(G) INCENDIARISM - RACIAL AND SECURITY INFORMANT COVER- AGE -- On March 29 and 30, 1968, fires believed to have been deliberately set were discovered in four major department stores in the Chicago loop district and in three large department stores in New York City. Two of these fires were started by Molotov cocktails and a Molotov cocktail which failed to ignite was found in a fourth New York department store. Although the Bureau has no jurisdiction in these matiers based upon the information developed to date, there is a possibility of the involvement on the part of extremist elements in either the racial or nationality field. In addition, past experience has shown that acts of this nature which receive wide publicity often serve as a catalyst in other areas for extremist groups and fanatic individuals. Accordingly, this points out the absolute necessity for having maximum informant penetration of these extremist groups (racial and nationality) as well as full coverage of the ghetios (white and black) by racial informants in order to obtain advance intelligence. It is also to be noted that in the recent past there has been a large number of acts of incendiarism against American~owned businesses in Puerto Rico in which Puerto Rican nationalists have been suspected. In the event such arson activity as described above occurs in your respective divisions, you should give specific assignments to informants to determine if any extremist groups or individuais are behind these events. In addition, you should maintain close liaison with the local police departments in order to be kept promptly advised of information which may be of interest to the Bureau. 4/9/68 SAC LETTER 68-22 -~Q-
(H) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - BRIEF TO ESTABLISH ILLEGAL STATUS -- The Internal Security Division of the Department advised by letter dated March 27, 1968, that it no longer desires to continue . receiving reports in captioned matter. Accordingly, each office is to . discontinue the submission of reports in captioned matter. It will, how- - ever, be necessary to insure that pertinent information concerning the illegal status of the Communist Party, USA, is included in the appro- priate sections of the quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Manual changes follow. Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover _ Director 4/9/68 SAC LETTER 68-22 - 10- NW 35069 Docld: 329089528 Page 8590 .
PERSONAL ATTENTION SAC LETTER 68-29 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 ‘April 30, 1968 ” In ‘Reply, Please Refer to File No. ° é (A) BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS - DEPART- MENT OF JUSTICE -- The functions of the Bureau of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury, and Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, (except the regulation of the counterfeiting of those drugs which are not controlled "depressant or stimulant” drugs) have been transferred to the Attorney General. The Attorney General has created in the Department of Justice a Bureauof Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs which will perform the aforementioned functions transferred to the Attorney General. All complaints previously referred to the Bureau of Narcotics or the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control concerning matters previously within their jurisdiction should now be referred to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Department of Justice. (Security Letters on attached pages) NW 55069 Docld: 32989528 Page @91 a a a
(B) WHITE MILITANT GROUPS ~ RACIAL MATTERS. | (ORGANIZATION) -- In view of increasing militancy in the racial field, neighborhood groups whose members are of the white race, have been springing up throughout the United States. Some of these groups appear to be militant in nature and some urge the white man to arm himself as a means of protection against racial violence. Some of these groups are known to sponsor demonstrations against integration and against the bussing of Negro students to white schools. Others appear to advocate more violent methods of opposition to integration. The appearance of these groups is noted mostly in the white ghetto areas of the large cities which border on minority group living areas. . In order to fulfill our responsibilities in the racial intelligence field we must be cognizant of the groups and their aims and purposes. Upon receipt of information as to the formation or existence of such a group, a preliminary investigation should be immediately initiated to determine the aims and purposes of the organ- ization, its leaders, approximate membership, as well as any pertinent background data which will assist in determining the militancy of the group. From information presently available, it appears that many of these organizations have been founded on principles of fear rather than hate and as such, they cannot be classified as hate groups. Your investigations should, therefore, be discreet and most circumspect. You should limit your inquiries to a review of Bureau files, contacts with Bureau informants, and established sources, and the use of public source information. Upon completion of your investigations, a communication in form suitable for dissemination should be forwarded to the Bureau together with a recommendation as to whether additional investigation _ is warranted under Section 122A of the Manual of Instructions as it pertains to the investigation of Klan and white hate groups. In addition to the above, I wish to point out to you the possibility of reactions by the Klan, white hate groups, and residents of white ghetto areas to the recent wave of racial disorders resulting from the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. You should remain alert to this possibility. Informant coverage of the Klan, white hate groups, and white ghetto areas must be intensified so that plans of retaliation or overt action are known to the Bureau prior to their taking _ place. 4-30-68 SAC LETTER 68-25 - 2- _ HW 55065 Docld: 32989528 Page 852
