| TA. De if 1. [ 2. [- 3. [ Ae [D. In 1. 2. 3. 4. hy Q e . 2 . a a . ec) ° S BR I EE EE EE TN nO EE ES re pa se te . | toaed e a H ¢ NEPA WHE Ho Ob WD ‘ o Ao * 6 pwn . a HW 35072 Doold: 32989529 Page isii ee ary OLY ONT DL LAG Sa LEAL TIO INE ah a th hd he ot eat é TABLE OF CONTENTS | 6 FIMLGLONS Jececcoreecroacesecverssesnvevececeneoesessesesese Security informant Pe ene see aooneseohosanrcee eases eooreeenee Potential security informant ...cscascvacescecvcvecsccscus Double agent PEOCCHCHE HOCH EHO OOH ECT HE DEE THECTDADHEHE EET EC EHOHMO ES - Confidential SOULCE gaecesesrcvsesrcsosovcaessveerseancoesene [B. Sources of Potential Security Informants .,.ccacececrececscvece {C,. Investigation of Potential Security Informants .ecccsceererese terviews and Development of Potential Security Informants ., [P, Bureau Policy aoeoeoeret seve entcovsereeer seo ere seoaercesoewerneeeeeee ver eond Development of military personnel .rccccccvaccerecesereecee “Contacts by desi gnated Agents Cece eee sreoet senor eeeeernecven Divul ging information to informant eeoeoesc nese rceraencesneetrae Recording investigative activity waccacssccceercesaevaceas Indoctrination, Direction, and Control of Security Informants Caution against divulging relationship ee oraeeaceesasasoadc Developing additional background cessscoescveccccssccvevecs Handling indications of instability @eodgeesoseaenoeseoansoenon Contacts by Agents eer c ceca ete ease cero tea etacecosencesace Checking reliability Seedeoeassaeroesseeoeavresescverseerooeeos Fingerprints @aooccea@ncoet#sneconeeceteaeneoeoeseevovoaese nee ct#*e tn vneseaeves Control ~- statement of cooperation ,oscaecoccereorecesceve Execution of party questionnaires Seer eoeecsnosnooereeoesaodene Informant's activity in organizations ceccscoccvcoccsccece ransfer of informants to other a@reasS sececnccecrassssceee Aotion by informant when uncovered .eseccccccasecsasscvoes Requests of informant to help defend others ..ccsaccescece Informants! Information sot aeorese evr ee ones eweveeratrsessraeneveeca General instructions re oral and written information ..... Recording written and oral information cesssasccasscvseasa Transmission of information Seeger senate eoreeveeseanegenassea Handling of lead information .ecscaccccncecsscesessesscces Handling documentary material furnished by informants .... ssing Information In Double Agent Operations .escccescaesecs Carefully haudie and create basis for acquisition ....cee. Locating information to PASS sevcnscosessoresssscsseesesaes Obtaining Bureau authority .iccseecscccccesecacccsseccvcas Retention of copies of passed material .iseesceceoscsssaves ymbols eeoe ese hoc esse aK Geuoss ee toes ees sense aeeeneeeaseeanaseseonaeens Assigning DUMDELS cecosesrc cess eeevacsscercoresesercesseron Communications — use of SYMDOLTS wasececceosecccseorceeaeaes Indexing @*enueeeeoeeconeusesn se Oeecaeeavee esc eeeeetandenesseeosesreete : ENGL COS sora carcccr sc oer so errr ass ased eer seteseesesseresaseses Alphabetical name index and symbol number index .....c.ec0- Tnudex entitled "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" Agents! 4ntormative index Cr ee ee ee eee a re ee es Currency 2nd SCOULLbY socsccccscescasseseesvascssssncessas 1 21 260 Page 680 oa aON IIo sousuveuunl
107 . SECTION 107. SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES ; : FABLE OF CONTENTS s Index Cards COO CORO ORR ORO REEL EEO TEETH ETOH EOE FETT eee ete Hnee 16 ore EM, Informant Files CRB dere re reece eee saves eHoesceneeeeeseeEeEeenareseneese 16 is 1. Opening PROP eee ene eee eeseceeseeeeTHeeEse ees eee eRe Ee HEC EO EEOS 16 [ 2. Monthly administrative report Ceo aeetanrseeeseeenenersevneeceneseeeoagsze 16 “ [ 3, Assignment and tickler CardS cesceccccccearercrersvuscveesesvens 16 C 4. SUBLLLES cece ceeccac sere c sane e eevee cer ass re erases sesesseeeeres 17 [ 5. Channeli zation @eeoteaaceeeanocseeweescesneeteeecaeacuaueegcseegaseseeseev een eee ee eee 17 [ 6. Dissemination of information ewer sees on eereeerereeesereosreerecseoese 17 « { 7. Correspondence Ser creeereserercesnscesreceseereoescessaoercesenneoeva 17 [ 8. Maintenance of files eae eter erro aseeeeeratesecesoseeeeenaeseasesses 17 [ 9. Use of informant by Department ~ filing correspondenoe re ....0. 17 [ ; 10. Form FD-238 .ccccescesececscaceecscresecresscgnesseaceesessesese 17 ii il. Bulky material submitted by informant er } 18 ([N. Payments to Informants and Handling Money Received wecssccecccsccces © 18 ii 1. No gifts to informants o#et#aesecegeove*ecgeseee@seaeeeeneesvp eee eoeaeease aes 18 [ 2a SAC authority to pay informants Cr 18 y t 3. Payments on continuing basis — Bureau authority ..scccceceeesces 18 [ 4, Four-month evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau [ : authority @t@oeoaut*o@aeesteeeseveoe ewe #@oneesvace ate eeveveee tee eeeaeeoeeraevae eae aezaeaede 20 { 56 Receipts a@oceetswaceeaonee eee eeeaevaeteaseeeoeeoe aes epeueanaeeroeaeveevesepecaetepeaeaeecenuveaen 20 . i G. Tneome tax returns Pr ee re a | 20 {[ -7, Stipulation re payments made to witneSSeES wiccecsseseccscceovess 21 [ 8, Recei pt of unemployment compensation Cove se caceccaeveceecereces ai [ 9. Handling money and property received by double agents wsscoceses 22 To. Semiannual Letter CO DO OOO ROR OREO HDC REECE EOC O HERE DE ECHOES NEE OO" 22 Cp. Si gning of Loyalty Oaths, Affidavits, and Statements ee oescerocoreneesg 24 Pa. Discontinued Informants eeacewerese ere rere easeceosoCe toes Fe eoeoaeevnesscene . 