70 C. The Dominican Republic A RE PUD LATS l. The Chronology a. The. Background Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Re public in 1930. By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt. regressive nature of his regime, because of his Systematic use of torture and murder as tools of government, and because of his intervention in the affairs of other nations. The country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other Latin American countries. The policy of the United States at the beginni 1960 was to refrain from actions which would hasten Trujillo's downfall but to identify, develop, and encourage a moderate qdod “a GIWHaS AHL WOUd AaODOLOHA group which would take power in the event of Trujillo's death, . re flight, or overthrow. This policy of non-intervention, althoughyH clearly required by treaty, convinced Many Latin Americans AUVdd that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, whose support the United States badly wanted in connection with Operations against Castro, conditioned their support on U.S. assistance in toppling Trujillo. In April the President approved contingency planning for a more active U.S. role in the event the political situation in the Dominican Republic continued to deteriorate, 4 ’ HW 53244 DocId:321058629 Page T4
HW 53244 71 b. The Rifles In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican Re public returned to Washington for consultations. ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents needed weapons, particularly a "small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses." _ The Ambassador has no present recollection of any such request. He is confident that he made no serious effort to obtain them, Nevertheless, the request went forward. Near the end of June, according to CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs approved the provision of "a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene," and requested that they he supplied at the earliest possible moment. Neither the CIA officer who obtained this approval nor the Assistant Secretary, now both retired, has any recollection of this meeting. DocId:32105829 Page 75 Both State Depar AUWdeTT quod "ad ATWagS FHL WOU AdODOLOHA
72 c. Explosives On June 24, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an unsuccess{ attempt on the life of the President of Venezuela; as a result the United States and other OAS countries severed diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations were retained. The Commission Staff interviewed the foreign ser officer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission before the severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter. It was his recollection that the dissidents had no definite assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of that course as the only way out of the conditions under which they lived. It was not until early 1961, as he recalls, that the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kill Trujillo. The cables and memoranda of the period tend to quod “ud GIWYaS AHL Wow xa000fona confirm this recollection. Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals dum AUWa8II 1960 to discuss with the dissidents means for the assassination of Trujillo. A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the \ dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, detonated from a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means of an armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary action. A more detailed proposal along similar lines appears to have been provided by the dissidents in December.
73 On December 29, 1960, the Deputy Director for Pla presented the Special Group with a program for covert action to bring about Trujillo's overthrow. A portion of the program called for Agency and consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo to continue to work with the internal dissidents to promote an uprising and the establishment of a moderate pro-U.S. successor to the Trujillo regime. The plan, as initially approved by the Special Group, contained no provision for supplying arms or explosives to the internal dissidents. WOUI AdODOLOHA Two weeks later, the Department of State, on its Motion, obtained Special Group consent to have the internal dissidents furnished "limited supplies of small arms and other equipment," meaning explosives, subject to the condition that these materials be provided to the dissidents at a point outside the country itself. The internal State Department memorandum which led to this proposal stated there would be no thought of toppling the government by any such “minor AUWdGIT Guod “WY AITwuqo azHL measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the hands of the pro-U.S. opposition with a corresponding hoost to their morale and their opinion of the United States. The station and the consulate were informed of the Special Group action on January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower . Administration, President Kennedy was informed of the Special Group action not later than mid-February.
HW 53244 74 . i a. Revolvers. During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch with the dissidents, and they were aware of their various schemes to assassinate Trujillo. Although these officials apparently took no active role in the development of plans, they did on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the dissidents. In mid-February, two members of the dissidents' "Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination, came to the United States. They met with both CIA and State Department officers. During these meetings they stated repeatedly that the key to the success of the plot would be the assassination of Trujillo. The evidence is insufficient to permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the State Department. DoclId:32105829 Page T8 AaWdd IT quod “a GIWYAS AHL WONA AdODOLOHA
75 In March matters took an active turn. In a cable on March 4, a letter on March 16, and an airgram on March 22. . the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans for Trujillo's assassination were coming to a head. He requested additional authority to supply the pro-U.sS, dissidents with weapons. Similar requests were made by the CIA Station Chief of his headquarters. Three times headquarters responded that it could not comply with these requests because the restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by Americans.. On March 22, the CIA Station Chief renewed his request that headquarters send him three .38 calibre revolvers a ammunition by diplomatic pouch. He stated that without AUVdaITSddod “ad GIWUAS AHL NOMI AdODOLOHAG some show of support the United States would lose the dissident group entirely, while if it supplied weapons it might have some control over the timing of their use. HW 53244
