Pnane {Area 202) 544-6000 a 3 «< a @ a & * Ed Wastrengten, B.c, O03 $f, 240 First Steams, at that point for the AGency to have proceeded to the point of sending poison to the Congo? Mr. Bissell. Ne, it would not. Mr. Wides. You draw a distinction before between what you called the planning stage and the implementing stage. I take it it was not common to send lethal means by the use of such a highly unusual messenger to 4 foreign country and turn them over to a Station Chief as distinct from experi- menting in the laboratory in Washington? Mr. Bissell. The phrase I used, or tried to use, most of the time was the phrase of planning and preparation versus the phrase of implementation. Mr. Wides. By implementation do you mean simply the actual commencement of -- Mr. Bissell. Of an active assassination, yes. To answer your first question as directly as I can, it was the practice, if I remember correctly, that devices or agents, biological agents, or other things of this sort, that some stocks of these were kept in certain major stations overseas.! I would be very surprised if that were not the case, and had not earlier been the case in the Me See rand in théocgistations, because these were. big organizations. Mr. Wides. These were lethal biological agents? Mr. Bissell. I suspect,yes.
Cerys eee n be Pa reat ht: aye Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 WARO & PAUL ATO Fast Stevel. 5.8. Weave saran. 0.0, 70003 a erat “| oe oe Bet wt rea ae nh TOP’ SECRET Mr. Dawson. And the purpose for these stockpiles would 6 f have been -~ Mr. Bissell. In case there was 4 gudden need for their use, so that there would not be & logistic problem. Mr. Pawson, To use for what? To kill people? Mr. Bissell. I suppose po, if they were truly lethal agents. Mr. Wides. You say you suspect BO. Do you have any recollection that you were at the time aware of such stockpiles abroad? . Mr. Bissell. If there were I am sure I was aware of it, and I seem to remember that in the two biggest overseas stations there were one or two or threa staff members who in effect represented the Technical Services Division. I could be wrong on this, but that, for what it is worth, is ) my recollection of the organizational pattern. Now, to come back .to your question again, however, it would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials ~~ a specific kit, if you Like, of this sort ~~ out to a rela~ tively small station, unless planning for their use were quite far along. Mr. Wides. Is it fair to say, then, that your dichotomy between planning and your use of the term imple- mentation would mean that if -- let us take a different example -7 4 sniper rifle and special bullets were sent TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202) $442-60900 WARD & PAUL Anos JIG Fast Street, $6... Vlaamangzne, Ge — pet ‘we re : "Shh aatt: at ert a bs , 33 eg At CESS paints i TUS ho ¥ Tope e ey x? : F, engi na zs muaiolios SMASH ROTA SSRI FEPAESIES 73 aS ¥ RR re ERO Sees aren to the city where they were to be used, and there was re- connaissance, and every step necessary to actually carry out the execution, that the implementation aa far as your use of the material would not start until someone actually picked up the rifle and pointed it at him? Mr. Bissell. Let me try to sharpen it by reference, if my memory serves, to the Dominican Republic, It is there, if I remember, that submachine guns were sent down to the Station by CIA. The State Department never authorized the release of those to the anti-Trujilio plotters. And I belleve they never were released. Now, in that case, to take that example, I would say that implementation would have started at the moment that you turned these over and they passed out of our control. would say that as long as any weapon of any kind remained securely within the Agency's control, that you were still Short of what I would call <- Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't that turn on the nature of the order to the Agency personnel who has them? Mr. Bissell. It does, right. Mr. Schwarz. In the Lumumba case, was the AGency person who had the lethal agents authorized to use them to kill Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. To that question I do not know the answer. Clearly the Station Chief had been not only authorized but TOP SECRET
Sopra nS ots % Phone (Araa 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 310 Ferst Street, $.6., Wastongton, O.0. 290003 ane piel eet oe TO encouraged, as we have developed -- as you have developed -~- in this testimony to seek out individuals who might have close access to Lumumba for the purpose of hostile action against him. Clearly the Station Chief was then sent, or a kit was then brought out to him and put in his possession, presumably so that if and when an individual with suitable access and other appropriate circumstances materialized and authorization was given, if it was still required, the operation could proceed. Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollec- tion on that one point, whether authorization had been given. -_-— ‘The Chief of Station testified that when Sidney Gottlieb ee gave him poison er instructions in the use of poison, he also made it very clear that these were for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that he should proceed to carry out the assassination of Lumumba if it were possible, that the! use of poison was not a sine qua non to the assassination, if he could find another way to do it, that would be fine, but that it was clear that he was to proceed with an assassin- ation operation if he could find a way to do it successfully. Mr. Bissell. Accepting that testimony, then, the authorization was given, Mr. Schwarz. -But we are dealing with your testimony, Mr. Bissell. WE have his testimony, and your comments on his testimony doesn't add much to the record. TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 202} 544-6000 WARD A PAUL PATE I 3.0. $.E.. Wastingson, JD Farst Sireet, fs Mr. Bissell. - No. Mr. Schwarz. Did you or anybody else, as far as you know, authorize him to do the act? Do you recall any fact which bears upon that? or is your mind ablank on that subject? Mr. Bissell, I am afraid, as far aa recollection is concerned, that my mind is a blank on that subject. I know the Committee doesn’t find inference particularly helpful, but I would strongly infer .in this case that such an author- - ne ization did pass through me, as it were, if Sid “Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the Station Chief. Mr. Baron. You say passed through you. From what source would it have passed? Mr. Bissell, From the Director. As I would recon- struct the sequence of events, the Director, after the meet- ing and the cable in late August, made it clear that this was to go forward -- to me that this was to go forward if and when feasible circumstances permitted it, and it was on that basis.that I would have authorized ‘Gottlieb, to deliver by word of mouth such instructions from the Station Chief. That is a highly unusual procedure, even in a sensitive matter of this sort. Mr. Schwarz. What is unusual about it? Mr. Bissell. That the authorization should have been by word of mouth rather than by cable. I don't mean a cable TOP SECRET
