157-10011-10093 Date:10/06/93 Page:1 . JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM 8 IDENTIFICATION FORM © } AGENCY INFORMATION | ~ AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10093 RECORDS SERIES=:' AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION FROM : ROETHE, JAMES, N. - ” TO : FILE TITLE SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH PAPICH, SAM J. DATE : 03/05/75 PAGES : 18 SUBJECTS : }PAPICH, SAM J. (INTERVIEW) DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT . CLASSIFICATION : S RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : SSCI Box 294, Folder 15 [R]-1TEMIS RESTRICTED HY 50955 DBocld: 322703861 Page i
SECRET _7- During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Analeton. In the early 1950's the relationship between the two agencies was probably the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both agencies seened to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the other. Relationships. Between 1965 and 1970 During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in the number of projects directed towards the Soviets. Hoover's desire to become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of the FBI's programs to identify illegal aliens attempting to penetrate the U. S. Government broke down. Hoover became extremely cautious and conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced Se ae er ee eee m9 : - faotaineted Teer gp rye that strong counter-me es were necessary. For example, Papich tried to promote considerati oniehond sulle mc crtlintmcimt Ore ot EOD eC MeAa ESO Veit (onstsikcdtal as a GIA a@emt During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the pro- grams and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted. Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was coming to an end. . Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinitiate some of the effective programs aimed at Soviet penetration of the United States. While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he did not fire him to the surprise of many. Further appeals by Papich to Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts was generally rejected and accompanied by a critical remark. While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude, Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich con- fided to his wife that he was seriously considering retiring in the Spring of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was -effec- tively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his letter of resignation, to be effective in early April of 1970. H , eS i i | SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 322703861 Page 2
SECRET . - 10 - EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI Efforts by Papich Under Hoover there was little exchange of ideas at the highest levels of the CIA and F3I. This was merely Hoover's style. Papich was able to get people exchanging ideas at the working level and this was done with Hoover's approval. Papich supported CIA innovative approaches to targets of mutual interest to both agencies and frequently became involved in conflicts with Hoover. for such interest and action. When any CIA promoted projects were ap- proved, the resvonsibility was placed on Papich to assure that there would not be anv invasion of FBI jurisdiction or violation of agreements. - For instance, tne CIA through the Domestic Operations Division (now the Foreign Resources Division) was always. looking for ae emneat in the IB L also a an imvenese- flicting with the Bureau. “Papich set up a program and sent it to Hoover recommending approval, but Hoover indicated that,he was concerned with possible CIA invasion of the FBI's jurisdiction fl ed well and much valuable in-4 he program apparently wor HW 50955 formation was given to the FBI which satisfied Hoover. Perhaps more importantly, new CIA/FBI relations at the field level were developed. However, Papich was well aware at the time the program was set up that if it flapped, Hoover could immediately kill the project. Papich also advocated the exchange of lecturers between CIA and FBI to give the two agencies some understanding of what the other agency was doing. Such an exchange of lecturers and training facilities did not come about until about the time that Papich retired. Papich also suggested an actual trade of personnel for short periods of time so that personnel from one agency could become familiar with the various problems that faced personnel from the other agency on the working level. This suggestion was never approved while Papich worked for the FBI. Papich reiterated the fact that he had a very good working relationship» with Jim Angleton. He feels that this relationship was probably respon- f sible for the FBI's arrest of the Russian spy Rudolph Abél, Apparently a Soviet agent came to the CIA with information on Able. The FBI was contacted | concerning the debriefing of this agent, but Hoover wanted nothing to do » with it. Papich cooperated with Angleton, and the information obtained led to Able's arrest and conviction. SECRET + | By Boclda: 3227036861 Page 3
SECRET -~ 12- The following grey areas were delineated by Papich: 1, The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United States for use by the CIA overseas or wnether this should be left to the CIA. . tiv th: Respect to: deltectors iand ‘he debitetting of defiactons |B the United States. (At present the FRI genereliy lets CIA do the icbrlefing as long as che PBI is given access to the mm within a . ~eascmdole time, On- nes detectorgsbeve bean : disputed by CIA and the FBI.) | ™ 3 gece £ who 1S  nesponsiibile - Gow Gases supemdision oves 'Gotoctons ones they have bese wesettled An. the United Seates. gS socsa"t Bally heve the mmpower to moniter the many hoa © ently. im the United States; Pepich feels that. the Andi wild oC ae oe sour sad shwuld he watched” by sane cao. (CAVE _ 4. The question of who should provide cover in the United States for CIA operations overseas, 5. The handling of agents Suspected by CIA to be Communist agents over- e Seas who travel to the United States. 