10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25, has control. |} emphasized. | more pronounced, a particular problem which I think Al director is military -- absolutely. TCP SECRET 52 a hig deal but a Mr. Kirbow. Because principally this is what occurs at the Agency ‘today if the DCI is not there... The three star Mr. Miller. Let's say the control of the Agency is what we have in mind. Civilian control of the Agency should be Mr. Kirbow. Well, unless you're careful you will eliminate any military people from being in the act at all. Mr. Inderfurth. well, I think it has to be nailed down to who is going to run it, whether one of the three, two of the three, or. whatever. | “Mr, Kirhbow. We have this problem, which is a little Quanbeck could speak to you here because we're going to have to consider it in his paper, and that's the national security agency and the rather peculiar problem there that if your Senator Huddleston. If you put in the statement that we believe that civilian control is essential -- Mr. Kirbow. In the national. intelligence function, Senator Huddleston. And then only one of the three could be military. .Mr, Inderfurth. Again, Bill, only one of the three would TAP SECDET Docld: 32423516 Page -55
10 11 12 13 14 15 1? 18. || 19 20° 21 22 235 20. 24 ‘TOP SECRET) 5. allow that it would he possible for the DCI plus the person running the CIA -- no, I'm sorry. , | , Mr. Quanbeck.. In the case of the NSA -— Senator Huddleston. A majority of those three must be civilian. Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I wish you would hear, because it's on this very subject to civilian control, the NSA thing, because it is. peculiar to that group out. there. | | Me. Quanbeck. Traditionally, the NSA has been headed by a military officer and the deputy has been a career -aryptologis Now in order: to. emphasize. civilian: control, we considered ‘having the director be a civilian;.and we came down to thé’ idea. that one of: the two. should be a civilian without. specifiying, and emp sizing the civilian control and getting the best. qualified indivi without.specifying | that one be civilian and the other be a car cryptologist.. He could. be.a well qualified individual. Mr. Kirbow. And the problem there was that if the Director were a civilian appointee, he may have ho crypto experience, and then the number 2 man would be a military man and there. wouldn't be anything out there representing those career crypto people that have made their whole life in the Agency. oo Mr. diGenova. So -the fix is only one? Senator Huddleston. I think so and civilian control is essential Oo TAR @Feerer Docld: 32423516 Page 56
‘qsh54 qo | TOP SECRET | 54 ~ ld. Mr. Quanbeck. Do you want that to apply in wartime as & || well?- 5 . Mr. Kirbow. Unless you say desirable, it'll mean there'll 4 ||never be a career military man out of the Agency. 5 Lf you promise that with the fact that it is essential -~ 6 || | Sénator Huddleston. All right, I'll agree with that. 7 Now let's move on. | | - 8. Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, one of my associates pointed obit 9 ‘that the paper which precedes, that starting on page 37 10 || ana going down through to the beginning of the recommendation 11 || section of that paper on page 43, that in the period required 12 || by the Committee to consider recommendations the other day, > 13 || that none of the language from 37 through the first full 14 paragraph on the top of page 43 had heen considered by the 15 || Committee and we might, should -—= 16 oo Mr. Aaron. That's correct, and more than that it needs 1 to be severely scrubbed. | 18 ||. Mr. Kirbow. it needs to be worked on tremendously, 19 |} so maybe we can do that today and get back. 20 7 *. We just haven't taken it up, Me. chairman. We've been 21 pressed with other business and this fell through ‘the cracks, 22 | Mr. Aaron. ‘It! Ss been suggested that we. expand the: sectio 23 || Somewhat since it really only had one paragraph and we tried ‘ 24 to include something about the threat as well as something “25 about. the operations, and I think it requires some furt ther work. Tey Fe feeorr Docld:32423516 Page 57
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18° ~ 19. 20 21 22 235 25 Now I'll just ask a question in this regard. Is it a fair assumption on the part .of the staff that even as the Committee considers these findings and recommendations and puts in their various fixes, that we will have some opportunity to go through here and try to clean up the language’ once” the policy issues are settled? | Senator Huddleston. Yes, and the members’ themselves wil probably have some suggestions. Mr..Kirbow. As -I indicated before, Mr. Chairman, we can do this up to the dav it goes to the printer. We did it on the previous drafts and we did it on the galleys. Mr. Aaron. If we could return to the Department of State and the ambassador's paper, now I hope people have had an opportunity to: look through this. I've tried to incor~ porate, at least as far as I could, various views. | | Mr. Inderfurth. This goes with:page 95, so it should be page 95 through 101, and then you don't have a page 102, and then on to page 103. | a | “Mr. Aaron. Now there is some bracketed language as well as bracketed recommendations. I might just - gat the discussion  - -going with what we know are problems. Why don't we just take up the first one here and that is there is an example here concerning coordination of agent recruitment programs: with the ambassador on page 83 and-it says, for exampl a [major]. new CIA recruitment program targeted on a friendly TAR Geen s a Docld:32473516 Page 58
