(404-10210-10031 sence ae Oe, mmr case wre | Be ae Be ‘et baad tet fet dos Mo lax oO MEMORANDUM FOR THE kECO.9 SUBJECT: Anatole Re NOSENXO. 1. i 32 March and 1 and 2 April 1969, Anatole was consulta: about the NOSENKO case as a fcllow-up to the Late January 1559 meetings. He gave recommendations concerning the procedures and topics to be covered during the begia- ning phases of additional elicitation from NOSENSXO which is to begin secon, 2. To provide a basis for discussion certain papers had been prepared for Anatole's review. (See Attachment A for list.) These vapers were basically questionnaires about some of the unresolved or questionable aspects of the had highlighted on 17 January 1969 when he comsented after reviewing the Octeber 1957-December 1968 interviews of NOSENKO. (See transcripts Ky 1, 2, 3 and 4.) Other papers concerned topics related to the NOSENKO case, memoranda NCSENAG had written, summaries and questionnaires prepared from both collateral information and NOSENXO'’s information SA sual erate WBBM 2 pele pao DE dg edt ON et aA Sk Oh A RT MOP ree ee NS oy Cee Mh tetany wea Ala eRe lin kab Leen te EOP bp eens Habe “ane raph contested di e
74-0000 - <r su wae ernment i tore opments gmasqnenbiterttnt gon 1 RAMAN iene a BECO IO ates ) AMS Pe Re Qu RA eee COE Uy Rae eo Settee ay and summaries and questionnaires prepared exclusively on the basis of information obtained from NOSENKO during the 1967-68 interview period. Each of these papers was read by Anatole. Anatole's comment, our discussion, or any comment is detailed in Attachment B, which sets forth crucial ques- tions in the NOSENKO case, 3. Anatole was told The Director had decided that the question of NOSENKO's bona fides had not been resolved and had directed that additional elicitation and questioning of NOSENKO would be undertaken immediately and expeditiously pursued. It was understood, of course, as Anatole knew, that he was to make a major contribution to the questioning of NOSENKO and that information to this end would be made available to him: there will be the closest coordination with him, including a timely review of future transcripts based on the new elicitation phase, It was understood his views, comments and recommendations will be transmitted and seriously considered if not explicitly implemented. Anatole emphasized the need for him to review in advance all topics, if not in all cases the specific questions, to be discussed with NOSENKO after the new elicitation phase begins. He understands the new elicitation phase will begin with Attach~ ment C and that there will be no additional topics discussed A gry ts oe fe. ae erent een ett ESSA PT STEREO re Ps eA ASE SAD SA PSE ROA PRETO: COP AA TREO TONNE AOA NE
14-00000 - 3- with NOSENKO until after Anatole has an opportunity to review them and comment. 4. The following summary points emerged during the course of our discussions as things which must be considered in the NOSENXO case information and as papers or question- naires are outlined and topics selected for further elicita- tion from NOSENKO: | Roce a. NOSENKO, as I understand the situation, has ‘ | | had full access to newspapers, magazines, radio and TV since . : | approximately August 1968. Anatole was told I have no | knowledge of the periodicals or tooks he has read. b. NOSENKO has recently been afforded a controlled | break from isolation and an opportunity to have feminine conpanionship. c. Since December 1968 the FBI has been inter- viewing NOSENKO about topics previously discussed as well as other matters of interest to the FBI which do not originate with NOSENKO. Anatole noted that FBI access to NOSENKO must be controlled according to the new elicitation procedures. d. That it is my opinion only that NOSENKO may think he is entering into or close to entering into a new tn 3 —j TTR aoe See EME HE Tyner HI ERIS TATION ee ie een ee cent ate tn ge Bae A mati ind eotee fee tne relationship with the Agency on the basis that he has . i i
Te aeera te ee RU A Hee gd mtn BK ta eg hE coy * : pe he satisfactorily anzyvered all questions during the period 1967-68. e. That it has not been possible and it may never be possible te isolate or pinpoint either the exact informa- tion or the point in time when NOSENKO was given new infor- mation or additional information which might be relevant upon analysis to the question of his bona fides or his mission. f. To date there has been a concentration on pre- paring elicitation questions on the basis of information obtained during 1967-68 period because (a) this is the infor- mation Anatole has reviewed, and (b) this information-has been considered to be the standard for assessing NOSENKO and his information and arriving at conclusions, since these inter- views were designed to elicit information which would help resolve discrepancies apparent in his previous statements, and (c) at this time this information is better organized and in contrast to information from 1962, 1964, etc., is retrievable as an accurate or literal NOSENKO statement. g. That the summaries and questionnaires, prepared to date may not include every comment or statement NOSENKO has made during the 1967-68 period because it has not yet been possible to isolate, by indexing and extraction, every SRE orange a! hed Bo epebdes (P Se eer ey eR oom ol ones Be Seiten Pek?
OOD “theme cepontin tae fap stab arene Be gel ent reference to a person or a topic. Anatole was told that the sorting or isolation process has been completed only throuxzh Nemorandym N-188, from a total of approximately 260 memoranda, It was emphasized that most topics and persons were discussed with NOSENKO several times at varying intervals, and that the in one or two interviews. topics which h. been correlated with the interviews, majority of topics were not covered to completion NOSENKO also wrote memoranda on may not have been covered during interview or which may relate to interview topics but which have not yet That research and analysis on most topics is incomplete, both with respect to collateral information and previous statements from NOSENKO. i. Anatole real and sources ligence and agree to rel PRAM tturiantwvactater mi 3a Bae SE or related information such as information from the FBI con- cerning NOSENKO which has not been made available to hin. consideration of the NOSENKO case and he also points out the possible if not probable relationship between FBI information That, as Anatole knows, there is certain collateral izes this type of information may be vital to any and the problem of penetration of American intel- Soviet disinformation. He hopes the FBI will ease pertinent information to him and discuss
14-00000 nd ek PH Bremer ota Ged TE LEE TONAL RARE Met tA DUE Fle mare "POF Taw STARA APO Nae isd oh, ERS TRO ew Bar IY at 3 sources in the near future. He realizes any analysis or assessment of the NOSENKO case will suffer to the extent information is withheld from him. Anatole understands the problem even though he obviously does not accept it as logical or helpful. He stresses the need for us to press the FBI to make appropriate information available to hin. j. That information we are dealing with in the transcripts of the 1967-68 NOSENKO interviews is not neces- sarily information previously known to or discussed with NOSENKO and that, for instance, the body of informaticn re-~- sulting from the 1967-68 information has been expanded con- siderably by NOSENKO's review of hundreds of names and photographs provided him. It was also noted that it has not yet been possible to isolate topics new to NOSENKO about which he was asked to comment during this period. Neither have we been able ta isclate or determine when in the past new, topics or questions of possible significance were intro- duced to NOSENKO. 4, We discussed in detail Anatole's recommendations and evolved an initial selection of Crucial Questions (Attach- ment B) and from these the first topics and/or questions to begin in the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO (Attachment C).
14-00000 LAS UAAT 8 COE eeee Remmi mnnien oe en oeee se Anatole expects to review and comment and to frame additional questions after he reviews the transcripts of the first elicitations. He has requested and expec:s, as this can be accomplished, to review and comment about a summary of each Crucial Question,. The summary is to set forth both collateral and NOSENKO information and detail, with attachments if neces- sary, exactly what NOSENKO has said. Also, pertinent photo- graphs and appropriate other documentation is to be attached for comment or verification of identity by Anatole. Anatole insists that he review and assist in the framing of all ques- ‘tions to be asked of NOSENKO and he states that he will stipulate the order of questioning by both topic and specific question where appropriate. He will specify or indicate areas as set forth in Attachment C where questioning may proceed without his detailed guidance but he expects to be consulted about each topic. He pians to carefully tailor the elicitation approach and, more importantly, to set down detailed guidelines to follow when the elicitation or questioning becomes more eo _direct and concerned with those subjects considered, now or later as revised, Crucial Questions. Anatole foresees a period of relatively bland elicitation which will be followed by a gradual sharpening of questions to the point where there will be a confrontation or hostile interrogation, He also foresees fae en mene LRA es ante egret rE En neenetetereadtreeretee eH Sete lit
14-00000 ae nae eet ERE le eete +. ae pte & ~ 8 - another polygraph examination either before or after the period of confrontation. The method or approach to the elicitation from NOSENKO is elaborated in Attachment C. Anatole's recommendations about confrontation tactics will follow after the results of the elicitation phase have been analyzed. During the period NOSENKO is being asked to com- ment initially, work on additional elicitation topics will continue, ’ §. Anatole continues to express his concern about the problem of an Agency penetration and his absolute belief that there is a continuing need to strictly compartment as many aspects of our research as possible and to restrict knowledge about our continuing efforts and particularly the details to get to the bottom of the NOSENKO case. ° He emphasizes the need to severely limit dissemination of the results of the elicitation from NOSENKO although he under- stands it will be necessary to provide the results to the FBI. He is concerned about the dissemination of his KY tapes and the possible implications since he now believes he may have erred in outlining too many areas of concern in the context of considering NOSENKO's bena fides. Anatole was told the KY tapes have not yet been made available to the
OOD Re eee car oe | _ - 9 - FBI but that, of course, he would be advised about any proposal or decision to disseminate thea. 6. In relation to the point about Anatole’s concern about knowledge of his information I told Anatole that it would be necessary for him to comment in detail in the’ future as he had recently on certain items. He was told that, as he knew, we are at a stage-in the NOSENKO case where details such as the organizational assignments of individuals and identifications and the number of leads provided were tending to obscure the Crucial Questions and divert our attention from the central problem o1 why NOSENKO would have been dispatched. I told Anatole quite frankly there was a feeling he had not been fully cooperative on the NOSENKO case. There was a belief that he should furnish the details of his knowledge about individuals, operations, the KGB, etc., so that others can try to judge _ the accuracy or inaccuracy of NOSENKO's information. ° Anatole was told that it would come as.no surprise to him to learn that the fact he has not told everything he knows is still a problem and that there may be some misunderstandings since it is obvious his detailed knowledge has had and will have a direct bearing on the NOSENKO case. Anatole firmly TT BR me TE ee teed we De oo. wade ven ea th Betme EE wey el ET ee ee eB
