TOP SECRET . . SPECIAL HANDLING — ee NOFO LIVTTED DISTRIBUTION APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A ‘DRAFT MEMONANS “IM FOR BRIGADIER “ENERAL E. G. LANSDALE, ; Chief of Oper: ‘tions, Guba Project Subject:. Cuba Projec >: . Peference: Memorandum “rom “Your office for ; . BrigGen W, i. Craig, USA, subj: 77 ~O7 "Special Pr ject", Gated i7 Jan 62 1. As. requested in refer nced memorandum, the position of the Departinent of Defense, ith respect, to .the military stake ane. w.e in the removal cf she Communist regime in cuba, has beer, dohovmined bage upon’ che following factors: - Nataonal security Policy, determined by the ‘WSC during ve nesting of G May 1961. . b. Current intelliger ce estimates cf the situation : in vba » . c. operations, against the Castro regime will be covert, es least initially. ‘da. Time favors the Cz stro ‘government. 2. The basic military in plications. of castro" 5 Commnist |  govecnme:.: are as-follows: | a. Lt exposes ‘the Wer tern Hemisphere to an increasingly serioas threat to its sc curity. This increases our national vilnezability and defen: e costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.” be “It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the possibility that additi nal Latin pnerican countries will come under Communist cotrol. Elimination of this base would - demonstrate to the othe nations of the world that the United States will not tolerat : such intrusions: Communist control of additional countries would or could result in: TOP SECRET = oo Appendix 1 to 7 Enclosure A SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NORFOHN —“=‘“CSS~<‘<;7;7; O HW 47674. DocId:32276301 Page 203
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN7 - NOFORN (1) Increased Communit st capability: for attack on other nations of the Wes sern Hemisphere. * (2) Increased ‘Communi st capability for spreading "Communi sm throughout Latin America. . (3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, training areas, faciliti2s and rights, as well as sources of strategic materials necessary to our military capability. (4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the Panama Canal thre igh subversion and sabotage. 3. The urgency of the requi rement to remove the Communist ‘ government from Cuba is made éoparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities for at tacking other nations of the Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action within the capability of the Communists are considered: a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air - ' bases in Cuba. . | b. The Soviets could prc vide Castro with a number of _baliistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could furnish the missiles .and mintain joint control of the nuclear warheads. . ~ 4. In view of the factors :et forth above, the Department of Defense holds that: the Commun: st regime in Cuba is incompatible .with the mintmum security reqiirements of the Western” Hemisphere. . The Department oO: Defense is prepared to overtly support any popular movement : oside cuba to the extent of ousting the Communist regime ond installing a goveranént a acceptable to the United States. While -the possibility of . Communist Bloc reactions in a-eas other than in Cuba is recognized, it.is believed ‘tht this can be accomplished without precipitating general war, an -without serious effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail: ro Appendix 1 to Enclosure A some occHQP.. SECRET  SPECIEL HANDLING  NOFORN
Pube SCRE TOP SECRET - "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED a . _ Foon SSSRD_ DISTRIBUTION a. Iv the impression di created. that there is an urgent, humanitarian requirement 10 restore order, in Cuba and/or the Uniies States is vespormiing to an appeal for assistance from a goverament represei tative of the Cuban people. ». Yf dt ds announced :neident to the overt military action ' that the United Sates and/or members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of resuoring order and holding free elections, and that hey, will immediately withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they have the capability bo maintain order without further assistance from the OAS “nations. | . I "og, Ef the military ope: ation is ecnducted as qulekly 7 as vest aoivle. and with suff.cient force no that the Commnist | Blos's ability to take ef ‘ective counter-measures in support | o: the Castro ro regia is roduced to a ‘aininuin. a. or; ' the Cuban re sime comm ts. hostile acts against us forces or property whi:h would serve as an’ incident. upon which to base overt US in vervention. In this event, applicable portions cP a, b, and ce aoove apply. - 5. The Department of Defeise is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA or Stite, or any US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terus of supplies, transportation, — personnel. and bases. TOP. SECRET , , . 3 _ Appendix 1 to. , Enclosure A. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOFORN ONrTED DISTRIBUTION aH 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 205
