bos “oom, | MW 55072 SECTION 107. SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES.” 107Q-R Q. CORRECTIVE ACTION ON FALSE INFORMATION 1. 2. 6. 7. Lo. Li. 12. 13. When it is determined that informant or ex~informant furnished false informa- tion while informant, promptly advise Bureau of complete facts. Set forth your suggestion relative to wording to be used in describing jnformant in future, such as: "informant of known unreliability" or tanformant who has furnished both reliable and unreliable information in the past." . . . Bureau will advise which designation to use. Then proceed with review of all data furnished by individual and label information from him accordingly. AlL communications containing information from informant which hava been disseminated to Bureau, other Bureau offices, and to outside agencies must be corrected. ‘ Identify cases individually by title and character, together with datas of communications containing information. If information was used in reports, corrective letters should be erystal clear and refer.to specific report, page number, and change to be made.” Amended pages should not be prepared unless so instructed by Bureau in accordance with part II, section 4, of Manual of Rules and Regulations. Corrective action should be called to attention of other Bureau offices, outside agencies, and Bureau by letter. Instruct each interested Bureau office which has made further dissemina-~. tion of information .to follow instructions set-forth above. _ Set up control file regarding this corrective action, and upon completian of same submit to Bureau final letter under informant's caption identifying each case by title, character, Bureau file, where known, and date of com- munication. This letter will be used to check all pertinent Bureau files to see that necessary corrective action has been taken. ~ Tf necessary, other field offices which have received information from informant should also be requested to submit summary letters showing what corrections have been made, All information from informant must be correctly labeled and great care must be taken to see that this is done. . Occasionally, ex-informant through his speech, writings, or actions raises @ doubt as to his reliability subsequent to time he was informant. It is not necessary to go back and change evaluation of information attributed to that individual in absence of definite indication that informant furnished unreliable information while he was informant. Dissemination of information from sources of questionable reliability and known wnreliability should be made in accordance with part IT, section 5, Manual of Rules and Regulations. R. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES 1. Definition See page 3 of this section. 2. Assignment of symbols [ @. [A symbol number should be assigned from the times any step is taken- [ to develop an individual as a confidential source.] b. Advise Bureau by letter giving name, address, business affiliation, symbol number, reason for assigning symbol number, and brief state- ment concerning type of information furnished, co. Abbreviation "CS" may be used in intra ~Bureau communications for confidential source; e.g., "Richard Roe, CS. Communications relating to espionage and foreign nationality matters should in addition have a character indicating country involved; e.g., IS - R. d. When permanent symbol has been assigned to confidential source, abbraviation "CS"-is to appear before symbol number: e.g., CS NY-~OO00-S e. Numbers assigned to confidential sources are to be taken from series [ of numbers used for security, lextremist, Jand criminal informants. 21 Docld: 32989529 Page i7i2 9-13-71
ey 1O7C~-D SECTION x) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND couMPene ras SOURCES. 3. Inquiries of discreet nature concerning individual's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, Stability, integrity, genera] reputation, present and past employments, ( and business ‘connections. Investigation must definitely éstablish that , individual can be used without danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from individual is not sufficient; his background must be established by investigation, including discréet inquiries among persons personally acquainted with him. i 4. Check local arrest records. Submit FD-165 to Identification Division ; to obtain any record he may have and to place stop against fingerprints if on file. , : : 5. Review armed services record if applicable. 6. Check draft status or status in armed forces reserve. Check domestic status and, if any marital difficulties, obtain details. ‘Persons being considered for use in espionage and foreign nationality cases may present special problems which limit scope of investigation. (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105,. volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical, cover above items, Leads must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. Investigation must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, or designate in- dividual as potential security informant. St am ots 5 Ra? Tie nes AUR SESS EME Ta ad ell aon eo. D. APPROVAL, INDOCTRINATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS 1. When background information obtained, transmit results to Bureau in same numerical sequence set out in subsection C, and request authority to des- ignate individual as Bureau-approved potential security informant and to proceed with development. Submit by secure teletype (usually Nitel), | Be brief and concise. Do not submit on UACB basis. Include physical description. : a. If the individual is a student, include separate paragraph clearly setting forth the number of extremist and/or security informants, the number of potential extremist and/or potential security in-- ( formants, and the number of panel sources currently being operated at the particular college or university to which the request pertains. | 2. After designation as Bureau-approved potential security informant, fol- ‘ lowing matters should be made clear to him: : a. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is to understand there is no coercion or intimidation: involved. b. He is not and cannot consider himself employee or "undercover Agent" of FBI. Seriousness of violating impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him. . . . c. His cooperation must be strictly confidential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this confidence, he should so advise. There should be no doubt left in mind of potential informant that his relationship must remain on confidential basis and if he violates confidence he will be of no value and by so doing Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardized. If he has special problem which would require revealing his assistance to his wife or other pertinent individual, this should be ascertained and appropriate recommendation made to Bureau. _o ad. If potential informant is connected in any manner with labor union, inform him that Bureau is not interested in employer~employee relation- Ships as such and is only concerned with obtaining information on infiltration of unions by subversive elements. , . eR AEE eS LORMAN EL: wes 2-14-72 Wi 55072 Doold: 32989529 Page i7is L --
Rae SECTION x SECURITY INFORMANTS AND con Men eza SOURCES LO7A-G DEFINITIONS 1. Security informant : Individual actively engaged in obtaining’ and furnishing current informa- tion on security or intelligence matters exclusively for Bureau whose identity must be protected, Such person should be member or attend meetings of subversive organization, or be in such position relative to. subversive organization that he is able to provide current information of value, 2.. Potential security informant Tndividual in position to become active in or closely connected with subversive organization or intelligence activities and is making . affirmative effort to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau. 3. Double agent Person cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks.’ for both foreign intelligence service and Bureau under FBI guidance 4, Gonfidential source . Individual who on confidential basis furnishes information availabie through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concérted effort in behalf of Bureau but furnish information readily available to them, 5. Panel source Individual who is not involved in subversive group but who will attend its public gatherings in behalf of FBI for intelligence purposes or as potential witness P Lvs] SOURCES OF POTENTIAL INFORMANTS Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to internal security. Informants may be obtained through alertness in course of normal investigative activity. Live informant coverage depends for most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, following is suggested: i. Evaluation off a. Gomplainants or other persons interviewed in security ‘matters b. Subjects of security investigations who show disaffection, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of party loyalty ec. Personal friends and contacts of Bureau employees a. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts 2. Review of closed security files, reserve index, and files of former . security informants - Review Pactionalism saction of file on Communist Party, USA. 4. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffec- tion on part of subversive group members. They should not be informed as to purpose of inquiry. 5. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a2 few meetings QaQ BACKGROUND INQUIRIES ON INDIVIDUALS BEING CONSIDERED FOR INFORMANT PURPOSES When decision is made to consider an individual for informant purposes, conduct background investigation. Extensive background investigation should not be conducted until individual has been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist Bureau, Obtain prior Bureau authority to interview when- ever restrictions imposed in section 87, volume III, and section 105, volume IV, of this manual, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation should include: ° : 1. Check of field office files 2. Discreet canvass of logical informants ' Sr ss oot ee Bc Be ee Be oe ne eee Boe See Dt ne Ne Dn oes Bonn ome Ye eet Ae a fae as Ue ee Bet cn Ls Len ees Ss een an Lan ae aes Ene Toes ae an eee toe Lemon hams Laan een fans ann teen nen coe me aan 8-24-70 Mi S5072 Docld: 32989525 Page i714 : -
— 5 dave RT AE SiO 72 107T-U SECTION T SECURITY INFORMANTS AND com@verat SOURCES. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribu- ‘tion or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for Limited use - ( and not intended for release to public.) . 4. Retention of copies of passed material a. b. Ce a. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents ox material related to national defense which is passed. Such material should be apvropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage, Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense. It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody. 5. Handling money and property received by double agents Qe Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence . operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to-this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute state~- ment describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name, Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part IT, Manual of Rules and Regulations, Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing ( recollection in event testimony is later necessary. U. UPILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING 1. Use of students ae Students under age of 18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances, Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Burean. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed writ- ten statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. 2. [Deleted] 24 . ' . - 3-13-72 - Bocld: 32989529 Page i715