104-10338-10048). “SEGRER NO FOREIGN DISSEM OCI No. 1586/64 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 4 June 1964 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America Since July 1963 1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are ‘continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed.the inevi- tability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to vio-~ lence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high. 2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re- captured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's mili- tants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and “open the breach.” On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperial-~ ists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accom- plished “many other revolutions like ours will ap- . pear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation." NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
13-00000 NO FOREIGN DISSEM 3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolu- tions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as pos- Sible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolu- tionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts. 4, Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi- _ Sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was success-— fully transferred following President Leoni's dra~ matic election victory last December; and the out- breaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April re- volt in which President Goulart of Brazil was over- thrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionar tactics When he visited Ene USSR-Iast January. This— year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. More- over, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US~Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then. 5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by~-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (be- fore the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British 2 NO FOREIGN DISSEM ~SECREF
13-00000 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means." 6. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serio rm of Subvergion_from Havana. is. its, train- ing of_other._ Latin Americans in the practical_arts_ of guerrilla warfare. “As many as 1,500 received such training” in: 1962 went is estimated that several traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train- ing. It has been learned that _''scholarship students" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" re- ceive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses _ the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military ; intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence net- works to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small armS, which aré Yéadily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla a tactics, Tneluding instruc~ ‘tion on how to 6perate independently in the country- side for extended periods of time. A separate train- ing school reportedly trains | Communist. youth from other “Latin American countries. The school's one- yéar “course is divided between the study of Commu- nist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are de- veloping extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects “pertinent” to “the planning and development of further, subversive. acti ity Detailéd questionnaires submitted to 2h Aye trainees requested comments on possible air dros zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques- tions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge eta. NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
13-00000 --SECRET- NO FOREIGN DISSEM 7. \GLatin Americans returning to their coun- tries after having received training in Cuba often take a round- about route to iL phbsaioae caine They then | go through “urope™ to ‘some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own, Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are givén Special | “training in clandestine con- tunicatfons, which permits them to. maintain a con- ‘tact with Cuba after they have returned home. 8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such “training in Costa Riés; "Panama; British Guiana, Peru, “hid Slse- where, “ “Thus ‘the Castro-oriented revolutionary “ef— fort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba. 9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Vene- zuela on 1 November, however, has there been in- controvertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long- established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms. 10. Another important aspect of Havana's ef~- forts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide 4 NO FOREIGN DISSEM -SECRET-
13-00000 fame ero NO FOREIGN DISSEM labor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its con- stituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's sup- port for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli- darity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress--which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian govern- .- ment--would be-modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroil, Brazil in March 1963. 3) NO FOREIGN DISSEM -SECRET-
13-00000 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM ANNEX Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion ‘1. Argentina Clandestine reporting for the past year con- firms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to estab- lish a coordinated subverSive effort in | Argentina. Ext reme— leit ie SRNR ae ee agents Aaa the "principal Support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peron- ists pee yes to be directed and supported *Oyaie Last January, saigkesg traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March, Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla war- fare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Sé@gundo™ and is probably in charge of the Small guerrilla bands discovered in north- ern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found. in the hands of the guerrillas pos- sessed 1! the same specifications as those found in ‘the 1 Novémber Venezuelan arms cache, It is be- Tieved-to" bE" OF “Cuban | orig Meo 2. Bolivia Cuban SubverSive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice -~l- NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET-
