a a SO , 5 “: nes . o § CIA HAS NO OBJCCTIGN TO Page DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE Or CiA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. yyy 7-99-99" i Recent FBI High Lights Comnuuniat Party, USA Conmunism and the Negro Movement i Prosecutive Action Under the Internal Security 2 Aet of 1950 [ Penetration of Seviet-bloc Intelligence services fefc) a The Fedora Case * 3 | The Tophat Case _. 3 Krne(Hicunact |case 7 4 | {fine( tater Joandfe 4 ho [Prine |Casey/s/ 4 ae 5 pe (Candy \Case}{®) G 5 , Penetration of tne Yugoslav [Intelligence Service Kt 5 | Penetration of Soviet Illegal Oporations “.) y yb og 5 Scientific Counterattack eunde Fier BY RUA : a) Cuban Matters DECLASSIFY ON: BEX : 6 eoversee ox(Non-soviet-bioc pinttors]f (S) 6 Wajor Criminal Investigations a Hoffa Case Ff Baker Case 7 vf Antitrust Investigation of Steel Industry va) ; eS SECRET vcuostled, (0707 hi HW 55355 DoclId:32305055 Page 2
at ps: Lo oO one W? Nd. [ Ponetration ef Soviet-bloc Intelligence Services RTT The Soviet-blec countries are conducting & aogeyiic! wellscoordinated espionage attack against this country. As of Noventber 20, 1963, there wore 265 known or highly suspected cs} Soviet-blec intelligence officers in the United States assigne te the various establishments of the Soviet blec in this county 0. To thyart their efforts we have conducted an all-out effensive to penetrate their organization, defect their. personnel and develop those defectors iu the very heart of their intellie gence apparatus, We have bean unusually guccesaful in developing such defectore. me Fedora case \(f)(U\ For example, one Soviet officer (code name Fedora) began cooperating im May, 1962, He is an officer of the KGB (Committee of State Security of the USSR) assigned to the Seviet iesion te the United Nations. He has Zurniohed informatien regarding approximately 60 agents being operated hy KGB officers in various countries of the world, Six of these are actually FBI deubie agents operating against the rep, (uy This officer piao furnishes inside information from KGB headquarters, For example, John Butenko, an American engineer, and Igox Ivanov, a KGB Anterg employee, wore arrested on espionage charges October 29, 1963, Three other KGB officers attached to the Soviet Hisaion to the United Nations wore expelled from the United States for their complicity in the conspiracy. Gur defector was eble to tell us of the cxtrone consternation at KGB headquarters, One third of the KGB scientific espionage officers in New York had been lost at one stroke.) (UW) (he Tophat case \(A\4 Jack Edward Dunlap was an Army sergeant ascigned to “ the National Security Agoncy (NSA) who committed suicida the night of July 22/23, 1963, His widow, on August 20, 1953, fur- nished Army investigators twelve classified Government docunents she claimed she found ip her attic after his death. After the FBI entered the ease August 22, 1963, additions] classified documents were found and Dunlap's widew admitted Dunlap had admitted to her before pis suicide that he was aelhing informna+ tion to the Boviets .(%) U We received verification of this from an excellent source, Fa 1963 we bad developed a Soviet intelligenco officer | {code name Tophat) who had furnished valuable data to us until ~*~ his return to the Soviet Union. dor te hig return he agreed to fill a drop in Moscow on specified dates in June, July or August, 1963, and place = specified signal. CIA agreed to clear the drop with State Department approval, Our sourcd. . made no signal on any of the agreed dates. CIA was wal inal 4 Thr) C2 HW 55355 DoclId:32305055 Page 3
| eh a | Cto clear the drop in July, but State declined to permit at, With State approval CIA cleared the drop in August and found a very ' important message which said, in port: “Most important agent he 4 143, eo Jack Edvard Dunlap, 1 Gilmore Street, Glen Burnic, Maryland, at ed us NBA, He came to Kostyuk himsel ? May, 1961," (likhail Kostyuk was | Soviet Air Attache, Saviet Enbassy, Vashington, B, C., from July, 1958, to August, 1942.) ty ; et po Analysis of the complete message and tho manner in which it was placed in the drop indicates it was probably placed in the drop in June, 1963, Had the State Department permitted CXA to clear the ‘Crop. in early July, . appropriate measures could have been taken egainst Dunlap prior to. nie Suteide. Seu) os | Az Nicknack|case¥S) ay | - Cin Morch,| 2963, (we successfully defected and operated Cs_)\ in place another Loyee of the Soviet Mission to the United 7 Nations \(code name(Nicknack}} He has furnished us documents: of CS. military egaizicance including vice jevaluations of the defense C 5} snstallations (in the New York and Bostenlareas, The United StatesC¢ C4tr Forcejhas Bdvised that these(SovietIdocunents are somplete and ‘Bceurate reportg of equipment and capabilitiesXo? the(North .Amor- CS ) | - dean Air Defense jas of. the time they were written, The information _ ‘$2 our dustallafions was obtainedfby the (Soviets through recowaise  Sance and through the use of mobiTe electronic devices,[S): | é 2. Ras source. is, now in the Sovict Union,| Through sa Cs) .. : ingenious method the recently .communicated with us and |\furnished sJ _ information of significant military. intelligence. Gy vos “Ythc[ Mi ter|casc Sho, ae . ; i. ae | (ouring Novenber 1963 (we detoeted)ana are now developingC sJ fo & Boviet |z telligence officer f(ccte name Miter) employed in. the CS ; o: United Nations Secretariat.| Ye expect. that_he will be able tex fo, furaieh information of ajipolitical nature,(which he has agreed to do fs) } , ‘ “oe om . y Kamel Prime lease) OT i Seorty. in 1963 we developed(as a defector in place the(_S ) Code Cletk' at the Polish United Nations Delegationlin New York . City (code nane( Prime e).. Shrough information furnished us by thisl s)} source, the United Sta ly bagis is able to 7 f3 an Tap ,:, resentative in New York. ons evaluated this source noting that - his data.conld not be bought for dellars and uf of. very: well XL ce ANS. 24a superheul| of this century, pM ROE IROPRY TG TC ORE VEER Aeonce superhen B sens Bs 5) DAF SR ew . feat ay RAUL A ABLEASE iN PART co el be UAL, OE NUAL HW 55355 DoclId:32305055 Page 4