Prone [Area 207) 544-6000 a 2 4a a a a & < z ALD Forest Street, 8 FL. Wosmnaton, 0.0, 2903 x ‘Sal setting it forth in as many words, with you this would have been identified with a project name by this time, and it is most unusual that even with a highly sensitive project that the nature is known to very few, probably only to the Station Chief itself. | What I would have expected is an authorizing cable saying, implement project such and such. Mr. Schwarz. But in the normal -coursevof :CIA assassination activity, 1f I may use that term -- Mr. Bissell. In the abnormal course. Mr. Schwarz. -- you would have been instructed by Mr. Dulles to do something? Mr. Bissell. instructed or authorized. Mr. Schwarz. And then you would have spoken to or cabled some other officer? Mr. Bissell. Correct. And knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instructions. Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station, to be fair to his testimony, indicated that he was greatly surprised when he received such instructions, and he was doubtful about the practicality of pulling off such an operation, at the least he was convinced it would he difficult. But he did say -- he added that as a fairly junior Chief of Station he might have checked back before he could have mounte@ such an TOP SECRET
Phone {Ares 202} $44-6000 WARD R PAUL 320 First Street, SE. Washington, 0.0. 20603 operation. But he added that he bellevedthe assassination ee ee was expected of him, and he left Mr. Gottlieb with the im- | pression that he would proceed to try to perform such a mission. Mr. Wides, He also cabled, Mr. Baron. Now, the next step that the Chief of Station took after Mr. Gottlieb departed from the Congo, according to his testimony, was to cable to headquarters for confirmation of such an extraordinary mission. Dig you receive such a cable from Leopoldville? Mr. Bissell. The record would have to show that. don't remember it. Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station also testified that he shortly thereafter received confirmation back in cryptic fashion to the effect that he was to proceed with the in- structions to carry cut the instructions he had been given. Did you sent such.confirmation to him? Mr. Bissell. I assume so, if the cable went out. Mr. Baron. And that confirmation would have come from yourself directly as opposed to Bronson Tweedy or anyone else in the African Division? Mr. Bissell, Probably. But again, if you have that cable, the initials would show who signed off on it, and so on. Mr. Schwarz. These cables have not been found. Mr. diGenova. The Committee is making an effort to find! TOP SECRET
Prone {Araa 207} 44-6000 a > “ ‘ « a Fa a 5 “aco) TIO First Steeet. S.E., Washington, O.¢, vey them, and the AGency has not been able to produce them yet. Mr. Bissell. Tf it is any help for me to say, this sounds highly likely as an account if it is established, as evidence seems to have established, that Dr. Gottlieb brought such instructions, I would expect the Station to seek con- firmation. And I would expect,given the background, that that confirmation would have been forthcoming. And I would also be almost certain that I would have signed off on such a cable, or signed such a cable, initialled it, even if it had been going to Mr. Dulles for final approval. Mr. Baron. These events occurred in early September, which was prior to your conversations with Justin O'Donnell about the assassination of Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. Yes, Mr. Baron. So at that point an assassination mission had in effect been mounted in the Congo? Mr. Bissell. Right. Mr. Baron. After you spoke with Justin O'Donnell, did you send a cable to Lecpoldville te stand down the assassination mission? Mr. Bissell. Again, I would have to go back to the record. Mr. Wides. WAs it your testimony earlier that you have no recollection of discussing with Mr. Gottlieb the. possible assassination of Lumumba? TOP SECRET sy oe yy ait iets = BEY Bi
sia ee Pacey. i ae mb: ae * % a a S f a pote Spe, aA ad Mr. Bissell. I thought I testified earlier this afternoon that I might well havediscussed it with him, but XI don't have a specific recollection. Prone [Ares 202} 344-6000 Mr. Wides. Let me read you an excerpt from your testi- mony on June 11, where Mr. Schwarz was asking you about your conversation with Mr. O'Donnell, and your request that he investigate, in your words, the possibility of assassinating Lumumba. And then on page 54 ~~ we should mark this -~ Mr. Schwarz. Just read it in. Mr. Wides. "Did you tell him this in connection with making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb? | "Mr, Bissell. Y think I probably did.” Was that a ecollection at that time that you had a 3 « a 6 a & « z sent O'Donnell to see Dr. Gottlieb? aera Mr. Bissell. No, I think that comes in the category of inference rather than recollection, because I don't re~ member specifically telling \Dr. Gottlieb. Pe Mr. Wides. Or speaking to Pr. Gottlieb, explaining the possible means to o'Donnell? Mr. Bissell. I don't recollect it. Mr. Baron. In the testimony of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville he said that during his visit with Dr. Gottlieb, as I have related, he was extremely surprised when he received these instructions. And the instructions were so specific that he wanted to be very sure that the authoriza- 210 Furst Street, $.€., Wastongton, 9.0. 25003 TOP SECRET
Prone [Ares 202) 444-6006 WASD O PAUL Soong Wiavtungtan, 0.0. VIG Fess Street, SE., ist Aas) yr R tion for this miseaion waa equally as spacific. And he probed my “Dr. Gottlieb on the source of the authorization, and said -- something to the effect, who authorized this mission. The answer was, it came from the top, or something to that effect. And then the Chief of Station pushed on to pin it down. And the response he got from Dr. Gottlieb was, something to the effect that -- age at ar # SS Mr. Schwarz. Will you read the exact answer? Mr. Baron. I will read you from Mr. Hedgman's testi- | ita Hs) asta Ae mony. At page 30, quoting from the testimony of the Chief of Station in the Congo at that point, testifying under the alias of Hedgman, the Chief of Station said: "In essence I must have -- and again I am guessing as to what my wording waa -- must have pointed out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic, and I may have probably said that I had never heard of it being done -- which “ZT had not, never in my training or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any reference to such, in my recollec- tion at least, such methods. And it is my recollection, I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued. "Mr. Wides. And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply? "Mr. Hedgman. It is my recollection that he identified the President -- and I cannot -- the President of the U.5. -- and I cannot recall whether he said the President or whether TOP SECRET
‘ They Wasa tlety Gi ; et aN Wigton te Ree tease Q rors ne Hea oe, a Nut. natty he identified him by name”. Then the testimony proceeds to the bottom of page 31: "Mr, Wides. Can you recall whether he said ‘the Presi- dent’ or ‘President Eisenhower’? Prone (Ares 202} $44-6000 “Mr. Hedgman. I cannot recall whether he just said -~ whether he said the President or whether ‘he said President Eisenhower. "Mr. Wides. But it was one of those two, ig your best recollection? a SR TSU Hh a Oy rt vy "Mr. Hedgman. I would say almost certainly". i Further down the page Mr. Hedgman continues: Ghat Ark how & pine "ZT have trieg: to go back in my mind on that, and I think, I believe ~~ but again now this one is pretty loose in my mind -~- it was something to the effect that the President WAR & FAUL had instructed the Director". And then on page 33 Mr. Dawson says? “you are not the least unclear whether or not you came away with a very clear impression that the President's name had been invoked in some fashion? "Mr, Hedgman. yes, I came -- certainly that is my recollection”. pid Mr. Gottlieb make you aware at this point that he had made such a representation to the Chief of Station? Mr. Bissell. t have no such recallecticon. Mr. Baron. Was Mr. ‘Gottlieb authorized to make such AIG Farst Street, TOP SECRET pak cance ata ge} iy Re Ne eA iy 2 4S cree tan a i 3 ps:
Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 210 Farst Street, $.6., Yeesmagron, 1.C. 20603 a representation thati:the President of tha U.S. had authorized the assassination of Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. I can't answer that question. But what probably occurred was ~~ Mr. Dawson. Wait a minute. Let's not do it that way. Is there any doubt that you would have undertaken ~~ assuming that you did so instruct Mr. Gottlieb to carry this poison into the Congo ~~ that you would have done this with- out Mr. Dulies' authority? Mr; Bissell. There was no possibility. Mr. Dawson. Is there any doubt in your mind that you would have then assumed that Dulles had received the President's okay to do soa? Mr. Bissell. well, I might well have believed that the Director was proceeding under the mandate of the Special Group as reported in jthe minutes of the meeting. Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Gottlieb anything about President Eisenhower? Mr. Bissell. I probably did, but I don't remember. Mr. Schwarz. Did Dulles tell you anything about President Eisenhower? Mr. Bissell. He almost certainly would have told deal about that meeting. Schwarz. By that meeting -~ Bissell. The Special Group meeting. TOP SECRET
eT Sa Pnone [Ares 202} 544-8000 WARD & PAUL S.E., Wasthenygtod, .C. 20603 310 Farst Street, Sue Mb tes Sma Eh Me HePAS Se Sue een ener as x 5 : ety baka De ES NOSES a ay eee Be teal eke, tear AAU URINE cee keer, poe ocshy o I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant. Mr. Baron. And you have communicated that to Mr. Gottlieb? Mr. Bissell. I could very easily. . Mr. Schwarz. Is all of that line that we have just went through could and would and might, and inference, or is any of that recollection? Mr. Bissell. I am afraid it has to be described as inference. Mr. diGenova. But you didn't make up the minutes of Special Group meeting on August 25 and you didn't make up cable which Mr. Dulles signed either, did you? Mr. Bissell. No. Mr. diGenova. So that was actually sent out, wasn't Mr. Bissell. Yes. Mr. diGenova. And Mr. Rulles wasn't one who used highest quarters, was he? Mr. Bissell. Yes -~ and also the minutes of the Special Group referred to Mr. Gray's associate. Mr. Wides. And your testimany a moment ago in response to Mr. dawson's question was, even though this fell within TOP SECRET 40S ey setae rf is 3 Reo feateeaee i
Prone (Aras 202} 544-4000 WARD & Pau 1,9... Wastengton, 9.0, 70903 310 Furst Stree what you regarded ag the planning stage, this meaning if it occurred, Dr. Gottileb taking the poison to the Congo, that you would not have taken that step without the approval of the Director, was that your testimony? Mr. Bissell. What I will:.now say at any rate is that the mere act of taking the kit to the Congo I would classify as still in the planning stage. But if it be taken as es- tablished that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions “to implement", I would say that we had then passed into an im- plementation phase. Mr. Wides. Let me read to you from your testimony on June 11, and then ask you a question based on that. On page 54 Mr. Sehwarz said: "Who authorized you to tell Mr. O'Donnell to take steps to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?" a And you said: "No one”. And then Mr. Schwarz: “Did you inform the White House of that?" "No." "To the best of your knowledge did anybody inform the House of that?" “Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no. "Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr. Lum mba? "Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. TOP SECRET y =? x a a < Ete ay band J
Prone tArea (02) 544-6006 WARD A PAWL P1053 ia ron Wasnenatar, ALO Fars: Street. S.&., CASE ENOTES aig i Nites “a ae ~ told the members of the clandestine service to make plans and develop the capability so to do if it were approved and ordered,” Now, in regard to your answer that no one had told you te tell Mr. O'Donnell to take steps to move toward assassinat- | ing Mr. Lumumba, I take it that reading that now in the - | context of other information we have, that answer was not ! fying affirmatively that no one had spoken to you at a higher intended to mean that -- page 54 -= you were not then testi- | j t i level about trying to assassinate Lumumba, but merely in regard to your discussion with O'Donnell, which you did recall? Mr. Bissell. My recollection -- and this I will des- cribe as a recollection, it may be faulty -- is that it was my own idea to give O’Donnell this assignment. He had, f believe, recently completed some other, or there was a change of position of some kind, and he was available. And given the background which has here been established this afternoon, I believe it was my notion to give him this assignment in parallel to any other thingsthat were still going forward. It would have been. unusual to have advised anybody outside the Agency cf a specific assignment to an individual of that sort. Mr. Wides. And the implication cf the lack of authori-~ zation from above yourself, or discussion with anyone above yourself, was confined simply to the giving of the asignment TOP SECRET Wises oa eed
Prone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARG & FAUL ATO Firat Steet. $.6.. Was 1 | to Mr. O'Donnell? Mr. Bissell. That is correct. And it is my recollection, as I have testified in part earlier this afternoon, that when O’Ponnell came later and declined the assignment and expressed the view that this was not the way to solve the Problem, that I shut off the O'Donnell operation completely. Mr. Wides. Let me go back to that 4£ I can. Mr, O'Ponnell's testimony, which I believe we went over with you when you testified, we might ask you to see now if you have any different recollection. In essence it is the following: that you called him in and asked him to go to the Congo for the Purposes of trying to see if Lumumba could be assassinated, that very evening you asked him, right at that moment, and it was toward the end of the Gay, as he recalled it, you asked him to see Dr. Gottlieb; that he expressed reservation about assassination, but did go down to see ‘Dr. Gottlieb. And ‘Dr. Gottlieb discussed with him several lethal means, and he immediately came back to your office and said, I won't do it, and raised legal questions, moral questions -- Mr. Dawson. I don't think he testified that he imme - diately came back. Mr. Schwarz. The same day. Mr. Wides. Same day -- and that he then went next TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202} 544-6000 WARD &A PAUL PEC. 2Heds se Wastnqtan, er Se a a Sphe Bee 3 ¢ i eS = ES OE rege i OT Re aT EE. aga . Sitat att PER Eo Sb Are eek aR yeh Aten RET door, as I say, and discussed it with Mr. Helma. This is Mr. O'Donnell's testimony. Mr. O'Donnell further testified that he told you he would be willing to go to the Congo to explore the possibility! of neutralizing him in other ways, and that shortly thereafter | in the space of a few days went to the Congo. And I believe the record suggests that he was there from October through . December, and that while he was looking into the possibility of trying to get Lumumba out of the property away from effect-: ive custody of the U.N. with the thought that if the Central Congolese Government obtain control of him, they might | try him for capital crimes, and this might result in his | physical removal. And this was mooted by Lumumba's escape and recapture and death, and he then came hack. Is it still your recollection that there was a period of several weeks between the time you broached the subject of an assassination and the time that Mr. O'Donnell expressed his opposition to it? Mr. Bissell. I shouldn't be firm on the several weeks. But my recollection of the course of events differs in, I think, only one -- or is inconsistent with his recollection as you reported it in only the one respect, that the impres- sion I carried away was that at a minimum some days -- and Iohad thought a period of at least a week elapsed between my giving him the assignment and his coming back to decline TOP SECRET
