Ti0-10086-1018" 1. 4a + 4 x REPRODUCTION = . GeO E a | RR OY ERR RET ER 3097 : C1A HIST OAL i layPtoonan a ” ~“ oN | Ss SUBJECT : Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File -Regarding Allega- tions of CASTRO Cuban.Inyolvement in the John F, KENNEDY -Assassination , St | REFERENCE ; ‘Letter by’ David We. BElin to Mr. E,“Henry Knoche, 15 April 1975, parag¥aply’3 (Regarding Public Statement by CASTR 1 ERY, attached BACKGROUND l. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, Fidel CastTrRo appeared at a Brazilian Embass reception in eeeneeeneermne ann naman, CE] Havana;. even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal ves | Semereonecennoeng eee teteeres aren interview by the Associated Press correspondent, Daniel HARKER. oO omar tee fis eC TT ERA ° . 2. HARKER's interview reached New York on Sunday, 8 September, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, 9 September. There: can: be.no question from the facts surrounding the” CASTRO“apb¥arance, which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this event represented a more=than-ordina attempt to get a message on the recorg in the United States. | % | . SE COC {O26 PAGE 63 ord l a i.
14-00000 - Oe See ft . « s 3. CASTRO's statements ‘to HARKER covered a range of ; ~ - UN topics but dealt principally with Afievican Political a AO eS leadership, in particular’ president KENNEDY, whom he ex-~ NOY he rovocati Lon " 4... the BATISTA of his Naar coriated in extraordinart ran KENNEDY is | times ... the most opportunistic American President of all time ..."), 4. The interview also contained an uncomplimentary reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the New York Times and Washington papers, with a result that CASTRO'S "message" was significantly modulated. oO 5. In New Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided until the middle-of. Séptember 1963, the HARKER story appeared in the principal morning paper, the Times=Picayune, on Monday, 9 Sentemberp-page-?, under a three-column head- line: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." The story followed under the HARKER by-line: "Havana (AP) ~ Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: ‘U.S. leaders woula be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of ”_ | CUCL S37 7 REPRODUCTION OF
"Bitterly denouficing what he called recent U.S. Prompted” ‘aids on Cuban terri- tory, Casto said: LF We are Prepared to ~ ‘. eer Ighk’ them and-ansi Y in kind. U.S. leaders ist plans Yo eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe,' eee World affairs vee Seemed | to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with . attacks. "'rhe U. Ss. is always ready. to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made. during the October crisis, They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks. ""But.I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's .,.'" 6. The New York Times, in its coverage on 9 September, used a UPI wire Service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real Significance. The Washington Post did an abbreviated re~ write (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted any reference to the main thrust Of CASTRO's remarks. ® 3 3 CCH O36
14-00000 REPRODUCTION = ¢ ‘ ‘f Saas en ON 8 NR nw aN, _ The Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed_the HARKER story nearly in its entirety in the second section of the Paper (9 September 1963, age B-4) and reworded the content no ~SPEember. 196% litical ase ~ in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER of th@ HARKER intenylew, placing the emphasis on the po- elements and burying CASTRO's warning to the United States leadership in the middle of the piece. 7. There is no evidence in the files On\the KENN assassination)that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealin S with the Warren Commission the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consig- eration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba. There is no evidence in the Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission sta itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interviey in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything alon these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader beforé the assassination, 8. The purpose of this review, undertaken at Mr. Belin's request, is to reconsider Lee Harvey OSWALD’s activity on the assumption that as an avid newspaper reader ~ which we know from testimony of Marina OSWALD and others ~ he read the CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results bd 4
