to specifically with recar NOSENKO was robbed of o which brought him to Cl when NOSENKC squandered *** to use as a notional source of isarmanent policy; BELITSKLY was to o his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made drinking and carousing with KISLOV, d to a night in early June - when r squandered his operational funds, A - and on the night_of 10 June 1962 2000 Swiss francs mwine and women.***** In gi a money to defray these p expressed to him their arising from KISLOV's k ersonal expenses, the CIA handlers concern over the dangers to his security nowledce of this inexplicable source of income... NOSENKO replied that there was no need to be concerned’ since KISLOV was'. "too 4 any event he constituted no.threat. ‘ order to have oper runk -to-know what is going on," and. in: _# MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in ational meetings with agents, ae Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of the “ANDREY" case friend of GOLITSYN, “@areer in the KG3 States. ‘eee In October 1966 uO the Ariane, withou -##8* The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in Part VI.D.6. and I1.C.2.¢. (see Part VI.D.3.b.). GUK was also a who reported extensively on GUK's including his service in the United ‘ef en ‘} oh SENKO named all the Soviets living at t mentioning KISLOV, - etn sree te a NTUOMNERIN et tees 1 oath bth) dane i seal 6 Kd hae ode edited eth be ee dedi wide tel pi ES oid an aid
eeneertt 196 4 ROSENKO” Conf irmed that” he had “spent mich “time with -" KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become very friendly. For the first time, NCSENKO reported that . KISLOV had been a KGS operational contact while in the United States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer _ in Moscow prior. to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and that after returning from Geneva. KISLOV had been recruited as. & KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had ~ prepared. ; s Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his “big, eas big friend” GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident . | . in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the “GB Legal Resi- dency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member i of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of lengstanding. NOS. ENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in 7 Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few , I drinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit infor- , mation about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer: i had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to - KGB Headquarters. When questioned later in 1964 about his relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK | well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva. . 6. Availability for Meetings with CIA oe In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed I : displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon (at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence) | until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed. for three hours, | | i } a smrott Setar atchacdte eth Hadar, rN ton eae a reendiabes + math fart toca and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled . for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours. NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours ve altogether, He offered to meet again on the day of his de- : parture, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endan- | gering his security. | | I saw mnwieathtdbiod Ui cah suntow « sanded wR SSR ba odie ete . oe Co ere Fase y oS eee i oe ee: fpsvane t ay ‘ , + sepa +e A nance ERTIES. censemitimete niet neil pe yp ate ot ee , porate age os Jae shen % , oe
ROE a En E. Timing of Defection E After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 cf his decision to defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when CIA gave operational and administrative reasons for hin to stay in ‘place until the middle of February, During the week that: fol- lowed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports ine dicating that less information of value would be forthcoming than CIA had at first thought. On 4 February, however, NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a conference cn tuoreign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore placed himself in CIA custody on that date.* Details on the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following paragraphs. At the 24 January mceting tne CIA case officers agreed in principle with NOSENKO's Jecisicn to defect.. NOSENKO F felt that it wculd be best for hin to disappear from Geneva : : without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions be- i d hind; he assuced that CIA could exfiltrate hin fron Switzer- a) land to the United States, ile wanted to carry out this i plan as soon as. possible, but the CIA officers encouraged ; a him--and NOSENXO agreed--to remain in place for at least J three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENXO for this re- quest were: » The desire to get information on the local KGB . Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Dis- t armament Conference while he still had access to this | information; | aa wer tech cote MER ABD eae nioer 4 « The value of having NOSENKO present when 0.M. GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a j visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;*4 | J - The necessity of making arrangements, accept- i able to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement. . The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain in place for a short time longer are chronicled below: | * The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the con- ference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F. i t t i 2 #@ GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, the sponsor cf NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. Several Gee sources, have reported that GRIBANOV was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's de- fection (Part III.1I.}. NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H. . septs on sar tee enalns exmnpmninttbiiatee tate tp HTT? oe Orn WRT RE ET PN demntgane me eueer a nt
not be coming to” Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna, NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end 26 January 1964: In a three-and-a-half hour meeting, : 2 NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was . ae nn ie : necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the — Do j GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter, : 28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might 4 e serene emneeapttte ements 4 aig bey . cenb lia ec A ped Wibeecatanesl dd & ste. of the week, NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be littie likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he emotional strain of any further delay and the fact.that he against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worth- while or promising targets, He also felt that nothing ef value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because i § 30 January 1964: At the seventh meeting of the series, i i . oN eee i eter marti 2eat wanted to defect right away. As reasons he cited the is Cas@ officers were wasting their time working because he probably would not be missed until the following Monday, This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans. "TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know wh wi sav until he : is told by Moscow the day before," s the best time for efection, he suggested Saturday mcrning, 8-Febriuary, ere are mentees tne i oe cards BBB hand Sb aedot te 31 January 1964; me ead | 3 j 4 | He repeated his willingness to remain- in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers®™, which -he was told were enroute from Washington, He explained that u , i he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an ~ . , imminent move by the delegation from its. hotel to the. Soviet 3 villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would f be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had rs ponn@, from Moscow, en ee ee ae " @@ See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV. .& been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer @ From-.% to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where - he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by | NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence. officer.. There is no evidence-that he visited Switzerland,
a) 1 February 1964: At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly agreed that tne detection would take place in the norning of 8 February, NCSENKO said that he assumed that exfil- tration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States,* iSlis case officers .coa- firmed that this was correct. : The dafection was stili scheduled for Saturday, 5 February. 4 February 1964: NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safe- Shouse from his hotel room in the eerly afternocn and said: ‘I want to come now and not go back." After arriving he ‘explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency fol- -lowing the morning session of the Lbisarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union.** The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to tfoscow via Paris the foliowing day, and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet yelegation in. Geneva; he was not- told who the replacement would be. Before he had left fcr Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Gcverne ‘ment had been dJoliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a aunoer of new. cities and tourist itineraries in this connection, SEMICHASTNYY had now decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new “tactics and strategies" for handling the in- veascd number of tourists expected, Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a dasic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report weuid be read to the conference either by himsclf or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate, SOSENKU explained that he was the only one who could Jo this jeb as Lt. Col. A.&. KOVALENKO, the KG83 Headguarters Department senior officer, was a rele atively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that “by great coincidence” he had learned, just be- fore the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February, Ile had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence wouid be noted at ‘that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning." NOSENKO felt, nowever, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening.. To foster Soviet un- certainty he had left his clothing lyizg around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe- house, NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss 3 February 1964: | sO0SENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials, . “a 4 id 4 & z te heated weak! tt, { 4 oe rans by hee ottins ita v6
37. . authorities would probably be made. late on 5 February or early wool ie’ on the 6th. . 7 : NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February he + and remained in a safehouse there until 1] February, when press = .. i os publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immedi- .. mu \ Poo ate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central In- . .. so ae telligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as j 4 possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February. ; aa) j } : 1 3 : : : 4 — ' i i aa) : i i | i Ey : t 3 fo: 4 3 t ' t . 4 * ‘ > | } : i ¢ : . : a ah er enka Sev tela ee. Sor eaten py Bett we att = By 7
714-00000 ° 33. F.. The Recall Teleyran On arriving at tne safenouse at 1015 on 4 february 1564 NCSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had becn to the KGB “Legal Pesidency duriny the day and again ain the evening. ("e hud met witm CTA fron 1200 te 1609 hours on 3 February.) He related thst as of that time “averything wis quiet and peaceful," an: he received four personal letters e from Moscow. NOSINKY suid that on the morning of 4 Peoruary he had again stoppe.: in at the Resiageavy, but “nothiayg was going on." Later is the morning, however, after attending a session of the Diserramoent Conferuonr NOSENKO learned that the coded teleyram degeriled above had arvaved from Moscow eréeving iim to return dimecqdiately to Moscow to participate in the KGL conference: on tourlem. On 26 October 1566, while being questicned abcut the circumstances of nis defecticn, NOSENKO was asked about this telegram which recailed him to Moscow. NOSENKC said that there was no such telegram, anid that he had invented it in order to defect as soon'as possible Lecause he was nervous and afraid his contacts with American Intelligence 1n Geneva might be noticed by Soviet autiorities. After cetailed ‘questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a statement with the fcllowing wording. ., "On 4. February 1964, L. told my CIA contact in - Geneva that a telearum from KGB Headquarters in Moscow — aero Tome mee te ite etd, sarin nd eked te Shon te ATE sia teeta ene steer! dain. ae? we Beat btane ! oe 5 trend a on Seat at ane th bola a aor (8 dicate Mile eal ne. te S ee “t
had been received in the KGS Residency in Geneva" + recalling me irmediately to.Moscow. I said at che time that this telegram said that I was recalled — to perticipate in a conference.to plen KGB activity ; —saagadnst tourists for the 1964 season. I meintained ae this story ae fact throughout subsequent interviews ‘: and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 .- : and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No tele- - Po. grem was received in Geneva. I admit that the story oR was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order bem to hasten my defection. I was nervous end afraid . that my contacts with American Intelligence might be : ’ noticed, " ” i 4 I i { 3 i i i i owe 3 » 8 oh wn 4 i t ¥ ¥ 4 - + ¢ 4 cae One EDT eye epO me nme temo come aN . x eres A
CG. Soviet Official Reactions = _ a Latér events showing Soviet Orriciar réactions to NOSE 8 fection are presented below in chronological order: & February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to Geneva, had been missing for four days. a 9 February: Evening news brosdcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared. Zz 10 February: Unidentified. Soviet sources were quoted in the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected. AU, S. Department of State press release was issued iden- ‘tifying NOSZNKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States. 11 February: The Department of State was advised informally _ by Amoassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, reauest his release, and demand an immediate interview with him. 1? February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Dele- gation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at @ press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanced that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody. ; At simultaneous press conferences in Sern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappear- ‘ance and Soviet failure to cooperete with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO. The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to ;the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to F-) ? Fy * _effort was made to notify Moscow immediately. take ~a he do NR akin aabt LEER tbtn 6 eee semorenennentenne ignites cae eueen emer ey ceanahnnapipemthtnwetnn aren ene: ie bane. nceenh. desert eititdaibetes Thos ot Bolom athe die oe
: Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland. The Swiss Embassy asked for a meet ing with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been volun- tary. Arrangements were made to have NOSEHKO meet with Swiss. and Soviet representatives in Washington as scon as possible. - (NOSENKO arrived in ‘Washington at 2130 hours this same evening.) 13 February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary. i4 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read him a statement deploring the “evasive” reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a “gross provocation by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody. The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL, interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service lare in the afternoon. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met. him.) NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen, uaa btasetabn ses sae pee Bi meee Metaret oni tibaian ott aisraan oes emesthit sitions ute satet, wom eel sof YY Cae } ae THAR Nae chnen htc to nateitdenalalindniia sine.