24 th. Furnishing of Informants to Immigration and Naturalization Service f (rws) SCHOHROHEHHKEE OE HOE EHH OOH HOOT ODOC HHH OHO HOEH ETD EEH TESCO EOE KOE ODEGD 26 rs, Corrective Action on Palse Information Coe rceosrcecaenesscaeoeecsaseces 26 5 it. Classification @#or2eaeG02C2 GHA GHOKC#ABHAEKOHe EHP Ue HKSHoOHaO EHO AOC eT et Ceevnecewsewwae tne oeeoce 27 id iG. Confidential Sources cascasscsacscccceceacceseesesccssvecsescetossece 27 L L, Definition oto gcopedscedageecoe oe Ootceaeendneaetcvee te ovr @o*egcea tone tevodcseeanceeaescee ee oos 27 t 2. Assignment of symbols CROAT OHHH TE CE HABO ROH OEE RECO TED OO Ee OOO Oe - 27 q 3. TNAOX cessaccccasrccceccsceae ere cessuecasessceeracescesvcssevere 27 t 4, Files eee oe e*ocexreevercaeesvetsceenceoeeeweaesenweenceeee eevee svravreseeeeeeoene 27 t 5. Utilization Ce oe eee eoee es eseeoeeoeoeTensoaaeenreeoneceeoeeeeneoeee 28 { 6, Security and racial confidential sources — certification of [ stability and payments *Goecoseacereregoenceeeoeescresseooores eosas 28 t 7 GALTS cescccccuscrocreecarasersesseccnocvessreesscescraverccoees 28 E 8, Discontinuance seacoscerccsosersececacessocsoesasesosatsogsgeuace 28 ‘ é i i i ‘| x fF 2 NW 55072 Docld:32989529 Page 1812 2-12-60
~ 10. li, 12, - 13, 14, SECTION 107. ,#ECURITY INFORMANTS([AND CONFID EYMIAL SOURCES] Fo Tnustruct each inte#tested Bureau office which has made further dis- semination of such information to follow the instruotions set forth above. Also set up a control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completion of same submit to the Bureau a final letter under the in-~ formantts caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of communication, _ This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken in each instance, If necessary, other field offices which have received information from the informant should also be requested to submit summary letters show~ ing what corrections have been made, It is iniperative that all information from the informant be correotly . Labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done. Occasionally, an ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises a doubt as to his reliability subsequent to the time he was an informant. It is not necessary to go back and change the evaluation of the ‘information attributed to that individual in the absence of a. definite indication that the informant furnished unreliable information to the Bureau while he was an informant. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known unreliability should be made in accordance with part ITI, section 5, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, T, CLASSIFICATION ~ 134 U, CONPIDENTIAL SOURCES | “2. if | 2. Of ft 3. 4, NW 35072 Doold: 32909529 Page 16135 2—1 2-60 Definition [See page 3 of this section.] Assignment of symbols a. A symbol number may be assigned if an unusual security problem exists, or if typing would be. saved, b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, ‘business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning a symbol number, and a brief statement concerning type of information furnished. c. The abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra-Bureau communications for confidential source. [Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating the country involved; e.g.,]IS - R for Russia.] d, When’a permanent symbol has been assigned to a confidential source, the abbreviation "CS" is to appear before the symbol number; e.¢., CS NY-000-S, e. Symbol numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from the series of symbol numbers used for your security and criminal informants, Index a, Index cards (3 by 5 inches) like those prepared for informants must be made up and filed as an adjunct to the criminal informant index or the security informant index, depending on the type of information furnished. b. The symbol index is handled similarly to the symbol index on inform-— “ants, c, Duplicate confidential source cards may be maintained with the criminal informant index and the security informant index if the source furnishes information of vaiue in both types of investiga~ tions, Files When active investigation is initiated relative to an individual who has potential as a security confidential source, a 134 classification file should be opened and maintained in a pending status until efforts to develop the individual are discontinved, The same procedure should be followed: concerning racial confidential sources, the classification being 137. Files may be opened on confidential sources in criminal matters in a manner identical with that for handling criminal informant files in the discretion of the SAC, 27 1078 - U
