1041053410203 po RE PRE ANAESTH 18 NR ts alee ORIN MEHR SE PRIINES BS HN IN Ns tena VST Or Bh . | a Dectasstied and and Appr HATES AR REVERSED AT Ci HEAURMER@ PERS 1) py the Cpn tral lipoma Ace le e: wg age auecegpepe dae: ate: OMGE SELECE COURLUPULE OM ASSASSIRATIONS STAUB HEUIBEaS ZOO3 i COMETS Jt! THE CASE LF VARY HA uCH » LCANC Leeft tt ro)" ce ce ee ee tt eR A Be en ATES: Lf, LL -MIT/LOCAT ION: : : - uf ‘ 1o fr . noemmeryvonum: Cig S7PGY_ Cas CLUSIENS Ye oR Mere 2: Aetannndn sti ee othe caret plc Ot EEE DY Be tee ee: me nesta | | TW te j IP ANY? OPO DE FRIAR Ot) SeCe WILY. CLE LEE 4 0 Ces EVES i TST GRATURE Gi PRE a NAHE) REV VTi VEG OFFICT AL dete or ry S:y tte om Seman reese SCR Nee MR et Ree HOS eat “ey PAC a fe vhost” bo etre ocd Oy ee Od aida ay eke tala Sap ee Ht See Bae ti soe Sete Laaectites chon ENTS MAY I. COPTED OF BLNOVED ERO TTS FILE.
13-00000 : é ers ~ aan er ae a . os Soe on CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS IN THE CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO a coll ‘ ¢ - t aa is ig Aa 4 é s - bd . a
13-00000 SF en a rene & 1 Sciaber 1965 EMORANDUM POR: Director of Sceurlty FROM g Deputy Chiel, Security Resjcarch Stull SULIaCT : NOGENAO, Yuriy Ivanovich 1, Jn accordance with the renucst of the Deputy Tircctor of Central IntcMigcace, atiachcd is a cummeary with ccaclesios concesaing the bona fices of Yuriy Ivanovich NOUSGENAO. Sub) es conclusiona are coniained ia tie suniraary concersian sevecs imsjor areas whtek were Given privnary ccoulceration la ise mater 2 Inchaded in this cuustoary are cooments concerning conclusions in the pravicus wumrarsy and an onnes centoinins ; auarks on three genavate suljecia reisted ta the NOSENICO Gare. 3. In brief, tae cusclulican of this aurarmasy ty thee ’ fe the person he claims tose, Uist he hei bic clatracd positions ia 3 the HGS during 1953 ~ January bjsot, laat NCOENHO was act cise patched by the NGO, and tant iis previcus Nes and exagreratioas &ro nos actually of material ciinuicance at thia time. Eruce L. Sclis Attachment; Summary - ; J Go01e62 BLS;:ko
13-00000 . a & a . cep k pen eeu yee poavse GOD CONTENT oe ii. Suxmary of Developmiesis in NCSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967 =i, Analytica, Comments Concersing the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENAG . a ut 3S ty A va ©) ee a. § me o an b ef iq] et a? t rety oy w ° 3 a ony ay Oo 3 Hay oO al p i uv to be? B, Is the Claimed 4O3 Carcer coi NCSENKO Piausible? sa- NOS UN Yo oe ames tt - CG, Has NOSED “ao Given an Accetiabie Ex in eal : Pei .OT Gi Win Yee wae FO wee net 7 1G¢4 eal Tae Plies MOGUVaiion in Conacting CLA in 1962 and Dor is Dele ‘ vis Detection in 1464? D, ds the Inforration Furnished by NOSENKO to CLA Concerning ACS Orerations, Personalities, anc Organization Keasorasly Commensurate With his ‘ Claimed KGS Career? E. Can tne Information Furnished by NOSENKO be Consicered in Tove 4s Having Resultec in Materia: . 3 the information Damage to the GB and/or Fa rurnisned ty NOSZN: to Western Iniellige a a & oe F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away" in information Furnisned by NOSENHKO Which Would Warrant a Conciusion tnat NOSENKO was Dispatczec by the KGB? , . | GOLacc3 °
13-00000 G. fa Taere Evie. LY tase Sats ae Concern: x net, pony H. is Tere Any EZvicence Tint the Comacts of NCS Jo2 or in 196% Wiih CLA Were Known to tle « "5 “ae wipe te PRL ee KEAN Rie, Dep we Dhwwl ela tO TiS Geeciuen of That NCSINKO Was fver Briciec ep et EE ate ee th tet ome i neiay ee oy ine WG Reiaiave to iis BGenavior or KGS Ovejectives 3 »] . weet ee cee A See TE a BES Contacts or Alter His Devectian? iV, Comracnis Concerning Previous Conciusions in Regive to NCSENAO ate A. & E es e be By ° % oO by fe er " ag t. Gini B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in ame pie Claimed C. NOSENAO id Not Serve in the American Embassy Scction Hout ine 1953 - 1955 Peried as He Cla: D. During the Peried £955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Si se Oilicer in, tor Desuty Cnici of, the Seventh lel 2.4% ab AIM @racan-Svitisn Commonweain Section G. NOSENKO Has no Valic Claim to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between 1953 and His DeZection in 1964 . . ev0L0d4 i omnes. oe eA NR tT
13-00000 a pe aD PSG a i Re SDR TS Ea aR PE SE Ea a aaa aoa eda Vv. arcry Onnex A - Staremesis of Soviet Officials Avout NOSENHO ~ - clo-m : : Annex % -Sur. ries of Causes Not aekamineéd in Text Annex C + The Ciucrepanov Pavers Q GO0LOCS :j SEcnee 2 tem St § 5 ee
13-00000 wr} i. INLDRODUCTION venti U0UL006 a t cee totes WA AT OLE oe aang dee TT - cope a BRS we
13-00000 INTRODUCTION The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi- zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so wouid be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern. This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects oi the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily divected toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not * dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career ig relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in ” a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO hae admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance UvUL0G7 Dey ath Bente Sree eete
17700000 “~ . OOM. ress Rs ace ad ae but not to misiead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or. policy nature. In order to avoid any misuncerstanding of the phrase "bona fides''as considered in this summary, NOSENIXO will be judged primarily on whet:::.+ he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB kno.siedge, and whetaer his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is nota es “uena fide" defector. There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSZNKO can be balanced or correlatec toe determine if he ia or is nota dispatched AGB officer, For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in tote against any standard he considers appropriate. eo The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami- . nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in : . SECRET G001CC8 —
13-00000 et St oe PoE Re rhs PPR be ‘ the preparation of thie summary. It will be cornmented on in part ead thie cummaery will Include conclusions correlated with the seven primery concluctons set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerniag cerisi:. srrorg, inconalstenctes, ominetons and uneupported conclusions i< ike previens summary ia regard to specific chEeCS OF cub-areas will be included in this cummary. However, this gummary will not include a polnt-by-poiat comparison of ell areas of agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous GUMMSF7. A posltiva decieion in regard to NCSENK® baeged on all avallable information should be made tn ths iramediate future. There arte Bo known sources currently avallavie to provide new positive information concerning NOGENKG and kis bona fides. it te recognized thet there io always a poesibility In the future a mew source or sourcus will be able to furnish additional information in regard te NOSENKO. However, this poselbility is exceedingly tenuous and it (s felt there de cufficlent information availatle on which to base a conclusics ia the NOSENKO matter. 3 Gooqlcs i
13-00000 - . * ead roar aes . AP TS een yeemaee iI, SUMMARY OF DEVEIDPAUINTS IN NCSENNS CASE te eee TTT Re mee te, of SiNCE 3S Re SSN 1957 tte Ue eather * e @ ® o , , S ® - 3 r at ‘ atts » : CV0LE1 a . a eee tens
13-00000 TT Es toe b SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE SINCE 39 OCTOBER 1967 Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENXO but whe has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962, Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and caree. of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews, NOSENKO, although naturaily apprehensive during tne first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed atiitude, and the interviewer has noted no Significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of hie life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to maxe positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the GO0LC14
13-00000 oc eter eet ICA ES GESTS AL OI TS AEE OE SIO EEL DELO LE DEED ELAR ELSE LTD DLE SSIS ELLE ETE I LD I LEAD interviewer would not Cispule cr disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in tne opinion of the interviewer, totaiiy disappeared. During the interviewing period, particularly in tne first 61x months, SOSENKO materialiy assisted tne interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de- fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities, As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately 875 KGB officers, 100 KGB agents, ed 35 GRU officers, and 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpna- beticaliy arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO haa materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him curing current interviews. Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBi and the C1 Staff. Special . Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter- viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information, 2 C0ULiC12
13-00000 ae te addition, three professionals from the $B Divisten have reviewed the current information and esetated in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current tnfermetion with previous fuformath-1. The latter is a tremendous task becauge of the volume of rnutertel; the nuniber of individcal cases i-volved; aod the extensive information in regard to KGB peraonalities, precedurea, organizational etructure end activities. The 85 Diviston also provided tha services of an expert translator to transiste the tapes of the 1565 interrogation of NOSENK? by Petr DERYASBIN and one of the previously mentioned three pro- feselonale completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, tranecriptions of certain cther particularly pertinent previeus interviewa of NCSENK have bean completed by the Oifice of Security. Approximately 7090 pages of tranecripts and related material hawe boen complied and diaseminsted gince late October 1967. Com~ ments concerning the value of the information contained in the ebove materiel are contained tn another section of this eurmmary. Ae of the present thane, & camplete anslyeis ia not poseatble since a considerable portion of the material hae not been fully procesesd. in the preparation of this ewummary all areas of major significance have been examilacd. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but {t fe not considered that, based on all 0001013
13-00000 Cr eee avatlable information, the remaining work will matertally affect the concinsions drawn in this sumraary. The polygraph tnterview of NOSENK® was initlated on @ éaguet end concluded on 6 August 1968. Approutmately sixty queations of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph tater~- view. No probleme were encountered during the polygraph interview end no additional testi:; of NOSENKO te anticipated. Attached ts a copy of ths self-explanatory. report on the results of the poiygraph interview.  intarviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review of previous information and preparation of this aummary. There le ee doubt (hat future interwlawe with NOSENKS will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will parrait a declelon ta the case of Yurly Ivanovich NOSENK. Z Attsehment: lz Aug 68 Polygrach Rpt go0101i4
13-00000 ry 4 , Security Research Starl 12 Augusy 1963 rs) o p > my interrogation Research Division ae Aan rete roe eee wr e & Yuriy Ivanovich STN re ogee pene aie bd ata bal ve TN FER Ade thP dee he oh et 46 & 40 year O14 former KGS Staflter wao defected .o the 6% in Geneva. : we. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de- criefing and interrogeting Subject since Octover 1957 in order to resolve the issue wietnes Subject was a Glapatched agent of the “G3. ae nae conducted & vast emount of research and checxing witn sources in an effort to esteclisn the veracity of Gubject's statements. — PURPOSE oe] Sne primary purpose ec? the poiygraph test was to determine: 1. Whether Sucject was a dispatened Agent of the GB; 2. ‘whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solle any Taice intcxuation. PROCEDURES Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1965 at & safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination ws conducted in tre ingiisn language. Suoject's comprehension and tne aollity to express nimsei? in Engiisa was coupictely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Sudfect was completely cocperative in all respects. Suoject dlsplayea no evasiveness and appeared to be completely tran« wreerever he was questioned or gave inforzation en a topic. % The following relevant questions were asxed during the first test: Is your true name Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes. -Were you bora in the year 19277 Yes. . Besides the Acericans, did ‘you tell anyone else about your es intentioa to Gefect? io. - , gou101s fies aig Ba etacetien%ten Po. a a
13-00000 pnUUnTnwre nrc rrr no eres temneetehee deena naememmnanas aaanieananaan inten aie eae tata eal “oh ‘ Scott ok a aio * 67h. Pace Z oad you ever teii anyone in the 4G5 abouts your contact wita feneracan Inteiiigeace? O.. were you given instrustioas oy the KGB to get an contact wits fzerican Intelligence? io. “ere you told by the 463 to defect in crder to carry out an inteiiigence mission? io. ad ue following relevant questions vere asxcea Curing the second test: Did tre KGB actually sera a concunication for your recall to the USSR on the Gay of your defection? io. Were you acquainted with CHEQEPANGV? Yes. Did you actually travel to Gorxiy in November 1963 to hunt for CinncreAnGV? Yes. ea are you dellizerateiy withholding from us any information about ° tne “G3 recruitzent of Azcricans? iso. Does the KGB Lave METKA and NEPTuG €07 Yes. Were you the responsibie Case Officer for Jona Abidian in 1960-617 Yes. oO you Know the true Gane of ANDReY or SASHA? Ho. Dig you ever Dave tucserculasis? Yes. One foslowang relevant questions were asced on test three: pid you serve in iiavy intelligeace from 1951 to 1953? Yes. Was Siva in the USSR during the periog 1957 to 19597 Yea. . To tne best of your xnowledse, were you in the Seventh Departaent at this tine? Yes. Did you telephone tie GRU about SSUBIN at this time? Yee. 3 fo the best of your mnowledge » Was POPOV comprouised because of tre letter Mr. dinters maiied? Yes. a a | —. G0UL046 « . : Fe ome on me . ‘ i ; a { e q ee ee "3 ee ee
13-00000 cose SPE AP A SEAS ERT TOE CLE ETE TS EE IAT IE TE TT TT aE a IS oo TaD Gee PUES --35 To wne oest of your incwlsc oe, was TILGVAY e:meosea to the G5 because of the 11635 Gurvelsiance oa the Briticn Gobassy7 = « GOL. ‘ 9 te wag UCI any Misheadii5 inforuation ia tae notes you-orougnt out frou the Soviet ULAOLs Os Did you intentionally e erate your personai association witha BOT Roe : are you niding any adverse information avout your bacnground? No. Sudiect's poiygrapn test reflected no sagnisicant responses indicative of deception regarding the raievant questions assed. No further polygrasa tests were administered om this Gate because thu examiner did not want to a a & to be ded a sun tue risk of fatigue se m and tnus possibiy causing adrenalin ' exhaustion. ~ & RY ow Polygraph testing was resucnec. on 6 August 1963. Tne following relevant questions were asxcd oa test four: ; bee Bid you join the KGB ia iarch 19537 Yee. Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to 19542 Yes. - " were you @ Deputy Chie? cr? tne Seventh Deparment? Yea. Were you only a Captain at tris tine? Yes. . Nere you en officer in the U.S. Embassy Section frém Maren * . 1953 to May 19557 Yes. In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chier of the fmerican- Britisn-Cansdian Secticn in the Seventh Departaent? Yes. Frou January 1950 to Decexser 1951 were you the Deputy to tne Chief of the First Section of the First Dopartment? Yes. From January to July 1962 were you the Chie? of the First Section of the Seventn Departzent? ‘Yes. Were you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, : at the tice of the Stasingrad operation against Zensen, Mule and Stroud? Yes. e e 0001017 : ~- a8 * ° Per ee P agi acest { i
13-00000 72 3 é Gh Page & The Toliowing resevant questions were assed on tess five: Since 1955 do you snow of any other “GD recruitccscs dn the American Enoassy besides Acie and HOUARD? Ne. Did toe KGB “now avout tie motes you brougit «7.7 No. Have you told us the compiete truth about your 4u3 career? Yes. ' Did you intentionally exazzerate your nersonal invoivement in cases in 1962 and 1964 ia onier to misicad us? iio. Did you intentionally give us any fuise operational infornation? io. Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chie? of the First Departuent? Yes. - Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Cale? of tne rirst Departient? Yes. In early 1960 cid GRIBANOV sell you that your prizary responsibility was to work against Auerican Code Clerxs? Yes. Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any otner reasons for i your defection? io. : Are you deliverntely wilnsoiding any information oa any foreigers reeruited oy the 4GB7 No. Tne foliowing relevant questions were asxed on test six: Did you enter the KGS througa the influence of Gezeral BOGDAN KOBULOV? §Yes. Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Cale? of the First Section? Yes. Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Crief of the First Section? Yes. , : '' Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No. teat memes ee ae . . . ~ 4 i oo ~ 9001018 Aten we
13-00000 om ee q yy . ° —ooottt *@ ; . Ta: vnowledpe was there any ulsicacing information in the Chesed papers? No. ® Did you ever personaly weet GOLITCY? fos . . was there & cable sen. to Geneva for you to assist AAT in the BOLITSAIY case? Yes. Did you personally maxe an approach to KSIGEAS at the Moscow Airport? Yes. Sne foiiowing relevant questions were asxed on test seven: Did you actualiy review the “GB SLle on OSWALD? Yea. . Did Lee GAAVEY OSWALD receive any KGa training or aseiguments? a ' No. . Vere there any microphones instailed in the North wing of the ' U.S. Euoassy in Moscow? No. Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in . oa 1960-612 Yes. : Are you withhoiding any inforaation knowa to you cencerning { KGB wicropnones or electronic activity against the U.S. . ENOASGY? NO. : Before your official transfer to the Seventh Departzent did . you read tne surveillance reports on the visit of AgIDIAN ae ‘ to PUSHALU street? ‘Yes. , a Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes. Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonei on your travel docuzent «_ to GORGY only a mistaxe py KASHPEROV? Yes. _ the following relevant questions were asxed on test eight: ‘While in the U.S. Exbasey Section did you obtain a typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter-to Edward Zilis SMITH? Yes. . _ | | _ GooL019
13-00000 ad er 2 : a ad . . Fa58 0 ’ Did you read the ofSleank repove of KOGGLAPOY on nile contact WAth Giawok OF & LYGAR Trou 2OLGinKkL to Moscow? Yea. Are you antentioniiy withouclaing cay inforsation concerning AGB wnowseage of CLA personne. 2a Moscow? Ho. , ; gag Zo there any posoluliivy wae wane XG would aisepaten an officer to Getect to tine fcericanc? xo. Sublect's polygraph test of 6 Aunist lixewise reZieoted xo ' SOGLcG%iOns Of Gecepison. CONCLUSION Based soleiy on the overaii anviysis of Suvject's polygraph teste, it la the opinion of the unicréimgice that tne Suoject nas MCOn Guostanviaasy TrutGcus 426 aneworalig tne rezevant queations oe) ached. a . e . t : . ' : top . a cy 6 . . 1 +. ‘ ee . : : . : z . . : : ‘ a t . . . : ‘ 7 . oy i . ott “t - . . * é a ‘ on . . nn aye .. . . ' RT os a * 4s .? t . aoe ~- . 4 2 saan toad we ete Nast divre..
