be w ws on Qu D.C. 2002h (202) $5%-2345 O WASHTUGTON , REPORTERS SUTEDING, JW, Ss 390 VU STRELT, oO a 29 We in Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. What is your impression, turning to another area now, of the manner in which the Agency handled the Ugarte issue? i A | | ' { Ugarte was a Nicarguan national who came in and reported having seen Oswald with some other people at the Cuban Embassy? Mr. Scelso. I think in the overall handling of it, it was proper, especially since I wasithe architect of that handling. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way were you the architect? Mr. Scelso; I wrote almost all the cables that went out of Headquarters and decided what. they should say. There were some, in the heat of reporting Mexico City did overlook certain things that they might have told us. For instance, they did not give us certain background. There was some information, a statement, Lee Oswald saying he was getting $3,000 or $6,000 or. some such amount for doing the job on Kennedy or doing the job on somebody, and the Mexico station indicated that there were reports that Lee Harvey Oswald had a savings: account in this amount in Dallas. What they did not tell us, for which I later chided them, was that. this rumor had been on | the radio. in Mexico Cit and everybody in Mexico City believed it. It was not on the. radio up here and we did not know what the origin of this rumor was, nor were we therefore alert to the fact that this ugarte could have heard it on the radio. Gee! ALDESSOM REPORTING COmeaNy 001870 Docld:32277215 Page 90 ; t i ; ! i i } ! | | ¥ 1 4 i
Ww 3 4 3 ws = 3 a Pe) ™ i a wa fs) ~ ~ ' a 7 — ow a ce ~ lod ™N : a ran) vd S = {¢ s S = oi a Soot is ona = e 13 = = 4 Ja} = m= ots my is = te > n \v - = 13 a = 19 = Ce] call 21 ay) a4 ooo Docld: 32277215 Page 91 activities. But my memory on. this was very weak. He was You know, I might have called him to get information about this 27th thing, because we might have learned it from the Bureau in the meantime. Mr. Goldsmith. How would the Bureau have heard it? Mr. Scelso. From the Mexico station. They were getting | briefings, and so on, right along the line, because the Mexico | | | FBI office was doing very extensive investigations in Mexico | with the police through which Oswald's movements in.Mexico were traced. - Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever. have any evidence that Ugarte may have been. a CIA agent? Mr. Scelso. Not in the sense that we call a person a CIAj agent. I think he was a Nicaraguan intelligence agency being | i run by somebody in the Nicaraguan Embassy in Mexico City ~-and 1 b i I think, if my memory is not tricking me, that we may have been in touch with the Nicaraguan who was handling hin. We may have been, at that time or in the past, or per- haps our Nicaraguan station was indirectly monitoring their “never an agent of ours in the sense that he was directly | handled by us or that he was handled according to instructions: which we were passing. i i Mr. Goldsmith. It is possible that if “his Nicaraguan | case officer was cooperating with you in some way, he may have: been using ‘Ugarte, this would have been without your knowledge? eg ECRET 001871 ALDERSON REPORTING comMPanyY
wa = e | = - N™ ; ! = i o. » | wn fo} | a “ 4 c ! ~ | n 2} o a : i ~N 4 4 . = 4 o 7 i a i | ‘0 | t BULEDING, VASUTHGTON, rat) REPORTERS Bt bn wT) a s “ 7 - : id a ~~ 1 = 19 1 S . S 29 | a tT es 4 @ @2 2 e = az 3 ash ! ri 3 tt y \ 1-91 Mr. Scelso. I am not sure about that. It:could be ‘that we had known in the past that Ugarte was a Nicaraguan agent working against the Cubans. It seems to me that I think we did. Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that Ugarte's Nicaraguan case officer was considered by the Agency to be a trusted. asset? Mr. Scelso. As I recall, he was either an agent of ours or liaison contact that we used as an asset. Mr. Goldsmith. What. was his impression of Ugarte's reliability? . Mr. Scelso.. As I remember, Ugarte had not been a very productive agent. He had not. accomplished much at all and was evaluated accordingly. Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at number 241. Would you please-that cable. (Pause) Does that statement accurately reflect the scope of the photosurveillance coverage, refierring to the first two paragraphs? Mr. Scelso. There is nothing in here. Mr. Goldsmith. ‘I am sorry. Does that paragraph accurately indicate the. hours of the Embassies? Mr. Scelso.. I have no recollection of those hours at 001872 Stgeet Docld: 32277215 Page 92 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
all. I would say it is probably correct. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware of the hours in which the 4a | ‘| 1 Soviet and Cuban Embassies were under photo-surveillance? Mr. Scelso. During the daylight hours, but the coverage, ta | | 1 was by no means complete. It never is, in cases of photo- oe | surveillance. | : | Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say that? Mr. Scelso. Well, the cameras are manually operated Oo N.C, 20024 (202) S54-2345 ave 4 | and it is just impossible to find operatives which will be | ' | so dutiful as to snap every person coming and going. Mr. Goldsmith. My understanding was that Scott was an extremely demanding man and ran a very efficient station. 390 7TU STREET, So. REPORTERS BUTERTING, CASIINCTON, | SE Mr. Scelso. That is true, but, if you have a couple -- is aman is away a part of the time and the wife is away and she has to go into the kitchen to prepare meals or she has to rZ i . * e : . . A : : ié | go to the bathroom, it is simply impossible day in and day | out, in a practical sense, to get total coverage. 18 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if there was coverage on _ 19 : week-ends? | 7 Mr. Scelso. No, I do not. know. : Mx. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at -- a Mr. Scelso. This is based on my experience with evalu- ey iy ils 7x ra ho i 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at CIA 249. Would > Fe ' { } 22 ating these things worldwide. i you please take a look at the first two paragraphs. peodel oo AD RSE = tm™e N ashy Docld:32277215 Page 93 censor” EPORTING COMPA 001879
(Pause) Mr. Scelso. That is right. ' Mr. Goldsmith. This indicates that the photographic a> ~ i saeevees ey coverage was of a continuous nature during daylight hours and = : | also, as you indicated, it does not indicate that that does i 5 4 not mean that everybody is picked up, necessarily. | g 2 Mr. Scelso. Yes. : : | Mr. Goldsmith. You stated a moment ago that,your | ; $ : experience, based upon your knowledge of worldwide operations | : - | : ol was not everyone would be picked up. | g ' Mr. Scelso. That is right. | = { . i = 1 Mr. Goldsmith. What percentage of people would be : > 1 \ Y Z 13 picked up? | , = i! z 1a Mr. Scelso. I would like to say first that the operators : | come to recognize the regular Embassy staff and visitors who. | : te frequently come and go and do not attempt to photograph them = - every time. Otherwise, they attempt to get pictures of new ! z . visitors. Even this is not. practical. It just does not work, | ae | = | and that is because it is extremely difficult to get people | : | to do this kind of work. at. all. It is a deadening, boring and’ a to get people who are clearable to do itis very, very diffi- ! Se , 223 3. i} cult. 3 3! Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, what percentage of | ~ ' people do you think you would manage to get? Mr. Scelso. I would have to make a wild guess if I were: 001874 Docld:32277215 Page 94
