JFK Assassination System Date: 4/12/201 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: OSA RECORD NUMBER: _ 198-10001-10009 RECORD SERIES: GENERAL COUNSEL'S FILES AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information ORIGINATOR: OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM: TO: TITLE: CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION DATE: 00/00/0000 PAGES: 18 SUBJECTS : ; CUBA; LATIN AMERICA; SECRETARY MCNAMARA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: — Top Secret -RESTRICTIONS: 1A CURRENT STATUS: — Redact a DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA: UPON REVIEW BY APPROPRIATE AGENCIES COMMENTS: — BRIEFING PAPERS/NOTES PREPARED BY STAFF FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S v9.1 HW 56529 DocId: 32423640 TESTIMONY TO STENNIS COMMITTEE Page 1
(98-0007-10002 JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/20 Identification Form Agency Information ™s AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10007-10002 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information ORIGINATOR: ARMY FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR. TO: GENERAL KRULAK TITLE: CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION DATE: 02/14/1963 PAGES: 139 SUBJECTS : . CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : — Secret. ; RESTRICTIONS > 10.4 ‘ CURRENT STATUS: = Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 02/10/1998 . OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 1. Transmittal of report entitled "Cuba as a Base for Subversion" from Califano to Krulak. Department of the Army EO 18526 = Declassity — Exclude [ Exempt Authority, © Refer To Review Date 12, AIS Ls ByLzte) Cfb.g NO STATE OBJECTIO N ey LASSIFICATION a i DATE H#/4z v9.4 : : 15 AW 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 1 HW 563829 Docld:32423640 Page 2?
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. 14 February 1963 MEMORANDUM. FOR GENERAL KRULAK:. This book.will have to be held .by you on.an EYES ONLY basis. . The 1700 meeting » with Mr, Yarmolinsky will be held. in Mr. Vance's office. | ~ ~ Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army a SE]? > Ss. it . a i> a Ni HW 50955 Doclda:32423995 Page 2 HW 56329 DBocld:32423640 Page 3 Semen re RE Tr ae tw aT em ae oe) See wi
HW 56329 . SECRED ~ NO. FOREIGH - DISSEM TABLE OF CONDENS CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION  GRIE 85-4 62 (9 Nov 62) ) PROPAGANDA . Prensa Letina and Printed Materiel - Hevena's. International Broadcasting Personal Contact U8. Counter Effort \ 2 sums - Bole Report of Evidence Reports of Cuban Funds for Subversion Sumoary Report of Tretaing in Cuba Program Travel. fox training Activities Upon Retain from Guba, Miscellaneous 1 mus sunpemems = RO CUBA Botheds of Operation 4 Reporte of Arms Simggling Bleetronie Communications ‘ Peuneats Couriers G SABOTAGE Reperta of Sabotage 7 Terrorist Activities COMMUNIST ORGAMEZATION FOR LAPIN ANERTCA Cuban Rolationships and Policies Soviet Activities and Conflicts Situation Reports ‘HY 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 3 DoclId: 3274273640 Page 4 Hoxt Attached, el fi 1 toe AA ous Be ie nD 4235 - RO FOREIGH DISSE
i l HW 56329 HW #50955 Docid:32423995 Page 4 DoclId: 324273640 Page 5 . f SUBVERSION .~ Actions, whieh miy of may not be inimical te U5, interests, deaigied to undersdne the ubiitary, econmile, payeho~ “‘Regieal, worale, ov polléieal strength of a. constituted government,
G4 nwov (96% - - ot , . - . Saree Po-N-+62u CY ae . SECRET CASTRO’S SUBVERSIVE | | CAPABILITIES IN LATIN | THE PROBLEM : , To describe and evaluate Castro’s capabilities, with Soviet nelp, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin Americ«. after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US com- mitment not to invade. NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro’s raw capabilities, co ; ' taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin ore American capabilities for counteraction. SUMMARY A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails through- / out much-of Latin America is the product of fundamental in- ‘ equities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of ° ‘Castro and the Soviets. Castro’s efforts, with Soviet help, +o exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage iave not produced significant, results. Propaganda exploitatic:. of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably beer more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castro's” in- fluence in Latin America had waned by the time of the’ missile base crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he -. had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and _ py the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them. B. Implementation of an agreement between the US anc. the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be with- drawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom HW 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 5 HW 56329 DBocld:32423640 Page 6
HW 50955 HW 56329 SECRET for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation _in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and perform- : ance of the other Latin American governments and.of.the,US with |, respect to the Castro threat... There are many targets in’ the 2°" na hemisphere vulnerable. to Castro-Communist subversicn-and sab~ - otage, and the Soviets are likely to assist.Castro in reaching ther. by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability — for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro’s subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to.take determined counteraction. This willingness will probably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to invade Cuba. oo : pe _ C. We have examined how Castro’s subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present up. to substantially increased levels. We believe that ‘course (1). would. considerably reduce Castro’s subversive potential, and that the Soviets are unlikely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would ' maintain Castro’s potential for subversive action at least.at pres; - ent levels or actually raise it to the point where he could under- take ‘amphibious and/or. airborne subversive operations against oo - _ a 2 ao SECRET SELES Docld: 32423995 Page 6 Docld: 3274273640 Page 7 -
SECRET THE ESTIMATE : 1. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS ? Aims , | 1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of | himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. . He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American . States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino- _ Soviet Bloc in. the pursuit of these aims. o Means | 2. Castro began. his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin Be America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Pan-. ° ama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful ' and he turned to other means. , 3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal in- struments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main trans- ’ missions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great ‘., deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised. ‘to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected : countries.2. A major effort has been made through Prensa Latina, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. . Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, ‘and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel — ’ have actively ‘disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination ba , in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among ro. |... Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets. 4, Thousands of Latin: Americans have been brought to Cuba; about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare. _ Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin America and the Bloc. a a 5. Financial support has been- provided. by. Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of-coufitries, although the cases on which we have ve involved-rélatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have Pa * Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. ae . . ' oa oe nn = | NW 50955 Docla:32423995 Page 7 HW 56829 DocId:32423640 Page 8
