we Ne tae nt ad a SECRET -93- retranscribed exactly what Nosenkoe had said on the two different occasions in 1962 when he had referred to this case. The retranscription clearly verified : Nosenko's detail. Nonetheless, 211 subsequent papers we ee ner eneee mtn . . on the Nosenko bona fides question included reference i to his having claimed in 1962 that : in person. His denial of such a statement in all sessions j from 1964 onward was lost from sight. oe enone et Later in 1965, retranscription of the 1962 tapes was begun, faithfully transcribing Russian when Russian : was used, and English when English was spoken. These t transcripts were not translated inte full English, ‘ however, until mid-1968 under the auspices of the Office of Security reexamination of the entire Nosenko case. In late 1968-early 1969, a line-by-line commentary om the more significant discrepancies between the two versions was prepared. It required some 35 pages to cover only the major errors and the effects they had had in supporting the charge that Nosenko was a false -defector who “lied” and “changed stories." sipnenpeney manasa menneramneen ear pena Ree RpbeN aoe SECRET . aaa rateanal ‘ 2 sorb hg aie MVE ARCO ABD OTe I serene. NeeiTzS NOC baStaLRemdinLstaone AC ataN eS ner ae epmoAtet ae” Sm hee enema ate ' SEL fia inane are ache seaside BAe nee PE A eh ee, $I, ts a RR eta te tte aE CPOE * ‘ Ay 8 esl rielate tn atta ae ~peerei naemepmacedpiciiaizecater ramaieeortnerasentirenentancn Maryetnae™ ee = a Sa, ttebelatbald ee ater eee whe een hea amen pean armromee capi te aa i brood ee bore Uehdnd ere Piaeded st C. CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's Life Story : | Hytigabha ao sedeauwheot 1 eae eae? = «stn Ate lind ten ge a - Shem edd cade Mine ade & vale + catered 1 ree eh ih A Lief dione dst Do hs be 12 lel iota DE LR go eae. Pe
+ ee tae or ane eae see emt emanate espn eta shtEn etP Ds AP RARE tsDC we APD AE ENE APN LOAN PARE g -94- lL _[ At this time, however, Nosenko was restless, tense, and impatient with the tedious interviews with which CIA was trying to keep him occupied. It appears obvious that he paid Scant attention to the dates or terminology used in this draft, because he made only one noticeable change: he insisted on deletion of a statement attributed to him to the effect that he had attended a one-year course in counterintelligence at the beginning of his KGB career (a mistake dating from the 1962 "transcripts" by the second case officer). Given the volume of other erroneous Statements in this “biography” that he left untouched, one can only assume that he considered this biography an exercise of no particular importance. When hostile interrogations began on 6 April 1964, the inaccurate biography was used as the base point for measuring so-called “lies about Nosenko's entire life story. It therefore caused him to be accused time and again of “changing his stories." One of the first wrangles that arose in the hostile interrogations concerned his responses to questions on his schooling. Among other aspects of this subject, Nosenko told his interrogators that he had spent approxi- i mately three years during World War II in various naval preparatory schools--(rough equivalent of American high school-level military “academies"). The problem that arose in this instance was traceable first to a careless transcription by the second case officer but was exacerbated by ignorance on the part of the interrogators concerning the subject under discussion. Because it typifies other misapprehensions that complicate the Nosenko case, this example is worth relating in detail, The second case officer “transcribed” the tape of the 25 January 1964 meeting in Geneva, quoting Nosenko thus (underlining is ours): » » « When I first came here I graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations. I specialized in International Law and on the USA there. I came to GRU in 1949. Before I attended this Institute I was in a naval school. I aiso ° : studied in Baku in a navy preparatory school and I even studied in Frunze. And then the war . my ee hpedat tatgy we et ee Aaa ony SECRET tata Rey ARS aoe mmm reer -cerm namntnr mrmteat emai nipaMiiaamtenncea ans em asancran yA cau cen cn enwatnns enim me att mate mame EARN oly Nef Br sas Oe ee g 2 he ¥ . i: . 1 . b j i 1 £ s 8 Ban ano corre a : 4 3 i  stenmttiieameete Lite ee we CMake ntelons x ohl MLS et san wartvtthisionBibedons Ane eae Ae re LA LET Metin tee wy ellbace ii saet in gpenat ont pad Latin Gielen adnak bce demeber y } 1
14-00000 ese one mamta IED HEE ~ SECRET -95- . | : ended. The only time I participated in war- ‘ time activitier was when heavy combat was going on near Novorossiysk. They threw the students i from Baku into the battle. 4 7 i 4 g I 4 hte ate After we lost Novorossiysk the remnants which were somewhere between one third and one half ‘ of the students were brought back to Baku. When the war ended 1 had not yet graduated from Frunze and I was demobilized. t didn't want a military career so I went to the Institute of Foreign Relations in 1945 and graduated’ in 1949. Toward the end of the year in early 1950 the placement commission (raspreditelnaya komissaya) [words missing in original transcript] where I wanted to work. I said that I've had ‘some military experience and I'd rather have something along . that line rather than go to MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. They said I would be called on the phone and they would let me know. I was c@lled up by the personnel section of the old MGB. thy endbetatanved 0 dueb Cee hegeutatte AB ei anes cnet by teeta w To Nosenko's interrogators in April, "Frunze” meant only one thing--the Frunze Naval Academy, equivalent to the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. Unfortunately, the naval preparatory school to which Nosenko referred was named Frunze also; it was the prep school for those Soviet boys with aspirations for naval command positions who would later go on to the Frunze Naval Academy. ' schooling, he referred to having entered a naval preparatory school--at roughly the high school level, and in Russian ® called a uchilishche. This was, said he, the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School named after Frunze*. In 1942, the school was relocated to Baku because of the fighting around Leningrad. Nosenko's interrogators clearly did not understand what he was talking about, as they had no back- ground on these naval preparatory schools; the only Frunze they knew of was the Academy, and every time Nosenko men- tioned the prep school carrying Frunze's name confusion te Wronabimantharaaastnnitdl patient 0 - #In the Russian. language, the fact that a school-is named after a great man is always made explicit. Thus, in Russian, the George Washington University would be called the “University named after George Washington.” . aha dias orcuathn mitaoe sitter ubth ely cmon getncammh te satin be iL edhe” | | | | i , | \ | | . When Nosenko was asked in April 1964 toe discuss his . . : ; | j SECRET : . 4 “Ppseatan atten caeeiomcinernaren memantine Ett ehlewne eepanere tree Tee EOE PSMA Arar etEen anes 7 Te ewan the i i 5 4 oe ‘ 3 : 4 5 z f ‘4 fetten § ne
14-00000 NA eee nereene ne wen asa Gi BN AT SECRET -96- cog pee a eg + an erupted. At the end of several heated exchanges on this topic, with the interlocutors invariably at cross pur- poses, the conclusion was reached that Nosenko had lied in saying originally that he had attended the Frunze Naval Academy. The claim was then made that he had been made to admit that he had not done so. He then was ac- cused of telling stories, which were confused and contra- dictory, about the secondary schools he claimed to have attended. Asked repeatedly if he was then saying that he did not attend the Frunze Academy, he consistently replied . no, it was the Frunze preparatory school. This discussion was repeated several times during these interrogations, without the problem area's being resolved in the minds of the interrogators. Because of the lack of background on the part of the interrogators, a memorandum for the record, dated 1: April 1964, Subject: “Interrogation of Yuriy I. Nosenko, 4-11 April 1964," contained the following relevant quota- tions (underlining is ours): - « « On 10 April, Subject was interrogated in the morning and afternoon for a total of nearly five hours. Questioning covered his early schooling, his studies at the Institute [of Internationa] Relations], and his service in the naval GRU, both in the Far East and in the Baltic. Gaps and contradictions in his accounts cast doubt on whether he was telling the truth about the early years of his life and even raised some possibility that we may not be . dealing with the real Nosenko .. . ; . « . Under pressure, Subject admitted that he had not entered the Frunze Higher Naval School (Vysshaya Voyenno-Morskaya Shkola_ imeni Frunze) in 1944, but that he had merely attended the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (Leningrad- skoye Voyenno-Morskoye Podgotovitelnoye Uchilishche) of the Sune Higher Naval School. His story now is that he attended the Moscow — Naval Special School (Moskovskaya Spetsialnaya V.M. Shkola) in Kuybyshev from [9471 to 19497, then éntered the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School in Baku, completing two classes of this - school in Baku (1942-1943 and 1943-1944), and AOR PPE totes er Re Ot in RN GER Rte ot oO SORT 3 dover Semmens “= ntnens Ate Ane nt SRNR LIER ARES USANA AED, BB a -- we nem geae9n Nere mamnataney Cemce Tenement etal Ie, ar tid ts whe Pet ten Arm erEE OM geen oene rete Y atone “s “4, A 4 4 “4 \ enero vweeannre meremenae « s-epume tt ppneyen amanemgeRt, 4% me Stee corte hE 9 filctinb eeticcprei oo Yarns? at rey 4 (Aa Si resected tedeehaah ont « y sotheait Lae, wn wibentedil it, nee onbetoni Red ated ftvg a gle os 1 These. 0 BE oat vee EF tee So he hes 6 pRoades (Bab atihah oh BADE ab Teleliow 0 evita te Tek pnd nth do tpt 2 Anebad Ei thane rales Ja fen,
-97- ce Coe a the third class in Leningrad (1944-1945). Subject insists that he was given credit for successfully completing each of the four years of secondary schooling, but says that at the end he had the equivalent of 10 years’ educa- tion. He can offer no explanation for the discrepancy--by his chronology he would have - completed 1] years of schooling plus one year of kindergarten. Subject has been very weak in providing names of teachers and classmates and descriptions of school layouts and curric- ulum for this period, particularly for the period in Baku. It is interesting that {Nikolay Artamonov*}, who has identified pictures of Subject as being identical with the son-of-a- minister Nosenko whom he knew at the Leningrad i Naval Prep School in Leningrad in the period , 1944-1946, has provided information about the | history and make-up of this school which is incompatible** with Subject's story, as is i {Artamonov's] statement that Nosenko was a Class junior to [Artamonov] and would not have graduated from the prep school until 1946. Subject has never mentioned [Artamonov], and has not yet been challenged on this part of his Story. fame ge ee Further compounding the confusion on this one subject was the development of suspicion that Artamonov, cited in the memorandum above, was himself not bona fide. This doubt arose because Artamonov claimed to have Known the Nosenko in question, and, as shown in the paragraph cited below from a 21 April 1964 summary of interrogations for the second week, because his “own elementary and secondary : schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's ... ™ (underlining is ours). The following is quoted as an , excellent example of the reasoning process by which one 2 could at one and the same time be suspicions of Artamonov's bona fides because some of his information supported what Nosenko said, while also citing his reporting as evidence *Nikolay Artamonov is a Soviet naval officer who defected in 1959. : Lg GAB eet eGARERT I 0% SARL SESE SADA NO RIE FRI SEAR StS icin tanmtntiepaettnn de Sa ents **This is not a true statement. Artamonov's statements are Dt more confusing than clarifying. The possibility that Artamonov's memory might have been unclear was not considered. SECRET © (ipisenasneirorneee enact Penne stem str Seemann rs ett memes sm tres 2an me ten ec weep men tere et Dance eter or ee Enon . ea a. ee en ere tr resi Se wadaistietrode te. atid . wee o at + comfedit yoo Ticats dated. Ltn pSetr chore wm ibtedach g bulging matt welt on ere: en deeObie . Kone. Steehamunl odd. ete ak MB asad ee we dhe oo ae eT ee watlielye + ve Amey tate he ie Lelie ole
14-00000 a 8 Lente me nent HE HE om a i | | © perenne terme orn een SFE i SA nN te a cepatnhin cat he ERE ntnhertt gs pap amen ma ta a rare ce Sam rate TS. SECRET 7 -Q9R- that Nosenko was lying because Artamonov's memories of the schools differed from Nosenko's: » «'. Adding to the mystery of Nosenko's war- time years is the information provided by Nikolay Artamonov, the Soviet naval defector. When Nosenko's defection was first made public, Artamonov volunteered the information that, if this was the same Nosenko who was the son of a minister, he had attended school with him in Leningrad. Later, when shown photographs of Nosenko he positively identified him as the same man he had known in Leningrad in the - period 1944 to 1946 and gratuitously provided the names of six schoolmates from Leningrad that Nosenko should remember because they were prominent members of the student body there. Nosenko was subsequently queried about three of these names, but out of context and with no indication of who and what they might be. He immediately identified them as schoolmates, but positively affirmed that two of them had been the roommates in Kuybyshev in 1941-1942, while the other had been in the school in Baku. According to Nosenko, none had gone on to Leningrad. Of the names provided by Artamonov, Nosenko mentioned a fourth one independently, but although he originally placed him in Leningrad he later moved him to Kuybysnev and stated categorically that he saw him for the last time in Moscow in 1942, before going to Leningrad. Artamonov, whose own elementary and secondary schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's, has provided other information on the schools and dates which Nosenko claims to have attended which is incompatible with Nosenko's story but it has not been believed advisable to requery Artamonov on this until we can be certain that Artamonov is not deliberately trying to substantiate Nosenko's bona fides according to a prearranged plan which misfired owing to crossed signals or Nosenko's poor memory. In May 1965, in preparation for his own.set of inter- rogations, it apparently occurred to the 1954 defector that the original “transcript” should be rechecked for SECRET we ene OA Hy a baler ay t ‘ mam ten ns weep SOP TE Ee Ses Re atl etre dees chat tie Te “ ” fas? ? ct AES —— ete ears ud peer a 4! . emer is ~ ° wee wh fy ' fe ray ty sigs Bue dhe UY RUS boku we icthud Met. ak desitelbab ei shdbeaabdiliinn, — aii aisiecbda ad 4 Agee mae eter et oe Seren meet Mane ame HN REET one Aon ere ae aaa nde SOUR. oy gvintedhait « a Pete t0 dM Oat fale : a . wad + o* wn bee ene eae mn See Bd eae
14-00000 accion te sn meanest sereste Gece xcpa tarterstreattt enrichment retention teeters ene 9 * -99- -accuracy (he was right). After transcribing it into Russian first, he then transcribed it into English, cut with one unfortunate mischoice in wording. He transiated the Russian word “uchilishche" into English as “academy.” The Russian equivalent to the English “academy” in the sense of a college-level institution is "akademiya." The following is the 1954's defector's translation of meeting No. 3 on 25 January 1964: Telling about his entrance into the Naval GRU, Nosenko says: .. . I went there... I com- pieted the Institute of International Relations in 1949. I studied in the Juridical Faculty, i.e. ,° specialist in international law and spe- cializing in the US. Before the Institute, I studied at the Naval Academy (voyenno-morskoye uchilishche), etc. In the beginning, IT was Still in the Special School (spetsshkola). Following the Seventh Class of the School, I then studied at the Preparatory School (podgo- tovitel'noye uchilishche), was transferred to the Frunze Academy [sic--uchilishche]. The war ended. We weren't successful in getting into battle. The only time they sent us in was when we were in Baku. There was heavy fighting near Tuapse. We students were sent in near Nov., i.e., near Novorossiysk, There was heavy fighting there. We took part in these battles there and then returned when Novorossiysk surrendered. Our health was gone: less than one-half of one-third of all the students re- ..Mained, and they sent us back to the school. So, the war ended and I didn't finish Frunze Academy [sic--uchilishche) after demobilization. What to do? Bea soldier? I didn't want to. Study? Where? I went to the Institute of International Relations and entered it in 1945. And I graduated from there in 1949--the end of 1949 or the beginning of 1950. When the place- ment commission asked me where I wanted to work-- it is mandatory for the commission to ask--I said that I was a military man and asked that they give me something related to military. To sum up, the following problems typical of the whole case are evident in this episode: SECRET ee et a 4 “Biscartacer anemones cnet renee sn mee en anmomeThaene = aeting ma gnc stl te Hunn te ha nando. marmnin mes Shnn ate mamieten nan nmr anette eps ge FL a eedd 3 ry Se nat tioachde Bh octets LilagnetbigdbbaP es ot Aad rs wed 5 abteonent Hs nenteres sevelbia th Staledosts foe he 2 dm ated eater fn dawtieal vo t i q a t 2 4 ~ Cree tied artsimhindi taltbridlamen — nnbldlatenth ght act = heat ahh ms trade athas bale ab ee nagete = Sd ate ite 2 Shp k on Neb ithe =
14-00000 + D. , | os SRE ~100- 1. Nosenko had been misquoted in the second case officer's transcript, because the second case officer did not understand what he was talking about. He had referred specifically te the "Leningrad Naval Preparatory School named after Frunze," a fact once again uncovered by the 1954 defector's rechecking of the meeting tape, but not until May 1965. When Nosenko “admitted” to his interrogators in April 1964 that he had not attended the Academy, he didn't know this was considered an admission; he never realized his interrogators had thought he had made such a clain. 2. In general, nosenko's interrogators overestimated their substantive background. Nosenko's "stories" about the several naval preparatory schools he had attended during the war are difficult to follow, because war conditions brought about a number of reloca- tions of these schools: the Leningrad School was relocated to Omsk oblast but was still called Leningrad School; the Moscow School was relocated first to Achinsk, then to Kuybyshev, but was still the Moscow School, etc. Nosenko's interrogators were almost totally ignorant of these matters but did not know they were. Because they were unable to follow his detailed description of all these changes (documented by other informed sources, including Soviet historians), they thought something was wrong with Nosenko, not with themselves. SECRET ends On Nap Bee ON eR tae HOY be Se oe BPE BL A | = Jaf Gib it amramenrommens moran oe rrsaeae ae rCee AEAEACN TTEEE LTE PASM A METS PNAS EN MORN te fy Web aeaSATOEETE PERLE 3 Sag 38 OO 1 A EE REI sn Ty Ay = sae Ot 8 le banc ais iS er Baw + rere ana poate: semagsrep-aere npgere amlaebgeenbperymacene , tos vt btu Boe tomate oma ageg UPEpbia te « yet amdlatte, cadet tetisd Sines. tPA 1.2 reer agin “7+ seep prin meenennrnnonme © rap etn tre Tre war Badd bebe en oa, be, weeny 7 aacabhg eupianeta depo Se a cara st aS teint. «arse onbin Seahfgh Se te te cate ~
