714-00000 i i i a SEER ERE. IBS oy 2B oda! TABLE OF CONTENTS _ Introductory Section ‘ : Scarcity of documentary evidence ': Relationship of assassination planning to govermnent policy Risk of assassination when a goverrment is overthrown . . . « - Resort to synecdoche “” Published intelligence on the possibility of castro! 8 demise Accuracy of the ‘Story Drew Miscellaneous Schemes Prior to August - 1960 ee. ‘Pearson has . ‘Aerosol Attack on Radio Station... ««. Contaminated Cigars  Depilatory . .« « » « « e Gambling Syndicate - Phase 1 Genesis of the plot... First contact with Maheu ¢ @© © @ @ @ @ @ & es ¢ € © © @ @® #8 & O'Connell named ac case officer . . » « « « _. Pirst meeting with Roselli Briefing of Dulles and Cabell . . 2 2 « o « First meeting between Maheu and Giancana True identities of Glancana and Trafficante Role of Trafficante become known Early planning on the means of assassination ‘'s involvement with le preparation of lethal cigars thal cigars Delivery of the cigars to Gunn ' Roosevelt learns of the plot . 2. 2 «6 « Possible ways of packaging the poison Decision to package the poison in pill form... . Juan Orta is identified as Sequence preceding passing Identification of Orta -. The Orta channel collapses Varona is brought into the Edward K. Moss .. . « « the syndicate's man in Gunn tests the pills on guinea pigs .. - « the pills to O'Connell : O'Connell receives the pills and passes them to Roselli - Harvey is briefed on the operation Trafficante receives the pills and | gives them to Orta - operation . Roselli associates O'Connell with CIA Funds are approved for passing to Varoma . Money and lethal pills are passed to Varona Yarona's restaurant contact in Cuba . . « « Edwards calls off the operation Disposition of the pills - list of those witting of the operation “gr TI VER ny Sitar eet Me fe bar Eel id “ote og tet eect Cuba GEE © anuenrK
14-00000 Sate ree Rees Pree lar RAT ae thy : i im ~ 0) SEORET-ETES OLY Why Harvey was briefed on Phase 1... ee we ew ee eo © .Harvey put in charge of the Executive Action Capability ; ‘Harvey briefs Helms on the Executive Action Capability. ... . | QUWIN- planned. assassination of Lumumba a ue | Approval of Project ZRRIFIE ...... eee ee ee ee we .Bissell puts Harvey in charge of the Castro cperation Harvey is told he will head ‘the Cuba task force ce 8 © ee ee Harvey's first meeting with Edwards on the Castro operation Termination of QWIN. . 6 ee ew ee we tte et tw as Harvey briefs Helms on the Castro overation Differing views on the turnover to Harvey . 1... ees ee Marvey's first meeting with Roselli in New York City _ Roselli and O'Connell go to Miami... . o 8 6 © © oe ww ww Harvey leaves for Miami with lethel pills Roseili is already in touch with Verona. oe eo ee © we ow harvey takes over "a going operation" Changes in gangster personnel participating . .. 6.2 ee. Maceo enters the operation Harvey supplies weapons and equipment to Varona .. ..«. ee Roselli reports that the Pills are in Cuba Verona sends a three-man team to Cuba... se ee ce ees Varona plans to send three militia pen to Cuba Harvey and Roselli agree to terminate the operation ..... Roselli cames to Washington to meet Harvey ' Harvey's meeting with Roselli observed by the FBI... . 2 List of persons witting of this phase of the operation The Wiretapping Incident... ee ee ee ee ee eee eee ' Glancana Suspects Phyllis McGuire and Dan Rowan . . , e 8 @ « Glancana asks Maheu to bug Rowan's room Likely date of the bugging incident . . 