memorandum from J. Elgar Hoover to Attorney 34 ‘General Ramsey Clark fquoted in ‘party: Blank letterhead 11emorandum . 3-6-67 TO: Attorney Gen:ral FROM: Director, FB: TOP SECRET /Attorney General Robert Kennedy/ indicated that a few days prior to /5-9-62/ he had been advised by the CIA chat Robert A. Maheu had been hired by the C/A to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition 0f paying $150,000 to hire gunmen to go into Ciba and kill Castro. He further stated CIA idmitted having assisted Maheu ‘in making’the "bugg.ng" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered :thi; clandestine operation and for this reason CIA couid not afford to have any action taken against Giancina or Maheu. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning ‘IA had not cleared its action ‘in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such ste>s without first checking “with the Department of Justice. Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any... prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring oit the fact the United. States “Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro. He stated the same was ‘true concerning any action we might take against Maheu for any viola: ion in which he might become ‘involved. ; incident (4 In summary, tie Las Vegas wiretap 3 forced, the.:CIA:to ac <nowledge the’ existence of the CIA-Mafia plots to non-CIA -govertinent officials
‘and provided the fir:t occasion for participants _to manipulate the op :ration to prevent prosecution. c. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee (20) The next majo: event related to the CIA-_ Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before -Senator Edward Long’ 3, Committee ,which was investigating, Oe EE ag wm . invasions of privacy. _ The attorney for Mabue Mme Edward Pierpont Morgan, informed the House—Seleet— " Committee. on-Aasassi 1ations—thereinafter the "connittes"T that Maheu contacted him during the fall of 1966 and said he was going to be called before the Long = oe Sees in conjunc: zion with the Morganthau investiga- . tion. _Maheu then informed Morgan. of. the plots and a suggested that any t sstimony might necessarily reveal his. previous covert activities with the CIA. Se Morgaa then contacted Senator Long and Lawrence “Houston, the General Counsel to tie CIA, to reiterate Maheu's concerns in an appar ently successful effort to block . ~356. 3f any testimony.
D. “Rowe: Efforts" :0 “Avoid Prosecution i) ‘The SSC relat.d that in May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli *for living in.the United States under «in un assumed name unless he “53 31 cooperated in an inv-:stigation of the Matias" The ssc then states hat Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently spo :e to the FBI in regard to 38,40 mo ; - Roselli. fer) The SSC repor -s that Roselli again contacted’ CIA sources ‘in: an ef fort to thwart prosecution when. Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities - He se at the Friars Club ii Beverly Hills in 1967. Roselli contacted Harvey, wh> was no longer a CIA employee, a eT : ok Hy us cunsa cess | to represent him.” Harvey subsequent ly attempted 5 ; : 41 to influence ‘the CIA into preventing the ‘prosecution, The Justice Departme it, however, subsequently convicted “Roselli for a violat .on of the interstate gambling Bed laws.
E. Debut of the Retaliation Theory {23 The geneSis of this theory can be attributed to an interview that Premier Castro held on September 7, 1963, wich Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker. In tiat interview, Castro. warned against the United States “aiding terrorist plans : to eliminate Cuban l2aders." He stated, according to Harker, that Unitad States leaders would be in danger if they omoted’ any aaa ae to eliminate the leaders wt comand), January! howard Morgan approached columnist Drew Pearson, related the background of the plots, "posed the possibility that the plots could have provoked a Castro retaliation and asked Pearson inform: ~44-(no No. #h Chief Justice Earl Warren of the operation. “Warren | subsequently informed Secret Service pirestor ; James J. Bawr7 who in: turn “notified the est. Morgan informed the Committ2e that Roselli initially approached him complaining of excessive FBI surveillance ever G46 since he had been involved in. this patriotic venture. Roselli also informe 4 Morgan that Castro. had retaliated for these plots by essassinating, President’ , Kennedy « ,
" . 25) After receiviig this information the. FBI “ay . IS decided not to further investigate the allegation. Pollowing the public.ition of the Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson art cles of March 3 and 7, 1967, . however, where the tieory of retaliation first gained public notoricty, President Johnson ordered Sd “48, . the FBI to investiga 2 the matter. The FBI © congequent ly interviewed Edward Morgan on. March 20, as 49 1967. ' Morgan “info -med the FBI that he represented clients that were re sonable individuals who entered into a project that -hey understood to have high - governmental backing and whitch involved the assassina~ “SY 5 tion of Fidel | Castro. Morgan then stated that: his clients had reason t> suspect that Castro - learned _ of these plots and. -k .lled President Kennedy, ain | vetaliation. 2° QQey The: FBI inves -igation resulted in President Johnson acquiring. a versonal interest in the : _ retaliation theory, wiich prompted CIA Director Richard Helms to prepare a Ysport on the assassination plots. _F. 1967 IGR
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(4) On March 23, _ 1987) Dixector Helms ordered . the CIA Inspector, General to prepare a report on the CIA assassinatio1r ples. This report detailed plans and Conte | the accounts, of various (CIA*operations against eam including an analysis of the CIA-Organizea ‘Crime plots and the AMLASH operation. The IGR also examined the 1960 La 3 Vegas wiretap incident. (24). In reference “<0 the AMLASH operation, the _IGR related AMLASH's activities in Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and ear ly 1965, where AMLASH was meeting $5 51 with Manuel Artime. The IGR further noted that ube. vee Rafael Garcia-Bongo, a "former lawyer Mor Santo Cie | Trafficante, was in fadrid, Spain in March, 1965. Bongo claimed to be in- contact with dissident Cuban ‘Military leaders, insluding AMLASH. — G. Anderson Articles __ ; a ae (24) In 1971, Ande cson. once again published information promotin 3 the retaliation theory in two articles dated Janua cy 18 and 19." ‘These articles exhibited more detail, relating that several assassins: made it to a roof tor within shooting. distance. of castro before being apprehended, _ that this event
The CIA's cmam wes Khe protection of - -intell gence Sources @ nd ha) etho ds . occurred in late Feb-cuary or early March, 1963, - that Rohert’ Kennedy it least condoned the CIA- Mafia plots, and tha: Roselli delivered poison pills to be used in -illing Castro toa contact at Gf the Miami Beach Foun :ainbleu Hotel on March 13, ‘i961. (30} In 1971, the \:ame year. that Anderson released additional information on the plots, the CIA contacted the Immigration and Jaturalization: Service, Department. of Justice, in an at empt to prevent information. on CIA operations. ‘exom being disclosed in the event INS §7G2 ‘brought deportation proceedings against Roselli. , TF The SSC stated in it: thterim Report, ‘released in November, 1975, “that the deportation ‘order was still _ “ ‘5a _in the process of be ng litigated. gn August, 1976, authorities ai; -covered Roselli' s butchered - body: stuffed in an o 1 drum and floating in Miami's . niscayne Bay~ His colleague in the plots to kill Castro, Sam Giancana had. been shot to death in his home in June, 19°75.
I. The Senate Selec: Committee To Study Governmental Ope: cations with Respect to Intelligence Act Act .vities i3)) In connection with its mandate to investigate : the full range of go vernmental intelligence activities, . the SSC “examined th: performance of the intelligence agencies in conductiig their investigation of the assassination and their relationship tothe Warren Commission." In Aoril, 1976, the SSC published» _its Final’ Report (Bo .k V) which ,in essence ,faulted ) the CIA for its errocs of omission in not informing the Warren Commissio1 of the CIA's on-going plots Ga) “After reviewing the details of the CIA-Mafia plots, the SSC stated that."Castro probably would . not have been certain that the CIA was behind the underworld attempts” and that it would have been unlikely that castrc would have distinguished the . the CIA plots with the underworld from any plots sponsored by the Cuban exile “community and not
6? affiliated in any wa: with the CIA. Gg | (33) The SSC ident fied the AMLASH operation, however, as being "c early different” from the. under- world plots. The /SC stated that AMLASH was in progress at the time of the assassination, that it could clearly be tra:ed to the CIA, and that AMLASH's proposal for a coup ‘iad been endorsed by the CIA, 67 A the. initial step beiig the assassination of Castro. The SSC cautioned, however, that it saw “no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government plotted President Ke: inedy's assassination in retaliation for U. S. operations against Cuba.” ; (34) As related in the Introduction to this material, the SSC did not reac. any conclusion because it . OF Be" believed additional -nvestigation needed ‘to occur. “TeSR Foes - (TER) > dg. The CIA 1977 as ertomGeners) Report - : ek Cone wt | fag af Stung-—by the senate criticism and the ra PE, effeet that Book V cused in the media; the CIA SIGHT & -.. prepared a comprehen sive report in eee dhsigned favestaate, : at least ‘aithin the cra, ‘the critical ‘gaetone. postulated in the ssc Final’ Report.
{24 The Fea tae dentifies a principal theme ‘of Book Vas the pos sibility that Castro rétaliated against the United S:ates for attempts on his life and that the CIA ope -dations may have specifically . O7k . -! a caused ayy such actions by Castro. -In responding to this theory, the CiA decided to perform the. following: 1) to conduc: a ful and opera -:ionsra he Cuban target to _identify my attTvity that might relate | ' to the assassination of President Kennedy, and Ses 6f information 2) to review the possibility that CIA pactivitie s against Cuba did, by their nature, ciuse Castro to order the assassina- _tion of P-esident Kennedy. 12 7/ (37). The details o7 the WEREbR’ are thoroughly related in this mate-ial because no source has oo ene me ooeTFe previously spublicly, -eleased themy " 1. Syndicate Op:rations : (32) Before analyzing the AMLASH operations, the CIA first related nev considerations pertaining to the TER . syndicate operations. The #@"% refers to a series of articles written 9y Paul Meskill and appearing “in the New York Daily News in April, 1975. (3Y In these articles Meskill described how  @gisO ce Frank Fiorini, @gsr known as Sturgis, allegedly
in some food or drins of Castro. - with hee assertion 3 because in assassination plots other than the CIA operation a Luemer Fudtress of Castro, recruited Marie Lore \Zy Sto spy on castro. and how Sturgis knew. Juai Orta ‘and planned to use him 12 388. oa: ina bombing assassi ation of Castro. Meskill asserted that Sturgis claimed he had ‘been a hired 0 pecat ye Gress Tor the CIA for at least a decade and that “Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators aeee]4 in Havana during the period ‘of the. Castro eakeover. In another article 61 "dune 13, 1976, Meskill ‘related - the claim of Marie Lorenz that in the fall of 1960 Frank Sturgis, acting for the. CIA, gave her two capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle BRI TER. 70) me writers of the --3#-PeR were quite concerned +he Name of the. Cuban g ficial Invelwed in Phase F of eres me had - the plots publiciy\surfaced, in connection with a Castro. assassina- we ACE bors | hy ex eis COM GA. tion plot = before the see ee the. CIA- ry organized. crime plots. Bag7 cies the-essigrment=t0, We poisonsCastuo=gave-t Creo PE TOTa LCase COASTS who-may..h ave sGeive i-ké-ekbacke—fromzthe=gambi41 HE. ; . this Cuban office interests.* The pos sibility that*@arem was involved © 7h also attracted the attention of the ‘CIA.
