we cc ep aR BS ae EN NER te cha Der at Pcie sa , ° 442. informed him that much of the information he passed to the Soviets was of no interest to trem. He therefore maze no attempt to obtain the Heidelkerg 2ssignment. Instead, JOHN- SON took leave to Wiescaien, Germany... Wher JCHNSOM néxt met _ : with his Soviet handler in Karlshorst, East Germany, JOANSON informed the Soviets he had been to Heidelberg and bad re. quested an assignment in the G-2 Section there. He was questioned in detail about his trip, but believes he was able*to convince the Soviets of the truth of his statements. whoa poked AS teres sa She Pietinideniae baie aeatta nes JOHNSON stated he had no contact with the Soviets after his transfer to France on 3 April 1954 until recontacted by the Soviets in the United Srates in 1957, through MINTKENBAUGH. better In July 1956 JOHNSOU was discharged from the Army and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. In the early parc of 1957 MINTKENZAUGH re- contacted JOMNSON in Las Vegas and gave him a present cof $500 from the Soviets. No conditions were attached to the gift, but JOHNSON was. offered a saiaried job if he would re-join the Army and again work for the Soviets. The Scviets instructed JOHNSCN to cktain some type of work involving security. JOHNSON re-joined the army as instructed on 18 February 1957 but applied for missile train- ing on his own initiative. JOHNSON was assigned to Fort MacArthur, Los Angeles, California, on 18 February 1957 and from there sent to the NIKE-Ajax Missile School at Palo Verde, California, for training. JOHNSON stated that, while assigned to the school, he: te ae ile - Photcgraphed all training manuals he could procure. Most were believed to be unclassified, although one or two could have been classified “confidential.” : - Stole a sample of JP-4 NIKE fuel. Pre. Cor - Photographed a Hercules missile in detail. JOHNSON estimated he took 15 to 20 photographs of the missile frem all angles. ~ Took several photographs of the installation while “on duty as a security guard in a tower overlooking a secure area at the missile school. - Photographed the inside of a NIKE Missile Site, but with negative results as the photos did not come out. JOHNSON maintained contact with MINTKENBAUGH on 2 bi-monthly basis. He passed photographs, personal reports and the UP-4 fuel Sample to the Soviets through MINTKENBAUGH and was paid by the Soviets on an average of $300 per month. JOHNSON was paid an additional bonus for the JP-~4 fuel sample, which was of particular ann interest to the Soviets. He signed receipts for all payments received. . In 1958 JOHNSON was transferred to Fort Bliss where he was - assigned duties as a supply sergeant with no access to classified se til meena eter pone ecxsunl Coed —s a Sa a at
: infermetion, During this assignment, JOHNSON accompanied MINT- KEIZAUGH to Washington, D.C,, on one occasion end was introduced to MINTKEVTRAUGH's hardier.* JOHNSON was transferred to Orleans. France, in the fall of 1959 and reported there on 29 October for dury with the Mutual Security Section, U.S. army Supply Control Agency. The Soviets Were aware of this transfer, and within several days of his arri- val JONNSON was contacted by MINTKENSAUGH who explained that he . had been sent in order to arrange contact berween JOENSON and a the Soviets. A day or so efter this, MINTAENBAVGH, JOHNSON, and JOHNSON 's wife travelled to Paris, where the JOENSONs were met by Vitaliy URZHUMOV, who introduced himself as "“Vintor."** Is Mes. JOHNSON's presence, URZHUMOV expressed an interest in JOHN~ SCH's sew daty post, a NATO supply installation, and in JOENSON's ; 4 job. which anvolved the handling of requisitions for supplies and replacement parts for NIKE missile sites. He asked CSOHNSON to renew his intelligence work, and JCrHNSON agreed. t + va tpibe oa thee hata atan wet Beginning in early January 1960, JOHNSON had approximately eight meetings with URZiUMCV in Paris. These meetings took place on the first Saturday of each month, and during the first few of them JOHNSON was accompanied by tus wife.*** Originally it was plarsed that Hedwig would act as a courier, but this plan was dis- ‘carded because it would have required that JOHNSUN give her a 7 @ecvaileda oral explanation of the information which he was furnish- ing the Soviets. The meetings with URZHUMOV lasted from 15 to 30 minutes, and at them JCHNSON passed the information he had managed to collect underwent training, and assisted in the development ef dead drops and emergency plars. While stationed at Grleans. JOHNSON furnished the Soviets with photographs of éccuments, typewritten reperts of his obser- vations, and personality data on other persons working in the Mutual Security Brance cf the ordnance agency. Specifically he passed information on the French S-i0 ard S-11 anti-tank wire- controlled missiles, then in use by the NATO forces and on parts - supplied to NIKE-Ajax units in Itely as well as the locations of F these units. He also gave the Soviets a complete description of his own job and duties and of the organization and structure of the ordnance agency. In lare 1960 JOXNSON found it necessary to seek a transfer from Orleans because of his wife's mental condition.**** He dis- cussed this transfer at length with URZHUMOV, who agreed that the *° MINTKENBAUGH took JOHNSON to Washington on his own initiative, when, according to MINTKENBAUGH, he told his case officer that JCHNSON was waiting 1n a drugstore on Wisconsin Avenue and wanted to meet him. The Soviet became qreatly disturbed | and took MINTKENEBAUGH to task for acting without instructions soucr theless, he went to the drugstore and visited with JOHN ** URZHUMOV was in Paris as an Attache in the Political Section of the Soviet Embassy as of March 1959. He replaced a sus- pected Soviet Intelligence officer, and GOLITSYN stated that he was almost"convinced" that URZHUMOV was a KGB officer. URZHUMOV was scheduled to leave Paris in early 1965. In a later debriefing, JOHNSON said that tha-met "generally every two weeks." JOHNSON's wife apparently attended meet— ings on a regular basis until some time in November 1960. ett¢Hedwig JOHNSON's mental condition is discussed further below, tet tee bie a ‘tee r ? 4 a4. .3 ¢ ° a 3 x 3 ayers”
14-00000 = A Ee information coming from the ordnance agency at Orieans was “not too important.” URZHUMOV advised JOHNSON to try to get an assign-. ment either at SHAPE or EVCOM since the Soviets could use a source at either of these headquarters.*  JOMISCN reenlisted in April 1961, and having requested assignment 3t Headquarters, Seine Area Command Paras, he was posted to tne courier station at Orly Field, a unit whicn he knew handled top secret and crypto- graphic material. According to JOHNSON, URZHUMOV zppeared to be very happy when ne heard this. JOHNSON arrived at the Oriy Courier Transfer Station in May 1961 and for the next year met frequently with URZHUMOV. He was, however, unable to furnish anything of intelligence interest be- cause of stringent security precautions, but ne did give UkZHUMOY reports Gf personal activities, personality sketches, and sug-~ gestions as to which individuals seemed to Se potential recruits for the Soviets. At one of tneir regular meetings in the fall of 1962, URZHUMOV introduced JOHNSON to a new Soviet case officer. G.N. VLASOV, who called himself ‘Felix. "** Thereafter JOHNSON saw very little.of his former handler. Aecording to JCHNSON, the nature of the operation changed after VGASOV tcok over. VLASOV's handling. JOHNSON said, proved to we more direct and iezs discreet than URZHUMCY's had been: Whereas under UR@HUMOV most of JOHNSON's time was spent on locat- ing decd drops, the formulation of emergency plans, and training, penetration of the vauit now became his primary mission. The first preak in tnis dire, tion came, JCHNSON sald, when he was able to optain the combinarion to the door leading to the vault area:*’* one of the officers in cha.ge haa thrown in the trash can 4 piece of paper containing the combination in coded form an@ JCHNSON retrieved it after the officer left the room. (JOEHN- SON hag earlier made an impression of the key to the inner coor of the vault when one of Nis Co-workers had inadvertently left the key in the door. The Soviets had made a copy.) JOGENSON describeé this phase of the operation as being slow and careful. He first wrote seports on every deiail of the courier service, including schedules for acrivais, deliveries, and handling of classified materials. On VLASOV's instruction he also photo- graphed the vault door and the office and made detailed measure- ments of the door and the vauit, this was accomplished et night, using a Minox camera furnished by the Soviets. 7 -SOANSON Inter Sala “Viktor® had told him that the only in- formation of value that he had supplied while Stationed at Orleans was that concerning the S-10 and S-11 missiles. ** YLASOV was scheduled to be replaced in Paris in January 1965. ***JOHNSON has described the courier station as consisting of two rooms, an office area and the vault. "Entrance to the vault from the outer room was through two metal doors. The first door was secured by a steel bar at either end of which was a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock. The second door was secured by a key lock.” , ; TOP SECRET . Reeerner rae wr TB T Settee hit betes cbse ite ft aten che BE wt cates band SE tea agree Meee pit ae i | primi nt decd Set ane mianatietine er ran Sper era eerem ere e Ser
14-00000 newbie cco casingirta s etqucictss Wiel During this period, too, JOHNSON began to establish 4 work pattern by volunteering to work straight through the weekend beginning Saturday morning and ending Monday morning. (He ex- plained to his superiors and fellow workers that he wanted to aa have Monday and Tuesday off in order to do the shopping and nouse- Cleaning for his wife, who was not well. This arrangemenc was . agreeable to all, az everyone would have every weekerd off.) JOHNSON also begen to bring ris shaving equipment and frod to the office in an Air France bag; this bag was to be used in the opera. tion, and it was necessary that it be thought. commonplace for him . to carry it around. 3 wate nt alle Sa te sab atta lgallillenwaih. JOHNGON estimated that about a month elapsed between the tine 4 he obtained the combination to the vavle and the first penetration, During this time he and VLASOV met axout every third night to dis- cuss the penetration and plans were @Giccussed for removing the gocuments, the Soviets‘ processing of them, and their sefe return ‘ to the vault, The plan, as finally agreed uvon, called for a meeting on the Priday night before the peretration was to be mad= to discuss cetails and arrange meeting sites. All penetretions - were to be carried out during the midnight hours on Saturday; JOHUSON was to enter the vaule at 2305 hours, obtain the material, leave'the office ac 2313 hours, and make the Selivery to the Soviets ac 2315 hours. As things worked out in practice, JORNSON Said. he sometimes entered the vault somewhat earlier. His selec- tion ef documents was on the basis of their addressees; all were wrapped.* He would then go outside to make sure no U.S. per- sonnel were in the area, then lock the frort door, open the vault, take the materials, lock the vault, and with the documents in his Aig France bag drive to the meeting site a short distance away. There he vould exchange the bag for an identical one provided ky the Soviets, containing sandwiches and a bottle of doped cognac, and return to his duty post. JOHNSON explained that if on re- turning to the station he was confronted by a visitor, he wes to say that he had gone out to get some food: if it appeared that the visitor planned to stay long enough to upset the plan, the cognac was to be used (it never was used). A second centact . with the Soviets, to retrieve the materials, was schedules for : between 0300 to 0400 hours at a different meeting site, about Six minutes' drive away. ——s On one or perhaps two occasions when the combination to the lock had been changed. JOHNSON used a special device (supplied by VLASCV) to determine the new combination. On 23 February ' 1965, JOHNSON said that he was quite certain he used this de- vice twice, in February and March 1963, This device was in two sections, one of which was a plate. The device fit snugly over the lock, the plate being placed to the rear of it, and the device recorded the combination of the lock by means of radioactive material in one section of it. JOHNSON said that VLASOV gave him the new combination to the lock about a week after he hed placed the device on the lock as instructed. JOHNSON had earlier made photographs and detailed measurements on the locks used to secure the vault door; because the a * JCHNSON did not know precisely what documents he gave the Soviets. ACSI confirmed that there is a document, such ag that described by NOSENKO, which lists bombing targets in France and that it had been sent to France during this period. : ewntee ne tle Ma evened mie wes ae oe tee age ttn Raabe in etd a ond a) “ a 3 i ‘t 7 a i. i
gan radioactive device supplied by VLASOV fitred trem exactly, he supposed that it had been mede especially for this penetration operation.* Pamrcnverter “tc cpFerie uagmranti, Oe ‘ JOHNSON could not recall the date when the first penetration of the vault was made, bur he said trat it could not have been be- fore November 1962 as his car was out of commission throughout October. UGefinitely, according to JCHNSCN. there was ®% pernetra- tion just before or after Christmes 1362, and tne first four pene- | ss 3 trations were spaceé closely tosether. Questioned in detail on , ; this subject during February 1965, JCHNSON eventually arrived at the estimate that there was ro penetration made in November 1962, that tvo entries were made in December, and that five more pene- 4 trations tcok plece during January-Muy 1963. Regarding the Decem- ber penetrations, he first believed that they might have been on the 15th and 29th of che month, tnen .sater said chat he tnought they had taken place on consecutive Sucurdays. and finally re- affirmed his belief that one was made on the 29th and ruled out the possibility of one on the 22nd. Ne believed that the January entry took place in the middle of the month. probably the 19th, and taid@ he was quite certain that ar entry tcok place on 26 April.** The operation proceeded witho.t disruption until it was terminated during tre summer menchs cf 13963 on iastructions from VLASCV, whe felt that the duys had craw. too isong and that the eperation could not he carried our in daylight. Plans were dis- cussecé for expanding the operation vien it was resumed in the fall, . however. Up until this time JOHNSCN had keen instructed not to ; : cake out more tnan 12 or 15 enveiopes at a time as the Soviet : d technicians*** couid not handie a larcer quantity during the time ; available. In the stepped-up operation, according to VLASOV, sufficient personnel and facilities wourd be available to process approximately 30 envelopes. : i : : ve ink SanibEtt oF tae dew * NOSENKO, however. described this device, or one very similar ! to it, in Geneva on 12 June 1962 ~-X-rays are beamed against : a safe in order to determine the combination by rediation... that is, in order to open a new zaie, any safe... The (spe- cial) equipment is contained in two suitcases; they turn it on and rays are emitted in orde: t> sense which combination should be chosern." JOHNSON said the device was contained in two separate pocket-sized packages as a guard against. harm- ful radiation, and both JOHNSON and NOSFNKO have described ‘the possible effects of this radiation on the health of its operator. NOSENKO was not asked and did not volunteer why, : . mo if this equipment was available at least as early as June So ed 1962, it was not used earlier in the Orly penetration oper- action. ** By matching Saturdays with the dates on which CIA records show the special technicians named by NOSENKO to be in Paris, ACSI arrived at the following possible dates for the penetra- tions: 15 December 1962, 22 Decemoer 1962, 19 January 1963, 26 January 1963, 16 February 1963, 2 March 1963, and 25 May 1963, diatgee a tecabel tee ee lie Caer rs ae Ree IGHNSON, who never met them, was told that it was necessary for the Soviets to fly the technicians into Paris from Moscow for each penetration of the vault. , . dino a ae eens eee natn ee oe eae spre ancy Ey 3 ae. ast Fi i i ‘ : a
34-90009 ee toes Bin wont eon There were, however, no further penetrations, On 4 August 1$63, COMISCN received orders transferring him to the Seine Area Command at Camp Bes Loges, not fer from Paris. He went to his Cemmending Officer and told him that he did not went the trans- fer, that he was happy with his current assignment, and that it Was better for his wife to be near the hospital facilities in Peris. The officer replied that he would try to find another re- placement for the position at Camp Des Loges but that, in the meantime, JOHNSON would have to report for duty as ordered. (Prior to leaving Orly, JOHNSON informed VIASOV cf the trensfer and offer-~ ed to attempt to cecruit a £ellow-worker to take his place in the penetration operation; VLASOV géve him definite instruetions not to make eny recruitment attempts.) fis assignment at Camp Des Loues as non-commissioned officer in charge of the "Classified Control Center" #as accempanied by @ promotion. JCHNSCN reported for duty on % Avguec 1962. JOHNSON served at camp Des Leres for mine months, until Mey 1964. During this cime he took pert in only one operation for the Soviets, photogrephy of 4 5 > Presa Commara catclogue, clasai- fied “secret". This 27-pag nt gave @ synorsis of each Seine Area Command evacuation p ’ SORENSON maneged to phocosropn th wt working hours, probkaLly scmetine at £ 19623 or in January 1964 using a special Yoll-over" camera, which he then returned to VYLASCVY. About a week later, JCHNSON egain met with VLASOV, who told him that he did not consider the information worth the risk involved and called off future atiempts. The tain purpose of the operation, VLASOV said, whicn was to acquaint JOHNSON with the “roll-over” camera and its use, hed been eccomplished. is document during normal c 303 SCHNSON described this camera as having a built-in light source and as resembliny a ciyaratce case; To expose the filn, JOUNSON rolled the camera access the pages. According to JOHN~ SON, tne Soviets attached great importance to this camera, and it was not given to him until he had provided detailed plans and descriptions o£ the building and office in which he worked, locations of the safes, and descriptions ci the personnel there. Furthermore, JOENSON was instructed to return the camera to his case officer the night after taking the pictures or in any case within three Cays whether or not he had been able to take the pictures,** ce * JOHNSON later identified this document es the "Combat Opera- tions Index and Status of Emergency Plans." Classified “secret," it summarizes the contents of various individual emergency and evacuation plans for units under the Seine Area Command. . os emtaoeee a Bekins ieee thenidealtatiia ce WEE ce eae ee ws .. inghh: 2 wath Dearden sine sow tines a” mremenren dah Bg vernks tebe tek f eathe she j i 1
"During an interview on 18 February 1955, JOHNSON stated - that ‘he did not feel that his espionage efforts at Camp Des Loges had been very profitable for the Seviets. It was his opinion that the most important document to which he hed access during this period was the top secret one on Seventh Army plans for retreat to the Pyrenees in the event of a Soviet Army attack. When he proposed that he attempt to obtain it for the Soviets, however, VLASOV showed a complete lack of interest. VLASOV's attitude led JOHNSON to believe that the Soviets already had the document. JOHNSON stated further that it was his usual practice to scan: decuments which came into his possession and to make oral and sometimes written reports to the Soviets om their general contents. He specifically recalled discussing with VLASOV the periodic counterintelligence summaries issued by CIC to which he had access, but VLASOV had not seemed interested in them. JOHNSON believed these discussions came up in connection with possible use of the "roll-over" camera, and that VLASOV:s response had been that the informetion involved was not worth the risk of his exposure.* JOHNSON recalled that “at their last neeting ard for a few meetings prior thereto, ne and ‘Felix’ (VLASOV) did not stop at a cafe as had beer their practice.** Instead, the entire meeting was conducted as they walked in the area of their point of con- tact in Féris. At one of these meetings ‘Felix' apoeared to be visibly upset. In fact, he had not appeared for a meeting on the appointed date. The contact was not made until the alter. nate date. At that time '‘Felix' sucgested that he (JCHNSON) knew why they had not met as scheduled. Whenhe (JOHNSON) replied that he did not know, '‘Felix' explained to him that a Soviet In- telligence officer had defected in Gereva and that they had to be extremely cautious. 'Felix' told him that he did not have to worry, that the off.cer did not know him, but ‘Felix' instructed him to destroy anything which could idencify him with Soviet Intelligence, *Felix', who normally was very calm and self- assured, was completeiy out of character on this occasion. At this and succeeding meets befere he returned to the United States, he (JOHNSON) tried to tell ‘Felix' about the status of his expected rotation to the Uniced States in May. ‘Felix' did not appear to be interested in anything he had to say. Finally, * JOHNSON said that in the Classified Control Section he had access to all classified documents originating with Seine ' Area Command and to some classified documents originating in other Headquarters; he was responsible for supervising the printing of classified documents and for accounting for. and distributing all authorized copies of these documents. JOHNSON was asked on 18 February 1965 whether it would have been possible for him to take original documents or copies of them to his Soviet handlers. He replied that he could have forged receipts and taken a document from the Center on his person and, in addition, he could have made extra copies of any classified document. .He did not do this’ with regard to the one document he did copy; he said, be-. cause he had an interest in seeing and using the "roll- over" camera. : ** This change apparently occurred following NOSENKO's defec-~ tion in early February 1964. © TO? SEouci F. tte aan atanernenine antiforepenns A oe qemtattescbemaranranrion yee Se yen wpe oe se ate tet 16 Ab S wee ciptainb site Reon en entre nt cry leet eee Mem al etna cv de mg ted te Ea ich ans eds Bla ae etch ad AR eden
F at a meeting in early April, when ‘Felix’ told him that it was their last meeting, which came as 4 surprise to JOHNSON, he (JOHNSON) raised the question of how. he was to rotify ‘Felix" in the event there was a change in his anticipated assignment to the Courier Station in dashington for which he had not yet been given official orders, ‘Felix! in reply instructed him te place on a designated wall of a buiiding somewhere in Paris the letter Ww af he received orders for assignment in the Weshington area and. the letter ‘X' if he received crders for assigrment elsewhere." At this meeting VLASOV also told JOHNSON that he was not to worry if contact was not established immediately upon his return ‘to Washington. He then gave JOHNSON contact instructions which called for the first meeting to take place in New York City in December 1964, eight months’ later. At some point in his ciscus- “gions with VLASOV, JOHNSON told the FBI, he was surprised to see URZHUMOV enter the cafe where they were sitting and join them at ‘the table. This was the first time that all three had met to- ‘gether since URZHUMOV had turned him over to VLASOV in 1961, prior ‘to the Orly penetrations. For URZHUMOV's benefit, VLASOV again _reviewed the arrangements for reestablishing contact in December, which gave JOHNSON an opportunity to express concern that he was to be out of contact for such a long time and to suggest the desirability of some sort of emergency contact arrangements such as he had had during his duty tour in Paris. VLASOV and URZHUMOV told JOHNSON that such arrangements would not be aecessary.* JOPRNSON claimed to have had no contact with the Soviets during his assignment at. the Pentagon Courier Transfer Station from May 1964 until he went APOL in October of that year. * “According to MINTKENBAUGH, when JOHNSON contacted him in Arlington after his return to the United States, JOHNSON said that when he was leaving Paris the Soviets. treated. him: as though he was keing “dropped.” JOHNSON said he had been instructed to get rid of all materials used in the operation before leaving France. He also told MINTKENBAUGH that an- other reason for this belief was the fact that he had asked for instructions regarding emergency meeting procedures but had been told by the Soviets that none were needed. MINT-.. KENBAUGH remarked to the FBI that this was @ change in usual procedures. Wate tem erab ie ot ae Fok ae ee ee ee ee on tae ca alba ec i ao “ + ar? 2 eet tanlb blab leas ld valde Sie pot IR Bios Aa Tan a etd ences cal seh sie 4 hint vie te ehteShads Rit eta weet when WI en tee eel tee ARE GE eet