1... .sesssece Maheu asks Edward Du Bois to do the job . Du Bois assigns Pallesti and Harrison to the job. . ... ee Wiretap made instead of microphone plant Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2... ee eee eee eee eee 37 Balletti 1s caught and phones Maheu for help. .... . cee ee -‘Maheu refers the FSI to CIA . . _ Shef Edwards meets with an FBI representative . 1... «ee Edwards intervenes with Sam Papich on Maheu's behalf . -Houston intervenes with the Justice Department. .. 2 2 6 » e« Houston briefs General Carter Edwards and Houston brief the Attorney General. . 2 2 so 6 Edvards sends a memorandum record of the meeting tu Kennedy - Gambling Syndicate - Phase 2 is already under way... a « Helms is briefed on the meeting with the Attorney General ; Kennedy's ye ° . Bdwards warns Harvey to clear with the DCI. . . 6's ss ee o @ « request on & March 67 for a copy of the briefing memo 66° . WAR ueinte eviews 7 vay Shere ce oe) be ' 4 “th
14-00000 “The Wiretapping Incident (continued) ‘Chicago Sun-Tires story of 16 Aug 63 re Giancana & CIA. . . «+ » 67. oo - _., Chicago Daily News story of 20 Aug 63 re Glancana & CIA , 69 i _ "Helms sends McCone a copy of the Kennedy briefing memo-andum. . . 69 - i Rumors now connect. CIA & gangsters in plot to kill Castro or who Pues, ua gees Qe Long Comittee. 2. 6 0 ee ew we a a cry : ana ot _ Former Maheu employee called to testify So _ 71 “4 /+ "- he OnassiseNiarchos fight over Oi] shipping rights . .. ./1'. . 7l oe Maheu is hired by Niarchos and is supported by CIA _ 72 CIA intervenes cn Niarchos’ behalf... 2 es oe 2 ee eo wo we FA The Long Committee plans to resurrect the Onassis wiretap 72. CIA intervenes with the Long Committee on Maheu's behalf. . . « « T3 H Maneu appiles pressure on CIA to avoid puolicity . 73 i Maheu indicates he may brief his attorney... 1.6 ee ee ee Th " : Sth hele! Schemes in Early 1963. 6... eee ee ee ee ee ee ee TS i ° i: Skin Diving Suit. o 8 © © © &© © @ @ © © © © 6 © © © ew ew ew ee 75 ne , .' Gift from Donovan to Castro ; . 95 i 5 : : The suit is bought and made ready. oe 6 6 © 8 & 6 * 6 © @ @ @ 75 Fo meet The plan is overtakva by events 715 : ~- - , ‘ oo List of persons witting. eo e@ © © © © © @ &@ &@ eo oO eo we eo 8 @ 16 C: oo . Booby-trapped Sea Shell — 71 o Books on Mollusca are bought... 2 eee eee eee ee ee TT Dodo. The plan proves to be impracticable 0 Tl . a Rames of those witting eo © ¢ *© @ © © © © © © © © © © 8 &@ & we TT * ve "Project AMLASH - Rolando Cubela. .... 2. ee cece eee ee TB) meeting with Cubela in Mexico City (Mar 61)...... 78 ““CubéeTaS role in the Cuban revolution 78 Cubela reported disaffected . ee @ © @ © @€ © ®@ ® » © © &@ @ @ eo 79 Mexico City meeting inconclusive : 719 Cubela and Juan Orta want to exfiltrate (Mar 61). 2... 2 6 « «.80 Cubela asks for meeting in Paris (Aug 61) Oe 81 Cubela plans to attend Helsinki Youth Festival. ......... 82 me . Meetings in Helsinki (Aug 62) - 83 : Sey 85 85 86 87 88 90 “Meetings in Stockholm’. 2...) 2. 0 see ee ee wee os a Cubela objects to the word “assassinate” Paris meetings (Aug 62); S/v & demolition training. ....... Meetings in Porto Alegre (Sept 63) Paris meetings (Oct 63); Cubela wants assurance fran U.S.Govt . * FitzGerald meets with Cubela in Paris (Oct 63) , Differing versions of what FitzGerald told Cubela e.e 8 © © ew be SERRE EES LY 4.
