198-10009-10099 JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10009-10099 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information ORIGINATOR: MULTIPLE FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 02/00/1963 -PAGES: 153 SUBJECTS : CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA - 1962 CUBAN SUBVERSION SOVIET MILITARY FORCES [IN CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.4 HW 50955 DBocld: 3274274709 Secret IB Redact 07/15/1998 Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in Cuba, etc. TFK Reve Binet of the Army EO 13526 eclassify © Exclude © Exempt Authority. [2 Refer To . . : Review Date i By. coed 22° Page 1
HW 50955 CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II NO. SUBJECT: — l. . Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC 2. £xStatement by the DirCIA ‘for use .of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis 3. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte 4, .SecDef testimony before House Appropriations: Cmte 5. SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte “6, SecNav testimony before HASCG 7. Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState ‘with attached statement by Mr. Martin before the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject -of communist subversion of the hemisphere 8. SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A.M.) 9. SecNav testimony before HASC 10. ‘Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell D. -Taylor, ChiCsS ll. | Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC. 12. “SecDef testimony before SASC 13. .Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC 14. - SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba) | 15, ‘Statement. by the DirClA for use of the staff-of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator ‘Stennis (Cuban. Subversion in LA) 16. | ‘Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Govern- ment Operations - U.S. Senate Bocld:32474709 Page 2? DATE: Undated 7 Jan 63 1l Feb 63 ‘12 Feb 63 (13 Feb 63. 18 Feb 63 19 Feb 63 "19 Feb 63— 19 Feb 63 20 Feb 63 20 Feb 63 21 Feb 63 ‘21 Feb 63 22 Feb 63 .26 Feb 63 (Transmittal Slip) 13 March 63
HY 50955 CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART Il (Cont'd) NO. SUBJECT: DATE: 17. Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert .& Mar 63 Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4,.5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11,.12, 13 and 14 included as attachments 18. Study on Cuba as a Base for -~------ prepared by Bob Undated Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def 19. Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis 29 Mar 63 Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano w/draft of President's message atchd _ Sub 20. Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm  Undtd en Armed Services US Senate, on. the Cuban Military Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8)- Docld:37474709 Page 3
—_ . DATE. an P@ANSMITTAL SLIP |" 26"Feb 6( TO: ° Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance ROOM NO. BUILDING 3H985 Pentagon REMARKS: FROM: CTA - William A. Tidwell ROOM NO. BUILDING EXTENSION Codelh. 6614 FORM NO 2 41 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO : 1957-~-O~439445 (a7) ‘FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. po ce Rt ae Te ER tate enema arene reer Fe HY 50955 DBoctd: 327424709 Page 5
Oye ait SECRET" @ STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS OSA, ASE Contre! Ne, <3 SECRET HY 50955 DBoctd: 327424709 Page 6
i SECRET ®@ 25 February 1963 CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA L.:- Introduction The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence, sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis- phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com- munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America. Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then~-Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support. takes’ many different forms, but its main thrust is in the. supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assist- ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require. In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: ; "Come to Cuba; we _ will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab- otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup= port, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and special- ized demolition equipment. " Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cu- ban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad- visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them:. "If you succeed in. establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con- front regular armed forces, then we may consider more — concrete forms of assistance." _ So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in _ fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had SECRET HY 50955 DBoctd: 327424709 Page 7
HW 509455 @ SECRET @ to fight a pitched battle with regular military for- mations which might have required more advanced weap- ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain- ing revolution wherever it flourishes. We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu- ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba. Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri- ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women, Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. of proven reliability.) Says tne Centra i” COMmMTttes agreed in January that a “peaceful solution to the pres- ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question." This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un- der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or- ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist- ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres- ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed. The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that -2- SECRET Docld: 32474709 Page &
HW 30954 @ SECRET & this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government build- “ings. We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train- ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Beta One of our best penetrations in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each. II. The Cuban Plan For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push- ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac- tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over- turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com- munists which have been repeated to us, have been in- Sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force. .The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic- aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first ~3- SECRET Doclda: 324274709 Page 3
ag SECRET ee eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade- ‘craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, ineldding veteran Spanish Communists. The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa- ganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha- vana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of. public record. It may be worth noting that the postal and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the airport or in the post office and destroyed. . The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents ‘have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet, about two and a half by four inches, called "150 ques- tions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba, ) and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with 100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and in- cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as well as charts for calculating the force of: various explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist- guerrilla organization in Colombia. All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home.’.They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces in his homeland. -~4- SECRET HW 350955 Boclda: 32424709 Page id
HY 0955 Docld: 32424709 Page it @ SECRET o III. Training We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with © the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo- logical indoctrination or guerrilla warfare train- ing or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present. The largest contingents have come from Vene- zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely at- tended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, eSpionage, and psychological warfare. We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. (Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed. However, we know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist par- ties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, = the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao. We derive some of our figures from travel con- trol points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the ~5- SECRET
