onthe ustifia’ a fo tase dy c J Ba od a: wf S [3 u 3 Fy i “3 st “a ee ‘ 4 2 2 ae - oa v : re 7) f4 . 3 rt $o- et 2 3 a 8 WO & . i QO ag ~ gp By ~ +3 au ae “ fa] £ te a] m bey id ae 9. e j ad fe 34 ? 4 3 1 reed ne Secs Ga 5uC 4 i 2 3 te 3 e 3 “g fe Sy nad ot ev 3 8 a $3 ‘ : ar] 1. 3 3 Bs Go 2  £ oo ta as U a oO S p ’ od oO mo 4g 2 a : r . fed * . a 1 Ho 4 - of : .° i 2 . : AP | aed 2 ; i] u) *y : ae Sana ist ad 2903 a i982 ~ s@YViCe i epremecte tg mee en wan siece es . Sot neers te oem NE ME IRIG UT TD US Sue at
NT 4 Cc ny eye AMERI = OF THE SPICER OR IN H HI OR SC x SECRET CTION NC oe as SN yy A NOSENKO V EMBASSY S tc a . . . . . b .é i? a “s Los . : . * a i o : ‘ : : Pee stanamun Jprtege aon tems 07 * nlat etba seh Soa 058 . ? ~ - . ca : i - , ; ° o . . . 7 as . ben, 0 bee i. Bee > ” aoe J ' hee ck , EGS : ger a cee mtn cen es . we ety en en ty mee aE ge a aiite ieee napwnet pyptategn Eitie Hen a BeSeNET MERRIE. Iie Heth Bee
14-00000 TORRE ATONE b cat obitttintre saath erutecatmiettADS: RDCAEO es eaten ese et See oe) b geeampninere oie wet eS Bape ee Seneeeee, AARP! Pata d BE. NOSENAG ws Embassy Section nor STnG1 7 Tt Curing the neriod of 1961 - 1962 ‘siz’. It is the conclusion of thi position of Deputy Culel, SCD, from Janua his claim toi ave held this particula y 1960 ~ December 29381, 3 a Oo oJ ¥ 3 e? te aw be & ‘ fs e h tv a decision as to whether the remainder of his c is valic, Deputy Chief of the American-Sritisn Commonwealda Sec Department, prior to December 1939 in that he was demotec, Section during 1960 - Position in ¢ from a rnonetary point of view as well as a eee ra Veen at aS + 4 she SGD, KGS, g Z ° It is believed scasonedle to presume t rs) t¢) a Of Tal3 SuTMMiTy that NOSENIAO hele one i Os NOSSNKO to that if NOSZNKO was tion, Sevenwa ence of any indicazion SROUIG have been at least a Deputy Chiez of i. and througaout tae AGB is important prestige point of view. If gous ies FERN ret eae cee
aevde NOSENAO was oaly imine Five. Se 1966 - 1961, this woud hav fe no ta ete we nwpl mwa att wo See wale wen eee tae els os e0SS 9, OOLA MHOMey ANG presse, #2 GF ta2s TEASON GONE, OLS cas.ure 7) e* . t : . t ty te nye 7 ot. mle lines oN eas a have held the POSs.0 Ge we DULy Cyuieria a ti nm oO be ee © 4 ¢) a w ts QO Y ey ' cg) ed] be i 8 bey wae yes UI BG GOGO b DOSLILOS Whi Fosus.ea ne watt 2 Lo 24 + 9 2 ee ws ee em hat eet ae 2 ates wile tgs SiGera due GOUI 42S TO WLCLES HE HE.G 2S CeGsThCG VOSS PraGr tO .Yuu, as well as wactner he nel pe Ox Je 3, 3, an eiiort was made to Getermine what the actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether € Bis Claimed positions in 2962 - 1953. 2 a sta Se ae aa * Ae + - voor a7 4 son ae Panel 8 apparent that the Knowlédze of NCSENKO conceviing au aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, curing i966 - 1961 is incomplete wiea iucged by wha: are considered the normal Yesponsibilities of a Deputy Chiel in C1A,~ During current interviews, responsibilities os NCSENKO were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fidteen Deputy © nieis ci Se ‘ fat ae In aGaition, transier of a Deputy Cuiel of a a Fo ety wet bee to le obs at hl ya ction in the entire SCD and iacertain departments none oi tre sections nad a Deputy Chiez of Section, Section was not aways followed x w et tee Oe Eee ae aT pe ee iatere ©
14-00000 5 -¢ a 4 : A eGins to NOSENIS, tesa ¥ set mg lay heen winston Spe SOCOTGAH YE oO array, toot eb Ven CU w oO GCSCTIDILGS 1GS & ~ ae en Tyce tae Salgl ef alee ewe ote, Le nt ete ay wep eet Sweet e te “Spe eee errs Deputy Caier of Section ane the waetes Of ine puriiculas Desuty Cried Se caught = Te gy, mee ie emer cee ce Doe pee tl tae ape te the Slat at Tae ce ae ee ee a el Ot . WEP E a5, EC Uuaae ef Wry Geel Weed Cra ase STS eG Were OS ee tee ~ * : os a GECGEG WOUIG SE od BVSTIZ IEG Geet, ade Jones pawn cee me pee oe ge atte ger ne Pom oe ee ae ee ane OR? 42408 previous SUITING PY GLUEW GlLenl.om 60 On Bp Par Cie COT. me replaced no one when he ve &. 7 between early statements of NOSINKS tna entered on cGuty in the 2 claim that he replaced Minxnai Section. Along with this he ha other oizicers in the Section wich previous responsibility for. certain ; } matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later ‘stated that BAKZVALOV had been ressonsibie for these matters, The previous summary noted © aa t wl ee ee ey * gx nat anterrogation Zac never resolved these contradictions. = In the light of the present clearer picture of the mature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NCSENKXO on BAKHVALOV P , en - . . and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, Gid oz did not replace ave not 5 contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with ‘ 1 ‘whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy ChieZ of “Section in the First Section before NCSENXO, and that he was respon- ible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other ss -  GOOLLES = 3 Ne ye ry 7 . a tee kd g acme & Pee O a SemEDNT HORT: Te Sire eet eee Shee et : eas . nena ig Aik ohne Se cant 8 ahs PRL esT pate eamta ELA ot madi goo RR ene INA oo ~
14-00000 Lane, ACCOrGang io LCSRNAG, wae pYinel jel reason ior ction was to concenivate on a new arte of ew ; : - clerks), There cowld of course have been no specilic prececessor Zor & Sostantively new areca, Therclore, in one sessed GABAVALOYV wos . the predecessor ol NOGENKO aac in another scase he was nor The interpretation Of ine various siiteminio of NCSENIKOG on this izsuc as . ; being in conliict appears to Se the result Of Conlusiow on . ail concerned, . ; AccorGing to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First . : .' Section, First Desariment, in early 1960, ne nad not been told and for , (& short period thereatier was not told ‘what his actual cuties woule se, |. ™ CoP ak tg KROVSHUX, Cater oi the. First Section, wanted to assicn NOSENS to ° - . supervise the word against Service Attaches at the Unived States Zrabassy. . NOSENKO teit that the proposed assignment by KOVSEUA wis intcncedc Lt . to Keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive words since AGS selicy , a for work against the Service Attaches was primariliy one of contre: on : trips and not active wor towareés possible recruitmeni. After a short period of time, NOSENKO Was iniormed sy GRIBA? NOV that he, NCSENKO, had been tranoferred to supervise the ; : ‘ .  ¢ work against code cleras (also code machine mechanics) at the United : 4 States Embassy. GRISANOV defined this work as being os the greatest a , 3 z ‘ . Do eo om Som an ® 7 wen ‘ - 4 7 = my 2 3 7 # . ¥ " 2 a. OLL a deme & * i . : . \ \ Bec ge ssi Deano ati Ate a ole yey nett ts oye ete ater 7 re ees we bones meet . Kotla ey . ‘ 4 > : . . tay 5 7 z i k As 3 : < eug ‘f ist % sree ATT AS , SN
. tena eo eee ee awe ye ete ew get 2°. wees ee ee oom on “oe es ae wel pees dye - STL POTUMCe, ONG be TECTUIG OA GL COUN C.eTKAS G5 a PTIOT Ly airn Oo: 5 — ae WED we ar Ne art are tare a Wiese TS = et. yo ee the AGED, ALY PIN, who wis Crici of he Sirst Department, later rie oe een gw et ENROL ES ow oe - TOUD CONeisting os NCLINKG, Gersacity i. Fs =] s oe s GAVAZNOV an6 Vadim V. ACSOLAPOV was Jormed win NOSENAG responsible for supervision of the work. GAYAZNOV and ACSOLA3SPSY ye ee were not new KGB oilicers, Wat instead were exnerienced oficers = tat . oe ord ara GLE ow ny one _— awl am = ane ae 1. he VAT TR Em astnough bots as Senior Case Oiticere w FS Ge s2SS0F Vand 14a wWoseee “Ge >’ : fp NOSEN KO Coes not claim that he hac to train ehher oiflcer or to minutely NOSENKO coes claim ne was responsibie tor supervision over their m, work, AccorGing to NOSENKO, GAIBANOV sr.cnasized that work i~J 2 Ps against code clerks was to be his primary work in tne First Section : _ and that it would taxe precedence over, any othex activity. Other than . work against code clerss, NQSENKO has : i so ‘ . O - mo sibilities as iollows: : . gainst) Joan (a) Responsidility ior file of (work ag c, sa : ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy. (b) Responsibility for preliminary review of re- wmee 6 ports <rom OTU (XGB technical unit) of take" irom . — : DD: _.. microphones.in the United States Embassy. a , | } “ ggost65 eer ' ‘ ry | - ? “ - : sad tsatfnrkdnard neon Ss ante ote mene een deans ea ga ; ees . x
14-00000 come aterm te at as histones 6 Ce : Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CLA, An anaiyst “ matter of the responsibility of NOSENXO for work against coée clerks x we Te F nee weet cn om = -] sigast (c) Responsibiiny fos wiaincenance of the pnysical go gras gel ap yal ge ee eh eR Se ae Od SECUTALY Ms ON UHC Usa Seeers WiNodasy. fet f Sem ry 2 "ope ot te Pianta b SUrTey wial (Cc) Acting in place Oo: Viacisiav XOVSHUK, Chilei, z avast Section, waen NOVSIIUA was absent, As Can be scen from the above, the respossiuilities of NCSINKOS, tear Ae Peaset ey . oh me lth pe tet ‘nat devcaw sm a OY 25 Getinition, which are borne out CY oPecair€ sO TN e.1Ge TUSnsLeG by: NOSENKO, would not coincice witha the normal responsibiiities of 2 re] - ret ~o - an either accept or reject the theory that there is necessariiy an equation between the pee responsibilities. of a Depuiy Caief in CLA aad the AGB, but is the analyst accepts the theory, ne must offer some supportin - Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conciusions in regard to the claimed service oi NOSENKO as Deputy Criei of Firs: Section, First Department, 196C ~ 1961, The previous primary conclisicn was that he was neither Deputy . Chief of the First (American Zmbassy) Section nor a supervisor in that - section, The ¢ conclusion of this summary is that he: was Deputy Chief ore and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code cierks, The 4 . will be considered later. Comments will first be mace on the respon- sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above. go01 166 “SE CCRET ; a Fred gait wre RS EL: peat Cae 0 gate Ua Ray RRR wet ET ee Re ty sey abate ta ya at ae seer bn Stee wits da nny ater Pant Swings % 1
14-00000 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain @ detailed te omen baois Jur ihe previous Conclusion thai NOSENKO was not the RCS cose wh mote PL me wee ee wom tee gt ne eg wee = ot ABLUIAN, ane Culvedt CoLC.us.On 43 ThET Ge Wee tLe a+ ite, - ffi Ln =e AA ert ee te ae we fy ~, ar aie © fCSPONSiG1IG CaS@ Gilicer for ADIOIAN, CWaclacr or aot his Word 4,ainst 74 & wen 2 ABIOIAN compared favoraaly with what is considered tobe the MO o7 + ‘a responsibie CIA case ofiicer is immaterial; what is material is =N ers A We whether NOSENKO vcasonably fulfilice the requirements. of the XG . for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN, itis fely thar the answer to this is that NOSENKO did. , : J 84 #.CCOTPGING to > NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the Girection of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to “ancue . . 2 obo . ‘ ’ . Me ot Tes, POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appcars reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his - Gescription of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered ony within that framework. Admittedly NOSENKO was unawaze of a considerable amount ' of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was.to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "ancther POPOV, u ~ it follows. that: such personalia information on ABLDIAN would have had » GUOLLE? eG od treet ie en eterna itor gern 0rd stance “* eect DN Be seh E EE Sr can gee aang Cite ed on one on saan Le Tete le EN di ot a Q Bone owe abt ah mentee medifarne
a LO cn NECA 21 ot me stim eestt nS te on de wom wa ye wn, wet gg * 2 “ x 2 ot} rs a rr 8 ws necting wre to the arrivals Gf ABLOLAN in the USSR 221 ADLOLAN was consicerccd to + ° ee ~ 2 = a wel i Sw mete ste Cw ee “es Pied 7 Security Officer position formerly neice oy Russell A. LANGILLE, + : $e 7 TSF ¥ a Ui mm em Ve E was necessary to Getermine if ADIDLAN was “American Mteli Or “Ot. The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite = wh 3 & re] be tate a ba & si @ is oF uw 4 ° be et be < ® oF © Ka tl "4 te “ fi fan wn fe} “ pie C) et i 4 eo ou w Kal a] WwW operational contact according to NOSENAO, waich are erroneous. This invalidates one oi tne bases for the previous conclusion tha: 4 NOSZEN KO was not the responsicie case uriicer for ABIOLAN, NOSENKO fad previousiy siated that ih cizca October 1965 he ye ~pe nem ad “4 Ve an sat gee om mS = pope ble OS moe prepared an opcrationa: plan om ADBIOLAN waich included continuation of the placing of Meta on.the clothing anc effects of ASIDIAN maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH, The statemen: is made in the summary that this coulc not be true because FEDOROCViCH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until ac least Jity 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above anc tse resuli invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICE could not ave treated the clothing ané effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961. GOLAi6s — © ee sR REY, ce owas Cem ea rr cap ne A eet
