datamatters24/research-document-archive huggingface dataset:
pet tna bi HdXI RSA ae NTA, > e e 7 . These were supplemented by informal responses or briefings to interested members on a frequent basis. The result has been greater exposure of the substance of our intelligence process to assist Congress in its decisionmaking, as well-as a few.’ untoward exposures of our sources and methods. I hope that this Committee sets out clearer arrangements with both houses so that we can make available the substance of our intelligence to assist in your decisionmaking while protecting the intel- ae o ligence sources and methods. The Executive Branch directs and supervises the intel- ligence apparatus to insure that our intelligence agencies work together for the common goal without duplication or bureaucratic conflict. At the head of the structure is, of course, the National Security Council, pursuant to statute. The Council itself has issued general directives to the Intelli- HW 55073 gence Community, and the subcommittees established under the Council give more frequent guidance and direction to our effort. Certain subcommittees focus on current crises and call for in- telligence coverage thereof, certain work on longer term problems that require intelligence analysis, and certain review the work of the Intelligence Community in specified fields. I will not get into the bureaucratic detail necessary to clarify this at this session, although I certainly expect to do so in ~12—- Bocld: 32989530 Page 17?
; ’ " aan . * . _ the future. I would like, however, to state my belief that the Intelligence Community receives appropriate general guid- ance and direction from the National Security Council and its committees. However, the Intelligence Community itself is responsible for xecommending actions needed or for recommend- ing the best way to accomplish the general goals set out by policy leaders. Thus, general policy direction stems from the National Security Council, but each of us in the Intelli- gence Community takes full personal responsibility for the actions recommended or taken in conformance with such general guidance and policy. An independent review of ‘the effectiveness of our intel- “ligence effort is conducted by the President's Foreign Intel- ligence Advisory Board. This Board over the years has had an important role in stimulating and supporting improvements “in our intelligence machinery. Its members are an impressive group of responsible Americans who report their independent views of the accomplishments and the weaknesses of the Intel- ligence Community directly to the President. Also in the Executive. Branch, the Office of Management and Budget conducts through a compartmented unit the same type of budget review of the work of the Intelligence Community as it does of any department. -13- | HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 176
cto ot ahha und Aew dnote The Intelligence Community is also subject to intensive audit, both internally within the departments and agencies involved, and to the extent feasible by the General Accounting Office, Even in those areas exempted by law from GAO review, our internal procedures follow the same standards and practices of audit and accounting that apply to the other components of the Government. | | Lastly, consistent with the policy outlined in Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence has been charged by the President with Lng OV rail leadersnip to the Intelligence Cuimmunity. He has been directed to review all expenditures for foreign intelligence within the Government and make an annual recom- mendation to the President as to the appropriate level thereof. This charge requires him to insure that the intelligence ac- tivities of the various departments and agencies give us the best intelligence product at the least cost. The Intelligence Community functions through a series of committees and boards that bring the different agencies to- gether. I have submitted an’’annex to this presentation out~ lining these relationships. The work of these committees and boards is limited to foreign intelligence, as internal secu- rity falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI -14- HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 179
HW 545073 III. The Needs’ of Intelligence nee ET ee © _participates in the Intelligence Community effort, however, so that any’ contributions that foreign intelligence might make to internal security can be properly handled. “I will not take your time here to describe all of these bureaucratic arrangements, but I would like to Stress the scope and com- plexity of the Community so that its individual elements can be understood. . The collection of raw information consumes the highest percentage of the resources devoted to intelligence. Large sums are required for the complex technical systems I mentioned earlier. In addition, the very substantial increases in mili- tary and civilian personnel costs over recent years have put a large burden on our intelligence budget despite reductions in personnel. In conformity with the Senate's vote on June 4th, 1974, I do not propose to discuss these figures publicly, but I do believe that you will be impressed with the way the In- telligence Community has increased its productivity over the years and also reduced its size and focused its effort in order to adjust to inflation. Mr. Chairman, in recognition of the fundamental purpose of this Select Committee, I indicated early in my statement that I wanted to outline for you some of the ways in which our Docld: 329895350 Page 160
