104-10332-10014 SUMMARY OF AUGUST 1996 REVIEW BOARD ACTIONS ON SECURITY CLASSIFIED HSCA TESTIMONY OF — JOHN SCELSO (180-10131-10330) 19; 9, 11, 22 Review 05/1997, "CIA Employee." Protect first four 10/2017, “Operational words of line 5;. ——‘ | Details." release rest of line. 52: 11 R_ (see release on Ree 141) 52521823 | 21 & 23 R&R | a 55:25 10/2017 “Describes . technical operation." Release line 4; 10/2017, "Describes protect all of line 5; | intelligence operation in release lines 6 & 7 Mexico City." 56; 19-23 — | postpone from 4th 10/2017, “Describes fap gr word in line 19 | intelligence operation in through the third ‘Mexico City." word in line 21; release rest of lines (21-23 10/2017 “Describes technical operation." 10/2017 “Describes individuals." 10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
13-00000 10/2017, “Describes intelligence operations “ | “Describes a group of people." 10/2017 "Describes technical operation." protect last three 10/2017, "Describes | words on line 20; intelligence operation" . . release lines 21-23. a 10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation" Pf i Release line 10, postpone Ist, 2nd, — and 4th - 6th words. on line 11. ; 24 38; 2-3 22 "Describes intelligence operation." Scelso language and identifier. . 10/2017 "Describes individual." Release date 08/2006: a Crypt. e 10/2017 “Describes a p= meeting." Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language" Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language" ye r
13-00000 a 84; 17 10/2017 "No suitable substitute language." 140; 23 = date 08/2006, | — Detail" Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language" asisid [RT 10/2017 "Describes technical operation." Release date 08/2006. "crypt" 10/2017. "describes Release date 08/2006. “description.” 106; 11 Release date 08/2006. = wo20 RO Release a "CIA Installation in Western
13-00000 Scelso date. Sub.lang. "location" CIA team disk 8\ scel_act.wpd_
13-00000 , ; SECRET 27 September 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board FROM: — John F. Pereira Central Intelligenge Agency SUBJECT: , Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso Testimony and Lopez. Report (We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.) _. .-. (8S). Igsue....This memo.is. to request. that. the JFK ~~. Board reconsider its decision to release certain information contained in the HSCA testimony of John Scelso_ and in the Lopez Report. Specifically CIA requests that/the phrases | | fbe~postponed-from reléase. We also offer some suggestions for substitute language which we believe will not detract from the JFK assassination story, yet still protect the information at issue. ee es ——~" CL BY [2224130 5 see CL REASON 175 (c) DECL ON Xl DRV FM LOC 3-82 LIA 3-82,HUM 4-82 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso 4 Testimony and Lopez Report ae gets rere ree ee ee cette Ee af : ee Wr 2 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso Testimony and Lopez Report i — = { \ J i) — nce —— — — Se a neti ATR a i A net ne Fi ie eal Sat et en TE ES 3 Time it SECRET
13-00000 - . : SECRET SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso Testimonv and Lopez Report On cc ee en " * a ne 4 SECRET
13-00000 ‘ SECRET ' SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso. Testimony and Lopez Report r\ | \ \ \ Z | ' John F. Pereira 5 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET From the Desk o ’ NOTE FOR: FROM: : DATE: 2204 PM SUBJECT: Agee Memo - New draft Here itis... with Jeremy's improvements. Please read it carefully as i had te rush through this. Some of Jeremy's comments were slight wording changes so as not to offend "the Board" so you may not notice much change. The biggest substantive change was on my FOIA section (I have skillfully crafted this section to avoid the use of that four letter word!). Please note there is one more paragraph now because | did add a bit about Scelso being an “official”. And don't forget to attach to Stokes-DCI letter which | will fax back to you. Have fun - and let me know if you need help. _& ce: SECRET
13-00000 ‘ understand it; “DO/Mexico- < | SECRET “23 Bugust 1996 Note For; Fred Wickham, DO ‘ Bleanor Neiman, DO DO/Mexico 1 {7 DO/EA i of DO/EA Cc From: J. Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG Subject: Meeting with ARRB Staff 1. Thursday afternoon I met with Dave Marwell, Executive Director for the ARRB, and two of his staff, Jeremy Gunn and Mary McAuliffe. I briefed them on the four releases in the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony that had been identified as potential anneal items. and on the Agency's concerns} re the I requested that the Board reconsider the release of the statements,6n 2. Marwell agreed to send a “staff recommendation” to the Board recommending that they delay the release of these four items to hear additional evidence from the Agency. The rest of the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony would be released on schedule. If the Board accepts the staff's recommendation, the four items will be addressed at the next Washington meeting (27 September). If the Board rejects the staff's recommendation, then we have the option of appealing to the President. Marwell and Gunn seemed confident that ~~ the Board would agree to delay the release. 3. ‘Gunn requested that the Agency's additional evidence on these four items (if provided in writing) be to. the ARRB staff by 23 September. The Agency can also brief; the Board members at. the. . : evidence memos ‘on 0 Fee olice” issues and OGC | [) will take the lead on a! T will contact the DA/TRO ) on the : 4. Concerning |’Marwell agreed to delay Board action until the 16 October meeting. The Agency's proposal on these documents should be sent to the ARRB staff as soon as possible. CL By: 611637. * CL REASON: 1.5(c) DECL ON: X1-» - DRV FM: MULTIPLE - SECRET
13-00000 oe Thethe, HECA, Mle Vow 1978 Dehn Sc|ersa (pseudonym) i Besckeredl poscages FY! as Boal upheld deletors
13-00000 7 Agide fe og De he oe Hae J 1-64 t been handled in any different manner? ; a g + | ‘Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissimina- 6 | tion of information about him, but I do not think that any n : . ° ‘ operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or > ; = to contact him or to try to force him back to the United : ~ i e 7H Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how would the x 3 ) dissemination have been treated differently? : | Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have : 'o disseminated any additional information that we got. g r | Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the 2 : Mexico City station for failure to send this information? , i = | Mr. Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to: a J : = vs ! go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of = 1s the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I usec z to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, i . i. tt | secretly. 2 We were running, at that time, a vast! - = | program in Mexico city’ ar ee —— 1 _} I’do not know whether you informed yourself - Be) “c about the magnitude of our political action program there at the time -- absolutely enormous. We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satel~- Lites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of 101845 bee ed oa tve dee San eae aes Dame re Co tn ad Te QEORET
1713-00000 Des : Xe 4 , l- ui fh Mr. Scelo. Yes. Now, why did they not report everything they found out? Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question. vA ERG 245) a ice eee nen tee eet +8 eC SDS AACN ie CENA a eS Sete ci het ee me oy ucharemona tg fa Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by cv .Mexican—. ( a . a wo 8 American... These people were just inundated with information = 7 : and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to : 2 Washington. G 7 | The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on, Z :G which only were divulged after the assassination. It is an = ‘i enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest .and most/ bs H = = active telephone intercept operations in the whole world Z = | and the job of processing this material is just impossible. : ‘4 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step, S| although I was not going to do this at this time. I am goinc : is \ to modify the line of inquiry somewhat. ° my Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were z a in the Mexico City station? a is = oy Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped? g 29 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet. aE ars Mr. Scelo. I think there are about @0’lines being tapped Re a2 ; altogether: That is just the number that sticks in my mind. ‘i “ Mr. Goldsmith. Thirty-medning’ a” total of 4thicty: from all sy both the Soviet and the Cuban? a Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects. Ce ORET ypRy 3 SLGHE] tes
