104-10213-10101 sae) ee gt Be eee oF yest 1 f et : OORT: : aughe es ’ MATERLAL REVLENCO AT CLA HEANQuUA VHTERS BY een HOUSE SELECT CONMLTLEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS . - . FILE TITLE/NUMBER/ VOLUME: 1977 IG Report I. i (unsanitized) . 4 Belk -o pee eee 8 ae wate a See aman ee a INCLUSIVE DATES: CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: PCS/LOC ROOM: 2D 11 . ‘ DELETIONS, IF ANY: DATE DATE RECEIVED | RETURNED REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) SIGNATURE OF REVIEWE 16 Sep 78 “facDONALD eee 5 ‘ ) 6. Pre eree oa i f : ‘ig < i Van eee .. a3 : Q { a ee fi fj ee AYe! Valea, : o, € DS. mom oe CES _eelzmh i MAC ET ee pan i ihe ot atari Ae canes ben* *, 0°, NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR RESIOVED FROM THIS FILE sat
14-00000 | CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM > RELEASE AS SANITIZED bf em 4 & .. : 23 May 1607 , MEMCRAIDUM FOR THE RECORD a .. : SUIJECT: Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro - 5 fois report was prepured 2t the request of the Director of oF Central Intelligence. Ee assigzed the tasx to the Inspector- . a General on 23 March 1967. The report was delivered to the Director, personally, in installments, beginning cn 24 April 1967. ‘The - ; irector returned this copy to the fusvector General on 22 May 1967 wa with instructions that the Inspector General: ra j : a Retain it in personal, EYES GULY safekeeping ot . Destroy the one burn copy retained tenporerily by the ¢. Inspector Gereral : v ° i Destroy all notes and other source materials originated - i . by those pParticirating in the writing of the report ” Fir as “ The one stayback burn copy, all motes, and all other derived C # source naterials were destroyed on 23 May 1957. ' - ; . | . This riboon copy is the only text of the report now in existence, . : ; either in whole or in part. Its text kas teen reaé only by: ' . a nD Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence { 4 J. S. Earmen, Inspector Genera : = Ke E. Greer, Inspectsr (sce of the authers) ; : L S. D. Breckinridge, Inspector (one of the authors) . . Be “ALL typing of drafts and of final text was doze by the authors. io Filed with the report are: : . Office of Security file used as source material : . Memorandims concerning Willian Sarvey : : Certain MGIGOCSE varers . } A : Drew Pearson coluzs [ y t. Taspector Ceneral j j i, i BN ; { z . - tt i ai oo
14-00000  ) , “* ganee tra 3 / /, ey . . cece te Le 4 e GFLoas oo ' ‘Introductory Section - . Miscellaneous Schemes. Prior to August 1950 Aerosol Attack on Radio Station i “A ; . : Depilatory , . | my "The Gambling Syndicate Operation “ Phase 1 (August 1950 - May 1961) no: , Phase 2 (Late 1961 - June 1963) , : 2 §€ J me Wiretapping Incident Cj. _ The Phyllis McGuire/Attorney General Phase (Late 1961 - Yay 1962) Ss coma Aaa RNASE oes eneat smepnanaeeten Se meus - The Long Committee Phase (May - July 1956) R: ar a _Project AMLASH ~ . Rojando Cubela (March 1962 - March 1966) . no an 2 . : ~ “Discussion of Asoaseioatiou at High-Level Goverment BMeetizgs oo . ef . - Special Group (iugnented) Meeting of 10 August 1962 i , Special Group Meeting of 30 July 1964 az ; The Ramificatioas of the Gembling Syndicate Operaticn - . i HA RRs ny anmmmaneT £5; r MES 32 oe Fath 5 é aoa os mrt eB ELIS nagar a LY init ee a ai : ae wre oe OE Ee oe
rare ae so + HA BBB 2e AS LOREM SPUR Oy etre ‘y ’ Sqr itgddy ee TABLE OF CONTENTS Introductory Section _Starcity of docurentary evidence 2... ew ee ome we Pelatioasaip of assassizattion Plesning to soverrmeas pollcy Risk of essassination when a Govermmeat is overthrown... « Resort to svnecdoche Published intelligence oz the possibility of Castro's denise Accuracy of the story Drey Pearse has Miscellaccous Schemes Prior to August 1960...... ferosal Attack on Radio Station... . eo ee eee Contaminated Cigars Depilatory 1... 2 eee eee cee een eccae Gambiing Syndicate - Phase Li... ke ee wt ee Genesis of the plot... 2 ee ese ewe ew wwe “First contact with Maheu O'Connell named as case officer . oe + & es we we First seeting with Roseliz @ Briefirg of Dulles and Cavell ob... oe eee we eo First meeting betveen Maheu and Glancana True identities of Glancera and Trufficente become krowa Roie of Frafficante Esrly plasctrg on the means of assassination .... . Guns! venent with lethal cigars [preretation of lethal cigars .. 22sec very of the cizars to Gunn Roosevelt learas of the plot ce ee ee ee ee ew Possible vays of paczeaging the poison Decisicn to package the poison im pill fors . 2... ee Juan Orta is identified as the syadicate's can in Cuba Guan tests the pills on guizea pigs... ss es sc Sequence preceding passing the pills to O'Connell O’Connell receives the pills and passes them to Rosellt Earvey is briefed on the operation Trafficente receives the Pills and gives thes to Orta . IeentiMcation of Orta Sze Orta channel collanses oe eo eo ee eo ee ees Varona is brought into the operation Edvard K. Moss coe te ee ee we ee ew ww Eoselli associates O'Cozzell with ct Funds are approved for Fessing to Varoma .... - Meney and lethal pills are Passed to Varoma .. . Varona‘'s restauran’s coatact in Cube es eeaee eo Eévards calls off the operation Disposition of the pllas-...... eee eee s + List of those witting of the operation ¥ Ly CYB RB WEEE BS BRAN R a ES. Oo GCAMAN 2°99 13 A 18 wun dem copia te +
14-00000 ? pera sen Garcliing Syndicate ~ Pace 2. 2 + 1 0 ee ee ee eee wo é Why Zarvey was brieved on Phase 1. wo we ee ew ee ee Esrvey put in charge of tse Executive Actisa Capasility Harvey briev’s Helms cn the Executive Action Capability. .. . Qrdli- planned assassizatioa of Lununsa . ne . Approval of Froject Z7REIS « « «2 0 oo ww eo ww ooo ow oy Biseell puts Earvey in charge of the Castro operation Harvey is told he will head the Cuba task fcr oe eee e Farvey's first meeting with Edvards on tre Castro operation Gersiration Of QTaIi. sew ce ee tt ee ee ee we ee te ew oe ML Earvey briefs Eeles on the Caszro cperutica ki Lifferirg views on the tumover to Harvey 2. 0 2 ee ee ee we AL Farvey's first meeticg vita Zoselli in New York City 43 : Resellé and O'Connell go to Mieml. «6 0 ee ee ee ee ew ew ww AG Farvey leaves for Mian vith lethal pills Roselli is already in touch with Varora. . 222 ee eee ee oe AT Harvey takes over “a going operation" AT] . Changes in gangster personsel participating . 2 2 2 ee 2 eo « 48 : . Maceo enters the operation 48 Harvey supplies weapons and equiprent to Varoma 2. «2 ee oo ug Roselli reports that the pills are in Cute 50 ct 5) Yarora sends a three-man teum tO Cuba 2 2 0 oe ee ee ee eo ew Gh ee re. 6 aan ce in Sa at anf  nehats DOK so Yarona plens to send <kree militia men to Cota §1 Harvey and Roselli egree to terminate the operation . 2 2 2 s+ «© 52 > ; Roselli comes to Washingtoa to meet Harvey 53 % . Harvey's meeting with Roselli observed by the FAL . . 2 2 + 2 2 « 5H . List of persons witting or this phase ¢f the operatica 55 ’ 6 es The Wiretapping Incident - . 22s eee ee cee e@ ee ap ur eee rorar ry ® @ ® ® ® RG SGU AEE 2.20 FORLHOSSBBSBBSIA Giancana suspects Fayllis McGuire eni Pan Bowan 2. 2 « 2 2 © « « ¥ Giencana asks Makeu to bug Rovan's roca ~ Likely date of the bugging incident . 2.1 2 6 ee ee ee oo 3 Maheu asks Edvard Du Bois to do the job . a Du Bols assigns Balletti amt Eerrison to the Job. . « « « © « © 3 Wiretap made instead of microphone plant es h 4 Palletti is caught arid puones Makeu for help. . - 2 0 oe 2 @ § Mabeu refers the FSI to CIA . ® Shef Edvards meets with an Fal representative . 2. « « 0 2 os q Bavards intervenes with Sas 2apich on Maheu's behalf % : Houston intervenes with the Justice Derartrent. « « « « « 2 « « i _c"? Houstoa briefs General Carter Gee ab aa cacames cram: peemtanerenetnpenctsmatiSsteAEOOeatnt oe nakaahtnltscltign dao ba tems 4 . Edwards and Houstoa brief the Attormmey General. 2. 2. 2. 2 2 2 oe Eé€vards sends a memornndm record of the meeting to Kennedy Gambling Syndicate - Passe 2 is already wader way . . 2 « 2 « « Oe heetom «6 Gh kp anemen een © . now st * 4. Eelms is briefed on the meeting vith the Attorney Gereral 65 : ety Edwards warns Uarvey to clear vith the ICI. 2 2 ee ee ee ee 65 ; -_ Kennedy's request on % March 67 for a copy of the briefing meno 66 . j. weds
14-00000 —- , ™ . ny “e, Page . 3} "3 4 The wiretapping Tactdant (contized) ( Calcego Sun-Tires stor; of 15 aug 33 re Glancars & CIA... oe 6 & i Cnicego Daily News story of 4) &:z 63 re Glancara & CIA . 69 2 Eeins sends McCare a cosy of cze ienzedy briefings memoranti=. . , 69 ; ¢ a Rimors now connect CIA & gangsters in plot to kill Casteo 7O ” : sels surabeat aaa ea aa former Fakeu eaployee called to testify 71 tee Onassis-Klarchos fight over cil Stiszing rights... ., oe. 7 Mateu is hired by Ularchss asd is Supported by CIA : 72 CEA iaterveces ca Elarchos' bot ee ee ee we ww FB . ; : She Long Comittes plans tg seSusrect the Orassis wivetao 72 i ‘6 CIA interveres vith the Long Comi:cee 02 Maheu's behalf. . 2. . 73 : ‘ as Mabeu applies pressure on Cla to avotd Puolicity 73 : i Mateu indicates he may brief hts attorney 2. ee we eee oe o Th i te, . . ‘ . 7 ere eee nega es Cit tte eee eee ene 85 } . 7° . Gift free Donovan to Castro 75 Se Tee plan 42 Dowant acd sade reeds... 7 . tre plan is overta‘en dy events 75 | i : > Byte eereess MittESS. we ee eB . } C . Booby-trepped Sea Stell TT . Tee phon Polusca are bushes ee - The plan proves to be sopract{cable 77 Hanes of those witting... 2... 0.0000... “yey . ® e mtparee gan aoe . 5 Project AMIASH - Rolands Cubela. se © @ @ © wm wm we we @*e@ @ @ 6 «@ 78 i cer * . - -d- meeting with Cubela in Mextso City (Mar 61). 2.2.2.2, 78 : J S role in the Cubtea revolution - 8 ad Cubela reported disaflected oc ee# B® ew &@ ww ee e e@ © © © « 79 . an Mexico City meeting inconclusive 739. , or . “Gate, 2nd Juan Orta vant to extiltrate (var 61)......~. ~~. oS) ° + Cubela asks for meeticg in Paris (Aus 61) a Cubels plans to attend Helsinkt Youts Festival... ....... 81 ‘ings in Gelsinst (Avg S32)... . Heeticzs in Stockkols eo a @e e o s 7 se e . = e Ss oe ae e a eta = cd & . 7 Cabela objects to the word “assassim+e" Faris ceetings (Aus 62); S/s & desl! tion “raining. 2... 0, Meetings in Porto Alesre (Sep: 53) , Paris reetirgs (oct 63); Cubela vants assurance frog U.S.Govt . , -Pitcerala meets vith Cutela 43 Feris (dcx 34) Ditvering verstors of what FitzGerald tcia Cubels alae? CORDED BEN AY ER SLAP R RA tds ye ie ~~ Lee ee yak ieee tte ‘ag Snewiute 1 1 Ease Hibs RATT egies nee ees Se a a ote ede Am ge et Hat see nt ae
14-00000 Gene pares 14 vertnwommagendeens: VIE EA al MONT) A. PASE So - f “4 vw 3 ° = 6 ‘4 . et 7 . rd wT fet, £° : : ‘° ‘ome OE Se 7 ‘a woe ms Sag ° . ae ~- a . 18 = wie ve goon “eee eM EM Sia er niente ae Me ns aa oe ee Page Project AMLASH - Rolesdo Cubela (continued) Cuba cache approved for Cubela. eee eee se ee ee wee oo ee GL Tne Blacks Lear +0 scheme ta discussed 92 Guan converts a tallpoins yen into a bypodersic syringe . . . . . 93 Sanchez gives to Cubels in Paris walle Keanedy {5 snot 92s Cubvela asks for high-powered rifle with telescople sight. . . .» Those witting of the Black Leaf kO episoézs Cutela cache put down (without rifles) (Her GG)... 2. 2 oe Cudels requests a ailescer for a FAL rifle SAS requests TSD to preduce FAL silencer on crash basis... . Second. Cubela cache put down (with FAL ritles)(dumé 64%) Artize meets Cubeia interandiary. oes ee ee eo we ew ow ew we ow Artise agrees to meet with Cubele personally Sanches meets Cukela in Parts (Dec Gb). 2 2 2 2 eee ee ew Explaration of Low Artime and Cubela vere put together Artize and Cubela meet in Madrid (Dec G+)... 2 2 2 6 ee ee ICL BSSeeseRes “Artine agrees to tarnish utleacer ane Artine gives Cubela silencer and other special gear . . 2 « » « 103 Second zeme-lins between Cutele and gasblisg syndicate operation 104 Headquarters tersicates all cuglacis with Cutele group. -« 2 2s Cubela and others arrested; plead guilty (Mar 66) OT The charges «2 2 oo ee ee ee te ee ee eo eee eee oe os 100 Castro asszs -for leniency 109 Pestisony about the silencer. . 2. 2 020 2 ee ee eo ee ew oe LOY Cubela expects to be executed 119 Cubela sentenced ta 25 years’ imprisomert. « 2 2 2 2 2 ee eo @ LG No mention made of Cubcla's pre-Nov 64 dealings with CIA ill Meme to Secretary of State (Rask), Subject: CIA Involve ment in Cadan Counter-revolutionary Activities -< Arrest of Rolands CUSELA Secades and Earnon Toxas GUIN Diaz,dated 7 March 1966 (added after completion of report) oe ee © eG ee Se ee Be He eee eee & ° ° - . ew - ¢ 133 « z @ s rf Ff ry Fy ——ronatiranineomer > a ee Tet : 20s repay ot wap Ie + 8 er ASE sa a mn tale tent . « t t epee He we PETS el LTRS PE OE eee cr I E eGR Naltiy gite ss pepe de tgti's Hime wes ole See secon Risen i auerth- a an te
re . rapre_rure nyt Gay baa Lid CMe Cpe 25 April 1907 4 ECMORANELM seslhgwqenee alone a e “ Talis receastruction of Agency involvereat in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect nistory. Because of the extreze censitivity of the operations being discussed or attenpted, as a cetter of principle no official recorés vere kent : of planning, of approvals, or of inplenentation. Tae few written records that do exist are either largely tangestial to the main 7 - : events or vere put on paper from memory years afterward. Willies a ole Harvey has retaized skeletal notes of his activities durizg the +i 4 : years in question, and they are our best source of dates. Dr. , at 3 Edvard Guan, of the Office of. Medical Services, has a recom of z = a —— when he met and when acd cryptic references to the subjects discussed. . } 0 oS | | of SSD, kes a record of ‘20 or three dates that eve | # : 3 . pertizent. Guna and vere involved in only the technicel g os a . G@spects of operational plenning, and their Farticipations vere short- ; zB? et a im lived. Although fragzentary, their records are a help in establishing . 4 Seige a ah - | Gritical tize frexes. Operational files are useful in scone instances, , = can ; because they give detes of meetizgs, the substances of which may be 3 inferred froa collaters1 infomation. ° ° . For the most part, though, we have kad to rely on information 1 oon fe 2 Given to us orally by pecate whose memories are fogged by time. : | y . -Toeir recollections of dates are particularly hazy, and sase of thea { esas . 7s € : Rass - -i1- a . r ¥ - & . zt oe * f Oe oe a - . af ° oct ose a FE ER NL TERE I ee ne RTA BS ant Bnd ae BELL MeN 9+ caren e ite gmat Yn es aa a eA Seg enone = ° . _ + Y + . » = 2
14-00000 * prt RB EAR (hte rener enn cdein eoeasengasttitiin Sah AB OF 15 AVES Aes ae Geert ao f) . ’ & 4 ’ % * Meee ‘3 ee UG ’ eo fe te MR Bey. aX é ° Wit Beatenee | ‘ ine”. ro. pints f SAPenLE OGERN Gs BEDS AEH le te 0 RCRA at om oe ‘e te the a a : . A were v . > me wee Hn ge mae eg Mt pee et Tg 2 eee tae ler ee Pte, yg te ~ eens aN ea raters are no longer able to keep the cetatls of Cre plan separate frog those of esothe.. We interviewed everyore whoa ve could ideatify as istely to be Maosledzeable, with the exceptions of Hr. Dulles end Geseral Cavell. A somplete list is attached at Tab A. We did not go on fisting expeditions among the mere possibles. To have done so vould ; have risked mating witting a mmber of eaployees who vere Previously wowitting and, ia our esticate, would have added little to the detatie avallaole fron hose directly involved. There are inconsi stenctes among the various accounts, but most of then can be resolved by collating the inforzation furnisked by all of the identifiable Participants in a particular plan and by then checking it against specific dates’ that can be fixed vith fair certainty. We believe that this recenstruction of what happened and of the thinking associated with 1+ is reasonably sound. If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are most Likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence Gf events. People still remember much of _ What happened, but they can no longer recall precisely vhen. ; " “Tt became clea very carly in our investigation that the vigor with which scheves were pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro _ bersorally varied vith the intensity of the U.S. Govermment's efforts to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases in Agency assassination Plaznirg, althouzh the transitions fraz one -~ 2. « . . ads aoe F) ° . ” vse ftw tae Stes ye Mead 24 wai ce wt GG a lees a in ee ithe oe q. 3 =m - ¥ ay Bg AQ). we oe wn 7: ¥ aE : 44 3 i : : é i “ Py a: & 8 -4 4 ~ er | a rd ted re Bt nine, er thane ema NE See ‘Sr meee © . gt ner eh Sak ne See wp eS Te Pete oe, 6 Aiegiam save 00+ + om wom by meets 6 tn cee tae
14-00000 Sonesta SAR EA rot aan ° to another are not &lways sterply defined. fach phase is a reflection - . of the then prevailirg Goverment attitude tovard the Cuban regime. | * a. Prior to August 1950: All of the identifiable schenes: prior to to about August 1950, “with one possible exception, vere aimed only at aiscredt ting Castro versonally by influencing his behaviour or by altering his =ppearance, | b. August 1960 to Avril 1951: The plots that vere hatched " ; in late 1960 ard early 1951 vere aggressively pursued and were . 7 , “viewed by at least some of the rertt cizaats as being merely one ~: : 7 aspect of the over-all active efrort to overthroy wae regine ce é *4 that culninated in the Bay of Pigs. | . C.. ¢. April 1961 to lete 1061: A rajor schese that was ; : : . begun in August 1960 was called off alter the Bay of Pigs and | ° remained dormant for several months, as ata most other Agency Si operational activity related to Cuba. i . “a. Tate 1961 to Inte 1952: That particular scheme was : : | * reactivated in early 1962 and was again jbushed vigorously in the 3 aes era of Project MONGOOSE and in the clinate of intense admin - : ; stration pressure on CIA to do scnetning about Castro and his ; Cuba. ° ; " "@. Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuben missple | crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the . ' eh ake iT ae ee Ce ae ne 4 ete OY - ee ° i wa RS! . aes Sepa mace ae Bee Deer re tre ee a” efAarz orura s Steat fot > me -3- an arm aT S én % a
14-00000 os is i my % yintal ermplpa sates: 18 are aein ° wre 6 Fem my ge . ; , . , | : . 11S Read ie 28 2) | . @ggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived ta April 1962 was firally tersicated in early 1963. wo other plots were originated ia 1963, but both vere {epracticable and nothing ever cave of then. We cannot overemphasize the extent to vhich responsivle Agency officers felt themselves Subject to the ponisiocration's severe pressures to do scmething about Castro and his regime. The fruitlecs and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in that light. * Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so i 2 4 “4 obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe, . € though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of tue - ; * . dominant figure in a government, even vhen loyalties are held to his ; | * personally rather than to the government as a body, will not . : necessarily couse the domfall of the goverment. ‘his point was 1 : * stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in en internal CIA draft § Bret paper of October 1961, vhich was initiated in response to General _ to - i : . oe * Mexvell tayios's a desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the g. . position that the demise of Fidel Castro, fron whatever cause, would : . offer Little opportunity for the Liberation of Cuba fron Coammi st g. . and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically E relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about the dowmfall of | i a) * ° & government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders froa Le, i are ae , ‘ a ¥ g tote Sat igh marred ohm DIR Monnet Bee Ne SoBe nag tet oens eed bee Deo.
rod ap oe Bee . eLulid hale at positions of power, and there is alvays the rigs that the rartict- Cate Coe. to. Gveriook.the. 4h oe ake oe OF a Trupilo-yp fozces sacouraged. but-aot- controLied-by~—the-Us3 -- Goverment. essere 13 @ third point, whies was not directly made by aay of / ‘ those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly troa the interviews x and 2rom review of files. The point fs thet of frequent resort to fynecdoche-~the mention of a part when tke whole is to be understood, -- or vice versa. ‘Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such woe e * » : 4m as “disposing of Castro,” which may be read in the nerrov, Literal Ce ™ sense of assassirating hiz, vhen it is intended that it be read in a et the broader, figurative sense of dislodging <he Castro regime. z. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking veguely of "doing some- thing about Castro” vhen it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. Ina situation wherein those Speaking may not Eave actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said. . what they actually heant, they should not be surprised 1f their oral - shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended. xX ° fhe suggestion was made to us that Operations aimed at the assassination of Castro may have teen generated in an atmosphere of . stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro's +S, SRR OR RE HORN Sa NBD RORY BLE RSS Ta ota demas 4
Gezise ‘acd on the reordering of the political structure that would follow. We reviewed intelligence publications fc: 1655 threugs * 1946, including National Intelligence Estizates, Special tational Intelligence Estizates, Ictelligence Memorandiuas, ard Memorardims for the Director. The EIZ’s on “The Situation axt Prospects in Cuba" for 1950, 1953, and 1S6+ Lave brief paragraphs ua itzely successor goverrments if Castro were to depart the soene. We also find similar short references im a SNIZ of March 1960 and in an Intelligence Memorandum of May 1965. In each case the treatment is no more nor less than cue would expect to tind in comprehensive round-ups such “4 as these. We conclude that there is no resson to believe that the Operators were unduly influenced by the content of intelligence . publications. & Drev Pearson's colurm of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA a a plan fn 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson elso has infomation, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a meeting at the State Department at which essassiration of Castro -) "| vas @iscussed and that a tear actually lasted in Cuba With pills to tad ’ be used in an assassination attenpt. . There is basis in fact for each * of those three reports. - oe Ate * Rar aan ein MEER 2 § n § ; a. A CIA officer passed an assassination weepon to an \ - Agency Cuban asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 Sovenber 1963. :«7 The weapon was a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe. ° . re sur. 4at . . « ec 4.4 - . 6 oo asa : . a ec eee Saws . ~ + eget eee on SNgamee ose ee iE Feros! bey 21S Rigg Olen 5 Fee, get Fae ett wea at io Prepan eet Sg GUE ete TS PS aatsucrastise, sdeideies 7 . - oo - Mee, fe, 8 MAS - + be oor) eke sel ies . . nat ole Ea Ry Set eeS owt a creche Seale tse meme me Ret eer ee Ee mere ae tne = sata ie co te tr = cece eecprins nest ie nA te bate * td Eat ae, — . ed . mae . . . : . eS re te MEP eng oe ‘ + am she. t @ *
week ay . out ‘ veda. Pat TAR, RP vy ee ay é wital 7 tghee we + ORR RAC IN oe a1 REBT N+ Soe, PsProgee ve wee oe ce . . atone t Tne CIA officer sussested that the Cuzaa asset load the syringe with Black Leaf 40. ‘The evidence indicaves that the meeting was undar way at the very moment President Keanédy was shot. b. Shere vas # eceting of the Srecial Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusx's conference roce on 10 August 19<2 at which Secretary McNamara brouched the subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a Project MQ:00SE action memorandum prepared by Ecvard Lansdale. At esothes Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there was discussion of @ receatly-disseminated Clandestine Services information report on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CTIA had refused the exiie*s request for funds and kad =9 involvemeat in the plot. e. CIA tvice (first in early 196) acd again in early 1952) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate renbers working in. behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. ‘The 1761 plot aborted and the pills vere recovered. Those furnished ia April 1952 were passed by the gaubling syndicate representative ' to a Cutan exile leader in Florida, vbo in turn kad them sent to Cuba about May 1902. In Jume 1962 the exile leader reported that a@ team of three men had been dispatched ta Cuba to recruft for the operation. If the opportumity presented itself, the team would make an attempt on Castro's life--perkaps using tze frills. { | | ween eee a wee ae
4 4 ! wae . “te 1 cra eS tie, . Oe a neces SPO ay” SO AERLOG YTD HY 0 Sx ger apeeertmastihaliags HMMS on doo 2 mee - . : ‘ PANTS Terra ag . = 3p ro j , This report describes these and other episodes ia detail; puvs thes into perspective; aad reveals, that while the events cescrited ay ewytomns © sesame Drew Pearson did occur and are subject to being patched together though one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative . , relztionuship among them 1s unfounded. nite BSc BBR, Sh a ae ‘ * i] 2 C ‘eo Soak ate tae 4 . . * a g ae thins metasmavamtynneasen at SATAY! POR CS Be SS AL hI - ee ee a es . ot . an eo tee ne ae ds Steger _pbgratemgete ok tse = rd eke cdee 8 te ee a Sees “er Hegre. OSE SI BRET STE Set
14-00000 “er oan 2 Oe a a ae wean - 09 iS Miscellazesous Schenes Prior to Aux:3% 1950 ; | Sen a gh ee A Wise $%S 19350 * Masch to Augu st 2950 We find evidence of at least three, und perhaps four, tchezes that vere under consideration vell before the Zay of Pigs, but ve . Ce can fix the time frame only speculatively. Those who have sone , kmovledge of the episodes guessed at cates ranzing fren 1959 through : 1961. ‘The March-to-August Span. ve have fixed may be too narrov, but sre at fits the limited evidence ve have. . Kone of those ve interviewed who vas first assigzed to 1 0 capb tarheney tem epee 3 :- . — ) : ‘the Cube tasx force after the Bay of Pigs ‘move of any of these ; schezes. * b. J. D. (Jase) Esterline, vho vas head of the Cuba task ; force in pre-Bay of Pigs days, is probably the most reliable FO, AP, ag od PP Mee +e 3 witness on general timizg. Ee may not have been privy to the “Precise details of any of the plans, but ke seems at least to * tepehetge +, aes SRREEG 8 Cnet e TD ayer EN «LER. CPO eens mse e ’ 4 +> have known of £ all of then.” Be 1s mo longer able to keep the Getails.of one plan seperate from those oF another, but each of the facets he recalls fits souevbere into one of the schetes. Hence, ~ we conclude that all of these schemes vere under consideration vhile Esterline had direct responsibility for Cuba cperaticns. €. Esterline himself furnishes the best clue as to the ‘ _ 4 at : tg ~. ett! cd ete te aR ee ey ee Pe gate Be Ee ORE Laas? * wo Mle neg Byte ye Naretstek preg em Bier wT ‘| . ‘ re .
