HW 450955 ‘SECRET and from Cuba of subversives, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, the movement of arms, and the movement of funds, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelli- gence gained by covert means and information obtained openly, The former involves the require- ment to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be ex- changed without fear of compromise. C« Current Exchange Arrangements a» At present there is little organized ex- change of intelligence among the Latin American nations, There is a limited amount of informal exchange,.often on a basis of personal relation- Ships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a parti- cular matter, b. The Central Intelligence Agency has estab--. lished working liaison arrangements in some Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning sub- version in Latin America available to the CTA is derived from covert. operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passing of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount.of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. In 1962, CIA received information reports from services with which liaison is maintained in Latin America and. released reports tof recipients. Intelligence items ex- changed included collated studies, weekly intelli- gence reviews, name traces and travel reports. c. The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador,. Uruguay, Peru; Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned SECRET 3 Docld: 324274002 Page 6
HW 450955 SECRET with subversive personalities, communist.infiltra- tion, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligerice received has: been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and-Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy and the U.S. Navy. d. Exchanges of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Department of State. e. As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information. on subver- sion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate. degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and re- liable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system ‘for bilateral exchange offers the greatest. possi- bility of achieving the results desired. £, United States experience in the matter of intel- ligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that. bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established. within the: framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also. that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange. g. The concept of an exchange of information. among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activi-- ties has: been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely’ for the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Undér the - Punta del-Este decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract. threats or acts of aggression, sub- version or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a SECRET 4 BDoclda: 327474002 Page 7
HW 50955 SECRET "Special: Consultative Committee on Security (sces)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments. and the Council on matters relating to. subversion. All American governments have. been asked to furnish information on Castro- Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies. ‘and recommendations by the Council of the OAS ‘Of how to counteract them. Sdince the Punta’ del Este meet- ing, the OAS has.been making slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence ‘through its machinery. h. The Inter-American Defense Board (app) has | also demonstrated an awareness of the need for exchanging . intelligence regarding communist: sub- version. Annex 4 of the General Military Plan | prepared by the IADB requests. the American ‘Sti to report information to the Board and to establish » -agreements among themselves for exchatiging #nforma- tion of collective interest. The United States has approved the General Military ‘Plan, but similar action has not: been taken by all member countries. i. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room.for expansion of' bilateral. An teélligence exchange arrangements among. the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an’ expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange be- tween the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the. possibili- ties of a multilateral approach within the recog~ nized limitations involved. TIT. Actions Recommended 1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of in-~ telligence conducted by CIA, DOD, and other U.S. agencies, where it is found possible to establish appropriate | arrangements for the exchange of selected information -con= sistent with security requirements. 2. Complete. eurrent priority project t6 evaluate feasibility and desirability of establishing military intelligence centers at the headquarters of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantie Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination when appropriate, of ’ SECRET 5 DocTd: 324274002 Page @
HW 450955 SECRET intelligence on subversive activity directly to the countries concerned through thé U.S. Embassies therein, 3, Increase and expedite the existing flow of in- telligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements .of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean Command aswell as to CIA headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate. 4, Inerease the dissemination to Latin American governments, by all U.S, agencies concerned, of unclassi- fied studies, reports and other non- sensitive information. concerning. Castro- Communist subversion. 5, Encourage Latin American countries to ongage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro- Communist subversive activities. 6. Continue the development at high oriority. of U.S. communications in Latin America. . 7. Inerease where feasible emphasis on-the provision. of U.S, intelligence advisors to Latin American countries.’ Discourage their employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the U.S. 8. Intensify and increase as applicable existing AID, CIA, and Military programs for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Establish such programs in additional countries where it — is found to be in the best interests of the United States a and acceptable to the country concerned. o | 9. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate gover. ments to keep the Cotinc41l and the SCCS fully informed ion ‘a continuing basis of the nature and incidence.of sub-. versive activities in their respective countries. 10. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furniish to the IADB intelligence information and. estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities. SECRET 6 Doclda: 327474002 Page 9
SECRET ll. Undertake to arrange for regional meetings of senior intelligence and security service representatives of Latin American countries and the United States for the purpose of fostering the exchange of intelligence eoncerning Castro-Communist subversive activities.and . developing the necessary mechanisms and procedures there- for. SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32474002 Page i0