(C) RACIAL INFORMANTS - RACIAL MATTERS -- In order to further streamline the racial informant program, effective immediately it will no longer be necessary to advise the Bureau the identity of an individual being operated as a probationary racial informant (ghetto) nor will it be necessary to obtain prior Bureau authority to operate this individual except in the instances set out below. oc a, In the event an individual is connected with an educational _ institution, a legitimate civil rights organization, employed ina sensitive position or in the news media field, or is a member of the military, prior Bureau authority must be obtained before contacting this individual to develop him as aninformant. If an individual is to be operated in an extremist organization such as a militant black nationalist group, Klan group, or white hate group, Bureau approval must be obtained to designate him as an informant. The criteria for developing as well as the required investigation for probationary racial informant (ghetto) set out in Section 130, Volume IV, Manual of Instructions, remains in effect, except that now the personal authority of the Special Agent in Charge is required to operate an individual as a ghetto informant. An individual may be operated as a probationary racial informant (ghetto) as long as he continues to furnish information of a racial nature. Contact must be made with this individual on the same basis as other racial informants as set out in Section 130 referred to above. In the event a probationary racial informant (ghetto) is able to infiltrate a militant black organization or a white hate or Klan group, the Bureau must be advised and Bureau authority obtained to'delete the "ghetto" from his designation. At such time as it is recommended he be operated in an extremist organization, the full investigation required for probationary racial informants should be conducted. If a ghetto racial informant is furnishing information on a regular basis and it is desired to pay him ona regular basis, specific Bureau authorization must be obtained. The request to pay 4-30-68 SAC LETTER 68-25 - 3- NE SS069 Docld:i 32989525 Page 893
this individual on a regular basis should be submitted in accordance with the instructions set out in Section 130G, 2, Volume IV, Manual of Instructions. L There is no objection to paying a ghetto informant under SAC authority up to $400 as set out in SAC Letter 68-16 dated March 12, 1968, captioned ‘Racial Informants, Racial Matters.'' However, you must insure that full value is received for any payments made and that these payments are made onac.o.d. basis. After a ghetto informant has been operated for a sufficient period of time to evaluate his reliability and stability and it is desired to remove him from probation, a recommendation should be made to the Bureau in accordance with the instructions set out in Section 130 concerning the removal of racial informants from probation. As I previously advised, you are expected to develop ghetto informants at a regular rate. Your progress in this matter will be followed through the annual field Inspections as well as through f analysis of your submission of the FD-372 captioned "Racial Informant Monthly Progress Letter.'' Effective immediately, you should include Bb in your monthly letter the specific number of ghetto informants you ' have at the beginning of the month, the number added during the month, the number deleted during the month, and the number of ghetto - informants you are operating at the end of the month. An appropriate change will be made of the FD-372 and you will be furnished copies in the near future. With the submission of your FD-372 for the month of May, advise the identities of those gehetto informants in your division which were previously approved by the Bureau and will now be operated in accordance with the above instructions. Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover Director 4-30-68 SAC LETTER 68-25 ~4. MW 55069 Doold: 32989528 Page 894
_ SAC LETTER 68-26 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION In Reply, Please Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 File No. | May 1, 1968 q (A) STUDENT NONVIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC) - RACIAL MATTERS - SNCC -- The militant black nationalist Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) sponsored a conference of Negro college students at Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Mississippi, on April 138-14, 1968. An informant has reported that violent, Mau Mau-type tactics were discussed at this conference. At this conference it was mentioned that Negro college graduates should be encouraged to infiltrate all police schools in order to work within all law enforcement agencies. Also discussed was the possibility of mapping the homes of chiefs of police and mayors so Mau Mau-type tactics could be used to eliminate these officials. You should be constantly alert to the possibility of infiltration of this Bureau in connection with applicant recruiting. You should also alert law enforcement officials within your territory to the above matters during your routine contacts with them. Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover Director HW 35069 Doold: 32969528 Page 895