Panes maianiaiecrowrtisihtortt Intelligence Community might be improved so as to open a new era in American intelligence. In this context, I believe this Committee may want to focus particularly on the role and pro- cedures of intelligence in the future as well as in the past. First, Mr. Chairman, I believe it essential to clarify for the Congress and the people of America, as well as the personnel in our Tnitelligence Community, the authorities, the limitations, and the mission of American intelligence. When President Eisenhower assumed full responsibility for sending a U-2 over the Soviet Union, and President Kennedy for the Bay of Pigs, they repudiated in the name of the American people the old concept of intelligence being disowned. I am confident HW 545073 that our people not only support but insist upon an effective intelligence apparatus to protect their security and welfare. I believe, however, that they want the role of intelligence clearly spelled out, they want controls adequate to pre~ vent abuse, and they also want necessary secrecy protected. In my confirmation hearing, I suggested the word "foreign" be inserted each time the word "intelligence" appears in the charter of the CIA, to make. crystal clear its proper function and to end any possible "gray area" in its authority. Legisla- tion was introduced in the last Congress that would do this and would also clarify the proper role of the Agency within the United States. I welcome such clarification of our authority ~16- DoclIda: 32989530 Page 161
wd Se I tea 7 son MA gaan 2 and any limitation on our activities desired by the people of this country. Just tell us in the intelligence business what the nation wants and does not want, and we will do our best to satisfy it. But also give us a way openly to change these rules when the nation expects them to be changed. With respect to oversight of our activities, Mr. Chairman, I have described the current procedures. I believe they are sufficient on the Executive side, and I reiterate that the organization of the Congress to carry out its responsibilities is not a matter for my determination or recommendation. I do honestly request and trust, however, that the Congress will organize itself to protect the necessary secrecy of our intelligence operations while exercising its responsibilities “for oversight. Lastly, I most earnestly request of the Congress some improvement in our ability to protect the secrets necessary to effective intelligence operations. The spectacle that we are presenting to the world of being unable to prevent ex- employees from revealing their knowledge of intimate relations with individuals and friendly intelligence services who put their trust in us is raising a substantial question as to our ability to obtain information from such sources in the future. The revelation of our activities from a series of leaks of supposedly secret testimony makes it impossible to ~17- HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 132 }
HW 545073 t ui Sd ® contemplate the initiation of sensitive operations today under procedures that require their exposure to a large num- ber of reviewing bodies. The issue of whether we should again adopt Secretary Stimson's view that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail" (and that we live in a world of gentlemen) should be faced squarely and openly by the Con- gress and not through irresponsible individual exposures. Iv. Cooperation with the Committee Mr. Chaixman, I assure you, as I dia on the telephone when you were named, of my most sincere intention to cooperate with you and this Committee in its work. I look forward to your, as well as our, contribution of ideas to the shaping of ‘the new era that American intelligence an have if we do our work well. By my presence here I indicate my intention to be as open and public as I can be during your proceedings. There will be, however, many matters which, I am sure you will agree, can only be handled effectively in executive session. For this purpose, your staffs have been given appropriate clearances by the committee, and I urge that you take steps to insure not only that they will abide by the Committee's cules but also that ~ See you have the legal ability similar to the one we use for our employees to require any later exposure of. such matters to occur only after you have had a chance to review whether they may improperly reveal sensitive information. ~18- Doclda: 327989530 Page 153
HW 545073 cooperation was extended to it. There are also a range of e a There are some matters, Mr. Chairman, which I am required under the statute and as a professional to protect against any chance of exposure. The names of our agents, the names of many patriotic Americans who have worked with us, and the specifics of a number of our costly and delicate technical systems are so important, Mr. Chairman, that I believe an additional level of secrecy is necessary to protect them. The lives of individuals are at stake, and we cannot put them to risk. There are also cases where the reputations and-future prospects of a number of patriotic Americans who have helped or con- tributed to our intelligence process could be jeopardized if their associations are revealed openly and then twisted in the press through misunderstanding or by hostile opponents. American intelligence cannot hope to have any future if it repudiates the understanding of confidentiality upon which specific methods for gathering information which needs to be secret. Hundreds of millions of dollars in complex technical equipment can be made worthless if the access it provides to foreign secrets is exposedi..,  .. An exposure is a one-time sensation, and American in- telligence today is suffering internally and abroad from a series of exposures and sensational exaggerations which have Docld: 327989530 Page 154
raised questions among many of our foreign individual and of- ficial sources, and also among our personnel. Whether the Intelligence Community can continue its contribution to our nation's security and welfare and the maintenance of peace ‘in the world will depend on our ability to conduct this review without further exposures. Thus , I do not propose to provide these details, but if oné becomes of particular importance to the work of the Committee, I will certainly consult with you and the ranking minority member to determine the best course of action. I stress this, Mr. Chairman, as we have but one chance to avoid unwarranted disclosures which can ruin -the lives or the futures of people and institutions which put their trust in our nation through its intelligence service. I believe that you and the Committee will want to fulfill that trust, and that this Committee's inquiry can be comprehensive and searching without violating it. Mr. Chairman, I have not discussed the newspaper al- legations that led to this Committee's formation. I have reported fully on this to the President, to the President's Commission, and to the Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees. I am submitting for the record of this Committee my remarks there and am, of course, prepared to expand on them. I believe it only appropriate here to deny -20- DoclIda: 32989530 Page 1685