Beka monn S, 3 | -101- | 1 a 2 4 ; 4 Feeeek ete On pe BAD eon tient = Ue a ranma Mn» tt The second point concerns the question of whether i Nosenko lied in claiming that Abidian cased a dead-drop site in Moscow that we assumed Nosenke knew was crucial to the KGB apprehension of Oleg Penkovskiy. ae ted varied I deudbasas ate + ba On the first point, CIA had no record of Abidian'’s having a maid, because he did not formally hire one until a few months after his last letter mailing for CIA. How- 3 ever, the maid who served an American woman in the embassy alto informally took care of Abidian's apartment throughout the time period in question. Thus, we were : wrong, Nosenko was right. , i 2 ; The second point has yet to be subjected to con- firmation, but there is strong circumstantial evidence that Abidian "cased" iv.dead-dran site nat a : ence, but twice. : % H : yi 4 | } i 4 a i ‘ if 3 ! “4 i i : ee po Both these problems seems minor in and of themselves. ; a But they were not minor in the context of the inquisition ‘ a4 | to which Nosenko was subjected. Rather, the discrepancies ‘ 3 involved were evoked, as was every other discrepancy i : | arising from whatever cause, to bolster the case against ‘ | him. ; : % i E. GIA Assumptions about the Second Chief Directorate i “ot “3 | Lacking contemporary information on the.organization, - F { 4 { responsibilities, policies and capabilities of the KGB's ; 2 Second Chief Directorate from knowledgeable sources : ; - other than Nosenko, it was necessary for Nosenko's 5 ‘ | 4 a oe -4 ° . “4 j * * - SECRET ; boo . : iH 4 aa rem ER A TELE EY EA AIEEE At LONI LT tt ATED at Dt TET a ELIT 08 BE My et il re BN al ee SR tiie do | ; * . ? ‘
SECRET or’) wy . : i ' . -102- wb ; DA interrogators to extrapolate from pre-1954 defector | : information plus that received from Goleniewski and | * : Golitsyn. Not one of the sources cited below by the y B : principal case officer had ever been regularly employed “|e 4 i in the Second Chief Directorate--except Nosenko. I ath ‘ 3 i In a memorandum of 20 October 1964, the principal ' : : case officer set out to demonstrate at great length : that Nosenko’s claiz to the position of deputy chief of i 4 i the American Embassy Section between early 1960 and late ’ i 1961 was completely false. Having informed his readers i ° i that this position was one of the most important in the } : : entire Second Chief Directorate, he then proceeded to : 4 present a “job description" for it: { : i . ' | | : ' * } . | : 4 | i 3 H i k . ° Z 4 JY La f i c t Be Re enn aD Ake ON omen temmeerne ee Arte minster meine eeainwrtan mieanctote main yaden © ate FTE ATS O A OAL Rt eet age ree tat SS fa, 4 5 y H : Sate «
14-00000 f 3 orenassany 4 Poy fr. al! ra avian. at €-3 a [ge] pe J | a , se ethan HER oh oan ? t at 4, wt deedbaudte - te dle ae ened kee, ’ meepep ee weet ores ws wt ay sts oa meg tite ¢ 5 Foe ner th = one gt Hostile interrogations in January 1965 produced a different picture. Nosenko said that, as deputy section chief, his principal responsibility was to supervise operational activity against American embassy code clerks. His detailed knowledge of this activity and his description of innovative programs he had instituted , in this area of operations have, with few exceptions, been fully verified by investigations and already.existing * ; i ‘collateral reporting. 4 * natal ot alba Pia ~ Bibb tons rank Gt Mee ot ure out an 480 MPR ERES ve COE Se He es aieh: TART ER Pa Bie realy pare eta BENT ee i RET =: Sppignesteomen enero aA tGicwa thse yop te ments enese onaner apy mene tt ti «Tes en Pa mat ei ws oo ' ft ptt Ps ‘ st Sesh, : stag ny pa ny my 4 : 7 eo ‘ £ . : é ‘
14-00000 Sondie aees LER UER AE ot: LOLA ert eT SERRE oi eteme tet ae pean eye ceaRe tpliaite stains etna, owe pene M Rte teeta cate de- wee oon eae oa ae i a sae sree en eects entire eine meaggy = oem so seeret : ~104- As for other aspects of his “job description,” Nosenko said simply that he did whatever his chisf told him'to do, and, while he granted that he did from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined above, he denied that he had any such fixed administra- tive responsibilities. He contended that the other officers in the section were not children and did not require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to o it. . The outline of the duties of a “deputy chief" was erroneous, because it was based on a misinterpretation of the Russian word zanestitel, the term Nosenko applied to himself when speaking his native language. When the meaning of this terms was researched in 1968, a clear distinction was drawn between the American and Soviet conceptions of a "deputy": "*Zamestitel," or “Deputy,” in Soviet bureau- cratic practice and usage is not limited to denoting what we think of as the number 2 in the office, but rather is a broader term which can perhaps most accurately be rendered in English as “assistant.” Soviet offices, at least at the higher levels, commonly have several “Deputies”; some may have five or six or even more. In keeping. eae a ‘with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does” not carry with it the same sense of responsi- bility and authority paralleling the Chief and of automatic replacement as the American term. The Soviet position of "Deputy" is probably not as intimately associated with a ‘ specific slot as is the American position of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at all. In addition, the outline of a “deputy chief's" duties can be considered tendentious because it was de- ; Signed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability that Nosenko clearly did not meet. Had the principal case officer examined the validity of the criterion more closely, he could easily have determined for himself that it was unrealistic. CaM maken BR ee Nyt veces te ate AY atta et ne How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be was also brought out in a paper written by certain SB. SEGRET Arete 2rd te ere, Set ot Bes . -, Ae ot ceact wee : a4 - . eae P cau. \aShereh mint Aetetrnaninntneaeeatitetnat “BE¥E: bee thsi Chote sia parerantth ntact as ad ieee! RST Blo fag gE aga Seemann Vn eh Lt GT Unsere enema cE perenne: wn Cn me cree tebe sein 4 ere ana semen Tenens ee emma pete manners eenret é + at onde Leb Seta whe See tee ea Y arabe ey ah ie Me ng a mnttibart iTee sana g ry sa enpetagn gunn $ . ee 1 ere ert en tear ger aN te gere eS aa! alles otal Medial adie co S es J Bales aetbe Fae ab Wa thereon ve ote oh 4 wah dene we etta tease tae 5 y * , bits Hebe cah ata toctige fa a scr, Kant mseeneieaih aah te
14-00000 chet ene ene fee aS ee vape-TeaRe SECRET -105- Division officers in January 1969. ._The following ex- cerpt is instructive: {Officer No. 1] I believe that some of our assumptions are too finely drawn, with the consequence that, at least in some instances, Nosenko's asser- tions have been improperly impugned. [Officer No. 2), 00 This possibly exaggerated view is also apparent when we question Nosenko's ignorance of inci- dents that we know occurred and which we con- clude, or at least suppose, are KGB-inspired. Finally, and possibly the most important, is the * * “as opposed to SECRET : . i. oe + pst RAMEE TEIN A ER NR ae aa NN AA REO rn A nC owe See ee mee me eek 6 te to _ a x EN i < MES eter meena oe eC erstret matin, SE un ae ntalin eteeaey tol gipae leh = Rate typin perder gh anil toiuste “ae eae we Spee wh x oreo RPE R A HHA orapagTUR parties ae nee Seta sean
SECRET -106- weno vemat eo alee s mtlantes at Thus, largely because of the influence of Golitsyn, i the Agency greatly exaggerated the competence and, in- ; deed, the authority of the KGB. Even though this ‘ defector's claims were often extravagant, they were re- ceived with very little reserve by senior officials who in turn applied them across-the-board. On a different conceptual level, this pattern of exaggeration was applied . to individual positions within the KGB; since that organiza- : tion was conceived as an all-seeing eye, it seemed to fol- : low that individual officers within it would partake of its omniscience. Such habits of thought, regrettably, ' were self-reinforcing in a situation where the objective of CI analysis was not to uncover the truth, but rather A SMe ge om 8 to prove that a particular present or former Soviet rs i official was part of a grand plot against the security of the United States. It made possibie constant exciting { discoveries of duplicity on the part of any Soviet source | who came under analysis, simply because he could rarely ever measure up to our expectations of what he ought to have known, accomplished, or said. ° F. The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involve- ment of Nosenko therein. SECRET & ony see gh iyi: bers ham tne rere rena et nena ~ nn ea oe ’ 1 2 arco oar bed A ROSE Ie a tl ait beta 8x Matte ole! ot thee ea Bee if 2 ana ct mntLen NER RCL fate “ee eamntveerptatneneen ry ee nry pte poeereon A mtg op 8 ati mene Ae, Laipaees, cay Y eeremen en ~ : the! . ‘ ry we wo haa
14-00000 ‘ercapteer cate, 10 eva ttl Oriani RR A 2s: PCD cA EES MATRA NCR AIT RAAT ANT eee nine 4b ntieE emmaeromtnbnneties cee 8 nemepees ornament a Ff z BY Ble ? en tte SECRET -107- Prologue It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn should have become so involved in the retrospective analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a great deal about it. Perhaps they would not have become thus involved had it not been for the dis- information hypothesis. Some time after 19 June 1962 the principal case officer was given access to tape transcripts of de- briefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who had defected in Helsinki in December 1961. ‘In a memorandum written by the principal case officer dated 27 June 1962, the day after his inter- view with Golitsyn, he set forth his views on “Possible Control of [Nosenko]."' He opened with a statement: “Detailed study of [Golitsyn's] produc- tion in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the possibility that [Nosenko] may be part wot a major Soviet disinformation operation . .. Implications of the Popov Case Unfortunately for Nosenke he had, at the end of his first meeting with the principal case officer : in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I°11 teil you how Popov . was caught." Feelings ran high over this case, . ae “ etr Popov was a CIA sourcé within the GRU : to October 1959, when the KGB : rolled up the opération in Moscow. He was the most : important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any informa- tion Nosenko might have cn how the KGB had learned of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of great interest. — POS rs Leer, Se ara! In Nosenko's discussion of Popov’s compromise, : he explained that, in January 1959, the KGB had had aewens § ES BN eC ie ps oo Aiea at SECRET h. | | | , | i | | | i | 24 ay 2 dada bes sin gs tee Daal eT tT ae aston am ge nites a bal a
14-00000 ' ey SRT aL -~108- under surveillance a member of the American embassy in Moscow who, they were certain, was a CIA officer When they observed this man, Georg? Winters, clandestinely mailing a letter in Moscow, the KGB intercepted the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr Popov, and came to realize that this Soviet was working for CIA. He was arrested soon there- after and sent under KGB direction to make several clandestine meetings with another CIA officer, Russell Langelle. Finally in October 1959 the KGB apprehended Langelle immediately after such a meeting, with material in his possession just received from Popov. The Popov case was over. Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information concerning the Popov case had been slight. As of the time of his defection in 1961, he knew or believed only that: ° a. There had been an agent leak- ing Soviet military, political and intel- ligence information to the US. b. When CIA officer Russell Langelle Was assigned to Moscow, he was going there to handle “a special agent or mis- Sion... c. Surveillance of Langelle i in Moscow then led the KGB to Popov. ; Nosenko, for his part, ‘said much the same thing but added that the KGB had been led to Langelle through their surveillance of another CIA officer in Moscow, George Winters. Unfortunately, to the principal case officer no statement meant what it urported to mean. Under Golitsyn'* s influence, 3 his doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides led to : the use of an analytical technique that he described as trying "to read the case through a mirror to find its implications if it is bad..." By the time this June 1962 memorandum was written, the principal bth oh fd te case officer had decided that the story of the Popov ; compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area to Z determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by 4 the KGB. ; | § ae SECRET “ay aatatan emcees So NGA Danae MEARE ARREST aA at LATA SOREL AEG ORES A AAA RT EE AEC eR 11 ered eoaat en Ma dh. roast wapteah be Lap oeigeee) atten. ucatek ablahenl 2 te hE Wes Gam attesab thelite due dat Zihbgiratid ins ao tabrin he veer Nagy nent wast thaw toe thie Asante dedastie 2 eed tack meee tree am STI cat hte la dled ora ead mate hah erlinea cdiarhs enact Moone cbs ay Adnaiiare te ‘ matenn + - wa etal oe sat teil, re “Reet ot bee
14-00000 tone eeeery -109- we PR Deere olen ' oe Golitsyn’s 1962 reporting on how Popov * was compromised, i.e., identified by name ; through KGB surveillance of Langelle in Moscow ; . in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the . name of the officer surveilled. The Golitsyn ~ : report was actually completely omitted from a 17 April 1963 memorandum. (Why this omission passed unnoticed is not explained in any records in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn gave a com- pletely different story of the compromise in June 1964, after he had read all the Popov case materials, this story became the Golitsyn gospel and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964 version shortly, but first some additional back- ground is needed. Seemperageerae rere semen nope mene nea eat bad vino Blade ite tena wkd Sage LSE eshte dbarmedsdtne tenia: uteteeins he ay inotecteibn natin cat on . Since Nosenko had said that Popov was com- promised through KGB surveillance of Winters, the ‘mirror’ technique indicated that this was not the case. The mental leap from this postulate was that if surveillance of Winters was not the cause of the compromise, then recruitment of Winters t. by the KGB was the logical possibility to be ex- £ plored. £ 3. ‘ Wale am tent hale Lat De The alt ate ceo se erie cnaeanae m  Ane a ee eee a a ra ea aa wa ene oe thatched oad LP gempeyesinee Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his . friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva with whom Nosenko had gotten drunk on several eceasions. Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer, Nosenko specifically denied that he was. Seek mm » few OM She Sell oe ee tap dees ot ater ao gaat te a tan eta hind SECRET - ieee REARS NEY DOV eee AE EASA Oo NC Thy TCA ERE ARCO ets Resa end AOE me AS ran “ . ” . etessant initia telat Sk. (Teena aman EA EB SS = f illgthe y ty Gabonese ¢ oe nathan eae any ei amen ce cine al pany
14-00000 erp eer et RAED AE NS oy yeahs Ae pA A Rar ets ecu RNS eps RENCE LENCE RRA TAN AN me AN I Nn gy NaN Mtn es eat mL Oem . SECRET -110- His contact with) : Tin Ko: duced e by Komarov/KoVShUK, WaS thérefore held to be not a coincidence but: We cannot find a convenient explanation for Kislov's role in this theory, but it appears significant ... A further twist concerned Golitsyn's and ‘Nosenko's renortino_on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY to Washington. | 7 — ecm ¥ ___\ who had been recruited and had w oscow in the early fifties. In the first cable of 9 June 1962, in the principal case officer's memoranda, and throughout the second case officer's “transcripts” of 1962, this agent was,consistently misdescribed as a garage mechanic, although Nosenko in fact always called Frm | Thanks to this major error in notes and transcription, the FBI was hindered in its investigation of this lead until Nosenko corrected our misconception in January 1964. The FBI already had located the one possible candidate for this lead but could not actively pursue the investigation until this con- fusion was cleared up. By December 1965, they finally succeeded in obtaining a limited confession fron a mr: lee iS Confirmed the essentials of Nosenko's reporting of 1962. “shone a encanto LASS SS esSeen amm nm wee ee eee ne . eee eect teeta ide tae Tw + | se ialaeagte Mere grandee oot net Sat ogy de he” al zt sneer meme ceremenenaerecee eaten enter ttiae tos e] ’ SET uals bat EI eats oA . 5 ae soy Limtald Matuatavainéne edittpenduothiscaetldic, rete ape neg ne SAT tn eRe : i + 1 i i i : Elen ee OREM TBAT tt ot Lady ow 1 sas he ee Ag 6 1 — 5 a meson hatst Ted RDG —MMeapttetels mba abated od ~esmarey rise spe a 4. . yoke oe ‘, * f ) } i § ? . Be tt i: " 4 t x ¥ ES +o 5 fot song ‘ van enh wad ob, aacdl tlhe Reclishetn willie -— reeeeees
14-00000 a ee al ee HBR. DERE SALA DESD EILEEN AP REI TLTEA LS LIS ACIS IEDC DITORSTEAC SERIES teense mente at arte gagy Mt N= 6 . Aptian & 3, 4. . £ Bae gl ot died uatisanade 2 ~ SECRET ae . ye a1 t 4 wey Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on “Popov Compromise Theory i a ‘ 2 Without our going into details on the Penkovskiy “| : a case, it is important to know that in October 1962, J? 3 only four months after the first Nosenko meetings, rt 4 the KGB dramatically announced the arrest of another (3 penctration of the GRU--Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. This was yet another blow to CIA, even more serious than the Popov arrest, and a great deal of worried thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's ex- posure. oe Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions within CIA--especially Soviet Russian Division-- that there must be a KGB penetration of CIA for two suc j ithi years. not ‘ ae aarti ee Kamee * Betti etl Penkovskiy (like Popov) had been exposed to the KGB through its omnipresent surveillance in Moscow, senior SR Division officers interpreted this report as proof of KGB disinformation designed to conceal KGB penetration of CIA. beet Ae teendaee agent eenagens mwryees rove Golitsyn's 1964 Story In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko'’s co version of the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated ‘ that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962 stated that the KGB did not consider running Popov as a double because he could not be trusted. He then went on to give a completely new story of the Popov compromise, diametrically opposite to his original information. i Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov (first name not given), who had been in the KGB in Vienna during the period Popov was there, sus- ‘ pected Popov of being a Western agent and made : known his suspicions. At the time, no action was i taken by Kotov's superiors. In 1957 or 1958, how- ‘ ever, when the KGB received similar information ‘ from another source, Kotov was sent to Germany be- : cause he knew Povov and was familiar with his back- . : ground. (Contrary to his 1962 report, Golitsyn here implied strongly that Popov, by name, was identified on war hte allt dS gyiibbadatn 1 tudadatotdi take’ BGS. alta mene tye ay . . ‘ , . ‘ . - , aan a weg as’) Belin ieee oh dich aid Reid Oa ee ee eee eet oe Lad SECRET s ay te a A ae T Penapete re ay + athe
