ia - a7 - Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission Stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit SEER ee its information to the Warren Commission, formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep. PP.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC Staffers.) Soh mes However, mtn el orote ot, Cont its " SSE the CIA's oe cived sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to ex Teliwars perience greater difficulty in getting sup information than when the protection of wip pe Such sources and Methods was not at issue. after such in- S, “rine tegen. anrbiuou, pow bebly Amn Bones y fi vo oe yay ee Sh ot hiaad the ye ar fp 7ted Ab cmcse, CiA 7 * Omt hn “7s J. Lee Rankin Protan ia, whew or 6 ote expressed the opinion that the Agency's wags to pro- ALwp Ons ; tect its sensitive sources and methods did —? Aegent pla Y 4 mm Qffect aman the quality of the information to Seema, orn. o D ™ the Warren Commission and i en access. yee OY : aa i : Mane ty 44.007 (Rankin at p. 23) [7 : from tts x3 : TR O- AR wha vee ponies ness thhe haeor bh mn at Agency wonniimueaie, unilatera decisions catia VI b RQCEST ¢e C/A €é< Gasp eM materialS pmeag i the Commission. og nt oN re on IA peler 0 Stam ony Age ms (scekso dep. by Gaih 3 : acer Oe w Lo Con enone tated whey <5§ r= Oop aan VEE TT er Ca geerr sources S90 £ : 33 § Sr investigatio®% to sorte! degrée: =a co (Resch Witkhy air rors “eB At iiss yen Etec by Popes photosurveillance an € $7 Po. oy fb ' Operations of the CIA's exicoy City Station ~- 3% efets af e 2) As a related consideration the*controversy sur- 8 oa $ i 3A e (A beto phrwsing Alco. ahs fe nat
- 18 - rounding™photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man" Each of these concerns will be examined &aepeegepeeress Grerein. The CIA's concern for revealing the existence -of sensitive technical Operations, as outlined above, was evident from the gibcoption of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that “we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep. ‘p.158) Scelso further testified: & We were going to give them intelligence re- yx ¥ ports which derived from all our sources, in- Q yr e cluding technical sources, tncluaing [ i ) , nd the information gotten ° . . “ . : orn V J * y from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which ation troy’ almost exactly & “ Fi with the information fro . . » Pe i( ) (Ext to Scelso quo all of p-5) Mr. J s characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission r. garding Lee Harvey Ztdanmewe Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (Cite.) Much of the informa- tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification ‘ of which had been deleted completely from the report. The OB ey Spaeigeep Limiting Warren Commission know- ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention o
~ 19 - “yin Order to protect your contin- \uing op> . Will rely instead .on ? Sosien of Silvia Duran and on iets’ gauf Sovi STAR Consular file which Soviets gav (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOLA 498-2 29Jan‘1964) ° The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal S ptcisl Lrvestigak i Ons Gfaup” of the CIA Counterintelligence/ Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison mem to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup- ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of Decmeber 9, 1963/Submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency wae nee eee. ) in Mexico, Papieh-—queried—o'Neat whether the FBI could wise supply the Warren Commission with"source of ) (The FBI had knowledge of crn ) V ‘}operations in Mexico City, see CIA § cr- ~3/779/510) Ww gh» wos" ; [uy ot Neai' S memorandum es he discussed this matter py with Scelso, who in turn, after a discussion with Helms, 4 . / eer erences ae en et ISS ET or ert, \ was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed a to the Warren Commission. / O'Neal wrote: is. \, He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the t ae Agency" s desire to make available to the Com- mission at least in this manner-~via the FBI- 1A aa information which could relate to (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Sub4 : Lee Harvey Oswald) ayes . ." eo
The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized 0 your Bureau. Beet CSC1-3/779/510) to the Warren Commission. .Helms wrote that the CIA had e become aware that the FBI had already: [es je 4 called to the at tig ion of the Commission, + “4 through its attorney, that we have informa- aed 3" tion (as determined from Agency sources) coin- Bo ciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico ny ya City and which may have some bearing on his oh Loe activities while in that area. (CSCI-3/779/510 / + IP ran GHD f of ws Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA sap De 4 A: DD callea upon to provide additional information acquired pr al from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He +h ZS bat va . beate. to yw suggest @that certain policies be. employed to enable CIA met: f | ( Cos paces © tn RRR eek w wel pewter tow to work ‘with the Commission s fbi Ahy Ea ae it ¢isif olm Helms claimaALoouly 7 Oe cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods. werk Among the policies articulated ae two which Ay 4 tive enabl@@ the Agency to control the flow Of tc formation § pre cifhe® > revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. TrRe—poli-
santatedtientthc ie * “nde oS hga es naatita wt wont 4) Your Bureau not: disseminathegr informaticn c re- x Oly . ; . . . AACA “otek f ceived from this Agency without prior concur- rence cen CAL, .2) In-instances in which this Agency has provided can -information to your Bureau and-.you consider ‘that information is pertinent to. the Commission's Carey interest, and/or compliments or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission 7) and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI ~3/559/710) iA Thess policy eliminating ef reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed \ by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, $i% vey sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. Liv duet cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques: was on ene still pgs withheld from the Warren Commission, Therein, it geSstated that, on Saturday, — No —_ a February 1, 1964) “CIA dip5to present a report on Oswald' s woe . Mexico City activities / ‘ko the Warren Commissionse——Hewever, Q.