14-00000 ge possible cime spas. He things it uniizely that esy plenaiag of this sort would have progressed to <ha point of consideracian a of means until after U.S. policy concerning Cuba was decided upon about Harch 1960. By about the ead of the third quarter of 1950, the total energies of the task force were concentrated on the main-thrust effort, and there would have been no interest in nor time for pursuing such wills-o'-the-wisp as these. * We are unadle to establish even a tentative sequence among the schexes; = they may, in fact, have been under consideration simulteneously. We ot find no evidence that any of these scheses vas approved at any ¢ c =) level higher than division, if that. We thizk 4+ most Likely that no higher-level approvals were sought, because none of tne scheses é x progressed to the point where approval to launch would have been 3 . ¢ needed. z . ° Aerosol Attack on Radio Stacion o, Jos ISD, remembers discussion of a schene to “ contaminate the air of the redfo studio where Castro broadcast his Speeches with au aerosol spray of a chemical that produces reactions similar to those of lysergic acid (LSD). Nothing came of the idea. [sata he had discouraged the scheze, because the chemical could not be relied upon to be effective. also of ISD, . enn CoO, woe De ERE ERGY,’ OPERA - He NHET AA, . . a . * ~ 10 - TT rere ayy 2 + meee, j SL ate ee fie tae ere mone hace eae moe Syn etme eegee error emer e te ids eee “y G78 Bh ne ote ae Wet foe s - > wy, . a Sern ° ete . 3 he oe he
14-00000 Sa alate coef AE wrest a wr on shane ite wars .) ed Sb agate me, * Nee, messes: Oh ee g eae + ote, nem n99 a A 2, Se . recalls experiventation wiun psychic ezergicers Sst earaot relate it to Castro as a target. We Sound no one else ce vi > resembered eaything * of this plot, vith the possible exception of Jaze ¥sterline who _may have it confused wits other schezes. Contarninated Cigars ‘ . Jake Esterline claims to have had in his possession in pre-Bay of Pigs days a box of cigars that had been treated with scone sort ; of chemical. In our first interviev with him, his recollection was that the cheminal was intended to produce temporary personality disorientation. ‘The thought was to scoehow contrive to have Castro u emoke one before making a speech ané then to cake a public spectacle Bey ef himself. Esterline distinctly recalls having hed the cigars in : his personal oofc until bo loft wey: ana that they definitely vere ewe intended for Castro. He does not reneaber how they came into his igs possession, but he thinks they must have been prepared by| é 3 : Ls Zn a second interview with Esterline, ve wentfoned that we bed learned * since first speaking with kis of a schene to cause Castro's beard. to fall out. He then said that his cigars might have been associated with that plan. Esterline fimelly said that, althocgn it was - 7 evident that he no longer rezembered the intended effect of the elgars, he was positive they were sot lethal. ‘he cigars vere never rr cts Sapeegnegtnanttniy farses Ge er CPROPEAELL Lone: eat e484, ° \ Ly i é I a t ’ & + the ” 4a A ,
14-00000 s boat ras ° . % os oF wes, a ° Ae we, . . ; © e owe * ~ & used, according to Esterliac, tecause WA/> could rot figure out how K . . . to Geliver trea without canger of blowtace on ihe Ayency. Ee says i _ he destroyed thes before leaving Wa;* in June 1941. ; | 4 Sidaey Gottlieb, of TSD, clains to remember distinctly a plot involving cigars. ‘To empbasize the clerity of his menory, be named the officer, then assigned to Wi/CA, who approached him with the scheme. Although there may well have teen such a plot, the officer . Gottlieb named was then assigned in India and has never vorked in ried 7 VE Division nor had anything to do with Cuta cperations. Gottlieb “Bates. mm: om t 4 ofa rye, Ww B renenbers the scheme ag being one that was talzed about frequently but not widely and as being concerned with killing, not merely with influencing tehaviour. As fer as Gottlieb kmows, this idea never got beyond the talking stage. [SD may tave gone ahead and prepared fe Se or x . the cigars just in case, but Gottlieb is certain that he did not get 2 . the DD/P's (Richard Bissell) personal approval to release them, as would ace ; have been done if the operation kad gone that far. We are wable to ; 3 ae 7 discover vhether Esterline and Gottlieb are speaxing of a single ” a E - 7 cigar episode or of tvo unrelated. schemes. We found no one else with He . : : firm recollections of lethal cigars being considered prior to August 1960. ee, e 7 id « ££ ao se ca x i - bane De et C ~2- . a) STFS IEY : ee ee 1 * ees rat 6 OS emg oo ee vee = sane a é. i ahs 6 . wee tae? tee 8 pee ™~ : z . : . tt tre am Ee tg oa era - SF ' ‘. sooty at an ee Saeed ora, FE ae ats one Wf ee an CP RG ee ee ee EE Se ae gO oe LB fy a ete oe hes, oT SER gee ly CP Ww eke, PGE art nye er aeth eee) aan Bs Ey TT Paice I OO SR al I gaa TE SORA RGR PAA A GR CER aE: oe 7 A
. = Ply Pre err et ierh a OU , rONa id. & : ; Depils*cry : = |zecatis @ 6cheme involving thelliia valts, a . ; chesical used by women as a devilatory--the thought teing to destroy Castro's image as “The Beard" by causing the beard to fall out. The chemical may be administered either oraliy or by ebsorption : through the skin. ‘he right dosege causes depliaticn; too muck - produces paralysis. believes that the idea originated in : connection with ea trip Castro was to have made outside of Cuba. The ; ° iGea was to dust thallium power into Castro’s shoes when they were “» . put out at night to be shined. ‘he scheme progressed as far as procuring the chemical and testing it on anizals. | . recollection is that Castro did not make the intended trip, and ot Fees Fat | ti : Le the scheme fell through | | rexeatiers consideration _ being given to use of thallium salts (perhaps against Castro) and . i _ Sone thing heaving to do with boots or shoes. | does not remember with whom he dealt on this plot. We found no one else : with fim kmowledge of it. ; rn - ' 4 4 t H . i ° . a : ° « a 7S i ee ~ - H +e wee abt toe i Wo Hpi eile, aan a tee se ae - “ * eur ca! 2, sae whengmae & ~ oe . son . Me OL, me. ae sm ee rare fie gb ope? wie Le a pegs ww tare Le tise We ete Ree edge phones £3 . 3 4 wate rt , oe dae BOS oo, we Derese ete
14-00000 @ “a * dma oe Bem -"?. ae TEE AS et AE RRM we ke at Genbling S:ndicate The first cericusly-pursued CIA plea to essaesizate Castro had its inception in August 1960. It involved the use of menvers of the crimizal underworld with contacts inside Cuba. ‘he operation had two phases: the first ran from August 1750 until late April or early May 1961, when it vas called off following the Bay of Pigs; the second ran from April 1952 until February 1963 and was cerely ua revival of the first phase whlch had teea inactive since atout Hay 1961. Gesbling Syndicate - Paase 1° August 1960 - Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield ' Edvards, Directar of Security, if Edvards could establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that wes active in Cuba. The . objective clearly was the assassination of Castro although Edvards claime that there was a studied avoidance of the ters in his conversation vith Bissell. Bissell recalis that the idea originated vith J. C. King, then Chief of Wi Divisian, although King now recalls huving nad only linited kmovledge of such @ plan and at a -much later date—about mid-1962. et . we Foe seen » 2: . Paars Fees any epi ee SEGRE Ets Soot tae Tee . 2 *, 7 . eet gt Mb te we Mee et . ”. i a ee ae i ‘ ite Pee +e tee oe PS on at : See ne eee
Ee 8p oes re a “4 GOD SS ave PM LTA Ee "2 siden den eset, ene: \er Ske a2 nelthe FI, ae ee www cote Tot A BE Fe eee nets Fait aed ME ; Swe ee er ey { @ Edverds consulted 2~sert A. Mates, a privevwe investigator who hed done sensitive work for che Agency, to see if Maheu had any underworld contacts. Maheu was once a special egent of the FRI. He opened a private office in dashington in 195 36. The late Robert 2 Os AE + A th ORI OTE AEN OD OS OM @ tRUPL eg, Cymaingham, of the Office of Security (and also a former Special Agent with the FSI), kcew Maheu ant mew that his business was kaving & shaky start financlally. Cunsingsen errarged to subsidize Maneu to the extent of $500 per monta. Within six months Maheu was doing 60 well. financielly that he suggested that the retainer be discontinued. . Over the years he has been intizately involved in providing support for seme of the Agency's more sensitive operations. He has since moved his personal headquarters to Les Argeles but retains a Washington office. A more detailed accoumt of Makeu's background. appears in @ separate section of this report. (Comment: Although ve see nothing sinister in it, ve are struck by tne fact that so many of the persoms whose mames appear in this account once worked for the F3I. We have already neced Cunningtes end Maheu. Oo appear are William Harvey, James O'Connell, and Edward Morzen.) Tater to Msheu acknowledged that he hed a contact who aight furnish access to the criminal undersorld, but Maheu was nost reluctant to He agreed ta ellow himself to be involved. in such en assignment. et ar eo TW Deeracmn ge ota rence whiten iateeizsestae done noncenanyeb rare neato : Sem ee or ee “45 . ~o eee
14-00000 a+ . er oe i al ve % oe rors) dagp tomes, Rey sob aati participate oaly after cefzz pressed oy Eivaras co do co. Marey identizted his contact as cze Jcnany Boselli, «ho -ived in Lus ; "ae Angeles and had the concession for the ice-makirg machines on "the strip? in Las Vegas and vow Mabeu understood to be a mesber of the Syniicate. Maheu vas knowa to Rosellt es a can vio bad & number of large business organizations as clients. Edvands and Maheu agreed that Maheu would approach Roselli as the representative of business- men with interests im Cuba whe saw the elimination of Castro as the 8 * essentisl first step to the mcoy very Of thelr Investsents. Mahkeu . vas authorized to tell Rosell{ that his "“cliexts" vere willicg to eC _ pay $150,000 for Castro's removal. 2 : e ¢ Septecter 1960 . Snef Edvards maced as kis case officer for the Opera tion James P. O*Connell (a former Special Agent, of the FBI), thea Chief, “Operational Support Division, Office of Security. O'Connell and oy Maheu met Roselli in New York City on 1k September 1960 where Meheu oe \ wade the pitch. Rosellf initially was also reluctant te become involved, but finally agreed to fxtroduce Maheu to “Sam Gola” who either ked or could arrenze contacts with syndicate elesents in Cuba who might handle the job. Posell said he had no interest in beiag Pe) eA 7 AO DeH eh TAA a, SOREL I. Dd be doe. paid for his participation and believed: that “Gold” would feel. the a + -.16 - co curs ovys a a one “e te hoe oT. eBe Eee ass Nee te TRL STEN ae, 0 ae
atet ee ee a Ses Py co ernorr ry-o curt sy ar bse * Be Ete sexe way. A menoract==: for the reecri. prepared by Sheffield fdvaris on 14 May 1962 states: “Mo nenies were ever paid to Rosell! and ¢- *: Glancara. Maheu was patd part of ats expense atcney during the periods . that he was in Miasi." (Giancana is “Gold.") O'Connell vas introduced (in true rane) to Roselli as an eaployee of Maheu, the explanation being that O'fensell vould handle the . case for Maheu, because Maheu was too busy to work on it full tise himself. Eo one else in the O? fice of Security was made wittiog of ; the operation at this tire. Edwards hizself aia not meet Roselli eve ; until the summer of 1942. ‘ ¢ a ; At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Edvards é os told Bissell that he tad e friend, a private investigator, who had . f 7 @ contact who in turn had other contacts through whom syndicate e - elements in Cuta could be reached. These syndicate elements in : £02 Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter : ° : part of Septenber 1960, Edvards, O'Connell, and Bissell vere the only ’ bee ', |," @nes in the Agency vho knew of a plaa egainst Castro involving U.S. E Tt . gangster elements. Zdvards states that Richard Helus was not informed F a of the plan, because Cuba vas being herded by Bissell at that tine. ; . With Bissell present, Edvands briefed the Director (Alles Dulles) g end the DDCI (General Cavell) on tae existence of a plan involving - 4 é . members of the syndicate. The discussion was cirevmspect; Edvards . ro lye . . 4 ren c Oi £ : { sich “3 epee the owt. we ee a Sc. ore eRe SAL Pale oettay ee ae 2 len ag aeeb 8: o* . Mek tata te hom, cegae ete gee > . . ~? * - - - ot 3 ee 3
14-00000 . - we @ H deliberately avoided che use of asy “tad vords.” The Geseriptive -eza 3 used was “an intelligence operation.” Edvards is quite sure that tre A i . DCT acd the DDCI clearly unterstocd wae nature of the operation be was discussing. He recalls describing the chancel es being “fron A to BtoC.” As he then eavistoned it, "A" was Metou, "3" ves Roselli, \ ana "C" vas the principal in Cuba. Edwards. recalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumatly in understanding and approval. Certainly, there was no opposition. Edwards stetes thet, while there vas no 7 Ye & forzal approval as suca, he felt that he Clearly kad tacit approval oe _ ‘© use his cwn judgment. Bissell camitted $150,000 for the support - ) of the operation. (Coment: In the light of this description of the brieftes, . it is appropriate to conjecture as to just what the Director did = eam ras os - approve. “Yt is safe to conclude, given the men particirating : and the general. subject of the meeting, that there vas Little 11k 1thood of miounterstandirg--even though the detefls were deliberately blurzed and the specific intended result was sever Stated in um stekable language. It is also reasonable to Conclude that the pointed avoidance of “bad words" expaa sized - . ~ to the participants the extrene sensitivity of the operatica.}_ “t oo + Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to “Sam Cold" at a meeting ; - 18 - . j - Denn ee cr bere et SEGRE ETES-EHEy ir Ba co aecipgianes pee Pee 1%" . WSeenrraaatemame santas ypc - Ne SRR sa ee FA ath, eA sg, EPO NOY to Ea get Set COE if =¥.. | | During the veex of 25 Septenter 1960, O'Connell and Makeu- wens to ' “att oe ond i tah owe. ew ete . ete sot CM web te ele tl a eae A Pa Fae 3 Sas we ee . . = . fee, ¥ « ah » ¥ ee z: “Cn a ee r= Seantoespewe, ¥ Pe —- o. ae ” x ‘ i ogee tm i 5 Eig Suen eens caterers Fine SETTING Free eet ee eae « Aer in ten. eee sure me Bertie? owt ae Tee) Late 8 ee eg oe ae on esas : - one Bt ’ " 3 *
14-00000 QeeTTT LUPO c.g: ete fin tre Fontafssleau Eotel. "Gola" said he ned 2a saa, ven he ilé-ntified only as “Joe,” who would serve as courier to Cuta end i v Rake arrangenens there. HMeheu pointed ort "Gola" to O'Connell : | trea a distance, but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or “Joe.” Be did, however, learn their true identities. Aa Office of Security mesorandi to the DOCI of 25 June 1955 places the time as “several weexs later.” O'Connell. is now uncertain as to whether it was on this first visit to Miami or on a subsequent one that he and Makeu learned ~ " , * the true identities of the tvo men. Maheu and O'Connell vere staying 4 ‘. at separate hotels. Makeu phoned O'Connell ome Sunday morning aad : i. . -) . called his attention to-the Parade supplement in one of that morning's : CG: Mianl newspapers. It carried en article on the Cosa Hostra, wita . a pictures of prominent menbers. ‘The ran Maheu and O'Connell knew as : . "Sam Gold” appeared as Mos Salvatore (Sam) Giancana, a Chicago-based 7 : . gangster. “Joe, the courier” (who was never identified to either ‘ pas _ Makeu or O'Connell in any other way) turned out to be ‘Santos Trafficaste, Ps _ the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba. , oe ” . At that tise the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuta, ; i ana Tratficante was maxing regular trips betweea Miami, and Eavaza on . é. : syndicate business. (The casinos vere closed and gambling was banned effective 7 January 1959. Ca 13 January 1959, Castro ancouced that . 4 the casinos would be permitted to reopen for tourists and foreigzers | t é ° Samastes Cae centan in cancreeeR AUDEN Tat PY ALLER CT eER ED on . Soe . ; ( “ . , e ; ‘ ‘ ° 4 : ' Oe % 1 oN aes : ' ' ¢ H 4 om ood eae POT eI eA  setermetiancaen aon ee ® * aiid a ™ ee 5 ee woe Tut tee Ce Spee meg o, aes a ee ee - sgn. at ee cae : me ee + Rad ee - rae folie ar nee é “a ote eee ee ne Sao pete ASeory : be : eas - - TO ee we ben Cette diag be
ow oy + tee © seem te sot 8 Be oate any Se nee Ot et o JR Giethanntateton acy GOREN: shew 4 > eihiinnyetth oa seIN Be O2 nto te ere ERR Bipot tea , . . , paetaiers raked! aMR put that Cubacs vould be tarred. ‘he eabfset on Ll] reorvary 1959 authorized reopening the casinos for the <curist trade. Tine magazine for 2 March 1959 amoimmced that the casincs tad been reopened the . previous week. The New York TMnes issue of 30 September 1961 enrounced that the last of the casinos evil! mnrfog had been closed.) Trafficante was to wake the errangements with one of kis contacts inside Cuba on one of his trips to Havana. - Fall and Sarly hinter 1950 Very early in the operation, well before the Pirst contact with Roselli, the sachinery for readying the neens of assassination vas set fo motion. The sequence of events is not clear, but it is apparent that a monber of methocs were considered. Preparatica of seme materials vent ehead vithout express approval. (Comment: It should be noted that TSD maintains a stack of equipment and materials for operational use. When qeries are wade of TS) technicians about cateriels or devicea that are not stock items, it is not wmusval for tee technicians to go - ghead with the preperation of the meterials or devicés against the event that there is ea formal reezest for them. Because of this, uniue significance should not be attached to edvance preparations for this operatica. [It should also be noted that 4 epnpccse ree nee
‘ ‘ . ha mes 74 om wh isd ese {t was not unusual at the tice in questioa for the Chief of TSD ie i ; to be by-passed in operations involving hi» people. While = — 4 . Cornelius Roosevelt, then Chief of TSD, has the clear impression a ELE teagan that ell requests were levied through his, instances were cited in the course of this inquiry where such was not the case. ‘The . practices and procedures in existence at the time may account, ; nt least in part, for the differing recollections of vhat did and . _ what did not happen and for the differing degrees of significence ": alven Sevelojsents in the minds of the partistmnts.) Dr. Edvard Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation tkat on 16 August 1950 he received a box of ae UP ood ) =e Cuban cigars to be treated with a lethal saterial. We understood then s i- : : g- - to be Fidel's favorite brand, and he thinks they were given to him by i é ' ‘ : Shef Fdvards. Edwards does not recall the Ancident. Guna has a : 30 notation that he contacted of TSD, on 6 September 1960. : . [___ remembers experimenting with sone cigars and then treating i ° -a full box. He cannot now recall whether he vas initially given tao | : -€ - ‘boxes, experimenting with one and then treating the other; or whether : ; . he bought a box for experimentation, after nich he treated the box ‘ . i . . supplied hin by Gunn. Ee does not, in fact, remember Gunn as the ~~" | fi. oo supplier of uny cigars. We is positive, though, that he did contaminate : ‘o a full box of fifty cigars with botulinum toxin, a virulent poison that ° AN ~ 21 - ; - anry ryro my tee :¥ so ait a Sb oad att Sat , . 4 we ae S sedi’ adn tect ae - * a BT é Bee sy ON et etet ah tebe tae es Gg We ak ee ee lee tips sot edn ae ata patently hs _ . ‘ . . . .
