; whether to fo or what we should do next", (Id.., D. 9.) Four ‘days later, on November 22, 1963, (the same day AM/LASH was given the poison pen), Jean Daniel was meeting with Castro. On that same day, President Kennedy was assassinated. With the change of Administrations, Atwood's talks with the Cubans became less fre- quent and eventually ended in early 1964, (Atwood , P- 10.) ! A, Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the AM/LASH Poison Pen Device (a) . Testimony of Helms CL). The October 29 Meeting -and the Use of Robert Kennedy's Name Without Obtaining Ifis Approval © As discussed above in detail (see pp. ), Fitzgerald met with AM/LASH on October 29, 1963, ina foreign capital. Fitz- gerald represented to: AM/LASH that he was the personal represen- Lf 7 pative of Robert Kennedy, ‘and gave AM/LASH assurances of full sup- ‘port should AM/LASH succeed in overthrowing Castro. The IG Report states that, - according. to Fitegerald, Helms and Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with AM/LASH and Helms de- ‘cided ' ‘it.was not “necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald to speak in his name". (IG, pp. 88-89).. In his testimony, Helms stated he did not recall such a discussion with Fitzgerald, but that he believed he had pre-existing authority to deal with AM/LASH -with respect to "a change in government" (as opposed to assassination) and that this made it unnecessary to obtain Robert Kennedy's approval.) "y felt so sure that if 1 went to see Mr. Kennedy that he would have */The’ following, exchange occurred in Helms’ testimony: a 1 "Sen. Hart. of Michigan: Dealing with respect to “what? (DD . A change in government, or assassination?" Mr. Helms: A change in government, Senator Hart. This is _what we were trying to do. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132) HW 50955 Docid:32423539 Page 933
“om fog : tty aid yes, that I didn't think there was any need to." (Helms, — ONT 6/13/79, p. 132.)_ Helms said his view was that AM/LASH was a political action agent, not a potential assassin, and that. the meet- ing with AM/LASH and his decision not to contact Robert Kennedy should be viewed in that light: "...given this Cuban of his standing and all the history...of trying to find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and have a group to. re- place Castro...this was so central to the whole theme of everything we had been trying to do, that TI. find. it totally unnecessary to ask Robert Kennedy at that point (whether) we should go ahead with this. This is obviously what he had been pushing, what every- body had been, pushing for us to try to do...let's get on with. doing it. | (Helms , 6/13/75, pp. _117-118) ,*/ -(ii) The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22 While Helms ‘stated that. the. delivery of a poison pen to AM/LASH was not part of an assassination plot, Helms. testified */As discussed above (see pp. ), there was conflicting testi- mony from CIA officers as. to whether they viewed AM/LASH. as an assassin and as to the purpose of giving him the poison pen. The docu- mentary evidence, however, indicates that AM/LASH in 1963 was-intent upon assassinating Castro, that the CIA officers knew of this, and, -in addition to offering a poison pen, told AM/LASH they would supply him with high powered rifles with telescopic sights. (see _?p. , above). Helms testified that because Amlash ‘was the asset we were looking for, (we didn't want him to blow himself or ‘blew anything else by getting involved in something like this [assassination] and have it fail. We wanted him to stay in place.' (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 131). Helms stated that “at no time was it the idea of [the AM/LASH-1] case officers, or those people in the chain behind, to use [AM/LASH-1] to assassinate Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135). Oo Helms further stated "...there was an enormous amount of temporizing. with this fellow to keep him on the team, to keep him -. working away at this job, but to try and persuade him that this was not the way to go about it." (Helms , 6/13/75, p. 135). Helms testified that AM/LASH-1 was given the poison pen "because he was insistimg on something and this was a temporizing gesture rather than athe him some kind of a gun he had asked for...." (Helms , | HW 50955 Docld: 32493539 Page 234°”
~ 14 - that he believed Castro's assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority. / (elms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12)./ As in the case of the 1962 plots, Helms based this on the vigor of the Administration's policy towards Cuba fand his perception that there were no limits put on the means that could .be used in the effort against Castro. (Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12). Thus,/ Helms testified that after the missile crisis the U.S. continued to conduct covert actions whose purpose was "to overthrow Castro.” (Helms, 6/13/75, Pp. 24.) /Helms was asked whether it was his opinion that the offer of the poison pen to AM/LASH was authorized because it came within the scope of the 1963 pro- gram against Castro. Helms. responded: ft think the only way I know how to answer that is that I do not recall when things got cranked up in 1963 any dramatic changes or limitations being put on this operation. There yO ' was still an effort by whatever device, and perhaps only | ; slightly differently oriented at this time, to try to get rid of Castro...But I do’ not recall specific things being said, now, (we are not) going to do this, we're not going to do that, and we're not going to do the. other thing, and we will do just these things."/ etic (b) Testimony of Administration Officials As with the Mongoose period, the Administration officials agreed that they were not informed about any assassination plot and that there was no order that Castro be assassinated. Again, they disagreed with Helms’ position that an assassi-~ nation plot could be undertaken without express authority. The only added part relating to the AM/LASH plot was certain testimony which asserted that it was in- conceivable that the President would have approved an assassination plot at the very ‘same time he had authorized talks to explore the possibility.of improved relations | -with Castro.*/ * /Rusk testified that "I find it extraordinarily difficult“to believe" and that "I just can’t conceive" President Kennedy would have authorized the passage of an assas- sination device for use against Castro while Atwood was exploring the possibility HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 235
WW 50955 Since. Helms did not claim any higher specific authorization for or. knowledge of the AM/LASH assassination plot, however, the additional issue posed by that testimony does not really arise. (continued) of normalizing relations with Castro. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p.°85). Similarly, Bundy testified he "absolutely" did not believe President Kennedy would have authorized: or permitted an assassination device to have been passed at the same time a possible rapprochment with Castro was being pursued. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 151). On the other hand, when the possibility of exploring better relations with Castro was initially raised (but before any talks were begun) Bundy indicated. that it could be explored on a "separate track" while other proposed actions, such as sabotage, were going on. (Agenda for Special Group meeting of 4/29/63, p. 2.) Docld: 32493539 Page 236
Subcommittee Meet ing 9/9/75. Approved Draft. d. The Question of Aithorization in the Johnson Administration 1. Summary of the Assassination Activity. As discussed above (see pp. _._)» the Agency delivered arms to AM/LASH in Cuba in March and June 1964.. In early © 1965 after AM/LASH became more insistent that a Castro assassination was neces- sary and had asked for a silenced weapon, the Agency ‘put AM/LASH in contact with the leader .of an anti-Castro group, B-1, with the intention that AM/LASH obtain such a weapon. Thereafter, the Agency learned that AM/LASH had received a silencer and other special equipment from B-1 and was preparing to assassinate Castro. | . 2. The Issue of Authorization. The issue of authority in the Johnson Admini- stration is similar to that in the Kennedy Administration. During this phase of the AM/LASH plot, Helms continued as Deputy Director for covert operations, and the principal members of the Kennedy Administration continued in their positions in the relevant period of the Johnson Administration (Robert Kennedy left the Administration in the midst of this period, on _ ).* Helms' testimony that he believed a Castro assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority in view of Administration policy towards Cuba applied to the AM/LASH operation in both 1963 and 1964-65. (Helms , 6/13/75, p. 137-138.) Again, there was no evidence ' that McCone or anyone above the Agency specifically authorized or knew about the 1964-65 plot. We discuss below four other matters occurring during the Johnson Administration: (1) the covert action program against Cuba in 1964-1965; (2) the Special Groups! action in investigating reports of Cuban exile underworld #RUSK (Secretary of State); WeNamara (Secretary of Defense), McCone (Director of Central Intelligence); and Bundy (Special Assistant for National Security and Chairman of the Special Group). HY 50955 DoclTd: 32423539 Page 237
Sebi plots to assassinate Castro; (3) Helms' report to Rusk that CIA was not in- volved with AM/LASH in a Castro assassination plot; and (4) Helms' briefing of PréSident Johnson on the 1967 IG Report on alleged CIA assassination plots. 3, The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in 1964-1965. According to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7, 1964, which he chaired, President ; Johnson decided to discontinue the use of CIA-controlled sabotage raids against HW 50955 Cuba.* (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964,.p. _.) A memoran- dum by McCone indicated that in deciding this question, President Johnson abandoned the objective of Castro's overthrow. ** At. the April 7, Special Group meeting, Rusk had emphasized his opposition to the. use of sabotage raids, stating his belief that they were unproductive, and had a “high noise level" that called attention to them. In addition, Rusk stated that "he suspects the Cuban exiles who’ actually conduct the raids of. possible ‘wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U. S. involvement in order to increase that involvement." (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, page.2.) - *A memorandum by Bundy on April 7, 1964, listed seven aspects of the covert action program which had been in effect.. These were: (1) collection of intelligence; (2) covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance; (3) cooperation with other agencies in economic denial; (4) attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba; (5) indirect economic sabotage; (6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding; and (7) autonomous opera~- tions. (Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group, April 7, 1964, p. 1-2.) **At the April 7, 1964, meeting Rusk and Bundy opposed continuation of sabotage actions by CIA-controlled assets as "unproductive'' and. impractical. McCone dis-~ agreed, noting that the covert action program relied on a "well-planned series of sabotage efforts". (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. 3.) In this connection, Bundy noted that since the approval of the current sabotage in June 1963 “policymakers..:had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that (the sabotage program) simply does not, in the nature of things, appear.feasible'. (Id., p. 2.) Docld: 324273539 Page 235
. 3 | ; QW fia on a yi jiu oo Oy ot eo U 1 \ [L ‘4, The Special Group Investigation of Reported Castro Assassination Plots | by Cuban Exiles. On June 10, 1964, Helms informed McCone by memorandum that \ Agency officials had learned of several plots of Cuban exiles to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to McCone, June 10, 1964.) ' Several of the plots, according to the memorandum , involved "people apparently associated with the Mafia". Reportedly the exiles had offered people associated _ with the Mafia $150,000 to perform the deed. In his memorandum, Helms stated that “the sources of the reports were parties to the plots and in submitting the in- formation to Agency officers were presumably seeking legal immunity should the plots succeed. (Id., p. 1.) _- Helms' memorandum, however, made no mention of any of the CIA assassination plots against Castro.* (Footnote continued from previous page.) In a memorandum the day after President Johnson's decision to stop CIA-controlled sabotage operations, McCone stated: ''the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement . the policy (outlined in certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bring- ing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed - nature which might accomplish this objective". (Memorandum by McCone, April 8, 1964, p. _.) In the context of the Special Group's discussion, McCone's use of the words "liqui- dation" and "elimination" appears to be another example of inartful language. A literal interpretation of these words leaves one with the impression that assassina- tion was contemplated. But the context of the discussion does not bear out such an interpretation. Thus in specifying what he meant by "future events of an undisclosed nature" McCone- pointed to "extreme economic distress caused by a sharp drop in sugar prices'', and ‘other external factors". (Id, p. 8.) McCone testified that _ such references as the "elimination" or "Liquidation" of the Castro regime did not» refer to assassination. (McCone, p. ; **Moreover, according to Bundy, no one from the CIA or anyone else informed him at the meetings that "in earlier years there had been a relationship with...persons allegedly involved with the criminal syndicate--in order to accomplish the assassi- nation of Fidel Castro" (Bundy, p. 71.) “ee HW 350955 Docld:32423539 Page 239
4 S Ci c ou ny | Indeed, it stated that "Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that ' the United States Governnent would not under any circumstances , condone the HW 450955 planned actions", (Id., p. 1.) When the Special Group considered the information in Helms memorandum on . June 18, 1964, McCone stated he was "somewhat skeptical" and proposed additional investigation, but "others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the U. S. was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention". (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, June 18, 1964. ) In a memorandum on the June 18 meeting, McCone indicated he had dissented from the Special Group’ Ss decision, stating his be- lief that the Special Group was "overly exercised" and that he was inclined to dismiss the matter as "Miami cocktail party talk". McCone noted, however, that the Special Group "was more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover". (Memorandum June 18, 1964, p. 1.). The Special Group decided that the reports be transmitted to the Attorney General “as a matter of law enforcement'"'. (Id.) Robert Kennedy was informed of this matter a few days later and stated that the Justice Department would investi- gate. (Memorandum of Meeting, 22 June 1964.) Thereafter the FBI conducted an investigation, the results of which were submitted to the Special Group on August .19, 1964, by McCone.* (Memorandum; “August 19, 1964, McCone to Bundy.) *McCone's memorandum summarized seven FBI reports on its investigation. The FBI found that several of the persons it interviewed stated they had knowledge of the exile's plots and had reported the information to the CIA.: Others inter- viewed denied knowledge of the plans. Docld:32423539 Page 240 jib IE
HW 50955 5, Welms' Report to Rusk that CIA was not Involved with Amlash in a Castro Assassination Plot ae In March 1966, Helms reported to Rusk by memorandum on the CIA's re- lations with Anlash. (Rusk Ex. 7, Memorandum, March 7, 1966, Helms to Rusk). | - In this report, Helms stated that the CIA's contact with Amlash was for "the express purpose" of intelligence collection. (Id.). Noting Cuban press | claims that Amlash and a second Cuban had been involved with the CIA in a Castro assassination plot, Helms stated: | | The Agency was not involved with either of these two men in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, as claimed in fa Cuban news _release/ nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act. (Rusk Ex. 7, p. 1). The Helms memorandum to Rusk made no mention of the fact that CIA officers, with Helms' knowledge, had offered a poison pen to Amlash on November 22, 1963, that CIA had supplied arms to Amlash in 1964, or that CIA had put Amlash in touch with B-l to enable him to obtain a silenced weapon to assassinate Castro. In his testimony, Helms stated that this memorandum to Rusk was > inaccurate" and "not truthful". (Helms, 6/13/75, ‘p. 115. ) The CIA's copy of the Helms’ memorandum to Rusk contains a typed notation in which Heims' signature was recommended by the CIA's then Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines. (Rusk Ex. 7, p. Z.) Helms testified that the day before his June 13, 1975, testimony to. the Committee he. had asked Karamessines why the memorandum to Rusk had been written as it was. Helms stated he and Kara- messines concluded they did not know the reason but Helms speculated that "it may be until we conducted (the 1967 1G investigation) somewhat later we didn't have the facts straight, or maybe we had the facts straight then but we did not “have them straight later''. “(Helms, 6/13/75, p- 115.) BDocld: 32473539 Page 241
6. Helms' Briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's Report. Drew Pearson's article in the spring of 1967 alleging U. S. involve- ment in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro prompted President Johnson to re- . quest Helms, who by then had become the DCI, to conduct an investigation. The result was the Inspector General's Report of May 23, 1967. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 35.) After receiving the report, Helms briefed the President “orally about: the contents". (Id. at 36.) During his testimony, Helms was shown his handwritten notes apparently prepared for his briefing of the President. Those notes carried the story through mid-1963. When asked if he told President Johnson that, according to the 1967 study, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's presidency, Helms replied, "I just can't answer that, I just don't know. I can't recall having done so". (Id. at 38.) He did note that it would not have occurred to him to brief President Johnson on the 1964 AM/LASH gun deliveries because "I don't think one would have approached the AM/LASH thing as an assassina- tion plot against Castro". (Id. at 39.) Helms had testified that AM/LASH was an intelligence and political action agent. (Helms,  _—, p. ___.) The IG Report however, treated. the AM/LASH operation as an assassination plot. (IG, p. - 4) 7. Helms Testimony on Authorization in the Johnson Administration. In his testimony, Helms was. asked if the Agnecy regarded "whatever marching orders. they had obtained prior to the dealth of “President Kennedy as still being valid and operative" when President Johnson succeeded to the office. Helms replied: HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 242
0) ltsuu ES i i} | i\y ff This is not very clear to me at this stage. A lot of the same officers were serving President Johnson as they served President Kennedy, and.:.I can't re- “ call anymore whether there was any specific issue about whether this was taken up with President Johnson at any meeting or any session. If it had been,.I would have thought there would have been records someplace." (Helms, 6/13, p. 139.) When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or had authorized continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms. replied indirectly that "the Special Group would have continued to consider these.matters , and I would have assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in turn reported to the President, which. was the usual practice": (Id.) But the records of the Special Group do not show any consideration of a Castro assassination or of the AM/LASH plot during the Johnson Administration (or earlier). And, as discussed above, there was no evidence that McCone or anyone above the Agency was informed of or specifically authorized the AM/LASH plots. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 243
SARE Ged LO Dy. oubcommli tiee LU/ LO; 75 Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommittee Editing and (2) Insertion of Gottlieb and ‘Tweedy Testimony TABLE OF CONTENTS | Page D. CONGO... os Introduction ........, re : ree ew oo] 2. Dulles Cabled Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters” a 3 3. CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts ‘to "Eliminate" _ Lumumba, Who Was Viewed. as a "Grave Danger" Even . After Being Deposed a and Placed in U.N. Protective .- Custody ... (be ee Soe ee eee 8. ' 4. The Plot to. Assassinate » Laman Lo ae woe ew we LG .(a) Dulles Cabled Again for “Elimination" - of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive a . an Assignment ... oo Sot ee ee ee eee 15 (b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to -- Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi- nation of Lumumba: September 1960 .......,.. 18 (c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That President Eisenhower Had . Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba... . oe 220 (d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It woe ew Le ew ee we. DK (e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward oo "+ With Assassination Plot ... ee. BL (i) The Chief of Station Testified ' That He Requested and Received. -Confirmation of the Assassination. Plan from Headquarters nc 2 2 (ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exp lora- tory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot’ 2... ee, 34 HW 350955 Docld:32423539 Page 2744 —
HY 50955 -ii- (£) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the | _ Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the = | Assassination Plot . an (i) (i) (iii) 5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination. Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison Lumumba coe ee ee Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating: Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba. for the Purpose of Assassination Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall. Whether the Assassination Operation Had. Moved from Planning to: Implementation But it Was Not. Against Armency Policy to - Send Poisons to the Congo . ‘Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the Congo Soe ee ee Se ~{a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo (i) (ii) (ii) (iv) (v) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate ‘on the Assassi- nation Operation Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October- November 1960 . . Bissell Testified That He Asked. O'Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination Operation. O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo | and | Learned That a Virus Was -in the Station Safe ‘O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter Ego (b) Agent QIWIN's Mission in the Congo: November- ‘December 1960 Soe ee ee . Docld: 324273539 Page 245 AL 41 48 52 53 54 59 60 67—
