180-10142-10038 Berk-Write-Ups Purpose and Scope of Study The Central Intelligence Agency's performance in its role of support to the Warren Commission has been a source of controversy since the inception of the Warren Commission. Critics have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated ina conspiracy ‘designed to suppress information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy, During 1976 the critic's assertions were the subject -of official inquiry by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC). The SSc, in its report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached the following conclusion: The Committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President — Kennedy. The Committee has, however, developed evidence which impeaches the process CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED [0142-10 6.3%
by which, the intelligence agencies arrived at their. own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassina- tion was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the inves- tigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of Government, who were charged with investigating the assassina- tion. ($$C, Beek Z, po) This Committee has sought to examine in greater detail the general findings of the SSC. The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information relevant to the assassina- tion of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, whether the misinforming or withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission was the
result of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employees. | The Committee has sought to examine the issue detailed above in both an objective and disciplined manner. In order to accomplish this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977 Report by the CIA's Inspector General (hereinafter 77 IGR). This Report was highly critical of the ssc findings and asserted that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of limited effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission in its work. The 77 IGR was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the SSc findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted: studies and submitted special analyses and reports." (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.) | In order to demonstrate further the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77 IGR contained a comprehensive listing of CIA generated material made available
to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassina- tion of President Kennedy. In this respect, the Committee agrees with the 77 IGR wherein it is stated that "This compiliation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort." (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E) In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA generated material referenced above, the Committee has paralled its review to the structure given to these material by the 77 IGR. In this regard the 77 IGR detail four inter- related compilations of Kennedy assassination material. These four compilations are: 1) Agency dissemination of information to the Intelligence Community (Formal and Informal Disseminations) 2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission
3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al regarding rumors and allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination 4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the Warren Commission on Rumors and Allegations Relating to the President's Assassination (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.) These compilations were reviewed by a staff member of the Committee who focused upon those CIA materials which the 77 IGR documented as having made available in written form to the Warren Commission. | | During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the review of the Agency's compilations discussed in this report. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive
issues have arisen related to the kind and ‘quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising an approximate total of ninety volumes ‘of material have been examined and analyzed by a staff member of this Committee in preparation of this report. The findings set forth herein are subject to modification due to the following considera- tions. During the course of the past fifteen years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system, certain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. Whether these documents merely have been filed incorrectly or destroyed, gaps in the written record still do exist. | ‘Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of
relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee, certain files requested by the Committee for review have either not been made available to the Committee or have been made available to the Committee in a santized fashion. Therefore, to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial of access and/or santization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the best evidence available to the Committee thZough this may not be all relevant evidence to which the Agency has access. One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance of these discussions, briefings, and meetings may not always be reflected by the written record made the _ subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session hearings with
Il. key Warren Commission staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to resolve questions that are not addressed by the written record. The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject — for discussion herein. Warren Commission Relationship With CIA Regarding Information Made Available By CIA To Warren Commission The Committee has contacted both representatives of
XN the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA generated information to the Warren Commission. The general consensus of these representatives is that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investi- gation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18.) (See also Exec. Sess. test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission, who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. | (See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman, 8/2/78.) Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality of work. (Executive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17, . see also JFK exh, 23.) | J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Com- mission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured that the Agency would cooperate in the Commissio work. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/7/78, p. 4.) John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during
- 10 - the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5.). Mr. McCone was responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission. (Ibid. pp. 5-6.) In this regard Mr. McCone testified that: The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I person-— ally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving. him--giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satis- fied. (Ibid. p. 9.) Mr. Raymond Rocca, one of the CIA's key representa- tives tothe Warren Commission during its investigation, also characterized the Agency's role as one of full sup- port to the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA,recalled under oath that Richard Helms had given the following directive: _All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CIA staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded indications--they were verbal in so far as I know--that we were to leave no stone unturned. (HSCA Class. Depo, of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 24)
-— lil - Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by ail. CIA employees. (Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., p. 26.) A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation,was directly responsible for the / CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Ibid., p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor- mation to the Warren Commission. He stated: An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com- mission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.) However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily
on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under oath he supported this proposition: Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to speci- fic requests by the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms: That is correct. I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which some- thing different might have occured, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to then. As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not. (Ibid., p. 34.) Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr.. Rankin was asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as follows: Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission com- municate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right
II.B questions and then we would’ not have the information and that would be absurd. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p. 4) Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29) Effect of CIA Information Supply Policy on Warren Commission knowledge of any access to CIA supported operations. The unfortunate consequences of not asking the CIA the right questions were graphically illustrated by the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots [(sSc Book V) see also (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, SSC, 11/20/75 ]- : Paradoxically, even if the Warren Commission had requested information on such plots, the Agency would have been able to plausibly deny the plots' existence. As Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investi- gation of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 50.)