14-00000 , Project AMLASH - Rolando Cubela (continued) . Sanchez gives to Cubela tn Paris while Kermedy is shot _Cubela asks for high-powered rifle with telescople sight. . . . Those witting cf tre Black Lecf hO episode _- _Artime weets Cubela intermediary. . ... 0s 2 ee eae ‘ Explanation of how Artime and Cubela were put togethe _, Gubelea expects to be executed . : '. Cubela sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. . 2. es 6 6 «© 2 2 6 _ Ho mention made of Cubela's pre-Nov 64 dealings with CIA - Memo to Secretary of State (Rusk), Subject: . CIA Involve RSG AS Eaain Be bi Cuba ceche approved for Cubela. ..« - we eee eos The Black Leaf 4O schene. is- discussed mo . ; Gunn converts a.balipoint pen into a hypodermic syringe . . 23 Cubela cache put dewn (without rifles) (Mar 63) ........ Cubela requests a silencer for a FAL rifle ; SAS requests TSD to prcduce FAL silencer on crash basis eo oe Second Cubela cache put down (with FAL rifles)(June 64) Artine agrees tc meet wiih Cubela personally : Sanchez meets Cubela in Paris (Nec Gi). 2... ecw we Artime and Cubela meet in Madrid (Dec 64)... we eo ee we ae Artime agrees to furnish silencer Artime gives Cubela silencer and other special gear... eo « Second name-line between Cubela and gambling syndicate operation Headquarters terminates all contacts with Cubela group. ... + Cubdela and others arrested; plead guilty (Mar 66) - The charges 2.02 6 6 se te oe eh eet te te th wt we Castro asks for lentenc ; Testimony about the silencer. . 2. 0 © oe see ee see eee’ ment in Cuban Counter-revolutionary Activities <= Arrest of Rolando CUBELA Secades and Parnon Tomas :. GUIN Diaz, dated 7 March 1966 (added after completion “Of report) 2 ccc ee ees sce enc een eceseece Meta eRe me ee ee am Ahi yy he san aetna eT PANN Y bali: aR ea Caceres ESV Se a ak
~ SECRET-EVES 0} ily 25 April 1967 ” : i 1 : : _ hte reconstruction: of Agency snvolvenent in plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because. of the extreme sensitivity of the ‘operations being discussed or attempted, B86 a matter of principle no ‘official records vere kept - | i 2 ‘of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written oe a oe records that do exist are either largely tangential to the main . . - events or were put on paper from memory years afterward. William oo "Harvey has retained skeletal notes of his activities during the _ ; “years in question, and they are our best source of dates. Dr. C oO _ Bévard Gunn, of the Office of Medical Services, has a record of TE whom he met and when and cryptic references to the subjects discussed. . bt TSD, has a record of two or three dates that are 1 . . Pertinent. Gunn and vere involved ia only the technical t aspects of operational Planning, and their participations were short- lived. Although fragmentary, their records are a help in establishing  eritical time frames. Operational files are useful in some instances, bo , “necause they give dates of meetings, the substances of which may be inferred fron collateral information. For the most part, though, we have haa to rely on inforsation given to us “orally by people whose memories are fogged by time. Their recollections of dates are particularly hazy; and some of then - EN RRMA wi Rema arte, Sea le ADIT GEE eR OM NTR TT Ae ee eatery. MP ate EE ee Bae tn YEN eee i __, SURET-EEs OMY Ree TL RSS BS
4 are no > longer able to: keep the details. of one Plan ‘Separate from there of another. We Antervieved everyone whom we could identi fy as likely vee ‘to be imovledgedble, with the exceptions of Mr. Dulles and - ‘General Cabell. A complete list is attached at Tab A. We did not go on fishing expeditions anong the mere possibles. To have done s0 would ‘have risked makeing witting a oumber of employees who vere previously unwitting and, in our estimate, would have added little to the details available from those directly involved. There are inconsistencies @ among the various. accounts, but most of them can be resolved by. oO . ae 6 Ne en, ne, ~ a collating the information furnished by all of the identifiable vustaenepet ee participants ing perticuler plan and by then checking. it against C _ Specific dates: that can be fixed with fair certainty. We telieve that this reconstruction of vhat happened and of the thinking __ a associated with itis. reasonably sound. If there are e significant pF | ie Do oe inaccuracies in the report, they are most likely to (occur in faulty . Se, pee entering of the Sequence of events. People still remember much of 7 ~ what - happened, but they ¢ can no longer recall precisely vhen. ne SOR o [ Dole oe . ‘It became clear very early in our investigation that the vigor with which schemes were pursued withia the Agency to eliminate Castro Personally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government's efforts - Mt I to overthrow the Castro regime. We. can identity five separate phases in Agency assassination planning, Aithough - the > transitions from one Sig gre . _SEORET-LiEs puLy Bie ot SEE wipe LY AALS ESE CES 0 a caste ni tne! on
