104-10431-10006] - aud etl h Rey SECRET/SENSITIVE | ve - me - es 46 - MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of. Defense .- James R. Schlesinger by an ex- -Member of the KGB le Several weeks ago I talked to Bill ! Netson, poo, eS - regarding a.more thoughtful use of. our Soviet KGB Source's know1- edge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy.. The information relates - to the clandestine programs of the KGB sponsored by the - Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the United States as the "main enemy." My suggestion was to submit a '. number of your speeches and solicit Source'’s critique as seen through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer. Mr. Nelson stated that he had no objection as Jong as there. was a description of the — Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily repre- sent. the views of CIA. I should add that the FBI and other serv- ices are on record to the effect that they have never been able to disprove Source's factual information although they do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A). 2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights. and chronology. of | his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 196). From 1953 until 196] various circumstances and events led to his disaffection with the system and hardened his determination to defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his’ *Bill has taken sick leave for the next tén., ways. and has not 25819. __ seen this letter. SECRET/SENSTTIVE ~~, denpossi ble hDiiines y 0303f aL eiedier es . SUBJECT . ' a Analysis of Soviet Policy towards: the united ed States .
SECRET/SENSITIVE young, daughter ‘who lived with her grandparents. in ‘Russia. In 1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad,. and this triggered his defection. Overall, the case is one where we unwittingly had an agent.in place in the KGB who was © breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the _ First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was | - to obtain information of great value to the West should he have the opportunity to defect. re 3. By way of special ‘talents, he is essentially an analyst ‘and historian. - He was frequently called upon by senior members of the service to study and make recommendations where there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one depart- ment. In -his-drive to gain more. knowledge outside of his par- — ' ticular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to - the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs — of KGB production indicating the overall espionage production obtained by the KGB. The investigation was initiated by the ‘Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product . derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and | Plans, NATO documents. etc. This gave Source freedom to in-- spect the processing of secret information and to trace its _ handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of the product and-its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately, the names of agents were not indicated, but it. enabled Source, after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were identified by Western services on the basis of his description. . This,. in turn, led to investigative action and important counter- intelligence successes in the West. 4, Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and security services under our. aegis. He has imparted first-hand -knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of “LENIN to 1961. This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply into the archives and records of the activities of Soviet intelli- gence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important _ was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School where he was able to milk.KGB officers from many departments of © the Service abroad. who were brought back for short periods of . retraining. 5. Because the Administration, the State Department and the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a prelimi-. nary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your Department might generate an interest in. the Source and his views. SECRET/SENSITIVE O0000-EL
13-00000 “SECRET/SENSITIVE oo BL | ae THTS could tead tea S eytipoe fu in hich” tie would: be invited: to" . participate and respond to adversary views.” His reaction to .. such a proposal is unknown... He has always resisted control in _ the sense of being an agent ‘of any given country. Further, he does make demands for classified information and position papers | including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to — any particular problem. Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches were obtained from him using only unclassified | information. a 6. His production has run. into several ‘thousands of pages .. of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had = with other foreign. intelligence and security services. The ‘yrange of his information is so vast and detailed that we are . hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet events. We have learned from experience that if we. give him a. problem with an adequate data base, he will computerize and. re- . ‘arrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new - subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting — his thesis. he often reveals new. information of value. — nt Cis a sensitive report received from our. ttachment D is an assessment regarding ‘the activities, rolé, modus operandi and reason for _ a Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (union Co _ is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated) 3. and... Ce! Attachment E is a rough draft of his review of the following - books - SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM - A-SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up - . on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are partly drawn. from a draft manuscript which he has in his posses- sion. The manuscript. runs to over two. thousand pages. He guards _ it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He | has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are. of unique ‘interest because of the classified information (based « on documents) which he read in Moscow. , 8. By way of digression, a bird's” eye view is set forth below of Source's theme. . Se ee ee pepe mene cme ape tee 9. The major reorganization (which produced ‘the KGB - Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the = KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN suc- ceeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV, who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a . _ _ SECRET /SENSITIVE
13-00000 --SECRET/SENSITIVE er oe special: committee headed. by: SHELEPIN. who: worked under. the - Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the KGB and GRU. They concluded that the Intelligence Services had not carried out deStalinization which required that the services — follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in ‘political action. By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were _ credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was accomplished by suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful mo penetration operations into Western governments , the manipulation - of agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation pro--: ... mo grams by feeding deception to the West through their intelligence. services. Under STALIN the services degenerated’into instruments — -- Of personal. terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost — ' . sight of the overall political, economic, and military obaectives (of the Soviets. — - . . 10. Before STALIN! s “death, there were anti-Stalinist ele- oe ments who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find =° — a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his. death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into ' the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents | of the Leninist/Marxist Institute. It was his objective to have .