-iii- _(c) QUWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE. . . 2. 2... 72 #(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman' s Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad’; oe Decembex 1960 kk oe ee 74 6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in —_ a ' Bringing About Lumumba’ s Death in Katanga bo .(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture . _by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at - . - Thysville: November 27-December 3, ‘1960 ere be (b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He . a 7 Was Killed: January 17, 1960 Loe a ee ee -. s 8LS 7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination | Plot. ‘Was Authorized Fe ee ee. 82 (a) High- -Level } Meetings at Which “Getting Rid . of Lumumba" is Discussed rr 2 Ci) Dillon Testified That the Question of OO Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960 | cr CT (ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the President Order Lumumba's Assassi- : . nation at an NSC Meeting -. ee eee ee ee.) BB (iii) The President ' s "Extremely Strong Feelings" Lead the Special Group to Consider Anything That Might Get Rid of Lumumba and Dulles Cables. for Lumumba 's Removal: August 25-26, 1960 . ........., 1201 (iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said Lumumba Would ‘Remain a Grave Danger Until "Disposed Of" 2... : soe we ew we ws 106 (b): Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of Assassination ..... ee _(c) Richard Bissell Testified That He "Strongly Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized By: President Eisenhower . . and Allen Dulles . 2...) 1G HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 246
HY 0955 ‘DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975. -. . TOP_SECRET Frederick D. Baron For Internal Committee ‘Use Only . D. CONGO 1. Introduction The ‘Committee has” received solid evidence of a CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. ~The plot proceeded to the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in. an. assassination were placed in the hands of ‘the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by. an Agency scientist. Although | ‘these instruments of assassination « were never used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case . which reflect general issues ‘that run throughout the Committee's assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the. Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba? Second, how high in the United States government was the source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally, | was the CIA connected in any way. to the events that actually led to the death of Lumumba while in- ‘Congolese custody? , Ao thread of historical background is necessary to weave these broad questions together with the documents and testimony re- ceived by the Committee. Bocld: 3274293539 Page 247
HW 50955 -2- In the summer of 1960, there was a great deal of concern ‘at the highest levels in the United States government: about the. role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.? Lumumba, who served briefly as Premier of ‘the newly sadependéne ‘Gatton! was viewed with alarm by United States foreign policymakers because of what. they perceived: as his magnetic public appeal and his” leanings toward the Soviet - Union. Under the leadership of Lumumba and the new Président, Joseph Kasavubu, the Congo. declared its independence from Belgium on. June 30, 1960. In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of Belgian armed forces. The United Nations Security Council re- quested a Belgian’ withdrawal and dispatched a neutral force ‘to the Congo to preserve order. In late July, Lumumba visited Washington and received pledges of economic aid From, Secretary. of State Christian Herter. At the beginning of September, Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technicians were arriving in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. By mid-September, Lumumba sought protection from the UN, guard in Leopoldville after losing a struggle over the leadership of the government with Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese armed forces. In early December, Mobutu's troops captured Lumumba while he was traveling toward his stronghold at ale * Since the period in which the events under examination. occurred, the names of many geographical units and governmental institutions have changed. For instance, the nation formerly known as the Republic of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city, Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville.. For the sake of clarity in dealing with many of the documents involved in this section, the names _ used in this report are those which applied in the early 1960! s, con- temporaneously with the events under consideration. Docld: 32423539 Page 245
~3- Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The: central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its -| own indeperidence at that time. Several weeks later,. the Katangese authorities announced Lumumba 's death. "There: are various accounts of the circumstances and ‘timing of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the inci- dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.%* 2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal"! of Lumumba Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a‘new Chief of Station to the. Congo. ‘The Chief of Station said that the briefings . he received at CIA headquarters . in preparation for his departure ' contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, Pp. 8). On his brief return to head- “quarters in. connection with Lumumba 's visit to Washington in late July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassi- nating Lumumba ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9). During August, great concern about Lumumba's political strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy- makers of the Eisenhower Administration. *k This concern was nurtured - Report of the Commission of. Investigation, 11/61, UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement . for October, November, and December. ** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing '. anti-Lumumba attitude in “the United States government as shown by minutes’ of the National Security Council and Special Group and the . testimony of high Administration officials. HW 509455 Boclda: 324293539 Page 249
by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CLA headquarters by the new Chief-of Station: EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING: CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. - , MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST |. PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT “LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR: JUST PLAYING . COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS. SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI- WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER. CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable: IN 39706, Leopoldville to Director, (8/18/60. — This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE [OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60). Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA’ s clan- _ destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State . Department approval for the ‘proposed operation based upon "OUR BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED ‘IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable Out 59741, . ‘Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell, Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up | cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" . (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60). | Several days later, the ‘Chief of ‘Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by Congolese leaders: ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU _~ WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU a REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT , VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT ; STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable IN 42761, Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.) WY 50955 Bocld:3274273539 Page 250
' This incident indicates that the CIA was aware that there was ' some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but that the moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and “refused to consider assassination. | | . - On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a neeting of the Special Group -- the National Security Council subcommittee re- sponsible for the planning of covert operations .* In response to the outline of some CIA plans for political actions against Lumumba, such as arranging a vote of no confidence by the Congolese Parliament, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that the President | had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward -action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient _to accomplish. this. . (Special. Group Minutes, 8/25/60.) After this discussion, the Special Group finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. ~ (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.) * This Special Group meeting and the testimony about its significance on the issue of authorization is discussed in detail in Section 5 (iii), infra. oe HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 251
HW 50955 The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cablé* to - the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of “removing” “Lumumba : IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR- -CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON-. - TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE - RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE-UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF- THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN 7 _URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS. SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966, Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60. ) Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the ‘previously authorized opera- tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group ~~ “INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YoU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). * Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCL are ‘a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention’ to .the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed. ** As discussed in Section 5(e), infra, Richard, Bisell testified that Allen Dulles would have ‘used the phrase | ‘higher quarters" to refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/95, p. 48). Docld: 32493539 Page 2452
HY 0955 ‘Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO CARRY OUT ANY CRASII PROGRAMS ON WHICH. YOU DO’ NOT HAVE. THE OPPOR- TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS'' (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) - He assured the . Chief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). But the Director of Central Intelligence made a “special point of assuring the Chief of Station, that he. was authorized to act unilaterally : in ‘a case where the ‘United: States Ambassador | ‘to the | Congo would prefer to remain uninformed; TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED , YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS. CON- CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH. TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE - (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI.was. contem- plating a particular form of action: against Lumumba which the Ambassador would-want to pe ina position to “plausibly deny" United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he was ‘almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its ‘transmission and that it was his "belief" that the cable was a circumlocutious means’ of indicating that the President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/19/75, pp. 33, 64-65). * “See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell on the question of authorization for the assassination effort . against Lumumba . Docld: 3274293539 Page 253
HY 509455 ‘3, CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" _ Lumumba, Who is Viewed as a "Grave Danger™ Even After ve "Being ing Deposed a nd Placed i n UN Protective Custody On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Premier Lumumba from the government despite the strong support for Lumumba that existed in the. Congolese Parliament. After losing - the ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and Mobutu, “who seized the government by a military coup on September 14, Lumumba sought “protection from the United Nations. _peace- keeping force, The evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba from the. government did not alleviate the concern about him in. the United States. govern- ment. Rather, the CIA and high Eisenhower Administration officials* continued to view him as a threat, at least until early December when he was captured by Mobutu's s troops and im- prisoned. During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised - and aided Congolese contacts known ‘to have any intent to kill Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic process © after the coup. -- by reopening the Parliament -- because of the likelihood that this would.return Lumumba to power. The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu, two CIA officers met with a high level Congolese politician who had a close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station re- ported to CIA headquarters that the politician had made a response ‘ A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern _ over Lumumba, at the National Security Council level is set forth in Section , infra. Boclda: 324293539 Page 254
HY 0955 to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might - assassinate. Lumumba ; TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS . ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE; [THE CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED. UNDERSTOOD AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE - oo LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 49679, Leopoldville to Director, 9/7/60.) ; So The cable continued to report ‘that the Chief of Station had offered | to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM" - ‘and assured him that the United States would supply téchnicians (CIA Cable, 9/7/60) . | As the chaotic struggle. for power raged, the. Chief of the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S. apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official position: | LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER- RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION | EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS - EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST . WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE. (CIA Cable, OUT 69233, Director. to Leopoldville, 9/13/60) . | The day after Mobutu' ‘Ss coup, the Chief of Station reported that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to “elimi - nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have “been. strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded a safe base of operations: Docld: 32493539 Page 255
HW 50955 -10- STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS | SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS ANNOUNGED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED ™ —.  .[TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK WITH. [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI- NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK. ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST. . (CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to: Director, 9/15/60.) - - i On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator “requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some — Congolese Army troops. The cable to. CIA headquarters concerning the meeting reported:. [CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPS RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA . [THE’ SENATOR]. SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE . ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT ACTION... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES ‘-LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS :~ - [ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228, Leopoldville to Director,. 9/17/60.) = The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to. CIA headquarters that they should | | HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES] DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES- SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60) .* ae * This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale _ planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support to anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960,.Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre- sentatives or operational contacts: (footnote continued on next page) — Docld: 32423539 Page 2456
HW 50955 -1i- Several. days later, -while warning a key Congolese leader about coup ‘plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of Station URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE ‘PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable, IN 15643, Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61) . Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba ' s lieutenants who were Leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody. (Footnote continued from previous page) - ({IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP - MENTS. [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING _. FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS . PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE’ FOR SITUATION. _ IN. WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN- _ DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED ' OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA. . ; CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS, SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME ‘TRAINING TO ANTI- LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS. (CIA Cable OUT 04697, Director to Leopoldville, 10/6/60. ) Docld: 32423539 Page 257
HW 50955 -12- Throughout the fall of 1960, the CIA continued to view '“Lumymba as a serious political threat while he remained in UN protective custody..* One concern was that if the Parliament -- - which had been closed by the coup -- were re-opened ‘and the moderates * Both Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the CIA Africa Division, confirmed that the CIA continued to view Lumumba as a threat even after he placed himself in UN custody’ (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. ; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. ). Both Bissell and Tweedy referred to two factors to substantiate this view: first, Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the. ability to stir masses of people to action; and second, the UN forces did not restrain Lumumba's freedom of movement and the. Congolese army surrounding them were often lax in maintaining their:vigil. [Quote/Cite from transcripts. ] Bocld: 39493539 Page 2456
HW 50955 --13- failed to obtain a majority vote, the “PRESSURES: FOR [LUMUMBA'S] RETURN WILL. BE ALMOST IRRESISTABLE" (CIA Cable, IN 33499, - _ Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60) . * Another general concern | at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in the Congo and bring Lumumba to-power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director to Leopoldville, 10/17/60). ‘Similarly,- throughout. this” period Lumumba was viewed by CIA officials and the Eisenhower Adminis - tration** as a stalking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet.. effort to take over the Congo" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, Pp. 10, 45). "During this period, the Leopoldville station continued to maintain close operational relationships with, and offer aid to, Congolese contacts who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba although there is no direct evidence that. aid was provided for the specific purpose of ‘assassination. * A CIA Cable Chit 37289) from Leopoldville to the Director on November 3, 1960 returns to this theme: the opening of the Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed. because it “WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO: POWER. "  *#* See Section , infra, on such analysis at high-level policy meetings. : *x*k. A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an attempt to tap Lumumba's phones "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LUMUMBA] KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN. (CIA Cable, IN 34367, Leopoldville to Director, 10/28/60.) Docla: 324273539 Page 2459
-14- 4: The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters: vet “delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio-| logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba . The Chief of Station testified. that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry. out the scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take ' ‘exploratory steps" in- furtherance of ‘the assassination plot. The Chief of Station testified that in the-course of his: discussion with the CIA scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he. was: informed that President | Eisenhower had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb's ‘mission to the Congo + was: both preceded. and followed by general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA headquarters, in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Onlv" channel -- including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles. The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly . before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there HW 450955 ‘is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-. nated before Lumumba's death. ‘Thete is, however, no. . direct evidence of a connection between, the CIA assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba' s death.* * See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about | _ the circumstances that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga. Docld:32423539 Page 260
HW 450955 -l5-. (a) Dulles Cables Again for "Eliminat ion" of Lumumba , an and a Messenger is’ Sent to Congo. Wit h_a Highly ; Sensitive Assignment On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him- self in the. protective custody of, the United ‘Nations peacekeeping force -in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting: . between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling to the Congo. on an unspecified assignment: ["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX. 27 SEPT. . . WILL © _ ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS"... . IT- URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["SID"}. SOONEST POSSIBLE -AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. ‘(CIA Cable, OUT 71464, Bissel1/Tweedy to Chief. of Station, 9/19/60.) ° ; . ‘The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator -- "PROP" ~~ that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters. to the | se Chief of the Africa: Division. * In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour’R. Bolton to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting additional CIA.officers and agents for the assassination operation. Docld: 32423539 Page 261