ns ene soe frag She a SUD oe, the assignment and recommend a different approach. What you further quote from his testimony I had not remembered, but it does now seem to me that I do remember -- part of my Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 original recollection was that when he came back to me I have several times used the phrase, this was not the way to deal with the problem of Lumumba. And that is wholly consistent with his having proposed other means of neutralizing Lumumba i. é short of using physical’ vielence on him directly. XI do seem Sagee bts uae i to recollect that. And although I had not remembered it, I do now seem to recollect that he went out there and with the assignment, most of it in his recollection rather than mine, of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba. But my recollection simply differs from his on the matters of the timing and how WARD & PAUL secon he came back. Mr. Wides. Do you recall when you proposed: to Mr. Harvey, in what I think we concluded was most probably very early 1961, that he explore executive action capability, and that two people who had been cut in in some way on earlier considerations or explorations of assassination, and two people whom therefore he might discuss this with, were Mr. weal and \Sidney Gottlieb? Mr. Bissell. I can't say honestly that I recollect 5.8., Wastunaton, 0.0. 7060. that. But especially with respect to\Gottlieb, this would have been absolutely -- I am reasonably sure that is what AD Frest Street, TOP SECRET eee Paes ye ie wee Aa Kan eae) as
Nt i i +7 G Prone (Aras 262) $44-6000 WARD &@ PAUL 1G Fost Sieeet, $.£., Wasningion, O.C, 79003 A ¢ A eS OPS ERs haga I would have done. Mr. Wides, But you don't recall suggesting -- -or if he brought it up, approving -~ his discussing it with them, in part from a security angle, because Mr. Gottlieb had already eetien anal been cut in, so to speak, with regard to prior considerations of assassination possibilities? Mr. Bissell. Well, I am:sorry te have to retreat the inference. I think I would have encouraged him to talk to them myself. And I don't think I would have particularly worried at that point about the security implications. Mr, Wides. Do you recall why you would have encouraged him or suggested that he speak to /Ptsesihy Salmo? OF Mr. Bissell. No, unless fv phd) Bilees had had some connection with this operation. And I @on't remember what the circumstances were. Mr. Baron. Do you recall an agent who went by the cryptonym of QUWINN that I believe we discussed in your earlier testimony? Mr. Bissell. I dimly remember that there was such, Mr. Baron. Do you recall that he worked for O'Donnell in the Congo and was sent there by Bahar] Sillwas Fire had recruited him in Europe? Mr. Bissell. I didn't recollect that. Mr. Wides. Does it ring a hell of any sort? TOP SECRET Shia nition ei
eee reyee Us mires Mirage Nev hte thay rane te fe naviehe coat Law Ks he at CA ae ia gs 1 a eS a Pace : : wt ae Whe sa. ay t oe en : | Ay PASE ; Mr. Bissell, Well, there was an agent recruited in Europe who was used against the Lumumba faction in the Congo. .Now, the agent I have in mind, he was extremely success-— Prone (ares 202) 344-6600 ful. He made a deep penetration of not only the Lumumba sympathizers, but also of those individuals physically lo- cated in Europe who were supplying Lumumba with money, and in Some cases giving him logistic Support. This agent was ob- viously engaged in an extremely hazardous business, because if his cover had been blown he certainly would have been, ch abaas I think, killed. pee od Now, this may be the agent in question. I do not remember that agent ever being put under O'Donnell's control. But if O'Donnell was given the assignment to find ways of a 2 a a 3 a & « z neutralizing Lumumba, given that assignment to O'Donnell when he went out there, it is very possible that this agent would have been put in touch with him. Mr. Schwarz. Why did you pick O’Ronnell, incidentally, for the initial assignment, the part that was killing him, as opposed to other methods of neutralizing him? Mr. Bissell. My recollection is that I regarded him as highly competent in the craft, I think correctly. I a. Washington, O.C. 20063 regarded him, I think incorrectly as the events turned out, $.£ aS a very tough guy in the sense this guy Harvey had,that such reputation, and I think with hindsight deserved it. 310 Feest Street, TOP SECRET
bart oat tel ares ¥ EC PRN iin 73 Be ra And I suspect. =~ Sees wo ay : t 4 ° time, in the fall of $1960, some previous assignment. Phone (Ares 202) $44-6000 . Mr. Wides. And you had had contact with him in regard to his being Station Chief in = uring the U-2 program? Mr. Bissell. Yes, I guess 80. And other contacts. I had known him in the agency. ware Mr. Baron. Let's see if this refreshes your recollec~ ares tion on the use of QUWINN. We subsequently became the “aet principal asset in the ZRRIFLE program under Harvey's direction? Mr. Bissell. Yes. Mr. Baron. And Harry apparently arranged with Voiced) who was supervising QUWINN in Europe, to have QIWINN 4 2 « a é a cy 4 = spot potential assets for the ZRRIFLE program in Europe. Does ‘that refresh your recollection as to QUWINN's mission in the Congo? Mr. Bissell. It suggests to me that the man I had in mind was not QJWINN, but a different agent. And I don’t remember, I don't remember a4 thing about it. Mr. Baron. What was QJWINN's mission in. the Congo? Mr. Bissell. I can only surmise that he had some connection ~~ that either he had the means of “getting close to Lumumba", or that he had connections that might provide -- eas Mr.Baron. I will represent to you that there is a 410 Foerst Street, S-E., Washington, D.C. 20003 WOR) oer: aC
ee \! uly Sasa i) ; z A EAS > a gl K 2 eos et ¥ Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000 * 3 "oe * November 2, 1960, sent by William Harvey in his memo on capacity as Chief of Staff D toa Suiwarbwitn a copy going to Bronson Tweedy that describes QJWINN, and talks at great length about his mission in the Congo, without pin- extremely sensitive operation, and that QUWINN himself wouldn' be told the purpose of it before he is sent down there. i pointing it. The memo talks about the fact that it is an | ¢ | | ; Does that refresh your recollection about his misasinn? Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not. Mr. Baron. If there were a mission in the Congo at | 2 that point for Staff D purposes, what would that mission have ; { been? i | Mr. Bissell. The Staff D was concerned with communications intelligence, as you know. And I would surmise that a Staff WARD @ PAUL i | D connected mission in the Congo would have involved ° °.. | Planting means of listening to conversation or traffic or in | H gome other way intercepting communications. That is the | competence of Staff D and its responsibility. Mr. Baron. Planting by means of surreptitious entry or by other means? Mr. Bissell. Yes, although Staff D wasn’t concerned with bugging people's rooms or this kind of thing. It is concerned with true communications intelligence, or it was at that time. Mr. Baron. If you had informed William Harvey at the 446 Fatst Street, 5.£., Wasningion, O.C, 20003 TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202) 544-6000 WARD & FAUL AL0 Fest Street, S.£., Wasmington, D.C. 20nd 3 2 eS ay SUN green i ssh LAsty SEARS : PETS ES SPHERE ESSER EAE SEATS uate ips Page RGR eptaaroh BERL Kper Gi ‘ A ut pal Seaks ‘ . f Rite atacd eo pd NS Py Beat) Aus We point when executive’ act @iksas already cut in on the discussions of an assassination capability, would you assume that that referred te aRTONe) We Peevision of QUWINN. Mr. Bissell. Well, it could have. It sounds that Mr. Baron. When you told Harvey that Gottlieb had already been cut in on the discussions of an assassination capability, fit that refer back to Gottlieb's activities in reference to the Congo? Mr. Bissell. Well, it probably referred to those -- and perhaps to earlier discussions or more generalized discussions! with Gottlieb in his capacity as science advisor, and there- fore someone who would be knowledgeable of weapons of various kinds. Mr. Schwarz. Did you have such discussions with him? Mr. Bissell. I believe so. Mr. Schwarz. And that, now, is a recollection, I take it from the way you are speaking? Mr. Bissell. It is closer to that than most of what I have to say. Mr. schwarz. What is your recollection of the dis- cussion with Gottlieb? Mr. Bissell. Over a considerable period of months when he was in that capacity ~~. TOP SECRET ST reas Sista toe oor STE U REE ae ee oh, FERS HI et s
