‘{180-10142-10056] «fl, ches pomty Hele 3 of the U.S. Intelligence Community.* As a visual aid to the analysis of the materials contained in the four compilations discussed above, a chart has been prepared which illustrates the flow of written information from the CIA to the Warren Commission and the U.S. Intelligence Community concerning President Kennedy's assassination. This chart sets forth the C IA‘'s designation for each document listed and lists the subject matter of each document-and the date of each document's dissemination. The chart also indicates whether the document was made available to the Warren Commission, the U.S. Intelligence community or both. A secondary purpose of this chart is to indicate for selected subjects the volume of information provided to the U.S. Intelligence Community as opposed to the Warren Commission. During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the re- view of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and /0/42-16 OS5te
Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms! orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. (Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: “the ‘CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., p. 26.) A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation was directly responsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Ibid. p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,-p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor- mation to the Warren Commission. He stated: An inquiry would cofte over (from the Warren Commission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in indivi- dual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.) However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under
>» » 4 cree . ks en | Coke hor effect. The following exchange between Committee Gounsel , ait and Mr. Helms illustrates the acutesaey ve the Agency's compromise: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Hens , I take it from your testi- mony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were rele- vant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee . would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots. Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations. Mr. Goldsmith: Ifithe Warren Commission did-not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it. Is that not true? Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of |. the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go. traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees to to any- place else without the Director's permis- sion. Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whe- ther the Warren Commission should be in- formed of the anti-Castro assassination plots? Mr. Helms: TI did not, as far as I recall. MMe Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)
wowawen:, Géfen asked Be whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarassing the Agency or causing an international cris@€$ he responded: "IT cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot an- swer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (McCone deposition, p.16) . aad K Thus, the evidence indicates that B® Helms @#eone=e to discuss saformming yee approached McCone ee or NEES ieee o< pase ann on gong cit se HS @@— anti-Castro assassina- eg Warren Commission tion plots! might have geese Helms ¢ Todese would had meant his Jobe keen informéds McCone that plots were still being considered by the Agency S Buk sar ttelms testimony mY SEE Regarding neo relevanc of such plots to ts mnt ISS MACON Commission's work, such information s have been reported to the Warren Commission. See also Spector, p. 46) (But see Liebeler ,AgZPpo. . From he Cals perspecti p. w74) Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti- Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the pos- Sibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated: "...in light of what has happened a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken. I mean, there are any number of things that one can say in
yo - 16 - the light of history. What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep., p.45) John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Ken- nedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms’ non-disclosure to the Warren Commission: Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly ‘when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots? Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly re- prehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (Scelso dep., p.153) III. Introductory Section/SS+M The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information has been shown to have been dependent upon 1) the availability of information. and 2)the complexity of the issues pre- sented by the request. On this point, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission re- \ quest, the CIA would then send a reply back: "and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others. For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country. Obviously, one takes longer to per- form than the other. (Helms Exec. Session hearing, p.25)
bg BOT IPE Hue ok & A dent ich ¥reo ees an Kas im Wh T has Vo cammit tee at [ det. Ca vPS canctern 4 SENT VER Bou o Ge Cf fe Pr Ly ed cue oF rey a aren CEMMISS 0A an yestio tthe AOR s QS - 17 - Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such in- formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.) ot tres However, OS, tea — Conlin FoF prote ching its Jee, the CIA's senstived sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting @@@m information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin tae CO pro- expressed the opinion that the Agency's tect its sensitive sources and methods did @==a=Rge@,- woh sch omm effect egmgm the quality of the information to @Gigamar the Warren Commission and i (Rankin at p. 23) Jy gn some instancag LA from rr od “Nha \., PP <coswn- ery a] + iN he | dror h, rm it Agency wauimiamuigt2 unilateral decisions enqup@usthisngudnvemene] c— accesstecsA b .. ese gS materials igang | the Commission. (scekso dep. p-158) woos be S £0) Y- : « ie t ¢ ¢ ar investigation ; Of the CIA's Mexico City Station ellecks of ) As a related consideration ,the*controversy sur-
