HW 54714 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITIE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DocId: 32977070 "cee Date 06/25/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Leased under the John . Eennedy Was5assination Records ollection Act of 1992 AGENCY INFORMATION NSC 145-10001-10185 (44 USc 2107 Note). ases#: NW 54214 Date: 126 HO-10-2017 DOCUMENT INFORMATION THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP 00/00/00 5 (AUGMENTED) CONSEQUENCES OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Lc RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 02/23/98 NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION Page 1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 4. on 2 ucues 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation requested the DOD/JCS Representative, ‘Operatic | wonoooss, to prepare a paper for distribution to the apeciaa Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific megane” is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (p pace 1, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability st, possibility of a require- ment for sustained occupat: vel of national mobili- gation required, and Cuba n." Pursuant to this request, the require divided into its separate parts. 2. Requirements (per airborne divisions, an infantry a and an Wine Geaus: a Navy Striking and Covering force cone - with an amphibious task force; ene 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport — ad. Principal equipment in A) ay - arti 275 tanks.) EXCLUDED FROM G HW 54214 Docld: 32977070 Page 2
— | (4) Air Force 3. Level of National Mobilization Hequired. a, Army - None. In lieu of ‘mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though. not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations. b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present — authority held by the Maritine Administration to charter shipping. : __¢. Air Force - In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops in the minimum time WR | nowever, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day. ad. Marines - None, sé. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands. 4k. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic contingency plan anticipates penleving control of key strategic areas in Cuba withi Mays. Subsequent to gaining” such control of the island there will be es progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits. Eap—efeatt Simmer wewece onan | HW 54214 DocId: ae Page 3
ter with’rasel from Cuba. The equivalent of an Army division force from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces ana remain on the islano to perform counterguerrilla opera- tions and coniuct military government activities. This force will be progressively :ithcrewn as the new Cuben government _increases in effectiveness. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available other commitments qm | About of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capa- | bility will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of - Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in the Pacifig) _In addition to the euphibicus troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. | ee for shipping will diminish after the i the operation. d. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed. WW 542714 DBocld:325977070 Page 4
e. CONAD air defense capabilities in Sa ecet United _ States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air Force forces brought into the area for this operation. There- fore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is anticipated. : 5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction. a. The military reaction will be determined in large measure by the will of the Cuban armed Porces to resist, as well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency in their use, at the time of US military intervention. b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are ~ _belleved to contemplate a strong initial resistance, Poliowed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare, : c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that Survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of which, if they survive the air oer ee by US forces, could attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States, AL forces engaged in the operation, as well as the Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to guard against any such attempts at retaliation. qd. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for eounter- action will improve if Soviet's continue to provide the | : Cubans with additional military equipment and training. Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities, etre ee ee HW 54214 Docld: 432977070 _ fete 4
erations, and time required to recons| iendly Cuban government, ult tasks will include restoration ef law and order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations. e. To achieve the objectives of Subparagraph b above, at is planned that the pee? assault military presence initially will oe of substantial Army follow-on new Cuban governnent Ancreases. Thereatter, a lengthy _