PERSONAL ATTENTION SAC LETTER 68-30 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION In Reply, Please Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 Pie No May 21, 1968 i | : (A) DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY ON FEBRUARY 23, 1968, BEFORE | THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS - FISCAL YEAR 1969 -- Copies of my testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on February 23, 1968, regarding the 1969 appropriation request of the FBI, which has just been released by the Appropriations Committee, will be sent to your office in the near future. These copies are to be made available to the personnel of your office who desire to review a copy. There will be about one copy for every two employees in the supply furnished. 5/21/68 . oe SAC LETTER 68-30 | : ai (B) FIREARMS - SERVICE AMMUNITION -- Special Agents will not carry in issued or authorized personally owned revolvers cartridges ;with hollow point projectiles or any projectiles that could be construed as "dum-dum" bullets. (Security Letters on attached pages) WW 55069 Doold: 32989528 Page 896
(C) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES - SEMIANNUAL LETTER -- Section 107, Page 22, of the Manual of Instructions pertaining to captioned matter calls for listing all sub- _ versive organizations, together with their approximate membership and extent of Bureau coverage of each. Review of a number of recently submitted semiannual letters reveals that not all offices are complying with this instruction with regard to a detailed listing of organizations in the New Left area. In order to properly evaluate your overall security informant coverage, captioned letters should hereafter include snecific and detailed comment on all New Left groups, in addition to those presently being reported. 5/21/68 SAC LETTER 68-30 | | (D) CHINESE NAMES -- A trend has been noted in recént months in a number of field offices involving the improper reporting of Chinese names, both in the title and body of communications. The proper reporting of Chinese names is essential not only for purposes of. thorough investigation but also to insure accurate and correct indexing. The Manual of Instructions, Section 105F, pages 4i, 4n and 40, clearly sets forth the correct manner of reporting Chinese names, including the necessity for obtaining Chinese Telegraphic Code (CTC) numbers or Chinese characters whenever possible. You should insure that all Agent and clerical personnel who have occasion to handle Chinese investigations or to process mail in these cases are thoroughly familiar with the above-cited manual provisions. In cases where the CTC numbers for a Chinese subject's name have not been secured, the office of origin should make reference to this fact when preparing communications setting out leads for auxiliary offices so that latter offices can be alert to obtain the CTC numbers or characters in handling their respective leads. In addition, the office of origin should keep the Bureau advised of specific efforts being made to obtain the CTC numbers or Chinese characters of a subject's name. 5/21/68 SAC LETTER 68-30 - 2- MW 35069 Doold: 32809525 Page 697
(k) INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW LEFT - STUDENT AGITATION ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES -- In recent weeks, violent student demonstrations have erupted on college campuses throughout the Nation. Student activists responsible for initiating these demonstrations are, for the most part, affiliated with the Students for a Democratic Society and other new left groups currently under investigation or campus-based black-nationalist groups. The pattern of radical dissent on the campus has changed abruptly from the sit-ins and nonviolent demonstrations of the past to the recent attempts by student activists to physically seize control of colleges and universities through violent means. The most recent outbreak of violence on college campuses represents a direct challenge to law and order and a substantial threat to the stability of society in general. The Bureau has an urgent and pressing responsibility to keep the intelligence community informed of plans of new left groups and student activists to engage in acts of law- lessness on the campus. We can only fulfill this responsibility through the development of high quality informants who are in a position to report on the plans of student activists to engage in disruptive activities on the campus. : In view of the increased agitational activity taking place on — college campuses, each office is instructed to immediately expand both its coverage and investigation of campus-based new left groups and black nationalist organizations with the objective of determining in advance the plans of these elements to engage in violence or disruptive ‘activities on the campus. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that all offices are expected to develop and maintain adequate sources to enable the Bureau to determine in advance and prompily report agitational activities being planned by campus-based groups. In carrying out these instructions, you should, of course, be guided by existing regulations which require that Bureau authorization be obtained prior to the develop- ment of informants and sources on college campuses. Information developed relating to disruptive activities planned or initiated by campus-based new left or black nationalist groups should be immediately furnished to the Bureau by teletype, followed by a leiter- head memorandum under a caption descriptive of the activity. The character to be utilized will be governed by the nature of the activity. It is not desired that routine antiwar demonstrations which occur on the 5/21/68 SAC LETTER 68-30 2 3- MW 55069 Doold:32809525 Page 895
