¢) Summons vo ‘ 07T) Even assuming that. Castro did ascertain -the -existencé of th: CIA-organized crime plots and , 1 that the CIA sponso -e@ them and ignoring the eae sibs. belief that Roselli fabricated the retaliation ‘theory, : 1k i) 54544 the Cameni eens pide doskiehapsenc ciety unlikely that Castro would have Er: sorted to assassinating the President of the United States in retaliation for the reasons indicated ii the AMLASH portion of the Issue . Analysis section. ‘ specifically, these reasons are: 1) the prosp :ct of exposing Cuba to ‘invasion. ind destruction would not have been wort the risk; 2) the act oO: changing a. leader does not necessarily change the system; . 3). Castro maz have recognized that among * : the leade-s of the United eiateesMenneay my b free '-maintainei the least hostile approach towards Ciba; and -4) the growi 1g prospect of detente between Cuba and =he United States would have. refrained Castro from assassinating an American official. 4. Related O ganized Crime Achivities (9 The Committee reviewedAevidence that dg raises the possibility that various organized crime. fad Ws. eo, figures involved in attempts: to assassinate Castro4were Life AS of th unrelated to the’CIA. .
a) Ngumam a (9s) To ascertain .wore information about organized crime's knowledge avout Castro assassination plots, _the Committee inves :igated Norman Rothman,who was active in operating variou; casinos in Cuba before the Castro takeover and who co :sequently maintained associations. with organized crim: and the Batista regime. (18) At various tives, Rothman served as manager ‘of the Sans. Souci and topacabana Clubs in Cuba ‘representing ee. the interests of th: Mannarino brothers of Piktsburghog (2) FBI. files: on: tothman indicate that a ‘proposal to kill Castro wan saat to Rothman as a "quid pro quo" in which Rothman ex ected to avoid imprisonment for a 1960 gun running sonviction? During an FBI interview, Rothman stated. that he had been in "personal contact with White House at-orney Harry Hall Wilson, as well as Assistant Attorn 2y. General John SSdgenthaler,. both of Washington, D.C. ' and members of the Kennedy Administration: © . (2 Ina deposition to the Committee taken in, Miami on April 16, 1978, Rothman expanded on thd dS theme to include a series of’ mysterious telegrams sommoning him to th: White House. for a series of two or three meetings & wieeh began in Attorney General . rag aR tae 2S ie = Ae ss
Kennedy's office wi-:h members of his staff and \\ / continued in a conf:rence room where Rothman's assistance in provi ling contacts inside Cuba was q explored. At the list meeting Rothman says that: "one of them lappened to discuss /the assassinatioi of Castro/with me, but not in a technical way. You know, just ina casual way. That is about it. I cannot for the momeit remember it word for word because it is too far back." Ay Ge) evidence Suggest ing such an approach: by Robert Kennedy is entirely uncorroborated and makes no sense when viewed in light of the Justice Department crack~ down on organized ccime. Further, it seems extremely: doubtful that any r2eting with Rothman on this topic would have occurreé at the White House. Consequently, ~ 1s : Any he Sommibtoo-bebie ves it*highly unlikely’ that smenelc Sah NOL & a event, coourred. oh Neuere tints bekzvear the Binet. Ord Au CLA oC ~ i) The Committee also’ reviewed eaence which Chon Opandbens, indicates ‘that orge nized crime may have been aware of the AMLASH operaticn during its existence. ( 6) The IS8F IGR identified three name links between the AMLASH operaticn and the organized crime operation. The _IGR did not sui ficiently analyze, however, \that the common denominze tor .in two of the links was Santo Trafficante.—
