157-40008-10241 - * J " Tip) 7/2698 Date:10/07/93 Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM ( IDENTIFICATION FORM ee AGENCY INFORMATION —_ AGENCY : SSCIA DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RECORDS SERIES : RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZEO AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R602 Of) 218 eee ee et et dey et se ee tee ee ee ees eee ee os OF ee Ee em oe oe oe ee ee oY on To oF ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO: TIT INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY DATE : 07/24/75 PAGES : 7 SUBJECTS : INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVER on ASSASSINATION INQUIRY DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : T RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : BOX 438-3 HW 50955 Docld:32203749 Page rR] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
( INTERVIEW WITH: Bruce Cheever YU Wu 0.. e ——---__--_Bruce Cheever 4 M/s REGARDING: Assassination Inquiry ee CSS BON 45 8H G poo 4 | DATEWTIME-LOCAT ION: July 24, 1975 PRESENT: Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenova nee AeA Tecate NE HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED: FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S): EXECUTIVE SESSION: _ Yes __ flo HY 50955 Docld: 32203749 Page 2
F 2027 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 1 of 6 ( Dd & Fn A aN eae bce Y aoe Ea] nit, FA) o BSE This morning Joe_DiGenova and I interviewed Bruce Cheever at the. . We focused on Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force W. Background: 1938-43 Marine Corps 1943~+44 OSS Parachute School 1944-46 Marine Corps 1950-53 Office Police Coordination; headed Plans Section for Western European Division _. Y= 1953-56 1956-60 éan Division 1960-3/62 Headquarters, U. S. European Command (U. S. representative) 3/62-65 Deputy Director: Task Force W 1965-71 | 1971 Retired from Agency ~ 3/64-2/65 Deputy Chief, Special Operations Branch (developing paramilitary capabilities for Agency) Apparently selected for Task Force W because of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure whether slotted by Harvey or Helms. Prior to his Task Force W:assignment, Harvey was known to Cheever by reputation only. He des- cribed Harvey as one of the finest operatives the Agency ever had, citing Harvey's Berlin tunnel. Cheever understood that Task Force W was Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro regime; that the Cuban operations had White House backing; and that the Agency had been given an operational carte blanche, with the caveat that each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval prior to getting off the drawing board. Cheever told us: “You don't pull in fast-rising men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid back- ing." Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK's representative and that Task Force W would not suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA with- out Lansdale's approval. BDocld: 32203749 Page 3 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION To ‘DECLASSIFICATION AND/O} RELEASE OF THIS DOCUME AS SANITIZED — 14 SR 94 (1) CB) (1) Cc)
ae ' INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Cheever confirmed what we! | knew hs. Harvey. Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey, he told us that Harvey was a loner and most surely would not inform him of operations unless he had a "must need to know". In Cheever's opinion, Harvey was one of the great believers in compart- mentalization; Cheever "complained that Harvey turned him into his staff man” (as compared to an operational extension). Cheever also told us that Harvey was a two martini man at lunch with thyroid problems; this often "led to problems for Harvey at early afternoon meetings". Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGA meetings. However#ftHe* do@s"fot recall RFK, only recalls briefing Bundy. (Maybe Cheever atténded other than SGA meetings -- the minutes do not re- flect his attendance.) Cheever met weekly with designees of the SGA principals in Lansdale's office (Messrs. Califano, Haig, Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson). Cheever would brief these designees on proposed operational plans; discussion of the details would ensue. Subsequent to the staff meetings, the principals would meet and decide whether or not the particular plan would be approved. Cheever did state that the Group often rejected proposals. In one instance, ' Max Taylor vetoed the maritime infiltration of a small team. Taylor felt that the chances of success were small and attributability great. (Cheever agreed with Taylor -- “but it was one of Lansdale's brain childs.") Cheever told us that “around the Task Force W shop it was known that the Kennedys wanted to get rid of the Castro regime." In order to get this done, "the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency's — tail and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations" According to Cheever, Lansdale and the SGA were “geared to keeping the Kennedys informed as to what was happening". However, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cuban Operations were not pursued with the same sense of urgency. HY 50955 Docld: 32203749 Page 4