14-00000 Section, His recognition of the names. of individuals at the United States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 ane even their assignments seems adequate, The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names of most agents or operative contacis who were part of the KGB network among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not Tecognize their Photographs, and did not give suificient details con- cerning their Specific activities is considered + to be an unwarranted criticism, ‘NOSENKO indicates that in general £ the & handling of agents in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers, It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain a Single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that respon- Sibility for an agent would-not be transferred merely because the agent had access toa a target who was the responsibility of a case officer other than the handler of the agent. This apparent Pailovophy is of particular interest in connection with NOSE SNKO, who even though he was the case officer responsible for ABIDIAN an together with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent network which he Specifically handled, Mere use of an agent fox report~ ing On or a specific activity agaiast a particular target was normaily GOOLL?S
14-00000 not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established | handler-agent relationship has considerable merit, ; _NOSENKO, as. previously indicated, has stated that ne had the responsibility for work against code Clerks” at tne United States Embassy during 1960 - 1961, Except for the period of time that he claims respon~ sibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early. 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision or the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, ‘Gemadiy i. GRYAZNOV, Viadimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN ; and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision oi NOSENKO only in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks, It is quite clear that the knowledge of NCSEN? AO concerning the code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1941, was mech greater than his knowledge of any other cate sory of American employees at the United States Embassy during this period excevit for ABIDIAN,
14-00000 The foliowing comments are concerned with several specific cases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by the KGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a considerable amount of specific work was carried oui by NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV. The first case, iJames STORSBERG) is covered'on pages 146 - 177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered necessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequate ‘reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB re effort against\STORSBERG, t is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment plich was made to'STORSBERG, NOSENKO has. retracted this particular claim, but there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approacn to STORSBERG) An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach to Ve ' ~, \ . : . TAN TAA to STORSBERG, since STCORSBERG! dated this as October 1961, NCSENXO has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based on remarks by KOVSHUK to him,
14-00000 i SS S ra Oo @ QO +2) oO oO Qa c by Lal Oo fon f eh gh © o 3 fu 2) rh fens —< ao; © NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable account of the STORSBERG) case, He has stated that he cannot precisely } vA Ou rs) er oO fe @ rs *g af i] p Qa rs ch oO 7) r . td ty bg a ti eh et b' i) ch we ct o Gi a ci r} by @ fen vi o fore the * i : —- ) 6 , approach at the Moscow airport to! James KEYSERS/(June 14, 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken against|KEYSERS; ; . » f . . sO ° . = When recently reinterviewed,| STORSBERG|continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1951, but the internal evidence in es his description of coliateral events makes it clear that the approach had 4 to have taken place considerably earlier. i; (Joseph MORONE, another code clerk at the United States Embassy, who will be the subject of further discussion below, nas been interviewed on the basis of statements by: ‘ST ORSBERG)|t that \3 MORONE E) was present in American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements of MORONE) clearly indicates that the events'STORSBERG describes could not have taken place later than the period February to early May 1961, The pest estimate possible ai this time is that the approach to ‘STORSBERG)] occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatibie with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO, In the face *S we M4 £ fx moe oy fo be son = - 7 rT Sa oT ~\ a. of this approximation of the date of the approach to|ISTORSBERG} it is gu01182
14-00000 believed reasouadle to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK to. GORITSYN in January 1961, as related sy GOLITSYN concerning ~ ; ~ . . Coase. wee ee lee mot y & successiui operation against a\military code clerk in Moscow at the end of 1960, referred to' STORSBERG, and that KOVSHUK either was referring to a compromise phase of the oneration rather than the actual approach, or was prematur ely claiming anticipated success. Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain information in regard to the attempted defection operation against James HEYSERS; As of this time, it is considered that there are no Giscrevancies between — record iniormation and information fvora NOSENKO w . ich in any way refiect against NOSENKO, KEYSERS| did not recognize a photograph of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the air- port, but this does not provide a valid reason to Gisbelieve the. statement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to tal to'KEYSERS} There are certain statements relative to the/KEYSERS, case as set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment, (a) The statement is made thet no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard KEYSERS as the replacement for STORSBERG) In fact, KEYSERS) actually was being trained by ST RSS BERG as a Si ubstitute, not 4 replacement, even though his primary assignment CUC1183
14-00000 —, Sad cam ey cet ng Was not that of a code NCOSENKO has during 0, 0 Hy al current interviews xeiated how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the macrophone in the Military code room at tne United States os Embassy thas KEYSERS) either ‘Was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a a considerable period of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was that\ST ORSBERG) was having a difficult time expiaining. the particular work to .KEYSERS) The observations of NOSZNKO are of interest since KEY ERS actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by ISTORSBERG) so that he could act as a substitute, Under the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that: (KEYSERS) was to be the eventual replacement of STORSBERG, (b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his iran cron departure from Moscow, KEY SERS)a acknowledged to his supervisors /Colonel URBAN/ his homosexual tendencies and he adraitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, Ay ll at the American House" (page 179). £ couiie4
14-00000 a ay Contrary to:this assertion, a review oi the official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of £(Colonel, \URBAN reflects that KEYSERS) was not informed by URBAN /of the Nallegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union." (c) On page 236 of the previous summary, tae statement is made that, "In the single case in which he) /NOSENKO/ asserted that he reilie d on information pro- ~ cured from microphones (KEYS: ERS} £ allure to report | receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error," While the official record shows that'KEYSERS) did inceed report receipt of the defection letter to (Colonel) \URBAN;) in the office of Colonel URBAN, it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before} EYSERS) left the Embassy for the airport, NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that'KEYSERS) had not reported receipt of the defection letter and there- Pp Pp fore had decided to approach) \KEYSERS) jJatthe airport. In % “ys ty rd. 19) J RS) revort of x ae cS view of the short time between eceipt 2 ( | | 6001185
14-00000 of tne letter and his departure frora Moscow, it would = +t ars aalocn 4 na ‘ = OP en nae, al 23.2 . Have been rernarc<aoie ix the AGS nad learned to.S in . 7 a \ . account of NOSZNKO in the| KEYSERS) matter therefore is considered completely credible, Pages 181 ~ 184 of the previous summary contain information in regard to(Matthew_ ZU iJ US), who succeeded (James STOR 2SBERG) » -having arrived in Moscow in September 1961, GRYAZNOV was the b responsible case officer for ZUIUS) according to NOSENKO. The previous summary states (page 183) that /ZUIUS, during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "I LILLIAN, " wno. visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. - "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech, Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport nad peen issued to "LILLIAN, ' and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN! repiied that she had forgotten it, then leit, and did not return, The previous summary stated that the above incident had been |
