eg SECRET ae -~ 9» were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the number of flights was increased. Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters but not over the Island of Cuba itself, In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports were collected and assessed, Included in these reports were many which con- tained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation ef such activities. In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities “and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month. The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or strategic weapons were discovered. The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future. SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 44
Gap SECRET . Gg ~ 10 « IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22; 1962 A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Byud:phent In late July and edriy August, our intéliigence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A suddéh rise in military aid from the Soviet ‘Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger, increased drastically, For example, for the first half of 1962, an average of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August. While our intelligence people were aware from this and other informa- tion that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and impact was not clear to the intelligence community. During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no econfir- mation of them. At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore eould not be confirmed. Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trin, SECRET HW 50955 BDocld: 374274709 Page 45
BW 450955 cy SECRET ae -~1ll-., physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee , exilé, and other human source reports suggested that, in cohtrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence com- munity adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include signifi- cant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet "ber- sonnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000. B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment 1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, estab- lished positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a slant range of about 25 miles. 2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional -eruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were identified in Cuba. SECRET Docld: 32474709 Page 46
SECRET -~12.- 3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air Foree with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the pre- sence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was Pirst confirmed by a picture obtained on September 5, 1962. 4, IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelli- gence commmity was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10. 5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile, which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identi- fied, still appears large to the untrained observer. However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion-- apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October 14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile complex. SECRET HW 50955 Bocld: 3274274709 Page 47
SECRET - 13 - Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announce- ment that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evi- dence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned to introduce. Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance missions flown after October 14, Six MRBM sites were located, all of which had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become operational by December 15. The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100 miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwith- standing the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophis- ticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the pre- sence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25 when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re- analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were, in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba. SECRET WY 50955 Bocld: 3274274709 Page 46
BW 450955 eG secret @ ~ Th. The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people to be about 5,000 men. In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelli gence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand. The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build- up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One factor in.the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is pelieved that additional Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962. The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which vere already substantial - ly complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading forees would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained, powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States commanders until several days subsequent to October 25. SECRET Docld:32474709 Page 49
a SECRET o> - 15 - In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascer-~ tained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our for- ces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated. Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet solidiers in heavily armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that ‘time their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles. D. Alleged Photographic Gap There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in our photo raphic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5 DerAwhe e Lo to Sa@@im@er 14, We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here... The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites. On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central por- tion but weather conditions prevented any photographie returns with reference to the eastern end of the island. A flight was planned for September 10th but this'was not flown. On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions, it was not wholly successful. SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 50
© SECRET a> ~ 16 - Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighte: as requiring early attention. Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14, On October 12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba. | BE. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a con- flict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Com- mand (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights. These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level vy transferring the func. tion of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba. These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photograph! coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being operated by CIA prior to October 1h, Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whon. the flights should be flown. SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 324274709 Page 51
SECRET ~17 - The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight whici was flown on October llth was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be ecnduct. ed by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reason- able and proper. It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight fiown by SAC was the one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no signifi- cance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence. F, “Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September. The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been out- lined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October 14th were flown by the CIA. After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature of the missile buildup and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the mis. sile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command fle: a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiat< until October 23, the day following the President's message. SECRET HY 50955 Bocld: 3274274709 Page 42
HW 50955 SECRET - 18. During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using refugees, exiles, and other human sources. In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Sub- committee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, how- ever, our intelligence did quite well. The MRBMs were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered ina very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates. The MIG-2l's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were iden- tified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before they became operational in a yery compressed and limited period of time despite adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost completely closed society, The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was killed. | CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photo- graphic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately piace@ in the hands of the President, his advisors and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet governnent assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the Organization of American States and world accep- tance of the correctness of our position. SECRET: Docld:324274709 Page 53
SECRET ~ 19 - Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important on: It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and thelr deploy- ment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other sources. The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and infor- mation. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appear: to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreove: there seems to have been a disinclination on the part -of the intelligence com- munity to accept and believe the cminous portent of the information which had been gathered. | In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence. There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile veports: This was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as mili-. tary observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible among those things which were within their power of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources. SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 3274274709 Page 54
~ 20- Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that suc: a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them. The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the facts as events unfold is evident. The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligenc: judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A few of these will be mentioned. The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until pho- tographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed. ‘It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic con- firmation was obtained on October Lith. It appears that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile: complex in the Sen Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation. SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 55
© SECRET @ - 21 - V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS Ay Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23, 1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there vas a concerted effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected. targets. | During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Com- mand flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through Nov- ember 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties. B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Conbat Units As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th pro- vided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distribute: to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized by the Cuban forces. | C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Boubers To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic nissiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers. A comprehensive and concentrated serial reconnaissance and fleet obser vation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equip- ment, This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accom- panied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over Cuba end Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic. SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 56
a] SECRET > | - 22 - The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships. | As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic mis- siles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible the despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived. VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA ‘A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue on 2 regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance, The reason for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights re- mains a matter for speculation. | fhe collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the i111-fated ‘Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveil- lance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and sur- face ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic recon- naissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that radar range permits. SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 57
SECRET 23 - A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated yu- mors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines. Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly ex- tend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate thei: operations generally. Keasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficieni depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxa- tion facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods con- siderably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and infor- mation from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facili- tate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempt: to evade detection. | B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba 1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was tes- tified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, ma- chine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers. SECRET BW 50955 Bocld: 327474709 Page 56
) a> secret @ ~ oh . They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated. The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plen- tiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive training, including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites, are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are manned by Soviets is apparently not known. There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about 30 to 4O miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba, far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and thus failed to reach Cube. SECRET HY 50955 Bocld: 3274274709 Page 49
© | SECRET = - 25 - The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high- speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles, The missiles sre estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are appar- ently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expe- dition. The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motor~- ized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in surprisingly large numbers, As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns ; over 200 57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost 100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple laun- chers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in. To the above must be added two very modem Soviet Arwy tactical missiles The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10 and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles, SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 3274274709 Page 60
BW 450955 Gc secret @ ~ 26 - which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST. JOHN. | According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approxi - mately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios neces-~ sary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system, SA-2 and fighter. 2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard. The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to sup- press an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern ’ highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organiza~- tion which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long duration. The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been SECRET Docld: 324274709 Page 61
BW 450955 © SECRET | ap - 27 - somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patro 4 activities. The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters, about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers , a considerable quantity of antiair- eraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters. The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to Imve been turned over to the Cubans. The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics. The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited 49 action against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real alr cover or air defense capability. The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intel - ligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000 are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments. About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which ineludes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated 7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contin- gent in Cuba. At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some SECRET Docld:324274709 Page 62
BW 50955 o SECRET © ~ 28 -— 4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accu- racy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present con- siderably higher estimates ~-some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in mind the substantial underestimation of last October we can only conclude that no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles --knows how many Russian troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure. In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. The air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft. The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could offer severe opposition to any attack, This opposition would be sufficient to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any desired sir-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combina- tion of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in the United States and the Atlantic Ocean. Based upon their judgment that 911 strategic missiles and offensive weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may SECRET DoclTda:32474709 Page 63
BW 450955 © SECRET e - 29 - or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence. It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and simall bands of provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the | smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery. Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons, grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter. Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a cen- trally located base for such Communi st operations, a present and grave menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report. 3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdraw, It is fair to say, however, that this is ea matter of great concern to . the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is oe apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The SECRET Docld: 32474709 Page 64
BW 450955 SECRET - 30 - current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14, There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and con- cealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It isalso true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc. The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with res- pect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assump- tion that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readi- ness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is clear and obvious. The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already been discussed. 4, Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to 5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons" the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that SECRET Docld:324274709 Page 65
BW 450955 SECRET - 31 - there is 4 low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the num- ber of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-— imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have been withdrawn. C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence in Cuba qaetisenmasietase presents to the Americas is as follows: l. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin America. 2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduc~ tion of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity. 3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR.. 4, The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities -based on Cuba. SECRET Docld:324274709 Page 66
BW 50955 SECRET _ 32 - 5. : The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originat- ing from Cuba. 6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and elec- tronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States and the Caribbean. 7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes launched against the United States from the Soviet Union. 8. Advanced Soviet submarine ‘bases could be established in Cuban ports with very little effort. 9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a furthe ‘yeorlentation of the U.S. air defenses. 10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage techniques. | 11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation!: image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our vexy doorstep. & consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents. D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen to be a most effective snield against either internal revolt by native insur- ) gents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the DoclTda:32474709 Page 67
- a secret @ - 33 - Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances, that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the peo-~ ple in Cuba, will wither and shrink, The communization of the younger ele- ment creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of free- dom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to insurgent forces. SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 68
"ws & | SECRET te - 34 - VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay. The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible. The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolu- tionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating the United States has been attained. Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods . and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates. With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuka as elsewhere it is conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and moral control of subjugated peoples. BECRET HW 50955 Docld: 3274274709 Page 69
"" 6 ap SETCRET © - 35 - This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be abhieved elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We _ must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national “‘gelf-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western Hemisphere. The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever alert and vigilant to all of ite sinister implications. We must exercise the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised. The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date. HW 50955 Docld: 3274274709 Page 70
on . wean March 29, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State SUBJECT: Miseile Crisie Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962 Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached draft has been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection to it, subject to the following changes: 1, Page 3, Line 8: Change nuriber "25" to "24," Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records. 2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to 4G" and "25" to "24," Reason: Accuracy. (3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and “ballistic before "missiles," Reasoa: Clarity and more accurate detail. 4, Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert “by December 6" before “ite promise" and "42" before "1-25," Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all boraber's (42 in nursber) had left," aad substitute “their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side:obsérvation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back te the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the 1L.~28 remeval being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR. HY 50955 DBocld: 327424709 Page 7fi
HY SOS Page 44, Line 9: Ingert “more vigilant and befera “stronger. Reasen: Strengthen prime poing that lacreaged awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threata veguited from evisis, particularly in the OAS. Joseph A, Califane, Jz. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army Docld: 327474709 Page f2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 28 March 1963 UL7,171/P-2 x SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962 TO: General Counsel Department of Defense Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted: 1. Page 3,-Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records, 2... Page 3, ine 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "2h," Reason: Accuracy. 3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word “November”, “and. observed” before "42," and. "ballistic" before "missiles,' Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail. 4, Page 37, Lines 13 =~ 15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise” and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR. 5. Page 42, Iine 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger. Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS, HY 40954 Docld: 3274274709 Page 73
DEPARTMENT .OF DEFENSE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 28 March 1963 -wiz,17i/P- 2 SUBJECT? Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft. _ Report: fa ' Congress on US Farticipation in the UN During 1962 TOs General Counsel Department of Defense Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and. the following comments. ave submitted: ‘ad. Page 3, Line Ss Change nuiiber "25" to "2h," Reason: Recuracy, based on official Department of the Navy recor Be 2. Page 3, Line 10: Change ~ "aa" to "16" and "25" to Local Reason: ‘Accuracy. ~ ” . 3, Pag | 15: Insert. "9" before word "Novanber = "anda “before © listic" before , “nissiles. Reason: “Clarity and more.accubate: detail. 4. “Page 37, Eines 13 = 153 iit promise” and "JS" pefore “I: "and; by December 6,. the ‘US: was. informed that all bombers: “(42 ‘in number ) had left," and substitute “their removal being confirmed uby: aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on. the decks of the Soviet.ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional. positive. detail, particularly with Ypererence to the IL-28 removal being baSed upon confirmed observation and not merely. ‘upon information provided by the USSR. Insert by December: 6" before 1¢ 92 Insert "more vigilant and" before “Strengthen prime point. that increased : uplicity and potential threats. resulted from erisis, particularly in the OAS, JOSEPH F, CARROLE. Lieutenant General, USAF Director HY 50955 DBocld: 327424709 Page 74
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. March 27, 1963 ae om 10° yo \o a |v? oO MEMORANDUM FOR. THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE ue : DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Q . Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-. dent's Report to. Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during. 1962. The Department of State has drafted this report and sent.it to me for Department: of Defense clearance, I. should appreciate it if you would read the- -report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on ‘March 29, 1963., A. Califano, Jy Special Assistant to. thé Secretary of the Army Attachment As Stated Mr. .Yarmolinsky Mr. McGiffert ‘General Carroll (DIA) HY 50955 DBocld: 327424709 Page 74
HY * 3010-104 * SJNITED STATES GOVEKNK ENT : SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report, a ae as Possible as the report is now overdue? 0955 to : CCA - Mr. H /. .FROM : RPA = William G. Bowdler™ aye ‘on the missile erisis for the President's annual report to Congress on US participation in the. UN. “> RRA/RPALWGBowdler? Jv OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 “Memorand tch UK To Congress on US > Participation in UN During 1962. UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter. Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have ns been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about ~~ - . fete . this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with Poe ate the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through CCA channels. Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly — Eien sso BDocld: 327474709 Page 76
Mareh 27, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Attached is a draft of the missile crisis. section of the Prasi- dent's Repart to Congress on United States Participation in the United. Nations during 1962. The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me fer Department of Defense clearance. 1 ehould appreciate it if you would read the report and return it te me with any comments. by 1296 hours on March 29, 1963. Signed ~ Joseph A. Califano,Jr. Jeseph A. Califano, Jr. Special Assiatant to the Secretary of the Army Attachment Ags Stated ee: hdr. Yarrnolinaky Myr. MeCifiert General Carrali (DIA) Docld: 324274709 Page fT?
