JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Date 08/28/98 Page : 1 : AGENCY RECORD: NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORTGINATOR. FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASST FICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 2Q2~-10001-10191 POTA SERIES BOC 192 DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD : MILITARY 09/07/62 3 MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET LC RELEASED WITH DELEDPIONS 07/30/98 Reviewed by JCS, OSD, State, CIA. Released under the John . Eennedy Was5assination Records ollection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ases#: NW 54214 Date: ee eS eee eee HW 54214 Docld:32424922. Page.1 [R] »~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED
As ~*~ (437) 7 August 1962 jcase No. MILITARY General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states: 1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplish- ment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose. 2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use U.S. military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be under - taken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at.the time the decision is made. “fw ith.no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a coordinated airborne /amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within 0 days jand result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan"provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to enduce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of lifel 7g A xequirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period cA i . - would neceseitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be "assembled and employed Under this plan the time required to gain essenti: __ US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, | reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. , In such case, air and naval‘forces could attack with little delay from the | time the decision is made; An air assault could be initiated within 8 ' hours; an airborne assault could be initiated within 5 days; and a Navy/ Marine amphibious force tould he committed 3 days later with a build up of the full scale effort to fo | j a ae : es : c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artilles naiirair capability. ais ios oe Records coe OBJECTION TO. esa Ne ose ceiease rooney eLi02-52) CIAHAS NO DEC SA ot MENT BK pm c[v2l% TOP SECRET — a Doc 142 4 0° HW 54214. Docld: 32424922 Page. 2
~ (437) & " Gace No. T.S. a 7 August 1962 General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states: 1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplish - ment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose. 2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use U.S. military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be under- taken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made. fw ith_no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a coordinated airborne /amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the _ principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in | minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan"provides for confronting | Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to enduce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life\¥ ” aa rain eeu f military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. \ \ nder this plan the time require g ad a In such case, air and naval ‘forces could attack with little oa from the | time the decision is made. An air assault could be initiated CA]: Ga airborne assault could be initiated ‘ Marine amphibious force could be committe of the full scale effort to fo _ F ieee fi: and a Navy/ ith a build up soa + c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery gat nak -air i os iv capability. . partment ©l state tis SO ee 9 S04 Aro OBI ECT — WOOT gece Ir POSE 8 CIAHAS NO OBJECTION Fe oo Jn ? ndertt een agcot ip oye DECLASSIEICAT ON ENT corn) . RELEASE OF THIST capi 2 jm g/val¥ HW 54214 Docld:32424922 Page 3