cnenemnarteeCeTtT EY BIRDIN WIE Z DISPATCH. * . JEGA~14781 & promotion for ANCARBON~1, and it reflected confidence in him by the Identity 3 management, AMCARBON-1 ig by no means an expert on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a long-term Latin American specialist. QDELI has been questioned about AMCARBON=-1, and he hag indicated that AMCARPON-~1 is regarded in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has .& keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American affairs, It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse of time, ANCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles, AMCARBON~1 has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting to improve his language fluency « It ig REUTEMAN's opinion that AMCARBON@=-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist, and he will continue to grow in this field, Thus, he is a contact who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing in mind that he does have long<~term potential, - '4, AMCARBON~1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES, In keeping with the traditional pattern of source protection which is common to newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers, ANCARBON~1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his . sources, On the other hand, when pressed, ANCARBON-1 has identified some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to KUBARK, As a result of these occasional witting identifications of his sources, and, as. a result of general conversations with. AMCARBON=1, REUTEMAN hag learned that ANCARBON-1's sources include the following persons: ‘ a) yaide* #FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766),, secretary “general of tha DRE, 0°: : b. Manolo *#RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE, Ce Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct Havana Times, ..... a. AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437) e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA -'. g, - Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau, AMCARBON-1 regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view ' of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of Attorney General Robert KENNEDY. g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and 0 0 2-) 5 1a 950 ol =) ol Oe he Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR, % i. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico, j. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201~103272), former president of the Dominican Republic. k, Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service. 1. Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252),. an employee of “USIA in Miami, AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSEY ig a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a source of information. GLASSIFICATION ; " PAGE NO. ‘ORM 60 S39 USE PREVIOUS EDITION, . g-B-G-R ET red 40). oe CONTINUED 3, ‘ " i ! : 1 seme aate 9 5 enOENOrEREN MES + . exo” me me oe som
13-00000 FORM f . 5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON~l1 is used to carry out certain operational support tasks, In such instances, AMCARBON-] makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of ANCARBON=-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3, -Several uxamplea of how ANCARBON=-] has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below: , yoo a. ‘Andrew ORDONO Camps. Im March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO Camps, DPOB 30 September I514, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived -in Miami and was given routine CAC processing, The details of this processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963, After being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed, In view of this story, JMWAVE tried to locate: ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productiv ’ thus AMCARBON<-1 was asked to locate ORDONO, AMCARBON~-1 did locate areeey in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for b.:: Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group, In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201~309611) of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims relative to his faction invading Cuba, Headquarters’ interest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's. irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-l1l, Ag'.a result of Headquarters’ interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which .AMCARBON~1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was.less than accurate in.its claims relative to its activities in Cuba, In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTIEMAN's comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by ANCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source, As a result -of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963. 6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, In the period February 1963 to February 1964, ANCARBON~I has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below: "sg, “In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON~1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of _& great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. ° AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This. operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements, Subsequent developments revealed that ANCARPON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publiaity stir that was initially anticipated. . . b,. Im WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion, The intent of this ,article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation, In this connection, AMCARBON~-1 pointed ont that he was 2 ~ GLABSIFICATION ; ; PAGE NO. 3-60 53a, USE PREVIOUS EDITION. Semel “EP fhe \ . ix | 4 : ; Oe CONTINUED °
13-00000 ‘thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E, *CARLSON, residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the Bay of Pigs operation, AMCARBON~1 stated that, 1£ CARLSON were of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would soft peddle the CARLSON angle, REUTEMAN advised AMCARDON-1 that he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of. the Opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON on the Identity.3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had played in the Bay of Pigs invasion, This briefing, in turn, enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting with AMCARBON~-1, . While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story. was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish his research, .. c.. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised JMWAVE that Mx, Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic missiles were hidden in Cuban caves, This information enabled JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational~type articles which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba, ‘d, * In“WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1 gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with AMNBIDDY~1 ‘at..the’ Miami Playboy Club on.19 September 1963, This . information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY~-1 was telling.the press, — ; ; . _ -.'"@e!.Im WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON~1 .reported on a discussion that he ‘had had on 10 October 1963 with ' AMBIDDY~1's public relations man. This operational intelligence was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's representatives were telling the outside world about their eperational activities, . , f£. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON~1 | informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK vessels which were located in South Florida waters, This . Adnformation alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny wag ‘going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warn- ing, JMWAVE-waa.able to take action which minimized the publicity repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity §&, g. -In WAVE7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru, This lead was examined by JMWAVE, Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there wag no real. operational potential in this lead, This incident did underscore |. the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant operational leads to JMWAVE's attention, . h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCAREON-1 advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calis indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected * froma Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previous] been seen in Minami during November or December 1963, At the same time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona > fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who was being used as.a means of creating an incident which would embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating . ‘ GLASSIFICATION PAGE NO. FORM 8-00 58a vex Previous EDITION. . i DO mpm GT CONTINUED 5.