rae a “ : DRAFT PRESTDGAT’S. REPORT | A962 SOVIET OFFERSIVE ‘HEAPONS “In CUBS 4 “Soviet Buiidep “On October 22, President Kennedy anounced to the nation and to the world - the “secret, swift and extraordinary ouilduy” by the Soviet Union of offensive : missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the President the previows Tuesday morning (Ostober 16) and, dwring the week that followed, surveillance was stepped up, cor firaing evidence evaluated, a course of action decided ugon, friendly governments notified and con ssulted, the " members and nachinery of tha Organization of American States (O.AS. > brought into the picture, and American defenses in the Caribe ean strength ened and wut of the alert. The Fresident revealed that 2 gsorions threat against the peace and security of the Americas) was being = & eretly aounted by the Soviet Union on a 7 the “iupris Loned islend" of Cuca. sites for Beddum-Pangs ballivtic 8 phe B84 ies “ceteus) capable of carsying a nuélear warhead 1,000 nautical miles h had been _ropidly and secretly invalled and additions sites not yet se oupleted Were designed for intermediatearange ballistic alesiles {IRBs} « apeble of travelling twice as ear and Shug posing a nuclear threat to wost of the sa jou cities of the. We stern Hemisphere. This urgent ‘prorkorsation of cubs inte a a“ strategic base with nuclear striking capacity Sonstites an explicit threat to the peace and security of the America of the Tuher-Ame miear Yreaty of Reckprocel Assistance (Ris Paw’) of 197, “the traditions of this nation & G. hemi epher @,° and the Gas .ae of the United Nations. This Soviet action contradicted the repeated ass purences of Soviet spokesmen, both {publicly and HW 50955 DocId:32424709 Page 78 . — i a oe
© =a2a« publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Ciba would retain its original defensive character. Neither the Unk ted States nor the vorld. " community, the Presideat emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate deception and offensive threat represent ted by the clandestine doployment of strategic nuclear weapons. | - fo meat this threat ‘the United States was takeing immediately the following steps: 2) te halt the bulidup, a strict quarantine of all offensive military, equipaant under shipment to to Cuba was being initiated and, should offensive nilitary preparations continto, “further action will be " justifieds" 2) ‘the United States declared that it would regard any nuclear wissile Launched frou gba against tne western HemLephere &s am attack by “Undons 3) Guantanazo was being reinforced; 4) the Council of the Orgenigation. . the Soviet Union, requiriag a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet of fnewican States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of - hentopheric security; ang 5) under the Charter of the United Hatlons, the United ‘States was requesting ari energency neeting of tne Secu urLty Council. : Finally, the President called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat %o world peace and . cas) stable rolations between our tuo nations.” U.S. Objective This was a diffiewlt and dangerous effort cn which the United States had set out, the President coneluded, * fot the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. 8 ‘On the wilitary side, steps vere taken to strengthen HW 50955 defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces in a posture to ayoly the quarantine. . The Department of Defense had orgéred 3 sii tours of duty of Reavy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the /Goantanazo ‘aval Bocla: 32474709 Page 79
HY - ena s docceti’nt ee an cuba offensive nuclear weapons, “and that our . evidene Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened3 air power was built up in the Southeastern portion of the United States; and military deployment put ~ §,600 narines and 40 nevel vessels in %he Caribbean, initially as part of a ~ . training exercise. Followiz: sued resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation of the Council of the Organization of American States (deseribed below) the President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of. Cuba as of 10 Acie on October 2h. The Department of Defense ordered the interdiction - of 25 Soviet merehan vessels known to be headed for gubay At 8 AcHe on October 25 ‘the first intereeptien of a | Soviet ships the oi] tanker Bucharest, uo " tool place, and. the ‘ship: was allowed to proceed. ie of the 25 Soviet vessels | /poading Lor. Cuba | ‘tuned around and no encounter with a contrabansi-carrying a bre ce "3 was conclusi LV@. the second + was to halt further shipuent.s and bring about : rapidly and effectively the ronoval of the offensive weapons, under Ue Be supervision, before the Quarantine could bs lifted. The United States was prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various ‘formlae but not - to abandon this goal. a . From the start, both the Organization of American me and the United - Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this henigphere were used %o underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet Union that elimination of the offensive weapons Was a purpose to which the — . hemisphere was solidly comitted. From the start, L005 fe was clear that | ) _ /the United Nations 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page BO | as betel wl ener mrequer vette tupac seen nema nantep re gharcema yay EYREEROT A shear wom Cee et fA Ee Menem enn en mB ne “ON ER ae anh ete tey Rann teerarmeniatensnneemr wees eect termes tie sere gerne SoH et antenna rntmen rearmartemptinnarannn trap wene Meaghan
wo / 7 ae — l, | the United ations would-have a erucial role. It was the foruz in which the - evidence of ‘Soviet gailt could be most convincingly exposed to a world-wide audience, worid opinion mobiliz ad, and the world vardict pronounced. It was, also, a ready and ‘efficient mechanism for diplomatic communis ations. The- Duited Nations served as a site where U.S. and Soviet negotiators could easily mest. The Secret tary-General hinoel? supplied an important, Link between the parties particularly during the first days when tension was highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevented their eaploysient, ‘the United Nations 7 . proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable mechanisms for inspection _ and vyorifieation of diszantling and renoval of the offensive weapons and for safeguards against their reintroduction. fhe United Hations was also prepared to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities: "Sum taneously with , the President’s speech, therefore, the United States took diplozatic steps to set in zotion the ‘political machinery of the 0.A.S.- and the UeNe “OoheSe Action in Washington the U.S. Representative om the Council of the Organization of American States, (C. O.AcSe) sent @ note %6 the Acting Chairean requesting the immediate eonvosation of. the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation ynder Article 6 of the Tntoreimerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio treaty). fais article provides for juxediate consultation on REasUres to be taken for the “pom oseon defense and for the maintenance of peace and socurity of the Continent vnen “the inplolability of the integrity of the territory, or the sovereignty or political independence of any Anorican States should be affected by an S955 aggression eaich is not an armed attack or by an exteaseontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endaager the peace of Avericas” [The 02A.S- a epetiggey Docta:: 32424709 ‘Page 81 ae at oats Te ae B i rr
o be fae O.ASo Council Ret on ‘the morning of October 23. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sitting as the U.S. Representative de seribed the nature of the threat 1s eetrererpen agar vomenpans ye garm eget tant Etre eR URE RTT to this hemisphere and the gowns: - :98sures ubleh the United States considered 4% essential for the interekwerican ¢ ysten eu to take. He ‘stated thatthe Soviet intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as | . ae capimnats a Negi rem neve une ram never before the detersination of the fzorican Governments to carry, cut hemispheric , commitments solemly assumed 42 inter-lmerican treaties and pentephere ‘heainst extra-continontal aggression or iaterve mtion.” He proposed resolut ons for the. defense of the peace and security. of the nations of the serra tenes si meine tp ieee ‘ that under the Rio ‘Treaty the Council, serving 43 Organ of Consultation, “without deley_ eal for the invediate dismantling and withdravel fron Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and ... recomend oo that the menber states of the Organisation of American States take the necessary measures to ensure thet Cuba does not continus to reesive additional ‘offensive WSAPONS oo and if necessary to prevent the offensive capacity already - . acquired ‘by the castro pogino from + being used to destroy the peace and security of the henispheré _ the Seerstary’ noted ‘that the United states was 5 simul taneously asking the U.W. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: “fhe threat Sor enna canes cee is to our hesilsphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as ‘We are now doing, as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from cutside the heni sphere aud it is appropriate that the extra-continental power which challenges our inter.American commitments ... bs dealt with in the forum in So ekadu eed, ‘ ; wileh that power participates. I% is therefore fitting in this case that the Securlty Council of the United Ya tehons bs requested to eall upon this mouber feo refrain WW 50955 DocId:32424709 Page 82 ~ .
