Cleniiealan ——Secret orm is fo be used ist materiq | extracte m ms. eo e ed decum cterial extracte rom ats) A—eentre eg documents ~65a= orally or in writing of the substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. (HSCA request letter of August 28, 1978) The CIA responded by. memorandum: "Although the (Mexico City). Station considered the conversation Of Sufficient possible interest to send a copy to headquarters, the latter apparently did nothing with it, for there appears to be no record in the Oswald file of such action as may have been taken. A review of those Warren Commission documents containing information provided by the Agency and still bearing a Secret or Top Secret classification does not reveal whether the conversation was given or shown to the Commission." (CIA Doc., Memorandum Regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, p. 1) The available evidence thus supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information nor the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association. with Silvia Duran, and her comments following the assassination, 009083 it may well have given more serious investigative Glassifieatien: secret _ | Gyssifimdubyydachetingn G4 —Rexk We, WEE, «OCXEUR RRL but. an NESBA y MBEAN, Spas .
“by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't ' the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the : Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency , recovered or recollected until after the Warren - published its xceport. (See above CIA explanation) A ga as Tt Classification: oe EL consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald (This form is to be used for material extracted and the cuban gaye SLNMe Died HORE LE involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. . Two difficult issues remain which are raised reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge ~~ ~, of Calderon’ Ss intelligence background, her possible. a knowledge- -Of Oswald and. her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence appatatus.. ‘SH. YR OA (GU, The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not Commission had completed its investigation ane See Pp OD) ciccled portion AS toetnste ner ti As for the Agency's withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely *@ » * informed that Calderon may have. been a member of the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64) Memorandum) wh. The memoranda which provided more extensive examina- tion of her intelligence background were not made 3 q: «d Pol ne | CRET,. Classification: =» 009089 NEED Classified by derivation: a
President Kennedy. (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written Py“Joseph Langosch f following his debriefing of AMMUG- L jindicated that ms, AMMUG~ “1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer “believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (CTA Doc. - eo + FOIA 687-295, attach S, 5/8/64) It is possible oe 1s . . aa that this information was not provided the Warren ©” we Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. It would have demonstrated pos ss € that aSCIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed information prior to the assassina~ tion. regarding Oswald and/or his. relationship to the Cuban Intelligence Service , and that Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate Ar ~ Regarding Calderon' s possible association with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no ostensible connectién between Calderon and the CIA. T wn wa o ria) RTs Classification: 900680 Classified by derivation: a. SEE, “Sih. SS Gn. Us.
' between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. . Classification: (This. form is to be used for material. extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Wh, However, there are indications that such contact “ae. 8 At the very least, the above dispnatches a) & evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon Whether this interest took y é the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file. GGA. i 4 ae 3 a & T ev a7 ow k y * Classification: DD DESE ‘Classified by derivation: __.
(This form is to be used for. material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The Committee has queried David Ronis, the em wen ocean ee author O£ the above cited dispatch| | | (HSCA Class... wa a Staff Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis was a member of the CIA's Spécial Affairs. Stare at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection of intelligence data. “Me. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi-~ bility \ was to scour the Western Hemisphere division “for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. Often he would receive no response to these requests, which normally.indicated that no follow-up had Be @ither been attempted or successfully conducted. wl y Classified by pe Rietey, 92 Be “SRR. Ne, NED... b.
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollettion of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to per form tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated ‘with the CIA. (Ibid.) Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, o. 136; -HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148; _HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78, | f Piccolo, Interview ofheny (778 PQs ahs, the Agency's file on Calderon and the testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:the ay is ee C3 ve rel Classification: ¢ 9693 ‘Classified. by derivation: A ‘ SS NG, “N,N NS "NGAI. eA, Siri,
Classification: sms (This form is to be sed for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) =e most glaring omission being the absence; from Caldecan “5 . her 201 filefof ~* cryptic remarks ennedy. } following the assassination of President K Minn Cave ek RAL aa IOS . This committee’ s investigation of Luisa om the Cuban SR, WE. ron has revealed that a defector fr he CIA with signi- Calde LY ( id aA ( ¢ wt Intelligence Services provided t ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts iain. with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was apes he CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 nereinafter) « * 1 defected from the assigned t CIA files reveal that. A~ DGI on April 21, 1964 | When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned aver to the CIA. (CIA poc.[ EN 68894, 4/24/64) 9 | a CIA officer, Joseph H. Following his defection, Langosch, vend ft meet A-1l, debrief him, and arrange for a-L's travel into the United States. Na, (Ibid.) 2 & *Tt is now known that A-L did provide signi ee hagein ) a leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon Pt “1s fur ter nt that little of ehis information . was “SiasStheGhign: ou tne cia to the Warren Commission. # - @herefore, the possibility axists that A-1l had Fg provided other information ta: CleRssffidd*sy derivation: . : Ss. WOrK waLet t War Commission’ B
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) : Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes. (CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64) ‘By Sune 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1L would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: There is no. question in my mind that AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, ' and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to Director of Security, 6/23/64) As an officer of the DGI, A-1l from August of | 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's {.. Illegal Section B (CIA poc| iN 68894 4/24/64) o 3) ¢ Lo ae which was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi- bility pertained to handling of agent operations naire 6/4/64; CIA Doc.| fin 68894 4/24/64) A-l identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli- gence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch described A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows: x} t ri ro > = f . ZOR ET; Classification: Classified by derivation: GG, SER “GER “GE, “HRS, in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Quest P@n- g fo -# 900635 oe ce ‘Ei, UT.
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. { I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64) Thus, A~l was able to provide the CIA soon after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City. & En gact fram ple The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-l. This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided. any — valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining: to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2) » ¢ whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information were made available to the Warren Commission. uw fw Or we ict Classification: pacngs Classified by derivation: NG. i a ee  RAGEHR, a SHRI. “eases ity.
-~ 74 - Classification: SECRET, (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The Committee's initial review of the . Materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the ‘AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during _ the course of its review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made reference to A-1. Included in this file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. (CIA Doc. FOIA 68~290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this file were the A~l debriefing memorando of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOTA #687-295, attach's 4 2’ 2 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the Committee requested access to all CIA files . or concerning referring to A-l. From review of these materials the Commi tted® e has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City. Classification: __ Ss | 009627 Classified by derivation: Nit, «NUR, a a a “RAM, “ep,
“eh. (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-—controlled documents.) +-he. Waren CaommiSSisn: Prior to*learning of Oswald's probable contact ‘with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter- | intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee | Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that the Director consent to an interview before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren Commission Report ,A VA Be reve9\ (CTA Doc. FOTA 689-298, Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton. - also wrote: Om 2 I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated With the FNC sensitivé Western H Hemispheré| source. I a informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the RB et. Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appear- ance unless we have--first had some pre- liminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implica- tions since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. ‘The DDP stated that he would review this care- - fully amd made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.) Classification: Classified by deriv Riff} G 4 at NE. “GE. “lb “SH “HR. ike. ER. a. Hana, ee NGI,