(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—céntrolled doctiriénts.). Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall. (HSCA Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31.4, emphasis Laded ) . Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots he directed that the. Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13) tion from the. Warren Commission about the Agency anti- Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he gave the following response: "I cannot answer that: since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from. me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they with- held the information from me. (Ibid., p. 16) Regarding the relevancy of such plots to 7, A Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels ~ Rakin, Slawson and, Spector were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the When asked whether the CIA desired to withold informa-~ . @ Classified by deri 8.9 G a 8 erates “SA, NE, “SCS DD, Pa, “SHB, GENE. SE. “eH. NG, &
Classification: _ : (This form is(} eGdats Pepa #3 Roki ¢/ 7 [Py from CIAconitr pl Grants.) Warren Commission. (exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test. of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec. Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71. where he states that possible witholding of information by CIA about Agency attempts to assassinate Castro did not significantly affect Warren Commission-investigation) | Frem-the-Cik's—perspective,Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of. the anti-Castro assassination plots his efforts to explore the -possibility of a retaliatory assassination against ' President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi- fied. He stated that: | "a completely different - procedural approach probably would and should have been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca 7/17/78, p. 45) John Scelso,: the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial inves tigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission: Classification: 2 2°8 ET GOOG 9 Classified by derivation: Wi, WW, A
Classification: (This form is to be used for. material. extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots? oes * # t . ‘ { “Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which - he cannot possibly justify under / his oath of office, or any ~ ' other standard of professional | public service. (HSCA Class. — ‘Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78) EAR.. . Laren ) Qespensids BA, II. Q. - oe Agency Goneern for the Sanctity | \ of Sensitive Sources and Methods - Factors Affecting | NR, CIA Resporise to Warren Commission Requests The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for~ information was dependent upon 1) the availability of information; _ “= 2) the complexity of the issues NE. presented by the request and 3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA EE, sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr™® e Helms testified that when CIA had been able to NR, satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a | reply ‘back: "and some of these inguiries obviously took longer than others. For example, some might involve _ owe Seca = a ee! WIA, Ra Classification: H66 40 Classified by derivation:
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to _ See if we could locate somebody in some Overseas country. Obviously, one takes longer to per- form than the other. Be. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, - 25) ut nt es the-CTa's « co réexn for protécting its a eo ces and -tiethods caused the Warvén n to experience greater difficulty i ; - a an getting relévant inform tion than when | oO €@ protec- tion such soureés and methods w not at issue. —_ J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sour cesvandpmathods, par Tedlar i witin césardk fo Gil serkiffance Spee cero iy MAI Co © ~. @€fectaithe quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78 1, is seas i a 4a2- For prote p. 22) Asa result of She SBA $s concern,in Some instances the Agency made=-t by tiathy Limi Paccags ’ wl Ne provid AGL TR (HSCA ass. Depo. of John Sdelso, 7G r cP: 15%) . The Committee has identified two Sareas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its conklictd with sensitive sources and methods Luapeged. the Warren Commission's investigation. These are: 000041 Classified by derivation: rth eee GEILE S <A G i ca orn, ~~, ~~, “GA YR “GR <oR 2 “GRA Tee, . NR. NAL AR
Classification: SECREL (This form is to be used for material extracted . f from ClA—controlled documents.) 1) Witholding information from the Warren 7 Ne Commission ~ pestaining’ to -the-phete-— . f surveiitance {era “telephonie’ surveillance | : x Operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station 2) As a related consideration, the Agency's va reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico f Suey ci ance moet} Sevele ped lg Ha da’ Meriacrty phe to - Ger Enitiak Concern fer Reveal ny Sen sative Sour ity TAIN ZUAR OLS The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that “we were not authorized | at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Ibid., Pp. 158) But Scelso did testify that: . ae f ‘We were going to give them intelligence pO ot) reports which derived from all our sources a N a including technical sources, including the eS: at x t LN 2 [telephone intercept find the information ‘ wm NN a gotten from the interrogation of Silvia As ) Duran, for example, which corresponded *" x almost exactly with the information from ( te. selephone. ‘intercepts. -j Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Oe a “~ A VW EB WE EA A Wea Classification: af nD aoe nae f Classified by derivation: MM a ee r