campus be reported under this caption however; and offices should continue to comply with instructions contained in SAC Letter 68-20 (C) in reporting these demonstrations. if This matter should be afforded continuous aggressive in- vestigative attention to insure that the Bureau's responsibilities in this field are properly discharged. Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover Director 5/21/68 SAC LETTER 68-30 ~4- NW 35069 Docld: 329089528 Page 8599
SAC LETTER 68-32 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ; In Reply, Please Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 File No. June 4, 1968 (A) SPEAKER IDENTIFICATION -- As you have been previously advised, the Laboratory has the equipment and competent personnel to analyze and compare known and questioned recordings of an individual's voice for the purpose of speaker identification. The use of visual voice patterns provides information which may not be perceptible to the ear and there- fore, is a valuable supplement to the ear in any analysis or comparison of voicesand other complex sounds. Therefore, this type of examination will continue to be offered to provide investigative guidance in selected Bureau investigations. Although there has been considerable research effort in recent years, current techniques of comparing voices for speaker identi- fication are still considered experimental and not sufficiently authenti- cated to serve as a unique means of identification with subsequent court testimony to that effect. The use of sound spectrograms or voiceprints for speaker identification continues to receive wide publicity. The comparison in the press of voiceprints to fingerprints as a means of identification has created some confusion and misunderstanding. Voice- prints are not analogous to fingerprints. While fingerprints do not change in pattern, the voice and the resulting voiceprint pattern may be affected by emotions or distorted by the communications channel through which the sound travels. For the above reasons and because of some technical variations and limitations associated with tape recordings, the comparison of voices for speaker identification and the examination of tape recordings are not services which are currently being offered to local law enforcement agencies. The procedures set forth in the Manual of Instructions, Section 8Q, should be followed in obiaining and transmitting voice recordings for comparison. HW 35069 Docld: 32999528 Page 900
WW 55069 Doold: 329689526 (B) TELETYPES - MAILING OF TO BUREAU -- Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, Item G4b, Pages 36 and 37, requires that when communication is being sent to one or more field offices by teletype and Bureau also is to be notified but circumstances do not warrant sending to Bureau by teletype, original typed blue copy of teletype is to be mailed to Bureau and submitting office should prepare additional blue copy for its file. Teletype should be addressed to Director and SACs of other receiving offices and word "Mail" typed in parentheses after Director and Bureau file number. SAC's approval signature must be on original being sent to Bureau. A number of instances have occurred recently wherein this regulation is not being followed and Bureau has been receiving unsigned copies of teletypes by mail. To facilitate handling at Seat of Government, these instructions should be reiterated to appropriate personnel and you should insure they are strictly adhered to in future. 6/4/68 SAC LETTER 68-32 72> Page SO1
(Cc) FEDERAL WAGERING TAX STAMPS - INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RECORDS - INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES -- On January 29, 1968, the United States Supreme Court handed down decisions in two Internal Revenue Service cases, namely, Grosso v. United States and Marchetti v. United States, in which it was ruled that information furnished by an individual to comply with the Federal wagering tax laws cannot later be used against him if he desires to declare the privilege against self-incrimination. i j 4 As a result of the foregoing decisions, the Department of Justice has recommended the following two guidelines be adopted in investigating gambling offenses: (1) refrain from examining or obtaining by any means information in the files of the Internal Revenue Service concerning persons who hold wagering occupational tax stamps and who file or have filed wagering tax returns; (2) desist from including references to a person's wagering tax forms in all affidavits filed in support of search warrants. | “aicaneimeiaiaie” 2 tile Be oe The Department of Justice points out that they are con- tinuing to research the feasibility of further pursuit of prosecution in those cases in which verification of a subject's compliance with the Federal wagering tax laws has already been made or where warrants have been previously issued in Internal Revenue Service cases involving a failure to file or register under the wagering tax laws. itis possible that independent sources may be relied upon and legal means can be implemented to avoid application of the ''fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine or a defendant's successful refuge under the Fifth Amendment. Each Special Agent in Charge should immediately apprise personnel of the foregoing prohibitions in the review and use of Federal wagering tax information. The two guidelines recommended by the Department should be strictly adhered to in the future investigation of gambling cases, and such guidelines should be borne in mind in all prosecutive Bureau cases. Furthermore, each gambling case currently pending, wherein Federal wagering tax data has already been secured, should be promptly discussed with the appropriate United States Attorney. In this connection, you should note the Department's continued research directed toward 4 6/4/68 SAC LETTER 68-32 2 3- MW 55069 DocId:32989528 Page S02