TOP SECRET Ta HANDLING y RRQUTRED TED PYSTRIBUTION FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 1. The over-all plan* for the overthrow of she Castro ‘government .is responsive to “he following objective: “the US objective is te help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a if new government with which the united States can live in peace," 2. It ta becoming increas ngly evident that the Castro regine, aidec mates “Lally » morally an financially by the Sino-Soviet Bloc,. has necome firmly entr nched. Over the cast two and one- half years, the ‘Castro regim: has graduaily built up a 2 police state on. the Sino-Soviet mod 21. The first stec was the “anniest-te' eplavenent of the existing Cuban Arsay and police force by revolutionary units which had fought with Castro during the revolution in- the hills tnd in. the unlerground. Changes in| the Navy une Aty Force were 1ecomplished through purges of top personnel. Toward she end O° 1959 © as disillusionment and opposi- tion over the arift toward closer association with the ‘Sino- - Soviet Bloc be gan ‘to erystalize within the regular armed forces, the regime again shifted its basis of power, this time to the ~ newly-formed civilian: worker -peasant-student militia. Dr. Castro ‘looked upon this militia as 2 presumably more reliable military force. For almost a year th: militia maintained its status as a para-military organizatior under labor union and student federation leadership. On ¢2 september 1960, Castro reorganized the militia along military lines and the chief of the corresponding military district’ took over command of the militia units. Specifically. trained officers replaced the original militia commanders and military training was accelerated. * Program Review by Brigzadier Genéral E. G. Lansdale, USAF, subject: "The Cuba Project", dated 18 Jan 1962; not. on file in the Joint. Secretariat. TOP SECRET - Enclosure B SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOFORN. LIM TED DISTRIBUTION NW 47074 Decld:32276301 Page 206
“0 OP es 4. Simcitaneously, the Ca:.tro regime was also building its secic..ty uetwork™, In June :961, the process culminated with the suteltishnent of 4a Minis ury of ‘Interior wauih reuponsibility ‘for vainivoining "public orde:'"., The decree centralizes the various police and investiga: sion units under the new ministry. | It also gave tne Ministry authority to supervise the activities af “Commicteer for the Devense of the Revolwsion". These somiittes: arg vespurnsibie for Anforming authovities of "counter- bevelatiosary" aativities or attitudes:. A campaign is under way (to establish 169, 002: of such committees with 50,000 “volunteer” members Si offices, factorie:, schools, churches, couneratives, residentr2.i areas, ete. By centraiising cha police function and Somblcnng it with a vast network of intorners, the Castro . regine has esteolisted a sec wity system cha tie Communist Bloc “model. , | : 4k. In supposs. of this military and security build-up, Castro forces have been equipped wish’ arms and materiel from the Sino- Soviet Bloc countries, i.e., Czechoslovakla and Russia. In- formation qxticates the Cuba. force is well equipped with modern weapons and that ther? isin Cuba an actual surplus of military equipment for the force in being. Some accounts indicate that certain materi 21 is. rather sophisticated, and includes EW radar, fire contcol ‘systeis, advanced fighters, short and possibly medium raage rockets. It becomes obvious that the Castro forces are being trained and equipped for | operations far beyond that required to mairitain law and order and internal security. This represents a continuous threat to the Western Hemisphere, and is a Communist stronghold for the * Department of State White Paper, subject: "The Castro Regime in Cuba", recently publisred but undated; not on file in Joint Secretariat : TOP SECRET re Q . Enclosure B ‘SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED \(0)0);]) LIMITED DISTRIBUTTON 3 at IRR RW 47874 DocId: 32276301 Page 207