gsh 56 — . TOP SECRET a 56 ’ 4 1 [European] country was under consideration in Washington, et cetdr nal 2 | Now some people believe we ought to take out major and 5 some people think we ought to take gut European. I think most 4 everyone agrees that one of those words should come out because 5 it narrows us down to France, Germany, and Britain, and since _ 6 | Britain is off limits, it narrows down to Germany and France. 4 / . My recommendation is to take out the. word major. I | 8 would like to reserve the word European because I think it's 9 important to give some, fiavor of the character of the program. 10 If the word major comes out, there are then more than a dozen 11 || European. countries that this might involve. le . Mr. Kelley. What about. ; Western - or something like ra. 13 that, not so much geographic but major allies? 14 Mr.- naron. Western would be all right, as a matter of “45 fact. But what we want to.get at is that this simply isn't 16 just a program like in Brazil where we have done this stuff 17 for years and years and years. But we're really talking about 18 something else. | | | 19 oe If Western would do it, I'd be happy to take out major 20 and put in Western. | 21 | Me. Kirhow. Take out European? 22 | | Mx. Aaron. ‘Yes, and put in Western. 23 || Mr. Kirbow. ‘If the example you are trying to make is ' VO 24 a Gisagreement or is a’ fact that the ambassador was not aware . _ 25 || of something that the station chief was aware of, you can Docld: 327423516 Page 59
14 165 16 1? 18 19. 20 eal 22 235 29 TOP SECRET on Sav a major program and leave out European or Western or anything else because that is not. pertinent. to the fact. He can be an ambassador in Lower Uganda and have the same right. -because. he is the number one man in the country. Senator Huddleston. Except you're talking about a specific case. . Mr. Kirbow. - We' re all trying to avoid pointing out the country by using the ambassador! s name or anything, Mr. Chairman, because it is really a touchy subject and goes directly to a very classified matter in a European country. Mr. Kelley. But we still want to make the point that. this was sensitive, that the size and importance of this countr made these an even more egregious example and I wonder ie maybe if. Western, Charley, still doesn' t €it the bill, we could use some word like sensitive, in a sensitive country because it really is different. If it's Lower Uganda rather - than a major,as it was in fact,a NATO ally. Mr. Kirbow. I would agree that substituting. sensitive for the word major and striking the word European should give no foreign intelligence agency a handle up on this particular program. | Mr. Kelley. Why don't we see what the CIA. says. “Mr. Kirbow: They have. Mr. Kelley. Why don't we put in sensitive program -in a friendly Western country and. see what the CIA says? We don't - TAP Crenrr Docld: 32423516 Page 60
gsh 58 10 11 12 Ve 13 | da 15 “16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 29 25° DocId:32423516 Page 61 — know about it. That has happened for years and years, you know, | which we've had lots of relationships with. We're talking abou 24. ¥OP SECRET ss have to vet this ourselves. | Mr. Miller. Isn't the point about, that is being made. that it's going around the Ambassador and it seems to me that if the detail is to illuminate that point rather than where it takes place, then you don't need the specifics? Mr. Aaron. No, I think Bob Kelley has. the point. It) isn't just that we have a major program and ambassadors don't around the world. “The important point here is that we're talking not about just a country in which we've heen involved for a long time a country in whom. the programs of this character could. have a major impact_.on the country itself and on our interests there and on their relationship to us. | “And in that case, and on vital U.S. interests. Mr. Maxwell. Could I suggest a fix, which is to be a major: and highly sensitive program? Mr. Kirbow. ° May I suggest that if that's what we're trying to show by example we're using a very poor example here because { was only under consideration in Washington and the decision had not been made on this particular covert operation and if we want to- use an example of the ambassador being left out of the action, this is not it. Mr, Aaron. I disagree with that point. Coot ame am TE ate Te cea aan aoe)
