THIS COPY IS NOT : TRANSMITTAL of TOCS INFORMATION REPORT S89 ! lous EVirginia B. Flynn eb / | ROUTING ; Urar WH Ss, Ine a2 /Ronorts 3 his = =, iat S547 => ———— sf i 2 set | bate December 1964 Ss C3 ' ONFIRMA TION WH/SS4 14 TDCS bs-315/01644-64 iF ORMATION COPIES CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO/H, WE 4, WH 9 (2N-39463) NF (AULASE.3) Liaison « <7 etememertpsee ae ennai § . ‘ : i f { : ee %-B OROLETE merwOUS coors 05-39-0849 4 = a . 2. - é ise SAS Rte ERAT EE Re hw ct teh ikea oth ATR Zee "Aaah gree Raines F% gig Fi glMe Fini aibinsee rm AMBER a TOR EEE te eu OO vehi aR EF te PBA tek Dt
14-00000 BE eeienctanenty, RRR AMIRI PERE NEHIS b ae m omen —_YEERET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ® RCUTINE Intelligence Information Cable COUNTRY CUBA TOCS DB-315/01644-64 DATE OF NOVEMBER, EARLY DECEMBER 1964, AND AS STATED DISTR. 11 DECEMBER 1964 . SUBJECT COMMENTS ON RECENT MANEUVERING BY FIDEL CASTRO AND BACKGROUND ON THE GROOQUI AFFAIR ‘PLACE & DATEACQ. 10 DECEMBER 1964 REF IN ~39463 AND ; Appraisal, A FORMER HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN OFFICIAL WHO WAS ONCE ACTIVE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT AND A CONFIDANT OF FIDEL CASTRO, HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN ANTI-COMMUNIST AND IS NOW STRONGL* ANTI-CASTRO, HE CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH MANY CUBAN OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, SOURCE HAS PROVIDED A LIMITED NUMBER OF REPORTS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN ACCURATE, 1. PROBABLY THE MAJOR CHANGE THAT HAS OCCURRED IN CUBA DURING THE PAST YEAR, TOGETHER WITH THE DECLINING ECONOMIC SITUATION, HAS 8 omit BEEN THE CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING POWERS IN ONE MAN, PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, CASTRO REFUSES TO LISTEN TO ADVICE ASD IS FOREVER BYPASSING HIS MINISTERS, CASTRO GETS AN IDEA AND WITHOUT CONSCTLTING ANYONE WILL CALL A TRUSTED OFFICER, ASSIGN HIM THE TASK, AND ORDER HIM TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO CASTRO, THIS CAUSES TOTAL CONFUSION IN | GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES, AND HAS ALSO GIVEN RISE TO PUBLIC CRITICISN OF CASTRO, SUCH CRITICISM, ALTHOUGH MOSTLY IN A JOKING VEIN, IS A. NEW DEVELOPMENT, CASTRO IS AWARE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE EFCOMING Ta, USO. Gece THD aad Tee ee tecting the Retional Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Eaplooage Laws, tie eee ney t h Manmlason oF reveistion of which in say manner W an uneuthorteee fern Cee Teas ad N { ABRCAD/BACKGROUND CSE osuy | See STATE,INR «DIA ABMY/acst NAVY nk, JCS SCORE NSA Nic MKXESK 0c: ONE Ock O82 oo FBI REPCINCLANT TREASURY COMWERCE = Re ng RR corte ttn et ranted a be 8 alls oeithinee eine ke Re On ahh Se apa ER tr etme bof ee LR ee ~~ ¥ TP ee SHG RYT REARS «RE fe Sea oN rc mate e + im ont tee Pantene ethene ememtemmee 2 A ee a eD me
