Phone (4188 &. fi . ft nN od ll 12 13 14 WARD & a 15 16 17 18 19 “20 ge 23 24 410 aes] §.€., Wastungian, O.C. 20003 25 21 NW 47129 Docld: ete ge eR ES, RS NT nc erage are Te APL ere A EEE EEE -or the development at leasi. of a nuclear weapon. the story, what substance there is to it, or in what way the Story can be substantiated’: 2202445 Page 2 TOP SECRET 39 than I and nothing stands cr nothing sticks in my mind to suggest that Dick. said anything which would be other than normal, casual conversatior after what was rather a strong remark by the President. ?fnd I was a little bit stunned, needless to say. Mr. Kirbow. Thank you very much, Mr. Szulc. Mr. Aaron. If we can go onto another subject, Mr. S#ulc, from page proofs of a forticoming article in the magazine there is a suggestion there concerning the involvement of the Agency in -~ the Centrel Intelligenca Agency -~- in the -- involvement of the Agency efter the 1956 Suez War in a program with Israel. | Can you tell us what that story is about? Mr. Szule. The article which is to appear in the Auaust issue of Penthouse magazine relates ina general fashion for reasons which I will explain presently, if so desired, the fact that sometime in tha Jate S0's subsequent to the Suez “ar of 1956, the CIA had made -vailable to the Israeli government technical knowledge, techn: cal assistance, in many fields, leading to the creation -- that was the case at the time -- Mr. Aaron. Can you tell us how you managed to acquire Mr. Szule. I wag to'd by one:-of my news sources thet a TOP SECRET
ecemaateeaemeemeememmenceccmmmmmmmaaaemeaaaaaaaasaaaa sss So —_ TOP SECRET 40 fe. 3 cr . situation had occurred in tire 1960's in which the CIA delivered to the Israeli government classified information, technical knowledge know-how, the services of distinguished physicists . Prone (Area &... no fissionable material in the form of plutonium to assist in the | 5 development of an Israeli nuclear weapon at the Dimona Israeli 6 Nuclear Testing Grounds. ‘ I have raised the subject in a private conversation with | i ai Mr. James Angleton in the soring of this year. Mr. Angleton ad told me that essentially this information was correct. Let me backtrack and aid one point. 10 ll My original information was indeed the counterintelligence, a 12 the CI Division of. the Central Intelligence Agency, which was | eas 13 then headed by Mr. Angleton, was the unit in CIA responsible | <commpmans==srasssiusunee sammamish a, : 14 for this nuclear operation. Because of an acquaintantshio | na 15 || which I have with Mr. Angleton I had the opportunity in a a private conversation to ask him in so Many words, can you ~ 2 17 | corroborate or confirm that this which I have described took 1g || place and that you and CI ware involved in this. 19 Angleton said that -- he was rather taken aback by this 20 information -- said that, in effect, he could confirm it, with ' 2) || two corrections. One, the timeframe was wrong, that it was 22 not in the early ‘60's, but indeed in the late ‘50's after the | 23 || Suez War and number two that as far as he was concerned it was not delivered by him or the CIA or anyone of his knowledze ‘of any fissionable material such as plutonium or other material. specae 2 ed TOP SECRET “410 GR. %.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 RW 47129 Docld!32202445 Page 3
Phone (Area EAL. oD © ll le 13 WARD & 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Re 23 24 410 GB. §.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 RW 47129 Decld: 14 TOP SECRET _ That all that was made available to the Israeli governmen nt | by the CIA as represented, and as represented by CI, the a counterintelligence was classified information, technical T assistance, and the availability of one or more distinguished nuclear scientists or physicists whose services were available to the United States government. I, based on information which I had from my original | source, asked Mr. Angleton whether he could confirm that a British born scientists whose name, upon investigation, turns out to be Mann -- M-a-n-n -~ first name Wilfred Basil | or Basil Wilfred <- again I can correct the record at that -- | where Mr. Mann, or Dr. Manr I should say, was indeed one of : the scientists involved in this operation. Mr. Anqleton | confirmed that indeed this was the case. ! He cautioned me that any publication of Dr. Mann's involvement in Mr. Angletor 's words could be enormously explosive, damaging to the national security of the United States, damaging to our intelligence assets and also enormously dangerous to Dr. Mann Perscnally. In effect, Mr. Angleton said at one point that shoild I surface Mr. Mann's name, Dr. Mann's name, he may go as far as commit suicide. I asked for an explanetion and Mr. Angleton told me that Dr. Mann, who was a Britis!, citizen at the time, who in the 'SO's was part of the joint. U.S.-British nuclear group based at the British Embassy in Washington, was found by | sone Page 4 TOP SECRET ne | |