+ ae .O . . i . . we . . . tea " so rien Eee ttt PENG cee eetONGE RCC tiem aRRDunMéaN Matinee Sesh tpe om Mimnrmenmen oats ss : 42. H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities, said he hud no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed dis- belief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United States or enywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned to the [Embassy to ask wnether he had replied; the younger Mrs. NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future and that of the NOSENKO children. NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in the United States and to sever all ties with his family and homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for: hin, and tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in Moscow on 7 April 1964, From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine Paris Match, KOROLEV indicatec that he would ¥~6niy once before had members of a defector's family called at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief ; Directorate, is believed jto remain under KGB control. : a8 | KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet Pavilion Of thé Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo- correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965, at the invitation of Life magazine, as a,photographer for Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to be accompanied. by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV is believed to be identical.with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press Inter- national correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.). ae renee ares Lotte kL aden tiaibiasd a Retene welt ieee a 4 a i 4 if et Sian bhi a STS hada ecellb aban atin te siete
} { i i ; ca: an “Like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed ‘that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a. "Soviet secret agent." Ags KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time. mer On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted : as his interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's i wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and i. he submitted a-one-page document in English which gave a short. account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part: "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and | an 12, a mother and a younger brother. .The family is not prose- cuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident {the defec- tion).- Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious _ that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said that additional photographs of -_NOSENKO's family in Moscow could be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspon- — dent.* * According to information available to CIA, a divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request. There is. no known precedent for either Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any ~ previous Soviet defection. teste TAIL welt wan Les ecg ael, Sewn ofp ale 1 athe: ad woh
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t was the “ynarime:s orinion"” of the KGB leadership anc or ‘GB officers GSeie Re that "NOSE“KO could do a tremendous amount of hern..to tae KGB," and that this damage would be severe for “several ~ years to come," As a direct result, G23 gee See, new rogulations were pronulzated to increase kod operational ~~ security in Moscow and abroad, * In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal 2 4 from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and tue recall of i ze anany officers abroad -- GW. Seewieee ang cae Agate 4 (BEER -- known to and presumably compromised oy NOSENKOG, * 4 Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, dn. ; P July 1964, WAR Aepsaid that 15 Kcb officers had already been fired, Among the: were GRIBANOV** and a nunber of his depytics : i 3 i . | aan Asada Test b a vat | T wield erable. See Part V.H. regarding GRIBANOV.
Gaol Ve ooarce . . -! dneluding cne General BANNIK.*( Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV'S personal friend and protege, stated it had been decided that GRIBANCV should have been aware of KOSENKO's nians_ and was therefore ultimately responsible. = et RAD, SPE GRIBANOV had been cistissed from the KGB and the Commaniet Party immediately after the defection, ad- ding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENKXO's 1964 trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a sum- M, Mary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which ae contained enough"compromising material" to prevent suc tT . trip under normal conditions.*" [ having learned that GRIBANOV was the Chicé of security at , ~~. a military plant outside Moscow and is considerca 4 “nothings” ** x Others dismissed from the XGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRIN, ; ; Chief of the 2ritish Department, First Chief Directorate. **** potent tans cts oe \ ee According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who sup~ ported his candidacy for the 1964 trip to Geneva; as far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved. Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had been approved by GRIBANOV. Mada tet tad ae% Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. Ban seed specter 4*%* In 1962 NGSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendly socially and we have often caroused together unofficially... He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together." . Under interrogation in Aprii 1964 NOSENKO was asked speci- _.fically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one occasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time. In February 1955 NOSENKO was asxed the same question and this time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially, most recently in October or:November-1963; TARABRIN, he said, was the only other person present on these three occasions; .. all three outings began as drinking, parties .in Moscow res~ . - taurants and the latter two ended at the home ixis .. NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although! ndicated that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly ‘established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the - Pirst Chief Directorate. Lo . : : Cet a AenNGIE igytete a iad Bune we Jd RUT ese y ceperginctaing = Hamas
14-00000 pat niga tyrerenneenenee cote a eet these plans were cancelled partly Secause 6 NOSES KO ¢ and partly for ether reasons not specified to é NOSESSO Matter was very serious, tnat @ AGD Wa a "major alert" a3 a result, vad that all missions had been ye: halted to make readjustments. “ TF Ld t_the time of NOSENKO's defection, Soa just afterwards V.S,MEDVEVEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committec* travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet d- legates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV under- scored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. the defection caused the recall cf Nina Ivanovna YEFREN TAs a KGB secretary in Geneva, and amcng the Sovicts there it was rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignments in consequazce of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB cfficer with_the permanent:Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated [ Ihe had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK ,| was discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his job. (This would be A.G,KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO, was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the de- fection.) ; : 7 WYEDVEDEV, a aGB officer tormeriy stationed in New York City, was said SGEsERMME to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel gotag abroad. | _ |MEDVEDEV, then a Couns selor at the Sovict Mission to the United ‘Nations, -as ‘the: Communist Party organizer and possivly.a member of the KGB, mtg her v TOP SECRET | wo Be os ce lemadhnt Oe 1 A adhe ue, A te Sertttace ae aouttias ayatan fe erie srewede pine dts cabin certs
14-00000 4. KGB Handlers of Agents : . A reflection of NOSENKO's defection was scen in FGB's handling of the subject of 2 toad received fron NOSENKO an . bon 31 March 1964, ‘was questioned by two of the KGB cffEivlTT crour possible sur- | ° : veillance and was asked to provide passport photcgraphs so : : that “escape” documents could be supplied to him and gq famits, | ee At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that fo a was being put on reserve status for an nspeciricd pertoa™anc . , told him that this decisicn had Leen made about two montne earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKO's cefecticn}. At the next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet hanvlors admitted to ; that they had "some connection" with NOSENEO, Al- a thouj.. sOSENKO probably could not identify 2S a KGB ot 4 - agent, they said, there was a possibility tncat™Vo nnew “what : 4 we {the KGS) are doing in Canada.” , cee ba beter sdedaandlts tia Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JGHNSON was told of NOSENKO's defection Ly his KGB case officer and was instructed to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intel- ligence. Although the Soviet told JCHNSON that there was nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the de- fection, JOHNSON said.** ne 6 whe wate te ews ote ama teteden, i tdean AER beeotlbl oe WE oa Exot, eres imine hee et tele dy ehcp TL bee, ee fats waren meweenes conemie: ae atts eeepperce smite nee #® See Part
r +E VereRON-KGR ASPECTS- OP-NOSENKO'8- A. Introduction The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon’his ownuatate- ments to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated (as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period preceeding his entry into the KGB, then follows a surmary of his statements about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and finally there is presented a review of what other sources have said on these subjects.. A separate section of this paper, Part V, discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB. , ~ B, NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defec~ tion furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early. personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the prin~ cipal source on this topic. Ha volunteered information during the 1962 meetings, during debriefings in early 1964, and under interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1946. These vari- ous accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following table, and. they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO'Ss birth to his alleged entry into the KG3. The first column in the table cpntains statements which NOSENKO made during the June 1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from ths transcripts of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NOSENKO's own words. The column headed “19é4," derived from the April 1964 interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before - and during that interrogation. Most of the information given ' in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO, mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation and from DERYABIN's interrogation in duly and August has also been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's ques- tioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his state- ments to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobicgraphy submitted to CIA at that time. The final column presents the results of the. October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early life. From column to column appear inconsistencies and contra- Gictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO, although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October 1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier Statements to CIA about the occurrence of ether events affecting his life. This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circum- stances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966. s ‘ Pes sna decciecdatsacdlee ae . wed eleSt Bed date we so AER ME BL one nt A a 4 | Oe .
