| ““{iv) | KGB-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE. .- -~ . (a) Introduction In 1961 CIA iearned from a Polish source who furnished much reliable and sensitive information that, with the assist-. ance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB), the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State cede clerk assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1960. The woman accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became inti- mate with him in Warsaw, returned tc Moscow twice in February 1961, and there had sexual relations with him. The compromising scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed. This information cn the KGB operation was received by CIA soon after the woman's sécond visit to Moscow. On the basis of this report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May i961, and he was transferred to Lisbon from Moscow in August 1961. . NOSENKO gave a fev details on the same case, without men~ tioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the YORONE case, identifying three KGB agents (besides the Polish fomale) who participated in the operation, NOSENKO, however, said that two cf them added no information of use to the KGB against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third agent reported: statements by other sources indicate thac re- garding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information of operational potential for the KGH. NOSENKO has not reported, as have other sources, that. a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVORTSOV~~ posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has confused the MORONE case with another by saying that a fifth XGB agent was directed against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the American code clerk ZUJUS (see below). The sensitive source of the original report on MORCNE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA" “(Wiladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO at first claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case re~ ported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA showed ‘him that travel records on NCSENKO made it impossible for the technician to have spoken to him as he described. According to NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could. take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities’ concern over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents. ‘(b) NOSENKO's Information At his first meeting with CIA on.9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American “€rom the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw. - Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow.in-..- --. order to obtain further compromising materials on this American. of i % _ 3 = 7S “F aE 3 3 3 ‘Z ; vetted Makes bhawlete Boab 4 “3 Z i i
‘¥Phe guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man — “py any suc Askéd'on 11 June 1962 whether he. had had foreign agent working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his having introduced the idea. of using such agents to :develop- Americans. ~ ‘afraid of contacts with Russian girls. .Heé said that he himself .. aad ., ag had several of these third-national agents, that he gometimes would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their intended use in operations against Americans. NOSENKO then ; : gave an example: “Listen, the sergcants [enlisted men] who -~ .«. eS - lived in America House had a custom--it was too far to go-to . co America, 80 where did they go to rest fon leave]? To Finland or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can finc women there, the rate of exchange is gOod, and so ou. What do we do? We planted a female Polish agent [on an American] in Poland. Then she comes to Moscow. We arranged a chancé meeting, anc things de- veloped. Once two guys, a Maxine guard and a coge clerk went to Warsaw. They were cn leave for a weex and a half. We knew when they would be coing. I mace an imrediate phone call to Warsaw. ‘Give me a woman,’ I said. ‘Get a gced whore for me there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the.eye particu- larly.’ Well, they sent me sucn a girl. And I placed this Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the game compartment. The train left. One of the Americans, the one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk, wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, shey went to bed together wk le the other American slept. I tceid the Poles in Warsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs. They arranged an apartment and he came there. Everything was O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Muscow. We did not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush, I said. A half a year went by. I insisted thar nothing further may be done any earlier. Then I said, ‘All right, let's give him this girl, this Pole.’ She arrived {in Moscow] and they met one another. I created the conditions: we created the condi- tions. They slept with one another once, twice. A [Soviet] girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to sleep with the girifriend. The Pole left and ne was with this Russian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are | afraid of Russians. But (we gave him] a Pole and then transe ferred him te a Russian." - vale ee ewe ot ee MGR oe a akg ag | shoe He Yr, Ab deborah = NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: “I remember we were working on one of the members of the guard of the American Em- bassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days' relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors [XGB officers attached to the Polish UB) to do éverything possible--to get a pretty Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate Rin saesee scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the girl, they did 4 have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without ~ Low bt nactamaaigil, any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting together, how ; he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photograpns and some time went by and .then we asked that the Poles send - . ; us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow, They | oe 3. whe accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The. facts, however, seem to relate tc MORONE, who has described. his enctunter with the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow. _ . .., BEGGS has also reported (see below) that: MORONE met a Polish... ” givl on the train to Warsaw and that she-later contacted.him: ‘.' dm Moscow: BEGGS has denied that. he, himself, was.contacted «:- h girl: in the Soviet: Union after the trip to Warsaw
oe hk Seolh od de el eters} eee Leis es SEER Sosa ticbatise Bt se ols Beak z adie ae. : * if ay “ras Rak y me ieee = BP UNe oe wee ; * ROSERRO has aise mentioned a “prob ib: tion on rececurtment ; ahs attempts ducing the 1959 Sokoininx1 exhibition pecuuse of the a need to avoid incidents afivctancd ULS,-Soviet celocior ships. i ° GOLITSYN told. CIA af. such. @ prenibition placed,an. the use Poe 8 Of homosexual” compromise mater igd, against 3 .U.3 co "eevee in, 1960 becauserof.ithe : tac Ln |, BEGENBCWER: to the, Soviet: Uoaion we oo, 2 “ineidention. Shy May 11960; chisi v1 & : $ WrS.aSoviet relations, deter roratcd. Thiochout ‘the rest: of - 1960 and most of 1961 they remained’ very strasned,. ang. Soviet - _ pressures ang hard lines .cclminated in the werain. srisis- and © _wali-building in’ Beritn. in, August oe. 19616 ;
\. working against MORGNE was NCSENMKO's subordi nate and special~  NOSENKO further reported to CIA. ‘that. the GB e2se ‘officer ist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV:. =o ROSENKO read the file On MORONE and saw his visa. photograph, but he never saw him in. -- person and so cours not provide a physical cescripticn. ‘NCSENKO had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GPYAZHOY on a number of occasions. , ie ROSENKO said that the ¥GB agents working on MORONE were: @ Svetlana IVANOVA , a maid or waitress at America House who reported to DEMKXIN, the case officer responsi- ble for Americans living there, on everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPGY visited her several times with DEMHIN to discuss MOPONE, and ‘idSENKO himself ret her once or.twice in cne of the twe safe epartments , ; that DEMEIN had at his disposal. NOSENFO did act recall! mg any specific infermation on MORONE which was interesting or useful from this source. qf a Seg TS ys . . - ERTL OM 2n egyption enpteved at the Egyptian Libassy who wos an agent of the xth (Under Geveloped Ccuntirie?) Departirent of the KG2 Second Chie 2 ee reper epee oman eee Se re r Beer ESTE f Veep aw: es Directorate piece visited America House and met MORONS, but he dic not vebort anything of value vhat NOSENKO re- membered. hee he ~ Ons of two East German females imported for use against ths inhabitants of America House In €arly 1960 GRYAJNOV went te Fast Berlin to obtain or -> German women ‘ wno could be used for this purpose. .The tirst of these was Hanna, blonde, docunented as a West eee aan travelliag #0 Moscow, NOSENKO never met her but instructed PREIS<. FREUND (see the STORSBERG case} to taxe her to Arericar Fouse and leave her on her own. Hanna went several tines to America House in 1496], but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reperted on MORONE. The other East Ser- man girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENTO never met her but recalled that she was asked fer her documents j at America House on her first or second visit there. She - replied that she had left them at her hctel, left America poo i i t Rouse, and never returned. NOSENKO did net remenber the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.* : ‘ esbanstdia i = y an Italians at the Anerican . Embassy and ROSOLAPCV: § agent,’ reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAFOV. NOSENKO re- called nothing specific that had said about MORONE @ CIA has no information cencerning such an incident in 1960- , | : 1561, but the circumstancés described by ‘NOSENKO seem to ee ine apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman Ss named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code toe . Glerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c.(v). ‘im anpylevent, the incident involving Lillian occurred after the date when NOSENKG says he was transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than. ABIDIAN was. the Embassy Security Officer. de
5205. ‘From one of these agents, or passibly in some other mar “neg, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave | to Warsaw. NOSE!NKO, KOSGLAPOV, anc GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt tc compromis2 his. KOSOLAPCV wrote tne draft of the cperational plan for the attexpt, which wag approved by GRIBALOV after some editing by NCSENKO and KOVSHUK, chief cf the section. XOSGLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGS Headquarters to Giscuss the pian. The Fole was tceid that the target was a U.S. Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk: this fact was deliberately kept from the Foles. As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscew Ly train. Upen her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who tcoek her to a Moscow hotel, where he gave her instructions concerning her role. in tne operation. The girl was told to mect MGRGNH on the train, flirt witn him, ba ve him fall in leve with her, ccontinue the association, and tudy him. she was to teil him that she had becn in Moscow as 2 guest of her uncie, a member ‘of the Polisn Trade Representa- tion in Moscow, and that she could mest him again on her next “visit. . enents we Directora for & technician to be aor) “tne train in “the compartrent next to thar of MOPONE ard BEGGS ind for avaio and visual (but not photegsarhic) Arran BEGGS left Moscow. nking NORONE's : Operaticnal Tecinical the day after the train ad NUSENKO the girl had en- he tris. The technician ngs obkaincd were of pss NOSENKO did noc recall The Polish agent did, hovever, accuaintance, and the technicia Directorate report te2 pack to reached Warsaw fhe technician ¢ cased in sexcal intercourse durin: also rererted that the tape recordi quality. Because the KGS still lacked ccmpromising materials, KCS0- LAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought £0 Moscew ond permissien to acquire compromising photogréephy during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and _ took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. ‘fhe girl called MORONE at Anmcrica Hause, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, curing which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on “MCRONE. He Gid not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had ‘hoped, and she had no further contacts with hin. | BOSENRO’ trans itted Amsterdam on t from Moscow to Cub 2 04 SENK 9 recarn mn CuDa- approximately aa D2acen 360, When told this, NCSENKO stated that instead of talking to the teche= -  mfeian himself, he may have read the report and seen the film strips after his return. recat ahaa E ED it'on «ali lake i 4 é
erect teva a ye lt anther wey “ amything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE . out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they a GOLITSYN: There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich] -" although the KGB had. the. compromising photocraphy, it was: feit that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment - approach to MOPONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apart- . ment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that is defi- ~~ , | [ I i i ! es nitely prohibited. for this purpose, Svetlana IVALOVA (see above) was ‘supposed to lure MORCNE into the city, but befere were concerned about his association with IVANOVA, Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE and no recruitment of nim. ete, i {c) Inforrnaticn from Cther Sources | , t i A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 Novem=- ber 1960 a Polish female, an exnerienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow wnere she was met by a KGB ease officer named "“VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The ¥-GB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1969 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Folish female met MORONE on the train to Warsaw, where intimacies began. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONE, Dut pur= guant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safe- house suitably prepared for clancéestine photography, and reveal~- ing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on § February 1961 and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further com- promising photograpns were taken of her and MOPONE on this trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and MORONE. caro peaabab dhe mbsf dee oa et’ | teeta ee Bots Me dent matte tn GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on 16 February 1962: Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?” GOLITSYN: Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against | ‘the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against the .- British Embassy and later he was sent to Cenmark.. Question: When was he sent? Do you know? GOLITSYN: It was in *57 until probably ‘60... I suppose that ; he will continue to work now in the First Chief Directorate. He. transferred there, from the Second...’ Question: Do you know anyone who used the name “VOLODYA" in ~— the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall ef 19607 ; ; . PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department, _; Second Chief Directorate who works against the Ameri~ . .@an Embassy. He evidently knows English. ...and he © worked in the American Department. I. know him and I. wet him in 1960. He was Chief of the American Section,. ' the Embassy Section... Lt erat “es
14-00000. +s i is ‘Question: Well, in VOLCOYA, itr. interested in a KGB: cage. offi-* cer who would he working agains pmerican code clerks * in the fall of 1960. : .y ; GOLIT. SYN: Yes he (PETROV] is the chief of this section. That’ is why. He in the Chief o. this section where GRYAZNOV works, (GOLITSYN had earlier identified GRYAZNOV as a code clerk specialist in the U.S. Embassy Gection.] QOuestion: And GRYAZNOV is under nim? GOLITSYN: Yes, he was an assistant at one time, but is not {new], and then there was the reorganization ard he became a littie “liguicated" idcungraded in position]. In an Vctober 1962 interview, Following his withdrawal from Moscow, MORONE stated that ha had travelled with Frank BEGGS Wergaw on 12 Nevember 1960. On the vrain he caw a polish girl cutside their compartmens and asked her wast languages she spok? Later she entered his compartment, and when ho tricu to engage in sexual relations with her, sne slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl cuntacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations, According to MORONE, he had senunl telations with at least two other women while in Warsaw. He 2Ad EGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 rebruary L9ol th: Falish girl from the train called hin at America Heuse, and the following day he visited her in her room ait the rek king Hotel, where they had several drinxs and sexual relations. On this occasion or earlier the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. MORONE Lad denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence, a statement which was supported hy a polygraph examination adminl- stered in 1961. (Further detaiis on his interview of MORONE are inserted in a later paragrach contuining information from MORONE's associates in Moscow.) Thea Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed MORONE's account in general, with the exception that he has stated that the two travelled to Warsaw on i3 Novernber 1960 and that, after meeting the Folish girl on the train, MOROCNE and she got into the lower bunk in their train compartment. They errived in Warsaw on 14 November and returned the 20th BEGGS nad heard from MORONE that the latter had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Hos- cow in February 1961. _ Phe U.S. military code clerk’ STORSBEXG ‘has reported that MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVOPTSOY), who laid some groundwork for the KS GE approach to STCRSPERG in the Win Februsiy 1965 Nosenno said that SKVORTSOY undoubtedly met ether Americans on his visitg to America House, but he did. “geet remember who they were. He added that the RGB would not. .be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concen~ trate on Jim (STORSBERG]. Jim was his target." u, J 3 3 Fe | | % i iH j : aadaereetieteidl Fo at dette, 19 au a
MASCKE's Yellow code clerks and residents of Anerica louse cribed him as a heavy dvinker, a heavy gambler, and a rman. Various reports indicate that MOPONE was involved ina currency-speculation ring operated by Sr eee, the KGB acent mentioned by NOSE EO. and MOPONE his confirmed tnat, on at least cone occasion, GztS2Bh arranged the intrcduction of fGRONE and other code clerns *o Soviet females. MORONE had rela~ tions with cne ef them in “O's apartment in the spring of 1561, 0 MOPOUE vis also maid io be a close friend cf the Embassy fom Oa «< ® fa. =“@ ¢ w Shee ; rf Ridentified by UCSUNKO as an agont ef KOSO- i y himvin -connectign with the MOPONE d at et eee t LAPOV, bun ser nentioned b Oseration., (MORONE admitted that along with other Americans, -ade it a coxsmon practice to purchoge rubles illegally from area “One report states that Chi God asked a Marine guard to aéiiver blackmarket rubles ts MORULL in tne State Department eode reom, & restricted area to which ee phad no access. A number cf repercts indicate thac MORONE waB” sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, OCEFMXIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KCB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but not menticned by him in connecticn with MORONE,. (MORONS denies having had relations with IVANOVA bkui”said that he told his friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had onca asked IVANOVA toarrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued. MORONE has also admitted sexual relations with a nun- ber of weren from varicus “estern embassies in Moscow.) wont nei eth bedded Sent his Sar elioe,. matademetnn ob bs vote = 3 4 at 3 2 4
