480-10131-10325 JFK Assassinatio.: System ; Date: 10/19/20 Identification “orm ; Agency Inform ition AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10131-10325 | RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY “AGENCY FILENUMBER: 014725 Document Info: mation ORIGINATOR: HSCA FROM: TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH | TO: TITLE: DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUGH TOVAR. . DATE: | 06/29/1978 PAGES: 48 SUBJECTS : ; CIA, METHODOLOGY TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH, TES] IMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ; OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIO ), DEFECTION TO RUSSIA DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION: — Top Secret RESTRICTIONS: 3 CURRENT STATUS: —Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/26/1997 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 5 - . v9.1 . 1 RW 48331 Docld:32277210 Page i
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“aeniwcesmel UR RUHL 7 | ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY | I | ~ | . 3 ! Thursday, June 29, 1978 @ i. 2 .U. S. House of Representatives, | 64 John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of ,; | | Select Committee on Assassinations, 8 | Washington, D. C. . 4 2 | eposition of: — 19 | —_ . BERNARD HUGH TOVAR Jai leaitea for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee, a2 (pursuant to notice, in the o/'fices of House Annex II, Room 3370, i3 second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at ted b, :00 o'clock Pp. Mae, before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Publici i 18 lin and for the District of Columbia , when were present on behalf “a the respective parties: | - j . 17 Por the Subcommittee: , , MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ. Staff Counsel ELIZABETH WOLF. For the Deponent: 20 5] (There was-representaticn by counsel) - 22 il. . 1 zu _ —_ at woe 5 nme Sp atin ne NW 48331 Docld!32277210 Page 3 Te OPPRET
24 ag NW 46331 _Docta:! se retort TTD ce we seer cers een we oe ne ates ee a ee a we ree re # eee ae 9 one a =3 | Bernard Hugh Tovar. oe | { ‘ | | | i | t i script of a deposition to he made available to a witness and to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript; 0277210 Page 4 . . the CEPDET ur OLUREL 2 TESTIMON? OF HUGH TOVAR Mr. Goldsmith. State your name for the record. Mr. Tovar. I sign my name B. Hugh. My full name is Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, my name is Michael Goldsmith, Senator Staff Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations: I have-'been designated by «che Committee to take your deposition _ today. You are here voluni:arily today? Mr. Tovar. Yes. . * Mr. Goldsmith. You have the right to have counsel present. Do you waive that rigkt? | Mr. Tovar. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Have vou read a copy of the Committee's supporting resolution? OT BO Mr. novare Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Have vou hada chance to read Rule Number 4? | Mr. Tovar. I have. Mr. Goldsmith. The Committee rules provide for the tran- - | i | | | | actually be delivered for :etention by any witness that. gives —— | - the Committee’ a statement. However, by virtue of the arrange- | ment that the Committee ha:; worked out with the CIA, the Agency; has asked us to request Agency employees testifying before us_ |, .
iUr wCuaci 3 a | . | The reason for that is becduse the transcript frequently | | | i | | i | will contain classified information and the Agency prefers for 3 that information to be kept in our secure area here. “So I - Aa 4 | would ‘like to ask you to waive your right to receive a copy of 5 _ your statement but in so doing, I want to assure you that you. 6 | will be given a right to review. the transcript for accuracy, | oO make comment upon it and if necessary, to give an additional *"| statement. 7 Mr. Tovar. I agree. 10 | Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you that the court | "| reporter will provide you “vith a transcript and the transcript | te will be certified by the reporter as a complete, accurate and : -. 13 ! true record of all the tes:imony that you give here today. . | ® ig ! Now, you are employed by the CIA, is that correct? 1§ | Mr. Tovar. Yes. 1§ 1 Mr. Goldsmith.. I had given you earlier a copy of a letter, i7 | dated 23 March 1978 from M:. Carluced to the Chairman of this : 1a ! Committee. Have you had a chance to read that letter? . : 9 Mr. Tovar. I have. ! 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it? i 7 Mr. Tovar. I understand it. | . , : 7 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. ‘hen { think we are ready to proceed to | @ %3 | the substance of the questioning. What is. your present position 14 : with the CIA? | | : : ae. Mr. Tovar. I am the chief of the Counterintelligence my 49991 DocId: 42277210 Page 5 THD SELRET . .
ivr welude 7 sects Staff of the Directorate o:' Operations. capacity? | | Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working in that | Mr. Tovar. Ever since: a year ago April. | i da 5 Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working with the 6 | Agency? | 7 Mr. Tovar. Thirty:yezrs. 5 - Mr. Goldsmith. What was your asSignement prior to becom~ "| ing Chief of the CI Staff? ‘| Mr. Tovar. I was recently returned from overseas where I un | was Station Chief in| and three years before that, 2 | Chief of the Station in — oe al Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to assuming your position as Chief oO 44-l-of-the-cr Staff had you hae. extensive experience in the area of! is | counterintelligence? | | | ted Mr. Tovar. No, not pexticularly. We don't as a rule of Specialize. We are normally generalists. I do not consider | 8 myself a counterintelligence expert. 19 | Mr. Goldsmith. . During the years 1959 to '63 what position \ ° 4 20 | did you occupy with the Agency? | | 21 | Mr. Tovar. In 1959 I was Chief of Station in 7 “3 | In 1920, I came back end I was originally Deputy Chief and 2 | then Chief of the Branch ir Far East. Division which controls 2¢ § Operations in the Phillipires, Malaysia,Indonesia, Australia,-. | 7 : . . | + — . A ; NW 48331 Docta!39977210 Page 6 THD CECPOET | | t
da 22 33 nu HW 48331 poora:ho277010 Page ? TAD OCPCoeT (Ur OAL! New Zealand, and Oceania. That was until 1964. Mr. Goldsmith. Have ‘7ou had a chance to review CIA document number 1817 and the pages that follow it? Mr. Tovar. Yes, I have read these. I had not read these. | They were released by one of my subordinates, Mr. Friedlander. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling us that today is the first; chance you had to read then? Mr. Tovar. I did not read. them this time. They went to you, to the Committee but < have since read them. | Mr. Goldsmith. They vere prepared by whom? Mr. Tovar. Jack Friedlander, Chief of Operations. they I | | i \ | | i i i | were signed by him, not prepared by him. “They would have been | | originated probably by Mr. Kowalski or Mr. Bradley, I am not sure which, I think Kowalski almost certainly. Mr. Goldsmith. The memorandum which is labeled CIA No. 1817 was a response by thé Agency to an inguiry by the ~. Committee as to whether it was standard operating procedure for I believe it is fair to sav by way of summary that the memo says that it was not in fact standard operating procedure during the years 1959 to 163 to debrief such individuals. ‘Is that correct? i j | { ! | the Agency to debrief what in effect were repatriated defectors| | | 4 i | | | Mr. Tovar. Insofar a::; I understand it. My knowledge is. limited to what I see here before me in the paper. During this: | - | period in question I was not involved, so I didn't know what fo
ivy Hct 7 6 Vi the current policy. was then. | 2 | What I have been told since by those. who should -know is | 3 | that there was no policy’ ais set! forth here. : : & ; ‘ Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the criteria were for | 7 an selecting the 117 individuals whose files were reviewed? “| Mr. Tovar. No. I th:.nk someone mentioned the other day | 7 that the names were incorporated in a memorandum I think ori- ' 2 | ginionally by the FBI but’. would not certify to that. | | | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, since you have no direct : ‘0 | knowledge as to the manner in which this memo was prepared and, | n | for example, you don't know the criteria that was used for. | a) choosing these 117 people, I am not going to ask you questions : i3 | pertaining to that documeni:. -I would like to request that you ; communicate with the Office of Legislative Counsel at the 7 Agency and tell them the individual who was involved in the : | actual direct. preparation o£ the document so that I could spend a some time with him. 7 | . Mr. Tovar. The document, of course, is over my signature,| 9 | so I stand behind the docunent. I am responsible for what : 20 | was said there. If it is _ncorrect then I am incorrect in | 2 | leeting that document out. I have no personal first hand know-' = 2 | ledge of the research he did to. arrive at the conclusion here : : — . Lo i @ °3 | which he presented to me and I endorsed. I am prepared to stand | ensng it but I will give :rou his name. | 7 Mr. Goldsmith. I wan: to ask you some questions about the ate ae ‘ 4 i NW ws pocras ho077210 Page 8 THp @ MF ERET
