od 2 < e e a «. < 3 “ax0 First Street, S-E., Wasnington, D-C- 20003 es peing. Mr. Colby. Senator Tower Mr. Colby. - | from counsel and menbera a of the connittee Mr. colby. “I ‘might just: precede the. “questioning by a general statenent which | I can make off the top of my ely Involved 4 in those days with vietnam. I served in ‘vietnam. as: the Deputy first and then the fief of Station from February 1959 to gune 1962. . When 7 returned from vietnan ‘I became pivision-of CIA,
J =] < &. é a « « ® 416 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 , distin : sand: insurgency fi i ERAT oa j degree: sek stent tat t. it Communist insurgency | that" had detects and. this gave our: government a problem ‘as to its position with respect. to auch a government and such Steet: My role in this- was to provide Intelligence 4 from ‘vietnam. when I-was there and to continue to assure’ that intelligence was provided from here. A good deal of: the intelligence critical of the regime - stemmed from our * Feporting. rom, clandentine, sourgea, within
2 5 < ‘ P Q ¢. & an "a10 First Streat, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 tu is ee Station atl was acting as: his, s special advises wehhirt for polit oft the war.’ “Nhu over the years. we together | ‘discussed th problem and how it should be’ ‘organized nd” wha Feet Sane” MA dd strategy should be applied ‘and we: very much: sgreed | that the key level to engage. “the population in’ ‘the’ battle 80 that the Communists did not. take the battle: at that! ‘level ‘and pull, the rug of - support . out. from under the governnent and under the military. w+ local village defense, An ‘ene early otvttess_ we developed, as.I remember; “something on ‘the. order. of some tens of thou- sands of armed villagers up in the high Lands, down in _the Delta, and various other places, and these ‘became ‘experimental models for the development. of Mr. Nhu! s , concept of this strategic hamlet... He then documented the strategic hamlet asa concept and imposed it upon the Aaninistration of. Vietnam with his brother, the President! Sy full support, “began. the program “of the! strategic
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ast ase if a ae a id the’'reportin wae oy Atte ‘eracked. Up pte bey ‘that ‘the’ es Cem | Fomally beatin At this time the goverment had troubles with” ‘the: * at Buddhists which broke out, ‘in a riot “up iin northern vietnam, in Hue, a riot in which a “grenade was. aropped and there were government during this period. “You wld” recall at was, bal particularly ‘marked by ‘the: self- sasha of one Sof ‘itie Banzis ina fire that he poured gasoline on himself. : This, of course, was a dramatic presentation of the fact that there were a lot of people ‘opposed to president Diem <in vietnam: .and this raised this particular political, problem for our government as to the degree to which it should support - President Diem.
ine! : ruta cre fig 8 re ae Raat pt fe praia as _ for at! to rally, ‘the neces ary! ‘suppor re win: the ‘conflict ‘again t. a tis , eal 'worla was. ‘being: fount urban problens 1 ‘and’ that. the basic | conflict in the ‘countryside was gradually being: built ‘through the strategic hamlet - program and | other prograns to other sountee-insurgency pro- 4 2 < s 6 -a « < z moving along,. ‘and that’ ‘we were ‘not apt to get. a better: govern ‘ment if we went. into any change of government or opposed the government. There was very little doubt following the general con- sensus of policy at that, time that ‘it was in the United States' interests to nelp. preserve a free South Vietnam as: against a ‘Communist takeover ‘in South Vietnam. But this. debate waged | in the United States government all during the. 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C..20003° | summer of 1963.
2 .? < a a ° & < z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 9. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 “18 19 20 21 Piece Mae ‘Commun tse takeover “in "tne counterion! in the State Department and’ to" gone extent ee wine ‘to carry on the war: Under’ the degree of political upset and * quently,, we should ‘Look into~ ‘alternatives. as u ‘ sir, Senator rower’ You were head of the station there. through 1962,ieathat right? Mr. Colby. yes, sir through dune of: "62. -- May of. Senator Tower. You, were back in the Agency? Mr. Colby: — ‘I was “back An Washington from. there on. “Senator Tower. what was your Posttion?, ines eal eit
4 > < a é oe « < z A10 First Street, $-E., Washington, D.C. 20003" would 3 run a. revolt against Ngo’ 4, AN at: the end of August, ‘more or” “We are pretty, sure. ‘that Some of our probes came to the attention of Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu ‘and he knew we were looking changing | our Ambassa sittin Ambassador Nolting to ambassador a Lodge that the. government. took. the intervening week or _two, the one was. gone and the other had ‘not arrived, to ‘raid. the Buddhist pagotas and ‘besentially’ suppress | the Buddhist. . dissidents... This followed, the example wapplied by President. Diem to a similar suppression of religious sects which were in opposition to him, in 1955. He went out and suppressed this n kind of active. dissidence justifying it in his mind ‘and publicly, as ‘not accepting ‘this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation which the country was. faced with. There was a x question ‘of whether he was “effectivein suppressing ie or whether ‘Lemna: 80° aaversely affected his
2 2 < a é o 3 < 3 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 © »U states; an ‘80 ent ee educated’ ‘elasa. Bet “had weakened himself: ft Unga ey ea. ‘ ; had ‘ 4 strengthened) hinself, ge th oe ‘state Department, ‘one Ssacuraay. upeete aut ant the mission in Baigon ‘as a directive ‘to go ahead and. plan e a for the overthrow of President Dien. this has been ‘covered. ‘in various publications, - jnemoirs: and BO. “forth, _during that period. I: was not aware of this telegram before it went out. I was somewhat shocked to fina out that: it had gone out with what — appeared to be. very little consultation ‘around Washington, + but at ‘that. point it. was policy because it was stated that | that had been approved by. nyannia Port, was the reference point, that the policy, the general policy: But as ce gaid;: our problems at that time came. out. to nothing and. there was continuing debate as to what. should. be done or what could be done about this. In the meantime, the. generals that we had talked .to and we had contact with, and through one of them - the: principal * ’ b er figure was a Mr. Coneini I think you, are’ ‘going ‘to. receive. testimony. from -- was a CIA. officer who ‘had served in Indochina
‘2 be) <. e ‘. ° ‘£ -€ 3 Expaie 3 OKs ae th one “years” bef ‘and t'variou c aa to. ‘hin if the ‘generals decided ever, of the united States was under continuous" ‘debate during to Saigon. Many of the more : “aensitive messages: ‘were sent through CIA channels but were actually composed and weitten or policy stated, whatever, through a joint governmental approach toward it involving the higheat officials. of. the “State, Defense Department and. ‘the “white: House ‘in this continu : ing debate and discussion as to There are some very clear. ‘in these cables but also in the open a lot ‘of’ things’ were: done. These were done with the rationale of putting. pressure on. President Dien and the government. to particularly remove Ngo Dinh Nhu from the ‘country to bring about . certain: changes of policy in the Vietnamese government, that we thought were necessary to improve its performance. in. order to make it more acceptable to us and. also with’ the Line that this would ‘ ‘ make it- more effective in Fighting the war. ‘that they. were .
