Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination 
Records Collection Act of 1992 
(44 USC 2107 Note) 
NW 53216 6/17/17
404-1024 0240032 rr 615. B. Views of Intell:gence Ferscnne!} 1. Statement by DERTAAIN @. Introduction Former VKGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYASIN has follo«ed closely the entire course of CIA's unvestigation of NCSENKO and his information. =¢ took pert in the interregations of NOSBIKU in April 1964, January-February 1963, and Cetober 1966 as an 9b- server and consuitent, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during July and Aucust 19¢5 concerning Cert2in aspects or his personal past and early Kou career. On the hasis ef his direct, personal knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union an@ of KGS organi- zation ard procedures prior te his cefectivs in February 1954, _ettupplemer.ted by continuing etudy of later infurination trom a ' variety of sources, DERYABIN is uf the epinfon chat much of wnat | HUSENKO has said azout himself ané the nts se purposefully false A4-or distorted. Although DERYABIN * able to offer aythorita- tive comment on many aspects of HOSEMMO'Ss story, the follce«ing sUctION Of this paper is limited ve.hts rerarks concernifg WOSeN- KO's entry into the KSB (then Mvy) anc his Communist Perty affili- ation, poth of which fall into the periud when DIORYABIN war active as a KGB (then MvL) staf’ officer. DEXYAHIN personally intecro- gated NOSENKO on these tcpics in the sumuer ef 1965. Since DER- YAMIN #as a personnel officer of the KG3 (then “GB and “{VD) in Moscow, with long experience in Cervaunist Party cetivities, at the time NOSENK.O claims to have enterea the American Departmen: of the KGS Second Chief Directorate, he is parcicularly qualified to comment on these aspects of NOSENNO'S story. DERYARIN, as a Soviet Army officer. «as Gracuated in 1945 rom the higher counterintelligence schoo. of Smersh (counter- intelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he worked in Naval Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work in the MGB es a case officer in the Central Persunnel Directorate. Shortly efterwards, when his superisr was apbpointod Deputy Chief of the Chief Guards Directorate for Fersornnel, DERYABIN trans- ‘i ferred with him to the Guards Directurate. He served as a Guards Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising throuch tne ranks frcm case officer to the position cf Chief of Section. one of his responsibilities was the opproval of personnel for service in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he wads also in charge of Supervising personnel end security metters concerning one of the Directcrate's surveillance sub-sections. After requesting a change from personnel to operational @uties, DERYABIN wes transferred ir May 1952 to the Austro-German Department of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. vntil December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in the Counterintelligence Sektor (2esk) of the Austro-German Depart- ment. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Sektor of the same department, e position he heid until March 1953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Ceputy Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible. -- for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. , In September 1953 he was transferred tv Vienna, shere he became Deputy Chief of the section in the VD Legal Residency respons- ible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He cefected to American authorities on 15 February 1954.
104-10210-10032 . * ‘ Poa, of von eee od ‘ ; ; PLRYALIN joined the Komecuod da i 8 ects. POs. arned ao men ues until 1940, when he became a candid: te member of the Connunist Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in August 194), During 118 Party carcer he teld a number of respeonsi- ble posts. Béfore the war, «hen DERYARIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he was the Secretary of a local Fomsenaol unit and simultun- eously served as a member cf the Komsomo} Plenum in the reyon * where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer BattBlion of the Red Army and from June 1965 until April 1946 held the: same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelli- gence work within the Navel GRU, which NUSENKO said he joined in S51. In the MGR DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of 4 the Personnel Section of the suards Directorate and, after his , transfer, was elected Secretary of the Parry Hureau of the Austro- German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 wntil his transfer to Austria in Sep- tember 1953. ; b. DERYASIN's Comments The following statements by DERYASIN are based on his cuestion- ing of NOSENKO Eetween 26 July and 13 aAugus. 1965. The questions asked an2 the statements attriruted to NOSENKO (referred to -as Sucject) were during this period. Althouch the soviet State Secu- rity Service did not become known as the KG3 until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MSB or MVD is under discussion. DERYADIN's comments follow: “NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security* ‘ “Taking NOSENKO's own statements at face value, it is hicthly improbable that a person such as he nas described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this reqard: a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children cf high goverrnwent officials. b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NCSEXKO gain é¢ntrance irto the service, had no influence inside the Mop apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOaULGV had no office inside the MGB cr the MVD buildings. I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad) ** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trage. The office was located on Chkalova Street, near the Kurskiy Railrvad Station (three biocks from my former apartment). * See also Part V.B. ** WISMUT AG. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ: for a further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helpinz NOSENKO join the KG3, see Part V.B.