Lae ee f ~ SECRET also been reported, but the evidence is unclear as to- quantities shipped and the extent of Cuba’s role in thesé transactions. We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana. 6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamen- tary line-he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some ‘cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists. » Evaluation 7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolu- ‘tionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the effort seems to. have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro’s influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and ‘tthe Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries— . notably Venezuela, Brazil, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they: are more likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Cas- - troism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally. 7 8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist assertiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advantage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important influence in the Latin American situation than Castro’s other subversive activities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a \force to be reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries, Certain govern- ’ ments felt obliged to move in the direction of neutralist and leftist posi- tions. This influence waned, however, after Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless, the appeal to Castro’s move- ment continued to be a source of major concern to almost. all govern- ments and seriously restricted their willingness to associate themselves, at least publicly, with the US. Se 4 Ce SECRET HW 50955 Docid:32423995 Page 8 HW 563829 DBocld:324273640 Page 9 BoE Mes lathe 2 eee, ek Sao SAWS kA AEE ete Ete enter
HW 56329 SECRET I. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE AFTERMATH OF AN AGREEMENT:: UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES AND THE US GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA “ 9 Gastro’s subversive capabilities—and his disposition to use them— will be enhanced by the sense of security provided by such sophisticated weapons as'are retained in Cuba after the withdrawal of, Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-28 bombers, if retained, and other modern equipment noted in Annex B; would be important in this regard. A US commit- ment not to invade Cuba will further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost certainly encourage him to intensify subver- sive activities in other Latin American countries. Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Base Crisis 10. Castro’s supporters throughout Latin America, with few though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrations. Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in judging this response, however. US. action to alert Latin American governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, including deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects, a condition’ of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the anticipated US invasion. _ Moscow’s apparent failure to provide guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judgment, however, that the response to Castro’s appeal for attacks on the US - and its friends indicates that his power to command revolutionary - action, at least in the circumstances of ‘the missile base crisis, is limited, | Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future . 11.. The range of Castro’s support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist; Rev- elation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Min- ister under President Goulart and an author of Brazil’s nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican officials have publicly expressed their — disenchantment. 12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force* on which Castro can“now count, but even their support has apparently _ been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet rela- tions: with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties. i re SECRET HW 50955 Docid:32423995 Page 9 Docld: 324273640 Page 10
SECRET Castro’s Resources for Continued Subversive Activity . 13. Arms. (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores.of arms inherited . from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available o for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been ham- ° . pered in his efforts ‘to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. .He has at his disposal, however, 11 IL-14 ' transports belonging to Cubana, airlines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circumstances. The IL-28’s now in Cuba are in- appropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for, infiltration of men and arms. The 6 Khronshtadt subchasers, 16 P-6 motor torpedo boats, ‘and 12 Komar missile boats obtained from the Blo¢ could also bé used - for arms deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers— both. Cuban and Soviet—could be used for arms deliveries. If Soviet ,” /f submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ‘ports, they, too,” . could be used in support of. subversive activities. We see no evidence that Cuba has or is- developing” a sophisticated amphibious warfare capability, and all the means: ‘of delivery of arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary 1 measures by Latin American mil- C a itary and naval forces. 14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's " propaganda machine remains “3 intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely ‘ to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both be- cause of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduc- Lene fion- in the numbers of cooperative | volunteers outside the organized Communist- groups. mo ; . . f° Me 15. Money and. equipment. Despite differences between Castro and Rt, , _ the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we believe that the ve Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equip- .. ment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection, » sabotage,, and clandestine communications.’ 16. Organization. The organization of Castro’ Ss subversive assets . throughout Latin America was shown by. the recent crisis to be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro -will make. a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will continue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus, both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activity such: as Mexico City and Montevideo. ; ; “. or ae | / SECRET JAW 50955 DoclId:32423995 Page 10 HW 56329 DBocld:32423640 Page 11
