OD EE TE DE ED RE OE FE EE EE erg eg I et ee eee De HW 35072 Doold: 32989525 _(1)° Purpose oT ee ae @ SHGTTON 87. SECURTTY IVES Qzroxs Oo 87D IV, CGhanges, additions, and deletions of data appearing in section A of reserve index cards (A) Changes in data appearing on section A reserve index cards should be submitted to the Bureau by form FD-122a., (B) Deletions from section & of ‘the reserve index Should be recommended by letter. The letter should set forth the basis for the recommendation, (G) Changes in office of origin are to be handled by _ submission of form FD-128a, Forward section A cards to new office of origin. (bd) Section B I. Whis section*is to contain the names of all other indi- viduals included in the reserve index. This section is to.be maintained only in the field office. II, Changes in office of origin are to be handled by sub— mission of form FD-1282. Forward section B cards to new office of origin. (4) Content (a) Each card in section A and seotion B should contain, as @ minimum, the following: I. Name and aliases II. Race TIT. Sex IV. Organizational affiliation ‘or nationalistic tendency V. Citizenship VI. Residence VII. Employment VIII. Birth data IX. Office file number ; (bv). In addition, membership and position or association in a subversive group or groups, together with the source and date of the information, may be added, (5) Removal and deletion of cards (a) Destroy cards on individuals who subsequently become security informants or sources or who subsequently become subjects et of security index cards. .(d).. Advise the Bureau of the destruction only in the case of section A cards,.] Security index a) Security index cards are prepared and maintained by the Bureau to serve as operational guide for apprehension of ' persons deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country in the event of a national emergency. (b>) It shall contain the names of all persons who have been determined through investigation to be dangerous or poten. tially dangerous because of their membership in or affilietio ~ with or espousal of doctrines of basic revolutionary or gan- _., izations and/or front organizations and who will be "apprehended upon receipt of instructions from the Attorney General, (c) It shall include subjects of espionage investi gations and any other type of Bureau investigation provided their activities bring them within the scope of the security index criteria : ° (4) Action shall be teken against individuals Security index only upon authorization oF warrants of arrest by the Attorney General. Howev.--, in preparing an maintaining the security index, to all .:actical effects, the Bureau is making the decision as to be apprehended in the event of an emergescy, inasmuch as the Attorney General has advised that he does not have funds or included in the . 43 Page 685 - 7~15-—60 those persons who wil1$ am a ue cy sab de wate ts, + tebe Tata Meda ead 1g 78 spay cited ok cee cep SP ERR os Seta” Soc ae aie aan. Ag 0 Gu Meee i nye | athbel he Mach 1, BLO? egy she eel og hence, RR Rh
87D rt ‘ PIERCED. 4 Nw SiO 72 Doold: 32989525 wee (f) (g) ties | or” 87. SECURITY TWVESETG.. manpower to review security index cases. Names shall be included in the security index only when investigation has established and reports[{ show] sufficient facts and evidence to justify the inclusion of each subject in the security index. ; . The contents of the security index must be accurate and | correct at all times, Matters pertaining to its preparation and maintenance must be given preferred, expeditious, scon~ tinuous, and detailed attention. Matters pertaining to the security index fAgen tial and are not to be mentioned or investigative reports. The general operation and content of the must not be discussed by field personnel out priox Bureau authority. Matters pertaining to the security index may be discussed with duly qualified representatives of other Federal intelli- ence agencies only on a strictly confidential basis ana only in instances in which an individual subject of prime interest to one of these services is involvea. are strictly con= alluded to in security index of the Bureau with— Determination of dangerousness of an individual (a) The dangerousness of a member or affiliate of a subversive organization does not necessarily depend entirely upon his personal charaéteristics, such as aggressiveness or a dis— position to violence. Although these factors must be talren " .into consideration in evaluating an individualts potential dangerousness, other factors are essential in making this determination, An individual's dangerousness also depends . upon the contribution he has made or is making in the advance— ment of the principles and aims of the subversive movement with which he is connected or his subversive potentialities in the event of a national emergency. Bear in mind that a subject active in a subversive organization is not merely an isolated individual but is a part of an organization of which the purposes are opposed to the best interests of the U. S. An individual's loyalty to a subversive organization and the principles thereof is a primary factor to take into . consideration in evaluating his potential dangerousness;[hovw— “ever, regardless of evidence of subversive affiliation, all _Among such factors are: I. Long continued membership in a subversive organization ir, Affiliation with or attendance at training schools, especially leadership schools Ill. Frequent or regular attendance at organizational meetings ".