104-10210-10032 G17. Cc. 1+ was physically impossible at the tine for NCSENKO to be recomicnded for and accepte? into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. {I£ one accepts his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in Jan- uary or February, his account is similarly impossible because KOBULOV was not then in State Becuricy.) It weuld normally have taken a much longer time, but in adiditicn to this it was a period of reerganizaticn and tne personnel staff was rot actively conducting their work at thac time, and permenent staff officers were not suce that they would retain their positions. &. In March 1953 NOSENKO was #lready twenty-five and a helf years old and only a memcer of the Komsomol. He hac no recommendation fer Party membership ana could net become a member for a full year kecause of his transfer from one ser- vice (GSU} to ancther. Jt is ympossible that State Security wouls zccept hin knowing in advance tnat on his birthday re would be twenty-six years ald and eithout cither Komsomol or Barty membership. Even for the sen of a Minister, the Secre- tary of the Komsomol Comaitt.ee of the KG would have to talk with the Personnel Office and would not Ggive a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for tre Internal Counterintel- ligence (Secund “hief) Directorate. in the case of a son of @ Minister and cone who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secre- tary would request from NOSENKO a reconmmer.dation for Party membersnip from the members of the Communist Party where NCSENKO used to work, in this case the GPU. In this way the secretary of the Kcemsomol would te sure himself that NOSZNKO would Leccme a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year. “However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, ore must also remember (according to NOSFENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's file contained the following negative peints.* They are serious factors end certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection; the totality makes it difticult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security orgens anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him: * a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security. b. He had been married to General TELESIN‘'s daughter and TELSSIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security. c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO's facner in which comoromisinyg material was collected on Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of infor- mation that would have keen in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary. a. The social status backcround in the life of Subject's mother wes nobility. See also Part IV.B.
404-1024 0240032 ‘€18, * Y e. The shocting incident in Leningrad “Guring -dorla War II and his desertion from the Navel Schneal in Baku would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security. : f. Subject never ceompleted high schcol in the normal fasnion. g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of Inter- national Relations. ‘nh. It should be added that the FG woild definitely know that NOSENKO was involved in an aucomebile accident in i947 and was interrogated hy the Mil:cia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSE.KO's admission to the KGB. i. NOSEIKO eouldé never be allowed tc. enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule at that time chat no person who ever had turerculesis (even twenty Years earlier) would ke permitted to work in the KGB, “In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KJDULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would heve keen noted in the file and would have playea a negative role in permitting Subject to centinte to work in Scate Security after KOBULOV's errest in June 1953. , “I asked Subject how he answer2d some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questicns on ris former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.”* I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fict that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject 's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) wes etill in jaii, and “ the fact that Subject was present when TZlrsin's apartuent wes searched--that he had been accepted into the KGS, parricularly in 1953 Curing the confusion and changes after the feath of STALIN, Subject edmitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the anfluence of FOSULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these nega- tive factors. Ee also cited his GRU experience in tnis connection. a "Tl then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KG3. He replied that before the marriage he hed mentioned —_— * NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a “glass of blood" at a time, Although DERYASIN's questioning covereé this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DE=RYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 informaticn but is included here for purposes of context. **The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are adis- cussed further below.
