13-00000 ou ‘ meet and talk with Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton, it began to look és theuyh Movers and Valenti were taking the Cocuments to the President. James C. Graham, Acting AD/CI, took up with DDI Rav Cline the possibility of inviting Moyers to CTA headquarters for lunch and a briefing. Cline first wanted to discuss the White House. problem with MeCone, and asked Grahem for a little memorancum on how things were going. *!8/ OCI drew up a state- ment for Cline making the principal neints that it had neo way of knowing whether it was meeting the President's needs be- cause it had no feedback from him, in contrast to the situation under Kennedy. The reason for this was that OCI's contacts at the White House did not deal directly with the President on intelligence matters. OCI hoped to be able to establish close links to the President's immediate staff. °*6/ Things remained in a confused state for the next few -months, with only occasional indications that oOcI's presi- dential publications. had hit the mark. Clifton commented in May that the Review was the best means of reaching the President, although he said the PICL registered at times when Valenti was interested in an item. There were days when the President read and initialed beth the Review and the PICL. One day when the PICL was heavy on the side of bad news, Clifton said, "Tt's no wonder the President doesn‘t 4 are ” Aw 5”, oy TOP SECRET |
13-00000 ey TOE SECRET want to read this stuff--it annoys you." From mid-year on, Mr. Johnson made frequent campaign trips around the country. (Cliften, who was usually with him, said he had more luck getting the President to reac his intelligence on the return flights than on the way out, when Mr. Johnson was etudving his speeches. | As the election neared, Secretary of State Rusk expressed some concern to McCone about the security of the Checklist and seemed to prefer that dissemination he limited to the President, Secretary of Defense McNamara and himself. McCone passed the word down and also conveyed his feelinc that the President should read the Checklist dailv, or have it read to him, and should not depend on the semi-weekly Review. #/ AD/CI R. 3. Smith responded in. a memorandum of 5 November 1964. He believed that the Agency would have a qraceful way of Gropping some of the Checklist readers if the publication were to undergo a transformation in which it would accuire a. new name, a new cover, and a. new format. It would become President Jchnson's publication, specifically designed to meet his needs. To increase the chances of its being read by the Chief Executive, it would he produced to conform to the President's working habits and woulc be delivered in late oo afternoon. Smith noted that the Review, which Mr. Johnson “usually reads," was timed for his evening perusal. Smith TCP SECRET ‘
13-00000 - TOP SECRET also noted the importance of finding a way to establish direct contact with the President so that OCI could cet - . a * a vod feedback and thus avoid writing in a vacuum. 28/ - The PDB Anrears Smith's prevosal for a new publication was accepted and was rapidly put into effect. The last Checklist was dated 30 November 1964 and the next dav the first issue of the President's Dailv Prief (PDB) was Gelivered to the White House. In substance it resembled the PICL, but it had a fresh apnear- ance--chiefly because it was printed on legal-sized paver-- and it came cut late in the afternoon instead of early in the morning. Jack Valenti sent this first issue back to McGeorge Bundy saying that the President read it, liked it, and wanted it continued. Dissemination was cut back, so that the only persons receiving the PDB outside the "White House were the Secretary. and Under Secretary of State, the Secretary. of Defense, the Deputy Secretary and one Assistant Secretary, the Treasury Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and .Gen. Carroll, the head of DIA. The semi-weekly Review was dropped, but by 16 December the DCI ordered that a summary of OCI's Current Intelligence Weekly Review be included with each Friday's PDB. The summary, titled Highlights of the Week, lasted only until 26 February 1965, having failed to arouse presidential interest. se) is TOP SECRET .