13-00000 ONO A mite tte oO ts tem opment "TT aake OF YURIY iVeAN OV TAL YTICAL COMMENTS CONCEREING ZCN 4 wets ak Awe GO01021 a
13-00000 ¢ en Se moe ee htiees ends oe oe a ae ere on tee a bee of ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to thir summary, information in regard to Yuriy ivanovich NOSENYZ.O will be considered against an arbi- trary but realistic list of areas considered ~crtinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early i964 contacts with represen: - atives of this Agency were known to the KGB. It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would aiso be consicered but that his admitted previous lies and exag- gerations would not per s¢ warrant a conclusion tnat NOSENKO is nota "bona fice defector, "' The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration, Attached is a separate section containing rernaras in regard to the designated areas of A - H. A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person wnom he claims to be? B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? c - GUUL022 RRL 828 feccaceit.cettgs
13-00000 ay C. Has NOGENKO given an acceptable expianation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his cefection in 1964? D. Is ine injormation furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi- zation reasonably commensurate with hie claimed AGB career? E. Can tne information furnished by NOSENKO be con- sidered in toto as having resulted in material darnage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by ov NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli- gence? EF. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conciusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? G. is there evidence of a political or any other type objective r) which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? G0U{023 pit RRS we in ae Oe a Dee Toes es Oe ee ae ce econ ita nee etm ee ete ee rc or cc ne ra ne
13-00000 a) H. Is there an; evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CLA were known to the KGB _ prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB reiative te his behavior or KGB objectives an, during these contacts or after his detection? dtl a Better LUULC24 t Red Wait ee et tee tye erent Sek eet a ne ge anger AR tee oe te
13-00000 on - . . . : ee eee ee ee re Moe [5 NOSON ARG lols 2 el 2 a eee SA re rn TE wr mr FASS ere Is WEOM SE CLAIMS TO sa7 eee eaaennttepenttenconen erent ’ ms ’ “¢ : e 3 . . . : & - 3 . $ , © . ¥ 4 . H . t . 2 6001025 seperrescg acd Cechassificatea
13-00000 A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be? During interviews NOSENKO has furnisaed detaiieé information in regard to his family, his activities as a youth, the schoois he attended, assoc- jates of his father and ruother, and his own associates, The period under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry into tne First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, ‘in mid- March 1953. Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning nis father and mother and his early iife, together with other information such as a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of nis father and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively estabiish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich -NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship- building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisiactorily supported by personal-type information furnished oy NOSENKO concern- RY ing other associates of his father and mother, Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of 001026 een ree veapsene nae capmpnes em conraaree ete wae mee snonrt wiser ceorumna en peemrempantiensenen Bert ne: teem A NE oxen gs tienes a
13-00000 Cs | ToT bee o thee & sitlle or mo value in aesessing tic bona fides or non-pona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has admitted a number, is of no iniport in a discussion of whether NCSENKO Was Or was nol Gispatcned by the AGD, Obtaining any coliaterai firste- hand information in regard to NOSENKO beciore 1945 would be of negligiole value, but there actualiy is supporting iniormation from Nikolay ARTAMONOY, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory 6chool] in Leningrad, NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad- uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained tnat ne shouid nave graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the jinal examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the institute for a longer period of time ana again take his final examinations. Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co- studenis and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950, The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after nis defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement 6001027 cette ee wee a ats
13-00000 ed VA eee fipptnictrimtny who tom & by NOSENKXO in 1964 resulted in conilicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO has given the explanation that he cnanged the date of his graduation to i949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to gracuaie in 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 195] and nis actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952, The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has characterized as hia “stupid blunders," The latter is a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not evidence that NOSE:NKO was dispatcned by the KGB. It is evidence of a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate. ‘ The clairned service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 te early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of Orpar: ~~ 6001,028
13-00000 Srp 8 setae HNL ‘0 time are contained in 4 separate section of this summary, but it is considered that tne recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub- stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during Mareh 1951 ‘to early 1953. Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandwm completed by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement con- cerning his iife and KGB carcer. No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling since to do soe would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO an opportunity to recuunt his life and activities to permit a re- examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1907 and both have materially improved since that time, interviews of and memoranda prepered by NOSENHKO since ‘ prep ' 31 Octover 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the siatements of NOSENXO in the attached memorandum. One charge that has been niade by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Cnief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization" 4 0001029 4 meena soe mroneteRIn ess 207 OF
13-00000 i VM PN cost (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May ~ June 1955, Since the unsatisfactory personnei report was directly related to h!.. transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature, An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by NOSENKO, | Attachment: 31 Oct 67 Memo 5 0001030 i ae ne nee ecard enn. gam eerneneces menme steno ee yo meget oman semester AI OAT SE EN AIT AEST St NET RRNA FN Aa IT SORERERNRL
13-00000 SARS WLS oh, en LL is . ne ore?’ re a Operational Memo # N=2 SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich The foliowing ia a typed copy of a handwritten mernorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on 30 October 1967: ° | I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city Nicolaev, Ukraine, a | My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, waa working at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSK]), b. 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Viadimir, b. 1944, a etudent, In September 1934 I began to study in tne school (0 claes) oui studied a snort period of time because in October with the mother went in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, "Sudsemech" from summer 1934, In Nicoiaev I was living at the Street Nicolski 7, Ail relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev. In Leningrad I wae living with parents: in three places till 1938; _ at the Street Stachek (1934 ~ summer 1935), St. Ganal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938), From 1935 till = pone — GUULO34
13-00000 7) & 1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and scon 1 with the motner went to live in Moscow in the end of this year, In Moscow we were living at the St. Seraiimovicn, 2 Here I wae continuing to study at the school 585 (St. b, Polianka), In 194i I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi) but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow. In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in Cheliabinak (Ural}, where I finished 7th clase in spring 1942, In Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, bei-.g there I tried to run to the front with my playfeliow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned © home, In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorxi and in July-August we returned in Moscow. In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special school, which was evacuated in Kuibysnev, where I iinished 8th class in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow, This & - school muet be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsx (Siberia) and I _ did not want to gothere, With the help of father I was accepted in tne + ab pts, - tees “tae Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, where I was studying at the second course (9th class). in this school _i twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon 2 —-, G0UL032 peo eee Oe te :
13-00000 ; after that l run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January 1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished 9th clasa and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory school, which wae located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in ; Leningrad. . All cadets of this school were sent to forest {about 200 km. from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two - months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put in the navy hospital, WhenI wag in the hospital I decidec 1ot to return in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such my decision. With the help of the father's friends i quited with the echoci and entered in the shipbuilding coliege on the second course in January 1945 and studied tnere till the end of May. The WW finished and I decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college had given me a document that I studied inthis college at the second course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). in Leningrad ] wae living in the hostel of this college (St. Toimachev). In May 1945 l arrived in Moscow and was living with parents (St. Granoveki, 3). Aes: te ye + GOUL633
13-00000 root et oot DR Para er ral - Novernber her father, Generai TELEGIN, was arrested, but Imarried ~~“ : : In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter« national relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute. In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers and he toox me {I received a ternporary rank of a eenior lieutenant, documents and a uniform). In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted - with a girl - Snicimov FLAVIA, student of the inedicine inmbii.wie. I was in close rec flene with this girl, because of the pregnancy i married her and she mace an abort. My parents were against the marriage and we did not live together and we soon divorced, In the end of 1940 I waa acquai nted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re- ceived a fiat in 1947 (St. Mira - former ist Uecyehckad, 162/174}. In i her, The marriage was not successiul. I foundout about her close relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with patnological changes. Iwas not the father of this child. After that I broke with ner and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949), In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working the commission, which was deal ing with future works of the students of my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization OU | | 6001034
13-00000 and soon I wae invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the help of the father I began to deal with the personne] department of the _ intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work, : Passing state exams I] failed Marxism-Leninism and with a group of fails 1 waa passing state exams once more. In October 1950 , i finished the institute and received a diploma. lI was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th } Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife. At the end of Aprii 1952 iwent on a leave in Moscow. Immediately aiter returning in Moecow I had a blood cough out. I: the middle of May I went to a tuberculous ganatorium not far from Moscow, in July I finished my treatment and returned in Moscow, Because of the health I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of ' the navy intelligence sent me to Baitic Sea (as a senior interpreter of the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district}. When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a ka  vank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the Bo da os : 9OUL025 ee ee . : oe 8
13-00000 second course in 1947. In 195i the ministry of navy nad given me also the rank of junior iieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence, In September-October 1952 I received a rank of licutenan., In Sovieta« the work was not interested and for me it wae nothing todo. Besides this the cliin-te wae not good for my health and I decided to change the job, With ©: purpose before new year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Moscow, January Lt was with my parents at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I 3 did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili ~- a former student and my friend, I told him about my job and that now I was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was apeaking with me on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nething more definite was gaid adout my work. This month I reported to the head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN about my decision and that I will be working in MGB. In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, where Iwas in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN Lhas come to Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There Ihave seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said : that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days , ‘ , ». im the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to : 4 | 7 | . 0001036 3
13-00000 mary come to KOBULOV. There Ihave spent about two hours in the re- | ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant SAVITS#I sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order andl was _ ‘accepted in the 1 department of 2 .i:cr Urectory as a case officer, SHUB NIAKOV invited the deputy oi ine chief of 1 department GORBATENKO | | (who was acting ag the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the : department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department of extraordinarily affairs (investigation) ), SHUBNIAKOV and ‘GORBATENKO eaid to me that I would be working in the 1 section of i. the department. Then 1 with GORBATENRKO went to the 1 department, was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOYV told me that I will be working against the American correspondents, ory showed mé room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were working in this room; KUTIREV, RACOVSAI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV. The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. i was said to come next day and began to work, When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, aud in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents edad ton C . at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at pte  GOGLES o , e
13-00000 ' St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of ner parents). In 1955 I received a flat at St. Narodnya, 13, where wae iiving with my family. ; In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the acvice of the friend iVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctore : | asxed to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an - , operative passport and showed them the passport, Doctors had given mea treatment, after that twice they made teats and asked to come once | more, but I did not come, They wanted to see once more and sent a letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport, Tne plant with MVD found out about it, The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAXOV, was speaking with me, I had written my expianation, and punisned by the 4 chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The xomaomol's _ organization aleo punished me, I received a strict reprimand and was { - freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director. Iwas a member oi kornsomoil's organizationfrom October 1943, In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomoi (oecause of age) tne «xomsomol organization of AGB took off thie strict reprimand, In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written ag BALD bale Te characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory, In June- - : July I wae appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case ong at Oe area ' 7 _.. G001038 wee peat ET CARR pelea °
13-00000 officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against tourists), The chief of 7 department ~ PERFILIEV, the chief of the @ section « GUSHKOYV. In 1956 Iwas accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party, “s00n received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion -a senior case cificer, ~~ - i In ."S7 Lwas accepted in the Party as a member. ‘In August 1956 my father died. | ij In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section, In 7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was aent to * work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in the 1 department 2 chief directory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Viad., chief of the : i scction ~ KOVSHUX). My family was consist of tne wife and two daughters: Oksana, born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958, Oksana was ill (bronchial asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in hogpitale, In 1960 Iwas thinking about change (temporary) place of living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB in Lvov and Odessa, But there was another question if I go from Moscow. I would lose the fiat in Moscow, At this time the chief of the section of ' , "2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia BO 5 © 6064083 Lappen conan © Bre WO AEM Soe eon OF Men ere I Om
13-00000 6 Oi tenes « KGB at St. Kiselni. (counter-intelligence work arnong Sovict speciaiists in Ethiopia), The chief of Z chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided oo ‘ ‘but in the last moment the personnel ccpartment of KGB did not agree, ' The reasons were the case of 1954 (iiln« >: and use of the passport for “cover) and a checking in the place of u:; :iving (some of agents report that drink and on this base have quarreis with the wife). Il was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 I was appointed again in-the 7 department as the chief cof the 1 section (v-or« against tourists from the USA and Canada). In December 1959 I pot a rank of a captain, When I began to wore in the 7 department I knew that soon I must pe promoted a deputy cnief of the departrnent, when would free a place ~ the deputy chief of department BALDIN waa preparing to zo to work in eastern Germany. In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working till January 18, 1964. | During my work in MVD-KGB i did not study in any school, - ; | only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD- . cron rr i | ew not den ae fa on RET PO OT OH | | | I
13-00000 Oe meee te oe a : Five times ] was sent abroad; in 1957 Iwas in England with a . eport delegation; in 1958 was again in Engiand with a eport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; . in 1596] I was sent in Bulaaria with tne aim to help to 1 department 2 directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of dis- armament. ° Working in MVD-KGB every year lhad leaves for rest. In 1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954 I wae with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. , In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechosiovaxia, In 1957 Iwas in Leningrad two weexs with the wife and then rested at the cottage. In 19586 l was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife reated in Sochi. - In January-February 1960 i rested with the wife in Kislovedsk, In 1961 + August - I reated with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev, In October 1962 I reeted with ine wiie in Sochi. In July 1963 ZI reated with the wife and daughters in Anapa. oo. couLlad
13-00000 ; ° . e : { . B, 38 THE CLAIMED KGR CARZER OF NCSENMO PLAUSIBLE? e ' a tz . . ; e 4 . a ; - i) i a. 9004042 ; . i ; ra § 3 ‘eee ge Ete a cs See ee oe a ne ae
13-00000 B, is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer in the KGB. information ofa detailed nature from NOSENKO concern- ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, nas been 50 extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer, It is considered that NOSENKO was a XGB officer in ine claimed Departments curing the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department, It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has not materiaiy varied in his statements in regard to the above since his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 ae date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given in 1962), There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, %5 indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day of transfer irom one Department to another and not considered critical or evidence of deception, NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning 0001043 MOS MOEA AB DIE Ere Men, E 6 8 erepan Cy beh