4 3° < a 4 oO 3 < z ‘410 First Street, $-E., Washington, D.C. 20003 “eng ce ate “ehe ene cope re me iWere the suepensic ie . and 80° forth, and all’ te ape Eiof President. Diem. Pehe" generals’ aid request: ‘thei om’ cour and ‘they: were. general terms that, yes, we would stand. Rye ad , took over, and Looked reasonably able to’ + ae s' could only be read as a green light | this message. was. passed ‘shrough - a CIA officer but his “he mae ‘the generals receiving. this” kind : at oe question about’ “what v. S. policy was nor that the CIA officer waa speaking for the, Ambassador and with his knowledge and consent. ‘The CIA. officer: received a call on October 30 to come over and . join the general staff and come to the meeting..and essentially sat with them as. they continued the ‘operation from their own. -
a Z. < e a -a 4 < a "410 First Street, S.€., Wasnington, 0.C: 20003 vk aaa on pine ¢ sate ‘in the headquarters” i Oring mos . Colby. He, in 3 a great part and with respect Cth 2 death of President’ cen end a received from an officer of the! vietnamese, that ‘there were various things that Gould be done about the government problen. there, and one of the alternatives was the assassination of the brother Nhu and the other brother, who “essentially ran central Vietnam, brother Kahn, Ngo Dinh Kahn. our acting, pe moved because anbassador ‘Loage felt he was ‘too ) closely identi- Abate, fied with Ngo Dinh whu’ ana: our ‘acting. chief of Station passed : this Suggestion with two or “three others which did not: - involve this ‘kind of ‘action to the Ambassador, with the: comment that we not set ourselves. totally against this course of action. Mr. Kirbow. I believe this. particular matter has been testified to before, Mr. Chairman, “and ait would be rl \ appropriate’ at. this time to put the exact language in the record and the reply then to Mr. McCone sent.
P ad < a 6 ‘a f- < z 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 in Saigon’ ‘or a ‘protracted ‘a 2 army “and. the = country gainers | as ‘cannot be in posision setter condoning tach course of: ‘action senator oe out in -- Mr. Kirbow. | In Saigon. “And: Mr. /‘MeCone. sent the reply: back. : oe Mr. Colby. Mr. ‘MeCone directed me, ‘tT sent ‘the message, and we sent that message » before we - answered. the other aspects of that cable. As soon as we got. the message we sent the response on this subject ‘right: back. sentor Tower. “That will, be made part of the record. Mr. Kirbow. Tt. happens to be on page. 28 and: continues on the top of 29 of the exhibits Senator schweiker: would: you ‘explain: what. that. means? Colby. what that means?”
2 3: <- a: a a « < a 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 | ‘ aie hig i age t. means we don! t want to a ay Re es of what to: do. ni ee “you “say we “were: ‘in’ ‘essence -- government. Senator Schweiker. “I see what you are saying. Mr. Colby. | But not the assassination in this case of the brothers Whu and Kahn. Senator Schweiker. The other went forward? Mr. Colby. “the other program continued, yes. Senator Norgan. May I ask a question? Mr. Colby, I have heard the words. Usedsaround. that what you call a CYA -- a letter?” Mr. Colby.’ Well, I wit say ‘that the, motive in “sending it was to make sure we did not get “involved in it. You can read anything in that. sense, of. course, but I think the motive was very clear that we don't want to have anything to do with any assassinations. Senator. Morgan. : the thing that, kind of worries me, Mr. Chairman, is that it seems “that almost ‘each time just before. something happens there always goes’ out a letter, and I don't:
J > < a 4 o « (« 8 ” Mr. Kirbow. 9 ‘In this regard -- Mr. Colby. Not ‘restricted, to CIA. Mr. Kirbow. In this regard I ‘think in: fairness to both Mr. Colby and’ the committee ‘record, of. their own Invests- gation, the cable traffic. both. prededing this and. after, wh, ‘ i: s {Indicates it was clearly, ‘intended as a position taken, by we Mr. McCone as | Director of “the: ‘Agency. to: ‘and ‘action that his Station chief had taken ‘with the Anbessador ‘and aid not, neces- sarily represent the whole policy | of the government at that. point. Is that a ‘correct statement? Mr. colby. oI am almost certain that we did not consult anyone in sending that message, 1 think probably. Mr. “‘MeCone and I sent the message.
4 FP) < % 6 Q « < 3 410 First Street, §.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 fg tyourselvesagair DS Aan ua tave he ‘dates. 4 and. ‘the way dt is marked these - were innediate » action at . both” ends, and Ir might | also add if. we look one step forward to the cable from ‘Saigon of 7 october, which would have been: really the 6th here, ‘they’ replied immediately to Mr. Mec tone and says action taken as | directed, and they went ‘a little ‘further to say. since: the deputy chiet of Station, Mr.’ ‘truhart, who is now a consultant “to this committee, was also present ‘ when the original recomnendation was made, ‘that he. had been made aware of Mr. MeCone" ‘s airective also. sentor Tower. Mrs Colby, ‘could. you “make available to the committee the full. text of the cable. traffic on this matter? . | Mr. Colby. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.’ Senator Tower. Thank you. Senator Schweiker. I might have missed this. Action as airected. _What does that mean? Mr. Colby... | “the action. was ‘to gO to. the’ Ambassador and
it as an option? Mr. Colby. Yes, sir, Mr. Schwarz. - Was the message passed on to Conein who was action officer on.the scene? 2 3; < a é. 3 « < z batoat Mr. Colby. I can "t say for sure, All right, proceed: Mr. Colby. Mr. chairman, when Mr. Conein went over to the headquarters and. ‘participated ‘in ‘the command center during the running of the coup, he. kept: the station , continually _advised. © 810 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003
a 5 <. a a. -) « < z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003. ‘Generel ey aE | at Peeeldont, ee ‘his’ Wu, % “ wt oe diye 'Conein when Catholics and he just” doubted that they would have done such a thing. to reconstruct this, ‘ts that, ‘there was: a ‘telephone. conversa- “tion between President ‘Diem and the generals. There were several of them. ‘And President Diem was very strongly rejecting them, calling them to discipline, and sO forth, in the earlier stages. Ata slater stage,- in the early morning of Novenber ist, he called and. indicated that he would surrender if he. would : o be properly handled. “the: generals “then sent - somebody down to
2 > < ry é fe] -@ « z 410 First Street, S.E., Wasmington, D.C. 20003 Beto t the iback. door’ of, the. races A endl t fier ce palace: and; had':go down’ ah 3 ne erals<ins nterin had been very | ts! oi ae ease wee -and epparently a, See» Knowtedge. eat Sek tenelan officer ry, a -amall arnored shot several. " elnes!: on incidentally. in. a rather bizarre aspect of this was himself apparently executed when this junta of generals was. overthrown about’ two months later, Somebody took that occasion to shoot him:. I think I can say, °Mr..Chairman, that CIA -had nothing “to do with the assassination: of President Diem and Mr. Nhu, that. the actual assassination was a shock and a surprise to cle Be 4 Es Nae i
2 a] <: a a. a « < x ; Ae SA See dae nae se AD EA SH TON a Sovernment: when: it eyes an ever, (f conaiderable iapaee abe fe rae! overall policy was s in: support ‘of that: overthrow ‘and, ‘of Sei course, I think it ts fair to. ‘say that in Launching a violent overthrow. of a “regine involved such as this, people are ‘going ' ‘to get hurt, and in this. case “the leaders were killed in the process, Now, there is one postecript to this I would like to “cover, Mr. Chairman, because at ts worth mentioning. October, I ‘think ie was, the. night before the coup, he’ carried with him five: imiL1ion plasters.” That five million piasters had been put in his safe at. his home, a. day or so before, by our Chief: of: ‘Station. ' That is about $65,000, as I remember the figure in the way it adds up. He was specifically asked by the officer ‘who called him: ‘telling him to come to bring, some money with him. He did. And when he got there he ‘gave some 2 of the money, three (‘million of it, ‘to the officers and. it, was’ apparently ‘used. _to support, to give to certain troop units that Joined the . coup. The. leaders, of certain units that, came" with the. coup. I can't
