457-10014-10151 JFK Assassination System Date: VTH2015 Identification 'Form Agency Information AGENCY:  SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10151 RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMIITTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER: 07-M-56 . Document Information ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA . FROM: | TO: TITLE: SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT DATE: 09/01/1975 PAGES: 560 SUBJECTS: | SSCSGO, REPORT DOCUMENT TYPE: ; REPORT CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: —Redact ; DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 03/21/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.1 HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 1
Date : 08/07/95 Page ;: 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY ; SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10151 RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMIITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-56 DOCUMENT INFORMATION OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM ;: TO : TITLE : SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT DATE : 09/01/75 PAGES : 560° SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORT DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET ~ RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS ;: POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99 {R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBDocld:32423539 Page 2
| | a Se ‘September 1, 1975 ; SELECT COMMITTEE ~ ASSASSINATION REPORT | Tab A: PROLOGUE “Tab B: Part I: Introduction and Summary Tab D: Part IIT/Cuba | Tab E: Part III/Dominican Republic Tab F: Part ITI/Chile Tab G: Part ILI/Congo Tab H: Part ITI/South Vietnam _ cd Tab I: Part IV: Findings and Conclusions - ~~ Tab J: Part V: Recommendations. ee en aw . t HWY 509455 ° Doocld: 32499539 .Page 3
Agreed to by Subcommittee oe . : re ' October 8, 1975 PROLOGUE The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in the context of United States policy and actions designed to counter the threat of spreading Communism. Following the end of World War Il, many nations in eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under ‘Communist influence or. control. The defeat. of the Axis powers was “accompanied by: the ‘rapid disintegration of the Western colonial empires. The Second World War no sooner ended than a new struggle “began. “The Communist threat, emanating from what was: then. called | 6 the "sino- Soviet bloc, “produced a policy of. containment intended ~ : @ to prevent further encroachment by. Communism into the free world." ‘United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for ‘the establishment’ of interlocking treaty arrangements and military. “bases throughout the world. Our concern over the expansion of an aggressive Communist monolith led the United States ‘to fight two “tnajor wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to Wage a relentless cold war against Communist expansion wherever | it appeared in the "back alleys of the world." This called for a yy “full range of clandestine activities in response to the operations. Crt of Communist clandestine services. SO , ef. The fear of expanding Communism. was particularly acute when Fidel Castro emerged as the leader of Cuba in the late 1950's. His takeover was, seen as the first significant penetration by the QQ  Comnists into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. leaders, including nr $0955" “pocta:32429599 Page 4
@ ‘most Members of: Congress, called for vigorous ‘action to stem the. ‘Communist infection in this hemisphere. These policies rested on widespread popular support and encouragement. Throughout this period,,. the U.S. felt impelled to respond to ‘threats which were, or seemed to be, skirmishes ina global Cold” War against Communism. Castro! s Cuba raised ‘the spectre of a. Soviet outpost at America’ s doorstep. Events, in the Dominican. Republic ‘appeared to offer more such opportunities. for - the Russians and their “allies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic. center of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist pene- tration ‘there was viewed as.a threat to American interests: in emerging “Africa. : Americans are well aware. of. the powerful. reactions set off 7 i ‘in the: United States, in. the 1960" Ss by the domino theory in Indochina. - a And, even .the election in’ 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was . wk —_ ‘seen by. some as a threat similar. to that of Castro’ s takeover in Cuba. The. Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this ‘Interim Report. as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but. “not. justified, by 1 the pressure of events at the time. . The Committee “believes that it is still in the national interest of the United “States. to. do what it can . to he nations resist Communist dominatio put. it is clear that this cannot justify in the future the kind of. abuses ‘covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved that steps must be taken to prevent them from happening again. CY ; | oo. . ; f, cher the DOT M4 ATI af i i HF 50955  powld: 32423539 Page 5
fl iy Hv 0955 aes . Agreed to Dd Drafting Subcommittee — on Mugust 2 BY Tors L. LX TRODUCTION AND SUMMARY, This interim report covers allegations of United States involve- ment in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. Of equal sitnificance in this report are certain other cases where foreign political leaders in fact were killed, where the United States was in some manner involved in activity leading up to the killing, but where it would be incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been to encourage assassination. The evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in . ~~ several assassination plots. The Committee believes that the use of assassi- nation as a tool of foreign policy is incompatible with American principles, international order, and morality. It should be rejected. Our inquiry also revealed serious problems with respect to United States involvement in coups directed against foreign. governments. Some of these problems are addressed here on, the basis of our investigation to date; others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into “covert. action has been completed. We stress the interim nature of this report. In the course of the Committee's continuing work, other. alleged assassination plots ray surface, and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may come to light. However, it is the Committee's view that the cases covered herein have been developed in sufficient detail to clarify thé issues which are at the heart of the Committee's mandate to recommend legislative and other reforms relating to the vital matters discussed below. 4 ; * The Vice Chairman reserved as to ‘the first sentence in the discussion of the similarities and differences among the plots. (See p. Boctlda: 324273539 Page 6
HY 0955 Doctd: 324295539 Page 7 In depth treatment of the assassination question has lengthened the Committee's schedule but has greatly increased the Committee's awareness of the hard issues it must face in the months ahead. The Committee intends, nevertheless, to complete, by February.1976, its main job of undertaking the first comprehensive review of the intelligence community. A. The Committee's Mandate Under Senate Resolution 21, the Committee was instructed to in- vestigate the Full range of governmental intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which such activities were “illegal, improper or un- ethical". ‘In addition to that very broad seneral mandate, the Committee was required by the Senate to investigate, study and make recommendations concerning various specific matters, several of which relate to the assassi- nation issue .* Although the Rockefeller Comission conducted an inquiry into reported assassination plots, the Commission declared it was unable, for a variety of reasons, to complete its inquiry. At the direction of the Presi- dent, the Executive Branch turned over: to the Select Committee the work the Commission had done, along with other documents relating, to assassina- tions. * For example, S. Res. 21 requires the Comnmittee to study and investi- gate the followings: the extent and necessity of . ... covert intelligence activities oe » abroad"; “[the] nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities"; "the need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversisht of United States intelligence activities hy the Congress"; and the need for new legislation. —
HW 50955 B. Committee Decision To Make This Report Public tee, i ap This report raises important questions of national policy. We wm. ri . Seg} ieve that the public is entitled to know what certain instrumentalities ag me their Government have done. Further, our, recommendations can only be Nw ’ ~ : J judged in light of the factual record. Therefore, this interim report “ should be made public. Because of. our faith in the democratic system, and the paranount importance of strengthening the institutions of this country, the Committee believes ‘the truth about the assassination allegations should be told. Democracy depends upon a well-informed electorate. Truth underlies both - | shes 5 vee justice and freedom. “We reject any contention that the facts disclosed herein should be iP set . that 17 kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United States. Despite cK + us, he done the possible injury to our national reputation, the Committee believes that foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection, respect the United States more for keeping faith with its democratic. ideal than they will condemn us for the misconduct itself. The fact that portions of the story have already been publicly dis- closed only accentuates the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and mis- leading partial disclosures are neither fair to the individuals involved, nor a responsible way to lay the groundwork for informed public policy judements. ! 4 -C. The Scope of the Committee's Investigation The investigation of the assassination issue has been an unpleasant duty, but one that the Select Committee had to meet. The Committee has compiled a massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway. | , Bocldad: 3274273539 Page 6
, - bs ag aur ‘The hearing record includes some sss pages of sworn testimony [rom witnesses*during _.__ hearing days as well as numerous staff interviews. The documents which the Committee obtained included raw files From the agencies and departuents, from the White House, ‘and from the Presidential libraries of the Administrations of former Presidents Eisenhower , Kenneay Kennedy and Johnson.** We obtained evidence of two general types: first, evidence which related to the overall setting of events, the national policy of . the time, and descriptions of normal operating procedures including channels of command and control; and second, evidence relating to specific H ee ig events. A Senate Committee is not a'lcourt. It looks to the past, not to . | . determine guilt or innocence, but in order to wake recommendations for the future. Therefore, where we found the evidence to be ambiguous-~-as we did on some issues--we have set out both sides, in order that the evidence may speak for itself. Despite the number of witnesses and documents examined by the Committee, there were the following shortcomings in the evidence available to us: J * The names of the witnesses are set forth in Appendix A. “ ** The Committee served both general and specific document requests upon the Executive Branch and the Administration represented to the Committee that it did not know of any additional relévant documents, except, of course, for the possibility that the "Nixon papers" (which the Committee is attempting to obtain) may contain material relevant to the allerations relating to Chile. : - NN BW 50955 BDocld: 32423539 Page 9
HW 50955 Hany of the events‘ under consideration occurred as lone as fifteen years azo. With one exception, they occurred during the adriinistrations of Presidents now dead. Otner high officials, whose testimony might have additional light upon the thorny issues of authorization 1p and control, are also dead. WNoreover, with. the passage of time, the memories of those still alive have ditmed. fe EE The Committee often faced the difficult task of dis- tinguishing. refreshed recollection from speculation. In : if oy ae many instances, witnesses were unable to testify from in- ae dependent recollection and had to rely on documents con- temporaneous with the évents to refresh their recollections. While informed speculation is of some assistance, it ean only.be assigned limited weight in judging specific events. ad 7 Assassination is not a subject on which one would expect many records orj/documents to be made or retained. a In fact, there were more relevant contemporaneous documents then we had expected, and the CIA in 1967 made internal uh : f ; study of the Castro, Trujillo and Diem assassination allega- tions. That study was quite useful, particularly in 3 : suggesting leads for uncovering the story of the actual assassination activity. Unfortunately, some material j i Yh fy * Those studies were made at the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms to provide him with information .to respond to questions put to him by President Johnson. ‘The President's questions, as to Castro, were provoked by a Drew Pearson newspaper column of March [6], 1967, which had alleged CIA attempts on the life of Castro using the Mafia. * The President asked Helms at the sane time to provide information about Trujillo and Diem. DoclTd: 32423539 Page i0
a relating to.that investigation was destroyed upon its completion.* A final deficiency in the evidence stems from the doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed from the world and performed in such a way’ that if they ne were discovered, the role of the United States could be . plausibly denied. As an extension of this doctrine of T? “plausible deniability” communications between the Agency © My y and high Administration officials were often convoluted yer Chk and imprecise.** . The evidence contains sharp conflicts, Some of which relate to basic facts. But the most inportant conflicts telate not so much to basic facts as to differing perceptions and opinions based upon relatively undis- puted facts. With: respect to both kinds of conflicts, the Committee has attempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it may speak for itself. In the findings and.conclusions section, we sugzest resolutions of some of the conflicts. Remembering that the Committee's main job is to find lessons for the future, there are also occasions where we point out that resolving conflicts in the evidence may be less important than making certain that the system which produced the airbiguitics is corrected. * This was done pursuant to the instructions of CIA Director Richard Helms (Helms Ex. ; 6/13/75 Tr.__). In fairness to Director Helms it should be added, however, that he was responsible for requesting the preparation of the I.G. Reports and for preserving them. ** For a full discussion of this doctrine see pages _ . a HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page ii
-T- H A D. Summary of Findings and.Conclusions 1. The Questions Presented The Committee sought to answer four broad questions: ASSASSINATION PLOTS. Did U.S. officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots designed to assassinate. foreign leaders? INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER KILLINGS. Did U.S. officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which Significantly con- tributed to the killing of foreign leaders? AUTHORIZATION. Where there was involvement by U.S. officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such activities ordered and if so, at what levels of our Government? COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL. Even if not authorized, were the assassination activities perceived to.be within the scope of agency authority, and was adequate control exercised over its activities. 2. Summary of Findings and Conciusions on the Plots The Seven Allegations. The Committee investigated alleged U.S. involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries.* They were; Country individual Involved** Cuba . Fidel Castro Congo (Zaire) Patrice Luiaumba * Insert Footnote on Sukarno and Duvalier. ‘Le _ ¥€ Insert re Raul and Che and Ngo Dinh Nhu. HW 350955 DBocld:327423539 Page 1?
~o— Countr Individual Involved Dominican Republic Rafael Trujillo Chile General Rene Schneider South Vietnam - Ngo Dinh Diem In summary, the evidence with respect to each allegation disclosed the following.* Fidel Castro (Cuba). United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro beginning in 1960. American underworld figures were used in these plots as well as Cubans hostile to the Castro regime. One of the later plots, which lasted until 1965, involved a Cuban dissident who was provided encouragement and material support by the United States.. Patrice Lumumba _(Congo/Zaire). In the Fall of 1969, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the tinited States was involved in the actual killing. Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic). Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. Commencing in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the U.S. Government generally supported these dissidents and some Government personnel were aware that they intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. | There was conflicting evidence whether the weapons were knowingly supplied Be for use in the assassination and whether any were present at the scene. Stier tere ene * See Section III for a detailed treatment of the evidence. BDocld: 324273539 Page 13 cat |
\ im Neos: ~ ee General Rene Schneider (Chile). On October 25, “1979, Ceneral Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted while resisting a kidnap attempt three days earlier. Schneider, as Commander in Chief of the Army and a ~ constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle to efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of [resident | ye Hh ne of Chile. The United States Government supported,and sought to instigate, (th yer a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine suns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. ‘There was conflicting evidence on whether the United States had previously severed relations with the group,that kidnapped and killed t : Schneider and on whether any of the equipment supplied was actually used in the kidnapping. Neo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam). Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Generals’ coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there was no evidence: that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it appeared that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Senerals' pre- coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and with which there was no American connection. In addition to these five cases the Committee received evidence that ranking government officials discussed,. and may have authorized,the establishment within the CIA of a generalized capability to assassinate. ce- Chairman Similarities and Differences Among the Plots. The plots all ‘ver reserved 7 : “cht to involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and canze to ‘clude con- none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart fron. “ot of Com- nist sphere that similarity,, there were significant differences among the plots. The / 2 tuence than following distinctions are pertinent: ‘stern Hemi- nere. \ \ \ HW 50955 Docld:327423539 Page 14
- 10~ | (1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot or were yesponding to requests of local dissidents for aid. (2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a foreipn leader,or whether the leader's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an attem i pt to overthrow the fovern- ment. The Castro case is an example of a plot conceived by United States officials to kill a foreign leader. The Lumumba plot falls into the same category. In thé case of Trujillo, although*the U. S. Government certainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose ain Le | . +s clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. Cif fd tb AUGALS uh » « * ' By aiding them this country was in- ( Ma ° - rr ; plicated, whether the specific weaponry actually supplied was meant to kill a sven Trujillo or was only intended as a symbol of U.S. support for the dissidents. por me . as | thas The Schneider case is different from that of both Castro and Tru- plinwerg jillo. The United States Government sought a coup and provided support to local dissidents, knowing they believed that General Schneider was an obstacle to their plans. However, even though the support included. deadly weapons, it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United otates officials was to abduct, not to kill, General Schneider. Similarly, in the Diem case, United States officials did want a change in Government, but 2 there is no evidence that the United States sought the death of Dien se himself. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority and Control. To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page La
-ll- ‘geen isyiir Soar & points must be made clear. First, there is no doubt that the United States Government opposed the various leaders in question. ‘U.S. officials - at the highest levels objected to the Castro and Trujillo regimes, believed the accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American in~ terests, and thousht of Lumumba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa. Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in the context of other, more massive activities directed against the regines in question. For example, the plots directed against Fidel Castro personally, cannot be under- stood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive, assaults upon 2 or 1 7 gy - ° woe * his regine, such as the Bay of Pigs invasioa in 1901 and Operation Mongoose in 1962. Yowever, the issue of Governmental authorization of assassination is of independent importance. There is a significant difference between a veal coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an. individual foreign leader and (y iT other forms of intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore, the Committce endeavored to sxplote as fully as possible the question of how and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, from what level the authorization came. We discovered a nurky picture. It is not clear whether this is due to the system of deniability and the consequent state of the evidence which even after our long investigation remains conflicting and inconclusive, or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the systeia of authori- zation so that activities such as assassinations could have been undertaken by ne an agency of the United States Government without express authority: ‘ HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 16