° +; and functions ee ~ - - iv. Subscriptions to publications of a subversive organization ~ “Ve Possession of or continued study of. revolutionary Litera- wm ture . - -s - Vi. Preparation or distribution ‘of subversive, “propaganda. and/or - - Literature , ane “yar. Holding positions in the subversive organization or. in , other organizations of a front character which indicate confidence of such organizations in his loyalty VIIIs .Espousal of a subversive doctrine exemplified in his aote . and utterances 44 , Page 686 1-17-64 evidence developed during the course of a security investigation must be carefully weighed for the purpose of determining Whether the subject's activities depict him as a potentially dangerous individual in time of a national emergency. Fadtors -having a bearing upon an individual's potential dangerousness are numerous and will vary in each case in degree. 7} wee « t Piop “oahs Lihat oes *, 1% ¢ # 3 ig y er, a Mie # . “Bary tree Bre ba ay ? < 2 & * “4 a a thee mee say UR etrere » ath tmp gy Ving d Fea tee f 2 het gt HELV a wees. ef at a 2 on Tee = hr nN 3 on fae oncigtet pied 4 pease
‘@ 87, SECURI’Y INVESTIGATI 3s 87D IX. Contributions to or collections of funds for the organ~ ization X. Recruitment of new members . rs XI. Revolutionary background XII. Participation in picket lines in which the subversive organ- ‘igation is interested or which it has fostered, or in demonstrations, riots, mass meetings, or pressure group ra + ae activity fos tered by the orgenization z XTILT. Violation of penal laws arising out of- activities as % , a subversive ? XIV. Active service in armed forces supportea by a subversive . Movement, such as service in the Loyalist Forces during the Spanish Civil War which were supported by communis XV. Constant support of the Soviet Union in acts and ubberances XVI. Acting as a courier for the subversive movement or as a confidential mail drop therefor eg XVII. Constant participation in the activities of a subver— * sive organization or advancement of the organization'ts i aims or interests, especially when such participatian involves financial sacrifices or personal inconvenience . or disadvantage [ (XVIII. Contacts with Sino~Soviet~bloc establishments (including E Cuba) where purpose of contact ‘canriot be determined or z [ contact indicates communist sympathies * [ ‘ _  XEX. Gontacts with Sino-Soviet-bloc, Cuban,or Yugoslav intel-— : { ' ; ligence agents where purpose of contact cannot be determined { or contact indicates communist sympathies: i [ EX. Individuals who have defected, revoked, or sought revocation 7 [ of their U. S. citizenship in favor of a Sino~ . a “of Soviet~bloc country, who have returned to the U. 5S., : { and who have taken no positive steps to counteract such rs [ action * [ XXI. Statements or activities on a subjectfs part establishing 7 € ( reasonable greunds to believe that his loyalty would lie [ with a Sino-Soviet-—bloc country in the event of armed = { ~ conflict between the U. S. and a Sino-Soviet—bioc = { country . . if [ XXII. Training and/or participation in espionage, Sabotage, or a L intelligence activities x [ XXTIT. <A history of emotional instability or irrational behavior : tf. . on the part of an individual with a subversive background Z [° whose prior’ acts depict a propensity for- violence and Zz ‘{ hatred against organized government cs : ont -(b) The security index criteria which governs whether an individualts . “£ name is to be added to the security index and/or retained - [ thereon are set forth below. The above factors, while not 2 [ all-inclusive, must be taken into consideration in each ae [ individual security case in arriving at a determination as a [ to whether the subject thereof falls within the security index = [ soriter:: and thus should be included in the security index. } = ae) . (oc) An individual shall not be deemed dangerous merely because ‘Z “estes . ; one or more of the above factors are applicable in his case. oe cSt ave - tye. : f ; rs 'S ne - . . _* . - ~ ~ Se - Re —e es z - . ag ae é. x % 44a 2 MW 55072 DBDoecld:32999529 Page 687 1-17-64 ‘¢
