as having:a key role and characterized his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who "+ could accomplish the assassination." 1/48. Joseph Shimon, a close friend of Roselli who had knowledge of the plots at the time, stated that Roselli contacted | ; a SF 131. Giancana to provide Cuban contacts /¥F - Shimon further characterized Giancana as only providing contacts, specifically Santo Trafficante, and not as an active: 132 /590 participant. -The most sound analysis. is that Giancana Glely? . pre nt ee ee Ne ee a Nn i, an ee served¥as a. person Roselli could approach who could “then make the necessary contact into ‘the Cuban domain, specifically Santo Trafficante. ‘Roselli, who FBI files indicate represented Giancana's interest in Probably Las Vegas and was subordinate to hin, woulddnot * directly contact the organized crime boss of the Cuban and Southern Florida area without first. contacting his superior, Giancana, who would then make any | necessary arrangements. Both Giancana and raf ficante, being bosses of two organized crime domains, would have the means, power, and stature to arrange for: the assassination. | After contacting Trafficante, -
yt pad who hewe the influence to recruit the necessary personnel to 2S: perform the assassination, -- Giancana probably was not an active participant in the process af poisoning pills or actually arranging 433-157 the assassination. The role of mrafficante, the only” Living major organized crime figure involved in the plots, vis a major source of conflict. - ‘The 1967 IGR contains / several references to vrafficante which characterize his function. In discussing how poison pills could be: given to Castro, it states that "Trafficante (Joe, - - the courier") was in | touch with a disaffected Cuban . | official with access to Castro and presumably of a - wort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castr. my Se Later the report’ states that “Roselli passed the pilgs to i. a and that "Roselli. reported Whe xpplt Y that t e pills had been delivered 7 de ( olf, 357 mn i Cuba."/S3 After Oba lost his position in the Cuban government and | could no Jonges, vase any Tot oe pills, the HOR. says "Roselli cola omed pment that Trafficante knew of a man high up in the Cuban exile a b36- °° a movement, who might do the job." 155 Roselli identified a _ HW 53080 Docld: 32273546. P
chen eile lesb 433 him as ANE AE Some ESE A The following ome passage further confirms ‘Trafficante' s role: Trafficante approached Yeuonn and ° told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and that they would pay big money for the job. . is reported to have been very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, arms and communications equipment. iS6 Trafficante testified in public to the Committee that Roselli asked him to @ieip actas an interpretor-/5 “Es between the American operations and the Cuban contacts. Trafficante denied handling or carrying any. poison pills 156 440. 7 be oF used in the operation, denied recruiting Veronnay ; £6° 149—- and denied recruiting Ousram In his Senate testimony, Roselli confirmed Trafficant' s role as that of a trans- *¢G/f oe “however, informed the ‘Committee that Trafficante was the person in. contact with Cubaiis in '-143- Havana 7% Giancana partially confirmed this in ‘the ee nator IGR by identifying Joe as a man *who would serve as. a Wha “2 a courier, te te. wie and make arrangements there. , Bloor ‘also “confirmed that he was the only CIA conduit and that if. the 20m IGR states. ‘Trafficante HW 53080 Docld:32273546. Page 54 __
contacted or procured the assassin then it accurately reflects the information the ~“L44- _ CIA received. 5 It is interesting that the 1975 and 1978 Congressional testimony of Roselli and Trafficante corroborate each other but remain contrary to how the principals reported the facts in 1967. The aan evidence (Strongiy| indicates that Trafficante was not. merely an interpreter but an active. participant in passing the poison pills and in recruiting the 7 potential assassins. This is “important in dramatizing ‘the deep involvement of organized crime with the CIA in these plots. one can understand why ‘Trafficante ‘today wishes to. downplay his role; the facts, however, simply do not support his assertions. The Committee hn The Committee also heard testimony from Anibondont ox Ke en | 2 \esbe Vetowamstated that he is not aware of any © Po believes the CIA IGR. CIA assassination plots to kill Castro. and denied [65 to involvement in their operations, - 23 is obviously lying... The Committee does not feel, “however, that a . Bare ~ Pur thes prosecution for perjurysit possible, would aasist ; the. investigation ¥ aos. if HW 53080 Docld: 32273546 Page.55 _ wet