Based upon the record of our investigation, the Committee's single most important finding is that the system was such that assassina- tion activity could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the highest level. Alongs with that paramount conclusion, the Committee makes four other major findings.* The first relates to the lack_of direct evidence of authori- zation of the assassination plots by Presidents or other persons above the Governmental azency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain officials may have, nonetheless, perceived tfiat, according to their judgment HAND Pee and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third eriticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to revea ir plans and activities to superior authorities, ov.for failing.to do.so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth. criticizes Administration officials for, on.occasion, giving vague and indirect instructions to subordinates, and 3 —_ - — p TPO PW consideration. . pss LM THR? 7HAF LAAL pnw tow aren reconnect There is admittedly a tension within the four findings. The first } and third points tend to suggest a lack of authority while the second and fourth points explain why agency officials could nonetheless have perccived that their actions were proper. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some confli¢ts over facts, it is more important that there may often have been two differing perceptions of the same Facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds and ex- perience of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinguished : * The Committee's findings are elaborated in Section > infra. HW 50955 Doclad:32423539 Page if
HW 450955 ~13- x from those who were not. Words of urgency which to the former may have meant killing, to the latter may have meant nothing of the sort. While we are critical of certain individual actions, the Committee is mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies upon secrecy, compartmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility. This sytem creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment are most necessary. Ience, before turning to an extensive review ‘of ‘the evidence relating to the cases, we briefly deal with ve the general subject of covert action during the relevant period. ae BDocld: 3274273539 Page 16
Subcommittee It. COVERT ACTION AS VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION Simply stated, covert action may be defined as activity which sup- ports the sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives but is concealed under circumstances permitting that nation to plausibly deny its actions. The National Security Act of 1947 did not specifically include authority for covert operations. However, it granted to the National Security Council, then created as an. instrument of the President, the authority to direct the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Thereafter, at its first meeting in December 1947, the National Security Council issued a top secret directive granting the CIA the authority to conduct covert operations. From 1955 to 1970, the basic authority for these operations was National Security Council 5412/2.* This directive framed the purposes of covert operations entirely in terms of opposition to "International Communism ,''** directing the CIA to counter, reduce and discredit "International Communism” throughout the world in a manner consistent with Ue S. foreign and military policies. It also directed the CIA to undertake covert operations to achieve this. end, and defined covert operations ‘as any covert activities related to * Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations ‘is National Security Decision Memorandum 40 » which. superceded NSC 5412/2 on Feb- ruary 17, 1970. '. ** By contrast, NSAM 40 of 1970. described ‘covert actions as those secret activities designed to further. official U. S. programs and policies. abroad. It made no reference fo. ‘communism. a, es eee HW 450955 Docld:3274273539 Page 19
HW 50955 ) AED Am G Ee propaganda, economic warfare, political action Gncluding sabotage, demolition and assistance to resistance movements) and all activities ‘compatible with the directive (emphasis supplied). In 1962, the CIA's . General Counsel rendered the opinion that the Agency's activities are "not inhibited by any limitations other than those broadly set forth -in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62) POLICY. DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL MECHANISM The evidence dealt with in Part IIL is concerned. with what actually happened as far as obtaining, or not obtaining, authorization for the ac~ tivities under review by the Committee. With respect to what was meant to happen in regard to covert action generally, the CIA's General Counsel stated in 1962: CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Gc- casionally suggestions for action will come from out- side sources but, to depend entirely om such require- ments would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibili- ties. Also, the average person, both in government and outside, is thinking along normal lines and to develop clandestine cold war activities properly, persons know-~ ing both the capabilities. and limitations of clandestine action must be studying and devising how such actions - can be undertaken effectively. With respect to policy approval, the General Counsel went on to say: Both in developing ideas or plans. for action it is in- -cumbent upon the Agency to obtain necessary policy ap= proval, and for this purpose these matters should be explored with proper officials in other departments -and agencies, particularly’ in the Departments of State and Defense, so the determination can be made as to whether any.one. proposal. ‘should go to the ‘Special Group or higher for policy determination. The General Counsel's 1962 memorandum made it clear that the CIA considered itself responsible for ‘developing proposals and plans to oe Bocld:32423539 Page 20 as
es implement the specific objectives of NSC 541d ever, the memorandum stated that even in the development of ideas or plans for action, it was incumbent upon the Agency not only to coordinate with. Xg other executive departments and agencies, but also to "obtain necessary —_— policy approval” (emphasis added) » The issue which faced the Committee, of course, was whether such approval was, in fact, sought and obtained for assassination plans, and whether CIA officials thought it was "neces~ —T sary" to cbeaiq express approval for thes ‘tivities. —— - a Beginning in 1955, the responsibility for authorizing CIA covert action operations rested in’ the Special Group, a sub~Cabinet level sub- "committee of the National Security Council composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central In- telligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of — State for Political Affairs. Today this group is known as the 40 Com- mittee, and its membership now ineludes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. In addition, during 1962-another subcommittee of the Wisc was established to oversee covert operations relating to Cuba. It was known as the Special Group (Augmented) ‘and was: composed of the members of the. Special Group, the Attorney General and certain other high officials... The overriding’ purpose of the Special Group and its successors has been to exercise control over covert operations abroad. The Special Group was charged with the responsibility of considering the objectives of any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these aims. how likely it would be to succeed, and in géneral whether or not it would S be "proper" and in the Aferican ‘interest. The Special Group Chairman usually was responsible for determining which projects required Presi- dential consideration, as well as keéping him abreast of progress or changes. N HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 21°
always have been clear and tidy, nor that they have always been fol~ lowed. Prior to 1955, formal procedures barely existed at all. In 1955 the Special Group procedures were made more formal. Neverthe~ — less, the procedures that were| followed during the period of 1959-63 were characterized by an internal CIA memorandum as "somewhat cloudy and thus can probably be described as having been based on value judg- / . ments by the DCI.” (Memoranduh. for the Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Co- ordination of CIA's Covert Action Operations,” 21 February 1967) | In addition to the "somewhat,-cloudy" nature of the formal pro- _ cedures themselves, there are other options a@ailable ‘to any Chief Ex~ ecutive. The Committee recognizes that an agency charter to plan cov- ert action could not preempt Presidential authority to develop and | ead ; | . mandate foreign policy. Similarly, it is equally clear that what may he represented as the "desire" of: a. President is often communicated by intermediary officials whose perceptions may or may not accurately veflect the true Presidential purpose. Obviously, formal procedures can be disregarded from above br below. In at least one case, for example, a President instructed CIA’ officials not to consult with the ‘Special Group or other departments. In at least one other case, Agency officials decided not to bring! matters to the attention of the Special Group. It should also be noted that all of the above procedures apply to activities labeled "covert action! whereas. some of the activities considered in this report were) treated’ as. "counter-intelligence" actions. “ ee pe Fe Such actions are not normally subject to 40 Committee-type interdepart= mental authorization and review. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 22
The Concept of "Plausible}Deniability" pe tity sei rerenexs Non-attribution for U. S.|/Government covert operations was the original and principal purposej|of the so-called doctrine of plausible denial. | Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this con- cept, designed to’ protect the U. S. and its operatives from the conse- quences of disclosures, has been significantly expanded to: (1) mask ; . not only Presidential decisions but those of his senior staffers; (2) | : aa support less than complete advice to such persons regarding these op- erations. The quest for “plausible denial" has shaffed the processes of the U. S. Government for approving) and evaluating covert actions. The 40 Committee and its predecessors|can serve as "circuit breakers" for a aa od President, placing the locus. of consideration of covert action at sev- eral removes from the Oval office. One consequence of the doctrine of a | plausible denial is an incomplete documentary record. , SAT ors tain techniques, including euphemism and circumlocution./’ These tech- (/ fe The quest for "plausible denial" has also led to the use of cer- niques have had as their purpose the objective of allowing the Presi- dent and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should ae ; ee it be disclosed. In addition,; the use. of indirect reference to inform a President could be reversed--a President could communicate his desire . - ; . i. ; to see a highly sensitive operation undertaken in a similar indirect, OnE Wily gt the 0K e circumlocutious manner. Whether, .at- times. circumlocution had thé affect of failing to let Presidents or other officials accurately understand what was being said, was a question faced by the Committee. HW 50955 Docld: 32493539 Page 23 1
"Plausible deniability” raises. a number of other issues which the , ‘ Committee has had to confront.| Differing interpretations of the practice of plausible denial has affected the extent to which sensitive matters | ar ; . n were raised or considered. The evidence discussed below revealed that — very serious problems of assessing and insuring acccuntability and con- trol can arise out of plausible deniability. sor". a wae HW 50955 Bocld: 32493539
on August 29, 1975 » B. Cuba We have divided the facts with respect to Cuba into three broad sections. The first discusses the plots against Fidel Castro's life without attempting to confront the question of authorization. . The second deals with ‘the ‘evidence concerning whether or not the successive Directors of Central Intelligence, "Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized or knew about the various plots. (Although we have organizationally divided the evidence relating to the DCI's from the proof relating to other high administration officials, it is important to remember that the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters, a member of major administrative policy-making councils as well as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.) The third section covers the evidence concerning whether or not other high officials--including the various. Presidents--authorized or knew about the plots. This section also considers the evidence relating to whether or not the CIA officials who were involved with the plots believed them to be consistent with the general policy objectives - of the various administrations even if they had no personal knowledge as to whether the plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority. | HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 25
HW 50955 an wy “a i. The Assassination Plots Themselves We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965. Although some of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stageof planning and preparation, one plot involving the use of underworld figures reportedly twice pro- gressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident. The assassination proposals ran-the gamut from high~powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which would strai ‘The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963--the very day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas--when a CIA official in Paris offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same. time an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to. explore the possibility of improved relations. The following narrative sets forth the facts of assassination plots against Castro as established before the Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. The question of the level and degree of authorization of the plots is considered in the sections that follow. DoclTd: 32423539. Page 26
(a) Plots: Early 1960 (1) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image Efforts against Castro did not begin with . assassination attempts. ) From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According to the Inspector General's Report, an official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled dis- cussing a scheme to spray Castro's bréadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but rejected the scheme because the chemical’ was not reliable. During this period, TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce. Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General . also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that. would cause his beard to fall out. The chemical was to be adminis- -tered during a trip outside of Cuba, in which it was anticipated | Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals, but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip. (1.G., pp. 10-13.) (2) Proposal to Sabotage Flight The first proposed action against the life of, — a cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is J OL aware took place in July 1960. :On July 18, 1960, a Cuban airline DPD HW 50955 DoclTd:32423539 Page 27
HW 450955 pilot who had. volunteered to assist-the CIA in gathering intelli- gence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably be chosen to fly to Prague on July ¢1 to return Raul Castro to Cuba (Memo to I.G., 1/17/75). ‘On July 20 the pilot confirmed that he would definitely fly the plane. CIA Headquarters and field stations along the route were requested to inform the Havana Station of any intelligence needs that the pilot might fulfill. The case officer testified that he and the pilot contemplated only acquiring information about Raul Castro, and that assas- Saad sination was not considered.* _ The cable from the Havana Station was received at Head- quarters on the night of July 20. ‘The duty officer, who was summoned - to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to DDP Richard Bissell, and J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.** Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS." The cable inquired whether the pilot was sufficiently motivated to risk "arranging an accident during return trip" and * A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs supports this account. ** The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King because he would not otherwise have signed the cable “by direction, J.S. King". (Duty Officer, p. 16) He also would "very definitely" have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barnes was the man to whom we went . . . for our authority and for work connected with the Cuban Project." (Duty Officer, pp. 4, 25) Since King at that time was giving only "nominal attention" to Cuban affairs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the gravity of an assassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes". (Duty Officer, p. 2h) Docld: 3242734539 Page 28
HW 50955 advised that the station could "at discretion. contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details”. Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the possibility that the pilot was a double agent. According to the case officer, this cable represented "quite a departure from the conventional activities we'd been asked to handle". (Case Officer interview, 8/4/75, p. 2)* The case officer contacted the pilot and told him of the proposal while accompanying him. to the airport for the flight. The case officer avoided the word "assassinate", but made it clear that the CIA contemplated an "accident to neutralize this leader's (Raul's) influence". (Case Officer interview, p. 2) After being assured that his sons would be given a college education in the event of his death, the pilot agreed to take a "calculated risk", limited to possibilities that might pass as accidental.** (Cable, Havana to Director, 7/22/70) | Immediately after returning to the station the case officer was told that a cable had just arrived stating: "Do not ° * The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surround- ing facts for precisely that reason: "[I]t was an unusual type of [cable], and I say this because I can remember it 15 years later." (Duty Officer, p. 14) The case officer recalled that when he saw the cable, he "swallowed hard". (Case Officer interview, p. 3) *% The cable from Havana to Headquarters stated that the pilot was willing to risk: "A. Engine burnout on takeoff to delay or harrass trip: B. Vague possibility water ditching approximately three hours out from Cuba. Doclda: 324273539 Page 29
HW 450955 pursue ref. .Would like to! drop matter." (Cable, Director to Havana , 7/22/60; Memo to I.G., L/AT/TS)* It was, of course, too late to "drop the matter" since the plane had already departed. When the Cuban pilot returned, he told the case officer that he had not had an opportunity to arrange an accident. (3) Poison Cigars A notation in the records of the Chief, Operations Div., Office of Medical Services indicates that on - August 16, 1960, he was given a box of Castro's favorite cigars with instructions to treat them with » lethal poison (I.G., p. 21). The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so potent that a person would die after putting one in his mouth (I.G., p. 22). The Chief reported that the cigars were ready on October 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to an unidentified person on February 13, 1961 (I.G., p. 22). The record does not disclose whether an attempt sas made to pass the cigars to Castro. (b) Use of Underworld Figures-—-Phase I (1) The Initial Plan In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist the aid of members of the criminal underworld with gambling * This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes (Duty Officer, p. 28) The duty officer recalled seeing this cable, and testified that he had heard that Allen Dulles had countermanded the cable authorizing the possible assassination attempt against Raul Castro. (Duty Officer, pp. 29- -30) The reasons for Dulles’ action are discussed infra at * Docld: 32423539 Page 30
HW 50955 Bocld: syndicate contacts .to assassinate Castro. The earliest evidence of the operation is a conversation. between Deputy Director of Plans ( DDP) Richard Bissell and Colonel . Sheffield Edwards, Chief of ‘the Office of Security. Edwards recalled 1 that Bissell asked him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro (Edwards, pp. 2-3). Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find someone to assassinate Castro, and believed that Edwards raised the idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate operating in Cuba* (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 71-73). Edwards, assigned the mission to James P. O'Connell, Chief of. the Operational Support Division of the CIA's Office of Security, explaining that he and Bissell were looking for someone to “eliminate” or "assassinate" Castro (0! Connell, pp. 6-8, 95- 96).  Rawards and O'Connell decided to rely on Robert A. Maheu to recruit someone “tough enough" to handle the job (O'Connell, p. 8). Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered into a career as a private investigator in 1954. Robert Cunningham, _a former FBI associate of Maheu's who was employed in the CIA's Office of Security, had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in * Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign tourists in late February 1959, and remained open until late September 1961. 32473539 Page 31
several sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to have an Agency person or a government person get caught"* (O'Connell, p. 158). Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA | of $500, which was terminated after his practice became more lucrative (O'Connell, pp. 13-14; I.G., p- 15). O'Connell had served as Maheu's case officer since the Agency first began using _Maheu's services, and by 1960 they had become close personal friends (Maheu, p. 6). "Sometime in late August or early September 1960, O'Connell approached Maheu about the proposed operation (O'Connell, p. 9; Maheu, 7/29, p. 6). As Maheu recalls the conversation, O'Connell asked him to contact John Roselli, an underworld figure with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he * During 1954-1955, Maheu cooperated with the CIA in‘ attempting . to undermine Aristotle Onassis! contract with the Saudi Arabian government that would have given Onassis virtually complete control . over shipping of oil from Saudi Arabia. Although he was employed by Onassis! competitor, Niarchos, Maheu worked closely with the CIA. He testified that he contracted for a listening device to be placed on Onassis' room in New York after first consulting with the + Agency, and that he provided the impetus for the termination “ne € Ves id contract by publicizing its terms in a newspaper in Rome that he said he purchased with CIA funds. (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 14-25.) O'Connell testified that Maheu, at the CIA's request had also previously arranged for the production of a film in Hollywood depicting a foreign leader with a woman in the Soviet Union. The CIA planned to circulate the filn, representing it to have been pro- duced, but not released (O'Connell, pp. 159, 162-163). Maheu testi- fied that he had located an actor resembling the leader and -had _ arranged for the production of the film (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 39-2). a HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 32
