"Na ENCLUSURE | | G2-143 9757 13 ee ee ee
ay" . . ‘ . . . . -* REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION ~ TO: The Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence “+ Agency . . a FROM: The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Guidelines 1. The attached request is not intended to call for a general file search. ~ of the Agency. Rather it is intended to call for various significant documents available in the upper levels of the Agency. Without foreclosing any further file review that may seem appropriate to agency personnel familiar with agency files, we would suggest the following offices (current a and past files) as likely sources for initial review: . (i) The U.S. Intelligence Board staff and Ics . (11) Offices of the Director and the Deputy Director/CZA’ (111) Offices of the General Counsel and Legislative Counsel/CIA ‘ (iv) Offices of the © Comptroiers Inspector General, } Historical Studies : and Finance/¢ TA 2. ‘The requests are addressed to the Director, ‘both ‘in his 5 capacity a as . Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence . ‘and Chief Executive of the United States Intelligence Board. so: . 3. Rather. then walting ‘until all materials are available, : it would be helpful if any particular group is produced when ready. . ae OAs previously discussed, ‘please advise va there ‘are categories of material where it would be appropriate for Committee staff members to review called for . material on the Agency premises in order to cull out the most pertinent materials. 5. The request covers documents in the covered offices wherever originated _ (including other departments or agencies). If any document referred to is believed ° by the Agency to be in the possession only of another agency or department, advice . to that effect plus an indication that the Agency would not object to its being made evailable to the Committee, would Facilitate an expeditious inqnizy. HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 71
= a_i REQUEST FOR INFORMATION "Te _ OUTSTANDING rPsrs The Agency has agreed to provide the Committee with (1) charts indicating the organizational history of the CIA; (2) identification of headquarters per- sonnel; and (3) budgetary and cash flow information. The following is a further elaboration of the kind of material in each of these categories which is necess- ery for the Committee's basic understanding of the Agency: _ A. Organization Charts and Personnel - The charts reflecting CIA organizational | " “history down to the Branch level should be accompanied by annotations or a nar--— |; rative explaining when particular units were formed, merged, expanded or abolished. The narrative should also indicate any changes in lines of authority, reporting responsibilities, and functions for each unit. Changes in unit designation which were not accompanied by substantive changes should be noted. ; The charts should include the organization and staffing arrangenents of the USTS, - the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and its | predecessors, and the Forty Committee and its predecessors. ; aan . The identification. of personnel should include all officials and t supervisors down to the Branch Chief and Deputy Branch Chief level, and to the executive assistants for the directors or deputy directors of all Divisions, Offices and Staffs and — similar assistants for any officials above those levels. . ; . B. Budget and Cash Flow = The budgetary information should include both the , budgets oo proposed to OMB and the final budgets approved. ‘The cash flow data should include the funds actually appropriated,. their location in the appropriations for other | Departments and agencies, and an indication of whether funds transferred from  par- > ticular agencies are earmarked for particular uses within the CIA. Laat . II.- SPECIAL REPORTS OR STUDIES ; ‘ " ’ The following are requested: in their dnexpurgated form (at ‘the highest level of classification} with all appendices, annexes and transmittal documents: ; 1. The Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report on'the Intelligence Community __. 2. 1949 and 1955 Hoover Commissions, Intelligence Task Force Reports . . . 3. 1953 Historical Study of the Expenditure of Confidential Funds prepared by the General Counsel's Office. 4, 1954 General Doolittle Report on the CIA ‘5. 1960 Bureau of The Budget study of intelligence activities’ _ 6. 1961 Taylor Report on covert action and the intelligence community qr: 1962 Organizational study of the CIA initiated by John A. McCone 9 10 . 1964 Study by John A. Bross, Frederick Nolting and Major General . John Reynolds a . 1965 Study of CIA initiated by Admiral: Reborn — . 1965 Study for the Director on CIA air propriataries mt coe 11. 1967 Internal CIA study for the Director on CIA activities at educet ional facilities in the United States . . 12. 1967 Katzenbach Study (with John Gardner and Richard Helms) « on CIA - domestic activity ; 13. 1967 Cunningham Study on the intelligence community ; 14, 1967 (or 1968) Eaton Committee Report for the DCI on NSA and the National . Intelligence Resources Board Study for DCI on NSA . ; 15;. 1967 (or 1968) report for DCI by the Senior Executive Group on the intelligence community © . 16. 1970 Study under Admiral Wilfred McNeil on CIA Financial procedures os 17. 1971 OMB study under James Schlesinger of the intelligence community 18. Executive Order of November 5, 1971 restructuring the intelligence community. 19. 1973 CIA internal review prepared for James Schlesinger on the CIA on 20. Additional studies specified in Appendix D of book furnished the cr, 4 Committee staff on March 5, 1975 7 _ III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND OPERATING PROCEDURES A. Legal Authority: - : 1. All files dealing with the history of the -agh9 CIA Act and the CIA sections of the 1947 National Security | Act. HW 55073 Deécld:32989530 Page 72
HW 55073 i ~, x . & ‘ . -2- - 2. All agreements on jurisdiction or operational authority between the CIA and other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 3. <All legal opinions, memoranda or other materials analyzing the 1947 a and 1949 Acts, Executive Orders or National Security Intelligence Directives in regard to: (a) the authority of CIA to conduct covert actions - (b) the authority of CIA to conduct particular categories of activity, or specific activities, within the U.8., including without limitation: S (i) the collection or maintenance of information or files on U.S. citizens $3 (ii) the conduct of domestic surveillance on U.S. citizens or foreign nationals; “~ (iii) the organization and operation of proprietary organizations (c) the appropriate scope or application of the agreements requested in — supra, including documents prepared in connection with their negotiation (a) the applicability to CIA of restrictions placed by Congress on the use -6f funds included in appropriations from which CIA funds are transferred ~ “(ej the generation or use of funds from any source other than appropriations transferred to CIA, and the investment for profit of funds from any source’ 4, ALL legal opinions, memoranda or other material analyzing the desireability or effect of legislation proposed or considered to alter the authority of the DCI or the nature, structure or powers of the Agency in areas other than employee compensation and benefits or headquarters construction. This should include analyses of the CIA amendment to the 197 Military Aid Act, whether prepared before or after its adoption. 5. All Director Central Intelligence Directives ("DcIDs") * Operating Procedures 1. An index of all major directives, guidelines, regulations, manuals or similar materials which prescribe or explain authorization and reporting procedures 2. Directives, guidelines, manuals or similar materials describing the various filing systems of the Agency . 3. Specifically, all directives, guidelines, manuals or other materials prescribing or explaining procedures to be followed and the authorization and documentatior~»- required in connection with covert operations, including without limitation: (a) field or headquarters initiation of proposals +} planning and modification of proposals approval for commencement, continuation or renewal, and termination (a) field reports on .the conduct or results of operations (e) evaluations following operations " . The materials should indicate the criteria which determine the level of authorization required--Division Director, Deputy Director for Operations, DCI or Forty Committee--for a particular operation. They should also indicate ry ! the procedures and documentation involved in CIA inter-agency staff coordination and CIA staffing for the review by the principals on the Forty Committee. To the extent the procedures described differ from those previously in effect, furnish earlier directives, guidelines, manuals or similar material regarding such previous procedures and provide a narrative description of how and when these procedures have changed from 1948 to present. (Request #3 is confined to procedures so that the Committee can subsequently better understand CIA operations in the covert action area.) Financial Procedures In addtion to budgetary and cash flow figures, the Committee will need explanatory information to understand the financial operations of CIA. This request consists of all directives, guidelines, manuals and other materials governing or describing: 1. Procedures for preparing and discussing budgets with OMB, including ident-~- fication of the documents involved in the process 2. The general procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing which are used either within the CIA or in connection with Executive or Congressional oversight 3. All special procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing in regard to particular funds or types of activity, e.g., proprietary organiza- tions, currency transactions, or the discretionary fund of the Director. DoclId:329895350 Page 3 4 4
Re rama can here hencreanens  Meeennabseareriinine cermin Rete cite | nines ervmneetetientire m-muetmannes-fimanminstihn daha qatasie arn annmanrinsimnakvtRAtaNAtahtGA enti h ” ‘ _ > _° — “ yy” he . , n 1 woe ly ‘ ¥ - ro. * YQ , -3- he ALL Bureau of the Budget and OMB examiners’ reports on the Agency, and all memoranda and reports provided by the Intelligence Community Staff 7 to OMB D. All Annual Reports of the Inspector General and all Inspector General reports for the past five years on all components of the Agency. E. The Agency's "Allegations and Résponses" files COMMITTEE All materials reviewed or used by the Office of the Director in preparation for }} Director Colby’s testimony on January 15, 1975 before the Senate Appropriations me Committee, including materials referred to in such testimony, (a representative list of which has been furnished to Central Intelligence Agency staff by the Senate Select Committee staff) . | AW 55073) Docld: 32989530 Page T4 a eee a
Wy ormboroR 6 COLBY'S PUBLIC SENATE TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC OPERATIONS ‘Refereace 18 made to Director Colby's public testimony ge January 15, 1975: before the Senate Appr ations Committee, in which re Colby identified several documents basic) an understanding of the Ager.'s domestic operations. The following requests are based on that testimony. Parenthetical page references after each reguest indicate the page of Director Colby's testimony where ‘the the items requested were identified. “1. The directive or other documents establishing the Domestic Operations Division, ’ “defining its authority and stating its missions; all subsequent directives or other documents revising its authority or missions; (p. 13) 2. The directive or other documents in 1972 reflesignating the Domestic Operations Division the Foreign Resources Division; .(p.13) 3- The directive or other documents defining the authority of the “cover and commercial staff" and stating its missions (p.13) 4, The directive or other documents establishing on August 15, 1967, a unit within the Counterintelligence Office "to look into the possibility of foreign links _ to American dissident elements,” or defining the units authority and stating its missions; (p. 19) . 5. The August 29, 1967 letter from the Executive Director to the Kerner Commission; - The September 1, 196T reply of the DCI to the Kerner Commission and all attachments thereto; (p.19) . - 6. The directive or other documents establishing CIA participation in "an interagency / program in support of the National Commission, among others." (p.20) 7- The document resulting from the DCI! s review of the unit created on August 15,1967 in which he coneluded it was proper, "while strictly observing statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency: domestic involvement;" (p.20) 8. The directive or documents governing GIA participation in-the preparation of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee Plan C the "Huston Plan"), and the directive or documents governing CIA participation in the Interagency Evaluation ‘Committee , when the. Huston Plan was abandoried. (p.20-21) xs «69. The document authorizing the operation in which. "the Agency recruited or inserted . about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles ‘in order to establish . their credentials for operations abroad; ($.22) ‘oO. The 1973 diréctive limiting .the program described’ in request #9; (p. 22) ° 11. The directive or other. documents..which in: merch "L974 terminated the- program ; described--in request #79 (p. 22) ‘12,.The directive or other documents authorizing the elimination from files of material Americans: generated from the program’ descscribed in request. #93; (p.23) 13. The directive or document authorizing the deStruction- in March 1974 of thd IDIU _ tape listing of 10,000 Americans received by CIA in May 1970; (p.23) 14. The directive orother documents authorizing the program to insert agents into. dissident organizations in the D.C. area to protect CIA installations, personnel, and information.; if a new unit was established within the Office of Security =... 0 Operate this program,.the directive. or-othenadocumeiits establishing the new unit, definiting its authority or stating its missions. (p. 23) ih, (e iy or other documents terminating. the program described in request fly D2 15., Indicate all lists "developed ‘at various times in the past ... which do appear ; questionable under CIA's authority" ( do not supply lists); (p.26) .- 16. All “current directives" prohibiting maintainance of the kinds of lists described in request #15; (p.26) _L7- May 9, 1973 directive requesting employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other docurfigts | reflecting oral responses to this; (p-. 27) "“ 18. The documents prepared for or constituting the "internal review" which resulted from the responses described in Request fe 173 (p. 27) 19. All documents containing "policy determinations and zuidance that van Lf etis n proper Trin Sugust 1 2 a ac tivities remain vithin prop ARS in Su 1973; (P: 7 Git G2 24/62 FST HW 55073 Docld: 327989530 Page 75 fa OC AG a QQ be LE ws FyE..
