124-10271-10058 aye = Memoran um < TO : Nr. — - "pate: June 22, 1961 “FROM: OR, OO, LiAllier SUBJECT: LIAISON 7 CTH INMIGRATION AND NUTURALIZATION | SERVICE (DS) Liaign with INS has been handled “for the past sevéval years by SA Sanm{Papich, who also handles Liaison with the Central intelligence Agency. (CIA). The purpose of this memorandum is -to recommend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with -INS in order to devote full time to CIA. o wreenntew. RELATIVE TE JMS CIA continues to be one of the most ‘ important liaison assignkents as well as one of the most time constiling, Proper handling ox this assignment now requires the rull tin i@ and ¢tention of 4 Liaison supervisor and it is believed that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order to devote his entire attention to CIA, IMPORMETIY RELATIVE TO-AGEWVT. To RE ASS/GVED To HAVDLE LdAISow with JMS. ° \CTION: - | | If you approve, . liaison responsibility for INS: will be . ! trans? erred ‘from SA Papich to’ WANE This document is prepared iz response to your re test | ie and nation. outside your Committee. I's use iv limited to Fos ese b ‘your Committee and the content may nut be piscloned ito unauthorized person. nel without the express approval of the he vac a foe a’. Be be Mo t™ /- 58
_ the Domestic Contact Service "Capability in a particular research field) which might be acquired from © 9-28-65 i SAC LETTER NO. 65-54 -5-. ) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) {DoMESTIC CONTACT _ Jet 8) SERVICE f- You previously have been informed regarding CIA's] Contact. \ “Division. Which has had offices in. various U. S. cities and which is openly identified as being connected with CIA. This division has been responsible - for the overt collection of positive intelligence gained through interviews of aliens, travelers, businéssmen, etc. The division has not been engaged in any operational activity such as the development of double agents. For your information, CIA has ce) Ney this division and it is now called JFK OYE) ~ , An examination of CIA s activities in the area of overt collection of positive intelligence has indicated thatthe Bureau can strengthen its position by haying our field offices’ establish direct contact with the local ’ offices of thd Domestic Contact. Service | This.panticularly applies to those ~ XC. Situations where the Bureau and CIA both have an interest in Soviet-bloc and Yugoslav nationals, excluding those who are connected with embassies or the United Nations. We recognize that CIA has a responsibility for collection of positive intelligence (i.e. information regarding Soviet-bloc | such visitors hnt we cannot condone any CIA activity which might interfere with Bureau operations. - You therefore are authorized to . establish liaison with local offices of thd Domestic Contact Service. 1 (iB ) documen ed in reaponse to your requeat and (s not for dissems- Phe ia i pom use 6? limited to official proceedings by Cammitiee. your C veiaiitee and the content may nut be disclosed to undutkorized persaie wel without the express approval of the FBI ‘ { : . 1
J . + a e e ro ° . « ? eo ° . . . - : ' . Se eo. . 4 . = a mee.) ys « o. ht op mee, . PoE a © tee cK . te : ae . ae sear? jan he neta wee aa Nias SEP cass eet besa cores “we Tb eerie: “res Pavern ote mst ep weet Men 10S, FE gett 9 "ty 2B iee Semis * eter age Boaees age Lge Py . & Tn each case when you initiate any inquiry or investigation of a visiting JFK viet-bloc national, you should obtain from the local/Domestic Contact | ays) (Service the nature and extent of CLA interest and all pertinent information hich cA has gained or may acquire in the future relating to our internal ~ security responsibilities. If you feel that CIA activity conflicts with Bureau objectives, yoti should so advise the Seat-of Government, clearly Setting forth your reasons. In this connection; there may be instances - where continuing CIA pursuit of positive intelligence would conflict with the Bureau s discharge of its internal security functions. ' -Very truly yours, ~ *.. John Edgar Hoover : %, 4 Director % . . | 9-28-65 7 . SAC LETTER NO. 65-54 -6-
. e ° a t 8 . aoa ae aA 4 Oe feat ae, Sok ch ong who o UAC A sek Lake Pe ke SLE a Fee eg sotto, Qh Atha rebate anal OS ee e ry . e a . @, . ¢ e ®% TO Director 3. FBI w=! S70M oo: SAC, Philadelphia . a . 1) SUSSECT: (bozses INTELLIGENCE AGEN mS ee CYC) DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE _ aM ORMA TION CONCERNING ‘DATE: 10/25/66: Re Section (E}, SAC Letter 65-54, 9/28/65. MAME . . Se 3 Phitedelshia lorrs se, Cena vir trai Intelligence Agency (CTA] DexestTe Contact Bezvice,| was . « eentacted on 10/14/65 as directed in referenced SAC Letter: C WANE advised he had just resurned from cenferences at his semency feadquarters in Washingtcn. where ke had been advised ere Bureau was directing ites eld offices to establish lisisen wath the local offices, of the Demestic Contact. Service] t JFkG) (8) WANE 'cifered his complete cooperaticn with this office “in mat- Tere of mutual interest. eo | , Arrangements were perfected whersin Agents cf this effice making inquiries or investigations of a Soviet-~Bloc Na~ - Sfeomal can contact WYAme ‘see ]re Will pléce thea in contact with the([Domestic Contact, Service |representutive handling the cise, sc that inforration of inté¥Test ta us tap be secured. Fk sav information coming to the attention of the) Remestic Contact [ayg@ (Serva e\|relabing to ovr internal. security respénsibliities will re im ‘immediately reported to this cifise. | <bean i MAME requested, In view cP his Agency's regue- * \ tathens, that CIA not, be identified as the source im the event % 8 @ 4 tial nroceedi:
: . » % we, ee e e . we te @ ae te 8S SP, & 2@ . e . Se a a rn ae ne “Ke tatisiging? emer, wrath wines he ey eke Se es alte 2s j | Jb ® Ny ° oe? ° e | . ge = - : t bd ° “ a by . - dnPormatvion received from, his effice should be fneluded tn 2 communication going t6 anyone outs ide the Suréan,. NAME _ W25 28sured that CIA's. identity an this regazd weulc de Paaa7 protected. [WRORMAT IO hecdiwe Te THE TERRITORY CovBRED ar THE | Par Aves Pun |, Je OFFi¢ A Fieg, C7 demesne COMTACT | “ SERNCE  O@- IMGLUDiVG ; | vs wanes CF CIA. PE Psoues. 4 | : SIQUEST OF THE BUREAU: . , In the’ course of future contacts with GIA in these . -€35E8; 1% is sredoinated thet CiA-representatives mey &t tines - request information relating to Subjects! background, habits, énd. characteristics, as well as any avellabie photographs . os “ . ’” {he Buredu is requested to advise if it will be per- - ‘missible to orally furnish such background information to the ' Ta, representative and to furnish copies cf Phoscgzapns, 22° shey. ere available. ° . The Bureau is also redues tad to advise af the establish~ rent of serviee) on the field office level with CIA 's( Domestic Jew ‘0 Contuct Service] enviszges the furnisning of reports ame letras GY head memos to this Sarvice at the Field orfice level where vac have @ legitimate interest in th “oJecy. oot, | ; | $ $ | ee +t ~ 2 u $
- BAC, Philadelphia 4 | " . 10/29/65 Diregthr, FBI\ | STRAY INTELLIGHCE Cad A-: ‘ CCT} @) © cece ony * « DCSESTIC CONTACT SERVICE ODSATION CONCERNING - . 7 a ’ . + Reference is made to your letter dated 10/25/68. 9 VEC | Tho Bureau has n follecing a policy not disseminating Berean inforuatioa to the|Dorestic Centect Servicelat a iccal level, $333 policy will continus uniess you are advised to the contrary. In the event that the local CIA office desires information conceriiny nny subject, such requests stould be directed by CIA to ro This document is prepared in response to your re dt i . . . ; quest and 8EMe nation outside your Committee. Its use is Hmited to official preseedaine by your Committee and the content may nut be disclosed to unauthorized persow= nel without the express approval of the FBI... . _?
