trons {fees POPS WAR ® PALL ¢ Fe Pa ese HOEY rai , ; : ¥ 7, Bara 1m e@}: ' +b ~ +p TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY The Chairman.. Would you please state Mr. Tweedy. Bronson Tweedy. The Chairman. Mr. Baron, &ra you geing to commence the questioning? Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have the counsel? Mr. Tweedy. I am. Mr. Baron. You are appearing voluntarily today without counsel? Me. Tweedy. I am, Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that vou have the right at any -cpoint to cease answerina questions in ordar to consult with counsel? Mr. Tweedy. IT am. Mr. Baron. Are you finally aware that all of your Consti- tutional rights are intact before the Committes, including vour Fifth Amendment rights? Mr. Tweedy. T am. Mr. Baron. Mr. Twesdy, the Committesa has been informed that wa have gone over your tastimony on thea Lumumba case in some: 3 detail in two sessions, one today when you raviewead soma docu: ments that wa obtained since your firgt examination. And 1 would like to baqin by reading a quotation from your first ! examination before you had saen these documents. TOP SECRET
Prone {Aree 202} 344-6000 Weet @ PaUL aoe | ae, : At page 30 of the: tranaeript of your examination on September Sth, I would like to agk you whether today's review of documents has changed your answer to this question. At that tima I asked you: “Do you have any knowledge of a messenger from CIA Headquarters having co go to the Congo to provide tha Chief of Station in the Congo with inetructiona to carry out the assasaination of Lumumba if posaible, and alse provide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination, namely poisons and medical aquipmant for administering them?” You said, “No, I do not.” Later on in your testimony of that. sama session when you ‘ware asked your opinion as to tha truth of testimony we had + received from Dr. Gottlieb -- axcusge me, from tha Chief of iad rer * x * * Station, who was in Leopoldville at that time, about a visit : Gottlieb, when asked your opinion about the truth about the ed that he received from Dr. Gottliab; where the Chief of Statior. testified that he received poison and instructions from(Dr. — a . testimony of thse Chief of Station, you responded that “Thare is nothing in my experience with the Agency that would really bear On that point whatsoever." And thet waa at paqe 39 is your trauscript. Have your answers to those two questions changed in liant of your review of the documents today? Mr. Tweady. t heave not had a chance to raad the transeris? of my first testimony. As you know, If started raading it this TOP SECRET
Prone (Aras 202) 9446-4000 WARD & FauE § : morning but did not get a chance to get through it. There seems : to ba something incomplete with that answer of mine, however, thera is no question in reading the documents that I read this morning,which I had not seen in the batter part of fifteen Years, that @ man did go out from Headquarters and was provided with material which you mentioned and had a discussion along these lines with the Chief of Station. Ha did not, however, go out with instructions to the Chief of Station without further reference to Headquarters to eet about &ssaasinating Lumumba. Mr. Raron,. Tn your answers that we hava just Teviewed in your first examination, you indicated that you had no knowledas aoe . . 4 of a mission by Dr. Gottliab to the Congo and that thera was od = nothing in your experience in the Agency that would really bear on the question whather such a mission was undertaken or what the character of it was, Has the review of the documents today refreshed your recollection to aome substantial degree? “r. Tweedy. What T wes cartainly trying to say the firse time, and TI repeat it, I said T had no recollaction of fir. — ~ a Gottlieb goina te tha Congo, but if the Chief of Station saic v4 ! he was thera, I was perfectly prapared to balieve the Chief of Station. T have now reviewed thase documants, I recall the etreum- : Stances in which thesa things occurred, and there's no question TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 2027) $44-6600 WARE & PAE SPS ee et eee ae dre mena tng Meek gmt ‘ that Dr. Gottlieb went to the Congo, ay I was merely telling you, at that time, what I cuoula remember, and there was an awful lot that [ did not and do not. Mr. Baron. To move to the period when you ware Chief of the Africa Division and Richard Bissell was NDP in the sumrer of 1960, did you have conversations with Richard Bissell where the subject of the assassination of Lumumba arose? Mr. Tweedy. Yas, I did, In fact, the first conversation, ag I recall it, that I ever had on the subject.was one he initiated with me, and, as f think 1 told you, % do not recall exactly what was said, but there waa no quastion about 1¢ but what Mr. Bissell was saying to ma was that there was agraamant., policy aqreamant in Washington, that. Lumumba must be ramoved from the position of control and influence in the Congo or that the Congo was going to be in serious trouble and thus Africa, at that atage of its development; and that among the possibil- ities of that elimination was indeed assassination. In terms of the detail of that conversation with Mr. Nissell, I really cannot. go any further than that. This cartainly was the qist of it. Mr. Baron. Was Mr. Bissell any mora specific at any with you about tha policy level where the consideration to 4sS8agsainate Lumumba had bean male? ‘gr. Tweedy. No, Sir. Tha most authoritative statement o: that was @ cable that went out to the field from the Nirector, TOP SECRET