(bp) MINIXENBSUCH Ss Statements ap Rs SCD Wher. he walked in to CIA on 10 November 1964 and during his: first interview by the FBI on 5 December 1964, MINTKEN. BAUGH described his recruitnen?t by JOHNSON in Rerlin in the ‘summer of 1453 aad his collaboration with JOHNSON in the Clandestine photography of documents and their transsaittal, ‘via Mes. OQHMSON, to the Soviets in East Berlin until the fasl of that year. He aiso deacribed his role in JOHNSON's reactivation as a KCB agent in carly 1957 and his own acti- vitices as & courier between JOHNSON and Soviets stationed ‘in Washington, D.C. until. the summer of 1959. On the basis of this personal invole:«ment, he has been able to give whet furports to be a rairly complete account of JOHNSON's esplone age activities during this six.ycar period. Witr a number - oP minor variations, which appear attributable to nemory, MISTKENBAUW H's doscription Is consistent with the story given by JOHNSON. Highlights of his confession are given . below, ws -parated into two sactions, ose on what MINTKENBAUGH said ahout JOUNSON and one on what he said about hiuselt. On Robert Lee JOHNSON After JOHNSON was transferred to Orleans, France, in 1959 and following MINTKENBAUCh's special training in Moscow (ses oclow) that fail, the KCBR instrueted both agents to Sever all ties with one another in an attempt to'compartment what row had become separate operations. Both JOHNSON and MINTRENBAUCH ignored these instructipns. The two corresponded by mail. throughout JOUNSON's service in France and one of the first things JOMNSON dill after getting settled in Washing- ton upon his return to the Unit-d States in the sprirg cf 1964 wis to look up his oid friesd. The two got together and swapp-d espionage stovies. From this, MINIKENSAUGH was able to teil the FRI in consid-rabl- detail about the Orly | Courier Station penetration, Although MINTKENSAUGH's infor- mation added authing to aad was far less dstailed than that Tater given by JOHNSON, the two accounts were consistent. * On His Own Activities MINVKENBALCH pletured himself as an agent with no unique access to signigicant intelligence, initially dis. trust<d by the KCB, later used as a spotter and then as a courier, ineffectual in carrying out the ore important ase Signment given him by tre KCB, but partly successful in -*#JOHNSON and his wife also were knowledgeable of MINTKEN. BAUH's activities during the 1959-1963 period. NINTKEN~ BAUGH apparently told them that he had been to Moscow for espionage training. From his letters to them in Orleans and later Paris, the JCHNSONs had a good idea of MINTKEN- BALCH's principal mission in the Washington area, and when JOHNSOY contacted him after returning from France in 1964, MINTKENBAUGH described his other assignments as well. atop aE a dn BAS watt kak teal Eitan. jo tstadined ¢ a 1 ‘ mn Fath alah gS ee 2 + Seaqy lank hesthale thee ertobindsba: Ll natant la caste allman,
ren) 451, fulfilling other less important KGB tsaske." He also indicated that, during the latter part of his agent career, he was a eed reluctant. collaccrator and became 4 handling problem for his KG2' ease officers. paned PGababeas. -‘MINTKENBAUGH's career as a KGB agent began in the summer of 1953, ‘shortly after a chance encounter with his old acquaintance, JOHNSON. Within a matter of weeks JORNSON told MINTKENSAUCH that. he was a Soviet agent and then, without consulting the KGB, re- cruited MINTKEN@BAUCGH as an assistant. JOXNSON's KGB handlers... were ‘extremely upset’ when they earned what JOHNSON had done: and 1t was not until October 1953, some months tater, that they would agree to meet MINTX ENBAUGH In the interim ne~assisted JOMWWSON by standing watch while the latter photographed docu- ments. From October 1953 to April 1954. when MINTKENBAUGH was transferred temporarily to duty with.a military hospital in France, he carried out a number of assignments for the Soviets, alinost all connected with the spocting and assessment of Americans stationed in Berlin. For the five-month period he was in France, MINTKENBAUGH ciaimed to have been out of touch with the KGS, Upon returning to Eerlin in September: 1954, he resumed his spotting activities ard spent a part of his time learning photcgraphy, the construction and use of dead drops, and secret writing techniques in préparation for his ampending transfer to the United States, : He left Berlin in February 1956, . < 2 4 6, 8 ede esd te Shes MINTKENDAUGH performed his next espionage assignment a year later when, in January 1957, he visited and reactivated Sergeant JOHNSON at KGB instruction. The tollowinc month he began service as a courier between JOHNSON, who was stationed first in Califor~ nia and then in Texas, and the KSB in Washington, D.C. Other than these periodic courier trips, MINTKENBAUCH carried out no other KGB assignments untii the late fall of 1959. Probably in October 1959, MINTKENBAUCH flew tro Berlin and from there, in company with a KGB officer, to Moscow, where he 3 was lodged in a safe apartment. For about three weeks he received ; individualized training in photography, cryptography, and manual Morse reception, with emphasis on the latter. At the end of this period, his case officer asked fo: the first time whether MINTKEN- BAUGH was willing to marry a Soviet woman and Live with her in the Washington area, According to the KGH plan as explained to MINT- KENBAUGH at this time, he would “establish a roof over his head" near Washington, preferabiy in Ariington; then, with the assis- tance of his "operational wife" he would serve as a courier, — * Although NGSENKO did not report on MINTKENBAUGH, he and JOHN. SON were so closely connected operationaliy and had such com- plete knowledge of one another's. activities, that the confes- sion of elther agent would almost inevitably result in the apprehension of the other. For this reason MINTKENBAUGH's story is given here in some detail. This account, for the most part, was given as part of. and subsequent to MINTKEN- BAUGH 's confession of complicity in Soviet espionage, but hbe- fore he was convicted for conspiracy. Sera a fantasti. ~ , ore wong ttd. sab bells, vaio and, 3 fi. Cd yor sECnET |
‘452. collecting information from a network of Soviet agents for celivery to tne KCB via dead drops, Several days after this, @hile MINTKENBAUCH was still considering the KGB proposal, . he was visited by "Alex." MINTKENBALCH was told Alex" was a ¢enioy KCB official aad a "very important person." (C"‘Alex" was later identified as Aleksandr FEKLISOY, then Chief of the American Department of the KCB First Chief Directorate and later, under the name FOMIN, KGB Legal Resident in Washirgton.) “Alex told MINTKENBALGH that nis Soviet wife would serve only as a cover for MINTKENBAUGH's espicnages Her pressnce would allow MWINTKENBAUSH to travel freely throughout the United States (New York, California, and New Mexico were mentioned specitficaily) without having to worry about a “nagging wife." She also would be able to help hin operationally, pazticularly with radio communications, From "Alex's" manner and questions, MINTKENBAUCH gathered that he had come mainly to "size him up" for this assignment, which MINTKENBALGH row agreed to accept. ‘Subsequently MINTKENBAUCH was introduced to his intended bride, known to him only as "Irene,"* and the two spent some time together to get acquainted. She nad either been informed or recognized that MINTKENBAUGH was a homosex cal and told bim she krew.** MINTKENBALGH returned to the United States at the end of December 1959. His only assignment from the Mos= cow trip was to establish his own businéss in the Washington area as soon as possible so that "“Irere"’ could join him. Following KCB instructions, MINTKENBATCH moved to Arlington, VYirginia, in about October 1969, but railed to ca anything about Lis "roof.” Shortly after nis arrival and wathou*t advising or securing the appro’al of his KGB handler, he entered into a homeeremodciing ventura with a female frierd fzom his days in Periin.. When MINTKENBAUGH told his case officer about this afte: the fact, the latter becume - “extremely upset," explaining that is iastructing MINTKEN= EAICH to establish cover, tne KCB had meant to determine what busin-ss se was to enter. He told MINTKENDSAUCH to get out of the partnership as soon as possibie and into a business of his own. While still continuing this activity (he eventually persuaded the KCB to accept his participation and to contribute financial support) MISIKENBAUGH took out a Virginia real estate license in the spring of 19€1 and found “employment with an Arlington dealer. MINTKENBAUGH said that although his KCB officer seemed "pleas:d" that MINTKENBAUOH Was working for this firm, it was indicated that eventually the KGB would like him to get a real estate office of his own, which the Soviets would finance. MIN!IKENBAUGH took no steps to do so. MINTKENBAUGH was also given a number of other assign- ments during this period. One of these struck him as being probably related to "Irene'ts'"' dispaten to the United States. Some time in 1960 (MINTKENBAUCH is not sure of the date) he Presumably "Yrene” was to become a. KGB Illegal. who would entey and live in the United States under a false identity. **Al though MINTKENBAUGH is certain that the KCB knew of his homosexuality from the start of the operation, this is the only mention of it to him by the KGB personnel during his — entire agent career. TOP SecHEr Lae an “ © Batch Ha See ht bbb worn dha a > ae Monet bese aeh waietomee bende Rerser Sepa
Ae tate cad 8 was sent to Yancouver, Canada, to sccure the birth certifi- cate of a female Canadian citizen, about the same age as "Yrene'™: this female had. cmigrated to Finland with her family as 2 child. Because of her age and "Trene's” Saltie origin, MINTKENBAUGH speculated that the assignment might be related ‘to his principal ore. In November 1960 MINTKENBAUGH was _turned over to a new Soviet case ufficer who, probably sone ‘¢ime in ]¥61, gave him a list of assignments which required ‘that MINTKENBAUGH travel to Oklahoma to locate a number of ‘missile sites. He was also to trace a petroleum pipeline running from Texas to Pennsylvania, to pinpoint the location -of a U.S, Department of State high-frequency transmitter near Warrenton, Virginia, and to determine the locaticn of underground facilities of either the State Department or - GIA near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. MINTKENBAUGH was succeéesg- fl in carrying cut some of these tasks and failed in others. By early 1962, according to MINTKENBAUGH, he was in considerable financial difficulty. The real estate firm where he vas employed was going bankrupt, his resodeling business required sizeable additional expenditures, and money was also needed to support other real estate ventures in California. MINTKENBAUCGH again approached the KCB for funds, which were reluctantly given. The KGB case officer was “quite upset’ on this occasion and told MINTKENBAUGH that the KCB could not continue to “pour money into the “[roemodeling} operation." He again instructed MINTKENBAUGH _to finish up the business as svon as possible so that he -covld “stop wasting time" and establish his own cover firm, Depressed by his financial raverses, MINTKENBAUGH now “began to feel increased pressures” because of his involves ment with the Soviets. He has since claimed that at this time ne wanted desperately to break off his relationship with the Soviets but did not know how to do it. He has stated his emotional condition "became so serious that he decidcd that he had batter leave town for a while before he had a nervous breakdown." During this period, MINIKENBAUGd claimed, he was furnishing no information of value to the KGB but was merely going through the motions of cooperation. For these reasons, MINTKENBALGH sold his share in the house-remodeling business to his partner in the spring of 1962, resigned his position with the real estate firm, and “unbeknown to the KGB, flew to Florida for about a month.* He financed the trip with part of the money he had recently received from his KGB handler. Shortly before departure : MINTKENBAUGH -wrote a letter to JOHNSON in France explaining that be was sick, that he was in dire financial difficulty and needed more money, and that he was going away for a while. He told JOHNSON to pass the letter to the Soviets. | MINTKENBAUGH later told the FBI that he had no intention at ii a *This was not the first time MINTKENBAUGH made éuch an unannounced trip. In 1938, on his own, he flew to Berlin to complain about nis currert handler in Washington, whom ‘he considered “creepy,” and to request a change in case ‘of- ' . ficers. TOP SECi = rey dg r s _ntanipeve nwsrirmensetetiony avdengestine pants nay D2 nner mn tment gnomes nore tad eset ui Coe nckay “fF iy i} ; 3 Py 3 fe tenteentine belts eae end ten
the time to remain permanently in Florida: Tne trip wes is reality an attempt to “run avay, to drop out of his espion- age activities." He hoped the KGB would lose interest ia him in his‘absence.. The letter to JOHNSON, MINTRENBAUGH said, was ta give the Soviets a logical explanation for his written to JOHNSON, a violation of the very specific instruc- tions MINTKENBAUGH had earlier received to destroy JOHNSON's address and hreak all contacts with him. Shortly after his return, MINTKENBAUGH found a job with another Arlington real estate agency. From this point on to the end of the operation, his principal assignment wes to photograph rental applications submitted by persons he knew or belicved to work 3 for CIA or otherwise to be of interest to the KGB. : absence.* cs Nevertheless, MINTKENBALCH returnacd to Washington in _ 3 time for his next scheduled meeting with his KCB case officer. ao ee ad He returned, .MINTKENGAUGH toi¢ the FBI, “to face the music." a The KGB officer was repurtediy furious that MINTKENEAUGH had . ‘ 3 The subject of the independent cover business and of 'Tvene's" arrival in the United States was not dropped, however, Soviet efforts reached a high point, WINTKENBAUCH estimated. in August 1962 when ha was summoned to a special meeting and fotnd “Alex” (FEKLISOV), whom he nad last seen in Woscow, writing fur him at the meet site. In what im- pressed MINTKENBALGH as a “pep talk," it was explained by TAjex'" thay he had come ail the way from Moscow to see him.** MINTKENBAUGH, he stated, was worth a great deal of money to the Soviets, who were willing to give it to him, but MINTKEN BAUCE must take immediate steps to establish his own business. i FLKLISOV indicated that there had been no change in the plan : to send "Irene" to Washington once this was done. Enphasizing this point, “Alex said that the Soviets would assume respor- sibility for all expenses involved in setting up such a business and would cover any loses which might result. Noreover, he advised MINTKEXBAIGH to devise some sort of cover story to explain the large amounts of money the KGB was prepared to give him. Other aspects of MINTKENBAUGH's performance, including his failure to follew up on various assignments in the Washington area, were also discussed. secteetaleealende Sou fae ame agg SPN NATO = *In fact, if MINTKENBAUCH had not written to JOHNSON, it is likely that his absence would have gone unnoticed by the KGB, for he had no dead drops to service or meetings scheduled in this period. There are other examples of this alleged anbig — valence on MINTKENBAUGH's part. He has told the FBI on several occasions that he was looking for a way to break con-= tact with the KGB and once said the "during recert years he , Sg had been intentionally careless from a security standpoint , and did not care whether he would be apprehended in connection with his Soviet operation.". On the other hand, JOHNSON has said that MINTKENBAUCH was depressed when the KGB finally did drop contact with him and that MINTKENBAUGH went to considera able lengths to reestablish it. . . : **The August 1962 date is apparently incorrect, as is "Alex's" statement that he came to the 'nited States especially to see MINTKENBAUGH. Travel récords indicate that FEKLISOV, who arrived in Washington in 1960, was out of the country. from 18 July to 10 September 1962. he AS aU aden the tha det orien va SHAE : yop SECRET : an Lo po Canina A pratteshinete fates +
wduw oe Mention continued to be made cf the ECB plan at meetings ‘gubsequent to “Alex's” talk; HWINTKENBAUGH had neo doubts that, as he had been told in Woscow, his primary mission was to | establish himself in a cover business of his own. At one of . trese meetings VINTKENBAUCH was told that “Irene” had become 11, but that the KCR planned to sond someone «lse in her place as soon as MINTKENBAUGH could provide cover. The latest mention of the plan which MINTKENSAUGH could recall ‘gas at a meeting in the late summer of 1963. At that tine, _#&is KGB case officer was distressed because 10 steps hed been taken and told him: "I have been here two years with you and this has rot happened." There is no indication in WINTKENBAUGH's confession that he ever took any decisive eteps.to camply with KCB wishes in this regard. Tnese meetings in the late summer and/or early autumn of 1963 were apparently the last darect contacts MINTKENBAUGH had with tre KCB, At one of them, he recalled, his KCB handler reveiwed the verbal recognition signais to be used in the event that it became necessary tor an unknown Soviet to contact him and said that he, the KGB officer, "might not be around in the future,"* WINTKENBAUCH next unloaded nis dead drop probably in Septembsr 1963, and he attempted to develop the film on which, according to established peocedures, schedules and sites for future meetings and dead drops were given, Only parts of the KGB instructions could -be made out, however. MINTKENBAUCH took the biame for this, . ‘telling the FBI that ke had “botched up the film" by using faulty developer. He was able to determine only that his enorgercy meeting site had been changed and that his next aead drop was scheduled for loading on 23 November 1963, but ke did not know the location of either, MINTKENBAUCH's means of contacting the KUB *herefore was broken, Although thereafter hs appeared at various of his previous meeting sites in the Washington area and called the emergency tele- phonze number given him by his case officer, M=INTKENBAUGH Was unsuecessful in reestablishing contact. The KG3 tock 29 unitiative to do so, insofar as MINTKENBAUGE knew. ** JOUNSON's dicappearance and an FBI interview concerning JOHNSON on 10 November 1964 caused MINIKENBAUGH to prevail on his roommate | o drive him to CIA Headquarters. There, during @ nig 6f 10-11 Noverber, he confessed his espionage activities to a Cia representative, ‘The next day, before the FBI had a chance . to talk to him. MINTKENBALGH moved out of his apartment in -Arlington and disappeared. The FBI located him on 5 Deceme= ber 1964 at his brother's mountain cabin in California. *HINTKENBAUGH'’s case officer at the time was S.D. ROMANOVTSEY, who did not leave the United States until December 1964, more than a year later. #tAccording to JOHNSON, MINTKENBAUGH told hia in the spring ‘of 1904 that he was considering as a last resort travelling to Mexico under a false identity in order to recontact the Soviets there, There is no evidence that he attempted to do % wee eet Lo Ee sabeeainstied Bee e isah aetcale ats on BADE DER fetter ihe STEEN TAU Spe EE I te
Tearfully, MINTKENSAUGH claimed that he was “in the posi~ tion of a man with a rope around his neck," that re deserved to be indicted and arrested for his past deeds, that he was “one of God's mistakes,"' that he had not found cut he was “queer uptil he was 27 years old and this revelation had “almost killed him,” that revenge "got.into him" and he had to get even, and that it was all "God's fault." When finally in control of himself, he madé a detailed confesgion. clea ermal ane wae ot ee | tones ] €/3 re Cone | are a | ee nip tom chaz Satalanid dating at 4 { ’ 4
INE teem ON 457. : (c) Hedwig JOHNSON’ s Statenents Mra. JOHNSON’s active participation dn Soviet espionage was short in time and limited in’ scope, encompassing only the period from 1953 to 1954 when she acted as a courier for JOHNSON in Berlin, She did, however, remain knowledgeaole of JOHNSON‘s, and to & lesser degree MINTKENBAUGH's, totellie gence activities and was-later able to describe these to the FBI. Mrs. JGHNSON's account of her recruitment generally agrees with that given by her husoand. She told the FBI how JOHNSON, embitterec over his failure to receive an expected promotion, had sent her to East Germany to contact Soviet officials for the purposes of offering them his services, Mrs, JOHNSON said that JOHNSON was primarily interested in revenging Himself against the U.S. Army and had forced her into accepting this mission by telling her that he would rot marry her otherwise. Her first attempts to establish contact with the Soviets at Karlshorst in early 1953 were fruitless, and it was not until about three months later that she succeeded in delivering JOHNSON's message. She was told to return to Karlshorst the same evening with her husband. At this firat meeting, the JOHNSONs were questioned by a group of about seven Soviets concerning JOHNSON's desire to cooperate against the United States and his motivations for wishing to do so. JOHNSON gave the Soviets ro classified information at this time and no decision wes made that night about using him. The Soviets said they first wanted to | check on JOHNSON and his wife, At the close of the meeting, Mrs, JOHNSON was given false identity papers to facilitate future crossings of the sector border. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. JOHNSON eccompanied her husband to a second meeting with the Suviets. Again, she said, JOHNSON paesed no information to the KGB other than 8 copy of his leave papers. After the meeting, however, JCHNSON _geked her for a pair of shoes so the Soviets could alter the heels to form & conccalment device. “This was done. On four of five occasions prior to JOHNSON's transfer to the United States in 1954, she crossed the border carrying filma ‘negatives which JOHNSON had placed in the shoes. According to Mre. JOHNSON, she never knew what was on the film and she ‘ yeceived no money other than for expenses from the Soviets. JOHNSON married her, 48 promised, in April 1953, This apparently comprised her total esplonage career, but JOHNSON was in the habit of discussing the details of his activities with her. In addition, she often accompanied JOHNSON to operational meetings after his return to France in 1959 and until her deteriorating mental condition made this inadvisable in November 1960. (She still went with — JOHNSON to the vicinity of the meetings and waited for him.)- Her knowledge of. his activities thus was practically totel. JOHNSON, for example, gave her full details of the Orly Pene~ tration, including descriptions of the methods used to achieve initial entry, how he selected documents for the Soviets, — and the procedures used to pass the documents to his case — officer and later return them to the vault. yor SENET (WAS ae Ae bLattetS vente et qhew adil « acitaitetad: ak en. é  anetof eininde dahetina ots aves one wa Wren dae te
Mra. JOHNSON's knowledge of MINTKENBAUGH's espionage activities was less detailed. She had accompanied MINTKEN~ BAUGH when he was first introduced to the Soviets and wag present at at least one later meeting; she waa aware that he ‘was involved in the photography of documents with JOHNSON , in Berlin: “rs. JOHNSON knew that MINTKENBAUGH hed “gene to ‘Russia and there received an assignuent from the Soviets.." From MINTKENBAUGH's letters to her and-JOHNSON while they-—— were stationed in France, Mra. JOHNSON learned of MINTKEN~ -BAUGH’s real estate ventures and got the impression that !"MINTKENBAUGH was using his real estate background to assigt Soviet ageasts in getting located {in the United States].' ‘JOHNSON, she said, put a stop to the exchange of letters with MINTKENBAUGH, telling her that MINTKENBAUGH had written things he should not have mentioned and that Mrs. JOHNSON © (who was about to énter a mental hospital for treatment) “might talk about Soviet agents entering the United States* and setting up business firms." | TOP SECRET esa oS agate aut pte wth bitin TR ean a bah ‘ + “eile abcen and
oe prmemnien Het LD ee (ad) Mental Condition of Hecwig JOHNSON Sirs. JOHNSON’s nental instability first manifested itself . ne tn serious form is late 1960, while JJOHGSON was assigned to the ., ordinance agency of the Orleans Area Command in France. At that time, JONSON said soe persisted in claiming that she was being followed by a black sedan, that there was @ microphone in the refrigerator, that she had been acquainted with the recent American defectors Martin and Mitchell, and thst JOHNSON was having an affair-with a local French-  —-- 0-07 To girl who stayed with their children.* As a result, Mrs. JOHNSON was admitted to the Army Hospital at La Chapelle, France, in November 1960 and was Jater nuoved to another hospital at Landstunl, Germany. Ske was under professional observation for about a month on this peeagion and returned home shortly before Christmas 1960. Following her release from the hospital, Mrs. JOHNSON was unable te sleep, and as the local dector would not prescribe more than two sleeping pilis a week, JOHNSON took her to Vienna in January 1961, After she had been examined, JOHN- SON was told that she would have to remain in a private hospi- | tal there for an indefinite period of time for medication, When JOHNSON later returned to Yienna, the hospital doctors advised him to have Mrs. JOHNSON live for several years in Vienna with her fanily or, as an alternative, in some other ‘Large city with a German-speaking population in order to provide an environment to which she nad been accustomed. She returned twice to Vienna for shock treatment and examinations while JOHNSON remained in France. When JOHN- SON travelled to Vienna to get Mrs. JOHNSON after the second of these visits in the fall of 1962, her doctor told him that she had referred to him (JOHNSON) as a "Russian general" and had accused one of the nurses of being a Soviet spy. {Larlier, in the presence of neighbors, JOHNSON was accused by his wife of being a spy.) JOHNSON learned from his father-in-law that Mes. JOHNSON had also told him that JOH\~ SON was a Russian general, Eventually Mrs. JOHNSON was persuaded to commit herself to a U.S. Army hospital, and at the end of April 1964 she was evacuated from France to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington. (JOHNSON and his children returned to the United States several days later.) She was released shortly afterward, but her erratic behavior, JOHN SON said, prompted his disappearance in October 1964, The FBI report of this debriefing of JOHNSON states -that "as an overall analysis of his wife, he described her as over-sexed. During the past 10 years her sexual demands had tripled over what they had previously been and she never seemed to be sexually satisfied." MINTKENBAUGH’s statements tend to confirm this evaluation. He has described Mrs. JOHN- SON as being a nymphomaniac who indiscriminately indulged in . any kind of sexual activity with persons of either sex. Fure thermore, for two years she prostituted herself regularly with JOHNSON's knowledge while weekending in Las Vegas; he gambled — with the proceeds. Mrs. JOHNSON is now confined in a Virginia mental insti- tution. me, oe *JOHNSON has denied the latter charge. Nevertheless, JOHNSON on his own initiative did tell the French girl that he was @ Soviet spy, and he sounded her out concerning her willingness to work for the Soviets. . Par TOP SECRET Bates fee Bids Utesnted linia Avighinnation . vaets 2 agp edinditadlib aS iin Be tee i
