ope 10 October Saigon Station's tui etry ¢ of. the Vietnane's se Generals’ ‘Coup The Ambassador instructed CIA not to initiate contact with Generals Minh or Don, but if the generals initiate contact, such ro contacts were authorized. ‘In the course of meetings with Minh or Bon, an assurances were to be given-as specified in DIR 74228 of 9 October. <* a an 2 7 Ne in. "per briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee : . "Yo have not scen a successor. government in the wings that we Da tht = - @guld say positively would be an improvement over Diem. Therefore, : _. 4% has been our counsel that we must proceed cautiously, otherwise Me po, a situation might flare up which might result in something of; a - civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely’ by ‘ C: sitting on the sidelines." Saigon Station's “History of the Vietnamese Generals' Covwp™ oe - nt At a meeting with Conein requested by General Don, Don said “the generals had decided to try to stage @ coup within a week following 26 October. Conein, under instructions, passed the substance : of DIR 7he28 to Don. . Don promised he would seek permission of the coup . ; committee ‘to give Conein their poli tical plan for the Ambassador's & YOR OMY. ee cry thaw edmerinis bane OPS Fae Ete 2 Aig eee aE AEs ANAM kN
SAAD ALOT tte, Peete mete tian coupe cen SOMO BE ne ee rem en Ma Ney eta ARTI om, aayy 3 . a “with and carried cut under the directions of the Ambassador, and had been carried out with both good judgment and a high quality of . performance ° . Lodge had not yet had a full briefing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a | few days later. 24 October Nemorandus for the Record prerared by the Executive Director following a ceevinz wi. th Kenneth Hansen, bureau of the Budzet— “At Hansen&S initial meeting with Lodge, Lodge made these charges: ~ (2) CEA was inprogerly dealing with Nhu; (2) CIA was reluctant tant ts turn over to the military its operations among the hill tribes; ; . , (3) CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddhists and was caught by surprise; (4) Richardson had a palatial ‘mansion and © 4 ‘ Fy entertained government officials there; (5) The CIA Station was too large and too visible; (6) CIA acted on ite owm initiative without oe ” , ' coordination and without any control from either the. Ambassador or . fe ee Washington. '-Hansen said be later reported to Lodge that he thought Lodge’s charges vere erroneous. He said he was. convinced that everything . SE CIA had cone in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated Hansen noted that at the time of his first meeting with Lodge a ' : '
cy a -“—, Cee e my: instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between s So RETO Paks tint - + Renee te i SS Gig Er eti erB Seeman naam RCE gah tds avin caireearttarcial “SRE iS Ci W 2h October (continued) ae . Saigon Station's “History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup” . Conein held two meetings with General Don on 26 October. Don reported he had been informed by General Harkins that the U.S. military would not thwart eny coup plans. Don said the coup plans oT vere complete; that the necessary military units «ere available; and a that the coup. would occur no later than 2 November. In the eecond 4 ot f meeting, Doh said the coup cami ttee refused to turn over the political ‘ en! plan but authorized Don to outline its substance, which he did. --* <# CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 78161) Eyes only for Lodge and Harkins from Bundy: “%.... . There Te fl may be danger Nhu attempting entrapment through Don's approaches to . ; so Conein. . . « « e Feel quite strongly that Lodge and Harkins should © stand back from any non-essential involvement. . . o". « It seems wise to maintain close control ‘over meetings between’Don and Conein.” CIA cable fron Saigon (SAIG 1964) : : po Na Se ae Bundy from Lodge: "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out General Don and Conein who has. carried out my orders in each instance explicitly. . « « « e 25 October a _ . . | Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CTA partictrent: Dc only. Record by DCI. arAn rue se | Stout Eis cay os
oe ASLO EB EEA BETA LORAN BL Bart netion, eee caer aa NO A wee ne trate wee ean tet ie and. quali fications of the individuals reporting; and (2) our policy... oA te injected: into. ‘the government and exercise effective control; (8) Cannot discuss important political issues with Diem because of the Mhe President stated that the purpose of the'meeting vas to consider: (1) recent actions in SVH with respect to coup planning in. SVN, as he wished to be assured’ there “wan ‘imanimity within the government prior to the return of Lodge ‘for consultations. The DCI. ‘stated his views in detail. In essence, he held: ‘(1) Don might be managed by Khu; (2) CIA has no control and therefore _ assume little responsibility; (3) Don could have a coup in the paking and could pull it off; (4) We are handling a delicate situation in a non-professionai manner; (5) Successful coup would lead to confusion oh because generals would provide veak leadership; (6) One coup would | be followed by another and the war might be lost during period of political confusion; (7) Civilians capable of running SVN could not policy of “correct, cool attitude,” (9) We either have to work with: Diem and Khu or we have to take agsre ssive steps to remove then, and it is not clear that the succeeding government would be much better. . Saigon Station's "Hi story of the Vietnamese Generals’ Coup" General Don asked Lodge if Conein vas Speaking for the Anbassador. . a EORET-EiSS y We