14-00000 oh ae ew Page 194 of the previous surnamary relates information from NOSZNKO that GRYAZNOV went to East Ber re am in early 1980 to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of American House, During current interviews, ‘this matzer has been again covered » with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for. these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an Austrian. _NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA, ' as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed "HANNA" had met MORONE/at American House. ina recent interview, Lo : a 4 . _- . . , ; ; . . MORONE) confirmed thatin early 1941 h had met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of -‘MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO,. Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO re- ported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American House, NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 ~ 1941. He as wan ferpartte + at has never suggested any connection with ZUIUS, nor is there reason = to assume that he couid be referring to the experience of| ZUJUS) since this took place in the summer of 1952, aiter NOSE NKO hac left the American Embassy Section. pooLLs?
14-00000 it was the conclusion of the previous sw ummary that NOSENKO dia not know enough about ‘ZUIUS) oy nis background to have exercised any Supervision in the development of ZUIUS). Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regard-n wg ZUSUS, tae fact is that NOSENKO S leit the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which ime any supervisory functions of NOSENXO terminated. ‘ZUJUS) who Gid not arrive in Moscow until September 1951, remained in Moscow until January i963, NOSENKO could naardly be held responsible for | knowing anything about'ZUJUS) ) er i January 1962. es 185 - 189 ox tne previous summary contain a synopsis of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to|Paul JENNER} Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that ‘Paul JENNER, who was s thought tobea code clerk,» was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as JENNER) to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the | rain entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted with! JENNER) as apart of a future operation against! JE ENNER): in Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with/ JENNER). NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both f cen e > KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of JENNER, 28 a 6001188
a ee ang that he, NOSENXO, read the renort submitted by KOSOLAPOV on tne trip from Helsinki to Moscow, i ~ —_= ‘ ad 2 7 (JENNER, after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, ''a boy. and a giri, probably university students," who struck up a conversation, . . f _ Se : ° fs ymrm)e According to\JENNER) they both said that they might see, JENNER in Moscow. About three months later’ JENNER) reported being apvroached . . f PE gone on courier business, There was a short conversation and she gave ‘i ENNER) a phone number, insisting that he call her ; The woman also advised JENNER not to.mention the conversation to anyone, NOSENKO has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter JENNER) at the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet couriers, Insofar as is known, JENNER)has never been shown a photograph of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a ’ university student. 1 G0U1189
During current interviews, NOSZNKO has repeated the same C ~ Qe Ty, = “ans oe ral story as regards Paul JENNER, He still insists that KOSOLAPOV yy 6 en gm @ £ * was on the same train with JENNER gvom Eelisinki. Collateral infor- mation raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the (31)March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, ang that one Viktor h KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow. ' The above obvious discrepancy has not peen and cannot be clari- fied with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was eitner on the same train as JENNER) or he was note Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy anc girl, probably university students' who, according tolJENNER) struck up a conver- sation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to [TENNER at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some other person entirely. gGoG1is
14-00000 it is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evicence that KOSOLAPOYV could not have been on tae same train as rnanifests are in error, .. Ds eh by p eb et at ce & et Lat rs) pie +) JENNER, Neither is it accepte + ° There is just not a satisiactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and JENNER/were on the same train, If indeed KOSOLAPOV Gid not travel with J JENNER; this Goes not establish anything more tnan + ‘ that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something te ne, as the supervisox of KOSOLAPOV, should have Known according to his own statements. Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the John GARLAND) case. GARLAND)was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to GARLAND) vother than to identity him as a code clerk, GOLITSYN nas reported on an incident which itis considered relates to the trip of GARLAND irom Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American ade + code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that GUOLASL
the responsible SCD case officer, XOSCIAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki under alias to > Strike up an acai julaintance with the code clerk which the scD hoped to ‘continue in Moscow, GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV -in Helsinki at that time, and the Resideincy procured for KOSOLAPOYV. a place in the compartm ent of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow. The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN nad advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy Section"! (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had aelped | a KOSOL APOV. “According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to Giscuss | the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have result ted ina successful recruitment. It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an intervi ew with the -FBI on 20 March 1962, referred. to the above "SCD officer from the Embas sy Section" as (inu) ZENKIN of the American Departmenz, GOLITSYN also Stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alia of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unaole to furnish a first narre and patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to {fnu) ZENKIN as being from the American Department, SCD, It is considered that there is no doubt that the (imu) ZENKIN referred io by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name 32 | gveL192 erry
i i iene ay concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information, NOSENKO has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but possioly is Yuriy) as an officex oz the Second Section, Firs: Depart- ment, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section . both before and after 1960 - 1961 Was engaged in "operative games! against American intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection With activities of the Second Section, but that he had no Specific ‘knowledge regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has fur- 1 nisied some ‘ragmentary ‘nformation which he learned in regard to_ ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together wit his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOS ENKO may prove quite useful, As regards the KOSOLAPOV~GARLAND matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the. case (GARLAND) that it must have resulted ina successful recr uitment, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption, According’ to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve } NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in 1950-1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case * GOUL193
at cee te meme od Ofticer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against/|GARLAND was the responsibility of the First Section, it Goes not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have knowof any developments in the KOSOLAPOV+GARLAND) matter, The finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists John GARLAND) and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers, ‘GARLAND; when interviewed in 1962 ; rollowing the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Sovéet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow. trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBlanda polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent. It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as|GARLAND/from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960. Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not goe1i84
