476-10036-10127 \ JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10127 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : Phase! DATE : PAGES : 18 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 199: Vietnam,9/11/1963-9/17/63. Box 2 HW 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 1
(ofl RT, “NUS a Vr 7B 22 SUN - eg ET . aig oocriredi “ ' _— 7 oan : wo. et Banh, CanGedosdul — ee Mar . ; ok ob SECRBT--BYES ONLY. mo a Ce - on , a (2a : i. Purpose oo oO oe Oe : ; “The Purpose of Phase Tis to ‘attempt to persuade Diem and ‘Nhu “ ‘separately that the Nhus should leave the country for’ ‘an extended . = period. The means are continuing the Lodge- -Diem conversations; . 8 - direct approaches to Nhu". "carrot and stick" measures to separate, " 7 ia oe the Nhus from from their immediate supporters ; and a carefully- vg = ; tailored public posture to supplement these efforts. Part A, ‘Phase 1. below, describes’ a possible Lodge approach to” foo ee " pressure on Viet-Nam, , — a oS a s Part p, below, describes the US Government public posture in - ‘eras . a ee ge 8, we” na « SEEK EEL EE UEP Tae We 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 2
vee he a. TOP SECRET ~ EYES ONLY rn Lo “Part A, Phase I | | | : oo Lodge! Ss Approach to Diem. ‘Lodge should ‘see Diem and. convey’ the following: The United States Government feels, as the’ President “indicated in his TV interview, that Diem must take drastic: wtk feet les a - action to recapture the Support of his people, repeating: : 7 the .same approach made by Ambassador Ledge in his last’ o ““ngetiag te., a long. vacation for the Nhus , actions ae Pa . "demonstrate a reversal of the policy of. repression, | and: the: | Mik “broadening of ‘the Government. . " However, in ‘the ‘meantime, the: United States Government” .o , <0. ‘Ls ‘faced with a crisis of: confidence in the vietnamese 210. "Government: on the: part of the American public. and: more oi especially: the | American Congress. : in order to preserve, a on he aid program ‘to south Viet- -Nam, which the president. "sincerely desires to do, it has become politically necessary | ve , ‘to. disassociate: ourselves from supporting, those units oe Vpesponsibte. for ‘the raid on the pagodas. ‘otherwise, the... angtea States Congress may cut off all aid. Therefore, ; ee ee _Rnbassador Lodge mist reluctantly notify President: Diem’: “that assistance to Colonel ‘Tung’ 3 programs must be - terminated, We will make an attempt. to redirect what Bid we can on ei programs essential. to the war effort Af: ‘this | can ‘be worked, if president, Dien ‘can see fit to take the ‘dramatic actions mentioned above promptly, we feel thet we can quickly ‘restore | | ‘confidence. “But, we. “must. warn the ; president that ig the ed Sa ely oa! _ oa “pituation: *. coe ve eee ae Ch NEU SLD vane” * SECRET. EVES Ofny eee St tuation faye NW 49061 DoclId:32626060 Page 3
'@ TOP: SECRET - EYES ONLY situation continues as it has been we may have to make further cuts--again in order to avoid: a total eut of ft aid. If this - becomes necessary we will endeavor: to make these in such away as not. to affect the’ war effort, e. Bea the". Saigon water works, the ‘Saigon electric power plant, -etes- “te 2 ane « SO re ey ares ope a eo: SECRED -- EYES. “ONLY W 49061 Doold:32626060 Page 4 7 ¥
Sate a —— C oo oe C . : . “@ | | - TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY | | -Part’B, Phasei | | | | A. Objective TO separate the Nous and their immediate supporters (i, e.. | Tung . leu of tne Police, Minister Ngo Trong Hieu). 7 2. Concept of Operations. _ Actions taken should fall short of seriously . 2 “damaging the war effort waile at the same time indicating that the U. S. will - snot tolerate the Nhus. The importance of these actions does not lie in . ot - aysical damage done the GVN but in their psychological effect upon Nau and » company; and upon the potential opposition. ‘These actions must demonstrate : 2 oy 3. determination not to tolerate the Nhus and their attempts to destroy . : ” = os :  ainericad prestige, For every overt action, there should be corresponding’ oe pri actions designed to split the Nhu power group and further discredit: cnet ee sot ~ . “we Naws and discrediting them. = 3. Specific Recommended Actions. Actions should be pinned to reportedly. . ins . ominous signs that the U. Ss. will not tolerate the repressive actions against | “the Buddhists or other citizens and will not tolerate and support any persons. : “directly res sonsible for ‘Such actions (i.e. the Nnus and Tung).. A Congressional, . — 7 or Senatorial Resolution to this purpose is recommended. (See below). 23? "Regul rement for a Sin ed Statement. to Accompany. U. S: Aid. me “Instruct all U. S. agencies promptly to answer routine requests fot support on : 1 PROD ern ma orate me sten guns Ragucmanet Ose mee Kah Speen fee Sete Gene woe a ; moe m . - Ee ee Me re “ . SS + Tee the merits, put to require a signed Statement, in substance:. ey Pe 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 5