&. a -h. programs wittWgf the CIA or at its direction een 1953 and February, 1973; (o. el. The directive or other document terminating mail inspection programs in February, 1973; (p.32) ro « SA . > . . 20. The directiveg@ other documents cctablishin (yy mail inspection 22. The documents prepared for the review of CIA assistance to other federal, state and local government components; all documents terminating or modifying such assistance as a result of that review; (p.33 23. All directives subsequent to the directive of May 9, 1973 which similarly requested employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives; (p.34) 2h, All internal regulations,policy statements or similar documents pursuant to the recommendations of the Katzenbacj task force in 1967. (p. 35) 25. The Presidential Directive of October 9, 1974 regarding reorganization of the intelligence community. HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page T6
| OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES _ ce. Fir. a x Dep. AD sng Dep Sal |) Memorandum “f ce 2 Comp. Syst. ito  . Mr. Adams DATE: 2-20-75 Ext Afftes — A Alin ou 6 Gen. Inv. Ath TNVORVATION OM TTALTED Ident. ‘Nix: a any ™ Inspection FROM : Legal Counsel. of HERE a ICUASSIY £8) nell O i 4 pass 9/95/60 1S 2 eG Od Leo — Plan. val. suBJECTY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ijl: ie ae ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Hest ant hall bon. Ne cae ten eS ACRE ART RAGE EI weet cumennre # Telephone Rm? Director Sec’y __ On 2-19-75 Inspector Bowers talked with William Miller, Staff Director of captioned Committee. Miller was asked if the Committee had established a possible timetable concerning hearings. He stated they are "months" away from formal hearings but that they expect to begin taking testimony in closed sessions to "'build a record" in about two weeks. RE NOO RT. A EPR, Miller said these sessions will be conducted by a Member of the Committee but will basically involve questioning of various agency officials, not at the Director level, to provide basic information about the administrative structure, legal basis, objectives and mission, and budget of the various agencies in which the Committee will have an interest. Miller was requested O give us specific notification as far in advance as possible concerning such testimony sessions so that we would have sufficient time to prepare the necessary material. Miller said this would be done. Miller stated he would doubt that the Director would be needed | for any testimony for some time unless the Director wishes to be involved in the early stages of providing basic information. } It seems apparent that the Committee still is uncertain of its course of action. Miller commented that the Committee will probably follow much the same procedure as used in the impeachment hearings where extensive testimony was taken in closed sessions and used by the Members and staff to prepare for the later public hearings. It seems apparent that John Doar and his staff who worked on the impeachment hearings will play a major role in the Select Committee operations. Doar and a number of his former impeachment | staf Z members already are working with the Select io RECS” 2 “ / Me 32 4 To date, we have received Pee ests from the Select Committed’: for investigations of potential staff people in connection with the éled thet dP ties Se people by CIA following certification by the Committee. These investigations.are., being handled by the Special WH vu ona a deadline basiseyy RECOMMENDATION: le i / Hor tnformation, | (ju o- \" a h 1- Mr. F t 1 heen TevelantQ7% t t. Farrington \ i. Me Mintz i - Mr. Bowers DWB:kjs (8) ge it 006 | HW 55073 Do @: 32989530 Page TT? aa
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| OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES Beev0wr Memorandum | ct 5010-106 . £ , » z Assoc. Dir. res Comp. Syst. , "\ ‘Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 3/14/75 Eek Cam 4 ee Zz ren: Inve FROM :Legal Couns by | \E , 7 Labo . Plan. & Eval. _ sume QENAT E_SELECT. COMMITTEE # DEE cop Pilea ONINTELLIGENCE ~~ hTERT nee NE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE monsed ERECT OO. pail Director Sosy ONINTELLIGENCE - natn 195-06 HW 55073 During a meeting attended by Section Chief Cregar, Intelligence _ Division, on March 14, 1975, it was approved by the Deputy Attorney Eb General and Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, and concurred hy in by William Colby, Directot of CIA, that the Chairman of the two captioned! At committees should be approached and asked whether they would make Y a Committee request for the offices of members to be examined for any N ‘ electronic surveillance devices. Offices occupied by staff members » PS would not be included in their proposed search. . “~ RECOMMENDATION: ‘ ny The Legal Analysis Office will contact Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi to inquire sf they;, acting as Chairman of their COPY FILED respective committees, would make a committee request for such a bhes 0 : ‘ a search to be conducted. aeepubstiif ny Clisetisen et, ope pee EGE Bb iaital crete “ aks . VA, Mn o —é ‘S 1 - Mr. Wannall a Bo iS 1 - Mr. White Yat ' OR 1- Mr. Farrington pie LY pa? 1 - Mr. Bowers pt my PQ 1 - Mr. Hotis 4 fe 1 - Mr. Mintz . § JAM: mid _) woe fe ? ea ry ees 26 MAR 31 1975 Docld: 32989530 Page 79
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 IRA 1962 EDITION | GSA ct, reQ. NO. "27 ; UNITED STATES VERNMENT F Memorandum Comp. Syst. TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 2-6=75 Pike 8 Com Gen. Inv. : , b 28%, Ieneevion ff FROM : Legal Counsel a Ate oP Sit ty Ire 7 Naty ec * ese oo { - Laboratory « | MSG Sea tera SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE pass CO i A ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES THEA eS Rm. y 34 Director Sec’y __ Reference McDermott to Jenkins memorandum of 1-31-75 recommending contact with Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) concerning the procedure for clearing staff personnel for captioned Committee. Contact was made with the Senator's office on the morning of 2~6-75 to arrange an appointment. The Senator's secretary advised that his schedule was so crowded that it would be impossible for him to discuss this matter for several days. She said he requested that we discuss this situation with William Miller, who the Senator intends to have head the Select Committee staff. Miller was contacted on the morning of 2-6-75 by Inspector Bowers, accompanied by Inspector Hotis. It was explained to him that the FBI has no authority to issue clearances as such but that in conference with Central Intelligence Agency officials it had been agreed that the FBI will investigate prospective staff personnel, furnish results of the investigation to Senator Church / as the Select Committee Chairman, and CIA will issue actual clearances based 4? on certification from Church. Miller agreed to this procedure. He was furnished [ a small supply of SF 86, Security Investigation Data for Sensitive Position forms. It was pointed out to him these forms should be filled out in complete detail and furnished to us along with a current set of fingerprints. It was suggested the applicahts for these pose ia . the any, , 3 he pea nt. Miller stated th they would need repults of ieee ard oatio s y soon as possible and after some discussion he agreed that a two week deadline would be reasonable. It was suggested to him that in cases involving clerical- type personnel that perhaps a longer deadline might be in order, and he said he would keep this in mind. It was pointed out to Miller that results of the investigations d to Senator Church personally. He also was advised that representatives of various intelligence agencies currently are drawing up proposed guidelines to suggest to the Committee for use in determining whether or not an *aeecrs | ra 1 - Mr. Callahan . 1 - Mr. Cleveland 1 - ~ Me. Cregar 1 - Mr. Adams I - Mr. Mintz LESSMAAR BOwéts 1 - Mr. Wannall 1 - Mr. McDermott _. DWB: IS, (9) CONTINUED - OVER yr Be u hy na a 8 % ~ ~ tw ary inf | ! a ¢ J os ern HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 60
Legal Counsel to vir Siem Memo é RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES applicant qualifies for security clearance as well as proposed guidelines to deal with the maintenance of classified material received by the Committee. He was told someone will be in touch with Senator Church regarding this in the near future. Miller stated that the Committee is going to set up offices in the auditorium of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the same space used by the Senate Watergate Committee. This space currently is being altered to meet Committee requirements. Miller stated that the Committee probably will bring on board as staff personnel most of the "security team’ used by the House Judiciary Committee during the impeachment hearings. He said this group has a proven track record with respect to leaks of information since all leaks resulting from the impeachment proceedings have been traced to Members following hearings rather than staff personnel. This is the group headed by former Assistant Attorney General John Doar, and Miller indicated Doar will play a major role on the Senate Select Committee staff. Miller will furnish Bowers the completed SF 86 forms and fingerprint cards on proposed staff personnel as soon as possible and these will be furnished directly to Assistant Director Cleveland for handling. This matter already has been discussed with Mr. Cleveland. RECOMMENDATION: a —————— ee on For information. HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 61
Memorandum zt Comp. Syst. —_ TO : Mr. Jenkins “””.. DATE: 1-31- % Files & Can AK fff ecco Gen. Inv. FROM :Jd. J. McDetingtt. 4, THPORS yt oes be Intell. \ } is we en “iE Wye ste iat SER pt SM Laberatory 0 : 50a" Seep eh Ginpcr SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE “_ rep’ ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES rrehal ae aw WwW 55073 Bas A OPTIONAL FORIA NO, 10 5010-106 may 1962 EDINON, A.GEN. REG, NO. 27 . UNITED STATES ERNMENT Assoc. Dir, é Director Sec’ Yon We have received the enclosed letter dated 1-29-75 from Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) writing in his capacity as the Chairman of the recently established Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Senator states that to carry out the task of the Committee, it will be necessary for the Members and designated staff to have access to the most sensitive classified material.—He said the Committee is in the process of gathering a staff, adding that it is likely many members of the staff will not have current. ‘security clearances. He stated he would bé most grateful if the FBI could expedite clearances on _ designated staff so that work can proceed as expeditiously as possible. He points ‘out the standard clearance agreed upon during debate on the resolution creating the Committee would be the equivalent of a 'Q" clearance. William E. Colby, as Director of Central Intelligence, is As ef coordinating the compilation from various agencies of the intelligence community suggested guidelines dealing with clearances and the handling of security information _ to be presented for consideration to the Select Committee. FBI representatives from the Intelligence Division have been participating in this matter. : ReC-70 we . @Z This matter Ee 19. ussea v with 7 age alte 595 ~ %., it was agreed that the Intelligence Division representative. should explore with CIA whether or not that agency would agree to issue clearances for the Select Committee staff if the FBI handled the investigations. Section Chief William O. Cregar took this matter up on the afternoon of 1-30-75 with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence. Cregar advised Clarke had obtained Colby's agreement to the following procedure. The FBI will handle investigations of potential staff members named by the Select Committee. Results of the investigations would be furnished to Church as Chairman of the Selec" — Committee and the Committee would determine whether or not the indivigy MeO ars the necessary criteria for clearance. Following such certification by. ne 01975 Committee, CIA would issue the appropriate clearance. A Sub Group=ofthe..., Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Commun ay was to meet on 1-31-75 to draw up proposed guidelines to be presented to the ..4 fee tu Enclosure ae O35 1 - Mr. Callahan ~ Enclosure 1 - Mr. Mintz - Enclosure tr AD i. 1 - Mr. Adams - Enclosure 1 - Mr. McDermott ~- Enclosure’! " Jf 1 - val Wannall - Enclosure 1 - Mr. Bowers - Enclosure re ; Bias ip Cleveland - Enclosure 1 - Mr. Cregar - Enclosure ed 7 JS: " 9 CONTINUED ~ OVER he (pg oe 52 Dep. AD Adm. — g¢* DepAD Inv.