14-00000 ebets bbe tome TN -39463 RULED hE aiskce meres yer Di SSEt-ABROADBACKGROL DEEP CT ’ TDCS DB- PAGE 2 . 315/01644-64 +e epee een eee CRITICAL, AND HE IS STARTING TO MANEUVER TO REGAIN GROUND, 2. CASTRO'S INVESTIGATION OF JOAQUIN ORDOQUI MESA WAS THE AFTERVATH OF AND DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE MARCH 1964 TRIAL OF MARCOS ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ ALFONSO, ORDOQUI WAS VERY UNHAPPY WITH THE PRO- CEEDINGS AND HE REFUSED TO LET MATTERS REST, ORDOQUI CONTINUED TO EXPRESS IRRITATION ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE TRIAL HAD BEEN HAXDLED, AXD HIS CRITICAL ATTITUDE CONTRIBUTED TO CASTRO'S BRINGING °~ i er eepetneEemERR, Get MATTERS TO A HEAD, 3, CASTBO'S PRIMARY CONCERN REGARDING THE “OLD GUARD" COMMUN- ISTS IS THAT THEY ARE SO DISLIKED BY THE MASSES. BY KEEPING THEY, HOVEVER, CASTRO GIVES HIMSELF MANEUVERING GROUND. CASTRO REALIZES HE MUST ACT AGAINST THE “OLD GUARD" COMMUNISTS Wi™H RUSTRAINT IN Coe 5 sean peettttemaratecne tensa =~ tcsesasepog : ed ORDER NOT TO CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS, THE LAST THING CASTRO WANTS IS AN UNCONTROLLED CRISIS EITHER WITH THE SOVIETS 4 OR WITHIN THE REGIME, 4, CASTRO'S MAJOR PROBLEMS ARE ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, AND LABOR, ho Men cote aya Conte ene « ene Pv LAZARO PENA GONZALEZ, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL DE TRABAJA- DORES DE CUBA REVOLUCIONARIA (REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN WORKERS’ ORCANIZA- _ TION, CTC-R) IS SLATED TO BE REYOVED, BUT ONLY CASTRO WILL SAY WHEN, CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ, DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE LA REFORMA AGRARIA (NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF AGRARIAN REFORM, INRA) | HAS ALSO HAD HIS PROBLEMS WITH CASTRO, THE INRA IS A “MESS" BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANYONE CAN SUCCEED IN THE JOB, AND IT IS UNLIKELY YS TLD sheolieh Senadtalaty Snodeshesy PEGROUSD (SE GN > x. ? nig CR ghee te et! : bey ee 8 BTRMA RS io eddy SRG TE ee a . a Pa ee a ee oe a a ete
14-00000 NQ_FOREIGN DISSEU/CONS —AREED=DTSSEW) MEU ton a) | KO-DEGEENABTOKD sche. UND OE- OHNE IN -39463 : . TorsDs- PAGE 3 SECRET 315/01644-64 THAT CASTRO WILL ESCALATE THE CRISIS BY A MOVE AGAINST RODRIGUEZ AT THIS TIME, (SOURCE COMMENT: CASTRO ONCE SAID THAT HE WILL NoT PERMIT HIMSELF TO BE PRESSURED BY ANYONE AND WILL REPLACE OFFICIALS ONLY WHEN HE DESIRES TO DO SO, AS EARLY AS DECEMBER 1963 CASTRO WAS PLANNING TO REMOVE AUGUSTO MARTINEZ SANCHEZ AS MINISTER OF LABOR AT A CONVENIENT TIME, THUS HIS RECENT ACTION AGAINST MARTINEZ MAY Se eres REPRESENT THE REALIZATION OF A YEAR-OLD INTENTION.) CASTRO'S PROBLEMS WITH THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN LESS SERIOUS. ACTION TAKEN AGAINST MILITARY OFFICERS HAS BEEN ON DISCIPLINARY, NOT POLITICAL GROUNDS, AS IN THE CASE OF THE DISMISSAL OF CAPTAIN JOSE AGUSTIN “TINTIN" DIAZ-ARGUELLES, oo, 5. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, . END OF MESSAGE A RI eer eRe See LTA TTC tIRE Reet AED REE TORN SE GAisiN tems cumTtenimar: 2 # a. 5 3 : i i - 4 * 3 2 4 — « i = oy *, ee - ad < x wwe * 4 BERR 6 nih EMC WRN pier OTN Lam Sin tart RN NCA RACK tele ES OI ceed 4 a | Bam \ 2 sete ef Ed Se we me : 7 ’ SAO es SR ne OC oT DU osu BES, Aloe TRL