14-00000 seewelacembte firmer ss pontine: 3. tteeste beat Aesth Bch te kthOW Att RSENS AERA eileen A A REN carries em gy ent tener Nant coeecalhe antennae sete SECRET -1iz- by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957 or 195°.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated within the framework of the facts that follow. On 21 November 1963, Chief, SR recorded the passage to Golitsyn, through the CI Staff, of all materials passed to CIA by Popov, including English language rons crjots_of_all_operational —_ ings held with Popov _ | Thus, by the time Golitsyn was commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise in June 1964, he had become aware of everything Popov had told CIA, specifically what “In view of the fact from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate to suspect that he had recreated a story of Popov's compromise based on deductions he had made after reading the Popov transcripts. Thus, the 1964 decision must be thrown out of court. The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated Unfortunately for the course of events in the Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn'’s 1962 version that was ignored in favor of his “facts” of 1964, which condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962 version had supported Nosenko. The reason for this is obvious. The Popov compromise hypothesis had been feeding on itself for so long that it had come to be treated as faci, with the result that the sub- ject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus paper test of every Soviet source. If a Soviet source reporting to CIA on Popov agreed with Nosenko that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent-- @ penetration of CIA--had compromised Popov, then that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever- growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration(s)- of CIA. By further extension, Nosenko's failure to produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been SECRET BLA A WD veh alate pty Pe He epee EAR rE 4% what’ Arb apart Fritts wa =” . 1 peje pang esermerte mene te 8 a SCARE APOC te uN RE ee Cm SereeA Te ae AERIS Hoe nS Torrente a a OE See cd Ff cote etcnegeneae OF owe cep netiateter eed nae Se oe . oe -w on 4 i oot sinaebocus pores qreenathremtn seen path mm sehglogee —tacatetd Pi pidnaeies Hale easy Soquel pea tede Batten Seabee eo ttsopldbteaaied es EUR Mens hp am Gatlida dade s2utiaa seo wince dlbieetnat Siaie o ow cxidanle ance ESeEs Mi ehdidnub di. — Shield anata ati beiatigtathns dase gag . i Sree
14-00000 : any enemy ate atten see ee AL END Sew eh cag te te ne eee “ap ott * ECRET -li2a- compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was interpreted as proof that indeed such a penetra- tion must exist. - The acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn guaranteed not only that Nesenko could never be seen as bona fide, but also that all other Soviet sources must be Considered suspect if they supported Nosenko's story. The overall result was to distort seriously for a number of years the ability of the Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona fides of any defector or agent. ra SECRET 5g SG Maa aches PHA AL AO ATA I th OR BEES BEB EI RARE LIT SENSED ADT ser Nn cedars NEB ine EI . ao ~ * casei ne RINE T RI 9 deen neR eR wm nee nee rane TS cmeenspenemieian ne enema mene saben d Ahn 6% tet EERE RED AR se plaepeiasens, bE mabey Aa Ara Tate MEME terse tat a WSS F geen ae i 4 a H : 4 _-a : AAP ERR ciao ts a2 hah dob ce is , wean tire f onb MELD SAT dees nite shyt nt das eatinad.. “ t iw x my nas tale de ww} i 4 Pa . AES 1B on ee + Br a a
14-00000 wets ot cone ane eee LAT Te “ee Mo Saino SatPh Gy vila tld he Bon Sse EL GL Lar tae aha ata eh haere cates Sacra varie aovatiodmre weiss Fm nate va (Bite, _ at fepheha Pats bat ee beth Casas RRR Le RRL aR AR Ra EERE PETN “eee RMSED Leib diieetnontte anatt eltazattattes cet casstonmanee . eat ¥ SECRET -113- CHAPTER VI Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and _ Application in the Nosenko Case Cal. There can be little doubt that the handling Nosenko received as a supposed dispatched agent would not have taken place precisely as it did had it not been for the Soviet in- telligence practice known as dezinformatsiya. Furthermore, the timing of Nosenko's defection, some months after that of Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided information on some of the same or similar persons or leads as had Golitsyn, and Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of a dezinformatsiya operation--all these factors combined to preclude “normal” professional treatment of Nosenke. As a defector, Nosenko's bona fides should have been established, or not established, on tne basis of careful and sound analysis and investigation of the information he provided under standard interrogation procedures. In actuality, he came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was therefore based upon this prejudgment. Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of long Standing that has been defined or described py numerous sources through the years. Two representative definitions are as follows: Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the are deliberate ant purposeful dissemination of false informatiop regarding accomplished facts and/or intentions, plans of action, etc., for the pur- pose of misleading the enemy. Such disseminations may be accomplished by means of the press, radio and television, agent reports and communications, operations, etc. The term also refers to the in- formation itself. Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the term dezinformatsiva is used to denote false, in- complete, misleading information passed, fed or confirmed to opposition services for the purpose of causing these services (and their governments) te reach erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to the USSR. SECRET ert ee oe ice ae nro Ae age ARS On apace dee i eC E 7 ty te dee tht RS CER SG ~ on a? » tesla Be if ve é “ad “te 4 “8 Lod wchect hens rev nance Paina rats &b Mameedd ie frearyy teperiepnnee ween atthe te oe ap BHR bala oF a hetteo ena ut wide Fe Bea ae actual ose? awetalbbr Gamd to at a aera tet eet
14-00000 i 485 erg CDA atess ceil a CURRAN eRe me iatmemATL antinee mnie ee _ time to time. Each geographic component handling foreign we ener epee 1 ’ Or roe " t ; -114- i 4 A ad By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to Golitsyn, the Soviet government hopes to ensure that the policy decisions of a gi:-en country will be based-on a false impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture. Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world, to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly discrediting, i individuals who are considered a threat to the national 4 interests of the USSR, or to weaken or dissolve, create or Hy strengthen certain political parties. e Mate aranremnenite nthe re ed one Amaern nies v2. sezeeb ws testunscbebbstebon a thes With regard to the definitions quoted above, Deryabin, _ Golitsyn and others have spoken from knowledge gained as Soviet a state security officers. However, implicit in all definitions is the fact that dezinformatsiya is not an activity that is a : the exclusive prerogative of the security organs. It has : i always been carried out as a matter of government policy, as ; an activity that at times may involve the security organs. . we dn totetonenlt tatale Before 1959, there was no separate dezinformatsiya de- partment within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations), although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from eh ees fee atte PET see intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya i work within its own sphere of activity. All such work was carried out with the approval of higher authorities within. ‘ the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of i Foreign Affairs and Defense, and even in many instances with i the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU. t It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya ; insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign i 3 { wae WRT Dip cote 2 taant med» intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized within that unit, and not until 1961 that the concept of dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking a ade» o counterintelligence officers. ; a wu eh shila TEE BaP te The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for 7 Soo Te oy hate while under interrogation follow- LO Th ing his dere ry 1961. The information he provided : 4a was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the : aa subject of dezinformatsiya from as early as 1953-.and was in . : 3 fact not only a ranking Polish intelligence officer but also SRS 3 a KGB agent. While Goleniewski was not the first source to refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to er tod Mate pan semeynseh Pedi Pere eke eet SECRET wees ‘ ate 245 oae RE seca ed mati. um. aoe weet caespbnsthntacsmAe Hpmrainsnnatmeae natn tents seman te ia ~ “aR rte ss Nate Wa abte'seprae YR AaB TTF 5 Sonatas nui ~ 2: ‘ae 4 wists a 3 hee
°¢ anane ae Ss eo bo epee ar geet ae CS 3 : one ie SECRET -115- newt tee oe i ve ete . : a nn . 7 t wood het aboan dds baal: ree neem Deans CIA consciousness as a technique.to be reckoned with in our analysis of the USSR‘s foreign policy. It was his claim that the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence ser- " Yy . vices played a major role in the implementation of such , policies. woe Wes ae gat ub die Specifically, Goleniewski provided information that was to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer. Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB dezinformatsiya was the protection of Soviet agents by means of action designed to mislead Western security services. He listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya operations those designed to confirm unimportant true informa- tion, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the , reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes mislead- ing information to anti-Soviet governments. Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation might be designed to discredit accurate information of signi- ficance received by the opposition through sources not under Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the veracity of the source or sources of this true information. tang teeta Ze tt does de wae Tid ae koa ne ly seat Ae ae nest Beast Goleniewski stated further that the information passed : through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis i of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e., ; could stem from defector damage assessments. One means i obviously might be the channeling of information at variance with that provided by the defector. Another means might be the provision of “give away" material, which neither added ° to information already in the hands of the opposition nor, by the same token, did any particular damage to the KGB. ; In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some 74 of their own agent assets in the interest of enhancing the Teputation of an agent penetration of ofe of the anti-Communist intelligence services. (That this latter technique was used to advantage by the KGB in building Heinz Felfe as a pene- tration agent within the German Intelligence Service has been : assumed in most analyses of that case. Felfe was a KGB agent | enviar BAGEL) Beosthrotd tiation or Saket, for all of the ten years he worked for the German Intelli- - gence Service, from 1951 until his arrest in 1961. During fe ’ this period Felfe was able to work his way up to the position :. of chief of the Soviet Section of the German counterintelli- 2 gence staff. It has been postulated that Felfe's rise in the - . German intelligence ranks was assisted by the KGB, which was Lo, oy willing to sacrifice less important agent assets to enhance a Felfe's reputation and position as their long-term penetration a me, agent. : : ESM Liha bny Septem igisbcopee 22a aghne SECRET SA TELEGSTSSIWR wom nara A RTE EMER At Suan meni aan anne nn ate At sar ann mn manne tates owe eas senenmei we ARNE Re R a ate, Medi Bede Smeal oe seid Lach “gtad AbD tele so baad* + or * * —
i Sa obdis ne roa ad wa, Cay : 1 j © & ~116- - |e Bessa = : 1 { 3 wh bs In all its essentials, the information provided by 4 Goleniewski was confirmed and elaborated upon by Golitsyn, who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant — : Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after : Goleniewski. In addition to the general definition of dezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya unit; the latter would search i:. opportunities to exploit the situation, after review of tne probable areas of informa- i tion revealed to the opposition by the defector. He indicated : in this connection that the Disinformation Department of the ; KGB maintained extensive files organized on a topical basis, t containing all information on a given topic that was known ‘ H (from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double i agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposi- i tion intelligence services. For example, a KGB officer assigned to Beirut to work against the American embassy who defected to CIA would be assumed by the KGB Department of . : . Disinformation to have told CIA e.erything he knew about : 4 ve KGB operations against the embassy and embassy personnel. ; if E By reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Depart- 7 ment of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent 1 ' to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to CIA. tenn 1 vem meegpicees wantin wrens arpa, On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinforma- tion and by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the West. However, the two men were not similarly received by CIA when they presented themselves as defectors; they received com- pletely different handling, based on quite different assess- ment of the information they provided and their motives for defecting. Golitsyn wastaccepted as a bona fide defector in relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected . as a bona fide defector, as explained bélow. ou, . Tak ee oe ‘8 Betetes Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961. Information that he provided relating to the organization and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual and true, i at least in part because there was relatively little record - dnformation against which it could be compared, but also because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable. ' “Seema beubllen Topher nF maneleimepasipeietlingneten TI cub mynIntioeteremuinmcRret vere wet tate deta oor kee kot | In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information . Y “4 “4 . on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings were r 4 limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to i . | 4 SECRET } 3 © szeamsec anne sr state fe isc stue AN tt Sailer mcthet a etek AAU A At tS 9 OTST REE  lalelnCTT OMS EAT Ty enero —~ - orem meee won mere . . ae too Sdwtlo op ‘ é . ° ny 2 doe a a an
q wey te She, or TARA ees a: SO ae ee SECHET F _ -117- t pte db adthhy ei edith. ex tes nts a aba en ATT NDS ra be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these holdings. Finally, he provided a <heory of KGB operations that was not only accepted at face value but received with - Outright enthusiasm. Given the value of his information, plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included an obsession with the evil inherent in the KGS and an emphatically-stated wish to “fight against the KGB," his bona fides was accepted in March 1962. 2 BAe + sitenecyramennosattomeniermeremtnhte = —wekermenpmaympmintrnn ey SEE; set sttgnaetea Em a hae Bese PS ‘ . The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in :; 1964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did * not receive standard treatment as a defector whose bona fides would be determined on the basis of the information he pro- ; vided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves i ' reference to Golitsyn. As explained in Chapter III, Golitsyn : himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the : trust placed.in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to . . label Nosenko as.a deception agent. 4 . woven oe ey ts ere neatly 4 This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts with CIA in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities * that was similar to that provided a few months earlier by ‘ : Golitsyn. Because CIA counterintelligence officers had been - warned by Goleniewski that they should not be “taken in" by false information fed to them through no matter what channels, the “duplication” or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko -» Was viewed with extreme suspicion. This original doubt led “ to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn soon after the former's defection. The paranoid Golitsyn * immediately saw Nosenko as a _ Person sent out to discredit or ' @ven assassinate hin. 2 ore ene tated ane tom rere nae oe en oP BLT Re IM “etre bet, Ie a ghee RA ot “Oe re i Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence offi- cers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an ana- lytical technique that has been referred to variously as “double think” or "mirror reading." This “analysis” led to the con- clusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us what the KGB wanted us to believe. Thus, everything Nosenko | said had to be "interpreted." If he said that the KGB had been unable to recruit any Americans serving at the US embassy _ dn Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had | been quite successful in doing so. If he provided information i wae tt hated tel sel semed on a given topic that we had already received from another source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that : particular piece of information, hence the other’source un- - 3 doubtedly was a KGB agent as well. And so on. Facts were -~ discarded or ignored when they did net fit the hypothesis eth. . + Aton? Sts at ae aBbldie fe. as we i Babee 8 SECRET oe Sesto artes Seine ARR AESS eee nic tt bene iC ea ibe per IE AESOP SLED OEIC ILLICIT Be 8 AOE SO EE I CAIN yy rome ee x3 ‘8: ~ Soy sae ole Dich gan ott & be wan!