SOSH et menioet eres wetted Fe but amicably reaffirmed his position concerning cooperation on the NOSENKO case. He said (a) it was obvious that research to date and collateral information supports his position that NOSENKO is 1 dispatched agent; (b) that he will continue to cooperate fully as he has when there has been an exchange of information; (c) that he would not give details now because to do so would result in a situation where it is "Anatole against NOSENKO" and it is obvious that more evidence than this is required for an objective conclusion about NOSENKO; (d) that details will follow after research is analyzed or during the process of analysis as we examine information and the detaiis are pertinent; (e) that it is unnecessary for him at this time to give additional details atout personnel or the KGB organization except when these details reflect on major items -- overall these details are not crucial and there is nothing to gain by considering small items and details. If, however, small details become a major point such as in connection with KOVSHUKY cuuranov’ cux’and GRYAZNOV then during the review he will pinpoint the specific and detailed contradictions, He reiterated his previous con- ments pointed to the waste of time and diversion involved in -pursuing details and leads to recruitments or persons of interest to the KGB when there is nothing crucial or significant involved. Beste tan QEreeIped Ae een
14-00000 ol a if S wg tae ba be ma 8 ° - il - : 7 7. j%&It was agreed I would meet with Anatole when the : first elicitation results are ready or when additional . pertinent research has been completed. and there are papers : or ideas to discuss. : N. SCOTT MILER DC/CI/SIG : ‘ ; : i see ae mS praatngie eerie vente g ot i i - } ! i i } 1 i , : i z z 3 oe £ #6 : Fi ! | ae 5 - ete judi caemthe Ne aAOM RAE PEs sate amen NT - tee enema te e t a Yip ge OE f ' a L i? cy a th
\ Lenten th 5 LN rae Ae Ate mn le EL Twa ty Be Oe 5 ae | ena ae, ATTACHMENT B ANATOLE Re HOSENKO CRUCTAL GULSTIOGNS A. ANATOLE was consulted 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969 concerning his rocomnendations on how to proceed to clicit additional information from NCSENKO. ANATOLE offered specific. topics and questions about which NOSENKO is to be questioned after setting forth items or topics which ANATOLE considers the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which need explanation or resolution, These CRUCIAL QUESTIONS are set forth below with comment or notations which cmerged during our discussions. __ 8B. ANATOLE understands that the immediate period of elicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his participation and contribution is actually the inplementation of the program he originally believed was to be followed before there were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides. ANATOLE had been reviewing his file material and the trenscripts £ his connents in January 1969 (The KY transcripts) so he ° was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as well as specific cLicitation topics. As our contribution te the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points or topics to be discussed. Each paper was read by ANATOLE, he a arene cement Ae mes etn ee ettrnrteecettttipahteie eee 0
14-00000 Bie the progran, - acconplished. tA iar] Oo oy pn twas oot retained certain of the papers and, as set forth below, he commented about certain of the papers or related matters. After outlining the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS we vorked out an elici- tation guide to be followed with NOSENKO as the beginning of The clicitation guide is detailed separately. C. ANATOLE submits the following as his recommendation about how to proceed with NOSENKO: . il. Isolate the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS for our guidance and consideration. (He basically accomplished this 31 March and’ and 2 April although obviously these may be revised) Z. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning of NOSENXO is to begin immediately and is to follow the pro- cedures set forth separately. (Tho initial phase of this was Additional or revised clicitation topics or questions will be censidered when the results of the first elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE). i ae
H0000. Mt PA Se - M : ~ ' ‘ nn) wee tbige ee 5 oy ah 4. A hostile/confrontation interrogation phase at & which time NOSENXO would be faced with the errors, incon- sistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story anid advised that his nission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation phase or if or when NOSENXO's attitude changes during the elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken only when full research on cvery aspect of each CRUCTAL QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are framed with ANATOLE on the basis ef NOSENKO's information or answers and all collateral information. In this connection ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question so that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all information about the question, the dotails of what NOSENKO has said and related or collateral information such as photographs or éocuments, etc. The hostile interrogation phase ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consid- eration of all possible problems. For exanplo ANATOLE stresses he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 to * NOSENKO since this will be a key element in considering how to proceed with the confrontation as well as to attempt to determine
HOG00 at 4, , te ARPT TA Spence senate sce ego eaeea nt Me rt ae OT eee AN POR cate ony att iy Qa aA CP Afra Bess MoS a ac bere wee Yentaneh atest samen ps aeeteaniimehaeliatecenehe aR Ee a Oe Ss satisfactorily answered all questions during the period 1967-68. e. That it has not been possible and it may never be possible te isolate or pinpoint either the exact informa- tion or the point in time when NOSENKO was given new infor- mation or additional information which night be relevant upon analysis te the question of his bona fides or his nission. f. To date there has been a concentration on pre- paring elicitation questions on the basis of information obtained during 1967-68 period because (a) this is the infor- mation Anatole has reviewed, and (b) this information has been considered to be the standard for assessing NOSENKO and his information and arriving at conclusions, since these inter- views were designed to elicit information which would help resolve discrepancies apparent in his previous statements, and (c) at this time this information is better organized - and in contrast to information from 1962, 1964, etc., is , retrievable as an accurate or literal NOSENKO statement. ° g- That the summaries and questionnaires prepared to date may not include every comment or statement NOSENKO has made during the 1967-68 period because it has not yet been possible to isolate, by indexing and extraction, every ate Tagdivatin © 5
14-00000 Sn il PBF beh nr ed 8 te BYE ETN ask Peps Kei atop A ce, SRT INR HS EEE AE ONE RARER APS See THEE en Ae EN NE VNB ARM BraeNeMA etm atnonTe fa eit mee oe ~ 5 - were discussed with NGSENKO several tines at varying intervals, and that the majority of topics were not covered to completion in one or two interviews. NOSENKO alse wrote memoranda on topics which may not have been covered during interview or which may relate to interview topics but which have not yet been correlated with the interviews. h. That research and analysis on most topics is’ incomplete, both with respect to collateral information and previous statements from NOSENKO. i. That, as Anatole knows, there is certain collateral or related information con- cerning NOSENKO which has not been made available to hin. ‘Anatole realizes this type of information may be vital to any consideration of the NOSENKO case and he also points out the possible if not probable relationship between FBI information and sources and the problem of penetration of American intel- ligence and Soviet disinformation. He hopes the FBI will agree to release pertinent information to him and discuss vy aoe Lg pet Fh pie, ME Te a A eat ory oe Dae jp See £2 ah ES Fe re Fe pa pe EE Se Co a RE SE ane RR a Te
MRR Rremip carat nt eG 06h Pe edie RET dia ati oR mln cates & vw sources in the near future. He realizes any analysis or assessment of the NOSENKO case will suffer to the extent information is withheld from him, Anatole understands the problem even though he obviously does not accept it as logical or helpful. He stresses the need for us to press the FBI to make appropriate information available to hin. j. That information we are dealing with in the transcripts of the 1967-68 NOSENKO interviews is not neces- sarily information previously known to or discussed with _ NOSENKO and that, for instance, the body of informaticn re- “sulting from the 1967-68 information has been expanded con- ; Siderably by NOSENKO's review of hundreds of names and photographs provided him. It was also’ noted that it has not yet been possible to isolate topics new to NOSENKO about ‘which he was asked to comment during this period. Neither have -we- been able to isolate or determine when in the past ‘new topics or questions of possible significance were intro- duced to NOSENKO. 4, We discussed in detail Anatole's recommendations and evolved an initial selection of Crucial Questions. (Attach- ment B) and from these the first topics and/or questions to begin in the new elicitation phase with NOSENKO (Attachment C).
74-00000 | Fede anand ytd Siete ilies iy nedaratbaie sa Saes bp at detite tp ert ogo, os . . bce agate Sei es ee ht toes Aa Digits rma B a Leaifiee see : Eo 1 NASI asaMh precise sans aden Gig nl NSN AE Ne 2, erhxeyian . wt ’ - cs te SCR ie 2 Oy he ge wa ak, «TS ay tte vet alt ong et, ~ . “ ee Sec ee: tea) uv ww ot Cc; ee m3 ie ‘lay cay -7- Anatole expects to review and comment and to frame additional questions after he reviews the transcripts of the first elicitations, He has requested and expects, as this can be accomplished, to review and comment about a summary of each ( Crucial Question. Th: summary is to set forth both collateral and NOSENKO information and detail, with attachments if neces- Sary, exactly what NOSENKO has said. Also, pertinent photo- graphs and appropriate other documentation is to be attached for comment or verification of identity by Anatole. Anatole insists that he review and assist in the framing of all ques- tions to be asked of NOSENKO and he states that he will ; t : Stipulate the order of questioning by both topic and specific question where appropriate. He will specify or indicate areas | _ as set forth in Attachment C where questioning may proceed withcut his detailed guidance but he expects to be consulted ‘about each topic. He pians to carefully tailor the elicitation ‘ approach and, more importantly, to set down detailed guidelines to follow when the elicitation or questioning becomes more direct and concerned with those subjects considered, now or later as revised, Crucial Questions. Anatole foresees a period of relatively bland elicitation which will be followed by a gradual sharpening of questions to the point where there will be a confrontation or hostile interrogation. He also foresees PRSARR RESP URNy Vermette 1 neice meee ae 2 aah Para Se a an ete ee
7 490000, cow ony another polygraph examination either before or after the period of confrontation. The method or approach to the elicitation from NOSENKO is elaborated in Attachment C. Anatole's recommendations about confrontation tactics will follow after the results of the elicitation phase have been analyzed. During the period NOSENKO is being asked to com- “ment initially, work on additional elicitation topics will continue, , : | S. Anatole continues to express his concern about the problem of an Agency penetration and his absolute belief that there is a continuing need to strictly compartment as i many aspects of our research as possible and to restrict ae knowledge about our continuing efforts and particularly the ' details to get to the bottom of the NOSENKO case. He emphasizes the need to severely limit dissemination of the results 6f the elicitation from NOSENKO although he under- stands it will be necessary to provide the results to the i FBI. He is concerned about the dissemination of his KY tapes and the possible implications since he now believes he may : have erred in outlining too many areas of concern in the context of considering NOSENKO's bona fides. Anatole was told the KY tapes have not yet been made available to the Ee