~ 18 - WA rounding™photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man" Each of these concerns will be examined ‘Qe Grerein. The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical] operations, as outlined above, was & . f . +e evident from the gbeception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that “we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep. p.158) Scelso further testified: We were going to give them intelligence re- ports which derived from all our sources,, in- cluding ‘*«rvrricg ‘sources, including thet ) nd the information -gott “ from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from th \ \ (Ext to Scelso quote, All of p.5) Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey ; Ztdan mene Oswald's trip to Mexico City. ‘(Cite.) Much of the informa- tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report. thebolicy Quueaigep Limiting Warren Commission know- ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention o
a) ane - 19 = Poet ] hid Aa MOE ( \ in order to protect your contin- uing ops . “Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents gf Soviet . Consular file which Soviets gaved yok 29Jan (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 964) - The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, | S ptcial LrvestigeX TOs Clerp~ of the CIA counterintelligence/ Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison mem to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup- ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided | with this report which indicated that some United States Agency” ) \ in Mexico. Papich queriea[ _| whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission withsource of ) ( ) (tne FBI had knowledge of CIA AN : jn Mexico City, see CIA §qor-3/779/510) memorandum 80888 that he discussed this matter with Scelso who in turn, after a discussion with Helms, ‘ was directed by Helms. to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. |__| wrote: He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Com- mission at least in this manner-~via the FBI- sensitive infoxmation which could relate to 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)
The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized o your Bureau. S FBI, CSC1-3/779/510) to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already: called to the at tie ion of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have informa- tion (as determined from Agency sources) coin- ciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (CSCI- TON Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA aan 9. called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He ~iemr suggest@Athat certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work with the Commission and with the Commission's cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods. helms clay mpeALooule Among the policies articulated aes LWO which enabl a the Agency to control the flow of information he CIA? originated by it ger In this way“check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. The poli- cies articulated were:
- 2] - 1) Your Bureau not disseminatéggr information re- ceived from this Agency without prior concur- rence 2) In-instances in which this Agency has provided - information to your Bureau and-.you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission ry é and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI ~3/559/710) rn be Licy cenmtinn eliminating @ reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. That cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and technigues was on that date still being withheld from the Warren Commission. Therein, it @@S§stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, CIA @#$to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission. However,
~ 22 - usas + foe in ae con thik vs0nl the form of this presentation th naa pro- tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques. (CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63) | - La Photo Surveillance i Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during & the initial stage of the aa \ana photo sur- , veillance operations in Mexico City, 2 Helms testified: The reason,for the sensitivity of these ) and surveillance was not onty be- cause it was sepsitive from the Agency's standpoint, but }e would have caused very bad feel- ings betweeh Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, pp.51-52, quam seh tama “ Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination. _and during the post-assassination 735 [srs S104] Facthacenace ) ieee, as * - f eiads of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council? had haan made Director McGeorge Bundy, % aware that the CI ‘ . » Pgainst the Cuban and Soviet Em- bassy/Consulatesand that through thesef swald's pre- sence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. Jeik Me Cong, piles Yoo We Geen xp Benth
The CIA'S e—ukenummeag- to inform the Warren Commission ly stages of w— in- Ilsfis-a-source ; ae ee figoney of-concern to thas Committee. It is indicative of an“ cium r pok's4 kh est nedfekerd in tS farcor st he Tete “ pdemomethe TONE PETC) tO wmminiennatitalaiaet ini : _ Wiech Lelt Uncembstable substance ommoer serene, information 2- provider 4 the Warren Commission. (See Scelso deby This process ‘ might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro- ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, even those which might have meant exposing certain sensi- tive operations to the Commission. As noted previously, on January 3l, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit€ during September 26, 1963 ~- October 3, 1963. That memorandum aid . th ; - eee noymention Oswald's various conver- sations with the Cuban and Sovbti Embassy /Consulate§s had * . ( }nd subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, dvd \ that memorandum sage ndy ention quimmeum~m@eee that the CIA f ‘pre transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and. Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico whic pan transcribed.
On February 1, 1964 Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memoran- dum of January 5/ , 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that Ars weieting otioeGeners aS Of timmizmeuswemeewerse, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge off jer the production ie”, the tapes and trans- _exipts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb- ruary 10, 1964 fatter whether Oswald's direct communica- tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in qd of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com- mission had been informed of . ) : Oswald this inquiry - by Rankin would not have been made. Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. ‘It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com- mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquar- ‘ters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various trans- cripts resulting from the CI ) f. \; Mexico City. (RScca dep. p.89) However, Ne. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission learned of these operations.