(4/) mn reference :o Sturgis' allegation that he -had been a hired rom: aebow for the CIA for a. decade the IO$A—HGR asserte:| that "he was in contact with some of the CIA Cuba: employees in the Miami area, lop 77 ‘but had no direct re .ationships with the Agency." TER. . The & recognizes that Sturgis, through his gambling activities and relat onships with various casino owners, _ may quite possibly hive known orta, and also raises ‘the question of wheter Sturgis may have been a source of information ° to" ca tro -regarding Orta’ Ss participation ee 73 in any assassination plot. | 42} In reference re) ‘the Lorenz-Sturgis poison pill 7 plot, the LREEER n ted. the similarit y_ of this. lot memprandtin cv ii tbitg “2 pick 43 ili Cs: ay q to the details in tae 18 October 1960. PBI FEEMOS The CIA concluded thet this October ‘date is “£00 early for the CIA syndicat:: operations and that therefore og the syndicate may have been acting - independently. (43). The CIA also roncluded that _the Cuban éxile leader active in the CIA syndicate | operationsg may have already been active in See : : ; OF ? ‘with the Mafia when che CIA approached him.
- underworld support fcr some Cubans, and second, a cs The CIA cited two" FB: memorandum as support. Pirst, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to - 18) January 1961 memo: andum relating an unconfirmed “the Cuban 22) Ulead en ; - report oe wis one of the Cubans receiving wy support. aa 9) The crn (forth: +] acknowledged jthat although the operation with tle Mafia was suspended . after the Bay of Pigs, it i ppeared to still be in progress BAL 93 when re- activated in April, 1962. TER 9) The “Sax summa; ized its position concerning non-CIA. sponsored sy: dicate operations in the following ‘passage: | , It is “possible ‘that CIA simply found, itself involved in providing additional ‘resources .for independent operations that : ‘the syndicate already had underway.../ I/n +: a sense CIA my have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contribution tas ans supplying an-aura of official sanci ion. 8 aie ; 2. AMLASH “7 TER the aR State: the ssc suggests that AMLASH was possibly a ‘castro agent assigned a ‘provacation
mission which would chen justify retaliation, or, in the alternative, -hat AMLASH was a security risk through win d:tails of the plotting may have surfaced $2 Castro ‘tous providing the impetus for’ TE provocation. “Addi -ionally, the ZER ‘cites the Ssc as holding that -n either ‘case, AMLASH should CRIS have = been reported to the Warren Commission. THe. 57 ¢8 ry, The EBS. conte ids neither theory is correct. ' stating that ‘the rel itionship between the CIA and AMLASH before the de ith of President Kennedy was so "“unsubstantial and iiconclusive that it provided no basis for AMLASH/1 t> feel that he had any tangible . - oo a OE PP ' CIA support for plot :ing against Castro. . (9) In support th > Fie proceeds to narrate the | Agency! s understandi 1g of the- operation. on August 7, 1962, the case offic:r for AMLASH reported that he “"fhas7 no intention ’of giving AMLASH/1/ physical elimination mission: 1s requirement but recognize this fas7 something a nad might try to carry — 8 a 9 98 Son a -out on his own initiation." Headquarters replied.
the next day, "Stron sly” concur that no physical ; FTO elimination mission he given AMLASH/1.' “From August 29, 1962 unti September, 1963 the CIA states. aad it did not have any - rontact with AMLASH. (G0) on September ', 1963 the CIA received the following cable: , AMLASH still ‘eels there only two ways accomplish chinge either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, _AMLASH still |. ga tao for U. S.. reveal plan of actio:. Gnd ; ec . inside j The FOR notes that tie SSC interpreted "inside job" “as referring to an. 9 eration against Castro; the CIA, however, says it refurs to a general commitment concerning oar “TER how: ‘to effect change 43° The aaa also states that. at. this. point, Book Vv gas "characterization. of ‘this phase eF . of the AMLASH operat .on is disputed. "9 The CIA + contends that any ai spute foniy\exists/in the eyes of the ssc a —— er TER Ce wo Soe (59 The. om next’ comments on an interview of Castro by AP reporte : Daniel Harker in which Castro 4 - said that. anti-castr > térrorists had the support of
gf Fee . U. S. leaders. © Th: TGR states “that the. Book V “implies that AMLASH/ L may have reported to'Castro 97 what the SSC charact srized as assassination plots. The CIA response is chat "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and ‘undertook nothin;.' cabled (62 On October 11. 1963 the case officer @anbis a. headquarters and sail that AMLASH/1 claimed to have . the necessary people and equipment to overthrow : +66- ’ Castro without U. Ss. assistance. 9? Bn October, iim vs Oudside the Lonted Staats | sip 1963, Desmond FitzGer ld met AMLASH/1* iam-Renée. (0o At this meeting the “TA. maintains that: Fitzgerald rejected AMLASH's xe mest for an ‘assassination weapons _ specifically, a high powered rifle with. a telescopic | ~re2+ TER lens SOF The GBA coitends that at this point it was clear that AMLAS | was informed that ‘there would be no U. S. assistan-:e until after the fact, which is contrary to the. 55C statement in Book Vv to-the efifeet that it was uicertain how AMLASH interpreted Seie-a the put-off by Fits srald SOX
. (8) On November 1), 1963, FitzGerald approved _ informing AMLASH/1 tiat he would be given a cache’ inside Cuba and that a high-powered rifle with a. _ oe ; D4 ; scope would be incluied upon request.ya3 -On ~ November ‘20, the case officer informed AMLASH that he would be receivin; the meeting he requested. - This meeting occurre! on November 22. 4 _ Tee . (54) ‘The EGR summa ized the significance of these contacts with AMLASH as related to the contentions in Book V in the fol owing passage: Whatever the -elationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President Kennedy, | “there is ever, indication that during President Keniedy's life AMLASH/1 had no ‘basis for belveving that he had CIA support for much of aiything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely : careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any,- actual CIA plot directed against Castro-rag, (sf Finally, in reply to the SSsc allegation that the CIA inadequately responded to the Warren Commission's request for all possible relevant information, the TER . ; . oo L $22 observed:
While one can understand today why the Warren Commis: ion limited its inquiry to normal aveives of inve tigation,~ it ” 7. Wold have se: ved to; {iesieexcerh >the. credibility he foe ~ of its effort had Gt taken a@& broader view of the matter CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban’ involvement in the assassination (JFK) because /O” of tensions 0° the time...The Agéncy should . &F have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." K. Recent Anderson ..rticles - SACK 6Y ‘In ‘September -976 and October, 1978, 4anderson again published articles whet propounded, the retaliation - theory. joe. In. addit .on, for the first time Anderson [Publicly\ revealed) th it John Roselli ‘served as his source for the retaliation theory in all of the articles published through th: years. (5) The ‘September 7, 1976, article appearing’ in the Washington Post Post contains all components - of the retaliation theory. Pie otntes: Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken th: secret of the John F. “Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few-weeks ago, his hacked up body stuffed inte an oil drum and dumped -into Miami's 3iscayne Bay. , Before he jied, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kernedy'’s murder. It was the same. conspiretors he suggested,whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. . By Roselli's ‘cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld.
contacts in Hivana who had been trying to knock him .ff. He believed, not altogether wi-hout basis, that President. . Kennedy was bchind the plot. & The Cuban .eader, as the supreme irony, decide! to turn the tables and use the same :rowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination according to Roselli's .scenario. To save their skins, the plotters line! up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull: the trig jer. Roselli co1ild never be pinned down /on names or d:tails. It was also difficult to assess whe -her he knew what he was talking about or whetier he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But tiere are enough curious circumstances . to justify telling it. Here are the facinating highlights. . : The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with inderworld contacts in Havana, _ was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency | in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no ‘authority, ho vever, over the underworld elements .in Havana. - “They were inder the loose control of Florida's - Mafia chieftai, Santos Trafficante. His gambling. enterprises ii Havana had. been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution.’ In fact, ” Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a _-Cuban jail, ai indignity that didn' t. endear Castro to hir. After traf ficante made it “back to his Florida-haunts, he left part of his organization ‘’ behind in Havana.. Some-of. his henchmen even “managed to develop contacts ‘in Castro's inner. circle. Thes2 were the people Roselli wanted . to use to knce ck. off Castro.. oe . oe Sons
But Roselli d.dn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary” ” arrangements witi Trafficante. So Roselli called i: his patron, the Chicago godfather Same (lomo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante As Roselli's issociates tell it, he ‘persuaded Giancaia that it would be to their advantage :o win the good will of the CIA. Convin:ed, Giancana flew down to Florida to make “he preliminary arrangements. ‘Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, “Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, su plied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of naturil causes. When this failed, snipers were dis ».atched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught. : The word reacied Roselli that some of the plotters had been torturei and that Castro had learned about the whole operat .on. The CIA callei off the Roselli operation in . March, 1963, but recruited'a Castro associate, - Rolando Cubela, :0 murder Castro. se In an impromp :u, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that h> knew about the attempts on his life and warned chat U. S. leaders also
.was behind the -might not be sa 1963. ‘According to the same underw caught plotting were Cubans fro tion. Working allegedly lined Lee Harvey Oswa pro- Castro move According to may have shot K. decoy while oth range. When Os suggested, the he would crack might lead to t have brought a Mafia.. ‘So Jack Ruby making it appea the President's Roselli explain Several ‘key C It has also b :indeed, had bee in the Havana u dated Nov. 28, ‘gangster type -n in his Cuban pr ‘e. That was Sept. 7, Roselli, Castro enlisted orld elements whom he had against him. They supposedly 1 the old Trafficante-organiza- ‘rith Cuban intelligence, they up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, .4, who had been active in the lent. Roselli's version, Oswald nnedy or may have acted as a irs ambushed him from closer sald was picked up, Roselli . inderworld conspirators feared ind disclose information that iem. This almost certainly would vassive U. S. crackdown on the was ordered to eliminate Oswald, - aS an act of reprisal against killer. At least this is how d the tragedy in Dallas. mo ‘A officials believed that | Castro | ennedy assassination. ee ‘en established ‘that Jack Ruby, 1 in Cuba and had connections iderworld. One CIA cable, — .963, reported that "an American med Ruby” had visited Trafficante oe -Son.