HW 50955 @ sECRET @ Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross- checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents | and in confessions of Captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not re- ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op- posite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjust- ments by the cross-—checking information mentioned above. Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and train- ing in Bloc countries. , Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961, ~The basic training covers cross-country movement. of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One | | took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna- tional Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into na- tional units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to'lead a "Liberation Army." -6- SECRET Doclda: 324274709 Page i2
WW 409055 @ SECRET ae A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training in Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other Similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill out : _lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil- ities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup- ply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection. Numerous reports come to us indicating that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu- bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are in- variably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in several million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature con- tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in- structors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of. the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November. IV¥. Weapons In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous -7- SECRET Docld: 324274709 Page 15
Hv 50955 — @ = SECRET @ sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weap-: ons at home. One | _ lwho was in the original group of | | trainees said he was trained exclusively in. the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces _at home. Similarly, an Ar- gentine trainee, said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any de- termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and ‘Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by in these same groups. aay . We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary.) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug- gled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the) Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do:not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms. This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been Sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in- numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels, A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders |that. Cuba will soon send Doclda: 324274709 Page 14 ;
& SECRET & them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that’ he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units, but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment. In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do So, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat- ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most ser- ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries. _ Vv. Funding Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit- case. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter- mine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was cap- tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto- carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep- tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane to over- fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was..found to be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras, Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar- rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32424709 Page 145
HW 50955 eG SECRET i having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together with funds to support their activities. One item - of $44,000 was publicized in the press. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected | last November has given us a specific account of.:pro- cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap- ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by. which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac- tivity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show- ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front- group propaganda. In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex- ' posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man ‘admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Commanist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sus- _ taining has obviously. been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob- beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. .The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub- urb last year which netted almost $100,000, From the participants, who have been caught, we know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer- rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the Sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February. 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 . by men wearing FALN armbands. VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all ~10— SECRET Docld: 32474709 Page 16
HW 450955 @ SECRET o times, with regularly scheduled and special broad- casts to specific countries as well as general trans- missions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op- portunity for revolutionary action against the "éor- rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressive- ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt. The official .Cuban international service called “Radio Havana Cuba is the chief. radio propaganda out- let. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta- tion broadcasts weekly a total of I87 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter- ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere, Radio Havana's. international service was in- augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first in- ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week Haitian Creole to Haiti -~ 7 hr Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hr 15 min English to Kurope - 9 hr 20 min English to the Western Hemis- - 17 hr 30 min phere French to Europe - 9 hr 20 min French to Canada - 3 hr 20 min French to Mediterranean - 3-hr 30 min Portuguese to Brazil — |  - 7 br Spanish to Europe , - 16 hr 55 min Spanish to the Americas. | - 108 hr 30 min -li- SECRET Doclda:324274709 Page iT
HY 0955 Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba. © SECRET @ In addition to the regularly scheduled inter- national service, Radio Havana has been Known to - broadcast special programs In order to take advan- _ tage of unique political situations, When serious disorders broke out in-the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating froma self- -styled "clandestine" station which said it was located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off after about a week, but not before direc- tion finder bearings and other technical clues in- dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio Radio Havana States that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin Ameri- can countries so they can beam programs to their home- lands. These programs, which have the evident intent | of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re- public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are ex-— emplified by the programs transmitted to the Domini- ' can Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re- public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National . Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican -university students to demonstrate against the Con- stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo. There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes, The other program, "The Friendly Voice ‘of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a ' wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States. The technical facilities of Radio Havana are | at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles -12- SECRET Dpocld:32424709 Page 18
