. Secretary, would you please explain t t a policy, tho, rea sond ‘for he: and | how Le works? a | Secratary Henamara. “Welt, id don be belisve wd have a ‘managed neve policy, but it we do it ien't managed very well - think a your comments would lead you to that - coneliision and they cor tainly lead me. to: that conclusion. We spoke 8 ‘monont age about! this B-47 wittaravals. “as an “lastration. Whatever management. of news wo are doing is a very inottective approach to. the pros L think the | term ia ‘ain unfortunate ono, Te igs: applied, I os . oat - think, without. any rea al evidence that, we. are acting in in. “that. “ways hat we: “are trying | to do is “to ) actually. increase the ex~" posure of the public. to. dafonse policies, ana aeteise prograns.. There was a period in the week of october 15 h we. aia not respond folly to questions relating to the “Inowie ge | we had about: Soviet weapons in. Cuba. ‘this because we. ‘were, then’ forme "et Xe core Lating a course of action debignea to insure’ ‘the ‘Yonval of ‘the "missile aystoms that have beon, introduced and ‘to 2 have disclosed” publicly the extent of our knowledge of. those syatens would have ‘compromised the action plans that. vexe ‘in ‘the process Lof. forma ‘lation, and for. a 1 period, ‘therefore, of, ‘pézhaps. it ae, ‘three: ote - days or 80 in- that week: to. the poirit of. che e Preaidentie speech « which, as. I enenber it, “was october. 22, wa: aid not: respond * WW 54214 Docld:37424094 Page 6 ~
; fully, I don?é call that a managed news policy. But 1 think it : os the circumstances. re wag very, very much in our national s interests to withnola from Khruahchev any indication. or how we were going . to rebpona. He obviously. thought we. ) weren't going “in error. - We didn't wish to. disclose ‘the oktent of his error to him wntil we wore ready to ‘respond with’ gome. force’ -oufticient / to force Tain to > change: ae course of. action. | Thha wo disclosed to the nation’ on the, aan of “october, and. dn tho days imoaiately prior to thot we aia not. dlacuss: publicly either. our plans or the foundation for ‘those plans.” Q oo think ‘this was. very invch iia: ‘the national interest. a “ pcause you may have hoard that. t have commended the President | very highly for the handling of that - eituation, ae t had great admixation for all. Of you who haa to. do. with it and I thought Le was most. necessary and r hope it may be done 7 whenever tha occasion . aris 308, OK. similar occasion. 8 . Seerotary McNamara. thank you. senator Sintth. ‘That is not what: I am. s tallsing about. = What I am aoking | is As HW. 54214: DocId: 32424094 . Page 7 : a ds an action which all ‘of you would support and agree with under | to respond at all ox he wouldn? t have taken the action. ‘He was OD sonator, smith. hr. secretary, I am not soferring to, that»
O- BASE 22 File BE oe TAT Pe 83. cu A ea. “on | what I saw. on the tleker about MaLinovairy. ever come to this stage, a matter. of this, ‘type and character, ee since T have been an tne. Senate, or cin ‘the Pontagori. Me, Sooretary,. the taot question I would ask’y wis. based oS (Discussion otf the pecord, ) ‘Senator. Symington. Thante you, Mr, “Seoretary Chaaenan Russell. f do not know what ‘the background of me chat, is, put. tT think At is significant: that ‘ne statenent was pe made by talinovsky and not by aruohehevs “ Seeretary: HeNanara . I ‘thinie 80 too, Mr. chairman. - think that Khrushehey is trying to ride both sides of. the Een ‘street wath. this kind of a statement. Chatyman’ Russeit, Senator ‘Thurmond, a i Senator Thurmond . “Me. Chatman, I was going ‘to alk the mo : Secretary about ‘that, “but 7 think what he has said | expresses 7 - my. views on ‘that too. 7 thant he has inade a sound explanation.” ‘The Communists, an my: Judgment are not “going * to start any Worad War III unital they are re cady. 0. ‘start at. Maen they 8 are ready, they, wi find some, incident anyway. Chatrman Russell. com they are sure: they wild win, they oe ; won't. care if they. have an ancident, a Senator Thurmond ard they are not, ready to, start it, ‘they are. not going to tet. an invasion ‘of Cuba op anything else : ' force then to start at, I agree, with the. Charman, the fact” ; that ‘the statement was ‘made. by HaLinovary: instead of Khrushchev -HW 54214 Docld:32424094 -Page.Bo. °° a be eee age ES
HW 54214 carries some weignt. they are ready | to start At anyway. “I am n Giad tof Bee the | a basis an that. in his letter of Novenber. | gould not be’ here yeaterd ey. this morning zr went Docld: 32424094. Page 9. ° Authough made by: Khrushehev hinseit, T obit don't think a | Seoretary express ‘that view, and I am: in “thorough. accord. | seoretary, ‘WeNamara. — oa share ‘chat viens. a ‘Chagrnan Russell. We certainty wut bea end men | power if we ever | frame our foreign policy with respect: to cuba, “ashamed ot my: country: ae we ‘framed our. ‘Porotgn pousey. “on” ‘puch - Mr. Seoretary, nome of ‘the meribers | of the. conn ttce wanted to hear. from you about: cuba. . I don't seriow | exactly wnat ‘they. “ wanted. of suppose. our policy is evil ‘one, of natentul waiting “and inaiotang that ‘Premier ithewahenev Live! uw. to.the commitments. Senat tor Engie. ‘me, Chatrman, nefore the 4 Secretary | goes : forward with that, may I say something. I ‘an sorry that 3 Tr. “down to: the veu rc participate in a ceremony. I aaa not mew. you. _ wore going to ince: thie morning. - Lt hope a “AnttLe ater ‘perhaps that I wit | get a s chance A to > 60 ‘thioueh, this record, is ‘suppose ‘the Socretary wall be ‘touch: with him: 1 personaly. r want: to say to him. ‘though that I. 4 that at would start Word vax 1x1 ar cuba was invaded, countess cao “upon any ‘threats that emanate fron Moaeons. oz would’ be aimost Sa " gone. after “that, but ar I have any questions, I wi. get as,
HW 542714 barrage, . elenents, two objectives.” of the castro ‘government, and the elimination 1 of, the _ controd of Cuba. ee poth. of those. objectaves, ‘bee the ones you would ‘taleo to aecomplioh “the first | communism froin cuba? Docld: 32424094 Page 10 '.*~- 7 was not nore hot. ‘because 7 was not interested, iit. becaiwe I - had some probiens tha r couldn't manage otherwise, © | Chatman Russell. “Als right, Senator migie. “of course oe I don't know, you ‘have a | very resourceful inn, and I am quite | ‘ure you wait be able to figure up’ a fou questions ‘that, have not been asked ‘the Secretary, but it expest. ‘you wae ‘find at. “Secretary MeNanara . “tte. chairman, ‘the President. has ‘One is ‘the eventuar change an government. The President . has expressed ab an various ways at. various. ‘times “put: I ‘thine at is quite: clear that: we. continue to. work ‘tor 1s cbortisan Secondly, Lt: 16 ‘our “objective to insure that ised: as ‘Q base for the export of aggression by fore elsewhere. in ‘the nemiaphere., “We are talcing steps to oy to “accomplish: Chairman Russelt. dust wah steps are vou! taicang? I can ‘them have been: manifoat in ‘the shipping. and ‘things of that Ielnd, but what ateps have you taxen. to , provent, ‘this. export of Some of am 7 was there by impiacation if not a direction an’ ‘one, ‘of. ‘the eo a stated our. polley with. respect: to. cuba. . “Yada pt see mes
Sac Det ROR, SNR ae we6 Lo nS ‘Isn't at true ‘that they have Hundreds: of young men “from ° sim * (3 most ‘of the Latin Anertcan countries ‘in cuba and ‘they are es | indoctrinatang them, An: ‘communism and ‘toaenang, ‘em rebellion . cand revolution? “Secretary MeNemara . You, T beldeve ‘that is. ‘true. that. a substantial nuniber of Latin Americana have. been sent to. ‘ua « for training of various Kinds in Communiot doctrine and. potentially subversive activities. Loe Me | ae "We are working with the other, latin American nations to ~ both restrict the eaves of their natdonals ‘to: ‘cuba. to. eR , their return ‘to th their own mation, and an particular to check | the export “Aft: any “of arms fron: cuba to other countries. in. the ce © ; = hemisphere. “So. far as ‘the controls over ‘the | ‘ohipnént of "arn from Cuba. to ‘other nattLons in the hhemtaphere, ‘Lt ‘ippears to. “be. " Woricing very effectively. “There 1s. no substantial volume of Suen shipments that we know. of, ag there are. any cat all. I think that. as “time goes bys we can aeveiop even t more _ . offective controls againat ‘the. use of Cuba as (a training at hase, for. subversion an the hentephere. - te 4s certainly eing used for that purpose today. But even an that ense,. at a ms does not’ appear to be ‘the primary baae ‘for subvers 0} tn “this. hemasphere, , | . | ara wd moet, © a ‘The Sovi ets: are, dea Lang airectsyy with a targe inuitber of. oy Latin fmerteans “You may have noticed vory. -rocentay ‘they - HW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 11—
Seen dita Bina Noe oni hae Rann At tt en vain ate R a eatin tet eS meee DER ee ee ple tas Meet wT HW 54714 , entered nto negotiations’ with Brazai for a ‘trage contract | - va ~ under which ‘they would supply. ol ts. Brazat. in return for “Brazaiian ¢ coffee, and an the course of the ‘transaction would Bont into Braz a substant lad number of technicians. “the extent ‘of Soviet efforts. to try to subvert ‘the auty ago. : there | Mae free passage and no. restriction ag to. ‘visa and oo Ton't. that, stad in effect? i more cooperation from Noxi.co an econt months ‘han we did DocId: 32424094 Page 12°” ‘This is but one of, ‘the whole series of Lijustrations of vote ‘eatabiishea governments in: latin America byt means other : - than o operat ving through Cuba. In: any, case, We are. “working with the other tavan Americans . to restrict the export of aggreasion by foree from Cuba into those other nections, ‘Chaarman Rugvelt. ° Wat degree af eSoperation are we “recelving from other menbers of ‘the ons? Secretary Mewanara . for more now ‘than we: were a | year: os ‘Chatrnein Rusnett. : How about. Mexteo? on short. white ago oO things of ‘that ind on aarpianes petiicen Mexteo caty ana Havarina « Secretary Mewanaa I beLieve that. ye" have | received far a. year AGO. a oo t. ohould. aay’ on “into quest tion of subversion as. dontrasted af “to the export, of atmo, that I. ‘enann. chat of ther nonbora ‘of. the - © goverment, partieutarty ropreaentataven of the State Department. -
“wast oe wn le » thoy are. “cooperating much more. fulty today | an Iniposing eave ne : are ‘restrictions of various types than | was the” case a year ago. os | Charman Russet. of course 80 far as ‘the fr t part of At. : 18 ‘concerned, you ould have. to enforce that. ‘The state. | -” Department would have no means” of watohing the: ox of dma an Secretary HeNamara . That 1s true. “We maintain a careful -_ survelilance of a. -movenent of vespe1s,, and any other. twratfie. 7 In any case, where we have even. the slightest, suspicion, er we wore with. the country to whack the ferattse 4s directed to } H m 9 * co! =. ae ; ot . Insure that. proper Inspection of: ab. as: mde. ‘bei or thoves a a | “- Anto ‘the interior of that. nation, meee ; ‘Chairman RuaselL. Is there any conmundeation ya air. "now 5 ey aot “asrptanee from Russia, to Cuba? oe Secretary | HoWamara . Yeo, ‘there aes put: 1, is: very ‘sporagio © indeed. If L recall! ‘correctiy;, they were ‘catablight ne. ga once + a 4 week service direct. from the, Soviet Union. to cube an each: oe airection, but ‘the: > last time I saw a | veport¢ ‘on that, which was: just | a fei days, ago, it had eperated very sporadiea ty. There. had been a number of breaiaous, onroute, “and “they } d missed Oo . ce their schedules an. a high « percentage ‘of the cages: 7 “Chatyman Russell. : Do they \ undertaice to make that a \ one-. a HW 54214 © DocId:32424094 Page 13° 0
