457-10011-10124 ; Date: 10/07/93 : Page:1 po JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM ee IDENTIFICATION FORM Ne ee AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA- . RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10124 RECORDS SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : UNKNOWN FROM : BARON, FREDERICK D. TO : FILE TITLE : ot INTERVIEW WITH HARVEY, WILLIAM DATE : 09/14/75 PAGES : 13 SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM Eb ASSASSINATIONS INQUIRY: LUMUMBA & ZRRIFLE . ROSELLI OPERATION IN NOVEMBER 1961 BISSELL, RICHARD CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION (HELMS, EDWARDS, O'CONNELL) DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : SSCI Box 226, Folder 8 ie GD SD SU GD GD ED GD cwD me wD mA nt GE cg my Et cD AED GED GED GD GED GED GM GD GEE DED GD GP ce MES ARS HD CE ED AND GID HE EE ED AED) NE Ht YM GY OOD eh A GN GH OE A GO GH GH NH Go ae Gm GO ut GD GD on ae oe a oe [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 DBoctd: 322703892 Page i
HW 450955 Ee NE SPER ETS EVE ES NISL APES ENO BIE Record #157-10011-10124 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY INVENTOR ZO: INTERVIEW WITH? REGARDING! Assassinations Inquiry: Lumumba & ZRRIFLE DATE-TIME“LOCATION; _September 14, 1975 0 PRESENT? Frederick Baron | HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED: FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: ____———————CS EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES _X_NO ¥ jo Jas Bocld: 32203892 Page 2 ‘Willian Harvey ae
ee MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES CIA HES BO FROM: Frederick D. Baron fo JAN 94. DATE: - September 24, 1975. Ci (A C\QC8 _ SUBJECT: is) with William Harvey (conducted September 14, (\ Cc LUMUMBA'S ACTUAL DEATH 1. I do not know of any connection between the CIA and Lumumba's actual death. LUMUMBA PLOTS 2. I never heard of poison being sent from the CIA to the Congo station, nor did I ever hear of any CIA assassination mission in the Congo. I am almost sure that{ i never told me r ] that he had learned that there were poisons in the Congo. QJWIN CONGO MISSION 3. The only mention of assassinating Lumumba that I recall is Sire eset dtacki ( sti“‘é‘ém'S:«sCORNVerrsattion with me. ee, : 4, Ij only told me that he had agreed to go to the Congo to discredit Lumumba and that he had refused to undertake an assassination mission which Richard Bissell attempted to give him. 5. I did not debrief c when he returned from the Congo. So I did not learn from him what the nature of his mission was. 6. [ids activities in the Congo were not a Staff D opera- tion. Despite the fact that the memo of January 11, 1960 & mentions that "QJWIN was being used for FI/D purposes," QJWIN's mission in the Congo was not a Staff D operation. Rather, it was an African Division operation. I merely loanedé St by. (es HW 50955 BDoctld: 3227033892 Page 3
-2- eS to the African Division. In turn, QJWIN was loaned by my deputy , jto| | for his activities in the Congo. 7. In fact, it is possible that[ | might not know exactly what QJWIN did in the Congo because| __|may simply have arranged for WIN to be placed under the supervision of { |and sent to the Congo. 8. The use of the phrase "FI/D purposes" in the memo of January 1l, 1960 was purely an administrative device to secure funding for QJIWIN and allow for accounting out of Staff D funds. I am almost 100% sure that there was no actual FI/D assignment. 9. It is possible.that hmay have used QJWIN to aid in a Weieiesy in the Congo. "survey (are Opporre il the primary purpose off i's trip was to undertake an operation against Lumumba. 10. The specific nature of QJWIN's assignment in the Congo was. probably worked out between and| ll. QJWIN was first recruited byl RW 50955  Docld:32203892 Page 4
HW 450955 l2. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Shortly after| came back |and perhaps before he was actually assigned t and I discussed OJWIN and his potential utility. In | early use of OSIM l QJWIN was told to "spot" people] ss] | | He was probably also told that he should spot people who were capable of obtaining documents or packages from couriers. QJWIN's instructions for asset spotting did not change at all after Project ZRRIFLE was established as far as I know. | [_|}continued to be the intermediary between myself and QJIWIN. I never met OJWIN. QJWIN was not permitted to make a Single recruitment as far as I know. | The lengthy handwritten notes which appear in the QJWIN/ ZRRIFLE file (a xeroxed version of a spiral notebook) were probably written by| in the course of debriefing OQJWIN on his asset spotting. This is a deduction on my part based upon the handwriting and the terminology used in these notes. If there was any CIA mission to kidnap Lumumba from UN custody and turn him over to Mobutu, I did not know of it. I do not think anyone would be naive enough to think that if Lumumba were turned over to Mobutu, he would live through it. As far as I know, QJWIN was entirely run by| at this point. In other words, I do not know of any independent lines of responsibility or reporting that QJWIN had to other people in the CIA station in the Congo (6&..to-anyoné on Staff B. Bocld: 32203892 Page 5
