v9.1 HW 54653 _ AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK Assassination System Date: 7/7/2015 Identification Form . Agency Information SSCIA 157-10014-10169 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE 07-M-74 Document Information SSCIA RICHARD BISSELL Released under the John Kennedy 08/06/1975 issasgsination Records 33 ollection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#: NW 54653 Date: BISSELL, RICHARD MEMORANDUM Declassified 1B; 1C Redact 05/3 1/2000 CCBOX 354 DoclId: 32423557 Page 1
Date Page 08/07/95 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA™ RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10169 RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE~CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-74 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO ; TITLE : RICHARD BISSELL DATE : 08/06/75 PAGES : 33 SUBJECTS : BISSELL, RICHARD ' ZRRIFLE -_DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM ' CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED | CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99 OPENING CRITERIA :; COMMENTS : CCBOX 354 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 54653 DBocld:3242735557 Page 2?
V/ ea | . a Pal SPREE AE Wi INTERVIEW AND MEE ING SUMMARY Pege 1 of “YLGUOU UU is | | \ FILE: Interview by telephone (203-677-1792) with Richard Bissell on August 6, 1975 (6:00 p.m.) conducted by Joseph di Genova. (Bissell's office: 203-677-2063). ao . I reviewed for Mr. Bissell the new documents related to the July 1960 incident. This included the July 21, 1960 cable fron Langley indicating that the ''Possibie removal of the top three Cuban leaders being given serious consideration at HQS." Mr. Bissell! independent recollection of that and-events about which he had previously testified was not jogged. He said that cable "is just further evidence bearing on the state of mind in Washington toward the Cuban operation." At this point I traced for him the steps of } E. H. Hinkle, who sent out the July 21, 1960 cable, and explained i Hinkle's recollection concerning Barnes involvement in the writing | of the cable. Bissell then noted that "Barnes would probably have f told me about it at the time.” | ! | | | |! ] When asked about the langauge "receiving serious consideration," | Bissell said that ''that suggests to me that the idea was indeed | receiving serious consideration and that headquarters was anxious to explore the possibility with the asset.''- "Dulles would have known that this was being considered.'’ When informed that the cable was subsequently superceded by a cable telling Havana to Drop Matter'’ Bissell said that Dulles probably considered this particular effort "too risky, because we didn't know enough about the asset, and because too many innocent people would have been killed by crashing a plane."' He speculated that Dulles may have ordered the cancellation of the first cable because the plan did not involve the killing of all three of the top leaders but rather only one, Raul Castro Ruz. { | i | I informed Bissell that J.C. King said that he was probably i circumvented on this particular matter; i.e., the incident and | also the serious consideration. Bissell remarked that he would \ be "surprised that King said that he would have been excluded from that type of thing.'"’ Bisseli could remember no cases where J.C. King was not kept fully informed. In this matter, Bissell i noted that ''serious consideraton in the cable meant that discussions | occurred between Dulles, myself, Cabell, Barnes and King.'' "Barnes was very close to Allen Dulles and me and if Barnes told Hinkle to send that cable with those words 'serious consideration' in it, { he would have known what he was talking about.'' "Barnes simply would not have sent such a cable unless he knew for a fact that it was receiving serious consideration." Bissell then added that one reason to suppose that the matter was receiving serious consideration was that the cable authorized an "approach to the asset, which as you know, is a risky act. Barnes would not have said in the cable that | inquiry should be made of the asset unless he had reason to believe that such an operation was being very seriously considered. And he would have only thought that if it had gotten beyond the think- tank level at the agency." - . : HW 54653 Docld: 32423557 Page 4
