424-10365-10006 JFK. Assassination System . Date: 6/9/2015 Identification Form ee Agency Information AGENCY: FBI RECORD NUMBER: — 124-10365-10006 RECORD SERIES: HQ AGENCY FILENUMBER: CR 65-68530-99 eR acc EES PP ET SSD err rrr eeepc Document Information ORIGINATOR: CIA FROM: CIA TO: HQ TITLE: ~~° DATE: 03/26/1964 “PAGES: 7 SUBJECTS : NOSENKO RE OSWALD DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : = Secret. RESTRICTIONS: 1B CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 10/16/1998 OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIA % COMMENTS : MEMO, INC MEMO, ASSESSMENT v9.1 2 : HY 50953 DBoctd: 32316811 Page i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.G. 20505 colons FOR: Mr. John Edgar Hoover: Director, Federal Bureau. of Investigation. United States Department of Justice Slole ec ye ssi ie ¥: is ae UBJECT: afr jade REFERENCE: CSCI- ie ‘Division for the inform Plans. It is an “in house" document containing. ar terim assessment of SAMMY's bona fides a y oe disseminated to other departments. without permission of this” ‘Agency. The réport is [oa ed toyour” Bureau per” paragraph 5 of referent memorandum, apps Coneduses that, SAY isa KGB Re lant _discus e@ sible KGB aims in stich an operation, an : to resolve ‘theta iseye ree ee pons CERO Can aa ESI 3. In previous correspondence, this Agency, oted the need for an, earl evaluation. by. y our. pagenciesand depart | of:..SAMMY's..bona fides, ~ “SiwTlarly, to your Bureau a@ Copy of ‘the - ‘SR eetessera On. 94 erepmnanseae sogn as possible, your. views: | described nthe. Lepor to “gper ational activities of your: emer EP USAT Ue near best FR DONOR Rema hid ON HE EEO FEED eaten So apevieia ent a aS whi eins “#e* 4. imformation.will.. not surtice,. HANe which no parallel exists insofar as wé. are. y we proper resolution suggests the, need° for. Akg ‘ Nik a By i ve ferme of |S es OF oe €77eR. see G : Docld:32318811 Page 2
| NW 50953 A®® SECRET TAB whe PERSONAL DATA, CONDUCT AND MANNER Statements about Himself 1. Biography: NQSENKO has contradicted himself in his own accounts of his life in ways w ich me _ may. be related to the events ; onda personalities “He “is” reporting” on. “ESpecially noteworthy is this, Shitt— in t962;"Hie “Said that he. graduated from the Institute of Foréign Relations in 1950, went into the Naval GRU, and then entered the KGB at the beginning of 1953. In 1964, he said he had graduated in 1949 and entered the KGB in early 1952. \ This affects his version of getting into the KGB with KOBULOV's | help as KOBULOV was not in the KGB trom 1948 to March 1953. carn ee Platina Miata wae 2. Friendship with GUK and CHURANOV: NOSENKO claims to be an intimate friend of certain KGB officers, especially GUK and CHURANOV, from whom he has obtained by word of mouth most of: the few operational items he has been able to provide outside his own immediate sphere of activity. He mentions these two individuais \ So often that that alone would deserve special attention. . Btit on > top of that these two individuals were, two of GOLITSYN's closest contacts, from whom GOLITSYN also learned by word of mouth about many operations -- Sensitive ones at that -- which he had no © right..to. know. Yet, if NOSENKO were in fact this _Cl6se to then, there. can be ‘litte’ doubt - "that. GOLTTSYN would have. Known NOSENKO be Eter. As it is, GOLITSYN remembers only that there was’ a. | Birect working in the American Department of the Second. Chief Directorate who had a reputation a 32 _ SEA. nasser There are. grounds here for sispicion that GUK and ‘CHURANOV gave honest accounts of what they had told GOLITSYN in the KGB damage | assessment of GOLITSYN's defection, and that NOSENKO is fabri- cating this alleged friendship to explain how he had access’ to the same information as GOLITSYN (some of which is outlined? in Tab "D", Table #4), which he is using ~- at no cost to the: ‘KGB a as build-up for himself. ; : 3. Personal Involvement in Key Accidents: NOSENKO: ,! when he. as came out in 1964, had certain information which he particularly: wanted to give us concerning practically all of the known. oo notorious incidents of Soviet security history in the perio Since his last meetings with us. It appears to stretch. sainctdexce | “ TAP SECRET ocld:32318811 Pagé 3