DoctId: to answer that. or Consu- having the . visits 001875 ‘| 4 | Mr. Goldsmith. I would not mind taking a wild guess 3 : from you, Mr. Scelso. 4 | Mr. Scelso. I would think you would get at least half = 7 of the people, or even more. 5 . Mr. Goldsmith... Certainly if it got less than-half it \ : S 7 would seem to me that the operation would not be at all worth- | : | while, if you got one quarter or one fifth. “ | Mr. Scelso. You have to crank into this the fact that : a the many people entering and leaving these installations 2 | en 1) | ‘deliberately conceal their faces; and-that. they’ approach Z 2 | the installations so they would not be photographical from : a 4 | any vantage point. 5 al - Mrs Goldsmith. My next question is sort of a difficult | : one. The Agency's records document that Oswald made an zi \s | appearance at the Cuban Embassy and Russian Embassy, ‘ 7 | tate, a total of six times, five or six times. Yet, z 4 |made five or six visits somehow he managed to escape = | = .y | surveillance coverage, even though those five or six E sa | were spread over three different days -- really, definitely | fa days, possibly three days. ee? 22 | Is there any way that that can be explained? 23 Mr. Scelso. Simply the. fact that. these photo-operations | 4 laze not set up, really, primarily to photograph and, identify 2s | unknown people entering and leaving the Embassy. They are set : SabAsI 30977215 page 95 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPSNY . ‘
1-95 primarily to get good photos, recognition photos, of the Soviet personnel or Cuban personnel in the place so that this | aw can be shown to our surveillance teams, you see, and to other | 4 | { i . 6 | require a constant surveillance operation if you were just that Oswald managed to avoid being photographed? i | | people of operational interest to us. | ". | “ Oo | z Mr. Goldsmith. Well, it would not seem that you would | % | wo | ~ if S 7 interested in the personnel of the particular government. | ~ | = woe | & a Mr. Scelso. You also get visitors. You are able, for gc example, to identify visiting Cuban or Soviet intelligence e | | ~- 10 personnel. 2 | = 1} | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you regard it unusual, nevertheless, 3 i | } Mr. Scelso. Yes,. I do. And the possibility is that NULEDING, Oo REPORTERS Bs he was extremely furtive. After all, he was not a novice at | this sort of thing. . Mr. Goldsmith. It I could just use your wild guess, Wy s 1 as you put it, and I want to have you understand. that I am not holding you to that estimate, but assuming for the moment the camera gets one~half the people that enter and say he gna 7 STREET, Oo | i | ie | . wo ‘ . ee 29 || makes five visits and not six, the chances of a person missing) i { 1 i , eae * being photographed, making five visits, if the coverage catches @ Ee? 22. | half of the people, would. be 1/2°, so it. is b/32.. And yet, : ! Oswald is our one case in 32. He managed to avoid being Are you certain that the Mexico City station never 901876 wo tan y 24 |) photographed. | - _ SEGRET Docld:32277215 Page 96 ALDERSON nResonTING COMPARES
iFRS Oe obtained any photograph of Oswald? ir) n So aS ee Mr. Scelso. I never heard that they did. I never heard} of their concealing it, nor could I conceive that they would Coe) : 1 1 : t. i 1 t i have concealed it. = ¢ The thought. that they might have:gotten it, that the 5] Agency or the station might have surpressed it deliberately to s 7 cover up their omission to send it to Headquarters, or some- | z 2 | thing like that is to me, that is inconceivable. I never ; 3 | heard it. And in view, of course, of some of the disclosures : Ke Bureau did with Oswald's threatening letter, you can conceive WASH LHG TON, | | | ‘ { that have been made in the Senate investigation of what»=the | ( ' | | | of anything. t | Mr. Goldsmith. That is why we are here today. Mr. Scelso. Yes. I never heard it. In view of the fact that Winn Scott dn REVORTELS BUTEDING, WwW. were plent of people in the station who hated his guts, it 8. ~ | | ! 