J. J. McDermott to Jenkins Memo RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Committee regarding the storage of information and the clearance of the staff. This group consists of representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Atomic Energy Commission. These guidelines, once approved by the Select Committee, would be followed in determining whether or not potential staff members should receive clearances. Cregar said there is no objections to the FBI discussing the foregoing procedure--FBI investigation, Select Committee certification, followed by issuance of clearance by ClA-with Senator Church. Senator Church will be told at the same time that proposed guidelines regarding a clearance decision will be presented to him as soon as they are compiled. acenaaledg2 the 4/18 letHer and ‘That Inspector Bowers/inform Senator Church of the above procedure and work out with him appropriate arrangements for the referral of potential staff members to us for investigation. AO oes | pt 1) I # RECOMMENDATION: HW 55073 DBocld:329399530 Page 63
SERRE f Assoc, Dir, } Dep.~A.D.- . | _Dep.-A.D Sain ‘| Asst. Dir 4 | Admin. 4 . i i Comp. Syst. WW canna et me AUlnited Diates Benate | E “9 aytT CO-CHAIRMEN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EMERGENG! peer. Inv! igs) PHILIP A HART MICH. CLIFFORD P CASE, Na AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS ADLAI E, STEVENSON It, ILL. CLIFFORD Pp HANSEN, Wyo, (pursuant ‘TO S. RES, 242, 93D CONGRESS) WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR ROOM 252, RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE a ‘THOMAS A. DINE, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 Laboratory Plan. & Eval. — Spec. In January 29, worl’ K The Honorable Clarence M, Kelley Director . Federal Bureau of Investigation { Department of Pa, Washington, D. C. iA , OS omate - Sefer a Cornea t lh iL, CFF Dear Mr. Kelley: 7 Stel (ae DATs Ces The Senate, on January 27, Se a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Al1L Intelligence Activities. I am confident that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will make every effort to assist the Select Committee in its work, and I look forward to working together with you in completing this important task. In order to carry out the necessary tasks mandated by the vote va of the Senate, it will be necessary for Senators and designated staff Fre * to have access to the most sensitive classified material. The Select é Committee is now in the process of bringing together a staff to assist in carrying out its work. In this regard, it is likely that many members of the staff who will be hired will not have current security clearances. On behalf of the Select Committee, I would be most grateful to you if you could expedite, as a priority matter, clearances on designated staff so that the work of the committee can proceed as expeditiously as possible. In debate, prior to passage of S. Res. 21,. the standard of clearance agreed upon by the Senate was equivalent to. the.standard  . , applicable to a "Q” clearance. b A./ {6 3 aS _ 3& a REG. : With kind regards, Li Aang <-+ MAR 20 1975 fo oes coo R\E Fanaa COMTALIED ) BY AUT: THO. a9STELED Church oe 7 we BOTY a yacly DAT. dlas/oe 35/00 — sie onal te O- Laas) Gms, nhl [ate J6 ee 76 P pwejey S7APR J IRS vase 84 HW 55073 Docld: 32969
\ HW 55073 TO FROM wa) SUBJECT; Admin, cont. Syst. __ : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 3/14/75 Files & Cone Gen. Inv. . Jar Ident. - : Legal Counsed4" teat rma Laboratory [Ch ie Plan. & Ect Spec. Indy, as!" SENSTUDY 75 >) soe. ' . . i Legal Cour, point f hs Ahrens rseeteen mam ae a OA yf Telephone Rij. a” GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 ' 1 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT a Assoc. Dir > yal ‘ep. athv. Memorandum aye Director Sec’y __ Reference is made to memok%ndum of W. 0. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 3/10/75, captioned as above. Page three of that memorandum referred to the CIA, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community, being concerned over the request received for access to their files by Morton Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). It was - also noted that the Bureau had not received a request as of that time from Halperin under the FOIA. The Department has now referred over to us today, 3/14/75, a request from Mr. Halperin to "inspect and, if I choose, to copy files marked ‘Official and Confidential' or ‘OC' kept in the private office of J. Edgar Hoover." This request is being processed in the FOIA Unit. - RECOMMENDATION : For information. Mr. Callahan Mr. Adams Rach Assistant Director ~ Mr. Cregar 1 1 1- L JCP emey (17)
O_- 1 ~- Mr. Cregar PB Eee SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 715 Spec. Inv. ad re at 4 YE FY DE, CONTAIHED BYE TRPORUATTON HERETH US UNCLASSERIND OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 UNITED STATES G@ERNMENT Assoc. 3 Dep. AD Dep. Memorandum sh Comp. Syst. Ext. Affairs : Mr. W. R. Wannall Wu DATE: 3/7/75 Files & Com. Gen. Inv. Ident. 1- Mr. A ction “wy, olecozer 1 - Mr. Adans ll fh 1 - Mr. Wannall aboratory y, Training —_ Telephone Rm. — ee acurnpearennnannncem se Canela —- Director Sec’y __ an Oh, We “‘Rhis memorandum reports ena Hoe ¢ of conversations with Mr. Johix{Clarke, Chairman of thé*Ad_ Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry, ‘referred to hereafter as the Group; reporting steps taken to insure that Mr. William Cotter, Chief Postal Tnspector” is sinvited “to” any. ‘discussions of the carp hn t wherein the question of opening U. Ss. “mail is addressed in the context of Congressional hearings. . In a memorandum to Mr. Adams and Mr. Wannall, dated | | 3/4/75, Mr. Kelley reported the results of his meeting with .” . Mr. Cotter on that date. Cotter advised the Director that the Postmaster General has become alarmed about the opening of mail ° by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Mr. Cotter asked the Director if the FBI knew this was going on and did we actually receive the benefits of it. Mr. Kelley pointed out to Mr. Cotter that the FBI eneBXok Ot and did get information on the procedure from CIA. Bem EI RECIO Gd //b 2757 3% During the course of their conversation, Mr. Kelley told Mr. Cotter that he should’ be joined in the group of investigative organizations headed by Mr. Colby, Director of CIA, to consider actions in the Select Committee's probe. Mr, Wannall was instructed to make.sure the Postal "Serer ers included in the Group. % 7 MAR 21 1975 On 3/6/75 Mr. William 0. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on this Group, discussed this mM@tter-wit Mr. John Clarke. Mr. Clarke advised that inasmuch as member- ship on the Group is made up of United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments he felt most matters discussed at future meetings of the Group would not be of interest to the Postal Service and would be a waste of Mr. Cotter's time. However, he assured Mr. Cregar that should a question involving opening of U. S. mails be addressed by the Group or any questions involving matters of interest to the Postmaster General, he would see to it that Mr. Cotter or his designated representative Enclosure ~ Se, 3~/3-7 5 Bern, WOC :e be (5) 4 ‘ aL CONTINUED - OVER °))) (4 : Docld: 327989530 Page 686
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 was invited to the meeting. In addition, Mr. Clarke indicated he would be in telephonic contact with Mr. Cotter to arrange for any discussions Mr. Cotter might desire to have with him. ACTION: Pursuant to the Director's instructions, attached is a letter to Mr. Cotter setting forth the arrangements that have been made with Mr. Clarke regarding future atten- dance of Postal Service representatives at meetings of the Group. A copy of this letter is being furnished to Mr. Colby for his records. fol. v ye oe ‘ia DoclId:32989530 Page oF
_— oan ~o foray Sud ey I 26t how Training Legal Geoun. Telephone Fos 4 LZAD Director Sef SS: MAIL ROOM / HW 55073 Docld:32989590 Page 86 Hareh 13, 1975 BY LIAISON gece} Mt Sy Lae. naams ~ l =~ Mr. Mintz 1 - Mr. Wannall . l= Mr. Cregar Honorable Willian J.NQotter A Chief Postal Inspector rain ; U. S. Postal Service jee Washington, D. C. _ a et Dear Bill: Puring our meeting in my office on March 4, Aad 1975, we discussed your participation in the group of \e 8 OF investigative organizations headed by lt. Willian NE ro Colby, Director of Central Intellisence, to consider QE Community actions resulting from Select Committee QE 5 o probes. A © F EAM! RE ew On March 6, 1975, lir. Wiliiam 0. Crear, ny oy) | a representative on this Group, discussed the matter with “y ross ir. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of [v Rog Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community and LFS Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Consgres= sional Inquiry. Mr. Clarke advised that membership on , this Group is made up of representatives from the U. S. ° intelligence Board agencies and departments and that the major portion of information discussed at this Group would fiot-involve the Postal Service. WUowever, Mr. Clarke has assured Mr. Cregar that should any questions reparding natters of interest to the Postmaster General be scheduled for discussion before this Group, he would see to it that your office is so advised in order that either you or Agsoc. Dir. your designated representative can attend the meeting. In +) Dep. AD A addition, Mr. Clarke indicated he would be in telephonic eae oor AA contact with you to arrange for any discussions you might \ 0+ Adin. desire to have with hin. we Comp. Syst. ‘ oe Ext. Affeies — Files & Com. Woc sebe ott Gen. Inv. _ 3s ° - 4 Inapgctin og 7 a VAY ett ce 0 SEE NOTE PAGE TWO "Plan. & Eval. a Spee. Inv. Jy 4 wy ° ae ‘y ay t TELETYPE UNIT [__} ! !
