JFK Assassination System Date. 6/24/201 Identification Form . AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Agency Information ARMY — 198-10007-10049 — CALIFANO PAPERS ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Document Information ICCCA JOSEPH CALIFANO SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION 00/00/0000 B4 CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS CONTROL OF TRAVEL BY SUBVERSIVES TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Secret IB; 1C Redact 02/06/1998 Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 13. Collection of papers produced by the Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion. =e K No VG DATE eyen ly epartment of the Army EO 13526 Declassify “ Exclude — Exempt Authority © Refer To ~ Review na BL eee aed i wW!50955 DocTd:32424042 Page i “3
SECRET _ fy pole ftp ee a * ° . , z [preoonnd puso on, WAKA SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION PAPERS ON CONTROL. OF TRAVEL. BY SUBVERSIVES CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS CONTROL. OF THE MOVE MENT OF PROPAGANDA CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN. EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES GROUP-1 SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC : DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION HY 50955 Docld: 32424042 Page 2
SECRET The papers included herein embody a series of action programs designed to impede the Castro-Communist subversive effort in Latin America. They were developed by an inter- departmental group which included represen-~ tation from the White House, Department of State, _Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Treasury Department, Central Intel- ligence Agency and United States Information Agency. : , SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32424042 Page 3
a. HY f0S55 0s) THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES — Doctd: 3274274042 Page 4 ‘T. % o- < A 3
Ve“ “ Actions Concerning legal Travel 1 : le Immediate Impact Actions _- a, Intelligence Actions ‘Longer Range Actions | . ay Surveillance Actions HW 50955 Docld:32424042. Page 6 . b Surveillance and Reporting Actions | a be U.S, Military As sistance Actions ..-
| SECRET CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES - I. Introduction The. ‘actions proposed herein are ‘designed. to. “dmpede wat the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin ==. American countries, Execution of any one or more of. 7 the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them all will not completely solve it. | : The practical problems involved, are too numerous: and. cs complex. . “ wee With respect to ‘diminishing legal travel to: ‘Cuba, ot - ,we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes. 60 0» . of those Latin American countries through which. the. Sey -gubversive traveller must pass. From. the viewpoint Of es: these nations the direct actions required have strong *= i! - political and sometimes legal Implications = imii- “cations which cannot be overcome easily, even when. the leaders of these countries choose to do so.. « - In the matter of clandestine travel, we are confronted not only with the great depth of communist - guile, born of two. generations of experience. in the. international movement of subversives, but with the. inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in... these same matters on the part of the Latin American. - community... ; ae . in spite of this, the advantages do hot all reside: .. with the communists. Cuba's insular character imposes ~ certain sharp limitations upon personal movements’: - Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone. ° . who enters the country must do so either by water, ~° . or aim, There can be no Slipping through the. barbed wire. SECRET _ HW 450955 Docld: 32424042 Page 7
HW 50955 SECRET - On the other hand, this same geographic situation makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple. There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpa- trolled. Central American coastline, within 175 to 850.miles from.Cuba, There are at least.93 airfields, .other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and ‘capable of supporting the subversive ebb. and. ‘flow, we EE As number, well into the thousands, os es ‘Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a po program of direct restraints, selected from among. the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable effects. Under the proposed steps some travel would. be stopped completely. More - probably much more .-. - ‘would be rendered difficult. Some hitherto legal movement would be driven underground. Previous. clandestine movement would be’ impeded, ‘complicated -and-harassed té the point where it becomes more: costly, more uncertain, more ‘hazardous and ‘thus; hopefully, Less extensive. “II, Nature and Scope of the Problem We do not know enough about ‘the movement of ae subversive trainees, into Cuba’and - more important” ee out of Cuba. We do not know enough about thé, volume “.. ~ of travel, or the media employed, This is par-. .- - ticularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where 7 our knowledge is extremely limited, 3 Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate: mo, . SECRET 2  DocId:32424042 Page 8
HY 50955 - Eeuador = 208 Unk Trinidad = Unk® > Peru 181 ~ Unk | Jamaica 593 Chile 551 85 ss Haita - Unk * In transit, ineluding about 300 Mexicans. SECRET Legai Travel Into Cuba ; Country No. of Legal Travellers Country. No. of Legal Travellers | -- Jan-Feb Jan-Feb. 19621963 1962 1963 | Mexico yo12® = -:969 Argentina 500°. Unk... Guatemala 80. Unk Uruguay 115 Un El Salvador 100 © 8. Paraguay «60. snk Nicaragua 50 - Unk Brazil... 400 eee) ee Costa Rica 216 - | 10 - Honduras ; 920 BL. Venezuela 200 “Unk British © AO Unk Guiana Colombia 400 “Unk Panama, 56 Republic “While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba-by 9 other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico. “On the most conservative basis, then, it will be'seen | ‘that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912:travellers... to Cuba during 1962, while the average monthly. number | a passing through Mexico for the. first two months of: 1963 ‘is even higher than the 1962 monthly average,. Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central - Intelligence Agency estimates that at least. 1,500,. and perhaps as many as 2,000,have received ideological. indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. | Many SECRET 3 Docld:32474042 Page 9
_ BW 50955 and the remainder of: Latin America. ‘scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only. . flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February. This) SECRET of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to their homelands; some by legal means; some probably “py illicit means, There is no. reason to presume, —- moreover, that. the travel to Cuba of the remaining 3,000-3,500 was entirely consistent with the best™ interests of the hemisphere. ‘Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans °°: travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial : airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered - Cubana flights, Some travelled to Trinidad or ae, “Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled. Cubana or KIM flights to Havana. Others travelled to Mexico, ~ and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial - flights to Havana, With the cessation.of service to Cuba by Pan American, KIM, Mexicana, and Iberia. airlines in October, the regular Cubana service: “between Mexico City and Havana remained.the sole. . direct. and regular airline connection between. Cuba. The Qubana ‘service between Havana and. Mexico. ‘tg a single flight is completed per week, Aircraft now oe employed are British Britannias - an obsolescent: model. -Cubana has requested, but has not yet received,’ Mexican approval to substitute Soviet IL-18 transports for the old Britannias, | Delay -by the Mexicans in oe granting this approval can have the favorable effect: of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in. poor condition, If, in addition,. the British and- ~“Ganadians can be induced to suspend delivery of. 7 ‘spare parts, the planes will = soon become inoperative. -” ‘Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice- -~monthly flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching. Havana. ae KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles, However, it is now, con- 90. - sidering doing so, In this regard it is concluded. that. resumption of scheduled. flights by a United-States- carrier could serve as an encouragement to KIM and. others to do the same. , SECRET 7 AL Dovld:32474042 Page 10
HH 450955 flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying <6 | -both material and personnel, The Ganadians have. been SS “American governments subsequently to identify the. aon _ travellers and to exercise surveillance over thelz activities upon their return, limited, Elimination of this intelligence Void. must |. SECRET ‘Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not. “stop regularly at any other Latin American country,. though - the Soviet Aeroflot line has eccasionally sought and... - received permission from Brazil to land at Recife, enroute to Cuba, - Some Latin Americans may have .. travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and, -ghould Brazil. permit this arrangement to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new: order of magnitude. oo A Canadian. non- scheduled, Line -has operated. a. tew. unresponsive to our efforts to obtain identification ; of the passengers, There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers. operating between Latin America and Cuba. However: a’number of trainees from British Guiana have _ --trayelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant: tee engaged in transporting: rice from. Guiana to. Clandestine sources report that transit of. ‘tTatin® Americans through Mexico to Guba often involves Te ee procedures, ‘The Cuban embassy in Mexico City. provides. ME the. travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with - -  .special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their: passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel” oS '. out of and into Mexico. This procedure is obviously: designed to impede any effort by the other Latin. Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow | of. travel by legal means, This must be countered directly. Beyond this, and perhaps of greater... importance, is the problem of illicit movement. both . into and out of Cuba, which will undoubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at present ‘mont. be accorded high priority. . SECRET | 5 Doold:324274042 Page il