MEMORANDUM TO : Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. and Curtis Smothers . a FROM: Frederick Baron -DATE: July 16, 1975 RICHARD: BISSELL Index to Issues . The attached "Summary of Pertinent Testimony" from the I.G. REPORT and the transcripts of BISSELL, HELMS, HARVEY, BUNDY, and ROSTOW is organized by the following issues: I. EXECUTIVE ACTION: Early 1961 ee II. TURNOVER OF SYNDICATE CONTACT TO HARVEY re a een Tif. AUTHORIZATION BY DCI IV. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATION - watges ee ee Se HW 54653 DBocld:3242735557 Page 5
MEMORANDUM TO : Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr. and Curtis Smothers FROM: Frederick Baron , —— DATE: July 16, 1975 RICHARD BISSELL: SUMMARY OF PERTINENT TESTIMONY I. EXECUTIVE ACTION (Project ZRRIFLE): Early 1961 - I.G. REPORT, 1967: According to HARVEY, "early in the KENNEDY ad- ministration BISSELL called him in to discuss what HARVEY refers to as ~ an Executive Action Capability; heen, a general stand-by capability to ‘carry out assassinations when required. HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL een as Saying, ‘The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capa- — bility.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a gen- | eral capability with HARVEY." (37) On February 19, 1962, new DDP RICHARD HELMS approves the handling of the project on a "special basis," including unvouchered funds au- thorized by HARVEY's certification. (39) BISSELL: BISSELL recalls "assigning HARVEY the task of undertaking the ZRRIFLE project," but he does not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in the WHITE HOUSE as the origin of that request." (51; 6/9) BISSELL said, however, "I have no reason to believe that HARVEY's quote (about WHITE HOUSE urgings) is wrong." (51; 6/9) BISSELL recalled turning the project over to HELMS and briefing him on it. (53; 6/11) HW 54653 Docld:32423557 Page 6 2 ee ae
~ Conflict on Knowledge/Authorization. BISSELL began his testimony with uncertainty about any "urgings" from the WHITE HOUSE. At a later. . — point, he said: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (46) He expressed the , / belief that the PRESIDENT lnew of the project, although BISSELL admitted a to having "no direct knowledge". of this. (56; 6/9) But at another point, BISSELL testified that it was a "possibility" that the CIA ini- tiated the project: "it was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part of its mission:to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be certain whether those would be used....So it would not be particularly sur- prising to me if the decision to create...this capability had been taken without an outside request." (67-68; 6/9) When BISSELL returned again to the theme that "it may have been initiated within the Agency," he characterized his conversation with | ROSTOW more as a briefing than as receiving an instruction from ROSTOW. (80-81; 6/9) | Generally, BISSELL recalls that in any discussion with ROSTOW or —— BUNDY, "all aspects of the creation of the capability" (50; 6/11) would have been mentioned. BISSELL said it was "quite possible" that he dis- cussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assas- i" sination targets. (50; 6/11) BISSELL said that the subject might have arisen at the weekly luncheon meetings at the State Department attended bE i » | by BUNDY, ROSTOW, and representatives from State, CIA, and Defense. (81-82; 6/9) . a WW 54653 Docld:32423557 Page 7
_ HARVEY: HARVEY confirmed the accuracy of the I.G. REPORT version of his a — -initial discussion of Executive Action with BISSELL. (36-37; 6/25) HARVEY testified that his "net impression" from the discussion with BISSELL was that both Executive Action and the ongoing poison pill assassination plot were "fully authorized and approved" (54; 6/25), ae although no specific individual in the "WHITE HOUSE" was mentioned. (81; 6/25) HARVEY said that after his initial meeting with BISSELL, he discussed the propriety and feasibility of assassination with se- lected CIA officers, who generally expressed a "negative reaction." (40; 6/25) After a subsequent meeting with BISSELL, HARVEY continued | pees to develop the assassination capability without mounting an operation or communicating the objective to any potential asset who was being “ assessed. (45; 6/25) | Chronology. HARVEY has notes (see attachment ) of two meetings. to _—— discuss Executive Action which he is "almost certain" took place in | 1961. (51; 6/25) On January 25, he met with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, the new | , Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division. On the following day, he met with ARNOLD SILVER, who recruited agent QJWIN -—- the only agent HARVEY ever employed in Project ZRRIFLE (for the purpose of "spotting" potential assets). (50-55; 6/25) HARVEY said that these meetings took i a ee oc yo . place after his initial discussion of Executive Action with BISSELL, i vee thus placing that meeting in "early January." (52; 6/25) a = — ~ ee as u .- . Os ee HW 54653 Docld:32423557 Page 8
