14-00000 Enclosure to 1LA-258 265 ; ® Avril 1o5 an election without their particular approval, but without their Specific disapproval efther. They have asked me to vait and talk to Dr. Prio and the other leadere in Miami who are working on this, but I refuse to delay any longer. 7. Firet, let's answer one question -- why @ government in exile? Well, everything else seems to have failed. Since the Castro takeover . in Cuba the firet big thing I cau remember was the Bay of Pigs. Well, that story ia pretty vell known. The reasons why the Bay of Pigs failed I think vere covered beautifully in an article by a Cuban attorney entitled, "Decision for Disaster: At Last The Truth About The Bay of Pigs,” in Reader's Digest for September 1904. Up to now_ “this hag been the most complete and factual article I have read on the Bay of Pigs. I heve double-checked with wany Cubans who were involved and they tell me this account is absolutely accurate, except for one point. It does not say why the Kennedy edministration cut down the second and third waves that were originally scheduled. The information I heard from other sources is that there was a very heated argument between Adlai Stevenson and President Kennedy. Stevenson had gone on record that the first wave of bombers that hit Cuba prior to the invasion vere flown by defectors from the Cuban Air Force. Apparently he did not know that this was part of the overall CIA operation. When he learned of this, I'm told, he got very, very upset, being @ man of great pride, and that in his rather strong argument wito President Kennedy about the point, he threatened to reveal the whole plot in front of the world and resign as Ambassador to the United Nations if there were any more such bombings. I under- stand President Kennedy feared 8 acandal, and gave the orders that resulted in the Bay of Pigs disaster. I don’t know if this is true or not but I put it here because it makes a lot of sense and tends to relieve the American intelligence groups of the blame they've been carrying on their shoulders since the Bay of Pigs invasion, but that's beside the point. &. The next big moment of Cuban hope of liberation was the October 1962 missile crisis. We all know vhat happened there, and many of us Cubans feel that the administration made another grave mistake because rany very important people in the adainistration do not understand the mechanics of the Communist wind. At the tine in which the so-called eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation came abqut the Soviets promised to take the missiles out, and to permit some international organization to inspect the island, etc. Of course, the question is -- why did the American Government retreat or lift -3-
Enclosure to ; TA oeyh -65 5 April 1965 the blockade when the moment of danger had already passed? I under- stand that many people in Washington and the administration felt that Khrushchev had behaved Like a good boy, had promised he would take his missiles out immediately, and disaantle then, and that he should not be pushed into a corner. It was felt that if he vas pushed into @ corner, posaidly the Stalinist group in the USSR, prodded by the Chinese, would overthrow Khrushchev, and then the US would have to deal with a much tougher man and not good old Nikita who wasn't too hard to get along with. All he had done vas point a few atomic wilesiles at our heads. In any event, we Cubans felt that if the blockade had been kept on for another few weeks, or until the inspec- tion had been made, this would have been ao brutally shamcfui to the Castro regime that right then and there, chances were good for an” ~~" interna. uprising while the United Nations or the OAS or the Red Cross was there making ite inspection. At any rate, this was @ fantastic opportunity that was miscacd sy rearons which perhaps history way be able to take care of. So, that was secoad ining that failed in the Cuben problea,. 9. Tnen, of course, we can also mention the disaster of Miro Cardona and hig group which failed in the opinion of many people because they were practically appointed by the State Department. At least, at that time, the State Perartment scemed to vant some left-wing leaders to take over Cuba. There is no doubt that Cardona could be clesaified as a Socialist of sorts, or left-winger of sorts. The disaster of Cardona was a result of the Bay of Pigs situation and was @ very unpleasant thing. I think persenally that Cardona conducted himself wrong. If he had been brought into President Kennedy's confi- dence, he should have respected that confidence and made a discreet exit, but not the big to-do he made which didn't accomplish anything except to kill the hopes of other Cubans and to make President Kennedy end Robert Kennedy very angry. Anyway, Cardona’s group had the original sin of not being # legitimate Cuban organization. Moreover, there is another tning about his group which wany Cubans have never forgiven -- that 16 tuat at the moment of the invasion they were practically locked up by American authorities someplace in Florida. They were supposed to be allies but were kept prisoners. I suspect the truth of the matter is that the Americans who were running the show feared these Cubans would talk too much and that their being put away for a few hours was just a roughshod way of protecting them against themselves. But this left a bad taste because it proved that the group was nothing but @ puppet of the State Department, and Cubans proud of their sovereignty and their nationalism didn't like it at all.
