AGENCY RECORD NUMBER . RECORD SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Date: 11/29/99 Page: 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Released under the John Kennedy CIA ; Lssassination Records 104-10306-10001 ollection Act of 1992 JFK-MISC CIA-DCI FILE: AGENCY INFORMATION (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#: NW 55355 Date: DOCUMENT INFORMATION CIA MEMO FOR THE RECORD DCI MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT 01 APRIL - 31 MAY 1964. 00/00/64 31 DCI MEETINGS PRESIDENT PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET 1B RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 09/19/98 JFK-M-06:F2 1998.09.19.13:09:33:233031: ARRB REQUEST. CIA - IR-28. CEASSIFIED ATTACHME - HW 55355 Docld:32401362 Page 1
HW 355355 wilt a wea tons 5 May 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Discussion at Luncheon Meeting 5 May with The President, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy and McCone 1. Ambassador Lodge's May 4th cable #2108 was discussed in considerable detail. The consensus was that the Khanh sentiments represent the most serious expressions since he has taken over, and that Ambassador Lodge's comments, though brief, indicated that he somewhat supported Khanh's appraisal of the situation and courses.of action recommended although Lodgedid not say so. It was decided: a. McNamara should proceed to Saigon at the earliest, accompanied by Taylor, Bill Bundy and Forrestal. An alternative suggestion was made that the three-named parties precede McNamara by two or three days. NOTE:. Subsequently I discussed privately with Bundy having intelligence support, particularly such as Bill Colby, accompany or precede McNamara. No decision was made... 2. In discussing the pros and cons of dispatching a private warning to Castro, pointing out the demands of the domestic political situation, it was felt that any further discussions with Castro should be through U Thant of the UN since Castro had addressed a letter to U Thant. _ Bud ‘Balance of the luncheon was consumed discussing the numbered items 3 through 7 on the attached agenda, none of which have particular intelligence interest except the decision was made to continue the sale of Pratt-Whitney's T-30 engine (the engine for the TFX),to the French even though doing so would enhance the French _ | nuclear capability. | ty SE east S JAM /mfb DoclId: 327401362 Page 2?
HW 355355 —SHEGRET Agenda for luncheon meeting, May 5, 1964 Lodge's latest message and a draft answer. Yesterday Lodge sent ina report of an extraordinary conversation with General Khahn in which Khahn proposed that South Vietnam go on a ''war footing, 'to include a major evacuation of Saigon, warnings to Hanoi, and a breakin relations with France. The message is attached at Tab A, and I understand Secretary Rusk will bring a draft answer for discussion. Further discussion of Cuba. I believe that there are two subjects which need discussion in a smaller group than the NSC. (1) A possible private warning to Castro (2) A possible private intimation to Castro that if things stay quiet, 1965 might be a year for serious discussions between Cuba and the U.S, ‘Plans for the forthcoming NATO meeting at Brus sels -- Secretary. Rusk and Secretary McNamara may wish to comment, | gree A report on the problem of tanks for Israel -- Bundy.. The problem of military cooperation with France. “Plans for the MLF Congressional briefings. ‘A British proposal for a tripartite non-dissemination declaration. DoclId: 327401362 Page 3
