HY 50955 Sorensen, who participated in these meetings, testified that the "widest possible range of alternatives" were dis- cussed, but that “assassination was not. éven on the list (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 4.) He said that consideration of . possible options such as forcing "a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means'' did not encompass assassina- tion: "[this].could not have included or implied assassina- tion. Instead, it expressly referred to_'the develop- : ment of pressures' and ‘gradual escalation of the con- frontation in Cuba' to produce’an overthrow of the regime, including a willingness to-use military force to invade Cuba' Such a course was obviously not adopted by the President, and in any event expressed an approach far different from assassination". (Soren- sen affidavit, 7/25/75, p. 4) .*/ The record of the first’ Standing Group discussion of Bundy's memorandum shows that a number of alternatives were discussed (none of which involved assassination) but no conclusions were reached. On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group met again. McCone argued for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented by sabotage to “create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting */ The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "all necessary measures” to describe the steps:the U.S. was willing .to take to "prevent" a di- rect military threat to the U.S. or to the Western Hemisphere prom Cuba. Sorensen explained the meaning of this phrase in the context of th April 23 discussion of Kennedy Administration policy. "this phrase] could not by any stretch of semantics or logic have included assassination or any other initiative. It reflected the purely defensive posture implemented six months earlier when long-range missiles. .and other offensive weapons were placed in Cuba. we - “(Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75, ley a ” Bocld: 324273534 ‘Page 242
to overthrow Castro". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group. Méeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1.) MeNamara said that sabotage would not be “conclusive” and suggested study of "economic pressures which could upset Castro. Robert Kennedy said "the U.S. must do something against sesvre, even though we do not believe our actions would bring him down". (Id., p. 2) In conclusion, Bundy summarized by stating that the task was ''to decide now what actions we would take against Castro, - acknowledging that the measures practical for us to take will not result in his overthrow". (Id., p. 2.) | (d) The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabotage Pro- gram Against Cuba | | | | “During the first six months of 1963, Little, if any, sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.*/ However, on June 19, 1963, following the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba policy in the Spring, President Kennedy approved a Cuba sabotage program. **/ (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63, p. 1.) */ At an April 3, 1963 meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no sabotage operations were then underway because the Special Group “had decided . . . that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it. (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63, p. 1). “/ The sabotage program approved on June 19, 1963 was directed at Ser major segments of the Cuban economy" (1) electric power; (2) petroleum refineries and storare facilities: (3) railroad and hish- way transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memoran- dum for the Special-Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1) Operations under this program were to be conducted by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from a U.S, island off Florida and it was to complement a similar effort de- signed to dewenoP ‘internal resistance elements which could carry out sabotage." (Id., p. 2. ) . BW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 233
1 ' ‘ t In contrast to the Mongoose program, which sought to build _ toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action program had a more limited objective, ice., "to nourish a | spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other byproducts of unrest". (Id., p..2.) | | After the initial approval,’ particular intelligence and sabotage operations were submitted to the. Special Group for specific prior authorization. On October 3, 1963, the Special Group approved nine operations in Cuba, including several sabotage operations. And on October 24. 1963, thirteen major sabotage operations were approved to be undertaken in the ty period November 1963 through January 1964, including the sabo- i tage of an electric power plant, an “oil refinery, and a sugar ae mill. (Memorandum, July ll, 1975, CIA Review Staff to Select : Committee, on "approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba."). | “(e) The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accommodation With As early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to. President Kennedy that the possibility of communicating with Castro be explored. (Bundy Ex. 6, Memorandum to the President, January 4, 1963, p. 3.) Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" to the | Standing Group on April 23, 1963, also listed the "ovadual de- velopment of some form of accommodation with Castro" among policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, p. 3).. we HW 30955 Bocld: 32423524 Page 234
-10- And, at a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed it would be a "useful endeavor" to explore "various possibili- ties of establishing channels of communication to Castro". (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, June 6, 1963, p. 2). 7 In the Fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3.) Atwood testified — vos that during the period of September-November , 1963, he held a series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss opening negotiations on: an accommodation between Castro and the United States. (Atwood, pp. 5-9.) Atwood testified that at the outset he informed Robert | Kennedy, who told him that the effort "was worth pursuing". (Atwood,p.6). Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the White House and to his. superior at the United Nations, Adlai Steven- son. (Atwood pp. 6-7.) Atwood further stated that he was told by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet - . fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into normal". (Atwood, p.7-3 .y “Atwood stated that he believed the only people. who knew of his contacts with the Cubans were the President, Harriman, Steven- son, Robert Kennedy , Bundy, Bundy 's assistant, and journalist Lisa | Howard. (Howard had initially placed Atwood in contact ‘with. the Cuban Ambassador after reporting to Atwood that during a - trip to Cuba she had learned Castro was anxious to establish HW 3509545 Docld: 32423524 Page 235
communications with the United States. Thereafter Howard served as an intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with the Cubans. (Atwood, pp. 4, 18)). - Atwood also testified. that he arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel, to visit the White House prior to Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, p. 19.). (According to an article by Daniel in December, 1963, Daniel met with President Kennedy on. October 24, 1963. They discussed the prospects for reestablishing U.S.-Cuba relations and President Kennedy asked Daniel to report back to him after seeing Castro.)*/ | “Atwood's efforts reached their high point on November 18, 1963, when Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's staff in Cuba. (Atwood, D. 8). Pursuant to White House in- structions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the U.S. favored preliminary negotiations at the U.N. (rather than - in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the U.S. desired to. work out an agenda | for these talks. (Atwood, pp. (8-9). After receiving Atwood’ s report en this « conversation, bundy told Atwood that after the Cuban agenda was received, President. Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and */ Daniel, Unofficial Envoy: A Historic Report from Two Ca itals, (New Re ublic, , December: 14, [963). Daniel was with Castro wien, Castro | received the report of President Kennedy's assassination. Daniel, When Castro-Heard the News, (New Republic, December 7, 1963). HW 50955 Docld: 324239524 Page 256
_*/The following exchange occurred in Helms' testimony: HW 50955 “whether to go or what we should do next AM/LASH Potson Pen Device - 12 - iq days later, on November 22, 1963, (the same day AM/LASH was given the poison. pen), Jean Daniel was meeting with Castro. On that same day, President Kennedy was assassinated. With the change of Administrations, ‘Atwood! Ss talks with the Cubans became less fre- quént and eventually ended in early 1964. (Atwood, p. 10.) 4, Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the (a) Testimony of Helms (i) The October 29 Meeting and the Use: of Robert Kenned Ts Name Without Obtaining [fis Approval et As discussed above in detail (see pp.. ), Fitzgerald met with AM/LASH on October 29, 1963, in a foreign capital. Fitz- gerald represented to AM/LASH that he was the personal represen- tative of Robert Kennedy, and gave AM/LASH assurances of full sup- port should AM/LASH succeed in overthrowing Castro.. . | The IG Report states that, according to Fitzgerald, Helms and Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with AM/LASH and Helms de- cided "it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald to speak in his name". (IG, pp. 88-89). “In his testimony, Helms stated he did not recall such a discussion with Fitzgerald, but that he believed he had pre-existing authority to deal with AM/LASH with respect to "a change in government"'(as opposed to assassination) and that this made it unnecessary to obtain Robert Kennedy's approval .*/ "I felt so sure that if I went to see Mr. Kennedy that he would have "Sen. Hart of Michigan: Dealing with respect to what?. A change in government, or assassination?" Mr. Helms: A change in government,. Senator Hart: This -is what we were trying to do. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132) Siegel £ a Bocld: 324735274 Page 237
said yes, that I didn't think there was any need to." (lelms, 6/13/75, p. 13z.) | | Helms said his view was that AM/LASH was a political action agent, not a potential assassin, and that the meet- ing with AM/LASH and his. decision not to contact Robert Xennedy should be viewed in that light: "...given this Cuban of his standing and all the history...of trying to find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and have a group to re-' place Castro...this was so central to the whole theme of everything we had been trying to do, that I find it totally unnecessary to ask Robert Kennedy at that point (whether) we should go ahead with this. This is obviously what he had been pushing, what every- body had been pushing for us to try to do...let's _ get on with-doing it. * (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 117-118) ,*/ (ii) The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22 While lielms stated that the delivery of a poison pen to AM/LASH was not part of an assassination plot, Helms testified _. */As discussed above (see pp. __), there was conflicting testi- - mony from CIA officers as to whether they viewed AM/LASH as an "assassin and as to the purpose of giving him the poison pen. The docu- mentary evidence, however, indicates that AM/LASH in 1963 was intent upon assassinating Castro, that the CIA officers knew of this, and, in’ addition to offering a poison pen, told AM/LASH they would supply him with high powered rifles with telescopic sights. (see Pp. , above). Helms testified that because Amlash 'was the asset we were looking for, (wye didn't want him to blow himself or blow anything else ‘by © getting involved in something like this [assassination] and have it fail. We wanted him to stay. in place."' (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 131). Helms stated that “at no time was it the idea of [the AM/LASH- lj] case officers, or those people in the chain behind, to use [AM/LASH-1] to assassinate Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135). Helms further stated " "...there was an enormous amount of temporizing with this fellow to keep him on the team,-to keep him working away at this job, but to try and persuade him that this was not the way to go about it. (Helms , 6/13/75, p. 135). Helms testified that AM/LASH- Ll was given the poison pen- "because he was insisting on . something and this was a tempor izing gesture rather than giving him some kind of a gun he had asked for. " (Helms , LED ve Parelge dae | HY 50955 DBocld:32423574 Page 239
tycete ne ewe Se, ~ 14 - that he believed Castro's assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority. /(Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12)./ As in the case of the 1962 plots, Helms based this on the vigor of the Administration's policy towards Cuba /and his perception that there were no limits put on the means that could be used in the effort against Castro. (Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12). Thus ,/ Helms testified that after the missile crisis the U.S. continued to conduct covert actions whose purpose was "to. overthrow Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75, Pe 24.) /Helms was asked whether it was his opinion that the offer of the poison pen to AM/LASH was authorized because it came within the scope of the 1963 pro- ‘gram against Castro. ‘Helms. responded: it think the only way I know how to answer that is that I do not recall when things got cranked up in 1963 any dramatic changes or limitations being put on this operation.-. There ‘was still an effort by whatever device, and perhaps only slightly differently oriented at this time, to try to get rid of Castro...But I do not recall specific things being said, now, (we are not) going to-do this, we're not going to do that, and we're not going to do the other thing, and we will do just these things."'/ . (b) Testimony of Administration Officials ~ - AS with the Mongoose period, the Administration officials agreed that they were not informed about any assassination plot and that there was no order that Castro be assassinated. Again, they disagreed with Helms’ position that an assassi- nation plot could be undertaken without express authority. The only added part relating to the AM/LASH plot was certain testimony which asserted that it was in- conceivable that the President would have approved. an assassination plot at the very ad same time he had authorized talks to explore the possibility of improved relations with Castro.*/ & /Rusk testified that "I find it extraordinarily difficult ‘to believe" and that "I { just can't conceive" President Kennedy would have authorized the passage of an assas~ _ Sination device for use against Castro while Atwood was exploring the possibility WW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 239
- 15 - Since Helms did not claim any higher specific authorization for or knowledge of the AM/LASII assassination plot, however, the additional issue posed by that testimony does not really arise. ‘ (continued) of normalizing relations with Castro. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 85). Similarly, Bundy testified he "absolutely" did not believe President Kennedy would have authorized: or permitted an assassination device to have been passed at the same time a possible rapprochment with Castro was being pursued. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 151). On the other hand, when the possibility of exploring better relations with Castro was initially raised (but before any talks were begun) Bundy indicated that it could be explored on a "separate track" while other proposed actions, such as sabotage, were going on. (Agenda for Special Group meeting of 4/29/63, p. 2.) HW 350955 Docld:32423524 Page 2740
wana Subcommittee Meeting 9/9/75. Approved Draft. d.° The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration 1. Summary of the Assassination Activity. As discussed above (see pp. _sd)s the Agency delivered arms to AM/LASH in Cuba in March and June 1964. In early | 1965 after AM/LASH became more insistent that a Castro. assassination was neces- sary and had asked for a silenced weapon, the Agency put AM/LASH in contact with the leader of an anti-Castro group, B-1, with the intention that AM/LASH obtain such a weapon. Thereafter, the Agency learned that AM/LASH had received a silencer and other special equipment from B-1 and was preparing to assassinate Castro. . 2, The Issue of Authorization. The issue of authority in the Johnson Admini- stration is similar to that in the Kennedy Administration. During this phase of the AM/LASH plot, Helms continued as Deputy Director for covert operations, and the principal members of the Kennedy Administration continued in their positions in the relevant period of the Johnson Administration (Robert Kennedy left the : Administration in the midst of this period, on ___.).* Helms' testimony that he believed a Castro assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority in view of Administration policy towards Cuba applied to the AM/LASH operation in both 1963 and 1964-65. (Heins, 6/13/75, p. 137-138.) Again, there was no evidence HW 50955 that McCone or anyone above the Agency specifically authorized or knew about the 1964-65. plot. We discuss below four other matters occurring during the Johnson Administration:, (1) the covert: action program against Cuba in 1964-1965; (2) the Special Groups’ action in mvestigating reports of Cuban exile underworld Rusk (Secretary ot State), McNamara (Secretary of Defense), McCone (Director of Central Intelligence); and Bundy (Special Assistant for National Security and Chairman of the Special Group). Docld: 324273524 Page 241
HY wit, plots to assassinate Castro; (3) Helms' report to Rusk that CIA was not in- volved with AM/LASH in a Castro assassination plot; and (4) Helms’. briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 IG Report on alleged CIA assassination plots. 3. The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in 1964-1965. According to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7, 1964, which he chaired, President _ Johnson decided to discontinue the use of CIA-controiled sabotage raids against Cuba.* (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. __.) A memoran- dum by McCone indicated: that in deciding this question, President Johnson abandoned the objective of Castro's overthrow.** _ At the April 7, Special Group meeting, Rusk had emphasized his opposition to the use of sabotage raids, stating his belief that they were unproductive, and had a "high noise level" that called attention to them. In addition, Rusk stated that “he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possible. wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U. S. involvement in order to increase _ that involvement."' (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, page 2.) *A memorandum by Bundy on April 7, 1964, listed seven aspects. of the covert action “program which had been in effect. These were: (1) collection of intelligence; (2) covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance; (3) cooperation with other agencies in economic denial; (4) attempts to identify -.and establish contact with potential dissident-elements inside Cuba; (5) indirect economic sabotage; (6) ClA-controlled sabotage raiding; and (7) autonomous opera- tions. (Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group, April 7, 1964, p. 1-2.)  **At the April 7, 1964, meeting Rusk and Bundy opposed. continuation of sabotage actions by CIA-controlled assets as "unproductive'’ and impractical. McCone dis- agreed, noting that the covert action program relied on a "well-planned series of sabotage efforts''. (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. 3.) In this connection, Bundy noted that since. the approval of the current sabotage . in June 1963 "policymakers...had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that (the sabotage program) simply does not,’ in the nature of things, appear feasible". (Id., p. 2.) ae SO955 Bacld: 32423524 Page 242
4, The Special Group Investigation of Reported Castro Assassination Plots by Cuban Exiles. On June 10, 1964, Helms informed McCone by memorandum that Agency officials had learned of several plots of Cuban exiles to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to McCone, June 10, 1964.) Several of the plots, according to the memorandum, involved "people apparently associated with the Mafia". Reportedly the exiles had offered people associated with the Mafia $150,000 to perform the deed. In his memorandum, Helms stated that the sources of the reports were parties to the plots and in submitting the in- formation to Agency officers were presumably seeking iegal immunity should the plots succeed. (Id., p. 1.) Helms! memorandum , however, made no mention of any of the CIA assassination plots against’ Castro.* (Footnote continued. from previous page.) In a memorandum the day after President Johnson’ s decision to stop CiA-controlled . sabotage operations, McCone stated: '"'the real issue to be considered at.the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy (outlined in certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bring- ing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and.thus rely on future events of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective''. (Memorandum by McCone, April 8, 1964, p. In the context of the Special Group' s discussion, McCone! s use of the words "Liqui- dation" and "elimination'’ appears to be anothér “example of inartful language. A literal interpretation of these words leaves one with the impression that assassina- tion was contemplated. But the context of.the discussion does not bear out such an- interpretation. Thus in specifying what he meant by ''future events of an undisclosed nature'' McCone pointed to "extreme economic distress caused by a sharp drop in ° sugar prices'', and 'other external factors’. (Id, p. 8.) McCone testified that such references as the “elimination” ¢ or "liquidation'' of the Castro regime did not refer to assassination. (McCone, p...) **Moreover , according to Bundy, no one from the CIA or anyone else informed him at | the meetings that "in earlier years there had been a relationship with...persons allegedly involved with the criminal syndicate--in order to accomplish the assassi- nation of Fidel Castro''. (Bundy, p. 71.) ae “me HW 350955 Docld: 324239524 Page 2743