74-00000 > . . j Taster SN RNG PAH MeO Ri Hy BFE RNY IEC eo RA Aa al Nh oe a bie ers RSD ate ore tb He i " ‘ ? . vee me . io . i ‘ vy ~ . OE alee AT Oe 1% FBI but that, of course, he would be advised about any . proposal or decision to disseminate then, 6. In relation to the point about Anatole's concern about knowledge of his information I told Anatole that it - would be necessary for him to comment in detail in the future as he had recently on certain items. He was told that, as he knew, we are at a stage in the NOSENKO case where details such as the organizational assignments of individuals and identifications and the number of leads provided were tending to obscure the Crucial Questions and divert our attention from the central problem of why NOSENKO would have been dispatched. Meee te nthe terete cae ends oe > a ee eat ARE ee tm tenet oe a Re tare ry F ra
AYER. cand BRRIEN Hebe Ta tener verre eswetenteene een ecm we tag ae ne 1 fede saat "Piste wardens Satna nastiest aries untcoirIonk’ 7 Drona ng claniapreaasteieieth meen ye Sperm nents 5aptieN aUTDHI # yD AE HEA, te EMAC ahem gb epi OST ba gpa nett NES 948 ee 8 ae ty te ehlivil "sing oy -~ 10 - but amicably reaffirmed his position concerning Cooperation ‘on the NOSENKO case. He said (a) it was obvious that research to date and collateral information supports his position that NOSENKO is a dispatched agent; (b) that he will continue to cooperate fully as he has when there has been an exchange of information; (c) that he would not give details now because to do so would result in a situation where it is "Anatole against NOSENKO" and it is obvious that more evidence than this is required for an objective conclusion about NOSENKO; (d) that details will follow after research is analyzed or during the process of analysis as we examine information and the details are pertinent; (e) that it is unnecessary for him at this time to give additional details ateut personnel or the KGB organization except when these details reflect on major items -- overall these details are not crucial and there is nothing to gain by considering small items and “details. If, however, small details become a major point such as in connection with KOVSHUK” cuuranov’ GUK” and. ‘GRYAZNOV' then during the review he will pinpoint the specific and detailed contradictions. He reiterated his previous com- ments pointed to the waste of time and diversion involved in pursuing details and leads to recruitments or persons of interest to the KGB when there is-‘nothing crucial or significant involved. Po cee Men meer aiemeet a aed ®
00) Pertenece ee Hl erage mb Pe ez ot eh er Rages ren Ra: gare s { Ss ag te @ aoe & AP SURA ST LORI ih teas i [Pete ts een reo ot -il- 7. It was agreed I would meet with Anatole when the first elicitation results are ready or when additional pertinent research has been completed and there are papers or ideas to discuss. N. SCOTT MILER DC/CI/SIG ‘ r) of ° fe ae ar Mar pbanitwheen som Noten lee tte ‘ PT Ream rue easton mL oto She, fa Sy Sine ~ A a eens ie etme ten ny Se ete a mtcee es ge tent ey Ret cet EIN ann es mene ntines Heme mentne me eR nH
OOD Thad Ee gece RRR at mae Ente in pI LTR rnNed Bon eeL eo tte ated ee Rte a Vee Hee he ern atid ees atc pe bn in REN NEIL RSTRNT OE ORE TR AP HN CSI ERT Pee EINE RERUN al ft i ts ie Tn meme te nas bee anew HH Oe ORIEL | ww, ATTACHMENT B tq ANATOLE Re NOSENXO CRUCIAL GUESTIC | A. ANATOLE was consulted 31 March and 1 and 2 April 1969 concerning his recommendations on how to proceed to clicit additional information from NOSENKO. ANATOLE offered specific. topics and questions about which NOSENKO is to be questioned after setting forth items or topics which ANATOLE considers the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which need explanation or resolution. Theso CRUCIAL QUESTIONS are set forth below with conment or notations which emerged during our discussions. : 2B. ANATOLE understands that the immediate period of elicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his participation and contribution is actually the implementation of the program he originally belicved was to be followed before there were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides. ANATOLE had been reviewing his file material and the transcripts of his comments in January 1969 (The KY transcripts) so he was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as well as specific elicitation topics. As our contribution to the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating ‘specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points or topics to be discussed, Each paper vas read by ANATOLE, he FN OR IU ta tt EE eo cle Lest ghee th! AC gern eemnee ers ecartetrtamacnestst 7 + nt RRP eet ttnstan See ‘sheen tame Os Miers mes eee Ane erat Ft nem ee ew 2 Chae ba taeed soe oO rmk Ot eee
14-00000 ‘teenporn TP aRNg pt Fah Zr eee Rhy MARE A  AERRINA RIE HEI HOE PHORESIS A rl i.) vel Pau | retained certain of the papers and, as set forth below, he commented about certain of the papers or related matters. After outlining the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS we worked out an elici- tation guide to be followed with NOSENKO as the beginning of the progran. fhe elicitation guide is detailed separately. C. ANATOLE submits the following as his reconmendation about how to proceed with NOSENKO: 1. Isolate the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS for our guidance and consideration. (He basically accomplished this 31 March and 1 and 2 April although obviously these may be revised) 2. Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning of KOSENXO is to begin immediately and is to follow the pro- cedures set forth separately. (The initial phase of this was accomplished. Additional or revised elicitation topics or questions will be considered when the results of the first elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE). 3. ‘ prt asangnanarnnte ths SSeS Aaa EASES DE ARCO Ant ET SEER nt eS RRR Ane re On ee STC ase a Peenoe+ mation wae oth
14-00000 alte wclarneig Hapoyemehanlapreine meee ercpdsnam esidoenleonisone entie Sa H asapnaih shear aisstah emo HascM bye a4 da oO at tee pty et Bal ho S Bhi gerne epi 1 Ding Sheba Sb ent tata " aes + meen me a ve ee i , . ore he 1 SUM oi 4. A hostilo/confrontation interrogation phase at which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, incon: sistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story and advised that . his mission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO . would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken only when full research on cvery aspect of each CRUCIAL QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are framed with ANATOLE on the baeis of NOSENKO's information or answers and all collateral information. In this connection ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question sO that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all information about the question, the details of what NOSENKO has said and related or collateral information such as photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consid- eraticn of all possible problems, For exanplo ANATOLE stresses he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 te HOSENKO since this will be a key elenent in considering how to proceed with the confrontation as well as to attenpt to determine Be weetie
HOGRd RE eigepitir ag paten esenninieddin deanery Lett a ef fie gO he Grd 8 OP LT ea A ae Netty EP Pais WAY QAP TT A arta ese nea ie Yee Botan be Chee ree ye neal cacao ence 4 what influence that letter hes had on NOSENKO during tho 67-63 interviews. D. It was necessary to enphusize to ANATOLE the fact @ that at this tine it is not possible for to assure hia that \3 everything NOSENKO has said on any topic has been recovered or is retrievable even for the interview period of 1967-1963 {and 69). Noting the papers we had prepared ANATOLE had to be telc there was no assurance that everytaing NOSENKO has. Said was included or considered when attenpting to extract or summarize his statements about a person or event. Specif- ‘deally it was noted that with a few exceptions no topic or item is: {fully covered during one or two interviows. Even though ANATGLE recognized the problem based on his review of the transcripts of the 1967-68 interviews it was necessary te emphasize the fact that the validity of anv given question we had framed might be challenged, reversed or nodified as the “process of indexing. the transcripts continued. ANATOLE was told that as of 31 March 1969 we had been able to index and extract the transcripts and memoranda of the 1967-68 interviews. ONIN eae waite The ee ne ANATOLE also was told it is not possible to be certain that a11 previous infornation from NOSENKO can be accurately and fully recovered. For this reason it is difficult if not inpessible to isolate what he night have said in 1964 and/or 1965 and coupare that @ RTA LE MORNE GLEAN tin Set AAR OL PR SN nee
14-00000 "0 otrmerbarrenneiteNe at ie dentate ree: RTE eet RERE RDG RA Se eye ute oT, eyes reer aa! . ' ‘ statenent with what ho said in 1908, ANATOLE also acknowled:ced noting the pessible significance of the interview techniques ‘as these have varied over the years, Contrast in the technique and the approach to NOSENXO whero, for exauple, ho is provided . information or asked only to conZirn a leading question has tended to dilute if not obscure what NOSENKO actually has had to say about nany subjects; at this stare it may be vistually inpossible to distinguish NOSENXO'’s original infor- nation from subsequent statements modified as a result of ‘ questioning. This problem is an inportant consideration because the approach to the olicitation phase was developed with this in mind. Essentially it was agreed with ANATOLZ that despite previous statements or information from NOSENKO the elicitation phase would be nanaged to attempt to obtain from NOSENKO cverything he has to offer or say about. each ‘CRUCIAL QUESTION at this tine without reference to any previous statement. It is ANATOLE's opinion that if NOSENKG provides a ‘full statement without prompting that further questioning can bo meaningful after analysis of his statement despite & the possibility NOSENXO has modified or revised his information 7 as he has learned or apvparently learned what he thinks is wanted or he should say. ANATOLE believes the fundamental problem remains and that despite NOSENNO'’s twists and turns it will be possible to sort through the various stories to focus on the reason for NOSENRO's dispatch and deternine the f etait enn nentbenmrtert MEM ooh ane lor eue terse ss cursiyen woe Reimers mo nana athena ad aNuh a EN Mann bala aeisak ER he oot MOS OE OES Ea at gna Bay Ut Rye Sa elie tn Sethe mes a erin wes Thmnee eet ferme cate ot
14-00000 +a rsa RI PRES OG Pom a SPEED RA ROLE ON eT EEF EH BE EMF ee OSS stereepraranenseeterereee He ee * ° a sty SECt ew key iteas of diversion. E. In reply to ANATOLE's question he was told that the FBI continued to interview NUSENXO usually with Mr. Solie present but that I did not know in advance anything about the topics of any interviews. I told ANATOLE it was my opinion that once clicitation from NCSENKO began on the basis of his recommendations that other interviews would stop. Ke recognized and agreed that there night be a tactical and/or psycholosical problem with NOSENKO by shifting the interview technique to elicitation rather than consultation and 2 response to questionin:. ANATOLE could not emphasize too strongly the need to let NOSENKO respond fully with mininal prodding or stimulation and without refreshing his mexory. ANATOLE was told it was my understanding the elicitation phase would be conducted by Mr. Solie without FEI particl- ‘pation although I did tell ANATOLE that the elicitation trans- cript results would undoubtedly be civen to the FBI just as _have the results’ of all the 1967-69 interviews. | LF. ANATOLE expects and recommends that the period of elicitation will be followed by the period of interrogation or confrontation to be conducted by a team of thres persons ~ The security expert, Mr. Solic; a counterintelligence specialist who knows related cases and CI problens, and a Soviet specialist. bts meogentnnta smene nettle tee eaiaimmmmetane sat