104-10210-1003 2 rn nnn 619,00 2 unolracially run - nam « 'clean';, and that afcer reeca in which he included it briefly to GORBALLNKO, aru that he hee check on his prospective briie (which we the marriige he tiad fillei out «noche: at all the required data on his wife ane her relatives, Aiter con- siderable prompting, Subject faid that he Nad indicated thet she and her parents had keen in Fracce, mut tnat he pad concealed tne fact that her grandmother had heen ir, German-oceupied territory during the war, (He admitted thet the ACB would have learned this in a routine check, nowever.) 1 then reviewed for Subject the necative security factors mentioned etove, adding the arrest of KCBULOV, the fact that his new wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grenémotner was in German-occupicd territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomrol but not yet a Party menber or candidate, and the fact thet Subject received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and in- curring venereal @isease, ans asked if he didn't think that his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and 3€ so, what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the “GH, Subject said tnat he thought that his file probably was reviewed buc that again the influence of his fatner had saved him. Subject added that enothner important factor was procadly his language qualifi- cation and particularly his hicher education. I. pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had heen abroad it was impossible that her nare check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was so. "NOSENKO's Knowleaue of K38, 1955-54 “Entry Date into KGB: NCSENKO was reminded that he had pre- viously given varying dates for his entry on @uty in the KCd. He replied that he did not renember the exact eate, but he wes sure that it was in the middle of March 1253 - perhaps 13 cr 15 Merch (15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He woslé give no explanation fer why he previously claimec to have anterced tne KGB in : 1952.* in fact it would te very w.urusal for a KOR officer to forget his exact entry-on-duty Cate to the very day because it is used to compute length of service end must he entered on vari- ous forms from time to time. “Numerical Desienation of the intellice:ce and Counterintelit- gence Directorates 3n 1953: Asked to Gescribe what directorates existed in the MVD while BENiYA was Minister (March-June 1953), NOSENEO nemed the First Chief Directcrate (FCD) ard the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) which he seid were the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were sure, NOSEWKO said he was positive, end that the only change that took place was th2t later, uncer KRUGLOV, for 42 few months only, the FCD kecame the SCD, ard vice versa. NOSENKO stuck to this even when told he eas wrong; he did not say he did not know or aid not remember, perhaps realizing that he covld not claim not to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change in numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the correct Cesignation of his own directorate was at the time that he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for the entire first year of his alleged service there. a * LOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he told CIA that he joined the KGB in 1952, See Part V.B.
"MWD Leadership, 1253-54: Asned to rare the cniefs of the directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA and KiUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine cut of cd. ie wee unable to “ane the Cnief of the Intelligence Dire tocits, sayiog that V2 remen§- bereé only SAMHAROVSEIY (PANYUSHEI was chied untia 1955). acket to nauwe KRUGLOV's ceputies, NOSENSD nosed only ROMASHKOV ang SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent @iputics as LUNEV and SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SEATALUN) , NCE- ENKO flatly denied that this was possible. "Organization of KSu: NOSENKG did not krow nen the KGb was organized UWerch 1955). He said that xt was in early 13955 or Yate 1954. Told that he was a year ot! and asked to think it over, NOSINKO insisted that he was right. "Processing Procedure $s for imploynwot with KGB: NOSENKO'S story about how he was processed tor employment with the KGE in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used ut chat time. He does rot know many of the things tnt he should hnow about cn- trance procedures; he is wreng about many of the things that he cluims to remember. The dispsrities ere So dreat that they can- not be explained (as NOSEN:Ke attempts to do) by the claim that KOEVLOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance pro- cecure for NOSENKO, "The most important cocument filled cut by prospective em- ployees of Soviet State Security is a detailed p2rsonal history questionnaire, called in Russian Ankete spetsialnogo naznachentya sotrucniks KGB. fnais exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an expericnce thut onc is not likely to forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remenbers filling out a questionnaire, but does not knew its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at heme, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually. tnis questionnaire was re- quired in one copy only, and was never permitted to ke taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in).* “KOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical exam- inetion prior to entering the KG3. ‘nis is not possidle. Such an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.** re * DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his criginal biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no enketa was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN. This Statement i3 given in Part V.E. *kSee remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958. ;