6 25.- On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indi- cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commissio PPX indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). x V. During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the cxf ) > Mexico City. A review of Shree these memoranda tend to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, and Willens did not obtain access to orf ) ( m terials until April 9, 1964. at that time, Coleman, 1lwson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City aus provided them with various transcripts and translations derived fro ) ‘pf the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson - memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: r) Aperi , HWS r, Prior to pe it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,
1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain Of the Cuban Embassy/Consulaté. ~ (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with _CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals” ~aeems the Warren Commission had learned that ClA ———=——==eg possess tak transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. Portices- hemes . Thees® conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, anime concerned Silvia. Durfia 's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal pa Orme . Police (cite?). @Gaaw@RMRMERMMe; Helms responded to the Com- ste -5 mission's request for access, gjmmumum@eee that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representatives' {> review @B this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964) tt shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-~Armas . FAs detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA! . n Mexico City. (crs One or the other could well have provided the War- ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray- mond Roqgas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep. ) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.
Another SlLawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated CPMALELM IG that the tentative conclusions Oswald's that he had reacheg memoranda@ of January 31, 1964 and February 193, 1964, Mexico trip, were derived from CIA and ,in additioy a Mexican federal police summary gp of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote: A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned en they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, $B an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu- rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. These comments indicate that safson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that salftson had been provided the Duran :\transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments conerning the Meiftan police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25 ¢ had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. a insect P 2% The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion Wrote. wo of ; he itiviem@mees based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testi- . his yramne Can dren pears mony before the Mexican police. p RARER sn subiriibanaan ry no
- RRA Ne aE irda Sree emery af oth a reves ce enh et COED  o ~ 28 - indication that he. nad reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, @ Csiawsoy had™been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accoreins noted for this purpose. His analysis gould havenweflected the fact of this ees ither by its corroboration or above’ RKInsxtpF criticism of the Nexiean police summary report. Mestigaite a. been given s Sdawison nestents y he Commission had been yy - J ~— a@ecSs to the Duran transcripts. forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not more suspt® fo. reference to «he surveillance operai yand a“ summary, po- lice report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera- tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem- ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of in order to protect your coMtinuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents . Sov “re consular file which Soviets gave ( Cc ere. ; CiA le, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, . 1964 CIA p.2144)
~ 29 - ¢ He statedgchat this conclu, joie, 37 2S based upon his — ey . wt review of Silvfa Duran's test fony Co he Mexican ,ot Pee . times. by (Slawson megorandum, Mar fi, 1964 CIA p. Sf?) Howeyer, an % Slawson goes not statgf Pchat hts fonclusioyf# were alsg@#drawn from review of fhe the p fic tion. fyb the Mexg fo City of i Gg , eil _ ince operaffions. ae, Fauson d Indicate, Soe eat OES ae roe Warren howevar, thay fnis~"easonings - pcan —_ regard i .~Qswald's P _ Fane ‘visit to- the. ‘Cuban- “Biibassy. oer aaa statigd su ann po nee i ae Logically, access to the roduction would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy, re- questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem- ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as | whe cH had twice Oswald # at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, CEC | | definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on-at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dateSand exact times of his presence in the Cuban nmbassy MBM Sstablished as the result of the » Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts
~ 30 - could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its @dnception but as the record indicates they were not then made available. ~ The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series o ) Yin a memorandum of that date by Coleman — and Slawson, they articulatedfone question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agencye (Ambassador Hann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Cole manancd Slawsen Cote’ 1) What is the information source referred to in the’ November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa; 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts / \translated if possible, in { refer all cases where tht ‘yar to the assassination or rélated subjects; f 3) We would especially like to seé ) in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed gent) The. question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the C of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). Necessarily, if Slawson ~aam~ our tf NEC cy toc quest , the source of the information, he had not been
- 31 + - provided that source ctr ne ? (Fier Naas vod : The first Coleman-Slawson request QP ends te Shows the CommiSeren ese that jeer aaa given access, concerning the assassination (asyTanchearty copeenyra Pted . pods cetes Whew § MSG er Lorem cree a “| ne gs CPs Ga Fea ea a EL er idea Qandil Gauls hat done tiduhit SARA ASAT ) ° he . r. RoE RG YATE TES memerare aac: {- befir uy tvag Ceripts od CP" had NOt een The second request,{item number three of the above listing? reveals tha the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies @& discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. af the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re- Noe ie. 8 presentatives. (Cite.) A tok On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving.complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip. They wrote: The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con- spiracies, etc. took place.