14-00000 na an eg et ease ini’ et hf 4 x “at . : tear i ay oe PEAS Z ost Site Tes adobe Ok : te gee Oy cn Je at ale * ‘sete, oe | , ANATOLE says this team approach will be necessary to inplement a fast moving interropation, based on the script he will help a pot devise, which will not permit NCSENKO time to reflect or . think about his answers. The tactic will be to insist on } i | immediate and full answers and ANATOLE insists that once the new elicitation phase begins HNOSENKO not be permitted to write any answers: He is not to be viven any written assign- ments: every response and reply is to be oral and transcribed and HOSENKG must be encouraged and permitted to respond fully: he is not to be asked to confira or deny any statement nor is “he to be assisted in replying to any question with suggestions or reminders. G. ANATOLE recognizes the problem of information froa FBI sources and the release of this information to hin. He respects the FBI need to pretect its sources and understands the FBI attitude even though he quite obviously disagrees. He believes that our failure to nake relevant information available to him is shortsighted and lessens both his effectiveness and. cur ability to decipher the NOSENKO puzzle faster. ANATOLE. recalls that at the time NUSENKO defected in 1964 and there ; was discussion with the FRI about the SASHA lead and related | matters he asked fer FBI file and source information pertinent to the problems. ANATOLE continves to believe there probably ’ § ‘ + ee é Sime me eas out @ re ee ote sont ale ne WINE Aen Pere 8 RSet tia inte ortee Le MET ane SMR REO Ne Ce AN yD ewe TE cee aa GE cee cee
HOG00 have said about NOSENKO and COLITZYH, form the basis for eclicitation from NOSENKO. They are set EAE Ree Cite 9th TRmrtteate seinen ane ease oe en, is a seriecus question about the possible siynificance of NOQSENKO to penetrat’>: of the FRY ana the bona fides of FBI sourcos in terms of misinformation (disinfornation) in relation to both NOSENKO and othes information. lie is of the opinion that a FBI source(s) probably cane te the FBI after his defection and perhaps after MOSENKO's contact if not dispatch in 1964, Ue suguests the possibility there may be a false arrest and show trial of a FSI source in order to further bolster NOSENKO's story. Altheugh it has not been possible to discuss this aspect of the NOSENKO story with ANATOLE it scems clear that if we are to gain full nousure from ANATOLE it will be necessary for the FBI to approve or conduct a briefing of ANATOLE appropriate to puting a perspective on the FBI sources so he can assess what they _H. The following are the CRUCIAL CUESTIONS which are to forth in the order discussed. 1. Hisinforaation in the Second Chicf Directorate (SCD) C3 (This is an anmediate topic for elicitation as set forth separately) | 2. Leadership of the KGB . 3. Leadership ef the First Chief Directorate (FCI) 4. Leadership of the SCD § . SHELEPIN's 1959 Report (This topic will be discussed
8 OLED Tables Be Var Oh Nate Sb Soa SaqieRale en ata | one: yee ae te 4 PY ope Ten dete eb nore thoroughly with ANATOLE beforo the question is raised with NOSENKO again, ANATOLE was emphatic in stating that it had been a nistake to raise the subject of the KGB policy and 1959 reorganization with NOSLENKO. He read the paper with attachments but deferred comment except to note that NOSENKO had said very little of significance. It was at this tine that ANATOLE first noted it was a mistake to pernit NOSENKO to write memoranda. ANATOLE obviously considers this aspect of the NOSENKO case most inportant and a topic which requires his study particularly in view of the fact ho now has extracts from’ the GOLENIEWSKI letters wiich relate to the 1959 KGB reorganization and disinformation. ANATOLE also did not recall the book so it will be necessary to make certain he has a . copy.)  . 6. Penetration of the American Embassy Moscow (ANATOLE considers this a most important topic which requires additional study and elicitation later after research will pernit us to assess NOSENKO's statements rapidly. ANATOLE reiterates his concern that it is exactly and specifically ‘in this area that NOSENKO'’s reassurance of no KGB successes is most likely diversion. ANATOLE expressed his concern that in January he may have commented too extensively and theoret- ically about this problem. He now wants to re-examine this problem and refocus everyone back nore precisely to NOSENKO and his story) te ee ees oe ere 4 he cs a a yon
14-00000 . ~ - " + > ¢ , she Qype mone om CoE , -lu- Ste tee nfo ~ | i i ' | | 8. VASSALL Case (ANATOLE believes NOSENKO should | | be asked to recanstruct conpldtely in detail everything he knows about the VASSALL case: tines, sources, officers, etc., at one taped session. Sinultaneously ANATOLE says ve should construct a conplete chronology of everything NOSENX mo has said about the VASSALL case since June 1962, including the questions or comments put to NOSENKO about VASSALL. An eS en aos problem and ulso be ultimately useful in confronting NOSENKO Fa ; ‘on the point of his dispatch and apparent immunity. S. Doris BELITSKIY Case (ANATOLE approved elicitation H t “4 1 H - and questioning on the basis of the summary ond questionnaire. ‘ ~ ANATOLE stresses the need to confine the questioning to the a questionnaire and tho fact that ROSENKO is not to bo given additional information about the case, its origins, etc., cither as we knew it or now know it from ANATOLE, There will be some tie-in to the elicitation about Vladinir Luovich ARTEMOV and Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV but other than the questions as set forth in the papers ANATOLE reviewed there should be no questions asked which brief HOSENNO or relate the three or any otner persons. oe GES I Kah 0 Lana eay en Tens meee Ree ee ew seems
14-OOG0Ky « <8 2 See emer e incre eter He win -11- ANATOLE needs a photoyraph of ARTEMOY to make certain of identilZication and he needs photoes cthers in the delegation wiftthh BELITSKIY to try to dotermine if there were other KGB officers in the delegation who nisht have been in on.the case or the disinfornation aspect) 10, The 1960 period of NOSENKO'S carcer. This is to be an elicitation topic later after we have summarized what we can about NOSENKO's story of this period. In reply to ANATOLE's question based on his review of the paper KOSENKO Timetable and Associates I told ANATOLE the researcher had found it impossible to date to sort out and isolate NOSENKO’s 1967-63 statements about his career during the period 1969 to 1562. ANATGLE was told this was obviously a priority job but that it just had been an ins- possible task without additional research and analysis. We -will discuss this fully when the isolation is completed and in conjunction with other topics. 11, Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV *s November 1960 trip. This item is for later elicitation after more research is completed about the code clerks, perhaps a reinves- tigation to make positive identifications, etc. ANATOLE asked _ Lf KoSOLAPOV's trip to Copenhagen was confirmed (N-167 pg. 16) and I told him I thought it was under a different nane. ANATOLE would like details. nat ie Nee aE Mal. Ene outta Ree Wee nen ctnemne Ae ae te aaa anette avon greta ReatRbOe tr ay eens ge gt alte Py seta ‘a * ARS AST SLT edhe PS merch et masieaeta iTS Toate | ete tet BAP RLE BBY THEY CDH HGS et tra mee da MON A ae ITER sari eO pared be : : ms ‘ “ oe 5 aac CER MERTENS NE pt a t { I hee
14-00000 Ree fw sedate 12. ‘The Robert Lee JOUNSCH case. AHATOLE considers this an i:portant aspect of HOSENKO's throw-away material. He acain questions why the SCD would lead technicians to the FCu and wants NOSENNO to explain this in detail as well as to fully detail asain how, from whow, ete, NOSENKO learned of this case. ANATOLE is of the opinion new questions can ‘bo asked but agreed to defer elicitation on this case prinarily because I pointed out that in 1965 a paper was written setting forth apparont inherent security weaxnesses in the Johnson case sone of which at least suggested strongly that, in addition to Johnson's . leck of access at one time, the KGB could have anticipated a blow at any moment. I outlined some of the points I recall about the weaknesses of the principals and quite frankly I told ANATOLE that I doubted that anyone currently of the opinion NOSENKO is bona fide would be any nore inclined to credit the 1965 paper today than he has in the past. I agreed that it might be useful to again atteapt te get NOSENKO's story about the JOWNSON case when this story would be exclusively NOSENKO's, 13. Aleksey Hikhaylovich GORBATENKXO. ; ANATOLE wants NOSENKO to tell in detail everything he knows about GONBATENKO. ANATOLE notes the 1955 promotion is a key elenent but stresses no mention of this is to be made to NOSENKO. Despite previous mentions of GORBATENKO, which should be collated, NOSENAO is to restate everything completcly. reas ps ‘se Rene int Pry ad
14-00000 oy -13- 14, Serafin Nikalayevich LYALIN Elicitation about LYALIN is to follow later. All references to LYALIN by NOSENKO should be collated with collateral information about hin. If there is a photograph of LYALIN, ANATOLE wants to sce it to verify any NOSENKO identification. 15. Viadislav Hikhaylovich KOVSHUX, ANATOD. 2 considers HOSENKO's information about KOVSHUK most important as a later elicitation point. He does not want NOSENKO asked any questions about KOVSHUK which nay relate to KOVSHUK's trip to the U.S.A, or KOVSHUK's association with KISLOV. If NOSENXO in ecnnection with detailing the biographios of his friends includes any of this about KOVSHUX he is NOT to be questioned on this matter or about the wonan trouble previously mentioned, . ANATOLE needs exact dates KOVSHUK was in the U.S and any details of activities he can be given from FBI reporting. In connection with our discussion about KOYSHUK possibly working with and associating with journalists ANATOLE said he recalled an incident which he thinks took place in 19595 when he net KOVSHUK on the street not far from the KGB offices when KOVSHUK Signalled him not to speak. ANATOLE did not and obscrved KOVSHUK meet a Soviet journalist in an apparent agent type meeting. rar Lea with, c sr Sundae lal 28 $2 tanh oes eT matte, ttre War eculern nepal pace ae et ME.
14-00000 ANATOLE said he had forgotten this incident and he never spoke to KOVSHUX about it. ANATOLE cannot recall the nano of the journalist but said he recalls knowing hin slightly. He will try to recall the name. (Hote for SM check: did KOVSHUX per ROSENKO work vs. Americans with journalists and specifically Ed Stevens?) 16, Eugene Peter SEREBRENNIKOV. ANATOLE says what NOSENKO has said is clear but that this needs full research and analysis - what he said contrasted with what NOSENKO said and what SEREBRENNIXOV said - before asking NOSENKO about this again. 17, Adan BROCHES Case ANATOLE was told this lead information was being reviewed in detail. That thore was some apparent confusion and possibly misinterpretation or nisunderstanding about his lead information. . cag we ANATOLE ‘reiterated his point that the KGB wanted 5 to reestablish relations which had been broken after BROCHES left France, ANATOLE knows about this from reading ZARUBIN ; paper and he knows that the KGB wanted to talk to ZARUBIN . : ne about this. ARATOLE said that he would leave the decision about when NOSENKO would be asked about SROCHES again to SM - \ it could se immediately when the review was completed or later. The review is in process and we will have to see what FBI t ee, i muy have asked roceatly. ; To ran een oe Bee tay sedate Wen belNebeses Ape chest Nemerters tee - - aa ~