12 | in his own station was not a noncontroversial figure, there | | | E a would have probably had leaked out. = a Oswald, being a defector and so on and. leading a sort : : 20 | of conspiratorial life, he was perfectly capable of so approach- at! ing the Cuban Embassy or the Soviet. Embassy that his face | could not be photographed. In other words, if this is the Soviet Embassy and our vantagepoint is over. here, he can walk under the window and walk straight. across the street. 3304 Mr.. Goldsmith. You would have to know. | i Docld: 32277215 Page oT ALDERSON sable COMP aR
1-97 Mr. Scelso. You:can figure where it is. It can only 4 | be in a certain number of places. | - ! Mr. Goldsmith. Getting back to the question of Ugarte i | | @ 4 for a moment, I willsask the question, to your knowledge; .was | $ «| he employed in any way by the CIA? | Be . z 7 Mr. Scelso. No. He was not carried by us as an agent, | S | as far as I recall. ot think we did have knowledge, or our | z | Nicaragua station did have knowledge that he existed and was | ; ; being used against. the Cubans. = al Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying he: had no» relationship | : 7 whatsoever to the CIA? | | 2 7 Mr.. Scelso. Of course, in the laws of agency, you | © 2 a know, he was somewhere out on the end of the line, like the ! S fT hi | 3 ba agents of all the liaison services that we liase with, and | we i | help train, and whose operations we systematically monitor. | E |, | Sither superfiéially or intensely. oo . ~. | I do not recall that we were in any way giving him | E |, | instructions indirectly, or that we placed any importance on I a | operation. But. we count as agents of ours people who : : xo | axe responsible to our guidance on a day to day basis. . : nl Mr. Goldsmith. In that sense, as you define it, was | xe £7 +» | he an agent? Mr. Scelso. No. | Mr. Goldsmith. Was he an asset or a source? nd oe / a5 i Mr. Scelso. Not of ours, but of the Nicaraguan service.’ ,  gtpgey 001878 | ho 4 az Docld: 32277215 Page 95 A LOESSON REPORTING COMPANY
, me i Mr. Goldsmith. What control did the Agency have over | the Nicaraguan service? , . 3 | - Mr. Scelso. Almost none. We did not attempt. to direct IQ nn oe ne eee ‘ | their operations anyplace in the world. Our relations with 5 7 Nicaragua,:.our political pelations and U.S. political relations & r) | and ours aS an agency was to talk to them, attempt to improve g 7 their political posture in their own country, to améliorate : S 3 their brutality and their repressive tactics. We -had no | : | charter to overthrow Samoza, so we kept in contact with him : a . : z | on a local basis so that we could monitor what they were ! : He doing. | S i2 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware of SHmoza's support of | @ 2 i3 the anti-Castro Cubans? | ! = ; : | a i Mr. -Scelso. Where or when? | Bis Mrs Goldsmith. 1963. : = rat Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any specific operations | = a ; i ” 7 | of his supporting anti-Castro Cubans, but I could well conceive : 7 of it. | | = i = a Mr. Goldsmith. What about support given to anti-Castro 5 12 | Cubans by the Nicaraguan intelligence people? | ; ; i an Mr. Scelso. What do you mean, financial support? | © ga 22 Mr. Gotdsmith. Financial support, military. | oe Mr. Scelso. To Cuban. exile groups that were anti-Castro? © 34 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.. : Ww ta Mr. Scelso. I do not.recall;having known of any such CLARET 901879 ads cree Docld:32277215 Page 99 ALDERSON REFORTING COMBAIKLY