- would participate in a.plan to "dispose" of Castro* (Maheu, 7/29, Pp. 8). Maheu had known Roselli since ‘the late 1950's (Maheu, 7/29, pp. 58-60). Although Maheu claims not to have been aware of the extent of Roselli's underworld connections and activities, he recalled that | "it was certainly evident to me that he was able to accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of attention" (Maheu, 7/29, p. 60). O'Connell had previously met Roselli at Maheu's home (Maheu, 7/29, p. 8). O'Connell and Maheu each claimed that the other had raised the idea of using Roselli, and Maheu Said O'Connell was aware that Roselli had contacts with the gambling syndicate Tat’ grr Tein p. 8; O'Connell, pp. 15-16). Maheu was at first reluctant to become involved in the operation because it might interfere with his relationship with his new client, Howard Hughes. He finally agreed because he felt that he owed the Agency a commitment (O'Connell, PP. 12-13, 103). O'Connell recalled that Maheu was to approach Roselli using a cover story that he represented business firms suffering heavy financial losses caused by Castro's actions** (O'Connell, p. 16). O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money , .* Maheu testified that he was told that the plan to assassinate Castro was one phase of a larger project to invade Cuba (Maheu, pp. 7, 13, 47). ** Roselli testified that the story was developed later and used as a mutual "cover" by O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli in dealing with Cubans recruited for the project (Roselli, pp. 16-17). HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 33
HW 450955 probably $150,000, for Castro's assassination* (O'Connell, pp. 16, 111; Memorandum, Osborn to. DCI, 6/24/66) . . .(2) ‘Contact With The Syndicate In early September 1960, Maheu met Roselli at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills, told him that "high govern- ment officials" needed. his cooperation in getting rid of Castro, and asked him to help recurit Cubans to do the job (Roselli, p. 8). Maheu recalled that Roselli was at first reluctant to participate in the project and’ insisted. on meeting with a representative of the government (Maheu, 1/29, pp. 10-11; Roselli, p. 9). A meeting with O'Connell was arranged in New York City at the Plaza Hotel during the week of September 14, 1960 (Roselli, pp. 10-11; 1.¢., p- 16). O'Connell testified that he was introduced to Roselli . as @ pusiness associate of Maheu, and that Maheu told Roselli that he represented international business interests which were pooling money to pay for the assassination of Castro (O'Connell, p. 26). Roselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that O'Connell was with the CIA** (Roselli, pp. 11, 85). * The 1.G. Report places the amount at $150,000; O'Connell thought it might have been $100,000 (O'Connell, p. 16), Roselli recalled $250,000 (Roselli, p- 25) and Edwards confirmed the $150,000 figure (Edwards, p. 9). Maheuw could recall no "price tag" for Castro's assassination (Maheu, p. 34). ** The weight of the testimony indicates that Roselli realized the CIA was behind the assassination attempt at an early stage. DoclTd: 32423539 Page 34 10
AP Ed ware Yea Spake i It was arranged that Roselli would go to 1 “ Florida and recruit Cubans for the operation (Roselli, pp. 11-12). Edwards informed Bissell that contact had been made with the gambling syndicate (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21; I.G., p. 17). During the week of September 2h, 1960, O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli met in Miami to work out the details of the operation (O'Connell, pp. 25-26; Roselli, p. 12; I.G., p. 18). Roselli used the cover name of "John Rawlston" and represented himself to the Cuban contacts as an agent of bin oe "some business interests of Wall Street. that had... | v, nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I pe eC was getting financial assistance from them" (Roselli, _ pp. 9, 17). , Maheu handled the details of setting up the operation and keeping O'Connell informed of developments. After they had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly prior to October 18,* Roselli introduced Maheu to two indivi- . Maheu substantially confirmed his account (Maheu, p. 111). O'Connell recalled that about three weeks after the New York meeting, Roselli told him, "I am not kidding, I know who you work for." (O'Connell, p. 26.) * Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gold" (Giancana) after November ,; 1960, when he was staying at the Fountainbleu Hotel (Maheu, p. 17). Other evidence indicates that the meet- ing took place earlier. When they first went to Miami, Maheu and Roselli stayed at the Kennilworth Hotel (Maheu, pp. 15-16); FBI records reveal that Maheu and Roselli (alias J. A. Rollins) were registered at the Kennilworth from October 11-30 (File R-505, FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved in the operation during the October period at the Kennilworth because (1) the wiretap of Rowan's apartment, discussed infra, was made on October 30°; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent, a memorandum to Bissell stating: that Giancana had been telling several people that he was involved in an assassination attempt against Castro (see infra, p. ). HW 350955 Docld:327423539 Page 345
HW 450955 le duals on whom he intended to rely: "Sam Gold", who would eth serve as a "back-up man" (Roselli, p. 15), or dan f (3 (Maheu, p. 17), and "Joe", whom "Gold" said would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there (I.G., p. 19). O'Connell, who was using the name "Jim Olds", met "Sam" and "Joe" only briefly (O'Connell, pp. 26-29). O'Connell. testified that he learned the true identities of his associates one morning when Maheu called and asked him to examine the "Parade" supplement to the Miami Times.*: An article on the Attorney General's ten-most-wanted criminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Mom Salvatore Giancana, a Chicago-based gangster,** and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante, _ the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba¢ (O'Connell, pp. 28-30); I.G., p.- 19). O'Connell reported his discovery to Edwards (O'Connell, pp. 31, 33) but did not know whether Edwards reported this fact to his superiors (O'Connell, pp. 32, 41). O'Connell testified that this incident occurred after "are were in this thing up to our ears", a month or so after * A search of supplements to all Miami papers during this period did not reveal the article described by O'Connell. *#* Sam Giancana was murdered in his home on June 20, 1975. - Trafficante made regular trips between Miami and Cuba on, gambling syndicate business (I.G. > pp. 19- 20). Bocld: 327473539 Page 36
13 Giancana had been brought into the operation, but prior to giving the poison pills to Roselli (O'Connell, pp. 30, 44). 3 ia peo 7 ven (15 Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job { ron, hen to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination (Maheu, p. 19), and that he met almost daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time (Maheu, p. 18). Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key role" (Maheu, p. 34), Roselli claimed that none of the Cubans eventually used in the operation were acquired through a~ Giancana's contacts (Roselli, p. 15). (3) Rowan Wiretap Incident In late October 1960, Maheu arranged for a Florida investigator, Edward DuBois, to place an electronic "pug" in comedian Dan Rowan's room in Las Vegas (Maheu, p. 36). DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balletti, flew to Las Vegas and installed a tap on Rowan's phone (Maheu, p. 38). O'Connell characterized the ensuing events. as a "Keystone comedy act" (O'Connell, Pp. 68). ‘On October 31, 1960, Balletti, believing that Rowan would be out for the afternoon, left the wiretap equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and notified the local sheriff, who arrested Balletti and brought * According to O'Connell and Roselli, DuBois had been requested to place a legal-electronic bug against the wall from an adjacent apartment. Balletti instead installed an electronic tap on the phone (O'Connell, pp. 67- 68; Maheu, pp. 36-37). ‘ ~ HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 37
14 him to the jail. “palletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this thing up to his ear" (O'Connell, pp. 71-72; File R-505, FBI memorandum). Balletti's bail was paid by| Roselli (Roselli, p. 52). (i) Evidence Cohcerning CIA involvement in the Tap. The Committee received conflicting evidence on whether the agency was consulted prior to the installation of the tap.” O'Connell testified that he had called Edwards and cleared ‘the placement of an electronic "bug" in Rowan's apartment prior to tthe installation of the tap (O'Connell, pp. 67-71). Maheu recalled that he hadeinitially asked O'Connell if the CIA would handle the job, and that O'Connell had told him that 4 "he would call Mp. Edwards and see if they would have the capability of accomplishing this, . . . and that subsequently he informed me that Mr. Edwards had said that they would not do it, but approved paying for it if we hired an independent private detective to put it on." (Maheu, 7/29, p. 37). On the other hand, Bawards, in a May 4, 1962 memorandum for the Attorney General (discussed at length, infra, p. - )}, stated that "At the time of [the incident neither the Agency nor the undersigned jknew of :the proposed technical installation. nk * Regardless of whether the CIA initially authorized the tap, it is apparent at the CIA paid for the tap. DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu had \ paid him a retainer of $1, 000 (File R-505, p. 14). O'Connell confirmed that CIA "indirectly" paid for the tap because "we paid Maheu a certain -amount of money, and. he. just paid it out of what we were giving him.” ' "Q: But it was understood, or you understood, that out of the money . the CIA made available to Maheu, Dubois would be paid for the tap? A: Yes. | ; "8 £ X wi Q: And Colonel Edwards. . . knew somebody was being employed oo a _ in order to accomplish a tap? a , “A: That is right." (O'Connell, p. 69.) Fa memorandum : by J. Edgar Hoover states that the Attorney General said he had been told by Edwards that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu in making the installation" (Memo, Hoover, 4/10/62). | i 1 HY 40955 DocId: 32424539 Page 38
15 . The Inspector General's Report accepted Edwards' assertion that "the Agency was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after the fact", but offered no further evidence to support that contention (I.G., p. 67). The Committee also received conflicting evidence concerning whether the tap had been placed to keep Giancana in Miami or to check on security leaks. O'Connell testified that during the early stages of negotiations with the gambling syndicate, Maheu informed O'Connell that a girl friend of Giancana was having an affair with Rowan. Giancana wanted Maheu to bug Rowan's room; otherwise, Giancana threatened to fly to Las Vegas himself. Maheu was concerned that Giancana's departure would disrupt the negotiations, and secured O'Connell's permission to arrange for a bug to ensure Giancana's continued presence and cooperation. (O'Connell, pp. 68-67.) Maheu substantially confirmed this account (Maheu, pp. 25-30). There is some evidence suggesting that the CIA itself may have ve, instituted the tap to. determine whether Giancana was leaking information ec about his involvement in an assassination attempt against castro. Bissell was informed that Gianeana had been talking about Glancana's involvement in an assassination plot* ( without indicating the CIA was * when Roselli talked ‘with Giancana after the wiretap had been discovered, Giancana "laughed. . . I remember his expression, smoking a cigar, he . almost swallowed it laughing about it" (Roselli, p. 52). Roselli claims that he was "perturbed" because "It was blowing everything, blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to keep quiet" (Roselli, p. 52). Roselli said that he told Giancana that the CIA was involved in the operation "in order to have him keep his mouth shut" (Roselli, p. 27). ae WY 50955 BDocla: 324235393 Page 39
16 ut Be eo call involved) by an October 18, 1960 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, which stated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported: "(D)uring recent conversations with several friends, Gianeana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. . . Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's." (File R-505, memo from Hoover to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/19/60.) Roselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for the tap on different oceasions: first, that Gjancana was .concerned about a possible affair between Rowan and his girl friend; and, second, that he had arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girl _ friend about the assassination plot, and whether she was. spreading the story (Roselli, pp. 47-48). Maheu gave the second explanation to the FBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the tap (File R-505, FBI Summary), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum to the Attorney General: | “"Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that (Giancana's: girl friend) might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friend of (Giancana's girl friend)". (Memorandum, Edwards to - Kennedy, 5/14/62.) , (ii) Consequences of the tap. Edwards told Maheu that if he was "approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed that he was engaged in. an intelligence operation directed at Cuba” (Memo, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62). FBI records indicate that on April 18, WW 50955 Bocla:32?42739539 Page 40
HW 50955 17 1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA, and suggested that Sheffield Edwards be contacted (File R-505, Memo, 4/20/61). Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it might reveal sensitive information relating to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion* (R-505, Summary of FBI file). Ina memo dated April 2h, 1962, Herbett J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney General that the "national interest" would preclude any prosecutions based upon the. tap. Following a briefing of the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to prosecute .** '*® Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are described fully infra at pp. ** Maheu subsequently drew on his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee investigating invasions of privacy in 1966. According to the Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the Committee intended to call him, “he applied pressure on the Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might expose his past sensitive work for the CIA" (1.G., p. 74). Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, met with Maheu and his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, and informed Senator Long that Maheu had been involved in CIA operations (Houston, pp. 58-60). As a result, the Long Committee did not call Maheu - to testify. — ; Doclda: 324273539 Page 41
. d 18 (4) Poison Pills Are Prepared and Delivered to Cuba The Inspector General's Report described ~ ‘conversations among Bissell, Edwards, and Cometius Roosevelt, AATETS Ar, c Chief of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning the most effective method of poisoning Castro (1.G., pp. 23- ok). There is some evidence that Giancana or Roselli originated the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro's drink to give the "asset" a chance to escape (I.G., p. 25). O'Connell | recalled Roselli's request for something "nice and clean, with- out getting into any kind of out and out ambushing", preferably a poison that would disappear without a trace (O'Connell, p. 116). The Inspector General's Report cited O'Connell as stating that the Agency had first considered a "gangland-style killing" in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reportedly opposed the idea because it would be difficult to recruit someone for such .a dangerous operation, and suggested instead the use of poison. (1.G., p. 25) Edwards rejected the first batch of pills prepared by TSD because they would not dissolve in water. A second batch, containing potulinum toxin, "did the job expected of them" when tested on monkeys. (I.G., pp. 25-26; O'Connell, p.- 43) O'Connell received the pills from TSD, probably in February 1961, with reassurances that they were lethal ,* and * Records of the TSD still extant in 1967 indicate that the “ pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to O'Connell sometime thereafter. HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 42
HW 450955 19 then gave them to Roselli (O'Connell, pe 43). in late February or March 1961, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered in Cuba to an official close to Castro who may have received kickbacks from the gambling interests (I.G., p. 23). The ‘efficial kept the pills for a few weeks, then returned them. ‘Roselli and O'Connell ascribed his failure to a case of “eold feét" (Roselli, p. 24; O'Connell, p. 44). The Inspector General noted that he had lost his position in the Prime Minister's office, and thus access to*Castro, before he received the pills (1.G., p. 28). (5) A Second Delivery Is Attempted Following this first failure, Roselli told. O'Connell that Trafficante believed Tony Varona, a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement, might be able to accom=_ plish the assassination (I.G., p. 29).* “Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona y Lorado headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a Cuban exile group supported by the CIA. The Inspector General! Ss Report suggests that Varona may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies” in * O'Connell testified that he met Varona only once. and that after the meeting Varona told Roselli: . "Look, I don't know [sic] like the CIA and you can't tell me that this guy isn't a CIA man". O'Connell recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or what, “ - but. he suspected that I wasn't what I was represented to be." (O'Connell, p. 22.) Docld: 32423539 Page 43
HW 50955 20 Cuba after the overthrow of Castro (I.G., Pp. 29). The Report speculated that Varona was interested in the assassination scheme as a means of financing the. purchase of arms and communications equipment (1.G., p. 31). ' Varona claimed to have a contact inside a restaurant frequented by Castro (Roselli, Pp. 21). As a prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and $1,000 worth of communications equipment (1.G., pp. 31-32; O'Connell, p. 23). O'Connell recalls that Colonel J. ¢. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division, gave him $50,0007in Bissell's office to pay Varona if he successfully assassinated Castro (O'Connell, pp. 17-21). O'Connell stated that Bissell also authorized him to give Varona the electronics equipment that he requested (O'Connell, pp. -20-2h). Bissell testified that he did not doubt that some cash was given to O'Connell, and that he was aware that ‘the poison pills had been prepared. He did not recall the meeting, and considered it unlikely that O'Connell would have been given the money in his office (Bissell, 6/11, p. 40). The Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an interview with the person who Signed the voucher for the funds, placed the amount at $10,000 (I.G., pp. 31-32). If the Inspector General's conclusions were correct, the funds which Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment Doclda: 32423539 Page 44
HW 450955 to Varona, and not the $150,000 that was to be paid to Varona after Castro's death. The record does clearly reflect, however, that communications equipment was delivered to Varona* and that he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, probably in the amount of $10,000 (1.G., p. 32). The money and pills were delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante, and Varona at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Roselli recalled, Maheu "opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of money on his lap .. . and also came up with the capsules and he explained how they were going to be used. As far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling soups and things like that, but they could be used in water or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Roselli, p. 21). ** Varona had no better success tha According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards béettéved the scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting the restau- rant where the "asset" was, employed. Maheu suggested an * O'Connell testified that a man from the communications office delivered the communications equipment that Varona had requested to Miami (O'Connell, p. 20). Maheu recalled deliver- ing an automobile which he had been told contained communica- tions equipment.to an empty lot (Maheu, p. 52). ** Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred, and _ did not recall being present at a meeting at which the pills were passed (Maheu, pp. 40-41). Maheu did recall that O'Connell showed him the pills in an envelope and told him that the pills would be given to a Cuban (Maheu, p. 40). Docld: 324273539 Page 45 we el
ein. alternative reason. He recalled being informed that after ; the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had to be received before in fact they were administered” (Maheu, p. 42). He testified that he was informed by O'Connell some- time after the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra or Raul Castro, but that the "go signal" never came (Maheu, pp. 43-44, 60-61). He did not know who was responsible for giving the signal (Maheu, p. 4h-b5). Varona subsequently returned the cash and the pills (O'Connell, pp. 19-20; CIA Justice file R-153, Memorandum ,: Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66). The date of the Varona operation is unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in March- April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pigs (I.G., p. 29). Bissell testified that the effort against Castro was called off after the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/11, p. 52) and Maheu testified that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of Pigs (Maheu, p. 50). O'Connell, however, was certain that it occurred during early 1962 (O'Connell, pp. 47-48). (c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II . (1) Change in Leadership The Inspector General's Report divides the gambling. syndicate operation into Phase I, termina~ ~ HW 350955 DBocld:327423539 Page 46
HW 50955 22 ting with the Bay of Pigs, and Phase II, beginning with William Harvey's involvement in late 1961. The distinction between a clearly demarcated Phase I and Phase II may be an artificial one, as there is considerable evidence that the operation was continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period immedidtely following the Bay of Pigs.* | In early 1961, Harvey*# was assigned the responsibility for establishing a general capability within the CIA for disabling foreign leaders, including assassination as a "last resort" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25, pp. 34-35). * Harvey.said that he took over a "going operation" from ‘Edwards (I.G., p. 42; Harvey, 6/25, p. 67) and emphasized that: "I would. like to make as clear as I can that there was no phase 1, phase 2 in this. This is an ongoing matter which I injected into... . (Harvey, 6/25, p. 90). Continuity was provided by retaining O'Connell as the case officer for the project well into May 1962.. During interviews for the Inspector General's Report, O'Connell recelled that there was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs and Harvey's assumption of control, (1.G., p. 43). When testifying before the Committee, O'Connell firmly recalled several trips to Miami in the Fall of 1961, and "right up to the time I turned it over to Harvey I was in and out of Miami" (O'Connell, pp. 89-90). ** Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities. He had conceived and carried out the Berlin tunnel operation (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9), and served as Chief of the givision, which was responsible for,the.surreptitious acquisition of code information (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9). DocTda: 324273539 Page 47