OR Kowa as err ctasry an te slatpediioacetcantmenpe ante ‘ ow : ° . seb necirprn sb Risers wing ma mpetNsey St Sri befoY ev ieptent nen RES AERC Ueloon ipsa Sr AtAN HET RR NOP ‘ Sp, ‘ r ” aaah de MA ets ver eRe AE ESR er ine 4 ir Bi Santen vem tet ent eo: MEAD Ween ence LaaneEE ORE Ns meen oe fan? it ay Pagar -15- 18. Viktor KOPEYSIN. A later topic. 19, The CHEREPANGY Papers ANATOLE stresses the isportance of this case but says this must be a later topic for NOSENKO probably in interrogation although it may be useful ta have NOSENKO review his knowledge again in detail before confrontation. AHATOLS referred to the need to unalyze the results of the BOWDEN investigation before proceeding too far with HOSENKO. In this connection ANATOLE was told State Security was securely organizing this investigation and that -it was currently planned that interviews would commenco with BOWDEN first including nention to BOWDEN about his mention in the CHEREPANOV papers. In response to ANATOLE's question ho was told that to my knowledge the FGI did not yet know abolit the BOWDEN investigation since to date it was a State Separtment inquiry based on a need to clarify certain possible N problens. ANATOLE said that he saw CHERDPANOV after CHESEPANOY , “had transferred to the American Embassy Section wearing a Lt. Col, military uniform. ANATOLE said this was unusual and it suggests to him that CHEREPANOV was engaged in an operation, perhaps a contact posing as a nilitary beginning in 1959. He said CHEREPANOV had as a constant companion a young man in the American Departaent but ANATOLE cannot recall the young man's nane. (ANATOLE suggests Later NOSENKO be asked if CHEREPANOY wore a military uniform and-who vas his companion, rneee a | ere eet ES Test het Ene lett atari. Siedienn OR ten heen Tem eect ee eee eo Ube ee PEE ER at ee ee tte IE cea 4 5. ca
14-00000 , TR eh np os eee ee PRATT Moe LETH HEEB APM OREM nap, of i i yraeinsN prs MtINe Copenh ten tor Mente {Ree Loans eee tee Sem slorch Ure ee UR ERATE aS THRE ma a dest dn Sr maar me ERIN TOFU Shen edia re Seranns goatley orn oe os, { tied ithe & C “, ay, ve . -16- change in CHEREPANOV's attitude and demeanor between carly 1959 to mid - 1963 or, amore probably, Dec, 1960 when ANATOLE saw Cherepanov again. ANATOLE said he can only interpret that CHEREPANGV was in a better mood, more confident in personality because he may have had sone onerational success, ANATOLE is of the opinion that CHECREPANGY’s change in demeanor and mood could only relate to American Enbassy operations. 20, The ANATOLE says this is not really a crucial question although an important case which needs eee eventually along lines sea forth in the paper NOSENZO - Homosexual Aspects but not on the basis of the homosexual angle {see separate Giscussion re homosexual aspects). 21. The TOPOV and PENKOVSKIY Cases ° ANATOLE says both of these cases should he delayed until later, They require special consideration and nore research and discussion. We are not ready now to delve into these and it is his opinion he may have tended to obscure sore » e of the points about NGSENKO by Gravinz perallels with PENAOVSHIY in January. Ue believes there ere parallels an! a relationship 7 Atm rae fete SOF POKER OY mek A ED GR tt ete + cree ene tenet gaara SOR AEsbeeetettstitrerttmmneen 2 + ep cramansengntaatgetrin® ween marhuneoes + ore 2
14-00000 seth | stm, . Tt . ' - ‘ } -17- = : ‘and we should continuc to cxanine all aspects of the cases | : but he concedes a better baso of understanding should be Laid | f ‘ x : before it will be possiblo to nahe a meaningful tie ta | - HOSINKO. : By re : | j j i | i a seal - . i £ t ry : “ y e * ’ } . . —y ~ i . i j i i ‘ : t : thpre | score] SAGs. lal eee cenliatine Gal ey Dyugtle Saban URE etter terme See ee ee ee ~ oo ~
14-00000 “Teepe tiie ied anenpeypteneei fal T pm ean sere leatees eet oaehemeshapncint ir ponangedber na used beth mer bmrnpt hhc erie ee spit HE pA rE AA he PARTI ee ot een Nt A ONS AT REF tt a Oe of this case vis - -18- NOTRE eos 22. WOSENXO's Friendship with GUX, CHURANOY, _ROVSHUK, ete: ANATOLE emphasized the need to eet from NOSENKO complete details about his friends or clained friends. ANATOLE agreed with the line of inquiry outlined in the paver "Knowledge Because of Association with other KGB Officers’ and said elicitation should include information sufficient to give us in one place a perspective on NOSENKO's associates and friends. This topic can be covered immediately. -ANATOLE stresses real imnortance of Guk, Kovshuk and Churanovy to NOSENKO He notes Guk's wife was the daughter of a minister and asks if NOSENKO could have introduced then. He also points secieiny 4 in school with NOSENKO . ANATOLE agreed elicitation on this tepic should wegin * * Ammediately and was most interested in the possible significance a vis disinformation. He noted, of course, the different perspective on the case and that apparently when this case was considered in the context of support to KOSENKO's bona fides analysis had not taken into account the actual origins and develonrent of the case. ANATOLE innediately cennected the SLAVACHENSKAYA angle to the PENXOVSKIY case and speculated that the KGB may: have been attemmtins to establish a separate : estensibly confirmatory source to the FRI to holster PERXOVSKTY pal Crp sprees ak aie ~} I atin oe erates TTT es ae ta ete Rast me EPH oh Hl
14-00000 oe ra . at gt ~y ~ td . ~19- sho was in contact with the British and CYA. ANATOLE emmhasized his view that NOSEYKO should not be given a hint about the actual bexinnines of the case to prevent NOSENKO fron nodifying his story or being led to explanations. SOSENKO shoule retell his eccount case and then be asked the questions listed (See N-24 - This 2a later tonic) ANATOLE requests everything available ahout GINSBURG and srecifically everything NOSENKO has ever said. After the research ANATOLE thinks he ‘can spot sonething in connection with GINSPUSG which is sienificant but which he says eludes hin at this cime. 25, The Military Attache Incident. eggs Veit per eiie AG RGe ; - . ANATOLE stresses importance apain as he did in kY - : : : ¥ transcripts. He persists in thinking there nay be more here than we have covered - that one of the MA’s may have been re- cruited or someone else was recruited and advised about the trio. lie refers to N-32, and maintains this incident needs reexamination again. NATOLS says it his recollection that the EGR knew : exactly the device they were looking for: that the KGR did not haye a detection device which could baye been effective and that the use of a hox which looked like a detection machine was staged ade ean sete tt Sante ae OAR Vienne Ne. TRE cad pds wi ETS baie ptm RE ep ELE an Le niet eR BITTE ee nee tenet ee ee Bale eet ings» . _ and that probably after research the Attaches should be questioned . i a
14-00000 “OAD oe pce etna ob Geb pein: ots eh Ry cAbatire RRR Feo sweandi p . . : . ‘renee heneriness terns re ae we Steen matt ee ENE ATTAR ESI 7 SOFTEN OMAR OOP OO EPPS IL TENE. Ce OTC Ap PHA el eT A PE ta et eo ra, waa i Ps a he Se to cover up fact “GI knew exactly were to Find the device and FAN wnat it was. He says his recolictction is thet EGR knew where oy to lo 9 ho and there was no search or mdnitorina. They just went t to the richt nlace. This ~tcans to ANATOLE a human nat a nachine “ é a source. He says questionins NOSENKO about this can only follow [ :: research. =: apace 2 pe terete tries va ANATOLE was interested in this but we did rot dwell eS - ° on this subject. ANATOLE believe it a sive away diversion although prohably true. Decision re additicenal elicitation to be made by SM on basis tine and Framing questions. | 27. Microphones in Anerican Enbassy ANATOLE still suggests review this information from MOSENKO and requestioning particularly to establish exactly what NOSENKO said when and if he said anythines about NOUT! #33 Wing. Decision re timing of questioning by SM. . . 28. WATKINS - Canadian Anbassador Case. . i“ retell in detail 1 AVATOLE thinks it necessary $ aree everythine Ae knows about VATSINS in same way-‘S2 to be asked vonut Vassall. Teen lt will be necessary line eut and conpare : 1 Po 2 2eehe w sete - Oe 7 wig
14-00000 an ° ~ . ~ ae SUAY A eRe OMe OPES SORES MEATS lok CR wal af fae Mraceveree mama emer terte ow te exactly what ANATOLE said and what NOSENKO said. ANATOLE points out innortance of early information from -OSTYSD before he was piven backsround information or leading questions. ANATOLE thinks this can begin early in elicitation or he done Jater. Decision re tinlna by SU. ANATOLE thinks it mieht Le helpful for him to review what NOSENSO has said about Svetiana STALINA /AGETLUEVA ~~~ a This is speculative but ANATOLE recalls or was told NOSENKO should or did know something and he thinrs there nay be sone clue here about NOSENKO's associates, friends, ete., possibly SngeOebe No. LOD s 4 of importance.) ANATOLE again emphasizes his need to see a full review of results of investigation of all the code clerk cases. He is convinced there may be a case her2 and that the clues have been missed or overlooked. He says he cannot recall the necessary detail and thet it is only when he can he stimulated with names, dates, etc., that he nay be able to pinpoint some angle of significance. ANATOLE was told we were also bothered about these cases - that much work had been done but that, quite frankly, I could not estimate how long it woulc take to assemble the inferzation 7 for orderly review. AYVATOLE was told this is en the agenda - it is a matter of tine and nennic. Any questioning of NOSENKO ahout these cases can ontvy ke cone liter. a Dicey we een ee BR ewe De ttt mee 7 . 2 EE ee Dag athe TNS LF ET ween sd » Be — ~ , : } a en
geet ~ ANATOLE opines NOSEN<9 should }now more specifics about this and that later it will be necessary to question hin with specifics during the confrontation stace after comnaring late elicitation results with collateral details. 31. A Code Clerk in Anerican Enbassy with Spanish Languase or Spanish Packground. NATOLE noted the reference in the paper re Viadinir Lyovich ARTEMOV to NOSENKO's information that ARTEMOV knew Spanish and said there micht be a connection to something he vaguely recalled ahout an interest in or a case against an Anerican code “clerk of Spanish backpreund or who spoke Spanish. ANATOLE said the period was 1957-69, Ne could not recall details. ile sald this should be considered a special case for him to work on- now for later questioning of NOSENKO if research Indicated this necessary. ASATOLE requestec for review any information availahle re code clerks, civilian or military, in Moscow 57-60 with Spanish | laneuage er bacleround. a Ee RR Mate, | tet s a ’ EL RE a Ber te Fk ag elt tate ane et tare Rae eee ae ee ee wm oa en ae ANE Bee
‘90000 to ney eatin oaeion des ted atte ee et pen twee antral aaNet TN rR IMENT POCA AR fs sere eitmie rersnen bettie gehapr un teetbed dey nto epee AAA Soave deere tacts etek en wan * “ woe Wide eae ery f~. Saar? bare f-. ’ PQ ee 32. Viadimir SUSLOV and Vasiliy V. VANPRUSHEY WWATOLS agreod that the questions re VAXHPUSHEY should be ashed of SOLENT during the first elicitatinn stares. ANATOL@ was concerned that NCSENKO not be siven any indication of VANHRUSHEY.  (SiONOTE: Cuestion sieleted from paraaranh 11 by SM on basis aper with ANATILE. Pe, of course, fa} J o C is] % uw oe) & ca Mg ef “iy t? od rq 9 < poo oO Pod prow os ye) “J was en same shin once with MAEKERUSHEV and researcher had included question because @ had high US GCovernnent contacts including some carly 1950 work on U.S. intellisence community reviews.) A specific question ANATOLE asted was about any collateral or documentary Information that VAXHPUSHEY attended the Institute « of Foreign Relations. We also asked if there were photographs identified f VAKURUSHEYV! s wife(s) available and if NOSFNKO had ese. te would like to see then too. (SM NOTE: See 12 Angust 1954 intervie uw) - mo B . ANATOLE thinks there may be a significant ‘asnect about . ENKO'’s schooling and VAKHRUSHFV's schocling which needs checking. ANATOLE is sneculating on possibility NOSENNO was in Milltary ee Gid not know if there was any collateral sroof that NASENKO was 2 aindert at the Institute of Fereicn/Intornatianal telations : hut woulc cer. this noint on the losical Me ee renner a er ne ia z eee Sey