ra 5 e . a- « < z ry ae “. later, which’ was ‘gtven under his pellet, a the? fininies ° a " individuals: kitted auring the ‘coin phere ‘ forth. This is a frequent. custom tn ‘the Wetnanese, particular activity. Now, that money stemmed from a station decision ‘to put’ the money. available there. The action of giving the money over was taken at the ‘station ‘level. Te certainly was con- sistent in the station's view with an exchange ‘of several cables over the past Several weeks which: had indicated that the Ambassador said that ‘it “nay prove necessary to ‘give some money in the course ‘of ‘this activity. ¥ There was one. message from Washington. which, referred _to whether money would be necessary as a part of this” overall effort, anda key quotation which | I do not find in this summary but I think is- very important, which is a message which was sent, I think, a day before, Part of which is ‘quoted in this” dccument: - ~. but. the: (additional part of which is quoted, a message, from Mr, Bundy | ‘to. Ambssador Lodge. The number of the message is 79407. ana
ENRON Sur his ARR Hoe, ty t er atcece intervention. ! of either, sige without futhorteetion from y vecesin ania: In “ene event of an " {haeciaive contest * o ‘ ea ee the U.S. will, strenuously, avoid. ‘the appearance of pressure either side. | In the ‘event: of. failure of the coup \ we ‘might provide a but: once a coup under responsible leadership has begun and within these restrictions it is in the interest of the United $ states Government that it should succeed. | 2 2 < ry a fe] e. < That is very. clears Senator Tower. What you : are saying is -the passage monies consistent <=" Mr. Colby. Totally consistent with. the policy at that time. There is a question as to.the degree Ambassador Lodge was aware of all of this. He was aware of “Mr. Conein's dealings over the months in great detail and he has stated that many times There is- absolutely no reservation. He was not aware, apparently of this money, of the fact of. the money being taken at the time. Ne had, of course, himself in his own 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.c. 20003 message back to fashington ‘referred, to the need for such |
i) < a a 0 « < “8 [£10 First Street, S.E., Washington, B.C. 20003 Pay te 8 seen and Vents one. “was, not. tae a . ee Agee Pet, > . * ve brought to his attention. oa a vow LEP Senator Tower. Mr. Colby, I think T’ understand, the Oriental mentality better than moat Americans and I am certain you understand it far. better, than I 80 you wouta expect really ina military coup that the targets of the. coup would be assassinated, wouldn't you, that is their Mr. Colby. Not necessarily. Senator Tower. - “They are not so naive to “chink would have bought them a. nice villa in’ paris? Mr. colby. Not necessarily. Actually Mr. Conein. Guring ‘that night while the thing was being launched was discussing with them before they made the decision to assassinate, bringing an American’ aircraft in -and bringing - it in and, putting the brothers | on
“y 2 < 8 é a « _« z- 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ACR Ae ABE. atog aircraf that tpparentiy Ekg sounds a little’ unreal, ‘but: that’ was’ ‘the answer given. east ‘ en we ous Mr. Colby: I “think he night: not. have been. 1 on! it. know for sure. I. ‘think that. e they were excited and eae and I think they- got excited and considered this trickery and. -- senator Huddleston: “He might be trying to develop an opposition? . “Mr. colby. Noy ‘ty hink ‘kt was more a feeling that they had been tricked and they were infuriated by it. I think that really is the ‘motive ato the ‘bottom of. it. on Senator. Huddleston. — “that, caused his assassination?
4 3 i _ a. ‘a @ < 5 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 cing that, the decision was aftet ey, “dead. < Soe under ; eh: . . oY 0 you $8 ‘ we ‘had.no of'c onsid tion of that before.» .T ct "first time’we heard of. Senator Sc throwing people who. would” - nd Ge a a 2 he * - ‘ . at. andthe key to the coup was that “coup. at the last. moment. He “the ‘government. Schweiker.” ‘Who was he? Senator Mr. Colby. Khiem. .. .. Senator Schweiker... The decision to kill. him, would that’ not sure of the circumstance, by all Mr; ‘Colby. “There was.'an element. led by General DE ty me yo Khiem,:I think ‘that. is, ,who advocated he be shot immediately. “genera however, that.he’ not be
4 2 < a é a rs 4 8 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 Mae fhe enero there that: <a knowiedae on i Mr. Colby.. There were a couple of them that did ad- vocate he be shot. Senator. Schweiker; , We have interrupted your answer frankly, because I wanted to be , prepared. At about six o "clock ‘they discussed this and an ele- ment advocated he be: killed. The consensus, of the generals was that. he’ not be. killed. Then the suurender arrangements by phone “and ‘obvious’ preparations to receive LPs Adm and receive a surrender, and that point was the point at which “Mr. Conein’ was asked whether if we could get an so, I think the Intention clearly at thatpoint | was ‘to
2 3 < » & Le fo] « _« z _ 410 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003. - UNS Soe sFlooking Conein then returned to. the headquarters and by’ that time they had all of: the ministers of the government there, the prior government, who" were: under arrest, ‘or most of ” them. He then went to General “Minh. to find out. what happened to Diem and General “Ninh told him ‘that he had: committed suicid church. in Cholan, a. part, of. the. city, and Conein indicated aisbeliet of it and: Geneyal Minh’ replied the bodies were | back in the “armored car. behina the headquarters, do you want to see them, and Conein said nO, he did not. Conein reported this back to’ Mr. McCone by cryptic message.. Also I Might add that another officer ‘that we had - Tuan. - ‘I have forgotten what, his, first names. were, He had
wh ee oes a Yip sf e a see _| ‘Senator Morgan. “What .was exact date ofthe execu-: ‘thon? | a “Mr. Colby.” “Senator Morgan Mr. Colby. '63. ne p oops did we have -in. Vietnam Senator Morgan. How many: tr at that time? Mr. Colby. On the order of 10,000. I don't now know how many precisely, Senator, but I would say something of that nature. , oy ‘Senator Morgan. We actually were not involved in the war 2. 2 < ry 16 a _& f E itself at that time,, were we?” Mr. Colby. We were in an advisory position and I think we also by. that time were, flying some helicopters for. them -and doing technical things like that, but we didn't have any . combat forces there. - an re - Senator Tower. That was largely MAC/V and special forces, wasn't it? Mr. Colby. . Yes, sir. ‘The special forces: first arrived in Vietnam working for CIA in this country program of developing the villages. for their. own defense. - When there got to be as I remember 750 of them the question _ 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, D.C. 20003 arose as to whether they should be. transferred out of CIA
J. 12 < ry / 6 fe] 3 «< z S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 © 410 First Street, caused the execution of President Diem? Mr. Colby. . As. a national, decision; “yes. Senator Morgan. Would you say. ‘that the action’ that set these forces in motion’ was the cablegram that upaet you so, the decision that was made, I understand, without consulting you, really? Mr. Colby. Tes. _ But I wasn "e in-a high enough ‘position to take umbrage not being personily, congulted. _ Senator Morgan.” I understand, ‘that. Mr. colby. Essentially, yes. , senator Morgan. “T-am trying to peg it down in my mind. Is it fair -to say that that was when the decision was made to set the forces in motion to bring about the coup? Mr. Colby.. Yes; although Ir believe that the debate -and we might even call. it vacillation as ‘to what we should. do in vietnam continued all the way. ‘up to. the. end.