SECRET Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend 17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement stated ~ in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked before the , missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have most of the arms as enhanced capabilities provided by accelerated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same, ‘or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow Castro than they had before the crisis—almost certainly not more. Unless. Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and economic. problems, there is no reason to believe that anti- Castro activities-aré any more likely to jeopardize his position than they did before-the crisis. a“ ‘8. Situation in Cuba. Castro's ability to engage in subversive activ- ~~. ities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his .. position at home. Heightened political and economic difficulties in ‘ he is at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and re-establishing his prestige and in- fluence. Castro’s position in Cuba will depend in part on his own . policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets. with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of. economic. and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe, however, that .. the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet center in Latin America is still too high to abandon. The stake in Castro as a person, ‘“, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did make a decision to with- ‘draw support either from | Castro or from C Ciba; we bélieve that Cuban capabilit y for su ubversion.in, Latin Ar America we ca would” be’ “preatly re reduced, | at Jeast for a time. This capability would be reduced more in the case of “the Soviets” withdrawing support from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone. "'. 20, kn alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue to - . extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could range ‘ all the way from -the amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its present condition, inchiding. support of the expanded military establishment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably reduce con- siderably Castro’s internal problems and thus give him additional free- dom to engage in external subversion and sabotage. Additions to Cas- tro’s stocks of small arms would not in themselves change his capa- bility for subversive activity, as he already has supplies of surplus arms. However, if the Soviets were to provide substantial additional air and and equipment which were delivered in the post-July buildup, as well- ~ Cuba would restrict Castro’s subversive effort, while the more secure © - 19. Alternative Soviet policies. There are several courses of action - we 7 “SECRET CO | 7 HW 50955 DoclIda:32423995 Page 11 HW 56329 DBocld:32423640 Page 127
NY 50955 HW 56829 SECRET sealift capability, the Cubans would be able to mount large-scale subversive interventions in neighboring countries. Furthermore, what- ever degree of success is achieved in improving Cuba’s position and in expanding its physical. resources, Cuba’s net capability for subversion and sabotage will in the last analysis largely be determined by the.. overall situation in Latin America. ; 21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet foresee what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long term.on ‘their rela- tionship. The crisis has probably created difficulties of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can readily solve, however determined they may be to do so. Castro may have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of the. Soviets to consider modifying his relationship with them and seeking to improve his rela- tions with the OAS and possibly even the US. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find feasible ways.of reducing his dependence upon the USSR. The Soviets certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising control over Castro. Furthermore, his re- , peated assertions of continued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism make it unlikely that he is seriously contemplating a restoration of relations with the OAS, or that he could succeed if he tried. 22. Policy of other American nations. Castro’s subversive capabilities will be greatly influenced by the policies and actions of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since 22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sentiments. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for countersubversive action by Latin - American States, on their own and in conjunction with the US, are im- proved. Many responsible Latin Americans will have interpreted recent — events to mean that firm. and united action can be effective against the Soviet threat from Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be less willing to take coordinated action against Com- - munist inroads if the US commits itself not to invade Cuba... : Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage _ 23. The extent of Castro’s capabilities for sabotage and other clan- destine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above.. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious - targets are: , a. US missions and personnel. US missions and personnel all over Latin. America were designated as targets for attack in the various . calls for action which went out during | the-recent crisis. Action against ee “SECRET DoclId: 32423995 Page 12 ‘Docld: 32423640 Page 13 3 = ae aes EB AR SESE E S os SLIT TT te tte Lene ee eee : TA | wi
SECRET such targets has a primarily political and propaganda value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US policy. It is also rela- tively easy for Castro to promote attacks against official US installations in a crisis situation and to get help from all the various elements which are opposed to American influence in the area. Future attacks may _ be anticipated in situations in which Castro feels that the public resent- ment of US policy exists or can be stirred up. b. Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort. Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and business installa- tions in which there is a large proportion of US capital, which are other- '. wise associated with the US, or which are so important to the local economy that damage to them would create difficulties for govern- . ments which are anti-Castro and cooperating with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and water pipelines to the’refineries on the Paraguana Penihsula, and similar facilities are likely to be chosen . as targets for Cuban sabotage. Installations for the handling of Vene- zuelan iron ore are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama . might be attacked. _ ¢. Port and communications facilities are generally vulnerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are cooperating with the . US and whose communications media.are taking an anti-Castro line. | Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facilities, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and transformer stations, are poten- tial targets. Selection of targéts for sabotage will depend on the im- portance of particular facilities but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to them. d. Political targets susceptible to exploitation. Political instability throughout Latin America, in almost every case characterized by pres- sures from below upon relatively conservative and generally anti- Communist governments, provide Castro with opportunities for sub- versive political activity. Particularly unstable situations include the following: — (1) Venezuela, where Communist-inspired disorders have been kept . in check by the government, but where continued. Communist and leftist violence may lead the military to take control. In a country such as Venezuela, where the stability of an anti- Castro and anti-Communist government depends heavily upon one man, assassination is another danger. _ (2) Nicaragua, where Communist-led groups, in - anticipation of ' -” coming elections, may seek to incite: or exploit violence against: the Somoza regime. ~ (8) Guatemala, where President Ydigoras’ position is weak and uncertain. , \ SECRET 9 HW 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 13 HW 56629 Docld: 32473640 Page 14
