{to4-t0103-10009} / sy ALE LE CRATER . » ‘ fight a riS! 5 s? tay as 2 6 wt am 4 won Roane CIA's Performance On The: Inquiries Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, emphasizing — things that F 4) teale-shoul have been done but which it assertéAvere not. It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the years. As a practical consideration, it is unlikely that every theoretical question that can be conceived can be answered conclusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is evidence somewhere, it may not — | be accessible. The issue is what the intelligence agencies did, with the SSC Final Report portraying what seems to be a pattern of neglect or avoidance, which we believe is inconsistent with reason and the record, | a | ‘The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in support: of its case. It refers to-an allegation by a person identified as "D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and saw | Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both by polygraph and by . determining that Oswald was in New Orleans instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to have occurred. Nevertheless, this subject is treated in a confused and inconclusive manner in the wo et eit meae ote nemetta The Pree te ' Fen waa woe Te ot Move +e ay prem ft, eae 4 i AS eteeaes CLs AIC: SOREL EAL UAL i " scteoracaneraeeennonie son es teanren pomarnnnr et rt etree tam ind pins svtstte somone me ssane nedere mete
14-00000 e SSC Final Report. Great emphasis is placed on the AMLASH operation, and its not being reported to the Warren Commission, inaccurately attributing to it characteristics and therefore significance that it did not have; this is treated in some detail at Tab A of this report. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from ‘Mexico city to Havana, on 22. November and 27 November, respectively, failures by CIA and the Fer being charged. In fact, the first of the flights is inaccurately described, the correct story removing the basis for the inferences” .- developed by the SSC version, In the second instance the subject in question was the subject of a detailed inquiry as-is discussed at Tab of this report. These examples: create some -problens, for the reliability of the SSC Final Report unavoidably becomes the subject. of basic reservations in the face of such errors. “How to respond 7 to treatments that seem contrary to the ¢ facts and that are used as a basis for serious criticisms presents (a problem en? essence, it is 7 necessary to review the record to the extent possible, and report the findings, whatever they are. . | Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964 on the part of CIA,even in terms of the more limited «perceptions of the time, it was decided to consider what courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the questions as wewe understood at the time, _ as well as considering those questions that have been developed in the years following. What would be the areas of inquiry? Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice sub- sequent to his return to private life from the Marine Corps. The -~2-
14-00000 Waa ei BLS Sw Fb te hw , | - "First ‘of. these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union “in 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these trips was when he. went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from which he returned in early October 1963. In addition to these two . areas of. obvious inquiry, there is the problem of general intelli- _ gence collection that might in some way produce information on the , BO subject. The SSC Final Report adds to these considerations opera- “tions being conducted by CIA as part of a general U. S. program against — | the Castro regime. These four general areas of inquiry are covered - “ below.. | | | oe Travel To And From The USSR _1959- 1962 . ‘On 26 November: 1963 a cable was sent. to Paris, ‘Rome, Madrid, We 6 qd. f Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa _ giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his discharge from the Marine Corps 11 September 1959 and his travel to the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as . to his employment and marriage while in Russia. Information was -requested on: | | | "any scrap information which bears on ° President's assassination . -." | On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with — ne London providing additional details on the travel of Oswald to the USSR. London reported that a British journalist © claimed that during his own. imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living: in ~3-. AMICI MPs Ng wits i; hed Bane 3 Ob EE see teroreesentt co Rp aenaeniinett Oo nn LL
