176-10036-10185 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10185 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO : - TITLE : Memorandum of Conference with the President DATE : 10/29/1963 PAGES : 4 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 317: Meeting on Vietnam. Box 1 eo sm moe - — 2 me mo mm -
ut oa) - . Loy oe nee Sy x ~ SKE SA MILA p . ot NARS Be 35 f C: . C. MUL. ‘\- 78 e+ ar ‘0 - TOP SECRET i —_ oe - MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT - October 29,' 1963, .4:20 PM,. Subject: Vietnam Others present: Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary - ..McNamara,: Attorney General, Director McCone, -.General Taylor, General Krulak,. Under. Secre-~ - tary, Harriman, .Mr..Alexis Johnson,.Mr.. William ‘Bundy, Mr..Helms,.Mr..Mendenhall (State), -Mr. Colby (CIA),. Mr. Bundy,. Mr... Forrestal, Mr. Bromley. Smith “Mr. Colby. of CIA gave the current status of coup forces: ‘He estimated ‘that the: pro-Diem. and anti-Diem forces. were about even, approximately 9800 on each.side,. with 18, 000 listed as neutral, The briefing was illus- trated: with a:CIA order -of battle map. , ve iy ‘Phe ‘President askéd:what ‘Diem had learned-from the attempted coup “in- 1960. : .My. Colby replied that Diem now had ‘much better ‘communica- — “ tions: with military forces deployed outside Saigon. .He could thus call “into Saigon rapidly loyal forces to-oppose rebel forces in the city. .The . 1960 | coup was.-frustrated when forces outside Saigon remained loyal, «moved. into- Saigon, and defeated the forces which had Surrounded the “palace. ee “Mr... McGeorge Bundy suggested that the. assessment just given the - ‘group be sent to Saigon to see if our officials there agreed -with it. -He 5 asked «whether: ‘Ambassador. Lodge: should return to Washington: now and. , meritioned that some of those present feltthe should stay i in Saigon, : Secretary Rusk said. we » must assume that Diem and Nhu have heard rumors about’.a coup. The- ‘question for. us is: whether: we think there is ~ _ enough prospect ofa successful’ coup to make the decision to keep Silent. Should we- let the. coup generals ‘know that a- protracted ‘civil war ‘must “not be the result: ‘of their ‘efforts to: ‘overthrow Diem? . Should we tell them we would support them only. if the coup is short and-bloodless? If ' fighting between, the two sides takes ‘place, : each will ask for our: help. : If we support ‘Diem, then we: will ‘disrupt the war effort because we will: -be acting against those generals ‘who are now. fighting - the war against the Viet Cong. .If we support the: rebel generals, . then we will have to. guarantee that they are succéssful in overthrowing. the: Diem government. ra TOP SECRET
7% he as was apparent, for. example, in: ‘Korea. -. TOPSECRET «= __ “2 - . Ambassador: Lodge was asked by General Don to stick .to his departure plan so.Lodge.should go as he had planned. .We ‘now have little informa- -tion, .We need 48, not.4, hours advance notice of any coup... We should - . -put our faith inno one, .including General Don.: We'should .caution.the — _. generals that they.must have the situation in hand before they. launch. — _-a coup. .We'should tell them we have no interest whatsoever in a long civil. war in ‘South: Vietnam. ; . The. President agreed that’ Ambas sador- Lodge should leave Saigon for “ Washington as-he-had planned. .He thought the rebel generals should 7 -talk.to ‘jGeneral Harkins. .He said the odds:were against’a coup. ‘He | ‘suggested that General’ Harkins be put in. charge of our ‘mission -in “Saigon when ‘Ambassador: vLodge leaves. If. Ambassador: ‘Lodge delays his departure, Diem. will ‘know we ‘are aware of coup plans’... It would -be good to have: -Ambassador- Lodge: out of thie country, when a coup takes .. . ‘place. ae : : ., Regarding. the estimate that the - ‘pro= and .anti- Diem forces : are evenly . balanced,, the:President commentéd’ that it:always: looks: this ‘way until the coup actually begins. _Then support for the’ ‘coup. is _forthcoming;: ' . ta ay : . . oe . : . . General ‘Taylor. cautioned: against looking at the Vietnam. situation. ‘as. if it were a.football game. He said a. few key. people: are. crucial to - the success of a a coup and. are more. important than total number's, t - The President asked t that we. etry to find. out who these key: people are. . “Secretary McNamara asked, ‘who of ‘our. officials in ny Saigon’ are-in-. charge . of the coup planning. He ‘suggested that the Deputy Chief: of ‘Mission, . Truehart,. the Acting Chief of CLA, .Smith,; and: General. Harkins form a ‘group which ‘would(gjointly. decide’ on: what our. agent Conein‘would say: '-and.do and: (b)shear. all- of Conein's reports, . If-any of the: three dis = -agree, a report: ‘would be sent, back to’ Washington at once. : :Genéral. Harkins. may not know what: ‘the’ ‘Embas sy and CIA are now ‘doing. ‘-Truehart. should, head the. Vietnamese country team until, the- ‘coup. was ‘initiated. >. At: that. time,. General Harkins: would: take over: “with. ‘Truehart . becoming: his political adviser. _ Ope '. Director: McCéné. dia not agree ‘that a troika should’ -be. set. up i in Saigon. .He said it would. ‘be better for :the CIA officer. to take direction: rather. ‘than participate in a decision-making. group. ‘TOP SECRET |
