HW 49061 The hot line, observation posts, and proposals to destroy B-7's may be worthwhile but they should not be allowed to distract our attention from the primary issue, the control of nuclear weapons. The shift we should, and to some degree have made, is to emphasize agreement among the nuclear powers rather than an international agreement. While resulting conventions should be open to signature by all nations, they should be negotiated and inspected primarily by the nuclear powers. It is no accident that both DeGaulle end Khrushchev have emphasized negotiations by nuclear powers while China has called for a world-wide disarmament conference of all nations. . Therefore, we should be prepared to negotiate a strategic force freeze without requiring concurrent reductions in conventional forces. As long as we can freeze the present strategic nuclear balance, then the question of whether the Soviets have five or ten divisions » more or less , in Central Asia is not a controlling factor. In any confrontation between China and the United States, the Chinese are less likely to use their local. conventional superiority in the face of our atomic superiority. This is | not to suggest that conventional force reductions on the part of the Soviet Union or other nations are not desirable, but rather that they can and should be analyzed separately. THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY COULD BE TO GAIN WORLD-WIDE ACCEPTANCE OF LIMITATIONS ON INCREASES IN STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE LIMITING STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AT THEIR EXISTING LEVEL, A CESSATION OF PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A een Seen BAN ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS. THIS NEED NOT MEAN DISARMAMENT aR ne ee eS Se ee AT THIS TIME. Docld: 3276276310 Page 3
HW 49061 { In broad outline, our strategy could be based on a two-phase ‘program, as follows: Phase I - the nuclear powers agree to freeze strategic nuclear forces at their existing levels, forbid the construction or deployment of anti- ballistic missile systems, and stop the further production of atomic mater- dials for military purposes under adequate inspection. ‘They concurrently an- nounce thet, when all the militarily significant states sign the treaty which is open to all nations of the world, they will meet together to negotiate reductions in their existing strategic force levels. Phase II - Participation of all important nations will be sought in the above treaty, including China and France. | In the Washington disarmament debate, there has been great dispute — between those who advocate the continuation of our present arms build-up and those who advocate proposals to the Soviet Union to agree to sharply cut back nuclear delivery systems and warhead stockpiles. Little or no attention has been given to the possibility that the Soviet Union would be willing to agree to freezing its nuclear forces at existing levels. To be sure, such a position contradicts all Soviet disarmament statements, but such an agreement might serve Soviet interests within the Commmist world and confirm what the Soviet Union may do regardless of agreement. Such an agreement would advance the joint interest of the United States and the Soviet Union against the minor or aspiring nuclear powers. Para- doxically, a U. Ss. proposal for a cut-off of fissionable material and cessation of production of arms has never been thoroughly studied or staffed because Soviet approval was not expected since such a proposal would be so obviously in the interest of the U.S. DoclId: 376276310 Page 4
HW 49061 This memorandum discusses primarily the Phase I proposal and includes, in TAB F and G, an outline of a possible approach to France and China. The Soviet View Military Analysis . This agreement has military advantages for the Soviet Union. if implemented on a world-wide basis y it would close the doors of the nuclear club, thereby strengthening the military position of the Soviet Union vis-a- vis both the non-nuclear powers and the minor nuclear powers, Britein and France. This agreement would, in effect, confirm Soviet military superiority over all nations of the world except the United States. On the other hand, it has the disadvantage that it would clearly freeze US strategic superlority. U.S. and Soviet Strategic Delivery Vehicles ns 1964 105 1966 US __USSR Us USSR US __USSR Long-Range Bombers 630 185 630 12175 630 175 ICEMs | 855 200-260 1055 270-350 1205 300-450 Sub-Launched Missiles | 346 254 hig 292 608 328 *Medium-Range Bombers 83 900 337 850 75 800 Medium Range Missiles 54 700-750 «5K = 700-750 54% = 700-750 * Due to overseas bases and tankers U.S. medium-range bombers can attack Soviet targets. Due to shortage of tankers very few Soviet medium-bombers can hit targets in the United States, with the exception of Alaska. Soviet TRBMs, in present positions, cannot strike the US except in Alaska. Clearly the Soviet Union would prefer not to accept a position of strategic inferiority if they had an alternative. They do not. Now that the United States Polaris and Minuteman programs are hitting a DoclId: 3276276310 Page 5
HW 49061 production rate of. better than a missile per day, it is very doubtful - that the Soviet leadership could believe that they have any reasonable chance of obtaining parity with the United States. If this truth is perceived by the Soviet leadership, then they have no choice but to -eccept numerical inferiority which does not alter the qualitative palence. Therefore » the determining factor in the Soviet view will undoubtedly be, not the balance of thermonuclear power, but the political impact of such an agreement within the Communist and non- Communist world. Another disadvantage would be the fact that the Soviet Union would have to permit inspection. Clearly this would be odious to the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, it need not represent an insuperable obstacle. Khrushchev's test ban offer of three on-site inspections, if made in good faith, would indicate that if the political benefits of the agreement were high enough, the Soviet Union would allow in- spection. In Western terms, adequate inspection for a production cut-off could be achieved with relatively modest inspection, to-wit, permanent parties at declared production plants plus a few on-site inspections of suspicious plants. This inspection network which would be primarily in fixed locations should be far more acceptable than the mobile inspections that would be required for any agreement on force level reductions. Political Analysis | The current Sino-Soviet dispute has brought and will probably continue to bring about changes in Soviet political assessments. The recent Soviet acceptance of the long-standing Western offer for a partial test ban treaty was undoubtedly primarily due, not to economic pressures or any shift in he conve WH les Docld:32676310 Page 6
HW 49061 the military balance of power which have ‘remained relatively static » but to a changed Soviet assessment of the value of. the treaty in their dispute with the Chinese. This proposal would have a number of political advantages for the Soviet Union: (1) It would increase pressure against diffusion, consolidating the nuclear status of the USSR, U.S. and Britain, and probably further dividing France from its NATO allies. (2) It could save the Soviet Union billions of rubles.: (3) It would seriously hinder the formulation of the MLF. It would also have some disadvantages: (1) It would permit Western inspection in the Soviet Union. (2) It would guarantee continued U.S. nuclear superiority. Despite these arguments, probably the principal incentive for the Soviet leadership would be their assessment of the political utility of this proposal, both in strengthening their hand within the Commmist movement and in dividing the Western alliance. If the Soviet Union could justify the treaty in terms of advancing the cause of the International-Commmist Party and Soviet leadership, this agreement might be viewed by Moscow as a powerful tool in strengthen- ing their policy of peaceful coexistence. If not, this fact in itself would probably be sufficient to cause the rejection of the proposal. Evidence from the present Moscow-Peiping debate indicates that the Soviet Union has elready begun to defend the nuclear status quo as & ‘Soviet (not U.S.) advantage. (See Tab C.) In their August 20 reply to the CPR government, the Soviet leadership clearly implied that Soviet strategic Docld: 3276276310 Page fF