14-00000 io waar ~c ace maee ae we Rt eae ee Ie Nf cae pn AZIDIAN Las nov S1ate¢ thut ns arrived in Moscow in March VO gente tee Cet ae tl ae feet oe Tmep = Soragien ai Panne tages L900 with the intention ihat ne wooed sot employ a Soviet maid. Approni- matey three monins later 1I3 Cluste ascarliien bez ones. Wate Moy ra This BSaGCI4TON Conn fu rn nL fom 7 = Be es Pd cre Lau eWay, & eDAYUMenT OF Scare * Sy ah a ft ” %, we wae es until she left Moscow in mié-i96i, ZHEMAIR hac Tatyane “pos greemeniwhh ADMNIER, TEDOROVICE =~ % ee ae Tae wee Pe BO ET OL al me im oy, wet became the paristame Maic f0F GBiGLLN Seginning sometime in me fol. 2? EA = a 2 Sane Saeed = eye - app in 4p a Qe 22 0: 1500, From that time on PFLDOAOVICN, according to ASIDIAN, mec _ABIDIAN did not mail any operationa: .etters witain the Sevier Union until after Marca 1961 and thereiore in view of the cbhove, there is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENAO that sie three pra eet? operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN aul eect gee re showed evidence of Metsa. It is interesting to mote that > [OSENKO fa eeeanennnaeens June 1962 warned CLA about the KGS use Of Meika ior Sporting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy - personne. ‘ABIDIAN, accorcing to NOSENKG, was the subject of a 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance '. brigade to cover ABIOZIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the / responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the goGLi69 ~~ ‘ we s IC5 , tS pews 4 8 6 w e ~ TP Sat anette, : Mee mw ae - poe et * - Sn eal a ee ee ee or. ae : i one. ‘—paretesreretteetseeremersreetyintnremsartes Settee ‘easetr Ene COROT ER r+ YER OE ag, i ai te
ores toto ee B. ee - he ee apttogs Wiest Tposnee esas tase ! ote eoeene eth ae pie First Section, First ad CS ona Sate NOSONAG, 22 ine Prespe. 2Si5.e Cu52 a 7, eres ~~ ame ” peas ey ee ns an ee am ee me . oilicer ior ABIDOIAN, Was @xvecica to veview these resorts anc gave velvance Gra cnt intormation Cisciesed 2ny pereonal Weaxnesses Cf ABIDIAN, the-HGB woud have attempted to exyloit chem. No peracnal & weaknesses ‘were disclosed, according t¢ NCSENKO, anc the pattern pr Of coverage to see li ARIDIAN would lead ine AGS to “anotner POPOV" remained unchanged. Pages 210 -2i2 of the previous summary notes that NOSZENKO ted by ABIDIAN is uring trips outsice the mn be was unaware of countries vi USSR and that no effort Was made by NOSENKO througa the 2CD to find out such information, According to the previcus summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD “would not accept! such 2 request for "operational . “8 action against an American Ciplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIOIAN abroad would certainly have placeé a severe burden onthe SCD. Farther, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably. be expectec would be of little or no practical value to tie SCD. - -s g904470
14-00000 ~ =a ages 4 te ed Come mane cote as - ges 226 - 221 of the previcus suwmary cosiain a Surumory mn. te « 2 at a te ee oe, meee wipes te Set nt A Vo AT Gn the matter of ine Pusakin Sire eUGClLOD ete WAICA Joan ASICIAN , 5 ee Ye ete “> me pe ee SS ae pte te - anne De ee they were unudle to Glariby ine vaatier anc Cla much te conluse the issue. . . Current interviews, a5 indicated wsove, have not fuliy resolved aCGSe TATA 2a se * am? went eo started te + the DOoo.ems, OUD L4VE A2SaLSTCE 1 & QO; " 8S ae a@ £5250 ee conilict or confusion, It is apparent thet NOSENKO was not in. . Section, First Department, ior any raiuterial period of time aiter 30 December 1961. tis also clear that he either reac the surveillance report on ihe visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street ceacdrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit, NOSENAO insisis that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly aiter the event. There is no reason.to question nis assertion that ne read the report since his accurate knowledge o: the route of ABIDLAN anc Gis actions ? ‘ in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relaiets to be, his ch ange of assignments raises a question regarding when ae actually read the report. | NOSENKO claims taat the visit of. ABIDIAN to the Pushkis Street , “ ‘deaddrop area ledto the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post on ar wo. ee a ote Set ny ad ate WD Bret Ra AT RA oer BA pani Names een atetatn en D O° Tada denen gent te tae anemic te a fee aa oak x PROF rt
14-00000 . x 4 wate DAS ENE TOT Renee orm mene md Tet 2 Mla t - = ne = bf . Wwe ee mee aS nr tage * . = MEAL LHe Save WwiiCal Was MGA. 208 LL See THON GiG tat 1 Woes aoe : . =fliy Saat a are * ment Pm quae InlorzMmea on a Gaily DASiv Gi TAG SeGerd OF T4155 StGKC Gul (a.waeys since, in addition to his iransler irom tne Fivst Devariment to the Seventh Department as of carly January 1962, NOSZNAO went to Geneva in mic-Marcna i962, x os “2 ig ame Sep et Meee ns bye nde tl may wate ab 2S COMNCCIVADAe PME, 25 OE AMNSa TOW Wide! advised of developments or noncevelopmenis following the visit o: ABIDIAN to the Pusakin Street building oy Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chic: . of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known tu _ NOSENKO since 1953, or Viadisiav KOVSHUX or Gennaciy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Depiri- * fad re rt 6 tt ce en o +e ef © rt * F? pee we 4 re AY ct tt od 4 ment, Even so, however, his sailure to call ou in June 1962 would seer to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter maii- ings by ABIDIAN “=a warning waich would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the sprinzg~ summer oz 1961, It is to be noted that curing the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specifically asked for ary additionai informatioa regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN, Beyond 's gQg4172 ™~ pe ee ha Cmte abeee tater 17 rem atwnedn’ aap
TH state etee Be Revdeaiginme stom ananen 2. ton mm epe , 7 eee ela SE MoS, NN ENAG BUNS Has SigieG wed 2 e? fe pte ran et q re Oo f r¢) - : ad et o ae on a 3s) et o et ce) if ’ = ¢ ~e “an wos, t “se cs ed + an lawn ~ te tan ot ~, us because the siake out nic long since been Cronpea, it had revealec MOI SUSPicious On the part of AGIDIAN or anyone cise, and wiervelore 5 2 See - = 3 = if ones AS pen he had regarcea it as insigniiicant. Tais is mot implausible. /orcther possibie explanation, however, derived from the alreacy noted inability of NOSENKO to pim cown a Care for the visit, is that he learned of tLe stationary surveil) ~ oe a of the visit itself after his. meetings with us in June 1942, it should tbe noted in this context that with the public éxposure of the PENKOVSXIY ccrop undoubtediy Gecame case in the fai, of 1962, the Pushkin Sixeci cea the subject oi widespread interest within the KG3E. That NOSENKO is. ata yainimum still confused about the Visit oi ABIDIAN to the Push«in Street cea Grop 4nG its consequences is clear froma tne record, While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has con- sciously exazzerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath, . “@ it is also possioie that the evident Gistortions of his accounts oz the afiair derive from honest confusion, Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inter = views ‘leave so doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gerkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by _ ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operatiozal goo1i73 Liang e a . ” nee eoreae ne Vint nl oy Cate ta Se kee eh nad Se core tore n
14-00000 BTS w iadadia idleness tet aeke ca wt ee cee, i ame Do lae POD CBAIIC TR wee . +. 2 one ne SCLLEY Tassie ~ OA CO mreren Habe ienty FG.E005, 2G as 2U O08 Commission ee Sam agetun es ele tetas ge «gma aye Grawi Whica SuBslaniiate, isi. Vieits of AGIDIAN ed SNOW tO and CONSIGE TEE SUBPiClovs bY the KGS. Dae CULTALCE to the axt shop, according to NOSINAO, was su situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing 4 Ceaccros, and & v.oblle surveillance was zlaced on the art shop for a perice G2 time 20-.0W21.3 the visit of ABIDIAN, Official recorcs condirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time and to the buildings descridec by NOSENAG, summary contain no reference - Pages 214 - 220 of tne previous to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative toa KGB interest in the ‘visits of ABIDIAN to the upper, Gorkiy Streetiarea, It is also clear 0 at from.a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations no ditferentiation was rnaGe concerning his siatements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorhkiy Sivect arca : 2 Pn a . ” = ? * * circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his-«nowlecze of the ‘Pushkin Street deaddrop site aiter the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 December 1962). it is impossibie at this time to siate that a detailed cebzieiing f NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile inter: ogation would :-. have permitted the clarification of ali issues including the above, but go0i474 14. /NEGRED . <ohea Se glen RUBE! Ste Tnawr nntantn Manteca nee tee slope rece AS ow ety Seb wets ee kg Fe tes ay
14-00000 ate neg Tee Cay! Se fT Te a ae a a a een bee Te 2b GS COuwe bat ce LOGlase LOT SOLE IION 268 CON IEG Mee ss to a pe eles ays cee mane getge oe eh th ee tee fae ie? wae mee Cotte toeG BOs Where COMP.vie Cal issCh..e ED GCG SS sos sage, OY EVER, Fe gh Lan Sim gegen een ce wet ete DR te ean Dene ge at a. COMAGS UG MMO ALON SO Lo 21a ine Suds cask SITES Gib. Cannes oe nm his claim to iiving been cise clicer for ABLDLIAN from eczl TOLD wee est tee TOAT ete re cage ee eT foe get 39% WMeks aOc! 2YOa, Seki TIGL e, 2.6 Lace twee NOSENAG je NOL EDS ts # prowerly Gate the visit o: ABIDIAN to Pusniin Sivesci, is in ne Way idicaive , . of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have aad the Gate right. tess In regard to (b),. the respons? “ulity of NOSZENXO for preliminary re- iew of reports from GTU (Technical Unit of AGB) of "cake" from micro- Tie yay me a wa oe mms ot a tee mis tases &' MOaS Sy, tae Prev.oOUus COnCs.us On Was T4600 635 paones in the United S claim that he personally reviewed the AGS w.onitorin sustained, « ” - eas ee it is not felt that the previous conclusion made sudicient allow- . , ance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually ' entailed, Iniormation irom microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENXO, was Landleé very specially, Telephone inter- cepts were given to a designated oificer for distribution to the appropriate wn case, officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even ‘ ; ae So wo mee coags SOOIATS within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Caief or in hi EEL FRR ERIE aw Te _absence-to the Chief and then were: distributed to.the individual responsible 3 catego aS . , . . 2, - . oad . . “ey , y - .* . :7
SP Ae tn astra em NE aE te Re eo Sener me tert ann a ae hane | case€ oiticer, In tsuis way, according to NOGEN this was consicered the most iraportant by tne MCB and OTU, NOSIN had so responsiaility for review or uliimatie clsseminetion of the infor 4 os) mnt ‘one ate «deus ae ww : a eer 4 3 mation to the Ciief, SCD, tne Cuaieman, AOL, or the Central Committe since this was the responsibilty of & unit in ine oifice of the Chiel, SCD. 2 NOSENKO has aiso stated thai the cutout irom cexiain of the wording microphones was "dying" anc that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having cifiiculty obtaining a sufficient Se eee eee eee 5 oe number of qualified monitor-transilators. As a result, according to _— a ee = NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from “most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent, Despite th =) conversations in areas covered by active micropnones would have been of interest to responsibie officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when askec to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel," According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at .OTU and could: not be furnished.to the First Section, . An officer of + gooit7s 6 es ~ a is ve 2 eae a : wl ilg ; BE ad cel BPLER, Mig lRln ly Oe te py PeAeN  eattee ean BeF eonoe wal nome stare 4 ae 1@ fact that full transcripts oz ail t a See er Sete ai + 2 a en tagnet- ol Ue be
14-00000 bares RES as Te Pett Poe se mo ae nate etme lg te OT ee ap ee ae a8 OCs eved thal ony Presumpiioes wire tac AUS recovercs GP len me el et te Se ee ea a Oe a ee ASSO TEGlG Gas CONVESS&AUGUS CVE A 10 LAST CO GT eas 26Sleu o - IAT t 2 Nee gm wel ane So ¥ CC - Sa oe ~~ o NOSONKO aS Giving active wileropnones is Not rezsonecle or even Peet Van s = own ee Te gee - a Sar ao 2m oo se eS we eel realistic. It i8 a1s0 uUnreacistic to presume that any conversaiien cone that NOSZNKO nec to nave been Aware oO: this ox thi one had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active nen ne microphone and NOSZENKO has claimed he reviewed the "taxe" tvom a . ou microphones in tne United States Embassy. It is apparent that there are a number of imponcerasile Jactors to be considerec such as whether the. conversation coulc be vicked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover suificient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being saic, and even if he did, whether he would consicer it of sufficient importance oz interest to incluce in his report in verbatim or in summary form. In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, at oe  gg0at7? Se meme oe Pen MEET cot tet ee ee ol
se ww me mon ei yee a ee a a Pa ee ew ge ee ee a oe re 2 ees 2225 MG. CONSUSTEG Chal WiesTe te on Goel ete SAS15 1OF CuGsues. ae fy Soe teas Catherise current snterviews with NOSZNHO have fucther indicated wnat his clhim + on this point should be accepted, In regard to (Gd), the claim of NOSZNXO that he acted in piace of KOVSHUK, the Calef of First Section, ween KOVSHUK was absext, ° * - itis considered inat this claim is accepinble providing it is not coz- verted into a presumntion that therefore NOSENKO knew everyiain ‘ that KOVSHUX knew. 8 NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirés of the officers in the First Section, ‘These oficers normally reported cirectly to KOVSHUA and would only report to NOSENXO when KOVSHUK was &zsent. AS an “example of this, NOSENZXO has shown < lack of detailed knowledge of ‘the work against Giplomatic personnel in tne United States Emoassy. He has stated he is sure he would have kc.own of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim - ~ ' ‘, to have reviewed all-the reports of the various officers of the First er Roa } . 3 emp XY ‘ ? 2 z eB t 4 I : ‘ 4