ANCOMING TELEGRAM Department of Stute 5 y , 7 . -TeP-SECRET : - fie 1 Action aoe egy ne cevretarrorencvne a reagents mopar Eeeremensp sree SS. “Rees ' MARY Ay 1964 5243 ‘AM. ane a : | FROMS ~ SAIGON i ACTION: SECSTATE 2198 ro (DATES MAY 453 Pete SEONE OF ‘ormo " EXDIS a Be ae TOP SECR ET. rr a os “FOR THE SECRETARY, MCNAMARA, HARRIMAN, AND BUNDY | FROM ‘LODGE. .i, JUST AS T i WAS LEAVING THE HOUSE THIS MORNING, I RECEIVED 3 THE UNUSUAL “MESSAGE TO CALL ON GENERAL KHANH AT 19369 AMo 4 ‘WHEN I CAME IN,HE SAID HE HAD ASKED ME TO CALL PARTLY BECAUSE 3 ‘"T ALWAYS FEEL BETTER AFTER I TALK WITH YOU" AND PARTLY OE ‘TO PUT TO Mz THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: — oe 4 ‘Co SHOULD RE MAKE A DECLARATION THAT HE WAS PUTTI G THE COUNTRY ON A WAR FOOTING? ' ‘3a THIS WOULD INVOLVE MANY THINGS AT HOME AND ABROAD. AT HONE j if WOULD INVOLVE GETTING RID OF THE SO-CALLED “POLETICIANS®  .. ¢ -. = AND meee A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD FRANKLY BE A GOVERNMENT 092. a ‘OF TECHNICIANS. IT WOULD INVOLVE 5 AS HAD BEEN THE CASE re | ; UNDER 2 LINCOLN IN OUR CIVIL WAR, THE SUSPENSION OF. CERTAIN od a CIVIL RIGHTS. THERE WOULD BE A’ CURFEWS$ SAIGON WOULD CEASE ae id ‘TO BE A CITY OF PLEASURES EVACUATION PLANS WOULD BE MADE re - ‘WHICH WOULD BE CAPABLE OF BEING CARRIED OUT IN THREE TO FOUR - _ («MONTHS TO EVACUATE ALL OF THE TWO MILLION PEOPLE IN SAIGON. 02° :UNDER THESE PLANS THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS  . .% ;WOULD LEAVE SAIGON, AND AMERICAN DEPENDENTS WOULD BE EVACUATEDe: 4 ‘4, ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE TO HANOI THAT ANY FURTHER | ‘INTERFERENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM’S INTERNAL AFFAIRS WOULD LEAD a {TO REPRISALS, AND. HE SPECIFICALLY, ASKED IF THE UNITED STATES — A 4 to » WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE TIT-FOR-TAT BOMBING EACH Been 'TIME. THERE WAS: AN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF. . ‘ SOUTH VIETNAM, wae By ra ee REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY 1S pho | “TOP-SECRET PROHIBITED UNLESS “UNCLASSIFIED” r sae ee HW 55355 DocId:32401362 Page 5
WENA ma HW 55355 Pee in ete ts Se Rn mE Ag Ne ER RS ° — EGATNED CONTROL OVER 60,009. IT WAS INDISPENSABLE 10 REGAIN | _s 2108, _MAY: 4, 3 PM, FROM SAIGON (SECTION ONE OF V0) r EA CAMBODIAN WOULD BE TOLD: WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE COULD 10. rr ‘HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH YOU, BUT WE WILL NOT RESPECT ANYTHING ; YOU NEGOTIATE EITHER WITH HANOI OR WITH THE VIET CONG. ar: sr acctena ms momgpegrree et paaameec renee pe me aan ertere: i eemeninemisnainaes anerenaenne arin: aaah he aaah csr eee awaaaeat “Ts oo is A DECLARATION OF ‘A ‘STATE OF WAR OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE TO BE. tACCOMPANIED BY ACTIONS TO PREVENT THE FRENCH SUBVERSIVE - - ACTIVITIES HERE WHICH HE WAS SURE WERE GOING ONe FOR ONE THING,“ f P THERE WAS NO DOUBT AT ALL AS. TO THEIR ACTIVITIES IN pt der tae a : THEIR PURPOSE OBVIOUSLY WAS TO GET THE UNITED STATES OUT OF. i THE WHOLE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. COLONEL LAN, GENERAL VY, AND HUAN, THE FORMER MANAGER OF THE CARAVELLE HAD MADE : DECLARATIONS UNDER THE POLYGRAPH IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS re | BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT WHICH.ESTABLISHED BEYOND DOUBT THAT... “GENERALS KIM AND XUAN WERE PV MAKE THE NEUTRALIST COUP. _ THERE WAS A LETTER WHICH VAN TAM THE WELL=KNOWN FRENCH CATIS PAW “HAD WRITTEN TO BIG MINH BUT WHICH WAS APPARENTLY. ; ‘"LOST’. HE ENVISIONED BREAKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH RENCE :BUT KEEPING THE CONSUL, “7, HE ASKED ME WHAT MY PERSONAL REACTION WAS. I SAID, SPEAKING. "PURELY PERSONALLY AND DIRECTING MY REMARKS TO THE bp SPEAKI ‘CHANGES, THAT, GIVEN THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY, WINNING THE WAR INUST COME FIRST. Pgs [AFTER THE WAR WAS WON, THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME TO, GO "AHEAD WITH DEMOCRATIC’ FORMS. Be HE SAID