e. Summary - Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off con- siderably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organi- zation itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with specific targets, this situation will probably continue. 4. Estimate of the Potential for Milita erations within Cuba - Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the U.S. could: ith-18-days of preparation, execute a coordinated. airborne- ous assault Which it is anticipated would gain control of key military installations ana-the principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in* minimum US and Cuban casualties. b. Should the situation demand, ‘a piecemeal commitment of US forces could be madefwith reaction times approximately as follows: 2 Airborne Divisions >, 5 days (para-drop units only) 4 Marine BLTS -y 7- 8 days Following Forces - ‘, 15 - 18 days ‘ (This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk. ) c. In conjunction with either of the actions described in a and b, above, cover and deception plans have been developed which, if executed, would result in prepositioning of forces. assigned to the invasion of Cuba and could thereby result in an over-all reaction time of approximately 12 days for a coordinated assault. i Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in Cuba fwithin 6, 12 or 24 hours; e time dependent upon aircraft availability and desired intensity of attack. ™., e. Air-sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours With-effective- ‘ness increasing to a complete blockade within approximately 48 hours. 5. Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba: NS i EPSP a. Cancel ‘operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.’ HW 542714 DBocld:324274900 Page 4
TOP-SECRET c. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other . countries. d. Voice e. Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the CIA. f. Utilization of AVON-PARK, Florida, by CIA as a Base for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the feasibility of using certain facilities at AVON-PARK for the training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare. g. [ Ou Drum Mines. DOD transferred 40 oil drum mines ency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANT's regular contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are being made to reduce the reaction time required for imple- mentation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US forces. j. Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Inter- vention in Cuba. CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which accomplished a a reduction in reaction time but requires piece- meal commitment of forces.” In order to reduce the risk in- herent in such an operation CINCLANT is.seeking means for reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment. k. Cover ag for the purpose i fapeception Plan. This plan has been developed HW 542714 DBocld:32424900 Page 5
1. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision, to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execu- tion of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal revolt. "oy ‘ | LO m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been develop- ed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours after decision. n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared. o. DOD's Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished ‘without leading to general war and without serious offense to Gixblic opinion. q. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba. r. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba. ' YAN wes, s. Manufacture of Soviet Aircraft. A survey was made con- | cerning the US capability for the covert production of facsimiles i of Soviet aircraft. oneal | — t. Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the require- ments of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols, [electronic collection|and special operations were implemented. Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation éf knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political 3 TOP-SECRET HW 542714 Docld:324274900 Page 6
e. Summary - Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off con- siderably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organi- zation itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date-and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with specific targets, this situation will probably continue. 4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba - Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the U.S. could: ay With-18-days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne- ious assault which it is anticipated would gain control of key military installations andsthe principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in* minimum US and Cuban casualties. “hy, b. Should the situa on demand, ‘a piecemeal commitment of US forces could be mad a 2 ah andr conjunction with either of the actions described ina and b, above, cover and deception plans have been developed which, if executed, would result in prepositioning of forces. assigned to the invasion of Cuba and could thereby result in an over-all reaction time of approximately 12 days for a coordinated assault. Z the time dependent upon aircraft uty of attack. oe, e. ‘Air- sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours With. effective-_ ‘ness increasing to a.complete blockade within approximately 48 hours. 5. Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba: a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it. 7 TOP-SECRET HW 542714 DBocld:324274900 Page 7