x 107B -C SECTION 107. ECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONYID! TAL SOURCES ‘9, Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party Punctionaries 10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant cxecuwtives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ- ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plantts making avaeil~ able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage~ =i ment. . 11. Personne] directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist—dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions. 12. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should , suggest to the potentiel informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact, 13. <Acter the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an indus— trial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dis- missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant, At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the pe~son advise the Bureau of his past activities. Be alert to take advan*- ge of such cooperation when offered, 14, Revie. of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ-— uals merely registered but never vecame active 15, Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is aveilable for such a contact, 16, Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U, 58. 17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat 18, Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed : the U. 8. 19, Individuals who because of background, employment, or social itatus ars in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the Suidance of the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105¥%,6h, volume IV, of this manual.) {C. [INTERVIEWS WITH AND DEVELOPMENT OF BACK OUND OI TNDEVIDUALS BEING [ CONSIDERED FOR THFOPMANT PURPOSHS ] When a decision is made to consider 2 particular individual for informant [ purposes, background investigation must be conducted. [Extensive background [ investigation should not be conducted, hewever, until the individual has [ been interviewed and it has been determined he is willing to assist the ( Bureau. Obtain prisr Bureau authority to interview whenever the restrictions [ imposed in secticn 87D, item 6b. (7), volume III, “and section LO5X, item 6b, , [ (10), volume IV, relative to interviews apply. Background investigation [- shouldlconsist of the following: i 1. Check of field office files for derogatory information [ 2. Discreet canvass of Logical informants to ascertain if thef[individual ] [ is known to[then]- . - 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to 2btein information concerning the individ- ual's personal history (date and place of birth, ete.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, Sencral reputation, present and past employments, and business connections. Back¢round investigation must [ definitely establish that the[lindividual Jean’ be utilized withous any danger of future embarrassment que to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from thelindividual lis not sufficient; {his]backgrounad must be established br the investigation, [including discreet inquiries among persons who are personally acquainted with hin.] 4. Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-S form which sheuld be transmitted to the Identi- - [ fication Division to obtainlany]record fhe may have. ] . . 5S. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran. 6. Gheck draft status or status in the armed forces reserve. 7. Domestic status and if a obtained, SERS SS CaN TH CRY AN PA ALY SG OPE CSE TES eT ST ee eer tae wA TERETE hte Weapons Senet 4 —eNre ai ou as my t arital difficulties ail details should be 4 10-13-65 MW 55072 Bocld: 32989529 Page L377 PRE SERAEE INET EAA PND. Y LCS OG EMILE SPE BAN AED SENS 8d ITE ES REO OAT Wane it ENE MITRE WV
107R ~ ¢ MW Sa072 ae 6 15. ii. 12.4 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18, 19, \ SECTION 1¢ ) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND ong SOURCES Investigation of communist petition signers who ore acquainted with Communist Party functionusrics Pe alort to receive any suggestions of plant excewbives and highly placed personnel who are re! sable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who mi Zit cooperate with the, Bureau or employ ees who might be willing to infiltrete a subversive organization, In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail-. able the services of an employee who a ment, Personnel directors in giants frequently communist-~domineted unions who retain thei their positions. With regard to both 10 and ll above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant thet he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contact After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in .an indus-— trial plant having acmead forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dis-— missezl or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the sams plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggsst that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities, .Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered, Review of Gozmunist Party registration records to ascertain what individ- uals merely registered but never became active . Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform ant when direct contact by <> ‘gent is inadvisable. . Request Bureau to furnish the services of an ' “ividueal who is availeble for such a contact, Officials and employees of ¥.-sign establishments in the U. S,. Employecs of the United Naticns Secretariat . Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of forsign officials stationed in the U. 8. - . Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in ea position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertske intelligence assignmen ats under the guidence of the Bureau. (See deseco program, sect ion 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.) Yy 2 able to advise of members of * nombershi merely to hold hp co INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS . When a decision made to consider a perticular individual for informe ant pur poses, background investigation must be conducted. This should consist of the following: . 1. Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly . of a subversive nature: - , 2. Discreet canvass of[logicaljlinformants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individ— wal's personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general. reputation, pre sent and past employments, and business connections, -Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future cmbarrassmont due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation, “ ‘ - ‘ 4. Check of local credit and arrest records, Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi- . fication Division to cbhtain the record, if any, of the informant, 5. <Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is 2 veteran. 6.. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve, 7. Domestic status and if any marital diffienlties ail details should be obtained, . . . . « 4 Docld:32989529 Page 1378 | 9-12-61 , : ct rLrseady is an informant of the manage eA SA EAN PREIS ATLL ENERO IOLA RTLED MALE MOLAR PTY CO BEG DRED SVE FILET ESO IIT HEY REA OE Bal EN We OTS aad peu x ware rO TS Aer Un