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED THTTED DISTRIBUTION continued spread of Coimmuni:im to other countries of the inter-~American System. 5. In response to a requc st™ by the President in April 1961 the Defense Department has : lyeady: planned for the over- threw of the Castro governn nt by use of military force. In the event formal, overt -com tment of US forces in Cuba should pecone necessary there are iow two US military plans** in being $i -p-of which could be. implemented. Both plans provide for 7 ule ispioyment of sizeable 1S forces and are designed, among oubor thivess, toward.the ovor-throw of the Castro-government as wigisiiy os uossible. @. CXSCLANT OPLAN 314 -61,** approved”** by the Joint Chiefs “ Siewk, provides fora simultaneous auphibious and airborne ba A within 18 days a‘ter the execution order, assuming 24, priov-alert on prepos tioning of forces. After the intial resav.iu, 2% is estinated that-overtnrow of the Castro HOVERING aici ine gain of essential control of Cuba would %2 assured in 10 days. : . . b. CINCLANT OPLAN 316 -61, ** designed for alfaster commitment cf US forces, provides for an airborne assault within 5 days of the execution order. However, since ‘this plan deploys - fewer forces initially, 10 estimate is made concerning tie length of time required for overthrow of the government or ‘control of Cuba. This latter plan, not yet approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in process of minor revision. ‘by CINCLANT. - * JCS 2304/29 ** CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan 314-61 aren and CINCLANT Contingency Srerations Plan 316-61 (Cuba), both plans on file in Joint Secretariat eee TCS 2018/306 TOP SECRET . ; 3 Enclosure B SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED NOPORN LIMITED DISTRIBUTION x Nw 27674 Boold: 32276301 Page 208
FOP SECRET AD on TOP SECRET oe ‘SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED . . — TWTTED DISTRIBUTION ' ENCIOSURE C . 'T ISCUSSION l. Although it is ‘possible that a Cuban counter. ‘revolutionary -leader zould emerge with sui ficient appeal to enable the anti- Casio. slements to unite in an attempt to seize power, such eventuality does not seem 1: kely unless fostered and supported by the United States. , To dite, exiled Cubens have failed to . (Pi eecuce such 4 leader. * Even the loss of Casto by assassination ot by n-tural casues, yhile unsettling on the government, would ainost :artainly not. prove : v‘atal to the regime. ** Tt is. there - _ Pose expected that no ‘Cuban leader or insurgent group can lideperdently undertake. a s: gnificant subversion effort against thé government with any rea.:onable chance of success: 2. Even a cursory look ‘a; Castro's military preparations to defend Cuba indicates that’. purely overt attempt to overthrow the Castro government ean o nly be accomplished by a well conceived military plan in significan ; force, requiring military inter- vention by the United States. , 3. As long as Cuba does i0t become a member and an accepted military partner of the Warsaw Pact the threat of general war as a result of US military intervention in Cuba does not appear to exist. . | | 4, It is expected that tie Castro government, will avoid giving the United States sufficiert provocation for armed intervention. For this reason Cuban Forces are-not expected to be committed to -an attack on the US Naval Ease at Guantanamo Bay. Neither is it * J-2 DM-400-61, "After the Assassination of Castro ' What?" © dated 27 October 1961; cn file in J-2 ; ** SNIE 85-61, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", dated 28 Nov 61; on file in Jcint Secretariat . oo, TOP SECRET = Enclosure ¢ ~ SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED . NOFORN SCS; XETCté<;<CO! _ EEMTTED DISTRIBUTION Vaya Vee SKC RICE RY 47674 Docld:32276301 Page 209
iE t a TOP? S RORY” TOP SECRET. '. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — OFORN EIMTTED DISTRIBUTION ‘expected that Castro will allow a definite relationship to become known or apparent between his governient and communist attempts at infilitration: and subver: ion of. other Latin American states. 