14-00000 Section, is recugastion of the Vues Of incivicuals at tae United r, + TU nee aC orucy ts eg kg gee be ate Ge 29G) and ever t4Gir assienmMcats sets en ~ to Staies Ermbvissy in 19 adequate. The previous criticism wat NOSONAO «now only the nemies { of MoOSt agents or Optrative cOnmiacis wae were pari. of the AGS nework | - among the indigenous exployees of the American Embassy, €id Loz n recognize their photographs, anc Gic noi give susiclent cetails con- cerning their specizic activities ls comsiccrec to Se an unwarranted eriticism. NOSENKO incicates that in general the handling of agents .in the First Section was the responsibility of incivicua:.case olicers. malt It is also apparent that the pailosopay in the AGB was to maintain - . 4 : a single handler-agent relationship a3 much as possible, and that respon~ sibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the a o . = had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case oilicer other & +f] tad 1 POTEET EERE IL OB BR RET PTE TG than the handler oz ine a Laon oe = st ae < , s wort gent, Tais apparent phiiosophy is of particular & 4 %, interest in connection with NOSSNAD, who even though he was the case officer responsible for ABIDIAN ane togetier with KOSOLAPOV ané f= J \ GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent .network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for resort- t oe wt ‘ing'on or a specific activity against a particular target was normal! g001179 SESINES. Nien SESE RD
14-00000 See it eget wot ntioe ct Jay Be mt ee _ fe Sotasa oO h-S Cie ry VsGleORSiD aeao CUNe Ge vaoou.e Merit. . me nee ee ee en NOSINAG, a5 Drevious.y incichatecd, Aas Stated that ne aaa whe . e 8 amen sieiiiey 2 saws ime pada laces on eee tilted Spe. Teete coy PESSOASLOLILLY 10P WOTK 4564N50 COCG Cszcr ns Gt st ONEsEG SreG.S aTUseesy Siviity for supervision Gi WOFK 4gnin3t the Lervice atiacnes in cariy 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsis.e tor supervision o: the work of Vadim A, | KOSOLAPOV, Connaciy 1. GAYAZNOV, Viacimir DEMAIN ané Yevgensy GROMAKOVSHIY. 4 GRYAZNOV ang XOSOLAPOV. worked only against code clerks . and therefore were supervised soic.y by NOSENKO, whereas DEMAIN - and GROMAKOVSAIY, who handlec indigenous agents in American ‘House, came uncer the supervision of NOSZENKO only in those cases where these agents were directec against code clerks. t is quite ciear that the knowledge oi XOSENKO concerning tae ‘@ , , . con ‘ code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouca clerks who, accozcing i to NOSENKO, were incluced in his targets in 1960 ~ 1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees at the United States Zmbassy during this period except for ABIDIAN, oe a a wo es t tae eee
14-00000 The ouowing corneas are Concerned with several specific cases in which, accorveing to NOSONTO, there was in approach by the AGB, intercoting information was Cevclssed, or in which at lezst a Syme ee om” ~ sae oe 2 ym wt Or ante oe vem s wegen see He Weak area g COnSICCTE OE AMOUNT GE SpUCIic Wark wis Corriecé cut oy NCSANKO, Tne first case, oes S70RS3=26} i8 COVETED On DE 177 os the previous sumumary. Little ecchlonai corament is consicercd necessary on this case since there Gocs noi appear to be any acequate . : : reason to question the general story of NCSENKO in regare to the KGE effort agains{ STORSBEAC| Ob ; . ot It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that, NOSSNKO in 1902 , ticularly in vlacing nis personai invoivement in the case, pa a himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was mace va * Gg ear A moe ao eR mas ton mt ane Tes O has retracieé this particular claim, but toSTORSBERG| NOSEN:? ad there is no reason to Gowot taat he was en am the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessiul assroaca to[ STORSBERG| : An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach — o& to(STORSBERG|sixce BTORSBERG ated this as October 1961, NOSENKO has indicated about June 1961, aud information from GOLITSYN, baseé a on.remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the  GOONBE ee . irae aan ae —. 2? fam o eectenpe rte cm emai Muse tenmctn ate ities mast ne tml Oo tn Sas oe * “wt ao pene eee ee eee ae, Pee sae errno ee ae as puis Ram Tee oh, seks on, Pana Te
14-00000 that the approach occurred in Octoser 196 e [storss RGloccurreé in March - April 1961, which is approach occurred at ine "end of i900, NOSENKO, Guring curves interviews, has given an accepicble BCCOUNS OF tae[STORSZERGlcase, ie has stated that he cannct precisely Senn Gate the approach ta STORSSERG| MUL WET OT Gocurres Gelore ine - é o 06 approach at ihe Moscow airpoc: sdf eBINes MEYSIAS Wun to, 2 “" ~5 nection + tte mean cs When recenily,reint zviewed| STORSSE onwiAued w% et +9] i o) iz et o on 5 bes cae - fie mm a t cars q » but the internal evicence in his Gescrviption of collateral events vnaxes it clear that ine approach had to have taxen place considerably earlier, [Joseph MORCXE| anotner code clerk at the United States Embassy, : wt . ° . who will be the. sudject of further « no Leiow, has n interviewed on the basis of statements by olsen] aah oe preseat in American House the nignt of the approach. Analysis ox the statements ox JMONGNEcteanty indicates that the events Groatteat descrives could not have taker place later than the period February to early May 1961, . The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to Wi quite compatible with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSZENKO. In the face bee ee be in of this. approximation oz the date of the approaca eefBz sonttead a GO01182 temo nat ot Meth aut ge tlthertt be oat 2
=} GCesween bond = a —, pare ee Matic re a = Vi as Oe 3 soe o eS mwed P - “ Soe teae & wee. = ae a Q & C38. S se anc v4 Pr ermecrese Ned ha to Gt ne oo SOVSRGA co zy » 0 Gis cya nema Akane 2 Ge CeaetsA wbotoe . t 4 ‘t 4 u he ob eh re y Clatcn a aiure Se eer eel a8 CO rs & ara: war . & time, i cn, Or was pre S G ~ = ee we ed Nl tet to te app As of thi a # i Se dan any w O weics rs aN Q inio ar roe esry 3 recorG iniorma eso” me ai Sree Ob = tute, ac ro ony Comm oe imatt ament ro o eve the stzteme c= subs ote act, |Kexs=xs| OG aimmary 423581 ts to oh a * ab arG - eason to aisoe «, X as Crd ac o oo os R ve rc. Te prone e : fe) ry ive 3 AS. alk y) a asta ry his pr 5 — oi £ a ~ a 2G a as the replacement for|STORSB e 2 c b a : @a valié d Ie a yap tcalh Foie Sane eo i mPa Ne tra nm Statements re a Ba o a. te peel ous summary w r twas he who trie @ a Goes no a ee ee (a) The-ssatemenit the prev There are c : refiect against > . tna NOSENKO that ‘directly connected wita the case could re actually was be » nota replacement, even thou “ra weg tet 2 t,. but = PS Or of NOSENXO as the Soviet who m set jorta in po
- ~~ owe ral ~ me "tng ae wed ab We ean ne es W4S GOL That Of @ CGce Giese, NOSGOINAG nas Gur poend Current interviews t ee . irom the OTG veports of conversetl Micropncne in ine Nilliiary ‘Wess nai] KEYSERS\eich a ee Ernbassy eheed aed Seeder (Came es WES TGS & COE Cr.Cr A OF had been away irom code work ior 4 conmsiceracle period of time. Inany event, = thai STORSBERG]}was having @ Cicticult time explaiain : . ROt been a coce clerk but, 4s noted, was being trained . by[STORSBERG]so that he could ac tas a substitute. Uncer the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that tae KGB would assume at the time that KEYSERS [was to be the eventual replacement ofSzoa¥ Sang} ° (b) The previous summary stated that, “srior to his ' ros departure irom Moscow AZYSERS|acknowledgeé to his . supervisors JCotonel URBAN] his homosexual tencencies % | and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, ‘all at the American House" (gage 179). oo — oe goci 1284 24 te, oo ‘ SDP y . ait a ~ . . td Lele ake d eae deteenen be nein = Neve nee te oe eet TO ele ate Re DEN iE I yee Sot culm fos Somers Brg Bee TU MME gg eater ab erent “Fart Bakes A SOE SESS essa USOT SAUNT TAINSE NRIOL EATEN
while withia the Soviet Union." 2 *, : ‘ statement is made that, “In the single case in which he fNOSENKG/ asserted that he velice on iniurmazion gro- ” curec from microphones fxexseas failure to report receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error," While the o icial record shows thar[ KEYSERS] OG _Gid indeed report receipt of the defection lcmer to [Coronel OG. URBANA the office of Corcnel Bony it snowed be noted that this occurred less than one nour before 4% the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in i and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded tha‘{ KEYSERS] had not reported receipt of the defection lester and there- Ob .fore had decided to approach|KEYSERS atthe airport. In *s : view of the shoxt time between KEYSERS|zepoxt of receipt . a ' wey - “ Jeraret owe armnen's a~Scarmmees tee a meennate sty cereal zee * G001185 fortes
ete me * APOE De SAGA NAhcfore nce ei ee ne te Js0ra Dloscow, it would tren woo :, e ifthe NCD nec wasacd this ine » r e od ted & t oO ey . ef ft oo i) e ms i g be foersction isa tiene co ent GB ce cles ats, he oa furmation in time tO C41. Of Une Gos pore ampeGelin 4 > f} tl) ln ee feat dodanie ee ene ers NAO in nels SEYSHAS| met ex therelorve : motel ae nn me” wae ectl et 66 CGNssGeres Com psacee.y CYec.ais, Pages 15] - 154 of the previous susmavy contain informatica am regard tol Masthew vIES who succceced}lames ST 0 SBERC} saving arrived in Moscow in Sentember 1961, GRYAZNOV was the es ponsabie case Oicicer for JZUIUS accoruing to NOSENKO, Tae previous sumraary states (page 133) tha ZUsUS} Guring @ rouline debriefing, coniirmeé an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN, " woo visited the American House with someone from the United Aras Resubiic. ut a 2 so + a s . LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she 2. claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech, to. fie Further izquiry revealed that no Austrian passporst nad been issued "LILLIAN, "and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" mY replied that she had forgotten it, then-leit, and did not return, The previous summary stated that the above incident had been van by NOSENKO "AL. in connection with attempts to entrap Josepi = HORSE aae0 1960, a BS 1962. “GOCLLEG crATrm: mes fj ww wee hate A FMR YE aT reg ora a re TR ga ct mente 8 eRe pam nee et oN Beata aps Bie ven ES oy
14-00000 ” . e =o +” we eo a 2 nets sats, aan fl yas gore <= Page 1.9% Of ine Drevidus Sumi; yelates information Irom aoe Ae ae had Lan i ee a +pect ~ T. os 62 to tea, oy NOSSNKG that GAYAZNOV went to Sul. Leviin in early 1966 to obtain ss tWoO German women wWwno coud be House, During curyvent uicrviews, Wile Miatiier has been again covered ; with NOSENKO. ACCOTEIng 1@ NOSENAO, GAVYAZNOV acranied for “ these two women, agente G2 the Berin KGS Aesidentura, to visit Moscow " - uncer false Cocumentation, one as a West German anc the other as an : Austrian, NOSENAO curtner icentined tae "West German" agent, UVRANNA, "as having the cover ofa journalist, anc stated he believed a NHANNA! had mei MORONE bt rnerican House. Ina recent interview, : : FE. [Road postismed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl ° a ‘ ats american 10% Use who claimed ¢ to bé a journalist, The statements of a 4 [okie eéiore appear to subsiaatiate the report of N OSENKO. D Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO re- | ported that she was queried about her passport at American House and : ag a result the KGS returned her to East Germany without further atiem mpts to use hex at American House. NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i,e., 1960-1961, He has never suggested any connection witl{ ZUIUS, nor is there reason .to assume that he could be referring to the experience of Z2UI us| since SO this took place in the summer of 1962,. after -NOSENKO haé left the ne American Embassy Seciion. 9001187 shitty \debtoad eB atarnaemsietmemten ser @ seus = y Beer an tem ai Pe sneee te oe . ot soe e aureceei tn ETI EM erate a Fe nets FeO is
14-00000 PASS ob WORD MEARS tatu ARRON S REE nee S 6 e Po ry @. e = iss] a ¢ ¢ » i v cy ca) 3 i¢] Ns e & me *% £ a ran £: &: we Hf 3 3 ft | we ot oY Ao qt as ¢) ’ ty ‘ oO iG LCT KAOW eLougn abou)Zus “Shox abe oe to Dave exercised & any Supervi.ion in ine development: plea Granted that NOSENKS rr reer meme A - -o| weve} tae Sect is wnct NOSIAKS iitMent, at the end of 1962 Kn ee time any supervisory cunctions of NOSENAO terminated zona Wad Cid not arrive in Moscow until September 1931, rer.aineé in Moscow * . , Pages 103 ~ 169 of tue provious summary contain a Synowsis oF previous informa: ion from NOSZNKO in reaaré to[Paul JENNER - Basically, N NOSENXO had reported that when ise XGB learned that [Pau Pea NER] who was thought to be @ code clerk, was comir AE tc Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KCSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as JENNER] to Moscow, «A iemace ‘agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg aXer 7 - train aan the USSR. The female agent was to aay acquaintes , b oo - wiey JENNER|as a part of a ivture operation aga insq 3 ~20b 5. a Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with|J |FENNE =x} 56 -_ . NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both a ‘KOSOLAPOV and the iemale agent made the acquaintance of|J ENNER} bg Co | 28 oo. 0001188 Seeat rae seeks 0 natn - ~ ceo - oe cenyate A tacenatee oe - Roe alii 4 TRE ata eter cnt he bE aan te TT ee eee Se ve ‘ ves Le beet