— the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the | crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state. The . course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of |. KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent 7 , in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and “boot- lickers." i 11. MALEHKOV was. unfortunately -outmaneuverd by the collec- — tive which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding . Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had to "steal" the process of de-Stalinization and shape it to his own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led eventually to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN's crimes in ‘which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers. This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs which represented a return to LENIN. 12. %XIn May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was ‘held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions of the Central Committee relating to the deStalinization of the intelli- gence services and to set forth policies which would result in their reorganization and reorientation. SECRET/SENSITIVE
13-00000 “SECRET/SENSITIVE 9 The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by. 13. General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many other senior officials of the Government and Services. SHELEPIN _ gave a broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the USSR and the USA had reached an atomic stalemate. Accepting this to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay-- behind net-workers should be abandoned. . He outlined programs and reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished. under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be in harness with all other departments. of the Government. He — stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to no help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter ©. “"P" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN, SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation | within the KGB but subject to the control and direction of the. Central.Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs of Government to implement strategic disinformation: in accordance with directives. This was meant to include all channels to the Wests namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic. . This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs. 14. In discussing the. various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded . on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed ' countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped = - countries, noting that these courses of action were not contra- dictory. 15. Shortly thereafter, the central Committee charged the KGB with the recruitment of two thousand additional S&T staff officers in order to exploit.on a broad basis the opening to the West. The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology | as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of in- fluence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and GRU had always been their successful acquisition of scientific secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change of balance of military power: could only be achieved through this additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic secrets of the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten its isolation. 16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB ’ had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that. about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 19617 he and some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake. SECRET/SENSITIVE
13-00000 -- SECRET/SENSITIVE. ~ He stressed that the objective of the-Soviet and the nec yas - ~ not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the 7 United States and swing the balance of military. power | to the - Soviets. . '. 17. The general stated that the Ussr was - Fourteen years behind the United States in electronic techno logy but that ve gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the > following . Fields: a A greatly increased espionage effort oe because of the addition of one thousand. staff - officers to the S&T of the. KGB and the * Academy | Of Sciences; b. Disinformation, i.e, programs to mis- lead the United States and the West regarding . Soviet technology which would lead the Western scientific community into expensive and time- wasting blind alleys of R&D; - To acquire new technology through trade. agreements; and . d.. To make treaties ‘and other diplomatic arrangements by which the Soviets and Bloc would acquire information and which would permit Soviet. scientists to gain access to the United States scientific community for the purpose of spotting | potentials for the KGB and GRU. Most important, he said, was that treaties could be used to block the natural technological growth of the ‘Western powers, in particular, the United States. 18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F - is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated 16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence Bulletin begins with the following: So _ "Leading officials of the Soviet electronics industry have told visiting US experts that the Soviet Union is four or five years behind the United States in integrated circuit technology. The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment. in this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment. SECRET/SENSITIVE
13-00000 SECRET/SENSITIVE Integrated circuits are . needed to meet the size, weight, power, and reliability of modern military - equipment as well as the needs of many. civil electronic. systems. mo Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only” one phase of ‘the -. question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this ~ question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets. 19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to - dispatch these papers for r analysis ¢ and comment bY your: expert before my time runs out. - a 20. As. previously noted, this package represents | a. unique: dis- ; semination, unofficial in character. ‘It is requested that this  —- exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the — _ future exploitation and/or discussions of the product. and the Source. We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet defector since World War II. : 21. At-your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledge- ment of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would ap- preciate. their return for the use. of my successor. rae y . : , Kindest personal regards from, sete Attachments: as stated . SECRET/SENSITIVE
13-00000 U.S.S.R. - Report No.: Subject: Source: 4-6444 MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION Born 1938 In RIGA, has an academic education and is a soclologist by profession. He acquired his academic — training In Moscow and Baku. In 1962 he worked for _ . about six months with the M.V.D. In Baku and after that; a until 1963, he worked as a lecturer In philosophy In - Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the. . oo University of Moscow. From. 1967 until December 1973 when he left the U.S:S.R., he worked In Yaroslav! and In Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Asso- clation of the U.S.S.R. From 1964 he was an active . member of the Communist Party in Azerbaydzhen and was. a member of its Central Committee. He was closely . associated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan! . - Party. He cooperated willingly. and made the Impress ton. of being a highly - Intelligent and educated man with’ | analytical ability, good perception and excel lent memory « Validity: of Information: - Novenber 1973 Reliability: B/2-3