a) < e “ee _& .« Bo _ 410 Fivst Street, S-E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 eCREF si es ky o” the; execution? Bo ‘you follow a “aifferent ‘philosophy in the CIR? Mr. Colby. I think I agree with you,. Senator. - y ‘think when you support a coup through violent ‘overthrow you have to _understand that, you are taking responsibility for people getting killed. soldiers got. killed and the head: .of the other side got killed. ; soldiers got killed on both sides. presidential guard soldiers ‘and. soldiers in the coup group. Senator Morgan. a 1 apologize for imposing on your . time. This bothers me more than anything I. have heard. We really were not at war, we were just there as advisers, and yet we set the forces in motion that brought about the execution of these two men. ‘That is a fair statement of the facts, isn't it, and concise? Mr. Colby. Well, I think when “you are dealing with foreign forces, Senator, there. is: a point at which you are no. longer responsible for the detailed actions” they take because
4 > <: ‘ 4 Q. « < 8 . S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 810 First Street ae ree orn S ae ASS ‘tors But I think when" ‘you are dea: abs : sh foreign group ‘or power’ that. at: 80 Rar Le: “to what is actually ‘to! be done. frame is. taken by ‘someone! ete ? ae a “on this committee recognizes any, more than T do the. need . for a strong Central Intelligence Agency, and the one question, the. central question ‘that r have been trying, to follow ever | ‘since we have. been in these hearings is is the CIA an .arm of government that acts somewhat Arresponaibly, on its: own, oie or has it been a + responsible and | controlled” vagency of Iam not interested’ ‘in placing blame, because as far as \ ‘I am. concerned the recommendations. that this committee ‘ought ‘to make are going to hinge to a large degree on where the action originated from. Now, the thing I think in this situation, your: conspiracy situation, we ‘might have tried to. back away but we didn't complete the back away. ‘Me. Conein, is that his name, was even on the balcony with the generals: . It is ‘sort of like, I really don't --
Z ? < a a :) .@ < z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Ripaad at Ba biilsdh ahs : i “haven! t": “had aileakynt ; Y a he was’ ee et “on: eh aleany on the ee the coup ‘took’ “Senator norsan. aoe almost Like’ ‘as it I had driven. to the bank, and | were sitting in the getaway ‘ear: for you to” rob the’ bank and: ‘in the course of robbing, you executed, you.shot a man. I am heid just as much cecporetpie.’ Mr. Colby. ‘Yes, sir. That is my point about the accomplice situation ‘in law, which I think is somewhat differen in international relations ‘because of the / concept of | sovereignty gets into there. Senator Horgan rt ‘troubles mes I am trying to see
rr > <. a “a a & < z ) - a eh eS Ue ks nor cat ble (At one point I made a suggestion that perhaps I could : ‘convince him ‘of the desirabitity. of leaving the country ‘for the benefit of his own, of the Country: itself, © That I could go over and argue him into ite) That I think ‘is a Separatable thing ‘from the actual decision to shoot. Diem, I think the decision to shoot ‘Diem was, a _consetous decision ae taken by. the generals which came as, a very new. development a
weal ante ae cont “dazing the’ coup, but ‘let! 8. face’ a throw of a governnent _ Senator Hatazentohs: 1 . sstimony.you, . . . a qed , ; ates lating to at least investigating the. teeta Prsay tions from the State Department or: fon the: » Forty Connittee or from the White: House or “from: just where? 10. _ Mr. Colby. That telegram was  acteidoram’ from the State 11 || Department to the Ambassador. Senator Huddleston. Is it the usual chain of command? Mr. Colby. That is the usual. 4 > <- ft 4 a. c- < . Senator ‘Huddleston. For the CIA to receive its in- 15 structions? — . oS . 16 17. ' Senator Tower. . + enn Mr. Colby. .And CIA was. ‘in ‘receipt of a “telephone call before it was sent. Senator lluddleston. ‘what i really want to know, you. as station agent in Saigon, what is the one source that is your “ultimate instruction to. do “something. Mr. Colby. Obviously a station ‘chief, has several chiefs. ‘Senator Huddleston. ° He does?. Mr. Colby... He is under instruction. and in this case he
2 > < a a . r) 3 < a. 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 oe pata 4 yore ; Tine was under very specific aon : . 83 seh “Mr nnbassador's atrcctives.,. Senator Huddleston. ‘Is that the usual chain ‘of command, that once: the National. § security counci} or whoever makes “the determination as to what we are going ‘to do, . do they then have the State Department convey that. message to the CIA throug the Ambassador ‘to that particular country, or is that set up seprately everywhere?, Mr. colby. I think policy is “normally transferred. from the National Security: ‘Couneil- to the “Ambassédor. The - Ambassador. is the President! 8° ‘representative and: has overall authority of all agencies. in that country and, therefore, an important question like this would be passed to the Ambas ssa- dor to handle. Now,. the other agencies in town would be informed of the policy directive that we might have additional communica- tion as the details as to how to implement them, which in. this case were done through’ directive to our station’ chief to make sure that he operated very directly and immediately. under the control of: ‘the Ambassador. : 4
id “5 «< a 4 8. e. i x med OM . te 4 - “The State Department wouidn’ iE dasue of the CIA? “Mr. Colby. Well, ‘in this situation we were having almost daily meetings with senior officiais: in the CIA, State Department, “Defense Department and To) forth, in ‘the basement of the White House, and there is no question that this was national policy and hammered out. Mr. Kirbow. In fact, with the President on most. of those occasions? « Colby. Frequently. At ‘these meetings, these’ were _the meetings in which Mr. ‘McCone cand ‘I argued very. strongly ‘that we should not move against the > ‘Diem government, | we should continue to work with it. ‘Senator Huddleston. Now, in the first survey, in the first check, you found no interest among the generals in conducting the coup? " nater,apparently, they were willing. What. kind of persuasion was used to. change their positio on. -this?
1 J 3 <. a «@ a £ « B.. 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.c. 20003 - i ‘the Vietnamese, and r ‘don ae me ‘fF "from: “unhappy with Diem? Mr. Colby. Most of the 2 people An: the, state Departnent ‘vidual matter, quite frankly. There is an article here in the Washington Post in September which sort. of, I think, pretty clearly states it. while the Pentagon and CIA on one “side of. ‘the ‘pot argue: At with the State Department on ‘the. other: ‘Senator Huddleston. - Is this. "622, Mr. Colby. 63. You can: have it. Senator rower. Let me just say one thing. I think this underscores the. difficulty we are going to be confronted with several times on the committee, that is, making ‘a dis- tinction between the CIA acting on its own and acting as: an instrument of national. policy made, by. somebody else. We are. going. to he in the position, I suppose, by. hindsight question-_
2 > < a se. fe] € «< z . 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 a ‘command and order in ‘Ww eae clearly CIA‘ 3 ah . re , . Bee A . = aes ¢ HM ‘ china f oh pines aa eae pce scion had’ been made aa. ' 2p ip and implenénted Is there any doubt in your mind had it not. been for: ‘the ‘United States insistence that the generals would not have ever initiated the coup? Mr. colby. There, is no doubt in my. mind. I believe that, frankly, Ir believe that the. five years which intervened. be- tween 1963 and "68 were years of chaos leading, to the commitmen: if the war was not to be lost, five hundred thousand American soldiers, and we “ended up in "68 with: a President of ‘ ‘south vietnam who was about ‘Like President Diem. Senator luddleston. I ‘take it you still think your. original decision was correct? Mr. Colby. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. ° Was correct or incorrect? Mr. colby. My.position was, correct, “The original rs decision I have publicly called a. disaster. “Senator Tower. I. want. to. recognize, Senator Morgan.