me : Qem (3) Criteria fer placing and retaining names in the security index (2) ‘ 87. SECURITY INVESTIGs @: The addition to and retention of names in the security index shall be governed hy the following criterias Io No name shall be added to or retained in the security " index unless one or more of the following situations have ‘ been established through investigation: . 3 (A) Subject has had membership or participation in the 2 ’ activities of a basic revolutionary organization with— ° - “in the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or state~ ; ments established through reliable sources, inform— re = ants, or individuals, € (B). Subject has had membership or participation in the = , . affairs of one or more front organizations, which = adhere to the policies and dootrines of a revolu— - . tionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active vey substantial participation in the furtherance of the te aims or purposes of the front organizations within ; the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or state . ments established through reliable sources, inform— . ants, or individuals. g (C) Investigation has developed information that an * individual, though not a member or a participant & in the activities of a subversive organization, has , : anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is Likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national - . . emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by . ° overt acts or statements within the last 3 years e established through reliable sources, informants, 2 or individuals, z (D) Although investigation has failed to establish . overt acts or statements on the part of a sub- a ject within the time limits set out above, facts ns have been developed which clearly and unmistak kably ~ depict the subject as a dangerous individual who os = could be expected to commit acts inimicsl to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in .F time of- emergency. & ~ 7 7” - - wre re : 7 : - . . a a . 7 es . . - “e < . a = = . i : . - ‘% Be Ea : 45 s NW 55072 Docld: 32989525 Page 656 . 1-17~64 2
Nw 55072 ' , 87D Doold: 32989529 eae JECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIG£ ons - ee in support of Cuban @. . , ° Careful consideration should be given to recommending f ‘for inclusion in the security index those individuals -{ who in the light of the clear identification of the Cuban Government as procommunist, pro-Soviet bloc, . and enti~U. S., would be deemed dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of -the U. S.-in the “event of an emergency involviug Cuba and the U. S. . Page 69 In connection therewith, there should be a substantial . showing of data within the following standards: . (A) An individual has served as a leader or officer or has substantially participated in the activities of a pro-Castro organization and has engaged in activities which have included either the preparation | or distribution of pro-Cuban or anti-U. S. propaganda; the active collection of funds for any agency or representative of the Cuban Government or for a pro-Castro group, which funds are not intended for the relief of human suffering or other charitable purposes; active participation in acts of violence against anti~Castro individuals or groups or _against the U. 8.3; or the active collection of intelligence data regarding the national defense of the U. S. or which would serve the purposes of the Cuban Government as opposed to the interests of the U. 5., where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such data is to be or has been conveyed to any agency or representative of the Cuban Government. (B). An individual, whether he has participated - in , organizational activity or not, has engaged in - one or more activities specified in (A) above and it has been clearly established, by overt acts or statements or other evidence, that there are réasonable grounds to believe the loyalty of the individual would lie with the Cuban Government in the event of armed conflict between the Cuban ; Government and the U. S. * (c) Aliens ‘of Cuban nationality and aliens holding Cuban citizenship should be considered for the security index when it is determined that one of these - (1) is likely to foster, encourage, or promote the oe policies, programs, or objectives of -the Cuban . Ab Government, or collaborate with the Cuban Government or (2) is likely to engage in or attempt to engage ineacts of espionage, sabotage, or other activities inimical or detrimental to the defense or public safety of the U. S. as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, . ,nformants, or individuals. Activities on a subjectts . ~ part which should be considered in determining 2 UE whether his name should be added to the security ~ . index under the foregoing would include but should “not be limited to (1) participation in ‘organizations “supporting the Castro regime, (2) participation “in picket lines formed in support of the Cuban Government, (3) contacts with Cuban agents opera ting in this country on behalf of the Cuban Government or (4) statements or activities on a subject's part establishing reasonable grounds to believe that. his loyalty would lie with the Cuban Government in 5 the event of armed conflict between the Ue S. and Cuba. tobe ye t atoegiy i shies gt » the Mokek sofa ger 45a 10-15-62 ri cco eer ice 2