TA DORIGETT ABS PETE oy BORLA G a M en t aes feainst Z25IUS (v) Develcomental. Operation, reported that he perscnaily recruited and handled iE AES the “cain agent" in the KGB developmental opera- : tion against U.S, Aray Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, althoaug! To GRYAZNUV was the officer responsible for the 2UJUS case. . So BIOTA Seip military orficer posted to Moscow for training, | . was used only in tais operation, buy NCSENKO continued to meet. him even after transferring from the U.S, Embassy Section to the Tourist Departrent. While being interregited in February 1965, NOSENKO said that “@@& could vorch for his bona fides, and he suggested that CLA approach 2g for this purpose. asain ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in Septenber 1961 to assune the military code clerk duties of STORSBEKG (see above), and he remained there until January 1963. <Aiter initially confusing ZUJUS with James KLYSERS**, ACSLANG first described the KGB operation against hia in February 1964, According to NOSENKO, neither t5-4gmnor any other sogurce supplicd sig- nificant inforaation to the KGB, and the KGB therefore did not attempt to recruit WJUS, Claiming not to know the nanes of . : XGB agents besides Sh uho participated in the operation, NOSENKO nevertheless ih otner contexts has mentioned two ! female agents who reportedly associated with ZUJUS, One is 3 Ella UMANETS, the ether an Esst Gersan woman posing as en : Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear chat ZUJUS was the Ancrican code clers who met this woman, .The date that she and ZUJUS were together, however, falis during the suamner Of 1962 when, NOSENXU said,he was no longer engaged in operations against the U.S. Embassy. hivhee dead tee deb ne 6 wa lind unan iain tbe (>) Information from NOSENKO The first reference by NOSENKO to. the ZUJUS case was made on 2 February 1964: NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'll tell you exactly what we tried to do with him because 1 spotted this in seme notes, This mistake [confusion of KLEYSERS and ZUJUS] made me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS until I saw my little note. In 1901 1 recruitec a from Damas is Fe gee Eye ee ted au so sd ai ae tet nee . ; a SC ee SEP eT eae ue, and né became ace cee od Saw ese s+. quainted with ZUJUS, The reason why they had some- — thing in common was that sometime carlier ZUJUS had . been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was _ from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance , away... Here js,his name. He wrote it out hinself. a : & and he wrote out his own address be 4 ast A beg ote’ i ie eee es YSERS case is discussed in the next part of
14-00000 : ; . 210. here [on one of the notes NOSENKO brourht with hia 1 4 to the meeting]. We did not .ork with nin, and we q retired the case to Archives, and did not turn him over to anyone. Here ig his edidras treet is GEL ERT ENE Bay sre , worked ay eee et sii sare tiie ia GT Toul oa the beginning of 1962. And when I was leaving Moscow to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 1962 I turned him over for contact to GNYAZNOYV, I seid greodbye to hin and he was scheculed toa leave the USSR permanently in April, back to Syria. panaiout, 32s. Recker he ada. Question: Wheat did vou do against Z2UJUS? ; , ’ NOSENKO; Nothing at all. He 0058; Weowas merely studying and devloping lim. Vuring the conversation fat Amerier House] they even spoke of how nice it would be to have some Lebanese veda, and we Bpecially had some shippped in from the [KGB Legal| Residency [in Beirut], and the Syrian brought it to ZUJUS saying it had come from his friends. ZUJIUS by character is a very quiet, Unexestable, caln person... Nothing disturts hir Question: Why didn't you turned Directorate? iz? onl i “ IS over to the First Chief NOSENKO: Cae RES no reacon for this because he was a ; rae aaa pe 2 . . a * : + oy ES we were to turn him over to . anyone al nee have been to the GRU. But we decided to nell with it and put the case into our Archives. Pk Pi woe Question: Didgy ey know ¢4PJUS when you fecruited hin? ‘ena NOSENKO: ‘No, he didn't hardty know anyonc--evyen Dy neme. So we showed hin photefraphs. end when he said that he had met ZUJUS. then we directed him to develop ¢CUJUS and not to pay attention to any= one else... If you want to approach him you can use my name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich. NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitmen AS whereby a CIA representative would approach hired that he was from the KGB a year later NOSENKO that if CLA telked to Pees the latter would be able to ! vouch for NOSENKO's bona fides. =e Speaking z of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO said: ‘Gare... 1 took with ole, even though I had cd e Seventh [Tourist] Department {in January ie 1962]. But it had been decided that no core else knbw him oo id from the First [American]! Department; it. would have taken ; some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was already working in the development of ZUJUS. So they [the First Department] said that they were asking me to continue meetang with him, and they were counting on my cooperation. They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [% meetings with ZUJUS." q | ne wet Set wp SOEETRER EB ere cout oo. coms teehee 68 ROTA Rae ARIA LOK ae RS eee =
When reviewing lists of employzes. of the U.S. Exbassy.. >. between 1960-and 1961, NOSENKO cn 19 September 1964 iden- tified ZUJUS as STORSBERG's replacement and said that the nr SS case officer working agaigst hin was. GRYAZKOV. He said that ee & his (NCSENKO's) agent hp was working. against ZUJUS, but mo rn that he did not knew the nares of other agents involved, nor of any unusual or interesting information concerning his, although he had read the Second Chiet Directcrate file on . ZUJUS, There was no information on IUJUS froa KGB micro- 5 phones, telephone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO stated, did not make an operaticnal approaca to 2UJuUS and did not recruit his. ieee ° NOSENKO reported on 2 february 1965 that he hinself had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling cf the epepation and ’ A + Somes sa - F * aro personally handled the main agent, epi set “ert NOSENKO read all current reports on LUJUS as tuey €3..0 into. the U.S, Enbassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYALKCV, KOSOLAPGV, DEMKIN (the case offices responsibie for the America House) and his superiors, GRYAZNOV wrote the cperationzl plan.on ZUJUS, «nich called for thoroug. developzent by “ime -2ey in order to learn everything possibie about hil.” aentugliy to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through Qirnes Eeyetivas to invite ZUJUS to a restaurant in Marcn “SMAprig“iys2, and a "friend was to, be introduced to 2ZUJUS at that tine, This had not been accomplished as ef NOSENKU's departure for Geneva in 1962, es 4 coveted wdsh bo riad Halas wae Progress was slow because 7UJUs was quiet and reservod end often stayed alone, even in America louse, plus the fact that although Gvieand ZUJUS were egquainted, they did not become good friends, On the days@eggay was to visit Azerica him in hoteis or restaurants (never in ange every week OF two, depencing a : Shae They would meet again the follGwing dly; "ey report on which Americans were @rinking heavily and which were caressi the girls frsa bo. foreign embassies in Moscow, Although went to America j wg i Beceterab ss at ames danst eg fol iad tind bo House once cr twice a month and drank there with ZUJUS, he reported little of interest, The KGB Learned something about ZUJUS's fanily in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS's ' family background, NOSENAO stated that the KGB was not i ‘aware of any vices or vulnerabilities tha: ZUJUS may have | ; had. There was no recruitment and no approach by the I. ; KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left the U.S. afecsu nono Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have feild ain yong i about it. (c) Infernation from Other Sources Lo In connection with a security investigation at the U.S. ao . Embassy in Moscow, 2UJUS prepared a statement in January 1963 SS . which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only ot one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. coe G During @ routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities Later in Se 1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S. Embassy Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that, 2UJUS. ‘had been intimate with an. Austrian wonan, Lillian (last “ name unknown), whe had. gone to America House: with sengons  -
from the ‘United Arab Republic. and had. Tet turned: atone a “2UJUS was a cryptographer, the: manager of America Rouse few days later, when she waS, picked ‘up ty 2UJUS, Since decided to interview the woman. . She tcld hin that she was from Vienna and was travelling wita her escloyer, a Czech. The manager then reported to the Security Officer, ‘who learned from the Austrian. Embassy that no passport had been issued to this woman. The Security Cifticer went to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport; She replied that she had forgetten it, and she then left Saying she was going to her hote: fcr the passoort, She never returned to Anerica Muuse.® The U.S. Army report 2UJUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1995. Asked whether ne had ret anv uationals. of Near Eastern countrics while in Moscow, “UsUS named anong others 2 person from Beirut whe hac besn in Damascus or a person from Damascus who had been in Belrut--ne could not remember which. ZUIJUS s2ad that he had been acting as goorman at America licuse when this person entered, and that the two "shet the breeze’ fer about 13 ninatos. ZUJUS could “mot yvecall what they had talked about, Lut their conver- saticn apparently did not interest the visiter, because he left after a short while and went to the bar, iUJUs may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could supply ne additional information, cuJus Jid not recall. that. this person gave hin Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored. this beverage, GZUJUS said that he did not know this man's name or why he was in Moscew, and he could provide no physical description, ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named by NOSENKO}). ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide a considerable amount of backrround infor- mation concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements ‘that he had never been approached or: recruited by Soviet Intel- ligence,. .* a sere NOSENKO's account — KGD using one of two “~ East German women, who represented thenselves as ‘Austrians, at America House in an operation against. MORONE. . Ot . ; Limos Shelate bib Ate Split atndon was
AY AE MAM TEN MRT RCE SOLE BI manasa aca RR aE OAS ENG tas ror pmb Pay esate dt ehsapanee nmr cman ance nee MS ressgarawn tl hg SEMEL cm Sop, AEE LE AT NT I a AN RL MOA LRN RDN ED, RANT OB MAI 213. . (vi) Approach to KEYSERS (a) Introduction U.S. Arny Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his tour in Moscow on 20 December Iy60 a3 an assistant to the Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C, MARTIN, an Air Force CEpe- tain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attiche, For a short per- iod in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perfern backeup cryptographic duties under Jaces STOKSBEPG in the military code room, but he was relieved of this in Anril 196). because of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest, Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from ‘loscow by his American superiors in June 1961, The decision to transfer him was made on 13 June, and KEYSERS wes intormed of it the fol- lowing day; approximately two hours before leaving America House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter from the KGB suggesting that he jdefect, This was followed by an approach tuo him at the Moscew airport, : NOSENKO has claimed that he was the KSB officer who spoke to KEYSERS on this occasicn and has said that this incident was his only face-to-face contact with an American target during his 1966-13961 period of service in the U.S, Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with STCRSBERG++See above), NOSENXO Sas confused the KEYSERS and ZUJUS cases, but correcte1 this error prior to defecting. In most particulars NOSENKO s account of the case matches the details from KEYSERS and other sources. However, whereas NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American authorities or having received the letter, KEYSERS did so before leaving Moscow; this conversation took place in an Embassy room where a KGB microphone was then located, (b) Information from NOSENKO NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: “Now | remember, He came to Mos- cow, to the Enbassy, le was to replace the military cipher clerk (STORSBERG].°® We sensed at once [that he was a homo- sexual], Well, everything was thrown at him, I stayed with this case constantly, I! didn't spend time on anything olse. We chased him all over Moscow but were iate. We were in an operational car, It happened like this. When there was traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the left side or on the sicewalk where people were walking, in the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we wero late, Jate [i.¢., could not catch him at anything]. But-such Although KEYSERS trained in Woscow to assume backeup Cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replace- ment; Mathew Z2UJUS, who arrived in September 1961, was, KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, who had earlier been reo turned from Moscow for reasozs of homosexuality. SERS pe 4 4 het oak wtihnnen emits Aptian Lhe tee eed Lae in te Mn thea
+ fhe od 216. things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow. He proved to be a homosexual. ie solid himself, so to say. The oo American ice ballex (Ice Capades tour) arrived. There vere a many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely , drunk, and was embracing and kissine aman. The Avericans also saw this. And decided not to... I thought. whet to do? Let's write him a letter, in real English, on an Enclisn typewriter. We'll send this letter to his room. “We knew that he was supposed to leave today, today. Ana we wrote it: "Lasten. they know about you, You have reen :eught. It will go very bedly for you back there. Come on. Stav here. We are waitang for your answer.’ Weli, aS 18 customary, you had someone accompany him. The AsSistant Military Attache ezcorced him. I1 daor't remember who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON. a lieutenant colorel., What was his naze?* He acce..panied him to Finland ard then returned by piane, Well, there was no answer from him to this letter. And it was already the lest moment, and suddenly--'Listen, they ave taking you away. wait, they know who you are, what you are, it's all over, If that's the way it is, stay here.’ No answer. What to do? Here's what happened: We got into a car. ‘They (KGS surveillance) hei reported that he and the Assistant Military Attache had puiler our from Kropotkin- skaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the plane. So we put on ali speed to get there iirst. We got there first, in order to have cot to him. No. It was WILSCN." The [Interview then continued: NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied KEYSERS to the airport. he replied: ry emecatnnde meee sappens wren Fenersneyin =: Sentny * centile he te bibe RRB nd La anbat pa stent Abia dented aide oe "Yes, Lt. Col, WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him for a@ moment at the airport. I am turning around here, walking there, There is coffee there eni cognac. He didn't leave him. I must separate them. O.K. So [ saia ‘What about their documents? Make some pretext to separate them.’ They were ‘separated for two minutes. I approached him and said: ‘Hello, helle, what about the letter? You think about it?' He said something to the Assistant Military Actache, that ‘they tried to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or four months. He gave himself away you see, If this ice ballet had not come we would have worked on rim, At the start we did not know who he was or what he was. 1.€., we kn tw that he came‘ vO ; to replace the military code cieck, .on whom we had spent much =. < i time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG operation without naming KEYSERS. revere Dihbt nds ing Ald ina nand bien tape naphtneee mer eet e Soe ee on . After describing the reccuitment approach to STCRSBERG, ; NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: “Then his replacement - : . came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and | it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily ' in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he ' Ey This officer's Mame is MASON. #® “See NOSENKO's statements on 28. January and 2 February  __. 2°41 1964 (below). ZUIJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who - completed. his Moscow tour in November. 1961,. five months : after KEYSERS” was removed ‘trom Moscow. *
was a homosexual, It appears tht thete was sone: visiting” -ballet troupe in which some of the malé nembers were hogo- - _sexuals, He met them in the America Hogse and his behavior towards them was reported to the American Security Officer and at the same time our agent had reported him to us. We wanted to mount an operation against hia but the Anericans had already decided to give him up. All we could do was to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned his . that he was being sent cut because he was a homosexual and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer was made to him to stay in the USSR, He did not answer the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure. He was escorted to the airport by two officers of the Military Attache's office, At the airport--I even went _ there with a group of assistants to see if we could get 4 few words to Lim to change his mind, ‘lie left his group for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed, that he wold receive great benefits, he panicked and ran back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If 5, thy oo Ree Hecht Saws hres oat habe. vag "Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been abie to get at him." While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKO said on 28 January 1964: "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't be in Moscow, That's the homosexual code clerk = told you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to the States with military guards. How come ne is back in 19637 In August 19637 ile touldn't be there. It is iapossible” te was asked whether he was sure of his facts, and NOSENKO answered: ‘Yes, this must be the same man, but this must be an error in your document. He just cannot be in Mssco«#." , NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February 1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had something important to say. The meeting with CIA opened -a8 follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized that I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so i ‘wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Re- member when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG, _ the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him? And I said that we wanted to get a hold of him because he was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS,— In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to KEYSERS ." "I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters {with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving,'* NOSENKO stated on 17 April 1964, “When he was being taken to the. airport we decided, ‘Why not try, in case he's aione; why not approach him and ask him if he wants to stay?’ And sure enough he stood there with these two officers and then he walked into the restaurant alone... So I immediately ap- proached him right _there in the restaurant. "I don't ree member what his name was--1 think it was Jid.}) -So I. said" know what will happen to you when you return, Say, please.’ He leoked at. me and turned around and without saying a word | he went into the waiting room and. started talkang rapidly | with the efficers.” ... Ti MoM Aantal, ARE EG ise earn aren Shaler. aseet aktitie ree sea bei ctl eee 5 ¥ § I. . ‘Se . ore “Pode seaalat nh capie a Ska ibe
