124-10168-10040).. AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY: FBI RECORD NUMBER: — 124-10168-10040 RECORD SERIES: HQ - AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116391-41X DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR: FBI FROM: PAPICH, SAM TO: DIRECTOR, FBI TITLE: DATE: 03/13/1970 PAGES: 85 SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT ORIGINAL Secret NEW CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFICATION: REVIEW DATE: 11/03/1998 | UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001 STATUS _ Redact . | ~ RESTRICTIONS: JFK Act 6 (1)(A) JFK Act 6 (1)(B) JFK Act 6 (1)(C) COMMENTS: EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES J \ : on HY 50953 DBoctd: 327169180 Page i
ore , woe : . Bee tee aa wat bee. EL . } 4 .. ~ “se Geto Fhe ree oF tor —_ ad we s i MPED SEANEES GOVE RMI LENE , VY I4 = ilemorandum p,, eee, ws made . kuctefeller Coma. SS (ard ra - Tue barector CLASS. & EXT. of REASON-FCIM II, FROM =: SA Gam Papich ~ DATE OF REVIEW i ALL INFORMATI en CONTATIED SUBJLC’ “prep aprous WITIT CITA - HEREINIS UNCLASSLFLED ey Pec EXCEPT WHERE SHUWN  Dohw ED Bacon) BATKO OTHERWISE . . Reference is made to-my letters dated parett 2 and March 5, 1987G, In my letter of March 5, 1970, tated “it is important Lo emphasize that the Burcau can also produce an extensive list of justified srievances.". It is ny under- standing that the Clrector desired that this list bo identivicd, - Eneloseg herevith is a list ef supproximately 75 items. \) ook a) ads This last should not be considered sorrel connie ete, Prepasation wes prediested on my personal recollection and na i review of Buvean records, To uske this list more conplate rid bate speciitically cccuvate would neceusitnute the review of thousands of files. ho enclosed list can be surmorted by Purcau vecords, Woe Cha eeeusdis aelheci ule tng Seno deems 25 wane. 21s also must be kent in mirpd in counce st2On With our evaluation of the allered CIA geievances which I previously listed, ™“ I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but {af the Director foels that our Bureau work can benefit by a lpersonal discussion between the Director and mycclf, I am favaidabio until April S, 1976. JI plan to leave the area. Jidmmediately thereaicer for an extended period, | ACTON: | REG Cis Z: 3. £07 50 - ; A: _ \).. Hot kee Nee ee Ob. For information. |, v i 7 40 APR ~2 Ek a a CrA HAS NO OBECTION\TO| i Enclosure DECLAS SIFICATION an DAGR 1 - Hr, DelLoach RELEACE GF CIA INP 1 - Nr. Sulli van th 1 -— Tir, Papich _ Exempt from Teaget ran 7 Date of Dee?issi ‘ NN /; CE AS : : \ enna HY 50953 DBoctd: 327169180 Page 2?
meme on “CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY yf ae WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 Let oon A BRARMETED R23 os 20 March, 1970, .The Honorable. J. Edgar Hoover | Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C, ® Dear Mr. Hoover: We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence collection engendered by Your letter of ll Maxch 1970. We warmly welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implemen-. Erinn Lome Tation CL tne i900 HELE CMC tie babe WU EEE RU UL poss pave amteliigence which you proposed. I concur also with your comments that there is a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I agree that it is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a ntinuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is of growing irnportance to the national security and to the United States intelligence Cornmunity, Therefore we endorse your proposal for a reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be conducted. ee ee men 7 . - With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to f L, the then Director, Vice Admiral William F, Raborn, Jr., the compe~ a ytent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an f (3 ,effective and realistic agreement. Iwelcorne your statement that no _ ‘major problems have been encountered since its adoption. ? 3 ue é page ee Net I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar ‘importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexamina- “tion since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine coll ec —_ Pr HAR 20 1970. aR of positive intelligence. REC 8 oo) 2 C ineadiieen el hal , AL gm ® ; { se batt om — he J ( | : CEOET _[excteés* ‘isa cutomatie HY 50953 DBoctd:327169180 Page 3
et - As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe ‘that. the following subjects are desexving of your personal consideration: | _— ye when wea Auaio coverage: Audio eoverage provides timely © intelligence of inestimabie worth to U.S. officials. for | policy planning, early warning and accurate guidance necessary for the improvement. of operational and collec- | tion activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique et | production because. it.is-readily. subject 4 to-local cross-... . checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on - Utargets which affect directly the national interests. For several years your Bureau had been recep- tive ‘to yequirements and leads which resulted in valuable coverage. The quality of your production proved that eemcgae Tanne mans one aw We tid man os - er as Your wT CG alonc possesses CAPA Sialic pore one cuporic Openerey which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency. On 2 October 1969 two related requests for audio « coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to’ positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connec- tions. (I refer to the case of Gee eae nd CHES seme.) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney General for approval, It is suggested that the question of audio coverage be:reopened between representatives of your Bureau and this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observa- tions on this subject. ; — . ae I wish to assure you that I believe that this sensitive type of collection should be implemented under rigid and stringent controls. This is absolutely necessary in order to maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting the coverage and for the exploitation of the product. (An excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective and secure production of BCOPE. ) [$) — - eect REST ETCNER a OEE EN 7 ae etna ncn HY 50953 DBoctd: 327169180 Page 4
‘(Z) Mail C Coverage. Another much néeded inteli-, ° 7 gence toolis {is mail: coverage.. -Its. importance. has been) | ww dn, proven inthe past. I have the impression that it has IBeen discontinued, and Iwould suggest that our represen- tatives should confer and examine together whether this asset might be deployed a against communications of the goviet Bloc the ge Lest, and. identified foreign, agents. ; ¢ (3) CIA out Technical Services, A. significant expendi- _ OF ture of this A: Agency's.money and personnel has been com-~ a ‘mitted to research and development for the improvement , of technical aids. This Agency has provided-your Bureau with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and has offered we pu at cost or “gratis our most sophistica ’ vhow, . ye Althovéh we wil continue these services, we would ‘welcome any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the | -..+ {technical field including proposals how these assets can be |" better employed. Your comments will be particularly appreciated in view of our mutual interests in implementing Operationg: (4) Cours es in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting. Since e the collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your ‘main internal security and counterintelligence responsibili- ties, lL realize that your personnel are somewhat ata dis- advantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting oe a processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence. 7 At our 1966 conference we offered to institute positive intel- . {viponce training courses, including reports writing and a¢ : - Ke vie deter Clidenitte det yy | | tte trace! bate Pett igionee 3 Cutheelivn » _ a : oe ; B SECRET HY 50953 Doctd: 327169180 Page 5 monies wotewemmniane, erences bah PSs we pane oe tan ee en eee neo ETERS A Se