HY A N\ ay need boo a mene a AW Indeed, it stated that "Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not under any circumstances, condone the planned actions". (Id., p. 1.) When the Special Group considered the information in Helms memorandum on June 18, 1964, McCone stated he was "somewhat skeptical" and proposed additional investigation, but "others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the U. S. was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention". (Memorandum of Special ~ Group Meeting, June 18, 1964.) In a memorandum on the June 18 meeting, McCone indicated he had dissented from the Special Group's decision, stating his be- lief that the Special Group was "overly exercised" and that he was inclined to dismiss the matter as "Miami cocktail party talk". McCone noted, however, that the Special Group "was more concerned than I and therefore. planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and “possibly Mr. Hoover". (Memorandum «- June 18, 1964, p. 1.) - The Special Group decided that the reports be transmitted to the Attorney _General "as.a matter of law enforcement". (Id.) Robert Kennedy was informed of this matter a few days later and stated that the Justice Department would investi- -gate. (Memoraridum of Meeting, 22 June 1964.) “Thereafter the FBI conducted an investigation, the results of which were submitted to the Special Group on “August .19, 1964, by McCone.* (Memorandum, August 19, 1964, McCone to Bundy.) *McCone's memorandum summarized seven FBI reports on its investigation. The FBI found that several of the persons it interviewed stated they had knowledge of the exile's plots and had reported the information to the CIA. Others inter- viewed denied knowledge of the plans. SO955 Bacld: 32423524 Page 244
} 5 Ss, Helms! Report to Rusk that CIA was not Involved with Amlash in a Castro Assassination Plot In March 1966, Helms, reported to Rusk by memorandum on the CIA's re- lations with Amlash. - (Rusk Ex, 7, Memorandum, March 7, 1966, Helms to Rusk). ~ In this report, Helms stated that the CIA's contact with Amlash was for "the express purpose" of intelligence collection. (Id.). Noting Cuban press claims that Amlash and a second Cuban had been involved with the CIA ina — a Castro assassination plot, Helms stated: ‘The Agency was not involved with either. of ‘these two men in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, as claimed in /a Cuban news -reélease/ nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act. (Rusk Ex, 7, p..1). The Helms memorandum to Rusk made no mention of the fact that CIA officers, with Helms’ knowledge, had offered a poison pen to Amlash on November 22, 1963, that CIA had supplied arms to Amlash in 1964, or that CIA had put. Amlash in touch with B-1 to enable him to obtain a silenced weapon to assassinate Castro. In his testimony, Helms stated that this memorandum to Rusk was "inaccurate" and "not truthful. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.) - The CIA's copy. of the Helms' memorandum to Rusk contains a typed notation ~« in which Helms! signature was recommended by the CIA's. ‘then Deputy Director for ON HW 50955 Plans, Thomas Karamessines. (Rusk EX. 7, p. 2.) Helms testified that the day before his June 13, 1975, testimony to the Committee he had asked Karamessines why the memorandum to Rusk had been written as it was. Helms stated he and Kara- messines concluded they: did not know the reason but Helms speculated that “it may be until we conducted (the 1967 IG investigation) somewhat later we didn't. have the facts straight, or maybe we had the facts straight then but we did not “have them straight later''. ‘““(Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.) DoclTd: 32423524 Page 245.
6. Helms’ Briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's ' Report. Drew Pearson's article in the spring of 1967 alleging U. S. involve- ment in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro prompted President Johnson to re- quest Helms, who by then had become: the DCI, to conduct an investigation. The result was the Inspector General's Report of May 23, 1967. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 35.) After receiving the report, Helms briefed the President "orally about the contents’. (1a. at 36.) During his testimony, Helms was shown his handwritten notes apparently prepared for his briefing of the President. Those notes carried the story through mid-1963. When asked if he told President Johnson that, according to the 1967 study, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's presidency, Helms replied, "I just can't answer that, IT just don't know. I can't recall having done so". (Id. at 38.) He did note that it would not have occurred to him to brief President Johnson on the 1964 AM/LASH gun deliveries because "I don't think one would have approached the AM/LASH thing as an assassina- tion plot against Castro". (Id. at 39.) Helms had testified that AM/LASH was an intelligence and political action agent. (Helms, p- _.__.) The IG Report , ~ however, treated the AM/LASH operation as an assassination, plot. (IG, p. -.) 7. Helms Testimony-on Authorization in-the Johnson Administration. In his testimony, Helms was asked if the Agnecy regarded "whatever marching orders they had obtained prior to the dealth of -President Kennedy as still being valid \ and operative" when President Johnson succeeded to the office. Helms replied: HY 50955 DBocld: 3274293524 Page 246
Dhue ou wie This is not very clear to me at this stage. A lot of the same officers were serving President Johnson as they served President Kennedy, and...I can't re- call anymore whether there was any specific issue about whether this was taken up with President Johnson at any meeting or any session. If it had been, I would have thought there would have been -records someplace." (Helms, 6/13, p. 139.) When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or had authorized continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms replied indirectly that "the Special Group would have continued to consider these.matters, and I would have assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in turn reported to the President, which was the usual practice’. (Id.) But the records of the Special Group do not show any consideration of a Castro assassination or of the AM/LASH plot during the Johnson Administration (or earlier). And, as discussed above, there was no evidence that McCone or anyone above the Agency. was informed of or specifically authorized the AM/LASH , ~ plots. HW 50955 Docld:324235294 Page 247
Agee Le Gy SUDCOMALL Ge ay AUS re Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommittee Editing and (2) Insertion of Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony TABLE OF. CONTENTS | D. ‘CONGO 1, 1. Introduction ; Loo 2. Dulles Cabled Leopoldville. That. "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters" toe ee ee 4 . 3 3. CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to: "Eliminate" Lumumba, Who Was Viewed'as a "Grave Danger" Even After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective Custody . See ee ee ee 8 _s The Plot to Assassinate 1 Lumumba to ee ee ee ee La (a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive Assignment soe ew ee “15 (b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to oS Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi- cs 7 nation (of. Lumumba: “September 1960 a ce “(c) liedgman Testified That. Gottlieb Told Him That President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba. 2... 1... 22, (d)- Headquarters Makes the Assassination ~ Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes . . Steps in Furtherance of Tt soe ee ee ee eee 2K (e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination Plot . ..........4.,. 32 (i) ‘The Chief of Station Testified. ' That He Requested and Received _Confirmation of the ‘Assassination Plan from Headquarters ee (ii) The Chief of Station Took “Explora- tory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic HW 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 248 Related to the Plot -......4.,.. . . 34
di (f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the _ Assassination Plot... ... 2... (i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation . To Poison Lumumba Be AL (ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With .. Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba. and Ile Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba for the Purpose of . Assassination So ee ee 44 (ai) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall Whether the Assassination Operation -Had. ; Moved from Planning to Implementation But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to Send Poisons to the Congo, Soe eee ee. 4B 5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA \ Officers and Operatives in’ the Congo .. Se 52 °>, (a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo... eo, 53 (i) Tweedy and the Chief. of Station Agreed That _ a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi- | mation Operation ... 8 (ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of. . Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him . to. Congo: October-November 1960 ......:., 54 (iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked 0' Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination . Operation a 39 Civ) O'Donnell Arrived in “the Congo» and _ Learned That a Virus Was in the _ Station Safe ... 2... el, coe ke ee 60 (v)..0' Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" . Lumumba by Turning Him Over to - ~ Congolese Authorities and Requested . the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to . Leopoldville as His Alter Ego ns oo) (b)° Agent QJWIN's Mission. in the Congo: November - December 1960 . 2... 20. Dn, Poe es 67 HY 50955 DBocld: 32742935274 Page 2749
-Lil-. (c) QUWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIELE. . _(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative -WIROGUE to Join an “Execution Squad”: December | 1960 ee ee ea 6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in ' —s-: Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga ee eee (a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville: November 27- Decémber 3, 1960 | (b) ‘Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where tle Was Killed: January 17, 1960 7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination Plot Was Authorized (a) High-Level Meetings at Which "Getting F Rid ~. of Lumumba" Discussed . (i) ‘Dillon. Testified That the Question of - Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon - Meeting: Summer 1960 ... (ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the President Order Lumumba's Assassi-: nation at an NSC Meeting .. (iii) The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Lead the Special Group to Consider Anything That Might Get Rid of Lumumba and Dulles Cables for Lumumba" Ss Removal: August 25- 26, 1960 (iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until "Disposed Of" (b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of Assassination (c)-Richard Bissell Testified That He "Strongly -Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized By President Eisenhower - and Allen Dulles . WW 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 250 Page 72 74 79 79 . 82.0 84 84 . 8&8 . 101 . 106 . 110
HY. 50955 DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975 7 EOP SECRET | Frederick BD. Baron For Internal Committee - Use Only , D. CONGO lL. Introduction ‘The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to ‘the point where tethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency scientist. fe ae a ms “Although. these instruments of assassination were never | used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case . which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's of assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba? _ Second, how high in the United States. government -was the source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally, was the CIA connected in any way’ to ‘the events that actually led ‘to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody? A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these broad questions together with the documents and testimony re- -ceived by the Committee. — Docld: 32423524 Page 251
HY 50955 ge In the summer of 1960, there was a great deal of concern. at the highest levels in the United ‘States. government about the role of Patrice Lumumba in’ the Congo. * Lumumba, ‘who served briefly as Premier of ‘the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm. by United States foreign policymakers because of what they perceived as his magnetic public appeal ‘and his leanings toward the Soviet. ‘Union. Under ‘the leadership of Lumumba and the new ‘President, Joseph Kasavubu, ‘the Congo declared its independence. from Belgium on June. 30, 1960. In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of. “Belgian armed forces. The United Nations: Security Council re- quested a Belgian withdrawal and dispatched a neutral force to the Congo to preserve order. In. late July, Lumimba visited Washington and received pledges of economic aid From, Secretary of State Christian Herter. At the beginning of September, Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technicians were arriving in the province where Lumumba's: support was strongest. | | By mid-September, Lumumba sought protection. from the UN, guard in Leopoldville after losing a strug ggle over the leadership of the government with Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese armed forces. In early December, Mobutu's troops captured Lumumba while he was traveling toward his stronghold at “Since he period in which che events under examination occurred, the names of many geographical units and governmental institutions have changed. For instance, the nation formerly known as the Republic of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city, Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville. For the sake of clarity in dealing with many of the documents involved in this section, the names used in this report are those which applied in the early 1960's, con- temporaneously with the events under consideration. Docld: 32493524 Page 252
HY 50955 ‘Station to the Congo. The Chief’ of Station said that’ the briefings =3- Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned, The central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its own independence at that time. Several weeks. later, the Katangese. authorities announced Lumumba's death. ~ There are various accounts of the circumstances and | timing of Lumumba's death. The. United Nations: investigation of the inci-. dent concluded. ‘that Lumumba was killed on January 17. OO 2. Dulles. Cables Leopoldville That "Removal". of Lumumba EE a vege obfeseise ia gh cammeere _ Shortly after the Congolese: declaration. of independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new Chief. of he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure’ contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to head- quarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassi- nating Lumumba (Hedgman , 8/21/75, p. 9). . During August, great concern about. Lumumba ' s political strength | in ‘the Congo was growing among, the foreign policy- makers of the Eisenhower Administration. *«* This concern was nurtured —* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October: November, and December . *x* See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing | anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by minutes. of the National Security Council and Special Group and the testimony of high Administration officials Docld: 32493524 ‘Page 253
by intelligence reports | such as that cabled to CIA headquarters by. fhe new Chief. of Station: EMBASSY. AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT . MANY -FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH. DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR LNFLUENCING FACTORS To PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR. JUST PLAYING — ~ COMMIE GAME TO.ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI- WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME. LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA..... (CIA Cable IN’ 39706, Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60. yo ‘This cable also stated the Chief of Station' Ss operational "OBJECTIVE - [OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA | WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60). ~~ - Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan- destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable Out 59741, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On .August 19, Richard Bissell, Director of CIA's covert operations branch , signed a ‘follow-up cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60). . Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba’ had been proposed to President ‘Kasavubu by Congolese leaders: ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU _ . WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE. LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU ' REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT. STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable IN 42761, Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60. ) HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 254
HY 0955 This incident indicates that the CIA was aware that there was ‘some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but. that the. moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and ‘refused to consider assassination. . On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a meeting of the ‘Special Group -- the National Security Council subcommittee re- sponsible for the planning of covert-operations::* In response to . the outline of some CIA plans for’ political actions against - Lumumba , such as arranging a. vote of no confidence by the. Congolese Parliament, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that the President ; had expressed extremely strong feelings on the- necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. (Special Group lfinutes,. 8/25/60. ) After this discussion, thé Special Group finally agreed that planning for the Congo - would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to. getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60. ” _ * This Special Group meeting and the testimony about - its significance on the issue of authorization is discussed in detail in Section 5 (iii), infra, Boclda: 3242935274 Page 255
The next day, Allen Dulles personally, signed a cable* to - the” Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the | “urgency of "removing" Lumumba: IN. HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-- CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL- [LUMUMBA] CON-. | TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN- AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF | THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY ' WE CONCLUDE THAT. HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN , URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING : CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD. BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF ': OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966, Director to Leopoldville,. 8/26/60. ) Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be. given "WIDER | es! AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the “préviously authorized opera- tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- “INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT, TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY. PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) . * Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed. *k As discussed in Section 5€c), infra, Richard’ Bisell testified that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase “higher quarters” to refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 48). HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 256
HY 50955 . Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100, 000 “TO CARRY OUT ‘ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH. YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR- TUNITY To CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) . He assured, the © Chief of Station that the message had been “SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) . But the Director of Central Intelligence made a. special point of = assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the Congo would prefer to remain 1 uninfotmed TO THE — HAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE | TO. BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CON- ‘CURRENCE.. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). ‘This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contem- plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly. deny" United States involvement. DDP Richard ‘Bissell testified that he was "almost certain" that he was informed abcut the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33, 64-65) .* | | | O | * See Section S(e), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell on the question of authorization for, the assassination effort against Lumumba . Docld: 32423524 ‘BPage 257
HW 450955 “ment... 3, CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" ‘Lumumba, Who-is Viewed as.a "Grave Danger” Even After = Being Deposed and Placed in _UN Protective Custody On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Premier Lumumba from the government. despite the strong support for Lumumba | that. existed in the Congolese Parliament. After losing the ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and Mobutu, who seized . the government by a military. coup on September 14, _ Lumumba sought” protection from the United Nations peace- keeping’ force. ‘The — a evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba from the government - did not alleviate the concern about. him in the United States govern- ~ ‘Rather, the CIA and high Eisenhower Administration. officials* continued to view. him as a threat, at least vuntil ~ early December when he was captured by Mobutu's troops and im- prisoned. During this period, CIA officers .in the Congo advised and aided Congolese contacts known to have any intent to ‘Kill ‘Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic process — after the coup, -- ‘by reopening the Parliament -- because ‘of the itkelihood that | this would return Lumumba to power, _The day after Lumumba was deposed by. Kasavubu, two CIA officers met witha high | level Congolese politician who had. a close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station _re- ported to CIA: headquarters that the politician had made a response * A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern _over. Lumumba at the National Security Council level is set forth | in Section _, infra. BDoclda: 324273574 Page 256.