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ae i Part VI.D.2., a takulation of NOSENKO'Ss leads involving American cases, includes several operations against U.S. ccde 2 enente 9 w gee nena Raat re MM would eerie et oe wnt a entedaae oe, Clerks f6r Which he was the supervisor; oh, their names are Frank DAY, Romert DWELLY, Joseph GAFFSY, John TAYLOR, and ‘Maurice ZWANG. +e erm nnpmaemeptiniat ey ete A Siar beeen 3 3 s a g. an
220. | d.  NOSENKO's Reeponsibility for Coverage of -ABIDIAN” (4) Introduction . . an John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S, Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 19€2, approximately. the same period as NOSENKO's claimed: service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. During hig Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings to several CIA agents insidé the Soviet Union and servicing @ : dead drop to be used only for receiving two sp:cial types of i communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel 0.V. PENKOV- : During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ASIDIAN's + ses ererertieneitaconmnte ert aos fs dent beetles bab. Hi aa eats! BE sbaoes letter-meiJ-ing-eetivittes;—and-he-setrd he wes-hitse:f concerned —a " ABIDIAN had net yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however, _ . ““< ¢@ NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's vise oa on One type was early-warning information, the other notifi- (ganimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After resontacting CIA in Genéva in January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he nad keen the KGB case officer responsible for coverage of ABIDIAN in Moscow; for the first time he described then a visit made by ASIDIJN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site. The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO's case officer responsibilities and the information he learned i about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop. ‘ (41) Duties as Case Officer On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from the Yourist Department to the Anerican Department in January 4960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was inter- viewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge of ABIDIAN, whose acrival in Moscow was expected in the near future. NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for cover- age of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ASIDIAN was the only American target for whom he, personally, was offi- eially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section. | NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for six days in January and Februery 1965. He produced the infor- mation in the following paragraphs at that time. , hen NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section, already had received some information on him, and this was given -- . Cation. of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Otherwise, :@s of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in| - Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the . British businessman. Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSRIY came - -is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b. WSiebergh Honea cre thn es ;
cord aeat i application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters _ £iles, and a report prepared by the American. Department of the * First Chief Directorate, According to this report, based on _ . - ! correspondence from the KG3 Legal Residencies in the Unitecd .° Songs — States, ABINIAN had served asa Departmen: o of State Security “ Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV ; when he visited the United States in 1959: from the way ABIDIAN had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA.” NOSENKO remarked that the report, combined ‘with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one cf the most important counterintellicence targets : of the U.S. Fmbassy Section and therefore of the entire Second . “d Cnief Directorate. i i + ‘ £ t iH NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later j assigned him the cryptonym VAPRSEN,“ since this cryptonym had been — used by personnel of che Sevench (Surveillance) Directorate, F KGB- Second Chief Directorate. who were working against him. : NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of AHIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Departmenc of the KGB First Chier Directorate, but this unit had no information in aadition to that already included in ; i the original information ceport. NOSENKO requested that the KGB : Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further de- : tails, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO : £ said that he did not Know and never obtained details about ASID- IAN's education and study abroad. date of entry into the Depart- ‘ ment of State, promctions, personal rank. previous foreign assign- i ments, military service. o1 status as Foreign Service Reserve, Statf og Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO),** and then secured empioyment with the Department of State as so a clerk/typist. He cemained in Paris until 1954. After spe- cial training at the CIC sechoci at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving | *°CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 [ 7 t Breer ene Cs ae for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Depart- _ment's Office of Security. A iarge part of his work ‘in this - period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the wisits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956, MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of 1959, These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage : . Was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S. cs Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became het clerks.» subordinate an Operations against American code ",: «,. Glerks. - of sonnns etore ne r 2 ; *®NOSENKO was. unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had. checked the Department .@f State. Biographic Register: for information on ABIDIAN!s ‘background, he replied: that this* publication ‘is .not available. “inthe U.S., Embassy Section. ‘ He subsequent ly: recalled that “the Chief.of the Section; KOVSHUK, did have a-copy dated: . “about 1956, which was: of no use an. Gathering information on ABIDIAN... °
os Sear “oo Béeause ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was... 90 ~ made a."special tarcet". of surveillance from the date of his — arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveiliance ky ct least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embessy. The only time this intensity of cov.rayge might heve been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a pericd of about one and one-half months in 1961, wren surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of Uritish tergets.* As the responsible case officer, BUSENKO directed the sucveiliance of BSIDIAN ard evaluated the operational possibilities offered by pertinent informaticn in the surveillance reports. Prior to ARIDIAN:s arrival in Moscow, the decision was reach- ed not to work aggressively against hin with acent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulner- ability, WCSENKO stated. it was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage ir. the hope thet, as LANGELLE's succes-= i t | ? ! NAN Saab tes recs of Peery sors—he-mrgherea 4on<anet:ner—PGPG\=-2""-Pheretere;—ne-operational lan was written on ABIDIAN until about October 1960. This plan, which NOSENKO wrote, callcd for no direct action but did specify chat: ~ ABIDIZN's maid, Tatyana FECOROVICH, en operational contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEETUNE-80 to his shoes.*** (She put metka on ABIDLAN's clothing approxi- mately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was employed by AFIDIAN.) The only item of operation:1 in- terest from her during this period was evidence that ABIDIAN was having inzimate relations with a female em-. ployee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find | personal mail or persona) papers in ARIDINI's apartment. Sees KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to N and report whatever he learned concern- ing him. fade never obtained significant information on ASIDIAN's repsonal life. ARTDIAN, NOSENKO said, was developing H& as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy. put NOSENKO did not recall any specific report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO told CIA in 1962 cultiva * "In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of British tarcets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENXOVSKIY. ** The POPOV case is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a. a mo, : £ ***Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described . by NOSENKO. The former. a “thief powder" applied to clothing, leaves a trace on anything with which it comes . 4nto contact: its use in. detecting clandestine letter q mailings is described in. greater detail below, NEPTUNE-80, ~ a@ substance applied to a target's shoes,. leaves a trace On ‘the ground wherever he walks,and permits the KGB to carry. out surveillance long.after.the target has travelled a. Dogs. are used.to follow ‘the target's: Heth ete y eae eer en 2 be Hada lbdbh ety, sore mer coke. Abroad) ct bay bbe sw tadbfiacbiieg hs, é
Dla hod recruited RRR to ero? intelligence misgion in France enert) that Abi the Soviet Union ir aor Lah ane Embassy Section trereupon quined the c First Chieti Girecturce.e.”® 4g were to apply KiPTUNE-80 to ~ Two Imbascy chautfiecu LP TU the flocrooaras and foot pedals of ABLDTAN ‘s cag if neces- sary. ~ All other agencs and operational contacts of che section wore to be instructed to report every a@etail about ABIDIAN {see below). to Le instructed to check all mailing letners. - Surveillance teuns pisces where ABIDIAN miah todas, cenacttbab tabee a cer NA. GAVRILEIKO EBIDIAS - Coverace of ANTDIZN's mar) was to Le continued. | Apart from tnose speciiied iy tne Operationad plan, the only two KCB acerts or operational contact whoo met ASIDIAN were Lyud- mila GROMOKCVA and "KANO" (KUb crypronye, rane not rememuered by NOSENKO!, CROMOKOVA, a Language instructor for JLS. Embassy per- s a KG2 agent handled by tne U.S. Fmbassy Seetion offi- . tcox "only several" Aussien language lessons from GROMOKOVA and SCSENKO did net know whether these were private or cléess lessons. He @id not learn anything cf operacion- al signaficence from GROMOUKOVA'S contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from rer.'! “KAMO" was an agent of the Mescow City KGB organization who acezacntally met ABIDIAN at the sonnel, w Claimed he concected this story for the KGB in order to * extricate himself when the KD attempted fo recruit him shortly before his departure from Moscow. &* NOSENKO first idencified GROMCKOVA as a KGB ager.t when viewing Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964, The list on which her name appeared indicated she was a Russian language teacher, and NCSENKO said she was handled by N.A. SAVRILENKO during 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO was later shown GROMCXOVA's photograph and failed to recognize it: wnen told her name. however, he again said she way GAVRILE:KO's agent and that she was valuable be- cause she had a good education and was able to provide per- sonality sketches or her students. He did not associate her with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in Febru- ary 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her stucents. NOSENKO then mede the ebove statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN.. . reported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKCVA, narmally three one-half hour lessons a week. beginning shortly after his arrival in Moscow and continuing until his departure. The first few lessons were with @ group of other Embassy per- sonnel, and then AHIDIAN switched to private lessons for the — remainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting his contacts with GROMOKOVA, ASIDIAN said he refused to be drawn language conversation: but “kept the topic Limited to- ris past. . personal life, travel, education, his fiancee, ard his trips _-.@n which he saw his’ fiancee. ABIDIAN also. reported that on. 23 June 1960-GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass & letter to departing personnel officer: Mery GORINHA for for- “warding. to Jean.LIENERMAN, a former. student. When. ABIDIAN. refused, saying that this is against Soviet law GROMOKOVA. tore up the letter. ©: into talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russian: o.%
14-00000 7 . “ ° Vee. z \ Ret pmmbinazeyes, hs Shed natin a Byte ‘ ae gee TL Reins SR ea ra Rane AEE oe LET PN EE mg om Re A errata eyelet ie ara HNN et pif myc nner re tenparns tars was wel | nk Son Suan eho tata cute 224. . t t Baku Restaurant. when informed that ABIDIAS gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that ‘KaMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAt!i, KOWSHUK and KLYPIN fineily agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIZN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet Kim, and no further action was taken.” NOSERNKO @id not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he could check the room nunber if necessary since he nad a copy of the Embassy telephone list publisned monthly with the office room . ‘ rumber of each American employee. AUIDIAN'Ss office was in the OO i “Zone of Security” (a.e., secure office areas). A report from : ; some agent, whose name NOSENKO gid cot recall, indicated that there was a sicn on ABIDIAN's office door which said “Security Offi.4." NOSENKO did not krow and said he was unable to dGgeter- ' mine whether ASIDIAN had a secretary. ho dictation cr conversa~ tion was heard from ARIDIAN's office because no XGR micropmone was trere, and “IOSENKO said that ne did not remember any specific interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other microphones in the Embassy. ** preva ean Wvey peer te ron sy NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apertment in the Embassy building. nor how it was furnished. He said that he Gig not consider data of this nature to be operationally significant uniess the target ha@ shown vulnerabilities or was under active development. vege tee 2 een Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were madet™ Such in- ; formation, he stated, would have neen of interest to him as ABIDIZN's case officer since, like LANGELLE s earlier trips abroad, AHZIDIAN'’s trips were presumed to be for operational pur- poses. There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone;**** even if the U.S. Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done * See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident involv- ing a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenla. en aeeneneitel then ne wy operative microphone was discovered in 1964. 4 7 ; 4 *e*ARIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years in Moscow, In August 1960 he took personal leave to visit his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on the ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and ; = then took personal leave to visit his fiancee. In September | 1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to New York City and Washington for briefings connected with the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow. | £* In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an in- | c°*tghen CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have ; photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, E Z RBOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not ; ft photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet a ’ Union, while this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO be - gdded, it was not considered so important as to justify the opel gpecial effort involved. : ; .
ty) 4.2 @bout it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First =| Chief Directorate wovld not accept a request for operational action agains= an American. diplomat coming froma Moscow, i. r In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times whether he knew of any occasions on which AS:DiAN took trips in the Soviet Urion outside of Moscow. He replied each time that he knew of no such trips and that 1f ABIDIAN had made such a trip or trips he would have known of them and would remember them as 1¢ would have been his responsibility as case officer to’ take cer- tain actions. Among the latter he listed: - Ao epee nreempranom renner ieee man Lib dof cmitiny « ~ Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Seviet Government organization which pro- vides services to the diplomatic community in Moscow) . 2 BAe. ovale ~ Notifying the UPDK of KGE approval for the trip. -_Notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN's . itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and : other operational activity if desired. - Receiving. reading. and filing all surveillance reports end reports of other operational activity carried out by iocak KGB units. NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He stated ; further that even if he were ebsent when such a request for travel ; i was made. he would have seen all documents upor his return and that he Gid not remember seeing such documents in ABIDIAN's file. NOSEN’O's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1940.* Thereupon NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave in October 1950. He said that he could not recall exactly the ates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at Ln a@ dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel coe time. NOSENKO said further that he also remembered that he had Pe cneeamaseamens * “ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A, SMITH, the Embassy's Publi- ; ; cations Procurement Officec, to Armenia between 5 and 9 Octe- - 4 4 ber 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the’ Acmenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their parishioners ard an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiaedzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or hear : oF the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian. > oe whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN . . "at the Embassy. but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOS- . at ENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ASIDIAN attended a ser- _ et wice celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Kato- likos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin-and that an agent had reported a contact with him ‘there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was @ priest or 4 monk, ._.. and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN: : . the agent -had no further contact with him.. NOSENKO said. - that this’ was his sole recollection concerning. ABIDIAN's ——° : trip, and that he remembered no other details. ~. ..
