157-10044-10048 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Date : 08/04/95 Page : 1 ee ee ae ee me ee ae ma em em Um en Ema eR aN mE mS RS ES AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014~-10048 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-06 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : SWENSON, HAROLD TO : TITLE : DATE : 05/10/76 PAGES : 67 SUBJECTS : AMLASH CIA DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS ale led re a DE tan ORI OOS aE EB a De Te ; HY 50955 Docld:32423436 Page 1 oe #8 Sa Ge Be BH FF Neco sana sane coma cans OEE emer fpeR pew wen san sad ED cn AD Em NH nes we Suns SED SED cams SE cow we Any <P SEY Ny AGENCY INFORMATION CASTRO, FIDEL OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, MEXICO CITY TRANSCRIPT UNCLASSIFIED 1A, 1B, 1c RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 06/02/98 Box 2 sm mee eam ews anes ana ans) GRE CAE CE CORE Ow ww 80 Sanb ENE ck one my rb san ene en SE GE SE, CE TRIP TO
Report of Proceedings Leone, Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Monday, May 10, 1976 Washington, D.C. (Stenocype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 3017 WILSON BOULEVARD ARLINGTON, VA 22201 {703} 841-0800 < c Ee a phy ¥ Vary Sa:
TESTIMONY OF : NT TEER Harold Swenson “accompanied by--~ Robert D. Peloquin Phone {Area 202) 2 2 « a a o © « = 26063 O.€. $.E.. Wasnenaton, ‘pipet 210 First Stree, SPMNS ANG TOP SECRET
ate! Ke SM Se bc igh EXECUTIVE SESSION Monday, May lo, 1976 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmenta? Operations with Respect to | intelligence Activities, Washington, pb, The Committee met, pursuant to Notice, at 10;18 ©’clock %., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms Hotel the Honorable ie | Richard 5. Schweiker Presiding, Present: senator Schweiker (presiding), WARD @ Pau Also present: gin Johnston, Michael Epstein Wallacn, Professional Staff Members, Rieter tte ePe _ rit 1G First Street, Se. Wasmingtos, D.C. 2000.5 TOP SECRET
ERE SS ESATA SA SRE RT OTT WARD & FaUL 410 Fost Street. $.6.. Wasnington, D.C. 20003 Senator Schweiker. All right, Mr. Swenson, we swear in all of our witnesses, if you would rise and raise your right hand, please, Do you solemnly swear the testimony you’re about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 80 help you God? Mr. Swenson. I do. Senator Schweiker. Be seated. Mr. Johnston. Mr. Swenson, would you state your name an: address? TOP SECRET | | |
ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT Dp, PELOQUIN Mr. Swenson, Harold Swenson, My home address is 5005 Edgemore Lane, Bethesda, Maryland. Mr. Johnston. And you are accompanied by counsel this morning, is that correct? Mr. Swenson. That's correct. Mr. Johnston. I would ask counsel to identify himself for the record. , Mr. Peloguin. Robert Db, Peloguin, 1707 4 Street, NW. Mr. Johnston. Let me State for tho record that I called Seyniour Bolten at the “Agency this Morning and stated that you were going to represent Mr. Swenson, and he stated that that WARD B&B PAUL wasuacceptable to the Agency. Mr. Peloquin. I am proud to hear that. Mr. Johnston. Mr. Swenson, you are appearing here voluntarily today. Do you understand that you have all of your | constitutional rights before this Comud tree? Mr. Swenson. do. 4x. Johnston. And Your attorney may be consulted at any ¥ x ‘ Swenson. Thank yoru. Joumston. would You stace the «: and position YOu occupied in the Special Atfairs State of era? 430 Fortt Street, S.€., Wastungten, 0.¢. 20003 ¥; Mg. Swenson. I joined the Staff ac the time it was Know: TOP SECRET SFR hi Rs
and I continued with the task force, which later became known Phone (Aras 202) as SAS, up to 1965, within the United States as Chief of Counterintelligence, My first job was Assistant to the Director of the Task Force for the crisis in Cuba, the missile crisis. I then became Chief of Counterintelligence, | i Mr. Johnston. Do you recall exactly when you became Chies j of Counterintelligence? H Mr. Swenson. I really can't, | Mr. Johnston, Can you recall the menth that you left? Mr. Swenson. Well, let me Say that when I was assigned abroad £ continued to have a relationship with that staff. was during a period of assignment in Etrope, so I really WARD & PAUL { retired from the agency in 1968, Yes, 1968, Mr. Johnston. President Kennedy was assassinated on y November 22nd, 1963, and f take it YOusWere=Chiéf-of~counter- thire~Swensonsv——I-was 7 2 3.3 : me. Johnston. And chat was tne srafti that was respons | ! | | I continued in a way to have a relationship with the Staff until | } t i | | Lisi for Cuban matters, is tha- correct? Mir. Swenson, That is correct. bir. Johaston. who Were YOU rusponsible to? “ir. Swenson. I believe at thar time Harvey had been 410 Fiest Steeet, 5.E., Washington, O.C, 20003 replaced by Des Pitzgerald, i believe. pes Pitzgerald was the TOP SECRET i | i }
Mr. Johnston. And you were responsible directly to him. Mr. Swenson. Yes, Prone (Area 203} $44. Mr. Johnston. Were You aware of the fact that shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, the CIA initiated an investigation into the Assassination? Mr. Swenson. Yas. investigation? i | | Mr. Johnston. Do you recall who was in charge of that | | | Mr. Swenson. No, I do not. Tt assume it would have bee: the CI Staff, Mr. Johnston, Speaking of the Ci Staff, wno was in charge of the CI Staff? WARD @ Pau Mr. Swenson. Jim Angleton. Mr. Johnston. And what was your responsibility to Mr. Angleton? Mr, Swenson. Well, there was a common interest in couiterintelliyence matters, and if SOmething came up which reguired consultation, I would constlt with that staff. 70C03 Jonnston., Were you suboréinace Lo sir. Angleton? Swenson. tot really, no. Jonnston. Whes was the relationship between SAS EL, Wastungtan, O00, * . ad Counterintelligence and che Counterinzelligence Staff at tr. Agency? 41D Forst Street, ‘Yr. Swenson. Well, tne SAS Counterintelligence Staff TOP SECRET
Matters, Cuban intelligence service especially. was sort of a microcosm of the Agency with emphasis on Cuban | a | Mr. Johnston. What was the size of the Counterinteliiyenceg Prone (Area 262) Staff within SAS? Mr. Swenson. I Suppose I had perhaps 30 people, Mr. Johnston. At headquarters, is that correct? Mr Swenson. Yes, Mr. Johnston. Going back now to the assassination of President Kennedy, were You aware of the fact that a special 10 | investigation was initiated shortly after the assassination thai 1 Was not located in Mr Angleton's bailiwick? ‘Ir. Swenson, I knew that thera was a Special but I had nothing to de with it. WARD & PaE “Mc. Johnston. Did you Know Mr. Jack Whitten, Whitten? Mr. Swenson. Yes, I knew him. ‘ir. Johnston. Did you know him as being in charge investigation of the Kennedy 48sassination? swenson. f don't recall chat. Jounston. Wid you ever contact Mae. Whitten about 2h. assassination? Swenson. I did noc. Meo. Johnston. were you personalay aware of any ‘inforno.. 4 Leé Harvey Oswald before the assassination? ATO Forst Street, S.£., Wastungton, B.C. 20003 ir. Swenson. To the best of my recollection, it's ratr.- MA ETS \ ayee rt © TER Se Hs TOP SECRET
he - i “ik oy to place before and after, his name. appeared as 1 || hara for ma having paid a visit to a Cuban or Soviet embassy in Mexico City, and that's about the only knowledge that I had. Mr. Johnston. And you have a recollection of knowing that | before the assassination? Mr. Swenson. Now, I cannot remember that it was before. This is what I am unsure about. 8 Mr. Johnston. Ali right. | | | 9 Mr. Swenson. Normally a great deal of information went i 10 Past the desk. I delegated screening of voluminous materials which came in to various people who worked for me, and they : would call to my attention things which appeared significant and then I would look into those. But really, as far as the WARD & Pawn assassination of President Kennedy is concerned, I am afraia I don't have anything to contribute. I don't know anything which didn't appear in the press, really. Senator Schweiker. You were never asxed to conduct any investigation Separately or specially or apart from what -+ Mr. Swenson. No, Senator. ‘The oeniy request which was levied on me with regurd to the as$assination, as I can recail, was to find whether the FBi had given co my staff any informac:. wnich was relevant, and I caused a searcn of our records to he made, and I believe there had been some memorandum which was relevant, which had then been passed on to Jim Angleton's 410 First Street, $.E., Wasmington, O.C. 20003 CI Staff, and 1 passed on that information, and I think that TOP SECRET
EA Eg Pe ag Ce we ze Saneae) Pa eas Papa ts eee B Sekaco tbat ace ze ra rae Shs ANS re CB A: ter nf hee — er id th goes ate poner * Prong {Area 2023 WARD & PauE 410 Firtt Sirect, SEL, Wastingion, B.C. 70003 LS 16 17 MD ops O © oo rm ray) w | | edi Mr. Johnston. Had that information been passed on to the CI Staff prior to the assassination? Mr. Swenson. Yes, Mr. Johnston. The routing on it, which I assume we are talking about the same thing, was the report of FBI agent Kaak on Oswald's activities in New Orleana, Mr. Swenson. That was probably it, yes. As I Say, I have} a very vague recollection of it.: Mr. Johnston. And that routing sheet on that memo indicer 2 Is it your recollection that it went there before the assassination? i } |: it went to the cr Staff on November 22nd, | i Mr. Swengon. I really can't regall. 1 am sorry. All J know is that McCone wanted to know had anything come in, I caused a search to be made. Normally Sam Papich, who was the Bureau liaison officer who came to my office every working aay, would see one of the peoole working for me, now deceasce, Austin Horn, and we would pass to the Bureau any information which appeared pertinent to the Bureag purooses, and we wouls receive from the Bureau anything which they considered Spyuro-~ priate for us. So that the memorandum, as I recall], which came in, Never seen, but it had been receivad by the office and on in due course, TOP SECRET
* ie ‘s i oo wit stage sk a rr) oe. Mr. Johnston. What ole did itself play in connection with the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination? Phone (Area 202) Mr. Swenson. Directly, none. My. Johnaton. pid you advise either Mr. Whitten or Mr. Angleton about Cuban angles to it? Mr. Swenson. Well, we -- you know, I was very conscious of all of the activities of Cuban intelligence. Probably I was better informed than any other one individual about Cuban intelligence activities, and I knew and know of nothing which made a4 contribution as far as the assassination was concerned. | 12 | Mr. Johnston. Were you consulted, though, by Mr. Angeetys 13 Oo WARD & PAUL or Mr. Whitten? 14 Mr. Swenson. No, I can't recall that I ever was, bur 15 7: wre Ree x Be 16 JT would have discussed anything probably with Des Pitzgerals. As I say, f can't recall any specific discussion because I haa nothing to coffer. Senator Schweiker. Did you ever pass on any informstiv. no the C1lA investigation relating to CLA attempts or plors assassinate Castro? Marys wir. Swenson. senator, woulda you mind repeating e328": not sure that . follow you. Senator Scnweiker- vuring tne seourse cf the inves ie. st San Seal @tO Fast Street. S.€., Weattengion, O.C. 20003 fic. Swenson. Of Kennedy's investigation? TOP SECRET et AORN NEAR EM EOE Ce vent
pg ey akg AT AP A pha oe oe x aN ' Pope athe hee Sar ERS eS ae ee ez Bier tes cas Sack EES Ci Bet TG. 3 evi nn CE ET Aa at sea ae fey: 3 perearsetss Parte 1S a aR RENN ATS WARD & PAUL . 7NsaF Areeet, 6.6 , Wastmanion, OE Did you ever pass on any information relative to plots ayainst Fidel Castro's life by Task Force W or SAS or any other? Mr. Swenson. No, I did not pass on any such xreports. Senator Schweiker. Why did you not? In other words, wouldn't that have been very relevant to the investigation? Mr. Swenson. I had nothing to do with any such plots against Castro, Senator. Mr. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable of them at the tine? air. Swenson. I cannot recall now whether my knowledge tan’ there were such plots was before or after. 1 would just Like to say I heartily disapproved of it, I thought it was a loc of nonsense, and my position on that was very clear, and } don't think people yenerally talked to me about it because o1 the way I felt. uy. Swenson. before or after the Nennedy assassinatia... in other words, l can't recall that 7 Knew that there haa peen vless prior te taat time, oF wnetnerc IT knew of azo. supsequent to that time. ay own staff was not involved :. way, and the only «nowleage that came: tc me about it was TOP SECRET