(e) Soviet Concern About Mrs. JOHNSON’s Illness _ When it became apparent that his wife's treatment in Vienna had been unsuccessful and that. he would have to leave Orleans to find a more suitable environment for her, JOHNSON discussed the matter. in detail with his KGB case officer. In the fall of 1962, after'he made photographs of the vault dour for URZHUMOV, ‘the Minox camera waS Pree- turned to the Russians. This {according to JOHNSON] was done because of Soviet concern over Héedy's. mantal condition. JOHNSON was instructed to retain no incriminating materials in his possession.” After URZHUMOV learned of Mrs. JOHNSON's confinement in a U.S. military hospital, JOHNSON said he became “all shook up" about the possibility that she might talk.  URZHUMOY told JOHNSON to inform his wife that he was no lénger working for the Soviets, and JOHNSON must never again bring her to an. operational meeting. URZHUMOV also advised JOHNSON to cease all intelligence activity for @ while, and all espionage paraphernalia was to be returned to the Soviets.* Reviseu and more elaborate emergency contact arrangements, providing for contact in Vienna and Washington as well as Paris, were agreed upon to replace earlier, un- successful procedures, and preparations were made for JOHN = SON's eScape should he be compromised. He said on 6 Janu- ary 1965 that there was no particular pressure concerning the emergency contact and escape arrangements "except that there was always the question and coucern that his wife might talk." Soviet fear that Mrs. JOHNSON might talk also was req flected in the handling of MINTKENBAUGH in Washington. MINT= KENBAUGH explained to the FBI that "during the period when | Hedy was confined to an Army hospital in Europe | November and December 1960] his KCB case officer arranged with him to effect an ‘eye-to-eye’ meeting-at-Brentano's Bookstore in downtown Washington, D.C. MINTKENBAUGH was scheduled to visit the bookstore three times a wcek for a three-week period. The Soviet indicated that this procedure was to be adopted in order that it would be assured that Hedy had said nothing during her hospital confinement which would expose the operation. MINTKENBAUGH said that he presumed that the Soviets had effected arrangements in Europe to become aware in the event licdy would reveal any facts concerning her know- ledge of Soviet Intelligence. In the event Hedy did talk and a dangerous situation resuited, the Soviets were to ade — '- yise MINTKENBAUCH through a drop or by a meeting." Lam. “ . ; m,, *In other tellings, JOHNSON has also said that the espionage | equipment, which included a Minox camera and tripod and a’ flashlight with a “hollow-battery" concealment device, was returned to URZHUMOV at his (JOHNSON's) own suggestion. | Top SECRET. Caren a eis eect ne ce Po ELT NEI ET RN Oe OI SEE AE EE, MEP AT SN PR TREES ERY 8 De hc Wy RES IRE ART NT ile hein ning ee atti et i FI Fe aden woteead tana wed
(vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.S. Interests mes > d The following excerpts are from a preliminary damage’ ; ; 4 - assessment* of JOUNSON's espionage activities since 1953 Lares which was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence. Board by its : Security Committce on 11 January 1966: , 7 "The relatively low level of sensitivity of the . information which JOHNSON passed to the Soviets during 2 aa ee his assignments in Berlin, the U.S., and Orleans, . % France, coupled with the passage of tine since those ; ; ; oO 4 activitics, permit an initial assessment of relatively : minor damage. “The damage done by JOHNSON at Orly, however, is’ : ¢ of another order of magnitude. Extensive investigative .. i efforts by the affected members of the U.S. intelli. i Bence community [ NSA, CIA, State Department, DIA, and the military services|...have succeeded in identifying both the type, and in some cases, the specific docu~ ments, which were in’ the Orty vault at some time during the period Rovember 1962 to May 1963. But.it hes not ‘been possible to identify pretisely which documents were in the vault on the dates of the penetrations..., | The only viable assumption...is that all the documents ‘to -which JOHNSON had physical access during the period of his vault penetrations, i.e., all the documents in the vault, were subjected to possible compromise by ; the Sovicts....The review, which Ts Continuing, in- ; ‘ ~ volves a considerable volume of documents which may total more than a thousand. “The full extent of damage will only be known when the current review of documents by all affected 4 agencies is completed.** The damage assessments pre- ; pared by the military services, however, based on a review of their documents to date, indicate that as a result of access to documents in the Orly vault, the Soviets may have learned: 1. Details of the Single Integrated Opera- tional Plan (S1IOP) including the attack plans of the Joint Chiefs of Stafi, the identity of Soviet targets, the tactical plans of USAF elements in- cluding weapons systems and methods of delivery. *Compilation of the final damage assessment has been compli- a : cated by three factors. One was the difficulty involved in oe, -} +. “determining what specific documents may have passed through PRs eg me the Orly Courier Transfer Station during his assignment there. oe Second, since all documents remained wrapped while at the station, JOHNSON himself has been of little assistance in identifying them, although he has said that he concentrated - his selection on documents addressed to particular commands. Finally, Armed Forces courier service records for this period’ have been. destroyed, ‘ co ae 2a vibe ae bier fee oho Kianennecty 4 i . fee i
2. U.S. Intelligence holdings eon Soviet military capabilities, atomic energy production, weapons storage facilities, industrial complexes and order of battle. 3. Daily U.S. Intelligence summaries in- i cluding our comments and reports on military and : political developments around the world. Soviet SAM Systems, 8. Indications of the scope and success of the U.S. national SIGINT effort, 6. <A wealth of taterial for use in crypto~ analysis. "From these preliminary reports..-it is evident that Sgt. JOHNSON's cooperation with Soviet Intelligence has resulted in most serious damage to U.S. national security.” e The initial damage assessment does not cover the period from August 1963 until May 1964, wher JOHNSON had access to all classified documents originatirg with the Seine Area ‘Cormand and to documents from a number of uther commands. JOHNSON has insisted that, during this period, he passed only one "Secret" decument to his Soviet handlers; ke has admitted, however, providing oral and some written reports concerning documents he read which were classified "Secret" and "Confi- dential" and which concerned emergency and evacuation pians of tine Seine Area Command. Having claimed no contact with the Soviets after he began his duty tour at the Pentagon, JOHNSON has thus indicated that he furnished no information to the KGB for that period, which began in June 1964 and ended in his disappearance in October 1964. TOP Sect 4. Comprehensive Comparisons of U.S. and aes aoe otto sade on bits se ak oe ee eae ee | feemuste Zumdbtalnatasaneedoadive te, sabi ; . x i 4. a a 4 t
a | pecan ddeeictess ee eee ca 4. Unsuccessful Appruaches to U.S, Citizens* a. The HARMSTONE Case . q en rr ~ a nto GiAien Adib dacs SER (4) Introduction After providing the two promised leads** at his first : meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO then volunteered 4 oo that the KGB-in 1958 or-1959 had made en-unsuccessful ree ©.) ___. cruitment approach to Richard C. HARMSTONE, Secchd Secretary ~~ at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Initially NOSENKO said that : the KGB had photographs of HARMSTONE in homosexual as well { as heterosexual acts, but in 1964 he stated that although : the KGB knew HARMSTONE to be a homosexual, it had no phcto- . ; graphs of him in such activities. The KGB, thanks to micro~ 4 phones in the Fmbassy, learned thet HARMSTONE did not tell ; 4 U.S. authorities the full story of the approach, omitting ; . the fact that the approach was based partly cn his homo- sexuality. HARMSTONE's report of the approach was not, however, made in the Embassy. When HARMSTONE was, reassigned from Moscow, a summary of his KGB file was turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO indicated that he was unaware of any developments in the casc therearter. Since the approach was made prior to his transfer to. the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in January 1960, NOSEMKO said he did not personally participate in the operation but was informed of it by V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of -the Section. The oificers who did take part in the case could not be identivied by NOSENKO. vibe ad “| esivesatn HARMSTONE, a bachelor, was posted to Moscow in Octo- i _ber 1957. He went to the security office in the Embassy on . . i 23 May 1959 to report a series of events which had culminated the day before in his having been approached for recrultment : ; by a self-admitted KCB officer (then known to HARMSTONE only ; as "Sergey" but later identified as KOVSHUK). The approach 4 was based, with accompanying photugraphs, on his alleged . homosexuality, an allegation which HARMSTONE denied in his interview by the Embassy Security Officer. He refused to collaborate, HARMSTONE said, but he had agreed to meet. "Sergey" on 23 May. In keeping with his instructions from U.S, authori’ ties, HARMSTONE lunched with "Sergey" that afternoon and thereafter avoided holding meetings with him. After his reassignment from Moscow in October 1959, HARMSTONE admitted to the Departnent of State Security Office that he had a homosexual background and the phdtographs shown to him by oe KOVSHUK had been genuine, but he again claimed to have rejected the recruitment attempt. HARMSTONE subsequently resigned from the Department. Among the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Moscow Embassy in November 1963*** was a document dated August 1958 on the KGB plans for operational activity against HARMSTONE, *NOSENKO has described a total of five unsuccessful attempts by the U.S, Embassy Section, American Department. KGB Second Chief Directorate to recruit U.S. Embassy personnel stationed in Moscow. Two of these, the attempted recruitments of mili- tary code clerks KEYSERS and STORSBERG in which NOSENKO says he participated personally, are discussed in Part VeE.3.¢. The remaining three are described here. — . - **These are the BELITSKIY and "ANDREY" leads, discussed in Parts VI.D.6. and VI.D.3.b., respectively. ; *¢#Por further information. on the CHEREPANOV papers, see Part % VI.D.7.c. 10? SEtne Mee ecm tim mt be At se et ERROR rete Pu wed Raabe sate ia ons owen yh ae Sue be we | . i 4 { f } } i i 3 j f . i
HARMSTONE, a Second or Third Secretary at the American Em- bassy in Moscow, The KCB tried to recruit him, but he re- fused the approach. Previously the KGB nad used both female and male agents against him, and the KCB had photographs of _& the homosexual side as well as his activities with girls. . i XOSENKO believed that HARMSTONE did not tell the whole story to the U.S. officials, reporting only that there had been : an approach to him based on compromise with women. The : report on the approacn had not becn submitted in the Embassy. (KOSENKO did not say where he reported it, however.) At this meeting, having called the BE. ITSKIY case the first matter he would give to CIA and “ANDREY” the second, NOSENKO characterized the HARMSTONE case thus: -"HARMSTONE. HARM- STONE. This is already the third item. Be patient. That's ‘enough for today. (Laughing.)" , , Details on the HARVSTONE case from NOSENKO and other id sources are presented below, 4 (11) Information from NOSENKO “4 : On 9 June 1962, at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva, . NOSENKO said -at the outset that he would sell two items of 4 . ' $nformation in return for the money he needed, and that he 4 _ “~  ". — euid telly CIA -no more> After—he had-finisned describing. ae - so re ce the “ANDREY"” case, however, he volunteered a story about : : In February 1964 at CIA request, NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREHANOV documents, one of which concerned a KGB plan for operations against Richard HARMSTONE. Part of the plan, according to the document, was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him in intimate relations with a Soviet girl. NOSENKO said this was in fact the way tle KG3 did get the material on which it based the later approach to him: "They got him drunk, At the same time they had him photographed. And after that they talked with him. They tried to recruit him, but he evaded the proposition. He declined the recruit- ment. But he also said nothing; he did not report. For this. reason they consider that if he comes into their view again somewhere, even in a third country, then they will get to 4 him and say: ‘’How about recruitment? This happened on such i and-such. You did not report it. Have you thought it over? You are hiding it for so long from your government, from the “State Department, that you had cortact with Soviet Intelli- gence.'" NOSENKO was asked how the KGB knew HARMSTONE had not reported the approach. He replied: “He was monitored, and we would have heard if anything about this matter was reported....Undoubtedly if he reported it, something would . have been heard from {the KGB microphone in] the Minister. | Counsellor's [office]....They would dictate a message on this...." whe Asked who tried to recruit HARMSTONE, he said, "I do not Enow. That was prior to my coming into the department. This was in the year 1958 or 1959. I don't know who was the. case officer who spoke to HARNSTONE." Asked if this officer 3 was still in the American Department, he replied: “I don't i think he is. I don't think he is concerned with it anymore.” , Later reinterviewed concerning the HARMSTONE case, ' NOSENKO repeated his assertion that he could not identify the KCB officers who were persorally involved in the case, addirg that he had learned of the case from KOVSHUK. He also repeated his statements that the KGB knew HARMSTONE 808 otros are Whe, pire eeeesdntbiane sh Abbie dade ey 4 haa in
$8 REP OPRE OF wats smncain Innere Sine eentatiete wee wore ita a Tek sonar Gy g-ncenmenies had not given the Embassy a full account of tae recruitaent approach; this was known from the microphones in the Embassy, from the telephores, and from the fact that HARMSTONE did not leave the Soviet Union immediately. (He thought that HARMSTONE had left the Soviet Union rot long after the ap- proach was made, toward the end of Lis tour, and it was not an early departure.) The KCB also knew HARMSTONE to be a homosexual, but did not nave any pictures of him in this kind __ of activity; the KGB did nave, however, a series of nude pictures of him with a female agent, and NOSENKO believed these photographs hed. been shown to HARMSTONXE in the course of the recruitment attempt. NOSENKO thought that the KGB may have had more informacion on HARMSTONE. than he, NOSENKO, was aware of and could tell CIA--otherwise, he said, the KGB would not have made the approach, After HARMSTONE left Mosccor, NOSENKO edded, a summary of his file was given to the First Chie? Directorate, but he never heard whether they had made an attempt to contact him thereafter. (441) Informaticn from Other Sources HARMSTONE, one of the economic attaches at the Embassy, shared an office with William TURPI*, also an economic attache, until TURPIN was replaced in August 1958 by George WINTERS.* WINTERS and HARMSTONE worked together until HARM. “ STONE finished his tour in October 1959. The KCB plans for operational activity against HARMSTONE outlined in the CHEREPANOY document dated August 1958 tally closely with information reported in Foreign Service dis- patches by TURPIN, HARMSTONE, and Janes RAMSEY, and sub sequently confirmed by HARUSTONE in interviews conducted by the FBI. The descriptive details in the CHEREPANOV document about the agents to be used against HARMSTONE are quite specific and, when matched against the Foreign Service cise patches, make it possible to identity them even though the document uses only cryptonyms when referring to them. For example, the plan states: "Through the agent "NIKONOV,' who works in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences USSR, continue to render to HARNSTONE small favors on a re~ ciprocal basis (cooperation in arrarging visits with economiets, visits to the institute, etc.) trying, on his part, to obtain from HARMSTONE materials on the economics of South America (the specialty of ‘NIKONOV')." TURPIN, HARMSTONE himself, and WINTERS each reported having many contacts with Yu.V. BELOV, who was the American Embassy's liaison contact with Soviet economists, particularly in the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences. BELOV was fluent in Spanish, and | was concerned with economic problems of South America. Similarly, most of the other agents have been identified with individuals on whom there was detailed information available from overt contacts in Moscow. . HARYSTONE came to the security office in the Embassy on the morning of 23 May 1959 and Stated that he was in serious difficulty and wanted to discuss the matter. He told of having been drugged while dining at the home of BELOV in April 1959; also present was a “cousin” of BELOV's who was © eqns ectteten ete tT TTL abe eT thes eee dadan MeL eee Ly meet heath ree Sat lalate nhesersite eo To? erent i eee | | q ‘ |. 1 ede ws "a mo
ee ” . ieee alist e eiben cesta ’ ~ gins easaSirac an actor. A few weeks later, HARNSTONE seid, he and WINTERS were invited to the BELOVs for the afternoon. but WINTERS was busy so HARMSTONE had to go alone. He named the various other Soviets who were part of the day'a outing, among ‘them a couple named "SOKOLOV" (identifiable in the CHEREPANOV - paper as the casa officer A.M. MIKHAILOV and the agent ~ _ "KRUCHININA’). At a visit to a dacha after lunch, a friend named "Sergey" was present and made HARMSTONE's acquaintance. A few days later “SOKOLOV” invited HARESTONE to have lunch, --—_and mentioned-that "Sergey! -wouid probably-join them,—as—he did, After lunch the three went out to visit "Sergey's"-“ decha, where "SOKOLOV" soon disappeared to-take a nap. — "Sergey" then identified himself to HARMSTONE cs a worker of the KGB who had been investigettug the case of a “notorious homosexual,” naming BELOV's “cousin.” call... pe Sergey then made recruitment overtures, which HARMSTONE rejected, but he did agree to lunch with "Sergey" the following daye: Also, "Sergey" offered to assist HARMSTONE in his career, and gave him his office number, to be called from outside the Embasey lest HARNSTONE should be overheard making the- Following the initial interview with the Security Of- ficer, the latter reported the situation to the Minister Counsellor, Richard DAVIS, wno concurred in the Security ; Officer's belief in HARMSTONE's innocence of the homosexual allecation. The two agreed that HARNSTONE might keep the scheduled appointment to have lunch with "Sergey" that same arternoon. : "Sergey" did most of the talking that afternoon, ac= eording to HARUSTCNE, commenting on a number of the Embassy personnel and various prominent Soviet personalities. "Sergey" planned for HARMSTONE to lunch with him the fol- lowing week, but, followirg instructions of the Security Officer and Minister Counsellor, HARMSTONE thereafter fended off "Sergey" by telling him it was pointless for HARMSTONE to see him, that the KGB knew the situation to be "completely phoney," and that the KGB should stop harassing him; he _. wanted no assistance, no further luncheons, no other appoint- -' gents with KGB personnel, HARMSTONE successfully avoided contacts with "Sergey" thereafter, until the latter broke in. on a dinner HARMSTONE was having in a restaurant with a - casual Soviet contact (a student) in August 1959. HARMSTONE said he repeated his refusal to see "Sergey" and the latter departed. In August or September of 1959 HARMSTONE passed a note to the Security Officer in the Embassy in which he reported that he was certain that his KGB friend "Sergey" was identical with George WINTERS contact in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V¥.M. "KONAROV,* He explained how he had come to. this discovery: *KOMAROV is the alias used by KOVSHUK on his ten-month visit to the United States in 1957-1958 #nd later in Moscow with his American contacts, until 1963 when he began to use his true name, a ; arene y TQ Brinks cake | Bennuta ie ade Shanda niplesttcite alba allee edie Sly test aC tae EE. te cates tebe Dw cir pls sa sadbetlasmesetandestdde bens 4 :
“George WINTERS’ contact in Foreign Ministry V.M, KOMAROV called the other day, asking for George. His voice sounded go puch lite that of ‘Sergey’ that I asked George if 1 could see a photograph of KOMAROV on his 1957 visa application, If KOMAROV is not ‘Sergey,* he could easily be latter's twin brother, The only difference ig that when I have seen "8" he was always wearing glasses, In the picture he ig not wearing glasses, George has. never seen him wearing glasses..." raebide chads. -HARMSTONE's_note_then_went_on_to_mention_other_points_whick @upport the identification. In October 1959 HARMSTONE completed his Moscow tour and returned to Weshington. | ment. He subsequently resigned.from the. Department. z. ta] ag to lhe hte te e ete wthlie s cheek yah ld Eaetatone
14-00000 @ Db. Edward Blilie SMITH a (4) Information from NOSENKO a . ON | ae ; dq .In 19862 NOSENKO told a-detsiled story of a KGB attempt to recruit the Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in 1954 . : or 1955, a@ man named SMITH, His KGB cryptonym was "RYZHYY" . ad (redhead) because he had red hair, . a NOSENKO reported that SMITH was having en uffair with - , . 4 his Russian maid; but the KGB could not manage to get photos ‘ 4 Graphs of them in compromising situetions beoguse their ‘iatimeate relations took piace in his agartment in the Embasay. ‘The maid was therefore given a@ camera to taze photographs of herself within the apartment, in various sexual positions} the KGB superimposed photograpns of SulTH ia a photomontage and used these to make a recruitmect approach to him, The — KGB mailed him a letter instructing him to come to a pergonal meeting, enclosing copies of tha photegraphs with the-letter. ‘He came to the meeting and Second Chief Directorate Chief — ‘O,.M, GRIBANOV hinself made the recruitment tpproach.. SMITH wavered, saying neither yés nor no, but zg.ced to come back “to another meeting. He did not appear for the second meeting, however, and NOSENKO claimed that at this time he personally wag sent after the Russian maid to find out why SMITH hed not come, She reported that he could not make up hig mind what to do, that he head been up all night, firat deciding that he would cooperate, then deciding that he would not. The KGB then sent him several more letters threatening to @xX~e pose hin, Finally, after three days, SMITH breke down and told the Ambassador of the situation. He was inmediately sent home, and that ended the operation, In 1964 NOSENKO denied that he had had eny personel i role in the case, explaining that as a junior officer in the U.8. Embassy Section at the time, working on correspondants, * he would not have taken part in so important en operation, j He said that he had heard about the operaticn from VM, 3 KOVSHUK, whose case it was at the time, (On a later occasion NOSESKO claimed that in a legal sense he had a personal rele | in the case; he was assigned to a phone-watch to receive sur~- ; velllance reports on the operation.) Otherwise, the accounts by NOSENKO of the SMITH overation have been consistent with the story he related in 1962, ' (iL). Information from GOLITSYN ne : In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported thet in 194% ne had | read a two-volume study on KGB operetions against American : i Intelligence in the USSR, prepared by 8,M. FEDOSEYEV, which se - a gave examples of successful work against tke U.S, Embessy in : *8ee Part V.C, for NOSENKO's dating of his responsibilities a dn the U.S, Zmbassy Section from 1953-1955; he claimed to an have been Working on correspondents until June 1984, when. oo he took over the Army Attaches. He stated that he left for. _ the Tourist Department in June 1955, Edward Ellis SMITH ar~ rived in Moscow on 20 July 1984. The first letter was dated 1 June 1936 and received on 2 June 1956 by SMITH, , asthe Eadie + bike ed eee me wd tne Lagu Sitalenm AOE ATI mins bates + bh oneba tS whe he habia eke bee