hd “seu et > am 3 a a LTRS SU ba as pe aa as as op ee vat et mee amma endl pnganaamanennaanmaeaeesD 1a op cpateeeeeronee en oer 8 OREN ces opens es eo a wo A ee oD Oa Sian Aah ie a oe LE a aan Sean Sen ee Ta ONT NON tran RATERS Serer Sate Se ANON OF RED IN iur vcuati document. CIA no. 1818 indicates that CI Staff has completed a review of the files of 117 US persons who had "defected" to the USSR between 1959 and ‘63 and since returned to the United States. Is that correct? '58 to '63? Mr. Tovar. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. I wou..d like you to review the statement ‘under the name Thomas Morr:.dian. M-O-R-R-I-D-I-A-N. While you read that paragraph, I wil... state for the record thst the way. the memo is set forth it indicates that it was not standard operating procedure to deb:-iet such individuals, that of 117 people whose files were reviewed only ten were debriefed. Then it proceeds to list the ten individuals who in fact were debriefed. I have now requested Iir. Tovar to read the first summary which is right next to the name of the first person who was debriefed. | Mr. Tovar. Yes sir. Mr. Goldsmith. When’ did that individual defect? Mr. Tovar. 1947 is.the :year“heiwent to /the- USSR. I assume that “is the year he defected, if that is the term. Mr. Goldsmith. So that in fact that individual was not someone who defected between 1958 and 1963? Mr. Tovar. That is correct. | Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at the next individual under B,. Joseph Marshall. _ AW sss31 Doola:4s2277210 paye g TAD QEPRET i | i t. t {
NW 48331 DocId "32277210 Page 10 23 TRAP CLPRET vidual defected? would assume to the contrary. bur SGuRe a 8 | Mr. Tovar. Yes sir. | Mr. Goldsmith. When did Mr. Marshall defect? | ‘Mr. Tovar. It is not clear. He was born in the US in | 1897. He said he was employed in Hawaii in 1921. ‘There is no . | oo | indication whence he went i:o the USSR. 1 Mr. Goldsmith. There :.s no indication he defected between | '58 and '63? | Mr. Tovar. No. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945. | Conceivably he might | have defected after that. { Mr. Goldsmith. The letter "C", Tommaro S-G-0-V-I-0. | Would you please read that section. and tell us when this indi- | | . Mr. Tovar. Again, he went to the USSR with his parents | in the 1930s. No indication when he defected. He left the | USSR in 1960. No way of telling. | Mr. Goldsmith. This individual: did not defect between | "58 and '63? | | | i i | | | | | i | Mr. Tovar. At last we: have no indication he did. One Mr. Goldsmith. Letter tpt Mary Mackler, will you please | read the first summary and tell us when she defected? Mr. Tovar. There is ro indication when she defected. She went to the USSR with ler parents in 1931. Sometime after,|. married a Soviet. Mr. Goldsmith. Again, no indication she defected between |;
ivr OCUALL memo responding to the Comnittee's inguiry makes reference to 9 | | a ‘58 and ‘63? | 2 | Mr. Tovar. No. 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you Look at letter "E". Sonia and | ty ‘ | Fréd A-S-I-N-I-A-N. When did they defect? | | an “Mr. Tovar. ‘They renounced their US citizenship in 1948. | So I assume that is the operative year. | 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Will ‘rou look at the letter "FP" now? | a | Mr. Tovar. Jack Kuralski. | 9 | Mr. Goldsmith. When did he defect? | 10} Mr. Tovar. He recoun.2ed his US citizenship in "34 and : " departed USSR I assume in 1934. 4 _ 12 | Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to: make is that the | ten individuals who defected between the years '58 and '63. D4 ; rs \ | |: 1S Ttuthen proceed to provide us with ten names. But in fact, | 15 | if we continue to look through the list we will see that seven : a7 | of the ten individuals did not defect during that time period. | 1a | Some of them did return ducing that time period. | . Mr. Tovar. And were jebriefed. 20 | | Mr. Goldsmith. And ware debriefed. | a | - Mr. Tovar. ‘contacted. | we 2) Mr. Goldsmith. Of th: ten, perhaps three or four returned; ad . 13 | during the relevant: time period. I asked those questions a mainly to draw your attention to the fact that the response fo given. was not really -- emcee ea we 40931 Docld: 42277210 Page 11 7 Tae QEroCT 7 | | | | |
an %3 24 a wow NW 48331 Docta: 32277210 Page 12 | THe SECRET . x ve 22 4Ur wcunnt 0 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Tovar. I don't know the answer to that. I would assume that the criteria they applied here as best they could | | Mr. Tovar. -- precisely what you wanted? ( i was when did he defect, when did he return, was he debriefed | or contacted? In some cases they hit one out of three, in other cases two out of three. I think they were giving the best correlation with your criteria that they could, “Mr. ‘Goldsmith. I understand that. My point might be then, that the introductory sect:.on should not have stated that these were people in 1958 and '6:; when in fact they were not. Mr. Tovar. You are right. That is an incorrect statement, Is your requesting memo here? That is not a very good state- ment. | Mr. Goldsmith. Here is the letter dated April 6, 1978 which I show you just for your information to show you what the Committee was requesting from the Agency. Jf you will look | under number two. | Mr. Tovar. Then this would appear to correlate with that. You asked’ to indicate whetter the AGency from °58 to '63 interviewed or debriefed fc rmer American defectors. So, the time they defected is not the’ operative consideration. Mr. Goldsmith. No, it. was not. Mr. Tovar. The time cf the debriefing -- Mr.. Goldsmith. Yes, that would be the focus. - _ 1 ( :
— , yr Okbaei | a 1 | | Mr. Tovar. So these vould be at. least: ‘consistent with that. | 2 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, hat is true. I would like also for | | purposes of further clarif: _cation, to have you..read the letter | @ 4 dated May 12, 1978 starting with the second full paragraph. *y It. is not ‘numbered. - zi Mr. Tovar. Yes. | "| Mr. Goldsmith. I show you that only for your background e purposes, not to ask you any questions about it. In any event,| : I would appreciate having t:he name of the individual who , | | prepared the memo passed a:.ong to the Office of the Legislative iF | Counsel. : - 2 Mr. Tovar. Yes sir. | .. | Mr. Goldsmith. The response that was provided to the | @ id | Committee indicates that she CIA had no standard precedure for 15 debriefing. returning US de: ‘ectors. What was the basis for that v6 | policy or actually for the absence of the policy? ! | Mr. Tovar. I don't know. IT can speculate only -~ not | 13a | having been theke and not having any involvement -- I don't : 9 know what mentality of those in charge was at that time. | 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. What vould your specilation be? | 31 | Mr. Tovar. I would speculate that the contact with and | - 3) | debriefing, in effect the supervision of Americans in that ; oe 83 : category would be FBI's prerogative and the Agency as a rule ! na would not. have had any bas:.c interest or reason to be involved" a5 unless there were a specifi.c counterintelligence concern. | coipmsthiE a NW 48331 Decld: sboorr210 Page 13 TAP “erect
1ur wowed 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Does she Agency today have a policy of, Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard procedure for contactr 28 § of such a procedure?’ | i | | | 2 aS a matter of routine ope::ating procedure, debriefing return-~ | 2 ing defectors? | | & ‘ : Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of. | 2 Mr. Goldsmith. Again. would you Say you relied on the ‘| FBI to conduct those interviews? | 3 | Mr. Tovar. Yes. | 8 | Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any coordination between the | Agency and the FBI so that the Bureau is informed when someone ! 10 in fact is returning? | | | " Mr. Tovar. On Americin defectors, the type you are speak- . , 12 | ing of here? | 7 | ao | Mr. Goldsmith. An American defector who is repatriated. | ab 1s ‘Mr. Tovar. | I know of no case where they would be - | : 7 interested in the subject. I can't say there is a procedure | 7 in being. Knowing the way we relate to the FBI, if we knew of | i7 | a case of returning Americins, Say we learned it from an ! 8 | overseas station and it seemed of interest, we would’ probably | 19 | refer it directly to the Fri by letter. : 20 | | I am speculating here because I know of no case in point. | | | | 7 2 | ingthe Bureau and informing them of a returning defector? © 94 Mr. Tovar. Not that ©. am aware of. ! | Mr. Goldsmith. You would be the person who would be oars i [ HW 48331 Docld:32277210 Page 14 TAP & FRQET