NW 55072 107B — C 9. 10. li. 12. 13, 14, 15, 16. 17. 18. 19, C. INVE SECEION L® SECURITY INFORMANTS AND COND , i T2TAL SOURCHS — - ‘ Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries Be alert to receive auy suggestions-of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization, In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail— able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage. ment, Personnel Girectors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist—dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positious. With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent originate the contect, . After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an indus— trielL plant having armed forces contracts, the comhunist frequently recants when he is informed of the cherges and is facing the possibility of dis— missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau Sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. .Be alert to take - advantage ef such co cooperation when offered. : Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ— uals merely registered but never became active Use of 2 reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform~ ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable, Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact, Oificials and employees of foreign establishments in the U, Ss. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. S. Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in @ position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of ‘the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manual.) cv cl STIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant pur~ poses, background investigation must be conducted, This shovld consist of the 1. 2. 3. following: Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature . . Discreet canvass of[logical]linformants- to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the i. tivid— wal's personal history (date and place of birth, ete.), patriotism, Lth, reliability, stability, integrity, gcneral reputation, present: and ae employments, and business connections. -Background investigation mu3é definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilised without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation, - Check of local credit and arrest records, Obtain necessary data for the completion ‘of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi- fication Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran, Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve, Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be - obtained, : . Dold: 3 2985595 Page 1379 ; 5-+12-~61
107B ~ ¢ NW 55072 9. “ine SECTION 107, QHMcuRITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDE? L SOURCES Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries ) 10. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or amploy-— ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the . past such contacts’ have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail- able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage. ment, ‘ li. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist—dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold . their positions, 12, With regard to both 10 and 11 abo ove, if possible, the official should suggest to the notential informant that he centact the Burcau rather than have an Agent originate the contact, . 13. After the Burcan hes notified the armed forces of a communist in an indus— trial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is "geoing the possitility of dis-— missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same % At such a time, officers fricndly to the Bureau sometimes sug¢ge2t shat the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. ._Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered, 14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascerta ain what individ uals merely registered put never became active 15. Use of 2 reliable third party to make the contact with a possivie inform ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to * furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a contact 16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U, 58. 17. Employees of the United Hations Secretariat 18. Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officiels stationed in the U. 58. 19,° Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign princiy?zi 2nd who } will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the , Bureau, (See deseco program, section LO5K,6h, volume IV, ec? this manval.) - INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS When a decision made to consider a particular individiual for informant pur- poses, background investigation must be conducte a. This should consist of the following: , 1. Gheok of field office files for derogatory information, partiovlarly of a subversive nature 2. Discreet canvass of[legicallinformants to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concern nalts personal history (date and place of birth, ete.), pa reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, pre employments, and business connections, ‘Background investid¢etion must Gotan bely establish that the potentiai informant can be v% 5 any danger of future enbaerrassment due to instability or un 2 ity - Seouring background information from the potential inform: sufficient; the background of the ihdividual must the . investigation, _ oe 4, Check of local credit and avcrest records, Obtain necessary iate for the completion ‘of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted te the Tdenti- fication Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant : 5, Armed services record ghould be réevicwed if the individual i 6. Check drazvt status or status in the armed forces reserve, 7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all detaiis sheuld be .Docld: 32989529 Page 1380 - 5-12-61. \ f obtained... var