13-00000 . Ss Seeged we ‘ te ty dale 3 1-53 2 i | Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related CO : 4 } : a 2 | to the Soviet or Cuban? < i Q 3 Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists a : _ a. 4 | living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J. 4 i : . 2 wn i ‘ = $4 Edgar Hoover. 2 3 i Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty. lines how many, at your ole = 7 | best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans? < i Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they g | had. ~ 10 | Mr. Goldsmith. You think just about every outside = ‘ : = ot | phone? ° = 2 | Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines. tc : : = ?2 4 Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you? _ 4 . . = ts 4 Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based on my recollection, = i o = cs | going back 15 yaars. = tS | Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was ~ 4 “ool H that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City = i8 : “was one of the most extensive in the world? a _ = ? Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great $s | deal which they could not exploit. They cculd not later tm ttt listen to it, they did not have time. Thev used to listen ra 32 to it sort of spottily, you see, and attemst then to expioit 23 what was the most important. Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the SECRET Pe ee ee ee ee 101834
cal (Pause) n | | & 3 i Mr. Scelo. Yes. = & 3] Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on a 4 | that. This refers to the envoy operation ishat o| in wa ‘ : wu _ s ke ” "4 < < : mayne Lr. Feet gts tay aatesttan npee te MEN ee : « 3; { and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lines; ‘in; : 4 : PC eo Atk a. f ek . s : fact, connected at one timé, so that your early testimony aS a was, in all likelihood, accurate. 3 $ | I am going to have to ask you also totread the section <= 19 2 marked number 3, Oswald coverage. E 1} | Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask? . A : = 2 Mr. Goldsmith. This is taken from the 1977 Inspector = 13 | General Report. = 4 | Mr. Scelo. I see. = id Eb ots Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald = ots Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162. ~ 4 : a 7 | (Pause) ~ y = 13} On page 161, the section where it says: “Oswald Cover- S 20 i zd noe NE se 22: Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible . 222 «coverage. !. | SS a4 The question I have for you is as follows. t would ple 2s | seem, from the earlier paragraph, that M1837
13-00000. : NEMEC PESOS 1-57 was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary orf feo ask | i) for the telephone numbers? a . iene tes Linney et genannten ae 2 wae an canoe 2 “ © & < oO 4 = ot > 3 pal j < “ eS u = 5, bed oe < : ‘| ~ a . i 4 ve 305 - ° i ) = 2 f Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. r) = ~ i ; GS + | Mr. Scelo. -- on those important targets. - ‘3 | Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior to 1962/: Soa; 4 operations | aia not cover the = + i Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies? = sad Mr. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really. = ‘ recall. That would have been in mid~g2ey That was just = : | about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk. = ts 4 And I do not recall what the previous status was. an 7 I do recall that they certainly did ask -- _ l. = 4 - I L = an Mr. Goldsmith. It " indicates hati 104 had” ‘taps ‘on 30. ‘lines’ If it was. not™ ‘the “Sovi DSR : S27 .: satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have oN F 72; been. 24 i Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; & 4 : ne Zé Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or TA1S38 —«SERRET mt ey
13-00000 wm hee a a we ysis i - 1-141 ) Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's Operations to one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency? 8 nie kt ee rar and Mr. Scelso. - It was then. That is; the variety and ie number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other technical operations is ok) That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world wy ; | ; by a lot. ‘There is no other station in the world that has ou that good operations. Then cam fonat got to be real good. Nothing S$) like it in Europe. WASUTHGTOM, 0.0. 20024 (202) 55n-2445 4 a7 | = . - Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to a * i cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me. The cable t ta. 7 | is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by i Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he i} Keproauced from the holdings of the Nati 10nal Archive 8 HSCA (RG 223 indicated and said the arrest of Sylvia Deran would jeepordize REPHeECRS RU PLDTAG , do. U.S. freedom of action. i | = é wn 4m i a? ‘ - Do-you remember that cable? : Gia: ! Mr. Scelso. Yes. * - ; ES H Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why it was sent? | Mr. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that Oswald | 47 i i oe i might not have been a Cuban agent, afid the arrest of a ES? 2! | : wo™~ ; foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under d j international law. i Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe, nevertheless, I did not think -- Karamessinas may not have — _SEDEE BTSAOMYT TOMS
"Alphabetical and numerical listing of CLA employees, agents and collaborators ard organizations controlled, Sinanced and influenced by the CIA. ACOSTA VELASCO, JORGE, Nephew of Ecuadorean President, Jose | Maria Velasco. Minister’ of the Treasury and Minister of Government, Informant and Political-action agent of the Quito Station, , AGENCIA ORBE LATINOAMERICANO, Feature news service serving most of Latin America, Financed and controlled by the cra through the Santiago, Chile, station. . AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT INC. (LAAD). Provided cover forcra officer Bruce Berckmans, q.v. . . AGUERRONDO, MARIO, Uruguayan Army colonel and former Monte- video Chief of Police, Close station liaison collaborator, AIR AMERICA, CrA-owned airline for paramilitary Operations, mainly in the Far East, 7 ALARCON, ALBERTO, Guayaquil businessman and Liberal Party actiy. ist. Principal agent for CLA student operations in Bevador. Crypto- nYM: ECLoss. ; ALBORNOZ, ALFREDO, Ecuadorean Minister of Government Gaternal security), Close collaborator of the Quito station, ALLEN, JOHN, CIA Operations officer at Camp Peary training base, formerly assigned in the Near East. ALLIANCE FOR ANTI-TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION. Propaganda mechanism of the Montevideo station, ALMEIDA, WILSON. Publisher and editor of Poz Universttarta, Ve, B university student hewspaper. Propaganda agent for the Quito commercial delegation to Brazil and Uruguay. Recruited by the cra in Montevideo before return to Cuba, a . AMADOR MARQUEZ, ENRIQUE, Labour and political-action agent of Guayaquil base. Minister of Economy. AMAYA QUINTANA, ENRIQUE. Leader of the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), recruited in Guayaquil as a penetra- tion agent. Resettied by the c1a in Mexico, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. The US member of the Public Service International 599
MICAL FEDERATION. OF PETROLEUM AND CHE!  NORKERS cu. The rx: for this industry set up originally by thecta through the US OF Wexkers International Union. NTERNATEONAL HEDERA THES OF PLANTATION, AGRICULTURAL ~ I : LIED i i de secret: qouxens (eras). The international tra ct arate coral wodkexs. Used taythe cx for lab uroperations, = ieyEU NATIONAL EEDERATHS OF WOMEN LAWYERS. Organization . craforpeopagaadsoperations. oo, See TONAL FORICE ACADEMY. cra-controlled police acre choad quder Arm qover Bz Washington DC. Formerly the - sv erkan Polke Acadeny founded in Panama by the Panata MneRMATTONALFOLICESERVICES SCHOOL. CIA training school for I «ne Za Washangson under commercial cover. . PR PRNATIONAL SFODEEY CONFERENCE asc). See coor cosee) ‘OF KAE L UNIONS OF STUDEN , ING SECRETARIAT OF KAFIONA pipan age {RADE SECRETARIATS. A gene escri INTERN a ona tracdeasion organizations having as members the Oe coal gunwasof workrs.in a particular industry. There are 15-2 i mostof wich have been used by the cta for labour operations, Sane have bendquartess Ii Eorope, others in the US but close rela- tions maintaiacd: zich thencF¥u in Brussels. <A TIONS. SRAMSYORT WORKERS FEDERATION (ITF). The aA ereatl Gade socreauiat for transport industries. Used by ¢ ct labor ageratio é RO. 2g, S#e TOAQUIN (ACK) OTE . eae Anzsizan married to Ecuadorean. Quito agent reas cktters unuis Toroella, q.