14-00000 wee ae yt ca ee a nem i : AB ok. leds dict a a. wes atu ta ON OT Batam liven a ahha SECRET ; | fmf “-118- that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other sources whose information confirmed, tended to confirm, or deait with ary of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded as “contaminated"--that is to say, they were considered part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko figured. a . Bemerey NUNES tT ot ee Oe Golitsyn played a major role in this “analytical pro- cess."' As soon as Nosenko's defection became public, Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in .Nosenke’s : interrogation. As of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed ‘ that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and ‘ given full access to the “Nosenko material." The reasoning at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko'’s function as a false defector, was that the Nosenko operation was "the reverse of the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn's assistance was required to pursue it properly. Accordingly, ° over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at ' his request was supplied with all available biographic data on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation. motte QA Tet he Firat met siectnnds th tebe atven Gre wtitcaid Stotn Dbee On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by Chief, CI Staf£, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and Chief, SR Division. The following is quoted from the transcripts of this meeting: Sal en Aen E NTE Ne “TREE RR Tr Ae EIEIO Farr RAITT tea npr nceinregnr i . Golitsyn: I have made a study of the docu- ments and information which was provided to me about Nosenko and his interrogations. I would like now to make known my conclusions e « « My conclusion is that he is not a bona fide defector. He is a provocateur, . Py who 1S on a mission for the KGB... to mislead, chief in the field of investiga- : tions . . . on Soviet penetrations made ; i Mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate j to Moscow ... Why did they choose Nosenko for that mission? In my opinion, Nosenko was recommended by Churanov, Kovshuk and Guk* ; for the mission. Nosenko could have been 3 ogee were cantthdisbdehadiataSputicnien — Stith tote hedin benim = “ *Vladimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich i Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk. Churanov and Kovshuk were : ‘colleagues and good friends of Nosenko’s in the’ Second Chief . , Directorate. Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a ‘ one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he trans- ferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the Soviet Mission to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva at the time of Nosenko's temporary duty there in 1962. SECRET PR RAs NOC, RDA UNC NE cee tian eneenmts oe antenna acetone meet Renee nee prmie oe Beye cabal Peg 8 m Mee Be tee . ~ . “ * , me . M4 afl cemeshee ay. - Te erage ett le ee To a AL oS oe tay a's ee ee nants toe Aart R pllin hele Bat hese A sore’ i tae eagey BIC Se RO i eG eS stings 28 Seat PS Sth te abet y= . Sat . GER eae ee Sei ae se 7 a . ws E : i . 4 : % -2& i . 4 esd 4
14-00000 ee nN o~ dated SECRET ~119- avant ee ye we nee nm ee gave these people a chance. They are very energetic--all of them. And, of course, they discuss things among themselves. , Many of them had made mistakes--they had , told too much. They were, therefore, in ; the damage report (on my defection) and , for them the only way to act was to suggest an operation against me in order to save their face, to save the situation. It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests: (a) to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of pre- : eminence as advisor to CIA (and other Western intelligence : services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to promote ‘ his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the Soviet Union.in political and strategic matters, and thus to enhance his position as advisor to governments on overall Soviet political matters. named or recommended by them and the KGB : } | | | wo ee te MELA. i cst we cua ana cud IE cee Llcte eh ae, sancilgatna gS ved Be mete eee Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When he defected, he brought with him some 23 classified docu- i ments from the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, which he made clear he wished to discuss with President Kennedy and the Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them to what was going on and to measures needing to be taken. Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other US government agencies underwent changes from time to time, depending upon whether his demands for access to and inter- views with specified ranking officials of those organizations were granted. : oe wrbted te | | ree aM Golitsyn's chosen role as igterpreter of Soviet policy and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all of CIA's files on -Nosenko for purposes of providing CIA with an “interpretation” “cf the latter's rele. In any event, the j idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn'’s hammer- - ing away at this theme that we were being “had™ by the - Soviets, particularly by being penetrated as a result of clever KGB counterintelligence operations, and that Nosenko had to be “broken” at all costs; his "confession" would make clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet machinations. Soden attest od, Liggieess m POM ae OO eg ak we Further, it was deemed expedient not only to proceed with efforts to "break" Nosenko but alse to study past mets ol ee ateep ate ay eereatenanest sie Mae e ero TTD exer scatr tata Dar Manin metmenee mune me coe on * e SEER D Rac REL vce oy oat HBEY Sane non SECRET PE re aittal oo 2 Tamanna NAL Nab erParipanandecmea ee A i eatin oan Arts San Emr mE, ORS Sati 5 - WE the ae” et a AS ee age BY UTEEC, el sees oo AW ete sows et ms
‘adben we AES eRe rien Sin nae Facet NiinAtame eee eee emetic rete ete mm we “t & pee © eaiss antonio SPDT RTT sal ARTA ARON GT, Sect T eR eh PGR Be RIT 0 0 ate Tarte Bol seers wth Lath Be ny SECRET -120- operations known to have been Soviet-controlled to see what could be learned from these cases about how the Soviet in- telligence services had carried out their activities against the West through the years. This study of historic Soviet cases, designed not to explore a hypothesis but to prove an already-accepted thesis, produced information about an awe- some “enemy,” cunning and complex, lavishing money and man- power on operations that were almost invariably successful. The fact that many of these cases were primarily of historic interest, undertaken at a particular time to take advantage of or exploit a particular situation that no longer obtained or had little or no pertinence to Nosenko'’s defection, appears to have been discounted. On the contrary, since the cases included in the study were considered to have been hugely successful in duping or deluding the Western intelligence services and governments, it was concluded that we were con- tinuing to be deluded and duped. It was reasoned that, as CIA and other Western intelligence services became increas- ingly aware of and informed on the Soviet operational tech- niques being used against them and changed their operational tactics accordingly, the KGB simply adjusted to the new Situation and continued to outwit us. With Shelepin and succeeding chiefs of the KGB as members of the Central Com- mittee, it was assumed that those KGB operations that could be (or were) classed as dezinformatsiya were not only important per se but took on added importance inasmuch as the KGB, through its chief, was involved in the policy making body of the Soviet Union. Consequently, any operation as important as the one that involved sending a senior KGB officer, Nosenko, to the West on a dezinformatsiya mission - must have been an exceedingly important one, involving high- level staff coordination. Any other agents who provided confirmatory information or whose information could in any way be regarded as suspiciously coincidental had to be part of the overall operation. Given the importance of the opera- tion, Chairman Khrushchev was undoubtedly directing the whole thing himself. No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known case of a KGB officer's ever having been sent to discredit a previous defector in the eyes of a Western intelligence service. After brief consideration of the notion that Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all, it was decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn. gpg oe SECRET , ~ se ate 2 dee aI eer Cent Sag 4 ce ntgnareece edtmstinn vontimcinn in we canna nemuarmannneeteg etfs 5 hot teat yan Bea ph , tee, ‘ ‘olka ya {cE Wisk bia tas on Rretey Wyte reas re % women AGO LL Sed Nike Ihe boa salt, endhsbocbi, dhe wand coudb abated ge watt d Pee sate 3 Mo “faye 2 strat shy oes Tht deh aren 24
14-00000 a eit eg 7 SRT oF ~l21- : : . wees ete Conclusions ‘ In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that Lb. (a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent i defection, no information has ever been developed to sub- : , stantiate the charges made against him either by Golitsyn “ or by the “mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with i respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent; : and (c) Golitsyn himself as the architect and sponsor of ‘ theories presented has not been able to support his claims, despite the wealth of information made available to him for analysis. The following is quoted from an unsigned paper, dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims: i Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet leadership in 1959 developed a “New Policy” (peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics, united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable as a statement of the “Right” strategy . developed during the mid- and late-fifties } and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow ' Manifesto. Golitsyn's depiction of this policy as, in toto, a "misinformation" : operation rests upon his extremely broad use of that term: “special deliberate efforts of the communist governments to mislead Western studies and to direct them in wrong directions" by means of official Soviet speeches and Party documents, offi- cial press and propaganda outlets, travel controls, diplomatic activities, leaks, etc. His vocabulary and general handling of this mew Bloc policy gives the strategy a con- spiratorial quality not justified by its essentially open and public character. eo a, A batty mes Amma a, aes 109 eeu ieee ences ggg et Te vom etnies saa mwenceneane sae ERA din been Mablnater eden @ i | ! i The role of the KGB in the execution and coordination of this policy is constantly alluded to, but no evidence is provided to .. define the precise nature of its role and no actual “covert” disinformation operations are cited for the years from 1959 to the present. Golitsyn provided factual evidence i for “politicalization" of the KGB in 1959, . but its new role may also be interpreted to . : M4 . . - hy, OED headtes EET — alda dis BOS ee hae f cover routine operations of covert propa- ganda, political action, recruitment of ee ry eee + eee sage tS aa oy a - : - et Bae ean wd PARA ION RON EDA A FLIES etn trot MOONY NAINA ena mr are ernewmrt ten Am ma leg! ae ae 2Dhe as aoa ht RAS sce ‘oe
14-00000 Oe ei ate Bott 6 OE pe SY Trade my, SECRET Seeker naepeeyrerer a canrmaeenti os oa em hout involving the KGB igence services) in any ra . agents of influence and specific “disinforma- operations wi e Bloc intell broader role. tion" (or th Tate ene er RB RRR eee athe Sine NERD penne RMERATO VEEN ARE a ae ener + + . ee a en at I A ik a a ae ee ea Ten 2 oe ey enone emetpmte e | a
14-00000 ay santo nee tate ete ADR OE RUE eR aRb else “PTE Ah EERO neo OEE. 05 SAOSIN We eK Uiiachcah® Ate idimeptnsnentiname nen ys ° starr pttetterennn stink anne EGHET _ ~123- CHAPTER VII Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: ‘h Com arison oF Their Handling’ By CIA The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differ- ences in handling by CIA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this study, since it was Golitsyn's “confirmation” of certain theories regarding Nosenko as a dispatched agent that helped to establisn the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when he walked in some months after Golitsyn. It is also material, since Golitsyn’ played a role in CIA efforts to “break Nosenko. Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows. Interrogation The defections of Colitsyn and Nosenko cannot be con- sidered directly comparable, since some five meetings were held with Nosenko about eighteen months before his actual defection. There had been no similar contact with Golitsyn before his defection. However, the following statements can e made. ‘Golitsyn was brought to this country within days of his defection in Helsinki in December 1961. Standard interroga- tion procedures were initiated, which included his systematic debriefing regarding his own biographic data, family back- ground and career, and his knowledge of the structure, organiza- tion, personalities and operations of the KGB. What he said was checked against CIA files and formed the basis for his acceptance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a bona fide defector. In Nosenko's case, he cannot be said to have been inter- rogated at all, in the strict sense of the word, during initial contacts with him in Geneva in June 1962. For one thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that time but simply offered certain pieces of information that he thought would be of interest to CIA, in exchange for a specified sum of money that he claimed to need. Also, time with him was limited. When Nosenko actually defected in February 1964, he was interrogated in a manner that contrasted sharply with that applied in Golitsyn's case. In the interim between initial _ SECRET Sm Se ae SRE RAE STILT Ca CL gs cinRrhwett ately wen MEMO TE ented Braet E Cae a nee etbreate Lind aur meine = ste me OE Aine atta Rake, Siti 4 | | #e° 0. SBuN adil al tye Th! 2 sadanebid Hosa Bn 8 pce + thereat tot ate Siitine dled Beth . ree ae Meade iheddy pbbebes we BMRA mao wets hetens hbk nerd ee are ted Yo, : mens Cetaeeth inact ON dee ei aE andi ated bette 8
| bos SECRET ~124- contacts in 1962 and his defection in 1964, as previously explained, it had been concluded that he was a dispatched agent. Voluminous papers had been written during this period "proving" that such was the case, and because of the accumulated "evidence" it was decided to attempt to. “break” him as soon as possible. Accordingly, and because it was also belicved imperative to act quickly, Nosenko's interrogation took place in various pre-planned stages or phases, ranging from ostensibly friendly to hostile. In Nosenko's case, then, the entire effort was to force him to admit to CIA's accusations rather than to obtain in- formation from him in any logical or systematic fashion. Efforts were made to “trap"' him or “throw him off balance," by indicating that CIA had “proof that he was lying, that his only option was to confess" that he had been sent by the KGB, etc. His denials of charges or refusals to "con- fess" only resulted in increasingly hostile treatment. While his statements did contain inconsistencies, and there were questions for which he gave no adequate or consistent and logical answers, the manner in which he was questioned was in no way that afforded the usual defector. Moreover, the pressures put upon Nosenko contributed to the creation of a climate not conducive to proper interrogation. It was not until October 1967, in fact, that he received a proper in- terrogation. Polygraph Examination As with other phases of their respective handling, the account of Nosenko's polygraph examinations is in marked con- trast with that of Golitsyn. SECRET . pda ihe Spt AR SEO CRA NY LRT eSB EOWA PSE AR Bt RAAB RCI amos SES IS 4 rn ow manent Sisetletet G aolg vin Be ten oe eet, Ma OWED Re Ce OLE debt oe tg Me were pene c peememgie cree ment meri tees tmmrnpminsiNs Myseeent HEermn eres catenin RD SEOEREEGN MS ret wNSPUT eed ae ar! 7 . > . 1 EE AE eS” fe ihe i Eibae sues eat 4 . siete A ad - . wcobtane stiches wad Bb. sebieatle “has agar tbe a bee Apt? De ro ve rte entre bitlis sera te idee ate 6 con Oe SS TG a er ebpenas MRA? ce Oe ne Uae Het bea BODE BEAR e dt snedsabenn e4teanntesaas 1.2 Geom rn ~ neta ht abet
14-00000 5 a | SECRET boa i an 4 -125- i A i t : home to him that the test was an absolute requirement for “4 ; receipt of resident alien status in the United States. f- ae Y, i The unusual manner in which the tests were conducted : 3 is illustrated in the following quotations from the report 4 j later submitted by the polygraph operator: 5 The undersigned had a series of prepolygraph \ 4 conferences with {Chief}, SR/CI [a] CI Staff ‘ : officer, and [an officer] of the Office of 1 A Security. The general consensus of the : | interested parties regarding what areas ae ; should and should not be covered during i si : polygraph testing all reflected the fact ‘ : : i 3 i : | : ‘ i i ! | ; i itentanyeie niente ttm haan — MbbhbeAlA EE pts Saoddteclnadan dtd « » » It was also pointed out .. . during the pre-polygraph conferences .. . that re- ; i gardless of how [Golitsyn] reacted specifi- : } | eign eet he . : . + ee — RRRENRPE RE pHRENEIEINERETY enone meer + i oe cally. even if there were consistent specific o 2 GEO Cap Seder yh Er ATA th Theo ¢ , . Es i " Seecoatiitangnart as ceemmaess emtrencteee ermine MeEMPIARNEAteaeeMi tte ne on eateNeh MeO set New a te ro re ° — ® ait en So SECRET » ee 262i vanish cis sr posenbnens nec MUD SNF Sega Reels West SS SAMRAT mm Lp omen am ti A et oe anata mB RAN M St » 7 . oe i i te ‘ . , '
14-00000 ‘ e ego — SECRET - -126- Se eee rae te 0 Although the operator was fluent in Russian, the test ‘was given to Golitsyn on 27 March 1962 in English; Russian was used only when Golitsyn failed to comprehend the full and accurate meaning of a question. Golitsyn raised no objections to any questions asked, but the operator did not consider the day's testing conclusive, because of the dif- ficulties that had arisen owing to Golitsyn's poor compre- ; hension of English plus a malfunctioning polygraph. A second test was therefore given the following day, 28 March, in the Russian language, during the course of ‘ which Golitsyn was asked the same questions as on the previ- ous day. Before the test could be initiated, however, Golitsyn again had to be convinced of the necessity for taking it. He stated that he had thought over the ques- : : tions he had been mnside : them “insulting.” \ _ [In the operator's words, he resented “all in all, any and every question which may have reflected that he was not accepted 100 percent on the basis i ef only his own explanations and assurances." Nevetheless, the test was finally conducted. Upon its completion, the operator informed Golitsyn that he (the operator) had con- cluded that Golitsyn was substantially truthful in his answers and that, as far as the operator was concerned, the results were favorable. Six months later, the Office of Security reviewed the polygraph charts, as well as the questions that had been pesed, the transcriptions of the interviews, and the final report. On 19 September 1962, a memorandum was prepared for the chief of the Interrogation and Research Division of the Office of Security. The report contained the following initial statements: om A review of [the operator’ 's report on the se ae ee The results of the ‘second : day's testing is not set forth. The re- port is rather remarkable for this reason. en ema ratnelt es tM BEER + SECRET BERR dar8.2 90 pr mrcabeal steatnetane ast WRdtbnenenTinh CARER ARNIS McLOEeN Sembee ete 1 - ‘ ahead e & parne ie Beppe rat on cet HET Utada TOAORR A vd DLT ARTS CAEL pe 4, .purey Coda rotate tee abner inemtmraenanennrererranier ous = See es we asus * = wo ceimaemeneedanaet ol 4 gh 3 3 40 tee heel ete aiepdas snes oR 0 _— “4 a¥ Ais eo a me er wonton bh eet SG ch AY Aa tt Has tok Leated setae salt. athe ye A Abate Sa Che ae aie 5 ace! ates, wthbes on. didn S28 Llsaredh angeantentt na. sob sata sb meadutrtlabeat ty See Bteow Tit el Lame. 6 nage noses Dt SLAM bob atan uted +4