rieoomrag aes Paras HEM rae es ab Pe AST Oa SS Prone (Aras 202) 344-6009" WARD & PAUL, + Wastungron, O.0, 20003 $10 Fost Street, 6. £ 8 9 Staff meetings and concerned people who mighthhave been | invelved. And I thought, as I said, it's a lot of nonsense. Senator Schweiker. Were you either asked by Des Fitzgera! Or the Director of cIa not to discuss or Pass on information relating to plots to assassinate Castro? Mr. Swenson. Absolutely not, no. Senator Schweiker. or anyone else? Mr. Swenson. By no one. Mx. Johnston. What discussions dig you have with Mr. i090 || Fitzyerald about the Kennedy assassination, and especially ll YOUr @xpertise on Cuban Matters? 12 1% 14 15 16 1% $3 x2 12 | ‘ I ! i i ie 7 Bi 2 i Mr. Swenson. To the best of my knowledge, there was never any discussion with Des about Cuban participation in a pLot against President Kennedy's life because it never appeared pertinent. Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you why you don't feel it wag pertinent, and let us just take as a basis for thac Wuestion fact that Oswald WaS associated with the PPCC, and in cha: capacity, clained to be pro~Castro, and tne fact that 4 he Visited tae Cuban consulace ia Mexico City co Glbteroc zo a visa to Cuba Shortly before the aSsassination, Ker. Swenson. If don't cnink thac the evidence which we ’ Saw, any hard information which we nhac, indicated char Uswa iu Was anything but a nut, perhaps a dangerous aut. we Simply 2 had no information to indicate that he WaS part of a Cuban TOP SECRET
« ESR ots aoe FaTTe Cee neye: e Cubans, who Prone iArea 2023 were knowledgeable ahout intelligencevactivities, Cuban intelli- gence officers, defectors, and I got never a single bit of embassy in Cuba, agencies that he was with Kostikov, who was also known to be a member of Department 13, which was &aesassination, was it now? | Mr. Swenson. I did not know it at the time, and this is the first I've heard of that, Senator. senater Schweiker, You cid not know that? Hr. Swenson, No, I did not, WARD & PAUL 4: iL Sate iene eee mms i katy mgm peasant. feteesevee euseeniere sere ppiepes asesecatatpoeeanas Senator Schweiker. That he visited with Kostikov or that > SOSCLKOV waS a member of Department 14? x ‘ir. Swenson, I did not know either. I did have within my own k i { q 4 Group some people who were Soviet experts, and we Kept tabs on Soviets who were in Cuba. I did a great deal af Yesearcn about their activities, buc what yeu have juste Mentioned, Senator, never vane bo ay acotention. Senator Scnoweiker. peraenreseeseeveseteves receive AS part ef vour job, which groups YOU work with of the Cuban @exlic urouns Specifically? 4 ORE words, what one «= air. Swenson. 1 did nos work With day of then, 410 Fest Stree, $.£,, Wasningten, 0.€. 20003 Senater, Senator Schweiker. Well, then, whicn Ones would you be TOP SECRET seat EP ater
: vq ¥ ota Z monitoring as Chief of CI?" Certainly yOu would be monitoring 2 some of them as Chief of CI or getting intelligence back as 3 Chief of Ci. 4 Mr. Swenson. Primarily T Sargeted our duties against the 5 Cuban Intelligence Service..-I did not deal with the Cuban ¢ | groups. That fell within other jurisdictions. 7 Senator Schweiker. In dealing with the Cuban Intelligence } ¥ : s ibid nab ish a0 3 DEE pnts EAEIEEAE LIE EALRsnsecy ve Udtda IESASneS eee seeLALARLAeSey OO URES es in [0d eee ever pucmneenemeemene 8 Service, weren't some of these people bound to be included in 9 some Of these Cuban exile groups? } Mr. Swenson. Let me put it this way. I did not monitor groups as such. i 4 2 WARD & PaUL 4 Senator Schweiker. Right. Mr. Swenson. I did monitor individuals so that if a name which had any relationship with the perations of Cuban intelligence serfaced, I would look into that very closely. I cannot recall a single name that surfaced which related to the Kennedy assassination or any information which I ever at any time which related to the Kennedy assassination. Senator Schweiker. Do you sbecifically recall where of your coutacus were located that jou were monitoring? they in, for example, the URE groups or the Alpha 66 yrous, oO: for example, where were some of the contacts that you were S.E., Washington, 9.0. 20003 monitoring? ix, Swenson. i was not monitoring contacts within tno. 410 Ferst Street, groups. If a name surfaced, regardless of what group he ‘wo. TOP SECRET a a aneee Np
Pk ‘el Prone (Area 202) 464-6000 1 spe 6 9 8 9 10 il rs ras 12 13 WARD & PAUL SS tadaeeat arn eieeh bone OaR 14 Sey is ates he 16 eres 17 18 SAAT SMITE i EM i PEAR ARN ERTIES 5 ae hci Pee KAS <n 410 Foest Street, S.£.. Wasmngton, D.C. 20003 | hignly compartnentalized, be in, and he was within the United States, for example, and I felt that there was some reason to be concerned from a counterintelligence standpoint, I usually would interview him myself. I would interview him at great length. Some of these were, let's say, people who were singletons, They were not associated with any group. The only group I can think of offhand was the AMCANOE group which I was concerned about, the penetration -~ Senator Schweiker. What was that? Mr. Swenson. AMCANOE. it was a Cryptonym. I don't know it by any other name. i Senator Schweiker. Well, it would seem to me, and maybe it is a matter of functional definition, that your Cuban exiles group would be a fertile field for any intelligence activity. This is where both the Pro~ 4nG anti-Castro agents were operating, where all of your activities would primarily be, wouldn't they? fix. Swenson. WoC mine, no, Senator. Senator Schweiker, In sealing with counterintelligence wouldn't you have to be dealings with PeOL.¢ who woula have ut or Cuba and been working in ches “LLG groups, unles I don't understand the nature ané maybe { . : 7 fat Ma. Gwenson. Well, that Senator a? and i saw iny rule in counterinteli:- gence 43 being focused primarily on che Cpoosite professionals, TOP SECRET
PERRET TEE IVA VER GUTT not as a groad gauged thing. We had other staff, sir, other Be +f components which focused primarily on other aspects, let's eine. Phone [Area 2025 Say, the non-professionals, the non+professionals. SPE RTS HAAS Senator Schweiker. In other words, on Cuban intelligence a ene RS agants, per se, is that what you're talling me? ry ™ Mr. Swenson. Yes. If they were Cuban intelligence FES agents, that was my jurisdiction. eer g tes ea i uh senator Schweiker, But what I'm getting at is wouldn'’s a number of these be working undercover in the anti-Castro exile groups? That would certainly be the logical cover tha: they would come into this COUNTY on. Mr. Swenson, Senator, ; was very alert to this. This Was part of imy job, so this was why £ would have all of those ear IN WARD & PAUL ic WV pte se names and operational aliases where we knew tnem, searched ts very carefully to see if they merited further attention, but eee! fe I ¢annot recall anything relating to any one particular grous except the one which I was concerned about because it appearer, ag TEs hens Ae et et TALL: tnac wnat was -- <a = bos sunator Schweiker. Ot e saying you did not realiy ce SAMA Ger SS: per se. Swenson. Yhat is correcc:, cénutor Schweiker. How abuuc if you found an agent thst Geise its foe cnGught, &@ SuSpect planted in one ground, Now, we know ~ CTA was cuerating certain of these yruups. Wouldn't you Rew. 410 Foerst Street, S.E., Wasrngion, O.C. 20003 gone to’ the case officer for that group to find out abour 2 onan a TOP SECRET > J SIRS par Cranes Tee Sere
= Porat Do Tt person? ¥ PRPS es Oi Mr. Swenson. I would have gone to the other staffs, or r i the case officer or whoever was responsible, and yes, I would 4a Prone (Area 202} nf te r have discussed that. If I had any doubts about it, I would have expressed them very strongly and would probably have taken | other measures. Senator Schweiker. During your tenure as Chief of CI, were you ever alarmed or concerned about leaks from our side to theirs and was part of your job to plug thase leaks? Mr. Swenson. Yes, I was concerned and took measures plug leaks where 1 suspected them. et cee ett ee aan Senator Schweiker. Did we have substantial leaks or leaks, or how would you describe the kind of information WARD & PAUL back to Castro? Mr. Swenson, tis very harag to say how substantial leaks were, east ts Let me yive you an example, Senator. We nad cperations ae aos targeted ayainst Cuba involving Cubans, resident in the Unwss 4 States, wno were ¢ indiscrete, so that if a mississ iden Pomeatiniis plot states vonos BE Se vlanned to lang some of them on Cuba, fer example, 21..7 inert oa would sometimes pick up the telepnone and they would call Estate hee Friend, a relative in Cuba, 5.E., Wasnraygion, D.C. aR at vary discrete, I suysose, by talsing about BAS eT or their grandmother or something like this, 416 First Street, weren't. Those calls were monitored py the Cuban x TOP SECRET
intelligence service, and some of those people were arrested or killed on landing. This was of great concern to me. o Prone (Area 202) | My role in this was Simply the Protective measure, to try 4 to determine who might be involved, and insofar as pecple in th 5 | United States were concerned who were Suspected of being 6 | Cuban intelligence agents, I would discuss that with Sam Papic ? i } ‘ because I felt that the Bureau had a jurisdiction within the 8 | continental United States, 9 Senator Schweiker. As part of your role, would you ever 10 | infiltrate an American agent to act as a double agent to find wnat the leaks were? Was that part of your work, too? Mr. Swenson. Yes, if 1 had had such an Opportunity, 3 would have taken it. WARD & PAUL I did not. Senator Schweiker. You did not. Mr. Swenson. I did not. fT would have if a Suitable Opportunity hd presented itself; Senator Schweiker. All right, gO ahead. Mz. Johnston. Were YOU aware of tho alleyations of a mar. pL TEES Sonie's APT sor OEE Sous Named oalvarado in Mexico city? BOOS that name ring 2 bell? fir. Swenson. Yeah, it i$ such a commen hame , bye. Joanston. Withd:. saree days after the t8Sassinacia,, walned into the embassy, tne SiG First Street. S.£., Washington, 0.0. 20003 wosequently in contact with the Chief of Station. tially ne “ileyged that he saw money passed to Uswald in the TOP SECRET AE Yor ae Shee ae
ASH Says Sater Met pee eas Nery EN ra © ones x aa Boers Sng hcne PALS TRU AS: Prone {Area 202} WARD & PAUL 21057 410 fest Street, 2... Wastenaton, 0.0. | | | Were you aware of that fact? Mr. Swengon. I can't recall it now. I am sorry. Mr. Johnston. Wouldn't that fact, an analysis of that have been in your jurisdiction? Mr. Swenson. if that had come to my attention at the time, we would have examined it very carefully, and I would say that either it was not taken seriously, or for some reason it didn't get to my attention. Mr. Johnston. Let me address the point of your taking it seriously. Mr. alvarado's allegations were briefed to President | Johnson‘at the time they were being made. Now, are you tesui- fying that you were never consulted about the Alvarado allegations? Mr. Swenson. I do not recall them. Mr. Jonnston. Did you know about technical coveraye oa te Cuban consulate and Cuban embassy in ilexico City? Was that in your jurisdiction? Swenson. ‘sNowledye af iz i did have. within my jurisdiction to operate, Trat was not Funecion. ‘ Gn embi. to Me. Johnsten. What Coes sonsulate supposed tu dao? Mz. Swenson. Well, when you say technical ceveraye, has TOP SECRET .
