70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. » DoclId: 32105779 10/5/61 10/5/ 61 10/5/61 10/5/61 1961 1961 11/15/61 Page 15 ~2- Memo for record, Parrott "the presence and positions of Raul (Castro) and Che Guevara mast be taken into account. " Memo for record, Parrott "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned." Memo for record, Parrott "on the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned.” Memo for record, Parrott "contingency that Castro would in same way or another be removed from the Cuban scene.” "The Situation and Prospect in Cuba," CIA Board of National Estimates. "His (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime...(i)ts principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a conmon danger." . "some sort of power struggle would almost certainly develop eventually.” ; . "significantly." Cover letter to CIA Estimate Report, Lansdale "seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your project.” Report, CIA Board of National Estimates "it is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising -..could be foamented." Cover letter to CIA Estimate Report, Lansdale "conclusion of fact quite outside the area of intelligence. Memo, Lansdale to Kennedy "picture of the situation has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba." AdVddIT ddOd “A ATWUID AHL NOU AdODOLOHA
79. 11/30/61 Memo, White House to Secretary of State, et al. "Use our available assets...to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime." 80. 1/19/62 Memo, McManus | "Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible." | " ..'a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov[ermmen]t. No time, money, effort — or manpower is to be spared.'" "'yesterday...the President had indicated to him’ that final chapter had not been written -—- its got to be done and will be done." 81. 1/20/62 Memo, Lansdale "demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command." 82. 1/30/62 Minutes, Special Group "policy determination." 83. 2/20/62 "Program Review of Cuba Project," Lansdale “open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." "Resistance." "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders.” "This should be a 'Special Target' operation...Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police — G2 [intelligence] officials." (Id., p. 151.) AUMWdaIT GHOd °a AGTWHAD AHL WOWA AdODOLOHA 84. 1/30/62 Memo, Craig to Lansdale "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban Communist hierarchy." "system of financial reqards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Commnists." ! "government officials." . "2h" DoclId: 32105779 Page 16
85. 86. 87. 88. 89, nN 90. 91. 92. DocId: 32105779 11/30/62 3/2/62 3/5/62 3/5/62 3/5/62 4/11/62 4/10/62. 9/14/62 Page 17 Memo, President Kennedy "kept closely informed.” Memo, Lansdale “popular revolution." Minutes, Special Group Augmented "...amy actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the Special Group for resolution.” . "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose. " "The Special Group (5412 Augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the (Mongoose) project, for _approving important operations and for monitoring progress." Memo, Lansdale to Helms "for each week as far into the next twelve months as possible - «sethe members and type of agents you will establish inside Cuba... (and) brief descriptions...of actions contemplated." Memo, Lansdale "be submitted to the Special Group for decision, ad hoc." Memo, Harvey to McCone "To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying.” Memo, Special Group Augmented Meeting ".,..made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to-be presented in more detail on a case by case basis." AUWdaIT GdOd “UY AIWHAS AHL WOU AdODOLOHA wo
93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. DocId: 32105779 3/5/62 10/16/62 11/5/62 © 4/11/62 3/14/62 3/2/62 8/8/62 8/10/62 Page 18 Minutes, Special Group Meeting "preliminary actions...involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents." "keep its hand tightly." "that many of the agents infiltrated would be of an all- purpose type; that is, they would be trained in para- military skills, as well as those of exclusively intelli- gence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although every effort will be made to attempt such control." Memo, Helms "pointed out that (Mongoose) had been underway for a year ...that there had been no acts of sabotage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice." Memo, McManus to Helms / During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military inter- vention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals." Memo, Lansdale “essentially an intelligence collection." "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose." "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts in the coming . months." "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt." Memo, Lansdale “must be inconspicuous." Memo, Lansdale for Special Group Augmented "stepped-up Course B plus." Minutes, | Special Group Augmented "CIA variant." "old-line Communists." . “a QTWHES AHL WONT AdOOOLOHd AUWaGIT quod
101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. Bocld: 32105779 10/4/62 8/23/62 10/4/62 10.16.62 9/9/62 8/31/62 9/12/62 4/19/62 Page 19 Minutes, Special Group Augmented Meeting "is concerned about progress on the Mongoose program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations." "considerably more sabotage." "all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime." NSAM 100 ."in ‘Light of evidence of new Bloc activity in Cuba." "with all possible speed." “for the time being." Memo, Helms "more personal attention.” Minutes, Special Group Augmented Meeting "It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered." Memo, Lansdale to Special Group Augmented "to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions." Memo, Lansdale to Taylor, Rusk, and McNamara "emphasizing such activity.” "cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel." "considerations will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel." Memo, Lansdale to Special Group "Upon the return of Mr. Harvey fiom his current field visit, more specific information on the status of agent training and operations should be made available." “ad GTWaaIS AHL WOU AdODOLOHd AUWVdGIT qaodr
109. 110. li. 112. 113. DocId: 32105779 Page 270 4/26/62 4/26/62 4/27/62 5/3/62 4/14/67 Memo, Lansdale to Special Group [Augmented] "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations." Memo for record, McCone "attend the next meeting and report on agent activities." Memo, Elder to Harvey “immediately on your return to discuss the Task Force activities." Memo, Harvey on Special Group Augmented Meeting "agent teams." "general field of intelligence.” Memo, McCone to Helms "dispose of Castro." "knock off Castro." "the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba." AMVdaIT GdoOd “A ATWUAD FHL WOU AdODOLOHA
114. 1/13/60 115. 3/14/60 116. 11/3/60 117. 3/14/60 DocId: 32105779 Page 271 Memo, Special Group Meeting "the CIA did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro" Special Group Minutes "there was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevera should disappear simultaneously." Special Group Minutes "whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara" "that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in comception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities." Special Group Minutes "Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Conmunists and there was therefore the > danger they might move into control." AUVdaIT GUOA °A GIWAID AHL WOUA AdODOLOHA