FROM SUBJECT # SENSTUDY — on s fk “ny oars é fe PLA “E > 7 Sat Se we sa BY ~ wt , Wed we cs Lez, ‘S DATE fi ; X11 ~ Mr. Jenkins 57M a 55073) Pe _ iM 55073 i Mr. Callahan noted ian) 64 LOUTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 auathy 1962.€D1HON . la ome GSA GEtS. REG. NO. 27 , . UNITED STATES VERNMENT ‘ Assoc. Dir. Dep. Gp we Memorandum he a — Admit * Comp. Syst. —_ : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 2-14-75 Files & Com Gen. Inv. TE oo Ident. = : Legal Couns in ree A canna ye mene Laborator a a. oe Plan. & Eval. — Spec. Inv. LETTER FROM SENATORS MANSFIELD AND SCOTT RE DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS JANUARY 27, 1975 In a letter to Mr. Kelley dated 1-27-75, “So Senators Mike Mansfield (D ~- Mont.) and Hugh Scott (R - Pa.) requested we.not.destroy : any documents or files that may be of interest iP roera as to the Senate in the forthcoming hearings c on intelligence activities. A memorandum from H. R. Hauer to Mr. LaPrade dated - han 75 captioned ''Destruction of Files Records,..Files and Com- ions Division, '' pointed out that cnn gpa a gerne by th SNfrederal Records Act of 1950 and regulations. .of.the*National Archives and Records Service. Our current practice is to destroy files over ~ L 25) years old relating to subversive activities which are based on unsub- stantiated allegations and have not resulted in prosecution. Criminal files over 10 years old are reduced to microfilm and the paper records are are destroyed. “In addition, all duplicate copiés of communications are destroyed when they no longer serve a useful purpose. The Files and Communications Division asked the Legal Counsel Division to determine whether the Senatorstrequest applied to our current destruction program. h SSC staff. b2 AL bo 3G63> On 2-10-75 Inspector J. REG 1g. Legal Counsel Division, met with William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Adivities, concerning this matter. Miller was toldabhat .outes destruction program has been suspended until we can determine whether ~ any iny documents are involved that might be of interest to the Comntiitees 4 Miller said he doubted that the Committee would inquire into intelligencé: matters that were over 25 years old but asked that we withhola-aestfactiof""™ Jof files until he consulted with Senator Church. He said he would contact us later this week. 2 wild NY S 4 38 Enclosures (2) ~ gee a~)4-73— 1 - Mr. Callahan 1 - Mr. McDermott 1- Mr. Adams 1 - Mr. Ash 1 - Mr. Wannall 1~- Mr. Bowers 1 - Mr. Hotis . * ane 25 491s \ (CONTINUED - OVER) Ae AT nn fi L)page 91
HW 55073 Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams Re: SENSTUDY Letter from Senators Mansfield and Scott Re Destruction of Records; 1-27-75 Attached are letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott acknowledging their letter to the Director and advising them that we have suspended our destruction program until the matter is clarified. RECOMMENDATION: That the attached letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott be sent. wer Eft Docld: 327989530 Page 92
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 ‘4 UNITED STATES GAQERNMENT @ Assoc et A Nd ‘DB inv. 7 . oar _ \ t Memorandum. She Comp. Syst. —_ Ext. Affairs —_ TO : Mr ° W rs R ° Wannall DATE: 3/10/75 Files & Com. — Gen. Inv. Ident. os Mr. Adams rsresih = FROM : W. O [Gea Eyes Mr. Mintz Wl all a sant, Cat ~ Mr. D.W. Moore Uaboratory —— 1 - £i— oN i es a Mr. Wannall Plan B Evel SUBJECT: _SENSTUDY 75 1 - Mr. Cregar Spec. Inv. Training wor Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y __ This reports information received telephonically from Mr. Robert Gambino, Office of Security, CIA, on the pyar morning of 3/1/75. According to Mr. Gambino, a CIA officer employed by CIA's Office of Security, fear of approximately 10 dissidents. The dissidents were to be infiltrated into extremist and revolutionary groups active in the Washington, D. C., area in 1967 in order that CIA could obtain firsthand knowledge as to whether aJFK Act 6 (1) (A)remist or revolutionary groups were planning any physical damage or attack on CIA installations throughout the Washington, D. C., area, . In preparation for this testimony CIA was reviewing | all records in their Office of Security. In this connecti . they came across a note from CIA Security Officer Paul Gaynor . reflecting a conversation he had with myself, During that time I had liaison responsibilities with CIA's Office of Security. The note, signed by Paul Gaynor, read as follows: "Discussed with WilTyan~ Ov Crégar , _FBI, 4/4-6/67. Says go ahead after conferring with Mr. William Sullivan, Assistant Director, FBI. ‘They néver héard of this matter.'" Copies of this note are being furnished tothe Rockefeller. Commission contemporaneous with RKuh's testimony. rere ' I have reviewed all possible Bureau records in an - . effort to locate any memoranda that might have been prepared. I have found no such memoranda and am inclined | j hat I did not make a record of my conversation with in : view of the quotation, "They never heard of this pee 33 7 sper 22 - |! et ie | - WOC:ebe We Bi (6) ie’ 112 MAR 18 1975 a “CONTINUED nec OEE Ramee sonata 9 ) “tl 7) | OMAR bed Qosess0 Page 93
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 Although I have no specific recollection of the conversation with Mr. Gaynor, I do have some recollection that such a conversation did take place with him as well as with Mr. Osborn, the Director of Security, CIA. This is somewhat reinforced by the fact that I can recall CIA and specifically Mr. Osborn was concerned about the security of CIA's installations, There was considerable campus unrest during this period of time. I can recall CIA recruiters were attacked and beaten. As a matter of fact, I am almost sure that CIA's recruiters were forced off campus and did potential employees’ interviews in Federal buildings. Recognizing that both Osborn,as the Director of Security, and CIA generally were very security conscious, I can understand and believe it was probably likely that the Office of Security, CIA, began to plan the security and physical protection of all their offices throughout the U. S. The fact is that approximately one and one-half years after my reported con- versation with Mr. Gaynor one of CIA's offices in Ann Arbor, Michigan, was bombed, resulting in the now famous Keith } decision. In the interim Martin Luther King was assassinated 4/4/68 and parts of the District were burned; Resurrection City existed during May and June, 1968. All of these events remind one of the situation that existed at that time and helps me at least put into perspective why CIA's Office of Security was concerned about the security of their installations. Although I cannot recall the specific conversation with Mr. Gaynor, I did periodically speak to him during my eight-year liaison assignment. Had I received such a request as reported on Mr. Gaynor's note, I would have discussed it with the Assistant Director at that time. It is likely that Mr. Sullivan who was then the Assistant Director would have reacted as reported in Gaynor's quotation. I say this because if the facts are true, no operational activity to collect intelligence was envisioned. CIA merely proposed to place asséts in a position to know if any violent activity was planned against CIA establishments and the Bureau was merely interposing no objections to such activity on the part of CIA. CONTINUED - OVER HW 55073 Docld:329895350 Page 94
HW 55073 mo Sons Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 I have attempted to reconstruct the events in my own mind as well as to view other activities that transpired during the approximately eight years of my liaison assignment. In all honesty I cannot recall any case wherein I was requested or instructed to make an arrangement with CIA without making a specific record of it in Bureau files. ACTION: For information and record purposes. ae Docld: 327989530 Page 95
poe ee a OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 5010-106 D « UNITED STATES ., See 9 Assoe. Dit pee a Dep, inv § Memorandum oe ’ Comp. Syst. — : TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 3/12/75 A Gen. Inv. Ident. § Wi ves 7 Inspection FROM : Legal Counselj\* 2 cs a Intell. AS os Re ° | Laboratory SUBJECT: ~SENATE SELECT.COMMITTEE AVS es eats ? Trainiad ON INTELLIGENCE ACEIVITIES == @\)-"— Lele SY Ccarasert tnt bat OI EDCAAE ALAIN Ee ay ee Telegho le Rm. __ Toye 4 i » - Diregtor#Sec’y __ On March 12, 1975, Associate Deputy Attorney General Wilderotter advised me that he was just advised that the Senate Committee staff has compiled a lengthy list of requests for documents to be furnished by CIA to the Senate Committee. He said that the list will be submitted to the Committee today for their approval in } requesting the material from CIA” He described the list as unrealistic. 4} Mr. Wilderotter said that we may anticipate that the FBI will recelvea , 7 Similar list requesting documents in creat detail. He said that his ~~ ,’f assignment in the Department at the present time is to assist in coordinating the Department responses with the White House in regard to requests from the Senate Committee and he requested me to advise him at once upon receipt of such a request from the Senate Committee. RECOMMENDATION: That upon receipt of request from the Senate Committee, as described above, Mr. Wilderotter be immediately informed. 62-116395 . up 1 - Mr. Wannall Cy ’ Lea ca if 1 - Mr. Moore mr A 1 - Mr. Farrington Mae 1 - Mr. Hotis in av 1- Mr. Mintz i, Kf y y aoe REC 6 AMES Fa 8 oe “i MAR J ALE, 8 1975 | JAM:mfd ,./ oe oe Ae (7) ai" edi > fr} eo (J = 70 ~ _ HW 55073 Docld: 329399530 t agi Ye
