TER wey CHP assertion that the Agency "may have been ~ The Committee “consequently agrees with the . piggy- backing on the syndicate and in addition to its materiad c contribution was, also supplying an aura we e oro x pone wt ty a Le Fa prem aN seeegeeel of official sanction, _ s AS. . te a ey ghed by tea, Crsramtte > j- The following considerationshemanate from this theory and more thoroughly respond to the allegations in the Meskill articles. First, organized crime probably initiated independent assassination plots against castro prior to any CIA involvement in late 1960. “such plots may have been in. progress when the cra reactivated its “plans to kill Castro in April, 1962. _ | Second, organized crime could quite possibly have been directing activities “such as those described in the New York rk Daily News article. | i third, Frank Sturgis most probably established ' contacts with organized crime through his gambling associations and probably was used by them in some - capacities. whis does not imply that he was a member. of organized crime. ~ HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page: 77-
Forth, Frank Sturgis probably knew @wsa — ce - and could have been involved with him in an assassifia~ - tion plot. Since Sturgis is not a reliable source, however, his allegations are suspect. | Fifth, according, to the committee's review of all available evidence, the CIA was not “involved va offteyy in any operations with Ona prior ‘to late 1960. Sixth, Sturgis was not necessarily involved with the Coy offal Lorenz or ®¥ea in a plot to kill ae He may have Uu CA wl [ ime learned of plots involving oer and Possibly Lorenz a 0 [Preia) in Miami after Oren arrived there in 1965. Additionally, the April, 1975 Meskill. articles ‘ did not relate the Sturgis-Lorenz plot to kill Castro with poison pills. It is only after the publication of the SSC Interim Report in November, 1975, and the Final Report in April, 1976, that Meskill describes this plot. Thus, Sturgis m ‘A have gompined accurate information obtained from oceraal omer Maimi sources | with the facts ‘the ssc presented and then fabricated UW thy the Lorenz story, together with other evidence such | as the 18 October memo, a can\Gucceed? VnfoFtunately -in appearing both logical and believable. HW 53080 . Docld:32273546 Page 78
HW 53080 DocId: 32273546 Page 79 k) Implications Arising From Phase Two of the (Operation Significant differences are apparent between _ Phase One and Phase Two which reflect upon organized crime's motivation and seriousness in fulfilling. its part of the bargain originally initiated in 1960. First, in phase One, Roselli and his colleagues demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, ‘ina position close to Castro. | In “Phase Two the. npdus: operandi and the ability of the assassin or essasging ite v wae ogile lee bb becomes quite vague. Harvey reported» that Veron had an asset in cuba who had access to someone in ae restaurant which ‘Castro frequented who could administer 201- the poison. po In gune, 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey tte ele, yt. t Yesena had ‘dispatched a “three man team to Cuba “to recruit persons to kill Castro, or to kGLL him a themselves, maybe with poison pills, if the opportunity. ~202™ , 203— arose. !F Harvey said they had no specific plans. Second, as already indicated, ‘the cast of the organized figures involved changed. Maheu, Giancana, and Trafficante allegedly retired from the scene, with | a ae ae eo | “asda ae Oped fa Ns co pe i \ <r velied — A e(Lenbsrliy — Some pt Crmplay a | To hag .