§) Link Link One - (i Wp ‘In March, 196 ., the CIA received information oth neal high- ranking military figure. in the Castrd regime and a former personal secretary of Castro q “ -Rereir wished to defect The military officer was. AML” SH paste Ne SH engity and the former the Cartan officias, Secretary was ARE 4 used in Phase. I of ‘the CIA-crganized crime plots. As already . revealed indicated, the 57 IRG documents/that Trafficante | re- tha Coban ¢ Sicvae ° cruited bran ” ; . fy ge) The Cammisiee- hae~detonmined thre @ther than the Cuban ofCiceal - the coincidence of Loth Guia Vand AMLASH seeking infiltration at the same time there is nothing to suggest a relations ip between the two men-in attempting Germ vo Exists am to assassinate Cast: Os agupae ecommon denominator gia Trafficante, Rosell. ’ Giancana or any other members ; of the American gam ling syndicate. This link is Themefere insignific ant.. a) Link Two © (2) in mid-March, 1965, Rafael Garcia Bongo, a agesm Cuban lawyer whose |.rother occupied the prestigious ; anne position of Ministe:.of Sports in Cuba, contacted*CIA
Statdion-persenneb=i eMadeid- to inform the agency that "he was in con cact with | a group of military : 24° officers. who were planning to kill Castro™ (Origa a pe It quickly became clear to. CIA a , ‘ AMLASI+ ; employees that Bong>'s reference was to Guida and the group of military m2n who were allied with him in ‘attempt- ~ Rofl - ok (te Te ing to depose Castr>. Although the Tee- and + Eiaammg 2A GUAR Gy, Repe@ews are: silent ORGS ERE attitude toward. Bongo! Ss le PY information, it must be assumed that ehexp did not respond affirmative ly since the AMLASH operation was. ‘ in progress, at. ‘the time and Artime was in the process | : Cuban oC GdaL! g of delivering arms: saches to Gebettests people within Cuba. (47) Interestingly, ‘Bongo identified himself to Agency imho Ceprese ie Sor Person a lawy 21am - ‘the Capri Hotel and: Casino 19.GdA, in Havana ;who had L2en jailed in July, ee="tor a period of 75 days, allegedly as a_reprisal for. _ representing Santo [rafficante. . Bongo's ‘utilization of the short prisor term to establish his ."bona fides” slAr Rebel : is “questionable, ae. Trafficante was ‘in jail during, . ee aay wh gta? ao ‘August, 19595" For the Cuban government to wait ~Sameg ~. years to exact ret: ibution for. that representation -isas rn > . Possibly, Bongo was involved in approaching - Seems unlikely ce
the Castro governme it in 1962 on Trafficante's behalf for permission to reopen the Capri casino. {i7) © One aspect of the Bongo- Trafficante relationship ‘eaettnoera- deserves ‘uller treatmentpaithough Its | As already indicated, ‘it has secret source until his death, John Roselli, had reason to speculate ‘that ¢ wanstoFTginaliy Wecruiteghoy” “Santo | Trafficante to kill Castro were “turned around" and sent back to the United States where they were directly involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. rf this line of hyp sthecation is adgpted, then the -. 5. other trip tesiitimak by Bongo could assume implications such as the possibility that Bongo's
- teeieeier to contact the Agency. - Given ; C £4 real purpose in con :acting the Madwie=SGtearien was to act'as a double igent for Castro in ascertaining , . : ag the nature and scop: of the AMLASH operation. Castro pices Bee ierersse . a Casbebrby became awire of the Artime meetings with BIDLAS HA a in the fall >f 1964 since the list of charges AIMLAS/ Se upon which Gubeda went to trial in 1966 began with these Maderd meetins. If£-Castro had begun his AIMELRS tle . suspicions of aaairre sal with the CIA during late 1964 or early 325, it is likely that he would have begun counter-.ntelligence measures to confirm his fears which could hive led to Castro sending Bongo on the taap ey -bHhe o reloaimShe | combe=Berge, it -can be postulated that fialdl fa cdege . Trafficanteawas-awa-e of Bongo’s. true mission prior to. his departure or‘became knowledgeable wke eee a4