73 24 ae ow HW 46331 Doold:32277210 Page 15. THD OLAOET Lo ot Re SS iP Seoncl | 43 | Mr. Tovar. Berween tie Soviet-East European Division and 7 cI Staff we should be awar2 of it. The two were most primarily concerned with the USSR. [ think one or the other ‘of us would inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern: The Americans, even when they jiave been naughty boys, having gone | | | to USSR and decided to return, we still don't have necessarily | a professional interest in that type of person. Mr. Goldsmith. What is the responsibility of the CI Staff within the CIA? Mr. Tovar. In a coup..e of sentences it is a little difficult. I will tell you what we do. The CI Staff has ‘two 4 principal areas of activity. We are first of all a staff. Are you familiar with the staff as opposed to the division? . | Mr. Goldsmith. No, I am not. Mr. Tovar. You have seen the table of organization of DDO? Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. ° Mr. Tovar. You know yenerally how we are organized? | ZZ weep | | | | | | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | | Mr. Tovar. The main set of components of the Directorate is divisions and staffs. “he divisions operate a function overt ‘seas. We-are ‘staft and that is in the military sense we support the Directorat and we support the Director, we suppor one another in an advisory capacity and in various ways. So, we po are not an operating component. We don't run spies. .We have
—s ae) te ° The at > ae i | HW 48331 pocta:hoo77210 Page 16 | TAD OFADET ‘SoesRreec- ovenspontbon coven vn VRPT conta OR-SOPVEEESSOD ENT wsSOO=tNO COOP onP etn” LESLIE OSERASLATanSnSoEFvosssoePv@naOOeaSrearciaarewooesvoronpvivvecsorwsmmjanrmacanahctraciasiansstesn oehamet + a wl) — mene bur OLA - 44 a lot of activities which impact on operations but we are not ih the true sense of the term an operating element. So, having said that, the primary field of activity for the CI Staff is research and analysis, and then the other, what we refer to as operat:.ons coordination. Now, that is sort of the term which ‘does not == research “and analysiS:is clear. We examine and analyze cases, essentially cases. We are not scrutinizing people. We acre looking at intelligence operations} old and current, primarily things that are not terribly current. We don't tend to follow current operations in the: analytic sense. We take o..d cases and look them over to see if mistakes were made, to .see ifve can derive lesssons from mistakes made in the past. We:publish papers for the Agency's wc eee eee crn eae nee een ene ee me nee en ma community .at. Large, all-in the R&A field..:.. On the: other: :side we sunction in the sense of a true staff: “yo We keep cur fingers on the activity of the Directorate overseas; We monitor what théy are doing, not in the sense of being spooky but we simply read he correspondence. We are given normal distribution of mosi. correspondence coming Back from — overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence activities abroad. To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency on operational activity ac::oss the board. So, we are generally aware of the operational patterns of activity that prevail in various overseas stations. On that basis we are in a position i i | | ; i t
iUr SCUAEI 7 1s to advise the DDO or Directorate as to the level of performance, the kind of activity conducted, the quality, the proper or improper degree of emphasis. We maintain an overview on behalf of DDO. in ea oe Benet a a rece SSS SSF SOE TN Mr. Goldsmith. Is your concentration oriented towards 6 counterintelligence threat: of a foreign nature? : | Mr. Tovar. Yes, totally. | é Mr. Goldsmith. You would not be concerned at all with $ counterintelligence threats: domestically? 0 Mr. Tovar. None whatsoever. n | Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that would be the | responsibility of the Bureau? a i3 7 Mr. Tovar. Absolutely’. CD ft r.~-Goldsmith.—Now)—lee-Harvey ‘Oswald returned from the 15 | Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Sovietion Union he worked | as a worker in a radio factory. Upon his return I imagine there a7 was someone concerned about: his being a counterintelligence | 13 | threat. Is it fair to say, and I do not want to ask you Leaain 19 | questions but would it be Yair to say that would be more : 20 | the responsibility of the bureau rather than the Agericy upon { 2 | his actual return? | a 2 | Mr. Tovar. Yes, the cuestion whether or not he was, let © 3 : us Say, a counterintelliger:ce threat. : mi Mr. Goldsmith. RGB acent? : ag t Mr. Tovar. “That would be a Bureau concern, no question NW 48331 Doctd: hoo77210 Page 17 TAP CEPRET
iur Huei — : 16 | about that. | ~ a Mr. Goldsmith. However, would the Agency make any effort | , 3 to interview Osald while Oswald was entroute from the Soviet | ; , : 8 ‘ | Union to the United States? = . : | . s| | Mr, Tovar. You are Speaking of what the Agency might have| 6 | done in '63 or '62? | 1 | : Mr. Goldsmith. ‘62. | g ‘Mr. Tovar. Again, we are speculating concerning the | o intelligence of thé men who were in charge then. Today I . : 7 would like to think we wou!.d be interested in what he is doing, nl At the time I don't know. I would think, why not. On the | | other hand, I couldn’ t say they would or should be interested. | — a] It was not their primary p::ecise prerogative. I think if they A ut could, as I assume they. did, the Bureau would discharge its ; | responsibilities. vis-a-vis any American: of questionable . ! is | propensity, I should think they would be deferring to the : | | Bureau. | = ; Mr. Goldsmith. “That would be the aspect of Oswald where 19 | there was a concern taht he posed a counterintelligence threat., 20 | What about the fact that Oswald may have had positive intelli- | | gence information that wou..d have been helpful to the Agency? 2 | That would not be within the jurisdiction of the Bureau? - 2 3 : Mr. Tovar. I think in that context it might have been | ; | ) appropriate for the Agency. if the assumed the point you made, se i to seek an interview with him. I think the appropriate HW 48331 poota 32277210 Page 16 THD GEPRET
an ‘NW 48331 DocId: ee aan Fle gto ceo eee AACE ang ON eS Caen eee en oe me oe nwo io Rhee EE Ghee: cee rt ee rt “aetna oy oe Te ee fe meet cto ox mem regs tn ee 8 neo b eaten + atm oe sonene e wa: 32277210 Pave 19 TRS SECRET sur DLLME I 7 vehicle for that would have been the Domestic Contact Division which I think handled most of the contacts referred to in this memorandum. Mr. Goldsmith. What is the function of the Domestic Contact Division? Mr. Tovar. They are esponsible for intelligence that | | { | | | can be checked properly and legally in the United States °° : normally through American businessmen or American persons and | nonofficials who travel ab::oad and acquire intelligence of | interest. This is not jus: USSR. It could be any other ! country. Their primary field of activity is to contact and debrief on a vluntary basi;, if they so choose to respond, : Americans who return from overseas. | -. Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that the Committee's inquiry | concerning the CI's policy as to returning American defectors | was routed to your staff, ar Staff. When the memo was prepared! : | | . { by the CI Staff for the Committee, was it done with the thought! of representing the entire agency or just the CI Staff? Mr. Tovar. It is aif ficult for us to presume to speak for the entire Agency. I thin on this matter we axe: speaking for | the Directorate of Operations, not for the entire Agency. | Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. That is really the area with which I was concerned: anyway, Di cectorate of Operations. : Mr. Tovar. The only other element of the Directorate of Operations that would be of an interest in this type of thing, : which might be construed a3; having an interest in this type | oo, / |
