040703108 Spoils an MEMORANDUH FOR Tig RECORD: SUBJECT + AMTRIIP/1 Meeting, Mew York City (000) Thursday , 14 November. 196 3 . This meeting was Laid-on - by phone fron We R “5 over uber. It took nlace as. scheduled nsing an o: ee/wark-room in A/L*s Jewelry: factory showroga at 31 W. 47% Hh New York. oe 1 This neeting was eoheduled : iC dentifienticns from A/l revelanb- to the AMLASE Operation, We were particularily |. To. interested in detersining AMLASH's present attitude toward ro tHe Operation and any datails of or nancs‘of-litely no . coufsderates which he nay have @iscussed with A/1 after. Qutrichts departore from the seone. We were also interested in using A/l as.a ehsex ag gainst the list. of lilely AMLASH TEPUEANT confederates whieh nad: heen, compiled by the MHAPRON éroup. a 3. Fingnees, The 1 widersigned waa prevared . to give AMvHTP/i autvistont funds to. cover his expenses and eS those of AMLASH during the recent three-week eojourn in pony Europe which Aft made at our request. However, A/l refused i to accept any reaunsration whatsoever, stating that. the money we had given hin for his round-trip ticket (¢950,00).-- was enough. This, for the record, represents an ontlay tee conservatively of some $1200 to $1500: by A/l fron his own pocket on KUBARK behalf,. not to mention the lost time from “his own business. We believe this. gesture should be , reuembered in future. dealings: with AJL. 4. General. Ash wes - feeling poorly as the result - of a flu-type. cold Wi when we met. He stated that be would not. have cone. in at all were it not for cur scheculed meeting. Nevertheless, he spent willingly several hours with us, going over the points in which we were interested. The oe, meeting terminated at 1530 with ‘no incidents of a: security oat . “nature noted. . ; 7 5. Yetsiis of Meoting.. Collecting inforaation BYES for the AHLASH operation cougtituted the prineizal.ef ~ a discussions during this meeting, and way be found ae -~ . oe . attachment A to this report. A: eopy is filed also in the |. - _AMLASTT 201. Xe a oe ee CEN see maa / aesttt g les eh EA fe: ARE Wik ry a 1) . om oe
AVTACHMENT. A gor” ANUHIP ‘NBNO OF HparING: oF. 14 Nov: 1963: _ the following information and observations, ‘wore ‘obtataed rot ALL: during the above’ neeting:. a i, eo _ ANLASH. Secretary: Brnestina. ACOSTA Gonzalez. (nicknane: “Rne) ealle 25°- #526 Apt 8. (presumably our 25th Shes. No. 5a6..... Vedado. “ Te Lephone 303865. ; 7 (Note AMLASH hag: ‘ons iderable. ‘eonfidance: in. his secretary, and hag. suggested: that letters or packages could ‘be sent there’ on a one or two-shot deal.)> ; ; ; 2. -Ia response to the question of: whom. AMLASH might. turn to in order to carry out bis: ‘plans, AMWHIP. nentioned the following: persons: uy w . . oat ea. 33 yrs: eld, “who is. unetionary oe oO in Havana municipal govg. He is rn _OF6E moorish oqusints Has wide . oo Ob rele of aequain ances An Havana. - 7 pe Awserias| | ees mon GUIN | Qiuan armmaj0e > BG ‘Ulthe NIEVES Sottere 0G Fo of the > above stAa/1 felt that oun thofitivm, rns) and ALMEUEIRAS] were, the most dependable... THE. degree too. =. * which (Juan ALN iBIDA) Rould: be. trusted was questioned by A/1. _ In addition to the above names: which. A/V: volunteered, he - ry asked about[Major. DIAZ-ARGUELLES , Major Tony CASTEL}\and QEP® Afiaser Faure - IOMO}, - AST stated . that he felt (DIAZ-ARGUELLES U4, 0b nd his’ brother. "fip-7 Tin"|\could be used and were trustworthy; CASTEL|and /CHOMOS Yon the - ‘other hand, would not be utilized | n thé initial e forts by AMLASH, but, if-his efforts were successful, they ‘eould: be. ‘counted on to- support LASH in the period which. foilowed, They: would never be taken into the ot ‘inter-sanetun", however. When asked about Majors Pedro 06,9 MIRST, Rodiles PLANAS| and[ Enrique BARONET. Gomez|0 stated: that \PLANAS)° jgould never be utilized, ci ie mould) 6 f£it,“into.. the CastutSonowan|Gategory, and (eas , though ob {friendly with LAST, could net be trusted a ac s primary loyalty was ‘ta FIDEL CASTRO, e
Taze 2 of Attach. A. 3. Concerningl Rajors © Willian GALVEZ nodriguer pb, 06,06  Yietor POULIN Machado, CPéscendio PRES (-ontano?) p and (anton tLe LYSSON (ZUUENG) Batira} A/l stated that h® did: hot know these types well ana therefore had “Tittle ‘to say. regarding them. We did say that he did not eare oot attend) ob | yb per egnaly ond that he was a little "psycho" ; [BORDON Was | OG. OK; (PEQeZ|was an older man, ca. 60 years, who Was a y nonentity. who had his rank because he had guided the [Grania 0 group into the hilis at. tiie beginaing. of the fight against - wy Pre re .. Batis a 20b[LUSSoN| was probably tec loyal to Raul CASTRO. to be considered tar any initial aecticnl 7 rns ——— i a —_ cael Os, When “anestioned about the identities of followers of Major[AjCmuErnas) 4/1 stated. that it would be better to “refer to AMLASH, as he (Ay /1} could: only give information that was three vears old and hence not very accurate. We did not press the question,, nor. suggest ‘manes, ag it wag evident . that he felt that his answers would Sluply net. give % ‘a true, _ current picture. . Do, 5. A/t provided the: full, naue of a possible lead | “\Owhich he had discussed earlier wi ph Ontrich: Raudol RUIZ, . ; Havens “|; RUIZ) is an assistant. to » "Director of Sportst] Zor. the National Govt. Cob ok 06,09. a : 6. In addition. to. “the above