13-00000 é oe ” United States terracorial waters, REUTEMAN a. .ised AMCARDON-1 FORM 8-60 (48) that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation against the GOC, At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time, AMNCARBON~l was prevailed upon not to write a story which might jead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC, 7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET, AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully, during the period dovered by this report, as a propaganda outlet - through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in the free world press, Examples of how AMCARBON-~1 has been harnessed in this field are outlined below: . @,  AMCRAB-1, The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally surfaced in thé Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de lias Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo, The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information . relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario ‘de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers in the Miomi area, As a result, it was decided to do a series of feature stories on AMCRAB-], pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1 _ was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt _ they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions - of obscurity:once the revolution had put CASTRO in power, AMCARBON-] was briefed in ‘detail on the ANCRAB-1 story, and he was given an -Opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-] under controlled conditions in a JMWAVE safehouse.. After completing his debriefing, ANCARDON-1 wrote a series of.-feature articles on ANCRAB~1, The first article in the series received front page headline play, The series of articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an excellent. peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other propaganda assets, . AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America, The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated 14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174, dated 21 October 1963. 7 - b, «Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story, On 26 February 1964 JMWAVE learned that wnen hir, arles Gh 8 sons went to Cuba . to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that . select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over to them, It was believed that this information would make a good human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items from. the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States territorial waters, In view of this opinion, a steering tip was . given to AMCARBON~1 to have the Identity 3 representative in Key West interview Mr, GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out, and an article outlining the points which were of interest to JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the Identity 3. . c. LAYC Story, The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santingo, Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March 1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the Identity 3 should pursue, AMCARBON~1 was grateful for this steering tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was | subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3 c above are attached for Headquarters information.) — GLAGSIFICATION PAGE HO. 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. | x | 6 ‘ a . CONTINUED oe : (COMMENT : Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through
13-00000 8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to . obtain daisseminable positive Intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during . the period covered by this report, This attempt has beon generally unsuccessful, in that AMNCARBON-1 does not have a great number of contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile intelligence apprecinbly in advance of the information appearing in the overt press, As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of |&p[ inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently, he is not a worthwhile source. of positive intelligence, As a matter of fact, AMCARBON~1 igs less valuable as a source of positive intelligence. than’ most journalists, This is attributable solely to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American politica] - scene, It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him fcr the collection of - Positive intelligence, -. O. COMMENT , ce the period covered by this report, ANCARBON-1 has been Yound to ‘be @ straight-forward individual who is honest, cooperative and: who understands the need for security, Our relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter of that information which he passes to KUBARK,. In view of this, JMWAVE plans’ to:continue to harness AMCARBON~1 in the same manner that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our rela- tionship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our operational mission in a secure manner, In addition, this relation~ ship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have diffi-| culties with the media outlets in the South Florida area, As a result of our continuing relationship with AMCARBON=-1, a special: activities report will’ be be forwarded at appropriate intervals, 10, It. is ‘yequested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON=1_ and that THAYER be advised ef the number, . END OF DISPATCH aM 2 53e 3=s-: vee PRevieve EDITION,