---In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican. investigatory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves. The thoroughness of investigation which Coleman and Slawson articulated as a vital concern to the Commission's thwarted by the CIA's @@@™—concern Wg swears” sources and methods, relevant ex ie « Ceng Aeris work had been @g to the Commission's investigation, the Ttmited number of persons engaged in an investigation of a gravity and historical signifi- erileree cance unprecedented in this nation's history +NIT mm ‘ DR Sromtia O avren Commissions tafg wat in bycusatbele , On April 9, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. Prior to their departure, they met with Thomas Mann, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's hol A assassination. Ambassador Mann i@@=S@eeesthe Warren Commission representative hat the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. )
Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA. That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of th . ) operations and English translations of the same. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances David Slawson wrote: "...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative inde that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, Avril 22, 1964, p. 22) Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. in mediakel ; Scott indicated that his staff qa@mmepepempmmet began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. ))Mexican officials, particularly Liis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Golernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded si—=
"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis- closed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that ‘this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible fr-™ the -vininal source materials at some later time 45 (p.24) : Slawson's memorandum of April 21, roe va of the notetaking from original source mat x 2 following Scott's disclosures. These note ie with the telephonic intercepts pertaining @®, respectively} “the Duran and Oswald conversationsSorthe peried Sept a7—Oct / ) 1963. It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic f- té 7] + * age ep OO surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired @. . gs Pr arery a courately Poa Sened, \ ies ability to draw “conclusions } fregarding Oswal: putes ne ea SAE RCS BN City, x NV of April 10, 1964, x nearing the halfway poini Commission investigation, the Commission wa: a the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise couls have horn materials weme available for analysis by the Commission.
Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with 19 vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation. that might have been more seriously considered had EDLS ager canaries anys vot . nets Bing IO gestae aii remiss material been expeditiously provided: (e.g. Cuban involvements oF RRs tev ap GTN nN eR OSS VI. Mexico City Mystery Man On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son. THEE, photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. This photograph was one in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates had been linked by the Mexico City Statio Prior to the. \assassination,~ Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to oswara. € Cite Hebns 66jdewet. inWer) | On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before | the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that 5 Wage RE § she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (p. 153)
py vrs me Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Thomas Karramesints Acsstackt Pope CO itt. | tinine, Cegarding the yr adh An dota inael uses cdot this “photograph” by the circumstances Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin GBB requested that the Commission be the identity of the individual os , ; ; 5 ; depicted in the photograph if that information wemm available On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone, Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret- Since Noyembl AZ, IV? Services that the CIA had disseminated“several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret reports and other materials. thee ibe cables theastomerenet: ‘ concerned wasies the photograph of the individual Rie City Sia tan aS kgm «Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother. @8bn, Among the materials hy PRECIA disseminated“to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination (DIR85177), a-ccopy.ofwhiehwestrarsmrttedrrto iCos the.seeret™ Service. That cable concerned the Dord@ggggg-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of cI = Mexico City*at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated: ab co wank ee TS requested copies of these Momiencasienty? )
“We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we-did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?" Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission. Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations. (Scelso deposition, R; 150) ‘ 7 Kee Foeksrucattg ban, 146 th: : a ? the Warren het BNE RRA Sly Myer ted | SENN seks Oe ee ores Tyla tan fot ee ag oe nee ee Coe ee : access to oO Saw fv’ at & anc€leri shen Yofoe C ft > - roduction’ (as discussed in the Sim Jia ofan e | preceding section), the -#eyegm of the photosurveillance operations, due ¥ha. Ad al Ken COCR CHEET fam Mand, Beg moe ads . * to cause concern within .Commission the Agency. On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that “we have a problem here for your determination.“ Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since Novem ker 23, \ 1964. Rocca then stated: | "Unless you feel otherwise,’ Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous s@x photographs which are not of Oswald..." (Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)
On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and Slawson memo, March 12, 1964) The’ record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communica- tions techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrase are complete." (Rankin letter of March 16, 1964, #2) Rankin further indicated that the same procedure to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, £963 which had not yet been furnished because it sommes sensitive sources and methods. (Rankin letter of March 16, #3) | Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (DDP4-1554, CD631 and DDP4-1555, CD 674) by two separate communications. CD63l1 provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (SS on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had waeqermeee
requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in “order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswala FAIS by checking the photograph against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963. CD 674 reveals that on November 22, 1963, immediately following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not, revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency further stateg| that the subject of the photo referenced w96§ in these cables was not Oswald. It m@ further stated that: "In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the regional copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and-the cables on which they were based,as well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA, p. 116444 of notes) On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record: "The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24,196° (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inguiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested."