THAT HE: COULD NOT ENTHUSE ABOUT JUST PMAKING - i THE AGONY ENDURE”, THAT IT WAS FUNDAMENTAL COMMON SENSE AND ‘LOGIC TO TRY TO MOVE AHEAD AND GET A REAL VICTORY, OTHERWISE . WAS INEXCUSABLE TO TAKE 2,990 CASUALTIES AND LOSE FIVE ind, | ,AS THEY HAD DONE, SIMPLY YO ORDER TO STAND. STIbbe . ' 8 BEFORE MAKING A DECLARATION THAT HE WAS PUTTING THE COUNTRY. -LONTO A WAR FOOTING, HE WOULD TELL THE PEOPLE AND THE WORLD -. IWHY WAR HAD TO BE (AGED. HE WOULD SAY THAT AT THE TIME OF. ~ !THE NOVEMBER FIRST COUP THE GVN HAD “LOST CONTROL" OF SOME - . ESEVEN.MILLION PEOPLE. IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS,7HE GVN HAD - “GAINED CONTROL” OVER TWO MILLION PEOPLE, LEAVING FIVE (MILLION WHO WERE STILL NOT UNDER GVN CONTROLs EACH WEEK, <* “LIN ADDITION TO THE REGULAR MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE GVN "MAS ‘GAINING CONTROL’ OVER MORE AND MORE PEOPLE« LAST WEEK THEY. a> stage a CONTROL OVER THE. WHOLE” COUNTRY, AND, THIS. WAS WHY THE WAR THAD TO BEVED, 7 f .GP=3 ~ Ay indaden haba arene os ADVANGE copy <6 “g/8-0 "5/0/64, 9: :10 “AM. PASSED WHITE HOUSE 5/4/64, 9:50 AM. PASSED OSD FOR MCNAMARA’ “5/4764, ‘10: 135. AM. at Ns aN DoclId: 327401362 Page 6
HW 355355 -Cy_unchassiFeD ro VMTERN AL [-] CONF*5ENTIAL [-] SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET “SUBJECT: (Optional) FROM: EXTENSION | NO. Chief, WH Division TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.} OFFICER'S INITIALS Deputy Director for Plans Director of Central Intelligence sor’ 610 “tomene’s (] SECRET ([] CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL ~—s]sUNCLASSIFIED DoclId: 327401362 Page 7
7 April 1964 MR. McCONE: wt the meeting today with the President on Cuba, McGeorge Bundy has prepared a 1-1/2 page summary covering the following: Collection of information. Covert propaganda. Economic denial. Contact with dissident groups. Contamination of ships. (Bundy recommends continuation of all of the above. ) Maintenance of faiding capability. Autonomous groups. (On 6 and 7 Bundy states that opinion is divided and this is the real point of the meeting. ) Op WN & “Nom From the Department of Defense - Mr. McNamara, Mr. Vance, and General Taylor will attend. From the Department of State - Secretary Rusk, Mr. Mann and Mr. Johnson will attend. Bundy will be present. The weekly lunch of the President with Rusk and McNamara is scheduled today at 1 o'clock. W. Elder HW 55355 Docld: 32401362 Page 93
“Mh LL hhhhsssmitshttitttttttn —FOP-SECRET NX SSS THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS _ INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS. No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI- GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Direcior of Central Intelligence. [no ncssome | - TOP-SECRET Lda SSSA \\ HW 55355 DBocld:32401362 Page 10
HW 55355 _ Soo77 4-7 7 SC No. 02971/64 WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING 7 April 1964 FOR THE DCI IT. DoclId: 32401362 Page i1 CUBA We have seen no change since the beginning of the year in the size of the Soviet military establishment in Cuba, put the evidence con- tinues to point to an imminent turn-over of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system to the Cubans. A. We believe there are still about 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, making allowances for as many as 2,000 more or less. B, The majority--perhaps as much as 80 percent-- can and probably will be withdrawn when the Cubans complete their SAM training later this month. C. An advisory and technical assistance group_ of perhaps one or two thousand will probably remain for some time. Cubans have been conducting comprehensive air de- fense drills throughout the island on an almost daily basis since early February. The exercises now include the tracking of live targets--in- cluding our reconnaissance flights--and the simulated destruction of MIG-21 targets flown by Cubans, a a 7 _—FOP-SECREF-DINAR 44 7