7 Mr. Dillee, which implied to me there was policy agreement in Washington. When I say policy agreement in Washington, X cannot! Prone (aves 207) 544-6000 be more specific because I naver knew any mora specificity. : However, it’ was perfectly clear thet the Agancy falt that it had some sort of policy consensus in Washington about the need for the removal of Lumumba. When I gay removal, I mean by whatever means; this does not necasearily have to be confined to assassination, a political way of doing it, or anything | eles. Mr. Baron. It did not excluds assassination? Mr. Tweedy. No, indead it did not. Mr. Baron. You are referring to the cabla of August 246¢h from Allen Nullas to the Chief of Station in the Congo. tec WARD & FAIL you sean that cable shortly after it was sant? Mr. Tweedy. IT suspect, aqain I cannot ba sure, I suspect that I saw it when it want out. At this point, I could not evan tell you. On instructions, I might even have drafted it, this seems odd. If might have done, or had a hand in draftina it, I do not know. It was basicaliy Mr. Dulles’ cable exporas- sing to the Station the tyna# of authority that he had to pass such a message to the field. I cartainiv would have geen it on its way out. Mr. Baron. When vou spoke to Mr. Rissell, either in the first talk or in any Subssquent talks -- The Chairman. Whera is this cable? TOP SECRET
Their ss °: : TAN “ se : “3 be iehite “ * t . oa x na ; a Mr. Baron. Tab 2 in the Senator's packet. The Chairman. Thank you. Proce (Areg 2077 Mr. Baron. Im your talka with Mr. Bissell, where the : 4 ! " 1 ! t i subject: of the assassination of Lumumba was raised in any fashion, did Mr. Bissell move from this general information to you that the subject had been opened at very high levels te asking you to procesd to explore means to qetting access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him? Mr. Tweedy. The purpose of his conversation with me was | to initiate correspondence with thy Station for them to explore with Headquarters the possibility of this, that is assassina- tion, or indeed any other means of] ramoving Lumumba trom power. In other words, the purvose of the] exercise was to tell the MARCH & PAU Station what Headquarters had in mind, civing it some idea of ’ the pelicy hackground of it, and than to have the Station start reviewing possibilitias, assets, and discussing tham with Headquarters in detail in the same way *hat wa would with any overation, whether it was as sensitive as this, or less so. It was, in other words, the initiation of quite normal operetional dialogue hetwean Neadquarters and the field, apart from the fact that it was an unusual subject. Mr. Baron. At soma noint after the serias of conversatious with Richard Bissell, die you have a conversation with Sidney Gottlieb ‘about a mission that ha was to underteke in tha agen Conge? TOP SECRET
Imre (Aras PO?) 946-6009 “ 3 4 * a c £ ¢ 8 ‘asked you to speak | to Nr. Gottlieb and giva him this asaiqunent’ : : SE Ee Pp. Ak eek Mend J m4 Mr. Tweedy. 'y was certainly reminded of that in this correspondence, as I think I told you in the first instance. “4 . If Gottlieb, went to the Congo, there is no question that I would | have seen him bafora hea want. This traffic makes it perfactly clear that I did. The actual content of that conversation is no more Clear to me now as is revealed in this cable traffic. On the other hand, I do think that is the qist of it. Mr. Baron. You are referring to the cable that appears in Tab 3, 4 cable of September 19th that you signed and Richard Bissell siqned and dispatched to the Chiaf of Station in Leopoldville telling him that!Sid from Paris, & man who would en, announce himself as Sid from Paris, would be coming soon to ~, ” | Leopoldville to explain an assignment to the Chief of Station. Mr. Tweedy. That is correct. —_ The Chairman. _Sid, from Paris baing Dr. Gottlieb?, a 2 _' Mr. Tweedy. Yas, sir. Mr. Baron. . As wa discussed earlier today, you do have "a recollection of setting up a specially restricted channe! of communication by this cable which would hold all communications On this operation: to the wyas Gniy of the Chie’ of Station, ls that correct? i Mr. Tweedy. , Yas. This was dene immediately after my first discussio:, with Mr. Bissell. Mr. Aaron. Po you remember any instance where “Mr. Risse!) x . ’ TOP SECRET
Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. My assumption would be that he would have had the first conversation with Dr. Gottlieb and quite routinely have said, now you talk to Mr. Tweedy, Chiaf of ‘the Division, before you go out. Mr. Baron. Would you assume in thds normal course of operations in the DDP at that point you would have spoken to Bissell before you spoke to} Gottlieb jabout this mission? on Mr. Tweedy. Inevitably, I think, I think} Gottileb|was in “eseerepenee— i. . ne effect sant by Mr. Bissell. He was not sent by me. jMr. Gottlieb, . wwe rot I think ipr. Gottlieb was, at that tima, an assistant to Mr. | be ‘ . ' Bissell. He was not my assistant. I would not have sent him. Mr. Baron. As bast you can recall, what instructions did you give to Dr. Gottliab when ‘you, mat with him? : i . P; Mr. Tweedy. This is very general, but | think it covars Pl ? 4 * a cs) * « 8 it: to assist the Chief of Station in his operational plannins for this particular purpose, Mr. Baron. Would that plannina have included Planning for the assassination of Lumumba? Mr. Twaady. Specifically, I do not think Dr. Gothlieb i would have bean there to discuss Constitutional means of over- throw of Lumumba. fle was there for one purpose only. fle was a technician. He had this material with him. lie was thus to act, as [ think, a technical advisor on thease matters fo the Chief of Station. I do not think he was to be there as a general operational advisor. That was not within his competence, TOP SECRET