rt OE Utilization Be £, w If confidential source is to be used for assistance in seourity or racial investigations, secure Bureau approval, and background data must be furnished to the Bureau of the same type which is required for potential security and potential racial informants, Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters in which the frequency of contact is dependent upon circumstances of the individual case, confidential sources on whom pending files are maintained should also be contacted at least once every two weeks in the same manner as seourity informants, Records of contacts with confidential sources who have pending files may be posted. Contacts with confidential sources should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated for that purpose, The letter to the Bureau requesting authority to use a subject as a- confidential source is to set out clearly the following informa— tion: (1) Background information, including date and place of birth, citizenship status, residence, employment, credit and arrest record, and service record, if any. (2) Details of the expected cooperation of captioned individual as a confidential source, together with the results of any interviews conducted with him (3) A statement to the. effect subject is being considered a con - fidential source and that he will be advised he is not a . Bureau employee and of the confidential nature of his relation— ship with the Bureau, In addition, a statement should: be made that you will be alert to be certain subject is not a plant, and if he is oonnected with a labor union he will be advised of Bureau policy on labor matters, [One of the required copies of the letter requesting authority to use @ subject as a confidential source should consist only of the first page of the letter.] If the request is approved at the Bureau, a stamped notation will be placed on the[single~page] copy and[it will belreturned to the field indicating that authority is granted to consider subject as a confidential source, Letters requesting such authority are not to be transmitted to the Bureau until subject is sufficiently cooperative and all necessary background information obtained, Security and racial confidential sources — certification of stability and payments Be d, Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security and racial confidential sources, See LO7N, 3b, for form of letter, If the security or racial source is not being paid on Bureau authoriza~ tion and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters, Gifts Gifts to sources Shalt not be reclaimed as blue slip items, Discontinuance Advise Bureau when confidential source is discontinued, and the reasons therefor, Nw 55072 Livt/a-messos29 Page 1814 28 SECTION 107. ah di INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIA TRCES “4 Nie” Fa Sw
SECTION 87 PART I (1969 TO PRESENT) ww t and is not for dissemi- ‘ is pr i onse to your request and ¢ dissemi This document is pi epared, in resp Its use is limited to official proceed mos ahaa i iid cond the. content may not be disclosed to un ; your Con nel without the express approval of the FBI c ™~.
/ C.. NW 35072 4, . ~~. ses 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVENMRVE * L ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVILUALS TABLE OF CONTENTS General GuideLineSececrvececcccce sc cnc 00 eer 000 no ee e080 eT 0000008000 1. Ze 36 4. "5. 60 Ze 8. Investigative JULALSAICTLON co ces ercccc cross ce cc ceeenceeecvcece ae Rebellion or insSurrectioneccececscecccocccescceceseseccvecse De Seditious CONSPLLacyeccceccecceccccescserccenccesecescoes ce Advocating the overthrow of the Governmenteccoecccecceccce de Internal Security Act of 1950 and Communist Control Act of LOD 4 ever aseecce secre rc ce reco ee soos ceresooeseroesooen Prosecutive GEtermMinationeccececerccvccrecerocesccorcesssesccces Related StatuteSccocceccececcescceccesececcccssececsesceccscen DefinitionSecececcoececssevecesscesccrvcescoceovececeoececcocos Predication for ANVESTigationec csesccesecescvccecvvsscceesscecce Accuracy of CharacterizationSococeccvscsccovcescvecveesccceesecce Investigations and contacts with individuals connected with institutions of lLearningeococcorececccacevesceccsecceeseeene Use of officers from other ABENCLES cececvccecevcecoceocescove Investigation of OrganizationScccecocoeececcrcccsccessceesscesscue i. 20 36 4 “de Doold: 32589529 Page i816 PULPOSS cv ccecacese ce ese cee ecco eo oC eee Oe ooe ere OED FOE EO eE® Responsibility to initiate investigationSccecescceceecvesccce Scope of ANVESTIGATLONc coccecovceccescceece rer see aeoeesecoeen Infiltration of nonsubversive FLOUPSececceescovcevceescesevecca Ae GOneralecccececcccccc cc cor cece coer acceso seco sence cceene Be Caption and DLETACE co oeececcccevcvescecocccesecnacevc0s000 Ce Limitations on