(2) The Testimony of Gordon Gray Gordon Gray testified that he had no conversa-. tions with Richard Bissell or anyone else pertaining to assassination plans. (3) The Testimony of Walt Rostow Walt Rostow testified that he did not have any recollection of having any discussions with Bissell pertaining to any attempt at assassination plots. (4) The Interrogation of the Phase I Case Officer The case officer stated that he had been told that the project had been approved by Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, but he (the case officer) had no knowledge of whether or not there had been any discussion or approval from the White House. (5) The Interrogation of Colonel Edwards Edwards said that he believed the plans were developed by Bissell and that he was "sure that there were not" any people in the White House that knew about these plans. He also said that he did not know of any attempt of plans to assassinate people other than Fidel Castro. (6) The Testimony of McGeorge Bundy McGeorge Bundy said that he was never aware of any ''actual decision" to go about seeking to assassinate any foreign HW 53244 Docld:321127270 Page 33 AMWddIT GHOI *Y GIwuaS FHL woua AdODOLOHA
leader. However, he said that he did ''have a vague recollection of the existence or the possible existence of contingency planning in this area. Iam sorry to say I cannot help you much with details about it because I can't fish them out of my memory, but I could not exclude that there were contingency plans, and a contingency capability of some sort, or plans for such a capability at some time.'' He said that he did not’ know of any case where plans went beyond the con- tingency {stage ‘and I know of no such authorization or any involve- ment by anybody in the White House staff or anybody else, for that matter." When asked whether or not he ever heard any discussion concerning a plot or plan to assassinate Cuban leaders, Bundy replied, "Not that I can remember...I certainly cannot exclude the possibility that you could have had the kind of discussion in which one or another individual would have said it would be, that there is a ‘possibility that thus and such a Cuban group, if landed and infiltrated, might have as one of its missions the following, which might have included an attack on one or another Cuban leader. Ido not have any directrecollection that this did happen, but I cannot exclude that it did happen."' NW 53244 Docld:321127270 Page 34 - AIVdAIT quod “a GIWagS FHL Wows KaODOLONa
Bundy testified that he did not know of any decision to go ahead and actually undertake a plan of assassination. ‘That contingent capability may have been authorized in this field I cannot - exclude, although I have no direct recollection of it. It is the decision to go ahead that Iam sure Ido not remember." Bundy said that he would have been "surprised" if any effort to assassinate a foreign leader had been undertaken without his approval as the President's Assistant for Security Affairs, and said that he himself would ''not have authorized anything of that kind without much higher authority than my own. I could not exclude that there would be communication with the President by other channels. Neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson always used any one channel," There was direct access of the Director of Central Intelligence to the President, according to Mr. Bundy. He said that based upon his experience, ''l would not have expected...the Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of a foreign leader without direct order from higher authority"... it did not happen in the time I was there... but I can conceive of the President saying to somebody, Ido not want to make this decision but giving some indication of the kind of decision he wanted made."! HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 35 AUVdAIT GYOd “HY ATWaaS AHL woud AdODOLOHd
(7) The Subsequent Interrogation of McGeorge Bundy After Mr. Bundy completed his testimony before the Commission, he contacted the Executive Director the next morning and volunteered that in thinking about the matter overnight "I have had a vague recollection, which I cannot pinpoint in time, that there was discussion that I knew about at some time of a proposal or scheme or project!’ in-relation to the Castro regime "that did involve poison, and the characteristic that sticks in my memory is that it would have involved a rather large scale use of poison and, as I recollect it, it never came anywhere near approval."' Proposals under the overall plan with regard to Cuba "which did come from time to time (mostly not with respect to assassination) were reviewed in the first instance for practicability and only after that for wisdom or political rightness, and I recall no proposal for liquidation that ever got past the first stage to the second." A memorandum of the interview with the Exec- utive Director was prepared the next morning to record these addi- tional comments. In this memorandum which was signed by Mr, Bundy and sworn to before a notary public in the form of an affidavit, Bundy said that "I simply have no recollection of plans" that "existed in January or February 1961" which involved the attempted poisoning of any Cuban leader. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 36 "I believe my memory tells me in a more general |, AAWdGIT GYOF ‘WY ATwugS FHL NOU AdODOLOHA