HW 50955 23 The capability was called Executive Action and was later included under the cryptonym ZR/RIFLE. It and the ‘evidence — relating to (i) its connection to the "White House" and (ii) whether or not it involved action as well as "capability" is discussed éxtensively infra at Harvey's notes reflect that Bissell asked him to take over the gambling syndicate operation from Edwards and discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba" on November 16, 1961 (I.G., p. 39). Bissell confirmed that the conversation took place and accepted the November date as accurate (Bissell, 7/17. pp. 12-13). He also testified that the operation "was not reactivated, in other words, no instructions went out to Roselli or to others .. . to renew the attempt, until after I had left the Agency" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 53). Harvey agreed that his conversation with Bissell was limited to exploring the feasibility of using the gambling syndicate against Castro (Harvey, 7/11, p. 60). Richard Helms replaced Bissell as DDP in February 1962. As such, he was Harvey's Superior. . ~ Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of the gambling Doclda: 324273539 Page 46
T/ll, p. 42; I.G., p. 4l). (2) The Operation is Reactivated In early April 1962, Harvey, who testi- fied that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms (Harvey, 7/11, p. 18), requested Edwards to put him in touch with Roselli (CIA Justice File R-153; Edwards memorandum, 5/14/62). O'Connell first introduced Harvey to Roselli in Miami, where Harvey told Roselli to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with Maheu or Giancana (O'Connell, p; 50; Roselli, pp. 27T- 30), whom he had decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65). O'Connell recalled that Roselli did not initially trust Harvey, *When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Harvey stated that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with Roselli, and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the Castro operation" (I. G., p. 41). Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms dia recall that he was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Roselli in April 1962. He remembered that he "reluctantly" had approved the operation, “but that. he had no confidence that it would succeed (Helms, 7/17, p.- 23). When asked if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida, Helms testified: "I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recall necessarily approving them, but since Harvey alleges to have them and says that he took them to Miami, I must have, I must have authorized them in some fashion." (Helms, 6/13, p. 4k). ; Helms confirmed that Harvey was "reporting quite regularly what "was going on. Whether he reported everything or not, I do not know." It was Helms' expectation that Harvey would have reported to him a matter such as the pills. (Helms, 6/13, p. 105). However, Helms also . testified: . ate "You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currently informed. Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember it, as I have said. But I do not recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life"(Helms, 7/18, p. 32). WW 503955 Doclad: 32423539 Page 49
although they subsequently developed a close friendship. -(0'Connell, p. 52). Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli met for a second time in New York on April 8-9, 1962 (I.G., p. 43). A notation made during this time in the files of the Technical Ser- vices Division indicates that four poison pills were given to O'Connell on April 18, 1962 (I.G., pp. 46-47). The pills were passed to Harvey, who arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Roselli already in touch with Varona (1.c., p- 47). He gave the pills to Roselli, explaining that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything" (Roselli, Pp. 31). Roselli testified that he told Harvey that the Cubans intended to use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul Castro. According to Roselli's testimony , Harvey approved of the targets, stating "everything is all right, what they want to do" (Roselli, p. 34). | | Varona requested arms and equipment as a quid pro quo for carrying out the assassination operation (O'Connell, pp. 53-54). Harvey, with the help of the CIA's Miami station nN _(SMMAVE) procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handgins , , Padios, and boat radar costing about $5,000 (I.G., p. 49). Harvey and the chief of the JMWAVE station rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot (Harvey, 6/25, p. 63). The keys were given to Roselli, who watched ~ the delivery from across the street with O'Connell (O'Connell, pp. 92-93). HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 50
HY 0955 OR Pry 26 pa The truckload of equipment was finally picked up by either Varona or Roselli's agent Maced\(I.G., pp. ho~50; Roselli, p. 40). Harvey testified thatthe arms "could" have been for use in the assassination attempt, but that they were not given to Varona solely for that purpose (Harvey, 7/11, p. 9). Roselli kept Harvey informed of the - operation's progress. Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the pills and guns had arrived in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 64; Roselli, pp. 34, 42-43). On June 21, he told Harvey that Varona had dis- patched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's Report ' described the team's mission as "vague" and conjectured that the team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the poison pills if the opportunity arose (I.G., p. 51). Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Varona was reported to be preparing to send in another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey ‘was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine,” were still "safe" in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 103; I.G., p. 51). Harvey testified that by this time he had grave doubts about whether the operation would ‘ever take place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued" (Harvey, 6/25, p- 104). Varona's second team never left for Cuba, claiming — that "conditions" in Cuba were not right (I.G., p. 51-52). During early January 1963, Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray Varona's expenses (1.G., p. 52). Docld: 32423439 Page 51
HY 0955 (ca Oe uy oe a we dibs Harvey terminated the operation in mid-February 1963. At a meeting with Roselli in Los Angeles, it was agreed that Roselli would taper off his communications with Varona (1.G., pp. 52-53). Roselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans. However, he never informed them that the offer of $150,000 for Castro's assassination had been withdrawn* (Roselli, p. 45). The agency personnel who dealt with Roselli attributed his motivation to patriotism** and testified that he was not paid for his services. According to O'Connell, Roselli . "paid his way, he paid his own hotel fees, he paid his own travel.... And he never took a nickel, he said, no, as long as it is for the government of the United States, this is the least I can do, because I owe it a lot.” (O'Connell, p. 27). , W Edwards agreed that Roselli was "never paid a cent" (Edwards, p. 16), and Maheu testified that “"Giancana was paid nothing at all, not even for expenses, and that Mr. Roselli was given a pittance that did not even begin to cover his expenses (Maheu, 7/29, p. 68). It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Roselli's “* "Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they understood from you to come from Wall Street was still outstanding? "A: I don't know if they still think so ... I didn't see them after that to tell them that” (Roselli, p. 45)." ** Roselli claims that he was motivated by "honor and dedi- cation" (Roselli, p. 59). ‘In 1943, Roselli had been convicted of extorting money from motion picture producers to insure studios against. labor strikes,“ and during the period of his contacts with the CIA, Roselli was deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas (File R-505, Summary of FBI Documents). It is possible that he beliéved cooperating with the government in the assassination operation might serve him well in the future. Docld: 324293539 Page 52 27
HW 50955 28 hotel bill during his stay in Miami in October 1960.* ‘The CIA's involvement with Roselli caused the Agency some difficulty during Roselli's subsequent prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and living in the country under an assumed name. ** - (a) Plans in Early 1963 ew0 plans to assassinate Castro were ex- plored by Task Force W, the section concerned with covert Cuban operations, in early 1963. Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), Chief of the Task: Force, asked Samuel Halpern to determine whether an exotic seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro commonly went skin diving (Halpern, p. 28). The idea was explored by the Technical Division and discarded as impractical (Helms, 6/13, p. 135; L.G., p-77) A second plan involved having James Donovan 7 (who was negotiating with Castro for the release of prisoners * FBI reports reveal that Roselli's expenses at the Kennilworth lotel, where he was registered from October 11 - 30, 1960 under the name. of J.A. Rollins, were paid by Maheu (File R-505, FBI file summary, p.10). Maheu's expenses were reimbursed by the CIA. , ** In May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli for living in. the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia. (Roselli, whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and allegedly brought illegally into the United States while still a child.) Roselli contacted Edwards, who informed the FBI that Roselli wanted to ‘keep square with the Bureau," but was afraid that gangsters might kill him for "talking" (CIA Justice File. R-153,-Memorandum, Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66). After Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency, ‘to represent him (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum for Record by Osborn, 12/11/67). Harvey contacted the Agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecution (Osborn Memorandum, supra). Roselli was subsequently convicted of violating United States interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA approached the Immigration and Naturaliaation Service, Department of Justice, to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity with CIA "that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought. (CIA to Select Committee, 7/21/75). It was agreed that CIA would be kept informed of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently being\ | litigated in the courts. A d- do ppt Le pry pt? BDoclda: 324273539 Page 533
2g taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39). The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed his negotiations by the miaaie of January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135). TSD Vought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaninatea tile breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus (1.G., p. 75). - The Inspector General's Report states that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified | that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135). (e) AMLASH — (1) ‘origin of the Project In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico City CIA station met with le highly~placed Cuban official. to determine if he would cooperate in éfforts against the Castro regime (I.G., p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been ! | *Donovan was not aware of the plan. HW 450955 Docld: 32423539 Page 54
Fa pT po a involved with an anti-Batista faction that only grudgingly accepted Castro's rule. (Case Officer 2, p. 9, 39).* The meeting was incon- clusive, but lead to subsequent meetings at which AM/LASH-1 agreed _ to cooperate with the CIA. AM/LASH-1 was viewed as an important "asset" inside Cuba. Asa high-ranking military leader who enjoyed the confidence of Fidel Castro, he could keep the CIA informed of the internal workings of-the regime (Case Officer 2, pp- 23, ho). It was also believed that he might playra part in fomenting a coup within Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 43).*% Prom the first contact with AM/LASH-1, until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in: Cuba. His initial requests to the CIA and FBI for a aid in defecting were rebuffed (I.G., pp. 80, 82-83). When Case Officer 1 joined the AM/LASH-1 operation in une (967, his assign- * The Committee has taken the testimoy of the two case officers involved in the AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH-1 through September 1963; Case Officer 2 continued until mid-1965 (Case Officer 2, p. ). The Committee has agreed not to divulge hy their names as they are still in active service with the Agency. © | #% AM/LASH-1 was the major "asset" in the AM/LASH operation. During this period the CIA also sponsored a separate operation to "penetrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections or an attempt to produce information from dissidents, or perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then present government in Cuba" (Case Officer 1,.. pp. 18, 22). The case officers for AM/LASH were also involved in this second related program. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 55
Hiv 50955 31 ment was to "stay in place and report to us" (Case Officer 1, p- 38). At a meeting in August 1962 in a foreign capital, AM/LASH-1 stated that he would remain in Cuba if he "could do something really signifi- cant for the creation of a new Cuba", and expressed a desire to plan the execution of Fidel Castro (Case Officer 1 Contact Report, August 1 meeting). The subject of assassinating Castro was again discussed at>a meeting on August 10, 1962, between AM/LASH-1 and his case officer. The case officer's contact report states that assassination was raised in discussing AM/LASH~1's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH~1 was visibly upset. "It was not the act that he objected to, but merely the choice of the word used to describe it. ‘Eliminate’ was ft acceptable. (Case Officer 1, Contact Report, August 7-10, meetings). The case officers who testified vefore the Com- mittee said that AM/LASH-1 was not directly requested to assassinate Castro. The record clearly reveals, however, that the agency per- sonnel dealin. gwith AM/LASH-1 were aware of his desire to take such action. A cable to headquarters reporting | an August 1§, 1963 meet- ing with AM /LASH-1 stated: "Have no intention give AMLASH-1l physical elim- ination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative."* * Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH~1 discussed "eliminating' Castro, although he attributed such remarks to AMLASH-1's "mercurial" nature, and stated that no specific plans for assassinations were ever discussed (Case Officer 1, pp. 39-41, 62). The case officer who took over the AMLASH project in September 1963 recalled. being briefed by Case Officer 1 on AMLASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, p. 28). The second AMLASH case officer described the context in which “AMLASH-1 generally raised the topic of assassination: "You also must recognize that AMLASH was a rather tempera- mental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and whereas he may have said something like this in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk about organizftng a regular military coup in the next breath." (Case Officer 2, p.29) Docld: 32423539 Page 56
At a meeting on October 3, 1963, AMLASH-1 again raised the possibility of defecting, but indicated that he would’ be willing to continue working against the Castro regime if he received firm assurances of American support (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49). According to Case Officer.2, AMLASH-1 asked for military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his. plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-9). Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), who was then Chief, SAS * agreed to meet AMLASH-1 and give him the assur- ances he sought. The Inspector General's Report states that Fitz- gerald consulted with the DDP, Helms, who agreed that Fitzgerald l should hold himself out as a personal representative of Attorney Ass ) General Kennedy (1.G., p.89).** Helms testified that he did not recall the con- versation, and speculated that the Attorney General might not have been consulted because "this was so central to the whole theme of what we had been trying to do . . .(find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and have a group to replace Castro}. This is obviously what we had been pushing, what every- body had been pushing for us to try to do, and it is that context that I would have made some remark like this." (Helms, 6/13, p. 117) * SAS (Special Affairs Staff) was the name given to Task Force W in early 1963 when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as head of the covert Cuban operations. The AMLASH Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald. ** The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated: "Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (fcreign capital) for spe- cific purpose meeting AMLASH-1 and giving him assurances of full support with a change of the present government in Cuba.” HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 57
HY 0955 33 Helms recalled that he told Fitzgerald to "go ahead and say that from the standpoint of political support, the United States government will be behind you if you are successful. This had nothing to do with killings. This had only to do with the political action part of it”. (Helms, 6/13, p. 131.) ° Fitzgerald met AM/LASH-1 on October 29, 1963, | ina foreign capital, and promised that the United States would support a coup against Castro* (Case Officer 2, p. 60). When later interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Fitzgerald recalled that AM/LASH-1 repeatedly requested an assassination weapon, particularly a "high powered rifle with telescopic sights that could be used to kill Castro from a distance” (I.G., p. 90). Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH-1 that the United States fe would have "no part of an attempt on Castro's life" (I.G., p. 90). Spree Case Officer 2 recalled that AM/LASH-1 raised the prospect of assassinating Castro, but did not propose an explicit plan (case Officer 2, pp. 62, 85). AM/LASH-1, was, however, "convinced that Castro had to be removed from power before a coup could be under-— * Case Officer 2 did not recall whether Robert Kennedy's name was used (Case Officer 2, p. 60). Docld: 324293539 Page 58
3h taken in Cuba" (Case Officer 2, p. 61). AMLASH+1 also requested high-powered rifles and grenades (Case Officer 2, p. 77). A memorandum by Case Officer 2, dated November 18, 1963, states: "C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMLASH-1 he would « Nehen be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include .. . high powered rifles with 3 scopes..." } mong AMLASH-1 was tola on November 22, 1963, that the cache would be dropped in Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 92). (2) The Poison Pen Device On November 22, 1963, Case Officer 2 met with AMLASH-1 in a foreign capital, offered him a ball-point pen rigged with a hypodermic needle, and suggested that Blackleaf 40 would be an effective poison to use in the. device. (Case Officer 2, p. 110) The needle was designed to be so fine that the victim would not notice its insertion (Case Officer 2, p- 103). The Inspector General's Report states that Case Officer 2, when he was interviewed in 1967, stated that AMLASH-1 had requested the Agency to “devise some technical means-of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (I.G., p. 92) The Report concluded that: "although none of the participants so stated, it may be inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination of a sort that AMLASH-1 might reasonably have been ex- pected to have devised himself." (I.G., p. 92) HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 59
35 Halpern, Fitzgerald's assistant, told the Committee that the pen was intended to show "bona fides" and "The orders were to do something to get rid of Castro . and we thought this other method might work whereas a rifle wouldn't." (Halpern, p. 26) Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured "to take care of a request from him that he have some device for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him, whatever the case may be." (Helms, 6/13, p. 113) ee . . . (t)his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11, p. 133)* officer met with AMLACH-1 in a Buropean capital and offered him the poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf-0, a deadly poison which is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, p. 112) The Inspect- or General's Report noted that : | "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro." (1.G., p. 94) * In his testimony before the Committee, Case Officer 2 offered a con- flicting story. He said that the purpose of the pen was "to provide AMLASH with a’ device which would serve him to protect himself in case he was confronted with and charged with being involved in a military coup against Castro." (Case Officer 2, p. 107) According to the case officer, AMLASH-1 had requested an “esoteric device which could easily be concealed and which he. could use in self-defense (Case Officer 2, po. 98-99). The device was not intended for offensive use against any person, but was rather "a kind of psychological crutch . . .to help him think that we were interested in his own protection, his own security" (Case Officer 2, pp. 104-105). This version is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, some of which were written by the AMLASH case officer, which establish that AMLASH-1 intended to kill Castro, and that the CIA knew his desire and endeavored to supply the means that he needed. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 60
36 The case officer later recalled that AMLASH-1 did not "think much of the device,"|/and complained that CIA could surely "come up with i something more sophisticated than that" (I.G., p. 93a). The case officer recalled offering the pen to AMLASH-1, but could not remember whether AMLASH-1 threw it away then or took it with him (Case Officer 2, pp. 105, 110). He did recall that AMLASH-—1 said he would not take the pen back to Cuba, but did not know what AMLASH~1 in fact did with the pen (Case offi- ‘cer 2, pp. 110-111). ~ An entry in the CIA files on AMLASH dated March 29, 1965, states: “Although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AMLASH~L on November 22, 1963, that CIA would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with AMLASH-1 changed and it was decided that we could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and would not aid AMLASH-1 in this attempt. . . AMLASH-l was not informed of (this de- eision) until. he was seen by the case officer in Novem- ber, 1964." HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 61
