e 14 > & & ppt SE-B TF watchusted™ | Cold dy . PE enmin mers “rg . JFK assasination | % FEB i970 | FOR: Deputy Director for Support SURJECT . 2 Control of Firearms x Memo dtd 30 Jan 70 to DD/P, DD/S aad OGC REFERENCE ‘), fr Executive Director-Comptroller, seme subject i, Pursuant to R it is requested that the subs be incorporated inte the =. Agency regulatory syetem . ce | 25X1A ched for information. | } F) nmendation No. 2 of referent memorandum, - ! | ce: IG w/att _ Distribution: » O&1- Adse w/att -)- OGC Official FIREARMS 1 - OGC Chrono 1 -AGC/O1, ‘Chron 5 February 1970) hed Pewee db de war
13-00000 25X1A © Pex your request for a statement of actic taken cee cee a ne mt on Kecommendation No. 2 of IG Report on ‘outrof . of Firearms, enclosed are memoranda to 3/8 and Executive Director-Comoptroller for vour : sruatate. cee see cemmtn s iat ate EE Attached report is returned for your sles. or. ARES AED, Aine POTD 5 OFAN PE MELEE * "ces SED + MIE tno IRL! MONS Kemer! | z rc | 25X1A 0 AEE EAPO Pky SERRE 42 SETS Sep EDN ARIE By OHO EERO! | NEE + GER WO CEE cn : sumcannecr. FORM NO. iol REPLACES FORM =. 107 Br a i 1 AUG $2 WELCH MAY BC Len. _ '
13-00000 | i Rae ‘ po poo f | | 3.0 JAN 1970 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans Deputy Director for Support‘ Generel Counsel cos tearm seen 9 ++ semen mean enemies i Stieber Een een crmemer: “eee i attire fi rttettenemn tb mabe sendteteenenenauusaneye neptune etteteehiesnesanentabeenenheeiTeedA PS EFAS: + AN SEE SUBJECT : Control of Firearms 1. Attached is a copy of a report on the adequacy of the Agency's regulations on the control of firearms, which was prepared by the Inepector General. You will note that : the report consists of a summary, in which all of the . i Inspector General's recommendations appear, plus a detailed i report of findings. . 2. May I have from each of you, within 30 anys, a state- ment of the actions you have taken or intend to take in i Pesponse to each of the recommendetions that are addressed. to H you for action. | 28X1A | Executive Director-Comptroller j \ Attachment: | i iG Report: Control of Firearms . . | | i j {
‘through requiaitions levi on the Military. percent of the total volum : Staff, . - AGENCY REGULATIONS pg The Nature and Exteat a Agency Jnvelvement with Firearms Ordsance is big asa ‘° in CIA and has bees ao for acari twa decades. The Agency’ e: eroat javelvemeat with {firearms faite jute distinct categorigs. The first is the sapply of large quantities of ordaaace miteriaie to combat forces in Soatheast Asia; the aecaad embrac all of the other miscellascous activities } .° The quantity of weapene committed to thie second category of mitacellascous activities is minuscele in comparison with these supplied for war sone eperations. Procarement of Ordadsce Material ordnance materials required fer support quired evertly by the Office of Logietics Gevert firearme. | The great bulk of t of current operations ia: ie handled throagh 7 There are a variety of programe within the Agency heving to do with firearme ia which weapons may be precared threagh other thee Office of Logistics channele. We have ideatified the following: TSD's ressarch and develapment program, SOD's weapons modi-~ fleation program, the weapore pregram of the Vietaamese Affairs -SOD'a foreign weipons procurement program, Preject DCE foreign materials program, aad a DO Divieien proprietary for the purchasing of foreign materials. We found all of these activities to be ender adequate control. AINING TO CONTROL OF FIRKARMS
13-00000 SEGRET Shipment ef Orduguce Materiales The vast bulk of our Grearme deliveries are moved as military shipmente under applicable DOD regulations. Requests for shipments of asy sort that require handling iu any manner other than as pre- acribed by law or regulation must be sent through the Office of Logistice to the Office of Security for approval. | 25X1A | Storage and Handling of Ordnance Materials — | Explosives, ammunition, and other dangerous material are | atored and handled in accordance with appropriate State and local. lawe and military aed civil regulations. (7 i prescribes ; 25X1A coatrois en the posseasion and haadling of firearme at field etations. ke ‘ ance materiais in the U.S. ie 25X1A We have discuased with the & officer the desirability of furnishing the depot ordnance specialist with a list of these weapons. We will take the matter up with the SAVA officer when he returne to duty from an extended illisese. ‘Agency Regulatory leeuaaces | We have a fair volume of quite detailed regulatory material on the control of firearme in cur maaenis, The reguiations derive in large part from intereal Agency policy, rather than having their bases in Federal statutes. The detailed regulations concentrate | primarily on the relatively emall volume of weapons committed to | | | | various miscellaneous activities invelviag firearme outelde the areas of combat operations. The guidance aeppeare under five separate subject categories in regulationa, inetructions, setices, and book dispatches. Some of it relates apecifically te firearms; some of it applies to flrearme only as one of many types of property. -~-Z- SECRET i | | | | |
13-00000 SZGCRAT Shipment of Ordnance Materials The vast bulk of our firearms deliveries are moved as military shipmeate under applicable DOD regulations. Requests for shipments of any sort that require handling ia any manner other than as pre- ecribed by law or regulation must be sent through the Obfiee of Logistics to the Office of Security for approval. | | _ 25X1A | Storage and Handling of Ordnance Materials Explecives, ammenition, and other dangerous material are stored and handied in accerdance with appropriate State and lecal lawa and military and civil regulations. prescribes 25X1 controls on the possession and haadling of firearms at field stations. f officer the desirability of faraishing the depot erdaance specialist ' with a list ef these weapons. We will take the matter up with the SAVA officer when he returns to duty from an extended illness. Agency Regulatory leauaaces | We have a fair volume of quite detailed regulatery material on the control of firearme in our maauals, The regulations derive | in large part from interaal Agency policy, rather than having their bases in Federal statutes, The detailed regulations concentrate | - primarily on the relatively emall volume of weapons committed to | . various miscellancous activities invelviag (irearme outelde the | areas of combat operations. The guidance appears under five | | | ae separate subject categories ia regulations, inetructions, aotices, - . aad book dispatches. Some of it relates epecifically te flrearms; geome of it applies te firearme only ae one of many types of property. -~-Z- SECRET
13-00000 s gC RET gmentation of the guidance may be unavoidable, but it does make for ease of reference, tlie Regulations Complete, Appropriate, and Consistent? Completeness i | | | | | We find only one possibly significant gap in existing regulations, | aa to do with the treatment of the updating of weapons inventories | | field installations, We have a question as to the form in which this | wentory should be submitted and an to who should be the ultimate | scipient of it. t ‘Recommendation No. 1 _ That the Deputy Director for Plans, in such consultation with the Deputy Director fer Support ag may be appropriate, review the requirements and the mechanisms for reporting of weapons inventories of field installations and propose euch na may be needed to eliminate existing ambiguities. in July 1968, the DD/P addressed a memorandum to the Chiefs stating that weapons le to foreigners as gifts or as accommodation purchases without hie personal approval. Since this is a standing instruction, we thought it appropriate that . The General Counsel was instrumental in having ¢ieaaed in January 1967. The notice specified that the O | General Counsel was responsible for the control of all liaison with | “the Office of Munitions Central. The notice expired 1 January 1968. | “Since this also is an instraction of continuing effect, we believe that would be appropriate to incorporate it iato Agency regulations. | | | Recommendation No. zZ That the General Counsel propose to the Deputy Director for Support the publication in the Headquarters Regulations of the substance off 7 _ 30 : SECRET 2X1
SECRET ‘Appropriateness | fu our inquiries inte the appropriatences ef the regulations on control of firearms, we repeatedly enceantered officers in beth ‘the Support and the Plane Directorates who feel quite streagly that there should be one central point of costral, or at least of cognizance, of the Agency's dealings ia firearms. There ie no such central poiat now, although it seema to ws that the import of the regulations is . that e cenfratized control of flrearnse withia the Clandestine Service was envigioned. We are aot eure that a point of central cogniaaace is aeedad, but we do belleve that the desirability of it should be takea ander consideration. Recommendation No. 3 That the Deputy Director for Plans have a veview made of the desirability aad practicality of establishing a ceatral peiat of cegaicance of all Grearme holdiuge and traneactione withia the Divectorate for Planes. — Recommendation Ne. 4 . That the Deputy Director for Plana, by whatever mesas he considers appropriate, extend te abound and lateral pouches a degree of control ever the pouching of rearms equivalent te the control that exists ever outbound pouches. The regulations oa the procarement, shipping, storage, and handling of firearms, with very miner exceptions, addrass thameelves to the broad subject of goverament property ia general. Firearms he | oo al SECRET 25X1 A (ae om sete Atenas teat OO % NE abt sd aannussat eee anna at Ans ee ROE: (utemnnnuenamstemmectmite 6 0
13-00000 _. accent Ate ere EEA at sansa steer CREE ecm teeth EAE SEARED 29X1A SECRET are looked apon as merely ae one of many categories of property. We do not ees this as a significant deficieacy. The supply procedures established for the control of all aen-expendable Agency property seem to us adequate in the cage of firearms. a Consistency We fiud no major contradictions among the provisions of . the eoveral regulations having te de with the central of firearms. There are, however, a namber of inetances in which the guidance, if net actually costradictery, at least gives rise to uncertalaties in the minds of some of those who must deal with firearms. There are enough of these seeming contradictions te call fer a review of the regulations on coutrol of firearms for consistency within and among the regulations. Becommendation No. 5 “That the Depaty Director for Support, in consultation with the Depaty Director for Plans, initiate a review of existing Ageacy regulations, te include Clandeatine Service lnustractions, with & view toward identifying and eliminatiag possible - | areas of conflict among the various Regulations and Inetructions. What Are the Checks on Compliance with the Regulations - The periodic « and continuing ehecke consist of audi Audit Staff, eo ‘ | Legistice checks on questiqnabie requieitioas, and the mechaniems for the reportiag of general property and financial accountability. We eonsider the checks to be effective. One additienal check occurs te us, which is readily available bat ie aot now applied. There is act aow a requirement on the Cable Secretary far the dissemination te the DD/P of cables dealing with the control of firearms. We believe that it would be appropriate for the DD/P to receive copies of cables on this subject ia view of the extent to which he has reserved to himself authorities ie this field, 25X1 | |