-“Memorand@n | TO. : Mr. C. D. DeLoach . DATE: 6/25/70 «| | . — | - . | . | FROM : W, C, Sullivan | SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AGENCY (era) , WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE ~ owe te ; . > « & tO, “ . . ! The Director bas inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) ; and CIA, Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to j | Specific operational cases and name checks. . i wf : WEO, of necessity, is in contact ‘with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field, For example, —— . § PECIFIC EXAM ALE GE oo oe In addition, CIA has a| office Ae in the District’ which makes name checks with WFO and” secures background information concerning foreign diplomatic personnel, No liaison is conducted with respect to policy matters and the objective of all contacts As the handling of immediate opera= - tional matters. , i ACTION: _— Tt Te For the Director's information, . e . . . a eS aa em, thes fo, he odd teas A es se On Fos Seeds oon gy tage ga: * sedis oF ame ES meee a obey .- ee, utd 8 ee | re to your request ‘and is + aot for dissemt- at doce fs pepe iy rn use ty limited to. official ; ried pe by natin Committee and the content may not EA i to unauthorized person vel aithout the empress approval of the °
oe een ee ee SB + 5 QPiOHAL FOE HO, 16 , s10-898 "UNITED STATES GOV gg MENT _ e | Memorandum : Mr. ©, D. DeLoach © = =~: pare: 6/26/70 -* wo ¢ cma orto EURO SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY cay . WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE’ — DW. C. Sullivan | ‘My attached menorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the Je operations: contacts tween the Washin ton Field Office - @) (WFO) and CIA's local office. Nr. Tolson (i noted "IJ thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter" and the Director said "I. most, certainly intended the same." We are instructing WFO accondingly. + ‘Jt is possible that other field offices have worling- \ level contact with the CIA offices in their. territories. If jtns Dircetor desires, similar instructions will be issued to (them, - . 7: . ‘ACTION: =~ | ao | ae | , (1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be ; handled by letter, ‘ - , , bp . , . . . ; . . 6 (2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be | prepared containing Sinilar instructions, applicable to adi | offices... . mee we we? a, alte, pte cx * MAR oe , abe tk, Pans Pose’ oe, see es. eR ae 2 bi se ” a are ae fat 3: wey as %e tube oh 6 © gacmtet * 0% . vu . ed ve ato ote a ms stint “a ashy se be 6 ibe, h te de o%, A * ragh : eae a “se : ‘ ° rete ewe ¥ “fee ~ ews Ste ts, ate . ee eee eee wt eee ry * ‘ s, : " ni , “% . ‘ . ° . e ee Me ght? Peer Fy a, i v ee eee eo "Hye Spe This document #8 prepared in ‘response to your request and ta not for dissent . nation outside your Committee, Its use i: limited to } your Commitiee and the content may not be diseloged - ri getters, ‘ wel without the express approval of the FBI, ° oat .
@.. 7-2 ears 4 2ellisance Board and sub=co: vil.tdes hich cover| sters such as “ haidling of devecbers, “Uvelomsent af comouter wroprauisy leaks of clessie fied inforartion and srddiction of intellirxence studies, Qur Lovell Ate taches have reason to contact Cli on a raguiar bacis, | ‘and althouch it nes bean a small. voluxge of business, the Line ef com-unication between our c mestic offices and [rccat. PIA represent tives has been|definitely useful. Pec )t8) Tha daily business saith CLA relates to hundreds of cases pert-iniuns rt) activities-of all, Corramist-Bloc services, the New Loft, Black fetiens1- ists, the Communist Farty snd related orp-niszations, and: political crises -in areas such as Victnam, the “iddle Mast, ond latin America, Théoret-c- ‘ally, 711 business c~wld “be hondled by mad, but from a nracticrl st-nd- ‘point such a crocedure will lezd, to unbel sovadle enaos. There vill te lalrost insurmountable abst: cles if ve cre to discharge ‘our duties in + ‘yesvonsi. ble meer rnd ifi‘e sre to counter a relentless cone. in tre interest of national security. Because interests of-other agencies -re {frequently intertwined with crises involving the Bureau and CIA, tae break in ¥BI-CIA liaison will’ adversely affect our liaison with such agencies, I.thins you will shere my alarn over the cons requences once the word is received by, the "troops" in all Uy .S. agoneies thet kBIond “Ls no longer have any lisison, Unfortamately, there fill. be ink ivi. curls + wt will maliciously distert and nisinternret the true facts, “Within a short period, there will be stories in the vress, and worst of al the Come nist-bloc ecrvices will pick up a choice entree for the promotion of gub- tle, stilitulend extretiely harmful ¢isruntion, I am absolutely convinces that the intelligence services of Greit Brivain, France, «est Gersany 7n¢ ‘others are well penetrated by the Soviets, TI can't believe thet the Fuil- bys, the Blakes, the Alser Hisses vere the last of the venctretions, 7 mention this bec-use if such penetr.tions exist, the break in relations betyeen the FSI and CIA will vrovide a.‘basis for vromoting Surther rifvs, This is the first tine in our history thet such an event hes ocevrred, -ni jit is difficult to believe tnt the enemy will not make every effort é0 reap the greatest vrofit vossible. Bricfly, tir. Hoover, I Inve too such respect for you and’ our ‘F3I to ex spose us to a potentially disastrous situ- ation. Although the sonver incident is a4 blight on the rolations be- tween the Fsl and Cia, would be most unfair of me not to coment on the dedicated and selfless efforts of numerous individuals in CIA «:ho strived for honest and harmonicus relaticns. ,As a result of their en- deavors there have been many services verformed in behalf of the Bure: | including noveble and outstanding accemplisnaents, ‘Ve have been furnisnes - sources, inform-nts, solid-‘hroductive cases, technical advice and ecuin- ment, . ond there have been instances of cooperation which led to substen~ tial: saving of Bureau funds. faere also have been exarples of alertness on the part of CLi employes which prevented Bureau commission of errozs ‘and -averted ombarrassrent. Among some of the more significant exarnlcs of cooperation. I cite the excellent and bedly needed assistonce of CLi in the Rudoloh Abel case, I also refer to tne Agency's providing us with one of the oettor criminal informants we nave had in recent years in the person of NAME I only refer to the forezoing to cmphasize that, if at «11 possible, we should preserve. the good friends and tne supporters of the Bureau. ar ‘ SeBRET It is recorniaed thit one can also present a bill of partic- wlars relating te ovarnles of necr coonerntion and deliberate skuldur- Perv. T hold no brief for these in C CTA vho disrupted relations between © wee een