June 1962. _ ™E was born in @iNikolayev, my father ijworked as a senior mechanic ata plant jand took. evening ‘courses, Then he - tgraduated from the aNikolayev Ship- 3 "My father was gent to Leningrad, ‘to the Sudomekh plant, a small iplant in Lenin- _igrad. He was at 4the plant for half fa year and then be- ycame director. lenis was 1936-1937. tThen he was sent — j to the Baltic iShipyard in Lenin= igrad as Chief En- igénear. He was -fthere-less than a x year, . 1964 Born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukraine, USSR, where he lived with family until 1934, uilding Institute." . In 1934, at age six, entered the “zero” (nulevoy) class, equivalent to kindergarten, im Nikclayev. * Moved to Lenin~ grad in 1935, where father was first appointed thief engineer and later director of Sudomekh. Lived at several ad- aresses and at- tended several schools. [Note: Soviet press stated elder NOs’ SENKO was chief ‘ angincer of “se- veral enterprises” in Leningrad during TNE BERNAL MEAS tye wee, Re aN ONT Cape 49. 1965 Born 1927 in Niko- layev where father was a student at the Shipbuilding Instie- tute. Father from simple peasant back- ground, while mother's parents were nobility. (May) Entered the “sero” class in Nikolayev in Septem= ber 1934, two months before his seventh birthday. (May) Moved to Lenin-~ grad, probably in spring of 1935. At- tended three years of school there, completing First Class in 1935-36, Second Class in 1936-37, and Third Class in 1937-38.° (May) ape omumpeaeigjertmemateess:  -aaremerege, erengreen April 1966 "I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, was born 30 Octoe ber 1927 in Niko=- layev, an oblast center in the Ukrainian Repub- lic of Soviet Russia." . "In September: 1934, in Niko- layev, I entered the ‘zero’ class. My father was already in. lenin- grad, where he was working at the Sudomekh Shipyard." "Shortly there- after he [father] found an apartment and, interrupting my Studies, I travelled to Lenin- grad with my mother. I did not begin studies in the Pirst Glass until Septem ber 1935 as there were no ‘zero' classes in the Lenin- grad schools. I finished the Third Class in Leningrad in 1938." October 1966 i Born 1927 in Niko=- .. layev, the son of = Ivan Isidorovicna mos NOBENKO and Tamara =. * - Georgievna NOSENKO. Lived in Leningrad from 1935 to 1938. ARLE Voted Soba Mh Ae att ase
“dune 1962 fF -*In 1938 my father was assigned “t© Moscow as Deputy Peoples’ Commissar. I}was only .a little ‘boy. In 1939 he was appointed Peoples’ Commissar, later Minister, of @ Shipbuilding Industry and re- mained such until ws death in 1956.* 1964 1935-1937: became di- _ rector of Baltic Shipyard in 1938.] NOSENKO's father ~ was appointed First Deputy to the Peoples’ Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and then _ became Commissar. Family returned to Moscow, and NOSENKO entered lQ-ycar school located on Ulitsa Bol‘shaya Polyanka. [Note: Soviet press re- ported that I.r. NOSENKO became Deputy Commissar in 1939 and Commissar ‘in 1940.) . Completed the Sixth Class at School No. 585.- Went to Sochi:- with parents for vaca- tion and was there. when war broke out. Returned to Moscow the next day. 50. 1965 In 1938 the elder NOSENKO ‘was named First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of Shipbuilding and the family returned to Moscow. NOSENKO entered a school on Bol’shaya Polyanka. Ne completed the Pourth Class in 1938- 1939 and the fifth class in 1939-1940. (May) NOSENKO finished the Sixth Class at the 10-year school on Bol'shaya Pole yanka during the 1940-1941 academic year. Then he travelled on vaca=- tion to Sochi, where the family stayed at a “rest home" of the Coun= cil Ministers. Learned of war's outbreak on the radio while there April 1966 "In 1938 my father was summoned to Moscow and he bee gan to work in the Peoples’ Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. Having finished the Third Class, I moved to Moscow with my mother at the end ef the summer.” “In 1941 I completed the Sixth Class at the 585th middle school and went to Sochi for a vacation. with my father and mother. On 21 June, during our vacation in the south, the war began and for this _ reason my parents and I returned to Moscow the mext day." p ¥ October 1966
; *F studied irst in a school @F the Navy. There I sailed @board boats and dutters." [No fate given.) “June 1962 1964 Enrolled in Moscow Special Naval School, but studies did not be~ gin in Moscow be- cause cf the war and immediate plans to evacuate the school. In Sep~- tember 1941 NOSEN~ KO spent one weck digging trenches with a group from the school, and on. 10 October he travelled with the rest of the school 51. 1965 and returned to Moscow the next day by train. (May) Enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuyby- shev, attended the '1941-42 school year in Kuybyshev. (May) to Kuybyshev. oy There ha began his studies in the Seventh Class. In June 1942 completed the Seventh Class at the Moscow Special Naval School in Kuybyshev. Re= turned to Moscow in July with about three other boys from the school. Prevailed on father to allow transfer to “real military school* and enrolled in the Leningrad In summer 1942 returned from Kuy- byshev to Moscow on leave. While there somehow learned that Special Naval School to be moved from Kuybyshev to Achinsk, Siberia. Did not want to go so far away from home, so enrolled in Leningrad Naval Prep School, Baku. Spent April 1966 "In October 1941 my mother and I were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where . I completed the Seventh Class in June 1942." (Note: NOSENKO here added a year to his life which he had not mentioned earlier, To accommodate this change he subtracted a year from the time he spent at the Naval Preparatory ~ School in Baku. below. ] a See “I completed tha Seventh Class in Chelyabinsk. In the beginning of the summer of 1942 I moved from Chel- yabinuk to Gor'kiy and soon after this returned to Moscow. In Moscow I wag ace- cepted in the Spe- cial Naval School which in August 1942 was evacuated to Kuybyshev. There Went to Chelya- binsk from Moscow in = _ 1941, after the start .. ef the war. oo Q De NUS AOL Paty arent eos maton ght, Was in Gor'kiy for... - a time in the summer of 1942, « om sty etie nent 1 edna ata Bedid ck,on tee Py
by Someyningemets.ore CUTER ERERES yee team beaee + wee ge as oe § 1964 Naval Preparatory School which had been evacuated from Leningrad to Baku. Spent summer vacation at home in Moscow with parents. After 3 1/2 months in Moscow, left by train for Baku with a group of about 30 other students in Octo- ber,. The trip lasted 14 days. . Route not recalled. Arriving in Baku joined Prep School and spent about a month in “quaran- tine.” Then as- signed to the Ninth Training Company, in the Third Course, equivalent to the. Eighth Class, — (Note: The Hoscow- Rostov railroad line was cut by the Germans by this time. The only pos-= sible route at this time would have been a long and circuitous one via Tashkent i 32. 1965 summer with parents in Moscow. (May) Went to Baku by train in October. Trip took two weeks. Spent first four to Six months in Baku in “quarantine,” which was similar to American bodtcamp. ‘Enrolled in the First Course, equivalent to the Eighth Class. (May) April 1966 I entered the Eighth Class." {In Kuybyshev; see above entry. ] October 1966 Retentions V8 RU Se
1964 Took military oath, {[Notez: NO-=- SENKO was 15 years old at this time, by law too young to take oath. This point stressed in April 1964 inter=- rogations.] Completed Third Course (Eighth Class} in June 1943. Took no vacation but spent summer working at the school in Baku. In September 1943 began new school year in the Second Course, equivalent to Ninth Class. Along with 15 or 20 classmates, NOSENKO submitted a’ collective letter. asking to be sent sey epee opgeumerne, eee ope bette E. 53. "1965 Took military oath at end of “quarantine” period. Oath administered to make boys feel a ‘part of service al- though too young. Oath taken between 15th and 16th birthe days, i.e., after October 1942 and be= fore November 1943. NOSENKO certain he celebrated 15th birthday in Baku in 1942. (May) Completed First Course in June and spent summer of 1943 at school. Entered Second Course at the Naval Prep School in Baku in September 1943. (May) .—~ Since 1942 NO@- SENKO had had an “obsession® about getting into the war. Students from we April 1966 {Studying in Kuybyshev. See above entries.) [Completed | Eighth Class in Kuybyshev. ] “During the summer of 1943 I returned to Moscow on vaca- tion. The Special Naval School was to be evacuated from Kuybyshev to Achinsk and there- fore, not wanting to go to Achinsk, I enrolled in the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. “While at the Naval Prep School in Baku, in Octo- ber 1943, I joined the KOMSOMOL." a a «6 7a "xX took the mili« tary oath in Baku. I” was 15 years old at the This was in [No month: given; ] time. 1943." TE tatty ma meee ROAM I Sete nithaa NASON, FR Sel ye Baw [rretainge oe Segoe Nrnmer enamine pe oe
ki ie hing of 1944) 5 =, reer permit rey yest + ot q fh 1964 to the front be- cause they had heard that stu- dents at the Frunze Higher Naval School had gone. Request caused an uproar '. and investigations. Permission denied. Joined KOMSOMOL. In January, to- gether with class- mate Yura RAD- CHENKO, NOSENKO went to the city military commis= sariat in Baku to inquire about joining a Marine detachment. They were turned down and thereupon ran away from the Naval Prep School. Tra- velling by boxcar, the two went to Stantslya Lazarev=- skaya via Tbilisi and from there walked to Tuapse in search of the mili- pemeeimenay gees morptete a 54. 1965 the Frunze Higher Schuel had gone to the front in 1612 and some of the older boys at the Prep School went in early 1943. Fired up, NOSENKO and about eight others filed a petition to be allowed to fight. (May) ‘After receiving a scolding from school authorities for having submitted the petition, NOSENKO and several other boys began to plot to run away to the front. When the time came in early 1944 only one other boy, RADCHENKO, would accompany him. the two slipped out of school, made their way to the railway. station, and found a freight train heading toward Tuapse. On arriving in Tuapse they were arrested almost immediately April 1966 October 1966. | {See above entry.] *“% studied in Baku only for half the school year because I ran away from « school, home to Mos- cow, in the begin- ning of 19441° The story about ‘going to or toward , the front was a lie, “NOSENKO said. _ Saw ages RR te ee aete wets ste fname se “ pepe wee SO RT hae poe us Toate st enste mete 8 ee mE oe