14-00000 nae nRoSSLAPOV on * < ec Sy oar O hAeGulGw. a a & & Wen ww » oe a iv) id ry re," foe AS eee Vem 3 eee ee ra Se nae om ves ep Dee mwo young R a) eb ans rary @ oa ‘approacne . 48 "3 2 3 Sd 9 F . “ o Tat 3 Bool k rae my at i rg 5 i if ag 9, 3 3 ay a a v7 “gy : £5 4 i ‘a 8 a. a Qe Q ty ha nt f | ™ y > "3 y ‘es 4 4 -, 3 OK: Bombay J n ; 3 Ag abd a 3) oe “ . 3 74 ey a * a a 2) BS , 4g F 4 fre) 3 mm 44 aK Re » Tt. O 3 l ma} 3 . F 8 ry i. 4 § 2 te 9 3: 8 <q a a gone on courier bus - oe to 8 Women &.30 woe, he ex. Lote 2 Giane ob ee ratte te x c= sealTey qd th Q % . y & +o G 8 i) 63 fl ged 4 By Be bj 2, 3a | i) sed 4 ‘ $ # 9 rt g a 43 "3 33 e a. 8 2 33 5 2 i$ > ie 3 ro re) Re si 0 : 9 » z 4 a o6 8, + rq FE 6 cn) rel + kpeg “et ted Qe f a ta @ + oe “ E fe M 7 3 9 9 “i ny 49 ‘o 5 to Th 34 SB Rl no nat in ra 3 E 2. A “43 O 4. 8 OM > _8 » as © 3 e] Wry 3 a » n he went alone to mee aFport wne 460 OF & lroac stati 3 rs the Moscow ra couriers, O6 NN as never been shown a le ER om ee 3 known, \33 a Insofar as a KOSOLAPOV was app of KOSOLAPOV. oximately 3 «3 “eo ae nough Xa,%, bo. ' a G VO in ograph and remarks by NOSE? ~ te ho is p 1960, hi age in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a . ee oa g001189 oy > = tA we 29 aes Pio: AP a’ oom Th wale Ernie AEM 8 we erie Gon ae te ce TR Te ty student. ~ anes eomenene : univer si
bet Hag nO R EEN neo Rem meRseRTBR GS ce te ee sper ier nae: * Fem mm 6 ot ce saayg ny egarés| Paul -- ER] oe gedit fw ater ag eles . : CNTs S607Y as Te[ares bie oa NN aot eet Siasa 56505 Veoh ADOGLALOY eos at aye te eats Sm wap ete PNT TTR Le mee Tg ee ee on oe ee Tl ww Wes On T4E8 SEM Tass wh|2ENNGR from Sebssting Ute ete sas LOL oe be Gace sesGasae OSes THAlIGn Tars@s CussCusties Le 2, GASP On tle te oP ae AS to re) Sam le wm eee s= > -. we tee WE — te mn ean sgefe Care CHES fs Boe NER| wes Be Gey ae GalOW —GGUre b { 31 March 1966 train irom Finlanc to Mioscow, anc inat one Viator we KOLOSSOV ja name NOSENAG nassicentivled as an alias used by The above obvious Giscrepancy has not Geen anc cannot be Clagsi- ea AGLOSSSV) was citer Bay Bs ® a. 6 a ea al 3 on bea iy f a ss $ pt ee an fe) rg 3 G € s y 6) .on the same train as(JENNE: miseets indicaie that KOSOLAPOYV was not. sation with him on the train wouic appear clearly to be part of the operational eifort described by NOSZENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girk to[SENNER|s: the airports. There is no reason to question that tais girl was the female ager: of CRYAZNOV. In view oi the conflict between the train rmnaniiest and sia:ements by : NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the “boy student” was; whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV. or whether it may have been some -other person entirely. go011S0 ., . 7 . Or AS TT % Jo  @ - ofr en a a. Coreen SA \ Bk 7/6R od semen mee RRA See Serer
14-00000 evidence tuat ROSOLAPOVY coule = gee > Sat a a Foe em ws, ee ar See 0 em ow . JENNER Neither is it Accepied tlat the train wianiiesis are in error. mare amend ee rr a oe wens pee me TOTES, eae petween the train manifests anc ine statement of NOSENHKG thet KOSOLAPOV ané|[JENNER were on thc same train, If incdead XOSCGLASOV éieé not travel wits TENNER, tiaS GOCS Ot CSt25lISh an hat NOSENKO is wrong; it is evicence that Re Coes not Know someinin re gy ae, 25 the supervisur of KOSOLAPOV, shoud have Known according to his own statements, Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in ~~ regard to the ohn GARLAND|case. [GARLAND}was idertified by NOSZENKO as & code clerk whom the KCS was studying, but on whom , A no derogatory information was Gevelovec, NOSENKO provided practically no Getails in regard to|GARLANS other than to idently him as a code clerk, ; GOLITSYN has reported on aa incident which it is considered ? relates to the trip oc GAnDRxS rom Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November . 1960, GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB : Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American ¥ a code clerk would be arriving. in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that } : go01191 a ae ; _e a . a 4 R34) eB
14-00000 ASS Lt ee or G& Clerk which the te ft? ce Cte ic 4 ACG UuLintance wha ua et - Pe 2 - 2 ow ~— wom ee te oe a, 3." “= 2cD hoped 69 COM 3s Moeacow, GOLITSYN talked to ACSULAPOV we 4 = = Ve 2 *, yee a = Lf lace * see fae Pw n Sqn tee @ Peace in tne Compartimens Of the AMecican om the irain from Selsingl BOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the ofticer reiuscc to Ciscuss tae case and he, GOLITSYN, conciucéed from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successiul recruitment, ident It has been Getermined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the €BI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the Embassy Section" as (Inu) ZENKIN of the American Department, GOLITSYN also statec that the officer was in Helsinki uncer the alias £SERGEZSV (SERGZYEV), but was unabie to-furnish a 2rst name and patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN veierred to (inu) ZENKGN es ' being from the American Department, SCD. it is considered that there is no doubt that the (Inu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name an ~ gauL1s2 ,
14-00000 sero, : CDNKG has furniencé iniormation. NOSENKO . fn g z f & at i ‘ 4 P Re ° Fe} a '¢) . 4 ment, SCD. According to NOCLENAO, one geoup of the Second Section ¢ both beforé cu.c alter 1900 - 190. was engaged in "operaiive cames" ! . ‘ against Amevican intelligence anc tual ZENKIN was a member or this 3 group. NOSONKO has acvised tii ZENIKIN traveled abroad in connection : wits activities of the Seconc Secvion, Suc that ce ac no speciiic Know.eége tape tee - regarding the activisies of ZENKIN oa these trips, NOSENKO has iur- oo nished some iragmentary information wnich ke learned in re ZENKIN N and when the full name of SERGE fY2V (ZENKIN) to <cner with & photograpa is obtained, this iragmeniary information from NCSENKO pas a may prove quite useiul, ot , ; As regards tne KOSOLAPOV GARLAND matter and the opinion & 3? : , mereseet PY GOLITSYN based on the rezusal of ZENKIN to discuss the case Godard « at it must have resuitec in 4 successiul recruitment, ‘ 2 there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presuinsiion. According £ NOSEN ‘KO, ang there is no season to disbelieve NOSZNAO on tais point, ZENALN was in the Second Section, not tae First Section, ix . 1966 - 1961, He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case 33 9004193 C45 rey CD | +4 won ee ree we -+ Raga. ree ncanimant to eal sGiostnns 2 jew . We Site Ee tse 2 MSR URISE NES SEN RCOTEN TCE TSS SCOR Manoa
fw am tee eile Sonate ry ea . OV V SOF ~ Na cen “~ ry} 5 14-00000 28 » : “6 ‘ br 8 3 ‘3 a fe of 5 ‘g a 3 % . aa Ms 4 " 9 ry as $ a ° 3 t shy g wy ofs ‘a 3 at Fwy . : 2 rr) ata as et i Q ‘4 id QO om ee ar is 2 . aed a ta a) d “a a a 9 @ - a i) Y 3° 5) ara) a 9 yo a BR 8 3s 2 mo . 3 @ “@ . " 4 Bag 3 » a Oo & “3 2 “ 9 9 rao i 8 ys Oo 8 4 ¢ % 8 eS og 8 & "3 4 s3 9 = ys ; PI 2 « ' a Q ; ‘2 ted uy % rf) : a J bn 2 in e Ps w a ° ro) uy ad iS) * v8 ; 4 . 3 re) — 4 : “4 y ee O S aa : nf 8 eb 4 eS) 3 ne m ; ‘ > ® wn rd 44 ) | cored g Pe) 3 te ' 5 : “ ig 4 “ ‘ " 9 Be} A 9 ‘ Oo a cs 4 an) oO 42 3 wa +3 ‘g > 3 ws ye o ws “ Ad “¢ 4 Py * a4 5 at 4 ‘ ‘2 . ' . "= my tad “4 ‘ aa to vy » ‘3 9 . te © ZG w ud NM fs § 2 a SF o zs ° an g . wn nan” 3 $09 7 re gO > 2 is we Wns , Oo ts 2 0 Cs o Fo Ba 2 BS OG 3 ” go g# 2 & & rs G9 ‘ i) “f : fA) 2 , % Pe) a, Sw. { a 4 2) “4 > RS) 3 3 3 0) g ‘6a o . . y . e * ¢ ee Ye am ot “4 ie) ot "gy % v 2 ® oO 4 Zo a a af 7 Ltd os ren : % etd A 4 $ > ‘ of CC 9 3 iQ) 9 ‘ 3 = ot oO me} ot , a In i # *§- fa a “Os 3 2 . oy a“ y wv i 4a: 2 4, ‘ re] 9 n €3 7 pe & Nos fg $. & Bo A slo » 3 ta 4 R Bee Sa gk fe i 8 so 2 . 8 8 o3 z ‘3 a Hod ® te Py ~& a a 2 “4 rc sot ares . . 2 fd i) “a "% i) QO <a > ny i o [9 f a Ps ; p ott ao oo. @ 9 & %¥ 9 6 «» « HY wz * Q 2a ~— N yA 4 3 48 12 pt 3 it q i] i oO $a Siw. 9 #)8 g¢~ § &@ # & So gos Gs ge. iA of A ta a og i] 08 ‘ ‘¢ ret re P=) % 204g es 2 8 2 4 8 m 2 woe 4A oa Yo go gl wy “a c) ° re RD 27) ¥ :4 o 3 yA 3 aa te w ne i¢ ad » fxg 'e) ay o e i a « ~¢ (Of xn UW 4 os a OKO gw 8 & 8 8 8» & HH 8 od I wd a a ® 8 ¢ & & z i  ® if ay $3 Fy 3 id a a ae] . * rs) on e a D ee 9 4 a ord MS 14 ry) y ‘4 nen . & any A on De . . a 7 % 6 es > 3 5 2 os 5 . 3 aw 3 oO 9 sed S 4 : 3 4 . “ a Od S 4g - YY: 3 w © 4 &§ S S 8 tf a oo Of a or ao om» Gg «mw 8 os . 8 & o : oe) 4 9 re} 2 Ad ? 3 ~ Fy 3 5 e@: fe 2 fe] v a wv o Pe « . oe 3 2 3 o y: | : y ed - v4 rom ry ny Pe 7 2 g ‘ ae a a ng of Goong $9 4 & Ho gb gq € 4 9 ° 3 aed J Py otg “4 ’ re “4 a . F4 i) pws “4
on ' ee ee z ce eat ae : re we tee neve wey feu e seen eee Ves . : . ™atier imat the inéividual has previews. snmission, cach trap must pave Species Ma Geka VES wich caus must inevitascy a ve ocen invo.vec trip . furtser suppor. the assumption thas NOSEN? AO should save xnown Gbout . ¢ corte ~paot . - vos . . ; the z KOSOLA POV IG ARLAND Er tPs . The pos.iion taken by NOSENKG on this point is that he accepts + sace moe a tote Su hee BOW ano Te eee the statemen: oy the interviewer that KOSOLADPOV mace such @ trip, but he says what Be, NOSENKO, simply Vi Soes NGt Gow anything ascui neces ee seeds wee re ST ee eS ee a eee ; _it.. He adds only. that had anything siz nisicant.deve.opec in the siucy ' : offer, ne he woulé have been aware of it. - hae EA DT ae cee * . .,. .NOSENXO, as supervisor. of the group working against coce 77 apy Ga tae eet MMe a + Pow eeeteeae S , pm ne clerks, should have known ‘of any, trip of KOSOLAP OV to Fintand in aa la tet cate ee ee Cree Wah es ey A ere re eee mo 1960.0r 1961, NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip tu Cusa 4 . from 15.N November 1960 +o circa i7 December 1960. The possisiwiy | _ exists that t tis could 7 nave accoun ted ior his sack Ge mnowsecge OZ the an . . trip of KOSOLAPOV to Relsin inki and rewurn to Moscow on 16 Novernoer , ; | so . 9605 However, 3 NOSENKO 1 has Not attempted to use his Cuban trip 93 | ro as Oa te ee byes . . See ke . aa . a a possible explanati on for nos snowing of the November KOSOLAPCV ' Eade er ep Beene wee eee . ene et ee me nek eae . Dott ee ae oe ; ‘ iy tele sve. eV VE Eat Ge “Ob ~ whee mw ae ee EER . 3 As with the JENN aR KOSO! LAPOV case, itis not possible at AUR DEEERORN Han VeristetanEnar einen nite Reon en at wins ww t .  eememrimmeatahead neraebits te: 06 this time to resoive the discrepancies pertaining to she[GARLAN xDL ‘ : wd tibet - 35 a . KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any kaa Sell gaan atar es. saul 2h ae, dap tannins ~ me mane oe sem a ee cis . . Ny
- this operational activity of KOSOLAPOY is another ap varent instance, : “as in 12 the[EENNEA once, of his not Knowing something he, by his own . . . t Seve sgtitements; should have known. tots } . 5 eC eee on Vebewed: in’ “the content of the total nucwledge of NOSENKO of | . . . : wee ee _opeepiens against code clerks, “owever, neiiher the préblems in the «feb nor those in thd Gani Obs ese, singly’ ‘or combined . . - ‘in any’ way: represent conclusive evicency thet NOSENKO WAS GD suDpEer= eo Wile .3r vigor -of KOSGLAPOV-or that he was not responsible for the code clerk ' . - 4 1 He gees “operations « éescribec by NOSENKO., This s atement, however, was not ‘til’. igubstantiateé in the previous summary. Fae ' . : ‘Pages 193'- 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity againes cote cies [Fosere “ — various sources, a ; “. fnéluding NOSENKO,” -NOSENKO first mentioned the case in’ 1962. . ; | ON. 8-7 According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work eee azine koROE vas KOSOLAPOV. When: ft was learned tna MORON =] ne | . wv doe Cand an ‘Embassy éolleague, a Marine guard by the: name of co were ios soplann wing a vacation trip to Warsaw, arranjements were mace with tne i SS 2 ©. UB (die Polish Security. Service) for 4 female Polish'dgent to come to ‘ _ 7 roils! “Mescow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as sons | = , andl BEC) The-intent was.for the agent, either on the train or sub- J . ae "8 gequéntly in Warsaw;-to meet and compromise oj She a Se | Oe ~ 5 yFy . ‘ a Q001196 ? eae fing : : } a a eraply ” ; | es SEROE | ola as i . * 8.4 Lk 8 ow = . a ve ; . ‘ : as 7 me sty Sadia + wn et eee ee ee Fe ce TO OO eee ee ce re ec) Roa ss BARES eT any
14-00000 successlully accompiisned this, but duc to cerisin problems in KGB-UB ; liaison relations, it was not pOssinae @ for the KGS to expacit this cirectiy, ‘ : The previous summary stated that with respect to the female : jB-agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NCSENKO nor , a : KOSOLAPOYV playeG the ro.es in thd MIORONE ase Cescribec by wo 4 NOSENKO, That summary cited the travel of NCSENKO to Cuba and : 7 KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as tie] ORONS | 7 2 trip to, Warsaw as evicence oi the impossibility of NOSINKO and : , oo q -KOSOLAPOV being invo.vee personally in this part of tae/MORONS| 06 8 . case, . ; _E NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female : agent and-‘made the arrangements to place ner on the train to Warsaw, Fiokisalanappades departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. itis not oO | 4 snown when KOSOLAPOV leit Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the : . 16 November 1960 train manifest 2s departing Helsin«i for Moscow. : F Z NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 fox Cuba. The a activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possibie within the * ares known time frame, ey ; a ; It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role 0 in the MORON NEjcase, varticularly wnen he stated that he, NOSENKO, on .placed the female agent on the train, NOSENKO now clearly states that gooL197 37 a - SEGRE) me a petmnnennnren nine digimart o= Sot Se amne ra wt beete HAH ELE Seg, cegtatmetitoe Shennan ame SESS Tm tema aer gah Fae - , x SBP Se Cease) wets < Ry 5 SAS SS gush ene RRS AY Seatheageantat