i HY 50955 | way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12). The Bissell/Tweedy cable’ informed the Chief of Station that hey was to continue to use this indicator for — a / nr ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU - INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO "YOURSELF . (CIA Cable, 9/19/60. - The Chief of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* -- testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such a cable.’ Hedgman stated that in September . of 1960 he received a “most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (edgnan, 8/21/75, pp. 11, 43). The cable advised, in his words , that: | someone who I would have recognized would _arrive with instructions for me. I believe. the message was also marked for my ' eyes only -,. and contained instructions that I was not to discuss the message with anyone. - (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 12-13.) ‘Hedgman said. that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-— tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer. to Lumumba in any . ; . : 3 Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was . to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi- tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only" basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60). * Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba 's “followers, the Chief of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi- fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman , 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75, Pp. 4). Bocld: 32493539 Page 262
HY 50955 _ -18- ‘on September 24, Allen Dulles. personally. issued: a cable to Leopoldvil ke expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate" Lumumba: WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT: IN- ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP [OLDVILLE] ,. SETTING HIMSELF _ IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE . (CIA Cable, OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60. ) Dulles had expressed a similar view. three days before in the ' presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating: Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC ‘Minutes, 9/21/60) (b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances - ‘to the Chief of station in Station in the Congo” for the Assassination of. nation of Lumumba The Chief of. Station reported. through the PROP channel to Bronson Tweedy that he had made contact with, the man dispatched to Leopoldville -with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same week in which: Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba and made his statement to. the NSC about the "grave danger" that existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of'". Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger _ referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel: .Q: ‘Who was the messenger who arrived? -Hedgman: Mr. Sidney Gottlieb- Docld: 32423539 Page 263
-17- _ Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be . required as: an agent in the PROP operation: IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES , BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [ AMERICAN ] ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED, (CIA: Cable, -9/22/60.) ‘Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station was using for other operations and said "WE ARE: CONSIDERING .A - THIRD NATIONAL. CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE. AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT. ‘FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). - Despite Tweedy's concern about. the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of station and his “colleague” -- presumably the man identified as "Sid" who was to arrive in the. ‘Congo shortly to explain. the PROP operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude in exercising their Judgment on the conduct of the operation: YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ | _ OVER YOUR SHOULDER-.AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS . OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT-. ' STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE ' BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.) + ri - | * This is probably a reference to agent QJuWIN, who was later dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections , and = , infra. HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 264
2 19 Qs And at that time, you” knew who'he was? Hed man; -I recognized him as an officer of. the gency . . ... I believe he referred to the ‘fact that I had received a message and that he was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 15-16) a DC The message carried by Gottlieb, then’ Science Advisor to ‘DDP Richard Bissell, was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman : “Hedgman:; It is ny recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate ‘Lumumba . Qi By eliminate, do you mean assassinate? Hedgman: “Yes. - IL would say that was . . . my under- _ standing of the primary means. I don't think it was probably limited to that, if there was .some other way of doing it. — , Q: Of. doing what? Hedgman: | Of removing him from a position of political threat. ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17- “18. ) Hedgman said that.he and Gottlieb also may have discussed non- lethal means of removing Lumumba as a “political threat", but he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 28). | | ; | . He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination, - however: | | | | Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb indicate with regard to the possibility of physically eliminating him? Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.) And again: Q: I take it that once you started discussing these Tethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was killing Lumumba? HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 2645
-20- Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that this was one of the way[s], and probably what . they thought was the only way that would work (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25). ' Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided. him with poisons as a means — of assassination: : And what did he tell you with regard to ow that might be accomplished? _Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents. T’assume that that's the correct word. But in any case, poisonous agent with him, which he ' passed to me.... . DS Q: These were lethal biological substances? Hedgman: Yes... That was my understanding aS a non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp- 18-19.). Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him. in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. -20-21). Hedgman indicated that this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons ‘to Lumumba: | Q: {[W]hen he [Gottlieb] came to the Congo to give you lethal biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear at that time that the means for administering ‘those biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was to-be ingested by: Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or toothpaste or any other substance that was to be ingested? Se Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes. Cledainan, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.) Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb: This was not a sine qua non that I employ this. If there were another method, another way, it _ would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.) WW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 266
~21- . For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29). - There was a firm requirement ,. however , that the means of assassi- nation should not be traceable to the United States: The biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up to my judgment, and if there was a better way -- certainly. [T]he point I now recall was-in no way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it’ be traced back to the United States.- It. had to be a way which could not be traced . back ... either to an American or the United States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.) Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were pro- duced to meet this requirement: | I believe I raised the point that poisons left traces in the human body, which could be found on autopsy ... I believe that I was. assured that these ... lethal agents would [leave] normal traces found in people that: die of certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.) Hedgman said that he had an "emotional. reaction of great sur- prise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of Station said that he did not give any indication that he.would not- carry out the instructions. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he told Gottlieb he “would explore this" (Hedgman,’ 8/21/75, p. 46) and left him with the following impression: I think it would be a fair impression that he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it - and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 267
HW 50955 —=22- stressed the difficulty of trying to carry out such an operation, (Hedgman, 8/21/75, te ~ op. 47.) The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his. initial contact with Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response to the assignment. The Chief of, Station said that he and Gottlieb were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's government — was ‘weakening under" foreign pressure to. effect a reconciliation with Lumumba , and said: HENCE BELLEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) (c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That ‘President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in Leopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb informed him that President Eisenhower had authorized the assassination of Lumumba: Q: Did you raise with him the question of authori- — zation of such instructions to you? = Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong recollection, that I did. a Q: What do you recall in essence was what you said to him? Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed out that this was not a common .6r usual Agency tactic; and I may have probably said that I never heard of it being done, which I had not, never in my training or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any > references to such, in my recollection at least, such methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued. ~ Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply? Bocld: 32473539 Page 268
HW 50955 -23-  -Hedgman: | It is my recollection that he identi-. EL ot the. President, and I cannot -- the President. of the United States -- and I cannot recall . whether he said "the President ,'' or whether he identified hin. by name. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 30- 31.)° oo Hedgman continued to- explain that he was told "something to the — effect that the President had instructed the Director" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32, 34). Hedgman was clear that the ultimate source of authority for the assassination mission was ‘the President: Q: Your understanding then was ‘that these - instructions were instructions coming to you from the office of the President? Hedgman: - That's correct. on Or that he had instructed the Agency, an nd: ey were passed on to you? Hedgman: That's right... You are not the least unclear whether or not you became aware with a very clear im- pression that the President's name had been invoked in some fashion? - Hedgman: Yes. I came ~~.certainly that is my recollection. oe Q: You have no doubt about that? Q: At the time. Hedgman : At the time, I certainly felt that I was under instructions from the. President, yes. _ Cledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32- 33. » Docld: 324234539 Page 269
-2h= Hedgman cautioned that he was. recalling events long past: pedeman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot 00 per cent certain, but I have always, since that date, had the impression in my mind that these . orders had come from the President. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 34. a But he left 1 no doubt. about the strength of his. "impression" ~Q: You have a very firm recollection that he Tottlien| represented to you that the President - of the United’ States directed the assassination of | . Patrice Lumumba, is that correct? Hedgman: ‘That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman, 2, p. 102; accord, p. 34.) _(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest: Priority” a nd Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It ° On the basis of his talks with "Sid, " Hedgman listed a number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At .the top of the list was the suggestion ‘that a particular agent - be. used in. the following manner : HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER, WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP . DETAILS | TO RAZOR’ EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60. ) Hedgman indicated that he would begin to. follow this course by re- calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60. ) He in- formed headquarters: “PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60) . - | On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that head- - quarters authorize ' ‘exploratory conversations" with this agent so. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 270
HY 50955 -25- that he could proceed with the > plan that was his top priority: cae NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES . o (IN) VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT © ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVER- SATLONS TO DETERMINE IF [AGENT] WILLING TAKE- ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. .. (WOULD: APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT. _. REVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL. OBJEC- TIVE OP TO HIM. ... REQUEST HOS REPLY [ IMMEDIATELY) . (CIA Cable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to. Tweedy, 9/30/60. ) ‘Hedgman's cables -- sent for Tweedy's “Eyes Only" in the PROP | channel -- indicated that the assassination operation had been mounted. They show that a specific. operational pian had been set. in motion to the extent that Hedgman thought that it ‘would have to be clearly ' 'cancelled" by headquarters before he would stop proceeding with the plan. Hedgman's description of the means ‘of maintaining the security of the operation could be taken as a reference to a lethal biological agent which would be slow to ‘take effect or which would leave no traces: ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [AGENT'S] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINI- MIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT. (CIA Cable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to. Tweedy. ) Doold: 324293539 Page 271
a “ fs eee «atid am ni ctatbondag howd, cede cua ciontacantnad aden ct aca ne mea 6 Funct masta eb . Esa Le cee de sane edn ead dee Ae ates Sail aden li tet ene a ant Cte tis ioe Aa atte gta a eit EAE a mete ane: Sa tate ne lahat van bahe Nea a AMON An tet ne te ~26~ The same day, through the PROP channel , Hedgman. received authorization from headquarters to proceed with his. top priority plan: a | YOU, ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS - WITH SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE. “TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE. .«. APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, OUT 73900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60. >. In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant ‘Chief of the Africa Division, expressed a "HOPE eee ‘FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CLA Cable OUT 75900, - Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60. > HY 50955 According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of | the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopold- ville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). ‘The " "expiration" ‘of Gotthieb' s | "materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances — would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the. cables, it probably Signifies that some of the biological substances had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indi- cated that Gottlieb Left some biological substances that were still lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination operation: » , [SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING: USE- FULNESS. [CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE | TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.) Bocld: 324293539 Page 272
HY 50955 ve nner rele atte deteueaeteien! Ateaetnnat by te\eiatnaenh inca inertaen nineteen mene set mma 227- By this, point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con- versation" -with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining access to Lumumba — (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p- 60.).. Hedgman testified | that the subject he "explored" was the agent ' s ability to find a means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60): I believe that I queried the agent who had _ access to Lumumba, .and his entourage, - in. detail about just ‘what that access, what access he actually had, as opposed to speak- ing to people. In other words, did he. have -access to the bathroom, did he have. access to the kitchen, things of that sort. I have a recollection of having queried him . on that without specifying why I wanted to know this. - (Hedgman, 8/21/75,. p. 48.) On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters -on this meeting: “CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES: [AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE. NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE. Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot: [C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild scheme professionally. I did not think that it ... was practical professionally. Certainly ... to keep the U.S, out of it.... I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. lll.) DocId: 32493539 Page 273
maeee aa desintens he oe a ae ec treceme nbn ante taste a nas ditel alana Natl atch mhundocee 4 Lathcaet aS bina ent hie aan diate aaNet Reman NG = Mane A atte nec beet os aS -28- However, his cables indicate that he was planning to con- tinue’ to implement the operation and sought the resources to do it successfully. ile, urged headquarters | to send him an alternate .- ‘operative for the assassination mission in the event that they found his first choice unacceptable: IF QS BELIEVE [AGENT' S CIRCUMSTANCES} . BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES- SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Heopoldvitte to Tweedy , 10/7/60. ) ; Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he “HAD. GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 ocr’ ~~ presumably referring to a de-briefing of Gottlieb: upon his return to the United States. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy » indicated that he was | | CONSIDERING. ‘DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN. BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. (CIA Cable: OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60. ) _ This expression of support for the operation was followed by an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15, 1960. One of these, cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as Division Chief, and gent to Leopoldville through standard CIA channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to HW 50955 © Docld: 32423539 Page 274 |
-29- appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States _ embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of . covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and 7 ‘military aid (CIA Cable ovr 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against Lumumba ¢ that would be authorized: ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND. IS. TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING. [LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE: ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE.. (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60. ) On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second cable was sent to Leopoldville.. This. cable was issued personally by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for Hedgman’ S "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable our 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). 7 YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH] ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE- CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC ~ [LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL . STUDYING CONGO SITUATION. CLOSELY AND HIS DIS- POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON- SIDERATION . RAISE ABOVE so YOU NOT CONFUSED BY’ ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST ‘PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi- cating that communications about the assassination mission were HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 “Page 275 Seccetainanal atin nnn tines ante teen gene a te a foe owe emaee
| ~30- restricted to the PROP » channel and that the assassination mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman' Ss: reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to the Congo. on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT’... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin Q' Donnell, who testified that in late October he was asked by: Richard Bissell. ‘to. undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba .” | In the course of “suggesting the assignment of an additional officer.to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly. under the Chief of: Station: SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO” HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION. PROP. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10419160. dy Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba activity outlined in the cable. sent through normal channels, Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba : POSSIBLLITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR - ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS. ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60. ) * For a Full account of the meeting. between Bissell and O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in the Congo, see Section 5(a) infra. : HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 276 ace ne ane eI ent ait eine yon F carnetee Sak m eet a
HY 50955 -31- ; This series of cables sent _ during, and after Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA. . headquarters to authorize and support. rapid progress on the assassi- ‘nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-. strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in CIA's Africa Division and among United. States personnel in the’ - Congo, including those who. were aware of and involved in other . ‘covert activities. (e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward i With Assassination Flot The: testimony of the Chief of Station,. taken fifteen years after the events in question and without benefit of ‘review of the. cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture derived from the cables ofa fully” authorized and | tightly restricted assassination operation. Hedgman' ‘Ss. testimony is at variance from the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he claims to have pursued the assignment which’ he dealt with in an affirmative, aggressive manner in the - ‘cables. | | (i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the. _Assassination Pian from Hea quarters -Hedgman testified that, after receiving Cottlieb's instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, . p. 36). Hedgman did not recall: whether he identified Gottlieb by name, and. he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President "in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43). Boclda: 324293539 Page 277
