on “ Enclesure to TA~294 -65 5 April 1965 31. To help people's memories we will provide with each ballot @ separate sheet containing apprxtmately 100 names vith @ brief biography of each person, each of whom has taken part in various activities during the six years of exile. They will be from every aide of the political fence. If voters want to have someone who is not on this list, it isa their privilege. This is a free and in- aependent popular expression or election, if you want to call it that. .Perhaps'in about a week or so ve will buy a full-page in is Opinion (Spanish-language daily in Los Angeles] and explain the wiele procedure. Also, we're going to keep a barrage of radio announcements going, explaining to the Cuban people the importance of the election, giving out the names, doing everything possible to create enthusiasm for these elections. 32. Now, this is going to shock many people in New York and Miami, but we want to shock them because they don't seem to be doing anything at all. If, between now and the 25th of April, they get their heads together and do something similar, fine. All we want to do is get the ball rolling. Hopefully, they will do something similar. 33. Incidentally, I should mention that we are going to try in the next week, after we get everything straightened out, to contact someone in the larger US cities, Mexico City, Puerto Rico, Caracas, Madrid and Santa Domingo, which are big centers of Cuban exiles, and all the Central American republics. We're going to try to encourage elections simultaneously in each of these countries and in every city of the US. If we are capable in the next four weeks to get the ball rolling in all these centers of Cubans, then we will count the ballote that same day. If we can only have our own elections in the Western states on the 25th of April, then we | will place the sealed ballot boxes in safe-keeping and wait until the other cities have held their elections and then do the counting the same day. Otherwise, we might destroy the whole election if we indicated Celifornia's preferences. 34. Now, let's suppose that the elections have cone off beautifully throughout the whole world, with expressions from 200 to 300 thousand Cubans. What happens next? Well, those who have been elected are going to have to act because they have received a mandate I am sure they will regard very carefully. I can tell you now that the people elected who do not accept this mandate had better forget ahout going back to Cuba. The ~ 15 + Boge tA iede. . .. coe
ty Enclosure to TA-295 -65 5 April 1965 mext move is this: These people are guing to have to decide how they’re going to operate, and perhaps get in touch with the US State Department te ceteraine what is and what is not leyal, Perhaps they may have to go t0 a Central American country, perhaps to Panama, who knows? But the gost important thing ‘that I want you to know is that we are going t subait to the government of exiles or in exile a master plan for the liberation of Cuba. . 35. This master plan is siaple and we believe strongly in it. This government in exile or of exiles would have euch tremendous : authority vith the backing of perzaps 300 thousand Cubans that it would be strong enough to overcome the fears of the State Department. We believe that the American people would endorse this exercise of democracy right in their own yard by people who want to liberate their own country . I think that the people of the US, if properly informed, would probably want their government to help. I don't think that the people of the US would tolerate any opposition from the State Depart- ment unless it could prove that this was bad for the US. Knowing the influence of American public opinion, we feel that this step will actually change the thinking of the people in State who at this tine may be opposed to this idea. 36. Now, if we are able to alter the thinking of the State Depart- went so that it will not oppose whatever [atin American countries may be disposed to help the exile woverent, then we come to the final stage of our thinking and our reason for creating this government of exiles in exile. The flnal stage is simply this. The government of exiles or in exile, or at least its President and its equivalent of Secretary of State, perhaps, should visit each of the heads of government of the following republics: Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, and the free associated State of Puerto Rico, The exile group should discuss with the heads of these 10-Caritbean countries a plan for organizing in each an arny or a brigade which hopefully would be composed of ‘three elements: Cubans, local citizenry and local ailitary nen. 37. The Cubans of military age would come from all over to get uilitary training at bases provided in one of these 10 countries. We think that the Cuban element would number approximately 50 thousand Cubans of military age who would be distributed throughout these 10 countries. Then we would have the local citizenry, the youth of these 10 countries, who would like to participate in this Army of the Caribbean, not to fight Castro for the sake of the Cubans, out for their own safety and for their own countries. Castro has proven hiaself a menace to the internal security of every country in the Caribbean -- Venezuela igs the @' yao tars ye t! N ara _? ® v