fur wcunZt ag of activity, would be the SC Division. On this I think the | ro CI staff could be considered as speaking for the Directorate. on | 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Domestic Contact Division part of 2 : | the CI Staff? . Mr. Tovar. No, part of the Directorate of Operations. | ‘Mr. Goldsmith. The response of the Agency dated April 7 20, 1978, which appears in CIA Number 1818, indicates that 8 7 contact seems to be based on opportunity and circumstance. . Then it goes on to-say only ten of the 117 persons have had 7 any contact with CIA. Would it be possible for you to go into ; more dtail on what is méani. by opportunity and circumstance? - Mr. Tovar. In the asecne of a policy, of a guideline, a Americans who return from l.aving resided in the USSR, in the | | procedure, internal instruction which says you will debrief i | "absence of that, this thing is left to chance obviously. I 1 | . 5 . 16 cannot explain to you. how the names of these ll ‘passed the -desk| 7 ' | of ‘whoever was in | charge at. the time, but assuming they did, | 13 | | my guess, and it is wally cnly a guess, would be that the | 9 | a | | a ! | Perse who read that, whatever document it was, would say, | 20 | | |e He looks like he might be interesting", and perhaps | 21 i would then get in contact with CCD and suggest if they get in = ) | contact with a person, let us say he is known to ‘be living in | t { : 330i ~ | New York, suggest that they might want to seek out his Location| 24 } i | : |. and if possible interview I.im. se of ; ; ' { i | HW 48331 DoclIa: "32277210 Page 20 “TAP LN SEORET }
HW 48331 Docld: 42277210 Page 21 The SECRET if. that Oswald received unusual treatment at the hands of the CIA. ivr am wit | a OS 19 I think it would be a matter of chance in the sense that the analyst or whoever it vas who reviewed that document, might react, and yet he or she m..ght not, too, depending on how they woke up that morning. It :.s sheer whimsy. Mr. Goldsmith. Let me explain to you why the question whether or not it was standard operating procedure to debrief returning defectors is important to the Committee. Since researchers who have revieved the Warren Commission Report and have reviewed releases made under the Freedom of Information Act by the CIA and the FBI. { i | | ‘the assassination of the P:resident, there has arisen a group of | | | | Having reviewed these materials the argument has been made One example of this unusua.. treatment is that there is no record of Oswald having been debriefed by the CIA upon his return. For that reason, ve are focusing on this issue. Is there any way you can give us guidance on how to respond to that question? | Mr, Tovar. I can't becuase I am sphculating every step along. the way. I would hesitate to say more than Oswald simply didn't connect with whoever happened to be looking -- let us assume his name appeared. Was his namde in the list? Mr. Goldsmith. No. That is the list of people who were debriefed. | Mr. Tovar. One hundred seventeen?
ivr @eUHcE | - i “Mr. Goldsmith. I haven't seen the list of 117 people. 2 | Mr. Tovar. What is tiis? | 3 ! Mr. Goldsmith. ‘That is a list of 350 odd people I was & ‘ : going to ask you about. However, since you don't have knowledge : of the 117, I am not going to ask ~ou about them. | | Mr. Tovar. If Oswald's name was on the list, I can't | { ; | explain why he might not have been contacted. Maybe he didn't | § | appear attractive or interesting enough. I don't know what | 9 | information might. have been given with these names on the list, 1G such as a memo from the FBL or State Department, whoever had | " | originated it, what they said that would have titilated the "2 | analyst who might have seen it that would have elicited a | . . 13 | response on the part of the analyst who would say "Ah, let us | @ 1s look into this further." | ! 1s | Mr. Goldsinith. “In particular, a lot of focus has been ; ! 7 4 20 | Mr. Tovar. I didn't «now that he was. It doesn't say so 2] | here. . | at 22 | Mr. Goldsmith. That joes not indicate the extend of the @ 3 debriefing. That information was obtained independently by . 24 : this Committee. : 2s Mr, Tovar. The name -neans nothing to me so I can't -% HW 48331 DocId:32277210 Page 22 TOP CECRTT
HW 48331 pocta:2277210- Page 23 The CEPOCT A any positive intelligence connotation. ivr DLLAEI / | 21 enlighten you on it. Mr. Goldsmith. ‘Does che CIA have any affiliation with . Organizations in the Unitei States who might be responsible for debriefing someone? Mr. Tovar. Not that am aware of. Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, if anyone is going to be debriefed it would be by the Domestic Contact Division? Mr. Tovar. In the in:elligence sense. In the sense of elucidation of intelligenc:, DCD would do it. A different typ of inquiry, personal inves:igation, ‘the Office of Security, o whoever iteworks through, would be the one. components might seek out an individual or might have in times past but I can't think of «1 case in point in my own recollec~ tion. I would say, given -:he strictures on our operating in Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. ‘ { t ji think I had 7 ” - i better defer to the other people on that. That is roughly where co p
bur wLuAcE - \ ~—s A SA AE A a Sa Re TT | it stands. They certainly would not have interest in debrief- | ing defectors that I am awire of. | Mr. Goldsmith. — In anv event, for the purposes of Summary | there is today no standard operating procedure of interviewing returning defectors? i Mr. Tovar. Right, insofar as I am aware, there is none. | Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard operating procedure between the Bureau and the CIA which would coordinate any ef fort to contact returning defec::ors and share information? wn oy Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of. an Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area which I would lLikej 2 to gt into briefly, would vou define what a 201 file is? a - a Mr. Tovar. A 201 file: is a file or files -- it could be @ id | several volumes to it -- which relates to an individual. It. is | might pose a dicotomy, a 201 file and project file. A project 16 | file might deal with an activity, say collection operations in Timbucktu, a broad scale Ox activity involving several numbers _ ao of people, there might be several 201 files, A, B, C, who were 19 associates in that project. The 201 file would be on the individual himself. Mr. Goldsmith. Ti would contain primarily biographic = 22 | information? dl “33 Mr. Tovar. No. It would contain a much vaster -- some 24 of them might contain one sheet of paper with name, rank and . Co | 2s t date of birth. But if the association with him developed and | RW 48331 DocIa:'32277210 page 24 Top CEPRET . 7 >
NW 46331 Docid: mere se ete sh cnn a sarees ene sae seen ae ‘| 4 gaara trate ama terest Ba errr AEN ree Eran a ee Se ee (UF OcbALL 3 became more extensive, it night contain a considerable amount of information. If he becime involved with this ope-ation it might include operational naterial, intelligence operations as well, all part of the 2)1 complex. | ' The point I am making is that it is an individual file as opposed to an activity file. Mr. Goldsmith. If yoi.wanted to learn about the operation ‘that an individual was involved in, would you go to his 201 file or to his operations file? Mr. Tovar. I would go-to the 201 file first. There might not be an operations file. In’fact, in the vast majority of the 201 cases there are no operational files because there is no hard and fast rule on when you open a 201 file or who opens a 201 file. | If I, for example, am overseas and I become interested in. ele ae el a eee ne) Tn a me a person who looks to me to have considerable promise from the _ operational standpoint, sav a local foreign type, I might give my own local checks, I might examine my own files to see if I know anything about him. Then I say to headquarters "here is Joe Doe. He is interesting to me for. these reasons. Will you please check against. headqiarters records .and other agencies and let me know if you have anything of interest on him." I might not ask for a 201 file. Headquarters might then, because they thought he wa; interesting, open a 201 file. Conversely, I might likewise say this looks terribly interest- * 2977210 Page 25 | TAZ SECRET
Ur oeuAEE ing Please open a 201 file and give me all of the information ~~ to open a 201 file. In the case of a person of CI interest, a you can collect on him." | 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that the fact. that someone | j @ ‘ | has a 201 file does not mein at all that the individual was : 5 | .involved in any operations of the Agency. If you;wanted toget | } é | information of an operational nature, would you go both to the | ; 201 file and operations fie? | } | . 3 | Mr. Tovar. Assuming ~-here was information of an opera-~ . | a tional nsture? : 10 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. a . ; | nd Mr. Tovar. | Yes, indevd we would. | a) Mr. Goldsmith. If soneone is an agent of the CIA -- I | _. i2 | am not referring now to case officers or staff agents -— some- | op is | one is a field agent for the Agency, would that fact be indi- ! is | cated in the 201 file? | 6 Mr. Tovar. Yes. : 7 | Mr. Goldsmith. In the Directorate of Operations someone : 7 might open up a 201 file on an individual if the person was | ig | of a potential positive intelligence significance? | 20 | Mr. Tovar. Or counter intelligence, either one. | a Mr. Goldsmith. That was going to be my question. The | | 7 a alc cr Staff in particular, when would you have occasion to open a -@ “3 | 201 file? : _ 2A | Mr. Tovar. CI staff would not necessarily be the only one! | ! | : as if | I | | NW 48331 poctassan77210 Page 26 THD | CEAOCT
