JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION Date:09/07/94 Page:1 Released under the John ; Ollection Act of 1992 MEMORANDUM ase#:NU 53244 Date: He6—-153-2017 AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R 2255 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : JOHNSTON/DWYER/GREISSING TO : SENATOR HART TITLE CONNECTION BETWEEN AMLASH AND INVESTIGATION OF JFK ASSASSINATION : DATE : 01/27/76 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : AMLASH INVESTIGATION OF JFK ASSASSINATION @ CASTRO CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : U . RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1€, DONOR REST., REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : X DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/07/94 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 53244 DBocld:32202181 Page 1
Lae CIA HASNO OBJEC TONTO DECI ASSIFICATION AND/OR EEA RELEASE-OF, TH! ea TO: Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator schveiker || K FROM: Jim Johnston , Dan Dwyer Ed Greissing DATE: January 27, 1976 re [é Su RIa- SUBJ: Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation of JFK Assassination © Background ae . ad ~The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January 9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and after a delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to review the file on January 23 and 26. yoummary of Amlash File 7 .. Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruc- tion in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA agents until mid-1963. Why there was a year lapse in contact with Am- lash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.: 4e In any event, DIR 48198 to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that ‘Auwhip, a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of ° an “activation effort to reluctant dragon.'"' Presumably, Amlash was "reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA. In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil. He cabled Amwhip about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal that he was prepared to meet Amwhip in Porto Alegre. Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of meetings which they viewed essentially_as_a get acquainted session. CIA messages tell a different story. @BOmeopAirerucmo0y eo Dee i September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he were only two 5 > felt there ways of getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S. forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was an "inside job." Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier as "too cumbersome" for his purposes. HW 53244 *pocthlReoster Messages sent from Langley.
At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters cabled on 9 September that, based on what little feel Headquarters had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his- own co- horts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage and more serious, Eters on an orderly basis. (DIR 6/110 tok US) (Horo prey O08" to DIR summarized the intel-- ligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe. - |! A document in the file dated 16 September and marked@@REW 72775 appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means. There is no indication the conversation takes place, but it probably is Gimme — “Mary: I don't want to imagine things but this thing of Amlash. \ Moreno: It is either a tremendous secret or a ~ top secret matter (unreadable) then the word "treason" or "reason"). Betty: I believe it is a top-secret matter." By letters of September_14 and September 16, Amlash Stayed in contact with Amwhip. MBanilcy Cationy apparently was picking up responsi- bility for Amlash at this ‘time, since (@eParismOyoowto DIR dated 19 September asks for some background material on Amlash. On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group as well as a communist group. The message also notes that Fidel is allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba. Nevertheless, Amwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According togBani 209349to. DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5 October. Case officer 9 sat and listened permitting Amlash to get everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the -low level espionage matters that had been discussed at. the September meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role. Case officer O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)''" With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash con- sy * The files do not accurately identify these case officers. mp Gee, and mi Pepe, however, were the principal case officers. HW 53244. -DoclId:32202161 Page 3
-3- (ATRPATA TES 3 siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job.*™" On October 15, (Honldons5224 fto DIR states case officer O met with © Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October- Although. the case officer had been forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's request for a high level meeting. "Amlash convinced that if such meet does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite decision: Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest target level which believe we cannot afford overlook." “jf ' This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's role. DIR 75683 (eOeLowden-fon 15 October directed case officer 0 to return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case. The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative of RFK. He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR,. that the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti- communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the. present Cuban leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.S. to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S: support could come only after a successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel, the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would disintegrate. He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion but desired to know what technical support he could get. Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was asked about Amlash's reaction to the meeting. His reactions are summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 Novem- ber. Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S. government. While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not ' at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not under- stand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. Amlash had accepted the fact he had to work with the CIA, but CIA might lose him if it continued to procrastin-, _ “ate. Amlash talked about going to the rretich térrorist organization, the OAS, but realized that was not feasible. The memorandum ends with what apparently is the author's conclusion: "It is hoped that he does realize that Havana must first be taken’. .-..or failing that, a truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) -which could be true rallying point." OILUINE HW 53244 - Docld: 32202181 - Page 4
HW 53244 © DoclId:32202181 Page 5 In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. Amlash was to be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup. He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18 and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment. The memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash operation be kept to a minimum." : to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called g November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to Cuba in order to see case officer 0 "if'it something interesting." The CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but -that it was to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in the 29 October meeting.) o Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the mom- ing of November 22 for this meeting. garimloOysto DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting had taken place. It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that day. The file contains no outgoing cableGtospatisk}on November 23 or any other time telling(®amits¥to break contact with Amlash.*-* On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash. The first two pages have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon. The type on the third page is much lighter as though prepared on a ‘typewriter with an old ribbon. Itimade no mention of the passing  — _ gf _a poison pen to Amlash.. . On November 27, @Barisel6697to DIR reports information obtained in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices. A source com- plained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they denigrate the revolution. The source said she wished she had a con- cealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash as. one of these visitors. * Desmond Fitzgerald ** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent but could not be found.