13-00000 oy : a his KGB career today ia not significantly different from the fragmentary version he gave in June 1962. | Basically the following is now considcred to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO; | Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section, First Department, SCD Late May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December 1959 «~ Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh Department, SCD | January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of ‘ Section, First Section, First Department, SCD Januery 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section, Seventh Department, SCD July 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD (NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief," The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CLA, is not synonymous with the term “Deputy Chiei" as used i » 0001044 Pe + cee ane ye + cred
13-00000 in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in genera: has supervisory functions over ali the Department sections, The c:.ception to the latter is when the Chiei of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider tne most important section, Other deputies have supervisory functions only over designated sections or organizational components. } During current interviews and in prepared memovanda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions inthe KGB, Detailed remarks on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary. it is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO _ was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in tne First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the Firet Department “in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart- ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available gouit45 4 rr iy rin ERPS aH A RE RAIN ARE oth te Se AM oman tet fey ge teed Tea ge BE Em UE re ate
13-00000 at this time, On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would iay claim to ihe litie of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers ciosely associated with NOSENKO at that time. NOSENKO has aiso mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former cificers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with wnom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN. A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Viadislav M, KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Viadimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy L GUK, Vladimir A, CHURANOV, Yevpeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV, The statement cf NOSENAO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conilict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talned with NC: KO in the SCD in the late 1950's. Tne description of GOLITSYN oi isis meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halis rather than a epecific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this 0001046 4 i “SECRET PRE mates
13-00000 issue, itis eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO eimpiy has no recollection of it, There is no reason to attach sign..icance to this lapse of memory. The previous opinion that NOSENXO did not noid the claimed --o..hion of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, curing 1900 - 1961 has had the most me: in the controversy over his statements relative to his KGB carce:, This particuiar aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time is tne controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in tne SCD, KGB, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities ci the First Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch, Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in tae SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his cuties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have some similarities to the organizationai structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment ~ 5 6001047 OLGHEP
13-00000 6 whee ty, as to whether NOSZNAO heid a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison oi his activities and responsibilities with that inherent in a somewhat similar position in CLA, One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, inciuding CIA, and the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the salary structure, Pay oi a KGB officer is based on military ranx and on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualizication, Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary betweena Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in miiitary rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant , Colonel who is only a Senior Case Olficer receives less pay tnan a major who holds the position of Chief of Section, During current interviews, an eifort has been made to obtain : irom NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual GOG1( 48 o SECRET fm a LR,
13-00000 fs, supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based toa considerabie degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resoiving the questions, out itis the only metnod possibie at this time, —~ 001049 ‘
13-00000 NOSENKG OCIVIN AN AO CIPTAB LI SNRLANST ION OF ate a ed ede ee tee tee we oe Ae” LIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CLA IN 1902 Sim ee AND FOR HIS DEPECTION IN 19642 a g001050 geelacaltics? et APN DOE OP ot ARTS area wR ae Graton C
13-00000 ~~ =~ An wes ean Ss . CG. Has NOSENKO eiven an acceptable exnlanation of his arent reer ae ree an Muncy efpanennsnesicensenyer Shutanngnatagneecasennsneanenesnnteereneer eter ott motivation in contacting CLA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the cignt listed categories waich are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficuit in which to present a logical position with factual support, There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation preblem is not a paramouni factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Deiecters are humans and nave at least the normal reluctance to admit , unfavorable information whica.tney consider of a personal nature. On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnisned a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memo- randum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime. gous Cot
13-00000 ound Bm thimen et + . ~ e fd tam es Som 6 NOSENKO and others of his generation nave lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a graGcual process in wich many iactors, some recegnized and some not recognized by the individual, have piayed a role in varying degrees. NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibiy until the death of nis father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally gracuates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a nign government position. The influence of his fatrer and the name vi ais lather undoubtedly was an important if not the mcst important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENAO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason. The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His 2 g004C3e SEGREP Sn dem eee ee,
13-00000 mS performance in both pricr to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have deen summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Niinister of Shipbuilding. ane. lia certain amount of speculation is permitied, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who iost many personal advantages ee, following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may nt een me 72 TR have actually Started | s00n aiter the Geath of his father, That NOSENZO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defec:.on in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and a the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence. A question has been previously raised regarcing his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "ewe pieces of information. ' NOSENKO has stated that he “wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he vias not emotionally ‘ @ ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed tnat if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat, | GOGLO53 A oc MRERRRIN og tare IORI AR uo ad vc ncaytattmamine rer rt ett Sean eee . : hoe. ce um ent
13-00000 NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would: offer to sell some i information. . NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counter intelligence officer who wanted to give information, "he would not have been believed and would have _ been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding © chow much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through Ageia NrARI whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence, . - The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the: _ record. NOSZNO did offer to sell “two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for “two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards, NOSENKO has during current. interviews stated, ‘as he first stated in. 1962, that he had spent excessive. amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the ‘ Americans, , Ae ey nner enna 2 oo “ PARI AM ae 8b RR RA Mac LURAY GN BEI? RE at he . all nee teem eros a pit rth ee a RRO a ent. a 0 tty lle Hit me Eid cea cot gt NEA ee TT
13-00000 NOSENKO hae stated thet the night before hte deperture from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but wae not emotionally adapted to dafect at that time. Following his return to tha Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period cf time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realiaing that tt meant lenving hie wife, childran, cn4 other mermbere of hie fe- uy in the USSR. Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obecure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact datailed chronclogy of all the factors involved could be prepared or {f even certain obvions factors could be accurately delineated, These are both irapossible at this time and probably at any time fa the future, What ig important at thie ime te a deciaton ve to whether the motivation of NOSENKO wes Leoed on personal regcons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation ta ecceptable and that his atstemont that no oas except the Americana was aware of his contacts with the Americase tn 1962 or hts intent to defect in 1964 ts supported by other information of 4 eoliateral mature. (See Section IZ, H.} Attachment: Typed epy Memo from NOSENKO 5 G0U1055
13-00000 Operational Memo # N-4 SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich ; Do The following is a typed copy of @ noudwritten memorandum 7 furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on i 31 October 1967: What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite isan — i understanding of the situation in the Sovict Russia, tne knowledge of the methode of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the iaith in the right« nese of the free world, It wae not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted . in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing inme, I think that the beginning was in, the studentship. Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's a and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers re a ar and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in th . the Far East and later being in trips in different regione and cities of poo Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the 7 " + ~ people of the Soviet Russia. . : SECRFT “(0610565 apn ee eotias sad Barkensitesation Oe nan cnainaee atte vba memes + 6a +o! = 8
13-00000 : - .When I worked 11 years in MVD-AGB i understood and found out very many things, detaile and the real ceal of the existing regirne, ' about metheds of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, | about hundreds of thousands of the pcople of Russia who were (and still are) considered “politically” dangerous and around whom wag (and still ie) going an active work of all organs KGB, At the same time when I was several times abroad I have ‘ { ‘ i | | _ geen personally the so-called "decay" at the West, Ihave seen in { reality how is living people, Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying’ ' at the West ard not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me «~- my family. In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the ' Americans, From my part "the seli of the information" was a real show. Iwas thinking that they would not beiieve me otherwise, In i that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay 4 abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when Iwas returning home in Vienna. In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad. 2 — GUULCS? Aimee ne vn | U8 Some
13-00000 . i a, 3 as 2 one : ges we ‘ | s _ It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult i : t to leave the family for ever, ! ‘ ‘ . i | poe : . $ And now in spite of everything I do not regret, . “ . . , : ‘ ‘4 | | j i | i fy { { ’ ' ! ' f | { “ bp Pe . QUILOSE my _ orn | “entra: atm Pome sem cap ent snuehine anne oe a _ i
13-00000 q é 2 ; D, 15 THE INFORMATION FURNES BY NOSENKXO TO CL : - | CONCERNING KGB OPE: ATIONS, PERSONA LITIES, | AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER? *s : . | } - ° ’ e - . ‘ wet eS wee 0001059 <ausmae Cote nomen en t+ a a mee eer oo ew cee oe eee Oe ame sees
13-00000 a cepts , ett tie. D. is the injormation iurnished by NOSENZO to CLA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen- surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor- mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with nis claimed career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964, In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each department, Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recalia particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human roind. There ‘is, of course, no ® accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter- mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events or could be attributed to wiliful deception, ' SECRET coven
13-00000 An efiort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas wnere NOSENKO has indicated he did not recali specific matters or certain detaiis, and no pattern or speciiic areas have been noted, NOSENAO, in iact, nas an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive iniormation furnished by NOSENKO purely t from recollection, In addition, there has been no material reluctance on tne part of NOSENKO io discuss his entire life, AGB officers he has known, KGB organization anc procedures, or other topics oi ‘utcrest. : NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire AGB career. : He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalied at a later date, Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of iniormation furnished by NOSENKO. This in- formation is not seiective, bul is aa excellent indicater that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and neld the claimed positions. Con- sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during GoULCEL C4 ve ke tie entation em ime Mie cette a te Be a ee eee
13-00000 ONG Oh om BBR + ether ER a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have heid. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports nis claimed positions inthe SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm tarough collateral sources that NOSENKO s5:.:ved in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicaole description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Departrnent, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable ammount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been rnade in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO. NOSENHKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices curing the four pri- rnary periods of time; 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - ' 1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co~officers 3 o001CE2 “SEGREF— ¢ ‘ | i ! i t nr te ee AS STI PSPTAE Ee aM Ee SO Sends eNNt ne weer fe seit mittee ments yeenmnee mete: xaesetsammen em camnwne Vem rence
13-00000 and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrarns of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - 1964, This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that thie detailed information could not immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or another officer who has defected since mid-1964, Ii these diagrams and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive con- ciusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information, NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during tne 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is jess dor the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job periormance undoubtedly deserved a low rating. Goui1C63 4 SECRET
13-00000 The xnowledge of NOSENAO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officirs can consistently oe related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period, The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto is broader after 1957 than before, which is comvatible with his claim of increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work af other departments of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is aiso a further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during this peried of time. GCLIO EF SEERET— erat oe ete mR, mE Aw ce re PE
13-00000 “ E, CAN TEE INFORMATION FURNISHED EY NCSENYO BE E. GAN TES INF ORMATIC? . al ate On v el eg Ome oe, > as aD tee a ee Pt teem eee caren Ne yee eee eee CONSIDERED IN TOTO 25 AAVING RESULTIS IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE XGB AND/OR EAS THE INFORMATION NISHED BY MCSEN KO MALN OF “ I Ct 53 SIGNIFICANT BENIFIT TO VWRSTLEN INTELLIQSNC2S? — g00iC65 rent es eons bes ce ee snare bole ene met manamene eeeyat wantin erat tmaetteel tg A 0m: ne mew ERY ROGET URMTPON SAE TORN ANZ ER Te NGS «
13-00000 wa et ectlegaenns met ATL. GIT ee LT. Leyee a ree oreee) is taser ere G, EWEN 2G to kee meets wastes Lee ceaeetee ~. - . adie ean te cee Tenet tty. ty tac AGS anc ustovate Genii: te Woweeen acetic eae 5 £ Imo eS Ga Gm ime ngiole Scaled eae GOEUPALE TNcGsuvemeon.,. FOOTE Oe Hm eet ee oT re ee wae noe eee te ee NOSENAS 245, as 2. SVU SeY BUG G, Urs ¥ Onan oue wa GOO Sal LOR. Owe Ge Ube OE OT. * “oes ao nate tate agree te WamaGen Wov et, a tee tee oes . wer awe tanto, CV as Ge ESS, wrod cticaiy EVGELY .n2eTvia yet me a tn procuction can continue foz rs mot be construed as an indication thay NOSONN at Wat ee Yo fn on Sa a~ tem vy de - we aus en - ~ oe sw we * eolding information, Gut rather Mat sclwwlotion of his memory warougs normal questions anc ciscussions has been and can continue to de productive, Pemennnetunet © ni mes meet gouice6G
13-00000 ares “403 oflicéses ane 340 MOS ayeio of wverative contacts NOSENGS nas Darnisied Gnd olan CONCEFMAg ger ee tee wee aw pare Mae aan ee “s eee rs elo. weet wt. Oe OThs US OUeTalived CGl.arte Be Use. wv veler to Soviet nationals), eee nee lle meme WET on Senet me eo EM wee tee OS bee CO SNGs AN tm hohe watranco waainiy in the Secone C: wee te 04s ay “me eg" te nya teow ot tel yE-vemy a no = woes ee BOWE Y TT, 2S LAS O02. ale elTONTE ey 23u sOrmcr GF Current cr) Caiei Directorate odiicers and there is a consid rabie exchange ci ene oliicers Setween iz 6 he Oo 1@) e $s on wu O) iz) ode Garam, MATE TGUS Gsicors of the $65 and other internal AG3 organizations travel abroazé with ° delegations, tourist grouns, anc as visitors to various major exrivitions such as Worié's Pairs, it is imposeic.e at this time to estimate the sumber of AGS otiicers identiiied by NOSENKO who nave deen outsice wae Soviet Sloe since Ais Cezection or who will be out sometime in the .: There has seen very Mstie atiempiede exploitation of informetion furnisned sy NOSENKO conceraing other AGB oiicers anc, thereipre, the possid.ie value of iis inijermation to United States intelligence ra cannot be estimated nor can the potential Camage to the RGB be esti-~ { sEtOGe - u ? te a) ga o v7) e oF te ° er fs ot >. i my e P fs] 33 ra] fa] ef fa t a) M4 fae ning certain AGS olzicers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a AGB agent or cilicer to the West either ior purposes of contact with Western Intelligeace ior a 2 ——— g001CE7 © ome WA i 0 dew
13-00000 LiimaieG Pees &. aT UF cee bat err eaey Mee Ae SGI IGG! 3% & Gule cl” er wt ge «a= Or a . ae tne a . oe Pan a ws ° Brats. Fae CWT, 1GCni alice Ue es Gi. lSs OF U,entis TG WW Sater. aeseesa Che 43 LCCC soar asy & Mule lr Ge CGNCUlS 6G te Awd GG UI che By ake CPs ana Severa: ee ns rad eles ae re el gem te ein hey et ok did oft posure Of The identities Gi appronincely 2,000 MOB ollic Runared AGB agenis coud noi oe Consicured of negiigibie importance. ome + Osialning speciiie informullon in vegaed to KGB ollicers o- KGB assets is important to Uniied Siates intelligence anc a consicer- | abie arnount of manpower and money is spent on tais activity, Zven = aa acxnowledging that it ia muca more Gicicuit Jor CLA to obtain this oi information about the AGB, w: then i itis for the AGB to oviaia the icenthy of CLA employees, it is Selievcs Goubiiul any reacer Gf inis summary Would consider that the iceniuci- cation of 2,600 CLA employees anc several hundree agent assets to the AGB would be any 1ess inan a very Serious compromise of voluatle information, Prior to the Geiection os NOSONM organization of tne SCD oz other internal information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive, That this information is of vaiue to the United Srates Intelligence community is narcly subject to cispute, although analysis 3 G001C68 oe ee 4 . gt at map ® baum mage wwe ee oe.
