THE WHITE HOUSE POP SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTON EYES ONLY November 12, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba l. Ivrefer to your interest in hearing more about the Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of ' Cuban machinery. 2. Attachedis a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted ‘for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5 would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald is now conducting. . Thave not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting. (As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While.I do not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached memo, they indicate that Iter? Wes: approved. My own strong recollection of the feblouueie from the meeting was , that Items 1 through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious - problems concerned Items 6 and 7. 3. Iassume that you still want to hear a status report on the - Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today andl will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup. ?, ' %Ithink this operation is probably too far down the road to stop, 3 if indeed we do want to stopit. Im any event, you will be able ~, ,. to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives “ Zhis status report. . : . . as Gordon Chase a t, ° ‘ “Lg, oot Came at OK Pe? Fin Hsin TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY. Copy” oan $2 fundan Ro lahasan “Vhvar oe HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 140
( ; | ema een Fee erates ae, ve : Snasinmmmneeeeenne ee — cen AN ee at ee ee ee o TOP SECRET | | April 7, 1964 Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Propram Against Cuba : rn a cn . i U.S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision ata o higher level. The present covert program is designed in support of a general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Gastro, accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in fact been held up for various reasons, and itis now important to decide whether or not certain substantial anc expensive activities - Should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, or (d) abandoned. Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories: ME, edt 1. Coliection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and exes filtration of agents-and covert supply of agent operations. at f —rRecommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this pro-~ \ “XL vr ,uesram be continued, vy , ye we cot . \ aa Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low~risk forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the \ ,j-~, regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc. \ EZ Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued with regular review of their operational guidelines. 3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selec- tive economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban »/> economy. , / Ye Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be cox- / tinued, ; : . / 4, Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential ee dissident elements near the power centers of the régime. SSF ' aS * = * Wi Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con- wa tinued. OP SER a ne a tg Ny dundon 8. fohnsen Library WW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 141
ey © ue) oA by OQ ee] ts oe A tu ’ 5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and detection, Programs of this sort involve possible overseas WA Sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating - Uv >. elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food). Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued. 6. ClA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before \>, authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons. . “3 Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom- “mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties. 7. ClA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile groups operating from Central America. These groups wiil begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them. Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments. seg ae mah wet Se Nagy HY 50955 Bocld:32423566 Page 142
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ‘HE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON March 4, 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY | SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba, 1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons, ‘DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluc- ' tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced. On this one, Iam inclined towards the DOD view. 2, Pesticides - The CLA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange to have diluted Cuban pesticides, State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange. Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched. I don't like this one either. 3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE, While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY a Copy” (> Lvnden B. Johnson Library HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 143 77
( TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Mr. Bundy . -2- March 4, 1965 attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com- promise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop ald to Artime?). , State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the: small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (2) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are ''good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked, I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; lIagree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off, 4. Keating Gimmick ~ Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might _be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing. . x ; While Iadmire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con- traption. Iam against it. 5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD. that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up againina very short space of time, EC Gordon Chase SO Copy ; | / - Lyndon B. Johnson Library. HW 50955 Bocld: 32423566 Page i144 Ree ee
4 * fons s S . \ TOP SECRET ~ SENSITIVE ; 12 November 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY (| SUBJECT: Policy foward Cuba In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the Inter - departmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the JCS. In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square Dance, !' I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on "Just! international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could under-~ take such operations without having our role discovered and resulting in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if "Square Dancc'"' were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid and control would be increased. As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I nderstand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend, “however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration of ‘Square Dance! at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals, we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment, a 2 fh. Do [KP ng aoe R.‘C. BOWMAN NN TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE | Cony ‘ Lyndon B. Joamson Library HY 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 145 Pp -