“, an , acso mart the position of Trafficante. a 1s Roselli ary aeeeethe remained. The Committee agrees with the CIA that these figures, at least Trafficante and Giancana, were kept informed of the progress of the plots. "What is puzzling is the introduction of a ~ person simply referred to as; "Maceo into a highly = es sensitive and covert CIA operation without any a apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background or ascertain his identity. It seems. extraordinary” ‘ oe ' that the CIA would propel the plots forward without a performing any security check. Indeed, it seems = A more logical that at least Roselli and Harvey did ascertain the identity of: Maced» and for whatever Meee att reason decided to withhold this info mati n. Further, Nee A open Nem Pe CN OCapeeenmaaNN |< SIE > oh aaa @ at eee le “although th S|mobi lization involved omen, -whom (4 Ay ia teens opel pierre Ties IME OE AN Ae O7 we at LE OL BE ff oo Trafticante recruited in Phase one, it. seems xeasonable } \ -to assume that some of the individuals in Phase | One iw, i 4 were actively attempting to kill Castro after the Bay f i i. - i \ { of Pigs and probably until the = advent of Soviet } \ solidification. - These efforts, however, may wees 3 . : . ; a | 5 ex f ues J £ ri % rang nae scaeaeaeieseeee - 2 Ne : LR Serres pen pa nem nn a Remeannan as Be arene mr Re ge WBS Matias chan et BACT PS be a ON a oA _ 3 oa, ree nar nit > pee = Pd HW 53080, Docld:32273546 Page 80 .,
have been conducted’ without CIA knowledge and | again support the theory of independent organized “crime plots. ~ rev be p: 14 bee: _—— A related issue is whether "phases" actually a existed or whether the operations to kill Castro a encompassed a continuous time period. As previously A indicated, the CIA precautions that the plot was oe é | dormant from the Bay of Pigs until Harvey assumed gdh gin A | direction in the spring of 1962. Both Harvey ana gi NE a j 7 eb Somime] 1 stated, however, that Harvey “took over ap SO a going operation." Considering that Roselli was | ~ - HC Vale to immediately mobilize his forces in 1962, in | - _ response to Harvey' s request and that ont fibe7 \ a : PiGR: ‘Ghavacterizes waco as Re Roselli! s man, it is | | more ‘probable that Trafficante, who had recruited aA all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who maintained’ the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba, provided this | individual. if this speculation is accurate, ‘then it sa, — Fag . . Pe nade OR Ny yay on nen ee eens e nen meer we | displays. Trafficante again performing a direct role \ during Phase Ii, a ‘function every source has ‘denied. i. can 4 . , a ee ; ~~, : : : wee . cme, tb : a ener ne a L HW 53080. Docld:32273546. Page 81.0 0. o.=
During late 1962 and early 1963 Phase Two , po a nn Nhat td ai are : f undramatically and slowly Yerminated. In retrospect, the ambiguous modus operandi, the Lack of identity of the potential assassins, the total reliance of Harvey ‘on Roselli for any information, “ana the . 7 ¥ oe ee seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corrsborate any information from Roselli all converge to posit the ~ theory that organized crime was not seriously attempting to assassinate Castro after following the solidification fof Soviet. influence: ain the Castro regime. Trafficante, Lansky, and other Cuban casino owners must have realized . by the mid-1962 ‘that the “golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. certainly, history shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas) Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and burgeoning bolita operations in Florida arising from the influx of Cuban exile: Further, organized crime . may have’ determined that the. new Justice Department , crackdown, would probably not have permitted the. | "wide open” | Cuba of the pre- Kennedy era even if ‘the os United States had ‘succeeded in ousting the. Cuban regime. Consequently, while the United States » HW 53050. Docld:32273546 Page 82.000 te
government, specifically the CIA, still possessed a | viable interest in assassinating Castro, organized crime did not. 2. Motivation of Organized Crime to be involved in Plots Despite the reasons just presented to discontinue _ ae) attempts to kilt Castro, organized crime still had es MY ge strong incentive to. string the CIA along. specifically, this incentive was to establish a | relationship with the CIA for subsequent use in “thwarting prosecution for Were Ous - uo L unvelated~offenses and thus blunting any Justice Department proceedings against organized crime. The Committee believes that organized oxime, while always recognizing the penefits of establishing a relationship with the CIA, (TaTeraTIy\ was) also ‘seriously. interested’ in assassinating Castro to regain lost territory. As already indicated, _ the Committee | believes this desire ebbed with the solidification of Soviet influence and other factors: just mentioned. _ “after this occurrance it appears organized crime may only have. put forth. the “appearance” of involvement - and good ‘faith in the plots to further define, a HW 53080 Docld:32273546° Page 63.
