(57000810226 : eee [2 /py . 7/2606 Date:10/07/93 Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM ( \ IDENTIFICATION FORM cen cme cece mn ree eww cen Sent ea mee me ee ee eas ak ae eee ek Gs eset D0 rae cow rome ah OO ro ms mse nn Sn nes ns snes nme Dm ge oye oe ye AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10226 _DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR ‘RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION RECORDS SERIES : IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED bi 198 AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R665 peo tem em ewe vee me mee ee tee ee aes ee ane ae ne ad hak a me ny me eta Gy Fae cee fe O00 Oke ee me meme meas re nek ee oe ED Pe ey rm tem eee wee tw ew rem my mm me Rw wy Ost tn ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO : TITLE : INTERVIEW SHEET DATE : 08/04/75 PAGES : 3 SUBJECTS : . INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY SHEET. INTERVIEW W/ ( MURRAY, WILLIAM DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS =: P DATE OF LAST REVIEW :. 10/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : BOX 437-3 [R] - ITEM ES RESTRICTED s HY 50955 Docld: 32203734 Page 1
ee GIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO AK b657 RELEASE ofrmis vocument INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY avg J AS SANITIZED / ; GE £ [10 { 44 INTERVIEW WITH? William J, Murray, Chief Latin America Division/Narcotics Agency phone: 351-4438, ‘ REGARDING: DATE-TIME“LOCATION: Carroll Arms Room 610, August 4, 1975 at 2:00 p.m. PRESENT: _DiGenova, Joseph E. EXECUTIVE SESSION: _ YES _ NO HY 50955 Docld: 32203734 Page 2?
INTERVIEW AND. MEETING SUMMARY Page 1 of 2 ROS ( ! Mr. Murray is currently operating under cover and no one other FILE: than his wife and two sons are aware of his agency relationship. . Biographical Information: Mr. Murray joined the agency on August 28, 1950 as a DDO officer. He was assigned to the Far East Division. In December of 1950 he went to the Near East Division where he remained as a Casa Officer until February of 1954. He went back overseas in April 1956 as a Western Hemisphere Division Case Officer. On January 9, 1957 he went to On approximately January 9, e went to Havana as a Case cer. On January 6, 1961, after 4 ic Trujillo was assassinated, he spent six months as acting deputy chief of station in| He left there in November of 1961. In January 1962 he went to| jas i6-U 27 —_ —— he remained until July _ - (He was then sent | He returned-to the” states in cirrencly ef of Latin American Division for Narcotics. His January 17, 1975 Memorandum to Colby His memorandum was written pursuant to a request from DCT ( Colby for any information that related te current allegations con- -.e ° cerning questionable CIA activities. He had never told anyone other than [__jand the Cuban pilot about the matter until then. According to Murray, the atmosphere in Havana was bombastic. "We were alert to the Cubans' attitude towards us. We-‘knew that the Cuban Security Service was interested in identifying CIA agents in Cuba." Among the people, he said, were those both very friendly and very hostile to the U.S. The opposition to Castro was, at that J time, very disorganized. The Pilot The pilot was introduced to Murray by the pilot's cousin. General assistance to the CIA by the pilot was offered. The Cuban was aware he had been identified as pro-Castro and anti-U.S. by Castro forces in Havana and he wanted to let the U.S. know that that was an inaccurate characterization. So he requested the rendezvous. He volunteered to help the agency in any way possible and agreed to accept stringent reporting requirements. On July 18, 1960, after the contact had been established, the Cuban pilot contacted Murray and told Murray that he was to pilot a chartered plane to Prague to pick up Raul Castro Ruz and his official nese, party. He sought instructions from the agency as to what intelli- ( ’ gence task he could perform. Murray immediately cabled Headquarters . for instructions -- "I sought assistance from headquarters re additional requirements.'' The Cuban Branch (WH 4) would have gas = Docld:32203734 Page 3
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 2 of ( *  vecteved his request. He asked for instructions re use of the pilot. Neither the pilot nor Murray suggested or intimated the possibility of assassinating Raul Castro. They were thinking in terms of simple hard intelligence “§ flight information concerning a denied country. He noted that ag aware of Mur ' elationship with the pvilot and that all cables were cleared by On July 20, 1960 head- quarters responded with a cable that made Murray “swallow hard" when he received it. "It left me rather surprised to say the least." That cable said that headquarters was seriously considering the "remov al'' of Cuba's top three leaders. (A blow-up of that July 21, 1960 cable (98941) shows that all authorizing signatures on the cable are those of E. H. Hinkle.) , Murray had never heard such proposals or plans or vlots dis- cussed at Havana station or elsewhere... Indeed, he had- not spoken to, persons above or belo pout such things. "Not only was I surprised, but I consideré @ possibility of this individual (the pilot) executing this,,type of mission was negligible." But he didn't question the orde vnen{ __“yaelivered him the cable. e said, was equally surprised by the statement in the cable. s cable represented "quite a departure from the con- ventional activities we'd been asked to handle."" When the cable was received there was a minimum of time (approximately fifteen minutes) to tell the pilot of the request for action by Headquarters. He met the pilot at a pre-determined spot and gmoke to him. He wanted to ( avoid the use of words like "kill" and hssassinate"” and so he "talked ~.. ‘ in terms of an accident to neutralize this leader's influence." But the pilot understood the meaning “loud and clear." The Cuban was serious, thoughtful and then became imaginative in terms of possibilities. They spoke for 30 to 35 minutes while the pilot drove to the airport. When he returned to the station, Murray discovered a cable from Headquarters, signed by Tracy Barnes which said to "DROP MATTER." of course, too late to "drop the matter’ so all he and uld do was hope that the pilot would not be successful in "accidentally" crashing the plane and, killing Raul Castro et al. The combined reaction of Murray ang__fo this abrupt turn about or flop on the part of Headquarters on SUCH a sensitive matter was one of incredulity. "What's going on if headquarters was our reaction." "Tt showed inadequate coordination at headquarters prior to release of the first cable." Moreover, such a turn-about was unprecedented in his, Murray's, experience. In his opinion, Hinkle would be-the best person to explain the activities surrounding the "removal" cable. Murray also noted that he had no personal contact with J.C. King on this matter and said tha ould have,done any briefing of King on Cuban matters. He did not know wnethey "Id ever raised the issue} of the reversal of position in the two with King or any other higher official of the agency. aero Dockd: 322703734 Page 4 ACB) 4(® Lip-