~ press relec A PRESS SERVICE FROM : PHONE ° . ra MOVIMIENTO UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.2.) 273. 8033 OFFICE: Bor 9940 FOR IEDIATE RULEASE DEFECTING CUBAN SEAMEN EXPLAIN ‘THEIR DECISION HE: Skipper, three officers left Cuban freighter in Japan. Cuban logistical support of Viet Reda denounced, Crewmen roluéstant to transport war materials to North Viet. Role of Castro's | Embasay in Tokyo, Cuban Reds withhold ship's itinerary to dg ceive the Japaneses ‘Cpying on board. Bureaucratic chaos re- sults in damage to Cuba's foreign aupplies, A Cuban skipper who left his ship in Japan Dec. 26 confirmed today in Miami that - Castro's logistical support of Viet Nam Reds was the main reason for his defection. In a prece conference held at the Biscayne Room of the Hotel HeAllictor, Francisca. Cobas, the defecting captain of the Cuban freightor "Aracelio Iglesias", told newa= mon why ho and three of his fellow officers decided to seek asylum in the United -- States, The press conference was arranged by UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARTA, a Miami-based Cuban << — group whom Cobas approached upon his arrival from Japan, Cobas eaid that he had = asked the U.R. to help him get in touch with the presa go that he and his shipmates could donounce Cuban maneuvers to help the Viet Cong. During the conference, Cobas was flanked by Antonie Arias, Mario Pérez and Humberto Ferndndez, the three other defecting officers of the "Aracelio Iglesias", Cobas, = introduced by U.R. Secretary General Morio Seiglic, spoke for the group, Said Co-= bag that ho and his shipmates had refused torun tho riske of transporting war mate- riale to North Viet Nam, particularly since they were convinced that such transpare tation was wrong, CGobas added that all Cuban vensola have been ordered to take mi] itary euppliea to North Viet Nam from other Asian Cemmunict ports, and that the Cub an Embassy in Tokyo serves as coordinator for all such shipments, Referring to his former ship, Capt. Cobas explained that the Embargy had ordered -= the “hracelio Iglesias" to saii to a North Korean port and to await further instrug tiona there. The Cuban diplomats withheld the ship's itinerary and declared that = the “Aracelio" vould return: to the Japanese port of Yahata before proceeding to <= North Viet Nem. By pretending that the ship would coma back to Japan, they hoped - to deceive the crew and reassure the Japanese as to the cargo and tho use to which « the ship was being put. The truth was, however, that, while in North Korea, the ~= *Aracelio" was to receive orders to load a cargo of war supplies and sail directly from thore to North Viet! Nam. According to Cobas, this could not be done in the end because the ‘Tokyo Embassy was warned at the last moment that the North Korean port of Chinnampo was.blocked by -« The "Aracelio" was now ordered to pick up another military shipment at Shane« ice. It was then that Cobas and his shipmates dec- ghai and take it to North Viet Han, ided to walk out. Cobas went on to explain that logistical support to the North Vietnamese was one of the two taske assigned to the new Cuban envoy in Tokyo, a fanatically loyal Comm-— 105.6. 9 $e ddiamt, Fleride MAILING ADORE SS
14-00000 = 2 « ¢ nist named Varuel Jorge Cuevo Venéndes, whose previous job was to run concentra-- tion camps in the Isle of Fines. ~ The Cuban skipper referred to ill-treatment of Cuban seamen by the Castro regime, mentioning among other. instances the constant spying on board by G-2 meng prefer-= ential Customs ‘treatment given Cosriunist-Bloc sailorsgand the ridiculously low lo} cal-currency allowance of 4 per, week given to the Cubans while in foreign ports. Elaborating on the isdue of espionage, Capt. Cobas revealed that the radio and tele egraph operator ie usually the G-2 man on board, Ag captain of the “Aracelio", Co- bas himself was forced to. surrender the mail of supposedly “disloyal" crewmen to <= one of the spies assigned to his ship. As regarde operation conditions of the Cutan merchant fleet, Cobas told newsmen =~ that the two basic problems confronted by Cuban shipping are the obsolete Soviet -- equipmont inctalled in most boats and the excessive bureaucfatic red tape and dise«« organization, As example of the latter, he montioned tho fact, that the Cuban buy~ ing agency seldom informs the shipping coordinating office of the dates oh which o« the merchandice ia to be picked up at a foreign port. Last-minute notites and b= sequent offorts to find ehips usually moe’ failure, with the result that the seller mast pay higher warehouse costs. This he’ caused rany foreign firms to cither ree fuee to trade with.Gastro or to impose extromely harsh terms to protect themselves from the cortly effects of ts Comiunists' unreliability. , Capt. Fraicisco Cobas then revealed that he understood that a vast "reorganization" of the Cuban Havy wos undertaken early this fall, Most officers, he said, were dig charged on the grounds of suspected "disloyalty" to the government. Incidentally, added Cobas, some retired Army officers who have had no naval oxperience, have also been assigned to the merchant marine. Cobas assured his audience that their deci« sion to quit was wade of their own free will and that no one had pressured them -- into it. He denounced Communiet oppression of his homeland and said that ho and his three shiprates refused to keep serving under it. ; Following Capt. Cobas! statement, the newsmen asked Him numerous questions, Most < of these referr,d te the iscue of Cubah boats being used to carry war supplies to =< Viet Nam, which was quoted by the Cuban seamen as the chief reason for their defec- tion. All journalists present showed great interest in thie matter, as such Cuban assistance to Viet Nam Rede more or less directly. results in the less of American = livea in that Asian country. UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (U.R.) ‘Mient, December 30, 1965.