157-10004-10138 Date:07/01/94 Page:l JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10138 RECORDS SERIES : INTERVIEW SUMMARY (EXCERPT) AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO: TITLE : EXCERPT OF INTERVIEW WITH WILLIAM HARVEY DATE : 00/00/76 PAGES : 10 SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM BISSELL, RICHARD CUBA CIA CASTRO QUWIN/ZRRIFLE DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : X DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/01/94 OPENING CRITERIA : - COMMENTS : BOX 450-4 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED “HW S0955 Docld: 32202027 Page 1
“VERVIEW AND MEBING SUMMARY FILE? Foreign meen oe Staff, ‘which is the unit basically in During all. of this period he had many occasions to work directly with Mr. Helms and had a close working rela- tionship with him. | The beginning of 1961, he was asked by Mr. Bissell to Rigs LBS EPS EE EE cee tt »@xplore the possibilities of setting up a "executive action capability" within CIA. In the Fall he was asked by Mr. “Bissell to turn his attention with regard to the general area of executive action to the _ Specific target of Castro and, particularly, to take ¢ over one ongoing operation from the Office of Security. Shortly thereafter, but as a distin t matter, Mr. Helms (who was clearly slated to take over DDP, F2lg, even while Mr. “Bissell was still its nominal head) asked ‘. “Harvey to set up Task Force W, to be the new working group | | on Cuban matters. [These items are rar, oeaee in more de- tail later on. ] UJ <a begin 8) | gongs Harvey stayed as head of Task Force W until the spring rym . . ; “os WO. KERVP of 1963, at which point he turned it over to Desmond Fatz- SEED Wy merald, served about a month on TDY in Rome, and then in 8) . : 7 u) yal Ghaeepin Rome. He returndd 43° ia ee to Langley in 1966, and then took a special assignment to suyvey the vulnerability of CIA installations to “technical coverage. 4 > SESRE HW 50955 Docld: 32202027 Page pid?
TERVIEW AND MEETING SUM ? & a ie) mn fe) by Harvey is not sure how much he knew of QJWIN's mission Dommetigs, although he thinks that he may well_have signed some of the cables to Leopoldville, since = for the Congo mission.) In any event, @ about it later when they were discussion WIN as*a possible ZRRIFLE asset. Harvey does not recall: anything about the WIROGUE; does not recall anything about ROGUE asking WIN” to participate in an executiion squad, nor does he recall + . on ; . . Yr anyone about viruses Vy ) . To summarize at the outset, the following is the thrus getting to the Congo. _ZRRIFLE of what Harvey would testify to regarding QJWIN/ZRRIFLE: ‘Harvey regarded ZRRIFLE as the overall project crypt under which QJWIN as an asset operation was going forward. He. had the general assignment of exploring discussed with (Sag executive action capability, and the possibility that eithet QJWIN or that other criminals whom WIN helped to spot might be assets. He never did more than review some of them as possibilities in the course of his taking an inventory. However, he did not use WIN or anyone WIN spotted in con- , nection with any assassination operations against Castro lor otherwise, nor did he even discuss the concept with any. of them. He did not stockpile any materials or discuss pre liminary targets or make plans or evaluations premised on particular tentative targets. Essentially, he c assed HW 50955 Docid:32202027 Page 3 ean ea7ant
- INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY 4 weet | | gar the technological, human asset, and organizational poten- tials in being,or which might be organized, under the cland- estine services, and came up with a pessimistic report to Helms and Bissell that the possibilities of effective dis- creet action were slim. He also concluded that it was “ridiculous” to try and set up a general reserve capability in being, am counselled that the one sure way to do ‘it, or at least the only one close to having. a chance at secure success, was to simply appoint a single senior officer to do everything: to run the operation, kill the person, bury the he had used th body, arid. tell no one. In regard to Castro, ZRRIFLE project as the administrative hook for his billing “and so forth, and said that at some times there were mix- ups in terms of the financing offices, so that QJWIN/ZRRIFL might be used. He did not completely explain why on some of his own bills he seems to have indicated QJWIN/ “TRRIELE, but we did not have time to pursue this at greater length, whether he would regard this as his own slip or indicate that to some extent they were written up by others), the bottom line is that he would swear that QJWIN was never involved in an = | ro operation -- nor, for example, ever in the United States, although there is a plane trip ticket from Miami to Chicago which. is charged o "QJWIN/ZRRIFLE" (Harvey says it was a plane trip of Roselli's, which was the only thing he ever paid for of ' 4 Roselli's.) WW 50955 Docld: 32202027 Page 4 FILE;