{Bd (a2) heey. givin the extent of Trafficante's “high-level contacts within the exile community and the low-level secur ty in the CIA exile operations, ; want : . it is enesemely log cal that Trafficante and other members of the unde -world knew, in some fashion, ‘part or all of the \MLASH plot. The question becomes: So what? | Short of being able to blackmail the government abou: the modus operendi of the 1960-62 events, the signifi :ance of mob knowledge of AMLASH is not readily appa: sent. Bet (193) 1\trafficant » was a double agent, ‘working for the CIA but actual ’ supplying information to Castro, then another scenario emerges. It is then logical | to assume that Cast-o knew of the AMLASH ‘and CIA- organized crime ope ations from their inception. __ As mentioned ‘earlie:. in this material, Trafficante could have received a sanctuary and assistance in __ Smuggling contraban J for such information. As also fheS Knaadedh as. aeaé HO $F howe, discussed: | earliergé WNever). the - -Conmittee—betieves / : € contemporaneous’ knowledge ‘of ‘the plots } would @
’ anducalia ort an (nr —_ a pee eee omen at mene ane tse tase Ate? _ Nike . AR see 4 f the ee of the pfchy’ a) . - ADS AS -2 TT i to neutralize eas ‘iain wConsequently, atin W had  Cammit. tee be) jemmass hnatiany contacts between Woduke henéeessaer' AMLASH and . Bongo Poxconc g nota effect the: wuntenabi lity od e bugs: whey of the retaliation heory, thee ee hee peer? Ex x . ble - abuse te c) Link thre: , - (a5) mast b ove, inked bo mole Be The. ssc Renee | that information contained in the rere EOReeaFGR from "A," the possibility tha: a link existed between the AMLASH operations aid the (1960- 62 CIA plots a ie, assassinate Castro ising underworld contacts? Se ere, (iA) A review of; 1e TEER. EMart does not ack cD bee ao sustain ihe geste S conjecture, & bhere is no- Tek, however, cited in the Repos to suggest ‘that. "A" 260.2 Wss2 uarndnadas had knowledge of, ' or involvement with, available evi dence any of the syndicate. or Cuban .exiles who participated in Phase I or II -of the * meke Yo: CIA~Mafia assassination plots during 1960- 62. = thy : Zoek 's ms ize upon the comes tentative 7 4A tlhe Lye identification of “name links" between the 1960-62 organized operatior and AMLASH intrique, and expand
the amorphus nature of those "name links," which . a0 Gat & possi$he Se ened included "Ar " Ty theory that "A" was the * conduit through whi ch the Syndicate became knowledgeable of both the AMLASH »peration and the initial CIA efforts to eliminat: Castro. ; Poe — such a nexus (97) the only seni! REWSERD basis for Bask EDa- Gh between AMLASH aid the 1960-62 CIA syndicate plots . “AC's -. exike is based upon Veete =Pspenesetecaitkbo activities ae aoe in June-July 1963, Asta nis involvement wit. anti-Castro exiles and "underworld figures” who were c perating the guerilla training camp in New Orleans in ‘July 1963. (142) The "“underwor id figures" reference relates to Michael and Willian Ncbaney, who have been considered organized crime affiliates by some law enforcement and media personnel, BB mis) Again, however, no ethan ch Ha. evidence from any source places(McLaney“ into the early - CIA plots to kill Castro.or into the AMLASH operation. “A review of the Jure-July 1963 activities of McLaney . - » td . . - and @iaees=mepinest- lead only to the inference that
‘their operation was a private limited venture with no.agency or s ‘ndicate support and very little chance of success. c : XN : : (194) Since the Senite did not azeempiiays. interview ‘ . AY either of the McLan2y brothers or Va $ - OD nor ask princi vals of the’ 1960- 62 plots of their u knowledgebor relat onship to McLaney or “fomieeey the~ Aut SKlidna sdbysmtinthe 2 question of a Kadeteage of the full range oc: CIA Castro plots ‘oo based “epon a f Hie, & Dont amanttn ot ileeenecting > sheeting Riiphévidence’ Link! LAOS ized Partial Sal, crime—tigures consistsof uss ‘Bdmission to being friends with "Cappy " Rothman, Norman Rothman's son, if ‘3 pa of al eee PRET and pacasual knowle dge of American gamblers cadens ysits fo faane. Cadi ner studendeentz from his
