14-00000 Top Secret {SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) é é [souNson\ became acquainted with_VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON)*that they had recently ar- rived in. Moscow and .invited [JOHNSON),to visit their hotel room. 0° [Jounsow] agreed because “they understood each other right away. ey knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals}." ‘Under the guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB offi- cers burst in on the trio.- Photographs of the incident had been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report _ describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and [Jounson} ))¢ was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO — had arrived_at the hotel from his office and he went into the room where [JOHNSON was being held. . t L i OoThe “militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO, in (GoHNSON|' s presence. Addressing (JOHNSON /SNOSENKO said? “How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and...people are given from five to eight years for such relations. It . used to be three to five, now it's from five to eight." Frightene@} (JOHNSON| wrote out and signed a promise not to criticize thé Soviet Union in the future. f The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached [JOHNSON] in the cafe of the 06 Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When (JOHNSON! said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO O6 presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photo- graphs and said that they would be released to-the foreign . depress if{JOHNSON\ were to break his promise. The KGB later 6b learned that |gomtsoxthad visited (or phoned, according to a later-version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation. a ee ne ee OST TELE a ercor en ec DDC PP EPS Ass ene. In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having occurred in summer in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his ‘notes paired [JoHNSON} name with the date of 5 January 1962, NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place in summertime.Ob[NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 us the date of [JOHNSON s entrapment, since it occurred “immediat ly after his transfer back to the Seventh Department. ] 270 0001544 | 5/62 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
fy4-o0000 — Fep Secret _ (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) oo [SOHNSON}'s Int ormation aan According, to.a ‘statement given to the FBI, prior to his. ~ . ~ -O& visit to the USSR({JOHNSON) had written a church authority in: - _, Moscow requesting. permisSion to preach there. He was.in- 9). fermed that some official permission. was needed. ‘[JoHNSON]_0 6. vt subsequently travelled-to Moscow as a tourist, and he did . ' ‘preach on one occasion but-he Suspended further such activi- :. _ty-on the advice of Russian| Baptist] colleagues .?) During his? a Vben-day stay in Moscow,[JOHNSO wrote. and posted letters to - .some. twenty persons outside the USSR, rn ee Ub op MB a \  ¢Poumson) reportea to the Embassy in Moscow on S January 5 . 1962 that he. had. experienced an incident with Soviet plaih- > oo s@lothesmen at the Hotel Métropol earlier that day [JOHNSON], OG. -. ‘who .had arrived in’ Moscow on 31 December 1961, explained “or > <r °“that he was dining alone at. the Metropol restaurant on the oo. » ", evening of 4 January. when “he: was joined by a Soviet citizen so: _. Swho identified himself.as “a doctor. from Riga": The "doctor". on “) ‘spoke fhe hovel Ob ee PICINSON agreed to visit the dector's0G “) room at: the hotel on -the following day; when the doctor would = _. have with him a: student friend who spoke English well... Soon“... - “Qbattex ounsow arrived in the doctor's room-‘on 5 January, the... "student" ma e homosexual advances .0b JOHNSON] protested and. © signing a statement..in Russian, (Jo ; C . -.,, ¥oom where -hé. was .confronted wit ‘@:man who identified him- (os self as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.. "the Chief of Police". - Ob After threatening (JOHNSON. with imprisonment, "NIKOLOV" of>. ie fered to-dismiss ¢ e matter, provided [JoHNSON] would Sign a‘ (){ riticize the Soviet Union when he ‘returned’ / “commitment not to Cc. = to whe Batted States. : Sol On 8 January (JOHNSON) telephoned the Embassy to report that. oso). he had: been recontactec by the “Police Chief" who reminded him. | Of his pledge and: showed him incriminating. photographs alieged-. . vo) dy taken: of [JOHNSON] and the “student" in the hotel room: prem" ae Ob "|S Shown photographs: of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, (GOHNSON} thought ao _. VOLKOV. t6. be "familiar", but he:could not idéntify - OSENKO aso. » Fhe “Police Chief". . ae Oe ne en oe 6004542 271. Be BR TS. No. 197124 Yop Secret Copy. 10
he | . Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) Comment: From their modus operandi the "doctor from —_ Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKov and the "student" YEFREMOV. NOSENKO frequently used the opera- tional pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and was called Georgiy. b ° Although JOHNSON) app&bently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame. According to NOSENKO's version, within five days of OHNSON!'s arrival 06 in Moscow the KGB had discoveréd that he was a homosexual, concluded from "two or three" censored letters that he was a threat, and ar- ranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of . events suggests that [JOHNSON!'s homosexuality O6 was already known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKO; . Qb before [JOHNSON}'s arrival in Moscow. NOSENKO's oh ignoranGe of JOHNSON|'s preaching ‘probably the actual cause Of KGB concern) is further evi- dence that NOSENKO did not know the complete . background of the KGB operation, and that his role was merely that of Playing the '"Police Chief". . NOSENKO's participation in this case con tradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department. (See p. 260.) [ Widdiam Carroll JonEs| NOSENKO's Information 0 a ne : (JONES), a wealthy (Baptist jayman,.visited the USSR on six?! _ or Seven occasions, each time meeting with Russian | Baptist. He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and Knew . President Kennedy. “He was the target of. Seventh Department - ., Case officer Vitaliy DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union Doin 1962 JONES] became involved with a Soviet female. Although : she was Hot a KGB agent, the KGB took contrcl of her relation- ‘Ob ship with [JONES] and, on JONES|'""subsequent trips to the Soviet Union, unsuccessfully sotight “to obtain incriminating photo- graphs. 272 CUUL543 TS No. 197124 | Top Secret Copy _- | | j2iee
fi4-00000 a Top Secret - |. (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT. = January 1962-January 1964) | 7 06. Interviewed by. the ‘FBI ‘in June 1964, Gones} “4 ‘(the - sponsor} of the annual | ‘Presidentialg . “prayer breakfast" in’ Washington) confirmed. ‘Comment: - the substance of . ‘NOSENKO's information but - denied sexual intimacies. with any. Soviet fe- “male .ts{s JONES)*claimed to have made 24 trips to ‘the Soviet Union and to. have successfully smuggled(Bibles} into the USSR on numerous occasions. AcGording to [SONES),0bin 1963 '. Pravda ublicized: an inci ent in which a num=-.”. ~ ber of (Bibles| were confiscated’ from his lug- “aes LAD (1961 KGB. document furnished CIa- ‘by - 2S gonrrsyy cited JONES) by name in. connection Dl oe? with a Gegcription < or "Me [bsblgyemsgting DY Ae aban coboke (JONES . a the Seventh. De-.  ; ae - partment’ case officer, DERA, was .NOSENKO! Sort “subordinate ‘iin the- Section. However , NO= = SENKO's ignorance of (J “(GONEST Bible] smaggling o4,of “(thevactivity which most pikely_ prompted KGB. 7 “. action) ‘and of the fact tha Eas “activitieso, . :had been publicized. in ‘the: let press, in--. ‘dicate. that NOSENKO had no intimate. connection “with. the cases” Natalie “preNewoee) Recruitment ¢ off | NOSENKO! s Information ‘The: KGB coe ee ee her, 1962 visit. to: the. USSRo:: The” ‘Seventh Department casé officers were K.G. . KRUPNOV ‘and AvG.: KOVALENKO , ‘who were acting in behalf of . ‘the Leningrad. KGB.!. The latter ‘had become. interested in- the. American: ‘tourist ‘while ‘she was staying with . a Soviet boy friend in Leningrad... -(NOSENKO. himself. would: have: attempted: the ‘recruitment,. ‘but. Ae, was. ‘busy preparing to leave for ' oo “During the recruitment, the KGB i officers:did not. ‘disclose: their knowledge that she was an. fmerican Antelligence: agent. ‘and tnat sne had been involved 2 fe So a045 a re (| TS.No. 197124 Yop Secret =|. Copy _ 10
74-90000 , Top Secret oS | | (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) | ° in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written | message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States. The ballerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB, | which concluded that [BIENSTOCK] was an agent either of cra (4 or of the FBI. After recruitment, BIENSTOCK] was turned 06 over to First Chief Directorate officers of Department D (Disinformation). If she returned to the USSR the KGB ] planned to secure her confession of her relationship with American Intelligence. . 3) , Comment: [srenSSocd was employed as an interpreter with a Bolshoi troupe touring the United States . when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to the ballerina, a letter destined for the bal- lerina's brother in the USSR. BIENSTOCR] re-04 fused, and the letter was delivéred by d6ther means. Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information, \BIENSTOCK] acknowledgeay, in July 1964 that she had been recruited. by the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in 1962, and that she had been intimidated by the ae KGB accusation of her involvement with the . ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB withheld its Knowledge of that involvement. )} %» (BIENSTOCK) also admitted having contact in the . United States through secret writing with KGB officers, until the letters ceased at KGB in- itiative in late 1962 or early 1963. CUGL545 | 274 TS No. 197124  /6R Top Secret - Copy
Top Secret “(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) ©" Gravel to Geneva” (March-June 1962) ~ _ us| NOSENKO. visited Geneva between’10 March and 15 June 1962°. “> as a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation. to © the Disarmament Conference. ‘In addition to performing that. ~ ‘* f€unction,. NOSENKO. claimed he supervised the activities of — ‘another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled CIA agent, visited the KGB rezidentura in Geneva and asso- ciated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period | Six days before his ‘return to: the: Soviet Union, NOSENKO con= tacted CIA, | Purpose of Trip: to. Geneva ' NOSENKO* arrived in Geneva on’ 10 March 1962 ‘listed offi- “-.-- cially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament “Conference. NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defec- ° tion in- Finland [in December 1961] an order was issued that - “no delegation was to be permitted to. depart.the Soviet ‘Union foo -without -an accompanying KGB security officer. [NOSENKO has ©. « Since stated that. he can recall no such order.]) ° |, “sectrity-escort,. NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed “to direct.the fifteen case officers in. his section, but...” GRIBANOV. stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading | she: delegation ‘and: that someone of an appropriate senior rank hould accompany the delegation, not just a senior case offi~ er, but’ a section chief or a deputy chief or a chief of al immediate superior ‘in the Seventh Department approved the rip.on the. basis that“ it would last only .amonth. °° | 0001546 — 275. TS No. 197124 — | Top Secret - . ; - Copy — | 40. "Explaining in’ 1962 how he came to be designated, as the i epartment.. NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His.
Tep Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) In addition to his general security duties with the. delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor, Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below). During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat varying accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Genevs. He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his assignment, but that [S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department, made the selection. The latter department was investigating SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the selection of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of being a Western agent, was to be in the delega- tion. Because of the seriousness attached to the case, the Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case officer, and when a request was made to the Seventh Depart- ment Chief, CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's as~ Signment. NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, let him go to Geneva as "a treat", even though he had just assumed his duties as Chief of the American-— British Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy,. arid. the trip was occurring on the eve of the tourist season. , investigation of SHAKHOV According to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but had been unable to resolve the KGB suspicions about him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send.a “senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish _ things up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO _ discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with. LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department. case officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case. He also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN, NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962 because he was working with different delegations at different conferences, and there was some evidence that in Geneva ear~ lier he was somehow connected with American diplomat (David MARR), ob 5 - 276 G001547 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 168 | Copy
Top Secret (SEVENTH. ‘DEPART TMENT. co January +1962- January 1964) who was” {erroneously} considered to be a CIA office . SHAKHOV "maybe" hae some contact with [MARR] Kin, 1960: or 1961, Ob “ but NOSENKO did not know ‘the .substanceé“of “it. -A counter-- J, intelligence. officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M.  GOLUBEV,. had once -been:on’a delegation with SHAKHOV ‘and. he “had. noted. “little details"... While SHAKHOV was in the United ‘States, -earlier,: he -had been terminated.. {as an agent] ‘by |. KGB officers. who had submitted a report stating that’ SHAKHOV “liked life-in the Unites States; American products, and money... In that. KGB. -Yeport. he was depicted as “not good" and: “not wanting: ‘to. work as. an agent". : me “ NOSENKO stated - ‘that. “SHAKHOV. had served with the Ministry of Foreign. Affairs in the United States and that during that. ' service he acted as an agent~ recruiter: for the KGB «. SHAKHOV ‘was permitted to. travel. abroad eventhough suspected of being -an American agent, because he. belonged to the Ministry of Foreign. Affairs, and “the KGB‘ could do- nothing about his “trips abroad". ”.. "There: ‘was no. ‘proof, only suspicions, and. furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of -, the head. ‘Of the: Soviet délegation, S.K. Tsarapkin.' According 22 to: NOSENKO, _SHAKHOV was. ‘not. and never. had been. a “KGB. officer. ~~ Comment :- SHAKHOV has- Served in and visited the. United mo fone JS States since.'1942)-when: he was assigned to the Soviet. Consulate General. in New York.. He atq | ténded the 1945. Conference: on International - ms ». Organization in San. Francisco, and he had at- - “tended a number of sessions of the: UN ‘General oo. Resembies ‘Most recently .SHAKHOV was assigned. ‘to the’ U. S. in.1963 as a member of ‘the Soviet ¢ Mission to the UN. ~ KGB. officer RASTVOROV iden-. |": it tified him as an “MVD .{KGB] officer. whom he is | . certain he saw at. MVD Headquarters | in MOSCOW fo, se S es KGB defectors PETROV and. DERYABIN-- “have. reported that from a Photograph, ‘SHAKHOV' s- face “was. familiar". An. FBI SOUrCe , however, in 1964 said that. SHAKHOV Was a “pure. diplomat": “and that to his’ knowledge, SHAKHOV. had . engaged in no. ‘Soviet: intelligence activity until that time. ; a a 6001548. | (277 _ TS No. 197124 -.Tep Secret Copy 10 ve KS
oo name eg bat Yat &; (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO described the various Ways he had tested SUSPICions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOY disinformation 4nd tier watched for an indication that he Passed it on to his Aner ica;, contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform counter surveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,.. while other KGE officers checked for Signs that SHAKHOV had fcrewarned the Americans about the meeting. — Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the Specially Prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion Was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of SUSPicion, and it was his intention to Teport this Finding when he re- turned to xGp Headquarters from Geneva, Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation entire delegation. (KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV ana M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing Statement to CIA. ] had the Services of a number Of coopted informants of the KGB who were Serving in the delegation, [NOSENKO has never re- ported what, if any, Security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants Provided him.] known ‘that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time, 278 GUL 549 . TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
74-90000 a Top Secret SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~- January 1962-January 1964) Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency | - Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself. GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesita- tion on the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subor- dinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands. [NOSENKO “was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva and his claims as to his activities there, aside from his meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.] LN LCL CTI RR STR NNOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he ‘was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Dele- gation in 1962. Among delegates he identified only Oleg GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB. GRINEVSKIY was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Among other delegates NOSENKO described A.K. KISLOV and V.G. FILATOV. According to NOSENKO, KISLOV was head of the Ameri- can Section of TASS and was. "a genuine correspondent"; "de- _ finitely not an intelligence officer". Comment : CIA had tentatively identified all three of . the delegates as KGB officers. ‘KISLOV was ob- served in apparent KGB operational activity in both Washington and Moscow. FILATOV served as an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO, Georges PAQUES, \British Intelligence]has re- || ported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the per-_ manent Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled OUOLS Se 279 TS No. 197124 Top Secret ee Copy —10—
74-00900 Top Secret | (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) Comment: | (Continued), . - a aduple. agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva at the time. Association with Other Soviets > According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the “ANDREY’ case: see p. 33 .) on A.K. KISLOV TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other .dele- gates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva. . NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to. be given as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was NOSENKO's. companion in early June, when NOSENKO either — squandered or was robbed of KGB operatdonal funds. [the loss he asked CIA to make good], and on the night of 10 June, when he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and women, With reference to the threat posed his security by _. KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV _was “too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event a constituted no threat. . ae . _ In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in if 1962, so that he. could use KISLOV at the conference. On the ip basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return. In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV. ana ee | 280 . oF GUCLSSL. TS No. 197124 | Top Secret Copy \(6R
oe Lop Secret . “(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT -~ January 1962-January 1964). - Yu. I. SUK ; ee “Implying that their’ friendship: was of. long standing} -' NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together near'y “vevery day in Geneva, ‘where they went out: to; chat’ and. have a “few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO. was. granted access to . the residency. and was able to elicit information about some ‘of GUK's operations in'Geneva. He described his “big, big . friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and ‘the 7 ondy: “strong officer" in-the residency. Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO ‘attributed his gaining access _ “to the. residency in 1962 to )TSYMBAL + not to. es. S. TSYMBAL In 1962 NOSENKO. ‘reported * TSYMBAL’ s “presence ‘an Geneva ‘and | '- identified him as: Chief of the Tllegals, Directorate:of. the: KGB First, Chief. Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with. Rim, but placed no. particular: emphasis on. ‘their relationship- ‘In 1964 NOSENKO: claimed ‘that he. had been dealing: with: .. TSYMBAL since1960 or 1961;.when he -was- looking for. some’ _ candidates for recruitment and.came across. some whose’ back- “ground ‘would have’ made - them suitable for the Special [Illegals . Directorate. ’ NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in ‘Moscow:in the’ “KGB. ‘Head-- -quarters and TSYMBAL had ‘asked him several times to transfer. “to the First Chief:.Directorate - and suggested that he might. be _. assigned. to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL: had . G@inner together: several. ‘times a. week, sometimes: accompanied - _ by-KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence; .NOSENKO said, “which secured NOSENKO access: to: the’ residency’ in' 1962 and- established the precedent from which . he. was . granted | access in 1964, 281 . Top Secret oe i: ~ Copy 10. TS No. 197124:
14-00000 Tae gaD D eget Tep Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964} Association with British] Female Secretar ne seine | S| Semate Secretary NNOSENKO has described his association with a British] secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva as .One of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational interest in the girl. After Several dates, NOSENKO could no longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she had told her superiors that he was a@ Russian and had pro- bably believed him to be an intelligence officer. Comment: According to of report, when - NOSENKO became persistent in his attentions and the secretary reported the contact to her 'Superiors she was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland and she later resigned from the [Foreign officg. 29 - | This same incident came to the attention of the which later reported it to CIA ,-witnout aetails, as an attempt by NOSENKO to recruit the girl. According to this report, “after a time it became evident that ‘NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but- also in information to which s in the course of her duties". aA in \( Geneva told CIA that NOSE a erfinitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted. to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her, ‘Su ervisin Case Officer for KGB~Controlled CIA Agent pupervising —— ee a Se nerolied CIA Agent ‘moenoratahetarrcepestenect eerste BELITSKIY NOSENKO's Information Among. his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard cf the BELITSKIY case under the code name "BELKIN", when he was working in the American Embassy Section of the American Department. He 001553 282 &/8R TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