thing because it would have been, to us, a trivial matter. > . What we were concerned about with Snmoza were his acti- a | vities inside of his home country, principally. . | de | _ Mr. Goldsmith. If hes had been giving support to anti- wa Castro Cubans, you would have considered that as. trivial? Mr. Scelso. Sure. ~ 2002% (202) 554-2345 reat | Mr. Goldsmith. Why? not have predicated any operations based on it.. We would not ‘pn. c. Oo have attempted to recruit agents to monitor his support of anti-Cuban operations, anti-Castro groups or anything like VASTITUCTON , | | | } | Mr. Scelso. Not a matter -- in other words,.we would | | | | | | | | that. | | We would have received and disseminated any information ; | | which came our way. al Mr. Goldsmith. It would seem to me that it would be . REPCITEPRS BULLDERS , in the intersts of the United States to become aware of all wu, the anti-Castro activities. Mr. Scelso. Oh, sure. I say our station would have known it if it had been going on, and our Headquarters, but 390 Jr STRENRT, S 290 | I just dosnot recall it. You see, :.Smmoza . was» active | : | against Costa Rica. His diplomats were engaging in smuggling : money for the U.S. Mafia. He was assassinating people, ris brutalizing the population, conducting guerrilla warfare. nn) 5 i He was at odds with the government of Honduras which harbored anti-Samoza groups and so on. . i 001880 Ww to Docld:32277215 Page 100 ALDESSON REPORTING COMPANY
1-100 | If he was also in left field supporting anti-Castro © 2 groups, this was one facet of his operations and would not have been of any significance to us. We would have dissemina- | { | 4 ted it to the State Department. _ : | | z 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware that J. C. King supported | z P | anti-Castro groups out of Division funds? | S 7 Mr. Scelso. Sure, through Miami, yes. ; = 3 | “Mr. Goldsmith... Were you aware that that was done = | S 3 separately from SAS or from Task Force W? : : 19 Mr. Scelso. Well, let me think. The various stations | é 1 had contact with anti-Castro groups at. various stations in | E 2 Latin American and may have financed them. Whether J.C. King | . i | @ 2 13 may have done this -- I would not have put it past him. He ; | : rs did all serts of personal operations. E all Mr. Goldsmith. Would that have been unauthorized? | g eo Mr. Scelso. He could authorize it himself as Bivision : = 1T | Chief. | : = a Mr. Goldsmith. Might. he have done that with the groups | 3 in Nicaragua, the anti-Castro groups in Nicaragua? é 0 | | Mr. Scelso. Sure he might have. It seems -- well, noting is too farfetched for him to have done. He went personally into Columbia, or someplace, and went up into the organization that had been murdering people right and left ; 25 when he was Division Chief. ; 2 ~~ ' 901881 ! : 23 hills and personally met the leader of some great guerrilla | 4 | | Docld:32277215 Page 101
1-101 i Mr. Goldsmith. What was the nature of the types of | 3 | stoves that J. C. King was supporting? | 3 Mr. Scelso. As I can say, I do not know he ran any | 4 | personal operations supporting any groups outside of this frame- = 5 | work of division operations run through the stations and | F b branches. | S 7 Mr. Goldsmith. It is conceivable to me that he was, a 3 but you have no direct knowledge. 3 | Mr. Scelso. No direct knowledge. : "9 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if he is still alive today? ! S , : rr | Mr. Scelso. No, I do not.. When I was here a.year ago : = 1 $ 12 on vacation I heard that he was dying, or he was very senile: | - © 2 13 | Mr. Goldsmith. How about Mr. Herbert, who you mentioned = i 2 ta H before. | : 1s Mr. Scelso. Yes? | ¢ i : 7 Mr.. Goldsmith. Is he alive today? | tr Mr. Scelso. As far as I know. He was in Argentina. | Mr. Goldsmith.. Do you think he would know about Jd. C. = 19 | King's operations? € 20 | Mr. Séelso. Very probably. Mr. Herbert was in Argen- eet | tina. You are not at a loss as to his whereabouts, are you? | @ ° oe 22 Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency will make him available to | 23 | us. Excuse me for a moment. ; : (Pause) - Did Headquarters station ever criticize, in any way, = «BE Docld:32277215 Page 102 ALDERSON RE: ws tn , 901882 T COMPANY t +
