HW 55355 NN “y added. that ‘the. more reaponaible military were trying to work out with S thai government. ee ome political parties a formula “which would prevent the from making large gains on the national level. ‘ 4. On the subject eof) Mr. ‘Murph felt that in so smalla “country action should be possible to remove and wondered why it had not been done. I pointed. out that we had as yet no policy approval for sach action but that we were active in identifying and making contact with opposition elements both siunta | and in exile. I described some of the difficulties, such as control of the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition otting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt t by army officers. 5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report of our recent decision'to allow Radio Liberty to broadcast in Rassian to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartily in favor of such action ‘but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear to be provocative to the Soviets. linformed him that there had, in fact, been some delay in obtaining the approval. 6. Both the | gentlemen asked for detailed information on the structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or / : interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that _ both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with tae way the LAPC _ operates and believed it to be highly aseful, 7. L then briefed them on actions which: were taken in Southeast Asia, particularly the measure to strengthen the border police in the [__—___] I tald them th ‘was aware of these actions and they wanted to be certain Mr. waa clearly instructed prior to ; 8 Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration officials believed the Sovids to be exerting a helpful and restraining influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain gach a view in the face of the Increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao, and ] described the existing policy limita on our relations with and I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese 2 DoclId: 327401308 Page 10
HWW 55355 split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbate these tensions. Mr. Murpiay asked for specific information on the exteat of trade, if any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the out- standing Chinese debt to the Soviets, I agreed to provide this via Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of the information supplied to usa by the Chinese Nationalists. I said that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would make sure that a report on this did get to them. 3. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Russia and recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers and artists. They were very much interested in the actions we! had taken to exploit this situation and particularly interested in the current issue of Encounter and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade at the recent art exhibition. 10. On Cuba I explained that I was not in a position to brief therm in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Krulak Committee and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have sent to them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum: on the present scope of the Cuban subversive training effort. ) li. I described the covert support to the[ _|political parties for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special Group. Mr. Murphy had not previously known of the decision to lend some selective support to thet Jand deseribed this decision with some surprise ‘as quite a switch. ". 12. Finally, when informed of the policy limitations on our relations with the[ Jana Mr. Murphy expressed himself as being in agreement with those limitations and seemed to feel that the best course to follow was to assist the Government in its attempts to control the situation. He said that he had met recently for the first time witi in New York last week and was not Impressed by the man. DoclId:32401308 Page i1
HW 55355 13. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and I detected no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert action program. CORD MEYER, JR. Chief Covert Action Staff Distribution: Orig. - Director, CLA 1 - Exec. Director 1 - DDP 1 -C/CA. WH 18 19 oF yy p3 DoclId:327401308 Page 12?
_C} UNCLASSIFIED =) ENT [1 CONFIDENTIAL [SECRET ro ROUTING AND RECORD SHEE, ri SUBJECT: (Optional) TO: (Officer designati ber, and a 3 er designation, room number, 9 [re OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom es INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column. after each comment.) ‘Exec, Director "bee's 610 “Eormore’® (] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL ~=—-s].-s« UNCLASSIFIED "GPO 1961 : O—S93646 HW 55355 DBocld:32401308 Page 13
LULL LLL A LL LLL IL TA LILLIA LLL SLLTLEL EDEL EDS ELLE ED CT BxE y2a-® ~— MHA &&AQ&QQA AAA Handle Via Indicated Controls BYEMAN WARNING This document contains in formoti on cffecting the ional s of the United Stet * within the mean- ing of the es oe lows su. S. ce de Ti tle 18, ee 2793 2 ” 794, The law vohi bits its tronsmis- ion or the © elo tion of i ntents ony manner to on un vthori ed ella use in cny manner ude al to the ster nte of the Un 4 Stote fo the ben ‘efit ate ny for cign go - men he detriment of the Us ed Sta Iti be see coy by i °: i ersonne | especiolly i indoc- ninoted end a the red to nfo srmatio the “de sign els. Its security must ane mointeined in vccordence w wth t egu ulet S pertoini ng the Ce igaeed. ar This document contains information referring to Projects: (CLASSIFICATION) WMO HW 55355 DBocld:32401306 Page 15
24 April 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1015, Tuesday, 23 April 1963 Present: Dr. Killian, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Pace, Gen. Doolittle, Mr. Gray, Dr. Langer, Dr. Land; Staff members Messrs. Coyne and Ash; From CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Bruce Clarke, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick 1. When Mr. McCone entered the room the group had been discussing the release of the American prisoners in Cuba, and it had been explained to the Board that the three CIA men who had been imprisoned had been released. Mr. Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for com- mercial interests, and that their fictitious names md apparently held up during interrogation. Mr. Murphy asked Mr. McCone the conditions of the release of the 22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were trying to obscure the fact that there had been a quid pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in exchange for the 22 Americans. The Attorney General had arranged the release of the three Cubans who had been accused of, but not convicted of sabotage, and Mr. McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina with Governor Rockefeller, who had granted him executive clemency with deportation. Mr. McCone noted that the release of the three CIA persons was very important to the Agency, and that nothing in the agreement for the release involved any other commitments. Mr. Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making these releases. Mr. McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles, and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States. Mr. Clifford asked if we had everyone out that we wanted. The DCI replied that he knew of no one else there that we wanted. He reported that Donovan had to make a statement that he would not return to Cuba, advised that he had no intention of returning at this time, and he would have to use another cover if he did return. Dr. Land asked why Castro did all this, and the DCI said we didn't really know, but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with HW 55355 Docld:32401306 Page 16