WW 50955 to a remark by the ‘Chief of Station that implied that the might assassinate. Lumumba: TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS- ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN’ OFFICE, [THE CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD AND IMPLIED. MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE _. LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 49679, Leopoldville to Director, 9/7/60. y on The cable) continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered | to assist this politician “INS PREPARATION NEW. GOVERNMENT PROGRAM" -and assured him that the United States would supply technicians (CIA Cable, 9/7/60). . -. As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the. Chief of os the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. Ss. | apprehension’ about Lumumba ' s ability to influence events in the Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official position: LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER- ‘RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION EACH. TIME IT SEEMS. HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE. (CIA Cable, OUT 69233, Director to Leopoldville, 9/13/60). The day after Mobutu' 's coup, the Chief of Station reported that. he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "“elimi- nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded a safe base of operations: Bocld: 32493524 Page 249
~10- STILL DIFFICULT -DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE: DECISIONS _ ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED ~ [TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-_ NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN. PROTECTION WILL GIVE . . LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE. COUNTER. ATTACK.: . . ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST. (CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to Director, 9/15/60.) oo os On September iy, ‘another CIA operative in. the: Congo. met with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator requested | a clandestine supply. of small. arms to equip some ‘Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters Concerning - the meeting reported: {[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE - - , “— SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPS , RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP [OLDVILLE] AREA ... { THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES LUMUMBA. MUST GO PERMANENTLY.  DISTRUSTS.. - ‘(ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228, Leopoldville - to Director, 9/17/60. ) , , The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters that they should HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]. DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES - SARY (CIA Cable, (9/17/60). % * This recommendation proved to be ‘in line with large scale . planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support to anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre- sentatives or operational contacts: (footnote continued on next page) HW 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 260
Lae Several days later, while » warning a key. Congolese leader about coup plots led. by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of Station “URGED ARREST ‘OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,,. IN. 15643, Leopoldviite to Director, 9/20/61). Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were ‘leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody. (Footnote continued rom Previous: Page) [IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT. DEVELOP -. MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN- -/ DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS. IN ARMED - OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA . CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS, SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO. ANTI- LUMUMBA. RESISTANCE GROUPS. (CIA Cable OUT 04697, Director to Leopoldville, 10/6/60. ) WW 50955 Docld: 324279524 Page 261
‘-12- ‘Throughout the fall of 1960, the CIA continued to view Lumumba as a serious political threat while he remained in UN protective custody.* One concern was that if the Parliament -- which had been closed by the coup ~- were re-opened and the moderates oom 7 -* Both Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the CIA Africa Division, confirmed that the CIA continued to view Lumumba as a threat even after he placed himself in UN custody (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. ; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. ). Both Bissell and Tweedy referred to two factors to substantiate this . view: first, Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability to’ stir masses of people to action; and second, the UN forces did not restrain Lumumba's freedom of movement and the Congolese army surrounding them were often lax in maintaining their:vigil. [Quote/Cite from transcripts: ] HW 50955 Docld:324935294 Page 262
HY 50955 - failed to obtain a majority vote, the "PRESSURES FOR [LUMUMBA'S] — - RETURN WILL BE ALMOST IRRESISTABLE" (CIA Cable, IN 33499, Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60) .*. Another general concern at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in the Congo and bring. Lumumba to power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director to Leopoldville, 10/17/60). “Similarly, throughout this period Lumumba was viewed by CIA officials and the Eisenhower Adminis- tration** as a stalking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet effort to take over the Congo" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 10, 45). During this period, the Leopoldville station continued to _ maintain close operational relationships with, and offer aid to,. Congolese contacts who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba*** oy although there is no direct evidence that aid was provided for the specific purpose of assassination. a % A CIA Cable (IN 37289) from Leopoldville to.the Director on November 3, 1960 returns to this theme: - the opening of the Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed because it "WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO POWER." kk’ See Section ,» infra, on such analysis at high-level policy 'meetings. *** A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an. attempt to tap Lumumba's phones "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LUMUMBA] KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS.JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE» BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN... (CIA Cable, IN 34867, Leopoldville to Director, 10/28/60.) Boclda: 32493524 Page 963
HY 50955 testified that in the coursé of his discussion with the CIA Gottlieb’ s mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by 4.. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba in the. fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA. headquarters delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio- logical substances to. be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba . The Chief: of Station testified that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the scientist's , instructions, he proceeded to take “exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower _ had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba. ee general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Oniv'" channel including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles. The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly . before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there is'no clear evidence that the assassination. operation was termi-_ nated before Lumumba' s death. There is, however, no direct evidence of a connection ‘between the CLA assassination plot and the events. which actually led to Lumumba's death.* * See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the ‘evidence about the circumstances that Ted. to Lumumba's death in Katanga. Docld:324735294 Page 264
(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba , ” ' ‘and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With. a Hi Aly. - Sensitive Assignment On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-. self in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy. signed a eryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a ‘clandestine meeting between the Chief ‘of Station and "Sidney Braun, ' who was traveling to the Congo on an unspecifiéd. assignment: {''SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX: 27 SEPT... . WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID-.FROM PARIS". . . IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["SID’] SOONEST POSSIBLE . AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL. FULLY IDENTIFY. © HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. Se ~ (CIA Cable, OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief. — ed of Station, 9/19/60.) The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator ~- PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the Chief of the Africa Division.* * -In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick _ A. O. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this | ‘sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and.the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation. HY 50955 DBocld: 324293524 Page 265
-16- The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chief of Station that he was to continue to use this indicator for ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU ~ INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO “YOURSELF (CIA Cable, 9/19/60. ) The Chief of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman''* -~ testified to. a clear, independent recollection of receiving such a-cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a “most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. ll,” 43). The cable advised, in his words, that: someone who I would have recognized would arrive with instructions for me. I believe the message was also marked for my 9 eyes only ... and contained instructions , that I was not to discuss the message with anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.) ~Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the. kind of instruc- tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any way" -(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. (12). | “Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that. Hedgman was to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi- tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only" | basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60). oe * Due to fear oF reprisal From Lumumba ' s followers, the Chief -, of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi- fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75, Pe 4), . | | i H¥ 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 266
-17- Tweedy 's. cable indicated that a third country national would be required as an agent in the PROP operation: IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN] ‘ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. — (CIA. Cable, a 9/22/60. ) Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station. " was using for other operations and said “WE ARE CONSIDERING AU THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT. CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT. FILL ‘BILL (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweédy’ s concern about the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of station and his “colleague” -~ presumably the man identified as “Sid" who was to arrive in the Congo shortly ‘to. explain the PROP °. operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation: YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND. WE CANNOT READ. _ OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT- STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE _° BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESS ONAL JUDGMENTS . (CTA Cable, 9/22/60. ) % This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections , and. , infra. Doclda: 32423524 Page 267
HW 450955 Docld: 32493524 Page 266 -18- ‘On September 24, “Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate" Lumumba : | WE WISH GIVE EVERY. POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN a ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL. POSITION OR IF HE - FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF | IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA. Cable, QUT © 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60. ) Dulles had’ expressed a similar view three days. before. ‘in the presence: of the President at an NSC meeting, stating: - Mobutu appeared to. ‘be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet. disposed of and remained a. grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, (9/21/60) (b). Gottlieb Delivers Lethal | Substances to the Chief of. Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba - The Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson Tweedy that’ he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville.to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that. -_ existed as long as Lumumba’ was not "disposed of". Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel: ’ Q: “Who was the messenger who arrived? Hedgman: Mr. Sidney Gottlieb
~ 19 - Qe And at that. ‘time, you, knew who he was? Hed. man ; I recognized him as an officer of the Bency ... . I believe he referred to the fact that I had received a message. and that he was the person concerned, _(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 15-16) - om The message carried by Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to DDP Richard Bissell, was unmistakeably. clear according to Hedgman: Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba. Qi By eliminate, do you mean assassinate? Hedgman: Yes. L would | say that was... . my under standing of the primary means.. I don't think it was ., ‘probably limited to that, if there was some other way. - ~-of doing it. Q: Of doing what? Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political © threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. I7- 18. d- Hedgman said that he and Gottlieb also may have discussed non- ‘lethal means of removing Lumumba as a “political threat" , but he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman,” 8/21/75, p. 28). | He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination, however: | | 7 | ~Q:° And what did Mr. Gottlieb indicate with regard to the possibility of physically eliminating him? Hedgman: It was my understanding’ that that was. _ probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.) _ And again: Q: I take it that once you started discussing these lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was killing Lumumba? HW 50955 DBocld: 324234524 Page 269
-20- Hedgman: ‘There was no - doubt in.my mind that. | this was one of the way[s], and probably what _ they thought was the re way that would work _ (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25). -Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means of assassination: ce 'And what did-he tell you with regard to. ow that might be accomplished? Hedgman : He brought some biological agents. I assume that that's the correct word. But in any case, poisonous agent with: him, which he - passed to me. , . Q: These were Lethal biological substances? -Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding oe as a non-expert. ledgman , 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.) . Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a a syringe" along with the poisons» and that Gottlieb instructed him in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 20-21).- Hedgman indicated that this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to. Lumumba: Q: [W]hen he [Gottlieb] came to the ‘Congo to give you lethal biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear at that time that the méans for administering those biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was to be ingested by ~ — _Lumumba, whether. it be food, or drink, or . ‘toothpaste or any other. substance that was to be ingested? Hed man: That's my recollection, yes, : Uielgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.) Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb: This was not a sine qua non that I employ this. . If there were another metho d, another way, it would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.) HW. 50955 Doeld: 32423524 Page 270
.21- For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested" ~ shooting Lumumba to.Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning é - (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp: 27-29). | ‘There was a firm requirement, however, that the means.of assassi- nation should not be traceable to the United States: .: The biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up-to my. judgment, © and if there was a better way -- certainly. [T]he point I now recall was inno way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it be traced back-to the United States. It © had to be a way which could not be traced back ... either to an American or the United States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.) Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were pro- duced to meet. this requirement: . I believe I raised the point that poisons left traces in the human body, which could be found on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured _that these ... lethal agents would [leave] ‘normal traces found in people that die of certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.) Hedgman said that he had an “emotional reaction of great sur- prise" when it first became clear that. Gottlieb was there to discuss an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, >. 30). But the Chief of | Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, >. 46) and left him with the following impression: | I think it would be a fair impression that he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it and try and figure if there was a way ... I: believe I HW 50955 Docld:324273534 Bage 271
-22— stressed the difficulty of trying to carry “out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, ep. 47.) | _ The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his initial contact With Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response to the assignment. The Chief of Station said that he and Gottlieb were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH ."" (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to ' Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's government was. "weakening under"! foreign pressure. to effect a reconciliation : with Lumimba, and said: ~ | | HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) (c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in Leopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb informed’ him that President Eisenhower had authorized the assassination of Lumumba: Q: Did you raise with him the question of authori- zation of such instructions to you?. | oe Hedgman: Yes, I did. ‘That's my quite strong recollection, that I did.. — . : Q: What do you recall in essence was what you said to him? : Hedgeman: In essence, I: think I-must have ... pointed — out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic, and { may have probably said that I never heard of _— no it being done, which I had not, never in my training or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any _references to such, in my recollection at least, such methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued. ~ -Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply? HY S0954 Docld: 32423524 Page 272
HY -23-, . Hedgman: It is my recollection that he identi- ~ fie the President, and I cannot -- the President of the United States -- and I cannot recall | whether he said "the President," or whether he identified him by name.. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 30-31.) - oo ote Hedgman continued to explain that he was told ' ‘something to the effect that the President had instructed the Director" (Hedgman, ~ 8/21/75, pp. 32, 34). Hedgman was clear that the ultimate source 0955 of authority for the assassination mission was-the Président: Your understanding then was that these instructions were instructions coming » to you from the office of the President? ‘Hedgman: That ' s.correct. ee | _ Q: Or that he had instructed the Agency,. and they were passed on to you? Hedgman: That's right. Q: You are not the. least unclear whether or not you became aware with a very clear im- pression that the President's name had been invoked in some fashion? . “Hedgman: Yes. I-came -- certainly that is. my recollection. , Q: You have no doubt about that? Q: At the time. Hedgman: At the time, I certainly felt that I was under instructions from the President, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32-33.) oo moe Docld:32493574 Page 273
HW 50955 Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past: Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot ‘be 100 per cent certain,. but I have always, since. that date, had the impression in my mind that these orders had come from the President. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 34. ) a But he left no. doubt about the strength of his "impression": ~Q: You have a very firm recollection that. he Oe eeu ts represented to you that the President. of the: United States directed the assassination of. Patrice Lumumba, is that correct? Hedem an: That's. my. recollection. Yes. (Hedgman, Brats 75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.) ° (d) Head uarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Hi riority' and Aut lorizes Steps in Furtherance o .On the basis of his talks with "Sid," " Hedgman listed a number of ' ‘possibilities” for covert action against ‘Lumumba. At. . the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent be used in the ‘following manner : HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN. TO’ BRUSH UP _ DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. . (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) ‘Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re- calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60. ) He in- formed headquarters : "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS. LISTED | ABOVE , UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60). On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that head- | quarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so Docld: 32423524 Page 274
HY 0955 Hedgman' s cables -- sent for Tweedy" s "Eyes Only" in the PROP es” Docld:3294935274 Page 375 a5. that he could proceed with the plan that twas his top priority: wt NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE. WITH ASSETS | NOW'AVAILABLE. MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING _ OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF ‘VARYING: ' DEGREES . os .. [IN] VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE- EXPLORATORY CONVER- SATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [AGENT] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT “REVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT. ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJEC- TIVE OP TO HIM, ~~ - REQUEST HOS REPLY CIMEDLATELY) (CIA Cable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to tweedy , 9/30/60. )- channel -- indicated that the assassination operation had been — mounted. . They show that a specific operational plan had been set: .. in motion to the extent that Hedgman, thought’ that it “would have to be. clearly ' ‘cancelled". by headquarters before he would stop proceeding with the plan. -Hedgman' Ss description of the means of maintaining the security of the operation: could be taken as a reference to a lethal biological agent which would be slow to take effect or which would leave no» traces: - ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC. DETAILS {AGENT'S] PART IN-OP, BELIEVE. RISK MINI- MIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS. OP ARE APPARENT. (CIA Cable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to Tweedy.)