| | ——e ay OOD - a Moscow, One case concerned an American, probably single, who was either the Security Officer or the counterintellie . gence fepresentative in the Embassy, He hed a dog, and lived in an apartment in the city or a country house outside Moscow, His Russian meid or cleaning women was his mistress, The KGB <%:" thought ne would not be recruitable by ordinary blackmail on the basis of his intimate relations with his maid, so the maid, . a KGB agent, was instructed to cozfess to him-that she had been recriitéd by thé KGB against hér will end would be gre ~ rested if ahe did not fultill her KGB tasks, He agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did not report this | to his Washington headquarters, He also recalled that the American first supplied only disinformation to the KGH, but) when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and disinformation, GOLITSYN. said this case study was hased on \\ @ true incident which took place between 1953 and 1957, but ‘ he was not sure if the operation really did result in a suce \ cessful recruitment as was alleged in the study. ' (441) Information from SMITH Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), who was the Security Officer at the Embassy in Nescow, reported to the U.S, Ambassador on 5 June 1256 that he had recaived four letters from the KGB, the first on 2 June 1956, The firet letter enclosed incriminating photographs of himself and his Russian maid and requested him to come to a personal meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy. He did not do so. SMITH received three more letters, threeteniag him with exposure to the Ambassadur. He admitted he had been intimate with his Russian maid. H was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1986, and he left employment a year later. When interviewed in March 1962 on the basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH admitted that he had maintained his affair witn the Russian maid during most of the time of his Moscow assignment, 20 July 1954 to 8 June 1956, and confirmed that he had in fact passed unclassified information through her to the KGB for many months, He claimed never to have provided information of a classified nature, although he did pass the contents of cables in the category of Official Use Only. In addition, SMITH said he disclosed information which “he knew would reach the KGB" (presumably through sources other than the maid). He also said that he never passed information that was - not true, i.é., disinformation, ny A arenes mabberty. HOBIE Likewise 2 3 3 cod ot eS atest te beets pene intone
(c) The BINDER Case (i) Information fron NOSEXN KO While reviewing notes he had brought tc a “meeting in Geneva on 26 January 1964, NOSENKO first: mentioned the unsuccessful attempt to recruit Peter BINDER. NCSENKO said that BINDER, the “top Sergeant in charge of America House,” —______had been having sexual_relations—with.a.Soviet- female 4n-hig-—— room at the America House for some time and had been obtaining articles such as dresses and coats forher from the United States, Because BINDER's activities were confined to America ‘House, the KGB. was unable to photograph his indiscretions and thus had little means to exert pressure on him. The recruitment approach consequently failed, In later interviews by CIA and the FBI1, NOSENKO idesti. fied the woman involved’ as Galya MORELLI, a KCB agent en- ployed at America House as a dishwasher, NOSENKO said that Viadirir DEMKIN of the U.S, Embassy Section was the case of- ficer working egeinst BINDER, and that S,M. FEDOSEYEV, Chief of the American Department, took part in the approach. This wag in 1962, NOGENKO said, after he had transferred to the ‘Tourist Gepartment, und for this reason he could provide no further details on the case. (ii) Information from BINDER Master Sergeant Peter BINDER arrived in Moscow, where he was assigned as manager of Amcrica House, on 16 March 1962.* He was approached by the KGB on 15 January 1963 and reported © the KGB siteapt to U.S, Embassy officials the same day. On 22 January 1963 BINDER was withdrawn from Moscow before the completion of his tour. At the airport as he was leaving, the Soviets attempted to prevent his departure by saying that he had never been properly accredited to the USSR, The plane was delayed for abcut 15 minutes while a heated exchange took place between Soviet officials and the American officers accompanying BINDER, He then was allowed to leave. The following description of the Soviet recruitment attempt is drawn from debriefings of BINDER by the U,S, Embassy Se- curity Officer in Moscow on the day of the incident and from debriefings by the FBI and Department of the Army after his return to the United States. . In about December 1961, according. to BINDER, he first -became intimate with MORELLI, a dishwasher at Anerica House _ whom he has described as being a pretty, intelligent, well- ‘manicured girl of about 26. Their relationship continued until June or July 1962, at which time MORELLI “disappeared” from her job without notice while BINDER was on leave. During *I¢t was BINDER who summoned the Embassy Security Officer, Hugh MONTGOMERY, to America House in the summer of 1962 when he becaze suspicious of "LILLIAN," the “Austrian” girlfriend of the U.S. military code clerk ‘iatthew Z2UJUS,.. After. telling MONTGOMERY that she was going to her hotel to get her passport, which would prove her nationality, “LILLIAN” disap peared and was not seen.again at America House,. NOSENKO re- ported this incident, but associated it with the development of another military code clerk (see Part. V.E.3. Ce). TO? sr j tat Dk RS hae ai Se 1. “Ge wi “4 3 i cs Rae BN in, ae ets A Enotes oat, een ge dahil tnileabiesds Sos
OOD BREE Ras es aeons nae isbn FIRES gE ES Nagar Sher ES, va BS a es sa their affair, BISTER occasionally gave MORELLI gifts of money and clothing but restricted his meetizgs with her to ; his room in the dormitory. In about February or March 1962 . a. - .MORELLI came to BINDER and said that she thought she. was ‘ oo pregnant; she sade no denands of BINDER, hovever,. and eaid i nothing about getting an abortion.:, Although at his first interview in Moscow BINUER said that MORELLI at no time ine. dicated that she was required to obtain information for the ——- .._..... Soviets,—he. told the _FBI-in. late. February_1963 that_on one. occasion in his rcom at America House NORELLI admitted: to him that she was sent to América House by the Soviets and that all employees there were required to meet is two groups once a month with their contacts [KGB officers] to discuss the America House personnel. ee : ! vests nda cis I | t 2 ores Bethe pee On the morning of 15 January 1963, the day of the ap- : : proach, BINDER left: America House on foot to get a haircut : at a Sovict barbershop, some 300 yards away. While he was ro, enroute, a car pulled up beside him, three “goons” strong=- : 4 armed him into the back-seat, and he was driven to ea nearby ; 3 Militia station. After some perfunctory questioning, one - : of the Militiamen made several phone calls, end an interro= gator arrived a few minutes later. The interrogator had a letter which he said had been mailed by NORELLI to the U.S, Embassy and had been inter- cepted by the KGB. The letter contained numerous allegations : i against BINDER, which the interrogator preceeded to list. Lg Anong then, BINDER was able to recall the followings: -Qn 25 November 1961 there was a party at America House fer Soviet employees, avter which BINDER and MORELLI went to BISCER's room. Subsequently BINDER and MORELLI lived tegether as man and wife. At another party, in December 1961, BINDER \ Ointed out five culisted men living in America House the letter named them} telling MORELLI that they were informants for John ¥V. ABIDIAN. the Embassy Security .Officer.* He told HORELLI that the girls working in America House should be particularly careful of Charles GIDARO, as he was sBIDIAN's righthand nan. eIn February 2962, MORELLI told BINDER that she was ‘ pregnant, aad BINDER instructed her to get an abortion. ~At the George Washington's Birthday Party. in 1962 BINDER pointed out ABIDIAN to NORELLI and Svetlana IVANOVA, another employee of America House, and told then bo to be careful of hin as he was the Embassy Security Offie es Se cer. . : : «~At some point BINDER gave a sewing machine to @ _ Soviet citizen to sell forhim. At another time BINDER crdered from the United States‘a coat for the America House exployee Luba TISHKINO, but then told her that it. had been lost in the mail, The. coat was not really lost, however; BINDER gave it to one of the old cooks at Amerie ca House because she paid him money for it. i i | | ¥See Part v. Evd.d@. concor-ing NOSENKO's responsibilities for ae t ¢ Sg ees ene Ste Te ae eer the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN. NOSENKO has not reported that the KGB was aware of these enlisted men serving as informants for ABIDI AN. | TOP SEGRET
conceals spn Reet domieEeR prieoreD Rstetiunte tiene nitive ese Os Mr. LOHRER of the West Cerman Exbassy, the. interrogator asked if BINDER hid given LOHRSR goods to sell on the After asking whether BINDER was acquainted with fos t Soviet market. -In April 1962, BINDER told MORELLI that Hugh | oe MONTGOMERY had arrived at the U.S. Enbassy as Security , Officer, that NONTCOMZRY was a good friend of his, and ; 0 $ that he had told MONTGOMERY about his affair with __ wee “2h —- — -- --MOREELI-but-MONTCOMERY Had told him not to worry abeut \ \ t -BINDER told MORELLI and Svetlana IVANOVA that : Richard C, JACOB,* a U.S, Embassy employee, was a "well- trained spy" and that MORELLI] and IVANOVA should there. fore be carsful of his. vie Te . In cescribing his convergation at the Militia station, BINDER said that, after the interrogator had asked'a number of queetions, he, BINDER, complaired that the Soviet was vee ‘talking *oo fast. An interpreter was thereupon called in and remained until BINDER «as questiored concerning JACOB, At this point. the interpreter left and the interrogator continued to question BINDER on persoral matters. Except for the relatively short tims the interpreter was there, all questioning was in Russian, which BINDER generally undere stood. After discussing BINDER's fanily, the interrogator 7 : asked BINDER what ought to be done about the letter and the , . 1 charges it contained. He suggested that if the letter were gent on to the American Ambassador, to whom it was addressed, U.S, officials would not belicve BINDER’s denials of the charges, his career in the Army would be ruined, and BINDER Wuld 0 longer be able to support his two daughters, According to BINDER, his reply was that there was nothing he could do if the Soviets decided to forward the letter, and "that would be that."" The interrogator then left the room. elas tet mete tetas fe When he returned about 15 minutes later he spoke to BINDER in a friendly manner, commenting that BINDER had been in Moscow for almost two years and that it was obviously ; importent for him to finish his tour there and remain in the i j Army. BINDER agreed with this. The interrogator then said : that BINDER's actions whiis in the Soviet Union had been quite i : ‘proper, that he had always been very fair to the Soviet girls who worked for him, and that he, the interrogator, had decided to help him, The Sovist continued that he was going to forget about the letter and ail the charges contained in it and that the letter would not be forwarded, He ealso pointed out that ‘ . &s- the ietter was not going anywhere, <here was no need for : _ BINDER to mention the incident of his arrest to anyone. BIN- Po i - DER was then driven back to the barber shop. a “ BINDER summed up the entire ircident, which lasted a little over two hours, by saying that the approach. was very - low-key and that at no time was he specifically asked to aup= ‘ply information to the Soviets, although this was implicit in the remarka of his interviewers, A AeA dee ede bee _  *8ee Part VI.D.7.b. regarding the detention of JACOB in connec- tion with the PENKOVSKIY case. . we tant ake | | o Niel Lalidiahaninntet ant + i
? 2 Ri During questioning by U.S. authorities afterwards, i BINDER seid that he had denied ‘he truth of the allegations, | A pointeby-point, and that, apart from the charge that he was L J intimate with MORELLI, none of them, in fact, were true. = ' 3 Specifically, BINDER told Army questioners in June 1963 that i ae a he had laughed at his interrogator when the latter attributed } t i i t ments concerning MONTGOMERY and JACOB : BINDER denied to his U.S, Aray inter~ } 4 viewers (as he said he had to the Soviets) that he knew ; 4 a “~~ "ON TCOMERY “personally, that-he kad told MONTGOMERY of hig-—--—-~ - an ae ae affair with ¥ORELLI, and that. be had told MORELLI he had ! a done so. He said that he told the Soviet interrogator i 4 that it was "ridiculous to believe that Richard JACOB was rs : a spy.’ In fact, BINDER said, he had no knowledge of JACOB's : duties in Moscow and had only slight personal contact with hin. | i i 1 ' beet “ 4s a Be : m7 4 BEL Rare ; ss 7 ™ ‘ t
74-90000 5. Operations Involving Other Westerners fe id } ok a. Tabulation I . 4 {1} Introduction : oe MOSENKO has provided identifying information on 90 ¥GB agents, probable agente, and operational contacts of Western (but non- : A American) citizenship and he nas described an additionai 12 de~ . i 3 velopment and investigation operations ‘against such third-country ~ yo a nationals. AS indicated in the following tabulation, 55 of 7 y NOSENKO's recruitment leads and five of the 12 unvestigative : i and developmental leads were contained in the notes which he brought tmthe meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1964 and which ene abled him to provide specific information on these individuals, for example, their dates of birth anc precise. dates oz reeruit- j ; : ment. At the same time, however, NOSENKO generally furnished \ : 3 comparatively fewer details concerning the KGB operations against \ : other Westerners than he did in his leads to American cases; i F often his information did not exceed that written in the notes. He has disclaimed personal participation in all but four of his cruitment leads and two of hia investigation/cevelopment cases. /For the most part NOSENKO's foreign leads are based upon informa- tion which he said he learned casually and noted for passage to TA during the time he was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Depart- J ment in 1962 and 1963. (With certain exceptions, NOSENKO nas . been questioned less about his other Western leads than about hia ve be tdas whe t+ sine ‘. er eeearens shel e emte et one et Gon cree meme mereatent wo q 4 3 q 4 £ 5} : 3 4 ' ' cant em ee ena oe Eee many a nana i i PONE, te Sr on cate eke Rot ciel a th na ae nat
gent Leads LEADS Regier cae sees ene Sa ng abot = Sie ie Snow, is a long-time erties agent. HSELKO did) not know the “t date of recruitment, the basis of Witment, nor what type of informa~ be had provided to the Kob. iglieved cs P. DAVIDYAN was the’ cas. : Sister Born in Odessa how ‘an “Argentine citizen; was con- ted in Odessa by the Chief of the omd Department of the Odessa KGB, a) VARYUS*; he was met again in 4 SCOw. er Te tera not eee see ee munngey te act pean ae + .o second dep artmerts of local KGB units are provincial counterparts of the Second Chief Directorate in’ se egreteinnes come woe bee Re rem 475. SOURCING AND DATE Of REPORT INVESTIGATION RESULTS Seurce not named. (1962 and oF 1564) Eade! canta 3 sie - oe 956 until 1963) aur ° ° Earlier CIA aeeeres tet that he is oS ” a KGB agent stemmed from his long ° ; tour in Moscow, his pro-foviet atti- ‘ tudes, and his ability to conduct large-s scale blackmarket activities in Moscow with impunity. g@@eiey tray was in official liaison with Soviet <a representatives in Kabul prior to pes : his assiqnment to Moscow; his rela- & . tions with these Soviets were re~ erry , portedly cordial. Sige apparently BS gave his full persoiia support to Sioa Prime Minister DAUD's program of ex- 7 panding Afghan military and other ties to the Soviet tnion. Contrary opinions have been receives which describe him as pro-West or at least staunenty nationalistic. NOSENTO . { "S i ; Source not named, but Tourist ‘aid Cp ppaalchi. geal ; Department involvement. (1964 investigation 3 SO iar has disclosed . notes) no contacts with Soviet Officials ‘ a in Argentina.
manne meaelt ee oreet oe A tapas res ne ete eee RATER TE seh neers we remey n arn sees FRATTON mS RRR ry eee the vy 476. ‘by an officer of) the Tourist ent, Second Chief Directorate, & recruited. Currently a business-~ Buenos Aires andj has relativeg in fj]; this case has been turned over ne Pirst Cnief Directorate. . . . . 2, tnu: BS Argentine Fecruiced in Moscow in 1961 or. 1962 eerie nae Source not mamed, (1964) . ‘ployee ofr .the agmMosexual grounds. | Recruited by : ; Argentine Embassy in Moscow, cone e IMALYUGIN of the Fifth Section, fessed to his superiors on 5 Decem= ‘@) rfcan Department, Second Chief Birec- ber 1961 that he had been reeruited . &.. ate, in Moscow in 1962.* . by the KGB cn homosexual grounds. . pe The case officer who acted ag in- ~ : terpreter in aes recruitment bn was V.L. ARTEMYEV, whom NOSENKO . Ft “ has identified ag one of the case CH officers under his supervision in rt 5 1960-61. a ee we: An Australian who Source not named. (1964 notes) eyto the USSR as a tourise in 1960 was Cuntacted at the request of Berst Chief Directorate; she- me — B agd ta cooperate and is an opera~ fF i. n@l contact, . net an lagent. . “Austria ep (fnu): Tae pu htt ae NOSENFG first learned about Fite cea teeg: Ee Pct vag ns ont Berto, in Moscow was possibly SEER when he was working in pg Sets euina inet ual ata in : ryited after an extensive culti- American Department in 1960 and Frou 1957 to 1962. ‘ ode by GRIBANOV in the period 1961, but he could not pinpoint ESTES 0. the date mora precisely. Source whe was Nikolay IGNATOV, who visited the Department on the ordera of O-e- GRiBANOV, Chief of the Sec- nd Chief Directorate, to obtain os se ~requirquenta. (1964) Fnoncos to NOSENKO, the Fifth Section of the American Department is concerned with Moscow.
An Rast-West tracer eet and a KGB agent; ceuited in Vienna by two KGB offi- there on TDY. ' he I ME UNKNOWN: The code clerk at the Strian fabassy in Moscow in 1960 gia KCR agent. tod | : d' Belgium Sete ead neem tee our Tyoe 1S Lt. Col. ROMANOVICH of the Tourists) of the che is a tour eruited On 25 July ERSEYEV and Cept. x@h Section (Auto ugist Dep: resent ; s iveig™ A Belgian, was re~ Utted on 14 Guly 1962 by the Tourist particnt; he is a bus driver for 477. NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva a COPY of the offi Tourist Department involvement. (1964) BUBNOV of the Third Depart- Second Chief Directorate, ENKO in 1960 about this (1962) O.S. ment, ‘told NOw agent. Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) : iggthe subject of several de- nunciationg as a Soviet agent, is Communist sympathizer; he offered his services to CIA in March 1961 but was terminated in 1962 on the basis of an unsatisfactory poly- graph examination, lack of produce tion,-.and gencral suspicions concerning hie probable KG agent status. . ARORAREY a code clerk in Moscow dur ing the late 1950's, hee cume involved with a young Russian girl and was questioned about this by his superiors, who suspected KGB sponsorship; he was removed from cryptographic work in 1961 and placed in a non-sensitive job. After reviewing CIA information on te NOSENKO confirmed that rare wae the name of the agent on whom he had reported. & also known a8 » Visited the Czech issels on at least (See entry on van de Embassy in- casion. His identity has been confirmed (See entry of “PORES PORTA E PEM eg a oF yee Fear ee EN nena MA pine Anti HOE HIN BARRERA TOL TR REE POR RAMA ADR ICN TE RGB COR # ETN ee 1 tae aa” repte ae mersigtes
Loe Tr ry A KGB agent nas given mayerial; he is a bus for the "YE agency. UNRNOWN: An “officer of unknown ‘Sratiies ‘whoa is employed at a NATO Ldllation in Relgica, is an ux- adly valuable KGR agent; the agent Ae involved in cipher dotk, as he gupplied large quantities Of infor= ié6n which has assisted the KGR in S| ng enciphered NATO communications. sets from the Special Technical eon of the Second Chief Director- éravelled TOY to Brussels to assist "i a the operation during 1962. . Recruited on Tourist Depart- August! 3 he wotks for “to meet with her | case officers ‘nm, she returned to the USSR in 1963; 4s an interpreter for DEST wy this case will probably ve” yred to KGB Archives. nee pres abot ee Pod r 478. Source not named. (1964 notes) NOSENKO learned of this Crom L.A. LERCDEV, Second Chief Directorate technician, who assisted in an entry into the installation. (1964) Source not numed, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) : Source not named, (1964 notes) Ter Serpe rere yt en : he had .been recruited by Soviet. In- \ telligence. He indicated that \ other. employees of the @ wear agency were also Soviet nents. (See also comments for LEBEDEV's travel to Belgium | | indicates this operation took place. in July er October 1962. pet at 4 - - -
Te TT pr cree. ne gpa ay geeg som wee ge 1 1 1 Brasil i . > Bn ee EY A Russian emigre ow ee in pratil, where he owns a oprist firm; recruited by the Tourist apactmont in 1963. | m & COMposer and con- ugtcr; was recruited in Moscow in ugust 1957. i a nas Cte) A naturalized ‘a Soran eee 2On Of Latvian origin; cae recruited, 2b the request of the 3 First Chief Directorate, by the aAdtic 7G while visiting the baltic se@ntries in about October 1963. Bat oA Wa " a EB OUNSNOWN: A former ci icizen of egminy was brought to the Soviet. ndo for Ttliegals training in 1963 n Ln contect with Wu.r. GUk. ik oe pevson fe] active efis su wuordi; vee roland in contact i$h the KGB Ledal Residency. Much ia data known by NOSENKO AME OUNFNCUN: Canadian Enbassy code (grr, “ho was recruited in Moscow bGut 1957; he later went to Warsaw fre he was contacted by a KGB sffi- fon TOY, in Cunada,: where wee eee nape ot Goer ee egetemneny en sets wetteee ee pea mene 479, oource not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 noles) Source not named. (1964 notes) Source not named. (1964 notes) “whO learned of this case fron GUK in 1963. (1964) Source not named. > ORE Sete, Suspicions that he is a KGB agent pre-date 1963, Interviewed in June a 1965 and denied any approach by 0 the KGB. Greer honest i a long-time Braziliun Communist. His contacts with Soviets are open. . ; 'e' tonne agent > AEny cic in Germany ARSE was compromised to the Sovince nd doubled by them in the 1950's. Confessed Soviet re= cruitment immediately to U.S. handl- evs and was aided in emigration to Canada. Later recontacted by KGa in Canada and reactivated. (See , Part VI.d.5.c.) - A Canadian Embassy guard who confessed his recruitment has been confirmed by NOSENKO as the subject of this ia ——e ae ryre trae one le TIP RAE evertese ape tbat lem rep rE rere ete maT FS mer TO 8 CUE oo Cet erect ae gtr me
TH tag eos Pay Tepe ame ae parte ‘ { { Ao Tanadian of Ukrainian vantage was contacted by the Tecurist vwariment while in the UASR as a tourist December 1967: although not fully re- wited, he came to an| agreement with a /jofficer and may be contacted in ida by an Iilegal. , Gy PGP on 1954; : ecenited. i oie about 1953 or sf CRIBANOY revsomalily involve: in 3@? TEUNAQ Dooughh thet Crete cic theoouerate with XGal after he left BGOV comuentied thal a case Lids would not be a ae Vnnt, b.e., thece would Me ave Goan a iret pI goucn, cad ne secrecy : Aypreements or we « pen nornal ly be required, 4g0. Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) In 1962 when NOSENEO first sup- slied this lead, GaSe rEreae Pe ae URES he said he had reeennnty of te cage Frou conversa> tion with the case otficers. In 466 he seid that V.B. CHELNOKOV, who was later his imacdiate supere- viser in the Tourist Department, had participatec in the recruit- ment while he was in the Second (Anglo-Canadian) Department, Sec- ond Chief Directorate, in about 1953. NOSENKO also said that he first heard of the case in 1955 or 1956 during an oafficia: visit to the city of Viadimir, where the le KiB told him the story of having visited Viadisir an 1954: while there he manifested homosexual tendancies while he was drunk: NOSENKO said BASRA got so drunk that he lest his shoes and they were later returned to him through the mails in Moscow. {1362 4 > ar wala . F) GOLITSYN provided information about . KGB operation-1l interest in@iegegte ducing ES BEGESP first tour in Moa- ‘cow, between 1944 and 1951; the Kose was aware that SEO was a home ood sexual; GOLITSYN knew that the KGY ee5 . was working on GREESe buc did not a . i know whether he had been approechad, i: In 1964 was interviewed con | *. cerning his experiences in Moscow. "ty te admitted having been compremised, — on the basis of homosexual activi- ties, during his tour ag & A 2 batwoen March 2954 and april OF tay ! 4 ! wee tam tea foren ecR tang penn age EIDE Phoned i 3 AB ERE kote . . : t ae meyer eng: peer et rane rere regret con ee gaot
NAME UNKNOWN: A low-level emolcyee of the Cqyptian embassy in Moscow was a KCD agent targetted against America House; he was recruited in Mascow prior to 1961 on the basis of speculatory activities. G.I. GRYAZHOV and V.V. KOSOLAPOV ef the Ame vican bepartment [helped the agent's case otficer in the Sixth Department, KSN Second Chief Direc terate, sell] 200 to i300 wateches that the agent had obtained abroad. This case officer and GRYAZNOV met with the agent; NOSHNKO did not know who had recruited him. (1) Finland H er ee QP as . eee Peevetie. Sie EO taal we : RGR agent, She wOorad for tu x firm and also for the Finnish Your set Agseociation; recruited by the Tourist Départment and the local KGB organs ia Leningrad. ' : Q. Recruited in Loo by the’ Tourist De- partment with the aid of the Leningrad KGD; she works in a travel bureau in Finland. sesterin oan er tain tome 481. Source not known. (1964) Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) No source given, but Tourist Desartment involvement. (1944 notes) BIEN UE, ; ‘ the UAR Embassy, Moscow, was known to tg residents of America House. Ha ree portedly involved several American code clerks with women and in black- — market activities. See Parts V.E.3.¢. and VI.B.2.