13-00000 Cs 48 U.S.S.R. “Subject: THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA {. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people [ike  KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (KOSYGIN's son-in-law), OSIPOV © a and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.0. In the BAKU Area). The following Is a gist of the main ideas: | rs The danger of. war with China Is not taken seriously in official circles of the U.S. S.R. and particularly in military circles. _— -- General KHALIPOV said more than once that common Interests ‘ . outwelgh the differences between the two Communist countries. — . : The majority in those circles are of the opinion that the | | ae ; ; ae }. | spreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberate ce cee “‘plece of dis-information by the Soviet authorities in order oS : to justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It was 5 re often sald that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear an’ ae attack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propaganda. ; oe 7 for her own Internal purposes and the U.S.S.R., In order to - ‘ ; | keep mit I Tons of mobilized soldiers. — oo oe I oe an ey be. In those circles it ts thought that war with China Is Impossible - for the fol lowing reasons: . : (1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, It would: take a tremendous effort to destroy just the military potential 7 oe ~ of China. KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 209 atomic bombs. . ntmeren yates
13-00000 e GH Ee nee oF aie it, Coad (2) War with China would in fact bea war of mutual attrition and even in the case of a formal Soviet victory and a ‘ ae change-over in Chinese leadership - the U.S.S.R. will be unable to feed the hungry masses of China. According to. . GVISHYANI, there are a hundred mil tion hungry people In | China, and in the U.S.S.R. there Is not enough food for the population. A Soviet victory would thus double the needs of the Soviet Union In this respect and would put . too great a strain on her economy. So 2, From some conversations mainly with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that |. tne Soviet Union Is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than | | “with China; here are his. reasons: a. The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and - foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the . border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not be- ; cause It Is near to China, but, mainly, because it Is near to the . U.S.A. be. According to KHALIPOV, two or three days will be enough for the Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated: _ England has about 920 tanks and 1590 planes; _ France - about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes; - Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes; All this put together Is but about a sixth of what the U.S. S. Re can putin the field against the West within 2 or 3 days; and. - ‘until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late. i get i ie i x <i ae aa Os, According to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversations with, the 2, adn People, not only its the Soviet Union- in. no fear of a war with China, but Pee even thinks | China wih loin her In acwar analne+ tha binns
13-00000 U.S.5.R. Subject:  ANDROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO 4. -Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the ‘opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO's and GROMYKO's inclusion In the Polit- puro should be examined against the backgroun of two tendencies current | . within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.S. S. .R. policy towards China — and. the U. S.A.- ne ae A policy of detente with China fs supported, according to these oo. personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think.that the _- Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by adopting: a “tough policy towards the capitalist countries; — a policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position in the International Communist Movement and at the same time ‘Strengthens _ the Ideological attitudes of China. be A pol fey of detente with the West .. BREZHNEV, “KOSYGIN, GROMYKO , GRECHKO, “ANDROPOV and particularly . ~.KIRILENKO = on the other hand - support a policy of detente. with — the West In general and with the U. S. A. In particular. This group. stresses the’ need for the niodernt zation of Soviet production pro cesses. “After this vital objective Is achieved, the U.S.5.R. should | adopt an even n tougher polley tovards the West than in the paste “2. Thus the menbership of ‘the three in the Politburo ‘Is iostgned to . » $3rengthen BREZHNEV's.position. It should be remembered that these three "12 & personal debt to BREZHNEV: it was BREZHNEV who made them what they - Be Poe it should also be kept In mind that the menbersh Ip In the oe a ers
13-00000 Politburo of the Minister of War, the Head of the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Winister, has a special significance; It Is an. Indication. that BREZHNEV fs . "bout to make most important decisions and needs the ‘support of the Armed forces, the K.C.B. and of the Foreign Office. . The general opinton In circles of the Intel ligentzia, and particularly in. scientific circles, is that a war against the West. Is being planned. fecording to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admisston of these three Ministers , to the Politburo Is a very unusual act in the history of the Soviet Unton. A simitar step was ‘taken only once before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV, oe SOLOTOY. and BERIA to the Politburo - about two months before the outbreak “4. of war between the. U. S. S:R. and Germany.
13-00000 7 : . ‘a . ; . . 7 i . a a . "DEVELOPMENTAL "AND RECRUITNENT APPR LOACHIES TO AMERICANS = THE SOVIET. SECURITY THREAT. IN. THE DETENTE. PERIOD oo The aura of detente in the Soviet ‘and Bloc. ‘relations dur- ing the last year ‘and a half, we believe, has created a favorable climate for recruitment and penetration in the West. This paper . ‘deals with the problems as we see them... There are related counter= © ' intelligence issues which involve internal security:. the leakage ~*~ and exchange of economic, scientific and political information; . the sale of technological . ‘information; and the impact of disinfor-..~ - mation and agents of influence on American policy. -As has been. -noted.in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us 0 US . documentary evidence* ‘that SoViet intelligence had launched a full-.° - scale penetration effort: aga he SYain Enemy," we: have seen'a. . -. eadv and continuing | Soviet effort to effect pe the: tee fae, ; fers vl cirenorent. as been. clear. to Soviet intel-. | meh > Tigence, as it has been apparent to Western counterintelligence, — .. °° that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and, oe ' hopefully, change the balance of military power. has. created. new: . opportunities: for Soviet espionage. - a cn 2 Bo 2. These new “opportunities may. be characterized. asia plethora: :. "of choices: a harvest almost unprecedented since the New: Economic ©... ] Policy (N.E.P.} period and the 1958 Central Committee. decision to. - : assign to the KGB a new vital. role in the policy to exploit the. West “by returning to the principles of LENIN. | Soviet intelligence a now finds more Americans , both official and unofficial: ite a. Anxious to ‘exchange all ‘types of information; oa b. ‘Willing to ‘discuss virtually any subject; c. Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and , potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can © be influenced if only the American people- to- people concept could prevail; *Referred to and quoted in Attachment A. pagae sreprer oo . CS