~~ SECRET -127- me meets ah This should not be considered any definitive (polygraph examination]. The conditions and limitations placed on the [polygraph] offi- cer as reflected in the body of the report imposed a set of conditions that preclude and make imvossible any unequivocal state- ment that a conclusive [polygraph examination] was conducted. & & & & & The use of the polygraph in Nosenko's case contrasts sharply with the way it was used on Golitsyn. We shall not go into detail here, because Nosenko'’s polygraph examinations are covered at length in Chapter VIII. It is relevant here, however, to make the point that those polygraph examinations of both Golitsyn and Nosenko performed prior to 1968 were all Access to Classified Information : With respect to their relative access to classified information, the cases of Golitsyn and Nosenko could not . Stand in greater contrast. Heo ER ORR HAIN PUNE tbe tet alee ad y SECRET 7 ; ie stan ARNON SALT : = oo Sees SEP Sberpssueee Aman ata cen AREA EA gins ay NET RENEE JP Soins Nem or eens mene mae mine each sg re ' . —— wtb seimaulns Dred sae Bhbene a fA i pow ugades ai, Dae vale, afew ieee UAD teeg ante the oh, 5. NT so SOL eer : tae 4 bt been dile nae thede eae ntti eed dabbe ws . dentin v7 dhennatanit ln diraee > + eA teQuestad sen
14-00000 oe ede et } | - 7. ee a 55 feerte - 7 ee oma wine, Een pa a it ” SEARLE RA ERA AP APE A A TE eA AS ASS RESTA DTT ht ET Nae ewer rome mar csnaaerna in wt tal Raina anon eset 0 tl OP aH ONG ethno SA TENS 4 i ae SECRET -128- Practically from the moment of his arrival in this country, Golitsyn began to demand access to CIA files. He largely achieved his ends and was soon being given transcripts of his own debriefing sessions as well as what has been described as a “valuable library," including reference publications classified up to SECRET. Starting in November 1963, voluminous information was made available to him, including: A. Thirty-two documents concerning the , B. Biographical sketch on, and all] | ; luminous documents pertaining to the including secret writing messages, meeting transcripts and contact reports. D. Copies of the fi ubstantive cables The on E. Transcriptions of all, \ - /following those noted in the ~~ cables described above. inti ings 1 through 13 with G. Material requested by ase" with his “work on the Nosenko case": | H. Sanitized copy of a cable summary of SECRET ane GED cap ASL Ee IEE ark tO ae OIE OS doa EE Ae ed Bemis eh & en 1 opens a we Pte ~ ereeinni, Hee ige e a 2 Mere creme ac elt eZ Ak a ee ee oe Mas 3 Race ada weit. bbe, aah Aae Brae Wee 4 Se AOR A 9 eRe tee mgt marbacelgeysimetingy se setts 4 ¥ utd we OE se toe je bt ew wis Le | ot Reed wets awe 4 cote Zee adeno! 8 La Ane 180 ttn ah tran ok Sp RT 1am + ar truttaen! Zeta Dae taser © oe wordt Ot ameteendte a sees me
14-00000 § i i $j Y -129- ; 4 1. Biographic sketch of a| and F i : 4 with a list of operations in which he was involved. : ‘ J. Biographic sketch of al | and a ; i ; oo 4 i _____ [with a list of operations in which he had j ‘ been involved. : , ‘ K. Biographic sketch of a(L__Jand a _L. ‘Biographic sketch of a | | and ! it ' [plus a list of opera- ; . tional actions Carried out by him for CIA. i M. Biographic sketch of a | lla : ; i. 7 [with a list of opera- ! { tional actions carried out by him for CIA. F N. Biographic sketch of a and : . . lat one time. He had no CIA : i j affiliation. : i . d SO QO. Biographic sketch of a| | and 78 ; at one Ciné.” ne nag ng orm : . i | affiliation. Golitsyn was provided with a copy iH ae of an interview of hin conducted by US govern- i : ment security officers (not identified as to ; i | agency affiliation). i 4 Pp. Bi ic sketch of a| land. i fat one time. He had no CIA i i affiliation. ; 4 Q. Biographic sketch of a [tana | Sop : re Aw . ME Mud, 2, 3 . t f i | | ; [employed as an interpreter by the United | : rr ; a oe 4 , i : } eed "are seas Na eet eat EAS Ti £5 Ra Seas nba. tae AREAL BRET ANGELA ESE i crane emt les Ae eS IS rote memento abet et , Es the ee Doers * 3 4 2 ‘ Tata 5 at gt Otitis Be rhatimnerctee 2b 6
; j ~ a, ! . SECRET -130- : . Nations in Geneva who was the object of a KGB : . ' recruitment attempt while on loan to UNESCO for : conference work in Tbilisi in 1968. S.  Biographic information| — This information was additional to sketches on the same persons given to Golitsyn with the tran- script for Meeting No. 12 with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964. T. A nine-page summary he N ko_ case | iL. Conies of two renorts on the subject of one prepared on the basis of information provided by Golitsyn himself in 1962 and one prepared on the basis of information brought out by Nosenke_in 1964. wi notation for Golitsyn that recent YY. A repeat of Nosenko's commenta suggested be put to Nosenko to confirm and clarify information given by , i | | j i i . . —oee-_,.,_—_——x—mn>" W. A list of questions that{/ _—ijhad 6 8 emt AAT US SS meted @ TY Tebeityh tee tea te WANT ote IE ey i 3 . I % ain EA CTE RA ENE ASE Plc eh lek Wands apes mp Zaccaria He ON srr ey gs = 4. a iy 6 wy ORG revs sag gaunt reve snynay «Etna SH nae tT ce A dhcdastvishratnne ithe eeteh. — walts dudatcil WF A tine worn 7 7 eS weed “ : ot eaten wea the ad rie mene rere es ta net! th thee es Fr een eee ne eent ree Rare ae bennett ee + na waidabean Uatedideet omen Koy ead ae wee na btththy dee en erowcesemenertingy Avermioamempanets! —“heqittnguEn ee sgeen one nae nets eon sone . aoeiintte TERI RI Eeiin — dab dewha eanindiet Discos vs a a a owe tm Hatter ae ent note Fat Ce tay -. 4 eee arms RH » ’ wie . oe Va dyjeur keer CoRpuntlnieanoeeniaingseanie= ao . A we + . r he edeTeanen ian. alhenbadidrte Ebddetem ek tam Sad aE Lae
Een Perret ry 4 Ge or neta monine mee sooner ed -131- recommended to the KGB that Nosenko be sent to the West to discredit Golitsyn in the eyes of CIA and other Western intelligence services. Feklisov was a KGB ufficer who visited the United States as part of Khrushchev's party in 1959 and later (1960-1964) served as Counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC. Ivanov was arrested by the FBI in 1963 in connection with the case of John W. Butenko, an electronics engineer who was arrested as a KGB agent. These reports were given to Golitsyn as his request. Y. A chronology of the cas { [Go yn had asked toé “re-read” the file on » Whose status vis- a-vis the KGB was first reported to CIA by Nosenko. as also given a background sketch of and transcripts of “all four contact periods. Z. File summary of the case of AA. Case descriptions of two operations ser- viced by | Both were KGB couriers dispatchéd of €migrée operations into West Germany, where they were apprehended, agreed to work for American intelligence, and later returned to the USSR. acne lO SANE PN SRSRANRRANN NASER erate te eA a At nN a nets BB. Responses by Nosenka ta_ouestiqns dzafsed——— _ by Golitsyn on: | @ 3 CC. Charts indicating what Nosenko had ted _ and what CIA had been able to develop on them through investigation, with one ne sh Want ACRES on ht nab tA rnin Ant tmei ett NC tet i BAL EE bie re Rie thee PR OTATEN os B * - . A i re) acs eee bac ’ . Top a 7 *, a a 2 . : adedeaststect. wattheatde - sretorimmrueenieetcanmees* Srey “Heresy ERatRRREEEMAEP “APES ay ERIE ER RENTER fe ee mene rewouern memantine foams Ten «car ape ete at 4 OUTS f tS eae e ae the tones bie tele tela wee codh fave f «bh, a ves ens MES BP AI. mead dt sant lbton en va + . . . ~ 4 Kos ae .. toe wt he bettcdes eetaaiese.  R P tte Tale cage + Sable BG mecibateteba eu° + ro
74-90000 ‘ en . -132- “* i. . a . . ete . . : us a 1 Ys re earlanetia  notdac tials Sse Reco ica atitaske ens mation provided by Nosenko on the structure and personnel assignments in the KGB as he knew them; a chronology of Nosenko's life "in varying ver- q . . F CIA comments as appropriate; an outline of infor- sions," | Hi Hanlcinih ES homies Ginidoense} Dunelle By contrast, the CIA position with regard to revelation of information to Nosenko is indicated by the following state- ment taken from a memorandum for the DDP prepared by Chief, SR Division, dated 30 March 1964: } nig 5 sede Bowaltaad Bist Sk uatabe des e ‘ . ob bate Ratti hatte Bins For information on Nosenko's | | of i- any sort for long periods of time, much less intelligence ; files of the sort given to Golitsyn, see Chapter III. Physical Confinement f Gelitsyn cannot be said to have been physically confined i at any time. The following description of the protective : eustody afforded him and his reaction to any type of control ‘ f is quoted from the 1976 Counterintelligence Staff Study : 7 soe (No. 3) on Golitsyn: ; | e Golitsyn always felt the need for protection | against possible KGB retaliation, but quite obviously believed he alone was the best judge of what this entailed. He wanted eee < aan 4 : Be guards around, but not underfoot. The record stem nema ares t i i | is replete with his complaints against the i guards and his attempts to isolate them. This became a key issue in the adoption of the codicil te the Statement of Agreement in July 1962, when Golitsyn moved into his own house and was given complete personal : control of the guards, their hours of duty ° and their responsibilities. From that point on, Golitsyn was essentially unguarded. His ancien emgage, . rr ” m4 ‘ . Sealine abbas te AE act ves i SECRET ETT fi ORR OS 8 aa Le SOMO ES? can det ntehd » See wr 4 ; 4
14-00000 . Tact toa te es are \ > Re iq - SECRET -133- wife also railed against her "companions" in the early days. She made frequent trig ; into Washington to shop or attend movies, theater or ballet. At these times, she would dismiss her chauffeur for lengthy periods. On two occasions she took the bus alone to New York for the day, and Golitsyn also visited New York in November 1962, at which time he roamed the city unescorted. range ttt see Golitsyn's behavior from that time on followed a similar pattern. He suddenly left the United States for the United Kingdom in December 1962, and while in England he lived where he wished and had no security protection. The British asked. Golitsyn to keep his whereabouts to himself, not to stay in i one hotel for any length of time, and to call when he wanted : . to meet. According to the study quoted above, this loose : . method of dealing with Golitsyn probably helped in maintain- ing a cooperative attituce on his part; it also apparently set a precedent for his attitude toward the manner in which he would live upon his return to the United States in July : 1963. Upon his return here, he was given complete freedom to set his own pattern of living and working, following the British example. He obtained his own residence in New York, moved several times, developed the concept that he was the best judge of his own security, and at times lived “alnost under the eaves of the Seviet Mission” in New York while simultaneously refusing to talk to CIA officers because CIA was “penetrated.” sag aents eile oe vrei domed sada katates wat ales be ty Lala echt an scairaadCa Baste eallbedhe | palette aaltnlede « Lory oli Foe bree — ee: wind Liab Rate aAlS tw de ome Resenko's physical confinement and deprivation of even @inor amenities from the time of his defection in early 1964 } until late October 1967 stand in stark contrast to the treat- ment afforded Golitsyn. This matter has been covered so fully in Chapter III that it requires ng further comment. * Conclusions If summation is needed, the following can be stated with respect to the five areas dealt with above: . A. Golitsyn controlled his own interrogation, withholding information if he chose, refusing to 3 ‘answer questions according to his own whim, and - on occasion refusing even to talk to CIA officers. Nosenko was not really listened to (or even talked to for long stretches of time), much less properly asttbhee ae oet woth tats we isedintone ah, pve ihe. ‘ a a at feed o gah ym ge SECRET _ 7 eR BR cet SS Nala hs wR SK pc a TEN TA ne tn remem | mec ete Te $98 aaae wl nether -4 boas . : vio ‘ 8 . , . 1 eet cue tea “1m <a, : Wo, oatidoyareteiibbe band,  etundit bat bua tkei ie tas « we
14-00000 Mey t soe N ) J Hag . ‘ - Se A ec eee ~ SECKET -134- interrogated, for.several years after the date of ‘ : his defection. pc:-; : ch ise ' B. Golitsyn was given a signed agreement ' covering the conditions of his cooperation with the US government, which met all of his demands. Nosenko was specifically denied a written contract, on the grounds that an oral agreement was the “bureaucratically correct" manner of handling his relationship with the US government, until five years after his defection (1969). C. Golitsyn's polygraph examination was admin- istered under ground rules imposed by SR Division. : These rules produced inconclusive test results, but full assurances were given Golitsyn that he had passed his examination. No further attempt was made to establish Golitsyn’s bona fides. Nosenko, on the other hand, underwent three separate series of polygraph tests. Two of the three were conducted in such a manner as to prejudice the re- : sults. against Nosenko; under the ground rules im- ? posed by the SR Division officers on the polygraph operator, the latter was under instructions to “find” evidences of deception in the polygraph charts, whether they were there or not. a oo ese leeses pam aides ine E. As to physical confinement, Golitsyn was simply never confined; the thought of confining him did not even arise. Nosenko spent virtually all of his first five years in this country as a prisoner, given fewer amenities than he would have received in most jails or prisons within the United States, or in some form of protective . custody. . SECRET ; - 7 TORREAGMCALAITny |e SIMBA at tose PRR LSE mw prcmpmaenmte m nrntrar owen, “ween Rat Sf “ERR earn aan, WRT errata me a we Ain eR ote wee ae phe oe aaa aR Cah ayn bare Sebo hetpatdl bak RETO YA OM Runesie gy HUE! Erte ae a . ‘ bt ate, 4 . * witebederittd Senne lites udasbline tbat La alent ida cone tbdeaiocs melEtioucrae laut 2 Sa, camest Vote! 4h ' ted ma
14-00000 s . ars, SECRET : re . -135- : r “atta of SR It seems self-evident that these two defectors should . to have received the same treatment, that one was as suspect , as the other until completion of all appropriate processing a aimed at determining bona fides. /iradi an; OVER TG ! ‘ : L sate bs ORT SelB aod ouadien — Atadh Seca hag me the DS Dealt slab ant aitig, - tte Aurea srisS ivan a tind dreds
14-00000 ancient SECRET -136- CHAPTER VIII Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko Case 3 goon . . “Ba, .. wae 5 anthitnchetn haben Re. ath ht 3 a we athe Tina 8 ate bb Nosenko was first polygraphed on 4 April 1964, in a series of six tests. That the procedures followed were somewhat unorthodox is indicated by the following quotations from the report of the polygraph operator: nae ns ec EERE IE OEE a RECN BLAH EST to RAAB ERO EE RISES, SES EAS RY tT MSE AR St — During the pre-polygraph conferences with representatives of SR Division, the under- Signed was informed that the polygraph interview was part of an overall plan to help break [Nosenko] and elicit the truth from him. SR Division's instructions were that, regardless of whether [Nosenko] passed his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his polygraph interview that he was lying, and -had not passed his polygraph interview. The question of [Nosenko's] willingness to participate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previ- ous occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether [Nosenko] would con- tinue with the polygraph testing, if he was confronted with attempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Consequently, in order to preclude the possibility of [Nosenko's] terminating the test prior to its completion, it was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be used during the ‘polygraph testing, specifically to ensure that @ polygraph record of ([Nosenko's] reactions to all the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on any significant polygraph deception indications his charts might reflect. Because of the extenuating {sic] circumstances of the case, this plan was followed throughout the polygraph inter- view. » » » When {Nosenko] arrived for his test, {the fact that he had been-drinking] was SECRET | ARIAT EAT Ag CIE Rheem ot ont Nate dA Toa Rosa ms YA 27 1c" t + je Whei atten ORI iets a stews tar atsees tedulomdbitragte naben Bihalee “4 : wie eatin alibte nee hale 6 aha Babisice we callable dbetes stable Ea eu Bada Ladiy apaLADOAs § He Abblie Bo ishendcon vbaedus wy ft tet eae ts an ra Lar pres igi diac, secret altel Zotar Sy a ate aad, few
14-00000 -137- Po mteNR ZTE Se one athe 2 Ty olathe esheets de evident both to [the operator] and the . : examining physician who checked [Nosenko] : prior to {Nosenko's] po:ygraph testing... ; Although [Nosenko}] had used both alcohol and i some unknown drug prior to. testing, there is no question, based both on analysis of : [Nosenko's] polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that [Nosenko] has attempted deliberate ; : deception in the specific pertinent areas oy i fon which he was questioned]. Pree bisetecra Seid bi Fees Wan eee Ficse Ao ete ee os gine Sper amNY rein i oS According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the different phases involving various pertinent i areas were covered with [Nosenko] polygraph- : ; ically. Challenge of [Nosenko's] reactions was indirect and "soft." . . . Subject was i told that he was lying to numerous pertinent } ° questions and was accused of being a dis- : patched agent. "y wo wed hatbads oh -After completion of the interview, the SR representative at the safesite was informed, b in front of [Nosenko], of [the operator's] opinion that (Nosenko] was lying and was a . dispatched Soviet agent. [Nosenko] was taken : : : . into protective custody and escorted to his . 5 new place of residence. Le sebietter teh Alink blag wets tend enn: moat The following is quoted from an interim report dated ; 24 October 1966 (i.e., before completion of the new polygraph foe Shae series), which was attached to a memorandum from Chief, SR ; , 4 to the DCI. 4 an ; ° a ae : : Our aims in this phase of the interrogation . 3 3 ° have been limited: in view of the possibility 3 : “I ; of losing access to Nosenko, we have sought 3 3 SECRET § te | anes arses Are ot Pash eZ etncntn tab RFe igs ramet tier oe we Ee mtn eo * ® e | Fee Tempe ° evr decbe tigre
14-00000 ‘ . wom te ape SECRET -138- : (a) to strengthen our basic report, now in preparation, by testing his story further, i clarifying points of confusion and reveail- } ing new contradictions, and by polygraph i examinations in key areas, and (b) to lead toward his eventual confession by directly exploiting our hypotheses about the true background of Nosenko and this KGB opera- tion, to convey to Nosenko the impression that we know more than before, that we possess irrefutable proof of his guilt and that he has no prospects for release. We refrained from doing this in earlier phases of the interrogation, but at this point there seems little to lose. i- | i 3 Date and Times Hours and Minutes i 19 October ° ; | | 3 20 October t . z : | | ‘ i : hes oo xpi hacksoticinbaatea te wc bnericaeibGem tL tn ammeneEme career a tr egmmacemtnm ssienmmmmmmenne ec } ‘ Siete te ee ca ptt capt cane een ~ ee on sot coke Aye ta ee } mer eb namma-giaegr ake : t eet ltepenel peniecngisy sheet 4 at ayer anced nevarocmonay sytem Lae? scent pit 2 Gre ees 4 coerce ag ’ % thay > Pate white” tat nese dare ent rerenagn eo nmterne ern a Se or NRO Oe See nT ‘ tate ag, thie CoB i +S somber iol ue Be pviricanidanes maui Babee Fear ads sae ts tlle fr bomen AEN ae uiinh ovate ALD React naan nthneta 2-9 cents tet _—s cone
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14-00000 — + yee pe B ae “ ee | ~ ~, a 4 -140- : , -4 - 4 8 | - ee _ t i from the record, however, because the polyg.aph operator : ' rz participated in both. For example, at one point the typed : 7 | 3 record reads: bae ’ i i ‘s if 4 j ae In a report he wrote on 16 November 1967, the — -d : rector of Security stated: | i I fo 4 ae | | | | j ' . # ] | ee ‘ | Nosenko's final polygraph examination, conducted under | H the direction of the*Office of Security, was quite at ; variance with the first two. Initiated on 2 August 1968... ‘4 it concluded on 6 August 1968. | “ | : "3 ee Nosenko * . | was completely cooperative, no problems were encountered, 3 : and the conclusion of the polygraph operator was that Nosenko 7 had been substantially truthful in answering all relevant ts ‘ 4 questions put to hin. “4 “4 In the course of the present investigation, the Office ; . a of Security was requested to make a further reevaluation of . 3 4 the Nosenko polygraph charts of April 1964, October 1966, 3 4 and August 1968. The resultant report, dated 30 September , : | 1876 and signed by the Director of Security, states: ; . 2 j . f 4 F Ad 2 | SECRET Spguierncitieeomemecncess commen setae am AN AR EL COTS Meet A ST ste ct sesame anaes ania a na lat its ags 208 4 . : ag!