59 Senator Huddleston. Well, we want to talk about whether not the Ambassador ought to he brought into this. Mr, Kirbow.: It's just a matter of when you bring him into the action. | | | | Me. Maxwell. For example, a major ina highly sensitive CIA recruitment program targeted ona friendly country were__ under consideration in Washington. If it's major and highly sensitive, I don't think we need to say where it is. | Senator Huddleston. L think that's all right. Mr. Miller. I challenge the idea that it's major. } Senator Huddleston. Major and/or sensitive. | Mr. Kelley. Why don't we see what the CIA says about the word Western. They may be perfectly happy with that word “as opposed to European. ° - ‘Senator Huddleston. 1 think it does make an important ‘point, that even involving friends, that we could strain an | already good relationship when the Ambassador was not taken int “confidence. | a Mr. Aaron. And we'll take a close look at this as well. Mr. Inderfurth. In light of the U.S. position in the world today, friendly may also limit it to the point that it can he identified. . | | | Mr. Kirhow. Mr. Chairman, I can't emphasize how sensitive the word recruitment is. When you add the other words to it. yo TAM ereperr i ) Doctd: 32423516 Page 62
cre | TOP SECRET 66 1 make it very clear to everybody that. you are trying to recruit a very high official in that government. oa | If the word recruitment doesn't, if you're talking about 4 la major new CIA program targeted and leave the word recruitment 5 out, you will inhibit the enemy from finding out exactly the 6 individual's’ name that you're talking about and recruitment 7 || doesn't add anything ‘to it, does it, David? 8 | What point are you trying to make in leaving this stuff 9 || in? The fact that the Ambassador was not brought into the 10 || act, right, and it was an important program: 11 Senator Huddleston. The nature of the act, I think, 12 || has to be defined to some degree before you know how serious te 13. it was that the ambassador was not included. 14 sO Let's leave it there and see what the Agency says if 15 || the Full Committee accepts this. 16 | Mr, Kirbow. Then will we bracket this to the Full 17 || Committee, Mr. Chairman? 18 ‘Senator Huddleston. We certainly have an opportunity 19 || to take exception to it, 20 Mr. Kirbow. We had taken that exception at the staff. 21 level and obviously we did not prevail and we would like to 22 | have that bracketed in the Full Committee. 23 i . Mr. Aaron. Perhaps we could then turn to the recommendathic t yo 24 || whece we have a couple of hrackets from the staff level, one 25 ||of which does not appear, I'm sorry to say. This is page 86 and Docld:32423516 Page 63
ash 61 a | . 7 ; 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18. 19 20 el. £2 23 a ae - pA Security Council and the Department of State should issue of ambassadors. 13 as saying the law makes ambassadors authorized recipients ‘to other components and the request that such instructions he TOP SECRET ~ a 87. Let me see if I can just go through them and indicate some changes. Let me just call your attention here’ to the first recommendation which, in effect, simply says the National instructions implementing © law with regards to the obligations We now make clear in the text that the conflict here tha has lea to, in parts, to the absence of any regulations is between the Nepartment's effort to implement them through instructions in the CIA's view that there is a’ conflict between this law and their responsibility to protect sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This recommendation would put the Committee on record and that is how that needs to he squared with -- Ms, Culbreth. Coula we geta copy of that to examine in context with this? | Mr. aaron: Yes. I'm sorry I don't have it right now. That’ it simply makes the point-that instructions have to go made available to the oversight committee. Now the. second recommendation. -- Mr. Maxwell. The footnote about the CIA's opposition, is that a letter from the Agency? ~ Docld: 32423516 Page 64
LO 11 12 14 15 16 ow) 18 19 20 21 2 ae) 25 13 Mr. Aaron. Weiwere just told that by deposition. Me. Maxwell. low? Mr. Aaron. They just told us. Mr. Kirbow. I don't remember how it was under discussian there but that is -- in other words, it is information that ‘I also know about. — Mr. Aaron. I don't have the document. Mr. Maxwell. Did you ask them with regard to examples that you gave? Mr. Aaron. We asked them if they had any further comment on it and I believe they do. Mr. Kirbow. What is the result of the Ambassador's | trip out there? Mr. Aaron. He went out and ‘talked with the review staff. They were aware of the sensitive Western program. They were not aware offhand of the other two examples. | Now the second recommendation should be in brackets from the staff level, and I would like to correct or suggest a correction in the first phrase.” Instead of saying to this end, just simply say in the exercise of its. statutory responsibility Ambassadors should have the right to access to the operational communications of the CIA's clandestine service. | Any exceptions ‘would have to have the approval of the - Department of State and be brought to the attention of the TAP REAR. Docld: 32423516 Page 65