— 4 ~ oe Y So / «4 A. Cubans have already assumed control over most early warning radar functions. B. The air defense system has been realigned from the two-sector organization the Soviets used, to conform to the three-sector pattern of the Cuban armed forces. C. Some of the more sophisticated radar and communications equipment we would not ex- pect the Soviets to turn over has been re- moved from the SAM sites. D, Air defense activity conducted wholly by Soviets has been declining steadily, and Soviet radio. operators are making increas-— ingly frequent references to demobilization in May. One operator, in an unfortunately fragmentary intercept, referred to the arrival of six ships in April, six in May, and five in July. _ III. Cuban naval and ground forces have been improv- ing. their combat capabilities with more intensive and more realistic training, organizational im- provements, and the streamlining of communications procedures, LZ A, FOP-SEGREFDPENAR | HW 355355 DocId: 32401362 Page 12
HW 355355 DoclId: 32401362 Cast There have been three purely military cargos delivered to Cuba this year, and a fourth is on the way, probably carrying vehicles and spare parts. One of the earlier ships brought in 12 crated MIG jet fighters, prob- ably as replacements, which are still sitting in their crates at San Antonio de los Banos. ro himself has recently been preoccupied with economic matters and with the re-trial of Marcos Rodr havi Bati to c rath poss putt A, Page 14 iguez, an old-line Communist charged with: ng betrayed student conspirators to the sta police. Castro steered the second trial enter the blame on Rodriguez personally, er than the party, thereby heading off a ible purge of the old guard Communists and ing them further in his debt. The immediate economic concern is the sugar harvest now under way. Indications are the. 1964 crop will be no bigger than last year's 3.8 million tons--possibly less. Clandestine reporting and intercepts show that the crop is being adversely affected by labor shortages, by a somewhat lower sugar content in the cane, and by damage to the cane by the mechanical cane loaders. -4- —FOP-SECGRET DINAR
present , and optimistic Over Prospects for improvement. You have Probably Tead Che Guevara's floating remarks a+ the un Trade Cubans are convinced they have, as they Say, "broken the back of our economic denial effort, D. The Cubans hag a balance of about $100 mij_ lion in Convertible currency , largely from Sugar Sales, at the end of 1963, The Sugar non~bloce Countries, SO much SO that the Seat, ~5. Page 15 1327401362 DocId:32 HW 55355
HW 355355 DoclId: 32401362 “1 OP SECRET DINAR Japan used to be Castro's biggest single trading partner in the Free World, but last year both exports and imports fell off. Now the Cubans are telling Japanese firms that unless they trade with Cuba, Havana will feel compelled to switch the business it does in Japan to Western European firms. -6- TOP SECRET PINAR Page 16
HW 355355 _ Info INCOM H Action SS wa CEXDIS 7 ae THEN T SAID THAT IF NWN “UNDERTOOK. TO: INV ADE SVN WITH ITs. nore CONTROL: 1593. > ne RECD.: “ OMAY 4, 1964 7225 As ele eS FROM? SAIGON ‘ACTION: | SECSTATE 2168 — ‘TOP SECRET. ee “FOR THE SECRETAR RY, MCNAMARA, FROM LOD@ ‘19. I ASKED HIM THE SPECIFIC QUESTION THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY AT ALL OF A SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH HAD BEEN WON AT THAT IS, A KEY BATTLE SOMEUHERE WHICH ‘11. SPEAKING AGAIN TO HIM PERSONALLY, ‘OUT WHERE IT ALL MIGHT. LEAD AND WHAT REPRISALS THE ENEMY ‘DATE: © MAY 4,3 P.M. SETWO OF*TWO ING TELEGRAM =Department of State ORT RTE TON pn ee er eae HARRIMAN, ‘AND