5, it is postulated ther fore, that to progress in following “the ucablished national po. icy of aiming at the downfall of . Casore, it will be necessa:'y for the United States to support a selected Cuban insurgent i.ttempt from.the outset and to be ’ prepared. to sustain such insurgent prograi toe successful conclusion, including overt military intervention as the final and decis ive step. 6, ‘It is clear that the indtea States cannot afford repetition, oo . — of the unfortunate miscalcu ation of the political aspirations | of Fidel Castro in the desiv’e to sz2 an end to the Batista regime. It would appear that ‘a sign ficant lesson of this costly mistake is the requirement for emphisis and improvement in US mes efforts to evaluate the tru: colors of potentially capable ‘personalities and groups wh ch eventually may have to be recognized and supported by the United States in future counter ~ . revolutionary undertakings. ' , 7. The basic military im olications of Castro's Communist government are as follows: . : : * a. It exposes the Wes cern Hemisphere to an increasingly serious threat to its security. This increases our national - vulnerability and defens: costs as forces are developed or shifted to meet this thr at. . b. It provides the So/slet Union with the most effective base they have ever had ‘or spreading Communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the: possibility that additional Latin American countries will come under Communist control. Elimination of this base in Cuba would demonstrate ‘to the other nations of the world that the US will not tolerate suci intrusions. Communist control of additional countries would or could result in: TOP SECRET. . oo 2 Enclosure C SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - NOFORN  etnurION INTTED eee NW 47674 DocId:32276301- Page 220
| Toe Se CREE, . TOP SECRET = CP | SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED EINIED DrsmRreurroN (1) Increased Commu sist capability for attack on other nations of . the Western Hemisphere. . (2) Inereased Commu aist capability Por spreading Communism throughout Latin America. (3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, train- ing areas, facilities and rights, as ‘well as sources of strategic materiels necessary to our military capability. . (4) An increased threat to US usage ana control of the Ponama ‘Canal through. :-ubversion and sabotage. 8. The urgency of the recuirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly ' increasing capabilities for attackin:, other nations of the Western “Hemisphere and for spreadin; Commund sia throughout the hemisphere. ‘This sense. of urgency is gre atly- increased ifr courses of action : within the capability of the Communists are considered: . a. The Soviets cuuld establish land, sea and/or air’ ‘bases in Cuba. . b. The Soviets could ; rovide Castro with a number of “ballistic missiles with 1uclear warheads, or they could furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads. | 9. In view of the factor: set forth above, the Department of ' Defense holds that the Commmist regime in Cuba is incompatible . with the minimum security r-quirements of the Western Hemisphere. The Department of Defense i: prepared to overtly support any i popular movement inside Cub. to the extent of ousting the Communist regime and instal ing a government acceptable te the United States. While. the possibility of Communist. Bloc reactions in areas other thin in Cuba’ is recognized, it is believed that this can be a: scomplished without precipitating general war, and without se *Lous effect on world public opinion if the following conditions prevail: TOP_SECRET 3° Enclosure c So SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED | LINtTED DISTRIBUTION . ere SCRE DT HW 47874 Doecld:32276301 Page 211
foe SCRE TOP SECRET ‘ ; . SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED OFORN TINITED DISTRIBUTION | a. If the impression 's ereated that. there is an urgent, ' humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the United States is res onding to an appeal for assistance: . SvON a government repres -ntative of the Cuban people. b. If it is announced ineident to the overt military action that the United Scates and/or other members of the OAS are moving into Cuba for the purpose of nestoring order , and holding free electicas, and that they will immediately - withdraw @8 soon as the new government advises that they. © have the capabllity to maintain order without further assis- tance from OAS nations. ec. If the military oy eration ig conducted as auiekly as possible ard with suificient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support of the Castro re gime is reduced to a minimum. “a, Or, if the Cuban 1-egime commits Hostile acts NS against US forces or prcperty which would serve as an ineident upen which to lase overt US intervention. In this event, applicable portions of a; b, and ¢ above apply. 10. The Department of De:'ense is also prepared to covertly provide support to CIA, or through these agencies, to any US approved popular inovement nside Cuba, in terms of supplies, : transportation, personnel ind bases. TOP SECRET . a Enclosure C SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED ‘NOrORN LIMLTED DISTRIBUTION * SECRET “NW 47674 “Docld: 32276301 ‘Page 212