BETES a kw” MEET Mai Mie” MELLS GEE MEGS Pee wv Classification: , net peek . | _ jer ov! (, his. form is to be used for material extracted F; LT -g.a from ClA—controlled documents.) . is J we a had a security clearance of confidential.* NS ceind teat bie teh not Sptad s\also dispelled the allegation Oswald's) military records Coste DGERLEES 5) pine, <7, that he had served a substantial pertod in Taiwan. These ote &xcent fr nw Silo mort preorod of LAR TR PR pte, records state that Oswald served in Japan from September 12, 3 '1957 until November 2, 1958. Department of Defense records, however, do indicate that MAG (Mariné Air Group) 11, Oswald's unit, was ‘deployed for Taiwan on September 16, 1958 and remained in a that area until April 1959, but an examination of the MAG ll unit diaries indicated that Oswald Gad remained in Japan as © & rear echelon Fowwala's records also state that on ff Cat ae > 6 October 6, 1958 he was transferred within MAG 11 to a . \ Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron subunit in Atsugl, E Japan. The next week he reportedly spent in the Atsugi *John E. Donavan, Oswald's immediate commanding officer, did have a security clearance of secret. SOFT oo. _anaeee £2, eg ree oar ae : : a one a é . . an Classi fice ation: . . . ~ . ope en a yin Doda! on Re oF cae ai Tee, ad . . “3 , ? oe aay « fay eed Peart att, aS ‘
ft bus WRI te Sey TR “en Hal Ta Committee) f Lis 4 > FRAT NT FR bus Pave ck Le i HK phe Wah cent Tawa, peek pie ded hed Oru hI Jee nye fark re Oe IE ety pet j ¥ 7 Lore es Cleytsz BK Rb hve by ‘om = tel Lp Spd tem Ay ‘os dtencd C- of Cin Heresy Ov 23 i a OO nhs ee: he Coes pee te le a pines ete FO EO wy x fe ate. ok fey wm o OA e, (Pf
Station Hospital. On November 2, 1958, Oswald left Japan tor duty in the United States. Lo, : . tp hom nad apniry ) Accordingly,,(there is no indication in Oswald's > Cuilitary records that he had spent any time in Taiwan. This finding is contrary to that of the Warren Commission that " -Qswald arrived with his unit in Taiwan on September 30, 1959) _f Kad  Ataarvinel tear pw ang bre lgncnro Footed heb hen a wee > cieane me mee Fe ee emma an ome but the Commission's analysis apparently was made without access to the unit diaries of MAG 11.* -Finally, with one exception, the circumstances surrounding ni met rnt Oswald's rapid discharge from the military do not appear to have been unusual. Oswald was obligated to service on active duty until December 7, 1959, but he applied for a hardship discharge on August 17, 1958 and two weeks later the application *Similarly, a message sent on November 4, 1959 from the Chief f Naval Operations concerning Oswald, which states that he had "served with Marine Air Control Squadrons in Japan and Taiwan" may have been issued without checking unit diaries which indicated that Oswald had not been so deployed. Classification: Classified by derivation: Gar Bary heres AB ASH Be Viet tia Sete sepreeTe te > sgeeamianren, RTT CTP AR, Ry ress iene pm,
Horesre, bp be, even of Dict ok, LI poke Avg antt Fe Ok “eereh eee, pot any phee& ftv vo | unt sani) | ak A tivg) 92> 2p —~™ 291508 ad “ye partake 2, ttae Oa yaa helt f df fo Ispon fe ee, kete OY poor J dviy rn. the ied Gt | yf
mes} Classification: __ (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) | was approyed.* It appears, however, that Oswald's application was processed so expeditiously because it was accompanied(with) all of the necessary documentation. In response to a Committee inquiry, the Department of Defense has stated that "to a large extent, the time involved in processing depended on how well the individual member had prepared the documentation needed for consideration of his ox her case." / A review of Oswald's case indicates hi pdt pal? that his initial application was accompanied by all of the a ; a ee ane _ requisite documentation. Oswald had met the preliminary requirements of having made a voluntary contribution to the . hardship dependent and of applying for a dependent's quarters *By September 4, 1959, Oswald had been informed that he would be discharged on September 11, 1959. This explains why he was able to tell passport officials on that day that he expected to depart the United States on September 21, 1959. wos Classification: Classified by derivation: ROTI EP Py, Sqr, | Seve a, eyrn seer