“ay s segs ‘ “ee a . oe 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATI ¢ 87D x 7 locate subjects are not to be submitted. The, Bureau % g will closely follow investigative action to locate vee x missing security index subjects. , II. If you receive indications that the subject went to ce Mexico or Canada, request the Bureau to alert other 3 appropriate Government agencies to this possibility = and to determine any available verifying information : through liaison channels, : III. If the subject is reported to have gone to any other. foreign country, the Washington Field Office should be requested to check the records of the Passport Office: of the State Department for verification. - IV. When all logical leads have been exhausted in the case . of a missing important functionary, consideration should be given to circularizing all field offices with the - - subject's photograph and background information for the ty) purpose of alerting the entire field to the identity “a . of the subject. Bureau authority must be obtained be- fore circularization is made. In seeking Bureau author~ ity, advise the Bureau as to the position held by the subject and what efforts have already been made to locate ie eas seats sniae Legal taynee a oagseonts eae tangoe him, g If this procedure is to be effective, its application 2 must necessarily be restrictive in the number of subjects a to which it is applied. Therefore, requests to circularize < must be made only after every possible lead has been ** exhausted and then only in the cases of the most impor-— tant missing functionaries. E (4) Individuals traveling abroad (Also consider section 105G,. - . ~ & volume IV, of this manual. : When information is received indicating that : . . ° @ subject of 4 current or past security investigation, € a past member of a basic revolutionary organization, a member since July, 1950, of an organizat*on designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450, sa ? 58 a member since July, 1950, of an organization dc:lared Sy subversive by the House Committee on Un-~Amer’. 4° - 2 | " Activities or other legislative committees, «: . Ea | @ Member since July, 1950, of an organization deseribed . = Se eee . by reliable informants or sources as being dominated or & ee controlled by one of the basic revolutionary organizations 7B bm soa mot intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country - ea poo for foreign travel, take the following action: ; oe “& (a) Immediately advise the Bureau[by letterhead memorandum } = setting forth complete available details concerning ; = the foreign travel, including places and dates of departure = and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpo'se a ; . of trip, the exact name under which the passport was = Pe Se . issued, the:number of the passport, and the office issuin., @ RP . . the passport, if known. Include in the letterhead Tee _ + memorandum a full description of the subject, including me ok, * all aliases, and in the case of Chinese and Xorean ° subjects Chinese telegraphic code[and Korean telegraphic , “+ code]numbers, a& well as 2 concise resume of available re ‘subversive data regarding the subject. Do not delay in | advising the Bureau of the actual or intended travel ; while developing the details of the travel as- time is % of the essence in this matter. - (vb) Set out a lead for the Washington Field Office for a check of the records of the Passport Office, Department of State; however, do not limit efforts to develop above information to a check of such records. ene 33 12-18-63 NW 35072 Doold: 32595895259 Page 690
: . ¢ 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATI’ ‘ 5 d, Other Marxist revolutionary groups A long-established group which would come under this category is the Proletarian Party of America, a relatively small organization, Aran There also are a few small groups composed of ex-members of the Communist Party, USA, who have voluntarily left the party or who have been expelled, usually for factionalism, . ; eo General " 7s Communist investigations must be conducted in a most discreet and “ thorough manner at all times, Members of law enforcement agéncies. . ; are not to accompany Agents during the course of security—type ¢ investigations without prior Bureau authority. Bureau employees Should not discuss communist or related investigations with any unauthorized individual, The subject of communism is not to-be used in speeches of Bureau employees without specific authorization. However, there is considerable mimeographed material in each office, including speeches, testimony,and magazine articles prepared by the | Director which could be furnished