HW 450955 37 (3) Providing AMLASH-1 with Arms CIA cables indicate that one cache of arms for AMLASH-1 was delivered in Cuba in March 196k and another in June. An entry in the AMLASH file for May 5, 1964, states that the case officer requested the Technical Services Division to pro- 1 duce, on a "crash basis," a silencer which would fit an FAL rifle. ‘The contact report of a meeting between the case officer and a confidant of AMLASH states that AMLASH was subsequently informed that it was not feasible to make a silencer -for an FAL. Toward the latter part of 1964, AMLASH-1 became more insistent on the fact that the assassination of the Cuban leadership was a necessary initial step in a successful coup. (Case Officer 2, pp. 129-133). In a memorandum dated December 10, 1964, the case officer wrote: t "AMLASH-1 was told and fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree in the 'first step’ of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he would request." Documents in the AMLASH file establish that in early 1965, the CIA put AMLASH in contact with B-1, the leader of an anti-Castro group. As the case officer explained to the Inspector General: DoclTd: 32423539 Page 62
HW 50955 Bocld: 38 " . ) , what had happened was that SAS had conttivea to put B-1 and AMLASH together in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had been engin- eered by CIA. The thought was that B-1l needed a man inside and AMLASH wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, B-1 might get its man inside Cuba and AMLASH might get his silenced weapon -- . from B-1. (I.G., p. 101) A report of a meeting between a case officer and B-l states that B-1, in his initial contacts with AMLASH-1, discussed plans for assassinating Castro. AMLASH-1 suggested that guerrilla raids against Cuba should be stepped up one month before the Cg "attempt on Fidel Castro" to "prepare the public and raise the morale and resistance spirit of the people.” B-1 reported that AMLASH-1 ‘pelieved that the only solution to the problems in Cuba would be "to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able either to shoot him with a silencer or place a bomb in some place where Fidel will be. He might use, for example, a small bomb that he can carry and place, or with his group attack, the residence where Fidel lives ... . B-l is going to provide AMLASH-1 with escape routes and places where B-1 is able to pick him up. He will memorize these points and escape routes. . . Next, B-l is to provide AMLASH-1 either a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer.* * A CIA document dated January 3, 1965, states that B-1l told a case officer that he and AM/LASH-1 had reached an agreement on the following points: 324273539 "], B-l is to provide AM/LASH-1 with a silencer for the FAL; if this is impossible, B-1 is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment device which he would be able to carry and place next to Fidel Castro. "2, B-1 is to provide AM/LASH~1 with escape routes controlled by B-1 and not by the Americans. The lack of confidence built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large: ; ~ "2. B-1 is to prepare one of the western provinces, either Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandes-— tine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back position and a safe area where men and weapons are avail- able to the group. . Page 63
HY 50955 39 that B-l had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMAIA had "small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965 the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l1's secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that "B-] had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to AMLASH-1 in Madria" (1I.G., p.,103 In June 1965, CI& terminated all contact with AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105). "hh. Bl is te be in Cuba-..one week before the elimination of Fidel, but.no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know B-1's location. "S. B-l is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established even though Raul Castro arid Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of the part of the country. This. is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be formed in that location. "6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-L will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid.was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be AM/LASH-1's war name." Docld: 324293539 Page 64
HY . , Maat } 1 Res rod 50955 Approved by Drafting Subcommiteee 9/5/75 2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or . Known About Within the Central Intelligence Agency? (a) The Question Presented. As we have seen, first Richard Bissell and then Richard Helms, each as Deputy Director of Plans (DDP), were aware of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. The evidence set forth herein relates to whether their superiors in the Agency, in particular Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized or were aware of the assassination plots. . Dulles served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1953 to November 1961. McCone served as DCI from November 1961 to 1965.* The Gommittee took considerable testimony on whether Dul- les and McCone (or their Deputy DCI's, General Cabell and General Carter; respectively) knew about or authorized the plots against Fidel Castro's life. In summary, the evidence is as follows: . (i) Dulles: -_Bissell and Edwards both expressed the belief that Dulles (and his Deputy, General Cabell) authorized the initial phase of the assassination plot involving underworld figures. They acknowledged, however, that Dulles (and his Deputy) were not told about the plot until after the under- . world figures had been ‘contacted. The words said to have been used to brief them--"an intelligence operation"--do not convey on * Bissell served as DOP. from January 1, 1959,.to February«17, 1962. (President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissell because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 6-8).) Helms, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell in February 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and DCI in June 1966. Docld: 324293539 Page 65
; Sean , \ oa HW 450955 their. face that the plot involved assassination, although- Bissell and Edwards insist the real meaning must have been understood. | There is some other evidence which can be said both to suggest _ that Dulles and Cabell did know and to suggest that they did not know. . (See Section (b) below.) 7 | (ii) McCone: McCone testified that he did not know about or authorize the plots. Helms and Bissell both stated that McCone was not told by them of the earlier assassination ef- forts when McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961. The I.G. Report states that Harvey received Helms' approval not to brief.McCone when the actual efforts were resumed in 1962. Harvey testified this accorded with his recollection. Thereafter, Helms and Harvey did not tell MeCone about assassination activity on several occasions... Helms did not recall any agreement not to> brief McCone, but did not call into: question the position taken by Harvey or the.I.G. Report on this matter. Helms did say that Mc- Cone never told him not to assassinate Castro, but added that he was not claiming that he ‘told MeCone about the plots. : (These mat- ters, as well as the various reasons put forward by Harvey and Helms for not briefing McCone, are set forth in Section (c) below. ) (b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or “Authorize the Initial Plots. Against Castro?* Both Allen Dulles and his Deputy (DDCI), * This testimony relates to the ' ‘airplane" incident in July 1960 and what the I.G. Report referred to as the initial phase of the assassination effort involving the underworld.*> With respect to the “schemes” prior to that operation, the I. G. Report concluded they could "find no evidence that any of the scenes were approved at any level higher than division, if that". (1.G., p. 10.) DocTd: 32423539 Page 66
General Cabell, are deceased. Since we were unable to take any testimony from either, the Committee's investigation centered around thé documents available and the testimony of those still alive who served under Dulles and Cabell.* ak ; . *The Inspector General questioned neither Dulles nor Cabell in ed preparing his Report in 1967. HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 67
HW 50955 (i) Dulles’ January 1969 Statement tc to the Special Group Suggesting Contingency Plans for the Overthrow of the - Casto Government, but Ruling. Out "Elimination" of Castro. January 13, 1960, Allen Dulles, in what. was apparently the first Special Group discussion of a covert program to over- throw Castro, emphasized that "a quick elimination of Castro" was not contemplated by the CIA (minutes of Special Group meet- ing, 1/13/60). According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles first "noted the possibility that over the Long run the U.S. will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and. sug- gested that ‘covert contingency planning to accomplish. the fall of the Castro government might be in order." Then, in response to the State Department representative's comment that “timing was very important so as to permit a solidly based opposition to take over,'” Dulles | “emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro,. but rather actions designed to enable responsible’ opposition leaders to get a foothold. " (ii) Dulles’ Alleged Recission of the July 1960 Airplane Assassination Plan. Upon Learning of It. As discussed in greater detail above (see Pp. id), in July, 1960, Tracy Barnes, Bissell's assistant, approved the sending of, in July, 1960, a cable to the Havana station stating that “possible removal of top three leaders (was). receiving serious consideration," and instructions were given to carry out a plan to kill Raul Castro, That plan was, however, abandoned shortly after it had been approved. Boclda: 3274273539 Page 66
‘ot HW 450955 The Executive Officer to the Chief of the Cuba Z action project, who had sent the cables testified that he had "heard" that Dulles had countermanded Barnes’ plan and had indicated that "assassination was not to be considered." (Duty Officer, p. 29)..* The officer added, however, that he had no-personal knowledge of the reason for calling off the plan, or even if Dulles had been the one who called it off, he further ‘testified that "assassination had not been part of the Cuba covert action project in 19690 and that Dulles' action in this incident conformed with CIA policy. against the use of assassination." (Duty Officer, p. ). *% i ate x" The countermanding cable to tne Havana station, which was “Operational Immediate," was sent the morning after the cable of the previous night. The officer who sent that cable testified: .L saw the cable and was told that, to the -best of. my knowledge, my memory is that the Director [Dulles], not the Deputy Director [Bissell] ... had countermanded the cable and nad directed that -- had indicated that assassination was not to be considered. a (Duty Officer, p. 29). The officer stated that he did not talk: to either Dulles or - Bissell about the countermanding cable, but that he did see the cable and in all likelinood heard of the reason for Dulles’ re- action in discussions the same morning with his superior, the Chief of the Cuba project. (Duty Officer, pp. 30-32). ** ©The officer testified: . .we were schooled that althouga other countries [used assassination] we do not, and I had always understood this as a basic rule.” (Duty Officer, p 14). "Question: So was it your understanding after this cable, and in view of your knowledge of the Agency a general practice with respect to assassination in which you had been schooled tnat it was not done, that assass- ination was not part of the Cuba Project, as far as you knew?" DoclTd: 32423539 Page 69
BW 450955 "Officer: That's correct.” kok * ‘ "Ouestion: And would it be accuaate to say that your recollections concerning what you now view as what Mr. Dulles' attitudes were ... are based on your general training. about what had always been said ... [and] that after this incident, what you were told ... fortified that previous belief [in] that Dulles had nullified at least this particular cable?" "Officer: Correct." "Question: Do. you have anything in your recollection or as a result of your informed opinion or experience that would indicate to the contrary; that is, that Mr. Dulles did have assassination in his arsenal, so to speak?" — —— , "Officer: I have no basis for any such speculation." (Duty Officer, pp. 31, —). Docld: 32423539 Page TO
(iii) ‘Dulles Briefing on Use of Underworld Fig ures in Septenber 1960... 1. Bissell and Edwards Said Dulles Was Told About An "Intelligence Operation" With No "Bad Words" Used, But That Dulles (Cand his Deputy) Understood That to Mean © Assassination. Bissell recalled that “in the latter. part of September" there was’ "a meeting in which Col. Edwards and I briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 20). Bissell testified that "Colonel Edwards outlined in somewhat circumlocutious terms the plan that he had discussed with syndicate representatives" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22). He stated that Edwards had said: “that contact had been made with [the underworld], that a plan had been prepared for their use, and I think he either said in as many words or strongly inferred that the plan would be put into effect unless at that time or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should not be". (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22.)* The CIA's 1967 I.G. Report, based upon interviews with Edwards and Bissell, said Dulles and Cabell were briefed as follows: "The discussion was circumspect. Edwards deliberately avoided the use of any ‘bad words'. The descriptive term used was ‘an intelligence operation’. Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing. He * Bissell testified that he was relying on the dating. provided in the Inspector General's Report, but that his state- . ments concerning what was said at the meeting were of his a personal Know Ledge (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-22). HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page fi
HW 50955 recalls describing the channel as being 'from A to B to C'. As he then envisioned it, A was Maheu, B was Roselli, and C was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval to use his own judgement." (1.G., pp. 17-18.) Bissell testified that the description sounded "highly plausible" (Bissell Tr. 6/9/75 at 24.) Edwards said it was "accurate" (Edwards Tr. at 11). In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwards described briefing Dulles, the question arises as to whéther ‘Dulles in fact would have understood that the operation involved assassination. The Inspector General, “in attempting to “con- jecture as to just what the Director did approve", decided "Tt is safe to conclude, given the men participating and the general subject of the meeting, that there was little likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details were deliberately blurred and the specific intended “result was never stated to unmistakable language. It is also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of ‘bad words’ emphasized to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.’ (I1.G., p.l8). Bissell testified that "I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from that meeting--and there was, I think, subsequent occasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles and myself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the nature of the operation.” 4 * “ * "Q.: What. were the subsequent conversations you had with Mr. Dulles in which you concluded that he knew that this was an assassination effort? "Bissell.: . . . it's really a guess on my part*that Doclda: 324273539 Page 72
Bo. such conversations occurred . ._. I do believe they did occur is that during the entire-autumn I suppose I must have spoken to Mr. Dulles: practically daily about some aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually certain that he would in one or another of those con- versations and probably more than once have asked if there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards' operation. He also may have been in direct contact with Edwards at that time." (Bissell Tr. 6/9/75, pp. 24-26) ‘When asked by the Chairman why, in this context, persons within the Agency talked "in riddles to one another", Bissell replied that: | oe | ", I think there: was a reluctance to spread even on an oral record some aspects of this operation. "Chairman: Did the reluctance spring from the fact that it simply grated against your conscience to have to speak more explicitly? “Bissell: I don't think it grated against my conscience. I think it may have been a feeling that. the Director i ¥ [Dullesl preferred the use of the sort of _ language that “ . is described in the 1.G. Report. " Bissell, ina subsequent appearance before the Committee, again addressed the issue of whether he and Edwards _had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an assassination operation: "I thought I made clear that it was my impression--and I believe the impression incidentally. that -I thought was confirmed.in the [I.G. Report]--that in discussing this with Dulles and Cabell . . . the objective of the . operation was made unmistakably clear to them. The terms ‘an intelligence operation’, I think someone said, was that not a cover designation? But we would not under any circumstances have told Allen Dulles that this was.an intelligence collection operation. If I said that on Monday, I must have given a wrong impression. (Bissell Tr. 6/11, p. 24.) On the other hand, Scott Breckenridge, the only | cy author of the Inspector General's. Report still with the CIA, testified that in his ‘opinion a “pointed avoidance of 'bad. HW 50955 BDocld: 32423539 Page 73
HY 0955 words ’" would have made it less likely that an "intelligence operation” would have been understood as an assassination _ attempt, and that "it was open to question how clearly this | was stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not. Mr. Dulles under- stood" (Colby/Breckenridge, 5/ , p. . .) Sheffield Edwards was quite infirm when examined by | the Committee and has since died.* Edwards testified before the Committee as follows: "  . . {T]his possible project was. approved by Allen B. Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General. Cabell, the Deputy Director. They are both dead. "The Chairman: How do you know, Colonel, that the project had been approved by these two gentlemen? "Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles ... . and Cabell." (Edwards, 9/30/75, pp. 5-6) In his interview with the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards testified (Edwards interview, p. 5): "Q.: Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did you have any contact with on the top echelon? "A, Very important. The plan was approved by Allen W. Duiles and General Cabell. " * As the investigation proceeded, members of the Committee requested that Edwards be recalled. Edwards passed away. before this could be accomplished. As a result of Edwards’ infirmity and subsequent death, the Committee was unable to examine him effectively concerning his conflicting prior statements concerning Dulles' knowledge of the plots. Docld: 324293539 Page 7T4
i ‘ Nee” HW 450955 James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the operation involving underworld figures, testified that when he and Edwards discussed the matter in 1975, prior to giving evidence to the Rockefeller Commission, he was sure that . Edwards had told him Dulles had approved the plot (O'Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 58-59). He added that he was "reasonably sure" or "knew" in the "back of my mind" that either Edwards or | Bissell had also told him of Dulles’ knowledge when the plot was underway in 1960-62 (O'Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 33-34; 36; 60).* : ~ | oe A review of Dulles' calendar for August through December 1960 showed no meeting involving Dulles, Cabell, Bissell and, Edwards.** Of course, such a meeting could have occurred without having been recorded. 2.. Whatever Was Said to Dulles, He Was Not Briefed Until After Contact With the Underworld Figures Had Been Made.” Bissell and the Inspector General's-Report (which * In June 1966, Howard J. Osborn, Edwards’ successor as Director of Security, wrote a memorandum for Helms on Maheu © stating that "the DCI was briefed and gave his approval". ' When questioned about this memorandum, Osborn stated that he | had no firsthand knowledge of the briefing, and that he had most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or O'Connell. ee The calendar also reflects no meetings during that period between Dulles, Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles and Edwards. ; DoclTd: 32423539 Page 7T45
' Neat” wo Se HW 50955 relied on Edwards) placed the briefing of Dulles in "the latter part of September 1960". . Bissell did not have a clear independent recollection of the dates involved, but recalled that discussions concerning the possible use of syndicate members against Castro began "in the Autumn of 1960".* He recalled initial discussions among himself, Edwards, and Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, which he said occurred before Dulles and Cabell were approached about assassinating Castro. According to Bissell, ~ "those conversations, the subject matter was a capability to eliminate Castro if such.action should be decided upon. "Tt is, therefore, accurate to say that my best recollection of those conversations (with. Edwards and King) is that they addressed themselves to the existence or non-existence of the capability and to the possibility of developing a capability. They were not conclusive or- decisive conversations . . . nor would they have revealed a prior decision to implement such a plan by anybody.” (Bissell, 6/9, p. 19.) to . * "Q.: When did you first become aware of any plan or effort to assassinate Mr. Castro? . | . ‘ . "Bissell: Well, I became aware of planning a contingency basis for such an operation. My recollection is , ‘August . "Q.: August of 1960? "Bissell: '60; correct. .:. but without reading [the L.G. Report], I would. have remembered initial conversations early in the autumn of 1960."" (Bissell Tr. 6/9, pp. 17-18.) Bs ‘Docld: 324293539 Page 76
HW 450955 - 13 - O'Connell contacted Roselli in early September 1960. During the week of September 25,|/.0'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli _ ) met with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. Bissell testified as follows concerning the sequence of those events: "OQ: Well, before we come to the meeting [with Dullesl, you had been informed, prior to that, had you not, that contact had been made with the Mafia? "Mr. Bissell.: I had. "Q.: Now were you informed; that the Mafia had been given the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate Castro? ; "Bissell: Not that early, to my “best. recollection. . I cannot date that at all well. I would suppose that it was within the next two or three weeks. (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21. > i On the other hand, Roselli's testimony suggests that Maheu had indicated prior ‘to the "latter part of September" 1960 that a . | large sum of money would be paid!for Castro's death (Roselli, 4 Pp. 17), and Edwards' May 14, 1962 memorandum indicated the briefing of "senior officials" took place after the money had been offered. oo 7 Do | | It is clear, then, that even if Dulles was informed | . about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, sub- - ordinate agency officials had previously decided to take steps toward: arranging for the killing |of Castro, including discussing 4 it with organized. exime leaders. Docld: 32423539 Page Ti?