BUNDY _ WHETHER HE THOUGHT - COMMUNIST VICTORY DIEN BIEN PHU IN 1 954, 0° WOULD HAVE A TOTALLY., DEMORALIZING EFFECT AND CAUSE CAPITULATION TO THE COMMUNISTS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT TANYONE CONTEMPLATING STEPS OF THIS. KIND WOULD HAVE TO FIGURE ~~ MIGHT TAKE. IT WAS ONE THING FOR. THE US AND THE GVN TO" BOMB ‘NORTH VIETNAM 3UT HOW: WOULD THEY RETALIATE? IF WE BLEW UP ‘THEIR GASOLINE REFINERY, WE SHOULD EXPECT THEM TO BLOY UP. OURS. IF YE DESTROYED THEIR POWER. DAM,-THEY MOULD DESTROY OUR POWER... % ‘DAM. WAS IT CERTAIN AT THIS: TIME “THAT IN’ SUCH. AN, EXCHANGE | {WE MOULD COME OUT AHEAD? -. 0 =. NM . PARMY, THAT WOULD RAISE A HOST OF NEW "INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. THE POSSI BILITY OF THE CHINESE °-.. [ARMY ITSELF COMING IN HAD 'TO BE COSIDERED. QUESTIONS OF VERY A CUTE. HE ASKED WHETHER. ‘THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH: “ALL THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT VERY WELL. INVOLVE CHINA. . ‘ULTIMATELY, NVN WOULD HAVE - ‘TO BE LIBERATED FROM CHINA. ‘IF THE CHINESE ARMY CAME IN, SAID I, THE QUESTION AROSE TO WHETHER THIS ARMY COULD BE PREVENTED FRO FUNCTIONING. BY ‘N | TTOP-sreRes DoclId: 327401362 Page i7 REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS “UNCLASSIFIED” PROHIBITED UNLESS AS
——ror-srerey «2= 2108, May 4, 3 P.M.,; (SECTION 2 OF 2), From Saigon BQIBING TTS’ SUPPLY LINES “AND THIS" tn TURN RAISE D THE QUESTION”? IN NY MIND AS TO YHETHER THE SUPPLY LINES CouLD BE EFFECTIVELY - -INTERDICTED WITH CONVENTIONAL BOMBING OR. WHETHER NUCLEAR ~:- AEAPONS YOULD BE NECESSARY: T prp NOT HAVE THE ANSWERS TO” ong oe QUESTIONS, BUT OBVIOUSLY THEY WERE ONES THAT aNy SENSIBLE PERSON YOULD ASK. HE AGREED, - Foes 15. I SAID THESE yERE ERY LARGE QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN TME ys GOVERNVENT, THAT.I DID NOT PRETEND cae TO HAVE THE ANSWERS, THAT 1 PERSONALLY HAD BEEN S3R20yGNT yp ‘ON -THE IDEA, ‘sO O “ASTA THE UNITED STATES Coup NE GREAT INFLUENCE WITH ITS. ‘AIR POWER AND ITS NAVY -AND IN WORKING IN SUPPORT OF ASTATIC | ARMIES BUT THAT IT YAS OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR THE UNITED” STATES TO COMMIT A LARGE LAND ARMY To THE MAINLAND OF ASTA.. FOR EXAMPLE, I DID Nor VISUALIZE. THE UNITED STATES EVER, 7 PUTTING AN ARMY INTO. asta COMPARABLE TO THE ARMY IT. oo HAD PUT INTO EUROPE DURING WORLD War Ir, 7 \ 14. HE APPRECTaTED THIS; BUT HE HOPED THAT WE wouLD CONSIDER” THE BIG THINGS WHICH. COULD BE DONE WITH AN "ARMY CORPS* | iOF US SPECIAL FoRCES. HE -THOUGHT THAT. ANY "ARMY CORPS'™.<. Pe ‘CH SPECIAL FORCES NUMBERING 14, 999 MEN COULD BO IN asta WHAT ‘AN ARMY GROUP HAD DONE IN EuROPR, HE SAID ONE aMERTCAN CAN MAKE SOLDIERS OUT ioF TEN ORIENTALS. IF An ARMY GROUP IN ' 7 ‘EUROPE COULD COVER 4 HUNDRED MILES, HE THOUGHT AN ARMY CORPS .OF “SPECIAL FORCES COULD COVER THE WHOLE GANBODIAN-LAOTIAN FRONTIER, 15. HE THOUGHT IT YAS ILLOGICAL, WASTEFUL, YRONG TO GO oN _ LINCURRING CASUALTIES "JUST IN ORDER TO MAKE THE AGONY ENDURE", ME FELT THAT THE SHOW OF DETERMINATION WHICH HE YAS OUTLINING © WOULD MAKE THE VIET CONG CHANGE AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE. NECESSARY TO GO TO THE ULTIMATE LIMIT, BUT HE WANTED TO BE... HONEST AND CANDID AND HAVE US FACE UP TO THESE ULTIMATE LIMITS. | ‘16. I ASKED WHETHER HE WANTED To CONTIN: | CONCENTRATING THE EFFORT IN THE PROVINCES SEROUND SAIGON, AND HE SAID BY ALL MEANS BUT THaT MUCH MORE 0.) ‘THAN THAT OUSHT TO BE Dewé* TN ORDER’ TO DEVELOP A REAL SHOY CF DETERMINATION AND AN OFFENSIVE SPIRIT. ae COMMENT: THIS MAN OBVIOUSLY wants TO'GET ON WITH THE yop | ‘AND NOT SIT HERE INDEFINITELY TAKING. CASUALTIES. WHO CAN ad ae —TOP-SEERET HW 55355 Docld:32401362 Page 13 FTEN VOICED BY GENERAL HAC ARTHOR, THAT INV). os od ry j UE WITH THE PRESENT PLAN OF!