000) A Rs a Bie aS A TCL TS LE ics Meg ee fe oe] ie FEELS ORS PE IE erg gt tassel tS ea NOE Ge EN RR MII, NRPS Ol 226. left the Soviet Union for Cuba two or three, but not more than five, days after hie return from leave: he could not recall the date of has Geperture fer Cuba ” Except for che American voman with whom APIDIAN was thought to have been intimate. NOSENK? -oula not name AZIDIAN's close Bmerican frienés in Moscow or his close friends and professional contacts with foreigners there. NOSENKO received ard rezd transeripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and epartment via the Moscow city telephone system. He did rot remember the names or .oY nationalitics of people whom AZIDIAN called or who called ABIDIAN . because there was nmotning of ancerest in these corversations. NOSENKO did not liarn anything from.telepmone transcripts about ABIDIAN'sS relationsnip with ery foreigner in Moscow. @ NOSENKO departed Moscow far Tuba on 15 November 1960 and therefore, ry his own statement, would have been back from leave by 10 November at the earliest (five aays before departure). It was pointed cut to NOSENKO that. in this case, his 30 days of leave could have begun no earlier than 10 October and that he muse therefore have peen on duty on 5 October 1960 when ABIDIAN left Moscow. In October 1966, however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February 1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to be on leave “in conditions cf interrogation when lies and truths were all a porridce.’ He told CIA. again for the first time. that his 1960 leave was taken in Januery of that year, immediately after joaning the U.S, Embassy Section, Additaonal details on this January leave period are given below, in discussion of NOCSENKO's claimed responsibility for operations against U.S. military attaches in 1960. ' t : ' ' ¥ nd, Die + artnet 4
1 aia Yh Pet tae th entasben ar mete plorenema snmp eh me ne ve aes ate 2 fae% tee Sn wey at get D8 beg RM AE RGSS ERE hig a THT TT Re SR OEE OR OM LTR {44i) ABIDIAN's Letter “Marling lca During the 19€2 meetings in Geneva, i eereee reported KGB knodledge of one type cf operational tas» ES | by ABLDICN in Mescow in eaditien to his recruitment of ees z. {gee above). This task, NOSFIUKOD said, involved mailing at least three clan- destine letters, in each cease to KG3 double agents. According to NOSENFO on 11 June 1962, tne KGE detected all the letters mailed ry ASIDIAN: he saig that this was achieved through the use of etka: “Stop mailing letters from the Fabassy, ky Emsassy employces. After LAIGOLLE you didn't mail letters for @ year and a halt eng thea you beg n egain. ASIDIAN mailed Several,* ABIDIAN, John ABIDIAN the Embassy i Officer. Listen, we have this t f/i.e. complete ; sstine mailinas/. we have we, 663 the methine Firas the letters c 5 ‘ ‘ which. are mailed. Without surveil . @. Une machine itself. This is a big, sic secret. Here's how it works. They enter your room - you live ain “Norco live in the En- bassy. They /Soviet maids/ A ang simoly cour @ powder cr apply it wiih a Z vour clothnes/. A rag, even like @ handkerchief. There is no smell. ‘hey puc it in the pockets where you mich: pet a levtar. And there 158 a crecial little machine at a station in Moscow... Fill ie Ltters woich ere mailed in Moscow vass through this chine, under a foteapvarat fiicerelly a camera; NOSENKO probably means some sort of light- gensitive device/, We now have lz ,machines/ and hope to have 100 in Moscow, ae ei the letters pass through the apparatus ang the machine it gelects the letter which was mailed by you or him. Do you | understand? The machine itself finds it... anis is how it was with the letters that ASIDIAN mailed. We had them all because this machine gave chem /ro us/. I even would phone surveillance and say: ‘He's out walking around, ABIDIAN 48 cut walking around, checking, cnecking.' I would say: ‘Drop him. Sut give me all the letters today.' The machine Ceter- mines whether there is e special letter there." three days later, at NOSENKO's fifth and fi With CIA in 1962, le was atked whether he pnae whom these detters vere addressed, NCSENKO replied: "To whem did ABIDIAN mail letters? first he mailed a letter te a guy in Odessa. Tnen ABIDIAN mailed one co still somecne else, He mailed two or three letters. Gne letter was ta the Baltic a Same kind, that is we hea planted this man on you. i thin it was to Rica, to our Gouble ascent. And still, I think, two or three other letters, also to double acents.** But we * NOSINKO's information is substantially correct. LANGELLE was declared perseia non grata in connection with the arrest of CIA agent FOFOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed, one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February 1960 fone of which was to an agent now known to have been under KGB control at the time); more letters were mailed until 2 April 1961, when John ABIDTAN mailed one, again to a KGB- controlled agent. LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the Cause of this break in letter-mailings; the suspension re- gulted from other considerations. operational letters for CIA, 3 ? 1 April, the second to an agent in elipeon 2 se and the third to & ee. agent on i Sentomber. fae Be thee + tr H i | i A eee poe epee Peneranney
Vaidn't uncover. any accents on ‘the tasi:3 of letters he mailed. - ‘There weren't any. know. I can’t tell you anything acour the agent in the Baltic area because he was handied hy the Second Section of the Am- érican Department, the ‘Active Line - penetration. "* = detected mailing the letter to Cdés sonnel assigned to the American Depart Directorate, he said on 24 June 1964: Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second Se ection in 1960, although I heard that se was there in 1959. H on working against letters contéein sees all the Jetters mailed py tme tourists. The letters are caught ©1 use Of metka. There are several ty colors, and one type will be used o faa fen 7 .f was concerned wath ASTID therefore I NOSENKO has described in gr er detail how ABIDIAN was sa While ciscussing per- a rment of the Second Cnief ‘I £irst saw Aleksey SECTET Wilting. se SUMIN ans. even the American ner by surveillance or by mer can “Embassy personnel, Saas ee eS COUrists. © Me Same wype if not , group. ABIDIAN mailed a lette: to an é ‘game’ /igra - deuble agen: operation.’ The agent was ‘ARK- HANGELSKIY /AGH ccyptonym/ I thank. AS car and walk around, visiting meny shops on Gorkiy Street. He went to one commission shop where tner: the shop window. and he wouls check tor surveillance, ‘He was ,even followed to a post office and cre of the surveillance “mer. got in there ahead of nin, buc he didn't do anything. Then o another type on British Er.cassy personne. and another tyre for. 3 4 ative 25 Of metka. with different Cd Jays used against the same Ar. exemple 1s in 1961 when “nit in Cdessa. This was a sre ney are swit. hed around IDIAN used to park his was 3 large mirror in é NOSENKO has explained that the so-called"Active Line" Section of the American Department was comcerned with the penetra- tion of U.S. intelligence. prinarily by serving up KGE- controlled agents for recruitment. “#* CIA has conducted 4 series ci tests designed to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device For the purpose of these tests, articles of clothing worn by members of the U.S. Embassy and those of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA Headquarters. ‘The ciothing in each case had been sent to Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted to heng unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or in the apartments of Embassy employees Special filter paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers, and the like. The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet, chemical, and microscopic analysis as well as to examination for traces of radioactivity... Results have been consistently Lemeeee att BRN hy oneneen KD. +h Aer aearam ramsmemanaNp NR Sta
“© “fe walked by a post pox on thé street and was checking it. Tae. ; or. three times he was followed by this post fox. but the ‘sur- veillance never saw him mail’a Leiter. Stili. the KGB wou:d remove the contents of ihe letter box and send it in, On the second or third time “CUMIN round the letter he maiLed with metka. He had also maiied a cover Letter to his parents. Of . course, SUMIN also knew the addigss of the agent. since it was “a ‘game’. " Under interrcogetion in January 1903 NOSENKO Gescribed how metka had been applied ro ANIDIAN's clovnang oy his maid and how, im particula: this led to the dastovery of the lerters ABSIDIAN mailed to the agent AREHAT in the United x1étes ‘tre Foltowing 18 takan from the protocol of these interrogations whach fOSENKC s:aned as being accurate, on 4 March 1965: : “ABIDIAN s maid in Moscow was Tevyana FEDSOROVICH. aR TT * : 4 ; eee a ee ee Ph CaWa Ga ah ODES Rah nt fe Pole Le 1g to AZTEMOV, She /. §tarted to work for AbIDIA. a fow contns after his arrival, perhaps three months but no Longer than s:x months after his arrival. [ wet her shortly after sne began to work for ABIDIAN in order cto yew ecaquainred with her, in order to evaluate hec and give her General Instructions about her work for ABIDIAN, 1 G9 not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fail of 1960, I wrote the operational pian on ANIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN, This operationai plan stated that FRDOROVIC! would con- tinue to put metka regularly on ANIDIAN 5 clothing. fe “FEDOROVICH put metka on AHIDIA: s clothing during the entire period that sme worked for him. She did this : every two o: thice wecks except for 3 few times when she was sick oc on leave No one else hed access to ABIDIAN's % apartment and therefore mo other persen had the possi- bility of putting metka om his clcthing. “T have said that AZIDIAN maaled an operational letter to the KGh aoukls agent ‘ARKHANGELSKIY’., He mailed it at the maiinox on Tverskaya Yemskaya where he had gone several times eariier. Surveiliance did not see ABIDIAN mail the iettér but the marlbox was con-" trolled and the letter to ‘“ARKHANGELSKIY: was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN s parents. Both of these letters had metka on them. as I was toid by SUMIN. 1 . cannot remember the date that ASIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961.'* : og 4 oes OI ‘ i ‘Fin @ CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a tia” photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for Wp _Marion ALEAMONTE and Myra KEMMER. Embassy secretaries, until , efter FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-. “time for ABIDIAN. -ABIDIAN.expleined that he had no maid at all.for the "first, year. o:, so" of his. Moscow. tour and that . FEDOROVICH ,was the only maid he employed there; When ; ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. There- = H ! i 3 v ot tte a ‘ 4. a LSKIY in oéessa and to his parents ‘ 4 4 a 3 i i i : a 7 4 4 $
74-90000 i: "¢ . é ee LENE GI 8g SS HM i Re EEG LR STR REA MSR ME ME eH RAMON RE I OE MOR TE Aye cay ged & ER MRS 230. - (continuation of footnote from preceding pege) code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine j letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to . 4 "ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961, If ABSIDIAN's recollec- vm { tion is correct (a review of Embassy phone lists shows that i KEMMER wes in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in " August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could not Nave been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said, led to discovery of the first of these letters; also, it is possible that she was not employed by ABID-.AN at the time the letter to “ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1561, appar- ently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him, ‘¢nen NOSENKO was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVITH could not have been applying metka regularly to ASIDIAN's clething at the time of the “ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated that no ome but FEDOROVICH hed the possibility of doing so and that he was sure she had. When nis interrogators suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned ABIDIAN's apartment on an informal basis before being formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was possibly the case. (CIA does not know whether this was so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression in Decemrer 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until hiring FEDOROVICH.) Sates tach al oe oe in . om ERIE T ~ - oo. uy Reatnicl | nia ee
eau SAN A ek ee Tab ee a ee Sate / / drop on Pushkin Street in Moscow a* the erd 2f 1960. This dead Ma 7 . oe ps, / sory wet nae, atte ob SR REAA teat cei onty or ne oo oineecies! ee “RETO a a ia SS Sia rea ea “ . TOP SECRET , : 231, % Tn 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB sur- uO i illance had observed a visit by ASIDIAN to a probable dead ‘ ) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop e drop figured prominently in the PENXOVSKIY case, NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April 1964: "I left /the U.S. Embassy Section’ in 1962. There was an interesting move. This address where JACOBS* was caught in the PERNKOVSKIY case - the same address was Visited by ABIDIAN in 1960, or at the beginning of 196i. And at that time 1 went there together with /V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance Directorate, /M. G./ MATVEYEV /Deputy Chief of the Auerican Department/ also went there with us. We went to that address several times, at Pushkin Street. It was very interesting, this radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to place an observation post there, ard that post was tnere for about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960, 196i... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams had to_be occupied there for 24 hours every cay. I was there then /in the U.S, Embassy Section for the entire time that sur- veillance was watching the Pushkin Street site’... At the be- ‘ginning I came there two or three times. I ceme there with MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK; we came there with Venyamin KOZLOV,.. But ne one appeared here and so they were not writing anything /meening that the Surveillance Directorate was not sub- mitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only orally, KOZLOV was Saying ’nothing.‘ A week passed - ‘nothing, ' the next week passed _ "notning'... I shall tell you why /1 didn't mention this to you in June 1962/, Because I had occasions where there were many sucn places, and they were watched for nothing. And it would gust pass away and in a month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two, three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten. Of course, the surveillance team hed it_all recorded, but we . had forgotten about that in the_First /American/ Department... In 1962, I was in the Seventh ZtTourist/ Department. I trans- ferred in January 1962." " On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during | 4 April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965 on ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is consistent with and somewhat more cetailed than earlier state- | ments not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interroga- \ tions: , 4 ~ In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case . officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy ; ‘, to @ residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A stationary surveillance post et the Embassy saw ASIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to @ bookstore, Both Americans entered the hookstore, but ee . ® Richard JACOBS, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servic- ing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 Novemher 1962. \ . a p yout Pog BSE P fiw is wt an \ ; . id UoPes Pa s aoe gee : ‘= a
74-9000 aa Dot a oe a ° shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. “He walked around i foi. the corner and entered a residential building next to a ot A: meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a os a : few seconds. The surveillarnqe team saw him go-in but. did rn: not follow him. This unusual incident was reported by { the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) : Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day . ' by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance ; Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Cnief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, 4 MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building i and its inhabitants, the duration and. circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway - particularly the radiator in it - for. use as a dead drop site, it was decided by the Jeadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a station- ary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover — a —this” location. Because of the short time available, it was , not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street, In addition, the radiator i was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had. been concealed behind it. This stationary a post was maintained around the clock for 390 days, after ‘ which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another ‘ two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to actach to jt very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remoye the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of: sight from the hallway below, During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then dis- + continued, but the address was placed on a list of sus-~- picious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Direc- torate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, (after the arrest of PENKOV- , - - SKIY in 1962. Aa a 8 = ¢ Coetendastesty teller ae iE menetd othe habia Enc eee ogee ~- NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the sus- ‘pected dead drop site on the day it occurred. . He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone eall from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief | of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the G ‘stationary surveillance post on this location was made at a higher level: neither of them was involved in it or in . the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO him- a self visited the building orn Pushkin Street the following , - @ay or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes ~ and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that ope there was @ radiator theres iver tom Lupita a Lo Aan Tart amencegentjatay eee ba wong i etapa hme tne “ot oe mains esaem meetin Senses pune tas etginn oe + i a — As. -ABIDIAN's case officer, “ NOSENKO recalled re. 'eeiving the surveillance report of his visit to the _ Pushkin Street building and placing this. report. in. | ABIDIAN 's. ‘eile. (mis: is the | case file which NOSENKO:
a 1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.) ~ NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss. this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, periodically after that. These discussions took place either by telephone, or when KO2LOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary sur- veillance. ~ NOSENKO was in the U.3. Embassy Section during all turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December ot s te ttle ou als ace. the period that the stationary _survei-l-lance—post—was—wacch= 5 epetnpenertnteatie steam wo ing the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLCV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections, ~- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts. in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been discontinued by this time without anything unusual or sus- Ppicious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA. CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY. The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961, following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain Alexis DAVISON drove from his apartment to the U.S. Embassy to alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station, Paul GARELER, about the signal. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso House with the other guests at akout 0200 on 28 December in ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part of his “drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was to leave a mark. - Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in his own car drove from the Embassy to DAJIDSON's apartment, where he first checked the telephone pple visually from the window and then walked by it for a closer examination. ‘Although it was not certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December . had, ‘in fact, keen a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no - supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision = was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 Decem- ber 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics “, Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet driver and proceeded to a boqkstere on the corner of Pushkin Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop Site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and _ The pair then returned to the Embassy. <__ left one minute later.. tee S Pr aet “These facts were outlined tp NOSENKO during the. February 1965 interrogations.. It was pointed out. that,. by his own. most. se La bee bee te prea Hehe tee | Bon anetadeena AH.
- recent account, NOSENKO had transferred. from the v: s. Embassy: Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and | — that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to . “ american citizen W. E, JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been con- os firmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENKO was told, much of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin - 7 Street affair became untenable, NOSENKO'’s response to this observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON, Pa we cnc cintticie w ware denveaime sine Also during the February 1965 interrogatiens NOSENKO refused to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows: "Z have keen told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 Bec- 3 ember 1961. Therefore, I was told that: % j bee a. I couleé not have placed the surveiilance _ _the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back: he would date this =report_in ABIDIAN'S Case file becatise IF had— -alreaay- — enna ea turned over the file to GRYAZNOV. ‘ saab id Phat © b. I could not have received reports about the stationary surveillance wnile still Be 3IDIAN's case officer, since I was already in the Seventh Depart- ment in January 1962, Paeneviany c. The three month period in which the sur- veillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more than two weeks after I left for Geneva. ; Thus I could not have known in June 1562 that the surveil- ' lence of the dead drop site had failed to produce results or that it had been discontinued.“ elevant au dade Bab de aie es Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involve- ment with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO said the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "“leok silly.' On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols : ; dealing with other subjects. ; ; : t ment pe NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concern- Po, a ing ABIDIAN's visit~to- Pushkin Street. NOSENKO reaffirmed that ~~ : ABIDIAN was under special survej{llance coverage throughout his Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from only as “sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB sur- veillance had detected any unugual movements by ABIDIAN during the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop site (a reference to his: movements on 27 and 28 December 1961 ° i. as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that Co, surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that a ay: ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB- surveillance ate : oat oat any time during this period. — CEN Bos Sea ~. ° Qn 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion, ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In re- — sponse,” he told CIA for the first time that in about .1960 an. 7
-Pmerican tourist or delegation member had gone to. the Pushkin - ~ ‘Street address and that it was the “opinion of the Second Chief - Directorate” that this American had selected it as a dead drop site,* it was thought that ABIDIAN. went there merely to check the suitability of the. proposed site. the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been ae nes seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't . 3 When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited remember, I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop. 1. . don’t remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me . : 4 that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited _ it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say ‘yes,' and I cannot say ‘no.'" AS previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day ABIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December 1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, inspected the Pushkin Street building. _ however, that KOZLOV was on TOY in the The FBI had reported, nited States from. a 15 November 1961] until leaving New York City on 30. December uo i 1361, travelling via France. The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to ” Pushkin Srreet, at 06339 hours New York City (Eastern Standard). time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having gore to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO Said he did. * The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOV- _this address and the only. ones connected with its use asa : ; ‘dead drop location occurréd on 12 November and 4 December . ee a ' Feturned and entered the building to check the precise - SKI¥Y himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initi- ally contacted CIA. . The only known visits by Americans to 1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address from the outside, and on 21 January 1961; when MAHONEY dead drop location. See Part V.E.3. £.. for a discussion. of. ROSENKO's: knowledge: of MAHONEY. . beg
"Tbe seo 8. Se gvisor of Activities. A aingt, American. Service Attaches i At the beginning of the interrogation session on 29 ae January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he as- . sumed upon reporting to the U.S, Embassy Section in Jan=- vary 1969. As he had on a number of earlier cccasions, — NOSENKO replied that he was given responsibility for the -~ - supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB case officer for American Security Officer Jonn ABIDIAN who was to arrive in the near future, and was charged jo. with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of ‘ \ the U.S. Embassy and his secticn's file cn the materia‘s. from microphones in various Exbassy officea. Later in this same session NOSENKO recailed--and toid CIA.for the first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising activities against cfficers assigned to the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Attache offices. The pertinent ; me F portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogatica was as fol= — - - OWS 2 4 a sy een nh ‘Question: Who briefed you or gave you instructions cn : what was expected of you in the Section? ; i NOSENKOS s I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN. Questions What did KLYPIN say? NOSENKOs That “you are Deputy Chief of Section, but = consider that you must also pay special atten- i tion to code clerks. We must study them and ; make an approach | to one of them. It’s necessary to work on thas." KOVSEUKX was in KLYPIK's effice and I remember also that he raised the questions "O.K. He will supervi-e this kind ef work, but maybe he can alao take the military. All three attaches." Well, KUYPIN did not say yes and dic not say no. If couldn't say anything because I had not begun; I didn’t know how much work this would involve. I couldn't say. And, . ; you see, KLYPIN said: “Let's try it a short ‘ period of time." It was that way, It was ‘decided that Ivwill supervise the code clerks. and then the three attaches, And KOVSHUK took : ; the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But, spun wee ws = «. Ofcourse, in the absence of KOVSHUK I nust . a take everything and in my absence, KOVSHUK must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -~ I don’t remember dates -~ later I was not super-_ ; . — wising the military attaches but concentrated neers: | only on code clerks. a es ee ee wteiiy Later you were not supervising military attaches, but only | code clerks?» attaches? . What ‘aoes ‘ie mean? Xf: che. case. ‘officers ‘of the. -:¢heee attaches. have any questions. or any papers’ to report to the Chief. of Section, they go, to
