aon woe ND ni —36- my : oe Toes . ‘ ty That same. day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he, and an Air Force General were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 ¥ November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner being given for Schneider ,* after which Schneider would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, jrould head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports: General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physfcian. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military will not admit involve- ad ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be 4, blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October) The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his. official car, and his police guard . ; K failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt.Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an- other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October) Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price . agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors." * The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel. Wimert apparently understood , that Viaux was involved in the October ‘19 attempt. He stated: , Q. Were you told any of the details of how a -the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out? | me aa r. Sa ~ They indicated it was going to be F Be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending. — (Sarno testimony, p-. 37) HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 474
4 f so bg 24 4 5 oe + : A Q . . Ry . fh ‘but Wimert,insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concluded Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October ; * now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October) i: E. The Killing of General Schneider In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt. * Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago. Da *al though Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic. do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group: -The only assistance requested by Valenzuela , to set the plan [of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub- machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand. (CIA. Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22) .Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen- zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason i why they still wanted the weapons was because ‘ there were two days remaining before the Congress . decided the Presidential election and the Valen- ; zuela group maintained some hope they could still Pats carry out their plans. on (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975) — HW 50955 Boclda: 3274273539 Page 475
i. f er: re ‘ : 1 ooh = ee At about -7 am that’ day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there. Shortly after 8 am,General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew _his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing. The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schweider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease Be. guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October). The submachine guns had previously Ww been described as "grease guns. Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen- zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters: * The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts. In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re- = sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con- Spiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge i. were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three years in exile. , HY 50955 DBocld: 324293539 Page 476
~4]- voy . . . y, “Station unaware if assassination was pre- sy wy ARE meditated or whether it constituted bungled A wALthough ‘it abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior Armed Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near certain that Admiral Army Lt. Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved. We have reason for believeing that General Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightests, set Schneider up for execution or abduction.... All we can say is that attempt against Schneic is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are will to follow Valenzuela's scenario. (Santiago 598, 22 October) prediction of ( an abduction at constitutional Dr. Allende wa: died the next « F. Post October 22 Events The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediate] tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to; as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Val uel of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, , Task Force to make the following initial judgment: With only 24 hours remaining before the Congre runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The on General Schneider has produced developments closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequent plotters’ positions have been enhanced. (Chile Task Force Log, 22 Octot On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed It was agreed...that a maximum effort has beer and that now only the Chileans themselves can successful coup. The Chileans have been guide point where a military solution is at least of them. (Task Force Log,~24° Octok . | pit Nate ert HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 47?
=~ Qa cAlthough it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of i constitutionalism" was correct. (Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24 — Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider died the next day. B i, &
: “a3. Soy CLA/White. House Communication During Track II The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials. Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White House stood downCIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile. Both testified that after that date they were neither informed of, nor authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters. By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House. The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testi- fied that he was informed of no coup plan which began with the abduction of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan-~-which he and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction. CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony, page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments. (Ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between -Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines' daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Haig prey gee es took place~~but does not establish with maine ‘that the. topic. § was “ ts LEN ETE Ne ey HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 479
A. September September 18 Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a Re plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA — records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September) nat The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con- ge cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was _ viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit.” cd September 21 bn ee a The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar _ confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair- man, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa- tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred. September 22 Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay eee « at “0 oom mitte ae oe & ans Wa Me fs aS meeting called to discuss Track I. especially the contacts with then-Chilean-Presigent Frei. According to ea ghd Re of aie HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 480
and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines) ’ px. 5B. October | October 5 A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals -| | Valenzuela and ~named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such «a meeting had taken place, although he had'no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, % pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 ed Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee. October 6 The Station reported that General Viaux was “yeady to launch golpe oe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October — 1970) “In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one “with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri- ous action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970) : Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of : r an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) poeqeene —_ makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kigsinger testimony, p. 24). 3 i or HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 461
"Similarly, Kissinger. did not remember having been informed that the CLA had called off a coup it. regarded as premature. He stated: My perception at that period was that if they had a coup they would come...back to us before triggering it...at no time during the period did they, in. fact, tell us...that they had a coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed, they generally told us the opposite. | (Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26) As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meet— ing on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms‘: and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting, CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed. However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State De- -partment's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes: Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende position such as proposed in NSSM 97.. It was agreed that an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr. : it Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait Lo , 5 accompli and higher authority had no inténtion of conced- ing before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the. Meeting. of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October 1970). a October 8 pede, Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar) © - In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch be with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must | have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going contacts. ab HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 482
- 47a - ‘ It seems to me, although the records don't re- flect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must: have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12) October 10 Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all." (Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970) ‘Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th. His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation. paren I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a nega- -tive progress report, that they were just not com- ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12) HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 483
50955 -Chilean situation.one way or another. -49- meeting on the 15th. (see below) to have discussed the results of the October Lath message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53) October 14 The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In ad- dition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by. Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the CIA, Charles Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned to Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation. According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile. | Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist." He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seem- ingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful one were slight.’ Ambassador Korry: agreed with Karamessines' assessment and stated that. "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would be voted into office on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that "there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the ' Other participants at the meet-— ‘ing concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970) Bocld: 32473539 Page 464 | we K if err