‘ 1 i i 1 ' 4 t | | Ill. ISSUE ANALYSIS A. "Preface Corman. &) The-#aC inve:. tigated this material to _ > Beanyse lea n determine what concl-isions -eas be asecertatred ¢ a -, ing Lradiond . concerning the natur:, scope, and remifications— of these operations. In this regard, various issues are presented in the following sections, — subjected to analysi.ie and_then_resolved-ascording to_ay dene -;probabie motivations and the_most_logical_inf. : Covamettine () To fulfill ths process, the HEA reviewed . material from numero is governmental | sources ‘that pertained to the per sons and operations relevant to the investigation These persons included: “LS gotin Roselli ; a -\principal - ‘in ‘CIA-0.¢. ‘ 7 operation. '2.° Santo Trafficant: : "principal viv ctato.e. operation en: ‘Cuban, exile rena. om - principal in CIA-O.C. operation ~ 4. Sam Giancana ... . ~ principal in CIA-0.c. . Ss : - Operation 2... 5. Robert Maheu = -- °° - principal in CIA-0.C. ' operation
10. ll. 12. 13. 14.° 15. 16. 17, "18.- (19. 20. vdenteby pratecteb Michael McLaney ‘Samuel Benton Norman Rothman John Martino Edward P. Morgan Edward K.. Moss “Dino Cellini ‘Richard Cain Charles fourine Rafael "Macho" G:ner * ere Joseph Shimon €———— - Angelo Bruno Sam Mannarino *  atheaeilll ~ Washout, 1 fhosoet RKC
/i/he AMLASH »peration prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs: staff, Desmoni Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA of iicers as an assassination operation ini -:iated and sponsored by the > CIArT gS (05) Wl tangosch-fartheF\rec »Llecte djthat as of 1962- it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA ‘and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the \MLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials, including “Ee M6 Desmond FitzGerald. ,i7..° (4) In. response t> Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA GQ foamer CIA employee. pseudonym) L. Pol loc ¢) SEaaESEREESETA . Pollock “served as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during ‘the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff... and sscurres with him the AMLASH u operation as it progressed. wt Pollock ‘specifically contested the assertions of Langosch stating: . To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald ccasidered the AMLASH operation to ce a political action
activity with the ‘objectio of organizing a jroup under @zkea AMLASH/ | to overthrow ‘astro and the Castro regime by means of a coup @’ etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald di:icuss the AMLASH ‘operation frejuently, and never - heard him cha-acterize it as an assassinat .on operation. Mr. FitzGerald stited within my hearing . on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat o‘ten involves loss of life, Fe@y ,13 — Vee also. statea:” abscher ae, Wires op ecation Cen a0 wr aon rati£n plot Desmond FitzGrald did not characterize. the AMLASH op:ration as an ‘assassination operation': tie case officer did not; I, as Executive )fficer did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Longosch; che Deputy Chief, the other: branch chiefs and the special assistants . could not hav: so characterized it since “they did not <now about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic ; syringe in re3sponse to urgings by AMLASH | for a means t> start the coup by killing _ Castro.) The case officer offered the pen <=. “to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death.  AMLAS 1 rejected the pen with disdain. =oem be eceribe ALOU yo the heath, th, Errcedints (pewreay. Aether , aA
- z . . ER le fe i ie qq mm (9) In his interview with the Committee, Premier . fig _ Castro.set forth som2 reasons supporting ehiseeomsenttont, ean TE UNS SF AMM RL Se ng care sen The reasoning in his ‘iS persuasive - “ : statements Castro sdid.in part: “ That was insane. - From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a ae tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. . What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory... Anyone who subscribed .to that idea vould have been judged insane... absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of ‘ . -" revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor i ‘ even speculat2 about a measure of that sort, . / because who could think of the idea of ’ é vA a ne wwe ee” a, — & “i why ne dtd weet OF, \:
{ the ASSA organizing th: death of the President of . the United Stites. That would have been ~ oe, _ the most’ perf>:ct pretext for the United. States to inv:ide our country which is what I have tried :o prevent for all these years, in eve Y possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than | we are, what :ould we gain from a war with the Unit:d States? The United States would lose no:hing. The destruction would have been her>. 120 . Castro also added: Ts a I want to tel. you that the death of the - leader does not change the system. It has . hever done thit.iz4 (2) In this inter: view Castro also commented on the speech of Septem ver 7, 1963, vaien has been cited throughout the years as an indication that Castro may have assassinated Pr :sident Kennedy in retaliation. Premier Castro asser -ed: : Soy I. said soxething like those plots start to set i very bad precedent. A. 7 . very serious one - that that could become we, .a boomerang ajainst the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I d.d not mean even that...not in the least...but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to s:t those precedents of plotting of other coun-ries would be a very bad precedent...something very negative. And, ‘if at present, the same would happen under gg snare } food ee re
the same circ imstances, I would have no doubt in sayiig the same as I said (then) because I didi’t mean a threat by that. _ I didn't say -t as a threat. I did not mean by tiat that we were going to take measures ~ Sixtilar measures - like a . retaliation for that. We never meant that because we kn2>w that there were plots. — For three yea-s we had known there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about ve-y casually, you know; but I would say tiat ali these plots or attempts were part of che everyday life. [22 (2). Some. Peasonin ¢whiehtCommittee-cautionsis speculative, may be of some, assistance. heme. It. does not seem likely that. Castro would make a veiled reference to assassi iatingfNnerican leaders in. “retaliation for ‘plot ; on his life if he was actually planning Ser contenpl iting such acts? ke would want to call as little at:ention as possible to himself. Rather, | it ‘seems Cas “xO was attempting to display | his public dismay ani knowledge of such attempts’ in an effort to prevent their..continuance § qConsequently, together with an abs :nce ‘of any evidence implicating \t seems probable the-Committee-betieves Castro,in the assassination,
‘MW 47055 Docld:32273547 Page 51. plot. “guring the life of Pre Sident Kennedy and. that _ Castro uncovered its existe nce and scope, Fu . [coke “t “Assuming that AMLASH was an assassination retaliation. o discussed the prospe:ts for reestablishing United States-Cuba r:lations and Kennedy asked tik. Daniel to see him af-:er visiting Castro. 16 TEEf+ SCawes oo Aah ~ThesGenn.bte9 makers that such efforts to “establish a peace “ul ‘coexistence between the - United States and Cuoa would have hampered any . desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy. . , 4he IR Compartay, the Bkdt huis FF (77) Second, the-C mittestalse-believes~—that ut it Can He arqard hake apn gabre leaders of the United States, Apresident Kennedy supported a. less hostile attitude and position toward Cuba. Even if Castro felt the relations between Cuba.and the United itates were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there wece legitimate reasons- to suspect they would have been wors? under any other administration. 2 OF Cosrquas oo bsajlasiming that AMLASI was “not. an assassination de io a hue . awe dy Uh ‘A seawsmam Tehat castro would a have been provoked ina manner sufficient to induce assassinating President Kennedy in retaliation. plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existe ice. and : scope remsonmmntoe iF MS SEL Uati iee iy ; Pe, Se | Shbhiebetrere s/lthat Gastro” ould Gur have resorted to assassinating the President of the United States in a - . : Thus, with the prospects of renewed diplomatic relations in the air ard the knowledge that Kennedy possessed a more favoreovle attitude toward Cuba than other. military or political leaders, Castro would have
had every. reason to lope that Kennedy maintained ‘the Presidency. Fur cher, shaw@eniicromdeasonct ; not . bebieve—that elimiria:ing Kennedy would*necessarily have favorably alter:d the United States: operations and ties toward Cuba In addition, thenGommixboe probable that decs=unG@ienbekieve Cas ro would have assassinated President Kennedy be :ause such an act, if discovered, would have afforded -he United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The r sk would not “have been worth it. B- ‘Yagusccementain nto The CIA- Organized Crime Plots “1. Scope and Na-ure of ‘Plots va): Rose} 1i K 1owledge of ‘CIA Sponsorship Seppe uk | Janoe 6 waned informed the Committee : that Nhe told Rose .li he represented an international. ’ told him from the be sinning that G26ennet1 was with 12d. ‘the CIA.\2-7 Maheu confirmed this’ account to the ssc. $38- re group of clients who had vested interest in Cuba. Roselli, however, te itified to the ssc that Maheu 7 the Att, Maheu also stated in a deposition to the Committee that : Giancana knew at the time that ena was with the CTA. 34 Further, Tr \fficante testified to the -
20 Committee that Rosel i informed him that he, rd —_ ‘ eis Roselli, was operatiig as an agent of ‘the CIA. (9/) The weight of the evidence indicates that Roselli, and thus Gi.incana and Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind tie assassination plots at an early stage. This recognition of CIA initiation is important! sms it shows that, Giancana and trafficante and thus organized crime knowingly became involved. with the CIA. b) Discovery of True Identities - 33) Rosel i arranged for the entrance of Giancana and Trafficinte into the plots and introduced ; them to GfEEaEFi as "Sam Gold" and "Joe."|3| Ot@emmetl contends he learned he true identities of these ‘persons a‘ few months after the operation was in progress when he and Maheu savy an article in one of the Sunday sections of the Miam. newspaper. \3*". This article supposedly pertained to fganized crime in the United States and contained pictures of top hoodlums , including Same Giancana and Saito Trafficante.\3% In the
st Sespparbeh ib Bier IGR OMGonnah s:ated that the article Es la came from the Parade magazine ;3¥ in the Miami Times. Maheu also contends :hat-he did not know the true. identities of sam Go .d and Joe until this article bccicd The Sept ¢ appeared. pay O.Gonm Hr also stated that this incident — occurred after the “ve were up to our ears" in the- operations and conse juent ly ‘the CIA decided to progress forward. 7 (33) The SSC condu ‘ted a search of supplements - to all- Miami newspapirs for the requesite ‘time period and could not locate any such ‘article. 137 The Committee conseq ientiy searched Parade -magazine for the fall of 1960 all of 1961, and all. of1%62, ’ the years which Spanied the entire operation. ‘the, Committee learned that on January 21, 1962, Parade . Soo-puis UNTO Sr TORY lag published an article entitled, “gem government's crackdown on organiz-d rime," written ‘by Jack : Anderson, which cones listing of the top ten hoodlums in the coun: ry. as well as several photographs of mobsters, including Santo Trafficante. kia The article focused on on tle efforts of attorney General -
