(404-10227-10139) i 27 October 1961 ' MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH-4 oo . EHROUGH: Chief, WH Division SUBJECT: Draft Memorandum, dated 26. October 1961 (attached) i an Lot have no real quarrel with the attached document, but 7 , I would hope that we would follow the realistic and specific . " position adopted by Chief, WH-4 at the State Department me cting - on 26 October, In other words, we have four major points which need settling with Miro according to an agreed upon Line, In addition, we need to find out what other complaints Miro has _ and try to work out solutions acceptable to both sides, Finally, we must establish a working relationship between Wendell Johnson and Miro through which we can attempt to persuade Miro of the need of reconstituting his cfforts in order to undertake a more : - constructive program thati his-present purely administrative one. : ; In the meantime here in Washington we should be rcecxamining the whole question of how to deal with Cuban exiles with the thought that we may be able to present recommendations for a change in the present policy position, On this last point I have’ talked to Sherman Kent's office and hope in the near future to receive a report advising what the estimators think they can contribute on these last issues, At that time we can also geta time schedule, 2. Irepeat, however, that for the moment let us cone centrate onthe major problems with Miro, eliminate the ambi- guifies which have existed between ourselves, State and the White House and try to obtain Miro's confidence in order to be more persuasive with him in the future, on nal B dnes A/DDP/A © Attachment Draft Memo Original & 1 - C/WH.~4 w/Att ~ C/WH w/o Att
14-00000 tN ‘ CE. S nuwee- (ap Cedets deb ‘4 trer, Posen, My Z. ryt, Bo ged cfesinons it GbOse rae vl,” LYS a ied 1961 Sa DRAFT Se - |e. It is our. feeling that it would be desirable to deal with one, . nay / representative of the Cuban ‘exile movements and. 1 owesvepreccatattor of the - Cuban. underground, Need for coordination of activities alone makes this logical, -However, we all recognize that both the exile movement and the underground are badly split into factions, It will be a continuous atruggle to achieve cooperation between these factions, and to achieve ‘complete unity ae a practical political matte is not very realistic. Even within the Council, . and within the FRD,there are elements which will- cooperate with each other on some things and not on others, The experiénce wa ‘with Justo CARRILLO and with Manolo RAY among others makes this amply clear. 2. ACcordingly, as discussed by Dr. MIRO with Mr. HANLEY and . Mr. CLARK, in Baltimore in mid- -September, there must be cher unifying and coordinating factors than simply aiserting the U. &S. Government or some , / one agency will lend support through the CRC, and anyone who wanta funds must go to the CRC, For example, it has now become apparent that the withdrawal of support from the AFJ, as requested by Dr. MIRO,has sirnply | meant that the AFJ has become vocally opposed tothe CRC, The leverage f ae 4 a, least we (9 re' 74 . f formerly exercised with the AFJ has now been removed. A 1 . Renta aero , ; Wwe were foomeoky able to keep them from criticizing the CRC roe -veoadly, ; 3, We are sometimes dismayed to hear the charges made by Dr. - Err fren ae ; 7
14-00000 MIRO that we are not supporting him exclusively. We feel that if we “nemmenerarcntareencittretitman witha bw support from some of the other groups, they. wouta become poe, Part of. Dr. MIRO's opposition, At the same time, we are dismayed at a me the charge made. by Dr, MIRO's , opponente that, .as in fact has been the case, a very large proportion of the ‘Support for Cuban exile activities has been given tohim. The other groups claim, aa he does, to have considerable influence over the underground and the exile communiyg. They too have contacts in the varioua Departments of the U. 5. Government and in- business in the U. S. and abroad; na, aga long time practical politician, Dr. MIRO cannot: be unaware of the Implications of this situation. 4. We have, thercfore, never agreed that kx it was feast to adopt the highly unrealistic view t that exclusive support could be given to the CRC, since some other groups a) probably would unite against the CRC, b) could get support elsewhere, and, c) almost anus c inevitably would organize a significant anti-CRC movement, | 5. We have, therefore, made it known to all groups inside and outside that while we do not inaist (except in the case of the judges) on unifi- cation and subordination to the CRC, we would prefer that they at least coordinate with the Council, gmat We have actively discouraged any criticiam of the Council whenever we had an epportunity, tuaeae, _ 6 Our position has been made difficult by the fact that Dr. MIRO has stated or implied to representatives of the various factions that he has high level U. S. Government sponsorhsip and thas the factions can in the future only obtain support through him, He has also asserted to U. S: ‘eemmtracetorenetg, A . : . hai Lon, A - - Sire “Por