¥.. and served Sa seriber znd courke Gr telephone-tap operation. Cryp $ Se eEE IME: Welssquista leader and Quite station penetration JA , Cot SRR. Sceretary~General of the Tater-American JAURE Resicesl Laior Ongasization (ORBIT), 4-5 in Mexico City. cia a WMoniewideo police commissioner in charge of move- JAUR! ments ef w-domkid population. Montevideo station Haison ; + ES, pene. Agent of the Montevideo station used in operation to JON preak teasds spstemof the Embassy of the United Arab Republic KARAMESERES; qeoscss:. Assistant Deputy Director for Plans and later Degute Hireces for Plans. 612 KAUPMAN, WALTER 3, Chief of Mexico branch of Western Hemi- sphere Division, KINDSCHI, JACK. Cta operations officer in Stockholm using non- official cover of Washington DC public relations fiom Robert Mullen Co. Assigned to Mexico City with same cover. KING, COLONEL, J. C. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the: . DDP. KLADENSKY, OTTO. Quito Oldsmobile dealer and station agent for’ intelligence on the Czech diplomatic mission. Also the cutout to Reinaldo Varea Donoso, Ecuadorean Vice-President, q.v. Crypto- . HyM: ECTOSOME later DICTOSOMB, LABOR COMMITTER FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, Propaganda mech- anism of the Montevideo station. LADD, RAYMOND. Quito station administrative officer also in charge of certain operations. . LADENBURG, ARTHUR, CIA operations officer in Mexico City under . non-official cover. Later assigned to Santiago, Chile. LIBIDINAL, Mexico City station postal intercept operation. True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown. . LICALLA, One of three observation posts overlooking the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Names of agents forgotten. LICOBRA. Cryptonym for operations targeted by Mexico City station against the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Prd and the Mexican Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Government. LICOWL~1. Owner of small grocery store near Soviet Embassy, Mexico City. cia agent. True namie forgotten. Licozy-1, Double-agent of Mexico City station against the Ken. True name forgotten. Licozy-3. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the kas. True name forgotten, Licozy-5. Double-agent of the Mexico City station against the KGB. True name forcotica, LIDENY. Mexico City station unilateral telephone-tapping operation. True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown. LIEMBRACE. Mexico City station surveillance team. Names of team WIC OeTs BOKOOwn. LIENVOY. Joint telephone-tapping operation between Mexico City station and Mexican security service. Names of agents un- team. True names unknown. LILINK, An operation in Mexico City to provide non-official cover for 613 iswicn ait | i ud ea) . eenmabernss ©
13-00000 stitutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are eat immediately to the White House. . The station also has its own unilateral telephone-tapping ation which is limited to special cases where the involvement the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this speration are made outside the exchanges by telephone company engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging ‘ef the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as “ar as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the ‘Mexicans in the event of discovery. " Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveil- } fance are the duties of a six-man team called tiring, They obtain flight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the station and take photographs of passengers to and from com- 7 munist countries and of their passports as they pass through immigration. nym: LISAMPAN) is still in the ‘interference-complainj Stage. Another important operation directed against the Cub; sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence Wat for Stan Archenhold,{ the case officer who conceived it*RR operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban inta gence service in. their Mexico City Embassy from a person‘ _ purported to be a cia officer trying to help them. The lea@3 . purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-g leader, of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking tary leader, as a cra agent. The letters are based on informatigg “ ‘from Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the Guatemalan exile and penetng tion agent, who was closely associated with Ordoqui and Margy: Rodriguez when ali three lived in Mexico City during the laty 1950s. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligence y, though Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired contry, . . versy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE, followed. : has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio- As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations gp, {| communications equipment and is mainly concemed with Soviet/ tion, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to meg ||_ satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson, t several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his maig | who also controls another eight-man team (ctrice), similarly agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulig | equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps. miscellaneous targets. Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail-from . communist countries, but can occasionally be used to < Support Operations pondence from selected Mexican addresses, Bet eorres The support operations must also be detailed. (The joint open. As in every station, a variety of agents assists in support tasks tion for telephone tapping, LrENVOY, is effected In COoperatig || Which they perform in the course of their ordinary jobs. For @ Mexican aulner a capacity for about fory processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistane,) personnel, for example, Judd Austin,{ one of the US lawyers in couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the conn, Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm tions in the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In ad&} ‘Serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice- tion to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic mission, President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIEN VOY also coves City, Al Wichtrich,} channels political information to the station special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cardess|) that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping bs businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual whoi]} ™SD under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualification: planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the Miami Nea} ™ audio, flaps and seals, and photography. and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democrat - os , 332
that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese hada fact, been using the NCNA office for propaganda and supporti pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Cent America. Central American Exiles Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles ie Central American countries including communists and othe extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including the Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in onde to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoig repression from the Mexican government. Washington DC 20 December 1966 Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the US, its size and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether the station has some fifteen operations officers under State Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the . Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks ‘and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around fifty. Liaison Operations, Dominating the station operational programme is the L1rEMPot project which is administered by Winston Scott,{ the Chief of Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie Goodpasture,{ a case officer who has also been at the station for some years. This project embraces a complicated series of opera- tional support programmes to the various Mexican civilian security forces for the purpese of intelligence exchange, joint 524 ~erations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelli- ce collection and public security functions. : At the top of the L1TEMPo operation is the Mexican President, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,t who has worked extremely closely with the gation since he became Minister of Government in the previous sdministration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos} (1958-64). Scott had giso developed a very close working relationship with Lopez Mateos, and, since Diaz Ordaz became President two years ago, scott has been working closely with the current Minister of Government, Luis Echeverria.