seveon geo ty Terr ey yet hu is a bus driver 3 mnish tourist agency @aeyy SOS the KOR believed &: @nterest to American Intelliyonce. e{sow known as Fer vate ba . ‘ ae DES) He worked Ourist agency, Sut -€t it in 1963; recruited in 1l%s61; & case has been retired to KGB | | | | { HON ie emgemapen mae gees ae 432. Source not named. (1964 notes) Source not named. (1964 notes) Source not named, bus Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes)
14-00000 TT PTET at vo TAPe Re oH treet ants sts ? wet ree we wee Stat we wwe. A : . . | i | s, . 4s3. , : ; ® ae ee ek eee ef KGB No source given, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 @ent: she ; notes) BAS aes ram arsity. Recruited (date unspecitied) yi the Seventh Department jointly with he Leninerad?d KGR crgans. etary STE ae aE wate rad 4 - By oaloyed by a travel No souree, but Tourist Depart~ c. Fe ruited by the ment involvement. (1964 notes) 9 @intly with the ; in 1962... ¥ | : : se : : ; wth: Was recruite. in 1943 t. source giver, but Tourist ; ‘ bepartment, but has pro- Lepartment involvement. (1964 4 L@ed no inforsation as yet; she works ’ notes) are : ; , ROR wa" NRO TI ENS UM NT een der pone , oF the CITC mar abe a RT a A ° i q | : 3) nf HOSENKO gave this lead first in sod o June 1962. NOGENKS reported on ef Pegurten: MATIN fo. By 967 to be a rveccuited agent cf the KGB; 30 January. 1964 that oe learned moiGsa, NSSTNEO suid ha was not cer- of tha operation in 1961, whon he accompanied O.M. GRI- BANGOV to a reception of the Ind- ian Embassy and realized from a4 comment made by @& me that he vas a friend of GrinanoV's and an i . agent. On 16 February 1965 NG- SENKO said he learned of the case mainly through friends, and that . ; : the Indian reception had been held ‘ in 1958 or 1959. (1962) ST eRe MIE te at
O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief secomt Chief birectorate, is cgonally handling this import agominent French businessman; ‘Muited as early as ‘1956 or 195 frequently comgs to Moscow gar ghe tant agent, ne was and omy geet PRIA ET FE EWE: te we, SobE ch cary ad wy Antes a uF imiuated in aed ine yourlst veparte 3 he is a section head in th ych tovrist elem QS UI SE ieee 434, NCSENKO said he knew there was such @ French agent but did not knew the name until “there was a call placed to the General (GRIBANOV), and when 1 asked from whem is the call, thon it was clear to me." (1964) e® not named, but Source Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) Ae pA TIRER EER RE IONE earner gripper erecta stom MOR ea BF wo creme: mye remap Art Tag GA. inset Sebortatk ne nade a ey Ofen tein to thé USSR and ree portedly boasted of belng in contact with Genera GRIBANOV and others there. i, erate ern Ge SOs Soa arte, ere ae ie: pares eo eet Be Sesh & vs Bat SASSO Tore TA Myce LONE ae ee gee a Ta gy ah, ‘3 ith A PBbee Te ee ee ol 8 39
Bp ashes SR Goa ase ie ‘QB AN PariS; WAS eared ta ere 95 9 the Tourist Department; he works as ide and interpreter for various meh tourist agencies, A lenional a gorrespondent cy tasheld oak Te in Moscow; a Long-tiie cond A eaeee reckora ate agent. | NO=- iKO said @s@rwas working for the eth Departmen (counterintelili- i@e_ ayainut employces of embassics Cee ee ee : eS Pata ge rd aa iene: onecruates an lyoy aBaot Cepartment; she wag an inter- ster tor tourast groups visiting the vhet Unioa during 15577933 by “the av Padi fee: say a eed Ra oVttzen Wing, in Paris; WAS reguited in 1963 by the Tourist be- rément; he is a teacher of geag raphy Jinistory at some college and work: he summers for the! National Tour ticenter. | ae a aE SIS ey nan? feat ‘e #,: ust he Likes gl Ro@ aoe is, th in ites he as, Che Director of my aa ee aS LS be sp nF x agency in Freee tas ope meine me rope noe ere ype: ose eames renee te, OH ED 465. oy Not identified. Snurce not named, but Tourist Lepartiment involvement. (1964 notes) NOSUNKO heard passing references from case officers of the Second Chief Directorate. (1964) Seaurce nol named, but Tourist De~ Not identified. oe purtmoent involvement, (1964 notes) on prs co e Souree not named, but Tourist De- Not identified. partment invelvement. (1964 notes) NOGETKO learned about & i trom Yu.G. GRICHMANOV, Chief of e the Second Section, Tourist Depart= ment. (1964 notes)
eam OREN IEE : A ” ‘ mers . | ‘ ° 4 486. ~ goes leg Recrvited on 16 Source not named, but Tourist Not identified. Agt LUUS oy etficers from the Tour- Department involvement. (1964 . Department and the Ukrainian EGR; notes) ver cir dyes 2 al ei . . ig a bus driver for the f Sacen edst aqency. BE lB - Germany ; : RS ae Pee SS eer; | Source not named, but Tourist De- formerly a hos agent in Kagakhse partment involvement. (1964 notes) was re-reeruited byithe Tourist agvtment in 1963. ta ~ ge Reerubted in 1963 3 t ourist Departinent; dives in pa akfurt and is employ ea by tho Baw tourist agency. ource not named, but Tourist Be= rtiment involvement. (1964 notes) \ on . — : SBRESTE” owner of the SMa MRE Scurce not named, but Tourist Bis a Communi st-controlled . vel agency; recruited in 192 b, Dapartment involvement. (1964 ‘ Fourist Department. - notes) 1 | i itctll pe bey or Se eas Pe ds isa, 6a wd KGB exyptonym Source not named, but Tourist De- fe TO“; an eaployee of the as lets 2 partment involvement. (1964 notes) rs vel agency, waa recruited by whe bee ale r§at Department in 1963. 3,
14-00000 TR CTU RINE VotT TF ro meas aaa spe ee Ty ee arc res co ” ws . mE net See teeny emer vee ee 7 aS Ae rete ttg mine eter eset ste Psy fi : 487. ME UNKNOW!: West Garman businessman ; NOSENKO heard about the lead from APR agent who Megts personally with the Tourist Department officer A.P. Mg GRIBANOY, Chief of the Second SARAPKIN, (1964) 1@6f Mlrectorate, whe né@s to Moscow. m the German \ BR as cep MB OUNNDOWN: Woe Gegman dep hlitree Source not named. (1964) Not identified. ~ Dein a RG ae PE eer Ee . i. re ahi AGE nt; & pe EI A Tied EN Te Aan vies no Biter ~Tden= sabe! fying information a lable. t . . os INET s west German code clerk 0.8. SUBNOV of the Third Be- Not identified. gfresrutied by the KGB in 1961. NO- perimant, Second Chief Direc- ng NRO tnought this agent was no lenger torate. (1962) corey Moscew as of 1962. . * ‘J i - nine ME OUSRNOWN: KGB cryptonym "AUGUST"; Source not named. (1964 notes) Not identified. eg M@st German citizen;! he owns a cona- rid reaction firm: was recruites in the , ; rand BR by the Tourist Department in 1960. “ ) Served as a KGB Source not named, but Tourist - Tore aie during World Department involvement. (1964 cjIl and was re- ~racruited by the notes) a utist. Departrent on a visit to the . eet tele eee works inSirey ‘ Pr oe | fae Hamburg wis Mass baw ed le | ' é on Ee Travel agency Source not named, but Tourist : ricrutled in 1962 by Department involvement. (1964 e3fuurist Department; the KGB sus- notes) ets he may be a double agent; the s@ is of no value. | | , ‘ . . + I. \
Jas eras ase Le eee pages oma * Le TO a ages Pom, An enpioyec cf the fan Evpansy in Moseow fram 1957 L 61 and a KGR agent. ‘ va . . ite. oe : Indian diplomat Mines 2 PTs SES YeMeP either a athe nmioot = aA rage es pes, ™ tion he Rey mi wl, aiid Co nlact, gs cae SE oy te ag TUM Se a ee ae * oo lap RIVE he wos met by in Geneva. Gu returnod 2 in Auyust 1963 to meet paki goes ‘etl Yd sation get eas MOSCOW i a! the had Embassy in Moscow, but . Feccuited by the KGB. , “HOSEDKO gave the robot named age S was reeruitod by ed on this change, NOSENKO wae. ow not sure be-thore were LWOoO ive who it was Heparate woe SEC" wake at gad Ce wae Sinn i Bw haat teh ian ae ‘ssistant Naval Attac aS OULACH I. Deen eet” Thee had same in- tho ea id and eases. Eo sliplomatic List which meee tee the os So a Fs anh gts names led i Tre: —— _bnr BBY i i Yas wehody named me lot “there. Was Lieb rae BALES stake din Nos sENEKO il yaar in 1962 - baht earlie xe the name ul tek ENOIRN : A member of the Iran “In v Moscow isa KGB agent. the Wa SENKO had lan No - 4aub, No source named. (1964) Yu.I.GUK told NOSENECO ai-out this case in Geneva in 1962, and BONTENED told CTA then. The 1963 Getail NOSENFG Learned from GUK alse, DULACHI's attempt to recruit €e eee a port= restaurant was overheard by means able microphone on the of tabla where the conversation took plava. NOSENKO was at that time Donuty Chief of the American Emb- ass ection (in October 1966, NOSENSO said that this took place vitor he had relinquished his ree spcnsibiliicies for which ducluded DULACKTI, in the spring of 1960). and juGa) (1962 No source given. (1962) Naval Attaches-- a Marine-= parergera te nema 8 ae seme 4 ae 4 Ronee dee ein eee, pee el ah BP o “ Ratt cS ore! é ee Rate Not identified, but two Iranian Bab~ . assy employees are known to have’ 1 fithe nenenpeeseemnepemeeine f+ AP ke " b SN eat i 9 Rc on file, ene pm pepe ORE LOIS dOL Leet een ATEN AONE: | ARREARS IOe sworn teaake Yh LLB eA cat, Ae ne 2) dee Eee I
489. Personal involvement in the KCB investigation of Pavel SHAKHOV as a possible American agent. (October 1966) Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) and the other in 1962. The name mon the Iranian diplomatic list.seemed vaguely familiar to NOSENKO.. This name appears in the CHEREPANOV Papers (Part VI.B.7.¢.). Not identified. Ste omega semen nertesey ta aren ys oS oremenaae pruning, 8 URAL AT oe seeeeutagerantanaye 8 os < eS ree bs aacwned a ae ., we ’ eg bs *
LETT EF teil gt senegegeenase: fone greases wee eae ne ane ee eee eee or hy ee ‘ : Bey emi: cegeatioR pepe eR ay pa Rt - aga rong * - rate nb tee deat eae be nee tee ee beets cm mes tena hy meaemennet teenies artemtmaeiome ihe ADAMANT MEIER Ae es areata hy werte! t ‘ é 490, weet: One lof a group ef Source not named, but Tourist turists detected muiling letters for Department involvement. (1964 i@ NTS an 1963; was detained and notes) : - was toen : Wd hy leased, pe Wea Source net named. (1964) peeaEs to refer to GER . Teh ! ‘i aera Sister was enployed ; ‘wited on homosesaual eoandas ho ae Embassy in Moscow. ae brother omployed at the U.S. a eed or Bie Yong : say. ee . on eS i oad Ere - < $ a Involvement with NOSDNKO's tardet, ABIDIAN {sec Part ViE.3.d.). (1962) , ear ar "7 . ae an * GETRMGNEP in the ° rmbassy ain the I Tee l aso! Si was raruit wioby the Gb Gn the besis of Lackina: ket Gealings. . Me was re- Interviewed by CIA, he repeated Lic Poae' ryited seh aaeT as tiv, _ hy S| yoacey - of be. pperted this to the Koa. gare See” AN | atdan citizen JET Inet in Moscow) he was re- ruitec in the USSR by the Tourist partment in Mry 1961; he is a guide nd interpreter for tourist grovps n@ at Italian oxhibitions. ay DLP et pret teammane wee a Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) ~ denials that he was a KGB agent and said he made up the story of his — recruitment by ABIDIAN to the KGB off." *gcare Cg yy Bet Pe a eet oe ene me meen cenneraearn tems aa ZS see
i $s 491. : ME_UNKNOWN: Italfon journalist NOSENKO heard from two officers Not identified. cfuitec an 1963; basis of re- of the Tenth Mepartment, Second ugtment was not known. ; Chief Directorate, that V.f. . KEVORKOV of that Department “must ; qo meet his Italian correspond- ent.” ‘ , , Ds sae Ee Seer = fecruited Source not named, but Tourist yod v the Tourist Department Department involvement. (1964 homosexual aqrounds; he is a pro- neles) “a S@Or of GRRE ee at the University ; Rome. Source not named. (1964 notes) j eee mei ted in rhe SR oan [46L when ho was caught i: 1@ intel? agence activity in Baku; was planned to turn him over to pyFirst, Chief Olrectocat- during Tokyo Olympics in 1964. SHOES dO 4a, <0 contecced with his 1961 trip, CIA ; in Japan characterized ag a ‘ “well-known intelligence purveyor, though not known to bean actual fabricator. He was suspected of | selling stock in his trip to all... hands." CoS
e Lun n RAK réel company: reeruLpes 28K aAftinent: : ver to Lie k Sor compa i I ol | TREE EY Ene venerretme simbanenryenye eet copia pte Ropresentatives ¢ Company, whicna deal Seviet Unions has been Mrs ited by the KGB (no date given). Sef Diss e wo KGRlcrypten y aaaecuor Gf Ge. mn oleed by the Tourist De- not yer been turned B Legal] Residency tree gee ypronys Pee Ges F was 3 Since he tod orted tne AG 1 I ‘ nGB cryptonym Swodish citizen of ; ‘ aa weet fal ty tie USSR dn 1960 at the of the Pirst |Chieg Direc- fe ab PRIRTIOWN 3 A codé clerk in the w moaussy in Moscow in 1962 Bpules was a KG agent; assisted the KGB > e Pp ntering the Embassy to photo- ho code materials. 492. Sanree not named, (1964 notes) Source not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 noes) Ssurce not named. (1964 wae motes} Gfgurce nok tamed. (1964) Source not named. (1962) sre ogc ape gmegete: stint - ~ ct ntriame pros “ Foner rip ay BLS: TALE OE a é bk al ww Re ag ri os at
lseaswiescs om Ser yep ur wte “ATR ry riay eet acre | PET (fnu): Japanese businera- Mah ih Moscow © recruited by the 'rourist epartnent in 1957 or 1958. | I . Se KSB frypronym "VLADIMG rec OS by the Toutis Sepactiment L962 and wags to be turned Over to °GB Legal Resice ency in Tokyo for h ". ope in the tainli~- | [s} Mexico Mexican ds plomat ; “Tn ee from 1960 to L9h2; ce agent. £ Re tte bom nt neve eggeets seg fe va meer eee ae 493, Source not name ad, but Tourist Department involvenent. (1964 notes) Sanrece not named, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964 notes) Source not named, (1964) mya crates me peeyanar am meng me pean sae pierre eer ty has. had longstand- onnections in the USSR. gong rab 986
te pee ro Derren Se aapapS pe mete mere Ae ee« Seat cited tens 4 benamberee te coe ye: A een er Bids weiter aeeetoNy hy WeM. Vile SEY RV Latin American Section, Amori- Department, in 1961 while a 5 ist in USSR; “very valuable ‘@ later turned over to the KGB st Chief Directorate; in January 2@he received 51,006, from the «AGE al Residency in Mexico City for €ilim runt of an ssignment. (In ater intervicw in 1964 » NOSENKO d, that ope was a valuabie agent the a Directorate, First @f Directorate, and it was from g@ component that the! $1,009 came.) t Netherlands wee eet N be te on Ik & eee Recruited by the “WC pacte at Guriing uly 19623 yothe Dutch firm ‘ee ear i as eed Posy Pm; he has, provided se to the KGB. kuccuLted t Department ater ust Soo wy fie Touris the basis of a sexual conpro- she Lives with her @ina parks hand in 4 . rec torate. . ) (Norway Sere; meet Norwegian journal- hameda see Swas recruited in sgow in 3°57 or 1958. NOSENKO ok part in the operation by NOSENKO received this infor- mation from YELISEYEV. POR AAC iby, gs notes) agent"; 494. (1964 Source not named, but Vourist Department involvement. {1364 notes) Source not named, but Tourist Department Lavolvement. (1964 notes) Personal involvement in develop- mental stages of operation. (1964) os ot fae rte eteengen reper vepme + nap mente meen amermn sar patency tea ety qergerne EEA OP a eee A journalist travelled to. “the USSR in 1957; later wrote an article in which he told of re- cruitment'on basis of blackmarket activities, but didn't mention sexual — oye eee ny ET ELT fo 3
wee pmeppeermtpestdie cee manne enna > Lew wee ee ete gene cert oy wane ee Senet een, emer Tse. SnTum eh opine meme eI AEA oH ~ rupee men semtciel sy : 7" at iN ea Se apd earpet ene! beeen Re ome dime Eze es RD reveatsar meuemrpigte tere em ste fees een eee cee nee oe oe Fe ee te teen ae ae fe a a Be Sead operating seater see nen ae a i i i i 495. i : ntroducing Seis to qirls anc then aA Se eek Described person who by setting him up for arrest on played role NOSENKO sald he played. wWharges of blackmarketearing.,  Re= See Purt 4.0.4.g., ferurtmont made by KAN. Pune of Trurish Departmant. Ae erted the approach after Besk. but did not tell whole story. | Hoo source named. (1964 notes) tine KGD begal City: his son, Lumugnba linaverecsaty an KG Soureca not named, but Tourist vwnment anvolvement. (i964 Peed yak since LOSas ne ir the KGB eryptonym "NINA"; Source not named, but Tourist Finanish national: was m rinent involvement. (1564 by the Tourist Deparimengc oun ar ; L@Sooor 280 de she works for sh tourist! agency QB i» n Sweden. ee: KGB evyptonyn - bouree not named, but Tourist recruited in 1963 by the Dopartment involvement. (1964 Tourist Department on the basis of notes) homosexucl. materials gathered during @ 1962 trip to the USSR; he is a ‘representative of the © &fieey Travel Agency. ; we % } ‘ | ' \ i \ 1 1
Peer Une ates aT Oe RY recruited | in Seer ake By 964 apparently not cooperating with owiets any more because of fear. eee (fnu): RGB cryptc- "BUANNAT; a woman horn in Italy "4 now living in Geneva; was re~ ited in,1959 and turned over’ to h@ Geneva Legal Residency of the . G8; she has contacts with Americans. ‘Réported in 1962 without name or any efails except that there was a fe- ake agent of the Geneva Legal Resi- ency whose KGS cryptenym was NA" el. GAVRICHEV was meete- ng her at vthee time.) ve Tunisia - UNKNOWN : KGB ory at n "MAGR TO" TO EIEN ER anist oTON T BBiGE Be wan recruited by the Tour= s@ Department while a tourist in ha, USSR in 1960, 2}i United Kingdom (fnu) : In June or July 1959, OSENKO personally recruj ted a ritish subject named ee ns eS ae fter he had been comprdwh’seid“by omosexual agentg. . YEFREMOV. and 496. NOSENKO was told of this case by Yu.I. GUK in 1962 and S.I. GAVRICHEV in 1964, (1962) Ta 1962 heard from Yu.r. GUK of an incident invelving her. (1S62 and 1964 notes) Source not named, but Tourist Deportment invelvement. (1964 notes) Personal involvement. . (1964) Unidentified; investigations con- tinuing. | Not identified, Not identified.