f~ ply) 7 22 = ‘Le \n nfs em Hockasscl 4 ae” . the-form ofthis presentation <vaiittle Srpentareacm tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques. (CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63) . e dnd 2 Photo Surveillance Mr. Helms of fered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during cxf Phe COIN SS pm § ssBAK the initial stage of the CIA’ . : hana photo sur- veillance operations in Mexi city, ¢ : ‘ The reason for the sensitivity of these ) : ~ ‘ane surveillance was not only be- ' cause it wads sensitive from the Agency's . standpoint, but pra therefore, if this had become public ” knowledge, it would have caused very bad feel- \ ings between Mexico and the United States, w and that was the reason. {Helms - Exec Session \ vy hearing, PP- 51- w52. eee: éd La Rg Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to Le the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and d during the post- sassination D735 [sve foulet Fn the Comars Toomer, ¥ yi” AF of November 28, “1963 the White House, through information oO made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council? had haan rede Director McGeorge Bundy, ‘iil aware that the CIA ha : ae ae y in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Em~ Sey | 7 of 4” bassy/Consulatesand that through thes pswala's pre-  \sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been yer 4 orroborated. Ji fe Mc Cong, Ou. Fe tt. Gee op Bendy
- 23 ~ anaillagecss LS fis—a—source Fglnity ofconcern to this Committee. et is indicative of anagem . port co] A OS tH aned eked inits-fuvor +h Cow A Utermaemetre AENEPHE Pere” to ioriireacacoccen deem ae whet A Lelt A ncoacker tebe ¢ substance aimee e Tawa information a: provided the Warren Gommission. (See Scelso debty This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro- ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, even_thes@ which-might-have meant—exposing—certain-sensi- tive operations to-the-commtssion, He'll haw Ye rae LIC We pucatlry of As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA Comp (etch, rey fhe, provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that ast le a i oa chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit@ during ~* <¢/f2 en TE September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum ‘on ba aid thot f ee TO COtLON <aitt itt ii aaat Oswald' Ss various conver- fe sations with the Cuban and Sovpet Embassy /Consulates hac a, beef ‘pra day transcribed. Furthermore, ai JD that memorandum sau Sa ndfrention immmameeee that the CIA wn ( )transcribed conversations between Cuban An Zz. ood ~ Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at aM) we the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the on re : : we conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban 3lz0 ° . . l Aide Ambassador to Mexico nd ft aan (iv transcribed.
On February 1, 1964,Helms appeared before the pa : ‘Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memoran- dum of January 3/ , 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that a Ars we «ting tt: 25 Of UIM=nppeaumnbewe, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of ° \ ( be the production i.e., the tapes and trans- . ~ cripts, from that Operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb- . ruary 10, 1964 [2+#r whether Oswald's direct communica- tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in | the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com- mission had been informed of” 4 ) ( :jand its succes Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.” Gued po Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between - the time period of January 1964 - April 1964), Warren Com- mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquar- ters in Langley; Virginia and had been shown various trans-~ \ - eripts resulting from the CIA's ) f Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Nr Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren as ‘ eit , Commission earned of these operations.