J > « a. 4. ) £. < 8 : ‘ ae eee Br) ; 8} Huddleston’ 3 suestions | that: it would. ba’ appropriate ‘to, SHOW ar i eines call from Mr. Harriman ‘to, the Deputy ee the Agency, which was the only. contact ‘sou nth ebcora where Mr. Marriman called Mr. Nelms, just. before 8: :00° Pome and outlined to him the substance of what eventually turned to be the Department telegram, 243, to Saigon. To Helms: Query: Mr. Harriman confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained | ans. implicit pull. out of Ameican forces and support ‘be ‘the hus were hot. ‘ousted. Marri te man said that the message had 1 been cleared with Hyannis Port, the president, Secretary of, State and with Mr. Ciipatrick. There isa “latter entry showing that ‘the. ‘president. was at Hyannis Port, that the Secretary of: State, ‘and the Secretary of Defense were all out of ‘the city. Mr. Colby. And Mr. McCone was out of the city.. Mr. Kirbow.. Yes. | | “his being from the Inspector General' s report which has been ‘made a Part of. the, record previously. The State telegram then follows. : And, while the telegran
-F 2 5° «< a 4 f°] 4 «< z eee a nai 5 Me me Rae cis apart of the:record, ‘important: to; ay HgaeGk aa ¥ or AUNTS in addition’ 'to.,the: oes a but “you will wo : t oe pet . also know we will back you to the. hire” on “actions: you take to On 25 August, following’ that, a cable. ‘from Me. iHLl1sman, who was “Assistant Secretary of! State for’ Par: East, to cable sent Separately represents agonizing at. the highest levels. The course outlines is dangerous but! ‘all ‘agree that delaying a clear-cut. U. s. stand is even more: dangerous, It won’ t be easy for you but be: assured that. ‘ae will back you all the way. This was followed by a cable on 25 august from the CIA. headquarters to its Saigon station which reads -- Mr. Colby, Which I wrote. r..Kirbow. Which Mr, Colby did write. and: it says on page 7, for your information, CIA not. consulted Tegarding ‘cable being sent “separately, which, however; cleared, at the
a Sicinbentene beliey 2th {CIA must fully cs i ve ty, og "t accept ‘directives ‘of “Polleynakers and: Seek ways: ‘to! accomplish + seg c of action we night naa cs ‘think wou ‘the Important part. The CIA is saying to “their ‘poeple, thus we suggest a “real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at the same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify, at which point we probably will be unable to effectuate. 2 > < y e a & < Ed . This boils down to seeking some middie ground for at leas an interim period. So I think that is simply to show, Senator, that while ‘the message went from State to the Ambassador and ‘then they werd having their local’ meetings there, that the CIA position : still is against theoverthrow was transmitted directly to their station chief. I think also that this same document, which is a matter of record, reveals probably in detail the same things that the witness has testified to. here about. the urgency of ‘the: problem at the Washington < area “because on. practically every 410 First Street, S.E, Washington, D.C. 20003 page of this record during August, and September, and Octoher,
2 2 < a. .8 ° 3 < -3- 810 Furst Street, $.E.. Wasnington,.0.C. 20003 ror with all, ‘of. ‘the Cabinet members who: ° alte Senator Morgan. The first thing, Mr. Colby, the last -message I think certainly ‘commends you and your actions.. But “when was Lumumba killed? Mr. colby. © Lumumba’ was killed February '61. Mr. Schwarz. OF possibly January? ‘Mr. Colby. Yes, sir. Senator: Morgan. When was 5 Trujillo? Mr. ‘Colby. Trujillo was killed May 30, ‘61, as I: remember. Lumumba , you know, was not killed by anything the CIA was involved in. We did, as I have testified, look ‘into the possibilities but we did not. have anything to do with his death. Senator Morgan. I remember that we were thinking about it. i Mr. Colby.. Yes,’ sir. Senator Morgan. Now, of course, during this’ period of -time we were also talking about Mr. Castro.
ig: > < e a] fe] @ < z “410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Senator M “When was he killed? tober of .1970. “Mr. Colby. He wa : Senator Morgan: nat HERS sor ty Mr. Colby. ‘Yes; OT tat Senator Morgan. Were there any. others that we talked about of that you have testified to? | DeGaulle, did you not ‘testify that never to your knowledge was there any discussion at all about deGaulle's assassination? | Mr. Colby. What happened ‘on that, Senator, is that ahout two weeks ago, I think it was; we got a memorandum from one of our employees who said that he was approached in 1968-67 by a Frenchman, that this Fremchman called for a meeting and he met him and this required’ some travel. . ‘ Senator tower. This was in a foreign country? Mr. Colby. ‘In Rome: Senator Huddleston. He was an employee of the CIA? Mr. Colby. Our present employee. . the other one was an agent. Senator Huddleston. The Frenchman? Mr. Colby. He was an agent. ‘Senator fuddleston. Of ‘the CIA? Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.
4 > <: s a] co) « < 2 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.c. 20003 flat down. Mr. Schwarz." § Senator Morgan. this business Goming out tn the press abo t ‘deGaulle is absolutely false? Senator tower. The chairman issues. a. statement on the other aay. | The fact ‘of the matter was the CIA was. approached by {t {the a rejected it offhand, there on the spot when he was approached with the idea. “Senator Schweiker. And relayed back to Washington. Washington -- ; | Senator Morgan. - _To pursue. my final question -- Mr. colby. There is. another atlegation about Duvalier. I knew there was “nother one. Senator Morgan. As I understand it, the CIA had no plans or participated? Mr. Colby. We did support. a. couple of groups ‘to try make a landing and raise a revolt, a Bay of Pigs kind of thing in there, and they didn't work. Senator Huddleston. In Naiti? “Mr Colby. Yes, sir. And Mr, Duvalier died of natural causes in '71, or something like that.