HW 450955 4 (iv) Questions Raised: by Edwards’ Communications to the Justice Department’ in 1961 and 1962. . As fully described supra, PP. , the FBI discovered in the late 1960's that Maheu had been involved in an illegal wiretap in Las Vegas. In April 1961, Maheu told the FBI that the tap had been placed in connection with a CIA operation, and suggested that the FBI contact Edwards to verify this fact. An FBI report of a May: 3, 1961 interview with Edwards (in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as ~ t : af relating to "clandestine efforts! against the Castro Government with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given to the Attorney General) stated: i Io "Col. Edwards, advised that only Mr. Bissell (Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and ~ Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards’ contact with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney ‘General in connection with their inquiries into CIA. relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro.'" (FBI memo- randum entitled "Arthur James Balletti et al.",May 22, 1961, p. 2.) (Emphasis added) | | . DoclTd: 32423539 Page 7T8
HW 450955 - 15 _ | | Bissell said he was certain, however, that the- . statement regarding Dulles’ knowledge about the operation was wrong, and testified that "it is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, ' as I have testified several times" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 27).* When asked to speculate on why Edwards would have told the FBI that Dulles was unaware of Edwards’ contact with Maheu, Bissell replied: | "I can only surmise that he believed he could. secure the cooperation of the Justice Department that he required without in any way involving his superior, Mr. Dulles, and simply did] this in a- protective fashion." (Bissell, 7/17/|, p. 20). A year later, on May 7, 1962, Edwards and CIA's General Counsel met with Attorney] General Robert Kennedy.. (That meeting, is discussed extensively: below at p. ). Edwards' memorandum of the meeting indicated that he had said that after Roselli and Giancana had been offered $150,000, Edwards had "then briefed the proper senior officials of [the] Now, it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified several times. Also, I submit it is quite im- plausible that I would have briefed Gen. Taylor _and the Attorney General--and incidentally, I have no recollection of briefing those two gentle men except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles him- self was a member--it is quite implausible that - I would have briefed them on a matter which had been going on for some months, and some which the Director, Mr. Dulles himself, had never been informed." i DoclTd: 32423539 Page 79
~ 16 - Agency" (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally approved.”* It further states that "knowledge" of the project had been "kept to a total of six| persons.” wx Dulles had left the Agency between the time of ] Edwards’ two statements. ‘(v) Remarks Made to the Special Group by General Cabell in November 1960. “Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware of the Castro plots (Bissell Tr.|6/9, -p. 22; Edwards Tr. 5/30/75, | | . On the same day as writing that memorandum for the ‘ ) Attorney General, Edwards wrote another memorandum for his own files indicating that after putting Harvey in contact with Roselli in early April, he had: nh a "cautioned him [Harvey] that I felt that any future - projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." (5/14/62, _ Memorandum for the Record:) This memorandum, which contained other information which Harvey and Edwards had agreed to include to “falsify” the record, is discussed infra, p. . | i **. The 1967 Inspector General's Report surmised that thirteen people knew of the plot, including Dulles, based upon Bissell's and Edwards’ account of the Dulles briefing. (See discussion, supra. at mo, oO xxx The Inspector - General ' s / Report stated: "With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director | (Dulles) and the DDCI. (Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. . . Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the a nature of the operation he was discussing.’ (IG Report, £ a P. 17.) nd O'Connell testified that prior to O'Connell's testifying before the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told O'Connell that Cabell had been aware of and authorized the project. HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Fage 30
HW 50955 ~ 17 -. The testimony indicates that the meeting between Dulles, Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime "in the autumn" of 1960, probably around September. The minutes of a meeting of the Special Group, the high-level governmental body for consider- -ing covert action, on November 3, 1960, reflect the following remarks: "Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execu- tion, because the instruments must. be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of speaker or those listening is uncertain. Neither was able to that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.’ elon simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded ae why (11/3/60 Special Group Minutes, P. 3). Exactly what the term "direct positive action" meant: to the - half AY Paar be noe beljeve pel, offer any interpretive help to the Committee. However, other participants at this meeting have testified that the reference could mean-or include assassination.* de a "Q: Do you read. . . direct, positive action. as meaning killing (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro and Che Guevara)?" Lo "A: ' I would read it that way, yes. "(Lansdale Tr. 7/8/75, p. 103.) a — Q: . . .would you agree that the words ‘direct positive action' appear to question whether there's been any planning in connection with assassinating (the Castros and Guevara)?" . . - _. he "A: I think. the phrase "positive action' could include assassinations, but. . . I'm not sure what was in Mr. Merchant's “mind.” (Gray Tr. 7/9/75, p. 9. > Doclda: 324273539 Page 61
Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meeting. After reading the reference to "direct positive action," Bissell said "I find it difficult to understand" (Bissell Tr. 7/17, p. 18). He was then asked "Q: Do you, in light of the November 3 minutes) remain firm that Cabell was knowledgeable (of the assassination plots)?" "A: It casts some doubt on that in my mind.” When asked if it cast "some significant doubt in light of (Cabell's) character" ,Bissell answered "yes" (Bissell, 7/17, “pp. 22-23). HW 90955 Docld:32423539 Page 32
-~ 19 - (c) ‘Did John MeCone Know of or Authorize Assassina- tion Plots During His Tenure as DCI The CIA considered several assassination plots against Castro during McCone's tenure as Director. Harvey initiated his contact with Roselli in April 1962, and the operation involving underworld figures continued into early 1963. In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated diving suit. AM/LASH was offered a poison pen device in | November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for nis use in the following year. (i) McCone Testified That He Did Not Authorize .! or Know About the Castro Plots and That He Vioould Have Dis- | approved the Plots Had He Been Asked McCone testified that he was not aware of the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those -plots.* (MeCone, 6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 6-7, 17), and that if he had ever been asked about the plots, he would have disapproved. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 47) MeCone testified: * McCone testified that he. first learned of the Roselli operation a, in August, 1963, long after it had been terminated. See discussion, | Pp. HW 350955 DBocld:327423539 Page 63
Swen HW 450955 I had no knowledge of any authorized plan or planning that might lead to, a request for authorization. Of course, during those days it was almost common for one person or another. to say, we ought to. dispose of Castro [bJut at no time did anyone come to me, or come to other authorities to my knowledge, with a plan for the actual undertaking of an assassination. fo ake $ fe of rs ras ew woe Senator Hart of Colorado: . . . Did you ever discuss the subject of assassinations PLAS with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles? McCone: No, I did not. ~ CAR ap o | rs wf ennanyi7 (ii) Helms, Bissell, and Other Subordinate Agency Employees Testified That They Did Not Ask McCone to Approve the Plots or Know If He Had Knowledge Of Them. Richard Bissell was DDP under MeCone for three months, “from November 1961 until. February 1962. Richard Helms assumed ‘the duties of DDP from Bissell. Bissell testified about McCone's knowledge as follows: rs No: Your testimony is that you never discussed assassinations with Mr. McCone? A.: That is correct. Q.:- . . .{D]id you tell McCone anything about that conversation with Mr. Harvey in which you at least told him (Harvey) to take over the relationship with the criminal syndicate? A.: I don't remember so doing. BDocld: 3274273539 Page 34
HW 50955 Helms testified that he did not recall ever having dis- cussed the assassination plots with McCone while the plots were continuing.* When asked whether McCone was aware of the assassination plots against Castro, Helms testified: No, it isn't my impression that I told him, - at least I don't have any impression, unfor- tunately. . . .. Mr. McCone is an honorable | man. He has done his own testifying, and all I can say is that I do not know specifically whether he was aware or not. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 90, 101-102) Helms further testified: - Q.: I believe Mr. McCone testified that he never heard of any of these attempts when he was Director. Would you have any reason to disagree with his testimony? Helms: Sir, I have always liked McCone and I don't want to get into an altercation with him. He had access to Harvey and everybody. else just the way I had and he had regular ‘access to the Attorney General. ade ole ate ale ale “a ae a a a Q.: If you were a member of this Committee wouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was un-_ aware of the assassination | attempts ‘while they were underway? Helms: I don't know how to answer that, Senator. Mondale. He was involved in this up to his scuppers. just the way everybody else Helms testified that he first told McCone about the plot using underworld figures in August 1963, See discussion supra at p. Bocld: 324273539 Page 85
HW 450955 ~22- was that was in it, and I just don't know. I have no reason to impugn his integrity. — On the other hand, I don't understand how it was he didn't hear about some of these . things that ne claims that he didn't. (Helms, 7/13/75, pp. 32-33) *k *# * *& * I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McCone ‘was: not informed and when I-was told that ' there was evidence that he wasn't informed, I was trying to scratch my head as to why I didn't tell him at the time and my surmises are the best I can come up with. I am really surprised I did not discuss it with him at the time. My relations with him were good, and so my surmises are just the best I am able to do in 1975 over an episode that took place that many years ago. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 90) , Several other Agency officials who were aware of the assassination plots testified that they had not told McCone of the plots. William Harvey testified that he never spoke with McCone about the operation involving -underworld figures or assassination and that, to the best of his knowledge, McCone had not been told about the project. (Harvey, 6/25/75, Sheffield Edwards, when asked whether he had informed McCone about the plot, replied: Edwards: No, I did not inform Mr. McCone. | Q.: Was there a reason for why you did not . inform Mr. MecCone? Docld: 32423439 Page 66
HW 50955 ~ 23 - Edwards: Well, I did not want to drag “Mr. MeCone into this thing that.in my opinion had petered out, and I did not want to involve him. (Edwards, p. 18). James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the opera- tion under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards had told him during a discussion about the plots in 1965 that Edwards had not briefed McCone on the operation. As a matter of fact, I don't think he ever knew. about it. From later conversations with: Colonel Edwards, not recently, we talked about it, and he said that he wae convinced that Mr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't on his watch, so to speak, and he didn't want to get him involved. (O'Connell, pp. 37, 39) George McManus, Helms' Special Assistant for Cuba during the relevant period, testified that he was not told about the ‘assassination activities, and gave his opinion that if McCone had been asked to approve an assassination, he “would have Take ran reacted violently immediately". - *MeManus advanced two reasons for this opinion: (1) McCone had a great love for the President of the United States and he sort of looked at him as an older son or a brother, a very protective sense he had about the President, President Kennedy, and McCone would have immediately said Jesus, this is a no win ball game. (2) Secondly, as an individual, he would have found -it morally reprehensible. (McManus, p. 33) (Continued) © Bh Bocld: 32493539 Page a7
HW 50955 a Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that he had not known of the underworld operation until August - 1963, and that in his opinion McCone did not learn of the ‘operation prior to that time.*_ (Elder, p. 15) | (iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the Assassination Plots __ McCone assumed the position of DCI in Novem- ber 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked Harvey to assume operational control -over the Castro plot in- volving underworld figures.** Richard Helms replaced Bissell in February of 1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on (Continued) McManus also testified: I always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the Director fully informed of any activity that he thought: was sensitive. . . . Under most cir- cumstances, and indeed under all circumstances you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone, with the exception of a situation in which ~ | Helms had been told by higher authority not to tell him. (McManus, pp. 32-34) . *In August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards' May 14, 1962, memorandum to the Attorney General. See discussion infra at p.. ; With respect, to the Cuban assassination matters, where Colby's knowledge was only second-hand, Colby said: "Mr. McCone did not know of it." (Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101) , **See earlier discussion supra.. Doclda: 324273539 Page 68
om HW 450955 the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was. Harvey's immediate superior and the person to whom he reported about the Castro plot activities, Harvey testified that in the spring of. 1962, when he was preparing. to contact Roselli, he briefed Helms on the assassination plot. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65) Harvey said: : . . L briefed Helms generally on the take- over of Roselli, on the doybts about the - operation, on the possible ..... future of it, and to the extent it had then been possible, the assessment. of Roselli and the cutting out of various individuals. x Harvey testified that when he briefed Helms on. the assassina- tion plot operation, they decided that it would not be .appro- priate at that point to brief John McCone. There was a fairly detailed discussion be-” tween myself and Helms as to whether or not the Director should at that time be briefed | concerning this. For a variety of- reasons *Harvey testified that when he took over the Roselli opera- tion, he had "cut out" both Maheu and Giancana because regard less of what I may: have thought of their trustworthiness, they were surplus" to the operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65). Docld: 324273539 Page 69
a) aN which were tossed back and forth, we agreed that it was not necessary or advisable to brief him at that time. I then said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you decide in the future that he should be briefed, I would like to know about it in advance to which, to my best recollection, he agreed. (Harvey , 6/25/75, p. 66) Harvey then offered the following explanation for why he and Helms had decided not to discuss the matter with McCone at that time: There were several reasons*for this. One, this operation at that stage had not been assessed. . It was obviously questionable on several grounds. -It obviously involved know- ledge by too many people. We were not even ‘sure at that point it had any remote possibility or rather any real possibility for success. It © had arisen with full authority insofar as either of us knew long before I knew anything about it, and before the then-Director became Director of the Agency. , I saw no reason. at that time to charge him with knowledge of this, at least until we reach-- ed the point where it appeared it might come to fruitation or had had a chance to assess the “individuals involved. and determine exactly the problem we faced, including the possible problem -- and it was a very, or it appeared to be, and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this: government being blackmailed either by. Cubans for political purposes or by figures in organized crime for their own self- protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned ‘out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp.. 67-68) ake ake ale al ake a a a a ae HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 90
HW 450955 - 27 -— -I am definitely not saying that there was any effort to hide or conceal any information from the Director. There was not.. This was a dis- cussion as to whether or not it was even neces- sary or appropriate at this point to take details -of this particular operation in an unassessed form to the then-Director at that time. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69) Harvey stated that he did not have any reason to believe that the assassination activities would have been "disapproved by. the Director" had he been advised of the project (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69) and stated that he hdd thought the plots “were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and | beyond the Agency". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 66). When asked why McCone had not’ been given an opportunity to consider the plot, Harvey replied: One of the things that I don't know from my own . . . knowledge . . . is who was briefed in exactly what terms at the time of the so- called Las Vegas flop that involved attempts to place a technical surveillance ... in Dan . Rowan's hotel room. _ Garvey, 7/11/75, p. 1.6) Docld: 32423539 Page 91
HW 50955 - 28 - Harvey was queried on whether the reasons he had given for not ° briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he should [have been] briefed forthwith". Harvey replied: Well, Senator Huddleston, it. will be quite easy in looking at it now to say, well, I can see your argument. All I can say to you in answer is at that time I didn't feel that it was necessary or advisable. I did not make this decision except in consultation, and had I been disagreed with, that would have been it. And I am not off- loading this on Richard Helms or attempting to at all. It isn't all that ‘easy for me to go © back this many years and sort of recast all of the reasoning and be. sure I am accurate. And -I don't also want to evade it by saying, well, it seemed like a good idea at the time. —~But . actually. it did, In other words, this was not something that either Helms or myself felt that at ‘that stage there was any point in attempting to , brief the Director.on it until, at least, we had a somewhat better handle on it. nn) ¥ * * ra) And I might also add, if I may, . . . but as far as either one of us knew at that point he might have been or should have been briefed, if you want it that way, by either Allen Dulles - or Richard Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, PP- 67-71) The 1967 ‘Report. prepared by the Inspector General for Helms states that Harvey said: "When he briefed Helms on i, he obtained Helms’ approval not to brief the (I.G., p. 41) Boclda: 324273539 Page 92
HY 0955 ~ 29. - Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation, but that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of Harvey's testimony and the Inspector General's Report. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 32, 106). Helms, when asked about Harvey's testimony that he and Harvey had agreed not to brief McCone, stated "I frankly don't. | recall having agreed to this." | My recollection is that I had very grave doubts about the wisdom of this. . . . And as I recall it, we had so fewrassets inside Cuba at that time that I was willing to try almost anything. But the thing did not loom large in my mind at that time. I was enormously busy with a lot of other things, taking over a new job [as DDP]. Mr. McCone was realtively new in the Agency and I guess I must have thought to myself, well this is going to look peculiar to him and I doubt very much this is going to go anyplace, but if it does, then that is time enough to bring him into “the picture. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 33) Helms also stated: It was a Mafia connection and Mr, McCone was relatively new to the organization and this was, you know, not a very. savory effort. (Helms,,. — 6/13/75, p. 92) Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having. been convinced. that any attempt was really made on Castro's life." I am having a very difficult time justifying before this Committee, because there is some- thing in here that doesn't come together, even. for me, I am sorry to say. Because if this was all that clear, as everybody seems to think it Docld: 324293539 Page 93
- 30 .- was, that there were those pills in that restau- rant in Cuba and Castro was about to die, I cer- tainly would have talked to McCone about. it. And this never was that clear, I am sorry to say, but it never was, not at that time. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 34) : On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on | the operation involving underworld figures, describing it as terminated.’ | . | “Harvey told the Inspector General that: . on 14 May he briefed Helms on the meet - ing with the Attorney General, as told to him by Edwards. Harvey, too, advised against briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and states that Helms concurred in this. (1.G., p. 65). Harvey testified that what he had probably told Helms was that: Any briefing of the Director onthe discussion with the Attorney General concerning this should come from Colonel Edwards and Larry Houston, the General Counsel, and not from the DDP unless we are asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75, Pp. 99) Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation and remarked: It seems odd to me only because, if the Attorney General had been briefed on something it would seem very logical that it would be very important to brief the Director at that time on the same thing. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 107) *The briefing is exhaustively describe? supra at p. According to the Inspector Generals éport, Harvey and Roselli had a farewell dinner before Harvey went on an assign- ment to Rome in June 1963. The meeting was observed by the FBI, and Sam Papich, the FBI liaison with the CIA, notified Harvey HW 50955 Docla:32423539 Page 94
-31- Harvey supplied poison pills and weapons to Roselli and his Cuban associates during a trip to Miami in-April,-1962.* At a Special Group meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent activities". (Memo, McCone, 4/26/62). On April 26, Harvey was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request and MeCone's wish to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately | on your return to discuss, the Task Force Activities." (Memoran- dum, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62). | 7 Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported to the Special Group on the "status of the active and potential . Ch tr a . sources. inside Cuba. . Q.:) "Did you report on. the passage of the pills to Roselli? 4 ‘Harvey: No, I did not. | Q.: “Which you had just accomplished in Miami. . .for - the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro. Harvey: ; No. . | | Q.: And did you report that to Mr. McCone when he asked you to. tell him what you had done in Miami? | ‘Harvey: No, I did not." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 16-17.)° that Hoover. would be informed. Harvey asked Papich to call him if he felt that Hoover would inform the Director about the incident. "Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of the. incident and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief McCone unless a call from Hoover was expected. (1.G., “* Harvey described the trip to Miami. as So ie Be _ "one .of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of’ reviewing in toto. . . the actual and potential operations at the Miami. base. . . and this covered the whole gamut from personnel ‘administration, operational support in the way of small craft (and) so on. . .'"' (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 15-16). HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 95. -