% rex Recruited by the Uepartiment on 16 July 1962; he leetrical engineer, but owns Bean and was to be used as a KNOWN: — NOSEUKO personally re- tic : he $8 ae CT eS a {name not vecalled) nferinteiligence (service un- who suoplies information on iftelligence aad on agent. OMS; possibly from this agent Yeceived a report on the NATO nde in London that also contained ‘Wethods of operations of Ndand British counterinteLli- although specific agents tinamed in the report. WN:  #& member of the Brit= 2@alty recruited cn homosexual m Moscow in 1957. Mer ge Ee Corres pond~ Mgscow; was the target of 2 gitment operation in early RO was not certain whether MLE Te ey coerce esto 437, Source not named, but Tourist Nevartment involvement. (1964 notes) Personal involvement. (1964) Yu.I. GUK told NOSENKO about this agent in April 1962. See Part IIt. B. which describes NOCENKO's in- volvement with a Seottish girl in Geneva and GUK's warning that “the KSB has an agent in British counterintelligence whe could report indiscretions. (1962) NOSENKO was told of this casc by V.A. CHURANOY of the British. Department, Second Chief Direc- tovate. (1962) No source named. (1964) Not identified. (George BLAKE, a KGB agent in MI-6, passed the KGB coples of minutes of CIA-MI-6 conferences on legal travel operca- tions; one of the Conferences was neld in London in 1959; BLAKE was arrested in April 1961; thus he .could not have been the Soviet re= ferred to by GUK in 1962; see Part V.D.7.b.) Identical with William J.C. VAS= SALL; see Part V.D.5.b. for de= tailed discussion, ce ‘ee or he Wore: AHH038 dOL
sng ppp sate teggrerc e fH t at ~ fnus By himself NOSENKO re- rusted a British citizen named canies Wacow during the 1959 tourist sea- Fon the bas is of ‘homosexual compro= ise involving: ‘One of his homosexual gents, either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV. Bs@® turned over to First Chief inpctoiate.. sab Urvauay | ™ SE A Uruguayan citi- BNE W220 Lives 1. HMontevideo and is prominent tb SR paneer there ; ecruited in Mos cow in’ 1960 at the equest of the KG@ Illegals Direc- orate; ne was then turned over to hab darectorate for handling in onbevicco. bb) Venezuela EE id A dentist in i%59 by the Peg Tee gay + beet + ema gti eseae ee 2 Areas coatennnnmmenseas oe 498. are as twa ataOntl ay meme pene boa ee ae Personal involvement as case officer of homosexual agent and as recruiter. (1964) Seurce not named. Source not named, but Department involvement. notes} (1964 notes) Tourist (1964 (74035 da! wat
PYRE MErEpr espe pierre: Pe ene TETRTSE Ape TE eo Stare tp eepper tates Mee tanee > sepeataqner : a8 y . = tienes emaqieetmnas & ~ 4 - ' s 9 498. , if) Developmental and Investigation Cases ' 1 - LEAD SOURCING AND DATE OF REPORT pr : . ; ta 06 Travelled to th Personal involvement. (1964) “of 1987 as an ' . LUNSGLAN ‘ * ne tapleae Pnee CONTA AEE POSEN DO was PD hacud . . & » Bontact with Se Te eee pric . / > : Oa waster Ce tog : . eapmpanied them durkag sucks teur. a By ‘ . oes, . auge of pessible intelligence mission. : i 9 Approach contemplated or made. neti OR alei A Beitisn citizen and Source not nmumed, bul Tourist natant Bing ee yg Fe MLSS WHO visited Department involvement, (1964) he: USS2 in fess ana several times iy : the KGS is actively working his case, but has not recruited aH035 OL
Director of the ss nS ~ sere te : A ourist agency; was under ueveopment by the Tourist Depart mant ; First Chief Directorate asked that case be turned over to them. Hiss was dance. 2H Hanh ety pain qoes to the USse aes year. NOSENEO himself was in meace with ride Hbout 1957 or f but ca not resrvuit him at this time. See had realized what was nh ay tall ane severed the relationship. westill goes to the USSR and the ts Continues to surround faim wibh agents but he has not been recruited. ; eee Bw (fea): A canadian; is knoen TQ dave cagarsg fh hamosexual acts : while fn the USSR as a tourist in 195%; tiho KG will attempt to recruit him it h@ returns. NAME INKNOWN: KGB cryptonym "KOMETA"; AfBritisa woman who works fer some pub~ ldcaticn in London which publishes in the Russian language; she visited the USSR in 196] and 1962 with a spotting mission for Sritish Intelligence, ‘tRere had an affair with a KGB agent, aged has corresponded with him; when ‘the agent wrote that he would be com- ‘ig to the West on a visit in 1963, she replied by mail that she would like te sec him, but could not at that time; the KGB is waiting for the British to @e tha next move. St ce as SUE secon eee eRe terme eR Amero sitar a tere S 500. Source not named, but Tourist De- partment involvement. (1964 netes) Personal involvement. Source not named, but Tourist Dopartiment anvolvement. (1964 notes) Source not nomed, but Tourist Department involvement. (1964) bt he cauteen ee ott gap gare 7 siete aet gee cnereneem mine tied a 1 me ah adage a nk ; sna meamne doe Soin vo gp cmap tt ee = peat dae
aa seme mein sya Cres resmere gpert ergy eer Sakeg IO Prem ade ge nite ee Soest oT ws ela ta sent ml cat ae ne vane nee ee we veces ele wa cemepaaete imate emer aes vt es cmon amen montanes seamen + 501. IAME UNKNOWN: In 1960 or 1961 the KG3 Source net named. (1962) Not identified. a® preparing a recruitment operation : gaéinst a Rritish audic technician who ‘ame to the British Embassy in Moscow; 7 . . KGB female agent enticed him into ' : . ef apartment, where compromising h@etographs may have been taken; as far 38] NOGENKO knew, the KGB never made a ratruitment approach in this case. zg NAME UNKNOWN: A former Russian now in Source not named. (1964). _ SEMany 2 | thet KGB was trying to recruit him in 1961 threugh his sister or cousin who stiil lives in the USSR; the KGB has met him in} France; the outcome is unknown. NAME UNKNOWN: A young female Swiss No source named. (1964) Eoprist in the USSR who works for the police in Basel or @urich was contacted by] the KGB on hey complaint cf stolen mohey; the KGB arranged to return the ohey to her; she was assessed and the lead was pussed to the First Chief . . m Dikectorate. with KGB officers in Switzerland. GBP. PLT A Swedish tourist Source not named. (1964 notes) im beningras curing Juno 1963; tried ta@ recruit a Soviet citizen] | the Soviet was a KCB agent, and the entire approach was recorded; if #22, returns to the USSR an attempt will be made to ruit him.
Seren yg erae meer apogee coreg oe ee ce Lee fot eae ae renee ote tove- — asiatttranitinie binant nents ses Sane mmeeeties teeta sea eee aes wie ee tee e Fh eee oe reset see Lectmmaeneeitae ae 5 oo 502. » hl {fnu): A Duteh citizen; Source not name“, but Tourist yavellcT aaa tourist to the Soviet Department involvement, (1964 ‘Adon in 1959; ha was photographed in notes) oesexual activity and this will be s@d as a hasis for recruitment proach if he returns to the USSR. _ eet neee Lives on ‘rgunsenweig, Germany; vis ited the ‘SSR in 1959; the KGB suspects he is mosexual and will attempt to re- t him if he returns. Source not named, (1964 notes) iM yy 5 4 . a4 : roan a Pr a : : Q , i ie : : . f : Ve Z x # ‘ 3 *. 4 . a + te . baa n . . + 4 1 . tems mo woes Lo : whee atemenee ce een tenes semeeamanatttrs  clignacee utuitrammmnnegernanete erence phentermine pean ee Tone ee
oe inten heb b. The VASSALL Case (4) Information from NOSENKO At the 11 June 1962 meeting with CIA, NOSENKO first mention-... eg the lead which was later equated with William J.C. VASSALL, the KGB agent in the British Admiralty. Neither then nor later in 1962 did NOSENKO identify this agent by name. , NOSENKO was asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had ever heard af the KGB agent George BLAKE, "the man who compromi3ed the famous tunnel operation in Berlin."* NOSENKO replied: “Yes, I did. But ‘ll tell you this, that there was a far more important Englishmi.a who was our agent than BLAKE.** He is @ very Cig man, and from him we get all kinds of materials, We get all the details about NATO, He is our number one agent, the best of all intelligence informa- tion. He hed been in Moscow, and we recruited him there. We got him on @ homosexuality charge, a very extreme one involving: multi- ple persons. The case officers who recruited him received the Order of Lenin... He is not an intelligence man. He is a high- ranking man. He is working on all kinds of NATO matters and is delivering most valuable information... He was in Moscow some time ago. My friend and three others in the KGB section running him received the Order of Lenin. ‘That is a very high distinction for the KGB... I do not know the man's name, cut I do know when he was in Moscow, and I know that he has a very high position. ‘He is in London now." NOS2NKO was reluctant to go into further details at this, his second meeting with CIA, kut he added: "I'll tell you all about him tomorrow, my brothers. I will tell you many things tomorrow, and the day after... This is our number one operation. There is no sum of money we would not be willing to pay him." The next day NOSENKO was asked for additional information about the “high level British agent," and he told his case offi- cers: "I don't know the exact content of the material (he was giving) except that they were very valuable military documents, and I know that he even brought in draft copies when he was here in Moscow. He went to London, and I believe he works in a Minis- try. I think it is in the office of the First Lord of the Admir- alty. He still meets with our case officer even now. He brings them extremely valuable material. He is either a deputy or a First Secretary, or a member of the Secretariat; the most im-- portant thing being that all material of the greatest signifi- cant value passes through his hands, He was recruited in 1956 or 1957. I don't know when he returned to London, but he was ‘ Working with the (KGB Legal)Resident there, who was at that kee ce “: time a man whose name is Major General (N.B.) RODIN.*** RODIN Spee apne ep nereraeenee ; . * BLAKE, a British M1-6 officer, has admitted that he informed the KGB of the Serlin tunnel operation (which involved the intercept of Soviet and East. German telephone ‘conversations by CIA and MI-6) prior to the time the operation became . active in May 1955; it was terminated in April 1956. "** In September 1964 CIA sought more details from NOSENKO about. : BLAKE... He responded: "BLAKE? Who is BLAKE?" when reminded, | NOSENKO said: “I don't know what kind of information he i (BLAKE) gave. I think he gave information, but. I don't know: what kind or how mich. This is a mistake on what I supposedly said before." For a further discussion. of BLAKE, See Part V.D.7.b. Se ***RODIN, who served in London under the alias KOROVIN, was previously known to have been Chief of the KGB Legal Regi- dency in London. ne . ax.) po oe ne re. Gee tee by o . “er ines Pers: = 3 4 Es we ee re age ce Bip dbl ba kata ee Het SS tee Wascbiees eamtel oe ene PARTE beet eee Te cornet renttn ean” sronseareemetemrieanganinenestimiemimptees _ ~omarehererbperettemr tt ree see © neers sia Ye te a hag . * ne. A , thle uti enone ani. or Ebon tis en ‘
504. also received an Order of Lenin for his participation in the case, but this was for the obtaining of valuable documents and not be- - — - cause of any involvement in the agent's recruitment. RODIN was personally in contact with the agent in London... I don't know what position he (the agent) held in Moscow. I’ don't want to ; tell you anything I don't know. Remember, this was handled by : another section and I could not very well ask them. You see, it's ; none of my business. He gave us everything on military and polit- ical matters. I found out (about this agent) from my friend (V.A.) CHURANOV, He was involved in the recruitment personally. He is in Moscow now. He returned about .a year ago from CopenKagen, He was there as the (KGB Legal) Resident, under the cover of First ! Secretary. Prior to that he was the Chief of a section in the 4 English Department of the Second Chief Directorate. That was , about three years ago, and at that time he personally recruited the Englishman.": | bhi ostnnen isabel as te a eeeenen repeaters ate eed ” NOSENKO told “CIA on 13 June 1962 that the "high-level British agent" had on one occasion provided a report on an Anglo- American conference in Loncon, which contained references to American and British Intelligence operations. * During} inal meeting in 1962, a day later, NOSENKO again stated that RODIN had received the Order of Lenin for his part in the operation. When asked whether the name KOROVIN meant anything to him in . connection with operations against the British, he replied: "I : ; have heard that name, but I cannot associate it in any way. Possibly he is the man in London now. "** After recontacting CIA in 1964, NOSENKO reported that he had alreacy provided almost all he knew about VASSALL, who had | been arrested in 1962. VASSALL, NOSENKO summarized, was re- cruited in Moscow and turned over copies of official Embassy documents while there. After he returned to England and while he was working in the Admiralty, he was considered to be the KGB's best agent. His value, NOSENKO said, was indicated by the fact that CHURANOV had received a KGB award for his role in the recruitment and then later, when VASSALL was producing in England, the Order of Lenin along with RODIN, the handling efficer in London.*** . rtm at Ade Leas teeta od eee Boel Lac adileta te TS cow ie q | i i ? i ape ee * NOSENKO on 1 February 1964 said: "In general it was known from some source important information was coming in from : the British, specifically, information about NATO. As soon as the NATO Intelligence Services would hold a meeting in : London, we had the information as to what was discussed. j When the American, Canadian, and British groups met in t ae London. The material came in from that VASSALL, or from weet ae am Beech weed g i someone else--I don't know." On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO commented further that in 1960 or 1961, about the same time ‘he heard about these materials, he also learned that the KGB First Chief Directorate had a good source;in British .counterintelligence. NOSENKO said that he did not know whether VASSALL had access to this type of information or whether this. indicated another source... - oo NOSENKO was asked on 29 January 1964 whether RODIN, ‘VASSALL's handler in London, was also known as KOROVIN, He replied he = — ft thought so. ae : + Galnatachinds sta eal het Questioned on CHURANOV's reaction to VASSALL's arrest, NOS. ENKO stated on 29 January 1964 that CHURANOV had said: “well, Po, co this is all. This is the end of my career and I'll never go |; wo abroad again." Shortly afterwards, CHURANOV went to GRIBANOV i ‘ to ask to be returned to the Second Chief Directorate for this a Lk TOP Seeper 7 ow
gees Po “505. NOSENKO added a few details concerning the compronise of VASSALL. The KGS, he said, had evidence of honosexual acts between VASSALL and one homosexual, but then the KGS managed to acquire photographs of him involved with three homosexuals at the sane time. NCSENKO was unable to recall the names cf two of them, whose KGB cryptonyms were "MUKHIN" and “SIBIRYAK" (the latter a young scientist and the only one of the three who could speak English); the third was Viktor BELYANOVSH]Y¥,. aa actor in. Moscow who also took part in oneran ions i 1@ American citizen Martin MALIA and Gieiece@ ; 3 : she ye 6 CHURANOV told NOS. ENKO that VASSALL was ‘really shocked” and became sick when he saw the photographs. ; NOSENKO told CiA on 24 January 1964 that he hed been very worried in 1963 when it was reported in an article by Josepn ALSOP thet VASSALL had heen apprenended cy the British as the result of a lead from the Americans. "I remember," NOSENKO said, “the press stated that there was a defector who was a diplomat and who was about to come to England from the States and that he_ was instrumental in heaving unearthed this Soviet spy, at a nigh- level place. whose name was VASSALL.* The First Chief Director- ate was in an uproar wnen they read this ALSOP article. As a matter of fact, at the KG conference 1 insisted that our recent flaps were a result of information from COLITSYN, particularly (on) VASSALL. When they asked me now I knew, 1 said we have records here that he was given VASSALL's material to read in connection with his own work." NOSENKO said on @ September 19694 that his fears that the articles in the Western press might eventually bcing him under suspicion were allayed when he learned from CHURAIIOV some time later that the First Chief Directorate had reluctantly decided that GOLITSYN must have heen the source to the VASSALL lead. The leaders of the First Chief Directecrate did not want to kelieve at first that GOLITSYN was the source of the Lead, but it was known that although GOLITSYN did not know VASSALL's name, he had On One Or two occasions translated materials received from VASSALL. (ii) Information from GOLITSYN On 26 March 1962 GOLITSYN was being interviewed by British authorities and provided information leading to the identifica- tion of VASSALL as a KGB agent. GOLITSYN said-that he worked in the International Treaty Organizations Section of the Infor~ mation (Reports) Department “of the KGB First Chief Directorate, from September 1959 until May 1960. During this period he re- ceived documents from the British Admiralty which were copies of papers from top Admiralty officials concerning the construc- tion and financial expenditures relating to a naval base at Clyde, dated July 1959. On the basis of many of these docu- ments GOLITSYN had to prepare a report for the Soviet Minister of Defense. He said that he-was told that the British Depart- ment of the First Chief Directorate had also disseminated such information, and after contacting the Pritish Department he was given a large file of copies of original documents from British Admiralty, including documents of the First and Second Lords of the Admiralty. (The documents he read were Russian translations of copies of original British documents.) There were other * The defector source referred to by ALSOP was GOLITSYN (see below). eaieanael Cane a eect ogtnrecren nam aspen sane + ct ee cane neers pirate! POLS Sar een ewer Ie TPE Tee , oy © ear danche teeny oft i ; 7 j 3 ~@ 3 4 4 i a
1 bbb documents covering all Admiralty activity mentioning navy bases, fleet commands in the Mediterranean, Aden and cther cities in the Mediterranean area. There were also documents dealing with bases in England ard concerning important questions and deci- gions in the Admiralty. . According to GOLITSYN, these documents were received from an agent source in London, covered the period 1958-53, and were. usually received at two-month intervals. He related that he had talked in 1955 to a KGB officer friend, Ye. G, KASHCHEYEV,* who was recalled to the USSR in 1954 from London. .KASHCHEYEV told ‘GOLITSYN that at that period KGB had two other important agents, one of whom was BLAKE. ‘The other important source was. working in naval intellicence in 1954,but GOLITSYN said he did not know the identity of the KGB officer handling the Admiralty agent | source, He suggested, however, it could have ceen A.V. BARANCV - because that officer received the Order of Lenin for.his work in England at about. that time. During a 5 April 1961 interview GOLITSY was shown a selec- tion of documents concerning the British Naval Command Organiza- tion in the Mediterranean. He selected two documents he thougnt he had seen before, although he said he was not sure, These documents were: (a) Internal Admiralty Memorandum, Subject: » "Command in the Mediterranean," dated 2 July 1959; and (b) inter- nal Admiralty documents, Subject: "Unified Headquarters for the Middle East," dated 22 January 1960. When GOLITSYN was shown additional British documents on 7 April 1962, he recalled he had seen documents concerning "the whole infrastructure program, the whole of NA " as well as documents concerning notes of meetings held a the Admiralty. GOLITSYN said on 25 May 1962 that the photographic repro- ductions of the documents were of medium or better quality, in- dicating they had been reproduced by a process better than hand~ held Minox camera production. . By 12 September 1962 British authorities had focused sufficiently on VASSALL to arrest him. VASSALL 1 immediately F confessed. oo * See Part V.I.7. for NOSENKO's statements on KASHCHEYEV. eitibe Spoh a tet tet TOP SECRET ree meg spmane pte ore os > cits BELL Se beahb eA an Bante oe rarer Breirer cece nea, sap wit acetic cata S th ee ae eat he seteessatit,
Sanaa) * VASSALL served in Moscow as clerk in the office of the British ance anata erent eee os : : 507. (iii) Information from VASSALL On the day of his arrest, 12 September 1962, VASSALL con- ‘fessed thax he had spied for the Soviets almost continuously since the spring of 1955." (A search of his quarters immediately after his arrest resulted in the discovery of 15 rolls of exposed Film which, when developed, revealed 140 photographs of pages from 17 official Admiralty documents dated betweer 24 July and 3 September 1962; all were reported to be secret documents, "the exposure of which would cravely damage the security of the state.") In his confession, VASSALL described his recruitment by CHURANOY and another man, known only as “Nikolay” in March 1955 on the basis of compromising photographs taken during the course of a@ “homo- sexual orgy" involving himself and a number of Soviets. at the Berlin Hotel in Moscow at the end of October 1954. From about Seotember 1955 on until he returned -to England, VASSALL bought KGB silence by bringing CHURANOV and "Nikolay" documents from the British Embassy. In May 1956, in anticipation of his depar- ture for home, VASSALL was introduced to a third Soviet, subse- guently identified as RODIN/KOROVIN, who was to become his con- tact in London. Their first meeting in England took place about the end of August 1956. VASSALL continued to meet RODIN once every three weeks until the arrest of Soviet Illegal Gordon LONS- DALE in January 1961, which resu’ed in a four month moratorium on personal meetings. To these meetings VASSALL would bring docu- ments that he obtained from his office in the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiraity?; the documents would be photographed and returned to VASSALL during the sane meeting. Several months after RODIN had breken off contact as a re- sult of the LONSDAL! arrest, VASSALL was contacted by N.P. KAR- PEKOV**and there were infrequent meetings from then until May 1962. It was not until May 1962, however, that VASSALL was told to resume his espionage collection; he was trained to operate an Exakta camera and used it thereafter until his arrest. The last two meetings with KARPEKOV took place cn 13 and 17 August 1962. At the meeting on 13 August, KARPEKOV told VASSALL that he was going away on holiday and the further meeting four days later was arranged so that VASSALL could hand over anything he had obtained refore KARPEKOV left. At their final meeting, KARPEKOV arranged for their next meeting to take place on 30 October 1962. (KARPEKOV left London for the Soviet Union on 6 September 1962.) By VASSALL's account, the first time he received any money from the Soviets was just before Christmas 1955, when he was - given “at least 1,000 rubles." Thereafter, at every fourth: ~ - Naval Attache from 3 March 1954 until 2 June 1955, when he ' left the Soviet Union to resume his former duties as a clerk in the British Admiralty. ®* KARPEKOV was identified to British authorities as @ KGB offi- cer by KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY (see Part VI.D.6.) in | — April 1960, before KARPEKOV was handling VASSALL. RODIN was reassigned from London in April 1961. BELITSKIY gave CIA the same informetion in July 1961. aS a a aS Seen Nt NMR ER ewe a 0 ? i senders Obert eon sbannas tab Laaiadee gdh cate beedamee mabe +
fetes ke oath eon sees es name Oe bes en nanan ' : i 4, oN RM Seem eS RAE atten He 84 ‘meeting during his stay in MOSCOW he was given suns of 2,000 rubles. On his returr. to England, RODIN and later KARPEKOV paid him sums varying from 50 to 200 pounds. According to VASSALL, the annual totals of these amounts varied between 500 and. 700 pounds, an estimate which the British consider “modest, to say the least" judging from VASSALL's luxurious way of life. Hey QP MHeE € Sern 5 tod Wolleaca em teem ote eA ideale he nledn Ae eesti Stas sete deen oe eossearteabeorteid ani widen MBG 3 ARSENE ag re ab ia leat Aa co oe ree Coe LW nist
° a ntrocuction G) IS a IOSENKO's crily identifiable lead te 4a Soviet Tilegal con- cerned @ German imnigrant to Canaia whe was in Moscow during the fall of 1963 for meetings vith Ya. T. 3Uk and sa. A. FARDASHEV* of the American Lepuriument, KGR First Chior Directorate, Frem his friend GUK, FOSEUYO leirned man Getaile about this Tllecgst but not his na: He commented thar he hac been inforiscd of the cage by CUK unofficially, over after-~nourcs drinks while the Illegal was in Moscow, end thar GUK “epsolucely will : ~Olunteer to the KGB thee he had given these details to NOSENFO, erty A check of HOSENKO'S information with, rae Paval Canadiar pounced Police 1 a a) matse) Jan- clandestine collection: activi- "Army, but during this pericd he wary tires in East Germany for the Us s. had once been eetained by. the Soviets and in Octobur 1955 he had agreed to collaborate with Soviet intelligence. ZTE EES reported thas to nis Anerican superiors end was teriuinated by them in early 1956. with U.S. assistance, he applied for inmigration to Canada .after failing to gain entry into the United States end he arrived there in June 1956, settling ir. Vancouver. “ERS FS NOSENKO was asked why this Canédian was considered to he an Illegal rather than an agent. Reetfirming that he was an Il- legal, NOSENKO explained that “an agent always has legal status. This man may run an lilegal net. And they may give him money to support other Illegals, and therefore that is the category assigned to him.“ The CIA case officer sumned up this new infor- mation by saying: "Therefore, in addition to the classic type cf Tllegal who is a Soviet citizen and who is trained for a long time and then goes to a foreign country to develop his legend for entry into nis target country, there are foreign nationals * KARDASHEV, who according to NOSENKO is a close professional associate of GUK, served in Washington from April 1958 to April J 1961 PRE E Ss: TOP SECRET (toa rine mem mNERENNE T= merry ere Ao ne ere pei cen ae nee BOMTeEEO Denve! not wees Raabe ale esd nels todd cabaret niin