14-00000 <j terme: Be wart x woke £8 foes ° ti) io yw INE haa Lai % luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source stated that Santos was "visited frequently by another American gangster named 'Ruby'." | Also on 27 November Ottawa’ reported the’ "delight" of the Cuban | Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although the staff was instructed ‘to “cease looking happy ‘in public, "in conformance with instructions from Cuba. to “govern their actions 9 by official attitude of Govt to which they, accredited. "[—_] on the same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the - assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial responses produced no other information. | On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's travel back from the USSR. This query was followed (on. 2 December by a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands en route to United States in June 1962. | The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or . information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without detailed results although there were some technical operations that produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups _ under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible significance. Book V of the SSC Final Report, in not criticizing the Agency's perfernance in this aspect of the investigation seems to have accented it as adenuato. -~4- aati teterten tie 7 | 7 Ur erne i ba eine . UR... : RinaereecataoePOan src Dera teanae . ” NNN ete ety ae RA
Pa an FOE wr ’ Oswald Mexico Visit -~ September-October'1963 - The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get a visa for travel to the Soviet Union, transiting Cuba, has received extensive attention. The details concerning the knowledge about Oswald is treated in another annex to this. paper (Tab +). Ss‘ The .concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on 28 November 1963: / | | "We have by no means excluded the possi- bility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations and your liaison with Mexicans." a The allegations made by "D" about having seen Oswald taking money from . Cubans received intensive attention From CIA and the FBI, working closely on the matter, and with:the Mexican authorities. Cttpts—was- eget CONCH alse-allegation. After the ae allegations by "D" had been proven false, Headquarters made the follow- d ‘ing statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963: a . “PIs continue to follow all leads and tips. The question of’ whether Oswald acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved." ~ 5 - PAN iwiew cnn + i RAINE bead ah. litte eifeetererninntiherenmtntss am tenRer re hAG Ine” fi
14-00000 Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as . follows: “Pls continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel in India had letters sent to ODYOKE readers demanding full investigation of case." On 17 December. 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico City Station stating as. follows: . . . Mexico City has been the only major overseas reporter in the case. While this partly dictated by ‘the facts of Lee OSWALD's life, we have not overlooked the really out- standing performance of Mexico City's major assets and the speed, precision, and perception | ; with which the data was forwarded. Here it was . relayed within minutes to the White House, ODACID, and ODENVY. | | “Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia DURAN, and your ‘analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blank- ing out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing." ~6- f cod ~ ee ted my | eee | sd . gta Ribak dv dae tll. Dod Aghya pi ble iad a da ate teacctmenerer tenet ween Hp ita sna
14-00000 Essentially, the/trip of Oswald to Mexico City was investigated as thoroughly as possible without producing any evidence thone. of Soviet or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this possible analysis as a proper view, but simply. note that ‘if it means anything it tends to counter speculation to the contrary. . ae . General Collection Requirements | "Qn 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable (DIR $4608) ; from Headquarters . with the following statement: "Tragic death of, President: Kennedy réquires - all of us to look sharp for any unusal intelligence developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes: over the reins." It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction to be expected from such a communication. In this case, without - any leaks, the requirements had to be general. General reporting can be stimulated by general requests if there is something to report. Beyond this, in any event, in the world of intelligence, reporting assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the ~7J- Peay amprTiay” vA S hed a4 ii meek tj 4 ii i dae | deemmrimasas Annatemtneecte tan am annette ad heat tha ol
eek.) RES SA SS SANS Se Aircore fhis will be revrkiten to -: taken into account the recently. discovered fact that “MaVE dia ies collection requirenents.to those” agents: insite Cuba, .h ovever: ther ‘the resovrees or access. Sarthe houever "passive tt the -pos ture in: “the U.S., owt of Ssference “to Ee “BI, the fact -of actual reguirexye nt to Cuban avents should be- coverdd, Will Sturbitt ts is going “to Ae "LD 3, develop this - ‘point. . SS ne ‘ " ‘ 5 so 1a tears OIE ET EDS He ef