qsh 63 10 lu 12 13 14 15 17 ~18 19 20 el 22 RO \ a 24 | 25 oversight committee, the point of that being that if you ought “to have full authority to. act for the ambassador, he ought to ha made in Washington.. TOP SECRET | é ' the right, if not the obligation, to read operational traffic. when. necessary. | Mr. Kirhow. Who would determine when necessary? The station chief? Mr. Aaron. He would determine when necessary. That's’ the point of changing the authority around. Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I find myself in an awkward position here because I think that the ambassador is entitled to know practically all of what's going on in this country. I think that he is entitled to know all of the policies and ° the national estimates against which all of the collections in this country are being made and any other major policy decisiong ‘I have stressed to the staff, as has Mr. Bader, I believ the peculiarity of cables which have to do with agent handling, and how it is publicly the. most sensitive operation in the entire Agency. 1 do" nob for the life of me.see why if the Ambassador has the control that we give him elsewhere in this thing, that he should read every operational message that the station chief or whoever is in charge in that particular area in the ‘embassy is sending back on the various agents and the manner. in which they are being handled or their names because he can't TAP 2 Ferner : Docld: 324293516 .Page 66
qsh 64 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ll WARD & PAUL 413 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 £0 Nepartment of State had the right to overrule, for instance, the Le ‘be resolved, would then put ‘the State. Department in the process. 91 || been in operation for some great period of time, the classified instruction from the State Department which were joined by the |) DCI prescribes certain situations in which they tell the | where you will request and he doesn't tell you, it says for the ‘TOP SECRET 2s help but find out the names of the people and who they are and exactly what they're doing if you brief the operational travel. i] Senator Iluddleston. This gives him the right. to it. It does not require him to do it. Mr. Maxwell. I think that's the real difference. I did’ have a question on’ the exceptions having the approvals only of t Department of State. The ambassador, as the President's representative in the country, it would seem that if the NCI or the deputy in charge of the CIA in regard to a sensitive matter, that there. should be a mechanism by which that can Mr.-Aaron. I, would certainly be subject to say any exceptions would have to have. the approval of the appropriate national security council body and leave it at that because cthat} Mr. Kirbow. My problem is totally different from that. I think that today the instructions from the President: of the United States, or at.least approved in principle because it's ‘ aml assador the station chief need not tell you, and in those case: Docld: 32423516 Page oT
gsh 65 a _ Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 WARD & PAUL 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 | 20 12 ‘law on the hooks. 24. TC)P SECRET 65 ‘exact procedures the station chief and the Ambassador both have. an absolute secure channel to refer the matter back to the Department in Washington where it is reconciled:here at a policy level because a man out at the end of the line should no I think in all circumstances have a prerogative that exceeds that which the President wishes him to have. That's the current state of the situation. The instructi is cited at great length in the full paper. Senator Huddleston. I think this recognizes the ‘exceptions and just sets ‘procedures. Mr. Truehart. But the instruction conflicts with the Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Ambassador, it also conflicts with the law that says that the DCI should protect the sources and method in the Agency. : | | | | Mr, Truehart. From unauthorized disclosure. Senator Huddleston. We should have to bracket this? Mr, Kirbow. ves. | | | Senator Iluddleston. Well, we have to wrap this section up here right now. “fir. Aaron. Okay. The next recommendation just authorize the Department, and t would suggest here that to clarify it a little bit, say by statute the Department of State should he authorized to take the necessary steps to assure that it can provide the kind of support. We found that it really was not. DocId: 32423516 Page 68
gh 66 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10° ll WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 End Tape 2brg 3 8 19 gv a ¢ 20 2 3. 4 22 5 23 Nog 24 ‘ot 29 12. 13 TeyP SECRET 66 in the vosition to provide this in the execution of that law. “This has been'‘in many forms: At one point we said there should be an office to do this and at one point we said to put it in the hands of a responsible official. But I think the main point we want to make here is that the Department does not have the parallel authority as. the ambassador has in law and therefore is not in a position to. help him out when he gets into the kind of trouble that Charley |. referred to. | | | So this simply gives the Department the same kind of authority. | Mr. Kirhow. “The words "can provide," I think we should require them to provide this, especially instructions on what the complications of the law is. | Ms. Culbreth. ‘I have a fix on that. “By statute the State Department. should provide effective guidance and support. Just say do it. | Mr’, Aaron. But they can't be told to do something without {} also authorizing them to have the information to be able to do it. Mr. Kirhow, The Department of State has access to evervthing that qoes to the National Security Council by the Secretary sitting as the principal member. Mr. Aaron. Well, as vou know, a lot of these activities 1 we're talking about do not go to the National Security Council. Docld: 32423516 Page 69
