' ANATOLE pointed out the DWWic and only question with@espect to NOSENKO is misinformation and he sees no advantage or assistance resulting from questiors about GOLITZYN. However, he said this was not his decision. He was told the paper about the GOLITZYN question was prepared by a researcher who works exclusively at this time on the 1967-1968 materials and the researcher responded to a general requirement to extract information and frame questions to be asked of NOSENKO which could be tested against known information. The researcher obviously believes that if NOSENKO were to make a false or misleading statement which GOLITZYN has or could deny or prove wrong NOSENKO would be in a bind. ANATOLE was also told he must understand that -compartmentation in research and on NOSENKO as well as on HW 53216 larger issues means that we will review a few papers which are useless in the larger context eventhough to the researcher who has a narrow view the concern is real.) 40. Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV. “" ANATOLE's reaction to the questions and paper was that they will not accomplish much of significance re GRYAZNOV since he thinks there is a GRYAZNOV relationship to the code clerk cases which can only be determined after that research and analysis of information about GRYAZNOV. He agreed the questions could - be used later during elicitation as time fillers and preliminary to hard questions but not much will come because the questions are not to the point, which he did not -explain fully. DoclId: 32404748 Page 34
HW 53216 ANATOLE did specifically challenge NOSENKO's story of his close relationship with GRYAZNOV 2s a lie. ANATOLE notes the "S Lo) Fe) uty) feos bility there was leakage of his identification to the FRI and CIA of GRYAZNOV as a source. Particularly ANATOLE says NOSENKO's story of a close relationship with GRYAZNOV in 1962 is probably false because there was no previous relationship leading to this. ANATOLE said definitely that GRYAZNOV would have been punished if the .KGR knew he was identifiee as a source to GOLITZYN. | ANATOLE says there is a contradiction with NOSENKO trying . to build up his relationship with GRYAZNOV and down-play or, “more accurately minimize, the extent of his relations with CHUPANOV and GUK. ANATOLE believes it was a deliberate part of NOSENKOQ's legend to set him close to GRYAZNOV since GRYAZNOV was an acknowledged source of some of GOLITZYN's information. he NOSENKO- GRYAZNOV relationship will be a key element .in future questioning. — A. ‘Comment on NOSENKO Family Relations’ was a paper in which ANATOLE found little of importance or significance as a crucial point except that as the discussions progressed he de- veloped the idea that the 1945-50 period may be crucial after all. ANATOLE sees Little question about most of his life and snecifically ANATOLE says the bomosexual question is not "in line with available evidence”. ANATOLE thought these questions would give NOSENKO the impression we are ‘unprofessional’ but DoclId:32404748 Page 35
immediately conceded this is really not a problem since NOSENKO has not been handled very professionally in the past. B. "NOSENKO - Homosexual Aspects" ANATOLE questions any assumption that NOSENKO had any "expertise" on homo operations. He just does not think NOSENKO was an "expert" or a "specialist" and points out he can run them at level he has described with very little knowledge. ANATOLE says he knows NOSENKO was not a homosexual before and doubts he would have been consulted by anyone as a "specialist". . In wiew basic doubts if any questions to be used should be woven into other topics and not treated as separate subject. ~ 41. RUMYANTSEV After reading the paper ANATOLE said there is nothing to ask NOSENKO at this time. ANATOLE maintains this will be a special question later. ANATOLE directly relates the RUMYANTSEV HW 53216 case to what he considers was the serious wnistake of asking NOSENKO about the May 1959 conference. (See N-228) He also thinks further questions on the conference should only come — later. ANATOLE saw Clearly why no questions should have been asked about RUMYANTSEV and May 59 Conference but after mistake- made it may be we will want to adjust and consider what we might gain by some questions during elicitation or if touching on this DoclId:32404748 Page 36
point will upset the phasing of questions to NOSENKO. This matter will be discussed further after ANATOLE reads the papers carefully. ANATOLE was told it will be clear to him that the May 59 meeting was known through GOLIENEWSKI and there was some indication from this source also of wide scale misinfor- mation programs. It was also noted that in my opinion the questions for NOSENKO, even with hindsight and ny knowledge of how seriously GOLITZYN's information about this conference has been viewed, were normal intelligence officer questions which NOSENKO could expect based on the overt information made available. Certainly the questions were not unusual except for the fact that they indeed were different from other questions asked of NOSENKO because they touched on political matters. To the extent that N-228 showed NOSENKO someone at a late date was interested 7 . in political matters NOSENKO may have been alerted. Certainly it would seem those questions were completely out of context - out of the blue so to speak - and since there was no follow-up NOSENKO may feel there is no real interest because there has been no real interest in matters political with him. A. ‘NOSENKO - Use of Alias by KGB Officers" ANATOLE commented these were very good questions. They could be asked during elicitation or later during the crucial or hard questioning phase when we were assured of fast follow-up questioning. | B. "NOSENKO ~ Knowledge Because of Association with other HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 37