Schwarz. - Which started when? Mr. Bissell. I don't remember. Mr. Schwarz. 1960? Mr. Bissell. I think it was 1960. And the back- Pnone {Area 202} 544-6000 ° ground, ag I am sure the record shows, was that Dr. Gottlieb had been in TSD, and he had then gone for a tour of duty, Tf ; i believe, to where he continued in the same kind of | j ¢ Rice taal eetcs work. But he had a much closer connection with espionage sehr operations and counter espionage in the field. When I brough ue him back his mission in effect was a very broad.one,it really was to find ways and means ~~ to concentrate on technical ways and means, meaning by technical within the general area of the physical and biological sciences, of improving the effect- iveness of ail kinds of covert operations. WARD B&B FAUL Now, in a sense that was:the mission of the Technical Services Division itself. But Gottlieb's role was to pay special attention to the interconnections between the technical people in TSD and the operators in the rest of the clandestine service, and to find out whether the technical requirements that TSD was ‘striving to meet were appropriate, in other words, did they really know what the operators needed, ‘and wanted, and also to find out if the operators knew what : } ‘ , , \ t i i ' TSD had available. It was that kind of a thing. .Now, I had many conversations with him on that, because this wags a success that interested me a great deal. And 1 410 First Strect, S.E., Warmington, O.C. 20003 TOP SECRET
Prone (Arts 202) $44-6000 WARD & FAUL 410 Ferst Steect, $-£., Washington, .C. 20083 Sreseate: 3 ATR ere ‘ NE P-SECRE Ed . - ~ had great respect for his judgment. And especially given this Congo involvement, I certainly would have discussed with him, probably on a number of occasions, the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination. Mr. Schwarz. And those discussions are prior to your Harvey assignment? Mr. Bissell. Yes, I believe so -- yes, they would Mr. Schwarz. Would have been or were? Mr. Bissell. Well, Harvey's assignment wasn't until January of 1961, so they obviously were. Mr. Wides. Mr. Bissell, with regard to the earlier -@iscussion with your sense of authorization, you said that you do recall the discussions with O'Donnell, and that althoug you can't remember specific discussions with Tweedy, in general you recall that you were looking into the possibility of exploring and planning the possible assassination of Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. Right. Mr. Wides. In the light of the documents from the group and Mr. Dulles' cable that have been read, do you have any recollection now wheher you thought at your level you had sufficient authority that even though you had not done so you could direct people below you te carry from the planning stage into the implementation stage an assassination TOP SECRET BS fea
Prone (area 202) $44-4000 WARD & PAUL SO Fisst Street, $.0., Wastungton, o.c. 276003 ee ime?’ Mr, Bissell. “t probably 80 believed. t think, how- ever, given the context, it. is very unlikely that I would have taken such 4 step without clearing it with Allen Dulles. Mr. Wides. You say you probably s0 believe. is that based at all on a recollection, ox simply inference? Mr. Bissell. tt is the way my mind worked then, and probably stiil does. You are asking me a question about whe~ ther I believed I had:-authority?: | Mr. Wides. Yes. Mr. Bissell. A good many years ago, and I am saying that given the evidence here and the background as it has been developed here this afternoon, it is my recollection that given the way my mind works, I probably did think I had authority. But it is also very unlikely. Mr. Schwarz. There are two parts of your answer which were at war with each other. On the one hand you say, based upon having seen some Special Group minutes and a cable, both of which say in effect that killing should not be ruled out as a matter of consideration -~ Mr. Bissell. Right. Me. Schwarz. On the one hand you say that based those two items, you probably believe you had authority | order action? OP SECRET
Mr. Bissell. Right. Mr. Schwarz. Move from contemplation to action or consideration of action? Mr. Bissell. Right. Mr. Schwarz. On the other hand you say, well, yes, although I probably believed that, on the other hand I probably spoke to Mr. Dulles about it, or would have spoken to Mr. Dulles about it. Mr. Bissell. You will recognize that here again I am talking about the pattern of my relationship with him and the way the Agency worked. Now, here was a matter in which the authorization, such as it was, had come down clearly from the Special Group to Mr. Dulles personally. 2 > < e 8 a « « E Mr. Schwarz. Now, we are talking about the exhibits which show an authorization -- assuming you read the words’ as meaning killing -- Mr. Bissell. Not excluding, yes. Mr. Schwarz. -- an authorization to consider that. Mr. Bissell. Right. Mr. Schwarz. And that had come down? hag 7 Mr. Bissell. It had come down to me via Allen Pe i: Dulles, and in terms that Allen was in effect being strongly encouraged to pursue the course of action outlined in the exhibit. t think under these circumstances that I would have nes 2EO First Street, $.£.. Wasnington, O.C. 20063 TOP SECRET
PAT ep SS, Unt Et Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 a > «< a ‘4 ia} £ « Fy » Wasmington, O.C, 20003 410 First Street, S-E. ATEN ee oe BSR ae gone back to him with, for instance, any cable of authoriza~ tion or other-instruction before sending it out even if I did believe him. But let us say in his absence from Washington I had the authority to send. Mr. Dawson. You say unlike the cage of-the-White Hous where you would not take details back, in the case of Mr. Dulles you would discuss the, details of a specific operation? Mr. Bissell. Yes. Mr. Schwarz. But it is not really amatter of details, Mr. Bissell. That is an important distinction. We have 2 ———- been talking about a chain that starts with two memos, or thread memos. We have talked about contemplation or consideration, gon't rule out killing, it doesn't use the word killing, but it could be read to mean killing, don't rule out killing from the items to be considered. Now, moving from doing it is not a detail, is it? Mr. Bissell. No, I wouldn't call it a detail by any manner of means, but I would read that language as authorizing any decision by the Director or the Director's authority. Mr, Schwarz. You would read the language cf the two exhibits, one of which comes from the Administration and one of which is the Director cable ~+ Mr. Bissell. Right. Mr. Schwarz, You would read the language of the Special TOP SECRET ee eee ae a as