a SECRET a _ . (4) The Dominican Republic, where the problems of political recon- struction after a generation of dictatorship have proved almost more than the caretaker government can handle, and where... a“ some political groupings amenable to Castro’s influence are “y . ‘ seeking to gain a footing. ' (5) Bolivia, where the struggle for dominance within the ruling MNR Party between the moderates and those on the far left is ready-made for exploitation by Castro. (6) Brazil, where Communists have penetrated the government _ and military to some limited extent, the tide of nationalist and ; | anti-US feeling is strong, and depressed socio-economic condi- ; ae tions and inefficient government administration provide Castro — many opportunities, especially in the northeast. e ca ae H . a4 A i \ ‘| a ot \ .. ' a : . \ \ . , on 10 _ SECRET ; I He : NW 50955 DocId:32423995 Page 14 HW 56329 DBocld:32423640 Page 15 -
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a Re, Aumands fort, Pa PROPAGANDA Generel? Sines 1 January 1959, the Costro/Commniet Regine has placed greet emphesis oe Ite propaginds efforte throughout Latin Awerica, a8 veflected in the quantities of persomel ond obvious smounte of funds Gevotes to this enteyyriee., One of the first effarts vee to eoteblich PARISA LATGIA, 9 Cuben news egency vith exchange agreenents with TASS and the NEW CHITRA BOX, es the pringipsl Castro/Commnist overt cutlet. Shipmnte 6? printed yomphiste, books eatlets have bean dtgeovered in dy Poniiua; Chile and Argentige, The baggage of mat travellers deps Cuba contains printed propegenda. Cubon goverimmt personalities such ater of Eiudation, are know to have trautported _ quantities of this printed material. Persousl representation plays o _@teat pavt in the Cestro/Coime ytomram. trevellera to Guba fox eeononte, politacal and cultui eve provided usterial for further distribution upon retum to their hone aie pro evi eathes rad, metiigs ard indestrinated and countries. Student, Maber, youth, wonaii, and professions) orgenizations sorve ad a medium for propaganda Gieséaination, Diplowatie and economic vepreaentatives heave qultivated local commmists, influential iefticts, cwrerament. dissidents through perdoial contact. Radio plays. pumely importer’ part tn the Castro/Comunist propagends within Cuba ond extemality, | | This teb contains » detedled mammary of Cuban efforts to organize nda Gnd gress control and an tten dlinstreting Cuban efforts te mail, printed material. through Mexico, | | aN HW 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 16 HW 56829 Docld:324273640 Page 17 arfort. ant |
AMS & Decent gummary of Havenats brosdcesting progran xin bropicmidn inciting revelt in Latin Amar is Additlowiliy this tab contatae four sepe rate items indleating in greater datatl the types of bromignat informtion currently being dlaseninated, nd nit Le (1) An example of attenpted diplemtic infieece in Bolivia; (2) A tebalation of neprecentatives oo Miding a recent Congress in Cuba (by profescion, eountry, end organt~ gations xepiedented); (3) An itan on propagenda through the Cuban Gpongdred labor organization (CIGR)s and (b) As cxumple of propage through « cultural, ofgantan national organization strongly influenced by Communists, 18.8 focent. fummoesy of USTA progeand on Cubs ond move detailed item om USIA radio broe ting to Latin Amorioa. ( WE HW 50955 Doclda:32423995 Page 17 HW 56329 DBocld:32423640 Page 13
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NW 50955 | AW 56829 2 | SECRER, NO ForEigy DISSEM most. bin The folloving description of the Cuben Goveranent'a measures thts past year te organize propaganda aid press eontrol te based upon thé (BD Septenber report of an official German eerviee supplemented vy August 196 information from a fairly reliable independent source. Tu early. 1962 the ORE decided ts esteblich » Gonlte de Orientacton rie (GOR) to be responsible for all propagands detivities of the Gubsh Gover ! omen’ whd for cendorship of the press. Cesar Eocalente, en old-tine Communist, & menber of the ORT National Directorate and brother of Anibal Recalante who was later “pirged™ by Castao, was appointed head of the COR and thus given control over the @ntixe Cubsén press, radio, and television. By August, Coser Ricalante was reported to have & personal etal? of 15 workers, most of whom vere Communist. Party members, end to bé holding weekly briefing sessions with editors of the four large Havena pers, entrusting condorshiy to these editors. In late Juine 1962, the ORI set we committee te be in charge of coordination o¢ Cuben propaganda thvoughout Intin America, This committee ‘dinate to thé COR, afd consisted of repregeutatives from the y of Foreign Helations, the Promsa latina news agency and the GOR, The dixeétor of Prensa lating was thé news egenty's representative on this representative of the COR, however, along with the repre- sentative of thé Foreign Mintetry, believed to be Hamon Penate y Moline, : ined the policy of Prensa Letina. ‘The Reorganization of Prensa Letina is deseribed a6 Excalante*s ortant ancomplishment, Since mid~duly 1962 the news agency haw been increasingly employed ds an inetiwnent of the Cuban Voredan Ministry end 4a, eervt: : wg ac tte propaganda medium in these countries vith ern NO FOREIGN DISSEM DoclId: 32423995 Page 19 Docld: 3274273640 Page 270
~ SECRET, NO FOREIGN DISSEN whieh Cuba no longer maintains diplomatic relations, Cesar Escalante how controls Prensa Letina’s activities both in Cube and abroad. Re is assidted by Ramon Coleines Govailie, also a veteran Commnist and ectorate,; who ecté se siden official member of the ORE Nationdl BL with the Comnniat orted parties of Letin America, Caldings hae been Pepe 48 being also a director of the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples . (TOAP) with wiiton Prensa Latina maintains close relations, The stag’ of the Prensa dating. denter bs Hevang Le to be enlarged tom 150 @uployees to: oh met 1,000 by January 1963... The center ales employs. about 250 salaried persomel in Letin America in addition to humévous. free-lance cortespondants, The atin Ameriesn section of the Bronke Jetina center sijoyd a favored position with special privileges given to “sibeageneies” working in cowitries which have broken ‘tplomatie relations with Cubs, ‘The sub-agen ' gre 46 be enlarged as. operational. centers fox 1 gevtain ereop » for exnagie, Rogvta will be a ebordinating center for Colaubia, Venesuela, Panama, Coste Rida, and Niesragua; end. Mexico City for Mexleo, Honduras Salvador, and Guatemala. . The 100-Kitowatt VAI transuitter of Radio Havens ie of spectal importance for inéreasing Cuban nropaganda attivities in Latin Amertcag eb. the ond of propaganda broaddasta the station reportedly alse. tronemits gpacltia atrectives to Cuben agents abroad, The manager of the radio stetion 14 Baldomevo Alveres Rios, preaident of the CubensChinede Priend+ | ship Comittee, who maintains close contact with Shen Chien, Communist Chinese exbessador to Cube. Communist China ea dada to have constderaple wis activities. ~ _ NO IGN DIS SECRET Q FO REIGN ISSEM HW 50955 DociId:32423995 Page 20 HW 56829 Docld:32423640 Page 21
SECRET no roreien pisseyy eriguno, which is A biveekly periodical, Panorama Beonomico Latinoam distrtbuted throughout Latin America, f6 to be given wider cfroilation end published additionally im ean Mnglish-language edition, Fernando . ing 8 campaign Colind, aditor of the periodical, 14 sala to be plamilr on “the econowhe tragedy of the Latin American peoples,” {CIA €8-3/530, | DESSEM) 108, S$ Devenber,. SHORET I FORETG SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM RW 50955 DoclId:32423995 Page 21 HW 56329 Docld: 324273640 Page 2727 .