Ta Pe me, not to KOVSHUK, They were deciding all> Be questions with me, This is what supervising» the work on thease three attaches means. They were deciding ail questions with me. For exe- . _ ample, the casa officers who were working of - against diplomats <= KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN, CHEREPANOV -= they were reporting any questions, ; . an any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was LE — such a division fof labor]. — ~ . a a Questions Am TI correct that by military attaches you . Mean Army, Navy, and Air Force? - : bd ideata NOSENKOs Yes. x shee Boat ens atncent Questions Attaches and their assistants? Pesta diag meIa TREE TTETED NOSENKOs Yes, yes, yes. Questions And enlisted pers5nnel? a ¥ da ee ewan eine NOSENKO: DEMKIN was handling enlisted perscrnel, and he was also coming in to me for advice. Questions Roughly how long did you have the responsibil- ities for the attaches? NOSENKOs (pause) I don't remember. Several months. Questions By several, you meaneso? vetoes des ratte eam nel ee NOSENKO?s Five or six. Questions And why was this responsibility removed from you? NOSENKOs I didn’t have time. No time, No time. You see, besices this, which is simple to explain, there were too many other questions which. See TEaC AUT: 1 ON CL eS eS Questions What occupied most of your time? NOSENKO:. Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of Department to study and develop this question, then this question, then this question. Then gomething to prepare for GRIBANOV, then some= thing to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report, then something to prepare for myself... @ peereee-a Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you devote the most time? HOSENKO: I don't know. ' Questione. What was most important? “WOSENKOs . They were all important. ae i st ic :° Can you teli‘me whexe you were spending most of: - yous time to cause the removal of your respon~ sibility. for. military attaches?. a
HOSENKOs No. I can't tell-you. _ Bee tee Ae once. Questions Who was given the respenasibility for military attaches? - : Lo, MOSENKOs; Just a moment, I think he was.e. I don't re- member how, or what date, when there appeared in the Firet [American] Department a Ceputy Chief Lok of Departzent. It was either before I came, or it was in January, or it was a littie bit later. Questions Who was this? NOSENKOs ALESHIN.* And his job was such -= it was a new one -=- supervision of work against military intelligence officers, act only Americans, but of other departments aise, the First, the Second, tne Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, Co= ordination of the whole work against all miiitary intelligence officers, And that's why, later, - KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You ere the Deputy of the Chief.“ It was not only be- 4 cause of the lack of time. Also it wasn't con- : venient to the case officers. They were re~ porting to me. ‘then ALESHIN would invite them in and they would have to report the sama thing Gy to hin. ; 3 s 4 3 3 3 4 nd ‘6 | fae awed heals Questicns Who were you supervising? NOSENKOs ee oGAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and assistants; KURILENKO nad the Army Attache and assistants; and BELOGLACCV the Naval Attache, assistants and marines. ** During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO chanced his earlier statement that the only operational file he held in the U.S. Embassy Section was that on ABIDIAN., At the same time, he described a leave period that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When I began to work [in the U.S. Embassy Section}, after a month or so, I tock the files on the Naval attaches, And F"HOSENKO had mentioned this earlier, on 18 June 1904 he was . asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Sec- ne ee ore eA EEY le ated edited ee tion officers in 1960. He saids "In 1960 the Chief of the First Department was KLYPIN. .MATVEYEV was still there as First Deputy. The Second Deputy was. Yevgeniy Nikolayevich — . "4 _ALESHIN, He was given the special assignzent of coordinae © : Le ting the activities of the Second Chief Directorate. against : “all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned . - to. the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK . ‘Wag the Chief and I was the. Deputy Chief. In addition to ; . :. general functions, X had the responsibility for supervising — SO ‘the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security Officer.® @ In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV wag re- — ; - -@ponsible for the Naval Attache‘s office in January when =~ ... BOSENEO. arrived, but he was: transferred and his duties, were taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had: been working with his
‘then after two months I gave thes | to BELOGLAZOV. I im-~ mediately went on vacation after I came,® After two weeks ‘I went on leave for a month. I took over the files. either. before or after the leave.*** NOSENKO was asked why he had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and replieds It was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only: the Navy while I was gettiag acquainted with the section. At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and he handled only Naval officers. 1 didn't take the Army. or Air Force,® NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he was responsible only for the Naval Attaches during early 1960. He answered: “I took the files only on the Navy, . eoetg WET AGE + but I was working on all of them.” m Otner contexts NOSEN aS Alwaye equated custocy -. of a file with case officer responsibilities. There=- fore, he seems to have indicated here that for the approximately two months when these files were in his mame, he was officially the KGB case officer charged with the American Naval Attaches. _. During a subsequent ‘interrogation session, NOSENKO. was asked to describe the leaves he took during:.1960 and ‘4961. He repeated that he took a senth'a leave im- ‘geddately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, “part ef Januaty and part of February” 1960; He had gon@, — then addeds *You want me to eay I was not. telling the ae aay pas es. case officer for John; ABIDEAN. he said, to the Caucasus with bis wife and mather. He truth in Pebruary [1965] when I said I was on leave be~ | fore I went to Cuba. [in Nove~ber 1960]. °:I know. this.” = - - See Part V.E.3.d., which aescribes' this November 1960. ‘leave and its relationship to NOSENKO's: responsibilities
yaepocoy. 7X erenrend mee Introduction “-xeBfe file on the security of the Embassy. According to ce HOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in. ee ci, Knowledge of the Target . ‘. ne oe : oe, . aan aan 2 :.. Hie position and duties as Deputy Chief and sometimes Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required hin to know, the extent of. the U.S. Embassy Section‘’s knowledge. of ita target. He has therefore been questioned at length by CIA about the locations and cccupente o: the Embascy — offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB . had identified ag CIA officers, The information from - i ¢ NOSENKO on these two topics ia presented below. t ahi (44) Physical Premises NOSENKO has said that tis knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy cerives botn from his gencral super= visory function during 1960 and-1961-and from his reapon= sibilities as the officially registered sustodian of the NOSONKO, he received the latter from his chief, KO‘'VSHUK, : when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly : thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate to have custedy transferred - . _ am officially to his name from that of M.F. BAKHVALOV, his predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time but that, under KGB prcce-lures, it was permissiule for an officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the American Department, 80 long as he remained in the Seccnd Chief Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV approximately during the pariod 25 to 28 December 1961, no one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the section, and GRYAZNOV and KCSOLAPOV, who shared the office ané safe where this file was kept. i Lenn bere BS nel ae cmpeboriaia tree! NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never studied the contents, nor nad he paid any special attention tg wae ar Di -¢o this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no operational analysis or planning by himself cr others was ‘done on the basis of this file during his two years in the gseetion. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second=--about one inch thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy . ce Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was impoesible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate’ the secure i areas of the Embassy because.of the security precautions in rn effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was generally interested in the floor plans of the: Embassy .by wirtue of his position as Deputy. Chief of the section. 7 Sian in atten the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements ©. . are given in the next paragraphs. © 2 Ge ee “SPALL KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone -© ‘ef Security") of the Embassy on the séventh through tenth floors* ape cone
gah were carefully questioned on what they saw, because these, = areas were of special interest to the KGB. NOSENKO knew no KGB employees who entered tha secure areas auring 1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them. He did not remember any information that such KGB erployees ever reperted to the KGB, except that Dmitriy. I. KUKOLEV, an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955, had observed antenna wiring in the attic; the details or - significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of 1965. NOSENKO personally p.aced some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it. None of the infcrmation, he said, was interesting, ime portant, or useful enough for him to remember, and he could not name the: agent sources of the KGB, In another context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he had received a report from some agent (name unknown) that there was a sign “Security Office" on the office — ‘door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security officer.* NOSENKO did not study the Enbassy security pro- cedures in detail and aid not remember where the classified trasn wes burned. He said that nothing could be done with this information operaticnally, because the trash was al- ways burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard ac@- companied by an officer.** The Embassy office or floor where any section was located or any individual worked during the years 1960 and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO. This reply was also given when he was asked about the roons and floors for the offices of the ambassador, the political officera, ABIDIAN, and the code clerks.*** NOSENKO said that he either knew these locations at the time he was Deputy Chief of the section or could have found them in the in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these xegularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office numbers and phone numbers.**** J Where never has been such a sign; NOSENAO’s responsi- bility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN is discussed in, Part V.E.3.d.. All Soviets who enter the top three © floors of the Embassy have a marine escort. —— *@ A check with two former Embassy security officers in- dicates that there has never been such a regulation. fhe trash is burned by the marine on duty who "in=- waxiably does it alone.“ One of the security officers questioned said: “I can think of no reason why the Sov- dets would think this to be the case, since whatever _ eollateral information they have on it would point to -.; the truth.* - g @ ' part V.E.3.¢. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge ‘of and parti- os cipation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks. #@@@ The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office “sit gumbers, They do, however, provide apartment numbers. G ted ade 8 . ¢ t i $ £ Si i H : Hob we bee tne gle cee wh dee oe SA TE ete dain hid Pana,
tn “4960 | a *matailic chamber” (acoustical room) arrived - at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use-and for . secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was as . . ‘located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an. re -unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a secure room in the "Zone of Security.” He did not know any : ‘- of the technical details of this room. yO The KGB accomplished only one theft cf classified material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1960 . and 1961. A charwoman (name or cryptonym not recalled), - . who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG= LAZOV, atole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval — Attaches. Most of the papers were turn or crumpled. They- included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches’ sighting of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad, Since this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO a . said, he was unable to recall any other details of tne theft, 7 : sO including the date, except that the charwoman was granted © ‘ a cash award. : (214i) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover 3 According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S, Embassy of greatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section were the identified CIA officers. When questioned on 2- Septerber 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence per= sonnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member oS of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat.as "suspect . American Intelligence," the latter nctation always meaning CIA. One of the tasks of the section was to determine which | of theses diplonats was the CIA “Resident” (KGB nomenclature for.Chief of Station), which were CIA case officers, and which were the CIA agents or cooptees, The KGB knew that eode Clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a pro= ,tocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA. officer in the Embagsy.* ; eS a vend tne tyra baw ne sted 4 : i 4 HOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all ” American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and t 4961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select ; these known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers. The Do os persons he so identified, together with his comments con- Co : cerning them were: : : “Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA “Resident® ' 'dm Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why (> ELOSSON was considered as such but gaid: "Every officer — * dm the First (U.S. Embasay] Section thought he was the - Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job, ' HOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the . '. GEA Resident on. the basis of: his behavior under KGB. ews 7 ourveilisnce and of his. letter mailing. * 'NOSENKO did.
“a, 14-00000 _—_ be f UIT . Pee, wie eeionnpmaens smisseannrstcsnsiemetarh iD j Evrae Ok 2 I RIE pe eB aA No oo a i . . 243. not récall the names of KGB agents working apecifically against. KLOSSON and never read any agent or surveil~ i lance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in Glandestine activity. NOSENKO did net know KLOSSON'’s : position: in the Enbassy, where he had been previously a stationed, what trips he tcok inside the Soviet Union, ; where he lived in Moscow, about XLOSSON's wife or whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything about his personal life, the names of close American friends and his Soviet contacts. “I didn't read the file® on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. The responsible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV, Fwag reading [the file]. LI can't tell you why [we believed KLOSSON was the CIA Resident]. There was opinicn-~his previous position, attitude. Little, little details. I don't remember."* -John ABIDIAN: Consicered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Departrent of State security officer in connection witn fremicr KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States ana be-= cause he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE in Moscow, Surveillance established the fact that he mailed operational letters anc visited a possible dead drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.). “George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA cfficer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS wae in peracnal contact with KOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV. | Known to be a CIA officer, As far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or two lettersto KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area, In addition, from a KG3 microphone he was over- heard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he xeturned from a trip in the USSR. Lewis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer, but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact with BOWDEN, z ‘S@@ below}; William MORELL was identiriea DY RLOSSON to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer be- fore MORELL arrived in Moscow. . &@ The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.3 further KGB information on WINTERS is re- viewed in Part VI.D.7.c. ##® The CHEREPANOV document; which sets forth a KGB plan for operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he ; was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy. - NOSENKO, when reading this decument in Geneva in February 1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN as FBI on later occasiony also, Sea Part VI.De7eCs on CHEREPANOV. q i j ‘ i
+ berate” 244. ms the wal |. sddanb bie ERidlah cht / : 4, we ~ Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected cf being a CIA - a \ officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union, a sy ; particularly economics. NOSENKO did not remember the uo a names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any ; 5 derogatory information concerning him. ~ William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case os officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of micro- ue at , phones in the Embassy, discussiny a report he had , q written, or dictating it, about his cbservations on a a trip he had taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said j that he did not know the names cf agents working against HORBALY or whether the agents obtained deroga- tory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO knew, there had been no operaticnal approach to or ~ 2° recruitment. of HORBALY. i . 7 4 Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by 7 NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS, . : : and HORBALY~--were in fact CIA officers. When ; was first assigned tu Moscow, however, he was 3 detached from overt employment as an economics analyst in CTA. In January 1962 he severed his connecticns with CIA to become a full member of the Foreign Agricultural Ser- vice of the Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first arrived in Moscow he Openty discussceag the fact that he had come to the Embassy from CIA. hile in Mescow he had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandest ine activities. was ; similariy detached from overt employment as an economic analyst with CIA wnen he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA “Resident” in Moscow from Febru- ary 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON, BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA. During the time NOSENKO said. he belonged to the American ; : . Embassy § i tationed in Moscow two CIA . : f : officers, and Paul GARSLER, whose status : : . as such was subsequently found to have been known to the KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition, ne be ete ape, one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page 1 374} reported having been. asked by one of the two KGB offi- os . cers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee; when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer ; i stated: "He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stan- : ley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the So : -§.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to - i‘. ¢he Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine activities in Moscow on behalf. of CIA, | but the first. two CIA officers were. i 4 i : | I -4| ' ae - NOSENKO- indicated that he did not ‘know about ‘the. intel- “Lgence affiliation of any of these four. persons: 2 2 -« NOSENKO was shown a photograph. of he did. not recognize. He wag then given “ame, which he recognized as being that of an emp , of the Administrative Section of the assy :
a air 7 Seem said than this, he did net «know anything about is previcus career, his knowledge of the Russian Tanguage, when he arrived an Moscew, when he a ars departed, where he lived, his activ2itacs there, or © a ., oN. wasn't known he was a CIA officer,* NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. “If there was evidence I would have there was none." %XCSENKO was told that IA status had been revealed to the KGB by a KCW penetration of British inteil: gence {George BLAKE]. He replied that he wat certain that the U.S. Embassy Section's file cal contained no infor- Mation from such a source conceraLng | and that had there been such informaticr availABraé,hé would have been a special turget and «ould have Leen handled by one of the best officers in the section. NONENKG added that he could not understana why this infer- : Lee % t evidence that he was ar intelligence officer. “It a | we i t | ndnead Hiieddliae € mation about wWaS NOt Jiven to the section by the KGB Firs Tirecctorate. wy - NOSENKO identifies Pacl CARSLER as a naval officer who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the case officer working against him as BLLOGLAZOV. He saic tnat he could provide no other deraiis on GAPBLER. NOSEXKO specifically said that ne 1c not know the aames of. any agents working against CARSLER, that he krew of no unusual or interesting .znformation concerning GARBLER contained from concealed micrcernones, telephone taps, oer surveillance, and that he ¢:¢ not know whether he . : : ; had read GARBLER's file or cther "materials" ccncerning : him. ~- NOSENKO did not identify William MCRELL as a CIA -officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO’s superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer of the KGS First Chief Directcrate. seeticetermre Ap RRA care ome cape - NOSENKO did not reccgnize the name of G. Stanley BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA, BROWN shared an office with HCFBALY, wnom NOSENHO said was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was.a KGB microphone with good rec ception but insignificant pro- Guctien, acsorging 22 MUSENZ..°° Feporteily ZRlWN and . another member of che Ens bassy staff were under constant og surveillance during a trip witnin the USSR during 1961, ‘ and in the same year he travelied to Leningrad with _ WINTERS, correctly identified sy NOSENKO as:a CIA officer. - . nim tenets soene ot my amma sct antl, z cords show that, as a staff officer, |__| served in during 1955 and 1956 anc was connected with a i - join project which handles the NTS, a Russian emigre TE. Org = His work brought his anto liaison in true name ee i 3 with both he was known ¢ aa _ Resentel armen eur nrree mane omy,” igen ob - —— - ‘¥ “SEE First” ‘Footnote, ‘Page. 243. ea eee abe “ne ‘Emgeday, o TS" that in late 1960 SE aeariy 1961. en2 U.S. Embassy Section. os - . had decided to withiray the requirement for continuous. Peed ReeeeS.dreg vB bate emg ony oigcppeeeem Ber $87 PREG SS wees) Abe AaTS® office. 7 Gaee Shieh hein fore 9909 Boog nd goreaet ‘ereetg he Sone -$daened, : ‘ hbuhes. wr bor tey. 4
George BLAKE, the KGB penecration of MI-6, was arrested in London on 14 April 1961. In his confession he said that he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons onn ed with the joint U.S.-British project with which had been connnected in Frankfurt, as well as other Ss on this project. On this rasis, yas relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn fron Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival. CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA by the Navy in April 1952 and served | from January 1953 until July 1955. Tn the fall On'3 June I96l, he returned to active duty with the Navy, and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as — Assistant Naval Attache to Mescow, with the rank of Commander. Lf _ In, September 1961 his official bivographic data was forwarded po to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who ; had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived ip Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of Station there. ; . : ’ Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in , i - Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. in April | '. 4, . 1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions i '... «> im Washington on-the question of tourist operations into > -¢hée Soviet Union (see Part V.D.8): BLAKE, who had access to information on the agenda and participants for these. talks, admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had photographed the minutes of: this meeting and hed passed them to his. Soviet _ handlers. -On this basis CIA presumed that-GARBLER was. ; identified to. the KGB. prior. to arriving in Moscow at the were scien wb aL aDiie eae way oe wwohheds Tene reses ee ewnaeie ey
end of 1961.. ‘ was definitely identified as such in an tiya in October 1963. % Sea Page 394 for other. 247. ‘ (BLAKE was arrested the pre article carried in vious April:) He the Soviet Government newspaper lzvcs This article, entitled "A Cruel Lesson. was allegedly written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in it HAMAN attempted to expose how “the U.S. Secret Service, riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty. recruits agents for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and other countries...making active use ofr the official U.S. missions in Stockholm, newsmen, tourists..." HANAN named GARBLER as. having been involved in. this work. which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of. WENNERSTROM, deseribed a sumber of fabricated activities of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, GARBLER had no connection with HANAN or with anything which HAMAN describes. * _ GARBLER's part in ABIDIAN'S visit-to the PENKOVSKLY ‘dead drop site on Pushkin 5treet is discussed in Part V.E.3.d. ok eee ee KGB oper i Me “This article, ves ssn Bye hei So a i 1 i ri a, i 3 i 3 4
74-90000" 248. ae pees oo Tee Be g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Exbassy _ er) The (i) Introduction NOSENKO had. three basic pieces of information on KGB : audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Em-. bagsy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the : ‘chancery buiiding, the absencé of audio-technical dovices in the north wing of the Embassy, and the exidtence of a beam which monitors and jams transmissions’ from the Embassy. Thesé are discussed separately below. Except for knowing that a resonant cavity (wireless) “microphone had been found in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO * said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and teche niques (other than the chancery microphones) in use against the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to. . . oe ““the best of his knowledge, there were no wireless micro-. . . - phones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters) in the Embassy. * His information on KGB electronic opera- tions against this target dated mainly from the period when : he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorute, in 1960-1961 and derives from his special responsibilities in this period; from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NO-= ; ; SENKO said, he learned only that audio installations : S existed. red ee. sat welts toh ote eye be (41) Microphones in the Chancery 3 4 i Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important : information, the microphones in the chancery building were first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in de~- | j “tail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on i : the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of | ‘ reception, and the value of production. He has not given the date when the. microphones became operative, but pre- | sumed (in agreement with the KGB defector GOLITSYN) that j -they Were installed prior te 1953, when the chancery was oc« ecupied by U.S. Government representatives.** Of the 16 ! microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the impor-~ ; i 3 ; ' tance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor, H , the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In . ‘-  . 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old - an on *NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the micro- eos ‘phones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since 2 ‘——_ gicrophone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this re-- - mark suggests either that there was an external power source 2or the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or... thet NOSENKO himself did not | ‘have rudimentary knowledge of guch matters. Toe ee eeThe inventigations by. American technicians leave 20: ‘doubt. ' ¢hat the microphone-snd-wire system would have had: te be > ie. place | at the time of occupancy.