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY | "These supplies will not be used in any way to indicate U.S. _ or GVN support of anti-Buddhist or other unjustified repressive actions, or of those persons connec: ted wii aa or _ directly responsible for such actions.. r Comment: No violent ‘reaction from the President is likely if iti is” ; explained to him by the Ambassador that these steps a are absolutely necessary "= to prevent all aid from being severed. Selected instances of this requirement: should be leaked to the press--alerting them to check on compliance. Instances . of rejection of the requirement should be’ broadly publicized as evidence of: ‘unwillingness to get on with the war. This should be very effective in » hastening o oie of anti-Nbu opinion. : ve “ oe _ - ‘Termination of CAS Sui port to ‘Vietnamese S cial Forces s by withdrawing CAS- owned equipment, Announce to Special Foreces that henes- “ - a “orth no ‘additional funds will be paid through Tung for any Projects whatsoever: . . a vo omer projects may, be supported by payment directiy to project officers, Se : a provided project. is. in mutual best interest. Any project capable of serving ” ae . oa personal ambitions. of ‘Nhu or Tung automatically excluded. “Actual harm : Poe Ee “done to war effort ¢ or to Special Forces would be slight but it would be a s By ‘Psychological blow of ‘considerable proportions to Tung whose power ‘rests 3 in - He es mee Ve “the eRe | ‘of the vietnamese, not only upon his connections at the Palace but.’ “upon apparent unlimited Uz 8. Support for him, * “TOP SECRET = EYES ONLY" 2 1° af. t « tthe, 49061 DocId:32626060 Page 6 nee ee ce ee ee tee ade
: | TOP SECRET -. EYES ONLY . No U.S. participation in any new projects involving Tung - . specifically the Hamlet Militia Leader Training Program.. Our. refusal to. - Participate because of Tung should be announced unequivocally to the GvN; . we can atcompany this by a counterproposal that the 6G/SDC Directorate be! ‘put in charge since we consider it a worthy project. | m . d. Cutting Aid to the Motion Picture Center - Direct U.S.: - paid’ personnel at USOM Mopix ‘Centre and other media activities to refuse to “handle or process any material prohibited under 1, above. This may cause: . “temporary termination of U. S. participation in some activities ‘under CN i a een “control, and will certainly evoke inspired local press attacks. “useful. . mo tte ee rr -, woes . . She cet ts teoe bes pi 2 aonten ner GOS cite Sieroter nana s aaa eh een beeen ements wae enim mat stan conten 8 ie vane Eattcs medemnS ebugmminer seo Sete. nutes wom toe . . . a . fe. ‘ , . , an * . 7 8 ° : bk EE: “activities should be earried on by improvised means, with full publicity e i a attempts t to impede the war effort, and U.S. continuation of effort. Diversion of Ammunition for Police . - ‘Actual Physical effect a2 ae a + neghigibie but psychological effect considerable, 7 f. Response to attacks in the Times of Viet-Nam. The Ambassatior "does not wish to demean himself by protesting officially, however, . if the U. s. . nai hal S pmena was see Letnett se deen os bar oaténns 2 are sae hee . +. gk 2h tee eg oF ee é Sas Pere : : Darer ens * ace oman dh Tone some nateentaceeh # © ap Slae idpntat an o mouse eel . rs Sar . * . . . ! . v tay “ Rr aoe ee, ade fn 3's 9 tien ode abt each ae reine aat : ‘ moa +6 . a 2A a Ty a steerer nse pomny Ye tae ere ee does not defend itself, this will be interpreted as a sign of weaimess--the, i ot U. S. will lose face and prestige. Suggested counteractions are Jeaks by! on gree emcees gee fides an ' Eraoassy officials Such as nthe Ambassador refuses to read the rag because, of its notorious reputation for outright lying", or other. comments indicating. . the U. 5. considers the newspaper ridiculous. _ — = 7 - ruiannounced” visits on ke Vietnamese ees g. Ambassador makes TOP. SEORET - ‘EYES ‘OnLy: we yo ane . ie eee a ae 7 a eee pee heeecectendemte Bee ode ele eet eee’ eS nee cent nn HW 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 7? eee melee! ee ne tn nt RN bh MESES NPP ee DEED © hg bg MSc me TT a SY a a een! A yt