Had Rocca,as the CIA's working level representative to the Warren Commission,been requested by the Commission to research and report on any and all CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's efforts would have produced no substantive informa- tion. (Ibid., p. 49) The record also reflects that the CIA desk officer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr. Helms to investigate for the CIA Lee Harvey Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investi- gation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 73, 111-112) Mr. Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots the following action would have been taken: “we would have gone at that hot and heavy. _We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have -had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban sources queried about it." (Ibid., p. 166) As the record reflects, these plots were known by few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding
these plots reveals that the Agency compromised its promise to supply all relevant information to the Warren Commission. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the acute laxity of the Agency's compromise: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti- Castro assassination plots. I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations. If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it. Is that not true? Yes, but. how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Com- mission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission. Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?
- 16 - Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall. (HSCA Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31.) Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13) When asked whether the CIA desired to withold informa- tion from the Warren Commission. about the Agency anti- Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he gave the following response: "J cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they with- held the information from me. (Ibid., p. 16) Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels Rankin, Slawson and Spector were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the
- 17 - Warren Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test. of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec. Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71 where he states that possible witholding of information by CIA about Agency attempts to assassinate Castro did not significantly affect Warren Commission investigation) From the CIA's perspective, Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi- fied. He stated that: " a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca 7/17/78, p. 45) John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:
Iit. ~ 18 =- Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots? Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78) of Sensitive Sources and Methods The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information was dependent upon 1) the availability of information; and 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request and 3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back: "and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others. For example, some might involve
checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some . overseas country.’ Obviously, one takes longer to per- form than the other. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 25) At times the CIA's concern for protecting its sensitive sources and methods. caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in _ getting relevant information than when the protec~ tion of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods did effect the quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78, p. 23) As a result of the CIA's concern,in some instances the Agency made the unilaterial decision to limit access to CIA materials by the Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 158) The Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren a . : Commission's investigation. These are:
- 20 - 1) Witholding information from the Warren Commission a pertaining to the photo- surveillance and telephonic surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station 2) As a -xelated consideration, the Agency" s . reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph “now referred to as ‘that of ‘the "Mexico City Mystery Man" | | Each of these concerns will be ‘examined "herein. The CIA's concern “for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. “Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at. first to reveal all our technical operations. " (bia. P. 158) “But, ‘Scelso did testify that: We were going “to! ‘give them intelligence reports which. derived. from all our sources, -including technical ‘sources, including the — telephone intercept. ‘and the information ‘gotten from the interrogation ‘of Silvia ~ Duran, for example, which corresponded . --almost exactly with the information from — the, telephone intercepts. Scelsco! 's characterization is supported by examination ‘of the background to the. first major CIA port. ‘furnished the arren “Commission regarding
Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA poc. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for Jd. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this.report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report. The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission . knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu- lated-as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to. protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran. and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA Doc. FOIA. #420-757, 12/20/63, Dir 90466) The basic policy. articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth? “as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBICGin a Segara ot yperome \ CIA memorandum of December 1 10, 1963.2 (CIA Memorandum for File, 12/20/63, included in with Soft file materials) In that memorandum, | of the CIA Counterintelligence/Special Investigations Group Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam
Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was” anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI' s materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 that ‘had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping ‘telephones in Mexico and asked him whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of the telephone taps. | memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. wrote:
& - 232 .He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not -. the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this --mManner--via the FBI sensitive informa- '.tion which could relate to telephone ‘taps, (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by included in Soft File materials) # The opinion expressed by Bcelso as of: December . 20,°1963 was set forth on January 14, -1964 ina. ‘formalized fashion. When Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already: “called to. the attention of the “Commission, through its attorney, _ that we have information (as deter- ‘mined: from Agency sources) coinciding - with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64, : CIA # esci- 3/779/510. Mr. ‘Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide additional information ‘acquired from. checks of CIA records and agency sources... He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively -with the Commission.in a-manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which ‘Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information.” In - this way the CIA could check the possibility of - revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. Th policies articulated were:
= 24 - The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed i by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. (CIA Doc. FOIA #398-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) This cable indicatea that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being with-_ held from the Warren Commission, and stated that on |. Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's -Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission which would be in a form protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques (Ibid. ) (ee also Angleton Deposition. ) - (Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.) .1) Your Bureau not disseminate information re- ceived from this Agency without prior concur- ‘rence 2) In instances in which this Agency has provided | information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments (sic) or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, - you refer the Commission to this Agency. In wi... Such cases it will be appreciated if you will '. advise us of such referral in order that we may . anticipate the possible future interest of the - Commission and initiate certain Preparatory to meeting its needs. . (ibid. a i
Iv. ~ 25 —- Telephone Taps Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the Commission's work, of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City. The reason for the sensitivity of these 'telephone taps and surveillance was not only becypflse it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with che £ “J and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52) The CIA's unwillingness to. inform the Warren Commission in the early stages of its investigation of the above-described surveillance operations is -a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of information the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the Warren Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/6/78, Pp. 158) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in
its investigation with all the facts before it. As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - (CIA Doc. FOIA .#509-803 1/31/64) October 3, 19637 That memorandum did not mention that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and by the Agency's Mexico City Station subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, that memo- randum did not mention that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed. On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, .1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #498-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. (JFK Doc. No. 3872.) A review of Rankin's letter
- 27 - indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephonic surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1 of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, had:the Warren Commission been informed of the telephonic surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. | Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephanic surveillance operations in Mexico City. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make
IV. this material available to Commission representa- tives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren - Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibid.) On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency neither revealed the source of this information in its response to the Commission nor indicated that this source would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). (Ibid.) Warren Commission Knowledge of CIA Telephonic Surveillance During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission know- ledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, and
and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephonic surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, who provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to Mexico City) Prior to April 9,it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephonic surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that. the Warren Commission had learned that the CIA possessed tran- - scripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. The Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren
~ 30 - Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the © Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, 45-46) Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, stating that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to ‘review this material. (Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6) Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. In that memo Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip, were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, (Slawson Memorandum of March 25, 1964, p. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary of interrogatiogps“conducted shortly after the assassination(with certain Cuban Embassy . employees.) Slawson wrote: A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is there- fore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. (Ibid.)
-These comments indicate that Slawson placed qualified reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephonic intercept tran- scripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson reveals, the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveil- lance operations, and a summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station: ' Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here. (CIA Doc. FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964, CIA p. 2144, DIR 90466)
The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum . of March 27, 1964 (CD 692) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. (Ibid, p. 2) This -conclusion,he wrote, was based upon an analysis of | Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears no indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, had Slawson been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis would have reflected the fact of his review either by its corroboration or .. Criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report. | “Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic jeurvetiiance production would have clarified some . ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 43 05 p.m. _ (Slawson Memorandum of April 21, 1964, Subj: Intercepts from Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico, p. 2)
- 33 - “Silvia puran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. this american was later determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that 'an American, subsequently identified by CIA analysts | as Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy. (Ibid. p. 4) _ Had this: information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than . they were as of March 27, 1964. The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced _, series of telephonic intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they posed one question to the CIA and made tyosrequéstsfor information from the Agency. (Slawson - Coleman Memorandum of april 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador “Mann File) ‘Coleman and Slawson wrote: . oo 1) What is the information source referred te in the November 28 telegram that
"Odessa; | | ', .2) We would like to see copies of the "transcripts of the intercepts, translated “af possible, in all cases where the "intercepts refer ‘to the assassination OL related subjects; 3) We we would especially like to see the | “intercept in which the allegation ‘that o money was passed at the Cuban Embassy “is: discussed (Ibid. ) | ‘The question initially posed by (Item I) in tke a above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephonic intercept of September 27, 1963 oat 10: 37, a.m. (Slawson Memorandum of April 21, - 1964, P- sD) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary to. request, the source of the information, he had not as yet been ‘provided | access to the original material by ‘the | CIA. “Ttem Nunber ‘Two. of the above Listing tends to show that the ‘Commission had. ‘not been giving access to the intercept concerning the assassination.