ROSTOW: ROSTOW testified that during his entire tenure in government, he | — NN ~ Hever heard_a reference to Executive Action or "such a capability or syeh an intention to act by the U.S." (10) He has no recollection of: ir'structing BISSELL to establish such a capability. (10) He testified _ that he was "morally certain" (13) that such a discussion was "unlikely - be to the point of being virtually unthinkable" (11) for a number of reasons: 1. Such a discussion would be memorable. (11) | 2. The division of national security responsibility between ROSTOW oir nt ace and BUNDY "excluded me from the covert operations business." (11) 3. He believes that assassination historically has proven counter- a productive and it would be especially so for an open society like the U.S. where leaders are vulnerable to attack. (11) . 4, Assassination is morally "repugnant" to ROSTOW. (11) 5. By January 25-26, ROSTOW had been in the Administration less than a_week and had heavy responsibilities concerning the USSR and Laos thrust upon him for inmediate consideration. He found it "incredible" that he "would go launching off in that week with suggestions for the planning" (15) of an extraordinarily sensitive operation. ‘ 6. He had no Knowledge at the time that any such planning or opera- tion was ongoing. (15-16) 4 7. The State Department luncheon meetings were too open a forum | in which to raise such a suggestion; only the first of those meetings HW 54653 Docld:32423557 Page 9
could have been held before January 26, 1961. (21-23) ROSTOW does, however , have a calendar notation of a meeting with —_ BISSELL and BUNDY at the Hay—-Adams Hotel on January 27, 1961 (Staff In- terview, 7/8 ); he has been asked to submit an affidavit on this meet~ ROSTOW explained the discrepancy between his testimony and that of his "close personal friend" (4) by saying that BISSELL's memory of the period may be blurred by the traumatic experience of the Bay of Pigs “which occurred shortly afterward.. (55) In the event of a blurred memory, ROSTOW felt that. he and BUNDY might have been used as possible WHITE HOUSE contacts in BISSELL's mind because they were "his closest friends © — in the WHITE HOUSE at that time." (17) ROSTOW also suggested that un- der ALLEN DULLES, the CIA fell into the habit of operating "quasi-auton- © omously" without correct clearance from the PRESIDENT (27-28) -- a habit which may have produced a "compulsion" to place a retrospective blessing upon the operation. (19) BUNDY: BUNDY does recall being told about the development of. an Executive Action capability "in a general way" (4): as an untargeted (5) "capa- | i bility coming into being" rather than a mounted operation. (7) Bundy i testified: | t fu "I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment after \ I was briefed. (10) ...I wouldn't have the authority to give HW 54653 DBocld:32423557 Page 10
asset who was a "capability in being....If you needed somebody to carry out murder I guess you had a man who might be prepared to carry it out." — (50) "I finally phased it out," HELMS said. (51) HELMS said that the "special basis" for handling ZRRIFLE funds was for bookkeeping reasons (53) to avoid the normal clearance procedures. (54) ; , Il. TURNOVER OF SYNDICATE CONTACT 'TO HARVEY — I.G. REPORT, 1967: Project ZRRIFLE continued on a separate course from the CIA-ROSELLI poison pill assassination plot against CASTRO until November 15, 1961: "HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with BISSELL the application of the ZRRIFLE program to Cuba. HARVEY says that BISSELL instructed him to take over , EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate and there- _ after to run the operation against CASTRO." (39) BISSELL: BISSELL testified that he did not recall directing the