¥ ? * & e fe] & « g ates Ba ipesakids es aa ai Ese eh apa it i x ‘ By hs wee his training, or anything else. Et would not have been his assignment. Mr. Baron. What did you tell! pr. Gettlieb about the source 4 | of authority for this mission? fH H i Mr. Tweedy. Io am not sure I told him anything. I assumed that came through Mr. Bissell. Mr. Baron. I will reprasent to you, as I did earlier today, ‘ that Or. Gottlieb testified that in his conversation with you | Nigga RES . you indicated to him that you were giving him this miasion on » the authority of Richard Bissell. Would that be consistent with tha way you operated at that time? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Tha only thing that is wrong there is " the use of the varb ~~ I was not sending him to the Congo. He | routinely checked, probably on Mr. Bisseall's instructions, with ma, Chief of the Africa Division. He had already bean given a his marching orders to go to the Congo by Mr. Riss@ll, not bv Mee . me OY Mr. Baron. You would assume thatj Dr. “ottlieh had a Rossi - Beparate conversation with Richard Bissell, where Richard Risse?) told him, it is time for you to qo to the Congo and delivar a lethal material and a cartain set of instructions to the Chiet of Station. Mr, Tweedy. 1 cannot assuma what was said in such a couversation, but that (Dr. Gottlieb talked to Mr. Bissell befor: wa TOP SECRET
12 y he want to the Congo is without question. I do not know what ‘was said. I assume the general outlines of the purposes of ' Prone (Ares 207) $64-6008 j him going to the Congo were discussed, and I would be diacussina i them with him in greater detail. Mr. Baron. Turning to Tab 6 of the Senator's books, I‘m refarring to a cable we. reviewed this morning iasued on September 27th by the Chief of Station and sent to you, Eyes Only, at the CIA Headquarters where the Chief of Station indi- + * . ‘cates that he contacted Gottlieb on the 26th of September and they were on the same wavelength. Mr. Tweedy. Which one is this? Mr. Baron. This should bea marked number 6, Mr. Twoady. Oh, yes, excuse mae, 4 3 « s a 2 8 « 5 Mr. Baron. It begins, "Idan Ref contacted 26 September.” In this cable, the. Chief of Station indicates that he had had ' two talks withiDr. Gottlieb. He and (pr. Gottlieb. had been - - - considering a list of possibilities as follows. In paragraph 3 at the bottom of the next paga, the Chief of Station says, “Plan proceed on basis priority as listed ab¢ve unless instructed to contrary." And paraqdraph A on tha first page was Chief of Station's top priority plan which related to racalling a cartain agent from Stanlayville and having him taka rafuqe with Midq Prothar. The cable Coutinues,* “would thus act 48 inside man to brush usp 4 details to razor edae." TOP SECRET
4 > ¢ ry 4 ¢ & 4 $ Having reviewed this cable early this morning, is it your understanding, Mr. Tweady, that Big Brother refers to Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. Yas, I do. Mr. Baron. That this was a report from the Chief of Station to yourself informing you that the top priority plan would be to recall an agent from Stanleyville and ask that agent to infiltrate the entourage of Lumumba where he could assess the possibility for poisoning Lumumba, would that be your under- i standing? $ Mr. Tweedy. Fvantually, when @ number of other stens had takes Place before and thay would, for example, have incluced . a discussion between the Chief of Station and this aqant which ‘would have mada clear to the acent what this was all about. At this stage, he had no idea of lt, and our saries of , exploretory cables between oe and Headquarters outlining the degrue pe his name I) accass to the entouraga, what ha-found out and whether any of this basically bore on the feasibitity of tha operation. Mr. Baron. This was ore of a sarias of cables whera the Chiaf of Station was reporting on his attampt of finding means of access to Lumumba for the purpose of nmoisonina him? Mr. Tweedy. Throudhout this whole period, the activity of the Chief of Station in corraspondance with Headquarters was exploratory. 4ry, Raror.. What was being axplorad was the means of access TOP SECRET sel
a Pe wake 1 | ¢o Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him? 2 | ! | | ! | ' | | i i i ‘ : Mr. Tweedy. That was one of the things that was being axplored. The other thing explored and constantly under review was the whole situation of Lumumba and were there other alter- natives. That does not appear in this particular cable: it appears in others. Mr. Baron. Turning now to Tab 9 of the Senator's books, this is the cable of October 7 which you received in the Fyas Only channel from the Chief of Station which indicated that | coventen had departed from Leopoldville for America on the to a . Sth of October, and it says: “View expiration date his ‘materials. However left certain items of continuing usefulness. * Guthman" -- which-is a pseudonym for the Chief of Station whom “ we have been calling Hedgeman ~~ "Guthman plans continued try implement op.” Does that indicate that you received a report from the Chief of Station that he would continue to trv to implement ' “y this operation against Lumumba even aftar Gottlieb had left x the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. He would continue to explore tha posaibilitics of this operation and continue to report to Headquarters. That is all that this maans. It dows not mean with the disappearance of ‘Gottlieb he would try te pull off the operation without further reference to Headquarters. Tt just maans 4 continuation despite the TOP SECRET