. ize ; tod H ‘ Tra cif CFFICE The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, TOP SECRET THE SECRETARY INFORMATION COVER OF OF Sires and woauchos - d disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, cus- vy, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security sn cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) red *y number above. to regulations, i | i i i | of \ NAME iden- Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shall sign and fill in the information required ATE . pate REMARKS AECEIVED RELEASED (lodicate portions and at! of documenis read) i Lf, Lv | 6 Ears i 5 Prd wm im meagan: Seaman tet HY 50955 1Sy FHEYEOLS EQETION TOP SECRET INFORMATION Docld: 32423566 Hy 5 CF THIS FQaM AVE CASOLETS, (hen attachments are semoved, thia race ba ungciasar fied) 6459933 COVER SHEET oe Lyndon 8B. Jonnson Library Page 146 20 ne
o¢ cme SP eg EP ae ila Moe NS HS TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE copy No. JCS 2300 /ereeL | DISTRIBUTION G 30 October 1964 ~ rd ages © - 8, incl. | SQUARE DANCE (JU) - Reference: JCS 2304 /244 1, At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreved the recom- mendations in paragraph 12 of tnis report, - 2. This Decision replaces page 2, Holders are requestvec Lo substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised white pages 3 and 5, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy tne superseded pages in accordance with security regulations, 3. The memorandum’ in the Enclesure, tegether with its Appendices A, B, and Cs was forwarded as JCSM-942-64, ae dated’ 9 November 1964, to-the Secretary of Defense. 4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of | 4. S matte jee the Marine Corps in th , tne provisions of Titie 16, oO Pollowed. S Code. 141 (c)lLapplied+and wer Gen. Wheeler (C/JCS) Gen. Burchinal (D/JS). 007 Gen. Johnson (CSA) | Gen, Manhart (VD/JS).. 00 | Adm. McDonald (CNO) | Adm. Davis (DD/T7S) we... Gen. LeMay (CSA : Adm. Mustin J-3) 5 | Gen. Emrick (J-5) Gen, Anthis (Sacsa we oom HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 147 a “a
POP SECRE tT TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE SQUARE DANCE (U) THE PROBLEM 1. Po respond to a memorandum*™ by the Coier of Starr, US Army, to consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President that the United States rw ff covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2, On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in. responding**5 to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cube ; 6 stated that the President would be advised of any new and. 7 promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure & Oo upon the Cuban regime. 3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent 1c a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding. a di study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime ie by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The Chie? LS of Staff, US Army, wecommenced shat the Joint Staff accomplish 44 interagency coordination on the study proposals; and that 15 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it 16 by mer morandum to the President, informing him that the Joint LT Chiefs of Staff support ‘the conclusions and recommendations 18 of the study and consider that the outline program therein 9 provides.an adequate framework for the development of detailed 20 supporting programs and plans for participating agencies. , eae “4. on 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered 22 the -recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and agreed 23 to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preperation 24 of a report. - a 7 BE “¥* Attachment to JCS 2304 Sit /2ty coreg ee Bnclosure to JCS 2304/218- -3 oo ~ Copy” Lyndon B. Johnson Library | POP SECRET - SENSITIVE J-5 2308/2443 3. HW 50955 Docld:32473566 Page 148
HY 50955 _ Docld:32473566 Page 149 ; ee I / . ‘ : eee * TOP SECRET ~ SENSITIVE . 5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented with a briefing on the study and discussed some of the issues of the proposed actions. DISCUSSION 6. For discussion, see Appendix A. | CONCLUSIONS 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. . 8. The. proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and merits consideration by other appropriate governmental agencies as another option, in concert with other actions, for causing the collapse of the Castro regime. 9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are possible political consequences which could result from proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed. 10. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for _Cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter- agency c coordination. 11. The study should be forwarded to ‘the Secretary or Defense “for referral to. the Interdepartmental Coordinating Com mittee for ‘Cuban affairs for comment and recommendation preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Starr . | | 7 ~ RECOMMENDATIONS ie, It is recommended that: a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Ap ppendices A, B, and’ C, waich reflects the above conclu- - Sions be forwarded to. ‘the. ‘Seoretary: of Detense, ‘yaion B ‘Johnson Library, JCS 330li/auile ae or uO: ip SECRI ST a. Oo CON HW WY 10 ee rf WwW }-2 Ov
HY 50955 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE b. This paper NOT be forwarded to tne, commanders of unified or specified commands. c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities. d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. Action Officer: Captain J. 0. Sherman, USN J-5, Extension 78926. 7 Ep . Copy 7 oe “Lyndon | 8. Johnson, Ai brary TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE | SCS 2304/244-1 Cee BN 6 - | : Docld:32423566 Page 150 a Vee ‘. . sO Be Or STG a8 mh or WwW & WwW -