eo 6 = to refrain fron his aggressive actions against us and seek to enforse wpon him its decisions. Meanwhile, without avaiting the outcome of the United Nations approach, wo must ensure that our heni sphere is effectively quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear sllitary pover in our midst.*® . | Following a general discussion of the danger confronting the heutephere the Council. votad 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instructions) to ‘gonstit tute itself provisionally as the Organ of consul tation (Co OokeSe 10. Ce )= Thon, at “the suggestion of the DoSe Representative, the organ of consultation adjourned for several hours ta permit | a number’ of delegations to gongult their governzonts and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the: United States to deal with the thrwuat confronting the hemisphere. oe The Organ of Consultation revoavencd that same afternoon. Debate centered on ‘the draft resolution. Ag gach representative spoke, it becane evident that the Anoeiean republics vere solidly united im their determination to resist this “nost ‘dangerous’ threat tothe peace ang secuplty of the henispherss... he few delegations ware not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions of the resolution, attributable for the most part to domestic constitutional - considerations, but when the regolution as a whole Wag pur to a vote, the support was unanimous. In one of tha historic decisions of the inter-Aesrican syste ' the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for “the imediate dismintiling and HW 50955 withdraval from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability," and (2) recommended that "the member states, in accordance with Aeticles 6 anc 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reeiprosal Assistance, take all messures, individually and collectively including the use of araed force, . | | Junien thoy Docld: 32424709 Page 83
a ted «Pe F } which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Goverrmen’. of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military naterial and related supplies which may threaten the peace’and se urity of the Continent and to sae peenrnie gs ope ene re cm SE i naan pray ren ne peer gman prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent.” The resolution nape ye nite tmp ate also expressed "the hope that the Security Council will, in aecordance with the Resolution introduced by the United Stetes, dispateh United Nations neg observers to Cuba at the earliest moment." Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American mmeperp mer wengnen ee sesar nee ae pa nee states/Organ of Consut’ tation and pursuant to the recommendat -Lons contained in the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy issued ot the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons and” associated mat terial to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Hastern Standard a Time on October zi, The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense | "shall take approp piate measures to preyent the delivery of srohibited material to Cuba, employing the Land, se ea and air forces of the United States an cooperation with any forses that may be made availabla by other American states.” The Secretary of Defense was authori zed to designate prohibited or ns restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that "any vessel or craft which nay be pros seeding toward Cuba may be intercepted arid may be directed to 4 . identify itself, its cargo, equipment, and stores and Lis ports of gail, to at stop, to Lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as divested.” Any vessel that refused to comply with dipestions ‘might be éaker into custody. In sarrying out the order force was not to.be used except an ease of failute ov refusal to conply with directions or /reguiations 7 4 ast ; aed; - eioe¥ “Sodta: 32474709
o & = regulations after ‘reasonable efforts had been nade to coumunicéte with the vessel or craft, or in self-defense. In the days {mediately following, twelve other American republics offered assistance in support of the quarantine ‘opsration: Argentina, Dominican | Republic, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Coloxbia, Beuadory EL Salvador, Guatezala, Raiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval units, posing the problea of coordination of foress. Consequently, on fovenber - 55 ' the 6.0.4.$-/0.C. recomended that the contributing masber states take among thenselves the technical measures necessary to establish an effielent and coordinated action. Pursuant to this recouendation, the governzents of segentina, the Dominican Republie and the United States on Noveaber 9 notified the CoOsAcSo /0.C- of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force into which they. were integrating their respective naval units and placing officers: of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander cf the | Combined “quarantine Fores. . Security. Council Consideration Simultanepusly with the call for a meeting of the 0. AcSe Council, Ambassador. Adjas Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council ad thet month the Soviet Representative eous to sali an urgent meeting of the Council "to deal with tbe dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by the secret potabLishasnt in Cuba by tho Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of ‘Launching bases and the | Anstallation of Long-range vallistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear ‘yarheads to uost of North and South jesrtea.* “the United States, f he. wrote, now has incontrovertible evidences that the U. S03 oRe has been installing in cuba & whole series of facilities for Launching offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the veapons theasslves." /the establishzent oe enters mem eriemtneencinn nena bein eeqemwant got
oO | O | -9- | The ostabli shsent of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, “gonstitutes — a grave threat to the peace and security of this heaisphere and of the whole vorld," It should be the purpose of Security Couneil action, he eoneluded, "to bring about the innediate disantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being pat into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to renove the puis ting threat to” . the security of the Western Reaisphere and the peace of the world.* Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft regolution hich ealled for the ismmodiate disuantling and withdrawal, from Cuba of al missiles and other — | effensive weapons, and vhich authorized the sending to Cuba of & Uolle observer t corps. to | assure. and report on , compliance with the resolution. the resolution called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of siiitary shipkonts to Cuba when the above ‘terns were compl ied with and recomzonded that the United States | - and the U.S.S.R. “confer promptly on mpssures to remove the existing threat.” tha Security Council held four meetings on October 23, 2%, and 25. By "the time the first meeting opened on the afternoon of Ostober 23, the Soviet Talon and Cuba had introduced two ‘parallel igtters to the President. of the - . Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Couns in an attempt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S. countermeasures and “aggressive action" against Cuba constityted tho real threat to Peace in the caribbean. Uader Rule 37 of the Coyagil’s provisional : rales of procedure, the Cuban & epresentative was invited to participate in the nw 50955" ciseussion of the matter before the Security Council. / debassador
a, ~ 10 « Avbassador Stevenson®s opening speoch put the issve in the porspeetive of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionisz. He traced the "vast plan of piecemeal aggression" and “the basic drive to abolish the world of the Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and‘ whieh had not been altared by the presont Soviet Government. Contrasting the history of Soviet expansionism and rejection of the prineiples of the Charter | with the United States record of loyal support for the Orgenization and “the world of the charter," Azbassador Stevenson regretted that soxe wsabers “secued to believe that the cold var is a private war petuoen fo. great, super : | powers." "It is not a private struggle 9 he insisted, "it as a : world evil war © a contest between the pluralistic. world ang the monolithic world e« | coatest between the world of the, Charter and the world of Communist conformity.® H the: ‘castro rogine,® he pointed out, thas aided and abatted an invasion of this oy pent sy ere” and "has Aven the Soviet Union a stag area in s this neaisphere” . Pt | by inviting tan cxtra-continontal antiadexocratic and expansionist power inta the boson of the ‘Azeriean fanily® and by making itsol? "en accomplice in the communist enterprise of world domination." ‘The Soviet Union, he continued, had secretly transforged Cuba into a forsidable missile and strategie sizbasey armed with the deadliest, wost Parareaching modern nuclear weapons, in an attempt to put all the Avericas under a “nuclear gun” and to intensify the "Soviet diplasacy of blackmail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded. mos 4 the United States and the other nations: of the Hestern Hemisphere should accept this nee phase or aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations — to world peace.” He could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded HY 50955 .- itsalf into suoposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its pover, and he voiced the gope that the Soviets would call an end "to this new. /phase of Docld:32424709° Page 87. _
Oo eB De uy . - phase of aggression.* He urged the Council to call for the issediate withdraval of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson then inforasd the Security Council, in in accordance» with Article 54 of the Charter, that the Counsil of the 0.A.S. had adopted a . resolution by 19 affirzative votes {as noted above) calling for the diguentling and withdrawl of the offensive weapons, recommending that mexber, states of the ~ OAS take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the: a . continent, and expressing the hope that the Security Couneil whi “dispatch UeNe observers to Cuba at tho earliest moment.” | —_ Ambassador Stevenson thus made three polats before the Security Council ubich defined the theses for the debate during the rest of the weck: (1) ‘The Soviet astion in sending thousands of military technicians, to . Lis puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and proparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing these things through deceit and under the cloak of secrecy, were in defiance of the security commitments of the Organization of American States and in " ylolation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a manifest threat - to this hemisphere and to the whole world. HW 50955. (2) «The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in gonsonance with the U.il. Caarter and had the unaninous backing of the ‘Organization of Aserican States. (3) The Security Council should rsuove the threat by calling, as tke yesolution proposed, for the imesediate dismantling and withdrawal froz Cuba of ab. missiles. and ask offensive Weapons; authorizing and requesting the secretery-Coneral 4o dispatch to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and /roport in’
HY - | quarantine upon U.N. certification of such ecapliance; and urgently recom: = 12 « report im eospliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the that the United States andithe Soviet Usion confer promptly on measures to rexove the etisting threat ‘to the security and the peace of the world end report thersin to the Security Council. - | - | Following Asbassador Steveason’s presentation, the Cuban and Soviet Reprosentatives sade thoir initial statenents. The Cuban Reprezontative, Me. Garcia-Inchaustegui, denounced the pavall “blockade” ag an “act of war? - . and declared that the” Cuban people bed ansvored tng Parned attack? with . genoral mobilization. He asked tho Council to call for the immcdiat “witbdraval of alt troops, ships and planes deployed on the approzches %o ' Cuban Shored, and for. the cessation of all “nterventionist® Beasures. TES: a cuban Representative also contended that the United States had ze right to os ask for AsszantLing and disarnenent and that “Logieally, Ue. Bo observers should be sent te ths UeSo bases from which inveders and pirates energe to punish and harass @ small state,” . He insisted that Cuba iLL not accept any kind of ‘observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction.° fhe Soviet Representative, Asbassador Zorin, declared that the United States charges were “2 ‘glumsy attcapt to cover up sggressive actions” in Cubse . - He deseribed the U.S. quarantine as a "new and extrenoly dangerous ect of aggression” and as Sundisenised piracy.” During this first encounter, while avoiding direst reference to the prosence of Soviet Hissiles or boxbers in Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that accusnti cas that the Sovics Union hed ®sot up offensive armazonts in Cuba” wore false, and officially confirazed the statement already made by the Soviet Union in this comection, “that the Soviet Coveranent has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive armanonts Ee also recalled the statensnt of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs | _ Pande Grosyko 50955 BDocld: 324234709 Page 69 a preecteren soem reign Ce A RNC HE OEE STL ON TID OT Tt
HW.§0955- Docld:32424709 Page,.90...0 00.2. 00 oe eee es wl3e- Andred aresyto in the General Assexoly jest a moath previously (Septexber 21s 1962) . that Sony soboraminded mau kmova that Cuba ig not ooo ballding up her forecs to “ guch 2 degree that she can pose a threat to the United States oo. or else a. threat to any state of the Western Healsphares a Anbassador Zorin gubaitted to the Security Council a statexent published by the Soviet Governnent that day which addrsgsed a serious uarning to the United States Goverment, to advise it that, im carrying out the seasares — eamnounesd by President Kennedy, “at is takiug on itself a heavy rosponmibility | for the fate of tho world;® declared that the Sovict Goverment wi do "everything in its pover to frustrate the aggressive designs of ss ‘ imperialistic eircless 38 and appezled to ell governments and psoples to raise their voices in protest against the “aggressive acts® of the United States and . strongly to condexm ‘puch acts. He introduced a draft resolution condeaning ‘the mactions of the Goverment of the Uaited States designed to violate the Charter of the United Nations and to intensity the threat of war." fhe Sevist resolution insisted that the United States “Spepeal its decision ox the control, | (of ships of other states going touards tho ghores of Cuba,* and ealled spon ‘the United States, Guba, and U.S.oSeRo to esteblisa soatacts and cater inte “pegotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thereby rezoving . the threat of war.” At the request of the Representative of Ghana the mecting tis adjournsd to the followlng morning so that represanta’ives night consult with other delegations outside the Council. Oo . gho Sext Horning: getoher 2b. nn The nears morning, the Security Comeil heard the representative of Yonezuele, re Soga-Rodpiguezy associate the Latin Anerican gations with the action taken by the United States pursuant to the O.AoSs resolutions He noted - _ Raat ed has _