~ 25 - On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indi- cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate an was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did ne re ws . . ; ; . . . net revealéthe source of this information in its response thy a to the Commissiog¢pr indicate/that it would be revealed by Other means (e.g. by oral briefing). a He . Aorta FL 62 4 WQAle { ) : Vv. During the period of March - April 1964, David : Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access \ , h. to the production material derived from thé’ ) - ‘yn Mexico City. A review of . é = \ these memoranda tend to support the Committee's belief — ty *7 . a et tne that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, 4,41 and Willems did not obtain access to crf ) pe . \ . 4 C )nti April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, , 4°, BF son and Willens met with.Win Scoi:., the CIA's Chief paid. £ Station in Mexico Cit rovided them with various fo) ation in Me Y /RE p transcripts and translations derived ere Y of tue Cupan and Soviet Embassy/Consuiates. (Slawson & memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: is . A * Herr, Prior to a CAL it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,
jet fa tt 1964, _the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA di ) ‘ (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with i the Cuban Embassy /Consulate. . CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals ~eiet the Warren Commission had learned that ClA —eE==yy=eeg possess tak transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. Porrices- Acmes | Theas? conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, ne,|~e concerned Silvia Durffa's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal pe Ger o> Police (cite?). @Gaatew@ey Helms responded to the Com- spei hs mission's request for access, ggguuiseememeeem that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commissions representativeg™ fo review < this material. ‘Slawson memo, March 12, 1964) It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-arma(s yas detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the \ cI es Mexico City. (cPeR one or the other could well have provided the War- - ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray- mond Roqas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep. ) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.
- 27 - | ee, fer Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated Cerce(nets - Eo, Oswald's that he had reache¢ memoranda@® of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, that the tentative conclusions Mexico trip, were derived from CIA and ,in addition a Mexican federal police summary Geprof interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote: A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, Qsic3 an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu- rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. These comments indicate that saffwson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that salftson had been provided the Duran . )ranscripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments conerning the Meiftan police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission,as. of March 25 / 7 had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ag in sert Pas The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been: given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. ‘This conclusion Wre wef he Viteisogeniss based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testi- ‘ : Wis pramecan due bear’ mony before the Mexican police. Ce eo eemtes no -
Fea we ts Goeth TRA TR FN . oe sue-( (CIA indication that he hag reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, win(Slawsoy nadbeen given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis puoUla havaeet lected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or abov’ et IF REnsxtpar criticism of the Mexican police summary report. g@March 25, 1964, they ttl not been given $ Sdawdseon a S10, 2 he Commission had- be reference to the surveillance operations, and ummMaryn, POo- lice report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for it over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera- tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem- ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station: Our present plan in passing information to thg Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave Jasee: able, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)
uy oa . . &# =e | Ath cimes. He statedffhat this conclugiap was based upon his yy : ai " Pi ta (Slawson megfOrandum, Marge) 1964f CIA p. gf?) Howeyer, y se | y ; Slawson g®es not state that his, onclusiop# were alsgfdrawn from review of ‘ff the préfuction Frfm the Mexj&o City statid@n su eillgince operaffio S. SHawson daes—Yndicate, howevar, thaWhis-feasoning ~wHommrTouoIS regarding Oswald's visit to-the Cuban«nibassy* Logically, access to the _- production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy re- questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was [«*& determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem- ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran. telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an american?” Bast ed by CIA analysts as . Oswald ws oe the Cuban Embassy. Thus, gee visited the Cuban Embassy—on-at—least—two-octastons. Moreover, the specific dateSand_exact-timesof-his—presence inthe Cuban Embassy Age establiched_as_the-result of the. pea this information been made available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These-transeripts
- 30 - é q ission at—its@fneeption. but—ac—_the recor —imiicatestheyawere not then—made—avaitlable. m The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not ye been given access to the above-referenced series oi ) pa v f re a memorandum of that date by Coleman a él fv hsb AP O , mye yeand Slawson, theyé -Loul: ne two requests for information from the Agency r (Ambassador oné question to the CIA and Nann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Cole manana es Ble SP Cotes i? 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa; . Kt LJ 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts pe of th \wranslatea if possible, in all cases where enf re to the assassination or related subjects; 3) We would especially like to se \) in which the allegation that money was passed v J ) at n Embassy is discussed . $ vi The question y posed’ in the above-referenced 3 Sv v emorandum of April 2 concerns the CI ) be ; ) \v y ot September 27, 1963 at 10:37 aT. ( wson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Gesessartiy is Slawson —sm~ fourdtt Orne tec equest a the source of the information, he had not. been ayy yr Ce
GS Persie request Gap 7 “ends 48 600 the Com mi Seron _y Jeven access, concerning the assassination (as, oes NAF nn Se Ae Be A | am ated Cp ee fe rel evens? SETS ah reenchalrhdle ato: oN aan TS maces (. ; BS Goripts COM af Ree mw, : SP Hae nee giver Spcessxhos ay" UE Me subject maferials The Gecond Pequest, item number three of the above listing? reveals that of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies @@ discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. —@f the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re- ‘he nee tie. resentativese (Cite.) * oegics Pp 4a ro > . J On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson artieutated their concern for receiving complete access to all material™ relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They-wrote:— fhe most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con- spiracies, etc. took place.