| _TOP-SEGREP | 43. °.2108, MAY ‘, 3 P.M., (SECTION 2 OF 2), From Saigon ! ; BE een itm cera mates wuece pare teu ee ay. SO teen ee Serge | Tne: SOT eee een eee ONT te eee | . veg ene | ! ‘HIS DESIRE. TO: DECLARE. A STATE: OF’ WAR, LEAVING ouT SPECIF a . WN LINE SUCH :AS THE PLANS For EVACUATING. “SAIGON, SEEMS Ho E WITH UR: DESIRE To. ~ GET. OUT. a A, "BUSINESS. AS USUAL” we Tyrer te come geen a (MENTALITY. HE IS” CLEARLY. FacING P ace Wha Ed US TO-DO. IT. TOO. u TO. ALL THE “HARD ‘QUESTI OVS AND, WANTS | co Lo i en | LEN 10. REAR Me 8 OEE, 16, Lopes, ee ee, . NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO s/s-0 AT 9:36 A.M., 5- “4-64. os | PASSED WHITE HOUSE 10:31 A.M., 5-464, 0 .. PASSED OSD FOR MCNAMARA 10:59 A.M., 5-4-64. 0 7 HW 55355 Docld: 32401362 Page 19
HW 355355 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON “SECRET May 5, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The decision to seli the TF-30 aircraft jet engine to France should be reassessed since it has developed that the French may use it ina new aircraft with a strategic as well as a tactical capability. ‘The TF-30, one of the most advanced jet engines in the world, has been developed by Pratt and Whitney for use in our TFX aircraft. Last fall, Pratt and Whitney agreed to sell to France two TF-30 engines for use by SNECMA, a French engine firm with close operating ties with Pratt and Whitney, and is now negotiating the sale of an additional dozen, it was originally assumed that the TF-30 would be used in the French Mirage II V, a relatively short range, tactical fighter bomber with a vertical take-off capability. . It now appears, however, that the French may also use the TF-30 engine in a new aircraft, the Mirage II F, which although advertised as a tactical fighter bomber, will have a Strategic capability comparable to the Mirage IV, the present French ‘strategic bomber. A separate and equally important consideration is that the French appar- ently hope to market the Mirage III F as an alternative to our TEX, anticipating that its lower cost will compensate for its reduced capability, The availability of this French aircraft, powered by U. S. engines, probably would put pressures on this country to make the TFX available to our other allies, a decision we have deliberately postponed for reasons relating to its strategic capabilities. The arguments in favor of continuing the agreement to sell the TF-30 engine to France, despite the above considerations, is that: (1) Cancel- lation of the existing agreement to sell the TF-30 engines would probably have significant political repercussions; and (2) the French could buy a . comparable engine for the Mirage III B from the British (ise., the SPEY engine produced by Rolls Royce). McG. B. DoclId: 327401362 Page 20
HW 355355 EYES ONLY 4 May 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence) SUBJECT : Comments on Saigon LimDis Cable 2108 (Attached) We have the following comments on Khanh's remarks to Ambassador Lodge: 1, Khanh has had several recent sessions with Lodge - at which he had an opportunity to raise some of the very fundamental points referred to in this telegram and did not do so, Thus, we wonder whether the views here at- tributed to Khanh do not, perhaps, represent more of a brainstorm than a well thought out program, In any case, they indicate increasing impatience possibly even: bordering on desperation, These views might reflect an over-—reaction to the weekend's events in Saigon, However, we do not feel that the overall situation warrants such sudden, extreme alarm, We are surprised that the Ambassador did not reflect this in his reporting or comments, Frankly, we find it dif- ficult to factor out the Ambassador's views from those of Khanh, 2. Taken at face value, Khanh's remarks reflect a very disturbing, new element in his approach toward the war, In many respects, these views run counter to the basic strategy against the Viet Cong which has been recently and painfully worked out, While Khanh indicates that he should continue to proceed on a "province-—by-—province basis," the impatience he displays, not only with the progress of his efforts, but with the long, grinding process that our strategy involves is fundamentally inconsistent with much of what the US now be- lieves as necessary to defeat the Viet Cong, EYES ONLY DoclId: 327401362 Page ?1
HW 355355 EYES ONLY 3. Evacuating Saigon, eliminating all vestiges of a democratic government and injecting a substantial number of American combat troops into the war would, in our view, be extremely counterproductive; Khanh is just now beginning to achieve a certain degree of popular support and sympathy. These particular measures would almost certainly produce just the opposite reaction to that which Khanh (and pre-— sumably Lodge) anticipate: they would be widely inter- preted as signs of weakness and despair, and would give the Viet Cong considerable psychological and propaganda advantage, 4, We are, of course, in complete sympathy with the desire to inject a greater GVN and US sense of urgency into the struggle. We also agree that these ends could be served by certain carefully chosen and calculated new US military moves in South Vietnam and adjacent areas, Nevertheless, we feel that the general philosophy involved in the oil spot approach is still valid and that we and the GVN must face up to a long, tough, gradual process of extending GVN in- fluence and control and reducing that of the Viet Cong. In this context, we still think that the GVN has a long way to go in mobilizing the assets, resources, and people available for fighting this war and to do this effectively, Khanh must demonstrate a steady sense of purpose and present inspiring and confident leadership. 