Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 19927 (44 Use 2107 Hote). DATE: 11-14-2017 JFK Assassination System Date: 4/9/2015 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: FBI RECORD NUMBER: = 124-10271-10122 RECORD SERIES: HQ . AGENCY FILENUMBER: 62-109717-16 Document Information * ORIGINATOR: FBI FROM: BRANIGAN, W. A. TO: SULLIVAN, W.C. TITLE: J DATE: 11/12/1964 ‘PAGES: 4 SUBJECTS : DILLON COMMISSION, WC, LIAISON WITH USSS, PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: — Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 02/25/1997 OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE COMMENTS : J v9.1 1 Docld: 32300433 Page 1
Released. under.the John F. Kennedy Assassination Regords Collection Act of igg2 (44a Use 2107 Hote} DATE: —1i- 14-7017 om " “OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 ©) . 5010-106 C) * + ~ Belmont - DeLoach jy") 6 ~ Sullivay say MAY 1962 EDD ION Gea GEN. REG. NO, 27 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ~ Bland Memorandum ~ Bland - Wannall 11-12-64 Y 1 —- Liaison 5 Tele. Room ———_ 1 - Branigan {°° fi Wh itson Gandy TO 7 OW. Cy Sullivan | . FROM : W,A, Brahiflan susject: “PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE _ ON THE WARREN REPORT Memo from A, H. ween Mr ¢ Tolson ‘1is5264' pointed out. that neutralization of persons who constitute - a danger to. the | President is a Secret Service function, However, . there may be some , few sensitive cases where action by the Secret Service would destroy an FBI operation of value to this country. The question was raised as to whether in these few instances the FBI would prefer -t6o “handle the subjects itself, rather than to have Secret Service neutralize them during a Presidential visit. The Director noted, "I am opposed to accepting this responsibility." \e at ‘ = ie i s 4 he ionage Agents: For the Director' s considéation - Gt is. at o approximately 18,500 names given by the FBI to Secret Service, the "sensitive cases" to which Secret Service referre SA f i involve 16 espionage subjects. of these are Yugoslav agents a !whose identities were supplied by€our Yugoslav gefector-in-place ; Three ame Czech agents, who were identified byour Czech defectoraipy in-place ix are agents of the Soviet Committee for State Secur# ru (KGB), iWenhtified through FEDORA, a Soviet defector-~in-place. Fort are agents of Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), identified throwgh TOPHAT, another Soviet defector-—in- place, One is a Castro-—Cuban = | intelligence agent who ons Ga S an important penetration re so clandestine communications, In no instance have the original sources indicated that uny of these eSpionage agents has ever had an asSignment of ; | assassination or terroristic activity. These people are collector and transmitters of information, BOLDED Bi Seat one These cases are of varying importance from an intelligence standpoint, but in all of them we have an obligation: to protect the original sources, These original sources mav be in a position at some future date to furnish us with the identities of communist terrorists or assassins who would be of immediate interest to the | Secret Service. Ge ot 3 CONTINUED ~ OVER A Pee pomencneeh tierce rurerarzen) be tieeene i omeatct DoclId: 32300433 Page 2
DAT 11-14-2017 : > B: ay f os a . . . . fi \ . (CC * \ oa a Memo Branigan to Sullivan ~ oe ; re: PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE De ON THE WARREN REPORT [ Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 “ve We cannot adequately protect our sources when these 16 names are out of our possession, and may even be furnished by Secret Service to the local police for "neutralization," Dangers in Handling by Secret Service and Local Police: Consideration should be given to getting these 16 names back from Secret Service, These cases are all pending active investigations of intelligence (espionage) agents, Should a leak occur in the Secret Service, the lives of-our defectors-in-place would be in jeopardy. . For example, take the case of (Josef. Ulver, a Czech illega1@!} agent, operating as a [traveling salesman of religious articles, } Hel as identified to us by our defector -in-phace, [Gril who is now in}/S Czech intelligence headquarters in Prague,\ and to) has [ji bys recentl Cs furnished additional information, through CIA} regarding (Gaech fs ent 3) in the U.S, If(Ulver! name leak out, (GIMME would be under immediate suspicion, ) Another example is [Alexis von Volborth, a Soviet KGB Ox) illegal] whose very existence is known to only a_limited number of - persons in the New York KGB Residency, includingyour defector-in- place, FEDORA, who reported him to us. If his name leaked, FEDORA q4would be in a precarious position. €The head of the KGB in New York | is already of the belief, from review of testimony in “KGB enko- [¥] B Ivanov trial, that the FBI has an informant within the KG nko- Ox furnished us with information on five other persons in thts list of 16. If their names were leaked, FEDORA could be easily identified | by the KGB as our source. . The same situation would prevail if the Secret Service gave the names ® the local police and the names were leaked by the police. The effect would be the same if the local police attempted to restrain these persons and the latter reported this to their intelligence principals. In the case of local police action: looking toward "neutralization," we would not only have placed our informants’ lives in jeopardy, but we would have surrendered control of the investigation of these sensitive -espionage cases to the local police, ; Re-evaluation of the -16:Cases: On 10-29-64, the Director met with the President's Committee on Presidential Protection. The Director | pointed out that we disseminate to the Secret Service on subversive individuals, even where there is no indication the individual has threatened the President; that these are the type of people we would ‘pick up in the event of a war emergency, t -2- | Docld: 32300433 Page 3