457-10011-10018 Se ee ee oe Ee a oe oD AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORDS SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO : TITLE : SSCI TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 11, 1975, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL DATE : PAGES : SUBJECTS : QP eanscrrer, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS SSCI Box 231, Folder HY 50955 Docld: 32203736 -SSCIA Date:08/15/92 Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION 157-10011-10018 06/11/75 135 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT T REFERRED P 09/29/93 5, Testimony of Richard Bissell] [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 1
dn5 TOP SECRET | 53 1 to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until 5 after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 3 Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably 4 with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developing more 5 capability of assassinations. And you may have discussed 6 | it in the context  -of various potential targets without "% | deciding on them. Once you decided on a target!, or you were 8 going to recommend a target, what was the process of getting ad 9 clearance? } 10 Mr. Bissell. I can't answer you that, simply because Ll no specific target was ever recommended. And ito the best 12 of my knowledge and belief, other than the case we have discuss 13 at length of Castro, which in time preceded the SRRIFLE pro- WARD & PAUL 14 ject. The issue of obtaining clearance never arose, 15 can speculate on how that would have worked if lou wish. 16 Senator Mondale. No. 7 The Chairman. Let's go ahead then with the questions. 18 Mr. Schwarz. Senator Baker asked, did Helms succeed you? . 19 Mr. Bissell. That is correct. J 20 Mr. Schwarz. pid you turn over SRRIFLE to him and F 21 did you tell him about it? | : 20 Mr. Bissell. I believe I did. And I also believe 23 that Mr. Harvey told him about it promptly after the turnover. >: oA Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a man called; Gustin 0" o' penne) : 25 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do. TOP SECRET : HY 50955 DBoctd: 3227039786 Page 2
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il 12 a a) 14 WARD & PAUL 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 20 24 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 50955 DBDocld: 32203736 Page 3 dn6 TOP SECRET Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him in words or kill Mr. Lumumba? 54 substance to Mr. Bissell. I asked him to investigate the possibility and to make explanation for so doing. Mr. Schwarz. When did you do that? Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may have it on a chronology here, but I imagine that is a matter | | of record, or that he has testified to that date. I don't remember the date. Mr .Schwarz. Did you tell him this connection with making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb? Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did. ' Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell you he wouldn't do it? Mr. Bissell. Later he told me that he didn't want to do it. But he also said that he thought it was an inappro- priate action, and that the desired object could be accom- plished better in other ways. Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized you to tell to take steps: to move toward assassinating Mr. , Mr. Bissell. Nobody. Mr. O#DOnned1 | ‘Lumumba? Mr. Schwarz. Did you inform the White House of that? Mr. Bissell. No. Mr. Schwarz. To the best of your knowledge, did anybody inform the White House of that? Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no. TOP SECRET 1 i t
HY Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL Street, S.E£., Washington, D.C. 20003 410 First 0955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 dn7 TOP SECRET Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr. Lumumba? Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. told a member of the clandestine service to make plans and develop the capability so to do if it were approved and ordered. Senator Goldwater. Approved by who? Mr. Bissell. It would have then had to have approval at the highest level of government. The Chairman. Where did the idea come from? Mr. Bissell. I don't remember, Mr. Chairman. It could possibly have been mine. The Chairman. It could possibly have been Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rostow that was! your initiativ Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruction as to MOUbonneisl) was my initiative. Senator Baker. How many others did you plan on, just as a contingency? * How many other people did you instruct to draw up plans to, assassinate? Mr, Bissell. I don't believe there were any others which - yours? 55 I went to the point of instructing that a man be prepared. Senator Baker. How many were there that didn't go that far? How many murders did you contemplate? Mr. Biseéll. Well, Senator -- TOP SECRET Boclda: 322703786 Page 4 id