—The tio seanetes heey s2 ie Woe for net Llise Se 0 f thene veya the eo csrenites who caresmice C@edy buveenear- bic ecpdreg, Dogger ree nec 9 cree abive ideo, anf “Liver cae ervers of tie dedierted mle. [ nelTieve thet an omar sae thom a exeninetion will reve) tiet the nrasence of such Lypes at the pres ont bare is noglicible er thedae inflaenea ic last couple Lely newtralised,  Jafoerine+e} y, Gik also bolicaves thet in ine pase ve did nat ade y net ina ferthricnt SANUGY , and the Avaney undothte . edly culdepresent p. list of srlevenees, You may not realige thet » Cov years era ve on joxesd Pony repabation asong OFA enndoves, ve "eve caer actorined 2b be ine Gavious cmb there uas a decided nimogphere of visbtrust. Napnily, that is net he pivarks et voday, Loam confident-tict you eon re . * into sor sesmeit of Cli, pere snd ‘abroad, and you will. Pind tnt Midelity, Bravery, cad Tn nbosysiy: are oincorely related to tne WBI, ‘The wradlens in past yorrs wrbarily. ards¢ fron wmbelievebly poor comaniention aneng in- terested urties. HL eck: mabecntion ans been mrastiy ispreved kecsuse ef _ the afters of reny Gediertca neovle. Yevertheloss, thore is reon for iuprover.ait, Tn ow own Surean tere are nwicrons officials and e.nloyés who heve little or no imeyicdge of the baci: ator wid end the vrincivles of the National Secnrity Ach of 1927 end of the Hational Sccurity Council Directives, im addition, these sic people have a va UC conception of the objectives and fimeticns ef an intelligen CS: OFF ran ivtion, Sivileriy, within Cl. there are very memy whose conesrdion of ‘ahe SBI, its juvic- diction, its objectives, its la: enforcercrit character, is * shocking ot tines, Tremendous progress Has Den made, bet it is’ not easy to harasn- iously coordinate the onesntiens of an organization designed to oncrete in a clendestine vranier with an asency which is basicslly a lav enforcc- went bedy, This @idfacdlyy de Du thes cyoe ed beceuse our resavsonsnip still coumosed of a- fragile inbric, Qie incident potentially can de- ; stroy years of constructive of Prflort, . ia, Hoover r, I resnectinlly recnest ‘thes tb you reconsider the dec! sion to sever liaison vith the Centre Intelligence Agency, I areal to you to leave the doer oven for furtrer celiberntion because I an con- fident this conflict can be satisfsctorily resolved, I believe that my removal from the scene provides tre ceporwumity to anroint anctner arent who will casure up to your desired capabilities and who will bse abie ‘rapidly resol ve the prod? cn wien a a pee and fresh approach, Tt is a mood time to reexnumine our relations th CIA and to make adjustments satis~ factory to zou, ‘I sincerely regret thet this situation arose, since i rer adly appreciate you sre burdened + 21th so mony ! neavy responsibilities yt I feel that I had a firm oblization snd duty to cermunicnte with you bo- - cause of the very nature of ny as iganent these many ycars and because & of my invoiverent in this controversial case. ‘ Ky years with the Buresu gave me mere satisf-ction then snyone can imagine, You would have to lmow me better to aporeciate this, I want to assure you thrt wherever I ¢o or whatever I do 1 will be prerared to be of service in any cause which involves the preservation of a strong and respected Ful, : Sincerely yours sn . . — e (Le #40 (hpeck. Sam Papich A
“ Memorangm —y Mr. Cc. D; DeLoach . , pate: March 5, 1970 — | : ito owees sult svn | | | : a vo 7 ; — /RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA - é ’ Ktt®nea is, a memorandum dictated by Special Agent Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the ’ ddentification of the instances Papich had.in mind when in his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes: that in the past we (FBI) did not always_act in a forthright manner, .and the agency undoubtedly. could present a list of grievances," - A list: identifying the cases’ and outlining the problezs invoived has been prepared by Papich znd is attached to the . memorandum. A review of the 25-page- document reveals that it contains several instances in which OFA has registered its: . @issatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints, rar and -athars in whieh nresumably. CIA had no knawledge of Rureay — action and has made no complaint. ; For the Director's further information, I have instituted in this Division an.- analysis of each situation cited aid a memorandum will’ be prepared ‘as vo-each, containing ny views and recommendations as a result of that analysis. This is being handled on.an expedite basis and the memoranda wills be sent through as soon as possible for dissemé- to your request and is not nog OY This document is prepared te Tete “use is limited 3 ficia ho oeerd persome . gation outside your, Commontont may not be, dtaclos 0 . Ma who the ezpress approval of te ;
qqemnpeoeerend> 1 Ste ~ sure ore BATT «oo ‘» he : : apt Oe, a. 9, 29 we 2°.” “UNITED STATES G. . @NMENT “M. emorandum Oo: The Director _ _ DATE: March 5, 1970 ROM : Sam J, Papich . 7 : 7 7 ~~ UBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CTA Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the statenent, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances identified. There ds enclosed herewith a list of cases ‘or, situations which arose over the years, . ¢ Based upon a review of files: and my. personal recollectioz this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, not recognizing the-need for concrete FBI contributions to the foreign intelligence effort, What CIA may have compiled over the ' years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants and sources, It “should be clearly emphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or confrontation vith the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time, I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination wil. conclusively Support the foregoing. ‘ ; . In order. that there may not’ be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list. of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing 7 conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly. needed inteiliggnce information, awe NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Date of Declassification , Category 2 , Bubject to Sanctions
, Memorandum to th director etal . RES RELATIONS % e CIA weUil ‘ero, , © 1 believe that it would be most helpful to you and . interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judement on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple mail courier..or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another ovency, very often working with very limited information, .It is expected that the Bureau Agent Carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions, He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain ' that the Bureau position is well fortified. in evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA, it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were easy to handle because the Agent had py. Edgar Hoover behind him, However, when an Agent struck at+an offjcial on one day and .BSOlicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions i-nave bitterly feuded with-CIA officiale and this has -.isicluded rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable.. They took the initiative by asking the Agent to return.. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this incluc. the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA-personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the ‘Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without “being positive that our position was'absolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism. I Can only refer, to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the . eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment, |. ACTION: For information, | ce oe od oe . . . a ’ SE ail - .