a Item nunber_ three of the above Listing i reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos~Armas _ eonversation 0 of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies: was discussed had not | as of April 2 been provided to ‘the ‘Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos- -Armas WE Bh transcripts ata March, 12, 1964 meeting between | Commission representatives and Agency. representatives. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, ‘Subj: Conference oo with ¢ ‘CIA ‘on March: 12, 1964) : | “On april, 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed “thea! ‘concern for: receiving complete access to all “materials relevant to. Oswald's Mexico City trip: The most. probable ‘final result of the entire Anvestigation of Oswald's activities | in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for che | purpose | ‘of trying to reach | all reasonable lines of investigation that might ‘have “uncovered other motivations or .
7 possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must - become familiar with the details of what -.both the American and Mexican investi- gatory agencies there have done. This . _ , means reading their reports, after trans- lation, af necessary, and in: some cases talking with the investigators ‘themselves. (Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, April 13, 1964, Subj: Additional lines of Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove Worthwhile, p- 11.) Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire for a thorough investigation had been thwarted by the CIA's concern lest its sources and methods, "however relevant to the Commission’ s. | investigation, be exposed. Considering the-gravity and signi- : ficance of the Warren Commission's investigation on ; “the aa ee “Agency's witholding of material from the Commission staff was clearly improper. |
on April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens, ‘and William coleman flew to, Mexico city, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State "Department, FBI, CIA,. and the Government of Mexico. ~(Slawson_ Memorandum, april 22, 1964, ‘Subj: “to Mexico city, | Prior. to their. departure, “they met with ‘Thomas Mann, the v Se Ambassador Mexico auring Oswald's visit to Mexico city, and at. _ the time of President Kennedy": s assassination. (Thid.) "Ambassador Mann told the Warren Conmission representa~ “tives that the CIA's Mexico, ‘city Station was actively engaged in | photosurvei ilance operations against the a ‘Soviet. and Cuban Embassy /Consulates (Ibias ~ Upon the group" s arrival in | Mexico Citys, they were met PY ‘U.S Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra - Commission repre: “telephonic surv
distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had ‘previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's. probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's Opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit." (Ibid, p.°24)* ¥ 4 A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conver- ea sations for the period Sept. 27 - Oct. 1, 1963. | (Slawson Memorandum, April 21, 1964 Subj: Intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City. eT A TC TA ITE A Baal Tee ACT IT Fat aN ° It is evident from Slawson' s record that the rset art Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's ability to draw accurately reasoned conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in -Mexico City. It meant that as of April 10, 1964,
nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise materials could have been made available for analysis by the Commission. (Ibid.) Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation e.g., Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided. Vi. Mexico City Mystery Man On November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odum. showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son (Warren
- 4] - Commission Report p. 364) This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives _ had searched their files in an effort to locate Thid. information on Oswald- (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555, 3/25/64, Warren Commission Doc. 67)f2-this photograph which was’ one nome eo in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance i \ operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. ™, . 7 ane Prior to the assassination, , had been linked by ene eene ete, the Mexico City Station to Lee Harvey Oswald. (Ibid. ) Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to — Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. (Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms 8/7/64, Vol. XI, pp. 469-470) On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the cir- cumstances under which she was shown the photograph. (Warren Commission Report Vol I .153)Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (Ibid., Vol. I)
Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP requesting both the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph and an explanation of the circumstances by which this photograph was obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872) | On that same day, in a Separate letter, Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials that the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963 to the Secret Service but not to the Warren Commission. Rankin requested copies of these materials which included three CIA cables. The cables concerned the photograph subsequently shown by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual originally identified by the Mexico City Station as Lee Harvey Oswald. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872) | Among the materials disseminated by the CIA to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination. (CIA Doc DIR 85177, 11/26/64) That cable concerned en oe |
the Dorticos-Armas conversations’.and disclosed ‘the existence of ‘CIA telephonic surveillance operations , in Mexico city at the time of. the assassination ohn Scelso testified /regaraing ‘the circumstances | surrounding he ventual explanation given to the Commission ° -Zecounting the origion o£ the “photograph | in question. “initially disclose to the © Warren ‘Commission all of our technical ns... In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had _ photosurveillance because the November . ‘production a “cause ‘for oncern 1 within. ‘the.