1-102 ‘ : the manner in which they handled the Oswald case prior to the | © 5 H assassination? | i i I ' 3 , Mr. Scelso. Not that I know of. Mr. Goldsmith. What about the assassination? i Mr. Scelso. Not that. I know of. ta P You pointed out that they admitted to doing certain H J 2002" (202) S54~2345 ~y , | to disclose the contact with the Cuban Embassy. cS 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Also the fact that Oswald was applying 10 | things. My position has been that they did, of course, fail | | | | | | for a visa. ~~ _ . | i | | | | i H _.4 go through with you. I do not know how long it will take Sy! Mr. Scelso. Yes. = a | - Mr. Goldsmith. I have another line of questioning to. ° Pires Wy HYHS aesdy. Mea, : me. If you would like to break for lunch, you may do so. = : Mr. Séelso. I leave it up to you. I can stay all day : 2, long. “ 4 (Whereupon at. 12:30. the Executive Session recessed to S 1a reconvene, at.1:30 peMe) e-waste Ag te a a | = i wa A H =. o13 1 a : : 4 = h : ‘ —— 4 . : - : i" ‘ ag i a a+ 4 - as a ao Y i , : as bo fe ke A Sa EL I PP a ee Sot heii 23 ; : x 001883 t fr 4 i Docld:32277215 Page 103
DoctlId: ~ oe) — ai 7 } ' { bat 2 | > 2 il = t “ n . i ws 8 tl a H ‘li sees a 7 | — Fa , | ina co coma e ' “N i ee +o a - a = 1G | S t Zz i pad prot ed po —_ iH 2 | =. : Hy = 2 3 BUCLDING, baa te | co = z = 2H = iS . it ~ ut an i} : ~ } ia V7 if . i s 18 | = \ in Ht ol = 17 if ied 1 i ¢ i 4 = 29 | | 31 — aa IQS Paar wees iD ae 32277215 Page 104 1-103 __AFTERNOON SESSION (1:40 p.m.) '. TESTIMONY OF JOHN SCELSO -- Resumed © Mr. Goldsmith. Two general questions pertaining to this morning. I think you could probably sense from the thrust of the questions that the Committee is disturbed about what it as a failure by the Mexico City station to communicate timely manner all of the information that it had to Headquarters. . Is there any explanation that you can think of for that failure on the part of the Mexico City station? 001884 _ SEGRET AiLoOzascsr REPORTIN So roMe oh ALDZASS*
1-103-A Mr. Scelso. I can hypothesize an explanation. Mr. ped Phillips -- you have talked to Dave Phillips? ree) Mr. Goldsmith. Yess Mr. Scelso. He should know. He was down there. But to ree i eEpeel RSON REPCRTING COMPANY Z § me, it would seem that in. screening the information, they did t ' 1 # 6 | not attach any importance to the added information. In other | 5 7 : words, it. was not earthquaking. | 3S 2 Mr. Goldsmith. We agreed that it was important, in fact, : 7 it was sufficiently important to warrant sending a cable : : He : instead of a dispatch. | : 1 Mr. Scelso. Almost always things like that were cabled | S 12 : in, but the added information gained from the other: meetings, | @ : 12 from the monitoring of the other telephone calls and Oswald's : | : ul other visits, it was not regarded as sufficiently .important : : is | to warrant dissemination. : = te | In.other :words, here you have a kook, you see -- to | a i7 | follow the line of thinking, a kook -- who had defected once i - 2 13 | and had come back. and now wanted to defect again. You see, : : 193 | possibly, this is not -- in the scale of values, you see, 5 29 | was not then of any great significance. woe : . i come 2! Mr. Goldsmith. Even thoughtthis: particular kook hap- T 3 rand 22 i pened to go not just to the Soviet Embassy but also,to the | 22 : Cuban Embassy? | @ 4 Mr. Scelso. Well, the contact was: obvious, you. see. | : He wanted to get a visa and, from there, to Russia. Docld:32277215 Page 105