7 ' AN. wi CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY |: : This ‘material contains information affecting the Nationzl Defense of the United States within’ the meaning of the Bepionage Laws, Title . H 18, U.S.C.. Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unactherized .person is. prohibited by law. i COUNTRY | . | SUBJECT | i | .| DAYE OF “LINFO, i PLACE & | DATE ACQ, a ' ' SOURCE: Xv eee ees HW 50955 SH8CRET HO FORMIGH DISSHM , Mexico/Cuba. REPORT NO. .CS.3/536,706 To the Cuban Embassy by the — wo: PAGES’ =. 21 Mexican Post Office 21 January 1963 Mexico, Mexico City (21 January 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-G6958 : SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 1S TENTATIVE. Person ‘(F) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Appraisal of Content:. 3. . Recently Mexican. postal authorities returned a large amount cf Cuban propaganda to the Cuban Embassy with the stamp "no such address." Herberto Jorrin Munoz, an. employee of the Cuban Habassy, cormented that with such tactics the Mexican Post Office "is sabotaging the Cuban Revolution." Field Comment. TDCS~3/526,575 reported that on 26 October 1962 * Wexiean authorities had refused to acept a considerable volume of airmail from Cuba which was destined for countries other than Mexico and ordered the mail returned to Cuba. “% Docla: 32423995 Page 22 r HW 56329 DBocld:324273640 Page 23 FO. Te ONE oct ay GN TE IA INE Beye oy Cd
é ro™ O f™ XQ. HW. 50955 HW 56829 DocId: 32423995 Docld: 324273640 Page 23 Page 24
CrFICH/L USE ONLY FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION DIVISION . , OFFICE OF OPERATIONS ae “ ' “SPECIAL MEMORANDUM. 1. HOURS ON THE AIR 11. SAMPLES OF RADIO PROPAGANDA  TRCITING TO PEVOLT IN LATIN | AMERICA | Proparod for . " Information Cepy fors se - 31 JANUARY 1963 | OFFICIAL USE ONLY ° HW 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 24 HW 56329 DBocld: 324273640 Page 245
“) OFPACIAL USE OILY. te 00/F 31D _ oo . ; 3) January 1963 . HAVANA'S TSTERUATICNAL BROADCASTRIG ‘t. HOURS ON THD AIP. vernment uses three vehicles. for its radio preparanda to “whe Cuban -Go uv "The Friendly Voice audiences in other countries: "Radio Free Dixie, of Cuba," and tradio Habana Cuba.” - . & "Radio Free Dixie” is.a one-hour weekly eransmission. in’ English to “Soa States, broadcast over the facilities of Havana's Progreso" and its network of eight. relay stations situated throurhout Cuba. Robert F. Williams, the North .. Carolina Negro wno fled to Cuba to avoid prosecution for alleved kid-" _nappinrs is the director and chief commentator 0 € this-progran, which is heard every Friday nimht at 10 p.m. EST. Using "Jazz" term inolozy and frequently crude languares Wiliams tells his "onpressed North American. brothers" that they .are going to have to "fill a lot o 50-kilowatt transmitter "Radio € jails and a Lot: of graves» and not just with black boys 5 either," in order to achieve O "freedom and social justice." assisting, Williams are newscaster Carlos” Moore and Mmusical hostess” (disc jockey and commentator) Jo Salase = "Radio Free Dixie" is heard very well. in southern Florida .and can probably be heard in many arees of the southern United States without elaborate ‘technical facilities. . , % “the Friendly Voice of Cub3,” formerly 4 popular Havana radio station known as WRadio Mambly" bezan proadcasting in May 1962. Although this powerful station does not So announce, its transmissions are apparently intended for listeners in the United States "The Friendly Voice of Cuba" proagcasts from 6:00 in the morning to 1:00 ‘a.m. EST. Ali of its ProyTraMms » except for four seven-minute Spanish news shows, are in ; Enrplish. Its approach is a shade more subtle than that of "Radio Free Dixie.” It is heard best in southern Florida, but can also be heard in many. parts of the southern United Statese’ "4 The official, internationai service called “Radio Habana Cuba" is con= sidered to be the. chief external radio propaganda outlet of the Cuban Government. More commonly known as "Radio Havana," this station broad- casts weekly a total of 187 ‘ours and 50, minutes of propaganda ‘in languafes which include Enrlish, French, Arabic, Portuguese » Spanish, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Yestern Hemisphere. "Radio Havana" is under the supervision of ‘Marcos Behemaras » deputy director (for international broadcasting) of the Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusion. In addition to the normal inforvation “OFFICIAL USE ONLY "page I-1 HW 50955 DocIda:32423995 Page 25 Hw 56629 DoclId:32423640 Page 276
O HW 50955 HW 56329 “°. ° . OPFICIAL USE OULY and entertainment, it transmits special programs--"sponsored" by so-called exile groups--the evident intent of which is to encourage subversion of the incumbent governments of Peru, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. Programs with similarly subversive intent were formerly beamed ta oo Nicaragua. and. Honduras 3 these wore discontinued in September 1962. Although first observed by FBIS monitors on 14 March 1961, the Cuban inter- national servica.was not officially inaugurated. until Nay Day of that year, when it began presenting a relatively mbdest schedule of programs in English, French, and Spanish for Europeand the Americas for a total . ‘of 82 hours a ueek. Since then, "Radio Havana" has grown by leaps and bounds, finally emerging as Latin America’s number one “international oO broadcaster. Its time on the air-is as follows, in hours per week s ‘Arabic to the Mediterranean area = 5 hours 15 minutes Haitian Creole to Haiti . 2. 7 hours oe “ Enelish to Europe.” +. « 9 hours 20 minutes * English to the Americas 2. > 17 hours 30 minutes ~ ° French to Eutope - «.. i(<‘—«‘~S«O hoe 20, minutes | . French to. Canada - . ' +e 3 hours. 30. alnutes - French to the Mediterranean = - 3 hours 30 minutes | Portuguese to Brazil = = - 7 hoyrs .Snanish to Eurgpe: & the Mediterrenesn - 16 hours $5 minutcs © ‘Spanish to the Amopicas~ - 2 108 hours 30 minutes The technical facilities of "Redio Havana" are at a trensmittor sito about 23 miles-southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave. transmitters are being used, but in the past a3 many as five: .- have been observed on the air at. the game time. These transmitters range | in power from 10 to 100. kilowatts, enabling "Radio Havana" to be heard ali over the world. Programs are sent from studios to the transmitter gto. by means of microwave relays. Lo So In additien to the .rogularly scheduled international service, those transe _ mitters have been known to broadcast special programs in order to. tako adventage of particular political situations. Whon serious disorders | broke out in tha Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a: self-styled Nelandest{ne” station callad “Radio ‘Revolucion dol Movimiento Catorce de Junio” demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station wont off the air after about a weeks _ but not before girection finder (DF) bearings: and other technical clues indicated that the Bauta transmitter site was the point of origin. "Radio Havana" announces that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American nations so that they cam beam programs OFFICIAL USE ONLY Pago 1-2 | stom Roe PS SE . Docld: 32423995 Page 26. Docld: 3274273640 Page 2?7