‘ “CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS. . - ; INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE . ‘CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) omen EE ee (1) MOCASE. (THE BORIS MORROS CASE) . . Oo 3 This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most . part in 1957,. The case had many wide foreign ramifi- . ‘not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the Cations and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important.and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated argu~ ments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to | cooperate with the Agency, The position taken by CIA . Was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, Claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did extreme sensitivity of the case, We actually did not ; . permit CIA to handle any- investigations relating to : ' the HOCASE until 1957. In 1957, CIA ‘complained that it certainly had every right to have received ‘the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. ‘CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case wag publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA ‘those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U - 5.5 to play a dominating role in Europe. & ¢ NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure- Subject to | Criminal Sanctions 48 . “. “me ss ma, ya ane uote wy capone neasme + S o Se a om | mS Bae od
rd with regard to dealing with the French, we tock the position that we would cover the leads through our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish leads to-CIA in those countries where we did not have: |Legal Attaches, CIA maintained that since we were on record that our Legal Attaches dq not. handle operations abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those French leads on CIA or, at. least. coordinate with the Agency | - (before going to. the French, (2) ms Xt is ‘to be noted that in any argument relating to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA-will fall back on the responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation of the foregoing through National Security Council Direc-= tives, CIA will maintain that’ it is-<incumbent upon the Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue j ehat in the HOCASE. these were ignored by the Bureau. e _SBWSITIVE ov cew6__OPERATIOV , BPA oF ye . _ ‘ sa — . eo. 2
SECRET (3) THE ABEL CASE ° Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably gtill exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case py not making certain that the |Acency was given the prover recognition for its contri- butions, CIA feels ‘that in the first place,” there would mot have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, NAME : . because CIA took the full responsibility for’ moving NAME from PLACE to the U. S.. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport NA ME to the.U. S. It should be noted that NAME Was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA jin /2Ace raised questions concerning Na WE mental rar tability. 7". After ME arrived in the U. S., we arranged access ay im for 2 period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelli- jeence activities in the-U. S. and we were particularly ijinterested in identifying all of his associates, es= eclally the man who later was identified as Rudolph i bel, After a short handling period in the U. S.,-we - dropped NAME because he became a problem. It was : extremely critical“situation because we had’ not yet iHdentified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility © _ For the carrying and safeguarding of NAME but we a 4 @ mame fp €- x +e weer
- 8 yr > . e e - a . Je ; ‘ O q were ‘given free access to this difficult source, This was a moSt fortunate arrangement’as far as‘CIA was con- cerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work with NAME ‘and subsequently develop the leads which led’ to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has main-_ tained that it was largely responsible for making absolutely certain that MAME Was mentally and physically prepared for: testimony at .the Abel trial. A ‘was a.key witness. CIA has- also referred to the heavy expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the benefit of the Bureau, ~ CIA has complained that the - Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its coopera= tion and CIA has been particularly irked becaused the Bureau did not see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by! CIA. GDS amu alm « aeaMar ome (4) NAME oF SuRzeCr’ ay oF | G os ab 8 . ; 4 c+ + In July, 1983, Senator MAKE ‘cought. . 4 to subpoena WAHE AVD OCCUPATION - | to testify before the Senator's Committee, MAHE claimed that MAHE alleged communist activities were clearly . documented. The most serious allegation was ‘that ad LOENTLFFING DATA ll of this was publicized..- The information set ‘forth | in the newspapers emanated from 2 Bureau report. CIA lanned to charge the Bureau with leaking the information o Senator MAHE - . CIA officials held numerous con= — erences concerning the matter but charges were never de against the Bureau. What information CIA has on is particular item is not known but the Agency did \ ow that we maintained liaison with w#a4é Committee. (53 BUREAU DISSEMINATION 0 OF INFORMATION CONCERNING a e ._-c ef . ‘ Yn May, 1954, ‘Allen Dulles raised the question concerning the propriety af FBI dissemination of information ; Veconcerning NAHE: This information had been fur-= - Wished to us by = MANE. a former official of the oa , e st a> ® ee s Cd : . * . on . . * ‘ e e ie ome:  gquuie eo ® ge ° ° . 8 — e & ® ReeRETT IID eh eR Grud ath oo
—y 7 + a . ow 7 . ry {Department of Labor. When interviewed by us, MAME made-several accusations against CIA.' We disseminated the information to the White House, the Attorney General, and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles took theposition that by disseminating derogatory in- formation concerning his Agency, Ke had been placed on - the spot because the | WAME . data was not the complete story. In the past, CIA informally referred . to this as an ‘instance of very unfair conduct on the part ‘ of the Bureau. . ° . ® (6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS __- . e . . . ? ¢ %. . On occasions in the 1950's,” CIA complained that officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless, many. of the visiters left most disappointed because they had not had any contact with any Bureau officials. CIA . felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI/s world-wide reputation. CIA also pointed out that hen foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials, they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind of friction between the FBI and CIA, In 1956, we had a clear~cut policy to the effect that tours for such visi~- jtors would be of a restrictive nature in that such visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the ublic and’ nothing more, CIA was so informed but. eriodically indicated that our policy prevented the gency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad, IA never lodged an official ‘complaint. T It should beemphasized that for the past several | ‘years there would not be any basis for any form c& complaint .with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship. The personal attention .}given to such officials by NANE. and | other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to ’ ‘the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native | A MEORET a et , OPUS CPN ALIS 6 8 EINE OF te ° . ee 6 ones cooge ° gp © wmtovgmunay = 6 ve m rs
. a. vis 1 : .f an . ° ’ eountries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs % by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, Maver tate this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped st our Legal Attaches. | Co (7) CIA ~ DUTCH INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY e } In 1965, the. Dutch Internal Security Service | was in the process of investigating individuals in Holland who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage activity. The Dutch wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached CIA to make inquiry at the Bureau. At that time,-our relations with the Dutch had been practically nonexistent because the Dutch had failed to honestly deal’ with.us in the . Gase of NWAHME AAD [DEVTIFYINEG BATA who had been - Clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National Security agency. when CIA approached us, wertold the Agency that the Dutch could submit their request through -diplomatic channels. We subsequently told CIA we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch. We stuck to our position. CIA.surrendered but felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information soncerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe. | - 8). Two WAHES MAME WENTIFVING 7" PATA ~~~, during World War It, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe, His sources included . @ny number of European exiles who came to the U. 8. While he was in business, he was.financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Arny, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. A/AME | ‘ established contact with the Bureau through one of ‘his subordinates, NAHE who periodically called a ell
