ge Other ‘U.S. intelligence agencies will gain by our disconfiture, Perens “. ‘and might use.the opportunity to encroach on Agency responsibilities | Ls “ and assets. ©”. eS >. * Me Resolution of the problem therefore appears to me to be most essen- «| po 3: thal for political reascas. Tae case is bound to be surfaced eventually. To hold “is Hosenko under present circumstances indefinitely can only add to the risks.. If we -. Were to turn him over to a cooperative totalitarian coumtry like South ‘Africa, ‘the a . .. Initial damage would be greatest on ‘the morale. and self-respect of Agency’ personnel, +: 13° @ Senl-free status... This change. would continue J . Central U.S. press, and in am area where any personal excesses he comits could 2 be localized and played dom. If necessary, such excesses could be used as Ge a, Blgo be given psychiatric treatuent, which could-be statted now. Rekabilitation a ey ‘would also.include language training and perkaps further formal, education. : oe ee os 6. In preparing Nosenko for normalization, he showld be paid a subs - Stabiial fee "for his information”. We. should also take responsibility for ... 7°. - his medical treatzent y Which will afford us a continuing measure of control. 6). | * “As an explanation to him of ow: handling of him to date, an explanation of the: . type the Soviets might give should be used. . Tais woald include tke assertion .-.. ;°. that suck handling was routine for persons with his background, as the need. to. a “Check out kis voluminous information mast be apparent to kin... We could now.» ./,: prevent hostile action against him by kis former colleagues. Some of this..." . danger, of course, still persists. ..If the fact of bis former status with ua Should become known. publicly, from kim or indirectly, the same explanations: eT could be given, plus the statement that his past behavior showed he could be a dangerous to himself and others. = sis re _ T+ In light of the psyckologists' evaluation of Hosenko as a weak — '_ Personality, ke will probably seek vindication upon release. It is therefore © 9 -- -diuportant that his release: be carried out with appropriate sincerity. Another =. | Mans of satisfying this urge on his part would be to collaborate with him in ne .., Preparing articles or a book which would tell his story (up to a point). Most © iaportant, as a weak personality, Hosenko's ability to sustain his spirits — _ ‘hrough the last three years testifies to his conviction that he would be “... '. windicated ‘in time.- Paradoxically, once that source of strength is removed, — . _ by our accepting kis bonafides, all the complications of his ."serfously dis-- . ‘turbed personality” will Probably return. . For this reason, Close support — is necessary. =. eye Ce a
28 April 1967 | - MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD — _ SUBJECT: “Meeting with CSB on the’ Nosenko Paper ~"- ZL. -On 4 April 1967, the present senior ., case officer on the BOURBON case, Jim Flint, who was on TDY at Headquarters, ,came to my office oe at my request to discuss the bonafides of BOURBON. | In this discussion I mentioned to him other cases ~~: now going on which Headquarters has related to. | BOURBON, and recommended that he ask the GRU. Desk. — for briefings on these cases. I also advised 7 him that a major SB Division paper on Nosenko, which mentions BOURBON, was now well over 700. pages, and that it was being prepared for the © Director. In addition, I told him that a number of persons in the Division and outside the Division who had read the Division's earlier papers on Nosenko disagreed with the Division's findings. 2. ‘On 5S April I was told, by an SB Division CI officer who was involved, that CSB had called him in/on that date and questioned him regarding the origins of the information which I. provided Flint. Later I learned that another officer of the same branch was questioned Simultaneously by C/SB/CI, and that immediately after the two meet- — ings were held, the first officer was recalled. - by CSB for further questioning. Both officers were, sternly warned not to divulge to anyone that they had been questioned. 3. On .7 April I was called to the office of CSB at 1630 hours and met with him until 1730 &
i. no knowledge of such a review, and therefore wa nace fe eate ds mainte Oe SoA nea seg ears Bot AeA we on ee SOE EE LOT ETE ye ak a 3 OPT TT RE ey, ‘ soa . ee -2- hours. He stated that he had a memorandum written by Flint which reported a number of statements I had made to Flint. He was particularly con- cerned about an "impression" Flint got that I had indicated that the DDCI was reviewing the. Division's Nosenko paper. I replied that I had certainly could not have said such a thing to Flint. I repeated what I had.told Flint about  =§=9... |: the Nosenko paper, as stated above.’ CSB-stated’ °° =.) that for my information, the Nosenko paper had... -. ‘ been finished and in the hands of the Director | for three weeks, which was news to me. He also... Stated that it was perfectly alright for the ~-. . -. - DDCI.to have a copy of the paper, in his position, -- and that he would tell appropriate Division person- nel that they should not be concerned that the a DDCI had a copy of the paper. CSB told me that. if I wished to raise the level of my disagree- ment about Nosenko to the DDP or DDCI, he would be glad to go along with me to discuss the matter in their presence. He said that he had lunched recently with the DDCI and discussed the paper with him, which was not the first such meeting — with DDCI on the subject. , 4, CSB stated that because of the privileged position I enjoy in regard to Division operational information, he had to be able to trust me in the handling of that information. I agreed, and stated. that in my. judgment Flint had a need to know items I had mentioned to him. As to the origin of my. information, none of which I received officially, ~ I stated that I made a point of maintaining a ‘ good listening post in the informal organization. _ in addition, most personnel who have served in the Division very long always assume that any current case will have been surfaced to me for intelligence exploitation. Therefore they do not hesitate to discuss new cases because they. believe I have a need to know. In this respect, I asked CSB why my office was given no opportunity to examine the intelligence potential of Soviet de-. . fector Olga Farmakovskaya or the new KGB case in oe! te tr LY 9 FFI ol Fa Ree ert Pte et cites ne ne te at it Ath th sata RE CERN IRONED 7