a eat ALAND TIE SIRE II SEAS! ETOAC, Ee te ae an ome NNeatane ees who would be called Illegals if they are members of a Soviet Tllegal's net or if they run an Jllejal net themselves, irrespec- tive of the nationalities of the members of the ret." NOSENKO agreed that this summation was “absolutely coricct." (ii) Information from NOSENHO While reviewing the notes he broucht to @ meeting with CIA on 26 January 1964, before nis defection, NCSENAO came across an entry which proupted him te gay: ‘I know one Canadian. I'L) give you his description. 1 have it written covn. fT don't have his first mame or his last name, rut I know treat he is € Canadian, nis age, when he was in the Soviet Union. be wernt there on a po@visnaya visa. This Cenadian actually 185 of Serman origin, from Germany. He's a Canadian citizen, end he is an Illegal. He took a trip to Moscow in 1963, he was met by GUK, and he was given money to oven a business. He is supposed to start a busi- ness enterprise in Canada. They wanted to get him up as an Il- legal Resident in Canada to run some agent. There are a few other things I'll tell you later," NOSENKO was.asked why GUK had met this man in Moscow, and he answered: ‘“GUK somehow got in contact with him. It wasn't KGH, It was simply an acquain- tance." In later interviews NOSENKO added that the Illegal: married, and the father ~ may have been escorted to Moscow in 1963 by KARD- ASHEV, since KARDASHEV had gone co 4 French port to meet a foreigner and accompany him on a Soviet ship to the USSR; ; - was given false documents in Moscow for travel from Moscow back to Europe: - in Moscow received"$10,000 or scmething Like that" to open "some kind of optical business;" ~ returned to the West via a Satellite country, either Hungary or Rumania, and then flew to Geneva where his genuine documents were returned to him. ‘ NOSENKO also said that the KGB had decided to have the Illegal remain in Canada after originally planning to assign him to New York City, where he would be under the control of the local KGB Legal Residency. a ‘ as ath etd 5 we. wi vestete Fee dbe err Rte eB heen podwenelaRsiweent” cet ans nT a nebo ales Stabe a:
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The BELITSKIY Operation . Introduction eacshaMaib bth. When NOSENKO first contacted CIA in June 1962, one of the “two. pieces of information which he said he was willing to sell _ Was the fact that the CIA agent BELITSKIY was .=nder KCB control. '(B.Ye. BELITSKIY, a Radio Moscow broadcaster and Soviet Govern- et ae “ment interpreter, had been a CIA agent in place since his recruit- ment at the Erussels Exposition in September 1953.) At the time NOSENKO made his information known, BELITSKIY had met CIA repre- sentatives in the West in debriefing sessions on thrse separate eoceasions. The last occurred in Geneva in May 1962 while BELIT- * SKIY was serving as an interpreter for a WHO Conference. At that time NOSENKO was also in Gereva, participating in the Disarmament Conference. ebctth she Side ShML a, b. Information from NOSENKO belt thle memsontebinds tt seb ve (i} Starenents in 1962 In the discussions with CIA officers on 9 ard 11 June 1962, NOSENKO revealed considerable information on BELITSXTY. He alsa’ : descriked his own connection with the case and offered his opinion 4 .on how CIA should proceed in the light of his revelations. He . Claimed that he had first heard of the BELITSKIY case, by its code name "BELKIN," when he was working in the U.S.Embassy Section American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. Not directly involved with the agent, he learned of the case through his friend- ship with the chief of the section (name not given) which was then running him.* “So I already knew there was this ‘BELKIN, '" said ; NOSENKO, He did not actively participate in the case, however, - - 3 until the spring of 1962. During his tour with the Disarmament ; Conference, MOSENKO said, he received a cable froin Moscow direct- ing ham to give advice to the “young” and “inexperienced” case , officer, V.L. ARTEMYEV in thé event that ‘American: Intelligence should contact BELITSKIY in Geneva. Actually, NOSENKO continued, the Second Chief Directorate had “inserted” BELITSKIY ‘into the WHO delegation in the hope that CIA would "find him." There was such a contact, NOSENKO said, and therefore he knew about the handling of .the case insofar as the Geneva meetings were con- 4 cerned, although he had not been personally involved in it be- : - fore. ‘ NOSENKO described SELITSKIY as a KGB agent whom the Americans had recruited in London and never met inside the Soviet Union. . Poet “NOSENKO stressed both of these. points. a number of times: "So I : SP ae knew that in due course he was recruited in London... There was. 7 o : . never any contact with him inside." NOSENKO stated that BELIT~ . 3 ot '""  SKTY was an agent of the American Department in 1962, although ~ a a ol he. had once worked for the Second (British) Department. He : .* NOSENKO said that at that time he himself was Deputy Chief of the U.S,Embassy Section. It follows from this that he would have become aware of the BELITSKIY case between January 1960 and January 1962. In 1964 NOSENKO identified the friend who _ had told him about BELITSKIY as V.I. PETROV, Chief of the : Second Section, American Department, responsible for pene-. . ~ trating American Intelligence operations, mainly those ain the USSR. . ; : ctr oyena ennai a tlnagmccenmne |. 6 TOP SECRET AGE RO RA aint at ee ADMD 8. CB cn matonnee tte ene UAE ENTER Ain oss am ohn mar Ree cae S : >
at . “te pop oak PSP sume Peet soba abl alice Lane: Claimed not to know the date of recruitment but said that he Knew that the case was already in progress during his second assignment with the U.S. Embassy Section (January 19€9-January 1962), and “The first time he went abroad he was already our agent. He had been our agent for a long, long time..." NOSENKO indicated that the KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was to lure American Intelligence into meet- ing with the agent inside the Soviet Union. In this way, the ‘KGB hoped to learn the channels and means through which Anerican Intelligence communicated with agents inside the Soviet Union. This, said KOSENKO, was the “most important task" of the Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, ir. meeting with his Am- erican case officers, continually pleaded fear of contacting or being contacted py American Intelligence in Moscow, NOSENKO claimed that this was a@ ruse and that the real KGS intent was to use BELITSKIY "to draw you to us ~- to the Soviet Union - so that you would work with him nen abroad." He said that after BELIT- Lenidon, CIA "did not go on with him... SKIY was recruated in Le didn t hold’any meetings with him." Nevertheless, he said; the KGB “cherished the hope...vo lead him in somewhat dceper...well, now they have." NOSENKO commented that the KGB First Chief Directorate,’ with its’ own responsibilities ard objectives, was unaware of the purpose of the Second Chief Directorate in the BELITSXIY case. The First Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformatsiya (disinformation, referred to by NOSEYKO as “deza") at the Second Chief Directorate’s request, but in this case, as in other "games," 1t did not know for what ultimate purpose the “céeza" would be used. NOSENKO indicated that in such cases I.1. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not even know in what country the disinformation was to be used, let alone the identity of tne agent. The Second Chief Directorate, more- over, was at liberty to add or discard items from the “Geza" pro- vided by Department D.* NOSENKO stated that after the directive from Moscow arrived, he participated in the direction of BELITSKIY's meetings with the American case officers, advising ARTEMYEV on specific steps to be taken. For example. NOSENKO said, when the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with some Soviet on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMYEV not to use anyone from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rather, he told ARTEMYEV that BELITSKIY should pretend * While on this general subject, NOSENKO commented that the _ Second Chief Directorate was looking to the.day when its: offi- cers in the field would not have to be subordinate to the KGB Legal Resident in a given country, always a member of the ‘First Chief Directorate. In Geneva, NOSENKO said, the local Legal Resident was “weak" and "over-cautious." According to NOSENKO, this man had keen ordered by Moscow to help in the BELITSKIY case “if anything is needed" but tried.to interfere. with the actual running of the case. At that. point, NOSENKO. told himt ~"We don't need your help. - “We shall run it our- Selves." ; My : TSP SE; 2 | fu iver of Eesliy 4 of 4 “a a eek 3% tenes Ostby eas ho cauleddla dana ees tvaitchea sabi wee bth od Bt ee oe tas feo
fee hse a aang eine meen orem we NMR CNN BERET enNeatie EO ee w - 7 . 8 Bd Saeed” Department of TASS, A.K. Ki information BELITSKZY furni course, be “deza" from the BELITSKIY reported informat officers. To backstop this Americana “checked up," NOS SKIY¥ to be introduced to KI According to NOSENKO, | | -y Padinennnanieeneemaneimemeemaiaeameees that he was gettirg information fren the head of the Aserican | SLOV, who was then in Geneva.* The shed to the Americans would, of KGB. This plan was carried out, and ion “from KISLOV" to his Anerican cease part of the operation, in case the ENKO and ARTEMYEV arranged for BELIT- SLOV, — — co Departinent D prepared ‘other disinfor- mation for BELITSKIY to give to his American case officera in response to thelr positive Chief Directorate asked Department D to “make it geod information, intelligence requirements. The Second so the opposition will not sense that it is “deza. ** "Moscow is happy, " NOSENKO reported, because KGB Headquarters believed that CIA had accepted “at face v gave. Among these pieces o the name of a Soviet Intell Concerning the individ related that BELITSKIY had iean case officer "Bob" and alue" the information which BELITSKIY f disinformation, NOSENKO said, was igence officer in the WHO in Geneva. uals involved in this cass, NOSENKO been met in Geneva first ky the Amer- later also by “Henry" who was “calied out from the States.’ The KGB case officer, ARTEMYEV, was “still a young fellow,” although he had good potential, and had not worked on the BELITSKIY cas Geneva to work on counterin RELITSKIY if the Americans the WHO conference ended, WN left in groups: BELITSKIY d ARTEMYEV stayed a few days e in Hoscow. Ee had beer sent to tellicence matters and to direct should make contact with him.*** after OSENKO said, the Soviet participants eparted on 26, 27, or 28 May but longer. According to NOSENKO, Moscow believed that CIA had accept:.d BELITSKIY's bona fides. From the KGB standpoint, while BELITSKIY was "not a bad agent," he was apt to go a bit too far sometimes and to "add things on his own." for this reason, NOSZNKO said, the KGB decided not to let him spent too much time with CIA, fearing that he might say something "which would cause you to sense that he is a plant." NOSENKO strongly and repeatedly advised CIA to "continue the game" but under no circumst Soviet Union. He indicated that he considered it “in your inter- ests" to continue to play 5 ances to meet the agent inside the ELITSETY, and he remarked that the KGB- would guess how CIA found out about the case if it were = See Part IiI.D.5 for further details on NOSENK with KISLOV. ’ Speaking of this case in NOSENKO commented, concerning disinformation in general and particular, that it is “very diffi- cult" to pass disinformation, and that there is a certain “danger" ‘connected with passing it ~ in providing “that. which ‘is almost true, changed just a little bit," the agent might give away something that There is aleo the danger of the opposition's case good enough, he implied. is of real value to.the opposition. of arousing suspicion:in the minds officers if the information ig not ***See Part V.D.7.c. for edditional information on ARTEMYEV ' a operational activity. TOR SECRET O's relationship nee : BREE ee da ended eatin de ae eat bsteateens be nence wate ata ac eal Be
~ terminated - he and ARTEMYEV were the only officers abroad who knew about the operation. (At that very moment. he eaid, the - KGB was waiting for someone to arrives in Moscow and contact the agent.}. NOSENKO sroposed a plan through which CIA coulda cause the KGS to send BELITSKIY abroad again, and two days later he again urged that this plan be edopted: CIA should choose an - elderly couple who were travelling to the USSR and give them a. letter to mail to BELITSKIY immediately on their arrival; in the letter there should be a Hint. through which BELITSKIY (and -the . - KGB) woulé realize that CIA wanted him to come out and did not plan to contact him inside; the KGB would then be forced to send -BELITSKIY abroad again in order to continue the "game." This reaction would be in line with the mission of the Second Chief Directerate "to recruit the foreigners... and then pass them on to you for your recruitment. That ie our mission - give our own Russians to you for recruitment and recruit foreigners.". NOSENKO also continued: “Don't trust him for a second putes. give tha impression that you believe him." He stressed that the travellers chosen for this task ke “elderly," that they not ba connected with CIA in any way, end, most important, thet they mail the letter immediately on their arrival. NOSFNXO also advised CIA to do something about the safe apartment in which "Hob" and "Henry" had met BELITSKIY. He complained that BELITSKIY had noted that the name on the door was not that of the American Counsellor whose apartment it was supposed to be, and he said that BELITSKIY had also reported that he felt it had an “un-lived in" iook. (11) Statements in 1964 When he came to the West again in 1964, NOSENKO again dis- cussed the BELITSKIY case.* In January 1964, he was aaked his advice about CIA's handling BELITSKIY. Agaia he suggested that CIA “continue the plan" in order.to determine “what actions they. will undertake when they will see that you do not plan to have Moscow contacts." He commented: "You have a realistic basis for not doing this in view of the PENKOVSKIY case, etc." ** Again he expressed the opinion that "what they are trying to do in this case is to pull for a Moscow contact... The hope ia that you would go out to meetings with him in Moscov." The Second Chief Directorate did not consider the BELITSKIY case @ big operation: “it was only a small success from our viewpoint," NOSENKO claimed, as he had in 1962, to have been personally involivee in directing the meetings BELITSKIY had had with the : Americans in Geneva, ARTEMYEV “was a very young man, There- fore, a cable came from Moscow ordering me to take over the -,. @ircection of the case over ARTEMYEV... in case a contact was made, and it was." NOSENKO -ndicated that it waa O.M, GRIBANOV himself, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who had ordered him to take charge. , * In the meantime, CIA had continued the “game." In Cctober 1962, during the week of the Cuban missile crisis (dis- cussed in Part V.F.10.) BELITSKIY attended a ‘coriference. and was met several times by CIA representatives. (See Page ** See Part VI.D.7.b. for details on the compromise of PENKOV~ ‘ Top SECRET - ' ea, 2 ede aes bie Kewl tee BAL oe adcash mw eid a ck etd 0 wll ileal de ihades Meidle t Lae
ce on ewe Nae oe amit indo ate ha Dat gore eterna eran Shem ae Cee Pateital len fies add hee Led leaned aiaut the case originally “tn 1960 or 1961" Coom PETROV, Chief uf the Second Sectior of the American Department. "I don't know when the case began, but it was coing in 1960 and 1961" he said. In 1962, he cbtained more details from ARTEMYEV, who was in the same delegation as ZELITSKIY, and _ then the cable came from Moscow ordering him to help ARTEMYEV “an the case, NOSENKO said he did not know who recruited BELIT. : SKIY for the KG3, but it was not PETROV. This operation, like ‘all "games" of the Second Section, was supervised by M.G. _MATVEYEV, - Deputy Chief of the American Department.. In 1964 NOSENKO made a number of comments and observations which he had not brought up in any way in 1962. In noting, for example, that BELITSKIY had originally been a British Department ‘ agent, he remarked: “Maybe they tried to serve him up to the British, and maybe the British didn't bite. 43 for the charac- ter of BELITSKIY and the KGB's view of their agent, or 29 Janu- ary 1964 NOSE-KO stared: "If you were to stop it, then wait until the appropriate moment, confront’ him, tell him the ‘geme' is up ~ you know 411 about him ~ then he might co for this and yu may recruit him." On 2 February 1964, when the CIA case officer suggested that perhaps RELITSKLY might not have reported everything to the KGS, especially the amount of money he had heen given by CIA, NOSENKO agreed that perhaps chis was co "be- cause I*was very much surprised how little money the Americans gave BELITSKIY... I was convinceé that something was not right, and I told ARTEMYEV chat I didn't believe that the Americans could pay such small sums. I was convinced that BELITSKIY only reported that he received a small part of what he actually got." NOSENKO said that when he told PETROV that he did not believe BELITSKIY, PETROV said he bad not quite accepted his reports either, becauseevery time BELITSKIY came home from abroad, “he always tries to hand me some qift and therefore I'm inclined to agree with you." NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been thoroughly investigated but that he himself felt that “it is possible that at any given moment a person would change his. mind and go off." NOSENKO mentioned for the first-time, on 10 June 1964, that the British Department had a file “in which material had been placed which would indicate that there were some suspicions” about BELITSKIY, but that “this ‘suspicious’ file was not given to the Second Section, American Department, when they took over.” (iii) BELITSKIY Photograph In Octeber 1966 NOSENKO said that he had seen BELITSKIY in person on several occasions in Geneva in 1962. - Shown BE-. LITSKIY's photograph a few days later, NOSENKO failed to re- cognize it. ; eno TOP SECRET
<a A ONOOL ET Nit they ote ae Re ket n tetetrttmeiomnimetsbei tient \ee.thte emte sit ate nate od. abe Mihecenon bee oe ‘Ge Information from Other Sources BELITSKIY was a chemist. by training and a translator and radio commentétor by profession. At the time of his recruit. ment, and throughout his relationship with CIA, he was employed by Radio Moscow, Fluent in English, he was used primarily as- 4 scientific commentator on programs beamed to the British Isles, : in addition to his radio work, BELITSKIY frequently served a5 an. interpreter for the Soviet Government, both at home and abroad, ~ | :- and achieved considerable recognition in this capacity during such widely publicized events as the POWERS trial end..GAGARIN 's visit to England. Ostensibly he was fully trusted by the Sovier authorities and was allowed an unusual degree of freedom in his association with foreicners, RELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in Brussels in September 1958 while he was serving as an interpreter at the Soviet Pa-vil- ion of the World's Fair. During the period in which he was being assessed as @ potential agent, BELITSKIY created the impressions that: first, he was not in full agreement with the current Sov. iet regime and probably even harbored some grudge against the Soviet system because his father had been purged under STALIN: second, he was not averse to considering defection at some future date, provided he could do so with his wife; and third, he was eager to pick up extra money, in return for which he was willing to provide information acquired in the course of his duties. som eee sneer encnem meee peepee sceceeet ye epee ete eee ns woe . Scopes ape vent: nee see = 4 a 4 i ; Bese ae ene iectade 2 Haden. ms
et HS 10 ace APRN ne ven oentsinaencn pecotthumetetan mre tem eS In oters wer Meehan wees m peer tomeet In the two years prior to his recruitment, BELITSXIY had on several occasions been rather outspoken during conversations with certain Westerners with whom he had come in contact. His frankness concerning his disaffection with certain aspects of Sovict life as they affected his career as well as his behavior on several occasions (includi i d to borrow money from a member of sev- eral years earlier), had convinesa tne] | that he was a provocation agent. In talking with the CIA case officer who questioned him about this frar.kness, BELITSKIY stated that he had been trying to make contact with either British or American Intelligence “for the past three years", but that he had “not been able to do so securely." He added that he felt he had keen “very careful" to whom he had spoken frankl He said that he had “trusted” ‘and had felt that could "put him in touch with the proper persons.". The possibility of BELITSKIY's being a Soviet provocation was thoroughly and frequently considered, both initially and as the case progressed. In view of available evidence, com-- bined with the personal impressions of the CIA case officer who ? indicated that BELITSKIY is ~ MOST SECretive about his personal affairs and does not easily confide in anybody." ‘ TOP SECher we Agemre a ee sn enere terror emenyae tar tenteremerrepere, "Mairi Weems & cea
SS 2s tad ab eentaeRRE ere meseeeriniea meaeners Weoedasneney cncnret mena ctsynerme ricempate;tasins ten ue men 6 a its 524. felt that BELITSKIY was sincere, it was judged at the tine of his recruitment that BELITEXIY, whatever his true motives, was”. not controlled by the KGS. During the 11 hours of meetings in. Brussels, the case cfficer observed, LELITSKIY “did not over- sell himself," “claamed no military friends," “sffered no oper- ational leads (even when requested)," "did not artempt to elicit information," “refused ATS contect inside the Soviet Union," "@id not use a single intelliyence term," and convincingly appeared to be unfamiliar with secret writing systems. The case officer felt that the Soviets would have more co lose than gain in sending a provocation agent with the scientific background and accees to information wWnich BELITSKIY. appeared to have. This, plus the Soviet's expressed fear for his owh security fCincluding his staunch refusal to contact American Intelligence inside the USSK), and his apparent ignorance of intelligence terminology — and proféssional techniques, contributed to the initial judcment’ that he was not under KGB control, SELITSKIY's motivation appear- ed to be a combination of factors, including revenge for the per- fecution of nis father, disaffection with the cppression by the Soviet regime of Jews and intellectuals (he fell into both cate- goriesjac tie shortage of consumer goods for the average Soviet citizen. «when asked point-blank why he was willing to cooperate With American Intelligence, BELITSKIY replied with the question: “Did you read Dr. Zhivaco?" Although certain aspects of his past behavior were somewhat puzzling, none was actually incon- sistent with, nor aroused any strong suspicion concerning, his ‘claims that he was acting entirely on his own initiative. . In April 1950 BELITSKLY was in London but did not contact CIA. He later explained this in térms of his personal security and also indicated that he thought CIA might contact him. In June 1969, CIA sent a summary of the operation to MI-6, request- ing any assistance it could provide and offering to share the product of the operation. In August MI-6 gave CIA its view: BELITSKIY had come to London with a Soviet intelligence brief? his attempts to contact Westerners were so blatant that the KGB must have known about them; but it was possible that not all of the agent's activities were necessarily controlled by the KGB. in September 1960 CIA advised MI-6 of its agreement that BELIT- SKIY "undoubtedly had an RIS mission when he came to the UK earlier this year,“ adding the opinion that he probably had _ been used in the past by the KGB; also, that the only way te resolve the unexplained points, CIA stated, was to engage in a secure interrogation which would include a polygraph examina~ tion. As of October 1960 the CIA position’ on the case was stated as follows: “As matters now stand we have our doubts - as to the bona fides of BELITSKIY, but are not convinced that all his actions have been controlled by the RIS. We consider him too valuable a potential source to drop without exploring all possible avenues of investigation. Subject has acknow- ledged access to high-level Soviet scientists and to informa- tion of high priority interest." ‘ . _ In October 1960, BELITSKIY attended a World Journalists’ Rally in Vienna but, he explained later, had no. opportunity to contact American Intelligence during his 10 day visit. The next personal contact with the agent was made in London in July 1961* when a series of meetings took place; tr een nnn * PENKOVSKIY (see Part VI.D.7.b.) was also in London (on TDY alone) in July 1961. ‘ PEE own be renrepeote at 4 4 A bate deena femedd Pad OER 2 La oa mine
