6 Croodigyan EX Z_ INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 1. of 6 aa Lae ra CENSITI, INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN WES EEE a , Wumu UU ts PILE: Date: May 27, 1975 Time: 10:00 a.m. , Place: Goodwin's residence ,~#BSe@e@nd* St: NW (cX3) Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton OBJECTION TO Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America | CIA HAS N , DECLASSIBICATION AND/OR Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton RELEASE F THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED a ven Sy During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter TION TO on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of q8 THIS 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Su. « of Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After Go working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White BRE + House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late in 1965. 1. Assassinations: In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as- sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro, someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant HY 50955 DBocld: 322761592 Page ? Cr
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page _3 Of ¢ the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of tha sort might have been passed by the Special Group. t Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA. The United States had seedngly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart a factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. On the military side, Walters*was brought from Rome HW 450955 to keep a contact with the. Brazilian military. How much further Walters' activities might.have extended Goodwin did not know. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Teoh Vor, 2. (Retain class’n 1 Change /ctassify to, . Cl With concurrence of oO Declassify In part and eel oT Pky -‘Docld: 32281892 Page 3 ¥PC/HDR by
INTERV{EW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 4 of ¢ : “S DEPARTMENT ¢ on. OF RUE CD kite Gee ta Retain class’n 7] STATE Be Change { 5 4 * Te & fi With concurrence ge/classity recess FILE: of Qi Declassify Cin part a 8? CIA Activities in Chile: \pid he) | “7182, BF shown O, Ste. Lyall { ; EPC/HDR by $ "+The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conserva tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were genera statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democrati political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the a ‘s a . +4 Christian Democrats fin | elections, but Goodwin did not know now ch __| bey pyrene ee me a Chilean election was the most intensely.,watched elec . tion’ ‘im.Washing LRT (fton “singe the 1948 Italian campaigny From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem so. 4, Changes during the Johnson Administration: Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy-- Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less-.about covert) actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin ‘American policy, although the President did become active in the two crises-- Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States’ policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support i HY 50955 DBoctld:3227681692 Page 4
HW 450955 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY . Page 5 Of 6 FILE: for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled Be pe } by Johnson's” assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated" in the Caribbean. ~The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after hey. | became President. 5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency: When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American. objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency ‘was some- thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police throug AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, [| the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to. power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support. BDocld: 32276816929 Page 5 : re