x rvs SLES G6 course, that would include the use of -- Mr. Johnston. What is the purpose of it? Mr. Swenson. Well, the purpose of it was to obtain Prone (Aran 202) intelligence about hostile intentions. Mr. Johnston. Were you ever asked whether any of Oswaid’s contacts in Mexico City were DGI? Mr. Swenson. I can't recall the specific question directed to me on that score, but had I known of any DGI contacts with Oswald, I would have discussed them, 10 Mr. Johnston. How would you have known who the contacts were? ams 12 ‘ir. Swenson, Well, my role was really the Cuban intelii- 13 gence service, and we went to great lengthssto keep track of WARD & FAUL 14 Cuban intelligence officers, their contacts, and their 15 i} activities. 16 Mr. Johnston. How would you nave known whose Oswald's contacts were? 1? A 18 wr. Swenson. Ir would have known only if one of those 19 known contacts of Cuban intelligence had been in touch with anvboty, and if Oswald's name nad surtased, I would have Lanes 2o Hl = - 2} at that. ares | “ye. Johnston. But you were never yiven Tt +. SE, Wastengian, 0.6. 26004 names of the Cubans with whom wswatd nay in Mexico City. DEO Farst Giver Me. Swenson. I do not recall that, no. * TOP SECRET 4 cH SESE Ga At AE ONT OE IS TUL R ag wa aah aesee Snes at NES EE TE
cuuumienys Ge peas ROE pechh Mr. Johnston. And. given: your advice on whether’ they were ecenemprr — WA Mr. Swenson, However, Jet me go a step further. I prepared a rather elaborate system of identification of people connected with Cuban intelligence service. This was computerizdd Pent aA ae HE ET at so that people who had clearances were welcome to look at that ror] a list for any connections. Se this group, like Jack Whitten's group, which had a specific function, could have simply looked for at that. They need not have talked to me. Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you whether in November of capsit 1963 you were aware of an operation that nad the code name oi PD Sa OPT net TTS srt ia AMLASH. Mr. Swenson. Yes. WARD & PAUL Mr. Johnston. And do you know who AMLASH was, his real identity? Mr. Swenson. I did know, yes. Let's go off the record. I can't recail his name. Johnston. ] 305 as @ recora. (Discussion off the record ha. Johnston. AON On tae vcecord, did you meow bac: Wovember 1963 that “: Six was meeting with AMLASH? Mr. Swenson. 2s, anc Ll had expressed my reservations «. ‘ meeting. L didn'tc consider nim to be responsible. Mr. Johnston. Let ve asx you a preliminary question. B19 Fast Street, S.E., Wasrengten, O.C, 270007 RN Trae ever been asxed by this Conmittee as to your knowlédce a+ pt ond SNE TOP SECRET PLE INR RTOS
TS at PR a Met EE Tie WF CoM aN F Pa TATA fs WARD @ PAULL “C04 5.€.. Washingytan, OC. 410 barvt Street, Mr. Swenson. No. Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald met with AMLASH in late October of 19637 Mr. Swenson. I believe I did. I have a vague recollectia: of that now, yes. Mr. Johnston. And do you know about the purpose of that meeting? Mr. Swenson. Yes. Mc. Johnston. What was the purpose of that meeting? Mr. Swenson. I believe this was related to the assassination, an assassination plot ayainst Castro, and as to this I had reference before. I couldn't recall the exact time frame, but I thought it was nonsense. I thought it wouls be counterproductive if it had been successful, so I opposed it. Mr. Gohnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald went ahead with it? SWENSON: on 4 Fiuzygeraid and 1 did net always Gonaston. But ae told you he was goiny ahead wit vachon. swongen,. £ @xpressed amy reservations aooun it. went aheac, le didn't KO “Bissio: lig was my boss. My. Connston. ow about the Octobe: wv...
‘ hee meeting in Paris? tee a o b Fi Mr. Swenson. I knew he had the meeting, yes. pe < i ; Mr. Johnston. That Mr. Fitzgerald personally a ‘, gone to the meeting. i. ' Mr. Swenson. Yes. Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald had assured AMLASH that he was the personal representative of eae Attorney General Kennedy? Swenson. No, I don't know that he did that. 4 Johnston. And again as a matter of background, hav. you read the Committee's report on assassinations? Lenses 7A Aeterna eat 8 xvas Em Mr. Swenson, I have not. ax. Johnston. Did you know that on November 2énd, WARD &@ PAUL the case officer was meeting with AMLASH? ‘ir. Swenson. I believe I knew that about that time there was to be a meeting. 5 Mr. dohnston., Did you also know that proposed for the = Pia ak meeting was the fact that the case officer was going to « AMLASH a poison pen? FANN iaews ix. Swenson, 10, Gid nok. . Me, Johnston. You iad no xnowlecye at the time . Woastanaten, 0.0 poison pen? tts. Swensen. Jo. as I cold you, I disagreed basical? with the whole thrust of tne AMLASH operation. My disapvnoriy.. ALO Fest Sere, SF of it was very strong. wes Fitzgerald knew it, and Des re. St PTE od SEE TOP SECRET ARUN GE Es IPT ATS CAEL ETT YET Moh: Te *
preferred not to discuss it anymore with me. Senator Schweiker. What was the basis of your disapproval? I mean, why did you disagree? Prone {Acea 207) $446-46080 Mr. Swenson. Well, I didn't think it was a sensible operation, Senator. “I felt first that we were dealing with professionalism was subject to question, and I felt that if the, Ay a i | people whose bona fides were subject to quastion, whose | ae > had succeeded in killing Castro, that he might have.been succeud by his brother, for example, who would be worse. So I thought it was a pointless operation. I thought it was a lot of Sie setae nonsense. x certs Mr. GoOlWwnNsSton. Were you asked to provide = for the AMLASI! operation? 1p ee Beate Sempre rn hse,” hepsi Spinnin ob bse: WARGO &@ PAUL Swenson. L provide counterinteliigence support fer everytning in the sense that IT have already described. Any SLEGEEA SGD Ne SR eS ee + names which cane up i wouleé check Pa Jonnston. But swecifically in debrieZing veopie connected Lhad @ let oc. rine 3 gi bo had coilecis - woes Suara ey wan, dnclagirir sa..on bor O82 AMMAN, see fa dL Cosa ectiuy : Bek a TO Let. PIAA SF ESERIES NY EY BL We raepteaee, iticaliy what re ete ists Lat Guesulen besiss, 26 UNLS Oseratien suv .. Pat ATA Feet Sst pave uilxwady bncicaivi to you, lou ret TOP SECRET S eetehahenantentarion eee eed z ry
them I disapproved it, I didn't trust the people, I didn't 2 consider it a good Operation on security grounds or any grounds. Phone (Area 2025 | 3 | Mr. Wallach. Did you consider it an assassination 4 || operation? { 5 Mr. Swenson. Did I consider it? 6 an Mr. Wallach. Is that how it was explained to you, 9 assassination plot? Mr. Swenson. Oh, that's it, yes. Senator Schweiker. There wasn't any doubt in your mind about that. Mr. Swenson. ‘That that was the intent of it? No. Just theught it was silly. “Mx. Johnston. Were You aware of the statement that WARD & PAL Fidel Castro made to the Ab reporter Daniel Harker on September } 7th, 1963, and in that Statement said the U.S. was meeting with dissident groups and was planning to eliminate Cuban 28 leaders, and that Cuba would retaliate if that continued? AUTRES . Mr. Swenson. I don’t hav ea firm recollection now. probably did. Mr. Johnston. Let me go then to 1965, Hine FLUE) 2 What happened with the AMLASH operation, to your recollec- | LM Shad iF TORET A tion, in 1965? | i | | | I | SE xtams Neha day Yo AA Satay Swenson. I draw a completely blank. I don't remenwe: 410 Frest Street. S.£., Wasnington, 0.0. 20003 t | | I Johnston. Do’ you remember the name Victor Espinoza? | 3 TOP SECRET # Seat
et STA A TRS i SLA PINT a Oe a} Tg eee a Mr. Johnston. | ‘me irefresh your’ r collection, that at . ae? a vc me i. . . . least according to the files, you and the PBI met with Victor ee Espinoza in New York city in'1965.° ‘. Mx. Swenson. bell. I met with a Cuban’ in New york, in°1968 for-the! purpose of training him and sending him back to Cuba. care Is this what you are talking about? Pont Prin Mr. Johnston. No. Victor Espinoza was part of the AMLASH 10 group that had knowledge of the AMLASH operation as it had evolved into 1965. ii 12 mr. Johnston. Did you meet with him and debrief him? Tey 13 rit WwARE & PAUL RS ‘ j Mr, Swenson. Yes I remember the man now, yes, yes I do. | . . \ Mr, Swenson. Yes, yes rt did. I met him at the PBI | 14 16 16 Mr. Johnston. At that time did you know of any connectic a7} between Victor Espinoza and anything dealing with the investi- 18 i gation into Presiéent Kennedy's assassination? office in New York. : rn | Rr ese F ur. Swenson. I can't recall. Anything which I knew coon 4 19 Espinoza I would have put into the memorandum at the time afin | ; 20 | I met him at the New York Office. And <i couldn't even ret the name, as I told you, until now. | | 22 i i T do know 22 nha a a that he went into the office, tnat he wants. eet | see someone, I believe it was Sam Papich that first tola Eee B10 Fiesi Street. 5S.E., Waseingion, .c, 270003 24 | ft o£ it, and I went in for the purpose of debriefing him, any 25 TOP SECRET Prati.