5. I discussed this message briefly with Sullivan over the phone. He told me that he had talked to the Secretary of State about it who in turn was going to discuss it with the President. Sullivan also said there will probably be no official US reaction to this until Secretary McNamara deals with it in Vietnam on 12 May. wnxeg her tb Gr Chairman CIA South Vietnam Task Force -2- EYES ONLY DoclId: 327401362 Page 2?
HW 355355 5 May 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT : Khanh's Data on "Population Control” (Paragraph 9, LimDis Cable 2108) Khanh's figures re population control warrant close examination. For one thing, the figure of 7 million claimed as being lost to Viet Cong control as of..last November is considerably higher than the most pessimistic MACV estimate, which puts it at 15 percent of the 15.3 million population. More important, Khanh's claim to have "recovered" 2 million people during his administra- tion is invalid. The only real gains made in country- wide clear and hold operations have been in Binh Dinh and Quang Tin Provinces. These gains can be measured in thousands - rather than millions - of people, and actually occured in areas shown on existing situation maps as already being under government control, Gains in these areas may, in fact, have been offset by losses in other areas, particularly the Delta, where the Viet Cong drive continues unchecked. ) Caer ; LEK RAY (8./ CLINE Deputy Direct (Intelligence): — DoclId: 327401362 Page 23
TOP SECRET . April 7, 1964 Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba U. S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a higher level. The present covert program is designed in support of a general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro, . accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, or (d) abandoned. Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories: 1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex- filtration of agents and covert supply of agent operations. Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this pro- gram be continued. vy "2. Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued with regular review of their operational guidelines. 3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selec- tivé economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban economy. . , ‘Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con- tinued. 4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elemenjs near the power centers of the regime. Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con- tinued. —POP-SEGREF . LS WW 55355 Docld:32401362 Page 24-
reer HW 355355 —FOR-SEGRET -2- 5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food). Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued. 6. ClIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons. Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom- mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties. ‘7, ClIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them. Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments. Docld: 32401362 Page 25
7 April 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD ‘ SUBJECT: PRESENT : Meeting at the White House 7 April 1964 Subject - Review of Covert Program directed against Cuba The President, State Department: Secretary Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Mann, and The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Mr, Crimmins, Defense Department: Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance, JCS: General Maxwell Taylor, CIA: The Director, Messrs, Helms and FitzGerald, White House Staff: Messrs, Bundy and Dungan, 1, Mr, Bundy presented to the meeting a memorandum to guide discussion concerning the Cuban program against Cuba, Seven categories of activities were listed in this memoran- dum as follows: (1) Collection of intelligence, (2) Covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance, (3) Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial, (4) Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba, HW 55355 Docld:32401362 Page 26