dnil TOP SECRET | 59 Ls 1 quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent ¢ g a to the Congo in the fall of 1960. é 5 The Chairman. Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which 2 4 counsel has referred reads as follows: 9) "In recommending the agent or asset ROGUE), 6 Station, Leopoldville, the Chief of the Agency's African 7 Division, probably Bronson Tweedy, wrote in late 1960: 8 "He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, 9 but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong 10 in the eyes of the world,but necessary because his case offi- 11 cer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he | : 12 will dutifully undertake appropriate action for, its execution ; 13 without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize ‘a ; ‘ 14 all actions'". 15 Is that fairly representative of the philosophy that 16 applied to such matters at the time? 17 Mr. Bissell. Well, it certainly applied within the 18 range of matters that would have come under SRRIFLE. . 19 . Could say, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no way in s 20 which it is possible to operate a secret intelligence agency : 2] or a secret service unless it has at least a number of : 22 employees who are willing to and can be depended upon to a 23 carry out orders involving acts of this sort. i 24 The Chairman. That assumes, of course, ithat the E 25 United States ought to assassinate foreign leaders. TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 322703786 Page 5
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL Freet, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 410 First HW 50955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 ay 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 dnl3 TOP SECRET 61 meant to suggest that that was entirely comparable? Mr. Bissell. It was not meant to suggest that it was entirely comparable, but the individual whom I have mentioned were all perceived in their time and place as menaces to their own countries and the U.S. interests. Senator Goldwater. Might I ask a question based on his experience? From my readings in trying to learn more about intelli- gence, I gathered the impression that the actions such as you have been describing up to and including assassination, are practiced by every intelligence organization that I have : been studying, is that correct? Mr. Bissell. That is my impression likewilse, Senator. Senator Goldwater. Including/:& Mr. Bissell. I believe so. In fact, I [think definitel it has been used [by Mang. I couldn't give you specific cases. Senator Goldwater. Certainly KGB. Mr. Bissell. Certainly the KGB -- although as, the Chair man pointed out the other day, I at least canndt point to any case where the KGB has carried out the assassination of a chief of state. Senator Goldwater. Would you assume that jin the cases 'of those other countries that this ruler would have knowledge i of this in every case? TOP SECRET DoctTd: 32203736 Page 6
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el Re 25 reet, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 dnl4 TOP SECRET 62 Mr.Bissell. In the case specifically of (theUtK., ] I would answer in the affirmative. I also believe, however, that the Chief of the Intelligence Service of a countries would flatly deny that the chief of s knowledge of such action. Senator Goldwater. Thank you. Senator Baker. Would you deny it? Mr. Bissell. In our case here?: Senator Baker. Yes, sir. Mr. Bissell. Yes, it would be appropriat Senator Baker. Have you done so? Mr. Bissell. I have not had occasion to, ny one of those tate had e to do so. because I am unaware of any high level assassination that occurred by the U.S. Senator Baker. Doesn't that amount to a denial? Mr. Bissell. It is a denial that any has occurred, at least in the period that I am aware of. Mr. Schwarz. Was your answer to Senator Baker meant to 1 indicate that you would perjure yourself on this matter? Mr. Bissell. It depends a little bit on the context. There are occasions when I would go a iong way to protect the President of the United States from certain kinds of embarrass-~ ment. Senator Baker. . The question was, very simply, would i \ you try to protect the President in such a case TOP SECRET HW 50955 DBocld: 32203786 Page 7 as you des-
