4d? Classifications Tis rm ig te be used for material axteasted . § fom Clacccentrelled desumenis,) i -§celso stated during his testimony that CIA field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's investigation "and the key stations were receiving tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions saying everybody participate in. ae the investigation." (Ibid. p. 133.)- It was ‘his: ek q nen (fécollection, however, that throughout his tenure as (2 Ve f coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the Mexico’ ° sentria City Station was the only CIA field station directly sy * aeeecermenermn \ Footnote * <= continued from bottom of page 4. I knew that we (at CIA) did not have the basic responsibility for investigating the assassination of the President. If there was a crime commited in the course of this activity, +sit) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that it was our responsibility to give the fullest cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr. Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully co » ' * operated, and he always fully cooperated with me. (Ibid. p. 52.) N O'Neal noted that his office (CI/SIG) at the direction of i the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was designated the central point for collection of assassination- related information made available to the FBI. (Ibid. pp. 52-53.; bua : 900013 | Castes by decxetieg, ————
etesificatiens Wels & farm is te Be used for moterisl asrasied om, CrA—ceatrslled ascuments.) involved in investigatory activities related to President Kennedy's assassination. (tial) . Co CF During the Tattoc~hate~be /pecenber!S pcelso issued a summary report which described Oswald’ s activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related information then available to the FBI but not provided to CIA until lake Dec. 1963. (Ibid. pP. 114-115.) (CIA j > Document Report by John Scelso to C/CI, MP pec. 63.)* Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted. responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination to the Counterintelligence | Staff. (HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 136, ef. HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 15 wherein Rocca states that A bs) e ° # responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI Staff on January 12, 1964.) Helms testified that this shift in * Approximately two days after President Kennedy's . assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report, ae & provided to President Jonnson by Helms. This report ° : adopted the position that Oswald probably was a lone assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban intelligence though such ties could not be excluded from consig oR) eka Dee ot Loh 7900014 j me =f _£ p Cees By privet on ~~ The
Chassfieatin: is rm € used or materi af oa t ts rm 3 13 | q do or eria I gat trasted x om ——Con Lise : rom CiA—<onir responsibility was a logical development because the investigation had begun to take on broader tones. (Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, ¢ p- 14, see also HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138.) 4 Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond Rocca . who testified before the Committee that the shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused in part by the establishment of the Warren Commission. fl7f et (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, pp. 12-13.) 5 Rocca added: It was entirely appropriate in the ER GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would Fs have that (responsibility for the Agency cet investigation. ) But the minute you had ; P a commission set up outsilde the line obviously had to be the Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions. Here you had Mr. (Scelso) being asked to sign off on- —P ; : 6 aby ee, % PR oe 8 1 3 1 and it would” * dministratively simply a hybrid monster. (HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 12.) i ise Bes, James Angleton supported Rocca's belief that "the “2 in spread (of investigative responsibility) involved... be Li nae 000015
Classification: ——g-2-57 , form is te be used for material extracte Poin P use na Arested —C rone ontral ne Bo 33 wa rom ——LOn all of the (CIA) divisions." Angleton testifed to this Committee that the Agency's efforts to gather and coordinate information related to | the assassination underwent a metamorphic transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and Case Officers approached Warren Commission. requirements in a piecemeal fashion. However, Angleton testified the Agency was eventually able to focus its resources to avoid duplication of effort and provide a system for the ‘central referencing of assassination related information as such information was developed. (HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, pp. 76-77, see also HSCA Classified ie Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 4/11/78, p-. 23.) L/i thad x) ed iwa et Cressi By evade, Vd0GG16
9 “SECRET Classification: is bis orm is a us for material extracted men mm ame ONTOS rom ae ONTTOUE oN The record reveals that during this second phase ef CIA information collection efforts in support of the Warren Commisssion investigation the concentration aN of Agency resources shifted in, emphasis from exploration of Oswald's activities in Mexico’ city” to. “his residency in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962 and possible | Csee P4ade association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. * °F x ) (Ibid., pP.32-33,44,Executive Session of Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, Pp. 23.)0 -A@ESe cAing hy , Rocca, commented 5 _ that during this phase primary interest in support of the Warren Commission was to follow-up on Soviet leads: on the assumption that a person who spends . four years** in the Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific interest to Soviet State security and their collateral _ authorities. (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, pp. 32-33.) (seep 1 fe **) i. ° Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended to concentrate on concerned the Soviets: bo » ta pP~/Pte coptinatioa of fexT™ ape ) a Fits ps Glesstfication: 2 ==R 21 go00i7 | Cestlieg By derivation, —————-_— re