Date: 11/23/04 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORD SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES ' SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS . CURRENT STATUS “ DATE OF LAST REVIEW COMMENTS oe eee AGENCY INFORMATION CIA : 104-10050-1014 JFK 80T01357A DOCUMENT INFORMATION CIA ACTING CHIEF, SR DIVISION ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR, Released under the John Kennedy Assassination Records oOllection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#:NWU 53199 Date: 6-06-2017 PLANS CONTACT OF LEE OSWALD WITH A MEMBER OF SOVIET KGB ASSASSINATION DEPARTMENT. 11/23/1963 2 KGB USSR EMBASSY OSWALD, L H KOSTIKOV, V PAPER SECRET 1B 1C RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/15/93 JFK3 : F6 II, 1993 .07.15.16:50:28:180150 : COPY 2 OF HELMS HEARING. PART OF VOL [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 53199 Docld: 32342971 Page 1 104-10050-10149
23 November 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR:: “Resistant Deputy Dir ector, Plans FROM: “Acting Chief. SR Division GG. SUBJECT: O Contact of Lee OSWALD with 2 member of Soviet KGB Assassination Department oN 1. According to an intercepted phine call in Mexico City, Lee OSWALD was at the Soviet Embassy there on 28 September 1963 and spoke with the Consul, Veleriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. - .“This was learned when OSWALD called . the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, - identifying himself by name and speaking broken Russian, steting the above. and asking the guard who answered the phone’ whether there was\ “enything: new. “concerning the telegram to Washington.” The guard checked and then: toka OSWALD that a request had been sent, but nothing had as yet bee \geedived. (MEXI 6453, 9 October 1963) The FBI liaison officer, Mr. Pappich, told me on 23 November that the Bureau. has reason to believe that OSWALD's visit was to get Soviet support for. a U.S. pas rt or _ Visa natter [perhaps the new passport mentioned in the press articles}. 2. KOSTIKOV {san identified KGB afficer. He was a case officer in an operation woich is evidently sponsored by the KGB artment (responsible for scbuteye-emtasemrsnmrtion), This oudcatlan, walsh ia cantmolioa my the FBI ifiider the cryptonym TUMBLEWEED, involved a See ttonal resident of . Oxlahoma who Was recrubbed—tn—Prrapen sna wst OER oth KOSTTROV in Mexico city and shortly thereafter with a ion 13th Depaxinent officer, Oleg ak, in New yore ~ wthe-fastructions given By the tuo. the evo officers, (pinpointing objectives for sabotage) and the ftheir involvement in the case, left no doust that both of them vere sorting # for the. same KGB component, the cS - 3. OF ‘course - it is not’ usuel for a KGB agent on a sensitive mission to have. such overt contact with a Soviet Embassy. However, ye have top secret * - Soviet intelligence documents, describing Military Intelligence doctrine, . xhich ‘y show'that very tasents can be met in official ‘installations using as of ‘gover for their presence there some sort of open business: . Vice Admiral. = Deas? pack C~ ~HW-594-99-—Dovdd: 32342971" “Page BO cee amen an deatnestmemenetmenentaemamemeeremenn senna neta ne nant eT Ft eae etre mee meter o- tner vipn? Sore Menage eEi een ‘ . ‘ | ee oe
L. BEKRENEV, in a “top secret lestue to a Soviet Military Intelligence - course at Military-Diplomatic. Acodeny, 1960, said, "Case officers who use as cover, let us say, the Soviet Trade Representation; TASS or Sovinformburo, can.use their cover . assignments as backstopping for non-clandestine meetings with certain agents “whose particular activities officially associate then. with. the. ‘previously mentioned Soviet institutions. ~ Howeverg. oT us such non-clandestine meetings within a legal residenty. should be: ; Srestricted. ‘to a minimum both as to Lace and time, Meetings of | this type should be carried out only in exceptional ‘cases “with,” ’" teste and-rerrabie agents in or Lao tines esos with” ak ecounterintelligence service against the ‘Soviek-tnstalletion being use yey. Such meetings sre held as a rate in the work offices of the case officer or of the agent during working hours. It is nécéssary that such meetings be conducted naturally, that . ‘ they do not attract the attention of outsiders, and that the receipt and transmittal of intelligence matters, properly cemouflaged, be ; carried out discreetly. In setting up such meetings, measures against . tapoing must be taken. One must bear in mind that a meeting with persons outside official premises and during non-working hours usually signifies a relationship between the two parties that is above and beyond official matters." Also > such contact in official Goey ne tne Beene own carglessusss. Again Admiral BEKRENEV speaks: "Some agents, because of inexperience or because of deliberate vidTetton-ofthe-rutes—of-securtty throws peculia dar personal ~ rashniess,-+s.. approached ou ase officers at places not stipulated — as as Operational meeting sites, others télepnored the casé officer at | « HYS*SOVISEIASTALIAT Toran waaarecusned personal contact arrangements > hk. I called the sbove Sonne SS to the attention of Mr. Pappich b by “Phone to his FBI office at 1030 houvs on 23 November. oo. oe ee art NRE A Re At See ce 7 4 J . . : _ Aero nh att GM-SsisT “DectarIestwT Page eR RR TE ae SE eS nee