13-00000 aoe nee, a P ae nn: oor Convinced that there is a bonanza ‘for. the American — 7 oe businessman in the USSR and that "business" can alter the “Soviet lifestyle and reduce governmental, i.@., CP control; e. ‘Believing that the Cold War was, a myth created by America; . oS £.. Anxious to atone’ ‘for the "sins" of Vietnan and” interventionist policies ; oo, ge Anxious about China and nuclear Weapons; h. Believing there is more merit to direct USSR- USA | woe - negotiation. if America attempts to negotiate in. ‘tandem with . as Western allies. or other nations ; os ais Ready. to believe there. are. many , “af not Legions , of Soviet citizens, particularly the young "intellectuals," ° vo who are willing to cooperate with .the West to advance. Freews, dom for the Russians; a eS Se . ee - ee jc. Ignorant about’ Soviet ideological consistency and 1 purpose. ae oe 3. Addressing ourselves only to manifestations of the Soviet “go -. security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate ——+". °°. for penetration, particularly for the recruitment of Americans, has oan an become too permissive. .The attitudes outlined have not only made America more vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence job - more difficult. Not only has. Soviet-American contact. increased in = geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that . _ the always relatively loose security check rein on official eer '". cans has lengthened even more. As. discussed elsewhere, it is ap-.. :  .*- parent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when: _. coupled with domestic attacks of whatever origin against American: FP... - intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on oe 7 - opportunities for Soviet intelligence to attempt to develop and” ‘recruit. Americans. _ Bes os ao . Lee 4. In’ an attempt to cope. with the problem ‘of ‘Soviet and Bloc. recruitments and penetrations, we have - since August 1965 collected statistics and case data on a government-wide basis ‘of | j recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and i foreign employees of the United States Government. Our objective has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information in order to: . . . a. Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist Services; - SECRET ©
13-00000 1 el se a san, Me b. Identify U. S. “Government: employees who are being ae targetted by these. adversary ‘Sgrvices; a Oe a ae Cc. - Determine. the scope of activity of these adversary - services: by area, | date: and modus. operand; — cr Determine ‘the. ‘scope “of targetting against any specific U. 5S. Government agency; os “Help - us understand the extent of foreign ‘intelligence. efforts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other per- .” -spectives about. possible disinformation and deception wats operations ; . ; _ : : Fe “Facilitate management of double agent | cases 5 “gS ‘Furnish. ‘counterintelligence ‘and operational guidance to. our field stations in their efforts to mount. aggressive " operations against the adversary; | coe 8 h Provide | ‘the. “Agency ‘and other U. s. Government. agencies,.” as ‘appropriate, information about the. scope and type of pene-. » tration efforts. being. made - against U. S. ‘Government Anstalla~. tions abroad. Do 5. “Our. evaluated cases* of rati ang recephent gt tempts over the last nine years By the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban . and = ese Communist services | are’ as OR OWS Boos nee ; oe gz Po, em BBs re 60 - 56 -- AS *The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as es- tablished By €Valuation of confirmed reports, unconfirmed or cir- : cumstantial information, and other specific reporting and informa- tion.
13-00000 — bo 6. Over the whole period the penetration. and recruitment eR bo forts have been fairly stably distributed by service as. follows : i Soviet oS 58% of the cases , At. ee. ery 7. Over the range Of cases, recruitment. and penetration ‘ef- . ~~ Sorts have been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30% of the. - cases, other staff in 5%, communications personnel in 5%, enlisted” ranks | ine 9%, local employees. in 305 5F others in 22% of the: cases. (8. Looking: ‘more. ‘particularly at our information on “Soviet ~ : and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente ©» period--the past four years--there is the following distribution | of adversary SeTvice case effort: oat ae _ co le is clear that. ‘Soviet penetration and: recruitment opera- vs ‘tions, up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government. .| “installations and representatives abroad have not been materially. -affected or inhibited by 'Detente."" Some representative cases since 1968 are cited in Attachment B. The cases have: been sani-"!*" “tized to protect the: innocent.. They are included solely to suggest -the range, precision and persistence of. the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and « Chi Commun ist penetrati ons effort. This. is “not the: end ‘of ‘the problem. Our. data consists es sentially of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily : _. reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those ' for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the a Po persistence of Soviet and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or. i “because. of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that. -* we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the . reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted. . OO *This covers only local employees outside of Iron Curtain in- a ' stallations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron _. Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control of their respective security services and are. therefore not con- sidered in this calculation. SECRET
13-00000 _ what it was. in ‘the 1920's and 1930's. (etc. ll. Soviet. Bloc modus cperandi--the operational techniques. Pt Arma wes maw . — —y 1 3 wa, ; uséea against Americans awncilude ali the known gambit eS aha have | a changed little over the past decade’ There have been slight tactix’ cal shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of © the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic M/O. remains. ! 12. “In ‘addition. ‘to diplomatic. ‘and. official “access t to ‘U. S. ms officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the Pad - bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and. local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet: American personnel or U.S. Government employees. In their recruit: © ment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the: . theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and. they. have. -. offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common” interests and cooperation to obtain information... They have utilized the ploy of professional advancement or business interests for one - - or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy. informa-: , ‘tion to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development © _. negotiations as. well as in some recruitment attempts...They con- ic .. tinue. in their efforts to.obtain access to both American and in-)). = .~ digenous female employees throughout the world by using. officers or. - local indigenous. male and female agents to cultivate these target ~ personalities. Recently they have used the language . ‘Lesson. gambit-- .. even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to . higher officials, have. been recruited and targetted either to ob- — tain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as official access to American officials.. They have attempted to recruit foreign local employees to report about the interests and — activities of their American employers.- They employ sex and. wo '. financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat,. seek out. personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportuni- ' ties, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or nationalistic grounds , utilize audio and other technical mechanisms,” 13. This summary “examination of the ‘recent case’ evidence of the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort © — against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story.. There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S. | students abroad. The primary objective of that recruitment effort — is to guide the student eventually to obtain employment with the U.S. Government. Such efforts are only indicative of the fact that. the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Government, via students, as a continuing and long-range. program. a ” 14. A recent additional dimension to the problen of Soviet and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access. the Soviets. -have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to SECRET
