SECTICN 107 or INFORMANTS AND COMPING: SOURCES 107¢ — DB 8. Potential security informants in espionage and foreign rationrlity cases many times present special problems which Limit or govern the scope of the initial investigation, (See instructions re contact cases and deseco program, section 105X%,6b and 6h, volume IV, of this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be covered, 9, leads to obtain background data must be handled by auxiliary offices within 30 days. , 10. Investigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, direct, and develop an individual as a potential informant. D, (INTERVIEWS AND DEVELOPMENT OF POTENT TAL SECURITY INFORMANTS 1. When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out [ in subsection C, and request authority tof[designale ]individual as afBureau- [ approved potential lsecurity infcormant[and proceed with his development. ] 2. When authority is granted by Bureau, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he shouvld be made aware of Bureau policy. 3. Carefully plan initial interviews as to time and Location to prevent any embarrassment to Burean. : : 4. Do not interview female potentials in their own homes or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their residences should be conducted by two Agents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants, This instruction is not applicable where active investigation ‘has established that the potential informant is of good character, there is no indication of affiliation with subversive groups, and there will be no embarrassment to the Bureau, 5. Except in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contact is maintained on a periodic basis dependent on the circumstances of the case, potential informants shovld be contacted personally at least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants, 6. Advise Bureau of progress being made at least every four months, Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on ( Bureau authorization should -be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain informative summary of information furnished during past four months, and must include certifications regarding potential informantts stability and reliability and his indoctrination against disclosure, These letters should follow the fori indicated under section LO7N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item (1) to omit reference to any payment recommendation, 7. Post records of contacts with potential informants so that the cases will not become delinguent. . 8. During interviews with potential informants, if it develops’ individual does not have the necessary capabilities, discontinue efforts, 9. Potential informant should have contacts, associates, or possibilities for engaging in activity through which he can obtain and furnish current information of Bureau interest in security field. 10, If individual does not have potential as above described but is willing to cooperate, consider indicating to him he can be of assistance if he places himself in a position where he may be able to obtain information of value, In this regard, address of local headquarters of subversive organizations or meeting places of subversive groups may be mentioned to the individual as places where it may be possible for him to obtain information if he so desires;-also, it may be mentioned that if-he sub— scribes to periodicals or frequents such places above mentioned, he may be approached or an interest may be shown in him which,if developed, wovld be the means whereby he could obtain information, 11. Inform potential informants who agree to assist the Bureau that such assistance must be strictly voluntary and they are to understand that pm there is no coercion or intimidation involved, i NW 35072 Doold: 3259595259 Page 1590
[107D —- E [ 12, [ [ [ [ { [ [ [ [ [ [ i t 13, [ [ [ 14. c . [ [ [ [ C [ [ [ { [ [ 15, [ [ [ [ 16, [ [ [ [ 17. [ [ [ 18. r- - [ [ [ [ [ c E, BUREAU POLICY - 7 [ 2. i [ {  [3. U . WW 55072 Doold:329899599 Page 1591 - 2-12-60 srorto My. SECURITY ITNPORMAWIS[AND ;_ ee SOURCES ] During initial stages of development and on occasion active informants may raise a personal question concerning their own position if it becomes known publicly that they are affiliatea with a subversive organization, In the event 2 potential informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, he may. be told that > his cooperation is a matter of record in the FBI and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider making the facts of his coopération with the FRI known to his employer or to the responsible individuals. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service which he is performing for his country may be terminated, Before taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informantts or informantts cooperation,. prior Bureau authority must be obtained. Specif Flieally advise each potential informant that he is not and éannot consider himself a Bureau employee or “undercover Agent" of the FBI. fn this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must bea impressed upon the informant. Advise potential informant that his cooperation must be strictly confi dential at all times and if he should feel he cannot maintain this - ; confidence he should so advise, There should be no doubt left in the- mind of the informant that ‘his relationship must remain on a confidential basis and if he violates the confidence he will .be of no valua and by . $0 doing the Bureau's investigative activity may be jeopardiued. This must be thoroughly impressed upon the informant before you accept him as such, If the informant has a special problem which would require his revealing his relationship to his wife, etc., this should be learn. from him during the initial interview’ and a recommendation made to th Bureau when the results of the interview are furnished. The Special circumstances will be taken into consideration by the Bureau, if a prospective informant is connected in any manner with a labor union, inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer employee relationships as such and is only concerned with obtaining -information on the infiltration in labor unions by subversive elements, ‘If the potential informant is a student, teacher, or has any similar relations with a school, college, or university, in his initial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instructions concern— ing investigations on the campuses of collegés and universities. From the first interview with a potential informant through his develop-— ment and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at 211 times to be certain he is not a