14-00000 oe . KROSOLAPGOY Was tire ony NOG officer in contact wiih the Polish a i ; 7 4 ’ go cf] 3 eF e Pa kt ao NOSENAO previously stated that a AGB technician who was on tle train train arrivec in Warsaw. Later NOSINNO said that instead of talking @ to the technician personaly, he may have reac the report of the technician aiter he returned from Cuba. The activities cescrizec by NOSINXO with regaré io this matter "are accordingsy possible within the Known time frame. It is not con- ‘sidered that the retractions NCB ENKO has made from his original -~. . .statements on this operation are of sufticient significance to materially ‘discredit him. L Page 198-of the previous summary contains the statement that | MORONE| when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana iVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSSNKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw ¥ o or heard concerning) MORONE (page 194). The sursmary, Rowever, / . ' cited a number of reports that[MORONE\nad been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparentiy unaware = Hf , ‘of the sexual involvement ofVdBxG with "IVANOVA's friends. " De 7 9004198 C4 cPocT ae ee i > , eo EEL, - . ~ - id - * ° = ied Poet eee aie Lag ee ek - ~ : Foo nee aoe
se aaecatalineiteaietieentetnateetet aamtahanaiiedathmeamanantedaaame erase camaamemmemenimanetthnd acco aceomeat aac 30 of at least some involvement of IDVANOVA with|acOc mo nished information on 4 ceveionin ob [GaRcia (Antho ny A. GARC: zh: Weseu O22 Lae invesvemensc oi]GAs with IVANOVA, He nes also wave ec taat the posa.oility was co! t militiaman/KGB guard at the United S:ates Embassy that IVANOVA, her girl friezd, 20lOx5 Z}ane @& Marine guard, possibty Baeza] been "in the city," then returned to the "slat" of one of ine Marines where the girls spent the night, This apparently placed the reliability f£ IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section, According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pictro ent of OS OLAPOY, CECCHI, Italian coox« at the American Embassy anda c=J reyorted on Americans at the Embassy, but ob ecalied nothing specific that CECCHI hac reported abouy M Sox9 The summary also can Embassy employees NE\had ad: a 8) states that{MORONE Was said by other Ame De ee e & m er wy pe o a to be a close friend of CECCH! and that MOR market money exchanges with CECCHI, During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information concerning MCRONS| but he, NOSENKO, gd01199 : = [o(SR
sae 0 | ae SVU eae cf .sORON Z]wita ClCouL et & x e oe bt re) er ae p o He a! ; or » G ee - epee i: one =- ole es eee tte’ NGOSENAO has wise imuccied ial uc AOS sometinnes suspected, “ wey - = oo *, — “ne Jon Pu “ oe go mierestiaoine AGS, Tue KGS of course Pig pe fully report everyting o « Was aware that CiCCzl was involved in the 5 ata Marcet, However, e« whether he reported to the KGB everyining Ae cic and with whora is Open tO questiusg;, Vide, “Ess Lv ANG (case SClow, ' The comment was mace in the previous summary that NOSENAG Was unaware safc met some Soviet femaies in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat c1SHAZLY, an gyptian-national KCS agent of the Sixth Depari:ment who was aiso reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this asariment, A veview of oiiicial records indicates that co report $3 oF, ‘2 dication iH ° at he admitted or that anyone cise has reported that ne was intimate with any of them. The conciusion of the previous summary inthis regard was baged on a misizierpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in tre Sarwat apartment, the story os NOSENKO oa this matter is con- sidered completely acceptable, 40 goui2o ule
14-00000 Seeal NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENXO was AT A eens : cae Leta ais eae A few comments are aporopriate conceraing remar previous summary on pages 169 « 204. Comments were mice there concerning/five code clerks, Macvice ZWANG, Joan TAYLOR, Frank Os 06, O¢ OD 06,06 ; 1), DAY, Robert DWELLY and Josep z of sper‘iically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting not supervisor of all MGR operations against code clerks, The Zo.low- ing observations may assist in placing these cases in . iad perspective: L (a) (Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on"! durivig 1960 - 1961, The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity 9 | b sgaine{ZWANE|vas inadequate, First, reporting of NOSENKO on EW ANG)containee no reference to the relationship of ZWANG|with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has icentiiec as a AGB agent. Although aoe [ZWANG]deniec sexual relations with his maid, ne did admit to some intimactes with her in her apartment, Ob During polygraph examination |ZWANG)eacted when he 1 sow orares sosgety
- woe ce i er rT nr nt or ener rerannner eee SESE EW ERG EO a ee a a OSS GV bitte PCa GMa CON GE wee tase > i) e © oe in & @ fe a4 a G « ba Ss ‘ ee" - %. et wg itt eye a le ae Tae fe te cae OUT 2480 Can DE Diu dSausyY CN DGInCG Of tauerYy Memory Gn oS © ty ct et p ee i) Lis part or failure om tne pas es tae Waid to rer of this reiationshin to the AGE. Second, NOSEANWO nad not reported that 52a was invoived in the currency operations of Pietro CECCEI. (A jact that previous summary inipliea he should have known from ACB agent CZCCHI.) Srom the record, now- ever, it appears that the dealings EWEN were not directiy with C=2CCril, but rather tarcugh other Embassy mat CE2CCriiwas either Ce employees, Maing it plausibi unaware of tie invoivem ast oflzws ANG jor , 48 NOSENKO 3 himse br stated he suspected, CECCHI did not revort all Getails of his currency operations to his AGB handjer, {o) [Joha TAYL R)- NGSENKO scersisie(Zay Loa] 0b 0 asa State Department code clerkjand target of KOSCLAPOV. he KGB was aware of the involvemenz of TAY LOR\with f 0& his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit{TAY LOR] before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might CTANTy ae ugg ih. $ wibR
SPR Dav ade tne sete Mee SPOTTER s wes Saye BLS sist Saris 85 RN ou ony % RNTIR : LAPSES CS Meta dees ecehtanes > ae ed 0 endganzer the pians for a vecruhiment anproacn ro Femes STORSBERG| WhO had Ocean uscer development jor 2imost a year and was considered more valuable, the expla 3 nation given by NOSZNAO was subject to cuestion failed to take inte account the fact that aithou n|STORSBES G| 66 was not approached until eiter the departure oi[Payon} Db the aa gsinsi(SToaseEaT|vas underway before Eat Lo@sccame involvec with his maid, Further, itis apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest inj TA rLOR|OS since ne was approached ata later date outside the USSR on the basis ot his previous afiair with his maid 3 (c) }E Fran a “OR <O identizie ed Frank \? a State Depar ment code ciérE\who was the target o: either Moscow, KOSOLAPOYV or GRYAZNOV, According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting' was learned abo <[DAY anc no oper- tI ational measures were taken agaizis Say The previous ob summary noted that in July 1961 [Dax|trav veled to the Caucasus with his friend and{formex overt CIA employee, 6%, yé Agricultural Atiache G, Stanley BROWN] It was also stated that the two were uncer surveillance by five persons ae | 9004203 43 SEORET + ™ 3 hPa E
14-00000 seraneasetergnaiees @ APenasPen wet erature ne en ct Zto NCSENKO, surveillance aneé any other Jocal coverage of any erapioyee at the Uniied Siates Snicassy : who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD, It wouic asnear that the r t ' 4 locai organization was trying to do a thorough job on[Day | Ob 0g and[BROWN| ‘but it apparently was nonproductive, it Goes not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a irip ae procuced no results. (a)| Robert DWELLY|= NOSENKO hes related in con- siderable Getaii the eiforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOGV and O& 0 KOSOLAPOV to involve|Robert DWELLY, a coce cierx|in Moscow irom April 1959 - July 1960, in 4 homosexus. com- promise operation. According to NOSENXO, a homosexual - agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion BWELLY}was a . : homosexual. “ ae | Gou12c4 > ‘ i i iH ash tivese dae
14-00000 wo Pe oye gt my et eg tem oh none wae at 2 HOT 65 TO Tehoun to COU Tne Statement O32 NOSENKO conceraing MGL ellurts to Cotermice wren : Ob anG wherd OW SLLY [was poling "into the city” (Moscow) G that a hornesexual Cormuromise situation could be n arvanged, There wer o A o ee et G fe] tes Pe Py ve ft. 6 < Les) Ha Q i : 3 ® f gt u me ¥ ° 3 taeir eiiorts, zccorGing io NCSEN KO, OG | DWELLY has Categoriczelly denied being a normo- sexual; NOSENKO has not said ne was, but ory that the nomosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed] DWELLY as a eee i. > UP Re . we a homosexuai:. There Coes net appear to be any reason tO consiGer the statements of NCSINK 0 abou DWE ELiY| Ob aa reflectin (e)| Joseph CAPFEY\- x has identified \ Joseph GAFFEY|as “eer seal The previous summary noted that NOSZNKO had siated the KGB had tried to lur adversely on NCSENAO. ~~ o Py [GAFFEY fat downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, we 3 ad an agent of DEMAIN in the American House. ne” way of comment, the previous summary stated thaq sees Ylarzived in Moscow in September 1961 an taat| Fred KADERAhad repozied that{GAFFEY|had told him . he had been ixtimate with a Russian girl at the AMEIGELCS a 38 i a or)
oo ar nouse, It was furthers wowed thas \aars ay was recaiued jrom Moscow in ine sumer of 1yud secuuse of Grunken~ aurin ft mess an BELO L Vw LaG auniiieG Ouig intimate with IVANOVA ai the American House and at ser apart~ ment and that she Aad citimed pregnancy. As to whether ine a5uve inlormaiion raises a guestion concerning NOSINKO, the following saCters should be considered: (1) NOSENKO has stated that Curing the latter part of December 1961 ke was part tire in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that.he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 19062. (2) In addition to the inf . xmation previously a gs Y (curing inter- Oh . view, Gar EY\also stated that he was first: ~~ intimate witn IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with hese later on three 06 occasions at her apartment, According to|GAFFEY : oy IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May Or nAr, 2: eat “a bee ~ 3 = em oto 8
14-00000 z [A a er ar a ee re fiwes oe oe ate 2902, White is Goosoximnuiesy four montns after ® £ e > NOSENSAO hoo Stated He wwansierved to the Seventh Deparunen:, The matter of review by NCSZNAO of OTU veporis irom r.icro- paGone coveraze on tue United States Embasoy has previously been P & s mentioned in this summary. Pajes 226 - 235 of the previous summary contained a ceiaileG account o oi microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and e e Gamage estimates prepzired by tne Americans. The previous conclusioa sustain nis claim to have been Deputy re was that his intormation did no Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports, Cormments have been mace in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion, A few remaras, itis believed, will assist in a fuller understar“i-~- . of the micropsone matter, In the material brought out by NOSENKO u.. 1964, there was a Single sheet of paper containing on one side hand- written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro=- phones (those which were being snonitored) in the United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous surmmary and need not be . repeated here, The acquisition of this list by NOSENXO was character- -— ized in the previous suramary as singular end it was stated that NOSENKO A - 0001207 . 2 * * 2 : . z . se a a camet une AIEEE re OB. ey dbegattnn aoe ete RENT SERS ESS iS NONSSARANCRSSE NS 3 SER EAM Rew ERS
he) t & ef te “ o La 8] eo St t: a be t tal was & tt ce Na fi be a 2eG SNe Circurnstances wa be ie) 3) as) a Oo y : al at & gu au > w at getiown pf tem tiene ywtit 15748 ae PCCCINUIGN Gi 1G 125e UNiis 2 yitr, a ee ee en a a, eee eee _ Weare oe DPUGUceG 42 iOF Gark on Geneva, : & Seeing current interviews. une mectter of thease tiew bas DEC . WETS CUPTess se rvicews, wae Maier Of the aoove ..8t 4as OEEA ee rl coveree in consicerably greater duiail with NOSINXO than hac seen Gone Oeliore, Tis expianaiion, both of the clvcumsiances which led to nis acGuiring the list as wellas of his still having i: in nis possession judgmenx: of the previous surimary, NOSENXO has statec that :. « Fy Criei of the Second Section, First Uepartment, cesired some "zoints" for use against targets os his section. NOSENKO uses the tezm “point? Se not as meaning just a micropnone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit waich includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors ana translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take," The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans anc, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem. : hae Pay ” far wget eg OE page tte eee gee ee matteo dar ne Pg RTI PHT een epee opt edi Sayre ee According to NOSENKO, most oz the available "points" were * f assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the. Unitec States i Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Viadimir A, XLYPIN, ; - if held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chies of the First Section Viadislav . KOVSHUK, Vladimir 1. PETROV, anc¢ NOSENKO, the purpose oi which ae _— g001208 : SECRET : FR LA Bi ME ce ee eee