oa OAs tee ee : oth - 2 “” Pete GeT PO 1K RI oo, GR 2 vs, -An SIs ea) . : hey 8 be sad produces a fatal illness some hours after Lt is ingested. Treichler distinctsy rezenbers the .flaps-and-seals joo he had to do on the box ao co each of the wrapped cigars, both to get at the cigars and to erase evidence of tampering. He kept cne of the the experizental cigars and s*ill has it. Ee retested it during our inquiry and found that the toxin still retained 944 of its original effectiveness. The cigars were so heavily contacinated that nerely putting one in the mouth would do the job; the! intended victim would not actually have ta smoke it. / \ ; Gunn's notes show that he reported the cigars as beirg ready, i / for delivery og 7 Octover_1960. [  _—__—iinotes do not show actual delivery until 13 February 1961. ‘hey do not indicate to vhos .Gelivery was nade. Gunn states that he took the cigars, at some unspecified time, and kept them im his personal safe. He remenbers . destroying them within a month of Shef Edwards retirerent in June 1963. (Coment: “Others recall the cigar schese, but only as an | fdea that was ‘considered end then discarded. Roosevelt, Chief ~ of TSD at the time, and O'Connell, the case officer, recall the cigar schene, but feel that it was never considered seriously. foCumani/ who gave it a good deal of tine but aia not participate in the broader operational discussions, the cigars loom as important.) on . . ° i i ¥ i
“Pre, . a a ert OA gc meme 2 BS ov . Edwards recells apprcaching Roosev2it after Bissell hed already a es # spokea ta Roovevelt on the subject; Roosevelt recalle speaking to LAR oS Edwards after Bissell @iscussed it wits Edwards. Bissell does not : :¢ recall specific conversacvions with either of them onthe techaical aspects of the problen, tut he telieves thas he must have "closed the loop" by tsiks with both Edwards and Roose. velt. Roosevelt recalis his first meeting with Edvards as being ia Udwards' office. Edvards ot remenbers asking to be introduced to a chemist. He is sure that he a4 . did not name the target to Rousevelt, but Roosevelt says he knew it - was Castro. Eoosevelt believes thet he would have put Edvards in CG - . touch va{ | then chief of TSD‘'s Crenical Division, but - Bortmer Las no recollection of such vork at that tire. [ * recalls other cperations at other tices, but not this one. Roosevelt FS é : ‘ i & & be _  * @4& gay that, if be turned 4¢ over tof |coute have le oy tte assigned it tal : ‘ ot ° { ~ Roosevelt remembers that four possible. approaches were considered: s GQ) sone thing highly toxic, such as shellfish poison to be adzinistered . With a pin (which Roosevelt said was what was supplied to Gary Powers); er - (2). bacterial material in Liguid ‘fora; (3) dacterial treatment of a The decision, to the best of his recollection, was that bacteria fa «glee tai Ebene , ile id fora was the best means. Bissell recalls the sage decision ~ 23 - . - 74, Pe ey op aged -, . - +] wd op diana blir sretigeatenes | aetna’ ve Gghetsal . 2 oe BS ee tant pias ees é 2: eke 2) TERS tt wwavhicr. s a ee Loony rete vet ahs WET Beat a esc Pe eae BS dete a eed 7 ae gee: 2 eseeateg ievinn8 fates fae ie pe Mee se : zg ere shad neey ie en | Shares eae? "ayes ok SO rr . fee
14-00000 a 8 ? ° ropes iw) 4 i Miles do lo wilde . e tying 1% te a recollection that Castro frequently drark tea, coffee, - or boufllon, for which a liguld poisca would te particularly well rot ag i suited. oI Janvary - February 1961 . ‘ Despite the decision that,a poison in liquid for: would be most + : é@estrable, what was actually prepared end delivered vas a solid in : the form of small pilis about the size of saccharine tablets. z remembers meeting vith Edwards and O'Conzell in Edwards’ office to ~ discuss the requirement. The specificaticus were that the poison te —_/ stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not tmediately acting, end vith a firmly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either liquid or solid fors. states that the pill form was . Chosen because of ease and safety of handling. (Comment: The gangsters may have had soze influence on the se ‘ choice of a means of assassination. O'Connell says that in his © wah y very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely, Maheu's discussions with then) consideration was given to possible ways of accomplishing the mission. Apoarently tae Agency-had first Sete meme thougkt in tems of e typical, gangland-style killing in which i Castro would be gummed down. Giancana was flatly opposed to the C ~ % - =) Bpyettitanvecess utac eattnee.<r9p 19 00 Sr} etree mee nntenn 0 ReN RIS ene Leo onsen mat emaen apanie aon meet ber anne eteumatinte +p AEN: « - . RR 2 enn, CYySO Gat -. ‘eo “3e PL sae ° . hea’ - tae aa oe e ste ig 4s ee, = S omttn vtne wer D * . + . 7 oot . 2 7% oe gst et . . - - ste te . 2 a - . . Lette Se Lae” UEP ee el ee ST ee ey ek ere 8 * . kt ROUND “re” EER AR Sa Re Bg pr cas Tae te ee eee og * goes appt Zire! mates". o° a . a i Ty Ee beers Bee RD me ene 9 Beith: eoteetee ede wee. tet eee Tle ee cnr, “eee be seamendicegi 3 Soe kt
14-00000 ay ' < 4 3 7 ed a oct ‘ EN ~ arg pt Awe we tee te eee vee amet wm thw wae ee ‘oe nag i. rare 2 ‘ 7 a CE peer ares pas - op ps PERE Go te ee B bate wie ' a: use oF firearms. He said that no one could be reeruited to do the job, Lecause th: chance of survival and escape would be Z negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill. “ OF oA aS 7 F that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante ‘ (“Joe, the courier") vas in touch with a disaffected Cuban 7 official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that ti : . would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gaagsters 7 named thelr man inside as Juan Orta wno was then Office Chlef a : and Direccor Gereral of the Office of the Prine Minister (Castro). - é on The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to : : ( receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost . ; * : that cource of income, and needed the money.) ; ‘ When Edvarde received the pills he dropved one into a glass of i vater to test it for solubility and found that it did not even l * 7 . disintegrate, let alone dissolve. [ __peoo them back and made i up a new batch that net the requirement for solubility. Edvards - Lo, ; a oa - at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. Se EG 3 called on Dr. Gunn to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave Guan money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. Gunn has a record of a i a” by & Ps » - é - conversation viel fa 6 February 1961. It may kave related-to | the ‘tests, but we cannot be sure. What @ppears to have happened is that . Guna tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found thea ineffective. Be me 6 z Ze e ‘i . aan i . F i + . > bee oe ages te feet atte area S907, Behe Er tenet by pling deta RTOS oe mee Ay ert set ey erie eo pa ate ee 2, tee ee ter SOR ee ee ow A" tae Re, Page) So 08 * RYT De Bore a ie eee ae a mete a Pitas a whe te Feng ORE ee le ea] is ae Se ST Tae A SP: “ a
14-00000 : Fe aie ane rr ~~ iu 4 6 Blears lw oh wae : States that zests of bowlin oa Guinee pigs ere not valid oe because Guinea pigs have a high resistance to this Farticular toxin. $ [___hetnsere ‘tested the pills on monkeys and found they did the ° . Jod expected of then. We cannot reconstruc: with certainty the sequence of eveats ; betveea readying the pills and putting them into tle hads of Roselli. ; | ‘ards has tke ispressica that he had a favorable report frea Dr. : | Guna on the guinea Plz test. Gunn probably reported only that the : pills vere effective, and Eévards assumed the report vas based on the i results of tests on guirea pigs. Dr. Gunn bas a clear recollection, ; ne _) without a date, of being present at a meeting in which Ruosevelt | ; ~ demonstrated a’ pencil designed as a concealcent device for delivering . : : the pills. Roosevelt also recalis such @ meeting, also without a . date. Gunns’ notes record that his last action an the operation came : oa 10 February 1961 vhen ke put Gottlieb in touch vith Edvards. i 4 Gottlieb has no recollection of being involved, an impression that is eb .-- ‘Supported by Bissell who states thet Gottlieb's assignments were of a - i ae tot: ateperent nature. O'Connell, vio eventually recedved the pills, recalls that he derlt vicn[ es no record of . ; delivering pills at this tice, but he dces not ortinarily keep detailed ; | | Yecords of such things. . . : { £ a t 4 ‘yt asiaatihialatae entesheaiahihenensinhh tadieini cs atntdintc nade vine E a . la ie : . ‘ - - Ce On ee “ f . te. os “oa he patie a ie Meee - Ce anele ed Le mY wgeute Tei tnt oegh peas tty « ee Jt { Bs re . as ‘t 2% red . 2. » 2 a a aan eetce Pee a aein ten te phabelgetts onan + soe c ee | tae Tee 108 9 gy Sen ete Rae ate car ee srg lanmet greeny pepe ees 9 Mies ee! PR ey ARE? es DS eee ate
In esy even: e there were six of thea. He recalls the other turse were used tq » C'lonn2)) ata recetye Cerner rims élving three to Roselli. Presumably the Pills, and he belfeves Tae dates on which O'Connell recefved the pills and subsequently Fassec then to Rosellt ca Sometime after Cung! Guan also has a =ecord of being esproactked about = » by Willian x, Earvey (fo 6 + Febey, at -~ . % . clarify it; the denfes learning ~ . one "EMA VARRER MAAN = astm pe SUES Loman: 2% etens ve tose . > 4 aot . ae + - O'Connell thas - aha a de ae wr yo om se ote iBaoe ’ . 7 ha - ~ =F eee. 7 *; . ot, eh de ebetbriatm ame eer eae ni “ee Se ete pee ee no > . stn PUA ° Bissel1. According end Harvey instructe the recollectios of any of oe fe States that J. C. King in connection with a sensitive Project % . © with Cottlep, Guna’s notation On this point is O9te cay have been im another context. Tate February - varon 1561 Rosellg Passed the “he pills had been delivered to Orta is umtlerstoca to heve Ser special ageas <8 Gunn's notes, he @ nim to discuss techniques, was also briefed at this tine, Pilis to frafficante, Snot be established. re would have been S$ notation of 10 February 1661. the undertaking of the FRY) in February avey was working on for briefed Harvey on the Operation, but not targets, not in accord with the others involved. we are unable to O'Connell although King of tze operation until much later, Rosell reported ta in Cuba. Orte kept the pills for & couple of weeks before returning then. According to the Gargsters, Orta got ‘cold feet. e Cd So oer le 2. ® . oo ~ eae By fh sf = SO CR ee & o * 7 or testing or folubllity and effectiveness, ° | { ' | . sipwhacieds : . Senay “vaccanes Rata emenertes sine Sains reitiniinds eaiatiale Siegen Seen a Sera were Nw. ie ileal aare iaaia ogi? ee TSR TH Bee Beare 9 ty Se rennet ve . iia ei vod
14-00000 a ‘ A) o Ba cbs - 2 SSS .. ee ak y ; ° (Coment: Crte lost nis position ia the Prise Minister's Office on 26 Jenzary 1961, walle Plunstizg for the the operation was : still going on in Niamt and in Washington. fe took refuge in oo ‘ or. the Venezuelan Exkassy on 11 April 1962 and became the respens{- 4 bility of the Mexican Entassy vhen Vereruela broze relations with Cuba in Noveeter 1451. Castro refused to give his a save \ conduct pass until October 1964 vhen he vas allowed to leave for ; | 2 Mexico City. Be arrived in Miamt in early February 1965. (Tt appears that Edsards and O'Conzell did not know at the : time of Orta’s fall fron favor. ‘They have made no reference Po + Ae hath, thes scadtins Ob w abe a. stead “eak ee e SPY GAM, & to it--ascribing Orta's faflure to cold feet. It vould cees, _ ollemehenantaneen aaniiie though, “that the Seogsters did know that Orta had already lost nis * @tcess to Castro. They described bin 83 @ man who had once kad @ position that alloved his & rake-off on gambling profits, a eae ne ane enen position that he bad since lost. The only job with which we cag associate Orta that might kave allowed hin a rake-off was the © ° one he held in the Prine Kintster's Oftice, vhtch he lost on as es woke VIROL Biber diet to teat ‘ . Toye 7 26 Jenuary 1961. Tt seens likely that, while the Agency thougat 00 om mom caer ame scot | the gangsters kad a man in Cuba with easy access to Castro, what they actually bad wes a man Cisgrutled at having Jost access.) _ i > The previously-meationea 24 Sime 1966 Summary of the operation prepared by the Office of Security states that when Orta asked out a o 7 ¢ .  ¢ H AM; ied rad ae e °- be = Fe . oe to ce 8 2a 423 oe * ‘ REAP RE Thee Maps AR APR LETS MRE Uy “erate * ‘s on ny retath ersten : Saat mae plennemves eabrner = tr oe Tete ete we newton + ae ates tuantinn set ne a aie Pert Noe Teg mee ta tee “ae fone a> ee wo at aoe ve. comer 8 ose Pe ene VV tate +
oF POPE O. Of the assig=mment he SUZZtS eG acotner caniieate veo xada several atrerats without success. Neltser iivards sor O'Connell mov the mae te : identity of Orta's replesesent nor any adiiticzal details of the , “Et reported further attesnts. Mares - April 1961 pe Ri a dad Following the collapse of the Orta chaanel, Roselli tela woe O'Connell that Trafficante mew of a san high up ig the Cuban exile Movenent vho night do the joo. He identified him as Tony Verona (pr. Manuel Antonio de YARCIA y Loredo). Varona vas tke head of the é * sraemarenia a oemgal se C } Democratic Revolutionary Front, a group supported by the Agency as ; 7 part of the lars = Cuban operation. O'Connell understood ‘that Varcra . was dissatisfied with tke rature and the extent of this support and that IMAAVZ Suspected that Varona was not keeping bis bargain vith the Agency. _ ° Pe Te erred (Comment: Reports froa the FRI suggest how Trafficante rey iets Tae have known of Varona. On 21 Decenber 1960 the Bureau forvaried : ote to the Agency a menorendia reportizg thet efforts were being “ae ee _ wade by U.S. racksteers to fine-ce anti-Castro activities in . hopes of securing the gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies hg ' in Cuba in the evert Castro was overthrove. A later repors 18 Janvery 1961 associates Varo-a with those schenes. Varona OO) | - 29 - POET FYyTa Ay - id te b ten ° A Roninee cane waeenmmamometin RRL Wey Pr em ages 1.199 eB “SOE Araneae a werent mewandien cman « siynanoun «eecmmmrs mente . tec yg ~ nidinge “teh 5 on 3.2 oe, . - ote . . i. wee gl 2 Te on tas. aE Orig ers ‘ - teen Agger er the vibe ebtahot one: Ages he ne Bev eta vee poe ae ee SFMT eet ere pe pF eae an 6 2.
74-90000 com Sg Semen tg . Se FE te cee wae Par rae . ee gse°@ 3 fea ar had hired Savard x. #988, @ Washington pestgs relations counselor, as a fund vaiser and public relations advisor, The Bureau report alleged that Moss' oistress was one Julia ~ Cellint, vaose brothers represented two of the sargest ebling casinos in Cuba. the Cellint trothers vere believed to be in + touch vith Varcna through Moss and vere reparted to kave offered ‘ i Varona large ams of money for his operations against Castro, 1 vith the understanding that they would receive privileged : treatment “in the Cubs of the future." Attempts to verity these ; ‘reports were unsuccessful. | * (There is a record of CTA interest in Moss, but there is ‘ no indication that the Ageasy had any involvement with hig . fa connection with Cuba. He was granted Covert Security Clearances in March 1959 for use by HE : Diviston in his (thea) role ag [ : : : end again in Sovenber “1962 for use by CA Stare under Project ZEMAIOR, 2 pregran for the exploitation of political consultants. In early 1965 Moss i . as decane of intsrest to ‘the House Foreign Afsairs Comittee because of his record of. having represented various foreign gover-rments, — ; A menorandi: Prepared by CA Staff in March 19655 states that the : yecords do not show any use made of Hess by either NZ Diviston Poy cof! “er by CA StaZf. The CSA of 7 Hoverber 1962 specifies that che , - 30 - gph ge Rene dB we oe eet Saye BR eg ote alia i Es “ty oe Sw
14-00000 ? e . . * a aout oh en eat, Sh seplmle ees Let : . é. = - . . oo ne Spy, emp tasaepts Bee cy ” ag f. Ferme Reg ete eee wm ge ae 7 eS a os bey “0.9 ' - rs ¢ . approval tecame invalid i? Moss were sot used withia six 4 moaths of the date of the approval.) é ° ° : . . frefiicente apprcacked Varoza and told rim that he hed clieats : who wanted to do away with Castro and that they vould pay dig coczey . for the job. Varcaa {s scerorted to have been very receptive, Siace : it would mean that he would be able to buy bis own ships, eras, aad ccmmunications equiment. is . , (Comment: By this tice Roselli had become certain that 74 O'Connell vas an Agency eaployee, not a subordinate of Mazeu, 4 3; of, He told O'Connell that he was sure that O'Connell was “a A . iC ’ ~ goveronent wan - CLA" but tkat O'Connell should not cosfirs . | ' . this to him. Roselli said that as a loyal Azerican he vould -: do whatever he could end vould never divulge the operatios.) i Roselli vas to deliver money to Varona for expenses. O'Connell 80° 0) AD GER ry REE pte AOE CONTE Seow ° A ° nov recalls the amount as $50,000. Edwards, who vas away at the tine, : Xf " , ss Fecalls it as $25,060. Since Edvards vas absent, O'Connell had to ¢ + a Fo - . get approval from Eavards' deputy, Robert Bannerman, who uat41 then . bad been unwitting of the operation. O'Connell told Bannerman that | the operation vas known to and approved by Eévards. Bencerman authorized passing the money acd now recalls the azount as being on the order of 4 a Lens: $20,0Cc to $25,000. An Office cf Security mesorandun to the DUCI, mt PR Me cS 2 eee mnG % 6 e em 4 tas ro] é te pt met « . > . oF . . ne ee a: 4
sot ees, eee poy 7.0 pelpaetnenh a) ‘ , ‘ é e Bad ee hed 8 nad we cme ee ea ons ates sted 2% Suze 1966, sets che acount as $20,005 in eesh and $2,000 worth of ccommntirattcas eGuimmens, Jaze SsterLize, WhO Sigmed the vouchers for the funds, recalls the anounts as being those stated + RP Be ne te ‘ in the Office of Security nenorazdcn. (Comment: As a sldelight, Esterline seys that, when he ; learned of the {ateadeg use of Vercna, steps vere taken ta : Doe. cancel the plan. Varona was on we OF the five key fizures in the Revolutionary Frost aad was heavily involved in Support of the anor wo g Phe ssh: approaching Bay of Pigs operation. If steps were in fact taken to end Varona's participation in the symiicate Plan, they weve oom eee! sae! 4 : ineffective. It is clear that he contisued as an integral part : . of the syndicate schene.) . , When the money vas ready, O'Connell took the Pills from his safe end delivered then ao and the noney to Roselli. Eoselli gave the pilis dmereee en aipeee + and the money to Varona, whoa Rosell{ dealt with under pserdonyn. ~ Tittle is known of the delivery chamels beyond Varona. Varona vas ee : believed to have an asset inside Cuba in a position to slip a pili Lo ' - Castro. Edvards recalls scrething ubout a contact. who worked in. Z a restaurant Srequented by Castro and who vas ta receive the pills aad PYG 29 Menge hive AP CED URE: Bee T! ~ sip IRE otee-beEERey amanOd on aniTtaRE IGT on . a* a! . . ‘ * . x put then into Castro's food or drink. Edverts believes that the ° . at t . 7 ee. wi schene failed because Castro ceased to visit Saet particular restauran:. . ; SARS ee | HTS sen ey s 1 wre MEE ? i hm d .- -32- oy Bons i etiws) = Iya ate - . Meee Got Seta g Ne marta - eg et wanes. Rage er Se ge 8 oo pir a at re e:
14-00000 ws = ; ORR OD heen eee SA Om wane ca bes ste en wens tne eee . BS . 3 é April - May 195. J i. Soon after the Bay cf Pigs, Zévarts sent word to Rosellt *F : through O'Connell that the operation ves of 2--even it something “ happesed there would ‘te no payorf. Esvards is sure there was a . : , complete standdown after that; the Operation was dead and remained so i until April 1952. He clearly relates the origins of the operation to the upcoming Bay of Pigs invasion, and ics termization to the Ray t of Pigs failure. O*Connell agrees that the operation was called off i- after the Bay of Pigs but that the temiration vas not fim ant firal. “ i. ; _ He believes that there was scnething going on betveen April 1961 and_ , : : C7 April 1962, but he cannot now recall voas. Se agrees with BLL | - Harvey that when the operation was revived in April 1962, Harvey toox ; : _ over a “going operation.” ; ; i sos : (Comment: As distinguished fron Zdvards and O'Connell, : i . both Bissell and Esterline place the termination date of the i “oy " assassination operation as being about six nonths before the - . F : ie, Lo “ ° Bay of Pigs. Esterline wives as bis reason for so believing the i. . Tact that the decision had teen rade to go akead with a massive, : } major operation instead of an ind‘widually-tergeted one Such as this. Whatever the intention in thts respect, if the decision to : ve # z terminate was actually cade, the cestsien was not cooaunivated i ~ - 33 - : -- . a «aaa SSP On chet S HBbt IS 5 ie SM 5 he aR IOG Cm OCR AOET Uh . > ee fe * ed ore ope we ot ta os oy - : . . : . oly ete Che ek SA a * a ; i ; x sere ae a Sigs Om ores San tot aagrat oe rae. caer, aon vim oe Ee esr ee ae at eee a ne a ee Tete aes Rate ins oer Lite aca eae a oe Se ty,
14-00000 “ae 3 . “ : atc a - Lee Ay eG oe hacen = alt oe * * e = 4 ° . . ue fas 3 3 @ ere, ora, RR he apg . ry ® 4 4 effectively. It is clear that thts pleo to assassinate Castro z F continued im train until soretine after the Pay of Pigs.) ; : i O’Coanell believes that he rust have recovered the pills, but aa* 7 he has no Specific recollection of having done so. He thinks that . instead of returning them to T3D ke probably would have éeestroyed ; trem, most likely by flushing them down a toilet. Treichler has no { : record of the pills having teen returned to him, but he says he is | : quite sure that they vere. in a memorandum of 14 May 1962 Sheffield Edwards stated that . knowledge of this particular operation was limited to six persons. i + SP ateme by °° . Co. En the course of this investigation, we have identified the following Persons who kiew in late 1960 or early 1951 of this specific plan - . tO aseaseinate Castro: 1. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence ; 2. General C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence i 3. | Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans 7 Oak anes eg. ‘st 1 ad ° ea! pane . oe 3, ‘ a &. ‘Sheffield Edvards, Director of Security <8 1° . ay w - /@ oe §. “James Q"comen, Office of Security, the case officer ee 6. J.D. Esterline, Catef, wi/ wf 4 ' : i a f t 7 Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD 8. 9. Edvard Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Medical, Services om ew. faetiax) 8 ° ° A x 8 Om ¢. a | i a ! i ! cy t & a a a ui | | ‘ SOUR OnbAte he ww ceNtE rire inte uate cca) fey ew eects « -m,.205, srempaagmen Gepmes + ame bing oP 7 i e 1 3 i Ee pre? she see SOE GT Fe ae Na elas 6 ae ae ape: a) y Boy ce + firewire. er eer eater TENE gent wot wcoewerie ie moe ~~ caries, Menage rele peti et oe 2 pss sone Ps : , sP Te EAE we a ee wT * Fewest 7 .