Phone {Ares R.. % om 10 ll _12 13 WARD Gt 14 (15 16 22 $.€., Washington, O.C. 20003 -o - Ae] | el 4460 EB 25° 24 WH 47129 Docld: TOP SECRET 42 in one Or more espionage situations involving the defection | of McClean and Burgess and subsequently Philby. I asked H counterintelligence, by CIA, to have been involved in some way Angleton to tell me more absut this. He said it was one of i those very complicated double agent situations in which a decision waS made when Dr. “iann was still in this country that ae TTR SL he would not be prosecuted, arrested or otherwise exposed and because the Agency felt tha : | a U.S. intelligence assat. Tt is further my understanding that Dr. Mann, who now resides in Washington, D.C. -- or I should say in Chevy Chase, Maryland, across the state line -~ is now employed by the U.S. Bureau of Standards, is an American citizen. According to . CESAR EEE Mr. Angleton, his equivalent, the CIA equivalent of a parole situation which means he's sander surveillance and has to report at certain intervals to his case officer or his parole officer | as it were, at the CIA and ie repeated that should the story of Dr. Mann's involvement ian those situations, the espionage situations and the Israeli situation emerge, it could be enormously damaging to the J.S. national interests, to the negotiations in the Middle cast, to men with our intelligence arrangements with the British, who I understand have the knowled of the u. Ss. decision not to prosecute Dr. Mann. and » that in the end it could even become personally damaging to Dr. Mann to the point to use Angleton's woris, he might kill himself. Tres rages TOP SECRET t he could be useful or helpful as | | | | | | | | ue | ! |
. Phone {Area @.; no oad 10 | lili 12 | 15 WARD B 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 410 eid §.£., Wastungtun, 0.C. 20003 295 NW 47129 DoclId: | E 1 u J | | i i t i f ( fj | | | | TOP SECRET 43 I told Angleton that 1 would handle the story in the most careful way, which is the way in which it appears, or will appear, in Penthouse magazine. The name is not given. There is no mention whatsoever of the Burgess~-McClean-Philby type of situations. Angleton's name is used in the story to corroborate the material but without direct attribution to Angleton. The article will say or is saving that sources close to Angleton confirmed the thrust of the story but. disclaimed other alleqa- tions, or words to that effect, that a fissionable material was made available to the ]lsraeli government. cea RS TLS Ae Mr. Angleton chose not to go into a question which I raised with him which was whether this operation was undertaken with the knowledge and the authorization of the President of the United States at the t:me or the National Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commissicn and/or othar departments of the government who would norma: ly be responsible for transfer or clearance for transfer of classified information in the nuclear | field to a foreign government. Mr. Angleton chose no‘. to discuss this and I therefore was | not in a position to pursu: this point which obviously was one which contains a great dea... Mr. Schwarz. Did you discuss with Mr. Angleton anythina about -- any question rela‘:ing to why this was done, assuming this was done, if it was done? 2202445 Page 6 TOP SEC RET
: Phone (Area of EB av) e 12 13 WARD BB 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 410 BB 5.€., Wasningian, O.c. 20003 25 a . RW 47129 Docld:32202445 Page 7 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 44 | Mr. Aaron. Can we intarrupt the record to note that the | Senator has left. | (Senator Mondale left che room.) I Mr. Schwarz. Under th: rules, you don't have to proceed | further, if you wish. Mr. Szule. Fine with ine. Mr. Schwarz. Did you liscuss with Mr. Angleton whether or not there was anything that the United States or the Central Intelligence Agency or Mr. ingleton, taking them in that order, : received in return for the s,assage of this material, if in ( fact it was passed? Mr. Szule. No, I did i0ot. I did not raise the question, I suppose because among oth2r things because of the limitation of time and because my main ‘effort at that point was to try to corroborate to my own satisfaction that such an operaticr occurred and to obtain from Angleton as much as I could of corroboration or denial, which was done in the form of transcribing. Mr. Kirbow. Let me get it absolutely clear so that there. is no doubt left in my mind. Did you describe in the same detail to Mr. Angleton that hg SEE EE eo EE eer eS, you related here about the transfer of all of this stuff and eggs ERT Eero, . the physicists, and did he confirm that that did in fact take cca eeeeeaaeeaeaaeaeaiaaeaaal Place except for the fissionable material? inl .Mr. Szulc. Basically yes. I said something to the affect. ad CY