‘SECRET ” : | Att, The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations Success of many of the overt actions proposed in - the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders the restraining actions. must take place. Presented - briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors of Iatin America in terms oe of participation ina coordinated program of. ‘travel: a control. oe ae As a general matter, the imposition of controls 0 “on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin = ° -American country. This, coupled. with their current: « lack of full awareness of the danger represented “by... Cuba's training. of subversives, will diminish the. willingness of some governments. to impose controls. a ate re ‘unilaterally. This is especially true since they: 0 fo. recognize that unilateral restraints will. have: eth ee | effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to 02) 03.5. Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not: also _taken, — It is likely, however, that most of thew... ... Latin American countries would respond favorably ---, 0). ‘albeit. in varying degrees -= to US leadership ie ‘seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba. for- * ideological or subversive training. _.. The Central American countries are more acutely “aware of the danger posed by Guban-inspired sub-'. “version than is Iatin America at. large, and.can be: expected to react favorably to proposals for re-~': ducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might. _ present. at the San Jose Presidential meeting. °° eo , However, their ability tol:carry out commitments which a they may make will be limited by domestic legal and political considerations, as well as by their). 2.0: countries’ technical incompetence in such matters. - Since Mexico is currently the principal hemisphere transit point for legal travel of sub- | versives to and from Cubal, its attitude is of great importance, Mexico, to date, has taken several . significant steps with respect to travel between .-- a rs Mexican cities and Cuba.. it has - instituted elose oP eae SECRET | «6 HW 50955 DocId:32424042 Page 12
| SECRET ~ surveillance over travellers, to include stamping. - "| passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition,’ the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons | ‘arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given - .tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by. ‘Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA), These actions — all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even ~ further cooperative steps, particularly on an un- oO . publicized, bi-lateral basis, wherein the political _ hazards of taking-a public OAS position are.not _. ree involved. In this regard, the Central American 0 A080) os Presidents would probably agree individually to ‘seek. © ‘the participation of President Lopez Mateos of. Mexico | --in- specific cooperative moves to restrict the Plow. of persons to Cuba through that country. Peru now has “regulations which:actually prohibit cope “travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered: * 30.20 00..-. public resistance, and are not enforced. The © veg - Dominican ‘Republic prohibits such travel. .Haiti:. has. no. established policy, but. passports and exit ° permits are reportedly issued. only on the personal .- _ approval of President Duvalier, Colombia could... on. legally impose restrictions by executive decree, ... ae but has. shown no inclination to do so. Other’. : “countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and. the Central 7 . American nations, plead the existence of legal or ote - constitutional barriers which preclude the- prow ley . hibition of travel to Cuba, but thus far, they. = ..: shave: ‘made little effort to:.remove these Barbier ies Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile,.. “2, Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its ‘drift: to theleft and gives little evidence of modifying. its. tolerant attitude toward the Castro government. Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises. no. restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct. or : via third country. . The elimination of all legitimate passenger : OO service to Cuba from Latin America could be —. SECRET 7 7 HW 50955 Docld:324274042 Page i3
AW 50955  . Latin ‘American and ‘other. free world countries to .” ~ take a grave view of the situation, and to. partici ate in dynamic action. a . nari - upon their return to home. countries, ‘onee they pu their new training to use. The efforts: of: these: suffer from deficiencies in technical: skill, training, . equipment and sometimes: from a lack of: a. ‘sense ‘of. : Teadership in eliminating all of: these: ‘deficiencies IV. Actions Concerning | Legitimate. Travel Docld: 42424042 Page 14 _ SECRET “achieved through invocation of the Rio Treaty, but - at , ~-ig-unlikely that the. hemisphere countries would. agree. | _.to-do so in the absence of some major crisis similar:. ~» to: that. involving the Soviet missiles ora case of . direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American country. ‘Nevertheless, a campaign on our part. to "develop a full awareness of the danger represented i. “by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would =.=... _ probably create a growing willingness to ‘take: action oriented in this direction. In this-connection;:. however, it is concluded that resumption of regular passenger service to Cuba by. United States companies « would render more difficult. our efforts. to persuade = : Virtually, all the Latin American ‘countries would be.willing to move against Cuban- trained’ subversives nations will not be dramatically effective, ‘however, since, in the area of internal security, all-of. ‘them urgency, The. United. States can provide. essential: Listed velow. are. specific actions contemplated ‘to. “dmpede- legitimately executed travel, to and from. Cuba’. cee hae ‘Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose, 0 as travel on recognized. public carriers, openly.- Se arranged and involving travel documents which. are _ presumed to be in proper order, Certain of the — - actions, it will be noted, are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS - wholly or -in-. part - by its Special Consultative Committee on Security. ‘SECRET _ 8
SECRET ~ de Tmedtate Impact Actions 7 The ‘following actions offer ‘promige: of producing early, visible and effective results. a, Administrative Actions (1) Both. through the OAS and pilateraniy, | induce . each Western Hemisphere country to: (a ) Stamp passports. or other: trave  .documents issued to own: nationals: note N for travel to Cuba ." “, . (b) Refuse exit permits for Cuba ‘to. any. national of-a third country’ ‘who cannot produce a valid’ permit issued. by Als: own: country. for _ travel to Cuba. . “(e) Refuse to. honor’ any visa for ‘cuba which is’ ‘not an integral, non-detachable. part’ ofthe: _. travel document issued by. the. country: of which the traveller. is a citizen, (a) Require accurate manifests of ali. carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba;.and- ‘furnish. 2 copies of these manifests ‘to diplomatic: missions. - oe .. Of other. Western Hemisphere countries: whteh: are affected. - ; os oO (2) Persuade ‘Mexico: to fingerprint, in: addi t _, to. photographing, ‘all persons leaving: for “ore. “oy arriving from. Cuba, and to provide. data’ ‘to the pare ent country» of the nationals, involved. oe (3) Make covert arrangements with police and. other security and administrative officials: ‘An countries now being used for legal transit to. ‘Cuba to impose administrative impediments and harassment on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to™. increase. the difficulty of travel and thus. dis-. courage. prospective travellers, . ae mr Intelligence Actions. (1) Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in. | ; each country to identity persons who have. travelled, : SECRET 8g HW 50955 Docld:32424042 Page 15 -
“. or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected — information promptly to the host government, consistent with our own intelligence pro- co “gram, and the requirement to protect our sources. Pe (2) Intensify current efforts £0 introduce - - _ covert, U.S. - controlled agents from each country vo into, the: Cuban training ‘program. Doane eid gs aon Actions | Related to. Common. Carriers “(1) Prohibit resumption of air. ‘service: to Cuba by U.S. carriers, in order to. provide. a favorable. example to. other, nati onse: eae a (2m Expand current restrictions. on: fore 1 o> -ghipping engaging in commerce. with’ Cuba: “by. _. « closing. United States ports to all. ships..o -~ any Shipping line which, continues - £0: send any ships: to Cuban porte. ee re aN passengers in| their ports,» a _ (4) Both through the: OAS. and. bilaterally, oo request Latin American” countries .to: deny: their — ports to ships of Cuban registry. ova gta oa, Propaganda Actions: Pursue a ‘nemisphere-wide publicity campaign” cto expose the scope and purpose of. Cuban training” of the nationals of other countries for sub-. 9... “>. versive purposes, in order to discourage prom spective trainees. and impress the governments... and the peoples concerned with the urgent > - need to halt the travel of Latin American = nationals to Cuba. 2, Longer Range Actions re - The following actions should also be undertaken _ ae without delay. .Their ultimate results. may. be of fare. * SECRET | 10. HW 50955. Docld:32424042 Page 16
