G- MAY 972 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans SUBJECT: Security Review of Project KDFACTOR 1. At the time you approved the renewal of Project . KDFACTOR in December 1971 you asked that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, which provides photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. You asked that particular atten- tion be paid to terminated agents and their families. The Station has made a security review and a detailed ¥Yeport on the findings, from Chief, WH Division, is attached. 2. The report discusses the history of the opera- tion, describes security problems of the past and steps taken to remedy them, and discusses the security and operational situation of the agents presently covered by the project. The report notes that the two opera- tional sites and their associated agents are compart- mented from each other and that processing the film is now being done inside the Station. One section of the report discusses in detail the assets who were formerly involved in these operations but have been terminated. The final section of the report describes current secu- rity: practices and notes that an alternate photographic surveillance site has been procured and is available for use should the present one be compromised. 3. The report demonstrates that the security of the operation is being kept up to high standards and that there are no potential security threats from former agents that the Station is not aware of. The FI Staff believes that the Station's security review and the attached report satisfy the requirements of your request. ~ Chief Foreign Intelligence Attachment
9 May 1972 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans THROUGH 3: MPS/S8G/PI SUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Security Review l. The CI Staff is satisfied with the fine Security Review of the KOFACTOR Project activity and personnel. 2. However, the Staff urges the Station to ¥Femain constantly alert to any security repercussions pertaining to all the terminated assets particularly in view of their past knowledge of the project activity and the fact that some of them had family and relatives who also were aware of the project activity. Focus should continue regarding any security problems pertaining to KDFACTOR-7. 3. In addition, the Station should continue to monitor any Soviet investigation or probing of owners and tenants involved in the properties used under this project. C/CI/OPS fH
14-00000 ° - 1? App 1972 . MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Plans SUBJECT ' : FI Project KDFACTOR, Security Review “ REFERENCE : ADDP Memo (DD/P 1-5899) to C/WHD dated 14 December 1971 i. In response to reference the following is a summary of the KDFACTOR security review: The Station summary of the KDFACTOR Project security is as follows: "Phere were no known problems of security relating to the Project. In response to the Headquarters request, we have reviewed all phases of the operation and believe that Project security is sound, The Project assets have all been with us for many years and have established themselves as respectable long- time residents of the area, All five assets, four in one family and one in another, are extremely security conscious and have all been SGSWIRLED. The assets derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their Agency employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termina- tion of their work for us., AS an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence", The Headquarters desk has also reviewed the security of the KDFACTOR Project and agrees with the Station that the security - | is sound. In fact, as presently constituted, the KNDFACTOR Project is well compartmented, and each of the two KDFACTOR - | photo basehouses (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) is run by long- So term assets who draw a minimum of suspicion in their operational activities, Terminated assets could possibly expcse the existence
14-00000 ~@ SECRET. of this project, but that seems unlikely from the Headquarters . review of terminated agents wilting of present KDFACTOR . Operational activities. A Soviet investigation of property owner- ship around the Soviet Embassy and their awareness that the Soviet Embassy was under photographic surveillance in the past could result in a Soviet investigation of the activities and contacts of KDABBEY-1, the owner of an apartment building and four houses close to the Soviet Embassy. It is doubtful that KDABBEY-1's activities, which do not inter-relate with the activities of the KDFACTOR agents, would in any way expose the KDFACTOR Project operational activities, 2. A drief history of the KDFACTOR Project: The KDFACTOR Project had its origins in the LUERSEY and LIPSTICK Projects, both active in the mid-1950's, In 1958, after the arrest of two LIPSTICK surveillance team members, it was decided to break off the more sensitive, uncompromised LIPSTICK assets manning and supporting two basehouses for photo surveillance of the Sovict Embassy, These asséts were consolidated with one photo basehouse against the Soviet . Embassy and one ‘surveillance team from the LJIERSEY Project into a new project. (LIEMPTY), which was approved on 16 January 1959. The LIEMPTY Project, renamed the KDFACTOR Project in 1971, consisted of three photo ‘basehouses, two viewing-the front of the Soviet Embassy (LIMITED and LILYRIC) and one viewing the rear garden of the Soviet Embassy (LICALLA), plus a mobile surveillance team (LIENTRAP) tied closely with the LIMITED basehouse, which was the radio control point for dispatch of the LIENTRAP. ; - In 1959 the LIENTRAP surveillance vehicle and two team members were arrested at the scene of a Cuban demonstration in Mexico City, A Station review of the security implications of this incident stated that it did not materially affect the security of the project nor expose any of the LIEMPTY basehouse operations, (Note: As the basehouse operations were compartmented, the only exposure possible from this incident would have been of the LIMITED basehouse, which is no longer in existence, } The LIEMPTY Project operated substantially as above until “ the Warren Commission report was published in late 1964, In this publica- tion was a picture of a person entering the Soviet Embassy taken from the LIMITED basehouse, The LIMITED photo basehouse was closed in Sept- ember 1964, and all photographic surveillance was suspended as a security precaution, In January 1965 the LIMITED basehouse was relocated, and SECRET