202-10002-10131 . oo | . JFK Assassination System . Date: 130/201 f . Identification Form Agency Information | AGENCY: JCS . RECORD NUMBER: 202-10002-10131 RECORD SERIES: TAYLOR PAPERS | AGENCY FILE NUMBER : i 7 ‘Document Information _ ORIGINATOR: JCS | | FROM: V.H.KRULAK | TO: CHAIRMAN,JCS | j TITLE: COVERT ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA \" 1 DATE: 10/14/1963 PAGES: 13 i SUBJECTS : | COVERT ACTION - CUBA t DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret) RESTRICTIONS: — Consulted; 1C CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 07/22/1997. OPENING CRITERIA: PENDING TREASURY REVIEW COMMENTS : Taylor Papers, Box 7, Number 5. Memo from Krulak to Chairman, JCS enclosing memo re: Covert Actions Against Cuba. |
F OIA Coordination. Sheet DOCUMENT UNDER FOIA CONTROL DO NOT REVIEW Document Coordination as ; part of case. NW 21895 Bo 7, Fah W Document ID 24142739 Document Date: 10/13/1963 Subject: Memo w/attachment “Sent TO: Office of the Secretary of Defense | Press ted in Gall, | Sent T TO: "Central Intelligence Agency
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE i THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANBUM 14 October 1963 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of! Staff Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba It is recommended that. you approve, sign and forward the attached imemorandum to the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs. \ | Varta Major General, USMC H i ! i i i 4 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE — —— : Ah fle Lasf Sfmncly Grog, ~ta haus ar AE te, Gods ae c Knee fie Case, 4 (Ce fote fee fa fot Sage Hie © Man was heneheef . 1 I {
Sopy_f®_ or. f © copies each of. pages series i” ~y fe t setae Pa tema pa Lb ef! "ui Oe? Q SENSITIVE (AZ 21 OCT 1963 CM-949-63 MEMORANDUM FOR TRE DE PARTISENT OF DEFENSE ERECUTIVE AGENY YOR CUBAN AFFAIRS G2 “ , Uhwe SUBJECT: Covert Actions Against Cuba (TS) brug ff fo i. The gurpose of this memorandum is te propose for consideration twe forms of covert action; both pessible of accomplishment at relatively a-nall coat and both capable af contributing to the disruption of tranquillity in Guba. The actions contemplated are: and a. The iatroduction of counterfeit currency, b. The imtreduction of srynall arena and ammunition. a4. The widespread disa¢mination of well made, diffiicult-te- ini recegnime counterfeit currency arnong the Cuban sopulace would serve to degrade the value of gunuine catrency and would generate serious preblema fer Cuban’ gevernrnental authorities. They would be compelled elther to call jin and replace all currency in clreuls - tion, an expensive and troublesome srocedure, or, alternatively, ta impose pemalties for possession of the Ulegal bille and aceept the | Sensequeat enforcement problems. In either case, there would be an adverse eliect upon the economic life of the country, and thus, apon lia imtermal stability. | 3. With respect to small armg, it ia neted that ame of Castro's early acta in 1959 was totally to disarm the private eitisenry, thereby removing a eritical threat to his totalitarian regime. Simee that time he has bad relatively little to fear from internal viclence. Uf naw we were covertly to introduce in many areas of Cuba quantities of emall and simple weanons and ammunition, including pistols and disguised lethal devices eaaliy concealed on the pergon, seme weuld come into the possesaion of peavle who would have & willlagness to use them, although it is recognized that many of the weasens go introduced would fall into the hands of the Castro Gevernment. Nevertheless, aa more individual Cubans geined possession of & weapon, the internal threat to functionaries of the Castre Government would as would problemas of investigation, enforcement and Incidents of assageination of oppressive officials and TOP SECRET. grow, diseipline, PP aee CTE par SHOE see
TOP S Wai aieh taal other armed aciion might be expected to imcrease, Castre would be &ced with the requirement to bay up the arme er te éngage in extensive enforcement activities, in which latter Chee conditions might reeeh auch lewela of severity aa te allenate progressively greater segments of the citizenry. In either event, the net effect of introducing quantities of amall arma would be to disturb internal tranquility and previde a growing base of discontent Emeng the peagla, 4. Intredection of counter felt carrency should be accomoelished gradually over an extended serisd by mawvitime infiltration, wtill sing ibe avallable agent metwork. Randem scattering of currency frora the air, while feasible, would lessen the cifectiveness of the ope retion, since the Castre Government would be immediately alerted and could take prompt countermesourea. Sraall weapons and aimreunition, an the other hamd, could baat be distributed widely by casens of alreraft, piloted by Cubane, which, in a series of aerial forays throughout Cuba, would drop quantities of individually packaged Weapons attached to ernall savechutes. Weapons could aleo be imtredaced by saa. 3. These operations can be conducted in suth & way as to be plausibly denieable by the United States. Gover would be provided by the widespread and highly publicised anti-Castre activities ad refugee groups baged in Latin fraertea. In this regard, it has already been resorted im the presa that U.S. Treasury offictaia recently arrested certain Cubana refugees in this coumiry who were engaged in printiag counterfeit Cuban currency. Thia would support future denials by the U.S. of responsibility fer any counterfeiting activity. & HK ts recommended that a prograra involving the actions described herein be éeveloped in detall by the Ceatyal tatelligence Agency. It is further recommended that the results of the Agency analysis be forwarded ta the appropriate inter-agency group for condideratian ae to the feasibility and desirability of early impla- menting actions. ! pte Seay Fanar MAR WELL EL TAYLOR . gy ~ DTS Chair man ; oe - 3T° Joint Chiefe of Staff 1s cc: Deputy Secretary of Defense “4 3 & ~ PEE xp Prepared by: LtCol Smith - 15 Oct 63 Puls © Cy ror arash: : pe