way that my knowledge of a scheme or idea of using poison probably relates to the year 1962." Bundy further stated: "J am absolutely certain that I never knew of or believed that there was any authorization to go ahead with an effort to liquidate Castro, or any other Cuban leader." With reference to his testimony concerning an executive action capability, Bundy said that ''I recall the words 'exec-~- utive action capability’ more clearly today than I did yesterday... but I do not have any recollection as to what I knew about that or who requested it or how much was done under it. I don't recall having any particular continuing interest in or information about that particular activity" which was "something like" a''plan to have some kind of stand-by capability for action against individuals. '! (8) Documents of the National Security Council On April 17, 1975, the Executive Director wrote AUVdGIT GuOdI °Y AIvuaO AHL NOY AdODOLOHA to the National Security Council requesting immediate access to all files and documents relating to the operations affecting Cuba and the Dominican Republic during the period 1960-1964 and in particular asked for access to the records of the National Security Council, the Special Group and the Special Group augmented. The request of the However, on May 9, the Executive Director was denied on May 9, 1975. National Security Council (NSC) purported to deliver to the Executive Directo HW 53244 Docld:3271127270 Page 3?T
all National Security Council documents in its possession which per- tained to the question of possible assassination attempts on the life of Castro or Trujillo. One of these documents was an excerpt from a paper on "United States Policy Toward Cuba''dated May 4, 1961 and prepared for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on May 5, 1961. are as follows: HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page 36 Paragraphs No. 79 and No. 80 from this excerpt 79. Castro. A political vulnerability of the regime lies in the person of Castro himself. It is not clear whether the regime could continue to operate for long without him. There is no question that the bureaucracy operates relatively freely, and probably makes many decisions without con- sulting Castro. However, it is equally certain that the Castro personality and his appeal to the Cuban people is an important element in maintaining popular support for the regime. If Castro were removed from the scene the regime might collapse for lack of this central rallying point. On the other hand, the bureaucracy may now be so firmly entrenched that it could function independently--although admittedly without the degree of popular support now enjoyed. Further, by using Castro as 4 martyr it might be possible to generate at least a temporary support for his successor. 80. A further possibility attendant upon the death of Castro would be the attitude of the PSP. The party would like to assume a moreopen and dominant role in the Cuban Government. Castro's death might force or encourage the party into a precipitate move to seize power... If this happened it would probably have an adverse reaction of Latin American opinion, though principally at the government level. a adIwugo AHL Wows AdODOLOHA AUWdAIT auor
Subsequently the Executive Director renewed his request orally and also in writing on May 22. On May 30, the National Security Council stated that it had completed a review of all records of the predecessor groups of the Forty Committee and trans - mitted some additional documents, although still denying overall access. Included in the copies of the documents transferred on May 30, 1975 were the following: (a.) Copy of the November 3, 1960 "Minutes of Special Group Meeting" attended by Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, General Cabell and General Lansdale. The last paragraph stated: "Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has. been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He avddIT duod °-a aiwugo aHL WOUd AdOOOLOHA conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously .% Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities." HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 39
(b) The remaining documents all related to 1964 and will be discussed in the concluding part of the section of the Statement of Facts pertaining to possible assassination plans directed against Premier Castro. je June 13, 1961 Taylor Report According to a June 13, 1961 paper, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed President-elect Kennedy in November 1960 at Palm Beach about the Bay of Pigs planning. The Taylor paper was prepared pursuant to an April 22, 1961 directiveiby the President to Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arley Burke and Allen Dulles for an overall analysis and study of governmental practices for military, paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity with special attention ''to the lessons that can be learned from recent events in Cuba.'! There is nothing in the June 13, 1961 Taylor report which specifically discusses assassination. However, during the time the study was being under- taken the aforementioned May 22, 1961, FBI memorandum was prepared and. sent to Attorney General Kennedy. k. Relationship of Phase I Plan with Bay of Pigs Sheffield Edwards, himself, thought that these plans were developed in connection with the Bay of Pigs, and it was Bissell HW 53244 DoclId:327112720 Page 40 AUVdGIT Guo "Y GIwago AHL WoT AdOOO.LOHd