13-00000 ~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM President Juan Lechin, Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup- porters some armS and money to aid his bitter strug- gle with President Paz Este “said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to Supply the required ii government waS willing to and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to of- fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance, In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na- tional Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador. he Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to Séhd trained sub- versives into neighboring _countires, ‘It is pos- Siblé that Some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia alsa has. long heen a_ favorite transit area for terrorists. returning to Pery after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August “1963, a Bolivian Com- mumist Party” (PCB) member in north Bolivia led =~? NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET-
13-00000 “SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM police to an armS cache which was to be used to sSup- port guerrilla operations in Peru, Bolivian authori- ties have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro- Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year, 3, Brazil Before the overthrow of PreSident Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active Subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda Support to Communist and pro-~Communist groups. Operat- ing primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American Brother-. ‘in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for \ starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from Late 1963 ‘until the Aprit overthrow, 2 reliable! ay -——heTore the beginning Of Goulart's overthrow, Ha- vana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces, >t reportedly took the money to Brazil Cuba alSo maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newSpaper was financed by Cuba, The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues a NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
13-00000 SEGRE NO FOREIGN DISSEM had increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar or- ganizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba, Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese. Brazil under Goulart also affordec Cuba an. excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro- Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)-~ which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera- tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega- tion to the Cuban-—supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly sup- porting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba. In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them direct Stipport. He 4. British Guiana The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro~Castro. ThuS, Cuban activities in British Guiana, n contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime. Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is, probably_giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Part “pPppy>"ciban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice. ~4—— NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET
13-00000 SECREF NO FOREIGN DISSEM Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these Ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elisSewhere in Latin America, The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Com- munist countrieS, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Ex- port. —(GIMRES)_. Havana ordered, payment eet of GIMPEX (grgnepeenhey), ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. [It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house, Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses. Miofficials believe Cuban- trained terrorists “are behind much of the Sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese Sugar industry. A senior official has told the US Consul General that Six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical Support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in George- town. Another Source reports Some Guianese were rec@€iving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the - The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on sup- port for the presidential campaign of Salvadore Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist- dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visi ited Cuba, on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. “While there, he was promised financial Support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable Source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin Ameri-~ can country to enter our camp." _5— NO FOREIGN DISSEM -SECRET-
13-00000 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM aoe ie F wdent said some 40 Chileans would soon be ‘leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The EOUTCS SAG these CHLTEANS Bad Leceived ‘political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identi- tied 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as "subverSives," but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of chilean groups in Cuba, 6. Colombia Cuba has” been. providing funds. to._subyersives.. in Colombia: Since. "1960. . The pro-Castro, Worker- Student-PeaSant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)~-whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recip- tients of Cuban funds . A fairly reliable Source veported: * Ee snr are soy = tists Spb iesaic siege EEE REE SEXBHBRA to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity. Cuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian _ countryside, ~ rmy troops who are fighting” “the bandits have’ found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits, Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had Substantial success so far in directing bandit _aetivity for political ends. The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba, Some of these militant returnees have -~6- NO FOREIGN DISSEM CRET -SE
13-00000 © asset in San Jose. ig naan trom Castres ee — ete SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM begun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for anti- government action. Much of. the pro-Castro.acti- vity in n Costa R Rica appears to. jhave been directed. ee : en against f neighboring Nicaragua. ‘Cuba-trained réyolitionaries based in Costa Rica have on oc- caSion crossed into Nicaragua. The police in- Spector at a town in the Pacific banana zone re- ported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica at- tempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US, The Costa Rican. Saciety for Friendship with Peoples, a small Comnunist-front group déesiptied’ tO propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other Latin American countries, iS an important Havana 8. Dominican Republic The country's two militant pro-Communist or- ganizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faith- ful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, how- ever, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-CaStro organizations in the country. Quick reSponse by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May. One Dominican who has received guerrilla train- ing in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new or- ganization is to promote urban terrorism. A ter- rorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms NO FOREIGN DISSEM “SECRET