| . * © t « flatly, as I have already, that CIA conducted a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation." I have also submitted for the record a number of annexes to this statement, mostly in classified form, in order to set out fur the use of the Committee and its staff some further detail about our intelligence apparatus and its work. IT am, of course, available for further questioning here today and to cover classfied questions in Executive Session when this may prove to be necessary. I hope that out of -the Committee's work will come a better public understanding of the role and functioning of American intelligence today and that the Committee's recommendations for improvements in our authority, procedures, and protection may indeed be looked back on in the future as the initiation of a new era in American intelligence. We in American intelligence are proud to be of service ‘to our country, and we firmly believe that the personnel of American intelligence, and my predecessors in this post, have served their country well over the years. We are equally con- vinced that our intelligence profession will serve the country ~ well in the new era of American intelligence being launched by a7 “ ~ this Committee. Thank you. ~21- HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 136
LIST OF ANNEXES ~ ; A. The Nature-and Purpose of Intelligence i B.. ‘The Intelligence Process | Co C. Mission and Functions Statements for all . Elements of the Intelligence Community DCI/IC D Intelligence Community Oversight and DCI Role oe . | DCL/IG EB, " Description of Intelligence Community Resources BS ; ; and Canehilities 7 : = DCI/IG “mh. OA Description of the Committees of the USIB and IRAC -- DCI/IiC G. Intelligence and the Law: Description of Suggested 0 Changés Now Before the Congress a | CIA/JUSTICE/ so  DCIT/IC HB. A Listing of External Reviews of Intelligence Community , ce Agencies 7". 7 DOI/ICS ‘yy ~c . . ; . € . . ; J. The Role of Security in CIA and the Intelligence ) CIA Community . ms _ ie _ K. The Nature and Purpose of Counterintelligence | : FBI/CIA ‘Le The Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan ° ’ (Will also cover Intelligence Evaluation Committee - and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Unit) ; FBi/Justice Dept. at dectawsificetion schedule { a colugorys : - , re ar We; ALL vr reronmariot ONG. Z 2-1M6875 LA Scot tre HW 55073 DocId:32989530 "Page 187 VEU!
. rt woo UF * J.B. ADAMS DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR Comp. Syst. 2/12/75 Ext. Affairs _— Files & Com. _— Gen. Inv. TO MR, KELLEY: — . Laboratory The original, after being apprové| 5)... a eval. _ Mr. Callahan and me, was furnished to Mri] ¢.... inv. for his use as an annex to his prepared stat| training before the Senate Committee. || Legal. Coun. Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y —— J. B, ADAMS . J BA:ams 7 a wa Nosas— [6 | li 4 3 FEB 20 1975 ; oft es oy / rd CS “e eee $ S see wer KD “>” HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 193
! q HW 545073 (D) Clarification of NSA's*@role in targeting against communication traffic involving U.S. revolutionary leaders and organizations. (§) (FE) Maximum coverage of the overseas activities of revolutionary leaders and of foreign suport of U. S. revolutionary activities. (F) Maximum coverage of campus and student-related activities of revolutionary leaders and grouns. (G) More detailed information about the sources aud extent of financial support of revolutionary organizations. ry (H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence role of the Armed Services. (IY Development of procedures for translating analyzed intelligence information into a format useful for policy formulation.” At a meeting of the working subcommittee heid on 6/23/70 a consensus was reached on a final draft of the to be issued by the Interagency Committee. ty This Report, which was captioned "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence (AD HOC) ,"4 dated June, 1970, and numbering 43 pages was signed and approved by the heads of each member agency at ~ Loy final meeting of the Committee held in Mr. Hoover's office on 6/25/70.> The Report footnoted several objections by the ¥BI to certain options contained in the Committee's Report. 4 These objections are enumerated in a latter portion of this paper. 2tpid., pp. 384-431. STbid., pg. 383. 4tpid., pg. 433. Doclda: 32989530 Page 2709
H¥ 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 210 the White House on 6/26/70. The "Special Report" was divided into three main sections: Part One, a summarized estimate of the internal security threat; Part Two, a summary of various operational’ limitations on certain intelligence collection techniques with cited advantages of maintaining such restrictions as well as the advantages of relaxing them; and Part Three, | an evaluation of interagency cooperation with suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collection. During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent the "Special Report" to H. R. Haldeman with a memorandum entitled “Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection.” In his memorandum Huston recommended that_the President, from among the options discussed by the "Special Report," Select; in most areas discussed, the options relaxing the restraints on intelligence collection.> On 7/14/70 Haldeman sent a memorandum to Huston stating the President had approved Huston's recommendations for relaxing restraints on intelligence collection and requested a formal decision memorandum be prepared.° In a memorandum dated 7/23/70 addressed to the AD HOC Committee agencies with copies for the President and Mr. Haldeman ,/ Mr. Huston advised that the President had carefully studied Stbid., pg. 437. Srpia., pg. 445. Ttbid., pp. 450, 454.