Mrone (Area FO? $44-4008 WAEaD & FRE Dtpants 4 B10 bey % 10 ‘that it was ‘increasingly apparent that all studying Congo disappearance of Gottlieb and his materials that the Chief of Station would continue to examine the possibilities of carryina this out. Mr. Baron. He wags to continue, in your mind, at least up until the point where he had determined there was a feasible means Of assasainating Lumumba? Would that be correct? Mr. Tweedy. I would put it more broadly than that. I would say that he was to continue to explore it to determine whether or not thera was a feasible maann. Ne perfectly wail could coma to the conclusion that with the hardest work in the world that he could ses no way to do it. That. would have bear a perfactly acceptable conclusion to Headquarters, bacause a decision would have to be made professionally. Mr. Baron. Turning to Tab 12 of the Senator's books, there is a cable that you ssnt in this Fyas Only channel to the Chief of Station on. October 15th, which is tha week after” Dr. Gottlieb | ae - meme had left the Co:go. In this cable, you are saying, you ara ” referring first of ail to another cable sent on the sama dav that was not sent threugh the Fyas Only channel, and then: reassuring this Chikaf of Stetion that footy CAK, which is 2 need 0 pacudonym for Lumumba, is it not? ¢ Mr. Tweedy. It is. ism: a - e ‘Mr. Rarow. That FauROA K was still a stumbling block ani TOP SECRET & ee a
16 situation closely and his disposition -8pontaneously becomas number oné@ consideration.” In the aacond paragraph, you told the Chief of Station: Phone i fees 207) 544-4008 “Raise above so you ara not confused by any apparent duplication,” referring to the other cable. "This channel remaing for epecific purpose you discuss with colleaque &lso reamainge highest. priority.” I- ; “3 Was the colleaqua that you ware referring toiDr. Gottliah? he ort ae nee! Mr. Tweedy. Without doubt. Mr. Baron. What. did you mean by disposition spontanaous!-? Mr. TWwaeady. The Fuglish of tha* cable, ag I maentionad morning, is absolutely annalling. What I am actually saying is, wharevar you talk to people « * a ry = « g like wa did with the French, as I mentioned in the next sentenc: fh or anyone is studving the situation in Africa, thay all came ' up with the same conclusion, that there was to be no solution . to the Congo with Lumumba still in powar,or in a nosition of overcoming it. Mr. Baron. To summarize what we discussed this mornina, : despite the suries of cables and the indication here that Lumumba's disposition snontaneously was the number one consi-iar- i ation and highest priority. You are still maintaining that the Chief of Station was not amnowearad to qo through with assaSSination without checking back with Haadaquarters? ‘tr. Tweedy. That is correct. TOP SECRET nance
Proce (Aree 2021 244-4000 4 2 * a « & & «< £ Mr. Baron. {i have no further questions at this point. (Whereupon, Senator Church left the hearing room.) Senator Goldwater. Mr. Tweedy, hew long did you serve with the CIA? Mr. Tweedy. I started with CIG on the lst of May, 1947 and served until March, 1973. Senator Goldwater. You have had experience with intelli- gance gathering agencies all around the world, I assume, or i most of them? Mr. Twaedy. <A considerable number, yes, air. Senator Goldwater. Is it common practice in intelliqance agancigs such ag the CIA for a lot of people to know about everything that is going on, or am I right in assuming that there are many things that you do in the Intelligence field, particularly the covert fiald, that the man sitting next to you may know nothing about. Is that corract? Mr. Tweedy. That is correct, sir. Compartmantation was very heavy in CIA. There were a qreat many thinds going on that. 1 osever Kiiaw anythina about and do not know to this day. Senator Goldwatar. Is that not in your experience the most successful form of intellinance sathering? Is that the British practice? Mr. Tweedy. Thea only way that you can run an intellioenc:: organization, in my view, is internally. Senator Goldwater. You have b@en with the CIA actually TOP SECRET
