[eee “a AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORDS SERIES ': AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE “S66 CLASSIFICATION a RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Date : 02/04/9¢ Page 1 _JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION Vo ICS 202-10001-10058 J-3. Doc 59 DOCUMENT INFORMATION | ARMY y APPRAISAL... 01/24/64 8 i, CUBA CONTINGENCY PLANNING MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET : eae PosTPOWeb NV PART : 01/0K7/ 96 Requires review from CIA, Ga» SD: NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION —— Wy IRES CONCURRENCE OF DATE:
> THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUBJECT: Appraisal of US Sabotage Program Agsinst Cuba In Jane 1963, higher authority approved a CIA covert program against Cuba which consisted of six interrelated courses of action: I. Collection of intelligence to meet US national security requirements and support covert Operations. : 2, Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk sabotage and other forma of ective and passive resistance. , 3. Econamle denial sctions to euppart US economic Cuban armed forces and other power centere of the regime. §. General sabotage and harassment. 6. Suppest of autenemous anti-Castre Cuban cxile groups we supplement and assist the US covert capability. i . The ultimate objective of the program is “to encourage dissident ss @demments and other power centers of the regime to bring about the 1 eventual liquidation of the Castre/Communist entourage and the elimi - nation ef the Soviet presence from Cuba." (Tab A} CIA set apprexi- mately 1& months from June 1963 aa the time frame within which these ' objectives could be substantially realised. This tentative schedule was based on the “sirnultancous, coordinated exccution of the individual courses of action. While this analysis is concerned with courses of action 5 and 6, the interlocking nature of the covert program must be kept in mind in appraising the sabotage program. STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW C) Retain class’ Change to. Declassify.in: ane excise as shown . TE cts flew | Ten CLs potasee an Vi MO) (9 With concurrence of (not}obtaings) , Docld: 3274274759 Page 2?
The intensity of the sabotage program has sever reached the level planned by CIA. Of 18 raids presented for approval, 10 were disapproved. Of the & raids approved, 3 were aborted due to opera- tional problems and five were executed. Those five raids were succeseful in the sense that (a) there was substantial damage to the target; (b) all participants wore safely recovered; and (c) cach was plausibly deniable, (Sec Tab B for a brief description of raids.) Any assesament of the effectiveness of the program must be made agsinet a background of the operational succeas of the raids, the discrepancy between the planned and actual levels of intensity and the limited duration of the program. { In addition te the CIA controlled sabotage, there are two autonomous groupes one is receiving substantial financial and logie- tical support fram the US Government; the other is receiving only relatively miner financial support. Both are entirely composed of Cubans, and with the exception of one or two individuals at the top of each of these groupe, no member of them realises that they are receiving US support. It is poseible that one of these graups may have conducted at least one raid, We do act expect any significant sabotage activity from these groups for at least ancther month aad probably lenger. The purposes of these programe is to incresee | Appraisal of CIA Sabotage Program | Spontancous luternal Sabotage 5 ; We have not been able to determine any relationship between the CIA raids and incidente of armed clashes in Cuba. (Tab C) On the other hand, while only 18 spontaneous acts of sabotage were reported throughout Cuba fram June through September 1963, there were 18 reports of. euch acte in October, 25 in November, and 13 Po in December. (Tab D) Although incidents of spontaneous internal sabotage tend te br seasonal (they occur more frequently during the winter months when there ie sugar cane to burn}, it ie reasonable to conchude that the increase during the latter part af 1963 ie in some measure attributable to the CIA raids in August, September, Octeber and December. Docld: 3274274759 Page 3
So wo wr SED 4 Ua uiGem WIN Y Turbalence Within Guba. | The sabotage program has had substantial impact on Cubac military and security forces. Ax a result of these raids, certain areas and posts were placed oa special alert statua; orders were fesued. to increase vigilance; and strict accurity measures were inetitated at industrial and military installations throughout the country. Air and ees searches were begun navy aad helicester patrole were expanded; and additional army patrols were ordered. Air, aaval and ground force elements have been put on special alert either on a local or island-wide basis on at least $6 occasions |" during 1963 as « result of remored or sctuel maritime operations. Almost continuous anti-insurgency operations, involving up to 2806 men, have been