13-00000 sg hie requirements ou the Cable Secretary for dis#emiaation of cables and consider addiag to them a requirement for the diesemiaation te hie office of all cables dealiag with control of firearme. Are the Regulations Reowa, Uaderetesd, and Followed . We find that perseunel who deal with firearme are aware of the applicable regulations and have a moderately good aaderstandiag ofthem. The dagree of compliance with the regulations ie aet cacy to acsese, but we have the impreseion that it ie high. The regula- tices axe followed well while the flrearme are in or moving through established supply chanacia; however, regulatery controls are not — always appliceble in ee operational envireament. Whea we are faced in the Agency with an operational exigency, we have no choice but to do the best we can with the means avaliable to us. It ig aot a case of regulations~be-damned but of recogaizing that the rega- lations are not absolutely binding at all times and in all situations. Can the Regulations Be Gircumveated Without Blek ef Detection / Our inclination ie to give a flat “no” to thie question, but there ie a possibility--altheagh a very slight ome~-that a dishanest employse could acquire a amall quantity of weapens for unauthorized age without too much risk of his being associated with them. The examples we cite ia cur detailed report are quite far-fetched, and they aggume a lack of integrity oa the part of an employee. The consensus is that, while it woald be impossible to write a regulation that would prevent a dishonest empleyee from engaging ia an legal firearms transaction, eur existing regulations are such that he would almest surely be caught. | H EGRET Recommendation No. 6 - That the Deputy Director for Plans review Are There Past or Present Firearms Transactions That May fmbarrass Ge le The Future ° Any iadividual weapon that le traceable to CIA ie a potential source of future embarracemeoent, because ‘we have almost no control ever what happens te it after it leaves our hands. The potential for ~6- etn RR REP i SECRET 2
13-00000 SH&CREZT ' | | embarragement over a dingla traceable weapon that goes astray ia not high: asually the fact of ite having gone astray becomes known when it is seized by U.S. law enfarcement authorities. ‘ A traciag of ite ownership history leads te CIA, and our records will reveal the disposition made of it by the Agency. There are, however, some old large-volume firearms transactions, which might one day be the source of quantities of wespous traceable to CIA appearing on the illegal market. The X1A | X1A ! | 2 2 Fallacious Allegations of CIA Involvement in Hiegal Arms Deals We examined a aumber of instances in which CIA hae been falsely accused of affiliation with an illegal arme trausaction. We have on occasion provided certifications that an Individual had no connection with CIA, but in mass trials of people some of who may have had prior CIA affiliation we prefer not to do this. We are likely always to be plagued by iacidenta lik there often is little we can de other than appy over allegations, ' : 1 | | | t and — 25XTA | How Important Are the Regulations ¢ | Of course the regulations are important--indispensable, in fact--and it would be foolish of aa to suggest otherwise. We ask the question as a meane of focusing attention on a form of control thet operates perhaps even more effectively than do the controle that are spelled out in the regulations. We are referring to some- thing that might be called state of mind, or attitade, or atmosphere. We found a universal awareness that firearms, while treated as juet another item of supply in the general supply regulations, are in reality a very special kind of property requiring special types of i handling. It is widely believed that the upper echelons of the Agency i would prefer to have no traffic at all with firearme and are likely {
SECRET to deal peremptorily with offenders who knowingly try to circemvent controle. This is not to eay that people are running scared; it is just that they know what the general policy is, and they reepsct it. What ie perhaps most aotable is the extent to which curreat attltades with reapect to firearms dilfer from attitudes that were . p¥evaleat in the Agency during its earlier years. Today's autlook on weapons procurement iu the Office of Logistics ie characterized by caution and conservatism. Withia the Clandestine Services, there are variations in outlooks on firearms arieing largely from differing conditions in the foreiga field. Even allowing for these variations im attitudes, we think it fair to eay thet the Clandestine Service, too, ie living ja a now era in which it ia waderstood that firearme will play & email and closely monitored role. |
13-00000 oc) ot ss 6S ECRE INSPECTOR GiSERAL'S REPORT on AGENCY REGULATIONS PERTAINING 10 CONTROL OF FIREARMS ‘ ma GECRET ne nt
Table of Contents ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE REVIEN. 2.0 ee ee ee ee ae Procurement of Oxdnence Material «22 0 2 2 ee oe Shipment of Ordnance Material o2e¢ 8 © 6 6 & © Storage and Hancling of Ordnance Material . . . « « Completenes§ .«2e¢ «2 0 « 2 ¢e# 8 @'s © © @ © 8 Appropriateness .« © «eects ss sane es Consistency ee ee er ee ee ee WHAT ARE THE CHECKS ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS ARE THE KECULATIONS KNOWN, UNDERSTOOD, AND FOLLOWED . CAN TIE REGULATIONS BE CIRCUMVENTED WITHOUT RISK OF DETSOLION eeees eee ee en eevee eases ‘ARE THERE PAST OR PRESERT FIREARMS TRANSACTIONS THAT - ° ® MAY ENBARRASS US DN THE FUTURE . « 0 «2 0 ee ee oo FALLACIOUS ALLEGATIONS OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL ARS TEALS « ec wo eo eo eo eo ec eo woe eee eee eee e wee HOW IMPORTART ARG THE REGUIATIONS . «2 eee ee ee ae SECREIT ary enpepihane 8 BR Ree 3 oy bi, 49 52
SECRE 2 - OxIGLe AXO CCOPE cP te coe REVIEW 1. This incuiry tnto the adequacy of Agoney vegulations ea tho | control of firearms originated as an ection item from the Director's noraing meeting cf 1h Cctober 1969. ‘Tne Deputy Director for Support noted the item by Martin Waldron in that day's New York Times, “Arzs Linked to "Agency, ’” and comzinted that, had we been involved cs | alleged, we would have kmovn it. (The Waldroa article reported the seizure last June of & five~ton eacke of arms on the farm of Earl V. Redick, a firearms dealer ia Tuyetteville, North Carolina. Redick was acting on behalf of an unnamed "Federal Agency,” and that they were destined for the Republic of Chad.} fo assure himself that ve would indeed have known it, if we hed been involved in this transacticn, the Director instructed the Inspector General to examine and report on all. Agency regulatéons pertaining to the shipnent and requisitioning — _ of tlrearms. | | 2. We made a quite thorough favestigation of all aspects of the - Agency's tnvolvenent with firearms. This included identification and | { i claimed that the asus were cvaed by a Henry Vizomar, who reportedly detailed study of the regulations themselves, examination of many files, and @ large nunber of interviews of employees whose work might
13-00000 SSCRET ~ ve exgected to retuine thes to be fandlier with end to abide by our vegulations on the control of fircarss. These ara the questions to Waica We squgob answers: What is the nature and extent of the Agency's involvecent with firearms? Wich of cur memulations pertain to control of Hirenms? are the reguintions complete, eugroprfate, and consistent? 4ve the regulations known, understood, ani followed? Wheat are the chacks on caspliaace with the reculstians ? Can the regilnticns be clreunvented vithout detection? Ave there past or present firearss transactions thet may ‘Eaw important are the regulations in thenselves? We take up each of there questions iu succeeding sections. in. one section va have o trlef Clecussion of fallacious allegetions of Cia favolvenent in various illegal arms deals. These folce accusations sometimes have an air of craiioility about them, and trying to dis- prove them might rick more than it would be worth. There is em anwx attached to the report aa Tab B exanining one of these follactous allegations in detail. Tt describes two incidente in the Zev Orleans ares, which Diatrict Attorney Janes Garricon tried to link to CIA ond to the assassination. of President Kennedy. «= 2 oo SECRET seen peeeeremttnentehstetpeneetnteetntennnteteteeesteerenteertntentietetteentatnrert ete peeeent ahaa onteremtte— tne ctftebepeeeesfnsetetententeeensieeteteettetrinntsheshettetersuntensshestetitetenitetttreerterttvee stteheestttetettenerrrene astebsesertnteceeeen mrs —temteteneineteateathvane Seueeeineiainiantnns  cvineatehienete inn een cee eee vers wen cow + ote
25X1A Ths MATURE AND DOGS GP? ACENOY EWVOWEENZ wena FIGARS 2. The Ageaey's current Lovolvemex) with Sivearts fells ints tuo Gistinct categories. fhe Divot is the supply of larga suantitiss oS ordnance materials to cauhas furtes and yorenilitary activities in the Janeous activities in which firearms play a part. Gncluted in the second category are: yporaniiiteary operations eiseubere in the wordd ths% are Gupported by Cié; git of weapona for Southeast Asia war zones the vecond enuruces all of the other miscol- iisigon services and other operatianal contacts; research, devalopusst, and testing of special-purpose weapons; training activities official weapons held by installations for protection of classified material or of persommel cr for operatioml use; and persouslly amed weapons. The quantity of weapens camsitied to this second category oF Ww" SX1A SX1A 2X 1A 5X1A - re a
13-00000 ef SECRET tMmacellancous activities is clin. wocule din comperisen witha those Gupplied ¢ for wor sone operations. Procurement of Grdinanse Metesial REET PAPERS AEER PAAR REE AEROS EEE EEDA ESIC NEEP PEELE EGE PEERS TEE ERE EET re ROT ENED b t Overt Se Tee grees bal: of the ordmanes unterdal required by the Ancacy in support of current oerations 1s procured ky the Office of Logictics in veaponse to requisitions raceived tron wer coast: finest alt of 3% ig acquired by Zegisties by requsitias ca the military and is for use in Southeast 4 fala. . Covers . For the three-month period immediately preceding our investigation, covert firearms procurements consisted of 17 transactions with a total ; ar &,639. EES 25X1A
szcase JN averase te ted, ex entitures for ox 22 per quarter last years wt 25X1A | should be nated that | 25X1A ag TSD's Researeh ond Poveloment Program 5. %3D is responsible, in coordination vith SOD,. gor the CORES Of sesearch end éavelopzant of gerusiiitary metericl. This *requentiy involves the purchase of a Mrcera or Mreavas ty a TSD contractor oro a commercial gan marutacturing Pisa. Att ter madification (in ween the gun my lose its identity) 26 or they exe delivered to 163 vy tle contractor. When the weance.(s) is daliverad so the component lewyaee the requirement, it is taken up wy into Ageney sovantory. 25X1A
13-00000 The Weesors Prosratc of the Vietnerese Alfairs Statf fhe Vietnamese AMfadra Steff has engaged from ti to tire 1 50D in mromacs coated to iuprove the cazebilities ct 16 t& cur aacets in Soutsenst Acia. The stat> has ro Sirearms speGiaiisct assigned to it, and be has a omall sugply of wenyons sent to\ Mn from Southeast Asia, At the monent, the Staf? is coucentrating on mamutition enhanecnent in an effort to iurrove the fire power : roe mrsvers of cavidnuss already in tie coins SCD's Foreion Veer & SOD maintains at MidvGGh Dopot for contingency use a ctors . attrioutable Weapons, wany of which of forciga tentracture. At one tine, there were TUMODRICN packs gto 4nstallations, but they have nov all been stations. Ghana, for example, is a current source of Sovi weap. At the tise of interviews in SOD, they vere amitidy nent fron Vietnam. SOD's role in this is Lmttea to levying thd quirenent ona field ctation, cupplying the money for the yurchases and furnishing a shipping ed2ress (always the Midwest Depot). ~6-
13-00000 , “RTPA eT Te Project Tit SE Se Project SDROMS ws waa established in 1952 to provide trainiac dex police equizmans to %G yolice agenctes throughout the verld. Tt holiap overt contrast with AXD gor the training of sone 500-(20 erg ench year. Ib also is an authorised representative of . f equips used by police forces. Tb has o pedssh display of wea: revolvers. The pv at its acadeny, moat of which are police service % Operates esccntisily as a broker in fireaxaa procurements. Many 3 police officers it trains wart to buy ~ersonal weapons to take vith thon. =o ne SUSTeSES an appropriate type of wearon A dtells the officer how to go abou buying it legally. This rei Eubassy euthorizing the juochase ‘purchase permits from the appropriete Jette ve from the offices 's ae WIGS importing of the vearon end Saket of Colucbia eubhoriides. firearus for a foreign police or security ce e. If the officiel ox the organization is sponsored by ATD, no D/P : | ERDGMORPH participation. | However, if the request chamels, then the DD/P's approval must be obtained £3 tics yurchase on bebalf of foreigners. ae shroug CTA eecoaseoe pes? Foreign Materials Progr, ont 202. The Format Staff of the Domestic Contact Service" 8 $99 Division functions essentially as a clearing house for the intelii¢ Diloc @ud defense caziunitices in the procurement of fareign~ wade materiel f. «= T RECRET .