. system varied from very clear'£0 zero: he said in 1964_ that toe rene mi was deteriorating and that “in a year or . | t two they | the microphones| will be completely inoperative."* | } Althougr the microphones produced a great deal of politi- — : . cal intelligence, NOSENKO said, he found nothiog worthwhile | for use against U.S. code clerks or others. of operational interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and other sources on the microphone system in the chancery biiilding is presented in the fol. .wing portions of this = 4 paper. , : " i A | (a) NOSENKO's Sources en ! 4 : at ' $ : ' " Nearly all of NOSENKO's knowledge about the microphone i i ' system in the chancery building was, he said, derived from two circumstances: Fitst, his responsibility as Deputy = Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second, a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as — Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of the microphone information. Additional information was ob- tained by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor 4s Deputy Chief of the Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV dufing this period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's : 4 reassignment to the Tourist Departrent in January 1962. , a NOSENKO'’s statements concerning his major sources’ 6f infor- mation on the microphones are presented in chronological order below. wet “We are listening to everything the military attaches gay in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches," «. NOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. “All the reports go through me. I read them....Only a limited group of people read these reports. They are all in the First Department of the ’ Second Chief Directorate. Who are they? The Chief of the Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people. Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important. Be conceal the fact that we are Listening to the Americans oO, . from our workers in other departments, from the English i Department, from the French Department....We are listening ; to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't even send coded cables abbut me (to Moscow). If you do it . will be the end of me....Only three people know that we _are Listening ‘to you. Even within the Second Chief Directo- rate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening. to you.” eae Le ROSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which he received the audio intercept reports and whether these ' geports were delivered to his office; He answered:. “No. Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned *#Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians ater. in. 1964 resulted in recordings of high. intelligibility in, certain: instances. Bap adeod ne Sate oe (AS \¢¢Vulnerability. data on Americans in Moscow could be obtained “* from the microphone. system, according to the damage report aa iby the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB)- @nd according to the views: of the U.3. Army Attache whose — ‘effice in the Embassy was the site of a microphone. = x a
" NOSENKO: 250. with this function which is called: the Second Special Department. It is a part of the Operationai Technical : ' Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several sections within it. Take, for example, the section under Colonel [N.¥a.}] KUZMIN. He has the entire English line, everything. He has young girls. and boys there who have an excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this,. everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They. listen to it two or three times so as to get every word.... { They prepare the materials.] The materials from the American Ensbassy used to come to me...and I decided what to keep and what not to keep. Why? <A summary report would come to me with the notation that the information in it was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but- -. I was required to return the report within two days’ time.-- So, I would read through the materials to see what was usc. ful and what was not.. It’s not all suitable. And 1 would -- underline this { the significant items] with a pencil. No, {1 was wrong!.:t°fhe report first went to the thicf of de- partment and then I underlined with a pencil what was neces-~ sary and gave it back to them {the Second Special Department, OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had received it from them and they gave me a receipt when I returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these _extracts alcne one cannot tell where the material came froa, but from the report one realizes that the Americans are being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts to place in the files. We have a file on each person working in the Embassy, the so-called delo~formulyar [developmental file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee.’ During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in “Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes from ‘his wallet. Pointing to. one of them, he said: "This piece of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those micro- phones which are actively used in monitoring conversations dn the U.S. Embassy.” This list named eleven offices and apartments in the chancery which contained microphones. When asked whether he had copied the list from records or had-drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came from an operational review of what “listening points we had in the U.S. Embassy." : A detailed explanation of his ‘acquisition of the written ' list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964: Question: How did this list cone into your hands? What caused you to write it? I came to KLYPIN (chier of. the American Depart- ment] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief . of.the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department] was writing and he put the list on my book. .°*"" KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working Weal, this one badly, and so on. a What was the date of this? What year and month? Oh, I don’t renember, 1960. .-maybe the beginaing | of 1961... At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 196r. you and‘ KOVSHUE met. in KLYPIN's office? | ame sek et at ene naeN een ae a : oan wucditaitianl LEAD A tae. net oti bist a, te me ode ead ot Na i : 3 3 } 4 i
_ NOSENKO: Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. ‘It is dif-- ‘ficult: to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was. .writing in KLYPIN's study room. 1 don't remember. NOSENKO then described the purpose of the meeting:. To dis- ‘cuss the possibility of releusing monitor positions from some of the chancery microphones and of aSsigning these ree leased positions_to Vladimir [patronymic unknown| PETROV, -.-. Chief of the American Department's section for werk against American tourists and delegates suspected of being con- nected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlicr re- quested English-language monitoring positions from the Chief of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special Department but had been told that all such interpreters were already engaged on pricrity targets. At the neeting KOVSHUK avid KLYPIN reviewed the microphone. coverage of the chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little vaiue and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV. KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those of lesser importance. At the end of the neeting, KOVSHUK gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing fur- ther on the locations of microphones in the chancery building, and much of his information concerning the quality and value of the production by these microphones cane from this meeting. Since his defection, NOSEXKO has spoken further on his responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts received from the Second Special Department. He said on 14 May 1964: “All the materials after they were read and ‘signed were returned to the Second (Special] Department of the Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material fron this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this. From this we gave information to those who needed it, de- pending on their interest. If there was something inter- esting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. if KLYPIN saw something interesting he could take it ‘and give it to GRI. BANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT {from the Second Special Department] . came by car with this material. . She went to KLYPIN. Some- times she left them with me." A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: “One of my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give to appropriate case officers the production from microphones: -dn the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained the control book (journal) for these transcripts. These 7 ‘transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Direc- :torate of the KGB. Every day a. female worker of the OTU brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy - ° from the previous day. I regularly returned all of. the ori- “ginal transcripts to this female worker; they were usually fim my possession for one day.’ In. my absence that nate} was performed by [ny. superior] KOVSHUK ‘or [my subordinate] ~~ GRYAZNOV." = 7° lee ee SAAT A wu? : z
14-00000 HE MSE EN ‘the Snes SA bebe te Fn Ne ciate redneta a RR  er e Ee MNL 4 ipa * st esa aac cae pe tu8e senoSonae Mo gta meses ec” pe gta ee 4 ed fos SLAP ro a ae. 2 ] Lk. oe athlete ela ie (b) Number and Locations of Microphenes _ The information from NGSENKO con the number and locations of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S. 4 Embassy is scparated from that furnished by other sources. 3 NOSENKO's Information : ia 11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been essured that none of ths information he had given CIA would be used without first consulting with Lim.]} “Well, because you are such _ KOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following offices and apartments in the chancery contained sicrophénes: good guys, I will give you even move. Have the Minister Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office... Listen, move the. Minister Counsellor from his present office to the north wing of the Embassy [where NOSENKO said there were no listening devices; see below!. We are not listening to the Ambassador. but move the Minister Cuounselior.... And we are listening to al! your military atteches there. All of them.-the Military Attache, tne Naval Attrehe, the Air Force Attache....¥e have four or five points [fron which we are getting intercepts!. #e hear the Minister Counsellor, all three attachos..-that's four points--and the fifth is where one of the State Department employees sits. And yes, there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the Agricultural Attache. [C. Stanley] BROWN is working there now and someone else, a young man ; William HORBALY]. So, we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest secret. Only a few people know this. [ was Deputy Caief of the section and received this information. I decided what to give the Chief of Pepartment and what not to give him. Oo you understand? This is to say nothing about the other departments and the [U.S.! Embessy Section itself." 12 June 1962: “We lost the microphone in the private residence Gf the Anbassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had somee thing there, but you found the [Ureat] Seal where it was located. But in the Embassy itsel., in the Ambassador's office, we have nothing. ‘Ine one we hear now is {Minister Counsellor] FREERS. Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is important material." 14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American i Embassy Section T received reports on the microphone material ; daily. If there was something important in it, I reported to the Chief of the dupartment. The rest KOVSHUK and I read and then distributed to the workers the parts that cone cerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against , the three attaches knew about this [microphone] equipment.... Nothing was received from the code room. These machines were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting alone and there was nething. [NOSENKO is evidently describing the silitary code room.]....There is a point there from which we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there in nothing there. They talk about what interests them in the Lield of agriculture. Nothing interesting.” id Fy vee Mel sete oe Saks 24 January 1964: The Late 1960/early 1961 list which ella! daa set wy newt epaemerenee mem en TEP Sepacy
14-00000 ny s . Urs ad 3 j * < a id ad 5 \ ¢ a & a pais gb ey ay 253. ae Rae i eee “Office of the Winister Counsellor, FREERS; "Office of the Naval] Attache, HOLGHTON: ’Oftice of the Miiatary Attache, URBAN; "Office or the Air Attache, NEILSEN; : f "Orfice of the Assisrant Air Attasne, WINDSOR; "Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENTIO and SACHANEN; "Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ and WILSON; "Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN; “Office of Agricultural Attactes, HORBALY and BROWN; "Military Code Roan; ; "State Department Code Room and Teletype Office; “Apartments of FREERS, HOLGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN; "Bighth Floor Bar ‘Marines)" Altogether, Sixteen spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO said that the microphon+ in one (the Marine bar) had never worked and that nothing of importance was learned from the microphones in the four Eabassy apartments. This leaves eleven; when presenting tha list to CIA, NOSENKO said that while he was ian the U.S. Embassy Section, “there were a total of eleven listening posts.” (In discussing the late 1960 or early 196i meeting at which EGOVSHUK and KLYP!* received the microphone coverage, NOSENKO said on 14 “Yay i454 that it was decided to celeas. the microphone positions in the GLEYSTEEN office, tne UORBAT Y-BHOWN office, the state De- partment code room and the teletype office. ‘this would leave a total of cight ‘listening posts."} 14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of micro- phones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO said that “mary” were installed in the chancery buiiding before the Americans moved in, but that he did not know how many were ins tailed in all, how many wege in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specifie rooms. He did recall that nost of the microphones were placed in the : outside wall, the wali rearest Cnaykovskiy Street, as most of i the offices faced this strest and the piacement of the micro- . phones near the outer wall would make it more difficult for American technicians to find them if they examined only the inner walls. January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted i men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was ‘ discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KCB agents i employed there to place temporary audio devices for one oF two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, be- cause such devices are too easily found. For the same reaie _ gon, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's residence) or ian the apartments of such Embassy officers ag John ABIDIAN. The KGB was “afraid that they will be detected and that there will be a scandal.” ee a eS a a eee - tafe eee see eee nine eee ae
PRA S yg yay Had tne ae Foote ge aR RR OBS targa “t iy SECRET ae La ESBS Orpen aaa MT Rng te NF tet te TD a gc ramet i & 254, Information from Other Sources In 1956 | submitted a vritien report to the U.S. Ambassador in Noscow with “he cautionary cemark: "Do not speak about this information in the room. of the American Embassy." The report itself contains a portion reading as follows: "Because all reoms in tne Amurican Embassy in Moscow are being monitored by the Keb, PT sntreongly ask that there be no conversations and discussions concerning this information in the American Embassv. dite flap involving the American ; direction..finding Speciatist>* in Stairingrad ducing the ; sunmer of 1955 vas organiazcd by the KGE because converse- tions were overheard in ths 1ooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a vesult of this flap, the KGB seized valu- able directien.finding ¢guipment from the American intelli- gence officers, he KGb did not possess this type of valuable equipmen., and it would have been necessary for Soviet technicians to vork and «experiment for a long time in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening devices are so Skiliftully anstailed in the walls, floors, and ceilings of the rouws of tae American Embassy that it is impossible to fared ctem, oven with special-purpose instru- 2 ments.” é ! i j COLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the exis- tence of a microphone in the office of the Sinister Counsellor and said tat many wore had been installed in *he chancery prior io 1953. “%:OLEPSYN was depriefed in early 1962 and his information or this subject was disseminated within the U.S. Government appcooximately two weeks before NOSENKO'S initial contact watr CHA.> GOTLISYN said ke had learned of the microphone in fhe Minister Counsellor's oftice when by chance he happened to sce a particuiar document in an office at KGB Headquarters. According to COLIISYN, during one of his visits to tee American be partment in 1960°* he heard and saw *This is a referencs to tre arrest of U.S. Military Attaches BENSON, MULE, and S#ROLD and the seizure of sensitive elec- tronic equipment they had witr them in Stalingrad in the { summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of . : this equipment was based on information obtained from micro- : oy phones in the U.S, Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b. (viii). : *#GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Sec- tion of the American Department on a number of occasions in the spring of 1960 as pact of his preparation for assignment to Helsinki in July of ‘that year; he has also said that he t | i returned on temporary assignment to Moscow and again con- ' | sulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. : With regard to the latter visits, however, COLITSYN's pass~ ¥ 4 port | indicate that he was in Moscow on f. temporary duty Tor two WeCKs in January 1961 and that he is _ i ; therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement that this incident occurred in 1960 ‘fhe has not been more _gpecific), he could have been referring to either his visits to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits in January 1961. a . FR eer: Ae SEGA ROHAN APSE Th RETREAT HE Boy Fo te
H0000. A ead er aeaet OO ag ne DE PE BOBS alla UE ORM a OG 9 2 conse TGP SECRET +e EACH GE BED ERY Sm aman 4 yersbelin aan Te Be Rac oye 255. that a report or reports concerning the results of audio- surveillance in the U.S. Enubassy had been misplaced’ While GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chier of the American De- partment ordered all personnel present to search for these papers, and all the KGb officers searched again through their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large’ nun- ber of reports with red stripes across their covers, indi- - cating that they were the property of the Operational Teche nical Directorate. The only office in the U.S, Embassy that GOLITSYN recalled being mentioned in connection with thi search was that of the Minister Counsellor.*. , . t f i i 5 we eee a dal abn, arate No technical investigations were undertaken as & result Somaiat, ig, Of GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis Oem ey aw. fof NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the - chancery building for the presence of microphones in the spring of 1964. The results have been described in the damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on 7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were dis- covered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the Chancery of the U.S, Embassy in Moscow. The ceble to this microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several inches under the outside surface of the cast face of the Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single twenty (20). pair and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed audio cable which ran along the cast fuce of the Chancery to the rcof area of the North Annex of the Embassy. At this point, these cables were spliced into aA one hundred and one (101) pair cable along with two ten. (10). pair cableSooo-. A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten, twenty, and thirty pair cabies to the various microphone installations. Fifty (50) microphones have been positively identified.«* Two (2) microphones not physically located oeemetmtae 7On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy : Section had received from the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate ‘in 1960 or 1961.” This document, according te NOSENKO, was “one of the reports with [Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as a result of i its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S. Embassy Section was in a turmoil" searching for the document. The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful, : however, and. in the end, the case was closed with the con» elusion that the document had probably been burned inadver- tently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up. In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in Decen= ber 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN’s secund series of visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSYN ‘Ss erroneous estimate of when these visits took place). NOSENKO has never reported that GOLITSYN was present in the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this decu- ment and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section either ia the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961. . The only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.5. Embassy Section reported |; by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of 1961, at which i time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not ‘im Moscow at. the time. | ee 4 . a Sed eee t ' at serene oF mn) seen te eee See ene 4 Re MAT cen octet cette SeFour nore vere. subsequently located, for 2 totak of 34. ‘e Aes ROR et ee oom] 3 “eS C5 ivr yg On wale