14-00000 ee ee ee "PRODUCTION — . Nf AY ST REPRODUCTION —— PRORBITED : | cD . wn) ae "Of the review, admittedly heavily using the 20-~..29 quality of Madsight, “nay be stTutacea in summary: <a. There tS RO increment of Credible ° ar baka meee OID => . | ictly, of S ettidente, applying this Phrase st emer : Soviet arava, Cuban Political, intelligence or security service involvement in the as- Sassination to what was developed and con- Sidered by the Warren Commission and its 0 enn net COmmission and . | Staff. The Commission's finding that “ Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIppry and did them in alone and of his. own determination stands. | . on a b, nodible evidence" that would upset or significantly modi ty this judgement did (and does) not exist in Washington, But among Such. evidence could exist in Moscow and/or quality, designed to cover up any admissions of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD which might be related directly or indirectly. with the @ssassination, Therefore, the belief that there was Soviet and/or cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist ang 5 ) . % CUCL Sg pace 6 / of ele
14-00000 oN a. *s. a Se, ~=" =""grow until there. fae Warr Comthetes Yon report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency. That, -indeed, was the opinion at the working level, Particularly in the counterintelligence com— ponent in‘the cra in. 1964. as was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the a. ; PEN Warren Commission, cra would Continue to Fegard this aspect of the OSwaLDp case as we ENS still open.+ Se ec ONO ao ¢. In the absence of additional: of! new LPNS SQXENS? Ji elements of "“eredible" evidenée, BAS are 7 _ S ! a LY, "nuances” in the record that onde @s note- worthy, in the light of other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item~ by~item, d. CASTRO's warning and threat of x 7 September 1963 ‘ae OSWALD did indeea read 4 arings, Vol. V., Pp. 120 = 129. See especially p, 124 — > Helms: ‘yes. I would assume é never be closed,'" {PRODUCTION — coe
14-09000 o", f “ at ee aoa oN. : it in New Orleans int & be considered of . + cae vy great Significance. in the light of the Pathological evolution of OSWALD's Passive/ aggressive: makeup after his attempt to kilj General WALKER early in April 1963 and his identification with Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban Tevolution which is directly trace-~ able as far back as his Marine Corps | service in El Toro, California, CASTRO's Warning ang threat, given to AP corres~ Pondent HARKER, irrespective of whether the summer of 1963, REPRODUCTION PROGIBITED CUBAN CONTACT wiry LEE HARVEY OSWALD, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, 59 (?) EARLY 19 6) Fh Q : te] fo a fa Q be pes rh fe 0 fy os Q @ ct 3 he sa @ < He i] = o rh ct ro a o fu ie) a Q a E Qu 19) rh PRODUCTION === PRONGITED CuC{oge Pace 69 of 212 COPY NO,
14-00000 cM SOOO The Warren ‘Comnigsion. Report takes note of this: & "OSHIALDS toxd DELGADO that he was in t Rey wih Shan diplomatic Officials in this country, which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed, 1"2 10. Actually DELGADO's testimony Says a lot more of Possible operational Significance than is reflected by the . : . . . language of the report, and its implication ness SSSI T PSST th deer ORS ats RE etree . . eee ; the Cubans Starts with a question mark. -ll. The Period was one of transition in u.s. ~ Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover, OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO Supporters, OSWALD being Particu- larly keen about how to get to the island. DELGADO testi- " wee I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that r know was t ENN port, p. 687. CCCises CPROOUCTION == oe | | Pace 70 gp 212 sere ere se RE RReNgA te ~ Nt emeten atn «wee nee gene erga mee
14-00000 PRODUCTION — | PRORIBITED ote, a _¥ SER op BS SN oo get in touch with a_ Cuban Embassy, you know. But at what fame, that tora him this ~ we were on friendly terns with Cuba, you know, so “his wasn ' & novsubversion Or malintent, ‘, youk ° ON aban 't know what to answer him, I told him to see them, "After a while he told me he was in contact with them .., aX oe = * , 2 " oe. I seen this envelope in his .foot~ _ ~ locker, wall-locker, and it was addrésseq to © him, and they haq an official seal on it, and” Los Angeles, and he was tel} a Cuban Consul. ang just after he "started receiving letters he had one Visiter, ft was & Man, because f[ got the call from the mp guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a Visitor at. the front gate, This man had. £0 be a civilian, Otherwise they would have let him in. - So I had to fing Somebody to relieve OSWALD; who Was on guard, to go down - 9 uJ CUCa Sag te BAT em REE RN at oar ey