Pehe soe pussy n, ay 4 posers SHIN BEE RE a NIRA TT SINE LI TEES de RES OR Bad mT fe E iu i : t ie pate Ta : i * & 4 WARD & PAUL 416 Farst Street, S.E., Wasmington, O.C. 20003 yee recorded at’ the time. Mr. Johnston. | Do you remember that he alleged that one of the CIA officers in Spain had been compromised by Cuban intelligence officers? ‘ Mr. Swenson. “¥es, 1 remeber that. Mr. Johnston. Was that true? Mr. Swenson. I dontt know whether it was true or not. I would say that the number of operations that were being conducted in Spain again were not secure from a counterintelli- gence standpoint. I thought that they were rather sloppy, anu I indicated that. Mr. Johnston. One of your memoranda that. you wrote after the Espinoza meeting states ~- and all I have are my notes fron. it -- the AMLASH circle is wide, and each new friend of whom we kearn seems to have knowledge of the plan. z believe the problem is a more serious and basic one. Fidel reportedly kiuew in 1962.that the group was plotting against him and enlisted its support. Hence we cannot rule out the possibility of provocation. | Do you recall that memorandum? Mr. Swenson. ‘his is true, and this is what I testifac. to already. I had sericus misgivings about the security oa: the whole cperation. Mr. Johnston. And what did you mean by provocation? TOP SECRET
o; abies) he Bs ‘ MW im ati the Cubans’ might have been tryin t to turn their knowledge ofswhat we were doing to their purposes, oe ee ir ie Slee tn rageee ties if only for propaganda purposes. 4 I. felt.from the outset the whole thing was nonsense, as i ee 5 || have said repeatedly, and in my debriefings of people, the 6 more I learned, the more insecure it appeared to me, so I ? simply continued to oppose such ventures. I thought they were 8 {i silly. 9 Senator Schweiker. Knowing Fidel Castro's personality and 10 || temperament, and on the assumption that you were right, ne | i j ii} had some knowledge of these operations which you feared, obvio:s+ } WARD &@ PAUL ake 12 lly, from the xecord of what you said, wouldn't you possibly hard 13 |) mMéant provocation more than just reciprocating with Propaganda, | 14 | Knewing his personality? 15 Mr. Swenson. Well, I would have considered any type of 16 || retaliatory measure by Castro, and this was the purpose of the 1? | dissemination of such material to other government agencies 15 | which ha& jurisdiction, such as the FBI and the Secret Service. 2 Mr. JoRnston. Lec me ask you, isn't it obvious that i: | CIA was plotting to assassinate Castro and he became aware c: it, that he might retaliate, especially when he had warned i. Sone retaliation? be ee \, te ion Mz. Swenson. it 2s possible, of course. This is one of or Be ARR A Ra Ate HE Ea SS BASEN ae Ra SA He ALA ER 230 First Siveet, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 the things that concerned me, but I never knew that as a resiit: 25 || of all of this there was any attempt.on the part of the Cuba TOP SECRET
E see eme aS Pi PNT RTS ge 7 ana t FN 508 Fy {the Sette tt Raa “ Ay government or'o ence oF gat . eo te t et eg Mr. Johnston. * Did ‘you conduct an investigation in order t SS sel Sete tes Se sae Pre rae seat eee to determine whether the Cuban government had retaliated specifica Say ROE ir for the AMLASH operation? Mr. Swenson. Well, your using the term investigation is what is puzzling me here. What I did is a constant function, was to look for any activities on the part of opposition UAE OT ELEN services which would threaten the United States or people in th facT United States, United States security. This was a continuing eae, PTressiceibecmes function. There was no particular investigation except as part of what I did all the time. The AMLASH group was of conceri tu me because I thouynt they were sloppy, but £ never did find out from all of the many interviews I conducted, anid WARD & PAUL the research I did, and that of everyhody on my staff, that there was ever any attempt on the part of the Cubans to tr. Johnston. Are you aware of an agent who was involved in the AMLASH operation who had the crymt AMWHIP? i H i assassinate the President. | 1 | Mr. Swenson. This goes back a lona time. IL remember AMT. ett i t Mer. Johnston. Lec me mention his name off the recors. ‘ ' I {Discussion off the record.) i Mz. Johnston. Back on the recoru, Did you ever sugyest tnat either AMLASH or AMWHIP be SR ra 410 First Street, S.€., Wasmngton, O.C, 20003 secur interrogated about the Kennedy assassination and its connectius:. | Fy TOP SECRET Sear
Mr. Swenaon. 'T cannot recahl whether suggested it or I believe I did question AMWHIP myself. Mr. Johnston. In what year? Mr. Swenson. This I can't recall, the exact, timeframe. It is quite a long time ago. | ) of Mr. Johnston. Was that 1965 that AMWHIP was interrogated? } Mr. Swenson. I would say it .was probably in 1965 because it was in 1965 that I departed for Burope, and I think it was prior to my departure, and that's the best I can do about fixing it. Mr. Johnston. Did you ever talk to the case officer who had been at the November 22nd meeting about whether anything Pi 2 € "| & 4 « & g € 3 was mentioned at the meeting that might indicate retaliation? 7 SOR SRM Mr. Swenson. I probably did. I can't recall anything fete aoe tte 746 specific, but I talked to the people, to the case officers URI Pe CREE Naik ae: who were involved. They were well aware of my reservations * about people with whom they were dealing. Seca Fed ee phe Mr. Johnston. After the assassination of President Kennu::} Bs did you have any discussion with tir. Fitzgerald or Mr. Hels about the possibility of retaliation because of the AMLASH ~ operation? Mr. Swenson. 2 would say that possibly at a staff meeti.-.; I might have mentioned the possibility with Des Ficzygeraid, pO is at RSS ard iy share 410 First Street, 5.6, Wasnington, 0.C, 70003 put I had no concrete information to indicate that there was 4 TOP SECRET SESE aap CH emt ae E pte ete SAP a: Soe taey, as nme
ene ron aan erieisss SE aa off Paty Prone (Aras 202) 94 J 3 a a 4 a g a 8 AUG Farst Street, S.F., Wathington, D.C. 2000.3 meeting? Mr. Swenson. . Probably Sam Halpern, Seymour Bolten, possibly Nestor Sanchez. ‘ghere ‘are a couple of others whose faces I recall but Z don't know that I'd even remember: their names, Senator Schweiker. Would the Director have been there? Mr. Swenson. No, he would not. Mr. Johnston. Would Mr. Helms have been there? Mr. Swenson. No, he would not. Mr. Johnston. And can you place a date, an approximaty on the staff meeting, or at least a date in relation? Mr. Swenson. We had staff meetingsjjust daily, sir. Mr. Johnston. Was it about the time of the Kennedy assassination or shortly after the Kennedy assassination? Mr. Swenson. I am sure that in that general timeframe there was a staff meeting, and 1 would have at the time expresnt- any counterintelligence views which I considered appropriut., a just warnings, or iet’s say, being careful. Me. Johnston. Well, let me refine it. Do you have a recollection of menticning a connection or the possibility of a connection between Kennedy's assassinacion at a staft meeting? Do you have a recollection of doing that? TOP SECRET
i ie : i : Vol: 5S os 13 HY SORES IK eS het rH : : petits oSrtekeg wart had a4 memorandum from which you quoted. Atesee wey Mr. Johnston. Apparently a 1965 memorandum? cate? Mr. Swenson. I can't recall anything ag of the Kennedy assassination, nothing definite. Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion now? Mr. Swenson. Not positively. Mr. Johnston. That you said that sometime. Mr. Swenson. What I am getting at is that this is one of the things I would normally have considered. 2 4 Senator Schweiker. You're saying it may have occurred. J WARD & PAUL Mr. Swenson. It may have occurred, but I don't have any firm recollection. Mr. Peloquin. May we go off the record? “Senator: Schweiker. Sure, {Discusston off the record.) : neh eee ye Mr. Johnston. Back on the record. My question to you 5 ‘ i ee OEE i ot is this. Do you have a recollection of a staff meeting at Eset some time with the participants you described at which a possibiiity cf a connection between AMLASH operation and the LR Sn loot Kennedy assassination was discussed? bir. Swenson. We Svecific recollection, no. 5 ils peered giv. Jonnston. Oil it occur to vou at the time that there might be some guch connection? 410 Front Street, S.F., Wathenginn, O.C. 2600) PALS NEETU RAED fs ONETE O97 a6 Mx. Swenson. 1 am merely assuming that I would have TOP SECRET cs
(Sot ep cp ee pee parry ean: i i ee ee I Sha FR 4 bE Mat 78 TMT YS Ris ei a PE APS EE gies st £ Pe etk Anta eee S WARO @ PAUL 410 First Street, SE... Wasnengton, O.C. 20003 + ave ramification. Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you at this point -- Mr. Swenson. I don't remember; fg as Mr, Johnston. I'm not asking. you at this point whether yo explored it. “r'm just asking you whether you drew a possibilit ef a connection in your mind? Mr. Swenson. f probably would have. I don't have any specific recollection of it. Mr. Johnston. Do you now draw the possibility of a connection? Mr. Swenson. AS a possibility, yes, but ali of my efforts over a long period of time which were say exhaustive and extensive, both, failed to produce any connection. I woul: be mindful at all times of such possibilities in everything that I did, and I interrogated many people, I interviewed many people. I read reports from many sources. I never found even a thread of a connection, Mr. Johnston, Well, let me ask you as a specific fact wnether you knew that on November éend an aircraft flight in Mexico City, a Cubana aircraft flight from iHexico Cit: oe Havana was detained from about $:00 o'¢lock in the afternoon until 10:00 o'clock in the evening awalting a passenger who arrived in a twin-enyined aircraft, who bypassed Customs ar: whe rodé in the piletr’s cabin on the flight to Havana? TOP SECRET oer ee
Mr. Johnston. De * Jow have any recollection of checking into that, either receiving that or checking into that? Mr. Swenson. “Not apecifically. Senator Schweiker, - "Bo any recollections come back to you of unusual movement of ; Sabah intelligence agents immediately prior to, during an@ after the Kennedy; acsassination? Mr. Swenson. They do not, Senator. Mr. Wallach. I am sorry I had to miss the beginning of yo testimony and I may be going over something that was already asked. Just let me know. it is my understanding that you were aware generally of the AMLASH operation and the purpose of the Operation in y WARRD & PAUL 4 vs ow ‘ Mr. Swenson. Generally and specifically both, I would say thats Mr. Wallach. You were aware that there was a meeting set up with AMLASH in Brazil in September of 1963 or thereabour aes ”S Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall. I co would have known probably that.there was such a weeting to be held I was rege red On record as considering that this was a dangerous and eine date stupid operation. Mr. Wallach. ete The meeting in Brazil with AMLASH was -~ + can you give me that? #22 QHEGHED xd Jonnston. September 5th, or early September. 416 First Street, 5.£., Washington, 0.¢. 20003 ‘ir. Swenson. I cannor remember the exact dates. Lt was Ieaghnd SYST she MAN 226 NRL a I) Sp as a long time age. TOP SECRET Eat MINE hk Banke Te tar porate