HW 50955 -32- Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he_ took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in- structions: ‘There was some special channel ... because it was handled differently than any other _ normal message. For example, it was not put on a regular cable form, which, you know, ‘you have several copies for your various. ‘files. And it was my recollection that I personally . carried the message to the communicator to encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt- talk way that even the communicator would ‘not necessarily know what it was about." - (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.) This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for all cables relating to the assassination. mission. Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con~ firmation that he was to carry out the as sassination assignment, he received an affirmative reply from headquarters: L believe I ‘received a reply which I interpreted to mean yes, that he was the messenger and. his \ instructions were ... duly authorized, (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38. Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con- -vinced that yes, it was right." -(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.) Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex- pressed some uncertainty about whether he “had an absolute free hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving . "final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53). Docld:324293539 Page 276°
HW 50955 -33- Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his» second appearance: TL, probably. had authority to act on “ny own but ... it was possible that I had. to go _ back and get clearance for my action. . ' (Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 3/21/75, p. 39.) . Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy, decision" had been made -- that assassination had been "approved" as. "one. means" of eliminating Lumumba as a political. threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, Pp. 52). I thought the policy decision had been made in the White House, not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as the Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.) Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not . personally selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under the impression that the. President had authorized the CIA to do so and to proceed to take action: Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the President had said, you use this system. But my understanding is the President had . -made a decision that an act should take. place, but then put that into the hands of the Agency to carry out his decision. Q: Whatever that act was to be , it was clearly to be assassination or the death of the foreign political leader? 'Hedgman: Yes. ' Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA? Hedgman: | Certainly if those -- if.Dr. Gottlieb's” lethal agents were employed, that would have been the result, yes. ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.) DocTd:324234539 Page 279 . . a annette tet he OP mint dente aN ASN REA eT a ac! Menthe awit em tenet eaded lon opened ence ne ene
at ce el fran eet oP tng cede ee ree tk aD aie be ~34- Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry. out | these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). ‘Whether or not he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without ' seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked with headquarters before taking action:. HW 50955 I think probably that I would have gone. back and advised that I intended to carry out and sought final approval before carrying it out had I been going to do it, had there been a way to do it. I did not see it.as ... a matter which could be ‘accomplished practically, certainly. (Hedgman , 8/21/75, pp. S1- 52.) He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53). (ii) The Chief of Station Took "Explorator Steps” _ Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Rectified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's visit, he locked the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably": sealed in ‘an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was. the only other person with access to the safe and that. she would not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75, ‘p. 49). Hedgman testified that it ‘was "possible" that he pre- served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any Docld:32423539 Page 280
HW 50955 geanapur ptewe cut the Qe ctu tet bone eine Bina fee a MAE aR NH AC IDO ge SRNR ett tn ahaa enmeirete annie Atami tte a AN ctl watmetne tenet ta nee se ~35- rate, they were not disposed. of before Lumumba was “successfully “netitralized" by being captured and imprisoned by the Congolese government ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 85-86) at the beginning of ‘December, 1960. Hedgman said that he does not recall taking the “ poisons out of his safe on any occasion other than when he disposed of them on the banks of the Congo River: I think that I took them out probably in a briefcase, or an air bag of some sort, and I believe that the things like the rubber gloves and the mask were thrown away in a bushy area or something where, you know, if. they were found, it didn't matter that much. -I believe I buried the other matters. (Hedgman,; 8/21/75, p. 84.) ‘Hedeman testified, however, that in the intervening months, while the poisons were in his safe, he took "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). He said that he sent several cables to’ CIA headquarters, after his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions, which "probably reflected further steps I had taken" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 59-60). a | Hedgman stated that his cables to: headquarters on this matter were essentially ' ‘Progress: reports" on his attempts to find a means _ of access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50). He also said that he "would bet on the fact that there was at least one or two more [cables] back"’ to him from CIA headquarters in response (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50). Docld: 32423539 Page 261
HW 50955 -36- The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's. recollection. For two months after Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream . of messages’ flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and headquarters through the PROP channel. - In late September and early October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority — plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular. agent thought to have _ sufficient access to Lumumba's “entourage te be able to poison. Lumumba. * In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of Station that the assassination mission remained “HIGHEST PRIORITY", and he . suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-. _tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA « Cable OUT 81396, “Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Wee These cables were followed by Hedgman' s report to Tweedy on = October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission * CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station.to Tweedy, 9/27/60; — - CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief. of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable IN 24171, ‘Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See ‘Section , supra, for . ‘full treatment of these cables. a - ** See Section > supra, for more complete text of this cable. DoclTd: 32423539 Page 262
HY 50955 LoS Senne er eS DE SENT SPIC OSPR Vae OVO TTT SOO -37- ‘HAS MOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE . .THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy 5 _ 10/17/60. ) Hedgman testified that this operative, left Leopoldville "sometime . in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of. assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pe 61). . The Chief of Station continued to communicate with heads ° quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina- tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so. Hedgman confirmed ‘Tweedy' s view that although the assassination operation was still his highest priority, he’ was overburdened with _xesponsibility for other operations. SO that he could not concentrate on the progress of the assassination mission: ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable, IN. 28936, 10/17/60.) Due to his workload, the Chief. of Station ‘responded enthusiastic cally ‘to Tweedy ' s suggestion of an additional case officer: BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF STATION] WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable IN 28936, 10/17/60.) - Docld: 324233539 Page 263 -
~38-" The Chief of Station concluded this cable with the following cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he may have: "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (liedgman,. 8/21/75, pp. 27-29): IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS) | ; 7 POUCH SOOWEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE — -. RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER. HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGIIT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable IN 28936, 10/17/60.) CO, The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers to sending a.sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" -- in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside “the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by the Chief of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy 's “EYES . ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from mid- ~September until Lumumba ' Ss departure for Stanleyville on November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese: TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL. WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY . CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP....° CONGOLESE ~ TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS. UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS- OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER- VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET HW 50955 © Docld:32423539 Page 264 _
HY 0955 239- COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED 7 - MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS REMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy. ) ‘Hedgman cestified that all of his cable traffic about the | assassination question would have been sent with the same extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- / presumably re- ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb’ s visit and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions: I would have sent in a special channel anything dealing with Lumumba, at least that would touch upon his. removal in‘one way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62. ). _ The Chief of Station also testified that sometime before leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's | best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never ' before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo .destroyed cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. Ql). But he. stated that the cables relating to assassination were destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said * It is possible that copies of cables. dealing with such a sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters. ‘Docld:324293539 Page 265
HY 50955 ~-40- that eventually vat I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because the Congo was a highly sensitive area in ‘which -- at one period I recall we had all of our files in the burn barrels. TI mean, when you wanted a file, you went over and dug it out of the burn: ‘barrell. (Hedgman, Bf21/75, p. 91.). At the. conclusion of his - ‘testimony about (the: assassination plot, the Chief of Station was, asked to give a general characteri-~ zation of the advisability of the plot ‘and the tenor of the times . ‘in. which it took place, His response indicated that although he was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized order, he was not convinced of ‘the necessity of assassinating Lumumba : I looked upon the Agency as an executive arm.of the Presidency.... Therefore, I | suppose I thought that it was an order issued in due form from an authorized authority. On the other hand, I looked at it as a kind of operation that I could do without, that I thought that probably the Agency . and the U.S. government could get along _ without. I didn't regard- Lumumba as the ' kind of person who was going to bring on World War III or something . uo - I might have had a somewhat different attitude if.I thought that one man could bring on World War III and result in the deaths of millions of people or something, but I didn't see him in that light. I saw him-as a danger to the political position of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,. pp. 110-111.) Docld: 32423539 Page 266
bccn vam yee iy coe Muvblaette teageete ae 4 tena ccna ten tents akg arth eine ashanti nae nam rinse Aine! aR eek et cau ancback Lot nant maaan HB wt ig (£) “Testimon of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree ~ oe of Support. for and erpetration of the Assassination There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard Bissell. and Bronson Tweedy ‘and the picture of the assassination plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from “the: period. While the weight of the .evidence demonstratés that the assassination effort was the “highest priority” at CIA hhead-. quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct recollection of Cottlieb's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can recall nothing more _ than consideration of the feasibility of an: | assassination attempt. | | | (i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the operation To Poison Lumumba . As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville : for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning ‘the “effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated ‘through the. special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only." Tweedy personally ‘signed both the cable which initially informed the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with — an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 207
HY 50955 secesfume wen tignuneatctane wehanan tenlteah tte neibenat ane fe wbmebdnnbn en AE ad MS MA 2M MIATA KM Ty Ag Tene i al afte oe te FH Ot mS atm Ladino Rea 9 ee we en A eh MATE BME Me oO ~42-— Station, 9/19/60) and. the cable of October 7 indicating that he had debriefed Gottlieb upon his. return from the Congo (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also the vEyes | Only" recipient of Hedgman' S reports on Gottlieb’ Ss arrival in the: Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to. Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan which emerged from the discussions between. Gottlieb and Hedgman as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba’ Ss en- tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/17/60). | | | Tweedy, testified, however , without benefit of reviewing these cables, that he had no 5 knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba : %.. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger. from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him ~ with the tools to: carry out such an assassination, - namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin- istering them? Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31) ate w See. Sections 4(a).- 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in ' Leopoldville.. Docld:3242793539 Page 286
When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in - the assassination of Lumumba , Tweedy replied: | | There is nothing in my experience with the a Agency which would really bear on that | oo, a point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39) Tweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the Congo as a courier, | "IT will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (tweedy, 9/9, p. 35). Tweedy testified that it was “perfectly possible" for lethal bio-- - logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't» recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30). | | In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable . from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to . the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be “very surprised if I didn't [know],.but I certainly have no recoll- ; ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, Dp. 31). | ‘Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of the Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through ‘a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions were to be carried out but he did not recall it (tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-33). | | Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the - testimony of the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their * Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the ‘Chief of Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding; 'T would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36) HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 289 ate ee lane cane tee gemma eta ntaae pe caren cen atin aP anne AE RIA AIMEE ra need a oo NS A eam ate ete
HW 50955 testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall: _I’really am having trouble with this. Il had to be reminded of so many things. . .[T]he things that I recall ‘the most vividly about all my African experiences were. . . the things’ I was ‘basically concerned with all the time, which ‘was putting this division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I: would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34) : Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have _ empowered ‘[him]. a to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32, 36). Tweedy said: In such a matter of this kind, headquarters, would have wanted to have a last word up to the last minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36) “Cii) Tweedy. Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedeman About Gaining Access to Lumumba For the Purpose of Assassination Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass- ination attempt. Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating Lumumba: “more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960 (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know Docld: 32423539 — Page 290
HW 50955 whether Bissell had consulted: with any “higher authority" about exploring the possibilities for assassinating ‘Lumumba (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy. said, when he ~eceived an instruc- | tion from Bissell he would proceed to “implement ‘it on the assump- tion that. it was fully authorized above the level of DDP : I would proceed with it on the basis that he was authorized to give me instructions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy , 9/9; dD. (13) Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass- inating ‘Lumumba as "contingency planning" (tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28): Tweedy. .:. .1 think it came up in the sense that Dick would have’ said we probably better be — thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case~ we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully. Qe) Do it, meaning carry off an assassination? Tweedy, ‘Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, - never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether. such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station be thinking along those lines as well. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15) _ Tweedy said that the planning that ‘he undertook pursuant to his con- versation with Bissell included "a few cables that he remembers sending to the Chief of Station asking him to keep in mind what sort of. access one might ever have had to Lumumba. . .{in] the. eventuality that we might wish to get rid. of. Mr. Lumumba personally. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21) - Boclda: 324273539 Page 291
eect anare secan tana tae meme Ate natn ie A ne etn ase etd SAR ene tm OF pe meetgates tetmtaras TNE ASS SS eons a ee -46- Tweedy did not récall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for. the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24); - “ rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were . being explored: | | | Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this “be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries? | Tweedy.’ I. suppose all those types of things might: have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23). Q. .In your discussions. with Bissell, about the _ feasibility of an assassination operation, did “poisons come up as one means that-.was being con- sidered and which the Chief of Station should explore? — Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I. assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as: possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities. . Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the Chief of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious answer. . . a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters" “(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27). - Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a special channel concerning the "messenger'' to the Congo or confirm- ation. of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 292
cee ae Ea tn ane ake Cae saree © be Scam an ETT ttateg ga atmne 9 5 ime wera octet afte ethan Mean nat A ERSTE ENR Nt tectalbnateadnth da Bu MeA Nk oy Sections 9 ET -47 - sent ina Ghannel that was even more closely restricted than the ‘normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp- 22, 32-33) . “Tweedy said destruction. of such cable traffic. would have been left to the discretion of the’ Chief of Station and he did not know: whether Hedgman destroyed | the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22), ‘Tweedy said. "T would be surprised if I-didn't' have a conver - sation with Sidney Gottlieb about "anything in his inventory that could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances (Tweedy, 9/9, pp- 68-69). -Tweedy ' ‘suspected" that "che first . conversation along. these lines would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb, © which Tweedy then would ‘have “£ollowed+ -up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69). Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im- tt minent that somebody. would say ‘go! (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19): Tweedy. Tt was always my assumption that at the time anything like this’ should occur there would | have been some kind of real focus on the problem | at. probably a very considerable policy level with- .in the Agency. .« and it never occurred to me that I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come ‘down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we ever in.a position where he said that I would . merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far. Q. You didn't have any action plans for the assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or ‘were aware of? HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 293
-48- Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere. . (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19) It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's testimony that no action plans were. launched and that no authoriz- ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization’ -for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba.'s entourage is in.accord with. Tweedy's description of his inquiries about eaining access to Lumumba. oa “However, the fact that Tweedy was personrialy informed that the . Chief of Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable IN. 24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile with his ‘statements that a "go: ahead" on the operation was never imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week "which told the Chief of Station that Lumumba's | DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR . ' SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable ; OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60) _ (iii) ‘Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall Whether The Assassination Operation Had Moved From Planning To imolementation _ But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to . Send Poisons to. The Congo j - Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy , but it “seemed “entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place _ (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4). HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 294 Wiakdepurnnrmrennine ee Me EMER TS AE nn eg nt canteaminentcuinbesnanm eaZatavints ate Watinamarsens Mie veneer seameteelh REE RON a aoe Go =
