-~- 54 - told the group that he had gone to the National Autono- mous University of Mexico looking for pro-Castro stu- dents who might help him persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a visa. (Ibid.) Oswald claimed that he was from California and was a member of a pro-Castro group in New Orleans. (Ibid.) Oswald remained with the stu- dents the rest of that day and evening, as well as the following day. (Ibid.) The reporter described Oswald as a strange and introverted individual who spoke very little Spanish. (Ibid.) On , the State Department forwarded a copy of Ruyld's letter to the Central Intelligence Agency. (The Committee could not determine when the State Department forwarded the letter to the CIA.) On June 14, 1967 CIA Headquarters sent the Mexico City Station a copy of Ruyle's letter to Bowles. (Dispatch from the Director to Mexico City, 6/14/67, HMMW 15557; Wx 7241 Entry #616, p. 117, CIA #744) CIA Headquarters considered Ruyle's report "the first piece of substantive info about Oswald's sojourn in Mexico" since the assas~ Sination. (Ibid.) Consequently, Headquarters cabled that though they ‘understood the source's relectance to become involved "the fact remains that this info cannot continue to be withheld or concealed." (Ibid.) Head- quarters instructed the Mexico City Station to elicit the identity of the source from Ruyle. In addition,
Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to bear in mind, while interviewing Ruyle's source, that Lee Harvey Oswald was a momosexual. (Ibid.) The final sentence of the dispatch, “It is our hope that the facts obtained through these interviews will help to confirm that several of Garrison's allegations about involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, the CIA, etc. are false," (Ibid.) explained the Central Intelligence Agency's motives for purusing the story. On June 29, 1967, the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that a station officer had gone to Tampico where he had interviewed Ruyle's source, Oscar Contreras. (Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/ 67; Wx 7241 entry #622, p. 118, CIA #745) The cable re- ported that Contreras was a reported for ElSol (a news-— paper, The Sun) in tampico; was circa 30 years old; married with three children; studied law at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) from 1960 to 1964; belonged to a pro-Castro group at UNAM; was per- secuted by the Mexican police for this affiliation and moved to Tampico to escape the persecution. (Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67; WX-7241, entry #622, p. 118, #745.) Contreras told the Mexico City Station official that he and four other individuals (When Contreras was
asked to identify the other four individuals who had met Lee Harvey Oswald, he refused to reveal their names because he feared that informing on them might endanger his family.) had met Oswald as they exited a roundtable discussion held at the School of Philosophy at UNAM. (Cable from Mexico City to Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67; MW 7241, entry # 622, p- 118, CIA #74S) Contre- ras stated that Oswald had made inquires on the UNAM campus about pro-Cuban groups and had been directed to his group. (Ibid.) Contreras reported that though the group initially mistrusted Oswald fearing he was a “CTA provocation," they allowed Oswald to remain with them that day and night and part of the following day. (Ibid.) Contreras noted that Oswald never mentioned assassination but kept emphasizing that he had to get to Cuba. (Ibid.) In addition, Oswald hed exhibited no homosexual tenden- cies while he was with the group. (Ibid.) On July 4, 1967, Headquarters cabled the Mexico. City Station that Contreras' story should be explored to the fullest even though he might have fabricated it. (cable from the Director to Mexico City, 7/4/67, DIR 16823, WX 7241, Entry 626, p. 119, CIA #746) Headquarters suggested that the FBI handled the story. (Ibid.) The following. day, July 5, 1967, the Mexico city Station . aryi Raed
cabled that it preferred turning Contreras’ case over to the Mexican authorities and to the F.B.I. (Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 7/5/67, MEXI 1991; WX 7241, Entry 627, p. 119, CIA #746.) Headquarters suggested that the F.B.I. handle the story. (Ibid.) The following day, July 5, 1967, the Mexico City Sta- tion cabled that it preferred turning Contreras’ case over to the Mexican authorities and the F.B.I. (Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 7/5/67, MEXI 1991; WX 7241, Entry 627, p. 119, CIA #746.) The same day, the Chief of Station informed the Legat of Contreras’ story, but asked him not to take any action without previously consulting the Mexico City Station. (Memo to Legat, 7/5/67 from Chief of Station; WX 72X1, entry 628, p- 119, CIA #746.) On July 10, 1967, Jeremy K. Benedum ("JKB") wrote a memo delineating the results of a Mexican government review of Oscar Contreras’ file. (Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67;. WX 7241, Entry #634, p- 120, CIA #747) According to the memo, a lone Oscar Contreras appeared in the UNAM law school records, Oscar Contreras Lartigue, dob 2/14/39 in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas. (Ibid.) The memo also reported that a newspaper article appearing in "Excelsior" listed an Oscar Contreras as a signer of a protest for the Bloque Fstudiantil Revolu~ cionario which had been formed mid-1961. (Ibid.) (The
~ 58 - leaders of the group were Victor Manuel , Carlos. , Hugo Castro , Antonio Teniro Adame, Jose Guerrico, Carlos Ortiz Fijeda, Daniel Holma, Balvez, Humberto Hiriante, Oscar Gonzales, Hibam Garcia, Pedro Sainz Cepeda, Alberto. ' Jose Eduardo Pascual, Juan Saldana, Martin Reyes Baissadel, Vicente Lvillamas, Rubilio Fernandez Dorado and Jesus .) The memo speculated that Contreras probably signed the protest as a front man to protect the real leaders of the group. (Ibid.) The Mexico City station. called the information to Headquarters the following day, June 11, 1969. (Dispatch from Mexico City to ‘Director, HMMA 32497, 7/11/67; WX 7241, Entry #635, p. Sea 121, CIA #748.) E. Cubana Airlines In Book V (the performance of the intelligence agencies in the investigation of the John F. Kennedy Assassination) of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, the CIA is criticized for its apparent failure to fully pursue leads surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy and then to fully report to the Warren Commission the results of the in-
“vestigation they did undertake. One such lead discussed was a reported five- hour delay (6:00 p.m. EST to 11:00 p.m. EST) of a Cu- bana flight from Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, November 22, 1963. (The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agen- cies, Book V, Select Committee to Study Governmental | Operations, 4/23/76, p. 30, Senate Report No. 94-755.) The most intriguing aspect of the SSC account involved the alleged delay of a Cubana flight to await the arri- val at 10:30 p.m. EST of aprivate twin-engined aircraft. (Ibid. p. 60.) The aircraft deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without cus- toms clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. (Ibid., p. 61.) The source of that lead was an Italian diplomate, Mario Mauri, who allegedly was on the same flight.( . ( Analysis In the 1977 Inspector General Report, the CIA at- tempted to refute several "inaccuracies" in the Senate Select Committee report regarding the “alleged" Cubana Airlines flight that is apparently the only follow-up by the Agency on the lead after the Senate report appeared. sabe gue