14-00000 -24- procression of -OSE.€4's schooling in the military and probability that hicher education vould have been under military unless sore { snecial family or ether influeace nernmitte4? chanzea. He also notes QSENKO's continuation in Neval Service and confirms he saw NOSENKO in Navy uniform in ‘larch 1953 in KCB Idqs. ANATOLE suecests this asnect be reexamined after elicitation in light of NOSENEO's answers and information about Pega VACHPUSHEV and SUSLOY, who was in Institete of Foreion Relations. : ANATOLE sav3 CHUIANT was in Foreien Relations Institute and that : SEPEEES & wees i Guk was in ‘litary Institute. NATOLE sneculates this rav be : . eeahoapepen area where NOSENKO is hiding his close relationship with Guk - that he might have first known Guk in the Military Institute although GUE a couple of years older than NOSENEO. uk worked in GRi but ANATOLE does not remember if Navy. ANATOLE says nef consider: * . futher elicitation later and also a surnrise question on new . polygraph about NOSENK CO's attendance at the Military Institute. A. The paper NOSENKO's Defection was read by ANATOLE with interest. I did not have 2 convies of this paper. ANATOLE was told a covy would be furnished him at next meeting. Certain 4 comments which follow are based on information from this paper but a specific comment hy ANATOLE was (see nara 2 page 2 of paper): Tt is true TSYMPAL was a former member of Department 4. It is illocical that TSY PAL was transferred ta the Illecal Pirectorate and more illogical he would travel with the delegation ; if he were head of the Illegals | Dire ctorate. As head of the 4th baie teaween seme tak Rigas halt Se ameneens serene t i Tengu aennrate = tm see ~ . ee ce _ Nea oak onc etonenemebagrhy A ented neon - meee eee me
Serer etegie ew mnlen pee unite Nee meee este e wee aaa taht arma ANE Eon ne Shy vom, — Pepartnent he would eo with the deleratioa but nerwaily and logically ticr2 would be no rixine ef leeat and Pllecal elerents. Tho KGB Would not permit any nublicity or #4 TSYMSAL Lf he were head of the Tllegals, ANATOLE can only conclude this information is to creste te impression of reorosaniaation after Ais defection. B. ANATOLE also points ont tha illecic asnect of a Tourist Denpartrent officer as security officer to such a delegation. "Ye also notes that when senior officials such as GhYNKO travel there are snecially assiened exnert security officers with their delegations if anv are sent at all. He notes that for the nost part the senior officials travel without security officers excent protective experts assiened such as would be the sltuation NOSFNKO deseribes. . . ANATOLE says a basic questicn for confrontation will be about the inclusion of a "sneclal security officer" In a delezation such az one headed by the Foreign “inister. He says — the inclusion of a person such as NOSFNKO is very unusual. The Forelen Minister and his aldes, etc., are trusted men who goa _ abroad recularly. These are always experienced KGR officers on the operations in sunnort of the delesations and the planning is well in advance. These officers can handle anything. At a Later date ANATOLE says we can confrent NOSFNAOA with this . opposite pesition from ANATOLM. TOM an SETS tases abe Mba tame ES ea eee or te ee ee + wae ate tee wth baby
14-00000 * we eee he tent nah orem Btls AB ORD PIE Ona! BAA Anew HEN NR RO ae 6 Ponce a ot weve o a oi Sep hepato . Te are dil eve enim apap AN RCT MEAT D LETTE EE IE TD otis alae srecanp ncaa E men aI, time BA RI eR TC IRAN NEFF erent owts weniorg : C, ANATOLE sald the story about “QSENKO's rele with SRANISW just pives a reason to us ahout why NOSENK<O was in Geneva. There vould he no reason for any special interest by NOSENKO, The residentnura could and would handle any technical ecevices and onerations such as NOSESKO describes. p.  whiebcorsxty, ANATOLE found this connection and Final drinking hout Interesting and said both Guk and KREPXOGORSKIY would Know what NOSENNO's mission was in 1962, I ceuld provide ro infornation about KRGPROGORSKIY and ANATOLE asked to see photo of KREPKOGORSAIY, nothing he could net recall name. ANATOLE asked for information aboutegg (SM NOTE: M needs HOSENK? say, ete.). . F, ANATOLE says a later question NOSENXO should be asked thy in 1962 he rejected the idea of using his position in tne Tourist Department as the lerical nosition from which he could keep in contact with AIS, fi.c., a tourist sent to he recruited hy NOSENKQ, etc. $3. Personnel of Ist Section, Ist Ment, 1959 - 61 ANATOLE believes this will be inrortant arca for later iv) ow poo ia) one ee ation and, rarhaps, confrontation after we have aypsortunity the cellateral and ANATOLE’ s i 1 7 * » 2 7a ao TF * . H check significance - where in "NOSEXO - Defection" paper. , What research this, ' ede Magee a See, ones, i kt ere 1 tt tithes e Ve at tenet 9 ee ee mene mee me ee Big taba ex Nat en MRA Rae ee WE ae Ta oat. Te Sen
HOG00 ANATOLE suseests we doubvie cheek the debriefing of foe about ROSEULI's approach and recxa*ine GER backsround and what he has heen coins to see if there leoks sign mt now, il.e., anythine invortai and more information. 34, The Maurice De Jean Case NATOLE said it was innortant to line out In quotes date everything that NOSENKO sald .ahout fe Joan and do the same for the information from Yuriy Vasilyevich | KROTKOV. These i | should .then be lined out and chroncloeically compared with what . “ ' AN*TOLE said. On the basis of these conclusions and the time : 2 sequence we shoulderenexanine the nroblem of the leakare of lead : . information to try to set indicationsen® least of how, why and where ANATOLE's information leaked. ANATOLE said we should also : i + consider the nossible preblem of leakase in connection with the WATKIN's Casa and the RCMP in this. le also notes that GRIBANOV's vi role and visit to Paris nay be important rs o When NOSENKO responds to questions about GRIBANOY we should exan nin ne this aspect also. a! | Specifically, NOSENKO should comment ahout, why GRIBANOV went to Paris. | 35,  BUSHEX and GPTRANOV ! In connection with discussions ahout GRIPANOV and bis trip in 1964, we discussed the BUSHEE cuse and ANATALE was told tes follevire re chronslery: Va or] acs eis. ee BS ° = « ; : : fot . . i. : oe" 1 PRT renin emseRENRET Rt EEA, Bay RMR E RTS 2 Hua at gnmeiR AS momen TSO s 6a
74-90000 - see ‘levee nein ante mes see pe bic STi maa Sa eter Mitte sAtiam iy tes steele tn Sa hn aba i atop ape REPO A RENO A Spee ti nes ~Ssrroatsergint ee ier, 5 coors 1S January SOSEUK) to Ceneva fron Paris. : $ Feb (5¢ helfeves) GRIPASOV arrives Paris frosa Vienna - = GOs + She GF eek MSA defects. : "7 Feb, GPIBANCY donarts Paris for Vienna (CPIRANOY uses name CORsyINTV In Vienna and with BUSHEE.) 12 Fob Saviets in Switzerland stronrly nrotest to Swiss about NOSENKN's defection. 14,.Feh (maybe 13 Feh.) GRIRANOVY, accerdina to PUSHTEK, : relaxed about “OSENKO defection when PUSHER raised question. | : ANATOLE susrests questions re MISHEK come later. . 36. Recall Teleeran It is apparent to ANATOLE there is slenificant in- formation about this aspect of the NOSEvKO case from the FRI. , ‘ This poes to the basic question of cooperation with the FRI and his knowledge which he concedes is a basic FPY decision about ak ade ’ -what he sees of the recall telesram information. ANATOLE has : seen only NOSEYKO's information (transcripts, ete.). The sienificance of this may bear on the question of rank discussed arately but even without being ahle to discuss all asnects of the recall telercram with ANATOLE he sugeests we should examine if we have not done this the detalls of NOSENKO's admissions he ae Late weet ae tnd eer ae on ad ed rns his rank and the recall televran. ANATOLE says it is i lied about necessary te determine: the exact date NAt*ENKO hreke on each ‘ story: who was invelved: who tnew he was being rressured; was there coordinatien with the FRE ahent the »ressure on the recaill telesran; ‘ an we ites Mie dae i RY HORA pt Letras gute Fk AR See EP WE IT Ma oratories Meme tenes ote aan at MEH ys ie & t pla ee a & ¥
14-00000 PMID Rett maa tmtureee memes hn z what and uno Led us to conclude the staries were faise: what wore the dates involved hetween MOSEANG's story of the telaaran and the information from annther source(s > was there tire for “Piet rmecene niet one ec AT ene tomcat th tearm ret ET ta taba en Reser gre Geese ers pt et ab inset itt ie ae ghee aman tis recs ney gt attr vee inane hay eset, Satan aa oe Con eb a phd each Sorta Sneee NTI ; . Bee TRS | NOSDARO te confirn his use of the reesll telecram story: could the message fran NOSENZO have gotten to another source or would it an spear the telearam story had to be alinned in sdvance and not trissered hy confirmation fron “ASENKO: after NOSHINO broke was the other source(s) confronted, was there any cnanee in the relations with the other source {s); has there been any collateral information reflectine KGS knowledre he has broten on rank or the telegram steries. ANATOLE suszeests this asnect of the question E g ' L -of bona fides cone later in confrontation and he assumes SM will ‘be covering tris fully even thouch he hones there will be permission for him to be fully read inte this. He was told, for the record “since he obviously understeod the implications, I could promise nething since any discussion about the recall teleqran and any other source would mean opening to him full information ahont any “source since everyons, including the FRI,tnew he would never be satisfied with partial limited information. Ve lauchinely agreed he would press for full information but did concede he might (temrorarily?) settle for less than the full seurce information if the context of the information ahout NGSENSOD was complete and he ceuld understand the sianificance of the seurce's position, etc. eeaare + ae gible Bap Lathe ts. oe cree Pa at ae
14-00000 eh vt ge > ees andr otnalnp Cae a Raf ped Tet Ban AERY si - shape eset crane anf A Tea le ACY FE eh gE ree Robannytatet ean areyiarehatgh tanya t feted anne tities evr kept och pei cae ret nS: apa eae ede at ame AB ppt rtm CT sages sptene rs bet gree cate eee Ue dine 1ette Feet Ae net eee esteem EBA bah aoe ann Vion wees amet A tee Seabipelahoa ans ! wd =~ ~ Y Y said we would think about what could he Jone but that aotinisn was not in order, Q t Pesinge nw 37. NOSESIEA Staterent Cendernins Sovi ANATOLE outlined the stens to ke taken to obtain fren NOSEIED a staterent which In its ultinate written form may serve both as a control and a provasanda Instrument. ANATOLY helieves that leading ROSENKO to a final alselute written and documented statenent arainst the Soviets wil] not enly nernit us to judge NOSPNKO sore accurately by observing his reactions Sut also provide additional psycholosical pressure useful in the final ~stases of dealing with NOSEXEO when we confront hin with the evidence we know he was on a mission. ANATOLE helleves the final denunciatory statement may help tip the balance in gaining NOSENKO's cooneration/confession., - The steps to be taken are as follows: . A. Elicit from NOSENKO statements as detailed and specific as possible condemaing the Sovict regime, the ¥GB, the party, individuals, etc. This should be at a fast tempo, (Tals, ‘can berin Immediately.) . | * B. After reviewing these statenents elicit from * NOSENKO inereasingly detailed’ condemnatory statements by having nd activities. e him add details about persons C. Concurront with 374 ahove NOSENND sheuld be asked to enumerate in detail each example of these things he did, saw or heard about vhich bhreueht hir te the reint of defection. If he dnes not mention the VGR then at later strise in the elicitation creacess he lay-FO 36 rressed Far reasons he dislikes . Hy hea g eluLn! mee eNO rT ETT a UE SO PET SRS A eter EEvementeisninmtninanananrveeanrrere sn...