14-00000 9 A a An aah ale! RBCS are suhe armen ces aoreonccnn CEA AET ~ inn ae ANI MULE IE Sk W S MR haRl ah AO c  aSi L ey w IG Ais ~ 256. can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6] based on the symmetry of the known installations. The microphones located were situated so that all microphones and probes were behind radiators. The microphons system discovered covered every outside room on floorg six through ten,. with : : the exception of thuse offices with dcors entering onto ! 4 balconies and when exterior building constructions were ad- jacent to cutside wall sections bearing radiators." srpmgeees The first microphone found was in Room 1608, in what is now the Army Finance office and which in 1950-1961 was the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of the latter were inoperative when found--one in to Ambassa- dor's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being heard in 1960-1961 and theother in the fecurity Office where NOSEXKO gaid there was none. The damage report concluded that all the microphones were installed before the U.5. Government tock possession of the chancery building io 1953, | ‘ i ; GO AS GF SAO STE ARTO CNA Bint in Gene nte  ew ‘ eave cs f é Pe ’ Sails RE RFRA Deane OBOE ‘ * ‘ 4 POT mas i ia Pa o
fraser eae we dn REE RNEIOTR  TTkat AACE YO REMI Tt MaRS ERASERS OLA GRE te eee cern vette Ghee ste PE PEEP DAPEIEED PAPAIN ee rvahe PA em UA cal ON mo 3 PD aR OTE miconrtnwenncencancnsisnenanneeagneme LOL. ihda§ ugh RB Rime RE CRATE AEE MR ROR 8 OARS ARGS se. Sa alae td She ‘ RO eS .. . a ., from Hintster Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, “but for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very A of a oe 4 257. . (c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones NOSENKO made the following evaluations of the quality of intercept received from the chancery microphone tostalla- i tions: 11 June 1962: “They are dving. the microphones, and we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into the Embassy {to make new installations}. In that respect i your Embassy and the Britigh Embassy are the only cnes we can't get into.” { 14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of ; course, ere irom the...{Note: one or tvo words on the tape are unintelligible here; from eariier and subsequent remarks, particulerly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear that NOSENKO is speakiig of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.| And I tell you honestly that it is becoming increasingvly difficult to work with this. The shayba {microphone}, as ve call them, is fading ard only two Aree people are able to make out what is being said. That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaning in a whisper. It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is fading. But, what can you do? They tell us categorically and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second Special Department responsible fur this, tells us that secon we will not have anything there. There are a great nunber of microphon:s there, but they don't work. I know that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work. They have all gone deaf." 24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get any- thing out of the teletype office because of interference {Prove speaking of machine noise]. Fron this point pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he was speaking about] the reception became progressively weaker until it finally stopped: evideatly it wore out. Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor. This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus, out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then \ referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.}] GRYAZNOV said that the equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches of conversation and that in a year or two they will be com- i ; letely inoperative. GRIBANOY is insisting on getting to i ; Precruiting code clerks at all costs.” sa A dempeteie e “17-92 January'1964: “Here in HORBALY'’s and BROFN's roon i orgy end nochine couse ree Attaches], there is no acoustical sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this, but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These microphones were installed] when this building was being built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building, but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now cur- rently active.| It couldn't be more, anyhow.” 14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard ~— TOP Sterer
dete Ree 8 258. difficult to hear. I was sitting with [S.G.] DMITRIYEV L. [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second ~ Special Departseat}] aad they toid me how difficult it was. The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times to the same place [on the tape}....! After 1961] GRYAZNOV was telling me that they vere getting rxlmost nothing from this point. [He said this] in 1962, 1963. I was thinking you had given a command fhad cautioned FREERS|. We were getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several times in 1963. Thr mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Navy, Air Force.... I don't know [how receptién was in 19621. ¥ know only that GRYAZNOV was tetling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting Zittle, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, Little pieces, but nothing...in generai | from all of the micro- phones]."* NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this was the fact that the Americans in the Embassy were not saying anything significant, but he said he did not know this to be the case. Speaking of the micrephone in GLEYSTEEN's office, re said: “here was something heard. In 1960 and 1961 it was working [ remember. Reception was good but there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's room was good in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 1961~-~good re- ception." According to NOSENKO, reception was good from the State Department code and teletype room “only always the sounds of [teletype} machines. in 1960 and 1961--machines only... Reception was good when conversation came through. I don’t know [sbout reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception was good [from the military code room in 1950 and 1961." On-site tests made by American technicians after the 1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones im the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of Decen- ber 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB damage report emphasized that it had not been vossible to determine how long these microphones had been inoperative: -one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval Attache; -¢hree microphones in the apartment of the senior Air Attache; ~one micrephone in the apartment of the Economic Counsel- lor; -the microphone in the office of the Publications Pro- curement Officer; ~fthe microphone in the Marine bar; =the microphone in the Internal Affairs office “the microphone in the Ambassador's office; -the microphone in the office of the Security Officer; =the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery; =the microphone in the office of the Air Attache; -the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air At- tache; =the microphone in the office of the Assistant Naval -' Attaches; ' ethe oicrophone in the Navy administrative office; =@the microphone in the Air Force administrative office. fais list includes the office of the Ambassador (froma which TOSENKO soid no intercepts vere being received in 2960 and ee ee ed \ SLA AN TE i 3 4 i 4 Bs 4
1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NGSENXO has said so microphone was installed).* On-site recordings made from twelve selected micrcphones in 1964 indicate that the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsel- lor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of “high intelli- gibility' as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in the military and State Depertuent code rooms in the office of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high inteili- gibility. As pointed out ctelow, hovever, the possible pro- duction by the code room microphones would have been sharply reduced by the installation of acoustical rcons during 1962. As noted in Part VI.D.3.¢e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S. . Esbassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his having been approached by the EGB for recruitment in May 1959. _ HARMSTONE did, in fact, report the spproach, and the report was made in the office of the Security Officer. i ; } i i 4 wane Be he het hh oS
(a), Amount, Type, and Value of Production Evaluations of the quality of production have been given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned with the microphones in the chancery building. NOSENKO's Statements li. June 1962: “Well, perhaps, there would be. some kind of fitness report [kharakteristika]. Sometizes there the Counsellor, FREERS, who wag there before McSWEENEY, dict«ted something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weak~- nesses, We had not known that. We are listeniag to your military attathes there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find-out. Fe keow wnat machinery and what targets interest then--always....They chatter sometimes. -Some of the things they say are surprisicg [from the point of view of security]. They discuss, among other things, _ where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permissica, if we are absolutely cer- tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to teke it, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955, but now you have botter apparatus....What du we do [when we know the attaches are taking special.equipment;? Well, they are getting ready to go dad we hear that such-and-such data interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's absolutely nothing there, trderstand? Absolutely nothing. We make it appear on the radio [by spurious transmissions] that there are rockets there; we even heve patrols standing there and everything....They talk about interestixg things, but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent operations, not once." . 12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S. Servite Attaches] "They say: ‘Today, let's go to such~and~_ such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two assistants, and say: ‘This region is interesting. They have something there.* We know it at once. I personelly tele- - phone surveillance at once and tell tre Chief of the depart. ment to come at once. He arrives and I say: ‘Throw in three, four, five brigades [surveillance teams].' We work 21- most openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around in his office and dictates. All_ this is recorded. Well, this is very important material. We do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Con~ fidential cables [in the clear]. We receive the clear text . pot. If we decide that this nust be reported to the [KGB] Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away." ‘24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code - get much out. of the [military] code room; we could hear [the _ ode clerk James| STORSBERG, svearing on occasion, and then. -he would mention a group of numbera.* This. was, of course, ®See Part V.E.3-ce. on the STORSBERG case. and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or = room and the teletype office, but we could. never get anything © Because of interference [teletype ‘machine noise}....We didn't © , j . 4 4 } chet pode voted tle 5 en a a ee Pe a | j + BURT ed F sy j wd ff j
all recorded, ana we “¢urned™ it: over- at! once to the: Fighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding.” ; 14 May. 1964: Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK and the decision to withdraw U.S, Embassy:.Section require~ ments for full-time monitoring. of certain microphones, h0O= ' SENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information frén the rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural Attache, The flats [Embassy apartments] --no; the bar nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldom anything received except several numbers. The code clerk is gaying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take, not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued: "“KOVSHUK said to give them these flats... But’ you see, nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't spearing or were talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing of intorest from an operating standpoint. Sometimes we heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility to hear something. .In this case we would call DMITRIYIY [ English-language Section of Second Special Departnmext | and gay: ‘This evening, this day, this flat. Mzeybe we will get something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms~-Naval, Air Force, When the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two lor three men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard, For example, when they returned from a trip ard discussed what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip.cee But we heard nothing about agents.' Later on this occasion the following diagogue took place: NOSENKO: GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing. Question: Was he talking about the Military Attackes? NOSENKO: In general. I think they were speaking very ‘ Little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV, | FEDOSEYEY, and KOVSHUK considered that there was @ room-in-a-room--a room [acoustic] for the meeting. Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the- —~ room? oe NOSENKO: First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower was _— going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had informa-. — _ 7 Hon that the Embassy had such a chamber made out “¢President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for fhe guaner of- 1960. but: wag cancelled: over the 0.2. Ancident.. Wiehe pe seen snaenan ng gen nemnce nef osee  aRENIER | o> peennanrinnne tbSgNSaRrareanrer aed ner 4 4 nd ge: tee nt tte ont ateathhtoke ss, eanittinakt Aistcitba Aas akan nad ani weit Sodas cane vile yar +
‘ef steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEY- STEEN's office was working, I remember. Recep- a, tion was good, but there was no secret informa- ot DON, tion... I don't know [about reception fron this oo oN mike in 1962]. , ee Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement [concerning diminishing production of the Embassy microphones]? . NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell “ ™ which rocm. I think he was speaking about the . — ‘ BrOUP. «oe ; a nettidaatel. Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's office? NOSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us _—— suspect he was connected with intelligence. HORBALY. , , Question: What about the code room and teletype office? ; ; NOSENXO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machires in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several oumbers. Question: Wnat about the military [code] area’ = “NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself. And sometimes a mechanic of code machines case to him, a military guy, a sergeant [Willian HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer]. They said two. or three phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes," “Panis side good." Et cetera. 4 t 5 i . Question: In all this time that you read all this material, 7 _ “——memee there must have been something that impressed you as extremely valuable. NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was in= teresting from FREERS' room. It was given to the special group of GRIBANOV, They were writing en special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the - os _ [Cpsu}] Central Committee. There were political =" ~~ 7 questions, for example. denen Eke bel ad ech Heinen a 26 January 1935: The following is taken from an inter- i rogatlon protocol Signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed . @11 of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from Janu- A : ary 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only infor- . aa an mation which I can remember as being important, interesting - §= | _ OF operationally useful to the EGB: 0. Gos -: Ge. From the micropione in.the,.office of the. Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I resiember that he oc- . . eagionally dictated cables about. the. Embassy's evalu- ation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet, Government and advised the StateDepartment. on posiy = _ tions for negotiations with the USSR. This information:
was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Coupittee of the CPSU. Howe ever, I cannot remember ary specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific . evaluations or recommendations made in these cables. . b. Also from the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on. about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot femerber who any of these offi- cers were or any dctails from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was interesting or useful to the KGB. c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's office Il remember that the Military Attaches regularly discussed plans. for trips within the USSR and the tar- gets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed. the results of these trips after their return. Howe ever, I cannot remember any information about speci- fic trips planned oy specific Military Attache per- sonnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific resulis from any trip. I do not remember any specific operetionaL activity taken by the organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on infoxrnation obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, impor- tant, or useful information about the personal or pro- fessional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone. d. I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of inter- est to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Crypto- logy) of the KGB. [I do not remember any conversations from this microphore. There was no information from this microphone on any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy _ Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, ‘KGB. During the approximately two years in which 1 daily reviewed the production from all the micropliones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting. important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the Points noted in the above paragraphs.” , 28 January 1965: “In 1960 and. 1961 I don't remember any réport from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS or WALMSLEY (Minister Counsellor 1954-1956] were dictating . interesting opinions of the Embassy. concerning the political ‘group end then they were preparing special reports: for. »-. situation and this material was looked at by the information __
" Bvelusetion. by Others » Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Arny Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the micro. phone discoverias. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN was succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While 4a. Moscow, Colonel HOFFHAN occupied room 1008, where the first microphona was found and his statements beiow relate to matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to ! the U.S, Embassy Section during the pericd when NOSENKO claims to have been its Deputy Chie?.* TO me moments + cage “James H. STORSBERG [military code clerk] was | 4 dating a foreign rational, 1 believe a secretary in " the British Fmbassy, name not recalled. On one or 4 - two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to encode for dispatching a message and was not avail. able. He would be off with his girl friends, and we couldn't find him. He was verbally reprimanced in my office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeism, "M/Sgt. Peter BINDER gwmanager of? America House] and I discussed frequently the administrative problems encountered in his operation of the America House. We also discussed the importance of hts keeping me informed of the conditions, personality problems, Grinking habits, and any other incident of importance that mi:sht occur in the America House or the America House club. All discussions were conducted in my office. ehude its "In May or June 1961, James C, KEYSERS [military code clerk] was found to have allowed one or more male members of...8a U.S. ice review entertainment group touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual © activities, and he admitted to me being a participant ' dm homosexual activities. I believe these edmissions and my entire discussion with KEYSERS tock place in room 9, identified now as the shielded code recom, lo- eated on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave SAVAGE [his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal . ‘instructions in my office to immediately prepare the necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the - gtation and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as Com a... tO the details of the incident. ee ee eet ios NRE 4 s e te 7 we alter an ry mame ti eee ese clot dB, a ER ts ' “J remember...a discussion I held with the U.S. r. . Air Attache in his office [where a KGB microphone was _. ° located] concerning homosexual activities on the part of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station... The discussion in his office concerned the administra- . tive procedures necessary in removing the individuals | from Station. a , . _ : r “eApart from his: general: ‘duties. as Deputy. Chie? of* the U.S: en, ‘Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for -° each. of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: . He auper=-; wised the KGB officers: cperating againat code clerks: ‘and the: ' . Tesideats of Aserica House, and he: personally. -partiofpated: in oa : Spproaches: ‘to. the: "two. code: » olorka: named, ‘STORSRERG and: K _