ash 67 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 le “WARD & PAUL 15 16 17 18 “19 20 21 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 Docld: 324235516 Page 70 13 ‘22 24 TIP SECRET) They will if we had our way hut they don't in current law. Senator Huddleston. Okay. Mr. Aaron. -Number 5 is in brackets. The point is that it is similar to number 2, the point being that communications with overseas posts are’ now in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency for |the most part. The recommendation here| is that they he put in the hands of the pepartment of State | as an overt organization. This.is a recommendation which the Murphy Commission came to, its recommendation which has =" Mr. Maxwell. No iwe have a position of the Secretary of State and the NCI on this, as well as a cost estimate of what, if any, changes there would be? | Mr. Aaron. No, we don't have any cost estimate. Mr. Maxwell. My, sense of the findings on which this is based. go to number 2/which I personally support in guaranteei the ambassador acess, hut I think that we have an inadequate record on which to base a recommendation that the entire communications network. be passed from one agency. of government. to another. Mr. Kirbow. I agree on 5 and have consistently found no evidence to support putting it back under the State Departmen who originally had it and aqreed to put it over under the CIA. ‘Senator Huddlesten. Well, that's in brackets. Mr. Kirbow. On 4, Mr. Chairman, I had an extensive and fairly supportive, I think, recommendation that we should not
Q wn Zz TN = Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ‘li 12 13 “WARD & PAUL 14 15 (16 17 18 19 Re 25 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 25 ‘|}recommend increased money if we have not heard that this is an 20. a TOP SECRET 68 inadequately funded program. Nor should we recommend internally a reorganization of the policies of the Department of State so that who controls this money without a record before the Committee, but rather that the recommendation be that the oversight committee, in’ conjunction with the Department of State, carefully consider the adequacy of the funding for this proaram in light of theilr value to the nation and whatever the requirements are. | | | Senator Huddleston. “Do you have any. trouble with that? Mr. Aaron. Yes, [I do because I think we do have a sufficient record from our discussions with members of the i foreign service and the State Department that they are not adeauately funded to carry on their political reporting responsibility and I believe that we can make a recommendation that this responsibility deserves increased support. ‘And so that is taking the first half of the recommendatio Mr. Kirbow, Excuse me. het me take the first part with you, | We-don't: have the Department's: position on that. “We ji : . have opinions of some of the individuals in that particular operation that. they need more money . The Department's position in defending their progtams before the Foreign Relations Committee as far as I cbuld see from what record was available to me does not stress. that it is inadequately funded and unless - Docld: 32423516 Page 71 : : - |
ash 60 | (IP SECRET 69 ° | [ . 8 oa ¢ a ~ a 1 |we're going to get the State Nepartment's position on this 8 oo - | ae oO 8 . Z -2 fland they say the same thing, then: that is not the Administration’ 2 3 | position. 4 Mr. Quanheck. It also runs contrary to: the points that 5 jlwe make in the budget paper when we Say that we have a surplus 6 |lof collection and that the problem is in analysis. 7 Mr. Aaron, Wait, wait, wait, that's a very different | 8 ||point. - be 9 Mr. Kirbow. The paper clearly says excess collection 10 compared to the analytical. ll / Mr. Aaron. Can.you tell me why the Administration - a . é 12 ||}opposes this? | 7 « (134). Mr. Kirbow. I think the point is that if we don't have z L 14 |/a position of the Department of State on this, it is unfair. 15 || for us to recommend to the Committee that they adopt the positio 16 || from individuals' views, not being the person responsible for 17 |) the program, 1 1 is | Mr. Inderfurth. I think another point here is that the 19 ambassadors that we talked with, and I'm thinking right now of 20 those in Chile, all said that the overt collection of intelligen it 8h through their political reporting was most, valuable to them and 99 ||I think it follows that. this recommendation is appropriate becau € oz |we want to beef that side up. 2A . Senator Huddleston. It seems like we are beating 410 First.Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 anants - 25 semantics here. io Docld: 32423516 ‘Page 72.