outside individuals interested in the subject of communism without any discussion, 2. Purposes of investigation ae The investigation of the Communist party, USA, and other similar—type organizations is of twofold purpose: (1) to obtain legally admissible evidence against these organizations for prosecution under existing Federal statutes set out above and (2) to follow closely the activities of these organizations from an intelligence viewpoint to have a day- to-day appraisal of the strength, dangerousness, and activities of these organizations seeking the overthrow of the U. 8. Government, be Suggestions for proper coverage of the investigation of the Communist _ Party as an organization and similar organizations should include: (1) The assignment of sufficient Agent personnel to insure that all . of the important ramifications of party activities are properly ° . covered * - (2) Development of confidential informants in all party levels, : { including the national headquarters organization : BS (3) The establishment of trash and mail covers on pertinent head~ 2 ° quarters and party functionaries * (4) The constant effort to develop admissible evidence against party . officials for violation of Federal laws c. Brief to establish illegal status of Communist Party, USA . (1) Purpose of brief is to collect all legally admissible evidence . to prove illegality of party in one file. (Bufile 100-3~74,)} > Ce, _ (2) Reports on brief to establish illegal-status must be submitted . . by each office quarterly and should include only legally “Se . '  " a@missible evidence obtained during” preceding three-month period. {If there is no information to report, include a statement to that effect in the cover pages of the quarterly report for the same period entitled "Communist Party, USA, Internal Security — cr {no copy needed for Bufile 100~-3-74).] . (3) It is advisable to use the following breakdown in preparing . reports: . tae ee . (a) Origin and continuity of the party: . 7 aa op . ~ {2} Pertinent statements, writings, and instructions relating to . ot, “_. (1) Marxism-Leninism, (2) imperialism, 13 proletarian Loe eet ‘ . internationalism, (ay defense of USSR, {5 revolutionary a '. statements — eT at ~ - ‘* (e)> Internal Security Act of 1950, Include under thi heading any admissible evidence which would tend to prove a violation of section 4(a) of this act. aadt gan we oye. + yn tabnd ore omy Fm deat Ae . Le FPA oo} thin ” abAL Sede Opa abe oe RY 3 ? ' <tobagi en aK oa ‘ ee ang oe ECE ag Ee de 5 3~13-~63 RL a as, NW 55072 Docld: 32989525 Page 691
“oy 87. SECURITY INVES TIGATT Ox Ql Investigative procedures and suggestions This section contains detailed investigative guides for use in investigating and reporting activities of the Communist Party, USA. . a. fo accurately and clearly show the true nature of the Communist . Party, USA, data concerning the following topics must be fully we developed and reported, When material contains information that ” would be ‘logically reported under more than one topic heading but to do so would make the separate accounts unintelligible, report all the material under the main heading and only refer to the information under the other breakdowns, Do not repeat same data under separate headings. Reports on the Communist Party, USA, as an organization must be submitted by each office quarterly and should cover activities for the preceding three~month period. All offices are required to use the following breakdown in pre-— paring quarterly reports on the Communist Party, USA. Bach . subfile caption must start on a separate page, (1) Organization (Bureau file 100-3-69) a5 Security setup of district and/or.state organization. Office covering district headquarters, describe the location and size of Communist Party office facilities, rent paid, and name and number of office employees, List address and/or post office box number of party headquarters, (b) Identify principal district officials and important functionaries, together with titles, and furnish a . ome rte ty tt gy ecday & ok * ‘ a ATR A MNS al See HE art «seal nadir ep hytong ate ets a aio. A 5 short resume of important activities of each during % . three-month period. # '(c) Nameé of new commissions or special committees, identity . . and capacity of individual members thereof. Submit vs resume of activities of groups under. appropriate subfile e ‘ oaptions. . - (a) Special meetings embracing only organizational matters. fe Other pertinent matters discussed at meetings concerning rd policy or strategy to be submitted under appropriate a subfile captions. xe (e) Extend this outline as far as necessary for clarity and 2 - ~- to meet needs of office under this or any succeeding = * _  gubsection, Auxiliary offices submit pertinent data a 4 " ooncerning above matters which do not normally come to x oe . os attention of office covering district headquarters. 