- OH US and furdished information which WAME felt . relationship with CIA. We never informed ‘CIA that we . . t e « ‘ ‘ . a, was of interest to us. This dissemination through NAHE continued during the period of were receiving such information which also was of interest:to the Agency. It is possible that ; . had given the same data to CIA but we da not know, CIA ’ to and WAHE clashed and the relationship was severed 8 in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings' with VAHE ° - the Agency had successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of ‘the sources. CIA hinted to the Linison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between MAME * organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known- but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Bureau bad withheld infor- mation from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which. WAS - | financed by the. ,Agency. . . a . (9) -CONMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE . . EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT | Gerbert Hoover Commission. ~ 1954) In October, 1954, a task foreé of the captioned ' Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadershipcc WAME . In MONTH , 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator, NWAME | had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this ‘development and there was . talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator, When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the.Agency — Tto officially submit its charges, The Agency never did. ‘What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not Known. -It is possible that 'the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge ‘| that we naintained liaison with the Senator’ s Committee. V e es geppp , 28a. ° : é j _ _ :
(10) ay * INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN L_ COUNTRIES |  puring the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in’ the U. Ss. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from “counter- intelligence,"-namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agericy to handlé the.Iead, In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of-cases who travel abroad, If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified betause of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches invese.. . tigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials: normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants,or on the Agency payroll, - is unknown. BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA ‘We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana, Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country, During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA, We did not advise: the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro’. came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in @ secure manner, Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA,. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau cperations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant toe Directives. =~9=
(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL, ~ ? | In -year the UL S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal’ Attache of engaging in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a. nature which I believe _ exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that. CIA was unhappy over -the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly -had ‘told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from - & source who was a fabricator or 2 provocator, This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attaches operation of an informant in Brazil. Some of the | information that he received from the informant was of a derogatory nature and related to a Brazilian who was being touted as a Presidential-candidate, CIA . &sked for the identity of the ‘informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his ideritity be disclosed. This case is being cited because_CIA may have evidence - that we had been operational in Brazil, had not coordi-~ nated pursuant to Directives, and that. the matter. was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information. (13) BORDER COVERAGE eo ' INVOLVES SENSITIVE METHODS AND ‘TECHNIQUES my a Ne # 10 = wa 8 Syemeeane nage on a7 QO. : 2 — resus EES SSAC STASIS gorgnegeenterinegn gee —
(14) “SEERET SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES i (Continued from Page 10) CODE WANE In May, Year the Bureaut ‘J double Agent in the captioned case was advised by his Soviet contact that. he ‘was to have a meeting in PLacé - ‘during ‘the period _ ORTE A question arose as to whether CIA ‘should be inrormed concerning tne daouple Agent's travel (15) to Place Lu was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA, ote : ‘What is important here is that CIA established contact: with our double agent. at one point. The Agency may have had further contact without our knowledge. The Agency may have also picked up the contact with the Soviet ° - din Place ' he case is being highlighted since we cannot exclude the. possibility that the Agency has evidence - to demonstrate that we were operational Lm PLACE. and we did not coordinate With the Agency. CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U., S. On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if M4HE could give a lecture on the communist movement in the 0. S. It was recommended that MAuE give the decture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts ' @f the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make NAME available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and @ blatant refusal wer ad S@ aa ep were 5 Meg _. SECRET. ° wwe Saad St LB OTP E ete he “eS
- SEG EL . to: cooperate on ‘a most important subject of interest to both agencies. — . . ‘ ; (16) CASE OF wae ° e " On July 9, vepR an official of the State - Department - confidentially. advised the Bureau that MAME a CIA employee in peace , had been dnvolved in an affair with a ropescey girl. According to NAKE allegedly had furnished information to the forsicwv girl, We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed MARE . involved in: an affair and that he had been. recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that WAKE involved in any espionage against the, , Ue. SS. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau. to adeatify ists suurce and then changed itg mind.” Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where ‘Che Bureau failed to cooperate by not voluntéering the source is a matter of conjecture but,- it ts : a@ case that should be kept in mind. , (17)° wane of ence _ pw / “tn April, 1963, we becam: involved with CIA in. that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information relating to fofe/6¥ Government intentions to conduct espionage against the U, S. CIA had access to a sensitive source, WVAME ', who was in 2 position to make available highly important foré&éw documents, On April 11, 1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Sttache in PLACE had docally contacted “CIA concerhing this matter, CIA Head-= quarters was highly disturbed because its office in PLACEé had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted | to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our Gissemination of CIA Angormation to our Legal Attache, We SERRE: # 12 = GRy aw ey oe aay
Sen | a - sever @ | as) LEAKS TO THE “NATIONAL REVIEW" = 1959 “In Apri, 1959, CIA became concerned over the appearance of certain items in issues of the "National . Review." The publication carried a column authored by. . w-- 29 Unidentified individual who was making. derogatory references to CIA, CIA subsequently identified the | author as WAME a former CIA employee. CIA ‘investigation indicated. that MAME: was obtaining his information from former CIA Agents, In checking on NAME CIA identified some of his friends who were listed as MWaAwmwé .. former member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; and MAME _ former t Assistant to the Director, The Liaison Agent was unable to develop any additional information-as it might have - ‘ 3° pertained to MAME in this. particylar matter, CIA ~ may have additional data not revealed. _ 4 ; : @ (19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA a) a In September, 1965, we received information indicating that oneof our informants: on the Mexican border was in a position to travel: to Cuba. A question was raised concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant made the trip. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant or ais trip to Cuba, It is not known if CIA acquired. any knowledge but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable. The * Agency could charge that. we were onerating outside ‘ of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency. , (20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to — interested agencies, including CIA, acopy of 4 monograph entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." The mono= graph contained considerable information which had emanated