HW 54214 way “flagnt or do they stop. any of then? ‘recentay they have been fiying non- -atop: _— rengons ) why. itechanieal aaftreurties and other aaeeieutties - have BO interrupted the schedule. As i” venenber ats. at tis something. on the order of I believe 5,000 miles. “ons stence of paper corparations there to buy, parta, to supply to cuban industry in this countr vy and ‘rane-shipping at to: extensive trade an parte with’ Cuba for, some 6 tine. -Docld:324274094 Page 14 ° _ Tene em ee a armen Fay Hh terk bet be ttm i GAR a tN ae en Ei it edit EN aot LA aaa iv t. > Seoretary MeNamava . ‘I. was trying to thane, “vp ont last” _ fall they: were ‘flying ‘them with stops in Arica. 1 ‘han that "Chairman Russell. That is a “pretty good hope ‘Seoretary MoNanara ‘When they could fly ae non-stop, ASS . and at aa. a very ong, non-stop ‘flight. This. is one. of the /Chaarman Russels. L was in: Hexico about tio, years AEs ana . tauiied to. ‘the representatives of the: ork ‘there, and they, were | very corieerned because they had been ‘reporting, the - of course we know chat our > good ‘friends fro Canada were not willing to. ‘Let ub even store ‘atomic weapons. ‘there for: . . us to use an defending ‘thom, that they carriea’ on’ a very, Have we . made any, progress ain damanishi Lng that? ) Scoretary MoNanara. I believe that: an votn: instances. we : have. You ‘mentioned this. to. me about a year ages. and I Aooked nto: it at. ‘the: tame, although ae does not fait within ‘the. ‘responsibilities « of ‘the Defense. Department 1 ‘yas! curtous,
_w5l0 . et fle | HW 54214 ‘based on what, you had said. “You were speaking think partidylar= ly of Mexico at. thait tame. oo aaa not snow anything about canada at. that time DocId:327494094 Page-15 ©.-.- // ree “Chaarnan| Russeld. Yeo, I vias, speaicing about Hewied, I a : . “e oo ra es lee pe ne Pe ee wo wee ee, see DS
‘Gantor. 45 . . | oo e®@ oa et. a . oe an " Secretary McNamara. I ‘think, ‘there was evidence that. + fictitious corporations were 2 being used as. facades: ebina’ which the parte that. Wwexe: of value to ‘Cuba. were: 2 being shipped into Cuba. That traffic has’ been reduced materially since “that time, “and aa, far as the Canadian’ ‘shipments of spares are’ concerned, x a | think the game “thing. applies. r think we have ade “quite a bit” of progress toward isolating Cuba £rori the free world Insofar ae. | trade is concerned. . : . | - an | cee : ae For example, the. free world | shipping to. >. Cuba jhas dropped precipitously § in the last: 10 or 2. ‘months, most of te in ‘the. last several months. iT ‘think it is ‘oft, in, “torms, of tonnage.’ O oe : ; : and . in “texms. of. numbers Of “shia moving { to. cuba, by about 80, to. os 90 per cent. this is Be “major step forward = eu aia not mean - to imply that Cuba te “now receiving a todor portion of those goods through substitute ‘channels, because of course» it is. “Instead ‘of receiving them from the tree world and “in free world bottons, ‘atc ig now, receiving them: from ‘the Communist | ploc and. in ‘Communist bloc bottoms to a: considerable degree, not to the. saine ) degree as. previously. ‘But this. is an ‘added cost bo. the soviet union ana this ‘again 3 is one o£ our objectives, “bo imereage. “the. cost’ to. ‘the soviet union 3 in sustaining Cuba.’ . ee 7 © | . : - 7 - ‘chaizman Russells “thoug ‘Cuba has. essentially. an. -agricuttural economy, r had under stood that Ehey: dia not produce, neaz enough HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page 16 oe
HW 54214 ‘food, to provide for x theiltty : ‘correct? | | cant apeak tnt authority | on “that aa to: the. volune. of thelr ae food imports. _ euch ag there are? = at the present, tiie ‘the nonber af free world ships. soning into” cuba, haa dropped to the polint where. I: believe ‘in ‘the month of. | _Cuba to ‘overthrow Castro? Are there “any guerrillas still in ae Fee mem aie ME A Flee te ee ete ne eee “756 t. Putkion i in \ Cuba itself. Te that “Secretary eNamaca. ‘I think that. is Sight, b | Chairman Russel. “Do we know where they are coming from, - | Secretary Newamara Tt think, econ the blow countries, ‘because’ January there were. only 42, AE x recall: _ correctly compared to. many binds that. number, a year ago ‘Chairman Russell. te there’ Stitt any. active movement in ee being there or. “do we ‘know? ‘Secretary Hotamara. Oh, | there is ‘evidence | of @iscontert,._ ! “and there: is evidence that some of ‘this discontent takes the form we of guerrilla operations, but | es think hey are 2 very, very small and Docld:32424094° Page ‘17? _ over. the people. we ane but I believe I am. right in saying chat ‘the ‘governnent. has about relatively ineffective. ‘the. government. has. a: very. tight control. wh “Again, Tt ‘think ‘you could get a more » complete story on ‘this me - subject. from Me. “Mecone, the Director Of Central ‘Intelligence, | “200, 000. agents. out of a 2 population, of, 6 million, Ancluding the very. young and the very old, ‘and that. these, 490, 000 agente have” yt Le : .-
Nn ce Nite te TE Tee ane morte me nk eB Be ATO ee Ee EE tee a ee RE a hae Lhe eet e et 3 De : . eo. , . oy eet . Toe a woe the right to deny, food ration books to those: ‘hey 1 believe are ad — operating ina ‘disloyal way. 7 i: Be - — eae geile 50 when you think of che possibility that there. is one e govern | ment agent. with euch: an authority ‘for every: 60. people, infant and. aged ag well, you ‘can Gee the tind of. control that, ‘ts ‘oiercieed by the. government over tho: population. Under. those | etrconotances Lt would be extremely atssicunt for any guerrilla moverient to obtain | any y size. | . ren | Chairman Russell, Do we have any: y information as t to whether - “the soviet 1 forces. that are about to be moved from 1 Cuba represent. ‘technicians ox. are ) they: organi. ned ‘units | puch as a tank battalion? Secretary, Mettamara . “the ‘inp1Leation. was: “that there would be 4) ae “organized unite as wold as what you might, wall technicians or advisors. “But x think it is far 00 early to. ‘say whether the organized Cy a | ‘units of which ‘the four. so-called, combat ‘unite, each ‘containing “roughly, 1200 men, and of a size. ‘equivalent, to. a reinforced . battalion, wild be unite 2 whieh x move out. ee ‘Those are ‘the | major Soviet combat: units in- Cuba, and it io, | those that we are paying particular : “attention to during this “possible 1 movement. period. . as 2a. | ‘Senator. Engle. May. i ashe hy do you ‘think: they are in there? wat are they doing there? | PO ye | | OQ ; a 3 Secretary Mctiamara. rt. would. be ‘sheer speculation for. me to res spond to the question. © I “have | some opinions ¢ of Ty own, HW 54214 DoclId:32424094 Page 138
© OUP ° ase 160() @ eo _ Senator Engie, but i have no definite Andication PE) he Soviot Te “auch a “tight security, purpose. But this is sheer speculation on ™y part, and I do not. oe advance Lt with any” ‘real authority. intentions My own opinion iB that “they were © there to 0 protect the nuclear. equipnont: that was. moved into Cuba by ‘the soviet. undon. _ We had many, indications, for ex xample, that the. Soviets placed “nuclear: equiprent was ‘deployea, they would not even. “allow the governor, of the | province in which the. area: exis ted ‘to penetrate’ that aren. . “fe ite thi simply to chow tha kina of dontro1 they maintained, / and t ‘think. ‘these ‘combat forces were ‘there primarily for that “Senator Bngle. Te wo ‘take all of ‘the: alternatives: ‘that are "Secretary Nowomaras Tr believe ae Senator bngle. That is what I would think. © chaixman Russell. Rither. that or a ‘wodyauard | for F Castro. Senator ‘ingle. Yes | ee Chairman Rugsell. Do we. have any “information or "theory as. to whether the warhoad ain the migsile that. shot down ‘the WR2 me, “conventional Or whether it had “any nuclear matter in At? a Secretary Nowamaza. We. do: not. have any. direct evidence that “the: Ur2 was. ‘even. ‘shot. down, bby ‘a \ warhead. Bverything points: in that ‘HW 54214 Docld:32424094_ Page. 19
eo. | this particular case, but we “really had | no elear evidence of the on HW 54214 Docid:32424094 Page 30 We think it quite unlikely that that vas the case. Was. at not © sent’ ‘back ‘bo the ‘stateo? inspection of the ody that nuclear weapons Were used: is: very sensitive to detonation of explosive, device near the: aixplane;, and such devices need not even hie, the sirplanes an, order: to cause. destruction of the | ‘aizplane, loss of. ‘control - os : and subsequent destruction. ‘this. is what we ‘think happened in. exact. circumstances. ‘kina thai was, | great enough to. knock “t ‘the: plane down would: fave dere - gome marks: on ‘the body of the. pilot. vee - direction, ‘but we ack any. real evidence of £ ekacthy | how it was shot down. We have no evidence whatsoever that a nuclear weapon was used. “chairman Russell. “Didnt we xecover, ‘the | ody of ‘the pilot? Secretary Mowamara.. Yes and: there ‘was no evidence. from. roa The v2" =.) conventional non-nuclear device need not “nit the’ ‘airplane | t Chaizman’ Russell. - “You would think that. an. n explosion of any: _ Secretary MeWa atiaza, Hot necessarily, Mr. chaitman. We have a geen evidence. Before that the W-2 is 60 sensitive to changes: in a | the envionment 40. which At is. functioning that the: ‘pilot can: lose control ef it, and At can 1 get, into a “condition: such that it hae is. ultimately, destroyed. This’ is “caused by | a Rear miss, for ~ example, of a conventional warhead. a ‘chairman Russell.“ ts there anything 3 about. c the bay « of the
HW 54214 © “plane © or by parachute? a ra ‘din the: record.” a any questions? - : might. it noe? a a Se not? Bs CS Oe ES 132494094 Page 21 pilot to indicate whether he. came downin ‘the wreckage of the o You would thik Lt he came: down from that s height, there 7 * certainly would be some ‘mark ox some indication on the ‘man' 8 | body as. to. how far he. fell. nee 7 Secretary, Mewamara. I had better not. answe: “Gon't know for sure. : I don't recall. T ‘aia go. over the report. at the tim 3 i but I- “have forgoteen the answer ‘to that ‘question. T will. L put At “Chairman Russell. “ALL right. Senator. Symington, do. you have “Senator Symington. r have just been * very interested in ve this, Mr. “Chaixman, “The chai suggested that it might be ae . bodyguard. for Castro. ‘Tt also might: be ‘a dagger pointed at hin, * “tn | other words; cho might he misbehaving - A. little bit as | fora - as what Mr. Mikoyan and Mr Khrushchev thought, end keeping those ““txoops there tidght he there to ‘keep ‘him in line arb bs mighé they > secretary McNamara. Yea, I think: they. could have fulfitiea oa number of aifgerent purposes. Tt "suspect ‘the primary. purpose was the one I. ovéLined, . “they could have both fulgitled that” > primary purpose: ‘and also accomplished other ‘objectives as well, senator Symington. Te occurred to me that, Er they. were there to. protect what ain effect, {most of what in -¢ffect’ they. had taken