Robert Kennedy's caipaign against organized crime and mentiong oth Giancana and Trafficante. (94 Although this parade article appears to correspond with: mee “bg Maheu' 's description, it is over ene year past the beginning “months of the operation. ‘Indeed, it occurs nine months after the completion of Phase I of the plots. Additionally, neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered . any other article pertaining to organized crime in Parade magazine or che supplements of any Miami * newspaper for the a .leged time period. . (#5) He Supperk Cush , sistent It appears Sa and Maheu are Rees in an attempt to look ‘Or an ex post facto reason £1 a continuing the oper ition after the introduction of two of the top orga ized crime figures in the united - States. Implicit i. their contention is that while “the CIA wished to solicit criminal sources to assassinate Castro, it would not knowingly have ‘recruited any figur:s.from the top-echelon of i yt. organized crime.i24{ Additionally,
. Statement that "we \ even more difficult aieGye IGR the operat. in the fall of 1960 until approximately [without addit: dece-not-beLioveuth: onewnnE tl O/- Not Fi 4 (3¢) A Thi® CIA plot . necessarily a highl: Once Roselli introdi scene it is not log: “neglected ‘to verity on the contrary, it probable that the C: of "Sam Gold” and ". consciously brogres: confident that thes: attributed to Colon individuals "tough « ‘ere up to our ears in it" is to fathom since according to the on was in its embryonic stage and no pills were, even delivered February or March of 1961 —j onal support, the Gomrieriiee contentions of Maheu and the, Sugpok belie valle , to assassinate Castro was volatile and secret operation. ced additional contacts into the cal that the CIA would have the identities. of such principals: is more believable and more A ascertained the true identities oe" at an early stage and . ed forward in the operation, two persons, ain the words 1 Sheffiela Edwards, were nough" to handle the job. jH4° © 7
c) Roles of ’rincipals— 1 Phase One 9 Colon:1 Sheffield Edwards assigned B2Gomedst the task of finding someone to- assassinate 2a~ ty Castro.14\) Edwards # 1 both decided to utilize Maheu as soreone to recruit persons to pay The Sepp effectuate the overition.o? Gk@onmeti- also ‘described his role is the liaison to the CIA and confirmed that all -eports or information would | ee proceed: through him to the Agency. MS In addition, Gigenmert said he acted as a “babysitter” to Rosellif bhabeop remainies; with him to occupy his time .to ; ; aa insure that Roselli was fulfilling his role. J44 p8) There is a di screpancy over who suggested Roselli for the ope cation,/“9” but in any event, sean he was recruited be sause ‘fhe had connections with Ea persons who could handle the assignment. /+& (29) Conflict aris2s over the role of Giancana. Roselli informed the ssc that Giancana was only a ae - “"pack-up" man! 7 It-chowld-be-neted—bhat Giancana | . was murdered four cays before Roselli made this statement. Mahue, however, described Giancana $n BET haar Yo on 3 Jonw Bose A - Le ’ rad r oe” uae . e clack Ue Line re bee. . ower anne td l (ofa say » &f24 rs as pt a
as having a key role and characterized his job ‘as "to locate someoie in Castro's entourage who ; ; - ” 236-— could accomplish the assassination." i48 Joseph Shimon, a close fricnd of Roselli who had knowledge of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted Giancana to provide Cuban contacts 49 Shimon further. characterized Gianc.ina as only providing contacts, specifically Santo “rafficante, and not as an active ime 52 ‘participant. (90) The most soun | analysis is that sonana GSD? rere ene aerate aterm prec cee ccenmnin mrs servedVas a person toselli could approach who could then make the ‘neces sary contact into the Cuban domain, specifically Santo ‘rafficante. ‘Roselli, who FBI files indicate ‘repr ssented Giancana' s interest in Prove bly Las Vegas and was s sbordinate to him, woulddnot directly contact th: organized crime boss of the “Cuban | _ and Southern Florida area without first’ contacting ‘his superior, Giancana, who would ‘then make any = -necesaary arrangeme.ts. Both Giancana. and Trafficante, - being bosses of twc organized crime domains, would have the means, Powe yf? stature to arrange for the assassination. / fter contacting Trafficante,
bye who hevwe the influe ice to recruit the neces: ‘personnel to a®mims sp perform the assassinat Giancana probably wis not an active particir the process of poisoning pills or actually = EB 7 ot the assassination. (42) The role of T-afficante, the only Liv: major organized ‘crive- figure involved in the is a major source o: conflict. The ZRG% IGE several references -:o Trafficante which: cha: his function. In d-scussing how poison pil: 4 be given to Castro, it states that "Traffica | ° . the courier') was i: touch with a disaffect:, ‘. ~ official with acces; to Castro and presumab) .: : . % wort that would ena>le him to surreptitious}, ; Castr."/ 5 Later tie report states that "Re passed the pills to Trafficanteg" and that ",° | Fane S-peoe Chief] reported to @+@emmg 2 that the pills had bes, Fhe Cuban official) = BBE Ha Cubom officio ‘ to G@ee& in Cuba."/53 after ex@e lost his pe in the Cuban governnent and could no longer Toe. [the Supgoet Ch i . pills, the @@B says "Roselli told @ch@eeeeert Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cui movement who might jo the job."!5# Roselli \ *
ae ; fim as (antonio! dent 002) The following passage further con irms Trafficante' s role: nay Mbas a J : Trafficante “aj proached Vewen2a and told him that he had clients who wanted so to do away wi'h Castro and that they would. ' pay big money for the job. Meaemacig"iLT» Cuba] _ reported to hive been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships arms and communications equipment. 16 oe (43) @rafficante testified in public to the Committee that Roselli asked * nim to Gieiy actVas an ‘interpretor s7 SQQs between the America: operations and the Cuban contacts. Trafficante denied nandling or carrying any poison pills. id qe. Saas eae used in ythe operation, denied recruiting | vetena f" . : Whe Cub otiier ike AOS Seip : ‘and denied recruiti iG Grete, In his Senate testimony, Roselli confirmed @-afficant's role. as that of a trans- - ses (4 OLCoOnRedb , ‘ho-lever, informed the Committee that Trafficante was the person in contact with Cubans in ; ’ “ . Havana.“®- Giancana partially confirmed this in the ear IGR by identifying: foe as a man “who would : serve as ; skit. Mg a courier :to Cuba aid make arrangenents;{there. The Senay Grane chick Pay 0-Gennell also confirmed that he was the only, crA conduit and that if the 238? IGR states Trafficante adi! Teak 9 — * & 2B Met the, fia Gi Aber, cdg fg Ade
AN contacted or. procured the assassin then it - accurately reflects the information the © ener . . CIA received. foe 4, (95, Te-is~interes ting—that tne 1975 and 1978.. Congressional testimony of. Roselli and Trafficante corroborate each ot ner, but remain contrary to how the principals repcrted the facts in 1967. The soemanaters= evidence fetxéngly |i ndicates jthat_ Trafficante was not merely an interpreter but an active participant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the . potential assassins. This is important in dramatizing the deep ‘involvemert of organized crime with the CIA in these | plots. | Ore can understand why Trafficante today wishes to dow nplay his role; the facts, however; Zin hemse simply do not suppcrt his assertions. ". The Coppitietere renee ret “Has” ; . cone 6) SEA. TERS be * bubawi The Committee also heard testimony from AseeerFro piace “voweba steted that he is not aware of any CIA assassination rE lots to kill Castro and denied 165 He involvement in their operations. i acieel is obviously Aol Falligrte tout et —yine- Brew Comme Se toes pabatecky-howeveer cher a ™~ i APD prosecution for Sei jury) ry} if possible, would ee ng Fos 4 Bens .ve, . ATONE sum investigation. aao.\s. @ : NW 47055 Docld:32273547 Page 61
Sepped Chie! 2} Phase Two 7) In- oe Two William: Harvey assumed Cas CtGenneikts role. ipo “Giancana and Trafficante-were no longer involved .n the operation. /¢? The IGR states that Ros::lli remained as.a prominent figure and worked “lirectly with the Cuban exile . Fed ‘community and direc ly on pena of. the CIA." (73) “Although the GR does raga that Trafficante was not involved in Phase II, Teh ie contains this caution: | Trafficante wis one of the principals in Shef Edwar:is Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. . , { After all, Tr..fficante was the man who brought [an Caton ong ented Veweaa into the operation: late in Phase One, an wa:; one of the main players during Phase Two.170 ...- - . ‘ fo, @ 1 is reasonable to assume that Roselli vat least Kept both Giancana and ? -afficante informed of the. operation’ s progres: : Delivery of the. Pilis fu). Neither te 164 IGR or the ssc pinpoints ; tha Support Choagy the date on which & Setmert delivered the pills - to Roselli during Piase One of the plots. The chain - " of custody, as alre idy mentioned, was for Roselli to deliver the pill: to Trafficante. The subsequent
2883 |i connection could be made betneen the Mafia in Florida.and eds 2Eey | shsgeoraey eateka was made steps remain a mystcry but Roselli reported to the Surppenk Chink 4 OLeennelt that the yills had been delivered to gi athe Excoaw official are ~@fee in Cuba in/lat« February or early March, -1961. Gol Joseph Shimon informed the Committee that he and Maheu travelled together to Miami to the Fontainbleu in Marcl,.1961, to witness ‘the Patterson- _ Johansson fight. tie Once there Maheu informed him of the plot to assa: sinate Castro. 1a ‘Shimon also says that during th:s trip he attended a meeting where a poisonous 1: quia to be used in the assassination $51 14 0 was passed. ap} Shimon is pro} ably the ‘source for Jack Anderson! s column of January Lt, 1971, which fixes the date of the passage of the poison at the Fontainbleu as March 13, 1961. . . (303) In any event, it appears sextain that the CIA did not pass any pi'ls, poison, ‘or assassination ‘weapons before February of 1961. _ The fall segment: of the plots only constituted, a planning stage; no’ ae : one undertook any operational activities. - | (cee ee eo va Ruthie Helene stated in Ade Headaimoray te he | _ Corensth 8 that Me dor loled VE Ue pilin CHE etee es eoneettnmnnnaatties pennant nenaeee a et tad PES pens ASSAS. AO Fora “pt . “sen I also understand that theze was a question of poison \pills which were supposed to be transported to Havana. here was never. any evidence they were transported there ox | ever left the United States. There was never any evidence that this plot ever left the Florida mainland. and i it was 2881 indeed an assassination plot, it was misadvertised to ma | | necause I had understood it was an effort to see ifa . . | I 2884] the Mafia in Havana: -As to the best of my Knowledge, ‘the 4) GE F at 332273587
e) .Location «of Trafficante ((65) To suppor. the description of Trafficante as a courier, the @i 7 IGR states that “/A/t that time ‘the gambling casino:. were still operating in Cuba, and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business." ob The Committee has obtained some evidence wath indicates tha. Trafficante was not travelling to Cuba during this period. No records available to the Committee from ‘NS, State Department, or-the FBI reflect any travels after February, 1960. During this | time, the FBI maint ined physical surveillance on rrafficante.1% ‘Tra ‘ficante testified before the Committee that he o.uly made two trips to Cuba after Cubay - his release from (th: Trescornia ‘prison, in August, 1959, and that these trip: occurred within two to three months of this rele ise.17@aAdditionally,. considering Trafficante' s Teput:: :d top position in the La Cosa Nostra, it Seems’ MO 7e reasonable that Trafficante would . send a representati e to Cuba to conduct any business -Yather than risk be .ng detained by Castro again.