iy me nae aun m ees mR etsy marek area ett detonterras Yat aeeliesed Sa) SiR a * febitit tics a herrea thee} othr d is t -3t- the ROB. Ue should be led te make statenents about reoucnant KGS techniques such as bDlacksail, hetero-sexual and homesexual wedges fa] ntransente. agoinst diplomats, tourists nrevinent Vester: entists, ete. He should re led to exrress his disgust at "A me c every. stare about the intimidation practiced and should include Pussian youth and the spying on Intellectuals. D, After NOSENKO has enurerated and elaborated his denunclation and condemnation ef the Soviets, orally and at leneth he should he asked to write in his em words a statement which he will agree can be published. Ne should be asked at this point, althouch it may he necessary to ask him carlicr, if he is prepared to make an official statenent condemning the Soviet regime and specific people. Ve will he told that with his cooperation we want to expose the Soviet regime on the basis of real knowledpe. This first statement will be revised hy us inclide specifies and which will include statements such as e te ie] Fy "IT condemn SHELEPIN, GRIRANOV, ete. for - f- - -": “Lf eoandemn GRIBANOV for forcing re to engace in reprehensible homosexual entrapaents - - “+: "I condemn a system which deals in nisinfornation and confusion suck as that led by AGAYANTS - - ™. . E. At a later stage after review of his other statements about personnel, thea KGB organization, etc: as foellow- up he should in interview only detail what steps were taken to counteract the danage from GOLITZY™'s defection and the Ker reerranization, Ne should List all nersonre] structural and Re AE BENT cut CR MTT etn Coke ITO Re Sear rttarigrea1 $A ECON tae regia - : _ ENE ie Act eter
74-90000 NOR PRE ENE ENTE PE BOS VTE ICT TTI $B ye AE ORT RUD nm ernst na AaUN ty Rengecne ibaa and nce mri bCiy tate pany aren maT A EN! ‘pst cymes onion npssa teeta i - \ i | +3 a particularly the functional chanses in the ¥GR. Ne shonld he ‘ : asved the spectfiec question of when was a conference held to : consider the iaunmact of COLITZYN's knowlecce avout tourlsts and the loss of documents. '%s skheuld relate this to the 1964 Tourist Conference he says was scheduled. PL. Vhe final written condematery statement will he 4 considered for publication with or without OSENNO's annreval or ; agreenent. The statement should he a key elenent in assessine his reaction at the nolnt where nis confession/cooneration Is : solicited and he is told it will be nublished. ‘ There was little discussion of this excent to consider need to review more and consider this a tonic for later questionine. Po 39. PREISFRFUND : ANATOLE considers this a tople worth more study and vat i review on the basis that something may have been overlooke i ' which relates to misinformation about the American Embassy or American personnel. We should not consider this case closed ana more research Is needed. . {ANATOLE sees no relevancy to the questians re GOLITZYN. If€ we have some operationally significant anmle he can anprove 1. ‘questions but he sees none - he finds this unnecessary and question : 15 especlally unnecessary. ANATOLE ae t ”y supe ee ee = ee eee cere ant cntnattan ae nantes amine ot wee ~ see a te + _ oe aD) ree t a] . : : vet - g
714-00000 . - yeeg oo . -33- ; ANATOLE oon oe ~ pointed out the b..ic and only question with espect ta NOSENKO is misinformation and he sees no advantage or assistance resulting from questiorw about GOLITZYN. However, he said this was not his decision. He was told the paper about the GOLITZYN question was prepared by a researcher who works exclusively at this tine on the 1967-1968 materials and the researcher resronded to a general requirement to extract information and ‘ é frane questions to be asked of NOSENKO which could be tested aovainst known information. The researcher obviously believes that if NCSENKO were to make a false or misleading statement which GOLITZYN has or could deny or prove wrong NOSENKO would be in a bind. ANATOLE was also told he must understand that : “compartnentation in research and on NOSENKO as well as on + b é ~larger issues means that we will review a few papers which are useless in the larger context eventhough to the researcher who has. a narrow view the concern is real.) "40, Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV. : ” KNATOLE's reaction to the questions and paper was that they .. Will not accomplish much of significance re GRYAZNOV since he 7 thinks there is a GRYAZNOV relationship to the code clerk cases . which can only be determined after that research and analysis of information about GRYAZNOV. He agreed the questions could be used later during elicitation as tine fillers and preliminary to hard questions but not much will come because the questions are not to the point, which he did not explain fully. > ARON peteat west amatnceens accemesia ve oan
14-00000 reshape cepa aa Ferment Mamma seme dae Anti Member uenyeponr oe ee er ancaee eer tae NS MEERA RA ONS WEN Baten I cyt lente He cainmereshmecaempeinrame: ° poaiaies * FOP SEA BONS RRR mathe I a yp s “e .-m, -34- ANATOLE did specifically challense “OSENZO's story of his Close relationshis with G2YAZNOV as a Tie. ANATOLE notes the errr pensar center sterner possibllity there was learasce of his identification to the FRI and CTA of GRYAZSOY as a source, Particularly ANATOLE says NOSENSO's story of a close relatienship with CRYAZNAV in 1962 is »rohably faise because there was no nrevious relationshin leading to this. ANATOLE said definitely that GPYAZNOV would have been punished if the HGR knew he was identified as a source to GOLITZYN. ANATOLE says there is a contradiction with NOSENKO trying to build up his relationship with GRYAZNGV and down-play or, more accurately minimize, the extent of his relations with CHURANOV and GUK. ANATOLE helieves it was a deliberate part OF KOSENXO's lecend to set him close to GRYAZNOY since GRYAZNOY ; was an ackrowledged source of some of COLITZYN's information. The NOSENNO-GRYAZNOV relationship will be a key element In future questioning; ° A. “Comment on NOSEYKO Fanily Relations’ was a paner in which ANATOLE found little of importance or significance as a crucial point excent that as the discussions progressed he de- a veloped the idea that the 1945-50 peried may be crucial after all. ANATOLE sees little question about most of his life and snecifically ANATOLE says the homosexual question is not “dn ‘ line with avallable evidence”. ANATOLE thoucht these questions would sive MOASENEO the inpressian we are “unrrofessional” but Bese samara y har arieditene eta ner ones Shee, aoe. Tene Ne Smee te hes
= 35- immediately. conceded this is really not a problem since NOSENKO has net been handled very professionally in the past. B. “NOSENKO - Homesexual Aspects" ANATOLE questions any assumption that NOSENKO had any “expertise™ on homo operations. He just does not think NOSENXO was an "expert" or a "specialist" and points out he can run then at level he has described with very little knowledge. ANATOLE says he Imows NOSENKO was net a homosexual before and doubts he would have been consulted by anyone as a “specialist”. In view basic doubts if any questions to be used should be ~ woven into other topics and not treiaie! as separate subject. sae ot . Tow “& ss . ‘% ~ 41. RUNYANTSEV After reading the paper ANATOLE said there is nothing te ask NOSENKO at this time. ANATOLE maintains this will be a special question later. ANATOLE directly relates the RUMYANTSEV case to what he considers was the serious mistake of asking ‘.SNOSENKO about the May 1959 conference. (See N-223) He also thinks further questions on the conference should only come later, ANATOLE saw clearly why no questions should have been asked about RUMYANTSEV and May 59 Conference but after mistake made it may be we will want to adjust and consider what we might gain by some questions during elicitation or if touching on this
14-00000 heeesternterartoe perf rete mR PEE OO AA BONEN IE A PEAR STARS FLEA OU ATE eT LC EET eH PR Ae RH ve ar ‘Siar oti canes par aOR a RC . ° were = iil : ai alee i : { - . . : weg om te ; i 7 ” ~ ata 4 & point will upset the phasing of questions to NOSENKO. This matter will be discussed further after ANATOLE reads the papers carefully. ANATOLE was told it will be clear to him that the May 59 meeting was known through GOLIENEWSKI aad there was some indication from this source also of wide scale misinfor- nation programs. It was also noted that in my opinion the questions for NOSENKO, even with hindsight and my knowledge of how seriously GOLITZYN's infornation about this conference has been viewed, were normal intelligence officer questions whicn NOSENKO could expect based on the overt information made available. Certainly the questions were not unusual except for the fact “that they indeed were different from other questions asked of [:NOSENKO because they touched on political matters. To the extent ’ that N-228 showed NOSENKO someone at a lato date was interested in political matters NOSENKO may have been alerted. Certainly it nS would seem those questions were completely out of context - out ‘of the blue so to speak - and since there was no follow-up NOSENKO" may feel there is“no real interest because there has “been no real interest in matters political with hin. | A. “HOSENKO - Uso of Alias by KGB Officers" a ANATOLE commented these were very good questions. They could be asked during elicitaticn or later during the crucial or hard questioning phase when we were assured of fast follow-up questioning. pene eee oe Lt re ibe B. “NOSENKO - Knowledge Because of Association with other _ ; ; KBS Officers". ; ANATOLE thought this was excellent approach. He at ay pa ome ane oa ra & ened. A aap ween vermin ernest commen mite le oS: Ten SB aioe « tenant eh aT ate Le trincmae te me mae oN wrt ee Dap he Dae ured ede weet
14-00000 abet oe ve ~37- comaented in connection with paras 9 and 11 and using this paper stressed need to elicit all possible from NOSENKO orally during interview and no written nemorandua. ANATOLE outlined need for NOSENKO to List exact dates of all his service assignnents; when he first met each officer; detailed biography of each officer, etc. He retained without comment the 23 March 1949 addendum re RAOVSKIY, KUTYREV, and SUROV. 42. Nikolay S. SKVORTSOV and Viladinir Vasilyevich KRIVOSHEY ANATOLE, as with these officers, separately lists KGB — officers of special significance as part of the enumeration of po .« CRUCIAL QUESTIONS because they are’ not only prominent, in OSENKO's story but also of major concern to us since they work a ‘against Anericans. They are important even without NOSENKO. In most instances also there will be the initial new elicitation about them from NOSENKO. Then NOSENKO's previous information will be collated and compared with collateral information, 7 including previous information from GOLITZYN, after which ANATOLE - will review, comment with now information, if any, and frame pertinent questions for NOSENKO. Specifically ANATOLE says that NOSENKO's statement he consulted SKVORTSOV about tourist operations 1955-$9 is nonsense. SKVORTSOV was in Gernany until 1959, NOSENKO should be asked what kind of tourist operations, petra th ameter etna seen ie bo Mure ta sneee, ? em seeeameane evneseem at a
14-00000 os ea Sr Spee BRR YY ety oat OHO PHENACETIN OEMS E SE II ‘i poetnetbags rt tearing att, ance ‘ttn SAN MN ohne RIN Re RSH INIA aE FN SOTTO eS Oe Cake he nee pbs tnah PAYEE EES as -33- 7 43, Nikolay Griporyevich BAGRICHEYV 44, GRIBANOV (GORBUNOV) ANATOLE stresses the importance of collating all information about the activitias of GRIBANOV 45, NOSENKO-Asen GEORGIEV Case ANATOLE believes these questions useful now in elicitation phase. He wants to review everything NOSENKO has 7 . said about Anatoliy S. KOZLOV and view any photos. I could not confirm that KOZLOV had participated in the Gg ANATOLE asks if we can confirm KOZLOY was Chief of the Anerican |. Section when NOSENKU left the Section in 1955 and what NOSENKO said about early relations including precise dates when KOSENKO says KOZLOV was his boss. In this connection it is noted that NOSENKO says KOZLOV was Chief of Dept I (Page 1 of paper) then ‘Deputy Chief of Dept 7 (page 4). ANATOLE says as clicitation question NOSENKO should be asked why the demotion and also what happened to GORBATENKO. * . Not unexpectedly, ANATOLE said he vould eventually ‘ : want to see the file on the GEORGIEV case to see what the tie-in to the Soviets may have been. 46. Vladinir Lvovich ARTEMOV ANATOLE would like photograph and travel record for woe *¢ s +t Re § ARTENOV. “aye ee , ete EM Apa OF EE LOEB IPT caeeTt ramenreee NT PT, yee Get eet PoftheCtrcantienseneen 2c