5 Anat ORT 525. during two of these BELITSKIY was given a polygraph test. He was questioned closely jalbeit in a friendly manner) about his relationship with the KCL. He explained that he was frequently in contact with persons whom he suspected to be KGS, both in his work at Radio Moscow and particularly in connection with his travels abrcead, but that his only official briefing by the KGB was in connection with the PO«*E25 trial. On another occasion, he said, he was told how to handle himself if the “wrong" ques- tions were asked at the MARTIN/MITCHELL press conference in Moscow, but this was not openly 4 KGB briefing. HELITSKIY also indicated that all travellers leaving the USSR were routinely | _ interviewed anc briefed, and were told to “sort of keep their eyes open” to locate potential targets of information. He said he felt that “whatever he had been able to do along this line" had resulted in his being given TDY's abroad and having relative freedom of movement... . At the end of the London debriefings it was concluded by MI-6 and CIA tnat BELITSKIY “did noc appear to be practicing deception or to be controlled by the RIS." Both did agree, how- ever, that he was “evasive when pressed, then glist, but without volunteering information."* The majority view at that time was ‘that the agent's prime motivation was a financial one, coupled with an assurance of CIA assistance upon his defection. It was also believed that BELITSKIY had py then become so deeply in- volved with CIA that it would be very difficult for him to break contact and/or to report his plight to the KGB. The third contact with BELITSKIY was made in Geneva in May of 1962. The CIA case officer met the agent six times, for a total of approximately 12 hours. At this series of debriefings a second Anerican case officer was introduced. In his report on the contact the original case officer stated that he felt “stronger than ever that Subject's potential as an agent is unlimited." He stated that his original views on BELITSKIY's bona fides had not changed and that he felt the latter realized that he had passed the point when he could afford to report his collaboration with CIA to the KGB. The second case officer reported that the reservations which he had had about the acent's bona fides before the meetings with him had been dispelled by the latter's manner. He also reported, however, that on two occasions during the meetings he had had a "sinking feeling“ that "the relationship was not kosher." He said that during thé discussion of the two factions which BELITSKIY claimed were then vying with each other in the Soviet Unicn (the “moderates" vs. the “hard-liners"), he had the feeling "that the tale was concocted and maybe the agent was trying to convey * Throughout the course of thig operation various individuals participating in it expressed doubts about BELITSKIY‘s bona fides. Whatever doubts may have existed, however, they did not affect the conduct of the case;.the general consensus was that the agent was not controlled by the KGB, and the. case continued to be run as if he were not. Moreover, the poly- graph examiner reported that BELITSKIY had been “substan- tially truthful in his answers to the questions asked," al- though he did recommend that the agent be re-examined under controlled conditions. . , Ss
peo mapoemewnccenneeen ease cstae Hear ae { i , H t | ! q 526. to U.S, authorities something that semeone wanted to have convey- ed and could not have done ‘through normal channels.“ The second case officer was also struck, by a chance which he perceived in BELITSKIY's manner when they.were discussing the matter of con-~ tact inside the Soviet Union: At first, BELITSKIY was very con- “cerned, but toward the end of the meeting he seemed to abandon all caution and to be quite happy about it, even suggesting that a CIA courier could perhaps bring him some scarce goods. Throughout the relationship, however, BELITSKIY exhibited great concern for his personal safety. During the period between the initial and the second series of meetings, CIA sent him two open letters containing secret writing. He responded to the first (in time to validate the terms of the contract), but not to the second, explaining in a later meeting that his failure to do so had been due to fear for his own safety. His reasons for this fear (ancluding the fact that the handwriting on the open letter was “typically American"), were judged plausible and convincing, and his desire to discontinue this type of communication was respected. Although BELITSKLY did not wish to communicate by secret writing, he-did-later agree that “in a matter of gravest importance" he would permit CIA to send him a message via some- one with whom he could be, logically, in professional or social contact. He stipulated, however, that it be .ssomeone who was entirely “clean"“ and completely unwitting of the true nature of his relationship with CIA. He insisted, moreover, on a guaran- tee that if CIA ever did have to communicate with him by any means, it should never refer to the supject of a previous conversation, He felt that under such circumstances he would stand a better cnance of refuting any accusations, since there would be no evidence that he had responded to the overtures of American Intelligence, BELITSKIY also expressed concern on sev- eral occasions for the case officers' welfare as 1t related to his own, cautioning them, for instance, never to go to Berlin or to Moscow. BELITSKIY was deemed from the first to have access through his work to information of unusual value to the United States on the Soviet political scene, scientific personalities, and science-related events. In addition, it was hoped that through various relatives, friends, or acquaintances. he would be able to provide some information on certain other high-priority re- quirements. During each of the series of debriefings he was able to furnish some general information on Soviet political factions and currents, on many scientific and governmental personalities, and on missile and space-related events. This information was in general, however, either not of great value, already known, or impossible to evaluate or corroborate. Never- theless, the case officer felt that the agent had "no way of measuring the usefulness of any particular piece of informa- tion” and that he was “going out of his way to provide us with everything he thought might be of possible use." BELITSKIY was not able to. answer specific requirements in the highest priority fields’ of missiles and atomic energy. However, as he himself stressed, he did not have direct access to classified documents, and CIA had not expected that he would be successful in these areas. On the other hand, he did appear to have access to some military information of a classified nature through his status in the military reserves. Although previously, he said, he had not been interested or TOP SEe3er sean enttnn ans Sie eee nee Los cannery eemonnn 1 hides ue tbbyebind etveadet nis d DEAE dbs Seats jo nb. Moabiaiin. Sh etd at oar secede ants olin ten bibed eco beted Bodom e sea +
inc Abe eee. Snel attentive at these meetings and hed managed to ayoid ali but one refresher course, he promised to attend in the future ard to try te remember everything he could which maght be of value to CIA. Before any benetit from this aspect of his life could ke reaped, his reserve status was charged to limited aveilacilicty” and he was no longer expected to attend meetings. On the other hand, EELITSKELY was successful in culcivating a number of individuals whe were potentially valuable sources of information to him on priority ta:cet areas. One of these. for example, waS & cousin who eliegedly was chiect engineer in a pliant concerned with nuclear submarines, Furthermore, the type ef information which HELITS*TY was reporting indicated that, in the course of his work and through cuitivation and extension of his broad range of acquaintances, he should be able in the future to provide CIA with extremely useful information.’ He was able, for example, to report thes: atems which were censored from his scientific program manus.ripes because of thei: security impli- cations. He also occasionally received interesting news in ad- vance of its publication. He had learned of the ouster of the Americar. diplomat, Kermit S. MIDTHUN ‘some time before it was officially announced. in October 1952. We aiso nad knowledge of the attitudes and activities of certain non-Soviets in Moscow who were Of interest to CIA, sucn as Francis Gary POWERS, and waS acquainted with several Westerners who had defected to the USSR. Also, BELIUSKIY remarked that he had once known someone who had lived in the house of “the real Rudolf ABFL," this friend had told him thac Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL, the KG2 Illegal arrested in the United States. had mereiy assumed the identity of the reai ABEL, who haw died. With regard to certain specific assignments which he failed tO carry cut, RELITSKIY invariably oftered expianacions for his inability to do so (usually relating fear for his personal se- curity) which were difficuit to regard as unreasonable, One example was his decision ‘at the las: minute” nor tro ktring to CIA the Radio Moscow telephone book which he had been asked to get. He “had it in his hand while psa.king.” he said, but felt that “because of @ current réorganization at the Radio" the information would ce “outdated by the time CIA gor it and that therefore he did not think it worth tisking its pneing found if his baggage should be inspected. Evaluations of BELITSKIY's behavior, attitudes and apparent motivation, and production were continually made in the course of the case. Although there was a definite feeling that he had not been frank about the full extent of his relationship with — the KGB, neither the results of the polygraph examination, the conclusions of a graphological analysis, nor the judgments of the two individuals who had contacted him personally during the three series of debriefings tended to contradict these con- clusions directly. Moreover, as the case progressed, it appeared that his reputation within the Soviet Union was growing and that his usefulness to CIA was increasing correspondingly. His personal contacts and potential sources of information. became more nu- merous as his job responsibilities increased, The trust which his superiors placed in him seemed to be borne out by the TG? SECRET ceesoatnnnap amen wey than tithe Dobe ble abtbece # pa aan dna Bob vats Sates Dhaka rn sort te mance
528, freedom he was allowed. It appeared that there was a good chance he would be permitted to exit the Soviet Union from time to time and would therefore be able to get informatior. to us despite his reluctance to communicate from within. He was thus considered, on the whole, to be a-nighly useful potential, if not actual, source of positive intelligence information who was basically motivated to help American Intelligence. After the NOSENKO information was received in June 1962, CIA continued the BELITSKIY operation. A fourth series of meet~ ings was held with the agent in the United States in October of 1962, -BELITSKIY was at that -cime accompanying a Soviet delega- tion to "The Second Informal Conference of Influential Ameri- cans and Soviets"(at Andover, Mzssachusetts), a gathering of prominent Soviet and American citizens to discuss international problems in the interests of world peace.* The Soviet delecga- tion of 16 was headed >y a member of the CPSU Central Committee, who was listed as a representative of the Soviet Trade Union Press. The conference occurred during the Cuban crisis, 21 to 27 October 1962.** During this extremely critical period in Soviet-American relations, BELITSKIY comnunicated the following points to his CIA case officers: . = The members of the delegation had been briefed in Moscow by the First Deputy Foreign Minister to be concilia- tory, even to the degree of pointing out that the Soviet Union disagrees with China on the distribution of nuclear weapons to other powers, and to avoid any position which could be regarded as offensive to the American partici- pants. ~ BELITSKIY¥Y “personally” regarded President KENNEDY's announcement of a "blockade" of Cuba as appalling. He stated that he was convinced that Cuba could have been weaned from the Soviet Union by very careful handling without alienating opinion in other countries, and that the President's action tended to strengthen the position of the “hard line, tough talk" faction in the Soviet -Government. Immediately following the President's an- nouncement, the delegation was instructed to make the Soviet position plain, but to do so in a moderate tone. - The leader of the Soviet delegation had partici- pated in a discussion with Norman COUSINS, of The Saturday Review, who explained to him the reasons for '* This conference is an extension of the “Pugwash” conferences, originally sponsored by Cyrus EATON, identified by PENKOV- SKIY as a GRU contact. **Also participating was S.1. BEGLOV, who had conferred with G.N. BOLSHAKOV on 19 October 1962. in New York,. ostensibly on matters connected with the USSR magazine: See Part wo ee & J syrgsad es . “ : soit tality a dicitaa sabe . ata Ai ashe abeataenece | teteeed 4 q ad : 4 i a 4 M z 4 * Natehtyees ae tReet, ded Zabel. dd x
i é i 3 t fo : a i the President's stand on Cuba, + who had acted as interpreter, the Soviérs' reply to 529. ‘According to BELITSKIY, COUSINS was that the USSR had refused to give nuclear weapons to China ard that there would ce no point in risking en affront to Communist .Chira by giving advanced de said the Sovier Union was willing to enter into negotiations with the United Srates on the question of the spread of nuclear weapons co other (COUSINS' explanation of President KENNEDY's stand was that he was pressured by the coming election and the need to circumvent criticisx py the Republican Party: by Congressional leaders; and by a report that Congress would soon learn of the irrefutable evidence concerning the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba. weapons to Cuba. countries. Except for once sailing abroad on a Soviet cruise ship, BELITSKIY has not been seen in the West since nis October 1962 visit to the United States. frequently in broadcasts from Radio Moscow since that time. Among BELITSKLY's broadcasts was a two-part series of 22 November beamed to the United Kincdom and to eastern and 2 December North -America, publication of 1965, His vouLce, however, has been heard c@lied ‘Inquest Into the racts surrounding the The Perkovskiy Pypers. > cob a seco tee DOA attend Oe cnithG Ne aethin tae eeree
ialites sa procirimecim 2 rt temet geonnticterebaineresminarems nein Henin nate enna fis vente OS 7. KGB Investigations x a. Compromise of POPCV (i) Introduction Twice during the first meeting with ClA in Geneva in June 1962 NOSENKO alluded to the compromise of the CIA agent penetra- tion of the GRU, Lt. Col. P.S. FOPCY, and at the next meeting he attributed the compromise to KGH surveillance of a CIA orficer in Moscow mailing a letter to FOPOY. Essentiaily the same story of the POFOV compromise was given by NCSENKO in 1964, with cervcain additional details heing supplied act thot tine. : And two of the GHEREFANOV papers* confirm that KGA surveillanc J to the discovery of POPOV's status as a CIA agent, but SUReRemm also said that POPOV was uncer some security suspicion prior to the letter-meiling incicent. Neither NOSENKO nor these other two sources, spay enrnE ee supplied a precise date for this incident beyond the statement in one of the CEEREPANOV papers that it occurred in January 1959. Tre actusl date of the letrec mailinz was the 21st of that month, and hence according to NOSENKO, GRATE ye and the CHEREPANOV papers, it was ther char the KGB establinietne fact of POPOV's collabor-~ ation with CIA. Information from GOLITSYN, however, places the tine of the compromise as ezrly as 1.957, and GOLITSYN nas aiso stated that a KSB agent (rather than KGS surveillance) was the cause of the compromise. aa . Presented below are selected portions of the CIA operation with POPOV, followed by the informacion on POF2IV's compremise fron NOSENKO, CHEREPANOY, (QRSRMAER ani GOLLTSYN. (ii) CIA Operation with Poroy After 32 months of contacts with CIA while he was stationed in Austria, PCPOV was transferred in September 1955 to East Ger- Many to become a case officer at the GRU (tactical) intelligence point in Schwerin, and contacts with CIA were resumed in January 1956. ‘The GRU reassigned PUPOV on 28 June 1957 to the inspection Directorate, a stratecic intellicence element in Berlin/Karlshorst, where he handled some of the Iiicgais being dispatched from, re- turning to, and training in East Berlin. There he remained in contact with CIA until his recall te Moscow in November 1958 (see -below). Meanwhile: ~- During July and until 13 August 1957 POPOV handled “uous, «, @ total of five Illegals passing through East Berlin and was made responsible for a sixth Illegal in training there. He was relieved of the latter responsibility on 2 November 1957. - The next and last Illegal to be assigned to POPOV, in early October 1967, was a woman whose true identity ts. believed to be M.N. TAIROVA. She was destined to join her husband, I.A. TAIROV, in the United States. Before her dispatch froin Werlin on 1 November 1957 to New York * The CHEREP ANOV papers are discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.c. Dah Semen ome ren i i i i he. t : tite Karedes tases + 6
Fel woman under surveillance when the entered the United Staces at New Yorn City on 27 Novemker 1957, and the F8I observed rer first mceting with TALROV on & Dec- ember 1957, in accoréance with the plan which POPOV had re- ported to CIA. The TAIROVY couple remained under FEL surveil- lance until their disappeerence on ic March 1938. POPO subsequently expressed concern for kis personel security, a3 an aftermath cf learning that the TAIRPOV couple told the CRU about having been under surverllance.’ 3 errr tates oo — From 12 Decewoer 1957 to 19 January 1953 POPOV way -_ on leave in the USSR. Upon his returr to Foerlin/kKarlshorst, : he was removed from the Tjlegals-handling unit end placed in the unit dealing with Iliegai supeort agents. ~ POPOV reports of March through Cctoker 1958 show that 3 the KGS wos then conducting investigations of the Tllegalis~ ! 4 handling unit and that two hoo counterintelligance officers { q were taking the initiative in associating with hin. . 3 In November 1958 POPOV was recalled to Moscow for the expressed purpose of discussing an rllegal support ecent of ris, and he did : not return to Berlin/Kar]shorst brush cencacts between POPCV ; : and Russell LANGELLE, a CIA oificer suatianed at the Moscow mn- er : passy, tock place on 4 and 2] Junuary, {3 Maren, 23 July, 138 Sep- : tember, and 16 October 1959. Georce ALNTERS, also 2 Cin officer i F at the Bmbassy, mailed a letter to PorCV on 21 January 1959, ; 4 POFOV passed a message to LANGELLE on 1@ September 1959 report- ; . : } ing that he had been arrected and doubled by the NGB in February : of that year.** At the final brush contact, on 16 October 1959, ; Soviet authorities d«tained, questioned, mete recruitment over- a tures to,cund eventually (several hours afterward) released LANG- ‘ 3 ELLE. He was then declared persona non grata by the Soviet “3 Government.*** 4 anaremereagetnepienteeremnpettemsttnte — atvmermenatN mater Ao stn «* There are strong indications that this message cevealing POPOV's arrest in February 1959 was prepared at the directicn ; ce of the KG8, The message opened with the following remarks: io. ©, .'"Concerning my compromise, I was arrested in February. The ; ‘ compromise started from the compromise of our Illegals (the JO husband and wife in the U.3.).... Then your first letter to =. - 22> (me at my home in) KALININ was intercepted." (This is a ca dt oe a d reference to the letter mailed by WINTERS.) no ***The Soviet Government declared WINTERS persona non grata on 26 August 1960, and at that time the Soviet press linked him to LASGELLE-POPOV case. NOSENKO was asked on 1 Jul 1964 why WINTERS was not expelled from the USSR at the time, LANGELLE - was, in October 1959.. He answered: "First of all, ‘why should.. _we (the KGB) show how we found out (about POPOV)?. Then it ar was thought that if WINTERS stays, maybe we can find more j rae ‘popOvs, if WINTERS sends some more letters." . LS : ence ene atant 6 A pndeeen tenn k she et spe vethen tele menacthawins ee be Aare bt bee — TOP SEGRET
532. (iii) Cause and Date cf the Compromise ot, Loe ea, he . 3 Ya) Information from MOSEINO. i i . Early in the first meeting with CIA in June 2982, NOSEIYG fog ‘outlined the tarms for his cooperation with, CiA and said: “Never. j | in my Life will I go in contace (eith CIA) in “Moscow “or the US52. I ‘A ‘never in my life. I aiso know about LANGELL: ana PCrOY; I know boo, 4 this matter. «hen it was abroad it was fire, Lut wien you decided 1 Z -to meet him in Moscow..." He went on to explein that he did roc : % ‘want to have happen to him what hed happened to PUFOV. Near the , -end of the: meeting NOSEIKC remerkeas “ZL can tell how LANGELLE a 4 blew FOPOV - not LANGELLE, hut because of whon and why we found ij 4 him - for your future use, S50 chit you will knew how to operate. i j But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was gqailcy. } 3 ‘Another person’ was responsible for the compremise. Next time.” S 1 : NOSENKO fulfilled this promise. He began py praising LANG- ct ELLE, whom he described as a@ competent otficer exploying sound operational techniques, and said: "“LASGELLE dic not blow the 4 a H operation. ALNTERS blew it.” WINTERS, NOSE:KO continued, hac ; been observed mailing a letter by oné or two members of a KCB : _ surveillance team (no date given). The KGS intercepted the : bo : letter, arrested POPOV, and controlled his future meetings with i i ANGELLE, about three in number.* i 4 During an examination and discussion of that portion of the . CHEREPANOV papers bearing on the POPCY case, NOSENKO on 3 Febru- ! i ary 1964 confirmed the authenticity of their contents and te- po 4 affirmed that surveillance of the tetter-mailing oy WINTERS had i e led to the identification, arrest, ard doupling of POPOV by the Eo “4 KGB. Alithouch at this tame NOSENKO commented that the WINTERS | 23 letter to POFOV definiveiy cid not contain metka. he said in 4 ; June 1964 that the letter had teen chemically treated, 1.€., with ; : metka. ** 4 i : $ NOSENKO was asked in July 1964 to descrike the format and ; , j ; contents of the official KGP orientation on the POPOV case, ne i : titlea "Boomerang," which he claimed to have read, Accoréiag : i 4 t - to NOSENKO, this top secret document made no reference either to WINTERS or to the letter-mailing incident. He added that the document was not entirely factual and some of it contained : sanitized information, (b) Information from PasraSer . Esions attached to POPOV because of the a i: © : wee that POPOV was Fre- 1 OF called to Moscow because of his correspondence witn his  Aust- oe rian girlfriend via a conspiratorial address in Berlin: Besides the susp TALROV case, Sieiasam reported brush contacts were made sub- ‘ sequent to 21 January 1959. |) ## "Metkea! the Russian word for "mark" or “sign" is used, to ee refer to a "thief powder:” it is said by NOSENKO to have oe been a KGB operational aid used in the detection of clan- 4 destine mail. ns . . ar poe ce ate meen dhttmatnilighie aon deanese ene tee me ee RSET wee ‘e 4 © sepa RinepY wnntaner sie i | | { | ¢ 3 ! nn ann aia 1 . : : _ .® Ks previously indicated, four | a
foe 3 ae De. As shan 1 ai eceteeet inal 1 seeeretean smell Z, (Sh a abit caktakte u y i” To of the CHEREP ANOV COCURENLE, dated Crtober 1649, discuss — , . 3 whe @ctivaties of LANGELLE and WINTERS as xnoern to the KGB, In i a perticulear, they state thee survediisnee of ALL it3 maaling the ' 4 Jeveer “in Sanuacy 1959" war Lhasa sole catise Af Poros “oeprotise. i 3 ' “~ (a) i : H > of : : 3959 cr enriy 1969, the cevicukw oromne’ i i that é@ NG3 egent reported there : military intelligence avstem (GRU ‘ of &@ militery, intelligence, SiN beiieved the orientarcion indi Was received by the Kt5 in aiso ssid: The KCU thereupon ing that LANGELLE was posted-to hendling a special agent, tne ES: under survelliance; ‘tin the KC! observed a bru PAIGELLE and ***%Georcge BLAKE, the British Inteliacence officer arrested in April 1951 on charges of espionace for the soviets, has agnittsd passing to the KGAR in Mav and June! 1957 information from and related to POPOV: the details which he has acknow- 4 ledged giving the KGE, however, were net sufficient fer the 4 KGB to have identificd FOPOV as the source. nor to have’ placed the agent in the tliegals-handling unit in Berlin/é Karlshorst. - € *****LANGELLE arrived in Moscow in January 1958. Sythe 6