eam tgs Son seaprem gis arenas rere emucneene: a+ Femaniainnanmin hist mney dente ne ee ame REN, $5. June 1962 1964 , 1965 April 1966 tary front. Ar- at the station, sever- riving in Tuapse, al days later they they were arrested were returned to Baku and were then re- where they managed to turned to Baku under escape. They then guard. In Baku, travelled to Moscow they managed to es=- using’ false documents cape again before and were arrested at being returned to the:the train station on Prep School. After arrival. (May) hiding a few days at the home of a girl-~- friend, NOSENKO and . RADCHENKO travelled ; to Moscow by train, oo rn using forged docu- : mentation obtained by a friend in the Naval Prep Scheol. They were arrested at the Moscow Railroad Station by military police who had been alerted by authori- - ties in Baku. 'NO- SENKO's father balled him out. [Note: Previous accounts varied widely. NO- ' SENKO originally said he had participated in the battle for Novorossiysk with his entire class from the *“Frunze Higher Naval School." This battle actually took place in September 1942. Ona ; later occasion, NOSENKO 3 t ‘ ' i t {
q, i 1965 gaid that he and RADCHENKO saw com- bat near Tuapse.} Took Ninth Class exams after stucying as an "external stu- dent" at the Gorniy Institute in Moscow. Passed these and through father's in- fluence was trans-— ferred back to the- Naval Prep School, which had just moved back to Leningrad from Baku. Tra- velled to Leningrad to join his class in September. Studies did not. start at once. NO- SENKO and others lived in Narva and worked in the woods. SRNR Te STE Lee epee rs ers upen te ee - ae 56. 1965 Did not want to return to Baku as ashamed to face class- mates after failure to get’ to front. Re- mained at home and attended adult educa- tion courses at Gornly. Institute and had special tutors in math and Russian grammar. Finished Ninth Class in spring or summer and travelled in fall to Leningrad to rejoin class in Prep School. (May) Arriving in Lenin=- grad NOSENKO was as< signed to a group made up Of stragglers and was sent to the forest near Lenine- grad to cut wood for the winter supply at the school. Condi- tions were terrible-- the work was hard and the weather was cold, camp, and miserable. (May) April 1966 "In Moscow I finished the Ninth Class as an exter- nal student at Gorniy Institate and at the end of the summer of 1944... was enrolled in the Naval School in Lene ingrad and travelled there in the month of August.* Bette, meet : . wr ON ghee, 1
dune 1962 Sree at ny mend erng pipette 1964 Studies in Tenth Class of Naval Pre- paratory School cone menced in November 1944. ; ' delegation. At the end of April 1945, NOSEIrKO was chot in the hand at a party by a ; jealous young of fi- cer and was hospita- iiged. In the ent. suing inveetiqation he protected the real culprit by pre- tending that he had shot himself acci- dentally while Cleaning a gun. H8e never gew the offi cer again. aw ae - | ST. 1965 Apeil 1966 About three or four days before the boys were to return to Leningrad a car. was cant for NOSEN=~ KO. Be returned to Leningrad to stay in the Botel Astoria with his father who was wisiting with a After this he went back to achool, sometime in Movember, (Hay) Somatime- in Febru- “In the ke= ary or March, a'fe~ ginning of 1945 I belie acquaintance of accidentally shot an unknown Navy offi- myaelt through the cer-began to flirt and and spent with NOSENKO. The of-about a month re- @icer became angry, drew hia gun and shot Navy hospital.* NOSENKO through thé Rand. The officer was apologetic, and NOSENKO promised ‘not to report the incie gent. The wound grew worse, however, and NOSENXO was forced to enter tha hospital. Ha told tho doctor that be had accident=- ally shot himself with &@ souvenie: gun. He was hospitalized for about three weeks. (May) eee ee Rg RT ae ‘military duty. NOSENKO made this state= The cuperating in the question NOSENKO shot him- self through: the hand, @his was absolutely ace cidental and was not an attempt to avoid iNotes ment in responses to a direct question. . that NOSENKO shot himsel? to avoid being sent to the front while at= tending a “naval college in Leningrad in 1942.°] Boao Set 7 ee eeu tante mele qi fet een Senter Henrmancaybemnete Tr: Seve an ait Fn reare teenie ease Guten etcetera uM anny
1944 tne» ms finaate tematic ee tes June 1962 *X finished the Naval School, then was in the Navy. I fought," (boyeval-~~ presumably in World War If). “In 1945 I was demobilized." ORE sper aery erent 1964 While in the hos- pital, NOSENKO ap- plied for release from military ser- vice. This was ag- sisted by father's friends. After release from the hospital he did not want to return to school. He called his father and then’ spent a week with friends of the family in Leningrad before getting a room in @ dormitory at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekh- nikum. Despite failure to return to the Naval Prep School, NOSENKO was erédited with satis- factory completion of the school year (Tenth Class). In June he passed the exams for the Second Course at the Ship- building Tekhnikum. He then went to the District Military Commissariat and was demobilized. He received his mili- tary reserve regis~- tration and a -certi- ficate of satisfac~- tory completion of Se ar ae ed epee ere aah od ar _—, —_— Se aay “EM sk, 58, | 1965 Apri 1966 In the hospital NOSENKO decided he could not return to school as he was ashaced of the type ef girls he had been with the night of the accident and could not stand the thought of being ‘made an example of by the school KOMSO~ MOL organization. He left the hospital in civilian clothes and stayed with a friend of his father. He obtained a state- ment: that he had attended the Naval Prep School, which was just a report of his courses and an average of his marks up to that time. Ad the son of a minister it was then easy for him to enter the Shipbuilding Tekh= nikum whefe, with special tutoring, he was able to complete the Tenth Class in the summer. (May) “After this [hand shooting] incident I. id notcwant to go back to the school and began to study at the Shipbuilding fekhnikum in Lenin- grad, in the Second Course, in order to complete the Tenth Class. In May or June 1945, with the. help of the Director - of the Tekhnikum, I received documenta~ tion certifying that I had completed the Second Course which made it possible fpr me to enter the In- atitute [of Inter- national Relations] and I returned to my parents in Moscow.* October T1966 bene tesa Sage “ime peiMMANaetelge ae pges are cinea teen 20 O sigk dara 8
Ter geen tnate tenes = omnia nrg mee STEER ORE Ft eng Meg tne cor sneer + ORE Oca June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966 ten year's schooling. {Note: A biographi-. cal statament was drawn up on the basis of NOSENKO's state- . ae ae ments in January- a ra February 1964 and ap- oO - a ee proved by NOSENKO as _ re correct in February : ee Se 1964, This state» ment said that he com- pleted his 10-Year ed- cation at the Baku school in the spring of 1943 and thereby became eligible to enter.a higher edu- eaticonal institution. From 1943 to 1°45, the statement continued, NOSENBO attended the Frunze Higher Naval School {a counterpart of Anmapolis). After three years there, he decided to leave the Navy, was demobi- lized. and entered the Institute of Interna~ . ' tional Relations. In October 1966, NOSENKO said he had lied about attending Frunze Academy. ] EA de te we ge eae Rte © e ThA Ce TER aN a, ALE. Ate ee "After the war I NOSENKO decided NOSENKO decided he “In July 1945. I went to study at he did not want to would like a career entered the Insti- the Institute of study further at the in the foreign ser- tute of International International Rela- Shipbuilding Tekhni~ vice ard returned to Relations." tions...In 1945 I kum and returned to Moscow, where he '-was demobilized. Moscow where he passed the entrance
emg enigeerger ee atnmentaeee me giemwan eatee oe a shee cate, ‘ June 1962. 1964 1965 April 1966 October 1966 - fo passed the entrance exams for the IIR. 3 id examinations for (May) + the Institute of : International Re- rn rs tg lations (IIR}. The . Oo . alc ye “ 4 . exam consisted only , re ; ; of a composition, ; Co ge, be dictation, and a Co Boa I f interview. wa et =e Travelled to Travelled to East oll pe Germany with his Gurmany in August 1945 ae rr father who was with father's delega- . coe | leading a delega- tion. Given tempo- . ; mo ds tion. For the pur- rary commission as mo pose of the trip senior lieutenant for Lo a eo a | - only, NOSENKO was the trip. Continued to ; ; 3 - 4 issued a uniform wear uniform on return, wn on and documents ‘even to classes at the a i showing him to be a institute. Entered in- cS: senior lieutenant. stitute on return from rr ‘ When he returned to Germany and chose to oo o (ved. . Moscow he continued specialize in English ae Myo to pass himself off language and U.S. area 7 me ; as an officer who studies for reasons he - vo fo had seen combat in could not recall. (May) a . ee ob the war and eventu- o) j ally got into ey ar : 3; trouble at the in- ’ : ee RE Lb stitute because of re me this. Began studies re re in Faculty of In- an ee ae Ae robes ternational Law and. . ‘ Ts a English language in ; a September. . a © . | i ‘ : : +} ae Ten we eect tes are anette ane apne cere mate Dn nage cupgemm arm, codes aged ate’ te
OPEL TOP RTT me ae June 1962 {NOSFNKO was talk~ sbout .his present “wife.] second wife. married before... cannot say that I "This is my. I was I 61. 1964. Completed first year at Institute of International Relations. Began second year at IIR. Completed second year at IIR. Com- missioned junior lieutenant in Re- serves. Began third year at IIR. . While studying at the IIR NOSENKO was dating Augus- tina Konstantinovna TELEGINA, the daughter of a lieu- tenant general. ret om nag gr mmemamnpees renee puermiet Ep Mp Ne 1965 April 1966 With help of tem- porary documents used for the trip to Ger- many, NOSENKO managed to exempt himself from compulsory military training during his first two years at IIR. When it was found that his claims of active duty were false, he was commissioned a jun- ior lieutenant in the Reserves along with his classmates. (May) In third year at IIR NOSENKO began to specialize in Inter- national law. (May) saemmeng 8 ote mere rt - In 1947. commis- sioned a juntor lleu- — tenant in the re- serves. Diu not under» go any military train- | ing. After complet- ing second year at the Institute, began to do military trans= lations to avoid military service. "Yl was a friend and companion of TELEGINA for some months before her father was arrested in connection with STALIN's campaign “While I was studying at the In- stitute, at the end of 1947, I married Augustina Konstanti= novna TELEGINA, who was born in 1929*