. “+ OFFICIAL: USE ONLY o ‘ ., back to their homelands. These programs are now broadcast as followa: To Poruvign Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movoment (Movimiento Poruano do la Lucha Anti-Inperidlista) broadcasts the "La Voz dol Peru Rovolucionarla" program to Peru on Sundays at 7’ to ‘7315 poi, ESTs . | transmits the "Mensaje. a Guatemala" progrem to Guatemala on Tucsdayo and Saturdays at 9 to 9:15 p.m. ESTs on a , Tho Dominiexa Liboration Fovemant (Hovimsonto do’ Liboracien DomlnaLeana) broadeasts tho "Patria Libro" program ¢o the Dominican Ropublic om Wedndsdays end Fridays at 9 to 92kS pom. EST. — m, Similar prograca wora becmed to Niearcaua end Honduras, but wora dropned da Soptambor 1962 in favor of a "Radio Havcna” program ealicd "Srinenora Avoricana,” now hoard nightly from 92390 to 9240 pom EST, tio propre ig moro floxiblo im that it attacka tho rogimos of cny Latin énorLean nation, changing ita target froa night to night according to tho’: onigenclos ef any givon provalling political situation. . qs OFFICIAL USE ONLY = iw CB Be SSS on ae aN HW 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 27 HW 56829 DocId:32423640 Page 26 Tho Guatcmalan Information Conmittca (Comitd Guatemaltecs' do Information): ” ne ce aren AT a i a ee TT
on " the Dominican Republic (Secticn B). The quotations are arrenged in reverce HW 56629 ~ UNCLASSIFIEB II, SAMPLES OF PROPAGANDA INCITING TO REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA. Reproduced beldw is a selection of sone of the more inflammatory’ statements that have appeared in Havana broadeasts to Latin America as ‘a whole, (Section A) and in special ‘programs tailored for listeners in Peru, Guatemala, and: chronological order, Most of the statements are taken from programs broad= east within the past ‘tio months, with a sampling fram the spring of 1962 included for purposes ‘of comparison. Passages not’ indludsd in quotation -) _ marks are paraphineses » A, Broadcasts for Latin Anierica in General (Radio Havana in Spanish to the Americas), _ SN 23: January 1963: The People’s animosity agairist Betancourt "has boon proving with each passing day. Already there has been an claboration 6€ xevolutionary tactics, the application of which is cause: ing the very foundations. of the spuricus government to . tremble, Tho National Liberation Front is turning out fo | “be tho most offective executor of the will .6f the Venezuolan poople at this tims. The slogan of the people ig "A Complete Change ef Government!" 7 a, ” . * 12 January 1963:. "Tha situation in El Salvador in disastious in evory respocts tho psopic are on the verge of a complete collapse oF .a, - GLolont reaction, The more tho Salvadorans aro oppressed, the more they strife back fom thelr Wboration, particularly since the Cuban rovolution.... ‘Tho masses-are acquiring a. groat avareness: of their atrength and the possibility of its effective use, thanks to maasures like the United Rovolutionary - Action Front, which declares itself to be the organization ereated by the people to carry out’ tho revolution the pooples ; ‘noed.” c, oO, te . > - UNCLASSIFIED - So ‘pago Yeo]. . pee woe _ , 7 . oa t ; . . ‘ : . HW 50955 Docld:32423995 Page 28 Docld: 3274273640 Page 29 Po
O HW 50955 HW 56329 ‘Hovever, the poopie of Paraguay - Spoodems at all costs, and tho crimes c _ dissuade them will bo usolcas." | ay Noventbor 1962: s Ly UNCLASSIFIED) © ts 9 January 1963: "Tho Paraguayan people are now determined to eat rid’ of tho governmont, which has ipnerod the jnost elemantary rights, ‘whieh has turned the country over to tho, insatlable voracity | of the monopolies, and which is proparing an eloctoral farce in order to remain in povor against the peopia's: wishes. nave decided t6 acquire tholr committed by Strequonar to | 6 25 December 1962, quoting a statement attributsd te Equaconan coimunists: "'tho demastic political ‘eriols is worsening, Adainiotrative ineptnicas 6f the dominating eladses: is boconing moso glaring.” | -'Centradietions aaong tho deminatina class aro inexcasing, — And copvility to Yankee imponialion is sproading, - Tho real jolution to this erisis is¢ .To atranpthen tho poeplo of abl - soctora-in thoir struggle for their rights; ¢o create a solid front with tho massess: to overthrov tho imporialipto and. - oligarche from powors and to Cot. up O posple's. authori ty ablo tq.carry out S.progran of radical rofernd.’” 23 Deocaber 1962, frau a apeech by. Education Minister Armendo sesete HQ yane ovory Amomiean nation and ovory man fa Login Anoriea to fight for hia country, fight for nig nation,. Signe for ‘nig national indopondence.’ This io that wo want aad wnat, . wo dosive, and thio is what dnporialism dese aot want. Ke dess not want it because it knows that. seoacr or later this ' gtruewlo will load to liberation fron inporialioa, and it vas the liboration ‘fron imperialism which guided Cubs’ to socialism, because liberation from imporialisa naturally loads to socialigm; What wo want is for tho poeplo af. Latin America to. fight for their. country and for the fon of Latin Amorica to fight for their country." ‘ 7 "Yonqaguojan evonta in recent days havo lost nono of thoir intensity, - Given tho vigor of the clashes between tho . Venozuclan. patriotd--porfectly organized for aetion in ehe fields and in the cities-cand Romulo Botanesurt’s traitorous forces, .decisiya episcdes should ba ovpectced within a fou days. Venezugla is the weakest tronch in the  dmporialise front in the Amoricas. La¢ it not ba forgotton . that the traitorous reeine in Caracas, despite all APZIAPAMCS p igo undor ira fron a great popular offonsivo.” + — to . * UNCLASSIFIED. - gaco Xleo2 DocId: 32423995 Page 29 Docld: 3274273640 Page 30 eee .