> < oY 6 -.2 e < 3 . S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 410 First Street and histor ‘Senator Morgan, As’ far as intel intelligence agencies, have you ever known. of any ‘such? Mr. Colby. Nos. As I say, it is hard to talk about in- telligence and not say that. as: a coup in Canada. ‘Senator Morgan. TD wasn't being. facetious. Mr. Colby, “I know it. 1 just wouldn't want to give you a flat statement on that, I-couldn't say. Senator Huddleston. Inthe coup ‘in Saigon, how extensive was the combat? - I.don't recall,
aes ‘ecu, group and, fighting only: involved “the ‘Presidential guare went? Could that be “conasgerea + as’ a “bribe? e 1a Mr. Colby. T ‘don! tknow ‘but T woulda’ t. be surprised. “Mr. Colby. 1 don't knew where the money went in specific terms, to what. uhits, but it:went to somebody: like Jd 2 < & é Q & < 5 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Colby. Yes”: gir. Mr. Kirbow. or to prevent them from taking action against hile the coup was under way. Senator Huddleston. Were any American soldiers or CIA employees actively. engaged in the combat?- Mr. Colby.No. - Senator Huddleston. Or fire any shots? Mr. Colby, No. Mr. Kirbow. .. Both our records and-later history written 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 by these Vietnamese governments indicates that there was’
P] _2 < « é Q £ < z 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.c. 20003 -headquarters to Saigon for the Ambassador’ 8 eyes only originated pn lees Proceed. on: think the anention. has been raised, y contacts may have “kept. ‘the Pot ting on this thing: ; Inspector. General! 3° report certain cabler tratfic. and ‘other memoranda from pages 32, 33 and 35 of ‘these articles. ° On 9 October the President of the United States ata news conference in connection with the transfer of the station chief of Saigon, Mr: John Richardson, was asked a question concerning ‘the CIA being under control or out of con- trol ‘because there had been some articles in the press that the CIA was running an ass sassination operation and stated the following. I know the transfer of Mr. John Richardson, who is a very. dedicated public servant had led to some question, but 1 can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out any independent activities but is operated under close. control of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under and with the cooperation of the National Security Council and- under my instructions. There is following that a “cablegran from the
2 2? < ry _@ _o e < id - 10 First Street, S-E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Serie SRSA Se that the uss. exchange of governnent. or “a@enied ecomomic or Bonk military. assistance to. hu ‘regine’ At it ‘appeared capable, ‘of. increasing effectiveness of ninitery effort, insuring popular \ ro . support to win the war ‘and improving, work relations with, the 3 U.S. The cable urges the contact with Minh press for detailed information clearly indicating ‘that “Minh plans over a4 high prospect of success. Inaddition to these thoughts, - at indicates that the cable had been discussed with the president of the united States. Later, on 10 0 october, PCT priefed the Foreign Relations “Committee ‘and gave the position of the CIA in its operations . in Saigon which was a “matter of record. I pelieve that the next: comment is very appropriate and should be read into the record. Apparently there was some concern in Washington onthe ‘part of Mr. McGeorge Bundy that Mr. Lodge and General Harkins and the CIA ‘should pull back temporarily fromthe ‘generals and the following was in a.cable to Saigon of 24 October. Fyes only, for Lodge and Harkins” from Bundy. There may be danger Nhu. is ‘attempting | to entrap. through, | pon' Ss
J > < es _«@ _ 2 « < . 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 nin Ped ae igs The ‘mediate respo ‘ste Bd in party Tr hava personas “immediately thereafter at which all. details of this matter - Bae were again discussed ‘and are’ a matter of record before the committee. Mr. Schwarz. I have understood from other sources some- thing that is not in the report, which may have some ‘bearing on the attitude ‘at the very moment of the coup, and that is there was a. telephone call from Dien to Lodge in which ambassador Lodge offered, to ‘help Diem get out of the country? Mr. Colby. There is a State telegram, yes, which I don't have, but. which Diem called Lodge.and said that he was having trouble with =-- that © an attack, an effort was being made against him by his: generals, and that he believed. it essential to put this down. He of fered to, he urged that the United states consult General Lansdale and'me by name because we understood. something ‘about this. tiatuion there. This was in ‘the. afternoon of ‘the coup.
5 <. _t a a 3 < z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Q oars ig s Anbaasador bots | that corinect fon! shapes ER the time Conein waa’ oe ithe Baléony ‘or somewhere® ay Paphage! stat 8 noe came, /back that” it. “ a from Taiwan or. the Philippines. , why is that such a. complicated matter, to get. an airplane. ‘out to Saigon? | Mr. Colby. I don't know. As r said, it sounds absolutely ineredible at this venture but: apparently that. was the response received at a request for an air force plane which would not come from either Taiwan, because of the political aspects of it, or T think it was the: Philippines, and I don' t know the rationale of that | at alle Mr. Schwarz. . From. that- I SUPPOSE | one could ‘draw - the conclusion’ that that represents kind ofa bureaucratic Mr. Colby.1 don't know of any other explanation. I frankly don't know of any other explanation, Senator tluddleston. ‘It wouldn't have been an excuse, would it? Mr Colby.-I don't believe so. I think it was the answér given by the Air Force when the request was made with that. limitation onit that --— a ea, S
ay cs ieee tae a 7 want to associate Vietnam At that’ period there’ was’ ‘a con= somehow be translated into ; an “act antagonistic to Mainland China and get us ‘into, more trouble” up there if we got. too closely involved. with Taiwan: Mr. Schwarz.. Did we have planes’ in Vietnam at that time. ‘Mr. Colby. I am sure we. had air attache planes there. Senator Tower. Wasn! t Air Anierica operating ¢ there then? t Mr. Colby. “Idon! t think yet. I am not sure. F > < £. é a ce. < z Mr. Kirbow. The largest: aircraft availableat the time have been a C-46 or C-47 type?, — Mr. Colby.Probably:China Airiines under contract to us China Airplanes, ‘not CAT. CAT was Air America, ‘Senator Tower. Yes, I know. Mr. Colby. ‘I guess you are right, we did have air- craft there for some reason or another, and I don't know the answer as to why we didn't use that. Senator luddleston.You are saying though that that answer or that decision was outside of the CIA? Mr. Colby.Yes, sir.. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Senator Huddleston, The Ambassador himself?
“J > « - Q < 3. $.€., Washington, 0.c. 20003 | os 410 Forst Street, gat ‘that’ dt! ‘would. take 24 noves. Mr. “Schwarz. Tt doesn’ é: seen, “to me, “pased upon your Flory testimony: © McCone to “the ‘station ‘ontet) t _ but in effect says don! t anadciate J yoursel® with ‘the assaseine- tion, the question. whether that was passed. on to: Mr. conein put against ‘the: “testimony doesn't seem to make any aifference “but ‘Mr. ne 4 would suspect he was. aware of gt knowing how close Mr.qs and conein were, and they were very close "personally and officially. Mr. Schwarz. Tt think in the ‘testimony ,based upon Mr. Kirbow's interview, is going te ‘be he was not aware. Mr. ‘Colby. Maybe not. ‘Mr. Schwarz. . Assuming ‘that to be ‘the fact, does ‘it tell. the committee anything. and. what lessons could be drawn from it, what kind of réasons are there for the lack of communication on such matters between persone in. the agencies or persons in the agencies and ‘outside of the. agencies. | | | Mr.. Colby. Well, the proposal had been made Y a. vietnamese, it had ‘been “passed ‘to the Ambassador The Proposal had been passed to the Ambassador reporting what proposal had. station had commented on the proposal in
2 > < nN 4. ) < z. , 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 apjtcgad a ws point. there’ is no further’ action’ ‘taken on the proposal. Mr. Schwarz.’ We. Sonware. but’ ‘foaiowing -- Mr. Colby. It wasn! t ‘followed uP. Mee Schwarz. ‘And’ I understand that is the thrust. But A following up on. Senator Morgan! 8 ‘questions, if Mr. Conein was the most important action person in connection with the generals, and the telegram was. expressing. an attitude of the’ United States about assassinations’ -- . Mr. Colby. Of Mr. McCone.” Mr. Schwarz. Of Mr. McCone. He was the superior of Mr. Conein?, Mr. Colby. Sure. Mr. Schwarz. Wouldn't it follow that it ought to be communicated to Mr. Conein and indeed perhaps more communi- cated to him than anybody else, more important to communicate it to him than anybody else? Mr. Dirbow. Mr. sriehy was the source of the Proposal, Mr. Colby. To the Ambassador. I just want to make sure where the proposal. came to him from. Mr. Kirbow. The record does not reveal that here and