investigationeccoesceccvevcccecsccssevasce de Conversion to full scale investigationocosescoecccvcecvcee Subversive PUDLICATLONS cece osvcv ec ce cc eererscceoeceseooeooEeeCs Investigative StePSceconececcceccescacesceseccccecesseccccene Administrative and reporting procedureScoeeccceccecvcceesscce ae Reporting requirements and StatuScecooeccecseceeccoscescon De Informant COVELTAGC ecceceecsceccesescocsc ss eneesosncceng0g Ce Topical NE@aAdingS seccvccececscceccecdesecssceecescssnsescccn . de CHAractlercesescveeses coe cso ese conc ecesesssesesessveeescees Co Classificationec eeseccccceccescceeecscesccc cece ss vcc ce 708 f. COPLesSoecevccecoccvcccscvecccsseces ccc seecceeesceccesoee ge Closing of CASS covceceecvrcecesecsesserceeeesecscresoeesne0cen Investigation of Individuals. ccocccccceveeccce cree cc eeeeceecceoss General DOLLCYoceceecccsccecsensee cn sccneceesceeseee soc usc nee ae PULTPOSEecevecceeeesasescrvere orcs eercereoereeeoeeneecesee be. Individuals to be investigatedecceccccossccecescccccecvese Ce Limitations on investigationSecceccccconecsvescccesncecess od. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approvaleeccocsececcveecsce ee Members of U. S. armed LOLCES eccccvescvccsccasccvsecccese [f. Candidates for or occupants of elective public officecece Investigative ProcedureSecccccnvevcvecccsenccsasesscescossesee ae Scope Of investigations cececsccsscvesecsscneveccenscssese De Investigative STEPSeacccccacevescscccnccccssesecesseseveces Ce Interviews of SubjectSccccccccacccccccccccccosescescccccs (i) POLLY occ ce sevevccvcccccccccscerseccescsesscaseccsce (2) Purpose sccecccccccncvccccccccscsscrcenesesvescscese C3) Approval to LNTELVieWe cecercecccecercecsescesevescec (4) Letter sequesting FBIHQ approval to interview SUD JjeCtoacrcccesccsccesccasccereescccseeeesceeesenn ' (5) If interview not conducted within 60 days, submit letter advising FRI HQe cece ccccecscescccesescsccecs 1 4=14-75 + as) E o Ld OMOOWO OOOO COMWDNNWNWANWNNINNIADDAAA DAN BAR WWW WO fa fA RB ps FPRREHOOOo , o | ho toe Je Set ent eee rrr rere eee are ERE Ene EET CT mA THEO ROYER aeRO RE toe RA tere aera eee ateamein” aly pee® ERA: RPL Rats ponesch oe Come NRE RRAMS AON ORT ATE WEES EERE STE OAKEY oe WP ENE PRL POTD COR TIE ARTUR RCE EMT EM RE RTA OE NES ae PUN PRT TR nL OA BT tare oh RAE LO EF wee
3e La 1. 26 3. i. Ze 3. 4. De ; BW 55072 Docld: 329895299 Page 1817 seon® 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF susven al ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS TABLE OF CONTENTS (6) Conduct of interviews. ccocvccccecccccccccccccsscccees (7) Direction of subject'S activitiesececcccssccescccces (8) Reporting results of interviewesceccccccccccsscccces Reporting PLOCEKULES o ecesrecececnncccesesccecceccccscceseecsce . ae GENSTAaleccccccccccescerscccescescesseccsssesscesesesencsee De Summarizing information. ececcceccccsccccccccceccesenscces Ce Administrative Or COVEr PAgeSoceecencscccccccesessssescee de Office of OLLSiNe wecrccvecccccccccsecccccesccvesseeessees @e Title of communicationS.ccecocccrecsesscsccscvcsscscccses f. Classification eccoccccvccccc ccc ccedecessesacesseesecaces Se Charactereeccecececveccvcescccecveceesctesescveccceecescccess he Copies of reports OF LHMSeccccccccecccvevecscvccesesseecn ie StTatuScccecoecccavesecsecrsesesaseseseecesesscscesessessces je Closing and. reopening of CaSeSececowcccccceccececescecccs ke Subjects traveling abroadsoceecccceccccccvcccecsccercvcces 1. Submission of information on members of subversive SELOUPSe cece seccevsvcvsecsvesccscccssecssssseseccscsssesesere me Control files on former members of subversive OFBANiZatlONnsS osceccccacceenccccccrasccscceccscvecreceece n. Channeling information to case fileScccccoccccesscescnves O« Movement of subjects between of ficeSeccescccccccccccceces [p. Destruction of channeling memorandasscccocccccccscceeecoes Urban Guerrilla Warfar€ecescecccccecacceccccsccccccccecsceses D. Dissemination of Data Developedeccecccccccecccccnscccccvvescscvess General DOLICYowececcccevcoescerecee recs recess eeeseseeeescenn Specific requireMentSeccescccccveccccssccecvevevssecessscsvace ae Members of armed LOrCESecccvsccecasescecsecescccssscccece be Aliens and naturalized CITIZENS. seccccccercscccccesesesos ce Individuals employed in or having access. to Key Facilities or employees of private contractors of the Armed FOrCeSeccccev cv ecc cee ce sere ceweccacccecoseseuecese de Employees of public utilitiesccceccscccscccssevccsccccsece @€e Members of military reserve branches or National Guardeos f. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry...eeoe. gs Employees of Federal Government ccsescencersceccecssescece h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate . vicinity of installation or other premises under jurisdiction of branch of armed forceScocccecccecencces is Airmen licensed by Federal Aviation Administrationecsecse je Dissemination to Secret Services ccccccsesccvvcsscescveces Restrictions on field- disseminationeccesssccescccccccccsccces “Ee Administrative Index (ADEX) ccccccccccccccccevescccccccceccceceece Purpose and general policyececesccccsccccccccscsscsescccveses CLiteliacaccececessccessnesccaresccscessccescstseescecereseces Recommendation for preparation Of ADEX cardecececccssccceccce Format of ADEX Cardeccccvccccsccevccccccrssserceccccccecscees Arrangement Of ADEXeccecccccccccccccceesenesassaveseccecceees ae At FBI HQ eo ccecc cnc recncsencccacceccesesessereeseseaseccecs De In field of Ficeecccoveccccccevecscccsscnccccsccccessccece (1) Alphabetical Sectioneccrscccccccccescscccscessececcs (2) Geographical SOCTLON cece ccccsccscccsvercececcveccsesses (3) Unavailable Sections ces decccccccccnsccccccceccccccce Special interest SUDjectS..ccccccccccsccccccessesvssccseseces Changes in residence and employment of ADEX sub jectSccoeececec Changes in other background datacacccecsecsccescsccevecscoeea Movement of ADEX subjects between officesecsccccccvescccevoes Subject entering Us So armed forcesSccscccccccecsvsccceseccece Removal of cards from ADEX.cccccccvvcscscvccncceccecececcaces Reporting Procedures on ADEX SubjectSeccecscescccccccevcccees Deleted cococescssasecrsessencecsrecarevececsccstesrenccesesa 2 4-14-75 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 18°. 18 18 18 19 20 21 21 ai a1 al al 22 22 22 22 22 23 23 . , . am 4 Om ERO R IE * eA wart, SEAS ENS D2 Hew AVON ENS Vy EM TOCY VOOR TIRANA, ve RATEMRERN WIPE tree OE DAA THR TER AANA. BENE UC RTIRSITEEEN A TRITRCRVERSR, PDT IPRA IRR IROTER CF Re rte At meee name qereravtnaee, eRe UT ne eereave cena ~ serene went
4 AL sect 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF subver@e ; ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ¥? t ") f. Copies , * Furnish 5 copies of reports and LHMs except where instructed other-~ wise in individual cases. ' ge Closing of case If it is determined subject organization is not currently engaged in subversive activities, submit pertinent facts in closing report. 87B ~ C C. INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS 1. General policy ae Purpose To develop evidence of any violations of the statutes enumerated in Ae 1. above and keep the Department and other agencies and officials of Executive Branch advised of information developed which pertains to their areas of responsibility and interest. be Individuais to be investigated Investigations should be conducted to fully identify and determine the activities and affiliations of persons who: Are reported to be engaged in activities which may result in a violation of statutes enumerated in A. 1. abovee This includes individuals who i are current active members of subversive organization or movement. Where formal membership in a subversive movement does not exist, it includes individuals who are actively supporting the subversive goals of the movement. i Priority investigative attention should be given to individuals who i are known or suspected of being involved in subversive activities ¥ ? ee ee ee which are of a clandestine, underground, or violent nature. ce Limitations on investigations All investigations conducted should avoid nebulous or sweeping inquiries : > which are not relevant to objectives. Under no circumstances should J an investigation be conducted of any individual merely on the basis j - that such individual supports unpopular causes or opposes Government policies. d. Investigations requiring FBIHQ approval Obtain FBIHQ approval for investigation of: (1) U. S. Government employee (2) Officials or employees of United Nations or other public international organizations of a governmental or quasi- governmental nature. (3) Officials or employees of foreign diplomatic establishments or governments, or foreign exchange participants (representatives of foreign countries who are in U. S. as part of official exchange program). (4) Faculty members of institutions of learning. ’ FBIHQ approval is not required for investigation of student or nonacademic employees of institutions of learning in the absence of unusual circumstances. If during a pending investigation it is discovered that the subject fits one of above categories, suspend active investigation and advise FBIHQ with recommendation as to further action. ee Members of United States armed forces No investigation should be conducted of active[members of U. S. military forces or retirees from the "regular" components of the armed forces who are subject to Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and over whom the military retains control (re- tirees from military reserve forces are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice).] If it is determined that a subject fits in this category, terminate investigation and promptly furnish per- tinent data to appropriate counterintelligence branch of U. S. armed forcese Advise FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination. 2 eee ern ee nreenar entree # 7 9 12-13-73 NW 55072 DoclId:32989529 Page 1818 bo mew Herbie eh ohare Et MANS RTA PAT BAe MTEL ERE Sd Wee MORE ade Sm Pern tae are ne Oe.