HY SO945. eB SECRET @ southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four Shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past aS many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being Sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays. 'VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob- viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos- cow and Peiping over global Communist Strategy. It has been aptly put. that Castro's heart is in Peiping | but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be- tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy-- call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin. ‘American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion. Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. . Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between var- ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de- liver the Latin American countries into the Commu- nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser~- vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible -and by subversion rather than by force. Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly ‘increasing. An excellent example of this was. the. set- ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the prob- lems of Latin America, which in their own statements | the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese -13- SECRET Bocld: 32424709 Page 19
HW 450955 ‘stitute, and entitled Alianza _ @® SECRET @ i languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance pro- gram in Colombia-~a showpiece of the Alliance. We have been reliably informed that posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and work- ers’ movements in Latin American countries" as top= ics which will be studied by the institute. Re-~. sults of these studies will be published in the near, future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin: America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the in- para el Progreso, will in the words of its hera. ds, "unmask the economic ex= pansion of. the USA" in Latin America. The institute also- expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians, during 1963... One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to fur= ther Communist subversive activities even in coun= tries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argen= tina, and Uruguay.. The USSR. maintains ‘yelations , ‘with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. ‘The’ Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. ‘That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries-~ Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru~=have no official ties whatever with any bloc country. Uruguay offers a good example of how the Com~ munists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor-~ tance the Communists attach to them. .We have found that Communist. subversive activities. in ‘Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government.: In this case even the Cu- bans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good. will of the. government so that they can con-~ tinue to use the country as a base of operations ~14— SECRET Doclda: 324274709 Page 20
HW 50955 -_ @ + SECRET’ @ against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplo- matic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to re- . tain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations, The badly split Uruguayan © government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic mis- sions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries _and Cuba at any time. -15- SECRET Bocla: 324274709 Page 21
| e SECRET @ ANNEX A ~ ARGENTINA has given us a detailed account of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July to December 1962. Instruction included such sub- jects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, com- munications, construction of defenses, guerrilla strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and open order drill. The trainees practiced with Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns, Brownings, bazookas, 8l-millimeter mortars, and a 57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean, and returned to Argentina by way of Prague. Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that they had raided a warehouse which had served as head- quarters for terrorists working with both the Peron- ists and Communists. According to the police, the gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives. A special. Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay, _ provides false documentation for Argentines and Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla train- ing. a | SECRET HW 50955 DBocld: 327424709 Page 22 |
@ = SECRET @ Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December... When a po- lice. patrol stopped, to investigate, they found he was: vearrying a. -number of: rifles. in his. car. In the last: week Of January, another of the ori-. ginal batch of trainees‘in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues Lima, - was arrested by national security police at an airport. He wds carrying-.a suitcase full of ammuni- tion for some of the camps which apparently are still operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues. at first refused to talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced | he ‘would tell his whole story. So far, according to. the press, he has revéaled that a woman attorney in. Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had bought another farm to continue the Peasant League — guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends ‘to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the farm, and work it. Don SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 327424709 Page 23
HW 450955 a SECRET aD ANNEX B - BRAZIL Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement’ in subversion directed against Brazil, These. are the so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authori- ties when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial dele-— gation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro on’ 27 November. The documents, a letter and attachments from "Gerardo" to "Petronio,” comprised a report from a Cu- ban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by ‘Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization. The report, which relays complaints of some of the guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cu- ‘ban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved. Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police official checking on possible clandestine landing fields in the interior, ran across evidence of the training camps and arranged to have some of them raided even be- fore the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo- Petronio correspondence, The Varig document provided the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources matched their details perfectly, and it has become im- possible for the. Communists and the Peasant League to obtain serious consideration for any claim that: the docu- ments might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their authenticity. The Peasant League operation, which was staffed by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the ‘Cubans | apparently have done their best to avoid all contact with the guerrilla organization since the exposé, Bra- Zilian police continue to turn up further ramifications of the operation. The second-in-command of the Peasant League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir SECRET Boclda: 327474709 Page 24
& SECRET = ANNEX C - CHILE On 28 October 1962, at the height of the mis- Sile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean police who searched the apartment found four members of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6 cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38 fuses, and one small bomb already assembled, One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these, . Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares, _ have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence of- ficers. The Chilean police told the press that the | group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and residence, US firms, and local public utilities, ‘This incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack US property and installations wherever possible in © Latin America. SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32424709 Page 24
es SECRET és ANNEX D - ECUADOR have reported that the Tast Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolution- ary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare training. More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean para- troopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders in- volved with the guerrilla operation in order to re- store full Communist control, newspapers reported that the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists of wasting Cuban funds. Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962, was reported to have photographs showing him under- going guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians, was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also Shown. a key which he boasts is the ignition key for a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party. Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees listed by name, SECRET HW 50955 Doclda: 32424709 Page 26