| HW 509455 Docld:32473566 Page 151 om, Fa TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ENCLOSURE DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Cuban Actions (U) 1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in respond- ing to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Castro regime. é2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a study which exanines. world sugar economics and the vulne abilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an outline program which would undermine Castro's economy, deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated 1965 Cuban sugar production, by introducing aerially from off-shore, a sugar eane plant paresite, Bunga. ° Subsequently, the economic and political disturbances” caused by this attack could be exacerbated and ‘exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, ana directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems. “GROUP Le oe uve Ballot aa AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADE ie DECLASSIFICATIO ‘ver iB. Johnson Library | TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - . Oo , JCS 2304/244-1 | ee GY a Enclosure ae Ms) RT. yee 7 “TO! Do Sas
HY 50955 Py GTR VIG “4 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the » ultimat se US objective coward Cuba iuust be to establish a governnent in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. The concept of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert £ means would furnish ancther option to the United States in bringing abouts the collapse of the Castro regime. kh, Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the possible political consequences from proof of the US involve- ment in suca a program, they believe that propogais related to the expansion of US influence over the world ‘sus rar market, the stabi ization of the free market, and the covert intro- duction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consid jerath Other forms of attack or opoged in the study.mignt be taken subsequentiy to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence. Additicnal discussion is provided in Appendix 5. It is recommended that the attached draft memorandun “ (Appendix B) and study (Appendix ¢C) be forwarded to the interderartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban ‘AL fairs for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a yasis for consideration of further recommendation by. the Joint Onders of * Start. . ne . Copy ‘Lyndon B. ‘Johnson Library” EOP Sucker - § Enclosure 0 wee (Revised by. Decision -) 9-Novermber 1954) es worn iD. Se Ss te fi $ LO? SEC ww Docld: 32423566 Page 152 a iy Be oe .
= poy — “es WZ AS oe ee ater ra TOP SECRET APPENDICES A, B, AND C (6 pages) _ m (Cone Lyndon B. Johnson Library” TOP. SECRET - SENSITIVE 2. . JCS 2304/244-1 0 8 . e appendices A, B, ‘end © ge a ms 1 wo a * L ny . * , . eo iia. ~ se we _— a eee: ay oe OPS SECRE HW 50955 Docld: 324273566 Page 155 oe ‘ . .
POP SECREX TOP SECRET - SENSTTIVE APPENDIX A CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK. COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY 1, The ultimate success of the proposed program would 1 depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic 2 controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices. 3 it would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual A production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of , 5 sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of " convertible currency as it had before the program was 7 undertaken, The arguments and rationale in favor of the tS) economic proposals in the study appear to have validity. 9 However, world economics is a most complex subject and 10 involves many variable factors, The important points on Li economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate Le agencies in the government having responsibility for such 13 matters. ; Th Ce Assuming that success of the actions of the cutline 15 program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this 16 would net assure the downfall of the Castro Government, opr Lv that if it did fall, a government friendly to the United 18 states would be installed, Russia has too much at stake, 19 politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime 20 for economic reasons alone, Success of the proposed actions el would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro oe Government and would be an additional means of exerting 23 pressure against that government. eu. Copy Lyndon 8. Jonnson Library TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 1 fonendix A HY 50955 DocId: 32423566. Page 154 1D ;
aoe, _ yy Bo ai iy ee tt aes ny [La so ada ct aon TOP SECRET —~ SENSITIVE 3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by 1 the study, The approval for implementation of such a 2 concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war 3 methods and would require a major change in national i policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the event of discovery. There is also an obvious political risk associated with this proposal, Should any credible 7 evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political 8 loss to the United States would be great. Quite apart - 9 : from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence 10 of the United States in international organizations such il as the United Nations and the Organization of American le States would be impaired seriously. © . 13 4. Nevertheless, it. is the responsibility of the Joint 14 Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the 15 President apprised of the capanilities of the military 16 establishment. The subject study presents measures which 17 should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after 18 coordination with appropriate government agencies it wouid 19 represent another option for positive actions against the co Castro regime, ——- | | | el 5, NSAM 213¥ datea 8 January 1963, established a 22 committee to coordinate the management of all aspects 23 of US policy toward Cuba, Tne President looks to tne © eu Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs 25 for the effective coordination of the execution of policy 26 decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses eft of action, The subject study should be referred to this _ 28 committee for the n cessary coordination preliminary to 23 reporting to the President. ' | 4 = 30 Copy * Enclosure to JCS 2304/4yndon B. Johnson Library TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 2 Appendix A eye ey ERI TT ae HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 155 if
AOD errnrT rand icin testeen Sarto PO: Roper uN - SENS IT LV i fo mm a tek St DPR AD Oh ore -~ - we ~ mig pe tnt den 6, The Joint Chiefs of Starr have a responsibilicy ore) ney we A » ete ary eS ee te a? Been Pa 7 “ ” ey tn provide military advics to the Comroqder in Chict and the a ee yey aa Te ~ - 8 mot nad Le ns, 4 = * 4 a an Secretary of Defense, It is appropriate, therefore, what a matter such as the vrovezals under consideration, sc sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommencation that the stucy be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for coordination and comment as a botig for considerstion of further veconmendations bir thea Joint Chiefs of Sterr, | Copy Lyndon B. Johnson Library TCP SECRET - SENSITIVE 3 HY 50955 DBocld: 32423566 Page 156 {O ff WN ON oO?
