“NO UD WD SECRION- 107 QABBECURTTY CNPORMANTS AND comm Quan SOURCES 107A ~ B DEFINITIONS 1. Security informant Individual actively engaged ‘in obtaining and furnishing current infor~ mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Partys or be in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. 8. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current infor. mation of value, 2. Potential security informant Todividual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or oan become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain an@ furnish current information to Bureau. \ . 3. Double egent A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating. with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureauts guidance. 4. Confidential source An individual who on 2 confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position, Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, {andjemployees of the United Nations Secretariat. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals ‘that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential intormants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investi- gative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs, For assistance “in obtaining potentisl informants, the following is suggested: 1, Evaluation of a. Complainants in security matters b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf~— fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, finanolal hard~ ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty - a. Bureau applicants as possible informants . . e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees f, Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con~ tinuous basis Review of closed security files on individuals Review of reserve index Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, [Deleted] Review factionalism section of file-on Communist - Party, USA, . Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection ° on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be ; informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. - 8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals ' who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members, o © @®© @ # © 10-14-64 iW S5072 Doold: 32989529 Page 1586 -
oa SAE @ " . 407B ~~ G SHCPTIOW © SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONTLOENTIAL SOURCES | : ma 9, Investigation of communist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party functionaries 10, Be alert to receive any suggestions.of plant exesubives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members of subversive organizations who might cooperate with the Bureau or employ a ees who might be willing to infiltrate a subversive organization, In the - past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant!s making avail— able the services of an employee who already is an informant of the manage ., ment, 11. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist—dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions. 12. With regard to both 10 and Ll above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather - than have an Agent originate the contact. 13, After the Bureau has notified the armed forces of a communist in an jndus— trial plant having armed forces contracts, the communist frequently recants when he is informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dis— missal or transfer to a nonrestricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. .Be alert to take - advantage of such cooperation when offered. 14. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individ— uals merely registered but never became active 15. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible inform. ant when direct contact by an Agent is inadvisable. Request Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such 2 contact, 16. Officials and employees of foreign establishments in the U. S. 17. Employees of the United Nations Secretariat 18, Contacts (business, social, or otherwise) of foreign officials stationed in the U. 8. , 19, Individuals who because of background, employment, or social status are in a position of intelligence interest to a foreign principal and who will undertake intelligence assignments under the guidance of ‘the Bureau. (See deseco program, section 105X¥,6h, volume IV, of this manual.) SRN em eae OR ema pe ae eae neal aemaaneT A GY YO PR Boy C, INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS When a decision made to consider a particular individual for informant pur~— . poses, background investigation must be conducted, This shovld consist of : the following: . 1, Check of field office files for derogatory information, partioularly of a subversive nature on 2. Discreet canvass of{logical Janformants- to ascertain if the potential informant is known to current informants of your office 3. Inquiries of discreet nature to obtain information concerning the ivitivid-— ual'ts personal history (date and place of birth, etc.), patriotism, . rith, reliability, stability, integrity, general reputation, present and rict employments, and business connections. -Background investigation mus% definitely establish that the potential informant can be utilised, without any danger of future embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing background information from the potential informant is not Lo . sufficient; the background of the individual must be established by the ~ investigation. - 4, Check of local credit and arrest records, Obtain necessary data fox the completion ‘of an FD-9 form which should be transmitted to the Identi- fication Division to obtain the record, if any, of the informant. 5, Armed services record should be reviewed if the individual is a veteran, 6. Check draft status or status in the armed forces reserve., 7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all details should be obtained, : . tet . wood 5-12-61 NW 55072 Decld: 323589525 Page i587