14-00000 SECRET -141- fee eet ene et one nant meme He This memorandum is in response to your reques* for a review of the polygraph charts of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko obtained ; during polygraph interrogations in April 1964 and October 1966... [and] in August 1 oe , . if a “4 q i i ce eee After a thorough review of the charts ‘ obtained in April 1964, it is our opinion that the polygraph charts obtained do not ‘ contain sufficient technical data on which to base a conclusion of deception or to support that Mr. Nosenko was a dispatched agent of the KGB... +0 the Bete ee aoe Renae went eeinni®  Setiwene seers seein enue ° ve wehtaceitendy Dy ane \ Finally, the polygraph patterns produced to pertinent questions during the August 1968 polygraph examination substantiate that Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers. It is our opinion that the examiner in that testing was a correct in his chart analysis. t eed ete he nd deg ote 4 Ser Lo etcen e . wep migeprmenecncon meme cop yrurentenmeniet mencwns cane ene md - € AR AE REA are entasaenetcEMD te Hele” ann rH Anette tbh mean ‘ ee HALOS I EE Staats entertain eee mantis nani i : 3 £ a me 3 . . : 4 ° & pot $ : H . a A iz a SECRET 7 ? i i “oa 8 geen a i os Bhnachid Be cla
14-00000 ac) 1 ¥ Boe : 7 ~~ “age fi ay Sue : 5 a wfibes f . dem ante sob i : a 4 3 —_ my a o4 i -142- vd 4 CHAPTER 1X Psychological and Medical Findings EM a Sti he eke: 8 Met eg 8 whe ode . A small, but nevertheless key role was played by two Agency specialists, respectively a psychologist and a psychiatrist, in the handling of Nosenke. Like so much else that occurred in this case, this aspect is edifying i mainly in the negative sense of demonstrating how the ser- : vices of such professionals ought not te be exploited. In sum, the psychologist and psychiatrist principally involved : in this case were given enough misinformation about Nosenko’s ' : ‘bona fides to prejudice seriously any chance of an accurate personality assessment. As eet ree ee hs * Pnenre tan Pe ma tea eee RR eme e Aa mes AEE Sah Me oy ad We now examine in some detail the roles played by the . psychologist-and the psychiatrist. In deing so, we have : 4 . very much in mind the fact that both these gentlemen are ‘ : members of organized professions, both of which impose : 4 explicit standards of conduct upon their members. We must ; 3 therefore look for possible conflict between demands the : “ Agency made of these professionals on one hand, and their ie professional standards on the other. A. The Role of the Psychologist The psychologist's role will be dealt with first . because, to judge by the written record, he was the 1 first to assess Nosenkoe from the psychological point of view, by means of a brief interview and test administered on 23 June 1964. His initial report is dated 9 July 1964. j In addition, he interviewed Nosenko at length in 14 ses- ; Sions during the period 3-21 May 1965. He then wrote a : chronicle of Nosenko's life and an éverall psychological ; ; _ i i A EET IRE rapaycenmetie ‘ . we Whitey? Ee Sed tne 7 evaluation based on these interviews. ve inlet + By way of background, it should be said that the hte = 3 _ e i ' ¥ = g EGRET 2 i] 6 pcmeceruia/ tinea tenmnarnerrnne seinane nue inie® sceacieaenitnnntn ft te ae men enn ane arn + et A P y . Tk ie i .$ q 5 . ot oth wi
- gamicarearar marr me = Sabena is SECRET «=i(iti(«<“ -143- Like any other scientific practitioner, however, a psychologist can only function properly on the basis of valid data. If you put a cube of ice in a patient's mouth before inserting the thermometer, you do not get an accurate temperature reading. If you provide an examining psychologist or psychiatrist with erroneous data regarding a defector, the findings of his examination will inevitably be in part erroneous. Personality assessment instruments, or “tests,” also have their limitations. They yield results that should be read only as statements of the statistical probability of the presence of a given personality predisposition or characteristic. In other words, the results give the psychologist a suggestion as to what to look for in a person, as he collects further data. In the case here under consideration, the personality formula that the psychologist derived from his administra- tion of the PAS test co Nosenko suggested that Nosenko might have the characteristics of a sociopath. The psychologist's task was then to evaluate this datum within a framework that included the following elements: 1. His judgment of the validity of his own test results. Note that he depended on a Single, English-language measurement instru- ment when he examined Nosenko on 23 June 1964. 2. Personal interviews. He had time for only a limited interview at the time of test- ing, and it was conducted without benefit of an interpreter in English, a language Nosenko spoke with far from idiomatic fluency. Lengthy interviews were conducted later, in May 1965, long after the original diagnosis had been "made. They also were’ conducted in English. 3. Collateral data, obtained from senior SR officers, which were uniformly prejudicial to Nosenko. The latter was described as one who lied and changed his story constantly, and whe had been sent to the United States on a mission for the KGB. Doubt was even expressed as to whether Nosenko was the person he. professed to be. SECRET Mpte fe ee PR aN be oh AZO ee tt phe rece bere Ae RU 6 Bar ALF Mala, } rere ts 148 eae « "foaae seweirrepernmramennesimamtae sme te tetas Arey att OUBREASA SEE sw mca seam em wee edatarm cae of Rerum amet iC LG. Aathtats fie. a ara tre Ppt Rot nmin oer ee Re gen ‘ F RRS . , * ae ght Te tthe mend ale ov ot elbancT isll tabla, wanted dance A EN Sins wee eel ann tebe, Lacan 2 dala AN ahd Heal be wrap Th ete ony AB Rees kgs Gatti lett amieatohy bo atte shyteabatiot eatOt panna eid tk SL eben ets tO Be RATE a ‘ 1 a ete det abate meets bas hoe
14-00000 & . iio aw reer neta ne ena NN eR By Recanee eae empties Any ena sateen mie nee ieneterentinentt A Senet ete e ete arena) tte mine agree er mente tdewns 10 a BR EAS heh cast TEN th colina ia mame ce mani mecarens mnmens = tena pe aiw SECRET -144- i Subsequent events have revealed that Nosenko's falsehoods were in fact minor ones. But the psychologist did not know-all this; told that Nosenko lied constantly and knowing that manipulative lying is part of the psythopathic syndrome, he diagnosed Nosenko as a psycho- path. ; ; The term psychopath” (another term used inter- changeably is “sociopath") itself deserved a word of explanation, because its connotation is misleading. Like so many psychological terms, it evolved out of the fact that psychologists tend to be involved primarily with people in trouble, very often with those who end up in prisons: and mental institutions. A survey of psycho- logical literature reveals, not surprisingly, that the one quintessential criterion of a psychopath is that he is habitually given to criminal or delinquent behavior. The critéria that psychologists use in distinguishing between psychopaths and non-psychopaths have been developed almost entirely from studies of juvenile delinquents, criminals and mental patients, and thus the term is really only applicable with any certainty to in- dividuals belonging to one or another of those groups. Despite this fact, testing of many people who are not delinquent or criminal may yield a score or profile of scores suggesting psychopathy. To illustrate the point, let us take an example. On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (one of the most widely used clinical testing instruments in this country), the profile that suggests psychopathy has also been generated in testing persons who turned out to be’ good WACs in World War II and others who have been predicted as likely to succeed in the life insurance business... Yet, good WACs and life insurance agents are obviously not groups to whom we would ordinarily apply the term “psychopath.” Thus, the fact that you have a predis- position to psychopathy does not mean that you necessarily become one; the psychopathic profile on either the MMPI * or the PAS test is merely a warning signal of what you . might do under certain adverse circumstances. When he tested Nosenko, the psychologist was not fully aware of all the pressures under which this defector : was functioning. He was unaware of the manner of his ; sudden confinement after glowing promises had been made . of rewards for defection; of the falsified polygraph results, and the fact that Nosenko had been informed .. weno LEE s as F SECRET a TORT nme meee conan demented sa Kil 2 MeL piRPe Te ee CP a we, caer eed ee tome + 4 | ak pees Hie tt bea’. ee pede a npitale! abo twp bimecee ee ree debates tteteggg uae? te vy ae aay cre alee en er magn snp teen tapat eno wade ane Usa ey tate We athe. ai . an hn stg — 1 ewe had heetnorntel dh SerkaeG LEAP leno . J! aa whe bark, mobs, arable te mabe car) a bonne’, Poche ag ei Lad 6 : aatdegl ini! a er secrete 3 "dee te wR GEL ne Le ate berating ons, wide ered ae” bine teen ten fae »
SECRET -143- . that the examination showed him guilty of deception; ‘ or of the fact that the principal case officer had a : told Nosenko that the latter's information (later te 4 prove of great value) was all "crap." Given these factors, we would have to conclude a priori that the -resultant PAS personality profile was ITikely to be partly spurious. The exact extent to which the psychologist’s test results were inexact cannot be determined, but one example is illustrative of the possibilities. One part of the profile suggested that Nosenko was endowed with a well-below average memory. That his memory was functioning at less than average level at the time he took the test cannot be doubted; but it has already been made clear that he was functioning under extremely i adverse conditions, and, since the Wechsler subtest that ; measures memory span has been experimentally shown to be ; vulnerable to so-called state (i.e., temporary) anxiety,*- this aspect of the personality profile must be considered spurious. From Nosenko's performance during extensive debriefings since he was released from confinement and , began to receive normally humane treatment, we know that his memory is in fact exceptionally good. We can only conclude that, if it functioned badly at the time of test- i ing, this was largely owing to anxiety induced by treat- i ment received at the hands of CIA. , . of ’ an weet TS De ett a - whet mere neene anes sneeenearemremnenpe inet ane gee. meer mene me mertaengaganmeeie semis mung null aeth lubbveevtabedly. ceditenttinttis de os. tod cndbalne diove abla otathbens ob ict Ma ROL ea Ladthreti habit. ttle leh See ost As to the psychologist’s characterization of Nosenko as a psychopath, the limitations of such a diagnosis have already been made clear. Since his re- lease from incarceration, although he has certainly shown himself to be an emphathic person, winning and charming when he wants to be, he has not shown any of the unde- sirable traits associated with psychopathy. Quite to the contrary, as of this time at least, he has since 1969 comported himself with both dignity and discretion. : elidulbdiide Rat, Kee bew hs node benenedd dwttieatn Faun Reh fa elncRac Adil in The psychologist's evaluation contained a section ; entitled "Vulnerabilities" that was, once again, clearly . based on the premise that Nosenko was dissembling, when é he denied being under continued KGB control. The psychologist i | | wrote: . *Matarazzo, J. D., Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Inteili- gence. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins 1972. Page 444, Aalst Sabie Aa cll g Stee ote eee Rabin att a yee St SECRET “eeaeeraos se settee se errant sl eeaeianeamnenamamaaasaaasacmmmaa mma en 5 a ee, BS AvGhber seat and Rice bh bmn cto SpA SAE Serer te mas 7) pag eed lly g vines Sead Re butte Rabe, .
14-00000 Pi Gtatat nlbeete-suetep meescetetrenermm nen tnenee OLRM Se TORRES ARETE ACA DURE IN AACR ERENT SCT RSL ES TEENA NERA PEG ahs HI et Bee ms nt St Ne a ee case tae = Bie eater errr ttemnenne esata ab et at AAAS Hn inc Rt ti Sham ben ee eT Cea Cipro a ser anc eo eR aeREN eats one mecca ems coment = = if be re -- SECRET -146- Under prolonged pressure he will admit almost anything to get relief. Another vulnerability is that he will “break" in order to get relief. Care should be taken to continue pressure for some time after an initial break is secured to allow for vacillation and modification. Long periods of isolation after these breaks may be useful in evaluating the reliability of his information. In general, it is better te give him slight rewards (e.g., cigarettes, baths, etc.) for no apparent reason than to tie them to periods of ccoperation, etc. The psychologist's last major involvement in the appears to have been the series of debriefings having to do with Nosenko'’s personal history, conducted during the period 3-21 May 1965. These led the psychologist to the following conclusions and r:commendations: 1. Nesenko's story was consistent with the previous diagnosis of a “bright sociopath" (i.e., psychopath). 2. The psychologist was “totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this. much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was as- signed. 3. New approaches were necessary, as described in the following paragraph: I have few specific recommendations. The first is to consider a pentothal sodium [sic] interview . .. Second, he can be hit with a hostile, or a better term would be a needling, in- terrogation on his psychological weaknesses. His reaction to my mild needle on him running away from a bad Situation suggests he may be highly wulnerable in this area. Third, some consideration could be given to turn- ing him back to the Soviets. The - publication of his life story with SECRET sages semper n mektns se pg diet: dee eae ne Asie ETE OA te Cee o m re ee, ee Te gps seaamegeme. st nde ach a4 EPR URES a a uenee ee rents pment ow ARO pee E RFR ROOT an yee oe ad ‘ wag Sarees | ry aoa taeein ioe temas tartans nats naoic pads ececaen a etn NEN ANTE Re We * “et «a 4 4 4 G > ob Rb By Hien dheen secdulee t eaten Sy aibit bess prin, gh ree ae + Varsha Pa teonaeh ste Arete faulted nM Eh meat Ra kaaheapt ae ab BARE + vor te, Pht adens ' to rrwlnths tiation Vi Aambbatt. re oe re ateatmatbotee 2 wy
14-00000 - i og va see ca sama ix deaeatilieecuentnaseat aearel o " , e < . oe? ay ee ; ; petaerte + Lee anthtieg  ae oe -147- eed | aw Mages 2 the proper editorial changes-- emphasizing the class distinctions ‘and privileges in a classless society could be most humiliating to the Soviets. In addition, we could take the gamble of demonstrating that de- : fection is an honorable act of moti- vated men. The US has no room for the misfits and failures of the Soviet system. thee ee ® 5 os aban re mameel eg names | eonnanpytane yee qe ee ae tele og The above findings were still insufficient for some of the SR Division personnel, who then drafted a series of very specific questions to be put to the psychologist. Of these the first three will be quoted, together with the psychologist’s answers: 1. This man’s story is full of demon- strable lies. Often these lies seem point- less--no matter from what point of view they are studied. When challenged, he will sometimes retreat from one of his stories; in other instances, he will cling adamantly to one even when it is clear to all that he is lying and even when he has an easy way out. In other words, his lies, distortions and rationalizations are harder to under- stand than those of most “normai” people. In your opinion, when he lies, does he do so: a. because he is a compulsive <origvivaeiner sratipmnipruateetsermo rene nme sau eeentnp ton ante Bo meteor _ , liar; (Answer: No.) b. because he seeks .to bolster i his stature and ego for his own reasons; 4 (Answer: Essentially yes.) {- c. because the KGB told him to. (Answer: Perhaps.) 2. Do the incidence and nature of his in- accuracies and distortions add up to a behavior pattern that might reasonably be called “normal”? - _ ,  I£ not, how can it be described in layman's . terms? ; (Answer: Not a “normal" personality but legally normal and not hospitalizeable.) . ok ae Baan ey £7 _ SECRET paket se Dadbaann. Ate Pam DOR mab i walle mao masa = 4 Beret * va ae tm ROE File S an eed ite, 1 ab a vent Raa Gt RAG F tse SRS Kear cr? Rene es ee ragge . og fe ‘ + web den eres eal ae, tie 4 satancsdll 2 ‘ 3k he tna. cop US ol was Maas ag maa meet ee Beet ee AMMA bere “4 &, = Me teak
74-90000 : . rr er co wee SECRET -148- 3. If his behavior pattern is not “normal,” could it be counterfeit, either for personal reasons or because he was briefed to comport himself this way? . Could he play such a role over a considerable ‘ period of time? . . (Answer: Absolutely not.) “4 4 4 4 ! When at long last, in February 1968, SB Division concluded its long-awaited study of the Nosenko case, the findings of the psychologist were included in the following abbreviated form: ‘at Nosenko is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dis- sembling for personal reasons. He is not @ compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate ; what he thinks he is expected to say rather ° than to tell the truth as he knows it. He : lies by design as well as for effect, however, : and he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither “insane nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions." i Nosenko's rationalizations are not the pro- i duct of derangement. . ' vest leslELie debate aime dad wt not a oot wna alia lin ad adie ete Hedas Bab The most notable quality of this summary is its selectivity. For example: 1. The summary nowhere mentioned the diagnosis of Nosenko as a psychopath/sociopath. The fact that psychopaths generally try to evade the penalties of their misbehavior by adaptive role-playing (e.g., sudden religious "conversions" to win sympathy and "prove" they are changing their ways) could’ have served 7 OE oh ee le dangerously to undercut the thesis that Nosenko was sufficiently dedicated to persist in carrying out a long-term KGB plot in face of the sort of treatment he had received Since 4 April 1964. sect goer oe atobad cin bee dikswes et. ATAPI LG dala dates pee tervadeeg Eaten AML pee wks eR oe fot ge cemeetltn IE oe ne Gk OLE Ok GI eal tar AEH BET eR ete heat antes ot | 2. By the above-cited omission, it tends to establish a dichotomy between the "insane" . or “psychotic,” who suffer “delusions,” . and * "normal" people, who tell the truth. It carefully skirted the existence of a middle * mea raccoon tt aad ARLE SOSA PNG ANG ELSE tO METER NP ARE NOIRE TRONS AISI EES EAE AS A OR HEED cas 3 t eb ett tethen BekRed i oter ate a ‘ Eonstise i
14-00000 | Dad Poa * wy SECRET -149- ground between normality and psychoticism in which people do not behave “normally” but are not insane. Yet this distinc-. tion had been drawn specifically in“ answer to one of the SR Division questioned quoted above. a Enough has been said to make clear that the psycholo- gist was put in an impossible position. On the basis of the “facts provided him, he was frankly puzzled as to how Nosenko could have been selected for a KGB mission in- volving extended dissimulation. The psychologist was not sure enough of his ground to stick to his guns. As a psychologist who had dealt previously with a number of Soviet defectors, he had a great degree of insight. On the other hand, he knew that he did not have all the facts, beczuse Chief, SR had specifically told him so. Insight is of very little use when not based on adequate data. Helms tried to help. When told by the psychologist that the latter did not have all the facts necessary to make a judgment about Nosenko, Helms called Chief, SR and instructed him that the psychologist should be fully informed. This instruction appears to have been disre- garded. We can only conclude that the psychologist did what could legitimately be expected of him, within the con- straints of the Agency's command structure. * The weak- nesses that in retrospect we can perceive in the psychologist's diagnosis and recommendations can be as- cribed directly to his being asked to make professional judgments based on inadequate knowledge. The propriety of the Agency's employing a professional in this manner should be carefully reviewed. B. The Role of the Psychiatrist The psychiatrist's role in the Nosenko operation Was more extensive and of longer duration than the psychologist's. In addition to physical examinations, it included giving advice on how Nosenko should be treated while in confinement, advice on special interrogation techniques such as the use of sodium pentothal, and an assessment of Nosenko's personality. SECRET t : t t i i } i t 3 i 7 ane SSC a AREAL ESSER NG EHC MESA TEAR MONA WOR LTR TYTN Een NEE ESLEH UN a Rouse a & wate ah - * oye ’ . “ eeathiticte aatliat stants: cheeks atten ibaa ge sienin tami cere ae atecetedone det adeeackule, ocb tied od + L “ag, . a. 1 et ih selyar tate ES + essere ti radinn Baba begets stemtetbey o seumanth