- Top Secret. - (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-sanuary’1964) learned of. the case through his friendship with the chief - | Of the Second (“Active Line") Section of the American Depart+ ment, V.I: PETROV. | BELITSKIY was _a KGB agent whom American .. Intelligence had’ recruited in London: he had never been. met. bythe Americans in the Soviet Union.. NOSENKO did not-:know - “T -thé® date-of recruitment but knew the case was, already in pro- gress during his second assignment with the Embassy Section: -.. (January, 1960-January 1962)... BELITSKTY had been a KGB agent ~ for.a’"“long,: long" time and was a KGB agent when. he first went abroad’ (prior to his recruitment by American Intelli- _The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was to ‘lure American: Intelligence .into meeting the agent inside : which American Intelligence. communicated with agents inside the Soviet Union. This was the. "most important task" of the. “Second Chief Directorate. “Although BELITSKIY, in meeting .with his American’ case officers, continually pleaded fear of . contacts with american Intelligence in:Moscow, this W&S ‘a ' ruse; the real. KGB-intent was to-use. BELITSKIY to lure Ameri-. _ Man Intelligence: into contacting him-in the Soviet Union. | _ After. BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on with him....didn't: hold: any meetings with: him"... Nevertheless, _ hevsaid,..the. KGB: "cherished. the hopé...to lead him sin some- a ‘what deeper". “The KGB-First Chief Directorate, with its:own . responsibilities “and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief “: ‘Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case. ‘The First. 2.0 Chief Directorate, ‘through Department. D, provided dezinformat- “. Siya” [disinformation] at the Second: Chief Directorate's re- ~ quest, but in this case,..as in other. "games",. it.did not know — for what ultimate ‘purpose the disinformation would be used... -- (fn. ‘such cases I.I.°AGAYANTS, Chief .of Department. D, did not ~ even knowin what country the disinformation was to be used; _ let alone the identity of the agent.) ~~. ; - Comment: According’ to GOLITSYN,. Department D runs its "operations alone or. in conjunction with (never . |, Subordinate to) other KGB departments. 0004554 © 283 oO | | a TS Now 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 ar , err «the Soviet Union,..to learn.the channels and means through = 0°
74-90000 Top Secret {SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO. did not actively participate in the case until he received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTE- MOV. ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow either; he also had been sent to Geneva to work on counter- intelligence matters and ‘only to direct BELITSKIY df the Ameri- cans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted" in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA would “find him". ~ AS a ‘result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO jcined with ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's ’ American case officers. BELITSKIY was first met™in Geneva by the American case officer "Bob", and later by "Henry", who was “called out from the States". BELITSKIY noted that the -name on the door of the apartment where he met his American case officers was not the same as that of the person wnose apartment it was- alleged to be, and that the apartment itself had an “un-Lived-in" look. When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from -the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that BELITSKLIY claim to get information from the head of the American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV. The information, of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB. In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV arm ranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV. The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was not a bad agent, he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add things on his own" For this reason, the KGB limited BELIT~ SKIY's time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that he was a plant. GUULE55 284 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —__—
“Top § Secret -(SEvENTH DEPARTMENT ” January 1962- “January, 1964) ‘Comment: NOSENKO" s information ‘about the - ‘BELITSKIY- ~CIA- _. relationship is substantially correct, except - ree “for some inaccuracies about thé origin of the ', case, BELITSKIY, a commentator. for Radio. Mos- “cow, as NOSENKO’* described, in Geneva. did. meet _ CIA. officers using the aliases "Bob". and - _“Henry" in a safe apartment. 4 NOSENKO's version of his role in the case,- —howevér, - is implausible. ~ He asserts - that BELIT- | SKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances ; : among influential officials of the Soviet Govern- . ment, an.agent ostensibly. undér:the- control of - . CIA for several years, was sent by the KGB to | . Geneva. to resume contact with.CIA. The KGB, ac- .. cording to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible .Case officer nor an officer of the KGB section § . - responsible for’ the Operation.. NOSENKO states .. '. that the KGB instead detailed a “young and in-" experienced" KGB officer. who happened to be in . Geneva at. the time, an officer who had’ no prior .-, . Connection with the BELITSKIY. case nor even. ”, _ knowledge. Of operating conditions in Geneva. _NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instruc- ; ce lly,’ who had no. experience. ox training in: double agent. Opérations, and.. who was similarly. von. Geneva for other, reasons, to guide the ‘other.’ « "inexperienced" KGB officer.. NOSENKO can: ‘Site no guidancé provided by KGB. Headquarters, . al-" though he claims he: exchanged messages. with. _ Moscow. about -the ‘case... | . ARTEMOV was not inexperienced. ‘He had: had © _ with a series of: CIA- American tourist agents in . .the. Soviet: Union. Although allegedly familiar -:: G001556 2850. “TS No. 197124 Top Secret ' Copy Ao a ted. NOSENKO, who had learned of the case atthe oy continuous service ‘with the Second Chief Direc-" Pe -torate at.least. since 1958, and had been. involved: 6.0 -,- 2 with. ARTEMOV,. .NOSENKO is unaware of the latter! s oS
Top Secret (‘SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964; Comment: (Continued) involvement with American tourist agents in 1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American Section. Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation started, did not know the nature of [ritish]|| involvement, did not know the operational - tails and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not know the alleged objective of the KGB opera- tion, e.g., the substance of the "disinformation" which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA. From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory func- - tion in the BELITSKIY case. Contact with CIA —— ee a — ; os On 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer [David MARK] reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a Soviet citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had -merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the following day.. In late afternoon on 6 June, -NOSENKO told (MARK) privately that he would like to talk to[MARR] as soon as VU possible. He was “not going to pump him for information", but “simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting Was arranged for 9 June, although NOSENO indicated that he preferred an éarlier date .0b [MARK] advised CIA of: the appoint-~ ment and commented that the Approach seemed so unusual that © it might be an offer of cooperation or defection. At the 9 June luncheon with[MARK| NOSENKO identified him- self as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that [MARE had p& previously served in Moscow and [erroneously] believed him to -_ g O001557 286 THRK . TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top Secret | onan DEPAEDAENT - January 1962-January 1964) be an american . intelligence | officer. NOSENKO said he needed _. approximately ‘900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB opera- ; tional funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prosti- “tube in ‘Geneva, and offered for this amount to. sell.two items . : of information to American. Intelligence. The - first item was ce the identity ‘of. an American,: a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow,’ ‘who*was a KGB agent "near ciphers". in the Washing~ / ton area.” ‘The second item was. the identity of a Soviet: citi- “ gen. in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, had been planted’ on CIA. by the KGB. Although NOSENKO proposed: a one- ‘time, transaction, he acknowledged to [MARK] that he might. be’ . . "3 unable’ to, avoid deeper. involvement. with American Intelligence. “GiaRR|introauced | NOSENKO ~ “to a CIA officer ‘the evening of ‘9 June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of -five ‘lengthy. meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the’ initial meeting —°” NOSENKO described himself as: a. KGB major: experienced in opera-_ “tions. against. the American, Embassy..in Moscow and against | —- _ American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union. © ~: ov» He. told of his financial. difficulties and: repeated his offer «..°.) "to. sell the two specified items: of information... He said that. . the need for money - was” his immediate motive for contacting . fee. - GIA, although in. the ensuing discussion. he asserted also that . vhe was dissatisfied with the Communist. regime in- the Soviet 0500 - Union... NOSENKO emphasized that he had no“intention of be-_ vs coming an American. agent and that ‘after his proposed trans-_ “action; . he would have no. further ‘contact with CIA. . Despite : this” ‘assertion, - after describing the cases of "“ANDREY".~ . (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33.). and. the KGB double agent BELITSKIY - eR 83 =. (see p. 282), . NOSENKO. supplied considerable. biographic infor-. 9° .. = mation about himself: and. also discussed in general terms cern tain additional. KGB operations ‘as well as KGB. organization:..\..%). "and operational’ methods in Moscow.” He understood, as he had © tolad (MARK) earlier, that CIA would ‘want more information, and Bo he Borers to meet: again two gays: later. ae co s SC: Phe Td re ; “-NOSENKO | met: ‘CIA ‘representatives: four: more ‘times: in Geneva. ooo With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially. expressed -" '.. reservations disappeared almost entirely... He answered most’ questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most '.0f his information being limited to. the Second Chief Directo-: sxate. - Besides “ANDREY"’ ‘and BELITSKIY, he provided leads to. - 1, more. than a score of American citizens who had. been compro- ‘ -Mised: or recruited by. the KGB, and Anformation. on the. KGB er re “onessse ee TSN. 197124 “ Top Secret 5)g¢ copy 10 _
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow. Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian Ambassador WATKINS ‘see p. 23 ) and described a British Ad- _™mixalty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30 ). He talked . freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delega- tion. NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive KGB operations. He described his education, his service in _. the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general func- tions and operating techniques of the various components of the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with - the approximate ‘dates of his service. Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on _his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communica- tion with him in the Soviet Union. He was willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the - Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other year. He said he would not consider defecting except in cir- cumstances in which his personal security was endangered, -Citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed _ mother's dependence on hime and his love of Russia. and the _ Russian People. NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were . .made for him to do so, when he came to the West again. Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within . limits. imposed by concern for his own security to obtain in- _ formation which he was - informed was of interest to CIA. ob Actempted 1 Recruitment of Horst pian) . Immediately after returning to. Moscow ‘from Geneva, NOSENKO claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit American tourist [BRAUNS} b& 288 | TS No. 197124 a{&R ° Top Secret Copy
ryote ae oe Top Secret ‘sevETE DEPART = “anuaty 1962-January 1964) owe Sos . 7 . eae " NOSENKO' ‘Ss | Information — Ad= 8 [Brats was” ‘Russian ‘born, “and > he_lived in “Leningrad anEL LT. “7” the Second World War when. he. fled. when_ the Germans marettag, 0, a ation He eventually settled in the United. States where the First Chief Directorate learned he had: become a technician working | - for an “interesting company making computers, adding machines, -.and other instruments". — When [BRAUNS], visited the Soviet 06°. “Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] -KRUPNOV. to in. handle. ‘the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take pb GRAUNS\ out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to a room in’ : ‘another hotel where KRUPNOV™ met. him. “KRUPNOV “couldn't. get. .” “Qbanywhere" with] BRAUNS)(°and he called on. NOSENKO for help. -7 >. NOSENKO joined im “in (BRAUNS)"*room, ‘and eventually secured - soGRAuns) agreg ent to- cooperate with the KGB, under threat of . ine imprisonment (for “treason {based on BRAUNS' wartime flight” from. ’ the Soviet Union) 0b [BRAUNS| s\lert Moscow the next day. for Lénin= @rad, and -becausé NOSENKO thought. -the. recruitment. ‘was "shaky", gb he’ sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad,to consolidate the. recruitment. very. ot “(BRAUNS|:: refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad- /-? and” again. talked ornctoad eee Bo so frightened, -how-- ..-\ ever, ‘that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the - | ~~. KGB; NOSENKO- decided to terminate. the case. and (BRAUNS] was sent ©. On his ways ob oe ; an ; ne: 06. Le ao 7 “-NOSENKO aid. not know. samy BeOS yates the’ Soviet Union, © *.’ Snore: was he. able. to. identify any. Soviet. citizens. whom [BRAUNS) age in the USSR. we we Eg, cee oe eg fh “In. “1964 NOSENKO asserted that. he’ had mantioned ee ease! to CIAL in. 1962, but. could. not at that time, recall. AIS ee os ‘Comment: NOSENKO- did not mention. on (BRAUN) 3 in 1962: gerne). a oo ..  arrived-in the Soviet.-Union- on°24. June..1962;,°°7— ':. after. -NOSENKO had met: with CIA in “Geneva. , an Os(BRauNS'"” ‘version is: consistent.with the events” "as. related by NOSENKO, although he could not . identify NOSENKO by photograph. In other con- . . texts NOSENKO has explained:that the Seventh “= .- Ce 09 i. co 00045 60. rn 7 co wR  TS°No. 197124 “Top Secret Copy LO
74-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) Comment: (Continued) Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, both of which were the responsibi- lity of other KGB elements. NOSENKO acknowledges that the KGB knew that (BRAUNS was a former Soviet 06, 09 citizen} i [BRAUNS|' plan to visit relatives in ‘Leningrad was informationaalso available to the KGB through his visa application.pl{BRAUNS| had corresponded for a year before his Visit with a former girl friend in Leningrad. She spent the . first week with him in Moscow (during which the KGB recruitment attempt occurred). The existence of the girl friend was presumably known to the KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned ap- proach to [BRAUNG in the hotel. NOSENKO was un- aware of these facts. “Ob Chiéf of the American=British Commonwealth Section; — " “Summary and Conclusion © , According to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly ‘successful KGB officer KOVSHUK. He is adamant that the trans- _fer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he - asserts occured in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions in the Seventh Department, he.cites directing five agents .whom he brought..from.the American Department. In his initial capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims in- volvement only in the W.E. JOHNSON|case, his time being spent 06 - @ither in "reading in" on his new Job or preparing for his initial trip to Geneva. He alleges that he was directed to accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department, over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his func~ tions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season. 56K 290 GOOLSEL TS No. 197124 Top Secret | Copy
- Top Secret. (SEVENTH t DRPARENE - Pasar, 862-depmacy 3868) in ‘Geneva he said he supervised. the KGB double-agent BELIT~ - . °SKIY¥'s meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to .° sell information for a relatively small sum. Back. in Moscow,,. immediately. after participating in the KGB approach to[BRAUNS), Ob -.” | he'claims he becamé Deputy. Chief of the entire 100-man reas "Seventh: Department. — ; : - Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO' s account of seeking” transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American De- .... partment", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims. . 2" GOLITSYN defected’ on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred, “oc. as he said, “in mid- -~January 1962, his earlier participation in - Ob che la JOHNSON] compromise (see ‘pe. 268) is not evidential of: his. “., Seventh Department service. If he transferred just in time. -- “Ol for: the [JOHNSON] operation, he could not have ‘played the. rolé ~. | he claiméd. in the Embassy ‘Section (re ABIDIAN and the. ‘Pushkin’ Street dead drop, see’ p.216 ¥. . In. the period. with one excep- . tion, none of. his ‘claimed agentura participated in a- Seventh. ms . Department operation... No change. marked his. claimed increased: ° “responsibilities: and new functions upon being | -promoted: to - , '. Section. Chief of the largest: department in the Second: Chief | “Directorate. Of the five operations. NOSENKO described as ~~ - occurring during this. ‘period, . all ‘had. aspects. for. which,’: by. . NOSENKO's description of ‘the Seventh’ Department's mission, they could have been -in‘:the: jurisdiction of another: ‘Second: oan Chief Directorate. Department. NOSENKO's various explanations oe *. for’his assignment. to Geneva in 1962 ‘prompt scepticism be-: 2.5. * Cause of tortuous contradictions. In. Geneva he neither. © = * : » Girected the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised” the. ‘BELIT- - -SKIY case, as. he- . Claimed. a : _Benuty ¢ Chiee of ‘the Seventh. Department a ee 1962 =" - —enneey 1964 ) : ‘In “guly 1962, in line with the personal wish o£ the ‘Chief es "the ‘KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, _ NOSENKO » : -_caeese2 ee (3/8R : 291 © pF rs °F No tortae: Top Secret = Copy - a
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist - operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about. 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO claimed to have learned, either. by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of otherwise, of a number of KGB operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and . investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB posi- tion during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re- turned to Geneva for the second time, and defected. | 6 Recruitment of | SVENCHANSKIY] NOSENKO's Information In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, Seventh Department case,officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management of KGB agent |Alexander WeEncHANSKIY] (cryptonym "ANOD"). an 0b (SVENCHANSKIY was the president of TTAEtOn Tours", a travel 21,0 agency in New York City) and the owner of a Chicago Russian- |0)(0& '- language bookstore. There was originally sditie suspicion pb that [SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was tbalso concerned over SVENCHANSKIY|'s contacts with AMTORG per- ““sonnel in New York City. ».NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that (SVENCHANSKIY|was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. | SVENCHAN- AYSKIY]|s cooperation was secured against KGB promises at Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel Be (SVENCHANSKIY\'s task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form. Aree 292 UL SE 1563 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 1o/6A oer ET
“Top Secret pot _ (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - Tamoany 2962-denuary 1864) en: When. 'NCSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in - September ae 7 '» .. 1963, NOSENKO's. name as- the handling officer was. entered | ; -. in the’ single-volume case file, although NOSKOV ac- _ companied NOSENKO.to both subsequent meetings with Ries Mos cow. (in September 1963, and. at the’ ‘end BE 1963). og. Comment: [SVENCHANSKIY}. a - Russian- “born naturalized 4: se a erican citizen, is.president of lAFton 2% fours ‘Of New York City “and the crogs world: “Books and Periodicals in Chicagd, His _RBEEneE “and: the actual operator of |’ Aton Tours, -is’ Sonya _ SOKOLOW, reportedly % “one 66 time Foon idential secretary" of Jacob _ GOLOS].. ph “ allegd ‘tons of [SVENCHANSKIY}'s, Communist “sympathies and probable involvement | in Soviet espionage date back..to ‘the Second World War. .His involvement. in. -espionage has been pub- —— -lieized in the press (notably. in. a.1953 0.00 2 “New. York Times: account vof [Harry Gi GOLD" Ss. 06 an > allegations)\._ yb” a rie Since (60) OL W}manages » the (Afton T Pours) Ry) office,. wirile: SVENCHANSKTY\ usually ~ is(y> ~ Occupied | élsewhere with his other. fim: he ’ would ‘be’ ‘unlikely to review and- mark : “suspect. visa’ applications, as NOSENKO-. a en eased de SVENCHANSKIY|' s background is such: -. as.to have prevented his being interviewed | On othe: basis: (Of. the: information NOSENKO. | provided. with (SVENCHANSKIY), spontaneous] ly, but described. - vil dt only: after re erring to the written notes. - ooehe. brought to CIA in Geneva in (1964. (See peasy : 4 Suspected ¥ FBI aX Source (BLESS 5 SLESINGER), ‘dkon 8 guly- 1964 NOSENKO. reported on KGB interest in. _ an- American named ‘ GLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic. shop.in New York Ci y, who was suspected by the KGB of - “having connections with the. FBI." —_ oe Le ae - 004564 ee TS No. 197124 Top Secret == Copy 10 | is ‘NOSENKO: did not. refer to: ‘has: “association an ook ;
14-00000 (SEVENTH DEPARUMENT - January 1962-1964) NOSENKO's Information [SLESINGER|came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. ‘The First Chief Directorate was of the Opinion that Qo (SLES INGER] was trying to become closely acquainted with _ Some Soviets, to.study them.%& (SLESINGER\ had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning \SLESINGER] plannedOt another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union.o6 The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that [SLESINGER] was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on/SLESINGER! ad a-senior case officer in the American Séction of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. ‘ DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo- graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly Oowith SLESINGER\ while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. Ob[SLESINGER) went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN. irected*the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who. _ could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted. to recruit SLESINGER but since no evidence was developed,. nO approach"was madé. §LESINGER had travelled to the eet . Soviet Union before, several times. Comment: NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. [Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER|, 06 - reported to the FBI in July 1962 of Ais June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa |SLESINGER]was contacted by a O04 Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York _€ity and had asked whether ([SLESINGER]had “ever been bothered by the FBI." LS | aa avis cag TS No. 197124 Top Secret 9 SUUISE5 BE
F 4-00000 7 Comment: . a Oe = oa a eae vb . many suspicious . tes had. concluded that {Ror} mia be a“ rom the ranks. of the united | States. was, involved. oe ana Technica ves agent ' s NAME ¢ a “cg twas va. S Yongesine: ‘(eontinued)«_ he was in touch wa ~ shop proprietor, of KGB interest - * goviet: ‘Union. in: 1962, (SLESTN J genta with a number of Sov from the: United | Nations.” -Previous ‘to NOSENKO.was ‘not. specific 4 in desc of (SLESINGER) who. may represent | aF (case. | Ob. as BE ye in’  Genev “NOSENKO | was: “geked’ t Of: an’ “tnvolved. in. the arres . USSR in the. fall- of. 1963. . identified the cas Afton Tours): in.:New. York. city .(and hence Alexander. SVENCHANSKTY):. See above) who “On . homosexual | charges: in Kiev. © NOSENKO. with. an American agen 1:- (S&T) Directorate. . Party: and @. frequent | visite -to the” “soviet Union ¢: -where he: had. exten ' @issident: literary figures. ‘and. ‘oth .. particularly among, Russian Jews.:. “another context. that” the: KGB is wary --pecause the 1 ently “inspired. such’ contacts.]- contacts, both the KGB “(NOSE has: frequ  Directorat ~ agent” plante Communist: Party in ral in: or recruited 295 and he- deseri ESINGER e:as that. ‘of (Bernard KOTEN - (SEVENTH: DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964) In, 1966 iStEstncr Sgjreported t “to! the” FBI. ‘that a : th a Moscow” ‘photographic. bed evidence: in him during: his: visit to. visiting. the. R)-had been ino umber of. Soviet ofé icials : sribing how. he learned irst. Chief Directorate ue a in ‘L964 whether he was: American. tourist: in. the. Almost at Once, NOSENKO - He Pa. guide for a an employee: o£. had been arrested. said..that :{KOTEN] bb t. of the. KGB ‘Scientific. a NOSENKO ‘did not: know. the oe te Ge tha nicl Communist r- World War -.. sive ‘contacts. among, er - Soviet citizens, NKO explained in- Because First. and C0130 an <i “of foreigners" contacts sraeli Intelligence ‘Service ‘of these: Second ..,. ‘provocatiol ‘the 66 o 1S. Ne. 197124 ADL.