aa FROM SUBJECT: 2 rem 76- SIPiep OQ Bf COMPA THEO 60 ae iy oS 2 Le gaat & F rn PE Ln i vat Ath TEne DATE Dep. ADAM. — Memorandum 1 = itr. J.B. Adans Me 1 ome Mr. N.P. Callahan Cond gan : Mr. W.R. Wannal DATE: Ext, Affairs — 7 We ol itear ‘ i) ° c WOE : “sw MARZ 1a dB75 255550 OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 MAY 1962 EDITION ASF cen RtS."No, 27 UNITED STATES G@VERNMENT 5010-106 4 - ‘7 Assoc. Dir. 2 Files & Com. — Gen. Inv, ____. March 5, 1975. Ident. i sat al Int&it. Laboratory Plan. & Eval. — Spec. Inv. 1 - Hach Assistant Director SENSTUDY 75 Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y —_ A This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the Group) held on 2/27/75 at CIA Headquarters. The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board. Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various Congressional committees. At the meeting of the Group on 2/27/75 several items of interest were discussed, which items are set forth, hereinafter. : Mr, Colby, in his role as Director of Central rion Intelligence, and Mr. Clarke met with Senator Frank Church on the morning of 2/27/75. Church advised that it is not his intention to harass the intelligence community and he hopes to reaffirm to both the Congress and the people of the United States that there is a valid and critical need for intelligence, Church is concerned that no inadvertent dis- closures result from these hearings PBich could prejudice sensitive intelligence community : st. He assured Mr. Colby that he would continue to consid: aim con apy ae, 3) sensitive matters that come before the Committee “to eae ~ S / such inadvertencies, Senator Church was appreciative of the security guidelines furnished to him for the handling of sensitive information and documents and assured Mr, Colby a) ete that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) would abide by these ~ sy guidelines, With regard to the Secrecy Agreement, which ve cad *: heretofor Senator Church has been somewhat reluctant to@naWaR 121978 his staff personnel complete, it is now acceptable to the 7 - Senator. However, he does want to have the Chief Couns®T of the SSC review the Secrecy Agreement and will probably propose certain changes in its wording. (A Secrecy Agreement was developed by a subcommittee of the Group in concert with the Justice, Department,) Enclosures; mt ; slo pew (16) oe CONTINUED ~ OVER | /'! “i Y Page 97
dea Qs Boe “ fae” ~ Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 Senator Church stated that it was the Committee's intention to investigate all agencies' participation in "covert action" with primary emphasis on CIA activities overseas, (Roughly interpreted, this could involve the Bureau's COINTEL Program.) The SSC hopes to avoid any confrontation with any members of the intelligence community over the release of sensitive documents or testimony and it is Senator Church's intention for him and Senator John G. Tower to consult with both the President and the Vice President to resolve this matter. In this regard, Mr. Clarke advised members of the Group that Deputy Attorney General Laurence H, Silberman has been designated by the President to act as his éounser in oth--the-Senate~andthe House seléct’ committees. Tt is ie. Ciarigs opinion that Mr. Silberman will act in this capacity only as long as_ he remains Deputy Attorney General. It is the feeling of Senator Church at this time that all staff employees of the SSC will be afforded "Q" clearances. (issued by the successor to the Atomic Energy Commission.) However, there is some question as to whether this in fact will be true and Clarke hopes to get further clarification on this point. Mr, Colby advised Senator Church that CIA requires all employees to sign a CIA secrecy agreement. It is Mr. Colby'’s intention, as he did in the case of the Rockefeller Commission, to issue an agency notice to all employees releasing them from their obligation under the secrecy agreement in the event an employee is called before the SSC, Additionally, Mr. Colby intends to write a letter to the SSC advising it that he has so relieved CIA employees from this obligation, (Attached is a draft copy of an Agency notice circulated within CIA. Also attached is a copy of the letter Mr. Colby forwarded to the Honorable Nelson A, Rockefeller advising the Rockefeller Commission that he was relieving Agency employees from any obligation under the secrecy agreement.) Inasmuch as the Bureau requires all employees to complete a secrecy agreement, the Intelligence Division believes that the Legal Counsel Division should review what action, if any, the Bureau should take in anticipation of FBI personnel being called to testify. With regard to deleting the names of Agents and confidential sources from documents furnished to the SSC, Senator Church agreed that this would be acceptable providing he or members of his staff could consult with officials of the submitting agency if it was deemed necessary that the names of Agents or sources had to be revealed, ~ 2 CONTINUED - OVER |, 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 93 J
lll 55073 Memorandum to Mr. Wannall RE; SENSTUDY 75 During the Colby/Church meeting, Church advised that he anticipates asking all agencies and departments of the intelligence community for the following three items as their initial request: 1) Organizational charts, broken down to a branch level, going back as far as 1947; 2) Copies of all budgets since 1947; and 3) Documents reflecting all cash flows since 1947, With regard to items 2 and 3, Mr. Clarke indicated that he will seek clarification with regard to budget and cash flow submission and will hopefully have additional information for members of the Group in the near future as to exactly what the SSC desires. During the course of the meeting of the Group, Mr. Clarke advised that the Bureau should consider advising Mr. Colby of any "bad apples" that are uncovered during the Bureau's investigation of staff personnel. This was not intended to try to eliminate a candidate as a staff employee where there is some derogatory information but if the Bureau develops very substantial information indicating the subject is a definite security risk, it is conceivable that Mr. Colby could at least discuss that individual's possible employment with Senator Church to prevent the Committee from hiring anyone that could later prove embarrassing to the SSC. Prior to the adjournment of the meeting of the Group, Mr. Clarke queried all members as to what provisions they have mde for handling the onslaught of paper and requests he anticipates all agencies will receive from the SSC. As an example, CIA has had to Xerox over 15,000 pages of CIA documents in the last ten days in response to requests from the Rockefeller Commission, Clarke feels strongly that each agency should develop a task force within their ranks supplemented by stenographic personnel to prepare themselves for what he believes will be very extensive requests from the SSC with relatively short deadlines. DoclId: 327989530 Page 99
@ Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 ACTION: The matters of interest reported in this memorandum were discussed at Mr. Callahan's conference on 3/3/75 and are being addressed separately in accordance with decisions made at that conference. , MW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 100
HW 55073 DBocld:329899530 Page 103 ? P > 7 oy ~ @ A . a . ’ by a member of the Commission Staff, the Staf£e member should notify the Commission and its Staff. ~ , oo Oo 2 ore = — '. purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of: State: tienbers. _ It is intended to allow time for the employes: to gain general legal guidance if he wants ‘it, and to. obtain security guidance a Agency and employee. None of us has any intention te ‘Eabricaté ‘Agency and its eminent service ‘to our country. When a current Agency employee is asked to be interviewed Mr. &E. ‘HL _ Knoche who is my assistant in charge of ‘Liaison, with M0 P7 Me. Knoche, in turn, will. saute the employee, ae ‘Exon an appropriate senior officer. ; ee - | oa = ‘Normally, we think an employee ‘would advise his supervisor —_ . ‘or other Agency authorities: on the nature ‘of the interview. "It Cook. should be understood, however » that this is not mandatory, In arranging the interviews , L am acutely aware of the need” to avoid the’ appearance as well as the Fact of collusion between ; - or mislead. I am convinced that being forthcoming gewhia emperors cpbancassingein-amiowsdetainS, Will om-the=whekess: vindicate the In _ keeping with my long-standing ‘policy, employees with. any knowLeage of activities conducted within the United States, now or in the past , Which they believe. to be of a questionable nature can follow the customary practice within the Agency o£ calling the matter to my attention or that of the Inspector General... This will ensure my ability to, continve to be forthcoming with all those involved in external reviews ef Agency activities. . .