aad “reaching importance, . but probably will be. - Longer in: ; realization, - ' Cy Ae Political | Actions (2) Renew and. intensify bilateral negotiations” with the. five Latin American governments which. _ have not done so to sever diplomatic. relations with. (2) Through bilateral negotiations 3 press. countries “with inadequate legal. restrictions on travel. to” a Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition. ‘of. suc travel and- providing severe penalties for evasion.’ Recommend that rewards. be offered for. identification of evaders. : (3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each - country, reiterate the need for full and effective cooperation-with appropriate OAS bodies, and -bi= ‘laterally among the several states, in the inter change. of information concerning travel of: persons: to Cuba: and other Cas tro- Communist subversive’ activities, - ae (4) Propose: periodic regional or. sub- -regional _ meetings of ministers of Government of ‘the... 006 -American Republics to review the implementa ton; of steps taken by them to combat movement of. subversives in the Caribbean. (5) Urge other Latin: American nations | ‘bo - negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico: Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to en= dist cooperation in adopting specific measures. fOr prevent the movement through their countries of - third country. personnel ‘to and from Cuba. > be intelligence Actions Intensify our action in making available. to. each . country selected intelligence concerning the extent; nature, and insidious implications, of. Cuban sub-)- 000 oe versive activities, as consistent with the require~. 0-00 ment to protect our own intelligence program, - | SECRET — Oo ll HW 450955 Docld: 32424042 - Page if
HY 50955 — » SECRET . reaching importance, | but probably will be Longer in. 7 realization, : ae Political Actions a 1). Renew and intensify ‘bilateral negotiations. “. with the five Latin American governments’ which | have not done so to sever diplomatic, relations with. Cuba. (2) ‘Through bilateral negotiations } press. countries “with inadequate legal restrictions: on travel to ° Cuba’ to adopt laws enabling the prohibition. of. suc - travel and providing severe penalties. for evasion,” _ Recommend that rewards: be offered for: identification of evaders . - - ae ee, . (3) In separate diplomatic approaches. to" each | country, reiterate the -need for full. and effective: --cooperation:with appropriate OAS. bodies,” ‘and ‘bi- laterally among the several states, .in. the: ‘inter= change of information concerning travel: of’: Berson to Cuba: and other vas tro- Communist subversive: SDE activities, .- = a (4). Propose. periodic regional or “subs “régional ~ meetings of ministers of. Government of thes on. © American Republics to review the implementation, 7 -.. of steps taken by them to combat movement of. subversives in the Caribbean. = ; (5) Urge other Latin. American nations to. woe negotiate separately and/or collectively: with. Mexiéo * Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia.and Chile in order. to. en= list. cooperation in adopting specific measures. to. prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba. b,. Intelligence Actions Intensify our action in making available. 6: each . country: selected intelligence concerning the extent; nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban sub-' 0 0°, -. versive activities, as consistent with the vequire- ment to protect our own intelligence program, | SECRET | ay Bocld: a2424042 Page 18
| SECRET HW 50955 - c. Administrative Actions (1) Encourage Latin: American. governments to insti- | tute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive: — examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aireraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health. and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of whieh persist in maintaining diplomatic. relations’ ::.”) * with Cuba to expose. the falsification. of travel. docu _ ° diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal: activity: - to a halt. Provide U.S. technical apelatance | as. re- ‘quested, 7 mont Maes american countries in improving. immigration. and customs controls, . “geryiee, If unable to do so, seek to persuade. passengers to Cuba. (2) Request governments of Latin American countered ments by Cuban embassies or consulates, and ‘take. punitive measures, such as the expulsion. of Cuban. -(3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin: d. Actions Related to Common Carriers, (1). Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana. Airlines Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet- made air- Bee -eraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical: grounds. This will create an obstacle to. Cubana; a - gsince.the Britannia aircraft. now used: are: ‘Falling OR into disrepair. a (2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and - "any other potential supplier that they cut off the: SECRET . oo 12 supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aireraft. (3) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Cafiada and Spain to persuade those countries: — to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial :. - : air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of 7 other Western Hemisphere countries normally pro-. ©. viding terminal service. for any of the airlines in- .- ws volved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying -... pressure. BDoclda: 32474042 Page 19
.. SECRET e, Propaganda Actions (1) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discredit- ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard © which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers. —° _ and develop: popular opposition to. such. activities. 00+ (2) Idéntify: returned. trainees who are: dise " satisfied with.their Cuban. training experience. ‘and. ee -exploit their capabilities for provision of. intelli-§ ~ gence and propaganda material for exposing. and.-. Lie discrediting Castro- Communist subversive activities. . (3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout. Latin America, not attributable to the United Sta es which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, |» Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit.factlities. for movement of ' persons of other. countries: to" and. from Cuba for subversive purposes. a ‘OAS Actions Or anization of! American States In view of the. important political, “psychological o> and, hopefully, material benefits: to be. derived from’ “any success achieved through the OAS in combatting _. Cuban “subversive activity, ‘the following measures: should be undertaken by ‘the United States. in that ‘pod: at times and under. circumstances which give. ‘regard. to: ‘the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, | and giv " recognition ‘to the fact that progress. will probably.’ be slow WEE, a. Pursue adoption ‘by the OAS of a “resolution ’ calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic. relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel. of” ‘gubversives to Cuba by legal means, and ‘at. the same. a time, creating serious obstacles to other. related aa “Cuban subversive activities. . . Bey SECRET , | 13 HY 4S09545 Dovld: 32424042 Page 20
HW 450955 Dee above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate» banding upon. all member states, to. terminate. Cuba. | _V. Actions Concerning TLlegal, Travel become effective, one of the: results will be to: fore the hitherto legal travel into clandestine: ‘ehanne: It may, therefore, be expected that measures to.” _- impede illegal movement will acquire steadily. ‘dr “ereasing importance, - - preceding section, in terms of immediate ee ee SECRET be, Propose. recommendations by the OAS to member “governments of a program of steps, on both’ the ‘national and. international levels, to control travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the’ proposals in the. report by the Special Consultative .. . ‘Gommittee on Security - (SCCS). as well as the specific -..Yecommendations set forth herein. Ce Once the initial comprehensive program in OAS bodies to follow up on implementation’ ‘through. ~-guch means as multilateral exchange of information, | - meeting of experts, and utilization by individual... - countries of the services.of the. ‘Special Consulta-. "tive. Committee on Security. d. Propose adoption by the. OAS of a “resolution, regular air and maritime carrier traffic with,” As. the actions outlined in ‘the: preceding: ‘sections “The: steps proposed herein are listed, as in. the: jects which promise early and visible results,.and_ , longer range projects which, while of great importance, '. cannot be expected to mature as rapidly.’ - 1; Immediate Impact Actions Ge intelligence Actions (1) Increase greatly our penetration and — other. intelligence efforts to identify persons . engaging in titegal travel to Cuba, and oo SECRET 14 DocId: 32424042 Page 21
HW 50955. determine routes and. methods employed. . Report. selected information, consistent with the - oe requirement for protecting our own ene renee institute survertlance and other: control measures. be “Surveillance and Reporting Actions ee i veillance of the Caribbean area. contiguous to. Cuba. | . oandobean Command and Caribbean Sea. Frontier . Loan . Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemi- special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, -Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence’ control capabilities, — - program, to. host government. (2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine: ‘aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba. ene other countries in the Caribbean: area, with ~~ obtained to persuade governments concerned to-. (1). Continue current US. sea and air. sures (2) Continue ‘the development, at high’ : priority, of US communications in Latin. Aner dees: in order to improve alerting, reporting and. . (3). Establish intelligence centers ato. nation to. countries concerned via the. Aner Lean, . - Ambassadors, of ‘intelligence: on the movement . of Subversives, SECRET . 15 “Longer Range Actions ae Surveillance Actions (1) Establish a coordinated. Caribbean” sur- ae veillance system. involvingt Do (a) Continued close-in surveillance. of. Cuba ‘by US forces. . (b). A US. military alerting system, by oes which intelligence of subversive movement will. 3 be rapidly transmitted to the American Docld: 324274042 Page 22
