Docld: 32425007 Page 15 & t ‘ a Z ose LUANG PRABANG i ~ ® La ary BTRY| ANNEX A INTERNATIONAL: BOUNDARY PROVINCE BOUNDARY ROAD ROUTE NUMBER PHASE LINE AXIS OF ADVANCE FINAL, OBJECTIVE EET Le oe SAM NEUA we " Peete \ - 1ABRBN | ‘ a ere 2 INF BN a ie TASK FORCE NORTHEAST promt . 5 PHASE 2 (SOG MEO | LINE SOO FAL. | fo Snowe PHAN ree gc TK GO sf. PHOU KHOUN ~~" ls ~s Mao Sige 008 Ne PEN ESG XEING KHOUANG jreNcR co | on’ pHase 2 [1 RECON CO |, —_—e LINE | MEO & “ig Joa: j o BAN SA - ‘ . : ZBAN TA VIANG ” iy, PHASE f See pod, TASK FORCE SOUTH ‘ € INF SN 2 ARTY ETRY MEO (MAP) DATE 9 MARCH 1961 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRE? REQUIREMENTS TO IMPLEMENT wt THe CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR _ TRE CAPTURE OF OF THE THE “PLAING Di DES_ “JARRES Additional psychological moves, fire support and logistic effort are required to implement successfully the Plaine des Jarres operation, ALL of these measures should be undertaken urgently in order to complete this operation before the onset of the rainy season about the first of May. Most of the pro- posec measures can be undertaken with little fear of compensa- tory or vetallatory ection by the Communist Bloc. These additional reduirements include: 1. Appraisal anc Froblems of Leadership: a. Phoumi is running a one-man show, giving little freedom of decision to commanders or to staff officers. He is now devoting most of his time to coping with governmental problems, instead of fisghting the wer. These problems stem largely from efforts by the United cA ct o ct fees, tne United <ingdom and France to persuade Phoumi to broacen his government base and "win the suppore. of if the Lao people," and the numerous concepts for the inter- vention of control commissicns. = b. Phoumi feels insecure due to the internal situation in Laos, the conflicting pressures of diverse family interests and distrust of his subordinate leaders. His crucial command positions is one result of his distrust. He also feels insecure because he does not have confidence in cotiolete US support. During his Revolutionary Period, he developed the conviction that the US Favored Souvanna instead of himself. Based on this experience, he i ta uneertain of US support; and conversely, the US Ambassador is uncertain cf Phoumi's capabilities and trustworthiness. TOP SECRET el petal te ercuherdoneiecoat Doclda: 32425007. Page 16 et = tl) 7 Wi 6
TOP _ SECRET (1) The US mission i Laos should be directed to 2 accept as a matter of overriding priority the military 3 mission of recapturing PD? and should support Phoumt y accordingly. 5 (2) Present efforts to broaden the base of the RLG 6 and to seek a political solution should be given secondary 7 priority to enable Phoumi to concentrate on the PDJ 8 militery operation, 9 3) US influence with other governments should support 10 soe these priorities, Other governments should be informed ca that it ils our judgment that a satisfactory political 16 settlement is not attainable wmtil there is an improve- 13 ment in the military situation, 1h (4+) ALL US personnel, including the Ambassador and 15 the United States Mission, should impress upon Phoumi 16 the importance of putting his best commanders in the field 17 and relieving inept officers who are losing battles 18 for him, 19 (5) Above all, the additional air ana artillery 20 support and logistic means needed to capture the Plaine a1 des Jarres should be provided. ‘The Chief, PEO, should be 90 authorized to inform Phoumi of support to be provided, 23 operations to be undertaken and results expected, oy 2. Maximum Utilization of MEO Guerrillas: 25 a. BY a maximum effort, including full cooperation by 26 the FAL, the present effective strength of 3,000 MEO OT irregulare will be increased as rapidly as possible by 28 lL April, The MEO guerrillas can be most effectively 29 employed in harassing actions behind enemy lines, cutting 30 supply routes and making hit-and-run attacks on eneny | 31 formations, They would be supplemental, therefore, to an 32 attack mounted by FAL regular forces, 33 TOP SECRET 2 Docld:324295007 Page 17.-- aio
b. CAS stocks on Okinawa can be increased to support 1 such a force F 3. Aly Support and 4 Inter diction Operations: 3 a. It will be necessary to sustain combat air opera- dy tions designed to: oe 5 (1) Interdict Pathet Lao lines of communication 6 (2) Destroy rebel supply cumps and installations 7 (3) Fragment Pathet Lao concentrations, 8 ireraft in the numbers and types néeded to make effective 9 delivery and achieve shock effect should be employed, They... 10 should be armed with guns, rockets, bombs and napalm, as - La required by the targets to be attacked, he b, There are nine armed T-6s (2/30 cal guns, 4/5" 13 rockets, 2/100 1b bombs) in the Laos inventory. Five 14 combat-ready Laotian pilots are available for current 15 operations; four qualified Thai pilots are on hand, The | 16 T-6, though slow and lightly armed, has a psychological L7 effect considerably greater than its destructive power, 18 It has value as a supplement to more powerful aircraft. LO e. (1) It is estimated that sixteen Sterile B-26s and 20 20 pilots are required to accomplish the missions en- el visaged in the attack on the Plaine des Jarres (PDI). 22 (2) CIA has eight of these planes in Taiwan and the 23 USAF can supply the additional eight, plus necessary Qu. spares support, available in a period of 2-3 weeks, 25 (3) CIA has four currently qualified American pilots, 26 and it would require 3-4 weeks of training to provide ae more civilian American pilots, Sixteen sanitized USAF 238 erews could be provided in 2-3 weeks, Volunteers from 29 the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF), Philippine Air 30 Force (Par), and REAP. could not be trained in time; The 21 former require 4-6 weeks and the latter two, 6-8 weeks. 32 Docld: 32425007. ..Page 16