Coleman went on to state: "As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin. by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry." The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. ( othis vis it | Sterns' memorandum“reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The f£i1@ also contained: MP “Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photo- _ graph of the unidentified individual mistakenly believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to ye the Secret Service by the CIA. Stern noted that these messages were accurately para- phrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. & Stern. also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to the CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background information on Oswald.
VIT. Stern noted that these messages were also paraphrased sed fe othe accurately aS Ieqmmmieemg in the CIA's January 31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to oswalare lokeel documents Located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased." Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representa- tive had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission Relationship It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence and one of the Geven members of the Warren Commission, concealed crucial information from the Warren Commission. Specifically,-the Senate Select Committee concluded: "With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency." (SSC, Book V, pp. 67-68) However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship and allegiancegof Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former DCI of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles'
service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which indicates Dulles =aum dh providijsmm information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission TALS mtrme Pas det om ten ng te chau activities and investigative policies. act leogtenté that Dulles acted as an informant ontoccasion’ for ‘the CIA. PS pre craca cdi, concerned the contro- versial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. The memorandum was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division part ‘eatlarly, Cancerncd « wat tT bee, who was ‘iam “ 2 Sellars 9's wom ' S interrogation. David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964 concerned his discussions with Allan Dulles ZaNosenko's knowledge of Oswald. This memorandum was prepared for DDP Helms. Murphy wrote: "Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could: possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report. Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language "which would allude to the existence of other, unverified information on the Oswald case." This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko information.
Murphy continued: "Tt was agreed an effort would be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko information from the report. To attempt this, howéver, we would have to know precisely in what context the Warren Commission intended to make use of the Nosenko information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the informa-~ tion he needs from Mr. Rankin." Whether by design or as an unintended result, the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the Warren Commission, was prepared to compromise his position with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically ahbowt Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case.  Ija@lso rdin goer ssion position on Nosenko, and that Dull efepared to act in this regard as a high level and Vy well placed informant for the CIA. Murphy prepared a second memorandy ted 28 July 1964. and Richard Helms, David Murphy and Tennant Bagley of the CIA. \
Luisa Calderon Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination,.a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named “Luisa". received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attach- ment) This call had pee . oy the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of it Operation. (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate. During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone: "Yes, Of course, I knew almost before Kennedy." The callerwent on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:
ho wav We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one- of the segregationists or against intergration ‘who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort __ of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows Luisa responded: Imagine, one two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.) Raymond Rocca, f= seca rae £o ‘ a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments: Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion, of foreknowledge. This is the only iten ( . Levee oy pe the Cubans anc Soviets after the assassfnation that contains the suggestion of foreknow- ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15) Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic com- ments do not merit serious attention. Her words may in- deed indicate ‘foreknowledge of the assassination but may also-egmmiey be interpreted without such a sinister impli- cation. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assas- Sination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.