the United States, that Donovan says he is not a Communist, and that Fidel . didn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U.S. _ because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching every- thing he did. Mr. McCone said that Castro had specifically requested that the President, the-Atétormey-Gereral and the DCI be advised of his attitude. Mr. Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know, and Mr. McCone said he had no idea, because at no time during the Donovan negotiations was any indication given that CIA was being consulted or advised. Dr. Killian _ then suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba. Mr. McCone said there were several things he wished.to discuss before going on to that briefing. 2, Mr. McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was in effect and ‘working pretty well. An agreement had been reached on the complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA, and NPIC was developing well. The Special Group has expanded its review of counter- insurgency activities to include those of the DOD, and they are now cognizant of DOD activities in this field. In the field of current intelligence reporting, we are now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum. Mr. McCone said this was supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries. He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the 15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr. Gilpatric leaves in June. He said that in the clandestine collection field the work of Defense was being fully and carefully coordinated on a regular basis. Mr. McCone said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordina- tion. He said that he and Mr. McNamara had postponed the reorganization of USIB. It was going along all right as it was and they didn't see any point of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this time. “3, Mr. McCone reported that recent CORONA and TACKLE flights over China produced the best photography we have ever had, and that he had not set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule. He advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board. The last CORONA flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these installations in 18 separate places. He noted that these complexes ranged from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that 18 launching pads were standard, and if the support facilities are proportioned Similar to the one with 18 pads, there might well be as many as 18 times 18 launching pads, or a total of about 450. Mr. McCone advised that at this time we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities. HW 55355 DBocld:32401308 ‘Page 17
‘The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to.150 launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate. Dr. Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr. McCone replied, "Only one. '' 4. Dr. Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better, and he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget that CORONA is doing the job. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, and said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave with the Board. This called for CORONA-M once a month to July, with an extra one in May, and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964, with two in September. If trouble develops with the 'J'"' configuration, "M" can be continued once a month until March. The next LANYARD shot is scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more. The first GAMBIT shot is scheduled in June, and will then be launched once a month through all of 1964. Mr.’McCone noted that if there were future failures, there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between shots. 5. Mr. McCone reported that the OXCART vehicle would have one more flight at Mach | and then would be pushed up to its full speed and altitude. General Doolittle noted that the next increase presented very serious engineering problems. Mr. McCone said that this was thoroughly understood but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status. 6. Mr. McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory photography in the area of re solution, He noted that he felt we were dealing too much in optimistic hope at the present time, and that he wanted the best possible judgment as to the. resolution that could be achieved from satellite photography in order to be wei hed with the political decision of overfl ing the Soviet Union.[] oan “IRK_Act 6 (1) (B) HW 55355 DBocld:32401308 Page 18
HW 55355 Dr. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future poten- tiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board the terms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panel should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the U.S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mr. Clifford” asked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied,-'"'No. "' Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and / Mr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle noted that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, and Mr. McCone said that he knew this, but felt that that committee was not full out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted. Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and’he thought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McCone said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He noted that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what resolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the engineering of missiles. // Mr. Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that he thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five who knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he was not sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to ask Dr. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. Land | Teplied that he might be able to do it. SPK Act 6 (1) (B) Se eye DoclId:327401308 Page 19
Cen na ee a . oi Pat ppc . in? & SE Td TA obi ay NER, hen J ! : ~, St Saget : arene ee: mane mm. a panne et) 8. Mr. McCone advised that he had taken so0me“additional steps “to - pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. He had established a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that area. He said further that TSD was directly linked to the operational aspects of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board and read to the Board the membership. HW 55355 DBocld:32401308 Page 20
HW 55355 9. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results of 51 days' reconnaissance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the four principal targets were analyzed. There were 59 occasions when weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet military camps. Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in a row and in one instance for as long as 12 successive days. Mr. McCone then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April 1963 and said.he would provide the Board with a copy. The DCI then reported that James Donovan during a nighttime drive to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks, the type generally carried on railroad flatcars. Mr. McCone stated that an examination of the photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace of the convoy. Dr. Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have provided the answer as to where this convoy might be. The DCI said he ' planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information. 10. At this point Mr. FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on operations in Cuba. He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated the number of resident agents, illegal teams, legal teams, shipboard agents and penetrations of Cuban installations. He noted that the number of illegal teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday, and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive coverage in the province of Pinar del Rio. Dr. Langer asked what the subagents were looking for, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly military. Mr. Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting intelligence, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose at the moment, but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was desired. He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempt- ing to develop a large scale dangerous activity. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installations were mainly installations and that some were our agents. Mr. Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted tof__by mail and then forwarded to Washington. He said there were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium speed transmitter that was quite small, and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds. He said that there was a smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development. “SPK Act 6 (1) (B) DoclId:327401308 Page 71