ie , _ -4- * * ° . Employees should also feel free to pring any such matters — , . | directly to the attention of the Commission ox the. Commission . Staff outside of Agency channels if théy so desixe | . In doing so, however, employees should bear in. mind. that the Commission’ s | £iela of. interest is CIA activities within this country. ; i ‘To contact the Commission, employees can cakl the Executive . “Directoz, Mr. David. Belin on 456-7010_or the Counsel, Mr. Marvin ‘Gray, Jx., on 456-7014. The mail address is: : oo Commission on CTA activities Within the United States 712 Jackson Place, N.W- . Washington, D. C. 20500 - Names of the members of the Commission Staf£ and their To -badge numbers are attached. We ER. Cokby Director of Central Intelligence | | { . | | AW 55073 Docld: 32969530 Page 104 . ° . : oan * - . 7 -- _ _ 7
.5 February 1975 rete * oh 2 ve The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller - Chairman, Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States 712 Jackson Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20500 . Dear Mr. Vice President:: As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are required to sign secrecy agreements when they enter on duty. This is a condition 6f employment, and it requires that they keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further re-— quires that they may not disclose classified information in inter- oo views or by publication without prior authorization from the Director _ of Central Intelligence. There is a provision in the secrecy agree- ment that the conditions and obligations with respect to the protection of classified information by the agreement continue after employment with the Agency has been terminated. As I have stated to the Commission, I will make available any employee of this Agency to the Commission for staff interview and for testimony before the Commission. This letter will serve as authorization for any such employees or ex-employees to furnish information as requested by the Commission or its staff on matters that may be classified. As has been discussed with the Commission, there are certain sensitive items which should receive special han- dling. Such items include names of sources, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in comparitmented channels by the Agency, names of employees, names of persons who may be targets of kidnapping or assassination by foreign intelligence organi- zations, names of organizations cooperating with the Agency, and detailed information which would pinpoint any of the above. Some information might also conflict with a subject's wight of privacy. ale -/16 39S 5 [ AW 55073 DocId: 32989530 Page 105 fABY i
hoe BELIN  DAVED W. A-6442 BAKER, HAROLD A. A-6428 CARGILL, MASON A-6439 GELLHORN, ERNEST . A-6429 GRAY, MARVIN L., TR. A-6444- "GREENE, RONALD J. —_A+6435 HARDY, TIMOTHY , A-6433 . MANPREDI, GEORGE _ A-6432 OLSEN, ROBERT A-6434 ROETHE, JAMES A-6427 SCHWARZER. WILLIAM a-4768 WEIDNER, JAMES. “64470 CLAPPER, PETER A-6440 | . het 55073 Docld:32989530_ Page |
oy’ ail 55073 DBocld:329899530 Page 107 There is no purpose here to impede in any way the Commission's investigation. I believe, however, in most cases these specific identifying names and details are not necessary for an understanding _ of our activities. Where the Commission or the staff believes that specific identification is necessary to the purpose of the testimony or the staff interrogation, the matter will be discussed between the Commission and the Agency, and I will be prepared to consult with - you and the Commission to determine the course of action to be taken. Where in the judgment of the employee a specific identification is especially sensitive as outlined in this paragraph, an identity number will be assigned pending resolution of the matter between the Com- mission and the Agency, and in the meantime the identity will not be divulged by the employee. ; I appreciate the cooperation of the Commission and of Agency employees in this regard., Iam still responsible under the statute -and as a professional for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In many situations the inad- vertent disclosure of a name or identification could have serious repercussions, including placing lives in jeopardy, and I cannot in good conscience put such information at risk. . . This arrangement of course does not affect the Commission's. procedures for advising prospective witnesses of their rights, secur- ing waivers, nor the employee's or ex-employee's right not to answer _ certain questions if they are concerned that the answers might tend to incriminate them. ' Respectfully, Sieg W. E. Colby Director
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 3 5010-106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 \y UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT _ b Assoc. Dir, e Dep. ap Adm. \ on aD wa 2 ao oe . Memorandum EECGNn - we. cattanan anes Wis 1 Mr. Adams iAdmin, Comp. Syst. —_ TO o:Mr. W. Re Wannalljy"Hor- DATE: 2/27/75 Flee & Com aa Gen. Inv. 1 - Mr. Mintz nae FROM :W 1 Qylroem 1 - Mr. Bowers a eat 1 - Mr. Wannall Laboratory — 1 - Mr. Cregar an, * Evel SUBJECT: ‘soi DY 75 Tretning. Training at Legal Coun. * ss enetonrgter supe omen Y enact A * Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y __ This memorandum recommends that we keep Mr. Colby _pbprised, as the Director of Central Intelligence, through the KA] Hoc Coordinating. Group on Congressional Inquiry of any Cl hens he proposed or completed FBI testimony before congressional com- mittees when such FBI testimony impacts on other members of Ae a4, the Intelligence Community, could result in other members of “” ¢ the Intelligence Community being called to testify, or any questions are asked of the FBI which are of proprietary interest to another agency or department of the Intelligence Community. f The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry, Ve chaired by Mr.- John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of e Central Intelligence, is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having membership on the United States Intelli- gencé Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before congressional hearings.“ ) At a meeting of the USIB on 2/26/75, Chairman Colby | commented on the effective manner in which the Ad Hoc Group | was functioning. However, he noted that it is imperative all | members of USIB be extremely sensitive to the need for prior coordination to insure that the basic interests of the Intel- ligence Community are served and that any testimony or documents furnished congressional committees are factual and accurate. He hoped that all members will be made aware of what other members are testifying to before a congressional committee as well as the identity of that congressional committee. Mr. Colby noted that it is highly likely that members of the Intelligence Community at 2 will be called before Various congressional committees other 2 than the Senate and H Select § tt ge f2 % ouge Selec ree ees _ Om FS 2 bp Mb 3 oe VAR The Intelligence pivasatte 6 OY this type of Wes Ss coordination is vital to “insure that one agency's testimo . geek is not in conflict with that of another through misunderstanding a ao ttt 915 62-116395 ones g wer? \ Wor :ehe s CONTINUER*-> OVER 7) bs % O MAR 4 2 1975 HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 106 7 Dee
Memo for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 62~116395 or inadvertency. As an example of this coordination, Mr. Colby has furnished the Bureau and other members of the Intelligence Community the statement he plans to make as the lead-off witness before the Senate Select Committee (SSC). This statement has been reviewed by the Intelligence Division and a memorandum has been prepared which notes that there is nothing objectionable from the Bureau's standpoint in Colby's proposed statement. A second point Colby made at the USIB meeting was his desire that all members understand that no agency representative should discuss with a congressional committee information or techniques which are of proprietary interest to another agency without prior consultation. This is certainly a valid request and we should concur. (As an example, the FBI would not want the National Security Agency to discuss with a congressional committee FBI support of National Security Agency's TELEX effort without first clearing with us. Likewise, the Bureau representa- tive should not discuss National Security Agency's exploitation of teletype traffic furnished to them by the FBI without prior (5) coordination with NsA..| Recently a congressional committee asked CIA for copies of any written agreements between FBI and CIA. CIA felt they had no alternative but to provide the committee with copies of theRBL ~ ~ CIA, Understanding dated 2/7/66. However, before doing so Cik-aid Obtain FBI approval.” a ACTION: ~ If approved, through the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry, representatives of the Intelligence Division will keep Mr. Colby and the Intelligence Community advised of any FBI testimony before congressional committees wherein such testimony could impact on other members of the Intelligence Community, could result in other members of the Intelligence Community being called to . testify, or where questions are asked which are of proprietary interest to another member of the Community. Te Age? “fg be i oe ‘4 Aa) a a a wee fe ae o Ey, | aA ate Zs ag qt ws F Hae SASH pi atts ie bie ae . ng om aw tee £ , HW S5073 DoctId:3 a30 Page og
JFK Act 6 \ nese Wy ir. yy Or IONAL FORM NO, 10 $010~106 MAY 1962 EDITION . GSA GEN, REG, NO. 27 4 UNITED STATES so@esvecser Dep. AD Bam A 7 Dep. AD ie LLINOTATSAUMN Asst Dies j . ‘ . Comp, Syst. — “To: Mr. WR, Wannaiy We bt DATE: «3/4/75 Files & Com 1 Gen, Inv. . d die ; 1 - Mr. Boynton heen FROM :H.A, Boynton, Jr. ee 1 - Mr. Schwartz Nae v ; ‘ i Laboratory 7 : : : Plon. & Eva bsduecr CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (crs) EMPLOYEE fees — NA SECRECY AGREEMENTS : Legal Coun. —__£ " woacsiping a_ news article appearing in the 2/28/75 ayer edition of the Washington Post newspaper (copy attached) , entitled "Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge to Cooperate NR With Senate Probe," the Director noted "Can we determine what the agreement includes?" nee scarann., L is aed s — chet dike ere ea On a/a/7s[ sd Office of Security, CIA, (Xt advised that all CIA employées prior to commencing employ- _ ment with that Agency are required to execute an "Entrance on : RY Duty Secrecy Agreement" and upon terminating their Agency \ . Pes employment are requested to execute a "Termination Secrecy Agreement" (copies of both attached). Briefly, these agree~ ments require that CIA employees keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their my employment. Both agreements further require that CIA employees NS may not disclose classified information during interviews i or by publication without prior authority from the Director Ei i of Central Intelligence. Both agreements specifically set / LB . 4OY, TNPORMATION conratee V2 HEREIN 5 UNCLASSIBIED DATES Z forth that the employee has read the provisions of the espionage laws (Sections 793, 794 and 798 of Title 18, U.S. Code), is aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense could lead to prosecution and has reviewed the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, which specifically charges the Director of Central Intelligence with protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. in this connec- tion, the "Termination Secrecy Agreement" notes that the employee has also vead the provisions of Section 1001, Title 18, U.S. Code, and is aware that making a false statement "herein or otherwise" may be punished as a felony. The "Termination Secrecy Agreement" consists of a four-page form, pages . three and four of which are entitled "Excerpts From iste 18 ’ United States Code. gud specifically sets forth the provision — aunt g he Enclosures - Ss . bag VO Zz 7 S— ‘s man TA ple CONTINUED ~ OVER ww tie i Teme BPM:tdp (5) f AGT RECORDED . ; 46 MAR 18 ‘975 ars qe en f PRS “ 5 6 MAR 24 ia7s —ao “ a5 50'73._Docld: 32989530 Page 110
: AW..250 75 - Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) EMPLOYEE SECRECY AGREEMENTS of Sections 793, 794, 798, and 1001. Both Secrecy Agree- ments also state that the conditions and obligations with respect to the protection of classified information con- tinue after Agency employment has terminated. The FBI, of course, utilizes Form FD-291 “Employ- ment Agreement," which has been executed by all current employees and must be signed by all new personnel entering on duty, to cover the foregoing situation. The "Employment Agreement" (copy attached) covers essentially the same points noted in the attached CIA Secrecy Agreements. While we do not have an exit secrecy agreement signed by the terminating employee, Form FD-193 “Report of Exit and Separation" requires (under Paragraph D, Page 2) that the exiting employee be cautioned regarding divulging con- fidential information and reminded that such improper action may violate Department of Justice regulations as well as Federal statutes providing for substantial fines and lengthy imprisonment or both. ACTION: ; . Above for information. — BOM / | Sy a/ vA Wee Docid: 329539530 Page 111