possible alternatives in cases where Internal Revenue Service wagering tax data has already been secured or utilized. Close contacts should be maintained with the appropriate United States Attorney's office in these cases to insure no unnecessary investigation is conducted or, where appropriate, logical investigation is undertaken to develop prosecutive violations which will be free from the applicability of the Grosso and Marchetti decisions. (Security Letter on attached page) 6/4/68 SAC LETTER 68-32 -4- NW 35069 Docld: 329599525 Page 803
ar a. (D) RACIAL INFORMANTS - RACIAL MATTERS -- Our informants are reporting more and more information concerning violent statements made by members of militant black organizations, as well as individual extremists. Such wild statements could trigger irrational action by unbalanced individuals. . Recently we have been advised by informants that militant black nationalist organizations, as well as independent Negro extremists are talking of taking such action as dynamiting the Empire State Building in New York City, throwing dynamite on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange and possibly assassinating some white political candidates as a means of retaliating for the killing of Martin Luther King, Jr. We. have also received information that militant black racial extremists feel that all white people should be killed and one has stated that he believes if the right contact is made with the White House staff, a plan might be formulated to poison 500 to 600 people attending functions at the White House. If any of the actions discussed above were carried out it could bring about.a national catastrophe. As you have been previously instructed, you must insure that full details are obtained from informants especially when they are reporting discussions concerning acts of violence or other dire activities. With the increased number of violent statements corning to the attention of the Bureau, you must be alert to prompiély run out all rumors of violence connected with racial activity for the purpose of either proving or disproving these rumors. In addition, our experience in the past has shown that often when an individual is confronted concerning a violent statement he is alleged to have made, it will deter him from taking any such action. In view of this, whenever possible, interview individuals who are alleged to have made violent statements. These interviews must be well planned and conducted by two Agents in such a manner that the.safety of the Agents !: will be protected and no incidents will occur which could bring embarrass- ment to the Bureau. Concerning these interviews you are reminded of Bureau policy concerning interviews of individuals connected with educational institutions, the news media and those employed in sensitive positions. Prior Bureau authority is required concerning interviews with any of the above-type individuals. Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover 6/4/68 _ SAC LETTER 68-32 -5- Director | MW 55069 Boold: 323989528 Page 904
SAC LETTER . 68- 34 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIC FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION In Reply, Please Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 File No. . dune 11, 1968 (A) COVERAGE OF DEMONSTRATIONS -- It has previously been called to your attention that the demonstrations in the racial, student, and antiwar fields are becoming increasingly militant. The results of our coverage of these matters are given prompt and wide dissemination at the Seat of Government. Many of the demonstrations occur on weekends and holidays. You are reminded that these demonstrations must be covered and that the Bureau must be promptly advised of the results. Do not wait until the next workday to report pertinent information to the Bureau. 6-11-68 SAC LETTER 68-34 i (B) DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION REGARDING RACIAL MATTERS -- With increasing frequency, teletypes regarding racial matters are being received at the Bureau which are not in strict compliance with instructions set forth in Part II, Section 4, page 41, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations. These instructions clearly state in detail the manner in which teletypes should be prepared in order that they can be disseminated to other Government agencies which are on the Bureau's teletype network. You should make certain that confidential sources are appropriately concealed in the text of the teletype and that the teletype is worded in the same manner as a well-prepared, concise letterhead memorandum. You should also insure that all administrative data is set out at the end of the teletype under the heading "Administrative" so that it may be easily excised. The provision relating to 'Sucop" is not applicable with regard to racial matters since the submission of a letterhead memorandum is required in each instance. A Manual change will be forthcoming in this regard. MW 55069 Doold: 32809525 Page 805