14-00000 , REPRODUCTION _ PROKIEHTED Shere to visit'with this fellow, and they spent about an heir and af hae, two hours, talking, ! I Ives and he Cane “hack, I don't know who the #28: Of what! they talked about, but he looked nonchala Sas ut the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing. "Mr. LIEBELER: How long dig he talk to YN him, do you remember? Xe "Mr. DELGADO ; About an nGix 'ana-hare, two hours cee SOO , "Mr. LIEBELER: You GW asiiea, osuary a who this fellow was GS eels or a oo "Mr. DELGADO : No, no QS oo Consulate? "Mr. DELGADO ; “id; because I thought it hardly ever received Mail; “in fact he seldom . received mail from home because fr made it a Policy, r used ta-pick up’ the Mail for our unit | and Cistribute it tothe guys in there, and very ; Aer eter oe SermaerenTre ate on Cll ges PRODUCTION — ne PROWBITED ——
14-00000 ; . , ¥ Be cr a | ' these Cuban people, GQ ktartes getting letter ww pamphlets and ne Bpivsr BAX QY | . " OIE ILE rted receiving letters, are SS SX SY me you kn Gen 7 Agee maybe pamphlets, you know, NS Dike? church, things we get from Ne \S church, you Ow, but it wasn'ta church "Mr. LIEBELER: Were they write’ | 2s Spanish, any of them, do you know? L "Mr. DELGADO : Not mate can “veeany) Ceo 7, no. . Os , CON AN “Mr. LIEBELER: PRES rier reason to believe that these things Semeé to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate? "Mr. DELGADO : Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope, you know ees SOmething like Ageean eagle, with a big, impressive Seal, you ‘Bhow. They had dif- ferent colors on itr. Ye an OS looked like our S6lors, io white; almost now. But I can't oid recall the 8h dat Rae it was in Latin, XS United, sRQUA ee that. I couldn't under- BONS stand. It was- "Mr. LIEBELER: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate? il Sie REPRODUCTION =
14-00000 fon . we ee oe a Se - But he had tol@ me "Mr. DELGARO: 2) prior, just, before JD ound that envelope in his wall loskér tha hbas receiving mail from theng’ and one’ Aine he offered to show it to me, tees but. Ba unvon interested because at the time we eS work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know. "Mr. _LIEBELER: Did he tell you what NN correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was DS about? | a ma "Mr. DELGADO : No, he didn’ a or TY "Mr. LIEBELER: Did he ev Cai este, to” you that it had to do with the conversa Quy” that ‘you had about going over to Cuba? "Mr. DELGADO : No. - The only thing he told me was that right after he had this con- versation with the Cuban People was that he was going to - once he got Out of the service - he was going to Switzertena toe "3 3 12. OSWALD's . application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzeriana, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably. to xeport there on 20 April 1960. Destined <. for discharge 0m. te Marines on 7. December 1959, OSWALD NG 3 Rearings, Volume VIII, pp. 241 -~ 243. . . 12 SBE ET} REPRODUCTION ee PAGE 1a oF 2 1 212,
14-00000 REPRODUCTION PROMI cD moOuN a aN accelerated his exit. “On. gzounds of family hardship in early September 1959, on aT Sep@enber 1969 he was issued a U.S. Passport a Lid for. ‘travel - among other places to . Cuba and tnd CuseR, wT @ QOH GQ Finland ons} Senet 1959, | | 13. DELGADO! testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contacted OSWALD at El Toro Camp and talked with him for between one and €@ half.to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO's reccllections, and actually there is nothing like it - on the record = in, ‘everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States before or after his return to the United States. The record reflects no identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO's presump- tion is that he was f the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. “3 Assuming ‘that, the guestions are: Who was it, and was —— there reporting Seon. Los’ Angeles to Washington and Havana that could, in(ettect represent the opening of a Cuban & ) file on OSWAE — ARS e pREDICTIONS op & IDENT KENNEDY'S DEMISE BY COMMUNIST PARTY CELL LEADER’ MORSE BENITEZ ZABOLA, 1962 14. Guatemala Station forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a 4 — = U.S./Cuban diplomatic ang consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961. SNS ® 13 ee en catges3