13-00000 NOSENKAG has furnished iniermation conceraing SCD, AGS, Pe pee OA Ae MFR APRA ER “ee eee -ethareee ee testaatare me fis. nf recruiments of Unitec States cliivens ind Joreicn nationais coverin 3 the period of 1953 through 1963, Tnis should not se interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all 4 wes SCD recruitments, even o: Americans, Guring this period. H mation based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the Firs? Depart ment and Seventh Department, He hag furnished information Ae fe ws iy be is) ' ¢ concerning cases of several other cepartrments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this injormation was in general acquired indivectiy i frorm social or business conversations with other KCB officers. ion NOSENKO iias furnished information in regard to a number of cases which weré previcusiy known to United States intelligence, Waile i the value of such information cannoi be considered high, the additional | Geiaiis which NOSENKO kas provided ina number of cases cannvi be | cismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even ii the injormation cannot be regarced as Gamaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch ag there is no reason to question his sourcing of informatioa already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information, eee” , | | : _ 001069
13-00000 war F OL mt has furnisned inforcnc.ion in regard to a nur recruiimenio Ey tne MGB of non-Biee netlonals who were known by ‘oo . e Fe yee games Veen ge Te “ ~~, zo wegen fue ee ‘ - sem ga etd gs eied Wesvern mielligence to be pro-Communist or even comaected wita cE ccs mere ote meaner cea nee eNO Communist organizations, bee 3 ww fay es, agent of an indivicual previcus.y knows to be pro-Communist i considerable value to Western Liicliigence and may be considercé to . fad have resulted in some damage io the EGR. Acrnitteciy, the potentia to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than that of a “politically clean" individual, However, “pro-Communist" nt aE eee aeainn gnentalnaane eda hinene or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGS agent. NOSENKO has furnished additional injormation on cases in which there was some previous but limited information. In a number oi these instances the additional information from NOSENKO nas per- wR, soe _— mitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing cian — : —— ——_ ee ‘Unknown Subject" case, In such instances the information from pao renee er nen tee ee Se eae ae NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since Ur G CF 3 o ct the incomplete information known previously would in many ca have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. = . This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in Gamage ¢ a to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence. , - + 1 Ae tee oA neenrinte mens one ° nh @ic tne AF 4% ken 0
13-00000 pe me ee o , : ee eet nee ped ae oy Ta Shedd OG CONCEAL SB OMGaGI VW CSLE SN ACA LONE SEG WY Se feces yormaiion., iis reco ; MG teal CUTIaN Gl nese Cabes Wide scioned oy t NOSENKO, purticuliariy in tue tourial Clicgory, weule srehelly hover - > ome enn: see . $ he - fe4t, ms mi eae le Loon rw eo me fot. Rave actus materialized as procuctive HGS OGeENIS, Vs COU Lé grapaical inaccessibility to ine ACS, SCD recruitment or later in a sosiilon to furnish insormation o! ey @ ime Re . — ae Wee eta aw amnterest to tne KOS, ia this re -~ 3 ~* : = wt - waa Mee gt tt et ew ye Tea ee oere, NOSINKO has sieted that al liast until 1962 there was a Ceili maxe a "recruiimen:! 1 we yeti % Pa aa eee gt as oar are tet GS $e eee ne faaY UNsideay Cae se Wow 3a & DGLeniiGe IN Tae Tuture * ways Le es a a oe “ re a . NOSENAO Las furnished iniurmition on or icads to & nusnser of 2 pam Fe Tee | mee fy lene ley apt iats be Bes ONGs.3 We SOT AM eOTLcan, ab Wl 2S Aas r¢) pe o a ee ~ ae] ef iy ry) Lai be & ed et 2) bee oy o eh e ct een unable to furniaa suilicient cciails to vermilt identiicaiion ai uh! time, In certain instances it is believed thet an identification will se oO. ion pee ep possible after a ional rescarch anc investigation, Until an icesi- fication is made, the value of any particular lead to Western intelii- : es at that hae “ate er os Fes) ’ m 2 gence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value fe EB,
13-00000 as ate ey : ge Caen ee gee BRL Lapel eg we pl ne ep te To ee we UNADO ee ENC Y Ceces,  ccliver vac codes to ine AGG ice 2 a MOAR arg of giapi tenet yen elis LT ye ewe Tee yen G Ge to the AGS and of significant vescin to Western litelligencs. yee leap cles gh LUT ge LAT fa Maen ec ete fe 5 TTL Gl gene te Quanwiy eione Of Ci of Si inforrnition Icom a KOS Cculectur is wotee ee TE wpgetios (2 apkatsa~ MOL a ST4NCETG OM Ge Gud 2G. 2h QEeseien a5 WHerses laat Gini, OF G15 1S YEASOnaosy Commensurate witn nis . vey noes claimed positions ia the AGB. This cuestion es regards NOSENKS has been exarnined, with ailirmative iindings, in anoth & this paper. A# few exampies from the above cited cacegories oi iniosmation surnished by NOSENKC are listed below, These cases are zive; aaVen as iiliustrations and are uot necessarily iistec in order of importan
13-00000 el = - wm meee st me - . - The Cae we RGueri Lee SGLILON ane i.e relaece 628 Ge a - Dea sate SobtON MUNDAS RGA CG Te VE VU COVE SEG an ie 2 8eanls ~ rr te 7 t — See 2 *. - ¢ ea. - . ame ° ~ woe we SU ary, al Ca GE Curse r ed theese Gul Weise CA sGdeu Ar iw Teast Gf a aac from NOSENMO wrich 265 te Seamless Gs SGLINS DI, Another American chad is that ol Neruest FOWARD, a USLA siGeréemic time in the USES in 196 *&f 4 employee who Spent consicezeuie time on tie USSR in 3962 ~ 2953. a AES ° 2, 2 4 os if: TS eh 2 23 - awe le NOSENAG identified Hurlbert NG Ww AAD os Luvll bles recs the First Section, First Desiriwient, SCS, in .$e oat that # WARD jurnished valunble inioraition io we KOS. interviewed in 1964, HOWARD cid not acmit ne hed seome ao LEG SOG SECS wel, wf. a 8RO Was $ bs CONST Wit but suspicion of HO™ USZA was not renewed, Ui indeeé HOWARD was recruiec sy v.e KGS * recruited, it was Lhe who wa potentialiy vaiuabie Soviet walk-in wit, wom CLA was atiergiing to establish contact using HO WAAC as intermedia ue H “¢ “ @ NOSENKO in 1964 furnished informatio: in regaré to a "ZHARI pee as (apparentiy a KGS code name, altnouga NCSENKO thouget st was @ true FA ete tte lh neem Reem Onna ew ams mms mS
13-00000 gems). He dentl{led "ZHARI" (phowetic) ae an Arnericag code clerk who defected to the USSR In 1961. 4a internal assuinption wage made beaeed on the original lead toforn.atlon from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Feul hiltrl HINDALY, a {former NSA eroployee who defected to the USSR in 1962, aad tha information from NOSENKO wae never disseminated or {ave stignted. , ‘ Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fril of 1967, Cee ees information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and Joha Discoe SMITH waa a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became appzereot that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical te “ZHARI, " Investigation Gisclosed that neo definite informa- tien could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively etated that appropriate fayestigetion ie 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identl- fication of John Discoe SMITH as "ZHARI," However, such (dentifi« cation would have been of considerable interest to the Department of Stete and CIA, aad could wery well kave permitted certain action which : wroald beve at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise &amouncement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967. NOSEKKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which Willlam VASSALL could be quickly identified. GCLITSYNM, ta late 3960 - carly 1941, hed furnished inforrnation concerning a Soviet pene- tration of tha British Government on the basle of which the British yuu Le can 9 “SEL a5 egke
13-00000 Services had compiled a Ust af twenty euspecta, including VASSALL. Even thouga it may be presumed that imvestigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in # determination that VASSALL wae the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the infozmation from NOSCNKO in June 1962 resulted in tha carlier termi- ‘ nation by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent. Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of tha micro- phones in the United States Embaasy ahould also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following hie defection in Cecernber 1961, furnished certain laformation in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones we.¢ connected to central cables, location of ona microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of inicrophones. However, appro- priate ection waa not tanen on thie information and the KGB would have beon aware tint no action wee taken prior to June 1962 when NCSENKO fivet contacted CIA. Li NOSENKO te a dispatched KGB agent, it {sa not clear why the & KGB would attract cpscific attention to a eystem of microphones which crust have till had some value ae of June 1962. A preeumption may be made that, if NOSENKO was adispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of suck an advanced system ig available and (t eahowld be noted that it aan GOULCTS
13-00000 WES 2600 Visdas CATCH Aiea aYurte oe ke ay weet eV BCLiGes Wad eel. Lo . ° = mo” Fe eo mre ee . ae en eC Ged BMG VCMMOIVE tape eee see Been. oe WN OGLIVS YN ned Se a oe a es wee TED eCaG ass «et ae we « fare ME wee TY 6 Tu mwe 8 faa were: gare, deo Cet OE Bee lee ay GGW BeneTas . WON ST’ ah eS Wee BOT LLG. set ” = ‘ . a er re . coe 2 eee as tee on, + wee wee ne ol these leacés have Seen Mermioned Db: 0.2 powvieus Sursmary. Cosress. nee interviews with NOSENKO have reouhca iv aperoximitely seveate ee eat a A mem a eee TT wt . . . . sew American icads which are being examined sy the BIL The inter- a a NOSENAO bas provided leads te Gver 100 thiré-couniry ACS eoaete va eel ae ap Cece en ge ee mage tpplge ow a er ee eens, Geogreviicaily amead alas GY Wide st SCOpe, nc. cenys . - a re ars Bee meme? ne cm a Manteo maticnais OF SUCK COurtrlies GS Incomesia, Austric, Uroguay, the Unicec tum, Swecen, Ausiveaiie, Capen, gaom, France, West Germany, Gel MexicG, Maiy, and a number of olier couniries, 7 2 ~ 2 3 ae a c ~ « ot = ms incluced in the more iniportant of these agent or other leads are ieaGs to high leveis of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for Americin targets, to actual or possible illegal mee - o0010 76 eee, fant fe
13-00000 a. Pe er we ee em DOT ESSCLE, sha BNC. Boe peel CUT Te SGU, Te ure - Ee ervons Perea Ur] Ce De Sa eg bee oT Te TG Sede . ° % 2 fe SUTOTIGTY Ge vee SOL Le were eee ee Oe eG US Gi ae le Se Zee ONCE SHGWS NIN CCG we eae - es * me ge GT, leepenet pee fel wn. a er rr we oe GCImied Ter. Cam ste re bl, aN sees Gliese 2 ELS tu oe ta dese de OT a aed ah oe te oe enows Bing instances Of cian tr. & v ee an te i?) im SY in Moscow, including acte Western eeTaoasSiedS (Fut not the NCSENAO has 4180 fusnioniG lelds wy certain FOS foreign MaviOnal Ages, His intormatiion on several Gelng Cerivede curing nis warce morins in Geneva in i962. at ie impossibie to give oa exact eviluiiion of the significance GO: tne ioreign i2aas furnienedc oy NOSEN: cf signe tern Intelligence 2ac camazing lo the AGS is harcly UaAls @Valcation Tus? Se even tAousn there are Wumerous ioreign leacs which have not been adequately exploited zt this time, ° . . ; As a linal note, the imopilce conclusion an Ine previous summary bee i) accepted that the failure of NOSENAG to provide usable positive - 000/07
13-00000 Te ep eee SE tose mene _—— intelligence information te uot a significant factor in « determinatiza | ' of ble bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that . | fe ts not felt that NOSENKO has, ae of thie time, been fully debriefed | fm many wrens cf positive intelligence interest. i ‘3 i j { i i Can 13 g001t 77 |
13-00000 7 ae sno poe, * * ‘ * F. I8 THERE EVIDENCI OF NOL NNT EETISON CR VOGIVE AWS TIONS TURNS er = . WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NCSENZO ‘ WAS DISPATCHID BY THE ACB? e , i. « i ‘ $ : wre . ; * t e : * a i ? nod sean dae ae te eee mb ee
13-00000 Srone H F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away"! in inforraation furnished by NOSENKO whicn would warrant a conclusion > that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatcned by the KGh. in reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above ¢..: “vien has ; been both a necessary and integral part, _ It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENXO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving ata conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely becn willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order te support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown, An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKG first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would i have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications rd of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. sg Ome oe ran oe ee on em aes | +] J
13-00000 NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information'' was his own idea as to what was most likely to ‘be successful, NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter- ‘ intelligence ofiicer who wanted to give information," ne very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters, lf NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides ef NOSENKO. Instead, a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite* likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO | | | | | | and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva. | 0001080 Dene teat
13-00000 ~, Cot yt meee Uru. Naren d NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossioie, and the investigation of which could only have raised ceriain questions con: srning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross cxaggerations or made incorrect or impossibie statements. {a) NOSENKO ciaimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment itch to James STORSBERG. (This was a lie and an interview with STORSSERG with display - of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate. ) (b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment y approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview. ). (c) NOSENKO said he recruited LUNT (Horace LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actuaily NOSENKO never met DUNT, ) 2 | coo1est
13-00000 {d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with Edmund STEVENS who, according to NOSENKO, hae been recruited by the KGB. (NOSEZNKO actually had never personally met STEVENS and only bad seen STEVENS once at a distance. } {e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "“ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnisned information that "“ANDREY" (who is considered identical to ‘ _Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. “"ANDREY! (SMITH) was actuaily in Moscow 1952-1954, f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (XOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH aad that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation, } (g} NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits 4 oe g0041082
13-00000 he was not involved but had some knowledge. (lf NOSENZO was under XGB control in 1962, doth he and the 41GB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. } In 1562-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962, These similarities were quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities ai the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENHKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted, (a) Both furnished information in regard to Johan PREISTREUND. (b) Both furnished information in regard toa military code clerk case (James STORSBERG). (c) Both furnished information in regard toa trip of Viadislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in goods 5 + ge
13-00000 _ Sea pee ee BE Sot mee toe sates Moscow, or a recruitment of an Anierican formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the “ANDRZEY" case, giving the aasumed name which KOVSHUK used. )} (ad) Both furnisned information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow. (e) Both furnished information in regard to Edmund STEVENS and Isaac Henry SHAPIRO, The above list is not compiete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any partic alar topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENXO. To cite tne above in detail in tris summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, ot situations of which GOLITSYN was alse aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence 001084
13-00000 Peg. a, dham 6 3 ‘that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisiaciorily sourced his iniormation in alm-st every instance, ina few insiances he has said ne cid not recali how he learned of a particular piec. of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in numoer and are considered to be in no way suspicious. The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insoZar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering arounc or in the First Department, SCD. It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENXO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961, Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN 3 7 -G001085 i be
13-00000 nn, KRnOW 256 WAS in conmiaci Wik Goines olcers of ine Pirat Section anc CGCOLITSYN has ativivuted his anawledae of Curia. Cases GF acuvillcs Oi thé Pissi Depariment, SCG, priwarvhy ty nls @sacClasion Wik Secu. STlain Cunllicte luo liowrailon furrisnecé by GOLIT YNand NOSENNO and at wis (ithe lola mai possible to satisiactorly correlote cevinls iniormélion Iron. GOLITS TN NOSENKOG, - 163 Gi the previcus Budunary reier io iniormation from GOLITSYN wach is as “information abour AGB Operations Against amuassy Cod 1906 - 1961," The references at v. GOLITSYN cescd on vemaxcks by Gennadly ivanov.ica GRYAZNOV anc Vadcin Visivrovich KROSOLA POV Gi tne Fivst Section, F & the’ same work ane under his supervision. Tne siatement by GOLITSYN
13-00000 that NOSENKO was not Deputy Cnief of the First Section in 1960 haa been noted and commented. on in another section of this summary. GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re- ceived from officers of the First Section, rirst Department, SCD. ' In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, couid not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKXO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real, In certain instances it has now beer possible to correlate frag- mentary information from GOLITSYN with inforrnation from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way refjecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c): and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d): {a} GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an : G0010g§7 3
13-00000 Fa Seer wae wsacketbeea, American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that tne attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman nad leit Moscow by the time he icarned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow s0 that further work could be undertaxen to efiect her recruitment, He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German sounding" name, NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH, who itis considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by COLITSYN. However, SCHWARZENBACH was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. The recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH, according to NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an. operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD. co01css” 10
13-00000 (b) Page 103 of tie previous summary cont. ins infor- mation that GOLITSY also learned from GRYA“NOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNwV had developed an operation against an American Embassy military code cler# in whica the KG> was "99 per cenit sure" that the target would be recruited, This is belieyec to undesiiedly be a reference to the case of James STORSBERG who was actually the subject of a recruit- ment approach in 1961, There is considered to be a good possibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing ior his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Viadislav M. KOVSHU (Chief of the First Section) that Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an American employee oi the Embassy. Johan PREISFREUND was used in the STORSBERG operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also 6001Cag il SECRET
13-00000 ‘aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about PRESFREUND since GOLITSYN wanted to use PREISFREUND in Heisinki, NOSENAO has stated he was not present curing the above conversation, It is very possibie that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in nis conversation with GOLITSYN in tne matter of why GOLITSYN could not use PREISFREUND as an agent, NOS=NKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the James STORSBERG case and with cue consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report- ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the James STORSBERG case and detailed’ information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the James STORSBERG case, The exact date of the recruitment attempt against STORSBERG has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by James o001C90 12
13-00000 STORSBERG that it occurred in October 1961 is com- pieiely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by STORSBERG himseii, {c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains + information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1900 tnat an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited cr prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960, The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photograpned the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideciogical rather than blackmail recruitments, SHELEPIN Gid not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve, NOSZNKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of Robert BARRETT, who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and “GRIGORIY ar two homosexual cGooLeot 13 | Cpoc