1-105 Central Registry? _ a w SII LE Mr. Scelso. Yes. | Mr. Goldsmith. I thought the 201 file was the file that is . i was maintained by DDO? | 4 | Mr. Scelso. I think it could contain operational infor- 23 ? z 65 Mr. ‘Scelso.. Yes, but there are 201 files in the ! I = i t 2 az Registry, too. Some of them are maintained on the desk and ~ | a. | & 7 | other ones are in the Registry. | = | S 7 I would assume, since the Oswald case is a defunct case, 3 | you see, that his 201 would be in the Registry now.. As long | < | 7 | ~ !0 | as it were active, it would be on the desk. = | = nn Mr. G6ldsmith.--Howsmanynéopiestare theré of a: particular 4 = iz | 201 file? © az ih Mr.=Scelso. There Sight be. one in Central Registry | = Ho, = ta | and another one on the desk. where the case is active. ba is 4 Mr. Goldsmith. Would these files be duplicative, > 4 i = 14 completely, of each other? , . = i “ 7 | Mr. Scelso. Not necessarily. The Registry would put — | , a : . ; { : 18 | in only the documents which they get, you see, and the desk = H i tt ! i = "| might have additional inter-office memorandum, and.so on, c He: . bat 70 | which they would keep. pee 2! t Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true that that 201 file contains Sa ~ : . . . ’ . t wa a2 i only biolgraphical information? ; | i | i ~ mation, too. i eo ‘ i Ww in ‘Mr. Goldsmith. What is the routine manner in which t 4 Hi} tt t QT PRET | | | SECRET 001887 ALDESSON RESORTING COMPARLY ' a Docld: 32277215 Page 107
1-106 information is maintained in files? \ 2 | Mr. Scelso. It is usually kept in project files. Our "| systemized activity abroad is done under the name of projects | 4 | : for. budgeting and management purposes and to keep an opera- = | tional, work in an operational file. ow 6 | Mr. Goldsmith. If you wanted to find out which opera- n . 4 . : ! & 7 tions that particular agent had been involved in, and you did : = é not know the names of the operations, how would you. go about | “ 4 G7 making that determination? = io Mr. Scelso. Usually an agent is in a project, you See, e oT and his cryptonym, like LIENVOY and LITENSOR will. indicate ae) | Son | | “te | the project he is in, so all the information he is in is in | T a iF i that project. _ In addition, you can trace his name through Central. | = iS 3 Registry and get back all the references which might be in ! j an other files. . “ H Mr. Goldsmith. So Central Registry will.indicate what | = il = '* | projects he has been involved in? 5 Fy Mr. Scelso. Yes. They would send you a list.of items, €. Ss 29 | | H } a1! . oS Mr. Goldsmith. There could be hundreds, though. LO 4 | © WR ~ | Mr. Scelso. Indeed.. 23 Mr. Goldsmith. What would be the most. expeditious way | | to find out what operations an agent has been involved in? Mr. Scelso. Go to the desk and ask them. ed; ae i ALOESSON REPORTING COMPANY r [cabtes and dispatches, referring to him. | { | | Docld:32277215 Page 108
1-107 . i | Mr. Goldsmith. Which desk, now? i 2 Mr. Scelso. The area desk that was responsible for hin. | | | [ ae) | If he is still in the Division, they will have-a.-complete file; | on him on the desk. =z 3] Mx. Goldsmith. Would that file be the 201 file, or sone | 3 é other kind of £ile? : ~ | = 7 “Mr. Scelso. It probably would be a project file. If | a ) he is a security suspect, you see, it would be a 201 file. 1 : 3 he is an agent of ours, he would be in. a.project file. : : 10 Mr. Goldsmith. Bet us say that, over a ten-year period, | £ | an agent has been involved in a dozen. operations. How would | a t ' = 2 you find out which operations he had been involved. in? | © S 12 Mr. Scelso. He has a cryptonym, you see, and.there is : = : z | a file on that cryptonym and in that would be all correspon- | 2 i . : is | dence, dispatches and cablés relating to that cryptonym. ! = ip ‘ ; ! z 14 So all of his activity would be reflected in that. ; - 4 4 Ta Mr. Goldsmith. Agents do not keep the same cryptonym : : 8 over the years, do they? | : 3 | Mr. Scelso. That is right. Then you might have to | < 12 | 100k in several different projects. . | | oa Mr. Goldsmith. You would not know which registry to | @ va’ 22! look into unless you knew the cryptonym in advance? > w Mr. Scelso. Well, this file would indicate if there > was a change of cryptonym. ee s a Mr. Goldsmith. Which file, the 201 file? | 4 ALDESSON Sw in a ‘NG feo scany Docld:32277215 Page 109 EEESSS! °
te in A EAS 1-108 Mr. Scelso. The 201 file and the project file, as \ well. Agents rarely change cryptonyms unless the old crypto- | \ eo | il 3 | nym has been compromised. @ 4 i ~- Mr. Goldsmith. - My understanding is the cryptonym is. is) } . . . ¢ e A * z S| given to an agent at the beginning of his involvement ina. | ‘ i : e 4 | particular project. | ! : 1 ~ | S 7 For example, let's take AMLASH, and the "AM" would \ “ a | pertain to the particular project, would it not? | Pa 2 | Mr. Scelso. ‘Yes. That would mean Cuban. ~ 0 | Mr. Goldsmith. Say he starts working on a project ina | = 1 | completely different area, Czechslovakia. Would he still | = iH i 3 1 = # retain the cryptonym AMLASH? ! BU ELI ENS oO REPORTERS 2 | Mr. Scelso. . He would. ordinarily keep the same cryptonym| | Cuban agents worldwide have the AM eryptonym even though they | | | | | | ig | may be stationed in Poland, or something like that. | | Mr. Goldsmith. As a general rule, you are saying that | a, Cc boy “4 the most expeditious manner to find out what files an agent : 8 | as been involved in would be to go to his 201 file, determine. : a what his cryptonym is, and from there look up his cryptonym | ‘& 20 | ana bring your. references, I guess in a particular index.of | a cryptonyms. That would give you a reference to the projects ! aad ‘ — vy > i he has been involved in, or all correspondence pertaining. ia. Qe / branch he worked under, each nation, each nationality has the , - t | 22 4 Mr. Scelso. .From the cryptonym, you could tell which i | 1 two letters which designates the nationality. You can go to ; : | Stpeet 001890 ALDERSON REPORTING CCMPSALY Docld: 32277215 Page 110 _—
wa = . A Pe) ™ ' vi) A wi ~ ~ ™~ ' cS = 7 — a R e co) pan ™ . a ro) Y a - tA = Wy S ad 5a) = ty ed at a a = i7 wr = = = = ta “- “ = - 1s = tw os =z 14 ia ~ ~ “17 =~ Pe r * ig al an = 1 = 9 ~ = + Co Ss 29 ‘A Sr ona) 434 ioe “— 2) AN 4 23 au ae Se . _. :™ b= Docld: 32277215 Page 111 1-109 the desk and ask them. Mr. Goldsmith. How would they know? Mr. Scelso. They would have a file on that.. Mr. Goldsmith. On that cryptonym? we eee ee Mr. Scelso. That cryptonym. If it were active, it would be in Registry. Sometimes it does take a lot of research. They will wheel out sometimes | in a cart, like a supermarket cart, only it's two-storeys, weet we a ee — this many, twice as many files. Mr. Goldsmith. As a rule, the information, cperational information pertaining to an agent will be contained in the project files? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Is it true CIA case officers do not have! cryptonyms? Mr. Scelso. Well, staff case officers who are staff employees like I was a staff employee, just has pseudonyms. Agents have cryptonyms. Mr. Goldsmith. An agent is not somebody who you would consider to be a CIA employee? i I i irelationship of some kind. This is a myth, of course, because | : Mr. Scelso. That is right. He is in a contractual i 1 ithere is not any contract, really, but there is an agreement. | There are certain types of high-level agents who are staff ,;agents, who have staff status, but they are not employees. : Santa] 001891 ALDEASON REPORTING COMPANY a st a]