lM so Wa LL eh a WLth SHyacage officer,’ ‘correct, and nee eye nN iy 7 . \ ; ay v4 vs vate: can . 2 then subsequently appearing.in-a September 7th edition of 3 || the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Fidel Castro goes down to the ae 4 Brazilian consulate ‘in Havana and makes a speech or grants an 5 interview, to'Daniel Harker, ‘the: AP xeporter, and specifically . va bo. . ‘< x . A Baas 6 |. uses the wordds"eliminate" :=- 9 Mr. Swenson. I-belfeve this has already been covered. B Mr. Wallach. I know Jim did raise that but what I'm 9 asking you is whether or not in your counterintelligence 10 background and your knowledge of Castro whether or not Castro's|-- mS: =e 11 A, the fact that he granted an interview; and B, the fact that — ; 12 he apparently went to the Brazilian consulate, which I 13 understand that he did not frequent very often, has any , 14 significance? I am asking this to you as an expert. 15 Mr. Swenson. Mr. Castro is a very bold, imaginative 16 person who is capable of doing anything. Does it have some 17 gpecial significance relating to the Kennedy assassination? 4 , 18 I don't see any. SETS SAS ES See re RR a AEE Scot 8 AT, ay i E 19 Mr. Epstein. The suggestion has been made that he chose a : 20 tne Brazilian consulate because that was his method of getiins i, ; 21 a message, if the operation nad been compromised, that he hed i ; “ 22 learned of the meeting that had happened in Brazil in Septevier| 4 : oy | Of 1963. The suygestion has been made that that is the way : 24 he was yetting the message te the United States. i ; 4 | . Do you remember that ever being discussed or considered? | i TOP SECRET he tee hes v omit eet FIR ESE
TMS tt maw ine Be - * rayrens se Sei Serna Me pl aT Nich Sa, EOE ST tes ie, a Th a EE Sate rie Sot WARD & PALIT 410 First Street, $.€., Wasnisgton, 0.7. 20003 Epstein. In retrospect, now, is that an issue that considerable by counterintelligence people, and does it trigger any kind of thoughts in your own head when you hear it now? Mr. Swenson. Well, you see there are so.many“‘things that were going on all over Latin:America with regard to Cuban activities in the different countries, ‘I would go to Brazil, for example, or, for example, of seeing people who had been connected with Cuban intelligence, and. debriefing and so on, and I would not read that Castro's visit to the Brazilian installation had anythiny te do with the Kennedy had anything to do with a whole host of thinys. Mr. Epstein. No. The issue is whether his visit to the Brazilian consulate would have had anything to do with -- Me. Swenson. With getting our attention -~-- Mr. Epstein, Getting our attention, and indeed, the veracity of hig assertion, that he had learaed of pilots -~ Mr. Swenson. £ would not attribute that special. signili- cance to it because there were so many reasons he could have done it. Mr. Johnston. Let me yo back to the aireraft. snew you Direccor Cable 8604 dated 30 November '63, which is the table to Mexico City abouct this fact, and IT call your attentioc.. to the upper left hand corner which would indicate SAS, EOL TOP SECRET
ets ed pp ? as Bed SAAS Ra ONT WTP PERLE col RAT FE 7 metas 4 fs 7 ALE NEE See A AD Se M \* iD . he pastatebet foie gree aa ees x WARD & FAL, 410 First Steet, §.€., Washington, O.C. 20003 nor can I, recognize ‘the aditials.=. Johnston. And EOB is what office in SAS? Swenson. i cannot recall what it meant right now, (The Witness reads the document.) Mr. Swenson. I'm sorry. Normally they would have put down my own group here, SAS/CI. This apparently did not reach me for some reason. Senator Schweiker. What does that SAS up there mean? Mr. Swenson. Well, the SAS referred to the task force, really, Special Affairs Staff. They changed the name of the task force. And then the slash was to separate it from some component, and I think that the EOB -~- they changed names -- I think that the EOB had to do with a staff which was trying to engage in positive intelligence operations against Cuba, things like AMCANOE and AMLASH, but I really can't teli vou the exact destination, but you'll note that it'did not come to my start. Mir. Johnston. Let me ask you, did you receive informulue: about a Cuban-American by the name of Gilberto Policarpo Lopex? | Mr. Swenson. At the time the name does not ring an; recollections, {Discussion off the record.} TOP SECRET SSE HSSSS SSSESE EEE SESEE EEE EEE CEESEASSEEE FOES
i 4 cree a NE eres IS ART SRR EMSA TR Bed EET PRL eel Re aCe WSS ig rere : Ks a ro, E.. 20004 410 Tiest stemet, SF, Wastin WARD & FaUL Texas into’ Mexies On ‘the 23rd of Novenber. The border had been closed by Mexican authorities On the 22nd, after the assassi~ nation, He went to Haxico City, arriving there on the 25th of November, and on the. 27th of November departed as the only Passenger on a Cubana airline flight to Havana. Do any of those facts -- Mr. Swenson. They really don't register with me now. Mr. Johnston. Do you ever recall being consulted about trip? Mr. Swenson. £ Simply have no recollection at ali. i Mr. Johnston, Could you have made a contribution on thas2} Reistc, Mr. Swenson. I would have, let's Say, searched through the computer runs to see if such an individual had ever been “a contact of Cuban intelligence service. Other than that, i don't know what I could have dene because in Mexico City there were people who were there for that purpose, Senator SChweiker. Here is one of the copies we are talking about. We just wonder if it helps you to recollecr, (The Witness reads the CGocumenc.) Mr. Swenson. The only thing I can Say, Senator, is when they mention ODENVY, which is the Bureau, if it was Cuban affair, any @iscussion with the Bureay should have through me. I do not now have any recollection of this. Senator Schweiker. Here is one referring to something TOP SECRET
WARD & FAVE 410 Fesst Street, S.£.. Washington, OC. 20003 4 “At that particular time he was coming out of Miami, as I recall. Mr. Johnston. Let me correct for the record. Initially they have identified -- they thought he was the same as 5 Gilberto Lopez who was in Los Angeles. Subsequently they found 6 7 8 g nae) il 12 i ‘ { i “it was not true. Mr. Wallach, Who did you deal with at the Bureau? Did you deal with Papich or did you deal with someone directly? Mr. Swenson. Usually Papich stopped in my office every day, every working day. Mr. Wallach. Did you have any direct contacts with anyone at the Bureau in the Domestic intelligence section? Mr. Swenson. I think someone else came over one time. don't remember his name, a young fellow who is far lower in category than Sam.. The only times 4 dealt with other people i:, the Bureau were on those occasions when we had to cooperate in a joint operation such as their transferring an agent to me wno Was going to send him back to Cuba, that sert of thing. fir. Wallach. Prior to the assassination, or immediate - after cne assassination, did you @ver Sit in on any of the meetings where Bureau persons were present and Cuban policy wa: generaily discussed? vin. Swenson. i did not. senator Schweiker. We came across sone documents ain the that as of about 13961, that the FBI had surveilled about 209 TOP SECRET
‘or 200 potentia : agents; who were’ with g 2 Cuba Committee as possible Cuban intelligence personnel. i 3 Does this ring a bell with you, and what do you recall abou 4 the information supplied to you by the FBI on the Fair Play for 5 Cuba? 6 Mr. Swenson. Well, we received a great deal of informatio 7 Senator, from the Bureau about people like this who might be in Foe 8 sympathetic to Cubs. I was not interested in a positive sf | as 9 Operation, by funetion, unless there was a Cuban intelligence : 10 connection, unless there was a way that I could use that to | < 11 penetrate the Cuban intelligence service. Other staffs were i j = 2 interested in it for other purposes, for debriefing them, for 13 positive intelligence, and anything that could be gleaned, soc: t WARD & PAUL : Cc a oO 14 of a vacuum cleaner approach. My approach was strictly -- a se 15 Senator SChweiker. Penetration. bo ™ P . 16 Mr. Swenson. Penetration of the Cuban intelligence i 17 service, or protection of our own resources. i t ‘ 18 So I did not get involved in that. be : i Riae “ . : s 8 19 Wow, had one of those individuals had a meeting with a : 3 G : : . , £. 8 | known Cuban intelligence officer, then [ would have been pe é 20 fee € 5 concerned and would have become invoived. &. 5 an ed d 22 f Senator Schwelner. Do you recall after the assassinatic. | Fe) ; : a re $ . the Cuban policy reviaw that was initiated by the Director, ks 22 ; < 24 after the Kennedy assassination, a review of the whole Cuban ° . kolicy of the CIA? Paty 4 TOP SECRET AT a Rena GAE PRAMS SOD HI ere em PTS Oh Re Parade 20g
Sree: a & -- 2 a vague recollection. i é : 3 Senator Schweiker. Do you recall what form it took or & 4 just how it was done? ee 5 Mr. Swenson. Well, my best recollection was that he wante i 6 to be sure that no one had been remiss, and he wanted to take | } : a 9 a look at the scope of the operation before, and whether it | i 3 B should be maintained at the same level and things of this Fe ‘s n: 9 nature. I was not directly involved. My own staff's function ! fe ome. 10 was clearcut, and up until the time I left, continued in the | a ee 1 i Oo 13 same form. ! <=, * | ; a 4 | t 2 1 Senator Schweiker, Was this done through written report; 3 * { &: ‘ 4a : 2 4 9 12 | to the Director, or now was this done? $ < “ ae : -o ‘ E Lo lé | Mr. Swenson. I customarily -- this is a management H z c | i rT | procedure in my own staff -- kept track of how we were doing, < ~ | tm f what we spent, what we needed, and how effective we were, | . 16 1 i _ : and I don't recall any special effort at that time te give | more than I had already done. I think they could nave take: 1é g 1 4 any one of the reports that I submitted, and it would have r=] Go ° . Q . sresented the situation as of the time. : : Ro ‘ é il f z H Senator Schweiker. After the review was completed, did : & 22 * | the Director send out an internal directive as to the future } “ ae" ¢ Cuban policy? & 22 - i é } Mr. Swenson. Senator, I just don't remember. 1 am sorry : ° 24! . Senator Schweiker. Did you have any specific dealings with] 25 | | i TOP SECRET