i a ae to another are not alvays sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection i: of. the then prevailing Government attitude tovard the Cuban regime. Prior to August 1960: All'‘of the identifiable ‘schemes setae to about August 1960, with one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing hie behaviour or by altering his appearance. St _ vo merece sepa ety peer ain merce nena pm see baer oie We) Teh aaPonts BEAT A PENNS 9 Roca! Setanta oF bd. August 1960 to April 1961: The plots that were hatched in iate 1960 and early 1951 were aggressively pursued and were oe Whe etn viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely one - i aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime = t we we, ‘that culminated in the Bay of Pigs. O nS @ _April 1961 to late 1961: A wajor scheme that was bo, - 2.’ :1+; begun £n August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and a _:. +. gemadned dormant for several months, ac did most cther Agency _ ie mo operational activity related to Cuba. oo ; ae late 1961 to late 1962: That particular scheme was reactivated in early 1952 and was again pushed vigorously in the ; — ; : era of Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense admini- a" . stration pressure on CIA to do something about Castro and his . | Guba. — —_ . e. Late 1962 until vell into 1963: After the Cuban missile _erisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE : the o Sea eee SE RS TN FE ENTS a Eat OR Th ope teem De ese ee ot mete -3- BF aae 96 IAEA WEN YS Pacem cE Nat ae Se OS REET ‘ tamen mnie
no et “and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in ‘that light. ‘obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. “We believe, ~ P ¢ ‘dominant figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him a ¢ ’ paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General ‘ position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would . relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about-the downfall of . @ goverment necessarily requires the removal of its leaders from aggressive scheme that vas begua in August 1960. and revived in - April (1962 vas 5 finally terminated in ‘early 1963.. - vo other “plots vere originated in 1963, but both vere impracticable.” and nothing ever came of them. : ‘We cannot overemphasize the extent to which wecponsible Agency Kennedy ‘officers felt themeelves subject to the/administration'’s severe Pressures to do something about Castro and his regime. The fruitless - Many-of those ve interviewed stressed two points that are so ee though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of the Personally rather than to the government as a body, will not neceasarily cause the downfall of the government. This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft ~ oy Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Ccammist and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically Senne VES SAMI
14-00000 positions of pover, and there is alvays the risk that the partici- *. pants will’ resort to assassination. Such-resovale from-pover-eo-tre_ oo oo | house-arrest of-e- Mossadeg or- the flight-of-a- Batieta-sheuld ‘not Cause_tne.to.cverlook the killings of w-Dien er ef-s Trujillo by NX forces. encouraged. but not controlled by- the U.S. Goverment. . There is @ third point, which was not directly made by any of cH those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly from the intervievs ‘ cn He 1 ie t and from review. of files. The point is that of frequent resort to . ee a synecdoche--the mention of a part when the whole. is to be understood, a Lan, 7° @F vice Versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such 7 : . . as “ai sposing of Castro," which may be read in the narrow, literal ; C . Bense of assassinating him, when it is iniended that it be read in . i re "| the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of “doing some- ‘thing about Castro” vhen it is clear that what they have specifically - wat oo _ in mind is Killing him. Ine situation wherein those ‘speaking may not have actually meant what. they seemed to say or may not have said “what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral : i shorthand is interpreted differently than vas intended. The suggestion was made to us that Gperations aimed at the . . @6sassination of Castro my have been generated in an atmosphere of. _. Stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro's’