HW 450955 SECRET Ambassadors to countries concerned through _intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Qaribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command . (c) A unilateral surveillance and inter- ception effort by each country in its own” . territorial waters, De (a) US assistance in final L totenceb tion | in territorial waters, upon. request by the. country concerned, lege ‘pb. US. Military Assistance Actions, (1) Establish Military Assistance objectives 7 and planning guidance to provide selected... countries, especially in the Caribbean. and” - Central American area, with the necessary: small. “patrol craft, training and logistical- support ,. “including. fuel for operations if required,. to: enable these countries to establish an effective | . patrol of their own coasts. Provide necessary. funds in addition to. present programs... Pda - (2) Provide US: Navy, Air Force and Coast "Guard training assistance, as required,-to- “> develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities.’ - of Latin American military forces.:.. This may « . ‘take the form of a’ Canal Zone training activity. : “employment of mobile training teams, or ao COM “bination of both, ms (3) Urge the ‘accelerated. improvement. of - dnternal security forces and police forces. i ne Latin American countries and the intensification: - of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at.. _ preventing clandestine departures and apprehenditie returned trainees, Provide equipment, ‘training =. i and advice as required. . SECRET 16. BDocld: 324274042 Page 23
se aes ee een 2-8) CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS 900 HW €0955 Bocla: 32424042 Page 24
" TABLE OF CONTENTS. * Introduction Nature and Scope of the Problem re | ‘General Methods of Transferring Convertible ~ Currency és "Introduction by Individual Travellers. 3. Transfers through Banking Institutions _ 4 Transfers by Diplomatic Personnel . 5. Transfers: through Trade Subterfuge 6 “Relative Importance « of ‘Transfer Methods,  Retiens Recommended : WW 50955 “Decla:32424042 Page 2500 °°
HW 50955 stoner CUBA DIRECT CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT .OF FUNDS TQ AND WITHIN LATIN AMERICA rT. . Introduction The purpose of this paper is to recommend measures which will impose. direct contrels upon the flow of funds from Cuba to and within other Latin American countries. We possess evidence that Cuba is providing financial support.to subversive campaigns in other Latin American countries, but the full dimensions of the problem, in - terms of amounts involved and methods used, are not known. We need more information. The difficulty with - which this information is procured underscores the prob- lems of counter-measures, since funds can. be transferred Minternationally or acquired locally in many ways, all] - difficult to detect and harder to prevent. While we may be able to diminish the flow through some channels . and increase the difficulty of Castro's subversive financial operations in others, we cannot hope to. suc-~. “eeed in stopping them altogether, and even.if this were feasible, the possibility of financial support of subversion by the USSR and other Bloc. nations would remain, Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that. the impediments recommended herein are of insufficient importance to warrant their imposition. Impediments to the movement of funds can be imposed at relatively little cost to the United States, and they will have some effect in interfering with Castro's pursuit, through subversion, of his basic objective of gaining communist allies in Latin America. This effect could be very significant when added to others that we hope to achieve through our over-all anti-subversion program. In examining this problem, it quickly became evident that the most effective countermeasures are to SECRET Boclda: 32474042 Page 26
HW 450955 SECRET be found in the area of reducing the capability of Cuba to acquire reserves of free world convertible currencies, such as U.S. dollars, Canadian dollars, Pounds Sterling, Swiss francs, etc. Cuban pesos are usable only in Cuba. They are not convertible to. any other currency and are therefore of little if any value elsewhere in the world. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange, moreover, have been steadily diminishing and are now estimated to stand at not more than $25 million to $50 million. If we are willing to intensify our efforts to weaken the Cuban economy, these foreign exchange reserves can be reduced further. However, it must hotcbe overlooked that. the Soviet: Union can- provide foreign exchange for Cuban use. While of transcendent importance, this question of diminishing Cuba's foreign exchange through economic measures is properly related to the larger objective of. weakening the economic position of Castro-Communist Cuba, and thus advancing further toward the goal of causing the downfall of the Communist government.. As progress is realized in this. broad endeavor, there will be a reduction in Castro's ability to finance, subver= sive operations in the Hemisphere. The matter of intensifying our economic warfare against Cuba is regarded, however, as beyond the ~: purview of this committee. Therefore, the program of actions recommended in this paper has been directed to the transfer of funds. This includes physical: transfers, transfers through bank transactions and transfers by subterfuge in connection. with trade. ° IT. Nature and Scope of the Problem . 1. The Castro regime may transfer. convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries by four general methods: a. introduction by hand, by legal or iilegat travellers. b. Transfers through tritemnational tanking institutions. SECRET 2 Doclda: 3242740492 Page 27
HW 0955 SECRET ec. Introduction by Cuban or Bloc diplomatic » personnel, including couriers. ad. The practice of subterfuge in connection with international business transactions. These methods are discussed in following paragraphs, along with steps which might. be undertaken. to. diminish the , effectiveness of each. 2. Introduction of Funds , by. Hand, by Tnaividval Travellers This is the least ‘convenient. and ‘least dependable. .method in terms of the hazard of theft, loss,’ misappropria-. tion, confiscation or extortion. Nevertheless, we: have evidence that this technique is employed. Funds. can be introduced by Legal travellers, where there are no effec- tive controls, or they can be introduced by. smuggling. With respect to smuggled funds, it is noted that.the measures previously approved for ‘control of illegal . travel will likewise be effective in. impeding the illegal — movement of funds by such persons. “Tn. like manner, the: " méasures previously approved for control of legal. travel will affect the movement of funds. by persons din. that. category. i, Additional restrictions on the introduction of - funds by legal travellers might be adopted by Latin American countries, in the form of limitations on amounts or administrative requirements for declaration of sums in hand. However, recommendation.on our part to oe institute such controls would be contrary to our estab- lished policy of encouraging .the. Latin American nations to maintain free exchange systems. These countries © need foreign exchange, and would consequently be hesi- tant to adopt any actions which would limit their means of acquiring it. Additionally, the adoption of controls on the importation of foreign.exchange by Latin Ainerican nations would impose an undesirable. burden on legiti-: mate. business and other travel from the United States, as well as from other friendly nations. SECRET , 3 BDocld: 327474042 Page 2&8
HW 450955 SECRET Thus, in the category of movement of funds by travellers, it is concluded that little more should be. done at this time than is currently in motion. 3. Transfers through Banking Institutions | in addition to physical transfers of currency, Cuba can transfer funds to subversives: in Latin America through banking institutions, either by cable or by mail. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange are held principally, in the State Bank of Russia, the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, the Banque Comerciale pour 1/Europe. du Nord . cy (a Communist owned institution) in Paris.,. the. Bank. intra: of Switzerland, the Bank of Montreal and .the Royal: Bank of Canada. Funds from these deposits. are. transmitted - on order of the National Bank of Cuba; which controls’ all of the accounts. U.S. dollars are the principal currency. ised in. Latin America. The transfer of. dollars from these: overseas accounts to subversives in- Latin. American. - countries can be impeded, in a significant. degree, through the “institution by the United States of..blocking: controls. ~ against Cuba, under section 5(b) of the Trading with: “the Enemy Act. This blocking action would prohibit: all: transactions with Cuba by persons or. institutions. sub~ ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and. would effectively interrupt Cuban movement of U. Se dollars to Latin America through’ any U.S, bank. Movement by Cuba of dollars through banks of third countries would also be greatly diminished by this action. It is known and generally accepted in interes . national banking circles, that it is standing U.S. policy that any foreign bank, which transfers. dollars through. U.S. banks in behalf of a blocked country is subject . to. having its own U.S. accounts blocked. Because of the. importance of U.S. banks in international trade, foreign banks cannot afford such a restriction. This policy has been effective in the past, having deterred foreign banks, even those of Communist countries, from engaging .in dollar transactions on behalf of Communist,.China, which have. been blocked by the U.S. for over twelve years. SECRET 4 Docld:324274042 Page 29 va