{ Thus the LiremPo project focuses at the top on the President and the current Minister of» Government who will be the second consecutive choice of pri faders to pass from internal security to the presidency. Scott’s chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has jis problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico City Freeman’s expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President’s preference for deal- ng with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts with the President while his diplomatic talents focused on the Foreign Minister. The problem of who would deal with the Presi- dent was confused somewhat by the Ambassador’s insistence, not tong after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station opera- tional programme, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott md the Ambassador visited the White House, where President Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing he had demanded. Since then the relations between Scott and the Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry. While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day- to-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate to Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who worked in the legal attaché’s office in the Mexico City Embassy ~ the legal attaché is usually the rei office in an American 323 ty
embassy. The rai officer had left the rai to come with the statlag: but pains have been taken to conceal his c1a employmen order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the cii§& ‘stealing’ of an FBt officer. The two non-official cover officers aig" the equivalent of an a1p Public Safety mission but in Mexico thi’: . function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mex, can nationalist sensitivities ~ as is the case in Argentina. Through” the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equip... ment for a new secret communications network to function ps tween Diaz Ordaz’s office and principal cities in the rest of thy country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security sen. vices include travel control, telephone tapping and repressiy action, > ; ‘The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Dig Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary orgy. nizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section og international developments based on information from head. quarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, ar passed to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials. These reports, like the daily round-up, include information from statiog unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authoritig in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action. . Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order te keep a foot.in the door for future eventualities. The US militay attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexiced military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received regularly by the station. Stan Watson,{ the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, ha been meeting with a South Korean CIA officer who was recenily sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean sounding for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central America Communist Party Operations The station cP section consists of two case officers, Wade Thomas} and Ben Ramirez, both under Embassy cover, pls 526 'fwo case Officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob ..priscoll,t a retired operations officer now working under con- «gract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil 40 Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organi- gations of importance, The quality of this intelligence is high, although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos Manuel Pellecer,{ the station’s most important communist party penctration-agent, broke openly with communism ‘by publishing a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (rot) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government during the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored over- throw of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico City where for years he was the station's best source (cryptonym LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America, Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propa ganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who form- ally break with communism without revealing their years of work as spies —- Eudocio Ravines,{ the well-known Peruvian defector from communism is a paraliel case. Another book by Pellecer, also financed by the station, has just appeared. This book isa | continuation of cra exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and Joaquin Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the Cuban revolution. : The station also collects information about communists from the US living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the Mc- Carthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI, which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico City (acGMc). Information collected about them includes that obiained through the Lienvoy telephone-tapping operation des- cribed below. — , ‘The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where the FBi continued operations against the local left when the CIA took over in 1947. The FB1 intelligence is of high quality. 527
Soviet/Satellite Operations The largest section in the station is that covering Soviet/sa opera ons. It has four case Officers, three intelligence asek er: ' - > At 1s headed by Paul Dillon other official cover case Officers are Donald Voselt Cn : | Besbetttion has two observation posts in front of the | mba vs " ch cover the entrances, plus a third observation i in ¢ back of the Embassy to Provide coverage of the para. € LICALLA observation post in the back is the cl houses bordering the Embassy Property — all five are owned the station. Several Stati years ago films were made of Sovi : versing in the garden, but attempts by Russian lip-readers toa cover their Conversations were unsuccessful, front ed 8, radio contact is maintained with purve ; ateet an. ee ignalling when & particular Soviet survei]. bassy, his route and other data, Pp are regularly taken from all the op’ i ‘fan lar OP's of Soviets and thei ili are Ss eir fami mente wanors to the Embassy, When visitors use vehicles, phon ee ta eno their ; plates for tracing. Occasionally is or electronic monitor} i it } close to the Embassy, but so fi kup radiata ; . ar attempts to pick y diati from Soviet ii i ° in noone re cryptographic equipment have been unsuccesc. In addition to the LIEMB i ; c , RACE surveillance team several o support Operations include coverage of the Soviets, Through a From one of the the dip amuests a raocan visas by Soviet officials, including cour addition, NSA is also monitorin moa communications systems involving ‘burst’ transmissions _ fom e USSR to as yet unidentified agents believed to be in N ico > Possibly Soviet intelligence officers assigned abroad as illegals’, with false identity and non-official cover. 328 Bardens’: losest of fig the LIEMBRAc, _ qhe station runs between fifteen and twenty access agents F ¢ the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and ibility. Several of these agents are suspected of having been cquited by the Soviets for use as double agents against the tion. Two of the most important of the current access-agents Katherine Manjarrez, { Secretary of the Foreign Press Associa- and her husband — both of whom are targeted against the “goviet press attaché and the Tass correspondent, Others are pcowL~If and LIOVAL-1.3 - ,1cOWL-I is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front ef the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends in- duding their soft drinks - rsp is studying ways of bugging a wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves. More import- got, LICOWL~I is involved at.the moment in an operation against the Embassy zavhoz (administrative officer), who spends consider- able time chatting with the agent. Because Silnikov, the zavhoz, bas been on the prowl for a lover — or so he said to LicowL-1 ~ the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait: An appropriate girl was obtained through Besaser,{ an agent who js normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers and who juns a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at LICOWL-I’s store the girl attracted Silnikov's attention, and a hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several serious afternoon sessions at the girl’s apartment nearby — obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov’s virility is as- tonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording dnd photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl. Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relation- ships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disrup- — tion by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail is refused, L LIOVAL-1] is not as interesting a case but is more important. The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquain- ted with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior "G8 officer ~ possibly the Mexico City rezident (Kan chief). Yats- kov and the agent spend one or two week-ends per month off in the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship. 329 oe areata Eat A AEP Me SORERRITES