> “from, CIA.. We did not obtain clearance. from CIA for the inclusion ofthis information in our monograph, Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document, CIA was irritated because | it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never. made any protest. — (22) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN - Pete r In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants dn face , At the inception of our operational ac- tivity,.CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant. in PAaeoe . In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October,’ 1967, “that we could con= tinue handling an informant in Peace . with the under~ standing that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would cenfer with the local CIA office on political information collected trom the inzrormant. ‘These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was wnder the definite impression that we had been running these informants before. we had finally coordinated with them. It is true that’ the CIA Chief in’ PAACE ., was much incensed but no issue was nade at CIA: Headquarters: and - themtter was put to rest. "CIA may have ‘developed concrete evidence that we were operating in Pace ‘bearing in mind that in a plage such as piace .—«_ ,,_ it would not be difficult my for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with Foféievers . Our potential vulnerability is. that we were operating in PLace without coordinating with CIA, “(22) CODE VANE CURREVT SEWSITIVE OPEKAT 10M | ! ee " > ee Mee . : soe: ® Se ee &
— (3) HARRASSMENT OF CIA (24) ' \' CURRENT SENSITIVE OPERATION. - Coritinuied from page 15 . ® ow * f', ° 4 : . _ By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired if the Bureau would check the toll calls on the home telephone of one AME ' Who was harrassing CIA-in the Miami area, MAHE . allegedly was seeking information ccencerning the Agency's covert operations. “We told CIA that we would not check the toll-calls. We explained that on the basis of the information received, there was not sufficient information to justify investigation falling within theBureau's jurisdiction, CIA accepted , our response but there is ho doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of . wefusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating ‘to the security of U. S. intelligence operations. Sevsitive DocumewT CIA became very irked when ve , restricted: dissemination of our SEWSITIVE DbcuNnEwsT to - two copies for thé Agency. CIA took the position with ‘the Liaison Agent: that CIA always has been most liberal dn providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed when it involved various types of CIA material, The : Agency never made an dfficial issue of this matter. The. Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always | considered this an uncooperative gesture on our part, . ce . sie. «an seit eeene oe eminem . . eg ° = 80 Q ¢ Semmes oe OO a ee Oe
-(25) (26) eo i$ oe | ESTABLISHMENT OF BURBAU LIAISON WITH 7 -DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE ~ 1960 + In Sanuary, 1960, our Legal Attache, traveled ‘to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrange~ ments for liaison with appropriate Dutch authorities. NAHE . Yaised questions, pointing out that over the years, all: relations with the Dutch authorities had been handled through CIA. He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI’ to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his. Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement, We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned. . ay "y. - Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in. line with National Security Council Directives. e . In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in.Copenhagen, Denmark, The: purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland, We did not inform CIA of our intentions. BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICE S = OAté By letter dated DATE . , CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination jot cpunterintelligence information to foreign intelligence ‘services, CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which» our Legal Attache had transmitted to the - | Fergiey Intelligence Service concerning AG& operations, CIA -|took the position that. pursuant to the coordinating | |. a , SEER Rode os 6 tee . a, : . : . qe 3 : woes em te sep cam 8, owes me wee’
‘ aqyd .- Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with ‘CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive Fofés/ev sources © CepéWAME We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation ‘and did not relate to any operational activity © abroad, CIA again surrendered, The Agency could argue that it: was responsible for following Soviet matters with the Feféio/ Intelligence Service and that we had an obligation of cgordinating with the Agency. (27) TITLE OF Boop © BOOK AUTHORED BY, . AvTHeR ‘In August, 1963, we ‘peceived information indi- ~ gating that AuTHeR in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S&S. ; intelligence activities. . AsuTHah contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise | CIA that ‘AvTtHek preparing a book con- cerning U,. S. intelligence agencies. The Director. noted “x see no reason doing so," a . It is not known if- CIA was aware of the contact '. with the Bureau. Av7HeXk subsequently published the ‘,’. book which contained extremely derogatory information mee concerning CIA, (28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA | - ok In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available.. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to. & ° : DT ‘REL ~i6- °° = eee gpedia as dine, a oi, we mee
og (SBE ‘Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended period. We told CIA we had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. We took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis. > + his item is. being mentioned because Africa .has become vitally important to U'. 5..interest, bearing ' dn mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have ~ (29) made significant inroads into the area, CIA could argue that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, dnd that we did not cooperate, ® . Fag . , e . ¥ - ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - BUROPE -: By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished the White House information received. by our Legal Attache from the SOURCE He was critical of intelligence operations in Europe. and made particular reference to the overstaffing of personnel. We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the "- existence of the Bureau: letter bearing in mind that the (30) Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as relating to/its operations. We do know that for several years, ‘CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had access to cohsiderable information, THE PRESIDENT 'S FOREIGN “INTELLTORNCR ADVISORY | BOARD AND JOHN. iC CONE In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a rather critical conflict as a result of communication the | ‘ Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, The matter dealt with consideration that might be given to increasing wire taps on diplomatic ‘establishments. a 19 «a