14-00000 SECRET - | "penetration dated 3. January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist! Party ont meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENDTED, Zabola;’ ‘said that the Communist Party in Guatamaia should form’ & single new party; "We need not Sian Nos : preoccupy ole Yes over the politics of President KENNEDY - : because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the. present year, 1962.” oo ; i F a 4 4 ef 4 d } } 15. This report apparently had been aiscountea when it was received and was not forwarded unit the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no . £ollow-up or. formal dissemination of the report. GY ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE HAUGE, 7 NOVEMBER 1963 . . 16. a sensitive! "source, reporting after the . KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception . on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the - recent refugee raids on ‘Cuba. and: their implications with a host~country diplomat, : concluding with the admonition: " .e. Just wait and you will see what we- can do. It will happen soon." Asked to ! be more specific, what. ‘would happen soon, SANTOS replied: “Just wait, just wait. " 17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have sy, %s a4 | Ne SECRET | a
14-00000 om REPRODE val ri ie i lays (Ont PROS) Te ‘ ‘ . » . .? _@a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled n, {Set from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966. ~ INTERCEPTED: CONVERSATION“OF CUBAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, LUISA CALDERON , _APTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER 1963 Me Sy . 18. At LF30CHeici co City time, S about five hours after. the KENNEDY assassination, @ Cuban Embassy employee named © "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an uniden— tified male outside. 19. The caller asked her if she haa heard the latest news. "Luisa" jokingly replied: "Yes, of ‘course. “E knew SN it almost before KENNEDY ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three [she laughs], what barbarians! " on @ “20. Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the ca assassination. “Luisa® as so stated that the party at wy Y Silvia DURAN 's had been called off so it would not appear that they were, celebrating: ‘the death of KENNEDY, oe they have the, party: coindide with the burial. nor would Finally she said shat planned: to) ove that night into the house of a Read doctor (a WomaNy friend. 21. Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge Ox expectation. 15 celine
14-00000 ' PEO nt is sharply highlighted | by the following facts: ae _"buisa” was 1 “prpbabl “ide 4; Luis! GXZDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban piredtératé Gynéial of Intelligence (DGI). Noes returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported ' to be working in DGI Headquarters. - . ‘ “ 22. The tenuous, enignamatic character of- ‘the-.conversation ("————B. ‘The DGI element in Nexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally ‘as the replacement of the Consul Eusebio AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The: “deputy: DGI Chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL ' 5 successor} was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez. ¢. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who dealt ‘with OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 ‘September to the Cuban installation’ in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness on the record regarding OSWALD's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct % 16 . we Rey REPRODUCTION PROMBITED
14-00000 ' le . 7 ‘ . ue | confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission staff but rejected by the Mexican’ authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's statements: that it was learned that oswaLp a car becameé engaged in a personal altercation on 27 September with Eusebio AZCUE. d. Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez, were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development ‘and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Annstasio SOMOZA. VEGA, it is estab- lished, was on post in Mexico City during OSWALD's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally Or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took fifteen days.° For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the visa action and facilitation of the trip to Cuba via Mexico City from 28 December 1962 ~ 21 January 1963 that ® 17 ra eS en a Celis ge UK REPRODUCTION — PROMIBITED | | coPY Hid. pase 79 oor le