HY 50957 NF analysis; ‘for FBI personnel, - . In soliciting your ‘views on . the desirability. of this. type. of training, I wish to reiterate | - our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be * desighed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community - in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CTRL) more meaningful to your personnel. ‘growing sophistication a and increased capabilities of hostile intelligence services, itis suggested that CIA and FBI _ |experts in this field-meet as required at our respective Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices, ‘|in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of opposition services. I know that you will agree with me . that'no opportunities for improvement should be over- . taatad which might hein to necate the effarts of hostile “services who are char ged with undermining the security of the United States. These sessions should also provide - " -an opportunity to explore and devise new means to pene- trate and neutralize these inimical forces. (6) ‘Live Bloc Sources. The record of our coopera~. tion and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defec- tors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual effort. . : . ' J believe that there is room for substantial improve- ment in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these Sensitive sources. I would invite your thoughts on how we may better coordinate requirements for these sources and establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive . intelligence production before it is given general dissemina- | tion within the Government. Our review would suggest. that there are good reasons for consultation to explore the development of higher quality live sources, for example 4 - Sebi at BDoclda: 327169160 Page 6 oS "(8)" * Seminars’ on Gago sition Services. ‘Given the Des SMS fee eee
a rs CS . ‘ hos . f . roN _ ae fee ag ; See! ran . oA e @ ‘ au “fe “a. . “YL Duin bp . Ww * t (7) Live Sources in the | Non-Bloc Area.. Sources such as d diplomats are a fertile field for ° procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the _ jactivities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern ‘|countries which are. expanding their subversive and © iterrorist activities, even tothe. United States.. Ido not. feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited the full potential of this field, and would urge that this subject * be peplored by our respective. representatives. (8) ‘New. Left and Racial Matters. There 3 is 5 already a substantial tial exchange of information in this field, Limi- tations of manpower raise a serious question as-to whether both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable developments. The increasingly close connection between these forces in the United States and hostile elements fo abroad has been well established by both of our agencies. I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how we can best emmplov more wisely ous Aiinited manpower, knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings, hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforce- ment officers, is. international in SCOPE. (9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. Ido not feel that there are any serious conflicts in this area but there may be room for improving the quality of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection, = |Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic . re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies to make mutually-agreed adjustments. Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your. experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency. eee Faithfully yours, e . . = a . ' . ; a ' - Richard Helms © a . oo . - Director . RO nance thet nner nhc x =e 7 > — . 1 rererameenmer min erecta eth: nt ETI A AE A NE I cree ent ce ptgnargeraengamtpegeaegnrrerenrensa GAERPERTTEGRTEARR Nee tere mn strard ames erer @ = a apn | HY 50953 Doctd: 327169180 Page 7 § © # Bott aif fee seine st wire eats OSMAN MTA AE Tie | | . + seep or ety
_ CASES: AND/€ C- SETUATICHS: INVOLVING Cow, SICTS WIM TE CEUTRAL TNTNULIGSUNCE AGRECY (Cza) a F boar ee Saya tats be SE a a a OP ane te am ttn ~CL) MOCASE (TrY RORIS HORRCS CASE)” sitive Savi ict-espionage ca se. 7 and terminated for the most doe anes ke 5 pape Pa S572 > The Gas é“had Hany wide’ foréiga’ "Pamifis ee cations and hist rically has been, and undeubtedly Will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet orersticons in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate anv iniormation of significance in this case until 1654, On various oceasions when - the Linigon Agent hes becone involved in heated arsu- ments with CIA officials they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate. with tha Ac - The position taken by CIA was that it should hea seen advised resardine the Soviet operaticna activity in fore cisn countries,. - This was a sen which originated an 1945 rs a claining that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develon more ang oreation of sinnificanee , identify Soviet ay its, and pos Sibly prepare conditions for  recru..tnei.t or daubling .ox Soviet operatives. We did 'hnot disseminate our reports to CIA because of the ‘extrene Sensitivity of the case, We actuaily did not “permit CIA to uandle any investigations relating to lthe KOCASE until 1957. ) In 1557, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have raccived the information earlier because many aspects of the MCCASE pertained to CIA ~ employees and onerations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicnpped in effectively carrying out the’ leads in 1857 beenuse the leads were given to the , Agency at the same time that the case was publicized, 'The Armency arrucd-’thet the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U, S., to play a | dominating rele in Europe. a can Recast (oil #t-t0 . AE eee siCREL ce en HY 50953 DBoctd: 327169180 Page @