14-00000 Sie TS a cea aco AA ee RES MICHELS RAE SIM NE ARNT ALAS iD ams eh UPON SAP OE TY SER AN OAK Neamt HAaRCe bambi ceer htm NS RANGE Lee ne SECRET -~150- The psychiatrist has stated (in discussions with the senior author of this report) chat he had ™ been told when he was first assigned to the case that Nosenko was concealing information of great importance to the US government. That he worked throughout th. case under this assumption is evident from the total context of his reporting. On the other hand, there is. no evidence that either SR Division or CI Staff shared the reasons for their suspicions with him to a sufficient extent for him to have evaluated their claim, even had he been qualified by professional background to make such an evaluation. He knew and accepted his limitations in the latter regard; for example, in a report dated 23 February 1965, after he had spent an hour observing an interrogation, he remarked: {Nosenko] comes off [in] his responses to questions (at least when I saw him) in the same fashion as always though I am not competent to judge the content of what he says. [Under iining added. | Yet, even though the psychiatrist was not an “opera- tions officer" according to normal Agency criteria, during his long association with this case (which included 34 examinations of Nosenko in the year 1964 alone) he acted in more than a purely medical capacity. Not only did he check on Nosenko's health and endeavor to safeguard - it, he also advised the operational component of the Agency on certain aspects of their own specialized activities to which his medical and psychiatric knowledge ” appeared relevant. In this latter capacity, the psychi- atrist's name was invoked frequently in operational correspondence, generally without his knowledge; for example, in a 27 November 1964 memorandum to the DDP, concerning arrangements for forthcoming interrogations, Chief, SR stated: , Given .. . the assessment by both [the psychi- atrist] and [the psychologist] that Subject is @ compulsive talker, we are hopeful that we will make some progress. By implication, this and other similar references evoked the recondite expertise of the psychiatric and psycholog- - ical professionals to bolster claims of impending success. SECRET NR nee dente oe ated ete, re diedmeratbtie 5. baat ‘hahah grb botenittem fatal.» de Bnet caalenltatsattad 5 on Lleden AREA eng Sameateest- "stsesetti
| z ste ‘ eats at SECRET D ss peat want tds dramgion ds athe Soits ate othe oe aalthet 6 vere . Thus, it was only natural that the psychiatrist, : having been told by senior Agency officials that Nosenko was consistently lying about his true mis- Sion, should accept their views. Unlike the psycholo- gist, he did not even have the advantage of having systematically debriefed Nosenko on his life history; had he done so, he might have shared the psycholo- gist's suspicions that the SR Division opinion of Nosenko was not beyond legitimate challenge. we deat { : Nevertheless, the anomalous situation in which ‘ the psychiatrist was placed had two unfortunate consequences: 1. Because he was led to assume that : Nosenko was systematically lying, his i diagnosis was somewhat distorted. i wd 4 a 4 “s 2. The same assumption led him to “ (oo play a quasioperational role in the handling ; of Nosenko. Let us look in greater depth at the first consequence. In so doing, it is not our purpose to second-guess a qualified psychiatrist; rather, it is our purpose to ascertain whether this particular professional, well : known to his colleagues for his devotion to duty, was a . in fact given a fair opportunity to make an honest evaluation. t COME NSE ie AIOE Lae Eeye oLore tame SECRET 9 ss ithiadisSeqnatiantitt sd ieee UECBEIISRA : iS EERE RR REG al ct era Ri NS Lea nn RN ate re FO AN UTE AO NOE te RE tai TNE Deut ate ek ree = 3 2 be
14-00000 -152- ; - SEORET ses he . , s, The psychiatrist's diagnosis of Nosenko, which he labeled "Psychiatric Impressions," was dated 20 NYecember 1964. It read in part: Psychiatric impression is that of an individual who shows an above average intelligence capacity, is shrewd and perceptive. While he claims to have desired to cooperate and work with US officials, his antisocial behavior was destruc- tive and self-defeating to the aims he claimed to pursue. His own needs and desires are of paramount importance to him and he manipulates those around him without regard to consequence i in order to satisfy his needs. As such he tends 5 to be selfish, ungrateful, narcissistic and ‘ exhibitionistic. In satisfying his own desires 5 . there is no concern for the feelings or interests . of others. There has been no evidence of a sense of honor or of shame. He has seen nothing wrong with his own behavior, being unable to view this from another's viewpoint. For most of his adult life, it is reasonable to expect . that he has operated in this manner--without : conscience, without guilt and has directed his efforts at satisfying his own needs. He may io at times give the impression of being a reliable and steadfast person, but after gaining security for himself and the confidence of others, can shrug off major obligations easily. As with many individuals of this personality makeup, his disregard for the truth is remarkable. Whether there is a good chance that he will get: away with a lie or whether detection is almost certain, he shows no signs of perturbation and can coolly maintain his position. While com- mitting the most serious of perjuries, it is ce In emerge ee ercnsetone yn a HPN ARERR IT ER EEF glare a . sete bees willed geet stadt, Boake web LA wetabilghabileiete WE cdimwde + te wbliges wbdaects oa sedicdicl ga cesae cea altd tee RRC p oe meme Ie me te SERRE ne > . tac nak ap hand Ch HBR OEE IE ston j | easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye. Alcohol certainly catalyzes his tendency to | uninviting or destructive behavior ... 4 Emotional attachment is shallow. Although he oc may give at times the impression of being ; : an an cordial and affectionate, beneath this is an. : 7 of >? astonishing callousness. : 1 i ° . AS a youngster, this man might well have been | “3, ; leckea upon as a@ juvenile delinquent with . | Hl ; vo t 4 SECRET | 4 : 7 ‘Sot areamciesi Ghar VIE RSA INE NN cca SORIRR RECN es = nee En me cb at ent, nam Ret Tate ETRE ten ok eh th tty :
14-00000 2 | 7 SEGRET oo -153- constant brushes with authority. As he grew older this behavior most likely continued in the same pattern with occasional brushes with the law and perhaps some punishment. But the effectiveness of his ability to manipulate and protect himself by personable appeals may ; have kept him in circulation in society on Bl the fringe, so to speak. His reaction to his ae restricted environment is not unusual, as OF some such individuals come to accommodate to was some limits imposed by authority while at the $a. same time not accepting the seriousness of ce: their situation and believing that, as in the Mi past, they can talk their way out. This man : is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively. On 1 October 1976, the above evaluation was discussed with the psychiatrist in the light of facts previously — unknown to him. Inter alia, he was given (in writing) background on the following aspects of the Nosenko case: ; 1. CIA promises of substantial monetary rewards and an opportunity for Nosenko to work with CIA on a salaried basis. © . 2. The conciusion of the Director of Securigy, as of 30 September 1976, that "Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers." 3. Acceptance of Nosenko’s bona fides by both FBI and CIA. The memorandum of conversation dictated by the senior author following the above discussion reads in part: * 1964 memorandum, as well as subsequent psychiatric SECRET $PBgE an ran edeimpncrtnecemmnnmasei tte ce OO A he TTT MNOS Na ttm Rt SR aeN'4 hares, watanete ttt GM es AARD i { i | | —— [The psychiatrist) agreed that his 20 December ge ” Fe be Nene OTE Ope eens RCE Steed Sy ch naan OIE Bee F 4 y\, Lien “sp ebelikl Bia ae : Irn nee Tate Cn a. aor tone gettin anne omen ara amy we eae rena apetnp ee renae : - Scanian {aiadtadl . ‘os pace nt Reeth je REE 290 ? pete: Baad [ ee : ate oo an ata x : an oe Sagi. 2 7 . > cht Het eset Bi oy iad this leit to eon li FSi 5 oy BEEN Seda asad, meted de te néwhee nineteen tag beednthe -4 (AB teed arp epee water wee tale te tenis beberare aie. ! ' * . + Sedat blade M er te Ta Step o sBbate
14-00000 . . ee es er 2 Oo phe *, fe. thE CR © 4 . sh ee ' ¢ Mes ara ae é i ‘ a SHEA ocinne © Lay, 3 2 ithe tanto i el ~SEORET bens ~154- ‘ asl oS EH AE a Bae ait ob iting ae epee etd WHE ID judgments which he had made, were all heavily dependent on “collateral information” which he obtained from -epresentatives of the SB Division. He agreed that, had he known the , facts as stated in my memorandum, his psychi- . ‘ atric. judgments might have differed from . : ‘ those-he actually made. i In connection with some of the specific points raised.in my memorandum, [the psychiatrist] made the following observations: nen me as -, a (1). He was not aware of the -inancial or other promises made to Nosenko, and perhaps assumed that Nosenko, like most defectors, was _ angling for large rewards. [The psychiatrist] mentioned Golitsyn as among the precedents which he probably had in mind... twa MaRS mh Ou te ntti dae tee [2]. In regard to Nosenko's alleged lying and deception, he was 3 totally dependent upon the judgments of SB Division personnel as well as that of [a polygraph operator]. i \ (The psychiatrist] stated that, until he read my i : j October 1976 memorandum, he had never known that Nosenko had contributed valuable informa- tion. He had also never received any informa- ; tion concerning Nosenko's behavior since his being released from incarceration .. . Bhatti aiasi to hatha net YO Last iat We are thus justified in concluding that, in the : _ : psychiatrist's case as in that of the psychologist, a i professional was not given the proper “collateral in- i , formation” on the basis of which to render a sound profes- i sional judgment. More explicitly, because neither the | psychiatrist nor psychologist was accurately informed even about such basic aspects of the case as the promises | made to Nosenko (which could not possibly be considered i to have had sensitive security implications), neither i man had an accurate criterion for judging the appropri- ateness of Nosenko's behavior in seeking better treatment. . a meet chide E hethibahs. q SECRET : i “Seca Rtana eterna mnemeennremar 4 maememamime antes on mv Stee IO MPR NMOL NMS Ae SIRS 4 "ete te At AEN Oe iy . tee ”
14-00000 Be: *y OE Peed see ae wide te Chain SOLMASE! + = | _ SECRET . ‘ Given the apparent consensus among the Agency's - . leadership that there were good and sufficient reasons : for incarcerating and trying to "break" Nosenko, it is not surprising in hindsight that the psychiatrist offered 4 judgments and advice extending well beyond the bounds of z+ . conventional medicine and psychiatry. Since his quasi- operational participation in this case has been covered to some degree in Chapter II1, we need only reevoke a few examples here: seustan te Shae she nated be SAL Spade --His judgment of 24 February 1966 that “things . : are bound to change as far as Nosenko is con- cerned--he is either going to stop faking or things will get worse." 1 4 3 eth, wacemhaatohiiens. 5 ie : ; --His judgment, reported on 26 April 1966, i — that reestablishing contact between Nosenko : : and the interrogators would be a serious mis- take because it would constitute a "relief." 2-His opinion, offered after monitoring the Q 6 July 1966 meeting between the principal a Z case officer and Nosenko, that “the way in : . which the interview was conducted would very . ; effectively slam shut another psychological i door." re tenniimbebate wlabte welstdeedtiy = Admittedly, the above comments come to us secondhand, via memoranda written by others. Nonetheless, they are consistent with everything in the psychiatrist's hand- ; written reports of his visits to Nosenko in confinement. ° It will suffice here to illustrate our point with one example, quoted from the psychiatrist's 14 July 1964 re- port of a visit to Nosenko: ; wo * eeseryeantpma. eeraaoteomttr oo Aas 7 , wo ‘ ith chaddleibadiaaltewes Rik = | | Subject was seen for [the] first time in over { two weeks. His general physical condition is | satisfactory and his weight is now 170 lbs. ; There is evidence however that he is reacting ; . i _ oon promt ete an et Bona Sty LE tah psychologically to his detention and is show- ing increased tension, anxiety and is misin- terpreting various stimuli in his environment. oretncerem -tonees tart sme gee nett Ae eee ar senaie vpn sanneit eA oor we ° ee ney SECRET * EDDA RAD le RR ence OS eh NS hea ER RONG Re RT TS ia as RE ANTES ADA LE OR IEE AAT RE AG TCE S SERNA AT fA eT i NR” OEE Mt ot ’ fe art cantata RA 4 scimde ele oe he Ae ay Bae oto eat Slasl maa ie PTL BaF ota 4 $ i See . e apageest Ar
SECRET -156- I i H 8 i 4 f i ‘ 3 ‘ z ; 3 Although the psychiatrist later changed his mind i and expressed the conviction that Nosenko had been faking : his signs of psychological deterioration, the reasons ’ : behind his assurance are not evident, at least to the ; : lay mind. There have been ample studies of the effects . of isolation and sensory deprivation on human beings, triggered in large measure by the demands of the space : SET Moeranabaaanan stomagtsrnstty GIGGA~ IOLA SRnpe Tg hae Nh OIE A ® ELON Hat a in coe SADA Mitek nat tector ane woeb lat EIN CLAY AA A epg he nA as remnant ene Tape tre AO A Mn 5 AT Tamara tet har te A NA NE HERR a : x Soar , se % : % eos Tyee menial! + mney te a aw ee - 3 ne . RSE, pa sgioteais +e ‘ . ve thas abe yntng Kd alta dtd Br “ 4 SEB Asoo. cnibbaitn Gattis, Bibs AP rca wee 4 ary a ew rmamumeenenin # yoomuewnee repens eo, we eta ha Hasaltal ant G bids ae by women he te ent eteepenppss geek snatcernemriadee bs os eabeietaldt toaitithinate amen . : . - ‘ : thai cklame wr tic dabinedd ociuszatle bar, i d 3 3 i F i a aaa ust . ad dL rete t - aceiidags Zor ae 4 elma SaaS Tae eh. £* 74
14-00000 ipreeeaner onan ° xX ° ay - SECRET -157- program. They are only partially relevant to Nosenko's Situation, because no experimenter in the non-Communist world has ever attempted to impose social isolation or other forms of deprivation on experimental subjects for more than a few days at a time. (The Soviets, who are bound by fewer restrictions than we, have employed durations of up to 60 days.) Nevertheless, while vari- ous researchers have obtained diverse results, there is ample evidence that certain psychological, physiolog- ical, and behavioral’ impairments do indeed result from Severe restrictions being: placed on physical activity, sensory stimulation, and social interaction; and this generalization seems to apply to Soviets in much the Same way as it does to Americans. The psychiatrist's . judgments were not doubt based in good faith on his clinical judgment, but the question remains as to whether the latter was not distorted by his apparent commitmerit to the cause of “breaking'' Nosenke. Thus we are ied inevitably to the problem of whether such a commitment is appropriate in the case of a doctor of medicine. Conclusions The senior author of this study spent 1972 making a study of Soviet agents| Two of the conclusions of that study are worth requoting in part four years later: e « « We have not always used our Agency psychiatrists and psychologists to best advantage. When we deal with computers, we know that we have to call on specialists te help us, but we have a false self-confidence in dealing with people. This Self-confidence is allowable when we are dealing with people : who are normal, but unfortunately many Soviet defectors are ‘not psychologically normal. They therefore ‘ require very specialized handling ... .« « « An operational death wish seemed to ; 4 overwhelm us, as we insisted on ascribing. . . every aberration of the agent(s) to some : Sinister design of the enemy. Granted that : SECRET 7 ; wk ne uate nt 8 he ald of sallans veobease Thu a ae mbt gE ak a te at Seriibsacia tea mabe be + Bebb fs, sonddt on adabeth Se oboe een aay sbitebeabeablds Her ete nae eR al +
14-00009 POISE TENS ADORED HAE ULES NAY ene tO rs hen ot Sg aetna ga re E NI AGEN San HI © gti etee oe enn eH ; f y Pat oe SECRET -158- misgioe we must always keep in mind the possibility of an agent's being under opposition con®" trol, as long as there is a change that he is genuine we should never let him become aware of our suspicions. We have missed some major operational opportunities by violating this rule. In the Nosenko case, the problem lay not in our failure to make use of the psychologists/psychiatrists but in out gross misuse of them. CIA officials in charge of the Nosenko case until 1967 sought assistance of professionals from this field, as they did from Similar people in other fields, only to help shore up certain conceptions. For their part, the psychologist/psychiatric professionals were not of as much help as they could have been. They had become accustomed over the years to playing a subordinate support role to the operators and had developed a “you cali--we haul" attitude that is inconsistent with the independent- mindedness legitimately to be expected of a professional. In addition, because of the doctrine of compartmentation, the knowledge that the Agency's psychological/psychiatric professionals have had to contribute has, at any given time, been much less than it could and should have been. SECRET . aastetstpeiaenpussaretnamttste toh RGU AMADA OOS tient menor erent natn Brrr thay tae LAE OTE NE MRI ke RIED a ntenmeomn A weve sam nt ne tee mee ne perenne anes be pony oe yo lee ? eM Hs nat boat as ae oor ah Fi. wen earth bile vn anid i inblichue tokttabes she ne enh Pies ndislney -sitinAY Roaeteanae cath Aalge ott adits tha, a toot fede aed tote aad oh Far wo ietathige te genet pede tects bel eens at! battens es Or tert itahatbalinnces git os pene AMA Lb catht wee tna Sere
14-00000 ASAI cet SMELL ERIE Gm TERE en ee mermesOr Oe TIAN oe etre oan Aan SEGHET 2 ~177- * CHAPTER XI Methodology and Leadership ; _ Lack of Counterintelligence Methodology We accept without question the necessity for counter- intelligence, as a category of the intelligence process concerned with the activities of hostile powers’ covert and clandestine activities against the United States and our allies. But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic methodology. Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no such thing. . t i i 5 ‘ nti . : . oy . . -_ . - . @ o- wo ° je Log vere Pace edhe dnandene 1 abate NUE, tATu, a « “ oy "3 ae Sipe MEADS onl AEA me BAR I ORS SES SR en a RerUaesss ca, Enka Ti ertentend fctnr oh teense SP tb Ag cad NaS ted 25 a5 ge Babe eae et cE eee Fr = Bacar a vinatat P Eaec. tym gy ae ane Tags sb ake!