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) Ne On the eve of [KOTEN|'s arrival in 1963, the Seventh Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the. First Chief Directorate'’s S&? Department that (KOTEN was. 06 carrying with him the: address of relatives of an , important S&T agent of- the New York residency, and that ( (KotEN| intendre to visit: the: agent's relatives. while. in he USSR. The S&T agent. had- asked to be’ repatriated to. the USSR, but when. the. KGB’ eventually assented, the agent balked, arousing: KGB suspicions.’ When it was. Qofound that [KOTEN) was acquaint es wie eeived fron (6KGB concluded that: [KOTEN "evidently received from American IntelligenGe an assignment to visit [the / agent's relatives].": After [KOTEN visited the relatives ¥ in the Crimea, the decision was made to arrest him as a suspect American Intelligence agent. (KOTEN| was en- VU trapped with a KGB homosexual agent and arrested, although he was released when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested... Ol, NOSENKO aid not personally participate in the arrest “|. nor meet [ROTEN, although he supervised the arrest from - , KGB Headqtarters.. oe ‘ 8 OB | Coniment: [KOTEN|'s- arrest: on: charges of homosexual -. Setivities were publicized at the time in.a report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist which was carried in the New York Times. In van interview with. representatives of the Department of State, [KOTEN described how he 06 had been arrested by the. GB in Kiev on 28. August’ 1963; accused of -being’ an American — Intelligence agent and interrogated for three days, and held in jail for a month. : GRU agent [John SHUBIN| Se ee 06 | | The name of [John Andrew SHUBIN| and his year of birth were among the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva. 296 GUOL567 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy iz 184
“phen “traction, “automobile, the GRU was. asked about.the American. -ivery furtively ‘said that they a “from, ‘which the. KG B “coneluded.. that [SHUBIN] was, a ‘GRU vagent. - - =~ pb: : ‘Top Secret a a MORMATH ObpaTnNE —'Janioky 2962-tancary 1964) °°" NOSENKO' s Information oe . [SHUBIN) was « a native: of California of Russian (ex~ * a Russian speaker,:. .. in’ New. York City . JU EHUBII Union twice before, or. 1959, while NOSENKO.was’ serving | his. first tour of . duty in the Seventh Department.- ‘was. the target of Severith Department..case officér . AVA. VETLITSKIY,. NOSENKO heard later’ ‘that (SHUBIN\was 06 placed under. ‘surveillance,: observed SHUBIN)-as- a passenger: in-a. Ministry. of Defense anda university professor. Me. who had visited the Soviet - ‘Visi a ‘the Soviet Union in'1958: At that tlpe,(aobI ob and when: the KGB surveillance. were interested ain him, wo “In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was. reviewing a List of foreign “and informed: SOKOLOV of {(SHUBIN]'s™ ‘presence (or, “te. another. version,.:. »-Others) . De : between I 40 and ‘June 1961; visitors: to :the- Soviet Union. and’he noted [SHUBIN's name (jb - “and recalled his ‘earlier identification as a GRU agent. " “NOSENKO™ himsel £.- ‘telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's: office. according ob pee ‘SOKOLOV's office was advised by i -SOKOLOV's office: eventually : apologized for... | “having failed. éarlier.. to: notify the KGB. of the. GRU! s- Be Anterest in(SHUBIN, 6 (SHUBIN|had no-valia’ Uz S. passport | if he visited: the: Soviet. Union, during - that period Lt was. not as. an. Améxican. tourist. under his. -true 2 name. - Consequently,’ he” could not: then have « been: the ‘tourist target. :of the Seventh. . Department. case. officer, . as NOSENKO claimed. ‘tk cont _ dists in the Seventh Department, ..he claims he was in the American rf to’ NOSENKO- erred, and actually was referring SHUBINI S Wisit. in 1961, there is a. further Eradic tion: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while. reviewing tourist. —. because - at. the’ time.. _— 297, | | , 1S No. 197124 |Top Secret, i | - aoe opy 10 10_ Department . |
74-00000 fee Fi Ru, Moscow. fee Seercet (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) Arrest of BARGHOORN At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following Paragraphs weke largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964, NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New. York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO {in November 1963] and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. (NOSENKO had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV, not because of any special im- portance of IVANOV himself." NOSENKO's Information In 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur “and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity. . GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB. Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye. M. RASHCHEPOV from the. . American. Department. After describing the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information. the Second Chief Directorate Departments had On any American, Embassy employee or tourist, that could serve as the victim of an [retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the Opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and they had been -observed taking notes. They could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to 298 . TS No. 197124 Yop Secret OU01569 g
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~-- January 1962-January 1964)"~ GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the _. American Department to write a report on what .other CO : “possibilities: existed. He ‘also told them. to request | permission. to. arrest and, search: the Service ‘attaches. 8 oe, co .GRIBANOV: ‘then’ asked: what. pextinent’ information was --° held by the Seventh Department. He was told that: there’ - were relatively few. American tourists in the Soviet, _: Union at.that time. . These. included BARGHOORN, who. was- “mentioned | to- GRIBANOV..along.with one other (name. ‘not’ > recalled). ““NOSENKO. and -KOVALENKO- ‘reported, however,’ _that the KGB had no. “strong” materials ‘to use against — / os them... ‘They were ordered to make an immediate study of -. _~ the situation and. to report back. to. GRIBANOV ‘as soon. as? possible. : va!) a moe, os ae ‘Returning. ‘to. the: ‘Seventh: Department, NOSENKO - ‘and mo | KOVALENKO | gathered’ the entire’ American Tourist Section . oo im their office. ‘In ’a. general ‘discussion, Lt was” -. -décided that BARGHOORN was the’ only possible American’ - target. ALL: information on. BARGHOORN was. gathered, oevand NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took. itto GRIBANOV. . “GRIBANOV: read. it and was pleased;.-he was sure. that~. ” BARGHOORN was. ‘connected’ ‘with: American . Intelligence. He then asked’ what’ could: be done...:NOSENKO- and. : ‘KOVALENKO: reported: that. BARGHOORN-was then .in- Thilisi, and that, -in fact, Ye.. N... NOSKOV.. (case officer,- noe American. Tourist: Section): was: in- Tbilisi with a “woman! doctor from the KGB Operational | ‘Technical: Directorate: —— * for the purpose: of: working against: ‘BARGHOORN; | the doctor * had. some. ‘special substance: which had been used= to make “BARGHOORN .so violently _ ‘£12 thathe had .to-be:: “hospitalized. . While-he .was.in- the. hospital, a careful: '. s@arch . had been. made of . his belongings» ‘but nothing aa “operational interest: had been .found.-” In) addition, = “-) | KGB-agent was. placed: in ‘BARGHOORN' S| ‘room ° as a patient; - J-i>he made anti-Soviet statements ‘and | offered. BARGHOORN’ "materials", | but. BARGHOORN did not risé’.to the bait. oo Bt the time. of this meeting. with. GRIBANOV,: BARGHOORN. Ld was scheduléd to fly from Tbilisi: to Moscow, ‘the fol=.— «lowing. morning,..and the KGB . knew. from a. phone tap. ‘that: ‘he had an appointment with(T Theodore a ene zeit the 06. | a i eritseh Baasey| at © ‘the Hote ‘Metropol the ollowing événing. a — 4 : 299. , ra = - 000570  TS.No. 197124 Top Secret. se) "Copy I
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving > “materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the compromi’sing material to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him twhen he obtains materials which are of interest to american Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the _ letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials. (That the evidence was to be planted was not to be mentioned.) GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the Service Attaches, to Semichastnyy. While the four -- NOSENKO,. KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV ~~ were waiting in GRIBANOV.'s office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB organization informing him that the Service Attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN. Khrushchev was absent from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had . called BREZHNEV and secured his approval. - When. GRIBANOV. learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service Attaches were already. on their way back to Moscow, he’ became furious and sent. GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile,. arrangements were made with the | "Department D" (the KGB. element responsible for dis~_ information, subordinate. to the First. Chief Directorate). to provide materials on missiles which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest. BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio. message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came_out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appoint- ment with \|ORCHARD of the British Embassy| at 1900 hours, 0 but at 1900 hours a report was received” that BARGHOORN | 300 TS No. 197124 GOCGLS 71 Top Secret 16h Copy ——_-__ \
‘Top Secret - a (SEVENTH DEPARTHENT 7 January. seer denunry 3964) - “haa left the American Embassy in ‘the american. Ambassador's.car. He was’alone but for the |. ae Soviet driver. Nothing. could be. ‘done whi Te b SaneHOORN was in the moving car. ‘A check 7 ORCHARD) D) established: .that-.he was in the. downstairs: hall of the hotel waiting... It was therefore .~- . decided to spproach ‘BARGHOORN Waen he left the car | Cat the hotel. No’ sooner. had BARGHOORN stepped’ out. Of the car. _than the:-agent approached. "You are an American?" _the agent asked. "Yes.."". "Please take it," the ‘agent said.-'The agent put’ the: ‘packet’ containing the . materials. on missiles’ in BARGHOORN ' ‘Ss inside coat” _ bocket and then ran off. ne! 7 BARGHOORN had taken. only - one: or two steps. wnen he ‘was seized by’ NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, ancther case.  OfFicer of the American Tourist Section, and told - “he was. under’ arrest.’ A surveillance car pulled’ ‘up. -BARGHOORN Was” placed in the. Car, handcuffed - (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets: arrested. in >the United. States. had: received. similar treatment)! oo Prepared. i “Le Tr. " YEPREMOV. and K. .G. KRUPNOV. from ‘the ‘American’ » Tourist’ Section were | ‘waiting at the Militia station, . KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and. YEFREMOV: to be » the interpreter. When. BARGHOORN: was brought into the » Station, ani' ‘incident ‘keport".. form.was filled: out,» -and - a document was “prepared requesting permission to hold. » him 48 hours. Between 0200..ana@ 0300 hours BARGHOORN . owas taken to the KGB inner prison. .At 0400 hours’ the. -o. Seventh Department. case’ officers were released with. * instructions: to report for’ duty:.at 0930 chours.” ~NOSENKO and. the others ' went. home." * KRUPNOV began the: questioning in Russian. at i000. hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good. - Russian, YEFREMOV ‘remained in Case he would be needed ‘to interpret. .NOSENKO entered the room ‘several times * "during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not: “want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he. knew » BARGHOORN would be ‘released, GRIBANOV had told. - - KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when. they. reached the point. where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained - 302 70 TS. ‘No. 9744 Top Secret. o 01572 —— Copy 10 and | driven. to" a HMaditia, ‘station. where: a room had. been. co a
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT — January 1962-January 1964) the missile documents.} The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history. after one and one half hours of questioning BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had peen placed on his person. He said that he thought they were “newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was. not, of course, given a close look" at the materials. Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV.- NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second declarations were reported to MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor.  .GRIBANOV directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB” Department of Prosecution so that they could begin — ‘legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by that department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter. Comment: . BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment, arrest, and interrogation coincide fairly “precisely. with. the version provided by | NOSENKO. He identified NOSENKO from a photograph as a KGB officer present at one stage of the interrogation on the ‘second day of his arrest and said NOSENKO took some part in the pro- ceedings. He recalled NOSENKO as being “clever and quick~witted" and as "giving the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive: he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good OD nevertheless." 001573 302 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —__—
| i ree “Top Secret Phe OSWALD CASE “| NOSENKO'S ‘kriowledge of the KGB's interest in” : - OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department ~ assignments... He asserted that while Deputy Chief: .. ~. Of, the American Section. in 1959 he participated in woos: |. -- (the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational | _ interest. In. September 1963, when NOSENKO was: Deputy ~~ “Chief of. the Tourist Department, he was informed of - “. OSWALD's visit to the’ Soviet. Embassy in Mexico City to... | ‘apply to. return. to the USSR... Immediately following. “., President Kennedy's. assassination, NOSENKO, aS .. Deputy Chief of the Tourist. Department, reviewed KGB... “records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet: Union including |. - »the Second..Chief Directorate file on OSWALD. | Doe ay Js 5 “For continuity. of. presentation, both ‘periods of  NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the. OSWALD, cage _ 1195960 ‘and 1963) are discussed here. ~~ = «The information -NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD: -, case is significant if. it’ substantiates. NOSENKO'S "Claimed positions in.the KGB and confirms the validity =o. cof hisclaim-that‘he knew the extent ‘of ‘KGB involvement °°” -with » OSWALD. owe tg a ee a ‘Residence-in the, USSR. a Prior to OSWALD's arrival inthe USSR, he was’. . ‘completely unknown ‘to. the KGB. “Moreover, upon... ee “receipt of: his visa-application, . the KGB’ Second™Chief | e .«, Directorate determined.that: he was not of sufficient": og iy :.~ importance to.justify any special interest -by the . 8 “o; Seventh’ Department. Not until’ about October 1959, 7 oe es when OSWALD expressed a.desire. to remain ’in the USSR “apes co aid he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at — oo. «that time, Deputy Chief of .the: American Section: of © ‘the.Seventh Department. -All available materials. on So him ‘were thereupon collected ‘and examined -: the visa ul . ° . application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, ~~ sy reports from hotel agents, and the results of a-check ' Of KGB.Archives. NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV:. interviewed: the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated _ his wish to stay in the USSR. 303 OG br, TS No. 197124 Top Secret A 8 Copy. 10
14-00000 | Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV _ sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet. Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section. ‘From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV. concluded that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed -« that OSWALD appeared somewhat “abnormal." For. this reason .. NOSENKO. instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist interpreter that he would’ not.be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that. he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry. as a permanent resident. through normal. channels. at the Soviet | _Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO.'s orders, and either ‘that day or thé next NOSENKO. learned that OSWALD --failed to appear for a scheduled tour. arranged by his ‘Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and.after several hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily rom self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident. from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief . Of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief » Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's. original decision that the KGB.should not become involved with. OSWALD and: that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR. There was no attempt to. debrief OSWALD because "he was ~~ not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an auto-- biography. GOGLE75 304 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) oo ., NOSENKO did not-know who eventually granted . OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR - oo Or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. _The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed.to live. > in the -Moscow. area. Either. the Soviet. Red Cross or. the. »-Ministry of. Foreign Affairs ‘may have made this decision *:: .to assign, OSWALD to Minsk. ~The Seventh Department updated “his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter pre-.. | |, pared by KRUPNOV, to. the local KGB organization in Minsk... _;,KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically in-"::... “- structed local authorities there to take no action con~ 9. :. -. cerning OSWALD ‘except to observe his activities "passively" _ ‘fo make sure that he.was: ‘not an-American Intelligence agent on temporary “sleeper” status... NOSENKO read this letter,.:. . “and it.was signed by DUBAS...On the basis of the “instructions » "contained in. the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could "be taken in Minsk.without: K6B Headquarters. approval. tt was «“ NOSENKO's opinion that, the only coverage of OSWALD during: - his stay, in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at :his.. . “place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and... associates, and coverage of his mail... After, OSWALD's. ~~ ° “-threatened second suicide attempt, the van hands of him"-and that eventhough there was considered)...” o.be some possibility. that he was a "sleeper agent," . - KGB Headquarters interest’ in“him while he was in Minsk. ‘was “practically, ‘nil:' gh te ge ee ERS RT CeReRETEOLEENNENReMeNY aE GURNEE Request. to Return to the USSR- with OSWALD's: return to the United States in June 1962, .. .- by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh = ._ Department. No. ‘further’ word on him was received at. KGB... Headquarters until he appeared: at the Soviet Embassy in |. - Mexico. ‘City in September.1963-and requested a visa'to..- °° — return: to the Soviet Union.- The’Mexico Legal: Residency _- “xeported his visit to KGB Headquarters. by cable, re-. . questing information. . The KGB First. Chief Directorate »., had no record on OSWALD. ~ M.I. ‘TURALIN, Deputy Chief of _ the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counter-. ~- intelligence Abroad). called the Seventh Department. to . see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD.:: : - The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department, — | W.K.. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the in- a ~ quiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO..' a . | 305°. a ee a oe ee GO0157¢ TS No. 197124 Top Secret — “Copy 10 KGB "washed its 007
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~- January 1962-January 1964) NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was — _told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV © relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere. _ Comment: ‘Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban. as well as Soviet Embassies in. Mexico City between 29 September. and 3. October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer. under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said ‘he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 . 7 . , -he revised this to say that OSWALD did not w cshenite Te have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. co _.NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet. Embassy in Mexico City _ requesting permission to return to the USSR -and that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only. OT ~ GUGL S77 306 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT = January 1962-January 1964). | Post-Assassination Review of KGB ‘File < ~ “NOSENKO ‘next. learned. of OSWALD! s: activities. asa result. of President Kennedy's assassination. About two- hours after President. Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO. was advised of this.fact _. in a telephone -call.to his home from .KGB Headquarters. © Ao: . . Short while later he was told,.‘again by telephone, that the So President: had’ died. - About: two hours later,. NOSENKO was told o< _. that OSWALD had. been arrésted, and he and the other ‘officers * of’ the American Tourist Section were called in to determine “whether. the KGB. had any information. concerning him. After. Cy . .establishing: OSWALD 's. identity from’ KGB files. and learning i . that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the. KGB... ‘office in Minsk.on: GRIBANOV'’s orders.” ‘The’ local KGB. dictated - over the telephone. a summary of its file on: OSWALD. This ~ '. summary. concluded with the Statement. that the KGB in Minsk | - “had attempted: "to“influence OSWALD’ inthe. right direction". '.. GRIBANOV.. had been greatly disturbed: about the local: KGB{S | efforts because’ it had ‘been .given specific : instructions. ‘to. | carry out nothing: -other™ than: passive measures against. ‘OSWALD ' there. He ordered” that: all’ records: in Minsk pertaining. ‘to_ re OSWALD 's - ‘stay. theré, “as. well. as an ‘explanation of the VEE Fo goa ... «meaning..o£. the. statément about . influencing OSWALD, be. ‘flown: fa immediately. to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally -.) read the: explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of. rs _ «this statement and - thoroughly | ‘reviewed. OSWYALD's file when > “io. omit! arrived by:plane.....Hé ‘then turned the file over to S.M. ve Ss FEDOSEYEV, ‘the Chief of the American Department, of the KGB ae “: Second .Chief: Directorate, ‘who prepared a two-page summary | ‘+, memorandum for. GRIBANOV. This memorandum ; ‘which NOSENKO — . i read, was forwarded to ‘KGB. Chairman Semichastnyy, and... -. Semichastnyy: in turn. xeported to: the. CPSU, Central ‘Committee | a to, Khrushchev concerning | ite 7 OSWALD" s* “ile from. Minsk. contained. no. information ‘to - indicate that the KGB in: Minsk had ‘taken any action with. respect. to: OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Head~: | quarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR ; until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with him and had not. - attempted to. utilize him in any manner. “307 - “ca0Ls 79 ‘TS. No. 197124 - Top Secret . . So Copy mia
‘Yop Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assign- ments. If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department, which originally opened his case file. In view of OSNIALD's apparent mental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particu- larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotaqde) Department, would have considered using him. KGB Head- quarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk, as it would have done had OSWALD been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on OSMALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him. , The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD; ‘all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file. There was no indication in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any - interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States. ; oo Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally. -—. a NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The consular file turned over to the U.S. Govern- ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington ‘after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from OS'IALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had 308 Nia bey Gd01579 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