14-00000 Enclosure to TA-2y4 -65 5 April 1965 10. The next point on the thins that have gone wrong in the process of Cuban liberntion is the fantesti- "operetta", and I say operetta because we could call 2% a tragic comedy, of Manolo Ray and his meanderings around the Caribbean. I had been in Washington in March 1964 and in Miami in Jacuary or February 1964 and I had done a lot.of talking, and interviewing, and investigating. When I returned to Los Angeles, about April 19th, I gave a meeting of Cubans @ Tull report of ay three-month trip on the referendum preparations going on in Miani, and ay conversations in Washington with some State Department people, with Cuban ex-amabassadors who still live in Washing- ton and a tremendous assortment of personalities. During ay report, "here in Los Angeles, one of the Cuban leaders asked me what I thought about Ray’s promise to be in Cuba, fighting by the 20th of May. I told him without any hesitation (and I have a tape of that meeting) -that there was nothing to be concerned about or hoped for with Ray because he vas going to be on sose convenient little island in the Caribbean with a photographer and a few friends and that would be the end of his prowise to invade Cuba. But I was promptly abused by 4 member of the Junta (JURE) because he thought I was desecrating his hero. I told hin I didn't have anything against Ray but that I had enough information to warrant sy saying that. Of course, when this actually happened just a few weeks later when Ray was discovered on ' Cay Anguila, a British posseseicn, I was looked on with great reapect by the people eat that meeting. My reasoning that Ray was going to be found on an island was just the result of putting o few bits of informa- tion together and asking myself why Ray had made the rash promise in 1963 that he would be fighting in Cuba or be killed in the fighting. This was because of his famous, or infamous, scheme known as the Judas plan. The Judas plan to refresu you was one whereby the American Government (when I say government I mean precisely Robert Kennedy and perhaps his brother) was to overthrow Castro just before the okctions of 1964, It came to be called the Judas plan because actually it was not meant to change the basic type of sovernment, just to replace Fidel Custro with Manolo Ray. Those of us who studied Ray wondered how much difference there would be in the basic political philosophy of Castro and Ray. I think that ve can say without missing the mark too far that Rey would find a ‘lot of support for this kind of thinking in sowe circles of the State Department and the American Governuent. Then I had another reason to tnink that this Judas plan was real because during my stay in Miewi I learned that several top officials of the first nine months of the Castro covernment, by then refugees theaselves, had been contacted by people ccnnected in some way with others supposed to represent the Ceatral Intelilicence Agency. Tnese former officials
4 Enclosure to TA-204 65 5 April les of the first year of the Castro government had been asked if they would consider taking their old positions if and when there was a Cuban government that would be close to the original revolutionary governwent -- in other words, Ray and his people. This was before the assassination of President Kennedy. After the assassination, which was in November 19603, I vss in Florida and found that the vhele =. Judas plan had disintegrated. The main reason for it was to have sowething ready in case it was needed for a spectacular to give the American people the feeling that its government had finally liquidated Fidel Castro and then would go out and re-elect the current administra- tion. This whole operation is very involved, would require hours to explain. It was dubbed by wany the Judas plan because Judas was the apostle who betrayed his lord. So, let's go on to the next point. ll. Ray floundered and was caught on Cay Anguilla, in the Bahanas, @ British possession, and as we 411 imow he was fined for something r or other and let loose. Since that time we haven’t heard much except that he keeps going in and out of Puerto Rico, Miami, etc., but he is laying low. As far as the Cubans are concerned, he's rinished. [et me say as a little sideline to the Ray situation: In a secret meeting in Ios Angeles, Jose Estevez, the JURE delegate, took an oath that Ray was already in Cuba. Tater, when Ray was discovered in Cay Ansuila, Estevez told his own executive sroup he had lied so that they vould not lose their enthusiasa. The people who had been with Ray in los Angeles told Estevez that if lying was a way of life for JURE they would back out, that they had left Cuba because Castro had lied to them, and that they were not going to take any more lies from any- body. This was the end of JURS and I have their document which is extremely interesting, but this is unimportant now. 12. Now, let's take a quick look at Manuel Artiwe. In the opinion of 95% of the Cubans that consider themselves in the "know", Artime is @ puppet, attached to the strings of the CIA. He's red, clothed and maneuvered by CIA to its wish and nothing else. This is & general consensus in all Cuban circles, 3o Artime is not taken seriously. Artine, however, is a very interesting person, he's a good speaker, and nice-looking, but I consider his thinking very much @long the lines of Fascisa.. Waen he travels he takes several of his strong looking friends along, and when he speaks in public places they seem to watch the corners, and leok very nasty with their insignias and all. I had the pleasure of asking Artime when he addressed the prestigious Asscciation for the Sconouic Reconstruc- tion of Cuba in Miami in March 1964, if he was sure that he was not being used as a puppet for elements in the American Government that ~6.- . ene eee re ad