pccvarteses sun ce ste ee Naga tie Me Mie adta nem anecteny 14 + av vanes anaheim one ania at aati mates MEE debate ee Nae DREN L ee MA CLA Sa Wears Te Bissell ‘said. he "may. have" given Tweedy specific ingtructions about: steps he was to. take to further an assassination plan, put he did: not remember to do. so (Bissell, 9/10,p. 4). Bissell said that ‘exploring access to Lumumba -- “almost certainly" seeking information from, the. Chief of Station about access for poisoning | -- would have been a “key part” of his “planning and preparatory activity" but he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6- 8). Bissell ‘remembered that he was aware. that the Chief of ‘Station had an agent thought to have direct access to Lumumba (Bissell; 9/10, p. 80). | “Bissell testified that he “most certainly" approved any cables that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about gaining access to Lumumba ‘but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell, 9/10. p- 8): Bissell added: I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author - ization from me, would have had the authority to - send such a cable without my signing off on it. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) | . Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb's trip. _ to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was “cut out of | knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21). Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his, assignment to * Justin O'Donnell*with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that | whe” 7 Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5 (a) (i) and 5(a) (ii), infra. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 295
Hi - 0955, hence cere cesses snste mein, cane cease en nt ten mame aran a to Srare a puck te ot cactus emeeter tance ance Toe tet tae S Tbe am ge a athe ae anni he ae ae eae PR I OBER ENE MRETI  D =50-— Tweedy might have been unaware of the true ‘purpose of Gottlieb! S visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20- 22). - Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. .. - would expect, given the background; that the confirmation would . have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43). It was "very probable, " according to Bissell, that he discussed . the assassination of Lumumba with ‘Sidney Gottlieb, who was then his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, -p. 14). Bissell said that on a number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 60). Although he had no “specific recollection, " “Bissell assumed that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he. had approved: the mission, (which “night. very well" have dealt with the assassination of Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 44)... Despite his absence of. specific | recollection. of these: events, Bissell said, "There ‘is nothing | in mind that T remember that would be in conflict” with. the testimony of the Chief of Station that. Gottlieb carried poisons to ‘the ‘Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35). Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35). Docld: 32493539 Page 296
HY 50955 _ Se ceneeumeeene ot ae peace nw a tem cnemecabnd LB caren ae 6 ne ee ake oe meetenle Meta TE By atta emcee nnatachalegts undulation Winers #6 9 bee hme eee vedic _-51- He “elassified "the act of taking the kit to the | Congo. . . as still ‘in’ the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, -p. 49). Bissell acknowledged, however , that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which to administer them was an. extraordinary event: It would indeed have been rather unusual to send . “such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this a - -sort.-- out to a. . rélatively small station, unless - planning for their use were quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 37). Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed” that he had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers ‘to move from the stage of. planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10, PP. 60-61). In light | of his absence of a specific recollection of these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions ‘to implement,' " Gottliet would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed into an implementation phase" and that: "authorization was given" (Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49). Boclda: 324293539 Page 297
-52- 5. The Question of a Cont Connection ‘Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA “Officers and Operatives in “the Congo Justin O'Donnell, . senior Oth officer 1 in the clandestine - operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to gO to the Congo to. carry out the assassination of Lumumba (0' Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. ue 12). 2 — O'Donnell said that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but | proceeded to the Congo to attempt. to draw ‘Lumumba away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in - the hands of Congolese authorities (O' Donnell, 6/9/75, PP- 13- 14). Shortly after 0 Donnell" sg arrival in the Congo he was | joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who. was used the following year by the CIA as part) of a program to develop a | stand- -by assassination ‘capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of - the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this ‘agent: of: oO! Donnell' Ss with a proposition to join an “execution squad” (CIA Cable IN 18739, “Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60). : Despite the. fact that O'Donnell was “initially approached to be part: of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un- “Likely that O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connec- _ tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives ~- - QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear. HY. 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 293
teat ny et ge noire memantine aniadinantbnedta dubai Satan ter dearenarys FM a 8 (a) QO! Donnell" Ss Operations in the Congo (4) ‘Tweedy and the Chief of Station ion Apreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sen Sent to the ) the Congo rr ce nae Be TS eet NNN ERATE A tt A A A TG ° - to Concentrate on the Ass Assassin lation Operation In early. October, 1960, several, cables sent “in the specially restricted PROP ‘channel dealt with’ a plan to send a. "senior | ease officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the. assassination operation. * on October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed | “Medgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national | | operative (CIA Cable our 78336, Tweedy to Chief of ‘Station, 10/7/60). On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman' s reaction ‘to the sugges~ tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon’ as possible to concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60) . Two days later, the Chief of Station replied affirmatively: | | BELTEVE EARLY ASSTCNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable - IN 28936, Chief of Station to | Tweedy). . . The Chief of Station advised that his sesponsibilities for “MULTIPLE Ops" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60). ~* See Section 4(e), supra, a, for full treatment of these cables. HW 50955 DoclTd:32423539 Page 299
HY 0955 coin sarnctnte nein ance satiatebicheltymense mats oats stn ibm macning anata cand iain titig areata eniimttis ~ NiBo Sam OB TAN AG os SM (ii) October. 17 pene ee rR Tecate ace te tReet aAlaet TINTS So Sanaer tat amt -54- passer Discussed Assassination of Lumumba’ With O"Donnel 1 and Sent Him to lim to Congo: “October- November 1960 Probably short ly after -the Chief of Station' s cable of requesting the assignment of a’ senior case. officer to concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached ‘the subject with CIA officer Justin 0' Donnell. At that time, 0' Donnell was the Deputy chief of a. com- ponent of the Directorate of Plans. -- the CIA' s covert action arm. 0" ‘Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8). Justin QO! Donnell testified that in October of 1960, he was asked by ‘Richard Bissell to undertake the mission “of assassi~ nating Patrice Lumumba (O" Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. (il-12; 9/11/75, pp. 19, 43): O'Donnell: we called me in and he told me Re wanted to so down to the Belgian Conso, the former Belsian Congo, ard to eliminate Lumumba Q: What did you understand him to mean by eliminate? 0! DonnelL: To kill him and thereby eliminate Q: “What was the basis for your interpreting his: remarks , whatever his precise language, as meaning that he was talking about assa ssination rather ‘than merely neutralizine him through some other means? O'Donnell: It was not neutralization Clearly the context of aed talk was to hill him. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.) 90'Donnell. reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction: Docld: 32423539 ci told ham chat T. would absolutely not have any part of killing Lumumba. He said, I want you to go over and talk to Sidney Gottlieb. (0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.) Page 300
HW 50955 /-55- Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who. was at that. time ‘the Science Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14). - O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct, such a mission without the personal. permission of Allen Dulles" 7 (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44), But the question of authorization -_ ‘was never raised by Bissell: I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles in such an important issue, but it was not dis- eussed, nor did he purport to have higher. . authority to doit. (0' Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 15.) O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and cestified that he was "sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming over" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7).. O'Donnell said that Gottlieb told him “that there were four or five a lethal means of disposing of Lumumba" (O0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p- 13). O'Donnell recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in- cluded poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12: 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell — ‘said that Gottlieb "didn't even hint ... that he had been in the Congo and that he had- transported any lethal agent to the Congo" » (0" Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A). After speaking with Gottlieb, O' Donnell said: IT then left his office, and I went back to Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no way would I have any part in the assassina-~- tion of Lumumba ... and reasserted in absolute terms that I would not be involved in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 43.) Docld:32423539 Page 301 be Tia tee tte Guarneri neater ee cae etme the, bad = Ser tate, seodani be tratis cwapeaba Leia cM seh alin aN aR BNE ae ELDER AR RTL ALE atte eb ate Bt Nhe
dt cans be te we sean “ahatt eothiratrcmrenbenme So adinitlan etekosiman wie ta EME one feria wie nace aces mE NH eee  -56- 0! Donnell said that in one of his two conversations with | Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be —in- violation of federal law" (0O' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14), ..He said that’ Bissell airily dismissed” this prospect (9' Donnell, 6/9175, -p. 14). Despite his refusal to. participate in- assassination, O' Donnell - agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission Co. "neutralize" Lumumba “as a political factor" (0! Donnell, 9/11/15, PP. 43- 44): I said I would go down and I. would have no compunction about operating to draw Lumumba out [of UN custody], to run an operation to ~ neutralize his operations which were against | Western interests, against, I thought, American interests. (0! Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13.) - O'Donnell added that his objective was to neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his activities against [a Congolese leader], whom at that time you might say was our close. “instrument, he was the man we had put our chips on. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20.) Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about -assassi- nation, O'Donnell went to the Congo "with the assignment wie Of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75, 53), | Although O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell: HY 50955 DBocld: 324293539 Page 302
aos ene sancti cee on tetennste te ata a nn ee Daan or at ate anced ante tee Mt sastets 2aboceestonste nit, Meck Bde BE AeA a ene wh Tate ES sar mene cle cae -57- Mr.-O'Donnell: JI told Mr. Bissell that I = would be willing to go down to neutralize . his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody] and turn him -over to the Congolese authorities, that is correct. Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that his life might be taken by the Congolese - authorities? Co ae Mr. O'Donnell: It was, L think, considered mn the -- not ‘to have him killed, but then it- would have been a Congolese being judged by Corigolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I . think it was discussed. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would re- ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities, according to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell "had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to. assassination to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still interested in the assassination of Lumumba:: “in leaving at the. conclusion of our second - discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't rule out that possibility -- meaning the. possibility of the elimination or the killing of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other words., even though you have said this, don't rule it out.... There is no question about ‘it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 45). oe O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis- cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 303
-58- to. make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of ‘yvecord (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45): [I]n the Agency, since you don't have -documents, you have to be awfully canny and you have to get things on record, and: I went into Mr. Helms’ office, and I said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed to me, and-I.told him that.1 would under no conditions do it, and Helms said you're absolutely right.. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 15-16). i Richard Helms testified that it was: “likely” that he had such a “conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's version _ of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).* — ‘William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed him about the conversations with Bissell: Mr. O'Donnell cameto me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimina- -tton of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this . -assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.) Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told him that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such an operation (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9). O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis- cussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, Pp. 45-46). | | * figlms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa- tion in any way. He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the Congo or what his mission was (ielms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33). _ HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 304
-59- (iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked oy Donnell to Plan owe and Prepare for an Assassination Operation Bissell remembered very clearly" that he and O'Donnell discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the. fall of 1960 Gissell, 6/9/75, Pp. 75) and that /0' Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell, 9/11/75, Pp. 18). According to Bissell, 0' Donnell said that’ ‘he thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that. 7 the desired ‘object could be - accompli shed better in other ways" (Bissell, 6/11/75, Pp. 54) . Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked o! "Donnell to. see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44). Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one seeirtan point -~- the \degree to which Bissell's initial assign- ‘ment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as opposed to contingency planning. 0' Donnell flatly testified that Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked 0' Donnell "to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance, - . however, Bissell stated that O' Donnell "had been asked to pian and prepare for'' the assassination of Lumumba ( issell, 9/10/75, p. 24). | | | Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donnell, he felt that it would be necessary to "postpone". the assassination ~ operation because, "civen O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 305
‘that the planning of suc 9/10/75, p. 25). Despit “activated assassination Bissell could not preclu Gobblieb poison plot con [T]his had been assignment to h ‘nowledpe of it within the Agen separate recoll occasion. But after this conversation much on Ct this put very inactivated fo doesn't rule 9 action through might have ‘my recollecti as terminatin also as reaso thing further 9/19/75, PP- Yr b n 25 | In Tweedy's mind, O'Donn ‘Linked t rather than to a general (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26). (iv) O'Donnell Arr a Virus Wa On October 29 the PROP channel that Ju poldville to Chief of Station, 10/ HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 306 ut the pos gone t en is, along that line. o assessing the possibility fo lg im the “IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" -60- h an operation would be blown" (Bissell, @ his impression that he might have de- operations against Lumumba at that’ time, de the possibility that the Hedgman/ tinued to move foward: a very sensitive -- with the Limited very. narrowly even cy. And it is difficult to ection from inference On © T seem to recollect that with him, I wanted he pack burner and. ite. some time. Yow that... — sibility.that some different channels But the best oF . d this not only t for hin, in my mind jim, limited qu completely forward. I viewe the assignmen for at least but © postponing any- (Bissell, ~26) . ell's eventual mission to the Congo was xr assassinating Lumumba plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody ived in the Con o and Learned That tation Sate — | the Chief of Station was informed through stin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leo- (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields 29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived
HW 50955 -61- in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director, 11/%/60) . Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). “Hedgman said it was "very possible" that as a new Chief of Station he took the dispatch to the Congo of a senior officer like O'Donnell as a signal that ‘CIA headquarters was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb's instructions “(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42). Hedgman had a general picture of O'Donnell's mission: I understood it to be that -- similar to mine, that is, the removal or neutrali- zation of Lumumba ... I have no clear recollection of his discussing the assassi- | a mation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.) Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell indicating one.way or the other whether he was considering assassination as a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). | Hedeman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen- erally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell as being unenthusiastic “about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89). When O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he met with the Chief. of Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe" | (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37), although Hedgman was not explicit: I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio shot up to date. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 16.) Docld: 32423439 Page 307
HW 50955 -62- He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,’ "Nit “would. have been in the custody of the State Department" personnel, hot the CIA station (O' Donnell, .6/9/75,. p. 36). -O' Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8) .* But O'Donnell. assumed that it’ had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office: ._ It would have had-to have come from Washington, in my estimation, and I would think, since it had been discussed with Gottlieb that it probably. would have emanated from his office. -(O' Donnell, 6/9175, p. 28. ) Hedgman did not ‘recall discussing sottlicb's trip to the Congo with O'Donnell, but “assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 60-61). | . O'Donnell.was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he © did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the Congo (Oo! Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17). | O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where 4 lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was assassination: * When O'Donnell was informed about Hedgman's testimony on the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba , he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, Pp. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew them, nor in Hedgman’ s character to raise a question about that testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as "an honest and-a decent man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) -- "a totally truthful man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56). Boclda: 324273539 Page 308 : soot
penne cenntedne imran tase SALE ind net ane oorennen Sealine stent inno abatss MmaMBAa saree Mi Maina ERA, SMM Nast tA Mt Bek SALA AF 98th SE No tant A sete Tet * My feeling definitely is that.it was for a_ _ specific purpose, and was just not: an all- purpose capability there begin held for tar- gets of opportunity, unspecified targets. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 49.) - At’ several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility: ” I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very | possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connec- tion with other people. (oO! Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 24; accord. 6/9/75, P. 17. ). His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific purpose” of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). . | Q' ‘Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that O'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi- nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 54.) While Hedgman has no direct recollection ‘of discussing his assassination operation with Q' Donnell, he vassuned” that he had at least discussed with O'Donnell the problem of gaining access to Lumumba: for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 55, 60)... O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was “morally opposed to assassination" he would “absolutely not'' have HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 309 . =