- 49a -— October 15 Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White.House to dis- i cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, | and and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one. chance in twenty-~perhaps less-~to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative.repercussions p> ; . | PF from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues: —_— 5. .It was decided by those present that the: Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. es Preserve your assets. We will stay in .touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." 6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least: temporarily, Dr. Kissinger. instruc- - ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main- tain the capability for Agency operations’ against Allende in the future. 8. The meeting concluded on. Dr. Kissinger's note 7 that the Agency should continue keeping the pres- —— P sure on every Allende weak spot in sight~-now, ; + a i after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until. such time as new marching orders are given. Mr.. Karamessines stated that the Agency would ‘comply. (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. ad Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970) HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 465
= ous Lak yok ad ra we a TF Kissinger, sin*his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets." Kissinger believed that the gist of the October l5th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maxi~ mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-5@) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated: 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much prefer- able to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date.... 4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune. (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970) Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as “turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony. The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something. that was not going to succeed....My general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized.” (Haig testimony, p. 13) ‘aad ar ae HY 50955 Boclda: 32493539 Page 4686
ig ; oa : — =51- , a ‘4 October..10-October 22 (approximate) Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89) According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress x all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential te that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted." As they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8) October 19 Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan, beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Com- mittee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to ve the White House.... (Karamessines testimony, p. 72) And as I say, if for no other reason we would have | wanted to get this kind of hopeful report to the. White House as soon as possible, and it would be my best estimate now that that is precisely what we did. (p. 72) In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then, Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining-the Valenzuela “If the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were not directed to end their coup:efforts in the October L5th meeting. Unfortunately, the Committee has. not had access to the daily calendars of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the # date of the President's conversation with Karamessines. Those calen- dars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have —— SAY been subpoenaed. By Sy om Om Mn tm recs er RET aa _ | | ie “AP AEin Ob op gm Pt "a ie Renae rs $ eg coy een et i I i i HW 50955 Bocld: 32473539 Page 487
_ plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haig had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the-19th. Nor dfd he believe he -had been informed of. the Valenzuela’ plan. "This xe is all very new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiar with this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters that are described in here." (Haig testimony, pp. 38-39) Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October ig l5th...." (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, according to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Lbid., p. 53) He indicated that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns and tear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was no further meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs (the CIA's), none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me." (Ibid., p. 62) Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved the abduction of General Schneider: Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure that the record clearly shows you answer to the direct question of whether you knew or did not know that we were negotiating with military officers with regard to a plot that did involve the abduction of General Schneider. Secretary Kissinger. I said I did not know. (Kissinger testimony, p. 86) Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction plans before the fact. De, HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 489
you aware during that period of time otal the plans to kidnap General Schneider? General Haig. I was aware after the fact.... Q. But you were never informed prior to his attempted abduction? General Haig. I don't believe I was at all. October 20 A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines testified that the references to "high levels" in the cable of the 20th meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan for the 19th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicated that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When news of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, ‘What is this all about?'" (Kissinger transcript, p. 68) October 22 Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came’ as "a great shock” to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either was present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in to maauad : ey Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had’ ‘told him! (Haig testi- Hi i : Re i b i mony, p. 36) pe _ HY 0955 Bocld: 324293539 Page 469
C. December December 2? A memorandum, dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated that Heims had given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney General - Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)." (Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18 5 al November 1970) In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiv- ing the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an “after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I, dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by. a number of aspects of me the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. - (Kissinger testimony, pp. 71, 74) ; . _ D. Did Track II End?. The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indi- be cated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presi- war wa * dential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress.” . : Ben ges -—y - Ee eee le om : pit? ee fl ae, mo, oe AEE ED eae AL eee , HY 50955 Docld: 324273439 Page 490
# -' The! Committee does not have this new ' ‘marching order" in its possession. However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed that there had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change , of government in Chile... Karamessines' testimony was most explicit: Mr. Karamessines. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that . in my mind either. (Karamessines testimony, p. 26) by kk RO Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there a specific order ending it? Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned, Track II was really never ended. What we were told to do in effect was, well, Rllende is now President. So Track II, which sought to prevent him from becoming President, was technically out, it was done. But what we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what poe we could to contribute to the eventual achieve- ment of the objectives and purposes of Track ITI. That being the case, I don't think it is proper to say that Track II was ended. (Ibid., pp.-128-129) When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never iz ended, Kissinger testified: — The Chairman. Would you take issue with that, : with the (Karamessines) testimony? ~ ' : L Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear’ that...after October 15th that there was no separate channel by the CIA to the White House and that all actions with respect to Chile were taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to or contact with military people, no plots which Loam familiar with, and all the covert operations in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress were directed towards maintaining the democratic opposition for the 1976 election. And that was ; : ' the exclusive thrust, and if there was’‘any further’. po contact with military plotting, it was:totally* unauthorized and this is the first that’ I have heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75~77) HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 491
HY 50955 | ‘Vou (0 fa / (Draft--9/8/75) Jw Hu 1 A. Summary | South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and: his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee _indicates that the United States Government offered encourage-. ment for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the assassinations... Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup. On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") out- lined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being considered for changing the government in the near future. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle which would rip the Army- and the country asunder" (CIA cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated "[wle cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination", and the second directed that the recommendation be withdrawn because “we cannot bé in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging Bocld: 324233539 Page 492
HW 50955 _our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63); CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63). B. The Abortive Coup of August 1963 On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killing nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the Diem regime. | On May 13, United States Ambassador Frederick 7 HNWolting met with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desired nim to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and. recapture public confidence. -These steps included admitting responsibility for the ifue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirming religious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) On June 8, Madame Wnu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publicly accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents; Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis- associate the United Ctates from any repressive measures against the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308). Shortly thereafter, Hadame Whu commented on the self-immolation of Quang * Senator Gravel Udition, the Pentagon Papers, The Defense Depart- ment History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, pp. 297- 298, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon Papers) . Forwer Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, John Mecklin),in his book, Mission in Torment, An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam, Doubleday and Company, 1965, (hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the vul- nerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this period noting that it*"“offered a classic Opportunity for a Communist Sleeper ploy.” Bocld: 32473539 Page 493
HW 50955 Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12,. Trueheart told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and again warned that the United States would break with his govern- ment if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers, p. 208.) Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought down the Diem regime (Conein, pp. 42-44). These events led the United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169) By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had agreed on the necessity for a coup. **. In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting, Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview * Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved in the coup “for many years. Some of them I had known back even in World War II. Some of them were in powerful positions, and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis, not as a government official." (Conein, p. 17.) ** Conein's After-Action Report stated that: "The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to. Ngo Dinh Nhu and.Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed.'' (Conein After-Action Report, p. 10.) Bocld: 32473539 Page 494
