. ~ oF Sr EN ERIE RE Ss HEN “SB Te TT act et tet eth A RE a 102. explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENZO had trans- ferred from the American Department to the Tourist Depart~ ment in June 1955, NCSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's | background. ka - Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was asked to leave the country. (He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been. in official, contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was the sub:ect of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his oe , arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant: } Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted , American atteches in many years. Six months later, on | ; 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of their “spy documents” on the. train, FELCHLIN said this charge was faise. On another cccasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his bunk. (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.) In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was toid on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major Walter A. MCKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same time.* ~— or at seth es EUR ome | | aed ae te Le ede wee eee ee etek Heated abl teeet one ene erecta oes apna cert goede ene ete Poe eatin ed tet ee Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the PC AMET GAN EEM Bat U RIC VU ie gtd Boe e Pea a ON eg NE OO eT fs WAS ea eald Entec oe ni taeee *~mbassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, in- asmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date. | s eet nea rameel ip narss J 3 r any La ANT tates ead pe ee
eepgens aie cameo SEEMS tty eae me neeayyie nn nate ee + TRS Me Re ay Fae INT OR tat ot kenge to Re RDN retin ibe Re erate, NGA ad tt Be ata tet Te 103. attaches referred to SHNYRYEY as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy"” (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily for the Military Attache himself, bur sometimes drove for the AssiStant Military Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical prebiem, NOSENKO said hé was not aware of any.) FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOPOVA (not specifically named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. when she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for shout 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80, FEDOROVA refused and ieft. ‘Iwo days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's upartment to “chat” with her, and sus- pecting that they were reporcing to FPELOROVA, PELC {LIN teased her about it. FRDORJVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the lccal - "poss" cf the Embassy network. PEARSOU printed the allega- tion. n the sunmer of 1953 or 1454, according to PELCHLIN, the maid approacied FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being PEARSON's source. (NO- SENKO did not reccgnize FELOROVA's name and did not recali hearing cr reading of this incident.} (v) BENSON NOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names cf any agents working against BENSCN but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when ali three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared per- sona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any cther source. t (vi) STROUD NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Military Attaches‘ drivers. From concealed micro- phones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of . @lectronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO Said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source. CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE, the victim of the Soviets’ seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared perscna non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Mos- cow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an Ameri- can defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE "Was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; || DALAM Ie TM Me ThE mana cg nett we ee een cetina oF pentane e+ | | ¢ i A 4 i fereerr San see eh ee pee bee he Se % pene ER ek nee Ob en bt
74-00000 - — nr a Owe HI SEATS EK gd Ree ERE BRR Pat MR Ba SAC Stee aE AL IMS RMN TR I A RT ARS SAME ier re pity IT ondary PAT RE eR er coe a Beast Ry ie (vii) MULE NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army Attache end said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection epproaches to Soviets in the United States on the basis of money and the promise of a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only a captain despite his lengthy service in the Aray and because material from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other attaches. When NULE received letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB, from this mail it was understood that MULE did not have a house in-the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Ger- oe. : meny for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N,M. BURODIN, a recruiter of the American De-~ partment, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chier Directorate's special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad i for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a ciock containing a concealed camera as well as microphoses in MULE's hotel room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE’s return. When MULE started to entcr the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK ’ closed the door inom the hall and “prevented nis_ escape ce BORODIN reviewed ior MULE thé facts the KGB had “SeGinviated about His” lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his ; ' i i i i j _ : | j fellow attaches, und his shortage of money and then offered \ him a job as a "consultant."' BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,C00 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. Ac- \ cording to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was a captain in the American Army. CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered nim $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to MULE, SIBGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal / life that could have been obtained only from listening de- / vices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident. CULE was unable to identi fy NOSENKO's photograph. eae te a A LL AIR = ENR rep Eee eran t (viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD ‘ After NOSENKO had been transferred to. the Tourist De- i : partment in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets 3 : of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being “4 { . 2 ‘ a : *Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the re~- : i eruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO. SoG a {See Part V.E.3.c.ii.) - TR z ve we dl . .f : e . & oe we a9 foe ce ny oy : }
Jt spe: t J i SR Se metamate te SREY ETP TEER MER TES | OAR ARRON EET TY declared persona. non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account of this inéldent:; For some time the Second Chief Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient ' - piece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence — . officers vere known tu be using during their travels insidc | ' the Sovict Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the American Department had been given authorization from the Central Courittee of the Communist Party to steal this equipment from tho Americans, provided that the success of '- such an operation was assured, Before his transfer to the” - Tourist Department in 1955, NOSEXKO himself had helped to develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an abortive attespt to steal the equipment from an attache at @ railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE, and STROUD were or one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transe fer) it was learned that they had the equipment with then, and the KCB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad. fo carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. FHRDOTOV, then Chief of the KGB Sccond Chief Directorate, end A,M. GORBATENKO, Chier of the American Department, flew with other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad. The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched ‘constantly from a visual observation post, and it. wes noted that they never ato in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms. It was also noted that the spparatus was . placed under a pillow before they began to cat. While they were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment. in order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it ‘was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, YULE and STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the persona non grata action. According to information from other sources, the equip- ment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a month before NOSENKO ciained to have transferred to the Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he did not directly particirate in it, but that he had been involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. | It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and that be had consistently said that he transferred from the American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. _NOSENKO ao shrugged, but offered no comment. *The Msource Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA in. 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Mille tary Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed that. © -~ he might have contributed information leading to the three : Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being de- ‘clared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's targets were Ny , and STROUD. bo ae wt obath bee? vate  4els Sm Someries ptenermemeen es mS Neat sbobtettl Sd eccle! = ci at Lisi ead os.