..Fop Secret — “(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) . ecnment: - (Continued) ey oo vous. “@arlier requested permission to return ‘to the: * Soviet ‘Union. _ In’ the last dated létter of -the. » (file, one. of : 9. November 1963, OSWALD. advised’  - the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his’ travel » “ wander alias to Mexico,- his fruitless contact » ’ with -an- official. (whom CIA. identifies: as a << KGB.officer) of: the Soviet Embassy in: ‘Mexico . «City, his contact. there with the Cuban Consulate -.and his efforts to reach. Havana in order to! -svisit ‘the Soviet Embassy there. Without regard - - to possible earlier ‘correspondence, . OSWALD's . <xequest: for.a Soviet visa, addressed to the |. Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require - “othe ‘Washington Residency to report the matter. “s to: Moscow..just as NOSENKO described the Mexico | « City’ Residency later id. : NOSENKO's: apparent _, Soviet Embassy in Washington: discredits his) claim to, complete knowledge of. all. ‘aspects | of” the... “KGB. _felationship’ ‘with, JOSHALD oo ; “he CHEREPANOV Papers On 4 ‘November. 1963 in: “Moscow; 1a MEZHKNIGA | . employee. claiming. to be one. CHERFPANOV, passed ~ -to an American: ‘book-buyer: a. package. which. he. “requested. the. American to deliver: to a trust- -- “worthy: person: at the. American Embassy... ‘Embassy. ‘officials found: the: package. to contain .a.- “bundle ‘of “typed or. handwritten. “doeuments which. appeared | to have ‘originated in classified KGB . _ files.- Fearing. a Soviet, provocation which © - could- lead. to a denunciation of .the Embassy. , £or® possessing: classified. Soviet Government - “documents, Embassy officials had the documents: a . -photographed . and on the next ‘days 5. November, “<" xveturned the ‘originals to. the . Soviet Ministry’ + OF. Foreign Affairs. ° a | oe = 0004580 Top Secret ie Copy 10 “ignorance of .OSWALD's communications with the ae
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N. | f . CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy | °° Section and in November 1963 sent them through an inter- | mediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow, and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for CHEREPANOV. , The significance of the CITEREPANOV incident is twofold. | The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the Embassy appear to have originated in the American Depart- ment's Embassy Section,. and the documents relate to KGB modus operandi, personnel, targets, and technical devices , | employed in operations during 1958+1960, during part of which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the - - Embassy Section. The KGB document, the "temporary duty | authorization", is an item of physical evidence NOSENKO . has offered to substantiate his claim to personal parti- Cipation in the CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank 7 i of KGB lieutenant colonel. [The document does not itself refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.]. — as “ NOSENKO's Information . : The KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or: 1921. During World War II he was a KGB officer working | with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in es Yugoslavia for four or. five years, and was probably Deputy: Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade. _ Comment: CIA records contain references to an Aleksandar - oo Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and- suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in 1953. CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956. A Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in 1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an intelligence officer. 310 . TS No. 197124 Fop Secret Copy
(SEVENTH DEBARIMENT - _ Tammany 1962-dSenuary 1964) o ‘when ‘CHEREPANOV. returned to Moscow, he had. some (unspecified), _ problem getting a job, but finally. the KGB Second ‘Chief re ‘Directorate’ took him into. the American Embassy Section of the.) * American Department ,.- working against: State- Department: SS ‘personnel. in. the. Administrative Section of the Embassy. | H He - ~ worked : in the same -room.as V.A. KUSKOV, “and: was case officer -for three: KGB targets::_ Richard SNYDER. and, -John -McVICKAR, . * _/counsilar officers, and Marion ALBAMONTF , Secretary. ‘to, the: oe (k(Gérsonnel}. officer. CHEREPANOV's work ‘a: a case officer was cf - poor,.and as it: “grew, worse, the KGB decided. to’ retire him. °°: “a Because of: his. service- in..World ‘War II, for which he. | an “received. three years' pension credit for each year of, military” service, he had. enough time to his“credit to be eligible for. “retirement... Also, he was. just over: the minimum, age (40). for. aoe "retirement: from the. RGB. 2. ns ee - Upon. ‘retixing.- in. | July” or, ‘augist. 1961, CHERFPANOV. got: ‘al a S0b. with MEZHKNIGA. Unhappy. about his ‘enforced xetirement re and angry .at the ‘KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when o | MEZHKNIGA turned ‘down -his several attempts: ‘to go. abroad. . “Prior ‘to. Leaving: the - ‘KGB, ‘CHEREPANOV. ‘had stolen’ ‘draft. le ‘copies. of. ‘documents he had handled in. the ‘Embassy Section... ~ In one. case, he copied: the contents. of a. report in his own. “handwriting, evidently having- been unable to steal the. ee me * document: itself... All 6f--the: documents he had stolen were eS "intended: for. destructions. .- es ; “tn November 1963. Yas tr, “GUK:  peought NOSENKO news - ‘about. tg | catastrophe" in the. KGB. GUK.said the -had the. Story from -B.D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK’ and NOSENKO. .MAKASHEV had’ been in Foreign’ Minister Andrey. Gromyko's: office when _ “the. -CHEREPANOV papers ‘were. brought . there, after their delivery ~ by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy. -MAKASHEV Saw the name of" (Second: Chief. Directorate. Chief): GRIBANOV on’ some of the: papers and‘ saw: that. one. of - ‘then’ was. a plan: for- agent opera-. ‘tions against - -an American. He noted. that. one of the. documents was at. least an.inch thick. Gromyko immediately called KGB . Chairman Semichastnvy, who. notified’ GRIBANOV. _GRIBANOV's:7 4 _. Gepiity. went? to Gromyko's office: and: picked: up the papers. The KGB then began an investigation of: ‘all ‘the personnel - assigned to the American Department during. the - time ‘period a E s covered . by the Papers, +1959. to 1960 ‘or. (1961. pe TS No. 197124 ‘Top Seeret- = Copy _10 _
14-00000 Top Secret | (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents, they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB - provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were tryang to do. The Embassy officials photographed the. documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the Americans gave the documents to the Ministry,.the KGB wondered why the Americans gave them back. , The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during its investigation for 20 or 25 days. When the KGB examined the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's hand- writing, but no documents were found which pertained to .CHEREPANOV's own case work, or.that of the American Embassy Section. The KGB found no documents dated later than 196l--none for 1962 or 1963~-~only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961. The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, _ but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and | office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him. who, in the course of.conversation, mentioned the great disturbance . in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents | _ to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the newsand was quite cool about the matter. The next day the surveillance .post observed him leaving his house in the _. | morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work, but the surveillance post at his office soon reported that ‘ he had not arrived at work. He had “simply dropped out of sight". An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued, . then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls | were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to . .-Republic and local. KGB and militia offices, and all.means. oo, of transport ‘were covered. Reports began coming in from - | various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV's description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there. Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast | strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check. GUL 583 312 | | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy |
14-00000 for, not. putting, CHEREPANOV under ‘full, round-the-clock © . Yep Secret. <> (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT: - Jantiary 1962-January 1964)" | ‘NOSENKO weénit:;to Gorkiy on the fourth'day after CHFRE- 97 PANOV's. disappearance... The: area. was.covered with very: deep:: . woods, “where a person could lom-himsélf for life". + On’ the | .séventh day CHEREPANOV. was Located and arrested: ‘in Bak cay a “where he: was on. his way to the Iranian. chorders A special plane was “immediately sent. to Baku; carrying a “S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American. Department, offi-. .- cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back ‘to. Moscow y_ interrogating - him on the plane. : He immediately confessed ~.. to having given the’ documents ‘to the Americans. When’ asked. why, he said he was: “angry: at the KGB, very angry", ~and © a besides, “he thought: he might ask.-the Americans for. some’ money in return’ for the documents. He confessed that: oh 4 November he “had. passed the documents ‘to ‘an American tourist who. was a ‘librarian . interested. ‘in Russian books... He ‘said he: . had. given - -the. documents ‘to the American in the entrance °° ~ -hallway inthe building” ‘of the! Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” the baliding: in which the: “Ministry Of. Foreign. Trade was also- housed. : So, “Because ‘CHEREPANOV chad eluded’ ‘the! KGB ‘between : othe caguoe: oe eee surveillance posts which. had been: established, “the Second Chief Directorate suffered. considerable. criticism ‘surveillance.’, CHEREPANOV- ‘himself, however ,- told the: KGB that” if he. had detected his | surveillants he would. have... “written. to the. ‘government, and. ‘newSpapers. a letter’ of protest against “such an- indignity,. such persecution" ‘and then: would , have | committed | ‘suicide, — ieaving. the: KGB “without. ‘PEOoE | “of his Guile.” “Comment: _ . NOSENKO's assertions with ‘respect to ‘the _ CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material. to. _his-claim that -he.was Deputy. Chief. of | the “Seventh Department, at the time. 0001584 — te pee Loe) BTS No. 197126 Top Secret = Copy 10
14-00000 top secret 4 $: (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) s i a: Bo: Contents of the CHERFPANOV Package The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled | a 103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost: 4c equally between typewritten reports in final form and hand- written draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The — longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report, dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in ae the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence _41 organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in 4. the U.S.A. in 1957-1958". The report was signed by Colonel A. FEKLISOV, [alias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident in Washington]. whose title is given as "Chief, First [American] Othe ae 8 Department, First Chief Directorate". The rest of the © documents refer to KGB coverage of varzous American Embassy 3 and American diplomats in Moscow during the ‘period August if 1958 to 15 October 1960. Most of the documents were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV. (NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the. Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV from about 1958 to 1961.) ‘Two reports were on Americans who had left the Soviet Union, Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary _ from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache ot from June 1956 to July 1958. There were operational plans — for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed in Moscow, Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A. RAMSEY, and George WINTERS. Other documents included were an agent's report of her relationship with WINTERS, a summary of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet. citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted | by the KGB, a handwritten:summary {signed by CHEREPANOV). of derogatory information on a Soviet youth who had been in touch with American: Consul Richard SNYDER, and various hand- written drafts and notes on the foregoing Americans. ae ‘Mhicaiaaa | G00L585 | 314 | Lois | | . TS No. 197124 ol : Yop Secret Copy
| (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) . . The operational plan on WINTERS, as an example, indicated _ _ that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence . _. officer, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence ».... *' activities, the KGB was to employ : round-the-clock surveil- | _ dance, technical aids metka and: "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveil-. . -lance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet... citizens. The plan “reflected that while the KGB judgment .. was that WINTERS “had-a hostile-attitude toward the USSR". ‘and that there “was no’ basis. for recruitment", care should. ... _be’taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country ‘ prematurely,‘ since there still might. arise an opportunity - _- to. attempt to recruit hime. 2 | So De “.". SNOSENKO said that he had ‘never seen the documents ee ’’ CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar® .. - : vas with their.substance., © Boe _. Comment: The. information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was | 0 :.. Substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had et _» Said earlier -in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE, ~~ HARMSTONE and Embassy Section operational os » techniques such as:the use of metka.. CE “ NOSENKO'S ‘Travel Document °°. “7. , When. NOSENKO. first ‘related to CIA in Geneva’ in 1964-0) 8. ~ his knowledge of. the .CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document |. .2 01)” _(see accompanying exhibit) -which he said was his official 00 -' KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to,Gorkiy Oblast). Wo to search for CHEREPANOV..: The document,. signed by General.) [20° ... GRIBANOV, authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to. travel: to: ' . Gorkiy’ during the period immediately’ before NOSENKO's trip ‘: »...to Geneva, 15-30 December 1963. . NOSENKO acknowledged ‘that — ait was “illegal"-to have kept, the document and to:have’.. . * brought it with him from the. Soviet Union. . He did it, he “said, to show CIA... _ Sp ee f | G00L5e6 315, Be a : ee as “TS. No..197124°  TopSecret = copy 10
74-90000 Fop Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTNENT.- January 1962-dJanuary 1964) Comment: NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory explanation for his retention of the document nor for bringing it to Geneva. According to an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a temporary duty authorization is held strictly accountable for the document which has to be turned in with the financial voucher. What- ever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting the document to CIA was to corroborate his statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350). When he eventually said in 1966 that he was enly a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to .expkain how he came to possess an official KGB document signed by General GRIBANOV and identifying him as a lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by mistake". Return to Geneva (January-February 1964) NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to defect. He brought with him a considerable number of hand- “written notes to which he referred when describing to CIA. - officers KGB. operations of which he claimed he learned at. | KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation. security duties were not onerous. He visited the Geneva Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently — while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration - from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three weeks later. .A little more than a week after his arrival, however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once, — because he had received cabled instructions to return to the USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was taken from Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought to the United States. . 316 CUGL587 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ————
Exhibit - _. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, “15-30 De 3 ~° Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt.: Colonel : cember 1963. 9 PRONTO Committee for State Security Under t athe Council of Ministers, .USSR no _ 15. December 1963 ee - Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel. - a rs __: NOSENKO © a 7 mew Xuriy Ivanovich For duty to: UKGB of Gor'kaya . Beane, Oblast’) “Length of 7 po : temporary 70 Se. assignment: 15 days. ‘through: - 30 December 1963 a - Authorization: directive of Chief: “of a Chief Directorate _ ., Effective on presentation of vp identity document No. :_.NK-2513 - Bt “Chief_s./GRIBANOV of Directorate. a ne 7 of Department Committee for State Security Under * the Council. of Ministers, USSR.._- 6001588 no Oo TS No. 197124 _ Top Secret Copy 1 ,
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) Purpose of Geneva Trip NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that had brought him to’Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as “a treat" when it appeared to be the last occasion he might have to travel to the West. [NOSENKO said in 1962 that when he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he expected to become, he would travel to the West every two or three years.] He had- discussed the possibility of the trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, and secured his agreement. He also talked with officers of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department, {N.T.] ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary for a security officer to accompany this particular delegation. {[A.G.] KOVALENKO, the new Chief of the Seventh Department, supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. ‘Although at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he “has later asserted ‘that GRIBANOV.was.not involved and that if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would: not © have permitted NOSENKO to go. _ - NOSENKO's. only mission was to concern. himself with the general security of the delegation, as he had done in 1962. He had no specific tasks such.as on his earlier assignment . (e.g., investigating GIAKIDV or supervising the BELITSKIY operation). . Se ; Comment: . NOSENKO has never, satisfactorily explained why .. - . a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department would - draw an unrelated assignment abroad which -—- would last many weeks if not months. In another context, NOSENKO had described a KGB conference to take place about this time where plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations during the coming tourist season: he acknow- ledged that he was expected to attend, but nevertheless went to Geneva. 6001590 TS. No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 _ 317
Top Secret _ 1. Komauaupoaannsa ne oongues F4neznore cpoxa RO posspagiennn 53 £07) MaBgeposna o€asan BPCActaERTD asaecosM® oTaer o6 mapacnoqcaanamx "| 8 Cease c Komauanposnol Cymmax . ‘ aeposonoe YAoCTORepERTe MAR NAAOREUBR KOWNOCTCPR. . Peer fea al i C0 62 Ha FeYlped PORES CEAL CK QETKH YHPABAE cy, wreTh OCYAAPCTEE! mp E _. ¥6ua us Mocxan » a TipnGeca B Mocxsy * oo “Hai. cexpemapuama we . Tledare HHO nee gt oROMHTETA TSCyAMPCTBERTION BESOMACHOCTH ups COBETE MHHHCTPOB C ccce * Bataduo: ps | Tasomn Be nadgrepry Nie — Cm. Sgmaamep , “G001589 "EXHIBIT 3 - Temporary ‘Duty Authorization for Lt. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 2. pe coayxesna spoessuoro 6uaera npexbeumte fh. REACTOR. macey xowan . ee Wanprenng cold - - Ihcew xB 2. Last faey Agage ga ‘packoan no konemauponis B “eyuace’ Sees : . , . Hepenosowsne spéGosanas done osued “2058 9 Top Secret Colonel 15~ ~30° December’ 1963) _ REVERSE : * worartoNs OF PRESENCE IN ‘PLACES. OF | TEMPORARY DUTY - Marrived | in city of Gor'kiy. ee ee J Bis pits a (16 December 1963". - a - “wayrived in city. of Shekhun' ye. ne 17 XII 1963 Did not use. free quarters" S. ,. Chief of: ‘Shakhun' ye. — Chief Militia Section, ~ Militia Major. 7 (illegible) |  Mbeparted. Shakhun'ye 11 /XIT-63 Did not use free quarters" S. Chief of Shakhun' ye. . ‘Chief Militia Section, > oe “Militia Major | (Tllegible) - Whest Gor'kiy 17 December 1963 Did not. use free quarters" S% he (nnesinie) TS. No. 197124 Copy: =
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTIL DEPARTMENT — January 1962~January 1964) Visits to Legal Residency As in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Resi- dency daily. According to strict rules, he explained, an officer in his status [temporary duty assignment which was independent of Residency] should not do so, but his case’ was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department and because of the relationship he established in 1962 through the intervention of M.S. TSYMBAL. Illegals Direct- orate Chief TSYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old friend; they had beconie acquainted in Moscow before meeting again in Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently. TSYMBAL's wife once had taught NOSENKO in school, and TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals _Directorate. NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL's introduction of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964, Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the Residency to his “old friend Yuriy GUK", not TSYMBAL, . He mentioned TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance, - « Availability for Meetings with CIA In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official responsibilities or any demands on his time, and he was Willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA. . He. “said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could . be explained as “security duties" since everyone on the Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February, © ° NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most of the meetings started in the afternoon. On two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings continued until past midnight. GAUL 5°: OU LOEL TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
_ Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) | - NOSENKO" s Written. Notes, , ‘Agter, returning to KGB. “Headquarters from Geneva in — 1962, NOSENKO said, he’ had availed himself of various: opportunities. to record what he learned of. KGB operations: ior in order-to inform CIA,. and to ‘pilfer: appropriate KGB.» . documents to which he had access, when he could safely do- “SO... He. brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents: and- a! large number of -handwritten notes... The latter, reflected - items. which he had. excerpted from.various documents to which -. ‘he had access, principally ‘the Seventh Department Chief! ae : special file containing. periodic summaries of all. Seventh | - . Department: Operations. |. He last had. access to this special “file; he stated; in’ connection with his review of -it ‘in: » December 1963 to.confirm that it was intact after the’:-°.: ~ CHEREPANOV affair..:.While. the file contained no true. names; | ' he claimed he learned’ such true identities as were contained _ < "\adnchis notes: by asking KGB colleagues... For: safekeeping, . _°., NOSENKO said he kept the: notes and documents’ in a wall safe .. O£ the office which-he: occupied alone, ‘as Reputy Chiet of. . the Department... mo, ne re - Questioned repeatedly. about | ‘the KGB operations: ‘referred: eet to in'his‘notés,. NOSENKO in- many - instances could not: expand Oss ‘on what: he had- written: -He insisted he: had written “everything ce “could (discover, “and, knew: no Mores: aa : NOSENKO's | sourcing: ‘for - the notes does not + @xplain: how he learned of the cases described | “- in the notes dating’ from 1957- -1959, a period | — not covered .by the documents NOSENKO. claimed. he oe |. keviewed. “Neither. can NOSENKO explain. why he: “> was ‘not knowledgeable, without the notes, of~ operations. which.occurred while he was Deputy - ea ' Chief of the Seventh’ Department’ s American- - SS British Commonwealth Section. . NOSENKO acknow~"— ledges: that his access to a- _Personal safe ins - me SE RE ee oe ee ra og cootse2 re BED 329 | eo, a Bo ee ; Bos a 7 oo : wont aa TS .No. 197124 7