Mareh 4, 1075 Vea q ~ S t SS MEMORANDUM FOR MIR, ADANS $ “4 pt Lik, WANNALL wah Sys RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 9 uiny Te" Cpeniniy of Mail-by-the “a "Central Intelligence Agency On Mareh 4 , 1975, Willing Cotter, Chiof Postal inspector, , came to see me, He said the Postmaster General has become alarmed about the 1 - 4 opening of mail by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for many years. Liz. Cotter wont to CIA and roceived : a listing, by year, of the activilyin ~*~ this regard. This list further stimulated the alarm of the Pestmaster ene tir, Cotter advised that ho had mown of this project since the 1950s when he was assigned to New York as an Inspector, He said that several of the Postmaster Generals were informed of the project and no protesisywas. made. He said tho gonoral feeling was that ese were possible cnemics af me nation and, therefore, the method was considered as necessary. The presen Postmaster General fecis the proceduxe minht bi be highly eviticized, and hir. Cotter came io me to got my assurance no such activity was now going on, £ informed hin it is not. Ty — " lin. Cotter further asked rac if we know it vas going on and did wo actually receive the benefits of it. I informed him te knew of it and did get information on the procedure from CIA. {then teld Mz. Cotter I thoucht he should be joined in the group of investisative organizations, headed hy liz. Colby, Girector of CIA, to zonsider our actions in the Sslect Commitine's probs, Liv, Cotter anid they had been __ invited io the first meeting, but to none cinco. he Ident. Teh AD ie - Agsistant Director Wannall should check to make sure thoy are included [ sin —_and we should confirm to Mix, Cotter et his organization has beon established Lr aii 2S & participant, Ww fee Cons ae is neo Gt -HG 3 ~ ai mw oF BR Sins "OGL Ins pectio! Intell. 32) Laboratory Plon. & Eva GM MAR , R Inv. “reining ; _ Claronee MM. Kelley gf Coun, . he reat pone R "Rm — fo oe a, _ . Earoctor torSec'y + MAIL ROOML_] TELETYPE UNIT(__] W S507 Eo Pe S72 AIO Page 112 VYory “truly your's, SA ee TPR hasta o£ 475 | een ee ee ee
3 CoRR ac eta SS alla eee See amsae eo ernl Tae a rermmnes cay ne hanes Bee me eee = an 7 Fags oe an stne attntes  nemem seyafena tema ' Mas Flteentemnge ares en a ee aw oNt ) BRE 553073 van M col Co (PS SUBJE secky Asgyoraxpun FOR.MR. TAMM — sea} Lye on aes — FROM JOHN EDGARIOOVER Serr grty Sok Pods # _ hte DATED SEPTEMBER LO” 1936 ; ie OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010—106 MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27 UNITED STATES @. NMENT Memorandum ‘J. H. Mortimer x 4) oe eas On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence CONFIDENTIAR MEMORANDUM B By OC. 00 Neen Det Ar Ne, Division delivered the above- ~captioned | memoranda to the Laboratory with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction - of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing on the memoranda. — ah, cMAY y} “SD ABR eae: Docld: apo neee0. Page 113 Akg PRE PE Ow Vw O «- It was determined that the -"Memorandum For Mr. Tamm from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the "Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25; 1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington ~ typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been fh. _ use since October, 1935. The memoranda were returned - to SA Lacey. RECOMMENDATION: ~ NOT F RECORDED Y, 2 The result of this cxaningtign WStordardes to the Intelligence Division 4 ~ Mr. Wannall Beso Cif ah F- ~ Mr. Lacey esi - Mr. White Ear Mr. Mortimer : - Mr. “ae mie “A 1975 fese . tk oa ER 2 DATED J 'D_ AUGUST. 229» L938 « }. SEGUE RLEAT Original Filed In G2. =
Fie) o~ eye on, a iY FROM , ~ a : o Nay | a) jad Ng 0 (9 Ne YL QE a8 2 £4. 0 Rta haan a WW 55073 SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75 | pou Sers 2, DoclId: 32969530 4 OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 sf * MAY 1962 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 5010-106 UHITE® STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc, Dir. — Dep. AD Adm. — m 1 - Mr. Callahan ck Ding Me orandum 1 - lr. Calla on é Comp. Syst. —_ be het d : :Mr. W. R. Wannait 04” “¢ DATE: Ext. Affairs — 2/14/75 Files & Com. —_ Gen. Inv. 1 =- Mr. Mintz Ident, 1 - Mr. Wannall near, 1 - Mr. Cregar i W. deregar Laboratory ____ Ce —— Plon. & Eval. — Spec. Inv. Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y __ This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of the Ye Hoe Coordinating Group _on Congressional Review of fervor | the Intelligence -Community (hereafter referred to as ‘the (pye- | 5) eee held on the morning of 2/14/75 at CIA Headquarters. ¥ in é The Group chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, is made up of representatives of agencies and departments having member- ship on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various congressional meetings. At the meeting of the Group on 2/14/75 several items of interest were discussed. They were: (1) A Secrecy Agreement (copy attached) was presente to Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee (SSC), with therequest that all staff employees of the Committee, which may number as high as 40, be requested to sen. Miller was rather cool to the suggestion and indicated that the 3 a SSC and Senator Church would take it under advisement. It is oe to be noted that this draft of the Secrecy Agreement was prepare 3 by the Security Committee of USIB in concert with Mr. Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Departmentyof Justice. Although this was considered the final draft. of. “thesgecrecy Agreement, the Treasury representative on the Group wals qpetur additional language could be incorpérated & into the Agreeme to cover other than classified information such as the confidentiality of Internal -Revenue returns. = q a (2) Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 2/4/75, advised that Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, had been instructed by the White House to identify what information the Intelligence Community felt could not under any circumstances be SEL ed with a congressional eC 40 6d MO395 vat Enclosures MN ce ri PaCASEBBS gg S FEB 28 1975 6 CONTINUED - Page 114
Pa ‘ es ” . ‘ . o 2 _— : . Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 62~116395 Attached is a copy of the paper Colby provided to the White House responsive to this request. It does encompass recon- mendations of member agencies of the Group including the FBI. At a subsequent meeting Mr. Colby had with unidentified persons at the White House, the above list was i cussed. Colby , Congression the caneittee nce Community had ‘ations? co) tions. to deny ey an Lia ee and face She poses iLity. of a contempt citation, (B) have: the President refuse\to authorize the release of such information, presumably through the exercise of Executive Privilege, or (C) the President could call the majority and minority. leaders of the congressional committéé to the White House, furnish to them the answer to the question with the added caveat that they were the only persons being informed of the answers and, therefore, would be personally accountable for any leak of information, Representatives of the White House were not very enthusiastic to the options put forth by Mr. Colby and indicated that they would be calling a meeting at the White House of senior officials of the Department of Defense, Justice Department, CIA and the FBI to review what position the Intelligence Community should take in responding to a request for extremely sensitive and highly classified information. (3) Members of the Group were allowed to read an internal memorandum from Mr. David W. Belin, Executive Director of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the U. S. (The Rockefeller Commission), to Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President. This memorandum reports the results of a conversation between Mr. Beldin and Mr. William Miller, Chief of Staff for the SSC. The memorandum revealed that Miller believes that within two weeks his staff will be in three-quarters gear. He plans to have a total staff of about 40, 10 to 12 of whom will be lawyers. The initial Jwork of the staff will concentrate on a review of documents, interviews, and what Miller called "depositions." Miller does not plan to have any hearings of the SSC for several months and believes the September deadline could not be met, rather that the investiga- tion would take at least the rest of the year. CONTINUED -— OVER HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 115
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 62~116395 BelYin's memorandum also noted that the thrust of the SSC's investigation will include the whole range of intelligence gathering agencies; will delve into the basic matters of policy, including whether or not there is a need for all of the agencies; what the results are; related public policy matters, as well as rights of privacy. Miller also advised Bellin that the SSC would operate out of a room referred to as "the auditorium," which Miller thought gave the best security. He said there would be rigid standards imposed to seal off any leaks. These standards would include having everything in a central filing area with a specific check-out system permitted to particular people so that if leaks occurred the source of such leaks could be readily ascertained. Xeroxing would be severely limited. In response to a question from Bellin to Miller as to why the Senate and House did not create a joint Senate/House committee as opposed to individual Senate and House Select Committees, Miller advised that it was too difficult to arrange because of matters of protocol. It is noted that although a House Select Committee is being formed with basically the same charter as the SSC, no chairman of the House Select Committee has been designated and the Group estimates that it will be a month before the House Select Committee can get started. ACTION: For information, Lots jr. Opa Docld: 32989530 Page 116 j
SECRECY AGREEMENT “4, ) » in accepting employment ‘ or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor ~ mation from unauthorized disclosure. I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect : to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee, it is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended: All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a F result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee. . I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if ‘ ' information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate cr their duly authorized representative. . : a HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 117 ba. WC 30 7S aed :
55073 . r ‘e, ies ot ita avd ONS bare i "ay . . a XN CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION “A I. The names of agents, infotmants, covert liaison contacts and - operations or other sdentitys ng characteristics | ‘of sensitive aan A SE ee ees . clandestine sources: to " a oo. a. Agent or informant names or ‘operational information revealing them. 7 b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counter~ ; ‘intelligence purposes, ro We te, ene --The numbers, locations, times and other indications of ‘recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organiza tions. --Specific statements of the use of technica] devices in a agent operations. oo + --The total extent of recruitment or investiga tive effectiveness against any given target organization or individual, or lack . oo thereof£. . ; = ; ‘4 sys oe te - ia ‘. “oh ‘ . - fe . o- ‘ . . . . . Py % S. --Names of selected agency and/ot ex-agency employees if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility. ~-Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure’ of their role, ey s., rn aa i. Relationships with Other Intelligence Services oe , . ws ay we os Cola a. Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries. . 2 by o>! S& to ONT j from eee escisss cation schadule | + Ge a0or more} Doclda: 32989530 Page 1