ete therae eam ae hey vores 6 ge tes gas eB ite Harrah ee mae tees eaeres 2 ots @eneee ea, Be meetin oe oooh eddie i aw rn a et te Tee ~f ev sn outed 13 aeree been MS te ce rede een Sa wets anette aepateeen ster wo Yo ern rn Bey he “eighisr U. 8. or, provincial bank accounts must not be overlooked. ahile'es che ofemoia here Perlee tule epen ome oct - him with. the Generais. bee Wi Vietname of the. regular Vietnamese press. cid:32626060 Page 6 “TOP SECRET = EYES ONLY’ . personalities and key areas. Visits Ministers, IGS, General Don, Dinh, Minh, and others, with the objective of seeking their views and indicating 7 . _ American freedom to talk to whomever we please. Purpose is to build up - nl American prestige and a feeling that we are in charge. “Must be carefully ae stage-managed to avoid embarrassment, 4. Direct iminediate procurement. in cash, and storage under - U.S. ‘control, of approximately 3 million U.S. dollars worth of piastres._ , a ‘insurgency programis, -the funds already authorized, "Possibility of {freeaing’ pte foo . (2) Covert | one a. Suspension of any CAs piojects capable 6 of being used i by y Nis to ot build up his prestigé and illustrate that the U.S. is continuing, to support ee — him. . “CAS should be prepared to offer recommendations in this regard. _»b. "Set Dinh and Tung against each other by rumors and reports to. Dinh. that Tung is plotting to assassinate him, etc. —) le. Set Nhu against Tran Van Kiem, Mme Nou! Ss brother. (and this * 7 iM Warner about Nhu. ma, | Fabgicate a document Linking Nou with the DRV thus 5 discreatting e ” a) Put out our ‘own black. newspaper as ‘a counter fo the ‘Times’ of eS, « ~ TOP. SECRET - EYES ONLY a cate RS 8 SI AIOE fl a PP OOP HO : “The purpose is to make immediately available for essential on- -going ‘counter=” _ increase tension between the Nhu! $s) by getting word to Nhu of what : Kiet told, i fe, Po ae . we tT Sa BERD PES El ES on SL ee es ey
. | £QP SECRET - EYES ONLY ; | 4, Suggesied Approach to Nou : Although the ap pbroach by Asta and D;Orl enai to Naw 1 was ‘unproductive, — a further approach might be made by John Richardson, If sO, the approach - ; should emphasize the strong possibility of aid cuts by Congress and our | . decision to cut or redirect aid to those units responsible for the raid on me : . pagodas along the nes of Lodge’ s conversation with Diem: “Richiardson \. m . 7 - - should then appeal to Nhu to leave the country for a » long vacation out of : _ : loyalty to the family, love of counttys, and to make. possible continued US * | | Support of the war étfort, . | : |. ’ 7 wo "*.. STOP SECRET - EYESONLY 9 0 : * : ; . - - oT : ae Se ee eee eer mn mien nnn tt i rt tee erent tc ne em itteannnnnneetnan emacs See eee Se eer atin RY 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 9
ie {iN a2) Fees eke meme gee 2. TOP SECRET =. EYES.ONLY . oe meme tee ve ate oe “Part C, Phase I | Congressional Action . - a ~ A. resolution expressing the “sense of the. Senate" oan "that aid to South’ Viet- Nam be terminated ‘unless that regins- a reverses its policies: of repression might be useful COREE ammunition for Ambassador Lodge, if at ‘were passed by a “substantial margin, With tacit Administration approval, aan *. the Church- Carlson resolution has good prospects for passage: oP mas Sn: terms : ‘of general’ strategy. on the foreign aid bill, ‘such: coe a resolution should be delayed until after senate: passage, won of the ‘aid bail: “although a case “ean ‘be made for. earlier os Geo im ec nang 2 ti inl aleve eae mc tab snl Cee wie amar 6 co neon wt dn cae eee teins 7” ace 3 Bos ; aaeree so - ae ne : ‘ oa pees a : ow ge oats wees wo : : an wee ra os teh, ‘ ‘ : : Se * “ : a . ve . . . . we ert . P pets mah area ate arias 6 a Son, he le sera Tes LF > n we . . er . fe . : ” oo moe, 5 oo ge o yc ° ¥ ‘ feede : Ae ‘ge ', f: ° en ad eee hee nen . eee -« iW 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 10