WARD Aw FAK sees ‘ ray Ajay bares ~ ik VARIG Oda Bt TD tee ET TOP SECRET 18 Since before its conception. I want to ask you, and of your expariance, what you think as a professional of the men in the CIA, Man and women? 7 Mx. Tweedy. 1 came away from a careasr in intelligence in March of ‘73 with rather strong convictions. I might preface my remarks here in answer to your question, Senator, by saying I was in intelligence during the War, I was in Naval Intelli- gance. This was not OSS, but I was in intelliqencea. [ft also datermined me, if thea circumstances permitted, to make a earear of intelligenca after the War, and after the difficulty of making the right contacts and so on ard so forth, eventuall. it worked and I snent a2 career in CIA. I have two vary stronqd impressions of that exnarience. Ouse of tham has to do with my colleagues, the personnel of the Agency, who I found to be a remarkably telanted croup. The second was, and it was something that I think all of us were basically proud of, the esprit de corps was at a vary high level and resulting from esorit de corps, as it usually doas, discipline was aqually of a very high level, and it came quits naturally, this was sot a matter that hee to be inculcated ee: dSeates inte junior officers, it came quits naturally beacause this was quite clearly the wav the organivation was run, and basically, we were proud of it. TI have never reqrettad for 4 second my cargar, and ft am very proud of it and my associations. TOP SECRET
Panne (arte POF) 344-6000 “ ‘ ry 4 c @ € g P: | 19 Senator Goldwater. Are you still close to the members of the CIA, your old friends? Mr. Tweedy. Obviously I have a great many friends who are still serving. This is increasingly not the case ag retirements are catching up with my colleagues, but If do keep abreast of Agency affairs to the extent I can. I do not attempt to inter- fere with them. At thelr request, I did a consultation job in- the Agency this summer. It's the first time I was asked to do I was very glad to do it. I found it interesting, stimulating, I was glad to be back. I do not necessarily expect to do it again. However, if they askeact me, I would if i I thought I could he of any help. Senator Goldwatar, Have you ever known of any actions or activities to be taken in a precipitous manner in the CIA? Mr. Twesdy. That is a vary broad question, Senator. not quite sure how to answer it. As in every organization, I have certainly ‘seen decisions ' taken and actions implemented that miqht hava bean better considered. This includes me, and there are a number of things that professionally IT would have dona differant if © had heen giftad with the hindsight I have now. But on the whole, IT would say the mark of thea Aqdancy was not ircasponsibility. Sanatior Coldwater. I askad that, hacause the attack on the CIA is probably tha satronqest T havea saan in my life in TOP SECRET
Crone {Aves 207) $44-Gex88 ~ 3 4 « a a & ri 8 PGA ehle P EDL wipe : politics, and I cannot follow the idea that such a serious undertaking -ag an assassination, ragardless of who the tarcet might be, would bea a subject that would be dreamed up in the ‘ locker room at some lowar level. Those decisions and other ‘| covert decisions, in my epinion, have to start someplace, and they do not start at the bottom. Mr. Twaedy. I would agree with you, sir. My experience in this particular case -- the only one of its kind that I have ever had any experience with -- indicate axactly what you say. I naver felt at any time that. I was onerating in a policy vacuum. I never had the impression that any of my seniors felt that they ware either. Senator Goldwater. That. is all the quastions [I have. Senator Huddleston. I just have a few questions. What is your concept of the term higher or highest author- Mr, Tweedy. Hicdhest authority was a term that we used in the Agency and it wes gerearally recognized as maaning the President, and I would like to make myself quite clear on this, lis this context, thet although, as ? said a minuts ado I never felt that To was in @ policy vacuum or that the Agency was, l have no idea of the context in which policv was passed to the Agqancy on this. [ate not know whether tha Preaident personally played « rele, wheather he vleved a role and passa’ the inessade to thes “ational Security advisora or the Secretary TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares P02) $44-G6680 3 « cS 4 & g « g ese ate Bivate ESE * a iret ae m= Rt of State or whoever; I have no idea. I merely felt that the concensus &t the policy levels of govarnment ware that Lumumba must go and that discussion of the feasibility of assassination was at least part of this. 1 cannot to any furthar than that. Senator Huddleston. Do you recall baing told specifically that thia operation had the approval, or was, in fact, the policy of the highest authority? Mr. Tweedy. No, sir, I do not recall that. Highest authority was normally used in cable traffic, so wa did not havea to say the President. I do not recall thet tha word “highest authority” in connection with this particular oneration was usgad., , Senator Huddlaston. tt is not an unfamiliar tearm? f¢ was used during your experience in the Aqancy? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, certainly {t wags. [t was somutimes necessary for examole, that Headquarters would coma to the and say, you will understand, I'm not talking about this Operation, but just generally, vou will understand, that in a matter of this kind, it will require the apuroval of highest dguthority. oad normally tais meant in my mind, Overseas, the 40 Committees or its several equivalants, most of which decisions Were referred to the President. That is baaically what it Medaint. TOP SECRET