HY 50955. eG SECRET - ANNEX E -— PERU The ruling military junta in Peru started in February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists, including 63.Communist leaders. In a 68-page indict- ‘ment, the government charges that the extremists have attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in San. Marcos University. The evidence te be submitted in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single- Spaced pages. .The security forces have given us no evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is _ ample evidence of Cuban involvement. . -The trials center on the activities of the Move- ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organiza- tion for extremist militants founded by De La Puente Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from ' Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the. revolution in Peru with economic and technical help from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the. indictment . - conforms with reports our. agents received at the time from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of -the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched by the junta early in January. We believe he is in Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, . - which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian associates with Fidel Castro in Havana. Although the government did not move against the Communists and other extremist groups with any. great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian _ police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains into directing them to a guerrilla. camp accessible only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from which trainees were being sent to the camp. AS a re- sult, they found complete guerrilla kits including Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates, ' and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba. The ‘custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this incident were released, but have been picked up again in the January roundup and are to be included in the mass trials. SECRET Daoctld: 32424709 Page 27
HW 450955 Boclda: 327474709 Page 26 & SECRET a who took guerrilla training in Cuba last fall has provided a detailed account of his training, lists of other trainees he could identify, and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla war- fare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry into and travel in Peru, the problems of Setting up business firms to cover eSpionage and agent opera- tions, and information on location of and access to police and military installations. Three major guerrilla groups, according to good reports from our agents and from Peruvian po-_ lice, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for coordinated action. This may be one factor that per- suaded the junta to move against the extremists. The main guerrilla strength at present is a force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peru- vian authorities to have received his guerrilla train- ing in Argentina, If in fact he has 2,000 men, this figure includes landless peasants and Indians, largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to believe that more than a small proportion are trained and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops be- cause the local police detachments have been unable to withstand Blanco‘s raids. Interrogations and agent reports have established that the guerrillas are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bo- livian military and smuggled across the frontier into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Com- munist. share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery. AS one example of the activities of the co- ordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guer- rillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima, and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three local banks and retreated to the hills. ~Q— _ SECRET
oe @ SECRET @®@ ANNEX F - VENEZUELA _ Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing. Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963, told various visiting Latin American Communists that _ Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin America. Venezuela is receiving priority attention from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt re- gime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods, © It would appear from the meager evidence avail- able in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists ‘have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic can- paign which is being waged in the country. The wave of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela has physically exhausted the handful of competent men in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban in-| volvement. Support from Havana can be inferred, however, if only from the expert character of. the sabotage carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was discovered that the Communists have begun to use Shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines. Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explo- Sives. The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Com-= munist Party, which is directly charged with the mis- sion for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with ad- vanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges, pipelines and pumping stations, All of these acts -have been well planned and professionally executed. There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist sabetage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana to attack all American installations in Venezuela as _a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba. Last November a Venezuelan military court tried 139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto SECRET — BW 50955 Bocld: 324274709 Page 29
HY 0955 Bocld: 324274709 Page 30 oO SECRET - Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences. Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba. One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban army maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several trips there. He was also the recipient of large quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda. Venezuelan police early in January raided a house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Com- munist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba, and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reach- ing Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested attempting to enter the house. The armed forces have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be located on the grounds of the Central University in Caracas, communicating with another station which they believe to be in Cuba. Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revo- lutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When the man himself was arrested, police |found a radio transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car. We have received reports from a reliable source that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramili- tary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last September for assistance. Castro reportedly had prom- ised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. How- ever, Castro is reported to have given Martinez $50,000 instead, and offered to train! some of Martinez’ men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000 to finance sabotage operations against North American business installations in Venezuela. | Mrs. Martinez was visiting in Cuba at the time that she| received these funds, -2- SECRET
a INVESTIGATION OF THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM INTERIM REPORT BY PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE Of The COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE Under The Authority Of ‘S. Res. 75 (88th Cong., lst Sess; ) | On THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP Teg es eet ge ae tne, T 5012 CF. oo. SECRET OATSD(LA) CONTROL NUMBER Al BW 50955 Bocld: 3274274709 Page 32
- ao @® SECRET COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman John Stennis, Mississippi Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusette Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia Margaret Chase Smith, Maine Stuart Symington, Missouri J. Glenn Beall, Maryland Henry M. Jackson, Washington Berry Goldwater, Arizona Sam J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina Clifford P. Case, New Jersey Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Clair Engle, California Howard W. Cannon, Nevada Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia Stephen M. Young, Ohio Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE John Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman Stuart Symington, Missouri Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusett: Henry M. Jackson,..Waghington Margaret Chase Smith, Maine Strom Thurmond, Carolina Barry Goldwater, Arizona James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel SECRET HY 50955 Boclad:3274274709 Page 33