3 e V5 i eS ra es * Ree LE Wet it « ¢ A ae cele ale orcad eet eee aa) reek TEMA TOE gid UR YR PY CLC RLER ET ON WARD & Paw. + Wasmagion, 0.0. 20003 410 Firs: Ste@er, 4.8 te ~] he m ~ wo Mr. Swenson, Tf remember the hame, and that is all, Senaco#, Senator Schweiker, No specific case. H Mr. Swenson. I donte recall anything Specific. If there had been somebody who was incidentally & member of that group who would have had a connection with Cuban intelligence, E would have looked into it, but xz don't remember now. | Mr. Epstein. What dig YOu mean by the word Yemiss, that part of the reassessment of Cuban policy involved the study of whether you had been remiss? Mx. Swenson, f think the then Director MeCone then wantes: to make sure that nobody had dropped the ball. For exampiec, he wanted to know what information had gonecto the Bureau, what information the Bureau hag Sent us, and where it was. ‘ir. Epstein. You mean with respect to Oswald? Mir. Swenson. Yes, wr. Epstein. Were any deficiencies found as a resuit? ‘iz. Swenson. Not that I know of, “ir. Epstein. Would that be a different king of review than a policy review? air. Swenson. Oh, yes. wr. Epstein. well, I'm Splizcting it into =wo Categories. j etner words, did we niss something? Mr. Swenson, Well, it would be different. 1x mean, wi the President is 13S34SSinated, every bit of effort which coul:: we ninhanan tna ee en TOP SECRET
ike ¢ ey a takes a ‘ ar, t © look for ‘anything 3 Mr. Epstein. What I'm asking you is were there two types 4 of -- t 7 ’ : 5 Mr. Swenson. There were two different things. ot + Fa eS RAA ts oak ba 9 RA ca de 6 Mr. Epstein. Two different types of assessment made. One " would be what should this agency's policy or this government's rene 8 policy be with respect to Cuba, -i.e., what kinds of operations N. 9 should wa--run:hereinafter, and two, did we drop the ball in the ey 10 past? | Ll Mx. Swenson. Well, I would say that this sort of reassesii: 12 ment was probably done, and Des Fitzyerald was probably invoiv:d 13 in it at this time. I don’t recall that I made any particular contribution. Mr. Epstein. Do you recall whether that included any 760 081g assessment of the possibility of the AMLASH operation having been compromised? 18 ily. Swenson. No, I can't recall anything specific abour 3 it. re 19 u . 6 20 | Mr. Johnston. Let me ask -- I shew you a document : 23 | dated 23 November 1963, which is a :nemorandum for the Acting € it a i z . . Le a 22 | Deputy Director of Plans from the acting Chief of the SR a : 3 23 | Division, which was in Mr. Angleton's staff, and the sub jecy rad a t 3 i : 24 | the contact of Lee Oswald with a member of Soviet KGB assass:- o H Py i t 25 | nation department. The contents I don't think are of great TOP SECRET
FS td Ue SE ies Be fen nts i" Hi rae “that ‘that document mainby is a two-page analysis of the Possible Significance of Oswald's Possible contact with Kostikov and Possible Soviet involvement. My question is, given the fact that the Soviet experts in counterintelligence would do &n analysis like this, why was ‘not SAS counterintelligence doing a similar analysis? Mr. Swenson. I can hardly tell YOu more thaniI have on at all operations of the Cuban intelligence Bervice. I could not have done any more than I was doing, sor continued doing what 1 -- I never recall se@iny this. roe Per ered eateten anal that subject: 1 simply had a continual function of looking : i t i | Mr. Johnston. did YOu receive any orders to first of sit investigate the connection between AMLASH and the Kennedy WARD & PAUL assassination? Mr. Swenson. No. fix. Jehnston. Did you receive any orders to conduct an | | : | | investigation into the Kennedy assassination? 4 | t ; i tir. Swenson. Ho. pareve PNR vioeat Lora (Che 4 Nr. Johnston. did you receive any orders to sooperate elther with Mr, Wnitcten's investigations or ur. angleron's See SEVIS Ree investigation? Nr. Swenson. No. SY COGperation would: have been giver: had it been asked for, Senator Schweiker. Wher, you interviewed AMWHIP, what SiO Furst Street, $.€., Wasningtan, D.c. 20603 deductions did you draw out of your interview with AMWHIP ee eee, fae een EIS TOP SECRET
2 4 ww 3 ‘ 12 oa - Gs ¢ ” Cc 14 . 15 16 19 18 $ Fs 19 3 © 20 é 21 J “ 22 i 5 22 ¢ 24 Mr. Swenson. .I didn't. draw any specific conclusions that ! I can recall, Senator. t “eas or true ‘to form’ individual Senator Schweiker!” ‘Did it’confirm in any way your fears that Castro might have had knowledge of AMLASH's operation? Mr. Swenson. No, sir. briefing? Mr. Swenson. Well, this is a long time later, but so 5 ' { Senator Schweiker. So you drew no Conclusions from your | i } | far as I can recall, my conclusions were that he was a person Prone to exaggerate his importance, and that a lot of it was j t sort of gossip, and that he was not really what I would have | t considered a very effective agent. | Mr. Johnston, Were you aware of the polygraph of AMWHir? | Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall now. ; Mr. Johnston, Were you aware that the polygraph indica:: . aeception on questions related to nis ties to Cuban intellicunws and AMLASH's ties to Cuban intelligence? i fi | | ‘lr. Swenson. I'm really drawing a Blank on this now. | don't Know. . . t H ? Mr. Johnston. Were you interviewed in 1967 by an Inspeciass! General in connection with the report of the Inspector General’ | office on assassination plots? TOP SECRET
“Mr "Swenson. : 7 Senator Sthweiker. For the IG investigation. Mr, Swenson. No, because I would have been in Europe at that time. ‘Merv Johnston. Did they come to Europe to talk to you? Mr. Swenson. No. | Mr. Johnston. Did you come back to talk to Mr. Earman Or anyone in the Inspector General's office about -- Mr. Swenson. No. When I came back from Europe, which was about the time that I had said I intended to leave the Agency, | I had a meeting with the IG at the time, with a number of people, who tried to persuade me to Stay, and I said I was not interested in staying. ad 3 ¢ & & i] £ c4 F There were no specifics that were raised in those sions. Mr. Johnston. You don't recall being interviewed assassination plots? | Mr. Swenson. Absolutely not. Johnston. Were you knowledgeacbie of the CIA dealings Mafia and attempts to assassinate? Swenson. Long after the time. Johnston. Not at the time? Swenson. Lony after the time. Epstein. How long afterwards? 450 First Street, S.€., Wasrongton, D.C. 20003 Wallach. After the assassination? TOP SECRET uy
Mr. Swenson. y about ity, have tag real’ eas fiouiadgetabeue 4 it. Mr. Epstein. How did “you cone ‘te be consulted on the AMLASH problem?” a Mr. Swenson. I don't think it was a matter of my being consulted. I think it was a matter of my expressing doubts abopt the AMLASH operation. Mr. Epstein. How did you learn of it, do you remember 4 Fo] < ry « i] e « z Mr. Swenson. Because his name came up -- names would be run through my shop to see if there was a bearing on Cuban intelligence operations, and I had debriefed Cuban intelligence officers, that is, interrogated them in depth anc had extracted as much information as I could, and one of ths persons concerning whom I got information was he. Mr. Epstein. And that information was that he was now reliable? Mr. Swenson. I felt there was good reason to doubt reliability. My. Epstein. So you would be preparing a response 430 Fiest Street. S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 name check request, is that how you would come to learn TOP SECRET
besser isi ukhepstebeontions at Mines fea peers ees SEN a © RN pet ai yne Seber ine ae ot sone Sas Soh aby » eee aera WaT ger ele aR Tae WARD & OA: 416 Firse Steet, 5.€., Wathington, O.C. 26003 15 16 17} 18 22 23, | held every day, ana the cables wnicn came in ws 24 25 I'm still not quite clear on how you learned they had the assassination plot. Mr. Peloquin, Can we go off the record for a second? Senator Schweiker. Sure. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Swenson. Mike, trying to answer your question, wher matterg were surfaced at ataff£ meetings at which I was present, I expressed my views.and I would do my homework and I woule go back and check any things which came Uy. Additionally whe: I was interrogating intelligence peovle in the course of debriefing them as thoroughly as Possible, I would disseminece that information zo other people on the staff, and I believe that the AMLASH, the results of my Gebriefings On AMLASH and the purposes for which they intended to use him, I had come up on both these contacts that 1 had obtained information concerning him that was not all favorable, and that at @ Stale | meeting his name was mentioned. chese scaff nocciass: Johaston. Are memos prepared on Swenson. NO, they geserally were not. g Johnston. You don't have any recerd of Swenson. No, because Senerally staff meecings were woich were consicered appropriate for discussion were discussed, ther was anything that you nad to note for your purposes, TOP SECRET what transpireg? i | you did | | , I | | | H i i I i | 1 i n t i i
patel SAS eed eae Scere ae See eee < oe PS TSEA Nirvan i RU TER ere oe ah =e we © ets aa at CONG Tie Sccscisth benietipee-etie otsetisediaeeee cease oaRe Seed el A RPE Tem tS MGM RT Beene aT swith FR es et eesti : keg Prone {Araa 202} , WARD & Paws . 20003 430 Ferst Street, 5.E., Wasnorigtun, O.¢ * 4 ‘there’ ws Mr. Wallach. who decided what cables were to be discussed or the topic of discussion? Mr. Swenson. well, I would raise any cables which had a counterintelligence importance, and which I considered should be discussed with other people, you know. If we had staff meetings all day Jong, we wouldn't get anything done. Mx. Wallach. Was Helms ever present at any of these Staff meetings? Mr. Swenson. No. Mr. Epstein. Did there ever reach a point in time when YOu received an indication from debriefing intelligence officer or in any other way that specifically the AMLASH assassination plot against Castro had been compromised? Mr. Swenson. No. I can't recall any specific. Mx. Epstein. Do you reeall any Giscussion surrounding the Castro speech at the Brazilian consulate relating to we hes one yuestion of whether sone CIA Operation had been compromised and that that is what Castro was referring to? My. swenson. I don't reeall and i have no specific Pp recollection of that, no. Mr. Epstein. Following the assassination of President Kennedy, Ll think you have testified that there were staf meetings at which you were present and which the issue of retaliation was -- TOP SECRET ULES Ue!