bl SECRER intelligence exploliatian or for overatiogual yuposes. It bas dis< ureed somo $2 million (lersoly DecD finds) during the last three or no and has a millicn “Line of credit" with Defense's or & vingle acquisition project. The larger chumks of the gone far costly items such aS afreraft and sdvanced Weaons tion of iafan a other cvmnat-typo veapona for a veriety oF yurposes. Its cok procucemonts cre largely from a Linited musber of established end x ble scuvces, alsunigh it also exploits sources of oyportunity (the rosie da oecasionaily the recdipid , of the Six-Day War, for example). Is also Do: surplus weapons from the Deyxuriuant of Defense fox xoscible Acency wo its principal Agency customer is oo Division. Format Steff accuires e Logistics varehouse syoten. § ’ my takes over froa there. wishes to purchase covestly; hovever, the principal custcmor is Department of Defense fx items with militery arpplications, and its interest lies in the intelligence exploitation of the itexs. « 3 w SECRET
13-00000 32. The agency remulotion on schipwent of govermsent proporty 25X1A D. specifics that the chinaont of explosives, auanition, ond other dangerous uaterial ghall, be made in accordance wlth anropdlacte Feeral and State law end military and civil reguistions. ALL chin- ments are to be nage under the supervision of a qualified exmuniticns gagyactor. Reoucsts for chiments of any sort thet require hanlling 4a any manter other thas as yrosertbc’d by liar ow rerwlation uct be approval. 23. The vast bulk of our Sirecras deliveries are moved «2 militery shipments uniter applicable DOD resulations. / Ghe Office cf Losistics hes issued special instructions on the packaging and marking of pllferable . 25X1A eargeen, such as handmuns. Poushing of Firearss 1%. Department of State regulations forbid the shipping by pouch of auch things as parishables, liquids, explosives, firearms, exnnini~ ton, an@ nitrate film. The prohibition stems fraa concera for the safety of passengers on an aircraft end for the diplomatic iuplica- tions attendant upon discovery of violations of pouch agreezents. AZ Adenticel probibitdon appears in our om regulations. ‘he applicable Clanéastine service Tnstraction states that Lnitations on size ana ~ De SECR2zT sont through the Office of Lesisties to the Office a’ Secwmity Lor 5X1A bo
1 aie SECA2LT weight of roucne’ iteas soy bo weived bub Ghat the Limitation on tha pouching of prohibited tto.s Will nob be waived. 5X1A
13-Q0000 SECRET eo There heve boca a total of 69 shipments since June 1955. woes Forty-two of tae shiozeats consisted of a aingle weapon. We found caly tarce instances of camunition being poucked. ons must be dizéssexbled, with tne parts being shipped in ate pouches.e Osten, the waiver agproval specified that us have been distributed es follows: 39 to AF, 13 ga to WH, five to We, shree to Fi, and two on behai? 2 the weapons were deatined as gifts to kixh ILS, Scnlor lisisen contacts, ox to persons > cverationaL contacts. ewe The great bull government ots the personal protec ow Piltyeone of the shin ae one shotgun. She ress woe Seizes . carbines, and. sumeachine Guns. : : 30 revolvers for tho arzing we The largest shipment consisted m American country. We nad of the presidential guard in a trained the mabers of the guard) | The pouching of firearms from headquarters is Unter tight contwol. Good records are kept in KID. We interviewed one intics Officer who commented that he vould like to see some relaxatia tot pouch _ . controls, because the pouch is the safest ond fastest wa assured delivery to the intended recipient. i i i @= Tnere ave four inuseagecs oF weapons belEg ani pe sd for use in “SECRET
25X1A en, —™ Tt SZCRLE 17. Tha aygiicable tusdcuarters raguints that explosives, amcmition, and other dangerous muterdal sacllos stored, aad handled under she supervises of a qualified asounttions dnapector end in accordance with Aroy Ordsance Cory Manual 7-225 acc ayprorriate State end local laws and vequiutions. Tha rez ation Gace specifies that storage facilities for explosives, amamitian, axd other dangerous material euch be inspectes pariedically by a ontuuy Oftices, designated by ths Dizcector of Sscurdty, who is cusiicicd ia woliedes and trocedures to be Polllowed by Tield dnsteliatiasn in th: issuance and control of fircarss, excevt for cyecial Gevices aad Zar firearms issued for approved pavacnilitary projects. The requlatiaa requires that the Cale! of Station establish procedures, in writing, for the control and issuance of firearms charged to the station. The Chie? of Statica may delezute to a sewlor officer st the station, o: to a Chief of Base, the authority for the safekeeping and issuance of firearas in accordance with rules apgroved by the Chief of Station. The regulation requires that the Cale? of Station ferword a cony of | the station's yrosedures to hescquarters, along with an inventory of weapous on hand. ‘The inventory is to ke revised an changes occur. wo 12 © SECRET
Migveot Dew a9. Grdnance cutcriais aso stered in quantity ia the United vot Doyot near San Antonio, Tea. The Suing this inveutigation aig not visit the Depot, because 2 Statea only at the Mau team of cure examined the facility recently in connection with our survey . Cifice of Logistics. They were favorably teoresscd With the profess= isa displayed in the operation of the Topst. Tay report that ace materials appeared to be properly stored and hangled and that goad Pols are neinteined over then. As noted previously, SGD"s rack of Wajnence naterials for contingerey support of peronilitery opirations ig : ntained at tha Mlévest Depot. | Central Tovoot quick response to rescesty headquarters x @uenta for individual weapons. The ordnaxce shop is 4 conpertnen room, Satisfactory controls are uaintalaed on weapons thatiare telng packaged for shigment fran the Depot. 21. Ag of early Decexber, the wospons inventory at the | Depot ordnance shop consisted of 327 U.3. ani foreign mde rifles, hendguns, machine gms, suimachine guis, and ahotguia. Amminitioa on SRORET
Peer bee fe tha Althouch oefice ag Loziaties facility, tke Central ordnance shop is used by SOD end SAVA officers 4n connection with their progrens for testing foreign veapons and improving U5. wepONS ang amumition. Son's Gocknical Recuirements OfMcer anc CAVA's onénance speciqlist both make some use of the shop's facilities for working on veapons, and both have eaall quitities of wespans stored ain the arne locker and in loched cabinets designated for their use. é& the time of om visit to the shop, there vere two lerre cratea of miscellaneous foreign-made weapond--evidently collecteé in Southeast ASlae~-stored in the — Locker’. They dig not belong to the S05 officer. We could not confirm the sowce of these weapons nor the use plamed for thea, became the SAVA ordmuce specialist vas hospltal- ized and not available for intervie. These weayors that are collected and stored for use in the RAD progrens are handled outside of the uormal stock control aysten; however, our inquiries suggest that they SECRET
on SECRED axe Rendlad with as cach cars as the reguimuents for Plezibility ia the pvograns vili, pocuit. 23. Whe Dev ordsauee opcclialiat is generally cvere of tha nature and oF the opiroxiuate quuntiiies of weapons being atereé ia on hemd eat a gives vine. We sea no neod for a etock contre) cyztca Detveen him and SCD and SAVA, bt we do believe that he shculd Ye %, yeyere such a ligt st 2is corliest coxotunity. ke will tae taic uy bis shop by SOD azd SAVA, web ho does not know poucisely what may be with the SAVA ordnance specialist When he returne to duty. : «15 = SECRET oc NN an An eR: Seether EEE rE
13-00000 25X1A 25X1A ie The previous section, profescedly Gesorluing the uature ed extent of the Agency's davelvoaut with fMrearas, dwelt heavily oa ike regulatory aspact. We found thie waveideble. We do meny thinvs ic this Acomey that ara uct “secs crGing to the Sock,” primarily becouse thay are not the sort o2 things that are succertinle te contrsl by regwiations. This is nos co with resrsct izeorks dn noaewor zone areas, We have a fair volize of cuite datatioa ragulatery waboriai on whe control of fircaras ia cur manuals, and ase cannot sped: cl? tle Agency's Javolvesens with Mrearas without reference to the rermtiations that apply to that involvensat. 2. Awnigques fecture of of agony reguictions ca tha control of Sarvaras is: thas taey Garive ia large pert froa interaat Sgeacy yolicy, rather than having their bases in Tecerel statutes. OF course, te regulations wers written with an eye to eamring that Ageuty peactices axe in conformance with ayplisable iews asd exteraal regulations. However, We ood, idantify only one regulatory desuamece curructiy o1 the docks that vao gut there in direct response to a Federal law, We refer to which was cent out in wil oF this year, giving guidence on the ispo: of perdonnly owmed Tireams. The wiimulus for | coms froa the Gun Control Act af
13-00000 S2CREP 1908. A draft revision of applicable regulations, taking up the yro~ visions of ths Douk Disgatech into the standing regulatiags, is tur out for coordination. 3e dnother noteworthy Texture of Agensy regulations on the control of fireswcs le that the detailed regulations concentrate primarily on the relatively sunll voluce of weononss committed to various miscellaneous activities involving Sixuarts--end most enpecialiy on offieial weapons and thon that are personally oinede Those pe ivi~ sions of general suzply regulations that are epplicable to the ndk pr SeureneTty Siiizent, and issuance of weajerns to war 26ne oferntions neers teen tite ca tem Een cTSESERED teeter enh mn vtetteenenteesetesnteseststeneaspsesensee aneeteeeneaee ustdtnealegnn asain AAO + with pertinent Yederal and Stuta laws end military ond civil somutationn © %, he praesent sixict controls on official and personully owned flresrus-<and they are atrict--cam anout as a result of a concern expressed by General Carter in 1963. He wrote 4m an Actica Menorandn to the Dixectar of Security and the Deputy Director for Support, doved 32 Sasmaxy 1965: "X av appalied at the number of people in the Agency authorised to carry firearms. I had received informatica Treviously froa an external source that the city fathers of the District of Colmibia were cbout ts raise this issue. Tis was what proupted ay request for information a8 ta Agency activities in this resara. "... AS I understand the Lect, we are eutborized to aesige nate certain couriers 2nd guards to carry firearas “when engaged in = angportetion of confidential documents ard materials." To ua this mnaane exactly that--aud I camiot see. how we would have as many as 250 people runing arcing carry= ing confidential duaments all at the saue tine. = if SECRET? ean 2 sentence) vere a ane es: REE ORG uen-nne npteaanahnneetptetie
25X1A 25X1A 25X1A SBLcara - 4 du sa Dootyucvters Temlations wmelhes ne apacific reference to Sizes 3s 6 cupyly item, Sindexed in 2955. The ote indcn lead to “firearas" ang the one to Beat exe no longes on the bodka. Tie exict- gterences to Divear<c appeared in the manual after the cate af the last indexing. fo nske noasonably ‘certain that we hed found ol seferenses to fircarus, ve resorted to = page-by apace veview of every regulatory issuante wach, iran dts title, aight conse sivenhy have something to Sey suet Disearus. We velieve we found thes elt Due wa cannes state this a3 a cextainty. A&A dis’ armpeara ot fab A. Wo can iMustirate sine of the Gifficuliies that nay be encountered in working with the requlatioss by these exenbles: & Eerly in this tnvestigaticn in a meeting with logistics officers, after ve bed 2 read all of the pertinent veguletions we could find, we asked if there wes a requirerent that the serial muanibers of rifles be recomdod at way pint in the supply chain. Ho one knew. the nest cay one of the logistics officers salied ond directed our attention to a provision | that sensitive and expensive items bearing serial mumbers shal be accounted for snd identifies by cextel mmbers froa tine of Soave to user throngh flash disposition or turn-in, except woe othervise authorized by headquarters. We had read that reguiation bub bad no reecilecticn of aaving ccon that particular sub-niv~ peregraph in waich weapons ave cited as a "far exammle.” 25X1A pore nee tener eer © 25X1A