OT, nnn ( o'i\>) ¢ is re In a-portion of our communication, we attributed cer-. ‘ tain-information to 'NeCone, then Director of CIA. He charged that the information attributed to him was not S06 because he, had never made.any such statement and he ‘could prove it. The actual fact was that ‘the information relating .to “eCone had been given.to us by one of his subordinates who had indicated that the information: originated with: McCone,- McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before we went on record that any information had.originated with him. The record at the President's Foreign Intelligence. Advisory — , Board was subsequently corrected, e : e (31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA , , ° ta *le- a - In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met with CIA officials and with MAME . to discuss @ilegations made by WANE | 23 Savict aefecter, relative ’ to alleged Soviet. penetrations of CIA, MAHE was interviewed in detail concerning these allegations. By letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA that there appeared to be no basis. at this time for a full investigation of the individuals involved. There are offi cials in CIA who continue to be : seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the ‘ « Agency. and have not discarded NAHE'S allegations. ‘We do not have any reason to believe ‘that CIA . has developed any substantive evidence to support MAME'S allegations. If it does, we could be vulnerable and could be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the - mecessary investigation in 1965, @2) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958 seman compe nem oh ‘In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled ‘to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots ‘land attacks which were directed against the Vice President “;and his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided the Vice President with a summary of information which ‘we had received concerning the events in Latin America relating 7 ‘ | ‘Seon
an - to the trip. Most of this information came from CIA, Our letter could be interpreted as. raising, the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America, ‘It is not known if CIA ever became kriowledgeable of the referenced communication. ‘As already indicated, we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House. We also know that ' MAHE AMD | TITLE; CIA, -Was attached to Vice President Rixon* 's staff. Ls If CIA is cognizant. ‘of the communication, the - Agency technically could raise a question concerning a violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore, “could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference to CIA's coverage din Latin America. (33) | MAME Of SUBTECT ‘@ . The captioned individual is a criminal infor- maunt whom we have been utilizing to very significant advan= tage in New York City. He has been the source of valuable criminal intelligence and has been 2 key witness in prosecutions of cases being handled by the Bureau. We acquired access to MAME through CIA. A covert CIA .  °. operator in New York City had become acquainted with . - .MAHE saw his potential as a source of criminal intelligence, ‘. and then conferred with MAME = ° CIA. WAMNE contacted: the Bureau Liaison Agent and asked if the Bureau was interested. Negotiations were initiated and we subsequently acquired the services of WAHE Although the Agency has never officially made any statement to us, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered extremely valuable, ; (34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION _ For many years, we maintained tight restrictions . with regard to the exchange of technical information with - CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years, we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions. a
~ — SGT | oo, e | a CIA never made any official protest but informally / indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange’ in this highly important field was prejudicial to over- all intelligence and internal security interests. The Agency implied that we actually were more open with the (35) British in this general area than we were with CIA. ‘ It should be noted that ‘the foregoing situation does not exist today. There is good exchange between the Bureau and CIA, “ CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS CIA-has never been able to understand why the Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau schools or training courses, CIA has felt that through &® careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make & very valuable contribution both to.the Bureau and to CIA, The Agency has indicated that its participation in some of our courses would give the Agency the opportune ty te deserib bea rT A tes organizatisn, 3 ge rd oD on om (36) pared tis baum problems, Furthermore, it has been expressed that “Bureau personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions and there would be a far better over~all orientation on the part of our people, ed (ety Bad, ety the Gay %P atte obs festives Soka & ad The Liaison Agent: has ‘always resisted CIA's. request. It has been a delicate matter to handle because Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees, EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD Although CIA has never officially made an issue of the matter, the Agency has: not been happy about our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field, When the matter has been broughtup for any discussion . . by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged. CIA informally has expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guide- lines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and internal security effort. & ‘SRE 3 oe 22 = ‘te
(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE ‘This is an area where discussion | with CIA officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau . for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assis~ tance. Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating foreign policy., Much of it is of’a ‘political nature and - & vital portion: pertains to scientific developments, military | capabilities of-foreign countries, and intentions of foreign countries. Positive intelligence is rot only important as it concerns the communist=bloc countries but also the non-bioc nations, | . There never has been, any ‘lav, Directive, or Executive Order which has fixed the Yesponsibilities for | the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the U. S. The Bureau does have a responsibility which we refer to as internal security and vhich falls into the accepted area of counterintelligence. We do investigate ‘gsubversives spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services, Our work in the positive intelli- gence field, for the most part, has been restricted to the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State . Department, usually when a political crisis occurs ‘in some country. -CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous unexplored field for expanded acquirenent of positive intelligence in the U. S. This would mean vastly increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants, and collection of cryotographic material. CIA does not feel that we have aggressively moved oa this particular subject and that over the years, the Agency has been | thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem. In PATE «=, CIA requested the Bureau to install technical surveillances at the offices and temporary residences of two Foffé/¢/ Government officials visiting the U. 8S. Pursuant to instructions, CIA vas told to seek the authority of the Attorney General. The Director stated that he did not want CIA utilizing FBI as a channel. - bee or v= SEREE ae
‘SERT ® In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau : would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on " (38) MAME: who CIA felt was a key figure in the > 4 transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the ‘ FoREIeW Intelligence Service. We declined to reinstitute the coverage; CIA considered the matter important ‘because of its relationship to the PLAGE on October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from.CIA fon technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the ‘Attorney General. CIA has never made any official. comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned .action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau ‘as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if, such coverage is even feasible. MISCELLANEOUS ITENS. The Liaison Agent: recalls fragments of. other Situations or conflicts which occured over the years and Which resulted in the voicingof CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the,.names of the cases which is mecessary to acquire the required data, There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe... We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest. » ®he Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official dgssue or protest. ct . ' . & & wo 24 oo
woes. ‘There also have been instances, but cases “Yr ‘Gamnot be recalled, where we included CIA information in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested, e te aa ’ : a cheer kaha . coe EGRET 4 | . 8, oe . w’ 25 = 1) ‘ t . ° hens a