2} Phase Two wb 45- Ch i js Phast Two william Harvey assumed me he s role.lo? Giancana and wrafficante were ~ no longer involved in the operation. /é? The IGR states that Roselli remained as a prominent figure and worked "directly with the Cuban exile . AF (SS community and directly on behalf. of the CIA." ceils a i Although the TGR does voqeast: that Trafficante 439° . was not involved in Phase tI,? Shit contains this caution: Trafficante was one of the principals - in Shef Edwards Phase One of the operation. -He presumably was not involved in Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. | After all, Trafficante was the man who brought — ' Verona into the operation late in Phase One, . and Verona was one of the main 1 players, during » Phase Two.110 It is reasonable to assume that Roselli at least. “kept _ both Giancana and Trafficante informed of the operation’ Ss progress. a Delivery of the Pills “Neither LESS ee ‘ gr the SSC pinpoints | wir . the date on und Spb Ore na the pills to Roselli during Phase One of the plots. The chain of custody, as alreday mentioned, was. for Roselli 7 to deliver the pills “to Trafficante.. The subsequent ‘HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 56__
Wy steps ee grein 2 a mystery but - Roselli. reported to oe $\ . , vagal Chiret that the pills had been delivered to wai Ne hy, elfenl _, 4m ate. * Ciba in late February or early March, 1961. . Joseph. Shimon informed the Committee that he and Maheu travelled together to Miami to the Fontainbleu in March, 1961, to witness the Patterson- ' Johansson fight s113 . once there Maheu informed him - oof the plot to assassinate castro. 173 Shimon also” says that during this trip he attended a meeting where a poisonous liquid to be used in the assassination E51 | . was passed. Shimon is probably the source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971, which fixes the date of the ‘passage of the poison at. ‘the ‘Fontainblew as March 13, 1961. | . In any event, it appears certain that the CIA aia not. pass any pills, poison, or assassination weapons before February of 1961. The fall segment '. of the plots only constituted a planning stage; no one undertook any operational. activities. HW 53080 Docid:32273546 Page 57
any information or evidence in this regard. In addition, the available evidence indicates Trafficante was not travelling between Miami and “Havana although the Committee recognizes ‘that’ Trafficante -could make such trips and not disrupt his normal routine in Miami and Tampa, thus possibly undermining the effect of any surveillance. “Mt £) Vipsaerret' s Other Contacts tf Civ. onl | eal “As ‘previously related, , the FBI forwarded | to the CIA a memorandum cea a December 1960 revealing that U. S. racketerrs were making efforts: to finance anti-Castro activities and subsequently forwarded os Aste another memorandum on 18 January 1961 which. associated “1557 17 Verona with those schemes. gehen sources were also providing assistance to Viesaane to conduct aeti- ~Castro operations, © At the time . of his introduction into the CIA-Organized crime, exile leaky plots, the CIA was funding womane tardigh the Revolutionary Democ atic Front and the Cuban Revolutionary “tse Th by Aa Vesde Council. 114 Vetere informed the Committee that the purpose of the council stemmed from an agreement with _ HW 53080 DocId:32273546. Page 60
the American government to invade Cuba ana EO ~“b59 establish democratic control of the ven epihe | eat ’ Adding to the support for Meena were the promotional efforts of Dino “and Eddie Cellini who reportedly were working through a Washington, D.C. ‘ public relations firm, Edward K. Moss “a Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations, amalras supposedly | 7 acting as a conduit: for funds supplied by the Cellini “prothers with the understanding that this group would : receive privileged treatment in the Cuba of the 4158— AL Future. In his testimony before the Committee Verona - uy also described a meeting with Jorge ‘Alonzo Pejol and Meyer Lansky in Lansky's home in Miami in the summer of 1960. }j2 Lansky said he had business interests in. Cuba. and wanted to help the Cubans fight Castro, destroy Castro, and try and establish a ‘democratic 60-7 4S government. The logical inference to be drawn £xom this. is. that the CIA, Organized Crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime. all settled HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 61. ~