erg _ SECRET -178- sateen pp B. Influence of Chief, CI on Methodology The predominant influence in the counterintelligence field within the Agency until 1975 was the then Chief, CI. His reputation for expertise rested on his purportedly unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political role. In truth, no one could compete with him as an expert on this subject. His analyses, based on fragmentary and often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than systematic and therefore neither easily comprehended nor replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike the Emperor and his imaginary clothes, Chief, CI's fantasies were never ' * vulnerable to objective examination, simply because he surrounded such data as existed with a wall of secrecy. His "facts" were available in full only to a minimum number of trusted apostles; to the rest of the intelligence con- munity, both American and foreign, he doled them out f. selectively--seldom in written form--to prove whatever : point he was trying to make at the time. Chief, CI‘s preference for oral over written communica- tion is worth emphasizing. During his incumbency as its chief, the CI Staff, though it supposedly had in its ‘possession information concerning a horrendous hazard to beth the United States and its allies, mever committed to eport on the sub C. Impact of Faulty Counterintelligence on Positive Intelli- gence Collection There is an important interrelationship between coun- terintelligence, as it was conducted in the 1960s, and the ° collection of positive intelligence from human sources. Only if this relationship is spelled out can the full im- pact of the events we have been describing be comprehended. ‘AIR Pa achina 1h atten ott 8 chap ee teen yee emits me este rH AL HAN eG NY She En SECRET "aa + hanged dy sla crit ca noth tescinnrabnebaes set att is pedi a saasttecpink’e 52 DTH pxienn Bataan. Sa Ace RRO ET ROUT Tee NEDA Sc eT aE perenne u reg ae enttereerennat veut sagt whee 5 yeni! . a 2s A weal RB sale teen udldee tle dadbinlant das sansa! 1 abd sow nanbli thie aaltcd rg ot t ened? Xe Kamit Talia aia hee ft de addEragtione ata can e+ es she bare sur eae Je COMBE, bende adam dtw 5 atm vet latneens abe Haale doen itched at 2
oe Epp ypc le reese net tenance acai ¥ sat, ghia RNG RAMEE & ast CRETETL I Cote ons otro + before there can be meaningful discussion of nreviously ~ _Meserihed de ©. seerer -179- At the time CIA was established, the primary mission of what was later to become the Plans Directorate's Clandestine Service was conceived to be the collection of strategicully-significant intelligence from clandestine human sources. How successful was the Clandestine Service in fulfilling this mission? . Agency claims of success in the human-source col- lection field have often been so phrased, whether inten- tionally or not, as to give the impression that our achievenents stemmed largely from the process called - “development and recruitment." The impression that we ‘recruited’ our best Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources fol- lowing a period of orderly development must be dispelled, If our most significant positive intelligence and much of our most significant counterintelligence from human sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact nationals who volunteered their services, why did we fail to systematize their handling more fully? Even more to the point within the framework of the present study, why would we not give such persons the benefit of every reasonable doubt rather than treat them with suspicion and, in the cases of Nosenko and - outright inhumanity? ee What Went Wrong? There are no easy or certain answers. Nonetheless, a retrospective glance at the intellectual preparation of those who led the Clandestine Service may shed light on the problem and permit the formulation of constructive recommendations for future action. The leaders of the Clandestine Service in its first quarter century were, for the most part, people who had SECRET é “+O sew A ee See (a TgtET arr reneei ate tne cocteeatetementer Tate eta getnnna neNinttn | Lee SERIA Ye a went AEA ere Tt ual SE pnewr te Ranta Gren ME ae eee bee BOS ate Tats hen alii crete. dete eiblnn eatery aod te SOT = 7 Oecd ' ‘mee a: Va wee ee ne nae sisGA Canc eanedl wesanipgspensreppasapenciatsanpeee ai ’ ~ i . et tee B sbneee ih Uolart oe ees yet 2 cams le eae BST ce taaen Te 3. aatle ipte
74-90000 : . ” re a a SECRET ee -180- emerged from World War II, oriented toward action rather than contemplation. Chief, CI was almost unique in his interest in long-range analysis. Within the Clandestine Service, his generation was in general suspicious of theory and ill-prepared in most cases to cope with it. rr ’ 1 . . wt y wteleddv cadet attvatlinn — Antllcbe Sindé lake a teaesisa ‘ On the other hand, the best of the Service's leaders ‘ -eand there were many good ones--were successful because they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called com- mon sense. Its value should not be underestimated. For example, when Penkovskiy was producing strategic intelli- gence that remains of value to this day, it was the com- mon sense of these other leaders that led them to resist Chief, Cl's allegation that Penkovskiy was a “disinforma- tion agent." , “het : . rh. pathectanttetitt Leet noe uth tee Meee Nevertheless, senior Clandestine Service supervisors of the périod 1948-1970 had seldom themselves been trained ; in rigorous analytic techniques, and thus they s-ldom : were in a position to demand high standards of analysis of their subordinates. Until the massive outflow of retirees in recent years changed the demography of the Service, most senior operational supervisors had received their higher educations before systematized analysis be- came routine even in such "soft" subjects as political science (for which a knowledge of inferential statistics is now required at most universities). Many, probably most, of these same gentlemen were also educated during a sort of interregnum in academe, when the study of classical logic had passed from vogue but had not yet been replaced by emphasis on scientific method. In the realm of technology, almost all senior executives in the Clandestine Service before 1970 had finished college before the first digital computer, an invaluable anaiytie¢al tool, became commercially available about 1951. . wa c08 abbas de 1b mee oe deals 3 lttdetess “3 There also have been, of course, a number of bright : - 4. spots. Some of the Plans Directorate’s divisions and ’ 3 staffs had subordinate components that specialized in sub- 7 ; Stantive intelligence and built up great expertise on: : 3 specific subjects over the years. From time to time aa) . there were also bursts of enthusiasm for the use of psychological evaluation techniques in the assessment of prospective agents. But these cases were exceptions; primary reliance within the Clandestine Service was on. teal de Peete | ! { | | | intuitive and non-systematic. “ a judgments that, though sometimes bolstered by impressive figures and arcane terminology, were nevertheless essentially 2 i‘ a ry ° 7 é + ' SEGRE | ; . : 4 * : % WGA AAU etn Su MEDI SAARDE Rhed pcOnsncrenanses errs een tne meena ore sects a ey, sreiticisteg 3 AEE TLIO * OY a0 fe nth deahigt ride Eat tonsa Ppatte cues 3 vy oer =
ARERR teen aD eel enon Boe bet ean Mente RAE LEEK AERREE! See Se ythuiemere ntaetimee notte + peor tance » SECRET -181- Such systems and criteria as did exist were largely in the heads of various individuals, ana there is no evidence of any appreciable long-term consensus - among the latter. Every defector case tended to be subject to the vagaries of the momentary line-up of CIA leadership. The existence of an Interagency Defector Committee, subordinate to the DDP, introduced ‘" some uniformity of approach, but its concerns were ' limited for the most part to superficial administrative and procedural formalities. Summary If we seem to have wandered far afield from the nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies, we have done so because the unfortunate handling of Nosenko was not an isolated event. . Rather, it was symptomatic ot some fundamental inadequacies of the Plans Directorate. What this means to us is that the long-needed improvement in our conduct of counterintelli- gence activity, now well underway, must be carried on Within the framework of a searching reexamination of the analytical techniques employed by the Directorate and its Clandestine Service. Whatever the course taken, however, we believe that the last quarter of this century is going to be even more exigent, though in a different way, than the past twenty- five years. We therefore sum up the implications of this chapter by posing a single question: How can we ensure that the upcoming generation of Clandestine Service leaders is better prepared intellectually to meet the challenges that face them than were those who ran the Service in the sixties? ; SECRET Bama ete saan tats meals a Bets ssc ATENEO LTE LITTRELL MPRA! VALINE REESE tence ASN Wa Nene ea SIN ee emt an «Mtns Bre Eg 2% Bete nbc aot . ‘ Me 4 ze ef? beac ita ed ed as abcln bale 5 tn creates Bhae, _pwbebeats attests stakhdee orem tba nea ab dla Ae paxk ; = Ge my soe cet ereete  gaini MA FP anrertioga pe Ae Ane Inet oe tin apes weeny fat . aks { ER Er OR LE IEICE oh oN vege Code Fiheate odors . “ -”
1400000, ee “s - ‘ f . a re : ; 2B a! » ‘adele ‘ : pati -182- CHAPTER XII i St Conciusions and Recommendations A. The Letter of Instructions » Soma fet safe. x tao Log yt mae A Bua Pies hoe BEEP Ss NREL Ae RTT eT Pere RUN Lem ae Be LA. antidling Sista. a fo General guidance for the preparation of this report Was contained in a Letter of Instructions, signed by the q Deputy Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It as- i 7 : . Signed the following tasks: : 4 You are tasked to write an analysis of the t 4 { Nosenko case which will address the following | 4 matters: - i | {l1]. The bona fides of Nosenko. | 4 * — ¥ . {2]. The value of Nosenko to | 4 | the United States and allied govern- i : ments. i F . : ! [3]. The relationship and 4 4 significance of Nosenko to other , i agents and operations. a i } j : [4]. The identification of unex- _ 4. | ploited Nosenko penetration leads and t 3 information. ; 4 [5]. The nature and validity of - 4 methodology of previous Nosenko bona 4 fides studies. . t ood We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather * | ai liberally, because the ramifications and implications of idk the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we, . i A and probably the framers of the above letter, anticipated. ; 4 Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter 4 ° i with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs ¢ _ 4 | a. through e. 3 -_ ra 1. Bona Fides ‘ ie 4 ; i Doubts regarding Nosenko'’s bona fides were of ‘ . i . . our own making. Had the job of initially assessing % ' 4 him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating ; , the intelligence he had to offer, been handled 5 ks Lod SECRET oo . . i LRTI AAA SE ae PREECE TEESE EEE BAO EAS PELE LIL POOLE AIT te cag aes, a RIM Ae ent ste + =p A fa BRIN ren Penner <r etnbed mterwa yin it orn eeies Sf F
14-00000 as Ss SECRET -183-— ‘ properly, he could have been declared a bona fide defector as readily as have many other Soviet in- telligence officers. This is not to say that we can be certain of the genuineness of any defector. It will always remain hypothetically possible that the Soviet government, acting through the KGB or some other instrumentality, will attempt to plant an intended “disinformation agent" or prospective penetration of our government on our doorstep. But the useful- ness of the Soviets’ doing so, in the manner as- cribed to them in the Nosenko case, is probably as Slight. as is the feasibility. Seviet success in using native-born citizens of other countries to spy on their own homelands has been considerable. By contrast, there is no record of the USSR's suc- cesfully infiltrating the government of a major non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged Soviet citizen, least of all one whose career has been spent in a Soviet intelligence or security service. We therefore conclude that Nosenko was from the beginning a bona fide defector. Value of Nosenko Nosenko'’s contribution has been summarized in Chapter IV. He has been of great value, but he probably could have been even more valuable had he been properly handled. Relationship to Other Agents and Operations As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the Nosenko case, through no fault of the defector him- self, had a most unfortunate effect on all clandestine operations in the Soviet field. Identification of Unexploited Leads We have not felt that this subject was one we could feasibly or properly investigate. To do so would have meant delving into the past and current operations of both the SE Division and the CI Staff to ascertain the extent to which there might have SECRET ee * - ? . teers emetic a ae ete OP NPR EI Hk, AE one agen Se Gif ap Aa ECE ILD Set ANCES EEE FAA OTNN AONE ET Se ete RE ORES UD Ne cP RTS ES ot ho TENOR Rhee KM wok Det ere alle cea oe td wt ini way wee + adtian! GEbOS alban « mre Rah LTE Aen pmo : ete 2 phseaeetnt es nih ene i vit Pair eee nettenjet tn F ; . cect eet at gates tere tp pee mpg! wh ne rote Ite ease - i A a 2 Ciigper techie matheve et it Ahhetnin tes» ’ co neiiebecd eeacnl ok oe an whats Sitsal TSR lean Sana alta ibd Fiat bs Rl npe i we] ww sawke abhi, at waste Bee ars a Ba, noes dos
14-00000 sana on oneness on ASS FRD innt SnEREtePe CAEP RAE UATE HD tt Pn ou me nen Hen me == MEE EAN i abate tt Mehul amar ty tg Lande # oe me See J oe on SECRET -184- been “exploitation" of any of the persons whom Nosenko identified by name? ime would not have permitted us to accomplish this task, nor would our doing so have been consistent with the principle of compartmentation. 'S. Methodology It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the variety of techniques used in handling Nosenko did not conform to any generally accepted sense of the term "methodology." ; : Recommended Action Most of our recommendations for action have been previously stated or implied. In the following para- graphs, we recapitulate them, with such supplementary remarks as seem necessary. . 1. Examination of the Role of Professionals We recommend that the role that can properly be piayed within the Agency by members of the organized professions--medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law, and others--be given careful study, within the con- text of (a) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills to the best possible use, and (b) refraining from in- volving them in matters not properly within their professional purview. 2. Improvement of Intellectual Standards We recommend that the Operations Directorate, and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps are possible to ensure that the intellectual caliber of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the future. We realize that the present persennel selection system sets high standards for those entering on duty at the professional level, particularly as regards IQ and education. But the standards presently in force do not by themselves guarantee that future selections will possess independence of mind, analytical ability, and objectivity. SECRET eee Cake a HOA Le eee re ce eo i a ere ie Ci eee as ENE ntti Ma eA CT PEN HERE ET AE HS SEY 9) on bee aoe BE oe te aN POSOE RS ety ES” Aen «alt = a eri, 4 aut wh Nie te Chettbeattfivee!? fate, prea a she aebaree 2 aiiediaetad Fn RAE wy 29 EY. phe tp ye Peo trary * cede se no EL
civil SECRET - =185- ” —~, i In the case of personnel already on board, it should be kept in mind that we live in a rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented ization. Knowledge and intellectual ' skills adequate at this time may be inadequate For an intelligence or- ganization, we define “inadequate” as anything a few that is less than the best. years from now. We suggest that a board of expert consultants be established, drawn primarily from research in- stitutions, high-technology enterprises, and the - academic world to recommend a program of screening new entrants and improving the analytical skills of those already on duty, with the aim of achiev- ing and maintaining a high level of intellectual excellence throughout the Operations Directorate. Detection of Deception We recommend that high priority be accorded a program to develop new methods of detecting deception. Specific criteria of bona fides will follow _ maturally from improved methods of detecting deception. 4. Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent Handling and Personnel Selection Wet a eeher ge yo Sanat ne Tare CREA ROMAN re melee ete TCHR atc Ret et ve EAMONN orth A on a" SECRET nin a eee cba « a in ote Mat ae be eee o (OR aa este RENN HN RAN EN ata Oa ve eis “A, a stati a! . oo REO Hb denne eo ; a a a * st . ait hierdie staked — tecodhd: acd 2 te os . WER ee ialecintntttaebim diac kdb, plea tlh ° Kenran segs < iihtw witi
14-00000 dee Newnes aeennteenie EON arbi Heo | | | | | ee SECRET ~186- We would thus substantially reduce the threat that the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities poses for the Agency, and particularly for the - Operations Directorate. Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors Aithough few, if any, of the Soviet or Soviet Bloc agents to whom we have had direct and continuing access have ever been tested as long as they remained in agent status, we do not accept as valid the. reasons usually given for not testing them. Implementation of this recommendation would, if the other programs above-recommended are also car- ried out, contribute substantially toward authentica- tion of agent sources and information. ® ee ee ey SECRET ee ae stent ine reat Mt ee ecimere ow ramet peters fatten etree eran eotreaetletoenit st HRRES A IRE CRD oo uO LS RRS = MAAR MO AORN “Rec SAU REAR er Mem eed tic ra toe Ne—metntiel wh“ apenadten Saale an eee ye manne ni tone teens el tne Se Spe a age ev pungent yt sionewern to FON OIA ay 4 ay ! # ot “4 a oho bey 4 eee ae ay oa aa, tee Lh a hatte oe ete de fee dhe ae wy eee on s oh eng ST rrr ware op +