b. Identifyin&’ collaborative operations between the United States »ntelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within a jointly targett ed third country. *~ \ c. The-nature of support provided, or arrangements with foreign ‘intelligence services suppoxting US technical collection operations. : d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service under conditions of continued secrecy, |. a ; : “ Tit. “Cryptologic and Communications Activities ee _a Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material. b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations. po, c. Activities taken with the manufacturers of eryptologic devices in the U.S. and abroad, . . . a on pe d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations .. Pps EL ADA ce ae Lee . 7 4 ‘4 & 202 CEES OD fur wipes Lauirlilies i: GO. S. asa LVL UchU Je on e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and unfriendly targets in the U.S. and abroad. £. Covert signals intelligence collection ificluding (1) assistance arrangements with commercial U.S, and foreign Sottipanies (2).taps (3) and from US installations abroad. rn oo g- Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved. .. _— —_ ch Protective communications security measures. © 2 1. a a , 1 om . ‘ - a“ . i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and: locate transmissions ; especially critical to our work in ASW. 7 IV. Technical Intelligence oo, a. identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical valnerability ‘and extremely high political sensitivity. HW 55073 Docld: 329899530
HW 55073 Lee foreign banks, investment houses, etc. » in support of foreign - intelligence ‘in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large DoclId: 32969530 Page 1271 #3 £__.- _ ne * b. mm, | of specific covert communications systems, including secret writing, special agent equipment, etc. ‘ c. Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in, the host. country, t ut \ . a dad. Idemtification of technical counter-measures techniques. ‘ ; . . . . e. Characterization of.emplacement of devices for technical’ collection of foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement. . a ry . * . . . * e g. Details of secure U.S. communications systems. . V. Other . es a . . ~. . . ao woe . + a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass the U.S. Government or frustrate the purpose of the operation. —~ me Fy b. Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and operations. c. Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials, This includes names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations. . d. Names of firms collaBorating with U. 8. - ‘iibelligence agencies Vs foreign clienteles). : : Ne ee e, Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and covert tax arrangements. oO ee apr . “= ON ~ ‘ . why sae te. £, Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations. of against foreign intelligence targets, Pe . . : g. The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic ox military intentions toward the United States or on the.state of our intelligence on military technologies of these nations. ae oy ome cance : 7 4 - aa iN
BS ST ns: Mie, WOR. Wanneil . february 19, 1975 E W.O. Cregar 4 INPOE A ae ~ ) | oe — g1 eS zee | SENSTUDY 75 oo - DATE gle petit Menorandum W.0, Cregar to W.R. Wannali, dated 2/16/75, recommended that a paper entitled "Origin and Disposition ef the Huston Plan" be furnished to Hr. Colby in his role as Director cf Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexes Mr. Colby intends te provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion ef his appearance as the lead-off witness. This memorandum was approved and the annex entitled "Origin and Disposition ef the Huston Plan" was furnished to Myr, Colby for his use. AAR wat i hha a Pa EA a soe OETA ae eae ae na ae in anticipation that Mr. Relley will appear before the BSS, g conv af the annax eantitied "Oricin and Tienagitian Dp of the Huston Dian" g belng furnished te the Legal Counsel Divicion for inclusion in the briefing beok being prepared ge he Director relative to his anticipated 2 eppearance before the ' ACTION: The attached copy of the PBI papex entitled “Grigin and Dispositien of the Huston Plan" be furnished to the Legal Counsel Division for their use in connection with the prevaration of a briefing book for the Director's anticipated appearance before the SSC. : IRDA wl ARE EE MEER LOTT CERNE TONE NN Wine temerer ar Fencnene weitere, et merveanammrten entities mei pans Lar on Ame tandh sbkiots RIE Ene losure a _ l= Br. J.A, Mintz a REC: Cea 1 - ie. WR. Wannalli ; = “> Mr, W.0.-Cregar . co WOCsbew (4) V2 tG MAY 27 1975 Gricnal cannot be located and is not on record. Whea ‘peipal is received in, Reear’s Prenat ee Of. = thar \ \ \ MAY 5 GF Sada Fe, a /- 55073 Deeta toons yt i if Ms ton
7“ , “ r 5 ; OPTIONAL FORM 380. 10 5010-106 . MAY 1962 EDITION . . GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 NS “o ‘UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ¥ Assoc, Dir. Ww Memorandugn 1 itr. Wannall ok p gil 1 - Mr. Cregar — : Mr. W.R. Wannal1l” DATE: 2/12/75 File & Com . Gen. Inv. ; Ident. , 1 _ ry Ins pe FROM :H.A. Boynton, Jr. Set 1 - Me re haere eae SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES } a oe henenernnenemirinttatteen oneness netenicemeni cannes amnminminiasaimmenenainat AE PNA saw Reena RE ie ra eat Legalfdoun ca i! Tele phone Rm. Pursuant to request of Mr. Adams, Liaison Officer ge L.F. Schwartz contacted Mr. John Clark of the Intelligence Community Staff on 2/11/75 with regard to suggested security |{- procedures for the handling of classified information by the Select Committee. Mr. Clark advised ,that ‘on 2/10/75 he had met personally with Mr. Williams iller who has been designated to head the Select Committee taff. He stated that he dis- cusséd with Mr. Miller the proposed guidelines for security and the proposed secrecy agreement for staff members and furnished Miller with copies of both these items. Mr. Clark stated that Miller was generally receptive to the proposed guidelines and felt that they would be acceptable subject to the approval of Senator Church. Mr. Miller was decidedly cool concerning the idea of staff_members Signing a a_secrecy agreement but inaréated that a final decision _ regarding this... e made | de by Senator “chirech err Mr. Clark stated that he raised two specific questions which Mr. Colby considers most important with regard to any . presentation made to the Select Committee. He advised Miller t that the Intelligence Community would desire to not identify specific agents or the details of Sensitive operations which might reveal “the identities of sensitive sources. Mr. Miller was agreeable to this and foresaw no probiem with the Select Committee accepting this proposal. Secondly, Mr. Clark advised Mr. Miller that Mr. Colby, speaking for the Intelli- gence Community, was opposed to having any dealings with staff members of the various Senators and Representatives other than those assigned to work directly under Mr. Miller as part of the Select Committee Staff. Mr. Miller stated that this was also acceptable to him and he assured Mr. Clark that all of his staff members would be subject to an FBI background investigation and the issuanee of a security clearance by LFS:tdp (6) [i 4. ' CONTINUED Tore fee / : hon - aes ° am GA-WL SHS ox. P44 TA. A FER 24 1975 IDE ot NTALHED ° © OMG PTT, THOS MATT ON COz oF ; RTA LS UACLASSIEL s sw yaw sass (25/00 ® 3B mmf A 73) Docld:32989530 Page 123 =~
woe! - : ie Te ~ * G f 44 ; . Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES During the conversation with Mr. Clark he advised further that it is not the intention of Mr. Colby to use as any part of the CIA's defense for alleged domestic activities the allegation that such activities were under- taken because the FBI had failed or was unwilling to carry out its responsibilities in’ the domestic area. Mr. Clark noted that he is aware that there have been references to such a claim in the newspapers but he assured SA Schwartz that Mr. Colby does not support this position in any way. Mr. Clark volunteered to arrange a personal meeting between Mr. Colby and an appropriate FBI official to discuss this point, if the Bureau so desired. ACTION: nor intoruats \ wee or Lnrormation. ager we fare Mole a 55073 Docld: 32969530 Page 124
TO ie jie Ee Constupy 75 «BS war 4978 | AW 55073 Docld: 3298953 OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1962. EDITION © Sh GEN, AEG. NO. 27 e®8 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ) 1 - Mr. Adams Asst. Di Memorandum 1 - Mr. Adams me Comp. Syst. -Mr. W. R. Wannall DATE: 2/18/75 Files & Com Gen. Inv. ~~ 1 -"Mr. Wannall Ident. We Cregar 1 - Mr. Cregar ap reo Rl Laboratory _——. ALT TPORUATEON pen ae HEREIN wr UNOLASSIY: pate U- 6-00 BY Sree ann |G This memorandum reports that on 2/14/75 Mr, John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, tele- phonically advised Section Chief, W. 0. Cregar, the Bureau's representative on this Group, that Mr. Samuel R. Preston, Senior Staff Member of the House Appropriations Committee, requested that CIA provide the House Appropriations Committee with any written agreements between CIA and the FBI. Pian. & Eval. — Spec. Inv. _—_— Training Legal Coun. Telephone Rm. — Director Sec’y —_— ae 5 The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review f; of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives -of agencies and departments having membership on the U. S. Intelli- gence Board. Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various congressional committees. pe} fg} i i On the late afternoon of 2/14/75, Mr. John Clarke, telephonically advised Mr. Cregar that he had received a telephone call from Mr. Samuel R. Preston. The purpose of the call was to request any written agreements that existed between the CIA and the FBI. Clarke advised the. only written agreement he could identify existing between the FBI and CIA was one dated 2/7/66 (copy attached). Clarke stated thatzcinasmuch as he had gotten this specific request from Mr. Preston he felt CIA had no alternative but to provide a copy of the Agreement to him. However, Clarke wanted to be sure the FBI concurred_i Goa! Oe EGE ~ wears fl) Subsequent to ude Yichiibie t 's cal Ay lt dams telephonically contacted Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman and explained the problem to him. Mr. Silberman authorized the release of a copy of the FBI ~ CIA Agreement to Mr. Preston. On the afternoon of 2/14/75 Mr. Cregar advised Mr. Clarke that the FBI interposed no objection to the release of a copy of the 1966 Agreement to Mr. Preston. cm Ee FEB 25 1975 Enclosures — nels ~L0- 7 S B ab 62-116395 WOC:ebe (5) CONTINUED - oven Sa 125
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall RE: SENSTUDY 75 62-116395 Attached is a memorandum to the Attorney General with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General confirming the conversation between Mr. Adams and Mr. Silberman on the afternoon of 2/14/75. ACTION: That the memorandum to the Attorney General be WR |-o4. sent. Whe of HW 55073 DBocld:329899530 Page 1276
[oo ere” ALD INPQRMATION CONTA TANS ENEIN 1S UNQLASSTF IEP File No. eo (HERE SHOW QTHORUESE: e 8 HW 545073  @® ry ust Se UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 February 7, 1966 OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATE za 1 ‘G CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY | a) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or _procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the - development of information through social contacts or contacts. normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover | ’ functions. -(S) (2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States. fhe FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action does not conflict with any operation, current or planned, including active investigation of the FBI. (Ss) (3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any ‘planned INeeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or communist-blioc visitor of known or presumed interest to the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social development. (¢ (4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national security interest involved. cS) (5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIR agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (S Bxeeclud from automatic aoe mesiynestion OD Me 3¢5- 27) Docld: 32989530 Page 127 |. &
' be positive intelligence interest as weighed against . intelligence, the fulfillment of -CIA- commitments to: - es next assignment abroad. ( (Ss). 7 SvHW 55073 . agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security Central Intelligence Agency erations in the United States ( assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the United States. It is recognized that.each case will have: its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will internal security factors. CIA will continue its contractual relationship for the purpose of handling ~ the training, the procurement of positive foreign «©. 2.0 Jee. le the agent, and the preparation of the. agent for his (6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its er counterintelligence requirements and will provide the FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence or internal security matters, including the scope’ and nature of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security. interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent. ©. , : . -DocId: 32969530 Page 126