14-00000 a oe ra eon each trip must have specific hign-level approval, The red tape waich taus must inevitably have been involved in prepar ration for sucha trip further supports the assumption tnat NOSENKO should have known about the AOSOLAPOVIGARLAND| trip. The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything* about - it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of GARLAND, he would have been aware of it, NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow ona trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibili: exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960, However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV ‘trip. As with the| \JENNER}-K KOSOLAPOV case, itis not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies ; pertaining to tae GARLAND: KOSOLAPOV trip, The fact that NOSENKO denies any mor igets i GUVUTLS 35
this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the TENNER case, of his not’ knowing something he, by his own statements, snould have known. Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the ‘JENNER case nor those in the(GARLAND) case, ‘singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not super- visor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary. Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk Joseph MORONE from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962. According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against MORONE) was KOSOLAPOV, When it was learned that MORONE) and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of BEGGS): were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to “ 9 . a ~=, . aN Moscow and travel irom there to Warsaw on the same train as. MORONE fo 1 and\BEGGS, The intent was for the agent, either on the train or sub- sequentiy in Warsaw, to meet and compromise MORONE sexually. She QOUCL1S6 | 36
14-00000 Saal tees Me? oi anne OS successfully accom: aished this, but due to certain voroblems in KGB-UB A $4. Fa > liaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB ito Oo exploit this directly. 7 The previous summary stated that with respect to the female UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the|MORONE ) case described by -NOSENKO, That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and of BKOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the Same time as ‘the(MORONE trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and KOSOLAPOV being invoived personally in this part of ¢ the|MORGNE i= case, NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female oc agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. IMORONE, and BEGGS) departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was onthe 16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow. NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 fox Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possibile within the known time frame. it is clear that NOSENKO in 1952 exaggerated placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states ¢
14-00000 KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent, NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking , ¢ to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician aiter he returned from Cuba, The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not con- sidered that the retractions NCS ENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him. Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that ‘MORONE, when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House, NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning! MORONE, (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that MORONEjhad been intimate with IVANOVA | and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of MORONE) with "IVANOVA's friends," 6001188.
14-00000 NOSENKO, curing cuxsrent interviews, has indicated awarenes ofat least some involvement of IVANOVA with MORONE. He has fur- nished information on a developing operation against Marine guard GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of GARCIA) \ \ with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered \ of using IVANOVA against’ ‘MORONE to obtain compromising photographs. This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the militiaman/ KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA, her girl friend, | ‘MORONE 2 Z)and a Marine guard, possibly. GARCIA) had been "in the city, “ then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines where the girls spent the night. This apparently 3 placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section. ae “According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Piétro CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embas. sy and agent of KOSOLAPOV, reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled aothing specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE. The summary also states that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employees to be a close friend of CECCHI and that\MORONE)had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI. During current interviews, NOSENKO has statec that CECCHI furnished "pieces" of information concerning; MORONE,) but he, NOSENKO x oS # e gJ0L1189
14-00000 knew of no black market involvement of MORONE with CECCHL: NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, _and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHIi was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the: Maurice ZWANG) case below, The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that/MORONE/ met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment. A review of official records indicates that MORONE)did repost having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them, The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation, Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is con- sidered completely acceptable. 40 | 5IUL2E0- aes
A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in-the previous summary on pages 199 ~ 204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank) \DAY, Robert DWEL: .¥ and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of . * NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was - not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The follow “ing observations may assist in placing these cases in their preper | perspective: (a) |Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG)was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on! during 1960 - 1961, The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against'ZWANG' was inadequate, First, reporting of NOSENKO on| ZWANG contained no reference to the relationship of ZWANG) with his maid, whorn NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although ~ ( ZWANG) denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment, During polygraph examination! ZWANG) reacted when he ao Go0L204
14-00000 ne of this relationship to the KGB. responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual. relations with his maid, The gailure of NOSENKO to re- port on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be piausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details . a + oe 1) Second, NOSENKO had not reported that ZWANG | was involved in tne currency operations of Pietro CECCHI. (A fact that previous summary implied he should have . Known from KGB agent CECCHI,) From the record, hnow- ever, it appears that the dealings of ZWANG) were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvem ent of ZWANG or, as NOSENKO himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report al details of his currency operations to his KGB handler. (b) (John TAYLOR)- NOSENKO identified ‘TAYLOR asia State Department code clerk)jand target of KOSOLAPOV. r ‘ The KGB was aware of the involvernent of, TAY LOR)with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit/TAY LOR) before his departure in early 1941 since to do so migne g001 202 42
endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to\James: “STORSBERG, who nad been under development for almost 7 a year and was considered more valuable. The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question "failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG| was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR; the operation against STORSBERG was underway before (TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, itis apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in' TAYLOR’ since he was approached ata later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow. (c) [Frank DAY) - NOSENKO identified/Frank DAY as ‘a State Department code clerk)who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about (DAY) and no oper- ational measures were taken against/DAY, The previous summary noted that in July 1961, (DAY) traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and|former overt CIA employee, Agricultural ttache G. Stanley BROWN.) It was also Stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons G001203