HW 542714 Russians to > whip all of Castro's forces. support, might go. after castro. “ever heard of ema ee _ question on that very same point? - is. an equivocal matter. Docld:32424094 Page 22 ‘7 ere tet eet te Rl A eee NN AeA R NT ab TLE Tt Be 761 m ont, that they might have also taken them out. whea ‘they took it a out, and’ the fact that they did not was ‘that: they wanted to be. ‘eure that caatro aia soma thinge that: they wantea him to. do. ot "secretary Medtamara. that might possibly have been the case. — senator Symington. | Thank “you, Mr ; _chaizman, -Benator Engle. wild the Senator yield | there? oe chairman Russell. . that could: be, but, éven 1 with a ‘Russian B, we? fo + ae * ~ who is ten feet tala, I dont. “think that would have’ been ‘enough Senator Symington. “the: veason it appealed tb me. was: I heard - “there were. a ‘lot of people : in | Cuba who, af they. could get a Little: 7 Chaizman Russell. We were disillusioned about that, ‘t don't now if you. remetiber ‘that: or not, at: "the Bay: of Pigs. ey | Senator Symington. ° The ‘Bay of Pigs? « Wor T don't. think : I. . Senator Engle. WAIL the. Senator . yield sot can ask-a a: “chairman Russell. you ne Senator Bigle. This is a. matter dt seems: ‘to me of. very “great. interest, “because the american people | ‘are: extremely, upset. ‘about these, 17, 000, Russians sin. 1 cuba: “And. yet ‘their "presence there af you divide them Anko. technicians: ana there combat ‘troops, you. can gay | ‘that the. ‘technicians, axe ‘there to” ‘train people. But
whey certainly wouldn't invade UB. ‘And AE “they wore going any: place else, thoy. would. have to have ‘traneport, a it tmnediately. Le is. a matter, of great puzzlenent, tor me : aa. to. why. ‘they oe are there: For instance, det. ma ask thie question. the air over: cuba, and we. are “doing it and we! “know. we are doing, at and the television progam that “you put: on | Proved ‘that we. are. doing ; it, in my, opinion proved it. to. a point beyond ‘what Z outs they want to shoot ‘those- planes: down, ‘they. cout: shoot. them down... "HG Coo! _— ‘Now dante. it possible that those ‘troops’ are. ‘being maintained there to. be sure, that those ant waireragt. batteries ‘do: not get in. the | hands: of these sueaponsible ‘Cubans whe ‘would ‘shoot | ‘us down, oe - ; | and ig ‘they, shoot one or two oe" “Our ‘planes down, we eae somng to 7 o oS | go in theré. “the ‘Dmerican 1 people wi eel not stand for fen! it. - Ss oy HW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 23 - So a an
AW 54214 et “that eight? hypothesis. a ‘thine that st is alinost certainly the ‘explanation "defense sys tema ‘of the. ‘type similar ‘to the ‘SAI It's and those e are highiy effective at high altitudes Of those, if they kriow about: where. they + were coming. and waited €or them. Of which we have. several, as t say, on each oda “have outlined. | the ai,1ema for . Be ain public ofttce. We: hear thi elanor’ to. get Docld: 32424094. Page 24 .- et NE ORNATE Eh ‘Secretary Motiemana. fg. think this de: a very reasonable ° | | | of why we are able to. fly. frequent, eeralty. datiy,, ‘when ‘weather is euitable, surveillance flights, over ‘Cuba, “without ‘being des- a troyed by. the: anti-aircratt batteries. that wo now are there and that have the capability to ‘destroy ua. Now what this implies for the ‘fueura, = cant ie. veaye : a nae no “Senator Engle. Do they have SAM III's. in there to. you ‘knowl- edge? Seeretary | Herfomara.. Wot what we call SAN 121", 160 altitude : ‘the only ? 7 high effective’ ax defense system they. have: are | the) ‘SAM ar ar “Senator: Engle. I understand that “but ‘they could get some Secretary McNamara. There. is no > question but what: ‘the SAM : II's in Cuba today could — destroy, everyone’ ‘of ur Uea) flights, | . when the weather. is good, “and yet they are ‘not destroyed.” "Frankly, the enty | ex~ op “planation that, 1 have for this situation is exactly the one: “you a Senator Bangle. of” ‘course, here is ‘the thin
Fema wt mn st a coro eae en a ye Tee a  theels od pate dh oh led te et bee ed he Ske deel wah ig bey ss dna cee bE . ° ™ aye 3 et10 | , troops out, and the anorica n people are very sensitive about it, | So as you know. it creates, a di. efioule. political problem for ue oa : at hone. ‘they sinat raise cane about. He Yet. at seems to: me that what Kiisus hchev is. doing fs keeping his own people in control, of ‘those wacterien, , 80 ‘they: do. ‘not stir ‘up an inetdent chat wid bring ‘inetant Anerican retaliation. 7 N Now how: in ‘the world go, you handle, that. kind of problem? . Z asked my. very. wige chaixman, who hae been” in, ‘this ‘business a_ wh long time, how do you. get, around that. T, just have the suspicion, and that is why | r asked ‘the co secretory, ag At As. true that those people are being maintained "Secretary Metiamsiza. sir, 3 think there. dg "an. answer to: ate the Firat place, x believe he can. take, out the combat ‘troops without turning control of ‘the surface-to-air missile ‘systema: over to ‘the ‘Cubans. | He ecrtainly, ought: to: Aneist 4 ‘On. that. ‘Senator’ Engle. Provided ‘the Cuban military. woula not exer. : cise ‘that, Power to: throw them out and ‘take ‘them ever nee | “Secretary Mowamaa Secondly, 1 believe he can. avoid ‘that ne  aituation a and. also probably. remove the soviet personnel | we believe : that are now. anning | the surface-to-air missiles, by saying to. Castro in eftect, Yo either, give: us ‘a ‘guarantee that you wil not use these surface-to-air missile systems. _againeti-the oa HW 54214 DocId:32424094 - Page 25
oe a o, aircraft. or we will s eay to" you, ‘that we wil. take, out. ‘the “systems.” a) me ‘Furthexore, ag ‘you give us. a “guarantee, we. leave | the’ “ayatens JB . in and you: use them, againat ‘the aireratt, was want to. “make ie perfectly. clear we ard not: going: to. come to ‘your asaistance in” the: event of farther attack by ‘the ‘United A states, a this. is: the way 1 answer ° “the @ilemman’ you pose, ‘the: ailena being how . can’ we as a nation and the United states ‘both: Pressure co the. Soviets: ‘to withdraw ah their troops, ang technicians and at: “the « ganic ‘time be assured that, ageer they ao, 80; we will he to. cars ry on surveil Llane. or chink we: ean \ aegomplish hoch those objectives: by, ‘the ner dio t have outlined. a think this is. in! effect the President's Senator Engle: Tn. other words, to summarize. ite you would: _eay, “nisten,. you take: them: out; “but: ig ‘they’ use. > them; ‘we. wind go in ana get. them," is chat ier - Secretary MeNainara That is exactly what v would: say, and : I: | think this is. in effect what we “have said) many, many times to” . the Soviet Union. We. aboolgtely insist upon’ continued surveillance of the Tekan of ‘Cuba. oo 7 Senator | Engle. ‘Thank you. | Chairman Russell. “That is 5 realy in ‘substitution for ‘the “onaite inepection ‘that . Khrushchev couldn't e deliver. | oO | : : . aed \ Secretary MeNainara. : Yes, eit, it is. in’ ‘substitution for it. - Chairman Russel. Or: ida‘ t ébliver ite” re don't know whether, HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page 26
2eblg ie HW 54214 of both. ‘ Senator Symington. | ws . neighbors and, their friends, and r think one. “thing: that ‘they have” DocId: 32424094 “Page 27 meee eee ars conan tht lin Sh an AiS nina cata Shennan ey 5 I OY ya ede he could have delivered. ie if he: tried hard enough. 7 Secrotary fovonara, Te to in: substitution for | ty, ‘but, Pa must way that x personally “om and this io simply ¢ a | Personal opinion teal woitla gather ely upon, you as. controlled: surveillance - from the air than: wpon some int cetmational ly controlled on~site inspootion. i ee : . ee a chetiman Russol3.” i think we ‘coula have. stood, a. Little . Senator ‘Symington. Mr. ‘Chaitan, i just have a ‘goupie of more questions... Mr. secretary, ajain’ hindsight . is ; always. better than foresight, ‘but in this country you have a good many military men who have, had military experience, and they: talk with their. ~ . “gotten mixed up about, and L agree with the’ Senator from caligornia . that there is, a. ot. of ‘tension about this problem in the country, ~ and that ia, this question of what is offensive, or . detensive as you know, ain. the wattle. of “the bulge | we. used every” “strategic boner we had as a’ tactical: aixplane,, and a ‘Highter taking off from two Sima. out, where you. were working in “the war - | that. destroyed ae Japanese plant was a 1 strategic bomber. Tt ery very hard for the people to see, ‘based ¢ on their actual experience, n many of thom. For oxampte, 1 word ‘rather see ‘T28'6 : personally etay in Cuba, than: i would MIG ai's. that would be a -eapecialy 4 true ag t Lived in Atlanta or Mian “And. 80° think |»
© HW" 54214" et 13 a HEGRE that you. have that ‘problem. to be, and what: are you going ‘to “do? fe oe | want." “ : care ‘gation betivecn an | offensive and a. ‘defensive | weapon. “that we can. avoid: that. in’ some way in: the future, openly docked and berthed: them in Havana Or. ‘new harbor « or any. other harbor except Guantanano? what ould we ao ‘fighter ‘pase. Docld:32424094. Page 28 | * - - Kise ReLaitcaite ic eben eae. wa Pox = ate mete soba te o “Now. it is | going to: continue . = They say you have got Guantanamo. "We will build a | harbor for subitarines, fnaybe for destroyers, maybe ‘for. “anything that we. I: would 2 hope For ‘exanple, what would we do ‘today it Russian: submarines. = Secretary HoNtanara. x thi nk we! have indica tea that we would - . not tolerate the use: of cuba, as. a soviet submarine base, Senator Symington. - the | we would tolerate at as: a Soviet 7 secretary Motiamara. a think: the. aifserence is hae the ey "submarines have potential for’ substantial att sack on. this. country, whereas, the ‘fighter aireratt- chere at: the present. ‘time do, Rot. ae Senator Symington. Thank yous sir. - now ‘one final. points a You had tried to ‘figure what you vould ao. | 0f alr the ‘stories oI have heard, the one that would appeal. to me the most, ag L nee 7 wanted to destroy this country Fa "think, would ry to. pat a. freighter undex ‘different flags in ‘the, various harbors around,”
2. étad “bottom, et cetera: ” OMA: Do we analyze that ‘from the standpoint of possibility, cand” what we would do in cage ait happened? be Ge Secretary HoNamaza. Yes, siz, we do. “We. have. a specitic. a exoxcise of that kind ag a matter of fact. ac ee Bven though that. would cause sexious aamage, ig it: were. Bes undetected, we have. a force that would | respond in itch a way as. . to destroy the. soviet Union, ‘and this should, ‘deter such action, - \ Se oe ORL We also maintain a ‘careful, watch to- detect uch: an. 1 operation, iE at, occurs. co ne wt ‘Mr. ‘chatman, AE it “mare with your approval, tr E would hope we a | “might have a 1 briesing | ae “to ‘what plans we would | have gainst that: type in’ character of an attack. ree  chaizmass, Russell. very well. We | wil see. as, to. that. os ~~ senator ‘ Symington. ° Thank. you... | Chazman Rusaell: ¢ Senator (Smith woes Senator smith. > I. ‘am sorry I was called out. of. ‘the ‘Committee “when you started. talking | about Cuba. . t have vonly. one: @ question, © Mr... Secretary: oe “That 18 what iss “the United : States policy with re mo a . Cuba. te you gave a positive . statement ‘on ‘that ana | dt is Hw RA214 DocId: 32424094 | Page 29... ~ Vo Co ‘Bue: we don't. rest on the. fact that our slpetior. force ‘should deter — Senator © Symington. — could we some time ‘on m this Committee;
a end Cantor — Pirsh fils. - HW 54214° DocId:32424094 Page 30° * etl5.- satisfactory to the comms “the Teland of Cuba, ‘and the other is to prevent the. export. of. . cory cor Ss meee = : ” a Re 768 Tf dt was not asked, then r would Like you a be secretary MeNamara. whe ‘question was aaked, “Senator smith. I hope my answer was satietactory: I wild be nappy « to “repeat it ie the committed wishes ma to. €o ao Tt can, say. simply very quickly the policy has two objectives. “one: is to overthrow Castro, and eliminate “fonmuniat control, of aos aggression by fore : from Cuba into § sother parte of the heniaphere. - *,. : . a “ Ye