aekindell aan. Ait MA Mit evi AT Pere Abe Cav) | Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted - lp =; ; fuenw # a> from ClA-—controlled documents.) - ! kt f te App ey f. hawt Bl & the ei ehhe rend baD wot See . ted an endortemente On wl kpp leat . allotment to alleviate the hards ip. meth TY eae EPP RTIE, SPAM, . ° emt crtecmntes £ ; E Oswald's inability to support herself. . lv ty @ b _ . . . ¢ a Documents provided to the Committee by the American Red E . | F i Cross indicate that he sought (Gheix ssistance regarding this . 7 . E matter, and therefore was probably well advised on the requisite documentation to support his claim. Indeed, Red Cross officials interviewed Marguerite Oswald, and concluded that she "could not be considered employable from an emotional standpoint." /. . The Fort Worth Red Cross Office indicated a quarters allotment was necessary for Marguerite Oswald, rather than a hardship ‘discharge for Lee, and assisted her in the preparation of the necessary application documents. { a i see, EB As d A Oswald: (Hevertheless, informed the Red Cross office in Classified by derivation:
Classification: CAND . (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) EL Toro, California, where he was then stationed, that he desired to apply for a hardship aischarge Hate unusual aspect. of Oswald's discharge application was that, technically his requisite application for a quarters allowance for his mother y should have been disallowed because Marguerite's dependency affidavit stated that Oswald had not contributea any money to . . . her during the preceding year. / fo tt Geartherans application noted in his endoresment, dated August 19, 1959, , the first officer to review Oswald's that "/a/ genuine hardship exists in this case, and in my opinion approval of the /quarters/ allotment will not .sufficiently alleviate this situation."& /A In addition, five‘sother officers endorsed Oswald's application. The eee «this quotation suggests the possibility that applications for quarters allotments and hardship discharges are considered J independently of one another. a —— _ Classification: Classified by derivation: aa ae eed seereeermanaeae * ae asain? oe te cia eT omar + ant EERE, SETHE 2 al Eh ETAT, em omy ety, erp ok rey
"New aan 6108 TE te cane ao ie ae ee re ore a —) Classification: | | (AY (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Committee was able to contact three of the (s\y endorsing ; a officers; two had no memory of the event, / and one could not recall ‘any details. / The Committee considers their absence of memory to be indicative of the Oswald case having been handled in a routine manner. Based upon this evidence, the Committee was not able to discern any unusual discrepancies or features in Oswald's military record. at en & mn, 13. Leawvaruey Oswald's Military Intelligence File Ker. On November 22, 1963, soon after the assassination, Lt. Col. Robert E. Jones, Operations Officer of the U.S. Army's 1l2th Military Intelligence Group (MIG), Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, contacted the FBI offices in San Antonio and Dallas and gave those offices detailed information concerning Oswald and A.J. Hidell, (hS;allegea alias. This information Classificatiohe’ 7~t4) Classified by derivation: URE A ee ieee (a ee mtarinen eae cat aiiten”
Classification: aw (This form is to be used for material extracted - L 4 from ClA—controlled documents.) . . . ] suggested the existence of a Military Intelligence file on her: Oswald, and raised the possibility that he had intelligence associations of some kind. The Committee's investigation, — however, revealed that military intelligence officials had / opened a file on Oswald because he was perceived as a possible counterintelligence threat.. Robert E. Jones testified before the Committee that in ead June Gf 1963 he had been serving as Operations Officer of the li2th Military Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.* Under the Group's control were seven regions encompassing five States: Texas, Louisiana, -Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Jones was directly responsible for counterintelligence operations, background investigations, domestic intelligence, and any ee *In his testimony, Jones also Clarified and corrected the errors that appeared in communications that were generated as a result of the activities of his military intelligence unit. . Classified by derivation: ee aes AE ce oF - FT ay AEF Se seater 7 fe me