information, the. undersigned discussed-various aspects of the. AHLASH case, and in particular, questioned A/1l about AMLASH's frame of - mind: and future plang which he may have revealed to A/1 . after Ontrich departed the scene. A/l made several points, . yin Havana. which basically boiled down to the fact that AMLASH was. still not pleased with the support he was getting from the - USG side... The- visit 1 with DAENOLD, ‘who acted in: the capacity. of a: representative of high. levels of the Govt concerned’ with the Cuban problem, satisfied AMLASH as far as policyy: was concerned , but he was not afall happy with the. fact a ‘that he still was not given the technical assistance’ for - the operational plan as he saw it. A/l said that AMLASH | dwelt coustantiy on this point. He could not understand why he was denied certain small. pieces of equipment which | - 7 prottised a Tinal solution ta the problem, while, on the other hand, the USG gave much equipuent and sioney to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets, According to A/l, AMLASH fecls strongly - -on this: point, and if he does not .get advice and. materials f 4) €79 Prd EET = facut feels Exetutes it2n aatonatic ep coast Tasty ay » aa . \l (ER
74-00000 or SESnET Page 8 of Attack. A. i from. us iG technician, he , will “probably ‘pocone: ‘fed-up ‘again, oY -and we will lose whatever progress wée have made to Gate, wots -A/l stated that AMLASII now has his. feét wet.vis-a-vis-: . -edonerating with USG and has accepted the fact that. he will . work profitably. and securely: with, it. It is. this that we. - stand to lose with our procrast tination. — AMLASH. ‘algo talked about going to the French terrorist group, the GAS 5 . intorder’ to: get. the waterials and guidance he needs... It- is belisved tha t. he was talked out of this idea, “after the J dangers involved were discus sed with AMLASH, 1. with regard to ‘the radio. gear, AMLASIL stated that he did not feel that he wanted to take one in with = . hin, particularly in view of the recent. arrests in. Cuba of agents carrying concealed radios. .He was not opposed, however, at. this time to havingya radio. cached for. Pay to be recovered by him later. — ; 8. Aécording - to ARWHIP if there. is any interest in having. AMLASH Link up. with other trusted assets in . ‘Cuba, these ‘naves ‘would have: to be given to him before he - - “VFeturned ; otherwise. he would not trust any other means . . uged later. inside. ‘to get him, bo. Anitiate. Or: respond. to. such contacts. ae ae Be, oe, o AL stated that AMLASH talked about’ getting ‘aid from), or at least discussing his position, with |. _. Manolo RAY. Tlowever, he stated that he. questioned. whether © this was the best idea, since. if RAY came to Paris while ' he’ (LASH) was there, people would. conclude that there was ‘something. between the BHO, Another. spot Mould ‘be betters oo : Bhoaht AMLASH. oe . lo. At the tine © of A/i's departure, AMLASH._ | said that. he would contact "Jack" (Red Stent, Paris. . staffer) “upon his return’ to Paris. (This he. subsequently did on the 15th of: November, - according ‘te info received |, from Paris-sonewhat belatedly). 1. When AMLASH, Asli. ana VENEGAS were. together Lye in Rome and Italy, VENEGAS told ANLASH that people were. == — betting that LASH would not return .to Cuba. .: Some had alse - questioned his wother on this -point.. APMLASH. reportedly . told VENEGAS to cover atl the bets he could as he would be a rich man. .{It tas at this time, according to A/1, ‘that AMLASTE decided that he had better return to Havana 8) 7. pre od oo ae! mt oat
et i < 0f ve-taking | lige _,his way. He also realized, however, that invasion was -_ . ~~ hot to be cunsitered seriously at this tine. Also, AMLASII. yage 4 of Attach, A oa littte sooner than’ he inteiled,. in fact almost. as secon  &8 possible, } , . AMLASH talked about the two possibilities: Cuba - cithor thru invasion by US Sroops, or A obo G ¥ ‘ talked ahent his ability to take some men into the hills en Girne Villas Province and.taking the small towns of Trinidad sud Topes de Collaates. He said that he and hig: nen could jiast no more than 15 Cavs in the hills as the anti-guerrilla fighters now employed by the Regime were ex-gueritins themselves and new. the way to fight and. -Wittian the hills. “Also the Soviet equipzent made the govt — _ forces mich more formidahie than in Ratista's time... AMLASH that this was the way to set up 4 provisional rebel govt apparently was discussing these ideag with the impression and thereby invite and gain US support, By the way A/1 - talked, it.is fairly certain that AMLASH realized that this was not the kind of a plan which could even renotely _ be expected to receive USG sid. It is hoped that he .. does realize that Havana must. first-be taken... or failing ' that, a treely sizable piece of land (say, alnost-an | . @ntire province) which could be a true rallying point and “staging ground under complete Rebel control, from which . “the rest of the island could be wrested from the Fidelistas @and the Communists. — ease Do . 13. In summary, the talke with A/1 led the _undersigned to believe. that AMLASH is again entering . one of his skeptical mocds, one which our actions have . (done. little to dispel. foo little and too Late.....0. sate enetaencmmrnameanaeng ‘ GROUP 4 ¥ Exetnded fran acionalic LwAagrading aad SesiU sess i K Rg 7 eae | !