7 et te FeO (2) Membership (Bureau file 100~3-68) Lee ee & a Quarterly reports are not’ to contain any membership | statistics. Cover pages accompanying each quarterly . . report must contain latest available statistics relating . to total number of Communist Party members in the : ‘district, Membership data must start on a separate babes ao Sats tat con {- cover page, [which page(s) must be devoted exclusively to such oe £.oe data.] Office of origin, which “is office. covering Communist a re O44 cy Party district headquarters; should submit. following figures: sth, _. I, For entire Communist Party district wee - ~~" TT. Por individual states covered DY. Communi st Party oe oot district 7 III. For number of Communist Party members in area covered by field office pp eho atolecte: eof t “bd a x Auxiliary offices should submit following membership ‘figures to the Bureau and office of origin: a a sh I. For state or portion of state covered by that 3 field office ea IZ. For number of Communist Party members in the area 2 Covered by that field office * , +¥ t {The total number of Communist Party members in the area i & t covered by field office, either origin or auxiliary, should 2 { be broken down as to the total number of Negroes in the over- 1% { all numerical strength of the Communist Party, USA, in the & " NW 55072 Doocld: 32989529 Page 6592 "10-14-63 &
$ “TON 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIC | 87C field office territory, the name and title of each Negro included in this total who maintains a national level > position, and the name and title of each Negro included in ‘this total who maintains a district level position above the status of “club chairman." Members of the Communist Party, USA, who are now carried as unidentified but who are known to be members of the Negro race should.be included -in . the total number of Negroes.] : [es Koen Kom Fane ne Cet Coe Lae . When possible, totals should be broken down as to nation~ { ality, sex, employment, veterans, and membership in unions. Auxiliary offices which, due to lack of Communist Party activity in their divisions, have been authorized to sub~ mit data by quarterly letter should include membership . . figures in these letters to the Bureau and office of origin. we . These letters to be submitted by auxiliary offices prior fo : to first day of month in which quarterly report is due. ey! Office of origin responsible to obtain complete figures : from its auxiliary offices. {(b) In preparing estimates, best available informants | and sources must be used. [{nclude in cover pages of quarterly reports evaluation of degree of reliability of figures furnished by each source and of final figures . . submitted, Also include in cover pages total number of individuals positively identified as Communist Party members and total number of individuals tentatively identified as party members within the twelve-—mo: “2 period . immediately preceding the submission of the quart rly report. In reporting membership figures, information from one source only is not acceptable unless facts are set forth demonstrating information from this source is the most accurate and most reliable information available. "of (oc) Explain in detail any increase or decrease in membership ( . figures previously submitted, Where informants use such ~ terms as "inactive™ or “paper” members, their éxact understanding of the meaning of the terms used and the- - number of individuals so described must be clearly explained, Full explanation must be made as to whether individuals so described are included in final membership figures submitted, together with reason for their _. . inclusion or exclusion. zt te! . (3) Results of membership recruiting drives . e Make discreet efforts to ascertain results of aniual | te national registration drives. | oe Coe OT (3) Funds (Bureau file 100~3-63) : aay a) Income and expenditures , . , ; : b Plans and results of fund drives including: " I. FYotal amount sought by the state Communist Party organization wt . . ‘"° I, Specific amount to be contributed by the state ron Smee ee ‘.+ + +. . Organization to the national committee fund drive . °° ° . 7: -f a , ; ‘III. Specific amount to be contributed by the ‘state . Le Bo . - + + organization to "The Worker" fund drive oo ae . . ; ‘IV. Specific amount to be retained by the state organize— . ° . tion after contributing to the national committee .. est oe and "The Worker" fund drives for use in the state organization's own operations ayers ott cee atgeal ype =. (0) Large contributions by known party groups or front organizations {2 Identity of any new party “angels” @} ‘Distribution of funds not sent to Communist Party . headquarters, such as -funds in safe-deposit boxes, - “"separate bank accounts, etc. Q (f) Any “special padding of expense accounts by Communis+ * ( --Party functionaries should be reported. 2 10-14-63 NW 55072 Docld: 32989525 Page 653 : 2 A ———“‘“‘“‘i‘ k;:*CS