Classification: a - ee . i \ ox) (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ra AL Poy "special operations in this five-state area. He believed that Oswald first came to his attention in mid-1963 through information _ provided to the 112th MIG by the New Orleans. Police Department SEE Hee, to the effect that Oswald had been arrested there in connection yf with Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities. Pas a result of. this information, the 112th Military Intelligence Group took ‘an interest in Oswald as a possible counterintelligence threat. The Group collected information from local agencies and the military central records facility, and opened.a file be he Alt ahd under the names Lee Harvey Oswald and A. J. Hidell. Placed fetes ey in this file were documents and newspaper articles on such topics as Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, his travels there, his marriage to a Russian national, his return to the ' United States, and his pro-Cuba activities in New Orleans. Classified by derivation: Be a Aa ee a a in a: ae b camaan! amt PPPS, RENAME EE, SB Roo Te, me oran
Neniew aoe at es | Classification: i. _ (This form is to be used for. material extracted . . from ClA—controlled documents.) MEF TREES ace A A ad 7 Jones related that on November 22, 1963, while in his quarters at Fort Sam Houston, he heard about the assassination of President Kennedy. Returning immediately to his office, he contacted MIG personnel in Dallas and instructed them to. intensify their liaisons with federal, state, and local agencies and to report back any information obtained. Early that afternoon, he received a telephone call from Dallas advising that an A.J. Hidell had been arrested of had come to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Jones checked the MIG indices, which indicated that there was a file on Lee Harvey Oswald, also known by the name A.J. Hidell. Pulling the file, he telephoned the local FBI office in San Antonio to notify the FBI that he had some information. He soon was in telephonic contact with the Dallas FBI office, to which he Pa summarized the documents in the file. He believe¥ that one Classification: Clossified by derivation: ___ “I Py, TST, ay Raye emmy Sgrorty rer, 28s rg, Repeat mts LER LEE EES SEE.
tS SI a ME MEE Aig PN . Aes Classification: ra (This form is to be used for material extracted _ ¢ wee from ClA—tcontrolled documents.) f person with whom he would have spoken was FBI Special Agent in Charge J. Gordon Shanklin. He may have talked with the Dallas FBI office more than one time that day. . Jones testified that his last activity with regard 4 to the Kennedy assassination was to write an “after action" . Wa reportg(which)summarized the actions he had taken, the people. SE TEETEEN, he had notiFica/ ana the times of notification. In addition, a , ‘Jones believe¥ that this “after action" report included information obtained from reports filed by the eight to twelve Military Intelligence agents who performed liaison functions with the Secret Service in Dallas onthe day of the ‘assassination. This “after action" report was then maintained in the Oswald file. Jones did not contact, nor was he contacted by, any other law enforcement or intelligence agencies Sa VEER concerning information which he could provide on Oswald. To Classification: Classified by derivation: Alea aa oP Pt Ft ney h yiPr] ine. oo AUNT tess . SST Ty Sry re,
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Cacemeotrnesentit The Committee found Jones' testimony to be very credible. His statements concerning the contents of the Oswald file SE consistent with FBI communications that were generated as- a result of the information which he initially provided. Access to Oswald's Military Intelligence file, which the . | Department of Defense never gave to the Warren Commission, was not possible because the Department of Defense had destroyed the file as part of a general program aimed at eliminating all. of its files pertaining to nonmilitary personnel. In "response to a Committee inguiry, the Department of Defense gave the following explanation for the file's. destruction: ome g 1. Dossier AB 652876, OSWALD, Lee Harvey, was identified for deletion from IRR (Intelligence Records and Reports) holdings on Julian date ‘ 73060 (1 March 1973) as stamped on the micro- - filmed dossier cover. It is not possible to determine the actual date when physical destruction was accomplished, but is credibly surmised that the destruction was accomplished. within a period not greater than sixty days following the identification for deletion. Ciassification: Classified by derivation: Sa GT TENT, ROUEITA, ROT,