“How much information CIA has developed over © the years concerning our operational activity in | Mexico City is unknown, However, we should,pear-in oe! tee. Fv orerbemind that forner Special Agent: ANGLED ee sets eae 4 ,many of our operaticus in Monico, includin® key ingore “mants, and subsequently bégan performing services foro" CIA after he lcft the Burenu. We also should not forget that Americans onerating in Latin American countrics for one agency are heavily exposed to the» emesources. of, another Us; Se. intelligence. or investi gativer ice sccte_ agency. This Agent knows from personal experience that er e operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world" and the exposure to leaks and errors is considernbie, od (3) THE ABEL CASE ; Althcush CIA has nov raised the point for co ‘geveral years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably 7 7 still exists, that the SBI did not play ‘it. square with OFA in the Ahel «age hy not making sortain thet the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contri- jbutions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would ‘not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this c.se, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA took the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France ito the U. 5, in 1957, CIA claims it took the risk and ‘responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined _to become involved in any operation designed to transport Hayhanen to the U. & It should be noted that Hayvhanen iwas an alcoholic and thet his first contacts with CIA> in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen'ts mental istability. map ae ee wee le . After Hayhanen arrived in the U. 5., we . arranged access to. him for a perlod, the purpose of — which was to obtain a comnlete story of his intelli~ ‘gence activitics in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, es- pecially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel, Aftcr a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped Hayhanen because he became @ problem. It was an extremcly critical situation because we had not yet lidentified Abel, CIA agreed to take the responsibility \for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but ve ee SEGRET . . HY 50953 Doctd: 327169180 Page 9
See OO SERED . « noe . + : . vor wd x eae “ gots a year * flee ee a Sof ML ttre eee Sees ek “. . | -gountries with far better. impressions than in. the past. In acdition, we have lezrned more about these. a fo, COMDEELES 5. their SETYACSS and their. scourit ¥ ehfefs. 0... By: -g spencing a few minutes with them, “Needless to-‘say, a + this kind of, tres LEnEAt has A159, Lmneasgurably helped our Legal Att aches. : a greener et Bovine ESPICUAGE ACT EVIT ' -In 1€65, @ process of Lhavestigating individuals in. ho allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionare . ,activity. The ranted to have certain,individuals ‘ ‘in the U, S. interviewed and approached [oO make nquiry atthe Bureau. At that time, our Felations po ‘with _the mad been practically nonexistent because ae ‘the fe aiiead to honestly deal with us in tee ‘case oO: fficinl who hac be oe ¢landestinely coi eelligence at the Nationa tL od pecurity Agoney. pproached us, we told : hat ld submit their request : TOUT Giplowuatic cHanners. We subseduontiy tol G) . we would not handle the interviews for the He ; stuck to our positicn. eit that OS We were impairing their efferts To gather information '... ‘teoncerning Sovieteespionage netivities in Surop i (Walter G. Kid vitsky, Bufile - 100- 11146) (8) COLONEL JOINT GROMBACH (Pat O'REE EX) / 1 Colonel dohn Grombach was o retired U. S, 7 Army officer wo, during World War Ii, established a private intelligence network, operating througheut the world but primnrily. in Europe, His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then -the Department of the Army, and in the later 1640's and into the 1950's by CIA, Grombach established contact with the Bureau throuch one of his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called SECRET HY 50953 DBocld:327169180 Page 10
eo ‘on. us Sand furnished infe rmation \ chich: Gronbach “felt. was of interest (: us. This Cissemination tl irouch . Pat O'Brien oe ara Guring tac period of Grombachts — ~) pelatienshiv: vith CIA. “We néver informed ‘CEA: that we oo vere rece:ving “such infornation which BisG was oF » aby ‘intorest to the “Agency, "It is possible that Gronbach aa given the same data to ClA but we do not know, CIA and Gr: ach clashed and the relationship was severed | in an atnosphere of severe bittornes yess, In the Jast ete Years OL its. dealings, with Grombach,[the “hgonsiPhae. veda successfully penetrated the latter’s organization and io: allegedly nad identified many of the s urces CTA. oo - - hinted to the Liaison fgent that it had be ome BWare - of the relationship between Grombach's oreanization and the Burenu. How much CIA really learned about this: relationship is not known but if its penctrations ay 18.6 were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence ; to gustify a charge that the Eureau had withheld infor a nation from CIA, particuiarly when we were receiving. _ the data from an organiuation which fwas tinanced by the Agocoyth (Bufile - 83-77204) (9) COMMISSION ON TEE ORGAN EZATI feGeUTEVE ERANCH OD VILE (Herbert Uoover Commission - 1954) In October, 1954, = task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of General Lark W. Clark, In vanuary, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator dJeseph NeCarthy had furnished the group a list of CI4 employees who were considered subvers ive. CIA became cognizcant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator, Wnen the Liaison Agent was informally appreached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its cherges, The Agency never did. What informatien CIA may have had on this matter 25 it pertained to the Bureau is not known, It is possible that the Areney's attitude was strictly eas tei-te on a ‘knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee. (Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-0750) SECRET HY 50953 Docld:32169180 Page ii Hie ee Reeser eae
(40). INTERNAL. ‘SECURITY LEADS IN F OnE SIGN, COUNT PIES. . Lo? ae L9S56's, we fave’ our. “Legal Attaches nunerous “te etemning trom internad security cases in 2 tances we did not see fit to 1@ Afrency Always meintsained that ba “internal Security" from "eounter- ly a lead in Yrance pertaining to a> the U.-5 “notify cia mi Ss focugumatsibes. hha a ‘ne Poet ~warran ted advis shu CIA SY notype wri po - .&t least asking the Agency to handle the lend, In the . a last severnl years, it is not believed that there is any basis ter ccmninint since we have regularly been notifying CIA cencerning subjects or cases who travel abroad, If the Legal Attache is investigatins, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate eftorts, rere have bcen exceptions where we have taken the positio , that CIA should not be notified because of the cengitivity of the matter How many such exceptions are known to CiAéA cannot be established from our files; howe ver, we BHUULE Weir La ibid Liles Warten Gun Doi Au be BilVvVGSe tig rate, they contact many of the same foreicn officials normally contacted by CIA, How many of those fercirn officiais are CIA informants,or on the Agency puyroll, dis unknown. (11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA We operated informants in Cuba when we had a po Legal Attache's Office in Havana, Infoermants reported on activities of communists and other subve ore res in ‘that country, During the period we operated thes a informants, we did not coordinate cur operation ith CIA, We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources However, in 1960, after Castro. came on the - _ scene, it becane jnfeggibl e to handle certain informants in a secure “nanner. ZApproval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown, This item is being cited in the event CIA had | evidence to cstablish that we had been operation™1 in Cuba and had n coordinated with the Agency pursuant _to Directives #MNenmorandum Donahoe to Beimont  Bebsuar “7 SO, 1960, re: "Partido Socialists Popular," 64-92 00-2 19, 2377 -and Memorandum Prohbose to Telnont,. February 3, 1960, re: 134 - a) SECRET _ o, an an = 9 _ 7 HY 50953 Docld:327169180 Page i2 eke me gee
