HW 49061 Docld: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM desks, However, there is no possibility that Belgian officers can resume command func- tions without engendering very serious tensions among both the officers and the troops. The Congolese officers are insécure in their new status and are keenly opposed to any infringe- ment of their prerogatives, Therefore, acare- ful delineation of the Belgian officers' relation- ships-with the ANC officer corps is crucial. A model of effective operation is provided by Col. Dekoster in Stanleyville. He never left in 1960, and he has worked unobtrusively with Col. Mulamba, the Stanleyville commander. It is generally recognized that he made a major contribution to the re-establishment of disci- pline in the 3rd groupement, without ever seeking to intervene directly, The notion of retraining, we believe, should be viewed inperspective, Attimes "retraining" seems to have ben discussed as a redemptive process to produce a profound metamorphosis in the ANC, It is probably a mistake, however, to regard the program in terms of a ''before!! and "after" caricature. Without the program the army has already made considerable pro- gress.toward restoring its discipline and developing .a command structure. The more intensive dose of technical assistance, which the retraining program essentially entails, will probably make a real contribution to the accele- ration of this regenerative process. However, the ANC will not become in six months an effective army. The ANC will continue to be brutal—as it was under the Belgian admin- istration, Its interventions will result in un- necessarily high casualties among the civilian population. Retraining's chief accomplishment is likely to be consolidation of the gains al- ready made in placing in the hands of the central government a reliable constabulary force capable of maintaining domestic order and pre- serving the supremacy of central power, The ANC Officer Corps The ANC officer corps is a relatively un- known elite group of considerable potential political importance. The officers constitute a very special sociological group. Both before and after independence they have been very far removed from the administrative bour- geoisie which rules in the political spheres. In the, Force Publique, the career noncoms lived with their families in military camps. They were seldom posted to their home areas and generally were transferred too frequently ‘to develop any network of relationships in their garrision areas. Soldiers frequently took wives from outside their own tribes. With the exceptions of Generals. Mobutu and Lundula, virtually the only top officers who were brought back from civilian life, the officers of the ANC have not been involved in the social-po- 44. ’ There -is capable officers as Maj. litical circuits of Leopoldville or the provincial capitals. Lundula was in the Force Publique for only 30 months during World War II, and Mobutu left in 1956, after seven years! service. As a whole; the officer corps is apolitical, The political elements present in the 3rd groupement during the Gizenga regime at Stanleyville have been removed or neutralized. little evidence of the militant, radical nationalism advocated by the officer corps in the Middle East and in some other areas, although this may emerge among the new generation of officers, and it was pres- ent in elementary form among those purged from the 3rd groupement. However, the army mentality today is that of the technocrat, not the political organizer, For analytical purposes, the officer corps may be divided into four categories: 1) A small group of former sergeants per- ‘sonally loyal to Mobutu, and with long serv- ice in the Force Publique. These number no more than ten. They are typified by Col. Louis Bobozo, who was designated ANC com-' mander-in reintegrated Katanga. Bobozo has more than 30 years of military service and entered the army at a time when little educa- tion was available. He has an imposing mili- tary presence. However, he lacks the educa- tion and imagination to exercise effectively a top-level command responsibility. 2) A larger group of younger, better-edu- cated field grade officers, most of whom had considerable Force Publique service. These are exemplified by such dynamic and Joseph ("The Ter- rible') Tshatshi, who organized the famous paracommando battalion; Col. Leonard Mu- lamba, commander of the 3rd groupement in Stanleyville; and Maj. Jacques Puati, the 23 year-old Chief-of-Staff. This group seems to be eclipsing the old sergeants, who played their crucial role in the 1960-1962 period, This group has had very little experience outside the Congo, since Mobutu has never been able to spare its members for pro- longed periods, Yet they clearly have suf- ficient education to benefit greatly from ad- vanced officer courses abroad, 3) There are more than 300 very young officers, with little military. service but with substantially more formal education, who, since 1960, have received several months of training in Belgium or elsewhere. Seven- teen have completed the Belgian military aca- demy program. : Clear signs are visible of a coming con-- flict between these men and the older, former non-coms. The elders point to the lack of practical field experience of the new Officers and insist that they can achieve résponsiblé.. positions only after a prolonged apprentice-. ship. The new officers are equally convinced . SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM , _? Page 53
