NR@46 WA CODE 8:48PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB TO ALL SACS wat FROM DIRECTOR SENATE’ SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT To INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COU NTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: SUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENTS TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY a CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY. END <— G3 725- / y fahe J05 Cp
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FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64) ( { ! | | | \ { | [ i { FBI Date: 3/25/75 Transmit the following in S008 canst ——--—— Viq_ TELETYPE NITEL | (Priority} | TO DIRECTOR Jase SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION REBUTEL, MARCH TWENTYFOUR, 1975. SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE) ee \2ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS, SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INFERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES somos Se CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS, FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNT ERINTELLIGENC THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL, Le ee one Approved Special Agent in Charge GPO ; 1970 © - 402-735
NROOS SA CODE 6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LPP TO DIRECTOR FROM SAN ANTONIO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ATIN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION. REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975. SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 2% PER CENT OF TIME ON SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 54 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO THESE MATTERS. FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL. E N Desccene
(Copies ta OF" ~s Checked) _ EGAT: PY? Albary (7) Heuston {J Oklahoma City TO LEGAT: ct Albuquerque  [7} Indionapolis (7) Gmaha [3 Bern (| Al@xandria ~~] Jack son "1 Philadelphia Al Bonn i Anchorage ~] Jacksonville f_] Phoenix P| Brasilia (j Atlanta “| Kansas City ("} Pittsburgh = Ruenos Aires [_] Baltimore f_] Knoxville {7} Portland fj Caracas “~) Birmingham (_j Las Vegas (—] Richmond rl Hong Kong {} Boston f_} Little Rock C4 Sacramento 5 London r} Buffalo [| Los Angeles [} St. Louis [| Madrid - [_] Butte [7] Louisville ("1 Salt Lake City f_] Manila {—} Charlotte [7] Memphis | San Antonio [} Mexico City P| Chicago (—] Miami [1 San Diego “1 Ottawa [_] Cincinnati [] Milwaukee [_] 5an Francisco [| Paris [_} Cleveland [_] Minneapolis C] San Juan PO Rome f=} Columbia f=} Mohile [=] Savannah Fj Tel Aviv [| Dallas [7] Newark ~) Seattle {_] Pokyo {_} Denver (_} New liaven [—} Springfield [| Detroit {(7] New Orleans (_} Tampa (_] El Paso [_] New York City {[]] Washington Field (_} Honolulu (_} Norfelk [_} Quantico paeDecember 4, 19 1975 E; R HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE Retention For appropriate [7} For information [7] optional {{7] action [7] Surep, by [7] The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, [7} conceal all sources, [—] paraplirase contents. : : Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA —_. ~ a daied Remark s: For your assistance in responding to local press inguiries, attached is a copy of unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the Director--Deputy Associate Director James B. Adams while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI allegations made by Gary Rowe, former FBI informant. JOE 5875-2 6 -b A, Vie (1) Bufile Urfile ~
EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR -- DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS TESTIFYING BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN, GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI TO PREVENT VIOLENCE DECEMBER 2, 1975
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: ....You do use informants and do instruct them to spread dissention among certain groups that they are informing on, do you not? We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one of the best examples of a situation where the law was ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights used much more than we hear today. We saw with the Little Rock situation the President of the United States sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a situation like this where you do try to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical problems. With the Klan coming along, we had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action was taken with that information as he pointed out during his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance. We also know that in certain instances the infor- mation upon being received was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem. And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no authority in the absence of an instruction from the Department of Justice to make an arrest. Section 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy. It ultimately resulted in a situation where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have authority similar to local law enforcement officials. So historically, in those days, we were just as frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable information--and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to do something about it, it was not always acted upon as he indicated. In none of these cases, then, there was adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act. The Departmental rules at that time, and still do, require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you have no violation. Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an
QUESTION: MR ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: individual. There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This was a problem that the whole country was grappling with-- the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing the Klan and that was one of the reasons. ».»-A local town meeting on a controversial social issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such meetings because they may result in violent government disruption? No sir, and we don't.... Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement? No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration. This is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the lst Amendment right, yet at the same time, being
QUESTION: MR. WANNALL: MR. ADAMS: aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the past than we do at the present time. We have had periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe and the courts have said that the FBI has the right, and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree- ments fall. In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known about. I know we have asked this several times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe Situation when violence was known. Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that and if you have no objections, I’1ll ask that he be the one to answer the question. The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals
since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice, and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on activities. We furnished the information to the local police who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those areas where the local police did not act. It resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights. This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in the South at the time either, because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that was a conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed the violations. We have over the years as you know at the
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR ADAMS: Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it? Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area. What would be wrong, just following up on your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence? We do. We have them in Boston in connection with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same time and this is the approach that the Federal Government finally recognized. On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need a better remedy than we have. Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or 50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning ~6-
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government had no mechanics which protected people at that time. Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member- ship. That's right. I believe these are FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members in the Klan that year were FBI informants. Isn't that an awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants, both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone. Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters and informants at that particular time and I think the figures -~J-
QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone, was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one tremendous problem at that time. I acknowledge that. Our only approach was through informants. Through the use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved. They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he could see that this could continue forever unless we could
QUESTION: MR ADAMS: QUESTION: create enough disruption that these members will realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy any longer. I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in 1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto situation? I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington, areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the Situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have another group here that is getting ready to start another fire fight or something. ... Without going into that subject further of course we have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent crime when you had information that it was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where you have.
MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: We disseminated every single item which he reported to us. To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to the crime. Not necessarily knew. Your informant told you that, hadn't he? The informant is on one level. We have other informants and we have other information. You were aware that he had worked with certain members of the Birmingham Police in order... That's right. He furnished many other instances also. So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were already a part of it. We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.S. Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions. -..-This brings up the point as to what kind of control you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing that you were supposedly trying to prevent. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer using him as an informant in spite of the information he had furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had But you also told him to participate in violent activities
MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: We did not tell him to participate in violent activities. That's what he said. | I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage in violence. Just to do what was necessary to get the information. I do not think they made any such statement to him along that line either and we have informants who have gotten involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately converted their status from an informant to the subject and have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence in this case during the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a day and he was a little late in disseminating the information to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in properly notifying local authorities. So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all informant files. Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going -~L1i-
MR. ADAMS: QUESTION: QUESTION: MR. ADAMS: to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel. These are words of the Agent. And be a good informant. He wouldn't take the lead but the implication is that he would have to go along or would have to be involved if he was going to maintain his liability as a --- There is no question that an informant at times will have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place but I believe his statement was to the effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is one thing being present, it is another thing taking an active part in a criminal action. It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut apparently. How does the collection of information about an individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention. Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any value whatsoever. -12-
QUESTION: You don't know of any such case where these instructions were given to an Agent or an informant? MR. ADAMS: To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir. -13-
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Lirse2P4 SITEL JS/ie/75 Gas PRUM ALRECT WIRE CTGR'S APPEBRANCE SEFGHE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OW LATELLIGeWCs ACTIVITIES, VEGEMSEN td, 1975 & ’ A COPY OF THE STATEMEAT I coMstit ek Ga LSTELLEIGENCk ACTIVITIES TOMAY HAS Sun SYNGPSL2Eo BCCGunT OF THe NAUGR AnESS GF THe COANITIZE*S C$) HEGARDIAG Fol LAF ORHANTS, auESTLb a5 WRAE ASKED LT USE OF wpe han F - CLs SSG . oe OTe ee? yy ko ta Bite Wh REED, : rere id ch be te " PUR FE STIGATIO VS GF ORGANESTATIONS (HY RESPONSE WAS AR WETHLA PROPEN LIPiiS So THEY vo sof iwVAuL niGatS PERSUNS (WY RESPONSE WAS THAT HELLANCE. HUST GA PLACED ON THE LaviVivual AGE WTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND Ink AGENTS WUdKk, THAT LNFOSMAHTS WG VIGLaTE THE LaW CAN GE
PROSECUTER =~ aS Cad AWY AGEST WHO COUASELS AN LWFORMANT To COMMLT VIOLATIONS); aad OID FORME KLA® INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY HEN HE TOLe THE COMMETTES Os BECRNBER 2 THAT HE LWFORWED PBL OF PLANNED ACIS OF YIGLEACE BUT Faq DID OT ACT TG PREVENT THEM CHY AESPOWSE waS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY was lot accuant®). (2) IW HESPONSE TO QUESTIOWS REGARDING LMP SOPEK COHBUCT BY FB fad PEy on ta id a ti + ei STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF Law BY 81 PERSUNNEL SHOULD BE LaVESTiuATED BY THE FSI OR G OTRLE APPAOPALATE AGENCY 3 THAT INE LASPECTION OLVISIOW HAS UVONDUCTED LagudaieS REGANDING ALLiGaTiuas Of. alScunauct3 THAT AW OF® ICR GF PHOFESSIONAL AZSPONSIBILITY nAS gust Silke ESTASLISHEDS if TRE JUSTICE Obras Taint, Aub WE WILL ADVISE SHAT GFF ICE OF CUA MAJOn TSVESTIGATIONS GP DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, INCLUULNG FBL EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OH STANOARDS GF COwDUCT3; THAT L WOULU RESEAVE COMMENT REGAROING POSSIBLE CALATION OF A WATIO HAL LWSPECTOR GENERAL ae 4 TG CONSLOER WATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY SeePLOYEES OF ANY FEOERAL AGEWCY »
(3) IN RESPOWSE TQ QUESTIONS CONCERSISG HARASSHENT OF MARTLA LUTHER KING, Je, 1 STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED [KE GNODEKE WHACH KESULT2D Le SUCH NAKASSHERT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBSILATY FUR Lf, SaTHEn THAS THOSE UNDER TKEM WHO CARRIED out SUCH ORGEKS IN GOOD FAITH3 THAT THE FRE STILL WAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTROWLC SUNVELLLAWCES OF KING} THAT WE RETAIN HECURELWGS FUR TEs YEARS BUT WE ALSG HAVE aGaZED TO a &EQUEST FXG THE SESATE WOT TO DESTHOY LaF ORMATICN Ie OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIGHAL INQUIRIES ARE BELQG COWOUCTEDs; THAT £ HAVE aoT REVIEWESO TNE KING JAPESs THAT IF INE COMMLTTER ARQUESTED To REViSw THE KiwG TaPES, INE AEQUEST WOULD Se REFEAKED TO THE ATTORSGY GERERALSs (4) Iw aALSPONSS FO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT wouLs 28 ADVANTAGEOUS Ta SEPARATE IME PBL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE KESPGSSELBILLTIES ASO OUN LNTELLIGENCE FURCTLONS, 1 STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUN THE TwO AREAS TO 32 COMPATIBLE, AnD I FEEL Ind FEL IS DGING & SPLEWDID JOR IN BOTH AREAS. (3) La KESPONSES IO QUESTIONS CONGERWING THE ADEQUACY THE WHLTE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER 1 — ae & = OY CONTROLS ON HEGUESTS GOYENGMEAAT AGENCLES FON FSI TaVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION
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