TOP SECRET that I understand, can you confirm this or not, because I'm in a quandry, do I use the story or not, would you comment on In other words, do I understand the following information. . eee Phone (Aree EP... correctly that the CIA and you personally have engaged | Israeli's information, k assistance, manpower, scientists and nuclear materials for specifically counterintelligence and in making available to the now~how, assistance, development of nuclear weapons in the early ‘60's. This was roughly the way I put it to him. His response  steeumeteetpfe ee fneeneneeens eerste eerpeEEEEEEEEE ag ck_by...che question in the first place, you know, he said, how the hell do you know about this, exer NT A of ee rete SAT OAT SEY , baing rather taken aha rn eS 0 8 <ESEEES I ESE0 SE S and I said, wel], you know one hear's things in this town, ‘eer ET and he says well, as long as you know, you might as well have it straight. Your timeframe was wrong, sone EER, the early ‘60's it was the late 'S50‘s and decidedly, flatl;, LL ET EE EEE aT es errr Te, to the best of my knowledge, there was no delivery of AA TD fissionable material to the cece cea eaeaaeeeauemesteanaeaiaaal Then my second questioc Israeli's. mwas, as I recall, do I understar! correctly that Dr. Mann was (fees oe SESE .mMada available to participate in this operation, which be one of the scientists who were confirmed, as I mentioned, and then he said, but, did you *now ee) that he had this peculiar tackground to which I referred You referred to him as a double-agent background? 416 ee §.E., Washengton, 0.C. 20003 TOP SECRET RW 47129 Docld: 32202445 Page 8
: Pnone (Area FR... n 13 14 vane te t ee mw ee Oo © 15 16 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 4i0 eB. §.£.,, Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 RW 47129 Docld: TOP SECRET 46 Mr. Szule. He didn't use the word. I think this was my word to deseribe him. I think more precisely he did not use the expression. Mr. Schwarz. You statad the conversation took place in rapa the spring, was it April? Mr. Kirbow. April of ‘Zoe Mr. Szulc. If that's ceally relevant to you and I can look at my calendar and give you the precise date of it. It would have been late March, early April. Mr. Schwarz. Well, I think it would be relevant if we want to check it out with anybody else. Mr. Szule. That's easy. I can check it out. Mr. Schwarz. Where dii tha conversation take place? Mr. Szule. It took place in the home of a mutual friend ges eer eeneecreee in the first instance and then it continued at dinner at a ce) restaurant in Washington. STEELE Mr. Schwarz. Dinner in the evening, not lunch? Mr. Szule. I would say most of the conversation was at the mutual friend's house and loose ends were wrapped up at dinner. Mr. Kirbow. What was the friend's name? 4x. Aaron. Can we ask a different question? Was your mutual friend a party to the conversation? Mr. Szgule. Yes, ha was present. Mr. Kirbow. Then I think the question is even more TOP SECRET 22027445 Page 9 ae tn la PERRET eR tLe
TOP SECRET amt 47 pertinent. What was the Pe7son's name and do you mind telling 2 | us where the home is locatei? 3 | Mr. Szulc. I would have the same problem that I had with Phone (Area e:::m a 4 : the other question on sourc2s. I have no difficulty here, I would make the request, if I may -- 1 Mr. Kirbow. Certainly. Mr. Szule. Because it does involve a friendship here. Mx. Kirbow. Apparently Mr. Angleton's a personal friend, | i | 9 of yours too. 10 Mr. Szule. No, I woulin't describe him as a personal Ll | friend. I would describe him as an acquaintance, a good | 12 | acquaintance. : © 13 The mutual friend is Benjamin Wells who_is a former | & "ee TET ‘ 14 | correspondent of the New York Times, he's a former officer of ! ee 15 the OSS who worked with Angleton in O§S.. Is there some way in een con eae i 16 | which I can refer this as priviliged information or words to that effect? | I do not like to be in a position of violating confidences, situations where people are trying to be helpful. ) | Mr. Schwarz. Well, I think in this case the individual | does have evidence. The other individuals were just sources, and there's a distinction Letween this and the other. Now it seems to me if Mr. Angleton confirms this story 235 24 then anybody else's testimeny I suppose is irrelevant. 410 A $.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Do you agree with me, Charlie? | | | | i | \ 25 | TOP SICRET : NW 47129 Docld:32202445 Page 10