(C3 EDS are oo HSS bey Hi la io) I w ty Q rH i ca te tA i~ te] is te APPENDIX B DRAPD MEMORANDUM TOR THE COORDINATOR, IN'TERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN AFFATRS Subject: Cuban Actions (U) 1, On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed “1 the President that they would continue to review the problem 2 of putting addit ional pressures on Castro and that the 3 President would be advised if any new and promising courses 4h - of action were uncovered, ) 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on 6 the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attack- 7 “ing the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world 3 sugar market and tne vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry, 9) and proposes a phased interagency program which would: 10 a, Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by 1 approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1966 12 production level, 13 bp. Expand US influence in the world sugar market 4 by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate 15 the free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses, | 16 3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in L7 the study are within existing or attainable military capa- 18 bilities, Several actions are proposed. Key among these 19 is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite 20 against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce el gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly Ze disavowing US involvement, 23 Gaour 1 DY, : EXCLUDED FRCM" AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING Lyndon? BECJowHsont rue brary TOP SECRET - SENSTTIVE A Appendix B HW 50955 BDocld: 32423566 Page 15? fi wba ay ST retain ea
HY 50955 : ‘ay ae S i ‘" 2 i i a POP SECRET ~ SENS TTS 4, Mindful of the risks stbending such actions, whe Joint a Chie®s of Stoff have reviewed the oroposals ‘of the sturdy and 2 Lieve that they offer an ootion for exerting new pressures 3 egainst Castro. They believe that provosals releted to the dy expansion of US influence over che world Sugar market, tne 5 stabilization of the free market, snd the covert introduction 6. of Bunga into Cube, merit serious consideration, Cther forms ¢ of attack proposed in the study might be talen subsequent Ly 3S) to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence, S + 0) omierded nerewith with a request tra te che outline program of cr ne Me © the concept and actions proposed in Ae) the study be coordineted by your committee with other mtovern~ mental departments end agencies, Upon completion of your 13 review and coordination, it is further réquested thst your 14 bet wi comments be made available to the Secretary of Defense and bes ON tne Joint Chiefs of Staff. Copy. TOP SECRED - SENSITIVE . oy Lyndon B. Jonnson Library. (Revised oy Decisions ’ Noveswber 1°S4) Docld: 32493566. Page 1535 5 : ‘ us
Pea se Cie ol Py sla Qo LQ iba: TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE APPENDIX C Army Report on SQUARE DANCE (U) (See Attachment to JCS 2304/24, beginning on page 6 of the white attachment) Copy Lyndon B. Johnson Library TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE 6 | Appendix © HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 159 7} Pe CE a
: lee a te | | TOP SECRET. TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE. oo. COPY NO. ae oo 2 DISTRIBUTION. G “NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES bo. the HOLDERS OF JOS 2304/2kM-1 os Report by the J-5 - FIRST CORRIGENDUM .. At the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations. - R. C. FORBES J. E. MANSFIELD Joint Secretariat . UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ist Coorig to Jcs. 2304/2e44-1 ( : . . are SED et 73 ST JF a HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 160°
Ig -@Q- 2-h TOP SECRET — SENSTIVE * c el July 1975 INVENTORIED: hy 3h MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF SUBJECT: Inspection of Classified Documents at LBJ Library Related to Covert Actions Against Cuba FROM: Loch Johnson Among the many documents which I examined at the Johnson Library in bm Texas this past week is one that I find particularly alarming. JI wish Lo draw it to your attention. The document in question is from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated 30 October 1964. The subject is a proposed covert action against Cuba, with the code name SQUARE DANCE On 21 March 1964, the JCS responded to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba by advising the White House that any new promising courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be brought to the President's attention. Apparently their first bright new idea was SQUARE DANCE, outlined in the 30 October document (attached). The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by intro- ducing aerially from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called Bunge. The program would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of antici- pated Cuban sugar production (see page 6) and within three-to-six . years the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved. "The we economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be