‘(a If Trafficant:: was actually travelling between Miami and H.ivana, the implications are interesting. He wa: either willing to risk being detained again or had acquired assurances from the Cuban government revarding his safety. In any event, the presence of Trafficante during the fall of 1960 in Cuba rai::es the possibility of a mos Cooperative, | eatunes relationship between himself and. the Cuban government. than{pre ‘iously|believed/ Such a relationship during the period when traf ficante was scheming to ass.issinate Castro invites the theory” that Trafficante was: possibly informing the Cuban government of activ ties in the Miami area in general. and of the lots in particular. : In return jue for such informatio, Trafficante could hhavenacausxed lost gambling opera - -ions as well as "support and a - Cuban sanctuary for the smuggling of contraband "into the United Staes. oo - . os OS “I Rene Gre : ‘ ‘ . , 108) TheComnittes Testiaaathe enormous ramifications : the Comm mudd 3S such © a theory an cautions that it has not received |
“any information or :vidence-in this regard.: In addition, the availible evidence indicates _Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and qt fs fecoan zed Havana although the Gommibteseecognives’ that - Trafficante could mike such trips and not disrupt “his normal routine .n Miami and vampa, thus possibly undermining the eff. et of any surveillance. f) Verona's O-:her Contacts ; ; ‘ ___ ( o4) As previously related, the 3 FBI forwarded : to the CIA a. memora:dum ea 21 December 1960 revealing that U. S. racketer °s were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activit es and subsequently forwarded : aS, another memorandum: m 18 January 1961 aeeh associated hi Cli aul adi E79 A Verena with those Ss: ‘hemes . ; ~ (jie): Other sources were also providing assistance to —_—— Verona to conduct anti-Castro operations. At the time — of his introduction into the CIA-Organized.crime ‘Cuban ex te Kader was active ia plots, the CiH=ee~— smding.Vesene—threugh—the- | Revolutionary Democ : ratic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary Council 30 Veememser informed the Committee that the purpose of the coun:il stemmed from an agreement with
- any information or evidence in this regard. In addition, the availalle evidence indicates frafficante was not -ravelling between Miami and . 7+ O's fec oan zed Havana although the ‘omubbhesxesognizes. that - grafficante could ma:e such trips and not disrupt his normal routine i1 Miami and Tampa, thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance. f) Verona's Otner Contacts ; —_————- (j04) As previously related, _ the FBI forwarded to the CIA a memorardum aa 21 December 1960 revealing that U. S. vacketer:s were making efforts to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently forwarded . a another memorandum «m 18 January 1961 ween associated ae Cobo lr Mader zag 179 A Yewvora with those schemes. (119) Other sources were also providing assistance to —- Verona to conduct a'iti-Castro operations. At the time of his introduction into the CIaA-Organized. crime - Cuban ex de \eader wag active “ plots, the Cpt were = Revolutionary Democcatic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary aeSor The, 21s lr haadhar. Council /.80 Yeasaxa informed the Committee that the purpose of the courcil stemmed from an agreement with
_ the American governient to invade Cuba and sot establish democrati:: control of the island. . +h Corban) enti (rly) Adding to. the support for yolswsr were the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini who ‘reportedly were wor!:ing through a Washington, D.C. public relations fi ‘me Edward K. Moss and Associates. He also Moss had previous CA associations. asdt\was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini brothers with the widerstanding that this group would receive privileged .reatment in the ‘Cuba of the lenthiet future. - oO sha Cubooy ale be (2) In his ‘testim ny before the Comittee Serena . Gin Boti- Gstro Cuban * UL also described a meting with. "Sqegembonaen bie and Meyer Lansky in Lan: ky! s home in Miami in ‘the ‘summer : of “1960. /$3 Lansky: said he had ‘business interests ‘in Cuba and wanted to ‘ielp the Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro, and try and establish a democratic WES , government. ‘ (13) The logical. iiference to be drawn from this is that the cia, pf janizea «ine, and other ‘persons "interested in remov ng the Castro regime all settled
the « Culyi onle, kaa ee upon deverona, prob. .bly independently, as a person “who -had the potenti..l of uniting the multitude of exile groups to -ove: throw Castro. Additionally, tha pike Ladils Vesepeaks reported ciuntacts with Organized crime raises the possibil. ty that he was involved with them in a plot to k.11 Castro before the . evolution of the cra-organize: crime Plots. If this was the case, “then Traffica te’ s recruitment of vetora into the CIA operation would result in providing official U. S. Sanction to an alre: dy existing independent operation. The ce pare re this in stating, fie is possible that wae already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs ae March 1961 L to ‘carry. out the Ca: tro pssassination. 795 were g) Introduct: on of "Joe" and "Gold" and ‘Related Events (14) The timin of the introduction of Giancana ("Gold"). and Traffivante ("Joe") is important to the analysis of the truc role of organized crime in the Castro assassination plots. “This ‘introduction,
| the thesis that the CIA found itself. involved in os together with other related events, i ffurthek suggests! providing additiona . resources for independent operation that the iyndicate already had commenced. (115) According to he Ee IGR, the entrance of . Giancana and Rosell occurred during the week of = eee ; September 25, 1960. ‘& In contrast, the SSC did not .assign a precise da:e for their entrance because of conflicting evidenc: between the ®9¢@°7 IGR and Maheu's ae Senate testimony wh -ch set the date after November, 1960." The SSC did conclud:, however, that Giancana was involved — _in the operation du-ing October because of the Las ; Vegas wiretap incid:-nt which occurred on October 30, _ and because of the )ctober 18, 1960 FBI memorandum z . whieir revealed Gian sana had told several people e/85 his involvement in 1 plot to assassinate Castro. (1) Although thes:.two events whreh the SCC cites may support the involvement of Giancana during October, they also invite speculation of. independent ‘organized crime ope-sations. The october 18, - 1960, FBI. memorandum is particularly applicable. This states: A)  Juring a r2cent conversation with several friends, - -Gianzana stated that Fidel Castro
was to be don: away with shortly, said it would occur i: November. Moreover, Giancana said he had a ready met with the would-be assassin on tiree occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu Hotel, Miami seach. Giancana stated everything had been perf :cted for killing Castro and that the assassin iad arranged with a girl, not further descr bed, to drop 2 a ‘pill' in.some drink or food of Castros: BOS 99 Since,.according—te The ro¢?-TER the poison pills, which -the CIA prepa ‘ed at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery mtil late February or early March, 1961, it is Oy doubtful that Giancana's November, 1960, ass issination plot was part of the & crime already had i:s poison plan in progress, using CIA operation. Ratier,it appears that organized a mistress of Castr>) to accomplish the deed, when the a oy CIA ‘Ortuitouslysen - sered the scene. . ‘Organized crime then occupied a perfect position’ tf their private plot succee led, they then would possess. _ far-reaching. blackmiil potential against the CIA Aes . whieh they could ex:rcise at an opportune moment, “CE. their intrigue £iiled, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing the directives of tie government A>#! coud possibly SHE uae the it invalvematk AS Dilasle wna. f potential.
h) -Govememes Richard Ciin senate Ceca oe - AbaAdes : (3) The “aiseserie' that Giancana refers to in Invalved oO . the October 18 memo may have -keea Richard Scallzetti Cain. Cain, in coniection with the top Echelon Criminal Enforcemen.: Program, informed the FBI of his criminal ‘act _vities and: close association wdaGe with Giancana. /9° Ciin admitted that he had lcovertiy| worked) for Giancana and ‘been on his payroll while he wa; a member of the Chicago Police - Department from 1953-1960, director of a private detective agency from 1960-62, and Chief Investigator (eee -Yetiow-pageteer for the Cook County Sheriff's. Office from (1962- 1964." — 04 4) Several of Cain's activities during. the fall '.O£ 1960, together with his past ¢ experience, Support - _the: proposition tha: if Giancana was involved in any Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination of Castro independent of the cIA plot, he would have recruited Cain to assist him.