Mike McLaney': ties to organized crime,‘have . ad ase domed within federal law enforcement agencie:. since ‘the 1950! ‘Ss Kay No solid : fRrtneyy evidence, has linked him to Trafficante, Roselli or. , Poe 4 LA te : Giancana, sees) Mc! ney has been most frequently heey baie Meyer ; goku, a honk bE hw mentioned deeor "Lan ky-ifaage> To @basee2e Boy /\ prin ee ta the : McLaney far theA19 0-62 plots, ea requires a series ok ; phurdles whieh include: vd ria)? Meye Lansky was a plotter with '. Draft ‘icante, . (B) McLa.ey was Lansky's "action" man; and Vv (B) the sarious underworld figures acted 4a. in concert in abe anti- Castro Y oper ‘tions. Bol) : ; hese premi ses any arejeasily supporta ale with facts, ae Gonsequently, Aaeeah. Hicwe | is Ao ove et Ra +o § Seaport fhe vie Qn oft. - Deatas of Jase tli and Dancaun: C 30> As indicated :arlier, both Sam Giancana and John Roselli were mardered$ Sam Giancana was shot in the basement of iis home in Chicago in June, 1975,. just prior tc his. scheduled testimony before the SSC regarding tne CIA organized crime plots,
John Roselli'’s butciered body was found inside ‘an-oil drum which wis floating in Key Biscayne Bay, Florida in Augist, 1976 ) whixshexnas shortly after his testimony before the SSC regarding the CIA- organized crime plo:s.. . pS (203) Various theor es have surfaced concerning why they were kille i. and who was responsible. One theory relevant. to :his investigation is that Giancana ‘and Roselli ‘were killed because of their participation in the Castro assassination plots and the ssc attempts to elicit informati>n on the plots. _In this regard, Trafficante has most often been the person assigned responsibility for the deaths. On the other hand, the Justice Department informed the Committee that it believes that organized crime performed the Low - _ The as , murders and—-tret—th 2 reasons were unrelated to the CIA~ organized crime ple ts APL (2.04) The Justice [apartment is still’ investigating — both murders. The committee has not uncovered evidence ae ane Bulihiay, relevant to solvinc these murders. ‘She=@ensmicseee oats 2 however, that a variety of motivations inspired the deaths: These motivations included internal mob conflict, especially in the case of Giancana, and participation and knowledge of the CIA-
Gos) ¥— organized crine plo: Ss. Thevcommeccee-constuers Lt 1S tha Trafficante approved of and assisted in ‘the muri erg of niedreomae. John Roselli. aoucel : Trafficante' s motiv.. tion ~weazkd have been to maintain a low profile in co:mection with the CIA plots and to prevent disclosue of other unknown persons involved in the plo .s as well as other operations and activities whic an investigation of the plots “Tn 5 mean fat might uncover. The Cemeabttese._does not balked such activities wer: necessarily connected to the assassination of. Pre: :sident Kennedy. atahed to prottick ‘Trafficante may hav : Apa covert relationship with Castro eS may have entailed his running contraband through Cuba into t 1e United States. GO 0) CC (pe... although the deaths of Roselli afe ¢ and Giancana Shakes ateenne related the CIA-organized » ‘rime operations, thepneorEnetoe : eae are wat necessepe NK ilieriguds iret ermeame related to the - assassination of P -esident Kennedy.
ane concealing es. Reactivation Soa Seem Continuation Gf ize ahaa i ssassination Plots @eam ee nee § DPASSiMacion PLotcs Team Attorney General Robert FP, Kennedy . " pusin geathemcou unsenobaits: e: amination of the CIA' ‘Ss use of otonized Crrme . . the ree in assassination cons] iracies against Pas mame Castro, evidence “Scems to mdicatir, thoes emcee the Commbbteerhasabecntarsmne: sayeth Agency Graconceakmentao& the continuation of those plots in 1962 and 1963 from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. — cNnee tated in, ection TL, Pout B, S08 ‘AS wasnsisnasit. detaiskedminat! enSenatesSelectmCommikkeenan - Intelikigencenflepontsonstheselte ndermondamndenabhety Attorney General Kennedy had been told’o: the pre- Bay of Pigs phase of the plots during a CIA briefing ‘on lay: 1, 1962. P67 ; ‘Rather ‘than . the CIA volunteering this inforr.ation about the existence of such. plots, the meeting had come abou t when Attorney General Kennedy had inadvertantly learned that the (IA had secretly. utilized the services of former. FBI Agent Robert Mahe) and Chicago Mafia leader sam Gian-~- Aad. ramped? cana a year ‘earlier. 