.. ee fe Fy TOP SECPET In the ersuing weeks and months, OCI was naturally watching for indications of the success or failure of the restyled daily for the Fresident. On 13 January, PDB writer Thomas Patton noted that Bromley Smith wrote "the President" in the upper right corner of Copy Ne. 1. Patten asked whether Smith would like ocr to. type this cn. No, said Smith, putting it on in long-hand gave it a human touch. On 18 January, the Prief went from a legal-sized to a letter-sized document as a result of discussions between McGeorge Pundy and Ray Cline. Bromley Smith said he liked the new format and he thought the South Vietnam item was it He reported very briefly and generally "exactly right.. that Saigon had a new cabinet. The President, Smith said, was not interested in the names of generals and ministers | and didn't follow such details. Further experiments in page size followed a talk McCone had with the President, but nothing came of them. There was even a sample Brief that the President could put in his pocket, though the thought of having sensitive material handled this way made Bromley Smith groan. “In mid-February, Bromley Smith said that the Vietnam “situation report, which OCI had begun sending to the White House daily at 8 a.m., was proving to be very useful; it was | going up to the President every morning. “ TOP SECRET \
13-00000 gree a. . rr’ TOP SECRET It should not be imagined that the PDB writers always transacted their business with Fromley €mith in tranauillity. Occasionally there was a certain amount of commotion around Smith's office because of people coming and soing to different meetings in the White House. One day Smith closed his door, explaining that . Bundy might be able to work this way with all the Indians cherging in all the time, but I can't, especially since I was here till after 11 last night waiting for the President to leave. The Impact of Santo Dominco . On 24 April 1965 events took place that had the effect of improving the standing of OCI publications in the White House. On that day an uprising began against the provisional government of the Dominican Republic. The US fear that -. Communists might seize control of the country led to the prompt dispatch of Marines to Santo Domingo. By coincidence, the day they landed--28 April--was also the day that Admiral William Raborn was sworn in as DCI, succeeding John McCone. President Johnson could hardly get enough intelligence on the Dominican situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined to provide the best service possible. The day after he tock | office, the Admiral ordered the establishmenf of a CIA task | force on the Dominican Republic under E. Drexel Godfrey, ~ chief of OCI's Western Area. As directed, it provided Go TOP SECRET
13-00000. - TOP SECRET "complete and around-the-clock CIA intelligence support to the White House." Its first task each day was to brief Raborn to put him in readiness to deal with calls from the White House. Periodically throughout the day and night it issued round- up situation reports, and when necessarv, spot renorts of particular developments. All these reports were teletvpved to the White House. They were read by Mr. Johnson, who was now described by Bromley Smith as a President “who eats up information." OCI, of course, continued to put out its regular publications. It was during the Dominican crisis that word was received that the President's Dailv Brief had taken firm root in the White House. Pill Moyers said on 21 May that the President read it "avidly." 8/ The increased temvoo of intelligence service to the Chief Executive prompted further consideration of the proper way to get material to him. DDCI Richard Helms and DDI Ray Cline agreed that the NSC Staff (McCeorge Buncy, Bromley Smith, and the White House Situation Room) should be the place of. entry for intelligence for the President, although information copies could be sent to Moyers and Valenti. Helms and Cline said that a “greased channel" through Bundy should be established for the PDB and any other reports the DCI wants to be sure © are es the President sees. 'p/ AD/CI Jack Emith commented on 20 May that a “greased channel" already appeared to exist for ee the PDB. * fe an TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET The hectic atmosphere in the spring of 1965, with the Dominican situatien coming on top of growing difficulties in Vietnam, caused the men in the White House to ask more of intelligence and to react to it more sharply. Eromleyv Smith said the President has a “very short reaction fuse." He wanted to hear firstfrom official sources and not fron the press about major developments, so rapid dissemination was essential. Smith also warned that OCI would soon be asked. to report on every coup and to cover all present and potential trouble spots with high precision. He said that in the future, OCI's reports would not sav that the Valencia regime is shaky, but that "Valencia is qoing to be overthrown by a coup on the umpteenth July by % in Toonerville." Since this would be asking the impossible in most cases, Richard Lehman, OCI's Assistant for Special Frojects, went to see Bill