due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods. Similarly the disclosure of the photosurveillance operations , to the Warren Commission had also begun to cause concern within the Agency. On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since ' November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated: "Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone requesting JFK Doc.3982) If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to.the Commission in response to earlier levies or the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..." (CIA Doc. FOIA W/ #579-250, 3/5/64) access to.’ CIA reports provided the Secret Ser -- vice after Nov. 22, 1963,
On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK Doc. #.-3872, Slawson Memorandum, March 12, 1964) The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the | Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrases aré complete." (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JFK Doc. No. 3872) Rankin further indicated that the same procedure was to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,
oe - 46 —- 1963 which had not as yet been furnished because ‘it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (Ibid., par. 3) “Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (FOIA # 622-258) by two separate communications. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CD631, 3/24/64, CIA Doc., DDP4~1555, 3/24/64,:CD 674 hereinafter) CD 631 provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (and to the Secret Service on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had om the Navy . requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person . believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Agency éxplained that it had checked the photograph: against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963, - CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately followin
the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not revealéng sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency wrote that the subject of the photo referenced in these cables was not Oswald. It was further stated that: "In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the original copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based,.as well as the photos of the unidenti- fied man." (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555 CcD634,24 March 1964) On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record: "The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24, 196 (Commission Document No. 631) “in whi¢h“it-‘set..forth:ithe dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested." (Memorandum of William Coleman, March 24, 1964) Coleman went on to state: "As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the
assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry." (Ibid.) ‘The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Sterns' memorandum of his visit reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The file also contained: "Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photograph of the unidenti- fied individual mistakenly believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23,:1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA." (Memorandum of Samuel Stern, March 27, 1964) Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the
Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to © CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. City. In addition, Stern examined the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background infor- mation on Oswald." (Ibid.) Stern recorded that .these messages were _ paraphrased accurately as set forth in the CIA's January 31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated “there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Com- mission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased." (Ibid.) Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.
VII. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission Relationship > It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence and one of the seven members of the Warren Commission, did not report crucial information to the Warren Commission. Specifically, the Senate Select Committee concluded: "With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency." (SCC, Book V, pp. 67-68) However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship-and allegiances of Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former Director of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles' service on the Warren Commission. “In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which suggests that on at least one ofcasSiran Dulles* provided information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission activities and investigative policies.
This memorandum which was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, concerned the controversial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964 “prepared for DDP Helms concerned Murphy's discussions with Allan Dulles about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. In relevant part Murphy wrote: "Mr. Dulles, with ‘whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report. " (CIA Doc. Memorandum of David Murphy of July 8, 1964, Subj: Discussion with Dulles re Nosenko, p. 3) Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language "which-would allude to the existence
of other, unverified information on the Oswald case." _ (Ibid.) This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko information. Murphy continued: "It was agreed an effort would be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know pre- cisely in what context the Warren Commission intended.to make use of the Nosenko informa- tion. This, Mr. Dulles will have to deter- mine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin. (Ibid., p. 2) Whether by design or as an unintended result, the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the Warren Commission, at the very least contemplated compromising his position with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information about the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case. (Add short section giving Helms and Angleton's views)
~. VIII. Luisa Calderon | Kennedy" s assassination | a Cuban government. ‘employee call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (CIA Doc. FOIA’ , This call had been intercepted and recorded by Fhe CIA's Mexico city, Station as the result of its. “LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (thid. ) : eM | City Stationyas ‘subsequently reported ‘to CIA headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversa _ the Commercial Attache's office at | the Cuban consu “Approximately five hours after. President in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone es axI 7105, 11/27/63, tion as Luisa Calderon, ‘who was then employed ins late. (Ibid. ) During the course of, the conversation, the
apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair © Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she also knew this. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a "gringo." The unidenti- fied caller replied, “yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassina- tion and that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened... who knows Luisa responded: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.) (Ibid, p. 2) Raymond Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rocke- feller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:
Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto Suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina- tion that contains the suggestion of fore- knowledge or expectation. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for DC/OPS, 5/23/75, p. 15) Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments do not merit serious attention. Her words may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassina- tion but may equally be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assas- Sination. In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the State Department (CIA Doc. DIR 85573 11/27/63) In. that cable Mann stated: ---Washington should urgently. consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men. are Guban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban Consulate here." (Ibid.)