Qo. 20. 21. 22. 23. eae 24. As far as I knew, neither |nor QJWIN ever had an assassi- nation mission. If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination mission, it would have been cleared with me. I was never informed that he was to be used for such a mission. Nor did I ever discuss any such mission with him as far as I know. I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge. I was shown a CIA cable to Director from IN 36814, dated November 2, 1960 regarding QJWIN's mission to the Congo which reads, in the first paragraph: "He accepted offer. Proceed Leopoldville. Precise mission not conveyed to him. He only informed that mission might involve large element of personal risk." | probably wrote this cable. This cable does not indicate any particular kind of operation, like an assassination mission, because anyone going to the Congo at this time would have assumed a great risk if they were undertaking any kind of operation against Lumumba. The memorandum of November 2, 1950 PRUTUBE?D, was a memorandum 1’read and approved at the time it A FKUTUBE/D was. a-cryplonym. for Fi/Statt dD, was issued. The memorandum indicates that! I] was the re- leasing officer. | | IT probably released this memorandum, although I cannot be certain. ~ HY 50955 Bocld:322703692 Page 6
It was probably written, for my signature, " | who would have been sufficiently familiar with the operational details to be the ( 25. author, 26. I do remember the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo, the subject to which this memorandum refers. 27. gbakar Mission: ‘I.do'recallthat OFWIN was to go. to Dakaziug ¢ Sénegalvat some point as indicated in the QIIN-ftle,but I do not recall. the-nature of the mission: Nor” do I know whether QJWIN actually w went to Dakar? I am almost certain NR B that this was not connected-in-any™ way to an assassination a . a «Ps mission. I do not, reall whether the mission—to Dakar concerned ~N. the spotting of assets, but Dakar would be a logical place for Benepe poy te on iS aGgetfspotting= activity. because“it is a cosmopolitan port Msi © wer 28. After reviewing the Memorandum for the Finance Division from Sag eg a "William K. Harvey, Chief, (READiviston’R" dated January 11, 1960 which concerns QJWIN's trip to the Congo, it appears to me that this memorandum was written for my signature by 29. I do not know what was to be signified by thé note in my memo of January 11, 1960: "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be noted that QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specific highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed."' I do not know what "completed" would have meant, but I assume it must have referred to the fact that | | ED had returned from the Congo. HY 50955 DBocld: 322703892 Page *
HW 509455 30. This memorandum of January 11, 1960 does not reflect any first- hand knowledge on my part of the nature of| mission in the Congo. WLROGUE 31. Mr. Baron showed me the cable of December 17, 1960 from Leopoldville to CIA headquarters concerning an approach by WIROGUE to QJWIN for the purpose of recruiting QJWIN for "an execution squad." I do have a vague recollection that QJWIN was approached in the Congo in connection with a "direct action" operation. But it is my impression that this was an incident involving free-wheeling by an agent, rather than an assassination mission. ZRRIFLE/ROSELLI OPERATION 32. Project ZRRIFLE was used for funding the Roselli operation. Project ZRRIFLE, which began as the development of an Executive Action capability, was later used for the accounting for the Roselli operation. This was for the purpose of the convenience of vouchering whatever expenses were involved and to ensure security. This enapled me to keep the general Task Force W operations separate from the Roselli operation. Boclda: 3227036892 Page &@ oud
HY 0955 33. -7- The question of "reactivation" of the Roselli operation in November 1961. In November of 1961, Richard Bissell asked me to take over the Roselli contact. Richard Bissell's testimony, as represented to me by Mr. Baron, that Roselli was viewed as an "inactive contact" at that time is exactly contrary to my recollection. I recall that Bissell simply asked me to take over the Sheffield Edwards operation. This was not a revival of anything that had been terminated or put on ice. The operation had never stopped. There was no indication in any of my talks with Richard Bissell that the Roselli operation was dormant. But in fairness to Bissell, I don't know that he ever said precisely that it was an ongoing operation. The impression I received from Bissell, however, was that it was indeed an ongoing operation. There was nothing said to the contrary. My subsequent talks with Edwards, O'Connell, and Roselli indicated that the operation was active. But I do not know how close Bissell was to the operation and exactly what he knew about it. It may have been his impression that the operation was inactive. Whatever language Bissell used with me, it was clear to me that the operation was ongoing and that I was to do whatever I could with it. It was also clear from my first conversation with Roselli that the operation had never been called off. Jim O'Connell also indicated to me that he was still in contact with Roselli. Shortly after my discussion with Bissell of my takeover of the Roselli contact, I discussed the Roselli operation with Edwards. The only reason for the Docld: 32203892 Page 9