g Prom (Avaa 202) WARD B CAUL Soe 4 oe A1O ty es Senator Huddleston. What types of action come to your mind when the instructions come down that a certain individual must be removed or possibly eliminated, or whatever form of instructions may come? Mr. Tweedy. This is the only case that I personally was | ever involved with. What we wera talking about was the removal, | by any means, of an individual, and, ag ! have tried to make Clear in my previous testimony, this involved the launching of the idea with the field so they in turn could make the proper operational explorations into the feasibility of this, reporting in all detail hack to Headquarters for quidance. At j no point was thea field aqiven carte blanche if they thought the~ 1 had found a way to do the job, just to carry it out with no further referenca. So it naver occurred to ma or anybody else in the position of the Chief of Stetion in Leopolidville to fael * that he had that kind of delaqated authority. Senator Huddleston. Removal would include all the way up to assassination? Mr. Tweady. Wa are now talkina about in this specific Case, yas, sir. Senate. datlllestio.. You hag. lack of understanding? Mr. Tweedy. We had no lack of undarstandina that Haad- yuarters wanted this explorad. At no neint did Headquarters ‘ever say to the field, ha is to be assassinated at all costs. It said, it is important he be ramovad. Amonda thea tools of TOP SECRET
‘ a a a £ < g Fintan os i wen Ua removal is assassination, you will explore it and report. Senator Huddleston. Is it common within the Agency, that } instructions of this natura be handed down in oral fashion from | the Director to the Daputy Director for Plans to the Station | Chief? Mr. Tweedy. Not the Station Chief unless you actually ask the Station Chief to coma back. Senator Huddleston. A cable would have to be used? Mr. Tweedy. Or send a massenger parsonally out. Normally on something like this, as it happened in this case, Mr. Bissell talked to Mr. Nulles and Mr. Nissall talked to me aud he did not sit dow, and write a memorandum to ma, T am virtually a hundred percant Sure. Senator Huddleston. Is it your belief that participants in thease kinds of discussions had very explicit understandings about what each was talking about? No possibility, virtually no possibility that thers would be a misunderstanding as to what tha instructions ware and what the Limits were? Mr. Tweady. Really the only veopla that wera suriouslv involved with this Were in the fisid, the Chief of Station: if you are talking about oparational detail, myself and mv deputy, with Mr. Bissell included, to the extant that. he neaded to yet into th. onarational detail. On that score, [ would sav no misunderstanding whatsoever, Senator Nuddleston. “Mr. Rissall’s communication wlth the TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 207) 544-6009 &@ avr VeRO TD Lowy stems FEO THON « SEW eat Street arn) eatentetntte DBS oe 24 Director of the CIA would be such that they would have no “TOP SECRET | | misunderstanding? | Mr. Tweedy. I always agssumsad so, fir. Obviously, again, ' I cannot comment specifically. Sanator Huddleston. Given their experiance and their knowledge of wach othar and the knowledge of the operation -- Mr. Tweedy. Thay ware vary closa parsonally, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, and Mr. Dulles had parsonal affection for him and enormous raspect for him, intellectually and professionally. Senator Huddlaaton. Even the communication batween the National Security Council and ths Niractor of tha CIA who was a member of the Council, if was not likely that thare would he» & great deal of misunderstanding thers between what you really are talking about, although thera is no written order? Mr. Tweedy. That would have been my assumotion, Sanator. Senator Huddleston. Sunator Schweiker? Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Twaedy, in the August cable that Allan Dulles sent to Chief of Station, he started out with tha words "In hiqh quarters here.” What docs that mean to you, "in hich quarters here”? Mr. Twaedy. The policy level. As I say, I cannot necessarily gay it included a spscific conversation with the Prasidant, pe certainly, is my view, would have involved the National Security Council, the advisor to the Prasidant, Secretary of State. TOP SECRET
SLE ate oh Se REN i SND SU a ER ae ‘ v f Seg rah Sean 25 I mention the Secretary of State, because later on in the cable, | r.Dulies .says to the extent that the Ambassador desires to be i consulted, you may seak hia concurrence. Mr. Nulles was perfectly content to have thie discussed with the Stata Dapart-~- ment in the field, i.e., the Fmbassy, if this should prove to be necessary. Sanator Schwelker. Mr. Bissell tastifiad before this Committee that °din high quarters here” maant the Preaidant to him. I assume that you ara not as convinced af that as Mr. Bissell? Mr. Twaady. I do not think it a question of conviction. was closer to the policy level than I was; he would have a bett«1 | feel for this than I would. He never explained to me what the PF] 3 « a 4a 6 @ t g * specific policy level decision was. He was the one Executive Director who would talk directly with the Nirector. Conceiv- ably -- I do not say he did not, and I do not say he did. "He i omay even have talked to the senior mambers of the government ; I did not. Senator Schweiker. Ha also testified that the further part of thes paragraph, consequently we conclude that his remeve3 that ramoval meant assassination. Dess that or does that not concur with vou? Mr. Tweedy. It does not concur; it would refer to assas- . BSination but not exclusively. Senator Schweiker. It qoas on to say "We further authorivs TOP SECRET