HY 0955 The same day, through the PROP channel, “Hedgman. received | authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority ‘plan: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS -_ WITH SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE. a APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO - > PROBLEM, (CIA Cable, OUT 79900, Fields’ to ‘Leopoldville, 9/30/60, ) In this cable, Glenn Fields;~Assistant Chief of the Africa Division, expressed a "HOPE . FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable OUT 79900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60. -) According to the. report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb - OF, left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of -the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopold- ville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The ' “expiration' ' of Gottlieb's "materials" probably refers to the date beyond which. the substances | ’ would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of -the “expiration date" to Gottlieb’ s departure is unclear from the | cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances | had lost their toxicity, Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indi- cated that Gottlieb left some biological ‘substances that, were still lethal and that he intended to proceéd with ‘the assassination operation: [SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USE-_ FULNESS. [CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. . (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60. ) | Docld: 327493574 Page 276
HW 450955 -~27-. By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con- versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining - access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Wedgman testified that the subject. he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a. means to inject poison into Lumumba' ‘8 food or toothpaste (Hedgman,. 8/21/75, p. 60): L believe that I queried the agent who had access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in detail about just-what that access, what _ access he actually had, as.opposed to speak- ing to people. In other words, did he have access to the bathroom, did he have access. to the kitchen, things of that sort. I have a recollection of having queried him. on that without specifying why I wanted to know this. .(Hedgman, 8/21/75, Pp. 48.) On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters on this meeting: . | | oe ' CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH © ' (AGENT ] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES: ‘[AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN. LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE, Hedgeman testified that his exploratory steps left him with doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot: [Clertainly I looked on it as a pretty. wild scheme professionally. I did not think that it... was practical professionally. - Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it. I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really | expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.) Docld: 32423524 Page 277
Log. However , his cables indicate that he was planning to. eon- tinue. to implement the operation: and sought the resources to do ~ it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate operative for the assassination mission. in the event that they om _ found his first choice’ unacceptable: ’ IF. HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES} . BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES- SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171, seopoldville to Bweedy, 10/7/60. ye, Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he “HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to a de- -briefing of Gottlieb upon his return.to the United States. ae (CIA Cable. OUT 78336, Tweedy t to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy indicated that he was CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO , WHEN HE ARRIVES , . SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY — ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60.) This expression of support for the operation was followed by an. extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15, 1960. One.of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to HW 50955 Docld:32493524 Page 276
99. appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States enbassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This. cable also delimited the kind of action against _ | Lumumba that would be authorized: ONLY. DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW. STAND BEHIND IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING | . [LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINIEILVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60. ) On’ the same day that this message was dispatched, a second cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally by Bronson. Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for | . Hedgman’ s "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy ‘to Chief of . Station, 10/15/60) . YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A’ PARA[GRAPH] ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE- _CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC [LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL - STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS- POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY. BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON- — SIDERATION. RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ~ ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT © 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by. indi- cating that communications about the assassination mission were ‘Docld:32423524 Page 279
~30- restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination mission was to move forward. . He went on to request Hedgman's reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, : 10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin. O'Donnell, who testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to © undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba . ° In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional ~ officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason that the assassination mission had not progressed more ‘rapidly under. the Chief of Station: SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIA - Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.) . Again, in contradiction of the limitations on. anti-Lumumba activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels, Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba: POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR - ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS "ANOTHER BREAKOUT | INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS. - (CIA.Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.) Seateeeememnemmemenmnceteneeeenes eer a ann  * For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in- the Congo, see Section 5(a), infra. HW 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 260
HW 50955 CIA's Africa Division. ‘and among United States personnel in “the. -31-. This series of cables sent - during, and after Gottlieb’ $ Visit. to the Congo. demonstrated a. clear intent: at CIA headquarters to authorize and support. rapid progress on the assassi-- nation mission. The cables also show an intent to. severely re- strict. knowledge of the assassination operation among. “officers in Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other: covert activities. “(e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward d With Assassination ot . . The testimony of the Chief of Station, taken fifteen years after the events in question and: without benefit of review | of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture: derived fromthe cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted assassination operation, Hedgman's testimony is at variance from the cables only with respect to the. lack of vigor with. which he claims to’ have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables. , Ci) The Chief of Station Testified That He. Requested Received Confirmation of the Assassination ‘Plan fron Neadquarters Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb’ s instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that _he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by name, and he doubted that he “would have'"' mentioned the President -in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43), DocId: 32423524 Page 261
HW 50955 -32- Hedgman described the extracrdinary security precautions he took cabling his. request for confirmation of the assassination in- structions :" There was some special channel: ... bécause. _ it was handled differently than any other normal message. For example, it was not put _on a regular cable form, which, you know, you have several copies "for your various files. And it was my recollection that I personally carried the message to the communicator to encrypt, and that was worded in-a doublt-talk ‘way that even the.communicator would not - necessarily know what it was about," (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. A2- 43, ) This description approximates. the PROP channel that was used for all cables relating to the assassination mission. Hedgman testified that soon after. cabling his request for con- firmation that he was to carry. out the assassination. assignient, ‘he received an affirmative reply From. headquarters: To believe I received a reply which I interpreted to mean yes, that he was the ee seneer and his instructions were’... duly authorized. ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37- 38.) Despite the cryptic nature of whe’ cables. Hedgman said "y was con- vinced that yes, it-was right. ‘' (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 44, 50.) Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, ‘either from Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization ; . ee : before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex- pressed some uncertainty about whether he “had an absolute free hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving "final. confirmation" | (iledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53). Docld: 32423524 Page 2682
~33- Hedgman summarized his testimony on’ this question in his second appearance: I,probably had authority to act on my own but ... it was possible that I had to go -back and get clearance for'my action. a ~Gledgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75, p. 39.) os oo ; ; Os _Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision’ had been made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52). I thought the policy decision had been made in the White House, not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as: the m ‘Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out - . ne a political decision. . (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.) Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally ‘selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under the impression ‘that the President. had authorized the CIA to do so. and to proceed to take action: Hedgman:. ... I doubt that I thought the President had said, you use this system. But my understanding is the President had ‘~made a decision that an act ‘should take © place, but then put that into the hands of the Agency to carry out his decision. Q: Whatever that act was to be, it was | clearly. to be assassination or the death - of the foreign political leader? , Hedgman: Yes. Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA? Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if Dr. Gottlieb's lethal agents were employed, that would have been the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.) BW 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 233
~34- Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out | these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, Pe 106). Whether: or. not -he felt there was. ; authority to attempt an assassination without seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked ee with headquarters before taking action: I think probably that I would have gone back and advised that I intended to carry out and sought final approval before: carrying it out had I been going to do it, had there been a way to do it. I.-did not see it as. a _ Matter which could be accomplished practically, certainly. (Hedgman,. 8/21/75, pp. ot- 52.) He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval. “would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the. 2 specific mode of assassination that he planned: to use ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53). | - | a (ii) The Chief of Station Took "Explorator’ Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testitied That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the PlIot Hedgman - testified that after Gottlieb’ s visit, he. locked the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of | his safe, "probably" sealed in an envelope marked “Eyes - Only" with his name on it (Hedgman, 8/21/75, PP. 48- -49) , He said that his secretary was the only other person with access to’ the safe and that she would not have examined a ‘package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 49). Hedgman testified that it was " possible" that he pre- served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any HW 50955 Docld:324293524 Page 264.
HW 50955 rate, they were not disposed of before Lumumba was "successfully “neutralized” by being captured and imprisoned by the Congolese government ‘(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 85- 86) at the beginning of December, 1960. Hedgman said that he does. not recall taking the poisons out of his. safe on any occasion other than witen he- disposed of them. on ‘the. banks of the Congo. River: I think that I took them. out - probably ina’ briefcase; or an air bag of some sort, and I believe that the things like the rubber gloves and the mask-were thrown away in a bushy area or something where, you know, if: they were found, it ‘didn't matter that much. I believe I buried the other matters. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 84.) Hedgman testified, however, that in. the intervening months, while the poisons were in his safe, he took "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot (Hedeman, 8/21/75, p. 60). He said ‘that he sent several cables. to CTA headquarters, after his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions, which “probably reflected further steps I had taken" (ledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 59-60). | Hedgman stated that his cables. to headquarters on this matter were essentially ' ‘progress reports". on his attempts to find a means of access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50). He also said that. he "would bet on | the fact that there was at least one or two more [cables] back"' to him from CIA headquarters in response (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50). Docld: 32423524 Page 265 oe
HW 450955 to Chief of Station, 10/15/60) .* (-36- The cable traffic’ conforms to Hedgman' Ss. ‘recollection. For two months..after: Gottlieb’ 'S§ arrival in the Congo, a regular stream of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and headquarters through the PROP channel. In, Late September and early October’ the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgmaii' s top priority plan -- recruiting the aid of: a particular agent thought to have sufficient access to Lumumba’ s entourage to be able to poison . Lumumba .* | In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of Station that the assassination mission. remained “HIGHEST PRIORITY", and he suggested sending additional. personnel to Leopoldville to in-. tensify "CONCENTRATION" on. this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, tweedy ' ‘These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to. Tweedy on October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission * CIA Cable IN. 13989, Chief oF Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60: CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields ‘to Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable IN 24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section , supra for. full treatment of these cables. em wk See Section __, supra, for more complete text of this cable. os Docld: 3242734524 Page 286
az... HAS NOT BEEN ABLE. PENETRATE ENTOURAGE, _ .THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS . INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable a _ IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/17/00. ) : Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville “sometime in October” which terminated their discussions about gaining access ° _ to. Lumumba for. the purpose ‘of _assassinating him (Hedgman, —8/21/75,. D. 61). The Chief of Station continued to communicate with head- quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina- tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do! so, Hedgman confirmed ‘Tweedy's’ view that although the assassination operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with _ responsibility for other operations. so that he could not concentrate on the progress of the’ assassination mission: | ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS | OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, ” VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable, aN: 28936, 10/17/60. d . ' Due to his workload, the Chief of Station responded enthusiastically to Tweedy ° s suggestion of an-additional case officer: ' BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE OFFICER AVALLABLE [CHIEF OF STATION] WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING oo . AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable’ . Co IN 28936, 10/17/60.) BW 50955 Doacld: 32423524 Page 267
~33- ‘The Chief of Station concluded this cable with the. following cryptic. recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he . may have "Suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (liedeman , (BL2t/75, pp. 27-29) 5 IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQs° POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE. RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND-SILENCER. -HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. - HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON. - (CIA Cable IN 28936, 10/17/60. ) The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch, The oo, rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the possibility of shooting Lumumba ‘at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" -- -- in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This. interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by the Chief of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES ALONE. " Hedgeman's cable described the stalemate which. prevailed from "mid-September until Lumumba's. departure for Stanleyville on November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese: TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BULLDING IN SEVERAL WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP.... . CONGOLESE | - TROOPS. ARE THERE TO: PREVENT TARGET'S ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS . UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF “PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS- OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER- VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET HY 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 2696
HY 0955 39- COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF HOUSE BY CONGOLESE. . TARGET EAS DISMISSED MOST OF SERVANTS .SO “ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS - REMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478, -Chief of - Station to Tweedy. ) Hedgman | testified that all of his cable traffic about the _assassination question would. have been sent with the same extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re- ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb’ s visit and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions: -I would have sent in a special channel anything dealing with Lumumba, at least that would touch upon his removal in one - way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62. d. os The Chief of Station also testified that sometime. before leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's . best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never before. in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo. destroyed cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91). But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said * It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters. Docld: 324293524 Page 289
_ -40- that eventually I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because the Congo was a highly sensitive area in which -- at one period I recall we had all. of our files in the burn barrels. I mean, when you wanted a file, you went over-and dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91.) a a Por At the. conclusion of his testimony about.the assassination plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characteri- . ‘zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times in which it took place. His response indicated that although he - was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating “Lumumba: I looked upon. the Agency as an executive arm of the Presidency...,. Therefore, I suppose I thought that it was an order issued in due form from an authorized authority. , So On the other hand, I looked at it as a _kind of operation that I could do without, that I thought that probably the Agency and the U.S. government could get along without. I didn't regard Lumumba és the kind of person who was going to bring on World War III or something. I might have had a somewhat different attitude if I thought that one man could: bring on World War III and result in the -. deaths of millions of people or something, but I didn't see him in that light. I saw , him-as a danger to the political position = '-of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 110-111.) OS HW 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 290
HW 50955 AL - _ (£) Testimon —s Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Su uppor r and Ferpetration Oo the. Assassination Plot 7 There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the assassination effort. was. the vhighest pricrity” at CIA head- quarters. among operations in ‘the Congo, Bissell has no direct recollection of Gottlied’ S$. mission to the Congo and Tweedy can recall nothing more than consideration of the Feasibility of an’ assassination attempt. (i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of. the 0 eration eeoy bag Xp To Poison Lumumba . As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal ' liaison at. CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the’ special PROP channel. / Most of the reports and recommendations cabled -to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination, operation were ‘marked for Tweedy’ s ‘Eyes Only." “Tweedy: personally signed both the cable which initially informed the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in. Leopoldville, with an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Docld: 32423524 Page 291
Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he had debriefed Gottlieb upon his. return from the Congo (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also _the "Eyes Only" recipient of. Hedgman' Ss reports on Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo. (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief. of Station to . Tweedy , 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan “which emerged from. the discussions between Gottlieb and Hedgman as the top priority -~ infiltration of an agent into Lumumba’ S en- tourage to administer a ‘lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CTA “Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable; ‘Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station to. Tweedy, 10/17/60). | Tweedy testified, however, Without benefit of reviewing these. cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba: 9. Do you have any. knowledge of a messenger ; from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo _ with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination, ‘namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin- _istering them? “Mr r. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, vp. 30-31) See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent - - in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in Teopoldvilte. he a HW 50955 - Docld:324935294 Page 292
HY 50955 recall it’! ‘(Tweedy , 9/9, p. 30). Docld: 32423524 Page 2993 -43-— When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received ee by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by ‘Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in the assassination of Lumumba, ‘Tweedy replied: oS er There is nothing in my experience with the Agency which would really bear on’that oo Bo point whatsoever. (Iweedy, 9/9, pp. 29-39) Tweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the. Congo. as a courier, “Twill bet I knew it, but T° don" t recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, Pp. 35). “Tweedy testified, that ‘it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio- - logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't. - In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable: — from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to the ‘Congo with’ instructions for hin, Tweedy said that- he would be very surprised if I didn't [knowl , but I certainly have no recoll- ‘ ection’ of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31). Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of . the Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through |. a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions were to be carried out but he. did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-33). Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the testimony of the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their - Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the Chief of Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity."- (Tweedy, 9/9, P. 36) whe Pat
HY 0955 ~44- testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall: T ‘really am having trouble with this. I had to be reminded of so many things. . .{T]he things that I recall the most vividly about all. my African experiences were. . . the. things I was basically concerned with all the time, which was putting this. division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start fuzzy and. you would have thought with something - like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34) Tweedy was firm, however , in his disbelief that ."Gottlieb would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered [him]. .°. to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any _ further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-7 36). ‘Tweedy. said: In such a matter of: this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a nest word up to the last minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36) (ii) Tweedy. Testified That He Discussed With Bissell -  . the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba For the Purpose of Assassination Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to. poison Lumumba, he. did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass- ination attempt. Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating Lumumba "more than once'' with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960 (Tweedy, 9/9,. pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know Docld: 424254524 Page 294
-45- whether Bissell. had consulted with any "higher authority" about . exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba: (Tweedy, © 9/9, ‘Pe 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when ‘he ~eceived an instruc- tion. from Bissell he would proceed to implement it orr-the assump- tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP: I would proceed with it on the basis that he was’ authorized to give me instructions and it’ was up to him to bloody well know what he was - empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)_ oo Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass- inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy , 9/9/75, p. 28):° Tweedy. . . .I think it. came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be — sO, thinking about whether it might ever be necessary aa or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully. Q. Do it, meaning carry off | an assassination? Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed. with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, . “never were we instructed to do anything of this. kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have. the Chief of Station be thinking along those lines as well. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15) Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con- _versation with Bissell included ‘a few" cables that he remembers sending to the Chief of Station asking him | to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever” have had to Lumumba. . .[in] the eventuality that we might wish to get-rid-of Mr. Lumumba personally. ~ (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21) Sn HW 50955 Docld:32493594 Page 295
-46- Tweedy did not. recall inquiring about gaining access to hess for the purpose of abducting him from UN. custody (Tweedy, 9/9, . 24); ‘rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were being explored: oO, | : a aan _Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be: access to his personal food or, drink or: toiletries? Tweedy. L suppose all. those types of things might - have been. considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, Pp. 23) Q. | In your discussions with Bissell: about. the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons come up as one means that was being con- ‘sidered and which the Chief of Station should explore? Tweedy. I am sure it must have. ‘After all, there are not many ways. of doing it. Shoot a man, poison _ 0, him, of course you could, I. suppose, stab him or aa something like that. But basically you. are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has. the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities. Tweedy did not “recall specifically" che response from the Chief of. Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious answer. | . a ‘disciplined reply to an instruction ‘from headquarters” ‘(Iweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27). Although’ Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in.a special channel concerning the ' messenger" to the Congo or confirm- ation of his.instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been HW 50955 DBocld: 32423524 Page 296 .