This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: “Info from Amb Mann for Sec Rusk re: ...persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy. Mann went on to state in urgent terms: "They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican govern- ment could use them as witnesses." (Ibid.) According to CIA files, Calderon made reserva- tions to return to Havana’on Cubana Airlines on December 11, 1963, less than four weeks after the assassination. (CIA Doc, CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/63) Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions. (CIA Doc. DIR 84950, 11/23/63, CIA Doc. DIR 85471, 11/27/63)
During her reinterrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with Calderon. accounting There is no indication in this report ‘for the questioning“puran about Calderon. (CIA Doc. DDP4~-0940, 2/21/64) The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964 more than two months after Calderon had returned, to Cuba. (Ibid.) Information was reported to the CIA during May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence operations. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Joseph Langosch to Chief, Office of Security, 6/23/64) Caldron's ties to Cuban intelligence were reported to the Warren Commission on June 18, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #739-319 6/19/64) However the Committee has determined from its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's conversation to the Warren Commission. Consequently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that
~ 58 — Calderon had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission by the CIA. The Agency's oversignt in this regard may have forclosed the Commission from actively pursuing a lead of great significance. Calderon's 201 file reveals that she ; arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc. Dispatch HMMA21612, no date given) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). (CIA Doc. Dispatch JFCA-10095, 7/15/63) That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the ~ Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The
“notation indicated that a report was pending on No such report is present. Calderon. (Ibid., p. 3 of attachment) The in Calderon's 201 File. . Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report. | Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first recorded by the CIA on May 5, 1964. (CIA poc.#Blind Memorandum of . ~~ FOIA 68-290 5/5/64) At that time, Joseph Langosch, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban Intelligence Service officers. (Ibid.) Specifically, AMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963.- AMMUG-1 told Langosch "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion
- 60 - General. De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically . with luisa (Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and "Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." (Ibid. ) - Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise. relationship to the. DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her ‘arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure for Cuba within one month after the assassination. (Ibid.) On May 7, 1964,.Langosch recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (CIA Doc FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 5/7/64) Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part: “a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section 7 where the rents are high. ~ Jb. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce - in the department which was known as the “Empress Transimport." . Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous ‘sentence. (Ibid.)
-61- On May - 8 Langosch further © disclosed AMMUG " s_ _ knowledge of the Oswald | case. (Ibid, attach. 5) |" Langosch paraphrased AMMUG" s knowledge of Calderon - as follows: oy thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned '- about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to México, that she had been '. involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to- Ne by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been. recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation . of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name .- mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been “Howard" or something : different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love _letter but indicated that there was a Clandestine professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if > this could have been Oswald... (Ibid.)
-~ 62 - On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Cc Thad elicited from AMMUG (CIA Doc. FOIA 687-295 5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum) Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, perferably the former, discuss the AMMUG-1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing. (Ibid. p. 2) On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA Doc. FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached to Helms’ communication was a paraphrased accounting of Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) In that. attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth. However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon. Howard Willens of the Warren Commission requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,
access to the questions used in Langosch's a | interrogation of AMUG. (CIA Doc. FOIA 739-316, 6/19/64, Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Gounterintelligence fesearch and Analysis Group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's office's for Willen's review. Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." (Ibid.) However, Willens was not shown . Langosch's memorand. of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid.)* The Warren Commission as of June 19, 1964, had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead. ‘It had effectively been denied significant rere erent RE ett tPA Ar A, * Tt should be noted that these memoranda of May 5, 7, 8, ll and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced in the Calderon 201 file. (See CIA Computer printout of Calderon 201 file) Their existence was determined by the Committee's independent review of other agency files.