HW 49061 ‘colonial days this omnipresent, DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM of their superior endowments in education and training and are frustrated to find access to high rank: blocked by former non-coms, 4) A.substantial group of mediocre officers fits into none of the above categories. They are most nearly comparable to those in category 2 above, but lack leadership abili- ties, The Sureté . instrument available to the Sureté. In clandestine force had the mission of preserving internal security and overseeing immigration and the movements of persons. It had 81 European agents and an enormous network of occasional "infor ers.'' The official definition of the Sireté mission is today unchanged, but its actual role has altered vastly. The potential of the Sdreté was early recog- nized by Lumumba, who put one of his trusted lieutenants in charge. The Sireté was ordered to report directly to the Prime Minister's office, rather than to the Ministry of the Interior. Since no Congolese had access: to the inner. circle of Streté operations be- fore 1960, the independent government had to organize the service from scratch. Lu- mumba was not in power long enough to ad- vance very far in this task, although in the disorderly days of 1960 various private ern sons operated under the guise of Sor ete agents, . In September: 1960 the College of Com- missioners entrusted the Wirection of the Sareté to Victor Nendaka, From the outset, Nendaka, a resolute and able man who has put to good.use the Belgian and US support he has received, established the special branch as an autonomous agency, He first consoli- dated the structure in Leopoldville. By late 1961 the SQreté began to operate effectively in the provinces. A major crisis arose when MNC/L leader Christophe Gbenye became Minister of the Interior in the first Adoula government, He made a determined effort to bring the Streté under his control, In December 1961 he -an- nounced that Nendaka had been relieved. How- ever, Nendaka responded by surrounding the Interior Ministry with his agents, and Gbenye had to concede defeat. Since then, there has been no real challenge to the autonomous posi-~ tion of the S@reté and its direct relationship to the Prime Minister. At present, the Stireté has an estimated 168 persons in its inner network. Slreté detachments are present in every provincial capital. In all cases but one, the chief provin- cial Sdreté agent is not a native of the prov- Another coercive the central government is . ince in which he serves, Although the calibre 45 - ment _ activities, of personnel varies from excellent to very poor, the Sdreté has emerged as a potent instrument’ under effective central govern- control. It possesses its own com- munications network and has come to work increasingly closely with the ANC. The Streté has the power of arrest and the capability for involvement in a broad range of sub rosa Its excellent files on the dubious financial transactions of many political figures provide another element of leverage. A main arbiter in Leopoldville, the Sttret€é is alsa a crucila instrument of the central govern- ment in limiting the extent of ‘provincial au- tonomy. The Police The other important instrument of coercion available in the Congo is the provincial police, The one element of force in the hands of provincial authorities, the police are a major factor in the evolving relationship between the provinces and the central government, The present provincial police force is an outgrowth of the pre-independence Territorial ’ Police, Organized in 1926 as a corps distinct from the Force Publique, and specially trained for the responsibilities normally vested ina police force, it reflected the growing com- plexity of colonial society after the~pacifica- tion phase, With the emergence of provincial urban centers, the necessity arose for a force trained in the enforcement of criminal law and in policing the rapidly expanding African quarters surrounding the European outposts. Two important procedures were adopted that have decisively affected the role of the police in the independent Congo: 1) The police forces were placed under the direct authority of the provincial governors rather than the Governor-General, thus es- tablishing the tradition of a provincial, rather than a national, role. 2) Recruitment has been local rather than national.” Unlike the ANC, the police forces are directly related to ‘the populations which they serve, During the colonial period, a detachment of police, commanded by a European. police commissioner and under the authority of the Territorial Administrator, was posted at each territorial seat. Unarmed local police also were recruited and commanded bythe chiefs of the Circonscriptions Indigénes (CI), These de- tachments were in addition to the Force Pub- lique platoons, and the exact delineation of the respective jurisdictions of the territorial and CI police was always somewhat blurred. In the post-World War II years police strength ‘usually remained near a figure of 6,000. In the year before independence there ' was a sharp increase, By early 1960 the force SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 54