ash 79 tw a Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 ‘12 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16. 17 18 19 22 23 24 - 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 Docld: 32425516 Page 73 JRO 13 said was I do not think): 20 || 21 wa ikk meg hIP SECRET 70 4 7 Mr. Kirbow. Inadequate funding against the funding for their normal ‘chores, which is representation in the country where we are accredited. ‘We're able to take out the business of the CIA having more funds for this than the State Department because we don't think it is cause and effect. | Senator Huddleston. Can't we just say there that consideration should be aiven to increasing the funding or. something to that effect? ‘Mr. Kirbow. Or need to determine whether or not it is 1 adequate. Mr. Aaron. Let me just make one last point on this. I don't really understand Charles' position. If I understand him correctly, his position is the recommendations that the Subcommittee or the Committee makes should all have been either approved or supported hy| the Administration in some way. Now in this particular case -- Mr. Kirbow. Now: don't misrepresent me. What I really ithat this Committee has before it a individuals in charge of the Department record from. responsible of State that fairly indlicates that that is an inadequately os . - a - a m funded proaram. Pe Mr. Aaron. We have the record before. this Committee that those people who are tasked with this responsibility including © , “| 7 oo, ambassadors. overseas do'jfeel that these programs are inadequatel funded and indeed, we have reached a point in Europe, for
TOP SECRET 7 {]. ash 71 example, which is of extreme importance to us that there is only one post outside of the/major capitals that has any funds Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 available or manpower available to do any political reporting, { that that is a major area of the world in which there have been repeated cutbacks. The | record is very clear on this. There has been enormous cutback’ in the foreign service as well as . . —_ the clandestine service! but unlike the clandestine service — ; ' ot a , the foreign service has|certain statutory responsibilities in the field of council affairs, They have gotten| to the point now that all they can do it to take care of theit council responsibilities. and are no longer capable of doing| the political reporting. But that is the factual matter, that is what we have WARD & PAUL | discovered. 7 | | oe - - I believe that oh that basis the Committee can make a recommendation that this requires further support. Mr. Quanheck. -I]would argue that if we queried all. of the program managers) throughout the intelligence community, 95 percent of them would say that they are inadequately funded. Mr. Kirhow. The| point that I make here for this is that there is apparently an irreconcilable difference of opinion | hetween the staff on the sufficiency of the record and the first day that we started on these recommendations you had agreed that where there| was a real and sincere difference of " 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 | opinion, that the evidence would be brought forth for considerat{: Docld: 32423516 Page T4 .