HY 0955 SECRET With U.S. dollar channels blocked, other, less desirable, avenues would remain open to Cuba for bank transfer of convertible currencies such as Sterling, Swiss francs, Canadian dollars, etc. If the British and Canadians could be persuaded to prohibit remit- tances in their currencies in behalf of Cuba, the latter's capability to move funds through banking channels would be further curtailed, and transfers in other curréncies, such as Swiss francs, would be © relatively easy to detect and monitor. While it is unlikely that British and Canadian cooperation would be forthcoming in this degree, these countries could still make a valuable contribution to the campaign against Castro-Communist subversion by providing intelligence concerning major transactions in their currencies by Cuba. 4, Transfers by Diplomatic Personnel We know that convertible currencies have been carried to Latin American countries illegally by diplomatic representatives and couriers of both Cuba and the Bloc countries, under the protection of their diplomatic immunity. This form of transfer can be . diminished through the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba by those countries in Latin America which have not already taken such action. However, the diplomatic facilities of other Bloc countries would probably remain available to Cuba in some Latin American nations. 5. Transfers Through Trade supterdure An effective method of disguising transfers of funds for subversive purposes is to give such transfers the appearance of legitimate payments for items received in trade. In one technique, goods may be sent to a Cuban addressee by a subversive in the export-import business in a Latin American country bearing an erroneous invoice. A shipment having an actual value of $10,000 © can be invoiced and paid for at $12, 00qg,thus achieving a direct transfer of $2,000 from Cuba to the Latin American country whence the shipment originated. Such SECRET 5 Docld: 327474042 Page 30
HY 0955 SECRET transfers .of funds could be eliminated only by the interruption of all trade between Cuba and other Latin American countries. And even if this were achieved, the same technique could be used, although at greater cost and with much more difficulty, to transfer Cuban > funds to Latin America via France, for example, through a third party French Communist import- export firm. Another commercial technique for transferring. funds from Cuba directly to Latin America, through trade, is by means of uncompensated exports. As an example, a Cuban source might send $5,000 worth of Cuban publica~_ tions to a leftist bookstore in Chile. The bookstore. would not pay Cuba for the publication, but instead would use the proceeds of the sale for subversive pur-. poses. This method also could'be fully controlled. only by an.interruption of trade with Cuba. 6. Relative Importance of Transfer Methods All of the above mechanisms are usable, and pror “~pably all are employed now. However, since large. sums... can now be transferred readily through banking institutions, — ‘with small risk of loss or exposure, this method is - ae considered to be the most significant and is deserving ~ of the greatest attention in an action program. .Next.— in importance probably is the transfer of currencies . by diplomatic personnel - a procedure involving small risk of loss or exposure. Transfers by legal or illegal travellers are considered to be less important. in view of the risks involved, the physical limitations on amounts which can be carried by individuals and the’ — availability of other means. Trade subterfuge would presently appear to be of least significance, since such arrangements involve more difficulties than. any of the other available methods. IIl. Actions Recommended 1. The actions proposed herein, when added to those already proposed for controlling the movement of sub- SECRET 6 Docld: 327474042 Page 31
SECRET versive persons, propaganda and arms, will serve to inhibit directly Cuba's effectiveness in financing sub-~- version in Latin America. It must be acknowledged how- ever, that.Cuba's efforts to provide convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries cannot be rendered wholly ineffective. by these measures alone. .Complementary steps designed to reduce the ability of Cuba to acquire foreign exchange will also. be required to constitute a full attack on the problem. 2. The following actions are recommended as promising to have some significant effect: a. Establish regulations ‘blocking (1) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars to Cuba; (2) the unlicensed transfer of U.S. dollars directly or indirectly from Cuban accounts to free world countries; and (3) all other unlicensed transactions -with Cuba or Cuban nationals, or transactions involving property in which there is a Cuban. interest. These actions should be taken only following the Gevelopment of detailed implementing instructions by the State and Treasury Departments and their final evaluation in light of other considerations which bear on the matter. b. Seek opportunities to pursuade Latin American nations which have not.done so to.sever diplomatic relations with Cuba. c. Increase intelligence efforts to gain information concerning: (1) the size and location of Cuban accounts DOD | in free world banking institutions; SuePoRT (DIA) SECRET 7 — HY 50955 DBocld: 327424042 Page 32
HW 450955 SECRET (2) transfers of funds from these accounts oP to recipients in Latin America; and ppot ul . (3): Cuban movement of currencies to other S A) Latin American countries by legal and illegal CO! travellers, including diplomatic personnel. d. Where locally feasible, encourage Latin American nations to impound funds of know Castro- Communist organizations. e. Encourage Latin American countries to enlist the cooperation of their financial institutions in detecting suspicious accounts and in exposing transfers of funds for subversive purposes. f. Seek, using appropriate means, to induce pod t Canada, Great Britain, and other NATO countries \ ppok ‘to provide information on the direct or indirect S A) transfer of significant amounts of their currencies < (DI SECRET by Cuba or Cuban nationals to other Latin American countries. g. As applicable, persuade Latin American countries to. sever all direct or indirect trade relations with Cuba, except those involving sale to Cuba of foodstuffs and medicines. h. Encourage Latin American countries to one establish surveillance of known or suspected cul? \ Communist controlled businesses to inhibit trans- ipl? fers of funds to subversives through such estab- lishments. i. Encourage Latin American countries tO ex-- pose and. publicize illegal transfers of funds for subversive purposes. Docld: 32424042 Page 33 a
HW 809455 Daocld: 32424042 Page 44 , TATE ARTA Ae ART PRA |
“TABLE OF CONTENTS od “The Introduction : ° I. Nature and Scope of the Problem oo . , . ” Direct Actions to impede. Legal Movement * of MaseRoa NOS Materials te San 7 ‘Political Actions ; na 2. Intelligence Actions oo , 3, Covert Actions : Direct Actions to Impede Illegal Movement 2 of Propaganda Materials — booth wd 7 Intelligence Actions ‘Surveillance and Reporting Action Political Action nd ‘ Dechnical Assistance Actions . 7 - SECRET ‘HW-50955 DocId:32424042, Page 35.0... cue
HW 450955 the basic actions relating to. control of movement. of. ‘sub= As in the companion measures. for.control. of. the’ movement. of subversive. trainees, successful execution of thevaction which propaganda materials flow. As these’ legitimate ~ outlets are blocked:by the initial. steps herein: proposed, ‘sympathizers elsewhere to turn from the mass: exportation: ‘of materials to the production and dissemination of. the : ful: factors is. the influence ef our own information ‘and however, is concerned. wholly with. direct. actions ~actions II, Nature and Seope. of the. Problem propaganda materials with which the. Latin Americans are. SECRET ‘BDoclda: 324274042 Page 36 SECRET ‘CUBA MOVEMENT _ OF PROPAGANDA MATERIALS I, Introduction ‘The actions proposed herein are designed. to impede’: the movement ef Communist propaganda materials from Cuba os to and within. Latin American countries. .They complement. versive. trainees to and from Cuba,.-which. actions: are: en= erally applicable in the. solution of this problem. a ell proposed : below will .reduce the flow of propaganda mat rials but will not eliminate it’ entirely. oo. i ‘Communist Cuba has many legitimate. outiése th veh it will be necessary for the Cuban propagandists: ‘and thei same materials in a clandestine environment: within: the several Latin American countries. “Of the. two. threats) th illicit production of. propaganda materials in’ eac LOL will ‘be. by far the more. difficult. to abate. In combatting . these threats; one of the. most. powers counter-propaganda efforts, which USTA and CIA. have. ‘Tn: creased greatly during. the past two years. This paper, designed to impede.the movement of propaganda | materials: to. and. within: Latin America, While the Castro image has faded somewhat - ‘in. tatin America, and the attraction of Cuba as a model. has. dimin= ished, the. susceptibility of the Latin American: people.-to communist propaganda remains high. The basic. social. and. economic factors which have made this true inthe. past: have not greatly. altered, and the variety and quantity: of now: besét are impressive, as exemplified in the many. millions of dollars which the communists are. estimated to be investing in the project.annually. It is.a large pro gram and it presents a continuing. threat to the Grane. quility of Latin America. a Dt