6. Inadequate communication between the tro agencies in resolving bona fides of defectors of interest to both agencies. 7. See the subheadings below. Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut delineation of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to time documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in particular areas. Generally such a guideline would be issued following a particular flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA, Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we ask Kelley for this type of information. Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear- cut. For instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the United States. However, it is not Papich's opinion that the determining factor of jurisdiction is a Strictly geozraphic one. (At least it shouldn't be.) . Espionage Matters apni ss* wate. Papich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate any possible violations of the espionage laws. He could point to no case # where the FBI refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable evidence of espionage existed, even if the Suspect was an employee. of the e CIA. In some instances, the CIA might cone to the FBI with information a . vl HY 50955 DBoctd: 322703861 Page 4 _
source of information to assist the FBI. A good example of this led to Ober's Operation: (continued) ma continued) - had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such acti- vity on a massive scale. However, Papich did receive a continuing Supply of information from Ober. Most of this information related to the relationshiv between domestic and foreign groups. Inciden- tally, information pertinent to internal security may have been Picked up and passed’on to the CIA. Papich is also aware that some of Ober's recruits were gathering information in the United States aS well as overseas on occasions when the student's travels ended and he or she returned to the States. This information was also Passed on to Papich. Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBI would provide CIA with an introduction to a Sympathetic student in a dissident group. 2. Projec PERRIN. Office of securt(S wo . (1) (B) Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groups per. by the Office of Security. He feels that if such a project had been extensive, the FBI would have become aware of it, as FBI had a large aire Washington Field Office and was very interested in the dissident groups and constantly monitoring them. Papich couid not recall an incident where a CIA asset working for Women's Strike for Peace was turned over to the FBI. He did recall Occasions when Ober's group turned over assets to the FBI when the asset returned from overseas and no longer wished to work abroad. Papich believes that only a smali amount of.information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBI from the Office of Security. Papich states that during this entire period of-the dissidents, the atmos- phere was such that something had to be done by someone to learn what the More militant of these dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings, and destruction of property were rampant. Citizens and newspapers were screaming for action to bring this unrest to an 2nd. It was a difficult time for all Federal agencies. Criminal Cases oe MESES Papich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law en- forcement tasks in the United States. This does not mean that there was not some cooperation between the FBI and CIA in criminal cases. For instance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain information connecting Americans with criminal activities in the U.S. Angleton would contact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA's , the arrest and conviction of a New York City official during the Lindsay Administration. : SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 322703861 Page 45
HY 0955 a9 apicn pe e5 that 1fihe c nN sactempted to gain positive i SECRET ~ 17 - Penetration of Embassies in the United States sno knowledzse of any CIA efforts to obtain positive etree Tomy penetrating foreign Gibassies im the United States 7 oy dl on occasion attempt to Sosa Eubassy pexsGael for acti vittas to-'tho PRI/CIA Menorendym of . Understanding.of. Reb. 7 action which should have been peTrroriec Dy THe FBL n- telligence information through @ateoey @nbassies . || his was an sorove(S) Information Obtained From Tax Returns Papich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns to obtain information on Americans. ” PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS It is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United States presently obtain great amounts of information through new techno- logical developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the leaders of foreign countries. Consequently, they must attempt to pene- - trate through clandestine efforts. The only way to successfully penetrate is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business unburdened by numerous reporting requirements. Papich's philosophy is "If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me alone." He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United States in 1975, as faith in the leadership is an essential factor. He be- lieves that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director _ of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President. Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups were directed by the Commumist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed. These differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich retired. Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3 man at the time) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo. Alto, California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport with the agents and could put things in their proper perspective. In fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover. Belmont's successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up. JNR/ var CC: D.Belin . SECRET Senior Counsels & Ped Boclda: 32203561 Page 6 i i i { ! | ! i