Bae exacerbated and exploited," continues the JCS memo, "by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and direct- ing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems" (6, emphasis added). In sum, SQUARE DANCE "would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime" (7). In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCE proposal, the memo notes that ~ the approval for implementation of the program “would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy.” Indeed it would—or at least one hopes we have not used such methods before The proposal is nothing less then a variant of germ warfare which would have had serious consequences for the civilian population. At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE concept. It may never have been implemented at all, even partially. (The covering memo written by Bowman, an NSC. staffer, to Bundy suggests that the White House was skeptical toward the idea.) To me, though, terse — HY 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 161
2 the mere writing of this kind of proposel is a reprehensible first ste toward the worst kind of foreign policy mischief. I find it even more repugnant than contingency plans for assessination. These are not the kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the White House from the intelligence community. The agencies must have a better sense of what is acceptable policy, legally and morally. As in the Huston Plan, the White House was confronted here with a series of illegal and un- ethical options. The result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic death for the major plant and animal life in Cuba. The feeble efforts of the CIA to direct assassination attempts against Castro pale by comparison with this Army proposal for covert action. Pp T believe SQUARE DANCE deserves our attention. If assassination is unacceptable, surely too is the widespread destruction of plant and animal life through covert germ warfare. Somehow (probably through hearings and restrictive legislation) the Congress must drive home the point that there are legal and moral limits to American foreign policy. These Limits may not be easy to define, but we must try. Wote: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference a is made to "possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food)." The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSC staffer) indicates that’this proposal received Presidential backing. ' t 2 HW 50955 DBocld:32423566 Page 162
HW 50955 ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS: Castro Newspaper accounts report that prior to the . April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA either directly or chr/ Robert Maheu inlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli in organizing assassination attempts against Castro. The first attempt on Castro's life was on or about 3/13/61. The first attempt used poison and it was hoped that with Castro dead,the invasion planned and executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success. There were five more attempts made on Castro's life after 3/17/61. The last was in late February or early March of 1963. Allegations(from Newspaper sources): 1) The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to == organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro. 2) Johnny Roselli headed several missions against through Castro from late March or April 1961 / late February or March 1963. 3) That RFK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it. “es an 4) Rosetli recéived poison capsul/ from the CIA which he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro Docld:32423566 Page 163
HG 0955 (2) f4, contt.] before the Bay of Pigs. One of the Cubans was related to one of Gastro's cooks. 5) The assassination was intended to take place before invasion the planned Bay of Pigs/in order to insure that CIA operation's success. 6) The CIA has extended services to Giancana which included a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas apartment. 7) Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA agents William Harvey and James O'Connell. 8) Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly with Cuban Refugees: 1. Roselli 2. Maheu 3. Hunt 4, Liddy 5. Glancana 6. James O'Connell 7. William Harvey Questions: 1) Who was COS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963? 2) Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals to determine if there were any Castro intelligence agent information? Docld:32423566 Page 164
(3) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on Castro's life? If so, how was the situation handled? In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and positive step towards the success of the invasion? Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by Cuban nationals? Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters made known to the agency by the Cuban nationais in advance? Did the CIA ehear such actions? Was the CIA aware of Roselli's actions? Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of ‘Johnny Roselli? At any time has the CIA been associated with Sam Giancana? HW 50955 Bocld: 32423566 Page 165