74-90000 ", demise and on the reordering of the political structure that would oe follow. We reviewed intelligence publications from 1960 through ~*~ 1966, ‘Including  S$onal Intelligence Estimates, Special National - Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Memorandums, and Memorandums for the Director. The NIE's on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba” Shee tet safes eon kee es ‘for 1960, 1953, and 1964 have brief paragraphs on likely successor governments if Castro were to depart the scene. We also find similar. / ghort references in a SNIE of March 1950 and in an Intelligence ee em EE, / Memorandum of May 1965. ‘In each case the treatment is ro more nor ; an a | - less than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups euch : i a6 these. We conclude that there. is no reason to believe that the CO . oo ' operators vere unduly influenced vy the content of intelligence z os publications. ; / ot , - _ Drew Pearson's column of 7 March 1967 refers to ‘a reported CIA . . plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson also has infomation, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a meeting at the State Department at which assassination of Castro ; was discussed and that.a team actually landed in Cuba with pills to . be used in an assassination attempt. There is basis in fact for each a of those three reports. Soe . eg \ 7 ; Bo A CIA officer passed an assassination weapon to an Agency Cuban asset at @ meeting in Paris on 22 November 1963.. The weapon, WAS & ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe. ee a ao eee A et a tT eee et a5 ‘ =” 6 - . . — : oe nme carer —_ 8 at « ereneT_Evee Nal Vv. 1 Getnenitie She MIR CORD Pat Sot eb AB ENF i, NETS a:
RESTO ie aT SE Ly OSE A tsas | .. She CLA officer euggested that the Cuban asset luad the syringe “with Black Leaf 40. The evidence indicates that ‘the meeting ; vas under way at the very moment President Kennedy was shot. _b. There was a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's conference room on 10 August 1962 at which Secretary McNamara broached the subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders. The discucsion resulted in a Project MONGOOSE action memorandum prepared by Edvard Lansdale. At another ‘ ume * . Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there vas discussion of rer aan ‘@ recently-disseminated Clandestine Services information report ee on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CIA had refused ated pom Dern nimmnys wees etc sees the exile'’s requeet for fimds and had no involvement in the plot. . - ade e. CIA tvice (first in early 1961 and again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working : 5 ons fare acetic ane in behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 196i ‘, . “plot aborted and the pills were recovered. Those furnished in "April 1962 were passed by the gambling syndicate representative . to @ Cuban exile leader in Florida, who in turn had them: sent to “Cuba about May 192. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that ’ @ team of three men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the - of operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team would Bake an attempt on Castro's life--perhaps using the pills. ... er eS a so temrarareahemee gang tess it ous Viet aes ON
: Tais report describes these and other episodes in detail; puts them : ' . into perspective; and reveals, Ut while the events described by aa ; Drew. Pearson did occur and are subject, to being patched together ye as though one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative 0 9° ~ - Loe relationship among them is unfounded. . ; - : . ; nN t . i i re wee cae id wts ; . - epietak wae Re LETT Diet gD OTE age ee et CeORT-EYES OWL Sent aR mie i SG Ts a EE - 2 ns
* March to August’ 1960 | wh teed ah Ba ust bs i os . - ; . ‘We find evidence of at least three, and perhaps four, schemes | that vere under cdnstderation ell be fore’ the Bay of Pigs, but ve A : , ‘ean fix the time frame only speculatively. Those who have some | Poot k. 3 knowledge of the episodes guessed at dates ranging from 1959 through : i, ee 7 1962. The March- ~to-August span we have fixed may be too nBTTOW, but . | an At best. fits the limited evidence ve have. | a : . yy a Lo a . - a. Hone of thoce we “interviewed who was first assigned to o a the Cuba task force after the Bay of Pigs knows of any of these . schemes. | : a . - b. J.D. Gare) Rsterline, vho was head of the Cuba task «= i . . force in pre-Bay of Pigs days, is probably the most reliable ‘ F 7 ” . ; i witness on general timing. He may not have been privy to the precise details of any of ‘the plans, but he seems at least to 7 have known of ‘all of them. He is no “longer able to keep the : ; details of one plan separaze from those of another, but each of the oes a a : eo facets he recalls fits somewhere into one of the schemes. Hence, oo : ; ; om i " oe - we conclude that all of these schemes vere under consideration ; dey a while Esterline had direct responsibility for Cuba operations. “he | ce. Esterline. himself furnishes the best clue as to the Ie of Senet EYES ONY . es a os