conducted. - . Castro expanded his const-watching network fram 46 . observation posts at the end of June to 163 at the and of October. At least 10 surfece search radar stations have been eatablished since June and there ia tentative evidence of T more. In August a formed in an attempt to cope with off-chore raiding parties. Is | September, new training courses were initiated for cammand | cadres of “popular defense units," designed to organise the peaple to defend themaclves against enemy attack and to protect industrial centers end installations fram sabatage. . ¥rom the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that exter- nally mounted raids significantly contribute to turbulence within Cuban military and security forces, with concomitant diversion of badly aseded funds, regources and manpower. ne cee mee nee emer tee There are fier indications that | Soe SEA. cabotage program has - Lope L ae Sane ARE SESS ESE EE Te srrinssims f Dookd: g7474 7H “page i aes eres * a a a ae ee . 1 : _ a a
| . _] A former Majer fa the Guban rebel army reported after his oxflltration fram Caba ia Jazaary 1964 that the | 23 December CIA Siguance raid (wees ewe was & great boost te morals among disaffected Cubsns. Castro's fear of rising diesidence and insurgency is reflected in his inuitistion of a variety of repressive measures.. These include the forceful relocatian of inhabitants from dissident areas and more I stringent coatroia on freedom of movement within Cuba, Theee / mreagures are bound te have adverse political, peychological and economic repercussions inside Cuba. — Although the psychological impact of the CIA program on Cuba 7 Coins be mee ee en Precision, the following objentives spent So . te An atmosphere of uncertainty and aneasiness within _ Guba has been created with reapact to the regime‘s ability to control — dissident elements in the population. | nooet. b Opposition elements have been given a peychological Ce: ‘The raids revealed to the entire Guban poptince the imitations of Guban defenses. The reports of successful raids against Cuba have apparently reduced the sense of frustration within the exile community -- a frustration which formerly manifested itcelf in vitriolic attacks by exile leaders against the US Government and its leadership. Although the CIA raide are not directly attributable to the US Government, raoet astute exilee have concluded that the raida are CIA sponeored. Docld: 32424759 Page 5
Effects on Qur Allies. We are confident that the British are aware of some US support of, or at least acquiescence in, the sabotage program. Similarly, other sophisticated allies also probably have atrong suspicions about US suppert of acquieacence, Itis reasonable to believe that Gentral Amertcan countries, particularly Nicaragua and Coste Rica, have similar suspicions, The extent to which our allies. believe we may be supporting or condoning such raids, is a significant indication of our intent to topple the Gastro regime, | et Within the United States. _ Although US sponsorship of the sabotage program has been credibly deniable, it seams clear that discerning elements in the US such as experienced Washingtom reporters and congressmen, realize that the US fa either sponsoring or permitting sabotage raids against Cuba. This realization provides credible eviddnce that existing programe are consistent with our publicly ennounced pelicy to replace the Gastro regime with one acceptable to the US, Soviet Reactions Deapite the lkelihood that Castro has provided the Sovieta i with evidence of US sponsorship of sabotage operations against Cuba, Soviet reaction has been restrained. Aside from the usual props - ganda, we have knowledge of only one sharp Soviet reaction to external raide. In September, following a serice of air raids by Cuban exile groups for which the US Government had no responsi- bility, the Soviet Union expressed ita concern to the US Government. Pros ects for the Future Continuation of the Program. The six point covert program is closely related to other on- going efforte which recelye some impetus from it. These include programs for overt economic and diplomatic isolation, ae well as surveillance and other anti-subversion measures. Docld: 324274759 Page 6
oy Oa a are Particularly if the raids are increased in number and scape, continuation of the CLA program ahould result in a correspondiag increase in any favorable results mentioned earHer, Continuation of the program should contribute to some degree to creating con- ditions favorable to a coup or a spontaneous revolt, In additioa, coatinued raids could provoke Castro inte teking the kind of action that would justify and, under certain circumstances, perhaps even require overt US military ection to topple his regime. The sabotage program is net without ite riske. To whatever extent the current United States/Soviet dialogue is relaxing tensions, continuation of the program, particularly if a fature operation is f compromised, could provide a basia for disruption of the dislegue. Also, while one of the objectives af the program is to reduce the a level of Soviet forces in Cuba, it is possible that