© HW 50955 HW 56329 wneussarrreD TE 2 i he folloxine quotations are taken eres broadasste An oe opekee of 18 323 : _g Hay 1982; epee oct, by Exneato Cusvatas mo - —— | . Nsonoekmad som eenrado ta ‘Latin Anories ‘aske v9 what’ va ehints of this or that place, how shall tho predlem bo faced in this or that piace. Yo alnays. answer thet thoro io ne set way to .seizo powers and that tho- working eleoo, helped and. stronethonad . by ‘tho -poasant class, must havor sook the moat bleoedy battio, - bocauso ig will cost thousands and thousands and millions of | Lives of thelr sens. . But tho solaurc ef pover by tho voriday . class is a historic necoasity, and né_ eno em oppose histeryeoo. fhe years’ ahoad, comrades, widi Bo tho geane in add of kmoriea of constants fratrididal etruelese’ "i . ' 8 Apral 1962, commentary on ‘Bandon: 3 ‘WAS oF eoday , Arosemona, the poopie ¢ ara rising up in am against you, your infanous cealivion sovernsiont, tho re ecrtic.ary olomonts of the amy, the bosses, tha powerful, the oxpleiters, and above all, imperialion, in order’ to FUIFILI the slogans that you prociaimad and botrayod: ‘land rofora, tax roforma, and national atanity. The pocple, Areacnana y nover forgot tholr word." & pe 1962: "the . precont governme nt of ¥dieencs’ Fuentes must bo fercod ta abandon offica, and the Cengross, ceaposod nalnly of doputios: - who hold office ns a rooult of fraud and Ampeaitica y ruc be. dissolved." . 2 Marca 19622, . "Cuba ‘hag: catd, and has mapeated a ¢housand eines , that it 4 not necossary to oxport rovolution, bocauge cach, ef tho oligarchical, - tyrannical, a and despotic ecveranonts undor which Aséelea’ suffers is itself proparing tho conditions -meceasary for tho: people to riso-uy against ft, And the peoplo wio-ourfer those proimperialist,; bloody govormmants de not nocd ‘to have parachutists drop into their mountaina. They thene selves scek. solutions for their prébiems, Tho oniy thing of which Cuba can bo accusod io of havine oponad: tha way, of have | ang won its freedan fighting in mucivilla WaPLaAR against ao. erucl] dictatorship.” «+ ‘ " UNCLASSIFIED "pono E98 Doclda: 32423995 Page 30 Docld: 324273640 Page 31
UNCLASSIFIED Be Special Sreadetsts 21 Jemvary 1963:' . | “Our standard must be a nationai MUberation, a transforming liberation, 4 transforming revolution.... The people of Peru know only too well-that clections will not solve their , problems, because Peru needs a complete chanre,.a radical ‘transformation of its economic, political, ‘and social - StPUctUreso'ccs, Therefore we must continue to fight, not for sirall or partial victories but for a transformation of Peruvian society, for the . destruction. of capitalism." 7 January 1963: mo , ae 5 "The military rovernment junta may rest ‘completely assured chat there will ba revolution in Peru and the people will’ take overceccs ; ’ We wonder if among the members of the armed forces there is ' not a eroup of truly honorable and patriotic mon who love i , the people of Peru and are ready to place thelr weapons at the Service of the people....- This is a yoar which will ot mark the beginnine of a now ora in Peru. Ndéw is the time C) to reaist with ercater forces and visor, Strike aeainst . ' abuse; trike areainst violations. oo. Tho strike is the mest ' powerful weapon. ‘The strike can do more than can —Pifles and bulfcts." 7 ne 2 April 1962: “The. Peruvian poople know vorfectly wall that tho Cuban revolue tion represents a hone for us and for all the nations of Amerlea o 4 I< is not. onough to. Gall onesel€ a revolutionary or support. the revolution; it is nocessary to: adopt ¢ a revolutionary attitude.” «'- ; . 2, To the panini can Republic: 19 January 19682 "Tho Dominican Liberation Morenent “ealls on the entiro nation . to demonstrate its repudiation of the allesed visitors (tuo U.S. warships), which are comine to outrase the country and vo be, suspiciously, : vresent precisely when the poople ar filling the streets in their strurele against the iinpe- rialist U.S. Gevernment. Everyone, forward to the fieht for freadom, for national independence, and social progress!” ss UNCRASSFIED =) page “TI=& =. he HW 50955 DocId:32423995 Page 31 HW 56329 DBocld:324273640 Page 32
“ Oe OT ‘UNCLASSIFIED - ; “5 yanuary 1963: °° 7 "Fhe: poople must coma avain into the streets and demand that _ the emergeney law be revoked immediatelysoo Citizens, all - ¢o the fight to end the reprassive gd antidemocratic measures!" | : : ’ 31 December 1962: _ “The expericnce of vhis year makes obvious to all the need to carry out tho national anvtifoudal, anticimperialist POvOlUticn cs - To carry ‘out this. revolution moans to doatrey the woactionany > antinational, and despotic power of tho larpe lando-mors ae and the great bourgeoisic in league with Ferolpn jnperialism."” 96 Decenber 19622 ‘- Wme situation can be chanedd only by tho grassroots mobiiizac .. eion of the popular masses, which WiLL bring about the proper - conditions to carry out an antieinperialist » antifeudal revolue — . tion of emancipation.” — . Me, . O "3 April 19622. . | ‘ . + fhe time wild comeseand i¢ is sooner ¢han you. thinke-vhen . + he popular. masses of our country, the maggacrad, tortured » etarvine, ‘and ipridentist masses, will Imow how to sottlo “accounts. with every one of their Opprassorde ceo fo tho 9. st streets! . To. arma! Down with tho Slloal. Trujilitsta Council » of State!" 