(7) First, Cain m .intained a record of { “voluntarily > . LN ov peenar (earner eae Am moana eee OO nano . ' ‘providing information™to the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effo:t to gain possible leverage with the CIA. -In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated 4 November 1960 Cai). supplied the following informa- tion in his first contact with the CIA: 1) that in | 950-52 while in Miami, Florida, le initiated several telephone no taps on viurious Cuban revolutionary ee fellow Toa ; figures wider the supervision of William Buenz, a }rivate detective who had ‘contact with the l.atista government. 2) that on O:tober 2, 1960, William Buenz, ' then oper.:ting out of New York ‘City, met with (ain at O'Hare Airport and offered h.m $25,000 to travel to Cuba at the revuest of former President Piro to instal. telephone taps on various Cubans, and 3) that in 1159, Constantine Kangles, ajo. former at orney for the Cuban 26th of July movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct | Castro Anriy officers in the use of poly- graphs EF ye {Fale ; @ Tn Seems more than oincidental that Cain! s approach to the CIA to ‘suppl this information occurred ; simultaneously with Giancana'’s meeting with. Roselli and Maheu. ‘Cain su sequently volunteered information to the CIA during 161-63.
c Second, on November 2, “1960, a confidential “informant told the lureau that on October’ 20, 1960, “Serapio Monty, o, the former head ‘of the guly 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Co:stantine Kangles, the former. attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July Movement and former counsel in the United States 43. for the ‘Cuban Government headed by Fidel castro. Cain indicated to Kungles that he had ‘¢lients who wished to get news : tores and photographs out of ae . Cuba concerning reb-l activity in the Cuban foothills. Cain/further |indica ed that he. wanted to cover this story and was soon -going~o Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, "and ‘Bob’ A: Ajamian, of Life magazine, had knowledge of this pret oe - capt venture. 195° oy ee a (,23) Third, on November 2, 1960; the FBI interviewed ‘Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, ‘Miami | Beach. SPI Cain said he was a “epresentative of Accurate Detective” Laboratories, . ife magazine, and sixty-four 190 egit—. other newspapers. .’: After providing information on the military armaments n Cuba, Cain said that the
Resistence movement had eight hundred men fighting in the Escambray Mo intains and that he was awaiting the opportunity to. »arachute. into.the Escambrays . wae 149 to take photos for .ife. Cain said that Antonio de Verona gave him che information on the Cuban armaments. eis (Ca) When Cain's p.ans to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps fo: former President Prio or to take photographs of rebe. activity, or both, are considered simultaneously with Giancana' s presence in Miami, a> _ Giancana's Cast Re ‘ . ie reference to th: assassination of one in November . _ and —s Cain’ S app -oach to the CIA, the true purpose -and possible interr:lation of these events become.. even more suspect. The wiretap assignment: and the photographic story aay “have been covers’ Giancana’ may have been attem ting to. send Cain to “Cuba to supervise the poisoiing attempt on Castro. ‘Cain wns conneclec? belonged. to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish, had extensive contacts in Latin America, was well-versed in sabotage and inv:stigative procedures, had been on Giancana's payroll for four years, and apparently
was attempting to acrive in Cuba by approximately aol November, 19602 Fu:ther, Cain's reference te Curbamy sale Lande in his FBI interviey to. ato desverana , the person that the CIA concedes may have been active in independent orga iized crime assassination plots against Castro prio: to his recruitment by Trafficante in March, 1961, raises more suspicion. we) sinese Busnes hat Cain may have >.een the "assassin-to-be" whom indicate Giancana referred t») in the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum, ef he miy have been the contact man (a) —_ for the operation._ phe operation —— { analysis is obviously speculative. : (4) Cain could also have provided another. service “to Giancana. "As al ceady indicated, a second person, called J. We Harrison, allegedly accompanied and “assisted Balletti ii the wiretap. Although the Justice eae nen panies teat Department igorous {y) pursued this investigation and tet ee
prepared to indict -he principals, no one. could ' determine who Harri>son was and no partirs ant: would admit to know ng his identity. Qu 22, is no doubt he existed! h: signed the hotel register and ne AOD accompanied Ballett. on the flight to Las vegas. | omenerese Sa DuBois, the pr vate investigator Maheu hired to conduct the surv :illance, ard-Badtbertt maintained that Maheu arranged for J. W. Harrison to accompany Balletti from Miami to Las. vegas to assist in the . 20d . mh Resese& The Sppoet Chink operation. Maheu-é stied—this. Gi GLeeneel,; the - CIA liaison man, in‘ormed the Committee that whoever “38% DO . Harrison was he. was not ‘a CIA employee. (28) Clearly, someo ie arranged for Harrison's presence and knows his true -dentity. “Since DuBois and Balletti- _acted only as the. iistruments of Maheu, it seems logical: that they would hav: revealed Harrison's identity in the face of federal prosecution if Harrison were just an employee of DuBois with no connection to the CIA. or to the associates of Maheu ‘in the CIA operation against Castro. “This, Balletti and DuBois either did
not know the identi y of Harrison or felt that their client! s inte:‘ests prohi it I them ‘from i revealing such info: mation. TI The Heo — ar ‘ f t oy we - oF a - den , ; ‘Crearly—somes: q~arranged-for-tarricon's: . vA \ ath. : cn eirek & presence angd._/’%k£ne Be idenbity. At_seems most ear (Reet mo ‘ und a4 wh, Apremaimamneot Rea Likelgcemet Maheu p ovided Harrison at the request’ _ Of a source that i a | dixect interest in the surveillance, of or LLG ee, Seews pros logtal. 7. froAtsn chud) 5 mes y heuer, age > Hahesintorne [-the-ommittee’that he instituted the surveillance to pacify Giancana's concerns Bona Woe Pir ewh matur a gh, fe +haviag—an—effete-with-par-Rowan seé yetlow’p,T13 and to uncover any ° possible leaks regarding the operation. , Roselli confirmed these two accounts in his Senate BHR ROF eee eon tt pg testimony. . Shimon farther informed the Committee YY that Giancana told iim he paid $5, 000 for the Las sep/vexion Ais - Vegas operation®... . a : ae (139) Assuming that Maheu - dia provide for Harrison, he ——s ebeoy | did so at the request ‘of someone else. Maheu did not have, iny reason to independently prefer one person over ano 0 cher the « CIA or Giancana, however, did have such a per sonal interest. Giancana's interest pecsaral makkeci, obviously stemmed £ com his (etetionsirip-with—Nogaire) and it is probably correct that Giancana requested ,
+A eget ACs Maheu to bug Rowan+ ».room. This personal interest ‘could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to .use a person of Giaicana's choice; Cain fits that vole perfectly. He was a skilled electronic surveillance techni :ian and was in Miami during which late October and ea-:ly November , Homi was the . ‘ Bath thy debarkation ‘point aa Be rrison and BaiRvee- on their 3)) @ dis abunlly mr hinrahd their trip to Las vice in-hic-deposttzer, Maheu im a depasihen toths Cornm ibhee denied any knowledg: of Cain When shown. several photographs of Cain from the late 1950's and early 1960's, Arthur Ball itti also could not identify Cain hr - as s Harrisone2/O Those ‘denials do not detract from the theory - that Cai was Harrisong if no one would identify Harrison in 1960 thore is no reason ‘to expect ‘any © change in testimony. za) Sp eu KO, Wiretap” \neidlenky ay the CIA had a pewssenei- interest in surveilling hwo pecsuns were tmegets, teeget A and treyt6)- NueRudee~because of che 18 October 1960 memorandum where _Giancana discussed in assassination plot against Castro. The SSC. co reluded that this memo caused the about _CIA to be concerned 29¢t% determining if Giancana was leaking informa :ion on the CIA-organized « crime plots. This may be partially correct, but as already
indicated, the PBI ilemorandum depicts a plot wea substantially in progress and involving a:‘girl which, Clnabok Ge. jor d ni does_not_resemble tl.e October status of the CIA “operation. The CIA could have been more concerned rae See Gelyee p, 00 ” “of Ue. personal that Giancana-was i:.volved in a separate assassination plot and ‘consequent. y could have been concerned with . . AI 33 barge + A its nature and exter.t.6 The reasons why Biegbiess S Was rhe OGhyelt OF MieQuad ap@emieicp haar CLec bated such ‘surveillance sdarged A's “were two-fold. Fir: t, nertzelationship with Giancana Aa might have entailed hex learning of certain clandestine Bat: activities. Second sect one of the “several friends" in the con’ -ersation related in the 18 October - memo. 21.” (134. ‘The CIA inter: st would also explain why a wiretap was installed. Mahi: uw informed the. Committee that he only ordered physic. ul surveillance of the ‘target, Resseitpe and could no. understand why anyone installed a wiretap since the primary intent was to check on vthe per nsonal jr atten. oo itl 135) Physical, survi: :illance and a room ‘bug would, admittedly, be more than adequate to uncover any evidence a waters anieima. If, howeve.-, “Maheu also.wished to investigate
_the possibility of teaks in the operation as well ‘as the possibility 0f Giancana 's involvement in an independent plot, tien the use of a wiretap would have been Logical. . the pariamard ‘wettlans (14) Assuming that investigating an aéfete was not ’ the primary focus o: the Las: 5 Vegas operation, it can is > racagt oun een ard oun Aghitate , ao Uppard * be argued that dire:t surveillance of beatenined vould - have been the optim am method to investigation Kap Fees \ Ho for sash leaks and’ information that Giancana may have ° ‘this, however, would have run the risk of incurring the wrath of Giancana and his poss bie departure from the cIA assassination plots if ameone detected the surveillance. Through the cover of : : & aunty toed Bs Asseciatian ate tergel- h surveilling or a possible oneaee with Mepeere , however, ‘the CIA hai the opportunity ‘to tadirectty A surveil Reeaeke to obtain information on the assassination plots for a reason which met the approval of Giancana. Indee i, Giancana probably always believed . Ma picerno? rrathea, that his directive to investigate aspermrictrbe Ses ‘ was the only issue ° ‘involved’ in the surveillance.