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) Comment: (Continued) which to keep the notes was just: fortuitous, since neither all offices had such safes, nor even all offices of Deputy Chiefs. NOSENKO's Defection , On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family. behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years". NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is. to part | with my family". He had, however, carefully considered their © ‘fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he felt that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them, . NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the ‘CIA officers encouraged “him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain” in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were: ~The desire to obtain further information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access; GIGI 503 320 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January.1964). 0. | >. NOS _ ~The value of having NOSENKO. present when. GRIBANOV ae ~ made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known _. to CIA only. through NOSENKO; ee ey "~The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's = + in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets.among the = Soviet representation in Geneva; ro mo “ a _~The. necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to » NOSENKO,. for. his defection and resettlement. =. | Ho > Ina three~and-a-half hour meeting on. 26 January ENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was -..necessary.-and useful for him to remain in place until. _GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to. defect:  as'soon as- . “possible thereafter.. ee s | On 28 January NOSENKO reported ‘that GRIBANOV might not | be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman Semichastnyy —~. ~ W&aS apparently reluctant to permit. him to travel beyond _, Vienna.  NOSENKO said ‘that’ he would probably have definite °'- "| information .on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of. the week. | On 30 January NOSENKO’ said that ‘there appeared to be = Strain of. any ‘further delay and the fact.that heand his: “case officers ‘were Wasting. their time working against the ~local ‘KGB Legal. Residency, which had no worthwhile or an “promising targets. He also felt. that nothing.of value could *~' - _ “be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "Tsarapkinn -Bimself doesn't. know what.he will say until -he is-told by 0” Moscow: the day before"... CIA handlers, however, delayed the. defection for one week. by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement - .to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, _ and NOSENKO said he. would. check .certain physical aspects -of the. delegation buildings. _As. the best time for. the “defection, he suggested Saturday morning,’ 8 February, because he..probably would not be missed until the following ~. a — 8001594 | TS. No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10. oe ittle likelihood: that. GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris. | - - : >» [From 7 to 10. February..1964:GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he ©... "|, Was ‘seen on thé street with. a Soviet identified by NOSENKO ve! - 3,"aS a KGB counterintelligence officer.].- Therefore, he wanted - 5 to ‘defect right away. He cited as reasons the emotional .-_
74-90000 | Fop Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT — January 1962-January 1964) Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSFiIKo again repeated his desire simply to “disappear without a trace". He also asked about exfiltration plans. - On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGD Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the . Scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHERFPANOV Papers, (see p-309) which he was told were en route from Washington. - He explained that he nad been alarmed at the previous meeting because the delegation was Supposed to move from its hotel to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappea- rance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had now learned has been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow. asitagnadiadssy At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of | 8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would Le by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption. ; On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHERFPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February. NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving at the CIA safehouse he explained that when he dropped. by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament “. Conference, he read a-cable ordering him to return to Moscow’ immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreian tourism in the Soviet Union. The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly. to Moscow via Paris. the following day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in Geneva. Before he had left for Geneva.in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top Secret ‘(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) See | agreed to “open a number. of. new. cities. and. tourist. itineraries. os “in this. connection... Semichastnyy, had’ decided that it was. ; Ce time to-call a conference to discuss new “tactics: and stra- / itegies" for handling the . increased number, of tourists. oe . expected. ‘Since NOSENKO. had béen ‘placed. ‘in charge. Of. the: _ entire’ conference, he-was- ‘directed to leave at once to... 013. . . prepare a basic: report on the KGB: handling of tourists;. fhe, “report would be read to the conference either ‘by himself « oy 's -by- someone’. from’ the leadership of the KGB: or the Second: ‘Chiet —_ . Directorate.” NOSENKO. explained. that he'was the only: one- “~, who -could do° this job as Lt. ‘Col.:A.G. KOVALENKO, .the KGB © . Headquarters Department senior officer, ‘-was.a rélatively. new -.. Manin this line of. operations, having been there only four - -- lor. £ive years, pexhaps less; .NOSENKO also-told CIA that... “by great coincidence" he had) learned, “just before the: cable ae -“Sarrived, he was. being moved : EO” the Soviet. villa con the -. ~omorning of 5. February. .- He had arranged for: a Soviet. chauf- ..feur to bring, a car around -at-0930. hours the next morning - “for the move... -His: absence: would be noted at that time,: and | ».o therefore "the. ‘main thing: is to cross.the Swiss border’ :>:. *. before fiorning".. NOSENKO felt, -however, ‘that there would’ w be. considerable. confusion among the: Soviets in Geneva’ for ae ‘time. following his ‘disappearance’,’ and- that there. would ‘be. _ no real ‘concern ‘until :the' evening: . To: foster Soviet- “uncertainty, . he whad™ left. his clothing lying around his’ ‘hotel - “room, and had. ‘brought: no personal’. effects to the CIA. safer “house.” NOSENKO. estimated the first, Soviet queries «to Swiss. ‘authorities would. probably. be. made. late. On 5 February. ¢ or. early: ‘on, the. Sth: a a ae ; ; map ~NOSENKO » was driven. to. Frankfurt the. night. of °4: February ‘and. remained in: a safehouse there until 11 February,’ when: - _-press publicity” “about ° ‘the Gefection and Soviet ‘demands for ... “an immediate interview with. NOSENKO dictated. that he be. oe ‘brought to Washington: as- soon: as) possible.’ He arrived, “in the: United.States en. the. evening. of ihe Bebruary. 1964 « une 6001596 323 ns en TS No. 197124. Top Secret = Copy _10
Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~- January 1962-January 1964) meaty ete an ih Jo caer eae nate ree Te NNN HN nt arene eee . «. Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB Operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962+1963 period. For reasons cited” in the description of these operations in Annex B, these Operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. , 6001597 325 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy _ 10. |
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT =. January 1962-January, 1964). 0 | ona ‘Operational Activities: 8\+ July 1962-January 1964+, Summary ~ BO: substantiate’ ‘his claims to havina served as Deputy. a Chief of the. Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO |  Gescribes KGB involvement in the .recruitment Seastigations fo Obthe arrests of fKOTEN} and BARGHOORN, and the investigations ~ . 9>0f(SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV , © EBS discovery that (SHUBIN] was. a GRU agent, and his assignment, “to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO. learned of the ope erations.aS wp. he described and they were as he des cribed — (there. are ‘ssubstan- - tial.reasons why they might. have: heen conducted, by KGB... mY _ -elements other’ than the :Seventh Department), they are atypical. “with respect - ‘to NOSENKO" s own Gescription of Seventh Depart ment operations. ~ They do not accurately characterize, as- : “ NOSENKO | ee KGB. ‘counterintelligence. operations against . tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department: “service.. --NOSENKO' Ss: explanations for his assignment to .. ~ -. Geneva. in 1964: are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962.: NOSENKO has asserted that, he: was “not a lieutenant colonel:as the- temporary. duty: authorization: - indicated, but a captain,;, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Ss ' Chief of Department. and one ‘from which he’ presumably would | 1 pave been. promoted 3 as’ he assumed the. senior KGB positions “KGB Gounterintel ligence. Operations, we “lis “AMO ng American .-Tourists 1962- ~1963" a ‘Because of. his. position’ aS a Deputy Chief, then’ First . Deputy Chief ‘of thé Seventh Department, NOSEN“O claimed © awareness of. what the KGB “posture Was with, respect to ee Co - _ ae “Ts. No. 197194 | - Fop secret OO Copy - a rrrenrs ‘ eed
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists. Information Furnished the KGB by George .BLAKE The KGB agent’ in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6 — meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to furnish other information by which the KGB could keep current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meeting was held in Washington in April 1960, of which a twenty~one page summary was made. BLAKE also passed this document as soon as it came into his possession to the KGB. KGB Study of American intelligence Tourist Operations The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier (see p.149) reflects the detailed and accurate information in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's © alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963. .Pertinent portions are quoted-as follows: “It has been established that the Intelligence “organs of the. USA are displaying special activity in the utilization of legal channels, specifically, ‘in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive work against the USSR. Numerous facts indicate that American tourists and members of various US delega~ tions, in the USSR strive to visit areas and instal- lations to which employees of the Embassy and mili- tary attaches have no access, establish contact with Soviet citizens, and collect intelligence informa- tion. In this regard, the channels of tourism to the USSR are used to dispatch experienced intelligence agents to develop individual’ Soviet citizens with  — the objective of their eventual recruitment. In line with the preparation and dispatch of such agents, among the tourists the Americans also make extensive use of persons not directly connected with American Intelligence organs. These latter’ agents are given one-time assignments such as collecting information leading to the ideological development of Soviet citizens. 6001599 327 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10
(SRVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-Janwary 1964) arn “With. the: objectives of accomplishing: subversive activities,. ‘a -SO-called: ‘Information Center; has’. been established in.the. US with the: participation * .. Of the Department of: State... .The 'Center' officially — - advertises: that ‘its .purpose is to: inform intending _ American tourists to the Soviet Union about the. = ‘opportunities | and | ‘restrictions existing there. _ ' Actually, . however, the 'Center' is. -involved.in the .- ideological’ preparation of American: tourists, whom it instructs. _cegarding their. conduct in the Soviet. - Union andthe methods to be used there for Propag~ -andizing..the ‘American. way. of life. The 'Center': - ‘collects information ‘about the’ Soviet Union from returning American’ tourists,” including the political . attitudes of | certain Soviet: citizens, ' their addresses, ete. The direction. of. the ‘Center! .is-. ‘controlled’ : by. experienced intelligence. officers of: CIA. 7 "Candidates for. missions: to. ‘the: ‘USSR. are “sélectea _ carefully..: “They. ordinarily possess. ‘knowledge of - : the Russian: language,. know. the fundamentals of photo~ graphy,. have’ Specific’ ‘technical: training ‘and must - look: Upon. their mission’as: a: “responsible assignment and. not..as. a: pleasure: trip... “Américan Intelligence: '- organs: prefer to use ‘persons ‘who have - previously: gh or lo, “visited: the USSR: and” ‘Person having. relatives there. "once selected, the American. tourist agent ig instructed ' as to his: intelligence assignment and’. his route, and’. he is. acquainted: with ‘the security | conditions . in..the USSR, "including: passport. controls, . documentation and customs controls, the . hazard Of - ‘both. physical and technical: surveillance, — as well. ‘as the possibility ‘of provocations’ and” compromise. : oo making: ‘the. “agent vulnerable | to blackmail.” “among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks . there are included: visual: observation and. clandestine . photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet citizens, and. spotting among such. citizens persons who may be developed as sources of information. For. American Intelligence, any. Soviet citizen, regardless” —GNCLECO gag oo , a Top Secret Se Copy
74-00000 +, Tep Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT — January 1962-January 1964) of his social status or his personal access to important information, is of interest, because of his ability to travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to American Intelligence. “American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB agents Soviet citizens who too openly express anti- government sentiments, who volunteer information about friends or relatives who work in secret establishments, © who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but display an awareness of security principles, who quickly request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a good knowledge of foreign languages." Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the docu-. ment instructs a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residen- . “+ ey abroad "to utilize all its resources to expose among American tourists pérsons suspected of belonging to the enemy in- telligence or counterintelligence organs." Promising its assistance, KGB Headquarters instructs the ‘Legal Residency _ “to inform’KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporarily - visiting the USSR who are of operational interest in the. work against the main enemy [the U.S.]. With this aim, the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti- Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; ex- ploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR, with the aim of obtaining information regarding tne firms _ being exploited by hostile intelligence services; and ~ telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Head- “quarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational interest, including the individual's surname, name, pat-_ ronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the USSR, means of travel, itinerary, description of group — with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent information available to the Legal Residency about the GO0041604 TS No. 197124 10 329 Top Secret Copy
a a cover for espionage,. - (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) . tourist. The Legal | clude where possibl Residency, informing KGB Headquar presence and advising how the -KGB agents in the USSR if the’ Legal Residency ‘aid, including financial - Survey conducted in the American Intelligence ha Department: use of multi ©. that tne Seventh Departmen I ~~. 1960-1961 regarding Americ Operations, a document’: it should- become necessary. “national touris t received. no in Top Secret could contact: tlie ons formation during "... an Intelligence use of: He was aware, KGB after GOLI d obtained a K a io) tourism aso oe he“ said, ‘from the damage Se SSYN's defection, that. TS No. 197124 Copy 3 Lastly; 2° to ‘provide. all possible ~) t groups." “He statea°. | = fo ome
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) KGB Counterintelli ence Operations Among American Tourists: Summary BLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal KGB documents establish the KGB concern for the threat of American tourist agent operations and the scope of KGB . actions to thwart that threat. The effect Of NOSENKO's Statements is that the KGB did not know of the American tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he described accurately depicted the nature of KGB counter- intelligence operations during the period. oS SEVENTH DEPARTMENT -~ 1962-1964: Summary and Conclusion According to NOSENKO,. in January 1962, at the direction of General GRIBANOV, he Was appointed Chief of the Seventh De- - partment Amer ican-British Commonwealth Section in the expec- ..tancy that he soon would be named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh . Department. As a Section Chief, he personally handled agents | and supervised all Second Chief Directorate operations against American and British Commonwealth tourists, of which he de- scribes four. In this’ périod NOSENKO also was assigned the case officer's Management of the KGB double agent, BELITSKIY. On that visit to Geneva NOSENKO first’ contacted CIA. In July... 1962, NOSENKO claims that as GRIBANOV promised, he became one — Of three Deputy Chiefs of the entire Seventh Department; in this position he learned of all KGB operations against Ameri- can tourists. In this connection he’ described five Operations, - as well as his accidental discovery of the identity of an. American GRU agent, and tne investigation and search for a _ disaffected former KGB colleague. In July 1963 NOSENKO states CU0L603 331 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10
(SEVENTH, DEPARTMENT ~ ‘January 1962 Jof the time as Deputy. Chief. These cases, "+ anomalies of NOSENKO's accounee of t _hlotes of KGB operations of which ne had] last meeting with CIA in 1962. “He also p ‘ of ‘lieutenant colonel. ‘Finally,- CIA to accept his immediate defection, | | tion, as a-case officer, and “he describes no a With uPervisory responsibilities. None of his with one exception, was employed in Seventh De “tions he described. Because. of contradictions . £licts in his varying accounts, neither ofthe NOSENKO cites for ‘his assignment: to Geneva ‘in is credible. “In Geneva, — be ved in the 1962-1964, period ii the Sevee religious figures, two American Communists, ~cpartment may have been résponsible. the Cases are evidence that NOSENKO did. serve "period in the seventh Department, although: the Top Secret ~January 1964) again and delivered: |. earned since his.’ resented “at this’ - | time a KGB travel. document to substantiate his he’ announced the receipt of: @_ telegram recalling him to “Moscow, an event Cases as evidence that che rate target who in e, anda permanent. -: Be det Union, allo 0: ./ This fact and: the. s) he ‘cases aside, however; Claimed rank’. which. prompted. partment’ opera- reasons.) |: ~he clearly: = agent, BELIT- nth Department, part. which’ included: two: ni; one emigre, one’. “Buspected FBI agent, a First Chief Diréctorate | ‘tended to-marry a. Soviet citizen,-a hostag 2: Yesident or former permanent resident of the Sov _ Rave aspects for. which KGB elements other than. he. Seventh. during. the. - Y-are-not pers. 0." TS No. 197124 - Copy | Claimed agents," .. and tne con... 1962 or 1964 °°. - it is implausible that he conducted | aig abvestigation’ of SHAKHOV as he claine tf “did not sipervise the lianagement of” the double ® ye ef. “A judgment of- 2 TSS* primarily on. an appraisal of other’
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964. aspects of his statements, including those relating to his Supervisory duties and to tne nature of Second Chief Direc- . torate operations against American and other foreign tourists, NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a liéuten- ant colonel, a rank appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief of Department, and asserts that he was never Promoted beyond the rank of Captain. Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor in the Seventh Department is his assertion that he accurately describes KGB counterintelligence Operations against foreign, particularly American, tourists. A senior Seventh Department officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's pre- occupation with American tourists: If NOSENKO is unaware of ‘the extent of KGB activities in connection with American tourists, he was not a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the Conclusion wwe fusion NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the - AMerican-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a4 Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. GO016¢C5 333 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10
wee Ba, Yep Secret | CHAPTER IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB SERVICE Most of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chrono- logical fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections. Some can most easily be examined separately, since they relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his entire KGB career. The principal aspects in this category: of claims are those he made about his. relationship with . ' Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status, his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his sourcing of KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service, and his KGB rank. Relationship with General GRIBANOV From his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO main- tained that he had a close personal and professional rela- tionship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO described recruitment approaches > in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their after hours carrousing. According to NOSENKO, GRIRBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSINKO's wishes, for his. appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed _ him.a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Se COULEGG a TS No. 197124. Top Secret Copy _10
Top Sat cay (OTHER ASPE ECTS: OF 1 ‘NOSENKO! s KGB CAREER) | "NOSENKO' s “Information - Post 1964 : ‘Immediately! following his defection: NOSENKO continued to i. xefer to this’special and personal. relationship, which er a 2, touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB- serv aCe ee oe  Under™ interrogation,’ however,. NOSENKO. could not sustain. this claim.-. The extent ‘NOSENKO's. statements were. retracted” ve: or. contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV. or contradicted. by oe .. other evidence, is seen from the following examples. excerpted - _ from the earlier chronological examination:, GRIBANOV wrote —..- us the very ‘best fitness report on NOSENKO that could. be. given. aa > -{Retracted. GRIBANOV, wrote none of. NOSENKO's fitness (oe. “"" “yeports) ; -NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused togéther with women 2... _\? provided by .NOSENKO (Retracted. | -NOSENKO . recalled only two . ”. occasions, and could relate only one in-any detail.); 9°. 'yecruited Edward SMITH. (see .p.- Bh ‘together with.NOSENKO. ° _(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit- . “meht attempt and was not in Embassy. Section at time.); NOSENKO. accompanied GRIBANOV -to. diplomatic receptions ain yp 1961 at which the latter learned that([French ambassador OG “Perea was GRIBANOV''s | agent (Retracted ~~ NOSENKO accompanied ~ . L e040? 336 re (BR | TS No. 197124. Top Secret ~~ Copy .