at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman" & in their hotel room wuen they unexpectedly returned, and that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet female'' was believed to have been psanted in their train compartment. According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the locAl KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to doa thorough job on(DAY! and /BROWN, but it apparently was nonproductive, It does not'seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results, (d) [Robert DWELLY| - NOSENKO has related in con- siderable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV to involve|Robert DWELLY, a code clerk) in Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual com- promise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion| DWELLY) was a homosexual, 001204
There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSZ@NKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged, There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSENKO. _DWELLY has categorically denied being a homo- sexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessediDWELLY as. a homosexual, There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about! DWELLY? as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO, (e) ‘Joseph GAFFEY - NOSENKO has identified Joseph GAFFEY, as alcode clerk .) The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure ‘GAFFEY) into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House. By way of comment, the previous summary stated. that GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that Fred KADERA)had reported that! GAFFEY nad told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Amenatepeco
A cee ad Se name 2 a GAEFEY) was recalled . House, lt was further noted thai: from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunken- ness and Guring interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apart- ment and that she had claimed pregnancy. As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered: . (1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962, (2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by'GAFFEY during inter-~ view, GAFFEY| also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to GAFFEY) IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about i May g001.266 46 PO ne a? * it é
14-00000 1962, which is approximately four months after NOSENKO has Stated he transierred to the Seventh Department, The matter ford review by NCSENKO of OTU veports from micro~ phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been © mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter | of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964; and damage estimates prepared by the Americans, The previous conclusion ~ was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion, A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding id . 5 t of the microphone matter. In the material brougnt out by NOSENKO in 7! 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side hand- written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro- phones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy, This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be repeated here, The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character~ ized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO G001207
14-00000 has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva. During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to | his acquiring the list as well.as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the ' Judgment of the previous summary. NOSENKO has stated that in 190 - 1961 Viadimix I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desized some "points" for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point! not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the Hake, " The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem, According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points!" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Viedislav KOVSHUK, Viadimir 1. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which g001208
14-00000 was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain Embassy "points'' controlled by the First Section, and permitting PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section, According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list .. of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical cover-~ age. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper ~~ which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the United States Embassy and residences, | When the meeting ended, NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office. Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following names in Russian: (LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and Sipe BURTIN: The name A, A, MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of (LUBIN) and the name of Y, E, CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of ( SMITH, NOSENKO has explained that’ LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and'Sipe BURTIN)were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section, | NOSENKO stated he imew nothing more about the four non-Soviet names except that they were targets of PETROV, NOSENKO stated chat he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it occurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (According to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey va FEDOSEYEV as G00L269 i to) neat een Se oh teen Sh
Me et Fe dee Na nme ve Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard to the four non-Sovies names leaves no doubt that/LUBIN is George, \LUBIN; and that Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTiN)are correct mames, with Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN All three are American citizens who were in the USSR cixca June 1961, (SMITH) at this time, -. has still not been identified, . | es In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961, 4 According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages . of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This, according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write ail their - notes, destroying any other notes, According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he leit the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSZYEV G0Ui210 50
when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate, According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh Department, In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared while ‘in the First Section; e. Bes his notes fora lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to a "mass. surveillance! on the American Embassy. | ‘By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject, NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit oi the KGB responsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traific, While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known couL2it
14-00000 to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there ' is no reason to question his statement. In the previous summary (pages 240 - 248), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With _ the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the “responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL : . was, CIA, but he hasnever identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK | . knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK. | As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate, (a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was . "American Intelligence.'' GARBLER, however, did not goodzt2
14-00000 nk © Sern arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO ieft the First Section for the Seventh Wepariment, (b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect tha | [ lwas a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow irom October 1960 to September 1961, The "intensive KGB . surveillance" is based on statements of land may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening, (c) (Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by. NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee, (d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer, George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicaze g001213
| I that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suspicion. it is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CLA officera are of particular significance in establishing t that he was | oF was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There ars too many un- known factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assump- tons as to what the KGB knows, it is poasible that (a) the KGB did net know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known. to the KGB was not t available at the First Section, Firet Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the Firet Section or to a specific case officer was of ne official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities ts  guggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in tha Section regarding CIA identifications; a Propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exeggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case. ; Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there ia collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in 34 . G0 O41244 Ce.