nome } quainted. | @aw each other for | about two seeks. § 10 o'clock [I came work]. dune 1962 1 loved her a “great '@ deal,..The war had just ended. £ | wanted peace. I wanted a guiet corner. I wanted someone to léok after, ma...and B80 we became ac= We Let*s get married. Zz married her. That's all." [Hotes NOSENKQ: did - not . Gate this marriage other ‘than to im= i ply it was right. after the war; dt is included | here to place it in ths context of g later statements.) "One Monday. ..at home early from Suddenly I heard--I. approached on tietoe--What is this? In my bed, who is lying with i my wife? Her older | brother. Well, I gsiammed the door, SPN gEE Se tery ermem gD AL ala aie i F 1964 TELEGIN waa ar~ reated by STALIN, and NOSENKO married Augustina soon afterwards,-.in about November 1947, Broke off mar~ ', vdage after several months when he found his wife in flax rante delicto with fee brother. The two were separated, but not divorced, at this time. [Note: As with other dates connected with the left, and did not go TELEGINA marriage, » back. . back. Never, went. That, | ‘was . all, precise here: _..JOSENKO has been im- in RT Santen ety rere eg ae , eed inte a - gt pe Bae RO ee 7 a os Bl . 8 "os 1965 April 1966 against associates of Marshall ZUUKOV. However, we never planned to marry. After the arrest, however, I decided to marry her in . order to show my ‘ strength of char- acter. I cannot ree member the date of the marriage, which was my first. I think that it hap- pened in 1947, but do not know what season or how long after the arrest of TELEGIN." (Ine terrogation Pro- tocol Signed in February 1965.) “One morning<-- er lived with my I cannot remember the first wife until 1949, date or season, but it was in the first . . half of 1948--~-Z came @arly and unexpected from my studies at the Institute of In- ternation Relations « to the apartment of my wife's mother, where IY sometimes met my wife, and surprised her in sexual inter- 8s saseeee. mean en tntee tect SFAEETERAANS CORA TR Ort de ns = October 1966 Nea othe Sey. AP Retr oe Menace Ey, ie LHS a, oa OER ee
+ June 1962. # Bye bye...Well, f you can imagine my $ horror.” [Notes * Portions of the tape of this con- ® versation are un@~ readable. It is & clearly implied that gy this scene took "A child was born who might : have been mine and i who might not have i been mine. God ~ knows. There was @ still no child when | I left. Well, I helped out. I + gent money. That's @ll,. But I didn't see either her or the child." (Note: $s} NOSENKO provided no * date for the above.] ? 5 : a gt eed pepo oe 1964 April 1964 he said on another occa~- sion that he found his wife with her brother sometime prior to June 1947.] Completed third year at IIR. Feng eee aerate atte ee camper a 63. 1965 course with her brother. I walked out without comment. The next day I re- turned to our apart@- mant where my wife and I continued to live together, al- though our relation- ship was strained. I stayed with her because she was pregnant at the time." (Protocol signed February 1965.) Girl with hare dip and cleft palate born to TELE=- GINA. NOSENKO de~ cided deformity was due to her incest- uous relationship with her brother, Subsequently gave his wife a little money to help sup- port the child, but never considered it his. Marriage cooled still further, but NOSNEKO continued to live in the aparte- ment. (May) April 1966 October 1966
“chaps narrzatay conta a + ? seas, June 1962 1964 Began fourth year at IIR. Completed fourth year at IIR. Successfully de- fended his thesis on the subject of “Dip- lomatic Immunity." Completed English language studies. In March or April 1950 NOSENKO was interviewed by the assignments commission of the IIR and was tenta=- tively assigned to the GRU. Ip May 1950 he went to the ee. Wee ay . oy eb ee 64. 1965 . NOSENKO was through with courses at the Institute in January 1950 and had already defended his thesis on "Diplomatic Imnu- nity." The last half~year at the In- stitute was relatively free because the students were given time to prepare for the state exams which were requifed for graduation. (May) . Before taking his final state exams, NOSENKO went before the placement board. Here they talked about his possible assignments and al- though no definite decision was reached the state examina- April 1966 x ’ ‘4 Jie atals tah ‘ 2 TRAP E emacs wot mata rei Sue heme Cpa Manager ween ® Samoan dL OWE Miata Lene The Placement Com- mission sent NOSENKO to the MGB where he was told he was not a . suitable candidate. The | reason was for “little ~~ sion was created at things. I was drunk the Institute and several times, only an I declared to it my average student, etc.” |. - "In the spring of 1950 before the beginning of tions a personnel placement commis-
Jine 1962 Sng Re tame sergeant oe 1964 CRU Peysonnel De- partment for an interview with Colonel KALOSHIN on the instructions of the chief of the "secret unit" at the IIR. -65. 1965 it was suggested he go into the-Navy. After this, but before the state exams, NOSENKO visited a special section of the Navy Ministry to give them special docu- ments for a secu- rity check. Al- though it was not stated, NOSENKO be- lieved he was slated for Navy Intelli- gence. (May) store gar oe netgear ee Be AN baleen tate Aatryet oa April 1966 wish to work in some sort of mili- tary organization. Soon thereafter the chief. of. the Institute's special section gave me a telephone number and told me to call it. The number was K-6...and I rea- lized that the MGB was interested in me since these numbers belonged - to the MGB. I called the aumber and was told to come to the MGB... {at the MGB] con- cerned my bio- graphy and my knowledue of the English language.. Nothing was said about where.it was. . intended .for.me to work....Later the ' chief of the In- stitute's special section told. me my. . qualifications. were not suitable.for .....": the MGB." October 1966 - NOSENKO said he did not mention this earlier because his _interrogators would not have believed that the MGB first turned him down and they later accented him in 1953. |
4 *X finished ‘the Inetitute of lEinternational Ree lations in 1950, 1964 ¢ Took atata exams for comple- tion of the Ineti- tute. Passed three of them but flunked Marxism- leninism. Advised GRU and was told to eall back when he had. hie IIR diplo- ma, He was allowed . to take the Navy ‘physical exam, which lasted three days. Passed exams. on second try and re- ceived diploma of completion of IIR. Contacted Colonel RALOSHIN of GRU Per- sonnel, Submitted a en oe. oe A 66. 1965 iter falling the state exam NOSENKO had someone in his father’s effice call the GRU to see what he should do, It turned out that the security check would take a long) time and NOSENKO was told to check back after he had passed the exam. (May) WOSENKO checked back with GRU Pere sonnel after passing his exams. (May) ore April 1966 "During the | summer of 1956, while the state exams were under« way, I began to | process for entry into the Navy GRU. My processing took place through Colcnel KALOSHIN, the Chief of the — GRU Pergonnel Dee partment. until March 1951 I repeatedly wisited the Minise- try of. the Navy... XZ gilled out questionaires in éuplicate, wrote two autobiographies and submitted copies of my diplo~ SENKO in hig 1966 autobiography did not mention Raving failed the exam in Karxiem- laninisn. ] ®% submitted copies of my dipic- ma to GRU Pergonnel,* {See above entry.) ROSENKO processing gor GRU entry. a re Pes ere HR MILB a SC ity
“+ Qdane 1962 wt! bP "when they of- fered me [assign- ments in] Moscow, ; Leningrad and the' @ Far East I took q the Far East so. @ that nobody could ‘say that Yuriy NO~ SENKO took advan~..__ me mepeeepgeyepenn nine one oo + 1964 diploma, trans~ cript of grades, and other neces~ Sary papers. (Note: Previously in 1964 NOSENKO stated that he graduated from the IIR, which at that time was a four- year course, in mid-1949 and "just loafed around" for a year. He later changed the com~ pletion date to Late 1949 or early 1950. Then he changed this to say that he failed exams in 1949 and had been forced to wait an entire year before he could retake them in 1950. Finally he gave the version above. ] . Entered on ac- tive duty with the Navy on 17-19 Sep- tember 1950, when he recuived orders transferring him from a junior lieu- tenant in the Re- serves to a junior Cor . wa 67. 1965 In the autumn of 1950 received orders transferring him from the Reserve to active duty. Offered a choice of duty posts, NOSENKO chose to go to the Far East. "in order to prove he April 1966 {See above entries.) Still processing for -GRU entry. October 19% a * f + + £., or i 4b
Be acetone Te neater ge me Baty omen i wo 68. 1965 June 1962 1964 October 1966 April 1966 ’ age of his father's lieutenant on ac- was now ready to *t worked in athe field of in- lgormation in the. .¥Far Fast, in the ‘eity of Sovetskaya {Gavan...in the , ifield of informa- ttion--radio inter- fcept, ete. All fyour movements, ywhen you moved vessels to Che~- amul’po, Korea, §the Korean opera~ tion...we knew all the ships there be~ scaurne you talked on athe air. You itransmitted. We '- knew each division, gite name, its num- tive duty. Re- ceived orders to the Intelligence ; Staff of the Seventh Far East Fleet. {Note: In an ear= lier version, NO- SENKO said he en- ~fered the GRU in 1949, having fin- ished the Insti- tute of Interna- tional Relations the same year.] On approxi- ‘mately 1 October 1950 NOSENKO left Moscow by train for the Far East. The “trip to Bukhta - Postevaya (near Sovetskaya Gavan), where his unit: was atationed, took nina or ten days. <As- signed to work in the Information Section under Cap- tain Second Rank KHAYTOV. Duties included transla- tions from Ameri~ can Naval litera- ture and making summaries of American Navy OB in make a man of him- self...in the country God forgot." (May) Arriving at his duty station NO- SENKO was assigned to the Information Section. He liked the work and did a , good job despite the rigorous con= ditions. During his aecviece here he roe ceived special mention as an out= standing officer. ‘ There were 300 to 350 intercept opera- tors there. NO-=- SENKO and other officers analyzed the take as well as information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok. (May) for GRU entry. {See above entries] Still processing tae BD gh ws + 4 & ;, (i oar ene ee a eet 8 eran nies Lee ts we 17 Ie Nee paella Ded HF TD amt st ota seer neaeataminuDm tine cetetedie ante tegaen SE QERRRRRRBR re ars