260 | we spherGnanGiancanay -- Mesneugeonnes etkon during the cou) se of a wiretap prosecution against Maheu; -a prosecution’ the Agency had warned might "result in most aa. embarrassment to the u s. _ government. " AEG Goi) During the wsiahisiney brief: ng ofsithennsommmGenensieemttag Voss CIA officials Sheffielc. . Edwards and Lawrence Houston in- forned. . Kennedy about the Agency S use ‘of the underworld ina 1960- 196i plot’ to assassinate Castro As the CIA's own evidence and il.ternal records ‘of the pilots has shown, as well as the Senate Comittee's investigation of the matter, ' Edwards and Houston told Attorney General Kennedy that the assassi- nation efforts against Castro hd “begun during the Eisenhower Admini- stration, had climaxed at the t me of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and "had been terminated completely “ 24 ee he es NW 47055 - Docid: 32273547 Page 114
(us) yet, as the CIA and Senate evidence makes clear, and as the & Or anited Ccime Committee's investigation has ccnfirmed, the CLAZMéifiia plots were actually being reactivated and intensified at the very time that Agency officials were ‘telling Attorney General Kennedy that they EGER. had been “terminated. A 273 jn the esiicoiaseinsnecionGonenaisks Repo eae EATON PITS, Gt was noted that % The Attorney General vas not told that the _gambling syndicate (assassination) « peration had already been re- activated, nor, as far as ve know, was he ever told that CIA had a continuing involy ement with U.S. gangster elements . 2H ey, While “noting the accuracy znd veracity of the preceding Tee, : conclusion from 1 the ESTAS TEC SEN 3 ‘other stat ements in the mae Stree paran Seen i nabuy, “erAle ‘that seem attempt to. justify, excuse, or’ even. deny. the Rgemeyas - concealment of ‘this important hi formation about the plots “from Attorney General Kennedy have _ een ductuntvig. | () Lawrence Houston, the CIA': former general counsel, testified , “in ee that Attorney General Ke: nnedy had voiced strong anger over ‘the & Seforops use of the Mafia diving his briefing by Edwards “and. Houston on May 7, 1962.° PYEe Louston, who testified that while Edwards: was familiar with the P: ots, he (Houston) was not, stated ‘that Kennedy had specifically 3: dered that he be personally notified before the’ Agency | ever consider: d utilizing’ organized crime ‘figures again. ya Houston testifies "IE you have: ever seen Mr. _ Kennedy's eyes ‘get steely and h Ss, jaw set and his voice get low ana precise, you get a definite feeling of unhappiness. ° “222 "Houston testified that Kennedy had stated, “y trust that. if you ever try to do business with or janized crime again ~ with gangsters . you will let the Attorney Gener il know.” 270 Former Office of. 7 Security Director Edwards similirly testified that Kennedy had demanded, "I want you to_ let me know about these things.” BIg (16) TER a (a3) In the IrspeetenGenesei's apart on-thepists belo it was noted that “Attorney General Kennedy believed that | ‘asa result NW 47035 Docld:32273547 Page 115,
- ; ; ; re 105 ” | ae | A of the méeting, he would be tolc of any such future actions contemplated by the Agency. The Inspector General concluded, - oy "From reports of the briefing, :t is reasonable to assume that Kennedy believed he had such a «ommitment from Agency represent- atives." 