HY S0955. SECRET. piles. materials" must extend also to publications whtéh are. “‘hand- transmitted through Cuban. and Soviet .Bloc diplomatic. duced through smuggling operations, oral. transmission: of ‘propaganda guidance by individual travellers. or. by” Radio: "by Prensa Latina, the official Cuban. news agency,. for. re _ production “py Local outlets. Finally to ‘be ‘considered: ‘are _ conviction. f Our efforts to combat the problem, moreover, are ‘complicated by the fact that freedom of thought,. express-- ion and press are generally highly regarded in Latin’ America, albeit not universally honored, and any proposals to reduce the flow of Castro-Communist subversive materials. must. be influenced by this. fact. Otherwise the United: States may find itself indicted for fostering police-| state methods, a charge which could alienate many of the Latin Americans we seek to influence. re “For the purpose of this paper, propaganda. materials. eo include radio program scripts, tapes and recordings,. printed -materials, (posters, pamphlets, magazines, leaflets,. books, . newspapers, news service output), motion pictures, dupli- 9 ©: ‘cating or reproducing equipment, electronic communications: equipment, and printing resources ; particularly paper stock: However, to be complete, ‘movement of. propaganda carried into a country by legal or illegal travellers. ‘for subsequent reproduction. It must also include. materials channels, shipments via. postal channels, quantities. intro- Havana, and the dissemination of communist. oriented: news’ thematic guidance, which can be reproduced and exploited, locally by returning trainees, front groups and” ‘sympathet? publications and, in some countries such as. Mexico, * Argen= tina and Uruguay, the products: of those commercial. estab: lishments which regularly print or broadcast pro-Castro- Communist materials as a matter of policy: or. ideological Press and Publications There are 326 Communist and pro- Communist’ newspapers and periodicals in Latin America,. and infiltration of ‘the. . democratic press, coupled with the non-critical attitudes” of some. newspapermen, increases greatly the. ‘diffusion of. oe the Cuban propaganda line. There are 228 Communist= oriented - publishing houses and bookstores in Latin America,. serving... as outlets not only for 30 different Cuban periodicals, but , for a large variety of other Communist printed material. , SECRET | 2 BDocld: 324274042 Page 37
HY SO0955 . media make unattributed use of Prensa Latina releases. this is-especially true of radio. broadcasts, . : overt. However, decrees banning Communist” propaganda have not prevented the clandestine. publications and distr bution of periodicals and books in some countries, and propaganda materials continue to seek. éntry: through: ‘th ‘mails. In Panama, for. example, postal and customs: authori ‘ties: destroy an average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda. per. in Costa Rica. This suggests. the further, quantities countries. medium used by Cuba to carry subversive propaganda. to-Lati ' America. The Castro regime has. constantly increased’ ‘Radio level of 115:30 hours per week. ~ where. there are now some 64 Cuban binational centers: and: SECRET Every Latin American country except . the. Dominican. _ Republic, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Venezuela permits ‘these bookshops to operate. Many of them offer publi-. cations at very low prices or give away several books with the purchase of one, and easy eredit terms are. available. - Excluding ' TASS and the New. China News “Agency (NCNA), Prensa Latina is the principal Communist news agency. in _- [atin America. It. operates openly, although not entirely... without restriction, inten countries -- Bolivia,: Brazi: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras,” Mexico; Panama and Uruguay. While most users of Prensa. Latinae: 2 releases are covert or overt Communists, Some" non- =Communist: ALL of this. publication. activity. is essentially month. Another. ten tons per month is seized: and. ‘destroyed eS yD haps.larger, may be Finding. their (Way into these: and, ‘othe Radio. Short wave radio is the . principal. direct! ‘mass. 5 audienc Havana's: short wave broadcasts to Latin America to. a currer Cultural Activities Penetration under the guise of cultural activities: tae a favored Communist propaganda technique in Latin Amerdea.y Friendship: ‘Societies. SECRET ie Docld:323474042 Page 36
HW 450955 -and in private or clandestine meetings. _also the ideas, the knowledge and the resources | which» are’ necessary to make those: materials effective: © oon) III. Direct Actions. to Impede. the. Legal Movement oft -to impede the legal movement of propaganda materials: ‘from: “Cuba to and within Latin American countries. . For, the. pur- ~pose of this paper, legal movement is. defined as: movement. : -by recognized private and governmental carriers and. ‘eommunt ~ effective results in some Latin American. countries,. ‘but ain another. “SECRET “Films Feature films and short documentaries produced: by the Cuban Institute of Motion: Picture Art and Industry play a direct propaganda role. These films are shown primarily ins. binational centers, pro- ~ Communist labor and student SOUPS, It will be seen from ‘this brief review. that. Latin: America is the target of a broad~scale. propaganda program, comprising not only. propaganda. materials but ineluding. Propaganda Materials ‘Presented below is a summary. of actions. ‘Gontenplated cations ,. as well as postal systems and diplomatic: ‘Pouching. ‘These actions offer promise of achieving’ early ‘and they do not have universal application, and ‘those which ma be feasible in one country may not be necessary or: feasible 4. Political Actions a. Induce news media to diminish the: utilizatio Prensa Latina. we, “D. Persuade those. governments which receive. Cuban and Bloc diplomatic missions to maintain. close. surveillance over the propaganda activities of* “the. Communist embassies with a view toward. prohibiting abuses of diplomatic privilege for subversive. Ma Py purposes. ; oe -c. As applicable and feastvle, tndise taban American countries to: Be SECRET 4 Docld: 32424042 Page 39
Hi 0955 2, Intelligence Actions . country to identify individuals, - organizations and - facilities involved in. propaganda - importation,“ ‘each country selected intelligence: concerning’ ‘these’ _ Party is illegal to offer rewards. for’ information: leading to interception. of :Castro+Communist: -propa-. “ganda and, in-countries where the Communist. panty is ‘legal, for-conviction - of persons supplying or...) disseminating propaganda materials. considered: dan-  eountry, urge full and effective cooperation,. with among the several nations; in the interchange of. SECRET (1) Adopt adequate internal security legislation ‘to provide severe penalties for any person engaging: in dissemination of Cuban-Communist’ propaganda. which inspires terrorism or proposes the..overthrow. ~ ‘of the legal government by force and violence. ee (2) Preclude attendance of Cuban delegates” at. Anternational meetings held in Latin America. (Delegates are propaganda disseminators, ) | ae Continue: U.S. intelligence efforts: ‘tn eae reproduction and/or dissemination; make available.to~ individuals, organizations and their, activities. | De Encourage: each country: in which: the ‘Coltimunist: gerous to the country! 8 tranquility. Ge In separate. diplomatic: approaches to. each’. the appropriate organs of the OAS and bilaterally. information concerning movement, of . Propaganda » materials. SS d. Persuade Latin American countries. to ‘report promptly to the diplomatic mission of the country» concerned, the identity of any national of. that: country who arrives from Cuba and who is. discovered... Pet _ to have been’ carrying Communist propaganda materials. 3. Covent Actions ae Disrupt the reproduction and distribution: of. _ propaganda materials, and the procurement and delivery of related supplies: and equipment. SL _. SECRET: 5 BDocld: 324274042 Page 40
HW 50955 IV. SECRET b. Seek opportunities to induce Latin American printing craftsmen to deface, destroy, or misprint Castro~Communist propaganda in the process of re= - production, ec, Disrupt Castro~Communist sponsored labor and youth congresses, industrial and agricultural exhibits in Latin American countries. d. Maintain or increase pressures. on media. owners, local advertising agencies and film producers: “and/or.” — distributors who accept Communist materials. ee a e, Dissuade US and local business firms. from. advertising in Latin American media which earry | pro-Communist materials; provide informally. to aan os US firms, for information, lists of such. media’ 2 00. in order to encourage - ‘their support of: a none.) 2 bev aes: ‘Communist press. wo ‘ ‘ ft. Inhibit the spread of ‘Cuban and Bloc: ‘pinationa centers and Friendship Societies in Latin America*by. 00. * an active program to expose. their subversive activities and objectives. oy : : . . Be Where it can be determined that. expenditure. “of the funds is clearly. Justified, provide. financial support to selected non-Communist news media requiring ‘assistance in order to compete with Communist-": .~ -aligned publications which: have significant: cire. culation or impact. a : h, Induce Latin American countries to organize _gurveillance over in-country. sources.of newsprint =: .: im and related supplies, and deny or inhibit: the. Use See of these. supplies for printing Communist materials, + Direct Actions to Impede Tilegal Movement. of | ' Propaganda a, 'Many of the actions outlined in Section rt relates to the legal movement of materials will serve algo to... restrict illegal movement. Additional measures designed. ‘specifically to impede clandestine traffic are enumerated | below. SECRET 6 Bocld: 327474042 Page 41