"NOZEINO's cescription of Signed when entering on cuty the agreement that was in use “It may be significant that NOSE acreement he recalls signing resemn. 2s that were taken from agents. “HOSENKO insists that he did net fill cut any other forms, questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGB, Actually, chere were a number of other routine forms thet nad to ke £illed our by applicants ard new employees. “Location of ROZIENKO's Office: NUSENKO says that all his entry processing was handied by « personne! officer named ROZHtN- KO and his staff. He asserts thet ROZHENKO'Ss office, which NOS- ENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Ureczhinskiy Street. In fect, neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel De- partment. were located in the Bch entry. They were all (inciuding ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th ficors of the 7th entry of Building No. 12.* “Rank Pay: Asked about his salary «when he first started to work in the KGB, NOSENKO said he get a4 basic selary:of 1700 rubles zs a case officer, 500 rubles for his renk of lieutenant, plus secrecy, languace. and longevity pay. He insisted that this was correct, even «hen told that KSB officers wer? no longer being paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remembered that there was cne year--i954--when they were not paid for rank. he was sure that when he first entered or duty he received this pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers in September 1952 ard was not restored until April 1954. “Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to have Leen promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB, Told that this was impossible, and that “no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSENKO replied that he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had re-. ceived his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible: all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERLYA took over as minister (March 1953) until lete 1953. ivieitor's Pass Procedures: In talking ekout his first visit to the KSB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to re- call the procedures employed by the KGB Pass Office in issuing visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact, the name of the interviewer did appear on the pess and the inter- viewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB Head- quarters for over ten years a5 a staff officer and particularly. as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors, ana thus should know visitor's pass procedures Guite well. re . *HOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel cfficers prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.8.
104-10210-10032 mmmeterm rr rn CLIT ter io) My a) om tae) stat ur oo rae J t ‘ + Se eee Aa ee “Unsscorted Entry into KGR Building with Visit i Gescribing his first day et work, NOSEIZO caie that ne went fren the Pess Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th entry of the building Nie. 7, where his pass was checked by the gquerds, ard then went unescorted to MOBULOV's office on tne ti:ica floor, Challenced on this ocint, he said he was sure that it was possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was #«broluvely - imcossitle to so tnrouch ceny entry of Buriding No. 2 without mts escort if you Gid net have a properly stempou KCB (MéD) tdentity document (see below). NOSENKG was asked to describe the raceivec wnen he first entered ing there was azythning unusual in connec- that time. be renlied thet he knew of hen reminded that afcer STALIN's deatn rrest it was neccesary to have speciel ity @ocumencs to valigate them. With- eut the right starp it wart impossibie to enters the KGB suilding. NOSENKO was ignorant of tt1is and was unsble to recall a:ything about it despite 2 number of hints and leading questions, Actu- ally, curing the perisd of upheaval foliowing SEALIN's death and aceain after BERIYA's arrest, all Kab isentity documents were ceéa- porarily withdrawn in order to have spetial validation scamps pleced in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the KGb huiléings if one did not have the right stomp. This was the subject of numerous aneccstes at the time and is hard to believe that an officer who served in the KGB at the time covld have for- gotten it completely. [+ je i¢ 1 Q KGB identity Gocument th KSB, He was thea aske vet fore chore "“Gastronom: asked to describe the sign in front of the KG2 Club, NCSENKO said that he did not remember any sign (there was one in 1953) but mentioned that there wes a Gastrenom (fcod store) next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Castroncm was cpened, he said firmly that 1t was already there wren he started to work in the KCB. In fact, this Gastronem was definitely nos there 2s of 1954. It was spened sometiie between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow : Gircevorics show. The K38 Club is in entry No. 1 of Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and %OSEVKO would have had to pass it every day he went to work. "Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Direc- torate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was located on Ulitse Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located next to the main KGs building at Duzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have fre- quent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia. "K.1. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelli- gerce Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NOSENKO replied that it wes scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Acricultural Exhibition, the K.1. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is a confused and incorrect answer. Asked for clarification, NCOS- ENKO said that he had never yisited either the K.I. or the First Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus, NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since 1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agri- cultural Exhibition were one and the same place.