-37- ‘commented in connection with paras 9 and 11 and using this paper stressed need to elicit all possible from NOSENKO orally during interview and no written memorandum. ANATOLE outlined need for NOSENKO to list exact dates of all his service assignments; when he first met each officer; detailed biography of each officer, etc. He retained without comment the 28 March 1969 addendum re RAROVSKIY, KUTYREV, and SUROV. | 42, Nikolay S. SKVORTSOV and Vladimir Vasilyevich KRIVOSHEY — ANATOLE, as with these officers, separately lists KGB officers of special significance as part of the enumeration of | CRUCIAL QUESTIONS because they are not only prominent in NOSENKO's story but also of major concern to us since they work against Americans. They are important even without NOSENKO. In most instances also there will be the initial new elicitation about them from NOSENKO. Then NOSENKO's ‘previous information will be collated and compared with collateral information, including previous information from GOLITZYN, after which ANATOLE will review, comment with new information, if any, and frame pertinent questions for NOSENKO. Specifically ANATOLE says that NOSENKO's statement he consulted SKVORTSOV about tourist operations 1955-59 is nonsense. ‘SKVORTSOV was in Gernany until 1959. NOSENKO should be asked what kind of tourist operations, etc, HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 36
a . S aa -33- 43. Nikolay Grigoryevich BAGRICHEV 44, GRIBANOV (GORBUHOV) ANATOLE stresses the importance of collating all information about the activitias of GRIBANOV and separate the sourcing. . 45. NOSENKO-Asen GEORGIEV Case | ANATOLE believes these questions useful now in elicitation phase. He wants to review everything NOSENKO has Said about Anatoliy S, KOZLOV and view any photos. I could not confirm that KOZLOV had participated in the GEESD case. ANATOLE asks if we can confirm KOZLOV was Chief of the American Section when NOSENKO left the Section in 1955 and what NOSENKO Said about ©arly relations including precise dates when HOSENKO Says KOZLOV was his boss. In this connection it is noted that NOSENKO Says KOZLOV was Chief of Dept I (Page 1 of paper) then Deputy Chief of Dept 7 (page 4). ANATOLE says as elicitation question NOSENKO should be asked why the demotion and also what happened to GORBATENKO, . . Not unexpectedly, ANATOLE said he would eventually want to see the file on the GEORGIEV case to see what the tie-in to the Sovicts may have been. 46, Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV ANATOLE would like phot raph and travel record for ARTENOV. HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 39 an on a gy eee
47. Mikhail Stepanovich BANNIKOV ANATOLE wants background info and photo, 48. Fedor Alekseyevich SHCHERBAK See 47 49, ENU_ GOLOVKOV. A. Nikolay Dmitrievich ARKHIPOV ANATOLE wants background and photograph. ANATOLE thinks questions re Egil SUNDAR needed and that NOSENKO should fully explain how and why he became involved with a journalist | and what kind of an agent was SUNDAR and his background, etc. SUNDAR's targets should be described fully and NOSE#RO should explain the relevancy of this to tourist operations. HW 53216 B. ANATOLE asked about the Arsene FRIPPEL case but I could not answer with complete assurance the details of his recruitment, admissions, identifications, etc. ANATOLE was told, however, everyone satisfied about this apparently but would check. 'C. ANATOLE Suggests full exploration with NOSENKO to get his explanation for the use of the technicians IVANOV, SERGEY, and LEBEDEV, Lev A, in the recruitment of the British tourist . Eric LUKIS? Is there a relationship. to the Johnson case. 50. Ivan Alekseyevich YEROFEYEV ANATOLE wants photo and travel record. A. In connection with this also, ANATOLE requested. a list of all CIA personnel in contact with Soviets in Berlin. (Page 2) He said he had originally or earlier asked for this a mT et Dottiik DoclId:32404748 Page 40
several times and he related this request to the larger question of his analysis which he raised with Mr. Solie and which has “gone unanswered - he asked for and wants a list of all CIA people in overt contact with Soviets world-wide. My only comment was to the point that compilation of such lists was difficult .if not impossible. HW 53216 Sl. Ivan Abramovich PANASENKO See 50. 52. PIVNEV | _ ANATOLE says this topic is definitely a confrontation topic. Specifically he noted para 7 in this connection. | ANATOLE says he needs the substance of the follow-up and results of the QU@MIEMm case to frame questions re PIVNEV put he also makes the point he considers the QqERRRMMp case important separately from considerations of NOSENKO. He recalled : Mr. O'NEAL was to review the file with him and arrange interview of TREE but he has heard nothing. On the basis of short discussion ANATOLE believes there are unexplored aspects to this’ case and parallels with the RUMYANTSEV case as far as NOSENKO is concerned which may go to penetration in the Ati EMB, Moscow or even to Germany. The timing is important. . . A. Aleksandr Konstantinovich KISLOV ANATOLE relates interest in KISLOV to KOVSHUK as well as tocthe BELITSKIY case to begin in overall elicitation about KGB officers. He wants to review the FBI information about VEY 4 DocId:32404748 Page 41
