HW 53060 Page Fifteen second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of October 30, 1960. Maheu needs to be questioned on this point.) Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August, 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. Interestingly, Cubela was the former head of the Director's in Cuba when he was a major power in deposing Batista. In September, 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture", a directive which is subject to several interpre- tations, including the fact that the CIA was a willing - participant in the deal. Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain, now the Chief Investigator for Cook County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in Chicago in April 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the assassination rifle in March 1963. 2. Recruitment of the Potential Assassin (s) s we ENE FOteENTIal Assassin(s) In describing the putative poisoner, Giancana spoke in October 1960 of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry. The identity of the "girl" referred to by Giancana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit one of Castro's Cuban mistresses due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and - prostitution circles. - It was common for American gamblers to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro .Was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McLaney) unescorter on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him. (Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness, to say the least, and her potential as a assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has been previously discussed. However, she was also Charles -Tourine's mistress and, thus, could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative and Lorenz was not asked about her relationship Docld: 32272935 Page ?1
HW 53060 ** Page Sixteen Z with Tourine'’ in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match. Comment: Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangsters’ contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former receipt of gambling "kickbacks". One fact is extremely bothersome, however, in attampt- ing to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the 1967 I.G. Report (p. 28), Orta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Orta receipted for the pills in late February-early March 1961 and "kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them". (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27) If the mob was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his position of accessibility. The other possibility exists, - i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to give to de Varona when he was brought into the plot. The question arises, then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the ulterior motives previously outlined. Turning to Phase Two of the operation which began in April 1962, the same possibilities exist. If Harvey and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into an "on-going operation", then it can be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Varona, which pre-dated CIA participation according to FBI memos of 21 December 1960 and 18 January 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs. With the resumption of the CIA's participation, funding and material support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although de Varona would continue to deal through his mob contacts, Rosselli and "Maceo". ‘Due to the loose structure of Phase Two in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete. reliance of Harvey upon Rosselli's word that activities were actually being carried out; the Agency's lack of interest or ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the speculation arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being solid businessmen, Trafficante, Lansky and other Cuba casino owners must have realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, Docld: 3227727935 Page 22?
Page Seventeen the evidence shows growning Lansky influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and a new opportunity for éetiry operations in Florida with the tremendous influx of Cuban exiles. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide open" Cuba of the pre- Kennedy era even if Castro and all his Communist associates could be eliminated. Despite the relatively useless business sense in continuing the assassination attempts against Castro in a sub- stantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along". First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was providing full logistical support for Varona. Secondly, there was the mounting pressure from the FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. | No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A. brief look at the record shows the employment of this strategy at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots. 1. Robert Maheu -- Quashing of Long Committee subpoena in 1966. (Interim Report, p. 79, note 3; Interview Edward P. Morgan) , -- Solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Organization. (Hughes was definitely told of the project by Maheu in November 1960 > and was himself in an alliance with the CIA which, in fact, occurred later when Maheu was Hughes' principal agent.) (Interim Report, p. 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony ?) -- Dispute with Hughes. See memo 20 May 1971 in Office of Security file on Edward P. Morgan. 2. John Rosselli -~- Avoiding criminal prosecution. (Interim REport, p- 85, note 4) -- Use in legal memo in March 1971 to attempt. to reduce sentence. -- Attempt to delay deportation hearings with INS which included Jack Anderson's personal inter- vention with IRS. (See Anderson Interview; CIA Rosselli file; CIA Office of Security file: re: Edward P. Morgan) HW 53060 DBocld:32272935 Page 23
HW 53060 Page Eighteen 3. Sam Giancana -- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat" for him by claiming the tap was a result of the CIA plots. ~- Early 1962, intervention with FNU Farrell of - INS re: possible deportation. (See Tab C Rosselli CIA file, stating that only Edwards, Qsborn, Angleton, Rocca and Houston know.) j wigs Ge ry MALE Ey _l --~ Attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 129) ~- Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May. 1967, _ Sam commented that Giancana and Rosselli have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation". He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Rosselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 131). NOTES RE: JACK ANDERSON "CASTRO RETALIATION" THEORY March 3, 1967) D p Fel March 7, 1967) rew Pearson artic e Source: 1. 1967 I.G. Report: . -- It is quite likely that Rosselli Morgan the channel, and Anderson the recipients. (p. 126) -- We may now assume that Pearson's is the source, and Pearson story is not patched together from nits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source, Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked... (p. 126) Impact The Rosselli- contact in Las Vegas’ in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination Docld: 3227727935 Page 24
HW 53060 Page Nineteen in retaliation for U. S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this. (p. 127) Maheu Does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lurcative client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Rosselli and urge discretion. -- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much ‘distress, includes one detail that is only found in Phase Two: the three-man team. Comment: Not necessarily since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the three-man team initially and only briefed Rosselli on the concept in Phase Two or Rosselli just didn't mention the three-man team to -Maheu or O'Connell during Phase One. Comment: In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point: -- If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct. approach to CIA for help. (p. 125) Since AGency cannot figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Rosselli is drinking too much and talking to > Morgan, who is also drinking and talking to Greenspun (and Pearson). Comment: Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best goodies: the story of the pills and the fact of the State Department meeting. {(p.. 127) Comment: See p. 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Department of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed. I.G. speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which was attended by Harvey. (p. 112) (RFK was not present.) So SS a a eens ce Docld: 3227727935 Page 25
‘Page Twenty 2. Other Sources a. Memo re: 15 February 1972 DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosselli or someone in his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident." (Momo in Office of Security file re: Morgan) 3. Memo: 20 May 1971 Subject: Intertel Mr.{Al Pease (former CIA),|now with Intertel, Me said Maheu and Anderson together on some oil mix deals...Recent exposure of Anderson re: Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate ex-- posure instigated by Robert Maheu using his son Peter, as an intermediary. Pease's theory is that Maheu probably would "scare them off". (i.e., Intertel would not want CIA stuff to embarrass Hughes). Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement with CIA (Memo in Security file re: Morgan). 4. Memo - 19 November 1970 -- Harvey had--contacts with Rosselli in November- ~* December 1967 and January 1968 following Rosselli Conviction. -- 17 November 1970 Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who represented Rosselli that Rosselli faced deporta- tion and would blow story. DCI decided to ignore threat and Maheu agreed. "Maheu further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity aa it affected him personally." 5. 19 December 1967 -- Series of conversations instigated by Harvey on Rosselli's behalf to get CIA intervention HW 53060 DBocld:32272935 Page 26
Page Twenty-One directly or at least discover how good Government case against Rosselli was. -- Calls from Rosselli began in October to Harvey. Rosselli knew what Agency had done for Maheu with Senator Long because Ed Morgan told Rosselli. -- Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harvey a4 news clipping re: Agency use of Giancana (pre- sumably the August 1963 Chicago story by Sandy Smith). Rosselli said that the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General. 6. Memo 28 April 1967 -- O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Pearson story. -- Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase - One operation due to Agency delaying on Long Committee subpoena. ~~ Maheuvisibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maheu) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes. -- Maheu denied discussing with Rosselli latter phase of (ms: 9i4 and said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962. -- Rosselli met Morgan through Hank Greenspun in the 1950's. -- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Rosselli met with Garrison in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the impression that Rosselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circum- stances. ~- Rosselli under pressure from FBI, drinking heavily and had a 19-year-old girl. -- Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson and did know that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintance with Morgan. HW 53060 Docld:32272935 Page 27
HW 53060 Page Twenty-Two -- Morgan also tight Docld: 3227727935 Page 25 with Pat Cayne of NSC.