Moyers. He explained that OCI could write 50 pages of intelligence warnings a day, thereby taking out insurance against any possible contingency, but that the office did not believe this would really serve the President. Lehman said OCI tried to be highly selective in warning of coups and the like. Moyers expressed understanding of OCI's difficulties, and the fire died down. k@/ This episode had an amusing sequel about eight months later when BromleySmith pondered the series of army coups in the republics cf West Africa. ~ t uf TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET He said he didn't think the President wanted or needed to be informed in advance of every threatened coup. “Otherwise,” he said, “you could fill the book with that sort of thing." The system for supplying current intelligence to President Johnson was now working better than previously. To be sure, OCI did not benefit from the steady presidential playback it had enjoyed under John Fennedy. On the other hand, OCI was fairly confident that the President was reading the PDB regularly, and the writers on the PDB team received useful suggesticns, criticisms, and reactions--vsually from Bromley Smith-~when . they delivered the publication each day. One day in June 1965 the first paragraph of the lead item in the PDB said “Accumulating information suggests that ‘Hanoi is bringing North Vietnam to a state of semi-mobilization.' The second paragraph explained that Hanoi's action was far short of classic mobilization for offensive operations; OCT considered the move defensive and was therefore inclined to discount the view of one British expert who thought a larce- scale attack would soon be made across the 17th parallel. President Johnson and Gen. Clifton at the time were at the LBJ ranch. Late in the afternoon, the PDB received a phone call from Bromley Smith, who said that Gen. Clifton had called from the ranch. He had been shaken by the first sentence of the Vietnamese item and was concerned about the ~ whole piece. The President was out on the lake and was not Bp TOP SECRET Cy:
Ow TOP SECRET expected back for several hours. Clifton at first felt he should summon the President to shore. Smith discussed the matter with the PDB writer, Thomas Patton, and there was further conversation with Clifton, who decided simply to add the word "but" after the first sentence and continue with the somewhat reassuring second sentence. The case was a vivid illustration of the potentiality of the PDB for causing excitement in the White House entourage. | Foreign deve lopnents often provoked spirited reactions: | from Bromley Smith, but it was not often that he expressed Suara sE. ae the WATUME ‘of the imre licence he was reabive, SuOSstapwee dpact. Tre Suek OCCA SIV E™ | howeverG Cane urhow th. A PBR naw AW bem Agent digsersian hatwiee Rumania) ara rhe zy 6. Soviet Union. (Ar | in sercept] revealec that CedusescuJ and C. the international scene without consulting its allies, just as in Stalin's time. the [Rumafians/cited the 1962 missile adventure in Cuba and Soviet positions on disarmament. (ShelepinJagreed that more coordination was needed. Smith was particularly interested in this item and remarked to PDB writer Archer C. Bush that it was "fantastic" that this kind of information could be obtained. a OCI produced many memoranda upon request by White House ~ personnel, who were often directly conveving the President ‘s WH . ° TOP SECRET
a Cte TOP SECRET wishes. For a considerakhle period of time, both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had been trying to find a means by which the supposed désire of some West European countries to: share in the ownership and control of nuclear weapons could be satisfied. The scheme that finally came to have official backing was the provosed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) of surface vessels with jointly owned nuclear weapons. The ships were to be manned by mixed crews of personnel fron most NATC countries. Washington officialdom was sharply divided over this proposal and the pro- and anti-MLF forces steadily bombarded the White House with their arguments. Towards the end of 1965, the White House asked OCI for an "objective" report on the status and implications of the plan. The President's advisers sent the word that they were "ecstatic" over the memorandum drafted by Joe L. Zaring. Soon afterwards, President Johnson dropped the MLF idea as politically unfeasible and militarily unnecessary. Bromley Smith now and then modified or rewrote PDB items when he felt that they might confuse or unduly alarn the President. tn December 19¢€5, for example, President Johnson ordered a halt in the bombing of Vietnam in the hope of getting negotiations started. A PDB item reported that Hanoi had broadcast a tough restatement of its position, making no reference to the pause in air strikes. Smith, afraid that this would be taken as a rebuff to the President's ct a \ TAT CRPeprTr