Noe EE I ne tne NW 55072 {f. SECT™ 87. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVER@@E 87C | ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIMMALS Candidates for or occupants of -elective public office Upon learning of the candidacy for public office of a member of a subversive organization, the office of origin should promptly furnish FBIHQ with a communication suitable for dissemination setting forth sufficient identifying data and a brief summary of the individual's subversive activities together with details of the individualts candidacy for public office. In the absence of a violation of a specific Federal statute, no investigation should be conducted until subject's candidacy for public office is resolved. Information received during the period of the indi- vidual's candidacy indicating a specific violation of Federal law(s) should be furnished FBIHQ by means consistent with the exigencies of the situation along with recommendations as to additional action warranted. Other unsolicited subversive infor- mation received from sources and informants or obtained incidental to other investigations should be channeled to the individual's file and, when appropriate, furnished FBIHQ in disseminative form with recommendations as to additional action warranted. Results of candidacy in every instance should be furnished FBIHQ under individual caption. Should the candidate have been defeated, necessary communication should contain recommendations as to addi-~ tional action warranted. Should the candidate be elected, necessary communication should contain statement*that in the absence of information indicating a specific violation of a Federal statute, no additional investigation will be conducted. At such time as the individual ceases to serve in public office, the office of origin should submit such information to FBIHQ accompanied by recommenda- tions as to additional action warranted. Should information be received indicating a violation of a specific Federal statute while the individual is in office, receiving office should submit pertinent information to FBIHQ by means consistent with the exigencies of the situation along with recommendations as to additional action deemed warranted. 9a 11~13~74 Doold: 323895259 Page i619 . a ’ stones Pomrede tare oh ae nr men it NTT OE OEE RE TULA TOT arereee pane te tenance rey oy bamem pmeny pepecemn an Metetintningi gt nary im seni nag marae 8 ,
ae ca 87C sscrro@y. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERSI : ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS 2. Investigative procedures ae Scope of investigation. Data concerning the following items should be developed and reported, if pertinent: (1) Background information, including a) True name and aliases. (b) Date and place of birth. [Where practicable, verify through appropriate bureau of vital statistics or birth registrar. | (c) Residences, past and present. (d) Occupations and employments, past and present. (e) Citizenship status; where applicable, naturalization data. (f) Family background. If available, include identities of immediate family and any information indicating they are employed in sensitive positions or by U. S- Government. If member of immediate family is known to be engaged in sub- versive activities, include succinct resume. (g) Military records, including any service in foreign forces. Ch) Educational background. (i) Arrest record and disposition of charges. (j) Physical description. Make reasonable effort to secure photograph. : (k) Handwriting and/or handprinting specimens should be obtained, if readily available, and kept in case file. Special efforts should be made to secure such specimens with regard to leaders of subversive groups and they should be furnished to FBIHQ by letter for attention of FBI Laboratory to be : included in National Security File. (2) Subversive activities and affiliations, including (a) Information concerning membership in subversive movements, organizations or front groups, date and circumstances of admission, positions held, and participation in activities of organization (e.g., attendance at meetings or other functions, fund-raising or recruitment efforts on behalf of organization, contributions, etc.) (b) Statements made or other factors which indicate awareness of the subversive nature of group, including involvement in underground operations, and/or in any other illegal or violent actions promoted by organization or movement. (c) Information tending to show subject's importance in subversive , movement or organization, e.ge, degree of influence and leadership exercised, close association with national or local leaders, participation in policy decisions. b. Investigative steps The following steps should be considered, but are not all inclusive. (1) File reviews. Office indices should .be checked. Any pertinent information developed should be included in initial report. Where logical, check files of other field offices and/or FBIHQ. (2) Public source material. Make full use of public records and public sources of information, including hearings of congressional or other Government committees both state and Federal, and publications, including those issued by subversive groups. (3) Check of files of other government agencies, both Federal and local, which could logically be expected to have pertinent information. V—_—O Saunt aoe bak A URAC ht eal as been dette at re Roe PET NY eo OL OM ATT ENO REDD con AE MS VSM ARP Mg eh AEN ng ATOM PCIe gg METH SEGRE Me IIPS SR POP CORTES ATTICS SE of DEMME IT a CF ALT PTI Mg EE - 10° . - 9m13=73 NW S5072 Doocld: 32989525 Page 1820 . f x , ye