HW 53080 DoclId: 32273546 Page 62 less upon Ue enla probably independently, _ aS a person who had the potential of. uniting the multitude of exile groups to overthrow Castro. (Additionally, : ay e@ _vorotaae reported contacts with Organized crime ‘raises the possibility that he was involved with them in a plot to kill Castro before: the evolution of the CIA-organized crime plots. If this was the he eatthe . Lega case, then Trafficante's recruitment of Mexzema into. the. CIA operation would result in providing official U.S. sanction to an already existing independent operation. The CIA recognized this in stating "it is possible _ Vhs axle let that Vemema already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of ‘Pigs in March 1961. REE to carry out the Castro assassination 7 g4 (see yellow page 96) — g)- Introduction of "Joe" and "Gola" and - Related Events a ie The timing of the introduction of Giancana- ("Gold") and Trafficante ("Joe") is important | to the - analysis of the true role of organized crime in the Castro assassination Dlots. . This introduction,
es together with other related evenva, [fucthck suggests ‘the thesis that the CIA found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operation that the syndicate already had commenced . According to the E989 IGR, the entrance of Giancana. and Roselli occurred ‘during the week of . " septenber 25, 1960.10 In contrast, the SSC did not assign a precise date for their entrance because of conflicting evidence between the 2967 TIGR _and Maheu' Ss [Pe Senate testimony which set the date after November, “ec The SSC did conclude, however, that Giancana was. involved in the operation during October because of the Las Vegas wiretap incident which occurred on October 30, and because of the October 18, , 1960 FBI memorandum ' which revealed Giancana had told several people of , 64/87 his involvement ina plot to assassinate Castro. Although these two events which the SCC cites may support the involvement of Giancana during ‘October, they also invite speculation of independent organized” crime operations. The October | 18, 1960, “FBI memorandum is particularly applicable. This states: | /D | Juring a recent conversation with’ several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro HW 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 63:
was to be done away with shortly, said it would occur in November. Moreover, Giancana said he had already met with the would-be: assassin on three occasions, the last meeting taking place on a boat docked at the Fontainbleu Hotel, Miami Beach. Giancana stated everything had been perfected for killing Castro and that | the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a ‘pill’ in some drink or food of Castro: > EF Since, _according—to-the-LoeF—£Er the poison pills, which the CIA prepared at Giancana's request, were not “ready ‘for delivery until late February or early March, 1961, it is extremely doubtful that Giancana's - November, 1960, assassination plot was part of the © CIA operation. Rather it appears that organized crime already had its poison plan in progress, using | a mistress of Castro to. accomplish the deed, when the CIAg fortuitously) entered the scene. . Organized crime then occupied a perfect position’, ff their - private plot succeeded, they then would possess far-reaching blackmail potential against the CIA which they could exercise at an opportune moment; ff their intrigue failed, however, they could then assume the position that they were only executing sh? the directives of the government And derrtel 7955: ‘b] Me. SHEL. Cb. the ih rAvO bvers at AS Vlarle me ( HW 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 64 |
h) +sGescoemrerre. Richard Cain Jat adits tluse 4 ay # that Ciancana refers to in’ involved the October 18 memo may have-keen Richard Scallzetti. yt Cain. Cain, in ‘connection with the top -Echelon Criminal Enforcement Program, informed the FBI of his criminal activities and close association +66- with Giancana. /$? Cain admitted that he had covertly worked for Giancana and been on his payroll while he was a member of the Chicago Police Department from 1956-1960, director of a private detective agency from 1960- 62, and Chief ‘Investigator (eee Fetlow-pes2oay for the Cook County Sheriff's Office from 1962-1964. 10 | Several of Cain's activities during the fall of 1960, together with his past experience, support the proposition that if Giancana was involved inv any. Cuban affairs, specifically an assassination ‘of Castro independent of ‘the CIA plot, he “woula have recruited Cain to assist him. HW 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 65