| ‘SEECREe bd. we Gisccvered axe additlousl reference te firearms in the . Tegulaticns on 5 Deceuber wea we were alseady eae seven Weeks into this inquiry ané were assembling our moterlals in previrse | pera ts tion for the writing of cur x (@. On 5 December, an Operating Division Logisties Officer, who kagw that vw ware Gigsing into the subject of control of ana shiycent to the station of a anctym for recreaticasi usc. He say caly kave been concerncé over the possible exheowasscent to bis division tron cuiing @ uistake while an Tneseater Covers duvectigation was under way, tc he seemed to us to be honesty perplexed ag to wacther 6 request such ag this is covered by une of the regilations. (It ise) | 7. Despite the aifficulties we excoumtered in assexbiing 11 pertinent reg Lory waterial om the control of Firearms, and in organizing 16 for study, ‘we doubt that it would be syarcyoriate to pull tosether all references to firearms under a single, blanket reguistion. Ordnance uaterials are not, in ow Judgumt, so exceptional itens of “supply as to require wholly segrezete trentment im the requletions. We do believe, however, thet ease of use would be enhanced if certain yrovisioas of headquarters issuances were combined under a single beading. Purthernure, guidacca on eontrol of fireares is. fragmented oe tm en IN ne a pf ft oN rh Ths td eee eneeeerrehebitreetntntsseneeee Saunt >
13-00000 ae gone of it ie coculecly contralictory; avi thare is at lenst ons significant sap in ite We Lave a-move detalied discussion of these yeobloms in the following soviica. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET ARS "HS KEGUUAPICIS CQPRIRE, APPROPRIATE, AND CONSISTENT? de 48 & GeGGral observation, we have the iupression thet the veguiatious were draftcd with care and with opecivic goals in nis. We aiso have the ingrecsaion that the body of renulations on firearcs was conatituted dn plecauel fashion, with dadividua) regulations nigeariag in response to cenirete ebdemli. Tf thave hes been oy attenyt to eit dows an? study the whole body of Treats reguistians for cunpleteness, ampropelateness, and consistency, we did not loara Q 2 it. General Carter's concern in 1953 did stimulate a thovouwsh | | 25X1A xeview of firearta acldiags ai@ Jad to the publication of “control of Fireeras." We dcuut, however, that that review included a full examination of regulations slveedy on the books. 2 Zeeouse the guidaime on cctrol of firearms 1s dispersed among severnl regulations in five seperate dubject categories, there ig always a isk of havics left scoething out o- of writing soaething into ane regulation that 4s nob wholly consistent with scnethin oppearing in some other reguistion, Uf there is « seeming conflict | between guidance in one igsumce and puldante in another, then a quese tion arises aa to which directive takes qrecedence ever the other. Wo find evidence of both incsupleteness end inconadetency in our resula- tions on fiveasss, although aut of unjor propertdons. wy
13-00000 25X1A 25X1A - 25X1A ate SECRiGa Conploteness 3, Oar @iseussion hese 2 of | c expletenses corcerns itself With fue regulations that are already on the buoke. Bo they coutein all of the 25X1A guidance reeded to accunmlisk the purposes of the veaguiatloas? We taxe up the jo. sible need for acditionsl or. difterent regu! Sions ia the subsequent section on Mere ropriatencss." kh, We find only ane possibly significant gap in existing regula- tions. It bas to do vith the traatecnt of the wgiating af weapon dnventories at fieldé iacteliations. “Control o2 Fire- ares,” Gated 15 Novewber 1063, the Deputy Director for Plans reserws to himself the authority to approve request frvcaa Chiefs of Station to have Pirearts ct & station or at a scbordindte base, including tyyes end mubess of weapons (| ‘Contral af Firearms," ented 20, March 1963, specities that the Chie? of Station shall forward to bead- quarters en inventory OF wos agons on hang andl ahat the inventory choll be revised as chanzes oscus. (ininistrative Reporting for GSuall Stations,” lists ag a reporting requiresient upon the occurmence of the event: “Acquisition or ataposal of Pirearns; changes in inven- tarys accidenta dyorolving.“ 5 A question arises as to the fora in waich this taventory abcula be subaitted and so to who should be the wltinste ; vecipient of Fo) requives that the Cate? of Station gubalt to heade {uaxtears a copy of iis written procedures for the coutvol and issuance wo 23 & SECRET Cc gal
13-00000 25X1A SECRET of firearm at his station. Espcifies that the Chief of thz Orerating Divisica shail mrovide a copy of these procedures to the SSA/DDS for a central file, wide tha latter will uaintain on behakt of the ro/P. There is no ccovespending guidance on the Glspositicn of the xeportes of inventory aud inventory changes. (ihe SOA/RDS does hold a central file of the initial daventories ad not of all changes.) & ala seeming defect in the regulations cane to our = ttention ag a xvesult of a seport of nwlit off . hich soc: 25X1A note of the fat that the station ted seven weagons on kend despite a DOP-approved inventury Tor the station of zero. Oa inquirdug inte this, wa foamd that fou of the weapons bad heen taken to the statics by headquarters officara on Toy ER Wes 28X1A the operation aborted, they left the weapons behind at the station. 25X1A Oe The Chief of Station may have hed reasuneble cause Lor believ- ing that his veapons inventory changes were known to baedquarters and were already a matter of officlal record. tion for purposes of apply and finaneial property accounting. | Chief of ¢ Station is the responcible officer for non-expendable prep erty, but sccountebliity ia maintained by headquarters. ake Office of Logistics maintains and forwards to the station at least amually 2 Consolidated Meuorandun Reweiypt (CMR) informing the Chief of Station Ly w« SECRET
13-00000 25X1A 25X1A - 25X1A SECRE #3 or his current inventory List a9 recorded at headgwarters. The four ® weapons takej— = 2 8) by the Tilers appear on a CMR of April ISG9. ALL seven weapons appear on the CR of Auguet 1959. Further, there vos an exchange of cables cnoig headquarters and the stations arranz- It cceoms to us fron stulying het it wea intended 25X1A that the weapons inventory was something ¢o te apmoved and reported VuxM separately froa ovdinary yrogerty accounting and reporting, although the regulation docs not specifically oo state. If the DD/? ' yepexyed to himsol? ths authority to approve recussts to have Sresr at a etation~-as he does 2 hen 26 would seen that bis ayproval would bave to be sought for any nodiMentians of hia prie ammvovela. The mere taking up of the weapons into the Cx does not . appear to accomplieh the intended purpose of ths remlations. _ The CUS ia an exorcise Datween the Office of togiaties and the station; there is rie Clendestine Service involvesent in dt. Further, the GR “may be out of date by ag mich as a year or more. 9. Tt sppeara to ua that the problem discussed above arises — a deficiency in the regulations en that stops shold be taken to coxmect, dhe We have a recamendation to this ¢ffuct in our summary 10. In duly 1968, the DD/P adaresaed « menorandua to Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs stating thet wagous WLI nob be made avaticble « 25 = BECRET
13-00000 — . o foreigners as gitts or as accommodation purchases rade for then targa Agency yersamel or fscilitics. The pronioition extends to “giving or selling to foreigners weapons personally owned by ou employees. Any exceyilon to this prohibition requires DD/P opyrovel. - he neudrandin stated that reguistions, instructicua, and guidence naterial Sealing with the contwol of Pirearas wala be vevis aed accord} dngdy. The sam instruction was tranaaitted to field atatlons and. vases in early August 1665 X1A LL. At the tins of cur inguiries, action had not yet been taken to incorporate tals directive into the standing wegulntscns. Ue called the matter to the atteution of the C3 officer regponsinie for reviewing dscumene yat out ag interin guidance with & View tovard | thedy possible inclusion in the poraanent manuals. A 20X1A preperation. 12. The Generel Counsel was dustrumental in having ERIE “Liaison with the O?fice off Munitions Contvol, Departuent of Gtate,” diesued in Jamury 2967. When it. Jobn Sipes roplaced Mr. Robert Margrave ad the Directar of the Office of Hmitions Control, ke © resarked to laxry Houston thet he und often observed Margrave deals: S on Gpviously confidential natbers with people waknam to Sipes. Fo his ova protection and that ov the Agency, he atked that & means be eatebliahed for contirming the bona Tides of 2 yindtors frou CIA. ‘the General Comsel wrote to Sipes in February 1957 infowring him that the a 6 « SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Office af the General Coursel is responsible for the contro], of all iiaigon with Macltionz Control. otification of this within tho Agency was accoulisted by puoilcation of a Tost notlea wos 5X1A allowed to expire on 1 Jamuery 260, witch means that it presucably has bean removed by the holders of the manuals. (Ws found thot our oun copy of the notice had been pulled frou tha anual snd destroyed.) Since there is a contimcing requirement far fedor coordination with the Office of the General Counsel of any contact with the Gffice of paakek Ze 2pX1A texen vp inte the ston@ing yegulations. We so recoumend in our cane Manitioug Costrol, we believe that the substance of mary report. Aperonrlatensss | 23. In ou inquiries inte the adequacy of amr regulations on con- tral of firearss, we repestiedly encountered officers in both the Gup~ port, end the Plans Directorates who feel quite atronyly that thara should be one central point oP control, or at least of cognizancs, of the agency's Geciings in firearms. Goue non-C3 officers belteve tant, becsuse of coupartuentatson, there may be ‘things going on having to da with tivearns that ers wiknam to the proper authorities. They point to the yroject aysteu--especially those qrojects thet operate under otministrative plans--n8 being an area in which nernel proeurenent controls may not apply. As we began our inquiries in the Clandestine forvies, it quickly becawe apparent that Adontitying the nature a1 ~ 2 ~
13-00000 SSCRER pxteant of Co invalvenent with Mrearws would require & cheek with evary glugle cosesent of the CS in order SO Gyan With eny confldance on the subject. de Gld jus that. We found nothing sexiously aalus, but coming up vith even a megative Minding wee a tedious and time. consuming exercise. | Ui. We have wised feelings on this t. the lack of e conival point of cognisence means that any tine & question ig yeised abouts the totality of oar involvement} with firearas on exercise similar te Wie one we have just completed mist be cone through agein. We wonder, thong, how ofte: there ts galng to be a requirement euch as this. Thure was a wassivs review and adjustuent of weasons holdings ia Ls. This iagairy of cise five yeara ister reveals that things are still pretty well, in hand. With the conirels that have been adéied in recent years, it seeng wilikely thet amy groas irregularities will develop. Om: the other hand, although the vegulstions are nos epcific on thig point, it seems to us that the liport of them is that a cen- tralized control of fireeras was enviatoned. 1G. Since we found adthing much wrong with the presant syste, wa are not Prepared to recumond that @ central poiut of control cr cagntzance bo established. We do believe, though, that it is a motter that should be taken under consideration, and we have o recawendation ta that affect in our gumary veport. 16. another eves tn which the ampromdatencss of «4 reguloticn comes into question is in the Lisitation on the youching of probihites we 2G « SECRET