2, Bye Pee | a | 770 firshein cS . Senator Smith. — - ‘Thank you, Mr, ‘Seoretary fe cantor 7 OO chaizman Russell. “Senator Ervin, Senator fevin. wol,; a would just Like: to “say. ct haven't - had a chanco to road my wail, Cor a. weok but! my state tells me. f= got more, ‘letters ‘about cuba; poopie are. more, ‘coricerned | sbout cuba, ‘than any. ‘other subject to come into my y office, and. r want to associate mysels with, vat Senator “Symington: said a while. ago, “. “think: that the: Cuba an “the present: ‘situation | a1~ wee ' £ills ‘one. of the dedires. Of: Rassias Te ‘gives tein a base where ve = thoy havo. got plenty of weapons which, tr think are" immaterial, what you, call, ‘them, that can ‘be exported to » other countries in ee South America and have got a base for subversic Q o “ eS of course, = am " probebly a little reckless Twa a : - - ranning, ite alt by mysole Fa think a would just put a 2 blockade chore, and. “stop everything’ ‘coming | into’ ‘Cuba.  mysele eeauee | i ae Tnliove you, have to take a chance. those. are cbacrvations. . Chairman RuBseli. Sonat or Tharmond. Senator Thurmond: Mr. Chairman, t ‘don' te think Eh have any ‘aueations, oe | Por the record E just 4 want: to ‘make this point Slee, ‘. coming from, mo , ‘that un my judgment we have’ got’ to set. “Up | ‘a » policy. ‘on this matter and it jas got, to. be. a | policy to, eliminate | Communi.em from the Western Honiophere. once, that" decision ‘is, ; - made: tr ‘think everything else will fall in ‘place. 7 “There” are” a “various sways ‘this. can be brought, ‘about. We can: establish a naval HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page 31
a a en tt a AOE eft 8 lea bine ee ae ck AW 54274 and | economic. blockade ‘of cuba. and all: relations with Ragsia’ ena with ‘her. satellites, and if “have « got first to decide wo are going, to “eliminate Communism oa feom the ‘Western Hemisophers. _t. don't hink it. naked any ‘di ffer- - te for what they are worth. - got to. remove him, too. “if: that. ‘doosn' t work we can. cancel. diplomatic commercial al - that don? ts work WO. may have 0 use the. wilitary, but r. think we / ance. whether castro, is removed or. not. Te Communists. are ‘running cuba, castro is. a mare ‘figuronead, and if he is. removed, \ long as the Communists are running ‘Cuba, + soticbody else will be hast t there, in his place, aia in fact, might, ‘be ‘tougher. than’ Castro is, with what little powor he has.” “The Communists are running Cuba, and. we “have got. to remove | Communism from cuba, “Those are my thoughts, tie “Secretary Chairman’ Russell. Castro says he. is a ‘Communist, 1, BO we have. “Senator ‘Tharmond, ” How is that? (Chairman ‘Russell. Castro says he ‘is-a Communises Sena ator Thurmond. Of ‘course; “he ought | to be ‘removed. I mean tho’ point. is the Communi sta are running. eis ‘Chairman, Russell. You think’ he is ‘being directed outside from the KeemLin rather than ‘the government in | the capital in 1 “Havana? Senator ‘thurmond. He is. just 3a | figurehead: oe GS 2 ‘chairman Russell. ‘any further questions? Docld:32424094 Page 32
HW 54714 - Fleturea, — stances.” L ‘frankly think it ‘would be. met. in both areas... 7 nations. ‘Docld:32424094 Page 33 7 Senator Symington. Just one more, ‘about this, ‘otfensive and “@éensive weapons. Senator Brvin was eaying ‘they have: got a ey . *. ‘these missiles into cuba without our, Incwing it ‘until: ‘we took Now! sxppone they took tanks in quantity and 1 put: ‘them’ into. Venezuela, as wo know tanks without proper resistance ouuipment, under the hatches of freighters, you: aay that the. Pree World | shipping in “down iit Comaniist shipping 3 is “8p, and that Shey. pat those da Venezuela | and with those: tanks: the Connunists, an: ; Venezuela started ‘moving in. and ° “capturing ‘the capital, what. would we consider. ‘that: to be? a Secretary Hotiomera. Export | of aggression by'4 force wnich is contrary to the skated policy of this government and which af would be | met. by, Some “forcosul. action by this / govornnant. “senator ‘Smmington. Would, it be: met. in “Venezuela: Or Cuba? | sectotary Metamard. We | would have to 0 face. the ¢ circum Bit r would Like to 8ay) first, ‘that. it is extronely. cunikely: ‘that type. Of surveillance that we. have over ‘cuba at the ‘present time, "But in any-evont, if ¢ Bra , Movestatingly sffoctive today, and then ‘they moved those tanks . - the. Cubans * or ‘the Soviets ‘contd accomplish that: ‘taak’ given the ae over ‘the, international waters between cuba and the other nations me
Senator: Engle. a Me. chairman, ae ‘chairman Russell. Senator Engle. Senator Engle. Mr. ‘Chairman, r would. Like fo e0k the ae a unanimous consent ‘that given ‘the. ‘epportunity to “100k ‘over: the | | record L missed hore during these heneings, that. I be ‘permitted ‘to oubmit ‘questions in writing to the secretary which tT agsure - - “you | will not bo repetitious, in caso. t discover any ane | eee ~~ chairman | Russell. You wilt. have tha opportunity, senator. are Senator Eng ie. a will de that over the weekend. Chairman: Russell. “ALL ight, sir. ° . Sonator Engle. ir would Like to. say chia, ir. Secretary, I looked over ‘thie document whitch was submitted ,. Which showed | “tho aisterence batsigen the classified information and. the ve sified information. a oS oe | Now, it was extensive, and ve we have aigticult problems in: / differentiating sometimes when wa are ‘speaking in the public or on television or anything else, ana it, makes it'very, very” | di tticult for us. because they get confused and they ¢ get fuazzed over and ‘eventualiy you can’t be sure | whether you are: ‘talking: ~ in a  clascified area, or not and it seems. to me ‘that ae would | be wise to devise. ‘some “way to manage that situation ; a “littie. - © - ee I would xather have it, all ‘classified or, - at east a" state- oo i 542714 DocId: 32424094 Page 34
HW 54714 TOTTI ce meme poe coeare aearamrmeenane ethene meme, Riteratem oP RN ch BORE OR oN renal Fo caR cee ee een ea Tat ge Dede ak BS - ment mada to the public which we 2 gat, Mrs. “onith ood ie & as. x . part of it, eventually, when somebody asks you a | question « on that wa are all getting shot at. every five minutes, it de very, ~ ‘to release soriewhat less than you do and Keep the ‘rest. all / elassifica £0 at: east: we. know where we are, soa, | ehis: business of corridors the other aay. 1 I heard that or saw it, bat: t. wouldn't venison 164 an eae except to ne it was go. ‘obvious ‘exon “what you aid “that. ‘there, oe my opinion, We just give away ‘too much Senet 2 ‘think - case. - Docld: 32424094 Page 35 ‘did, the whole. business that you sont ‘around, oF “that wa’ ‘got from ‘the, Conmittoa, and yet after you ‘Listen to the ‘classifica a teloviaion program or radio program, “Or soinething ike vory difficult fox ug to. be sure we are “not. on clagsitiea ‘grounds and I would hope, there would be. come way: to manage | “that. z don't. know how: you are going ¢ ‘to do it. te may be necessary nora oe on at “But what 7 a Suggesting 3 is - that. perhaps in. future brief “ings” wa, have’ a. ‘clear, delineation in the eginning in ‘the state ment itselt as to what is s classifica, what has. been taken out, - ana that has been: lest in: in order that we are not. put. in this a _pobition ~- t took the document, Me. Chairman, ‘enat. came. in here
the other day. and I “Looked. it. over: very carefully, and there are extonsive pages of ie where changes hava been. made, and whexe classified Anformation has. ) been inaiéatea, . Now, I don't want to give avay classified ingormation and 7 nobody else on | this: Committee does. on the other hand, ir am sure, the Chairman faces. more prob- | lets than r do because L am + only a junior nenber of ‘this Committee, but. 5O help me, you got on a television program ana somaboay. 7 ‘asks. you something and you may divulge, at. and not. now te So, it seems | to ne it would he helpéul to “us if whe « dolinoation \ was ‘clear and more precise 80° that | vie / gould be, sure . es oo and be on clear notice when we. are stepping into the area of 7 classified information. — We had a Little @iscussion here the: other aay, you may a  rocelt, ‘senator Thurmond, brought it. up," about: this ‘business of what wa know about their anti-migsilo mioeites, and. ‘we know Le oa good deal, cand Ir could detect inmediately ‘the ‘Secretary's - ) | apprehension on this point, and ‘that. is that! where ‘you have a _ harrow area, in | which information “ean gon from, thon ag: “you ren veal it. you know ‘it, it is. | perfectly obvious | that they are . going: to put a complate survei Lance ‘on. at ana ‘eventially they . “wild 3 find out what: it. ies me | on | ee | | What t am ‘saying 18 ‘that this, ‘briefing has been -magnificant, “bat it: would | seem: t6 “ne, ia would ‘be helpgul if when. ‘we get: one. . - oe _ , we know precisely what is in ‘the. classified area "and what. ie HW 54914 Docld:37474094 Page’ 360 7
‘ ; — 7 not, because when a hook comas in hare Like: ‘this “one, and’ wo eS have had a book already delivered to. us, and Tr take ait ‘home. and. - spond half the’ hight ‘reading i, 5 ‘and r think r xnow ‘what is in it” | ‘that is. unclassified and yet. when. x take’ the next book that. comes along and Lines have. been changed, “Lines have been added, and matters have ‘been stricken out, rane gets a ‘Little. Aight for. | MGB. Chairman Russell. Senator Engle, of course, t lating it in here ana have ‘that. whieh: ‘they released. printed in . black ana that which is. class ified printed: in re but © “unless you: are a great ‘deal amar ter ‘than L am | that) won! He. help | you much on, the ‘television prograns because: you will: get confused about what’ is printed ain red and what is in 1 black, and yeu: | eantt bring : it in’a television program and tind it when vou are asked the “guestion, ° Phat is one» of the | worst preblens, I have never: oben. able ™~ to. aolve. zr solve it by : if ba have any doubt. E. “don't say, ¢ that is. the only. rule of. thuni I can, think of. . Senator angle. That ais. the way rt a6, it, te a “this seoma 0) me to ‘ba - a matter. of ‘greot, Anportance 7 he c HW $4214 Docld:32424094 Page 37
_HW 54214 “and ¢ the hard place when people “Bay: we have to get. ‘them ‘out , cand at may not be ain our’ ‘interest to get them ‘all out. hat aed vhat. I am saying. I just: don! t nome a a eae Docld:32424094 -Page 38 — people of the country are aggravaticd, beyond beli i Senator: Ervin haa indicated, we get, I get, a | thousand: 2 teeters | Tf we could know what they ware: really, op coy ie would ‘help. us a lot, it ‘seems ‘to me , in malting | an intelligent, decision: about what we wanted to do, and it pats us| s in “between a: “tock oP: ‘ . Senator Thurmond. oy You won't, ‘be. able to tell the people poe that. Senator, Engle. Of course ‘not, you can't, ‘unless you “know ‘exactly what, you, are eainsing about and | we might not. be able to - van? reveal it. Sonetines wa have to stand up. and. just’ ‘take it. But is- thexe any way to. ‘improve our intelligence’ on ¢ that . 7 ae score? | ‘Secretary McNamara. Senator Engle, doubt very ‘much 2 that , in the near future’ we are "going to loarn ‘much | more than. we ‘now. know about what the Soviet mitttary personnel are there for. : Senator ‘Engle! can't “we tell by ooking | at who » they are? / Seeretary McNamara... We have Looked at then in terms of ao! \ the kind of “equipment they have, the kinds: of units s they « are: “formed: in, whether they. are. in | temporary or "permanent housing, which gives. ‘some ‘indication of their intention, ‘and we, based “on. all this, have arrived at certain tentative coneLusions. as to