me ee. { : i 10. Willies Harvey, Chief, S1/D i ; . . : ll. Sidney Gottlied, Special Assistant to the DD/P (Gotilied's #40 > Somes. “+ i rame was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he -  g! i denies wowing of the operation in 1960-61.) . * 3 ; 12.  Bovert Bannerman, Deputy Director of Security s 13. J.C. King, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of : { ‘the operation at the time.) : oo + mem Orb eee oe Tse follovirg persons outeids the goverrmen’ are known to ‘be witting of the operation and either know or strongly suspect the Ageacy's connection with it: -3 1. Robert Maheu, a private investigator Li (. i 2. John Roselli, the Agency's princizal contact with the 7 gasbling syndicate : 3. Saw Giancana, an important figure in the syndicate Te ea ° : ° ® ORR eer wre RICE EL: LEA AAA ARETE ANT O os eet ee . : * C ° . : ' a me Wie i J ! k, Santos Trafficante, the courler and man inside Cuba | | } These additional people vere avare of the operation, but their kmovleége of CIA's connection with it can only be speculated: : Lone j 1. Jven Orta, the man originally selected to poison Castro : 2. Antonio Varona, a Cutan exile leeder . . | 3. Tre son-in-law of Verona » who is known to have been involved with his closely during this time. (The Varona 201°file nakes mo reference to Yarona having a-son-in-lew, but he identified Lo, j this close associate as such. ee e- NA ote tare aes cai ated tp debeb ; ° . - cee PT gee a a he ar Tig ot apr! i woot ea Re Ce eS abe & ee ge ee : : 7 Cie cg TMT AT Sete ene ca : : i- TE Ne lan (timer otha fag. omaeh une ee we Seen Bae yee ‘ee me OD ena ed
. {> Gt ammeter. pn ee 5 es . ee FOE OME EL REE Hg wen i oe tee’ 2 3 i a > a $ & te ate ‘ Tae agency's General Counsel, Lavrence Houston, end Attorme HG oe 3 Gersral Rotert Kennedy learned the full dswils of the operatioa in “et May 2962. We do not know the particulers of the report Drev Pearsen, now has, but 1% may include many of the deteils of this operation. If it does, thea the circle of those now knovledseable vould be widened to include: N Edvard P. Morgan, Maheu's Wasairgton attorney Columist Drew Fearson and probably his partmer, Jack Anderson i. 2. a 3. Chief Justice Rar] Warren &, - 5. oe, « CO) James Rowley, chief of the Secret Service freer Pat Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB . - _ 6. Attorney General Ramsey Ciark ; To Various menbers of the FAI ‘ K i | . | eet. Sem * ’ ¥% Helene, eres - eae oRe set me ae : - oe a a PT ee ee re ee aoe ie
14-00000 eo gt et AS te ‘= s be sores a peer mllene ore ane agers ies, saps Ete nee, Se GR Bae ret ton pt m rtuay * sang nitiiney, ae ing «SP ae BRP * wom im - “oars, CLASSY Fira pepy vs aban 6 § bad honam Geshlicg Syndicate ~ Poace 2 Willies zarvey, Chfef of FI/D, vas triefed in Febreary 1961 (vy authority of Richard Bissell) on phase ore of the gesbling syndicate operation.” That briefing vas {nm connection with a sensitive operation that Bissell bad assigned to Earvey. Earvey describes it thus: Early in the Kannedy adainistration, Bissell called him in to discuss what Harvey refers to as an Executive Action Capability; 1.e., @ general stand—by capability to carry out assassinations when required. Harvey’ 8 notes quote Bissell as sayizs, “Ske White House has twice urged me to create such a capability." Bissell recalis d‘scussirg the question of developing a general capability with Earvey. He mentioned the Edvards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro in that context, but he nov thinks that the operation was over by then and that reference to it ws in terms of a past operation as a case in point. It was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be briefed by Edverds. Harvey's fixing of the cate as February was ‘only after review of events both preceding the briefing and folloving it. Ke says nov that it might have beenfearly as late January or as late as March 1961. . : After some discusston of the probleas involved in developing an Executive Action Capability, Bissell placed Earvey in charge of the effort. Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects . 37-- $Riforrs +. ta ‘Lm eenenepetmienee stn 5 Breese temine at wane porte west etna oiptte © ”
14-00000 ’ 1 tr aay as Ee bok t we ont Wek of the probles wita Arnold Silver and vita Sianey Gostited. Since Silver wac already cut in, Earvey used rin in developing the . e s- Executive Acticn Capebility, although never with respect to Castro. ce es “= 5 ie i a Li We did not question Gottlieb on his knovledge of the program for eo we creating an Executive Action Carebility, but Zarvey's mention of bin in this connection may explain a sotation by Dr. Gum that Harvey # gesewe instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlied without associating oy the discussion with the Castro operation. Harvey states that after the decision vas made to go ahead vith the creating of an Executive Action Capabilicy, and while he vas i 5 still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helms Oe of fully on the general concept but without meation of the then ongoing i — Plan to assassinate Castro. The Executive Action program cane to be known as ZRRIFIE. Ite i ae ens eeeagetEneRED 3 enti principal asset wes an agent, GI4IN, who hed teen recrulted earlier ‘ ot by: for use in a special operation in the Congo =(sbise- ; “ok " mesacchuaslon er Pateicedtmmvr)> to be rm by Justin O'Donnell. | “a i one 82 ° . ° . “ho Bt. ° (O'Donnell made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in an assassination attempt, and asked to be released--which Bissell 1 tec ome oe granted.) The project name, ZARUFIE, firss appears in the Miles in GAGE AFR CRSY He CE ROE GR Sr aehinte emt Ree sore RAMON BS ONG oe PATNI on vonte ERNE os + j ts _ _ _ . May 1951, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February Ct genes | ! 1962. Tae new DD/P (Helus) on that date authorized Harvey, by Pare ec? . a ee ee ae . . soar a ape talte, _— eae Cmege cceeeey toe € . ae Ce ne one AL Rpeis at Rain ASS Se aT SR CMLL S SATA cB TTY Pare het et WONG EBRD Ct tn Rain
14-00000 - 9 cote, eee Deas ety le wee ne tots Sey OP A oe ae an. Sees 2 ae . 7 & - eee me at . er ar : eR gcse wceeindlinanieee Seco Baga OE PE AD OST 6 Teens Syeg ice, SN RI RL REARS BET SOE Sean ft es ee ; mencoraadim, to handle the project on a special basfs. Accounting for . expenditures was to be by ceseral category end ou garvey‘s certifi- cation. The initial approval was for $14,700, consisting of $7,200 . ~-. : P for QIWIN's annual selary and $7,500 for operaticcal expenses. Project ZRRIFIZ was covered as en Fi/D operation (ostensibly . to develop a capability for eatering saves acd for kidnapping couriers). Tt continued on a course separnte from the Edvards/gambling syndicate i operation against Castro until 15 November 1961. Esrvey has a note ; : that on that dave he discussed with Bissell the application of the b. ZRRIFLE progran to Cuba. Earvey says that Bissell instructed him to om nom ame cept aaa oe take over Edwards’ contact vith the criminal syndicate and thereafter % rum the operation against Castro. Harvey adds that, as a completely 7 unrelated development, shortly after this discussion with Bissell he a vas told by Helms that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's . . _¢ Guba task force. . mo, ; 7 4 Tate 1961 ~ ~ Early 962 ; . ; , Kerrey recalls that he ves vory busy vith @ mnber of things te i a the period that followed the discussion with Bissell that led to his | taking over Edvards' Castro operation. He vas cumag over his , responsibilities in FI/D. Ee ves working with NSA on the Martin/ Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and Soe rire pale . ; SAAT RSET Cn BR REI Bie: we eRe Owen: AOL on ROB FAD HY rend Be ¢
14-00000 - "> Pee Tarte ee a ee eee 8, “s , & Wa5 engaged ia daily seetisgs concerning thes, he attended a statisg ; calels’ conference in Paraca in late Jaavary and early February. oo ; ‘ . February ~ Yarch 1942 ; Earvey recalls’ a first neetizg with Edwaris in February 1962 oa the subject of the Cascro Operztion. ii also recalls working 3 out the details of the takeover during March. : . (Coment: After Earvey took over the Castro operation he : fan it as one aspect of ZRRITIS: hovever, he personally handled _/ the Castro operation ang did sot use any of the assets being seante 6 OR NORRE TM 6 cr — developed in ZRRIFIE. He says that he scon came to think of the , . i C Castro operation and ZRAIFLE as being syzonyzous. The over-all i . H Executive Action program cane to be treated in his mind as being . | synonymous with QIWIN, the agent working on the over-all Progra. He says that when he wrote of ZERLFLE/GIWIN the reference vas to 9On om ccm: oe . - . Executive Action Capability; when he used the cryptonym ZRRIFIE ot . alone, he vas referring to Castro. He said that his correspondence | ; / would. disclose this distinction. We revieved the. correspondence . : | and found it for the most Part unreve - - ” : (After Fervey lett Task Force W and vas winding up ‘his : headquarters responsibilities {n preparation for assignment to vO crn: ae Rone, ke wrote a mezorasdua to the the Chief, FI Stat, dated 27 June. SOG Meret eimsomta ret aie 2 eater nate oatacmaren 20° HOR © = seammaR pe e 8 ~ ay Ts ; * ge mR : Tote. cee wg Fee eo eee ts . - . dtalete ‘mee gpreneh Prey Sorrcr ec reva JTtsalberene oi ioe Acasa 08 wey ear rn? re oe vee a 7 ? Gam | tat Tint eerie Ee Fae te nes o # 3
14-00000 + eh Gp ete ote ete a 1953, stating that the origiral justification for exploying QivT as longer existed exd raising the q:estion of QIAIN's termination. The records (CLZA-197%, 2 April 195%) show that QJWIY was termizated by the Luxembourg Staticn on 21 April 196%. There is no indication in the file that the Executive Action Capability of Z2aIz/Giai7 wus ever used.) i ! i ' : April 1962 z ‘. Edvards recalls Harvey contacting hin ta April and asking to be bot, put in touch with Besellt. Edwards says that he verified Eelus‘ 4 C: S approval and then made the arrangements. Farvey states that he briefed . . : Helms before hfs first meeting vith Roselli, explainixg its purpose, t s 7 and that he also reported to Eelas the results of his meeting vith pe Roselli. Harvey states that thereafter he regularly briefed Helms ; “e. on the status of the Castro operation. ‘ BS . . (Coment: Edvards statenent that he “verified Helns* is : . approval” ‘ts the earliest iniication ve have that Hr. Helms had a Castro. Harvey added that, when he briefed Eelas on Roselli, ( i he obtained Helns' approval not te brief the Director.) ~ ree ENTS ANAS Ht OTHELLO A BE tap Eévards, Harvey, and O'Camell have differicg recollections-of the specifics of the turnover frea Edvarts/O'Comell to Harvey. Not Ser @ Bea £ at’ np,
eer fe . Pree - wee - > . . vet tee all of tee differences can be resolvad--n9% evea by follow-up interviews in wuich *Le information furniszed by each was checked with each of the other tvo. There is no disagreement on tee fact ve a woe? of the turnover nor on vhen it tock place. The recollections vary deciéedly, though, on the status of the operation at the tise of its transfer to Farvey and on just Lov clean the break ~as between phase as gues a one under Edwards and phase two under Harvey, Sos a. Edwards believes that the operation vas called off i ; coupletely after the Zay of Pigs and that there was no further ‘ operatiosal activity in coasection with it uatil Harvey met seh perme + C ‘ Roselli and reactivated the operation in April 1952. O'Connell introduced. Harvey to Roselli, and Edwards had nothing further te ° do vith the operation--with the exception ef a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in connection vith the Phyllis : cone . McGuire wiretapping incident. (‘The wiretapping incident is oF seam mee described in a separate section of this report.) Edvards’ : records show that on 1k May 1962 Harvey called Edvards “and : Oo indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of a : a ° " Roselli for the future." : | i b. Earvey’s recollection of the turnover tends to support Edvards' summary, but he claims that he took over "a going (1 SGRGREGD Reng iP Hs ORR 8 cee ADAP I sah ot SRB WED 28 ditt emamien onh mertretpom ee WETS + 8 Hh AOS: te OCS . . ‘ « * » #: % operaticn.” Scae support for this clain is found in his description * 4 7 omen fe wt ates gag repre 2a ie. " 2 poet Poet Hees Ree “ tte a aor eno: Bele as, Tae eng oe ek oa ae a7 ap hee Bh Ae ek od] 1 ¥ ' 6, “ “a we ‘ . ‘ 3 t 4 if } Ste 8 iy seek: a irene eT ITE Shere, ees oe mibgeemeast 3 .ee ~- SP the Fer fe
14-00000 : é :%. , e ‘ a Ee oD te ad wore ake ob ws es Spittal, = ttt dune eT Ay i; SERRE Spee S Alp nt dee eeenet & seein Eecp eniest is popes tes AGH PLE, Oo He SO. inate emtaten aimee gt: SEP oe acre 4 : Jendeymageenrevesmmenes is etm meme aa venertay 0: re toa ted ts i + 4° @ . . rr we, we Meme wee ~~" . a ied <755h, res Yoo Cay. cs Ge Bbao se ya: of juct nos it was planned to get the poleon into Css tro’s food by employirg someone with access to a restaurant frequented by Castro” The meckanics vere identical with those described by Edvards and as reported in our earlier accoumt of phase one of the operatioa. . . ec. O'Connell's account of his own role in the operation in the early veeks folloving Harvey's supposed taxcover makes it evident that there was not a clean break between the Office of Security's sesponsibility and thet of Harvey- Further, O'Connell nov believes that there must have been “something going on” petueen April 196L (after the Bay of Pigs) and April 1962, but he claims to be umable to remember any ef the particulars. There are other disagreewents among the three on facts. They are reviewed here, not because they alter the essential fact of the turnover or of Harvey's sole responsibility for the operation after a certain point in tine, but because they suggest that persons who _ were supposedly unwitting of events efter the turnover vere in fact “vitting, because they were not effectively cut off At the instant of turnover. Harvey's notes show that he and O°Comell vent to Hew York City to meet Roselli on the Sth and 9th of April.1952. O'Coanell recalls it as being early in April end thet the introduction was made on & - &3- ee oe a : me eae . woes - Por mres ¥ Mw ete cr oe Pa oad woot - wet fe - . is A Mees baie AE em A te pies at AG. ae Pe te ws : ay i I 4 i i rom 4 eee scbee» aed
14-00000 eee oe Sei ek re 8 hee repartee FE Ratt ae gute sos Oe wy . : ate : awee 2 camber tee Suscay, welch world maze it :te 8th. Harvey says “has only he esd O'Cosrell met wich Roselli; O'Connell says that Maheu was also : i : ene ° . 2 neh + Present at the meeting. Bove are positive of the eccuracy of their ar i recollections, and each gives reasons for his coa®idence in his Clarity of recall. The significance, for purposes of ‘this. inquiry, is whether Maheu @id or did so+ knov that the opereticn continued We, ve under Harvey. eo 4 a. Harvey is certain that he would have remembered it if Maheu were present. He and Maheu were in the same FBI training oF RE ee class at Quantico in 1940. “te does not remeaber having seen C a“ Maheu since he, Harvey, cene with the Agensy in 1947, although he . acknovledges that he may heave seen him once or -tyice socially. . ’ He is sure be bas not seen Maheu since 1952 when Harvey vas assigned to Berlin. ; bee “be O'Connell, who set up the meeting, is just as positive . taat Maheu vas there. Fe describes a series of events that : ||. Seassure kis of the accuracy of his menory. The four of thes , traveled seperately to Hew York. They met at the Savoy Plaza 7 ‘Hotel (Savoy Hilton?) where all four stayed. After discussions, Cn Me oe Oi : . . 2 . . ‘ eo . . : ? ? Mahbeu suggested dinner at the Elk Room, a fashionable restaurant in a nearby hotel. O'Comell says thet Makeu picked up the tab. eo Tuey finished dinner about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. Rosell4 wanted to j a aye Ae  tte Slee ee «Se nee eS kgs tig oo, oer ND am tre, oe tk ete YR . arr a ee . s . . . wot a ate a - wel we mead’ ft ‘. ane, - - 4 care &: Dy 6 ti, NN tes diya bal, aT _JAeree {- RENEE eae A, eS Pe TS Lee NIE ON OEE ES eT ES en ey
14-00000 . Biren nemo one xceneo nary e, : i . 4 a + a ye ‘ 3 Cav en os ae buy tae group a nigatcap, bet since it wes Siméay atchs avarly all of the cers vere closed. hey walked arourd the neignbor- hocd locking for an open bar and firally vound up at the alld Copacabana. hey vere refused admitterce to the bar because of bl @ rule restricting adzission to cougles, co they sat ata table | ; ; where they could watch the floor shev. Roselli found uinsele : facing a table at “ringside” at which Phyllis McGuire vas sitting fs — with Dorothy Kilgallen and Liberace for the opening night of singer Rosemary Clooney. To avoid Fayllis McGuire's seeing him, i 7 Roselli got his companions to change their seating arrangenent EC. > so that his back was turned to Hiss McGuire. Maheu vas an ; . integral part of all ‘this. (Roselli's reason for not wanting . ; Phyllis McGutre to see him vith his cospantons will becone : evident frou ker role in the viretapping incident, vhich 1s ‘ ; - described im a separate section of this report.) f° . The two differing recollections camnot be reconciled. As a point of interest, Hdverds stated that when he briefed. Harvey on the operation Si. . "he deliberately axttted reference to Maheu in order to screen Maheu ‘off from Earvey's takeover of the operation. The next significant point of difference has to do vith vhat ° happened after the Hey York meeting. O'Conmell teld us thas te and ah ORR AUR Reva Se SEB eS ore gate Roselli left New York for Miami the next day (presumably 10 April) oO 7 / a 5 ia] % tals 404d ee Petree cy mse ee te my ee cetttgs on - ve we the nd vos od
14-00000 be ‘ a . Pag os t i i t woe : ~~! ms ~4 : A : & z and remained there until Harvey arrived. Eazrvey, on the other tacd, 3 i ° recalls a meeting with i)'Comell aad Roselli ia Washington on 14 April. ; at ~ O'Connell, at first, did not recall the Washingtca meeting, but, , ; when given Hervey's.chronology, he said ke did recall returning to ; i Wastington to neet Eervey for scme purpose but that the details are ; 4 . ‘ “FE t vague in his oind. Harvey at first thought that the 14 April meeting t : ° 3 in Washington vas O'Connell's last contact with Roselli during this ¥ secdsi phase of the gambling syndicate operation. O'Connell told us that Roselli was apprehensive over the new arrangenept (and of Earvey personally) and asked O'Connell to remain on for a time, vhich O'Connell / op mamma a \ agreed to do. When told that O'’Conrellwas sure that he had continued on in the operation for sone two or taree weeks after Harvey's take- . over, Harvey agreed that this was correct. O'Conneli‘s carryover was. for purposes of continuity.. We caanct be sure of the date O'Connell ONS ie ae or ew Le Ra SE evn vee ween ten ln WA et eet BNR, 18.) ERY was finally eliminated from the operation. He was in Miami with ‘Roselli and Harvey perkaps as late as 27 April. His role in the . e _ operation had definitely ended by June 1962 when he was assigned PCS | | ! | | | . Harvey recalls leaving Washington for Miemi by automobile on 19 April. He thought that he took delivery of the pilis froz Dr. Gunn before leaving. Gunn has no record of any such deliveryat that time; his last record concerning pills is dated February 1961. - 46 - 4 e \ a t 4 ' 4 4 4 4 4 ¥ t ic, Se eR ’ ‘ ct or re ee eo! oe Se Se Me Ot Be aad ti Saghiwan fo ates me — ont dae 5. 2 ug oo . A abe, peta 25
14-00000 Dares re ee oe wee fats wee oy tay eet ® ee TSE a CM TE ET CO Ms gems oF nd does have a rotation of delivering four pilis (cxe capsule acd three teblets) to "J.C." on 18 April 1962. | resas this as being — j | : ° . . Be re cee ey Jin O'Connell. When told of this, Harvey agreed that it was protably eee € : correct. O'Connell elso feels that he must have been in Washington : for the pill delivery. : ° . Harvey says that he arrived in Miami on 21 April 1962 and found 4 : Roselli already in touch with Tony Veroma, the Cuban exile leader vko ; I j _ bad participated in phase one. It is at this point that the final of ‘ difference in recollections occurs. Harvey described the manner in : me, which the lethal material was to be introwiced into Castro's food, oe 7 IC > involving an asset of Yarora's vho had access to someone in a : : restaurant frequented by Castro. We told Harvey that Edvards had . | described precisely the same plan. When ve asked Harvey hov Edvards | j - could have known of the mechanics if there had been no activity in the operation for @ year, and if Harvey was starting again from scratch, ! | -- Harvey replied that he took over a going operation--cne that vas [sae . already "in trein.". Edwards denfes that this is so. O'Connell says ' . ; 2. ° ‘that Harvey is the one vho is right. The operation was going on when | Harvey took it over, although O'Connell does not remember vhen Varora ; | i was reactivated or what had been done with his in the neantine.. | . Along with the change in Agency leadership of the operation, * | + : which sav Harvey replacing Edvards/O'Connell, there also were changes ‘ co) eM : | et é Boge prea Ms ee eee Ten cee tee aS a aS We gS
ety ome eene es De ot te ) " pate *, eae a i ak I be rg cc. a oer os . . we PE get es oe yt he pene « weal fa the orizinal cast of hocdius piayers. Carvey specified that Clencaca was not to be brought in on tne re:stivatioa of the operation, end be believes that Roselli honored the request. Roselli once repovted to Earvey that Glancara pad eszed if anything was goizg on, and’ vhen Poselli said chat nothing was ceppecing, Clancana said, “00 bad." Additionally, Zantos TrazMcente (“Jce, the courler™ frea the earlier phase) was no longer involved. With the closing of the ast casino in Havaca in September 1961, Trafficante presumably no longer kad access. Roselli now bad a can knowm to Earvey as Maceo, who also used the rames Garcla-Gcuez ace Godoy. (Comment: Harvey is unable further to identify Maceo; he @escrites his as "a Cuban who spoze Italian.” Que of Varoza‘s associates in the Cuban exile comunity was named Antonio MACZO Mackle, but it seems unlikely that he was the Maceo of this operation. He vas promizent enozgh ia the exile commmity to have been known to Harvey. Further, it seems clear that, Maceo was “Roselli.'s man." This second phase appears to lack the overshe. " high-level gangster flavor that characterizeé ‘he first phase. Roselif remaized es a prominent figure in the ” operation, but working dfrectly with the Cutan extle commas ty and directly on behalf.of CIA. Roselli was essential to the secord phase as a contact wlth Varona, waa presumably still tae a . gto wet ee cant eters i 2 24 ‘ alot *y : 4, ° vate. ny ities 1; atadamienieaal 1 1 enna opus eee By ame toe ee
believed he was teing Supported ay U.S. pisizesscen with fires fal scezes in Cuta. Roselli reeced Giancsena end Trafficante , $ ° in the first phese as a means of establisiing contacts inside Cuba. a He did not need them in the cecond phase, because he had Varona. Eowever, it would be ratve to sssme that Roselli did not take . the precaution of informing higter-ups in <ne syndicate treat he : was working in & territory considered to be the private dovain . me of someone else in the syndicate.) | ‘ ; ; "When the pills vere given to Varoza through Roselli, Varona. | ; ~y requested arms and equigment needed for the support of his end of the ; 1 - operation. Roselli passed the request to Earvey. Harvey, with the help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JMAAVZ Statica, procured ° explosives, detonators, tventy .30 caliber rifles, tventy .45 caliber , } hand guns, two redios, and one boat radar. Earvey says that the. _ “shopping list™ included saze items that could be obtained only from . I ‘the U.S. Goverment. Harvey aaitted those itens, because Roselli, _ — i have had access to such equigment. ‘The cost of the arms and equiment, . | : ; about $5,000, vas T/A'd to headquarters. . : i . Earvey and Shackley rented a U-Haul track under en assumed rene, i loaded it vith the ams and equiment, an’ parked {4 in the parking lot L. $ of a drive-in restaurant. The keys vere then given to Roselli for a S apeemets cya eT ae ed nn Sh ces SEEM a ME Deepen oe WO a ew Tet a eT eA BUfguee 5 earns ae ats Reb ete? oss cet Thawepe eae IWIL Ti ae ome teres