13-00000 to headquarters or SECRET tems. Both the agency Regulation and the Clanéestine Services etion on this roint state fiatly that the linitation on youching a vited items nay not ee waived. As we have noved in the Nadction on sulyment of firearms, the Limitation is, in fect, waived on jon. For shipzents being pousked from headquarters, the vaiver is \Qkated only by the DD/P. Ho such central coutrol ap- pears to exiet ov pitea itexs that are poushed trou the field ally between Tiel’ stations. It seems to us that, if it is import contraband fron heséqua mat the DD/P alone authorize shizuents of then his approval also should ba procured Yor siniler pouch shipucnts quarters and between stations. lic know that such shimments have t ace, but we have no ready way of discovering their frequenacy--other by going on a fishing expedi- tion through an assortment of files. We %guspect that AP Division | would be the most likely source of these nts because of the lack ment that, since we routinely (although not by regulation} the weapons and ship the pleces in separate pouches, we are ping weapons--only parts. (We might nota in this regard that instructions for the tyvo shipcents thet ceme to our attention--one laterally and one to headquarters--included an eduonition that the BECRET
13-00000 25X1A 25X1A SECRET 18. ‘There is one final arca on which we feel we should cement however, our views are not well enough formed for us to call inta questica the appropriateness of the reguiation. This has to do wits s in the xegulations--Logistics. The regulations on the procurement, shipping, storage, and handling of firearms, wita very minor exceptions, edésess thamselves to the broad subsect of govern~ ment property in generel. Pirearme are locked upon as merely ons of many categories of property We treat such things as automobiles and foniture as separate entities in the reguistions--but not Mrearzs. Theres are specific references in the Logistics regulations to the handling of amumition and other dangerous materdals but not to weapons esagain with one or tyo exceptions. 19. We heard ergumeats in favors ef setting wp firearms as a separate category in the regulations, with narcotics and precious matals being cited by comparison. We are not persuaded that anything gignificant would be geined by this. ‘The supply procedures estab~ lished for the camtrol of all nonexpendable Agency property seen to oa 30 w SZCRET
13-00000 vs aGequate in tha ease of fireamm. Relebed ragulaticns in the Secur~ ity series provide amronriate efditional coutrols. Consistency 2. We find no major controdietions among the yrovisiona of ha goveral segulations hnving to do vith the control of fireanss. There axe, however, a Dew instances in waich the guidance, 1? not actually eotrafictery, at least gives rise to uncertainties in the mings cf? soe of those who mist dual with firearms. We ave souniiat reluctant even to surface these as tossible discrepaicies, because our comments Gm them necessarily have an oir of nigghing over trivis. -We are cali- ing attention to then, icvever, because we did eaccumter some people who had doubts over definitions and delegstions of authority. 21. The reguintion that gives rise te most of the uncertainty is “Authorisation end Control of Fireazna Issued for Training, . Rasearch, and Operational Purposes.“ Whe regulation is Listed as hav 25X1A ing been “Revised: 1 /gril 1961." This algnifies that it wen elresdy | on the bocke when the seuistions were converted to the new format in gyri 1961 and-has remained unchanged since that date. the follesdag are oseible dmconsisteacies in the regulations; | a» The leeG sentente of tes that the reguiatioa 25X1A proserives the responsibilities and yeocetures governing the requisition aad control of firearus for operational use overseas. ‘Whext constitules “operstional use" ig gubject to verying ~ Ue mn fa F _ SEBCRE row : f ‘
13-00000 _25X1A 25X1A 25X1A SECaEne interpretations. In a suncequent subparagraph on procedures, the statement is made that the Chief of an Operating Division shall establisS adequate control end continuing accountabdlity of «1% weepons wider bic juris@ictiun. (Unterscoriag supplied.) Use oF the word "elk" siithout qualification seems to suggest that all weapons held by the Division eve for operational usa and the there are no exclusions from the responsibility of the Division ietinguiches among weapons necessary Tar the wrotection of classified information or facilities, veagcas for the protection of perucnnel and their dependenta, and woapons inv approved operational mmposes, tatea that: ”...Within the Clantestine Services, the Chiefs of Special Staffs and Operating Divisions akall, within their respective areas of jurisdiction, determine the need for, " ensure proper use of, and establish adequate control end contin. ing accountability by mike and serial nusiben of all westons under theiy jurisdiction.” (Undergcaring supplied.) This seems inca sisteat with guidance in aS Mich reads: "Before igoue 25X1A to user, no attempt shall be mide to obtain cerial numsers of equimment by opening ar unpacking the equigment, and thus destroy- dng the protection of the packaging ar proceasiag.“ Se totes that responsibility within the Clandes- tine Service for requisitioning aud controlling firearus for SECRET
13-00000 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A SEC aE? operational use overseas rests with the Chiefs of Special Statrs and Operating Divisions. ates that authority is reserved to tha DD/F to amwrove remotes troa Chiefs of Station to have firearrs at 2 station or ct a subordinate basa, dncludcing types and mmbers of weayonu. Tha effect of tha gaeits to with- dow fron Colefs of Qrevating Divisions atae oF the responsitility a the disposition of weapons. | "Chiefs of Station or Dace are mithorized to approve dispocal of property...without headquarters approval, except for vehicles and regulated itens which ore neither coniemed nor compromisod." Firearms are soguiated items. “Ef fireavus on hand are no longer needed, or if they are of an unsuitable type or of doubtful serviceability, the Chie? of Station may dis- qooe of then dn accordance wlth the provieioas of ow 33 =
13-00000 SECRZ32 22. Sone of thane examples are rather Tar-fetched, and otnars wight reed goue of tham ac not being exumles of Imonsistercies. Zs cur vaew, hovevor, there aru encugh oceixences of contradictory pro- vinieng=--or af provisions that usy be interpreted aa being ccntradlote orye-to tall for a review of the regulations om control of firearss fox conadstency withia and anong thi veguiations. We hava a recamucn- dation to that, effect in cur summary report. . —_ ! « 3h = SECRET
13-00000 25X1A SECRES : | 7 WHAT ARE THE CHECKS ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS? ie There are a nucber of checks on compliance vith the regulations on the control of firearms. Some of them are in the form of periodic reviews, end some operate continuously within the procurement cyclic. We have no way of evaluating the effectiveness of these checks, but we have the impression that they give reasonably good assurance that nothing could go seriously amles end remain that way for long. ‘These eae the checks of which we ore aware: & The sudat Stat?, in its anmal audits of all AgeACY installations, routinely checks on compliance with the — on the storage, control of issuance, ard *xeporting of inventory of firearms. During the course of this investigation, we noted two current reyorts of audit that ude yecommendations on the control of firearms at the field stations. be The Office of Sccurity, in its periodic security surveys of Agency installations, tekes account of firearss holdings in the context of overall security protection of the installation. | — 25X1A = 35 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET d. The Director of Logistics has issued a written directive to the Chicfs of the Supply ani Procurement Divisions instructing thea to make sure that any requisition weceived in the Office c? Logistica requesting PMrearns for desuance to forcigners be accompanied by the written epproval of the DD/P. Usually the requisition itself reveals something about the source of the request and the ultizate destination of the weapon. Logistics’ practice fa to ask when in doubt. @e Perhaps the most effective continuing check exists in our mechanisms for the reporting of general property and finenciel accountability. 2. One additional check occurs to us, which is readily available and ia not now applied. There is not now a requirement on the Cable Secretary for the dissemination to the DD/P of cebles dealing with the control of firearms. We believe that it would be eppropriate for the DD/P to receive copies of cables on this subject, cspecially in view of the extent to which he has reserved to himself enthorities in this Meld. We note in this regard that the SSA/DDS, who yeresumably would ride herd on this for tha DD/P, receives hia cables through the Office of the DD/s. This may pose @ small problem, but we. gee no reason why it could not be worked out. We have a recoumendation on this point in our summary report. SECRET
13-00000 SecReE? ARE THE REGULATIONS K:OWN, UNDERSZOOD, AND FOLLOWED? he We testes knculodge and understanding of the reguiaticas by inguivies of @ muxber of officers in Logistics, Security, and the Clandestine Service. Our conclusion is that personnel who deal with | firearms are aware of the appliceble reguiations and heve « acderately good unccorstanding of therm. As noted earlier, the fraguentation of giidence among an assortment of regulations uckes thom mot very casy to work wlth. We else found some uncertainties arising from seeming inconsistescies in the resulations. In general, though, we believe that knowledge aad understanding of the recgula- tions are adequate. We might note in this connection a remark maic by @ young operations officer who hed recently returned fron 6 fiold tour. Hie reply to cur question was substantially as follows: "No, I don't know precioely vhat the regulat, ious have to say about the control of firearms, but ' cife) know that this is a suoject on which the DD/P ie real. goosey, end I wouldn't make a move without being gare that I was following the book to the letter." 2 The degree of. coupliance with tho regulations ie not easy to assess, but ve have the impression that it 1s high. The Office of Logistics is meticulous in adhering to the applicable laws and regulations on the handling of firearms. Our office reviews all = 37 =< SECRET
13-00000 25X1A SECRET reports of audits, and ve can recall, only two in recent months that found flaws in the control of frcerno at Meld installations. We examined the written records on @ muber of firearas transactions. dost of them wero strictly according to the book. One transaction, which became the bacis for an audit exception, wesulted in Incrcace dag the weapons anventory of a sield station, Presumsbly this would require DD/P approval, which was nct obtained. Tastructions have - been sont to the station : 25X1A |) This also would appear to reyuire DD/P approval, which was not obtained. We suspect that there may be other instances of noncompliance with the provisions of F 25X1A but we have no good way of checking on this--other than by avalting reporta of audit. hs we have noted carlier, there may be come 25X1A misunderstanding of just what is expected 3. We noted in the preceding paragraph that we believe that there 4s a high degree of complience with the regulations on the contvol of firearus. The statement needs some qualification, The wregaletions are followed well while the firearss are in or moving through established supply channels; hovever, regulatory controls are uot always applicable in an operational environment. We can cite a couple of examples concerning weapons, eumnition, and | explogives of which ve have personal. knowledge. « 3B o SECRET
13-00000 SECRET a. Allegations reached the Waite Eouse in 1962 of A. misdoings in the Miami area. A team of Snspectora was to Floxida to investigate. ‘the Chief of Station (Ted ), in his geueral operetional briefing of the team, The Station had no sabotage maté on hand, and its asaigned {SD officer was eo audio faniiierization training in the facilities for storing hazardous usaterialg nor for +t. porting them as specified in Agency reguietions. The j weg Gone, however, within the time allowed and by the means et hand.