13-00000 _ a eee aera eet ae ‘ foo ss ie ba | |. delegations under their Chamber of Commerce cover, and they are: - . applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques. It has “been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range one U.S. Government secrets ‘through defense- related contracts--who\_ travel to the USSR and entertain Soviet trade delegations in the ~~ U.S. The concérn we have previously expressed about the role of _ Lt. General Yevgeniy N. PITOVRANOV. and the Soviet intelligence — _ officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in. . Fact, we believe was ‘Somewhat ‘understated. It is now. evident. that o PITOVRANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on” . where American business encounters Soviet trade. officials, in. the International Trade Center. to be built:in Moscow, cin exhibits in. the USSR. and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in the supervision of the travel. of trade delegations” to the U. go and the like. Se abe, ae ofa igelea td 41s. Reports: which reveal that the KGB is” “active ‘among “American. businessmen are beginning to. surface. Not too surprisingly, these... reports indicate that their techniques are both subtle and blatant. -. One of the most blatant approaches to American business-involves  - . . -Igor ARTEMYEV, who.is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. | _ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships... . between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries and. licensing - “.- agreements between U.S. and foreign companies. In the course of -. © '- his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. com- '| panies. The questionnaires are the kind required. by our Securities _ and Exchange Commission. . While some companies do not respond,. _ there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to '. talk with officials. .On.one occasion he replied to. a question about the level of classification of the meeting by saying it was. "confidential." With that xind of access, who needs to recruit in) .. the. classic sense. ce oe 16.- PITOVRANOV' s. people are very svident de various ‘trade. are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch, _-although these devices are being employed against some American... ... businessmen who.visit Moscow. There are also strong indications: that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly ex-. °°: panding demi-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain =.” “employment as the. in-house experts who "know how to deal with the...- Russians" and who find employment with American firms as guides — and advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to Moscow. “Attachments CUO AP om
The following are highTights of the chronology of Source’ S| (Subjects) professional career: September 1944: Subject was’ mobilized and sent to the 1945-1946: 1946-1948:- 1948-1950: | specialized in counterintelligence during» Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where. oe . he remained until ‘July 1945, “At that time eo . Subject left the Artillery School before - “completion of the course and ‘enrolled ain. a " Counterintelligence School, . - Student at the one year course, ‘Military ~ ae Counterintelligence School, _GUKR/"SMERSH, Ww aae - ” Moscow. Desk officer, Assistant Operational case | Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section. ot | " (etdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony ees _ security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart- ve ment (otdel) of the First Chief Goreign . Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. _Head- quarters in Moscow. ‘During the period - “November 1947 to September . 1948 Subject, held 7 : _ the title of ‘Referent and his office was, a) 7 designated the Fifth (SK). Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI oo (Committee for: Information), but his: functions were “unchanged. . - oy _. Student at the two- “year course, Higher on Intelligence School of the KI. . ‘Subject: : - studied goncsral subjects and the, English _ +e language; he was one of 30 students who - the second ‘year of the course.
13-00000 1950-1951: an) Desk officer, Operation a Case officer, supervising oK activities in China, "assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern Depart- . ment, ‘First Directorate of. ‘the MGB Head--- September 1951: November 1951: _, Case Officer. " December 1951: March 1982:. ‘quarters in Moscow, the SK functions | having: reverted from the KI to. ‘the MGB in. 1949. . At his request Subject was transferred as - a desk officer to the Anglo- -American Section, Courtterintelligence ‘Departnient Of. the ‘First Directorate, ‘MGB Headquarters in | Moscow. Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational The KI, was dissolved and former state security a elements were returned to. the MGB. “Subject 's functions continued the same, ‘but, in the ‘reorganization, he was assigned to ‘the cr Section of the American Department of the 9 Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the MGB. . Subject and an unidentified young colleague ne , wrote a joint letter through the Central Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making ' suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of September 1952: . officers for their suggestions, discussed meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two to send him a letter with specific proposals Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- intelligence work, os | - | While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour, 8 intelligence matters in detail and asked then |
13-00000 March 1953: October 1953: August 1954: with the names of recommended chiefs. — for necessary reorganizations, together. In a subsequent letter they recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then. in. prison . for "political crimes ;" and Yevgeniy ' Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy is chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR. ~ STALIN met Subject and his. friend a ‘second time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and _ appointed Chief of the First ‘Chief Directo- rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A | Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was then formed, containing a ‘Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and | seven geo- graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by | OGOLTSOV as. chief ‘of the American. Desk, supervising approximately 15, staff persons. ; When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control - of the State Security apparatus,. which he. combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he. replaced OGOLTSOV with one “of his. own appointees. ' Subject was reassigned as deputy chief’ of ene Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign - Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject supervised activities. against enigres: in oo Austria and Germany. oe oe Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in. | Vienna, “Austria, as an operational case. officer in the Emigre Operations Group. . Subject was transferred to the British Sub- _ Group of the Anglo- -Anerican- ‘French Group of the KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of ale “counterintelligence nature, i. e. concerned ot . with penetration of foreign intelligence | services...