14-00000 Top Secret (OTEER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CARTER) 06 GRIBANOV on only one steh occasion and learned from "friends" in 1958-1959 about [DeJean) ; GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to Supervise code clerk operations (Contradicted. NOSEMKO was not Deputy Chief and did not supervise code clerk o erations); GRIBANOV approved NOSENKO's operational plan for [MORONE! s recruitment (Retracted.(% The plan was written by another KGB Officer.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it with GRIBANOV.); GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subse- quently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to lieutenant colonel (Retracted: NOSENKO never was promoted past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB Chairman, the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and the Order of Lenin (Retracted. NOSENKO received no such awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO' to Geneva in 1962 (Retracted. \NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted. NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.); GRIBANOV allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal favor" (Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally, GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relation~ ship was no closer than their relative rank and position indicated.) ~ Conclusion — NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh: Department. ; CO0LECS 337 jee TS No. 197124 Top Secret °° ~ Copy _19_
(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S. KGB CAREER) ~ - Top Secret : ; Communist Party status - n about Par with NOSENKO's ‘ac count | Candidates ". ‘ Komsomol s Statements about ch they are ty. activity in the KG of his KG =] RB, and: 3 career, rand ‘he took it without much ©") _. thought, Mainly because all-c¢ : ~ _. He continue “ in the Nava ' Spring 1953 + d his | 3, he transferred + Organization 338 the KGB in. - >» the KGB Komsomol .-”’ ‘unit in the che | ; _ Top Secret - : | _ -TS'No. 197124 Consistent» | Baltic. 9.” said, without
14-00000 alee "guess ene mee Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the Komsomol Committee. The latter elects the secretary. — e NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secre- tary in any specific manner. He does not know who was the secretary of the KGB Komsomol Organization, nor could he describe his dealings with that official's office. Comment: The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate j Komsomol organization is directly subordinate to the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have occasion to deal with the latter frequently. NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was a .Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the Second Chief Directorate, but that the Congresses were ordinarily held yearly. _ Comment: The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was held in March 1954, entailing considerable work by every Komsomol member and especially by the unit secretaries, As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the members of his unit: All members paid in the amount of two percent of their monthly salaries. GU01 610 339 ‘TS No. 197124 Top Secret | Copy 10
4-90000 (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKG's KGB CAREER): . © Comment; Komsomol dues were calculated -on a sliding.. ae Soo geale in woich members earning 500 rubles”. one Pep ae monthly paid .5 percent, those earning .500 to / 1500 rubles: paid one percent, and those —  -@arning over: 1500 rubles paid 1.5:-percent, » NOSENKO insisted ‘that in 1953-1954 the maximum age for a. _ Komsomol.. member was 26 years.-of age, and that he was a - —— member until Te pecame overage in October 1954, and that: no - Special privilege was extended: to him. So a to Komsomol statutes at the time; . / | the maximum age was twenty-five,-a fact which coe would: be-known by ‘a person who ‘served as a - _ Komsomol secretary at the time.-- NOSENKO would have thus been excluded from the Komsomol. when he! became overage in 1953, not in 1954 as he “Claimed... (2.8 eT, me Be | po Comment: According | ao The’ March 1954: Komsomol Congress retained’ re 4 “the 25..year age yimit,’ but provided for two= ae 0 Ege" extensions in certain cases. Because of” = age at the time, and because of hig claimed .. the matter. on as accepted as a candidate member of the. eg ‘Communist Party in ren EY: 1256+ NOSENKO. claimed that he oo | was the‘ only officer in the KGB’ who was a member of neither “Organization: . PU a ee a as ae rece a OOMLBEE a CSE ATE) Top Secret. © Copy TS No. 197124
14-00000 Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) Comment:. NOSENKO is the only Soviet official known to CIA who claims to have occupied a position of trust and who claims he was not a Party member at the time. @ In the period following, "to show his eagerness" and’ "to improve himself", NOSENKO asked for Party assignments. For more than a year he ran errands and collected newspapers and performed other such tasks. He stated that he applied for Party membership in January 1956, was accepted as a candidate member .in 1956, and that he was accepted as a full Party member in 1957. Conclusion NOSENKO's claims about his Party activity do not sustain his claims to KGB service, and they suffer from identical discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility, and contradiction by independent sources. It is concluded that NOSENKO was never a Komsomol secretary and, if a member at all, was no longer a member after reaching his twenty- sixth birthday in October 1953. The period in which he had no Party status was twenty~eight months, not the fifteen he claimed, and it covers the period of his first tour in the Embassy Section as well as a portion of his initial Seventh Department assignment. An officer unqualified for Party _ membership is ineligible: for ‘KGB service. Consequently, the evidence provided by éxamination of NOSENKO's Party status. indicates that he was not serving in the KG6B through at least a portion of the 1953-1956 period. 6001642 341 ; _ TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10
490000. ee Top Secret ° (OTHER ASPECTS. OF NOSENKO's KGB CAREER) , Rhowledge ‘of Certain SCS Forms. and Procedures: » In-the course of “his various interrogations, NOSENKO had | occasion to. comment generally on various KGB forms and. cae i . procedures, : tnterrogation on these points, however, developed © 27 that..while. he was generally familiar with various. aspects . Hh .. unexpectedly there were some of which he was ignorant... Some .. | . of these topics are described’ on page in connection with . oy : his KGB entry, and. others whi h are described below. __ KGB Forms” ~ «.. NOSENKO was familiar with the anketa, the KGB ‘Personal _ ae _. History, Statement, including its appearance, the nature of | . - oar 4 - the questions included, and the purpose of the document. ufos _ However, he maintained that it was requi : sie in two copies, that it coulag ed “premises, and that it consisted of four to The. anketa is a detailed, sixteen page question~ © 9. i NaLire,. AS a sensitive document, it is not. taken: Mea -. from stion omises. -Defectors' describe its “ | ot Soon ‘to be completion as "an experience: n : NOSENKO maintained that he had never-heard of the Communist.: | Party Questionnaire, (Lichn Listok Po Uchetu Kadrov). Shown. . (an exemplar,’ NOSENKO’ stated that he had ‘seen it in personnel. files, but had never himself filled one out. Asked in whose Personnel files he had seen the document, NOSENKO first said | those of civilians (interpreters, etc), and finally expressed | his belief that -the KGB did not use. the. document, ues 7 0061S sag ae a an TS No. 197124
1400000 ee ee te ss Tep Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) Comment: The form is completed by every KGB officer, and while it is not of critical importance to the KGB itself, a copy is filed in every officer's personnel file, a fact known to any Komsomol secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing KGB personnel files. ‘NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel action form, and said he did not know of it. When its purpose was described to him, he gave a superficial description of its content. Comment: A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the form, which he would see on every occasion in which one of his subordinates was promoted or transferred. NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service Record (Posluzhnoy Spisok), but he claimed he filled it out only in “1958: or. 1957", , Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed on entry on duty with the KGB. In citing 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO..is claiming that he completed it only four or five years after entering the _ G004614 343 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10
‘Top Secret ce ae a (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) Visitor's Pass Procedures” ed procedures entailed in’ a non-KGB:. tallation, but he - _ Comment: The: interviewer" a ee oss ° &@ fact which a senior officer of more. than Qe - _ decade's.Kcp Headquarters Service would recall, Oho: . Since he would have frequent ‘occasion to admit’ — “Visitors to KGB buildings... rs ~against KGB files.~ Prominent. 0. 0° 80): RGI)\(See’ p.115). and. ABIDIAN (ps205)0 2 “and. that. the Firsts = | ; -¢riminal ‘index’ separate. £ ee security card indices, NOSENKO was unfamiliar. ee _.with the KGB term spets roverka, meaning a_ bre ., Clearance check., Despite NOSENKO's claim that |. io he performed name checks of American Embassy ‘personnel, he- pleaded ignorance of any aspect of the files held ‘by the First Chief Directo- rate, where any KGB record on, foreigners is = (OU0L6LS ae “pe ~ "TS No: 197124 a Top Secret - UDR Copy |
Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) Conclusion NOSENKO's ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures. is evidence that he did not occupy the position nor perform the functions he claimed during his alleged KGB service. e Awards and Decorations Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various awards, commendations, and decorations for his KGB service. His assertions are material to any judgment of his general credibility and, as well of the validity of his claims to having occupied various KGB positions. In January 1964 NOSENKO mentioned that in 1962, shortly after meeting with CIA in Geneva, he received the Order of Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience and improve the quality" of Second Chief Directorate per- sonnel in Moscow. . In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked about his awards, and he first said he received the Order of the Red Banner, then corrected himself to say. he received first the Order of the Red Star. He confirmed that he received the Order of Lenin, in 1963. [Earlier he had said 1962, “just. following visiting Geneva".] He ctaAimed he received the Order of Lenin for his performance in his Seventh Department assignment, but when he was asked what recruit- ments justified his receipt of the award, he said the main task of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments, but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations. ..[For his. contradictory statements regarding the Seventh Department's mission, see pages 103 and 326.] The Order . Of Lenin was the highest decoration for which a KCB officer _ is eligible, NOSENKO said, and besides himself, the Chief and former Chief of the Seventh Department received it. NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star, he "thought" for his service in the Embassy Section in 1960- 1961, not for Seventh Department service; no explanation accompanied that decoration. COOL6L6 345 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy __10
~ .. Fop Secret oe (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) '.:The*question of NOSENKO's awards, orders and decorations’ -. reflect the importance: the KGB attached to. particular’ ’|. ‘operational activities in which NOSENKO engaged. However, - ..before the April 1964 interrogations were suspended, NOSENKO ..Yetracted his claim. that he received the Order of Lenin, Saying that it was just an idle boast. _GRIBANOV,; NOSENKO explained, had promised in .1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALENKO would receive the. Order of Lenin “for creating _.. the Central Operational Communications System of the Second — Chief Directorate" within the Seventh Department, but the _ | award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in ~ January 1964.00 0s. ele De - one - |) “Comment: | Earlier NOSENKO claimed he received the Order _ €nce. and improve. the quality of Second Chiéf:.. ° Directorate personnel". ‘Questioned, NOSENKO * ”« teverted to -the earlier claim. the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked to*. - _ list the dates, reasons,. and types of awards, decorations, . .'and bonuses. he.had received “in his KGB career. He replied “that he received.nothing from 1953 until 1956, when he ©. - ment. of [BURGI}[see p.115]. by order of the KGB Chairman Serov.. - NOSENKO..saw his. name onthe list of recipients which was. | dation, according to NOSENKO, but personnel recorded the. -_; a event in each. KGB recipient's personnel file. “Almost every: ~ year. after 1956, NOSENKO ‘stated, he received.something, —.. “perhaps -on the KGB anniversary, or May. Day, or Army Day" .-.” tation -at:an assembly of officers in. the KGB Headquarters “auditorium. NOSENKO:said he received ‘in 1959 a second — ‘commendation’ and one month's pay from KGB Chairman Shélepin’ | C0646 47, BTS Nos 197124 ys Top Secret Copy — were of..some interest to the interrogators since. they might. ae for ideas he. developed. "to enlarge the experi-.. ~ (nent of[B0RGr} (see pitts! > one month's pay for the recruit-. - _-GRIBANOV informed him of the commendation, NOSENKO said, and: -) 0°) circulated. - No written certificate accompanied the commen-— -- In 1957-or 1958, NOSENKO did not recall exactly, he. received |» .. “something" from GRIBANOV,:. "maybe on the anniversary of the... * Soviet, Army": .GRIBANOV's deputy;. PERFILYEV,' made the presen- |. — ‘ocx Ee tf me an nn ee 2. + Sem
14-00000 Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CARFER) 06 ob or "several recruitments, including Anericans [MERTENS|, [DRE 06 [eRrppeey * and three British citizens whose nameS he cdul not recall. Along with a large group of KGB officers, NOSENKO received a commendation from GRIBANOV in 1960, he Said, "for good work in general". He received in 1961 the Order of the Red Star, he statec, with a group of Second Chief Directorate case officers "for general good work"; IVASHUTIN made the presentation, which included a medal and a certificate which the officer may retain. Comment: A week later, NOSENKO said that he received this award in December 1962. He said he recalled that the presentation was planned for the KGB Anniversary on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and not made until the end of the month. In 1962, NOSENZO claimed, he received another ‘commendation from GRIBANOV for “general good work", and he also received the Unblemished Service Award for ten years' service, Comment: At this juncture his interrogators reminded NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date of entry to the KGB was March 1953, and that in 1962 he would only have had nine years' service. NOSENKO said that he could not under- stand why, but he was certain he recéived the service award after his return from Geneva in _1962.. (The date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier retracted claim that he entered the KGB in 1952.) The following day NOSENKO announced that he recalled why “he received the medal in 1962 rather than in 1963; the medal . Was awarded to servicemen as well as to KGB officers, and prior Military service is taken into account in computing KGB officers' time CUUL618 347 S/R TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy _10 _
(OTHER ASPECTS ‘OF NOSENKO's KGB CAREER) .. _ ~. Comment: (Continued). _ res To ag ae — 02 LS ’ in. service, | NOSENKO éntered. the Naval RU. in. 1950, he said} and shoulda have recéived the. _ . oo Medal in 1960, . ut did not because of some*. 0...” - Soninistrative mixup. (See p.36 for NOSHNKO's a eventual claim that he entered the RU.in.195i,). - . In°1963,. NOSENKO. said, he received .another commendation from _GRIBANOV. for "general good work", and GRIBANOV told him that “along with others he would receive’ the Order of Lenin “for. - _.. inspiring the seventh Department" on 20 December 1963; the’ ~~ RGB anniversary. NOSENKO Said because he left for Geneva, - _ he didnot actually receive the medal... (NOSENKO. arrived ws Jin’ Geneva on, 19°January 1964.}) 00 So a necatezrogated in- August 1965 regarding his claim’ to having ©. "ll. “received a. commendation ‘from Kc} i ae om née was nominated for the -Order Of. the: Red Banner. fort : 41° i . -s@id not receive “it, American Embassy Sec NOSENKO @pparently is referring to the KGB |. _ Practice of conferring decorations on KGB anniversary, 20 December. - NOSENKO claims he \ transferred to the Embassy Section in January. - ap J When “NOSENKO's claims ‘to various’ ; was: reviewed. with him during -the October 1966. in: re} i — tion of ten years" service, and that he had receiv _ award, ‘decoration, .or commendation for. his operati | C0CLEIg gee | I aye TS No. 197124 Copy
14-00000 Top Secret (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) Conclusion NOSENKO's claims to having been the recipient of various awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his claimed operational successes, his rank, and GRIBANOV's patronage, on all of which topics he had made virtually categoric retractions. NOSENKO's Sourcing NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies, contradictions, and retractions. Three of these categories, each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the , validity of his sourcing, are personal participation {W.E. 06 JOHNSON p. 268) cases learned in the course of Specific |“ Obofficial duties (SHUBIN) p. 296), and information obtained ' informally from KGB colleagues (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON, p-24). The fourth category of sourcing relates to the. ‘notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva ‘in 1964. ; : Regarding the notes, NOSENKO said he collected them at various opportunities in order. to bring them to CIA. He kept them in a wall safe in the: office which he occupied as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. [In this connection, NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes, ‘and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but asserted that. his did.] Most of the notes are in NOSENKO's handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a typed top secret. summary report from one’‘of the: Seventh _ Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon co of a KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an Austrian} || businessman. NOSENKO said he. copied the date for the remaining notes from such sources as. the "Special File", which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief. According to NOSENKO, he obtained access to it for various GU0L1 626g 349 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 0 P | copy —10— e/BR
', . (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREFR) . “.. -officers for them. Questioned. on case after case which - _.everything he could learn, and: could add nothing more.” ". Conclusion. ~ is not credible... . . “© NOSENKO's' KGB Rank ° oe identified himself as.a KGB officer holding the rank of . time in’ grade and expected to be oromoted shortly to the .). rank of ‘lieutenant, colonel. on defecting in. 1964 -NOSENKO:™. -- | Gareer.as he initially described it, his’ military rank pro-: .. motions had generally paralleled his assumption of . 0. (. > ‘in his becoming Deputy Chief of the Seventh: Department. ..; “<\ has-évoked a series of inconsis and c “Tents: leading to his eventual assertion that he had never “sin 1964-a KGB: document ‘identifying him as a. lieutenant © he -held -supervisory positions in which KGB officers of | Significantly senior rank were his subordinates. | 6OCLESE 350... i Top Secret — a _ Feasons from time to time. The "Special File" contained. no ~~ true names, -however,-and NOSFNKO said he obtained such true. - names as. were-included in his notes by asking various. case _-* appeared in his notes, .NOSENKO insisted that he had written. ¢~ __ NOSENKO's. sourcing for many of the events hé.has related. hie first met with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO Lae -major.-..He said at that time that. he ‘had served ‘the requisite |. . “said that he was a. lieutenant colonel. In the. course of his. %.: “successively greater supervisory responsibilities, culminating | Under interrogation, however, questioning about his rank 9s). stent and contradictory state- ee - \sadvanced beyond the rank of captain. “The matter. of NOSENKO's: _; “Statements about his rank*is Significant with respect. to hiss. general credibility, to ‘the fact that he brought to Geneva ~~: colonel, and to the paradox that’ as a company grade officer... TS 'No. 1971245 - Copy ___ is -
Top Secret | (OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER) In June 1962 NOSENKO volunteered that he was then a major, but that he would soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel. In 1964, in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the United States, NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic statement which included the claim that he had been a senior | lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic) ‘until 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963. In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952]. he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it was pointed out to him that that was less than a year after he. entered the KGB, he asserted that his Naval RU service - was taken into consideration. Asked in June 1964 to list his promotions, chronologically, NOSENKO asserted that he became a senior lieutenant in 1953, in 1956 a captain, in 1959 a major and, in October [in Geneva, just afterwards, he said November] 1963, he was advised by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and afterwards was personally congratulated by General GRIBANOV. NOSENKO did not recall the month of his earlier promotions. Comment: KGB defectors have commented that it would be . _ unusual for a KGB officer not to recall his date of rank, from which he computes. his seniority and time in grade towards his next promotion. 7 In January 1965, while discussing his role as case officer for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volun- teered out of context that he had never been a major nor was he promoted to captain in 1956, as he had claimed earlier. He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956, but his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had obtained treatment for a venereal disease under an alias, 6001620 351 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10
Top Secret - with’ the use of KGB Operational documents, He stated. that. — _. thus he was a senior lieutenant still -in 1959," and although oO “.,. GRIBANOV had: promiséd him that.he would be . promoted directly’ .. 2, tO major ‘at. that time, ‘an administrative error was made in. “!s"the personnel office,-and he was just promoted to. captain, ». “Instead of rectifying ‘the mistake NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV _ .. persuaded him.to: remain a captain until (if a major). in 1963 he became’ eligible for promotion to.lieutenant colonel. _ In October 1963, he conclude _ ii August’ 1965 interrogations NOSENKO Still claimed that: he was proposed for advar . stated that he was “pr po8 Work.” [He earlier had claimed he was being punished | " is operat : -]| In response to his c d that he had. claimed 4 to have been a major because he oo not’ have been believed. — t written in April 1966, NOSENKO ~ moted to the rank. of senior i, and the travel order [which he “ brought to Geneva in 1964} indicating his rank _ colonel, was filled out erroneously. . en — CBCLERS. 352 mo a | : i nn | . : | | 7 TS No. 197124 | : 7 . é 7 . 7 Top Se cret
Top Secret | CHAPTER X | PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT oe. ‘Because OF the incidence o£ deranged persoris CIA: has “-encountered among many would-be defectors, the question _ of: ‘NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter. considered early 2 vafter his: defection in Geneva. From the time of his arrival in the United States he has been under psychiatric observa- “tion. oIn addition, he has ‘undergone psychological examina- tion. The CIA psychiatrist and ‘psychologist, besides: being = highly- qualified professionals, have both had extensive... - Lexperience. with ‘Soviet. ‘Bloc: defectors. Their findings | were . _ Keached independently. oo, " Psychological Examination Oo tn April’ 1964 NOSENKO was: ‘administered a. series Of - ce psychological-tests by.- the CIA psychologist. After monitoring ~ - numerous interrogation. sessions, the psychologist interviewed ; “-NOSENKO for’ fourteen. days during 3-21 April 1965, in an. oe attempt to develop sufficient. insight into NOSENKO's. persona~ ‘lity to permit the > obtaining of a | Eruthful: account, OF. his. es “Lifes © 7 “Bindings oe oS Y . ‘NOSENKO. is: a: rationalizer, ’ a distorter, ‘and. an’ evasive. " .person clearly capable of dissembling for personal. reasons. He is not a compulsive liar... He ‘is’ inclined to relate what. “he thinks ‘he -is: expected. to Say rather than to tell: the a ..truth as.he knows it. He lies. by design as well as for... effect, : however, and he does not always” ‘embroider just ‘to. “bolster his. ego. .He is neither "insane". nor: psychotic, and “os he: suffers: from. no. "delusions"~: - ‘NOSENKO" s rationalizations. "are not. _the product; of derangement. 6001625 355. a TS No. 197124 -.FopSecret ~ | copy 10
Top Secret (PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT) Psychiatric Examination ~ Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation of the CIA psychiatrist. Besides monitoring many of the _ interrogation sessions, the psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO weekly for the first year, monthly until 1967, and at some- what less frequent intervals since. Findings © NOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive, and highly adaptable. His memory is not defective. Besides suffering from ordinary lapses of memory, however, he sometimes falsely claims lack of recall, ‘ NOSENKO's thought processes are unimpaired; he.is rational and fully capable of distin- guishing fact from fiction. __ PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT: Conclusion The findings:of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel the notion that NOSENKO's behavior and his statements are other than willful. a, ee 4626 | 356 TS No. 197124 Top Secret | Copy —___
_ SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS — CONCERNING NOSENKO'TS BONA FIDES _-NOSENKO claims. that he served for a decade in the KGB in ... SUCCeSSively senior positions of authority from which he. - derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and - results of KGB.operations against Americans in the Soviet. ‘Union in the period. 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, - . he provides an impressive array of information about KGB-  personnel,. organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of ‘his - bona fides. . Various Soviet officials, including .intelli- gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's - -claims. = ncecunnaneamasimanereempenere  ° The examination has compared each element.of NOSENKO's ° biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known -/facts and reasonable surmise. -The examination reflects . the test to which his accounts were put: whether his... - accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known. — . fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has “from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. _4in-short, is he what he. says he is,. according to his. own © “accounts? — a a ae ae 6001627 a a 357 oe - TS No. 197124 me a Top Secret a a Copy 10 7 i ee 7 re .