RW 48331 oe ot i. : a) ~ Docla:' Be Ge aa ee Slee" eeeaeneneecttbe aman 2¢ § integrated in the files of the Directorate or it is in the bur OeoaL i (25 nies! a field station might have a counter-person I described earlier, and become interested in him because he did have some CI : attraction or interest. The station itself or the division would open the 201 file. It woud not be us. The CI Staff as a rule is not involved in that type of thing. At this stage of the yame since we are not operating and we are not out soliciting new contacts, we are not working in that sense of the term, we don't to my knowledge originate 201 files. | Mr. Goldsmith. The C: Staff does not open up 201 files? Mr. Tovar. There is no reason that we couldn't. Mr. Goldsmith. As a pratical matter? Mr. Tovar. As practical matter it does not work that way. Our research is primarily vocused upon established cases, cases! that may:even be dead, terminated, or dormant, or even current in certain cases, but as a .tule not very many | 201 file is opened by someone else. We: may examine those files and review them. We do review other activities, But the 201 file would be in existence. They’whould not be created by ourselves. In former days when oom Staff files were segregated from therest of the Directorate it might have been different. I ' don't: know. | _ Mr. Goldsmith. When was that? Mr. Tovar. Say prior to 1974, 1957. Today our foles are | 52277210. Page 27 | TAD CEPPET
26 bur LUNE seastn: ote process of being integrate. We have been working on this. This is one of our major f:.nal exercises in the past two or three years to make sure, vhen you go to the central files and research a name, if there ..s something in the CI Staff reposi- dee tory that will turn up when you are making a check of the index. ‘Mr. Goldsmith. Will most 201 files be open as a result of information coming into headquarters from the field, one of the field stations? ao ae | a Mr. Tovar. Yes, the vast majority. In years before when me | they has such programs as MH Chaos, I assumed they opened 201 12 | files of their own. | Mr. Goldsmith. What :s that?. Mr. Tovar. MH Chaos—program? aR { | . : . 5 | Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, will you indicate what that 16 program is? : 17 | Mr. Tovar. I frankly would rather not becuase I don't | , | | | 13 | know the precise definition of the program. It was a program | . \ 19 | which has been described ir. the press as domestic surveillance. , : - oo ; — | 99 | Whether that is the correct. proper designation, I don't know. — i 21 | Our CI Staff does not normally open a 201 file. We don't have 7 , ae 22 | occasion to. _ He, a @ “3 | . Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands lw i. | " a f! | 44 | for? ; | ~ ae fi Mr. Tovar. Counter Intelligence/Special Investigative | HW 49331 “Doota: 42277210 Page 28 THD QeAoeT ;
1ur acUALi 27 Group, I think it is. Invastigative or investigations, I don't |. I. &2 . know which. OS — | | : Mr. Goldsmith. Is that group still in existence today? an d | Mr. Tovar. No. | | e 5 | Mr. Goldsmith. When did it go out of existence? - Mr. Tovar. I don't k10w exactly. Before my time. I ; think it ended in "73, '74, '75. 1 am not sure. a | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the function of that 2 group was? | | Mr. Tovar. only in a very vague sort of way. I have hear i about it, it was the inveszigative group in the or Staff that 2 investigated whatever the °I Staff did in those days. I can't 3 | speak to that with any first hand knowledge. . I know some thing G va i they did but I would be hesitant to make a general definition ol of their function. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the function of that a7] group was to investigate Ajency employees who were suspected a || of having been penetrated? | | Mr. Tovar. — I think, because I have seen nothing in weiting so on the subject, but I have been given to understand that was onp ad of their. functions in ‘the sontext of their responsibilities | , | that was included. But I am no authority on the subject. ! ~ eG “3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether CI/SIG would have | ee! 7 ; | occasion to open a 201 fils? | ae V Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate. I don't know. NW 48331 Docta:42277210 Page 23 THp QE POT 4 | | j j
28 Ur aZuRe! Mr. Goldsmith. What vould your speculation be? Mr. Tovar. I would speculate in the days when they were functioning they probably ida. You have a very unauthoriative witness on that subject. | _ Mr. Goldsmith. What is the relationship if any between the Office of Security and the CI Staf£? Mr. Tovar. We have basically different functions. The Office of Security is unde:: the Directorate of Administration and is responsible for the personnel and physical security of the entire division. Itsfocuses on personnel security and physical security. | |The CI staff as I described it, is an element of DDO .concerned with research and analysis and operation and coordi- “ation.” The relation between us and the Office of Security is simply that between us and another fraternal element of the Agency which has responsib..lity which sometimes comes close together. Mr. Goldsmith. Does che Office of Security maintain files which contain informition of a derogatory nature on individuals, not necessari-y limited to Agency employees? Mr. Tovar. To my knowledge they don't. My assumption is ii I have never seen what .s in their files -- my assumption is: that they have files only on Agency personnel. I.cannot visualize circumstances under which they would maintain infor- mation on people who are not in the Agency or who had not been HW 48331 poota:42277210 Page 30 TAP CEPT | | | | | | | | | | | | ! | | | | | | | | .
33 24 “ae ow 29 §UP SeuREeil yp secereteeesemeestesueee> euveteeewever er Seeeesetereey taaganaaanse applicates for employment and then left. Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Office of Security interested in maintaining information so that if in the future an individual was being considered for employment. in some capacity with the Agency the Secuirty Office would have that information on him? Mr. Tovar. I cannot visualize that heppening today. Mr. Goldsmith. I wou..d like to ask you to read CIA 0786, om et Fad tance rm rvenerie which is a document that this Committee obtained from the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald. to a . | Mr. Tovar. That sort of suggests they maintained such | information then. I still cannot visualize there doing it | | today. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think the function of the Office of “Security may be different today from what it was in 1959 with | regard to maintaining such files? | ; | Mr. Tovar. The funct:.on, I would use the term function, | I would say the policy of che Office as far as the way the | { office operates today. I don't know what they do intrinsically, I cannot visualize their maintaining that kind of current _- records today. Maybe this is historic, it was in the files Roa Ga A ee Sec e ncanan ete te z since 1969. With the injunction against dest-roying files, the files remained. If it was John’ Q. Doe appearing today in a similar context 8s Soe eS su I would not visualize the Office of Security maintaining this mw 48331 pocta:ho277010 Page 31 TAD GCEPOCT
ve 22 73 24 Si ST ee ea sa aR AT TNE rR EET GE Mr BeprNomgeeies wee = ivr veiled | . 30 kind of document. ‘Mr. Goldsmith. To whom would. this document go today? Mr.. Tovar. ‘You mean from the State Department? Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, a State Department document. Which is indicating that an American citizen is giving information, intelligence information t2 a foreign country, to whom in the CIA would that document go? | Mr. Tovar. I am not sure it would come to the CIA at all because the CIA does not have responsibility for that type of person. I think it would jo to the FBI. “Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the individual is overseas? Mr. Tovar. Yes.. He is an American. Again, this is speculation. I don't know what moves the person who releases cables to the Moscow Embas3y today. He might decide or some- body here in State Securit, might decide that CIA should see this. In.that event, it probably would go to the Office of Security as a matter of information... Mr. Goldsmith. Would information contained in this type of telegram normally lead <:o the opening of a 201 file? Mr. Tovar. I would tiink not. Mr. Goldsmith. Why not? Mr. Tovar. There is nothing that suggests here this is going to be of continuing interest to the CIA. This is ~ 1959. Let us say in 1962 he man came back and another message! WW 48331 Doota:'$2277210 Page 32 TAD SEPOtT | | | | : | | | | | | i . | came over and it indicated that he was available for discussion