13-00000 September 1959: des fo. i "1955-1959: 3 Subs ae One. of 170 Students at. _Ading the four — year internal security- counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher. School Juridical Institute. | He presented and successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK. activities among Soviet delegations and tourist ‘groups traveling abroad. “He re- ceived his diploma in August 1959. During 7 his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on- the- -job. training as a student | | assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's Second . (Internal Counter intelligence) Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on foreign diplomatic personnel. in Moscow ae ‘who were KGB targets. oe Subject was assigned as a | Senior Operational Case officer responsible for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, ee : Information (Reports) Department, First (Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters, —_ Moscow. His: function was to translate, edit | and summarize information reports, obtained by. _ KGB agents | abroad and to disseminate the pertinent information to the Central Committee of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including — KHRUSHCHEV, and, in. the case of information with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the ‘Minister of Defense. At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation. Thus" he examined registry logs showing. the titles of agent. information ‘reports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of | dissemination of the finished Russian n intelli? gence reports to the government.” a 2 te me ct was transferr u ri : eu er o ‘the Aner ican. ect tion ae
13-00000 August 1960: 15 December 1961:. 28 December 1961: 1962: or tne CI Department of the First Chief — Directorate, KGB, to prepare for assign- _ ment to the KGB residency under Soviet _ Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as” the CI officer working against: foreign intelligence services. Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true. | name was compromised through | the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and . with the cover title of Third Secretary. Subject, with his wife and young daughter | defected to the U. S. ‘Government which \ granted | them political asylum, ee: Subject met . Attorney General Robert ‘KENNEDY along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.° ‘Subject was’ debriefed by CIA ‘Sttucers, officials from other ‘US Agencies and teams of | 16 February 1962: 2 July 1962: 9 July 1962: 22 August 1962: | Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. _ Subject provided much valuable information on the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, aims and efforts against the Free World. : Subject, however, proved to be a aiegicult handling problen, especially as a. result of his personality and his ee ee ee regular meetings with high-level. US officials such as the President, the Attorney- -General, the Directors of CIA and ‘the FBI and for a policy role in the US Intelligence Community. — Subject had another meeting with the a | Attorney- -General. ‘Subject met again with the Attorney-General. and Mr. HELMS. . . . se Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS. ~ Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the. White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW, , Director ot USIA.
13-00000 - + 18 Nov. 1962:. nee 27 Nov. 1962: 14 December 1962: 21 Feb. 1963: Spring 1963: 8 August 1963: 22 August 1963: 23 August 1963: 4 Sept. 1963: October 1963- April 1964: 1964/1965:. June 1965: August 1968: October 1968: July 1970 te An FBI source reported. . shat the KGB was aware of Subject's presence in the U. s. A. and ordered _ all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately | any information which they may obtain regard- ing Subject. | | Subject met Mr. McCONE, ‘Ber, and protested treatment by the Agency. 7 Subject met ‘again with the DCI. - Subject and his family left N.Y. C. on SS Sylvania for England. o Subject worked with the British. | Subject returned to the U.S. AL | Subject met ‘the Attorney- -General again. Subject: met: the DCI again. : _ Subject met the DCI again and stated ‘that he z wanted to become an advisor to the DCT and . the Intelligence. Community. oe Subject an contact with the “Agency nostly aa the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative: to sone extent. | Subject, according to a- Dutch official, visited The. Netherlands. — : Subject interviewed by the Canadians RCMP) in the N. Y. Cc. area. Subject in contact with the British regarding we possible publication of his book. | An FBI source indicated that he had no current information concerning the KGB aan attitude ‘regarding Subject but the source / _. Stated that if the KGB. knew Subject's- location ait might undertake to. eliminate hin. 7 Subject was in contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida.
March L9722 - April 1972: September 1972 A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew | oh that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB. An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after” 1964. “Subject w: was in touch with CIA officials. A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a ‘copy : of the 1969 KGB ‘Alphabetical List of Agents — of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, — Members of Anti- Soviet Organizations, Members of Punitive Units and ‘Other Criminals under | Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed . Subject and his wife as under the ‘Sentence of -
13-00000 woot The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's. (Subject's) . professional career: September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the | 1945-1946: (1946-1948: 1948-1950: Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that time Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a - Counterintelligence School. ' Student at the one year course, ‘Military Counterintelligence School, _ GUKR/"'SMERSH, wo ". Moscow. - _ Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case | Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section CE - (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet ‘Colony ee _ security of Soviet officials: abroad) Depart- ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Head-— quarters in Moscow. During the period : November 1947 to: September - 1948 Subject held the title of Referent. and his office was designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI (Committee for: Information), but his functions were unchanged. Student at the two-year course, Higher Intelligence School of the KI. Subject — studied general subjects and the English language; he was one of 30 students who . ‘specialized in counterintelligence during the second year of the course. mo 0303s
13-00000 1950-1951: September 1951: November 1951: -. Desk officer, Operation“ Case Officer, supervising SK activities in China, assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern Depart- ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head- quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in.1949, At his request Subject was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, “Counterintelligerice ‘Department of. the First Directorate, MGB Headquarters in. Moscow. Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational . Case Officer." December 19S1: The KI,was dissolved and former state security elements were. returned to the MGB. Subject's functions continued the same, but, in the. reorganization, he was assigned to the cr. - Section of the American Departnent of ‘the: _ Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the. ‘March 1952: _ September 1952: First Chief Directorate of the MGB. Subject and an unidentified young colleague wrote a joint letter through the Central : Committee of the CPSU to STALIN ‘making suggestions for a fundamental. reorganization oF Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-_ intelligence work. | . While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a. four hour meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV, and BERIYA. "STALIN thanked the two officers for their suggestions, discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals.