(See yellow 104). HW 53080 ‘Docld: 32273546 Page 66 First, Cain maintained a record of § Woluntarily” pian en ee ee cant aeons me net OLN SNOT ee Metre eS te tan osmend "providing information“to the CIA concerning his foreign ventures, a practice Giancana may have promoted in an effort to gain possible leverage with the CIA. In a CIA memorandum to the FBI dated 4 November 1960 Cain supplied the following informa- tion in his first contact with the CIA: 1) that in 1950-52 while in Miami,. Florida, he initiated several telephone taps on various Cuban revolutionary figures under the supervision of William “Buenz, a private detective who had contact : with the Batista government. 2) that on October 2, 1960, William Buenz, _ then operating out of New York City,. met with Cain at O'Hare Airport and offered him $25,000 to travel to Cuba at the request of former President Piro to install telephone. taps on various _Cubans, and 3) that in 1959, Constantine Kangles, a former attorney for the Cuban 26th of July movement, inquired whether Cain would instruct ~ Castro Army officers in the use of poly- graphs .7+43— }4) . It seems more than coincidental that Cain' s approach to the CIA to supply this information. occurred - simultaneously with Giancana's meeting with Roselli ‘and Maheu. Cain subsequently volunteered information to the CIA during 1961-63.
Second, on November 2, 1960, a confidential informant told the Bureau that on October 20, 1960, Serapio Montz jo, the former head of the July 26 Movement in Chicago, met Richard S. Cain in the office of Constantine Kangles, the former attorney in Chicago for the Cuban 26th of July Movement and former counsel in the United States 194A for the Cuban Government headed by Fidel Castro. Cain indicated to Kangles that he had clients who wished to get news” stores and photographs out of 7 } “Cuba concerning rebel activity in the Cuban foothills. Cain further indicated that he wanted to cover this story . “and was soon going to Miami in an attempt to enter Cuba, and that Jack Mobley, a Chicago columnist, and Bob Ajamian of Life magazine, had knowledge of this ‘venture. jay Third, on November 2r 1960, the PBI interviewed 177 (As. Cain in Miami at the Sands Hotel, _ Miami Beach. Cain said ‘he was a representative of Accurate Detective | oo ta ith , oo Laboratories, - Life magazine, and sixty- four. ; - 27S" a _ other newspapers. ne After ‘Providing. information on the - military armaments in cuba, Cain. said that the HW 53080. DocId:32273546 Page 67.
sant adel ACs OnW 33080. DocId: 32273546 _ even more suspect. ‘The wiretap ‘assignment and the Page: 63 ne ren te erated a ae ae eee aan ete ame ene Maeno atten Arata Sean '° Resistence movement had eight hundred men fighting in the Escambray Mountains and that he was awaiting the opportunity. to parachute. into the. Escambrays 4 TTS 196 \ to take photos for Life. Cain said that Antonio. : de Verona gave him the information on. the Cuban , <t$80 - oO armaments. ,44 When Cain's plans to visit Cuba, either to install wiretaps for former President Prio or to ‘take | photographs of rebel activity, or both, are. considered simultaneously with Giancana' s ‘presence in Miami and Clas ~ tee his reference to the assassination of fere in November _ and with Cain' s "approach to the CIA, the true purpose and possible interrelation of these events: become photographic story may have been covers? Giancana may have been attempting to send Cain to Cuba to supervise the poisoning attempt on Castro. Cain “belonged to La Cosa Nostra, spoke Spanish, had - extensive contacts. in Latin America, was well-versed . in - sabotage and investigative procedures, had been” on Giancana's ‘payroll for four years, and apparently