ivr Dene 1 or was of interest and so on and maybe there are reasons for wD debriefing, I can visualize a 201 being opened if the matter 3 -were of apparent continuing interest. I can see no reason why | tt 4 | a 201 would be opened in this case. | | Mr. Goldsmith. What :..£ this telegram was followed by a | 7 aable indicating that the nddvidual had decided to defect? | | Mr. Tovar. What do you mean? He is applying for Soviet | a citizenship, so he is defecting here? | | Mr. Goldsmith. You ate correct. I withdraw the question.: ! . ] | Mr. Tovar.. I think basically my point is that it is a | "| fact that a 201 need not be opened up on this type -- this is | 2 a casual piece of informat:.on. If one could eliminate the | . a name Lee Harvey Oswald, wh:.ch raises flages, it is John Doe | iy id and there is nothing in th:.s -- someone might say what an SOB 2 i is | this is but there is nothing to indicate anything but an is unfortunate incidental event, I would say today, “why bother! wd We have enought to do without opening 201 files on people of | | that nature." The encyclopedic approach is not one that we | 19 | try to appiy. | 20 | Bear in mind, I am do:ng a lot of speculating here. I nl perhaps shouldn't. ory . — 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. You really aren't aware of what the ! -@ "4 | procedure would be in 1959 for dealing with a telegram like | ; a | 26 | this?. | ae Mr. Tovar. No. I would still say today I would not expect x i HW 48331 poota:2277210 Page 33 Tnp QECOlT
ane a , i ~~ b= ‘reveeetenana—ectoe—iovesnas-Genesnacy nasans “gpestaanpunsaas sO . wn 24 > . oe oe sow gas ' NW 48331 Docra:$ 5 Coe Eakge Senneee ne TSG rrip Sates aeeatenananeincteeanssanbntSie nse SSE og Ts LS aN nT that kind of document to be retained in Agency files anywhere. You know, inter-departmentiil correspondence is firing paper in all directions all the time on an informational basis. That lUPr SeUNE! - does not mean it is retained. Mx. Goldsmith. your testimony is moreorless speculation but you are saying that today you don't think that this type of document would be With :-egard to this document, after 1959 retained and have any spec..al significance? retained. There is nothing ef interest to the Agency. Mr. Tovar. I don't think so. Io am scratching my trying to visualize circumstances under which it could is nothing of immediate counterintelligence interest. know who would retain it o:: why. Mr. Goldsmith. For the purpose of clarification, citizens? 2277210 Page 34 ' Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. TAP Greory Mr. Tovar. You are asking is it? . Mr. Tovar. Primarily yes, but not solely. We are concerned with Americans QO: counterintelligence interest. If an overseas station is informed by somebody that an American is contacting the Soviets and is apparently engaged in what looks like espionage, we would become interested. That is 32 head: be There . I don't if the (CI asked that of the CIA, hy that I mean the counterintelligen “aspect of the CIA concerned primarily with a foreign counter- intelligence threat, in otehr words, foreign nationals, foreign nn re Se ce
33 1UP DEGREL Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. Mr. Tovar. You reali::e of course with the sensitivity of Americans investigation: of Americans we have to be an we da . | | espionage I.am talking abouw:. © | | | | ! | | | | | | are extremely careful in making the determination as to when a 6 | person is of counterintell:.gence interest. - We have very strict ] rules and regulations on the consideration of investigations, | . 7 | considerations retaining information, the rights of a person. | . : a, | "| The criteria are very stringent. Theyare under esecutive j . | io | order and Attorney General guidelines. We don't approach this | " casually at all. It is proscribed activity. | | | 12 | Mr. Goldsmith. Both as to Americans?. | t : + : | .. rs 13 | Mr. Tovar... Primarily Americans. The Attorney General, | | ; is | is not concerned essential:.y with non-US persons. Our focus of Is | sensitivity is on US persons who are US citizens or residents, | te aliens or US entities, orgiunizations, which are primarily 17 | American in composition: ot 13 | Mr. Goldsmith. Again, would you focus outside che-borders| | of the United States? . | { . - i i . 20 | Mr. Tovar. Yes. Ins:.de USvis FBI. | 21 | Mr. Goldsmith. Before when you made reference to a a 22 | station overseas, you becane aware of an American who might’ f ee 7 overeene ee | . 3 be involved in espionage for another country, you were refer- 24 | ring to an American who wa: living abroad, is that correct? i . | ~ as fi Mr. Tovar. Yes, or t::aveling abroad. | 7 lL. J | NW 48331 DocId:'32277210 Page 3 TAD CLARET
HW 48331 DoclId: : mes Frat Sats Se eG BTS CNMI ALAS A Sear ag Pw ag rt Aor a A a A Hi 2 2AdSe Sos SSS SS SS eee eo : 1. cla ieeetate Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA. Number 788 which is the field personality file request form that was used - to open Oswald's 201 file. In the middle of the page there is | box which states-the term ‘Other identification", If someone | wrote the number or letter "AG" down, what does that stand for?| Mr. Tovar. I have no idea. What are they referring | “to here? I cannot think o* anything. : ; Mr. Goldsmith. The form also indicates that Oswald's | : file was restricted. Do you know of any reason.why Oswald's file would have been restr.cted? | Mr. Tovar. Where is Hat? » | Mr. Goldsmith. Here. | | | Mr. ‘Tovar. No, I don't know. I don't know what criteria i? they would have used at that time or even today for that matter to open a restricted file. Bear in mind, there is a lot of | latitude given to the individual. who opened these things. He : “could be a very. junior ana..yst who for reasons of his own decided he would do it this way. Supervision would not neces- sarily get down there very closely behind him. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the inter-agency source ' register is? | Mr. Tovar. yes. | Mr. Goldsmith. What :.s that? ! Mr. Tovar. As I unde::stand it, it is a register maintained in which other agencies of the government register their . 2277210 Page 36 THe | QEPOCT —
| a : bur SEK i 35 interest in a person. Let us take, for example, you are al interdsted in Mr. Smith. et us say you: check Mr. Smith with the CIA and with the other agencies and in so doing you wish’ . B da Gre for the Army Intelligence and you are in Germany and you become to have him recorded under the ISR, Inter Agency Source Registry, the entry of his name in the ISR will normally flag prior interest on the part of somebody in the government, in this case you are in the A:my. j i | . Hs I don't know what this symbol is but they put two asterisks | . i | 8 | { i | | \ 1 9 10 which indicates to anybody else who checks that name later the W | us army has.a prior interest in that person. 2 . Mr. Goldsmith. © What lind of interest would that be? . i3 | | Mr. Tovar. Intelligence interest to me, potential e 14 intelligence interest. Again, the ISR may have ramifications 1s! that I am not aware of. In my experience the ISR has been the | | place we go to check, say, a new or potentially new source to | see if there is ny other p:-eviously established government | a interest in the person which means keep your hands off. The | 9 military rely upon this ve:-y heavily because we coordinate thei 20 | clandestine intelligence operations. | "| Me. Goldsmith. Would an ISR index be checked prior to | | ws 22 | opening up a 201 file as a matter of routine? | | ; 3 Mr. Tovar. It has been so many years since I have done | ue ‘this. The way we have become mechanized today I would assume | R that a normal file check through the central files of the | . HW 48331 Doclda:$2277210 Page 37 . TAD GEeactrT
IVE SEUAEI 36 | Directorate would include or would turn up anything that was in the ISR. I am just not sure. how it works. Mr. Goldsmith. If.someone were an agent of another intelligence organization would that be indicated in the 201 | file? oo, 7 | . ; aa wat? sa t - soca oe 5 6 Mr. Tovar. Tf it were an agent, agent of another service,| ; that would be in..the ISR:only if it. had been of interest to | 8 "another agency which said "Put Joh Doe's name in the ISR and | a indicate he is a US Army intelligence source,” at the very i 0 | least a person of interest to the US Army Intelligence ngency. n | rt would not be there if the Army had not put it in. So you | 2 | might not know, | . a Again, I entnk atacd any any agent ‘of the military would rely e is ! upon the ISr, I would thin}: almost certainly would be entered | | | in the ISr, because they want to maintain control of ity to- | 6 make sure nobody else gets in the way arnad interferes - with sete in| operations. : 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone were an agent ait would in | IS | all ‘Likelihood be indicatedt in the ISR and assuming the ISR 20 | is checked by a CI person prior to opening up the file, he woul a | take note of that fact? | a 2 | Mr. Tovar. Say that again. Some of this is pretty fuzzy | " ® <4 to me. I don't want to mislead you by extrapolating from my : u| ' own ignorance. | = 4 me Mr. Goldsmith. If someone is an agent of another ° NW 48331 Docid!32277210 Page 38 TAD CEPT