~47~. sent inva channel that was even more closely restricted than the - normal CIA ‘cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the discretion of the Chief of Station and he did not know whether ~ Hedgman destroyed the Station! Ss copies (tweedy, 9/9, p. 22). Tweedy said "I would be surprised | af I didn' tn have a conver-. sation with Sidney Gottlieb about ' ‘anything in his inventory. that could possibly be used, inéliiding lethal biological siibstances _ (Dweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held . between Dick Bissell and: Sidney Gottlieb, " which Tweedy then would a have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, Pp. 69). Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning _ interval and at no point ean I recall that I ever felt it was im- im] minent: that somebody would say ‘go''" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19): Tweedy. -It was always my. assumption that at the . .time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem _ at probably a very considerable policy level with-. .in the Agency. . and it never occurred to me that I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and sya-go to it. Nor were we ever in a position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far. . Q. You didn't have any action plans for the _ assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or _ were aware of? HY 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 297
-48- ‘Tweedy .. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that 7 ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19) It is difficult. to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's testimony that no action plans were Launched and that no authoriz-_ _ ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization _ for Hedgman' s approach to his agent. to explore access to Lumumba's entourage is. in accord with Tweedy' Ss description of his inquiries about gaining access to Lumumba . ‘However, ‘the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the Chief of Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable IN > 24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile ‘with his statements that a "96 ahead" on the operation was never: -* imminent , especially in Light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week ' which told the Chief of Station: that Lumumba ' . . , ‘DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL. REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable | OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60) (iil) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall _ Whether The Assassination Operation Had Moved From Planning To Implementation But It Was Not Against Agency voliey to Send Poisons to The Congo _ xX Richard Bissell testified that he. did not remember discussing the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place _ (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4). HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 298
-49- Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did not remember | to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p. 4). “Bissell said that 7 exploring access to Lumumba -- "almost certainly" seeking information from the Chief of Station about access for poisoning -- would have been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but he had no specific recollection of ‘cable communications on this subject (Bissell, 9/10, ppx 6-8). Bissell remembered ‘that he was . aware that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to have direct . access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80). . | | Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about _ gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) Bissell added: ; I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author- ization from me, would have had the authority to _ send such a cable without my signing off on it. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb! s trip to. the Congo, although it was possible’ that Tweedy was ‘cut out of knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21). “Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his, assignment to | Justin O'Donnell*with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that ee _ * Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a) me) and 5(a)(ii), infra. HW 450955 ‘ Docld: 32423524 Page 299
25Q- ‘Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottlieb's visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22). Bissell did not. recall cables concerning the dispatch of a messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were _ to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . . Tt would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43). It was "very probable,” according to Bisséll, that he discussed | the assassination of Lumumba with Sidney Gottlieb, who was then his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb “the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 60). oe Although he had no “specific recollection," Bissell assumed that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved the mission, (which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of -. Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, Pp. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, ‘There is nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the testimony of the Chief of Station that Gottlieb carried poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35). | Bissell. testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35). HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 300
HY 0955 -51- He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. as still ae in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p..49). ‘Bissell acknowledged, however , that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which to administer them was an extraordinary event: . er It would indeed have beén rather unusual to send such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this , - sort -- out to a relatively | small ‘station, unless. . Ce planning for their use were quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 37). Nonetheless, Bissell said. that he "probably believed" that he had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to. move from the stage of planning to-.implementation (Bissell, 9/10, PP. 60-61). . In light of his absence of a’ specific recollection of o these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions 'to implement,’ ' Gottliet would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him: by Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot “had then passed into an implementation phase" and that. "authorization was given" (Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49). Boclda: 324273574 Page 301
HY 50955 -52- 5. The Question of a Connection Between the “Assassination Plot and Other Actions of C CLA [TA Officers. and srs_and Operatives” in in the the Congo , ‘Justin Q' Donnell, « dentor CIA officer in che clandestine operations division in 1960, ‘testified that’ during this period he om -had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to ‘go to the Congo to carry out the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnel, (6/9/75, PD. 11-12). -O" Donnell said. that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but proceeded to the Congo | to attempt to draw Lumumba - away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in ‘the hands of Congolese authorities (0! Donnell, 6/9/75, ‘Pp. 13- 14). Shortly after 0’ Donnelt' Ss. arrival in the Congo he was joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the ee following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of  O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA Cable IN. 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60). Despite the fact that O'Donnell was initially approached to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba , it is un- Likely that. O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation of that plot by the Chief of Station. - Whether there is any connec- e- tion between -the assassination plot and either of the two operatives -- QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear. Docld:32423524 Page 302
HW 50955 . (a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo . »  ¢i). Tweedy and the Chief of Station Apreed That. a _ -, Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the ent to the Congo ~ to to Concentrate on the ; Assassination Operation Operation In early October, 1960, ‘several cables sent. in the specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to. send a "senior - case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief. of Station with the assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed . Hedgman that he "WOULD ‘EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [ TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER. RUN THIS OP" by “supervising a third country national operative {CIA Cable our 78336, ‘Tweedy to Chief of. Station, 10/7/60) ... On. October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman ' Ss reaction to the. sugges- tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon. as “possible to. concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, | Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief of Station replied affirmatively: | oe BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy) . The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for “MULTIPLE OPS"! had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the. assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60). * See Section 4(e), : supra, for full treatment of these ‘cables. Docld:32423524 Page 303
HY 50955 (ii) -54- Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With O"Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960 Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior: case officer to concentrate .on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached the subject with CIA officer Justin O' Donnell. O'Donnell, 6/9/75, P. 8). a a aon At that time, 0' Donnell was the Deputy Chief, of a com- ponent of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA' s covert action arm Justin QO" Donnell testified that. in October of 1960, he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi- nating Patrice. Lumumba o' Donnell, (6/9/79, PP. il- 12; 9/11/75, pp. 19, 43): ‘Docla: Or Donnell: He called me in and he told re he wanted to go down to the Belgian Conco, the former Beleian Congo, and to eliminate “Lumumba . Qn What did you understand him to mean by _ eliminate? 0! Donnell: It was not. neutralization Or Bonney To kill him and thereby eliminate . a: What was the basis for your internreting his remarks, whatever his precise language, as meaning that he was talking about assassination rather than merely neutralizing him through some other means? ‘Clearly the context of our talk was to kill him. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.) O'Donnell reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction: I told him that I would absolutely not have any part of killing Lumumba. Ile said, I want you to go over and talk to Sidney _ Gottlieb. (0! Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.) 32423524 Page 304
7 d3- Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who was at that time the Science» Advisor to Bisseil (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14). | ‘O'Donnell. said it was "inconceivable that: Bissell, would direct such a mission ‘without the personal permission of Allen Dulles" (0! ‘Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorization: was never raised by Bissell. I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles in such an important issue, but it was not dis- cussed, nor did he -purport. to have higher SO authority to do it. (0! Donnell 619175, p. ee. Q' Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and testified that he was "sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming :-. over" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, P. 7). O' Donnell said — _ that Gottlieb > told him “that there were Four or five :.. lethal means of disposing of Lumumba" (0! Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13). 0' Donnell recalled that "one. of the methods was a virus and the others in- cluded poison" ¢O' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. De 0! ‘Donnell said that Gottlieb “didn't even hint ... that he had been ‘in the Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo’ (0! Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A). . After speaking with Gottlieb, 0! Donnell said: a then left his office, and I went back to Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no way would I have any part in the assassina- tion of Lumumba .:. and reasserted in ; absolute terms that I would not be involved . - . ina murder attempt. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 43.) - HW 50955 Docld: 324273524 Page 305
-56- (O'Donnell said that in one of his two conversations with Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect “that. conspiracy to commit murder being done in the District of .Columbia might be in violation of federal law" (oO! Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). He said that Bissell vairily dismissed" this ‘prospect (9' Donnell, 6/9/75, pe 14). | Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, 0! Donnell | agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to. "neutralize" ‘Lumumba ' ‘as a political factor" “("Ponnelt., 9/11/75, Pp. 43-44) : I said I would go down and Tt would have no compunction about operating to draw Lumumba - out [of UN custody], to run an- operation to - neutralize his operations which were against Western interests, against, I thought ,. American interests. (Oo! Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13. i) O'Donnell added that his objective was to neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his activities against [a: Congolese leader], whom at that time you might say was our close. instrument, he was the man we had put our chips on. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20. ) Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassi- nation, O'Donnell went to the Congo “with. the assignment ee of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53). - Although O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a . general strategy with Bissell: HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 306°
HW 50955 There was a -57- Mr. 0' Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I ' would be willing to. go down to neutralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody] and turn him -over-to the Congolese authorities, that is correct. , Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that © his life might be ‘taken by. ‘the Congolese a authorities? Mr. O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered in the -- not to have. him killed, but then “it would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I think it was discussed. meen Donnell, 6/9/75, “very, very: high probability” that Lumumba would re-~ ceive capital ‘punishment at the hands of tne ‘Congolese authorities, according to O'Donnell (O' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell "had no compunction about: bringing him out. and then having him ‘tried by a jury of his peers" (0! Donnell, 6/9/75, Dp. 14). to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to' Lumumba's influence, . interested in the assassination of Lumumba: in leaving at the conclusion of our second ' discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't rule out that. possibility ~- meaning the possibility of the elimination or the killing of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other: words, even Though you have said this, don't rule it out. . There is no question about it, he said, ‘I wouldn't rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination (oO! Donnell. 9/11/75, p. 45). Although 0' Donnell had expressed his aversion. to assassination neutralize" it was clear to him that Bissell was still O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis- cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order Bocld: 39473574 Page 307 =
HW 50955 7 58- , ‘to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of record (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45): -{I]n the Agency, since you don't have documents, you have’ to be awfully canny ¢ and you have to get things on record, and —_ I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed. to me, and I told him that I would under no conditions do it, and Helms. said. you're absolutely right. (O'Donnell, 6/9/79, pp. (Tote). ‘Richard Helms testified that. it was "Likely" | that he had such a conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that 0' ‘Donnell 's, version ;: of | their conversation was. correct (Helms , 9/16/75, ‘PP. -22- 23)..* William Harvey testified that 0' Donnell had. informed him about the conversations with Bissell: - Mr. O'Donnell came so me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimina-. tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.) Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told - him that he had asked 0' Donnell to undertake such an operation (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9). | 0! Donnell said that within forty- eight hours of his second dis- cussion with’ Bissell, he ‘departed for the Congo | (0! DonnelL, 9/11/75, pp. 45-46). an Oe ca fle ims testified that he did.not follow- -up on this conversa- ‘tion in any way. He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the Congo or what his mission was (ilelms, 9/16/75, pp. 32- 33), Docld: 32423524 Page 308,
HW 50955 -59- (iii) Bissell -Testified That he Asked O'Donnell-to Plan ~ and Prepare for an Assassination Operation Bissell remembered ''very clearly" that he and Q' Donnell discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 - (Bissell, 6/9/75, Pp. 75) and: that Q' Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that he thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways" ‘Gissell, 6/11/75, p. 54). ; ce Bissell also confirmed. the fact that he had asked Q' Donnell’ to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, D. 44), Bissell: differs with O'Donnell's account on only one oN important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign- “ment to 0' Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation. as : opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell flatly testified that: Bissell requested him to attempt to kill ‘Lumumba. In his first testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked 0 "Donnell "to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance, however, ‘Bissell stated that 0' Donnell "had been asked to. plan and: prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24). | . | Bissell said that after his conversations with 0° Donnell, he felt that: it would be necessary to “yostpone" the assassination operation because, "seiven O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk Docld: 32423524 Page 309
-60- that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 25).- Despite his impression that he might have de- activated assassination operations against. Lumumba at that time, | Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/ Gobblieb poison plot. continued to move foward: [T]his had been in my.mind. a very sensitive. assignment to him, limited. -- with the’. ‘knowledge of it limited very narrowly even within the Agency. And it is difficult to oo separate recollection from. inference on — oo - occasion. But I seem to recollect that | , . after this conversation with him, I wanted ' this put very much on the back burner and inactivated for quite some time. iow that doesn't rule out the possibility that some action through completely different channels . might have gone forward. But the best of ‘my recollection is, I viewed this not only as. terminating the assignment for him, but also as.reason for at least. postponing any- thing further along that line. (Bissell, 9/10/75, Pp. 25-26). . oe In Tweedy's mind, O'Donnell's eventual. mission to the Congo was linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody (weedy, 9/9/75, p. 26). (iv) o' Donnell Arrived in the Con o and Learned arned That a Virus. Was in the Station ation Safe On October . 29, the. Chief of Station was informed through the PROP. channel that Justin | O'Donnell was soon to arrive ain- Leo- poldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields _ to Chief of Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived HW 50955 Doold: 32423524 Page 310
HW 450955 -61- in Leopoldville. (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director, 11/4/60) . Chief-of Station, Hedgman testified that he had been made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo - (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible” that as a new Chief of Station he took the dispatch to the Congo of a senior officer like O'Donnell as a signal that ‘CLA headquarters was ‘dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb's instructions» (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p.. 42). ltedgman had a general picture of 0" Donne!’ s mission: I understood it to be that -- similar to mine, that is, the removal or neutrali- zation of Lumumba ...° I have no clear’ a .recollection of his discussing the assassi- . ces nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p- 54.) °- -Hedgman said that he had no recollection of 0'Donneli indicating one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). . Hedgman said, “in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, -p. 55). Gen- ‘erally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell “as being unenthusiastic ‘about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89). | When O'Donnell arrived in. the Congo, -he met with the Chief of Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37), although Hedgman was not explicit: | I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio shot up to date. (0' Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 16.) BDoclTd:32423524 Page 311