{eee pene ey os sk se me es gan eee ae . . Ca laeeeeeeeeendieteieettetetedted bettie . ee ay . TOPSECRET .. .- ede ee “patablé ‘to that’ in tag or" ina South: American : ‘Country where-a”coup™ | Genetal Taylor: ‘said he agreed with. ‘the: ‘Attorney: Generaly When “pressed by the President,..General Taylor said. that evena successful . -Secretary Rask’ ‘paid’ the “important quéstion was: agethies” the: ¥ebel: ve mee re - generals: could. achieve: ‘quick success. -He felt that: in the: long’ run; O ~ : The Attorney General, .adkriéwledging’ that he had not geen all of . the reports; ‘said ‘that in his Opinion the present situation: ‘makes no’ : os sense to him on the face of. it. -The situation in Vietnam is not-com- could be brought off: promptly... The situation now is no different than that of four-months ago when the generals were not. able-to organize a- coup. _To support a coup would be. putting the future of ‘Vietnam and in-fact all. of Southeast. Asia ini.the hands of one man not now known to us... Diem will not run from a fight or- quit under ‘pressure. .A failure of a. coup risks so. much. .The reports ‘we have ‘are very thin-and the information about the assets which:the rebel generals have at their commant is limited. .We have a right to-know — . what the rebel generals" are ‘planning. - We can"t go half way. “If‘the coup fails, . ‘Diem will throw. us out. .If'we send out the ‘draft. cable. as -it. stands, it will appear that we are.in favor- of'a coup and. only “> want more inforzation.: IMy -view is the. minority views! , ‘Secretary. Rusk ‘replied that: if we. say: we are not for: a ‘coup, * then the. -coup-~. ~minded military- leaders. will turn. against us: and:the war. effort , an will drop off rapidly. | : coup would: slow down :the.war- -effort because the new central 'govern- ment would be. ‘ihexperienced:: ‘In addition, all of the province’ chiefs’ appointed by" ‘Diem. would probably be replaced by a new government, ‘Director McGone- ‘said: ‘he agreed: with General Taylor. ‘The failure. of a coup. would. bea disaster: ‘and a succes ssful coup ‘would have: a harmful ‘effector ‘the. war effort. a . The President asked General: -Taylor. why. all the’ province chiefs. would be replaced. -He replied. that.as Diem appointeees they. would‘ be. loyal | to Diem, .and, therefore, . not. trusted by the rebel generals. ‘who had ‘overthrown: ‘Diem. oe ra if the Diem’ government continued, the war effort would. go. down. hill, Mr.. Harriman: said: it. was clear. that in Vietnam there. was-less and less enthusiasm: for: Diermn;* “We. cannot predict. that the rebel generals. i “TOP SECRET
team tee we me ee weet . TOP SECRET a a ae can overthrow the: Diem government, put Diem cannot ' ‘carry ‘the - country to victory over the Viet Cong. . With :the passage of time, ; “Your objectives “in Vietnam Will beconié nisré and imiore difficult: tom rer coeteens ‘achieve with Diem in’ ‘control. . The President. said. it appears that the -pro-. and. anti- Diem military forces are. about equal. .If this is so, any attempt io. -engineer.a. coup hs silly, - If. -Lodge agrees with this point of view,. then. we should.in- a struct-him t to discourage. a coup. — ; oe » Mr.: McGeorge ‘Bundy ‘said. the most unfortunate development would be. a: © three-day civil war in Saigon, . The.time remaining for -us-.to ingtruct ‘ . Lodge is very. short. = If a military plane were sent to pick: up. Lodge... _the Ambassador ‘could. i stay: slonger ‘in Vietnam during the uncertain. days immediately. ahead. is Fe la tte eebene he nee epee ey a entnenh 9H vO cae o ' Ve wm treme wre ert nee rar te ome pe em ee By . "Secretary, McNamara thought that we. ought ‘to leave - it “up. to* ‘Ambas gador - Lodge! when he would leave. Saigon. for:Washington.«. In: Commenting. on the draft cable, he ‘said ‘he thought: Lodge would: read. it as a. change of. ‘signals, © ‘Lodge now believes:that he -is- not to, ‘thwart-a, coup. ‘The draft instructs him-to call. in General Harkins, . which: would ‘be- difficult: to do. : in view of.the- fact: that. ‘Lodge is not now keeping: -Genéral.Harkins. vine? - formed of developments. : The Ambas sador ‘should be. ‘givens san option. to delay his return if he wishes. ‘ - “The. President asked: what + were. Lodgets’ existing - instructions”. In reply, vs Secretary Rusk read: a. paragraph ‘from the ‘October. ‘5. telegram. pores The: ‘President agreed to ask Lodge. what he: thought: he- ought to do about — returning-to Washington. . Mr. -McGgor ge Bundy. said. the: e working: group | to would rewrite. the draft cable. me cw a = ween sane perenne * | ; Bromley Sinith’ a _. a 4 . . . oe «TOP SECRET “