14-00000 mr ae recent . REPRODUCTION cr", cS PRUBITED . xa 23. There- ~is Sng evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia Duran Was subjected to a systematic elicitative interrogation that would have related her dealings with NAS osirany, known or” ‘confirmed by intercept, with the data held on the AY Ss DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot. had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they’ were not asked at the time. And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting. the DURAN story on its face, could it Havé-happened without the knowledge and participation of the pcr personnel above cited? This seems unlikely especially because VEGA is later ited y @ Cuban. DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD Soot eam eee gener ererceny erat made Several visits ‘to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear CASTRO's overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfacéd in the DURAN was taken by Vincent Theodore LEE, the organizer of the Pair Play Committee for Cuba, with which OSWALD established relations from Dallas during the period 19 April - 2 November 1963. There is an Overlap between LEE's and VEGA's travels to Havana during that period: VEGA departed Mexico City on 6 January for Havana and returned On 13 February 1963, 18 * a2 HN Cte oe an an) - ™ Cola 53 PAGE 80 op Cle
14-00000 t . F - statements. Coming - back to the beginning: Luisa" Luisa CALDERON -— as a “member of the DGI unit in Mexico City - , ete) SILVIA a SUBSTANTIAL AMPLIFICATION OF ADMISSION OF ALLEGED PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, 1967 24. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. {In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez ARMAS, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the ques- tion whether Silvia DURAN had been asked about [or been offered?] money payments by her Mexican interrogators. ) 25. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have uct cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of how she had been taken. into custody and had. been. interrogated after the assassination repeated what was alzéady known... She added, under circumstances that did ndt permit the-~ source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail; ‘that 19 ® Senate eid,
14-00000 PROKIBITED ft , .f “ap , ‘She had gone out with OSWALD during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she hag sexual relations with hin. con rae ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPERATORIAL CONTACT BETWEEN OSWALD AND CUBAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ALLEGATIONS OF (A): ELENA GARRO DE PRAZ AND (B) OSCKR CONTRERAS, ” Pe 20\cvAs theWarren Commission reported, “Literally Ore dozens of aWegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated .._"6 Among these cases, which consumed |. . wv hundreds of cra man-hours in Headquarters and abroad ~. ~ and Similarly the FBI in the United States — wag ther” | Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City, 26 Novénbeds 1883, | Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte, - 27. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "p." _ ALVARADO Claimed ‘that he had seen an American, whom he identifieg aS OSWALD, receive money ‘some time in mid-September 1963 in a meeting in a patio of the cuban Consulate in See Report, p. 305 ££. -~Some of the others were the cases of Ylario ROJAS Villenueve in Cozumel and Guadaloupe, the allegations of Enrique Ruedolo GONGORA in New York City, the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT, Santa Clara Prison Farm, California, and the allegations of Ray DOBKIN's, See Report, pp. 307 ~ 308. 20 . nate Ie GUCESSS PROMBITED — COPY NO,
14-00000 rN REPRODUCTI t : . .¢ = Mexico city. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the ene which ALVARADO Showed evidences of 28. Pie ALVARADO. “Story is a particularly acute repre- sent Lomo, the. (aif ficulties that beset the evaluation of observed etigdhice: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. aLvaiabo, whose account ‘did not become public until the release’ of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of: e. the presence in the Cuban Consulate transaction of a Negro with red~dyed hair. qQqQy’ fe 29. Elena GARRO de Paz is a mecurial, ulate and ln eeneeemmmaseeneineneesinmnnnammmmimeene ee) socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is also the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of Silvia ‘DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal . antipathy between the two women descending from Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Conmunism, 30. From October 1964 Mntil his retirement in the fall of 1969, a U.S. Embassy ofticer, charles moms, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRO's account of what. had actually ° gone On between OSWALD, the Cubans and: in’ | particular Silvia DURAN in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with red-dyed hair. HePRODUCTION ‘ree 83 i a NS oe, of ele