Prone (Area ee. nm ll l2 13 WARD i 14 15 16 1? 18 n° 19 8 r 20 3 3 21 $ > 2 : 23 @ . $ 25 NW 471235 Doecld: | ti | 2202445 Page 11 : TOP SECRET Mr. Kirbow. Yes. I believe that it should be fair to say to you at this time that if the Committee chose to verify this matter with ; Mr. Angleton and he denied the same, then the Committee might | well want to look further and talk with someone else, so I make you no promises of what the Committee would do. I'm not in a position to do that as a staff member. But I think that would be a matter which they would very carefully consider along with the regeust that you've made. Mr. Szule. The point of the request is essentially that Td Angleton and Ben Wells arg old and close friends. My way it is a bit of a -- it you know, friendship to cita Ben Wells as a witness, a corroborating witness. Mr. Kirbow. I don't believe we understand here that he corroborated the fact, only that he Was present at the time that the confirmation took place? Mr. Szulc. This is why I have a problem of giving you the name but again I want you to understand about the personal relationship that exists arong friends, particularly in our profession. Mr. Kirbow. I think rore importantly in our understanding you should understand that the transcript is in your own words available to the Comrittea and they will be able to see TOP SECRET would be a bit of ethical violation, |
TOP SECRET e | | | g 1 exactly what the concerns ae. oS 2 Mr. Szule. Sure. | i 3 Mr. Schwarz. I don't have anything further on this | : 4 || particular matter. i 5 ! Mr. Aaron. I have one last matter. 6 : De you intend to do anv further stories on this varticular 7 || subject? 8 | Mr. Scwharz. This one’ 9 Mr. Szule. Israel? 10 Mr. Aaron. Yes. 11 Mr. Szule. At this point, no. I understand that a 12 || colleague of mine, a professional colleaque of mine in this 13 || town has some knowledge, I io not know how much, of the WARD cits] 14 | general story. This colleajue, for his own reasons, has 15 || Yefrained from publishing i:. We have discussed it as friends. . 16 || We have made an arrangement that -- a gentleman's agreement, 17 | if you will, that each will inform the other the last minute 18 if one of us wants to uge tia story. 19 This is a conversation which goes back to January, 20 || February. I beleive .that ny colleague, at the time, at least, 2) || did not have as much information as I believe I do at this a2 || time. | 23 I would go back to this only if either this colleague o4 || surfaced in more detail than I have and as you will sea in 416 Riem §.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 Penthouse I am enormously restrained about the datail. “ose TOP SECRET NW 47129 Docld:32202445 Page 12
TOP SECRET ctr am 50 of the detail that I mention here does not appear in the story for obvious reasons. Or if some agency of the government produces a flat denial which then involves my credibility and | Pnone (Area . §44-6000 po my reputation as a reporte:- which would then force me almost REESE EEE SESE tapes EE SESE QR SEE EET A at . i 5 | in defensive action to go -nto detail. enti Lan ee LT 6 | If left alone, I woulc prefer to stand on what I'va 7 | written and the Story is tc come out in such detail as I have 8 Mentioned here. My personal predilection would be to See it | 9 come out through the Committee for reasons -- 10 Mr. Kirbow. You're telling the Committee then that you ll | did not obtain the information from this colleague of yours, ; 12 |) but you think that he has s2parate source information? (a 13 Mr. Szulc. Well, he has sources that are obviously not -- | i ‘ 14 Mr. Kirbow. Could you -@1l ous this Colleague's name? 15 Mr. Szule. If it is not absolutely necessary, I would 16 || rather skip that one, becaure again we are in this peculiar . ‘Shae RE eS ee er 17 | field of very personal finarcial relationships and I don' seein Senco a j think it reaily tells you all that much. You know, wa tend to Coad 19 || Waltz around each other, you know, when one of us thinks the 20 || Other one knows what he's working on there's a little bit of 21 || Waltzing and there's a little bit of confidential -~- discuss 22 || Personal friendship involved. 23 I See Wells' name is re_evant to the conversation because 24 || he can corroborate a conversiition. Here I'm dealing with a ‘@- 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 | Man where I don't even know how much knowledqe he has, and simply TOP SECRET , ; RW 47129 Docld:32202445 Page 13