TOP SECRET efforts, reworked the text to avoid this interpretation since the broadcast. did not constitute a fully official government statement. | Cuite clearly, the White House staff cringed at bad news from Vietnam. When the PDB reported in Avril 1966 that "the political situation appears to be rapidly worsening" in South Vietnam, and averred that Ky micht soon have to take drastic measures to restore authority or make major concessions to the Buddhists, Smith remarked that the article was pessi- mistic and that he had later information. It was, of course, one of the perils of the PPB operation that the White House sometimes had fresher reports from the field. Smith handed John Heidemann cables reporting that Ky was going to formulate a new constitution and that the State Department looked upon ' this as hopeful. Heidemann agreed that OCI had written in. ignorance of this information, but added that offhand he would not be optimistic. . A few days later Smith read in the PDB that “There was " and said ho real improvement in the situation today... "You're going to break the President's heart; he thinks things are much better today." When he finished the whole ‘disheartening report, he tossed the book in the air, whistled, 2. and said, “We'll have fun tonight. But that's no reason fer- not writing it as you see it." ~ GS wt TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET Smith had cause for unhappiness again when the PDB had to report that a Pakistan official felt that his country was drifting apart from the US and would prokably establish cleser relationships with the Soviet Union. Smith told PDB writer Allen Valpey that this article was a "shocker" and that Walt Rostow would be disturbed by it. (Rostow had replaced -McGeorge Bundy in April 1566.) Although John McCone had not taken up a White House suggestion that the President's daily give occasional coverage to CIA activities, Admiral Raborn as DCT dia adopt this practice. Bromley Smith reacted negatively to these reports, however, apparently believing that President Johnson did not like them. He particularly objected in 1966 to a PDB Annex . explaining enthusiastically how. CIA. used a portable ultra- violet Light device in Vietnam to detect guerrillas who had recently handled weapons before mingling’ with innocent # villagers. Smith did not want the Agency to "advertise" in the PDB. He believed that if the President should he ° infermed of some CIA activities, the DCI should send him a memorandum. | Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith said that he had some ideas about the PDB and would like to get together with all the writers. By this time R. J. Smith was DDI, E. Drexel Godfrey was D/OCI and Richard Lehman was PD/OCI. Bromley Smith met with them and the PDB writers in the Langley, : b S 45 :
- _ TOP SECRET building on 3 August. He prefaced his remarks by expressing his satisfaction with the way the President was being served; he had no criticisns. Ne explained, however, that while the President "tolerates" anonymous documents, he is much — more responsive to a personalized paper. He wondered whether the Brief could be signed by Mr. Helms, now DCI. Then it would become a personal link between the President and the Director. In regard to content, mith said the PDB did rot have to alert the President to impending crises over which he would have no control... Rather, Smith thought the PDB could be most. useful by rendering pithy judgments on situations with which the President is or will be faced. Smith said these judgments would be accepted; OCI did not have to support then with argumentation or evidence. smith emphasized that the | Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should read presidential speeches. He thought: the President was kept adequately informed of Vietnamese military developments by other means; the PDB should carry more Vietnamese political. and economic items. f€mith urged that the Brief increase its coverage of Europe and said that Panama was another subject high on the priority List. "33/ Helms did not take up the igea of personatly signing the PDB, but ocr promptly set about adopting Smith's suggestions as to content. Smith soon commented that he noticed the change. °2a/
& TOP SECRET The DDI Operations Center, uncer the executive direction q of the D/OCI, haw superseded the Watch Office in 1965 and played its role in supplying current intelligence to the ‘White House. Whenever any information of great importance came in at night, the Senicr Duty Officer would have the White House Situation Room informed immediately. On most of these occasions the SNO and the Watch Officers were aware that the President was personally taking an interest in the developments. Cometimes the initial report opened up a sequence that involved many incoming messaces, calls. to and from the White House, and hours of intensive work. A classic example occurred when King Constantine made his abortive attempt to overthrow the Greek junta in December 1967. The Operations Center got the werd about 3 a.m. that Constantine planned to move within the next five hours. Neil Huntley, the £DO, alerted DCI Helms, who told Hunt ley to call Walt Rostow at his home, brief him, and carry out any instructions of Rostow's. Rostow asked that the White House Situation Room -be informed that he was on his way in and would wake the President when he got there. Meanwhile, Rostow wanted copies of the relevant cables sent to the White House by LDX. About 7 a.m. Rostow called the . Operations Center to say that he had not received any follow-up reporting from the Embassy or CIA station in Athens. He asked Huntley to telephone the station and find ad ’ TENTS C8 TTY