14-00000 the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960 damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which there is no supporting evidence, As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which there is no collateral information, the previous summary coneluded that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to Bulgaria, if it did take place, ata time when he claimed the operation ( against STORSBERG) was reaching a climax and his subordinates were "apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS ty newly -discovered vulnerability, " it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dis- pensable. - There was, however, no evidence that NOSENXKO did not travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his account of the purpose of the trip was untrue. As to the\STORSBERG! case, while it cannot at present be proved that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKXO left for Bulgaria, it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from} LORONE) that it had to nave taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning PAG RAS ECS wy ° ie: feo Bot
of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively ixee to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the [STORSB ERG) operation had been completed, As to the KEYSERS) case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to KEYSERS) took place aiter NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made. «+ In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.. wi oN . me ee me ee
14-00000 ~~ SECRET F. NOSENKO's CLAIMS, TH T IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF . 4 OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND ee Ra ee a Oe EN RIN ob WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE
14-00000 SECRET F, NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a A Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous | conclusion) The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter. NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief ScD and although an order had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position | According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was a sr ir aeinet | we J . SECRE | | Exctadeg a anowmatle Ciwagradiaz aad | beciassities Silea
14-00000 willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section, However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUKas a Deputy, Vladimir . Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the . position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indi- cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best knownto ~- GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB. This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 ~ January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart- ment, Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-_ tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks. in regard to the January ~ July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases G80 219
14-00000 OLuitus are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of (Wallace Everett | JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst | ‘BRAUNS, Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO, It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January ~ July 1962. That there were KGB operations against; JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and) \BRAUNS) has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals. | A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari~ fication. . In the [Wallace Everett JOHNSON\case, it was previously noted | that JOHNSON| arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962, The summary sug gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend- encies of JOHNSON) were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO, NOSENKO during cure ent ines rviews 3 7) Ty =D an Semas. :
14-00000 ya som ' oe on Oi bbe & has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON "by chance" soon after his arrival, "SHMELEV" and NGRIGORIY, " two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where/JOHNSON stayed. They met JOHNSON there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies, “In regard to the William Carroll JONES! case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation as an agent to work against JONES jand was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the| JONES) case are compatible — with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, In regard to the Natalie BIENSTOGK: case, NOSENKO did not claim oad to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details con-~ cerning the (BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case, In regard to the ‘Horst BRAUNS) case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom! BRAUNS) met inthe USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that ( : 4 | go0d 221 CD
14-00000 EIN. the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor -with Soviet expatriates, NOSENKO, accord~ - ing to the previous summary, was aware that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application. In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting ‘velatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from -NOSENKO,* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon=- sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved.’ However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that'BRAUNS) was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made (BRAUNS) of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD, However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Depart+ | ment since BRAUNS)was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa appli- cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. ‘BRAUNS) had a * By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the . 999 Seventh Department. The situation was not the same DD iges: PA aT
14-00000 vs © Ne rea he Se ( relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concern- ing his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no | specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR. Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible, There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of ‘the case, There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance ae to Viadimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV. The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in. what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and infor~ mation from the actual CIA record of the case, There are major differ - ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differ- ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case, NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom & American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the - GN0L 223
14-00000 KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated _— that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrange~ ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, ad did not know BELITSKIY's pattern 7 of activity in Moscow or Geneva. NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness | that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still-has dated the recruit- ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR, The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY v was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR. There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis= crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKLIY case and the actual record are a reflection against eH OULE 24
14-00000 siete nee ter eeeneemsee wean three aetna ete RATER een ee ence nee nen 4 the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relation- ship of BELITSKIY with CIA, There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. ‘Asa possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in —196la partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused . - BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these. events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA. | The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was xecruited by CIA in London ~ in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961: a (a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which ‘time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also" reporting to MI-5, This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to G0OL225
14-00000 det roe. Sol b ae ae George BLAKE, (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would » ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead-to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under | suspicion as having passed information to Soviet. Intelligence. } (b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CLA rather quickly because he met a girl he had pr eviously known whom he was sure-‘was an American Intelligence agent and © that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence, (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact, However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail- ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore GUUL225 oe) ie ye perry wand
would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact - with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have toid the KGB ke had seen a particular woman wnom he had previously kaown, he was sure she worked fox American Intelligence and it was through this woman - = American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in | ' Geneva.) - > {c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva a « greed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA,’ However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must -be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSATY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY e with CLA, The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSXAIY had not been under KGB control between 1958 Rha and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story o the 1961 events in London.