104-10210-10032 “er "NOSENKO's Claim to Haye Heen @ Rem nei Second Chief Directorate, KOE "ROSENKO claimed to havt become a member ar the Komscomol Creanization (K/O) cf the KSS when he entered on duty in March 19£3, to heve been elected as Secretary of Komrunol Orgenization of the Second Chief Directorace in the f2:1 ef 1953, and to have . Served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was re- . moved beczuse he used operat:ional-alias cocuments in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he nai incurred. Ee claims to have been excluded from the Kemsomol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th dirchday in Cstober 1of4. “Acked ¢o Gescrile how ne transferre from the Komsomol Crgan- ization of the Naval Intelligence ost in the Biltic to tne Kom- somol Crgenization of the K55, NOSEN"U gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure. hoth as regards deregistration from ’ , the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB. He stated that he «as issued a new Jiomsomol reg.stration card by the KGB K/O, withcut reference to the yrevious x/O in the Baltic; this is impossible. “"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a %.) secretary is elected, steting that he was elected at a meeti:.; of the K,/O, In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O cc1mittee, which will convene separately to elect the Sécretary. “NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific marner. "NOSENKO dia not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate to him ard would deal with him frequently. "NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/c or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there. "NOSENKS insisted that in 1993-54, the maxizmun age for a Kem- somol member was 27. in «ctual fact, the maximsm age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, boti: because NOSEN?9 should know exactly if he hed served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he wes excluded from the Kan- somol for over-age in 1954, "NOSENKO maintained that a)} the members of his K/O paid dues i - jn the amount of 2 percent. of their monthly salaries. This is incorrect, as monthly Kemsomol cues were calcul2ted on a sliding scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent: those earning 500 to 1560 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, and must know the right amount.. "NOSENKO @id not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress took place while he was K/O secretary, saying that they took place every year. In actual fact, the i2th Komsomol Concress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a numter of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustav). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved
104-10210-10032 mene i ear Pon. Feldied Serer in a good deal of preparatory work fer t*aa cotgre a big event in the life of every Komsomel worker e coulé rot be forgotten." ss, waich was .. + the tixe, and. — Although LEPYABIN's direct kcowlectge of che KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGS procedures has been updated - vo his more recent cxamination of report: from arher_sanrces. = vita regard +o What NOSENKO has said about C5 procedures, DERYASIN stated: “Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embsss3y in 1953-§4, NOSEXKO gave a superficial descriptizun of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe this process :n derail, and he mace several blunders which show thet he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know wnere the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, end he attempted to improvise en answer (completely wrong) that they would cneck with the Militia apout this, NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable te stretch his limited knowledge to provide a descriptior of ow these various repositories were actually checked. NOSciLAO was 2iso asxed to describe in detail how he ran such a check on 2 Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was ir. aifficulty and re- fused even to try. He did not even know cae everyday term Spets- proverka, which means a check for clesrance. "It was particularly interesting tnat he dia not feel able to @izpute my challenges of his information, even thoush he undoubdt- edly knows that I do not have first-nana knowledge of procedures in this period. I even tested tis on one gecesion Ly asking NOSENKO che difference ketween the lst Spets Otdel (Speciai Department - KGH cards and files) and the Cperativno-Uchetniy Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the £unctional name for the Ist Specicl Cepartment).. He answerei that the ist tpecial Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases while the Operational Reports vepartment is for pelitical and espionage cases. It seems he invented thig answer on the spot. In addi - tion, it is wrong that political and security cards are separcte from criminal oneg in the lat Special iepartment. They” were in my time and must still be combined in cne ecard file. '* “NOSENKO states that he knowp nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unkelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NCSENKO never eaw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would ne be able to check information on foreigners, especially on fanerican Em- bessy personnel? ‘The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they — may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENEKO should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to the American Department or the Tourist Department." rca RET