14-00000 WES to Ciscus tin the poSeouaiy Gf Wwinporiryy Ciscontinain we us fete tt we eT ae ne ote tows wot 2 mam ? ambassy "points" controlce oy ine Pivat Section, anc termi: ama wa ate re een wen ote af hia gantian PETROV to use ta PUINS  25asmee ATZCts Of Gis Section, te w G6 SOON NT ew ye bn oe mad . ete a wee ig wm BI DOTA * ng te « HCCOLGIAE tO NOSINAO, PoTRGYV oz Gugat tO tic TIGeuns & cast Or Names Of certain iargeis to Walch ne wished to give tecanical cover- . ¢ ge. During the meeiing, AOVSHUK avgarenily ioox a piece of paver which PETROV hac ana wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and resicences, When the meciing enced, ack to his office, a pe we we NOSEN KO had this paper anc he ico Contained on the reverse side oc i.e paper were the following names in Russian: [LUBIN, vats oe BURTIN| (anc[Sipe BURT} “ af The name A, A. MIAZAY LOV was listeé next to the name of LUBIN| ue bey and the name of ¥. E, CHEARNZETSEV was listed next ta the name o 7 Ob SMITH| NOSENXO has expiaine thay LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTD x] 06, 06, Db and [Sipe BURT IN]we ere among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Secozd Section, NOSENKO siated he imew nothing more about the four non-Sovie 18 names except that they were targets of PZ TROV. NOSENKO stated tsar he could not be positive of the cate of the meeting other than that it occurred while ALYPIN was Chiei of the First Department. {Accoreing to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as . Arann? : . : i BL si . : . - - ee wo veer nee * - re ae nat . ~ AR
Pea Soe aa Tie eater Crieff oiine First De pe oa SST a er qe et ® 8 & by t °. we POUL GOm-Sovies Navies caves Oo COUST teat) Lil! ars eee 7 Res ~~ , = to Civca mlc-19G1.) Research in regerc Ob 0s 4 -e tot UT afte BURTIN|a nu pusne nm ween uan LUBIN} ANG inat Wal, GUATIN an6 Sive BURTIN are correct names, 66 6 cae SS ae te we 2% pee Potrero ree nen "ee oat “, a fae ee mt Wie. Size being tne Wile of WLLL GUAT | fees TST8G ATE ATETiCan has Still not Seen icertiiiec. In view of tz Go: the meeting AccorGing to NO Was places by or @ bound volume wich NOSENXAO cails a “working copy." cared by ALYPIN as cir @ above, i: ca June *96i. SENKO, the viece of paper described above NOSENAO with oiner notes he Kept between the pages. according ta NCOSENXO, wis an accountabie, registerec notebook ee q issued to all officers in which they were supposec to write aii their notes, cestroying any other rotes, According to NOSENKO, he, like many cther officers, did not poeaa4 ompletely follow regulations anc the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook octen actec as a zile rather than being kas stated that with him to concerning cériain used int when ke leit the First Sec S@ way required by regulations. NOSENKO tion ne took various notes the Seventh Department; these incluced notes he had drafted use in briefing FEDOSEYE 6001210 50 | oo First Section activities for 47 oon ome SE PORT ce i Cena roe 1 Ne eg wet HY ie,
14-00000 we fee o, ome Tae ar, % sae On mes oe a ow - ar ‘ . i era HOt intentionaly take the pariiculay tiuzer pertaining to microphones; os sqe e fe te ome me: ee eee ota oT nae ae. ~ ce Oye an it was just in the group oO. notes ne tooK Jlong Waen he went to the Seventh + * In consigeration of the above explanation oy be noted that ne 4150 bron Mb Wits im 1. 19664 his no of FEDOSEYEV azc certain notes he .0.. sly Bac Gls0 prepareeé walic in the First Section; e.97., his notes lc... scture to the Seventh Directorate in regazd to &@ "mass surve..cance’ on the american Embassy. By inciuding a section (pages 236 - 235} on the mmow.edge of NOSENKO ofthe KGB cryptologic attack on Unitee States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his informaiion on this subject. NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB hac never succeeded in reaGing enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible fox communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what ’ : extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known eo . cooi2it . ouge we) ry Pp) ¥) ee ea OS - TO Rn see
a eres a <Ccee Xo a ta DFOVsOUs FUN the excention of ABIDIAN, N resnonsiole case civice to his claim, NCSENKO sa was CIA, but he hasnever icentizie knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSEN CIA is not known, NOSENKO, 48 Deputy Chiei, was not awar KOVSHUK, thasa leea wha Cee ws Ae As regards some oi the other Li are appropriate, fa) XS Pare Dewar Stmaent, wit wee aed CeasTeG DOSsien fay) > me © 2 dy been es tha iste aSte @ of ali of the ac G individuals, a-: tadlisned, Zowever, th BLY. OSENKO has never indicated any «nowiecge we. MOS Surely KOV. tes monte Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yes GARBLER was surely snown to the FCD as 4 Moscow, It is presumed that the at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was “American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not 52 ~o : ° ms Fare a CIA employee before going to FCD furnished the SCD go0L212
14-00000 nee Ne mee oe arrive in Moscow until November 156.1, only a rnonth . beiore NOSENKO ieit the Firs: Section for the Seventh on Lay ee 64 >" Q 3 ot Q « ~ S fof bad uw fi t bey gt at “S & rt Qe ee & fh e 33 Be ee iu i?) a oO by o. ee be] [ ys a CIA oilicer, yet he was a CLA aoilicer, 2 a+ we genet gael ops — 3a 8 FepereeG tac presen e a O: intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow izom October 1960 to September i961, The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statéments o. and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather taan what was actualy happening. s .(c) [steve WASHENKQ|was correcily identisied by NOSENKO as CIA, William HORBALY was CLA anc ideniiiieé by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CLA officer or cooptee, , (6) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected oi being a CIA officer. George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that ‘ KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate ‘ , 9001213 C ene tee isa ek cee . wee we ne Cement > silent ce eee
14-00000 rm, that the KGS had reasons to coneidar the activities of BOWDEN with suspicton. It ie not belleved that the Heted fatlures of NOSENKO to identlly CIA officers are of particular significance in establichtng that he was ev wae not Deputy Chiaf of the Firat Section. There are too many an- kaown factors which would need to be considered. Despite our asgump- tiona as to what the KGS knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not keow of the CIA alfUlation of theae people, (b} the information known te the KGS was not available at the Firat Section, First Department, lewel, of (c) information available to the Chief of the Firat Section or te a epeeific case officer waa of no official concern to NOSENKO and | was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is suggested in opite of claims by NOSZNKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propeneity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of hia own hnowledgeability hse been seen elaewhere in this cage. Pages 252 «- 258 of the previous surnmary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and Bis 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With wegard te the Cuba trip, there ls collateral evidence of his travel as desertbad by NOSENKO, and there (a no substantive reagon te doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement wae made ia 54 | | go0i214 | | | i
a! ATURE Meee hame teatemeerem sere the previous summary that tae vravei of NOSENAG to Cuba in 2960 7 damaged his Clairn that he was supervising onerations against Embisay code clerks ai the time, To accept vne valiaity of this judgment 2s to say that no supervisor in the SCD woiule be permiiice to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence, As rezar vds the trip of NOSENKG to Bulgaria in 1961, dor which there is no collateral inforrnation, the previous summary conclucea iat his account of the trip was untrue anc argued that such a trip to 2 Bulgaria, ii it did take place, ata time when be claimed the operation 1 agains STORSS ERG|was reaching a climax and his subordinates were "Napoarenty paanning to exploit|KEYSeRgt newly -discovered vulnerability, " it would indicate tuat the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was Cis~- pensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKXO Gié not travel] to Buigaria and only highly specwative reasoning as to why nis account of the purpose of the trip was untrue, As to th STORSSERG [ase, while it cannot at present be proved # that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSED NO leit i for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting {vom MORON, that it nad to have taken place before tne time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning Tae Spence : & 55 GLADOT wlll. le we atte amt woe eaiee eee . . FT te eaten ape
14-00000 of NOSENKO in Moscow at the .iine thie pitch was mace, it would anpear ‘ that NOSENAO was comparatively free io go to Bulgaria because this O4 | phase of tae] STORSZ =. G)oseration hac been completed, = opm, «tf were ey nee Ue” le we - ed lane As to the KEVS2RS case, there is no apparen: proolera since tis clear that the approach to [k=ySzaSpoo! place aier NOSZNKO pee @ furthermore tzat the KGB nrobably cic not becorne aware nails EYSERS wes a homosexual, and therezore returned izom Bulgaria, an potentially vulnerable, until just before tne pitch was mace, In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO oi his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are noi essentially true, nang or that if they are true they necessarily refiect on his claim to having been supervisor of coce clerk operations. "9001246 ae Le be Le ae | SEP RET : SEE! | . . rae ae ae ~ See te : x XR
14-00000 4 - fr] . <i, . . , 3 3nd 4 Sonat i N CG? ve ‘ Brink TR RRR ee oe wl elie NOT CREDIS ste Seclagsir. SECRET * “4 a be fl , va ; 7 : e | ., i ony NeBRITIS > < ° wee aA te ee, O's RICA? REAFTER A.D A i | =) 3 a? . fq iH = ‘ : . (o) Lo ‘ j f . . , . 4 4 : 7 f . a “ 7 we -_ . . eee ee OA ee ER) REET me OTS Meme wi NRE woe al
en, Se £9 wi F, NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonweaith Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous conclusion) The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was.a Deputy Chief of the Seventh - Department thereafter. | .NOSENKO has. stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. CRIBANOV, Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position. According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was Co0i2is: Gewegraeey sod Sechecgsl cciigs j its a i
woe tee Gbicd willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV cid not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to . return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSrHUKas a Deputy. Viadimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief: of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indi- cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to oe GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB. This section actually covers two periods in the claim ed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart- ment, Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de- tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962, The previous summary (pages 268 ~ 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of '. March ~ June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases ; Cs 8 gd01219 BG en meets vat ce hed emt ieee Heels! rrr ne Beh Mae i ee ee e
14-00000 %, . a. bse ake BP are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett OG 06 Ob Ob JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS| Apparent conilicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO, It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO cid not hold the claimed position of Chief of the , , Paaeny First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against[ JOHNSON, JONES, “BIENSTOCK and 06, 06 / 06, 66 BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals, | A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari- 0G In the| Wallace Everett JOHNSON]case, it was previously noted- fication, that\ JOHNSON prrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962, The summary sug- gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend { encies of] FOHRSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO, NOSENKO during curm ant yintegviews 7 SECRET vv Santer ne cent Wes erat ie Sse ne eS ne TOT ee te cae
14-00000 en Cane ES » PPP teens cam or oN be ume has stated that the KGB learnea of the homosexual tendencies of Fo1s208 "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEYV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENAO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hote: wneze FOAASOS| stayed, They mei{icNsox here anc reported his apparent homosexual sqraenciese In regard to tine| William Carron JONES |case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation . ageine SONES including the woman indmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited. i ° as an agent to work against[JONES|and was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENXO concerning enefFOREScase are compatibie with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, In regard to the| Natalie pieSstock case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but was abie to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI, That he did not know all the cetails con~ cerning mn BrexstBcR ase cou:d be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the cane oliicer directly invoived with the case, In regard to th Fiore SRAUNS case, in the previous summary a) the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why[BRAUNS Wisived the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom|BRAUNS | met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that f 4 9001224 SECRET : wfoe ta cs of H -?