14-00000 As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep- ancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against _NOSENKO, and there is a distinct Possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the  BELITSKIY case, The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA, '§ ‘The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and 'CIA did not warn BELITSKIY, "! | There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement: by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actualy happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence whie previously in Paris, France. | 6001228 ll w rr cD - rey a]
14-00000 We ia ate It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been Nforcibly recruited by American Intelligence" ata previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB asa loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA. | Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. _ It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly . familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV . with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959, The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart- ‘ment. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV ' was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi- mately 1957, 12 GOL 229 ae 2p ne ean reer eeememns meme erent rE etter eaectnaneniefet beh ane RH Se NAPA TORS FPS PT BOSE BER LT EBT PEEL EPO TE dl EE STREET OY
14-00000 A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as 'CIA American tourist agents,'! reveals there is no con- flict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Depart- | ment. As anexample, one of the cases is the case of (Edward McGOWAN, ‘NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the — First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only — became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department. Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with(a CIA) ‘officer| _ | | | and visited the USSR ona tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely un- likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for as sistance in a case involving an American diplomat. G004236
14-00000 Ned Gen Ye § A een ib Pages 332 ~ 333 of the previous summary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO thathe wasa i_- Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. ‘During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964, An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu~ sion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964, The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews, an cifort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explan= ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes. ‘During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa- tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 - 1961, COGLI34 nowy cri ad rei SEU
14-00000 Voi Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows: | (a). Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Departrnent, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. | According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of: the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also ex=_ panded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand- ' written reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors, Many of the above cases had previously been trans~ ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about thet 4232 15 en a er
14-00000 inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA." (b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were - made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two - occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before _ his defection, (c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 ~ 1963, (d} Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961, (e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre- pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the . Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh 0001233
14-00000 SECRET Department, According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document, The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union, ‘An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con- siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with — little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his depart- ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been des-~ troyed by NOSENKO. | The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable, The reference to three documents was to: (a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously. (b) A typed two-page report on several cases, Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did. 6001234
14-00000 eR Me (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent, NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one, Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered | document and did not contain the usual information as to . “number of copies typed. G0GL235 7 c Cr rey 7) oA Pr] stone f
14-00000 SECRET G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT Ten TS a SEE ESSA Arete ere SSS cacti nen ateneoreah—Pe THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN ZMBASSY PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964 - en ne a att AN AN LIN 170% GRaUP 4 ; vom nutematic
14-00000 ea ea ee G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB ” recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion) The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB ‘recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception | of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and ‘Herbert’ HOWARD, who actually was a USIA) employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy. | The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of — NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB | recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment, This should in no way be interpreted asa suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area. The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENQ UST? be examined and can be cited as follows. epee reece Chou? 1 | Excluded from automatic Gowairading and Mnelessificaiias j
14-00000 tt ange ted tem (a) During March 1953~-late May 1955 NOSENKO _ Was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been ' he would have heard "something. " (b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, | but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department, NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United . States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details, (c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United | States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960~1961, have heard or learned some details of thy 04228 case or cases, There is merit to this contention by 2
14-00000 NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart~ ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 anda period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department. . | (d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First | Department; in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First. Secticn, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department, | According to NOSENKO his relationship with . GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that = he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the. Herbert HOWARD: case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually | 6001239 es) C4 i “> ae vy Sad |
14-00000 be noted that there a are ne y other 7 Ideatifed | KB recruttments ay aney oo this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of of NOSENKO, acceptance of the’ ‘opinion of NOSENKO as a being 3 an absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred. NOSENKO may be completely corzect in his opinion, bat since. | . NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1983. - 1955 and 1960 ~ 296 - Jearned of the 1 name when the First Section, First — Department, needed the services of the Seventh oo . Department (Third Section) in obtaining @ Yoo; in a | certain hotel fa for # the Soviet girl friend A offHowaRDy ” in general tt the above constitutes the basis for the. stated a oplaton NOSENKO. However, tn view of the cited actual basis for the opinion 7 honest opinion shouta not be converted into a | statement that it is his s opinion that he would have heard ‘nomething” about 3 a | recruitment in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallibte. : g001240