VY “at hha . ory ee 3 ah ae q : Seg KISLOV's U,S. activities and surveillance reports of his association with KOVSHUK, All the questions re KISLOV should be used in elicitation. B. In connection with NOSENKO's stories about his status and cover in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, ANATOLE would like to review all verified info against NOSENKO's statements. for example was his diplomatic passport verified, etc. | C. ANATOLE would like to review the lists of other nembers of the delegations of which he was a member‘as well as the | “lists of other delegations there at the same time. (SM NOTE: Check N-127, page 7 - he could take orders of Chairman on POPOV case. Compare with other info re POPOV case from NOSENKO. Why would.be,have orders on POPOV case in his ' safe in 1964? The order was put out in 1959 (S85 6Q\exNOSENKO - would know this in 1962 - immediately after American Section duty. - ‘He would have it or access to it but why as late as 1964 in Touri Dept. ) | | D, After considerable reflection “ANATOLE thinks it is quite possible that NOSENKO held the rank of Lt. Col. but that when he saw he was suspect on the rank issue because his actual history and his assignments as he described them did not warrant the | to cover his dispatch/mission Lt. Col. rank 3 end the reward he received he decided to agree and downplay his HW 53216 DocId:32404746 Page 42
importance. He had to accede to his interviewers to avoid more questions about why and how he became a Lt. Col. ANATOLE thinks he may have been rewarded (promoted) quietly with only a very few persons knowledgable. (SM NOTE: Check all reports.) ANATOLE suggests this question for polygraph: "Did the travel document you brought reflect your true rank on the basis. of your success and achievements of your game with AIS which began in June 1962 in Geneva? In this connection also ANATOLE points to two promotions in one year (1962) (See N-181 pg 27): Chief of Section then Deputy Chief of Department. How has NOSENKO explained this ‘when he was not in his first job even three months and he had no major successes in Geneva (except contact with CIA?) - What were the cases he handled and the recruitments he made in 19627. 53. American Ambassadors ANATOLE believes at a later date NOSENKO should be asked or confronted about operations against American Ambassadors, HW 53216 ‘However, as an elicitation question ANATOLE thinks he should be asked if he knew of any American Ambassador who was recruited at any time by SCD? | Later, under the hostile interrogation he would be asked if he knew about an important high level SCD American agent who was recontacted and reactivated when he visited Moscow in 1959. Qther questions to follow from the team of interrogators such as who did or would have handled this agent, etc. DoclId:32404748 Page 43
54, Yuriy GUK's Agent in Washington ANATOLE thinks this case needs attention again even though it may not bear on the NOSENKO case. He says it needs “analysis and future research on the basis of what action the FBI took. If there is something pertinent to NOSENKO we can consider for later use. 55. Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV ANATOLE says we should extract and review what © NOSENKO has said about KROTKOV and line out the parallels _in the info. ANATOLE notes KROTKOV - Oct 1963; Cherepanov - Nov 1963 and NOSENKO - Jan 1964, and he thinks we need to frame questions to include KROTKOV in our considerations. He recalls | KROTKOV promised an exposé of the KGB and this never canae about. HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 44
ny { f ae \ - woof “Te é . . . —— ee - = : i. c ad ” ” CORRECTION AND AMENDMENT TO PARA 35/PAGE 28 of ATTACHMENT B TO MEMO FOR THE RECORD DATED 7 APRIL 1969, SUBJECT: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO: 2 - 11 Jan 64 GRIBANOV applied for Austrian, French, (8 Jan) and Swiss visas. 18 Jan NOSENKO arrives in Geneva from Paris. 19 Jan ‘Mikhail S. ROGOV arrives Switzerland, 24 - 25 Jan . ROGOV registered Hotel Regina, Bern 25 - 28 Jan ROGOV registered Hotel Krebs, Bern ; : _ 28 Jan . - ROGOV to Rome 3 Jan - 3 Feb | | GRIBANOV, FEDORENKO, KURISHEV ana NOVIK at Winter Olympics, Innsbruck. 4 Feb NOSENKO defects 6 Feb ' Soviet Ambassador advises Chief, Soviet Delegation. Disarmament Conference NOSENKO disappeared 4 Feb. HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 45
8 Feb 9 Feb 10 Feb ' 12 Feb 14 Feb 14 Feb 1? Fag HW 53216 Docld: 32404746 Page 46 7 GRIBANOV arrives Paris. KOVSHUK was in Paris. Soviet official in Geneva reports to Swiss police NOSENKO missing. ROGOV returned. to Bern Radio news in Switzerland attributed Swiss and Soviet sources said NOSENKO presumably had defected. GRIBANOV left Paris for Vienna, BUSCHEK claims to have seen him 10 Feb. TSARAPKIN, not Soviet Ambassador to Switzerland, holds conference condemning Swiss for permitting NOSENKO's kidnapping. Swiss called Soviet Ambassador Bern and strongly protested TSARAPUIN action. GRIBANOV dinner party with BUSCHEK at which | GRIBANOV not unduly disturbed about NOSENKO. ROGOV departed Switzerland via Austria. KovesAvie Lede Pany as member of thea Rup wev Delegation,