-4- with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory . and asked for harmony and support of the government. Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Whu ordered forces loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's * promises to Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p.210) On August 24, 1963, the State bepartment sent a cable (Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot. Lodge. The telegram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State Averell Larriman, and was approved by President xennedy. (Pentagon Papers, ».235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take “prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the Buddhists. “We must at same time also tell key military léaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVW (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically unless above steps are taken. immediately which we recognize requires removal of the Mhu'ts from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept : the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate Inilitary commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism... - Con- currently with above, Ambassador and country teams should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's replacement if this should become necessary .o « ae ~ —— * Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur when no American Ambassador wés in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few days before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein, p.21). HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 4945
In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True- heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 “as a basic decision.from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (1.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government. Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids * and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South “Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 912) .* _Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that ''we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63). | A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United ° States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho- rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, -8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated: ¥¥n a cable to fMarriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast - had “complicated our already difficult problem’ by eliminating “the possibility of the generals’ effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that “the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the ‘kiss of death! to its friends” (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63). HW 350955 Docld:32423539 Page 496
HW 50955 -6- “I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I emphasize that everything in these . messages has my full support. We will do all that we can to help you conclude this operations successfully .... Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions. While fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this. operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63). In.a reply cable, Lodge stuted: "1. I fully understand that you have the right and responsibility to change course at’ any time. Of course I will always respect that right. 2. fo be successful,.this operation must be essentially a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of. its Own . Should this happen you may not be able to control it, 1.e., the “go signal" may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge to President, 6/30/63) A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:. "This particular coup is.finished . . os . Generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of Forces ... . ‘here is little doubt that GNV (South Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have con- siderable detail ...." (SAIG 0499, 8/31/63) Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later relations between the United States representatives and the generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength of American support, grew in confidence. C. The November 1963 Coup American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell, in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course Bocld: 32473539 Page 497
HW 50955 -7- (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). Lodge suggested a study to deter- mine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the regime (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). On September 12, with White House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were curtailed (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215). In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's. actions, recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers, p. 215.) On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington and presented their findings to the National Security Council. Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops: by the end of the year, ending support for the forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended Boclda: 3274273539 Page 4968
-~B- against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be e identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-]16) On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of pDien's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63). The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that “we do not set Ff co ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63). A cable froin the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that: "“(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we micht receive even partial know- ledye. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Conseyguently believe best approach is hands off. WUowever,,we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan." “* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units. ** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified: "Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director _ personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas- sination? "Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57) HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 499
HY 0955 McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that “our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a “hands off attitude” (McCone, p. 62). McCone testified: "I felt that the President agreed with my position, des- pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.) McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather “whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his “hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6: "McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to -ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, aS we cannot be in position actively con- doning. such course of action and thereby enyaging our responsibility therefore” (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63). In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters: "Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was inade, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's instruction was Also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodye commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SATG 1463, 10/7/63) Bocld: 324293539 Page 500
HY 50955 -10- Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals ,* testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the assassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20 (Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate in his detailed After-Actiou Report) that he then told General Don. that the United States opposed assassination, and that the General responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talk about it anymore" (Conein, p. 36). | The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his / ways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3) informed .Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspending aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217). On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with American requests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219). On October 28, Conein met with General Don, who had received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup * Conein described his role as follows: "My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals who were planning the coup, to get as much information so that our government would not be caught with their pants down" (Conein,.pp. 38-39). Bocld:324273539 Page 501
HY 50955 -11- available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place, and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the -United States on October 31. (1.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers, p. 219.) On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely - in Vietnamese hands. General- Harkins disagreed and cabled his opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers, p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed White House concern and stated that "[w]e cannot accept conclu- sion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup" (Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolve- ment and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers, >. 220.) 7 Late in the inorning of November 1, the first units involved in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters (Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits ' Docld: 32423539 Page 502
to those killed in the coup (Conein,. 6/20, p. 72) .* | - Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during most of the coup (1.G., C, pp. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15). The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30. p.m. the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired about the United States" position. Lodge responded that the United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern ' for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221). According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later, telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report, pp. 17-18.) At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General ade a CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21). On October 29, Lodge calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated (Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63). Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe in his house. HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 4503
HW 50955_ ~13- Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to . surrender if he and. Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After- Action Report, p. 24). | At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage United States interests (Conein, p. 57). The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.* * Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel from the palace and.fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon. He opined that an informant must have identified them and called the ‘General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23). Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace . the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2. Ten minutes later they were picked up by soldiers and forced. into an army vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No. 888). Minh originally told Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives ina church (Conein, p. 56). The Inspector General's Report states that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their backs (1.G., C, pp. 43-44). The source reported that Diem and Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint General Staff headquarters. BDoclda: 3274273539 Page 504
-14- None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.* * It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in ‘any other country. There were no aircraft immediately avail- able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54). HW 350955  Docld:32423539 Page 505
HW 50955 IV. Bocld: ens TABLE OF CONTENTS Findings and Conclusions . A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves . 1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba ........ No Forei n Leaders Were Killed As A Result of Assassination Plots Initiated b Officials of the United States - oboe ee American Officials + uncouraged or Were Pri to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider tee eke The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions . American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Cou Gontrol the Actions of Coup Leaders CIA Officials Made Use of Known Under- world Figures in Assassination Efforts ......... . 4. 4 3A B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves . . 5 Le -” 324273539 The United. States Should Not c_Engage in Assassination . a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments. b. The Setting In Which the Assas- sination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them Page 506