When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow ~ he hag af been in Mexico for some years ~ we shall decide whether tous defect him through LiovaL-1, Recently Peter Deriabin,$.g well-known KGB defector from the 1950s who is now a US dg r han Operations Cuban operations section consists of two case officers, pie cis Sherry and Joe Piccolo, and a secretary under Embassy Ee and one case officer under non-official cover. An observa- and full-time c1a employee, went to Mexico City to Study dae gover voluminous reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL~1, He ¢ cluded that there is a strong possibility that LIOVAL~1 has recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the stag officer in charge of this case. Nevertheless, the operation tinues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied “ ; The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, 11 cozyj of productivity or problems of control. One of these agen Licozy-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who was ie: ctuited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who Feported | the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City Station, Hg worked for the FBI after returning to the US — the Soviet cagg officer was a UN official at one time — but recently Soviet interey in him has fallen off and the rpi turned the case back over to thé Agency for termination. . Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of operation are targeted, Access agents, observation posts, tels, phone tapping, surveillance and travel control are continuoys although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets, In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the cias has one of the Embassy’s secretaries, Until the New China News Agency (NCNA) office was closed last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite sec. tion of the station was responsible for following the movement; of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the L1RICE team were directed against them, but the most important intelligence col. lected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in head. quarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to Mexico City. Now that the NCNA offices are closed, the audio equipment will be removed and the station will continue to follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation. 530 1cozy-3} and Licozy-S5,t are all -being wound up for I gon post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the *jEMBRACE surveillance team is functioning, as well as LiENVoY u hone monitoring and LiFiRe airport travel control. Through -LIFIRB team the station obtains regular clandestine access tp the Prensa Latina pouch from Havana, and copies of corres- lence between pL headquarters in Havana and its correspon- ats throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations concerned, - oa Through the LITEMPoO liaison operation the Mexican immi- tion service provides special coverage of all travellers to and fom Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveller is photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or depar- jure cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate the Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper in- gead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that game checks can be made, In the case of US citizens, the Mexican givice obliges by preventing departure when requested by the tion. “The most important:current operation targeted against the Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the tele- phone system. Telephone company engineers working in the LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters with switches will have been cast by Tsp. At the moment, however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange. Each | time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of interference on the lines, the engineers report back that every- thing in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally atrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the wall-boxes ‘defective’ and will replace them with the bugged boxes cast by Tsp. Right now, however, this operation (crypto- 331
13-00000. ww ney saz a Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean, things like this | ; ! happened all the time? ; ; | Mr. Scelso. Planes were held for travellers who would = 7 otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and soon. 2 2 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate. ~ . a | Es | this particular matter? Fi “8 , 5 S i Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there at et : = & | Was nothing heft to investigate. The plane was gone. The : ; $ Man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left. B : : 's We had Very complete coverage of the Mexico city Airport” 3 § a and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes z 3 | happened that an important Cuban official would comé late, é 2 a he would go directly to the plane without going through = tl 3 = var travel controls. a st + : 4 = _ At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture e E 1 of him. Nobody looked at his passport. Period. io at a 7 Mr. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban FE: :3 , employees in the Airport about the man? Pn 4 : 19 Mr. Scelso. We-did—not have ank so source of Cuban © 729 | employees. We only had vein al Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of them questioned about him? “ES Mx. Scelso. Yes, this was a routine thing. We had a | 42 whole reporting set'up there with that, two of them, who t watched ‘things’ 1ikée"this: But the report from them was that the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know who Serpeey MOL96T, ALTEZSIMN ASPORTING COMFBARLY 2 Gree bie ome maredem Sa ceke, Imes See
13-00000 . Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) 744- was in operation on only four of those days. This . : Committee has not been able to establish or disprove the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those days: when there was no coverage from LIMITED because the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were not made available for review. That material was requested but has not been made available.141/ An explanation of why this material is missing was requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated ~ * that the photographs and logs “may have been destroyed es in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed material were reused to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention. "143/ The folders which once contained the production were located at the OC National Archives‘ Records Center but, w National / | according to the CIA's explanation, the folders contained production material from 1967.144/ Because the CIA has not provided the photographic production and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no precise determination detailing the effectiveness of the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made. | ; Classification: __~ a | 2508.29 nigh nee 160
13-00000 .-—— - oers eR ated tan aH Nees aso ed gee duties in this operation ranged from meeting with Fo ee EE ee ed Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted - from ClA—controlléd documents.) -54-— BN surveillance project.189/ ‘Even though Mr. Scott was the nominal case officer, the “routine case officer functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/ An American technician was stationed in the listening Brea post to maintain the equipment and to protect the Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes of daily supervision of the operation to handling the collection and distribution of the tapés and transcripts.192/ Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968. 193/ é With the-exception of the: te chnician, the listening: P post. and. thes transcriptions Come ofiethisubase (were. Pate ars eee, ER, y analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet ji94/ This listening Yi lines at one time.195/ Ee post covered up to thir } b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained [was responsible for the WH, transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a daily basis by.