14-00000 Sy ee 1 Bd 8 few’ coed BB OT Oka Significance of important information and will report in on their own initiative. It must be considered significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has been massive silence on the subject over the years. Were there relevant or significant information : on the subject it would have. been reported either in responset to. the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources. If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared the. knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously - would be nothing to report in’ the first. place. In either event, . insistence that CIA produce something that proves or disproves the conspiracy theory flies in the face of a view that absence of reporting means that no collection requirements were issued. The general collection requirements were addressed to stations . with Cuban assets. The Miami Station did query its assets, but as was stated by the Chief of the Miami Station, in his testimony before the Committee, we had no real sources. inside Cuba that could be expected to help on this (page 58), much Tess "an extensive intelli- _gence network in Cuba" (as stated at page 10 of the SSC Final Report) . that could be expected to have special access to. such information. His characterization of acting in a “passive way" was seized on in the SSC Final Report, without its qualifying comments. In fact Cuban sources were made aware of interests in information . - § - ancarcomarriag® Wish BAe oi Bd aD A Bananas RAE GERM Rac H
14-00000 UU BhF wa a bd vL While. the ssc Final Report undertakes to paint this in different — terms, it is very difficult to conceive, even today, what could have been done in this respect that was not done. GIA’ Op erations Against Cuba . The SSC Final Report speaks of various operations against ‘Cuba and the Castro: regime that should have been reported to the Warren Commission as. part of the subject matter” that it consciously took into consideration. To demonstrate its case the SSC Final Report discusses Operation AMLASH extensively. Because of ‘the extensive treatment given that | _activity in the SSC Final Report, we have addressed jt in detail in one of the other annexes of this report (Tab A). ‘We feel that the ‘SSC Final Report did not analyze ‘that activity carefully ‘and as a result misunderstood it, and that much of its presentation is _ therefore badly flawed. That will not be treated in detail again here. The discussion at Tab A does refer to other known operational activities against Cuba, and the remarkable tensions between the Cuban and U.S. _ governments. The following discussion addresses what has _been done recently in CIA to review all other Cuban operations to see what they may reveal relating to the Kennedy assassination. — In 1964 the people responsible for the various operations were still assigned to the general field of Cuban operations. They knew what was in them, and what was not.” Today, persons unfamiliar with the files have gone through them in detail to determine if there was anything in them relevant to the Kennedy assassination. ~9-- fret song rm TO RS sping” in 42 § iz, yogi: i 4 hae ree pigcligda Lee Ee Ne eee
14-00000 _ This search of old operational files necessarily meant that not only the obvious would be picked out, but that hypothetical tests must be applied to information and that tenuous possibilities would be treated as real for the purpose of the review. Findings might well be of a nature that would not be acceptable under normal professional standards. Nevertheless, to, ensure thoroughness, even the most far-out . possibility was to be scrutinized, with the thinnest leads being . offered up for consideration. The fact that they are recorded does not mean that they are accepted as real, but simply that they were noted in the course of the special research that was undertaken. “Ordinarily these items might not be dignified by even taking them past. the first phase of hypothetical consideration. There always are reservations about. advancing unfounded theory beyond this first step; nowadays this is an additional consideration simply because once they find their _ way into print they may find their way into. the public domain without © ‘the profound reservations that may be held about them. The talent of the press for extravagant extrapolation and selective réporting ‘almost ef findings certainly seems to risk a reckless and irresponsible presentation /to the public, once separated from the special circumstances that produced them. Nevertheless, they are duly recorded here. . | . The relevance of the ede Fol lowing tenuous summaries is based on an hypothesis that has attracted some current acceptance, but . but that is seriously flawed in itself. This is the hypothesis that actions of the U.S. Government were so provocative to Castro that he - 10 - OOMcy TA eed “AAS bet doa i ii “ake + qn AA tr atta PETER OD