(C) INCENDIARY DEVICES - RACIAL MATTERS -- During a recent inquiry concerning racial violence, an official of the United States Park Police, Washington, D. C., received information indicating the ’ possibility of aerosol spray cans containing deodorants being utilized ‘as incendiary torches. Containers of hair spray and similar products which are easily obtainable could be put to the same use. Although it is necessary to maintain an open flame in front of the spray stream, such as from a cigarette lighter, the effect produced is that of a blowtorch. Since this information may be of interest to local law enforcement agencies in areas where there is a potential for mass racial violence, those agencies should be appropriately advised. 6-11-68 oy os Ce SAC LETTER 68-34 - . (D) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES - PAYMENTS -- As you are aware, all security informants and sources receiving compensation from the Bureau are paid on the basis of the value of information furnished, services rendered and incurred expenses. Recently, it has been noted that some informants and sources have beén paid consistently the same amount each month with no variation in payments during periods when the informants or sources were less productive, which leads to the illogical implication that information furnished or expenses | incurred or both seldom, if ever, vary. This practice must be discontinued. Your informants and sources must understand they are independent contractors remunerated ona C.O.D. basis, and they must | never be led to believe they are recipients of a fixed salary. This matter will continue to receive careful consideration at the Seat of Government and you will be held accountable to insure that payments are for value received and no fixed patterns continue to develop. These instructions should be called to the attention ofall _. | Special Agents in your office handling security informants and ~ | sources. 6-11-68 SAC LETTER 68-34 -2- MW 55069 Docld: 329595265 Page S06 ee ie
‘ (Z) VISITORS TO COMMUNIST-BLOC COUNTRIES (COMBLOC) -- SAC Letter 67-65 (E), October 31, 1967, instituted the Combloc survey to encourage field offices to more fully exploit interviews of visitors to satellite countries as provided in Manual of Instructions, Section 105G, and to include visitors to Yugoslavia among those interviewed. The results of this survey based on statistics submitted by the field offices to the Bureau have proven the value of this investigative procedure. . Additional individuals who were approached for recruitment by hostile intelligence services have been uncovered and the field increased coverage among nationality groups by developing additional sources. Valuable intelligence information was also furnished to interested United States Government agencies. Since the survey has shown successful results can also be obtained in the Yugoslav field, Yugoslavia should be added to the list of bloc visitors of.interest to the Bureau as noted in Manual of Instructions, Section 105G. Each field office should continue to exploit the counier- intelligence potential in this area of our work with particular emphasis on the satellite countries and Yugoslavia. Although the Bureau does not desire additional statistical information at this time, each SAC will be held responsible to insure that interviews of visitors to communist-bloc countries are given proper consideration. Obviously, you should be certain that our responsibilities are fulfilled, within manpower limitations available to you, so that individuals approached for recruitment by hostile intelligence services are uncovered. For your information, approximately 27 per cent of known visitors were considered for interview during the six-month period of the survey and about 12 per cent were actually interviewed. In order that you will be able to afford proper administrative controls over this investigative procedure and so that the Bureau will be able to solicit pertinent data from any office in the future, you should channel certain statistical information to the control file in your office. The control file should reveal at any given time the number of individuals known to your office to have visited each specific country and the number actually interviewed. The file should also contain the identities of individuals compromised, approached - and/or recruited by hostile intelligence; developed as double agents or potential double agents by your office as a result of these interviews; t t 6-11-68 SAC LETTER 68-34 -3- MW 55069 Docld: 32999526 Page SO?
developed as sources or informants among nationality groups; and those cases wherein positive intelligence information was furnished for dissemination to other United States Government agencies. Since we have known of very few individuals traveling to Albania or Bulgaria and none to Mongolia, particular attention should be given toward interview of visitors to those countries which might come to the attention of your office. The code word Combloc used during this past survey should not be included in the caption of any future correspondence since this survey as such has been completed. Manual changes will be forthcoming. Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover Director 6-11-68 SAC LETTER 68-34 ~4- | MW 35069 Doold: 32809525 Page S05 ; .