June 1962 1964 Far East. There was a unit involved in radio intercept of American Naval ctar- gets in Korean area, but NOSENKO was not personally concerned with this work. ‘tha we reported this to Moscow. I don't know what ‘was done with this ihformation after this. So, we were Goncerned with. “Aformation.® After about seven months in the Far Promoted to the rank of lieutenant. moted to lieutenant. This was April 1951. Normally one is pro- moted from junior lieutenant to lieue tenent only after a year's service in grade. This can he reduced to six months in the Far East. (May) age. April 1966 7 "On 12 March 1951 two orders were is<- East, NOSENKO was pro-sued by the Naval Ministry; one con- cerning my enlistment in the Navy and the other assigning me as a translator to the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet (Military Unit 70176). The following day at KALOSHIN's instructions I re=- ported to the Moscow City Military Com- mission. where I was. issued my passport and my voyen bilet. The Commission also issued me temporary duty orders and tra vel documents. On 16 or 17 March I left Moscow for my duty. post. I arrived at. Bukhta Postavaya at the end of March and was made to obtain October 1966 _ *T lied when I: said I started in the. GRU in-1950. It, was. really March 1951.* (Note: . No effort a a reason for this lie or to question — NOSENKO on its im- plications for his earlier statements about promotions, etc,]_ "I was on active oe duty in Sovetskaya =~. Gavan--Bukhta Poste~. - vaya from 1951 to " 1953."
June 1962 fanuary- Bebruary F 1952 TAL SETA Teerrges pee cree at A ee ee Cres 1964 NOSENKO involved in apprentice work in the Agent-Intel- ligence Section at Bukhta Postovaya. This involved going out to sea on sub= chasers to pick up and drop off, and conducting meetings with agents from Hokkaido and Sak- halin. NOSENKO did not actually meet agents, but was merely along to learn how they were picked up at sea. . Filed action by mail to divorce TELE= GINA in Moscow court and published inten- tion notice in a local Sovetskaya Gavan news- paper in January or February. » ote tes eet at wee SPE ~ 70. 1965 April 1966 began work in the CO Cras Information De= ta partment of the Intelligence Unit of the Seventh Fleet. NOSENKO was planning to divorce his wife before he t left Moscow but did not start proceedings because he was afraid she would bring charges against him in the KOMSOMOL. ° Sometime in late 1951 or early 1952. he published his notice ; ; ae eae ee - he f- © an # pt " October 1966 | i t yr os z oe t Ros Jf.
June 1962 cemgrenane eerenese™ po Hon ey Pe smegma raat ett 1964 Left Bukhta Postovaya and re- turned to Moscow on leave. Arrived at the end of April and reported to KALOSHIN. Re~ quested transfer from the Far East. 71. 1965 of intent in a local newspaper and for=- - warded the neces- sary papers to Mos= cow. (May) On 1 May 1952 NOSENKO's father was to observe his 50th birthday. NOSENKO's two-ycar tour in the Far East would not be up until October or November 1952, and he was not entitled to any leave until it was ended. How= ever, his section chief was very under~ standing and ar- ranged for him to leave in April’ so that he could be in Moscow for the birth- day celebration, NOSENKO flew to Khabarovsk where he had a “two-day drunken orgy" with another Naval offi- cer. He then con- tinued on to Moscow in time for the May Day and birthday celebrations. The next day he reported to the Navy Ministry and was told to re- “yes wee Pe ee ee erat mend April 1966 "At the end of April 1952 I left Sovetskaya Gavan on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April,*
#*~ worked in the ag Fast until 1952, nen euddenly I Fell i121. In the Fat East. It was this way. Then I arrived in Moscow, I went to the doctor. They began toi xeray Me. Clear lungs, lutely. They e¥amined me one day, two days, three days. Clear, abso~ ldtely clear. Then bY accident, right ugder my collar- akhso- béne, a small, small, little spot was. found and it turned oat to be on ay blood vessel. It tarned out to be at aivery early stage. at that time they had just discovered streptomycin and I was confined at the Hertzen Sani- torium near Mos dow, 1 was there for two months. I @lt fine but they 1964 NOSENKS was on leave during May and June 1952 and lived during this time at the home ~ of his parents at No. 4 Ulitsa Gor'kogo in Mos<- cow. He received one month leave for his 1951 ser- vice in the Far East and the other for his 1952 service there. [Note: NOSENKO did not mention having had tuberculosis ducing any inter- rogations or state> ments in 1964. Ac cording to his 1966 statements, ne spent only one year, March 1951 to April 1952, in the Far East.) Vere 146 Fagg sP bail oe oO ie 72. % 1965 turn at the end of his leave for reas@- signment. (May) NOSENKO was on leave during Hay and June. No de~ cision had been . reached with re- gard to whether he would return to Sovetskaya Gavan cr not and he was "at the disposal" ef the’ Naval Minis- try during this period. After the Leave, NOSENKO waited another month until his as- signment was de~ cided upon. (May) [Note: NOSENKO did not. mention having been hospitalized in this period.] April 1966 "while on leave i became ill with tuberculosis and spent almost two months in a sani- torium near Mos~ cow." [Notes In another statement, written a week earlier, NOSENKG said that in Sovetskaya Gavan “arunkeness and the severe condi- tions had their effect on my health and led to an outbreak of tuberculosis in May 1952."] ‘October 1966 NOSENKO confirmed that he was at the Herzen Sanitorium during this period and said that 48 a. result of his illness ‘ -he was "coughing - up a half a glass of blood. at a time." His treatment con= sisted of shots of atreptomycin. bakitete me we oe
June 1962 1964 gave me shots of streptomycin every hour for two months and stopped this disease at once. After this I had check-ups for five years, was car= ried on their books until 1957. It was nothing." "They of fered me the opportunity to study in the ’ Military-Diploma~ tic Academy. I went and took a look ‘at the courses they had to offer~-Marx- ism, Philosophy, History, and so on. Well, what did I need this for? I already knew this. I said: ..'No, I won't go.'” "after my ille ness and after the Far East I received erders to the Bal~- tic. On the Bal- tic there is a city which was formerly A ewe 8 Bl De eR ae vd ps ot . Following his regular leave NOSENKO was or=- dered by the Navy to procedcd to Berlin and Rostok, but refused to go TeUREMEAReR™ Cmte en cea a ee . During the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to the Military- Déplomatic Academy, to a special Navy espionage school, and to Germany, but turned all of them down for various reasons. He re= jected the opportun=- ity to attend the Military-Diplomatic Academy because: he had already had 96 per cent of the courses in the In- stitute. (Hay) NOSENKO received erders to Sovetsak and arrived there in late August or early Sep= tember 1952. In Sovets* NOSENKO was assigned a political 8 wert April 1966. *During the . month of July the Personnel Departe.: mont of the GRU reached a deci~ sion concerning the place of my NOSENKO was offered _an opportunity to attend the Military- Diplomatic Academy, ‘but did not want to go... Besides, he failed the. physical examinations. for entrance when sugar was discovered in his faeces. NOSENKO drank too much. oo NOSENKO. was shown a map of. Kalinin- {/gradskaya Oblast ~~. showing Primorsk to be where he said Sovetsk: should be located. NOSENKO continued te oo
June 1962 a German city of Pillau and is now called Primorsk.” There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent -observation posts." Suitable ndidates were. ‘selected from among the crews of : ships. They were .then formed into groups of three men each and were trained in radio- @peration, demo~- lation, etc. fter this the roups split up gnid.their mem-. bers wenl their eparate ways. dase of war the @roups were to be eformed and sent In wwhen he lefc for h @hind enemy lines: In Sabotage and ntelligence mis- gions. ([Note: fhe former German enna ep npen 74. 1964 - 1965 when he learned that officer's job and the Naval Intelli- helped train gence Points (MRP's) sailors for wartime in Germany were agent missions. clesing down His main task was and that his final to prepare the assignment was not training plan for definite. He then the sailors, to tock more leave instruct them in (unauthorized) subjects such as until about 29 July "The Foreign Policy of the USSR," and generally to see to their needs. (May) Bart: and ren ported for duty to the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth Baltic Fleet, He was assigned to a Naval Intelli- gence Point being set “4 in Sovetsi, a Siig cOWn near Baltiysk. ‘There ne prepared area training materials for and carried supplies to agents, but did not actually deal with or train them directly. {[Note: Previously during the April city of Pillay is now called Baltiysk.. 1964 interrogations not Primorsk; the De meeiiel “fatter is a small NOSENKO said that he had received training near Moscow and was then sent to Rostok and Sassnitz before RADA a a ails fu cone steep te id rOetnte barman ceomapetanrsie seid see mage April 1966 further assignment and I was ordered to the Naval Intel- ligence Point of the Fourth Baltic Fleet intelligence’ Unit in Sovetsk, Kaliningradskaya Oblast. Sovetsk is located before you go out on the. spit of land where _ Baltiysk (Pillau) stands. I arrived in Sovetsk in August 1952 and began. to work in the Naval Intelli- gence Unit as a senior translator. Shortly before my arrivai the In- telligence Point had been moved from Rostok, in Germany, to Sovetsk. {Note: It was clear from NOSENKO's earlier descrip- tions that the "Sovetsk® which .NO- SENKO described is, in fact, Primorsk, a small village on the coast. The only place ‘called Sovetsk in Kalinin- gradskaya Oblast ‘were no positions October 1966 gay that he was ase signed to Sovetsk in the summer of 1952. He was asked why, as a son of a minister and a& a patient under treat~ ment for tuberculo- sis, he was not as- signed to the Black Sea or somewhere else with a healthy climate. NOSENKO explained that there available "elsewhere."