ee camn Sem corn NW 35072 *, SEC1. 87. INVESTIGATION OF SUBVERS ry 87C ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDS#LS . 3. Reporting Procedures ae General (1) Pertinent information developed during investigation may be reported either by report or LHM. Reports should be submitted: (a) When setting out cesults of extended inquiries such as summary of subject's activities. (b) When subject is being recommended for inclusion in ADEX. LHM should be used to report timely or significant information ‘ regarding subject's current activities. (2) All communications should be limited to: (a) Information regarding subject's subversive activities, sympathies, and affiliations. (b) Pertinent background data concerning subversive individuals Or groups with which subject is connected. (c) Essential background data regarding subject. They should not include information regarding subject's social or personal affairs or other background data not relevant to subject's subversive activities or affiliations. (3) Information in both reports and LHMs should be organized under topical headings. Main headings and subheadings should be employed to make the communication-as readable as possible. be. Summarizing information. When reporting information of repetitious or cumulative nature, such as attendance at regular meetings of subversive group, use summary narrative statement. Exact dates are not needed, but time period involved should be indicated. Summary statements must be statements of facts and not conclusions. Information from different sources should be reported separately and any significant items must be set forth in detail. ce Administrative or Cover Pages (1) Material to be included Pertinent information concerning following should be. included in administrative pages of report or cover communication of LHM: References to other reports or correspondence, ADEX status, reference to security flash notice (FD-165) or transfer of origin (FD-128), reason for classification, if any, documentation of data contained.in report or LHM, identities of confidential sources, leads, and other administrative or noninvestigative material. Use form (FD-305) for ADEX cases. If used, nonsymbol source page should be last page. (2) Documentation (a) In documenting information originating with another field office, file number of original document need not be shown provided source, date information received, and receiving Agent are identified. (b) Do not conduct extensive inquiries to document background information. (c) In characterizing persons who associate with subject, identify source but further documentation not required. d. Office of Origin Office covering place where subject's principal subversive activities occur or originate should be origin. In unusual circumstances where 13 6=6-73 Doold: 325895259 Page if21 , x
ae. (Doeld:32989529 Page 1822 °° ae: >» SECTIC a7. INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERS1 ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVID there is doubt as to which office should be origin, request FBIHQ to » designate office of origin. Title of communications Normally, only one subject should be carried in title of each report or LHM and separate reports should be submitted for each subject regardless of relationship. However, when reporting virtually identical information concerning two related individuals (e.g., travel data concerning a husband and wife) an exception can be made and Single LHM or report submitted. In such cases dual captions should be used and an extra copy of communication provided. Classification - 100 Character (1) Designation "Subversive Matter" (or abbreviation SM) should be used in all cases. Add organizational affiliation when chief group with which subject is connected is under current investigation or has approved[characterization. Example: Subversive Matter - CPUSA Subversive Matter - SWP (2) Where meaningful organization affiliation cannot be shown, ne use caption "Subversive Matter." Copies of reports or LHMs tw In all instances furnish four copies to FBIHQ to cover dissemination ° to Department (2) and Secret Service (1). Where it appears dissemination will be made to other agencies at FBIHQ level, furnish one additional copy for each such agency involved. Status Carry cases as pending until logical inquiries aimed at resolving purpose of investigation have been completed. As minimum, case should be kept pending until essential background data regarding subject has been secured and sufficient information developed to present good picture of nature and extent of subversive activities engaged in ) by subject. Closing and reopening of cases If it is determined that subject's current activities do not involve an actual or potential violation of one or more of the statutes enumerated in A. 1. above, case should be closed. Case may be reopened at a later date if additional information is received which indicates subject's subsequent activities involve or may result in a violation of the statutes cited in A. l. Subject traveling abroad (Also see section 105G volume IV, of this manual). Take following action when information is received that subject of current investigation intends to travel abroad or has departed on foreign travel (except where travel is of brief duration and is known to be for innocuous purpose, such as vacation): , (1) Immediately notify FBIHQ of available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination, itinerary, purpose of trip, and pertinent passport data. Include full description of subject, including aliases. Set out concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising FBIHQ while developing details if time is of essence.