74-90000 . «f ei tecet a a es -~39- 47. Mikhail Stenanovich BANNIXOV. ANATOLE wants background info and photo. 48. Fedor Alekseyevich SUCHERBAK 49. FNU GOLOVKOV, A. Nikolay Dmitrievich ARKHIPOY ANATOLE wants background and photograph. ANATOLE thinks questions re Egil SUNDAR needed and that NOSENKO should fully explain how and why he became involved with a journalist and what kind of an agent was SUNDAR and his background, etc. SUNDAR's targets sheuld be described fully and NOSEFRO should r i See 47 explain the relevancy of this to tourist operations. B. ANATOLE asked about the Arsene FRIPPEL case but I could not answer with complete assurance the details of his a recruitment, admissions, identifications, etc. ANATOLE was told, however, everyone Satisfied about this apparently but would check. : C. ANATOLE suggests full exploration with NOSENKO to i _ -.get his explanation for the use of the technicians IVANOV, SERGEY, | and LEBEDEV, Lev A, in the r@cruitment of the British tourist Eric LUKIS? Is there a relationship to the Johnson case. 50. Ivan Alekseyevich YEROFEYEV ANATOLE wants photo and travel record. 8 ROEM AER ZaS eRe OU ete MIL ee ra wD Sarg 2 Resim ont sy te neti ae cy emi st atte yn ad eae gtadiotiete, Aten’ 3 Beg
14-00000 4 ; important separately from considerations of NOSENKO. He recalled Erase eta Co ar te OSS ~40- S81. Ivan Abramovich PANASENKO ee SPORTSTER REE Reaper Reiey nap SoREE TENET tr tho TAR TER PS see 50. . 52, PIVNEV . | ANATOLE says this topic is definit«\y a confrontation “topic. Specifically he noted para 7 in this connection. i . _ ANATOLE says he needs the substance of the follow-up and results of the @ESE2222— case to frame questions re PIVNEV but he also makes the point he considers the Mr. G'HEAL was to review the file with him and arrange interview of SAU but he has heard nothing. On the basis of short -‘discussion ANATOLE believes there are unexplored aspects to this case and parallels with the RUMYANTSEV case as far as NOSENKO is concerned which may go to penetration in the AM ENB, Moscow or even to Germany. The timing is important, ot PON Ga tebe nage nara teat toe A. Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV ANATOLE relates interest in KISLOV to KOVSHUK as well as to the BELITSKIY case to begin in overall elicitation about KGB officers. He wants to review the FBI information about TEE IT wad PLDT A eee SDH A EONAR IN HES cod! etme oh Brea be Re TRH a St Be ah GSE Le MACE Hh, aS AW dace 6 OT gL EET atemeanarerttn oto ramntmame ONE attpeg meee ceweate eT Te tame meena 2g
rene een aes ee pecans nike em oe Oe 4 Temes n ete an nee tm -41- KISLOV's U.S. activities and surveillance reports of his association with KOVSHUK, All the questions re KISLOV should be used in elicitation. B. In connection with NOSENKO's stories about his status and cover in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, ANATOLE vould like to review all verified info against NOSENKO's statements. For example was his diplomatic passport verified, etc. €. ANATOLE would like to review the lists of other menbers ' o£ the delegations of which he was a member as well as the lists of other delegations there at the same time. (SM NOTE: Check N-127, page 7 - he could take orders of Chairman on POPOV case, Compare with other info re POPOV case from NOSENSO. Why would .ka,have orders on POPOV case in his safe in 1964? .The order was put out in 1959 (53260}..NOSENKO would Know this in 1962 - immediately after American Section duty. He would have it or access to it but why as late as 1964 in Tourigz Dept.) D. After considerable reflection ANATOLE thinks it is quite possible that NOSENKO held the rank of Lt. Col. but that when he saw he was suspect on the rank issue because his actual history and his assipnnents as he described them did not warrant the Lt, Col. rank =s¢eeeesmet to cover his dispatch/mission end the reward he received he decided to agree and downplay his Te neste ame RS nS then tee om eMeL eM aase semen GE ae
74-90000 emeeretind tr trernaeene seehant i Ae repack opis eteneperdhsenre anal meats tetpe MTs coe mp ened ien Et . . : : - . . sores = ees ve ONES AEN AS REET OPE NSU O OE ASOD EE CON oe HS NU EC; At OR TN UREN RNASE. Eris tae 04 oe importance, Ne had to accede to his interviewers to avoid nore guestions about why and how he became a Lt. Col. ANATOLE thinks he may have been revarded (promoted) quietly with only a very few persons knowledgable. (SM NOTE: Check all reports.) ANATOLE suggests this question for polygraph: "Did the travel document you brought reflect your true rank on the basis of your success and achievements of your game with AIS which bezan in June 1962 in Geneva? In this connection also ANATOLE points to two promotions in one year (1962) (See N-181 pg 27): Chief of Section then . ‘Deputy Chief of Department. How has NOSENKO explained this . — mm ' when he was not in his first job even three months and he had no majer successes in Geneva | |- What oe ; x, were the cases he handled and the recruitments he made in 19627 € §3. Anerican Ambassadors ANATOLE believes at a later date NOSENKO should be asked or confronted about operations against American Ambassadors. * However, a5 an elicitation question ANATOLE thinks he should be asked if he knew of any Anegican Ambassador who was recruited at any time by SCD? CL Ten ae ae Later, under the hostile interrogation he would be asked if he knew about an important high level SCD American agent who was recontacted and reactivated when he visited Hoscow in 1959, Other questions to follow from the tean of interrogators ‘such as who did or would have handicd this agent, etc. SMPTE] a e a ai bo Ad ESPANOL Ar LUDA AML bt Dy GALE A ad ot Agr A AA PE. TU ee GS ida oe ~ L tage eos ss RRR BSI oe tee Seong cee alge E ad
A nmnte OER ences oes beet Ane arte ttle ates ees waeeyeapenann eran arene. poneemteneet nas 54, Yuriy GUK's Agent in Washington ANATOLE thinks this case needs attention again even though it may not bear on the NOSENKO case. analysis and future research on tho basis of what action the FBI took. If there is something pertinent to NOSENKO wo can consider for later use. 55. Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV ANATOLE says we should extract and review what NOSENKO has said about KROTKOV and line out the parallels in the info. Nov 1963 and NOSENKO - Jan 1964, and he thinks we need to frame KROTKOV promised an expose of the KGB and this never canee about, 28 ne meerem ne wera ane tae ener oe ANATOLE notes KROTKOV - Oct 1963; Cherepanov - questions to include KROTKOV in our considerations. om ge meee reese He says it needs He recalls se etna oe Fare
CIMA eds idee atwnmnenetiersies santo menenan + tienen 4 a we dy , 7 woe a . . . . : . . A {ne aawe sme tere en nba parm gear tats Re ti APR Ea rh on ce PA AR htm fn Rab na prt: URSA gh HRD Llane STEAL AIM EERE NTS HORA RN TE ner This ap eek a tart i peat . : vo : . * ane Ee BMENT TO PARA 35/PAGE 28 of CORRECTION AND ATTACIMMENT B TO MEMO FOR THE RECORD DATED 7 APRIL 1969, -SUETECT: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO: 2 - dl Jan 64 18 Jan 19 Jan 24. 25 gan 25 - “28 Jan 28 Jan 3 Jan - 3 Feb 4 Feb 4 Feb 6 Feb GRIBANOV applied for Austrian, French, (8 Jan) and Swiss visas. NOSENKO arrives in Geneva from Paris. Mikhail §. ROGOV arrives Switzerland. ROGOV registered Hotel Regina, Bern ROGOV registered Hotel Krebs, Bern ROGOY to Rome GRIBANOV, FEDORENKO, KURISHEV and NOVIK at Winter Olympics, Innsbruck. CrQRiBANor NOSENKO defects rr Y, amy mt, Soviet Ambassador advises Chief, Soviet Delegation Disarnanent Conference NOSEXKO disappeared 4 Feb. Po Anan ES GREER owe ot tet ate me” we
ASAE pth ct EAE bet EL RT nt teat me 7 Feb 8 Feb & Feb 9 Feb 10-*Feb 12 Feb 14 Feb :14 Feb 1? Fag GRIBANOV arrives, Paris. KOVSHUK was in Paris. Soviet official in Geneva reports to Swiss police NOSENKO nissing. ROGOV returned to Bern Radio news in Switzerland attributed Swiss and Soviet sources said NOSENKO presumably had defected. GRIBANOV left Paris for Vienna, BUSCHEK clains to have seen him 10 Feb, TSARAPKIN, not Soviet Ambassador to Switzerland, holds conference condemning Swiss for permitting NOSENKO's kidnapping: Swiss called Soviet Ambassador Bern and strongly protested _ TSARAPUIN action, ” ~ ee GRIBANOV dinner party with BUSCHEK at which GRIBANOV not unduly disturbed about NOSENKG. ROGOV departed Switzerland via Austria. Kovstet ieSe> Pansy Aa MAM ee eo tha Rupwev Delegation, ec et om st a ty wl ead As pa atietoeth fm meer
14-00000 RN Teste bacteraemia ratte tert remnant enintpinnnn min mbatint eens tecpem amdescarniatt et wales epi é . ogg ATTACHMENT ¢ : ANATOLE Ro LASENSS “ Elicitation | : | A. As a result of consultations with ANATOLE SL “arch : and 1 and 2 Anril 1369, it “as conclude) the fsllaving tonics | or items were to be used to begin tha new clicitatinn phase with NGSPNKO. The following outline notes of the tonics are : arracised in tha order they are to be ciscussed with NASENKG “4 although it is important only to begin with the topics Listed | land 2. Additional elicitation tepics to be added hy Sin > consanance with discussion set forth in Crucial Questions. | ; B. ANATGLE onmphasizes that it is aecessary that NOSENXO : ros he permitted te respond fully and conpletely ahout each topic ; “ with all possible detalls. NOSENXO should not be reminded ° of any previous statements or consents nor should ke be corrected ~ about datess places or persons. He is not te he given any ‘ written assienments and each tonle is to he cevered as completely as possible in one interview withect digression into other topics exceot, of course, where NOSENED ray take the initiative in the digressien, fe should, however, he brought bach to the main | tonic as socn as possible without losing value of divression, E C. Tovics: : 1. Refectien Motivation - . : | Mast seriona: to set staee oresressive clicitation. ; ; CPAnET i efunt] : < i Te te . Wr
14-00000 ~~ os “ Mey | A, Retell votivation - : ; (1) Uhy he hates rerinre, (2) Can he eive narticulars and speclfles - concrete exinples why he hates reevine. (3) Concrete examples of actions, operations of ¥GR (security). why he develonad neeathve attitude vs KGh and reine. (4) Concrete cxasnles of this re Party. | {5} Concrete exarmlies of actions, attituses, | etc., of narty Icaders, the clite, the i hierarchy which caused hin to take | ‘ negative attitude. | f The above must be srecilal session - then to | | : be reviewed for further consideration re : statement. | . "2. Detall career | “ALL assignments, month, year, naking heed of denartments and sections 1953 - highlichting major asslennments acconplishments. . 3. General question to have KOSENKO describe and | -detail with exanples how nisinforration handled in SCN - give : e1ses - name versonnel «= what “kind of panes - relations with ! FCD - entire KGR - everythings he knovs without -sucgesting ‘ anything to hin, :
74-90000 : . § m OMAR I ted! Spenagte ae sot yours aie RD enn Tsar : debi - a laa tale en A et earl Pompe ynifoea! *e! ROR eH es AEN AR te Ute Fp ha Nt ER Et NI a Sead ety tds Mek 0D, ane oogten ets  Moecesianati y ogi “Pel Wi createFgpit site somal Reta YA ame, s 8 , 2 peel ay hh, 4 pane Ino May PEN HoT BL ON ASN ote atone “Ae ASHLEE Sir 3 hc PRN EY nena Rati ott a eat asst, Pare pila onsen, Lictagd ei ‘ y : ¢ , 4, Leadershin of Ean. Chalrean, Yeputies, and their cellearues - yearly ; basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 vit: detalled biesraphy : | : ; of each. ¢ 5. Leadershin of FCN, | Chairman, Nenuties, and their colleacues - vearly basis 1953 (do not combine years) to 1964 with detalled. blogranhy ; of each. ~ 6. Leadershin of SCD. 7 : | ; } Chairnan, Deputies, and their colleagues - yearly uO ; basis 1983 (do not conbine years) to 1954 with detailed biogranhy , \ + of each. (do not go to Heads of Denartnents) ; 7. Vassall . Oe 8. BELITSKIY - go ahead on basis questionnaire. . , , 9, All heads of American Denartment and deputies 1953, on yearly basis, with conplete detalis re biogravhy - ask questions on Gach - oral. ; : i9. GUK, CHHRANOV, ete. - explore in detail as wita questions. : ; 11. VAKHRUSHEV ist years in Institute Fercien Policy. 2nd question list of fricnds, classmates with hiocrashy when/if mentions YAKHRUSLEY and SUSLOY - then ask i questions outlined.
14-0000 Peaenm aed cates" ne hea pinriebir scenes Sasi ; fgets tse tete teen e SORROLe caanstaLae ny sta eRe atl Sette Hol angry Sat tA sna eetta re 8 - wet = af _ a bw *e 12. GRISANOV Trin. 13, SEVORTSOV (with friends). 14. BAGRICHEY (with friends). 15. KOZLOV, 16. ARTEMOY. 17. YECQFEYEYV. 18. PANASENKO. 19, EYSLOV. 29. Documentation - Explain again how, when received documentation, why discrepancies, how can you travel - identity card one vank order another rank. 21. Travel abroad, cover, etc. _ 22. Use of alias, questionnaire. 23, Yuriy V. KROTKOV - (probably nothing yet) , 27 eye Sat a A ele phe S, ° te ED x . a re ha * - t we then ge ee . - Patten Wy ee te SU ind aka Ba Te A a ee ten aD Late ~ ee es ne eee Serer ere en ee ET se ee PPE GP : : reeme
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