the "Special Report" and had made cergain decisions with respect to issues raised therein. The President's decisions called for a relaxation of certain existing restraints on intelligence coverage including the following: NSCID~-6 was to be interpreted [to permit NSA to program for coverage the communications of United States citizens using international cacilitiess| ‘ene intelligence community was directed to intensify electronic surveillance coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal security; restrictions on legal mail coverage were to be removed and restrictions on covert mail coverage relaxed to permit its use on select targets of priority intelligence; restraints on the use of surreptitious entry ware to be removed on certain high- priority targets; the coverage of wiolence-prone campus and student-related groups was to be increased; [CTA coverage of S) American students traveling or living abroad was to be increased; the restrictions on the use of military undercover agents were to be retained; each member agency was to submit a detailed estimate of manpower and monetary needs required to implement the decisions; and a committee consisting of the directors of representative agencies or appropriate alternates was to be constituted effective 8/1/70 to provide evaluation of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, carry out other objectives specified in the Report and perform such other duties as the President should from time to time assign. The Director
fl t ' It ‘ HW 55075 Docld:32969530 Page 212 of the FBI was appointed to serve as*chairman of this, committee. An attachment to the memorandum from Mr. Huston captioned "Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security (IAG)" set forth specific composition, operations and duties of this new committee .® On receipt of the letter from Mr. Huston the Director, FBI, addressed a letter to the Attorney General dated 7/21/70 pointing out FBI objections to certaim of the decisions reported in the Huston letter. Mr. Hoover objected to relaxation of electronic surveillance policy, the implementation of covert mail coverage, the removal of restrictions on the use of surreptitious entry of embassies to obtain cryptographic materials, the removal of controls and restrictions relating to the coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups and the establishment of a permanent Interagency Committee on Domestic Intelligence. The Director stated that in the "Special Report" he had pointed out his opposition to these aspects of the Report and requested of the Attorney General a prompt expression of his views concerning the matter. He noted that no action to implement the instructions contained in Mr. Huston's letter would be taken pending a reply from the Attorney General. No further action to implement the Huston letter subsequent to the 7/27/70 letter to the Attorney General was instituted by the intelligence community. There is no indication that the Attorney General ever responded to this communication. 8tbid., pg. 456. ; eee psec ess anager ete nen
HW..55073.. DObTA: 32999530 Page 218 oc cccroreereere yy ees vit eee rp me on ney mene ne ppee memne was to consist of representatives from the Department of’ & Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and National Security Agency and "when necessary, representatives of other departments and agencies designated by the Committee.” 1/ The Committee was to be supported by a permanent staff consisting of representatives from member departments and. agencies and headed by an Executive Director appointed bythe Committee. the staff was to perform certain functions which ‘included: (1) when requested by the Committee, agency repre~ sentatives would furnish to the staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated request of the Committee; (2) prepare estimates; (3) report information~gaps; (4) recommend subjects for intelligence estimates; (5) prepare relevant studies and reports; and (6) provide for the secrecy of the information received and the protection of all sources of the information, The Department of gustice provided necessary office space, supplies and incidental administrative support. (See | Attachment 3). 1/7 In his report of January 15, 1975 to the Senate Appropri- ations Committee, Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby stated that the State Department was represented on the IEC. It was not. However, at some time after its formation, the Treasury Department appointed a representative to the Committee.
Mr. Hoover initially declined a request from Mr. Mardian to provide staff support, but on May 17, 1971, the Attorney General requested that the FBI provide two agents and one secretary for the permanent working staff of IEC. — Meetings and Reports : . John Doherty of the Department of Justice was named as the first Executive Director of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and with the approval of the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, James McGrath, a staft attorney, was assigned as his assistant. Subsequently, Bernard Wells, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi-~ gation replaced Mr. Doherty, who retired from government service, as Executive Director in septenber, LO71. Weekly meetings were held with representatives of the various agencies and procedures for agency contribution to IEC estimates or reports were adopted. (See Attachment 4). | The first estimate ox report prepared and disseminated by the IEC was designated E~1 dated February 18, 1971 entitled “April-May Demonstrations" dealing with the potential for | violence during the anti-war demonstrations in Washington and other parts of the country planned for April-May 1971. During the period February 18, 1971 to April 30, 1973, the Committee Doclda: 32989530 Page 219