MW Sa072 l. Me (2) (3) (4) (5) ‘. . “~\ j } . SECTIVL@®’: INVESTIGATIONS OF SUBVERS1 87C ' ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDU If necessary, set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Department of State. Pertinent information is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and interested Legal Attaches. Furnish FBIHQ with six copies of LHM (2-Department, 1~Secret " Service, 1-State, 1-CIA) plus an additional four copies for each Legal Attache Office which covers area in subject's itinerary (i-Legat, 3-Legat's sources). Also, furnish one copy of subject's photograph, if available, for each. Legat Office involved. If stop should be placed with security services abroad, so indicate in cover letter. Set out requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page captioned "Leads" at end of LHM. Request should not refer to Legal Attache or request investigation by any particular service. Advise FBIHQ promptly by LHM of subject's return. Reference any prior memoranda dealing with the subject's travel. If subject has traveled to a communist country, furnish recommenda-~ tion as to interview and advise whether additional investigation being conducted. Take following action when information is received that organization or individual engaged in subversive activities is forming tour group for foreign travel: (a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, as to identities of individuals participating in tour and furnish LHM to FBIHQ for dissemination to State Department, CIA, and interested Legal Attaches. Include readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, dates, names, and addresses of participants, and characterization of organization or individual sponsoring tour. (b) Other offices should immediately identify participants residing within their respective territories and submit LHMs on those of security interest. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. In cover letter, list participants on whom there is no subversive information. Submission of information on members of subversive groups. (1) (2) (3) Offices covering national headquarters or local units of subversive groups should promptly furnish FBIHQ names and identifying data regarding persons affiliated with such groups. Furnish information by letter, and indicate list is being furnished for indexing purposes. Information regarding subversive affiliation of individuals residing in territory of other offices should be furnished to latter. Subscription lists of publications of subversive organizations should be indexed in field office covering address shown for subscriber but should not be forwarded to FBIHQ. Control files on former members of subversive organizations. ‘ (1) ~@) Boold: 32989529 Page 1525 , , . \ Offices having sufficient volume may, at the option of the appropriate supervisor, maintain control files on former members of subversive organizations. Such files will preclude necessity for extensive file reviews to identify persons who are in position to furnish information of value in particular CaSeSe ; Where appropriate, make copies of communications for these files. - Insofar as practical these files should contain following information regarding ex-members of subversive groups: background, type of information possessed, time period covered, availability for interview and for testimonye 15 my . 9413-74 ae SEM gre pS A RINT OTRO NE, SHOPS ROT RUMP IEPNE TE Co SREY OTRAS HATE MET tO eam FD are trevehtten Seen eee sa ne 9 ERNE METRES GY EAP BW ESO RETR REE OTT aE BTA '
87C ~ D [4. : ~ scr 87- INVESTIGATIONS OF suBvEn@e= ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ae ne Channeling information to case files (1) Memoranda regarding membership or activity in subversive organiza- tions, including summaries of informant reports, should be channeled to case files of individuals involved. When informa- tion from informants or surveillances is channeled to individual case files, it should be documented. (2) When preparing lengthy channeling memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit number of copies prepared to two for each other office. Clearly indicate next to names of other offices the page number containing information of interest and. note on cover page that distribution of material to individual case files should be handled by recipient offices. Oe Movement of subjects between offices If office of origin receives information that subject of current or past investigation changes residence to territory of another division, office of origin request verification within 30 days. If new residence confirmed, office of origin submit FD-128 to transfer origin. Office of origin should furnish new office with any pertinent subversive data which has not previously been reported in a form suitable for dissemina- tion, or suitable for incorporation in an LHM or report. pe Destruction of Channeling Memoranda At the option of appropriate field supervisors, in order to avoid the accumulation of channeling memoranda in a case file as well as to facilitate the subsequent preparation of LHMs or reports, the following procedure may be used: Files may be reopened for preparation of an “investigative insert" for later inclusion in a LHM or- report, using T symbols identifying informants who have furnished prior information. Agent preparing this insert should also prepare a cover memorandum showing what serials in the file have been covered by his review and also identifying all symbol number informants involved and indicating the location of the original data (similar to documentation in the cover pages of a report). The channeling memoranda covered in the review can then be destroyed and the "investigative insert" along with its cover memorandum can, if necessary, be forwarded to another field division in the event the subject moves. Urban Guerrilla Warfare (Instructions relating to investigations of above subject matter are con-= tained in section 122, item A8, Manual of Instructions.) De DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED 1. Ze General Policy Information developed during these investigations should be furnished to other agencies in Executive Branch which have a legitimate interest. See MRR, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities and policies in dissemination. Do not disseminate earlier reports without reviewing them to insure they meet current reporting standards. If they are unsuitable for dissemina- tion, prepare LHM containing pertinent information. Specific requirements Following instructions cover representative situations which occur frequently. ae Members of armed forces Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volume IV, of this manual) requires free exchange of all information of mutual interest between subscribing agenciese Immediately refer any derogatory or possibly significant information developed concerning members of military services, including contacts with individuals or groups of security interest, to military service having primary responsibility. 16 4-15=74 WW 55072 Docld: 32989524 Page i624 Neo! ’ a oe ee ee ee ee ed MOIR wy te LPOG PEE Se rer Ra EE ae ETS PET ETT ERT eC meow grees, mene SET: PETRY C ITA, DAMP ey MPM CRUE SPER: | MOTHER UTR IM EMD eg NIM NET Sere P-,