(a) x} " ¢ blithely going "to_ ed" wi with .th organized crim aH In any event, the o! rjectives of both Giancana ‘and the CIA could hive been achieved whether Harrison was a Giancana choise, specifically Cain, ‘or an Agency opeamiston. cj ie Bi Le. (33) After the Las Vegas operation backfired, the CIA obviously. decid:d to continue the assassination’ plots. . This indica es that ee eenncat elt the security of the CIA organized crime’ plot had not been seriously brea shed. Additionally, it possibly indicates that the ‘IA determined that even if Giancana was involved in an .ndependent operation, ‘that it would - not hamper their ef ‘orts, and that all interests could be reconciled. :|the ¢ CIA ‘continued on the same tracks a) The “girl' in “the 18 October 1960 am ‘ Memorandu a ; ; " (39) In this memo, jlancana spoke of a. girl who was going to drop a pill in some food or drink of castro. in This format is agai contradiction’ to the CIA Hr Carbon offeinl ‘operation which ini dally relied On Jeam@Girea, a secretary in castro’ s prime ministry, to administer . the pills.
a aon { js) “the identity 2.f this"girl"referred to by Giancana has not be:n ascertain, but it is reasonable ’-to assume that Trafficante was in the 2a position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution . circles. }— — , oe 1a) 4 of a girl is quite logical and further supports the _involvement of orga.ized crime in an independent plot f Be to kill Castro. Fa ra) Me le Agency "may have been ‘ “ a piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to | ° he its material contribu :ion was also supplying an aura / wie | of official sancti a ee ne
PD: 5 Articles cn Frank Sturgis “(#) As indicated in ‘Section II Paul Meskill of the New York, Daily Pews wrote - “several articles in 1975 and 1976 conce? ning activities of Prank, Sturgis. These articles: furtt er \weflect)the theory, that organized crime was involved in independent Castro assassination plots. : : oh : ae cad @ gt The following ‘considerationstemanabe.f rom ate ‘@l,o0 this theory: and-/nor 3 thoroughly respond ‘to the allegations in the Meskill articles, (See Prac. ke Uore & QL ( First, organized crime probably inseiater pe) | independent assassi iation plots against Castro prior to any CIA involvem:nt in late 1960. Such plots may have been in progres when the CIA reactivated its ‘plans to kill Castr> in April, 1962. (us) Second, organized ‘erime could quite possibly have been directing activities such as those described “in ‘the ‘New York Dai ly News article. (148) mnica, Frank sturgis most. probably established contacts with organ. zed crime ‘through his gambling associations and Probably was used by them in some : fe not. connate) capacities. ‘This ‘does not | ey that he was | aomember . te . ef organized crime.
ta Codes. effrccal ty) Forth, Frank iturgis probably knew Orta and could have been involved with- him in an assassina- tion plot. — Since S:urgis is not a reliable. source, however, his allega:ions are suspect. (3) Fifth, accord .ng to the eninipieets=revssie<om— ES available evide ice, the CIA was not involved in mY operations wth ebea prior, to late 1960. (a) yy Sixth, Sturgi; was not necessarily involved with “gue Cuba of, cual _ Lorenz or Geta\in a plot to kill Castro. He may have he talon tit learned of Plots. involving 4 ‘and possibly Lorenz aud cue etre ‘in Miami after Qwba arrived there in 1965. (D2) - Additionally, the April, 1975, Meskill articles hel Le did not radetie the sturgis- Lorenz plot ‘to kill Castro with poison pills. ~ It. is only after the publication of the SSC Interim report ‘in November, 1975, and the Final Report in ‘April, 1976, that Meskill describes this plot. Thus, S:urgis may have combined accurate oo the Cuba ticond information obtaine i from oeed\and other Maimi sources with the facts the 3sc presented and then fabricated - whi . the Lorenz story ,“t gether with other ‘evidence such as the 18 October m2mo, werch can eucceea in fortunately re “in appearing both logical and believable. .
k) Implications Arising From Phase Two gf thee@esrer =o -- ; (sd Significant d. fferences are apparent betwéen Phase One and Phase Two which reflect upon organized crime's motivation ..nd seriousness in fulfilling its part .of the bar-jain originally initiated in 1960. (we) First, in Phase One, Roselli and his colleagues _demonstrated their bility to execute the contract. on Castro by naming their source who was, indeed, ina position close to Castro. | In Phase Two, the modus operandi and the ab Lity of the assassin or assassins - - ha Cubos a "| becomes quite vague Harvey reported that had an asset in Cub: who had access to someone ina restaurant which Ca stro frequented who could administer - the poison. Bre. In rune, 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey Hs Cuban enti Sends - that Vee@ra had dis vatched a three man: team to Cuba ‘to recruit persons :0 kill Castro, or to kill him themselves, maybe w .th poison pills, if the opportunity i ast alt arose US Harvey'siid they had no specific plans. ww Second, as al-eady indicated, the cast of the organized figures i volved changed. “Mahew, Giancana, o and Trafficante all >gedly retired | from the. scene, with
a "Maceo" assuming the position of Trafficante. ly Hu Cubar esc Gader the CIA 4a prin) conch Roselli and Vesets cemained. BhouGannibkaonageees . : wn OU Sh, Ladin $, . ‘ oo Wakelin eee, t at tnese figures, at least. Trafficante and Giancana, were sept informed of the progress of the plots. ) What is puzzling is the introduction of a person simply referred to as "Maceo" into a highly sensitive and covert CIA operation without any apparent attempt by the CIA to check his background or ascertain his icentity. It seems extraordinary that the CIA would propel the plots forward without performing any sect rity check. Indeed, it seems more logical that ~t least Roselli and Harvey did ascertain the identity of Maceo. and for wh tever Lee decided to v ithhold this intornhe Grortner, od : vere eas capa nese EES = rte R characterizes Maceo as “Roselli! s man, it is| . more probable that trafficante, who had recruited | : wm a all the Cuban perso inel previously used ; in the _ attempts and “who. maintained the most complete network . , Pic og Cuban allies” in tiami and Cuba, provided this “ : - APQU Re Con lee tape Ato YG trac individual. Tf. this specutation—is accurate, then it _i displays Trafficant> again performing a direct role ‘ @uring Phase Il, a Eunction every “source has denied. A sca ant ae cea hk ete ne eRe eerie HOE, eldme eer RW 47055 Docld:32273547 Page 87
“Trafficante recruited in Phase (One, it-seens reasonable cs . (58) A related issie is whether “"phases" actually “existed or whether ihe operations to’ kill Castro encompassed a Conti: uous time period. As previously ‘indicated, the CIA | recautions that the plot was dormant from the Ba: of Pigs until Harvey assumed ;° direction in the sp) ing. of 1962. Both Harvey and, ae QLCeaneti-stated, hc wever, that Harvey “took over . 4 a going operation." Considering. that Roselli was ‘vable to immediately mobilize his forces in 1962 in. response to Harvey's nce and that ane een : an CT eee a eae vet tEli ee tan Aloe ented Maen I asians heme ATE comayr Coy to assume that some of “he individuals in Phase One can were actively attemptin« to kill Castro after the: Bay of Pigs and probably \ un il the advent of Soviet solidification. These «fforts, however, may wells” fate oe have ‘bean’ conducted - witt out CIA knowledge and Saati agen 4support the theory of independent organized | crime plots..~
+ ra y ‘ (5 ou During late 1/62 and early 1963 Phase Two f WS a ne atten yf CSA sien ene nr undramatically and ‘lowly Yerminated. In retrospect, the ambiguous modus operandi, the lack of identity of the potential as;assins, the total reliance of Harvey on Roselli for any information, and the seemingly apathetic desire of the CIA to corroborate any information fro 1 Roselli; all converge to posit the theory that organiz :d crime was not seriously attempting to assassinate. Cast - ae) all follo ing the solidification py En thd eng of Soviet influence in the Castro regime. Atrafficante, Lansky, and other C iban casino owners must have realized by the mid-1962 tha: ‘the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last e 1a, and that fortunes ‘were to be made elsewhere. Ce -tainly, history shows. growing Lansky infiuence in the Bahamas and Las Vegas» «_ Trafficante project; in the Dominican Republic, and burgeoning bolita erations in Florida arising from the influx of Cuban exilg. ‘Further, organized crime may have determined that the new Justice Department . 779 24,’ crackdown wouldopad ratcly not have ‘permitted the "wide open" Cuba of the pre- Kennedy era even if the United sips} i s 1cceeded in ousting the Cuban. regime ne HS’ nséquent Ly, while the United States
government, specifi:ally the CIA, still possessed a .viable interest in issassinating Castro, organized crime (aca not, -2. “Motivatio: of Organized Crime to be involved .ni\Plots (/69) Despite the r:asons just presented to discontinue attempts to kill Ca:tro, organized crime still had strong incentive to string the CIA along. Specifically, . this incentive was ‘:o establish a relationship with the CIA for subsequent ise in thwarting prosecution for 4 Ee Ons ; . ffenses ind thus blunting any Justice Department | proceedi igs: against organized crime. Te Aten Leb. (él Theeistinkhhes seaiiowes. that organized crime, fire Nr while always recogn zing the benefits of establishing . a relationship with the CIA,. initiaiiy was. _also ‘seriously. intereste | in assassinating Castro to regain lost territory. _ As already. indicated ; 78H - probaly. Jobin. this desir: ‘\ebbe with the solidification of soviet influence and other factors just mentioned. ‘After this occurran :e EES organized crime may only have put: forth the “appearance” of involvement and good faith in tie plots to ifurther define, a
relationship with tie CIA. - Indeed, the CIA prevention of prose ‘ution in 1961 in the Las Vegas wiretap ‘incid :nt would have given Maheu, ‘’ Roselli and Giancani confirmation of the value | of such a relationship and impetus for continuing it in 1962 even though the assassination of Castro may no longer have .een a viable alternative. oe (16a) The actions o: Maheu, Giancana, and particularly Roselli in the year; following these plots support this theory. As related in Section II, these individuals actually did use their CIA affiliation: and knowledge of th: plots in attempts to hinder age 17 law: enforcement prosecutions and objectives. (163) The success of some of their efforts verifies the. tremendous blackmail potential they possessed. As . Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to the CIA, commented in May, 1967, Giancana and Roselli had the CIA “over ‘a barrel” because cf “that operation" and he doubted -that the FBI would .e able to do anything about either Giancana or Roselli because of “their previous activities" with tke crawl S - ,