| AW 54914 Docld:32424094 Page 39°° “present time. this. is: the position we ought? to ‘take with the Soviets man. 1 brought: up| ‘on "the first day of this session, ah “why they are there, But r think ‘the ‘strong. opinion that is neta ee fe Reda LY iSite biettien by most. of us is that whatevor thoy. are there, for. makes very Littte ‘aiftorence we » ought to. get then out. and this is’ ‘the | Presigent's -pogition I bolieve, and. we think that ate ‘is to our advantage Xo got them out. ana, therefore, the fact ‘that ‘we don't know" precisely why: they. are there dent affecting our actions at the ~ 4 personally believe that you are correct in® seying. that | you. believe at the present tine ‘the Soviets axe manning ‘the . v4 anti-aircraft: systen ‘in. Cuba. r ‘think that is ‘true I also believe that. the ‘reason they. are “manning it is sto. | insure that inresponsibie Cubans don"t. attack: our, surveillance aircraft: and thereby bring. On - some incident. ‘that. presumably the ; Soviets wish to avoid. But t also believe ‘that: wa, can “continue ‘to. maintain our oe "surveillance of. that: islena without, ‘the Soviets. ‘there: and that se oR esn't make any difference vhat. their intention is. they ‘ought ‘to get out from our point of view and: we, ought to. "continue to. put pressure, on ‘the Soviet: ‘government to force them outs am certain this | is , the way ‘the President, looks at ‘the. problem. oo “Senator Engle. all right. ro wil: take thats Nob, ‘the ‘last . question and thi Feoccurs, to what ‘the chairs” “the « question, of. the force structure of the "Defense ‘establishment — it ca ie. involves
779 | So of. thie nations.” he ‘beat constitutional "lawye the Senate is sitting right here - today, Senator Brvin’ If 4 Constitution is correct, and i “would ask to. be corrected by ‘senator Ervin. at T: ain. m Wee. Sonator Ervin. Might rt interrupt? L r appreciate the _ compliment. I ‘believe the Supreme Court. has reverséd about. erything L knew about Constitutional law. “(uaughter) Senator Engle. * rt otal. ‘think you area the Best: ‘conetitution- \. al lawyer in the Senate, and tho constitution says. ‘that the fe “Congress has. ‘the power to, raise armies “and ‘to. implement. ‘the eo oo ; national defense. ghat is ‘not the: pracise language. But let's assume that we! dis sagree. with the Executive Department: with ref- ' ance to the kina of: force structure we ought to. have” in “the S - Defense Department. That isi. we: “aay “to you that we ‘believe - ' that manned bombers ‘or ‘manned aircragt are being. faced out: too yapidly,. that wa are- - placing too. ) much reliance on missiles, and ' - that: wa indicate a different policy for this nation with refer- ance to the ‘fore. structures that” we ‘expect to have in the military establishment of this country. a : Who is going to. prevail, “that is what r “want 0: > Fo. re ; ‘you going. to Bit, thore and. gay to us, We. are snot, : going to “spend the money," even if wo give. it to. your Is ‘that, the way 74 it: is. “going ‘to be? ‘ HW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 40 © re ae ‘Secretary. HeNanara. “weld, six, ‘T am fot a constitutional a
‘HW 54214 "lawyer myaeit and qr reallybeliove: we: have to rely in. matters but even more important than: ‘that, Lt “think we mast ‘rely \ upon continued | probing of each other views ‘to ey ‘to: understand them | better ana in hope they can. be reconciled in ‘that, case, to devalop ‘the strongest possible foundation fo ‘our national security, and, therefore, E think that it Se-in exploration « of the views, ‘willingness £0 adjust the force ‘structure ae eixcum e tances change mat guarantees. our + safety and a put in the bill the words: “the Defense | Department: i 5 mandated ang required" to ao. _cortain. things. os tracture of. ‘the Aritied Services| or: does ie tie down | ‘in. ‘the DocId:32424094 Page 41°.” such: as this on “other than perhaps: the law becaise. Tr think ‘that | bo At is the tradition and the precedents of our. “Government which | perhaps: have. the character Of law . in| situations: of. thie kind, BY I don t think ‘that the congre: 88 objectives are ‘ony ai £forent From these of the Executive Branch, We. are ‘poth trying views of the other party, continued reexamination of one's a own — urance that the force structure Ls. s adequate: senator Engle. You ‘know that Congressman ingon last year “Now,” he ‘took at out finaliy, and r think advisealy, but gs _ the ‘basic question eta troubles me T. “think maybe. an. accommo~ dation can 1 be arrived at, and. thie may. be a. problem 't that Shae de - to. be dacided by, the Pros Jidont himsoies ee we oe But do. you have. any views - with reference, to whether or not . the ultimate: power lies. in the Congress to. ‘establish. ‘the ‘force
Re gS mo x J eo. : a Executive Department; © ol. - House. Secretary ‘NeNamara. Fz think the, powers, are. -aymmetrical * ee oe “71 oo “i the Pentagon: or-in. the White in the sensa. that the. Congress can. refuse to, " aceape Propovals a they have in ‘many cases of the Executive Branch relating to. the ‘ree structure and, in turn: ‘the mtecut ive Branc “ean. "be given within the Limits of the authority, authorization of congress, _ baila a force: structure that it. believes suits: the: national ob “a ae jective ‘or. fite the national “objective, ana in, \ that. sense, ‘the i | powers of the. two branches | aro symmetrical. “But I veally. think that weliance on a legalistic approach to ‘the -probian Oe ee ag! not, the proper way. to. strengthen and maximize our “national curity. ne eee I think the proper way | to do it is: in effect as” you have ~~" done it ‘here. You have “spent, four days with: me,” the, ‘House Appr ~ ” . x priations Committee spent w iin days with, me, “and the House on Armed Services Committee spont ‘five, days with me.” Each ‘of the. a three. Committees will spend a ‘long period of £ time wai cinerea in the. Department, and through 4 this: extensive. exchange of view, IL hope. wa can ‘come “out with a near - unanimous v: view. as. to. what: action is. required, . es think that on 99 ‘per cent: “of ‘the force  structuxa that. would be the case, ana ‘the. renaining one percent, “white i it remains, ‘perhaps ain ‘contioversy, ie! ‘not by ‘iteelé 50 s erious a matter in either dixection as to. substantially stfoct 4 ae our, national adcurity. (MW.54214 Docld:32424094 . Page 42°
HW 54214, to oparata “one with the other. " aswer you, can give and probably the one. that | we ought to try) 7 to: put in their "Mondated and roquired". rather. ‘than /just regular ~ Language 4 in an ‘authorization bill. “Appropriations | bills, suspend the rules, “put engi I woula only engage in At as- a Last ‘resort. DoclId: 324274094 Page 43 pide a ons seinen Hine Scud flea. wee Cu Abel ob SEES it ft personally belisve chat ‘this is ‘the: ‘Proper. way, for’ 7 out o the Executive ‘Branch, ‘and the. Legislative Branch ‘of | ‘our Government Senator mngie. | Welt, L suppos 8@ “that is the most practical "to work with. ‘Thank you, Me. ‘Chairman: aN ret t Chairman’ Russel “that has. ‘bean a > question which has troubled us fox a. Jong time, just. where the power iss. ‘The: Const Ligution | is very clear An one point 1 but . in’ many. administrations: “dealing with many. diferent. problems the Executive Branch has - not seen Fit ¢ co spend, the money that. the congress has. ‘appropriated. r don't think you can ‘mandate the Bxecuti ‘Branch | ‘in . an authoriz zation pills L “aonit know juet ‘wnat good” it ‘would do- I éhink if we could get a two-thirds: wots. from the in there oy to tie up the Department they would altiost be ‘conpelied to do. it. but . that is not a: pleasant Prospect. and. it ‘cortainly ‘would a be, t ninything: further? : ‘Senator Brvin. te « “Chain, L “would “just Like. £O° “express a Lele
HAAR ALAS ATER SNR Sore tat cme ain Mt PL le Pet te ale Ne aa Oh eed : @ . . ha oa 7 a res ree nation. Co en ee - “Secretary MeNemane. th “Thank. you, ws Senator. - pee — an ‘Senator Ervin. And to. say that I think one of the most: rofrashing, inspiring things ‘that, has ‘been. said in. the United | States lately wae the Presidont’s statement. that, in.  Srctich , ‘with the cuban crisis | that, its a missile. was, fired, ‘rom. cuba - ee on any American state that the United states would Fegard + that - “as a missile. fired ‘from Moscow and. retaliate. “accordingly. a I ‘think that, 46 such a contrast | with the situation we had” an Korea where wa tried to pretend all. the, time. we: “were really ae not at. war with Réd rina bo Secretary. Netiamava. : Thank you very mach, ‘sir. chaixman Ragsell. ot think it. wad a: very fine ‘presentation, - ° an , o Mr. Secretary, Dut rt said ‘that before: and 1 don't! want: to be "Fedundant. ‘ sn 7 to reconvene ait ‘10: 00 a. me, Honey, February 25; WW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 44
2 a renee rtertntnnn es mami we Sei a Braue headed wi br. Alexander r Plas, bn wae s aoptoted by tlc herespnee torpordtion. y ee a os . ‘The’ chasrman, Phan you very. 7 mucky Gonoral tie, Bates mat is this? mae the Chatrmant es Hebert 's duestiond.” Mr, Arends, ‘Skytolt. we : : The Chadrman, How, Mr. Secrotary,, 7 just, have a. ‘Sew 7 questions. rT want to compliment you on your statouent, 7 ; te ds a good « ptaténont. Et is vory constructive ‘and wilh ae 4 of great help, to polnt. out the ighiignts, on matters, that = the Committes ‘no doubt are. ) dooply concerned ‘about. . or, : aa And before the hearing is over, we will, ‘have vie ee | “nent: ‘questions in reference ‘to: it. cen pone . Now this is not in your Seem oe At lunch L was informed by. a: “novapaper r reporter that. some ur6-Cuban airplane had ‘fired on some hig ‘fisherman, in the Florida Straits. oe / Of course, rr made no comnont, “because Tue not Anything about it, - “Even af had known about “At 7 7 “have made any ‘comment. re &, Oo "eet a General, you'are fant MW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page,45-
I know of the incident: but t ‘think the Genera “more - familiar with it than r am The Cladrmdn, Au right. .- General, proceed, ‘General. Lellay. Yes, sir, . me Chairman, ‘General, ‘talic just a little bi louder. ‘Bates, Creeps? Mr. Arends, Creeps; yes. General Leltay: “About 5: 36 pin. yeste da ow 54714 DocId: 32424094 -Page 46°
+ nln emas me ale ee ‘The incident occurred in international waters OS at 24 degrees. on 5 minutes north. Antathide 80 degrees 20 minutes west -longitiae, which, was 60 nautic: north of ‘the Cuban mainiond and 1 78 cauticar east southeas t of. Key West. ‘The shrimp Boat wag not bit and the crew W of ti sustained no injuries. ~ About| 8: 24 Pp. M., the radar station at Key’ West observed. an ‘unidentified target on their sdreot; ‘proceeding at. bixty degrees, at an altitude ‘of. lo, J000 took at 500 knots. . | When the » targets crossed the 24th parallel two. air borne fighters vere. dispatoned to Anvestigate. ‘the’ un= identified targets ‘trom Key . West and to make’ an intoreent, This is the normal reaction by the Air Bo efense ‘Syotem in tho Southern Florida area, a Shortly aftor tho. dispatch of. the. Air Defense’. fighters, the Key West radar operator” observed “the: tarests - _b be turning southward. | woe Hees | : a | The interceptor fighters reported visual. ¢o | L — four. Migs. on a: “southwest material heading an reported two. oo igs firing rockets ate -:) surface vessel, At this tine four additional. FBS were,  dispatohed to. the seone of the Aneident.. “There was, BO “engagement between the . wien and the uw. Be Antereeptore. Dy ee HW. 54214 DoclId: 32424094 Page a7...