Orsi gy ca or oo ei Bet hae Doe ow ET Gurl cuie+ Classification: fine a mieece (This form’ is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controfled documents.) SR, 56- at It should be noted, though, that an examination of the project files shows that Americans in contact “GEG. 6 “SEN, with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination “CRE to the intelligence community.203/ . 3. Telephone Lines Covered BLN This Committee has made an attempt to determine Penden a which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic intercept operation in September and October of 1963. The monthly operational report of this project for the month of September lists the following phones as targets of the operation: 204/ 14-42-37 Cuban Embassy 14-92-14 _ Cuban Embassy € 25-07-95 Cuban Embassy '- 14-13-26 Cuban Embassy 15-60-55 Soviet Embassy ale 15-61-55 Soviet Embassy (¢ t 15-69-87 Soviet Embassy ( f 15-61-07 Soviet Embassy ae fie ; 15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film ‘Rapresentative) The rerort notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at { the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September { 1963.205/ The monthly report for October says that. SP A ee oe ore — Classification: 7 A ee. 172
13-00000 “eaten ann sete. tate te Sy 2 Ele i (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) --71- in a chronological file.292/ One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.293/ (g) Format of Transcripts The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff produced was much the same as those of the Spanish. language transcripts described above.294/ Mr. Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/. Many of Mr.. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation “(previously transcribed)" after the meter number referring to the reel footage location of a conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this notation meant that the conversation had already been transcribed from a.tap on another embassy phone: “Previously transcribed" means, for instance, I went to the embassy first and the embassy number was 605055. Now this number 501264 belonged to the film's office. So consequently if that particular ‘call went out of the main building to the films office and it had been transcribed before, that is exactly what I would do, put down “previously transcribed". So there was no question of doing it twice. 298/ Soa RENT Beem sean
13-00000 Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) — , -~58- Od i subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in _ the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were: 14-42-37 The 25-07-95 The 14-13-26 The > 25-09-14 The 11-28-47 — The One CIA employee Ambassador's private telephone Chancery Chancery Commercial Office Consulate who was involved in Cuban operations in Mexico City remembered that there were taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ ‘It is Do possible that the-employee, Mr. Phillips, who Was “stationed in Mexico City from 1961 a fifteen-year hiatus, i As the above notes, ane files fails to support: although those files do telephone was tapped in to 1966, was incorrect, after n placing this tap in 1963.214/ xamination of the project Mr. Phillips’ memory, show that the Consulate 1964. 4. Production from Operation The intercept lis approximately 7:00 a.m. tening post operated from to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/ Classification: Or fica Katt. ow . is ay cs x i ay: : coe os — 7 a9 _ seg fais , és ex: y a - oe ° *. : om ? ‘ ? : ners Ret ae aa *y | Classified by derivation: 174 734s ‘s
13-00000° PBR a wd a Madge SAMA) (ARP Aare ss Classifications: ne Ware Ay %s fi tid GsiekSyal. (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ry | 9 E ~ 177 7 Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet > - one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have been handled in any different manner? A: It would have been in the case of dissemina- - é tion of information about him, but I do not ES think that any opérational action would have ea taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States. Q: ...how would the dissemination have been treated differently? A: Well, it simply means that we would have dis- seminated any additional information that we got. 657/ . fi ( It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not this additional information about Oswald was reported iF TET, NEI to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters. é ee sa He said: Ko. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important il- Tegal manipulations of society, secretly. ee
13-00900- - 7°00 ° Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) - 178 - pest a I do not know whether informed yourself about - an the magnitude of ourd | Program at. ; the time--absolutely WUUS. . We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of the Station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians; Cubans and satellite people. 658/ Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's | handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination | can best be summed up in Dave Phillips’ response when he was asked how he would characterize that handling: “At the very best, it is not professional, at the. best.“ 59/ V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination | A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man . Even though some people in the Station clearly dis- associated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453 from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is clear that some people still considered it possible for . some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In Octo- ber, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Win- ston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the oe hse Mexico City Station cabled Headquarter Classification: & (vd wks “ as soon as possible “copies of only visitor to 217 P Classified by derivation: STM. || ITE, TONE | REM, ENT, =o,
13-00000 ’ SECRET hh Wed From the Desk ofiLinda C. Cipriani” Ye NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira J. Barry Harrelson Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO Fredrick C. Wickham @ 00 00 oo FRON: ; DATE: 04/24/96 12:15:25 PM SUBJECT: Interview with John W. (S} Sa5aien 2 CL By 2224130 ; CL Reason 1.5(c} DECL On X1 DRV FM Hum 4-82 Attached is an MFR summarizing my meeting with Mr. Whitten. On a more personal note, Mr. Whitten is an extremely charming and interesting gentleman. The meeting with him went much better than | had hoped, but it was also rather emotionally distressing for bath Jeremy and |. Mr. Whitten broke down several times during the meeting and was obviously feeling very scared. Aithough Jeremy is sure that the Board will do the right thing here, we both agreed that Mr. Whitten is without doubt someone who should be protected even if it means going to the President. & WHITTMFR.DOC ce: SECRET
13-00000 % SECRET 17 May 1996 ' MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) 1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600, ' Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Revi Board, and I spoke with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy inh Gunn conducted the interview by showing Whitten v ocuments and 'his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to ‘the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add “anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA. After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten ‘about 1900. (S) 2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry ‘with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on ‘his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be / serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA ‘become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out ! CieSe places CO US WEN WE WEIC CO MIs artment . He made it clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any. ‘attack. (S) 3. . Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a complete rent life now i He. and his wife have lived in approximately 25 years. He is a member of i Music and art societies. He sings in a prominent cant uen s Choir. He has published various articles on music i ecialty is Johann Str He has received many medals -for his work in the arts hich we saw when we went to his apartment. (S) 4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly i out the fact that he committed perjury en applying for residency by ‘stating he worked for é believes this CL BY: (2224130 } CL REASO c DECL ON: X1 DRV FM: HUM 4-82 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) _ could subject him to criminal penalties int comexb He stated on several occasions, should his affiliation 1own, he would have to leave On other occasions, he stated that he would turn himself in to the sauthorities and offer his services as a consultant to tHe police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant. that no matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S) 5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this process and.even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would » turn out well. (S) 6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn ' about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree , to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that . Should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on ‘which to bring an appeal to the President. (S) = 2 SECRET
13-00000 : * e SECRET Interview with John Whitten (S) SUBJECT: DCI/OGC/LD/ {76124 (17 May 96) Distribution: Original - Original 1 - Registry 1 - Lit File 3" SECRET