~64- explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would he lave undertaken’ a mission to the Congo if it involved assess- ment of the’ situation for an assassination operation by someone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26). . | | O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, (9/11/75, P: A6) . Hedgman, however, had no ‘recollection of learning this From Q! Donne! Ciedyman, 8/21/75, p. 56). | Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassi- nation with dedzman vere general and philosophical, dealing with "the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54): From my point of view I told him I had moral objections to it, not just qualms, but objections. I didn't think it was . the right thing to do. (9'Donnell, . 9/11/75, p. 9).. oo When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination based on those discussions, 9'Donnell said: I will answer your question just as fairly and as scrupulously as I-can. I have a ~ great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if he said something, I would believe him to_ be speaking the truth as he knew it without shading it.... The best I- could say, I | think, would be this, that he would not have been opposed in principle to assassination in the interests of national. security. I know that he is a man of reat moral per- ception and decency and honor, and so forth. ~ And that it would disturb him to be engaged in something like that. But I think I would have to say that in our conversations, my memory of those, at no time would he rule it ‘out as being a possibility. (0! Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 18.) HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 310 ween te Eee RR EL SRR niietmanUn gm tetleiHnon tana AsO Meet Staci ed NMR me Wan fad bts WASTE NEY oe
-~65-. (v) oh Donnell Planned to “Neutralize” Lumumba b Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Re vests the - Assignment of Agent OJt : . . Alter Ego After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formu-_ lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from the custody of the WH force which was guarding his residence: O'Donnell: (wyhat I wanted to do was. to get him out, to trick him out, if I could, and then turn him over ... to the legal | authorities and let him stand trial. Be- cause he had atrocity attributed to him for which he could: very well stand trial. ~Q: And for which he could very well have received capital punishment? Q! Donnell: ‘Yes. And I am not opposed to capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 20- ai. a . To implement his plan, O'Donnell made. arrangements. to rent "an ob- servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced" x According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST .A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop ' Chief of Station to. Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable: , STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60). HW 50955 Baclda: 32423539 Page Fil
-66- (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, Pp. 20).* O'Donnell also "spotted" a member of the UN. guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody ¢O' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p- 21). 0." Donnell said that he cabled prog ress reports on his plan to. CIA headquarters (o' Donnell,: 9/11/75, p. 26). He ‘also. said that. he informed the. Chief of Station about. his plan (0! Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56). . | In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out. of UN. cus- tody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was QJWIN ,. to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19): | | What I wanted to use him for was .. - counter-espionage[.].... I had to screen. the U.S. participation in this ... by . using a foreign national whom we knew, .trusted, and had worked with ... the idea was for me to use him as an alter ego. (O'Donnell Tres PP. 19-20.) _ In mid-November, two.cables from Leopoldville ‘urged CIA: head- quarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261, Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) ‘with this message: LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO LEOPOLDVILLE . (CIA Cable IN 41556,: Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.) . * A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: “CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE" (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 312
HY 50955 ‘The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about , Seat 7 ae ft the | operational circumstances. (b)° Agent QJIWIN's Mission in the Congo: .November-December QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background ,. recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance. Division, Re: . Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supetvised by CIA officer Arnold . Silver. In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19), agent QJIWIN was dispatched to the Congo by Silver, to under- ~ take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk." (CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)* ‘A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip, to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to his mission: In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob- jective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do..... Instead; he was told ... that _ we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use.... It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use [him]. (CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.) * Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to | send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci- fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta- tions that dealt with him. There is no indication in CIA Files as to ) whether QJWIN com- pleted this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country -(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33). Docld: 32423539 Page 313
HW 50955 =-68- This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic ‘necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA Dispatch, “AUDW-147, 11/2/60. ) QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1969 (CIA A Cable IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December ‘1960 | (CIA Cable OUT 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60). The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN had been recruited earlier by Arnold Silver '.for use in a special operation in the Congo '. [the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be run by Justin O'Donnell. (1.G. Report, p. 38. )- However, both O'Donnell and Bissell ceitified that 0'Donnell re- fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead, © O'Donnell said: he went to the Congo: to attempt to snatch Lumumba from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14, 37.) | . "According to O'Donnell, QUWIN was a man who was capable of tindertaking an assassination mission: | O'Donnell: ... 1 would say that he would not be a man of many scruples. Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything? O'Donnell: ‘I would think so, yes. | Q: “And that would include assassination? O'Donnell: I would think so. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.) * See Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii) above. Docld:32423539 Page 314
HY 50955 -69- But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an_ assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, po. 36, 42). 0 Donnell said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QUWIN did not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 28), When asked if it was possible that QUWIN had a mission independent of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said: O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible _- or it could have been that somebody contacted him after he got down there, that they wanted- him to do something along the lines of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29.) But he discounted this possibility as “highly unlikely" because it would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent ina position of knowledge superior to that of his: supervising officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29). | Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QUWIN had an independent line of responsibility to the Chief’ of Station, a cable of November 29 shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities. In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to “PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba 's residence and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody Docld: 394293439 Page 315
veut Coogee mae teceatas WEN He Satete A MR EE ee Sel ble ad Be ae mat emiaeteanaseee er oe -70- (0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21).. °° But Lumumba had left UN custody at _ this. point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This: did not deter QJWIN: | VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN. ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cab te, Te It is unclear whether this latter ' “pian” contemplated assassina- ‘tion as well as abduction. . An affirmative reply £rom headquarters came through the PROP channel the next day which was also. suscep- tible of interpretation as an assassination order: CONCUR QJIWIN GO STANLEYVILLE. . WE ARE PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY OJWIN BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY FACTORS. -HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314, Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station, 11/30/60.) O'Donnell said that agent ‘QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "eo- extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19.) O'Donnell said he left the Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in: Katanga at the hands > of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20. ) QUWIN left in December shortly, after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army. In a memorandum ‘to arrange the accounting for QJIWIN's activities _in the Congo, William K. Harvey ~- under whom O'Donnell had worked _ before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the success: of QJIWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a HW 50955 Baclda: 32423539 Page 316
specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been . completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). oh Donnell explained Harvey's reference to the fact that . QUWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that.once Lumumba | was in the hands: (of the Congolese authorities ‘the reason for - the mounting of the project ... had become moot’ (O'Donnell, | 9/11/75, ‘P. 35). ‘When asked if he and: QJWIN were responsible for - Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent” capture, 0! Donnell said: “Absolutely not"! (0! Donnell, 9/31/75, p. 35). Harvey did not ‘recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he’ assumed that.0' Donnell" Ss . return from the Congo constituted the “completion” of > QIN" S mission (larvey, affidavit, p. ). ‘Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that. QUWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November, _ there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was. actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt. _ The CIA officers who were involved in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot. The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN” was in the Congo working for Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p.. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of | Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo HW 50955. Docld:32423539 Page 317°
nye ca Oe ete Re BM ME PROT ts ne RR aR eek eae (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61). - William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on “loan for his Congo assignment , had no specific knowledge of WIN's: - activities in the Congo: I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know __ specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge. “Tf QUWIN were to be. used on an assassination mission, it would have been. cleared with me. ’ [T'was never. informed that he was.to be used - for such a mission. (Harvey. affidavit, p. .) . He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda con- - cerning QUWIN: and submitted them for HARVEY? s. signature (Harvey . affidavit, p. | ). | . (c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE . After leaving the Congo in early 1961, Quit was used by CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project: ZRRIFLE a project which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders. * QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT" figures of the European underworld who. could be utilized as agents by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE: _ * For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section infra, on the "Executive Action Capability.’ oO HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 318
HW 50355 ‘Arnold Silver had not previously used | QJWIN as an assassination capability or even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi- davit, p- Although Harvey also had discussions with . Sidney Gottlieb in connec- tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned to him either QIWIN' Ss activities in the Congo or Gottlieb’ Ss own trip to Leopoldville. (Harvey affidavit, p. - de Harvey had con- sulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of. Project ZRRIFLE. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). The Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he-had never heard of Project ZRRIFLE , nor was he aware of. any. CIA. project to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was’ "quite certain” that he never. discussed assassination capabilities _ or assets with Harvey at any “time. Gledgman, 8/21/75, ‘P. 99. ) Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter- intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss | _ the plan | to assassinate Lumumba. | (Hedgman , 8/21/75, p.. 92.) An interesting note on the value accorded QUWIn by the CIA and the. inherent predicament for an intelligence agency. that employs. hoodlums ‘is found in a cable ‘from CIA headquarters to Arnold Silver in 1962. The CIA had learned that QUWIN was about to-go on trial in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested: IF ... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASH | CHARGES. OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943, 4/18/62.) Docld:327493539 Page 319
-~74- (d).. Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE : to Join an eg QUUIN ae naked pr Hadanan + Opecatsg uimoeur | | The one incident where there is an explicit reference to . assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with - WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station. a | ‘WIROGUE was an "essentially stateléss" European, who was "a forger and former ‘bank robber"! and had fought. with the French Foreign Legion. . (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was. sent. to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee by the CIA so that he would not be’ recognized by Europeans traveling through the Congo. (I. G. Memoranduin, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was | assessed by the CIA as aman who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANCER" (CTA Cable OUT 86554, Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60). | | The Chief of. Station described WIROGE as "a man with a rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, D. 96.) Hledgman used him as “a general utility agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop- ing new contacts, various. things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman supervised WIROGUE’ directly: and. did not put WIROGUE in “touch with Justin O' Donnell, (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.) | A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for. the CIA Inspector General's office in 1975, described ‘the training ‘and tasking he received: HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 320
HY 50955 - Leo Docld: 32423539 Page On 19 September 1960 two members of Afvica - Division met with him to discuss "an opera- tional assignment in Africa Division. In, ‘connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1 was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization.... In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated that Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as utility agent in order to '"(a) organize and- ‘conduct.a surveillance team; (b) intercept - packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute 2 other assignments requiring positive. action. ‘His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville." (1.G. Memorandu,. 3/14/75.).-. . WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on: December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 18739 , 12/17/60). He was given two . instructions by Hedgman: () to “build cover during initial period; " ‘and (2) to “spot persons for fa] surveillance team" of intelligence | assets in the province where Lumumba 's support was strongest. (CIA 7 Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60.) ) Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad. "This incident is described by Leopoldville Chief of Station Hedgman in a cable to CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99): QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL.AS WIROGUE REPORTED ‘LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QIWIN SAID WLROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN | REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD."' WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT. INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER’ SAID HE WORK- INF FOR [AMERICAN]. SERVICE. ... LN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS , WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE | HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. {CHIEF OF STATION] WAS ‘UNABLE CONTRADICT , AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN ‘CONNECTION {CIA]. (CLA Cable, opoldyille to Director, 12/17, 60.)
-76- ‘The cable also. expressed Hedgman's concern about WLIROGUE 's actions: ... LEOP CONCERNED. BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND: LACK SECURITY. . STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD- ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT - ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND. WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING | KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE | DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST ; SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17/60.) / a WIROGUE 's attempt to recruit QUWIN for an execution squad is explained by Hedgman asia mistake and by the actions of QJIWIN as an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate. The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else. (Hedginan, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:. I would like to stress that I don't know what ‘WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] “execution squad,'' and I am sure he was never tasked to . go. out and execute anyone. . (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) . Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an execution squad: | His idea of what an intelligence operative should do, I think, had been gathered by reading a few novels or something of the sort. (iledgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec- HW 90955 Docld:32473539 Page 322 —— 7
Setedenet wee eee fete Nat ae teat hee RMN te ce apts weg teeletertcapnating neni sini ARS eta rata tats heta mtensatesepeatenama be mtanain atin eeintee Seaton ee RN eR Scns Ce HW 450955 Docld: 32423539 | Page 323 | -77- tion of WIROCUE. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 39-42). O'Donnell men- tioried that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm squad," _ but’ said that this was for purposes more general than "assassinations: surveillance teams where you have to go -into.crime areas ... where you need a fellow that if he gets in a box can fight his way out of it. (0" Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 36). Richard | Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to _ QUWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall chat WIROGUE was “dispatched on a general purpose. mission" to the Congo (tweedy, 9/9/75, on 63). But Tweedy testified. that WIROGUE would a absolutely not'’ have been used on an assassination mission against | Lumumba because "he: was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people “in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn Fields -- who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba was being: considered (Tweedy, 9 9/9/75, pp. 64- 65). | ‘The Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident wag - connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE 's approach to QJWIN was sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed’ much wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received concerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, ‘p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about
he Poe eee th Sa tat nme AARNE te Sn athe tS EN a he tae WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would “normally do ... when you speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman , 8/21/75, P+ “101)- . | The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to WIROGUE!s "“Ereewheeling" nature. Hedgman said: . I had difficulty controlling him in that he was not a professional intelligence officer’ as such. He seemed to. act on his own without seeking. guidance or authority ... I found he was rather an unguided missile ... the kind of.man that could get-you in trouble be- fore you knew you were in trouble. _(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97). But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for, WEROGUE's, sions: (I l£ you give aman an order and he carries Lt out and causes a problem for the Station, why then as Chief of Station, well, you accept responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.) In ‘sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact ‘that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during: this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad" was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi- nation plan. . Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical immunization’ (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility . that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 324 DEMEEN IS! ee te ne