-~ 32 - --e-in order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed | through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investigatory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators yw themselves. ae The thoroughness of investigation which Coleman and Slawson articulated as a vital concern to the Commission's. work had been @&& thwarted by the CIA's W@l@%&—concern Gt v sources and methods Pwelevant , expords Cong Abily to the Commission's investigation, the Timited number of persons engaged in an investigation of a gravity and historical signifi- cance unprecedented in this nation's history +KiT m é gh Grom tha © arren Commiss:0a s tage wo asta tens able So | { On April 9, David Slawson, Howard WilTens;—and a 1% v7 William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. Prior to their departure, they met with Thomas Mann, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's skal ¢ assassination. Ambassador Mann i the Warren Commission representativeY¥that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. -)
-~ 33 - Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA. That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the # Cedenpented woth ee HOY (Oey ery ~ Papacy. ne English translations. @f the ‘same In addition, e provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances David Slawson wrote: ",..Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22) Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives . the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination, \ Scott indicated that his staff dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and whom the CIA knew had had some Scott revealed all known Cuban aa « . . hod immediately been put under imacdiaktly Seupeepemet began to compile everyone else throughout Mexico contact with Oswald (p.22). and Russian intelligence agents surveillance following the \ assassination. iaison was set up with Mexican officials, “yt Yi v/particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the v _ Mexican Golernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded sea=
es % "Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis- closed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's © reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit. " PPR bee? Ve Of aa fis Slawson' Ss memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealVexclusively with Dp rtaining #@,seapectively? “the Duran and Oswald conversations Sortfhe perueh Sept a7—Oct / ) 1963. It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this cas ) seriously impaired the Commission's GEA, rca. ; ability to draw*conclusions jregarding Oswald! S$ sojourn in Mexico SS ee ee as SRCRRRSCaSE It meant that as sare City, Sake at Pt Sa EN of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact “on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise could have horn materials e@eme available for analysis by the Commission.
ke prea g cctv GPs Le uber lisnct 12 aw wlhnnce. We Ly hate n RIUM ORL Thus, the Agency's “Garly policy of not pfoviding the Commission with t8%® vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation | that might have been more seriously considered had ee > material been expeditiously provided; CTT Gn ie TES — Shoe hl - CG a aera “a Ge maton > Mexico City Mystery Man On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no | physical resemblance to her son. THEE photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on oswala>” This photograph was one in a series had been linked by the Mexico City Statio Prior to the on fee assassination,-d¢ a pLee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. C cake Ha baes 266) deat. in Week) On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that weet ? ‘she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153)
- 36 - Ae Add - + The ne Kacnnanwe on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote < omas Kourramesin ts Acssturt ro watt Sodd CO rare, wiiedonerimmoseminnneen': / fagxectng the > yer adh vcd Chet beer pags dott ied S this photograph“by the ye On that same-day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone, e M xankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret , x Zine Pose rsra \. ry Servites tha the CIA had disseminated”several reports or ‘s vet communications concerning the assassination to the Secret ey y, Service séem wr os we - v wp 4° reports and other materials. Taree ths cables tiaayoyeg@@® “eee ac iey nally de act Fred c concerned vasisiet the photograph of the individual ieee? py rb Mtaice C: 44 Station of - on eae. Te uested copies of these Numi Oswald an ubsequently shown to Oswald's mother. 4 ~ wv Ld bw ay chacheses ppm b> oT ra tay wert’ disseminatedto the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR85177), a Gepy-of-whieh-wrs~trarremttted"to ices breuteorwee= Serre. That cable concerned the Dorimms-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence o , ) prerations in Mexico City*at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:
"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had {of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?" Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission. Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations. \ (Scelso deposition, 150) ~* Febraay fan 146, the Warren rn = Req Ae td Commission os Coreen access to a saurve ake once(an te the CIA. Protection’ (as discuégsed in the YY 7 Spi jar Selasat® vrclen, we le Louw f preceding section), the —sowas of the photosurveillance operations, bo Yha Woolen COMME fan Maud, f wmmie Lote. alse ; ee CO Cause concern within the Agency. On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since Novem ber 23, \ 1964. Rocca then stated: y” “unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by ree, \ paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 a letter). If they. come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to N go over to show the Commission the material rather than ae if pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these a yy, items are of new substantive interest. We have either Ms prose the material in substance to the Commission in “y fesponse to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous Sqx yee which are not of Oswald..." pre A\(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)