13-00000 co en ple oa agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were particip. ting under the direction of the Ninth Department, One of the above homosexual agente succceded in involving BARRETT in homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because ofa general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also stated that the compromising materiai and information on BARRETT was later given to the First Department and that BARRETT was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation, BARRETT, following his return 1 | G001092
13-00000 rc \ —, CCAR to the United States in January 1902, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising pactograpns which had been taken & during his 1959 trip to Moscow. Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possibie that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the Robert BARRETT case, It should be noted that Robert BARRETT could not actually be . charactcrized as an “American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, * (4) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor- mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he ' visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to rielsinki, GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some inforraation, that he was i 6001093
13-00000 considered by the AGB to be a "real" agent and that ii the transier of the code cierk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki. NOSENKO has furnished no information whica ca-. be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is consicered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. I: is also possidle that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited semarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible. The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is ee | 6 goostcs
13-00000 Sipe ietme ace . a. = a Bb how also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1901 cz reer of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsin«i to accompany an American Embassy code cierx on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strixe up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow. The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly John GARLAND and the train manifest lists John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Heisinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity of John GARLAND but claims no knowledge of the above irip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip. NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, shouid have been aware oi the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lacs of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities such.as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if be had been, the KGB snould have briefed NOSENiO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the LePage ONO Ste Serene ao KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of. Sead 001055 17 pea et bee ee MRE
13-00000 oan . . . ° A theery which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was io confuse leads furnished to American inteMigence and/or to Genigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews bas not made any remarks which could in any way be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO coes not claim to have any detailed xnowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD bas been broached with NOSENXHO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCO," or "You should ask GOLITSYN about thar," In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 couid have been initiated py the KGB as 2 result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing: oi certain events should be noted.. GOLITSYN defected on iS December 1961. * NOSENKO Geparted from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzeriand, where he remained until 15 June 1962, it is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, 1 Go01096 Lemont ie eneteetn ae
13-00000 ‘* ia A select NOSENKO as the indiviaual who would be dispatched to counter- act ine possible Gamage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his Geparture for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO ‘ was Gispatched by the XG3B, it would appear that pians for this would have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN aspect could only be a related aspect and not tne basis for tne original plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA, ' The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been Gispatched te confuse and divert American intelligence and thus ‘to protect an important AGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Covernment, particularly CLA. This is a theory which should and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to iactualiy sere 2 eee ay, substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information { that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist. Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts Hy - 19 J | | oo01ee7
13-00000 ro of American counter-inte.ligence td deiermine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB pexeirations of the United States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be ‘ that there would be iittle consoiation or assurance to American intelli- gence even if every statement by NOSENHO was accepted at face value, The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con- sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow, In this area hie statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD. The basis for this expressed opinion of NOSENKO is Cconsicered elsewhere in this summary and analysts may diifer as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith, it shouid be noted, however, that at this time , 2 there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENXO. NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities, In addition, he does not claim « & a to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. Asan . ° e » goor tee er ae woe ota - dat ee
13-00000 { tuo baWe’ example, he Las made it clear that nis knowiecge of SCD activities against members of deiegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, ee ata ene a A cen ence stermteme 9 9 meena Bem aig + ete tt Aa POR et nt EE Ec and individuais in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or as a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best mainly of a collateral natire. NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain enw notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the AGE code name, These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventn Department and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particuiar cases. ? | gooit 9 21 rPAnr | wf RAL tne meee
13-00000 G, IS THERE 2VIDINCEI GFW A POLITICAL OR ANY mes I ae boy bo i ard aol onic Ven he Oe Rea oe eas Cake SUSTIEY A DISPATC(. OTEER TYPES OBILZOTIVE wi rince: COULD SUSTIZ “a DUPAt ad FREELY TO CLA CONCERNING HIS KNOW LIDGE OF TLE AGB AND WITHOUT NOSENEO BEING GIVEN A SPECISIC rane MISSION OR MISSIONS ? dsclassifreation
13-00000 mn. a ea ee ee ah pete ‘Staant us, pS CNS TS CMC SNe Glo Glee GF OLY Gener esvse CO SCIIVS yen penne 2 G2: NOSIN? Ese of t2¢ KGB ene wit that such act would political gain for the USSR, For sich 2 possibility to be seriously entertained by the Soviets, however, it would nave to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leacership and presimebly would have to 2 BS eee oc
13-00000 ee ee se meee. weet : se We CUMS. GG OY 6GeIh Go wl Gly Ge oe abd eae OGEL Te te, EV ef eae GE SeTEG CAG Ano Go. Lae BO VEY AL prosasiiy ao ae é “2 é r.o ae $ Wa Feet te OD eG ~e wap res oe ee Te ce gee ee Tee i amreeraheane aera er a as eda Onan GPER WU Boe Oy Df aN ee RN Se ee ee weal slee we ge te : a cone ey fee te al pe ole ee Foe one banter weats Oh ae wee SD awk oe woe oe ee Sogn we ee plare fan SCG ys the invoive ment of Lec “gat tae time tat taere wis Sov: ee ween einnet Pe ewe Ty em Saw ate ee w GSSE551N400K, (ope. G GTEMASE wae in faci Wnes invo.vement, and concerned lest CLYOnRCOUS CONCLUSIONS G& CTaWN Welc COUlG LoEd to 6G to take extverne 5 iv t v < & er G G ~ mS " & 3 9 my mt fe eer ele tla oes WLAVGLVELTIORS in The 2554S51N07.0N. {4a6 PL55G GYOME|NS Of VAS alse zeciy COM Bet oS Suvict consu.er —s file on CSWALD was, rn tre, Bo wa sene win ¢ aeembsce bed lena de The NOSENKO case warrants ex h light of the fact that among the inforrnation NCSENKO provicec was ‘Naside' KGB information on OSWALD: intormation waics purporscly
13-00000 er. ae pee sont a romans st Vee See 20S OT ee ced. nar) ne a re ad ene Ce eho oy! Pais iniexmai e eel Was Le ~ weet aye ee be, enag 4 = ee Beak es Vice aweds Baahe Sead suas woe we WG OIG intewoest in Gs Earerel Ces GS f. STHaee ee www hs nw tee ae * . seg oat WG Wis a, SMOSSINE Steom Go & aren Le NOSENSO' 3 1G 1962, i? rnonths pwior to int ass + wr tke le Fe See ee ET De Wemabat? TG RTOS IGALLOG Crom, NOS LD BUG Tov sar Gaes, fiesently convincing ior United States authorities te reisonaecly Se expected to concluce thati er 3 fo ie) *s o ts ta $3 et Fy none-involvement, assume taat United States autnoriues, in any examinziion of the possibility of a Soviet (AGB) hand in the asscssinaiiona, would presume £ { q + iN : b or se ne ane seprgrsintaee gensten. ong FE amp fae EE OATH, SIRT cen ah gene apse repent f | if
13-00000 CMe ay GAS LON WOR CNSR wee ae Te BOLO ANCiViGuals Stcclllan ll concerned wien Sentero en ® Oe Saeed Tobe a os nk ees a ee : PO ae - : ar ee ; _ aoe Ohh CALCOS OF Wwrtawevoey WU Toe POP Gvem SG beastie a fee - GSENSG Cove 2eV7u 2 agony BPG ek meee Bleed wees wea Category. wote - * "Nyce ont re G2 NCSEINAG we satisiac he ey oq »? o é cod ic) m ar) oy g P. tn ‘a e et re] be n rs) v pre i ¢ if © seus - Sac ge * ~ a Tyee ys meee LID naar fe with nuraerous ieads to MGNAVEINGGeS GS AOAC Tene Ais agents Geo ences thy fo wt eet age Al ety Tiel Bee eg Tete : CaSES5, 146 2402.101E5 Of te ene, Bee eV S alaelace my GNWULGS DSEs.oa Ga UG. ov.y Se based on an assurnption aati the United States Invelligence comraunity would involve a major portion of its personnel and éficris @ Gl mo Curren. in the investigation and vesclution of cases which had te ox potential value to the KGB. The asove Dossisiiicy cannot be « arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. Is is not believsd chat go011C04 ~9
13-00000 - OSIN tae a a ar Te ae et - NOSIN CVarmerlGe Was OG LEG EY Bs ITE SLOG . ssi GVGTaae. GSSS EWLUAIA the esove cat Fi ae ee aid + me Nae ol me SETAE. Go eee OTe CCL TO LLG CONC sion . to tne NGL. we mi el geet ew ee ce oe may - ne ne -e ] oe Wwe ON SIGO Tae Ge eee GUOVE GOs cans ew ee fy SUS e Go SS 2ECaGk OG Valuation of the actervesnl Gicct y ics HOB caused oy oe t iniormation irom the a Crime ov crimes has iong Seen sare r henge ed I ewe aol ° * a ae q o, aay William VASSAL, Aopert Lee SSRNSON enc James Allen MINT toe “4 tJ Known that information cuvnisscd trdai and conviction of other NGS & The GWterrent eiscct on Othars Of tne trials ana convictions o: Pet tet te N e AS wet Mert tt ‘OM OULersS OF ihe CONViction auc SUntG..cing of persons wro have commiticc ee fen f aay h awe s & DAL Gs 166 icy 31 CAGory Cs WY Parsons mene Ae ays em reaT =N- * Lor wt ~ ste we fae waste: AGU mot Oe UnCutes timated, 4450 S45 2459 COUAG NOt Save agents or reovultments concerning ¢) ¢3 whom NOSENHKO had some knowledge. 2.28 meneroneunnntn when aentnninenents Mies br mieny Onn E as want &-otoepara . . ferLder ta IE on EEE oe eee fare Je RRR ERNEST | eer pcre eer reerrreeemreneriterntinpisnnegusnsenanssnsnsetakaADOROMA Set RESE UO AERP Ete eee Bennet enantio
13-00000 ° e epteensy te rae gaye) cites weet en gees worm amg on BH, IS THERE ANY EVITLONCIE That TAE CONTACTS C= Oe er ene aN tN oe er ee NOSENKO (N 1962 OR IN 19.0 TITER SLA WERE ANGWN TO TEE KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION GOR THAT NOSENKO WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KG3 RELATIVE TO His BEHAVIOR OR KGE OBJECTIVES DURING THESa CONTAC 2S OR AFTER EIS DED TION? nee on mows aateRonme 9:
13-00000 dame cere. Pee dy Rte teaes Re apy eee. QT AS CT vivite.. H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1902 or in 1964 with CLA were known to the XGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives Gurins these contacts ov after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were xnown to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB. The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treatec nere as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration. It is recognized that since positive factual confirrnation suca as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information. The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is goois07 eager EEE aE Ea EET tee lr are avenger tbh. EEOC TARTU FID SEIT TO oar on ne en a op emer neers a momen awesome: Reammemincneemmern renown qnenancmrnvee in acne dS ance ee g queuing neni. <a poe teem
13-00000 ereran Vrerers necessarily based in part ona judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control, One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time. Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CLA were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. it was con- cluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traiter in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect. Worthy of comment in this section is the iact that NOSENKO, during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the 2 go0tt08
13-00000 f erp en cose meee Bae Clee le ee ae Be et Comores to See oS Eno S By 17) wat ie Gid sot wien tO So Co lcce EL woud Mol vecor Suet Any Gee eae * ~- - as + f _ - + oT en o ae COLDS. Waves TLE BOW. Ge Se ee es BLS A BE LOL BS =: a a : we mets SCARS BOT cae GOOG Tae ecw Vere SMe ee PE Se oot eee - wee ae ts : ue Wie Gl On COne ALOW A ao ele O- ~ Lec. Mea Stes Enuase powee ee cee Dee ee te WATTS! eee me ne ee aes Gan gers 2G Nene Nay 1 GY COL. Oe EIT BGG col Late toe gae ea ate Maw S eta WAS eoetemie ee Ot Oa SNe mre te eee am SCDINAGS : re er adbcus ais versona, secusity 25 no ae rer ee aks Sy eee awe fe fy Poe wee - wos Ws MGT ULUSET Mes CON ws; ROW SVE itis @vicence whut NOSTRIN woes te . sew 7 ew ee eee PS geet mile te NG> in any Way encouraging casncedtine contact of NCSENES within me - ay ann Ln ee ee USER, Waich very sikeay WOU. LoVe Seen ween OF . te tn Varner 7. Fata onan) a? w6a NOSIENNO furnished tc CLA in lget CLeLeS tare 23 -any GVLECINCY!S Tlat whe LISS =o map tay Me ley mt ee we ee eet tle any WEY 4 tne GSounlioa ng Ge tS Tess poenns Skene fot oe merebee Fel mm eo Loaniabie nag =. qeepweee Pe eee anes ‘ PROTANT TT ee ep eee te type 4nG, ON tae Contrar Ye Sb GDPSars Coan. OSIINNS coule have Javnisned ail of the material to CLA and returned to the Sovict Unica wittout the 46GB aware Tait the m The latter statement cven tncluces the trave the trip of NOSENKO to Gorxiy in December 1963. GOO ps p>» oy “6 ane rere) sy she aeees
13-00000 em STF bes CC eS 20 NOSINAG, was vo TTR TDA SY cg tg le waeeetase cs eatit Fg cela trae ta to Pi om seats 224 tan SACs US feaGhuwewad nome atte at ote MOSENEG, fuse atc te pene ee pe spe ety ge let wes Bebe bois OCU VOSS Le SOCOUN GG ON Cee LU Wes op gy tiecee Fe Se gp wm | J 60 blh oe at Whe Sec cc sls TER US SOT ae Ue ee ee ew Chay Lecesba am x aan é eta te . To em ee a ne sane VA BENSGCS. wea a etd Weiaetine mentee con aaenta Tee Codeaesetile bea Sheets Ewes OE et ieee Ce red Cae a eee gyre oO em Om eer Meet 7 te te ee te eo we ge bm me ee a eT OUTee Ge TOG Y CO Marea i WLS Uber BN LS Bes BUTTE Come oot cope Yap epceeapeet Mee Copies gree ete Fw eee Se ne gee, Melee ee le Sl were scasly BSGU Gs Sead GOCE G.G0L Uulnues BS MUG abatie went atten Sc ce. Sic GO. Lieutesans Colonel, meee ww bene Nee : moe ba om eo eee oe Saf TSLTACTSG Lae Cadeaces 0 ante Warn CS catede wnat ort ee * 8 we tone twa Wo a et te o ‘  auts Ce eget wane aeisec cme vane Of Lieutenant Colunel, stating chat even 2s &@ Doputy ment he was oniy a C sere te ete « -at a er ee - me ee mmm em fl 2 ee ae Feceive thé TanK OF Majors in early 1964, NOSENTIO co6 Stitsc thes giving him ine rank of Lieutenar. IMSNS o ee few aha Cem 7 we- nt Cosonel in ae Glove cocument wos tac errox of AASHPRAGV, the officers on cuty in the SCD on Suncay, a eum em tole ae Net et aetaG Seu aise that praciicaliy ail Depuiy Chieis of Deparment in the th tae rank of Licutenant Colonel. aie above explanation sy NCSEZNAG may weil ve consicered oy vee G2 Sxspilcism|a, However, 22 NOSENAS 24 seem thai he couieG save been sro- was dispatcsed by the KGS, it wou! megan aoe fe AT 7. f.. aT Ces 225 Ceili Of viGee wits something a little more substantial to ¢ ra] the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In eédivion, it woule seera that the KGS ‘= G001110
13-00000 ee re soe Nefet ata ows ree we Gace goo WL G © Be oe eG ¢) & c -4 Coie Coe VE te ree em eG positions ia the SOD, wicu, BAY WEY SUDTGST tne Cabla GL ee a weeny see ee aa * ws * ne ee ae oe - . 7 eo ao Pa so DGSINAG taal Gc was Sepuly Call. oo ue Pleat Section, Divs: Ad i Pew Ore aseey drat y Ge NOSIN wake Hee BN Wile See we slew ewettes bee wee ace Sel wows oF “324 "GL" se hag in Ty me c=” ASS © afGe OF CVE 2m 2 foe GT a¥ a fe gooitit
13-00000 o C attint IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TG NOSENKO - ‘ 6001112 scent [SSF “ ew et ton,
13-00000 ~ ereoerrenny ar FT Peewee Tt a add COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO Attached is a verbatira copy of pages 357 ~- 360 of the "“Examina- tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and AGB career of NOSENKO, These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments. With the exception of "G, " the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENO served in the Naval RU from March 195] to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the “AGB during tae March 1953 - February 1964 period, * For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated, Attachment: | Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" go01113 F3ciag $23 Cachasstes Mies | SECRET
13-00000 PREViOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKGO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENXO. (Tne specific conclusions have been gi.c: the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with otder sections of tais summary.) “SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES' “NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of auhoriy from which ne derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period ~ 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnei, organization and opera- tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including i intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensiive positions, who Ci ‘ _ = 6001114 2 eae ee eae ee
13-00000 ee ere ee eee eS enjoyed congicerable auusoriiy anc trust despite personal shorte- comings, and whose defection, ‘the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence’, paralyzed the work of Gm KGB - Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assas~ sinate him." “The examination has ccmpared each element of NOSENKO's biograpay relevant to hia claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The ¢xamination reilects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information ne has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have heid. In short, is he what he aaye he is, according to nis own accounts?" “This examination hed led to the iollowing findings, arrived at independently: A. NOSENKO cic not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed, 3B. NOSENKO éGid not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed. Cc. NOSENKO did not serve in the American g001415 Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed,
13-00000 D. During tne period 1955-1900, ne waa neitner a senior case oilicer in, nor Deputy Chief of, tne Seventh Department Armerican-British Commonweaith Section. . E., NOSZNAO was neither Deputy Crief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior oliicer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic) F, NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962:he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was _ thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible, c G NOSENKO has no valid ciaim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embasay personnel between 1953 and nis defection in 1964. These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of provability or certitude, put they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance." “Tne above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOS&NKO's bona fices. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unaccepiabie. While truth and fact in this case frequently c001116
13-00000- cannot ve establisned with certainty, itis evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By alunos: any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned oy iact or probability, or contradicted or retracied in nis own statements, NCGENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector." “Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide : defector, itis necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal coaclusions. Nevertwiess, the question cannot be ignored, The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims nave been corroborated by Soviei-officials, and the necessity to maxe decisions about NOSENKO's future ail require that at ieast a provisional judgment be made. '! "Of the reasonable explanations advanced ior NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB GOULL17 agent."