ve SECRET 2. to the limit that this one KGB officer, NOSENKO, was personally involved in every one of them, and could thus talk -- and deliver the KGB's message" == with complete authority. Note his role in the cases of Lee Harvey OSWALD, of Professor BARGHOORN, of (3g of the CHEREPANOV affair (even to the point of Showing a travel order for his use in the "search" for CHEREPANOV) . and others. Note also his fortuitous friendship with Georgiy BOLSHAKOV, which permitted him to recount in detail a provocative \ version of BOLSHAKOV's dealings with the White House. 4, Order ‘of Lenin and/or Casp Award: NOSENKO mentioned in January 1964 that he had received the Order of Lenin "Shortly . after the 1962 meetings with us," as a result of ideas he developed on how to-enlarge the experience and improve the quality of staff personnel on the job. About a month later he mentioned to one of his security guards that he had received a. large cash award (no date, but was then reluctant to say why; it is not clear whether this is separate from the medal mentioned earlier). New,such medals and awards are not given for routine contributions. However, it is possible that NOSENKO | “could ff not resist bragging about his medal “(Or feared” that we “might hear of it through other sources), and that he actually got it for his 1962.-meetings with us ==_as the timing would suggest. In in fact, on one o€CaSion he pointedly asked whether HiS“T962™ case officer had received an award from the 1962 meetings with him. And the i cash award may have been related to a report from another source, that some officers of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate had gotten cash awards for the recruitment of one or more Americans in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow around 1960 -- when NOSENKO was in that Department. 5. Claim to have Worked in Place for Us: NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he tried earnestly, to..collect.evexy,,.bit ‘of infornma-ti-on—he_. could for us during—the-period between the 1962 ~ meetings and his defection in 1964, He uses his written notes, many of them on small Scraps of ‘paper, to document this’ claim. | Ig Yet he clearly. did not try to collect even the most insignificant item of positive in LSTLiGSnce,.po. olitical or “military, “from his ~ many contacts, nor did he even. bring_o' gout a. a clear “table -of Pu organization for the. First Chief Directorate, “which could be had for the asking by a person in his position. The nearly 200 ; operational leads he so earnestly collected do not, insofar as’ our traces to date permit us to judge, contain the identity of a. ingle active agent with any current access..to ‘U. Se OE NATO sje ol ie CRANE OREN, OTE LS AR HL OSL SERIE Sas GAR nT ans areeesise setae) EBERT YA classiried“information " {SisacuestranamugaicTaaenEn eis SRRERSaNPR ERNE , \ 6. Shift of Job Before Contact With Us: NOSENKO claimed to ‘ have transferred from the. American Department to the Tourist ie SECRET | HW 50953 Daoctd:32318011 Page 4
+8 .. a C CO mo SECRET 3. Department in January 1962. According to knowledgeable sources, a provocation agent about to be put into contact with hostile ai? intelligence would usually be removed from his job, particularly if it was a relatively sensitive one, at least six months before being sent out. This is the exact pattern in NOSENKO's biography: he left (at least ostensibly) the section working against the American Embassy just a month after GOLITSYN's defection (and about the time planning for a provocation would have begun) and moved to the Tourist Department, whose targets and methods are less sensitive, more transitory -- and more numerous -- and whose basic techniques had been well known to GOLITSYN, partly through a detailed document GOLITSYN was known to have taken with him from the Helsinki Residency. It is possible that NOSENKO did not in fact move from the First.Department as early as he claims. 7. Sourcing of Information: NOSENKO has provided information. (1), from his own immediate vantage point in the Tourist Department, and (2), which he has learned through other means. In the first category we learned interesting details on methods and organization although their essence was already known from GOLITSYN; and a mass of names and identifying data on agents and agent candidates which he claims to be the totality of his Department's successes and which turn out to be practically worthless to us or the KGB, His own.position, however, has. enabled..NOSENKO to play a role in some more notorious events: the OSWALD case, the | [case, th BARGHOORN case, etc., which are of interest. But much of ; NOSENKO's more interesting information came from outside his * immediate periphery. His accounts of how he got these other items provide an interesting aspect of the bona fides problem, 8. As will be touched on again in this paper, NOSENKO has infqenationaupjchahen, has volunteered, often out of context, 2 rpingto get over fo US, a5 contraste pythr oughquestioning...Aside from OSWALD, nowever, practically every one of of these.-was : snd ess, aa Ww: wis“ op tained” fortuitously. “or theough-conversations, with other 2 case ise Ol Licers.=—This=way of getting information is normal and “expectable. What is unusual . abqut_.NOSENKO!'s case is that his explanations ar are in every st suck’, case. either vague ,_ contuséd~or unbelievable ‘and he “quickly Sources. Almost every item that NOSENKO volunteered” HaS“an ‘ implausible source. A few examples are given in the paragraphs elow. iy SECRET ‘ i | BW 50953 Daoctd:32316011 Page 5