pine Prone (Aves 707) 4464-6008 WARD @ PRU axpanditures of up to $100,000 to carry out any programa which you do not have the opportunity to-consult. Please advisa.* Dows that not mean to you, hare is $160,000, do with it as you want, you do not have to consult if you do not have the opportunity? Mr. Tweady. This ia certainly the way it would read. I read it, and I think I read it at the time, when you are talking about that kind of money and crash programs, what you are talking basically are political action type programs, not assasaination type programs. Senator Schwaiker. Of coursa-: Mr. Tweedy. The beginning of that. paragraph says, “Hence wy wish to gives you wider authority,” et cetera, et cater, "including more aqgressive action, if it can remain covert.” Senator Schweikar. What does the tarm mean, "Mors aggressive action? How aqqrassive can you get, even more agqressiva, "including éven mors accressive action, if it can remain covert” meaning if you can get away with it. Mr. Tweedy. Correct. My own beliaf is, because quite Frankly I cannot recall what this had specific refarence to -~ my belief is that this hed reference to general political action along the linas 0° mounting successsful political operations against. Lumumbe, whrr is the sort of thing that would! cost 4 lot of money. TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 : a « ry @ ¢ e « g Fi ged bg ag PK: what you know about the business, would he have conducted himself any differently than what you now see as this case? Mr. Tweedy. Not the slightest. He would consider himself disciplined organization, a servant of his chain of command member of the organisation and not receiving some direct from the President which, in affact, would have made him to go out and do anything he Pleased, Mr. Kirbow. Ia it not the paramount situation, the non- attribution type situation, was the only thing that he coulc undertaky, that it could not be attributed to tha United States? Mr. Tweedy. That was inherent in 41] of the correspondance on the subject, our intercourse in tha fiel@ on this. | thii this makes it amply clear in something like thir, on attridbu- tion obviously would be vary important. The other was Just. plain feasible access. Mr. Kirbow. Thank you. Mr. Smothers. As I listen to the tastimony hers, we mar not ba terribly clear on what would have happened had our Chin* of Station come up with what he considered to ha a feasible ple... How would he have communicated a feasible nlan back to you? “re, Tweedy. Thronah this chanel. ‘yr. Smothers. What would have happanead if vou had racniy for example, the messaqe from him that we now have a feasibts TOP SECRET
Bone (Aros 707} $46-6000 a > « a e fe] £ rt g Plan for the removal or the killing? Mr. Tweedy. I would immediately hava shared it with Mr. Bissell. After that, I can only speculate what would happen and I know Mr. Bissell would have talked to Mr. Dulles. Where it would have gone from there, I just cannot do anything more than speculate. I do not think that would be very helpful. My duty was quite clear. 1 was charged up the chain of command. I would probably comment on it onerationally to Mr. Bissell. I would say, professionally this seems sound or professionally 1t do not agree with it. Mr. Smothares. It is your assumption that it would have Wne UPD wVen beyond Mr. Nulles, your assumption from your vear of work with the Aqdency? Mr. Tweedy. T think that would be fair to say, but that would depand so much on the understanding between Mr. Dulles and the policy levels of qovernment to which I was not privy, 1 really cannot comment substantively on that. Mr. Smothers. I have somes problem in looking back at the tu8timony, your previous tuystimony -- which [ realize you have not had a chance to raview. The gist of what you say on nate 34 of the transeript is that this opsrerion against Lumumba was Garteinly something, thet was so extraordinary that vou woul | have qoue to bed and sot un thinking about Lumumba -- T use your words hare -- vet at that. time your recollection was certainly not as clear ag it was from a raview of the documents. TOP SECRET
GEN ESUS Ry eceteevestecscesaseeretarers SURED Sa Ry neath 2 Be raat 33 + = * ee x & AVAL BWYIAESEP 7 7 ye ye bay ' In your experience, are we ‘talking about this activity i being an axtraordinary situation? Mr. Tweedy. The only one to which I was ever axposed of ‘dts kind. Mr. Smothers. In terma ~- the only ona of its kind, you : mean the only one involving an assassination? | Mr. Tweedy. Let us be quite clear; exactly. I was never personally involved in any conversations about a specific assassination at any other time in my career in the Agency, nor wag 1 aware of any other, so this was the only ona that I personally had any experiance with. Mr. Smothers. After looking at the documented evidence, your mamory i8 sow much better concerning your own involvemant BARO & CHUL in the cable traffic. Mr. Tweedy. In the spacificities of it, Mr, Smothers, yas. In tarms of the general role I played as Chief of the Africa Division, thera was naver any doubt ahout that, but the specificities of this. reallv -- E had forgotten, as ft told Mr. Baron the other day, for wuxampis, that there was 4 period when Lumumba was actually in the hands of the U.N. had just foraottan. I had not ramemhered that Mr. O'Donnell had been asked by Mr. hissell to assist the Chisf of Station in this oparation until Ll was reminded of it. I'm afraid that's my frailty. Nut that is -- my conscianca, howaver, is quite clear, but TOP SECRET
