e° _ attempted to accomplish was the preservation of 5 . 7 -3- | wey 8. Mizones was assigned to Santa Cruz and was assigned to La Esperanza, where the latter conducted most of the intelligence training. As time went by, Mizones'" own duties gravitated to becoming basically those of.an advisor. .,He-said that his case officer was aware of and approved of this development. Among the things which Mizones anf of- captured guerrillas, for the collection of intelligence about the guerrilla's locations, as well as for humanitarian reasons. ‘Mizones said that he: saved the life of Jose Castillo Chavez,. traveling for that purpose to Vallegrande from Santa Cruz, -: - where he spoke briefly to Castillo at the Nuestra Senora de -Malta Hospital. .At this time Mizones. learned of the intent of Colonel Selich of the Rangers, to have the prisoner executed. “Mizones prevailed. on Major Saucedo and General La Fuente to take his side. The prisoner was flown to Vallegrande where . ‘Mizones covered all medical costs and tarried out a two-week interrogation. The resulting twenty-page interrogation report. provided the Bolivians with a complete concept of the guerrilla’ S strategy, which turned out to be the key to Guevara's capture, according to Mizones. This report was attributed by the Bolivians to be from their own people. 9. This. important development was followed. by an encounter in late September between a unit led by a Lt. Galindo and the remnants of the guerrillas. . During this action, a Cuban . lieutenant named Miguel; the Bolivian Coco “Peredo;. and a Bolivian physician named Jose Gutierrez Ardaya were killed. Mizones. travelled by jeep to Pucara, where. the bodies were located, and through the information he had learned from Castillo, he was able to establish that the men were from Guevara's forward element. Upon his return to Santa Cruz,. Mizones advised Colonel Zenteéno. that the 2nd Ranger Battallion should be immediately deployed, with the remaining two weeks of their training cancelled. Zenteno accepted this advice and the Rangers were moved to Pucara, and the- ‘Headquarters of the Eighth Division were moved to Vallegrande. Mizones continued in-his advisory role, suggesting areas for troop deployment as well as the deployment of the intelligence. teams. On the 8th of October, contact was established with ‘Guevara's remaining forces. (At this. time Mizones was: in .Vallegrande anc in Esperanza.) On the 8th, Major “Saucedo reported over the radio that "the chief" had been captured. Mizones then flew over the area in a PT-6 carrying with him a PRC-10 radio with which he was able to. communicate with the Bolivian forces. He then confirmed that Guevara was - "the chief" who had been captured. He returned to Vallegrande where he told. Col. Zenteno that Guevara had. been wounded and. captured. , . ra =e an . . . - SeoRET : 7 -
“10. That day Major Selich was sent to Higueras to . interrogate the guerrilla prisoners and assembled the ; captured documents. Since Colonel Zenteno was planning to fly by helicopter to Higueras on the 9th, Mizones asked him on | the evening of the 8th if he could accompany him to interrogate Guevara. Zenteno consulted his staff and agreed. (The a helicopter had room only for a pilot and two passengers.) Mizones prepared a 100-word message to th in code reporting Guevara's capture and asking that an Embassy representative be sent to. the area to prevail upon the a, ‘| Bolivians to spare Guevara's life, since he did not. believe that he could succeed in doing so. This message was prepared for the scheduled 10 a.m. transmission of 9 October, and was not transmitted to the relay point in Asuncion, Paraguay, until about 10:30 a.m., after Mizones arrived in Higueras and set up his radia-transmitter an RS-48. — 11. Zenteno, Mizones and the pilot, Nino de Guzman, set out by helicopter from Vallegrande at 7:15 a.m. on the 9th, - and arrived in Higueras at about 7:40 a.m. Mizones accompanied Zenteno and Major Ayiroa when they visited Guevara in the | school room which was his improvised jail. Guevara would not answer Zenteno when spdken to... He was. bound, hand and foot, and had a leg wound. ; sy Loe 12. Mizones and Major Selich then reviewed the captured documents and Mizones obtained permission from Selich to photograph all the papers, including Guevara's diary, and also. Selich's permission to retain the original accommodation . addresses found. : a Oo, 13. While Zenteno and all the other Bolivian officers . (with the exception of a Lieutenant Perez) were outside of ‘the village attending to other military affairs, Mizones . remained-in Higueras as the highest ranking "Bolivian officer". In this capacity he answered a'call received on the military field telephone and answered as Captair| ' He was given | the code numbers 500 and 600 as orders which were to be implemented by command of "higher. authorities". He said that the connection was not clear and he could not recognize the voice but it could have been that of Major Saucedo. In any case, Mizones said that. since it was a line only available - to the military he was confident that it was order re~ transmitted through military channels. He said that he knew that 500 referred to Guevara, 600 to the word execute and . 