. , ‘ wo 2 a that "4b bas been proved that the Soviet Union has set wp ini Cuba rosket bases that mieht deliver mucleer sissiles to about 1,060 miles distance, and that, enparontly, it is at preseat Sets: ting up others for, rockets with a range of rp. to 2,200 miles." This had ereated an atzosrhere of insecurity amd concorn in the ecuntries of the American kenisphera which felt thezsel ves directly ". theoatened by such BEaPORS » The weapons in Cuba, the Venezuelan Representative exphasized, wars no Loager defensive but offensive, and thoy ane ef a magnitude oo . that might be sufficient: to vipa ont any of the dneriomn a ics fad drag the : world into the holocaust of piuchear are? ‘We deseribed the apprehension felt throughout the continent at Guba subversive activities, including the . introduction of agents, ‘propeganda, and weapons to equip guorrilla forces in | fserican republics, | fubasedor Sqaachodrigusz recalled the veselutdon adopted by the organization, of. joariean states axd declared that he was spoatcing for the ~ entire continoat in asking the Security Council to take measures to step nuclear vo weapons ‘con arriving in Cuba and to have the recently existing bases of . nuclesr roskets” in cuba @iguantled. 7 Sir Patrick Dean, Representative of the Onited. Kingdon; noted that by no stretch even of the Soviet imaginaticoa could a nuclear mis sile with a range of 2,200 niles im Cuba be galled defensive, mud ‘yeealled assurances on this point — by Foreign Minister Grosyko and President Dorticos of Cuba at the General Agssexoly the previcus month. hile the Soviet Govermzent vers acting their  Lie,® he stated, "the orders vere being given, plans laid and preparations being uade for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who can possit?y believe in tho honesty of the Soviet Goverzzent’s intentions in these eiremstances?® tho United Kingdon, he concluded, considered that the Uaited States acted properly by eouing to the Security Council at the first possible mczent. Now _ tho Security Council must take imzsdiate and urgent steps to restore confideace HW "50955, jin the Western Docld: 32424709 Page 91
| | ae in the Western Heaisphere by having thesa offensive missiles aissantled and withdrarm. The United Kingdom fully supported the U.S. resolution before the Council. | | fhe Representative of of Rumania, Hre ‘alitze, supported the Soviet positions fhe Irish Foreign Minister, Hire Ailzen, underlined world concera wath tho growth of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He & appreciated Cuban Go acera ‘sith its national socurity> “out 4t is a , far ery frou that to a military paildup of the kid which the Cuban Govermesnt now appears to have exverked upoa with the masslve assistance of the Soviet Union.” He. sould not endorstem’ mea ths Soviet Union should have chosen this momzomt to estehlish new missile and poxber ; bases om the island of Cuba?® The Foreign Minister belioved ke perceived sone CORON ground im the UoSe statexont to the Security Council of October 22 which . declared UeSe. vilLingnoss B09 confer with the Soviet Union on measures to : rezove ‘the existing ‘threat to eceurity of the Kestern Hemisphere,” and in the Sovist drat resolution “hich proposed thet the United, States, GoS.S Re and Cuba eotablish contacts and enter into negotiatloacs The Security Council reconvened that evening, sone forty-eight hours after President Kennedy" s 8 nistorie speech. Tee naval quarantine had gone into effect at 10:00 A.M. that morning. Hoabors ‘mes that if a Sovict ship attexpted to run the quarantine the result would be serious. ghey aso meu that the President had indicated that the quarantine tis an isnodiate step" which would be followed by “further action” if the Soviet nissiles were not renovede AY this necting ‘the Council hoard statexeuts by those mexkers who had mot yot spokems Framed, china, Chile, United Arab Republic, asd Ghana. In ‘etditicn to expressions of support for the U.S. rogoluti on by France and Chiaa, the bigulights of the mosting ware the statexcat of Chile, the United Arab /Repablie-Ghana HY 50955 DBocld: 32424709. Page 92 onan Lp eeoeeeone pms ee ene cee aR NR BEM at errr irgomncaererm ements Deyo eget reer nent Re RODS ET STR Ane ee mene met cee aen ements emt = emer ca enum tmp acezpnte wee
HW . + 16 - 4 Repeblicohana "restraint resolutica,® and the first formal intervention of tho Secretary-Gensral » Anbassedor Seydoux, the Representative of France, noted that “the appearance of foreign muclesr missiles on Cuban geile. cannot bs considered as other than a serious initiative aized at eroating @ pou war that the U.S. had denoastrated elearly that 4% is scoking a peassPul solution in eecordance, with the ) Charter of the Gaibed Eations and that the solution Proposed by the B.S. wag, desirable ia the ‘antorest of tho countries ccoeerned : ead “in order to banish once and ‘Lor all ths dangers sith which world peace 28 threatened by the roeent developzeats in Gebse' ® srehassedor Lin, for the . tO Republic of China, noted that it was particularly disturbing to sea Cuba \gransz cried eo a result 'of Sino-Soviet {ntervention, into an arsed base for , conminist ponstratios og ‘the jnorheas. He declared that the measures initiated by the TVatted States designed ‘to call, an ienadiate halt to the shipzeat of . pilitary wpatorial to Cubs were justified and supported tks U.Se draft resolution as a reasonehle and peacefull soluticn. ; a Speaking for Chile, febassedor Schweitzer endorsed tho esourity measures 509545 ce the rogional systen and expressed sapeort for the U.S- dratt resolutions | He weleoned the. eathorization that the U.S. draft % resolution gee to the Seerotary.Conaral to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. epatortanately," he said, “the Representative of Cuba yesterday rejected this ides. At such a | dscizive roxent as this, wo blieve Cuba chould trust tho seikods of the United — etions for putting out the flexes of ecnflict and for ensuring peas. Ons mek mothed could be to CAsure the United Hetions presence im a zone of 8 conflict ..0. Ho make a fervent and heartfelt appeal to Cuba to accept sach 2 procedure.” - | [tee United Arab — Docld: 32424709 Page 93
nw ' his country comet condone tke wallateral decision of the United States of 7 izerica to exercise the quaran e” ubich ke characterized as contrary to internsticaal Law| end Liked Ly to inerensa world tension. He recalled that ' Ie Dorticos had told the Cenerel, Assexbly that the weapons Cuba had a acquired a wee re “defensive, in natures” ana celled for epopmalizntioa® of rolations beotusen “against. the spread of nuclear wsapezs. He urged all parties to refrain from : Representative, Me. Quaison-Saskey, took a similar position, stating that ke - | hed no "incontrovertible Proof 0. 028 to the offensive characeter of milltery | ~ devel opzents ia Guba" and therefore could mot condone tho queraatins. He alse i for coveretga Pightso® fhe U.ARo-Ghans joint draft resolution requested tha” ; | seerotary-Geacral Sig prouptly confer with the pertics directly concerzed on 7 imiediate steps to be taken to rexove the existing threat to world peace, and. Lar AERC RA The Tnited Arab Repeblic Representative, Mr. Hahmoud Ried, declared that eee tear nih cea s ae cae pcaraet guba end the United States. b a the saxa tine he veaffirzcd UahaRe policies vesslonaaggrevating action and called for wmegotiaticns. Tho Ghanian eet comes ee ennienangy *0)-pe IE ypoetat nan eam rtpese ek were ncume gyn penny eae net ent OEE: Panam Rgtrene Int me! AHA Ina A ended for ucgotiations to resolve the erisis om the basis of “matunl respect | to morselize the situption tm the Caribbsans” emi called on the parties 7 concernsd to cozply forthwith with the regolutien, to provide eVory assistance . dirsstly os or indivestly further aggrave 4o the sitestion.” The: formula groposcd ok. ; but provided neither for the suspension of the Soviet offensive buildup ner . LOF Bolo jnvollverent in inepsction and verifiestions 50955 was thus Lintted to a general appeal for zadiation by the Secrotary-Gensrally. to the Seeretary-Gensral, and “to refrain meanunile from any action which may f oe, Tra, Mean § Shank. Peepozal of Qgtohor pan ot ; , a ] aa At the close of the mating, the seesoteryonsral revealed that he bad he é . /4 just addres set Boctld: 32424709 Page 94 , ; ; . j
eo lS oo i just addressed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy and Cnairasn Khrushchev — which proposed “the voluntary suspsnaica of all arms shipszents to Cuba, and also ths volustary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching ef shins bound for Cuba.” Thant bolicved that such voluntary gag on for a period of tuo te tires weeks would grootly ease the sltcetion an? give eine to maser gegen gent pce ege penny” fore pom teen yet 9 the par vties to "mest and digcusse” Ko offered to “make nyockt evailable to » QL2 parties for whatever services I eay be shle to perform.” . Im addition to this appeal to President Keamsdy and Preser Khrushchev, the Sesretary=Ceneral took tho ceeanies of tho Security Council weoting to / agdeess an urgent sppeah to the President ont Premier of Cub, declaring that ‘4% would also contribute greatly te the sazs cad if the constructica and dovelopaent of major military feoilities end installations in Cebs would be suspended during the period of zsgotiations.” He then appealed to “tke parties . consarned® to enter into mogotiations imedistely, Seven this night,” | ierespestive of other procedures, uith tho fixet subject to be dieceseed being the “nedalities® to achieve his suggestions. Significant im U Thont°s intervention ie wore his offer to rake hinsel? available to U.S. and Sovict nogotintars “for . vhatever services” he night perfors and the concrete suggestion for eguspensiion” of soviet ares shipzonts and of the constraction aad covelopyant of major military iustaliatians in epchange for tho suspeasica of the | ‘quarantine. The uoxt day, President Kennedy*s reply resinded the Secrgtary-Consral that, the thresy "was exented by the sserat introductiog of offgnsive weenons. Sate Cuba, end the answer lies im tho rencvall of such weaponge” fhe Prosidsat Po : monca that the Seerotary-tenoral hed tends eertiain suggestions nado. oinvited pote srinacy talks to determine whether satlatactery aprengezexts can be a
2 196 these arrangements with yous" Pre ster Enrugshehev’s reply wellconed v frant’s anitiative and characterised ‘the situation "as highly dangerous and calling © for the immediate intervention by the United Nations.” When the Security CoanclL eeconvansd Thureday afterncon Lor what proved to bs the last formal mecting om the Guba erisis, ‘ambassador Stevenson usleozed both the cou *S8 adopted oy the. Soviet Union the provicus day to avoid direct. confrontations iia the 500 of quarantine and the report that Er. Khrus hehov bad agieed to the proposals edveneed by the: seesotary-onoral . povertieless, the situntion rouained serions and Asbassador Stevenson set the 7 realities of the situation posed wy the buildup of nuclear ‘stritring power | ipoaseatoe Stevenson eautiened the Couneil not to forget that vs are here todays 3 ofOP ningle reasou: beemuso the Soviet Union scerotly Antroduaed this menacing offensive military baildup into the islend of Guba. “while escuring the world that nothing was ferthor fron its’ thoaghts.” Already the Comamists hed attemmted to distort the record by opgeing that ay uns Rot the Sova. et Union weich created this threat Yo peace by secretly — installing these weapons isn Coba, “bat that lt was tha Gaited States waich  ersated this grisis by discovering and reporting these inetallaticns. This | ig the firet tine, I confass,* the U.S. Representative continged, “that I ae Rave ever heard 4% said that the ering is not tha burglary. | bat the discovery of the bargLay o” Be noted that sone: vepresentatives #8 the Gomeil say. ‘eet they do mot mes whether the Soviet Puior bas in Fact ‘pull ip Cubs Seotellatioas eapatle of firing avelear missiles cver ranges fren 1,680 « 2,080 tiles. Tf Further dewbs rensined on this seers the United States would - ag pd a: oe 50955 poeta: 32424709 “page 96 ; aA a ca . ne an) oe e eared . a . rote theme an his opening remark by inviting the Council to address Ateelf to "the : nytt vag fo ee Baa Peet : : ' . eee ae ee the fet gy 1S BM Snag ae By Cee Lean ae La te tags CERT TERT A ong pene aes cere egy Epes oy STI fh cones tyeesiegire ets eevee  yceeney een egene nf atone smuecnaeyn pense fine peomerne eR NED RT MOR Ener tN 8 gem rp OMAR ASI teen URN en Ee Te MTEC RSE TET MIT TE
o 20 2 : ; an) dé . gladly exhibit photographie evidense to prove the truth of the charges. Ons by one Aubassador Stevenson dexolished the argements that Aebessador © Gorin had presented at the first Security Council meoting. As for the “ehirtyefLive bases in forcign countries” whieh the Soviet Represcatative had mentioned, the fact was that there ware suck missiles with the forces of ealy threo of our allies <- the United Ringdoct, italy, end Turkey: =. and that . these were extabl ished by the decisioa of Heads of Gevernmont in Decesbor 1957 ®vhich vas eozpelled to sathorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior ‘ Soviet decision to introduce its ous missiles eapeble of destroying the countries of Westers Europes" why was it necessary for the Western Hexisphore nations to act with ‘such apeod? The "spsed and stealth? of the Sovict offensive buildup in Cuba desonstrated ‘the premeditated attempt by the Sovict | Union "to. confront this hemisphere with a fait 3 ecorpli,” If ths United States - had not acted prospthy and pad delayed its counteraction, “the mdlearization _ “of Guba would have been quictly cospleted.” He stressed that the United - ae states had acted promptly to pat into proves “the political machinery which | - us prey wild achieve a solution to this grave crisis.® ‘The one action in 7" SO the ‘Last few deys which had strengthensd the peace was ‘the doteraination to stop this further spread af weapons an this hewisphere. The United States was now ia the Security Counsil, Asbascesdor Stevenson noted, because it wished tho machinsry of the United Nations “to Sake over to reduce those | tensions asd to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to _ Peace and to ensure the renoval ‘fron this hemisphere of offensive nuclear HW 50955 weapons and the corresponding Lifting of the querantine.* ‘Whes Zorin again attempted to dellude the Council about the fasts of the Sovict offensive builduip, a dramatic encounter occurred betusen Se [stevenson and Docld: 324274709 Page 37
