(roetoton-t022th\, 3 4 ' 4 se me a tame war aun asatngian® 'setannei Sige nnapbatieenentiemmrtihe teh mien sestinhids biMioeMtterah Mists pants LEN athlete arent eae Secret S iithte dee jn BBachaaet’ abt mati eas neil dete Si Sa le meses si@isttNTiehirtin aitn oss ata TB a tw . _, _’ RETURNTO CIA INDEX - -’_. Background Use Only , Do Not Reproduce A. Operations to Split the Castro Regime 1. A Study of the Loci of Power | 2. HMMA-19325, dated 10 July 1962, with Att. 3. Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey 4. Memorandum to the DCI from Desmond Fitzgerald B. AMTRUNK Operation . Ll. Memorandum on Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC, with Atts. 2. 7 February 1963 Memorandum for the Record by Albert C. Davies, with Att. 3. Memorandum on Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez 4. Memorandum on Jorge Ajbuszyc VOLSKY, with Att. 5.* JMWAVE Dispatch UFGA-8381, dated 8 April 1963 6. Memorandum on Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez, with Atts.
Operations to Split the Castro Regime - Interim Working Draft, Dated 10 February 1977, with Attachments
14-00000 Loe as see mee >a, . iow : tara Ga. . ow Loe bined B® Le wf. INTERIM WORKING DRAFT 10 February 1977 OPERATIONS TO SPLIT THE CASTRO REGIME Review of this file leaves no doubt that CIA was. being ; pressured by Higher Authority, as far back as early 1962, or earlier, to come up with an operational plan for actions against Cuba with the eventual aim of overthrowing the Castro regime. The following three documents of particular signifi. cance were surfaced. A Study of the Loci of Power, March - June 1962, and two policy papers: 1. A Study of the Loci of Power, March - June 1962, cites on page 5 the direction in-which Task Force W (TFW) was moving in efforts to split the regime. CIA had already recruited or attempted to recruit certain individuals. including the following: a. (201- 205568).) A sustained effort by TFW to recruit him in Brussels was unsuccessful. Despite failure, remained in close and friendly contact with TFW sources. ‘b. Major Rolando CUBELA Secades (201- 252234), ex- s President of the Federation of University Students, and an go M.D. A Mexico City Station dispatch (HMMA-19325 - Att..) Oh dated 10 July 1962, cites 11 defections and "recruitments" 2° of Cuban officials in which Mexico City Station had been involved since about January 1960, and -indicated that none of the agents was ideal from the ‘standpoint of control. An ensuccessful "approach" was. made to CUBELA. o Neetatt er homametabid fine Mate cinta th,
14-00000 Fee a testament th mae atin te Teammate bean term ne m0 pra oman Bal Pala eta tA lB ere s60 nda and selmi AS wht s ernie AA SAR S8 ottsnntdsmatte wn boven «sane atienene b aieeiate! ; . eee * Rae M3 _- so ‘ by Chaves Bite oo oO y “ae no i ; COMMENT: CUBELA might have reported the initial approach in Mexico City to the GOC and consideration could have been given to running him back against CIA as a provocation agent. Several incidents tend to illustrate this view: | (1) CUBELA reportedly had let it be known for some time that he wanted to defect. Word of such inclination could have gotten back to the Goc. If it did, it is unlikely that the GOC would have let him continue to travel outside of Cuba under those circumstances. | | (2) CUBELA reportedly had all the tools necessary to carry out an assasSination of CASTRO, and probably some opportunities, had he really wanted to do so. Perhaps he was sent by the GOC to confirm whether the U.S.G./CIA would support executive action - or to confirm information possibly passed to the GOC/Soviets by Tad SZULC. _ (See biographic sketch of SZULC attached to AMTRUNK Operation report.) CUBELA also wanted to meet with a high-level policy making official. | (3) CUBELA, following arrest, was given a rela- tively light sentence, considering. the seriousness of the. charge. Upon incarceration he reportedly functioned “Ay {7 ' aS a prison physician, and drove around in a jeep unescorted. Such treatment by GOC is quite unusual and, if true, is an indication that he was trusted.. ened : ; Be TON SQ Iee BeBe * we maby aes at Ubi lecdei dae aus } 9s
14-00000 ad TU gee Ee, gad Sent Ls dak th ae + ° Litton heme aera masta amen temaate er reatat atid em oat titiaret H num a vecnmtmtnatt anit were Famine ik Mines mime oie tnd LAS, Lat tn ¢snenet © dintenmethtineen t mnerditgs Cine la Neue cnet evan c atecu ee wena teas wer omen eee see eee / : fs a 6 a eet tm Coo spe ? . oY bom " side ~) c. Juana de la Caridad CASTRO Ruz (201-218126), _ younger sister of, Fidel and Raul, was recruited 0 ; ( ee and )functioned as a JMWAVE Station propaganda asset which included broadcasting into Cuba. d. [Major Raul Jaime DIAZ-ARGUELLES Garcia , « (201- 269882), reported to CIA from Havana throughf | | |caMsTRUT-1)~ ] i who travelled to Cuba for TFW from/( ; ) where (lived. ‘Raul DIAZ, a known terrorist, held an influential position in “the Cuban Department of Technical Investigation of the ‘Department of Information of the Rebel Army (DIER). He reportedly worked with former U.S. gansters who were deported from the U.S.; was affiliated with the narcotics racket; and was believed to have been in complete charge of any activity contemplated by two Cubans, Aldo Pedro MARGOLLES y Duenas and Emilio ARAGONES y Navarro. MARGOLLES and ARAGONES were involved in a 1961 plot to enter the U.S. meet with Cuban agents, and assassinate President Kennedy. DIAZ allegedly was responsible for assassinations during the Batista regime, and was trained in the use of explosive bombs and automatic weapons. He is believe to have ‘directed assassinations in the past from somewhere in Mexico. DIAZ was killed in Angola in December 1975 when a land mine exploded beneath his jeep.. DIAZ was reported to be a good friend of Rolando CUBELA. 3 wR wet ae ar) cer Eee Ee © Shy | 4