UP acbaci 37 intelligence service, that fact would be noted in the ISR? “ih “Mr. Tovar. Another U3 intelligence service? Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Mr, Tovar. A US milicary intelligence service only, yes, the military intelligence service would normally be registered SE SS a NT RSS Saas Was Se “8 { | ' { | assets would not be registz3red in the ISr to my knowledge. : | | | ! | | | { | | i 6 in the ISB. Other than tha military, the FBI. intelligence é _ Mr. Goldsmith. “ But the military tends to make that list- $ ing? : 10 Mr. Tovar. In my experience t the miltiary has been the a oad primary element involved in the use and the exploitation of thei - ai Isp. Let me interpose ano: -her point here, I am not an expert j . | : _ 13 | in these procedures and I am way out of touch. You live most. . @ Id | of your life overseas, you don"t do these things~back-at——— i oo 18 | headquarters. These procedures may be quite different in i os | 16 : actuality. I am groping through my memory to see how they were 17 | dealt with on an active basis. | 13 ; A fellow like Bill Donnelly might enlighten you much nore 49 | than I could about the Isa. : . : 20 | | Mr. Goldsmith. 1 I understand that. I think you can tell 31 | i am not pressing you for detail on it. | 2 | | Mr. Tovar. I would like to help you. I am prepared to | oe ag | ‘specualte as I have been doing on things that are somewhat <= - 24 | beyond my direct experience: and direct responsibility. There | | isa limit. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, i.£ someone checking IS:R notes that NW 48331 Doctd: soorrais Page 39 TAD QEAOET
22 73 24 mi 49931 docta:b2277210 rage co §6=6 TAY OLAOTT eee es erat eee ng cre et eee ent Se tee nn et erent eee te cn a te Oe ee ER SES Sh aire nh ep earner = | doing a file check on a p2rson whose name came from one of the .xegistered in the ISR, if 1 person is of interest let us say, Vm a iUP deURE | 38 an individual is a military intelligence agent would the fact of that agency status be-noted and a 201 file opened on that individual? Mr. Tovar. I am not sure. I would think it would be. Again, I .am speculating. {[ think almost certainly if I were field stations and it turned up the fact he was already - to the US Army Intelligenc2, that would automatically sort of proscribe further attempts on my part to go in and get involved. I think a notation would b: made in the 201 file. | , | Mr. Goldsmith. As a practical matter ‘that would be a good| reason for making. the nota -ion? | - | Mr. Tovar. Yes. : t | Mr. Goldsmith. Does -he CIA regularly use the ISR? 4 | Mr. Tovar. We maintain it as I understand it. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone is an agent of. the CIA, would that fact be noted in the ISR? Mr. Tovar. No, I don't believe it would, Again, you can check on that to make certain. Donelly I think can help much better on it. I cannot visualize all our sensitive source | | | 5 . | being registered there. | ; \ Mr. Goldsmith: Do you know how internal memoranda prepared by James Angleton when he vas head of the CI:Staff, how internal |
BD 3 . i aa in o ae i | | | | | | | { ‘ l ¥ i 10 | | j oy i 2! | i3. | | t 4 7 | | 1UP SEGRE! Oe paperwork relating to the JFK assassination was prepared and subsequently stored? - Mr. Tovar. No, I really don't. I have no idea. I have seen no documents on that subject. x have seen nothing either originated or approved or :igned by him. You realize that any files on this subject are ead files. I am just doing my current: job. Until you poeple became interested, we were not dealing with them on a dai..y basis. Mx. Goldsmith. What happens to the personal files of an individual such as Angletons or even yourself after leaving the CI Staff? Mr. Tovar, After rearing the staff or leaving the Agency ___—.- 9. eee eee na meee ne eo en tne 4. Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take. the first after leaving the “4 —Staff{,- ‘what-would-happen “tov your personal papers? ’ My. Tovar. The personal file, official file on the person in the Agency is retained by the Office of Personnel. a Mr. Goldsmith. That would givern your personal. file, your personal papers. ‘tha: about internal memos, soft copy type files, what would happen to them? Mr. Tovar. Having bean only one element of the organiza tion during my career, it is hard to say. : _ Mr. Goldsmith. I am not talking now about personnel file.. -I am talking about soft copy, working files that an individual : may maintain. | Mr.-Tovar. You mean he files he himself as an individual WW 40391 Dootacheo77210 Page 41 TAD CEPT { \ wee TT ee ee
oo “£3 KW 48331 Decld: SLES ERS See BTR ET, wines ae aoe se ioo77210 Page 42 TAD &CeRET 5 PER Ore eNO re Ne eA NTE SS EE ET 2 SS ae a Pooler aca ese a , see what I wrote. I would not take it with me. PUP DLLKE I 40 maintained? Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Tovar. | Most individuals don't maintain: personal. files, . I don't think. I would say, ‘for example, anything I write, I dictate a memorandum and I send it to anybody you want to name, in a sense that is my work, I have done it but I don't | keep a personal file on that. That goes into my office file. | It is part of the office cironological file which is maintained by my secretary. Let us siy multiply that by 500,000 over a period of years the foles jrow. At the time I leave I am | incidental in a sense. I just happen to be the person in the job at the time. The files will still be there. There is a normal retirement and destruction under normal | | | | | | | | conditions, retirement and destruction program which eliminates the accumulation of excess.ve useless material. Mr. Goldsmith. Most paperwork would go in this office . chrono file? Mr. Tovar. Yes, anything of significance would go in the office chrono file. Anyth:.ng I write to the Directorate of Operations, DDO, CI, it is normally part of the chrono files. If I want it, it is there. It is my own file in the sense that: when r am on the job I have total access to. it. If I left the job and wanted to ‘look at it six months later, it is “still in the fole and I would as). somebody who took my place could I
20 | : : tess s Off on a host of things which are not really my creation. I tur OLUKZI 41 Mr. Goldsmith. If it is an office chrono file does that meant that everything is filed in‘a chronological order? | Mr. Tovar. Not necessarily. Here you ought to consult my secretary. There might be a subject breakdown. Ordinarily hte front office, we don't main-ain a lot of files. There is no point. in it. Let us say something I signed off on, here is a case in point, memos that are signed .on my behalf or that I might have signed, if I were there that day, I would not maintain that in my front office as a rule. That would probably be maintained by <he office of origination. I think if I signed it my secretary would certainly maintain a log of . things that had gone throuyjh me for signature. But I don't think, I could be wrong on this, I don't think as a rule she would maintain a routine memorandum just because I happened to sign it because I sign so :nany things on-that staff. I sign am representing the staff as a whole. Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo:i know when Mr. Angleton left the CI Staff? Mr. towar. Yes. I an not certain of the precise date. L think it was either Decenber '74 or January '75. That is the position of Chief, Counterintelligence? | Mr.- Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Tovar. I believe he may have retmained in the office for several. months after tiat before he finally retired. NW 48331 Docld: hoor7a10 Page 43 TAP GCPRtT