~32- Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special Group about the operation at that time because: "I did not consider either, A, that this should be in any sense in this amorphous stage, surfaced to the Special Group, nor, as I have attempted to explain before that it should be briefed to John McCone at that point in the state that it was in with as little as we knew about it, and with all of the at- tendant. background which at that point, and I was not personal- ly cognizant of all of this, had been going on for approximate- sy y88t recall, two to two-and-a-half years." (Harvey, 7/11, Pp. . oe Harvey attended an August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Augmented. * He testified that a person {Robert . McNamara] at that meeting suggested that the Special Group “consider the elimination or assassination of Fidel" (Harvey, 7/11, p. 30). Harvey then testified that on the day following this Special Group } | meeting (Harvey, 6/25, p. 71): "in connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the question again came up and I expressed some opinion as to the inappropriateness of this having been raised in this form and at that forum [Special Group meeting], at which © point Mr. McCone stated in substance that he agreed and also that he had felt so strongly that he had, I believe, . the preceding afternoon or evening,. personally called the gentleman who made the proposal or suggestion and had stated ( similar views as to the inappropriateness and that he [Mc- {he Cone] said in addition . . . if I got myself involved in some- \ Me el Eping like this, I might end up getting myself ex-communicated." a6 . ov a OO Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion. about | the actual assassination operation involving Roselli. He said (Harvey, 6/25, p. 73): | a *This meeting and the raising of the suggestion of assassina- Se . tion is discussed in depth in part __, infra. HY 50955 Bocld: 324254539 Page 6
-33- "T would like to recast the time that this took place. This was August of ‘62. This was at the start of the so-called Missile Crisis. "A tentative decision had been made at that point that the only sensible thing to do with [the Roselli operation] was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be done . . . I am sure that I had discussed with Roselli, at least on a tentative basis, by 4 August, the probable neces- sity of terminating this .. . According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was” reported to be still in Cuba at this time. (1:G., PP. 51-52) Harvey testified that the Report was referring to the pills © (Harvey, 6/25, p. 105).* -~ In relation to the August 10 meeting,.Helms was asked whether he believed McCone would have stopped an assassination attempt if he had known that one.was underway. Helms stated: ae Mr. Helms: "The reason I say I don't know... is that elsewhere Mr. McCone states that he went to see Mr. Mc- Namara in connection with this August 1962 affair and told Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with this, that I have no recollection that I don't believe he ever. said anything to me about his not wanting to have any- thing to do with it. ~Q.: "And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You are his Deputy for Plans? Mr. Helms: "I saw him almost daily. Q.: “And is it your belief that if he had made any: such statement to Mr. McNamara that he would have come to you and told you about it at some point? Mr. Helms: "I just don't know why he didn't but I don't re- call- any such statement. As I said, and I would like to '. repeat it, Mr. McCone had given me my job, he had promoted me, I felt close to him, I felt loyal to him, and I would not have violated an instruction he gave me if I could have possibly helped it. ol *Harvey said: . "T may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving an actual order to terminate this as soon as possible, (Harvey, 6/25, p. 74). HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 97
=34- O.: "But in any event, it is your judgement that he did not indicate that he was opposed to assassinations Mr . Helms: "Not to me.’ Walter Elder, who served as McCone's Fxecutive Assistant, testified, however, that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition to assassination after. the August 10 meeting. ¥ (iv) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone | An August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claimed that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana. ** MeCone asked Helms for a report about the article. McCone testified that when “Helms. came to see him, he brought the. following memorandum: "1. “Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney _ General in May of 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence’ of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year. "9, I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening, and, in the absence of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with.Colo- nel Edwards’ assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I *Elder told the Committee: "I told Mr. “Helms that Mr: McCone had expressed his feeling . that assassination could not be condoned and would not -be approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be unthinkable to record in writing. any consid- . eration of assassination because it left the impression that’ the subject had received serious consideration by governmental policy makers, which it had. not. Mr. Helms responded, ‘I un- derstand’. -The point is that I made Mr..Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assassination. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation. (Elder Affidavit. ) **The 8/16/63 Chica o Sun Times article states that “Justice Department sources elieved that Giancana never did* any spying for the CIA, but pretended to go along with the Agency "in the ol . hopes that’ the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars might be slowed - or at least affected | - by his ruse of coopera- tion with another government agency. HW 50955 Docldi32423539 Page 96
-~35- am aware, this is the only written information available on Agency relationships with subject. I hope that this will serve your purpose. "3. I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation , . discussed in the attachment."' (Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Helms, 8/16/63.)* That memorandum attached the May 14, 1962, memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy from Sheffield Edwards which described the opera- tion as having been terminated before McCone became DCI. (See discussion, infra, p. od) Neither McCone nor Helms were alle to remember what was said at the meeting. Walter Elder, who was then McCone's Executive As- sistant, recalled: "Mr. Helms came in with [the memorandum]. He handed it to } [McCone] who read it and . . . handed it back without any particular comment other than to say, ‘Well, this did not happen during my tenure.'" * * * 4 % Q.: "Was anything else said? A.: "No, he had very little to say about it. Q "Did Mr. Helms then leave? A.: "Mr. Helms left." (Elder, pp. 16-17, 57-59.) Elder testified that he had concluded that the operation in- volved assassination from reading the two memoranda that were given to McCone (Elder, 8/13, p. 60). Elder "further concluded that [Mc- Cone] was perfectly aware of what Mr. Helms was trying to say to *When asked whether this entry in the memorandum suggested that. he had previously been aware of the operation, “McCone testified that fn Helms had orally informed him "on that day in August" that it in- an volved assassination (McCone, p. 9). HWY 350955 Docld:327423539 Page 99
-36- him" (Elder, p. 60). Elder further testified: Q.: ‘“Other than that conversation that you just described between yourself and Mr. McCone, did he have anything else to say about that memorandum? , ¥--Elder: "No." Q.: "I take it then he did not tell either you or Mr. Helms that we absolutely could not have this activity going on in. ‘the future? Mr. Elder: "No." The Inspector General's Report conclaided that: "This is the earliest date on which we have evidence of Mr. McCone's being aware of any aspect of the scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the gambling syndicate." (I.G., p. 70).° HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 100
Hy wee “neve 0955 1 . PLLED pasea on Subcommittee Meeting, 8/29/75 {b) The Question of Authorization Outside The Central Intelli- gence Agency In The Eisenhower Administration. i. Summary As discussed in the preceding section, the evidence as to whether Allen Dulles, CIA Director during the Eisenhower Administration, was informed of the Castro assassination operation is not clear. Even assuming that Dulles was so informed, ‘authorization outside -the CIA for a Castro assassination could, according to the testimony, ie only have come from President Eisenhower , from someone speaking for him,. or from the Special Group.* At issue, therefore, is whether President Eisenhower, his close aides, or the Special Group authorized or had knowledge of the Castro assassination plots. In addition to Bissell, we took considerable testimony from President Bisenhower's principal staff assistants, Gordon Gray (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and President Eisenhower's . representative on the Special Group) ; General Andrew Goodpaster (starr Secretary to President Eisenhower with particular responsibility for. ‘ * With respect to. then. Vice President Nixon, Bissell testified~-and he was supported by the principal White House assistants and the documents-—- that Nixon was not significantly involved in Cuban matters generally at the critical times. There is no evidence suggesting his knowledge of the Castro assassination effort during the period under review, significant. parts of which occurred during the Presidential campaign. (Bissell > Pp. ; Gray, 7/9, p. 39) Therefore, we concluded that, despite the indications in Nixon's book My Six Crises (p. } that he was involved in Cuban matters generally--and Howard Hunt's characterization of him as the [action officer] for the Bay of Pigs, there was insufficient reason to examine Mr. Nixon on Cuba looked at alone. We came to a contrary  " conclusion on Chile and. . cr eo de Nee’ ont eae” Bocld: 324293539 Page 101
\ \\ mene oe \ HY 50955 national security operational matters); John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff Secretary and the President's son) and from Thomas Parrott (Secretary to the Special Group and special assistant to Allen Dulles). In summary, the: evidence was: . (i) Bissell testified that he did not inform the Special Group or President Eisenhower of the Castro assassination operation, and he had no personal knowledge that Allen Dulles informed either President Eisenhower or the Special Group. However, Bissell expressed the belief that Allen Dulles would have advised President Bisenhover (but not the Special croup) in a "circumlocutious" or "oblique" way. Bissell based this "pure personal opinion" on his understanding of Dulles’ practice with respect. to other particularly. sensitive covert operations. - But _ Bissell testified that Dulles never told him that he had so advised President Bisenhower regarding the Castro assassination operation, even though Dulles had told Bissell when he had employed this No ireumlocutious" approach to the President on certain other occasions. (ii) Gordon Gray testified that the Special Group never approved a Castro assassination, and that President Eisenhower had charged the - ‘Special. Group with the responsibility of authorizing all-important covert operations. A review of the records of Special Group meetings shows that .a query concerning a plan to take "direct positive action" against Castro at a Special Group meeting caused Allen Dulles! Deputy, General Cabell, to advise that such action was beyond the CIA's capability. Gray, - Goodpaster and John Eisenhower all affirmed (i) that they did not believe President Eisenhower would have considered such a matter in a private Docla: 32423539 Page 102
meeting with Dulles, or indeed that President ‘Eisenhower. would have approved a Castro assassination in any event, and (ii) that he would not have dis- cussed such a matter without telling them. They conclude, therefore, as a matter of. opinion, that President Eisenhower was never told, and testify, as a matter of fact, that they never heard anything about any assassination at any time. (iii) In addition to the I.G. Report (which found that the CIA could .- wee ; ie wi BA not say that any assassination activity carried on during this period was Luaemee responsive to Administration pressure), the documentary evidence showed that . Se the subject of Castro's removal was discussed at two meetings of the National vane Security Council and the Special Group in March 1960. The minutes of these i> meetings indicated that the discussions were in the context of a general con- Jey sideration of the proposal to train a Cuban exile force for an invasion of -, i b | pel te Cuba and an assessment that Castro's overthrow might result in a Communist Ty takeover. Gray and Admiral Burke testified that the discussion of Castro's yf fd. removal at these meetings did not refer to assassination, but rather to the 4 t problem of creating an anti-Castro exile force strong enough to insure a non- Communist successor to the Castro regime. In any event, no action was shown to have stemmed from those meetings. An additional Special Group document showed that when a question regarding planning for "direct positive action" ‘against Cuban leaders was raised at a meeting in the Fall of 1960 (shortly after Phase I-of the CIA/underworld assassination operation was initiated), the Deputy Director of the CIA told the Special Group that such action was “beyond the CIA's capability. HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 103
2. Richard Bissell's Testimony (a) Lack of Personal Knowledge. Bissell testified that he knew * nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the Castro assassination effort. (Bissell, 6/9, p. 30). Indeed, Bissell met frequently with the Special Group in the Fall of 196C for the purpose of discussing Cuban operations, but never informed the Special Group that there was a plot underway involving use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 25-26); nor did Bissell inform President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon or any other person outside the CIA (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 26-29). Bissell testified that his reason for not doing so was that as Deputy Director of Plans, he reported to the Director and under Agency procedures relied. upon the Director to inform the appropriate persons outside tha.Agency. Thus, the question of President Eisenhower's knowledge rests on whether Allen Dulles personally informed him of the Castro plot. (b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles. Based upon his belief that nr Dulles had been briefed about the operation involving. underworld figures and understood that it involved assassination, Bissell assumed that Allen '- Dulles would have sought authorization above the CIA level. As Bissell testified: "T went on the assumption that, in a matter of this sensitivity, the Director would handle higher level clearances. By clearance I mean authorization."* (Bissell, 6/9, p. 26.) */ ett tr erecta serene ee *Bissell reiterated this view on his second day of testimony: " I felt that. the responsibility for obtaining necessary authorization should remain with the Director." (Bissell, 6/11, p. 4) HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 104 r a r to '
A ys: "| f it acon Bissell further stated that although he believed that Dulles "probably" talked with President Eisenhower: | Vohe Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance and there were much more important matters to talk about with the President." (Bissell, 7/17, p. 25.) Bissell said he was "guessing" that Dulles informed Eisenhower. (Bissell 7/17, pp. 38-39.) He said, however, that he based his assumption on his knowledge of "command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his [Dulles'] mode of operations". (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained, his guess that Dulles informea President Eisenhower “is not based on hard evidence" but is "pure personal opinion". (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61.) Nevertheless,’ he believed it to be so, and that the Presi- dent thereupon gave his authorization "perhaps only tacitly”. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained, "My guess is that indeed whoever informed him, that is Dulles directly or Dulles through a staff member, would have had the same desire. . . to shield the President and to shield him in the sense of intimating or making clear that something of the sort was going forward, but giving the President as little in- formation about it as possible, and the purpose of it: would have been to give the President an opportunity, if he so elected, to | cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to continue but without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement of the detailed specific plan." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61) HWY 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 105
* Ee gre oe i . k ¥ anes WALKS SEP ce f _ Bissell’ said circumlocution would have been used "to protect the President" in accord with the concept of "plausible deniability".* As noted above, Bissell testified he had no personal knowledge that Dulles informed President Eisenhower of the Castro plot. On other specific occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Dulles had told Bissell he had used the "circumlocutious" approach with President Eisenhower. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 10.) But with respect to the Castro d / . ; : ses 4a assassination attempt, Dulles did not so inform Bissell. (Bissell, 6/11, sw” ; Ge Pte p. 11.) As Bissell testified: . . ow 42 AoA "I still want to be quite clear, I do not have.a recollection of the hoe Sa Director telling me that on this specific operation he had made g such an approach and received assent , approval, tacit or otherwise." py? a) (Bissell, 6/11, p. 11.) : As to whether Dulles knew of the plots and informed Eisenhower, we 2 have discussed above the fact that in January 1960 Dulles had told the Special Group that the CIA "did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro." (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, January 13, 1960, pe). And in July 1960 an instruction by Bissell's deputy to attempt to kill Raul Castro, which also stated that “possible removal of top three leaders is receiving serious . consideration at headquarters" had been | countermanded. The CIA officer who drafted this instruction testified that he hed heard at ‘the time that it was Dulles who countermanded this instructio doing so had "indicated that assassination was not to be considered.’ (Hinkle, p. "ylausible deniability" practice as follows: * Bissell explained the “Any covert operations, put especially covert operations . . . that -if successful, would have very visible consequences, it was of course an objective to carry out in such a way that they could be plausibly ‘disclaimed by the U.S. Government . " (Bissell, 6/11, p. 5°) aes Bissell apparently assumed that a corollary to that doctrine required the use of "oblique", "circumlocutious" language. i Tae ae ee - bE ok a be “Swans Sd HY 50955 DBocld:324233539 Page 106
(iii) White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed. 1. Gordon Gray. Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration on January 20, 1961. (Gray, p. 4.) In this capacity, Gray served as the President's representative on the Special Group. (Gray, p..4.) President Eisenhower specifically instructed Gray that all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty of another country must be deliberated by the Special Group. (Gray, p. 6.) Gray testified that during the period July 1958 to January 20,.1961, the Special Group never approved .an action to assassinate Castro (Gray. p. 6) - and no such suggestion was made vy Bissell. (Gray, D. 37.) sy | Gray testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would have approached President Eisenhower without informing Gray. Gray stated: "I fina it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with such a proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it from Mr. Dulles." (Gray, p. 35.)* * Gray pointed out "that I was not with President Eisenhower twenty- four hours a day. It was a few. minutes every day, practically every day.” (Gray, p. 35.) According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone with President Hisenhower on’ one occasion in the Fall of 1960. That meeting lasted ten minutes on November 25, 1960. The record of the previous portion of the meeting attended by Gray indicates only that, in ' addition to discussion of operations in another country, "there was also some discussion of Cuba". (Memorandum, November 28, 1960, by Gordon Gray, of Meeting with the President, November 25, 1960 at 10:40 A.M.). We feel compelled to state that the fact of this brief meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any, significance or relevance. HW 350955 DBocld:324234539 Page 107
HY 50955 tA Gray further testified that his relationship with President Eisenhower was such that President Eisenhower "would discuss with me any~ thing that came to his attention independently of me.". (Gray, p. 7.) And Gray testified that President Eisenhower never discussed with him the subject of a Castro assassination or of the use of the underworld figures and Cubans in such an effort. (Gray, p. 7.) | | 2, Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster served as President Eisenhower's Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer during the last two years of the Eisenhower Administration. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) In addition to responsi- bility for the President's schedule and the Supervision of the White House staff, Goodpaster was responsible for handling with the President Mall matters of day to day operations" in the foreign affairs and national security field, including the activities of the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) Goodpaster testified that he had.a "very close personal relationship" with President Eisenhower and saw the President essentially every day when [President Eisenhower] was in Washington (Goodpaster, p. hy. Along with Gordon Gray, Goodpaster served as the channel between the CIA and the President. Goodpaster was the particular channel for "operations in which [President Eisenhower | might take a personal part". (Goodpaster, Pp. 4.) _Goodpaster testified that he never heard any mention of assas-— ination efforts. (Goodpaster, p. 5.) He said that President Eisenhower ‘never told him about any assassination effort and that it was his belief, under White House procedures and by virtue of his close relationship with President Eisenhower, that if an assassination plan or operation had ever been raised with the President, he would have learned of it. (Goodpaster , Pp. 5.) “Yh Bocld: 324273539 Page 106
Beyond this General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell's assumption of a "“circumlocutious"” personal conversation between Dulles and the President "completely unlikely". "That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He had made it very clear to us how he wanted to handle matters of this kind, and we had set up procedures to see that they were then handled that way." (Goodpaster, pp. 6-7) According to Goodpaster, after the collapse of the Paris Summit Conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Khruschev as a result of the. U-2 incident in the Spring of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration reviewed its procedures for approval of CIA Sperations and tightened them. General Goodpaster testified that this review was carried out "with the aim in mind of being sure we had full and explicit under- standing of any proposals that came to us and we knew from [President Eisenhower] that in doing that we were responsive | to a desire on his part." (Goodpaster, p. 7. Secondly, according to Goodpaster, the relationship between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles was quite different from that '- between the President and John Foster Dulles. He said John Foster Dulles was a confidant of the President while Allen Dulles was not. (Goodpaster, p. 8.) | 3. Thomas Parrott. Thomas Parrott, a GIA officer, served as Secretary of the Special Group. from 1957 through the end of the Eisenhower . Administration (and thereafter until October 1963). (Parrott, p. ho) “Parrott stated that, by virtue of this assignment, he functioned. as Allen Dulles! assistant in connection with the Special Group, knew Dulles well, and gained an understanding of Dulles’ method of expression and his HW 350955 Docld:32423539 Page 109