ee ee eens emt cee np te et ee imams | prempapete ne ee Cet foattnciediin ae b! a See HO ee ease ordered a. rescue euiores 1 Three aircrast were | Oke _ ' dispatened to, ‘the area ‘to maintain ae | 4 A radar picket ship | on station approximately, 20. miles “away was ordered to. tne ‘seenc, | And Py cestroyer ‘edeort was dispatched. ‘rom Key. West to roturn. any, Survivors picked up by ‘the picket ship. whoUE oF 7 ae - By. 8: 45° Pp. mi. Bastern Sthndara ne two | men had: been. taken oft the ‘str inp boat, which was “Adentified as. ‘the: “BLA ~- Zrom Fort iyers, ‘Florida, and ‘the two. crew men | of the ALA, a ‘Paris Jackson and Benjamin mega SE ore are euployed by. the. Seb food Packing Company, of Fort. lyers..| | oo | a Both Jackson, and Washington state that ‘they: ‘had ‘been artseing at about thres ‘days because | of ‘engine failure. when: me attacked, “The ALA with a partial hateh of. six shrimp. had been. away, Sh - Exow. Fort: uyers since February | 10 and had sustained ite - ‘engine failure the afternoon, of the wen. . “When rescured, both men. “expressed a. “seawese tor" Pe oo | in saving their shrimp eaten. “The Coast, Guard has punped ce ae OC the water: trom the ALA's bilge ‘and have her ‘anchored _ dust: to the north of vhere she was attacked, two const ‘Guardsmen ‘are aboard as guards. NW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 48-.*°
HW 542914 12 DocId: 32424094 - Page 49.) ; care of nost of. the ‘airplanes that could get in agaist us | southeast. United States ‘now. 7 eee ~ Cuba that: have a Mach 2 performance too. ~ area in our interceptor system? ceptor, § yes, : air. scored. ir. “Rivers (Other ‘than your 104, General Lettay. We have the 106 and the. 102. that, wil! ‘take Now At is: true we have a special situation ‘down, dn’ the Nr. Rivers. “You, certainly do. | am General. Leltay. Where there are ‘sori ‘60: NIGS across ine itr, Rivers, That, ds what. 1 am. coming ‘to General Letay. ‘But the 104" will. take: care of: hose... . ir, Rivera.” It wild not take care of! then at altitude General Lettay. ‘Yes, i ‘think 900 | } . Mr. Rivers, - 1 don't think 80, >» when they ‘got thom at i Mach Now here ig my point: Don't: you ‘think this 4a a” riteal = Goneral Letlay:, - We. must have & new follow-on anned inter- Mr. Rivers, 18 there any program on foot: 160 this problen? .. - General. Letiay. We have proposed one,
HW 54214 subject briotiy?  greaunenslon’ that the Secretary of ‘Defense gave te to the situation in Cube? are ha appy with the amount of Antentigonce, that. we: are etn intelligence, - doesn't hold; “for “example, that ‘there aire. x. nunbes “in various pots: that the Secretary ‘is. covering, Uy “discovered or anything of that, kind, know about thea Docld: 32424094 Page 50. itr, ‘Stratton, ‘Goneraly could. 1 eviteh to. ust, ‘one ‘other this ‘comitttee _, and to the nation: over television: a little ‘bit, ‘ater, with rogatd General netay. Generally, yes i ~The. Aue Force has had an Anput into that. “presentation and the: facts that were brought out ‘there... ‘And We - agreed 1 vite sei ; The only ‘thing that r would soy” on ‘that is “that, none of us. ate ores We elways ‘want nore. And we | would Like to > have. ‘more - tin, Stratton, rE mean ‘you, you are not wae, ~ the Air Foxes | a General. Lotlay:, if there are any, missiles th
' #10 HW 54214 © , estimates. tn the e past. regard, to Cubae -phiment you. You developed ‘fine cauestions. intelligence people and + what. the Secretary’ of Defoape has ‘sald. that the number is: inaccurate, “people ¢ that: ‘there probably | are’ ngne™ there; DocId: 32424094 . Page 51." The Chairman. — Thank youy. te. ‘Stratton | Bre Uy. Stratton. 1 remember we “have had | differences in the 2 o just wondered whether there: was. any aitzerence with coe LG The Chatraan. | Thanks you, Mr Stretton, r {want to come. ‘Secretary Zuckert. “There is. no difference: 4 substance - that I ‘have ‘been | able to discover between. the conclusions ‘of our Me. Stratton. | ‘Thank you very. mich | The Chairman. Mr. Pirnie. ieee Mr, Pirnie. | Yes, Mr. onaitmin. gust pureuing 4 that, question; “General and bir “The intelligence that was | available didn't disclose: the arrival of those missiles, and, it could be very ‘well possible . “Secretary Zuckert. “what is true. We counted 42. missiles, I believe, 1a Cuba, or: something ~~~ less than that ios at counted 42 Aeaving, ‘it is entirely possible that there are: & few: miesiles. ett oo around | some place | an there. But we, haven't “beef able: to find” a ‘Ana 1 ‘think at. te goneraday agreed by ard of the» Antti tgenet
7) oo But we can't say definitely. only. an | onsite ‘very © at (Cy ' So careful oncsite inspection an cuba would prove, esthate | | - Mr, Pirnie, ‘That was the podint, that 1 was leading uP to. | Ks 7 | Because: it is an. obvious trick that has ‘been employed in a1 ve military. operations to let the eneny_ see hat you. want at to , “p00. Za - ; : a : | . 7 And therefore while nobody would | quarrel with the ‘deductions aa that might. be made fron the type of surveillance ‘that was 5 ropres- ‘ented | by these excolent photographs, it pust: be admitted that: thet only gives Limi ted dsclodure, don't that correct?” Socrotary auckerts That is. correct. | “And that 1s ‘the. reason | I sald we would ay like to ae ss intelLigenca, “because we ean’ t definitely. prove: that. there. ve oot are no more: ‘missiles ‘thore. oe I think the odds are very greatly. in favor. of ‘their not. be any there, but we can! t definitely any thore aren't, ALL. we can pay is “that we haven! t been able ‘tofing ese tr. Pirnte. “That is. right.” And ait woula ‘be true also in regard to mobile. es that it ‘would be > possible. for capabilities to be | concealed | oe there, too? ate . : | a 7 “Seerstary tuckert, 1 it is s possible, yes; eae “Me: Birnie. - Sonera, r was very mich intorosted 4m we Me ‘of questioning & that. has just boon developed because 1 hove ‘boon. puzzled as We, have been atuaying « our. "weapons ‘ayaten, to detersing WH. 54214 Docld:32424094 . Page 822009005
HW 54214 sane Secretary MeNamara. I agree. But ‘the fighter aircrast WOULG not cad the weapons wilt ch sucn accuracy as to. “preclude the pisohabd lity that sone would land off the air bases. senator Coldwater. why ao. you feel that? Taciy accuracy me ‘is rather good, Secretary NeNamara. No, I think the histozy o£ all fighter bower attacks has’ bee an that. many explosives hava bean landed otner than | on the target. Senator Goldwater, I agzea’ wit oh you in the past , bat that was when we, during Wor id War iL, WO Gidn’t even have. ao o unified sighting devica fox sockets. But we do ‘today, ana for > instance, in the Cuban baiidop,’ 1 vas, Tt happonsd: to be, ‘on guty at that cime and I was very imp snessed with: the degree « ‘of “ eeurcey that these men cele choy had in. the event they had to . attack their targets, and chink it.was eeu ee ale limited nunbar of sort: Leg that were planned on rather sisticule targets. I Gon’ buy tna idoa. 7 Secretary NeHamaza. ‘tnt che case of Cuba” we were planning a. suis c antial number of sortios, and i chink the Aix Porce would. agsse that Lt is oxtrenely unlikely that, very unlikely ‘that, 100 sex cant of the weapons ‘would be landed on the target, in this case the. air fields. tz think: we rust: recognize the: = high probability chee a ‘substantia al percentaye of those ‘weapons 5 would not ba Landed on che tar eget. “in any event, even Ag they were landed on the target, the - damage would be so ‘largo and the | aan DoclId: 3274274094 Page 54
, - approach, while “Ssonom Zing: on manpower, still reqiires ‘that airlift be available to move the men to where the. materiel bis) -prepositioned, but men are much easier to nove 1 by air than large a units of equipment. | | ya We believe an ‘appropriate blend of all four methods would» _ produce the hest results, and that is what ve have a atomic ae achicve in the proposed program. We already have large. general purpose forces deployed abroad, particularly in Burepe and ‘Korea. We have prepositioned substantial amounts of. equipment and . ' supplies in Europe and in the Far East. We have initiated a a limited program of forward floating bases. Finally, we are main-= a caining a 1 large central reserve of General Purpose Forces in a the continental United States, and are ‘building the airlift required - to move these forces promptly to wherever they might be nies, A. AIRLIFT © | Last year r outlined to the conmittee the manner in which we = computed our airlift requixenents and the forces. ‘progzanincd to ‘fulfill then. Problems encountered during. the Cuban Gvisias. © however, have lea us to the conclusion that some increase in these’. rorces is necessary. Our standby plans for the invasion n 06 cube, for example, called for the simultaneous ‘air “drop: of the assault elements of 2 airborne divisions, totaling, in all about 10,000 | men and their equipment. When the. airlift force reqiiroiente were a computed, however, we found that we. did not have enough suitable oe aircraft in ‘the active forces to carry out. that operation, an Hi 54214 ‘Docld: 32424094 Page’ 55
_ HW 54314 DocId: 32424094, Page 36 together with the other missions requiring ‘airli£t airevare. coe Therefore, we had to activate (24 equadrons of Aik Force Reserve _ _ €-119's, and c-123"5, totaling 439 aircraft and about 14, 000 nen. 7 i might say, by the way, the Air Force did an absolutely magnificent job . in an act tivation. We issued the ordez at 10:00 ° ‘clock one Saturday night, and within 30 hours those men and . _ planes. weze available for combat operations ready to take-ofe if. necessary on an airlift move. The old c-119, hile specifically designed for airborne operations, is small and slow and has but a ‘fraction of the gange o£ the new C-130. While it is useful to have ain reserve, we "cannot rely upon this aircraft £or airlife to areas more distant than Cuba. We therefore propose to acquize an” additional 6 squadzons of C-130E's which are not only good cransport aireract . put are also efficient troop carriers. We plan to acquire. ‘the - additional aircraft by increasing the production rate | fron ve to 15 per month, thus raising the C-130 force ‘to 34 squadrons by early 1965, instead of the 28 squadrons which we had.previously ._ programmed. This force will be continued at least. through 1968, |. ‘as shown on Table 13. . You might wish to turn here to page 197 and see-the airlize forces outlined in Table 13. in Table 13, there is. shown ‘for. eect of the: years of the five-year program period, ‘64 to "68, ee planned Zorce structure. we. have also shown the actual force structure for "61; °2 and "3. “These cover both the active forces’
“HW 54914 ~ needs GO pe publicized some more, - of rive wide others go down to land troops. We ave ubiliging ~~ “he fix Pewee aly planes GO give air cover and, in other. ‘votds, have developed 411 the i sacties and techniques we Imew. of an order to improve the safety of cur helicopters and our personnel engaged in other icinds or teste. | | Sonator Stennis. You don't lack modern equi mont 110W. You have plenty of modern equipment ( Ee) do the vety ¢ bhings you a have described, is that rights? | General Taylor. I don't. know of any. kLnd. of equipaont . Ghat anyone has asked for or suggested as being + useful ‘bint iB not. avallable in South Vict Nam, _ Senator Stennis. And you give them as > good « ag. ‘you have? General Taylor. Yes, sir. Secretary McNamara. I % think, Senator, Lt is Pale co say chat we have sald to our commanders in Sout n View ‘Nant, chat. . we are spending $52 bliiion a year, and they have: fir at b clad 2. on the whole $52 pillion, meaning all of our rescues Senet or Stennis. That is very good. Those. ‘asst uranees, SOUNG good, L won't dabor ¢ chat any further ; bub’ T betieve at Now one queséion here about the Navy, and this is my last question, 7 was very much impressed really in going down Go Guant ca namo Bay after. ~ cne  erisis Was over. firs 8. Sth - and Twente “down there, and I was very much pleased. tO. bed vine had happened ‘with reference ko bringing this force, this’ _ = So, nS a Docla: 32424094 Page 57 ‘ ne \ ; : ; a oo f
