AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR PROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT -TYPE CDASSIPICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS 08/28/98 Page : 1 JERK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Peleased under the John . Eennedy ges WSsassination Records 202-1LO00L~LOL9O Ollection Act of 1992 FOTA SERIES DOC LOL AGENCY INFORMATION (44 USC 2107 Note}. ases#: NW 54214 Date: DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD OPERATION. MONGOOSE 08/07/62 3 MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET Le RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/30/98 Reviewed by JCS, OSD, State, CIA. NOJOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION HW..54214 Docld: 3242749231 Page 1
“ ak f O y ( Operation MONGOOSE ‘. ~ 7 August 1962 - McNamara undertook to p f poate needed by CIA on ‘ ) pr@peration of « list of x coh If | Ie was decided that I) "Tand-ba 1o facility would \ not be considered at ch vie 3_March 1962 "3 The Group noted that the seale of the covert intelligence effort ie about the maximo that can be supported with the assets available. March 1962 ° It was agreed chet CIA would continua to bring specific proposals which involve policy considerations, to the Special Croup for approval. qe CIA was asked toe look into private sites for training, and to re- | , @xemine whelr the possibility of using Isolation. (Mote: This was in 1 tion with a suggestion to use &@ specific Defense facility.) — be Ak Desens ania in Gheksp with os pinion vis {te capability to provide one or two aircraft for initial resupply operations. | preparations are alse to be asde | leading toward the availability of persounel and aircraft. Mr. McBama ra urged, however, that such planning should proceed on two "tracks" with | \y ae be made that would make it ee | \ connection with small boat operations, the Secretary of Defense rAl oak to provide anything available within Defense for which a ; aN | Fequirement might be established. CIA will present a specific request | / for equipment others G/PT-boats (these not being available) within "Scaammnaieion! "32 March 1962 ECTION TO, CUA HAS NO ORTION ANDIOR NT General Craig summarized an Air Force study on risks which would DEC OF TH iS DOCUME! be imvolved in air resupply. He emphasized that the Air Force study a 6/r3 ‘5 is only "a first look” because “a detailed plan has not been submitted 770 by CIA." oh eG oh: begow 4 The Group agreed that each projected flight would be submitted to it for approval. Easton a The Attorney General urged that airptene pllotea and other Cuban defectors be carefully looked at in connection with resupply missions. . SPR Te & fla. oct 14 ‘a ee HW 54214. Docld: 32424921. Page. 2
1 & 1 + eae ae SS ee a HW. 54214 DocId: 32424921 Page 3 : | | General Lansdale reported that two Air Force airplanes and crews ma readied for air resupply missious, although no such mission been requested. ( Mr. McCone said he was not yet informed on ‘i to train persomel and run the air operation completely for [Al \ aS readiness to supply non-l. g, crews, Lansdale said thet the Air Porc. ( ai 2 April” 1962 , —— a! a Mr. MeCone said that CIA has concluded that Cubans are not suit-. able for night supply drops, although they could be used for les, da ; missions such as leaflet drops. However, CAT pilots could _ be available in 30 days and arrangements could be made to remove their! _attributability co the U.8. Government. The Group appeared to feel | that euch U.8. civilians would not be essentially different from | AL Aprti 1962 Coons - Nees seid that present restrictionsson attribution present , difficulties with respect to training agents and supply missions. i Ske Secretary of State asked about the adequacy of existing policy approvals. In response, Geuaral Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents rather than restricting them to intelligence. It was agreed that within the frame< work of present understandings more people could be infiltrated. Ie was noted that it would be difficult if not impossible to maintain motivation, aad without at least an implied promise of eventual U.s, action, . 12 April 1962 Mr. McCone urged that activities in addition to intelligence should be authorized, end thet the U.8. should be prepared to accapp more attributability than it perhaps now is. It was agreed that the Guidelines did not require reviatom at thie time but that the operation as presently conceived, with the ateppimy up indicated by Mr. MecCone, should be continued until Augugt, Mr. Gilpetric thought {rc Dat Ct Ag ay to achieve as high « posture of readiness as possible, for exmaple by acquiring materiel nacessary for more active operations. Tae Sou
1 at Operation MONGOOSE ‘. . 7 August 1962 1962 « McNamara undertook to p y boats needed by CIA on om aration of e list of one 6. \A _ f ON le wee decided that internal ‘Tand-ba io facility would as eet be considared at th : \t . , ree The Group noted that the eeale of the cowert intelligence effort is about the maximo that can be supported with the assets available. March 1962 It was agreed that CIA would contime to bring specific proposals which involve policy considerations, to the Special Group for approval. S— CYA was asked to lock into private eites for training, and to re- |) . ; Oxamize whee the possibility of using Isolation. (Mote: This was in / . {3 Sion with s _ Suasestion t to use a specific Defense factitey-) att a ” Piles "42 Mareh 1962 AS NO eacatites cIAK SSIFICATION 1 Gemeral Craig summsrized an Air Force study on risks which would DECL ee OF TH aN SCUMEN be involved in air resupply. He emphasized thet the Air Force study REL é yee is only “a first look” because "a detailed plan has not been submitted " 3 pero” ~— by CIA." 2S The Group agreed that each projected flight would be submitted te ie for approval. toms oe The Actorney General urged that sirptene pilots and other Cuban defectors be carefully looked at in connection with resupply missions. we me see (fen ey NW 354214 DBocld:324274971 Page 4
a a 30 March 1962 rf | (Al in ; N\A a Mr. McCone said that CIA has concluded that Cubans are not suit-. able for night supply drops, although they could be used for less \ demanding missions such as leaflet drops. Howewer, CAT pilots could be available in 30 days and arrangements could be made to remove their! attributability to the U.8. Government. The Group appeared to feel | that euch U.8. civilians would not be essentially different from ~~~ sheep dips. Lh April 1962 — ~ ~ Mite MeCone said that present restrictionason attribution present diigiculrion with respect to training agents and supply missions. . The Gecretary of State asked ahout the adequacy of existing policy approvals. In response, General Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents rather then restricting them to intelligence. It was agreed that within the frame- work of present understandings more people could be infiltrated. It wes noted that it would be difficule i€ mot impossible to maintain wotivation, amd without at least an implied promise of eventual U.S. action. ie epi ti i ee ey ete . oe : i ene Dh MS eS Sit i a ae os 12 April 1962 ie. MoComa urged that activities in addition cto intelligence should be authorized, and that the U.S. should be prepared to accepe wore attxibutability than it perhapa now is. It was agreed that the Guidelines did not require revisiom at this time but that the operation a8 presently conceived, with the steppim up indicated by Mr. McCone, should be continued until August. Mr. Gilpatric thought {ce necansary to achieve as high a posture of readiness aa possible, for example by acquiring materiel necessary for more active operationg. \ Ti Sana HW 54214 Docld: 324274921 Page 5 Pee ese fl |