~ relationship with the CIA. Indeed, the CIA "prevention of prosecution in 1961 in the Las Vegas wiretap incident would have given Maheu, Roselli and Giancana confirmation of the value of | such a relationship and impetus for continuing it in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro may no longer have been a viable alternative. whe actions of Maheu, Giancana, and particularly . - Roselli in the years following | these plots support. this theory. As related in Section If, these a individuals actually. dia use their CIA affiliation — and knowledge of the plots in attempts to hinder og 7 ee 26g DIE ‘law enforcement prosecutions and objectives. ‘The success of some of their efforts verifies the . ? tremendous blackmail potential they possessed. | AS Sam Papich, the | FBI liaison to the CIA, , commented in. May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA "over | a barrel" because of "that operation" and he doubted - that the FBI would be able to do anything. about either | Giancana or Roselli because of "their previous 2.05- Loo . activities" with the CIA. a It is clear that at least one group benefited £rom the Failure of the assassination plots. a 3. Retaliation Theory The Committee. found no evidence that these. HW 453030 Docld:32273546 Page 84. _
operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate ‘President Kennedy in retaliation. . The Committee also has found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA sponsorship of these activities . or even knew of their existence prior to the death of President Kennedy. 2 )7331 Te castro did discover their existence, however, the Committee does not In an article in the Washington Post on . September 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex- CIA. agent William Harvey, attorney ‘Edward Pw. “Morgan, .and reputed mobster John Roselli. were his” sources. ‘The Committee has ‘determined that gohn Roselli was s the - person who’ informed Harvey and Morgan about the plots: and the retaliation theory; thus, only one source, © HW 53080 DocId:32273446.- Page.85.
st ry pe Crest true Cc nll ol WweertLdl’ wot Au Connected tan arth, li Cre he Comm mbit Aecogneny ihe only a fire farts crete tly [ven on Ube C/A Aperaseship ark thot the — Cubar Oprats 1 One) Othe paged uw petites | (vite Can aenzetly piliep itorg pn laa aesasasncilitey shhoke AVE Ape eY Ate. Mae Ah trie  apmacied le operat . The Cont —s bberes, fovever, at obehe wot heerg - abl fo be Ceclatay Crates. veto hare Aah Arreola le C/A on any Anscaceli nation per he uncovered, at Mark fo be hey, LOAF | Ae ceaad hooe seeped be CIA ms pu Mefotan ¢ set, HW .53080 DocId:32273546. Page 86 | ee
{ _ ane Even assuming that Castro dia ascertain ; the existence of the CIA-organized crime plots and that the CIA sponsored them and ignoring the Committee's \ belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation theory, the Committee still believes it is unlikely that. . castro would have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation for the reasons indicated in the AMLASH portion of the Issue Analysis section. Specifically, these reasons are: | 1) ‘the prospect of exposing Cuba to | invasion and destruction would not have. been worth the risk; 2) the act of changing ; a leader | does not, . lat . necessarily change the system; ik can be. angst Laces -3) Castro may have recognized that anons) “ . “the leaders of the United StatesdKennedy - | Maintained the least hostile approach ' towards Cuba; and 4) the growing prospect of detente betweea Cuba and the United States would have refrained Castro from assassinating an ' American official. ; 4. Related Organized Crime Activities The Committee reviewedMevidence that Laaseedme: raises the possibility that various organized crime bo Wak Da figuresinvolved : in attempts to assassinate Castrofwere unrelated to the CIA. . HW 53080 DocId: 32273546: Page, 87 lees
To ascertain more information about organized crime's knowledge about Castro assassination plots, the Committee investigated Norman Rothman, who “was active in operating various casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who consequently maintained. associations with organized crime and the Batista regime. | “At various times, Rothman served as manager of | the Sans Souci and Copacabana Clubs in Cuba representing. See yello Pp. 149, the interests of the Mannarino brothers of ‘pittsburgh. Al | ne | | FBI files on Rothman indicate that. a ‘proposal : to kill Castro was made to Roéhman as a "quid pro quo” | | “in which Rothman expected to avoid imprisonment for _ a 1960 gun running conviction?" puring an FBI interview, ‘Rothman stated that he had been in “personal contact with White House attorney Harry Hall Wilson, as well. as Assistant Attorney General John Liegenthaler,. both of Washington, D.C." and members of the Kennedy © | Administration.77° | oe Ina deposition to the committee taken in Miami on April 16, 1978, Rothman expanded on the theme to incluae a series of mysterious telegrams sommoning him to the White House for a series ‘of two] or three meetings which began in Attorney General HW 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 88