aoe $k ate AT es Reidy Sere Prone {Area 262} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL S10 Fiesa Street, $.6., Wasnington, 0.C, 20063 ‘tously, proceeding vigorously, ‘the agreement is: ”, Seige: TAU lta Usp eva ee “TO esayatt! = Be bea is: vy eat t t : Dy as : ae 4 Group minutes =- Mr,Baron. of August 25, 1960. Mr. Bissell. Right. Mr. Schwarz. May I see that? After talking about extremely strong feelings, straight- | forward action, and Dulles commenting on taking this ser- pore a eet af, aba 35 "Tt was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out ‘consideration’ of any particular. kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba”. Now, the first point, you read that to mean not ruling out killing? Mr. Bissell. Correct. Mr. Schwarz. Now, was it just your testimony that you believe that the agreement that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out possible consideration of <-- and now I will substitute the word killing -- is authority to actually order the killing -- sufficient authority? Mr. Bissell. May I look again at the other exhibit, Mr. Dulles' cable of the next day. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record. There is a pending question. Mr. Bissell. It is my belief on the basis of the cable! TOP SECRET
So eretoes te et Sea —— Mee RRS ae a pt Se 202, r bal drafted by ‘Allen Dulles that h Special Group as authorizing implementation if favorable 202) 548-6000 circumstances presented themsaives, if it couid be done Prone [Area covertly. He speaks of targets of opportunity. He authorized, as I remember the words of the cable "even more aggressive action". And the tone of the cable clearly gives the Station Chief a lot of datitude and conveys @& sense of very great urgency. Mr. Schward. And whether or not that is a proper con™ to discuss. Finish the Congo, then. WARD B PAUL Mr. Baron. I have one more question on Mr. Gottlieb's vyisist. And that is, in the light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at that time, | | struction of the Special Group is not really gomething we need | | t | | | Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that i \ the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this misgion would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's a 7nand authority at that point? Mr. Bissell. No, it would not. Mr. Baron. For the sake of the record,. let's duce aS an exhibit the memo that Tf referred to earlier “treet, SE. Wathanginn, 0.6. November 1960. And I will ask you one question about it. This is a memo going from the Chief of KUTUBE/D. And that 240 Feret AOS F P ey Aerie
i a Bie SES BAA maak E, ey aie: Peet Rie he 2 (FS: Fo eas oe ea a Ee) +8: if aie Marte aie cide Lt ee ta ny eo. oy. “tg. the’ Poredgn: 1 ( @-Divist fe mike william Harvey at that time. Mr. Bissell. XY believe 80. (The document referred to was Prone (Area 202) 344-6600 marked Bissell Exhibit Ne. 3 for identification.) WARD & FAULK rn ¢ 2 c t aol tS et Haase rae Sens 410 First Street, S.0,, Warmiagion, Oc. oe TOP SECRET
ay OUR eee Se ee i ay SPOR S ice Nae 2 b Jie: ee oe gr ear eaceh oe ae Pun eter oF ae ee ¥ i Pens FOES ene Pata Bibs we ; 3 Ll Pe aiiDdid 3 ou eceive a copy of this cable? 3 5 think it is doubtful. And I don't 3 3 believe I would hava. It is rather narrowly an operational - bas | 5 _ matter, | 5 | Mr. Baron. Thank you. | 6 | Next, let's turn to a cable that was sent on September | 7 16, 1960, to Leopoldville from CIA Headquarters which we will 8 mark Exhibit 4. i : 9 (The document referred to was ' 10 | marked Bissell Exhibit No. 4 for identification.) ! 11 | — 12 “a 2 noe é 13 a C3 14 | wae, - | , Areas ae 15 |i . a . i at } te) $ ; a 5 29 s 22 re Fs R4 Pe I a 3 25 TOP SECRET
at ot, Fnane {Ares'202} 544-6000 WARD & FAL SIO Ferat Steeet, §.£., Wasniagion, O.C. 20003 Mr. Baron. This is a cable that we reviewed, Mr. Biseell, before we began your testimony today. And I will turn your attention to the paragraph that says: "Yt is-still difficult to determine whether Mobutu had sufficient control army to enforce decisions announced night 14 September. Station advised" -- And then there is a sanitized paragraph -~- “Station advised two moderate Congolese politicians ‘ery work with key Congolese contact’ in effort eliminate . Lumumba. Fear UN protection will give Lumumba’ opportunity organization counterattack. Only solution is remove him from scene soonest”. Now, the night of September 14 was the night of a coup in the Congo where Mobutu took power, is that correct? Mr. Bissell. Correct. Mr. Baron. And does this cable refresh your recollec- tion as to the attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba even after he was in U.N. custody? Mr. Bissell. Yes. It seems to say rather clearly that it was still desirable te eliminate him. Mr. Baron. WAS it still your recollection, then, that there was a continued sense of urgency about eliminating Lumumba after he was in U.N. custody? Mr. Bissell. Yes. Mr. Baron. And this would account in part for the fact TOP SECRET
ms eyes aos Prone (Arex 202) $44-6000 a 2 < & a i+ a « 2 20063 SD Fiest Streel, S-E., Wastingtos, O.C. are) Sire ei F AS Ws ie SA Aes a a Ne a a to stand: down the assassination mission after Lumumba was in U.N. custody? ’ Mr. Bissell. That ia correct. Mr. Baron.There is a set of NSC minutes from September 21, 1960, that I would like to introduce as Exhibit 5. (The document referred to was marked Bissell Exhibit No. 5 for identification.) TOP SECRET
ce BAC S175, ARP 24 pe 7 rE a ae 3 Aad See Sat i es Apert pect fi a Hepa Sha RORCae Cetheh eet SER Septet a4 Mr. Baron. You are. not listed as a participant iat the meeting, although Mr. Dulles ig present, and the following i paragraph relates a remark of Mr. Dulles: enone {Aras 202} 544-6000 “MNobutu appeared to be the effective power in the and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of". i ! Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of | § I i} | Does that accord with your understanding of the policy of the National Security Council toward Lumumba even after he was in U.N. custody? Mr. Bissell. It does, Mr. Baron. And the language “disposed of" would contem- plate assassination at least as one means of disposing of him? Mr. Bissell. As one means, as one possible means, if WARD & PAUL necessary. Mr. Baron. I have one further exhibit which we will mark Exhibit 6, that is, a cable dated December 17, 15966 sent to the Director from Leopoldville. (The document referred to was marked Bissell Exhibit No. 6 for identification.) ia nee top AoE oR 1G Feest Street, S$.£.. vast TOP SECRET
Prone {Area 202) 546-4000 4 2 < a 2 a .& < z Toons T.C, Washingtan, 430 Forest Street, SE., Mr. Baron. And this cable deals with an incident where an asset of the Chief of Station who was. known by the cryptonym WIROGUE made an approach to agent QJWIN. And the cable says: "QOWIN, whe resides same hotel as WIROGUE, reported that he had lived Alaska, Japan, South America, Germany and other parts Europe. QJWIN said, WIROGUE smells as though he in intel business. Station denies any info on WIROGUE. 14 December QJWIN reported WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to participate in intel net and be member execution squad. When QUWIN said he not interested, WIROGUE added there would be bonuses for special jobs. Under QJWIN questioning, WIROGUE later said he worked for P.B..PRIME Service”. Do you recall this incident? Mr. Bissell. 2X don't, no. Mr. Baron. Does P.B. Prime Service refer to American Intelligence Service? Mr. Bissell. Yes, it does. Mr. Baron. Namely, the CIA? Mr Bissell. Yes. Mr. Baron. Ro you recall anything about the formation execution squad in the Congo during this period? Mr. Bissell. I take that to be a phrase used by an (Discussion off the record.) TOP SECRET
Phone {Ares 262} 544-6000 a 2 « a & i] a <q z A603 ALO Farst Street, $.£.. Naimingtan, O.C. TERR Bi Tt want to ‘switch,unfortunate we ys ‘ ‘and go to Cuba. This is the gam : from the Continent of ‘Africa time period, however, it igs July of 1960. I had a conversation with you on August 6 over the telephone. You may recall the conversation. I have in front of me a cable which we will mark as Exhibit No. 7. (The document referred to was marked Bissell Exhibit No. 7 for identification.) TOP SECRET