14-00000 Bae : ON ea ae «= - wore ey ts - f erence fra a Hd shee bef a z elivery elcner to Maceo, to Varona, or to Varoza's son~in-lew. Evidently Eervey and Roseili rad not ;et caoze to crust each otrer. wagers Pertaps fearing a dcuble-cross, each cet about independently to . assure himself that the equipment reacked the proper hands. After pardicg the truck, Harvey and Shackley kept the parking lot. under . surveillance until the pass vas completed. Poselit, accompanied ty . O'Connell, did the ‘same. Neither pair knew that the other vas ‘ | i watching. Eventually the truck was picked up sad driven away. It : | i vas returned later, empty, and with the keys uncer the seat as ; j prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey save vf a ; IC “yy that Saackley never knew to vhom delivery was made ror for wnat ¥) r. - purpose. Shac¥ley was merely called upon to furnish support for a . headquarters operation from vnich he vas othervise excluded. : i May 1962 i eo ee farvey and Roselli arranged « system of telephone communication | i * i 2 _, by which Harvey vas | kept posted on any develoments. Harvey, using a _ : | os "pay phone, could call Roselli at the Friars Clu in Los Angeles at 1600 pee hours, Los Angeles time. . Roselli could phone Easvey at Harvey's home | | ° in the evening. Roselli reported thet the pilis vere in Cuba ‘end at i . the restauraat reportedly used regularly by Castro. i | . q + tele Me . fot eb E ie et Te Ste eta, Sate Sf osetigwehee. att See oes ae Saath ag $e lege 5. ee tne a. eine acts oS than ima te, terete he en ol ieenti tarts 1660 teSice lina’ Lids” VB aR Open: SEE ge oe Eder hy Ser ot eae RRA A ate ame ee rr tad Ca Cn ee 2 a a a ee
14-00000 « . hare ¢ ose 2‘ peede * + $02 © on vee a ~~ owe me - core oa ? 2 ’ ; Je 1952 ; Reselil reported to Zarvey on 21 June thut Veraca had dispatched. é , ‘ a team of three nen to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Earvey said that they appeared to rave no specific ples vor killing Castro. ‘They were to reerult otrers whoo might be used in such a scheme. If an opportamity to to kilt Castro presented iteelf, they or the persons they recruited vere to make the atteapt-~. pernaps using the pills. Barvey never learced their names or anything @lee about then. From the sequence of the reports, it would seem that om 10 ae Eee cxtatietengniem certerateness Ce “. the pilis were sent in ahead of the three-man team, but this is not now ya ascertainable. , . September 1962 . Harvey sav Roselli in Miami on 7 and on ll Septenber. Varoza was reported as then reedy to send in another team of three men. They Cm canes BE BE oe were supposedly nilitia men whose assignozment was to penetrate Castro's ° body guard. During this period the “medicine” vas reported as still im place and the three men of the Mirst team safe. ber 1 ~ Jentary 1963 Although Harvey received several reports that the militia men were poised to taxe off, presumably fros sonevhere in the Floride keys, ro annie ~~ Gay thw Uli a ob Sema, <BOmE + UMEDEAINe eR MOLE OND. Aaron ry eetaattge = , ib. ‘ . “haven -* . ee ; akegipnemine: woe Stare alld a)! Queene golem enReTRRRD oh 0 EERE: emu LANE! PERU on a PAIS Wag BITES oo wae te avn alle emREEED O° ates THN w seems w6 ‘ . ® ‘ a fe. eI] 9 4 . ‘ * ey Sag yeas ‘ vo > * a: we tet re Be te or ee ee de tee ee of pe te AR Ree ge ct ‘ Hy . : wee Rieromgentascetanspetee CEP ee cV tbe yea > anttlectett et - per ee Sty Pa sees eye ay. > *e re foe pe fee “Hgrsteon pte ae, ee pes pogene ae rae PN ERE fo Fears, ng ytmategre a oad “Shandon, 2 3 - af ‘ 2 .- r z ‘ ~ . en nS 2 oe Ca Oe EO Oe ee re ee eC OO SRC caer eee we ee a OT eee ke
ao eres REG cane Reeeoman semvemeneneaienstinnrenenccenees BERL FLEA! BNET we ON REED Were ARTE oy BID He i A Ona ian tee ln pe oe ne a CMON Me ANE ae : Fs they did not actually ieave. First, "“sonditionus inside" were givea ; as the reason for delay; then the Cototer missile crisis threw plans avcy. Harvey was in Mieni tevween 22 Decenter and 6 January. He saw both Roselli and Maceo several tizes duricg that period. He made a paynent of $2,700 to Roselli for passing to Varoza for the expesses of the three militia men. Harvey and Roselli had telephone discussicns of the operation betveen ll and 16 Jenvary. Harvey says that Roselli wasn't kidding himself. Ee agreed vith Harvey that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future. As far as Earvey knows, che three militia men never did leave for Cuta. He knows nothing of what may have PO ee ce . * . happened to the three reported to have been sent to Cuba. February 1963 Harvey was in Miam{ 11-14 February.” Ee had no contacts with any . of the principals, but he left word for Maceo that there vas nothing 2 new and that it now looked as if it were all over. (Just how Harvey “left this vord for Maceo is not clear.) Harvey left Mieni on 15 February to meet with Roselli in Ios Angeles. They agreed at the Los Angeles meeting that the operation _yould be closed off, but that Lt would be unwise to attempt a precipitate break betveen Roselli and Verona. Roselli agreed that he would continue Pd te oo os 1 - 23 « > 3 ont -. 2 : 4 rea “= e 7% ‘ 2 acto: 4 t ’ t Ce led +e ewamenem oe Fi t
14-00000 ee ns sees . . ne .e ae Pa eee Y x iv to see Verona, gredvually reducing the frequency of contact uatil there f WES Sone. o Gthe e April - Bay 1953 é Earvey cays that he received tvs telephere calls fron Roselli during this period. Harvey decided that it vould be best to have ose t : last reeting with Rosell{ before he left for his assigaument in Rome. | . ; He states that he reported this decision to Mr. Helms who gave his | : eypproval.. | ; “\: — Sune_1963 i Roselli came to Washington to neet vith Harvey sometime about the ; middle of dime. Harvey met him at Dulles airport. Harvey remembers i having suggested to Roselli that he bring caly carry-on luggage se | ‘ a there vould be no delay at the airport avaiting baggage. Harvey had by : 7 " then closed his ovn home in preparetion for leaving the country and | Bost was living in the house of a neighbor who vas out of tovm. Roselli | Pee: e " ptayed with Harvey as a houseguest {tn the neighbor's home. That | ; £ “evening Roselli, Harvey, and Mrs. Earvey went out for dinner. While | : dining, Harvey received a phone call froa Sam Papich vho wanted to mcr H i . if Harvey knew the identity of his dincer guest. Harvey said that Le did. “ | no : outa - 53 - e bw tie) WP z cyte A é ° _.. bee. ~ i emda oF * ame A, : pore a . 7 ra - « . e eee . a ee ee ame 7 a ae etwas Fw er he, Se 2 tse tyme Ctra L:: RN AS A eS 9 DM he et i abereasees MRT AE cf OEE : ce > eon sees. es ae ee a ns ee
14-00000 are Te tee es weep wet ba oe . esi, oo had wy a7 yi See ee br eet Uh ne te mt a le ele Dag ee See ey gee caaiaaauel eS 3 : “ae a 7 er Site giepres ah Tite . wnser: (Late Oo) Teme seem Teg ie roi yereracaten So ee Sass: or. ae gO. . It subsequently developed that the TEL nad Roselli under inveasive ; surveillance at the tine, and Earvey speculaces thet ke was picked x . . * as he left the airport parking lot and vas ideati“ed through his auto wet dae cred license mouber. Earvey ret Pepich for breakfust the next morning aod & explaised that he wes terminating an onerational essociation vith ; Roselli. Papich reminded Earvey of the FBI rule requiring FRE personnel . : to repors any known contacts between former FBI employees and crizizal ; elements. Papich said that re would have to report to J. Edgar Hoover : that Harvey bad been seen wits Roselli. Earvey said he understood fo. Papich's situation and did sot object to such a report being made. , : C > Harvey said that he asked Pepich to infor hin in edvance if it appeared —_ - that Hoover might call Mr. MeCone--Harvey's point being that he felt . that McCone should be briefed before receiving a call from Hoover. ; Papich agreed to do so. Earvey said that he then told Mr. Eelss of ; : the incident and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief : HeCone wiless a call from Eoover was to be expected. ne net ot a 1) |. Ths vas Barvey's jast face-to-face meeting with Roselli, wee :  TIASES aa “although be has heard from him since then. The later links betveen ; : Harvey and Roselli are described in a separate section of this report. The list of persons vi sting of the second phase of the operation differs from those who Imew of the first phase. Those we have ideniified ; Le aed eres : : i Ee Ee eit Lae ‘ i cre ren wote es ee Ee oe et te ep eee BRE gn tet Nae ager A Mme etme em de em Fw . re re as
14-00000 0 © oe ee + ae : . . . ” . + . ~, - . nee . fe) 2 Sey eee ithe omeeer 2 peed em peca Tha og wine we octtatiyt gid Sg eed ee ee ee ven Scene oe wesc em reate ete neat TE + te inh cpp ens abe ree oO a te an ee Of we eR ag Mg AO Oy Pan ee OT Pe BR aR OL SD ee ree et net ee ee nme a a? = 5, Mow cmeg ot tun son _ re : eee a ae vate Sigh: wan i . i @ ‘ v3 ° t i i. Richerd elms, Deputy Director for Plas” | & . : 2. Willies Harvey, Colef, ‘isk Force WZ : § 3. .Jemes O'Connell, Office of Security (H= imovs that Harvey 7 see : 7 : . took over the operation and delivered pills, ars, and . _f ? equipment in April 1962. He does not kmov of developrents : after May 1962.) . . . e | hk, Sheffield Edwards, Director of Securit; (Ze knows of the fact i of the turnover to Earvey, out states be knovs nothing of { . develoments thereafter.) : 3. J. C. King, Chie’, WH Division (Ee swated in our interview With him that he imev that Harvey vas having reetizgs with. A members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.) ; . 6. Bruce Cheever, Harvey's deputy in 1962 (Cheever knows that i” Harvey was meeting with gangsters in Beno (sic) {a the winter ; “y of 1962.) Won , . ¢3 al 7- ‘Ted Shackley, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted Harvey in the . delivery of arms and equipment to Varczs in April 196: ? . : but presumably did not mow the identities of the recipients i nor the purpose for vinich the material was to be used.)- a. : 8. || oe ne oer ttsszation vas linited i t furaishiag the = 11 oa 18 April 1962.) : is 9. Antonio Varona, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably vas | ; not avare of goverment sponsorship.) _° . : & _; 20. Verona's son-in-law (Be too was presumably was rot evere of c , the government's role.) a. é il. Maceo, Roselli.'s “man” (Maceo Probably knew there was a government comection, but may not have identified CIA as i the agency.) . : ; | =. ‘ We can only conjecture as to who else may kave known at least that " the operation was coatinuing and perhaps soue of the details. Saz . r FuO Cpt . { . - -. . ote . . OC GITES te Bee rs ona Le pee tac 13 SRE at - 4 ee yt ” . ote ow ett eter ee OD ee ~ ete se +
14-00000 bake Il ee wad oe Be BT eth” Bah were . PBS tay « i Glancaca was supposedly cut ous of the second parce, but ve cannot be sure that Rosellt did not keep hin informed. The sane cay be said t , of Sentos Trafficante. Harvey is sure that Maheu was not involved in Earvey's introduction to Roselli, but O'Connell is equally positive % Mabeu perticipated. The story that Drew Pearson ‘told the President, and waich {s ‘mows in other Goverment circles, sounds . % suspiciously like this second phase of the operation. If that is so, Oo) ence mammten wes : ° ’ then it is Likely that the operation has leaked--perhaps through i . °- these channels: po Roselli. to Mahe | . : ose faheu ifs. , . ae . Makeu to Edvard P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington lavyer Morgan to Drew Pearson Pearson to Chief Justice Warren and to the President Warren to Rovley, chie’ of the Secret Service: "pA iy oy dete actin ey Bape mae e eee mG tne caED  o0 ‘ : Rovley to Pat Coyne and to the FBI oO Eo a .? The FBI to Attorney General Clark . tq foe areal We bave a more detailed treatment in a separate section of this report ' : Of the chamels through which the story may have ressed. = i So PUR a GRENDEL Ug BP GREY e * = e . - ° o- a - . id aa * Mem - ar eo - { ° » 56 - = Yeo i274 r C oe ae = - - * - 5 ae Se ape eee ge eee a i i re * const ee a CONF meme Se OORT Sg aT eT Sa ee a arenes Seapine PORE vie I uence ts inbtin be
14-00000 + tg tt ae 6 i at Oye * ialeiaanins igmstie Miletesiasininaeteabihia diel ateinden eettinle ortaed OEE FoGtERA ys amaiEN perme 2 . * . a ° . rae ae te A tte tg Bae ee ee ae ca sara Se i Sp hte 2 I. SPSS ie nina <a) parsers mo ata ae “ "Maheu vas indebted to hin. Giancana said that 12 Mabeu wouldn't” -* re ar are ° mete Tne dtretavsing Insideat Well after the Pre-Zay of Pigs phase of the geubling syadicate operation to assassinate Castro, and caly indirectiy related to it, a development in the private life of Sem Glancana led to an incident that made the FBI avare of tht Agency's relationship vith the syndicate aod required the briefing of the Attorney General on the details of the assassination plac. Phyllis McGuire, of the singing McGuire sisters, was and is venseoe « openly known to be Glancena'’s mistress. Giancana suspected her of having an affeir with Dan Rowan, of the Rowan end Martin comedy tean. Both Rowan and Miss McGuire vere then entertaining im Las Vegas, and Glancana asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan‘s room. Maheu did not vant to do the job and declined on the grounds that he wasn't equipped for that sort of work. Giancaza made a claim for a return favors he had worked on the Castro assassination operation for Maheu, and. “x on . *. ol a Pd take oa the job, he, Giancara, vould go to Las Vegas and do it - = hinself. Makeu agreed to arrange to have the rocm bugged. ~ (Comment: The exact date of this is uncertain. An August 1953 ites on Giancaza in the Chicago Sun-Times refers to the incident, without mention of wiretapping, and sets the year as CRs aan Os ~ 57 - | ‘ Ca ae venting ene Ge Cop tn tales TRF ae ne EE we Oe Eee nate eh a eS ee tee eee mame me le stow
14-00000 ee ae oF RR ewne oo page meee Ne cee aee og care 3p hapecrres oe. a “ttt ee ° room ee ° j 2 : oy ae ee) : a a ? : i =. i . 44 $ 7g MEL. There is nothing in Ageacy files zaas plapoints the date, and the memorfes of these we imverviewcd who ano of the incidest ) o- 7 sat sictow ct oo are hazy. Wévards and O*Coarell @id not learn of the incident Omit, ‘we ren. . until after it had happened. Zavards can place it oaly as being after the EBay of Pigs. O'Convell at Sirst thourht that it was in early 1962. When shown the newspaper accoumt, O'Consell said : that if the nevs story vas correct, 1t would kave had to have been very late in 1961. An Office of Security memorandum to the DDCT, ; of 2k June 1966, states that 1t vee "at the height of the project . t _ negotietions.” This is confusing, rather than clarifying, because ‘ C 4 __ the operation vas supposedly at dead standstill in late 1961 and very early 1962. Clearly the incident occurred before 7 . February 1962, because it vas on that date that the Director of Security told the Fal that CIA would object to prosecuts . " Presumably the FBI's case vas already complete by then.) Msheu arranged. to have Giancane’s request handled by Edvard Le Beco Hope Bois, a private investigator in Miaxt. Du Bots assigned two men OEE. . to the job: Arthur J. Ballett4 and J. W. Harrison. - : (Comment: The September 1965 classified telephone directory, for the Greater Miexi Area lists Edward L. Du Bois under OPEN A he EGE AGERE PA RET os Cite CB PRE «0a WAT. Ph he ae te twemto cat * * . . . ae . “Detective Agenctes.” here 4s an advertisezent on the page for “Arthur J. Balletti Investigations” waich lists as one of (OO ; = SB | t cab “] Qe roams an . . ® 6 a a re ot Rn ahaha at FS 0m Vinglt igre wee ete etn wy ete ee ee et S Sites om - oe ce wet e D GTA. we oe a é . PO eae. ahd .. nema gat 0 on - ee - Ce ae sith 8 0le » cenit 3 Be WPL, anal eth Toetrie aes wc sermsg cine ne Sint" FESR NS geRe a. oe Ee. ane wont de “ae
14-00000 6 PME e his spectalties the obtaining of Photographic and electronic evidence.) : O'Connell noalls that, instead of planting a nicropho ole in Rowan! 8 . ° 4 roar, the investigator ‘apped the telephone, which would not have ; , revealed the sort of intizactes tha: Glancana expected to aiscover, When Rowan left the rocm to @o & shov, Balletti also left his rocy : to see the act, leaving his equipceat out fa full sight and rimaiog. | It was found by a maid, and the local sheriff's office was called, Balletts Was arrested. Harrison ws not Picked up. Agency Personnel : : ; have uo further inforzation about Harrison. The FBI identified him : j oN only as being “supplied by Mabew.” . 24 ' C. -- | -Balletti first tried to telephone Du Bote for kelp but coula woe | : not reach him. He then called Maheu, in the presence of the sherirrts i Officers. O'Connell Says that Maheu was able to fix the matter with } : local Las Vegas authorities, Perhaps with help fron Roselli. Hovever, + dB Pepe 4 ‘Ballettt's call to Maheu caused the case to reach the FBI. The oo ranma gee Bureau decided to press for prosecution under the wiretapping Statute. ~ ‘4, "When Maheu was approached by the FAT, he referred them to the CIA" >” “Mey tone Director of Security, Sheffield Edvards. at ner ore (Coment: Edvards:states that he hed told Maheu, who haa . to work closely with the thugs, that £7 ke got into a bing with: RAGES URE FTE iene O08 Bupha, Oa F a “he FBI, he could tell the Bureau that he was vorking on an eo . aa 7 3e -? oy se. - "hs |. oy : a re = : . ? FT oe . : ° se tye ge” . #4 a ot gee tc O Fate tee ., it tm ge Tiel ban oe he otros ne ee SFist rons -, oo ay tae ea ple No etal) oer . sere Bes cat eae P89 — pte: bert SISRST ter Eee PIE re Semmes, Sct Papeete
14-00000 art Sea *s . a. meee fae . . Pe: ca ey ee pro pmae te a TA ae * he demas “PET ee ene sree seegmnverytee re ° oe Fea init 0 . . SEPARA CORE TRRREIRRN Cee. cet ERS EATEN GREENS LPR PIE OA. ony one nereete ca cts en OU UMARY ET «Hetty y . fag whos >. ‘ . . oe ° ‘ . . ra * g . a - if i ° a . intelligence operation deicg aandled by Eavards. Pakeu, accoriing to Edwards, told tse Bureau tha: ke had not Pperconually done the wiretapping, but thet it Grew ous of an operation he was x working on with Edwards. Menheu presuzably did not mention the z ° - ‘ ultimate objective of the “Intellizense operation” involving the gambling syndicate. ‘Tre Bureeu, in a nencrandin from J. Edgar : Roover to the PCE, dated 23 March 1962, Stated that: “Meheu claimed ‘ . that he ordered coversse of Rowan in behalf of CIA's efforts to yO obtain intelligence inforzation in Cuba through the hoodlis ; 3 i @lenent, including Sam Glancara, which hed interests there. Maheu = said he was put in contact with Glancana tn conzec ion with these C - ° intelligence activities through John Roselli, a Los Angeles hoodlum. Makeu authorized wiring of Rovan* & roc and discussed ° this matter vith John Roselli." ) ; March 1 the 23 March memorandus fraz the Bureau takes the form of a “ : letter of confirmtion of a 7 February meeting between an unnemed ° - representative of the FEI and Shef Edwards. The penorandua - quotes Edvards as having made the following points: Makeu was involved ina sensitive operetfon with the Agency; the Agency would object © any ° prosecution that would necessitate use of CIA personnel or inforza tian; tena et are Sete 7 ns “Sretenmn se cansonat cared, or ~ . we - of. i ats, Lee? rar . wos Tat tw a 7Re . nm he i Oo, i en no er nar oars ene ey eee ee a ny ‘ ” 2 ete Ta * seek? #1 tents! cane SHES ees aT an! ' Oe a H § Ce oe eee es ro ' ot cottentless we
> ene eB Es Cmte + ' fe... ae matt oe Ce ee Ce re TO | Oe Eo Ct cm oo aor ae asd introdustten of evidence scacernicg CIA cperations would eabarrass the Goverasent. Thais is elso esseatially as stated to us by Edvards in revievizg the incident during tke course of this investigation. The 23 March memorandus stated taat the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice requested that CIA advise specifically if it objected to initiation of erisinal prosecution egaiast Palletti, Haheu, and Harrison. Cn 28 or 29 March, Edverds met with the Bureau liaison officer, Sam Papich, and told hin that aay prosecution would endanger sensitive sources and methods used in a guly authorized Project ard vould not be in the national interest. Papich accepted Edvards‘ oral statement as the reply requested and said that ke would report to proper authorities in the Bureau. Edwards made a record of the meeting in a mezorandua of 4 April. 1942. Edvaris informed us during our inquiry that at the time of the bugging incident and the flap that ensued those (Dulles and Bissell) who kad given the initial epprovel of the plen to assassinate Cestro through the gambling syndicate vere gone. As no one else in authority (including Mr. Helns) had been cut in on the operation, Edwards dealt with Papich without reference to anyone else in the Agency. Avril 1942 In early April Papich informed Etvards that Serbert J. Miller, = 61 - 7, - cm wee OS 6 - « . fale ern abr Eo bbe SA ° . > a - a Rd we & ; . ° ¢ o : é foo —_ 4 we ey alte Ry PEE cag wok, PEAT EAAIS PM * .£ ce _é to ees ee Se ee -- wees .o oo Tm ne a cee th RS © cert at - * “ ° - a . ' - . . . wpaca . e: B. fe get ty: -. ote Be a eer ee Teta ET ME rt an eee ee cece ate mente Rel apd oom © em eoe See Lak adem «gue teen Bile md oe sl antes of 7S SR TTE ERSTE re a Se Re ee Ma ee ter cree eT comers. ar es dukes ¢ 5 eRe Ene wea rORTyRAe % Feet , tee oem etna OG dae we ogee <a> camel EpTURYN on! ba = > seoathemm sacs 5 a ert ont eee Cr ome Pn ree ene at REE RE GG SORE SPER TOE
© + Fe IP PORIAN TS, om at é aE vagal 2. ot $ AUR Re ir SOR ater + = acne A ~~ ee va . oot mee a vst ee te cae ) fe ifapeasmeemmarere. = tera ote A Faaas’ atte © ype BC c0r Pehitasl® ~ eae en pai nha hal - tS ane wet ot “a rae near ant ot, ‘hae? 2m weenie atta ec = Soir heainel Po erat wt 8 fle, See BA ew ¢ “3 ne rom? ARREDEL Pt 4 eed B ra : ‘yp etal we ‘aH ow) FRB 0 = 38 . Aes Assistant Attorney Generel ia charge of the Crintzal Bivistena or toe Departzent of Justice, wanted to discuss tte case. Edwards the, brougnt in Lawrence Houston, General Counsel, and asked Houstoa to . : call on Miller and tell bis shat the bugging {ncizert in Les Vegas was related to an intelligence operation end ¢ the Agency did not ~ think it wise at that time to surface {ts cosrection vith Poselli. Houston net with Miller on 16 April and told his of the Agency's involverect, without revealing any details of the assacsination AO at eer een Operation. Houston's memoresdim of the meeting, dated 26 April, quotes Miller as saying that he foresay no gajor difficulty in stopping Bete Prosecution, but that he migkt xention the problea +o the Attomey General. Houston's wemorandia notes that Miller reised a question . ey an about the possibility of our involverent in this particular case, the Las Vegas viretap, standing in the way of prosecution of other actions, particularly against Giancans. « Houston's 26 April nerorandus states that on 20 April there was a” a rere ae  cmnipemaeneer second meeting with Justice--with Miller’s first assistant, Mr. Foley. At that meeting Houston told Foley that the Agency’s request not too: i oe a prosecute was limited to this specific . bugging inciéent, was based on ; . j security grounds, end that Security considerations would not be a bar to prosecution on other matters. As it was possible that the Attorney . General might be told about this and might then call the DCI, Houston Te at ae eee ae fe. Tagg ei * Soave ee, Ce mee re ee ey Peters Eatin x set felt - mee - aw ae fn ome onal secon "SOs een Smee ne he Oh : Bene Tester ae LSMP « m = nf, MO Bat Pia “es Ste sone weet ghee Ved Re ete arte ot pe te eee ewe ee Le eR ee ER rere tg *
14-00000 yor oe wn 6 o epee “FG Sw FET ET Ue eae or “9 3: ARAL Fey TSE PPM oD CNRS FOB BA MDM S LORE! HE a. ‘) ( ‘General know before you do it.” a cove, oe re . 7 ts? tay eee PP eo . dl AG oy santh ” Rae: a eee tet Pa ee, cet rH L gethatee ee eae é em goanh briefed the DDCL, General Carter, who sald te ucdersczood the st teach erd in due tine aight crief the Director, Mr. NeCone. It is rot L2oeR whether General Carver lid or did not brief? Mr. MeCone. There is no incicatioa that General Carter was further briefed on the full cetalis 3 : i ; of the assassircation ols against Castro. . i { 4 . ‘ | May 1902 ; i . om j The Attorney General obviously was told o2 CIA's operational involvement with gangster elezents, because ke requested a briefing on the details. On 7 May 1962 Sheffield Edvards and Lawrence Eouston me® with Attorney Generel Robert Kennedy anid, as Sdvards puts it, 4 "briefed his all the May." Houston says that after the briefing ; . Kennedy “thought about tke problem quite sericusly.” The Attorney aa i General said that he could see tne problez end that he could not pro . t against those involved in the wiretapping case. He spoke quite | firaly, saying in effect, "I trust that if you ever try to do business - _. he " with orgenized crine again--vith gangsters--you vill let the Attorney ee Deters i Houston quoves Edvards as replying that a Ro ee aes te oe this was a reasonable request. Edwards says that anong the points covered was that of Reselli's motivation. The ttorney General had thought that Roselli ves doing the Job (the atteapt at assassinatioa of Castro) for money. Ezwards corrected that impression; he was not. ; ., - 62a- ~- eae | oer nafineie « seman ca or Bee Aorat weve tobe ie hoeenvaens eee sonesroniaiteinonine. Rae sears etn. + re cele Pe el eRe at cts BN oe omy om BETH bemeTe meee 8. re i ne z ~ ast at 7 re eae ae hes «tow . oe ea eee wee Su “eo aoe e we 7 aoe . .