14-00000 Baw lars atiarede” the Seventh Department was not concerned wita ioreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKXO, accord= ing to the previous summary, was aware that] BRA NS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB tarough his visa application, In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO,* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact wna fRACS|was a former Soviet citizen could very well have rade[BIARSS of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of é . the ScD, However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case. would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Departe ment sine BRAUNS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated tha BRAUNS listed on a isa appli- cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. [BRAUNS}nad a * By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same COU 83¢. 5 SECRET. Aelia tab Sedchate yeteah aes
14-00000 rene: relative or relatives in Leningrad, Although}BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concern- ing his background and occupation Irom his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR. Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary revicws remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his imowledge of the case, Tnuere is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now atates he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV., The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in, what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSHIY case and infor~ mation from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differ- ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining wnether these apparent differ~ ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case. | NOSZNKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom “. American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the 9001223 . 6 SECRE BS wtp ot aba Gana Faeroe amare ee + . ® Ver AME Ue St aah we eget be levipye re te . wad
14-00000 KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY insice the USSR. The previous summary stated that NOSENXO did not know when the BELITSHI. operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did n:t know the operational details and contact arrange-~ ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva. NOSZNKO during current interviews has indicatéd an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit- ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR, The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKHIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSHKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR. , ; There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis=- crepancies between the statements by NOSENXO on the BELITSKIY | case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO a, . 7 | o 8 pov224 j Protas a e 7 SECRET | | | : BAe Lk elo se ee oy
14-00000 uis association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not xnow the true story of the relation- ship of BeLiTSKiy with CIA, There is a distinct possibility the 4GB believed the BELITSHXIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some: at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result | he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA. | The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 196] and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prioz to 196]; (a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also - | a reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to | 0001225 SECRET . a Ls ies Sie tee ee
14-00000 | i q George BLAKE, (It seems highly unsikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed {rom June 1959 to August 1960 to come under . suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence. ) (b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, aiter he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had pr eviously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSHIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to , initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and-then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 19él, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail- ' ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR, BELITSKIY therefore 6001226
14-00000 - } ee Se ee eayeot aot : : i a ol - we en Would NOt nave told the BCL huw he act tA wat ote, a ar ee ee moe COuUzG Gave 66.6 toe Aes co Sac Seen @ pot raCiuas Woman Sam Tee, TE om, Waar wm = min ar Teese ery ae fea HxYAGVican Intelligence became aware BELITSALY was ~ sp oremortety 2 TGC Ere, 2 age eet ona . {c)} BDELITSIAGY in 1902 °SS Geseva Bzrecd to meds ~u within the USSR an individual roproseniing Cla,” Howsver, b pee S agreement was.only under certain stipulatec coucitions, uw the most interesting of which wa be unwitting of the true nature of the relationskin of gt BELITSALY with CLA. in addition, any message to y renege BELITSALIY or any indivicual who me > BELITSXIY must “ maxe no reference to any previous meeting of SELITONTY e with CiA, e The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSHIiY had not been under KG3 control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB osiy 42 partial story of the 1961 events in London. . { 6001227 10 ae te eee te . ne team, ay ene ae seen eee saonarcerestr nremeen NOE ene ne memtriemieeetantnien: meter arte sme tenet eens j i i i
14-00000 As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep- ancies between information f.om NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reilection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did net know the true facts of the BELITSAIY case. The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB . that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY," There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actualy happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva, The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence whie previously in Paris, France. -_— - 6001228 vl . SECRET
tas aa i oe it was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHIULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behaif of-the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been “forcibly recruited by . % American Intelligence" ata previous date. It was also suggested to | BELITSXIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGI™A, Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKXIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV, It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of America:. tourist agents in the Sovict Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 ~ 1959, The summary noted this bere ee wwimnaecey apnannss omesmamnnci cri SM mnrae meneame cane em was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of tne Seventh Depart~- evereme pesrean er wane ment, Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV ryt ae was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 ~- 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned te the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi« mately 1957. ‘on 12 0001229 canes OER eS en me ste NREAe ns ote oe e e a ne TO
A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CiA American tourist agents," reveals there is no con- flict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Depart- ment. As anexample, one of the cases is the case of] Edward McGOWAN| O6 NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department, ’ Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV withl| t and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularily since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport, it is,assumed the individual \ . was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the Fiist Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally. request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely un- likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat. 6001230 13 SECRET | . O24, 14-1
i . FR ma aang e Tat Oh an rene a) Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he wasa .. Deputy Chief of the Seventa Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position - which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964. An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu- sion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.- The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews, an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed expian= ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes. , During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa-~ tion concerning ail aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 ~ 1961. 001231 . hype ae SECRET Tn AU ee
14-00000 et be Ae a hee Primarily the notes of NOSENAO can be categorized as ' follows: - (a) Snort case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section ane Sixth Section, Seventa Department, NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsibie for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV,. Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department, According to NOSENKO, the order from BOSKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives, NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the tnree Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also ex~ panded the request to include ail 1900 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand- written reports from the Chiei or Acting Chief of each Section : _ ss Om recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors. - ; Many of the above cases had previously ‘been trans- . ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about theif 4232 . . 15 Ccency a ; BIL 8 bm 8 _ a ht eveten | ae. 7 * . 0 a . at
Somes sme wore AE Md ARASH inclusion ‘support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have __, some "pieces of information to give CIA," (b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of. during the 1962 ~ 1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sulficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before - . his defection. {c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 » 1363. t {d) Draft report ior the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961, : {e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre- pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO, This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh 16 . SECREE 6001233
14-00000 AOROIT NOP Vie § ac Lb bbe @ Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a forrnal cocurnent, The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests -nat NOSENKO was using extrerne care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating er which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con- siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB aiter his depart- ure for Geneva would disclose that certain niaterial was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been des- troyed by NOSENKO. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three. KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered ; rd or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to: * {a) The drait report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously. . (b) A typed two-page report on several cases, Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of ~, submitting in handwriting as the others did. . “Nene eAbimente pRB a ee . . ” 6001234 se meting 8 wen ‘ ee ot sake sees : ns - : a teemarate te enon Tan mene eae es ee Se Coreg RE ot Date Eee Sa oe eps: ee oars tak - a ~ Hope
14-00000 HS erm, {c) A second copy of a summary ona XGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file Kept by the Cn-2f which he reviewed and that ne kept one. , Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed. 6001235 2) rr a) av m B a PP RUE ORT GENTE oP ITE RTE OREN LE ea aT wees Ham y f
, . ~ ° 7 . . er ee a . ae . we , ts =} SN , aby a S ; {4 ~t = : ' be 73] . me . hy 4 ° , ; ne a oo Do oi rs) ee?) y fa] : fe Co. 2 5 _ AS NO V. R . od ® f e : - i . . ; ; i | . Se ee
14-00000 oN _ Veil G. NOSENKO 1s no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his ec aE na paEannngeaannnnngenayaganennnnaes EAA a Aga nascar earn cers t Abeta Dasnnnsnanananeasengenbinnebietebnssteteee tees etree rE 7 a or EE OR EC SEEEESES * defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion) The conchision in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wailis SMITH) and Serbert HOWARD] who actually was " employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy. The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion 3 can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were. no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. -The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, ‘there is a possibility that’: a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment, This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area, - "The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO. sho: be | } GouLode examined and can be cited as follows. . Chub? 8 stiked tsa setmatic . éowsreieg aes ; . ; ° ; foclasaficatiea > TE meet arpa ng aN Ry tat Ue eS Mat ae
14-00000 AR, Pee een an menpg ey sep eas y gaa woaress (a} During March i953-late May 1955 NOSENKO Was a case oificer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, NOSENKO does not claim that he would kave known the detaiis concerning any recruitments (other than VANDREY") in this period, but states if there nad been he would have heard "something." (b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned | few details, (c) Duving the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United Siates Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of thg)Q){ 238 case or cases, There is merit to this contention by
TT TA heart 8 Me NRE RO, NO te AE Sm eee Yau eh et NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart- meni since 1953, actually working in the First Section except ior the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "“ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a Tas period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department. , | (d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department. According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments . of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed . 06 out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert HOWARD] case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name, NOSENKO actually | 0001239 ~ SECRET
14-00000 learned of the narns when the First Section, First Departinent, needed the services of the Seventh _ Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room ina certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend offfiowAnd} ‘In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion 06 of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and [Herbert HOWARD }were the only eucceseful KGB recrultmente during 1953 ~ December 1963. It should be noted that there are no other identified KGB recrultments during this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basie for the opinion of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an 1 honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it te absolute proof that ancther recruitrnent could not have occurred. NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, bet since NOSENKO was only in the Firat Department 1953 ~ 1955 and 1966 - 196) his cpinion that he wovld have heard "something" about a recrultment in 195% - 1959 of 1962 - 1963 €annot be accepted as infallible. 6001240 4 SECKET | | } i
4-00000. ‘ ss - goo0i24t : : Be i — ee, . o . sake i . “Sher EEE, tid & . a * ‘ ” S3 ‘ . } . ‘ , a “ ~ ? . % * . . , . , ; ~ 7 7 ~ 7 ° + * . : t, a. . _ 4 . . . * a i - i : Ce See kere ie er ae)
ANNIX seemee- 2 PP, The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Anacx "3B" covering pages 316 - 435, Limited comments concerning Annex 2 oak, tA," Statements of Soviet Officiais About NOSZENAO, and Annex "3B," Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, ot : there is an Annex "C" to this summary whica is entitled, "The Fin) it A epg Cherepanov Papers," a. Attachments: ‘ ; annex A Annex 3 Annex C te near emia Qd01242 ( ¢ ” at coments AD SPP BON LAINE Peoenet se at ott a fnetet ttt (thea aan deme maanem Bases S26 EE EES Se gw we eee A es RUT Tate ; i . ~ 2 8 areseeaty Rs RTSNSSPOST NaS STERN SRE ots ts SRR SEs bu bpp e PON REA TS
“SECRET oN ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT , vi ' FY » . # : . t , re. ° . .@ i “ aay * > . > . . ' ' . 6001243 . CY : : SECRF Eselaged 27 ortsz - ‘ : . ® cowrgracny end bt | . detlassitueatap B * * Tomei ce Ren ypaagmane Sw me CT te mene ee Sette Lie ta eae OE Oke? wae ee eS oa ae o gh 8 the La de enlOtad 4 WEES Oe cabins ae ee E acs aatine entities Aatenamenst tn me tne aera rt
14-00000 ANNIN DS — wae ec em en NED IN WENT SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EP: | Bt te oye fee ta me aye fa Caen one os Pages 399 - 435 oi tae previous scaumary contain sumsasavies on the cases of 49 Americans Who, Gccorcing to informazion ison NOSENKO, were oi KGB interest, were avproacked by the KGS, or were actually recruited by the AGS, I: was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to tae syeciie KGS positions held at paricuar times by NOSENKO aad thus coulc not be usetully employed in exumining his claimed KGB service, The sourcing of these cases has beex expiored sis now bee in detail Guring tne curvent interviews wits NOSENKO, and . ‘  possidle to establish a certain relationsnzip between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KG & of Sis the conclusion oi this summary taal any croup of a9)easee, as well as all other cases concerning waica NOSENKO kas furnisned information, must be fully considered, noz necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENXG claimed to have learned of che case and waether his statements con- cerning each idertified case are supported by collateral information. ry ‘These factors are important in assessing the overall validity oi iafor~ _ . mation from NOSENKO as well as being supporting eviadhideed4:s .t -claimed.positions in the KGB. ' meres pet aa ghee ee eee,
wre K acGitionai iitormaiiun ivom NOSDONMO in approximatuy cases. Of even more signiticance is the logically sourced his iniorvrsation in 22) except pernaza The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source ai) the ca knowledge of all the cases is Guite cow.patlole With Kis claims positions in the KGB, In addition, criticism of NOSENXO ior not being able to source all of his information would be unvcasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or jallure to recall some- et ° a & fe * 4 o ou. ; thing which was insigniicant at ihe time i Without citing in detail any of the|/49icases, the ways in wnick . NOSENKO iearned of a number of the cases ave considevea important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGS i during 1960 ~ January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chiez, First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1962; Chief, Fivsat Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 « January 1964. Cextain examples of the above ‘are as follows: La , 6001245 ee) cD ae rm eee ee Aa aay get te eae ne
14-00000 {a} NOSENAO learned of u number of the Seventh weil as several 1958 - 1959 cases irom notes prepared by { tue Ciiei or Acting Chiei of ine First Section, Seccnd ‘ Section ai.¢ Sixth Section in 1963, These notes were gre- pared at the request of NOSENKG who as a Depuiy Chies, | i { 1 { ! m Seventh Department, was responsicie for supervision of pansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief wf the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1904 the noies prepared by the Chief or Acting Cuiei of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section anc nis knowsedge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 ~ 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes. From tnese noies, NOSZNKO had prepared his re- port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were nét applicable to the request, (b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 ~ 1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, fror:. Genz madiy i. GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chiei, ; . pO ; 6001246 S Pt as 8 8 oe — SECRET Te geuresen eke es nt een, eer SE aces ‘ * a? To roe 6 ae etengyaaperainemeents ss sat Ny RENE a ab as APPAR AEN ETS AEN A8
First Section, ayer ct ae “, ” rade er mortem me dep Hommes * rf oer ar ars Zurnisned ta NOSENHAO primarily Decause of Lis Irienceuls eden Bowever, NOSONAG learned o: Cevtain u ce cases or was furnished additions: Cotails as a result of & sequest oe pats My ayes cet mee ae be “4 “Blew ne Samet wAf age from. the Sevenias Genpiuriunene te tac First Section, Fisst Departmen:, for assistance or vice versa, 08 Cextain of tim [29 bases a.sted were cases oa: the Sevent, Deparie ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NCSZENKO was in the Seventh Department, Certain of the cases wore cases in waich the Firs: Section, First Department, was involved prior ito 1960 or 1960 $ a) a Or pay e ' b th knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these Ovo groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claiinec 4@SSsignment to tae | Seventh Department prior to 1940 and in 1962 ~ 1963, anc Bis claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961, ve It is difficuis to specifically comment conceraing these Es|cases since they do not iali into one ox two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining aster completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a pexiod of approxi- ( mately five and one-half years. It should be noted, bopetpry Aupt the : | 4 | | erenrs cot terme ls a ct Wate A me eee eet tere me a cnn ree SLANE he CNL
4-90000 explanation of NOSENXO concernin ge of cae) 49 feases . . . 48 both plausible ana compat stions in the inst Deparment anc Sevenia Department curing 1960 - Januazy i964. : wn CEPacy a Tree marisa OTe fn rea mR eee hae ene Te ae wren ‘ ° ? . wad oe ’ a . m _¢ . eo: _. sf. se } ‘ STEMEERE, +4 ayes So UESL A
cease aN AED SEO REY Mt TH SOONER ee oe ne o ANNEXM © - THE CHIDRIPANOV PAPERS toes ten ed Eneletes g05 Saray fowaags; fay fackeg-s eat) alee aka ee ee es x 6001249 “3 ‘ : » ¥ : - ¥ i ? x \ \ “tel
Pages 309 - 316 of tne previous sun.aary contain oi the Cherepanov Papers, anc now Alexsandr Nikolayevica CHER ZPANCV passed a pacuage of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENHO with respect to the CHEREPANOYV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that ne was Deputy Cries, Seventh Department, in late 1963. | The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona ices NOSENE cannot be ignor and must be civen svecific consic~ fides of NOSENKO be ignored t be given specii si > eration, li CHEREPANOV was under KGB control wren he passed the papers to the American tourist, or ifthe papers contain "deception information, " the bona fides of NOSENHKO are sudject to very Serious question, NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an oificer in the First Section, First Department, I capes . . a : | ~  SECKEI 6001250 | | 2 R aap. DORE ESE RE Reina senrceceret SOIREE
14-00000 haere Pe oa lee — ~ ete o een ee Stee ne Oe 3940 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retivement from the Pw KGS, During the above period of time, NOSENIAO claims to nave .been Deputy Ciief, First Section, althouga be does now claim to have woe mad a Girect supervisory resmoasibiiity over CHE REPANOV encest G mew ees arn sav KOVSEUA, NOSENAO pre B e bi ce] pe o we @ MS a @ 5 ay er, ia) 0 Q b ~ oO ete o rey ay G a] ee pe o 33 — ro) oh fle be tf pee December 1963, Consideration has previously been given to the tueorvy that tre es Cherepanov Papers were passeG to Americans by the KGB warough § CHERZEPANOY to support the bona dices of NOSENKG, Tauis cacory 2 way oe ee seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no intormacion —_ which would even support tae claim of NCSENXO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1930 - 1961. The papers also contain no injormation which would indicate there was even a Deputy Crici of the First Section during 1958 - 1930. Statements by NOSZNKO are emphatic taat CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that se passed the papers wiich it iaver he had taken from ise Fivst Section prior to his retirerment because he was disgruntled with nis treatrnent by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB. There is no coliateral evidence which contradicts any of “at .the.statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOYV. Further, there is 001254 2 RET . , , . et are ad BM Bae we. “pee i ® eee : Ae OO ho gto ly SN ade ER tl AE gee er ee fy cas) < o to ° aS] & is a
14-00000 . vice oe mn ca oe oe 2a ane weiss a ae 2 gh - a. s0 = od - seer Ome Ss notsing in either tse form or suosiiace of the papers waich provides basis ¢, eel ele Qi ty thal meet pm ed ate Ce re ea ee a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, vse form Department, . . \ Tc eel Le ae fee, Pepe te wee ey SOP a ke we en Dusing current antervicws, ine CHITAEPANGY case nus Seen ' covered in detail with NOSENKO, The Ch ing a rey § i Hi c ad "J $e SS a ef 7) < ie] ‘ay aise been coverec in Cetail on @ sepirate iteme-byeitem basis, Alchough NOSENKO does not claim to have seciiicaily seen any particular item prioz to 1964, his statements in regard to the various sandwritings, ypes of notes, and drait memoranda leave so cout that NOSENXO was very famiidar wite personae. in the Firat Section, Tirst Devaxt= ment, ané with First Department procedures. . Certain additional research Las been conducted in regarc to the papers and a detailed analysis will de prepared ata iater cate, ic should be noted that a considerabie amount of pexsonal Judgmex: cas been necessary in maxing an asses srment oz tae Cuervesanov Papers since there are no exemplars wita which to compare any of the material, However, based on information ceveloped thus far, and there is no reason to believe aGditional work will alter the conclusion, there is fw not an adequate basis for.an opinion taat CHEREPANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive interpre" : “ 3 acer me ; Re ei ee ee Ra BR mT ans ne ee RAN hee mr en en tke * : Ma at ee Oe aoe IN rete EINES we eer de Lm Tae Ae DE be Sey eat cee sueyen eee
14-00000 fe Ree mee, or taat the papers were owner than the colicction of material by a Gisgruntied employee which he very carveiully selected or acccumwmacé, the removal of which would omy “Lave constituted @ minimal visk to if there is any information which coule be considered "deceptive intor- mation" either by direct statement or implication. ‘Two possibile areas have been noted and given cull consideration, These areas are: (a) There is no specific information that there were any recruitments by the KGB of American per- sonnel in the United States Dimbassy curing 1938 - 2560, nor is these any information suggesting the KGB had an . American source or American agent in the Embassy fhe t sa § ple 3 ga at period of time. (b> Petry S. POPSV, a GAU odiicer who bad deen an extremely valuable Cis source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to tne KGB in January 1959 as a result o: a letter mailing by Geovge Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CLA employee under z alan - ‘pssiznea to the Embassy in ana Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained ‘ by the KGB after mailing oy WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS. 6001253 Sy kath Peavatsy Basts ‘ BEES TESE ENS SAE SS
a Me lie WP neem ag ate te yea ia the First Section curing 1958 - 1960. 6G an Armervican source in the Emoassy Cuving tae 23 & POcslaVve Static MIane On In regara to (5), the quite speclic information in the napers that Petr S$. POPOV was uncoverced by the AGB 28 4 result of KGB surveiliance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who ‘mailed a ietier to POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibiy information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow irom East Germany ia November 1958 ostensioly fox TDY. The circumstances under which he was recalled and coliaterai infor mation have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November & 1958 PGPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence, it may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more sPeea ay ie! eae yt te hae, 254 exvlanation 8 Q & Me cram ge, RS atte * BROS ERS SS BESS GAS 2a sperms!