\ See yellow p. 15 Docld: 32273546 Kennedy's office with members of his staff and \ fo : Co Ke ‘continued in a conference room where Rothman's assistance in providing contacts inside Cuba was. explored. At the last meeting Rothman says that: ' "one of ‘them happened to discuss /Ehe _ assassination of Castro/with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just in a casual way. That is about it. I cannot for the moment remember it word for word. ‘because it is too far back." aA The evidence suggesting such an approach | by Robert Kennedy is “entirely uncorroborated and makes no ‘sense when viewed in: Light of the Justice department crack-. 7 down on organized crime. Further, it seems extremely doubtful that any meeting with Rothman on this topic would have occurred at the White House. Consequently, the Committee believes it highly unlikely that such 4 event occurred. OS The Committee also reviewed evidence which indicates that organized’ crime may have been aware of © the AMLASH operation during its existence. The ee TGR identified three name Links between the AMLASH operation and the organized crime operation, he Gadi The IGR did not sufficiently analyze, however , "that — the common denominator in two of the links was Santo Trafficante.
a) Link .One In March, 1961, the CIA received information that a high-ranking military figure in the Castro - Soa er e Acs) Age - is '. regime ,and a Loumer—persdrrel~seexetory no Castro. both < to defect. The military officer wis | ee i Sena ee” a Stles—(AMBASH)~and—theeSossnens : sectatargnacn~hisn-Othimthenopenabivenised ai PhAsé-cimofathe~CiA~onganizedachimerpLots . As already - revealed ow . indicated, the —- 1, documents /that Trafficante re- 2 (on ee ce erulted Sxtce | Gre ‘ The Committee has determined that other than, a he Cr o (fren ) the coincidence of both Ce and AMLASH Seeking th infiltration at the same time there is nothing to- “suggest a | relationship between the two men in attempting _ to assassinate Castro, not @ common denominator with Trafficante, Roselli, Giancana or any ‘other. members of the American gambling syndicate. this 4 ‘Tink, is a » _ . ae there fexe ewinsignificant. yu ink Two - In mid- March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a noted» Cuban lawyer whose brother occupied the prestigious position of Minister. of Sports in Cuba, contacted CIA HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page90 0...
station personnel in Madrid. to inform the agency | _ that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro” (1967 . - aad I.G. Report, p. ). It quickly became clear to CIA” employees that Bongo’ s reference was ‘to- ectime and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempt~ Ps ae eGR we TER ing to depose Castro. Although the tee and Lie ean , ROAGADIUng GAY, Repests are silent eed attitude toward Bongo" s . ttre CEE information, it must be assumed that ‘baa did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation \ was in progress at the time and Artime was in the process : of delivering arms caches to Suincivines people within i — oo, _ i es | Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency | Pe palaandiry . personnel as a Lawyer, Ss the Capri Hotel and Casino | in Havana ,who had been jailed i July 1998, for a" period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for . , pte representing Santo Drafficante. . Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides” is questionable as. Trafficante was in jail during — August, 1959. For the ‘Cuban government to wait for Po oe years to exact retribution for that representation makes | [ft t Hie no sense. Possibly; Bongo was involved. in approaching HW 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 91,