14-00000 mage ae, Fe" wea, on, may Bee WeGes Beh agane 5 1 1 j + fos . a OR Ome « e Houston recalls that during the meeting with the Attorney i Gezeral the letter asked for a nemoranduy reecrd of the neeting, as eo Fdwards believes that +e vequest was made later and by telephone, ae A remorandia vas prepared and was signed by Edvards. Both S¢vards end ~ i . Houston recall heving bed a hand is writing it. A transsf:cal buck- : slip from Houston to Kennedy notes that the Tequest vas made on : i Le EE EES . ‘ ll May, which suggests that Rduarda is correct in his belfe? that the : . : * f request was made by telephone after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney a General. The memorandum is dated 1 May 1062. Tt ug tyred in eyo Z, ; copies only, with the original beirg sent to Attorney General Kennedy tc) and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It was a aor typed by Edwards‘ secretary, Sarch Hall. It does not state the st ‘Purpose of the operation on which Kennedy was briefed, but it does make it clear that the Operation was against Castro aud ite true in purpose may be inferred fran the mesorandim. He . Havards states that the briefing of the Attorney General and <<a caters 0 a + ene eal geocetete & : the forvarding or @& memorandum of record was carrted out without ; i “prtefing | the Director (Join McCone), the DDCT (General Carter), or the “i i DD/P (Richard Helms). Ee felt that, since they had not been privy to the operation when it was under way, they should be protected fron eS SRE Te ie ase” * ES A involvement in it after the fact. As noted Previously, Houston hed. rn i briefed the DDCI on the fact that there was a matter iavolving the § - ° we cere eg ee “fore f - : oe “oO Lo pea wee | ee ot ‘ ~ eo tee Ch Sena . ar tye ee we . fers . + - ? ~ t “ : a = rie tha its re meineniee ae = i Oat ae Poe te var at warily soe ae ia Mie a Se ee ee Se Tea nC aE: dws gn we, om gett, ae lim New att aia art nen : ce. to. ° = TE. tay ORT oe eee ren 7%, =. wl eee Bee NS SAIN Te oR, wn . ee seat ote . tect er + mgm. Maree et Dee + Dye platkete Sere Lm pe Pa ee eR Re eee ee ated el +,
14-00000 ae a e i ervnpttoertas ei nsrccnenetebancary tase OE 8 RATE ORS BMAP. G - OP + RAAT RINE CoB F ‘ : ; i Bs 7 &e 4 4 8 = « - 7 & oot ite ose ae ate! eq siownwegate ovens ieee seers are - TEE eae | SRE tara on Bea Be ii irs we nt ot v8 haa Departzeat of Justice, out Houston Lad not givea the DICE the specizitcs. Ee feels it would Gave teen normal Jor bia to Lava briefed the DCI- in view of the Attorzey General's interest, but ke also feels quite creth ote he sure that/vould have revembered doing 1t and ke éces not. He secret per 339+ +988 201 Os ge eee 26 cece at 0 suggested that Edvards' Celiberate avoidance of such briefings may kave led him also to avoid meking any briefings. Se recalls no cisagreerents with Edwards oa this point and concludes that be must have accepted Edvards’ decision not to brief. ‘. Houston anil Edvards briefed Robert Kennedy on a CIA operation oP . . ere . enbracing gengster elements, which presumably was terminated folloving the Bay ox Pigs fiasco. Kennedy stated his view, reportedly quite ‘ ) c strongly, that.the Attorney General should be told in advance of any ; I From reports of the briefing, it is reasonable to assume that Kennedy ot dh eR tata te te future CIA intentions to work with or through U.S. gangster elezents. . believed he had such a commitment from Agency representatives. In fact, hovever, at the time of the 7 May 1962 briefing of the Attorney General on "Gambling Syndicate - Phase Oce,”.Phase Tyo under gTh beat st { - Willies Eaervey vas already well under vay. FParvey had been introduced . ; | to RoselIt on 8 April ant Veroca or ts nen had received the lethal : - pills, the arms, and related support equirment in late April.” The | Attorney General was not told that the gaubling eyadicate operation had elready been reactivated, nor, as far as we kiow, was ke ever told ee oe en a On i Soci ree a tame oo sees, en enter tere PRE. oe: aorpeelacpatca soe neal, er arr a ove er oa. tae . whey oes ete ete eet aed toy TT -- ae th oa a ot ee ee ee 2 Co or on 2. a wear es
Cre orem * 5 poate a “~ of rod Se “he - * - ~ - va, we erat, 2 ae on ~ f wits that CIA had a continuing involverent with U.S. gangster elements. When the Atcorsey General was briefed o2 7 May, Edvaris knew  - : that Hervey had been introduced to Roselli. Le cust also have mown that his subordizate, Janes O'Connell, was in Miant and roughly for ; what purpose (although Edvards does not nov recell this). The , | gambling syndicate cperation bad been taken from him, aad, in \ | retrospect, ke probably acted properly in briefing the Attorney General ae on only that aspect of the operation for witch he hed been responsible | and of which he nad direct, persoral anowledze. “ee Earvey states that on 14 May he briefed Mr. Helms on the neeting with the Attorney General, as told to hin by Edvards. Harvey, too, mn 7 8 BD wt wo omemnpaaguatttbecos «adh aw su advised against briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and states . ® that Helms concurred in this. On that same date, 14 May, Edvards Prepared a memorandum for the record stating that on that day Harvey ‘ . ems oahaatn PaemmsnaAPEDEC 3:8 4 ‘ hed told hia that any plans for future use of Rosell vere dropped. | ‘Eédvards' memorandun states that he “cautiored hin (Harvey) that I : “ote Soa (Eavards) felt that | “any future projects of this nature should have the RALMALOd Ny . $Uy BtECEE, EH tR eRe eS + & see n ee 4% 4 a ey é ‘tact approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." Edvards oe “4 informed us that he has no specific recollection of having told ‘ Harvey of Kennedy's warning that the Attorney Gereral should be told ” in advance of any future CIA use of gangsters. _ & a ' ys gc iad Lf sendin. weet, atcha bp Oe ee OY EM ae a CL eee ere Sees eerie Sea: + Pu Reet : oo : : : - bctaetngee ean . eg ae a tee ee ee SNS ott aaee Soe FES Ea Pee ee Te TM ~ ee rt tw a ee eae 1 ieee re re ee: $6 sate gS ehleee es etait ven Peres oo B71 toshatiacipmdine ts oe Coca gio Phe 1 Seta tegen ta tees tam ota ele ge
& % ® of ag Sen Oe ee oe . see ew Owe ke ee kM _~ * oe te me OD e ~~  omags oe oo eh “howe d 2% = [ oe ary | Although the Atzormey General on 7 “Vey 1952 vas givea a full aod frank account of the Agency's relations vith Maheu, Roselli, and Giancana in the Castro operation, including the wiretapping flap, it appears that the FSI vas not given anything like the same detail. Te Sureau quite properly was not told ebout the assassication operation, and it seems thst it also was not told how the private ° A life of Glancena came to involve the Agency in the las Vegas wire- : tappicg incident. Edvards states that to have briefed the Bureau on cf . ° the agssassinatioa operation vould have put it iu an impossible bind, ‘ . — since both Roselli and Giancana were high on the Bureau's “list.* é . The briefing of Attorney General Kenzedy was absolutely restricted . @ to hin, and we cam only speculate that the confidence was observed. . i (Comment: Senator Rotert Kennedy's secretary, vho was also his secretary when he was Attorney General, phoned the - 7 t Director’s office on 4 March 1967 and asked for a copy of the . “== eee afte, -" °°" ", Edwangs' memorandi on the 7 May 1962 meeting with Kennedy when he vas Attorney General, at which time he was briefed on the .- So Bete ac . eet tthe taemmmnenemsemanen metres eT 5 Ton Stas 7 4 +9 aol y 4 Dao. a a ‘ ¢ ‘t zy ad Foe ee Castro assassination operation. Kennedy kev of the Drew Pearson EN EEA Nt EOE s eat arene toe me sel . ’ article of 7 March 1957 and wanted to check his recollection of SS ESSE Sg sears ees SSRIS : vhat he had been told by Edvards and douston on 7 May 1962. ‘The Ee teeta Attorney General's copy of the resorandum for the record of that briefing is in the archives of the Attorney General‘s office. - 4 : gi f, + ae ‘ ; on wife mee ates oo _ . Mr. Helms subsequently had lunch with Senator Kennedy. He took a - 65 - | ae rl were te see fe Loa gM ty etn A eting RGR? fan a op EN by Gantt on Gh Lege p apletgnmenn lias woe 4 em ped daa Soe fo ee engl eree” oat ete ae on Egesgnes cok, fapetent, ef re Ft ent Ste eg Te te eh ga Rae hag MTEC OS yee gat STE RTL oe 9 Se Some ea sormteren ABs mae Seat a Remett aan te eta ares Fa Old SaaS thn SBE . ors Se eae - ~ FS. te Te ete a AOE gg Toe = ate SPOS Te 8 PR te Py eet BBO late e a4 we OA A Dhak ort nbtinagtoe eames tae RA ee te es chalet : | ep oe
Me Re Rp a Oty eR Le ep rm ete An Rm cent a timate andl me Te eae! 1 oar rie oto tab a eh Lae of eck ber copy of the nezoranium with hin and allowed Kennedy to read £4. hg fee Be dia not leave a copy vith Meneedy.) j ir the inforzation given the Bureau is as limited as the records | 8. 9 tite SY : ané our foformation indicate, then the Bureau has not been inforzed, ‘ as the Attomey General was, that the Agency was first unwitting and thea a reluctant accessory after the fact. It vould be surprising, = Oe pe tee HR ee one + thougn, if the Bureau does not now know the whole story of the Las Vegas bugging incident. Whether the Bureau may now think that CIA was less than candid about the bugging incident (ae distinguished fron the ee ee anh es sensitive assassination operation) is a question for speculation. C.~ August 1963, +8 woes: Bureau. In fact, some indication of the extent of the Bureau's se , What is available to the press is undoubtedly available to the ‘ | i knowledge is found in a feature story in the Chicago Sun-Times of | “= 16 August 1963, vith a Washington date line, under the banner lead: naa - ° The article cites "Justice Department sources’ as expressing the belief E i that Giancena never did any spying at all for the CIA. He merely : . : pretended to go along with the CIA: “in the hope that the Justice Department's drive to put hin behind bars migat be sloved ~ or at least affected < wey his ruse of co-operation with enother goverment agency.” The story places the period of the relationship from 1959 to: SR AG ARIS MIBRRBIR WEE A NpatE NE an! AD pee IA 6 ABAD fied eRetgerENE NaNOe se eR EEsDERAARE Aap ete “ene ene a . . * toa . * as een aes ee meee ~ Fp 0: ETB Een: TRIES TER F
Mee Poe ee ay oe . . . . . wot the ere ee 2 a ey adel y ela! cette eee + ae, aif Sopd-e mek ets | SOM eRe ee ey, em 8) deem Fc ented thea Ste Foe oa ee ep a ote tad between allah ager 0 oS FEE RE bP. ABV AUBI As ries none artnet, neirote caaam reamancaasevossuietos C0 RA OAH OP 8 OS seh. 0 he MORNE TOE gt 86 oD Proncup * nto eles 7; ano i. puadrtasthinn a, come tize in 1969, leony tefore the abortive ratel dan sion at the day of Pigs in April, 1951." “Be 1 Te revwspaver then gives the folloviag version of the bugging incident: CS t PF “An equally bizarre episode months later gave the Justice Department its first clue +o Glancana's negotiations with the CIA. . “The figures in this incident were 2 rale night- club entertainer and Giancaza's girl friend, Phyliis MeGuire, one of the singing McGuire sisters. en es oe oR AE 6 we a . “At the time, in Giancena's opinion, the entertainer was Overly uttentive to Miss McGvire. "At Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961, sheriff's police seized a prowler in the entertaixer's hotel suite. Por hours, the intruder refused to identify himself or say he was rifling the entertainer's rooms. a { Ly Ce ee ey ‘ . "Fersistent questioning by sheriff's deputies, “te according to federal authorities, led to an , - admission by the prowler that ke was on the * payroll of a private detective agency in Florida. “Florida authorities sought an explenation of the incident from the operator of the detective agency. At first, the operator refused to discuss the matter. Fisally, however, he told investigators to get in touch with the CIA. : _ + * . e 4 -°¢ "fhe inguiry then shifted frou Florida to Vashington . and revealed Glancara's negotiations with CIA, i it was disclosed. ° . . ' "Governmuent sources reported Thursday that the ° . . private investigator's mission in tre Las Vegas i suite of the entertainer wes another riddle of the . ; tae, “+ . Giencana caper with the CIA. Neither CIA nor the . , f. Florida detective Agency ever has o2fered an exploration of what the investigator was doing in a a 1 . ; ’ ‘the Hotel sulte, the sources said." Tort te ages as ae - . ey * © *~. _ a - te } - 6 - ° C wee og en Tate gee Se et eet meme ae ne a a «sete rite tang omni BZ 50 € wees 1 Eiht GPF R RS pe vee ee fa eae. me west te ower ee parses tte? te so .. . wee «oooh drs dy te Waele SODA we gees Te ik Ow A Io EP laa a AOE TES i
14-00000 rs f - ° ~ . ° . oe , geass ma es ‘ se Cran tft ato toe ow “Code ee 7 f f f Four days later, ca 20 August 1953, the Chicago Lally News reported further cn the subject under the Zollerirg neadline: "er? TRUTH ABOU? CCSA NOSTRA CELEP AND THE CIA” The story cited an incident im vhich Glancara literally tumped into an Fal agent who was tailing his. Giancama was reported to have said, "Why don't you fellcvs leave se alone? I's one of youl” Giancana ewes a is represented in the revspaper account as having been approached by-- er ei ane oom y but not a3 having made any arrangements wlth--CIA. The story also mentions the Lac Vemms incident, but in terms of someone, possibly tien Po audie ag . a? - CYA, ransacking a roam occupied by one of Giencena's henchmen vho ret 3 f . a ‘ ‘ : _ had just returned from Cuba. ; | On 16 August 1963 the DD/P (Helms) sent a memorandum to the my DCI (McCone) forwarding a copy of the 14 May 1962 memorandua for the ‘wecord sent to Attorney General Kennedy following the 7 May 1962 fF os briefing of Kemnedy on the gambling syndicate operation - phase one. ee Pe ona The coincidence of dates strongly suggests that the Director's $8 St en Be Arte tene Matte Coda EERO a + a . jh eee Bee Be of 3 ; oa ° : interest resulted from the Caicago nevspaper story of 26 August, - oo. . rr _. ai ey te OE ate abe wt ° ¢ Tn his trensai tts] nenorandizs to the DCL, Hr. Helms wrote that: t he a *as” cE BR ABOL RR, REALTOR EIR? 1 BER RO Aare Kis, ROBT A ,« &" 8 RO i . A a . . rg . . ‘ * wok : . ., ee 5 e + . Do. . y “oe, O . . e 6 . : on on a oan . 8 . “ ; . * e ® t 574 remtion « Py ve Ay Y ‘3 Paine eee « ~ he * ® . « « ¥ was veguely avare of the existence of such : t- a wemorendia /tre memorandum for the record of the 7 May- 1962 ‘ brieficg of Rovert Keanedy/ since I was informed that it had been written as a result cf a brieficg given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in at May of last year. . . - « « I assume you are aware of the es mature of the operation discussed in the attachment.” - : - & - ‘ : 8 Poa. . : ‘ . epee oy a a crtemplomatyemmmy a4! . ve . ‘ t Y % & ta” “2 apse zee 3 : : tet ie gage ett Bete Re ene ny cage pecan, eanyeerminmpestnmen see! enna gene gee ie, Seog Sete Cae CG UTE A eek Serna pecarenagel weenie eset , . } . t> we, ~ ee) See ets ere . . - . . ree tee mor eg ARS OY APA ASABE OS og MARE gdemegh Suge Neg me a ee wer tet oe 2 a a nn ee a ee ee aes
14-00000 ? So rare nw wah ye See .benbers of the gambling syndicate, ; a " necessarily xaov more-~subject to what he may have learned as a ” . ee ome me oo. tm a east Ae gt eth mie ee le Fee eh ee ee Be am ete we . ‘ ctw So Be ames © om ween ee cee mete eg ome i Teis is the earliest date en which we have evidence of Me. MoCone's | Pa . oa at. 3 . being avare of any aspect of the schese to assassinate Castro using + SOP grant cabin v a Tr +o a oeane. Drew Pearson hag access to these nhewspazer stories, and they are available to any number of sources who migat wish to collect - Such information. The rumors of CIA's Alifance vith gucgsters are not new; what is new is that the recors nov consect CIA aad the Gangsters in a plot to assassinate Castro. I+ may be assimed that the Attorney General (Ciarz) knows that the noors of the relation- ecometn oem + ship, as such, are true because of the records of the FRE om the Les Vegas wiretapping incident. As of th{s writing, he does not ; result of the FEL interview of Edvard P. Morgaa, Maheu's dashington attorney. A clue as to how much the Attorney General ray imov ig . i ° 2 9 ro 04 nga epemeetetnm-tn found in his statement that Maheu {s the closest thing to a link *. ; between CIA and Glancana. . oho: . gone: at “ e . , wae. : - * { - 70 - ln ee aS grenmecne: me em ear, dae et ee te
f t ‘ cenanraanie stteey may : oN ( ' May - July 1955 : The Agency's previous interventiozs oa Maheu's behalf are * : revieved here, because of the inereasicgiy izportan: role of Maheu i t : in the scenario. ‘The last of these interventions occurred during i ; the period May - June 1966. At that time a Senete Comittee headed t ; by Senator Long of Missour{ was investigating invasions of privacy , ” and planned to call Makeu to testify. We learned indirectly of the {os Committee's intention to call hin. A can who vas employed by Maheu oo in 1954-55 was inforsed that he would be called to testify ebout his . activities during that period. He was an employee of AID in 1966. the Internal Security Division of the Departuent of Justice learned that he was to be called as a vituess and informed CYA's Geseral Counsel. . Tn the 1954-55 tine perfod Makeu vas hired by the Greek cntpping . . -Biignate, Niarchos, £0 help ina financtal tussle Hiarchos was having | with another Greek shipping fignre, Coessis, swho had nanaged to megotiate a pact with King Saud under vhich Osassis would control 90% of all Saudt Avablan of] shipments. British, American, and German shipping interests cpposed Ocassis’ near monopoly, and the US and UK govermsents supported Hisarchos fn his fight to ave the agreesent ig tRL Ps ft aa 3 tow? he Sas : t . : ‘ 2 a . as ee tee a ty ahtatiies niamaiatl Ce et BS coe 5 bnew e ~ es hae oe e a : te te ates aaa “ett Bigot ee ee bepmerir  emnt. AS emp ot Senge rag ww se tate Cr onamenis ne “a teat wie a ioe 4 oe a * “ et come oe eR eee ee ge We atelier Wau A ow cee. 8 Staal Bw RA Toe Mp Pa ay “ores nemo ER Co des oe soto ete bee oe 7
age eee rapa # “peton cancelled. Maheu is believed to have worted at 709 levels in doth the British acd Azerisan Goverments, reportedly aeeting at least onze 4 with Vice President Kixoa. Mebeu's operations were fnanced by : moive lilarcnos, but CIA becaze involved ‘a supporting trea by request of the Departeent of State. Agency ccamunications and pouch facilities ' were made available to Yaheu, acd he was given help ir éevelopiag anemone © a black propagaz3s campaign ageinst Ccassis. ‘Iarenos, with Makey's ee te help, won hisscrap with Onassis. - A variety of litigation arose fron the contest. In one lav sult z. for libel before the New York Supreme Court in early 1956 (Onassis vs. , C } Catapodis), Niarchkos was examined by attorneys for Catapodis. When t ° questions were’asked about certain affidavits in issue (which hed been , , passed through the CIA pouch systen), Wiarchos, as a wituess, was advised by his attorneys not to testify on the grounds of Goverment Privilege. CIA inevitably becase involved. The General Counsel Spe tt AE aR ge on tig ote * @ sen cnentennth intel giete eaten + mone gta USER an Ge Hs H+ prepared a statement for the U.S. District Attorney in Kew York, (to te retained by the Oofc office there) stating the Agency's interest. As a consequence , cra was identitied as being a party to the Rlarchos/ ha, ues : pe ° ih { stew Onassis squabble. Although that vas in 1956, the Agency's inter- 2 vention is presumably still a'zatter of record. * Tee Long Committee planned to resurrect the old Cnassis/Ntarchos Tight, because it had involved an {evasion of privacy. Apparencly a ee VE eS ‘ ‘ orn, ' i ve i 4 e 7 ! f ] Bt) + 3 e 1 t 4 ? 4 , fy s [3 ¥ ce ifs meee: sre some fs ra STEAM am eames eet een Ok RR ET EE ee em ee ad
at sae le ats & se Remon AP BA, % + f On 4 one of the things Mateu id vas to hire sczecne to mma techatcel surveillance on Caassist offices, and this becane Eno. saheu's more recent involvexent in the Les Yezas wiretapping incifent alss seened certain to receive extensive etteatioa by the Lorg Commit: The Long Comittee presimably vould have been tnteresced only in Maheu's connection with the wlretapgings thes srew out Sof the the Cnassis/ an Niarchos affair and the ganhbling syndicate operation against Castro. The Agency decided that it would not be in its interest to allew oe etBero a i | | - Maheu to testify an the bugging incidents because of the visk that his testimony sould not te confined Just ~o wiretapping. furtrer, C “ Makeu has been used over the years in a muster of seasitive CIA aa operations. There was a risk that a generel inquiry might open up ° other sensitive issues. A mmber of meetings were held vith Edvard P. Morgan, Msheu's Washington attorney, and vith a close legal associate of Senator Loag, a St. Louie attormey named Merris Shenker. Finally, in direct meetings with Senator Long, our Ceneral Counsel + cme eet gmt 0 _MBS able to have Maheu excused frox testifying before the Long ne ; Vette negnttions ven td my to inve Habe excused fru ; . ‘testifying, Maheu became quite alarmed over the risk of adverse publictty, - which might jeopardize his business with very important clfents. Ee vas especially worried over his Howard Hughes accomt. He arplied pressure oe =). ARGUS CCRREAT CoE RRNBNB DNRC SAIS AAR AVNER EAI RE IA. Hoke SET RRO RARA Oe Minne» Nem NOKtN aA CCAS tom SEATS Fou P. we vie ee -- 7 te teat boat Sel etait ee awe reste, Hedy rn St, Sis tee pe fom hs eer ONT Sete crag crete: a. Fo RR RR Re De ae eR on SY 7 OO RY RCS oe
an fe thy a i t ‘ tea att ons ee ae teas %* é Ec SERD RNA Sth aR ORR A ee, Pe eto eae ROR caRRI OTT 5 alas WBA Groen BH, -- Set drm ene nngeneEn Set. my ge ROE + . ® tag . . . ar | satel agree { On the Agency in 8 vartezy of ways--sugzesting chat publicity ef zhs expose his past censitive work for CIA. Meheu's teckground aud past assuciutions with CIA ere the subject of another section of this report, : James O'Connell states that at one point in the negotiations with the Long Comittee Meheu tndicated that he might brie? his at: rney et nn nD L, Edvard P. Morgan, fully edout his past activities so that Morwaa would be able to decide how best to represent hin. Whether he did or not, and, ££ so, wha he told hin, is not mown. We have a discussion of the possible inplications of this in a later secticn of this report. &. Maheu may very well have told Morgea tse details of the plan to assassinate Castro using members of the ganbling syndicate, and . b. Makeu has nov, on three separate occasions, seen CIA intervene in official proceedings--once for Niarchos and orice for Maheu. 7 i , © . , . ee Se ee ee ed ‘ eye tee Lo - a = ge cma sialnd tenet Be : : ee : . ane ere Ot Mamet ee 1 a eat, oe fate ne re AOI Get gay eee SOY Ta ame MAA eo meteor Ye et ety meme ee ot le oe - a ‘ weenie oie ke tame ee are Seek at
ST tees -- me ome Ae ee oT ete Eire Mo up Mae ee we we . we ew e iS . 6, ON ; ace 3 , 3 4 3 : 23 vs Z . Echemes im carly 1933 Ski:. Siving Sult | ee At about the time of the Donovan-Castro negotiations for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners a. plan was devised to bave Donovan present a cs ntaninated sxin efving suit to castro as a gifs. Castra was known to be a skin diving enthusiast. We cannot put a + ome precise cate cn this scheme. Desmond FitzGerald told us of it as if u i t i £ k : it had originated after he took over the } Cuba tase force in January 1563. Samuel Balpern sald that £5 began under “ilitam Harvey and + dwar ae that he, Ealpern, briefed FitzGerald on {¢. Est rvey states positively . 4 . “ that he never heard of it. nN &. - According to Sidney Gottlieb, this scheme progressed to the ° point of actually buying a diving sult and readying it for delivery. The technique involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus that vould produce a disabling and chronic sxin disease (Madura foot) tase mteeetteny and contaminating the breathing apreratus with tubercle bacilit. , : ° eee ee re Gottlieb does not yenember what came of the scheme or what happened rn Re re ‘a ew F ee 6 « - - ote se > "te the scuba suit. Sam Halpern, who was in on the Scheme, at first + oe said the plan was dropped because Lt was obvicusly impracticable. a He later recalled that the plan was ebandoned because it was overtaken ry A cerasfipe eneaso siete nde eae PCED FPO MoGREle ® «G08 EDTA OD RAE GU WOE AEE Ogg g ARES Ow oAGET + ° * . ‘ " r by events: Donovan had elready given Castro a skin diving suit on his . own initiative. The scheze may have been mentioned to Mike Miskovsky, a en . at e ae ff er ee gon cD ' - who vorked with Donovm, but FitzGerald has no recollection that it was. pd SRS ~ 75 = : . wee Boot tee te aoe wae . a a -e eet ey Z he 4 2 . i ot RLS Delt f...~ aa Foray a a pegeg~ sth, Aaa ae PRI RU teeta g oa EE Mame « imens OyofiO Berane tee epee Patent a weeps teas pe tantrabifete - Foe Ce Cn 8 fae wet 5 fon ¥ . Tee Fey ene dete gee teen bat mere ba tate 6 nt ROTO oe ee OE yk Mel ee cement ee ne Ale - oo wet er ee
14-00000 oe é : ' a+ tee . al : - - VES ote armen ss am aS del A ghe twee wate oe were ie : . ee ae . 86D PEGARD © TL™ Lae Om AB PY EMRAPERM 4 ie ‘ Halpern says that he menti cnzd the plan to George EeManus, then @ special assistant to tre p/P (Helms). McManus later tola Ealpern : os that he had mentioned the schene to Mr. Helms. ‘Those who vere favolved in the plot or vho vere identified to us by the participants as being ° ‘ sting are the following: . . ° ; Richard Helns William Harvey (sentes any knovledge) 2 OP mere omen es meee pee oF Teenond Fitzerald etd Semel Eelpern George McManus i Sidney Gottlieb . | a > ae @ weenie nee « Oe ee ee . . any « ° - ne so wero mapeme: Q ERATOR TN ENDRAID Cy HP COURT ty & Sut yt MPH anno mn wm PORE Ey bo + $ : . ° ~ 4 { i . Hi . : aes ° 7 Moa of. . anid ° ™ 7. ie ~ - re ( . = = t - . . 7 3 tee wes et + te pet: Tce eae ree 6 geattt a trl : Le wget a . ; ae ‘ thee eae pence neon Bin” re eb agy. wh ae = eh 5% vee tle moet tt 2 Le . . . . sree meat tee Reais «© ayy 4 he eee om Fe wmatty y oof matali thE te oo meen Bia weet wi me hte te helene eg me” a bee ea AD See Bi Be Ne ee me Seer eteime ee ae 8
aye re . Pees cr * . e 2 ee “3 per * pegs Nh #6 MRR MR AN GOR OBS + ary a ee eee we = nn ee Pod 4 SCUBTES CF TiS MATICN Files were furaished for review by the Director of “curity, the Deputy Director for Sspport, the Genera Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, tre Crtef of Wi Division, sn4 by Col. J.C. Hing, former Chie? of WZ Division. Bicgranhie files and intelligence publications vere furnished oy the Director of Central Reference. ff vas not made witting of the reason for our faterest im thes, end those wao assendlied thez for him were not told for whon they vere intended. We called sack four offfeers Zor faterviews: Richard Bissell, Sheffield Edvards from retirement, Willian Earvey frea sick Leave, and Restor Suachez from his post 4 Ceracss,| Otzervise, our inuterriews were conficed to officers assigzed the headquarters installation. We opened each interview by referring to the Drew Tearson colin of 7 March 1967, citing thet as the reason for our interest in learntcg : of plots to assassinate Castro. We told those interviewed that we were on a fact-finding micsfon on tekalf of the Director, ard thas this was not the usual sort of Insvector General investigation. We askxed each to raze any others who were lizely to have knovledge of such plots. ‘we cautioned each not to discuss the subject of the iaterview with anyone elze--even others whoa ve sight interviow, This is a conplete list of those interviewed: 4a 18 rs pentane me wineententedh mH Desuond FitzGerald ; ° Sanuel Halpern Rruce.:Cheever, 7 J. C. King Alfonso Rodriguez J. D. Esterlize Edvard Guna Hovard Osbora . dares O'Connell Sidney Gottlieb . ed « Sheffield Edvards : . Richard Bissell sort “ i Restor Sanchez Williem Harvey Cornelius Boosevels Rovert Bantermaa . ' £0) eo emniateenatenennnmte @ an ek * © eevee oom m0: RUEGEard ter J laeehd ot ne AY SAR RRD Rabat em ene mga soo + 6
. a a ees + CS OT ee let rete oe Hy - sat . Bawten + mee aw, : oad Sfingdy bade wn 2 mig? meen ‘ Sore fe. een eit TO cae ORT eek. fo = ‘ Bocby-traozed Sea Shel} 2 : : Seze tine f5 1953, date uncertaio but piSably carly in the ad i . year, Desrond FitzGerald, then Chief, Sas, origina ted 4 scheze for mai : . doing away vith Castro by reaas of an explosives-rigged Sea shell, i Lote The fdea «as to take an unusually Spectacular seg chell -that would i be certain to catch Castro's eye, load 1+ with 82 exmlosive triggered | , * to blow vkeo the 8hell was lifted, ana submerge it in an area vhere | ; Castro ofteg vent skin diving. 1s Des bougat two books on. Caribbean Mollusca, The scheme vas £00n ' as found to be impracticable. None of the shells that might conceivably i BS 4 be found in the Caribbean area was both Spectacular exsough to be sure f i. . . of attracting attention and large enough to hold the need2d volume “ i - of explosive. ‘The midzet submarine that would have had to be used | H . in emplacenent Of the shell has tco short ua Operating range for such : ‘ an Operation. ; * i ' . FitzGerald states that he, Sam Halpern, and Bruce Cheever had . ‘ Several sessions at vhich they explorea tys possibility, but that no- . . ; 7 + E: welt ly ‘. One else was ever brought in on the tals. Ealpern believes that he . ; had conversations with TSp on i . feasibility aad using a hypothetical, . 7 case. He does not remember vith whos he may ba unable to identify @ny others wh: ve spoken. We are ° new of the Scheme at the time it Was beirg coasidered, wee woot ee 8 DERE. re eo HAL sae AER / , () ; c J . ‘ ray “i : ad “eee, Ve So aE SG oe . ces. om See Sat tte Free mye 2 hed . . Spa retet ee gr Pe oe gtd ge snr eer sin et “ aio eo : fee tm are Tovbe ott onan ag! ee es ~ baer . 245 see eed AR See cereale Bit Sting ee Oe BE - PT nee = “
ee w ACh ono ee ° 7 i te ' ( March 1961 ; a ® an officer then assigned to the Bexico City Station, met ia Yextco City with Rolando Cubela to sound out Cubela on his views on the Gyhan Situation. Cubela bad been atreading the leftist-sponsored Letin American Conference’ on Natioral Sovereignty, Emancipation and Peace held in Mexico City from § to 8 March. 2 Cubela vas noncremittal. ‘The meeting was arranged by Carlos : - Tepedino (AMWHIP-1), a long-tize friend of Cubela. Cubele mew ; | __ensuany from Havana vere| ses once assigred and vhere iC a @ similar meeting kad once teen set up but had fallen through. . i (Comment: Rolando CUAELA Secades vas the second-ranking i leader of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) 13 de Marso, which : was an elite group of leftist. student activists founded in 1956 . to organize violence to overthrow the Batista regize. Cubela "~ ; : . : was believed to have been one of the participants in the an i . fone hah _*” assassination in 1956 of Lt. Col. Antonto BLAWCO Rico, then . . i. the head of Patista's military intelligence service. The DR i ; , meavers considered themselves quite apart from the Fidel{ste ra = ° . H . z - : 26th of July Movement, Gespite the fact thet they had reluctantly f oe Signed a unity Pact. In the final Cays of the revolution the DR h., : took the Presidential Palace, which they refused to surrender ; a). oo - 6 - C a: i & . . ge soma om RA a ot Fe en tee a Pde eee tt ee thie » apadihs yo ate. Se eetketotenn Leaked seme eee 1 cary earns caste Ostet ds ten eat
14-00000 s to Che Guevara but eventually (ena reluctantly) turned cver to Fidel Castro. Culela was a major in the Cuban army, the highest . _ Cuban militery rank. : f ; “ (A CS Information Report with a dste of information of - ' March 1959 reported that: “Prior to his appointsent to the post of Cuban Military Atcache to Spain and his subsequent Ceparture for Madrid on 27 Yarch 1959, Rolando Cuoela frankly expressed to Prime Minister Fidel Castro his diesatisfaction over the present situation in Cubs. Cubela .. . privately od ry Be told intimates that he was so disgusted with Castro that if he, ) Cubels, did not get cut of the country scon, he would kil) Castro Himself.* . (Although the March 1961 meeting betveen, land Cubera in Mexico City was inconslusive, it led to other meetings out of C which grew Project AMLASH. Cubela (AMLASH-1) repeatedly ins{stea that the essential first ste tep in overthroving the regize vas the te common qa es 9 canpememeey tom elintnation of Castro himself, which Cubela claimed he was ; prepared to accomplish. He repeatedly requested that ve furniech oa him the special equipment or raterial needed to do the Job. Those immediately concerned with the rucning of the operation | now ; : recall it as one in vhich the Agency was interested primarily in 7 { Keeping Cubela active in the MHAPRON progren directed against “ ) fe metesigee on ve: eo gen 7 a . re ve an a SEE OPE 95 SERRE GAA ph YS Lee cob aiyre h Je SP CHTE TENE nmr peTR eT He 8 ERR atte e Yt i . . . . . ’ : < o 8 .