S.  - OYa Gee, HG, HO, 27 "6, “UNITED STATES COWVF “MENT MM emorana@n re] : Mr. C. D. DeLoach 4 | to % ; . nation 89 prepared ROM : W, c. SuLlivaf, me Comme your Conamitnare rant @ to JOUr request ang + — , ; withon ee and the content Use tx limited 4 to and is not for di ne € expr May nut be officiot SFC disclosed 4 , rb Pcedings b 8 approval tof the: FBI. { | : Reference my memorandum 3/9/70 recommending that a . letter be directed to CIA outlining the elements of intelligence “and counterintelligence work affecting the United States. _ Purpose of this letter is te protect Bureau by giving ClA.a 5 UBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA octagon THO 8 RIED DEM LIE 0 ee page era MAbs at Heh + 0 ined eat oS a ayo eomeem chance to make any comments it may have concerning current use of sources and facilities affecting both Bureau and CIA. ... Pirector instructed’"Prepare same and let me see it." We have prepared letter to CIA Director Helms in line with the foregoing. Letter cites agreement or so-called “sround cules" dretm ur hetween Bureau and C1A in January, 1966, with regard to coordination of FBI-CIA efforts in collection of positive intelligence in the United States, At that time Vice Admiral Raborn was head ‘of CIA and we are enclosing_a . COPY of the 1966 agreement for Mr. Helms' attention. ‘ In letter we have also. pointed out the Bureau's “primary responsibility concerning internal: security of the ‘United States and for conducting counterintelligence operations here. We have noted that while the Bureau has no statutory responsibilities concerning collection of foreign intelligence, we have made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence - of value to other U.S. agencies and policy-making officials and have regularly furnished the product to CIA and other interested agencies. Letter invites any observations Mr. Helms may desire to make after reviewing this” matter, including the 1966 SEESEMENT « t A copy of the 1966 “‘Nground rules". between CIA and the Bureau is. attached to this memorandum for the Director's, + information. — oo, 4 ) ACTION :. If the Director approves, “tie-ettached letter fad Hels should gO forward. :
- “§nyestigation” means systematic and. direct inquiries or UKE meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or: of: , 1966 KO! se .-> . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ACENCY OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES © (1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of anr foreign official in the United States without the concurrence and coordination of the FSI. In this context, the tern procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information. concerning an individual's activities or background; - “Investigation” does not include the acceptance or the | ‘development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover functions. BL "(2) CIA will seek concurrence and coordination ‘of thé FBI before approaching for recruitment, any foreign. official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States] | ‘The FB1 will concur aaa coordinate if the vroposed action @oes not conflict. with any operation, current.or planned. ‘dneluding active investigation of the FBI. : (3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned _ communist~bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to "the FBI (this would include all communist~bloc officials and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social , Gevelopnent. _ 4) Clandestine CIA staff cperatives, ‘domestic “American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited abroad who come to the United States will be identified to ‘the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on the national ‘Security interest involved. Te, toe (5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when ‘a CIA agent arrives in the United States for a visit or for an jassiganent, the Bureau will be advised and the two egencies | Will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the Unites . (States. It is recognized that eaca case will have its ' [individual peculiarities. The governing principle vill be ‘Positive intelligence interest as _ weighed against interne eo woe eee mE, vs wees? me CET oper yong setae “rteeesreegernt yen se Cap Din oe t. . » . a eo 6 Rents prémred inl response to nation’ outside’ your Commi he your request and te t3 use ts limit be for dissonié. pt may not be disclosed of icia? p wccedings v4 : vour Comittee and the cont dt : 0 (Uneeihorized, perseie © ' 4 , + nel without the express approval OF the’ OPP . - ‘
cera INTELLIGINCE AGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE UXITED STATES security factors. CIA will continue its contractual rela- tionship tor the purpose of hand‘ ing the training, the procurement of tositive foreign intelligence, the "tulfilixer: of CIA commitments to the agent, and the preparation of the ‘ agent for his next assignment abroad. — (6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI secur or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the F -@ll agent information bearing on counterintelligence: or internal security matters, including the.scope and nature. of the agent's access to information and the identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security , interests, the FBI will have direct access to, the agent. . e . nn . ° . . . . To, * . . voy « . ° . lle . . . ° 78 . “4 ~ . . . . . . * ee = ew rn ~" . se ° A re ar ep Ste ae . we . . . . $s > an’ . ae a te * . fe set . pos Ra . PP ag rtp its eee rr ° * ° ° . ° ° . ee Ps e - . ; ae Ss ao dy ey om, we ak . > ” . wt & 2 . P ote ae? ’ ae egdee et “ie : . , . : ob of * ee . o% ‘ bd ‘ . 3 ° oe . - 2? @ e od eee oo ‘ . a*% i ? Pen ” ‘ ag eg ott A ba : ad * ‘ ; ' . ~ ° e . « “ nat i, ‘ . . cy % ° ” ‘ we . . a rn ar ee ¢ ‘ ? ‘it a e 8 ° * .. * ‘ * . “ o. . . 4 o ase 4 . z : , ary s vs feel ly. ‘ bite aye . . ° ° ° . o 6% . *e . . . bal 4 = ” ‘te Pa . ° werk, 2c . Fi *s ‘ “~" ov for. cal so, oF . 3 ie : ° fo + mete ee 1 P° eye °% or ‘ a weed . s Ne weet ie! o° ots"® us ceah * ome _ we gaps, ‘ * * A om a = on ole? . Ay oe ; .e* Bee = see Samo “ota sie oo! ge ettinte THEN tere mene. yn or ada ag aes, he “Et, fete o? . . &, . o* ® . . ‘ . eg & . * * . ,@ . . oe . - 4 Z- ) 2 oa ey Fe ae . % * ’ ‘e # e ° . * .
March 11, 1970 é : Honorable Richard Helms , - . Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. Ce. Dear Mr. Helms:' ‘eoordination of theyintelligence-gathering anc,counter- As TI am Sect will agree, the need foe close “Gnteliigence < efforts of the, Fsr “and ‘the_ Central “Intelligence . Agency (CIA) is self-evident. This matter, is one which Fequires a continuing analysis to assure that both agencies have established working agreements whereby we can most effectively realize positive results with a minimum of > duplication, misplaced effort, and jurisdictional problems. During Janvary, 1966, representatives of this — Bureau met with officials of ‘the CIA to consider coordina-: ‘tion of our. mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. As a result of these ‘conferences, a set of ground rules was drawn.up and agreed . to by both agencies, A copy of this agreement was transmitted in my letter of February 7, 1966, to then CIA Director Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. A copy of the agreement is enclosed for your information. ' This agreement has proven generally effective and no major problems have ‘been . W@ncountered since its adoption in the areas it covers. - The FBI has primary responsibility with regard to matters involving the internal security of the United States as well as for conducting counterintellig&nce operations in NATIONAL SECURITY nauthorized Dis Subject’ to Crimin SEREF IN FORMATION elesure al Sanctions
« aoe wo w iA . ‘ . eo + an ’ &, ‘ a ¢ bd ° . ° ” . this matter, including the attached 1966 agreement, I“would - 'vesponsibilities with regard to the collection of foreign - intelligence agencies, intluding the CIA, and policy-making ‘SECRET this country. While this Bureau does not have any statutory intelligence, I have always recognized that the potential for the development of such intelligence in this country is considerable. The FBI has, in fact, made a concerted effort to obtain positive intelligence of value to other U. S. officials of the Government. While these efforts have, of course, been incidental to our main internal security end counterintelligence responsibilities, we have on a Selective ‘basis developed sources, both live and technical, providing coverage at key foreign establishments in the. United States. ‘The product of this coverage has been furnished. on @ regular basis to the CIA and other interested agencies and oriiciais OL the GuVermentis Pe I know that you will share my belief that this matter requires a periodic reexamination to assure that the netional security interests continue-te be served in the | most effective and complete manner possible. After reviewing welcome any observations you may desire to make. _—= . Sincerely yours, ° _ - J, Edgar Hoover a OF e . SECRET