13-00000 - . SECRET 24 April 1996 _ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) 1. On 22 April 1996, from che gek Revit 1000 to 1600, Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Revi , and I spoke with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy | i Gunn , conducted the interview by showing Whitten ‘various documents and his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be ‘useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although Whitten had in general © a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add -anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA. ‘After the interview, Mr.. Whitten took us to his apartment and ‘then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten about 1900. (S). 2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry with CIA and. the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on . his left. side.and. has. -Great- difficulty. walking = -On-a-map; hess ess ~ pointed out his apartment and indicated what. he believed to be. serious threats to his safet Should his affiliation with CIA — ‘become known WA nin a plock o hi see Ole men 8h poin 1.0 Tm O29: é then pointed-ou ‘these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it ' ‘clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any ‘attack Ss te 3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for . almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a complete rent life now inf ers ‘He and his wife have lived in approximately 25 ye He is a member of and art societies. He sings in a prominent Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music ecialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals. for his work in the arts hich we saw when we went to his apartment. (S) 4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly i out the fact that he committed perjury ——— residency by stating he worked fo € believes this various CL BY: CL REASON: 1.5(c) | | 7 an a DECL ON: X21 | . | DRV FM: HUM 4-82 SECRET
13-00000 “ - . SECRET SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) could subject him to criminal penalties int He stated on  geveral occasions hould his affiliation wn, he would have to teavd On o ions, he stated that he would turn hi o the authorities and offer his services as a consultant to thé police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the - Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no / matter what happens he ‘would never betray the CIA by telling . anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S). hes 5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him / and Gunn had stated_he would argue for hig protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and as his allies in this | process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would turn out well. (S) , 6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn a ‘believed that it was more than likely t t the Board would agree to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he ‘could to them. The Board will make its decision in (it's) next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be nécessary for -anyone from CIA to come down to that meetin We agreed that —  should-the-Board-.make..the--reprehensible » decision. of--releasing==—-——-- .Whitten's name, that we. could _not imagine a stronger.case on......... ‘which to bring an appeal to the President. (S) SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 24 April 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) “1. (On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1690, Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Revi Board, and I spoke with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy Se conducted the interview by showing Whitten v. ocuments and his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to _help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be . useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add "| anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA. After the interview, Mr.. Whitten took us to his apartment and then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten about 1900. (Ss) ; 2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry -with CIA. and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of © being vulnerable. ‘Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed : on his left side and has. great difficulty walking = -On-a map, he-. pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA e_known.__Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out eC TCE Perce” oaT partment. He made it Clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any pattack. (S) 3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for ‘almost as long as he worked for and that he has a complete -different life now iy He and his wife have ,lived i approximately 25 years’ He is a member of Various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music “(hIiS™ Specialty is Johann sexanss He has received many medals © ‘for his work in the arts hich we saw when we went to his apartment. (S) 4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly i bout the fact that he committed perjury en applying for residency by stating he worked for - e believes this Chi. BY: 2224130 CL REASON: 1.5(c) DECL ON: X1 DRV FM: HUM 4-82 _ SECRET
13-00000 SECRET SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) could subject him to criminal penalties inl He stated on several occasions, should his affiliation become Known, he would have to leave| | On other.occasions, he stated that he .- would turn himself in to the authorities and offer his services as a consultant to €he police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S) ’ 5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he ' felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and(/as his allies in this process and even stated that he had a wenderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would turn out well. (S) . 6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree - to-protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he could to them. The Board will make its decision in Gt's) next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be nécessary for anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that should the Board make the reprehensible decision.of releasing - Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on _ which to bring an appeal to the President. (S) 2 SECRET
13-00000 e MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRET Eleanor Neiman — 20 November 1995 FROM: SUBJECT: Per_our telecon, here is a copy of the cable that came in on Friday { from Vienna} Re REFERENCE: i a an ee cen ne a re y poe Document displayed with Header, Body, and Footer zones SS Edit cable Categorize cable Print this cable : \ \ A \ CATEGORIES: | | ROUTE SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT ) fi ROUTE COMMENTS: a / j / } ie: 7 ay / on a / oo SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT an oe — a ToT man REF: fa. DIRECTOR 493642 95 2040015 / ¢ Be DIRECTOR 493658 95° 2040060 | TEXT: 1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI. _ _ _ == — ho ’ i : if Jf ee oe We ete eee NOV 14, 1995 - SECRET
13-00000 be SECRET I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF THE LAW. HERE ARE SOME REASONS: _i..-I EMIGRATED TO) JT USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY > “MY OLD FRIENDS IN HIGH “PLACES WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR, EVEN MORE, DIED. USTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU 2.0. A \ i. PERSONALLY KNOWN TO REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2 POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN. WE ARE WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA. WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME? C=: —- — oe we cee neces TT Oe IS FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVE é EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS. UNDER LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL LICENS YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD. 4. I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE “DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS. 5. IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA, WITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING, ETC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983. BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT. APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED. 6. MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE. 7. I REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME, I WANT TO APPEAR BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT) AND MY ADVERSARIES. I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU. I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO, FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME. I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE. SECRET