plant. — When potential informant begins to furnish current information and otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and advise Bureau, This communication must be personally initialed by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; individual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keeping in mind possibility of using informant as a potential witness, If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards being followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau. ] Development of military personnel] Do not develop informants among military personnel on military reserva. tions, establishments, etc., uniess specifically approved by the Bureau. Contacts by designated Agents] Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be made by the Agent or Agents specifically designated[to contact him.] Divulging information to informant] No information should be divulged tola potentialjinformant[or an informant] -- concerning any of the Bureauts investigative activity other than that which is essential tolhisl]proper operation. - 6
Ss Ata aw hEAe OF Ae Te aa ores AGRINEAT SE EES SA Re ED OE puna, NW 55072 ‘a aenee & _ SECTION 107@ szcvarey THFORMANTS AND conver. SOURCES 107A —~ B DEFINITIONS L. Security informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor— mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose i untity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend». etings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or 7: in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U, S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and ‘does provide current infor~ mation of value, 2. Potential security informant Individual in a position to become active in @ subversive organizgation or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. 8. on behalf of foreign principal or can-become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau, 3. Double agent A srecialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance. , 4. Confidential source ‘ An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau bul merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Tnformants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are irimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential inform nts may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investi- gative activity. hive informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: ° 1. Evaluation of a. Complainants in security matters -b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf— fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard~ Ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty d. Bureau applicants as possible informants e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees ff, Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con~— tinuous basis 2. Review of closed security files on individuals 3. Review of reserve index 4. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants. '5. Deleted 6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA. 7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, Should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. 8. Review of files on communist front organizations Looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended: only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members. 4-13-65 Bocld: 32989529 Page 1592
SO RAS eer een ge wan at Aare ny some Mera = ar NED a a aa ae a a a a a re et a oer Nw 55072 107? -~ LO, Li. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16, 17. 18, 19. Cc SECTION ,® SECURITY INPORUANTS AND cove Dareras SOURCES Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party func-tiouaries ¢ Re alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed { personnel who axe reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the. Bureau or employ~ ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making avail “ able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage mert, 7 , Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of comaunist—dominated unions who retain their membership merely to holé their positions. . With regard to both 10 aud 11 above, if possible, the efficial should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an Agent origirate the contact, After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in .an indus- trial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dis— missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. <At.- such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. _Be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered, Review of Gommunist Party registration records to ascertain what individ— uals merely registered but never became active Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform ant when direct contact by «- ‘gent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an A) Pvidual who is available for such a contact. Officials and employees of uw “sign establishments in the U. Ss. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed n the U. 5S, ‘ : ’ Individuals who because of background, employment, or Social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who' will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of the Bureau, (See deseco program, section 105K,6h, volume IV, of this manuel.) C, INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant pur. poses, background investigation must be conducted, This should consist of the following: : 1. 2e 3, Dooeld: 32989529 Page 1593 SIO oT e 0 Check of field office files for derogatory information, particularly of a subversive nature Discreet canvass of[logicallinformants to ascertain if the ‘potential informant is known to current informants of your office inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the individ ualts personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, health, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and past employments, and business connections, -Background investigation must definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilized without any danger of future embarrassment due to iastability-or unreliability, — Securing background information from the potential informant is not sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the investigation, | - Check of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for the completion of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi- fication Divisicn to obtain the record, if any, of the informant. Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran, Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve, Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained. 5-12-61