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 410 First Greet, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 el dni5 cribed,(MI6 6r otherwise? TOP SECRET 63 Mr.Bissell. I can conceive of so doing, Senator. i i i Senator Tower. May I pursue that just a moment further? You might say one thing in sworn testimony before a committee like this, but say another thing publicly, what you mean? I think I would have lied about the U-2 myself: 1 | Mr. Bissell. That is exactly what I mean. The Chairman. Have you lied to this committee? Mr. Bissell. No, sir. The Chairman. Would you lie to this committee? Mr. Bissell. No, sir. is that Senator Tower. I think that distinctionjhas to-be made. The Chairman. Shall we proceed with the questions? Mr. Schwarz. The remaining topic I have is Trujillo. It is respectfully indicated, and involves a lot of documents. And we have some procedural matters that we need to take up. I know we can't finish Trujillo before 12:30, and I would suggest that. we ask the witness and whatever Senators that can return to. come back this afternoon on Trujillo. be no further committee meetings this afternoon. HW 50955 DBocld: 322703736 The Chairman. We have a -Senate order that there will I doubt that we can obtain unanimous consent. TOP SECRET : Page 6
3 TOP SECRET 66 5 1 almost any kind of paramilitary operation, such as the ¢ : 2 Bcuatantiiin operation, the Bay of Pigs itself is, the earlier é 3 operation that has been discussed in the press (in @igan, and: /j 5 | © SH@hY¥ there is an expectation that such operations will involv 6 military or semimilitary action, and that some |people will los 7 | their lives in the process. | | 8 Senator Baker. Yes, but I am speaking rather more 9 precisely of a single person or a group of people whn were 10 targeted, or discussions were held about. targeting..them, for 11 |). what would be an assassination were it not for the legali 7. 12 significance of the. term. 4 13 Mr. Bissell. I don't think I remember any cases in F 14 which that sort of matter was discussed or was /|the subject 1s of planning, other than the ones which have already been 16 mentioned in testimony. 14 Senator Mathias. Could I interject a question at this 18 point. . 19 But of course that contemplates what we have seen in 209 the earlier testimony, that when you begin an operation ~— F 21 and I think this was the history of the Castro operation -- i 99 to in some way incompacitate him politically, that it often ‘ 23 moves to the extreme of incapacitating him physically, isn't y: 54 | that true? : 25 Mr. Bissell. That is correct, sir. HW 50955 Docld:32203786 Page 9 TOP SECRET |
SHELBURNE :msl1 TOP SECRET , 81 E 1 AFTERNOON SESSION Os : 2 2:17 f 3 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D) 3 4 The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. 5 Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning), 6 It will be understood that the oath still) continues to 7 | apply. 8 Mr. Schwarz. Before we turn to Trujillo, two quick i Onwe neers oc euSemsuaanomne questions. Ont neWSuby ecto gasulaanoem el > a & < 14 Mr. Bissell. I have no recollection of that. 15 Mr. Schwarz. And if I took out any of the details and 16 broke it apart you would have no recollection? 17 Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not. 18 M. Schwarz. And the second thing, to pin down on Mr. os | 19 Helms, did yon brief. him about the Mafia matter? g 20 “Mr. Bissell. I am reasonably clear that I did not brief |. 1S) : : : ra] Lone U, PMEE 3 sh. . Ly ¢ 21 him-in. the early stages, that is to say, in 1960. And my § 202 impression is that he may very well not have been briefed on i s | 3 23 until I was about to leave the Agency in early 1962. ¥ 24 Mr. Schwarz. But at that point you did brief him?..: uw . i ° 25 Mr. Bissell. I don't remember whether I personally ¢ | | TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld: 32203736 Page 10
TOP SECRET "° ns 1 they might eventually be so used. : 2 Mr. Schwarz. Is that a supposition, or is it based upon & | é 5 any recollection? 2 4 Mr. Bissell. I would say it is a faint recollection. 5 But I find it very difficult in this case to distinguish 6 between an element of supposition and a dim recollection. 7] | Let me come to what I seem to remember about this matter 8 There was, as you have already indicated, several discussions 9 in the Special Group, and one or more at least in other very 10 small groups with representation from State, the White House ll and the Agency. And I am clear ~- I do recollect that the ‘¥ 12 plans at that time contemplated the arming of obviously a 13 relatively small group inside the Dominican Republic, that is, iF 14 the provision of arms perhaps for a dozen or so, people, but 15 not for something like a Bay of Pigs invasion or a major 16 geurilla activity. i Now, in discussing that kind of an operation, I am 18 perfectly certain that everyone that participated in the 19 discussion was clear that weapons so supplied might very well 20 be used against Trujillo or other senior supporters of his. F 21 Mr. Schwarz. For how many countries in your experience i 20 at the CIA has the US Government supplied arms to dissident : 23 gréaps within the country? | 24 Mr. Bissell. Well, we have talked about two cases; : 25 { is another casé during.the. time I was in the Agency, TOP SECRET HW 350955 DBocld: 322703736 Page 11