HW 53080 DoclId: 32273546 station personnel in Madrid to inform the agency . that "he was in contact with a group of military officers who were planning to kill Castro” (1967 aot I.G. Report, p. ). It quickly became clear to CIA™ 7 . 8 | employees that Bongo's reference was to- @ebtirr and the group of military men who were allied with him in attempt- 200 Gk wa TEE ing to depose Castro. Although the 126 and LEAs. ROA GALI Gy | hepewess are silent Koinonia ine attitude toward Bongo' s ste C1 information, it must be assumed that tires did not respond affirmatively since the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time and Artime was in the process of delivering arms caches to @wberbéaks people within Cuba. Interestingly, Bongo identified himself to Agency _ Cepariaanding personnel as a lawyer, 233% the Capri Hotel and Casino 6S. in Havana ,who had been jailed in July A975, for a period of 75 days, allegedly as a reprisal for representing Santo wratficante, Bongo's utilization of the short prison term to establish his "bona fides” is questionable as Trafficante was in jail during August) 1959. For the Cuban government to wait for BR years to exact retribution for that representation makes [ive n@*sense. Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching Page 92
‘the Castro government in 1962 on mrafficante's behalf for permission.to reopen the Capri casino. | Bongo's ‘trip to Madrid apparently involved more than a contact with the CIA for he was arrested for counterfeiting and held until his old. client, Santo le LCE, MAAS Py Pa Lay Trafficante, arrived with a Siunemeiae DL Ldsoe SHOBoR to obtain his release! presumably, Bongo was paroled - back to Cuba, at an “unspecified later date, where he died. | one aspect of the: Bongo- Trafficante relationship in Madrid deserves fuller treatment although it is” doubtful that anything more than supposition can result ‘from further exploration. _AS. already indicated, dt has” been. reported ‘by Jack Anderson that secret source until his death, John Roselli, had reason to speculate: ‘that cuens oETGinaliy ecruited, by Santo. Trafficante to kill Castro were "turned around"“and | sent back to the united States where they were directly | involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. If this line of hypothecation is ; adapted, then the - trip to Madrid by Bongo” could assume some sinister. a nansis implications such as- the possibility that Bongo" S HW 53080 _ Docld:32273546..Page 93
oO ween) Co real purpose in contaéting the Madrid station was to act as a double agent for Castro in ascertaining - the nature and scope of the AMLASH operation. ; Castro | certainly ‘became aware of the Artime meetings with Culeder in the fall of 964 since the list of charges upon which Gubets weht to trial in 1966 “began with these Madrid meetings. Tf Castro had begun his suspicions of ose kam's role with the CIA during late 1964 or: early 195, it is likely that he would ‘have begun counter-intelligence measures to confirm his | fears which could have lea to Castro sending Bongo ‘ bel ag AOR rns s , iw vagaer ft - to Spain to contact. the Agency. Given Trattieanters ‘ ca bi coek ER CEH E cay | BREE 18 | aa } bhapek ClOsebies-to-Berge, it can be postulated that . vee 2 pad Cpr Sie . co hited o 4 Art Boe ~ wih a ot Trafficantes was aware. of Bongo" s true mission prior GR ie ate aN at - caggar rerlt % ‘ - to his departure or became knowledgeable when he bailed © Tepe Cem So ~ Ee him out of jail in Madrid. DP OO oe pment” pen Fe LET nn meter <—\rrafficante also could have received news ‘of MLE 8 ties with ‘the Agency through his close associate Jorge Nobreg&s who was described by Gorge crite in his Washington Post, article (circa 8/17/76) ) as "having worked: with the CIA, was in, cabesbas s student revolutionary group in cuba, and always close to nrafficante." HW 53080 Doeld;32273546 Page 94
Actually, given the extent of mrafficante's high-level contacts within the exile communi ty and the low-level security in the CIA exile operations, it is extremely logical that mrafficante and other members of the underworld knew, in some fashion, part or all of the AMLASH plot. the question becomes: So what? Short of being able to blackmail ‘the government about the modus operendi of the 1960- 62 events, the significance of mob knowledge of AMLASH is not readily apparent. however, : . Ufjtrafticante was a double agent, working for the CIA but actually supplying information to Castro, then another scenario emerges. It is then logical / to assume that castro knew of the AMLASH and CIA- “organized crime operations “from their inception. As mentioned earlier in this, ‘material, Trafficante could have received a sanctuary and assistance in smuggling contraband for such information. AS also discussed earlier, however, the Committee believes | that: even if. Castro had knowledge of CIA sponsorship of plots against his ‘life, that this would not have "provoked him to ‘iil President “Kennedy. The benefit of contemporaneous knowledge of the ‘plots would be - a HW 53080. Docld:32273546 Page 95° - |