Ger On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding the February 12 -request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and Slawson memo, March 12, 1964) | The’ record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communica- tions techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrase are complete." (Rankin letter of March 16, 1964, #2) Rankin further indicated that the same procedure to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, 1963 which had not yet been furnished Concerntd, because it ismumiRS@ sensitive sources and methods. (Rankin \ letter of March 16, #3) Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (DDP4-1554, CD631 and DDP4-1555, CD 674) by two separate communications. CD631 provided. the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (SS on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald ‘and his presence’ at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had
requested two copies of the most recent photograph. of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald TAYS by checking the photograph against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on. November 23, 1963. CD 674 reveals that on November 22, 1963, immediately following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency further stateg{ that the subject of the photo referenced éa in these cables was not Oswald. It s@® further stated that: "In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the regional copies..of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based,as well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA, p- 116444 of notes) On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record: . "The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24,19 (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the- dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested."
3 3 2 g | an ‘ Coleman went on to state: "As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed \ Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I ( hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the ‘ eh answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this y } inquiry." _ / ? \er 4. The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. e€his vis it . a stern$0 memorandum“reveals that he reviewed Oswald's ile with Raymond Rocea.—Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The fi1@ also contained: | a MY cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from \L the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photo- graph of the unidentified individual mistakenly » believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on ae those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to " a the Secret Service by the CIA. Vw Stern noted that these messages were accurately para- Perea phrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren \ Commission on March 24, 1964. yA “Stern also reviewed ~ x CIA' . | e October 10, 1963 cable from exico City Station to the CIA headquarters porting. Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background information on Oswald.
The ee atete ee sw + C buck: To pit read New) Atan¥ Grew, ¢ wp € IV Oa ft wa etek 41 aie Aeteve A a rey t Loe Stern noted that these messages were also paraphrased accurately as ‘Meta in the CIA's January 31 memo to the : el Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City crip. Do Tgp Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswaldre lakeed decuments located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased." | Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representa- tive had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the 4 mysterious ue bee e pelle ta ew be phan Cot etn Ten VII. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission Relationship It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central intelligence and one of the $even members of the ‘ct Oo aa balc ar]. Warren Commission Gonceaied/ crucial information ms the Warren Commission. specifically, the Senate Select Committee conclude phta iH gh ‘with the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely ge that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA ger assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the \27 4 CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place > PL. during his tenure at the Agency." (SSC, Book V, pp. 67-68) However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship an allegiancegof Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former DCI of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles'
service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which indicates Dulles «aes 00h providiuamp information to the CIA regarding. Warren Commission £4 mé mean dis om «dene tee chow activities and investigative policies. atle atone that Dulles acted as an informant on*occasion for the CIA. the contro- aeneeenemmmemnaiene any versial case of the xseian « defector Nosenko. The memorandum was written by David vid_Murphy, Chief of ‘the Soviet Russia Division) cerlariy CSACE red ait \ oe s interrogation. David Murphy's memorandum,of July 8, 1964, concerned his discussions with Alla 1 <EENOsenkoYs knowledge of Oswald. i um was prepared for DDP Helms ; ar aa ntti v 4, wt - —=. Murphy wrote: I "Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report." Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language “which would allude to the existence ef other, unverified information on the Oswald case." This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point ata future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko information.