of the position of the govarnment on the thing, that at least the exploration of this, or possibility of removing Lumumba from power in the Congo was an objactiva worth pursuing. Mr. Schwarz. Including killing him? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. I suspect I was ready to consider this. Schwarz. That was an objective worth pursuing, right? Mr. Tweedy. Getting rid of him was an objective worth | purauing, and if the government and my betters wished to pursue professionally, I was parfactly willing to play my role in yes. Mr. Sewharz. Looking back now from tha varspactive of 1975, do you think the United States shoul) continue to eanter~ a 3 € & € c & a F * tain assassinations of foreign political laaders? la: Mr. Tweedy. J have navar thought that assassination 1: 1L i most cases was anything more than a mugs game, for the simple te fi reason that. I do not think in most cases, becausa I think er » @xceallent case could have been made that the early elimination of Hitler would have saved us all a hell of a lot of trouble. 2000! But that was an almost uniques case. Most paeonle do not contre} a¢ situations totally within themsalvas. T think Mitler dia, i egies, I Know gomathing about that. 2 Nats In other words, I don't think anybody alse would have Steet ht continued if Hitler had either had a heart attack or tlisawieag: + i think the thing would have foldad. S10 8 st In most cases, I think wa kid ourselvas that gatting rid TOP SECRET
Fatwa DE Pag “TOP SECR of -- Henry II said, “thia turbulent priest is in effect, take 2 care of the issue. i? Preme (Ares POT? $44-200R Having to do it all over again, it would be my strong | recommendation that we not get into it. I was never in any 5 doubt whatsoever about it on a professional basia, because there 6 alwaya was a possibility that the Soviets might try this kind 9 of thing on what I would call a professional basis. 8 Mr. Schwarz. What do. you mean, professional basis? 9 Mr. Tweedy. Get at our sources, or Conceivably avan 10 | getting to staff officers, this type of thing. 1 was never in 1: any doubt whatsoaver that to engage in anything like this, if ; i the Soviats should show inclination to do so would he totaliv ‘ . é 1v |) non-productiva. k le Mr. Schwarz. You mean having a war back and forth between 14 ! the two intelligence services? ’ 2 16° Mr. Twaedy. The only reason I mention it, services have 1; | done this. The Soviets certainly have done it with some of }@ their own operational aqeunts, and other services hava done it. i We had a couples of conversations in the Agancy, | remember quits T000 + Oe. informal, if the Soviets evar startad a qama like this whethsr we yrae, it would be worth rataliating. tT think we all aqraed that the sn we oar wi) 6@nswer would be no. Two can olay at this :qama, and there would bea no and to it. In fact, of course, it naver has happened, to my knowledae, eote BER Paar Nrseet SE end tape lh: | TOP SECRET
Pa > 4 ry a Qa g € ER .Wamer stem, OC 2o008 4210 teret Stemet sf Mr. Schwarz. What was so special about Lumumba that | justified killing him? Mr. Tweedy. There was nothing special about Lumumba as ‘ & Person. Mr. Schwarz. In that sense, you would distinguish him | from Hitler, whom you did say was special as a par son? Mr. Tweedy. No, let me try to answer your question, which i has to be answered mora fully than juste discussing Lumumba. Tha concern with Lumumba was not really the concarn with Lumumba 48 @ person. [Tt was concerned at this very preqnant point in tha new African development of the effact on the ; balance of the Continent of a disintegration of tha Congo, any ‘ 41¢ was the general fealing that Lumumba had it. within his | power to bring about this dissolution, and? this was the fear i that it would marely bea the start -- the Congo, after all, was , the largest gsographical expression. Contained in it ware enormously important mineral resources. Africa as az whole, the Congo itself, is adijacant to Nigeria, which at that point _ was considered to be one of tha main hopes of the future stability of Africa, and if the Conno had fallan, then the Chences wera Nigeria would be seized with the sama infection. This was why Washineton, after the point the Western worid was so concarned about Lumumba, not because there was something unique about. Lumumba, hut it was the Cenqo. Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever consider in your discussion of TOP SECRET
WARD & PAWL Oc. 20005 Cas tengtasn, Stee. SE BLA d cont one of the sine qua nons of this operation was that the American. l ordterda that we were never able to achiave. thie subject what effect it would have on the United States' position in Africa if it were to be known. the policy makers in Africa sat around thinking about killing Patrice Lumumba? hand would be totally hiddan, which was, amongst others, a Mr. Tweedy. Policy makers in America? Mr. Sehwarz. Yas. Mr. Tweedy. Indead wa did, which wae one of the reasons, Mr. Sehwar2. In fact, it is probably something that is not possible to achiave, is it not? Mr. Tweedy. It is nevar possible to achieve anything with 100 percent assurance, no. Certainly you can achieve profassions!} results with a high deqreea of assurance, but you can never ao further than that. Nr. Schwarz. I have nothing further. Senator Huddleston. I have nothing further, and @ vote ig on. uct? Am I to understand that Senator Church is coming back or tar. SGhwarz. JI did not have that impression. Senator Huddleston. We will recess at thia time. {Whersupon, at $:19 o'clock p.m. the hearing concluded.) TOP SECRET