iUr PLEA 12 Mr. Goldsmith. Do yoi know whether, after Mr. Angleton Left the CI Staff, any typ2 of followup was done by that staff else's inquiry as to what happened, what did it say, what does | | | - on the Nosenko issue? & ; : Mr. Tovar. Followup work? 5 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. For example, one of the issues, the 7 key issue. with regard to M-:. Nosenko was his bona fides. | Mr. Tovar. Yes, indeed. _ - - | | : Mr. Goldmsith. After Mr. Angleton left was any additional] ; analytical work done on that issue? | : | Mr. Tovar. A very de:ailed study was done by my predecessbr . ni George Kalaris. A very thorough analysis was made of: the whole 7 2 | Nosenko question. | . i3 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you referring to the Hart Report? ! @ is 7 / Mr. Tovar. Yes, | st Mr. Goldsmith. Other ‘than the Hart report was any type of is | followup work or analytica. work done after Mr.. Angleton's | 7 | departure? | a Mr. Tovar. I don't know. for certain: The Hart Report is | 19 | a thick piece of paper. In the >» Preparation of that report | z0 | there were probably all kinds of drafts, scratchings and sort I 2 | of preliminary jobs. ‘ALL chat I know would be in ‘the context 7 ‘nl ofthat report. All I know would be same representations in | -@ | response to the Director's inquiry or your inguiry or someone 7 ! | as § it méan, that type of thing, but really correlary efforts. RW an331 vocta:borr7a10 Page 44 TAD a RET
iUr OeUNEL gg I. Mr. Goldsmith: Think for a moment on the Nosenko issue. } nD As Chief of the CI Staff, if it were demonstrated to you very Glearly that the story given -by Mr:-.Nosenko on Lee Harvey ase dictions, it was in many ways simply incredible, what impact would that have on the Agency's assessment of Mr. Nosenko as being a bona fide rather than a dispatched defector? Mr. Tovar. Well, it is difficult to answer: You are | | | m | & 4 | Oswald was full of contradictions and in addition to contra- | | | | posing a question in a narrow sense. You are focusing on one | «aa a} a. point, Nosenko vis-a-vis Oswald and contradictions that may emerge there. I would answer by saying that again I am not an expert on Nosenko. I don’: profeasto havea full grasp of "caren —csteoy vnvontar weranhen aeatnomeetboteme ab San ma his bona fides or anything related to it. I would say that ques:ion alone would not be enough to satisfy me that the inquiry had been made carefully. ‘There is wr eee ee = much more to it than what Josenko had to say about Oswald. ary There are more aspects about the bona fides issue, more than ar could give you today. Mr. Goldsmith. I have: read the Hart Report. cans mean ee eed eo we me Mr. Tovar. He tried =o deal with the whole consideration, ; ‘Se a So .% rv) the whole Oswald, the handling, the methodology. He did not go into every jot and tittle of the issue. Mr. Goldsmith. In fast, the Hart Report did not mention the word "Oswald" even one time. Even so, the question I have, ‘ 3 & a3 > a] = if it were demonstrated to you that Nosenko's story on the } NW 48331 Doota: 42277210 Page 45 THD CLADET
i) da 73 440 NW 48331 pocta: 42277210 Page 46 | THAD ClCOCT { | | | { { | distressed and concerned, [£ would want to know more about it. | i | ! i i | 22 | ivr olyael | 44 Oswald issue is untrue, cainot be believed, would that have any, impact on the Agency's asszssment of him as a bona fied? Mr. Tovar. The first reaction would be I would be deeply You have to exptrapolate from me to the Agency. Other people have views on this other tian myself. If you carried this thing further and convinced ever;thody, the point you made is valid, then you would have -- Mr, Goldsmith. We ar2 talking hypothetically now. Let us go beyond you. If it were demonstrated to the Director of | q on Oswald -- I am not talking about any of the other information { : the Central intelligence Ajyency that the story given by Nosenko | he gave, but on Oswald -- simply cannot be believed because, A, part of it is incredibl:, B, it is full. of contradictions, 1 | i | what effect do you think tiat would have on the Agency's | assessment of him as a bona fide defector? Mr. Tovar. I literally don’t know. I am not sure what the comparative weight of chat point would be when considered’ against the backdrop of th: full Nosenko question. Mr. Goldsmith. As Chief of the CI Staff, you would Mr. Tovar. Yes, I think I would be troubled by it. I { tl | : | personally be troubled by <:hat? i | | | | assessment is wrong. That would trouble me. | would be troubled. I woul be troubled that our current fi Again, I would say, loo, if this is a serious proposition
d Vg oouUAL | 45 a you are making, let us say you adduced a number of analysts who examined this thing thoroughly and were in a position of making that kind of judgment, I would say, "I want to have these analysts talk to my analysts because I am not in a posi- da, 5 tion to make that kind of judgment." ! Mr. Goldsmith. First of all, I am not making the statement 7 that Nosenko's story on Oswald is inaccurate in any way. | a Secondly, even if the story is inaccurate, I don't want: | t 5 to suggest that because of that anyone on this Committee has ! 7 any feeling that that means Nosenko is not bona fide. My | Y : question is really very linited. A, if it were demonstrated | oo. . 4 1Z | that the story on Oswald is inaccurate, what impact would that | .. 13 [ have on your overall assessment? | . . | i 14 | Mr. Tovar. You mean demonstrably inaccurate? : s Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | : "a Mr. Tovar. It would have to be examined. It would have | a | to be examined the full panoply of the whole Oswald issue. : | _Tswould say weiwill get this team of analysts and we will 19 fight it out. We are talking about hypothesis. ! “a! Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I would prefer to stay away from the | term “fighting it out" because there is no one here who is in | .: 99 , the posture of making a fighting issue out of it. © , | ad “4 \ I no longer have any questions. I.will have questions to 2 | ask whoever on your staff participated in the preparation of | as ! the memo that we discused earlier. : , i = RW 48331 Docld:$2277210 Page 47 TAD Qe PprrT ;
46 a ur eu i Normally whenever a witness has an opportunity to testify wD from the standpoint of a guy overseas who is dealing frequently with the military and registers military sources in the ISR . and checks the ISR either on behalf of the military or to see if they have. already regis::ered prior interest, and so on. There before the Committee at a iearing, the Committee gives him five 3 minutes at the end to ‘make a statement. This is not a hearing. B “| However, if you would like to make a statement for the record, 3 ‘feel free to do so. If no:, you will be given a chance to : verify the record for accuracy. | / Mr. rovar. Since I have no position to present and no | a point to make it is probably improper to make a statement. | 7 The only think I would reiterate is that I have been sort of i 10 | speculating here in many respects. Bear in mind there is an | " area here where I have a purview that is perhaps. valid. We : i . : 12 are talking about a lot of things which are way beyond my : ; 43 immediate experience and certainly my current responsibility. | & Lb I would say, take some of my speculation with a grain of | i a 1s salt, because I don't mean to be dogmatic on these things. | The procedure for handling the 201 file, there are some GS-7 17 | girls down the line who could tell you much more about the 201 13a | files than I would ever be able to compile for you. They are 19 the ones you really should talk to. 20 Things like the ISR, = know the ISR-in a limited framework | ‘may. be other aspects of the thing that you should ge more -— HW 48331 pocta:2277210 Page 48 Th. QreptT
tur SCURLE H - | | professional advice on. | a I think your question: have been reasonable. I have found 3 : no objection to try to mee: you more than halfway on it. . Go ‘ | Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Thank you very much. 5 | (Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m, the deposition was concluded.) 6 | | | 8 | | | 10 | i H 12 | | | 13 | | is | : { 1s | aS , awe — to co i?) op of mazes os = we we omen mens ge arene ers epctmeecin G 6 a eet en eo ee ee ee “WW 48331 Decta:42277210 Page 49 THe QEPRET
by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition | tur VPLUNE | 48 “CERTIFICAT? OF NOTARY PUBLIC ! 2 | I, Alfred Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the 3 foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the | 7 @ 7 witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition | 5 was duly sworn by me ; that the testimony of said witness was | 6 | taken by me in stenotype to the best of my ability and there-. | 7 after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said | ‘ deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said. | 4 | witness; that I am neither. counsel for, related to, nor employes 1 t i 11 || was taken; and further that: I am not a relative or employee | z | Of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, tf t i3 | nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action. Notary Public in and for the not in 16 District of Columbia : 17 | My Commission expires Novenber 14, 1980.: 13 | 9 | | | | i 20 i i | : 22 | eS ! | me H i ( - 24 | i ! ! ag § i} own cece: ve agreeegianase aks HW 46331 DocId: 32277210 Page 50 The GCPOCT - ‘