14-00000 Lhe SSC wr he F- retaliated by ordering the assassination of President Kennedy. There has never been a secret about the tensions between the Kennedy Adminis-~ tration and the Castro regime: The SS¢ Final Report notes this (pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro regine, and most certainly was JOD poe” by it y JE as provocative. on the basis of this hypothesis, the ‘SSC reat Report feels/ thex| should have been reported to the Warren. Commission. The approach in the SSC Final Report was to select separate elements of the overall program directed against the Castro regime which might, of themselves, have been especially provocative to the Cubans ‘had they learned of them. This selection of separate activities, seaing in them especially provocative characteristics, hypothesizing a possi- . bility that they might have become known to the Castro regime, and then pointing to an-ultimate conclusion of responsibility, presents 7 a series of discrete progressions that must be viewed at-each step: the selection must be well founded (the ssc dismissed out of hand the relevance of the operation against Castro that involved the criminal underworld, while the AMLASH operation failés to support the thesis) the provocative characteristics must be well founded (the treatment of the ANLASH operation does this unsuccessfully) the possibility that the Castro regime learned of the activity in its essential characteristics: (this is not done, either Sefconclusively demonstrating its security weakness or even that the SSC really appreciated the nature of the operation and then there would -have to be some serious consideration
14-00000 of how Castro would haye reacted, given all the questions that would have been presented to chim in taking the action suggested by the SSC Final Report. It obviously was on the basis of the well known generally Tow: State of relations between the U.S. and Cuba that the possibility of Cuban involvement with Oswald was considered at the beginning of the investigation. The Warren Commission obviously did not elect to inquire - about the separate pieces of the’ entire Kennedy anti-Castro program, but relied primarily--as still seems appropriate today--on: extensive and detailed recoristruction of Oswald's history to ascertain where he had been, what he had done, the identity of his associates, etc. This was . supported by more general information requirements levied ‘among Cuban sources who might know or learn something, as well as sources in other parts of the world, especially in Europe. | Today in 1977 it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything that did and did not happen in 1964, although when specific issues are raised they can be checked. For instance, there were many individuals - assigned to various aspects of Cuban operations. ' They were familiar with those activities, : and. with their strengths and weaknesses. Had they known of any aspects of their operations that might have born. on. the assassination of President Kennedy, it is certain that Se Kould. have been reported, as in fact were a number of separate items of information: That sources did not report more meaningful information is an indication of what was known then to those actually involved and what could be learned.
14-00000 har rill aE “4 e i i Us WEST EL JPN Sea 4 3 Jacit oe - ‘Today, the knowledge of the persons directly involved in the various operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's death ‘cannot be recaptured in the form it existed then. Those persons are scattered, their memories are not as detailed or accurate as they then were, and some are dead. The SSC-~in its attempt to capture elements of the past~-led some employees into expressing opinions on subject matter they did not know about in 1964, phrased to be responsive ‘to representations of SSC staff members that. were inaccurate; this - iTustrates at best te etter question today | on a responsible basis. | . | “In the face. of the hypothesis advanced by the SSC Final Report, " with: its interpretations | based on imprecise presentations of events Land « a generally captious character of its arguments, fit has been felt . necessary to review. in great detail all records of Cuban operations conducted .by CIA during the period in question, 1960-64. The ‘organi- zation of the review is described. at Tab , It was not easy to - predict the form that information turned up by this inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort. In doing this the provocation concept was kept in mind. In the months that it took to. complete this extensive review, itis significant to observe that only ' . two areas of specific operational activity were found that might. meet some of the requirements of the provocation theory, or that in any way might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy. To report this conclusion to the research is not to set aside the original general ' question facing the Warren Commission, that led to the initial concern -~11b- o_o ? OAT T OTE A] Wied a 84 iwinididewe . fresoe semdtanatsteiynr te emnmnamerenioinatutir Anton pare
14-00000 over whether there might be Cuban or Soviet connections behind Qswald, arising from the state of relations between Cuba and the U.S. That such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but that the records for that period disclose no such leads today, and that the appropriate sources were queried at the time of the investi- ' gation, is the conclusion of the present inquiry. “The two areas of operational activity noted above can be described — briefly as follows: | | | . gh. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership. pa Operations involving the criminal underworld. ~llc- SYS RTM IMT eg a a 4 @ gs4: ie ae arn
14-00000 I have experinented with the thr-e questions riiseds Sturgis, AMITRUNK and the objective of spli°ting therezime, to see vhat we might en] up saying. However, what ve put in here devends on how your paper progresses. Please destroy previous drafts. $53