HY 50955 Bocld: a oad . ‘The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Their Criminal Talents , Findings and Conclusions Relating t the Issues of Authorization and 32423539 The Command and Control System for Assassinations Was.Such That the ‘Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization... Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized b. Schneider ec. Trujillo d. Lumumba e. Castro . CIA Officials Involved in the Assassina- tion Operations Perceived. Assassination To Have Been A Permissible Course of Action The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their superiors In. The Agency.And In The Administration Was Due To: (a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations to Their. Superiors ; and... . (b) The Failure of Superiors To Give Precise Orders Regarding The Nature of Permissible Operations and to Make Clear That Assassina- tion Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Ageressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations Page 507 LO 13° 14 15 15 16 16 17 18 “20 26 26 26 11
: oy ' ~~ Page (a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions to Reveal The Plots To Their Superiors Or To Do-So With Sufficient - Detail and Clarity Ce ek kk kk 27 Castro .°. . . 27 Trujillo .... 34 Schneider... .... 0. ee 36 (b) On Occasion, Administration Officials ; Gave Vague Instructions to Sub- ordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration. Lee ee 37 Schneider... . 2. 2. ee ee, 38 Lumumba... . 0. be ee 38 Castro . ee, 39 6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary . . . . . 2 eee ee ek 46 (a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial .. . 47 '(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and 'Euphemism . .... 2... .2.+%. 48 (c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions. 49 (d) The Danger of ''Floating Authorization". 50 (e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert Capabilities ....... . 50 HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 503
HY 50955 Approved, Drafting Subcommittee, 10/8/75 (Lumumba sections open to possible reconsideration) IV. Findings and Conclusions In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and conclusions, the Committee has been guided by the following standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee. 1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose guidance for the future. 2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions because of the amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and "many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents and testimony. | 3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons involved in the events under examination while at the same time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations. | With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the following findings and conclusions. Boclda: 324293539 Page 505
HW 50955 A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves l. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba The Committee finds that officials of the United States Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro. | The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quick- ly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination. | The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965... The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars,. exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving under-. ‘world figures reached the stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba, procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. In the 1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode 7 from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement | | i to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and | provided the means for carrying out the assassination. _ a Boclda: 324273539 Page 510
2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assas- sination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba - were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assas- sinate Castro failed. DP, ie. Laon Loin Far 7h nen? 3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider American officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissi- ‘dents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols and rifles. A ern! PT (VHS Af Cefypreg | ‘American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals who. plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun. However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested by officials of the United States. | The record reveals that the United States officials. offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who ‘plotted . the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider. “ HW 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 511
HY 0955 ~3A- AS, . g A_ < Bei vou yt & (ACS fitocer, Mie Ee a iy eh fA 2 “ JS As Director Colby testified before the Committee, fe death of a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo: the contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed, ‘although the possibility of his death should have been recognized as a.forseeable risk of his kidnapping. 4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived _.to be of Crisis Proportions The Committee fully appreciates the importance of evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we described the perception, generally shared within the United States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed, although it does not justify them. Those involved neverthe- less appeared to believe they were advancing the best inter- ests of their country. Docld:32493539 Page 512
HW 50955 Na a Men” her fe se teh ot eh? IAD Tae 2d YS Sue Fr] oa 5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders Running throughout the cases considered in this report was the expectation of American officials’ that they could control the actions of dissident groups which they were support- ing in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he’ was unable to halt a coup; a. cable from Bundy in response stated that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later. Shortly ‘after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA headquarters requested. operatives in the Dominican Republic to. tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the aftermath.'' The dissidents replied that the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States Government . Dbocld: 32423539 Page 513
HY 50955 tletr og at Ka 2 agi 3 wh he BAS ae Eh idee 6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens. Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used | by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign ‘national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA for a variety.of purposes, including assassination if the need should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back- grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo.’ B. Conclusions Concerning. the Plots Themselves 1. The United States Should Not Engage. in Assassination We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assas- sination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life. Bocld: 324273539 Page 514
In addition to considerations, there were several practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of ‘this report recommending a statute making assassination a crime. | a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments | Two of the five principal cases investigated by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders (Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, Schneider) involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the coups and the degree to which United States officials motivated the coups. | The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations instigated by the United States must be prohibited. HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 515
Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination. The . possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises questions concerning the propriety of United States involve- ment in coups, particularly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect. This country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed to be tyxrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants. But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such support should be overt rather than. covert; what tactics should be used; and how such actions should be authorized and controlled by the coordinate branches of government. The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's final report which will be issued after a full review of .. -covert action in general. HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 516
b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them The Cold War setting in which the assassination plots took place does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our~society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justifi- ed the assassination plots: a ‘First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied, Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but po. only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. leo Ss AO Pedy p assassination—had_been planned _ by. ae GiZto% before that, crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible course of action during the crisis. | Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United States should justify its actions by the standards of totali- tarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending. HW 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 517
HW 50955 Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend. The first was written in 1954 by a special committee form- ed to advise the President on covert activities. The United States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than [those] employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."* Although those proposals did not involve assassinations, ft . the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, | indicative of the setting. within which the assassination plots were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117) * The full text of the passage is as follows: . another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political, and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. .No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplish- ment of this mission. The second consideration, it is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever | cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U. S. is to survive, long standing American con- cepts of American fair play must be reconsidered. Boclda: 324273539 Page 5186
HY 50955 We do not think that traditional American notions of fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt tactics “more ruthless than the enemy” A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent -- t WIROGUE -- because ‘He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because nis case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of con- science. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. (Memo dated / /60; Bissell Tr., 6/11/75, p. ) mo The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the ideals of our nation. 2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents We conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld figures for their criminal talents* in carrying out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect —apending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their expertise in carrying out _eriminal acts. Bocld:324273539 Page 519
upon our government,* the use of underworld figures involves the following dangers: a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business" gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the : : * ; . . . PoSrpurre figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used_. You their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution7 The CIA 9 #7» yr rrr ern ene - also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against QJWIN in a foreign tribunal. | b. The use of persons experienced in criminal tech- niques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood that criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are neces- sarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper activities is increased when persons of criminal background | are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take t advantage of their criminal skills or contacts. \ *The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fight- ing organized crime, did not issue an order against: cooperating with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had . made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba. In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the operation had involved assassination, he did, according to a CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworld figures should not be used before checking with him first, but failed to direct that they must never be so used. HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 5270