37 who was in charge of the overall coordination of the Bay of Pigs Operation. Bissell denies that these plans were part of the Bay of Pigs planning. He testified that he was ''quite clear! that the plans. for attempted assassination of Fidel Castro were not developed as a part of the Bay of Pigs operation. 1. Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba Bissell stated that he did not think the actual attempt was ever made, although it is physically possible that the poison | pills did reach Cuba. He also said that although he did not remember having any evidence that Castro knew of these attempts, "it is perfectly possible that, with some time lag, Castro would have come on sorne evidence of this operation." Bissell also testified that to the extent individuals in the Cuban exile community in Miami may have been involved, "our belief was that Castro was extremely well informed on what was going on." m. ‘Termination of Phase J Plan After the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, according to Sheffield Edwards ''the plan, as I recall, petered out." Edwards said that he did not become involved with any other person, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, to try to get the pills to Cuba. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 41 “a GIWaASD AHL WOYT AdODOLOHd “KUWdaIT auoa
n, Other Plans During Phase I While the Phase I plans were underway, the Agency received confirmation from contacts in Cuba concerning possible assassination attempts inside Cuba against Castro. Most of these contacts took place in the first part of 1961 immediately preceding the Bay of Pigs landing. In particular, there were several cables received referring to a possible assassination attempt against Fidel. Castro on April 9, 1961, during a public appearance at the Sports Palace in Havana. There were also messages received from dis- sident Cubans inside Cuba in the first few months after the Bay of In some of these messages there were references Pigs invasion. to trying to kill Castro. None of these possible assassination attempts from dissidents inside Cuba appear to have been coordinated with the Phase I plans. HW 53244 DoclId:321127270 Page 42 AMWdaIT Guod “a aIwagdS FHL Nou KdODOLOH,
39 3. 1962-63 and the Phase II Plans. Possible authorization - the Testimony of Richard Bissell es In late 1961 or early 1962, Deputy Director for a. Plans, Richard Bissell, recalled asking a new case officer "to take over a part of our reviving effort against Castro and the Castro Administration...I probably urged him to look into this plan...which had been the subject of active attention nearly a year before. I have no recollection of authorizing him to revive it, except to look at it as a plan, or to proceed with any action along those lines." Richard Bissell resigned from the Agency in February, 1962. His successor as Deputy Director for Plans was Richard Helms. b. The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer (1) Developing an "Executive Action" capability. The Phase II case officer in a signed recorded interview said that he had a conversation with Richard Bissell, which he believed took place in the latter part of 1961 or early 1962, in which Bissell told him in substance that someone in the White House had raised the guestion whether or not the Agency should develop what, was called an "executive action capability," which was a capability of assassination or HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 43 4 GIVYIS FHL WOoud AdODOLOHA AYVddIT ayod
40 liquidation of leaders of foreign countries. The case officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation against Castro "had been mounted". and "that it had been handled through Sheffield Edwards. (2) Discussions with Edwards and Helns. The case officer said he was then briefed by Edwards on the operation that’ had been previously conducted. This testimony was corroborated by Colonel Edwards. Both Edwards and the case officer stated that Edwards did not have any further contact with any subsequent phase after Phase I. Colonel Edwards put the Phase . II case officer in contact with the case officer who had been involved with Phase I for a briefing. The Phase II case officer then took over this entire operation for the Agency. The Phase II case officer stated in his recorded interview that after he was briefed by the previous case officer and discussed the matter with Sheffield Edwards, AMVdGIT Guo °"Y aIwugqo FHL WOU XdODOLOHA he then discussed the matter with Richard Helms. The Phase II case officer took over the direct contact with the Mafia personnei which to the best of his recollection occurred “about early April 1962." (3) The Phase II Plans The Phase II plans involved two possibilities of assassination: rifle fire and the use of poison pills. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 44
4) Delivery of funds for the acquisition of rifles and handguns plus some medicinal drugs and anti-biotics took place in the summer of 1962. According to the case officer, it was somewhat less than $5,000. The money was delivered to the Mafia contact, and the case officer received a report from the Mafia contact that the Cuban contact had called to report that the arms and poison pills had gotten into Cuba. The case officer stated that he felt he was dealing with a very volatile situation that "in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs failure” was the kind of an operation that the Government, the Agency or anybody else could not afford to have surface. "...It was quite obvious ! that there was an explosion potential here--an explosion not in the technical sense--a flap potential, if you will, but it took some time to find out just what could be done and how it could be done, to try to sanitize the possible reper- cussions of this." He claimed that very shortly after taking over the operation he reached a tentative conclusion that the plans had little chance of success and he decided to "wind down" the plans gradually. The winding down was completed in the Spring of 1963 and in June, 1963, the case officer went abroad to another position wholly unconnected with the Cuban operation. HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 45 AMWdGIT GUOd -Y GIVYTS FHL NOU AdODOLOHA