HY (a2). Beni REAU. OPERATIONS IN eg see tae gk, t Was ‘activities and the Ace: “—thet=-the Ldged- Attache! oe ; ” { “cna” . ; giles *, . rie oa ™ até ed ve oe, B ~ e é ed cov in Brazil accused | ordi ed covart ich r “Relieve In“1959 the ul Ss. “Abbas ad our Legal Attnehe of, Onseein.. “in unea “intel ‘Litence activity “of a nature P o Ae xeeceds his 4° Pola ee -Pegga bt Ambpagsador further £, & ul n py over the Loral aetcene *s ¥ aie gealy had told the Ambassador adi Ssontnated “in férma tion from io oe eee &@ source who was a fahricater or 4 provocator, This. Situation arose as a result of the Legral Attache’ operation of an informant in informetion that he received FL 48s tt lng rence. 2210 corms of reo indicsted that CIA vw 2. o some ox the t informant wv ted to a "LO FA net petted nae Lote of a derogatory nature and relat was "being touted as a Presidential candidate, CTA i asked for the identity of the inforuent and we told the Agency thnt the person could not be identified | becauce he did not wee tha t his identity be disclosed. This ca 1Se is being cited becnuse CLA muy have evidence That we nad bean operational in Med not coordi-« . i nated purcuent to Directives, and the matter was ‘ further secravated beenuse of the alles oral unre Liability. of the information. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, ; May 1, 1909, re: "Williea I. Friedman, Legal Attache, Rio de Janeiro," 67-429540) and (iemorandum Roach to Belmont, May 25, 1959, re: 2 “: "Scoviet-Satellite Activities = (a3) BORDE: ER R COVERAGE 50957 In dune » 1987, our Phoenix Office presented a problem concerni ing the Bureau's handling of informants = . on the HNexican border. These informants vere operating : inside Mexico. The problen was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to Gevelop informants who already were being handled by the Bureau, It was pointed out that CIA logically could come in contact with such sources and could make approaches for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would continue to be utilized even if he were contaced by CIA. . Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to the Agei. wVe «! , oo ; : BDocld: 327169160 Page i3
HY -As indicated he later b@uan: performin ‘Roach to Belm Along tbe. "How much ‘CIA learned about oi'r bordé er” coverdite| ae Rives. is not known- Bureau Agent se pointed out that former way have been hn towhedseab bie. ig services for - Cra. If CIA learned that we were operating informants * a ‘in Mexico, it could use’such information ag additional — evidence of Bureau failure to ceonerste and coordinate With the Aseney pursennt to Direc etives. (Memorandum ont, dune 14, 1957, re''Communist Coverage Lcan.Boxder,, Relations. MELB. CIA! “"160-356015.1 TERBy | PAcs7. A quesTicn 47686 as to whetheg,CIA . _chenia he infarsed eansernine thagiouh ® Acant: es yaved as) (14 : 6 4 o a pene Bu 28 In Hay, 195 ¥ ¥ q captioned case was advis b havt he was to have 2 meeting in| uring sx iod to Jit was recommended and approve PLT Wwe not Saviee CIA. ‘act with@our double srentpevs one point. ‘The Agency | may have had furvher. contact oy may bave also picked up the contact with the| Rhe etce is being hithlichted since we ooo What is important of is that CIA established to demonstra 2: that we were operational wna we 2 7 thout our knowlecse, The he nossibility that the Arency. hag svidence did not coordinate with the Agency. (ilemorendum Bronicen to Belmont, June 10, 1557, re; CrA REQUESTS FOR E JREAU LECTURE ON C MNUNTEM IN THE U, 8, On Septémber 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C, Sullivan could give 2 lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the lecture, Such leetures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "Ye cannot maxe Sullivan availablo to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusel SECRET 7 50953  BDocld:32169160 Page 14 “ H 4 i i :
HY 50957 (16) 1963, CIA : ‘locally con tacts AU? , SECRE . AO Se — oo we a a a “to cooperate. ona most ‘important subject of interest occ 6 | oy to both.agencies, (Memorandum Sullivan -to Belmont, October 1, 1955, re: "Request for Lecture on Corainisis BY.CIA) Gass o> en oe ktcial On suly Os 29964. 8 9 a CIA enployec in Moscow, had been . iz with a Soviet girl, According + allesediy had furnished information involved in an to our source, to the fviet girl. We checked with the State Denartment and CIA und we confirmed that BABS had been involved , an affair and that he had been reualled, According to Cif ind State Dencetuent, there was no indiention that ae hed been involved in any espionage against the oS U, &. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Burenu to identify its seurce sed thea chanved. its mind, . ar - A Whether CTA has iocumeanted this as an ins tance where | oo j the Buresu foiled to coopernte by rot vyoLlunt beer ing the source is a matter of conjecture but | se that should be kept in mind, (Bufile - rs (17) THE ES PERATION | In April, 1963, we becam? Involved with CIA in that Agency'g efforts to collgct sensitive information relating to tentions to conduct espionare CrA had access to a sensitive . source, m@ WO Yas in &@ position to make ~ available Cocuments, On Apri} ii a ¢ Lemal Attache in ad /C3a concerning this matter, % Sri chee quarters was highly disturbed because its office ae, had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted ‘to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of cur dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We ~ 12 - SECRET BDocld: 327169160 Page 15
oO SERER “indilirids ain “vnseh And boon" “gent fron“ Boréswe! ee s being highlichted heccuse Operation: to CIA and. the Agency. phat aniormaticn had been jeaked atlevtoss, ve Lt vies a vitally inpor tan he 3 5 hed wa at 4 as) we ey cO can wr feet “to Jie have no evidende or renson td - believe that the LEeal At acne Oftice ever involved itself in any such z 2 hould not, under ary cir eunmstences iat CIA Poet eng Sted Be ; biinty of tappinw thones ang instaliane microphones in Much coverega on U. &, officials, including their residences, should never be excluded, The information we hid convered to wank Attache possibly may have been acquired by the hrovugh clandestine coverage, CIA possibly ecula charge us with handiing enews sensitive infoumation in @n ducenure manner by transmitting it to . . i [| without ¢ niersing with the Agony. In eannectian with alleged envionarce » “BCtaVAity in tac ae S., CiA has never ye@en Satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau, The Agency possibly could take the position that ve looked Lightiy at the allegations and did uot purgue &@ mo cer which, in eve erited amore aggressive appro.uch, (Bufile - . __ For some time, CIA has. held tg ,2 posi the @ pene | the ine Agency has pointed out that i | . ere Golleetine sSensitive_information in the .U product is ending up in In Januesry, reviewed the stntus of our investigation of _ligence activities in the U. 8. . The Directo oO a "Y think this whole thing has been imaginary on ' of CIA whic th has been played as a sucker by a I would waste no more time on it at least until nil Cr A restricti ons are removed,' CIA did impose restrictions by not noemittin 1s us to pursue certain leads because it ae feared that its sensitive seurce woul... be Jeopards zed. “ (Bufile ~ BEES LO . ~13- 6 SECRET HY 50953 Docld:327169180 Page 16