on Sip ME AE Vee RZ eg But I would’ assume now that’ that, might have been mentioned. Mr. Epstein. Was there any specific investigative > responsibility or counterintelligence responsibility levied ~ set I " a ey “ s ox divided or assigned at those. nestings with respect: to, HEM tee ey “ determining whether or not the Cuban government was involved ere Pa in the assassination? Mr. Swenson. I can't recall any specific requirement that was levied on me for example, but it really wasn't necessary. ie: 2 SRE oe he Iome¢an, it was an cbhvicus thing which I would look for to see if there was anything. ee enre This was part of my ongoing responsibility, and I never found any relationship, Mx. Epstein. Was an instruction issued to the WAVE WARD & Pau Station to determine that issue? y SEES v3 Mr. Swenson. Possibly. I have no recollection. Possibi, is it was. Mr. Epstein. What I'm getting at nere is the question 4: PROT TT LIED ie of whether or not Bietye that is a logical issue to arise in debric and a logical issue to be handled by the counterintelligence peopie if it comes up in the course G2 & contact with a seure or an asset as distinguished from specific instructions to contact ali known sources, informants, &Ssets, and oneratio te determine any and all information be: icing on that issue. Mx. Swenson. I simply cannot recall anything specifies o:, 4 410 Fisst Street, S$... Wasnington, B.C. 20603 the subject. VE 9S EE AT a: nettle net Sag Tg TOP SECRET AS Sy Sia EaMRaS StL TEE
2 being issued. 3 Mr. Swenson. No. 4 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall any discussion or decision 5 to-invdlve or to run a counterintelligenca operation specifically 6 designed to determine that fact? 9 Mr. Swenson. No. 8 Mx. Epstein. Was it ever considered? 9 Mr. Swenson. JI can't recall that any such was considered. : 10 REally, good counterincelligence operations depend on having 1 something tangible which you can use. So if there was ever an opportunity for any counterintelliyence operation, I woul. Z 13 examine it in the Lignt of the approach which was feasible and 2 > < & 4 a & < % how we could exploit it to the maximum degree. I cannot recall that there was ever an opportunity to do anything whicn would throw Light on the Kennedy assassination. Mr. Dpstedn. With respect to the connection between th. CIS and the underworld figures with respect to the assassinvu_: plor. Mr. Swenson. i. know noetning abour thar at all, hearsay long after chac. Mr. Epstein. i would lixa your nelp in understanding «..° nat kind of an operacion would not nave been Knoviedge of that kind of an operation and the details of 416 Furst Steert, 5.E., Washingion, 0.C. 2000% who was involved in it would not have been useful or releva.. TT ee te ig TOP SECRET
° ee, ape SRP ES ETS SHE BAR kiny oe i ste af c i my i 23 et: “i PRLS SH phe AGEL RE SNES Peat ELEN ARS Sethe et se, ne NS |: WARE & PRUL Street, $.€., Washengron, D.C. 70003 410 tu. “grom a s couterintell igence standpoint tn order for you in your general business to determine what sources the Agency had, what assets they had, and if a person was in a position -~ Mr. Swenson. I believe it might have been relevant, but it wag never discussed. with me, and to the best or my knowledge underworld contacts had oceurred prior to the Kennedy assassi- nation and prior to the time. that I became chief of Counter- intelligence. Mr. Epstein. Were you aware of who those cantacts were? Mr. Swenson. At the time? Mr. Epstein. Right. Mr. Swensen. No. I read about it in the newspapers. Mr. Epstein. Were you aware at that time that there were contacts? Mr. Swenson. At that time, no, Senator Schweiker. Have you finished your point, Mike? Mr. Epstein. Yes, Senator Schweike Can you just very briefly recall relationship did General Lansdale and MONGOOSE have to relationship functionally, organically, or structuralls? Mr. Swenson. I would say there was none, Senator. star Schweiker. None? was doing, I have heard diffe erent versions of how it was sec up and one version was waS OVersil coordinator, including the 1 x The TOP SECRET
roe Sper Mestre SE BRAS a ge IEE Al a AICS ai: 3 ee ge } ) WARD & PAUL Phone {&:aa 202) 544-6008 S10 Fave Street, 5.0., Wavturgtan, O.C. 20003 | | “was really working primarily with Defense and State and other non-CIA agencies in his MONGOOSE work. What is your best recollection of that? Mr. Swenson. I had no occasion to meet with him ar participate in any discussion with members of his group, but Des Fitzgerald certainly knew him and met with him. no, let's say, reporting function by anybody in the Agency that I knew of to Lansdale. Senator Schweiker. Mr. Swenson. Senator Schweiker. a regular basis? In other words, In other words, There was Des Fitzgerald -- Did not report to him. On a regular basis or rather not it was sort of a separate operation from what you recollect? Mr. Swenson. Senator Schweiker. Mr. Swanson. Yes. wr. Johnston. Let me ask you first of all, Roa, Was he Mir. Swenson. Mir. Johnston. bol, of “tr. Swenson. Lo was very hazy on that. interestec in Saul Koa, sT., provide useful inteiligence ¢ wnat? put I cannot recall My best recollection -- And just coordinated. was ne susye¢cred of beling oUt? Iow&s very because possibly he could that wis. was anything that realiy indicated he had an intelligence TOP SECRET
? EES < ro Sang OME ans le mane aK i : t | f ¥ ou . =" Patios ERR eS OE EEE Aa] eT NE SaaS SARE See tert bo WARK & PAUL 70003 410 Fast Street, $.E£., Wasnington, Oc. function, Mr. Johnston. How about Carlos Lachuga, who was Raul Roa's successor at the United Nations, was he DGI? Mr. Swenson. I think there was suspicion that he was, but I don't think we had positive information. Mr. Johnston. Do you recall the name of Charles Santos Bushe, who was one of the founders of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee? Mr. Swenson. It doesn't ring a bell with me now. Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you finally, dia Mr. Fitzgerald a principal deputy on Cuban matters? Mr. Swenson. Well, you're talking -- you see, Des © Fitzgerald’ for a time succeeded Bill Harvey as Chief of the Task Force when it became Special Affairs Staff. Subsequentis the Special Affairs Staff was reincorperated in the WH Division. At that time Des Fitzgerald became the Chief of WH, and John Hart became the Chief of the SAS component. 56 SAS became Like bigger than any branch, put still respondin. zo Chief, WH, which it had not before. Gunnston. =n Nevenber 1963 did he have a principe. Swenson. Noveinber of 163? T dontt think 30, no. Senator Schweiker. Does a Cuban intelligence agent te the name of Ruiez, Reavi-“ ring any bell with you? TOP SECRET
i that whie aos ¢ * 4 me now. At the time it might have, I don't know. It is a rathdr common.:name, Senator. Senator Schweiker. So you wouldn't know offhand if that wag a particular Cuban in the intelligence organization. Mr. Swenson. I wouldn't know. Senator Schweiker. There's an allegation that he was in wm Ee minty tet vy Dealey Plaza that day. I want to make clear it is just an allegation. Mr. Swenson. no recollection. haan deetaniahelen Re ix. Wallach. have a recollection of any suspecte: ar) Cuban agents being i i valias axe. the day of the assassi- nation? WARD & PAUL Mr. Swenson. No. Mr. Wallach. Not that they had anything to do with the z 4 z : t ] Es i 4s 2. tecsea be assassination. 2 Mr. Swenson. I de not. ce ae, S “ SUSAR Myr. Wallach. guestioning —— eaten Do you recall at. Qi the ieseuinys, § fo meetin: or otherwise, immediacely af the assassination, and shortl; after the assassination of President Kennedy, wheth.. a0 | Woatingian, D0. 70607 there was any discussiun as te A, Waether tne CIA had jurisdiction to loex into the assassination and to invese..: FIG Fargs Uteeet, the assassination, or i, whecher it was juse the FSI's TOP SECRET
a oe ‘and ‘that the CIA Ps faa . would ‘respond: O-any requests from the FBI. In €11 fairness -- well, I'm sorry. Just go ahead and ~ answer the question. Phone {Area 202) Mr. Swenson, Well, I remember we had a@ number of 5 discussions, many of which were informal at the time. (Discussion off the record.) 6 7 Mr. Swenson. In answer to your question, there were | 8 never’ discussionS as to. who does what and so forth, but a ram 9 let's say it was very clear in my mind as to where, what the Agency's role was and what the Bureau's role was. Mr, Wailach. What was that? “xr. swenson. Well, the Bureau was concerned, in my view, with Domestic Intelligence, and we were supposed to be concerns WARO & PAULL foreign intelligence. | | } Mz. Wallach. We have heard testimony from other high bevel $ | j 15 CIA officials stating that insofar as they weresconcerned, 16 the investigation of:the assassination of President Kennedy 17 i was an FBI matter. H 3 | Was that ever told to vou or discussed in your presences’ 8 12 | 3 Mr. Swenson. I don't think anybody had to tell me, bir € 20 | 5 | I woula assume that this was discussed at the time. E was 2 | certainly a matter of interest to me. I saw Sam Pagich 4 22 z | @aily. ff felt sure tnat it was primarily the Bureau's juri.- é 26 4 H | diction to investigate within the United States, yes, and 3 24 | es my cole would have been to see if there was anything that ! TOP SECRET
J > ¢ a @ & @ < F 3 $.E., Washongian, O.C. 29003 410 First Street, so fue apie "yh e could contribute from the standpoint of Cuban intelligence connections, ,or possible connections, . Mr. Wallach. But as your role vis-a-vis your normal job, and any information you may have picked up, is that correct? Mr. Swenson: what ao you mean by my normal job? Mr. Wallach. well, let me go back. Did you ever receive;,.or-are you ever aware of anyone ever receiving in the CIA specific instructions to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr. Swenson. That has been asked before, and it has been answered. Mr. Wallach. Well, I’m asking it insofar as you are concerned, was it ever issuéd anywhere? Mr. Swenson. (Nods in the negative.) Mr. Wallach. I take it you are not aware of any investigation conducted by the CIA. Mx. Swenson. And I don't specifically recall Whitten's heading the particular group. Senator Schweiker. vr Angleton? Mr. Swenson. Or Angleton. I do recall making sure that the information which had come to me or passed throuy: me, that ther? was nothing which had been left our. Mr. Wallach. Did you tell Papich about AMLASH? Mx, Swenson. I don'c think so, TOP SECRET