14-00000 ANNEX | The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex P y - "BY" covering pages 316 - 435, Limited comments concerning Annex A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex mB. - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition, # there is an Annex "'C'' to this summary which is entitled, "The Cherepanov Papers," Attachments: Annex A Annex B Annex C OCR Cy QUUL24¢
14-00000 ~ SECRET ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT 6001243
ANNEX B SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT ne nee LIN Bad LINE tsb Pages 399 - 435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of ‘49 Americans who, according to information from _NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now _ possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGS, It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of ‘49 cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NCSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKS claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements con- cerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of iafor- mation from NOSENKO as well as being supporting eviadtdeA-Lis claimed positions in the KGB.
14-00000 Red won vt 4 8 me 4 To comment specifically on each of the 49) cases would require . avery lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately '40)of the '49) cases, Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps/four cases. The. indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all(49) of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENXO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall some- thing which was insignificant at the time it occurred. Without citing in detail any of the |49)cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, - . - First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows: 0001245 CENRIT Sel ew AR de E
14-00000 (a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960 ~ 1961, as well as several 1958 ~ 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were pre~ pared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an ex- pansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Cnief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960 «= 1961, was limited to information contained in the notes, From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his re- port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable _to the request, (b) NOSENKO learned of several 1942 - 1983 cases of the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I, GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief, puty GO0L1 245 2 ae
First Section, First Department, This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations, However, NOSENKO learned of certain oz the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section,. First Department, for assistance or vice versa, Certain of the 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Depart~ ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 ~ 1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 -1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior £0'1980 and in 1962 ~ 1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 ~ 1961, It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these 49! casas since they do not fall into one ox two specific categories, Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous Ssummazvy. included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approxi- mately five and one~half years. It should be noted, LOWRYPED seat the 4
explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of cael 49) cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - Januazy 1964, ( | a 6004243
14-00000 eS vale | wt ca § THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS TT et ED ? - Pages 309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description | of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV. . passed a package of documents to an’ American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963, The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, - in late 1963. The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consid- eration, if CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information, '' the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question, NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Devariment, i é ayy
14-00000 during 1960 ~- mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from. the KGB, During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have _ been Deputy Chies, First Section, aithough be does not claim to have | had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANGV except in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK, NOSENKO - also claims to have c participated in the hunt for CHEREPAN ov in : . © December 1963. eo a | a bas previously b been given to the ¢ theory that the | Ee : oe Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through - CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO, This theory @ seems 8 to have little cxadibility since the papers contain no information which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the | . First Section, First Depaz -tment, 1960 ~ 1961. The papexs also contain no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of | the First Section during 1958 ~ 1960. Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was | not t under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB. There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is | . . GOOL2S2 iy | OF Pary
14-00000 . ‘wt b some BO nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides -a basis for suspicion . as to their authenticity. im addition, the form and substance of the papers & axe in keeping with the description by "NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department, During current * interviews, the CHE REPANOV case has been ‘covered in detail with NOSENKO, The ‘Cherepanov Papers, Which “ were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, ‘have also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. | Alough “ “NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO- was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, Fir st Depart- ment, and with First Department procedures. | Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the papers anda detailed analysis will be prepared ata later date, It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment kas been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Pavers y S a Since there are no exemplars with which to compaye any of the material. However, based on information developed thus fay, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the ‘conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KCB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive RTT 2 3a »
or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV. The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive infor- mation'' either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas poe oe have been noted and given full considerati | (a) There is no specific ini were any recruitments by the KG i sonnel in the United States Embas a PR. nor is there any information sugge | f : ‘American source or American age 1 during that period of time. a 1 (b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU” an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under lassigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The lettex, which was to POPOV, was obtained » by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS. 4 nO el oe
In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather mimite part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960. The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 = 7 1960 period is only a matter for consideration. | It is not conclusive - we proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source: : - . did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on. either matter, | In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers _ that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to’ POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. | The circumstances under which he was recailed and collateral infor- mation have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV nad been cooperating with United States Intelligence. Ji may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more Spee 4s 4 AE LY OT Pome we