to neutralize their effect. Consequently, the Committee believes that any contacts between oo Q necessarityf AMLASH and Bongo Geax nota effect the untenability of the retaliation theory. c). Link three The SSC noted that information contained in the D) | IG ve 4 TEAESePSR from "A," spinosa~Hernandez , raised the possibility that a link existed between the AMLASH operations and the 1960- 62 CIA plots to. : 22 assassinate Castro using underworld ‘contacts. SE Gets. A review of the Eero - report does not sustain the Senate’ Ss conjecture in that there is no available evidence cited in the Report to suggest | that "A" (VA had knowledge of, or involvement with, any of the syndicate or Cuban a exiles who participated ir in Phase I or It of the. CIA-Mafia assassination plots during 1960-62. ‘What Book V did was to seize upon the 1967's tentative 7 identification of "name, links" between the 1960-62 organized operation and AMLASH intrigpe, and expand NW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page96 |
the amorphus nature of those "name Links," which included "aA," into a theory that. "A" was. the conduit through which the Syndicate became knowledgeable of both the AMLASH operation and the initial CIA | efforts to eliminate castro. | . | ‘The only solid factual basis for Book V's tie- in between AMLASH and the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots is based upon Victor Espenosa's exile activities in June-July 1963, which Book V examined. “Moreover; CIA files contained at least some FBI reports on "A," | ‘the Cuban exile who was involved in _transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963. These ° reports ‘detail his. involvement with anti-Castro exiles and "underworld figures" who were operating the guerilla training camp in New Orleans in July 1963. The "underworld figures® reference relates to Michael and william McLaney who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law ‘enforcement and media personnel. (See profile) again, however, no evidence from any ‘source places McLaney into the early CIA plots to kill Castro or. into, the AMLASH operation. | _ A review of the June- July 1963 activities of MeLaney and © Victor ‘Espinosa leads. only to the inference that . vail We coma euler gosttewely, - | | ak al rc ko NAN = s wie ke bk | 4 Wok ‘A kinw | te. (ped ne 1963 book Be, Sc Fm Qepoit
their operation was a private limited venture. with no agency or syndicate support and very little chance of success. | Moreover, the link between McLaney, Espinosa . and the organized crime principals connected to the initial CIA Castro plots must be dissected in order to make a judgment as to the likelihood of the SSC speculation that the syndicate held "inside" information on Agency operations in 1960- 65.- | ‘Since the Senate ‘did not attempt to interview either of the McLaney brothers or Victor. Espinosa in 1975 nor ask. principals of the. 1960- 62 Plots of their | knowledge or “xelationship to “McLaney or "Espinosa, the ‘Senate’ s hypothetical question of underworld knowledge Of the full range of CIA Castro plots is based upon a . “minimum ‘of hard data and a maximum of free-wheeling | conjecture. | | | | | The evidence Linking Espinosa to any known organized crime figures consists of his admission to being friends with "Cappy" Rothman, Norman, Rothman" Ss son, “ana : a casual knowledge of American gamblers gleaned i from his student days of visiting the Havana casinos. HW 53080 Docld:32273546. Page 98 |
Mike Noha 's ties to organized crime have’ (aves 194 led . : pemiessimanitem~e Within federal law enforcement agencies since the 1950's but no solid evidence has Linked him to Trafficante, Roselli or Giancana, ince McLaney has been most Frequently mentioned-as a “Lansky man.” ‘To place a witting — | McLaney into the 1960-62 plots, it requires a series p speculative hurdles” which include: Sate SET iy (4) Meyer Lansky was a . plotter with | Trafficante, ~— (B) McLaney was Lansky's "action" man; and L’ @) the various underworld figures acted ya- or in concert in ‘promoting anti- Castro 7 —— operations. ot : a a oo The Committee believes that ne : ve these p premises _ | | | carofigasily supportable with facts ond consequently | | does not place any significance in the Victor spinosa Link. | | | “Ske mer on As indicated earlier, both Sam Giancana and —_ eS — John Roselli were murdered ‘Sam Giancana was shot SX : . in the basement of his. home in Chicago in June, \ 1975, just prior to his. scheduled testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA organized crime plots/ . HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 99.
