HW 33320 One of Golitsyn's major claims, made almost immediately after his defection, was that another defector would soon be sent by the KGB, as Angleton invariably put it, to "mutilate" Golitsyn's leads (which in another oddity of terminology, Angleton always called "serials") . In 1964 Nosenko defected to the CIA. Angleton, who by now had complete control of Golitsyn, instantly viewed Nosenko as the predicted plant thereby ensuring that Golitsyn would maintain his primacy as the CI Staff's resident expert. When Nosenko did not confess to his role as a false defector, he was incarcerated for three years under severe conditions. Epstein blames this action entirely on Soviet Division management, while portraying the powerful Angelton as agonizing helplessly on the sidelines. This rendition is not only wrong, but patently. absurd. Angleton knew all the legal inquiries concerning such action, was kept informed of the construction of the prison quarters, and never once raised an objection. If he had, as Epstein Claims, genuinely opposed Nosenko's imprisonment, One word from Ain to Helms would have been sufficient to stop the program instantly. The foregoing is but one of many errors of fact and/or misinterpretation in this book. Like Legend it is Propaganda for Angleton and is essentially dishonest. The errors are too many to document : ‘here, but one more example will give the flavor of this work. This error tends to | confirm what an exasperated senior FBI officer wrote to Director J. Edgar Hoover: "Golitsyn is not above | fabricating to support his theories." on page 85, Epstein cites Golitsyn's assertion that, to support the KGB deception program, it was necessary to divide Soviet . intelligence into an outer and an inner KGB. Epstein then explains what Golitsyn allegedly reported about this, but nothing remotely resembling this can be found in any of | : 35 TRACT Docld:32697298-cPage 14° .,, bo ok (rammces
HW 33320 Golitsyn's debriefings. It seems likely this fiction was developed by Golitsyn after his. visit to England, when. ‘there is much evidence he began to embroider and fabricate. The idea of the two KGBs has never been reported by any other. Soviet source or defector, including the most senior defector of modern times, Oleg Gordievsky. Thus it is suggested this statement should be treated with great reserve. It also suggests that Epstein, who makes considerable pretensions to scholarship, should have been more conscientious in checking such stories with more responsible sources before labeling them as fact. In summary ,. this is one of. many bad books that appeared during the period after Angleton's dismissal which were inspired by him and mostly have no factual basis. Just as Angleton gulled the British and Canadians with fake stories about an alleged highly secret source of his in Moscow who on occasion produced Startling, if mostly historic, information, so for over fifteen years Angleton and his 7, gulled the public via such writers as Epstein with “books like Legend and Deception. It is difficult to believe that @ writer as obviously intelligent as Epstein could believe the stuff he wrote, _An interview: with Epstein in the magazine Vanity Fair in.May 1989 suggests Epstein is having second thoughts about: Angleton and even about his pet defector, Golitsyn. In the interview, Epstein admits Angleton' S views were shaped by Golitsyn--but how reliable was he? "Possibly Golitsyn was a liar," admits Epstein, "but Golitsyn is very interesting because he is a museum of Angleton's mind. What I believe happened is that Golitsyn listened to stories Angleton told him and then repeated them to British intelligence and vice versa," ‘This suggests that the great confidence writers like Epstein put in Golitsyn is being eroded (witness the article William Safire wrote in The New York Times after his “ae Rew sork Times 36 CONFIDE ORN NOCONTRACT Docld: 32397298 Page 15
__ CONFIDE} CT visit with Golitsyn). - and as a result, has Epstein's « confidence in Angleton's veracity been equally eroded? It appears this may be the case as Epstein concluded the interview noted above with the remark: "Actually, I don't know whether to believe Angleton at all!" - 37 . OFORN NOCONTRACT AW..53320 0 Bocld:32397296 Page 16
HW 53320 Postscript 7 Two books concerned with counterintelligence history have been added to the group reviewed here. They are Robert Lamphere's | B War: Specia ent's Story, published in 1986, and Gordon Brook~Shepherd's The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-war Defe ctors, published in 1988. Although they appeared in the period when Many books dealing with CIA and British counterintelligence issues focused on the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy, these two works concern themselves entirely with providing an historical account of the counterintelligence benefits flowing from defectors and from such other exceptional events as a break into the KGB cyphers achieved at the ena of World War II. Lamphere's book concentrates on