vad eu ae gad goon GR gem get mm TDP SECRET on 8 3 1 |lbv the Committee. a 2 I ask that the record on this one he produced to support 2 5 |/that recommendation. _Ijdon't think it is adequate. . | 4 Senator Huddleston. Well, all I think we can do is move 5 it up to the Full Committee. °1 would suggest that we put in ther 6 ||consideration be. given to increasing the funds with the earmarki 9 left there when it comes before the Full Committee. Then we 8 can expect to have whatever record we have. 9 | Mx. diGenova. “The recommendation that you're giving is 10 that the .sentence he changed to say consideration should be 11 |) given to increasing the'lmoney. J x < 12 _ Senator Huddleston. That's correct. ane a . ; : ; . : 13 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. |/Chairman, on number 5, what was the < é oe 14 || recommendation that Mr. {Aaron said he agreed was not an 15: essential. recommendation? | 6 . Mr. Karon. 1 don't recall agreeing to that. - Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me. I thought you said you were 1g |) willing to take it out if I were going to be insistent on it. 19 ; Mr. Aaron. No. : 20 | Mr. Kirbow. Well, if that's not the case we can leave ot it bracketed. 22° 7 ‘It always puts us ina bad position that just by putting 23 || forth the recommendation from the staff hy which there is no oA general consensus among the staff, that we always wind up on 410. First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 the defensive when we want it taken out. I don't think that Docid: 32493516 Page 75
ash 73 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10° 11 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 1g 19 20 21 7-2) 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 24 29 12 13 || before the Pull cons ete Re over the following day, | I mean that same evening, and say that TOP SECRET rr? should necessarily be. I think there should be an affirmative record shown where that yreconmendation should be in the recommen dation of the Committee at all. P I don't think tha ‘t has been shown at all. It's just what one member of the staff jfor sure wants done, and I don't think the record supports it. | . Senator Huddleston. Let's just leave it there in bracket Where do we go from here? Mr. Miller. Defense. Senator Huddleston. Well, I can't go to defense. We're scheduled for 10:00 tomorrow morning, and meanwhile would the staff have an. opportunity to go through this entire paper here? ; Ms. Culbreth. couid I raise a point? . .f Several of us on the staff were talking about this .and I, know you have’ to go, but is there some. plan or procedure that. has already been decided for how this is going to be brought | Senator Huddleston. That's. the next question. i ' Ms, Culbreth. I believe that! s awfully important. | Mr. Miller, I recommend the following very briefly, that tomorrow you present the briefing book to the Full Committee with a.covering letter saying that this represents the view of the. Subcommittee, that, you ask them to look the briefing book - i Docld: 32423516 Page 76
gsh 74 * Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 o a oa (ee) 10 ll 12 WARD & PAUL ~ 14 15 16 ay 18 21 24 . 410 First Street, 'S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 29 Docld:32493516 Page 77 © - Se to 13 19° 20 Re 23. TOP SECRET on you would, and suggest that the Chairman entertain any suggestio on the part of Senators £rom the. other subcommittee for any expansions, corrections, deletions, and proceed by suggestions from the Senators, not from the staff but from the Senators until completed. Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Miller, I will note that the Chairman's letter would also point pute like Mr. Bader did a while ago, that there are several things in here not yet adopted but recommended as alternatives, | | | Senator Huddleston, Yes. I believe that would be well, plus I believe Dave ought. to he prepared to give a quick overlay and the rest of vou availlable for any questions that might come up the first day as we give it to them. Mr. Maxwell. I don't know what the time schedule is but could we have it as early as possible because just an overnight reading for. 120 page document. ‘Senator Huddlestgn. I see no reason why this shouldn't go by spending the rest of the day, if you can smooth it out any at all at that point, that At couldn’ t go. ahead and go to th full nenbership. ‘Mr. Aaron. could I ask a question about -the nunber of copies? | at Obviously we'll have a copy for every Senator. Now the question: is whether there should be a COPY for every Senator and his designee.
chs | TOP SECRET es: . J , - | AL Mr. Kirbow. The only wav to work it, Mr. Chairman, it's ) 1 d t ae) just impossible not to have a copy... or Senator Huddleston. That suits me all right. . Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 PD Mr. Inderfurth. Let's do one thing. On the designee D' ||copy let's stamp the Senator's name. 6 Mr, Kirbow. I might add, Mr. Chairman, the security 7 operation under Mr. Marshall has been exemplary during the 8 ||last couple of weeks. 9 _ (Whereupon, at 11:20 o'clock a.m., the hearing in the 10 above-mentioned mattér was concluded.) 12 13 waRD & PAUL 14 15 16 a | i 1? ‘18 Oo | 7 a9 ]-. oe - L 7 7 20 a | | { 22 R35 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 ‘Docld: 32423516 Page 73