13-00000 SECRE® ‘We do not describe the above activities as we do with the intent of being eritical of them. What we are {llustrating is the fact that, when we ere fuced in the Agency with an operational exigency, we often have no choice kut to do the best we can with the ocans availeble to us. It 1s not a case of regilations-be-damed but of recognising thet the rogulations are not absolutely binding et all times and in all. situations. = WO w SECRET
13-00000 SECRET CAN Tis REGULATIONS = CTAARVENERD WITHOUT RISE GP OSTSCLION? Le “We asked this question af most of the people we interviews’, including a random sacpling of operations officers who have served both at headquarters ani abroad. Each of then felt that it would bo ' Just about impossible for hin to make off with any quantity of weayous or to acquire official funds for the eivate gaxrchase of weapons Praga nonofficial scuxces. his is a question that wa would yrefer not to have to antuwer. du inclination is to give a flat "no" and go on to the next question, wut there is a yossibility--although ry very Glight ons--that a dishonest exployee eoula aequire a suall quantity of f weapons for wnoutheraged use without too much risk of his being ascowiated with thon. a. Tt is conceivable that an employes who was willing to 26X1C be a thief cauld pilfer a few weapons Ge They vould have to de concenlable veayons that could be hidden in or under bis clothing. However, nsarly all of the employees @ long-time enployees of demonstrated integrity. b. It ta eleo conceivable--but only by on extrema stretch — of the iuaginstion—~that an employes could dream up a phony project by which he could obtain funds for the private purchase 25X1C of firearms. Most people felt, hovever, that this would require ; the callugion of an officer at a level where collusion is cut | of the question. a UL ew SECREL
13-00000  @e One operations officer suggested thet it might have deen possible for him to have padded hia operational expenses vitle at his station und eventually to have accumilated encuch money to buy a fev weapons on the local market. | He added that, because of the high cost of cums in his erea, the aoney he could have diverted would not hava bought BOTS than one or two veapons. 26bX1C @ (Qne Operating Division logistics officer suggested that, because of the close cooperation that develops between station logistics officers and the crews of fa. 5X1C one should not rule out the possibility of collusion betwen then in the illegal transportation of firearas. Be Local military forces ave another possible source of firearms that could be acquired without being taken up into escountable records. Our on-the-scene working arrangewents with a the military often are co close thet on employee could requast SECRET
13-00000 SECRET weapons for an unspecified operational purpose and probubly — could get them on nothing sere than a hand receipt. The bacike keeping on the transaction might never catch up with the 25X1C_ 25X1C 2 The cxexples cited cbove quite for-fetched, and they assume a lack of integrity on the part of an employee. While it ig true that we have kad en oceasionsi this? in cur midst, ve operate on the premise that ve hire employees whe bring integrity to their jobs and that they do not lose it as a consequence of exposure to the intelligence business. | 3. Several of the officers we intervieved, who are in pocitions to speak with authority on the subject, volunteered the coment that, while it would be impossible te write «a regulation that would prevent | @ dishonest employee from engaging in an illegal firearms trans-~ action, Gur exioting regulations are such that he would alzost aurcly be caenght. a kj oe SECRET
13-00000 SECRET le Any individual weaycn that is traceable to CIA is a potential source of future exbarrasszcut, becauae we have almost no control evar vhat happens to it after it leaves our hands. Rifles end carbines, which we requisition from the Hilitary end supply in bulk to combat forces in Southeast Asia, arc not traceable to CIA as a purchaccr, | weceuse serial numbers ere nct recorded except et the tine of issue to the user--if tacn. However, weapons that are procured covertiy and all, handguns and specially modified weapons, regardless OF moans of . procurement, are recorced by serial number, and moat of thea are traceable te us. For example, a policeman noticed a handgun lying on Ghe seat of a parked and unlocked car in New York City. The gus was traced to CIA. The cuner of the car claimed that he hed been on military duty in Vietnam and hed acquired the gun in a trade vith s Montagnard. | 2. the potential for cubarrassment over a single traceeble weapon that goes astray in not high: usually the fact of its having gous astray becomes known when 4t is seized by U.S. police authorities. A trecing of its omerehtp history leads to CIA, and our records Will reveal the disposition made of it by the Agency. An exanple occurred earlier this year. We received a letter in April from a o 4 ie SECRET
13-00000 25X1C 25X1C 25X1C Viee President cf) to @ probable visit frou <he FSI concerning “ showed that the pistol had teea shipped to | ebCRET jalewting us 25X1C |shippeé to CLA in Cetober 1955. Our records 25X1C in Jamary 1965. Tho Station reported in response to headquartera’ query that it hed received the pistel and recorded 4% in property accountability in April 1966. Issues were undo tol 25X1C md the pistols vere considered as operationally expended upon daguance and no serial mumbers were recorded. Tue file docs not revoul the reason for the PSL's interest in the pistel. | Je There are, hovever, som old largeeVolume firearms transace sdens, which might one Gay be the source ‘of quantities of woepous traceable to CIA appeariag on the illegal. market. The so-called is one of these potential : 25K1C 25K1C - 45 ~ a 7 . 2 SECR
13-00000. SECRET 25X1C 25X1C | 5. We asked elnost everyone we interviewed if they had any recollection of CIA ever having been involved in o firearms transas- | tion in any way reacubling the Redick incident that led to this inquiry. We drew only one possibly effirmstive reply, and even it ie of doubtful validity, One officer thought he remesbered hearing of": something like this years ago--in which CIA was duvolved--but’ he could remeber none of the specifica. He named other officers who o 4G w BECRET
13-00000 BECREs wight, from their duties at the time, have some recollection of it. Hone of them aid. . 6. An illegal Mrverns transaction involving Agency persomel de the port of thing that might reasonably be expected to come to the attention of the Inspector General. for possible investigation. We card the names of the principale in our investigations, but we do not index cases by subject matter. However, we do have personnel assigned with contimity on the steff extending back for seven or - eight years. We can identity only two cases involving guns. fe In Jemery 1965, the A/DD/P forverded to us for “favestigntion a report that “the gins thet dtsappeared severe. years ago were not stolen but vere sold” by the chief of support of one of our field stations. Our investigation indicated that the station had reduced ite weapons inventory, that the surplus weapons were disposed of in proper channels, end that the charge probably arose from irresponsible gossip. be ‘The second case wan investigated in Jemary 1963. It concerned en American busineseman with whom the Agency was asso< — 25X1C 25X1C The businessman turned out to be a crock, end the dissolution of the proprietary relationship was accompanied by Litigation between him and Agency representatives. Ee tried -hT SECRET
13-00000 25X1C SECREP te reopen his cleing against the Agency in 1963. We revieved the operational Mies ani mat with the bugineseman and told ‘him that we saw no basis for reopening the case, He is now guing the Agency on a charge that the Agency was responsible for the breakup of hia marriage. ~ &8 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 25X1C 3e At Tab B we have « fairly detailed examination of tvo erus incidents in the Bev Orleans ares, which Diatrict Attorney Janes Garrison tried to Link to CIA and to the assassination of President Kennedy. CYA had nothing to do with either arns incident, and Gurriaon never, to our knowledge, came oat with a flat statement saying that we did. What he did say wes this: | Sg ag = 50 » SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 1. Of course the regulations are iuportant--indispensable, in fact~—and it would be foolish of us to suggest otherwise. We ask the question ag @ means of focusing attention on e form of control that operates perhaps even more effectively than do the controls thet are spelled out in the regulations. ‘Wo exo referring to something that might be called state of nind, or attitude, or atwosphere. We found @ universal evarences that firearms, while treated as just another item of supply in the general supply regulations, are in reality a very special kind of property reqoiring special types of handling. It 4s widely believed that tho upper echelons of the Agenay would prefer to have no traffic at all with firearms and are likely to — Seal pereuptorily with offenders who knowingly try to circumvent controle. This is not to say that people are running scered; it i¢ gust thet thay know what the general policy is, and they rospect it. 2. What is perhaps most notable is the extent to which current ettitutes with respect to firearms differ from attitudes that vere prevalent in the Agency during ite earlier years. arly in this paper we remarked that ordnence is big business in ClA—and this is gobut it is @ quite different type of big business than it was in the ninetecn-fifties.. The massive woopons dealings are @ thing of the pest. Today's outlook on veapone procurenent in « 5], @ BECRET 25K1C
13-00000 SECRET the Office of Logistics is characterized by caution and conservatisa. Within the Clendestine Service, there are Variations 4n outlooks cn fiveorns arising leegely from differing conditiona in the foreign field. Latin Americans and Africans, for example, like guns; and they are @ useful commodity in fostering or reinforcing operational rela- tionships. Not unexpectedly, officers of WE Division have a somewhat different attitude tower guns than do officers of, say, ZUR Division. | Yet eacther attituie prevails in FE Division as « consequence of its support of Large-scale paremtilitery operations in Southeast Asie. We ahould e44 that FE Division mkes « clear distinction between gupply of weapons for combat and weapons for any other purpose. Even allowing for these variations in attitudes, we think it fair to say thet the Clandestine Service, too, ie Living in o nev era in which it ig understood that firearms will play a small and closely monitored TOl@s SECRET.