Stevenson and Zoria, which exposed the truth beyond doubt. | e2Ze | 4 STEVENSON: Wall, let me say scusthing to you, Hr. Ambassador: We do have the evidence. We have it, end 4% 45 clear and incontrovertible. And let mo say somsthing elses: Those wapons must be taken out of Cubas Next, let no say to you thet, if I waderstoed yous you said o» vith a . trespass on credulity: tbat exeels your best == that our position had changed since Bg spoke here the | ‘other day because of tke pressures ‘of wo; orld opinion end a majority of the United Hations, Well, let no aay te Fou, sir: | toa are wrong ageing We have had no prossure from anyone whatsoever. ve cane here teday to indieste our willingness to cisouss u Thant’s proposals - eo AB . that is the only change that has taken plase. t. But let ne also say to you, sir, that there has been a changa. You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, pave ‘upget he balance of ‘power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have. created this. new. ‘danger - oe not the United. Statese... Finally, wre Zorin, {I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence af these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly | pacome defensive weapons. But today w+ again, if I heard you correctly <- - you ‘say that they do hot exist, or that we have not proved they exist ww and 7 you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. athe right, Sid, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the UoSoSoRe has placed and is placing mediuss. and interusdlate-rangea missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do mot wait for the interpretation. Yes or no? HW 50955 ' ZORINe I am not in ; an snerLean courtroon, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answar a question that is put to ma ain the fashion in which a. prosecutor puts questions. In dua course, sir, you will have your reply. . /STEVENSON: Boclda: 324274709 Page 36 cet eee one ne ee rane ee mt een ge OTE AE AEC Pa Sr gE a ee los Saute ened tempers toon ene Heong nee eat one epee ss eng net enaenarenaneseengrse ten mabe rey, sn attr tte gre sere at gente tenon Te
“fgg Atta age pate tin short, ail of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible . * > 22 « 4 STEVENSON: You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and _you can answer "yas" or "no®. You have denied that they exist -- and I want to know whether I have understced you correctly. ZORING WALL you please continue your statenont, sir? You will have your answer in due coursé. Inasmuch ag Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and maps ‘ pinpointing the details and Location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aireraft and of . Soviet missile bases, complete with launching Sites and ‘supporting equipaent, \ weapons." When Zorin’s reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he had identified in order to authenticate the evidences. The proposal made by the United arab Republic, and supported by Ghana, to postpone further work of the Couneil and to adjourn the neeting was _ adopted without objection, in the light of the willingness of the 0.5. and the U,S.SoRe to consult with the Secretary-Gensral on his suggestions of the | | previous day. - The Security Council thus adjourned but remained *gaized" of the problay while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the formal chauber of the Security | Council to the informas chanbers of the Sgorotary-cengral. rs - {Weekend Negotiations: aye cB a iat fie as hae cited Hy et peo” we the Up PCa tee a, ape TE blithe oe Tle age oR eB A “ nes ef O955 “Den @:39424709" " Page 39 : rr an Sa tian gees see  ephe omy re ne mrp ene “bn emp geomet mere gre etn sane snigtt tern cnteeneantt en ene trnaimmmrpmysntemenrem pavers ene EGC} AA MOTT NOTES SITEP® PREAMP! AA OO ‘
at : | eg BB ew Weekend Nogetiatiors: The Kennedy-Khrus shchev Letters That. weekend {October 26-28} there was an exchange of letters between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter. Ad President Kennedy, naking certain proposals eon the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. “On Ceteber 2? another lotisr from Khrushchev, which vas broadcast befors ‘ aslivery, also expressed willingness toe withdraw the weapons but proposed to tink the q ueation of Soviet effensiva weapong | tn Cuba te the unrelated ; fosue oF strategic weapons in Turkey. ‘he USSR would tagras tw renove: fron cuba those. neang which you ‘regard aa offensive means 3 we agree to carey this out, and made a pledge an the United Nations. Your repre- ‘sentative will rade a declaration te ‘the effect that the United States . of America, 08 ‘tee’ part, considering the wneaginess and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove ita gimilay moana from Turkey... .Af% er that persons entruste eg by the United Nations Security Council may check cn the epot, tho fulfilment of the pledge made ty either side," Of course, | be: added, She Bw thorisatvion of tne Gevermmente of Gaba and of Turkey - would be necoesary for tha eatry inte ‘those countries of these agente. a HW 5095 5- _ In addition, “Kare shchey proposed that the United States and the USSR vive pledges againat invasion of Guba and Gurkey respectively: and selemm promises to respect the sovereignty end the inviolabllity of the frontiers of these countries. This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejected. by the United States. A statement issued by the White House that dey nated that geveral inconsistent and conflicting ereposale had been made by the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast. - BE a . " - fthe propusal DocId: 32424709: Page 100
2b gy mtgabe oy iW _. verification.” As to propogals concerning the security of nations oxte}de oe . 2x 4 fhe proposal involved the security or - nations ot wteide tne Wester ' Hemisphere and it: was.the Weetern Hemiephere nations alone that were the subject of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of . the United States, the statement read, wag that "ag an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bag 208 magt tops offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further ehipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease ~- ali under effective international this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United states and ita allies kad tong taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. Thess afforts could contains ag soon ag the present Soviét~ created threat was ended. ae President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khruehchev of the same day : (ooteber 27) replied to Khrushehev*s letter of Geteber 26. Srna De eg ba eta 50945. Docld: 32424709 | Page 101 as follows: | nae r read your letter," the Preaident wrote, "the Key elenonte of your proposale which geen generally acceptable as I understand them are 8h, “You would agree ta remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate U. We observation and supervision;’ and undertake, . with suitable safeguards, te halt the further introduction of such weapons systems dato Cuba, . ne, We, on our part; ‘would agree <- upon establishmant of adequate arrangensnte through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out end continuation of these comituents -- (a) to renave promptly _ the quarantine measures now in effect, and {b} to give aggurance against an invasion of Cuba, and I am ‘egutident ‘thet other nations of the Western Hentophore would be Preparcilt to do aikeinss. i ire Ce re Sen ane a . nee
Nene eee ° © ~ 25 = d Agsuming work csaned en offensive missile bases in Cuba and all weapons systene in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered incperabdle, under. effective UN arrangemants, the President was prepared to have representatives oe in New York work owl an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary-General Lor 3a permanent eolution along the lines suggested in Chairman Knrughchev?s letter of October 266. ” , oy (On Sundey, October 28 == Chairman. Khruchchev broadcast the text of f his replys In addition te eater ingtructi.one. to discontinue: further work the Soviet Goveramsat *has given on woapens coustraction sites be ‘g o by of og now ‘order to disnantle the ayms vhieh you described ag offensive, and be crate and ‘yetura them to the Sovier Union." The letter stated: “I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your ngeeage of October 27, 1962, that there wowld be no attack, no invasion = of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, bat also on the : | part, of athor nations of the Western Hemisphere, as. you gaid in your aug i neswage. then eho ‘motives ‘which induced us to z vender ageis stance of such a kind to Cuba disappear. "7% is for this reason that we instructed our officers -= these mans as XY had already informed you earlier are in the hands. of the Soviet os (officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue conetruction of '. the aforenentionod facliities, to dismantle then, ard to return them to HW 50955 the Soviet Undon. As I wad informed you an the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives: to verify the dismantling of these means. "Thus in view of the agsurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every ecoudition for eliminating the present conflict." mo — | 7 — fehairman Doold: 32424709 Page 102,
ie acne ae AW 50955 * roa * Spd ths te fo cn 4 Chairman Khrus henow gent a copy of thie message to U Thant "to enable you to fauniiiarise yourself with cur position, which we regard ag exhaustive — and shich ‘will help you to discharge your neble funetione." At the same a tine, he informed the United States and the United Nations, that in connection with the negotiations U Thant was conducting with representatives ef the USSR, ‘the United States, and ‘Cuba, the Soviet Governmsnt was sending First Deputy - Foredgn Minister V, ¥. Kuenetsov te New York to help U Thant in his noble ‘efforta aimed at eliminating the present dangerees aituation.® President Kennedy replied at once to the breadcest meseage ef Octaber 28 — even before the official text reached ham, and weleemed i¢ as "an important ‘contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read: | “The distinguished efforts of Acting Secrotary-General U Thant _ have greatly facilitated both our taske, I conzider uy letter to “you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on . the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. Y hege that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the Uyited Nations es your masage gays, so that the Ynited States in tum can remove the quarantine msasures now in effect. T have | already made arrangement 6 to report all these matters to the Organization of Anericaa States, whose mombera share a deep interest ain a genuine peace in the Caribbgan area." a | "Y agree with you, P the President concluded, What we must devote © urgent attention te the problem of disarnanent.. oI think we should give priority to questi ons relating to the proliferation or nuclear weapons, on earth and in cuter space,and to the great effort for a _ fouélear test ban. Docld: 32424709 Page “103°
i nuclear test ban. But we showld also work hard to $89 4? wider msagures of disarmament can be agreed and put inte operation at an . @arly date, The United States Goverment will be propered te discuss 7 these questions urgently, end in a constructive spirit, at Geneva er elsewhere." A, U.S. statement iesued the sans day weleomed the Khrushchev response and stated: We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United . coe, Nationa | with re spect. to reciprocal measures to assure the peace ai the "Caribbean area.” a, : Re oo : y Weakend Kegot tations in Now, York: : AW 50955 ae Meanihile stepi continued in} New York vo gach agreement on practical means of avoiding conflict at gpa and of arrangenente to carry cub the Seoretary-Geneval’s euggsutd on for stopping work on the offensive bases and 7 _perontg further ahipments as conditlong. of suspending he quarantine. the: snitial ain of the Sesvetary-Ceneral was to avoid an incident: at "pea. What concerned hin most, he had written on Cetober 25 to Chairmen _Khrushehev, wag that a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and Uheted States vessels tyowld deatroy any possibility of the discussions x have Q suggested as a prelude to negotiations on & peaceful settlensnt. a Be therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed , - to stay away from the interception area for a Limited time in order "to permit digcugsicns of the medalities of a possible agreement." The next dey (October 26), the Secretary-Censral address sod a parallel Setter to President Kennedy, informing him of hig app? roach to Chairman Khrushchev and requesting that ®ingtras tions may bes issued the United States’ vessels in the Caribbean %. ae everything povedbis to avoid direct confrontation. with Docld:32424709° Page 104 Coe, _ {Soviet ships ecemenin ea mat aim oe euarty waa es eupemane eran eecann ethernet eae ea CELE YH IT SENAY OTTOMAN NTN {ETRE ESN EEN TEES LATTES
Hi 2 2B | i Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the rigk of an outward incident,” He expressed the further hepe that such couperation . could be the prelude to a quick agreexent in principle on the basis Of uhich the querantine msasures could be called off as soon’ as possible... Premier Khrughchey accepted the proposal and "ordered the magters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception | area, as you recommend.” President Kennedy weleoned U Thant °s efforte for a: a eatisfactery golutdlon acd stated that a the Soviet. Govermisnt accept and abides by ne request that Sordet anipe already on their wey te Cuba . stey out of the. interception ares during the. peried of prelininary discueeions (fyou may bs. ‘assured that this Goveranent will accept and abide by your "* poquest thot our vessels in, the Caribbean Yo everything possible to avoid z direct confrontation with Sovket chips in the next few daya in. order to “ minintg the risk of any untoward incidents ® at the: sama time the Fresident . “underlined. that, thes, we, a, matter of great urgency ia view of the fact a that certain Soviet chip were. etal proceeding tovard Cuba and the interception area, Sergening Shipments aw 50955 As the Unite House. statenent on October 2? pade clear, the urgent . preliminary to the coneideration of any proposals for a solutien was that work on the Cuban bases atop, the offense! ive weapons be rendered inoperable, and further shipuent of weapons to Cuba mst ceageosall under effective. international vey tification. After that means must be found to get the missiles and other offensive weapens removed and their removal verified and toe institute adequate safocuards against their reintraduction. - f/The immediate Docld: 32424709 Page i105