coy . Sard . ) apie ee OO grep Oo ; ‘from CIA, We did. not obtain clesrance from CIA for ‘the Inclusion ofthis anor mation in-our-monograpn.. - Clénrance approval was not obtained pecause of the urgency.of the. ¢oc unent Cia was irrivstea becaube "4€ @onsidésved our “adtton’ 4 ‘dis stinct: Wola “ton Tok thee cee tie Fees Ghard agency rule. Tne 4 Agency. “never made any. protes to - (21) BUREAU THER? ‘ARTS . ° i Yoe6 ana 1967, ‘We were ‘operating informant in JAt the inception of our op pevational ec@ tivity, CIA was not informed. . In one case, We finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Buresu would be peraitted to run the informant in yin the second instance, we established &n agreement with CYA in October, O67. thay we could con- tinue handling an informant in eon the undex~ standing that the Bureau aces nthe casion of efcn visit, would ecenfer with political ; Unfownation collected from the informant, These two cascs 7 had @ll the makings of & condlict. CLA Was unaer une OT definite immression that we had been running these 4 informants before we had finally eedinntgd with them. _ It ig true that nh fas much incensed but no 155Ue Was Ha at CYA Headauarters and theratter Was put to rest. . = CIA: my. have See, ee ine in evidence that we were operating in ering in mind that in @ plego such as tt would net be difficult for a CIA intelligence office® to spot an FSi Agent in contact with Gour notey tad vulnerability is : that we were ope Tatine onl Bi thout. coordinating as) oO ; i Phe information emanating from the caption 3 sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA and other avencies for several ycoars, | The sensitive : source has traveled abrou id numerous times ond his trips ~- ' \ , . a oe - BERET wee ener ee ee cee: pela Raines ae SB pane rae we Tet carpe neae rymmmme TT me HY 50953 DBocld:32169180 Page if
; ; : opie, ‘ em, ; . : * . . val : oR TT , = i: SECR | ; ~ . . ; * i oo. (25) ESTABLISHMENT OF RURGAU LIAISON WiTs Inanuary, 1960, our Leral Attache, Bonn, traveled to ‘Or the purpose of exploring arrange= rn ments tor lrars th appropriate “uthorities, The i  U. S. Ambassador raised questions, ug out thay over. me the yoars, all relations vith the| had ; 4 , been handled through CIA He indrenteaq that berore there i Was any change in procedure, it. would be necessary for . CXA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his at. Agency had not been contacted “by the Bureau prior ‘exploring the lisison arrnncement., We. eventually . With CI& and came to an agreement satisfactory to parties concerned, IOLNTL @ ty ~ hmiO O ¢ bel £3 b-bh Ol ht ed oO L C3 a 4 “ Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where oo we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with Nationsat ~Securet vy Ca wHaLL Nirertives_. (lomovandum: Bre to Beluont, March 3, L960, re; “Lagal Attache Operat: Norwey, P OREARE, mweden, and the Netherlands," 66~ pS $3 C2 ch i In t! 1¢@ latter part establishing a Lercal Attache in purpose of the assignment wa Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and H ’ CIA of our intentions, (lemor January i4, 1990, re; "Legal A Netherlands," 86-18973-113) © en ee o By @ gave censideration to. Sees Denmark. The reau lends in e as did not infgern um Frohbose to Belment, 2che Operations, The eth O et $2 Duet 1 be $3 by © ® er 3 fet © (26) BUREAU DISSENT) IAT iON OF COU IELRINTELLIGENCE ae eee ii ONMATION TO. POCRSIGH SERVICHS ~ 1962 reer enn a ne A Ne AO a “By. letter dated Novenber. 7, 1962, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bur: 22U disseminntion ‘of gounterintellig¢ence information to foreign intelligence Services. CYA, at that time, had particular reference to inforgition which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the peed gence, Seryice con Ice erning. KGB operations, CIA. SRE a sso ene ee a fe ea eee veer erate pene ie errengen na ancinie rem ate Fae Ay Re me Ree onda noe, CR SER eI tnt! HW 50953  Bocld:32169180 Page i¢
oN red 8 em | 7 SECREI | | 7 | - | 7 - .'. . Direetive, the Burcau was obligated to coordifiate with | om CIA prior to such dissemination, rhe particular: data ‘ had emannted fro: cne of our se nsitive t e582 sources sa -, Ye vesr ided to CIA by stating that the information was the product of-an internal security operation and dic not relate to any operational activity abroad, CIA again surrendercd, The Agency could argue . that it was responsible for following ¢ Soviet matters Ss with tel oe rntgdtsgones Service and that we had an obligatis coordinating with the Agency. . Brandis : Rovember 9, 1262, res” 7 fe (27) "“THS. INVISIGLS GOVERNHENT,"A BOOK AUTHORID BY WISE DAVIE: SB AND THOUAS ROSS In August, 1963, we received information indi- cating that Wis 3e ard Ross were in the process of gathering 7 material for a book pertaining. to activities of U. 5. | intelliceneg ackinitias Rath Raaa and Wise cantactead . | the Bureau. It was recommended that Liaison orally advise CIA thet these two individuals were preparing a book cone | cerning U. S, intellisen a agencies. The Birector. noted '"y see no reason doing so.’ 7 my ;. It is not known if CIA was aware ‘of the contact with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subseque aatly published the book which contained extremely derogatory information — . | concerning CIA, (Hemorandum Jones to DeLoach, re: "David Wise of the ‘New York Heraid Tribune" and Phonas Ross of the "Chica co Sun Times") . o (28) | COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES ~ AY RICA ee | 7 -. In April, 1660, CIA inquired if the Bureau would ‘give any consideratien te acsistae the Agency toward ' developing coverave in Africa, CIA was leoking for the i services of any Nero. infornant who might be available. The Agency also inquir ‘about placing a Nero in the. Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to no 1S. ~ » SECREL an Sa SNR a ne nee a a anes RR oan en AEH Om Ene mem RE NES a SS Yay EA, te pa Aerentaget lg aa EN ee nme A wg HY 50953 DBocld:327169180 Page i9