13-00000 BECRETF TAB A 4GENCY REGULATORY ISSUANCES 25X1A 25X1A futhorizstion and Control of Firearms Isaued for the Protection of Classified Documents and Sensitive Naterlals Authorization and Control of Firearma Issued for Training, Research, an4 Operational Purposes CIA Exergensy Security Patrol Prohibition of Explosives, Incendiaries, Pyro- technics, Chemical Ammunition, and Other Hazardous Oxinance Items in Agency Aduinistration Budidings aud Warehouses Procurencat of Material ani Eonpersona, Services Shipuent of Governnent Property . Preperation end Sranmeission of Dispatches 4 25X1A 25X1A Security: Fircarnd Headquarters Property Accounting Procedures, Sype II Accountable Activities — Property Accountability Records Disposition of Ixucess or Unsexviceeble Property SECRET
13-00000 . . S BC RE? SX1A . 5X14 - | Administrative Reporting for Small. Stations Field Property Accounting Procedures, Type II Accountable Installations 25X1A 20X1A Firearng Lielson with the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State 25X1A _ | 25X1A Coutrol of Firearns Research and Development of Paranilitary Material Pouch Trenemiesion Pacitiities and Limitetiong Pouch Factiities and Iimitetions Control of Firearna 25X1A 251A Policy on Giving or Selling Firearms to Foreigners Miscellancous tructions and Directive: 25XhA : eel cue Instructions end re a Firearms: Isauance to Foreigners as Gitte or Accommdation Purchases , 25X1A Mission, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, Supply Division, Office of Logistics Memorandum from Director of Logistics to Chiefs, Procurement ‘Division and Supply Division, dated 16 August 1968, subjects Procurenent of Firearns o2«= ’ | SECRET | On ° L
13-00000 < SECRET TAB B Diatrict Attorney James Garrison's investigation of the supposed New Orleans origin of a plot to assassinate President Kennedy tried to link CIA to two incidents in southern Louisiang involving caches — of weapons and explosives. The first incident occurred in 1961 and eoncerned the theft of material from an explosives storage bunker at the Houma Air Force Base at Houma, Louisiana. The second incident. . was in July 1963 when the PBI seized a cache of explosives and other var-related materielg near Lacombe, Louisiana. Garrison may have gotten these two incidents confused in the early days of his investigation, thinking that the theft from the Houma bunker tock plece not long before the assassination of President Kemnedy. It is also possible that he deliberately merged the two incidents to add sensation to his case. There may, in fact, be a iink between the ‘tuo <neidente: the description of the materials seized by the FBI at Lacombe sounds suspiciously like those reportedly stolen from the Houma bunker. In any event, a key elenent of Garrison's cose Wee en allegation that oue Julio BUZHEDO went to Dallas at the tine of the essassine- tion in panel truck used in the comission of the burglary of the amminition bunker at Touma, Louisiana. The truck allegedly contained Dealey Plaza. . fF SECRET
13-00000 SECRET ~ wing accounts of the Houma ani.Lacoube incidents: are often named, but they appear to have been dealing with the sama . people as was the press. Kost of the sources are unreliable, and much of the available anformation is contradictory; thus, neither account ts high on accuracy. Although detaile may be wrong in spote, - the events did take place approximately as we describe them and serve t© illustrate how readily an investigator could establish trails supposedly leading from these arms caches to CIA. Bone of the trails | ead to persons who hed o direct and then current affiliation with | Gervrisen may have come to associate these caches with CIA. | The Houma Burglary Gorvion NOVEL fled from Louisiana to avoid (among other things) questioning by Garrison on HOVEL's role in # 1961 theft of explo-~ sives end related material stored by the Schlumberger Well Surveying Corporation in an emamition bunker at the Howna Air Force Base near According to HOVEL, the Schlumberger company had an arrangement with CIA wherein the company leased a bunker in which enmmition, © . bomb casings, and other matex‘ial would be stored for CIA. The ®lleged theft by him and his associates was supposedly a war materials Pickup made at the direction of his CIA contact. NOVEL firat clained eo Ze SECRET
13-00000 SECRET. - that the explosives were picked up and consolidated soca after the bunker incident and vere taken to Guba by boat for use in a divere slonary operation in support of the Bay of Pigs invasion. When 1¢ became known that the burglary occurred after the Bay of Pigs operation, reportedly on 1 August 1961, MOVEL changed his story, He clained then that the Schluxherger interests became upsct tolicuing the Bay of Pigs invasion and wanted out of their contract with CIA, Three months after the invssion, saye NOVEL, arrangenexta were made (presumably by CIA) for the mterial stored in the bunker te be removed by NOVEL and his group. At the time the material was removed, one of the group alse tock some of Schlumberger’s low-rrnde powder’, fuses, end other mteriel. - : WOVEL has eleo told differing stories as to the disposition of the material stolen from the bunker. He firet said that the ssterial | was to have been shipped out of the U.S. in Schlumberger boxes iabeled “machinery.” He later said that the boxes of ordnance were Joated on trucks, taken to New Orleans, and dropped in three epots: David FERRIE's home, Gordon WOVEL's office building, end Guy BAMNISTER' s office. HOVEL claimed that the munitions were leter consolidated and teken by boat to Cuba for the diversionary operation. He leter changed thet story.. Another source, Carlos QUIROGA, when questioneé by Garrison, said that « Mami group picked up the cache and hauled 4¢ to Mami in @ rented truck. QUIROGA said that he ~3- SECRET
13-00000 c” SECRET - NOVEL named Sergio ARCACHA Suith and Dav. . ¥SRRIE as two of his associates in the burglary. Trails to CIA from the Houma Bunker Theft The Diversionary Operation: There was a diversionary operation planned, end the Cubans scheduled to participate in it were trained — near Hew Orleans. This was the Hino Diaz group consisting of some -- 1600270 men who were to land about 30 miles east of Guantanamo 48 hours in edvance of the Bay of Pigs lending. ‘he Diez group put to sea, end actually reached its Cuban, lending area on schedule. Poor | Cuben leadership caused the operation te abort et the last moment. | The training took place and the war materials for the operation were stored on a reactivated Yavy installation know as the Belle Chasse Ammunition Depot shout eight miles southeast of New Orleans. (Houma ie about 45 miles southwest of New Orleans.) We find no record or — ' wecollection of arms for thig diversionary operation being stored anywhere in southern Louisiana other than at Belle Chasse. Joke Esterline once described the Hino Diaz group to us as consisting of “a bunch of real thugs,” many of whom eventually wound up in New | Orleans as public charges or es threats to public order. The Bch yr Well. Surv rations ‘he Office of ‘Logistics hes had dealings in the past with Schlunberger-related firms, but avoided the Schlumberger Mrm itself because of ite foreign owner= ahip and questionable personalities in the firm, ‘he Hew Orleans aba SECRET
13-00000 SECRET £ <= } office of the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) had one contact in ume 1955 with the manager of the Schlumberger office in New Orleans. DCS has hed continuing, althouga infrequent end circumspect, contact with the main Schlunberger office in Houston. None of these contacts in any way related to the Houma bunker incident. Julio BUZNEDO: Garrison reportedly believes that BUZNEDO was one - of those present in David FERRIS's apartment when the essasoination of President Kennedy was supposedly being plotted. Gexrrison also re= ‘portedly has a photograph showing BUZNEDO standing with FERRIE beside FERRIS a alrplane. Garrison also alleged that BUZMEDO went to Dallas at the time of the assassination in a panel truck used in the burglary of the Houma emmmition bunker. The trick allegedly contained three rifles end was parked behind the wall on the grassy knoll at Dealey Plaza. Julio BUZNEDO may be identical with Julien BUZNEDO Castellanos, who exrived in the U.S. in late 1960 and enlisted in Brigade 2506. He served on the invasion craft BARBARA J, was captured, and was released in the prisoner exchange. JMIAVE requested a Provisional Operational, Ayproval on 6 Jamuary 1961 for bis usé as 0 PM marition trainee. The POA was granted on 16 Jemeary 1961 but was later cancelled. There is no record of BUZNIDO's being involved with the Agency, other than his participation in the Bay of Pigs operation. Sergio ARCACHA Suith: ARCACHA was an associate of David FERRIES ani was named by Gordon NOVEL as being a meaber of the group that a 5 « BECRET
13-00000 SZCRET burglarized the Houma armamition bunker. Garrison brought Emilio SANTANA Gelinéo from Florida to Nev Cleans to identify ARCACHA as having been in New Orleans on a certain date. File traces reveal that ARCACHA became the FRENTE REVOLUCIOKAREO DEMOCRATICO (RD) éelegate in New Grleons pricr to the Bay of Pige invasion and contimed in thet pooition until the FAD ceased to function. ‘The FRD was the predecessor to the CUBAN REVOLURIONARY COUNCIL and was organized end guyported by the Agency. The orgonization was used es @ front for recruitment of Brigade 2506 for the invasion. ARCACHA reported to the ERD headquarters in Miami through a post office box in Coral Gables an4 reportedly maintained extensive relations with the Hew Orleans FBI and Imxigration offices. One of his reguler FSI contecte was Guy Bannister, who was umed by NOVEL es one of the persons to whom material from the Houma coche wes delivered, Emilio SANTANA Galindo; SANTANA, a convicted burglar, vas brought to New Orleans from Miami by Gerrison for questioning. Garrison reportedly hoped te use SANTANA as a means of linking ARCACHA to the assassination plot. 4n FBI report says that SANTANA wes . alleged to own a MailichersCarci 90! carbine Like OSWALD's and to have been in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination on orlers of tha alleged conspiretors (SHAW, OSWALD, FERRIS, and ARCACHA). SANTANA was recruited by the JMHAVE station in Octeber 1962, and, after training, he participated in a single infiltration-exfiltration » & o SECRET