| Top Secret (SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS) This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently: . ~NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. ““NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed. ~NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed. ~During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Depart- “Ment American~British Commonwealth Section, -“NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. . ~NOSENKO's-claims, that.in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible, ~NOSENKO has no. valid.claim to certainty that the KCB . recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964, Lo These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certiéude, but they reflect the preponderance Of available evidence in each instance, The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. . The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be “established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted Or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus -he is not a bona fide defector. , 6001626 358 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
. | (SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS) - Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide~ ~ _ defector, itis necessary to attempt to determine his true’. . Motives for contacting American Intelligence and for... -. “providing: the information he has given. Here, it must be . + ‘reeognized’ that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's- | . OWn assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions... . ~. | Nevertheless, ‘the question cannot be ignored. ‘The character Of the’ information. NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that ‘some ~. . Of his false. claims have been corroborated by Soviet offi- © | -. » + Clals,:and the necessity to.make decisions about: NOSENKO's =. > future all require that at least a provisional judgment be" Made. se le, — ee Of the reasonable explanations. advanced for NOSENKO's | : /. mMisrepresentations, the chief ones-are that he isa. 0°30 0: .., .Swindler posing asa former KGB officer for reasons of: °°) Personal advantage; that. he’ suffers from a deranged person-.). °°. \--ality.or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated’. * | "his actual rank, status and. access in the KGB, for simply ne - spersonal reasons; or, finally,.that. he is a dispatched KGB - pagent. we OE aie 28 @ eespatched KGB o . The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. -That. ~— “-.» NOSENKO is not simply.a swind#er who falsely Claims for: =... a, personal advantage. to have been a KGB officer is evident; /“ = '- we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, 7 personnel ‘and operations which he has -provided -and. which «©... _ could-only derive from within the KGB itself... 0-00: 0. os: “> Second, as noted in. the text, extensive: psychiatric and | product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind. > -. It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is aKGB- officer who served in at: least some of thé components for °°. _‘Some or all of: the time periods that -he claims, but who .°..° . ‘ _» greatly exaggerated his positions, rank’ and access to infor- ~ /».Mation, and’ invented ‘some matters-outright, to achieve oe _. greater status with. American intelligence. This explanation, ' _ however, fails’ to accommodate the. fact that. several KGB. officers. have asserted that NOSENKO did infact hold senior a 6001629 359 ee a TS No. 197124 Top. Secret 7 Ca Copy 10 | psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out crodece sibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the. ©
Top Secret (SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS) . Positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources, » the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable, In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or _ other persuasive evidetice to the contrary, CIA finds that ' the evidence establishes a Presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and TS No. 197124 Top Secret — Copy
' Annex B 7 “/ Summaries. of ‘Cases Not Examined in Text — | service. The cases include, for example, Seventh Department ° - operations of which he. said he learned while serving in ‘the American’ Department, -and vice versa, as well as. operations "— |. Gonducted by KGB. elements other than the Second. Chief Direct- _ 9, Orate.’. Unless otherwise Specified, each entry reflects all. . of the “information NOSENKO provided; rr Do me PROCTOR] os NOSENKO's Information “ AcTor{ ace An’ American ‘known as ACTOR. or (PROCTOR) is a valuable First Chief Directorate agent who travelled overtly to © «= Western Europe: and ’there obtained other documents with”. Which ‘to continue clandestinely to the USSR. oa - Ob. -PRocToR) summer, omplete. . 3 information was limited to that . “> contained in notes he. brought to Geneva in ss 1964.00: .. Sm, ue i Sonment: The lead may refer to one‘[Vernon W. ee who visited the Soviet Union in the Ps Of 1963. The investigation is not ¢ NOSENKO's.. rr - |. TS:No.: 197124 oy ~ Top Secret _ Copy 2 0004634 BRL
Top Secret (Annex B) |ALBINGER, Donald] NOSENKO's Information | bb [aLBincER} an American citizen born in 1937, visited the USSR in 1963 and there was the target of a KGB investigation in Sochi because-he was believed to be an American Intelli- gence agent. . In Sochi [ALBINGER was in touch with a KGB agent, "TRAPEZUND", Oo By NOSENKO's account, the [ALBINGER] case was directed by a provincial KGB element while NOSENKO Was assigned to the Seventh Department in Moscow. . f tn inp enna Comment: According to the FBI, |Donald ALETNGES) visited the Soviet Union in 19 3 and while there, in _ Sochi, was associated with one Gazarian OHANNES (sic, Probably Oganes GAZARYAN), a Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR in the 1920's. OHANNES allegedly offered OS(ALBINGER| intelligence-type photos which: Ob ALBINGER| said he refused to accept, : ALLOYAN, Lawrence |ALLOYAN hawrence| NOSENKO's Information An American of Armenian background, [ALLOYAN| visited the USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB. He stated to KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army Captain and military intelligence officer, to inform the KGB of American Intelligence use of the Monterey Language School. The Army captain's name is possibly [Hugo VAN KRAKOVI, O( and the KGB lanned to contact him. NOSENKO Woted the case OG when [ALLovaiy, a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow through a Seventh Department case officer. Sa Tae en eet nineteen neers mas a _— ne COCLEg2 400 TS No. 197124 Top Secret 82 Copy |
: ; Top Secret > (Annex. B) - “Gonment:\ Interviewed by. the FBI in January 1965; “0b ALLOYAN] denied having. been in the USSR. ‘in 1963, e! OFAN] ae that -he was acquainted with a(Hugs a “VAN. KRAKOW] who hada son of the same” name, but. “disclaime knowledge that the latter was an a Army captain QU[ALLOYAN] said ‘he had not seen oso thes Ss. n for. twenty: years. The younger(VANO6 _ KRAKOW “was. interviewed by the FBI and said “that. fe was discharged from the’ Army in 1953 | “oo as a staf€ Sergeant and that. he was not. in... 7 oS” Contact with | ALLOYAN],. 06° eT, , “NOSENKO's Yaformation was dimited to that | “eontained ‘in’ notes: brought to Geneva in 1964. -NOSENKO! 8: Information: we An: American. citizen of Armenian origin Heazy essay) (sic) was. ‘recruited. by the KGB of the Armenian’ SSR in ~ April 1963, On, ideological | grounds. The recruitment -: Wag: believed. not « ‘to have been firm, . ‘however, and the: KGB wo pd enew it Lf (EPIs on). ‘returned-to the USSR- in. 1964, 06. ccess to. a miditary” installation in the New: York “Suburbs. cot, . . . | ee gS ok ee ae oe Comment: + Gene ashe: ‘a: naturalized American: and- the: Cee a _ Owner: of a hotel and: restaurant near West: do. Point} N.Y.,- visited the USSR in 19637 In. — °19647he acknowledged: having had contacts. with Soviet. officials in 1963 in Armenia, where he may have conveyed an impression of willingness. ce to see them if they’ should later visit [West}0 | Point}. QUAPISSON| claimed he did not realize the approach was for intelligence purposes, NOSENKO's: information was limited’to that’ contained in fhotes ‘brought to Geneva ‘in 1964« ae 6001633 401 a oo 7 oe | —TS.No. 197124 re Se - Top Secret —
Top Secret (Annex B) - f | O& [ARMSTRONG, Rober t| BRUSTRONG, Robert Oe a NOSENKO's Information 4h [armstRonG, ‘the American Ambassador's aide] is known by . the KGB to be-having a homosexual affair with a ffode clerk OY UG of the Danish Embassy, one Johannes BUHLE. ARMSTRONG is a close friend of another homosexual officer of the American Embassy, [Stephen HOFFMAN! (see below). Comment: Recalled fron Moscow and interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allegation, ARMSTRONG] JG acknowledged the truth of the a legations. Before resigning from the Department of State in August 1964, he asserted that he had had no mation regarding [ARMSTRONG], which was a > Embassy Section case at a time when NOSENKO Claimed to be Serving in the Seventh’ Depart- ment. | 06 BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin] eee ad a ed L NOSENKO's Information OG [BARTHELEMY twice led American tourist groups to the USSR in 1959, during which visits the KGB assessed him to be an — American Intelligence agent. He was’ sub Sequen y in contact with one {V.A, LAINE, a Finn] who Was a KGB agent. 06,)\ = ; NOSENKO only. learned of the BarTWELEW] case and of his contact with [LAINE] while visiting the Leningrad KGB in 1963. tion he had Braduated from an intelligence school. Leg 402 . CUCL 634 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy vali
OF op Secret bo (ANNEX. BY, “ob. “gannent WHEE vo a’ CIA ‘contact. whose: intelligence Sy .*" connections were assumed: fo have been compromised Ovi during his Wisdts touthe USSR, -He reported his. “oot. Contacts: with: LAINE. Qo. CIA. ( BARTHELEMY] s: name OC So appeared ‘in the “KG! document on Western. tourist | operations . which GOLITSYN Provided CTA. (See Pela ye  NOSENKO! -s “Information oWhile: on: one of his ‘frequent visits. to the Soviet. Unions: “American lawyer and -prominent professor of Law BERMAN} ‘was Oo (Surrounded by KGB agents, but the KeB "could © ‘do ‘nothing with him". > a vo. ‘Who is a specialist. ‘in the Soviet legal system. He'.has visited the USSR on: several occasions for study. and research, and. he had described “Ageveral. incidents which ‘occurred in Moscow . “which appear to have.been KGB provocations. , . » NOSENKO: did not indicate the source of his- -QGinformation. on. i thevinfors did he’ “Provide the = date he acquired the. information. — “Comment: [#RNAN}te a a ‘professor: “sce Py a “NOSENKO! 's Information. res : the Con sergaane in Charge of America’ House", BINDER)” con te Was involved with a Soviet female employee at ‘America House, - a with whom at various times he had been.intimate in his room. ‘He. obtained for her items of clothing from the’ United States. a -~ :". Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising -photo- cans 6 graphs. of((BINDER\ and the Soviet girl, it had no means ‘to exert Pressure on him, and - a recruitment attempt: thus: failed. (ek | TS No. 197124. - Top Secret sw Copy =
74-00900 Fop Secret (Annex B) | 0b (BINDER, Peter (Continued). “NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher. Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer bworking against [BINDER and the Chief of the American Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment attempt, in 1962, by which time NOSENKO had transferred to the Seventh Department and thus knew no further details. 06 Comment: {U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER] served as|manager of the America House from 16 March OY 07 196f to 22 January 1963). On 15 January 1963 he reported to Embassy officials that he had been abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothes- men, taken to a Militia station, and interro- gated on the substance of a letter alleged to have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his interrogators threatened to send to the Ambassador. The letter alleged that [BINDER])6 had’ lived with MORELLI as “man and wife" from 25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, that_MORELLI had told[BINDER| she was pregnant £/) OG and (BINDER) instructed her to get an abortion, had éngaged in blackmarketing, [BINDER] had C96 told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY - , had told him not to worry about it, and that O& (BINDER]had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer . Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and that she and other Soviets should be wary of him. When (BINDER\denied the allegations and OC challenged e interrogators to send the letter on to the Ambassador, he was allowed to go free -lp [BINDER] acknowledges that he was intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her gifts of money and clothing; and that she said she thought she was pregnant in February or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion and made no other demands of [BINDER. [BINDER| 0G 404 TS No. 197124 GUC4 oor 1636 Top Secret Copy ie /8h
14-00000 ‘Top Secret (Annex B)! “Comment: (Continued) ee a "States. that. MORELLI “disappeared” - ‘in: “June. o. On July” 1962, while [BINDER was on leave. O6.- a “Except: for dating the. recruitment attempt. dia 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary information coincides with [BINDER Ss account, 06. . _ 'NOSENKO asserts that. the notes brought” to: -, Geneva in 1964 contained all information. he. .Was able to discover. .NOSENKO claims to have, . , been. Deputy. Chief of the Embassy Section in, 11961, supervising| BINDER sand MORELLI's 206 officers, but he rélates his. knowledge of the.. _ \case neither. 3fo: that. Period mor to. the: Position ~ he ‘then: held. : Goats, aaa) ob NOSENKO! ‘Ss “Information, “Ob Soa Se <@RocHEs|, born. in 1896, visited: ‘the Soviet Union. witha. tourist - ‘group in 1960.. “He: has relatives in’ the USSR, and che .was- recruited | in ‘September 1960. by the’ KGB. on ideological | grounds. ar eo re a - Comment: ra wes + born: An’, 1890. 7 His brother. ye a wt 206 [A Alexander\ was: born in 1896. . GOLITSYN. ‘reported , that a. Séventh: Department officer told him in. ~ (0b 1960 that, Adam BROCHES| had been a Soviet. agent “ in the.1920's: and 1930's in Paris and that .-° > when he visited: the: ‘USSR as a tourist. guide in. 1959" or 1960 the:KGB. suspected: that he might ~ be’ on an® Américan Intelligence mission to °. " contact V.M. ZARUBIN, his one-time Soviet. Intelligence Superior in Paris. . According ™ to- con “.GOLITSYN, the KGB anrunnets surveil- “Ob lance and the Chief of the Seventh Department: ‘was planning to discuss. with ZARUBIN what. , - action the KGB: should take. | oo0t6a7 ee em, - 405 Ss . | Oe TS No. 197124.