700 to the preservation of Guevarra's life. These simple codes had been identified to him previously. — TN RR ere te ee Fn OO TANT WN GROAN CRe = 2 ate ae atone ore S oS e eo =
14. - ‘Upon Zenteno! s return, Mizones told him of the message and. Zentend took it as an authentic order and nade no. effort to have it confirmed. Mizones asked if Guevara's life ‘could be preserved since he- had these instructions. jeopardy if he did not comply. “Hizonas asked him to ta ke. : ‘the attempt anyway. (Mizones believes that Zéenteno had . already resigned himself to the inevitability of Guevara's execution.) . Zenteno said that he was in sympathy with Mizones' wish but that it was not in his power to reverse the order. =-- He told.Mizones that he was well aware of the treatment which Fidel had meted out to Cubans and told him to éxecute Guevara in any manuer which he might choose. JZénteno said that he chad fo leave for Vallegrande at 10: 00 a.m. and would send "asa friend", ‘asked that the body be “yeady. Mizones reiterated his Yequest that the order be appealed and Zéenteno agreed to make the attempt, and said he would advise if he were successful. 15. ° Failing a counter- -manding of the order and as the senior "Bolivian. officer" left in Higueras, Mizones Said he was left with the implémentation of the execution. After ~ Zenteno left, Mizones was able to talk to Guevara, who identified Mizones either as a Puerto Rican or a Cuban : working for U.S. intelligence. He said he made this judgment. on the basis of the questions asked and on Mizones' accent. Whilé Mizones was with Guevata, shots were fired in adjoining: rooms and Mizonés later determined that these involved the execution of two other prisoners. Recognizing these shots for what they were, nevertheless, Guevara blanched when. Mizones confirmed that he too would be executed; although later, composing himself. 16. After leaving Guevara, Mizones told a sergeant of the order to executé Guevara and entrustéd the mission to hin. He was told to fire below the héad. The order was given to the sergeant at 1:00 p.m. and Mizones heard the shots fired ‘at Guevara at 1: 20 p.m. At 2:00 p.m., the hélicopter returned to Higueras. A Father Shiller performed the last rites and Guevara's remains were strapped to one of the helicopter's Skids and Mizones accompanied them to Vallegrande, where | they landed at 2:30 p.m. Mizones said that he lost himself quickly in the crowd gathered at the airport, but that took charge of the remains and was photographed. Tzones said that the title of the photograph, which appeared in the press, gave an incorrect identification of the name Mizones used,
14-00000 ‘Where Mizones contacted his case officer. ould board ha Oe wee re & ey * Sash Y ! ~6= | { - ‘ & 17, Mizones Said he réported the executions to Major Saucedo and the Chief of Operations, a Major Gutierrez, and then was takén back to igentaty the bodies-ofthe-.three _. executed guerrillas. They then drove to Santa Cruz‘with the documents, films and equioment and then flew. to La Paz, “He was taken to and other Americans were briefed by a home where® e ‘him. Everything which he had been able to retain was turned | in then to be carried by a special courier to Washington. Mizones then-fléw back to Santa. Cruz where a C=+130 ordered . by General Porter, CINCSOUTH, was to pick hii and| up for 4 flight to the Canal Zone. This plane arrived _with a flat tire on the 10th or lith. The u.s. a C#54, was then flown to Santa Cruz and he and were flown back to La Paz. After overnighting there, another C-130 carried them to Panama where Mizones was asked to After 2 weeks in Panama, relate his story to General Porter. Mizones and | were documented as GS-16s so that they a over=bookéd military flight to Charlotte, - South Carolina. After their arrival there, they journeyed to Miami, where Mizones briefed General Cushman. (Mizones believes that in both high-level briefings he mentioned: his» own personal role in ‘the eXecution of Guevara. 3} oo.