DRAFT CM ~~ GHAI TOP SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS Subject: Covert Actions Against Cuba (TS) 1. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose for consideration two forms of covert action; both possible of accomplishment at relatively small cost and both capable of contributing to the disruption of tranquility in Cuba. The actions contemplated are: | a. The introduction of counterfeit currency, and b. The introduction of small arms and ammunition. 2, The widespread dissemination of well made, difficult- to~recognize counterfeit currency among the Cuban populace would serve to degrade the value of genuine currency and would generate Grave! problems for Cuban governmental authorities. They would be compelled either to call in and replace all currency in circulation, a most] expensive and troublesome procedure, or, alternatively, to impose penalties for possession of the illegal bills and accept the consequent enforcement problems. In either case, there would be an adverse effect upon the economic life of the country, and thus, upon its internal stability. 3, With respect to small arms, it is noted that one of Gastro's early acts in 1959 was totally to disarm the private citizenry, thereby removing a critical threat to his totalitarian regime. Since that time he has had relatively Little to fear from internal violence. If now we were covertly to introduce in many areas of Cuba quantities TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE of small and simple weapons and ammunition, including pistols and disguised lethal devices easily concealed on the person, some would come into the possession of people who ‘have a willingness to use them, although it is recognized that many of the weapons so introduced would fall into the hands of the Castro Government. Nevertheless, as more individual Cubans gained possession of a weapon, the internal threat to functionaries of the Castro Government would grow, as would problems of investigation, enforcement and discipline. Incidents of assassination of oppressive officials and other armed action might be expected to increase. Castro would be: faced with the requirement to buy up the arms or to engage in extensive enforcement activities, in which latter case conditions might reach such levels of severity as to alienate progressively greater segments of the citizenry. In either event, the net effect of introducing quantities of small arms would be to disturb internal tranquility and provide a growing base of discontent among the people. 4, Introduction of counterfeit currency should be accomplished gradually over an extended period by maritime infiltration, utilizing the available agent network. Random scattering of currency from the air, while feasible, would lessen the effectiveness of the operation, since the Castro Government would be immedi- ately alerted and could take prompt countermeasures. Small weapons and ammunition, on the otherhand, could pest be distributed widely by means of aircraft, piloted by Cubans, which, in a series of aerial forays throughout TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 2
aa TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Cuba, would drop quantities of individually packaged weapons attached to small parachutes. Weapons could also be introduced by sea. 5. These operations can be conducted in such a way as to be plausibly deniable by the United States. Cover would be provided by the widespread and highly publicized anti-Castro activities of refugee groups based in Latin America. In this regard, it has already been reported in the press that U.S. Treasury officials recently arrested certain Cuban refugees in this country who were engaged in printing counterfeit Cuban currency. This would support future denials by the U.S. of responsi- bility for any counterfeiting activity. 6. It is recommended that a program involving the & yelspre dd. dy aad actions described herein be,undertaken by the Central , - ; a bode hye PF age Pa CE, Peck ig 7 Intelligence Agency. Hoag fun ane ; fo o&e As Lae ) bye bynes Broo new oe ta Bae. pyre pe gue Pyrey- Cas poe a . é , . ¢ 7 V0 the a pours st gel on Re BO crags Sate t, Uh dastiak f, & on Panty Wraig le ve bow é "8 we Fan : é ce: Deputy Secretary of Defense TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 3
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a support plan which can be implemented Mr. Califano has advised General Krulak peat notice Lf directed. his ataff of the nature of this problem and CIA is prepared to meet with DOD representa - tives to accomplish necessary coordination. (Signed) Cyrus R. Vance Cyrus R. Vance Secretary of the Army |
“4 ASG Contral Nos oe sr i 23 SEP 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUBJECT: Department of Defense Supp srt of Covert Operations Conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency Against Cuba (TS) A program of covert operations against Cuba conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with assets under their control was approved some time ago by highest authority. Externally launched operations already conducted under the program have not included Department of Defense (DOD) support during the actual operational phases nor is such support provided for under the approved program. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the CLA/ will in the immediate future raise the issue of prearranged DOD support, on a contingency basis, in the event CLA controlled raiding vessels are subjected to hot pursuit in international waters by either Cuban aircraft or surface vessels. Under existing Rules of Engagement, the prearrangement of DOD support of this type will require approval by the highest authority. | The presentation of a DOD position on this sensitive policy question will probably be required at the next meeting of the Special Group (NSC 5412/2) on September 25, 1963. As the DOD Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs, it would be most helpful to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this urgent matter by the close of busi- ness on September 24, 1963 go that these views can be fully considered in the development of the DOD position. In consideration of this policy issue the limitations imposed by currently approved national policy should be adhered to as far as possible, First, there is a continuing requirement to prevent attribut- ability in sabotage operations against Cuba. Second, the provision of DOD support on the contingency basis outlined, should be viewed SF. + F
RNS dg p eer ais? wes SESE ie within the scope and pace of the CLA program already approved and under way. Within these parameters, | would appreciate the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following specific questions: a. Would it be desirable te prearrange DOD air or surface support for the protection of CLA raiding craft of U. 5. registry im the event such craft are subjected to hot pursuit in inter- national watere by Cuban aircraft or surface vessels? b. Ie such prearranged support desirable for CIA controlled raiding craft of foreign regiatry? tus R. Vanes (Signed) Cy Cyrus|R. Vance Secretary of the Army 2 WOP SECREY SENSIT re wl . . oy h ol