91 March 1962: ‘mo Trusiaiiota Council og State ia net gompotcat. to RISOXVO . the serious national problons: in .tho Sngorast of Sho countzyo ‘that is why i¢ mst ‘be ovorthrova aad poplocod by a. governs mont of tho people whose hand will not traimblo ia Ubdrating tho country fron feudal extortion and yankee impertalict | ' " domination." Os po 3. To Guatemala: § January 19632 ~ .s . 4 oo, ; 7 ; : : . ; 0 . "the workers arid employees’, by means of strikes, and tho peasants » by starting a big resistence movencnt CVCEYWROLS » : must make their strength felt so as. to accontuato tho popular ~ Oo) . ; “nature of the struggle and pave the way to yovolution. fhe , Guatemalan people repudiate Y¥digoras and His eliaue.” "2 QNCLASSEFTED “nage: BLS NW 56955 Docld: 32423995 HW 56329 DBocld: 32423640 Page 32 SS Page 33 ‘
HW 50955 HW 56329 SECREQ) No forEIGN-Dissem — An even laresr maiber of Alrect Havens radic inottensnte to revolt. Seions to Latin Ameyicen comteles recently, apparently veflectiig the ineressed references to the need for other Latin Americas countries to follow Cuba's example viieb have boen noted This a i Jenuary Guban broadeast quoted a Guatemalen writer ad Saying that “after Cubs the Américan revolution will eleause the other countries of thie dirty bleiish of ignorance, mintained purposely by tO a » the way of revolution that. began in Cube," A Late December broadcast about Peru letued that "a interested groups, How America has @nly on vay eerilla movement. Le growing? it alread the nucleus for « future natiowal Mberation avy," A 3 January report on the meeting of the Uruguayat midet. Party quotes ite first. secretary 06 saying? “The net. phase will be one of hard battles, A sherpened Lib at. any time aid wileash the revolutionary storm ..« Class wer may bres! There: is no othex way but to forge the social forces of the revolution step ty Step, shaping the unlty of the anti-impertalist. forces whose mucleus 46 the left-wing iteration front.” A speeds ily beamed “Donlniedn niListin" te the Dominteen Republite om 31 Deceuber quoted a communique of the "Domindesn Liberation Movement” oa saying: "fue exportence of this yeet mikes obvious to all the need to carr out the nationsl, anti~ eudal, anti-imperialtet vevolution." On 3 danueyy, Bavens vedio attacked Prosidant-dlect. Boseh of tha Danii ean Repubide for prepering to 6e11 his country to the “Anericad monopoliete," ‘The Fado algo. repeated. ingtruetions. from 4 Cuba~based Doninicen. exile gia urging Dontnicend SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DocId: 32423995 Page 33 Docld: 3274273640 Page 34
RW 50955 HW 56329 to mobilize in support of String workers. Ten leading Domtiniesan pro-+ eet recently weate Gzech plane, (FBIS Specitel wiekly report. to. the Batly Summaxy ‘transported, to Ciba from Barope aboard Caste ext HIV} Inet sentence above SHCHET NOFORN) Docld:32423995 Page 34 Docld: 32423640 Page 35°
HW 50955 HW 56329 ste to Latin Americs continné to take the Line thie Cuba, “te, Hot exporting tevohition,” but to stress the necesaity and inevitability of internal, armed leftewing revolution in individwil Letin 28 + galling for a “solid front” of the magses in support Of such revolutions throughmut. the hemisphere, and indeed throughout the WworLd,. ‘Ghs Deniniten Remibiie and Veneguela continue to receive epecial pete Havens broddensts, Braadcacts af 23 and 26 Pecenber omindsen elections a “farce”, and mode the point that auch elections are no aubstitute for ammed yevolutions + such eo “the hérote Venetuelai revolution which hae etirr it,” A 87 Deconber gonbine broadcast. on the Venezuelan situation es euch ead; "he workers, students, inmélLiectudis, and men snd, vouen of Venesuela fight vely. Meltbexs of the Movement. of the Revolutionary Left and of the Democratic Repibitcan Union, Cammmists, and other patriots, civilians t eve Poudht at still 46 fight egeinst the traitorous and teins end cities of Vensmueia; ard that the fasotet regine of Betancourt ntator said that patricta bave risen, in eras in the moun (WRIS Spectel Report to the Datay Sux i hovenent remained active in veelous regions of Venezuela. TCIAL USE ONLY) PoclId:32423995 Page 35 Docld: 3274273640 Page 36
Radio Havana's regularly scheduled program.te Peru on 7 Jamary wad particularly strong in its appédis. to the “Peruvian people” to The program, like othere directed to several other Latin Auericen purports to be ixected by a group Of exiles: living in Cuba, “ginee we already hive a good part of the road behind us." The evolution may be lengthy, the broadéast states, but. “it ié too lste wow to contain the wadentiineable,,.the wore brutal the repression, the @reater vill be the force of the people in their struggte...." Young ary officers were urged to side with the people and, at the right moment, to “imow whdare to direct your rifles,” / Breadeasts of this type have béen directed in vecent months to & minber' of countries, tnoluding the Dominican Republic, Guateiala,, Honduras, and Nicaragua, Late last month, Radio Havena bégan broads. Casting dally programs to Haiti in the Creole language. (FBIS Daily yj and YSIS Opereticnal Dovelopuents 371, 4 Jamey, — Report, 9 Janus OFFICIAL. USE ONtY) DoclId: 32423995 Page 36 Boclda: 32423640 Page 37