14-00000 & ©) - é +S E CIA, had a source in th source of the FCD, NGS, not ihe SCD, It can aiso be presumed that & BOUXCe oF agent of the FCD in a position to Sugnisa a lead toa ' : “et yor penetration of the GRU by Western u protected even within the KGS. The sossibility of couvse oxiots vhat a lead fzom George BLAKE, an rCba of POPOV to the KGB, but itis not established that it did nor is these any reason to believe tae SCD could not or Gid not have another a or agents who furnished information te the KGB pertinent to cevelop- ment of the case against POPOV. ‘The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if itis presumed the KGS obtained information . irom an FCD source or agent waica led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, tmis Would be incorapatible with information in the papers and coulé omy lead to tae couciusson thai tae pazers contain “deceptive information. " The conclusion in regard to the above is that the faci the papers a attribute the exposure of POPOV to the AGB to surveillance oa WINTERS ‘ . when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible | “with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained infor~ a ' mation from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in - 3 | regard to POPOV or actual. identification of POPOV. | | | | - oe - G00L255 | a \ oe — SECRET | ‘ LAR OE Sone die taoy ste Ma bat De eee ee oa ne > ok we aad wee a Poa dt AL ides seemetmeee comes See petaeieny
14-00000 \ Can Fanta seta sniormition was received from an important PCD agent such as George BLAKE or inrouzgs another valuaole FCD agent wich led to KGB suspicion of POPOV yerios to his rehizn to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlizely suca information would reccive wide distribution within the KGS, c¢ither in the TCD or the SCD, i: is also possible the Limited grouy within the KGB wiao would be aware at the KGB had receivea informction leading to suspicion of POPOV irom a valuable agent would de very interested i: exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPGY by WINTERS. The possivility should be considered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letier io POPOV there was only a dee3 suspicion of POPOV but that the ietter compietely so.idizied the case. against POPOV. Consideration has been given to the possibilicy what CHERIPANOV was under KGB control when ue passed the papers to the American tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope os invoiving Ol in a KGB-control’ed operation withia the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since this would have been the initial step in waat tae KGE noped would become a successful operation. The above theory has beex rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it, These factors inciuee the fact that | a — 001.256 it ane Bt anene ay NMR > PP EeU> REET ctr sarees peers art ty area merase pg mans fh see ue arene pworr aware PRR TPRRTENFIOUET 000-490". “Figs wn. wane*? on eemmemrews, me ee
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14-00000 Scene | INDEX ABIDIAN, Jokn = IV, E, 5, 7-15, 19, 20, 52 “ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) ~ lV,G,)-4 ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - ILL, A, 2 ARTEMOV, Vladimir Lvovich - 1V,F, 6, 12,13. BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV, E,3,4 : BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F,2 [barnzty: Robert|- ll, F, 14,15 ms [BEGcs, Frank|- Iv, F, 36,37 .BEL:TSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12 BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich ~ IV, B,2,3,5*7 Ve (BreNstocx, Natalie]- IV, F,3,4 me Bis, Arthur ~IV,D,1,2 BLAKE, George - IV,D,9; IV, F, 9: V;C,6,7 BOBKOV, ‘Filip Denisovich ~ IV, F, 15,16; V,B,3 BOHLEN, Ambassador ~ IL, F,10 fi Lewis - IV,E, 53,54 bb Finauns, Horst|- IV, F, 3-6 OG [BROwN, G. Stanley}~ Iv, E, 43 . . - 001258 - ‘ _ . baad? 2 ee ma Ly tee MOP te tt ar mete mR ane ee me ee eee aire re ee are en ee EL Te a wees | PERLE ea srtenati 7 ECRE be { bee “BO Be . a PWT tateeeds nat ——rceetcmamepnnanpamamaamansmine a, Sree a ne
14-00000 HEL bn Yarenet perpen amin abo wm sas y cece + BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F,4 ab [BuRGt, Richard (IV, D1 Do {puRtin, Sipe |t IV, E, 49, 50 , 0G [suxtm, wal} LV, E, 49, 50 CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E,39, 40,42 CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - Iv, F, 2,16 CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. ~ U,H, 4; V,C,1-4,6-8 CHERNETSEV, Y. E. -IV,E,49 CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - ill, B,4 Ob [pax Frank} IV, F, 41, 42 | DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E,20,45 DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV,B, 5, 6 DOUGLAS, William 0. - IV,D,3 06 [prew, George|- IV,D,1 Ob PWELLY, Robert} 1V, =, 41,44,45 7 -FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V,A,1 FEDOROVICH, Tatyana = IV,E, 8,9 FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV,E, 49-31; IV,Fy1 0b (Fisk, Norman|- IV,D,5 Db [FRIPPEL, Arsene |- IV,D,2 7 ne [GAFFEY, Joseph + IV, E, 41, 45, 46 2 SECRET cose aecdate en we EEC ptna tee 12 ns Sane ae Te 0001259 ag - * - , + . . “~ —_ * pa ERP tA Renmin cen SeberemtnNtete nA rm gash se EE ae ET A aA Wa tate NN I LA
74-90000 PE TIOIRTNTIOETISETSRTTYS tee TiC a tz ese. Gr Cree TORT tr tls dhe S GARBLER, Paul - IV,E, 52 oO [GARCIA, Anthony By -~1V,E, 39: Ob. (GARLAND, John ¥ 11, F,17; iV, E, 31, 33-36 Ob [ex SBURG, Michael]? IV, D.5,6 W,E,9-11; IO, F,5-13, 15-19; GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhayovich - U1,B, 3,4; Iv,8,5,6; IV,L,9,10; Iv,E, 21,23, 31-34; VA] GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - HI, F,3,4; 1V,6; IV.6; IV,E,4,5,21; IV,F,1,2 "GRIGORIY" ~ I, F,13; IV,D,3,6; IV,F.4 GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - I1,B,4; IV,E,20 GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - 1,B,4; WI,F,8-13,15; IV, E,5,12, 19-21, 26-28, 30,43-45; IV.G,3; V,B,3,4 GUK, Yuriy I. - 10,B,4 HAMILTON, Victor Norris - TU,E,9. (axa: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri) UHANNA" « IV,'E, 27 OC [Harnis, Cisella|- IV,D,1,7,8 HORBALY, William - IV, E,53 Ok [HOWARD, Herbert} 111, E, 8; LL, F, 20; 1V,G.1,3,4 IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38,39, 45,46 Gb fFENnER, Paul . IV, E, 28-31, 35-36 JOHNSON, Robert Lee - Ill, E,8; UI,G,5 ne | JoHNSon, Wallace Everett) ~IV,F, 3,4 Ab [FoNeEs, William Carroll |- Iv, F, 3,4 SECRET G001269 STO ey, om ee peryrciten bot fu yon enarernr ERE ear METRE DE Pe at 5/84
14-00000 i Po cee ONES : WinWe a hn & KADERA, fred LIV, E, 45 KANTOR, Marvin - Iv,D,5,6 “ObfRxRLov. fnu|- IV, D,5 oO KASHPEROV, Mixhail ~ 00,5,4 KEMMER, Myra-I1V,E,9 ‘ Ob[KE¥SERs, James|- IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56 s KLY PIN, Vladimir Atekseyevich - 1V,E,5,48-51 KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - 1V,B,1-4,7 KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34 {Alias used by KOSOLAPOV) KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - I10,B,4; I0,F,8,16,17; IV,E,5,19-21, 28-32, 34-39, 42-44 KOSYGINA, Madame - III,A,1 KOVSHUK, Viadisiav M. - 11,B,4; UI,F,5,11,12; 1V,E,3,4,6,12, 18,21, 23,49,52,53; IV,F,1,2:; IV, G, 3; V,C,2 KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV,E, 12 KRUGLOV, Sergey Nixiforovich - 1V,B,5 Ol [ FANE. Anew IV,D, 132 at LANGELLE, Russell « III, F,3; IV,E,8& - MLILLIAN" - IV, E, 26 . = | Ho {LUBIN, George], IV, E, 49,50 . Ob (MAHONEY, Eugene|- IV, E, 53 lo DMAnA, Martial 3v,D,2 GOOL261 oS pak BEA Sten Cane etme ee wee Temeee ok ce os * setae wee me at thee FE bay WN RN yl tee Be we . a
14-00000 ‘NO , CENT ~ SooUAL _ 0o ean David] UL, C, 4 faa Maw, Ralphl- IV.D,5 (MERTENS, « Gerard -IV,D,2 _MIXHAYLOV, A, A. - IV,E, 49 _MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - II, E, 8; I, G, 5 . MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 52 . forone? Joseph] - LV, E, 22, 27, 36, 37,39, 40, 55 MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV,C,4 {MC GOWAN, Eaward|- Iv, F,13 0} BECHTER, Bernard} ,D,5,6 PENKOVSKIY, Leg Vasilyevich ~1V,E,13 * PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - Ill, B, 4; IV,E, 48, 49 POPOV, Petr S. - IV,E,7, 10; V,G/4-7 OW [PREISFREUND, Johaz\- tt, F, 9.22,12 O4 [PRESSMAN, Patrick]-iv,D,5,7°- "RAKETA" -IV,C,5 BASTVOROY, Yuriy '* IV,B,5,6 " RHODES, Roy - IY, F, 4 64 (RuFE, Toun|- IV,D, 5,6 OL, [ScHWARZENBACH, Collette]- I, F,10 ee SECRET aad we fast! ily HE a 0001262 neg Merlot RRS SR OIPAPRIT PTE MIS ayer GET SATA SEY RAT ESI OOS IST me. p ‘|
14-00000 r ap MBI J esmcasapepsocte Ni Pa Rte TAD OPERA ARIE EOE 2s per taint tee nae cetet e SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU -IV,E, 32, 33 (Very possibly Igor Alexseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also _ identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.) . . OG | SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry |- LU,F,6 Hb [SHaTTAUER,. Sofia]- 1v,D, 5,7 SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV,E, 40 SHELEPIN, Aleknandr Nikolayevich - Ul, F, 13 “SHMELEV" - I, F,13; 1V,D,3,6; IV,F,4 Ob [SHUBIN, Joba\- IV,D, 1 om SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV,F,H, 12 SMITH, Dayle Wallis + IU, F, 4,26; IV,G,1 SMITH, Edward Ellis - ili, F,4 . 06 [SmiTH, “Fohn Discoel - I, E, 9; IV, E, 45, 50 STALIN ~ IV,B,5 OG [STEVENS, Edmund |! wl, F, 4,6 6 [srorsBERG, James - 1, F,3,5,H-13; IV, E, 21*24, 26, 43,55, 56 Ob [TARASKA, William -IV,D,5,6 Qb[FAYLoR, David Hiv, D,2 Ob [TAYLor. Joba IV, E, 42, 43 rary e UMANETS, Ella -IV,§E, 38 6001262 6 aR i 4 ah d ok : a cence Tae Sate etileter s >,
RTA 2 tracey § “t TIERONE He One OA CO SRO AE ARS «ANE | NTR RE, fre Blane, HIE TO Ae ape pare AHR YON Om get EN ee [TCI oe samme ume ae etme — —— - 5  < eneen ee ~e -. WA bbs tee A O&b [/GRBAN, (Golenety} IV, E, 24,25 VASSALL, William - IU, E, 9: Il, G, 5; IV,D,9 O6 [c WASHENZO, Steve) IV, E, 53 ” Of [ae William Stanley|- IV, D,2 INTERS, George Payne, Jr. - I1V,E, 53; V,G,4-7 ZENKIN, FNU - 1V,E, 32-34 (Very possibly Igor Alekseyevica ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alexseyevich SUKHOV ana very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.) : € [(zos0s- Matthew\> IV, E, 26-28 oot ZWAXKG, KG, Maurice), IV, E, 40-42 7 GUOL2Fe SECRET BSF sents an .