(5) Indirect economic sabotage. (6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding, (7) Autonomous operations, 2. Mr. Bundy*s paper recommended continuation of the ‘first five items listed and recommended discussion of the last two, 3, There was a brief discussion of item (5) during which various methods of economic sabotage were described, There was no disposition on the part of those present to interfere with this program, 4, With respect to sabotage raiding by CIA-~controlled assets, Secretary Rusk said that two things presently mili- tate against. a resumption of the program: (a) the pending OAS matter with respect to the Venezuelan arms cache which may. be strengthened by discovery of arms in the Argentine as well as in Brazil, and (b) the prospective turnover of the SAM sites by the Russians to the Cubans in April or May, Secretary Rusk said that we would wish to maintain a clean hands posture while the OAS case is pending and that if the Cubans are to misuse the SAMs we would wish the onus to be fully on their backs, Secretary Rusk said that in addition he does not believe that hit-and-run raids are in any event very productive; that they have a high noise level and, furthermore, that he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possibly wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U.S. involvement in order to increase that involvement. Mr. Bundy said that in the past he had been an advocate of sabotage operations, but in view of the history of the program since June, he had come to the con- clusion that it is unlikely that an effective sabotage program will be conducted, In explanation he pointed out that the policymakers, each time for good reasons, had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that a program of the type envisioned in the June paper . Simply does not, in the nature of things, appear feasible. 5. Mr. McCone called attention to the paper dated 8 June 1963 which is the basis of the Agency’*s current program against Cuba, He quoted from the 8 June paper as follows: HW 55355 Docld:32401362 Page 27
the Soviet presence from Cuba," With respect to the interdependence of the are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in terms of achieving relatively limited policy objec- tives, This is Clearly a case where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts," With respect to the sabotage program, he quoted from paragraph 6.E, as follows: "It must be recog- nized that no Single act of Sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate Significant resistance, However, it is our Opinion that a well- planned series of sabotage efforts, properly exe- cuted, would in time produce the effect we seek," Mr. McCone pointed out that five relatively low-key sabotage operations since June 1963 do not in effect con-~ stitute a test of the program and that the statements quoted from the 8 June paper remain valid. He said that there was a surge of anti-Castro sentiment during the fall of 1963, corresponding with the period during which the Sabotage raids were conducted, but that resistance senti- ment has now fallen into apathy. He said that the five 6, The Secretary of State said that part of our problem has to do with the Soviet Union which is now going through a crisis period, particularly with respect to the Sino-Soviet split, He said that he felt sure that were Ambassador Thompson present at the meeting he would . HW 55355 DBocld:32401362 Page 23
HW 355355 indicate the danger of forcing Khrushchev to take a militant defensive attitude with respect to Cuba, Secretary Rusk said that should the Cubans shoot down a U-2, raid peaceful shipping off the coast or should there be a strong OAS resolution, the question of the conduct of sabotage raids could be reconsidered. (I do not think that I am in error in quoting the Secretary as equating a U-2 shootdown with a good OAS resolution as a basis for resuming raiding operations, ) 7. Mr. Mann said that his attitude towards CIA- conducted raiding operations would depend upon getting a clear legal basis for action against Cuba out of the OAS, He said that he doubted that all seven courses of action combined would result in the overthrow of Castro, He said that he leans away from CIA-conducted raids and “towards autonomous operations, He said that at the present time, particularly in the light of the Brazilian events, favorable action by the OAS on proposed paragraph two of the resolution looks like a fifty-fifty chance, In reply to Secretary Rusk*s query, I said that I believed that CIA-controlled raiding assets could be held together for another two months pending the resolution of the Secretary?s two points (OAS and Cuban use of SAMs). 8, I briefed the President on the present status of autonomous operations, including the fact that Artime is planning to launch his operational program on the 12th of April, There was some discussion of these plans but no one appeared disposed to try to stop Artime, I said that Manolo Ray*s plans were not as well known to us but that he had made it clear that he intended to move by May. 9, The Secretary of Defense said that it was his opinion that the covert program has no present chance of success in terms of upsetting Fidel Castro, He suggested that it might be useful, for reasons which had not been -brought out at this meeting, and pointed out that the principal decision to be made was a broader one -- pre- sumably what the overall U.S, attitude should be with respect to Fidel Castro, He said that he felt that the present raiding assets should be held in being pending resolution of Secretary Rusk*s two points but that in the meanwhile the fundamental question should be debated, Mr, Vance said that he agrees with the suggestion of con- tinuing these assets in being but that he believes that Docld: 32401362 Page 29 SOF