New York. He stated that the first case had | no such value, and that the second was not under his control. Although I disagree with both . statements, especially since a Division officer is meeting with the New York walkin, I said — — 7 . ‘nothing. oo ne 7 ‘5.° CSB stated that it is eSsential that | personnel in the Division, other divisions and other agency components.do not feel that. he and ‘I have. opposite attitudes toward intelligence ‘Collection. He asked if there was a personal | factor in my opposition to his views and I as- > sured him there was not. I pointed out that as long as the Division had the negative attitude which was exemplified by the Nosenko, SCOTCH, OURBON, Farmakovskaya, the New York walkin, the OZY case, and numerous other minor cases, we ' "would not collect any intelligence on the USSR. This was the only point at which he became upset; stating that he could not agree with the Polyannas - who say that the US Government is not penetrated and that the Soviets do not know every move. we make. I stated that I did not agree with them either, but that I disagreed most strongly with the Division's positions on most of these cases, and would not defend them. . . 7 oan . edatsh stie aie sscuedih aah ie eRe aS Sie a hal oe is eran tia fetta iE RAS ant is eed s 6. I tried to explain that most of the: Division personnel who are aware of the cases which are lumped in with Nosenko have doubts about the validity of the Nosenko paper. He said that , he met with them and knew their views, and I sug- gested that his own views, and the deputy division chief's, were stated so vigorously and categorically in those meetings, that other persons were reluctant to contest these views.. He did not believe this, but .I. added that since all of them were at his mercy in their careers, they did not want to get into a vehement argument with him, leaving bruises on both sides. (As I left his office, a branch chief who knew that I had been there for an hour : Se es ats obhy ete se eh aekuetdbedt ct abuts 2 #90 Soudntece talon eedie Rca 25 habe tandems chen tds SEE F oe les wae oe = gee poy een, TS ie em. nob Mag tet ba “Kus Eta ioe i e mdborencietdl. She cnk ale Colt? sents out mtn: at htine Bows o:
Ie ote cat . “Ae asked why I was not bleeding from dozens of wounds, and I said that I had listened a lot.) 7. In closing I stated that I would not °° ~ . tell Flint that I knew of his memo, but CSB oo é said that I should tell him. I said that Flint. ‘Was ill and needed help, but CSB said he knew Flint and that it was just separation from his ~ family that had been the problem. (I did not -tell CSB that Flint asked me privately to get . him removed from: the BOURBON job, stating that _he found it extremely trying.” Also, I did not tell. Flint that I knew of his memo.) - oo - 8. Immediately after my meeting with hin, - ‘CSB. called in all senior CI personnel in the Division. He began by stating that he knew he was pompous and domineering but that it was most’ important to him to know if any of them had _ doubts about the Nosenko paper. Of five persons, three admitted, two for the first time, that they | had doubts about the paper. Initially surprised, | he eventually dismissed these doubts as the reasonable doubt that is always present in the intelligent mind. He then told the group that the DDCI had a copy of the Nosenko paper, and that it was proper for him to have a copy, so that no one should be concerned about that fact. He also told them that someone outside the Division . might be coming to talk to them about. the paper. Discussion of whereabouts of copies of the Nosenko paper led one person present to believe CSB was trying to determine how a copy of the paper reached DDCI. . 9. On 24 April my immediate superior returned from leave, and on 26 April she was called in by - . CSB and he showed her a memo for the record of his conversation with me. He stated that he did not intend to forward it to anyone. He said that he had discussed the incident with DDP, who was ‘concerned, and with DDCI. He also indicated to her that he intended to continue me in my present _- position and to’"stand by" my promotion recommendation, — f a * ws é ee ae go Ms
Lat SECRET } . , fe soa . . , am . . which he has again submitted. In the memo, he — repeated the assertion that I had told Flint that “a group outside the Division" was going . to review the Nosenko paper, which is a slight. e change from what he told me, and information that I did not previously have to tell anyone. - My superior indicated to CSB that I had already |» described my meeting with him to her: ©: |. oe rn eeaos e - one mea eeee i i ; . wo OR forme EN aad | os » & * e é EPI teri carer nom mee cat mpsetite mien mee oo nee penne ae ceed ee aca carn cane emer ceeee cpammie tenet tome Geen ak seen crag nee te cnn Hi eo Bae / a ¢