In an.interview with the Committee, former Deputy Director (194, | AC Be 2 of bMaccmaly of the CIA Richard Bissell discu ised SoDEREab bes, stating that he “had come to feel that the threat of blackmail by the underworld figures. involved had constituted the single greatest danger in the plots. ad Bissell, as Deput ’ Director for Plans, had -been - personally involved in’ the planh .ng and authorization of the CIA- Mafia plots’ in 1960-1961. 22! O Bissell had not been interviewed by the Inspector General's Offic: during their 1967 investigation of the plots, and thus ‘his recol lections and views were not contained in the Inspector General’ s Repor - per! fe [ (/65) Bissell told the Committee that he believes he and other Agency officials should have bee more cognizant of: the possibility of blackmail by ‘the organized cr ome figures involved in’ the’ plots. See Bissell stated, "We didn't give it sufficient attention at that _ ‘time. It was unwise. We only tho ight of the possibility of: ‘plack=— mail later." a3 The former deputy Director recalled that the CIA's main fear at the time had >.een “some sort of unfavorable publicity, if by chance it leake i out,” rather ‘than ‘the potential ramifications of entering into sich a sensitive relationship with
powerful criminal Figures. Dot Bissell went on to states "y knew it was serious. I “knew these were Mafia leaders. And i knew they were ina position. to make very damaging revelations “about the Agency. But we thought it war all under control." Bas 3 While Bissell stated that te and his colleagues had not realized the potential for blackrail when they first enlisted Mafia leaders in ‘the ‘assassinaticn plots, the CIA officer who later assumed control over the ccntinuing plots has stated he was well aware of - and fearful ¢ sbout - such a possibility. 226 William. Harvey, the clandestine :ervices agent who coordinated the reactivation and continuation of the. plots in 1962 and 1963, testified in 1975 that he and then Deputy Director Richard Helms ‘had concealed the existence of tle assassination plots from CIA Director John McCone partly out «f concern over the potential for such blackmail. In his Senate: Testimony, Harvey stated that he and Richard. Helms decided not to inform McCone about: the. plots: . » - until we reache:! the point where it appeared it might come to fruition or had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem we faced, including thé poisible problem'- and it was a very, or it appeared to be and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibil ty of this government being _ blackmailed either by Cubais (exiles) for political . purposes or by figures in organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrand .zement, which, as.it turned out, did not peppers but at tha. time was a very pregnant possibility. wry (eo Upon learning partial deta -Ls. of the plots, both Attorney General Robert F. "Kennedy and FB Director J. Edgar Hoover had immediately recognized the distu -bing leverage the participants in the plots had gained through their involvement with the CIA in the murder attempts. As noted esrlier, Attorney General’ Kennedy was partially briefed about the ore- Bay of Pigs assassination attempts, authorized during the Eisenhower Administration ein May, ‘@ 1962. aif Upon being informed of the plots, Kennedy had met with FBI Director Hoover to share the - enformar ion and to voice his anger over" the CIA's actiong. aaj. In © whe. nc randum of their conversation prepared on May 10, 1962, Hoover stated that Kennedy ‘had angrily noted that the CIA’s use of these | figures rad resulted in. the possibility that . RW 47055 Docld:32273547 Page 93
"the CIA was ina position where it could not afford to have any action taken against Giancan and Maheu." * 30 Hoover further noted that he had been greatly gisturbed over the Agency’ s use .- of these individuals, stating, ne expressed ‘great: astonishment at this in view of the bad reputation of Maheu Lee “The Attorney General shared the same views."« 23/ (8) In his interview with the. lommittee, former Deputy Director Richard Bissell stated that he hid been distressed over reports that. CIA Director John McCone hai never been. told. about the _Agency~ Mafia assassination plots during the period in which they \ were occurring. 3A mccone had bee i appointed Director ‘of the Agency: ‘by President Kennedy ‘in. November of 1961, thus serving. as “head of the CIA during ‘the last 15 tionth ; in which the plots were’ continuing. 233 In his Senate testimony in 1975, Richard Helms (who served as McCone's Deputy Director during che period in which the plots were - continuing)- Stated that he could not recall telling McCone of the a existence ‘of the plots: ‘while ther were océurring. ay Helms went. _ on to state ‘that: he ‘iwas trying to seratch my head as.to why I: , didn’ t tell him at the time and ny surmises are the best I. con come up with. I a am really surprised I did: not discuss it with him ~ at the time." exe y McCone's former Executive Assistant, Walter Elder, told: the Senate that McCc ne had once notified Deputy ‘Director . Helms. that "assassination, could aot be condoned ‘and would not be approved, ' . ‘and that the Agency, was never “to ‘become involved in ‘such activity. ASL In his Senate testimony, William: Harvey stated that Director McCone had once persona lly toa him that the Agency and | U.S. government must not engage in-such plots ‘against’ any foreign leader, and ‘further, that "if I got myself involved in something like this, I might end up getting myself excommunicated: . 237 As noted earlier, Harvey went or to testify that he and Helms had withheld their knowledge of (anc personal involvement in) the murder plots from Director McCone, partly out of fear "of this. government - my . being blackmailed . . . by figures in organized crime .°. RP HW 47055 Docld:32273547 | Page 94
(ey Speaking of the failure of Heims, Harvey, and other agency. personnel to inform Director McCone of the plots,. former Deputy - Director Bissell told the committee, "the Director. should have been ‘informed. - This was bad, anc shouldn't have gone on. "BG Bissell, who left the Agency in January 1962, stated, "The Director should know if: his. subordinates - his- top subordinates - are in‘a position of being subject to blackmail ox are in fact being: blackmailed _ “by Mafia figures or anyone else. This is very bad." O4o Bissell commented that “in something that sensitive, involving national security, you shouldn' t have that potential of blackmail going unknown to the Director. AGE . | . (7%) Bissell told the ‘Committee that he would not have becomé | involved in. the early plots witt out then Director Allen Dulles’ . personal authorization, Stating, "Tr Dulles told me not to become involved in such-a thing, - ‘I know for sure I wouldn' t. You can re disobey ‘the Director." BW Sr eaking of Director McCone' 's | reported notification of ‘both Richard Helnis and William Harvey " that the Agency | ‘must ‘not ‘become involved in assassination activity, Bissell stated, "I cannot say what McCone’s reaction would have ‘been if he found out. about such a violation of his wishes at. the - time.I do know that Helms woulc have been ina most ‘uncomfortable position, but, I can't speculate. " 243 The former Agency official stated, “It's wrong. Obviously senior officials should follow’ directions, especially on somett ing’ ‘Vike that.' r ell Bissell. further commented, "If MeCone tcld Helms and Harvey not to get - involved, then it raises obvious questions about their actions . . . I would rather not speculate abe ut this. I ‘don! t “know who gave what orders to whom after I reft." QYS . “ oe ‘ (14) Speaking of the CIA's ‘witt holding of all information pertaining to the existence of the CIA-und« rworld assassination plots from the Warren commission, Bissell £ tated that the Agency probably "didn' 't think it was relevant I would giess. " a6 Bissell further . stated, mat can't believe the potential concern over blackmail by thé Mafia people would have been allowed ly the Agency to serve as a reason HW 47055 Docld:32273547 Page 95
: for shielding the existence" of che plots from the Presidential | Commission. OT Meee Biss all ‘added, oy guess you couldn't absolutely rule out such a , possi vility. " aud WP). Asked it he: believed that che Agency would have informed — _ the Warren Commission “of the CIA plots if there had been substantive news reports at’ the time Linking Santos Trafficante, Sam’ Giancana, or other organized crime leaders to the assassination of President Kennedy, Bissell stated, "T can': speculate what. it would have done. I would hope so. " oy 4 Bissell went on to state that he ‘believes that if the Agency: actuilly suspected - such Mafia involvenent mt in the President's murder, - it wo ild probably have - informed the Warren Commission of the CIA plo:s. Bissell stated, “They wouldn't have liked to. But I do think th:y would have told Earl Warren." 25%. Bissell stated: his belief that ‘hidthe Agency found that trafficante or Giancana haa been involved in some way with President Kennedy's | ‘assassination, it would. have inf xrmed' the Warren. Commission of the ‘CIA plots against Castro, even, t ough such information would: have ‘lea to the disclosure of the Ageicy' s own prior involvement with ' these same Mafia elements: in ass issination conspiracies. | aS} BW 47055 Docld:32273547 Page 96
3. Retaliation Theory . G4) Results of the Comm tins (173) 1 The Committee found no evidence that these operations provoked Premier Castro to assassinate tN veaTinadion ". president Kennedy ii retaliation. (174) The Committee also daw found no evidence that Castro knew of CIA >ponsorship of these activities or even: knew .of the.r existence prior to the death of President Kenned’. Beem Te Castro did discover. their existence, ho ea Sa : are | 176 In an artic e in | the Washington Post on E september 9, 1976, Anderson revealed that ex-CIA agent William Harvey, attorney Edward P.. Morgan, he Em Wes 18 and reputed mobster John Roselli were sourcesA &* Th seems Certan— ThesGemnittee—hes—e ope te etermined that John Roselli was the person who informec Harvey and Morgan about the plots» and the retaliatior theory; thus; only one SOUrCE, “ Mis
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