June 1962 % No date given sor divorce. SPR OTE Tp 1964 going to Bal- tiysk/Sovetsk. He then said this was "a Lie.and gave the version above. The reason for the lie, NOSENKO said, was that he knew we "“woulda't be- lieve the truth"-- that he had suc- cessfully refused the assignment to Germany. ] In mid-August or September 1952 NO-_ -SENKO returned to Moscow from:the Bal- tic for 7 to 10 days to conplete divorce proceedings he had initiated in the Far East. This was not counted as leave, but as of ficial business. He then returned to Sov- etsk. Ny cog eh geen Neg "Sometime ufter my return to Moscow from Sovetskaya Gavan, I carried through with my intention to divorce. My di- vorce was noted in my Officer's Book- let and nowhere else. I turned this document in to the KGB Personnel office when I began my KGB Service and since then have had_no re- cord of the divorce. I continued to pay alimony to Augustina. TELEGINA (one quarter of my salary) until I left the USSR in April 1966 is about 40 kilo- meters inland, and NOSENKO himself .. had saidvin 1962... that he served.in Primorsk. ;
Oe aan Pea a oe PeeegaTE te gtk ypmerpadpemerne e+ June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966 ' October 1966 1964. She kept the name NOSENKO even after she remarried." (Note: This is placed here for comparison with his 1964 statement. |* [See next entry. ] NOSENKO did NOSENKO disliked "Tt remained in a = not like his work his job as a politi- Sovetsk a“Sforf€ time - in Sovets is cal officer and was and returned to Mos- a and wanted to re- disdainful of the cow at the end of . ’ turn to Moscow to low educational level the year [1952] witb me arrange for a of those he was the aim of changing Z , transfer. He called upon to train, my place of work... : asked for annual as. well as of the While in Sovetsk I leave which the ‘whole stupid" pro- received the rank of ast unit commander re- gram. He remained  iieutenant of the | “9 fused to give him in Sovetsk only Administrative Ser- C3 as he had none due. “Gntil December 1952, vice." [Note: See pan NOSENKO thereupon when he obtained 1965 entry for the : ae went to Admiral leave to spend the spring of 1951.] oe oo GOLOVKO in Bal- holidays with his ; , oo tiysk and with his parents in Moscow. help obtained (May) leave because of the elder NOSENKO's influential po- sition. NOSENKO . ’ then returned to ; Moscow shortly — : before New Year's. "In the be- "T arrived back In January NOSEN- "On 1 January 1953 S ginning of 1953 in Moscow in Decem- KO and his parents my parents and I were @- 2 came to Moscow ber 1952, just be- went to visit the guests at’*the dacha 7 [from Primorsk].. fore New Year‘s. I family of General of KOBULOV who at ifS was ‘53, in had vacation for KOBULOV at KOBULOV's that time was working the beginning. the month of Janu- dacha in Usov. NO- in GUSIMZ in East Ber- Ce eeeeeeed NOSENKO was divorced from TELFGINA during his leave hefore ening to Sovetsk (Mav ond June 1952). °
“77. dgne 1962 -964 1965" April 1966 | in January. Well ary. At the end SENKO and KOBULOV : lin with the: WISMUTH I came on leave to Moscow. I was . there at my father's ‘dacha, near Moscow. ‘RORULOV came to visit us at the ongcegrieenmenie ne" RPT . bate “me EpRE EM ame seteiten te OTT: of January, at the end of my vacation I went back to GRU Personnel and saw KALOSHIN...I toid him I did not like fan iyg eRe ye mete ert ee discussed.-NOSENKOS s....: dissatisfaction ° -with his Sovetsk assignment and KOBU-- LOV suggested the Ros sSibility of seer vane atin tah mt een 8  KOBULOY; .- “member:how the con- company... first time.-Imet: {.don't re- versation came around to me, but I told This. was. the ote dacha...3 conver- my job, all that OSENKO getting _ “KOBULOV about my & Sation started. typing, and he into State. Security work in the Naval : oy He asked: ‘What said: ‘Well, work. ° (May) GRU and my desire to : are you doing?' I-answered: ‘I am working in the GRU...I came home ‘on leave.’ KOBU- LOV asked: ‘How do you like your work?’ I said: "Speaking frankly, i don't.” ‘Well,' wait 4 while. Look around.’ I was at the dispo- sal of the Person- nel Department all of February. I had no work at all. And since I was hot working, I did not get any *. work, change my place of x4 He promised to find me.a place in the MGB, but this promise was "empty conversation. " oe “EOS dO he said, ‘you pay for this month. better come work with us....Look, drop in to sce me for a minute some- time.’ KOBULOV- was First Deputy to BERIA and a Father friend of my ether’ $s." During this vacation ¥ I was living with my father and mother on Gor’kiy Street." "After. the New Year I went to this Sanitorium, Kubinka, 78 or 78 kilometers - from Moscow, and I was there January "IT met my [second] wife [Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA]. for. the first time at the Herzen "House of Rest," one of the "From the end.of January to the middle of March I-was under treatment at the Sanitorium near Mos- cow where I had been 6b bivne A igh erates cone ae ecm ss pam ns eee = een ne ede bee Leyes paBie? |
Trp gpr Erect gramtt tte fee emvtnangyreast eg tat eo nese brome rg wena Rees Im oe meee oe etree & = eine ein ate ee ete ete ee ate ante ease ae 78. June 1962 1964 ; 1965 April 1966 October and part of Febru- “Houses of Rest" of during the summer of | ary. After that I the Council of Minis- 1952. Here I became ac was home." [Note: ters. Io was resting acquainted with my eo This statement was there for several second wife, Lyudmila - made on 8-April. days. She was there Yulianovna KOZHEV- ; As no attempt was too. It's about NIKOVA. “ made to reconcile 65-70 kilometers . it with the pre- from Moscow, not far : vious entry, made from Kubinka. ° I on 6 April, and be- was waiting for my cause NOSENKO of- — status to he re- - fered no explana-  .solved...1I didn't . tion, both are want to stay alone included here. ] at the dacha fhis father's]. She was » studying philology . in the third course. Dok at Moscow State Uni- versity. She had been seriously ill with tuberculosis when she was 17 and still required treat- . ot ments." (Interro- ; of gation,.12 February 1965) (Note: NOSEN- KO's explanation of his presence at ' the “House of Rest" was given in response to.the specific ..... question: "What . . were you doing there?"]* : eg 1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a llouse of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it. tried Dyatkino and met her. -Sée June 1942 entry: Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special.naval schools" were. established am gin’ 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, ow, Vladivostok, _Gorkiy, | Kiev, Odessa, and Baku, There is no indication that any Of [ 7 # t mem re we oad ai
| @* -@he GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked ake NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth Ce Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB 1. Family Life The Soviet internal passport which NOSENKO carried to Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or. — "rest home” outside Moscow and about three months after he says he joined the KGB.) Immediately after their marriage the couple moved into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtain- ing their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.* . . KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Wikolayevich KOZHCVNIKOV, a b metallurgical engineer by tcaining, who held the position of First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Com- mittee (GKKNIR) of the RSPSR at the time cf NOSENKO's defec- tion. ** sevaitelina dase dud Kshs . NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second marriage. According to his: passport, the eldest of these, Oksana, was born on 21 August 1954’ and the other, Tamara, on ; 13 July 1958.*** NOSEWKO in 19$2 displaved to his CIA handlers a photoyraph of the two girls and their mother and made a par- ticular point of noting the close physical resemblance between i Bante renin te weettabion Gee eer ent ct et * On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questioned? on the various apartments he occupied in Moscow. He seid that, from the i time of his marr:age to TELEGINA until his departure for nis first GRU post in the Far Fast, he lived in an apart- | ment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment, he said, in 1950, when his Navy orcers came through. . Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why ; i the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at Lo | i | 4 3 2 a 3 4 the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the house in 1950. (He later said he moved to the Far East in 1951 - see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita ISHCHENKO. Although the pnene then in the apartment was switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow phone book; he said that this would have required a visit | to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms, i etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone any~- - : way. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defec- oe : | tion in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed . under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story coe be during subsequent questionings. The 1961 Moscow phone directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list +. JSHCHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa. . ‘ -under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR. | - a8 1957." In 1962. he told CIA that the older daughter was - OF “then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, how-. ar ever, he said she began school in the. Fall of 1962. q4
