14-00000 fidently replied that the political consciousness of the proletariat, there seemed to be no obstacles in the internal logic of the Chilean bourpecis state ta prevent the workers’ ‘winning sufficient strength to gain control of the lepislature’as well as the executive.” ” ‘ On the political front, there were Individuals and. ‘groups en both sides who attempted to stem the movement toward polarization, which they corzectly foresave would lead to the breakdown of Chilean institutions. Two important effarts to arrive at a com- promise on the issue of the constitutional amend- “mentan the “Three Areas af Preperty’ were made in the first part of 1972, In Aprit the Left Radicals, who had entered the Allenda government in January, carticd on lengthy negotiations with the Christian Domacrats to harmmer out a satisfactory agreement on this issue, only to have it rejected by the top command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The Left Radicals responded by leaving the government and joining the opposition, a move Allende described as “a stab In (he back." "' A second set of, negatia- — tions inf June between the’ head cf the Christian Workers occupying a plant outside of Saniiage pro- | Democratic Party and Allende’s Minister of Justice claim their intention ta held it to the desta. The | broke down when the time limit set by the Christian initials of the Unidad Pepular (Popular Unity) ere | Democrats expired and the POC leadership refused painted on the wail by the gate. - to extend it. - an The two sets of negotiations sesm to have col- ~Phete by Moggi Coveliog | 1nd for related reasons, In Aprit the left wing of immediately evident from the figures for 1971. In- | the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept dustrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian | a compromise which would slow down or stop the production (based on plantings before Aliende’s | forward movement of the government nationalization accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent, | program, while in June the right wing of ihe and unemployment had drepped to record lows. The | Christian Democrats could point to an impending Communist Party in-a report to a Popular Unity | by-election ir, mid-July as a reason for discontinuing “conclave” in early 1972 warned that “very siveng | discussions. Both cases illustrated a general prob- inflationary pressures could make our situation | lem posed by the Chilean muitiparty system. Once acute," but the government tcok iio action to Geal | political conflict became polarized, the extremes with the problem. The continuing optimism ci gov- | held the rest of the opposing coalitions hostage and ernment policymakers .at this time was expressed | prevented what could have been a convergence of ai a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the Uni- | views in the center. versity of Sussex.and the Chilean Planning Q*ice in! = The negotiations were interspersed with a series March 1972. In the course of discussion Raccomiro | of demonstrations and countercemenstrations by Tomic, the defeated Christian Democratic presicen- | the government and the opposition which always tial candidate, asserted that the Allende government ! stopped just short of open vicience. Several ob- had committed a “fatal political error” in failing to | Servers, including the American Ambassador to establish an “institutional majority” in the Concress thrqugh a “far-reaching agreement between SOTIIUSIS 1° | Ann Zammst and GaDriel Palma, fos, D~e Crea Road fo inspired by Christianity and those inspires by | soccansm, austin, University of Tecas Press, 1973, 90. 3B, 247, Manism—that is, between the Christian Democrats | the Communat Party report atoears in fi Verne (internatonal and Popular Unity—in the period following tha 1970 | oect 7am ahve. 6 1372, B. & : . 7 " . Parise lguerda Radial, Prayectone Portca Ge PIR (Poltical ; presidential election.” Allende’s representatives Com | pain of ine PIR), Santiago, 1972, BAR ear) Wg sd a fees aE hn ommy AEG OPI a” sheaig Le SS ewnerene bye S 684 “So ww Fae 9 *