_ Similar to those of lysergic acid (LSD). Nothing came of the idea. poceible time span. He thinks it wnlikely that any planning ast ‘of this sort would have progressed to the point of consideration of means until after U.S. policy concerning cuta vas decided upon about March 1960. By about the end of the third quarter of 1960, the total energies of the tasx force were concentrated on the main-thrust effort, and there would have ven 20 interest 4m nor time for pursuing such wills-o'-the-wlsp as these. We are unable to establish even a tentative sequence among the schemes; 'they may, in fact, have. been under consideration simultaneously. We... othe _ Pind no evidence that any of these schemes was approved at any © Cy ges level higher than division, if that. We think it most likely that no higher-level approvals were sought, because none of the schemes progressed to the point vhere approval to launch would have been - ‘needed. Aerosol Attack on Radio Station of TSD, remembers discussion of a scheme to contaminate the air of the radio studio where Castro broadcast his ‘ s speeches with an aerosol spray of a chemical that produces reactions 74 L i [pata he had discouraged the scheme, because the chemical could not be relied upon to be effective. also of TSD, - 10 « GEPDET_EVEC fanlV ie ire Cac
ne eee ee nent oe of this plot, vith the possible exception of Jake Esterline who . —— Contaminated Cigars that. the chemical was intended to produce temporary personality. _his personal safe until he left WH/s and that they definitely were with that plan. Esterline finally said that, although it vas recalls experimentetion with psychic energizers but cannot relate it to Castro 85 a target. We found no one else who remembered anything may have it confuse d with other schemes. Jake Esterline claims to have had in his possession in pre-Bay of Piga days a box of cigars that had been treated with sone sort | of chemical. In our first interview with hin, Ais recollection was disorientation. The thought was to somehow contrive to have Castro smoke one before making a speech and then to make a public spectacle of himself. Esterline distinctly recalis having had the cigars in intended for Castro. He does not remember how they came into his - - . possession, but he thinks they must have been prepared by In a second interview with Esterline, we mentioned that ve had leamed os a since first speaking with him of a scheme to cause Castro's beard to fall out. He then said that his cigars might have been associated evident that he no longer remembered the intended effect of the cigars, he was positive they were not lethal. The cigars were never
14-00000 used, according to Esterline, because Wi/4 could not figure oiit how to deliver thers ‘without Ganger of blowback on the Agency. He says ne “e he destroyed then before leaving we in Sune 5 1961. Staney Gottnie » of qSD, claims to renenber aistinetly a | plot involving cigars. To emphasize the clarity of his. memory, he named ‘the. officer, then assigned to wH/ca, whe epproachea. him with the : oT, scheme. - Although there may well have been such a plot, the officer Gottlieb named was then assigned in India and has never vorked in WH Division nor had anything to do with Cuba operations. Gottiieb my _.’ Yemembers the scheme as being one that was talked about frequently , pov ips _ C “but not widely and ae being concerned with killing, not merely with bere eee influencing behaviour. As far as Gottlieb knows, this {dea never got beyond the talking stage. .TSD may base gone ahead and prepared so. . the cigars just in case, but Gottlieb is certain that ke ata not get , "> the m/P's (Richard Bissell) personal approval to release ‘them, as vould ; ‘ have been done if the operation haa gone thet far. We are unable to 7 discover vhether Esterline and Gottlieb are speaking of 2 single wo un cigar episode or (of two unrelated schemes. “We found no one elre with fixm recollections of lethal cigars ; being considered prior to ) August - “1960. ia SN eet ee oer PEATE ae
14-00000 Aargau seit * - on geen “4 The nee Rames merece tates eR ae BH rm eGR Sep Maes, “\. i ~ aerteNen ip ra “vith firm kmovledge of it. Dep latory chemical used by women as a depilatory--the thought being to destroy : a scheme involving thallium salts, a - Castro's image as "The Beard" by causing the beard to fall out. The chemical may be administered either orally or by absorption through the skin. Tne right dosage causes depilation; too much produces paralysis. idea--as to dust thallium powder into Castro's shoes vhen they were | berteves that the idea originated in connection with a trip Castro was to have made outside of Cuba. The put out at night to be shined. The scheme progressed as far as procuring the chemical and testing it on animels. recollection is that Castro did not sake the intended trip, and the scheme fell through. being given to use of thallium salts (perhaps against Castro) and something having to co with boots or shoes, remember with vhom he dealt on this plot. We found no one else remembers consideration does not fof r “hott tb t. ! : ie D3 i a: re ners } , . i 4 P. Lg “f 1 4 ‘ ae ! it oa f a) + $2 Mee RR oe Fa