13-00000 | March 1953: October 1953: August 1954; — for necessary reorganizations, together with the names of recommended chiefs. - In a subsequent letter they recommended © Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison for "political crimes," and. Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR. STALIN met Subject and his. friend a second. _ time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo- rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A ‘Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was then formed, containing a ‘Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and - seven geo- graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by | OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,. "supervising approximately iS. staff persons. ae , When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control of the State Security apparatus, which he combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he. replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the. _ Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject - supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany. - Oo | Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in Vienna, Austria, as an operational. case. officer in the Emigre Operations Group.. Subject was transferred to the British Sub- Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the KGB residency in Vienna. His duties. were of a -counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned. - with penetration of foreign intelligence. services.
13-00000 “1955-1959: S27 ~One or 170 Students at Thing the four year internal security- counterintelligence course, the. KGB Higher. School Juridical Institute. He presented and successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK activities among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad. He re- ceived his diploma in August 1959. During, his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on- -the- -job training as a student | assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief . Directorate, with access to operational files a on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow who were KGB targets. | September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational “Case. Officer responsible for NATO information. within the Treaty Organizations Direction, ae . Information (Reports} Department, First . (Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters, a Moscow. His function was to. translate, edit coe and summarize information reports obtained by ae _ KGB agents abroad and to disseminate the | pertinent. information to the Central. Committee of the CPSU, members of the Presidiun, including KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the Minister of Defense. At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation. Thus he examined registry logs showing. the . titles of agent information reports, the place e . | acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelli- gence reports to the government.” April LSGG Subject was transferred te the Auerican Sect ivn
13-00000 August 1960: 15 December 1961: 28 December 1961: 1962: 16 February 1962: Z2 July 1962: 9 July 1962: 22 August 1962; wee a on wee ea . Directorate, KGB, to ple re for assign- ment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as the C1 officer working against foreign intelligence services. | | Subject was assigned to the KGB ‘residency in Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true © | lame was compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN ‘in. Vienna), and with the cover title of Third Secretary. Subject, ‘with his wife and young daughter defected to the U. S. Government (Which . granted them political asylum, eee Subject met . Attorney General Robert ‘KENNEDY along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.° Subject. was’ debriefed by CIA officers, 7 officials from other US Agencies and teams of - Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. » Subject provided much valuable information on the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, — aims and efforts against the Free World. Subject, however, proved to be a difficult handling problem, especially as a result of his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-level US officials. such as the President, the Attorney-General, the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a policy role in the US Intelligence Community. Subject had another meeting with the | Attorney-General. Subject met again with the Attorney-General and Mr. HELMS. . _ Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS. Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr. Edward R.. MURROW, Director ot USLA.
13-00000 ; ~ 415 Nov. 1962: An FBI source reported, “at the KGB was aware | ~ of Subject! s presence in ‘the U.S.A. and ordered | all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately any information which they may obtain regard- ing Subject. | 27 Nov. 1962: Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested: treatment by the Agency. ' 14 December 1962: Subject met again with the DCI. 21 Feb. 1963 : Subject and his family left. N.Y.C. on | SS Sylvania for England. | co Spring 1963: | Subject worked with the British. 8 August 1963: Subject returned to the U.S. A. 2Z August 1963: Subject met the Attorney- -General | agains 23 August 1963: Subject: met. the DCL. again. a ees 4 Sept. 1963: . Subject met the pcr again and stated ‘that he | | wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and - the Intelligence. Community. E : October 1963- . . 7 . April 1964; Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in | | the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative | to. 7 some extent. : 1964/1965: ‘Subject, according toa Dutch official, | visited The Netherlands. 7 June 1965; _ Subject interviewed by the Canadians RCMP) din the N.Y.C. area. — August 1968: Subject in contact with the British regarding _ . possible publication of his book. October 1968: An FBI source indicated that -he had no | | current information concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source 7 stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location. it might undertake to eliminate him. July 1970 _, Subject was in contact with Agency personnel and visited Florida.
April 1972: September 1972 cre ey me pm ep em ee et lt EF oe that Subject had been sentenced to death - by the KGB. An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after 1964. Subject was in touch with CIA officials. A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of. (Sarena ae erento entrants eeerapa sti aneerorae=nnenanamerw/vacescunetntatth Punitive Units and Other Criminals under Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed) Subject and his wife as under the sentence of death for revealing Soviet State secrets. |. |
13-00000 a wl oa ¢ ® The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) . professional career: September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the 1945-1946: 1946-1948: 1948-1950: Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that time — ‘Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled ina. “ Counterintelligence School, Student at the one year course, Military Counterintelligence School, _ GUKR/"'SMERSH,' it. Moscow. Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section ere | - (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet. Colony ES _ security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart- ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign . Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. “Head- ao quarters in Moscow. During the period | . November, 1947 to September. 1948 Subject held the title of Referent and his office was designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the. Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI . (Committee for: Information), but his” functions were unchanged. Student at the two-year course, Higher Intelligence Schnol of the KL. - Subject studied gencral subjects and the English language; he was one of 30 students who . specialized in counterintelligence during the second year of the course. - 2303s
13-00000 1950-1951: =, __Desk officer, Operation, Case Officer, “supervising SK activities” in China, September 1951: November 1951: . December 1951: assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart- ment, First Directorate of. the MGB Head-.- . ‘quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949. At his request Subject. was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, ‘CounterintélTigerice’ Department of the First. Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow. Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational - . Case Officer." The KI, was dissolved and former state security oa elements were returned. to the MGB. “Subject's functions continued » the same, ‘but, in. the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI - Section of the American Department of the an ae _ Anglo-American (First) Directorate. of the March 1952: First Chief Directorate of the MGB. Subject and an unidentified young colleague . wrote a joint letter through the Central. September 1952: Committee of the CPSU to STALIN ‘making | suggestions for a. fundamental. reorganization of Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- ee | intelligence work. | While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV, and BERIYA.. STALIN thanked the two officers for their suggestions, discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals.