snestes at aab i aie a A a a Classification: _ (This form is -to be used for material extracted - from ClA—controlled documents.) a Evidence such as the type of deletion record available, the individual clerk involved in | the identification, and the projects in progress at the time of deletion, all indicate the dossier deletion resulted from the implementation of a , Department of the Army, Adjutant General letter dated 1 June 1971, subject: Acquisition of | Information Concerning Persons and Organizations | not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (DOD) (Incl 1). Basically, the letter called for the elimination of files on non-DOD affiliated persons and organizations. . .# 2. It is not possible to determine who accomplished the actual physical destruction of the dossier. The individual identifying the dossier for deletion can be determined from the clerk number appearing on the available deletion record. The number indicates that Lyndall E. Harp was the identifying clerk. Harp was an employee of the IRR from 1969 until late 1973, at which time she transferred to the Defense Investigative Service, Fort Holabird, Maryland, where she is still a civil service employee. The individual ordering the destruction — or deletion cannot be determined. However, available evidence indicates that the dossier was identified for deletion under a set of criteria applied by IRR clerks to all files. The basis for these criteria were established in the 1 June 1971 letter. There is no indication that the dossier was specifically identified for review or deletion. All evidence shows that the file was reviewed as part of a generally applied program to eliminate any dossier concerning persons not affiliated with DOD. 3. The exact material contained in the dossier — cannot be determined at this time. However, discussions with all available persons who recall seeing the dossier reveal that it most probably included: newspaper clippings relating to pro- Cuban activities of Oswald, several Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, and possibly some Army counterintelligence reports. None of the persons indicated that they remember any Classification: i Classified by derivation: bo oiracn 2 I SEZTTON, ETN LET, Secale
Classification: I OO — obs (This form is to be used for material extracted . _ from ClA—controlled documents.) .Significant information in the dossier. . It should be noted here that the Army was not asked to investigate the assassination. Consequently, any Army derived information was turned over to the. appropriate civil authority. 4. At the time of the destruction of the Oswald . dossier, IRR was Operating under the records . disposal authority contained in the DOD Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, OASD(A), © 9 February 1972, subject: Records Disposal Authority (Incl 2). The memorandum forwards | National Archivist disposal criteria which is Similar in nature to the requirements outlined in the 1 June 1971 instructions... It was not until 1975 that the Archivist changed the criteria to ensure non-destruction of investigative records that may be of historical value. _/ Upon receipt of this information, the Committee orally requested the destruction order relating to the file ‘on Oswald. Ina lettex datea September 13, 1978, the General Counsel of the Department of..the Army replied that no such order existed: Army regulations do not require any type of specific order before intelligence files can be destroyed, and none was prepared in connection with the destruction of the Oswald file. As a rule, investigative information on persons not directly affiliated with the Defense Department can be retained in Army files only for short periods of time and in carefully regulated circumstances. The Oswald file Classification; Classified by derivation: RPE VE Oe, Sera 7 A he, QE, RETA
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) was destroyed routinely in accordance with normal files management procedures, as are thousands of . ‘intelligence files annually. _/ The committee BERS this “routine” destruction of the Oswald file extremely troublesome, especially when viewed in light of the Department, of Defense's failure to make this fi¥e available to the Warren Commission. Despite the credibility of Jones' testimony, without access to this file the question of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence cannot be fully resolved. The absence of this file, however, A mV bearing upon the Committee's conclusion concerning the absence of any relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald. and the CIA. ~ Classification: Classified by derivation: eT, TTA ai LLL Rg ROLE
A, al pate tf Kent | —_ (PAY IR TAM GST