‘- with Erbassy officials. G, URQUHART (ps), presently in Mexico on temporary duty has provided the Station with the rollowing evaluation of the LIENVOY products. "The LEENVOY production on the Cuban Bnbassy traffic in Mexico.City hes been one of the basic elements centributing to the guceess of the AMHOD operation, directed ageins: the GUIS for CA purposes. Tre LIENVOY operation has been of value in two general eenses: a. The documentary material derived from the texts has formed some cf the basis for reconstruction of historical facts needed for the operation. b. ‘The day to day coverage has enabled the case officer on the AMROD operation to sense the climate inside the target, to keep track of the movements of key opposition personnel, ’ go check on the bona fides of certain exunts, to check the work of «. others for veracity and to live monitor porticns of the reactlons to the AMROD operation itself. Being able to keep track of the shifts and movements of the opposition and their personal relations has been of vital importance to this operation. On two occasions the AMROD Case Officer also used the LIZVOY base as his command post when engineering personal contacts between a KUBARK staffer and the opposition. This type of close support did muck to determine the success of those meetings and contributed greatly to the success of the operation. These transcripts provide one of the best sounding boards for the AMROD operation end are regularly forwarded to me at Headquarters." The six lines above are fully transeribed by LIEVVOY transcribers and delivered by AREHART to RIGGS each morning. Lengthy conversa- tions sometimes require an additional. day for transcription. A carbon copy is pouched weekly to Needquarters for WH/SA use. ‘The original is retained by the Mexico Station, A thind copy is retained in the intercept center chronological files. LIRAMA dorms not read these transcripts unless some simmificant item appears in the "resumen" which causes him to ask for a Miller transcript or listen to the tape, The coverage of this target also ylelds a good picture of duily activities, residences, personal habits and weaknesses of Cuban official personnel in Mexico, Tunis is used by Station Case Officers in selection of targets for recruitment and in checking on activities of agents already recruited and either working for or in contact 2, Soviet Enbassy. The Soviet Government, has over fifty officials pertanently stationed in Mexico (the largest foret{gn emoassy except for the U,S.). Tuirty-four of these Soviets (aimost 70 percent of the staff) are known or suspect intelligence officers. The five lines under LIENVOY provide details on the activities of most of these Sdviets, The lines are: 0
14-00000 } ee‘ «65 15 6C.55 Soviet Consulate and Chancery. ‘thie line is used by ; fifteen (15) known or suspect KGB ofalcera. It ts also used by foreleners in Mexico attexpting to make contact with the Soviets, when contacts sugrest clandestine meetings, the tation arranses for unilateral eurvelllance and has had ' g0Me success in identifying contacts, 15 61 55: Soviet Chancery, This line ise used primarily by the Ambassador . "and provides more information on protocol contacts than leads ne “ "of dntelligence interest, However, it gives the Station a picture of the persunalities being cultivated by Soviet diplomats and of Mexicans who sre seeking contacts with the Soviets. 15 61 O7 Soviet Commercial Office, Four (4) known or suspect GRU officers use this number, They are Military intelligence officers using Commercial Office cover and in some inatances actually perform commercial functions of trade negotlations but the volume of trade between Mexico and the USSR does not justify a Comercial Office staff of eight (8) Soviets. This produces some information useful to check on double agent operations run’ by the Station against the GRU officers, In addition, the LIENVOY product usually identifies the GRU orficers as escorts for trade, scientific, commercial, and tourist delegations who now are constantly on trips from the USSR to Mexico. LIENVOY also provides details ‘of: the itineraries of these groups once they arrive in Mexico. 15 le 64 Soviet Films Office. This leads into the residence and office of Vladimir Petrovich OBRUBOV, a suspect GNU officer, who distributes Sovlet Commercial Mims in Mexico,. There have been several calle from what appear to be Central Americans but the Station has not been successful in identify- ing the callers or determining the nature of the calls, 15 69 67 Soviet Military Attache. This is the least productive of ; the coverage sinnly because the Soviet Military officers elther won't answer the telephone or spend very little time where it rings, Nevertheless, U.S, AWOL servicemen try this number to make contact. There are three GRU colonels end six (6) civilian CRU officers who use this line. The Soviet information is transeribed by the LIFUVOY transeribers in the same way as the Cuban traffic except that the transcripts are delivered daily with the reels from which an outside translator (Douglas J. FEINGLASS) trenscribes the Russian conversations into English. These Russian coaversattons are of considerable value end it is apparent that the Soviets are not evare that these conversations are being overheard en? understood. There have been conversations identifying code room personnel: one conversation between two Soviet children revesled tne entire layout of the Soviet Commercial Office; personality clashes and svievances are also atred. ert ac... -
4-000 : ; -In June ‘1964 the SR Division. made available personnel for temporary duty in Mexico to analyze and collate personnlity and background. data collected -by LIENVOY but which had aceunulnted in Station files on Soviet officinis. These Soviet Personality Reports (SPR) \ should be useful on a world-wide basis an Sovict officials are ; ‘ transferred from post to post, Ln providing the KUBARK representative : with a summary of the Sovict's past work patvern, intelligence \ ; ; activities as far as known, physical description, wenknesseo, and St vulnerability toward recruitment by a Western service. Hot all but , a large percentage of this data is received from LIEXVOY, 3, Czech Eebassy. Two lines in the Chancery (45-30-91 and 45-30-12) are covered by LIENWOY,. Reels from these targets are delivered ; daily by AREHART to RIGGS whe delivers them to the EE Case Officer j ® who arranges for transcription and translations to be done by David : B. SCHLAGHTER, Meld contract agent. This agent also prepares & . monthly summary of information on the activitLes of Czech officials in Mexico, - During September 1904+ LIENVOY revealed {important intorma- : tlon on the establishment of a factory equipped with Crech machinery : - to produce dyes in Mexico (ANYL MEX). In addition to the significance of this information in eacsecsing Czech economic activities in Mexico, there wus operational benefit in dealing with DISOBER, a Czech | official on temporary duty in Mexico in connection with the opening. of this factory. 4. Polish Mabassy. LIENVOY coyers one line (12 25 hy) in the main Chancery which produces data onthe activitles of Follah officlals stationed in Mexico. The second Line (25 &2 35) is the private line of Polish Commercial Counselor, Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWLEZ, in whom the Mexico Station has a definite operational interest as & recruitment target. Recls (without transcripts) from these tarxets arc delivered daily by ARFHART to RICGS who delivers them to the EK Case Officer who arranges tor translations and transcriptions to be done by Norma Q. RYMINSKY, 2 contract employee. 5, Yugoslav Fnbas sy > During part of the project year LIENVOY . . covered two lines in this Bnbassy. The lines were disconnected by ; : LIENVOY in April 296% and transferred to LIFEAT, ‘rhe reason for oy this terminetion was to conceal interest ia DMPETAL, en agent recruited as a result of a follow-up of @ Lead supplicd through LIENVOY coverngr. During the time this target was covered, LIENVOY transerLbers provided trenscriptions of the Spanish conversations. The reels were then delivered to Victor W. ObOLD, a career agent who provided translatioas. 6, Communist China News Agency (NCNA). On 18 December 1964 Willard C, CUETIS briere?d LIRAMA on the presence in Mexico of representatives of Communist China using journalist cover for an intelligence missioa. LIRAMA agreed to install LIENVOY coverage of this Line and share the teke with the Mexico Station, This will be a Mexican line and replace the present coverage of the p,F.S. The Station hopes to use this information to influence LIRAMA to declare these persona persora non grata, — LIFEAT has been teken otf of this target. Oe ey CREE Bvt Bee fees prerren