ee EXCERPT Po ‘ 0: chice, Special attiars Starr . Fnthe2ines. ” INFo: chief of Station, JHWAVE ; . & dune 1963 Chief, WH Division FM: ‘Chief of Station, Mexico City - . SUBJECT: Operational/KUTUBE/TYPIC Debriefing of LITAMIL-9 on Trip to Cuba Enclosed as attachments A, B and C are the results of the debriefing of LYBZAMIL-9 by Edward D, Knapman. Willard C, CURTIS eee ce & Se Fe seeseeese eee KR eeseeseeaeeeeoeae &e Gee Be Attachment A 1. In compliance with DIR-401k6, Eiward D. Knapman was dispatched to Mexico City from JMWAVE to conduct a debriefing of LITAMIL-9. ceeece the debriefing seeee totaling eight hours on the nights of 29 May, ; 31 May ahd 1 June 1963. ; 8 ee @ ee be ese ee BPeee Re SEHR REESE EH E REE HE SE SE ES FS Attachment C Operational Intelligence eee8o 8. Victor TRAPOTE Mateos ~ This man's mest interesting operational access. is. througn his daughter, Irina TRAPCTS de VALDES, who is married to Ramiro VALDES, The” prospective fruitfulness of this entree diminishes, however, as the facts are laid on the table, For one thing, though anti- Commmist, TRAPCTE is still a friend of Fidel Castro, 1-9 said that he shelterdd Fidel in his home during Fidel's exile in Mexico, ‘TRAPCTE, who was born in Spain, is about 58 and apnarently more interested in his art (seulpturing) than in politics, TRAPCTE arnarently has no intention of going to Cuba permanently. L-9 says TRACTS has made np comment concerming . Ramire VALDES, but he apparently has sugrested that Irina is not getting along well with Ramiro. L-9 described TRAPCTE as of mediun height, solidly built, and in good physical condition, His daughter is a tall attractive blonde of about 25, and has a rather rethring personality. L-$ could come up with no means of developing an operation against VALDES _ through these entreess EXCERPT HYMA-21475 4% dune -
14-00000 vE OMe Tw coupliance, “with DIR- ith Din-hoLte, Edward D, Keiapman | Was dispatched Oo ee , to: > Mexico. City. from JMWAVE. to eoriduct a debriefing of LITAMIL-9. Knapman- Se . arrived | ‘here 29 May: 1963 and conducted the debriefing at three sessions “totaling elgnt hours on the ‘nights of 29 May, 31 May and 1 June 1963. 4 MIGROFIEMED Ae 2. Attachment’ B is largely positive. intelligence while Attachment C. is basically of operational interest, The intelligence debriefirg was conducted on the basis of current and past intelligence requirements lists available at the Mexico Station. To the extent feasible we attempted to ‘pinpoint ultimate sources, but headquarters will note that a sizable part of the information provided was based on personal observation and impressions, Headquarters should keep in mind that L-9's perimeter of access was the city of Habana and that he was exposed principally to bureaucrats who are identified with the regime, We caution headquarters on this rather obvious point, per- haps because we were exposed recently to AMANOCK-1 who has been living deep "in the entrails of the monster™ in Oriente and who had a different view of the temper of the people in that area from that given by LITAMIL-9 for . Havana, 3. In attachment C are the answers to a series of questions of operational interest which were posed after a thorough review of the LITASSL-9 operational file. In some-cases fuller biographic information can be ooptained from L-9 7 1f and when required, L-9 was most cooperative and understood clearly what " the debriefer was locking for. In most cases, however, it 18 not probable that L-9 will be of great help in making operational approaches and pitches because of his present position. Edward D. Dh SECRET . “3 COPY _ Luct / & Nom asyrs- BO -6 -fos7s
MCRSHLMES | im SEGRE Attachment B ~ JUN 17 1968 “poe. MicRO. SER. ot \ Intelligence id, * gubseet had 1 nothing meaningful to-add on disaffections or realignments as a-result of tre October crisds, 2,. With regard to internal friction within the GOC, he said that there is considerable criticism of the "old" C ists by the "new" Commmists and 26th of July, He cited the case of “Pelipe GUERRA Matos! criticism of ’ Joaquin ORDOQUI and Nicolas GUILLEN (previously reported) as cases in point, By and large, the new Comminists and Fidelistas are grabbing off most key position in the government bureaucracy, Fidel Castro is still the principal leader of the Revolution and both the PSP and the Soviets know that he is vitally impostant to them. Source was told by his sister-in-law (Conchita) that Fidel showed. some annoyance with Blas Roea one, pight when he phoned and told Rene VALLEJO to tell that "son of a bitch” NeGe puta) to stop. bothering him, Cpachita also says that Fidel is somewhat annoyed at his old crony Carlos Rafael @ROCRIGUEZ because the zafra is preving to be such a bust and that Fidel has ‘complained that Carlos Refael frequently doctors INRA statistics to his own advantage, Despite these minor problems with xey, Communist leaders, Jroce continues on friendly terms with the key members of tue PSP, and 3las Roca should be included with Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara among the four most powerful men in Cuba, Source commented that we must understand the myth created by the Revolution and its propaganda “in, evaluating internal friction and cleavages, Non-conmmunist officials have been either brainwashed by propaganda, are still blindly loyal to Pidel, or else have no place to go, Thus, in the final analysis, the cleavages are superficial and of ne great moment, 3. Source had no detail on the formation of the Partido Unico, He com- mented that the PSP view PURS as an attempt by Fidel Castro to absorb it and that the PSP consequentiy has deen cool to the idea, “R, Subject was questioned on mass orgenizations in Cuba, but could provide no information worth reporting. 5. Source was questioned on the positions of Lazaro Pena, Luzarde, Ramiro VALDES and Juan-MARINELLO, He had little of importance thgigh} he commented that Fidel, according to Conchita, did rot hold Lazaro PrENA in high regard, Source had no information on MARINELLO's reported problems at the University of Habana, 6, We covered the gamit on counter-revolutionary activities and other types of resistance with disappointingly negative results, 7. %In the military field (number of Soviet troops, training in both Cuba and the Soviet Union, missile arrivals, hiding of military materiel in eaves etc.) source could add nothing to the bolas which can be picked up on Flagler Street in Miami. OS COPY. UA $7O -6- 10 Sf fuel 2 EWMMA AIS IS67