contiauation of the vaide (or any increase in the scope or intensity of raids} could result dn a stoppage of the Soviet force reduction or even an increase in Soviet personnel in Cuba, Although some have suggested that there is a relationship between covert US pressure against Cuba and the ‘export of Cuban-eupported insurgency in Latin America, we do not believe continuation of the program would affect Castro's subversive activity in Latin America. Finally, and particularly if there.1sn0_ increase in the seope or number of raids, continuation of the program, | may not achieve the original objectives sought. Termination of the Program. There are two major factors te be considered in terminating the program. One is the effect it would have on cour progrems, our allies and the Communist Blec, The other ie the existence of accept. able alternatives which would accomplich our ultimate objectives. The sabotage program is sufficiently interrelated with our other overt and covert programs directed ageinst Cuba so thet the effect would be to reduce the impact of those programs. With respect | te our allies, and particularly theese Latin Americans who are encouraged by the belief that we are condoning or supporting raids against Cube, termination could discredit our recognised intent to remove the Castro regime. This would be particularly trus in view af developments which have occurred during the last few weeks to 6 Docld: 324274759 Page fF
CNA aa hn ho aan the de ilnetpanatadat amcaebmainne . BEE : a ud 39 ares a & Be f i roe: emerassnrstieasoraysgen . ‘ a LY F asm neraetyctyepe en strengthen the Castro position in Cube, the hemisphere and the world. Theae developments include (a) the expected continuation of high sugar prices (which enabled Cuba to expand ite convertible currency reserves in 1963), (b) the Soviet/Cuban trade protocols of 1964, (c) the British bus deal, which points to a break in Cuba's economic isolation, (d) the recent rioting in Panama in which Castro had some hand, and (e) the Zanaibar coup with its attendant publicity for Castro whatever his actual iavolvemeant. If in the aftermath of theee incidents the sabotage program is ended, Castro will emerge with a majer propaganda victory and a greatly strengthened political base. In addition, it should be recog~ nized that such a decision would reduce the policy alternatives available to the US, At the present time we have beon pursuing @ policy track designed to maintain maximum acceptable pressure against Castre, thus playing for the breaks while developing a broad menu ef contin. gency plans which would enable us to capitalise on any fortuitous situation. Discentinuation of the core of the CIA covert pregram will tend to reduce further our current flexibility to ene ef two broad pelicy cheices, Essentially these alternatives are to pursuc at some point in time a rapprochement with Castro or to rely on military force to accomplish our objective. Other possibilities, such as the recognition of the government in exile, seem remote at this time and would require some sort of sanction for or eupnort of sabotage activity against Cuba if they were to be credible. We do not have sufficient experience on which te judge the value of the autonomous programs. However, if they are terminated, a signi- ficant anti-US reaction can be expected from the exile leadera. In the event that it is decided to terminate only the ClA-controlled sabotage operations, it should not be assumed that the autoenamous groups, des- pite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance te Castro and inspiring dissident elements within Cuba to take the personal risks necessary to eet a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct succeseful sabotage and harass - ment operations on @ austained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CLA. controlled operations, either in quantity or quality. Docld: 324274759 Page 6&
Coaclusions 1. The sabotage program to date has been operationally _ successful and has had salutary effects within and without Cuba, 2. If continued at its current pace and in the light of recent 7 evente, the sabotage program in conjunction with our other programs, | will accomplish litte more than delaying consolidation of the Castro/ Gommuniet regime. 3. If the program is continued and the raids are permitted te intensify in number and scope, there is a reasonable chance of accemplishing our original objectives. At the aame time the riske te the US will be increased. 4. Termination of this program will result in deterioration the consolidation ef the Castro regime at a more rapid pace than would otherwise be poseihie. Termination alec might be interpreted as a US policy decision te coexist with Castro, provided he dees not boldly conduct subversive activities in Latin America. wae | &. There is insufficient experience on which to judge the autonomous program. However, {t is unlikely that it will provide a substitute for the raids performed under the CIA program either | in quantity or quality. | | Joseph A. Califanc, Ir. Assistant to the Deputy | Secretary of Defense {Cuban Affaire) Docld: 324274759 Page 93