13-00000 SECRET = operation. He was terminated in October 1963. In 196% he listed CIA as his exployer when he applied for credit to buy an automobile. Ue knew eight CIA staff necbers by true names or aliases and 14 other agents. | Gordon D. nova NOVEL has both claimed and denied CIA affilia=- tion. Garrison has claimed that NOVEL was a CIA agent and thet one of his lawyers, Stephen PLOIMIM, vas paid by CIA. NOVEL was yoly- graphed by Lloyd FURR, a private detoctive in NeLean, Virginia. The reference to Mclean caused newspapers to speculate that NOVEL had been polygrephed by CiA. ROVEL claimed thet he ani others robbed the Schluuberger bunker in Houma et CIA's instigation end that he ren the Evergreen Advertising Agency in New Orleans as a CIA front. He left @ letter in his Kew Orleans epartment, subsequently delivered to Garrieon, implying a tie between NOVEL and the CIA Double~Chek —-— ' operation. RHOVEL sent a telegram to the DCI on 23 Nay 1967 shout the Garrison investigation, He telephoned the DCS office in New Orleans on 22 August 1967, saying thet he would try to keep CIA from becoming involved in Garrison's investigation. ALL of NOVEb's claims about association with CIA ave lies. | Carlos GUIROGA: QUIROGA was one of Garrison's prime sources of information on supposed assassination plotting in New Orleans. One interview was taped without QUIROGA knowing it, and Garrison subse- quently released the transcript to the press. GUIROGA claimed to -T- SECRET
13-00000 ‘would prove thet BRINGUIER was aware of: OSWALD' a: SECRET © have known of the burglarizing of the Houma bunker end to have helped load the material on @ truck bound for Niemi. QUIROGA is xeported to have once been & mamber of the CIA-sponsored Cuban, Democratic Revolutionary Front. There is some evidence euggesting that he may actually have been « penetration of the Front on behalf? of Cuban intelligence. While he waa a student at Louisiana State University, QUIROGA vag a ceniidate for the Agency's student re- cruitment program. (his program involved the recruitment of Cuban students in the U.8. who would return to Cuba as agents in plece.) There is no indication, however, that QUIROGA wae ever employed by the Agency in any capacity. Carlos Jooe BRINGUIER: BRINQUIER, evidently a confident of Carlog (UIROGA, in July 1967 turned over to the FBI a copy of the transcript of QUIROGA's debriefing by Garrison. On 6 April 1967 ERINGUIER reported to the New Orleans DCS office that he had been summoned to Garrison's office, was polygraphed, and was questioned concerning his CIA contacts. He was also questioned by Alborto FOWLER, @ Cuban who ig a Garrison investigator. According to a statement to the FEI by GUIROGA, FOWLER has claimed that Garrison affiliation with i According to the Warren Commission report, there ves an altercation between OSWALD and BRINGUIER on 9 August 1963 and a. radio debate between them on 2). August 1963. BRINGUIER is a former ~8- , SECRET
13-00000 SECRET leader of the Student Revolutionary Directorate, an anti-Castro organization that was established and funded by CIA. ERINGUIER vag also en occasions contact, on his own initiative, of STATOTHR STATOTHR Miogellenecus Prats Devid FERRE: Garrison has repeatedly claimed that FERRIE was once employed by CIA. We have seen nothing that could cone celvably link him with ClAm-other thon his association with persons having indirect ties to CIA through memberchty in ClAssupported onti- ‘ Castro organizations. | Clay SHAW: Surprisingly, Gorrison has not, to our knowledge, publicly accused Clay SEAW of having ties to CIA. The DCS office in TATOTHR [ in contact with SHAW sone 30 tives beginning in 1949 “end ending in 1956. When General Cabell, then DDCI, addressed the Foreign Policy Association of Hew Orleans in May 1961, he reportedly was introduced by Clay SHAW. Lloyd FURR: FURR, the private detective vho polygraphed Gordon NOVEL in McLean in 1967, cen be Linked with CIA but only in 25X1A SX1A SX1A hen Chief, DDP/WE/3, directed a memorendum to the Chief, nnp/ia/6, in which he recorded a conversation he had on 27. April 1963 with Raymond CASSAGIOL, on anti-Duvalier exile from Haiti. aa 9 oe SECRET | Wt .
13-00000 - fusea, 25 pieces of primacord, 24 blasting caps, end a 5O-pound SECRET Ee relates in the memorandum that the conversation tock place in the home of Richard L. BAS? whom Oven met through @ neighbor, Lloyd FURR. | 25X1A fhe Lacorbe Yunitions Cache James Garrison seid in his Playboy interview: “In the New Orleans erea, vhere the conspiracy was hatched, the CIA was training a@ mixed bag of Minutemen, Giban exiles , and other adventurers north of Lake Pontchartrain for a foray into Cuba and en assaseination attempt on Fidel Castro. . . «+ » when the CIA withdrew its support | and they couldn't fight Castro, they picked their next victim-~Jchn Fe Kennedy.” The Mev York. Lines on 1 August 1963 reported that the FEI had raiéed a house near Lacombe, Louisiana, on 31 July, and seized a - eache consisting of 48 cases of 60 percent dynamite each weighing 50 pounds, twenty 100-pound boub casings, paraphenalie for asseubling container of gasoline thickener. ‘The following account of the _ Composition and activities of this group in training near Lacoube is baced in large part on statements of particularly unreliable vitnesses, ‘but Lt 4a Close enough to the facts to fit ox purposes. In June 1962, Lewnence Js LABORUE Gereld P. HEMMING, and Howard K. DAVIS visited Frank BARTS, @ Cuban Living 1m Rev Orleans, end « 10 « SECRET
13-00000 ee ee a ne - bes tiekets for four af the men who had no money to return to Miami. SX1A SECRET seached aa agreement with him for the training near New Orleans of anti-Castro Cubans as g@uerrille fighters and demolition experts. LABCRIE'e son, Michse2, identified his father’s contact among Cubans aa being Alberto FERNANDEZ of Key Biscayno, Florida, a menber of the UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA. Rudolph R. DAVIS, another Cuban in New Orleans, arranged with Lazeano BATISTA, in Miami, to send come 19 Cubans to New Orleans for training. Radolph Re DAVIS was reportedly the contact mon between the Cubans at the camp end their Amexican supporters, who were unnamed but were reportedly antl-Castro right-wingers. Victor PANEQUE was ' the Cuban in charge of the group, end Gerald HEMMING appears to have been in charge of training. According to Carlos QUTROGA, the men in ‘the camp were disgruntled over the food end became demoralized when the FBI seized the mnttions cache. GUIROGA claimed that he bought ' 25X1A @told « Warren Comission investi- | gator in April 196% that he had been visited on 2 August 1963 by two | Cubans who Claimed they had deserted from @ training camy across Lake Pontchartrain out of fear that the training group hed been penetrated by @ Castro agent. BRINGUIER claimed that he had not known before then of the exiatence of the camp. ERINGUISR said that he collected funds from other Cubens in Mev Orleans to pay the fares of the two deserters back to Miani. elle SECRET
13-00000 SBECRET ~ Trails to CIA from the Leecnive Minitions Cache and Training Camp Alberto Federico FERNANDEZ Hechavarria; Albert FERNANDEZ was named by Hichael LABORDE ac being his father's contact among Cuban exiles. In a 196% interview with the FaI, FERNANDEZ acknowledged that he knew of Rudolph DAVIS, the Lacombe group's contact with their American supporters. FERNANDEZ was a prominent mexber of the UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA, which waa CIAesupported. FERNANDEZ was also — & JHEAVE contact beginning in December 1960 and continuing at least through Jamary 1966. He figured in e 1962 IG Savestigation of CIA activities in the Milani area as the owner of a ship, the TEAEANA which was used by the Agency in wayitime operations egainst Cuba. Lawrence J. LABORDS: LABORIE wes named ap one of those contect- ing Frank BARTES in New Orleans to arrange for the training of the Cubsns at Leconbe. Larry LABORDE was granted a provisional covert security approval for use by the JMWAVE station on 24 March 1961. A 31 March 1961 cable from Miami requested permission to increase his salary to $700 per month, plus bonuses. JMWAVE requested on 20 April 1962 thet the approval be cancelled on the grounds that LABORDE was & poor security risk. He served as chicf engineer on FERNANDEZ’ veasel, the TEJANA. LABORDE alxost certainly wes the source of the: charges of CIA mismanagement of Cuban operations, which reached the White House and were the basis of the IG investigation in Florida in (3962. On 11 Mey 1967, LABORDE telephoned the New Orleans office of wo i2 « \ SECRET
SECRET — the DCS, saying that he was a former CIA employee, that he feared that Garrison would subpoona him, that he was willing to leave the U.S. to avoid @ subpoena, and that he wanted tho office to tell bin’ What to doe He was told that the New Orleans office was in no posi~ tisn to advise hin. Vietor Memel PANEGUE y BATISTA: Victor PANEQUE was named by Rudolyh DAVIS e@ one of the Cubana vbo arrived at the Laconbe train ing comp from Miomi and vas identified by Carlos QUIROGA as being the Leader of the Cuban group. ‘the Miami station, on 10 August 196%, requested a POA and Commo clearance on PANEQUE as secon as possible. The FOA vas granted on 13 Novenber 1964. The atation reported on 5 October 1965 thet PANSQUE vas to be terminated a¢ of 31 October 1965, because there was no immediate operational use for him. Gerald P. REMMING: HEMMING was one of the men who approached Frenk BAREES in New Orleans to propose the training activity at Lacombe, and there is some evidence that puts him in charge of train- ing @t the camp. HEMMING has denied sponsorship by any U.S. Govern- ment agency; hovever, there is information in the file indicating that he may have been in touch with the Los Angeles DCS office at one time. A DDP/WE meucrandim of February 1965 atated that the Clandestine Sexvice had never had any operational relationship with HEMMOING. A 1964 cable from & WH Division covert operations office in New Orleans reported that HEMMING's group had threatened to creste a acene to exbarvasa CIA. ' #-13- SECRET
13-00000 - SECRET Caxlos CASTILLO Armas: ‘he training alte reyortedly vas located on or adjacent to a form owned by Carlos CASTILLO Armas, vho overthrew the Guatemalan regime in 1954. CIA's involvement in the Guatemalan operation and its support of CASTILLO have been the subject of widee spread publicity. Miscellancous Traiis Carlos GUIROGA's ephemeral ties to CIA were discussed in the earlier section on the Houma cache. Carlos PRINGUIER'S similarly vague ties to CIA were also dise cussed in the earlier section. | @ 14 @ SEBCREP