457-10014-10109 JFK Assassination System Date: 7/8/2015 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10014-10109 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-15 Document Information ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 06/25/1975 PAGES: 19 SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM ZRRIFLE / OPERATION MONGOOSE DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/08/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 418 v9.4 | HW 50955 DBocld:3274235497 Page 1
Date Page 08/06/95. 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION SSCIA 157~-10014~10109 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE 07-M-15 ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCTA 06/25/75 19 HARVEY, WILLIAM OPERATION MONGOOSE ZRRIFLE REPORT TOP SECRET REFERRED POSTPONED IN FULL - 01/05/99 CCBOX 418 HW 50955 DoclId:32423497 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 2?
AGENDA TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE oN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 10:00 ry M, ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING | | | uUNVENT, Di HAR da; oth Testimony by Mr. William Harvey HY 50955 Docld:3242735497 Page 4
cae enema tens in af tram en earache oe cera pre HW 450955 Biographical 190-47 19h7 | 1948 1952 1959 1960 August 16 . 1961 . Late January (approx.) February _ (approx. ) TOP SECRET WILLIAM HARVEY Short Chronology* “ Counterespionage work as FBI agent Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP) Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation) Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries) DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21) EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of POISON PILLS. (24) BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE - _ ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's. notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House” to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37) HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38) Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25) * Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA. Docld: 32423497 Page 5
HY seen eee ON eNO SEN Ge ese er ce RD 50955 1961 (cont'd) Early Feb. Late Feb. March-Early April Mid-April November 15 November 29 1962 February February 7 ’ February 19 April 8-9 April 14 April 18-19 - Boclda: 324273497 Page 6 TOP SECRET According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the ‘pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques _ but not targets. (27) Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed . to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27) O'CONNELL... gives, pills and money to ROSELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32) Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor Committee. - Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to .. Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39) MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (ho) - EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60) HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38) HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase. II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is — arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to brief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on. Phase II. (41) HARVEY, ROSELLI, and 0" CONNELL, meet in Miami. (46) Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)
mete ee ete ce mene aerate er Hone te HW 450955 ans tate eee arti one wenn ee ret sRmtrntne Conte nem li i BEEN a urea A HORA 1962 (cont'd) April 21 Late April Throughout May May 7 May 14 June 21 August 10 August 13 TOP SECRET HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. (47-8) HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (chier of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left ina parking lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49- 50) Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. (50) EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F, KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)* Edwards tells HARVEY of. the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65) . HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be_ used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42) ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51) — Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the _, Subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans. General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes | planning for "splitting the regime, including liauida- tion of leaders". * RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a) Docld: 32423497 Page 7
1A ep SETA Ghanerennne se ee eco ow ~rton. Ane eR eeeL ae te meta ae ae ee oe aatnapaeamin awn sere no Aen Le cement LOND, OTN ctr es ae A HW 50955 1962 (cont'd) August 14 September October 1963 February June August 16 Docld: 324273497 Page 6 TOP SECRET _ HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders". _ from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document"; Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10. Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51) CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously . with VARONA. (52) ‘HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54) Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)
“aggre . ~ R (krone Gor ay mo _JINVENFoRtED: co ; o — ee ORMAR 2 gp? SUBJECT: John Rosselli...” BAe MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: » biter; 1, In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange © a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged . for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would ‘take no part in future Operations proposed for Subject. — PERT B Ss 5 Sear 28H ma Aah © yee AE RB aint OTR ART O86 bt otaeen ron 2. In the interim I have kept Mr. ‘Harvey fully informed __ reference to my briefing of The Attorney General onthe former 8 . project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of  ° a | this nature should have the tacit a roval of the Director of ral. yy - Intelligence. . 3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future, SE OR a mecca 6 6 aatan ict ane dy ttimene Sei pa oe _? . She: [Se adres “ Director of Security . & CHW 50955 DocTd:32423497 Page 9