- 12 - c. There is the danger that the United States Govern- ment will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal.acts and that criminal figures will take advantage of their associa- tion with the government to advance their own projects and . interests. d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of oun society forbid. The use of underworld figures by the United States Govern- ment for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context five decades ago: | Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is con- tagious. If the Government becomes a law- breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in- ~ AO ae vites every man to become a law unto himself. To declare that in the administration of the thy criminal law the.end justifies the means -- . a to declare that the Government may commit a pea crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S. 439, 485 (1927). HY 50955 DBocld: 324293539 Page 5231
C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori- zation and Control In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing _ discussion elaborates and explains those conclusions. | | The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for the assassination activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking positions authorized or were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the officials responsible for the operational details of the plots perceived that assassination had the approval of their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would not disapprove. No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes , discussed in this report were authorized at the highest levels of the government. But the record leaves serious me HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 522
-14- doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by the Administrations. Even if. the plots were not expressly “authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel _4\ believed they were acting improperly. 1. The Command and Control System for—Assassina- tions Was Such That the Plot§ Coul ave =—— eee Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization As. emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility for the assassination plots. Even after our long investiga- tion, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization which made it possible for assassination efforts to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government without express authority from officials outside of those agencies. | | | Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 423
HY 0955 , Oe il Oe "FN Bie ‘ explicit authorization from the highest level. The command A A tet and control system revealed by the record made fe possible for : . : ener ener reer eee as the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without express authorization by officials outside the Agency. OO The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. While there is no evidence that the "plausible denial" system has succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered in this report, the possibility that a system exists which might permit those responsible for authorizing major operations to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government requires that public officials be held accountable for their decisions. 2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized | a. Diem We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assas- -sination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top State Department officials did know, however, that the death of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup leaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coup leaders were considering assassination was brought to the Boclda: 324293539 Page 524
HY 0955 -16- attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and this information was relayed to the coup leaders. | b. Schneider . We find that neither the President nor any other . official in the United States Government authorized the assas- sination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnap- ee Tru yillo——__ | —_—l a. The Presidents and other senior officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end. The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended 7 i to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents' intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of the government responsible for formulating policy is less. clear. The record does establish that. in the Spring of 1961 senior American officials, including the President, learned that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that they desired machine guns for that purpose. The Special Group disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself, in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the Docld {42423539 Page 525
HY 50955 United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone / assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters. fee et. d. Lumumba . The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot. | The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles’ cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb ‘about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba. Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was . Presidénti Orizatiow for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because ne Boclda: 324273539 Page 526.
HY 50955 5 ee ea a SE ian id ~L7A- this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when this occurred. | The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the|lack of absolute certainty ny in the evidence. ) oO Sry Boclda: 32493539 Page 3237
-~18- e. Castro oe SIF UR There was no evidence from which the Committee ond could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the assassination of Castro. We find that the effort against Castro was clearly autho- rized through the level of DDP. It is not certain: whether Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro. The only suggestion of express Presidential: authorization for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been plan- ned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding. HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 5236
~19- First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second,.it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely a a oy th lon Third, em _— plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing» 747 it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "“circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed. ( The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee ‘to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that “formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy. * If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circuulocutious briefings of the. Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. : Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be: approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential autho- rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he: was told by Dulles. : , HW 350955 Docld:32423539 Page 529
HY 0955 ~20- Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under which they served never asked them to consider assassination. There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson. knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his Presidency. © 3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Opera- tions Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permis- sible Course of Action The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination attempts testified that they had believed that their activities had been fully authorized.* In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation, Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in the Agency. In the case of the assassination effort against Castro, “Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the operation involving underworld figures had been authorized by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the * ‘The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the . AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since they had clear orders from their immediate superiors. Boclda: 324293539 Page 530
~21- plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal knowledge whatever of the individuals’ identities, times, | exact words, or channels through which such authority may have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized “from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior.. Helms testified that although he had never discussed assassination with his superiors, he believed: . . that in these actions we were taking against | Cuba and against Fidel’ Castro's government in Cuba, that they were what we had been asked to do. ... In other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro and . . . there were no limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines that we understood to be in play at this particular time. The. evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have been within the parameters of permissible action, but Adminis- tration officials (including McCone) responsible for formulat- | * 6 fri floy het ah ing policy were not aware of the effort an di not. authorize n it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those orders. . The various Presidents and their senior advisors HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 531
-22- strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example, President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was that day." Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort against Cuba'as "a combat situation", and Attorney General Kennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban: problem today carries top priority". Helms testified that the ¥ pressure to “get rid of |Castro and the Castro regime]"' was intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to "get off your ass about Cuba". It is possible that there was a failure of communica- tion between policymakers and the agency personnel who were experienced in secret, and often violent, action. Although policymakers testified that assassination was not intended by such words as "get rid of Castro", some of their sub- ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that assassination was desired. and that they should proceed with- out troubling their superiors. | The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations appropriately observed: HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 532
GO a Na -23- The point is that of frequent resort to. synechdoche -- the mention of a part when the whole is to be under- stood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro", which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assas- sinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking ‘vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended. Differing perceptions between superiors and their sub- ordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.* McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows: | Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro”, "remove Castro", "knock off Castro", etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and,*as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban government. * "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, ‘who will rid me of this turbulent priest?’. He didn't say, ‘go out and murder him’. He said, ‘who will rid me of this man’, and let it go at that. { "Mr. Helms: That is a warming refererice to the problem. "Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the. generations and the centuries? "Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir. "Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the Docld: 32423539 Page 4533
ore yge x HY 50955 7 eee FEMS feo! : moO SS ba ce i ry ‘ i 5) bat co Aya Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpret- ing them as conveying authority for assassination. Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of | Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as pro- viding authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the Castro regime, but rather that "'I had already made up my mind that. we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director." Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and McManus testified director or by anybody else as presidential ‘authorization to go forward? “Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I vealize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office. Boclda: 324293539 Page 534