13-00000 aor Tne first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not siinply a swindler who falsciy claims for personal aGvaniage to have been a KGS ofiicer is evident, we believe, irom the confirmed details of AGB organization, persornel and operations which he has provided and which couid only derive from within the KGB itself." . “Second, as noted in the ext, extensive psychiatric and psycnological examination by Gualified specialists rule out the’ SP mera ee nat eet ae possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind." ‘It is somewhzt more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer whe served in at ieast some of the components for some Berated nis positions, rank and access to intormation, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB ofiicers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact nold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be justa 6901118 ,: comment by other sources." i | | i | ' product of his own invention, since these were the subject of | _ —_ I
13-00000 "Because none of ine above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispaiched by the i KGB. Whiie tnis e.planation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable. "' ‘In tne absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, an¢ believes that prudence requires that he be ‘ regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor- mation snould be assessed accordingly." cou1419 ;
13-00000 A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES CR AT THE PLACES AND TIMES HE CLAIMED oo qnmre titan mam tte se wees cote
13-00000 ae - call A. NOSENKO cic not serve in the Naval RU in any of the cavacitics ne. or at the places and times he ciaimed, (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard Y & toc NOSENKO, The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSEN KO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be acceptec. The interrogations of NOSENKXO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation irom the Institute of International Reiations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majerity of his ciass. However, ‘previous eZforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1982 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time. It is considered that NOSENXO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders"! as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March goori2t
13-00000 195i to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fuliy accepiabie, it is not consicered necessary to comment concerning ai of the remaras in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reilected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, oe limited in scope, The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Cnhiei, Colonel KALOSHIN, He identified no ranxing officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or througn hia visits to Geneva," Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late i967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom re had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remar«xs by NOSENKO regarding approximately 875 KGB oificers, 106 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals. 2 004422 SECRET
13-00000 —_—_—— | t is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU oificers whom NOSENKO relates to the carly 1950's period. In addition, NOSENO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the narnes of additional Navy Intelii- gence personnel whom ne knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period, Page 52 of the above summary anc other related pages question whether NOSENKO‘ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Inteliigence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area, Attached is a copy of a handwritter. memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy telligence in the Far East and the Baitic area, The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams ‘Indicates they are quite accurate. NOSENKO nad previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an aimost deserted fisnermen's » village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENAO for this place as having the mail address of Sovets« Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non- existent, A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and a, that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausgen. 3 (001123 Ac
13-00000 ri ' ine previous summary 4:so0 siated that despite nis claimed active cornamissioned service in ine Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures, at snouid be noted that there is 4 considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of tre Oilice of Naval Ingelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy. Attachments: List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO vOUL124
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13-00000 B&B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER TEE KGS IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED aa t of ‘ ‘ ‘ . aN On arene ene \ GOULLSL sean en eee
13-00000 he wit yeryr Pad B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time Srvemceverenretesineeren-cenaseemsaaanaannpnaceinanacanan/Dorenannaana/cetnantennadanineseansdaneseteseiAsssAQRnseerSesenseensencsAnnsnenAnenenZQeers\eQeees—et nwa ete CE SE ACRE SEES CE ESET Sp agganaeslFTasiashasansdaherwientineeenssowseeetsneenens claimed. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard | iv NOSENKO, The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENXO entered sf tne then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and tnat his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KC3ULOV. Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will nat be repeated here, His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con- sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted. The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSEN KO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB {MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN. SECRET — g0G1132 Cave? 4 Excladed tea ing aad estatuilzotioa -
13-00000 * eG Ted wre! 8 oom in 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the AGB in an eiiort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949. The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, tne Minister of Shipbuilding, a = and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB {MVD) through the influence ci General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGS procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. cae te el ees = HEE stan men Generél KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 wae First Deputy to BERIYA, y the Minister of the then MVD. The orevious summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not contro- vertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO : | , Go0L133 { “SEGREF
13-00000 was not sponsored by any person of influence as was tne case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA. The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the stancards in foree at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement which at is doubtiul any defector or series of defectors could fully cubsiantiate; namely, that it never happened, Until and unless it is medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- resi. place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB after mid-March 1953, The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have vermitied NOSENKO to entex the KGB even though he previously had tuberculosis, but the flat staternent that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated. The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these wiil be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD} as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that ; GOUL134 SECRET
13-00000 NOSENKO did not taxe a physical examination in connection with his processing ior AGB entry, and that such a medical exarnination was 4 routine and mancatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This staternent makes no allowance for the influcnce of General { KOBULOV; but, in addition, docs not ccnsider the fact that the Navai RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD). The previous summary also failed to note that tne MVD wouid a a have had independent information in regard to NOS2£NKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry cr re of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the. father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era, ‘The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the ny personnel officers or visit the personnel oijice. It woud fe ~ ee, speac to an men a seem that the influence of General XOBULOV could have perrnitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has curing interviews stated that he com- pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (vp). Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly 4 LO0L135
13-00000 Ned men eo nae entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service, While NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 3953 was the Second Chief Directorate and that it subsequently wis redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN nas stiiucd this reversal of cesignations occurred in March 1953, oe 7 PTALIN gied tn-barly March 1953 and that same month the MVD and the MGB were merged under tne name MVD with BERIYA as Minister, BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June 1955. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less thana year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places itas the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "'soon after ine advent of BCRIYA as nead of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective cate of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD). There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD. NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is 5 GUULL3E “SECRET
13-00000 : gis seh 48 eee « Seal . ~~ ‘ . in conisict with tne staterncnts of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and ° “ GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsisle for the changes. As ‘or the issue of who was responsibie for the reversal of Gesignations, it woule appear that NOSENKO is inerror, However, the fact tnat he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively climinates any signizicance in this issue. . NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with cither office curing 1953-1955 and there is no acequate reason to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the Ai ceased to exist (931 given iu tne summary, but other information indicates the XI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's}, but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he beld a certain position. Readers oi this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist. . GOULAS
13-00000 The point nas also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB énowG have endeG or he should have at least encoustered difficulty when bis Seneiacior General KOBULOV, together wita the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no diificuities but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an oificer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOSULOV through his father, and that NOSENXO has stated that although nis father knew General KOBULOV, his father couid in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group. Uc AL3E he Oe re ee oa
13-00000 atts C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN DG ASSY = . , | 6001139 eet oe
13-00000 . Nee we oan 4 Gd an ¢ & mle C, NOST NEO did not serve in the Arncrican Embassy Section Ts eaeaeetendeememeaemanaamenmaemmnmeennmenenmmnatmeneateteeramaeeatentnimeeeremerenesneetaneen sean amare nine oeeterae rane ia ed throughout the 1953 - 1955 nericd az ne claimed, (Previous conclusion) xeon REET EP EE Tree PE PEP PE ESE PETE The above is conclusion "C'' in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD. This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews, The conclusion is that NOSENAO was an ci:icer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work curing this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal be- havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory “characterization" - £ 6061140 cppascad 336 apres tte
13-00000 © 8 eS eget 1 to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired irom the KGB or transierred to some other component. The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the “GB ana his mother interceded on his benalf in 1955 with the Caief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENXO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB. , . = The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain . in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist F-irty. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son oi the then Minister cf Shipbuilding. NOSENKO has stated curing previous anc current interviews tat following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon- Bible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not “e claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news- paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer, " indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experieaced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB. officers and his 2 7 GO011414
13-00000 a ' indormation concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight on ae to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor- | | 1 respondents was his assignrnent irom mid-March 1953 to mid-1954, From circa mid-195¢ until his transfer to the Seventh Depart- ment in late May 1955, NOSE: NKO claims and has claimed he was an. officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the , Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow: It, OO = : is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other coliaterai information furnished by NOSENKZO, that NOSENKO was an officez-of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Oilice of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly leit much to be desired. | In circa mid-1954; NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komeomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the ry First Department, if not the KGS. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if net undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and hia knowledge of the members of the Office of 3 yauri se - Arey tb A RBG Re oe,
13-00000 rr cor a yak Fal the Military Attache supsorts the claim of NOSENKXO that he was an oificer of the Fire? Section with the indicated assignraent ab related NOSENXKO has stated that the work against the Military 7 - os , Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment + possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be compietely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Waiter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches . aT wad to Soviets in the United States in that period, NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. it ie submitted that this may be evidence oz his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his ob Y . | 7 0001143 SEGRET- Son ib 8S ae
13-00000 | | | : z — : a ors woe ee - am wl, a a . Ere Zdow eurct: Bee 8 ww Ten h SL Ban WETS "no the wacectaln Peo Rsceae _ sen fc, are 7 ot ww eh Y . fe * eve l.. : $14.U8 ic NOL OIND TD Waced octue) stare on the KG Waa ix. jeopard, WA ofiee wi - 1556. “eos a ar. . * . aa* spe my tee et iia é * - ee Crenrary ! New 2aKkG ne yee Cw Say Ce CRleG ana etial sndicates < Gcismice ‘ wack of a.cwledge concerning (is Besignec cargvig during “ppt OKaececs uy wees March - Mzy 1935, Tile, according 36 NOSZNKO, was when an _Satiecactery “chavacierizatioa™ was being prepared on? NOSENKO, fi wat . “: : Gucision was being mace on nis case, anc a period of time in wlich Le went ong “big drunk" which cuirnimated in his spending about 46 days sncés ALospi:al care Lecause of the possibility of recurrence ci his . scvicus MOU Nis alleged wi emi Leiwor Ke Dee x. Sere uve @sainet the Miltary Atizcnes. It is considered tia: OSoR 0 2. : cuvreni isn.ervaews has Jurnisned adequa.e cccepiavi: wacalls, anu a6 BE OM Ape aUsMisaed 2 oci5lt lormaiion concerning '. ~LODINA hat there Was 20 Wt oc by t > > 4 ue 4 * tt tl 64 * me f- : . te Oo Ate . A & ray i. ry te hc rc vy te % re ee ene fede « NO LONG ve Withacle Loder. a tom concerning mese ANGiViteele, BUS wlOVIOL.. Sa ack Peres eal. Thi. L@ WAS BEVET Eli. @. these individuals. 6001144 > eam tent ae hee
13-00000 am H _ The effectiveness or non-eifectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actuaily was an officer . in the First Section during this period of time, It is felt that iniormation furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable, : | G001145,
13-00000 D, DURING THE PERIOD 14955 a 1926, HE WAS NEITEDR A SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR. DEPUTY CHIEF OF, THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION i ’ e vn . . - : COCL147 ~w ; pee ener
13-00000 ES ld er] Loar o peerenes) 5 of w® penne ay ry D. During the period.of 1955 - 1900, NOSENKO was neither z senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, t - American-British Commonweaith Section. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh i | Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and waa {- Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventn Department from 1958 to December 1959. é During current interviews, NCSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventn Department during the 1955-1959 period, Interviews of persons who were the sudject of XGB interest collateraily confirm that NOSENKO was personally in- e . : volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI jn June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE and Arthur BIRSE in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS in 1958, the re- cruitment of George DREW in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of “ 7 | 6001148 ee a Oe ee een
13-00000 wee ee wy . ." ‘siempre eo ne A & 6 teow ie ” Is fy “ William Stanley W iLBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David. TAYLOR . in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENS in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSEXKO claime personal invoavement, but is representative oi cases in wnicn his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target. . Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and David TAYLOR were British citizens and the other above-named indi- viduals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate | the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was'an- officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common- weaith tourists in the USSR. . in addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against Martin MALIA, an American tourist wno was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955, MALIA has not been interviewed and evlii not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved, goci149 yee oe