A Chem AWE, OR Cuban nilitary leaJers, while resiscing -13 pleas for techaical assistance in an astass’ ition attexpt. The voluminous project files and the information furnished us by ilestor Sanchez, Cubela's case officer, do not vholly support those recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubdela's , plottings.) au 2 26 March 1951 An asset of the Miami Station reported that Rolando Cubela acd Juan Orta wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. (Juan Orta was the gangsters’ “man inside Cuba” with access to Cast tro in the lethal pill operation we have called Gazbling Syndicate - Phase Oze.) Headquarters expressed interest in exfiltrating Orta and Cubela. The exfiltration attempt was called offas a result of a report thet the Cuban police were evare of Cubela's desire to defect and of his departure plans. s (Comment:. This {s one of three naze-links ve found in the AMLASH file betveen Rolando Cubela and persens involved in the genbling syndicate episodes. Te other two links are ever pore nebulous than this. If Cubele vas in fact one of the gangsters‘ assets inside Cuba, that fact was umkcom to either the CIA officers running the gangster episodes or to those handling Cubdela.) ° ca “we . e- . . - . - 4 whoo on . zu, Bowel, . - aot fee ~ : 2 'g. . vega see one, a Spats . ney oR. . * aa te : ~ F - 7 PRS at, Spa od. ve Fes: Prec” L.. sa SER Far sank se wae on Footy pea eye wa Sntotae aspen anes! pot wee” Tor sewer tetera ons gee sche dot = 2 Rett : oe mee rte 5 ete ST ete tome meee Th da i ie Tae tac aera whet BRS eaphg ne thee ig men gitteg Fo NaS eye ren yy atin 9 Me erties al OE uh gene oN wt © tee 5 wa gmmteanecengeth fo mom => SpRE TH MERE OH ee we ene 8 Oo +s tmempaptge nm epetmenttetteeiaraES Apiceeeey $ eel: a Or Oe eee es
14-00000 toe - BAM pe PR ree, * * BFE ere com ee aw asete at om ‘ade nd ede bats . Mange 1s Suzust 196% ik od ‘ Carlos Tepedino reported that Rolando Cubela vas planing we to attend the French Hational Student Unfon Cultural Festival later in the month. Cubela Sent a message to Tepedino saying that he vanted to talk vith a "friend of in Paris 1f possibile. The wessazge presumably was passed through Cubela‘s gtr] friend, an elrline stewardess. The Paris Station : was given approval to . appreach Cubela, but there is no indication tn the file that he g { £ 7 Was actually contacted. i —_~ f Wf 15 June 1942 i C-~ Ao due 192 The JMWAVE Station cabled that a station asset (aMconceRT-1) Was told by Lucia ECHEVARRIA Blanct that Cubela had left Cuba for Helsinkt on 10 June 1962. He was traveling on a Czech airline, by way of Prague, to Helsinkt where he planned to attend the Worla . .+ 1, Youth Festival. -Tacla's mother and father had arrived in Mient © + ee tomes eames gelacnarrae . a af Rims shee wt fears a a ue “on 9 Jue and bea been seen off at the ajfort by Gubela vnen they left Cuba. Lucia's mother told Lucia that Cubela wanted to defect “ i and to enter the U.S. Cubela said that on his retum fros Felsinkt che would pass through Paris vere he toped to meet his old friend, Carlos Tepedins. ¢ i } t 4%, bp t i ! 2 ony _ LR SS Rneen GAR INIA CS LEERY Tbe arent, Se TEENE Ip! 1508 bere -eRp emia as eeon + ea t Ste ote Rt tec +2 wee . eat ne Ps Ps z weet mee meen & sara aa pena 0 cath, ae Cat ate teh and Ree so ion Sottcimaiids ov, eatin aired ep 08. ext veantieeetned ones - 27e 5 Ts Bee feel ot MR RTA T, Mikey Sot io eee aa we Dy serge: Te Bote ee Ee en, . woes 1m Qe
we, “ome ow 5 Pe eet oe a ro “e Fatt WEF ora o e .* : Tne FEY forwarded to CIA a report of a meeting «ith an FBI inforsaat in Miami on 11 duce. ‘Ths iniormant .cported that Cubela was attending the Youth festival in Helsinki in July-August 1962 and wanted to defect. In a detailed transaittel nezorandin, the Fal identified its informant as Carlos Tepedino, weoa the FBI mew to | be a long-tize contact of CIA. Sepedino offered his services to the ‘ “FBI to assist ir the defection of Cutela. He told the Bureau of | __daeeting with Cubela in Mexico City in March 1961. ‘The | Bureau stated in its menorandim to us that it had told fepedino wm ee + gMteaigetne + epoemes oe Ci that his offer ‘would be forwarded to the proper U.S. agency. ‘The ® Bureau also stated that it was informing its Paris representative Gent sco cates at as 9 to refer Tepedine to CIA if Tepedino should contact the Paris Legal me entree cnnaradjationen Attache. - . . °. ood. - 8 July 1962 a ae . . e-? . - . - 7, 7 Oe : aa ° The DAVE Station reported the suostance of a telephone . ' conversation between Tepedino and a station officer, which vas . i f H - ; arranged by AMCONCERT-1. Tepedino identified the orizizal source of his inforzation on Cubela‘s desire to defect as being the Echavarrias, froa whoa the JMAAVE Station had received its report. Tepedino said - 7) he had: appreached the Fal in Miewi because of dissatisfaction with the |.) - & . ' an | PDOs Oo ED CRESTED My AORN Ph ee RE A TO aE petRe = ofr des oon . a . + 7% * . . . . pe OO parece -4. ieaoammmataiviac caekeadered eh poy vo: covrnaiearin eee tae sora, “echer eee = 9 omar rah atm Aten eth on aa ee - eee MEO et en BE le Eek ey oe ape mee H a OE ae Note le + ne . » - . Swe tT rege eat Tey ob EARA nar ertsD ems 6 gn NEE, gee te Pet ee OE dite Me fl a an etns gom eg  R eae ete ftw sows
14-00000 : rs ’ “Bee » hd + fare ne. ee er rs c £ F iM ;. eeta eee eereen Site GaP Fs a ° ‘s . i ‘ 3 a way CLA had handled Cuteia’s “planned defection” ta Paris in August t 1951. Tepedino egreed to ceet with a CIA officer and contact arrengements were made. 13 aad 14 July 1962 4 : ° becom headquarters, met with Tepedino in Sev York City on 13 and 1) July 1962. Tepedinoe agreed to meet | ss Helsinz, and to travel anyvhere else necessary, to aid 1 TEU Ans CELT Oe wo eumese me te . . in an attempt to defect Cubela. Tepedino, vho is a successful oe Cuban exile jeveller in Kev York City, refused an offer to pay his . C . full expenses. He did accept reimbursement for airline tickets and hotel expenses. He vas nat offered a salary or bonus. * 30 July - 6 August 1962 ; — | fepedino arrived in Helsinki on 30 July. [ss already there. Cubela vas found, and the first of a serfes of meetings with a Mae | nee Be fe . # hin vas held on 1 August. che original objective of defecting Cubela * : t was quickly changed to ane of ‘recruiting him in place. these are . 4 & excerpts frac | contact report of the first meeting with Cubela : Betta Sear’, , ry e, “be 4 Pn) ° ip aaah SER esa 8 Be OREN OS * herb oD, BS Ge SOE ey BGA, oe WE AE * ‘ . oe “i . + e 1 : * f . . { He said be was considering not going back to Cuba, but after , talking to Tepedine, he felt thet if he could do sosething ; really significant for the creation of a nev Cuta, te-weo Leesa 4 . - ° he vas interested in returning to carry on the fight there. ~ 4 gee . : o- - wes tee oe s ~ , sane Fig hee ie Preble or an il re eT ae Se aes . wt : ee eget aes Ae CASES nee. - . senor termatinet a gy oct raed, OTT a ee Serene =~ Ee eT > = tata eet ont cq? EAD he Sere 4 . : - wr . Po ae I a oo . . oc af tm ote a oF ws y - seo pe whs ower Se * TU see Tee Tae tee a — a we a8 Tey be ylan eet tape n ee tek een ce He O1G Sate Ay 2 entre, <P sais 5 seit act e E, te 7 ee OPS See oe d omy. ere Segre gh pemishe a otens. om 8 Agar en ain eee arena: wag tae : sete Sema feet Ret cert gactintd aie alent Agee aeteanitatte Sw mtet s? Tie RL Rabie a ett od ie Soom Ede he EL oh bite $6 Aine 6 Am MNO a ot tm a ee ee a e =
14-00000 frm ra e. abt, ie aj f ae * - ~ o. re — . . os ‘ "2 s ° ws ap nd eo UAE oe ne ) . + ’ 88 mt OM Be ey He caid he was not (sterested in risking kis lire for any szall undertaking, but that if he could he given # really large part “a play, he would use himself ani several others in Cuba when he could rely upoa. Ee said he hed plans to blow up an ofl refinery, as ke felt that the continuing existence of a senblance of normal functioning in Cuba depended upon a continuing supply of petroleum, Supplies of waich, as ve know, are at a critical staye today. : He also wanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriguez (a top- ‘ ranking Castro subordinate) aad the Soviet Ambassador, and also : t to eliminate Fidel, by execution if necessary. eur ae on APE eno we o onimese While we were making no committments or plans, we pointed out to Cubela thet schemes lize he eavistoned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, iatcrmatioa-collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to easure the value and _ success of such plans. . ni - Cubela stated many tines during the course of this and subsequent } C: "meetings that he wes only interested in involving himself in a , Plan of significant action, aad which was truly designed to _¢ } achieve repidly his desire to help Cuba. L=_2 August 1962 De my , Because of the security hazard in too frequent meetings in Helsinki ,where Cubela vas surrounded by his associates in the Cuban te delegation, it vas agreed that further meetings vould be held in: a ar onee . Stockholm and in Copenhegen. Cubela ‘agreed to meet with a Spanish- @ eee weesammioee os Sypien speaking case officer in Paris later in the month. Hotairg significant came out of the meetings in Stockholz, 7 - 9 August, except Cubela's ' revelation that he had told four of his Cuban associates of his meetings -in Eelsinkd with Tepedino. names : at es : . « * - ~ te? . wee ee ° a ST = . Feet tee et ae te. 2 os t. . ove» ., TBS. oe . = = » * ° ° nn er rt oe eee te ee ee eee ean ‘ a s . . . ; — : ar) . . ° ee . * oo. - . - : . - : a - Foti! wt Sh ote cat. 3 Meo ge uw pes ee * . - cr: Coe ne Cette, _ oF : Hele Ee petds oe SAE Ste R ~ o lose ae Tne Te ae Anette on ares nae + ghia etna mae nee oy be nn Cem nee aT te fa ce mw ne hee ee ° a
14-00000 Coed ont em. awe a ~ oo. porte OD 1G - 31 Aussss 1942. ene IE, [re zeatn, asa Cubeis sec in Cogenhegses Tor furthes meetings. | fete in nis contact report: « « « &t One tine whes we always wrote of hinselr as ‘we'] were discussing the various aspects of Cubela's future ' role in Cuba, we used the term ‘aesassirute.' ‘the use of this term, we later learned from Tepedino and fro Cubela hizself, was most objectionable to the letter, and ke was visibly upset. - It was not the ect he obfected to, but rather merely "the choice of the word used to describe it. ‘Elicinate was acceptable,‘" (Comment: It is worth noting here that Tepeding, a Cuban a * Jeweller in New York, ves Preeent at a series of meetings at which the assassination of Castro vas discussed, betveen Cubela andj eh Tepedino knew to be a CIA officer.) Uke 23 August 1962 ( . Cubela, Tepedino, ond et in Paris acd vere joined by| @ Spanish-speaking case officer fros Madrid. Cubela was given sfa training and was issued appropriate S/w supplies. ach AAROUREPRD ABA satin 4 é He was taken to the south of France on 20 August for a dexolition denonstration. | planned to polygraph Cubela and asked for a polygraph operator to be sent to Paris. Cubela isdigvantiy ro" """gefused to be polygirarhed. | attra on 17 August: . “Have no intention Give Cubela physical elimization mission 46 requirement but recogaize this something ke csul4 or might try to carry out on bis own initiative." * Headquarters replied by cable on 18 August: d : Rare, GARDE MSS. Y wie ane PATER eBve | EE G0 Ae Gabi, oy darn ortine * a ‘ ry ry e . , “Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be givea Cusela.” August 1952 . — { Cubela left Prague by air for Hevena. ; : Co ti alti . ° - WieWola Bint a . ~ Je oe ot ae - ees ho bey a tHe ay pee Seas: . ect ‘ . 7 Out oto ot : . : ae - oe me ee eve = nee ae MOM ss a hea kn Onan as a eee SS eee Oe ae Rae. ert er rt ee Se Pa ee wee . wate FR Re mtn - : a ¥ Fetes ate tet + ‘ oa ° x =I * Dos tat ae ents On ome epnenin oe te ie re 8 Anette wm
14-00000 R0OE$ © Gre 46 ASE aM ete on Rygptngeters ’ ® 4 a 0 . . ae £ : BPUTTT we tes F ™ “ginteieed Lica ese ( t . : Cubela attended the Collegiece Cazes in Porto Alegre, Brazil, ° as a representative of the Cubag goverment. Ee was cet there by [na Tepedino. Also yartictraticg was Kester Senchez, a * Spacish-speaking case officer freq headquarters, who thereafter acted : es case officer for Cubtela. ; : Cubela claimed that he had written tvo S/s messages. (Only one 3 . + had been received.) He said he was reluctant to use S/d because + tees he feared the efficiency of the Cuban postal censorship. Cubela discussed a group of Cuban military officers known to rc hin, and possible ways of approaching thes. Te probles was, he explained, that although many of then were anti-Communist, they vere ” either loyal to Fidel or were so afraid of hi= thet they vere reluctant to discuss any conspiracies for fear they might be Dees provocations. Cubela said that he thought highly of Banon GUIN Diaz _ fT (aseeux-10) who was hiding Miguel DIAZ Isalgue (annce-1%). Diaz ; . had been sent to Cuba by CIA to recruit Guin in place, and had done so. - , _Cubela said he planned to use Guin but was concerrced about Guin's “nervous condition” and the fact thet be érazxk heavily. Cubela was told to assist Guin in Guin's intelligence assignments, but not to help Guin leave Cuba--as Cubela provosed. 2 OTA era's Oo ee ante Saael pe tI MEE ele HE OR all Mas [cate salen pared Rat tba oat Lahti 1 ep, ge th tte meh et el alo de ee een Ean ace mill 9 cae otal Nee tale oe vf . ' ‘ thy! . wat seid feben 3 tree. some Sos Beanies? Seemed : : t i ! g t : e © ome maupattinndjuta comm 2 pom + eee lien le dinate 28,
14-00000 t " Fo aan ch, tos, a* . Teme so tee : yf é ry % a | THrey eyes mye 7 ¢ ar) é . 4 i 1k Septeeber 1553 iy t Froa Porto Alegre, Cubela flew ‘to Paris, arriving oa ib Septaazer. retry He was there osten.ibly to attend the Alliance Fiaccaise, but actually to tekxe an extended vacation--of which he planned to inform 74i4el 7 AE semmegelg ; 16 Sevtenbder 1953 Cubela (in Paris) wrote to fepedino (ia Eew York): "I don't intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again,” which you eee. 6 ee ge oy I ete + eaten vie! should tell them, “so they don't make the trip. I want ta get amy tras politics completely .. 2. . » * 3 Ostober 1963 } Restor Sanchez arrived in Paris for meetings with Cubela. (the . . t « P) co record does not reveal why Sanchez went to Paris in the fuce of Cuteia’s . | "> stated wish not to see him. The letter may have been written during | - . @ spell of temporary depression. Station officers vere already in . ; cr’. Contact vith Cubela when Sanchez arrived.) Also participating in the | : meetings vere John (Red) Stent and Richard Long. At the tine of these meetings it was digcovered that the French vere unilaterally keeping . . aie Cubela under surveillance. CIA informed the French that our contacts with Cubela were for the purpose of defecting hin. ll October 1963 - . ' Sanchez cabled that Cubela was insistent upon meeting with a deem an senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kensedy, for assurances NEAR ncn retacek PON. VRE i. POR IO ang 9 eSrRI DREN QE 2 egyhepiee) «naan pcan alt aay Ary eo an ® | = ome e 4 ote +f Sah ic el Eo oe alan ah es ee carl a a hd . - - a Tee eee ity AS rap te eb Seon, opal owe OO ee wel gba OG apes ape a nde mE te legit me SI MILE cite Cope pee een, GPO bene oe BOR gle oe Clan pt pee oe RAPE sna went ben FADS WE oo 2+ we Cb EbAGA AS bade ah eh
a a ‘ab 8 “fe 4 ange wt oes ere ee ee Dee . oe . . . mt leat eee an mabe pent of U.S. moral supgors for eny activity Cabeta under tock in Cuca. Sanchez said that the ansver Cutela received oicht ve crucial +o CIA's relationship with Cubele. Sanchez re sonzended tha that "highest and profound consideration be given as reeling draw by all who in contact Cubela is that he determined attenpt op against Castro with or without U.S. support.” 13 October 1963 Tae Faris Station cabled: "Sanchez STA LOD 13 Oct. Pending change after 12 Oct meet Sanchez plans return Eqs after LOD stop in order discuss details operation before entering final round discussions with AMLASH." 17 October 1963 — ° Red Stent cabled the results of a meeting with Cubela and Tepedino. Cubela, in a private conversation with Stent, reltersted his desire to speak with a high-level U.S. Government official. Stent - cata that basically Cubele wanted assurances that the U.S. Goverment we vould support him if bis enterprise were successful. a Lis. 29 October 1963 Co , * Desmond FitzGerald, then Chief, SAS, who was going to Farts on ‘other business, arranged to neet vith Cubela to give hiss the essurances waktts OT, . ee ee © ao tae . eetlo.t J ee a, ne - Ft ce tat. . wo ol. .f . . . . : ary rura py See 1a 8 amt ces ow a a i 2 ae ee « ap ee a ee Or So Beet abtSel* z enn ar: wpb inst site Lotta na ne San Ini py, -earemerenne septa a te Boks Capt ae Pe etntes Ngo af Ret CESS CO a ee, a a Pe Tbk as 7
he cougst. dhe contact plea fer the Geeting, @ copy of which f:. in the H 4MIASH file, bas this to say on cover: * FitzGerald will represent self as persczal representative of Robert P. Kencedy who traveled Faris fcr specific purpose meeting Cubela anc giving him assurasces of full U.S. Support if there is change of the Preseat coverzeent in Cuba. According to FitsGerald, he discussed the plonced meeting with the DD/? (elas) wno decided it was rot necessary to ceek approval frog Robert Kemedy for FiteGerald to Speak in kis naxe. The meeting vas held in Red Stent's house in Paris ca 23 October 1953. FitzGerald used .ce alies james Clark. Uestor Pew e °, Sanches acted as interpreter. Red Stent wes not present during the meeting. Sanchez on 13 November 1953 wrote a memorandum for the record of the meeting. It reads in part: OAR 8f oie FitzGerald informed.Cubela that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any enti-ccemmist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cutan Jeadership and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it ‘5 prepared to give. It was eophasized that the above support will be forthcowing only efter ae wets — & real coup has been effected and the group involved is fn a position ° to request U.S. (protably under OAS auspices) recognition ard support. It was wade clear that the U.S. was not prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as suchan ~ . uprising can te extinguished in a matter of hours if the present goverment is still in control in Havara. As for the post—coup perioe, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock te turned back but will support che necessary econenic and political reforms which will tenefit the cass of the Cuban. people. so , ’ a ee ee Co POPE RROY ones emt es . Y . : ‘ * in iy ‘ w rr ti * 1 - “> eye BO rT or ie ae eT ag se een Mae OR Rd ag Speedin yt FBShe wt SHAS fying ale Pe gdp ent Eke tnd Fn geet gem plate ena be hist, wee a est Pant Pee ote mde eh ASAT hak Mit area i i ey : _ zy ‘i co. Ae Se artnet ore as tote o> Ee : Pat meg Fen vitiy ah y Aenea eRe « = eae weie . Sete ER sera FOU ae eS ER Se tae ca ae 2 ey: 5
- a Cec to lh 2 gene ota” = aa ee ce wees PETAR OT Cid, «eR ON ORE be a . B08 Rotten 1413+ erecameane bret Silo: 1 ine s-atane eteyye- art 6 a aa . wo e 1 be * “th ¥ ' carey “GBR. oe, ae ariep "Bory. ai antes . GD to abe, a eee ae se ggand * : = ° ARN PSST UE a stn! fixe In Seriges’ ‘merorendin of the reeting with’ Cubela he wrote a were : i oa Dott bs ad eee: Be Ce eS Ce eee De Oh een ne ee eee Qemecvmd tama Wie s (Comment: hose invo-:ved now recall tte porzcse of the meeting as being stpething quite different fos thet appearing’ 7 °° F* in written records prepared at about the tine of the seeting. “4 FitzGerald recalls that Cubela spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a hign-povered rifle with telescopic Sights or some other weapon that could Donen eR eR Sap ae 2 oO be used to kill Castro from a distance. Pitzlerald vanted no part of such a echexe and told Sandez to tell Cubela thet the . U.S. sispiy does not do such things. Waen he vas told this, Cubela ‘said he wanted confirmation frea a senor U.S. efficial, not a mesber of CIA. FitzGerald says thet when he met with ~ Cubela in Paris he told Cubela chat the U.S. Coverment vould “oe e by have no ) part of an attenpt on Castro's Life. Seq Ealpern, who H ° 7 tor was not present at Fitzerela's meeting with Cubela but who: was f ova eae 3. : thoroughly fextliar with. all that was : going on,’ ‘has a recollection . Nee S tk phe so wt ae 7 oy . wet! atte OMe. ‘* os ' {dentical with that of Fitzerald. - se i ie 3 ide es we hee tegcas’ Teel os! ee, + fe ae, ae ~'* “ dete. Lae a seg = NS! ee nit that as. At BBY, ‘the written’ "record telis : & sazevhat different : e a? Nothing of en operational nature - was discussed. at the FitzGerald seeting. After the neeting Cubela stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion. but now desired _to know vkat technical support we could Frovice bin. * wea ce . nd *. led os - wets 2 . “oe lee oo a7 bee ew - = a) oe . - an a - ° + tee, wane - f . ° . TOe 25 : : . oles ogee een - Eo na whe EE oe es ag fonaee tt yee Shane Sen BON $ inn grudaiicean: een As myer “to Mee fom oF saoaadeeatwussiacet octamer: a wpe - bre - tere . a atts Bape 1 RRETM - : so z os ere te ne re Me eee ene teeter hee
ie ' *- 7 a tet See Aine tone” an mag dey op. Spe a anh pote AY me age ey FN te Ot tae gl ce ase Eheeeelbn “Gale Nance tes ee toe tan mn ad, oe Guat eG e . 8. ® . , i atten. ha & ageeeaneran ovempettnpah ov ps sehbrae — *s) ' on re? ; * . 2 v tree Ls Novenver 1952 & . Let with Tepedino in New York City cd 15 Novenver, Se peeeng cove | contact report reveels Cubela's reaction (as teld to Tepedino) to his meetiag wich Pitclerald. . The visie with FitzGerald, vno acted ‘rn th capacity of a : xepresentative or hizh levels of the Goverzmment concerned with 7 : Lo . the Cuban problem satis2ted Cutela as Zax as policy vas i . * Concerned, but he was aot at all hapoy with the fact thet ke stil. - Was not given the teckztical assisterce for the operational plan ; 3 as he saw it. Tepedino said that Cubela dvelt constantly on rs ~i-fui this point. He could not understand why be vas denfed certain is Jz; “, all pleces of eculment which promised a firal solution to a - '2¢ the probles, while, on the other hand, the U.S. Govermzest ge | SLIN': gawe much eqrioment and money to exile groups for their ms ‘ineffective excursions against Cuban ccastel targets. j is .,, According to fepedine, Cubele feels strongiy on this point, wad yy cs and 4f he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. i ine. Government secunician, he will probably became fed-up -f ae ‘again, and we will lose vhatever Progress ve have made to date. sao etree ee mens = “9 Hovenber 1963 - "7 wee eee Be | - el a x 5 3 : g- 20 November 1963 Re é . . : — Loe . . s i i - Thus far, this account of the Cubela project has been based alnost | < oF us —— a. oes % a fee . . oe 's AMSBrvak an) $ i cry cen A my . ° ' » fs ‘ may Fy et 6 fe Py egpe see, sg TR ene eon panmoged ape sed 2A a em * #0 PaO oh HH hsm Sapa sear nt ces rs tat