-62- ‘He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes, “it.would have been in the custody of the State Department" personnel, hot the CIA station (O'Donnell,. 6/9/75, p. 36). O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgiman’ mentioned the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8) .% “But O'Donnell ‘assumed that it’ had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office: - | It would have had to have come from Washington,. : in my estimation, and I would think, since it ’-had been discussed-with Gottlieb that it probably would have emanated from his office. . (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.) Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo with O'Donnell, but “assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 3/21/75, | cea pp. 60-61). Oe Oo | | | O'Donnell-was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that | such.a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the Congo (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17). O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where 4 lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was assassination: — 1 _ * When O'Donnell was. informed about Iledgman's testimony on the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumunba, he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell, ~ 9/11/75, p. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decent man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) -- “a totally truthful man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p.. 56). a HY 50955 DBocld: 3242935274 Page 312
Hiv -~63- ‘My feeling definitely is that it. was for a specific purpose, and was just not an all- purpose capability there begin held for tar- gets of opportunity, unspecified targets. (O'Donnell, —9/11/75,. p. 49.) At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that Lumumba was the target specified for the use of. the virus (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17; OEMTTS, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility: — I. supposed it was for a lethal operation, very possibly Lumumba, but very possibly. in connec- tion with other people. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. l7. y His final word on the subject was ‘that he assumed that the “specific purpose” of the virus was the, assassination of Lumumba (0! Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). . | | 0! Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that 0! Donnell was to employ the virus (0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman ' ‘never discussed his assassi- nation. effort, he never.even indicated that this was one. (O'Donnell e 9/11/75, p. 54.) 50955 While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his) assassination operation with 0! Donnell, he "assumed" that he had at least discussed with 0' Donnell the problem of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman,- 8/21/75, | pp. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he. was “morally opposed to-assassination" he would "absolutely not" have. Docld:32423524 Page 313
642. explored the means by which such access could be sained, nor would - he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess~_ ment of the’ situation for an assassination operation by someone else (0' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26). O'Donnell was "sure! that he "related everything" “to Hedgman about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination . of Lumumba (0! Donnell, 9/11/75, P. 46). Hedgman, however, had no recollection of learning this .from ©'Donnell Giedyman, 8/21/75, p. 56). Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassi~ nation with Hedgman were general and philosophica!, dealing with "the morality ‘of assassinations" (O' Donnell, 9/11/75, vp. 46, 54): From my point of view I told him I had moral objections to it, not just qualms, but objections. I didn't think it was the right thing to do. (9'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 9). When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination based on those discussions, 0'Donnell said: I will answer your question just as fairly and as scrupulously as I.can. I have a great deal of respect for Hedeman. And if he said something, I would believe him to be speaking the truth as he knew it without shading it.... The best I could say, I think, would be this, that he would not have. been opposed in principle to assassination in the interests of national security. I know that he is a man of «reat moral. per- . ception and decency and honor, and so forth. — And that it would disturb him to be enraged in . something like that. But I think I would have to say that in our conversations, my memory of those, at no time would he-rule it. out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75 p. 18.) HW 50955 Baoclda: 324235274 Page 314
-65- _{v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba b Turning Him: Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent OJWIN to Leovoldville as His , . : nna ne en error Noe we Alter Ego - After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formu- lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by. drawing him away from wr _the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence: O'Donnell: [W]hat I wanted to do was to get him out, to trick him out, if I could, and then turn him over ... to the legal authorities and let him stand trial. Be- cause he had atrotity attributed to him for which he could very well stand trial. Q: “And for which he could very well have ' received capital punishment? a O'Donnell: Yes. And I am not opposed to capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 20-21.)* - To implement his plan, O'Donnell made. arrangements to rent "an ob- servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced" _ ™* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA' (CIA Cabie Leop Chief of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The Chief -of Station: proceeded to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable: a STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS "ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60). , HW 350955 DBDocld:324235274 Page 3145
-66-- (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20).* O'Donnell also "spotted" a member of the UN guard: and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21). O'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to CIA headquarters (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26). He also said that he informed the Chief of Station about his plan (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56). | . | | ; In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus- | tody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was QJIWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19): - oe | What I wanted. to use him for was . counter-~espionage[.]... I had to screen the U.S. participation in this ... by using a foreign national whom we. knew, trusted, and had worked with ... the idea was for me to use him as an alter ‘ego. (O'Donnell Tr.,. pp. 19-20.) In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville. urged CIA head- quarters to send. QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261, Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message: LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIM TRAVEL TO LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556, ce Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)- * A. cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION. POST IMPOSSIBLE" . (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station-to Tweedy, 11/14/60). HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 316
HY 50955 -67- ° The cables: contained no. exploration of this sense of. urgency about the,_"operational-~circumstances."' ' (b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November -Decembér  QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, | recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re: Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer Arnold Silver. In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to. the Congo by, Silver, to under- take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk." (CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)* oe oe “A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip an to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to | his mission: - In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob-— jective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do.... Instead, he was told ... that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted ‘persons for our use.... It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the ‘final decision to use [him]. . (CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.) * Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to . send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci- fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and. the various sta- tions. that dealt with him. There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QIWIN com-. pleted this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33). OO . Bocld: 3242735274 Page 317
HW 50955 BDocld: 32473574 Page 3186 -68- “This: message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at fhe station: a ‘this. dispatch should be. reduced to cryptic - _ necessary notes and ‘destroyed after the first reading. " (CIA Dispatch, ‘AUDW- 147, 11/2/60.) QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 49436 , 11/29/60). and returned to Europe. in Late December 1960 (cra Cable OUT. 54710, Director ‘to. Leopoldville, 12/9/60). The CIA Inspector General's Report | said that QSHTN | had been recruited earlier by Arnold. Silver : for use in a special operation in the Congo — _[the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to.be run by Justin O'Donnell. (1I.G.. Report, p. 38.) . However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testified that O'Donnell re-. fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead, O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt. to snatch Lumumba from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14, 37.) “According to oO! Donnell, QJIWIN was a man who was capable of vundertaking, an assassination mission: O'Donnell: i I would say that he would not be a man of many scruples. Q: So he was a man. capable of doing anything? O'Donnell: I would think so, yes. Q: “And that would include assassination? O'Donnell: I would think so. | (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.) * See. Sections 5 (a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii) above.
/ ~69- But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42). O'DonneLL. said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with. supervisory responsibility for ‘QSWIN and QJIWIN did not report | “independently, to: anyone. else (0' Donnell, 97/11/75, p. 28). When asked if it was possible that QUWIN had a nis sion independent of that he was. performing for 0" Donnell, he: said: O'Donnell:. Yes, that is possible -- or, Tt could have been that somebody contacted him after he got down there, that they wanted him to-do something along the lines of assassination. JI-don! tC know. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29.). ; = =P But he discounted this possibility as “highly unlikely" because it would be a departure from standard CIA practice =~ placing an agent - in.a position of ‘knowledge superior to. that of his supervising officer (O' Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29)., Despite Q' Donnell ' s doubt that QJIN had an independent line of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of Hovember. 29 shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities. In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Tweedy that QUWIN had begun ‘implementation of a plan to “PIERCE BOTH CONGOLE SE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence | and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDEWCE'" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief . of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). Q' Donnell said that he had. directed: ~ QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force whose help he sought for the phan to snatch Jumumba from UN custody HW 50955 Bacld: 32423524 Page 319
‘-70- (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at this point | to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. this did not deter QJWIN: | VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QSWIN ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED “ DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60). It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassina- | tion as well as. abduction. _ An affirmative reply from headquarters - came through the PROP channel the next day which was. also suscep - “tible of interpretation as .an assassination ‘order: | CONCUR QsWrH GO stAMLEYWILLE .. WE ARE PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWIW . BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314, Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station, 11/30/60. ) Q' Donnell said that agent oauny’ s stay in the Congo | was ''co- extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19.) O'Donnell said he left the Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20.) QJWIN. left ‘in December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army. In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities in the Congo, William XK. Harvey “= under whom oO Donnell had worked — before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the success of QJWIN's mission: "QIWIN was sent on this trip for a HW 50955 Bocld: 32423524 Page 320 —
- -J1- . specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William kK. Harvey, i 1/11/61). 0" Donnell explained Harvey' s reference to the fact that QaWIN's Ss mission had been "completéd" by saying that once Lumumba. .was in the hands. of the Congolese authorities “the reason for the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QUWIN were responsible for Lumumba" s departure from UN _eustody and ‘subsequent capture, O'Donnell said: “Absolutely not" (O' Donnell, 9/12/75, P. 35). Harvey did not. recall the meaning of the memorandum, but> he assumed that 0' Donnell! Ss . return from the Congo constituted the ‘'completion" of QSWIN ' Ss fission (arvey, affidavit, pi ). —_ , | | Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report ‘that _ QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November, “there is no. clear evidence that. QJWIN was actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved _ in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba’ gave’ | no- testimony that tended to show. that QUWIN was rélated to that plot. | The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection" that QJIWIN | was in the Congo working. for Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QUWIn was in the Congo. (edgman, 8/21/75, p. 95. +) QaWrN was not a major operative of Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, P. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo HW 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 321
HY 50955 | cerning | QIWI and submitted them for HARVEY ' s signature (Harvey -72- Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; ‘Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61). ~ William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for “his. Congo assignment , had no specific knowledge of WIN' s activities in the Congo: I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know . specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I - do not think that I ever had such knowledge. Lf QJWIN- were to be used on an assassination mission, it would.have been cleared with me. I was’ never informed that he was to be used’ for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. ) He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda con- affidavit, p. ). (c) QJWIN's Connection so Pesta ZRRIFLE After leaving the Congo in early. 1961, QJWIN was used by CIA officer William Harvey as the principal | asset in Project ZRRIFLL, a project which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders.*  QJWIN's ‘role in Project — ZRRIFLE was to “SPor™ figures of the European underworld who. could be utilized as agents by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation — of Project ZRRIFLE: * For a Fall treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section infra, on the "Executive Action Capability." — Docld: 32423524 Page 322 pa
2 73- . Arnold Silver had not previously used QJWIN as an. assassination capability or _ even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-- davit, p. ) Although Harvey also had discussions with Sidney Gottlieb in connec- tion with Project. ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Cottlieb's own trip to Leopoldville (Harvey, affidavit, pe dy. Harvey had con~ sulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of. Project ZRRIFLE Clarvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). The Chief of Station in Leopoldville. testified that he had never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project. to develop: the capability of assassinating foreign leaders, La (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was “quite certain" that he never discussed assassination. capabilities or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) ‘Hedgman ‘testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter- intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss ‘tthe plan to assassinate Lumumba. _ (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.) An interesting note on the value accorded QIWIN by the CIA and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs HY 50955 hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters | to Arnold | Silver in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to BO on trial in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested: IF . .INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISIL ATTEMPT QUASH CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJIWIN FOR. OUR PURPOSES . (CIA Cable out 73943, 4/18/62.) Docld: 32493524 Page 323
-74- (d) Agent QJUWIN Was Asked By Hedeman' s “Operative WIROGUE “to Join an “Execution squad": December I' ad”: December 1960 The one , incident where there is an werticit, referenco to assassination in connection with QawWIM involved his contact with WIROCUE, another. asset of the Congo station. —_ - i | - WIROGUE was an © vessentially stateless" Buropean who was " a’ forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French Foreign Legion. (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75. ) He was sent to the Congo after being: given plastic sursery and a toupee by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling through the Congo. (1.¢. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT | ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable our 86554, Africa: Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60) . _The Chief of Station. described WIROGE as "a man with a rather unsavory: reputation, who would try anything once, at least." -(Hedgman, 8/21/75, .p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility agent" because "LT felt we needed surveillance capability, develop- ing new contacts; various things.” (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) “Hedgman supervised WIROGUE: directly. and did not put WIROGUE in touch with Justin O'Donnell. ‘(iledgman, 8/21/75, p. 97. ) | A. report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the GIA Inspector General s office in 1975, described the training and tasking -he received: HW 50955 Docld:32493524 Page 324
HW 450955 ~75- On. 19 September 1960 two members of Africa: Division met with him to discuss. ''an opera- we tional~assignment in Africa Division." In connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1 | was to be trained in demolitions, ‘small. arms; and medical immunization.... In ‘October 1960 a cable to Leopoldville stated that Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as-- utility agent in order to '(a) organize and conduct.a surveillance team; (b) intercept © packages; (c).blow up bridges; and (4) execute ~ other assignments requiring positive action. . : His utilization is not to be restricted to ‘Leopoldvilte.’ (T. G. Memorandu, FANT») WIROGUE made his initial contact with Medgman- in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60) .. He was given two instructions by Hedgman: (1) to. “build cover during initial period;" and (2) to “spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence =. assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA © Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60.) | | Soon, after receiving, these instructions, agent: WIROGUE approached QW and asked him to join an “execution squad." This incident is described by Leopoldville Chief of Station Hedgman in a'cable to CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99): _ QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN. INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QIWIN. REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL’ NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD."' WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER’ SAID HE™ WORK- INF FOR [AMERICAN] | SERVICE. ... IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS , WLIROGUE MENTIONED OJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO. HAVING TRIED RECRULT HIM. ' THEN [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE. HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN. NO STEPS. [CHLEF OF STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJIWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.) Docld:32493594 Page 325
~76- ‘The cable also expressed Hedgman’ Ss concern “about: WIROGUE ' s actions: ... LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING. AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH oT. . ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT. ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND.WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE — DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to. Director, 12/17/60.) . oo - _WEROGUE 's attempt to recruit QIWLN for’ an. execution squad is ‘explained by Nedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as - an unauthorized, unexpected contact’ which | he did vot initiate. The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed: WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QUWIN or anyone else. “(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added :. I would like to stress that. I don't know what WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution — squad,"’ and I am sure he was never tasked to- go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) oe Hedgman suggested that ‘WIROGUE may have concocted’ the idea of an execution squad: His idea of what an intelligence operative should do, I think, had been gathered by reading a few novels or something of the sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) Justin 0" Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec- WW 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 326 ; ~ ee