reactivation of the project but, he said, "I think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY's responsibility for Project RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact." (19; 6/11) BISSELL agreed that the purpose of the contact had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is a fair inference that there : would have been no reason to maintain it /the'contact/ unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (19; 6/11) i f . L t BISSELL was more explicit later that day: "late in 1961 or early in 1962...the contact with the syndicate which had CASTRO as its target ...folded into the ZRRIFLE project...and they became one." (47; 6/11) ~~ seen. - wens nen = - —---;-----— — a > a a HW 54653 DBocld:32423557 Page 12 ‘ . _
HW 54653 ae . Oe RE a eet Docld: 32423557 Page 13 BISSELL does not recall telling anyone in the WHITE HOUSE that some— thing had been done to bring a CIA officer together again with the crimi- nal syndicate. (19-20; 6/11) - \ HARVEY: HARVEY recalls being asked by BISSELL to "takeover the ROSELLI opera- tion" (86; 6/25) in the context of discussing Executive Action. (19; 6/11) HARVEY does not recall any mention of the WHITE HOUSE in this discussion. (21, 60-61;6/11) HARVEY told HELMS about the talks with BISSELL when HEIMS took over as DDP. (63; 6/11) _ HELMS: HELMS does not recall that ZRRIFLE was ever contemplated asa capa- bility to assassinate CASTRO. (55) ITI. AUTHORIZATION WITH DCI I.G. REPORT: In the latter part of September 1960, after BISSELL, EDWARDS, and O'CONNELL had initiated an operation to. assassinate CASTRO using syndicate contacts: "with BISSELL present, EDWARDS briefed the Director (ALLEN DULLES) and the DDCI (GENERAL CABELL) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; EDWARDS deliberately avoided the use of any ‘bad words.' The descriptive term.used was ‘an intel- ‘ligence operation.' EDWARDS is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI ow understood the nature of the operation he was Giscussing....EDWARDS states that, while there was no formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval to use his own judgment." (18)
HW 54653" —_ BISSELL: "Relying heavily on the I.G. REPORT" for his recollection of the meeting with DULLES (21; 6/9), BISSELL said at one point that he Nbe- lieved" DULLES had been briefed (22-23; 6/9) and at another point he was "quite convinced" DULLES knew the nature of the operation. (24; 6/9) He could only "guess" about whether subsequent conversations with DULLES about the operation would have occurred (24-25; 6/9), although he was "virtually certain" that DULLES "would" have asked for reports about the "SHEF EDWARDS operation." (25; 6/9) BISSELL acknowledged that before the meeting with DULLES, contact had been made with the Mafia in connection with the operation (20; 6/9), although the $150,000 contract on CASTRO's life had not yet been made. BISSELL had "no explanation" for why. EDWARDS would have reported as follows to the FBI in May 1961, in an interview about the wiretap inci- dent. (65; 6/9) "Colonel EDWARDS advised that only Mr. BISSELL (Direc- . tor of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the GIANCANA-MAHEU activity in behalf of CIA's program and ALLEN DULLES was completely unaware of EDWARDS' contact with MAHEU in this connection." (5/22/61 FBI memo re "Arthur James BAL- LETTII, et al.") (Emphasis added. d \ \ i Docld: 324273557 Page 14
-10- IV. AUTHORIZATION OUTSIDE OF THE CIA IN THE EISENHOWER a ADMINISTRATION 7 aR ME EU A. Bissell - . _ Bissell testified that as of the Fall of 1960, he knew nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the Castro assassination effort, (Bissell, Vol. I, Tr. 30). Bissell met frequently with the Special Group in the Fall of 1960, but never informed the Special Group that there was an effort underway to assassinate Castro. (Id., 25-26). Thus, the ques- tion of President Eisenhower's knowledge rests on be whether Allen Dulles informed him of the Castro plot. Bissell assumed that Allen Dulles would ob- tain the required authorization above the CIA level. | Bissell conceded that he is "guessing" that Dulles TEER ae book ob. informed Eisenhower. As Bissell explained, however, his guess that Dulles informed President Eisenhower vt “ g a opt NN, "is not based on hard evidence" but is "pure personal Opinion." (Bissell Tr. Vol. I, 61). Bissell further { : I characterized this method as one of "obliquely" ad- vising the President (Bissell Tr. Vol. I, 47), and of a ."circumlocutious" approach (Bissell Tr. Vol. IT p. 6). , . Oe ree HW 54653 Docld:32423557 Page 15