was attempting. to arrive in Cuba by approximately November, 1960. Further, Cain's reference C vith. ante \eodw . in his FBI interview to wmteniode-Hesena, the person that the CIA concedes may have been active in independent organized crime assassination plots o : against Castro prior to his recruitment ‘by’ Trafficante in March, 1961, raises more suspicion. | ' These events can be interpreted to indicate that Cain may have been the "assassin-to-be" whom 7 -Giancana referred to in the 18 October 1960 FBI | memorandum, She may have been the contact ian for the operation. The Committee cautions that this analysis is obviously speculative. Cain could also have provided another service > to Giancana. As already indicated, a second person, called J.W. Harrison, allegedly accompanied and assisted Balletti in the wiretap. Although the Justice cee cvenen naeetenant tH tetas ORLA oe ete ge tears eee many, Department ; wigorouslyy pursued this investigation’ and ae akan aie HW 53080 DocId:;32273546 Page 69
prepared to indict the principals, no one :could determine who Harrison:was and no participant - would admit to knowing his identity. There is no doubt he existed’ he signed the hotel register and — 1g3 29° accompanied Balletti on the flight to Las Vegas. fone <BCEH DuBois, the private investigator Maheu hired to conduct the surveillance, anc-Bebbeett maintained that Maheu arranged for J. We ‘Harrison to accompany Balletti from Miami to Las Vegas to a ase ~ wet f f ‘operation? Maheu-dented—thisn Sa pend CIA liaison man, informed ‘the Committee that whoever TSS DOR Harrison was he was not a CIA employee. * the Clearly someone arranged for Harrison's presence and knows his ‘true identity. | Since ‘DuBois and Balletti. acted only as the instruments of Maheu, it: seems Logical that they would have revealed Harrison’ s identity in | the face of federal prosecution ‘if Harrison were “just an employee of DuBois with no connection to the CIA or to the associates of Maheu in the CIA operation against Castro. Thus, Ballet cti and DuBois either did - HW 53080 DocId:32273546 Page 70.
not know the identity of Harrison or felt that their client's interests prohibited them from at ~F é t “— * ee if in poy Lona revealing such information. I ne Ba epoy PR Abs ERY oe vie a . 7 1a a cle ‘Cleariy—semeone—arranged- -for-Haeiconts / Geib f ~ : A “presence and knew. At seems m mM hig idenbi-ny. oe fete an enn NORE Tn erate a wale y Yeo {oe Li kelestret Maheu provided Harrison at the request of a source that had a direct interest in the surveillance Seer$ paoste logiel, . voadter, chedl Bo ters v4 naan, Mahou-informed—the-Commintee Mthat he instituted the surveillance to pacify Giancana's concerns that, -) Phyllis McQuire was having an affair with,Dan Royan | oon ~ aaa eALERTS va 7 od oad Peo Seé yetlow"p,-T13 and to uncover any possible leaks regarding . the operation. . Roselli confirmed these two accounts” in his Senate. testimony. _ Shimon further’ Sihformea ‘the. Committee ‘that Giancana told him he paid $5, 000 for the Las QOL Lae a segvextou-p Alt - Vegas operation, . . Assuming that Maheu aid provide for Harrison, — he Sima icticesby did so at the request of someone else. oo Maheu did not have any reason to independently prefer one person over another; “the CIA or Giancana, however, did have such a personal interest. Giancana's interest obviously stemmed from his relationship with McQuire *~ Wiemere and it is ; probably correct that Giancana requested
HW 53080 Docld: 32273546. Maheu to bug Rovan's room. This personal interest . could have prompted Giancana to direct Maheu to use a person of Giancana's choice. Cain fits that _ role perfectly. He was a skilled electronic surveillance technician and was in. Miami during late October and early November. Miami- was the ER EOe Boliss -debarkation point for Harrison and ‘Babies on their their trip to Las Vegas. In his deposition, Maheu’ A8F— QO denied any knowledge of Cain. When shown several photographs of Cain’ from the late. 1950's and. early 1960" Sy arthur Ballztti also could not identify Cain ; ~188-.. a, as Harrison. rad These denials do not detract from the theory that Cain. was Harrison if no one ‘would identify Harrison in 1960 there is no reason to expect any change in “testimony. “The CIA had a personal interest rr surveilling MeQuire because of the 18 October 1960 memor anduit where Giancana discussed an assassination plot against | Castro. The SSC concludes that this memo caused the CIA to be concerned with determining if Giancana was leaking information on the CIA- -organized crime plots. This may be’ partially correct, but as already — Page.: 72