14-00000 $i Sait ittate amcrasedbntn btn e. Raul ROA Garcia (201-170466).. An effort to contact and recruit him in October 1962 failed; however, 3) was recruited by and worked for TFW. At that time Raul ROA was Minister of Foreign Affairs. f. President Osvaldo DORTICOS Torrado (201-260268). An October 1962 approach to him in New York failed. He became so ited that the agent who pitched him was forcibly removed from DORTICOS' hotel. g. Jose LLANUSA Gobel, at that time Director of Sports in Cuba and one time "Mayor" of Havana; recruit- ' ment attempt failed. h. Major Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO- 3). ‘Qo1- 249386) then Chief of Rural Housing in Cuba. He refused ‘to work in place but was willing to defect. Defected to the U.S. in an INRA plane in December 1962, and was recruited by JMWAVE Station. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly to attempt the exfiltration of his family. He allegedly was arrested. upon return to Cuba, imprisoned, and set free in 1967. His file reflects that he might have cooperated with the G-2, at least after his return to Cuba. . . | . COMMENT: RABEL was interviewed by JMWAVE Station in February 1963 in relation to the AMTRUNK on-island target personalities. Hé could have been forced. to reveal all he knew to the GOC when he was arrested, or he could have been a provocation.
14-00000 One, some, or all of the foregoing individuals could have reported to the GOC, Agency attempts to recruit them. Further research is necessary, and indeed recommended, to determine whether those who did agree to cooperate were run back against us. Knowledge by the GOC of such recruitment attempts against some of their highest level officials, together with GOC knowledge of other CIA activities targetted against Cuba, might have prompted CASTRO to consider taking retaliatory action. The retalia- tion concept increases considering the possibility that Tad SZULC might have been reporting White House policy to CASTRO, and the GOC and/or the Soviets all along. Of interest is the fact that on the heels of the aforementioned recruitment attempts, (between 1960 and 1962, to split the CASTRO regime), came a request to CIA from the State. Department, in early 1963, for an operation to do just that. Proposal for the operation was made to Mr. Hurwitch by Tad SZULC. It appears that pressurewas exerted on CIA to support the activity and it became the AMTRUNK Operation. (See the separate memorandum on the AMTRUNK Operation.) In view of SZULC's involvement, this could have been a political action operation (by the Soviets/Cubans) against the U. S. G./CIA. ae _ ene 18 ai faded eset odd ae E ae gant «het Fa alia
14-00000 . Ly eo pte cupwiiide >) tepne ee —— ms  - ™ 2. A Secret-Sensitive draft memorandum from William Harvey to the per, dated 27 November 1962, which outlined on-going operations and suggested proposals for continuing activities. Page 12 made clear that an intensive program would be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion, which was recognized as a long tern effort. Page 16, para V. B, recommended that the plan be discussed with the Special Group (Augmented). for concurrence.. 3. A memorandum to the DCI from Desmond Pitegerald, undated, attached to a buckslip dated March 1963, which outlined.a program to exacerbate and stimulate disaffection in the Cuban Armed Forces. The DCI had requested that TFW submit a plan to split the military establishment from the CASTRO/Communist regime with a view to replacing the existing regime with one acceptable to the U.S. The CIA proposal was to identify and seek out disaffected officers and attempt to convince them that their future lay in disposing of CASTRO and establishing a new govern- ment which could be returned to the OAS. (This appears to be the AMTRUNK Operation. See separate memorandum. ) Pages 9 and 10 cite a statement made by President Kennedy in his speech | at the Orange Bowl in Miami, Florida on 29 December 1962 [to the approximately 1,150 Bay of Pigs prisoner returnees. Kennedy's statement. reportedly had a favorable impact on the Cuban populace which might. have bothered.CASTRO.] Fitzgerald stated that CIA would also explore leads to dissident elements in Cuba from journalists such as Tad SZULC of the New York Times, et al. : ey
14-00000 PSone Me abe Mente esa Se She He eet te ace 7 a mbt ehy r AASBM AR . a AY ee eee St “4 sig ve i Fitzgerald assured the DCI that the highest priority had been assigned to. the above program within SAS. COMMENT: See the AMTRUNK Operation. paper and attached biographic sketch on Tad SZULC, a possible foreign agent. SZULC claimed to have had direct access to President Kennedy, Attorney General Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy on a continuing basis. concerning Cuban matters since early 1961. If true, that would have placed him in a position to be used as a possible channel by which policy infor- mation on CIA operations and activities conceivably could have gotten to the Cuban Government or to the Soviets. DDO/LA/Kennedy Task Force:Chris Hopkins:rp £S3 weet a i % a iP