+ SECRET 1, Intelligence Actions a, Use penetration and other intelligence techniques to identify efforts to move propaganda materials from. Cuba to and/or within Latin American countries; deter- mine routes and methods employed; report selected | information, consistent with requirements for protect- | ing our own intelligence program, to the governments concerned. b. Utilize the U.S. intelligence community toy >.>. determine the nature and extent of clandestine. cadre \ craft and small boat traffic “between Cuba and other \. \ countries in the Caribbean and Central American areas. 5 giving particular attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use the. os evidence obtained to induce the governments coneernéd ; to initiate surveillance and other control measures aimed at interception of propaganda materials. . . @. Surveillance and Reporting Action pe . Exploit the mechanism of the Caribbean 2)" system, approved by the President in the ‘study on . movement of personnel, for discovering and impeding the movement of propaganda materials by illicit means. / 36. Political Action Where legally feasible to do so, induce - each Latin’ _ American country to improve its police procedures ‘designed to expose the subversive Communist propaganda’. apparatus in that country, and to detect and eliminate oS corrupt officials who permit illicit shipment of we. propaganda materials. a Me A, Technical Assistance Actions a. Provide technical assistance, where requested _ to enable Latin American governments to locate Clandestine transmitters, b. Assist in the accelerated improvement of the... capabilities of Latin American internal security forces, especially those patrol and intelligence .- activities whose function is the prevention of clan= ) destine propaganda activities. Provide equipment, _ training and advice as required. os SECRET | , 7 “HW 50955 Doold:32494049 Page 42
Cece mnt tt ES | HY 0355 Docld: 327424042 Page 43
| OL Intelligence Actions Sigs Be Intelligence Actions | ; 7 .. a Introduction _ Nature and Scope of the Problem. Actions Concerning Legal Arms Movement - “2, Political and Administrative Actions 30. “IV. : Actions Concerning Illegal Arms Traffic oe 30 : - l: Training, Orientation and Indoctrina-""" 4 a 3. Political and Administrative Actions.. - a) ae _. TABLE OF CONTENTS » 8 PAGES: ' . tion of Latin American Personnel 3. . 5, Military Actions 9° SS 6. Covert Actions") - | HW 450955 Doclda: 32424042 Page a4
HY 0955 SECRET CUBA DIRECT CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS TO AND - WITHIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES Ir. Introduction There is presented herein an action program aimed at controlling the movement of arms to and within Latin American countries through inhibitions on movement of arms, restraints on their sale, ownership and fabrication, . and controls over the movement of the critical components which are essential to the. local manufacture of weapons. If success is to be achieved | in reducing their use for subversive purposes in Latin America, the term "arms cannot be limited to firearms in the narrow sense. In addition, it must include explosives, fuzes, detonators and demolition equipment; all the weapons of hand-to- hand combat; grenades and mines; underwater demolition equipment; lethal gases, chemicals and instruments for their projection; undercarriages and transportable appendages for automatic weapons, mortars and other heavy weapons; spare parts, special tools and equipment for maintenance of weapons; portable radar and fire control equipment; special sabotage devices; and printed instructional material. relating to any of the items listed above, or relating to techniques for their em- ployment in sabotage and demolition. Il. Nature and Scope of the Propilem Our information pegarding traffie in arms. between Cuba and the remainder. of Latin America is extremely limited. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency both conclude that Cuba is _probably not now sending significant quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents. Rather the Cubans appear thus far to have followed common guerrilla practice in the matter of firearms supply, instructing the sub- versive trainees who attend indoctrination in Cuba to obtain weapons by theft in their own countries, or to fabricate them locally, rather than to rely upon supplies provided from:Cuba or elsewhere. SECRET Bocld:327494042 Page 45 0.3
HY 0955 SECRET Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to assume. that the Castro government will not.or cannot export arms to Latin America when to do so will serve its purposes. The very large quantities of US arms furnished to pre- Castro Cuban governments, those weapons collected from the Cuban people in 1961, and the sizeable Bloc arms shipments delivered to Cuba since that time, provide the Castro regime with large stocks which are available for transfer to subversives in other countries, should a decision be made to do so, Moreover, Cuba has a con- siderable air fleet and a large array of small craft. These unite with Latin America's: long, unguarded coasts, numerous isolated landing fields and inadequate local security forces, to make the threat of illicit arms shipment a considerable one, On the basis of these facts it is concluded that the immediate problems with respect to arms movement are twofold’ ~— to prevent internal assembly of illegal arms and their distribution in ‘and between Latin American countries, while at. the same time improving our capability ta impede the movement of arms to those countries from Cuba, Tt is to be noted that, with respect to a number of Latin American countries, national policy decisions are a precondition to many of the actions proposed below. These countries:will have to find the resolution to deal much more firmly with the general problem of Castro-Communist subversive activities than they have in the past if the proposed actions are to be effective. TIt. Actions Concerning Legal Arms Movement For the purpose of this paper, legal arms move- ment is considered to be the movement of weapons and other instruments of:violence or the special materials from which they are made, resulting from overt orders placed by Latin American governments or private groups, and then subsequently shipped openly. Many of the actions, which have previously been approved with respect to controlling the movement of subversive personnel, will have a direct application SECRET oe 2 BDocld: 327474042 Page 46
HW 450955 ‘to the arms control problem, are proposed courses of action contemplated specifically to impede legitimate arms traffic to, within-and between SECRET Latin American countries for subversive purposes. IV. | -l. Intelligence Actions Latin American country to determine the final recipients of legal arms purchases and, consistent with our own intelligence requirements, make this information available to the host government. be Monitor covertly, suspected sources of local weapons manufacture (machine shaps, metal fabri- cators, foundries). Report positive findings to host government, where appropriate, 2. Political and Administrative Actions a. Persuade each Latin American country to confirm the accuracy of cargo manifests of all ships and aircraft departing for or arriving from Cuba, and to intensify formal tnspection of all cargo, regardless of country or origin, for munitions materials. b. Provide further US technical assistance to Latin American countries to improve customs pro-— cedures and controls for ports, airfields and border stations, ec. Through the US diplomatic mission in each Latin American country, impress upon the appro- priate ministries the need for ensuring the bona fides of all legal purchasers, dealers, brokers, and transporters.of arms, munitions and explosives, and confirming that they are not communist relay points, ‘ Actions Concerning Tllegal Arms Traffic Listed below aré proposed actions designed to impede the illicit fabrication, transportation and dis- tribution of arms, in the broad connotation of the term SECRET ee 3 Doclda: 3274274042 Page 47 Listed below, in addition, O32 SEO a. Intensify US intelligence efforts in each pV Sy
HW 50955 SECRET as presented in Section I. By virtue of their specific nature, the actions do not have universal application, and those which may be effective in one country may not be necessary or feasible in another. 1. Training, Orientation; Indoctrination of Latin oe _ American Personnel in initiating training programs to educate law enforcement, military, customs, border police, and other officials in the technical aspects of arms control, to include creation of an awareness of the characteristics of all’mechanisms of destruction and violence. 2. Intelligence Actions Offer US assistance to Latin American nations - ) pov . a. Penetrate subversive elements or groups in ) re each Latin American country to acquire intelligence no at 6) concerning illicit arms manufacture and movement. een Provide the affected governments with this S ve information, as consistent with the requirement iA 4 to. protect our own intelligence program. Assist in disrupting such manufacture and movement. by oR covert means. -b. Utilize the resources of the US intelligence p° 4 community to determine the nature and extent of { clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic which SV \ could be used for arms shipment from Cuba and ) between other Latin American countries. . Propose bilateral arrangements providing for the exchange of information on arms.movement among De mv fe the US and Latin American countries, along the same I lines as proposed for.other information relating a‘ to subversive personnel and propaganda movement.  , Oo da. Encourage Latin American countries to utilize their private aircraft in Civil Air Patrol Programs for the purpose of extending in-country surveillance of coasts and borders. oof soe d SECRET . 4 BDoclda: 32474042 Page 46