42 When asked why. the operation did not meet with success, the case officer said "I don't know if I have any valid opinion why. There are a great many things that could have happened. It wasn't tried, it was choked off, it was penetrated from the start--at least on the Cuban end--that is the end in Cuba. When I say I have no personal knowledge of this, I am aware that Castro has claimed there were a number of attempts on his life. I am aware that he has blamed those on the U.S. in general and the CIA in particular. But I have no personal knowledge of facts which would prove that there was ever actually, if you will, a shot fired or any poison administered, or any other attempt other than in the inchoate stage." The case officer also stated that "given the capabilities of Castro's security apparat and the general seive-like character of the community in exile and the number of people who knew at least something about this particular incident or operation, before I had any connection with it, or later as a result of things that occurred before I had any connection with it, I think and thought at the time that it was conceivable that it had been penetrated. I cannot honestly state that I had at that time any firm reason to believe that Castro was aware of this operation." HW 53244 DocId:32112720 Page 46 a aTwaaS AHL WOW AdODOLOHd. AMWVdGIT ayod
43 The Phase II case officer stated that he knew of. no other plan to assassinate any other foreign leader except Castro. c. The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge of Phase II According to Colonel Edwards, at the time of the May 7, 1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy, he did not know that the Phase It case officer, whom he had earlier briefed, was undertaking another plan along the lines of Phase I. Therefore, he did not tell the Attorney General at the time of the briefing that there was a Phase II plan underway. ad. Knowledge of John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence re Phase II The Phase II case officer stated that sometime prior to August 1962, he had a conversation with Richard Helms, who had succeeded Richard Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans. AMVddIT GuOd *Y AIWuaIS AHL NOU AdODOLOHA The case officer said that the question was raised whether or not the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, should be briefed of the operation. "I did recommend to Mr. Helms that since this 'operation' and the possible repercussions from it all stemmed from actions which had taken place long before either Helms or myself had had any personal connection with it, and before John McCone had had any connection whatever HW 53244 Docld:327112720 Page 47
44 with the Agency, and since the decision had been made at that time that this should be sanitized, tied off and terminated as soon as practically feasible, I saw no reason why the new DCI should be briefed on it, anda I strongly recommended that he not be." The case of ficer said that to the best of his knowledge McCone at no time in 1962 knew of the fact that Phase II of the operations were underway. | John McCone testified that he first learned about Phase II when he was first interviewed by the Executive Director of the CIA Commission in April, 1975, and McCone further stated that the only knowledge he had of Phase I was knowledge he received on August 16, 1963 upon receipt of a memorandum from Richard Helms together with a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" delivered to Attorney General Kennedy. e. The Testimony of Richard Helms re Phase II Helms was asked whether he remembered any discussions with the case officer concerning the furnishing of either arms or poison pills to Cuban exiles to have them try and carry out any assassination plans. Helms replied "T don't have any question that we tried to line them in Cuba, to bring down this government or to kill anybody they HW 53244 Docld:321127270 Page 48 4a GIWUAD FHL WOU AdODOLOHA AUVdaIT quod
80 but that for security reasons they could not be sent by pouch. . The Chief of Station. returned to Washington for consultations in early April. He was able to convince his superiors that the pouch was the only feasible and secure means of getting the weapons into the Dominican Republic for delivery to the dissidents. The Deputy Director for Plans approved on April 10, and the pouch was sent on April 14 but with the restriction that the weapons not be passed without further approval. The files show that there was no coordination with the Department of State in Washington. Because of the Bay of Pigs landing on April 17, the station and the consulate were never given authority to supply the weapons to the dissidents and they never did so. On May 2, as the result of repeated entreaties from the station and the consulate, the Deputy Director for Plan approved a cable for the DCI's release, stating that as it appeared the Action Group was prepared to act whether or not the submachineguns were provided, the station was authorized to pass them for the additional protection of the group. Apparently someone decided this decision should not be made without the consent of the Department of State, for on May 3 HW 53244 Docld:3271127770 Page 64 AUVdadtT aquoa -y GIWaaS AHL WOW AdOOOLOHA