76 On the same day, March 22, representatives of the CIA met with the State Department officer who served as their point of contact with the Department's Bureau of Inter- American Affairs. Three days later, on March 25, the Deputy Director for Plans cabled the station setting forth United States policy with respect to the Dominican Republic and stating that the revolvers and ammunition would be sent by diplomatic pouch in the near future. There is nothing in either CIA or State Depart- ment files to indicate whether the Department was consulted on decision. The memories of the participants are hazy on the Matter, but there are indications that the CIA did discuss the introduction of handguns into the Dominican Republic and “a aiwuqo aHEoWOuA KdODOLOHA believed it obtained approval. The then Deputy Director for Plans testified that as the territorial restriction on delivery of weapons was initially imposed: at the request of the Department of State, he would have considered the State Depart- <“AUWdaIT auog ment's willingness to waive the restriction as adequate authorit and probably would not have returned to the Special Group for formal approval. He observed that the members of the Group or their staffs might have been advised informally. HW 53244 DoclId:32105829 Page 30
77 The use of a diplomatic pouch to send weapons for such purposes was prohibited by regulations of the CIA's Clandestine Services, and it is also illegal under inter- national law. The Deputy Director of Plans approved the waiver of the internal regulations. There is nothing to indicate that the Department of State was informed of the use of the pouch, and the fact that the March 25 cable instructed the Chief of Station not to advise the Consul General of the use of the pouch suggests that the CIA acted unilaterally in this regard. .. The CIA files indicate that the revolvers were passed to the dissidents, and the Department of State files in- dicate that one was passed by the Consul General and the other t a G§vagIo AHL WoUT KaODOLOHG . by Agency officers. Neither the Consul General nor the former Chief of Station has any particular recollection of the matter. e. Carbines On March 26, the day after CIA decided to fur- AUVdaIT ayor nish the revolvers, the station cabled that it had found three M-1 carbines in the consulate, left behind by departing naval personnel. It requested magazines for the weapons and permission to pass them to the dissidents. On March 29 the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans responded that he was pouching the magazines, and that headquarters was "inclined to » HW 53244 DeclId:32105829 Page 81
78 favor" passing the weapons and ammunition. Another meeting was held with the Department of State on March 31. The State Department memorandum makes no mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director for Plans granted authority to pass the carbines the same day. Both the State Department liaison officer, who prepared the memorandum of the meeting, and the Consul General are clear in their recollection that the State Department in Washington did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took place. Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was coordinated in advance with the Department of State. It is possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well, It is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group AUVdSIT GuOd “HY GIWYaS AHL WONT AdODO.LOHA restriction on importation of weapons did not apply, as the carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic. CIA cabled its Station Chief on April 5 to request. the Consul General not to comment in his correspondence with the Department that the arms and ammunition. were being passed. A reassuring reply from the Consul General was received two HW 53244 Docld:327105679 Page 62
days later. The CIA Station Chief, who would not have been involved in any coordination at the headquarters level, speculated that this injunction may have been designed to keep the State Department from knowing "officially" that the weapons were being passed. It is clear that the coordination on the deci-~ sion to provide the carbines was inadequate. It is impossible to determine from this evidence where the fault lies. £. Submachine Guns AS early as March 20, the consulate and the sta-~ a9 FHL HOUT AdOOOLONA tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed that the assassins in- IVa tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress-~substantial§: the plan followed some two months later. Although the plan originally called for Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress' residence using silenced weapons, the group requested five M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self AWMWdGIT quod “wy defense in case the assassination plans went awry and there was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces. In its March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was prepared to provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the capacity to receive them at sea or in a cache on the coast,
80 but that for security reasons they could not be sent by pouch. The Chief of Station. returned to Washington for consultations in early April. He was able to convince his superiors that the pouch was the only feasible and secure means of getting the weapons into the Dominican Republic for delivery to the dissidents. The Deputy Director for Plans approved on April 10, and the pouch was sent on April 14 but with the restriction that the weapons not be passed without further approval. The files show that there was no coordination with the Department of State in Washington. Because of the Bay of Pigs landing on April 17, the station and the consulate were never given authority to supply the weapons to the dissidents and they never did so. On May 2, as the result of repeated entreaties from the station and the consulate, the Deputy Director for Plan approved a cable for the DCI's release, stating that as it appeared the Action Group was prepared to act whether or not the submachineguns were provided, the station was authorized to pass them for the additional protection of the group. Apparently someone decided this decision should not be made without the consent of the Department of State, for on May 3 HW 53244 DocId:32105829 Page #4 Auvdaf1 quod -yu GQIWaaD) AHL WOMA AdOOOLOHG
81 the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the Interagency Task Force on Latin America. According to Berle's memorandum of the interview, confirmed by one of the witnesses, the initial presentation stated the group wished the arms in order to overthrow Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo, and that the guns were wanted for that purpose, Berle responded that he could not care less for Trujillo, but that the United States did not wish to have anything to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. The Agency officer, who had been in a supervisory position with respect to this effort for approximately a year, told Berle he felt the same way. _ It may be that the CIA tried to get Berle over- ruled; on May 5 a cable informed the station that a high-level State Department decision on the submachineguns was pending. Nothing in the files indicates what this cable might have referred to. In any event on May 8 the station was informed that the State Department had disapproved passage of the submachineguns, and this ended the matter, AMVdaIT QUOT “a GIWYAD AHL WoYg AGTOIO.LOHA