BAG 3° Fut X did get the idee that the myy, sarbiouiarly the. conventionai Pace of the wavy, that 1s vhag you used, was. stretched out cons rably gust for that nearby mission only. a few sited tg, | the thovght occurred tc me suppose you had itd soneshhi -Olse hapoen os semevherre else in: the world far renoved at coun “the same ‘ane. | “You said yesterday : as I unterete fd payee Waa today, that you figured that for liatted wor requireaants: Cas the Muwy was sapapie in sine end enapooibien and 20 forth, LT woud like for you to vespond, to entargs ori that statement and respond to the impression I got about the Tay being prets ty much absorbed, Secretary NeNamara. - Weli, sir, t don't believe that it | was, cn ‘senator svennis, A don't mean the carriers were all mete 7 baleen up, but nove convention ships. : | Secretary MeNamara. We did not redeploy any. ‘subs bstantial number of ravai crart, either surface or air fort chat operation. “We. utlilzed trie naval. onal assigned to. this garviouiar area. ee | we did not deplete | the naval forces eluewhere da tne” -- world therefore auring that period. i thinle Ghat many, of ‘the crews were onan extended duty. We did as a matter: of. fact as. I renenber extend the pours: or " eniietment, of certain naval HW 54214 Docld:32424094 Page 58
HW 54214 / what you called in? ‘Docld:32424094 Page 59 CF fou an ” © tS @ OT ae “542. personnel to assist us during that period. Bus I aon't believe oa. that it demonstrated shortages of naval forces. Bots) Senator Stennis, What about your landing tesias “and units of that kind? Did you have then to spare, in addit Lon. to oe Scoretary Metamava . Ti think we had aiaple oxeca, and that the readiness measures or the last. two years de aonstrated their effect by the rapidity with which -- Seint or stennis. I imow you had plenty there, Kir. Secretary, as I said in my original statement, but how much.) did you have should | you had been called ‘on fax anay? Secretary. MeNamara . We did not redeploy ‘forces: “fron. other theaters into this theater. Perhaps General Taylor. - would like to coment vhough on the adequacy of % the forces as he appraised them ducing that period. General Ta ior. This was a ver valuable exercise for: ¥ x ail the Services engaged; because we checked out many factors: BS, that we had only compus ed more oi less an eheoxy. I would say & the naval forces were. thor oughy adequate, oe aithough cert cainly in some sectors | they becane.% thin, Tor example, in amphibi cus crate we connie gust. about all we. “could lay ou hands on an the Atlantic, vLstt ro were - ghorté ag a matter of fact we. are going to. bring, out, about an additional ist! ante ‘the regular 2 Tavs, in oracr ‘to. have. then available,
HW 54214 ars -So we developed shortage’ in narrow seguenés, but on the...) whole I would say the naval forces are thoroughly adequate. Senator Stennis, Well those you named thovgh ; are very. vital and very necessary. You did not “have onough Go-nave taken care of that operation ehould -1t ‘develop? General Taylor. Tt would have béen hard. to ) dupiieat an ainphibious landing at the game vime. ‘That i would concede. But We did this without reducing the strength: in the Pacific. or our general war readiness. Ir thought it was aulve a good demonstration of adequa cy « | | | Senator Stennis. You did not have any cas suaities or replacenents % GO deal vith or anything like that. ei ther, Torcunately. | Secretary MeNamara . in ail of our ‘Services, Senator, as | | you know weil, if we Go ror prolonged periods or time we will 7 have to have some kind of mobilization at hone, | Sertor Stennis. You feel satisfied, then, ir. Secretary, — about: the situation. | : ge wots Secretary McNamara. I felt very: pleased wit ch the degree of readiness that was exhibited in Oct ober of last year compared bo t che degree of veadiness chat we saw a year eters, ft think ¢ shere was a treme andous amprovement. and, ‘one that cea eB ee "was amply. denonst arated. - T thine there were some: ‘Serious shortages chat were exhibited as well. These we ‘enew about, particularly ‘the. yaarnast, because in ee | Docld: 32424094" Page 60 an Se io
- order to na combat Lacy, we a@ary had to call up vom the Reserves before entering into combat 400 aircraft and 14,000 wien. Wow fort gunately | the Air Reserves. had been 80 organized | and maintained at such a ltgh state of readiness | that we were ' able to do this, bus it Wad also fortunate that the requircicnt 7 Was or a shor transport, becuse the alrorat that those Reserves were equipped with aia not havea | capabaiity to. move any substantial distance, - oo | Senat or ‘Stennis, | So if it had been 3,000 miles, you would “have been out of business? | | a Secretary McNamara. We would have been in very serious. difficulty in airlift, and I think that was our. nost important: | shortage. r think it is probably the most Y Important shortage today, ‘the one we are seeking to corvect by the. alvlift . ~ procurenent progvam put before you. Senator Stennis, Is there any. other you. want to ) mention there before we Leave that subject? - ; | Secretary Meitamara. NOs sir, I sais eck! mentioned 0% sher shortages, - Sonat or Stennis. Yes, ‘Ali right. Secretary McNamara . that. we are aware. of that were not. particularly demonstrated, too, Sena tor Steniis. We will pass” ‘on. | Others are waiting. Mrs, Safin, you are mexG. (HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page 61 a re) ° pn
HW 542714 so “ A AJ 3 INDONESIA AND TO THE UNTTED Afias REPUALIC. THE. COMMUNISTS ARE: . TO THE STRATEGIC § STONIFICANCE OF VITAL SHIPPING PASSAGES THEE TH IN TERMS OF WORLD TONNAGE. ne boar PROGHAN OF CCANSTHAPYIC. OUR OWN. RECENTLY EXPANDED EFFORTS IN THs FIELD. a - “tg THE SOVIETS HAVE FURNISHED SUASTANTIAL NAVAL FORCES is) OCEANS. CUBA FLA NKS THE ATLANTIC APPROACHES TO. ThE PANAMA CANA ’ “HOWEVER, AT PRESENT, THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT CONTROL THE IMPORTANT NARROW WATERS. OF THE WORLD. SUCH AS THE ‘STRAITS OF CUDRALTAR, : cn SINGAPORE, SUEZ AND OTHERS. WE MUST nor LéT. THE 20 so. a WITH QUT POTENTIAL, ENEMIES ° MOVING FORWARD 1 Expanin THEIR. syst Mt ON THE WORLD MARITIME FRONT, THE MEANS 10: USE AND CONTROL, THE seas: ARE GOING To BE. MORE IMPORTANT w AMERICANS IN THE 19708 THAN’ even BEFORE. CUBA FURNISHED A PREVIEW OF WHAT MIGHT HAVE SEEN HAD THIS COUNTRY - NOT HAD THE GRADUATED, FULLY RESPONSIVE NAVAL STRENGNY, n,, APPLY TO THIS SITUAT TON. THE KEY TO" SEAPOWER IN” THE NUCLEAR AGE LIES. IN THE. ABILITY F THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS. 10 EXERT MILITARY | FORCE ‘ON A oRAbu TT TROLLED SELECTIVE SCALE WHEREVER AND | WHEHEVER IT May BE. EAUTAED. IN THE NAVY ARE FOND OF USING THE WORDS MOAILITY, “RLEXTUILITY. ‘AND NAVY. AND MARINE CORPS FORCES MAKE 10. THE NATIONAL. VEFENSE.. ITH SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, AND MARINE UNITS aS BASIC "BUTLDING BLOCKS". WE CAN, Pur : Docld: 32424094 Page 63°: |
HW 542714 CAPABILITY WHICH WILL BOTH HELP T DETER AN ENEMY ATTACK “AND INSURE AN” ; MARINE THREAT. THES CALLS FOR VEGOROUS “BEFORTS ACROSS THE WOLE SPECTR PARE CANNOT BE BROKEN out on ISOLATED. SO THAT IT CAN & ADENTIFEED SEPARATELY - FROM OTHER NAVAL OPERATIONS, qT. KS AN ORGANIC, rutecaiL PART OF NER=. . TUALLY ALL OPERATIONS. IT is AN ELEMENT OF EVERYTHING ELSE. THAT GOES ON: ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF NAVAL OPERATYONS ~ FORCES WEAPONS y. TRAINING, By - | RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. WE ARE Givine THIS, PROWLEM TOP PRIORITY. re OUR PROGRAMS. | MAVAL COMMITMENTS » ‘ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS EVERY REASON nv ‘BELIEVE DocId:32424094 Page 64° ~ IT MAY BE SAID with ASSURANCE THAT BECAUSE OF THIS warty Y cundacTERastie NAVAL FORCES AT SEA ARE MOST LIKELY TO PROVIDE THE sagon RESIDUAL, STaIKE EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-ON STRIKE CAPACITY SURV IV ENG THE ENPACT OF AN INITIAL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE, — TO PROTECT OUR SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS ‘AND to ‘INSURE CONTROL, OF VITAL SEA AREAS, THE NAVY MUST BE ABLE TO CONTAIN AND DEFEAT THE suB- ores OF NAVAL ACTIVITY. CONTRARY. TO POPULAR CONCEPTION, ANTI-SUBHARINE wane AT SEA. THE ANTE SUBMARINE BATTLE WALL 8 SRN BY UNREMETTING EFFORT, me THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS ARE AND ALAS HAVE re GEN : PRE -EMINENT IN. THE WORLD ‘IN THE FRELO OF ANPHEBIOUS WARFARE. Me THE. N ves ABILITY To TuansponT, LAND AND SUPPORT RARINE As SSAULT TRaOPS on ‘Enemy HELD _ oo ” _ COASTS HAS PROVED ITS VALUE. TO OUR NATION TLME AND AGAIN. we eure STATES . NEEOS THE ASS SURANCE THAT FAST, COMBA T READY ANPHIBIOUS FORCES RE t HAND: TO COPE WITH ANY FORESEEABLE SITUATION, “FRO A LEBANON ym iy “cuBA THE FUTURE HOLDS LETTLE PROSPECT OF ANY REDUCTION IN Noun wont pene THAT THES E COMME TIENTS wm, INCREASE AS. THE Souter aoe, TURNS. ats
axception to the 35h requirement would have been required.” ‘held that military requirenants chow be the prime. aeterminent in  elLoceting HW 54714 HASe Mars The Navy has taken positive etepo ‘to Sap Lonent thia reatrivtion in our - 7 ° eee a shipworlk program, We now fully expect to comply with this requirencat,. end oy. ‘beve firm plans to elocate 35h of the funds made ovatleble in re 1963 tor . ee repair, cateration, and conversion of novel sbips to private shipyards.” ae Emeeutdon of this provision has by no moans been easy. Th has been reoponsible . for 6 redtetion of epproxinately 3,900 in navel shipyard employment during | FY 1963, and the transfer of several destroyer conversions from, ‘the: Weat to. the East Coast to. maintain balanced naval shipyard work forces... Navel. oparations during the Cuban crisis resulted in nunerous changes to planned shiywork schedules. Tt 4a quite probable that had the Cuban ertats, ‘contimed - for a longer period, Anvocation of the parndissive Provisions | of the jaw re aa a ar In addition to these problens aad the extra. ninintetrative bude OF... regregating and controlling the private yard portion of chipwork, the: effect” of this work avsiganent hes been felt by the Fleste The Hayy bas consistently " this work. While eur experience in FY 1963 resulting, fron the aseiganent, or ae a & lLexger nuniber of hetive Fleet ships | to private yards. has not dogreded, Fleet | : readinass to a neosurable degree, » We must be very coremul that our future. me fos oe ations insure that we continue to nadatain the best yossible posture « of’ ee a | Fleet readinoss. It should be noted that ve ‘have only had. a Little over, six, months exper fence with ‘this requirenent mud 4% 4s etl too early to evaluate a Ata full errect. | 7 to date At has ‘been the practice to asoign cuxiliary | and sniatier tie : ships ta private shipyerda for- conversion, alteration and repair. From’ an ; inductrial point of. view alone, ‘this bus been feasible and the private shige “ yards bave generally performed up HOR RT. However, there ie no ° os aie oe Assurance that the private ehipyurds satisfactorily secon! oh overhaul, ae a. ‘ .: Bocld: 32424094 Page. 65.