13-00000 | March 1953: October 1953: August 1954: “for necessary reorganizations, together with the names of recommended chiefs. Ina subsequent letter they. recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy — Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy chief of the NGB in the Uzbekistan SSR. "STALIN met Subject and his. friend a second © time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-- ' rate, with PITOVRANOV - as his deputy. A. Chief Intelligence Directorate of. the’ MGB a was then formed, containing a ‘Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and - seven geo- . ‘graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by . OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,, supervising approximately is. staff persons. aoe When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control | of the State Security apparatus, which | he combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he. replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees. | Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department. of the Second (new designation for foreign. | Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany. . Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in Vienna, Austria, as an operational case. officer | in the Emigre Operations Group. | | Subject was transferred to the British Sub- Group of the Anglo-American- French Group | of the KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a  counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned - with penetration of foreign intelligence services.
13-00000 "1958-1959: 2 ~one of 170 Students at: ou ng the four year internal security- -counterintelligence course, the KGB Higher. School Juridical Institute. He presented and successfully defended his thesis on the subject of SK. activities among Soviet delegations and | tourist groups traveling abroad. He re- ceived his diploma in August 1959. During his school tour Subject also spent several . weeks in on- -the- -job. training as a student assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief | “Directorate, with access to operational files - on foreign diplomatic personnel - in Moscow : ‘who were KGB targets. _ | . September 1959: Subject was assigned asa | Senior Operational Case officer responsible for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, | . Information (Reports) Department, First . (Foreign) Chief, Directorate,. XGB.. Headquarters, Moscow. His function was to translate, edit oe _ and. summarize information reports obtained by a ae _ KGB agents abroad and: to disseminate the a | | a pertinent information to the Central Committee of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including | ‘KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of. information | with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the Minister of Defense. At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation. Thus: he examined registry logs showing. the titles of agent information ‘Teports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelli: gence reports to the government . ' - = Oo the American Section “va a ae & if ais fSLee QT ua rn ca er, ct wa te fed joa 43 cy Lo) at wm... tf SUL J 4 fe! fo
13-00000 i a August 1960: 15 December 1961: 28 December 1961: 1962: 16 February 1962: 2 July 1962: 9 July 1962: 22 August 1962: Attorney-General. or tne Cl Department of the First Chief _, Directorate, XGB, to piv,wre for assign- ment to the KGB residency under Soviet Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as the Cl officer working against foreign intelligence services. Subject was assigned to 0 the KGB residency in Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true. name was compromised through the 1954 defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and with the cover title of Third Secretary. Subject, with his wife and young daughter defected to the U. S. Government which granted them political asylum. mee: Subject. met | Attorney General Robert ‘KENNEDY along with Mr. HELMS ,. DDP.: Subject was’ debriefed by CIA “Officers, officials from other US Agencies and teams of - Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. . Subject provided much valuable information on ‘the ‘KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, aims and efforts against the Free World. Subject, however, proved tor be a ‘difficult handling problen, especially as a result of. his personality and his constant demands for regular meetings with high-level US officials — such as the President, the Attorney-General, the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a policy role in the US Intelligence Community. Subject had another meeting with the © Subject met again with the Attorney- -General and Mr. HELMS. | . Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS. Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW, ‘Director of USIA.
13-00000 ry & 18 Novy. 1962: ° 27 Nov. 1962: 14 December 1962: 21 Feb. 1963. Spring 1963: 8 August 1963: 22 August 1963: 23 August 1963: 4 Sept. 1963: October 1963- April 1964: 1964/1965: June 1965: - August 1968: October 1968: July 1970 - the Intelligence Community. nm “JAN FBI source reported. _it the KGB was. aware of Subjects presence in the U.S.A. and ordered all Soviet Is personnel to report immediately | any information which they may obtain regard- ing Subject. | Subject met Mr. McCONE, ‘DCI, and protested treatment by the Agency. Subject met again with the DCI. ‘Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on SS Sylvania for England. Subject worked with the British. Subject returned to the U.S.A. “Subject met the Attorney- -General again. Subject: met the DCI again. - Subject met the DCI again and stated ‘that he wanted to. become an advisor to the DCL and Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in Te the N.Y.C. area. Subject was” cooperative to some extent. | Subject, according to a Dutch official, visited The Netherlands. 7 Subject. interviewed by the Canadians RCNP) in the N.Y.C. area. a - Subject in contact with the British regarding _ possible publication of his book... 7 An FBI source indicated that he had no current information concerning the KGB attitude regarding Subject but the source — stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location it might undertake to eliminate him. | Subject was in contact with Agency personnel | and visited Florida.
* “March 1972-4. ~ > April 1972: September 1972 ” har ager ot” _A KGB defector, LYALIN, | reported that he knew that Subject had been sentenced to death by the KGB. An article regarding this sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after 1964, “Subject was in touch with CIA officials. death for revealing Soviet State secrets. A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents _. of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, Members of Anti- Soviet Organizations, Members. “of Punitive Units and Other. Criminals under . Search Warrants. In ‘this List the KGB listed | Subject and his wife as under the sentence of we