14-00000 Aad ey ew ~e L officials that he has presented proposals for assisting the underground and ‘for aiding the underground to a@ ganize and has received no support from the |. Agency. The Agency is aware.of the proposal to aid RAMIREZ, with whom at the time it was proposed in Baltintre, ‘Dr. Miro said he had no communica- tiong line. We still de not know whether. there jaa communications line, - tthe Or many of the. details needed to ka assist RAMIREZ in the Escambray, If ‘2 Dr. Miro now / bas such details, he righ pags it to Colonel Johnaon at a Separate meeting, The Agency is aware of a pfsposal for a 1,000 man invasion force paepesw! which was refused by both State and the White House before it was presented to the Agency, We nee no purpose in commenting further on that plan. At such time as Dr. MIRO has specific plans for operations to aid the underground, he or his designee might denexiarex discuss them with Colonel Jehnaon, , 7. We would like to péint ‘out that during the difficult months since Arpil vie hive'continued to urge the internal resistance groups to organize. ina truly underground manner, to establish j lines of command and channela of communicationa, and to look to the CRC for guidance. We know that ina number of instances the external representativea have sought to obtain guidance. from the CRC only, after our urging, them-toccdemeo, We would hope that Dr, MIRO will be frank enough to recognize these contacts and the fact that thru these contacts he has been generally-informed onthe! Srganizational . activity in Cuba, 8. We would'like to make Special note for D.r. MIRO that we are pow tn eey Ve
+ Be aus” not engaged in another invasion attempt, are not training Cubana for an invasion, and, therefore, cannot keep him informed on any such ‘activity. oo an ; Co 3 We would like to point out that ‘Dr. MIRO has been in n frequent t contact during the past few months with the Department of State, represen- ' tatives and haa, as directed by the White Heuse, taken his guidance from the State Department. He has rarely sought guidance or even utilized ag a channel his contact with the Agency which has been continuously available. Many times it has been impossible to ‘reach Dr. MIRO for us to arrange a meeting because he, according to ARAGON, wae either ill, ona trip, or preparing for an interview with the State Department or the White House, 10. It is aleo worth mentioning that, as Dr, MIRO himself stated in various meetings, it is for security reasons neither possible or ey desirable to keep Dr, MIRO informed in detail of our activities affecting , . me ‘4 t Cuba or at times certain Cuban exiles residing in this country and under our protection, . | ll, We have long felt there are certain aspects of our work which could have been done by the Frente, but because of lack of interest or leadership on the part of some, the Frente took the credit, but did little. We refer here specifically to propaganda. We feel that if the opposition to ; the CRC among the student and labor groups calld be overcome, some very useful work could be done, _ We would point out that much of the DRE and . - an | . tie . ft SECh eT
14-00000 ° . 7 - ot FORD activities have been done with modest and frequently without any, financial support, We feel that ideas, organization and persone _ “with talent. are much more important in these areas than. money. We ; would like to urge oncemg ain that the FRD and the CRC take practical steps to work with the people | in the DRE and the FORD. We certainly do - | not want to gee the energies of thease groups dissipated as has so clearly : occured in the case of the jurists. 12, We renew our proposal once again that Dr. MIRO have his people come up with some propaganda ideas and plans with or without: 7 ‘DRE and FORD type participatdion, and we will give them our most sympathetic eonsideration, i _ 131 Despite our misgivings as to the utility of the further support -of the Judiciary groups, we understand a commitment has been made to , again advance Dr, MIRO $5, 000 for the judges and we are honoring this commitment. i : an teem SFon, y