14-00000 PS) most glaring exauple. The youngsters in these countries, vitn a sense of patriotism and adventure, should provide another 50 thousand wen to be trained with the Cubans in tris ring of stee] around the in the Caribbean would be volunteers free the regular army of each of these countries provided we could work things out with their owm governments so that they would not jase either their citizenship, position or reputation by reason of weiunteering for this arny of the Caribbean. 38. Now come the big questions -- Who is going to pay for all this? Who is going to supply the ammmition? Or the military hard- ware? Or the armada necessary for an iavasion of Cuba by an arny that may have between 150 thousand and cA) thousand men. he believe . Caribbean, Then, the cost important part of this army of iiveration — that the Cuban Government of exiles or in exile can make arrangenents with each of these countries to provides tases, nilitary facilities, training areas, military advisors, food, and housing for that part of the liveration force in that country. If one or another country is not financially able to do this I az sure that once the arny begins to form, the bases working and the training started, there would. be a move throughout all of Aperica, north, central and-south, to raise funds for Cuba's liberation. i's sure that millions would be available. 39. The next question is military sardvare. I'm afraid Uncle Sam, directly or indirectly, 1s the onir source of supply that we can look to. We would like to keep Uncie Saa out of any inter- national involvement and let this be essentially a movement by latin Americans for [atin American purjeses. Eovwever, there should be nothing to keep the US from supplying these legitimate govern- ments with whatever arms they request, The latcer, in turn, could make these arus available to the brisades being trained in each country. I believe the US Government is as anxious to eradicate Communism from America as it is from Southeast Asia, and certainly, it can find a way to supply hardware to these 10 inter-American armies within completely normal inter-scovernment transactions. There need be no direct contact between the US Government and the Cuban exiles. 40. Once this army is trained there's always the possibility Castro might be assassinated, or other American plans might be put into cperation, or if the Cubans inside cr Cuba do it themselves, well, then the battle is won. In that hargy event, we will dis- santle this operation and return to Cuns. If none of these things happen, and ‘the army goes ahead, then tne way I see it is this. I doen't honestly think that this army oF l:beration will ever have ae 4 ~~.
Enclosure to LA-29h -65 5 April 1965 land in Cuba as an invading army. I believe that when this army is ready to pounce, the people around Castro will tell him they don't think they should be there any longer. Then we'll see either Castro fly out of Cuba or have his head blown off by his own men, wost of whom would rather be heroes of the revolution and save what ‘they can. In my opinion, this would end the affair, but if it doesn’t, then the army of liberation will have to invade Cuba and go abl-out. This is the way I see it and .this is about _ the end of it. 31. I think I should point out at this stage that the elections we are preparing are completely different from the ones conducted for RECE. The RECE plan presented a package of five wen to the Cuban people on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and I think many people resented this. There vere no alternatives. Ours is different. Ours is a completely blank ballot. The voter can choose anyone he wants, even his mother-in-law. Go I think the people will react favorably. h@, I think before ending I would like you to hear the words of Dean Rusk when he spoke at a Los Angeles World Affairs Council luncheon at the Beverly Hilton Hotel on Sept. 18, 1964. I asked hin from the floor if the State Department was grooming RECE for a government in exile. At that time I really thought this was happen- ing since RECE people had been so secretive about their activities in Washington. Rusk seid, “Well, I don't want to probe the future unduly in this current situation but there are some tough problems about a government in exile that we should keep in mind. In the first place, Cubans outside of Cuba have not been strongly united and there are a considerable number of divergent groups, and my under- standing is that they have not yet been able to come together with the degree of solidarity that would speak with authority on such @ point. Then one must bear in mind also the attitude of the people who remain in Cuba and what their attitude toward such leaders might be. Nor what would be their role to play in any future development on the island. Third, I would like to emphasize that it is of the greatest importance to us to deal with the Cuban question on as broad a hemispheric basic ag possible. We made great strides in the last year or two in moving in -~16- teen er yf toe ree