HY Nia set In the” same month, CiA inguired if the Bureau... vould reostablish | bechnd surveillance coverase on ce ee gwho CIA elt was a key figure in pane f-seentifie in Cre ee dnta.to ti gence worvice » CIA considered the matter: important becnuse: ionshiip to theflideast crisis. [@) On October 21, 1969, we toid CIA that future requests from Cia for technical surveillance coverage - should be transmitted by. the Agency directly to the Attorney General, 7 CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the aforc-mentioned action by the. Burenu as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has lenked to the Eurenu as the logical point of contact and as the only organizntion naving the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible, FR oy BEY OF TEENS Anwen meer H PRIA UH. ae Ch rr Se ae ek oe Oa a EL eS Oe] 50957 The Liaison Agont recalls fragments of oth: situations or conilicts which occured over the years und which resulted in the voicing «f CIA displeasure or criticism.: The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance ecnrly in the 1980's which involved ingormation recocived from a source of unknown reliability charging Alien Dulles with having been a communict and a spy while in Burope, We Gisseminated the information to several agencies, Dulles exploded but never ledged a protest. The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its gource or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation.of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us, Techuically, this would be violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerabie, pa ticularly 22 an - important informant was lost. . CIA never made any official issue or protest. : ; a = 24 0 SECRET _Bocld:327169180 Page 20 We declined to reinsts tute. Tay
i ad — og . oem SECRET LIST OF BUARAU CRISYARCES tear emanates Petite sah SEPARATED a - ; i. ATIA CAS “CAENST BUPPAU CIBXICO CITY AND FRANCE ~ 1951) ; Althoush Ament Pasich di a not bowrin Le tesy Linison with Ci. until 1652, it is important to refer to highly signi- ficunt differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fail of 185i, Our Legal Attaches in Hexico City and Peris renorted that CIA representatives were attocking the Bureau, were endeavoring to plinace us in an ungavornble light, ~ is L % were questionin our juricdiction, and were naning disparaging tale ae remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was sumed up by characterininzt it as covert hastility within Cia, stemming clargeiy from aisg¢runtled gormer employees of the FBI. In October, 1951, General Valter Bede 41 Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing dif ferences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostilitv arninst the Buresu and maintained that these WAS & gene a} feeline of resnect for us, He admitted that there nad been isclated instances of friction for which CIA -must accept its share of responsibility. It is my recollection that the Director and other Buresu officiais did meet with General Smith, at whieh time guidelines were set foxth for maintaining future relations between the two arencies. I was not able to find menorancen 4b ee of record covering this meeting. (« 2. RGSELYTING CF EVRUAU PRREONIAL BY CIA se tn AG NT ap The. Avent clearly recalls that carly in the 1950's via encountered difficultics with CIA because the Agency allosedly was reeruitinge BGurenuecmployed personnel. We vigorousiy pro- tested,and subsequentiy che Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having’any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a pericd of at least thirty days. the Arent could not locate the baock- - ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos= \ Sible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent. \ eneotaate . KO teh a “L3- 56 75 Y 78 4 HY 50953 Bocld:327169180 Page 21 wt
HY aye, oe 2 vy . ; “ECTORS = 1LOE4. . yo a eBoy” Zetec oO ik) teed a of protest Was ‘sent to Gensral Py de ; " SM Pe pGe tor Cohn vtee Nt CINE MMPS Le eae 7 politieni usyiun waieh was being considered for cextrin polish . sailors who had been “scized by the Chinese Hationalist Government, General sseminat pomorangum indicating that members : of the : greea@ that in view of commitments made : by the : nd Chinese officials, that failure to arrange reeentry tor the Polish seamen would have an adverse 2 effect on the overeall United States Defector Prorram We : emphasized te General Betis that this matter had never been : Officially pores before the Defector Committee. He was : informed that his seticon was not conducive to mutue uh eooperation. i 6. CYA INTERVIEY OF BS IN TEE UNITED STATZS - DISCUSSION " WITH Mes DULUES MSMBUR 27, L055 On September 27, 1955, the Liaisen Agent met with “Allen Dulles, at whieh tine the Cli Dirsetor's attention was. i geferved vo a mauter witch Aad not yes developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to ec nfliets : between bie to agenct ‘Dulies wes referred to the contacts i ‘of aliens in the Uni tates mage by CIA personnel without ; first obtainins the clearance from the Bureau, The requirement for such oranee was clear-cut and pursuant to an estublished agreement, (62-S80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont . _ Septembe y 28, 1955, "Relations with CLAN) co . 9, CHA. APPROACH OF A HATIONAL ACADEMY EMY GRADUATE = (1955) In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA apnroached. @® National Academy (Bracuate to utilize his cervicesMin This appronch was made while the graduat & WAS uttending NEUiONG Academy CESSES, A protest was made to ksy CIA. officials for not having advised us prior to Q blishing contact with the Academy graduate, (fe: sae . 10, in Dece ber , eee wo received information i. dicatine ith an indivicual whom the Bureau was in & double arent operation, We atives had established contact with some advice and ruidance without resu, We protested to (cra. : SECREL . ~~ Som. f0953 Docld:32169180 Page 22
‘ e . a i . . ” im st ro " REI , so - a % : : ~ te FS oa cor Sat £ - eee F : ay : ¥ wat te ! py .2 CIA official thet the FRI us that he had been. Bee are be ‘feantantnc “operational ites etochdare We. Hades Re Ver he oe _. beeoame involved in unv een ae rent aud ; We later goeterninead Ces thet: Me Cha: words eR bo, Geena! hi 3 the pal ohh On duly 20 2a had been inc Washington, Dp. Ce 1 CIA employee. We wore the Agency hag Lic contacts % it was inc 2 COA & 1 en i Bs sm Stace Re i . are Vai Gd. c necertained that ee sed by CLA on duly ah, 1086, that z = a Lacer intexviered ne xy ots . i 3 t, had bee = ~ £ = we whith a be 4 Aetcon es 2 >sted and CIA sunnm ; a Cer OL £ ¥ Maen ot: eg FE ie Fant de eR eeaD aes Gis HOLE Bolmont to Boaréman duly S1, 105CG Tass de ry In duly, 1986, @ statement was made hy a State pertment official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly ised that the eubace ss ~ Soviet agent pevas being JON em ted te enter the United States so that his act: vities , could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a positisc to promote a defection, Tae Luretu was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose deseribed above, The State Department official was unable to veenll the name cf the CIA employee involved; inguiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CLA cup Lovee without conduc (ang th bebe i investigation wit the. Agen icy comin up with the ident yw) 17, ibex 8, 1956, we strongly pro- tested to CIA nonnuse ron atives of that Agency had inter viewed an a@lien in the un clearance frown the Bure. By letter dated Novem ts0n c 9 4. be States without first obtaining t should be noted thet there was yelleestablished ni cement. whereby it was incumbent upon CLA to first check with the Bureeu betore interviewing any c 22d I United States. (Letter to CIA November &, 1856, pee wrgeenermenetengene vent tm TLL ERNE pager HY 50953 DBocld:327169180 Page 23
