SC 03537-77 HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS — S7PxAS%2 8 April 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM: Andrew J. Percival Assistant General Counsel “SUBJECT:  TOTIGER - Collins Arrangement and a New Era in Cipher Equipment Control 1, The prospective arrangement between the Collins Division of Rockwell International and TOTIGER, a European manufacturer of cipher machines, is nearer conclusion. TOTIGER has in the past and is presently producing cipher machines that NSA finds defiant of analysis. D/DS&aT/OSO has tentatively devised a method of dealing with the problem that is satisfactory to TOTIGER, NSA, Collins and OSO. 2. OSO has introduced TOTIGER management to representatives of Collins and its parent Rockwell with a view of fostering a commercial arrange- ment. It is heped that TOTIGER will purchase from Collins micro-processor cesigns for its new lines of equipment and eventually for all its equipment. . & micro-processor is a solid state mini-computer which is the heart of many modern cipher devices. Collins would also manufacture and-sell the micro~ processors to TCTIGER. The fact that the micro-processcrs are manufactured in the United States guarantees that the level of cryptology is acceptable to NSA. Any such devices exported from the United States must have a license . from the Office of Munitions Control. That license is contingent upon NSA approval of the cryptclogy. This fact is known by those in the cipher machine trade and would seem self-defeating. NSA states, however, that the level of cryptology, that is acceptable to them for export is of such a high level (as high as 1079) that expert mathematicians who are not aware of NSA's capabilities are at loss to understand how useful and timely analysis may be accomplished. It is true that this applies only to determinate systems. The most secure of systems, random generated key, is not susceptible to analysis except in cases of error in usage. Random key is not conducive in practice to volume traffic and is a logistics problem. Most users have opted for determinate systems of sophisticated cryptologic algorithm . 3. Collins, one of the worlds largest producers of telecommunications systems, has no cipher equipment of its own manufacture. Collins is interested in offering complete equipment packages to its customers including cipher devices. An ‘arrangement may be reached between Collins and TOTIGER to include the latter's equipment in Collins systems packages. This will work to the benefit of United States SIGINT collection efforts,
HW 53216 4, Should TOTIGER find the price of Collins micro-processors to be too high based on the small volume of units required, several methods of fostering the relationship have been proposed. One method weuld bea classified contract between NSA and Collins for additional identical micro- processor units te be delivered to NSA thus effectively raising the volume and reducing the unit cost to TOTIGER.. This contract weuld be entirely separate and without reference to TOTIGER. NSA would be purchasing the units for its own undisclosed classified purposes as it does with other contracters. Ancther method would be a direct subsidy to TOTIGER through a CIA funding mechanism. Other metheds may suggest themselves as discussions progress and the arrangements made between Collins and TCTIGER come into sharper focus. 5..The governments of West Germany and Great Britian are aware on a classified basis that arrangements are in progress to eliminate TOTIGER as a SIGINT problem. The government of Switzerland is peripherally aware that CIA is dealing with TOTIGER and Collins and has interposed no chjecticn. Indeed, for reasons that are unclear, the Swiss have encouraged the relation- ship. . 6. With the addition of TOTIGER to the stable of the TOARIEL and the TOMINERVA operations as well as the inherent constraints on U.S. produced equipment thrcugh the Office of Munitions Control, the large majority of cipher ‘equipment available in the market place to all but a few world powers will be susceptible to analysis and intelligence collection efforts. . 7. A NSA representative has informally stated to the undersigned that these three projects will account for 90% of the intelligence "take" from diplomatic third world communications. That "take" is estimated at 90,000,000 words annually. 8. D/DS&T/OSO/SPB has stated that they will make every effort to keep this Office informed of developments on a current basis. . ndrew J. Percival ce: C/DDS&T/OSO/SPB . HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS Docld: 323568065 Page ?1