Fee OG OB oa ea 2 | ‘Top SBORBT--BYES ONLY | | PartD, Phasel *:, _ Se 3. S. GOVERNMENT PUBLIC POSTURE IN PHASE J il Po TARGET Public statements or explanations of U.S. Government actions in phase one should be primarily directed toward those eleménts of - Vietnamese public opinion which our actions are e attempting to influence. By . . : This means that we should not make it. our purpose to inflame mass publi un” Y subrest. “although demonstrations ‘such as those spontaneously generaled | ies by high school Students doubtless: have’ an effect even upon fanatics ok a : ‘ ch as. the hus, on balance they probably result only in more 2 vigorous. os repression and at. the same time more thorough débilitating of ‘the v war effort ‘among the: nelite". Moreover, agitation ‘whipped. ‘up by. Ruierice public! ‘statements which resulted in bloodshed of innocent victims - : “would be an: ‘additional burden which” ‘we do not wish to bear and hich | : * would complicate continuéd acceptance of our policies here in the ao s Me! Bs “Unite States... es oo On _ Therefore, since the basic concept is of a surgical operation: “directed against the Nhu family rather than a massive convulsion’ in similarly - - _ South Vietnam, ; our propaganda targetting should he ‘as confined ‘and 3 as. a + te. " precise’ as we can’ make it. We should primarily concern, curselyés:. ele at with, dlaritying what we are attempting | to do in the mitids of the: fy ee eee mee ones we sor eemeces : a > * WW 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 11
TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY Vietnamese Nelite", " This "elite™ must be made aware that our aims : and theirs coincide; that we are merely trying to help them remove | obstacles which stand in the way of the: achievement, of their basic goals. They must be made to feel that we are sharing our confidence ee 7 | with them concerning the actions we are taking in.the hope that we. can. n a ; continue to rely upon. them to provide leadership stability once we have, aw, aon oo oe “finished our operation, . : - . Exigencies of the American scene may require us from time to. 7 . time to elaborate on + the basic theme and basic targetting of our ‘pb 7 output, On the whole, however, we should be able to: rely pon . . ; interpretive analysis made by a very active and very ‘well- informed ° Américan press in claritying | the significance of our: statements to. the a American ‘public. | 7 ME METHOD. | | - On the whole the Vietnamese "elite " has: a very sensitive we - (grapeving which is ; alert to the. significance. of actions taken in the . - 4! . ; ° "2 a S political ¢ context... ‘On. the whole, thereforey, actions: may be expected. “to speak at least as loudly ‘as words in most instances. This fact - o suggests that our. r best course might be to let our: ‘actions spealc for, 2.) "TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY | iF 49061 Docld:32626060 Page i2
i a i etber te maccoe are tet rine weer TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY ; themselves ‘without public explanation. Because of the Machiavellian “cleverness of the Nhus, however, this course leaves open the pas : - | sibility that | our actions could be so distorted and manipulated as to. a 7 _make their meaning confused even in the minds of the Helite " | * observers. oo | | -_ ‘Therefore, while still relying primarily upon the cy sah me : than the words to carry the import of our objectives, itis felt . . Ee necessary to make limited public statements concerning the purpose. a . . ones sof our undertakings, “There follows a. short ‘public annouiicement which * : it is: s siggésted, should be made from the White House at the outset of. ‘ “4 | “the actions being directed against Nhu in phase.o one. This should * a © prooaiy’ be ‘issued after Ambassador Lodge has made, clear to, . i - resident Diem that we intend to move to undercut the authority of the “: : . fs “once this announcement has been made it is not considered -. cee 7 “desirable to announce each specific step that is. taken in implementa a a - - tion of our operation. “Instead, on the assumption that the actions taken" ys will become readily and immediately known tothe press, we should ; Le os merely be prepared ine) 9 confirm each step as its is. taken referring pack. cf 7 a pry ty wed te edan dh nen se manta Faas ain eager temimmmomemn Stara) niece = we mim 4 Rats cat, pene en ae OE uti se we #0 «tetas Nene nen ata ed we ent He en Ut 24 KI Nee ms he SA NANO ON eat nate + Hn nee hater om . ate oa . P . . : weno oat , oy Bogpreee * * toe + . . “. Moet . a . . . . % . 4, toe ae ‘ of . , . . . . ” “se 7 . . mot . ae < ae ie ao “y . oo : soy . . . in ‘each instance to the original announcemént.. j t \ | WW 49061 Docld:32626060 Page 13