SFetrat th Mr. Baron. And this is a cable sent from headquarters to the Havana Station dated July 21, 1960. The first sentence of the cable reads: Phone {Area 202} $44-6000 “Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at headquarters”. The cable is signed by E. H. Hinkle by direction Tracy Barnes for DDP, and about E.H. Hinkle by direction J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division as authenticating officer. Relseasing officer was Tracy Barnes. Do you have any independent recollection of that, cable and what surrounded its:issuance at headquarters? Mr. Bissell. I don't remember it until you mentioned it in the telephone conversation to which you have alluded. Mr. diGenova. Having had some time to think about WARD & FAUL since we spoke on August 6, does it ring any bell at this juncture? r. o Pa eC! & C Cc a la Mr. Bissell. It does not, I am afraid. Mr. diGenova. It is apparent that this cable was sent out at a time when you were having conversations in the summer or the fall of 1960 with Mr. Tweedy and Mr. O'Donnell concerning Mr. Lumumba, is that correct? Mr. Bissell. Correct. Mr. diGenova. Did Mr. Dulles at any time during this assigning assassination as an agency action? 410 Foest Street, S.£.. Wastingtan, O.C. 20002 TOP SECRET eR art PG RIVE TENS BTS eapire Set at Nope geen eee FRR ba aban 64 IE A OCT Rage ay Cah owe eh rae Bee TIRE Tae tte Papas wah Pa eate aa
EE Se aR aed TE Pnone iftrea 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 2unds Wasnington, 0.¢. B10 Ferst Street, 5.E., Cee EEE 5 Ht, iad Mr. Bissell. Not ‘to my knowledge. Mr. diGenova. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not Mr. Dulies knew about the issuance of this cable which stated that the possible removal of the top’ three leaders in Cuba was receiving serious consideration at headquarters? Mr. Bissell. I don't have knowledge of that, no. You yourself quoted internal evidence from the cable and the one that was sent, a followup the following day, suggestin that he may have ordered it countermanded, Mr. diGenova. The duty officer at that particular time that evening, indicated that he had sent this cable, and that he had keen instructed, as he recalled it by Mr. Barnes, to send this cable, and that the wording came from Mr. Barnes. Now, the duty officer also said that the next day when he came in there was a-cable, which we have, and we will mark that as Exhibit No. 8, which in toto said: "Do not pursue reference, would like to drop matter.“ And that was signed singly by Tracy Barnes. (The document referred marked Bissell Exhibit for identification.} TOP SECRET
cs ae * a toxay Prone (Ares 2023 544-6000 ee! mh as Gore Rok: rte Mee WARRD & PAUL 200c3 $10 Forst Strent. $.E., Wastungion, OC. Races sei a ; RISENER SR Cerca Brarites exe EE eh Pt eiarh iaehe ¢ ey ai Hae ae Sabah eee Mr. diGenova. firat cable about serious consideration, he had no personal knowledge, but he had heard that Mr. Dulles had countermanded the original cable, talking about the possible removal, and authorizing the approach’: to the asset, the Cuban pilot, who actually attempted the crash of the plane which would carry Raol Castro from Prague to Havana. . Do you have any personal knowledge as to why Mr. Dulles would have countermanded, assuming that he did? Mr. Bissell. I don't have any recollection. I could surmise lots of things. Mr. diGenova. What I want to ask you ia this: do you have an independent recollection that any assassination efforts against the Cuban leaders which were being considered contmmplated simultaneous action against all three, other~ wise it would be useless action? Mr. Bissell. The only evidence 1 know of, hard evidence | is the Special Group minute to which I referred earlier, which was an exhibit in earlier testimony. Mr. diGenova. You are referring to the Merchant cable exchange of November 3, 1960? , Mr. Bissell. That is correct. Mr. diGenova. Now, Mr. Hinkle, the duty officer, has no personal. knowledge about’ the rescission of that cable. Does it seem to you upon reflection, knowing what you TOP SECRET eat: a Roiet Sh athe
wane 2) FASS at iors oT Sie = wis ys % *% % OR Tks FS aes ress yt WARD & PAUL Pronma (Area 202) 544-6006 S50 First Srreet, S.6., Mastangtan, 9.0, 20003 eye aM GT Fr. . 8 ae ene Gun ss aT 5 IS 5 Heat 3 4 ee 4 mate : BA iaet it: Re patel *} = Pos know -- for example, Mr. Dulles cable to the Congo personally authorizing, apparently, the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, “and $100,000 to do it -~ is it inconsistent to your way of thinking that he would have authorized that assassination and would have rescinded this cable that would have apparently authorized the assassination of Rag Castro. Mr. Bissell. Not inconsistent at all, I think it may well have embodied a judgment on Mr. Dulles part that this effort concerning Radd Castro was altogether too risky, and technically not sufficiently likely of success. Mr. diGenova. During our initial telephone conversa- tion on August 6 you speculated, and you clearly identified it, as mere speculation, that one of the reasorsthat Mr. Dulles, assuming he did, ordered that initial cable countermanded was, | first, too many innocent persons on the plane would have been killed, and second, that it was so risky because there had been just an initial approach of the asset and it wasn't known whether or not he was a double agent, and thirdly, it appeared that the contemplation of all three, the assassina- tion of all three was being considered, and, therefore, since only Raol would be on this plane that it would have resulted in the dilemma that they sought to avoid, that is, if he had been killed there would have been two left over, and there may have been a reason that he ordered the countermand. Would you take by that as a form of speculation at this TOP SECRET
: rene Sak OTIS SMR | é en er nO aN Se fo eS ELIE TT point as one of the reasons that he would have countermanded that cable? Mr. Bissell. I would. Prone (Ares 202} 544-6000 Mr. Schwarz. Could I follow up on the Congo, Exhibit 2, the Dulles cable to Leopoldville. room the first paragraph at least, which talks about the clear | Now, we apparently read to you when I was out of the | $ 1 cut conclusion: "If he continues to hold high office the inevitable result would be chaos and at worst pave the way for Communist takeover. Consequently, we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective, and under existing conditions this must be a high priority of your covert action". And you have read that language as meaning killing, right WARD & PAUL Mr. Bissell. Yes, Mr. Schwarz, I want to ask you if you continue to read it as killing in the light of the third paragraph of the cable which reads as follows: "To the extent that Ambassador may desire to be con- sulted you should seek his concurrence. If in any particular : case he does not wish to be consulted you can act on your own authority where time does not permit reference here. "Paragraph 4, this message has been seen and approved at competent level of the Department of State". Bo you still believe in the light of the authorization 410 First Street, 5.E., Wasmeegton, 0.0. 20003 TOP SECRET Se aE HERBS fm etd Wen eniet he og,
to discuss the matter with the Ambassador that assasgination was involved? Mr. Bissell. Yes, especially since there is evidence Prone {Area 207) 544-6000 here that it was discussed with and.: approved at State, and in the light ef the background in this Special Group. Mr. Schwarz, You don't think this ig referring to a coup? Mr. Bissell, I don't think so. But I can't be perfectly certain. But I think it refers to more than that. I think actually it is saying, his removal by some means or 1 | other is the very high priority objective. <I would infer from this that what we know was discussed at least in the Special Group, and that is that removal might be by the means | | | of assassination, although obviously others would be preferred, WARDS B PAUL Could I add one word in answer to that question. I am almost certain I am correct, that the then Ambassador to the Congo was Edward Gullion. Mr. Baron. I believe it was Timberlake. Mr. Bissell. I think Gullion had arrived by this time. But certainly in Gullion's regime there was extremely close collaboration between the Ambassador and the Chief of Station. And the Ambassador was an individual who would have been quite prepared to contemplate this kind of action. Mr. Wides. Mr. Bissell, just to make sure the record is complete in terms of your efforts to analyze TiO Fiest Street, $6... Wasning TOP SECRET