background information. This denial may have impeded or prevented the Commission's pursuit of Calderon's popential relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. But even if the Warren Commission had Learned of Calderon's background and possible contact with Oswald it still had been denied the one significant ‘piece of information that might haveraised its interest in Calderon to a more serious level. The Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's conversation of November 22, 1964. The Committee has contacted former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine | whether a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren Commission. The response has uniformly been that the Calderon conversation was never made available to the Commission nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission. ferme
- 65 - HSCA Interview of W. David Slawson, 8/17/78, p.5; Willens response to letter of HSCA Class. Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 132; CF. deposition of Raymond Rocca, p. 156 wherein he states that he is sure the Commission knew of it,) In addition, the Calderon 201 file bears no reference to the conversation nor does it indicate that it was ever made known to or provided the Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Computer print-out of Calderon 201 file) In an effort to || determine the manner in which the CTI treated the Calderon conversation this Committee posed the following questions to the CIA: 1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever given access to the transcript of a telephone conversa- tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a female employee of the Cuban Embassy/ Consulate in Mexico City, identified as Luisa, and an unidentified male speak- ing from.outside the Cuban Embassy/Con- . sulate? If so, please indicate when this transcript was provided to the Warren CommisSion or its staff, which CIA official provided it, and which Warren Commission | members or staff reviewed it. 2. Was the Warren Commission or any member of the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever informed
- 65a- orally or in writing of the substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. ‘In a memorandum dated 1978, the CIA responded: The available evidence thus supports the —_ conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information né¥ the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's signi- ficance to the events surrounding. President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expedi- tiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her commentary following the assassination, it may well have given more serious investigative consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald and the Cuban government's possible involvement in
eek a amen te  N AER carat ee a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Two difficult issues remain which are “raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn' te the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission; secondly, why didn' it the ‘Agency’ reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to” the CIA or some other American intelligence “apparatos. The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not + recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and — | published its report. (See above CIA explanation) “> As for the Agency's withholding of information ‘concerning Calderon's intelligence background, . record reflects ‘that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a’ member of » the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64, Cc | JMenorandun) | The memoranda which provided more extensive examina tion of her intelligence background were not made
available for the ‘Commission’ Ss xeview. that this information was “not provided the Warren fact for the allegation | or because the allegation “would have been serious.” It would shave demonstrated Cuban Intelligence Service Signiticantty, “the: May 8 ‘memorandum written by ‘Joseph Langosch following his debriefing of ANMUG-1_ indicated that  AMMUG=2 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer . “believed | Calderon to be a cIA operative. : “-FOTA | 687- ~295, attach Sf 5/8/64) ‘It 3 is possible. _ Commission either ‘because there was ‘no: basis in -. was of substantive concern ‘to the Agency. “If the : allegation were true, the consequences for. the cra & that @ CIA operative, well placed 4 in | the Cuban p Embassy, _ may have possessed information ‘prior to the assassina _ tion regarding Oswald and/or his relationship ‘to the possible involvement in a conspiracy to. assassinate President: ‘Kennedy. “Regarding ‘Calderon’ 's possible association “with the. CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal | no ° | ostensible « connection ‘between Calderon nd the ‘CIA
- 68 - _ However, there are indications that such contact ote ~ between Calderon ‘and the Agency was contemplated. A September 1, 1963 ‘CIA dispatch from the ‘Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the cIA's Chief of Station in Mexico city states _ in part: “. vecluisa Calderon has a sister residing . dn Reynosa, Texas, married to an American “3 O£ Mexican descent. .If (CIA asset) can. further identify the sister, our domestic. ~ ..4. exploitation section might be in a posi- -~ tion to follow up on this lead...Please 7... levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at . the next opportunity. (CIA Doc. HMMW- -1935, 9/1/63) | ct Be “An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that: Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister _.residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- ..Ox her mother may make the trip--details _ .. not clear: (CIA Doc. HMMA 21849, July 31, ~ 1965) © a eo At the very iease,’ the above dispatches evidenced an interest im the activities of Calderon and = her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.
- 69 - : The Committee has queried David Ronis, the author of the above cited dispatch requesting» that calderon' s sister be contacted by the CIA's "domastic exploitation section." _ (HSCA Class. | Staff Interview of. David Ronis, 8/31/78) | Ronis “was a member. of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff at the time he wrote the ‘dispatch. “He worked “ principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection of intelligence data. Mr. ‘Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi- bility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. Often he would receive no response to these requests, which normally indicated that. no follow-up had either been attempted or successfully conducted. It was Ronis’ recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division
- 70 - might have been: requested to locate Imisa Calderon's” 7 sister. Ronis told the Committee that: he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall | that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in - Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated. that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (Ibid.) . Various present and former cIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon haa ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 136; HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148; | HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch; 8/21/78, Piccolo, Interview of _) | | Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:the
-~ FiL- most glaring omission being the absence) from mo, . Calderon's “her 201 filefof “ . cryptic remarks following the assassination of President Kennedy. AMMUG-1. 1 This Committee’ s investigation of 1 Luisa Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban an Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi- | ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter) .* - CIA files reveal that A-1l defected from the DGI on April 21, 1964 in When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned over to the CIA. (CIA Doc.| _|IN 68894, 4/24/64) Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph He Langosch, went to ito meet A-1, debrief him, and arrange for AcL s travel into the United States. a oe (Ibid.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch’ s *It is now known that A-1 did provide significant | leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon. It is further apparent that little of this information was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission. . | Therefore, the possibility exists that A-1 had - provided other information to the CIA | , relevant to the Warren Commission's work which was not properly reported to the Commission.