13-00000 _ ‘SECRET _a. 9. I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND IMPROVEMENTS. IF I LEAVE, I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS. OUR LAST MOVE TO }VIENN COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREIGHT AND INSURANCE. ILL NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF YOU EXPOSE ME, BUT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS. I AM A RETIRED MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR. 10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY’S DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGAT INGEGERMAN gar POW'S, WE PROMISED -WOULD-EVER-LEARN THEY HAD—"“SPILLED" ; tR-GUTs;*— ‘ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST. BUT ALMOST 25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS (THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE "ROOM CONVERSATIONS," TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN - INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING ‘LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT "COCKFOSTERS" MANSION. NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES ALL UP. IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION, THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER, SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO GET COPIES OF THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS: . THEY DID IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SOQ SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT, IN ACUTE REVULSION, THEY STOPPED LOOKING. iI ASSUMED THEN THAT “EVERYONE” HAD “TALKED,” WHICH ‘IS TRUE. il. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZER ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A STROKE IN DEC. 1993. I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY 1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT . SIDE. THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN | TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP, WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG. IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILL BEGIN A. 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T VERY WELL LEAVE FOR 20 WEEKS. ; YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE. OF MY ATTORNEYS. I WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS. . WITH BITTER RESOLVE, (SIGNED - REF B IDEN) 3. REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO. PUT THE ABOVE INTO "CABALESE," BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT. NONETHELESS, REF IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED: . SECRET
13-Q0000 , 4 oe ‘ a SECRET i. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL eel . PRIVATELY TO} “WOVERE FUR HIN NOW DEAD. WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND DEPORTATION. 3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL. 4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE If IN| HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO 21, AND OWN FARES. 5. SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN 21. 6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE ASSASSINATED SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY GETS | THREATEN TAC. DEON CATT J i we Pd 7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES, TERMED "DESK OFFICER," OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO, HIS WORK WAS SABOTAGED BY ANGLETON WHO WITHHELD HUNDREDS OF BEST FBI REPORTS AND CONFERRED DAILY WITH FBI WITHOUT PRESENCE OF SUBJ, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS. 8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING. . 4.-_FILE:_ 785-120-034. CL BY: 618711} CL REASON: 1. -§(¢) DECL ON: X1 DRV FROM: HUM 4-82. END OF MESSAGE SECRET cc: SECRET
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13-00000 of , eee INTERNAL USE ONLY k, i SAW SUAL IN es APY Novis Cannan * A SUBS HAS PRE WRITTEN Pt ER Zo REASONS? SBS HAS Em 1GRATE f PUGH OFFICIAL NERE wd —— COVERED FOR Hiat VOW DEAD, WOLLLD FACE SCANDAL. TRIAL, JAIL, INP DE POR TATIW. “ 3. be bs PROMINENT IN LacaAL MuUSsie CIR CL LE 5 LA DIO, TV nwa POLITIC 5 | Os SCANDAL POTENTIAL, % SUB/ INVESTED 30 THOUSAND DILLARS /N API” AND WOKLD LOSE CT IN MURRILO OE PARTURE , PLiKs EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS To Z4, AND OWN FAR ks. J, SUBs Now 76 HAD CRIPPLING § Feu ICE DEe 93, WIFE ALSO 7S ABLE TO CARRY OW BECAUSE STORES, B/S, POST OFFICE DEWTIsT, docraR, MROC OG IST of au 7 DUPLICATE ries [WN 4h, 6, SUBJ WOLLD BE ENDANGERE D By ISLAM te GROUPS HERE Who AAYE ASSASSINATED SEVERAL (NCL. OWE ElPy COUNCIL EMBpssy Wy METS S$ PAREAL FEAUNG PHONE CAs O~ ANb PULITAR y, GREAT i | | 7 O 4 Bd HPs 7 EST. VIED OeeLy CEEORE House OFFICER, OwN ROLE MIN bee ALTHG Puy 1A CHARGE OF AGENCY INVESTIGAT) THEN DLO HIs L/aR TION BY HEL mus
13-00000 © WITH FBI WIT Hout PESENCE OF SUBS, ALL iN FLAG RANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS, %. SUB) AVERS HE WILL NEVER TORE ATL py Te EXPOSE AGENCY, EVEN (Ee ban Ere ix DO Wiha DENY, EVERY THING %
13-00000 Subj: Gn Scelso testimony Date: Octi2 TueSun 19961995 18:46 EDT ~ From: 74030,.3022eCompuServe.COM A-From, 74030.3022@Compuserve COM (ed dolan) To dickkovar@aolcom (Dick Kovar) Dick, this is what Chuck Briggs requested. Date: 06-Oct-96 02:36 EDT From: [The name of this person is unimportant] Subj: Ex-CiA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination F ire By Michael Dorman (c) 1996, Newsday The chief CIA investigator of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has testified that another high CIA official - noted for seeking conspiracies - disobeyed orders in repeatedly conferring with the Warren Commission shortly after the murder. The witness also said a colleague once told him that the CIA official, the jate James Angleton, “has ties to the Mafia.” Almost 33 years after the assassination, the identity of the witness, who held various top-secret CIA jobs, 1s considered so sensitive that federal authorities insist on withholding his true name. He is known only by the alias “John Scelso.” While Scelso testified before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978, his 192-page testimony was kept secret until now. It has just been sent to the National Archives by the Assassination Records Review Board, a federal . agency that screens assassination documents and makes public those that do not endanger national security. oceiso's testimony, which criticized operations of the CIA, FBI, Secret Service and other agencies, likely will renew debates, especially. among conspiracy theorists, on the assassination and how {it was investigated. when Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 19635, Sceiso was chief of aCiA
13-00000 18/8/1996 America Online: Dick Kovar Page 1 branch responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the CIA chief of clandestine services and later the agency's director, placed Scelso in charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, a counterintelligence official with close ties to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, “immediately went into action to do all the investigating,” Scelso testified, criticizing the move sharply. “Helms called a meeting at which Angleton and a lot of others were present and told everybody that | was in charge and that no one should have any conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present - which was violated from the word ‘go’ by Angleton, who dealt with the FBI and the Warren Commission and (warren Commission member and former CIA Director Alien) Dulles himself, .. Angleton ignored Helms’ orders. | tried to get Helms to make hin obey and Heims said, “You go tell him.’ ” Angleton, wha died in 1987, spent much of his career searching for conspiracies - belfeving that there was a Communist mole in the CIA - and was presumed by other CIA officers to have tried to press a conspiracy theory on the Warren Commission, The commission found no evidence of a conspiracy. Angleton. was fired in 1975. Years later, a mole was found - Aldrich Ames - but he had entered the — CIA after Angleton’s dismissal. At one point in the 1978 House testimony, committee attorney Michael Goldsmith asked, “Do you have any reason to belleve that Angleton might have had ties to organized crime?” “Yes, replied Sceiso, who 1s now retired and lives abroad, government sources Said. He said the Justice Department once asked the CIA to determine the true. names of people holding numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was hiding Las Vegas “skim” money there. “We were in an excellent position to do this and told them so - wh ereupon Angleton vetoed it and said, ‘That is the bureau's (FBI's) business.’ " Sceiso said he discussed the situation with another CiA officer. “And he smiled a foxy smile and said, ‘Well, that’s Angleton’s excuse. The real reason is that Angleton himself has ties to the Mafia and ne would not want to doubie-cross them.’ ’ On another subject, Scelso gave Kennedy conspiracy theorists a slight plece of
13-00000 10/8/1996 America Online: Dick Kovar Page 2 ammunition. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, was Known to have told investigators. that Lee Harvey Oswald - identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's assassin - was not a Soviet agent. But Scelso said: “| later heard that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level. That information was imparted to me by CIA officers.” — Based on the information CiA headquarters had on Oswald before the assassination - chiefiy that he had been in the Marine Corps and defected to the Soviet Union, then returned - Scelso said he saw no reason to pay him special heed. “Oswald just Seemed ta me to be a small-potatoes defector,” he said. But he conceded that significant information about Oswald - known to CIA agents in Mexico City, for example - had not reached headquarters before the assassination. it dealt chiefly with Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City and his attempts to obtain a Cuban visa two months before the assassination. Scelso said the information failed to reach Washington because of Simple overwork and bureaucratic delays in the Mexico City office. He revealed that ail the outside telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban embassies were tapped by American agents and that calls Oswald made to them were recorded. After Oswald was arrested, Scelso revealed, agents compared audiotapes made while he was in custody with the wiretaps and determined that he was the same man who had visited the embassies. Distribution: “ To: j. dolan » 174030,3022] Dickford Cohn > [76226, 1572] men ane a ne H@ad@rs ----- nnn nnn reer From 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM Tue Oct 8 18:45:41 1996 Return-Path: 74030, 3022@CompuServe.COM Oo Received: from arl-img-4.compuserve.com (arl-img-4.compuserve.com [149.174.217.134]) by emin09.mail.aol.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id SAAI2122 for <dickkovar@aol.com>; Tue, 8 Oct 1996 18:45:40 -0400 Received: by arl-img-4.compuserve.com (8.6. 10/5.9505 15)