HY . 19, 56, ‘en VWiNLGGNtL ES .the subject 1 -perteining to. u- high-speed coer CIA was not inv 20, a _ SECRET | 4 a ot J. o wath whem .we bind been in contact beau 5, asscemition - where he Was contacced by. givenja le etter Thaicating: “na that he was ; United States. When ¢ ) permitted CIA to interview ‘Soreisnw intelligence inter: at which time he. sAutioned by CIA not to furnish enied shat any such that the writer YW dnterested as returned to. a rd Scaus ests, We subs cauently ir informed us that he had b per ane =} Hornation to or as ‘ -_ = er a ue hry Ne 4, eer: 19, CIA REQUEST FOR INSCRMATICN CON ERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAHERAS LOST hata dee Aa es etn te The San Francis 5cO Office furnished information indicating that CIA had regue fivm ain Californian. to furs gadvih Liveblu Aguacy BULLE atien Messed hs ad LUPGLEN LHGUhe Ret etured by the com; ed becat to be certain tha cur jurisdiction, We did not develop evidenee that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction The Director cid make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me "we give CLA & pretty wide authority to explore such a field, H" (Herorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, "Flow of Inteliigence Information to Soviets and Satellites throush So-Called Channel , & 2 nt : mf ard " fa } 3 J The matter ves. revics On May 28, 1957, CIA advised what one of Lts renre- sentatives in, the field hed intervieved the eapticned Gere alien who h tO coonerate with tha “agency ¢ ariter he returned to Eee CIA condueted this interview without) first obtaining clearanes from the Bureau. Such clearance Was neccesary pursuant to an established agree MENT. vi proiest wag made to the Agency, (Re: @&8 SECRE! 50953 .BDaocld:327169160 Page 24 was A “gorier ” mews ae bat Columb ia awh nivier sity: Tee aS aa Sse of z nDeoenmber ,0 0 oe dah ote
Oo SECRET CIA REQUEST FOR TOU REPRESE ENDATING osom 1 n July, 1987, Cia reauested a tour for several officisis wha were coming to this country under CIA CIA was tol tours woubLd be riven to the becouse in t abaesador had nsulted the Bureau aiter we had ¢dFPrested the sader's chautfour on White Slave Traffic Act charge. @®) invatstion i that no If we so desired, we could give consideration to accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individunls whom ve considered undesirable in lieht of the frores ‘rift, (Memorandum duly 165, 1957, Noach to Belmont ll ~ Request Tor Uurenu Tour by CIE RY. =) 22. WREQUEST POR SE SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN (a) Re APIO = LEY = L&s? ee ee er ed On Novem sber 15, 1957, our Rey Yor? Office was ¢con- Lo ? tacted by the local CIA representative } tho desired to be ine formed if the Burenu could conduct a security survey of the premises of the Council on Foreicn Relations which were loca sted. United Nations Delegation The CIA representative indicate’ that his visit to cur offiee was pursuant to instructions received from Allen Dulles whoggllesedly was concerned about cy of thafEoviets PstablLishing coverage of conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council, .It should be noted thet the Council included eas members many wWwelleknown personalities, including officials of the United States Government, vy) across the street from 2 a occupied by thagGoriet = Pursuant. to instructions, Allen £ Dull es was informed on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the ayproach used by CIA in that such a sensitive matier had been taken up at the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters, (Henerandum Roach to Beinont November 19, 1957, re "Council - on Foreign Relations") U) oO ye —  SECREE ~* ae snanae sateen nse ~ cee ew ceflteren, eee HY 50953 Bocld:327169180 Page 25
In Octgber, 1957, we received information fron SL indica ting tha a keientist then visiting in tHe Unitea(S) States mizht defec@. We™followed develic pments through SSE wand we hept.ClA.advised,.. The, Agancy was iuliy avare-of the... . Situation and particularly Enew that we were in contact with oe \ tiv received information indicating that CiA sop rove? established contact with : re leping information concerning eS) Jsctoatists A protest Was made to CIA for not their interests with us, bearing in mond nossibly could have Teonardined : emeroeyrieeraaT properly that the a Burenu 24, protest ng that Aren subject lien, withou 7° cesary c AS PRPERSONuATION CF FRI EMPLOYER . vo . . raw 1958, we received information indicating Loyees lhegedly had re 2presente ed herself as being with the ‘a3 “when she tried to arrange an interview with Unio , 2h official of the 2 jternationsl Association of uachinists in Washington, D. ¢ ie gave a si igned. statement in which he claimed that he hea @ phone call from a Miss EERE? vio id S wit Uson checking with CiA4, we were int HM gd that she had made ' suca  NUnEnoun 3@Lmont April 35, : '1S38 "Unknown ' By letter dated May 12, 195&, the Bureau protested to CYA for intervieving-an alien in the Detroit area without first obtaining the necesstry clearance from the Bureau. “ such clenrance wae necessanry pursuant to established ag srecment. -~ 8 - fates - — eterno atl 50953 Daocld: 32169160 Page 26
HY ee ov 4 e y ge oo ov. The Legal Attache “Sune i 1253, that he ~ whe hend- of the GCnne avare of this informed our Lecai_Ateseh LeEgav Visit with to acgeept the inv We could being uncooperative 1958, "Relations with eve 31 Oe In June, . wluate the CHomoroangumn Roach to Be CIA") CIA position in this matter as linent June 17, ° CIA eee TENS. GOS, - q o question concerning CIA's failure acdhex to. am nes sement relating to CIA's (S) recruitment of aliens an the United States for over gene Veteblicanda ongrations. Under the aryeement. CIA was not to approach a abien without first necking witn(S) us & Situation develosed In Illinois indicating that CIA allegodly hod becone interested in recruiting an alien and even took some action without finst checking with us, We expressed our disapproval in 2 letter to CIlA June 12, 1958. (Memovancum Belmont to Boarduan dune 9, 1855, "noorul tnent (S) of Aliens in the United States for. Intelligence Oncratians' rd FICIAL's CREPICISA 32, CIA OF our Legal th oe gat. Attache, Tokyo, OVEerseas oy tts MASTERS oF acme A DECEIT" obtained a ‘copy of & mano Embassy in Tokyo by (EEE In his communication foreign countries. weapon in only to the Communist Party, USA small, ineftective, f¥detion-ridden that ti 2 author of the book y a policeman, (Memorandum "Masters of Deceit.") as not an intellectua Deceit! as an anticonmunist claimed that the book nertained A, which he characterized as a Oree snigation. He stated Ll but rather Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 19538, ~ 10 — “ at, 40953 DBDaocld: 321691860 Page 27