TOP SECRET 20 S , . 38 1 or before I was DDP. Off hand I can't remember, other cases, "i 2 but there may have been some. Well, earlier before I was ever é 5 in the Agency, there was /the: ¢ase) om iran. And there was the 2 4 reasonably well publicized case ‘SerGuatama la. 5 Mr. Schwarz. And the Iron Curtain countries? 6 Mr. Bissell. I think we have. 9 | Mr. Schwarz. But what I am driving at, it is fairly | 8 common to supply arms to dissident:.elements in countries all 9 over the world? 10 Mr. Bissell. Yes, that is correct. 11 Mr. Schwarz. Does taht also imply that there is an >, 12 assassination contemplated or not? ; 13 Mr. Bissell. I would say definitely not, in most cases 14 not. In a large scale operation Like CEERNEY there was 15 no intention of any assassination. I think you| would include 16 it under that term. 1 The same is true@intkecantof course -- the| possibility 18 that a chief of state would be killed. . 19 The Chairman. But you would distinguish nas matter fro 20 just supplying of arms to dissidents? In other words, there ‘ 21 was an element of knowledge here that the arms were supplied i 22 for a purpose, and that that purpose might well be the assassi : 23 nation of Trujillo or other highly placed people in this ; 24 Government, correct? + 25 Mr. Bissell. The way I would prefer to state it, wn | TOP SECRET HWY 350955 DBocld: 32203736 Page 12
TOP SECRET ar! E 1 I think is basically consistent with what you said. I would 3 ) say that in the planning of this operation, and in the approva « | i x process, those involved would probably have given a higher E 4 probability to such use being made of the weapons than they 5 would in some of the other operations that I have referred to. 6 Mr. Schwarz. However, just focusing on the Special " | Group as of the 12th of January, you can't tell from the | 8 minutes which state of mind existed, but you have a faint 9 recollection that the more targeted state of mind existed as o 10 the 12th of January? ll Mr. Bissell. My impression is that as of that time, as. 12 I mentioned at the end of the testimony this morning, the reason that the State Department, and probably the Agency's ) a a 13 oo , 1 ‘ 14 representatives in the Special Group, favored this group was 15 a pragmatic reason. It was to maintain and strengthen political 16 ties with the dissidents: WW Mr. Schwarz. The next matter of record that we should 18 focus on is a memorandum of January 25, 1961, apparently 19 reflecting a discussion of FbrojleceteMDEED. WastEMDEED the g 20 code for the overthrow of Trujillo? a ¢ 21 Mr. Bissell. I suspect it was the code name for the & 202 project of support to the dissidents. z s 23 Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember the name(’'E 24 I show you the memorandum of January 24, 1961 headed e 25 "Discussion of Project EMDEED)]." Does it appear to be a ¢ . ‘TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 322703786 Page 13
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD &@ PAUL treet, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 410 First’ HW 450955 LO il 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 él 22 25 24 25 an2 TOP SECRET | 107 and this record, which is a record we have obtained from the Agency, may be unfair to you. But do you not agree that on this record it appears that on the item of the pass- ing of the weapons which were the weapons that were in fact used, it appears that the AGency elected to keep the State Department uninformed on that item? Mr. Bissell. No, sir, it does not quite appear that way. It appears -- if I put these two together -- | Mr. Schwarz. By these two you mean your: cable of March 24 and the cable of May 1 relating to certain matters is po not to be discussed with the State Department? Mr. Bissell. Yes. The earlier cable of those refers to machine guns. . , Mr. Schwarz. And to the pouching of revolvers? ( t Mr. Bissell. And the pouching of revolvers. And | I believe that °- what ‘eventually passed to the dissidents were three rifles, not the revolvers. And, therefore, neither of these cables in fact refers to the passage to the dissi- ee pi this cable states the conditional willingness at some time in the future to pass machine guns. That permission was never granted and they were never passed. It refers to pouching revolvers. And I don't know whether there was a record that those were ever passed, or even intended to be passed, to the dissidents. And it would TOP SECRET Docld: 322703766 Page 14