ace G JFK Assassination System Date: 9/22/2011. ldefitiiication Form: Agency Information | Peleased under the John Kennedy WSsassination Records Y: AGENCY Ro) RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUM. oOllection Act of 1992 (44 U5C 2107 Note). AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ase#: NW 54545 Date: : n - ; —O-12-2017 Doetinene information. ORIGINATOR 2 WHITE HO USE FROM: “PARROTT, THOMAS TO? L103 /1.960 a 4 ee SUBJECTS GRAY, GORDON ZRRIELE CUBA CASTRO - AMLASH a DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: —“Unelassified RESTRICT! > ‘Consulted; FA; Donor Restricted CURRENT STATUS: Redact . DATEOF LAST REVIEW: — 03/01/1994 > OPENING CRITERIA © COMMENTS : Box 256Folder SExhibit J to testinony of Thoinas. Parrot, 7/10/75 a oO Be same Sei o7 sharps tne ecto alae Raina RAGS D: CSE eR ONAN TIL TSE RR EE SLA US RE EET se eae EONS Sa) ccumutseeussnmmematrescnennomerissan eines sunnstytncgones snmp: et AAs ee OC NOMAD BORE REA AE TE EO NTE SS NEN PNET E TE HW 54545 DBocld:322781994 Page 1
Released under the John Kennedy WSsassination Records (44 USC 2107 Note). ases#: NW 54545 Date: wO-12-2017 PROPERTY ( THE WHITE Huger tert Ollection act of 1992 | 3 November 1960 6-5 ~ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD . ; Rielle ow SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960 PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale an : 1. Cuba 8 Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. “Mr. Merchant ‘said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter. From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of a the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, ; supported by Mr. Gray.and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed toa point where covert activities | of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. | Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray i cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the. population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The —-' latter said that he and others-in the State Department had originally . thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under ClA control. Now the same peopie are beginning to feel more and rnore that despite the numerous defections and the econornic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job. 2 “ ad Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to ““Nolean up'! the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the ClA-backed exiles to’rmount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt TirG CSD IUT IS —_ , SOO RET VIN Te Co iO 7LieAs Ena MAT Weer aw ~N 1 Docld: 322761994 Page 2?
HW 54545 “Snotervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion [| Se of which was that such action.on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it-essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely —- understood by responsible officials, so that-any overt Cuban act would be met-with a previously-agreed-on response. Mr. Merchant stated thar, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant thet it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and 3 ret that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and clean-up the mess.!! He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that a uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria. 4 > Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious. doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not representa cr final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal on embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; thatis, the choice should ; — rest between continuihg our operations entirely on foreign soil or: preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention. Mr. Gray sug egested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agrecd that this 1s where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepar ed ‘to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed. In this connection Gen, Cabell mentioned the possibility of using -a refugee or anization - either an existing one-or a-contrived one - to backstop the operations. DoclId:322781994 Page 3
Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have L—~- | ‘ the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable. 7 , ae - 1 . : . : oo ! ‘ Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been | / ‘done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.} , “He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be . x ae leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be . an an necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed _~ out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous 4 action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion ; if ‘hevand our canahilitias. : - ; ve Le. IT 7 PROPERTY O¢ Cees bee Cave THR WHITE Bouck Greiti HW 54545 DBocld:322781994 Page 4
HW 54545 \ | _ KAY Sup ply Drops - Cuba Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place’ because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.. V5, U-2, Cuba Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because. of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results-on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage. “Mr, Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not. be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week, " The other members appeared to have the same reaction. V6. “4 Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles Mr, Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and — Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; ‘that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA. The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group mecting and discuss the matter at firsthand, Mr. Parrott was asked to make — arrangements fox this. J 7. Naluc.of Cuba to the USSR as a Buse Vis-a-vis ‘Ca ape Canaveral “Mr. Parrott gave Mr.. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum pyr args PRC yt pane yr 4 DoclId: 3227681994 Page 5 aT
on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on 20 October 1960. “a THOMAS A, PARROTT aN © -wand f? eg oe “u toa ~ HW 54545 Docld:32261994 Page 6
Gnited States Senate MEM@R ANBEM elder/bolton Checklist: 2. ZRRIFLE documents “(need another look =f CV 4 hp "Fung woe Memo “4. Sign affadavit Ws, Isle of Pines source Deller (3 Khe, r i é HW 54545 Docld:32281994 Page 7