HY 50955 -25- that "it never occurred to me'’ that the vigorous words of the Attorney. General could be taken as authorizing assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted from their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work) were experienced in covert operations.* The perception of certain Agency officials that assas- 'sination was within the range of dermissible activity was ne reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions: against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level and by the failure of the successive administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section. * Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were Administration officials with no covert operation experience, construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret ‘them. 7 Bocld: 324273539 Page 535
~26- 4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials in Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To: (a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations To Their Superiors: and (b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Precise Orders Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations. While we cannot find that officials responsible for making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassina- tion attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case) , Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP neverthe- less perceived assassination to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible, and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds that Administration officials failed to be sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities that they did authorize. ) 0 060 5 Tvl bow ~ HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 536
HW 50955 Ey 4 ~27-- | (a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal The Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient Detail and Clarity Several of the cases considered in this report raise questions concerning whether. officials of the CIA sufficiently informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the Agency about their activities. | Castro The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly troubling. | | Richard Bissell testified that he and, Sheffield Edwards told Allen Dulles only “ei rcumlocutiously" and only after the project had begun about the operation which used members of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP, Richard Helms, testified that. they never discussed the opera- tion with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. The two officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards and William Harvey--testified that. they never discussed the th... ames level of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted about a-yt +e / operation with McCone or any Government official above the the operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on its existence. On the basis of the testimony and documentary evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles Boclda: 324273539 Page 537
HY 50955 wn & ot x -28- By Pal hes i was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation, and virtually certain that it continued into McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge eT - Or approval. 7 On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against . . evel cots Poot Castro, he either failed to’inform em Oy misled them. Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and then only after contact had been made with the underworld and a price had been offered for Castro's death. Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under Dulles in the chain of command , he would normally have had no duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Adminis- tration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible x for formulating policy. on the unverified assumption that they might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who Boclda: 324293539 Page 536
-29- himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.* The failure to either inform those officials or to make certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions - on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis-_ tration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development of an assassination capability within CiA--executive action. But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board of Inquiry which was formed to report to-the President on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did not inform the Commission of the assassination operation. As chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in ‘the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban oo, , es Flay The > operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not aA tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the. * Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles understood the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further, even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the Presidents, they would have been told too late, because Bissell "guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had been planned and was-being attempted". HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 539
~30- effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and Presi- dent Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned “the assassination operation that was underway. The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy- makers continued during the time that. Richard Helms was DDP. -Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation HY 50955 when it was reactivated ‘under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was told that the CIA's involvement in’an assassination plot had terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney General that the operation was still active when he learned that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not inform McCone of the plot until August 1962, and did so then in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified, "not truthful". . | | When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots, he apparently described the activities that had occurred during prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH opera- * DocId: 32423539 Page 540
HY 50955 tion which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked. AY Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the assassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administration officials because he had assumed that. the project had been previously authorized, and that the aggressive character of the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime made assassination permissible even in the absence of an express instruction. He added that he had never been convinced that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go anyplace". Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them were reasons why he should have sought express authority. As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasized on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmented required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub- mitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about Castro and the Castro regime, it was a’serious error to have MC Cme 9b LCOS ve AYA / Bocld: 324273539 Page 541
HW 50955 ~32- undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and equivocal permission. William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt using underworld figures. to assassinate Castro, testified that .. he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been -fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because he believed that it was Helms', not his, duty to inform higher authorities. Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the braneh | | of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey reported directly to General Lansdale and the Special crore c/n, Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had’ made known that 4, ¢ bynes covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, bo by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular operations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet Harvey. Bocld: 32423539 Page 543°
' did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group Augmented of the assassination operation, either when he was explicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor, and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April 1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval. The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not _ having informed those responsible for formulating policy about the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading, and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as. too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not sufficiently. advanced, but too late to ‘tell | him about it in August 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminate it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure was someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was up to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helms | remarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his back j pocket™. 7 ae ita fArl | w~ f fiw] HW 350955 Docld:32423539 Page 543
HW 50955 -~34- ~The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform his superiors. | Trujillo. In the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient information, or were not informed in a timely fashion. At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions. -At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating the assassination of Trujillo had been know’: in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs, and by senior officials of. the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which | Boclda: 3274273539 Page 544
HY 0955 ~35- was said to have been the ‘basis upon which the Special Group agreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential" and stated that there “would be no thought of toppling the [government] by any such minor measure [as the supplying of small arms]." | On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knew that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but his memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that the dissidents’ "plan of action" included arms for 300 men. Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a non-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination. | The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA head- quarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently unaware of this passage for séveral weeks. The pouching of the . machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA. The State Department official from whom the CIA sought permission to pass the machine guns stated that on "cross examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was assassination. The CIA official then agreed the United States should have nothing to do with assassination plots “anywhere , anytime'', even though the previous day he and Bissell had signed a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for use in connection with a planned assassination. Bocld: 324293539 Page 545
HY 0955 -36- Schneider The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that Presi- dent Nixon desired to prevent.Allende from assuming office, even if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (includ- ing as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of. suc- cess, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics. The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after Octo- ber 15 there is some doubt. The documentary record with respect to the disputed post- October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one. hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any sub- stantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with Several such memoranda describing contacts with the White House between Septem- 4 ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a _ lack of. significant . communi - cation on the part of the CLA as well as a lack of careful super- vision: on the part of the White: House. BDocld: 324293539 Page 546
HY 0955 ~37- The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes called for _top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming power. Machiné guns were sent to Chile and delivered to SESS SECTS treat S88 0S SSE SSE SSRI SECS G00 9009 EE EGS SSE SEE SEES SSS ESESTRSPOS SOTTO, military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers en aaa without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of 7 otrnatzassernesteenancrzgarenepergnasmnnennns Sec TSR the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that __omecernneasemecre sneer e passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude within the CIA toward consultation which was. unduly lax. Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check'' to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions are and are not permissible, aetna aaa aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaae teeta and without adequately supervising and monitoring these activities once begun. ~ (b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should. Be Excluded From Consideration. While we cannot find that high Administration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived Docld:3294293539 Page 547