Summing. up] "To be ‘perfectly:..frank, I would ~ assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our . targets, some of the results, and all oY our personal | od i weaknesses were compromised. Tais is not a very de- a finite answer; however, it is the best estimate I can ab. make." In its general introduction, the USIB damage report -. : . ( states: “Although there has been no observable indication — . on thet the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment. Cee, , . of the United States based. upon information considered pose |. sibly.compromised, it must be concluded that due to the exe tensive period of penetration, the cumulative, effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. “The Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effective- 4 ness of United States operations within the, Soviet. Union, : particularly the military attache collection progran. . ‘ : oo Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence’. collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions.. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable infor- mation concerning the personal habits, problens, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which i can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any ‘ . oo time of their choosing in the future." _ . 4 f 4 ; Ss The following extract from the USIB damage report con- cerns the declining value of the production from the micro= phones in 1962 and 1963.* been. arte het ays "The security practices and procedures appear to wat have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at ; which time the first plastic room was installed. A change occurred in the work habits in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a Limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number . _ of classified discussions were held outside this secure . area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was &n &c~ oo '  gepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy to, --  @hdef of Mission to discuss openly in their offices - routine classified operations of the Embassy and to ; dictate classified documents and telegrams....I5 Sep- se tember 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handling of sensitive classi- oN fied material. From December 1963 to date it was indi- cated that no classified telegrams have been dictated eee ye enneman senna nee rennet egmmtrtr eens” . %As previously indicated, NOSENKO. said that in 1962 and 1963 co he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy. a microphones. One reason was the natural decline in effie fy ciency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB believed that other reasons were the installation of acoustic rooms..in the Embassy and. tightened security pro- aks Ref
outside of reported t typed by t the acoustic ro né.se.The military attaches hat most cables were drafted in longhand or. he originator and then turned over to the — code clerks for transmission. In certain instances eables wer discussion e dictated in the offices. There were many g in the offices relating to official duties, office routine, proposed travel, personal observations and normal office talk not specifically in thenselves considered classified, From 1953 to 1959, sensitive classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and-- street noises....In 1959 a secure inner room Was cone structed in the attache section and has since been . utilized for classified discussions and debriefings.... a a bok oe ae ae a . . ° eee a oa te eee batg ate crn Rees Pr ernris
aaa) | Microphones in the hocth Wing. According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other ‘gudio devices were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery) of the U.S. Embassy prior cto its occupancy in 1962. (For this reason, NOSENKO advised CiA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--from the chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented below. 11 June 1962: “The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy, I wrote an entire report about it. SUNELIPIN was still there then [as KGB Chairman. ™ proposed that! equioment be installed in the walls, gave the justification for this, etc. SKELEPIN wrote: ‘Is it worth it?' At the time ctrere was an improvement in mutual relatiors (retween the Soviet Union and the United States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, But feared that...and k2fore this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in War- Saw.* SHELEPIN wrote: ‘is it worth it? We row have good re- lations with America, It isn’t worth ict.' He didn't want com- plications. And then time was lost. Two or three months passed and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it was already too late. ASIDIAN was going there all the time, the Security Officer. It was already too late because this can he done only while the building is being built. When the windows and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do it slowly. Gon't hurry: don’t be in a hurry. Have him say that he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear all the military attaches--the Milizary Attache, the Naval Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make any (sudden) changes. Quietly transfer one and then another there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assist- anté... You must be very, very clever and very. very foxy... Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the build- ing, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and won *t have anything.“ . 31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right (north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the mew addition to the building, there was a plan to install as many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick’ them. everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was _SHELEPIN. He didn't co for this. Whether it. was the flap with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it was something else or whether it was.the international situa~ ‘tion, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then, ,. later, when the building was finished, and when you were > finishing or putting up the addition yourself,. at that point - it was too late to put these - “things: ine. : was. impossible = WOSENKO ry peferring to ‘the discovery in June of. 1960: of is microphones: ain then new U.Se Embassy in: Warsaw. - : a ne ayn ene ROOD fmt 4d q BN sane Bae evi peptide + wah cee neat abatel ore they head =
' After being told by..CIA on’31. January 1965 that a lead erable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I personally can assure you that nothing was done in that right. wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. Thore was nothing done there, so it must have been something else," No extensive couater-audio checks have yet been cerried out in the north wing of the U.S. Embassy, and no wired - microphones have been found there. Investigation of the microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however, to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. The USIB damage report stated: "Three - coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the onée - hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof grea to the basement of the North Annex...[{All three cables were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable runs were as follows: , "1. The, first coaxial cable...terminated under six inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic. The certer conductor was connected to the lead sheath of the 20-padr and of the 30 pair cable which in turn come irom the east face of the chancery. The shield of the coaxial cable was uncunnected. : "2, The second coaxial cable...followed the same path as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated. The center conductor wag terminated in an insulated metal grill. The grill is lecated in the upper crust of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the Chancery and the North Annex. The long diménsion is normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The everall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4°7". The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the grill....The grill is located as close as possible to the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the State Department code rooms. The grill ‘points’ in the general direction of the code room as the plane of the grill is parallel to the plane of the ground. "3. #The third coaxial cable ran along the approxinate path of the uther coaxial cables to the block cf rein- forced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above. This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of fine Lits wire. _ The shiéld of the coaxial cable was unterminated..." The damagé: report added: . "The coaxial cables’ appear to be of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation -@f the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial cables. were carefully insulated." The coaxial ‘cables. and their terminations were evaluated “as follows. inthe: damage report: "All tests that have been. for] the. indicate that the grill. work and. the lead sheaths f} the cables 20-and 30 patrs were used as antennas.... ~ He function hes been determined for the third coaxial cable which terminated: in ae short piece of Lits wire... -Tie: Location - fe re seetce erent ten so scan 4 3 H santetls pee: Fa Maher ge
of the grill in ‘such. close’ proximity to. the State. ‘Departaent | Code Room indicated that an operation vas directed against that area....The lead sheath nay have had other uses. The- possible uses that have been suggested are listed below. The sost likely use is as an antefina although the other pos= sibilities have not been completely discarded. --.. “@e “D. "Ge "d. te, Antenna for collection effort directed agbinst code POOR. Antenna for use in connection with some other surveillance device or technoique.., An alarm system to ‘protect’ the microphone system. Part of a hum removal system connected with the microphone installation. Not in use," neo mprarpa pte eee © 4 i x
. Civ) Monitoring/Jamming Beas - 7 NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the s0-called “Moscow Signal." (This is an “S" band signal that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure erea"..of the U.S. Embassy since the early 1950's from en apartment building located about 200 feet away. Detailed investigation of the signal hae been underway since Octoe ber 1962, but ite exact nature and purpose have not yet been established. Although there is some speculation that the signal is meant for ‘haraseswent purposes only, the view now generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has som. intelligence-collection function. No change in the signal has been noted since the discovery and the cutting of the cables referred to in the preceding section.) The inter view went as follows: a NOSENKO: There ia a beam, there is a ray which works “annua = is against the Embessy. I. know. Question: Do you know what it is? ‘ NOSENKO: No, I don't. Sut I know that they work and they put things in, and they Listen and they do sgome= thing, and they... ; ‘Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working? NOSENKO: Yes, they keep working: all the time. Perhaps periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is something in the back.of the Embassy on this Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in front of the Embassy, too. . : -Question: And it is for listening in? NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with stationary equipment. ‘ Quéstion: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't operate properly? _NOSENKO: Look, I'm not a specialist. I don’t know the ; details. I know only that the work is being done in this particular area, in this particular direction. But what they do, I dontt really know, Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining in- formation? : NOSENKO: Let*s say you go on the air. So we: find out | . _ @hether you're listening in on some of our com _, hunications or something like this. ‘fo what extent would you in your [American] De- “paptment,.ioa your {U.8. Eabassy} Section, know- about these technical. aspects? Would: you. have. ‘to know it?) Would you know the details of these
aft he Xo. No, . This is sométhing that ‘thé: nenbers of... “the (KGB) Eighth Directorate. [responsiblé for communications and ciphers). should concern then selves with, the ones who work in OTU. This- doesn't concern us in the American Department, ia the U.S. Enbassy ‘Section. Questioned again later,. NOSENKO said that the signal was tised to Jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building. oi wags this system, he said, which had determined that the . Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications. ‘The beam was designed “both to monitor: and to jam" trars= *‘missions from the Embassy.:. NOSENKO repeated that. “not being & specialist" he was ignorant of the technical naturé of the Job, or any further details. } wn esee ecole ne Peder ees tite” Re rt AST NEO TO alae Freer tir i 4 t aw tleecteclean athe Nye ded aes
HOG00 Because NOSENKO's true name’ and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad. i pha kt Cc. The Cuba TDY (1960) In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKC travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men- tioned this trip on ll June 1962, during his second meeting with "CIA. is account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: “I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I wag in Cuba in '6]. Well, as NIKOLAYEV, I was there a montn and a half. This was when your Embassy was 5 there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it cver to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were Working against you, just on you. Everyone there is worsing for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had uniimited funds, any amrcunt. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: ‘He {an fmerican] is there,’ My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, put. for a inonth or two, to provide an opinicn... I worked pretty cleverly on trem, He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: ‘He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there,' I would go and observe him in the mir- ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to gee how he behaves, etc., ete. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. If would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an in- telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. Ti.ey didn't know a thing... They had turned ali intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it.” In the final minutes of NOSENKO'’s last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re- called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer. Question: When did you travel to Cuba? NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960. Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV? NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been gubmitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there +. [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that -. 2). 4... this delegation could be accepted, but a little “cl deu, later. And my passport had already been issued. Sages ~ , _ My passport had already been signed authorizing travel foe Sgee Ma abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic oo : one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to rt - id Tea. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January NS £0 -=_ 27 SF a a a oye ’ at a ‘ : ~ . ‘ ‘ ess | 1\:) |; anne
‘Her: Job + waa. simply ‘to. inform us | in case. ‘gomethine 1g interesting ‘happens and somebody interesting comes: to the library, but. prac- tically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she | tell ue akout these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons, that she was supposed to be reporting cn? In the first place, they were lazy buns. They would go to a lesson once and then .miss the next two and“then perhaps go again, and again miss one or two." In September 1964 NCSENKO added that LEVINA had never been targetted ayainst any particular individual and had never provided any interesting reports on her American contacts... At the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she was released from the Embassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because she was a little deaf and one had to epeak loudly to her to be understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer be- fore he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canad- ian Embassies. ; “fF CYK records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as ' @ Librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary. of the Embassy . fi charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and: Publications - Procurement Officer from May 1959 until approximately ‘Septem ‘ v4 : i 4 3 o Cdinamane amend tee H 4 4 . y { 4 “
Overseas Assignments : wade a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment. in Ethicpia (1960) . During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oksana's asthma. . O.M. GRIBANGV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved his reguest, but then the KGB Personnel Department turned it down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character weaknesses. : NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows: "Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Cepartment of the Second Chief Directorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was stucying in the Higher Schocl of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956 he was assigned to the KGB Personnel Department, and then he came . mo _ im to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I wanted to leave, to yo abroad on permanent assignment I said to GRIBANOV: ‘Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.’ When the Per- sonnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have 3 to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what : it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and hap- pened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire ; ‘directorate, and he at cone time had worked in the Personnel Office - . 3 himself. He said: ‘Give me this thing and I'll see wnat I can : find out about it.' So he went to the Personnel Department and ; through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me a call and said to come over. I went to his office and he locked the door. Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,*® and then said that at that time they made an investigation of my previous residence. And they found out that while I was study- ing at the Institute [cf International Affairs] and was living. on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me; different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week. This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954. And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to me also~-the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides these things that I just mentioned.* batene 1 walbids Fe te mes ae tL be. U.S. Visa Application (1960) NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for menbers of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled _— |S NOSENKO Is referring to the incident he says took place in ..1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true identity while. seeking treatment for-venereal-disease..See@......_:
to. visit “the United. States in mid-November 1960;*  NOSENKO-was. listed as an engineer. employed by the State Sciertific-Tecanical - Committee (CNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had been scheduled te accompany this delegation as a security cffi-. a cer but that the delegatior's visit to the United States had ot been postponed at the last moment. He therefore did not travel to this country. He further explained, on 17 April 1364, why his visa appli- cation had been submitted in true name ané under a different cover: “In 1957 and 1958 I went to London as NIKGLAYEV repre~ ; senting the Ministry of Culture. Then in 1959 1 didn't ge any- where. ‘nen when this question came up of my going to the States in 1960, I said: 'I'm rot going. I've seen going under the Ministry of Culture [cover] and with sperts delegations. This . has to be changed somehow at this point.’ So we theught about ~ ° it and finally somebedy said: 'Locx, how about this? Perhaps {you can use] this committee cf RULNEV's [GNTK]).' Sa 1 gaid: ‘.tWell, it's up to you. You decide.’ by that time my passport was ready, but the Americans and th Soviets hadn't come to an agreement yet. It was deciced that this celeygation would go ts the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he coulc not have used the NIVOLAYEZY name for his trip to the United States. He replied: "Sure, I could have gene as NIFOLAYEV, but I just didn't want to. Pecause, look, it was krown to us that the setae - British and American Intelligence exchange information on people they suspect of being kGb, ana that the Hritish, of course, had probably watched me when i was in England {in 1957 and 1958] and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under the cover cf Ministry of Culture. He's not a eportsman., It * xind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy. : Also suspicious. So then I nave to go to the States. and if I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I couldn't use the same cover of Ministry of Culture Lecause of the type of the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. fo I'd go He there and they'd say: ‘Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under different : cover now.’ But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard the nana. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be O.K.® NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under gome other alias. He answered: “That's the way it was ce- cided. I guess so ag not to get all mixed up they decided to send me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in charge of these operations. They are the ones who decide."** : 4 netthines detebe oe . ae thse wh, wae This visa application was submitted approximately six months after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to oT Ethiopia. #% With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 1958, NOSENKO ..: .-. Said that he had been forced to use the name NIKCLAYEV because ve : this wag the name he had used with British citizens G@ . on rie Eeesehen they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he Sone -. gould not, he said, have shown up in England with another pn: - . rg eee Se Le . a ‘ 2 <eeeeupon their return from cn (see Part Vibert -Phis apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name - for the 0.S. visa. application, for NOSENKO had used the name. ; SERGEYEV in his approach te American George: DREW in 1959 (Part. V.D.43h.) and the: name PETERSON: when he recruited Professor Gerard MERTENS, also in 1959 (Part. V.D.4.1.). NOSENKO was in contact with Arsene FRIPPEL. under the name: NIKOLAYEV: during: thi period. . NOSENKO and other sources have: said: that the. KGB’ sus~ pe ted that. FRIPPEL was an American. agent. (see: Pa €. VD. Ss. Laedt ot 229°