10 y ; Me practice for dealing with the President. (Parrott, pp. 13-14.)* Parrott testified that early in 1959, President Eisenhower directed the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve, ‘or reject all significant covert action operations (Parrott, p. 4.). Parrott testified it would have been "highly unlikely" for President Eisenhower to have instructed the CIA to carry out a covert operation without informing the Special Group. Parrott testified: "as evidenced in his . . . revitalization . .. of this Committee [the Special Group], [President Eisenhower was] highly conscious of the necessity to be protective . .. in this field, and I just cannot conceive that [President Eisenhower] would have gone off and mounted some kind of covert operation on his own. This certainly would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's staff method of doing business... "**(Parrott, p. 7.) 4k. John Eisenhower. John Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's son, served in Goodpaster's office as Assistant Staff Secretary from mid- 1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. (Eisenhower, pp. 5, 9) He testified that his father had confided secret matters in him "to a very large extent" . (Eisenhower, p. 3.) For example, he said that after the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, then Gen. Eisenhower told him that the United States had developed the atomic bomb at a time when this was highly * Parrott testified: "T saw him [Allen Dulles] several times a week for hours at a time. I had known him somewhat before . . . but I got to know him very well indeed during these four r years." (Parrott, p- 13.) * Parrott further testified that Allen Dulles followed a practice of insisting upon specific orders rather than "tacit approval" and he also. found Bissell's assumptions regarding a. circumlocutious conversation between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles "hard to believe” 4} ‘ (Parrott, p. 14.) etd WW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 110
lade secret information. (Eisenhower , p. 3.) And he said that as early as 1956, President Eisenhower told him of the secret U-2 flights. (Eisenhower, p. h.) | | John Eisenhower testified, as a matter of fact, that President Eisenhower never told him of any CIA activity involving an assassination plan or attempt with respect to Castro. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) Based on his father's practice in other matters, it was his opinion that President Eisenhower would have told him if the President had known of any such activity. (Eisenhower, Pp. 5.) He further testified that President Eisenhower did not deal with important subjects ina circumlocutious manner. (Eisenhower, p. 8.) John Risenhower further testified that it was his father's velief that no leader was indispensable, and thus assassination was not an alternative ~ in the conduct of foreign policy. (Eisenhower, p. 1h.) (iv) The Documents | 1. The Inspector General's Report The document latest in date which bears upon the issue of | authorization’ for Phase I of the Castro assassination efforts is the 1967 Inspector General's Report. ‘In the concluding section of the Report to Director Helms, the authors advanced several possible Ageney responses to . Drew Pearson's public. charges regarding CIAAinderworld links.* One of the * On March 3, 1967, Drew Pearson stated in his newspaper column that there was a U.S. "plot" to assassinate Castro, and that "one version claims that.underworld figures actually were recruited to carry out the plot." (Pearson, Washington Merry Go-Round, March 3, 1967) a HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page i11
HW 50955 Le questions they asked was whether the Agency could say it was acting pur- suant to Government policy --. or as they put the question: "Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer given was: "Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the i attempt commencing in April 1962) was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration: pressure to | _ do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier i phase." (I.G., p. 132). — In addition to the I.G. Report, we examined the records of the National Security Council and the Special Group, as well as other relevant White House ‘Files bearing on the question of authorization for the period from Castro's rise to power to the end of the Eisenhower -Administration. As we discuss below, three documents were found which contained references arguably related to the subject of assassination. 2. The Contemporaneous Documents In March 1960, the National Security Council and the Special Group focused on Cuban policy. President Eisenhower had just returned from a foreign trip in which "Latin American Presidents had counseled further forbearance by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization of American States would finally see the potential danger in Cuba and take concerted action." (Gray, Ex. -2@, Memorandum of March 10, 1960 NSC Meeting, p. 8). Castro was characterized as hostile, but his Communist ties were apparently then unclear. Indeed, it may have been the prevailing opinion, at that time, that Castro was not actually a Communist. * For it was stated in. the minutes of the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting: "there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's dis- appearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray, Ex. 2, p. 7). ee * Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "Marxist-Lenist" on December 2, 1961. (David Larson, Cuba Crisis of 1962, p. 304). BDocld: 324273539 Page 112
13 ten foes a : out of these March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group came th oD Mrb an Y the general covert action plan against Cuba.* Against this background of general discussions of Cuba, we con-. sidered certain remarks appearing in the records of a March 10, 1960 National Security Council meeting and a March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting. The record of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President Fisenhower was present) states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in- commenting on Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba cbvert action plan was in preparation, “suggested that: any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package - deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around {astro were even worse than Castro." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9). Ana, according to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on March ah, 1960 (which President Eisenhower did not attend) "there was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel on and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2). Admiral Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to . 1961, stated in an affidavit** that although he did not have a specific recollec- j tion of the March 10, 1960 meeting of the National Security Council, he had a clear recollection of the discussions ‘of Cuba policy that took place in the spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated thet the reference to the suggestion by him at the March 10, 1960 meeting "clearly refers to the * As Gray testified, this plan covered four areas: sabotage, economic sanc- tions, propaganda, and training of a Cuban exile force for a possible invasion. Gray stated that this plan had nothing to do with assassination, (Gray, 7/9/75, Pe 1T). - ; . | . ** Admiral Burke was unable to te a a Lo he hee stify in person bef : oan because he was in the hospital. P ctore the Committee HO QCAME | i aun Bie a. WW 50955 BDocld:32423539 Page 113.
itn HY 50955 14 et 1 general covert action plan reported by Allen Dulles at that meeting and to b the general consideration given at that time in the U. S. Government to identify Cuban groups with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castro “regime.” (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated: "In this connection, it was my view that the U.S. must support those Cuban groups who would: have a sufficient power base among the Cuban people, not merely to overthrow Castro, but to be able to cope with and dismantle his organization as well. It was my firm belief at the time that many people in Castro's organization were Communist and that Castro was probably a Communist. .I therefore advocated that any effort to support groups so as to achieve Castro's overthrow must focus, not merely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime, but on the very strong organization that had been the key to Castro's rise to power, and was the basis for hig power." (Burke affidavit, p. 1-2).% - Burke stated further: "The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting or at any other meeting or. discussion that I attended or in which I participated. It is my firm conviction based on five years of close association with President Eisenhower during my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that President Eisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion, or have permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would he > have ever authorized, condoned, or permitted an assassination attempt." (Burke affidavit, p. 2). Gray testified that the discussion at the March 10 and March 1h, 1960 meetings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro government, rather than to assassinate Castro himself. He said that Admiral Burke's recorded comment at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting was part of a. lengthy and general discussion of the problem of Cuba. At the outset of that discussion, it was Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon who pointed out that "the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 7; Gray, p. 11). Ana & Fy. Serpent Atay. i ond ; oA ioe peayre td i ed Be Boclda: 324293539 Page ii4
HW 450955 HRB Owed} Admiral Burke's reference to a "package deal" for the removal of Cuban leaders was in direct response to a comment by Allen Dulles recorded in the minutes that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked ~ on." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9; Gray pp. 13=14). Gray said he believed that — , C Mr. Dulles "was certainly referring to” the Eisenhower Administration's COAL ‘plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than a targeted attemp wa | dive |e on Castro's life.*/ (Gray pp. 14, 45). Gray testified that viewing Admiral bd, =. lp Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that “Admiral pn Af rob ¥/ A CIA memorandum of an internal CIA meeting (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960), shows that the first meeting of the CIA task force established to plan-the training of a Cuban exile force was held on March 9, 1960, the day before the March ' 10, 1960 NSC meeting. (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960). At that March 9, 1960, CIA meeting, the CIA task force discussed "an operation directed at the overthrow of. the Castro regime" and described that. operation as.one. in which-a Cuban exile force would be trained for "6-7 months." In the discussion of this operation, it was noted that a principal problem was the weakness of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided into many parts," put it was hoped that during the long training period the “opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed a government-in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached." (Id., p. 2). According to the memorandum of the meeting, chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division J. C. King, had stated, “unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in onepackage - which is highly unlikely - this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force." (Id., p. 1). nn To — Docld: 32423539 Page 1145
LU Fs serpy, fa aetna an: Soenbatiatiediede! Burke ... was expressing his opinion that if you have any plan /for the overthrow of Castro/ it ought to take these factors into consideration, that you might end up with a Communist government." (Gray, p. 45). With respect to the March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting, Admiral Burke stated that the "general discussion" referred to in the record of that meeting ‘clearly did not involve a discussion of assassination of Cuban leaders, but to the possible effects should only those leaders be overthrown by a group not powerful enough to also master the organization those leaders had established in Cuba." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) Burke stated. further: "Thus, it was consistent with my views then that I should have been recorded in the. record of the March 14 meeting as warning in this discussion that the Communists might move into control even if these three top leaders should be overthrown. As stated above, I strongly believed that a strong, organized group must be in the forefront of any effort.to overthrow the Castro government." (Burke affidavit, p. 2). 7 In any event, when a question "whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara" was subsequently asked at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Cabell, according to the record of that meeting, pointed out . "that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities." (Gray Ex. 1, p. 3). * The record of the March 14 meeting states: "admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger they might move into control." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2) HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 116
HW 50955 3 ; > and other ambiguous phrases in minutes and memoranda drafted by aly ie CAE W MUTE A 7 mo Pees 0 The reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and can be subject to a number of different interpretations, including a. L question suggesting exploration of assassination.* However, it is-clear that at most a question was being asked. Moreover, assuming that "direct positive action” meant Killing, it is Significant that shortly after assassi- nation plots were begun, the CIA Deputy Director told the Special Group that such action was "beyond our capabilities." cc * Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action" and General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum. Gray testified that the phrase "direct pesitive action" could be taken to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 1/9, p. 9). , Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based on the context of weekly Special Group meetings and discussion in the Fall of 1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba; General Cabell was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to earry out this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, pp. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the phrase "direct positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did not employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the President. (Parrott, pp. 19-21). We discuss in greater detail at pp. cS A Parrott. (aga les bo? Bissell testified that he found it 'aifficult to understand" that cenerar VIF / Cabell would have told the Special Group that it was beyond the CIA's capa- 7 ( bilities to take "direct positive action" (if that referred to assassination) in light of Bissell's assumption that General Cabell was informed of the CIA/_ f . underworld assassination effort. (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 15-18). | Mr. Merchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of his physician. Docld: 32423439 | Page Li?
HW 50955 Cc. ‘Docla: TABLE OF CONTENTS THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION (i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS --------------2---------- -- a. 329493539 BISSELL WAS OF THE. OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED RESIDENT ae I THE ASSASSINATION 0 TON HAD BEIN BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE OFFIC "THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION an eee ane cb SnD GE Sey SE SE NY eee NERY HR HRD Ane re SEED exty GY A GHEY SUD WD Uy RLY GERD cee GEE ED tat GABE GOP EL GD nh SD GID Site enle gne SnD) HH) bth AEN tet) cium sem WUE cou uD MED SUP KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENTED KNOWLEDGE OF . wu AND NLO PRESIDENT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS O. ADMINISTRATION OFFIC (i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT ----------------- -- (ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON “EXECUTIVE ACTION (SFO ID rE UT WA one ORD tet ech SED CE SSE GD GIGD GE ED SED NS EE nth ONY tRY ce teE SEED AED SEH SRD GED GED Gash GUE SEH wip nb HmRe eae ace (iii) ‘TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY --+-----------~- (iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY CENERAL ---------------- CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND Page 1165
(LUKAPIING SUDUUMMLL LI DE) TOP SECRET -- FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE ONLY 8/29/75 ~ c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided herein into two broad sections. The first primarily relates to the assassination operation involving underworld figures and occurring prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. . The second section deals with the Post-Bay of Pigs period, including the Roselli operation in the spring of 1962, Operation Mongoose, the laboratory schemes in early 1963, and the AM/LASH plot in the fall of 1963. (i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS | The pattern of testimony for this period was essentially the same as for the Eisenhower Administration. . Bissell, once again, said he assumed and believed that Dulles had met with President Kennedy and informed him, in a circumlocutious fashion, that’ the operation had been planned and was being oy attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) did not inform the | President about the assassination efforts or any of the other non-CIA persons with whom he was working on covert Cuban operations. The Kennedy Administration officials all testified that they did not know about or authorize the plots. “Furthermore, they said they did not believe the President did or would authorize - an assassination plot. | There were for this period no significant contemporaneous documents. a. BISSELL WAS OF TE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KENNEDY ; When John F. Kennedy became President in January, 1961, Richard Bissell . was still Deputy Director for Plans and the principal agency official respon- sible for the ongoing efforts against the Castro regime, including both the Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination plots. Bissell is the only sur- wot HW 50955 DocId:324293539 Page 119 Hs Soe caetnenee nner eee ce ne
HW 50955 Page 2 viving CIA policy maker with first hand knowledge of high-level decision- making in the early phases of the Castro assassination efforts. Bissell testified that he believed Allen Dulles had informed the President (although Dulles did not so inform him) and that accordingly the plots had been approved by the highest authority. Bissell was questioned about how he felt the Pres- ident would have been made aware of the plots: "Senator Baker: ...You have no reason to think that he [Dulles] didn't or he did [brief President Kennedy]. .But the question I put was whether or not in the ordinary course of the operations of the CIA as you know it under their traditions, their rules and regulations, their policies as you knew them what in your opinion -- [wJas the President, President-elect briefed or was he in the light of all these circumstances? Bissell: T believe at some stage the President. and the President-elect both were advised that such an operation ‘had been. planned and was being attempted. Senator Baker: By whom? Bissell: I would guess through some channel by ‘Alen Dulles. The Chairman: But you're guessing, aren't you? Mr. Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that I cannot recollect the giving of such briefing at the meeting with the President-elect in November or in any meeting with President Eisenhower."".. (6/9/75, pp. 38-39). Bissell's testimony varied with respect to the force with which he stated his belief that the President had been informed. Once he referred to it as "a pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-1); on another occasion he testified as follows: Docld:32423539 Page i120
aed HW 509545 Page 3 "Senator Morgan: Mr. Bissell, it's a serious” matter to attribute knowledge of this sort to the President of the U.S., especially one who cannot speak for himself. Is it fair to assume that out of an abumdance of caution you are simply telling us that you have no knowledge unless you. are absolutely certain?...I gather that you think ..it [assassination plot information] came out but because of the seriousness of the accusation you are just being extremely cautious...is that a fair assumption to make? Bissell: That is “very close to a fair assumption, sir. It's just that I have no direct knowledge, ' first-hand knowledge of his [President Kennedy's] being advised, but my belief is that he lmew of it. [assassination plans].'' (Bissell, 6/9, p. 56). When asked why he had not himself informed White House officials or the President of the assassination plots, Bissell said since Dulles was the DCI, he "left the question of advising senior officials of the government and obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles' hands" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 29, 33). As with President Eisenhower, Bissell said that, based upon his testimony that Dulles knew about the assassination plot, he "assumed" that Dulles "had at least intimated [to President Kennedy] that some such thing was underway. " (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 33).* _ * The Presidential logs from the Kennedy Administration indicate only one meeting before the Bay of Pigs invasion.at which the President and Allen Dulles may have met privately. This meeting took place on March 25, 1961. (There is no record of the meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this . -meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any significance or relevance. Bocld: 32473539 Page i271
Page 4 Again as part of his "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60) that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a “circunlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using "rather general terms." | | Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kermedy together when he speculated about’ the manner in which he felt the Presidents would have been advised to maintain "plausible deniability." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 38, 57; | 6/11/75, pp. 5-6): . "In the case of an operation of*high sensitivity of the sort that we are discussing, there was a further objective that would have been pursued at. various levels, and that was specifically with ‘respect to the President, to protect the President. And, therefore, the way in which I believe that Allen Dulles would have attempted to do that was to have indicated to the two’ successive Presidents the . general objective of the operation that was contem- plated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the President -- either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy -- could have ordered the termination of the operation, but to’ give the President just as little information about it as possible beyond an under- standing of its general purpose. Such an approach to the President: would have had as its purpose to leave him in the position'to deny knowledge of the Cee operation if it should surface. "My belief -- a belief based, as I have said, only to me knowledge of command relationship of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations -- is that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated. I used the word on Monday "circumlocutious ," and it was to this approach that I referred. - . ‘Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the effort would have been to minimize the possibility of embarrassment to the President, it is’, I think, under- standable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency would have discussed this operation on our own initiative * with, for instance, members of the White House staff. Ld HW 50955  DocTai33423499" Page “122
HY 50955 vage > The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been ' notified and had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization."' (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6). However , Bissell testified that Dulles never told him he had briefed President. Kennedy and he did not recall asking Dulles. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34; 6/11/75, p. xx; MATT, P- 27). In contrast, Bissell testified that on certain other occasions, ‘Dulles had mentioned that a "cireumlocutious~7" approach had been used to brief President Eisenhower on sensitive subjects AOL (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 10-14). Bissell also said that he never asked to what degree Dulles had advised McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, of the assassination plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34). | a b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DED NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION PLOTS. When asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that an effort to. assassinate Fidel Castro was underway; Bissell stated, "not to my recollection." He added that he was not told that any Administration official had been made aware of such efforts. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-30). - After the change of Administration, McGeorge Bundy was the White House official who was the liaison with Bissell concerning Cuba and in general was the principal White House official responsible for CIA matters (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 16). Bundy was a former student of Bissell's at Yale and they were personal friends (Bissell, 6/9/75, p- 28). . Bissell testified that he did not tell Bundy about the ongoing Castro assassination plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-29; 7/22, p. 31), and Bundy confirmed this (Bundy, p. 41). Docld: 32423539 Page i135