LO7I ~ £ SECTION 107. Qe INFORMANTS AND conrrper@® SOURCES 2. Communications ~ use-of symbols a, After Bureau is advised of the permanent symbol, in subsequent communications true name of informant should not be set forth; use Symbol number, be. In all communications after the initial letter, Bureau and field office file numbers for informant must be set forth. co. In communications between offices, the same procedure is to be “followed, ad. Informants and sources entering another division 1) Active informants and sourees entering another division on temporary basis for Bureau business or for personal reasons should be referred to in initial letter to interested office by true name and symbol number if it is necessary for the other division to know the identity of the informant. Office receiving such letter should make appropriate index cards and place same in "Informants and Sources in Other Divisions" index, Subsequent letters between interested offices may then identify individual . by symbol number only. (2) Individuals who leave the division where they have been furnishing information and do not plan to return should be immediately discontinued, their symbol number, if any, should be eancelled, and their true name should be used in all administrative correspondence. - (3) If an informant is transferred to another office and remains active, his identity must still be protected. e, In communications, the teletype abbreviation for the field office, symbol, and letter suffix "S" shall be shown to identify the informant; @.g., "NY 000-S,! £. In communications concerning a potential security informant, the name of the potential security informant and abbreviation "PSI" Shall be used; e.g., "John Doe, PSI." g. Similarly, in communications relative to confidential sources, the abbreviation "cosy should be used; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS. h. When symbol numbers are assigned to potential security informants, the designation should be as follows: “LA OOO-~PSI," i. In communications relative to a confidential source having a permanen% - symbol number, the following should be used: "CS LA OOO0-S," je In espionage and foreign nationality matters the caption of the communication should show in addition a character and the country designation (i.e., IS ~ R for Russia or IS — PO for Poland, etc.). This facilitates routing the mail at the Bureau. J, INDEXING 1. True names and aliases of all informants, as well as the cover name { assigned to them for informants! use in submitting their statements, put not their permanent Bureau symbol numbers, shall be indexed in the general office indices in the same manner as any other name. 2. These index cards should show the file number of the informant and ' such terms as "Informant" or "Potential Security Informant" shall not appear. K, INDICES 1. Alphabetical name index and symbol number index a. Alphabetical name index 1) In all offices all active potential security and security informant cards are to be kept by the SAC, ASAC, or security supervisor consistent with maximum security and best admin- istrative practice, This is to be known as the alphabetical . name index, (2) Pile these cards in alphabetical order and also inolude cards for security confidential seurces, These cards should show whether the individual is a potential informant, an informant, or a confidential source furnishing information on security matters, 14 5-12-61 HW 35072 Doold: 32869525 Page 1515
SECTION 107. ‘SsCURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES 107G — D 8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign nationality cases | many ‘times present special problems which limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation, (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105K,6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered, 9, Leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices . within 30 days. 10. Investigation as ottlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant. D, INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS 1, When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to develop individual as a security informant. . : : 2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.. 3, Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and location to prevent any embarrassment to Bureau. 4, Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants, This instruction is not e Vicable where active investigation has established that the - poter. «1 informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau, 5. Except in espionage and foreign -tionality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis daxpendent on the circumstances of the cate, potential informants should be contacted personally at. least & 2 every two weeks in the same manner as informants. 6. . ‘ise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months, [ ° [L.° ers concerning potential informants who are not being paid on [ Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, Jshould contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informantts stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure, These{[letters should]follow the[{form indicated]under section 107N, 3b, [but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation. ] (Refer to section 105K, 6h, (3), (v), volume IV, of this manual for exception to this rule in deseco matters, . 7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinquent, ’ 8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts. 9, Potential informant should have contaots, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field, 10, If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing | - to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value, In this regard,, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places. where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desire’; also, it may be mentioned that if he sub- scribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest‘may be shown in him which,if developed, would be the means whereby he,could obtain information, 11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that there is no ooercion or intimidation involved. Cet Bl oatet Bee Bee 5-12-61 NW 55072 Doold: 32989529 Page 1520 a
[107 -f£ SECTION 1® SECURITY INFORMANTS [AND corr Qu. SOURCES } i2. During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organization, In the event a potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may be told that his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his . - (cooperation with the FBI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals, It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Eefore taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informantts or informantts cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained, 13. Specifically advise each potential informant that he is not and cannot consider himself a Bureau employee or "undercover Agent" of the FBI, In this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon the informant, . 14, Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confi- dential at all times and if he s? «ald feel he cannot maintain this confidence he should so advise, ‘here should be no doubt left in the mind of the informant that his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such, If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learned . from him during the initial interview and a recommendation made to the Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished, The special: circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau, 15. If a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor . union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer- employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining . information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements, 16. If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concern ing investigations on the campuses of colleges and universities. 17. From the first interview with a potential informant through his develop-— - ment and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant. 18, When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent Symbol number and advise Bureau, This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau, ] Nene Se eit OO NE EE TT ee se E. BUREAU PoLIcy E {l. Development of military personnel] Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reserva— ~ tions, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau, [ [2. Contacts by designated Agents ] [ Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by - [ the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him, ] t- {3. Divulging information to informant] [ No information should be divulged tol[a potentiallinformant[or an informant] . concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential tolhislproper operation. 6 2-12-60 HW S5072 Docld: 329895259 Page 1521
' SECTION 107. Qian INFORMANTS AND conrroen®, SOURCES A. DEFINITIONS 1. Security informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor- mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in ~ such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U, S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current infor- - mation of value, 2. Potential security informant Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or eSpionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts $0 that he ean be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau, . "3. Double agent moO . ; a ae ~ A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance. 4, Confidential source An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position, Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, employees of the United Nations Secretariat, and individuals who furnish trash in connection with trash covers, These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them, B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS . TInformants should be developed on all organizations and individuals which are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investi-~ gative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon ‘ initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs, For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: 1, Evaluation of a. Complainants in security matters bd. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf-— fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard- ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty a. Bureau applicants as possible informants e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees £, Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con— tinuous basis 2. Review of closed security files on individuals [ 3. Review off[reservelindex - 4, <Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, 5. Survey possibilities of trash covers. 6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA. 7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection ° on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not de ‘informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. 8, Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field. ) wo 3 7-15+60 Brn 55072 Bocld: 32989529 Page 1522