is : pret ati Sa LATS sO ies. sate ee HW 50955. Docld: 32424703" Page. 106, 4 The tmodiate concern of the negotiators in New Tork, during the . ‘initial phase,’ wee to work out a system for incoming shipments to ensure that no further ‘of fonsive weapons. ware being introduced, “The UN asked fo the International Comalttee of the Red Crose (ren) to | gerve as its agent in inspecting i neoRring vessels to make sure that ne more 5 Soviet weapons were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expec vad to eontinus for . about one month, and would be entrusted to gome thirty inspectors whieh | the TORC would :widertake to recruit. Mr, Paul Ruegger, former preaident of the ICRC, arrived in New York early in Hovenber. te-diseves with the UN _ whether and under what elrevumstances the ICRC cowld undertake this task. in releases isgued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the TCR ‘pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with the formal agreement of “the three parties concerned." The statement _ issued by the {CRC on November 13 explained that “eventual action by the . ZORC: would be based on previous congent being given by the three states. . ccacerned® and ths methods ‘ef control would have to be clarified in future discussions. Premier Castro refused to give hig consent to the proposed scheme, Before final arrangements could be made it was, in any evant, realized that the system envi eaged would no longer be required and that ' the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely on other meane, including air surveillance, to guard agaiyst new shipments of offensive weapons. Hevana Talks The pain obetacle to progress on establishing the conditions for a. - gottlenent wag the attitude of the Cuban government. “On october 26 U Thant _fuarote Prime Minister oes okey Ase her vig ey Bae We we ne a Brn en ces eae ogre
HY 0955 on . e = 30 wrote Prine Minister. Caetro renewing bie appeal that he (Castre) direct that  Bthe const braction and developnont of na jor military facilities and installations in Cuba, end especially installations feel gned 4 6a Launch medium-range and internediate-range ballistic missiles, te suspended during the poriad of negotiations wich are now anderway.” Dre Castro's reply cane the next day and p proved to be a hedged accept~- ance. He rejected “the presumption of the Uaited States to determine what . action We are entitied to take within our P country vhat icing of arms we. consider appropriate for our defense, ® “Cuba was prepared to accept ‘tthe compromises thet “you, request as efforts in favor of peace, provided that c a the gama tine, ‘waile negotiations ave in progress, the United States | "covernnont desists from threats and aggresaive actions against Cuba, including neval bleckade of tne country." Read iiteraliy, DP. Castre was paying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of onding the quarantine. A& the same tins, his letter eontained another notes’ 8, . Should you ecnsider 4% wsoful to the cauge of peace, our government would be glad’ te receive you in our country as Secretary-Gensral of the - United Nations, wi with a. view to direet diecussions on tha present, crisis." u Thant replied tho next day noting that Castro was "prepared to accept ths suggestion he hed made provided the Thited states Government "desists from threats. agains Cuba including the naval blockade" unile negotiations 7 Were iin progress. ‘He accepted the invitat chen to west Cuba carly in the conlng wook <=. end to "pring a fow, aides vith re to leave some of them behind to continue eur - common etfort te wards 2 pase jefu2 solution of the problem.” Po facili state: nig task ‘the United States had agreed te ‘guspend its naval quarantine and eorisl surveillance during. ‘the  Seeretary-Consral's visit to’: a /Bavana. Docld:32424709 Page 107 oe ERE EE TE IE I ens ae ES a naa sages engin Sree te epee mama pen mom maprenenenenr tt at spear epe rien mere NOR EE mee see ne RTO EET
0 Rhee Havana. At thts point, the United Nationa was vorleing on tt aseuption that the vieit to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of U.N. observation and ingpection and "reciprocal measures ts assure the poace in the Caribbean." | 7 fhe igeue was further clouded by Castro’s netatenont, of conditions" . gegued in Havana on Octeber 28, “The guarantecs of which Pregident Remedy spsaks against the. invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elinination | also of the naval blockade,” he declared, "and adoption, anong others, of ' “the following meagares3" 1. End of the economic blockade and Pall measures of comnpreial and economic pressure" exercised by the Uaited States against Cuba s . ar 2 End of mal subversive activities® and the organization or suyport ef invasicnss | 3. End of tpirate attacks" from besee in the United States and © Puerte Rico; | | | h. Bnd af “yLolationsa of air and naval epecet by the United States; Pegturn to Cuba. ® This shatexent of conditions was dlearly unacceptable and adumbrated . tg intrensigent: position that the Cuban authorities would take during the . Havane talke. JU Tnant and a party or ninetesn, including Brigadior General Rikhye and @ amall military staff, Slew to Havana on October 30 and held  telke with Guban Leaders that day and the next te arrange for U.N. eupervisioa of removal of the offensive weapons and to disquse the other modalities for: carrying out the Keanedy-Khrushehev agreement « of October 27~28. | MW SO95S° Docla:32494709 . Page 108 pt pe ctse Becca ea Oa GE pow Uaited States withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its /witnoigh genoral a ; 7 veeeneeenn canna eae tpn tutes agement RE ERE EE AONE AOMORI EG MEY ATER AE OE IRE AEE TE REESE SIT TOE TONE
HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 109 ; 2326, - Although general agreencsnt was reached that the United - Ratiens should participate in settlemont of the Cuban crisis and the talke vere characterized . ag "Lruitful," the Cuben authorities balked at ali preposals for U.N. imgpestion of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction. ‘Premier Castro reiterated the five asnends he had rede in his October 28 ‘statement. These demands were ebvLoualy beyond ‘the ecope of the, Secretary-General’s purpog ech negotiating with ‘the Cubans , and no agreeneat was reached. The Secretary-Conoral and his party returned te New York “tag next day, whore, it was underateod; gaika betussn the Secretery-Ceneral and Cuban | representatives would continue. Prenier Castro, however, did state that he t would net interfere with | the Soviet removal, of the migsiles. The missiles © 8re, Snot ours", he’ gaid in a radio epsech om Novexber 1 in which he reported on his talks with J fhant, but he rejected any form of international “Anepection. on the withdrawal of Seviet weapons, He epecifically turned down a “proposal that ‘the Intemational Compmittes of the Red Cress (ICRC) earry owt the ins mpestion tas sk, He also ve jected other forma « of ON inepectign. On Friday, November 2, Soviet Firgt Deputy Proaier Anestal I, Mikoyan arrived in New York cn his way to Havana and issued a . statement supporting Prenier Castro's demands ard warmly endorsing the Cuban regime, “Surveillance and Dismantling Continusd When U Thant left Havana without a mutually satisfactory formula , President .Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to. Guba and authorized reg sumption of close aerial surveillance of the island _ to dstermine whether dismantling of Soviet 2 niseile bases was preceeding - as reported by Soviet of fieiale. On the evening of November 2, the /President reported seretentgran enty preeminent nm beans tp miner see hae Kerman ne tg epee tee,
seaec sn At Laan ile abet ann Ate o 34 a President. reported in a short television and radio bresdcast that the Soviet missile bases ars being disuantled, the missiles are being ‘ erated end the fixed installations at the gites are being destroyed." Tho x DocId: 32494709 Page 110 President said the information vas based on aerial photographs and added that the Urited States intended to follow closely the completion of this . work through various MEARS, fneluding aerial surveillance, until fan equally satisfactory international means of vorification is effected.” ‘He also eaid wae wunile the quarantine reualned in effect, hs was ‘hopeful that adequate procedures could be developed for: international inspection of Cuba-bound “cargoes. Tha International Committee ef the Red Cross could be Sees appropriate agent" for carrying out this Anopoction. Hew York Hogotiations: "Yori sileation and Wn28s_ | eanvnile, talke provecded im New York between Ambassador Stevenson a and te. John J. HeCloy for the United States and Deputy Foreiga Minister — ‘Kusneteor, Lor the Soviet Union, Apart from working cut the details of. “the schemes for ICRC inspection of incoming shi pments (described above) , the “negotiators gpent the next three weeks in considering awo main issues. | Until November 12 the cont ral concern ot the negotiators was to make sure. that the offensive niesile system had left Cuba and to work out a satla~ | factory ayaten for verification that dismantling and renoval had in fact » - taken place. Associated with thia was ths problem of Lengor-term safe~ guards agai einst the reintroduct tion of offensive WOAPSNs .. From Roverbar x2 to November 20 the focus of ne gotiation shifted to the problen of removal of the sevie et IL-28 bombers from Cuba. | On voriil cation, 3% wag clear that what the President had tergsd . Pan equally gatiefactory international msang of verification" required an adequate t ti eyoten of ‘fagpection to make sure: that the offensive wsdpons oe / fnad in fact ce ne en et TO Nat mg eaten te ME
HW 50955 > - 6 had in fact been removed, | to guard agalr nst hiding, and to provent reintroduction | of ‘sus oh weapons, Ya rious gchenes were considered and the USSR made clear its willineness tot have oy verificetion take place, Castro adamantly refused to accept amy form of vex rifieation in Cuba by the UY cr under its auspices for removal of the weapons. US negotiators continusd te make it clear to the Sovlet negotlaters thet 0S aerial surveillance would continue se long as there was no adequate ON cyatem of inspection, When it becaxe clear that Cast?o would not give his cons eat te UN inapection or verification of shipments frem his ports, txe nogoviators turned to ‘devising a systen for US iuopection at sea of outgoing ships carrying the dismantled missiles. The 5 ‘gavel vessels would coxzs "alongside" dsparting Seviet vessels unieh would be loaded im such a way as te enable sd the ws vessels to see and count the missiles end agsociated equipment. Rapid progress was mede in dismantlin ug and leading the missiles and by November "the US had counted 2 departing miestles by this procedure, Failing UN verification and safeguards, the US continued ite om systen of surveillance. under the existing OAS resolution to make sure thaw offensive weapons were not reintroduced. | On November 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators -took wo again the question ef the remer a of: TL-288 and made it clear that the United States could not consider Lifting the quarantine ants the bexberg were withdrew. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their pert of the bargein by diswantling and renoving the missiles and were pressing for lifting of the quarantine and a U.S. non~invagion pledge. . Tre sad position WAS that the bombers were defined ag offensive . weapons in the Presidentlal Proclamation of. Octeber 23 and that they. fare ineided as Docla: 32424799 | Leen ae an mane remanent eee ET EN EN SN og ENR NNT Eman me mE
. -! ; were included.ag.such in the Kennedy-Khruchchev exchange of Octover 27-28. The United States made it clear that 1t could uct consider lifting the quarantine wntdl the Sovists agreed to remove the Ti28s within a shoxt time. . Fartiel Settlement: Rovember 20 On November 20, Br. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wlehed to rancve the bexbers he would not object. That day an agreenont wag reached petwoen Kennedy and Khrushchev under viich the Th-28e would oe withdrawn, Sgt Thant was n notified the game day by anbazsador y Stoveton and Deputy Poretan HW 50955 Minister. Kuzneteov. ‘Soviet agreement we ‘renova the bombers payed the way ‘for the Lifting of the: quarantine. the partial s settlement had taken just four weeks | og acdomplts AL his pres conference that evening, Preeldeat Kennedy ennounced “thet he hed that day been informed by Chatman’ Khrushcher that all of the He? bouders in Cuba would be withdrawa in 4 thirty days, and that these - pianos ‘could be observed and counted ag they departed, "Tnsemuch as this’. goes a Leng may teeta reducing the danger wiieh faeed this hemisphere . four weeks ago," the Fresident announced . “ft have this afterncon instructed . the Secretary of Defense to Lift cur naval quarentine 5 The President | then recalled the agresnont he had reachdd with Chairman Rhrushehev October e726, ‘nelading the a tipulaticon that once the Soviet leader had complied with all his pledges, eee vould remove ow naval quarentiue. and | give asgurance against invagion of Cuba." Bridence to date indicated that ‘gil known offeneive missile cites had beon diswantled, he stated, and gea inspection by the navy had confirmed that the missiles had been withdrawn. But, ke warned, ‘“ieportent parte” of the agreement tremain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to. \ feerify whether all a Docld: 32424709 Page 112
* ene werify whether all offensive weapons ave been removed, and ne lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction or offensive weapons back inte Cuba.” ‘the Unit Led States, therefore, had no - : ° wegen ee MOR EET IT TEER ON oT choice but to pursue its ows mgans of checking on military activities in Cuba. fhe United States, he said, will continus its efforts te achieve | tadequate international arrangemnts fer the task of ingpection and | oor verification ‘of Cube." Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate ; : safeguards as "an inspection which would provide | us with assurances that there are not in the is sland weapong capabis of offensive action against United States or neighboring countries and that they wil not be reintroduced, u fot mee gonmerermerremeng sees pice ort Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these ' were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future. 7 - SAS for our part, Ay all effensive weapons are removed from Guba and hope out “of the Hemiephere' in the future, under adequate verification asd safeguards, end if ‘Cuba ig not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposea, there will be peace in” the Caribbean. And, as x said Ain ‘September, We sheil - noither inttiat 2. nor permit aggression in tds hemisphere. 8 The United Stak ee he ebressad, would net a abandon the poitical, economic, and. ‘other efforts to hal a eubversion from Cuba nor its purpoeg and hope the Cubari posple shell some day be fully. free. "Bat these 4 polices & ako very aiffercnt from any intent to Jaunch a miitary invasion e? the island. pabotatg eet giapen Lf ¥ thay HW 50955 ‘poeta: 39400709" ‘page 113