AL Gy SO he does: not. ‘recalls; ry te (ca eet dean’ is what strikes me.. Mr.  Kirbow. He. goes. not. “we. Colby. The proponal a nade to a different officer. Mr. Kirbow. At this time he does not appear to be aware of ‘either: ‘the’ submitted: recommendation to the Ambassador or the ‘telegram that came out and indicates he. would not necessarily have. ‘known * from the cable traffic unless he heard it ata meeting which was being run practically everyday among the senior CIA station personnel. | Mr. Colby.I have a feeling in my mind, which I would J 2. < a 4 o: 3 < 8 i ; ; | | have to examine and’ clarify in. the record, (a). that this pro- il , posal came to us from. somebody other than, through someone othe than Conein. Wehad another officer in touch with other generals and. ‘sO ‘forth at that period and Idon't know whether the advice was passed back through that channel or not. Mr. Schwarz. Aga matter of general | practice,. the attitude expressed by the McCone telegram was presumably important and Mr. Conein was. at least a significant actor, whether or not: he was the source of the telegram which Mr. ‘MeCone responded to. Assuming he wasn't notified, what I am searching for, 410 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 under your experience, if you can give an explanation. in the
a 2 < ry a o « < z 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 nies Se a da with compa own independent reasons for - proéeeding, we. hear ‘of these, we get reports. of proposed assassinations and so  gorth,. in our regular. reporting, and sometimes we warn people and sometimes we don't. It depends on the overall situation. It doesn't have any involvement with us. I mean but it is an intelligence report in a-sense ana then the action as to. what to do about it. I think that, ‘consequently, so long as it is clear that we aren't involved in it, and that is what was wrong with that particular message, is that it indicated support of the idea, and that was innediately responded to. If the message had merely been reported by the station - to the Ambassador that ‘this proposal had been made by:a vietnamese, 1 doubt that there would have been a cable from ‘Washington... Mr. Schwarz. But once you knew the problem existed, and Mr..Conein. was the most important action officer with the generals --
Fi] 2 < Ly é [s] « < z 410 First Street. S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 attitude of the Director. ‘concerning assansinations. because ‘that attitude only ‘extended ‘to ‘making sure that the United Is that what: you were. ‘saying? Mr. colby. No Anvolvenent. Mr. Schwarz. No thvolvenent« If it wag, McCone' 8 attitude was” ‘the U. S, should have no. involvement and Conein was the person most closely asso-— ciated with the generals and the subject had come up. I “can't understand why he would not as a matter of ordinary course be notified of the McCone telegram. Mr. Colby. Because no proposal of the American involve- ment ‘was made through him. If this is another individual, as I suspect it was.” Excuse. me. It was Conein. t beg your) pardon. In-a meeting with Conein General Minh requetted-a state- ment of the U.S, position, said it did not expect U.S. support of a coup effort but did need U.S. government assurances that the U.S. weuld not: try bo thwart his plans. He outlined the three possible plans. — One, assassination of the ‘two brothers, keeping Diem in office, encircling of Saigon by various military elements, and thirdly, direct confrontation between if military ‘units involved “in the coup. and loyalist. military units:
el > < IN 4 fe] & « z 410 First Street, $.E., Wastington, 0.C. 20003 ‘afternoon before the committee. arenes Tt: tis doubly’ important to understand (a) whether Mr. Conein was notified and (b) if not, why not. And I only have it from Mr. Kirbow! 3 description of his interview that he does not. recall _ being notified, Mr. Kirbow._ that is my recollection, Mr. Chairman. I guessMr.. Conein would ‘be the hest evidence. He will appear. Mr. Colby. At the next’ meeting with General Don Conein,under ‘instructions, and I believe that means under. instructions from the Ambassador, passed the word. that, passed’ the word consitent with the response really to Minh's sugges- tion of how they would, do it, why we do not wish to stimulate a coup, we do not wish to leave the impression the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny military assistance to a new regime if it appeared, et cetera, et cetera, to win the war and improve the working relationship with the U.S. The cable urges that Conein press for detailed information| clearly indicating that Minh's plans offered a high prospect of success. The message that came back from the policy levels of
2 3 «< ‘ « -} & .« 2- S.E., Wasnington, 0.c. 20003 “410 Fest Street, > we the generals, - oe 7 Bo Ser ct e aikee Maat ‘those three ‘curses of action, Mr. Schwarz, ‘that record says. ‘Were ‘three ways to Accomplish , a coup, ":one of which was by assassination, Mr. Schwarz. Which: said the U.S. should not actively ‘condone assassination. As far as the written record. shows, the next contact is between, the next ‘Felevant contact is between Conein and Minh and there is. no’ statement in this con- tact one “way or the other about “assassinations, Mr. Colby, That. is right; nor in the message from. Washington which dealt, with the whole, the three proposals, Mr. Schwarz. So. the message. from Mecone to Vietnam, as far as the written record Shows, and we have to explore this further, obviously, suggests that ‘the statement the U. S. shall not condone assassinations - just never got past Don to Mr, Colby. That. is right. The u.s> would not involve
2 > < .& 4 Q « < z 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ale ea SSeS tlre: -invo assass not passed. There was : canes le oy ‘ Ry, i” en not specific c: wet gr Poe ou . + . Becausé ption’ as.to--how th rene Hie ROR Ne : coup was 1 ey ‘conduct their Mr. Kirbow.: ‘message from the Director of CIA to its station chief. instructing him as to an action that he took wi sador would never be passed to General?_ Mr. poe No, I was. told, he was told to go to the “Ambassador and withdraw his’ somewhat favorable comment about the assassination possibility. Co | 7 | Mr. Kirbow.. These are not directly related to the: subsequent meetings that Conein had with General’ Minh at | all?’ | | | | oo | Mr. colby. ‘the general made the proposal, described how he would go at it, the three alternate positions, and: the re- ply which came from Washington to that was that the U.S. would not stimulate a’ coup but it wouldn't thwart«it:and. -it would continue the assistance.thereafter. = “qhe option as to which course of action was left. generals. ra | | . Mr. Kirbow. “Chronologically the report kind of. ’ that CIA message ‘in the middle of what was going on at
J. > < e a o « < z 410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Mh SAH ind 1 GE ta amen Sénator “Tower.: ‘pursued fairly exhaustively Weis Washington and were ‘acted upon. - You have made. fairlyclear your position and I take it the nosttion of CIA’ Saigon was that I think the bird-in-the- -hand phrase is an accurate ‘unmary of your position? Colby. Well, I think that was certainly true of: “Mr. Richardson as” ‘chief of Station, and that really was a little bit the problem that got between him and Ambassador Lodge which ase to his transfer, Mr. cued 1 position was. one of being a loyal: subordin~ ate to Ambassador Lodge. That was clear. | Senator Hart of Colorado. We had three basic American presence it seems to me in Viegnam at this time. ‘One is | military, one.is intelligence and one is diplomatic, CIA, Defense “Department, and: State. CIA's, position it seems to me was pretty clear against a coup, against certainly the ramifications of a coup. Mr. Colby. I wouldn't say every member of CIA believed
3 2 < e e Q & < 3 410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, 0.C. 20003 te any ‘ te , ar sa aay! vs were “individual CIA people “I am not. talking about sat tye ae ter Washi by ‘Given * ° was recommending - Department .and/or’ Mr. Colby. ° I would.say that the embassy's position, the political section and the Ambassador, was much more sympa~- thetic to the proposition that the war could not: success- fully be conducted with President Diem still in power without a major change in his style of operation. However, there is -an additional factor in this which was the public pressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and_ in the United States, and I think this public pressure was ~felt | ‘particularly by the people in the National Security Council -and by the people in the State Department. Senator Hart of Colorado. That public ‘pressure ==. Mr. Colby. WAs one of distaste for President Diem. _ Senator Hart of Colorado. And it meshed with what the Ambassador and his political section were saying from there?