HW 50955 in any particular operation." (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75, - pice eee ential “Raheet aan tee nnetete: ane nti 9 net: Ase -79- by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The report concludes. with. the statement that 'WIROGUE/1 spent most. (of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly en t, when the report was circulated in the Inspector General’ Ss office, the following comment was handwritten by Seott Breckinridge, one of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in assassination attempts: "ROGUE's. pitch is too clear to be dis-.- carded out of hand as ‘exceeding instructions.'" (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) 6. . The. Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About: Lumumba’s Death in Katanga There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement “in bring- ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death. | (a). Lumumba 's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thys sville: Hovenber 27-becember 3 [960° The strongest hint that the CIA inay have been involved | ‘in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from. the Chief of Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60) . In the cable, Hedgman re- ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's - POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT ‘HE BREAK OUT’ OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO™ ‘THAT. CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE’ IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.) Bocld: 32473539 Page 325
-80-° The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Eumumba | 'S- departure and that action plans were prepared | for that eventuality’ DECLSION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY. BE MADE SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY -{AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE..../ STATION _ HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO “USE IN EVENT OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/69. )- There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually “gained prior knowledge of Lumumba" Ss ‘plan to depart for Stanleyville, In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum- stances. of Lumumba's. departure (CIA Cable IN 48484, Leopoldville | to Director, 11/28/60). | But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese troops: - [STATION] WORKING WITH [ CONCOLESE GOVERNMENT] TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED -[BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable, 11/28/60. )- A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates against CIA involvement, however , because it portrays the Congolese ‘forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643, Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60). | The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 3276
-81- from uit custody and’ that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's plat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 63-64) .~ He stated that he. consulted with Congolese. officers about the possible. routes. Lumumba might take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track- ing down Lumumba prior. to his capture (Hedgman, ° 8/21/75, >. 65). Despite the act that 0! Donnell had planned to draw Lumumba out of UN.custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked by the CIA (O'Donnell, 9/11/75; >. 22). | - (b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Ub Where: He Was Killed: January 17, 1960 a | The. vontenporaneous cable, traffic! chows that: the CIA was kept informed of Lumumba 's condition and movements in January of. 1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba | "a serious political ‘threat. But there is no direct evidence of . CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba Ss death. in Katanga. * xcerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and Helms (investigative report) should be inserted. BW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 327
HY 50955 fe eed Mattes fy aes eoee ee a woe ee cove cee : cite Th ee ee enn te en at _ SECTION 7: Rewritten per -82- ' - Subcommittee Instructions, 10/20/75. (FDB) «7, The’ Question of the Level at which ‘the Assassination Plot - '  Was- Aut orize The chain of events revealed by the documents and. testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assas- sination plot was ‘authorized by the President. It is ‘clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot. At the least,. the chronological relationship between strong ce ‘Presidential or other White House expressions of hostility to Lumumba and CIA steps. toward the assassination of Lumumba is close enough. to make it appear that Dulles thought he was.acting in re- sponse to pressure from above in approving assassination as one means of removing Lumumba from the political scene. | Nevertheless, there. is enough countervailing testimony “by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity in the records of high- level. policy meetings to raise a doubt as to whether President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba. The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case ‘begins with. the testimony that President Eisenhower: made a statement. at ‘a meet- ing of the National Security Council in the Summer or early Fall of 1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a. memo- randum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indi- cated that when the President's "extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action" were conveyed, the Special DocTd: 32423539 Page 329
HW 50955 .~83- Group agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac- tivity which might contribute. to getting rid of Lumumba. (Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 ‘August 1960) The next day CIA Director “Allen Dulles, who - had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of. ‘Station in Leopold-_ ville that Lumumba ' s "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60) . Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON © “YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE . " Although the Dulles cable. does not, explicitly mention assassina- tion, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under. whose aegis the as- sassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in his. opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group’ meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas- sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33- 34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba , testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy ‘that no measure, “including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re- move Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5). On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting. of the National Security BDocld: 324273539 Page 329
cites pen buna; ouemnets we tee tare te et Mata etantaater imine Mt SO HY net onthe tect neBeE EN RG Hen EUR, MOH AT RATES -84- Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave ‘danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien- tist’ arrived in Leopoldville: and provided the Chief ‘of Station © with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate. Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation. | | - Two mitigating factors weaken ‘this chain just enough so that. it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza- tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba. — | First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re- sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an | assassination plot. | . | | | “Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council and its ‘Special Group do not record an explicit oo Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda. reflect the ac- tual language used at. the meetings without omission .or euphemism — for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19). NSC staff executives stated, however, that. there was a strong pos- sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by: means. of euphe- mism. Several high Government officials involved in policy- making HW SO955 Bacld: 32423539 Page 330 late Ramat ache mah ete A ADRENOCEPTOR ene ae tee me
de cueenie ce ewes eas Sete ene eee aaa Beta bee oH ER RT Edna eae dnam te MT and planning for covert operations testified that the Language in these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba asa political threat; other officials testified to the contrary. | (a) High-Level Meetings at which "cetting Rid of Lumumba" Was Discussed a Oo, (iy Dillon Testified that the Question of Assassina- . tion Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960 In late July 1960, Patrice Lumumba visited the United States and: met with Secretary of State Christian Herter and Under- secretary of State C. ‘Douglas: Dillon. While Lumumba was in Washing- ton, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to ‘the newly formed Govern- ment of the Congo (New York Times, 7/28/60, pr). | | According to Dillon, the impression that Lumumba left with the Government. officials was that of an irrational, almost psychotic personality: | When he was in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the Secretary in my presence .. . he would. never look you in:the eye.. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the particular things that we wanted to discuss... . . You had a feeling that he was.a per- son that was gripped by this fervor that I can only char- -acterize.as messianic . ..-+. [H]e was just not a rational being. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 24.) Dillon. said that the willingness of the United States Government _ to work with Lumumba vanished after these meetings: - HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 331
ea UE AE A TEE RTA AR Le PORE ae WE Be tee ~86- | oe [Thhe impression that was left was . . . very bad, that this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time . We f{had] hoped to see him and. see what we could do to come to better understanding with him. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 23-24, ) a, , ‘Dillon testified that. shortly after Lumumba's visit to Washing- ‘ton, in late July or August, he attended a meeting at the Pentagon . where representatives of the State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA were present (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. “17-20, 25-26).* - | | According to Dillon, "a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised" at the meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 15; see also 17, 25). Dillon did not recall anything about the language used in raising the question (Dillon, 9/2/75, P . 30). Dillon assumed that when the subject of Lumumba's assassination was raised, vit, was turned off by the CIA" (Dillon, 9/2/75, b. 30). “Dillon said chat "the CIA people, whoever they were, were negative to any such action" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p.-18). This opposition ' wasn't moral," according to Dillon, but rather an objection on the grounds that it was "not a possible thing" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Dillon said the CLA reaction “might have been" made out of the feeling that ‘the group was too large for such a sensitive ok Dillon was unable to recall the precise date of this meeting (Dil- lon, 9/2/75, pp. 25-26). WW 50955 Docla: 32423539 Page 332
HW 50955 -87- discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, D. 60). Dillon was clear about the fact that “top level" CIA people. were in attendance, although he did not remember who lodged the - negative reaction to the assassination question (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 22, 25). He said it "would have to have been either Allen. Dulles, or possibly [General] Cabell... . . most likely Cabell" (Dillon, 9/2/75, -p. 25). He added that it was "very likely" that Richard Bissell was in attendance (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 21). Dillon stated that this discussion could not have served. as.. authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p- 31). But he believed that the expression of concern typified a prevalent: attitude toward Lumumba that might . ~ have justified the CIA's development of a capability to assassinate him: “I think they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability . . . just by knowing the concern that | everyone had about Lumumba. .. . . They wouldn't have had to tell anyone about that. That is just developing their own internal capability, and then they would have . to come and get permission. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30) . Dillon testified that he had never heard any mention of the plot to ‘poison Lumumba; nor, by implication, had he heard even a hint that the CIA asked permission to mount such an operation (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 50). But after being informed. of the poison plot, Dillon made the following comment about. the Pentagon meeting he attended:. Docla: 324273539 Page 333
HY - 88- - a . I think it is .°. . likely that it might have been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't have it then and went to work to develop it be- ginning in August. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 61) _ Dillon said that it was unlikely that formal notes .were taken at- the meeting or preserved because it was a small "ad hoc" group rather . than an official body (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Such interdepartmen- tal meetings weré "not unusual," according to Dillon (Dillon, 9/2) 75, p: 20). The only officials Dillon. named as probable participants other than the CIA representatives were Deputy Secretary of Defense James Douglas and Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin IIL (Dillon, - 9/2/75, pp. 19, 21). Douglas stated’that it was possible that he attended such a meeting at the Pentagon, but he does not recall itt (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Nor does he recall the question of Lumumba's assassination-ever being raised in his presence (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). | Likewise, Irwin stated that it was "likely" that he attended the meeting to which Dillon referred; but he did not remember whether he was present "at any. meeting at the Pentagon - where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised" ‘(Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 3). (ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the Presi- dent Order Lumumba" s Assassination at an NSC Meeting Robert H. Johnson, a.member of the National Security SOQ955 Daocld: 324233539 Page 334
(-89- Council staff from 1951 to January 1962, offered what. he termed a "clue! to. the extent of Presidential involvement in the decision to assassinate Lumumba (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5) .*. Johnson re- counted the following occurrence at an ‘NSC meeting in the Summer of 1960 which began with a briefing. on world developments by the Director of Central Intelligence: a * Robert Johnson introduced his testimony with the following state- . I would like to preface my remarks by pointing out that my decision to offer testimony to this committee has involved for me a profound personal, moral dilemma. In my role as a member of the NSC Staff for ten and one-half years, I was privy to a great deal of information that in- ‘volved relationships of confidentiality with high officials of the United States government. I have always taken very. seriously the responsibilities implied in such relation- — ships. . These responsibilities extend, in my view, far beyond questions’ of security classification or other legal or foreign policy concerns. They relate to the very basis of human society and government -- to the relationships of trust’ without which no free society can long survive and no government can operate. , i Ihave been forced by recent. developments; however, to ‘weigh against these considerable responsibilities my broad- er responsibilities as a citizen on an issue that involves ‘major questions of public morality, as well as questions -of sound policy. Having done so, I have concluded, not without a great deal of reluctance, to come to your commit- ~ tee with information bearing upon your inquiry into govern~ ment decisions relating to. the assassination of foreign leaders. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5) After his tenure on the staff of the National Security Council, Robert Johnson served from 1962 to 1967 on the Policy Planning Coun- cil at the Department of. State. ; HY 450954 Docld: 32423439 Page 335
HY 0955 ecm ee OA I ete eat erat REE IEEE Sy asst Halen atone ha guavinn sr ch Bata bit be te a ee ee . At some time during that discussion, President Eisen-.- hower said something -- I can no longer remember his words -- that came across to me as an order for the assassina- tion of Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no dis- cussion; the meeting simply moved on. I remember. my sense - of that moment quite clearly because the President's state- ment came as a great shock to me. I cannot, however, re- construct the moment’ more specifically. Although I was convinced ‘at the time -- and remained convinced when I thought about it later’ -- that the Presi- ‘dent's statement was intended as an order for the -assas- sination of Lumumba, I must confess that in thinking about ' the incident more recent ly I have had some doubts. Asis well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC ' meetings. Certainly, it: was strange if he departed from -that normal pattern on a subject so sensitive as this. | Moreover, it was not. long after this, I believe, that Lu- ‘mumba was dismissed as premier by Kasavubu in-an action that was a quasi-coup. “I have-come to wonder whether what I really heard was only an order for some such political action. All I can tell you with any certainty at the present moment is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 6-7) Johnson "presumed" that the. President made his statement while "look- ing toward the Director of Central Intelligence" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 11). He was unable to recall with any greater specificity the words. used by the President (Johnson 9/13/75, p. 10). When asked about the strength of the possibility that he had heard only a general directive for the political.overthrow of Lumumba, Johnson testified that it was his clear impression at the time of the meeting, and has remained. so for the fifteen years since, that he had heard an assassination order: | 5 . Would it be fair to say that although you al- ow for the possibility that a coup or some more general Docld:324293539 Page 336
ite aaron anda ance a tates ons es aaa PET arte ted Radin MME SS EE ce onmeten ANE eee TR EO mn MUSE I ena Sat Rt ate tebe en tem be ttt Eee Sg tee oes ew owe political action was being discussed, it is your clear impression that you had heard an order for the assassi- nation of Lumumba? Johnson: It was my’ clear impression at the time. Q: And it remains your impression now? Johnson: It remains my impression now. I have reflect~ ed oon this other kind of possibility, but that is the Sense . .°. that persists. (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 24-25) Johnson explained that his allowance for the possibility that he had heard an order for a coup did not disturb his recollection of hear- ing an. assassination order: | It was a retrospective reflection on what I had heard, and since this coup did occur, it occurred to me that it was possible that that’ is what I heard, but that would not change my sense of the moment when I heard the President speak, which I felt then, and I continue to feel, was a statement designed to direct the dispos-_. al, assassination, of Lumumba. (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12) ' Johnson stated that. the incident provoked a strong reaction. from him: I was surprised . . . that I would ever hear a President say anything like this in my presence or the presence of a group of people. I was startled. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 13) — a A succinct summary of Johnson's testimony was elicited by Senator Mathias in the following exchange: “Mathias:. . . . What comes across is that you do have a memory, if not of exact words, but of your own reaction . ‘really to a Presidential order which you considered to be an order for an assassination. Johnson: That is correct. “Mathias: And that although precise words have escaped HY 50955 DBocld: 324293539 Page 337
we ae me we te wea tinaved wert met nnntgt tA EA ETT Metered baer antin? 9M Aon sacar om Peake wrath, vt Gees badSoek GT OMA MIRA A RS OR REE INC HG twa ae me ee -92- oe you in the passage of fifteen years, that sense of shock remains? Johnson: Right. Yes, sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 8) After the meeting, Johnson, who was responsible for writing the memorandum of the discussion, consulted with a senior official on | the NSC staff to determine how to handle the President's statement ‘in the memorandum and in the debriefing of the NSC Planning Board. an that followed each meeting: | I suspect -- but no longer have an exact recollection -~ that I omitted it from the debriefing. I also do not re- call how I handled the subject in the memo of the meet- ing, though I suspect that some kind of reference to the - President's statement was made. “(Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 7)- ‘In his second appearance, Johnson reiterated that it was "quite like- ly that it was handled through some kind of euphemism or may have been omitted altogether" (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 21).* * In 1960, Johnson was Director of the Planning Board Secretariat -- third in command on the NSC staff. He attended NSC meetings to take notes on the discussions whenever one of the two senior NSC officials was absent. a Johnson testified that the person with whom he consulted about the manner of recording the President's statement in the minutes was one of the two top NSC staff officials at that time: NSC Executive Secre- tary James Lay or Deputy Executive Secretary Marion Boggs (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 12-13). Johnson could‘not recall which of the two offi- cials he had consulted, but he “inferred” that it must have been the "top career NSC staff person present" at the meeting where he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12). At both of the NSC meetings where the President and Johnson were present for a dis- cussion of Lumumba -- August 18 and September 7 -- James Lay was ab- sent and Marion Boggs served as Acting Executive Secretary. Marion Bogg's statement about his method of handling the situation described by Johnson is in accord with. Johnson's testimony: ~ HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 338
-93-. As Johtison stated, his testimony standing alone is "a clue, rather than ‘precise evidence of Presidential involvement in decision- . making with respect to assassinations" (Johnson, 6/18/75, Pp. 5). To determine the significance of this "clue," it must be placed in the “context of the records of the Nsc meetings attended by Johnson, | testimony about’ those meetings, and the series of events that pre- “ceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassina- tion. — a | : In the Summer of 1960,. there were four NSC meetings where. de- velopments in the Congo were discussed at: which Robert Johnson was present. The President was not in attendance at two of those occa- sions -- July 15 and July 21 (NSC Minutes, 7/15/60; NSC Minutes, I have no independent. recollection of being consulted by Mr. Johnson about how to handle in the memorandum of dis- cussion any sensitive statement regarding Lumumba. I am not saying I was not consulted; merely that I do not re- member such an incident. If I had been consulted, I would almost certainly have directed Mr. Johnson to omit the matter from the memorandum of discussion.. (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2) . James Lay, who attended other NSC meetings where Lumumba was discuss- ed (e.g., September 21, 1960), also confirmed the fact that NSC min- utes would not be likely to record a statement as sensitive as a Presidential order for an assassination, if such an order were given: If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without. identifying the specially sensitive subject as the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 2) .-: , HW 50955 Docld: 324293539 Page 339