- 3 3 ry A Bs YE LO ia ose of DEE SUR ERLE BEARERS: a pony and ased aed te ihe uni te scates. Ot infosmation by CIA . ~ in Washington, D.C. and volute ved ‘@ Source by CEA ar . the Ageney, In ' that in the case of ean have notified us at te? in order that we could have considered cxpl suternel segur at the outset, (Re: Activities «= ed Ween developedias (0S Fete, me information to ae 1853, we told CIA the Agency should oy A ares uo hye cis RA os oe te s fipcarss eh ST a Da on Pea a ee we Sit meth ew gp ne OR Do ek ere eee pen Me kw ae ae ae hae BEN ote ote ale yn te er a “ln ae nt 4 he Foy ok ae 3 A abe on - Saw a 5 Service, acfectcd the United m1 S an ° + Sg oe ap te -x 78 UPRASMCa GAUP CHE Ly valuable 3 Ch ‘infcrmati wt ie: ‘ we develoned information indicating 4 letter in fhaich had ¢ AN IManvar who ha . ) The writer further bed that he mignt Be connactcd with the tntellicence Services. phe letter addvessed to the Director een pleced tivo. hed enced in in-the office of Ale subseduently cular cemuunication from Cid, | 2t that time that no setion was noise 2 Bede a t pote i?) ‘ ‘ the PECEe } and the contents were sue in L envetore which, in avVed & copy of a A required by the Bureau, We asked CIA for particulars. lending to the alles ee opening of the Letter which had been. addressed to the Directo CYA claimed that it had not opened the letter. We ware confidential.y informed by an Agency repre- sentative that the Kad onened the letter and then reforrved the matter ne contents were such thut inves- . tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA - . cin Hurope, | “What actually peppered at the United States Embassy is something. \ 7@ may nover knoy S SERET ale - a 7 - es ie HY 50953 DBocld:327169180 Page 234
a oo = =~ SECRET “ : t dated June 2 e9 rerardine cra ‘gen bhectd: garter view: ~ was considering for overseas reeruitr “On July "18, 1858) CIA requestéd the Bureau fem ~ to Be) 1d been develored throucn our [C Fis Washineton, D.C, On June 5, 10338, we had obtained the conten of oa The Convers? ted that OT Closely with the AS ogyent ly, ~OLA Geveloped information A koy ficure ina revo lutionry volo! whieh wes to overthrow ; HY Fo? ie * 7 a . ~ wt oge raturned to and was impor . ‘ 2 ~ 4 ~, 74 yon Luforns: de available zo ¢ “enied y impiieat 5 revolutionary C4 st oo supp i in tep officials in the ; : covernnent. ld Cre at he was on the aetiy om that he needed proor of Nonepivatorial leg if we would permit the ing that this was ie Only way | ®) a On July 18, 12858 £4 sl was advised that the Bureau mositiye ly wontd. ‘Sion to ) We maintaines if we granted Such ~ permission, our other Jgors be serious Ly tepers tet) ~—~G) On July 21, 1°58, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation in ) Pursuant to dnstruetions, CTA was then tol@€ that in view™of the position in which the Bureau had been placed, we acceded to Dulles’ request. CIA was further taid that we were seriously considerins: the | Hecause we did not intend to be  &P t n the future. \ . On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Ligisen Agent ‘that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction He stated that he was not interested in-holding a pistol to SECRET - 72 - . eee a 50957 Bocld: 327169160 Page 29
HY and ie Baolees, tastes “be! nsedy ay the matter for the - fags to be used Py CTA ore ane aan in) reesare | NOW: pre Hpriy hear of any ¢ mo owe tool in resisting sive information to a foreian : fe crorandum Roach.to- Bglmont, | | ‘for “Deritission to ne (insemination c _ govern “dated “Saty Co -Who could be considered as cs aoe ee NESTS _ “2 Jn T85a, engared in. a program cesgion “@ctivity in Bemico. We became was to involve goon ea tien oF MMOL tS residing an PCR LCO, PRO WOWat Due Peel mee: A : to the Undted States CIA denies operation LOL In September ad embaried on a Americ ins were ore Agency's ey in involved . A): The Linie son Acont subsequently was informed on strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had cially informed us that it srupt erned because this ira ples, “Ane ludins implomenta tion of si gebliici od Adesucau that it was engaced to oust AmePican communists. Formed that the Mexican Government aunist program and certain . re checiied with CIA and the ‘ laimed that his Agency was net ° been in contact with certain Mexican officials concerning . ' possible antic wndet ectivities The And Gor had consulted t i , ad fora list of Americans ins deportable, me CIA oificer reportedly : fur nished a list of approximately 40 names. (memo- randum Reach to iy Reda Septenber 17 2rib : “1958, “onal Attache/ss ship with Embassy and CIA hay with the local. “CIA chief and had aske 9 Be ROE a expressed our. displensure to Cra its Septenber, 1958 ,Abecause of that Rionaiaa ee thorized. investigation in man the United. Stat 3 Romanian tigen who.was here in connec~ tion with an cxehanre orran, Tha Romaniang#indicated to an : fcceq) in sthying in the “ay ‘9 Aynorican frtend that he was interes States, but was not roady for actual defection because of U) SECRET. Bocld: 327169160 Page 30
HY be a a SECRET the ‘Riscau. NM Lotter® ‘da ited “Séntonber ion 1s 59), was | i fea And he-was told “thet the Buea HRS cee because he had failed to make any objection, had “hot alektot “us, donee rni ie “the inpending (Hemoxandunt Frohbose to Gelmont, — August. 27,1959, » faerica's Global wets 2 Pruet 3 Septem a58 and Memeorandum, rohbos se. ‘Beluont, Septenber “4, 1s59, "Allen Dulles") 59 3©W 5 KA REARS ES 19 OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA - oo infovmation in september, TOSS, that . the Cont on Lon of CIA had held interviows with American nets. Divis im the Beston area, which dealt with meetings between the | business smen and tl tee gy roportedly + yas inter- ested in developing positive antoligcence information Mbut so happened t] one Was involved in a 1c Burgau, The Bureau already By letter{s to the m&iner g, bureau to" HoeE Ey” also:sont- -£ disappointed “ha. te “the: ateiele. attdck against ¥ ive en end + the Bureau, “Allen Dulies: farina, ser, 195 ms ade 8 Lt. fy de aa Bai A bei Sept venbe co y yvich CLA had io Bah g pai yandied this, Re ATE RY oee Sah. py BEFORE ACTIVITIES CHCUA de APT Xf FOU ove. PIN ost ATT 4 fae ie at aes a) La ae a I 2 R Abs bak) THE ise Ve RAED eee te NR Ri 1959, information was received interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek Tisler, a Caech defector, to testify before the Committee. HCUA ~ advised us that it had contacte 2d the State Bepartment who, in murh, had conferred With CiA, Allen Dulles allegedly informed HCUA that Tisl Was agreeable to appenring before the Commitice and that he vould be nade available pursuant to certain security | instructions. : On Noverber 6 3 indicating that HCUA was he Director aslze d whether or not CIA had authority ~ to make a defector availcble. t to a congressional committee without first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was informec that CIA did not have such authority because a Nationa Security Council directive made it very clear that this could n be done without PROCCES INS the matter through the Inter-Agency Defcector Committee, In this particular case the aforementioned Committee had not  éallod a mecting, but the chairman, a CIA official, had made certain phone calls... A Bureau representative was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, butet that time we had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allicgedly contacted the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee had no cbject lon fo making Tisler available. SECREL -~ 17 - ct v7 moos Su oe) Yt ee ts anne aman nana SO953 Bocld: 32169180 Page 341i 4 fl fl gE rapt