. as his "double" (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya. Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her NOSENKO's father, the Shipbuilding Minister, died of stomach cancer in Auguste 1956, three years after NOSENKO says he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of time surrounding his father's death was, according to NOSENKO, a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was. then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past. @rinking and wenching, and indifference to his work. . t 2e Venereal Disease The incident which NOSENKO has most often citec as an example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956 involved his illegal use. of KGB alias documents to cover treat- ment for a case of goncrrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time his wife was pregnant with their first child.. The CIA psycho- logist who questione@ NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the follow- ing summary of NOSENKO's statements about this incigent, which are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interroga~ tion): “A girl friend he had known in Leninerad since 1945 came to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954, (She. called him, and he spent some time with her. She was not 4 prostitute, and he had slept with ner before, so he thought nothing of it. Later he developed what he feared was a venereal disease. Since his wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow for a private doctor wno treated such diseases, but could not find one. Some of his friends at the office suggested a central. clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting him go home to get his documents, but the doctor said he would have to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a conmunicable disease. He was forced to give the false document. He..came back for treatment about three times and was ordered to report back in two weeks for a final check. They also demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back and a nurse visited tne safehouse about two times and left a-note for him to report. However, he did not go to. the safe- house so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was a listing of where the named person worked, a fictitious factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request “ for information got into the hands of the section which made the documents. NOSENKO was called before the deputy chief of the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However, the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even talking to him. He told his wife he was going on a trip and moved into the administrative room near the office to serve his term. In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party ‘ 7 4 a . q 3 7 roy rem enero nemerstrTe i an asesko adod Hive Shares Heig oileraget sereareen Sade tree REE RERTTTRETTEOe y o fe wi atbities Baciedat. wtibovoes
81.. 4 Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him the whole story. NOSENKO's father never told @ither NOSENKO's wife or mother of the incident, but did chide NOSENKO about it. The incident was brought before the Korsomol and discussed. A written reprimand for immoral conduct-unauthorized use of ; official documents was placed in his record. This was also . 4 a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result ee in expulsion. .He made the statement that he had been punished for this incident many times. He could not immediately apply for party membership; the incident was broucht up repeatedly oy in Komsomol.meetings and even in party meetings (after he was accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being promoted from Senior: Lieutenant to Captain. (The Deputy-~ Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion commission.) " Although there have been slight changes end contradictions in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story (the house arrest was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 Gays) it remained basically consistent until the Octoter 1966 interrogations when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954. In 1954, he said, he again was infected, this ‘time by a prostitute whom q a 4 d 4 we bak ered cee he picked up in the vicinity of the Leningrad Railroad Station : in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source, _NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl ‘from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute o£ International Affairs. He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation‘carried —. out by the newly-created Tourist Departmert of the Second Chief Directorate.* "And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, “before my father’s death, I was made a candidate for membership in the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned the rank of Senier Case Officer. TIT developed 2 pride sa ny- self. (a feeling) that _I.can do things. Ycu know how it is. When a person feels that he can, that he has some support, then he works much better. ‘le has more initiative and so_ forth." 3, Affiliation with Communist Party Organs NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Comnunist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he: cee se ad joined the Komsonol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku. This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it without much thought, mainly because all his friends were 4 Se ont be * See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruit- _meént operation. Until _ 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that he had received an award for his participation in this operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted ' this and said that he never received any KGB award for the BURGI or any other operation. Se ae -
Lf RAO eNO AOA eA A ce ante oe "#8 See Part V.F.9. . | . . 37 ***PREISFREUND is discussed. in detail in Part V.E.4.a,. °° 82. “joining. When NOSENKO entered the KG3 in the spring of 1953, he transferred routinely to the Komsomol organization there and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate. This was a small organization consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees: he remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents. According to NOSENKO, “Immediately after this incident the Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a “striet reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records. In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.* At that time, the “strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to leave the organization with a clean record. He was not per- mitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however. NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows: “Now I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness, to prove myself, I also asked the Party Organization of the Second Chief Directorate for some ‘public service’ (obshchest- venniy) assignments, I collected newspapers." For a year, NOSENKO “made qood" by running errands and performing other such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year; full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, £rom October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the distinction of being the only employee of the KGS who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant. 4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons involved in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this paper. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREIS- FREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the "little girls" and later reported to CIA that, although ‘“"“"NOSENKO was a “woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very much.*** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL, NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his *. According to the Statutes (Ustav)of the Komsomol in effect in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that-time was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. When this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965, | - NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special exceptions were made in his case. Mae seth aE we eR nee nest et oe Heenan ge renner CO AR Sree i 4 - 4 3 3 3 A i a : a 3 ' Atle aandneadtths owe wattle a ed eaisinbit Medians dantina de -sédtinemesott <% x z
get. had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion ‘NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home.* NOSENKO told nance a service in the Soviet Navy: he dwelt at length on his father's work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had two daughters. mo, p- Soviets’ Statements About NOSENKO Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported and other portions contradicted by the statements of several Soviets following thse defection. The Soviets‘ remarks dealing with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with reference to other aspects of. the background of NOSENKO: ~ Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who later went to the U.S. fmbassy after his defection) in- clude a reference to one of the daughters as his “double” und two other personal letters in his, possession at the time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and‘G, I, DUCKKOV, referred to visits to NOSENKG's wife aad children. ~ A KGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came ““Frem a wonderful family, loved his wife and children and earned a good salary. . TULAYEV later told) | that he had “friends who knew NOSENKO well, "* , «_A Soviet diplomat | ‘| Feliks KOVALEV, no NOSENKO had twice married, had a go ound, was the son of a Minister in the government, was notorious. for his “adventurous” nature, and was “famous for his character." - The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NCSENKO in 1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved, however, differs from NOSENKO's./ i _ Froseano is the son of a former Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot himself te avoid going to the front with the rest of his Class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his father's influence avoided damage to his career. & *""FRIPPEL is discussed more fully. in Part V.D.5. ** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either by name or photograph and said he didn't know him. Sa Ateeioty OME yh playen, 1-2 att K dee ce Hel Hata testable Bt, 4 enim sieh got!
+4 Etta when NOSENKO was a young man, he coe! atten ne” -Dinlomatic Academy and then spent. a short time, perhaps a year, in ‘the Information. Department .- at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO hed been a "very_undisciplined . arson" while in the GRU and "not very good, 1. Powe | and he was discharced from the GRU. However, his oo? an "influential person in the Ministry of Ship- , NOSENKO transferred to the XG5. father, & building, " wag able to get . The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in October 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was . . wot “closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families. | and homes" and that his “father who died several years © : a ago was an important official in the Party and state or organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's 4 family consists cf a wife, 35, two daughters, 40 and 12, : mother and a brother (younger)." KOROLEV and ROSENTAL also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's wife and daughters. z oe ‘ tele Settee that SOSENKO's fatner was a Minister or @ General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was. Jewish : and “was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She oo : : also said that she heard NOSENKO was 4 “civilian)" not a , KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB. (She i could not explain this connection other than to say that i all Soviets permitted to meet foreicners are either officers or "relatives" of the RUB.) [ Fo. { woudl