NW 55069 Docld: 32989528 Page 909 PERSONAL ATTENTION SAC LETTER 68-36 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION In Reply, Please Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 File No. mo June 21, 1968 (A) DETPRO - SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS -- The primary purpose of the investigation of subversive individuals is to determine their identities, activities, and/or whether they present a serious threat to the internal security of the country. If investigation develops positive evidence indicating that an individual presents a threat or potential threat to the internal security, his name is included in the Security Index. The Security Index contains names of individuals who are considered tor immediate apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency, in order to safeguard the internal security of the United States. The list now consists of over 10,000 names. Effective immediately, the following Priority Apprehension Program and report writing procedures will be instituted: 1. The Priority Apprehension Program is being divided into three Priority levels. a. Priority I. This list will consist of hard core national and state basic revolutionary organization leaders and those leaders of other subversive organizations and unorganized groups and individuals who have indicated a propensity for violence and/or have received special training in sabotage, espionage, and/or guerrilla warfare. Individuals employed in or having access ta key and/or defense facilities will be included on this list. Verification of residence and employment of each individual will be made every three months. A report will be submitted every six months. b.- Priority Il. This list will consist of second level leadership of basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive organizations and individuals who present a significant threat but are in less influential positions than those in Priority I. Verification of residence and employment of each individual will be made every six months. A report will be submitted on an annual basis.
c. Priority 1. This list will consist of all other individuals on the Security Index. Verification of residence and - employment of each individual will be made every six months. A report will be submitted every two years. d. Each Priority List will be broken down into nationalistic tendencies and/or organizational affiliations so that apprehensions can be made in each category on a selected basis. e. Individuals in each Priority will be apprehended only upon the Attorney General's authorization that their immobilization is in the best interests of the national defense of the United States. - 2. The category 'Key Figure" is being deleted. Consideration should be given to placing these individuals in Priority I. | 3. The category ''Top Functionary" is being continued, and these individuals should be placed in Priority I. ' 4, Each office should immediately review its Security Index and by letter under above caption advise by name, Bureau file number, ’ and organizational affiliation those individuals who are to be included in Priority Iand Priority II. This should reach the ! Bureau by July 5, 1968. The Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and ° San’ Francisco Offices may submit their letters to reach the Bureau by July 15, 1968. Hereafter, when recommending an individual for the Security Index,, the FD-122 should indicate the Priority. Appropriate manual changes will be forwarded. Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover Director 6-21-68 SAC LETTER 68-36 -2- MW 35069 Doocld: 32959526 Page S10
oS ; PERSONAL ATTENTION NITED CPArE .. SAC LETTER. 68-38 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION In Reply, Please Refer to WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 File No, - . July 2, 1968 ' . r (A) PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ~-- Secret Service has now been directed to furnish protection for Governor Ronald Reagan of California. Any manpower requests or threats involving Governor Reagan should be handled in accordance with previous instructions concerning other candidates. You should continue to be particularly alert to the public appearances of the President or Presidential candidates in your division. Insure all Agents are keenly aware of the importance of recognizing any situation posing a potential danger to them. Appropriate security, criminal, and racial sources should be reminded of the necessity of immediately reporting information of a possible threatening nature to your office. The importance of timely advice to Secret Service of such information cannot be overemphasized. The Bureau should be promptly advised of any significant developments or of any threats affecting the President or the candidates; however, it is not necessary to advise the Bureau of arrival, departure, and related information in the absence of other significant developments. 7-2-68 _ SAC LETTER 68-38 . (B) “INV ESTIGATIVE COVERS -- ‘At a recent antidraft demonstration, a Bureau Agent posing as a newsman was recognized by a representative of a newspaper that has been traditionally hostile to the FBI. The Special _ Agent involved was attempting to identify the demonstrators and those who were burning their draft cards, and to record statements of various individuals participating in the demonstration. A distorted news item regarding the Agent's activities appeared in a subsequent issue of that paper reflecting the Bureau in an unfavorable light. Le APA mete baht 4H Be AA PALI FD eS r mma, peo | Consequently, you should instruct your Agent personnel that, henceforth, no matter what the justification, they are not to pose as newsmen or representatives of any wire service for the purpose of establishing an investigative cover. fr (Security Letter on attached pages) NW 35069 Doocld: 32989526 Page ii