HWY 50955 Docld: 327027027 Page 5 COTY CLRNAET . : aS fT om _VPERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY” Os Page In early 1961 Bissell asked Harvey to explore an executive action capability. Harvey confirmed and said he. firmly recalls that Bissell on at least two occasions indi-] cated to Harvey that he, Bissell, had been repeatedly im- portuned by the White House to explore such a capability. The first time Bissell spoke to him, Harvey thinks, was early on and at least one other time occurred which was whet Bissell asked him in the fall to turn the RIFLE approach (4 to Castro and pick up the Roselli operation. The first time Bissell spoke’ to him about it, / definitely said he had oan aie ene en EE cet a Be te been urged by the White House, but Harvey does not recall ne A aan whether he mentioned anyone at the White House. Harvey | thinks that if Bissell had said that he had been directly asked by the President, then Harvey wuld have remembered it even today. His impression is that the implication in Bissell's conversation with Harvey was that the White House had initiated it; but he said that he couldn't be sure whether Bissell had said the White House wanted it set up to be. ready. ‘in being or whether the White House wanted the possibility explored... Harvey elaborated that the White Hous might sa "create such a capability" , or might say "deter- mine whether it would be a good idea to set up such a capability" or might say "see if it would be possible to set up such a capability." Harvey is fairly certain that Bissell did not indicate Harvey be sure whether Bissell had indicated whether it was e . someone in the Kennedy White House or the Eisenhower FILE: whether Dulles knew about this White House request, nor cou]d
]. .ZRVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 8. of FILE: | White House who had made the request. Again, he has the ‘impression, although he can remember nothing express, that at the time he received the distinct impression Bissell's conversation at the White House had only been a short time 4 prior to his conversation with Harvey. When pressed, he said he was not. sure and he might even have spoken to Bissell a short time before the Kennedy inauguration(which would have meant that Bissell was more likely to have been referring |] to the Eisenhower White House as having pressured Bissell : to set up an executive action capability.) On the other hand, he has the strong impression that the second time he Mas told by Bissell, i.e., in the fall, Bissell again implied Phat the renewed pressures had been recent, thereby strongl suggesting that, at least at that point it was the Kennedy White House which was involved. Bissell asked him to explore the current clandestine services capability to make recommendations on how such an operation should be set up. He does not recall Bissell men tioning Castro, Lumumba or Trujillo, although it is possibl that it was at that time that Bissell told Harvey about his approach: toliggion cn (and as noted above, Harvey definitel remembers that,at some point Bissell did do that). But Harvey does not preclude the possibility that there was a general discussion of the kinds of situations when that = pability might be useful to have, and that this could hav HW 50955 ° DoclTd: 322702027 Page 6
L..tRVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY _— Paze 9. of cg erent — included discussions of Trujillo, Castro and Lumumba. He FILE: simply does not remember and does not think they discussed the project in terms of likely specific targets. Gither at that first meeting with Bissell or shortly thereafter, Harvey learned that @genea Gil and Sidney Gottlieb had been "cut in" by Bissell on Bissell's interest in executive action capability. Harvey thought this was unfortunate, but it was done. Harvey ‘also thought Bissell should have known better than to discuss Lumumba. with action capability, Harvey learned about the Cuban operation| involving the Office of Security and understood that both and Edwards. Harvey is not} sure why Bissell would have tol knew: (1) that Bissell was interested in setting up an executive action capability, and (2) that Bissell had spoken to Harvey about it. There- Wou))spoke about it (see discussion of notes HWY 50955 DBDocld:32202027 Page 7
_TERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY in the file, inf DAS ices relationship to the entire project was really threefold: (1) he was actively running QUWIN the asset, (2) QJUWIN was spotting people whom Harvey concept involved for setting up such capability with Harvey We next spoke about the portion of the report suggest- ing that Harvey had been briefed about the technical de- velopnents. of capabilities under the Roselli plot. Harvey . said that he does not recall the name and is fairly certain he never met or dealt with| ) the person who actually made the pills in the TSD. He did know both Sid Gottlieb and "Manny" Gunn fairly well. He said that in terms of his general professional duties as a Station Chief and counterespionage expert against the Soviets, he had made it a point of keeping fairly current in background knowledge on the enemy's capabilities for assassination. He had therefore discussed the latest state of the art with the Office of Medical Services (where Gunn was) and TSD (here Gottlieb was). He said he had also discussed with | those offices medical and other scientific aspects of interrogation techniques (e.g. truth serum) and control techniques (e.g. post-hypnotic suggestion for controlling BAacents). He had had general discussions, therefore, with both Gunn and Gottlieb. However, he does seem to recall a discussion of specific techniques with Gunn at one point, although he is not positive this was after he had been HY 50954 Doold: 32202027 Page fp GenusT aq
ONS ere assigned the ZRRIFLE task by Bissell. In any event, he can ot remember asking Gunn to brief Gottlieb, as is suggested in the IG Report. | | We next discussed the notes in the ZRRIELE file. (The xerox of those notes sent us by CIA is in part illegible. J returned and took down completely that set of notes which specifically discusses the executive action capability and which is the set Harvey identified as his. Appended here- to... are’ my notes, but_if Harvey is goin to be questioned about them we would really have to ask CIA for the file copy before next Wednesday. ). nna en The reference to Notes hereafter refers to a package of three sets of notes which we had xeroxed by the Agency. The first two or three pages which are not in Harvey's handwriting appear to be a draft of what would be the basic project outline used as a cover for the ZRRIFLE project. It does discuss QJWIN as the asset and does indicate that he will be used to spot other criminals for sensitive pro- jects. But unlike the subsequent notes, it does not discus issues regarding the setting up of an assassination capa- . bility. The next set of notes which are in large writing on pages covered with various doodles are those identified’ Harvey es his. From looking at them, he judged that they wer notes based on two successive conversations. First, with . B Harvey concluded that the first conversation with Gottlieb ranged across a HY ; : f ~~ 50955 Bocld: 322027027 Page FAY GRIT Ip _ERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY : Page #f of _
_ JERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page _}2-of ui ’ variety of activities which fell within the framework of BILE: Gottlieb's position at TSD. (Harvey speculated Gottlieb had just become Acting Director or taken over some other high post in TSD.) His conclusion in this regard is based in part on references in that first section of his notes to items which he recalls and which hewuld swear have nothing to do with ZRRIFLE. For example, mere is a dis- oe who was someone . regarded as the The first part of the Notes of the 25th/1 meeting with Sidney Gottlieb is headed "Executive Action." Harvey could - Mot recall‘what he meant by the phrase "the magic button" HW 350955 DBocld: 322027027 Page 10
fil NUERVIEW AND MEBPING SUYMARY = Page [3-of Gottlicb used for whatever mechanism was eventually chosen. He could not understand the reference to the narcotics . PILE: bureau, except that if Gottlieb or he at that point knew about QJWIN they might have been aware of Nis initial in- volvement with American intelligence agencies -in a narcotic enforcement operation. The reference to "RIS 201 cover caution" meant that if there was an attempt to get a fake 201 file as cover involving the person. allegedly ‘in some operation relevant to the Russian intelligence service, thi had to be done with great caution. Harvey speculated that the word ."bankruptcy" referred to the same considerations discussed below -- that there was a bankruptcy of policy on the part of the. CIA or USA if there had to be a resort to assassination. (This might frame an interesting general _ policy question for Harvey.) Harvey did not know what "no star'' meant. I asked him if that might refer to the star file system, and he said th ct when he was in the Agency he didn't know about one or does not recall one now. He thinks the reference to "eyes | Jim A. -- contradistinct from U-2" may have meant that the check of any assets to be used through the CI Division, a normal operating technique, in this case should be done on an 'teyes only" basis through Angleton. He also thought the reference to the U-2 might mean that unlike that operation, this project should not be run on such a compartmented basis, m that any assets to be used were not checked with CI {so that ithe counterespionage protective resources of the Agency were utilized.) Harvey thinks that the phrase "not a TSD Tur cb] as ee RE HW 50955 Doold:32202027 Page 11