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, 5.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 1s 16 “19 18. “19° aa interfere with the smain things going on. ‘this was ‘true of the Secretary and General Harkins out ‘there and the goint Chiefs here and so0 forth. Senator Nart, ‘of colorado. When you say this thing shoulc not interfere -< Mr. Colby. the political problens of Niem with the dissi- a duntitlostion for ie Oe is an. urban. probien, urban political problem which should not dents, political dissidents in the urban centers. Senator Mart ‘of colorado: Therefore, their) conclusion was it was no great matter we should get rid of him? ‘Mr. Colby. The most dramatic way in which ‘this was posed, this has’ been described publicly a number of times, was that at one time, particularly the frustrating period the. sent two officers, one a general Crewlack, who was. an assistant ‘president faced with these two strong positions, he to Secretary: McNamara and a Mr. Mendelhay, who had formerly been ‘the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about five days to make an assessment on the spot and back to the Cabinet Room and one sat on one end they came of the room :
a: a] < e a: [) « .« z 21 22 25 24 “25 ATH Atha f ae Liab nee eli ere crevlack frat eas ‘he 30 military chiefs and all that. ‘sort of thing and the war business going on basically all right and. there were some problems but ‘the thing owas “they seemed ‘to have a strategy and they seemed to -be moving along on tt, and: Mendethay said he want to three cities and. talked to ‘lots of civil servants and political people “and all: the rest ‘of. it “and there was a . general feeling that the. ‘cause. was | hopeless ‘because there was so. much distaste for president Diem and so much opposi- tion and the general feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, looked at them and said did you two fellows go to the same country? And the answer is they did. | they Looked at two different parts of the elepha * senator Hart of Colorado. ‘$0 to recapitulate the infor mation before the National Security Council when this coup decision was made, was CIA offieially against the Defense Department, officially against or neutral. Mr.Colby. Against. Senator Hart of Colorado. Officially against. Mr. Colby. And State. ‘ Senator Hart of colorado. And State for the -- Mr. Colby. pasically for, although 1: think you would have to say the. final policy was that the United States would not sponsor, I guess is the right word, or stimulate a coup,
2 [2 < s. e o « < z 410 First Street, S.E£., Washington, O.C. 20003 A Foe fi sa ft eg heonered ae . "ite ves pees Mr. Colby.: - The bag of money vas not. really the CIA Five million: plasters, “the ‘bag: of money was the aid program. ae That is the real thing. We “suspended with an indication it would be resumed . and ‘that is a much bigger bag of money than CIA ever handles. Senator Hart of Colorado. Would the coup have gone forward without the CIA's bag of money? Mr. Colby. yes, sir. Senator Hart of Colorado. So that was inconsequential? Mr. Colby. That is right. “Senator Hart of Colorado. Conein showing. five million pi- asters?. Mr. Colby. That was incidental. He had been called over because they had made the decision that they were going to go for the coup and he'was invited to go because they had made a commitment that they would give him an advance tip on it and when he came they had already made the ‘decision. There is no question about that. Senator Hart of Colorado. © One’ final question to ‘amend my recapitulation. .
ri -3 < « a o. « < z 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 it they: wanted are _ the coup they weal neve He. cathy, | r aon' t: think they necessarily had that assurance; _ oR Senator Hart of Colorado. They didn! t know that? Mr. Colby. our embassy “had - that and our station had no Senator Hart of Colorado. Conein or no one else? Mr. colby. T'can't say we ever told them that. I just don't know. There is no indication that we told them that. ‘The clear position was that it was. their: coup and then we picked up the pieces ‘and go on with ‘the war after the coup. Senator Hart of Colorado. : dust to amend my recapitula- tion, (CIA officially and Defense. Department officially against, State Department for, and public opinion in the United. States for --~ Mr. Colby. Basically, yes, Senator Nart of Colorado. And, in your judgment, what “in- fluenced the National Security Council decision the most, “State Department, Saigon reports, | or what? Mr. Colby. I think ‘the general press coverage and general awareness of. just. the State cables by a long shot, You had a very heavy treatment and ‘frankly Mrs. ‘Nhu didn't do.
4 Aeeekl ot Siow C + o 2 3 « a a Q = < a. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003: by. << Mr. Colby. Excuse me, ie ‘T'may. I ‘think the answer to your question, Senator,- is. one that I have used with many foreigners, that: you cannot expect the ‘American government to carry out a ‘course of action which does not have the support of its. people, that it just won! "t work, and that if there is no Public support of a- course of action the American government will move to a differ- ent course of action, and that is the way we run our country. Senator lluddleston. it sometimes takes a long time to filter through, though? , Mr. Colby. Yes, sir. Senator Huddleston. I was going to inquire whether or not there was ever any. serious attempt on the part of our government to persuade the President that he should leave “office voluntarily. Did we express to him our unhappiness with the situation? Mr. Colby... We certainly discussed Mr. Nhu's . Leaving Vietnam at various times. I don't ‘remember any. There was almost’ no contact, direct contact between our Ambassador Lodg ‘and President Diem very, very little contact.
XN J 2? < a « a- @ < 2 AS fe “pnbassador Lodge, f q Whee at that ‘he could communicate ‘back’ and forth to President Diem. 1 “You had to .8pend about. four’ hours listening to y his dis- ‘cussion of the whole situation. ‘in order to get a fow points in. - Senator Huddleston. | But the llth hour’ telephone call from Diem ‘to Ambassador Lodge would indicate that he at ‘least thought -- Mr. Colby. He went to him as the official representative of the American, governnent. Senator Nuddleston. | He thought we might still sympathize with him and be on his side? Mr. Colby. “He said that he was: going to require his officers to fulfill their oaths | of loyalty to the Constitution, to the Vietnamese Constitution and his office as president. He was very stiff about his position as president. I don't remember the text of the message but that comes through very clear. Senator Huddleston. Wasn't there a telephone call or conversation or a call in which the Ambassador indicated that he would help him get out of the country? . Mr, Colby. . I believe. so. Mr. Schwarz. It is not. in your report? Mr. Colby. No, it doesn t really have much to do with our
P 3 < e e ° & -« 2 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.c. 20003 be overrun. 0 . - , ve ape saan ‘ Senator Huddleston. Wouldn't that’ also have been perhaps the reason he left the palace and went: to another ~ location? | Mr. Colby. He left the palace because it was going to Senator Huddleston. He wasn't going to another loca- tion where he might be picked up by the Americans and taken out of the country, as he was led to believe we. would help him? . -Mr. Colby. We had no contact with him after the coup started after.the phone calls. | | Mr. Kirbow. The record reveals the generals informed him if he did not surrender they were going to totally destroy the palace, and apparently from. the record he was not .there while he was making these phone calls, he was over in the Cholan district, having left the day before from the palace ‘and having. taken his children with him. Senator Hart of Michigan.. I think some of us were’ struck by your statement that there was relatively little communication over this period with President Diem. You mean of any sort or simply with respect to the suggestion he leave? | Mr. Colby. By the Ambassador himself. There was a lot of contact. Admiral Felt, who. was. the CINCPAC, visited with President Diem on the morning of the ‘coup, and the generals