BW ed Nae ee le le Uy Nee we OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C, BO BO 13 August 1952 boo MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CLA ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE | ° CEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE <———«« | DON WILSON, USIA bo From Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sg oe oy . Subject: Alternate Course B ¥ — ee : In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the ; 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce. i an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. he CIA paper. : Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting i basia. : Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy i guidance to be developec, I Lolicve the paper need contain only a a statement of objectives and a list of implemeating activitics. ‘The Hat of activities will be uncoz the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychciczical, Paramilitary, and Military. | We will hold an Ogerationunl Repre my office, at 1400 novrs, Teeccdy, 14 August, to comanlote the 7 outline paper for submicsisa. Tacn of you is to bring 5 copies of: , completed assigned work .3 this work eessioa, to permit cach of uB to work froma full sol of Coulis. ae magne nena a ip Oo cae oo pat <4 ch pre < {) te “ < Q &e oe © o {8 an?) ° Wa bar] ret Fa 4 Papers required frora cacn of you for the Tuesday meeting: oo Mr. ervey: Intellicconon, oiotiical (splitting the regime, J ; 7 “i, Dasnemie (caborage, limites y “ deception), and Paramiiizecv. leo, any sugzestions for inclusioa ; in other sections of the 2. r. 7 Mr. Wurwitéeh: Si-torscci ol Ovwiectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any oi ©. cious lor inclusion ia other sections of the paper. } . . .- ' PONE Eke ele eet os canetoclne DOES NOT ALeuy mene i .. F2.0M. GDS ele. mee nto, men on % my 2 2 ? tee eee a : ING Ll... mae aocumeny cor’ 2ins se ae a Hor ie. wee On os HW 50955 Docld:32423497 “page 10 ; oe
re eee ened Se em OE gamete Rt ene naar a gts HW 450955 was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the he agreed and that he had done so, | Pocld: 32423497 Page 11 LEAs Teac anne CMAJ i y ola { \ t v- f a J y. ee eels peony UF | Cr OSEELUES , ae oe wo 3 lay MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) bh SUBJECT 2° Operation MONGOOSE 1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information. 2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the. memorandum of that date from General Lansdale, Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including. liquidation of leaders, " 3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's oifice on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer toa comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point, 4. ‘Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand - the inadmis sibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in sucha document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it, | I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, in-. cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA, Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that cae
Attachment Fa nO LIT . fro, 7 c™ . a ee gt a . Relea liad yu i at ra So ad tte Wiriace ie fF ity oan ae md de he ; 5. For your information also, in your absence and since © the attached memorandum already had been Gistributed and in. ‘view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's - . attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above, — | . | | WILLIAM K. HARVEY Chief, Task Force WwW. Memo fr Gen. Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62 2 HY 50955 DoclTd: 32423497 Page i? - Remote
i ss Project ZRRIFLE_ l. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. ‘Agents will be spotted in several areas, ‘including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of retiece, Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE. areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to ‘other division areas, The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel. 2, Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of and information concerning such] in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, & primarily by th Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the “duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed, - 3, Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from _ became more refined and in — many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to RECEIVED FROM 307789 - Exempt from ceneral EN eory aaa DURATH NATIONAL SECURITY INFG MATION — —_ BA 2A 19 “declassitication sthrdu's ef 6.0, 11249 _ Unauthorized Disc! osure subject to C i" DET : ’ Criminal Sanctions. V exemption schedu'e 5B (1), (2), (3) Automatically deciecsifisd oa ¥ \ A Bale Iimpossibla to Dsierming ‘conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely ' ~~ HW 50955 Docld: 32423497 Page 13
HW 50955 ne Hh el control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the ‘ activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. 4, Operational Assets: (1) Pers onnel: QJWIN is under: written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the| ] by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted | sporadically by COs, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent nerformance by QIWIN. In October 1960, win 24 1915 secret sO NA t Docld: 32473497 Page 14
Cf Tip o> ne cr ~——| QJWIN annual salary: | : - $7,200 Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & other agents & agent condidates: oo 2,000 Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates: 7 2, 000 Travel of staff employees engaged in ARRIFLE activity: 2,500 Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:. | ; 1, 000 , - $14, 700 Pay for agents on completion of jobs? . 1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability. 2)} Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE -experienced ops officers (few available), ‘able to conduct patient search and with guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important. 3) Maximum security: a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know? }; no approach to other Government agencies, b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point manda DE EIVED cpg ; had bE JUN 24 1975 SECRET | GIA. HY 50955 DBocld: 32423497 Page 145
— SEGRET oT } ‘DCI officially advised? ec, Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips. . d, No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; ‘rigid case- officering, from start to finish, e@. No_ approach to officials of foreign governments. “f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency, Training by opposition would . : | 7 g. Use of already tested assets {e.g., Manuel in the search, fo  #. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners. : _ i, Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome), je No discussions in Stations. | | k, No "team" until ready to go, if at all. 4) Blackmail: a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa. b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops. c. No meeting any candidate in house territory, | d, Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record BAN 24 1975 GA of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals. ean A omen TORE SEURE sect Sh oe arene a eee HW 50955 Docld:32423497 Page 16
SEK | Y e. Staffers -selection. | 5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow. 6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged and backdated, Should look like a CE file, 7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail. 8) Former resistance personnel a possibility, { 9) Use }jastbasy nobody who has ever dealt with criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc. | 10) Possible use of staffers for the action, | ll) Silverthorne, Keeping of files, GLA HY 4S0954 -Docld: 32423497 Page i?