BW 50955 ad SECRET © LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL U. S&S, Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, May , 1963. Honorable Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services U. S. Senate My Dear Mr. Chairman: There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup. In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future. It is necessary that this interim report to the full Committee on Armed Services be classified "Seeret." However, the Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security purposes and will have the report printed and released to the . public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security matters have been deleted, Respectfully, JOHN STENNIS, Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, SECRET DoclTda: 32474709 Page 34
II. III. Vv. VI. VIT, eo secrEeT © INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP m Page Introductory Statement. scsccerccescsecenucsccsosseosese OL Summary of Major Findings .ccvecccccssvessncesscssecseses 3 Situation Prior to Mid-July, 1962. ..cccevecsessceseveees 7 (A) Cuban Forces.sscccccccseccceecsecccscecsceccees (B) Intelligence Activities and Operations.....e.s. Situation: From Mid-duly to October 22, 1962...ssseeeee0. 10 (A) -Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment... .cees 10 _ (B) Identification of Specific Weapons ..... - . and EQuipmentssesscseveseecsevevecveneveenees 11 (1) SA-2 SUtES cr cccccscncvessccsccneceeteons 12 (2) Cruise Missiles..csssescvescscccsecceese Ll (3) MIG- el PIghters ceccssccccovcvaceecsccose 12 3 TL-28 (Beagle) Bombers. sstrrrreeserrees, 12 5) Medium Range and Intermediate:.... cei. | - Range Missiles, . .% os. ey os lB (C) Failure to Identify Soviet Organized . ‘Combat UNLts ,eccascccceescvssoseeneresesveses 13 (D) “Alleged Photographic Gap.cresecoseoessesecesvee 15 iB} Transfer of U-2 Flights From CIA to SAC.eseases 16 ‘(F) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally.screresccseesvscescsscssvecssceeess 17 Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of © Removal ‘of TL-28 Bombers cer ceeoesseetevencesesesseege eal (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generelly..sceccescersccccecvvenecvesssesursce el (B) Identification of Organized Soviet ‘Combat UnitSiscorcccscevcevcsecsersveceesenes al (c) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers..secsees. 21 Current Military Situation in CUDA. crcccscncevoesseveces ee (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally.sscccccvccccecvcrscccescesseessneees Om (B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces and _ Bquipnent Now in CUub@.ecsicceveccsccresnenees 23 Types and Numbers of WeaponS..escessees 23 3) Strength and Capabilities of Forces.... 26 (3) Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba.sccscodsccccccrsevees on (4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnal...ose... 30 (Cc) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet. _ Presence in Cuba. scccvececccncccseneosnsrvecs 31 _ (D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion.....s+. 32 Concluding Statement. segersvscerscccsssssccssensscessers 34 SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32474709 Page 35
, ’ SECRET I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive weapons were ostensibly withdrawn. However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not subsided, There have been and are insistent reports that the Sovlete still maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agita- tional and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries. The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness ‘Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation into the entire subject matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discus- sion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included in a subsequent report. Broadly speaking, the term “intelligence community" includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 36
ee SECRET ao - 2.» Federal Bureau of” Investigation. It is used in this report, howéver, ina somewhat nore ‘Limited sense; “here the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or operations discussed. Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive bearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen, Joseph F, Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear Admiral Vernon L, Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Securit, of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolution- ary Council, In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone. Information has’also been received from individual Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 37
ceo SECRET ig - 3-5 This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received frou the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however. include some information from other sources. Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, -<~ based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all activities taking place in Cuba. II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelli- gence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society. 2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission. 3, While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated. SECRET HY 50955 Bocld: 3274274709 Page 36
eo SECRET qed ~ & = 4k, Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence com- munity to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were: (a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our - plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were neces- sarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous Cuban defense forces. (vo) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially under- estimated throughout the crisis. On October 2énd, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island. (ce) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October lth that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October llth negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installec were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles. 5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to BY 50955 Bocld: 3274274709 Page 39
BW 50955 aia SECRET ge - 5 « October lith. The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded. 6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelli- gence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14th were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock or friction between the agencies. 7. To aman the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion thet all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However , they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern.about the matter. 8, There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activi- ties have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence SECRET Docld:32474709 Page 40
' co  @ . SECRET - 6 - confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time. 9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdraw, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cube. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equip- ment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could ' be made operational in a matter of hours. 10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet . personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving, according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of hocc to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelli- gence people say. However, because of what is deseribed by intelligence as "technical reasons,” the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn. lL. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate thet es many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall, we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure. 12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 3274274709 Page 41
ae SECRET g® -7- internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover. 13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence. 14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas. III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962 c A. Cuban Forces It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962, the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training, they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500 SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 324274709 Page 42
BW 50955 aise SECRET ae - 8- Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba. By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 4o propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types. The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially codstal patrol type. Several of these craft in the stb-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training. It was agreed. by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July, 1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted. B. Intelligence Activities and Operations The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962, consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnais- sance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from refugees, exiles, and other human sources, For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelli- gence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early,1962, two flights SECRET Docld:32474709 Page 43