- 72 - debriefing ‘of A-1 were forwarded to. the Chief of. Liege Station in : “(CIA Doc. Dispaten[ 7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-1. was ‘under. contract, with the CIA for ‘operational sperbones. (CIA ‘Doc. contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64) By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to ‘the Agency. He stateds “There is no. question in my mind that -AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or. that he has furnished us with accurate _and valuable information concerning ' Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to Director of Security, 6/23/64) -As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of — 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B (CIA Doc.| _ [In 68894 4/24/64) which was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi- _ bility pertained to handling of agent operations ee in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record ‘Question- naire 6/4/64; ‘CIA Doc. [Jin 68894 4/24/64) : -a-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli-_ gence officers assigned to Mexico City. ‘Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI ‘operations in» Mexico as ‘follows:
Cha pe - 73- PAS Koop, BEC7 fess etek ee isarrs ey 73 SLASE OF 7 ide é NG 4 G In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That. is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. ( I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64) Thus, A~l was able to provide the CIA soon after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City. | The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-l. This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining - to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2) whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information were made available to the Warren Commission.
The Committee's initial review of the materials provided by the CIA to the Waxren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during the course of its review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made reference to A-l. . Included in this file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by . Joseph Langesch which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. (CIA Doc. FOIA 68-290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this file were the A-1 debriefing memorando of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA #687-295, attach's 3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the Committee requested access to all CIA files concerning referring to A-l. From review of these materials the Committee has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.
~ 75 - Prior to learning of Oswald's probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter- intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that the Director consent to an interview before the | Warren Commission on May 14, 1964. (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren . . Vol.Z Commission Report,“Pp47-!2e)(CIA Doc. FOIA 689-298, Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton also wrote: I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appear~- ance unless we have first had some pre- liminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implica- tions since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this care- fully amd made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.)
-~ J6 - Undoubtedly the White House source referred to in Angleton's memowas A-1. This conclusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which was quite close in time to A-l's defection. [In addition, Rocca's staff prepared prior to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren a “Brief : ‘A Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission ‘outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64) At Tab E of this brief it states: Within the past week, significant infor- mation has been developed by the CIA re- garding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the: Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab EF) ‘on May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-l. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64) However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-1l by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information
was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area: (Tbid.) The May 15 communication did state that the Agency had established contact “with a well-placed invidivual who has been. in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia." (Ibid.) Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro- bable contact with the DGI in Mexico ity. The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment) As set forth in the section of this report concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa- tion set forth in the Memo was elicited. Neither the questions nor the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector col- laborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOTIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64).
- 79 — ‘Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant 7 information regardsng Luisa Calderon specifically of Nov. details of her: a her conversation anarfisociation with Cuban Intelligence ‘were withheld £rom the Warren: Commission. “phis — & information as described above, was derived from — However, debriefings of A-1. ‘From the Committee! 'S: review of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, ‘the ‘Committee has not found any credible evidence | indicating | that | other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was - | relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, _ in its review the Committee has determined that a ks a specific document.. referenced in the A-1 file is + not present in that file. The: missing itemis of considerable concern to . the Committee. . It is a debriefing report of aAel a entitled "The ‘Oswald C Case." “(CIA Doc’ Dispatch. ‘UPGW- 5035, 3/23/65) . “on March 23, “1965, a ‘CIA ‘dispatch records the transmittal of the report, ‘along with | eleven other A-l debriefing reports. (ibid. ) Next to the Listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report -is the handwritten notation "sr." A CIA employee © 7 who has worked extensively with: the » Agency | files