28d et. Bbstuchingdychowewer, “the “nspector General's Report then wwe) went on to conclude, that Edward: haa “probably acted properly" in concealing knowledge of the ‘ eactivation and continuation of “the Mafia plots from Robert F. _Lennedy. The CIA Report stated: | ‘The gambling syndicat:. operation had been taken . / from him, and, in retrospect, he probably acted properly - in briefing the Attorney G-neral on only that aspect of the operation for which he had been responsible and of which he had direct, pérso:ial knowledge. a (a's) One page later in the Repo:-t, the inspector General went on to state; hay "the Attorney Ge ieral on 7 May 1962 was. given a “Full and ‘frank account of the Ayency" Ss. relations with ‘Maheu, Roselli, and ‘Giancana in the Ca stro operation o 2 oe” Pod om in the Inspec :or General's Report, the- official - Cevonstrate a lack of qcad faith. Agency document on the. “CIA-Mafi: assassination conspiracies, The | statement that Edwards “probably acted properly" in concealing. tie continuation of the murder plots is _rn 5 Needs and vine xeuaadle - from ctorney General Kennedy i Aaotashs omrsrsike — description of oo , oo Also the briefing on May 7, 1962 as “full and frank" is gimishasbigs “Further, the & ssp ‘untruthful, in light of the reastivation and continuation of the. plots Gage under the direction of Deputy Director Richard Helms, CIA agent William Harvey, and vaifia leader John Roselli. oreern InSPECEO CE TERT EEN TONCISOD chasobanatantnobshiuasichedapeopeny " {nmrpehtedsdmmemcnobedgnnofntn “This Nhe Mnank : whem Tonsidewnd CenemaineRe SSE Saker ay is all the more disturbing iguana be eeoinentrines ée6 that the Inspector. General's Office knew that Edwards’ own assistant was then still involved in the plots, with Edwards’ 23 — personal knowledge - ABS a5 (ie tee Inspector Genera also "8st amarante rennet b mate (eae Fea knew that Edwards had. personally Drépared a fraudulent ‘internal NW 47055 Bocld: 32273547 Page 116 . _ i vee eee ae ne tnteens meow omen Cues rpeuepnemenenere a Pee ae eaege inne are Lr Sates te ee ee
memorandum for the files, in which he |falsely\stated }that the assassination plot and utilization of John Roselli was being dropped. Bay - “Tr ¢ @\a 3 ed The implications. of the ups BeGkounGonemalaisntsD conclusions about. the adequacy and propriety of Sheffield Edwards and ‘Lawrence Houston's May 1962 briefing of 7ttorney General Kennedy are serious. The Inspector General's Office vas chearly cognizant! of the fact that Edwards had withheld - and thereby concealed ~ the continuation of the plots from Robert Kenned,, and more importantly, that this ‘concealment of information concc rning the Mafia maxrder plot was in direct disobedience’ to the Atto) ney General's: personal direction: “Spthe COMIETES TIGHT SIGH Glas agua dicoboyal of, the Attorney © General's orders to be: of utmosi ‘seriousness, particularly in hight of the gravity and nature. of the operations in Cr . the Reaueomilafia assassination ylot: ‘from Attorney General Kennedy uestion. plang Fhe concealment of tl.e reactivation and continuation of ~ and hence, . in all likelihood President Kennedy - was gimme 1S ‘serious. @1 ope. the Inspector General’ s a ‘apparant endorsement and justif. cation of. such ‘concealment in 4 leo obtgreny: the Report prepared for Directo: Helms” an 1967, is even-more~ass- taming. TICULL Seng : . - (ev The Agency' s total withholting of information pertaining to . the CIA~Mafia assassination’ att mpts from the Warren Commission (which-never—asked_abowt-sach™m rtters~in 2964) becomes all the more — ~ HHenterreblee— Tieblioo feashromainke, when the. withholding of _the same matters: £xom the Attorney CAM Gaottnteh + General (who did ask for: such i formation in 1962) is “CSERE Tnat the Se two Seperate witnnol lings and concealments may have been DP asrectay connected is a possibi ity the Committee believes cannot t | . be dismissed , : SA a if: a ai) While the propriety ahe_he resty-of these Agency actions in 1962 and 1964 inust be seriously questioned, the judgments and =m ee statements of: the Kittirmimares:® ref just as seriously. As the most important embodiment of internal en eeapernlert errr CeETe CHIR must be weighed checks and balances within the \gency, the Inspector General's Office is intended to serve the function of conducting official internal reviews and investigations of potential wrongdoing and iy Page a7 rat car seat ermine escent eee nasbe PHNGD 2 NAUK IERIE TDI RN VAC TEE LN oh le 0 fi ane EET EE oN al de ean ty ee ee