HY 50955 assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials were remiss in not seeking express authorization for their Mhy be Sef,’ activities, their supegiors were also at fault for giving Kas "fe PE a ¢ vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassina- O& nn nnn nnn nnn en tion. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued ee  ,ttecemeinntamamennnpepa umecnnienianasienacceriatt AC ECL A OL, until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA dir j i by Director Helms. Paid Schneider As explained above, there is no evidence that assassina- tion was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presi- dential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of General Schneider. This was also partially due to impositing ‘an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably short time. Apart from the question of whether any inter- vention was justified under the circumstances of this case, the committee believes that the Executive in any event should have defined the limits of permissible action. Lumumba We are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the Boclda: 324293539 Page 546
HY 0955 ~39- strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings, led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The minutes contain language concerning the need to “dispose of" Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessity for straight forward action", and a refusal to rule out any activity that might contribute to “setting rid of" Lumumba. Castro | The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castro regime. Richard Helms recalled that: “I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very intense. And therefore, when you go into the record, you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure. And we were quite frustrated." Bissell. recalled that: "During that entire period, the administration was extremely sensitive about the defeat that had, been afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of Pigs, and were pursuing every possible means of ‘ getting rid of Castro." Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in the Fall of 1961 Bissell was “chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime." General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation Boclda: 324293539 Page 549
-40- Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter". Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Aug- mented that “a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority . . . no time, money, effort--or manpower is to be spared.'"* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that were considered by the top policymakers included incapacita- ting sugar workers during harvest season by the use of chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants: sabotaging merchandise in third countries--even those allied with 9 the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging * The Attorney General himself took.a personal interest in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles active in the covert war against the Castro government. HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 540
HY 50955 -~41- of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines, ‘and harbors. Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials that assassination was a permissible tool in the effort to overthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting in November 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whether any planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action" against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell replied that such a capability did not exist, but might well have. left the meeting with the impression that assassination was not out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, which was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed at inducing “open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime", and included in the final phase an "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposal stated that "this should be a ‘Special Target" operation Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential against police. Several minutes from Special Group meetings contain language such as "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene". Although Lansdale's proposal was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was not ruled out. On several occasions, the subject of assassination was Boclda: 324293539 Page 551
HY 50955 -42- discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials. While those officials never consented to actual assassina- tion efforts, they also failed to indicate that fey was impermissible as a matter-.of principle. did vh a len In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project described as the development of a capability to assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy's remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then underway, the fact that he believed that. the development of an assassination capability had been approved by the White House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have contributed to the general perception that assassination was not prohibited. | Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General ‘Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA officials present at the briefing, the Attorney.General * Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error. Bocld: 324273539 Page 552
HY 50955 as having been terminated in May 1961. There is no evidence ' operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it -43- indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must not, engage in assassination plots. At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August 1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway, , Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored, and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for the assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified that he had immediately made it clear that assassination was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that Harvey may have .been confused over whether McCone had objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only concerned that the subject not be put in writing. Im any * Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, ‘learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld figures in an operation against Cuba. The documentary record further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that -the operation had involved assassination efforts until May of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the had not in fact been terminated. While it is curious that the Attorney General would not have inquired further into the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that ~ he did.. Docld: 32423539 Page 5543
-44- event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order banning consideration of assassination within the Agency. One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled “Operation Bounty” and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders. “Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assas- sination might be permissible. _ Whi e ambivalence of Administration ofSicials does not extusé the misleading conduct by Agency officials or justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it dis- played an insufficient concern about assassination which may have contributed to the perception that assassination was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's ‘general. objectives. | 7” a) oe Ge With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by ~ OD “ S- the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose,” “4, y precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring prior permission for the details of other proposed covert operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assas- — sination was promulgated until Helms" intra-agency order in 1972. In Light of the number of times in which the subject of assassination arose, Administration officials were remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity. 2 HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 554
~-45- The Committee notes that many of the occasions on which CIA officials should have informed ‘their superiors of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner,. were also occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced the perceo:ion that assassination was permissible. For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that “an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy ‘failed to rule out assassination as a tactic. In Mav of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told “about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney General, however, did not state that assassination was improper. When a senior administration official raised the question of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed, but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had ex- -hibited strong aversion to assassination. HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 555
HY 0955 -46- 6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assas- Sination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary. Various witnesses described elements of the system within which the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We find this dis- turbing, and view the following concepts as particularly dangerous: (1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other countries to an effort to. Jb, 5 shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsi- ee, La , , Pe bility for certain operations. Oi. “pom -(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings ought to be made clear. (3) The theory that general approval of broad covert ‘action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weapons. Docld: 32423539 Page 556
HY 0955 -47- (4). The theory that authority granted, or assuihed to be granted, by one director or one administration could be "presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming _the authority with successor officials. (5) The creation of capabilities without careful review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that such capabilities might be used without further authoriza-_ tion. (a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial | The original concept of plausible denial envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the UnitedStates resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its hand fas ultimately exposed ‘In addition, the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be revealed. Whatever can be said in defense’ of the original pur- pose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of Bocld: 324293539 Page 557
HW 50955 -48- the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of ofS ar . oe : . +e . ACC of the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an Ave ¢ 7 abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic government. (b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and “Euphemism" | According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of cir- cumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials. | Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should des- eribe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; busy superiors are entitled to and should’ demand no less. | | Euphemism. may actually have been preferred--not because Boclda: 324273539 Page 558
HY 0955 -49- of plausible denial--but because the persons involved could not bring themselves to state in plain language what they intended to do and may have, in some instances, assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not want the issue squarely placed before them. Assassinate, murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which should not even be pro- posed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business . by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty business being done. (c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions. | Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed. A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for embarrassing activities. . In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy objectives and the specific actions under- taken:to achieve them was far too wide. It is important that policymakers review the manner in Docld: 324793539 Page 559