13-00000 1 “t . % a4 4h. & Game & NOSENKO has furnished infjormation on the travel of certain United States Government oiiiciais, inciuding Congressional represent- -atives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice ‘ . William 0. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, waen consicered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his ciiimed service in the Seventh.Department and work against American-British Commonwealth “iy tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period. NOSENKO as stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Totirist Section had just been established and an agent network was not .vailaole for operations against American and British tourists, This seems quite logical since the infiux of tourists into the | USSR was jut ina iormative stage. NOSENKO has spoxen in detail about an agent network he de- Oo veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homesexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (AGB code names), whose extensive use in AGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuais who were the subject of homosexual com- promise operations. The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of gou1 159 NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in thoée fiuty lay
13-00000 "MERELY e 2. Om. Latent teens oo Vie OCA oe a : eat, ft Bocce diets pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfiuous. [i is considered that even ii the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis ior 4 conclusion that NOSENKO was not an oificer in the claimed positions in the Seventa Department Guring the period of late May 1953 - December 1959. Nor is it con- ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepied without quaiification, there is any — vidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB.. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment ana which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification. On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter- “intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit- ment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart- ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was “only an English- speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB Ged btea
13-00000 oe owes * ae, talglstepaimineaniennnES considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has. proviéed on Seventh Departrnent persounel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to nave any ioundation in fact. ® Page 145 of the above surnmary lists ¢leven operations which | : were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO,. The. named operations - were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, Jonn RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (inu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William TARASKA, The criticism madé in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and sucn details as he could acquire when he reviewed.tne activities of the Seventh Depart~ *ment in 1962 foliowing his return from the Firet Department. The notes brought out by NOSENKO axe considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review e of all of the notes of NOSZENKO currently avaiiabie indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi- mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. ~ GOULL52
13-00000 a During current interviews, NOSONKO furnished. specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE. it shouid aiso be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and Wiliam TARASKA were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives. in-the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory expianatioa oi how he iearned of the KANTOR case, NOSENKO has, in discussing his cuties as Deputy Caief of the American-British Common- wealth Section, aiso Expiained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USS“, the case automatically was assigned toa (group of officers in the Section who reported directiy to the Chief of ' Section and were, not under the supervision of NOSENKO, NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the iiles of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," . , two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Amcricans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt ; action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual — . go0Lis3 SEPM a ne wees cae NOT eG ry
13-00000 was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information Was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR. NOSENKO has aise explained how he learned of the Patrick . PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVERN cases; and, the listing of the Sofia SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 = 1959 period is in com- plete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962, During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given.a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing. The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the 2 Seventh Departinent or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual, An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why ne was involved is logical and normal, No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases. The summary also noted that there was a question concerning a) whether Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case. goo1is4 ee ong
13-00000 This question seems quite superfluous since HAI415 was in the USSR on a tourist visa and “real tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Departrnaent. Deparimental responsibility within the SCD fer an indie i ‘ $ viguai traveling in tie USSR is décided on the basia of how the individual is traveling; i.e., whether on a tourist visa, as‘a member of-a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a iormer diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, we. as amember of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc, There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actuai tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility oi the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD. e On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents ‘inthe USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made severai references in 1962 to the KGB having such information Go01155
13-00000 : ote am wet : ‘4 1 _althougn he did then ané still suspects that William VASSALL waa the source, The references by NCSENZO to the KGB having such inior-~ mation were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was e . . ‘not until current interviews inat it was establisned tnat NOSENZO haga. actually seen excerpts of information passe’ by George BLAKE, ‘According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviousiy only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come ° . from an agent. The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document. was furnished by GOLITSYN following nis de- fection in December 1961). it was noted that the summary contained “references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter- ’ intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSE NKO claimed he was Deputy Chicf ci the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB icentified no American Intelligence agenis curing this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. be | G001156
13-00000 aohemey ee “4 ees NOSENKO Las never claimed to know all activities against American traveiers in tae Soviet Union curing 1953 -.1959. Many of these travelers would have oeen the reaponsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-Britisn Commen-. wealth Section, or another Department in the SCD, NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 =. 1959 were acting suspiciousiy from a KGB point of view, NOSEN KO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSY Ne NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after tne defection of GOLITSYN and foliow~- ing advice from the TCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document nad been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department ior the FCD. NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with -a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by on GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiqn}§ {KG ENKO Nate 10 & ahi So
13-00000 Pm weon Cre ott ow met na eets & e : 8. & f. Be ee en te : } weet ry neers. ee, TPS eee \ Vee enc ce Cee’ Boras Oa evens a WiewseSs to tas UVOSR ovo j i [ i £ ° “ole 2. ute i re. _ . “, : Gare afotmoee mates AUS aneS Wiesteovene weer ee Se eae ee Wears oo aes . ee 4 = te oy wesw eee we - ° tee we eee tts OOF wate US OST ees le Re tee hn So emt ont Sb altos ~— ~ +2. Fr eCintamen ss Re meme “= 7° wee Oe ee mw ee were Tee we ee we Sed Ue Se wf Boat! Sheets ween eae be SG wees aa be Seow ane ~ T8 gees be ne cee tag St. nef ath 2 © Taw oaaneg « ane San Secone Watetin than GO a keen, semasetayg pg & EGU SLaS 2S eae wes wae FS ue oe Oey woe mele mas . : =. we aee gates CE AaV Ganges, ws won woridas Goo & erase vise, Sucha Pes aGn a ett -* a, OR aaemel om Sn mee we Stage woe wyce tease PESBOMSIGanely Ge VG VOUT wee Dell. Gs CAS SGV woo os . err n: Se tae Tae we 2 oe aus ao” emves oe waveless Soe weet ascretaty moctrarsionss , fan ee 2 VavieeaOie GF Ze Covias GF vanize.on, J *. yy . we mw meet 2 a ‘Caan - eee Ste oeeG hts COMEG I. Gre Gic., ate eo a we ETS eg 2 ate PR eet ne ae on ir ne Ome weLAty GF TRG Toucla: Sestion of the Seven. a es + are to the 1955 - i954 pevied is che Locount sy NCSENNG cl ine --eyeuen % tae alitos Fano om, ~- a2 = 7 presence Of Armervican cligen Jonna SHIULIN in ize USSA 25 & tourist au Vae late 2956's, Tne previous sumomecy pol.sed out a) ee ee eS « é ~, - x 238 ie. oer See om sence « to am a4 Joan SHUSIN Cia not ave a valid United Siaies passport seaween 720 ose * © ee teem TGLY fe yee Swe eee Ate See Hien om hn > emp e eae nee eG yp ee 29655, at WG5 2276551546 SOF 210 20 Gave Geen G@ wOULeSe ULES te : true mame in the USSR and, therefore, a target of tne Sevenva Depirt- waent, a8 NOSENKO claims. Altsouch several avenues of pessisly " 904158 =ruitzcl investigation have not yet beex iully explored, th & Te is no ne es mtn
13-00000 ac SIOTY oa am bet! 4 hat, ever od ante be 4 web, 9 SVE ZS GCaspecccy ase O “a "a oe at at ” end ie we. ~~ Me etee wey SWS nol Dep a wt ey Savon a Fieve weadree sete een a &. “ge 3 oCV sat & nate ae BI Wasesaw on 4 4 a) gov1159
13-00000 .2,  NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHLEP OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION NCA « SENIOR GCFTiICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE aw PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic) . | . gag1160 Sie BE Na? oe PEA, HBO OB I ee Peale
13-00000 2 MOT na te eneenairat PM, hese Sn Net eh, ome 5 mye a : see patel ne. = dbs NOSE™. Meenas nails Dasvase Gales oi the sowewieun ° Smbassv Suction nor ee sy Sat at Curing the veriod of It is the conclusion of this sumimicy that NOSENAO cele the position of Deputy Cale, SCD, from January 1960 - December 1981. Tae claim of NOSEONKO that ne held the evove position in 1930 ~ 1961 has been the most Giliicul: claimed: me wha Ce’ | satisfactorily resolve anc accexi. his claim to Gave held this particular vositien is a cvivical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of Lis claimed KGB career ic, itis believed vcasonisie to presume that if NOSENHO wes Deputy Cries of ‘he American-Sritisea Commoawealin Section, Sevenca Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that ne was Gemotec, mG SHOUIG have been atleast a Desury Chiel o: Section during 1960 - i961. Position in the SCD, KG3B, anc throughout tae XGB is important from a monetary point of view as weil as 4 prestige point of view. Li sa, i6t
13-00000 . con = : * . . - ae re. owe ee am ee cae NOLENAO was only in tie Sire. suction us & Senior Case Glinces in GL 7 "os et le is moe lem quedo . 1965 - aYGae, 100d WG GeV We & CecnGsion i Poessign With restau: “em ~~ - 7 a2 SASSOON ONC, a ve “Cte . soc MeV 204G Wie DOS. Ge med Teel y qewea Se 205 1950 ” 1962 WOULE waiae co. SiGCTEI28 GCOUse 2S tO WCET 8 Mea LS Coke aspects of acitivizy in che + 2 196i is incormpiete wie. )2cged Sy wae cre considered the normal responsibil. an eciort was ma actually were in 2960 - 194. and whether nis statements in this ares Par assity o 6 man antar an wnt Mawar wie giant a kes Were 1P055.0.0 OF COULG Ge 2CCEDiCL GS NOt HePalin, HIS Ciasm to aan Accorcing to NOSINAO, in the ¢ y 1960's there were oaly approximatesy fiiteen Deputy Caiels cc Section in the entire SCD anc os. io wen lee 2 wr 2 - oe Ae. ~ gaat o_o ef § ae on anh Certain Gepartmenis none of tne sections aad 4 Deputy Chrles of Section, in uGdition, transier of a Deputy Culer oF Section was uot always followed by a repiacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chie! wren ne transferred to the First Section, First Departmext. ga01162
13-00000 Dy wgiie e. ns: Tho wee “et metanes CCOPGas f 6 NOGGIN, war betwee GO eeserint te ce Ee WETS 2oe ACen ef Warde e Geb Week a at Clee ee Coen Cees Us Ge Se “_, ~ Lee eee ee ee genes et eo ee ee ee we ee ee Te 240 PIOVsGus SUTIMary GQ ew Glenn 6G ON aE paren. CorL.ce GBa Sy Bie OS SUG URS = 20. anne % wnt ee Pte Pt OTR AW OU ST ON es yee lat tae claim inat he repiaced Minha: GAAAVALOYV 438 eDLLy Recetas AT Te Dice mee et et EOP OUTIL Soper eigen ava Crecciiee AGVSAGRK ane various Section. Along wiih this he nad a ee tt art o ia’ et oe & w& ty ° 4 ee et eh fo og roy ey 5 Gy stated that BAXHVALOV haa been responsi G we G previous summary noied thai interrozation Lac never resolved the contradictions. % Vente af eh = Se ww Hl pe: 2 oate ny cee eee BS 8 In the light of the present clearer picture Gf the uature of 2 Deputy Chief cf Section, the — and on tne issue oi wno he, NOSENKO, Gic or dic not replece ure not by ba] 1] ye n id G M eason to Guesiien tnat BAKHRVALOYV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, d bee d not overlap, was 4 Deputy Chiei of Section in the First Section before NCSENAO, and that ne was respon- sible for certain areas which later fell to NCSENKO. On the other gagi 163
13-00000 ne Torr are Sener yp BOCOT UAT 6 wet mewecday, Vee Tate vied TCGSUG 2OF aw GEL Wed CO CONC OSLIS G2 a TOW Gree C. COG Gs COLTS LOVE Geen 1G SPCC... Br cuceceasat G2 one : . m8 tee 4&cca, Theselore, im one sense DARE Rm eee we PYeLCCessor G2 NOSLNAG anc in another sonee Lewes noi. The we mee eo nee We Staiemenis of NCSINIAO on $EtOr prea. Gi tne vari = na o e ae 7 - 2 an tG Se the vesult Gf contusion on this So oY hmm cpweg inet HARON lage clam gt et bre Accoraing i NOSANAG, al tae ile Of Als teLaSier to the Pivse Section, Firat Denariment, in early 1960, ne nad sot been tolé anc for a short period thereaner was nui told ‘wnat his actus. cuties would ve. KOVSHAUA, Crier of ine First Section, wanicd to agsign NCSEN - swaping thm ule noni et Dealing: fee ata t + Sane Tae sper BUPCTV.SE ILE Wold 6 CaLlee SELVA’ eacnds at tne CNL Stace wisest’. NOSENKO tent ti to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonprccuctive wore $ 7 for work against the Service Attaches was primarily ore of contre. on $i o. “3 oO us e) et 3) ro Cy bg ty oO be ce 3 fe) a4 ¢l ° trips ang ror active work tow After a snort seriod of time, NOSZENKO wes iniormed by GRIBANOV that he, NCSENKO, had been tranoferred to supervise the work against code cieraks (also coce machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRISANOV Cefined this work as being of the greatest v
13-00000 —_ EG tue FeCPulwiost GF couse Cluvas G5 a ? ny wee army ae an en ee GB. BRLYSIN, wee was Cale of ne Ph i TUNE, dar See aWVOVE ANG & Gioup Censieting Gl NOSINAG, Gersadiy 2. wae ct Ue Sle Wwe one GAVAZNOGV and Vadim Ve. ACSOLAS SOV was Jormca win NOSENAS woe ei St f mgs se esee te fate | oes ” aed a? pane ee responsible Jor Supervision Gi ine work, GAYAZNOV anc ACSOLATOV eo - cin fen: Bem ee scopioncen ofiiceaxs were not new “G3 Giicezs, Bul insicaca were SN DSTIChCEG Gilwe|ers a aw x oo. FT a ele ge tat ar” =: Fe nei tier ahead autnoug th both as Senior Cast Oiiicérs Were cf lesser Yank chan NOSINAG, 2s on LY, tn = ato wa oe wma le ie Ill mee pe wre le eee ag” NOSENKO Goes not claim that he hac io train clther oiicer or to minutely Gs YAZNOV ing KOSCLASSV. CG scrutinize every action or proposed action © NOSENKO Coes claim he was responsible ior supervision over tieiz work, Accoréing to NOSENKO, GAIGANOV ccvnasized that worn Bgainst code clerks was to be his primary work in tae Firat Section 4 : ang that it would taxe precedence over any other activity. work against code cerss, NQOSENKO nas generally Gefined nis reszon- sibilities as iollows ports ivom OTU (AGB technical unit) of take" irom microphones in the United States Embzssy. : goU1 169 Lb
13-00000 ‘Or reject the theory tha (c) Responsibiny lov wiinsenance of the Scurry 134€ GN Caelcu Gonies aiNoaesy, “ . eo err am Boace vl Wiselisliav NOVSACA, Chi a r ne alge Sage RUSS SL of eee ee Se SETUIGs, Wace DOV SLU A NGS Bass Crie, 3, aw - mS a a “ ote we, we wee eit ides SON LOT ATES 2.5 C4 SE SCORN TPTOM Ae GOCE, TNS PesvoNSs Les OF NCSINAG, + we = fig. iat iw ns ay aes es tg me Bem Om wore ott m ere ee cee OY 645 CEsihw.OMm, Whats aT GOPAS Gul CY a pecs WLo sialon usmle cae . oS NN verse el ee eS if ae sy Doe ee ee Set og oe are wy NOSINKO, woud not coincide with ine morwal réespousinlities oF 2 * -t 2 mn ve mel mw am o 2 ama” = - Fel pane mm ee Depuiy Chief of Branch or Section in CLA. An anadsyst can Giiher accept § MECessarvily Gn euation Geiween wre ee ee . & ad « a ©. ] ee Fe a mt Tae we Me coy but is tne anal responsibilities of a Deaucy Chiel in CLA i.3d accepts the theory, ne must offer some supporting eviceace on this point, aopgee 2S? PY pO nee aye - aes avy coMtnives ooewetess Pages 351i = 201 of tne Previous SuMMary Contained COMMS and conclusions and sub-conciusions in revarcd to the ciaimed service oi NOSENKO as Deputy Caiei of Pirs: Section, Firat Department, i960 - ° 1961, The previous primary conclusion was tat he was neither Desuty o. ae = rs Lowe ee ee east ae aw ~ tome § wane o. the First (American Zribiussy) Section nor a supervisor in that Chie ny Poy section. Tae conclusion ci this summary is that he was Deputy Chie and had supervisory responsibilities ior work against coce clerks, Tne Pee i matter of the responsibility of NOSZNXO for work against code ci will be considered later, Comments will iirst be mace on the respon- sibilities listed in (a) - (d) above. goOL166 y!