Hw 35069 Doocld: 32989520 Page S12 (c) MINUTEMEN -- SAC Letter 68-27 (£) instructed that all members or suspected members of the Minutemen organization were to be investigated in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions with consideration being given to placing such individuals on the Security Index. ‘. It will not be necessary to convert existing files from the 157 classification to files under the other security classifications. Communications “should be submitted utilizing the Security Matter - Minutemen character regarding individuals and Internal Security - Minutemen character regarding organizational activities. Reports should follow the outline of regular security reports although additional information should be included, such as information relating to any specialized training or knowledge regarding the use of explosive material or various weapons. Weapons in the possession of the subject should be set forth as well as a description of the automobile being utilized. Each office should thoroughly review informant coverage available regarding the Minutemen and adequate coverage should be developed expeditiously. You may consider your coverage adequate at such time as - you can assure the Bureau that you are aware of all Minutemen activity within your territory. In this regard, each office will submit to the Bureau within 30 days complete information regarding existing Minutemen informant coverage. Two categories should be utilized. Existing informants who report exclusively on Minutemen should be set forth in one category and existing informants who report on several organizations, such as Minutemen, Klan and/or racial activity, should be set forth in a separate category. Informants who report exclusively on Minutemen should henceforth be handled as security informants in accordance with provisions contained in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions. Appropriate review of informant case files should be made immediately and the Bureau expeditiously advised of any additional data required. Each office should submit a complete listing of all Minutemen members within its territory to reach the Bureau by July 22, 1968. Indicate field and Bureau file numbers along with the date of the last communication submitted to the Bureau in each case. Such 2 listing of members must henceforth be submitted periodically in accordance with provisions contained in Section 87B of the Manual of Instructions. 7-2-68 - SAC LETTER 68-38 -2-
Each office having Minutemen activity within its territory must submit investigative reports setting forth such activity. The report concerning the national organization to be submitted by Kansas City will contain a brief summary of Minutemen activity within the territory of each office. | Very truly yours, John Edgar Hoover Director 7-2-68 "SAC LETTER 68-38 -~3- HW 35069 Docld:32989520 Page $13
‘ ‘ ’ PERSONAL ATTENTION Toes “SAC LETTER 68-39 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 7 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 July 9, 1968 In Reply, Please Refer to File No. _ (A) "OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968" -- | PUBLIC LAW 90-351 -- The President signed captioned Act on 6/19/68. | You will be provided with a copy of the Act under separate cover. Set forth hereafter are salient provisions of the legislation. All investigative personnel of your office shouid be provided with a working knowledge of its contents, particularly as they pertain to the Bureau's responsibilities. Title I of the Act authorizes the Federal Government to assist State and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at every level. It establishes within the Department of Justice, under the general authority of the Attorney General. a Law Enforcement Assictance Administration. hereafter referred to ag the | Administration, guided by an administrator and two associate adminis- tratore. The Administration will make grants to States and units of local government to establish law enforcement planning agencies and to carry out programs and projects to improve and strengthen law enforce- ment. The Act also establishes within the Department of Justice, under ‘the general authority of the Administration, a National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The Institute will make grants to public agencies, institutions of higher education, or private organizations for research and development to improve and strengthen law enforcement. Section 404, Title I, authorizes the FBI, under the general authority of the Attorney General, to (1) establish and conduct training programs at the FBI National Academy, Quantico, Virginia, to provide. at the request of a State or unit of local government, training for State and local law enforcement personnel; (2) develop new or improved ap- proaches, techniques, assistance, equipment and devices to improve and strengthen law enforcement; and (3) assist in conducting local and regional training programs for State and local law enforcement personnel, when requested to do so by State or units of local government. Title I authorizes up to $5, 111, 000 for the implementation of Section 404 during Fiscal 1969.