‘Ee HW 53060 Status in System: v09-16-96ccr JFK RECORDS Cross Reference: None AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Other Agency Equity: HSCA 180-10142-10001 CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION 22-09-02 None ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES DOCUMENT TYPE SUBJECT(S) CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW COMMENTS Date in: 01/26/96 TTFFFFF F FFFFFFFF 00 00 oe 08 08 fe oe oe 00 ce oe DOCUMENT INFORMATION HSCA CIA Peleased under the John Kennedy 00/00/00 . . 8 5 WSsassination Records REPORT ollection Act of 1992 CUBANA AIRLINES; CIA, FILES; (44 USC 2107 Note). UNCLASSIFIED — ase#:NW 53080 Date: 3 6-01-2017 POSTPONED IN PART 08/04/95 Box 10 DoclIda: 32271305 Page 1
* -' EB, Cubana Airlines cin Book ve the” performance of ‘the: Antelligence vagencies. in: the investigation of th john. F. Kennedy. esination?. of Ene Senate assassination of President’ “Kennedy. and ‘then: to fully . pale was ‘report. £0" the Warren ‘Commission ‘the results, of the ane . , a HW 53080 Docld:32271305 Page 2
-.59 - vestigation they did undertake. One such lead discussed was a reported five- 7 hour delay (6:00 p.m. EST to 11:00 p.m. EST) of a Cu- bana flight from Mexico City to Havana the evening. of President Kennedy's assassination, November 22, 1963. (The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F.. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agen-~ cies, Book V, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, p.- 30, Senate Report No. 94-755.) The most intriguing aspect of the SSC account involved the alleged delay of a Cubana flight to await the arri- val at 10:30 p.m. EST of aprivate twin-engined aircraft. (Ibid. p. 60.) The aircraft deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without cus-_ toms clearance and traveled to Havana in ‘the pilot's cabin. (Ibia. P. 61.) The source of that lead was an Italian diplomate, Mario Mauri, who allegedly was on the ‘same. flight. is Sigs oy “airlines flight that is apparently | ‘the only “follow= up by “the, Agency on the: ead after the Senate report appeared. HW 53060 DBocld:32271305 Page 3
(This form is to be used for material extracted fromm ClA—controlled documents.) —6e-- *SF The Inspector General's report corrected the state- ment in the Senate report that the "Central Intelligence Agency had noX¥ information indicating that a following investigation was conducted to determine that a follow- ing investigation was tity of the passenger on the passenger, and investigation was not conducted to determine the iden- and had no further information no explanation for why a following conducted." (The Investigation of _ the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Perfor- mance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Select com- mittee to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, p. 30, Senate Report No. 94-755.) The Inspector General Report ; stated that the Central Intelligence Agency conducted | regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to Headquarters (Tbid., p- 11.) There was one unilateral, CIA surveillance’ team (DIFIRE) that ‘observed “aevivals’ and departures’ of: Cubana flights, reporting any: unusual recurrences: and providing copiés® of: slight “vided: ‘the: CIA ‘with photographs of ‘passports: and: “copies of passenger “lists: of individuals travelling: to. ‘cubas whee od ‘Classified _by derivation: HW 53060 Page 4. DoclId: 32271305
This form is to be used for material extracted from C ClA—controlled documents.) ~ 61 _ (Ibid., p. 11) In addition, telephone tap operations (LIENVOY) against the Cuban Embassy provided transcripts of conversations between the Cubana Airlines Office and the Mexican Airport Control Office. (Ibid., p. 11.) The LIENVOY transcripts recorded a series of dis- ‘cussions concerning the status of the- November 22, 1963 delayed Cubana flight--when it arrived and when it de- parted. The transcripts showed that the flight arrived at the airport at 1620 hours (All times used will be | Mexico City time to avoid confusion) Mexico City time. (HSCA Staff Review of November 22, 1963 LIENVOY trans- cripts) Prior to the arrival of the aircraft, one per- son stated that the aircraft was due at 1630 hours and "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as i serving» of aircraft to. a relatively short period. “(Ibid. ) However, ‘the only, key report. on the: departure of the- air-. Docld:322771305 Page 5.
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) - 62 - times of the Cubana flight) (Neither LIFIRE nor the ‘Mexican surveillance team reported the arrival or depar- ture flights of the November 22, 1963 Cubana Airlines flight to Cuba) then I.G. concluded that there were major differences between what the Senate Select Committee re- ported about the alleged delayed Cubana flight and the . known facts. (Ibid., p. 12) The Cuban flight was on -the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. (Ibid. p. 12) It was not delayed five hours as reported in Book V. (The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, p. 30, Senate Intelligence Report No. 94-755) The Cubana flight de-_ - parted at. (2035 hours. Mexico (City, time, “55 minutes ahead of “the: alleged arrival at. 2130 of a private flight with, a - othe: 2035. departure aits “Becket. ‘passenger. (oie ‘Pe ne 2200, shotire. . the. surveillance | ‘coverage of, “the ‘Mexican | Airport “bys Ed $ Same oils HW 53080 Docld:32271305 Page 6. “pot the: CIA and ‘Mexican governinent at was doubtful that one “ae
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—-controlled documents.) - 63 - the alleged activity involving the private twin-engined > aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred. (1977 CIA I.G. Report, TAB B, p- 12.) Presumably, the discrepancies pointed out by the Inspector General are meant to explain the fact that the CIA did not take more aggressive investigative steps to ascertain whether there might have been some connection between the delayed flight and the assassina- tion of John F. Kennedy. In that regard, the 1977 In- spector General report explains that the Agency had car- ried the lead as far as it was able by reviewing the surveillance file of the LIFRE and LIENVOY operations and : asking the Mexican surveillance team ‘LITEME 0) about any strange occurrences at the airport on November 22, 1963. (CIA, 1977. IG. Report, P- 12, “Tab Ba. However ; Le ‘the CIA’ Ss. ‘lack, of. -access. to ‘further. information: about. the. elayed Cubana: Flight and unidentified passen “ger, does not expla n either, ‘the failure of. ‘the ‘CIA. to. také more ‘seriously=.th suspicion £ the _ source, vand » to, “report whatever. information. it had “cmost importantly “to the. Warren Commission. The Inspector General's Ss attempts’ HW 53080 Docld:32271305 Page 7
Amy rar (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) | - 64 - to denigrate the value of the information provided on the unidentified alleged Cubana Airlines and unidenti- fied passenger do not diminish the apparent negligence of the agency in seriously pursuing the information as it was received. The CIA is not to be faulted for, the strength of its intelligence gathering, but rather for the judgement which kept that intelligence from the Warren Commission. (The Warren Commission was mandated to pass on the strength of exactly that kind of informa- tion.) Depsite what is now know about the alleged delay. of the Cubana Airlines flight and the unidentified pas- senger, the Warren Commission may have wanted to abrigate suspicions which would remain, and satisfy itself that these circumstances did not indicate foreign involvement “in the assassination. ‘The cra “contributed to ‘those ‘1 Classified by derivation: __ HW 53080 Docld:32271305 Page 3
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlied documents.) ~ 65 - Commission out of a desire to not lay-bare extremely sensitive sources and-methods of intelligence. The LIENVOY and LIFIRE operations fall within that category. HW 53080 Docld:32271305 Page 9