WW 50955 e- © naval unite t ha ad payed eipated 4 in the interAmsricsn combined quarantine force w= 46805 Argentina, Dominican Republic, and ‘the United States -- notified the C.0.A.5. /o. C. en Noverber 30 that the operations of the quarantine force had been terminated. During this peried, it had not been necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and other types of aseistance made by other ‘hemispheric determination and solidarity, Ag the stent the United States and the Sovict Union in New York progressed, the United States kept the 6.0.8.8./0.0. fully informed ef ‘devélopuents.. fhe C,0.4.8./0.C. in the meantime withheld “taking any further action with regard te the erisis until these talks were _ ‘eoxpleted. Continued. Regatiations — "he Seviet Government carricd cub 3 its prouise to withdraw the rin28 bonbere, and, by Decenber 6, the titted States weg informed that all bombers (he ‘in ‘nunber} had” left. Ho progress, holjever, was nade during the rest of the month in achieving the Hadequate international arrangerants fer the task of inspection and. verification in Cuba" that the President had . mantioned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding. Daputy Premier Mikeyan!'s three-hour conversations with ths President or Noveabor 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did act advance the final golution. ‘The question was turned over again to the delegations in New York. | By mid-Pocamber several important loose ends still remained, . No, fadequate, Bocld: 32424709 Page i114 agen agence me erstereencesreme rs < cap ee erm sere rrintennnaenirieem moment ae aT meet Trent gr mepeeganemerttenpee sme SL DUT se renee coger terns naman ty 2A a gtr te eter a tap tenn ren Ene manne emg es
HY | Efforts te secure their removal continued into 1963. 0955 e Pen } 4 Aad b ‘ offengive weapons and safeguards ageinst their reintroduction had been 3 achiaved, The U. S. agsurance against invasion or supporting an invasion of Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons were not present or reintreduced into Culeand thet Cuba refrained fron aggressive acts against the Weetern Hemigphers. . Soviet Troops The withdvewal, of Soviet pergennel from Cuba wag algo a matter of deep concern to the United States, As the President stated at his press conference of November 20, the U.S. had beon informed that Soviet combat unite and other Soviet units were associated with the protection 7 . ef offensive weapons systems and would also be withdrawn in dus cowrse. the U.S. position was that removal of tha offensive weapons systems made the < presence of Soviet troops to defend such weapons no longer necessary. Security Council Consideration Concluded fhe formula for tonninating Security Council consideration of the Cuban crisis wag finally agreed betusen the governments of the United States and the Seviet Union on January 7, 1963. Tt represented a standstilZ ‘pather than a final settlement. The two governmnts agreed to send a joint letter to the Secretary-General hich he, in turn, transmitted to the Security Council for information of its membere, The text of the letter read: Ron behalf of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for . your efforts in asaisting our governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area. “While it has not been possible for cur governments to /resolve all the: Bocld: 32474709 Page i115 we nrg enarenamrennneene sarees anepaunespiee mee aon free reopen mE racnnmcen ee eprpghee anes npn: centr opto ennemeggen ymenemirs poem mmm eee nee nog tee ae
HY 0955 a : - resolve al} the problems that haves artesn in eonnection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisig and the extent of progress in the implementation of this a nderstanding, it is net neceagary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this tims. utne Govern rents of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the ¢hreat of war in connection with this crisis will lead teward the adjustment of other differences between them end the general ' gaging of Gengiens that could cause a further threat of war. ® The sams day Ganuary %, 1963), the Permanent Representative ef Cuba, Caries A. Lechuga, eddresced a let ter to ‘the Secretary-General, which he requested be tranimitted to taiited Nations members, sxpreesing 2 dissenting view ‘OF the conclusion of the affair, Cuba, the ete Ler declared, "doses jnet consider a3 dffyctive any agrecnent other then one vhich would Sinelude: _ conaideratt fon of fiye points or measured, which ag minima guarantescs to peace in the Caribbean, our Prima Minister Fidel Castro stresses in in bis declaration ef 28 Optober, 1962..." | | ‘cAgs the Security Council concluded ite consideration of the Cuban item, the eit cuation remained as follows: 3 ares O the Soviet Union had withdrew ite offensive missiles, °° i$ bembers, and som of its milltary personnel. The United | ‘States and participating American Repabiies had lifted the “quarantine. | 2, The Cubans had rete ssed to accept on site Snepection and post-remeval verification ey to agree on a system of continuing safeguards against reintroduction af offensive. weapons under Vaited HatZons auapices. 3. In the absence of adequate in nepection and safeguards, the United States continued other methods of ‘surveillance of military - . eo “factivities in Bocld: 324274709 Page 116, “6 ete p mee caee e center meneame erg ae tee eee ener mene ie stebertneetce are springen erainrcenees mp tmepanet a9 moet
Gonciuss ions . et @ eo HO « estivities in Cuba in the interests of hemispheric eseurit ty. lL, The continued presence of Seviet military personnel in Cuba constituted an wnaccestable intervention of foreign nilitary power in the Western Hemispheres. Efforts continued with the USSR to cbtain their removal a8 agread, 5. The United States continued tc be seriously concerned about ' Guban subversive efferts directed against other American Republics. é. The United States post tion wher regard te aseurance against: es Aywasion romaioed that stated by the Prosi ident on November 20, as duthined above. : eat - . Pe With the contluss on of the New York talke and the joint US-0SSR Jetter terminating $e Security Council congideration of the matter, “pesponsibility: of further action remained with the OAS Organ of Consultation ini its homispaers¢ context, Con ener ary Rolex of of BL the Cuban affair deme otistrated the utility and gozssibilities for inte action of f the varicus diplenatic and military inetruments avallable to the Unit ed Statse in a crisis. Orchestration ef bilaterial diplomacy, regional, HW 50055 arrangements, and the United Nations syotem marked the handling of the erisis throughout . in particular, the Cuba affair represented a unsque: doxanstret on of coordination between a regional aystem and the world erganization, with diplematie action being taken in the 0,A.5. and the United Nations, depending on the task to be performed and the governments dircetly involved. The 0.4.5. system successfully met the test cf | fworkability by Docld:32424709 Page i117 . pe age eee ee Pa rn Re RON ne oe ane ndigtagres ements we verre yan Se eee le rae ee : a by oi
os LL ® os | workability. by . dsxangt wating conlusively the solidarity and determination of the American Republica when their security is endangered. The rapid, dacisive action taken by the American Repubtics under the Rio Treaty etrengthened the hand of the United States in making its ease before world opinion, iti dealing in the Seeurity Cowncil vith the crisis, and in negotiating vith the Soviets 4 t The United Nations slayed a three-fold role: as a forum for exposing Soviet dupl seity and for enlisting diplomat tic support of the United States positions as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for negotiations and, a6 an institution willing ed able, oa short notice, | to provide ingpection and verification services. rom) tne United States provided an unparalleled forum for presenting the facts of the Seviet offensive buildup directly te representatives of 109 nations and through communications modia directly to world public « opinion, Ambagaador Stevenson's spsechea of Octcber 23 and 25 in the Security Council, ts gether with the photographs and explanations tO delegations both ingide and cuteide the chamber, prevented incontrovertible evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus helped in convincing the world of the facte. Yn additdon, the United Nations provided a forum in eh the American Republics could impress on the world and on the Sscretary-Genaral their sclidardty on this issue. (2) Ths Sceretary-Gensral, provided an effective point ef contact, notably in the tease days at the outset ef the crisis and valuable suggestions for avoiding dirset confrontation, The Secretery-General’s —.— interventien on the eecond day of Security Cowneli debate, in which he called for gus speneion af arms shipments and of construction and development of military installationg im exchange for suspension of ’ 4 COTE eg TERS ae are me
bay We HW a fren the intereeption area and on that condition the United States agreed _ vo de everything poseible to avold direct confrontation. Khrushchev gave . the quarantine led te the formula under wiieh Seviet ships stayed away unprecedented agreement to tho idea of U.N. inspsetion and verification of arme removal on the spot. And, the United Nationa preved that it was ready and sapable of organiaing a corps of observers and a eysten of inspection in rapid erder. Both ths United Nations and. % Organization af Angrican States preyed their ability. and vigor - oe and energed atronger from the ordeal. as 0955 Docld: 37474709 Page 119 LPP I Rem NA NY OT ante uN
‘SECRET - wagN WITH ATTACHMENTS OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 235, D.c. March 8, 1963 & we MR, BROMLEY SMITH Be EMORARDUM POR: SUBIECT | ‘Cubs Ae « fellow-vp to my memorandum to you on February 15, 4963, 1 am attaching excersts. containing teferences to Cuba in. testimony given by the Department of Defense te congressional committees. They continue from the iatast date of each corancitiee | excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed a Services Gommittee tranecripts. Net ali testimony has been screened for Caba references inasmuch aa all transcripts are got available. Thus the House Armed Services Gormmittee has been covered up to February <i, the DOD Sabcomumittee of the House Appreariations Committee te. february 13, and the Senate Armed Services Committee to February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee hag not yet begun ite bearings. | : Ag transezipie become available, I will eend the raqueated items to you. “SIGNED "David E. McGiffert ™. Aasietant to the Secretary (Legislative Aifaira) il Attachments @ HASC Transcript excerpte 3 Deb SC, HAppne Transcripts excerpts 4 SA6C Transeript excerpts SERY (2) | SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENT ce:(S/Attachments included) - Mr. McNaughton, GC Mr. Lennartson, PA Mr. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst. _ Mer. Califano, OSA - Mz. McGiffert, ATSD(LA) HW 50955 DBocld: 324274709 Page 120
HY 50955 STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS | 13 March 1963 U. S. SENATE Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of General Dynamics Corporation aS prime contractor for this versatile new addition to our Defense arsenal. My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an air- plane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more depend- able both in training missions and in actual combat. The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in omy judgment, and in the judgment of the ‘Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of. obtaining a single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with: - The least expensive, time-consuming research and _ development effort before production. - The least reliance upon unknown process and materials. - The earliest delivery to our fighting forces. - The highest level of experience in building fighter-type aircraft. Bocld:324274709 Page 122
HY 0955 ® © - The greatest use of proven design techniques and methods. - The most understanding of the requirements and difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and producing a fighter-type aircraft. When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 -- 1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be continued in order to meet the military requirements. Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded: "(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system. (2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy. '(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period. Boclda: 324294709 Page 1235
HY 0955 > © '(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war. (5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability. " The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal, and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both “proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing pro- posal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied amore realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considera- tions entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part of the record, When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed me to: Boclda: 324294709 Page i234
HY 50955 ae : @ l. Develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings. 2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost. Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory forces:<And to. increase :théir flexibility by: shifting the emphasis to those weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of ‘nuclear surprise attack. At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non- nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, pro- curement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly in- creased. ° Concurrently with these increases in.our fighting strength we have attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy - period of development, their tremendous combat power and their enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves. 4 Boclda: 32474709 Page 125
HY 0955 ee ; te In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have com- monly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when the program started, and in some instances more, Some of the reasons for such overruns have been: 1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet petform- ance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements. 2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied many times during the program. 3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in what we call a 'program definition phase" before a development contract is awarded. 4, We have too often employed inadequate and unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting in- sufficient weight on. seasoned experience in-the: design and ‘production of similar weapons. .. 5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce cost. j Boclda: 324294709 Page 1276
>.  ®@ Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been, launched, which should produce savings of at least $3. billion per year by the end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting frorn cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program definition and cost estimates, using the sesources of such non-pfofit organiza- | tions as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources. At my request the problem of how we select contractors. has been under _ study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our i current source selection procedures can be improved. One way to rediice costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements. The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic: support, ‘maintenance, training programs, and operations. | The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a HW 50955 Borla: 32424709 Page i27