On other occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Dulles had told Bissell he had used the "circumlocutious" approach with President Eisenhower. (Bissell Tr. Vol. II, 10). But with respect to the Castro assassination attempt, Dulles did not tell Bissell he had used this approach, according to Bissell's recollection. (Id., 11). — ‘B. Gray Gray testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would have approached President Eisenhower without inform- ing Gray who was Eisenhower's Special Assistant for — National Security Affairs. (Gray Tr. 35). Mr. Gray further testified that his relationship with President Eisenhower was such that President Eisenhower "would discuss with. me anything that came to his attention independently of me." (Id., 7). And he testified that President Eisenhower never discussed with Gray the subject of a Castro assassination or of the use- of the syndicate and Cubans in such an effort. (Id.). Gray testified that in mid-1960 President ¥ t i e i bE Eisenhower approved a "four-point program" which ultimately resulted in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. (Tr. 14). Gray recalled that the four points comprised (1) sabotage,’ (2) economic Sanctions, HW 54653 DBocld:32423557 Page 16
-lleq (3) propaganda, and (4) training of the Cuban exile force. (Id.). Gray testified that discussion of the "overthrow" of the Castro government in the con- text of this program did not constitute authority to conduct an assassination of Castro. (Tr. 18). Specifically, Gray testified that unless the CIA was given a direct order to assassinate Castro or such —_— assassination was included in a specific program, the CIA had no authority to attempt an assassination. (Id.). Moreover, Gray emphasized that throughout the Eisenhower Administration -- through the day President Eisenhower left office’on January 21, 1961 -- Lf "there was no plan or action committed" with respect to launching the proposed invasion to overthrow N Castro. (Tr. 40). The minutes of the Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, state that the State Department representative, Livingston Merchant, inquired "whether any real planning has been. done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raoul and Che Guevara." (Gray Ex. 1). In response, Gen. Cabell, the Deputy Director of CIA, is recorded as concluding that such action "is. beyond our capabilities." (Id.). In his testimony, Gray agreed that those minutes indicate that subject of a Castro assassination was HW 54653 DocId:32423557 Page 17
( vats: cctober Té,; LS60 To: Sirector . ‘° Central lntelligenge 4 Azency Attention: bepury Director, Plans Frouis. _Jonn Edgar Hoover, Director Stioject: ANFI-CASTRO AV LLVATLES weer ac ates Cate ee Livia SaCUnLry - CUnA ’ ‘Tire following invormation has been reported by a Source WiG se relianility lias not veer tested ont wre is in | & position to oscain information conccriing the activitics ox Uaautel il, Giancana, weil-known racketeer from Cuicazo gilinois: ‘ According to the source, duriny recent conversation with several Yriencs, Glancana-stated that Fidel Castro was to be Gore. away WLth very shortly. nhen Goubt was expressca revaraging this statement Giancana reportedly. assurcd .those- ; es sresoit that Castro's -a yk. — B Ssassination vould occur in Kovciawer,. roreever, hie allesealy in aQ 3 licated that ho had already wet wita - Me essa! 35in-te-ba on thrée occasions, the last meeting taring wAice on a boat dsaced at the bontainbican Hotel, inlaws veacn, vida. Resortealy, Glancana claimed that everythin: nas servectcd Yor “hte “illins of Gastro anid that tie “assassia® Wet arranged witn a Giri, not furtier: auserived, to drop a ‘agd21" im some drink or rood of Castro's. a — The source further advised that Giancana reportedly . stated chat Castro is in the advanced stazes ov syphilis. ana — -is not conpletcly rational, «wcvare makiny) efforts to ovtain additional information coiucerniry these allegations, whicn yiave not vecn substantiated, and recipicnt ayencics will be Kept adviscd of any additional pertinent Gata received. 1 --Gtiice-or Security: Pe  pepartment of State —_ HW 54653 DBocld:32423557 Page 19
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