Mr. Wallach. Do you know if Papich knew about AMLASH? Mx. Swenson, 1 don't know, Mr. Wallach. Is there a reason Why you didn't tell him about AMLASH? Mr. Swenson. I don't think that was the type of informa- tion which fr would have discussed with him, Mr. Wallach. who might have discussed that type of invor-| mation with him? Mr. Swenson. Des Fitzgerald. Sam's normal contact withic: the Cuban task forcecor SAS was ed myself, but there were time: when he talked to Des or Des talked to him, ! Mico. Wallach, TACT MR NE Me OEE DO you know whether or not the Bureau at any tin a ag ) WARD & Pau na @ until recently knaw about the AMLASH operation? aay 8 Mr. Swenson. I don't know. MxO. Johnston. I would doubt it. L Ky Let me ask YOu just one last question, ane uM I guess we've gone through pret teen dant mtn =¥Y much your testimony abouc rs and your concept. Let me restate what I think you have testified, and that is that at least in your mind, that you Grew a connection, the bossibility of 4 Connection betweer tne AMLASH operation and the Sere 45sassination ef President Kennedy, “Xr, Swenson. £ Wouldn': oot ie quite thar wary yan What hat owlenouc a Specific recelicction, tag: Wound tie che cwo together, 410 Forat Stree, S-£., Wastungton, O.c. T0603 “y TOl@ was to consider ali POSsibilities, and J think I would have considered that SOAP ESE SE AST 7, Bs TOP SECRET SRN EAN aS
oa] REVS HSA | Dri AoE EeY + ort . ETE PART NATE Prone srenretee Phone (Asse 202) 544-6060 a > « & @ c « 4 z 430 Fast Street, $.£., Washungton, 6.C, 20003 ‘. Soya among others, but 1 don't ‘recall anything specific relating or tying the two together. Mr. Johnston. Would you quarrel with individuals who had the same knowledge you did -= and you have testified that they did not draw such a connection? Mr. Swenson. That they did not draw a connection? Mr. Johnston. Yes, Mr. Swenson. I couldn't quarrel with them, no. Mr. Johnston. In other words, you think knowledgeable officials, knowledgeable of both the Kennedy assassination investigation and of the AMLASH operation += Mr. Swenson, I think iv would have been logical them to consider that there could be a connection and have explored it on their own. Mr. Johnston. But therefore you say it would not seem logical for them to testify they drew no connection. Mr. Swenson. Well, I'm not Saying tnat, Mx. Peloquin, Let me just say that I think it is a Semantic difficulty there. tir. Swenson. Plainly Syeuning, everybody's imagination is different. My job, I had Many, Wany years in intelligence, going Dack to pre-Pearl Harbor, so pernass I had a devious mincg so I would consider such things. i think that Many pruee.- dust never considered it. Mx. Johnston. Finally, let me ask you, Knowing that CiA TOP SECRET
ZAR EASES tarmR NM 2 AVON RRC rs B ik Bess Prone (Area 202} WARD & PAUL B10 Forsa Street, SE, Wasnitgtan, O.c. 20003 10 . le 13 14 | | j { ° He. Pay had a special group to investigate. the I ask you how they could have canducted that investigation thoroughly if, A, they didn't know about the AMLASH operation -~- Mr. Swenson. I reaily can't respond because I can't remember the group or what they did, or I can't recall any. with them about it. . coe Mr. Johnston. AS a counterintelligence expert, could you have conducted an investigation if you did not know about the AMLASH operation? Mr. Swenson. I think I would have considered it had I had that role. I didn't have it. Senator Schweiker. I gave you a wrong name there. tow about Raul Diaz, Rea-uel, D-ica-«, as a Cuuoan intelligence agent. Mr. Swenson. I think ne might havevbeen, Senator. The mame sort of stirs 4 faint recollection. Senator Schweiker. The name was incorrect before. an alleyatien that he was at Dealey Plaza. If he were pictured somewnere, would you attach mucin significance or nat? Mr. Swenson. I wouldn't Know, Senator, withour Kno: more about nis background. x'a have to see rvulationship he hau to Cuban intelligence. Sanator Schweike:. pia you ever hear of a werris Bishep or Bisnic who was acting in some capacity with tikes: TOP SECRET
Phone [Aras 202) alo Fisse Street, $-E.. veasmingron, O.C. 26003 Mr. Swenson. Morris pishop? Senator Schweiker. Bishop or just Bishop as 4 cede name or either the name of a Bishop oF Morris Bishop? Mr. Swenson. Tf don't recall. Senator Schweiker. It doesn't ring any bell at all? Mr. Swenson. (Neds in the negative.) Mr. Epstein. What other assasination plots, if any, you aware of against Castro that were being planned by the CIA other than AMLASH? Mr. Swenson. 1 think vat was the only one that 1 personally knew about at the time. 1 think there might have been one other. My stand was the same on this generally. Mr. Epstein. Did tne other one have the same security problem involved? mx. Swenson. I @éon't recall] that it did. Really, f don’s | | have any keen recollection oF anything on chis. if there were | 16 | 17 o something significant that would have anergea, £ would tell you because [ would have remembered it. ‘ pe. Epstein. At any af the meetings or diseusgions that followed president Kenneay'S assassination, was any concern ever expressed chat an investigation ci yossible Cupar cies might resuit in @xpesing the CiA's plex, toe agsassinate absolutely not. 2 Gon't think any friend oF TOP SECRET
if aa] ENN. 7 - ©: He i f Prone [Ares 202) 364-6000 WARD & PAUL ., Wastoagion, O.C. 20003 Alt Fist Street, SE ~ ~~? woe oH Gc fc @ nN ee nm to nw nm n an o> ‘operation in investigating possible connections. eared. Mr. Epstein. They wouldn't have cared if the CIA's plots to assassinate Castro were exposed? Mr. Swenson. Not if that had a bearing on,.the assassinatign of the President. I'd say there was no attempt on the part of any people I knew to cover up anything which would be embarrass) ing, if that's what you're getting at. i Mr. Epstein. Well, my question also relates to your own Would -- Mr. Swenson. Had I found a connection, I would have i surfaced it immediately. Mr. Epstein. I understand, but in the decision as to wha: leads to set out or what preadth to give to the exploraticn of tnat issue, or what assets to contact, would not an issue involved in how broad to carry that be involved with the of wnether it would compromise an onyoiny CIA operation? Mr. Swenson. I suppose it would be an element. ! everthing if I'm dosny it. Bub it would not have: consider deterred me. ar. Epstein. were the Agency personnel attached to une itiami office aware of the security vroblems involving AMLASH Aygeney plot might have been ana che possibility that chat compromised? TOP SECRET
Mr. Swenson. I can’t recall specifically. Insofar. as people located at the WAVE station who had any participation or connection with it are concerned, I would have seen to it that they were alerted concerning any misgivings 1 had. Mr. Epstein. Would that haveincluded every person connectgd with WAVE station that was interrogating Cuban intelligence assets? f Mr. Swenson. Well, 1 wouldn't have gone to talk to everybody there, but there was a CI staff at the WAVE station a se] J which reported to the then Chief of Station at WAVE, and in ar 10 a dotted line function reported to me, and {I certainly Looked PA cette inertia ae ee who ns | ad 4 o ~ cea : — < 12 | at everything that they were doing, and when I had misgivings z . c # ! RE © § 12 | i would go there and express them. x fom < ¢ H ae : z - 14 Mr, Epstein. Do you remember discussing the possibility <= is |} Of the insecurity of AMLASH being the subject of discussion : La ‘ : : 16 between you and the Chief of the WAVE station? 1? Mr. Swenson. I have no specific recollection. iz ‘ : i ie ral Mr. Epstein. Did you have any contact with the Warren eee ay i ees ™ Hi : eee 3 ya Commission? ee oH cS Pr Sir, GwenSon. None. H Pee g ra i el J . o4 : > Ls a z 22 Mx. Epstein. Do you recasi who Gite . ea a - ; Ed \ : ‘ ° 4 ay Sys Tq ral ‘ \ ui op i Mr. Swenson. i do not. U ~ . 1 iB some & i wy, Hustein. Was any reguirenenc ever levied on you 4 a Ze . a 5 bt ru be 24 | for information bearing on the assassination to be supplice S { the Warren Commission? TOP SECRET SET wae N ES GETS BS SIN AEN RUMP © as a a A NOE TS <
Mx. Swenson. Not that I can recall. Mr. Wallach. Were you ever at any time learn or pick up knowledge that Castro might possibly have sent teans Prone [Ares 202) 344-6000 ** %: of persons into the United States, for sabotage missions or otherwise, in mid-'63 or late ‘63 in retaliation for the sabotage attempts against -- Mr. Swenson. Not in retaliation, no. Mr. Wallach. Well, how about just for sabotage here? Mr. Swenson. Well, I think he ~~ the teams which he sent in of which I am knowledgeable, were sent for the purges: of intelliyence collection or penetration of anti-Castro rt as within the United states. Mr. Wallach. Were you ever aware, or are you aware th3+ 4 2 < * a a « 4 2 sometime -- I cannot recall the date, it was "61 or ‘62. Mr. Epstein. ‘62. Mr. Wallach. ‘'62. they were run out of New York, which Fy was later intercepted, caught by the FBI, that there was an assassination attempt peing run by DGI anc certain perse.a within the United States? . ts tnat a fair quesriony vat, O.C. 20003 Mr. Swenson. t think in 1962 we dian’t xnow MR rg NTRS ET Cuban incelliyence. Well, what they used to call Cuban ALG Fasat Xteeet, S.€., Waarur was, you Know, our knowledye early on SEARS San eT | tl at 4: presses as ¥ TOP SECRET Seat kag BNE eH BOER
Prone {Ares 202) 544-6000 < 2 « ry 4 a & < z 410 Forat Sireet, $-£.. Wasmngtan, D.C. 20003 quite fragmentary. We Learned about the Cuban ‘intelligence function through the defection of a rather well-placed person whom I debriefed at great length, and [ never got from him anything which is germane to what we are discussing here. Mr. Johnston. What was his crypt? Mr. Swenson. AMMUG-1. Mr. Wallach. In any event, the FBI did through 4 well- known Cuban in New York City, intercede and stop assassination plots against certain-of the anti-Castro leaders. Was that ever called to your attention in ‘62? Mx. Swenson. iI can't recall that. Mr. Epstein. Just one more yeneral -- Mr. Swenson. It might have been prior to the time thas I went to the Counterintelligence group. we. Wallach. Generally, can you describe for us 16 | your knuwledge, what you know, iff anything, about the or Hatia-run operations in Cuba in '63? Mr. Swenson. No knowledge. Wallach. No knowledye? Gwenson. Absolutely mone. Was that an issue chat 2s aver consiuersd by your gration me possipility, not for assassination purposes L had no xnowledge ci ist a i would not nave Looked on it with great favor TOP SECRET
Bo er saying your operation =~ You're Mr. Swenson. I didn't know about it, had no connection with it, and I have no firsthand knowledge. counterintelligence activities by your.-- Mr. Swenson. Not by me, no, or my staff. Senator Schweiker. Well, we want to thank you very Mr. Epstein. And it was never considered as a method of : much. | | { s I think we have pretty well exhausted ourselves. I hope you are not. too exhausted, ir. Swenson. We appreciate your cooperation in coming here this morning. “yr 11 4 Hi 4 mS 12 | Mr. Swenson. Very giad to have been here. @ 2 12 | (Whereupon, at 11252 o'clock a.m., the interview in tne \ cu ¢ . = . ~ 14 above-entitled matter was concluded. } : fh 7 nN Paws ary ie tess : 1G Forst Strezt, 5.£.. Wasningtan, H.C. 20003 ie) rae] oa we ores TOP SECRET SME ED GARETT FRAT OTP EA at: ah ee ™