Phone {Area 202) $44-6000 . 4 3 « a % a & @ z . Wasteagton, G.C. PO003 ALO Feat Street, $.E represented to you that at the time thar was traffic between the station and headquarters in the normal African Division channels regarding U.S. efforts to influence President Kasavubu and others to dismiss Lumumba from political power as premier, and also traffic relating to a takeover of the real power by certain military figures such as Mr. Mobutu, would your reading of that cable still be that it suggests authori- zation of assassination as opposed to possibly discussing only authorization of removal of him from political power? Mrr Bissell. I think it authorizes removal. And I think that probably Mr. Dulles would have sald, if you can possibly really remove him through political power, that is obviously the preferred course of action. But I think this authorizes the whole tone of it very strong measures indeed. I say in support of that, there had been a record established that even after Lumumba had been removed from political power and had taken refuge in the U.N. he was still widely regarded as a menace. Mr. Dawson. I would like to follow very briefly on this. I would like to ask you about this agent that you did have a firm recollection of being President of the Congo. He was described as being a well-placed or a very good agent, was he not? Mr. Bissell. I think he was a very good agent, and TOP SECRET Sees, om oi Cipeseret uy on a 34. Sales eek ruagnsreds ape be ia See
Pnane (Aras 207} 544-6000 WARD A PAUL 310 Farst Street, SL. Weastungion, f.C. NOG} Regret 2 oun 2 dere a oe once 24 also he made an effective penetration of Lumumba's supporters both in the Congo, and as it were, in the line of funding and supply in Eurepe. Mr. Dawson. So, he was in place, so to speak? Mr. Bissell. Yes. In other words, he was a dual agent. Mr. Dawson. Did he have access directly to Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. I think he did, yes. Mr. Dawson. Do you remember having been told that he sometime in November or December went to Stanleyville? Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the specific case, but it fits the pattern very well. What I do remember is one operation. But he knew:of,he was close enough to -- he was used as a courier from Lumumba, I think, first in the capitol, and then later from Stanleyville to Europe... And on one occasion, because he had penetrated so effectively, he was aware that a large amount of cash was being taken by two other couriers down to the Congo, and as a result of his awareness of that, and all the details of that trip, that shipment was intercepted. Mr. Dawson, The Chief of Station testified about having an agent that had access. Would this have been the agent that he believed he would have access to? ‘Mr. Bissell. I believe he would have, yes. TOP SECRET eorerrrecerey
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL ists! pS pies 4 Gi: Caras ah Washington, 0.0, 29603 330 First Streei, 5.E., Pe sesy tutte ae RE her ranted ere 3 ee Sas Mr, Dawson. Thank you. Mr. Wides. Mr. Bissell, touching briefly on rrdonesia Y LL -when you testified to the Rockefeller Commission, and this was reviewed very summarily when he testified before us, that you recalled some possibility -- some planning of a possibility lee oa of assassinatingfStkarno Aprogressing as far as the identifica tion of an asset who might be recruited for this purpose, but the plan was never reached and never perfected to a point where it was decided to go ahead. Do you recall anything, or do you have any information A that would be relevant to our information that a Moslem asset from the Middle fast was recruited who was considered for an operation infindonesiajagainst Gukarnof with the crypt “7 we : ILALAT ION , and/an operation that in regard at least to the \ assasSination aspects had been started by Kim Roosevelt be- cause of his ties with the Mid-East? Does that ring a bell at ail? Mr. Bissell. No, sir. That one I don't remember at all. I remember enough of the plan that I referred to know that what you speak of was a different activity. Mr. Wides.” And the one you referred to involved indigenous fndonesians? bE ened * ' Mr. Bissell. {I think it involved ~~ I don't know : ~ oo what nationality the asset, but I think it involve a member of an air crew on a commercial airline, ~~ not on a a TOP SECRET IY ide
AE STM) ESN AEN aha ‘ ERY PRT POSTE ae Saat Sn PANEER EC IN ay it Ne Ys cata oN man LUat Nh chats Baer oo tal Sate hee CMON Pee Copan ce CREE aL gh mine aise MR cas. Ge pe tee Rees s? ie? . TO ae ue: S Vceaaen nade Bash se acannn Fan CLARA 3 "¢ ; _ vi commercial, I will take that back, on a flight that might be chartered, €or Sukarno.- . 2 Mr. Wides. Either when you became DDP or before, whether or not you were personally involved, did you ever hear Pnona {Area 202) 544-6000 anything regarding any efforts by the CIA to assassinate Nasse and to send teams, assassination tems into Egypt for that purpose? Mr. Bissell. No, I never did. I could almost go so far as to say that that was one that was never even thought of. Mr. Schwarz. We forgot to ask you a question which we ask almost all the cther high people who come down here to testify. Looking back on things, now, ~- and I hate to use the a pe] < a £ is] « 3 word get rid of, but let me ~-do you think the U.S. should get rid of assassination as a tool? Mr. Bissell. I think in today's atmosphere the answer is yes. Mr. Wides. Why do you think that? Mr.Bissell. I think that to use means for the Loon. advancement of policy of such a sort that in the pre- vailing climate these days would be almost certainly dis- approved of by a large majority of the legislative arm, and the public at large, and everybody else, is unwise unless you can have absolute confidence of total security. And by security I mean that outside of the two or three people who ALO Poest Street, Sof. Méastomaiaees, C907, TOP SECRET
Pe Ie undertake the effort, nobody else will ever know about it. Now, that circumstance doesn't obtain today, it never a ue a) has, but it certainly doesn't today. And I think the climate REI uf Prone (Ares 207) 344-6000 i} | is as I have deacribed. And I, therefore, would eliminate. this | Sheekrac: Cae method. ep et S: Mr. diGenova, I just have one question. I apologize fo jumping around, but part of this is to get you out of here. When the phrase"receiving serious consideration" in headguarters was used in that cable that we alluded to in regard to the attempt to kill Raol Castro, what does that mean een EE 8 SON to you when Tracy Barnes authorized that sort of language to be used in a cable? Mr. Bissell. It means that he had fought and talked about this, and almost certainly that I have. And it WARD & PAUL may refer to considerations with Allen Dulles. I can't tell how wide ranging they would be. They would probably have involved J.C. King, the head of that division. Schwarz. Did Barnes work for you? Bissell. Yes, he did. Schwarz. He is now dead, isn’t he? Bissell. Yes. diGenova. But that was not light language when Shee apaite=: S.£., Wasningron, O.. 20003 it was sent to a station? Mr. Bissell. No. It was sent to encourage careful planning. ATO Fars: Strees, TOP SECRET
at Tey emitted much. Y ee Gets: ta : by & > ba] Qo. as “ poy c+] xa B Fe tepse sick Si TOP SECRET Schwarz. r (Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the hearing was concluded.) M wt wD ON nN Scere: pee Nite eas A