HW 49061 included 8,927 Congolese police and 272 Bel- gian commissioners. There were-no Congolese police commissioners. before and no serious plan was elaborated for ac- celerated training. Although in 1960 there was no mutiny of the police comparable to that of the ANC, the disorders of independence hit the police harder than it did the army. Nearly all the police commissioners—except those inKatanga—left, Thus the force was as leaderless as the ANC, although not as a result of its own insub- ordination, Belgian sources who have worked with the police estimate that half the 1960 force was absorbed into the ANC during the large-scale army recruitment in. 1960-1962, The army offered better and more regular pay. African police commissioners were desig- nated by the provincial Ministers of the In- terior, frequently on a political basis, In this respect the police stand in sharp contrast to the ANC, where political criteria played very little role in the massive promotions of 1960, The present status and possible reorganiza- tion of the police form the subject of a recent extensive survey by an AID team which spent April-June 1963 in the Congo. Although re- liable figures on present strength are un- available, the AID team estimates there are about 22,000 police. Most of the police, unlike the army, have been recruited since 1960 and have never known the training or discipline of the old Territorial Police. Dressed in shabby uniforms and frequently under in- competent or venal leadership, the police are a sorry force. In many areas provincial authorities have used police forces as an avowedly political instrument, One example is the recent in- vasion and occupation of disputed territories by Lac Leopold HH and Lomami provincial police. Another is Stanleyville, where the ANC has been forced to supplant the police because of the political orientation and in- eptness of the latter. In Leopoldville the PSA Minister of the Interior of former Leopold- ville Province had inflated the police forces with recruits from Kwilu in a transparent effort to solidify PSA predominance at the provincial level, An unstated objective of central government Interior Minister Maboti (a Mukongo) in dismissing the entire Leopold- ville city force following a brief mutiny in independence,. 46 a serious SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM May 1963 was to rid the capital of the Kwilu policemen. In Luluabourg the police force is a potent instrument of the vicious Kalamba- Lwakabwanga clique. Its commissioner is notorious for the magnitude of his illicit gains from the diamond traffic. There is growing recognition of the threat which the police constitute to Congolese re- covery. For some time the UN has worked with the police, using mainly Nigerian per- sonnel. A few Belgian police specialists are assisting as well. The AID report urges a vigorous program of retraining andassistance by Belgium and the, United States in an effort to strengthen the police force. However, any reorganization plan will encounter the acute difficulty of provincial supremacy inthe police field. The central government apparently would be willing and eager to have help with the police. However, agreement centrally -ne- gotiated cannot always be carried out at the provincial level. Two other solutions to the police problem recently have been proposed: 1) dissolution of the police and delegation of all law en- forcement to the ANC; and 2) federalization of the police force. Both these solutions ap- pear unrealistic in the present political con- text. The provinces have no intention of abandoning their control over the police, and the central government would need to be far stronger than it is at present to enjoin the provinces to surrender their police forces. The ANC is not capable at present of handling routine police work, such as the collection of evidence and accident reporting. Further, effective police work requires amore‘intimate contact with the local population than ANC detachments are likely to achieve. The AID report, which concludes that no basic structural alteration is now possible, strongly recom- mends that a central inspectorate be es- tablished to place limits on police venality and political activity. Just how an inspec- torate general would enforce its will is not clear. The police are likely to continue to pose problem, Probably in the more efficiently governed provinces, technical as- sistance could enhance police effectiveness. In the unstable provinces, the police will con- tinue to be key weapons of factions contend- ing for power, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 3276276338 Page 55