° 14-00000 + any ‘ * t 1 t aaaltye gdn > 8, ode 4 0 shite 7 ' Fan g : . : wholly on docimenzs foun? in tre Prolecs “ite. Segiostes bere Ls ag : Secouns of 2 episode ¢4 the Cubets operation lea wWaich there ¢s no : i Commentary evidence. Dr. Gunn hus a reson f nice coazacts and = 44. ode} ‘ thelr dacec; Gthervise, this sone cmary is arava! tron the recollections ; . of those involved, bo —_ ° Saachez says th “, “hile Cubele was aszcious to da away with | ' Castro, Cubela was no+ willing to saerivice his own Live in exchange ; for Castro's. What Cutela really was ted was a be algn-powered, silenced sue rifle with aa effective range of hucdreds or thousands of yards. : _ Cubala finaliy said that, as a dcctor of medic cine (vnich be was), he ' { i was quite sure that ve could devise sore tecsaical means of doing the - 7 { é: C . Job that would not autecatically cacse hin to lose his ow life “in ; ; . f the try. _@ - : ~ : * Samuel Halpern end Hestor Sanchez 8pproached Dr. Gunn for . ° | , assistance. Althouzh rone of the participants specifically so stated, i . -  4&t may be inferred that they vere seexizg 2 reans of assassination : ; : of a sort that Cubela might reasonably have been expected to baw ceed 28 . fab ‘ devised himself. what hey settled upoa was Black leat 40, a common, : 2 “‘easily-obtainable insecticide containing about Lo/ticottne sulphate, i | Nicotize is a éeadly voison that may be adnintstereg orally, by injectioa, or by absorptics through the skin. It fs likely that there also were compe: . discussions of means of acainistering the the poison, because Guna was ready , . ~ : ache, Lefer 3 stone oe Seen etifth Olean oo: a “ic TiN ede ay alent a Nate deere Site me tae Rott ; : . a . Wet eo = - a . ~s Aaa Witetioe Fh os EARS per Os 8 Fa gtiae “Ewan an me. to move ven asked. : eel tasew oof che antalya Brac eke motes * apne emcee & viet soe Saet caonaa Ret peewee, TR Sawn. ig sees . tae - seats Be? aT a ns en ce +o enntthetet —
ei wane a te Guna egaia cn tae morning cf 2) Sovenber 195} ani tole his that che . device for adniaistering the poisca (a tall:cint pen rigged as a g : : hypodermic syringe) bed to be ready in time for Sanchez to catch a : { Plane at noon the next day. Guna suys that he went iemediately to : the FI/D worzshop and spent the rest cf the dey and most of that ‘ ; night fabricating the device. ‘cose in FI/D vho vorked vith his ; & i Imew what ke wes trying to make but not for vhom it was intended. | : { Eventually, after seven or eight fallures, he succeeded fin converting , —_ a Paper-Mate pen into a hypoderate syringe that vorked. He said that . t- _ the needle was so fine that the victin would hardly feel it when it ; - i iG oo was inserted--he compared it with the scratch from a shirt with | | A -3 . ° : i : too much starch. He delivered tke workable device to Sanchez the a : i following morning and retained tvo of the later prototypes. He states | 4 . that they are still. in his safe. He does not know what happened to | é i the device he gave Sanchez; he does not recember ita baving been I io: returned to him. He believes he vas told that Cubela refused to f. s _ @ccept the device. .He says he vould not now be able to differentiate . i BoD . . : % the finel pem from the earlier prototypes that are in his safe. : £ ' ge 1 é 22 November 1963 ° i : 3 ; Nestor Sanchez arrived in Paris ca the ecraing of 22 foverber 3 -{ é and met with Cubela late that afternoon. Sanchez states that he ! = . a . a - > oe ae J % wists 3 { ZA. é & . b i ¢ : s : og comer o's ‘ arth alate + ytptinn, onthe pon’ feik Safe Ay paris OH! A worn peas ges: nes rr “Tae re « ~ a ee wee ee eee ee 2 Lee ea Ee Se eee ee a ee 2
rey a ‘ BE cnet ties en Pre rer ae Tree eres. st Prowde me ? . wre as " whe pany, 1 AAR NL O08 On OO Ie LOE Bom BOOS Ee Sy o8 4 a ( . . PARADE) OL: TE DE Ca 10 Ee. SAREE TP it TAEDA 2: i Creare Med . oon . . * . . okt cee ie Flee ee RAS OF RT GE antetn Ab EO gen eal a oe meatal “ B wees are fe SEP SO SES A Sad 8S EES shoved the per/syringe to Cubela and explained how it worked. . rote os Poh 7, fous pe oes oat wt mreerar rh a 6 . ed 4: + en id a e ‘ ‘ "bg. ay oy A i Ee is not fure, but he believes that Cubela accepted the davice but said tras ke would . st take it to Cuba with hin. Sanche- aistinctly recells tkat EGE heen ces Cubela didn't think much of the device. Cubela said that, as a doctor, he imew all about Black Leaf £0 asd that ve Surely could. cone up with something more sophisticated then that. It shoula be noted thes Guns and Sanchez agree that the Syringe was ro: loaded. Cubela was ao 28g ate Semen me expected to supply his om Polson; ve merely Suggested Black Leaf ho @8 an effective poison for use an the syringe. Sanchez wrote a contact report of the meeting. It makes no wention of a pen or of poison. The following is a@ summary of the contact report. Cubela said that ke was returning to Cuta fully Cetermined to >ursue his Plans to initiate a esup against Castro. i Sanchez reiterated the assurances given Cubela by FitzGerald of full [ e U.S. support if a real CGup agaiast the Castro regime vere successful. . | Cubela asked for the folloving items to be included in a cache inside Cuba: 20 hand @renades, two high-povered rifles with telescopic . sights, and approximately 20 pounds of C-k explosive and related 2 7. fee 8d equipment. Cubela Suggested the best place for the cache was on the finca (fara) managed by his friena, (AMTRUNK/10). Since he uns necurning to Cuba by vay of Prague, ke A242 not want to carry S/¥ or any other facriminating natertals with his. As they were coming a= er pinky wpe tye a ‘ Bea e, Dee a “Tunes. 3 Jat legate Seba Ses ae my Loa lee de ok the ogee So TE 3 ; My Be oS, «Sat Stee Tg tdifta® at wo * aeaigy gird: [i re os ed a:
° OF ABR TRO, GHP OF Chae Oe eae $, ‘ess freer ae r *, rn * (GRETe 2 nt roast. To 2 LORRY aap Ar oe pT AS, fae ae ema eet ae ert Seine Cut of the meeticg, Sanches acd Cubela vere inforsed that Presiden; Keanedy had been essascinated. Cubela was visibly moved over the news. Ee asked, "Why do such things happea to good people?” The contact report does not state the time nor the duration of the Sanchez-Cubela meeting, but it is lively that at the very morent President Kennedy was shot a CLA officer vas meeting with a Cuban agent {2 Paris and giving hiz= am assassination device for use egainst Castro. Sanchez states that he received an OPIM cable from FitzGerald that night or early the next sorning telling him that everything was off. We do not find cuch a cable in the AMLASH file. There is a record in the file that Sanchez was due to arrive back in Washington at 1810 hours, 23 November. fhe AMLASH project was probably about as widely inown within “the Clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature. Hovever, ve can identify only four people who kmow of the just- éescrited episode involving a hypodenric syringe and Black Leaf ho, — Sanchez knew all of, the story, Ealpern imew moat of it, and Guna inew ‘much of it. FitzGerald did rot mention this aspect of the Cubela _ operation when he first briefed us on it. YWhem we vent back to him later with specific questions, he said he rementered something about Black Leaf'50, but aothing whatever avout a device for administering it. Gunn said be had the impression that FitzGerald ® ‘eel ont Fee ee orsenred f Lie Lids bias. core ERRORS gor © mami oo meetin ed 9m + a ras venmnsearpraiimmcgpeeiacatite + 7 ty a Sts oe ‘ + ere eme mem oe
mre sam an ® . . a & i j. i + ee one On HO atari Ruane Ce oe ay e. — See Pte ow ws Sean knew about the operaticn “but aida"s want te knew." Tanchez says [4 that FitzGerald imew that he and Balpern vere seeing Gunn. Halpern Gem ieitad agrees, but adds that FitsGerald did not troy the specifics of the fabricating of an assassization fevice. ee te & . Feginning here, the narrative is again drawa fron records in a: the Project AMLASH files. eee % : i December 1963 ; | i FBIS reported that Cubele returned to Cuba from Prague. . | 19 February 1 . . ’ . 3 - he JMMAVE Station reported by cable that two separate, identical caches would be explaced in support of Project AMLASH during March. One would be put dova in Pinar del Rio on Operation. 9 Ps "ZORRO. The other would te taken by the AMTRUWs to the AMIRUNKX . infiltration area. Each cache vould contain, among other things, two FAL 1.62 automatic rifles, ° 6 March 196% Cable from the JMIAVE Station: "Unless headquarters has overriding . | be a ee er ra! et : ae 7 . 5 - . os 5 . ¥ a wet Tate ee te tee a ae or Soe wn Bases . of see saa ae pa ot Ch nat he: IP, Tipteerers SaaS beies Hevea oe miahetioradacionts rete ° - oo: { ° 5 . . car - - -o L nS EY 2a en ee OF 0 RIND: FOND TAP oderergnninttas aaa te + “ements te ca
4 ‘ its beach pe hein 9B Se tg i ee BOE eid eaeR : Piel te fl ae bene citce 0 gentonl sang Oa EER emir ta gE TOA N00 ge crit ine Lt gel tng failed “° Aes ae “* ~ + Memeo sams. | en ome ore <p ewer cama me i i t i reasoa unknown WAVE Zor including TALs in cacke te te carried by : AMIRUIKs, wish stress followicg point in WAVets cccision to elinizate FALs; FALs require 7 by 9 by 50 inch oblong cache container which is difficult to handle in the {ntermedlate ereft.* H * & * @ Tterch 1964 : ;¢ , Headquarters replied that: "Reason fer desiring include FALs is : that this is-the main ites requested by AMLASH-1 13 March 1 ~ ; The JMHAVE Station cabled: "Since cannot break down FALs to fit : e available cache container shorter than 50 inches, will omit FALs . from AMLASH cache." . . 1 BR Boos oto Aaa RO oct enh. © mae +o ‘ e PT SPEARS 668 - . 17 ~ 21 tarch 1964 . . re Te MASE cache was mut domo Gperoton AMIS YEE : oe en. i vue td tere ” : . - « . * (0 | Mectctemitangatet cman cy ' eA, * “4. wt an } = Headquarters cabled the Paris Station that Carlos Tepedino hed been briefed to meet Carlos Jorge ROBREHO Mariqner, "vho kas an t “os Amportant nessage froa Cubela." : a “FT " aid 3 tale tod alah nares ciasiaeeil ACOREERE PALO GS CRE B.9RNe IR fie ob ab Pepe WT es om ete Tee . + e - 2 ee shy ees 3 Bo. {* <: mo. am a . . Lye s "et: x oon NS stich og calla ae . ~ % - - fe _«@ . . rf ° “ 6 : . * . . = sis . . . . i cone 8 te . ° . . . eg eh Fe ke one we aw a ad o tote Se ween Nate Mee ogee" Sm gt, tne Rein’ “nd 2 . - Sey oe ss ve - reget” a ~ = ¥en, ea ee Sg anti es ACES ne a te LD coat. eg eso ope <a, * es bs ee aaa ln eae rca
+e oo coederrinf ~“, estbge Nei ete tAven s = roe wnre, 2s an, ED, wert: ea a Parad srpctarmhtrepictee, re ay D . ; frie Teg SRE Rae wy Bee ps Be HPS tae «om oo Sathana sage * & . a e eB Baty ot ae . * qf t . . & ‘em ad @, _ hcitemmar mame egpacmirmee ne RA AOS BARD WB $c TEI " seare = ene HSE Ree eT eA s ‘ + yw, ret & 4 _— ¥ «oe. . -.* _— . . pee + Peed = ESR ee Tet ay opel tien bof arenarga « ah acca PGhialliat Om w 5 5 Bop Te RB Se way we Ea eT and Phen tate fame BAe An cateele oeee : & fake -itee Saal P| eee “Rhee eae at eters te Berd, wade BO ate mene e ee OrUNG “ET OER Cone eet ee 3 May 1675 Tre Paris Station reported that the message Robreno hed from Cubela vas that Cubela vanted.a silencer for the Belgian FAL submachine gun soonest. May 1964 SAS requested TSD to produce FAL silencers on a crash basis. There are severnl later dociments in the file describing TSD's efforts to silence a FAL and to modify its sights for firing wer poor lighting conditions. TSD eventually came up vith 4 silencer and modified amsunition that fairly effectively silenced muzzle blast and eliminated sonic boom by reducing muzzle velocity. 9-11 June 196% . Operation ZORRO put down an AMIASH cache on the north coast of Pinar del Rio containing, emong other things, "tyo each Fat, automatic - wifles with five magazines per weapon.” Fo mention is mace of ellencers. Fron {SD's reports on developrent of a a silencer, oue was not yet ready at the time the cacke was prepared. ° 1 August 195% ; ‘ . : The JMWAVE Station reported receipt of an S/W message from - 97 - se ear oes Teton FE SEE os . TAbeserngm cas wt tet? | | ? 3 + wetted “oe on oe weed
14-00000 | i ¢ " i H AERTK-10 cated 16 July. It stated that the AMLASH cache put i. down in the AMERUTIC infiltration erea had been located and that : steps were being taken to recover its contents. ‘The pessage said that . it was hoped the cache contatred “tvo high-povered rifles with : Silencers,” because ‘AMTRICS ~15 sas not yeu certain trat he ‘could ‘ recover the cache put down ia Pirar del Rio by Operation ZORRO. | , 30 August 195% ‘ i Manuel Artime received information through Madrid that a group ; . _ Of dissident members of the Castro regine desired to establish | i C: direct contact, with Artime. On 7 October 1964, an Artime associate i, went to France for a meeting with an intermediary froa the dissident ° Group. The intermediary was named as Alberto BIANCO Rezartz. bce 12 Noveber 1964 Do [: . a Fars report: @, éelegation of the University Student Fedration ood. ; Pe oe cube arrived in ‘Prague on 11 Noverber to participate in the meting | 1 . of the Executive Coumcil of the International Stulent Unton to be H held from 14 to 17 Kovenber. The delegation is made upof... — Maj. Rolando Cubela, who will attend the event as a special guest of the rus." “er te Soper eee eS a une, : - en see we eR mb es are Pe35° Lae ne a raotnton = ty 2, Feyattinn se i ries dean aa ene we se etapa saghe Sacha roa nealy webct her sn Tee chee tae <tr reter the He neiegipeen > cae be rar 3 i . yess sent RN et Re te Hedin Se evesinnt Liebe eet as Peo he ee
14-00000 } ee weg tee meth eee : 13 Rovenber 1954 : . . ee gk ee a a's ' Contact report of a meeting {x Yashington with Artime: “Artize semanas } : agreed to talk to AMIASEZ~1 if 1+ tums out that be is the contact maa for the internal dissident group. Artice thinks that if AMLASH-1 43 ° the chief of the dissident group ve can all forget about the , ‘ operation." 25 Hovember 1964 The Paris Station reported Cubele‘s arrival in Paris. 6 - 7 Decenber 1954 Sanchez met Cubela in Paris. This ts a Summary of the details reported by Sanchez: Cubela, althozgzh uthappy because he was unable 2B eee enn bee MEAP ACR ADO VRE LASEe UEP ee. weree ria immeNIMamN (744 DEERE seme see MA Roe e “ Cc) . : fn - ( ° as ° i” = moo eae, Marte eye y he i a he ne = ee ES nierana 4. gt eet tie, aptamer: SPE On gig gia bem tegen Be Ea awe eon a nite 8b hams om m Gee somite » Restor Sanchez prepared a merorandim request for $6,500 as an | extraordinary budget expenditure for the travel of Artime for : { maintaining contact with the interzal dissident group's representatives in Europe during Novesber and December 1964. ‘here is no direct / ‘ SO indication in the file that the request vas approved, but indirect — Le aie 4 13 picank ‘s “evidence indicates that it was. Artine did travel to Europe and - ; maintained the contacts. . “ *
i 2 I wan wane aren Ate ® ' | | i ; y 3 ‘ . : to carry out his plans during the rast year, continued to feel. that his solution to the Cubaa probles wes the only cre feasible end that H he had to coatinue trying. Cutela was told *tat the U.S. Government i could not and vould not in eay way Lecome involved or provide . assistance in the task he kad plensed for himself. Cubela appeared : to understand our position acd safd that if te needed help be would a e a look elsevhere. i. . . 10 Decenber 1964 Menorandim prepared by Sanchez end left co of the “Paris Station, as background om the then current status of the ANLASH re oti ° . ee operation--excerpts: ®artime does not mov and ve do not plan to tell hin that ve are im direct contact vith Cubels, nor does Cubela mov and we ° ; do not desire he know that we ere in dizect contact with Artine. ro} “Cubela vas told exni fully understands that U.S. Goverment cannot become involved to any degree in the ‘first step‘ of his Ree OR URC Agttn se o EEO gh Thy Oh ow PREEY ha? " a" ' aa plan. If he needs support, whe realizes that he will have to Bee ce get it elsevbere. Fi: This is where Artime could Ait in ~* - ~ . Fel les * (Comment: Sanchez explained to us that what had happened : was that SAS contrived to pus Artime and Cubela together in such I. ° a way that neither knew that the coutact had been engineered i . - by CTA. The thought was that Artime needed a ran faside and a. “ . | Cubela wanted a silenced weapoa, which CTA was unviliing to furat ; ~- ~ eon o . REEEA ATS Le ee eis peas, AE ° . Tateige® foscseestier eee ata ony , elmer”. . . ne hee gee es ee LL Ae, ieee ae Se, oe Jet oa TR eae aAy8.0 dade sy = “3 . toe ate Ne a ute aw Fe “as cai Toa? woh atom me e | ] boa i} we! 6 mae ry i . ‘ : nee cand tome + CARPOPRG HE © Se abs ae Lie ia, a sew cmbmepe o anetiae de yo ; . 0 eegane cE ame sotes 608 Of 2A? $20
14-00000 Steer Ape emer lneeay Renie ae oy manne nee rt thu tp deupemnense Pins tame are’. ~~. Tar, i e ; . ® e i ° 4 ai Fe - - aa an _ nee, nn He .. 5 ee} e # a? at i . to nim cfrectiy. By putting the tvo toze sher, Artine might get i his ran inside end Cubela might get his silenced veapon--fros ; 2. apame Artime. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination veapon I ii ie for Artine to give to Cubela, and did not do-so.) 17 Decenter 1964 i . . Headquarters cable to Paris: ween] —_jeontacts Cutela to i i debrief him, . . « please confirm statement by Cubela to Sanches that t Gnly money and a few como itens vere retrieved by the fishermen. Cubela and AMTRUNK-10 unhappy that fishermen had not recovered nore o mp, from the cache, but it was not possible for Cubela and AMTRUNK~10 ag eso "Seay 8° ‘ 8 EE TRAIN 5 Oy Sot to g0 to the site of the cache personally. (Cudela had told Sanches . "that AMTRUNK-10 bad used seme "fishermen" to recover the cache and that not all of it was recovered. This was the cache put down in the AMTRUNK infiltration area, which did not include the FAL rifles.) rr ae ee Corl a . 8 1) pieniae ngtttn i SemB map ; . 27 December 196% .o? . - ; Artine and Cubela met for the first time--in Madrid. . : : ;. 30 Decester 195% ° i § .Artine and Cubela met for a-second time in Madrid on 30 Deceater. . ; ! : e . re, aie H Pe Artine reported the resuli: s im a meeting with Nestor Sanchez in i & . . ? i —, Florida on 3 January 1965. Cubela told Artine that he had requested rin i + EC - 101 -~ ° ' g ~ } a ° - * 3 ° ied ce . an : om 7 4 wa ie St than 6 edred ined: tat SE meee g tei , Thene | Fe Peter tntitosee os el ieee se eaten Ha tncraneinaces
14-00000 8 “a | ~ San ome . ate = + Fe P OF PRM NES: © engines Ot ot oe em a a - @ Silencer for a FAL rifle rra3 the énericaas, witch they ned sot teen ’ “+ 9° 9 Reeneupeneraantcane/tt jh trainee tein aiantoann bie BY , ae . ° "7 ' A { ? H R ’ ¢ P t rn ‘ t i i e enaee ote ee, Ee TON te ate Teper Wie 5 AB wine fae ee rari ae To wn A lh he eo Ra, gon eh, Sam a sa wisibees ee oe Be ° A ‘nthe we ; foo al -, Ch ie Sue aang he wb Sore SETS Be eS 2 TRE ae Fe egies FE sags es “fhe eae re. pad Aa 36S eet ter tet Merde etn tino adits Anas o ntenar te Sut d etchant a atecintat he EN we tec temae 6.9 San oe ale to provide. Artime agreed to furnish sitter a Sllencer for a ¥YaL or a cozparable rifle with Silencer. If Artime obtained a ~~  ° ‘* sae we audi. 8 ’ Silencer for a FAL, Cubela vould personaliy carry it tack to Cuta with him. If Artize had to settle for some other type of silexced . rifle, he vould cacke it in Cuta for Cubela. ‘ 5 28 January 1965 Sanchez arrived in Paris for meetings with Cubels. - 6. ge mee, @ $ tea Oe 2 February 1965 teas eR . ry { ‘ ’ ° Sanchez cAbled from Paris: "Cubela and Tepedine returned Paris ‘ * 31 Jamary. Met 1 February. Cubela states fall agreement reached with Artime and he well satisfled vith arzangements which he outlined — for our informetion (elong same lines as reported by Artime). . _  _Axvtine providing package in Madrid which Cubela plans carry back fa ee Sanchez cabled. “lece'wnt “AS of Hovember 196% vhen Cubele departed ‘Cuba neither he nor AMTRUNK-10 had received any part of the Matanzes noe ‘ é. FUR REG fates SURYA. ontuCt tet on. Rees ie we « ° a te . was . Cathe. AMTONT-10 ‘told hia fishersen recovered money and perts of ° . communications gear but that money vas no good. since it was ine series out of circulation.” . 3 ws pre gt Beae too “wo 2 oe LTT ge Deel at sored Beh oie Sede sate Fh mesg eas “a 2 . Ae he eae rr . . a + GER. eee ogee ge ay te
14-00000 ae 1, ee a oor PBs. ee ew . ‘ : 3 “ . items ied nce tgs [ ; co [AFSL Her OER | } é ROT ee Tern Madrid Station catled: "From Cutela on 10 February; Ca 10 or LL Februery Cubela iz to receive one pistol vith silencer and one Belgian FAL rifle with Silencer froa Artime's cecretary. 33th weapoas core fron U.S. and now in Madrid." (Sais is in con®lict with the . earlier report that Artine would cache a rifle and slleacer if that * were all ke could find. We are unable to resolve the conZlict.) + etm s amen rat ammpene © i. 12 February 1953 + Gar ee Gove Tse Paraza cit cy Station cabled: “Artime reported on final meeting Nag de with Cubela: Artime had three pacvages of spectal itess made up by ° his technical people and delivered to Cubela in Madrid. Cubela . seemed satisfied.” & Marched 1955 : a Carlos Tepedino reported receiving a telephone call fren a *+ friend in Havana who had seen Cubela tack in Eavana the previous ‘aay. CE nectar. a 5 e .t t t : fee, 15 March 1965 . The Madrid Station cabled that one Rafael GARCIA-BUZO Dirube had arrived in Madrid froa Cuba on 15 March and bed beea introduced to @ station cficer. Carcia-Bango claimed to te in contact vith a € . a. =~ a Soehloe oT "S203 - So ro) Seer <F.. oN on, SIR SaREEIYRARReRARS Lith men DER meso bneRtEe beer en te sav 10? oa GtRe MAG 0°90 yyy ° ° ° - 5 = ge oa, ante d - oe : wee cewek Ba 1 ete cree 1 a ee dannii genie, <men ter Etre ottedr aonadete is cease eS weary Ramee, en ee . we ete, eet - a: or teeta tgtes be 0 aE adhere giemans aie o  O AO t OF et OAR An RBS eo Battal ogy Hf age ah Ne ONC HG re babe dee tom an le be Meal ctny gon 5 Cessna Gant tone nei oe aiel ean an ate in AS er EE te
14-00000 @ 3 ¥. PR W teenie won. ore 4 etee PO ee on ee aan ” om ee oy ae = Be. : f \ a é e ge 4 @roup of Cuban silitery leaders was vere plonting to elinisate Caszro tat ee BD oo. and taze over the governzent. It guickly becene clear thet he wee 5 referrirg to Cubela. Gercia-Bango said that ke bed always been Fublicly identified as a close friend of Cubela, vhom he last say B in Eavana on 9 March. Garcia~Bango said that he had been the lavyer ; for the Capri EKotel in Favana. He was sailed: for 7§ days in July 5 1962 for defending Santos Trafficante, a U.S. citizen and ex-manager . of the Capri gambling casino vo was kicked out of Cuba. oe (Coment: This is another ranc-link between Cubela and a, the gembling syndicate plots reported upen earlier in this ; wo report. Trefficante vas one of the principals in Shef Edvards' i rs “tg? Phase One of the operation. He presumably vas not involved is Phase Ivo under Earvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, . wane Trafficante was the man vho brought Varona into the operation late no etm acpmna aemamnme co in Phase Qoe, and Varuna was one of the min players during Fhase two. The three-man team that was sent aroma was reported, Aiea ARTES BanaR energies m0 be BP te 0. Syne ERLE Ang EGE ot”, neta <4 BO wee. * re este ® ° _ ' oa 21 June 1962 to be in place in Cuba.) . a _ er June 1965 Headquarters decided to tersirate all contacts with key nenbers of the Cubela group. It had became increasingly apparent thet the - - 7. ot on eps T SS ULSTER NO Ate OPIS RAAT f . Y etee eofe : eo . -, { ® ee C- a | ! circle of Cubans who knew of Cubela‘s plans and of CIA's association : : aut; zt | eae gt em he tem te Spite Aneta oa RAEB I re tie tae Ap IEA, Viay ne $ . “ 18 tgeel es eerare fp aie any tees gos - oo er net roe - . ar te tea aed , oe PEN Sg ste Aree nl atu» * ork os thea: 2 epiite ea a woe eae ge oe Me Oe RP gays eer SRL ere eee etl cae ee a ae ee et