/. John Roselli's butchered body was found inside “an oil drum which was floating in Key Biscayne | Bay, Florida in August, 1976 which was shortly after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA- organized crime plots. | Various theories have surfaced concerning | why they were killed and who was. responsible. one theory relevant to this investigation is that Giancana ~vand Roselli were killed because of their participation _ in the Castro assassination plots and ‘the ssc - attempts | to elicit information on the plots. In this 7 regard, Trafficante has most often been the person assigned responsibility for ‘the deaths. on. ‘the other hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee : ‘that ait believes that organized crime » perforned-the murders and that the reasons were unrelated to ‘the CIA- organized crime: . plots. | | | | The Justice Department is still investigating both murders. “The Committee has not uncovered evidence “relevant to solving these murders. The Committee does believe, however, that a variety of motivations inspired the deaths: ‘these motivations included internal mob conflict, especially in the case of Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA- HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page .100 ©
organized crime plots. The Committee considers it- probable. that Trafficante approved of and assisted in the murderg OF fxbedeowee. John Roselli. Trafficante's motivation sesia have been to maintain a low profile in connection with the CIA plots and to prevent disclosure of other unknown persons involved in the plots as well as other operations and activities which an investigation of the plots might uncover. The Committee does not believe that such activities were necessarily connected to the | an assassination of President Kennedy. |For instance, Trafficante may have had a covert relationship with | Castro which may have entailed his running contraband through Cuba into the United States, ~~} - | NS . 7 \ od HW 53080  DocId:32273546 Page 101. - |
_ ge [| ——conseguentny, although the deaths of Roselli 5 Ot a & and Giancana So etna “Lelated the CIA-organized crime operations, the Committee - NOECES ES Mo does not, believe that they are/related to the assassination of President Kennedy. IV. CONCLUSIONS oe a The Committee makes the following conclusions: A. AMLASH OPERATION To 1. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE i. A _ AMLASH OPERATION PROVOKED . PREMIER. CASTRO. : TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. 2. THE COMMITTEE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE “To ‘ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION. PRIOR TO THE DEATH © OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS © AN ASSASSINATION PLOT. 3. ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND _ . THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, —_ “THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY ; ce - THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN, PROVOKED IN A _ MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. ee ss ‘ASSUMING THAT AMLASH WAS ‘AN ‘ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THAT CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND a 7 ; SCOPE, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES If IS \ , so * UNLIKELY THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO an ASSASSINATBATHE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ IN RETALIATION. La . 5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES. THAT ANY KNOWLEDGE ON . , THE PART OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH ' OPERATION OR ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD .NOT ALTER THE -CONCLUSION THAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. NW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 102, _
_B. CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS le THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO. EVIDENCE THAT THESE OPERATIONS PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. 2. THE COMMITTEE FINDS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY’ hour) pavemes IF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE, a THE COMMITTEE ¢ BELIEVES THAT CASTRO prozably WOULD HAVE  2e8syaeerms MEEGESD THEM WQBPH THE CIA. ; Atteipived “Toe To > 3. ASSUMING THAT. DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT CASTRO DID LEARN OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS AND THAT THE CIA WAS SPONSORING . THEM, THE COMMITTEE STILL BELIEVES IT IS UNLIKEL THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 4. HE COMMITTEE BELIEVES THAT ORGANIZED CRIME | WAS INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO INDEPENDENT OF ANY CIA OPERATIONS. - 5. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES ‘THAT THE. PRINCIPAL | REASON WHY ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN -THE - PLOTS WAS TO STRING THE CIA ALONG AND THUS FOSTER A GROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONS OF THE ORGANIZED FIGURES.INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS. 6. THE COMMITTEE BELIEVES. THAT JOHN: ROSELLI USED THE FACTS OF THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS TO FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN EFFORTS .TO PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION IN LEGAL MATTERS. ~ HW 53060 Docld: 32273546 Page 103 —