14-00000 CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD, It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead toa penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully Protected ¢ even witain the KGB. The possibility of course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, re sulted in the exposure “of POPOV to the KGB, “but itis not established that it did nor is there a any reason to > believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to develop-. _. ment of the case against POPOV. | ‘The primary question, howéver, as vegards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, ‘this would be ancompatible with information in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion t that the papers contain "deceptive information: "! | The conclusion in regard to the above is chat the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in J anuary 1959 is not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained infor- mation from an FCD agent ox agents which actually led to suspicion ia regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV. GUOL2ZES on
14-00000 oe ‘that the KGB had received information leading to. suspicion < of : POPOV li information was received “rom an important ECD agent such as s George BLAKE or through another valuable # FCD agent which - led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prioz to his. return to Moscow in. 2 November 1988, : it is highly unlikely such information would receive 7 wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or . the SCD.. ie oe is also > possible t the limited group within the KGB who. would beg aware | = from a valuable agent would bes very interested in attributing the, ee exposure of { POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV. : ° ; by WINTERS. » ‘The » possibility should be considered t that prior “to the | retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep / suspicion of POPOV but. that the letter completely solidified t the case against ‘POPOV. . Consideration has been given to: the possibility th ¢ CHEREPANOV | ‘was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American _ tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA - in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most Likely be genuine since’ this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would i : become | a successful operation. . The above theory has been rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it, These factors include the fact that GIOL256 Quem i |
14-00000 ers was at least three years old, which would indicate CHERE BaP eN SOV aad no current access and there | Was no indication CHEREPANG Vv was ix terested in a future contact. POT re re, oem ornay
14-00000 INDEX ABIDIAN, John - IV,E,5,7-15,19, 20, 52 “ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV,G,1-4 ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - I, A,2 ARTEMOV, Vladimir Lvovich - IV, F, 6,12, 13 BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV, E,3,4 BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F,2 ‘BARRETT, Robert)- Il, F, 14,15 | BEGGS, Frank) - IV, E, 36, 37 BELITSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12 BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - lV, B,2,3,5«7 BIENSTOCK, Natalie) - IV, F,3,4 IBIRSE, Arthus -IV,D,1,2 BLAKE, George - IV,D,9; IV, F,9; V,C, 6,7 BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich - IV, F,15,16; V.B,3 BOHLEN, Ambassador - Il, F, 10 BOWDEN, Lewis ~ IV, E, 53,54 BRAUNS, Horst)- Iv, F,3~6 ‘BROWN, G. Stanley - IV,E, 43 G001258 SECREY
14-00000 BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - Iv, P,4 BURGI, Richard - Iv,D,1 BURTIN, Sipe) - Iv, E, 49,50 _ | ae ‘BURTIN, Will) - Lv,E, 49, 50 | 7 | a CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E,39, 40, 42 | CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2,16 CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - III, H, 4; V,C,1=4, 6-8 CHERNETSEV, Y. E. - IV,E,49 CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - Il, B,4 DAY, Frank)- IV, E, 41, 43 DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20, 45 DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV,B, 5,6 DOUGLAS, William 0. - Iv,D,3 | DREW, George) - IV,D,1 \DWELLY, Robert) ~ IV, E, 41, 44, 45 FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. ~V,A,1 FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV,E, 8,9 FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV, E, 49-51; Iv, F,1 FISK, Norman)- IV,D,5 ‘FRIPPEL, Arsene)- I1V,D,2 ee | 6001259 iGAPFEY, Joseph) ~ IV, E, 41, 45, 46 2 OPA rs
14-00000 ae) rr C2 rm | GARBLER, Paul - IV, E,52 GARCIA, Anthony A) - IV, E,39 'GARLAND, Johni - Ill, F,17; IV, E, 31, 33-36 GINSBURG, Michaeli- IV,D,5,6 GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich - WI, B, 3, 4; “IT, E, 9-11; Ill; F, 5-13, 15-19; IV,B,5,6; IV,D,9,10; IV,E, 21,23, 31-34; ViAsL : GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - II, F, 3,4; IV, 63 1V, 6; IV,E,4,5,21; IV,F,1,2 "GRIGORIY" - Ill, F,13; IV,D,3,6; IV,F,4 i GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - I1,B,4; Iv,E,20 . GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - II,B,4; Il, F,8-13,15; Iv, £,5,12,19-21, 26-28, ; 30,43-45; IV,G,3; V,B,3,4 GUK, Yuriy I. ~ 10,B,4 HAMILTON, Victor Norris - II, E,9 (aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri) "HANNA" ~ IV, E, 27 HARRIS, Gisella’- IV,D,1,7,8 HORBALY, William - IV, E, 53 ‘HOWARD, Herbert)- III,E,8; II, F,20; IV,G,1,3,4 IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV,E, 38, 39, 45, 46 JENNER, Paul)- IV, E, 28-31, 35-36 JOHNSON, Robert Lee - II,E,8; UI,G,5_ JOHNSON, Wallace Everett)- IV, F, 3,4 ‘JONES, William Carroll)-1V,F,3,4 GOvL2& 3 mars peo NR] eh | hed doe ERE S
14-00000 KADERA, Fredj- IV, E, 45 KANTOR, Marvin - IV,D,5,6 (KARLOV, fnu - IV,D,5 KASHPEROV, Mikhail - II,H,4 _— . KEMMER, Myra - IV,E,9 KEYSERS, James) - IV, E, 22-26, 55,56 KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich - IV,E,5, 48-51 KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV,B, 1-4,7 KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30,34 (Alias used by KOSOLAPOV) KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - I,B,4; I0,F,8, 16, 17; IV, E,5,19-21, 28-32, 7 34-39, 42-44 oa KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1 KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - IL, B, 4; Ii,F,5,11,12; IV,E, 3,4, 6, 12, 18,21, 23,49,52,53; IV,F,1,2; IV,G,3; V,C,2 KOZLOV, Veniamin -IV,E,12._ KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich - Iv, B,5 LANE, Allen) - IV,D,1,2 _ LANGELLE, Russell - II, F,3; IV,E,8 "LILLIAN" ~ IV, E, 26 (LUBIN, George)- IV, E,49,50 ~ LUNT, Horace}- Ill, F, 3 MAHONEY, Eugene - IV,E,53 G001261 MALIA, Martin)- Iv,D,2 4 Armano Hi ad te Fo rare | VLU §
14-00000 . MIKHAYLOV, A, A, - IV,E, 49 4 MARK, David'~ III, C, 4 MATLAW, Ralph - IV,D,5 MERTENS, Gerard’- IV,D,2 MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - I, E, 8; 1, G,5 MORELL, William N. - IV,E, 52 .MORONE, Joseph’ - IV, E, 22,27, 36,37, 39, 40, 55 MULE, Waltex (Capt.) - Iv,C,4 MC GOWAN, Edward) ~ Iv, F,13 ‘'PECHTER, Bernard\- IV,D,5,6 PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich - IV, E,13 PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - Ill, B, 4; IV, E, 48, 49 POPOV, Petr S. -IV,E,7, 10; V,C/4=7 'PREISFREUND, Johan)- Ll, F,5, 11,12 ‘PRESSMAN, Patrick)- IV,D,5,7 "NRAKETA" -IV,C,5 RASTVOROV, Yuriy - IV,B,5,6 — RHODES, Roy ~ Ill, F, 4 “RUFE, John’- IV,D,5,6 'SCHWARZENBACH, Collette ~ III, F,10 SO0L262 SECRET
14-00000 SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV,E, 32,33 (Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.) ‘SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry) - U1, F,6 SHATTAUER, Sofia/- IV,D,5,7 | SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV, E, 40 SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - I, F,13 "SHMELEV" - i, F,13; IV,D,3, 6; Lv, F,4 ‘SHUBIN, John)- IV,D, SHULGINA, Nataliya -IV,F,l, 12 SMITH, Dayle Wallis - Ill, F, 4,20; IV,G,1 SMITH, Edward Ellis - It, F,4 SMITH, John Discoe - Il, E,9; IV, E, 49, 50° STALIN - IV, B,5 ‘STEVENS, Edmund) - Ul, F, 4,6 ‘STORSBERG, James - Ul, F,3, 5, 11-13: IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55, 56 TARASKA, William ~IV,D,5,6 TAYLOR, David! - IV,D,2 TAYLOR, John - IV, 5, 42, 43 UMANETS, Ella -IV,E,38 6001262 - RP aS ’ ae
14-00000 gre ete (URBAN, (Colonel);- IV, E, 24,25 VASSALL, William ~ I, E, 9; Ul, G, 5; IV,D,9 \WASHENKO, Steve) - IV, E, 53 ‘WILBY, William Stanley -IV,D,2. | | 7 WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, E,,53; V,C,4~7 ZENKIN, FNU - IV,E, 32-34 (Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also. identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SURKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV. ) ‘ZUIUS, Matthew) -.IV, E, 26-28 2WANG, Maurics - IV, E, 40-42 y | ’ GO012°¢. pi 80 nd SECRET