HW 50955 .. ~50- cy which their directives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from’ public scrutiny. (d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization" One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under - world. figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion that the project had already been approved by McCone's predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more advanced stage. Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961, at the end of the Eisenhower Administration. The idea that authority might continue from one adminis - tration or director to the next and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ. New officials should be given the opportunity to review significant programs. | (e) The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert Capabilities - The development of a new capability raises numerous problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert = Docld:327473539 Page 560
-5]1- activity increases the probability that it will occur, since the capability represents a tool that is available for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use without need for obtaining explicit authorization. Of course, an assassination capability should never have been created in the first place. HY 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 4561
vy Approved by Drafting . ‘ Subcommittee 10/8/75 (with possible reservation V. RECOMMENDATIONS , as to language of -statute) During our long investigation of assassination, a number of vital issues © came into sharp focus. r Above all, stood the question of assassination. Our recommendations on other issues should await the completion of our continuing investigations and ‘our final report. But we need no more information to convince us that a flat ban against assassination should be written into law. . - ; , : ~ We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, at present there is.no statute making it a crime to assas- . sinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute mak- ing it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so. « A. General agreement that the United States must not engage: in assassina- tion. Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by HY 50955 the Administration. President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to deal with the assassination issue, stated: I am opposed to political assassination. This administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national _policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p-. 611. The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. -As President Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets." (Goodwin 7/18/75, p. 4) The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said: Docld: 324273539 Page 562
~2- With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I just think it is wrong. And I have’said so and made it very clear to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89) ’ Colby's predecéssor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot, said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and practical reasons: As a result of my experiences through the years, when I be- | came Director I had made up my mind that this option...of killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want to happen.on my watch. My reasons for this were these: There are not only moral reasons but there are also __ some other rather practical reasons. It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep any- thing like that secret.... Somebody would go to: a Con- gressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, what- ever the case may be, but it just is not a-practical alterna- tive, it seems tome, in our society. Then there is another consideration...if you are going to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader, then who is going to take his place running that country, _and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice i when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then had a revolving door of prime ministers, after that for quite: some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government at a-time in its history when it should have been strong was nothing but a caretaker, povernment....In other words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of the United States. -+-there is no sense in my sitting here with all the ex- perience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. .It isn't because I have lost my cool, or because I have lost my. guts, it simply is because I don't think it is a viable option in the United States of America these days. Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms ~- T: _ agree with what you have said fully -- but doesn't it also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side, that ‘since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do very grave political damage to the United States in the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 563
-3- involved themselves in political assassinations, but under their system they at least have a better prospect of keep~ aad ing it concealed. Since we do like a free society and since. these secrets are going to come out in due course, the: revelation will then do serious injury to the good name | and reputation of the United States. ; Would you agree with that? Mr. Helms. Yes, I would. The Chairman. And finally, if we were to reserve to our-: selves the prerogative to assassinate ‘foreign leaders, we may in- vite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assume . that if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prero- .gative as well, and that is another danger that we at least _ invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree? Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78) Similarly, John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations because: I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p.:15) 1 B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms -and then Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order, Helms said: It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA: engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, however,’ I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by. any of our. personnel....(Memorandum,. Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72) ‘Colby, in one of a series of orders in August 1973 arising out of the Agency's ' own review of prior “questionable activity," issued an order which stated: CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce. assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colby to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73) HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 564
HY ~4- Cc. The need for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are, these CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change, and someday in the future what was, tried in the past may once again become: a tempt- ation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to: do all that we can do to prevent their happening again. Laws express our society's. values; they deter those who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those who | “want to resist. The statute we recommend, which is printed as an appendix to this report, makes it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a | foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate. a foreign official, or 3) to assas- sinate a foreign official. . Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign official or foreign official guest while such a person. is in the United States. | 18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1117. However, there is no law which. makes it a crime to assassinate, or to conspire ‘or attempt to assassinate, a foreign of ficial while such official is outside the United States. Our proposed statute is thus» designed to close this gap in the law. | Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the United States. Subsection (b) is) necessary to eliminate the. loophoie which would otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. . Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or to kill a foreign official outside the United States. Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S. S0955 Daocld:32423539 Page 565
HY government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation. to the-U.S. government. In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies | within the United States, applies to "any other person," whether or not a United States citizen. Noncitizens who conspire within the United States to assassi~ nate a foreign official clearly come within. the jurisdiction of U.S. Law. Sub- sections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or. not they. are citizens. Criminal. liability for conduct outside the United States of persons who are not U.S. citizens or-who do not hold a position as a officer - or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such conduct takes place. The term "foreign official" is defined in subjection (d) (2). The defini- tion makes it clear that the offense may be committed even though the official ean CC NCCC ee belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governmental political party. Our investigation -~ as well as the reality of international | ar politics -- has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination.*/ Cr a | The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus, for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is not politically motivated would not be’ punishable under this statute. The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that such per- son must be an official of a foreign government or movement ‘with which the United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have */For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held no official governmental position in the latter period of his regime. 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 566
~6- not been introduced into hostilities or -situations pursuant to the provisions of the Wa Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a decla- ration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the © War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense, /insert discussion of. paramilitary aspect/ kk KK In the course of our hearings, some “witnesses, while strongly condemning assassination, asked whether, as a mat ter: of theory, assassination should absolutely . be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was | cited as an example, .Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not of that character.*/ In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the Constitution "is not a suicide pact." Kennedy Vv. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). | | | ] | Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented power based on the need to preserve the nation: .. My oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of. my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government -~ that nation. -~ of. which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law life and limb must be pro- tected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the * Constitution, through the preservation of the nation The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. UX pp. 65- 66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894). . */Indeed, in the only situation of true national. crisis -- the Cuban missile crisis -- assassination was not even considered. HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 4567
Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional powers, it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional: system that these powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pur suant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law . must be disclosed to the Congress. Only thea may the Congress judge whether the acm ~ ‘tion truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to the life of the Nation. As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress for ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment , perform. yours." (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861). HW 50955 DoclTd: 32423539 Page 563
. . ; Approved by Drafting Subcommittee on 9/9/75 — EPILOGUE | , . We do not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the’ real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given. the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer. life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations. We must not adopt the. tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that ace men free. But each time we do sO; each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes ‘us free, is lessened. | Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear /it-and to ‘learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we ' i do, .our future will be worthy of the best of our past. | HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 569