-77- tion of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 39-42) . O'Donnell men- tioned that. agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm "squad," but’ said that this was for purposes more general than assassinations: surveillance teams where you have to go. into.crime. areas ... where you need a fellow that if he gets in a box can fight his way out of it.. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 36).- oS — Richard Bissell recalled’ nothing of the WIROUGE, approach to. QJWIN- (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that . WIROGUE was "dispatched | on a general purpose mission" to the Congo (Tweedy, 9/9/75, Pp. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would "absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against | Lumumba because ' "he was basically. dispatched, assessed and dealt with: by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people -in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn Fields -~ who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba was. being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64- 65). The. Chief of Station said that if the WIROG RUE incident was connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have cransmitted a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in whieh this cable was sent. His. cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much ' wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received concerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about HW 350955 DBocld:3242355274 Page 327
HY 50955 -78-" WIROGUE. only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." ' (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 101) . The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition to QJWIN to join an “execution squad" could be attributed to WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. “Hedgman’ said: . | - I had difficulty controlling him in that he - was not a professional intelligence officer . as such. He seemed-to act on his own without . seeking guidance or authority ... I found he was rather an unguided missile ... the kind of man that could get you in trouble be- fore you knew you were in trouble.... (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97). But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for. WIROGUE's actions: [I]£ you give a man an order and he carries it out and causes a problem for the Station, why ' then as Chief of Station, well, you accent responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.) In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during .this period, agent WIROGUE 's attempt to form an "execution squad" was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi- nation plan. Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical immunization" (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) ‘raises the possibility that he was connectéd to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means OL lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case Docld: 32423524 _ Page 328
HY 0955 © = 79- by the ‘Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The report concludes-with the statement that "JIROGUE/1 spent most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved in any particular operation.” (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office, the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one - of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in assassination attempts: —"ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis- carded out of hand as ‘exceeding instructions.'" (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) - . 6. The- Question of Whether the CIA Was. Involved. in bringing About ~ Lumumbas Death in Katanga There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring- ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely connected to the ‘plot. to poison Lumumba | ‘testified uniformly that they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba’ s death. (a) Lumumba’ Lsca e fron UN > Custody, Ca tu cure by Congolese ! risonment_ att ysville: November 27-1 aeons > ~ 1960 ae eee ee ON The strongest hint that. the CIA may. have been involved .in the’ capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's. troops after his departure from UN custody. on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from the Chief of Station ‘to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA ‘Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). “In the cable, Hedgeman re- ported that an agent of his had learned: that Luinumba ' S POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN _STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO | THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY, (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.) Boclda: 3242935274 Page 329
~8O- - The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that eventuality: DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE .... SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY’ - [AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... ‘STATION HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO. “USE IN; EVENT = : - OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL, PLANS: OF , SO -ACTION.. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60. y There is no other evidence, however, that- the CTIA - actually gained. prior knowledge of Lumumba" s plan to depart. ‘for Stanleyville. In. fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the. day after Lumumba’ s . escape betrays the station’ s complete ignorance about the circum _—s stances of Lumumba’ s departure (CIA Cable IW 48484, Leopoldville to Director, 11/28/60). But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese troops: | | | [STATION] WORKING WITH. [CONCOLESE. GOVERNMENT] TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED [BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable, 11/28/60. ) ‘A cable of € Decenter' 2 réporting Lumumba's capture militates against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable ‘IN 10643, Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60). The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure HW 50955 DocId: 32423524 Page 330
-81- from Ui custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba’ s _ plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted. with Congolese officers about the possible. routes Lumumba might take to Stanleyville, but he was not a major assistance" in track-_ ‘ing down Lumumba: prior to his capture (edgman, 8/21/75, p. 65). | Despite the fact that O'Donnell had planned to draw Lumumba out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he “insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own. devices and was not tricked by the CIA (o'Donnell, 9/11/75, Pp. 22). a (b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Wh ere He Was Killed: January .1/, 0 The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that. the CIA was kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of 1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba a serious political threat. ‘But there is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba 's death in Katanga. * Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the testimony of CIA officers Hedeman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and Helms (investigative report) should be. inserted. . - . u HY 50955 DBocld:32423574 Page 331
of ij ‘BW 50955 SECTION 7: Rewritten per -+82- Subcommittee Instructions, - , 10/20/75 (CFDB) 2 7. The Question of the Level at which the Assassination Plot oe ‘Was wut orize , ‘The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the. assas~ sination plot was authorized by the President.: _ It. is clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot. . At. the least, the chronological relationship between strong oo — Presidential or other. White House expressions of hostility to - Lumumba and CIA steps toward the assassination of Lumumba - -is close enough to make it appear that Dulles thought he was acting in re-_ sponse to pressure from above in approving assassination as one means of removing Lumumba from the political scene. | an | a Nevertheless, -there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and. enough ambiguity in the’ records of high-level policy meetings to raise a doubt as- “to whether President Eisenhower “intended an assassination effort ‘against Lumumba. | The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with the testimony that President Eisenhower made a statement at a meet- ing of the National Security Council in the Summer or early Fall of 1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memo-~ randum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indi- cated that when the President’ s "extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very. straightforward action" were conveyed, the Special Docld: 32423524 Page 332 .
-83- Group " -agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration" of any particular kind of ac- tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1969) The next day. CLA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of Station in Leopold- “ville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added; "YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. " . Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina- | “tion, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under. whose aegis the as- ve sassination effort against Lumumba took place ~- testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and. signaled to him that. the President had: authorized assas- sination ag one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33- 34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that- no measure, - including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re- move Lumumba ‘from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4- 5). On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station to. expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security HW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 333
AW 50955 ~84- Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba “would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th 'NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien- tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the Chief of Station | with lethal biological substances, instructed Him to assassinate Lumumba , and informed him that the President had authorized this “operation. | | Two mitigating factors weaken this chain. just enotigh SO o that it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza- tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba. First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re- sponsible to the President for national. security affairs testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an.. assassination. plot. | Second, the minutes of. discussions at meetings of. the National | Security Council and its ‘Special Group do not record an explicit ‘Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary | of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac- “tual language used at the meetings. without omission, or euphemism for extremely. sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 18-19). NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong pos- sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe- mism. Several high Government officials involved. in policy- making Boclda: 324293524 Page 334 o>
_35- and planning for covert operations testified that the language in these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat ; other officials testified to the contrary. .— om "Getting Rid of Lumumba” (a) High-Level Meetin s at which Was Discusse (i) Dillon Testified that the Question of Assassina- tion Was Raised at Penta on Meetin Summer 1960- In late July 1960, Patrice Lumumba visited the United States and met. with Secretary of State Christian Herter and Under- - secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. While Lumumba was in Washing- ton, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to the newly formed Govern- rd ment of the Congo (New York Times, 7/28/60,. p. ). According to Dillon, the impression that Lumumba left with the Government officials was that of an irrational, almost . psychotic personality: | | When he was in the State Department meeting, either with ; me or with the Secretary in my presence . . . he would never look you in the eye. He looked up at the sky. And -a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the particular things that we wanted | “ to discuss .. .. You had a feeling that he was a per- ‘son that was gripped by this fervor that I can only char- acterize as messianic... .- [H]e was just not a rational being. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 24.) Dillon said that the. willingness of the United States Government to work with Lumumba vanished after these meetings: “MW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 335
HW 50955 7 86- {T]he impression that was left was ... very bad, that ~ . this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal -with. And the feelings of the Government as a result ‘of this sharpened very considerably at that time We [had] hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to better understanding with him.. _ Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 23-24.) . . Le Dillon testified that shortly after. Lumumba's visit to Washing~ ton, in late July or August, he attended a meeting. at’ the Pentagon where representatives of the State Department , Defense Department, Joint:Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA were present (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 17-20, 25-26).* | “According to Dillon, "a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised" at the ‘meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 15; see also 17, 25). Dillon did not recall anything about the language used in raising the question (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon assumed that when the. subject of Lumumba's assassination was raised, “it was turned off by the CIA" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon said that "the CLA people, whoever they were, were negative to any such action" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p..18). This opposition "wasn't moral," according to Dillon, but rather an objection on the grounds that it was "not a possible thing" (Dillon, - 9/2/75, p. 18). Dillon said the CIA reaction "might. have been" made out of the feeling that the group was too large for such a sensitive * Dillon: was unable to recall the precise date of this meeting (Dil- lon, 9/2/75, pp. 25-26). Docld: 32423524 Page 336
-87- | discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 60). "Dillon was clear about the fact that "top level" CIA people | . were in attendance, although he did not remember who lodged the negative reaction to the assassination question (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 22, 25). He said it “would have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly [General] Cabell . . + Most likely Cabell" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 25). He added that it was "very likely" that | Richard Bissell was in attendance (Dillon, 9/2475, p. 21).- | Dillon stated that this discussion could not have served as” authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 31). But he believed that the expression of concern typified a prevalent. attitude toward Lumumba that might have justified the CIA's development of a capability to assassinate him: - ce 3 | I think they could have decided they wanted to develop ' the capability . . . just by knowing the concern that everyone had about Lumumba. . .. They wouldn't have had to tell anyone about that. That is just developing their own internal capability, and then they would have _ to come and get permission. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30) Dillon testified that he had never heard any.mention of the plot to poison Lumumba; nor, by implication, had he heard even a hint that the CIA asked permission to mount such an operation (Dillon, 9/2/75, 7 p. 50). But after being informed of the poison plot, Dillon made the following comment about the Pentagon meeting he attended: HW 50955 Docld: 324293524 Page 337
Douglas and Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II (Dillon, , -88-) _I think it is . . . likely that it might have been 7 the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that oe they should develop such a capacity. . And maybe they didn't have it then and went to work to develop it. be- ginning» in August. (Dillon, (9/2/75, p. 61) © a Dillon said that it was unlikely that ‘formal notes were taken. at the meeting or. preserved because it was a small "ad hoc" group rather than an official body (Dillon, 9/2/75,- p. 18). Such interdepartmen- tal meetings were “not unusual," according to Dillon (Dillon, 9/2/ 75, p. 20). oe es The only officials Dillon named as probable participants other than the CIA representatives were Deputy Secretary of Defense James 9/2/75, PP- 19, 21). Douglas stated ‘that it was possible. that he attended such a meeting at the Pentagon, but he does not recall it (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Nor does he recall the question of Lumumba's assassination ever being raiséd in his presence (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). .Likewise, Irwin stated that it- was "likely" that he attended the meeting to which Dillon referred; but he did “not remember whether he was present "at any meeting at the Pentagon HY 50955 where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 3). (ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the Presi- dent Order Lumumba's Assassination at an NSC Meeting Robert H. Johnson, a member of the National Security Docld:32473574 Page 336
289 “Council staff from 1951 to January 1962, offered what he termed a "clue" to the extent of Presidential involvement ‘in the decision to assassinate Lumutnb a (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5).* Johnson re- counted the following occurrence at an NSC veeting. in ‘tke Summer of 1960 which began with a briefing on world developments by the Director of Central Intelligence: _#* Robert Johnson introduced. his testimony | with the following state- - ment: cL . I would like to preface my remarks by pointing out that my decision to offer testimony to this committee has - involved for me a profound personal, moral dilemma. In my role as a member of the NSC Staff for ten and one-half ‘years, I was privy to a great deal of information that in- ‘volved relationships of confidentiality with high officials of the United States government. I have always taken very seriously the responsibilities implied in such relation- | ships. —- => These responsibilities extend, in my view, far beyond questions of security classification or other legal or foreign policy concerns. . They relate to the very basis of human society and government -- to the relationships of “trust without which no frée Society can long survive and no government can operate. I have been forced by recent developments, however, to weigh against these considerable responsibilities my broad- '- er responsibilities as a citizen on.an issue that involves major questions of public morality, as well as questions of sound policy. Having done so, I have concluded, not without a great. deal of reluctance, to come to your commit- tee with information bearing upon your inquiry into govern- ment decisions relating to the assassination of foreign leaders. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5) After his tenure on the staff of the National Security Council, Robert Johnson served from 1962 to 1967 on the Policy Planning Coun- cil at the Department of State. HW 50955 Docld:32493524 Page 339°
-90- At some time during that discussion, President Eisen- “. . hower said something -- I can -no longer. remember his words -- that came across to me as an order for the assassina-— tion of Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no dis-. cussion; the meeting simply. moved on. I remember my sense of that moment quite clearly because the Presddent's state- ment came as a great shock to me. .I cannot, however, re- construct the moment more specifically. a, Although I was’ convinced at the ‘time -- and remained convinced when I thought about it later -- that the Presi- dent's statement was intended as an order for the assas- sination of Lumumba, I must confess that in thinking about. the incident more recently I have had-some doubts. As is well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC meetings. Certainly, it was strange if he departed from” that normal pattern on a subject so sensitive as this. ‘Moreover, it was not long after this, I believe, that Lu- ‘“mumba was dismissed as premier by Kasavubu in an action ~ that was a quasi-coup. I havé come to wonder whether what —--" I really heard was only an order for some such political action. All I can tell you with any certainty at the present moment is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet Room of the White Hause. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 6-7) Johnson "presumed" that the President made his statement while "look- ing toward the Director of Central Intelligence” (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. ll). ‘He was unable to recall with any greater specificity the. words used by the President (Johnson 9/13/75, Dp. 10). | | When asked about the strength of the possibility that he had heard only a general directive for the political overthrow of Lumumba, Johnson testified that it was his clear impression at the time of the meeting, ‘and has remained so for the fifteen years since, that he had- heard an assassination. order: | | : Would it be fair to say ‘that although you al- Tow for the possibility that a coup or some more general HW 50955 DocId:32423524 Page 340
/-9)- political action was being discussed, it is your clear impression that you had heard an order for the assassi- nation of Lumumba? aw Johnson: It was my clear impression at the time. tae Q:. And it remains your impression now? Johnson: It remains my impression now. I have reflect- _ed on this.other kind of possibility, but that is the sense ... . that persists. (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp: 24- 25) Johnson explained that his allowance for the | possibility that he had heard an order for a. coup did not disturb his recollection of hear- ing an’ assassination order: It was a retrospective reflection on what I had heard, and since this coup did occur, it occurred to me that it was possible that that is what I heard, but that - would not change my sense of the moment when I heard the President speak, which I felt then, and I continue to feel, was a statement designed. to direct the etal al, assassination, of Lumumba. (Johnson, 9/13/75, 12) * Johnson, stated that the incident provoked « ctroigg wevetton Iwas surprised. . that I would ever hear a President say anything like this in my presence or the presence of a group of people. I was startled. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 13) . A succinct summary of Johnson's testimony was elicited by Senator Mathias in the following exchange: “Mathias: . . . What comes across is that you do have a memory, if not of exact words, but’ of your own reaction really to a Presidential order which you considered to be an order for an assassination. ~ Johnson: That is correct. Mathias: And that although precise words have escaped HW 50955 Docld:32493524 Page 341