the FBI's work against the Soviet intelligence services' operations in the United States, which although suspected for some time was proven beyond doubt with the defection in Canada of Igor Gouzenko and in America of Elizabeth Bentley and others who had been involved in the Soviet spy apparatus. Their -astounding revelations were in turn Supplemented by an unusual accomplisHment in the cryptographic field. Lamphere arrived Noi in the Washington field office around the time the cryptographic wizard, Meredith Gardner, had achieved a break into the KGB cypher system and had the good fortune to be assigned to the National security Agency (NSA) as Gardner's principal FBI liaison. Using-the fragmentary but very valuable information from this breakthrough, Lamphere participated in. -uncovering some of the major Soviet espionage rings then in operation. His work included dealing with Philby, the ace Spy for the Soviets, as wel] “VY interrogating the atomic scientist Klaus Fuchs, pursuing Harry Gold, assisting in the Judith Coplon trial, and many other memorable cases of the immediate. post-war period. aA sera neg . Docld: 32397296 Page 17
——-CONFEDENTIAL NOFORN _NOCONTRACT series of conflicts with J. Edgar Hoover led to Lamphere's “ early resignation from the Bureau. His excellent memory was | supplemented by access to FBI records, and NSA, after — considerable pressure was brought to bear, gave Lamphere permission to describe in elementary detail Gardner's magnificent achievement against the KGB cypher system. It is altogether a gripping story well and accurately told. Brook-Shepherd's excellent history of the post-war Soviet defectors also benefited from assistance given the author by the British intelligence and security services and the CIA. Asa result, he has produced a highly accurate and complete story about most of the major Soviet defectors all of whom but one (Shevchenko) had served with either the KGB or GRU. He has eschewed the controversial issues upon which many of the other books in this collection are concerned, although he devotes a chapter each to Anatole Golitsyn ana Yuri Nosenko. Each of these men is given objective and fair consideration. Brook~Shephard's two summaries are probably the most accurate evaluation available to the public and go far to make the two men and the issues connected with them comprehensible. These two histories are largely accurate and together constitute a mine of important information on the early defectors, both American and Soviet, as well as detail on later defectors such as Gordievsky, who provided inside information at critical periods in history. The two books also illustrate how important the defectors were not only ‘in helping the Western intelligence ana security services but also in alerting the public to the Soviet threat. Both books deserve reading by counterintelligence officers. 87 sO L NOFORN. NOCONTRACT CONFID HW 53320 DocId: 32397298. Page 14
e Sto Is: Sovi st-War Defectors by Gordon Brook- ' 4 Shepherd; Weidentela and N{[colson (London) , 1988--303 ‘Pages Gordon. Brook~Shepherd, a British foreign, correspondent _ turned historian, ‘has with publication of ‘this. book done the best work of his long career. As intelligence history dealing with Soviet post-war defectors, it is. not. only an exciting read but is factually accurate in almost every respect. "Compressed within its 303 pages is the story of how the Western intelligence services, largely denied the possibility of obtaining information from within the Soviet _ Union, came to realize the enormous intelligence ‘value of those Soviets who risked-the r lives to make the leap to freedom. More importan y, the author has immersed himsels thoroughly in the voluminous detail about the defectors sO that he comprehends the events which influenced - ‘the. secret world of intelligence, with the result his judgments are objective anda fair. The author likely achieved this kind of professional knowledge partly from work on his. earlier book, The Storm Petrels, which recounted the story of pre-war defectors. from the Soviet Union. With this experience plus generous help from CIA and the British intelligence services, Brook-Shepherd has written a. fascinating, account of how and why so many senior Soviet intelligence ofticiars 7 defected and their impact on. the West. » The author deals with his Complex subject in Ao chronological fashion starting with the first post—var’. defector, gor Gouzenko, in. Canada. It is difficult. today to comprehend how little knowledge the West, governments as_ well as people, possessed about Soviet espionage and:: subversive activity prior to Gouzenko's defection in. September 1945, ‘This event and the revelations that: ‘fic from it stunned both statesmen and the public, it. had ae enormous effect in America where it was coupled with: _ defections of americans ‘such as Elizabeth Bentley, Louis” "errr wefon Hoorn HW..53320.. Docld: 32397298 Page 19. Peer per pepeee ee mer nanan ny nner etenaberpn time ans tans annemapepengentpe nance een