13-00000 ~SEGREtF NO FOREIGN DISSEM 9. Ecuador Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the Ecuadorean government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities has hampered Cuban ef- forts there. When the junta began to exile Com- munists and pro- “Castro extremists last . . 4 i 20l5...UD...1 dence in Havana,  ktpold a clandéstin é6éxilées in Cuba were receiving guerrilla warfare training before returning to Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities. Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard~line faction of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE) , is re~ portedly planning a trip to Havana in late May to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by then so that he can “prove his good faith" to the Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid. Other clandeStine sources report Cuban aid has peen offered to supporters of former presi- cent VYelasco Ibarra and that aid is being of- ferea to followers of former president ArosSemena. 10. El Salvador There has been little evidence of direct Cuban- supported subversion in El Salvador during the past 10 months, The Castro government probably helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for guidance and training. Havana radio, heard clearly in El Salvador, provides & propaganda line which can be echoed in locally published —Communist publications. eg Go “NO PORSIGN DISSEH SECRET
13-00000 NO FOREIGN DISSEM ll. Guatemala Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of Substantial Cuban assi LOGS sage WO DSS mae ‘ Mexican Marxist eens list cite often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is Said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists, Strong anti-Subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala, The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guer- rillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communica- tions and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets. “At least 64 ‘Guatemalans are known to have ‘traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandes- |tine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 jtraveled secretly and that these received training jin guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination, Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio. NO FOREIGN DISSEM “SEECREF-
13-00000 “SECREF NO FOREIGN DISSEM A French-language transmisSion is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses, The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba, The content of Depestre's broad— casts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla train- ing in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti, The long- time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for Sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire, _ “13. Honduras Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala, The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence | of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role, ao : Two recent clandestine sources 5 report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an ef- fective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organiza- tion with no direct ties to orthodox Communist ' groups, The Cubans are said to have selected ; | “ Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to * begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to | - investigate. their readiness for armed action against, Honduras ' military government . : Sip MRR Rate! enna aa OTE? — NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECREF-
13-00000 -SECREF NO FOREIGN DISSEM 14. Mexico The Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in ‘view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point. Havana may f£ di t, however, ig... avoid exploit ng_theendenic-peasant.. unrest..which 15_increasi neo iT Der nee? Oo, A clandestine source LS ported | - Gl Ltewhich has been behind much Or tne pea Unrest. he US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities consider- ably in recent months. Mexicans: ~traveleds-to~Cubain=:1963 ; yaefrom January~through April~of Nicaragua Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revo- lutionary organization. Most of this group's guer- rilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolu- tionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organ- ization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon. -Lil- NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECREF
13-00000 Loo wes , a DISSEM— Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in Ottober 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May. Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably re- ported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR). Cities a Bs belay” gia members “Another eroup” of recent ly_returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future. = _ _ : “om in tee 17. Paraguay Cuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and tra y Par: 1yan_exiles based for the most part ‘ineMontevausopmunieiay,,) The Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and ~12- NO FOREIGN DISSEM om, ay,
13-00000 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM tmmuatmeudaee, Sone TULNA nonbens have rece ‘embassy . treVotevddeo. Some FULNA members have received guerrilla training in Cuba. . A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the — program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani. Qillyssix=Rarapuayatis-traveléd=to" Ciba in-1963), However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana, 18. Peru The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. and 500 MIR members have received | guerrilla, txrain- ing abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably ‘upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the move- ment is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign Of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro. Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in renote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training... Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September, Castro-inspired extremists have exploited re- curring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have oc- eurred there. ~13- NO FOREIGN DISSEM SECRET:
13-00000 ~SECREF NO FOREIGN DISSEM is. Uruguay We have no evidence of Cuban support for revo- lutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighbor- ing countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuhan..embassy in.Montevidea has been particularly useful as.a transit _point.tox air fravel.to. Ciba of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for. Cuban propaganda for, “neighboring | countries, Cuban propa- ganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals. 20. Venezuela The current level of Cuban activity in Vene- zuela is considered fairly low. International reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented dis- covery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist campaign to disrupt the December national elections, and the presently increased capabilities of the. Venezuelan military and security forces will prob- ably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the short run. There is no reason to believe, however, that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high priority on Cuba's target list for subversion. Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly will continue, and may even increase. _ The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activi- ties, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963. The decision in late April of the central committee of the Communist party to continue using violence -~14— NO FOREIGN DISSEM -SEGCRET
13-00000 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM as a political instrument probably presages a gradual increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May led by Communist-dominated students took place in Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida, At the same time, one successful student-led robbery of a post office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery of the university payroll. Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist activities. EE ee EE ~15- NO FOREIGN DISSEM ASECRET
13-00000 SECRET KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963 SEGRET~ NATIONALITY January February March April May June duly August September October November December 1963 To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From ARGENTINA 18 27 47) 34 12 21 130 (14 5712 4 5 6 0 4 0 v7 ) 4 9 5 3 5° 4 222 (126 BOLIVIA 1 7 4 3 3 5 & 0 2 5 3 2 14 0 5 3 21 5 1 17 2 1 7 0 69 = 48 BRAZIL 9 22.«13 9 ts) 18 7 10 5 | 6 . 25 0 0 24 121 7) 2 162 8) ) 0 0 219 242 BR, GUIANA 0 4 0 0 ) 0 0 0 0 0 \7 1 0 0 7 10 0 0 1 o oO 10 QO 26 25 (51 CHILE 31 44 26 «20 13 42 20 8 9 14 3 8 20 1 22. 47 = =(175 1 9 70 9 54 18 ? 355 316 COLOMBIA 54.99 7 12 13 9 23-5 7 #15 3 7 29 1 6 14 17 1 8 14 5 1 10 4 182 122 COSTA RICA 9 0 0 29 \ 0 VW I 0 8 i] 3 12 0 0 8 0 3 0 | 4 I 10 0 47 56 DOM, REPUBLIC 0 2 0 0 0 6 2 1 4 2 0 2 37 0 | 8 19 0 iF 0 0 0 3 3 74 24 ECUADOR 20 0 20 5 10 1 oo 1 24 | 4 6 2 0 0 2 7 0 3 4 4 0 1 0 121 20 EL SALVADOR 7 2 0 0 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 4 4 1 | 0 3 0 6 0 0 i 0 0 26 «12 GUATEMALA 30.18 0 5 15 0 2 0 ! 0 0 0 6. 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 64 23 HAITI 0 0 4 4 0 0) 18 18 0 0 o 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 23.0 «22 HONDURAS wo 12 20 0 0 0 It 0 | 8 o ol ne) 0 8 0 0 0 0 7 0. 0 0 50 39 JAMAICA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 | 0 1 33 | 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 38 6 MEXICO . 1008) 22 0 2 8638 37-18 34 O54 14 42 65 28 34° O63 84 36 24 7) 23. «(27 49° 72 512 530 NICARAGUA 4 7 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 t 1 0 0 I 12 9 PANAMA 4 | 20 0 2 ] 2 3 2 0 3 0 15 it) é 0 6 3 | 1 3 0 0 0 3 61 24 PARAGUAY 2 3 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 I 0 3 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 PERU é 2 2 4 3 1 5 8 5 3 3 3 4 0 2 9 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 2 33°00 (38 URUGUAY ye 419 16 «14 8 8 8 0 5 12 9 0 7 45 1 16 56 é 3 27 1 0 6 13 158 130 VENEZUELA 26 9 2 3 9 9 ] 0 4 4 8 0 22 0 3 0 WF 0 fi 610 i) 0 3 0 13935 MONTHLY TOTALS 354 296 212 150 124 149 223 88 163 144 73.1030 «319 47) 104 21458784 76 380 69 99 =126 132 2430 1863 The peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batiste and of the "26 July " movement, and to the internotional architects’ congress in October. 640719 3
13-00000 KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA = JANUARY 1964 NATIONALITY JANUARY TO FRO ARGENTINA 3 BOLIVIA 1 PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA = 1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well=known Communists went to Cuba. l attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-— nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school, BRAZIL R. GUIANA HILE OLOMBIA 29 December 1963 =~ not previously reported — unknown, _ Returning from Habana celebration Sth anniversary of Cuban Revolution. An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to OSTA RICA ll ECUADOR L SALVADOR GUATEMALA | HAITI JAMAICA MEXICO NICARAGUA PARAGUAY PERU SURINAM RINIDAD URUGUAY . ENEZUELA Cuba for the 1 January celebrations, 3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was. discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration, 1 attended Architects Congress __. 5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. 13 ee So be ie) ones _ Gi TS a he Wool lr| enf Ope es on ee wo|Hlol~a m 148 91
13-00000 KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA = JANUARY 1964 ATIONALITY JANUARY TO FROM PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA ARGENTINA 3 {1 UNESCO delegate, 2 welleknown Communists went to Cuba. BOLIVIA 1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-~ nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school, BRAZIL R, GUIANA HILE 29 December 1963 =~ not previously reported = unknown. 15 | Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution, An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations OLOMBIA a(n = SHoits e > re O > € co toed wHolHlola 2 cS ess (oo w OSTA RICA 11 13 {3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at. which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration, | i |i attended Architects Congress CUADOR | 0 |5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. L SALVADOR | Of GUATEMALA ee AITI Re en ONDURAS a nn POP EXICO 45 ICARAGUA PANAMA (PARAGUAY 0 | | 3 PERU SURINAM RINIDAD ENEZUELA hao i) ra} Hod wr 148 91
13-00000 KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964 NATIONALITY MARCH-APRIL PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA TO ARGENTINA ll 10 1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban Construction Ministry. 9] oO 4 BOLIVIA 3~ Attending May Day Celebration. BRAZIL BR. GUIANA CHILE 14 4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16- Returning are members of delegation from School of Economy of University of Chile. COLOMBIA =f 7 | | COSTA RICA lj En route to Las ermany. 2—- In attempt to Po | obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara. DOM. REP. 4- Returning from 26th July Celebration. ECUADOR of ST EL SALVADOR 3 Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning . from military training in Cuba.  |GUATEMALA [0 [0 | | HAITI ae eee | HONDURAS] 0 JAMAICA of OO MEXICO [32.—«d 24 | 3- Attending May Day Celebrations. NICARAGUA_| 2 | _1_ : PANAMA | 2 | 14] 3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action PARAGUAY [Of 0 PERU pF UO SURINAN fo JO, TRINIDAD [0 J _0-| URUGUAY | 14 [11 _ VENEZUELA {170} pen wo oS joo iw] pont i TOTALS}