os SECRET Freedom to travel . Khokhlov case. Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems. os 1) Maximu security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much dgés Siragusa now know? ). imitation on number code clerks for enciph ing & deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not sefure enough. 2) One_ focal point or search, control, training, case-officer & PA . selection. Complete NDP authority in this focal/point mandatory. Overseas i one-man control base wi h own (non-Station) Commo, ‘ 3) Every operation to be rh idly case-offfcered; no silk-shirt PA's. 4) Non-attributability: NoA itizens or American residents for | direct action; possibly for approachfo foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another Ameri agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners -- and limfled offixial reference. 5) No chain of connections permitting b ckmail. 6) Don't meet any selectér in house territoyy. 7) Avoid discussion w. foreign officials until Al possibility of search through private citiz ns (e.g., QUWIN) has been xamined, 8) Planning shoul include provision for blaming S viets (or Czechs) in case of blow, /4 above essential, 9) Exclude or anization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime, IN 24 1975 GIA dott, OA GR ER, ache ar pdr an ntiouens toecti e SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32473497 Page 18
SECRET t 10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to/Mafia, ll) Former resistan personnel offer possibilitie ~. (OSS archives, ) 12) Period of testing, s rveillance, ete. for each ‘selectee, 13) All Kubark personnel volved should have ome CE experience. 14) Silverthorne & stable in 15) What are limits on team or individuals ¢gelected? No "team" until ready to go. 16) Danger of Standbys. es pt yee ane nash be Harte I lok OPENED TO BS at at gRR NEA RA HAN oS te AEE CEST Y EI Ce HANNO MOTE OE AHL tee mY RECEIVED FROM aN 24 1575 HW 350955 DBocld:3274235497 Page 19
AOR YR MR ORME OIE MY KR eee HW 50955 SECRET Scd G . 25 fl oO Exec Actions "The Magic Button" Narcotics Bureau Nfor a living" | a RIS 201 cover caution - Bankruptcy -- No star eyes -Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2 Not a TSD problem — , Apply brakes Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. .-El Benefactor -- assumptions / Examples of 3 'wrong" Framework of Sid's job. _ Ledford Ehut R&D - memo, i "Translating machines" - of E basic sounds project. pherious - (V with CB) . " comment - Gear Anathesia -- 26. -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI Matter No file . Never mentions word assassination, 1. Select proper oern to run -- . 2, Place acover _ ; Max ast 3, Security Rules B - WKH - AS- 4, Guide leves Sid - Reserv. 5. Last Resort - Brakes - ; Substitute - What next 6. No other agencies ~ oe oe 7, No projects or papers except per cover. . WED FROM 8, Principal agent - (Mankel) ? a. f RECE c: AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB.' - - Mask spat rqm. stall AF project -cler Dbieke aN 24 1975 Bocld: 32493497 Page 20
SEGRET 9. Disposal -- 10. Targets who & where -- Must know before we can spot -- ll, Case officering 12. Cover file - create to provide RIS or akbetobel it, - non Sov 13, heverveeswaraner amen te.cvtnfar int ae anette! ie soln WES RS pas vim Boge Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed - Fd J list - Rernember aM 2A 1919 GMA ~~ Cf) rr] cD md aa 4 SEERA - HW 50955 Docld: 32425497 Page 21