478-10004-10053 wz AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES : SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW: OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK Assassination System Date: Identification Form Agency Information ROCKCOM 178-10004-10053 ASSASSINATION FILE MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3) Document Information CIA DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962 12/10/1962 3 ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES PFIAB OPERATION MONGOOSE MC CONE, JOHN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM Top Secret 1B; IC Redact 08/03/1993 4] 8/27/20 1
| 10 December 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. | HUE ope 178-10004-10053 SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign intelligence Advisory Board, 7 December 1962 1. After concluding the discussion on Guba, the Director told the Board that-he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the end. of December. He said that one had reached Thére had been some trouble with the J-58 engines, but all problems were soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on the engines. and noted that we had had'75 hours in the air with 18 hours on the J-58 engine. “He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to insure that the project was receiving top priority. Dr. Killian asked if Pratt and Whitney had their. first team in and the DCI said yes, “but one of the problems was thatl_ didn't have access to everything in Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way. 2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a 2 solution to the fuel pump problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached. Dr. Killian noted mat] wad working. on an alternative fuel pump. The © DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small q. as we had hoped for, it was being worked on. a Se §
SS PU ULUALE eee NO ane ee oS ° _ 3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordina- tion. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence budget was f the over all effort. He said that he had discussed this with ; Secretary McNamara. Dr.’ Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should review the whole intelligence budget. The DCI noted that intelligence in | Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CLA was only » a: the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending on intelligence and CIA onl " This was an. increase from| in the past, but Defense had put all reconnais- sance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did not believe this was correct, ‘and thought it should be deleted. 4, : Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about less than what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the _ Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in NPIC, and as a result the budget was versus . The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to and taken for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this a unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point Pratocopy ae ntis atrial Penal I topes moe i Gerald R. Ford Library : —
aw VULUULT bee ee ane Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several | occasions, and asked v what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the MONGOOSE project and how it was setup. He said that after his discussion with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to utilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention “some of. the activities of the project. Mr. McGone then said he did not favor continuing . sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about. the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the next few days, and that the Russians 5 might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of explaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Dr. ‘Langer asked if it might not be for fear of a an invasion; the Director said he did not think so pecause our miliiary forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much trouble. a a a ge 5, Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement. He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must ; have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively week by week and month by month, The DCI said this was wrong because the appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of Congress to whom we were responsible, He noted that CIA could handle the project more clandestinely. He had discussed this: matter with the Secretary of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is witbholding bnd asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance the money. The Director said that such a.decision cannot be made retro- * Ca Ww rene powhe reat . . 3 mat ve | t+} ee Sot pes SD Rees teee meres we Deas wht ld Oe ee ed oid ma Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library