HY 0955 SECRET a. Urge Latin American countries to intensify iP 4 application of those internal law enforcement (oe ) -.measures which are designed to impede the illicit cyt oO traffic in arms. Provide US training and technical 5b” assistance, as requested. . (0: b. Encourage Latin American countries to offer rewards for information concerning the location of arms caches and for positive identification of persons engaged in illegal arms manufacture or traffic. ec, Induce Latin American countries. to expand. 90 and intensify port, airfield and border inspection eure of incoming and outgoing cargo for contraband arms. ad. Request diplomatie missions to bring to the attention of each Latin American state the necessity for employing strict physical security measures and reliable accountability procedures with. respect to all arms and ammunition issued to units of the armed forces, militia and law enforcement units. e, Where applicable, propose bilateral agree- ments among. neighboring Latin American countries concerning establishment of cooperative procedures to prevent iiiteit arms traffic. f.. Through bilateral or OAS mechanisms, as _appropriate, encourage Latin American countries to: (1). Re-examine and adjust, as necessary, the licensing qualifications and procedures for-all companies engaged in the manufacture, transportation and sale of explosives and firearms, to provide a ready basis for con- . trolling their: activities. (2) Establish rigid control procedures for the disposal of surplus and. obsolescent arms in use by armed forces and police. Docld:32424042 Page 49
HW 450955 SECRET 4, Propaganda Actions a. Publicize confiscation of communist arms caches, illegal arms movements, apprehension, con- viction and’ punishment of arms smugglers and illicit arms manufacturers. Utilize news media, UN and OAS forums. . , b. Continue exposure, in Latin American mass media, of Castro Cuba as the focal point in the international conspiracy to undermine established Latin American governments by means. of violence, armed . insurgency and terrorism. wae Fee. Teen Be 5. Military. Actions” Exploit the mechanisms of the Caribbean sur- \) veillance system, approved by the President in the 5) study on movement .of personnel, to. impede illicit Ae traffic in arms. This will be supported by the revised military assistance guidance which was also approved in the study on personnel movement. ; 6. Covert Actions a. Where: favorable circumstances. arise, provide for supply to. known indigenous communist groups of special- ly prepared arms which will malfunction in such a manner as to: cause injury to the user, and thus gene- rate both doubts and fears among the communist sub- versives involved. b. Apply: subtle. sabotage to intercepted illegal arms shipments: sand - “permit them to. proceed to desti- nation. ee Cc. Throush ‘Szents, attempt to purchase arms from suspected. illicit. sources in Latin America, in order to expose these sources and to determine facts eoncerning their method of delivery. Also through agents, attempt, to.setl arms, to expose illicit purchasers... j: +: SECRET mone 6 | ee Docld:327474042 Page 50
LLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN “SURVE ISTIR VETTTANCE | HY S0S55 Docld: 327424042 Page 51 °
Special Considerations - : : - ie Detection and Identification “ Interception a - . . | ‘g ; Intelligence and Communications ae . . Command Arrangements. | oe - . Funding and Logistical Arrangements 7 “Attitude of the Latin American Nations oe -ctions . Multinational Actions to Control the Surveillance Effort | _ - Unilateral Surveillance Actions a “cx Actions to Establish an Alerting System™... - es Actions ‘to Develo : , Effective. Communications: : HW 50955 Docld:32424042.
HW 50955 * SECRET CUBA THE ORGANIZATION OF A CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM oi, Introduction On 8 March 1963 the President approved the estab- lishment of a coordinated Caribbean sea surveillance system involving: a.. Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U,S. forces. b. A UsS, military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the United States .American Ambassadors to countries concerned, through in- telligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command. (The feasibility and desirability of establishing these intelligence centers is being. studied further, on a priority basis.) ec. Seeking initiation of unilateral sur-.. veillance and interception efforts by each country in its own territorial waters, d. U.S. assistance in final interception in territorial waters upon request of the country concerned, It is the purpose of this paper to present the detailed actions required to put this decision into practical effect, with emphasis particularly upon the function of United States forces, and giving considera- tion to the fact that the decision was addressed to. Surveillance of surface movement only and not to the. Surveillance of air activity. II. Nature and Scope of the Problem General Considerations The thousands of ships and craft operating in the Caribbean provide an excellent. means for clandestine movement of personnel, arms, equip- ment and propaganda materials from Cuba to the other countries in the Caribbean, as well as SECRET Boclda: 32474042 Page 53
HW 50955 SECRET between Caribbean countries. The many miles of essentially unguarded coastline in the area enhance further the attractiveness of these means of disseminating elements of the Castro- “Communist program. While our information on the extent to which this procedure is now ex- ploited is meager, there is little question that it constitutes at least a potential danger, one that we must be prepared to meet. The Caribbean surveillance system envisaged herein must have the capability to: a, Detect, in Cuban or international waters, Suspicious ships, and small craft, and b. Identify and track these ships and craft in international waters, until they can be apprehended and inspected in the territorial waters of the state which is the intended destination or, alternatively, to ec. Detect, in territorial waters of a Caribbean state, ships or craft bearing sub- .- versive cargo, and apprehend those vessels prior to their escape into international waters or into the territortal waters of another state. Development of a program to meet the above problems will be sharply affected by the fact that that Central American countries have only limited _ capabilities to patrol their own coastal waters by sea or air. Their intelligence capability is small and their communications resources are meager.. Special Considerations a. Detection and Identification Detection of suspicious surface travel can result from visual sighting by air or surface craft, radar contact or radio intercept. It may derive from observation only, or may re- sult from intelligence. The identification of those surface vessels which are actually transporting subversive cargo can only be achieved by intercepting and SECRET 2 Boclda: 32474042 Page 54
HW 450955 SECRET searching all suspicious subjects. In the absence of a political decision permitting such operations in the open sea, this must be accomplished in territorial waters.of friendly countries, and will prove a costly and burdensome undertaking. In any event; effective detection and identification within the jurisdiction of a friendly power, in the territorial waters or ashore, will demand the coordinate use of | indigenous resources including naval forces, air forces, military or paramilitary forces, fishermen and the local populace. These re- sources must be organized for rapid reaction -to warnings..of impending subversive activity. b. Interception Sspicious targets which have been detected and identified in international waters, or those upon which advance intelligence has . materialized, could be shadowed to the limit SECRET Docld: 32424042 of the capabilities of sea and air forces — available, and the movement reported. In — . the absence of a political decision to auth- | orize visit and search on the high seas, subsequent action on the high seas would be confined to observation. In territorial waters interception would be accomplished by or with the consent of the country in whose waters the interception occurs. ce. Intelligence and Communications The difficulties inherent in timely detection, identification, and interception of craft bent on subversive missions point up the need for intelligence on prospective movements coupled with adequate means for rapid interchange of this information. The Department of Defense, the Department of State and the Central Intelli- gence Agency have taken action to improve U.S. communication networks, but the systems of the Latin American nations concerned are, in most cases, unsatisfactory. d. Command Arrangements An uncomplicated cooperative system is visualized, based on each nation policing its 3 Page 55
HW 450955 SECRET own shoreline and adjacent waters, with its own surface and air forces, coupled with agreements between neighboring countries to provide mutual information and assistance. An over-all command structure for the system as a whole is neither required nor desirable. t e. Funding and Logistical Arrangements The operation of a modest surveillance system, as envisaged herein, would still entail operations on a larger scale than currently in force, with corresponding additional costs to cover materiel and train- ing for the Latin American participants. These financial requirements should be ful- filled over and above current programs, and accomplished through existing channels. TIT. Attitude of the Latin American Nations Given support and encouragement by the U.S., it. is concluded that some of the countries bordering .the Caribbean Sea would be willing to parvicipate ina coordinate surveillance effort. However, the intense national pride and the sensitivity of the countries in- volved makes it by no means certain that any will par- ticipate to the precise degree or in the exact manner. considered most desirable by the U.S, Inter-service rivalries, political considerations, mistrust of the military by their executive branches, and antagonisms between indigenous police and armed forces will all tend to impede the program. However, the proposals that follow will serve to diminish these impedi- ments, and to establish goals not only for U.S. planning, but for U.S. efforts to encourage the Latin American participants as well. IV. Actions To be effective the coordinated Caribbean Sur- veillance system will require: “ a. Multinational actions to reach agreement on surveillance, and on the means to control it. b. Unilateral and cooperative measures to detect, identify, track and apprehend clandestine movements of subversive personnel, arms and equipment. SECRET . mn Docld: 32424042 Page 56