¢ s3 Kz Can e “ Ry Con September 17,| 1962, the cooperation of @ (aeniber of the Czechoslovakian United Netiens Missien|was obta ‘a cf REL {(eode name|Gimme).\ Through this source we have qbtained so voluminous information concerning eaochootovaijc calintett gence | Cs) operations and targets in the Uni States, (Gh 8 particular (defector in place has (fron th Sen ores a) and has agreed C$} £ to furnish informationf fron theré.y, Case¥ > ) ux infezmant entered the United States(es a Hungorian CS a refugee i February ,\ 1957, (ander cover of the Hungarian Refugee Program, \ Following recruitment(in Hungary)as an illegal agent “Cs3 and disphtch to the United States with high-level intelligence assignments, he has successfully carried out an extremely value abie double_agent role under our directionffor ever six and one- CS] haif yeara,) His most significant assignpents are to(pinpoint Cs‘) lecation long-range bailistic nigsiles in several areas of the United Stated if<) “JFK Act 6 (1) (B) JEK Act 6 (1) (C) Penetration of{ the Yugosiav| Intelligence Sorvies () : nm July, oped (the ‘Pirate Seeretary of the Cs 3 Yugoslav Embassy pe ieee. ue _deveiones a9 a source.| Through hin we have obtained€a penetrating picture of [Yugoslav jintelljgence CS_5 perationa in the United States, as well as policy piansxe Yugoslav Government jin dealing with importent political ‘situae ° ons, As a result of information furnished by this source, action hes been initiated to neutralize Giz Government amployees known te have beenWalued Yugoslav | intelligencé sources 3) L: Penetration of Soviet Illegal Operations Up inuportant in the Soviet-biec intelligence systen is the undercover or illegal agent sent to this country who has. . no diplomatic or official status, He is the sophisticate o2- espionage whe uses fraudulent documents, elaborate codes, secret inks, microflim and covert financial support to avoid detection. Networks of illegal agents serve to bolster the espionage active ities of Soviet-bloc officials and are prepared te take over ali eepionage operations in the event of war or ether emergency which results in a break of diplomatic relations /% To neutralize the threat posed by this illegal appara- tus we have resorted te highly uacenventional and imaginative » %echniques which have resulted in our penetration of a numbor ef these operations, One ef these operationa involves the two Soviet illegal agents using the identities of Robert K. Baltch and Joy Ann Baitch who were arrested by ws in Washington, D. C., this summer and are presently awaiting trial, The princtoal Cy HW 55355 DoclId:32305055 Page 5
Dn ee . ! - oo os ae Government waidhoes in this prosecution wiil be a Soviet illegal agent who was successfully doubled by us over four years ago and has been operating against the Soviets ever since. He is a Soviet Military Intelligence Officer (code name Karot) who ‘entered this country through fraudulent.documents in Decemper 1958. He vas uncovered by us two months after his entry. y  ~ OPE scientific Counterattack CRE One of le contributions in the security 3_bee procure materials. 5) States for use These opera«+ ions have involved(the opening of intricate 10 Ring mechanisms CS ) on safes, the penetration and subsequent 3 ion of theay contents.) As of today, the value off Fs material C 3 | obtained by this Bureau from(47 foreign estah iShGents}has peen CS] $10,955,500.}. The real worth of the material, however, lies in ite incaictinble intelligence value to agencies and officials of | our Government. A & SRK Act 6 (1) (B) Cuban Matters Qur investigations in the Cuban area have been most intense since Castre ascended to power January 1, 1959. We have concentrated not only on pro-Castro individuals but on such groups as the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, organized in Nev York City in April, 1960, to serve aS a propaganda organ for Castro. {Lee Harvey Ofwald, accused assassinator of President Kennedy, claimed to head a chapter of this group in New Orleans.) ~~ cialized coverage of(threa\ high-level Cuban(5 )| hose notivities are being’ directed from Cuba o the United overnnent under the guise of refugees to ca aces oO 2 Cuban y out intelligence activities against this country are cooperating with the PBY and pont are nowy being directed against the Cuban Government. tn late October, 1963, (one of our sources} who has theCs’) confidence of Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa Garcia and the Foreign Minister's son, Cuban Ambassador to Brazil Raui Rea Mouri, (s\gyas sent\te Brazil te visit with Raul Roa Kouri, Vital information concerning the extent of Castro's influence in South America and - future plans of the Cuban Government was obtained. \ i ‘ ge _of(Non-Soviet~Bloc |HattersyV/S) fesse . Cs> We maintain coverage of certain(non-Soviet=bloc) countries in order to produce intelligence information of value to the various United States Government agencies. One of the principal means of} accomplishing this is by maintaining technical surveillances on |, foreign diplomatic establishments in this country. As of today we have(47 such surveillances on( 27 different countries .(<) aa SECRET ne ~ 6 = ces Oe re ke # HW 55355 DoclId:32305055 Page 6