_ The Chairman, Yes. Nr, fiivors. Now ) thoy. have gone 80 fi Tari. to not  gupport our buildup of two more attack ubmariies’ _ The Chairman, Mo are not “tolicing about “thi Secretary 1 K, arth. No, sir. ‘Wo. have aozansiely put: ourselves on record with ‘the committee, 1 “think and with ae the ‘Chairman also. : The Chairman, Keep vac mei ue ge Now the next one «~~ oe eemesece . ie, Stratton, ‘itr, Chédrman, may I ask a question — in conneétion with that? oS My recollection was that Admiral Burke said only. that. he recommended AS. ‘Submarines in order that thirty. might be on station at. all times. And at was his. estimate: ‘that 7 45 total wore nooded in “order to got, tnirty operational. Could you give us an idea, Admbrat ‘vhat fan se would be if you, have Ad boats how many are - going. to be Pe. , available on station at ald times? | ! | | “Adnivar Anderson, We can count: on approximately vo two-thirds of these boats being on station at all, times, ~~ | We also havo the option of Aneroasing. the nunber of bonis on station, 4g, for coxample, ve feel. that there. “jig a particular period of ‘tension, ‘such. ag. We: did uring the Cuban operation, en a a would say ~— off ‘the record aoe DocId:32424094 Page 66 nes Bo aR et TS
HW 54714 military philosophy. have seen a case arising right ‘out of the Cuven aituation, “ yhere wo might indeed havo been ongaged in. ‘warfare with. “particular matter. DoclId: 324274094 Page 67 - 2 There are 32 ballistic missiles ; mow | thea what we” have. ‘The theory of this war “= or battle - — ag ae comes, = ‘would be the idea of mass destruction on the | enemy. This submarine ‘would. not give that. mass: destruction’ oo on the enemy. 1 mean, it seems to ie L detect a: change, deep change, to a political, ‘let's say, instead ‘of  Aamixe 1 Anderson. I do: not feel it does constitute ‘a change. 1 think ‘that the addition of 32 additional . ; Polaris m asiles, ‘for exainple, or more, “would not make ae a quantum, differonce in. che knowledge of, the Russia s that if ‘they start a thermonuclear war their destruction ‘4g. inevi- o. table. It is. However, I ‘think that we are moving into. an ora where At 4s far more likely. than ever betore =< ‘and. we “could the ‘Russians dircct without a. chermonuclear erebie Mr. Bray. is that why we are cutting ‘down: and going out of the long distance bomber business? Admiral Anderson. No, ‘sir. a : tT don't | believe that ‘that is related to. thie Mx; Bray. It seons tome it is. I.will not rane? be
See HW 4342714 You requested one: ‘and the department approved. it, The" gost of it is 29: million. ‘ship. 2100 tons ‘and a normal peaching load of 500 vous: _ deficiency? | . . tho. Cuban, crisis Ne wore forced to, as Aduiral anderson Docld: 3274274094 Page 6% din this: but Laing program on the program. and ‘construction. Put all that in the record, Admiral Griffin, Yes, Sire The Chairman, “Thenext + one 18. the tank lending ‘ship Give the committee the information bout that. Admiral Griffin. This is. the. first of a new ‘elass pees LSTs designed for a “Sustained speed, of 20. knots. | tt will: be able to litt 400 troopa, with a: full load capacity, ot 22 previously authorized post-world war: bea inte ied in a apeed fron 14.5 to 17 knots. ty ‘Rivera. Aren' t you deficient in, 1 this “area?” Admiral Griffin. Yes, sir, we are. | as . Me. ‘Pivers.. Didn' t the Cubion crisis point. P.. tmis Admiral Griffin, res, Siri. Aa a a consequence of 1 think testified yesterday, forced. to bring. sone - tod to. a hire Bome y ships -- that were in ‘commercial use. -
deficiency, Admiral Anderson? . You attached a priority to ‘the two subnarines? Admiral Anderson. ‘We are very anxious, ‘ir Rivers ,. to build up both our antisubmarine warfare ‘capability - and our. amphibious ‘capability. | Wenecessarily have to place our antisubiar e warfare capability at the higher priority. Burt we feo). that ‘the amphibious force ae . modernization of the “amphibious forse, Ae nost inportant, 1d 1 Axyny yap wile! M folgs ¥ 2 fols A.M. | HW 54714 Docld:32474094 Page 69
“BASS 20 Bb | arene ere 54a | 7 2 - no draft: I don! t understand it. “You know what T mean... ae “ Secretary Korth, No propeller. wt is. 5 norely an ejection. fos oe Admiral Janes. This is a standard | gas turbine. It 1s o developmental application for Marine use with propellers and it is. a displacenent type craft. a Mr. Bray. ‘This is not what you are working on “Admiral James: This is not. the hydrofoil type of craft. re 7 Mr. Bray. That 48 what t was ‘thinking, of. Admiral Janos. I thought you were. The hydrofou} is in our program in provicus. years: and the a first of these will fly for the ‘Navy. wo hopefully == « on ‘the. lth . of March and wilt come into service this yer, eee oir. Bray, It usea the jet principle and. has’ slight: draft. : Admiral James. Tt. has zero draft. It flys above the surface of the water with only the foil cubmorged where instead of jets we are using gear drive mechaniom. Ge Secretary Korth. ‘Looks like it is’ s standing on.etiits, in . other. words. The Chairman. Mr . Wilson. - Mr. Wilson, f know this has conventional, arinanent. ‘How: a ' . does ‘this compare with the ‘Russian. Conar gun boats. such. as. the WY Russians have put into Guba, 3 Mr. “Rivers.” ‘For. defensive "Piurposes. only. | Admiral Griffin. It is better ‘than the Conar for dow "ance es - “ HW 54214. DocId:32424094 Page 70: Me loon ee Often
413 ae of course, Comar has two surface. ~~ relatively short Ste | range -- eurface- to-sui'face stant : ; | Ur. Wilgon. We don! t see any really, offensive capability. | for this type of. boat, then? 7 | a | Admiral Grittin. We have case’ inch. gun | on. on this. | : ir. Wilson, We have a ‘three inch. gun. and the: ‘Russians have : ‘missiles. Can't we upgrade the armament on. our gun boat to: pe: at least superior to the Russians, or " do we. have to keep ‘butlding three “Anch pop guns? aa “Admiral Griffin. We don't feel we Aeod that particular ~ . application at this time. We have other means ee Secretary Korth. tt isn't ‘designed “t8! carry ct the. Comar. lx. Wilgon. I know. | Admiral Griffin. | We have other means of ; doing this: oe Mr. Wilson, .The Conar is designed for’ the: ‘same’ purpose, I am wondering... Admiral Griffin, Not the | same purpose, “no sire They don't have control of the seas; “fore m Jey over here, which was a very eignificant characteristic. in connection with the Russian endeavor. a Mr. Wilson, | ‘Do you “think ‘the Comar’ is. a defensive gun boat a or offensive gun boat? : Admiral Griftin, ‘1 think it. is 1s offensive, | Mir. Wilson. Thank you. HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page 71.
ASE 20 Fede. mo 14 7 The Chairman. Mr « Chamberlain. ye | a - Mr. Chamberlain. © “What is. the range > that I co chart? | Admiral Griffin, 1700 y mites. | ne Me. Chamberlain, What is the. range | “i aa Admire) Griffin. That 4 is at 16 knots. e: - ir, Chamberlain, Capability: of 1700, sa Admiral. ‘Gritzin. At 16 knots. 7 a ur. Chasorinin, that is the range of, “tne Comar t that we. have been ‘told of? | | Admiral James. 4 would speculate it. t is under 500 miles, without having full knowledge. a ee ee ae Mrs Chamberlain, Is there anyone b here that ft knows? Admiral Anderson. — 655. at 20 knots. Let | me put the Conar in proper’ context. I think that the Russians ‘put the Comar boats. ‘into ° Cuba, and the. Rus seiang have put Conar boats: into “Indonesta,, and’ wild probbly put them in other’ areas, to. be able to use ‘them against: any of our ships, particularly our amphibious ships, which might _ come into the aren. : | : oe So in that respect, 1 would vay ‘their idea of putting thom Ne ' dn is. defensive. . ae oe Eg - But: ‘actually we know that they would be ‘used against < our. tle | ‘hoes and: they could be used, recognizing. ‘the: range. te missiles against shore inetalia Lons or, ‘anything lees HW 54214 DocId:32424094 Page 72.
re en a, 188 unclassified advance copy of the ‘Secretary's advance statement.” on Latin America, B-1, Latin American and I shall ask. two ef the il questions, Mr. Secretary. ae There are those who contend that the ‘lesson of Cuba was that _we won that showdown because of our superior conventional | forces ~ Yet there are those who contend the lesson of. Cuba was that we won that showdown because it turned on being a’ nuclear. . a confrontation, and’ we had the nuclear superiority, and sensing. : that, Khrushchev, backed down. . Was there a nuclear confrontation? Did the crisis turn on. -;" eur nuclear saperiority or’ on our convent ional “superiority? oe an ‘ . ? /NW 54214 Docld:32424994- Page’
@ BSere— ; @ a : 7 7 isd STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ROBERT S, MC NAMARA, oe SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ; ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN oF THE JOIN? CHIEFS =. OF STAFF -- resumed . Secretary McNamara. Senator smith, Khruschev did back) down but he backed down in my opinion because we had both, because we had both a nuciear superiority and a conventional _ superiority in that, particular instunce. Senator ‘smith, “Had Khrushchev had superior conventional forces in Cuba what would have been the outcome of an eyeball a to eyeball showdown? | _ . | Sectetary HoNamara. Tt ie aif ficult for me to speculate on 2s. an iffy situation such as that, but I “believe that our veotti | would have ‘been cubstantially weaker had we ‘been Timited | to! nuclear superiority and faced Soviet superiority in Cuba. Of course, it is very difficult: to conceive | of how they, could have had conventional superiority | in that situation but | Soe assuming for the minute they did, tam ‘confident that our total. | NO power position would have been mich, ‘much weaker. Senator ‘Smith. Mr. Chairman, t will have here the balance a Of my questions: on that subdivision for the Secretary t to take and I will go ‘on to my second group of questions on the introduction, B-7,. NATO, and I will ask from that group two of 8.” ‘the 13 questions. — . SO df there is an assault by the Soviet bloc against western | ' - wg pana 2 poBRESPGa0dRA pif OBE conventional forces fail under: that assault,»
Seer © Admiral Anderson. ‘Eight. eo UL" . oe Mx. Bates. They just: eut. you eet Admiral Anderson. That is right. | At | - Secretary Korth. What? | : | Me. Bates. They just cut you two? Secretary Korth, . That is right, Admiral Anderson. I would also like to see. ag “the” funds vos Were available for a nuclear | propelled frigate with hn periaps a terrier missile. | I would Like to > see some of. our Lst's, fast ists. : We have need for improved amphibious Litt, during the course of the Cuban ‘operation we saw that we had need for litt, not only for the Marines . but also for the ‘Arny. | I ‘would like also to continue ia. the field of. modern izing our. fleet replenishnont ships, AOR. 1 would ineluge two of ‘those ‘ships. Because this means the difference of. ae — ship tist has to be re-supplied. It cones to one ‘ship to cae got its resupply rather than bo two or three, . cwkss . I would increase by maybe a’ couplé of more, destroyer ae escorts. Then I would accalorate some of the ships which are in next year's ‘program or the program | in the. following year fox. auxiliary. purposes. ify, Bates. How what would that total up? NW 54214 DocId: 32424094 Page 86 ar.