13-00000 Sages 265 - 222 of Tae previcus Sunumary Contain G Celallcd . nyt en ate qe Oiesd OF Lhe PYEVIGUS COACluslun nai NOSENSKO Was not the MOL cose =yoe se nme - G@alicer con Gonnm ABIOLAN, ee CULS GT CONCLUSION 13 ThA Ae Wie whe res tonsio.e case oiiicer for ALIUIAN. Whether or not hls work a A we FON we pees eye ae meer 7 - 2 Lr a ea a nd ABIOUIAN compared iavoraciy Win what ls Considered ie Oo tae AIO os = ee att Ts ~ fo Soi mw ow ig t act ewetate ah on osetia Ss -&@ Tésponsio.e CIA case ollicer is immaterial; wnat is material is “ae ea se ge at vieran Ware weet eee ard, a a Sete whether NOSZNKO reasonably Tulllice the requirements of ihe ACS a4, wag - ~ neat LT : Be. gOnn ABIDLAN, ot io fest thar . + NET A a we cupdmee EDRTETAN aye fa than ecorcing t@ NOSZNAO, tie wore against AGIOIAN Was i the G é the KGB to “anctner re Q fon S) =] fe] Rhy tu r) ef o H 4 ae aa Ea 1 ps bey ‘> td b c 2 < ra) 2 > te Be POPOV," and no cons. Géraiion was uiven to active 2 ABIDIAN for possible recruitment, This exglination by NCSINA appcars reasonable and logical and his knowledze of ABIDIAN anc Ais Gescription of his work agains: ABIDIAN should be considered omy within that framework, Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ADIDIAN, but om the other hance ii the staternents of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of tne KGB was to see if coverage of ASIDIAN would lead to “ancther POPOV," it follows that such ‘personalia information on ABLDIAN would have hac gouL16?
13-00000 oe ~~ ee 8 cas Weat aan eyelet oe, ad at gy SO : little siaterias Value ior ine SCD. (Shc DOD had 2evised the SOD Briar ep te eget ho FS RTT NP Tae ot rrr sone ee : Be we ean CO CAS USTAVGs G2 Beaders adicd BN UE COGN coe es taeda WES CUCL cE 1S ‘aay EE ame pee ae Tet ge tiem ge oF meme we MATL Pacam ate aaa tence, UG an wUCluon ASIDIAL sssumiee the . om. 7% 4 Ce ine oa was Cee See tee eng t "3s + wn ov the Bus . ar ees Om Sapa rigs eae ee SO WhO Was OWT OY BO Mass 6G GS wroteon ae LV Cee ZGtGl OY te Se “4 <2 zawap © 5 yet pening oe LUIDIAN ang Ne el mee Mee le wah Wad DeCCSaary tO GELETMINE 22 Heatace WES “SINE TsCan wis Gene aie OF Gite = The previous summary, 2oges 212 - 216, contains some quite specific siatemenis reiative to ADLOLAN anc 2 Soviet tnaic, a ACS “ operational contact according to NOSZNZO, whica are arronecus. This invalidates one of ine bases fo NOSZEN KO was not the responsizie casé o2i% NOSENKO mac previously si é prepared an operational plan > - of the placing of Metsa on the clothing anc ellccts OF ABIOLAN Sy us maic who is mentioncé above, Tatyana TFEDORGVICH, Tae siatemen: - TAT AT Mey is made in the summary that this could not be true because FZOOCACVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until ac least July 1961. ASIDIA has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above anc the results invalidate the previous conciusion that FEDOXOVICH could not save treated the clothing anc effects of ABIDIAN with Metxa prior to July i961. cocL1i68 os ale ae BS tom ed on aan te
13-00000 Acie? og eas wee fan ADADGAN aS DOW St01C0 Tut he aycivedc in Moscow in Marcon Ope gels tee Susy, - . ete meg = Re gl oe ame ig! Poe wm eee YOO Wii LRG INiGRGu Wal SG Woe Aol anpley ao Soviet malic, Augronie rately three RENMER. a Denartiment of Srete exncle ete ee male we wens Leman ge Lda aaa oaks & aA CNAP TCL. Of wear Crd poweeed BS SGC ce 0eO Coma wece ; wee THAT Ree Comte vente ace My Sa wete ead ahd © ie oe a near a a ae = cere 2 on yen em ee plete TMS PE TRAD Ayer emt - BS &@ TGsG 2G LUTGUga Mawes AgTcem WR LoNwMOR, SHDCGROVICH od - Laas ee my et gt! aig fae Am TON : a spree ge te ot ee emi > wlan’ tact pare tate MAlG Jor ALLS LLIN & Browtmee SOT CITILG ate CeO Stem tet Ee we At time on TFODONGVICH, eccoreing 16 ABIDIAN, nec unCOntrolied access to Lis iiving cuzriersa Since she hac a key to perm. entry for cieaning purposes. ABIOIAN Gid not mail any operations: .eiters within the Soviet % Union until after Mares 1901 and therelore in view of the chove, is no reason to contradict ine statement ol NOSIONAO thai ihe thi * operational ietters intercepted by the AOS anc mallee Gy ADIOLAN al. tenant showed evidence of Metsa. it is interesting to nolie that NOSENKO in ‘ - mag ote _ anton 2 see tin 1 wee ot June 1902 warned CiA asoui the #GS use Of Merka ior apowting internal pe ee Ce ne . + Sy om ey Tele “-- ge we ner; letter mailings by Unitec Siates Emiassy personnel, a en ABIDIAN, accorcing to NOSENKO, was the sublect of a 24-hour surveillance wita the Seventh Directorate assigning a specizic surveillance brigaée to cover ABIDIAN, The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was ine : . responsibility of the Seventh Directorate wzich submitted reports to ch g0G1169
13-00000 eet Tee ae, i a oe eee Siw My ee et ae oe Salad DECI, Lal at Pe par alee Nee etd, GS = iG2 srabaatadaees Wek S UMC C Lee oe VOW LEW LCS eige wm meme ott ne me ee . ar * eco Tae Guc.Le OF Careeelen 1G wie Gevenin Gu wane fips wl pn Oe rs ee ee es ee ees 7 FT GeNsZE0LON ME WOES Not BET Ucl pale 4m ie Surcve. eygrt: “lege rnencs TON TAT ee ae 2 3EVeTmE. Glvectoraie, NOSINAG scaiee that Veiwencée Gro. it MOT Matlion GisCicsEa Qny Per sGues. Wee cea cs 6 eh Aaa We " Pe ce ee er a ra OT we ee ABLOIAN, ae Wea awe GveCri Bela CO CMe ae aceW ree oO DEL Ske WeAANESSES WETe GiSC.65e0, a2CCGrTGing to NOSONAO, and the patiera GF Coverage to see if ADRIDIAN woulé lead tne AGS ie “anoiner POPOV" Ly remained unchangec. Pages 210 - 2i2 of tue previous summary notes that NOSZNAO stéc by ABIDIAN curin ur cS Vi poe Was unaware of countr USSR and that no effor: was made by NOSENZG ihra eo & ~ Ging to ts + ‘out such information. Acco ce] *d 3 is 4 eh g t we be i$ action against an - jormat coming irom Moscow." Tue surveillance which would nave been required on the past of ine ry a to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would certainly have placec a severe burcéen cn the SCD, Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably de expected would be of little or no practical value to the SCD. ga01179
13-00000 2 HO mT et pee mega we eee os ete lie on nem eme © ° 28 216 - 22. oF the previcus summary cunmin & summiry Sada Sivect Ccaccrop site waich Joann ASIOIAN Gn the Matter of the Pu = - 0 gh ar 4 ie vo : a ee - et n they were unable to Glarily ine miaiier anc Cid much iG cowtuse the issue. Current interviews, a5 indicated atove, ' eT ee ne Se Tee ” fae ate asdasiassca dass e th Ch ron ® ® thé wros.ems, bus have aso. conilict or confusion, It is appasens that NOSENKO was not inthe Firat . section, First Department, ior any taiterial perioé oc time aiter 3G December 1961. Ii is also clear that he either read the surveillance report oa ine visit of AB IDIAN to the Pusha«in Street Cezccrop site or was iully brieled on the Cetaiis oi the visit. NOSEN SKO insists that he a3 eac the surveillance report at ine time or shortly aiter the event. ~Tnere is no reason.to question ais assertion that he reac the yeport un since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN a in connection with the visit support tnis claim, However, nis consisien: inability on his own to approximate the Gate oi the visit or relaeit to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually reac the report. NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushxin Street Geaddrop area ledto the KGS setting up a stationary surveillance post pours 7h
13-00000 _ ~~ et gto er aa re Segre we a gee meets peel etene oe SEaY LES SAVE WaiiCas WAS Mise 2S CASES THOS SIG Ge IE WAOS a ee SR a OSTREG Oh & Ua Uaa.e GI IG Sess OF 1455 StGKE Gul (e.ways ae : rs ay se pore dae) ne nr ee See re err Pe ee MC GGUVE Fe, 46 GF LARS Fseed SUGECTIEHS AsO Tay WOGG Taiwe cures Bloom Line fy -fgi-t Se big tw te Smee ot Neen eee ee a S6eCe, 2% 2GG.020N 16 8 ePaiseed TPG tae SATSL WONG TION tO te tee = Seventh Department as of caciy January 2902, NOSENAO west to » ‘Geneva in mid-March i962. me ce ig rors fers me Mae oe he noe t lm oy eg? ae 28 CONCCIWVaE GE Caiae, BF OG RUTLSCsi VOW waa! advised of developments or nonceveiopmenis following the visit of AZBIDIAN to tue Pusasix, Sircet bulidiag by Veniemin KOZLOV, a Chicz NOSENXO aince 1953, or Viadisiav KOVSHUK or Gennacity GRYAZNOV, _, = “ hief and Deputy Chiei respectively of the Tirst Section, First Desizi- wel ge en thie wees gataQre 0G This TMi s & ment, Even so, sowever, his iacilure to call cur att im Tema 1653 world seem + aeuis - a inthe im view cf in June 1902 would seem te require explanciien, especially im view ci the fact that he Gid warn us about the Canzez of operational iett Ober ings by ABIDIAN -- a warning waich would appear Clearly to have deen derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the aprinz- summer of 1961. te It is to be noteé that curing the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specilically asxec for ary acditionai information regarding : ; any. known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyoud g001472
13-00000 SSIES T cam S008 pa aten etewtremer G i mOot OCCUT to Lira te tell t. ar. om Re a: fe at tris, NOSGENAS himseil Has Biuivd wed it Gi one ey eh _ “ae ot oe ee ee - o~ ; 2 cw * : Us because ine siake wut nie long since Geen Cropped, it had reveulec ately tesetons Gs the 32 sarees SUST.CAOGS Gas ot DEP tof AGIOLAN or Enyone 2ise, aM w.ceelere HO fad TELarGes it aS ins. gnwscant. FO 5 Sage eT oy a8 2 os or mame as nm -o wais is wot implausiole, f..clnes possizae explanation, Boweve-c, . derived irom. the alreacy nozed ameuasity Of NOSENKO to pin Cows @ C206 2 tit ne ior tae visit, is taat he icarned of the evationary SUIVEelLlance pos it isit itseii after his meetings wits us in June 1962, It should se 3 Gi ise Vis pte noted in this context that with tae pubiic expos of tne PZNKOVSHLY case in the f22. of 1962, the Pushkin Strect Geaccrop undoubtedsy Secame the subject of widespread interest within the KGS pes That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit oi ABIDIAN to whe Pushicin Stre G4EGCVOD ANG its Consequences is clear “irora the recorc, While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has con- ain = oA sciously exazgzerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermam, - € it is also possivie that the evident cistortions of his accounts of the aiiair derive irom honest coniusion. Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inier- views leave zo doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March i951. These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational Goo1i73
13-00000 _ & OORT vane Assen ines oo ous aa net ” Sapte wel hie gy NOSENDK Ge : Boe vent eee Soe gs Sygate ad sGtcez TTidemasdiggg  sv0 Ardara & Bete Sently ow SateelSs TG, oe S SUTH SLC See age a mete msint sy  nter. oye N - Sas eS men Cxvawinws whiea 6uosianiiatie, wie. Vielils G2 AGLOLAN to a cornrnission ct weet ene net eos 2e 6 4 teen? stem n acer apices SaOD, & WEKT-GGUT at S407, 2nG & .0Ca. Deal Gite On Ue a2Lca Were AROWT 16 GAG CONS CG Suspicious oy inc KGS. The entrance wo ine aXt ShOD, ACCOTGInNg tO NOGINAO, wis seo situated 2s to be an iccei place for picking up or piecing @ ces .Cires, anc & T.0Gl.e surveswance was placed on the art shop for a pericl o ABIDIAN, Ojficiai recorcs coniirm tac and to the buildings Gescrizcé by NOSENAG, Pages 216 - 220 G2 ine previous summacy contain no reference we by a tf to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interes? visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area, it is also cieaz frorn a review of certain transcripis of previous interrogati eer no differentiation was raac¢ concerning his siatements relative to AGO coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in tne upper Gorkiy Siveet areca ? circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his «nowleéze of the Pushkin Street éeaddr op Site aiter the visit oc ABLOZAN to that a.te (30 December 1963). It is impossibie at this time to siate that a cetalled cedrieiing sion woulda o% ¢ NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrog have permitted the clarification of ati issues inciuding the above, but gooit74 14
13-00000 @ ip MG COaus nat ihe Rosie intelsae MELLON, hOs CO lustd Woe iEess ft r¢) the Preyer where COMPU Cat Sahel OD Se LS arte eS oaGate ery any eves, “ welew Se aia we CO lw my % . ‘ wees te ere eee it gt we ge TN * Goal wary 6S Catar om Bane He Tay Ww Saa DUVE Trangaev eco Gut Of the First , ; wee tga wtee es) ner Dl Mee ex — nen ‘ ! ot IO YETLL EN, OY 24 MCCETLOET 69Gb. BLE TUS. COL aia EG i atm pect ge cag! nap aeccet Gt wee NAST VS Ue tine i ee edeGSTeG oY Saray veiesa TY Gud, seat tact what NOSENAG “as Sup renCh em etiin yo ate De ot Die et ee ey ee Con ase Povete ba currrat oor" Fe ens Gag te ueaads DIPTESS 1.4.8 CONN. SS usc am 3 win kia eclai to bevine been case ofhicer Zor AS WTET PEAS Pee ety, eO UG PUR 645 CMM TG OVEN Qeen case Calices 1G7 mod anaes am ihe Co : aan INAS t fe we esa STOLE, toe LCE comme oe pete alee Sead ad 20e Baer prey Gate right. In regareé to (b), the responsi Uiny of NOSEZNXKO lor preliminary re- ene w- es Ny arte) view of reports from GTU (Technical Unit of AGB) of tiake” from micro- i : : paones in the United Siates Evnbassy, the previous conclusion was inact nis Ciaim that he personally reviewed ine AGS moniorin KGS mz FeuOris Was not 7 Sustained. it is not felt that tue previous conclusion mace 6 ance lor the explanation os NOSENAO of what the respousibility actually entailed, iniormation irom micrepnones in the United Siaies Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially, ‘Telepaone inter- cepis were given to a designated oliicer for Gistribution to tne appropriate ; case officer, but microphone reports, to srevent wide dissemination even io .Goetii7s within the First Section, were brought caily to the Deputy Craief or ix his absence to the Cniei and chen were Cistributec to the indivicual responsible Fw oe eee ‘ ° ny AOR RP TT - . . a -
13-00000 Case Gilicer, imtesis way, Eccoraing to NOSENKG, no one beiow the . - oe “s . Ln cank os Deputy Cyied Was Gear Ul the tua. molors: aeeae ened! igor ewan gle oe Fant eels mela em VOSTOK A 4G FOLETCS HussesCan. cy Be ieOlatLon, ENS BCCorasng 7Oo NOSINAG ed ~ = eeifg Oe we wept te sree t om "ee OT Fateh ee this was cousicered the most iravoriani by whe GB ane CTU, NOSE xO we meen pee ital bleep Se. ~ er eres On a 2 owe py te las had 1.6 rvesponsivility for review or uliimate Cissemineiion of tac infor- re same aes pw cee ge » SOO, Gee U,aavman, bull, or the Central Committee 2 “= ‘toe mat ion to the Criel Since this was the responsio_..y Gf & unit in ine oXice of the Cise:, Soca. NOSENKO has aise siatcd ther the Gutsut from certain of the in FRCS ~ TU im 2GGition to havis ae working micropaones was "dying" and that reception Gilficuities was also having cifliculty obtaining a suf, Ziciens: } number of qualiiied moxitor-transilators. Asa result, according to ~~ NOSENKO, OTU was uot providing complete verbatim transcripts from conversations in areas Covered by active micropscnes would have been oi interest to responsibie ofiicers citne First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, dic not provide iuil transcripts and whea askee to provice more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENZO, the tapes were maintained at of OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An oe ‘eid AR 16 : Beer ee