in anal abuses WktiekorstheSenam The fing ngs and judgments of the Inspector , General have long been integral to the continuing integrity ana well being of the Agency's “Be «tions and activities. hase ConbbhLeeshassioundepantkeudans Sénstuching’the judgments reached by the Inspector General in 196° regarding the propriety of - ss oy : ; ; ie gt os Sheffield Edwards’ actions in tle briefing of Attorney General ot Jt . bomenatictininted the paccbiey oF te Oso Kennedy about the assassination plots in May of 19624 To state in.1967 that Edwards had “probal ly acted properly” in withholding the important information that le did, and to characterize the . : May 7th briefing as "Full and f1 ank,”" ‘xcepresents a mistake in judgement, and-departure—from_tri thfulness—as—serivus—as~any—the— Comni-ttee-has—found_in—its—inver cigation-of-the-compkemseniesaatm CTR-assassination-piotsy gG6Bis cum Grete former Director Richard Helms has ee described 2 : . : | Keb "not, + 2 » Very maven yS 4.2 Olols tlangalves , itis tines Gomumes zi POMEMG aarods sehen “The views and conclusions reached in the 1967 Irspector General's Report do not ne- ; i _ cessarily reflect the judgment about such matters by present j Tt sheukd be agency officials. tom Tatra ober Gonmighrere nu or) decries cob e | / 4 ay . that a principal auther of the 1967 Report has served as : Ss . g Lye, . - . . Na iO 4 pbawens eee Agency's official liaison to the Committee during the ! \ —_ course of its investication, coordinating Agency activities / \ , and responses relating to the investigation of President LS Kennedy's death. - BO . NW 47055 DoeTa:32273547 Page 118
A. (22 Dy (222) (24) . Iv. ‘Ll. 2. 3. 4. OOK my Sh i Sct hae 7 a eee ee CONGLUSIO? S™ AMLASH OPERATION There iF THE-COMMEDH BoBEHDS NO EVIDENCE THAT. THE AMLASH OPER TION PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO ' TO ASSASSINI TE PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. pony Phen ts trbuthiewct, @rrdonce THR-COMMELT! SHAS NOR-BEBN@RBER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE AMLASH OPERATION PRIOR TO THE DEATH - OF PRESIDEN? KENNEDY CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS AN ASSASSIN? TION PLOT. "ASSUMING TH? T AMLASH WAS NOT AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND tinine CASTRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, SO oo! EeREBEEZES IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY © ~ THAT CASTRO WOULD HAVE BEEN PROVOKED IN A MANNER SUFFICIENT TO INDUCE ASSASSINATING PRESIDENT KI NNEDY IN RETALIATION. ASSUMING TH? T AMLASH WAS AN ASSASSINATION PLOT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY . AND THAT CA‘ TRO UNCOVERED ITS EXISTENCE AND SCOPE, ‘Tint < Po POPPRMES IT IS sTii UNLIKELY TH? T CASTRO WOULD HAVE RESORTED TO ‘| ASSASSINATH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN RETALIAT- ON. fh ANY KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART | OF ORGANIZED CRIME OF THE AMLASH OPERATION O01 ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURIS INVOLVED IN THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS AND AMLASH WOULD NOT ALTER THE CONCLUSION ‘HAT CASTRO WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSI! ATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY.