HY 0955 -92- you in the passage of fifteen years, that sense of shock ‘remains? - “Johnson: Right. Yes, sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p.. 8) After the meeting, Johnson,: who was responsible for writing the ' memorandum of the discussion, consulted with a senior official on the NSC staff to determine how to handle the.President's statement in the memorandum and in the debriefing of the NSC Planning Board that followed each meeting: __ a a 7 I suspect -- but no longer have an exact recollection -- that I omitted it from the debriefing. I also do not re- call how I handled the subject in the memo of the meet- ing, though I.suspect that some kind of reference to the President's statement was made. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 7)- In his second appearance, Johnson reiterated that it was "quite Like=* ly that it was handled through some kind of euphemism or may have been omitted altogether" (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 21).%* * - In 1960, Johnson was Director of the Planning Board Secretariat -- third in command on the NSC staff. He attended NSC meetings to take notes on the discussions whenever one of the two senior NSC officials was absent. oo _ Johnson testified that the person with whom he consulted about the manner of recording the President's statement in the minutes was one of the two top NSC staff officials at that time: NSC Executive Secre- tary James Lay or Deputy Executive. Secretary Marion Boggs (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 12-13)... Johnson eould not recall. which of the two offi- cials he had consulted, but he "inferred" that it must have been the “top career NSC staff person present" at the meeting where he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12). At both of the NSC meetings where the President and Johnson were present for a dis- cussion of Lumumba -- August 18.and September 7 +-- James Lay was ab- sent and Marion Boggs served as Acting Executive Secretary. Marion Bogg' s statement about his method of handling the situation described by Johnson is in accord with Johnson's testimony: Docld: 327493594 Page 342°
HY 0955 ceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassina- —-93- WAS Johnson stated, his testimony standing alone is. "a clue, rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement in decision-. _ making with respect, to assassinations" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 5). To determine the significance of, this "clue, "it must .be placed in the context of the records of the NSC. meetings attended by Johnson, testimony about those meetings, and” the series of events that pre- tion. ‘In the Summer of 1960, there were four NSC meetings where de- velopments in the Congo were discussed at which Robert Johnson was present. The President was not in attendance at two of those occa- sions -- July. 15 and July 21 (NSC Minutes, 7/15/60; NSC Minutes, I have no independent recollection of being consulted by- Mr. Johnson about how to handle in the memorandum of dis-~- cussion any sensitive statement regarding Lumumba. I am_ not saying I was not consulted; merely that I do not re- member such an incident. If I had been consulted, I would almost certainly have directed Mr. Johnson to omit the matter from the memorandum of discussion. (Boggs . affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2) James Lay, who attended other NSC meetings where. Lumumba was discuss- ed (e.g., September 21, 1960), also confirmed the fact that NSC min- utes would not be likely to record a statement as sensitive as a Presidential order for an assassination, if such an order were given: Lf extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes’ would record only. the general. subject discussed without identifying the specially ‘sensitive subject.as the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 2) : Docld: 32423524 Page 343
HY 0955 | ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter- -94-.. 7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these. early meetings was. vehement: | Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a person who was a Castro’or worse . .:.. Mr. Dulles went on to describe Mr. Lumumba’ s background which™he de- scribed. as "harrowing" . ... It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been .bought by the Commun- ists; this also, however, fits with his own orienta- “tion. — (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60) ‘The President presided over the other two ‘NSC meetings. After look- mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the - President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16). ‘However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the aod “Congo during this period makes it most Likely that Johnson's testi- mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, ‘1960. The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold- ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba. * The Septem- ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this.series of events. * The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-. tail in other sections of the report,. may be summarized as follows: The week: following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to . consider "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting. rid of Lumumba” (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the cdiments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vig- orously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60; see Section 7(a) (iii), infra). The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes Only" cable under his personal Signature to the Chief of Station in Bocld: 324235274. Page 344
HY 50955 -95-— The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu -- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard the President's statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the statement by. the President was held on Septem- ber 7, two days after this event. Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960, _ indicates that Acting secre aky of State C. Dotiglas Dillon* introduced ~* Leopoldville, indicating that | it had been concluded in “HITCH QUAR- ~ TERS" that. Lumumba's 'REMOVAL MUST BE.AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT... . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION _ (CIA Cable -OUT 62966, Dulles. to Chief of Station, 8/26/60). The Dul->. les cable added: oe. . a WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY . .-. INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF .IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . .-:. YOU CAN ' ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE- .FERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, supra, for more complete treatment of this “cable. ) | On . September 19, a CIA scientist: was dispatched from headquarters to the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60; see Section 4(a), supra) . On September 21, in the presence of the President at an “NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba “remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see Section 7(a) (iv), infra). Finally, on September 26, the CIA scien- tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in- formed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an as- sassination effort (see Sections 4(a)- ~4(c), supra). The Chief of. Station stated that he received confirmation from CIA: headquarters that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section “(e) (i), supra). ** Tn 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two ' position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently (Continued) Docld: 3249395274 Page 345
HW 50955 296- ‘the discussion of. U.S. policy toward the Congo. ‘In the course of ae his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations troops in the ‘Congo was necessary to prevent Soviet intervention at Lumumba's request: _ Se a oe If... . Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN ‘out, he might then offer to accept. help from anyone. The elimination of the UN would be a disaster which, Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we could to prevent. If the UN were forced out, we might be faced by a situation where the Soviets intervened by ‘invitation of the. Congo. - (NSC. Minutes, 8/18/60) - The: discussion ‘then continued to raise ‘the spectre of an alliance be- “tween Lumumba and the Soviet Union: Secretary Dillon said that he [Lumumba] was working to , serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed er out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/ 60) : In this context; the following exchange between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dillon was recorded: ‘The President said that the possibility that the UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to’'do it. We should do so even if such action was: used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight. “Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling but that the Secretary General and Mr. Lodge doubted whether, if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the UN, the UN could stay in. In response, the President stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent -- we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumum- ba supported by the Soviets. ‘There was no indication, the ee served as Acting Secretary of State and either attended or was ‘kept informed about NSC and Special Group meetings. Dillon later served as Secretary of the Treasury under President Kennedy. (Dillon, 9/2/75, Pp. 2-4.) BDoclda: 32742935274 Page 346
-97- President stated, that the Congolese did not want ' UN support and the maintenance of order. Secretary Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling about the matter. The situation that would be _ created by a UN withdrawal was altogether too ghastly to contemplate. (NSC Minutes , 8/18/60) ‘This is the only statement about Lumumba which the memorandum: of the meeting attributed to the President. | . As” ‘reported, it clearly does. not contain an order’ for the assassination of Lumumba. But the statement does indicate extreme _ Presidential. concern focused on Lumumba : ‘The. President was so disturbed ‘by the situation in the Congo that he was willing to risk a fight with the Soviet Union ‘and he felt that Lumumba was, the “one man" who was responsible for this situation, a man who a did not represent the sentiments of the Congolese people in the President's estimation. . After reviewing NSC documents and being. informed of Robert . Johnson's testimony, Douglas Dillon stated his “opinion that it is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson." (Dillon affidavit, 9/15/75.) However , Dillon testified that he did not "remember such a thing" as an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of ‘Lumumba’ (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 32). ‘Dillon explained how he thought _the President may have expressed himself about Lumumba: | Dillon: .. . . It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody:-that Lumumba was [a] very | difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world, HW 50955 DBocld: 324234524 ‘Page 347
-98- that the President expressed himself, we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others present may have interpreted it’ other ways. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 32- 33. ) Q: Did you ever hear the President: make» such a “remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him,. or ‘let's take action right away on this? , Dillon: I don't remember that. But certainly this was the general feeling of Government. at that time, and it wouldn't have been if the. President hadn't) agreed with it. (Dillon, 9/2/75, P- 33.) Dillon said that he would have thought that sucha state- ment. "was not a direct order. to have an assassination" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33). But he testified that it was “perfectly o, possible" that Allen Dulles would have translated such strong Presidential language about "getting rid of" Lumumba into authorization for an assassination effort (Dillon, 9/2/75, “ pp. 34- 35) ; I think that: Allen Dulles would have been quite ‘responsive to what he considered implicit autho- rization, because he felt very strongly that we should not involve the President directly in things of this nature. And he was perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally » that maybe some of his successors wouldn't have ‘been. And so I think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 34. y Marion Boggs, who. attended the meeting of August 18, as. Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, stated after reviewing the Memorandum of Discussion at that meeting: HW 350955 Docld:32423524 Page 346
99 I recall the discussion at that meeting, ‘but. have no independent recollection of any statements or. dis- cussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or reference by the President (or anyone else. present - at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favor- ing action by the United. States to. bring. abdéut the assassination of Lumumba . ? Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, pp. 1-2.) : The Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC. ‘meeting of Septem- ~ ber 7, 1960--the only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the President' S statement--records only a brief, “general discussion of: developments | in the. Congo (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60). As part of Allen Dulles’ introductory intelligence ‘briefing on world events, the Memorandum related his remarks on the situation in the Congo following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba from his position in the government (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. Ay. Neither the length nor the substance of the. record of this. discussion indicates that Lumumba's role in the Congo received the same intense kind of consideration as the NSC had given it on August 18.%** There is no record of any statement by the President * Boggs added: "Based on my whole experience with the NSC, I would have considered it highly unusual if a matter of this nature had been referred to in a Council meeting where a number of persons with no.'need to know' were present." (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.) ** The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal with the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5). By.comparison, the August 18:meeting required an HW 50955 Docld:324293524 Page 349
-100-° during this discussion (NSC Minutes’, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5). Nevertheless, in: the course of his briefing Dulles expressed his continuing concern over the amount of personnel and equipment that was being sent to. the Congo. by the -Soviet Union, primarily to aid Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7760, >. 5). Dulles concluded this part of his. briefing with an observation that demonstrated that Lumumba's dismissal From the government had not lessened the extent™to which he was regarded at the NSC as a potent political threat. in any power struggle, in the . Congo: : oe | Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed to. come out on top in each of these struggles. (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5.) | The day after this NSC meeting, Gordon Gray made a pointed reminder of the President's concern about the Congo to Allen ‘Dulles at a meeting of the Special Group: | | Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully. aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60.) There are three possible interpretations of the failure of NSC records.to reveal whether the President ordered the assassination of Lumumba at one of these meetings. First, an extraordinarily lengthy (fifteen pages) summary of discussion on the Congo and. related policy problems in Africa, indicating that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60, pp..1-15). . "} of HW 350955 DBocld:3242355274 Page 350
-101- assassination order could have been issued but omitted from . ‘the records. Robert Johnson testified that it was. "very likely" that the Presidential statement he heard would have “been handled by means of a euphemistic reference or by “complete o omission “rather than given as fa] . oo. direct quo- tation" in the Memorandum of Discussion (Johnson, 9/13/75, », 14). . ‘Second, as illustrated by Douglas Dillon's testimony, the President could have made. a general statement about " “getting - rid of" Lumumba with the intent to convey to Allen Dulles that there was implicit authorization for an assassination effort. Third, despite general discussions about. removing Lumumba, the (President may not have intended to order the assassination of “ Lumumba-even though Allen Dulles may have ‘thought an assassina- tion effort had been authorized. The three White House staff members responsible to the President: for national security affairs testified that there was no such order. - Gordon Gray, Andrew Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower were all in attendance’ vat the NSC meetings of. August. 18 and September 7:*- (iii). The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Led The Special Group to Consider Anything That Might Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960. ; On. August 25, 1960 five men** attended a meeting of the * See. Section 7(b), infra, for a general treatment of the testimony of Gray, Coodpastex and. Eisenhower. ** There were four standing members of the Special Group at this time: Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; Gordon HW 50955 Daocld: 32423524 Page 351
HY 50955 . -102- _. -. Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security _Couficil responsible for planning covert operations. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer who served as Secretary ‘to the Group, began the meeting by outlining the CIA operations that, had | been undertaken in “mounting an anti- Lumumba - campaign in the Congo" ‘(Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). This campaign involved covert operations through certain labor groups and “the planned attempt . ~ . to arrange a.vote of no confidence in Lumumba" | in the Congolese Senate (Special ‘Group Minutes, 8/25/60). : | The out Line of, this campaign evoked | the following dialogue: The Group agreed that the action ‘contemplated is . very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, ‘that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the - plans as. outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of pro- ceeding, as vigorously as the situation permits or | ‘requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out ‘consideration’ of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid ‘of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60, p. 1.) Both Gordon Gray and Thomas Parrott testified that refer- ‘ence to Mr. Gray's "associates" was a euphemism for President Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;.Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; and John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Also in regular attendance was Thomas A. Parrott, Secretary to the Special Group. , Boclda: 324293524 Page 352
HW 450955 -104- Eisenhower which was employed to preserve "plausible, deniabil- ity" by the President of discussion of covert operations . memorialized in Special Group Minutes (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 27; Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 8-9). oe The four living. participants at the meeting have all stated that they do not recall any discussion of: or planning. for the assassination of Lumumba (Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, D. 1; Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, ppl 1-2; Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 27, 32; | Parrott, 7/10/75, pp: 25-26). Gray said that he did not con- sider the President's desire for “very straightforward. action" to include "any thought in his mind of assassination" (Gray, 7/9175, p. 32). Parrott testified to the same effect, maintain- © ing that he would have recorded a discussion of assassination in explicit terms in the Special Group Minutes if such a dis- cussion had taken place (Parrott, 7/10/75, PP. 26- 27). John N. Irwin Il acknowledged, however, that while he did not have “any “direct recollection of the substance of that. meet- ing" » the reference in the minutes to the planning for "getting rid of Lumumba" was “broad enough ‘to. cover a discussion of | assassination" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, Pp. 2). Irwin's interpretation is shared by Douglas Dillon and Richard Bissell--two, high government officials who were not-: participants at this Special Group meeting but who were. involved in the planning and policymaking for covert operations in the Congo during this period. Docld: 32423524 Page 353
HY 50955 _that Allen Dulles stated that he "had taken the comments -105- | As a participant in National Security Council meetings of this period, Dillon said that he would read the Special Group minutes of August 25, 1960, to indicate that - assassina- tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might be used to ' ‘wet rid of" Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 42). Dillon noted that the reference. in the minutes to the fact referred to seriously" probably pointed to the President's - statement at the previous NSC meeting at which Robert Johnson | took notes (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 39-40), When asked whether the CIA would have the authority to oe mount an» assassination. effort against Lumumba on the basis of en the discussion at the Special Group, Dillon said: They would certainly have. the authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would be enough to actually go ahead with it. But cer- “tainly the way this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything just on their own. L think they would have checked back at least with the. senior people in the State Department. -or the Defense Department. (Dillon, 9/2/75, P. 43.) Dillon said that if the CIA checked with the State Depart - ment, it might have been done — in such a way “that it would not appear ‘on any record (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43). Dillon added that "to protect the President as the public representative of the U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen Dulles “wouldn't return to the President" to seek further Docld: 32423524 Page 354