re es TOP SECRET out what was going on. COMMO then set unr a telecon with the chief of station. Huntley went dewn to COMMO, kent the red- line to. the Operations Center open, and the Senior Watch Officer in turn keptthe secure line to the White House open. After the chief of staticn gave an undated situation report, Rostow fed questions to him and received answers via the Senior Watch Officer, Huntley, and the communicator. °'s8/ The Final Arrangement A major alterfation in the PDB system occurred at the end of February 1967. Seemingly all that was involved was that President Johnson decided that he would rather get the Brief in the. morning than in the evening. This change in | delivery time, howéver, forced other changes. The President wanted the Brief at 6:30 a.m., just before he began reading the newspapers. This meant that OCI's closing time on the book was 5 a.m. Nonetheless, the PDB had to be written in full knowledge. of what was in the morning press. As E. Drexel Godfrey commented, the schedule put “the highest premium on making the publication up to the minute." “33/ Because the Brief now had to be delivered to the White House Situation Room by 6 a.n., there was no longer a member ' of the President's staff wp and available to receive the oe . book and comment on it. This meant that there was no point a2 be, por a. te ee TAD Crenrom
in having the PDB writers make the trip to the White House. From this time on; the PDE was delivered by couriers. To make up for the loss of the morning conversations with Bromley Smith, an OCT staff member would visit him occa- Sionally to check on how things were going, and there was also communication by phone. Shortly after the changeover to the new schedule for the PDE, Bromley Smith, commenting on the President's reaction, said emphatically that "we are much more certain now. that he's reading it." He also made a point he was to make several times subsequently, which was that he disapproved of annexes to the Brief. He was afraid that if the Brief were burdened with an annex, the President would put it aside for later reading--and then not get back to it. In Smith's view, the PDB should be of a length which the President could whip through quickly. It would be better, he insisted, if annex- type reports were sent down separately. emith thought it was an excellent idea for the Brief to summarize the conclusions of “important" naticnal estimates. 16/ Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then about the words and phrases they employed in the PDB. He admitted that it was hard to know where to. draw the line, but he did not like "hopping mad," nor, on another occasion, ~ fe fet MAD creprm ve
did he care for a description of India as an “unwilling bride." As a rule of thumb, he said the writers should avoid seeming frivolous or light-hearted. At the Presicent's request, Oct on 7 Septerber 1967 began to attach to the Brief a Special Report on tMorth Vietnam that dealt mainly with the effects of the war. The only copy to go outside of the Agency was addressed: "For Bromley Smith —- Eyes Only for the President." Beginning with the issue of 6 October, this Special Report carried a of new section on North Vietnamese treatment of political attitudes toward the war, expressed in statements and demonstrations. In November DCI Helms talked with Drexel Codfrey and Richard Lehman about the PDB. The Director expressed great satisfaction with both the Brief and the Special Report. He said the latter was "really hitting the mark." He urged that OCI try harder to come up with items on the personali- ties of men familiar to the President, who Helms said, thinks in terms of personalities. Helms also asked that the PDB give more attention to coming visits of world VIPs to Washington and to each other. | No major changes in the PDB were made during President Johnson's time after the introduction of the €vecial Report oe fag ve TOP SECRET | Co,
eta sou bu Rat REE Nowe SI eon man ee TH « “epbbinidbmeeieierediiadtiiew lywio 8 MOR SECRET [scr m ur owe Sn nade bee cet dlhnge Cate imeie! ates +g te lina te can «shine iin eo eminenatetem te «ae athena ana Oe tere mete one, . TOP SECRET ; | on North Vietnam.. To all appearances, the Brief had evolved into a document satisfactory to the President, and it kept. serving its purpose throughout the rest of the administration. All OCI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar with a photograph of President and Lady Bird Johnson sitting in the White House in dressing gowns. Mrs. Johnson is holding their first grandson, while the President is looking at the President's Daily Brief. This homey picture epitomizes the position OCI hoped the Brief occupied in the White House. And perhaps it did. los”. BSR rrr REE pu PT REDY OR TNR gUE ae ep EY ORI oa fegt ee me MRbennrteND® cmt ots ant f= seman t=