HY 0955 cere tet om na Ft ne cee ceteate Hon neath eat tn ERAS Sah ane Mat ASA ab EARS The eh ATM OL RB eee TT 7/21760). © Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these early meetings was vehement: | 7 Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a | person who was a Castro or worse .. . Mr. Dulles went -on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de- scribed as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun- ists; this also, however, fits with his own orienta- tion. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60) “The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look- ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter- mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p.°16). . However, the chronology of meetings; cables, and events in the Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testi- mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960. | The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold- ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septen- ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events. * The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de- tail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows: The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to consider “any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba'"' (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vig- orously as. the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60; see Section 7(a) (iii), infra). The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes Only" cable under his personal. signature to the Chief of Station in Docld:37493539 Page 340
HY 50955 “The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before . - the “‘quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu | -- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard the President's statement. | The only other meeting at which Johnson could. have heard’ the statement by the President was held on Septem- ber 7, two days after this event. | Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960, indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced * Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR- TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT . .°. THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Chief of Station, 8/26/60). The Dul- les cable added: . a . . WE WISH: GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY .. . INCLUDING EVEN MORE © AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . . . YOU CAN . ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-. FERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, supra, for more complete treatment of this cable.) J On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters to the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief.of Station, 9/19/60; see Section 4(a), supra). On September 21,-in the presence of the President at _ an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see “Section 7(a) (iv), infra). Finally, on September. 26, the CIA scien- tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in- formed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an as- sassination effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra). The Chief of Station stated that he received confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section 4(e) (i), supra). oe on 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the “number two position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently changed to Deputy Secretary of State. -In this position, he frequently (Continued) ‘Bpoclda: 324273539 Page 341
‘the discussion of- U.S. policy toward. the Congo. In the course of his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations “troops in the Congo was necessary to prevent Soviet intervention at Lumumba's request: | | If . . . Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN out, he might then offer to accept help from anyone. The elimination of the UN would be a disaster which, ‘Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we could to prevent. If the UN were forced out, we might. be faced by a’situation where the Soviets intervened by invitation of the Congo. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60) The discussion. then continued to raise the spectre of an alliance be- tween Lumumba and the Soviet Union: - Secretary Dillon said that he [Lumumba ] was working to_ serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed out that Lumuiba was in Soviet pay. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/ 60) . SO, In this context, the following exchange between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dillon was recorded: The President said that the possibility that the UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to do it. We should do so even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight. Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling. but that the Secretary General, and Mr. Lodge doubted whether, if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the UN, the UN could stay in. Im response, the President stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent -- we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumum- ba supported by the Soviets. There was no indication, the eR served as Acting Secretary of State and either attended or was kept informed about NSC and Special Group meetings. Dillon later served as Secretary of the Treasury under. President Kennedy. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 2-4.) . HW 50955 Docld:324293539° Page 342
HY 0955 ~O7=. « . -Ptesident stated, that the Congolese did not want UN support and the maintenance of order. Secretary Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling about.the matter: The situation that would be created by.a UN withdrawal was altogether too ghastly to contemplate. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60) - ‘This is the only statement about Lumumba. which the memorandum of . the meeting attributed to the President. As reported, it clearly does not contain an order for the assassination of. Lumumba. But the statement does indicate extreme. Presidential. concern focused on Lumumba: The President was so "disturbed by the situation in the Congo that he was willing to risk a fight with the Soviet Union and he felt that Lumumba was the “one man'' who was responsible for this situation, a man who- did not represent the sentiments of the Congolese people in the ‘President's estimation. After teviewing NSC documents and being informed. of Robert Johnson's testimony, Douglas Dillon stated his "opinion that it ¥ ug p. is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 is the . meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson." (Dillon affidavit, 9/15/75.) However, Dillon testified that he did not ‘remember such a thing" as an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p- 32). Dillon explained how he thought the President may have expressed himself about Lumumba : | | Dillon: .. . . It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody that Lumumba was [a] very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of. the world, Bocld: 324293539 Page 343
Stl inc ae weer eee Danan ANE Benton nts oe ete cts marae tah stim anita atinnsttmicenates we tatanas Nanas NR a pe gine eta Dh cota ttgen ne Won RRP Tid Shar Theta tenn la tote -98-, oe that the President expressed himself, we will have. to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut.order as Mr. Johnson apparently. did. And. I think perhaps others present may have interpreted it other ways. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 32-33.) -Q: Did you ever hear the President make such a remark about Lumumba,. let's get rid of him, or let's take action right away on this? Dillon: I don't remember that. . But certainly this was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33.) Dillon said that he would have thought that such: a state- ment "was nota direct order to have an assassination" (Dillon, 9/2/75, Pp. 33). ‘But he testified that it was “perfectly possible" that Allen Dulles would have translated such strong Presidential language about “getting rid of" Lumumba into’ authorization for an assassination effort (Dillon, 9/2/75, . pp. 34°35): | | I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite responsive to what he considered implicit autho- rization, because he felt very strongly that we ‘should not involve the President directly in things of this nature. And he was, perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that maybe, some of his successors wouldn't have ‘been. And so I think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 34.) = Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, as Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, stated after reviewing the Memorandum of Discussion at that meeting: HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 344
-99- ce _Irrecall the discussion at that meeting, but have no independent recollection of any statements or dis- 7 cussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or reference by the President (or anyone else present _ at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favor- ing action by the United States to bring. about the assassination of Lumumba.* (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, pp. 1-2.) : oS | The Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC meeting of Septem- - ber 7, 1960--the only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the President's statement--records only:-a brief, general - discussion of developments in the Congo (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60). As part of Allen Dulles’ introductory intelligence briefing on ~ world events, the Memorandum related his remarks on the situation in the Congo following Kasavubu's dismissal. of Lumumba from his | position in the government (NSC Minutes , 9/7/60, p- 4). Neither the length nor the substance of the record of this discussion. indicates that Lumumba's role in the Congo received. the same intense kind of consideration as the NSC had given it on August. 18.** There is no record of any statetient by. the President * Boggs. added: "Based on my whole experience with the NSC, I would have considered it highly unusual if a matter of this nature nad been referred to in a Council meeting where a number of persons with no ‘need to know' were present.'' (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.) “ek The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal with the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, . pp. 4-5). By comparison, the August 18 meeting required an HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 345
ween nee ne a eee te nee enna Tanditene mar ne mat etent ene SS seems nepiesuetieme ete we ntey winedabetanhneneMae sch antedaeat Mite tane Wma Ne Nera aN Pah ARE RAE BAER Pea tae BRS ES -100- duritig this “discussion asc Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5). ‘Nevertheless, in the course of his briefing Dulles expressed his: continuing concern over. the amount of personnel and equipment that was being sent to the congo by: the Soviet Union, primarily to aid. ‘Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, P. 5). Dulles. concluded this part of his briefing with an. observation | that demonstrated that Lumumba's dismissal Erom the government: had not ‘lessened the extent to which he was regarded at the NSC as a potent political threat in any power struggle in the Congo: . Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed to come out.on top in each of these struggles. (NSC. Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5.) The day after this NSC- meeting, Gordon Gray made a - pointed “yeminder of the President's. concern about the Congo to Allen “Dulles at a meeting of the Special Group: Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in. the field are fully aware of-the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60. ) There are three possible interpretations of the failure. of NSC ‘records to reveal whether the President ordered the “assassination ‘of Lumumba at one of these meetings. First, an extraordinarily lengthy. (fifteen pages) summary of discussion on the Congo and related policy problems in Africa, indicating that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60, pp. i 15). ae HW 50955 Docld: 324293539 Page 346
HW 50955 — =101- assassination order could have been issued but omitted from the records. Robert Johnson testified that it was “very likely" ‘that the Presidential statement he heard would have been handled by means of. a euphemistic reference or by complete omission “rather ‘than given as [a] .. . direct quo- tation" in the Memorandum of Discussion (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 14). Second,-as illustrated by Douglas Dillon’ s testimony, the President could have made a general statement about, "getting rid of" ‘Lumumba with» the intent to convey to Allen Dulles that there | was implicit authorization for an. assassination effort. Third, despite ‘general discussions about removing Lumutiba ; the President may not have intended to order the assassination of Lumumba even. though Allen Dulles may have thought an assassina-_ tion. effort had been authorized. The three White House staff members responsible | to the President for national security, affairs testified that there, was. no such order. Gordon Gray, Andrew Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower were all in attendance at. the NSC meetings. of August 18 and September 7.%* (iii) The President! s "Extremely Strong Feelings" Led . The Special Group to Consider Anything That Might : Oo Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 19 0. - On August 25, 1960 five men** attended a meeting of the ec * See Section’ 7(b), infra, for a general treatment of the testimony of Gray ,. Coodpasterx and Eisenhower. «ek There were four standing members of the Special. Group at this time: Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; Gordon Docld: 32423539 Page 347
-102- Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security Council responsible for planning covert operations, Thomas Parrott, a CIA. officer who served as. Secretary to the Group, began the meeting by outlining the CIA operations that had | been undertaken in “mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60) . This campaign involved covert operations through certain Labor. groups and “the planned attempt’. . . to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba" in the Congolese Senate (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). The outline of this campaign evoked the following dialogue: The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, - that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that’ he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of pro- ‘ceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself . in a position of interpreting instructions of. this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out ‘consideration’ of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of.Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60, p. 1.) Both .Gordon Gray and Thomas Parrott testified that refer- ence to Mr. Gray's "associates" was a euphemism for President — Gray, Special. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs: and John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Also in regular attendance was Thomas A. Parrott, Secretary to . the Special Group. - oO HY 50955 Docld:324233539 Page 346
AW, 509455 _-104- _ Eis@nhower which ‘was employed to preserve ‘plausible deniabil- -ity" by the President of discussion of covert operations memorialized in Special Group Minutes (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 27; Parrott; 7/10/75, pp: 8-9). | - | The four living participants at the meeting have all stated ‘that. they do not recall any discussion of or planning for the assassination of ‘Lumumba (Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, P. 1; “Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 27, 32; Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 25-26). Gray said that he did not con- sider the President | s desire for "very straightforward action". to include ' ‘any thought in- his. mind of assassination" (Cray, 7/9/75, p. 32). Parrott testified to ‘the game effect, maintain- ing that. he -would have recorded a discussion of assassination in explicit terms in the Special Group Minutes if such a dis- ~ cussion had taken place (Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 26- 27). John N..Irwin II acknowledged, however , that while he did not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meet- ing", the reference in the minutes to ‘the. planning for "getting rid of Lumumba" was "broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination” (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p- 2). Irwin's interpretation is shared by Douglas Dillon and Richard Bissell--two high government officials who were not participants at this Special Group’ meeting but who were involved -in the planning and policymaking for covert operations in the Congo during this period. Bocld: 324273539 Page 349
L Fa id eee cee woe ee ee Tene on mee pitcw commana mans eange me Sen vena ema sae scons Mearns Hieeatiimaia smarts 9 Me nara fie 8 imation -105-_ As a participant in National Security Council meetings of this period, Dillon said that he would read the Special Group minutes of August 25, 1960, to indicate that assassina- tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might : be used to "get rid of" Lumumba. (Dillon, 9/2/75,.p. 42). Dillon noted that the reference in the minutes to the fact ‘that Allen Dulles stated that he “had taken the comments .referred to seriously" probably pointed to the President's statement -at the previous NSC meeting at which Robert Johnson ‘took notes (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. /39-40). | When asked whether the CIA would have the authority to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba on the basis of the discussion at the Special Group, Dillon said: They. would certainly have the authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would be enough to actually go ahead with it. But cer- tainly the way this thing worked, as far as I _ know, they. didn't do anything just on their own.- I think they would have checked back at least with the senior people in the State. Department or the Defense Department. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43.) pillon said that if the CIA checked with the State Depart- ment, it might have been done in such a way that it would not appear on any record (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43). Dillon added that "to protect the President as the public representative of the - U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen Dulles “wouldn't return to the President" to seek further HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 350
cececamcnsonls see cttene = Ee eaE Lannea fadian Be an met that wih come at Be ee vee ne etme eT ante aM Ee ant Santa wad ne wae we ERAN Ee ON URE eA ad ge tea eT eee oS ~ -106- “approval if an assassination operation were mounted (Dillon, 9/260, pp.. 42-43). Richard Bissell stated that in his opinion the language of the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 indicated “that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general strategy at the NSC and within the CIA for removing Lumumba from the political scene (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 29, 32). Bissell added: a | | . | The Agency had put a top priority, probably, on a range of different methods of getting rid of _ Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating his political influence.» (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 29.) © a Bissell pointed to the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 as a “prime example" of the circumlocutious manner in which a topic like assassination would be discussed by high government officials: Bissell: When you use the language that no particu- [ar means were ruled out, that is. obviously what it meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room. Meant that if it had. to be assassination, that. that was a permissible means. SO You don't use language of that kind except to mean in effect, the Director is. being told, get rid of the guy, and if. you have to use extreme means up to and including assassination, g0 ahead. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33.) Bissell added that this message was, ‘in effect", being given ‘to Dulles by the President through his representative Gordon Gray (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33). (iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said fumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until "Disposed Of In the course of his intelligence briefing to the NSC: HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 351
-107- on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of. - Soviet influence in the Congo. ‘Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN . ‘custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between ' Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government :. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet . disposed of and remained a grave danger as long | as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, - 9/21/60.) | ‘Three days after this NSC’ meeting, Allen Dulles sent a personal cable to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville which included the following message: WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE] , SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60-) On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment from CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the Chief of Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba; and: assured him that there was Presidential authorization for -this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), supra). Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote the memorandum of.the discussion of September 21, did not interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination: HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 3452 .
Hi 0955 ~108- we I have ‘examined the memorandum (which I prepared) ‘summarizing the discussion of the Congo at the September 91, 1960 meeting of the NSC. I recall the discussion and believe it is accurately and adequately summarized in the memorandum. | T have no recollection> of any discussion of a possible. assassination of Lumumba. ‘at this meeting. With specific reference to the state- ment of the Director of.Central Intelligence . . I believe this is almost a. literal rendering of what. Mr. Dulles said. My own interpretation of this statement was that Mr. Dulles was speaking in the context of © efforts being made within the Congolese government to force Lumumba from power. I.did not interpret it as referring to assassination* (Boges affidavit 10/10/79, pp. 2-3.) Boggs was not, however, .in a position to analyze Dulles' remark in light of the actual planning for covert operations . that took place during this period because Boggs was ‘not privy to most such discussions (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2). C. “Douglas Dillon, - who attended this NSC meeting as. - Acting Secretary of State, said that he. did not recall ‘the dis- cussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, P- 47). Dillon said that the minutes “could mean that" assassination would. have been’ one acceptable © means . of "disposing of" Lumumba , although he. felt that “cotting him out [of the Congo] or Locking him up" would have been a. preferable disposition ‘of Lumumba at that point since he was I * NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who was also present at the meeting of September 21, 1960, stated: “I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings." (Lay affidavit, 9/8/79, p.. lL.) Docld: 327493539 Page 353 wet teeee ee oe we cece nea econ he tediarm at tape ye eg nee ae ee femaranena s cere tae ete AGT MRD LE TEMES STEEL ee a Smt nas erm te