HW 49061 Docld: 32626338 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Vill. EXTERNAL: FACTORS Since its accession to independence the Congo--as a result of its colonial inheritance and of the disorders which have plagued its three years of self-government—has been re- liant upon and subject to greater external influences than any other newly independent African state. Invoked to thwart an East- West confrontation in Central Africa, the UN has played an unprecedented civilian and military role in the Congo. By virtue of its commercial and financial stake Belgium re- tains major economic: ties with the Congo. Because of the massive assistance rendered by the United States to the Congo and to the UN Congo operations, the United States prob- ably has greater political leverage there than has any other foreign state. Finally, the Soviet Bloc, although discredited in the Congo, remains a potential source of external in- fluence. . The historical roots of the present con- fluence of foreign interests are of signifi- cance, but their relevance to the present discussion is limited. We therefore intend to discuss the most important elements of non- Congolese influence only as they relate to the current situation, Excluded from this dis- cussion is the impact on the Congo of de-. velopments in Angola and other neighbor- ing states. The implications of the Congo's relations with its neighbors are of such po- tential importance as to warrant separate consideration. The United Nations The dual military and civil character of UN Congo operations has been obscured by the news value of UN military successes. How- ever, the civil operations program has furn- ished important technical assistance to sagging central government and provincial institutions. The specialized agencies of the UN have financed almost 700 experts in fields rang- ing from medicine to meteorology, under the supervision of the UN Civil Operations repre- sentative in the Congo.23 The UN civil presence. At the level of the central government, UN technicians have served in many instances as replacements for Belgians who left the Congo in 1960, Although about 1,590 Belgians are employed in the Congo Government and parastatal enterprises, UN civil operations personnel continue to fill many advisory and functional positions requiring advanced technical skills. The lack 23. There are, in addition, about 550 teachers provided by the UN. 47 of Congolese university graduates will re- quire the maintenance of UN or other foreign personnel in many ofthese jobs for the foreseeable future. It is likely that bilateral assistance programs could provide qualified French-speaking personnel to replace UN’ technicians,- but at the cost of some dis- location to administrative relationships al- ready existing between UN personnel and the Congo Government, UN technicians provide assistance, on a . much more limited scale, to the infant pro- vincial governments. Most striking, however, are the UN civilian representatives who fill the ad_hoc role of ''district commissioner" in several unstable provinces. At Kindu, capital of Maniema Province, a single UN represen- tative of UAR nationality, assisted by only a handful of Nigerian police, has gained the confidence of the provincial government, the local ANG, commander, the representative of the Sfireté, and the judiciary. In his role of counselor and mediator, he has prevented latent hostilities from erupting into serious disturbances. Similarly, in the confused and uncertain political climate of Luluabourg, the UN civilian representative has marshalled the representatives of central government’ au- thority~—the ANC Commander, Sureté Chief, and District Attorney--into a peace-keeping team which has had to contend mainly with the Luluabourg government, probably the most corrupt provincial administration inthe Congo. Although the effectiveness of the UN civilian presence varies, it appears generally good. Insofar as the UN civil representatives serve as buffers between competing elements of the population, their presence aids greatly in the maintenance of order. If possible, their serv- ices should be retained, particularly in Lulua- bourg, Kindu, Albertville, and Elisabethville. Consideration might also be given to placing resident UN representatives in troubled San- kuru and Unité Kasaienne Provinces. The UN militar resence. Since the end of Katanga's secession, UN troop strength has been reduced to 7,475, including 1,983 ad- ‘ministrative support troops (June 24, 1963), All but a few are positioned in southern Katanga. Apart from Kasai, where about 700 Ghanaian UN troops act as a damper on possible disorders, the only area appearing to warrant a continued major UN troop pres- ence is southern Katanga. The absence of local political leadership in southern Ka- tanga, and the hostility between the ANC, onthe one hand, and the Belgian and African popu- lations and former ‘Katanga gendarmes, on the other, present a latent threat of blood- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 56