we. Pnone (Area . 3 . np 10 ll 12 13 WARD ee 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 235 24 416 cee S.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 25 WW 47129 Docla: 2202445 Page 14 TOP SECRET 51 we were discussing did we know about a CIA nuclear Israel situation without mentioning any details. Angleton's name was never mentioned in my conversation over lunch with this colleaguk so I don't even know what he knows. He may know just the general subject. Mr. Aaron. I have one question, the last question for my part. Why did you want to tell this story to the Committee? Mr. Szulc. Two reasons. As a reporter I do not believe that I can clarify this matter further than I have because of my own limited resources. I cannot subpoena people, et cetera, et cetera. I think it is an extremely important point to be established in the context of the whole look into the intelligence community whether this is or is not the case of the Agency acting outside of established channels of government. | | | ! ! | | | | | | | I think it is useful and necessary for the Conqress and for: the public opinion at somé point somewhere to have knowledae of it since I am not able professionally to pursue this any further, unless someone lands on my doorstep with the information. I think Angleton is as far as I can go on this in what he has given me I have written with all the self-imposed restrictio to which I have referred and I think that nothing is served by my keeping this in secrecy. The thing which I have not printed which I have mentioned TOP SECRET | | | t | ns
Pnone (Area a. h% 10 ll l2 13 Ve oa) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 aio Aa, §.£., Wasmingion, 0.C. 20003 TOP SECRET 52 here, but I think that there may be a valid follow-up on your part of this information. Call it a citizen's duty for lack of a better word. Mr. Aaron. Did you speak to Mr. Mann or Dr. Mann about this? Mr. Szule. No, I did not. Deliberately. Mr. Aaron. Did anybody working with you make an effort to contact him? Mr. Szulc. No, it was a very deliberate decision on ny part not to go to him because he was described to me as an elderly gentleman in ill health and if, indeed, with Mr. Angleton -- (Pause) I was simply saying that I made a deliberate decision not to call Dr. Mann because I did not think one, he could be very helpful to me and I was told by Angleton and other people that he was an elderly man in ill health and my calling hin or coming to him saying is it true that you're a spy, is it true that you worked for the CIA in Israel, is it true you work for the CIA would unhinge the person and in situations like this I think most of us have simply to balance what you're likely to get out of a call of conversation against the damage that you can inflict on an individual, and I felt that it was too little to be gained. Mr. Kirbow. I have ore final question. TOP SECRET RW 47129 Doclid: 32202445 Page i5
e Pnone (Area & . ny 10 11 l2 13 m ) 14 15 16 1? 18 - 19 3 8 dG 20 a a 2 z 22 ui : 23 2 + 25 NW 4712S Docld:32202445 Page 16 TOP SECRET 53 Although you'va indicated this was prepared for an August issue of Penthouse, did you tell the Committee when you first obtained this information from your source? : Mr. Szulc. The very first inkling about this would have been early February. | | Mr. Kirbow. Of this year 1975? Mr. Szule. Yes, 1975. And then I pursued -- I was given and so on, subsequent to which I had a conversation with Angl=ton which would have teen, as I say, late March or early guapins April. And Angleton was really the only -- professionally the only person who could ba ir a position to discuss it. Even if he stonewalled it, which he did not, which raises the question, was the counterintelliqence, was the CIA or how was it directly involved. Mr. Kirbow. Have you ever discussed this with any other government official or police person? Mr. Szule. I have not other than which appears in Penthouse magazine or will appear, this is the first discussion to date. Mr. Kirbow. Wa want to thank you, Mr. Szulc, very much. Mr. Schwarz. Thanks. (Whereupon, at 4:55 0 clock p.m., the hearing in ‘the above-entitled matter vas. recassed.) TOP SECRET the name of the scientist and we ran down the background details t ‘