HY ee ® rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high, The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already obsolete and practically worthless. When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105, At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became con- vinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common tactical fighter. The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new. ‘I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be'done. As late 50955 BDaocld: 32424709 Page 126
HY 50955 as the Zend of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated requirements of both Services was not technically feasible. While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways, | was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach, considering the. versatility and capabilities that could be built into a modern aircraft because of advances in technology. “Iwas also convinced that, if we could achieve’ a single tactical fighter, we would save at least one billion dollars, . in development, production, maintenance and operating costs. In short, | after study and review, I believed that the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to ‘both Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward this objective. ‘Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept myself fully advised of the development of the {FX as it progressed over the succeeding 14 months. Docld:32424709 Page 129
HY 50955 Since I consider it essential to a thorough unde rstanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to. recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up.to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the ‘Air Force to seek to develop a single aircraft for. both the Air For ce tactical mission and the . Navy fleet air defense mis sion, “From the outset, the emphasis ; was on development ofa weapons system that provided minimum . divergence between the Navy and. Air Force versions. My specific -guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical oe ' version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission-shall be held to 2 minimum, " “This is a: recurring theme throughout the procurement actions which followed. - a os - Requests for proposals from airc raft manufacturérs were ve issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six-firms two months thereafter. a a A Source Selection Board was organized with members appointed by the Navy.and the. Air Force, | and they we re instructed to work jointly: in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting chairmanship of the Commande r of the Air Force ‘Ke ronautical Systems Division. Docld:324274709 Page 130
To assist the Source $élection Board, an Evaluation Group was | established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management - strength, production efficiency, and suitability for wee on aircraft : carriers. | | The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by appropriate commands within the: Navy'and thé Air Force, as well as by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief 7 - . , | of Naval Operations,, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force who made their recommendations to me. ve Of the six proposals conaide red inDecember and January, those of Boeing Company and Gene ral Dynamics Corporation we re dete rmined by the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. : But it was recognized that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it. would. be acceptable. Althongh the Boeing design wae given the higher rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the higher rating in the technical area,. the Evaluat jon Group recom- mended that study contracts ‘be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to ne et the military - requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General ' 10 HY 50955 DBocld: 32424709 Page 131
Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change. A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recornmended that further work to achieve a satisfactory design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. ‘The Board's recommenda- tion was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsi- bility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and General Dynamics, as suggedted by the Evaluation Group. ll HY 50955 DBocld: 32424709 Page 132
The Air Force Council, chaired by the. Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua- tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to-both companies for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized - that neither the Boeing t nor ‘the General Dynamics proposal, as s submitted, would meet the established military requirements. The. Council felt that by: extending the compétition for an additional petiod "time and dollars are thereby more apt to be saved than lost in the long run. " It considered that competition should produce realistic cost estimates, further as surance of the validity | of the eventual choice, “and, in all probability, an earlier final design. | Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the. Navy and Air Force recommended to ‘me that study contracts be. awarded. to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that: : a. The proposals of these two. companies were markedly superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up to stated Service requirements. | | | b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General Electric engine (on which ‘the Boeing design had been-based) because of the low probability of its development in the time required, ‘since not even a prototype existed at the time, 12 HY 50955 DBocld: 32424709 Page 133
c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints. I approved the recommendations of the-Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions. about the realism of the Boeing cost estimates . | The two companies submitted new proposals ‘on April 2, 1962,. and the second evaluation was conducted in April and:\May. The Evaluation -Group.concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job-in correct- ing identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability to remain on station for adequate periods of time. -The difference of opinion between the Navy.and the Air Force emerged more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and over'- shadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorse- ments transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a joint fighter. It is clear-also that the Air:Force members of the HW 50955 Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing: submission. The qualified, 13 Boclda: 32474709 Page i134
HY 0955 Se 6 concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation, As a matter of fact, Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had ''no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met.'' Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally selected," The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft, resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined. Three weeks. were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasiz- ing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent ina joint program, | At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of the new proposals met the Navy's requirements. The Board also noted that 14 Boclda: 324274709 Page 135
HY 50955 the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions that would be. necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recom- mended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing, should be. selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design . definition" phase. The expressed neéd for the continuation of the definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the third evaluation were held had not been satisfied. Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy require - . ments, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully under- - stood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. | That goal was to. develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy. and the Air Force. Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from . which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and. the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. - Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities 15 Boclda: 324794709 Page 136
HW 450955 in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use.of common equipments and structures. To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in accordance with our requirements, That letter of July 13, 1962,. explicitly established three conditions that had -to be met before any contract would be awarded. These were: | | "1. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air:Fore that a significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the winning design, "2, Minimum dive rgence from a common design compatible with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the | inherent savings of a joint program. "3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for development and procurement of the complete: TFX ‘weapon ‘system,,.which costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military strength by the weapon system." | | These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used in judging and weighing the two proposals | -- Boeing and General Dynamics. They were. constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its comments and conclusions. | 16 Docla: 32424709 Page i137
HY §0955 Docld:327494709 Page 136 a | i The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962, These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which. made its report on November 2. At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by the’Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force: "(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system. '(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy. "(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period. (4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war. '(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and - -when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability." ‘ The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors, When I reviewed the report,. I could see. why. The question was a very close one. ': In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design as having ''a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel 17
. e Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had an edge in supe rsonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera- bility at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system, For deceleration,. it uses dive brakes in the air and brakes on the. ground, providing a conventional but limited deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in fe rry capability, conventional:weaponcarriagé;.. loiter capability, and in landing perform- ance. It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent : deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort." In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable from the users! viewpoint. In the "Production, Management and Cost"! area, General Dynamics was rated higher than Boeing. ‘In “Scheduling, Ht General Dynamics ‘presented the better program. It was ‘somewhat moré detailed and better time phased. In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal received a slightly higher rating over-all, | It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air ‘Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their. tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. - You- will recall that those two conditions were; (1) minimum divergence from a 18 HY 50955 DBocld: 32424709 Page 139
common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs. It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than ope rational capability. These are conditions more properly the conce m of those charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are equally a part of my.determination of what is in the national interest. . When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint of minimum dive rgence froma common design, Iwas immediately struck by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. . The Report found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very . high degree of identical structure forthe Navy and Air Force ve rsions. On the other hand, the. Report estimated that in the ‘two ‘Boeing ve rsions less . than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail we re the same. In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, . proposing two diffe rent airplanes from a structures point of view. | ‘The same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of identical. parts in the General Dynamics design. --a particularly crucial point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development process to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small divergences in the early stages tend to grow.as. development proceeds, In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of pe ripheral technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact. 18a HY 50955 Bocld:324274709 Page 140.
@ @ It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic pur-~ _ ‘pose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase costs at every stage beginning with development itself. As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter, and fatigue. analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs; and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions," Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics preblems become compli- cated. Itis evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the logistics area, These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates, common technical manuals, and the. like. If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects of saving one billion dollars would have evaporated. The issue of minimum diver-. . gence is fundamental. ‘The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality. 19 MW 50955 Docld:32474709 Page 141
HW 450955 of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are subject to substantial errors, Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by the application of statistical factors. The question has been raised as to why costs are important when both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There are several reasons. In a development.contract for a complex new weapon system like the TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of change orders .is borne by the government, Consequently, when two pro- posals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred. Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of change orders, there are. other reasons why credibility of costs must be carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract. 26 Docla: 324274709 Page 146