14-00000 _c/-thactive because the aN pire eroem oer tate Tep Secret (Annex 3B) Comment: . (Continued) mo , 06 Interviewed by the Ft. [srocues) sata that he escorted tours to the USSR three times in 1960, and that on his last trip, in September 1960, he was approached by Soviet officials for information on members of his tour group. Ob[BROCHES] claimed he refused to cooperate and denied that he had ever been a Soviet agent. 06 (BROCHES] said, however, that the allegation might refer to another of his brothers, [Ignacy},06 now dead. NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. NOSENKO claimed to have been in the American Department when the Seventh Department recruited [BROCHES}, COG 0 [BUNDARIN , Eugene Peter| NOSENKO's Information eS (BunpaRIN, born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre, and an employeé of the\|"Four Winds Travel Agency} in New York 24 City, was recruited by the KGB in 1962 on ideological grounds. He left chefPour Winds agency\and his case is?4 ; ; B is waiting for him to open his own [travel bureaul {t [BUNDARIN\ was handled by Seventh Department Case officer”  V.G. DERA. a ‘Comment: [BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, the son of an emigre and an employee of the |Four Winds ?4 agency; visited the Soviet Union for eighteen days in 1962. He left the[Four Winds agency|?4 in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works for — (O\ Hermes Travel of California. Interviewed by OLthe FBI, BUNDARIN| denied any connection with Soviet Intelligence. FBI reports indicate 406 _ | TS No. 197124 GUCLE38 Top Secret Copy ——I, /s k Mere) fag
4-90000 + (annex B) | Comment: | (Continued) re a woe as /-  ObBUNDARTN] and’ parents associate with CPUSA Dea Jy (s .membérs “and participate in cP front: organiza-.__ “ho tion activities. © oe Sor ram ee Ve. 7. NOSENKO's information was limited to that - Contained in his ‘written notes which he- cs brought ‘to- Geneva in 1964.: .° | i - (GERISINER; Robert Chatled] 9 | “0 NOSENKO"s’ Information “oi: While reviewing after his defection ‘in 1964 a list. of 7. the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted — ; arres ouring the’... Joos Soviet Union-by automobile, - He did not indicate the source | oF date of his acquisition of the information. ae "Comments Ag described in press accounts of the’ per ae '- ‘and stated in a KGB. document on American are _ tourists which GOLITSYN. provided, [CHRISTNER] 06 ~~. . Was. arrested in: the Soviet Union on charges - Cy “0. Of .e'spionage in the summer of 1961. He had a~°* - CIA mission at the time, but he reported that °°. - (“he had managed to maintain his tourist coves | - = throughout his intensive interrogations. ia.) lat -) the summer of. 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the... J's Embassy Section of the American Department. | - an : (EMEM, Thomas) - an 56 ae ae NOSENKO's Information et _[FAIN)~ ans "American consul" “visited Moscow in 1959.° NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV, dod.» | e encountered’  ctattoned inf Yugoslavia, ‘During. that visit who reported his suspicion that % il a - GOULE39 Ts No. 197124 ‘Copy 10
14-00000 Tep Secret (Annex B) [Eaun » Thomas] (Continued) OL FAIN was a homosexual, There was insufficient time during Ob / FAIN "s visit to arrange his entrapment. be FAIN| was assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the KGB planned at‘that time to entrap him with a homosexual. Comment: In a Department of State security interview pd [FAIN) has stated that he recalled no Soviets whom he had met during his five-day visit to Moscow in 1959, except’ a female Inturist guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist. He reported no noteworthy incidents during his dlater permanent assignment in Moscow. ob NOSENKO's Information FINK) is an American professor from Philadelphia and frequent visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hoped to recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of a. female agent. Because of|his sister's love affair with a () Soviet|he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB has arranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if he applies again. NOSENKO learned of the case when the Leningrad KGB objected to[FIN 's being denied a visa: 0% NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time. ; Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964, . () [FINK] acknowledged that/his sister was trying OX - €0 marry a Soviet citizen) but that she had been refused a visa to visit the USSR for the purpose Qo FINK admitted involvement with a female in Leningrad, during his visit to the 408 ; TS No. 197124 COUL6 4G | Top Secret Copy
14-00000 Top Secret : -.) (Annex B) Comment: (Continued) ae — ; — é _.., USSR in’ 1961, but denied. receutenene. (RINE OG : "asserted that he had visited Europe every : . Summer since: 1957 (except in 1959,. when he. = : -went.:to Mexico), and. that he Ahad only. visited | a a the’ USSR: once, in 1961. _ , oo Ot. 7 _{FISK, Norman\: | nn eho ae ee NOSENKO' — Information. “{FIsK]visitea™ ‘the: USSR ‘as: a “tourist: ain 1959, when: he was: ‘assessed to'be a homosexual. ~ The. KGB planned to attempt to! ‘recruit him if he returned to the: Soviet Union. NOSENKO © Dingess EE S ‘name while. _xeviewing files 0£ YEFREMOV: and . a VOLKOV (see- P. 145) in. 1963. a a - gonnsnt: CirSt}v4etves the. UssR with his wife and parents “ oe oe, in D959. In. an, interview with the FBI -in. 7 ’ | December - 1964 he’ claimed. that his- only~ Soviet | contacts: ‘in ‘the USSR.were with Inturist. ; _ personnel: anda. spinster niece. NOSENKO: ‘has, oo never: explained why he learned. of: the, case tae ~only- from the files ‘of VOLKOV and: YEFREMOV: in’ 1963, a the’ ‘time [FISK] visited: the Soviet Union, in ns 49ST use . ~ ay ~ [emisnte,. ss : NOSENKO" S| Taformation AL Professor = SOTED agate, the. USSR in 1957 or 1958, a when erational contaé was established. between him and 7 the KGB.. re re ee - “TS No. 197124. Top Secret = Copy _10 fy OS oe
74-00000 * Tep Secret (Annex B) 06 Comment: One [Professor Michael GINSBERG Teported to U.S.) ' Officials in Helsinki in August 1956 that he had been the Carget of a Soviet recruitment attempt earlier in Moscow. His contact hag been identified by CIA as a KGR officer whom are (GINSBERG, according to the FBI, has met during subsequént visits to the USSR, NOSENKO's information was limited to that a ors [SRover, Preston] NOSENKO's Information Ob | : oy (RoveR, currently (in 1964) [Associated Press corres- pondent!in Moscow, is a recruited KGB agent handled by the Tenth (intelligensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief Directorate, met her in Moscow, where she was a corres- pondent for a French hewspaper, According to FBI Teports, she associated with known Communists. in the United States during an earlier assignment here, NOSENKO indicated “no source of his information on (GROVER), OL : | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy |
. Tep Secret ner re a (Hawzave. “Charles 2. . a ‘ NOSENKO" s ‘Information An American, omg (sie) - was the object of ‘considerable interest to the KGB.during his 26 October-1° - .. November 1963 visit to the. USSR. A’ KGB officer under. cover . was in contact with him in Moscow and the KGB planned to | - resume this contact in the United States, The Seventh. |. ; Department action with respect -to KHAMZAT was in response Ob. to a.request.from the First Chief irectorate for assis~.— tance in developing, a contact. with hin. in Moscow. | . Comment? “ NOSENKO's ead has been identified as [thartes Ob _ —P. . HAMZAVI), who has been noted .in freqtent — . - contact with Soviet officials fron. 195 5,- when - he immigrated to the. United Statés; until 1963. “According to the FBI, he was in Moscow-in 1963, ‘when he was in’ contact with a Foreign Ministry official which CIA. identifies as. KGB officer. Ce ; tr. D. BORISOV. oo Cie Gamera, sad) Pies a ° | ce _ NOSENKO! S$. ‘Information. ~ In 1958" or’ "2959. ‘the: “American: Department" S| “Embassy Section _ _attempted to. cecruie {lanustont a. Second c or ‘Third | Secretary Ob yor “at the Embass ‘Both male and female agents were used ~~" against “iti, “Znd photographs were obtained of [HARMSTONE|'s Ss. Ob. - homosexual _ as well.as. heterosexual activities. When- confronted, _ Qbhowever, HARMSTONE] refused’ to collaborate with the KGB, | cee reported the approach to American officials, but. asserted ‘that he .was involved. dust in. heterosexual ‘compromise. : -NOSENKO. reviewed: ‘the: -CHEREPANOV documents (see p. 309) | 1964, _including the KGB plan. of operations «lace Rawe TONE OS NOSENKO confirmed the substance and eventual success of the Pian, which | was to eee eae and photograph. hin | UG oe 0001643 a a “Tse 197124 Top Secret ~ 2. Copy 30
_ Top Secret (Annex B) , ! | Ob | [HARMS tone, Richard |(Continued) Z while in intimate relations with a Soviet girl. Because the : KGB concluded that (HARMSTONE]had not reported the homo~ ( sexual compromise, ft was planned to attempt to recruit him again later, when he was transferred elsewhere abroad. If Ob(LARMSTONE) hag reported the homosexual compromise, it would ave been monitored by the KGB over the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office, In later questioning NOSENKO stated that he learned of Oothe HARMSTONE]case from KOVSHUK. He could not recall who the KGB case Officer was, but was certain that the latter had left the Embassy Section. Tf [HARMSTONE| had reported 06 ‘his compromise, he Surmised, he would have been withdrawn immediately from Moscow, and [HARMSTONE| did not leave the 06 Soviet Union prematurely, 0b Comment: (Richard Cc. HARMS TONE), who served in Moscow /from October 1957 to Octéber 1959 as Second oj ~ Secretaryil, reported to the. Embassy Security Officer dn 23 May 1959 that a KGB officer had tried to recruit him after threatening exposure through doctored photographs purporting to show HARMS TONE]' s homosexual activities. {uarm— Of STONE subsequently identified from a visa application photograph the KGB officer as "KOMAROV", an overt contact of Embassy colleague WINTERS. (HARMS TONE] left the Soviet@6 Union six months later, admitted homosexual | activities,.and -resigned from the Department - of State. The relevant portions of the : CHEREPANOV Papers confirm {HARMSTONE|'s admissions 06 with respect to KGB agents with whom he was involved. "KOMAROV" has been identified as KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's Superior in the Embassy Section and the Source of what NOSENKO said he learned of the case, oe 0 COG A 412 OO, 1644 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 12/88
(Annex By i | Horna, 2 . “Sonal 06 eee — [NOSENKO' Ss ‘Information ‘. Hoe. An. ‘American Embassy. official. ‘and a friend of. the ; - “eee 6S aide Robert ARMSTRONG) (see above), et maigog. is known to have engaged in homosexual. acts with: ‘an Ariienian. -in- ‘Yerevan. The KGB currently (in 1964) is Planning. to cattempe: to compromise and, recruit (HOFFMAN). | 06 ~ mo Comment: - Interviewed on -the ‘basis of NOSENKO' s llega. on 06 tion, (HOFFMAN) in a. State Department security . ».interview denied ‘homosexual activities. so Informed that the results.‘of a polygraph. - ~ -examination indicated he had practiced. deception >, om that question, HOFFMAN |-resigned from. the Department of Staté® on (31 July. 1964. “GIOPFMAN) 06 ‘asserted that he had no contact with. the KGB vwhile assigned in Moscow, . an assertion. _ Supported by the polygraph cfaminations : ' ls NOSENKO. claims he.was assigned to the: — Soe . Seventh | Department . at the- Section of the’ 0b. - the target of the Embassy. Section, of -the’ American Department.” “ob . ‘[Howarp, | sees 7 NOSENKO! s Information : “tian? a. “WSia: Avemployed, vas assigned ‘temporarily. for * four months. to the’ Embassy. in Moscow in ‘spring. 1962:as alow. Oi gublacations procurement officer) ‘He was ‘recruited. by. the GB... GRYAZNOV, of. the American Department Embassy - - Section, requested NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room - Segtion, reg HOWARD)’ s,.- for a woman: from Leningrad. TS Now 197124 Top Secret CS 7 Copy’ _10—
(Annex B) Comment: Top Secret 0 [HowarD denied recruitment in an interview with the FBI, although a polygraph: examination indicated he was disturbed on related questions, HOWARD] had earlier declared his intention to ivorce his American wife and marry a Soviet national. His contract with] USTA) expired in 24 December 1964 and Was not renewed. NOSENKO claims to have been serving in the Seventh Department at the time (HOWARD) was a target of the Embassy Section. ~ 04 [zuston, Hayden Henry] ina taxi, OL [HUsTon] did _NOSENKO's Information 08,06 Comment: sta employee Hayden Henry HUSTON] was inter- Vv ewed on 30 October 1963 regarding a report 1954 as 4a result of his Sexual activities. 6 HUSTON] served in (Yugoslavia for eight years-|( rom.1953 until January 1962, During that interview he Stated that during his tour in 414 7 TS No. 197124 op Secret — © tener
(annex, Bb oS oe -! oo bf 7 ean Department’ E a and” GRYAZNOV suggested ee KANTOR,. Marvin ideological grounds. in’ 1961..." a, ‘Garvey. an {abe cee! “agent ‘who. was. ‘cultivated. and recru 1963, while in the Seventh. Department, NOSENKO asked Ameri- mbassy Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent. Melvin ‘(sie) KANTOR , a. “Harvard Student, ‘in: 1958 or 1959.. oy NOSENKO'S Information _ in ‘Moscow,’ “tse ‘an active. KGB.: ited by V.A. KUSKOV. In- ‘who: could be used against: a visiting American delegation, “Comment: » Before. “NOSENKO' s “information was ‘received, - OSLSAFFE) reported his- recruitment by one "Stava So KISLOV" in October 1962. “QG-in. December: 1966 {JAI ‘In a CIA interview FFE|did not recognize A.K. . KISLOV' s photograph but identified.a photo-- . > graph, of KUSKOV-as being the KGB officer who “Ov, reeruited him in 1962. ‘from the: ‘USSR in. ‘October 1965. As. far as CIA: _ is! ‘aware,. he-has not’ been interviewed | on., the” , basis. of NOSENKO' S| information. . JAFFE| was ‘expelled © _NOSENKO! s Information Comment. “Marvin KANTOR, a. Slavic- language instructor -. = a. tat the University of Michigan, visited the USSR: oo When. interviewed by. CIA in “1961 hé- admitted having. had contact with. Soviet : Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in. °1959, but asserted that he then had flatly ee a refused to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence. | “causa? 10 was) recruited: on- ; His” case ‘was turned over to: one the | First Chief. Directorate. 7 - . - eo al TS No. 197124 | Copy - —
“| : oe Top Secret (Annex B) Comment: (Continued) When interviewed in 1963, KANTOR said he had not travelled to the USSR since 1959, NOSENKO's information was limited to written notes brought in 1964 to Geneva. NOSENKO claim&S he was in the Seventh Department in 1959, at the actual time of KANTOR's recruit- ment, and does not explain why the KANTOR case [Kazan-Komargx] 06. ( NOSENKO's Information  (Komaren, an American of Czech descent and somehow connected with a tourist service in the United Staes, has been identified by the Czech Secret Police as being in contact with Western Intelligence and the to locate him. fhe Czec ‘Comment: The subject of NOSENKO's lead was [Vladimir O6 ; ' Joseph KAZAN~KOMAREK, a naturalized American citizen and the operator of the |Harvard Travel C4 |p Tourist Agency in Cambridge, Massachusettsl. / He has never had any covert relationship With CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. In August 1963 the FBI was advised by another source of the Soviet-Czech plan to lure (KAZAN- O6 KOMAREK ]to the Soviet Union and take him to Czechoslovakia where h@ wuld be tried for espionage. GUCI G4 416 TS No. 197124 Copy __ Top Secret HR
Top Secret “Comment: (Continued) re os gt lee pa as : NOSENKO' S| “information, which he’ reported” Sf lenty to:the FBI, was substantially accurate. - i In October 1966, ‘after being warned of the... .ndsk by the FBI; fkazan= ~KOMARER] visited Moscow Ob for an Inturist travel’ agent &.- conference and, os em route back: to Paris, was arrested in: Prague <when his AEROFLOT flight was. diverted... ue : NOSENKO's~ ‘sourcing for this lead, which . presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in. the Seventh Department, had not been established. . ‘CIA did not learn of. NOSENKO's report on [KAZAN= Ob. > KOMARER] until the latter was arrested ino ., Czechoslovakia.in 1966, by which time’ NOSENKO' s- , Enterrogation: had been suspended «. ne a a : [bata sel] NOSENKO' s “‘Thformation, iss oan visited the USSR, in 1959, and the KGB os ‘concludéd that he-was a “homosexual. and planned to attempt - ‘to recruit: him if he should. return to the Soviet Union.-. - NOSENKO. noted the information. while. reviewing, YEFREMOV cand: ~VOLKOV'. Ss file: “prior: ‘to. their. retirement. “The. identity. ‘of. NOSENKO' Ss. lead ‘has’ been: ee, “confirmed to be” NosiaKo" MATLAM. ObThe case’ Cty pots still under, investigation. OSENKO:¢laims -. onto have been YEFREMOV!' s and VOLKOV's case .- . .officer at the’ time one of them was -in touch | oe oes tie 1959,. but learned of the case....-- ~~: ony | later when. reviewing | those agents’ files... , Comment: 6001649 oo “ah | TS No. 197124 Top Secret | W TO Copy 10 _
(Annex B) Top Secret Oo cE IELSEN, Philip] NOSENKO's Information tasks. On one of his Visits to Moscow, (IELSEN] OG with KGB agent (Tamara KUNGAROVA), and the KGB 0% used her in the development of (NIELSEN). pu For Purposes of Seventh Départment officer, was a introduced to (NIELSEN] in the role of [KUNGAROVA}'s father, but ()6 Positive -resiit, NOSENKO heatd later that (NIELSENT(% ARGWA had married] and were living in London, / NOSENKO Was involved in the determination of [NIELSEN} 5 Ob KOPEYKIN was Comment: Men t ohue € intelligence Status on his first trip. Besides LEONOV, American Department Case officer Viktor ‘also involved, NOSENKO has asserted variously that he recruited (KUNGaRovaA) in 1955 and that sha was his agent tasks on this trip was to obtain a Soviet . telephone oon ORINTELSEN) met [KUNGAROVA) os a OF later trip, in January 1959, Despite CIA warnings that he was involved in what appeared -to be a KeGp Operation, NIELSEN returned to see ft ph. her in Moscow in January 1960, ana there met a Person re resenting himself as[ KUNGAROV "s (6 Father DU WIELSEN] returned ‘co Moscow in 962, married KUNGAROVA, and they moved to France. KUNGAROVA] died in France in 1965, In January LEEO TS No. 197124 Copy PolsK
_ TepSecret — Comment: (Continued) . 1960, when NOSENKO claims pérsonal knowledge _. Obof NIELSEN} s_ meeting with(KUNGAROVA}s "father", Ob - he was not .in the Seventh Department, ‘but in ‘the American Embassy Section. oe we ee. oa em. passe) -NOSENKO! 8 ‘Information ‘An American » couse GOED vie recruited. by Seventh. “Department . case. officers in. June’'1963.°. NOSENKO was not’ in. “Moscow: at the: time, and knew ‘no. further | details.“ - Comment: Interviewed b the FBI on the basis of. NOSENKO' s 7 Ob information, ee having been - recruited while visiting the Soviet Union. He “was not. contacted by the KGB in the United “States, although such. arrangements had been .made at the time of his recruitment. | On a visit . toe Moscow in 1964, after NOSENKO's defection, ae asi was again. contaéted by the KGB and he -. agree to collaborate for fear of reprisals us against. relatives in. the. USSR. Meg ch ga a wt 4 eee Gene fet Ca i -NOSENKO! 8: Information _ “06. cee contacted by KGB. officers during the. Winter olpmpies at Squaw Valley, California. Although he was not .reeruited, he was to be recontacted by KGB officers later, . ‘in. Switzerland. wranereay cent Moscow in August 1963, ~ ‘Seventh. Department American Section case officer K.G. KRUPNOV. arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) - ‘ZAYTSEV., ‘to meet. the ‘American, “iiss a “Ts No. 97124 Top Secret © Copy 10 10 ~~ 419