HW 450955 SECRET Since the Punta del Este meeting, thé OAS has been making slow progress in the countersubversion’ field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence through its machinery. h. The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has also demonstrated an awareness of the need for exchanging intelli- gence regarding communist subversion. Annex 4 cf the General Military Plan prepared by the IADB requests the American States to report information to the Board and to establish agreements among themselves for exchanging infor- mation of collective interest. The United States has approved the General Military Plan, but similar action has not been taken by all member countries. i. This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelli- gence exchange between the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requicement to develop the possi- bilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized limitations involved. Til. Existing Programs . 1. Bilateral exchange of inteliigence is now being conducted by CIA, DOD, and other U.S. agencies with their Latin American counterparts in instances where it has been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements. 2. A study is currently underway to evaluate the feasi- bility and desirability of establishing military intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activities directly to the countries concerned through the U.S. Ambassador. 3. Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean Com- mand by CIA and other elements of the U.S. Embassies in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate. 4, Various agencies of the U.S. Government are now dis- seminating to Latin American governments unclassified studies and reports and other non~sensitive information concerning Castro-Communist subversion. SECRET 5 Doclda: 327474000 Page 7
HY 0955 SECRE ‘Betiamecsevowenate bea 5. U.S. Government communications systéms throughout Latin America are being expanded and imprded upon on a high priority basis. , 6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence services. Additional programs could be established in other countries where it is found to be in the best interests of United States and acceptable to the country concerned. 7. All information received by CIA concerning travel to and from Cuba is put into a computer system capable of producing lists by name, by country, by point of travel, or sorted on various other bases. IV. New Actions Recommended - 1. Reinforce the present procedures for bilateral exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III. 1. by recommending that the U.S. Ambassadors utilize the existing Country Team mechanisms as an intelligence advisory committee to coordinate procedures for ensuring timeliness, completeness and freedom from duplication or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange with the host governments. 2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities. 3. Arrange for the rapid dissemination to appropriate Latin American governments of daily summaries of radio broadcast material as monitored by the FBID of CIA. 4. Make available to as many countries as security per- mits, the appropriate sanitized results of the extensive travel coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, already processed by machine, listings of which can be made available readily. (See paragraph III. 7.) 5. Increase where feasible emphasis on the provision of U.S. intelligence advisors to Latin American countries. Dis- courage the employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the U.S. except in instances where the U.S. can arrange to provide for the training and control of any third country intelligence advisor. 6. Arrange for the preparation by CIA of periodic studies of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can be disseminated to selected Latin American governments. 7. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing SECRET 6 Boctld: 32474000 Page 6
HW 450955 SECRET basis of the nature and incidence of subversive activities in their respective countries: 8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities. 9. Undertake action in the OAS to establish a Security Intelligence Advisory Committee consisting of senior representa- tives of the appropriate services of each government to deal with all major aspects of subversive activities in their respec-~ tive countries, consider new coordinated plans of action to counter and neutralize subversion, and implement necessary actions to insure the most effective and timely exchange of information between the governments on subversive activities. SECRET 7 Bootd: 32474000 Page 9