wore, C7 SECTION 107 . INPORMATYS AND conrry SOURCES LO7N N ‘Residence and employment (If no change since last justification letter, merely state no change.") (2) 3} Current membership and position held in subversive organizations 4) Summary of information furnished and/or services rendered during pertinent period (5) imount paid for services and expenses by month (Initial justification letter should set forth amount, if any, ever paid under SAC authority. ) Type and number of meetings attended and other activity Number of written and oral statements submitted (Tist separately.) Information furnished of unususzl value Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage. and their importance Steps being taken to advance informant ; Stability and reliability ; (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant, and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the - Bureau.) (12) Indoctrination against disclosure (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any “media. ) ) All necessary-action taken on information furnished. 14} Miscellaneous {Any other matters concerning informant'ts operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention) ‘ , SEO oO @ ——e ——- eet WR - Oo (Where applicable, substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source, or source of information for the word "informant.") When payment to an informant has been authorized for a definite period of time, advise the Bureau at least two weeks.in advance of the expiration of the period for which payment has been authorized as to ~ whether the services of the informant are to be continued. Every four months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureav requesting continuation of payments, Follow form in subsection 3b. Letters requesting authority to continue (increase, decrease) payments to an informant should be submitted in duplicate except that the copy should consist only of the first page of the letter. When payments as requested by the field-are approved, the single-page ~~ copy will be stamped "Approved" at the Bureau and returned. If the recommendation is not approved, correspondence will be prepared and transmitted to the field. In order for this system to function properly, payment letters must be explicit. When payments are authorized by the Bureau, it is the personal responsi~ bility of each SAC definitely to assure himself that full value is — being received. Discontinuance of payments Tf at’ any time it appears the information being produced by the informant is not commensurate with the payments being made to him, the payments should be immediately discontinued or adjusted accordingly and the Bureau promptly advised, Extraordinary expenses : In connection with the operation of paid informants, if any extraor~ dinary expenses are anticipated for which approval has not been given, obtain specific Bureau authority. . 19 ; 3-15-65 NW 55072 Docld: 32989529 Page 1566
Pr re LO7z NW 55072 Docld: 32989529 Page i589 SECTION i SECURITY INFORMANTS and conrt@exm SOURCES Your-menth evaluation of informants not paid on Bureau authority Lf the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communi- cation must be transmitted to the Bureau every four months after the . ( date of designation containing the same information set out atove in subsection 3b except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth UACB. * In espionage and foreign nationality cases comment is necessary regarding only those applicable items in subsection 3b. Receipts . - ~ When payments are made to anyone for information or assistance on security matters, either on the SAC‘s authority or on prior Bureau approval, receipts must be obtained in every instance in which it is possible to do so, If a receipt cannot be obtained for a particular payment, complete circumstances should be set forth on the blue slip at thd time reimbursement is claimed. a. Receipts should be of such a nature that they will be self-sufficient so that, if it becomes necessary to introduce the receipts in. evidence during the course of a trial, the receipts will not relate to other documents or files. pb. Receipts should clearly show: 1) Date on which payment was made 2) Period for which made when informant is paid.on a period basis 3) Total amount paid broken down into separate amounts for services or expenses where these items are pertinent {3} Name of Agent making payment 5 Signature of person receiving the money c. Receipts are not to be witnessed by another Agent. ad. If necessary to make corrections on the receipts, such corrections must be initialed by the informant and not by the Agent. e. When transmitting receipts and itemized-statements of expenses to the Bureau, they should be stapled directly, to the blue slip, leaving a margin of at least one inch to one and one~half inches at the top to avoid contact with the Acco fastener punch. The staples should be Placed in such a manner that the date or other data appearing on the receipt will not be mutilated and all information on the receipt can pe easily read without detaching it from the blue slip. Care must pe taken that receipts are of such a nature that they clearly show payment of money and do not refer to any other documentary material contained in Bufiles., Income tax returns a. Informants who receive compensation for their services to the Bureau should be advised that such compensation must be meported as income when filing an income tax return. b. Bureau income shovld be set forth[on the ]Federal- income tax return, form 1040, as income received from other sources for personal services rendered through a private enterprise or Similar general term applicable to informant's position and station in life. c. If the informant is self-employed and files a Schedule C as a self— employed individual, it may be possible to include his Bureau income with his self-employed income from other sources without revealing connection with the Bureau. d. Effective 1-1-65, in these instances in which the informant cannot report payments received from the Bureau for services without jeop~-- ardiging his security as an informant, such payments will bé subject to a 20 per cent withholding tax. There are four categories of - circumstances in which taxes will not be withheld, Taxes are not to be withheld from payments made (1) to other.than security informants and sources, (2) for reimbursement of expenses, (3) under SAC authority, or (4) to informants who have been able to report Bureau “- income on their Federal tax returns without jeopardizing their security or without challenge from the Internal Revenue Service. Each office has detailed instructions and exhibits concerning the procedure to be followed in the handling and control of money withheld. 20 3-15-65