B. CIA-ORGANIZED C ‘IME PLOTS “hh 2 (225) 1. THE-eoRMe -wzmweERRS NO EVIDENCE THAT THESE wos OPERATION ; PROVOKED PREMIER CASTRO TO ASSASSINA''E PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN RETALIATION. , . ALAA oy | (2.26) 2. BHBeGeMMI: BERWRENBS NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT CAST 0 KNEW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THESE PLOTS DUR NG THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY? nixntaky arenes OF CASTRO DID LEARN OF THEIR EXISTENCE, “Hh tunel “hippeeceia Nata ORE oe CASTRO protably | WOULD HAV: SESE ESrEeaCONEEEN THEM BEE THE CTA. an . Aaicivered tees ASSUMING “'HAT DURING THE LIFE OF PRESIDENT 4 KENNEDY T IAT CASTRO DID LEARN OF THE EXISTENCE: | | OF THESE °LOTS AND THAT THE CIA WAS SPONSORING THEM, TEE GOMOHEeGRlboDOMERVES IT ISSUNLIKELY - THAT CAST <0 WOULD HAVE RESORTED ‘TO ASSASSINATING THE. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. (229) 3 . _4;, RRR = j THAT ORGANIZED CRIME '. WAS INVOL/ED IN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO INDEPENDE iT OF ANY CIA ee A , eaeteite ee (2.24) -5. ‘THESGpeMe PERe PREP URROPRNT ‘ae! PRINCIPAL : REASON WH’ ORGANIZED CRIME PARTICIPATED IN THE . ; PLOTS WAS TO STRING. THE CIA ALONG AND THUS FOSTER A ;SROWING RELATIONSHIP WHICH COULD : SUBSEQUEN (LY BE EXPLOITED TO PREVENT PROSECUTIONS - : : 7 OF THE OR;ANIZED FIGURES INVOLVED IN THE PLOTS. | (20) ce . . 6. | BeBe Cows epg? Baas JOHN ROSELLI’ USED : : THE FACTS OF THE CIA-ORGANIZED CRIME PLOTS TO FABRICATE THE RETALIATION THEORY IN. EFFORTS TO PREVEN’S HIS PROSECUTION IN LEGAL MATTERS. we, g *
st A Luton en Respont ON THE PLICBIHOMS OF THE c = C/A - Pra. L284 as ra
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A NA be al be HSCA Staff interview of Riciard Bissell, 12/15/78. Bed? 5. “Alleged Assassination Plot; Involving Foreign Leaders," p. 74 Da 4. HSCA Staff Interview of Riciard Bissell, 12/15/78. 522M, Ibid. . NAB A bia. oey p ae: ow Ibid. . Ted "Alleged Assassination Plots,” p. 102. 27 4 Ibid. at 69.. The 1967 Inspector General's Report took note of the leverage that those involved in the murdér plots had attained as a result of their association with the CIA. In one section of the Report (pages 128-129) titled, "Should we try to silence those who are telking or might later?" (emphasis theirs) the Inspector General's Office noted that one or more of the conspirators, most likely John Roselli, was then leaking information about the plots to newsmen Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. The Report discussed the possibility that Agency pressure could be brought to bear on Roselli and the others to preserve the secrecy of the past assassination plots. The Report went on to note that, "None of them-would have compunctions about dragging in his CIA.connection when he was .being pushed by law enforcement authorities." . ; Ibid. at 133. hia, rbid. HSCA Staff Interview of Richard Bissell, 12/15/78. "Alleged Assassination Plots,” pp. 84-85, 99-103. Ibid. at 100.° _ ) . Ibid. at 101. . Ibid. at 106. . Ibid. at 105. 4 , , Ibid. at 102. HSCA Staff Interview of Richard Bissell, 12/15/78.. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. ‘Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. - Ibid. ibid.
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Footnotes: Qi? a ‘eahwegedwassessind tomes: havolwinggbonehymeheadenss " REDOTH Of etch Om cnacromS ehecitea( onnistbhecuonwinte leh gene ered Ot Se ) Gi Ov Ibid. 5 or} 3. Ibid. «gO 7H Ibid. ° “pi “Sy Ebid.) ap74. “73,6 Ibid., aep132. -° yqyR% bid., st283-e4, 133. 3-74 78. ‘bid. #9133. The Inspector General sets forth Robert F. ‘ , Kennedy's partial knowledge «f the plots in a similiar manner in another section of the 19¢7 Report. In’an analysis of the newspaper column by Drew Peaison and Jack Anderson in 1967, in which it was stated that, "Rcbert Kennedy may have approved (the) plot," the Inspector General's Report disagreed with that statement. The Report stated: "Not truce. He was briefed on Gambling Syndi- cate-Phase One after it was cver., He was not briefed on Phase __ cs Two." ~.The Report went’ on -to state (pages 118-119) that Pearson = and Anderson had "a garbled -ccount of the role played by Robert “Kennedy.” | ; eo oat Ta, Mears VWepark, : eh AG Nihal a el ASsascinattenebhohs: imiodvingn Rove ionwheadersy! -p . 133. cr 0. Tia. “7? TR. Ibia. Le ems ~2 74 3. Ibid. 28D a4. r.oR., p. 64. 8 Zé ag. Ibid., ty64-65. 7 a . so i % _. - dA dE. Ibid, gfp.66.— Hedy atouns okays moana 1y | on BYE ba. rbid. MW 47055 Doold:32273547 Page 148