name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent by oui AMbaS Sad Or set} tothe ARAGE Qepartment. (DIR 85573 fr a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Iptelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was him- self a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding | In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's Cuban Intelligence operations. Calderon's ties to Cuban Sntelligence were reported to the Warren comission on ent ee (Did the State Department supply the cable to the Warren wel \ Commission? Have we reviewed their Mann file?) However, Stam (¥5 Filerceher the Committee has determined that the CIA did not provide Calderon's conversation to the Warren Commissiong CLS As acesult olthe ak prods, the Warren Commission was aware that Calderon had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Com- mission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this re- gard may have roreckhsea the Commission from actively pursing a lead of great significance. > ‘ ._ in that cable Mann stated: ...Washington should urgently consider feasi- bility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban
Consulate here." This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann Sar See. Rusts re: .. -persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy. Mann went on to state in urgent terms: "They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican govern- ment could use them as witnesses." According to CIA files, Calderon returned to Havana on December 16, 1963, less than four weeks after the as- sassination. Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions (Cites). During her reinterrogation, Duran was questioned wast Ss regarding her association with Calderon. No g@aaseefee-en. is ® on; . the ete J ts inferfe @ given in t¢#ts-report for the question$concerning Calderon (Cites). The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964 (DDP4-0940), more than two months after Calderon had re- turned to Cuba.
-~ 47 - Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in “Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch, 21612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City ShStion and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis- patch. had attached to it a report containg biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's Gommercial Office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report. On September 1, 1963, 4 Calderon's association with the, Cuban DGI reco AZA PY irst sepe@eed WP the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that Sostgpr hang oS c& time ft .,; Chief of Counterintelligence for the . . reps‘ tea . Special Affairs Staff, wepeeaed the results of his de- briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that ammuG|{nad no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-~
; 4aas telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-—1 “Hier tesfh asked if Oswald #as known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-] cond” ) dum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, rN) Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. Corte Mags rans ) band, oSCA_ ‘Fhereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch 4&3 re, TAN UAT f traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, Miarte. "for Cuba Shertla a Sher tte aSSASSinKON Cortem Ay coms «) 23th, On May 7, 1964,/ ~.c~esma’ precorded additional informa- tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible.contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memoran- dum stated in part: “a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not per- formed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high. -b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico,: she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the “Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.
Ae On May further disclosed AMMUG's know- bamaesc4 +. ledge of the Oswald case. ( paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows: _ _ I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American. in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI althought she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al- though Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something \ Similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan- dez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine- professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald... On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the informatio had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that “the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis- cuss the AMMUG/] sitafttion on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this
A dnd takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writ-~ * ing.’ (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments). On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi- tivity and operational Significance. Attached to Helms' j perm, OS CH ‘5 communication was a paraphrased accounting of ) May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez Ame set forth. However, that attachment RKSS no reference. what- soever to Luisa Calderon. Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, yyyyb4esvwetr the baton, & SEK questions used ot s)interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's Gounterintelligence esearch and Analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw "p May 5. memorandum. The only mention of Alderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about \ six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early & - hi amqosu in 1964. However, Willens was not shown the’ ' -Memoran- dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible
eie™ association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intel- digence. Core Dosle, ma) © EN. It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5, 7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced in the Calderon 201 file. Their existence was determined by the Committee's independent review of other agency files. WR, “Tne Warren Commission Wik as of aN a jrumA little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead. It had effectively been denied significant background This deniak ete, Comma! SSieas information wan may have impeded or prevented Ss pur- suit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kenned PL if the Warren Com- mission had been apprised of Calderon" s background and ido fictivn possible contact with Oswald it still wig denied the one C7 | Bho. Significant piece of information that might have inkereitin Calderon aan its ix to. a more serious level. The nets Warren Commission CD vaMeore about Calderon's conver- Mh Phe Bante ogg + an ae S$ wot o£, Oe ee oF gh sation, of November 22, 1964. Phys cone ion ee , re ta he Corry ~ jf-e = 45 ows Be Oe aan het wn ABA Wey “4 at aad ractehke Cad OPS Ae j [-€ - Eng bee. ; [rn rae dpa Cy pant uf ot Eegmetoty ~” tHe | Roa of how we know we ree cite ‘testimony of F€ankin,; ~Siawsoni giv. possible motive for not telling _ Stalled. information on Luisa 0, (mentions CIA Ociation; site the dispatéhclose out with OSE te, Rankin aa i fa . 2 pr aban of &
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