_/ operations against the Soviet services in Mexico City. - 902nd ‘controlled agent was identified from an LIEMPTY photo- “graph taken when the agent tried to. contact the Soviets at an 2! the ‘LiENTRAP. tobi te: unit, consitating of LIEMPTY-10. and. ‘LIEMPTY-11,, is. ‘being removed from Project ‘LIEMPTY and “> placed. under. “Project. ‘LIEMBRACE, which supports a unilateral - physical” surveillance team, - The purpose of this change is . ‘to increase the size of the LIEMBRACE team in order to meet. gt growing. demand. for operational . surveillance support from 1 . «the various Station operating sections. The transfer will © “i -.. become effective at the ‘beginning of FY 1971 and both , -. FY 1971. project budgets - -have been adjusted to cover financial / aspects. of the “change. a - Be. ‘Raymond. ‘H, GERENDE’ was " pemoved as the’ LIEMPTY “principal agent in early December 1969 owing to a security. problem (see Problems, paragraph 1). He was replaced on. 9.December 1969 by Br Truce .H, FERNALD, a career agent oper-~ ating. under cover as a retired immigrant. The chang?. has ". caused some delay in the. receipt of photographs because FERNALD is unable to meet LIEMPTY agents as frequently as ~ GERENDE had met them, but operational effectiveness is not significantly reduced by this delay. The key issue is that security. and reliability of the principal agent have Amproved ‘ considerably, ‘ Accomplishments? 1. Project LIEMPTY has provided continuous daily photographi¢--and visual coverage (Monday through Saturday) ‘of the front entrance and rear areas of the Soviet Embassy “in Mexico City... ALL Soviet personnel and their visitors entering or leaving the Embassy have. been.photographed. In addition, visual surveillance reports were prepared when appropriate, These photographs and reports have contributed. essential operational support .to the Station's Soviet oper- ations program, ; . 2. Recently, LIEMPTY photographs were exclusively used. “to produce an updated mugbook | on Soviet officials in Mexico, ‘The book has been loaned to the FBI,. AF/OSI and. the 902nd . Military Intelligence. Group for operational use in debriefing ‘theiy agents engaged in dangle operations and double agent One . Pte Tem oe oe
Ree CE L i ont . ‘ the Soviet Embassy in-Mexice City. Similarly, an AF/OSI controlled agent scheduled to mect a Sovict contact wags \ unable to do so owing to illness, but LIEMPTY photographed - _another person whe appoared at the meeting Site and this . '". | person is beliéved'-to.-be the agent's Soviet case officer, ; ho Such coverage has been helpful to the 902nd, AF/OSI and ‘. the FBI in running their controlled double agent operations against the Soviets in Mexico, : Be Within one weok after a biannual change of license . plates on Soviet Embassy vehicles, LIEMPTY had provided a ~ “ gompléte list of the new tag numbers, along with a complete - identification of the vchicles. Among other things, this enabled the Station to identify the companions of Aleksandr Aleksandrovich NIKITIN, a known KGB officer, during his last few days in Moxico, : 4. LIEMPTY has also detormined that newcomers to the Soviet Embassy frequéntly gravitate to groupings with their -RIS colleagues in the "safaty"” of the Embassy backyard, This fact enabled the Statlon.to make certain tentative KGB and GRU identifications. In addition, certain TDYers have been linked up with’ their escort officers and clues to personal relationships have cccasionally been exploited, $3. In the field of Sovict patterns of activity and associations, LIEMPTY has been able to report accurate . changes in certain specific cases. LIENMPTY coverage showed ‘that NIKITIN, mentioned in paragraph 3 above, changed his . activity pattern following the defection of Raisa Yerofeyevna KISELNIKOVA, former secretary in the Commercial Mission in Mexico, The same applies to Oleg NECHIPORENKO, a Second Secretary at the Embassy and a known KGB officer, ' LIEMPTY also provided information on the patterns and : associations of Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV, a known KGB officer and on Valeriy Vladimirovich SOKOLIN, a known GRU officer. Coverage of Vladimir Viktorovich GORDEYEV, a suspect KGB officer, .showed that he did, in fact, work in a “restricted area" at the Soviet Embassy and also established -_.. Whe Some of his associates were, In the case of Oleg * Konstantinovich IGNATYEV, who had arrived in Mexico City - from Caracas, Venezuela, LIEMPTY was able to observe : IGNATYEV entering and leaving in the company of Svyastoslav Fedorovich KUZNETSOV, Press Attache and First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. IGNATYEV also visited the Soviet Embassy SECRET
several other times during his stay in Mexico City and had contact with other known. Soviet intelligence officers while visiting. This kind of information is a basic contribution to the Station's continuing efforts to identify and assess certain Soviets for possible recruitment or defection, , 6. At Headquarters, the Soviet Bloc Division uses LIEMPTY photographs, particularly photographs of Soviet Embassy officials, for identification purposes in con- nection with defector cases. The LIEMPTY material also keeps the Station's Soviet section up-to-date on which Soviet officers have been in the Embassy, which ones have been away; who has used which car; who has been in contact with whom; and other similar information useful in the conduct of Soviet operations, Problems: _ 2. A security problem has developed involving Raymond H, GERENDE., According to GERENDE, his wife wants a divorce, apparently based mainly on incompatability of personalities. The problem basically is that both want custody of the children and this has sparked a dispute : that has become more bitter and violent daily. In addition, the monetary settlement is in dispute. The problem is ao compounded by the fact that GERENDE's wife knows in-.some ‘ considerable detail of GERENDE's activities on behaif of the Agency. Thus, if the case does go to court, it could lead to the surfacing of GERENDE's Agency employment and possible compromise of LILYRIC, LICALLA and LIENTRAP, Even if the case does not go to court, GERENDE's wife could expose him as an Agency cnployee. Since late 1969, Mexico City Station has been in touch with both GERENDE and his wife on this problem, and every effort is being made by the Station to-have both parties settle the divorce out of court, and to protect GERENDE's cover and that of the project, After weighing all factors, it has been decided that continued employment of GERENDE is not an acceptable hisk, and the decision has been reached to terminate him by the end of FY 1979, GERENDE will be paid a termination bonus of $10,000 for 15 years service, about $1,250 more than the $8,750 his contract calls for, in order to ensure that the termination is amicable and thereby preserve