indicated, the FBI Memorandum depicts a plot _ Substantially in progress and involving a girl which does not resemble the October status of the CIA operation. The CIA could have been more concerned that Giancana was involved ina separate assassination plot and consequently. could have been. concerned with. its nature and extent. The reasons why Phyllis | “) : ~McQuire would have been the target for such surveillance "were two-fold. First, her relationship with Giancana might have entailed her learning of certain clandestine “activities. Second, she was one of the "several friends" in the conversation related in the 18 October memo. 204 |The CIA interest would also explain why a wiretap was installed. Maheu informed the Committee that he only ordered physical surveillance of the targetj. Rowan, and could not understand why anyone installed neers, a wiretap since ‘the primary intent was to check on ‘See/yelloe p. Y18 | McQuixe.' S reported affair with Rowan. 210 4 we ease Physical surveillance and a room bug would, ré, & admittedly, be more than, adequate to uncover any ex diene gy affair. - If, however, Maheu also wished to investigate HW.53080 DocId:32273546 Page 73 —
HW 453080 DoclId: 32273546 the possibility of leaks in the operation as well as the possibility of Giancana's involvement in an. - independent plot, then the use of a wiretap would ° have been logical. - Assuming that investigating an affair was not the primary focus of the Las Vegas operation, it can in A stam Rowe Ome gihar hadrtete be argued that direct surveillance of mefusre, would “have been the optimum method to investigatSir her’ for suet leaks and information that Giancana may have given her. This, however, would have run the risk of incurring the wrath of Giancana and his possible departure from the CIA assassination plots if anyone detected the surveillance. Through the cover of surveilling Rowan for a possible affair with McQuire, however, the CIA had the opportunity to indirectly surveil McQuire to obtain information on the - SLEEPERS, assassination plots fora reason which met the approval of Giancana. Indeea, Giancana probably always believed | that his directive to investigate a possible affair was ‘the only issue involved in the surveillance. ws YO \ Page. #4.
o oye In any event, the objectives of both Giancana and the CIA could have ‘been achieved whether Harrison was a Giancana choice, specifically Cain, ‘or an Agency opaxnizken . Opunaiiete « After the Las Vegas operation backfired, the CIA obviously decided to continue. thé assassination race cio | plots. This indicates that Oo et, al, felt ‘the security of the CIA organized ‘crime piot had not - been seriously breached. Additionally, it possibly indicates that the CIA determined. that even if Giancana__ was involved in an independent operation, that it would not hamper their efforts, and that all interests could be reconciled. The CIA continued on the same track, blithely going: "to bed” with organized crime. i) The "girl" in the 18 October 1960 — Memorandum - -In this’ memo Giancana spoke of a girl who wae was going: to drop a pill in some food or drink of Castro. ; ya ‘This format is again contradiction to the CIA - operation which initially relied On Seba, an 2 BH esl ta, Ane € le Yew - ' a secre lary.in-Castxots—prime=mintstyrabomadminister the=prt ee Hw 53080 , Docld: 32273546. Page 75
ee The identity of this"girl"referred to by Giancana has not been ascertain but it is reasonable -. to assume that Trafficante was in the prime position to recruit a mistress of Castro because of his numerous contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles. | - American gamblers routinely maintained Cuban mistresses and Trafficante was a typical example. A witness also informed the Committee that Castro customarily arrived at the Nacional Hotel unescorted a —i9t+- -to visit one of his peramours. oil. This indicates __ that it may have been relatively easy for Trafficante ~ to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him. Consequently, the use _ of a girl is quite logical : and further supports the involvement: of organized crime in an independent plot “he J ht ee . to kill Castro. j) 0 Articles on Prank ‘Sturgis As indicated in Section If Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News wrote several articles in. Gow _ 1975 and 1976 concerning activities of Frank Sturgis. These articles (further reflect! the theory that os i ‘organized crime was involved in independent Castro assassination plots: EORTC ISIS MY RPT ANE OF ALIENS LPT MR OT ITE