HW 450955 34. hiatus in activity in the Roselli operation between November of 1961 and my meeting with Roselli in New York in April of 1962 was the intensity of my other responsibilities at the CIA. During this period, I had to set up Task Force W, including recruiting its members. I also had to continue the ongoing Cuban operations and write frequent memos to Lansdale and Robert Kennedy on these subjects. When I was requested to take over the Roselli operation, I assessed it and determined that the operation should be terminated because it had little chance of success. But because of the tremendous repercussion potential, I delayed the termination. I subsequently terminated the Roselli operation as soon as feasible after the missile crisis in October of 1962. It would have been terminated earlier except that during the crisis I could not cut off any potential asset. Had I been given the original assignment of removing Castro, this is not the way I would have done it, Authorization through Bissell. At no time did I or anyone else connected with the Castro assassination operation (Helms, Edwards, O'Connell and Roselli) ever have the slightest doubt that this was fully authorized. But my sense of the existence of this authorization came solely from my conversations with Richard Bissell. I had no other direct information about the source of authorization for the operation. > BDoclTd: 32203892 Page 10
HY 0955 35. Robert Kennedy. I never discussed the Roselli operation with Robert Kennedy nor with anyone outside the CIA except for John Roselli. ZRRIFLE/RICHARD BISSELL 36. 37. My initial discussion with Richard Bissell about establishing an Executive Action capability was the first time assassination was ever raised with me in any context other than as a subject of general philosophical discussion. The memos of January 11, 1961 and of November 2, 1960 do not make it any easier for me to date my original conversation with Richard Bissell about Executive Action. The ZRRIFLE cryptonym could have been assigned before or after my initial talk with Bissell, so the date of that assignment would not be dispositive of this question. I don't remember whether ZRRIFLE was a ZRRIFLE/ARNOED SILVER g 38. 'I do not know in what connection Richard Bissell raised the subject of assassinations or assassination capability with prior to my initial discussion of the subject with Bissell. My best recollection is that in my discussion with Bissell, Bissell said that he had a general discussion of assassination with in the course of which|__|volunteered that af asset of his might be useful in this connection. But Jhad not previously used QJWIN as an assassina- tion capability or even viewed him as such. would Bocld: 322703892 Page it
@ have had to clear any such use of QJWIN with me, and he did not. When Richard Bissell spoke to about de- veloping an assassination capability,[ _ [must have raised QIWIN as a possible asset. 39. I reviewed the typewritten version of | notes _ headed "Project ZRRIFLE" which were included in the QJUWIN/ZRRIFLE , file. On page 2 of those notes, the following sentence appears: The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the 900A category. “OOA' refers to "Other Operational Activities," which is a general fund that a CIA officer maintains to pay for development of assets, including recruitment of assets, and general support of agent operations. & 40. The QJWIN file was created first in regard to WIN's recruitment by| and then in regard to WIN's activities in the Congo. Subsequently, it was transferred to the ZRRIFLE file. ZRRIFLE was primarily set up as a project ~ UI I distinctly told| | that QIWIN was never to be told about the development of an assassination capability. As far as I know, QJWIN never knew that the development of an assassination capability was one of the purposes of the asset spotting to which he was assigned. 41. I approved the asset spotting trip that QJWIN took through fl jin 1961. LAA HW 30955 Docld: 32203892 Page i2
SED MEMRCOTTIELEB/ZRRIFLE AND CONGO Sn 1 =m 42. I believe, as I testified earlier, that my discussion of Ecotec) was a general, philosophical jofficer never cut in on the Caeee) operationg _| ee OT | | “translating machine." subject of assassination or on general 43. I talked tofSidneycotelehy frequently in the course of my SIDS Y work. However, I do not recall any other talk with a6 that more specifically concerned assassination than this one. 44. I knew that TSD had a poisoning capability -- in other words, that they possessed lethal drugs. I very probably discussed -tuvebg the poisons that were available. But I do not HY 50955 DBocld: 32203892 Page 13
He 45. talk with(Gottlieh would have involved the manner and means of assassinations. I have no knowledge that'SidneyaGot@lie and Richard Bissell ever discussed any specific assassination missions. 46. Ido not think that I ever discussed QJWIN's trip to the Congo -Gottkiel’ never mentioned to me that he had been to the Congo. TESTIMONY OF TED SHACKLEY CONCERNING A "THREE MAN DECISION-MAKING COU 47. Mr. Baron represented to me that Ted Shackley testified that I had informed him in the early days of his tenure at JMWAVE es Station in Miami that there was "a three man group" making decisions on Cuban operations. There was no such formal decision-making group. I probably mentioned the three people referred to. by Shackley -- Lansdale, Helms, and Robert Kennedy -- as three key people in the Special Group at that time. | BUREAU OF NARCOTICS 43.[.—-—sdiwaas once used to go to Rome to spot assets. He wal ss—CSSCid tb’ the time, so his participation with the CIA was an extremely sensitive matter. ec: Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers Rhett Dawson lp Burt Wides [sr 50955 Docld: 32203392 Page 14