14-00000 - 4 - _ CS-311/00866-64 . the vd@rious countries are obtained bv the 1S through the local Comrunist Parties in the countries concerned, Forgery ang Falsification Capabilities 16. 17. - se me Travel Pattern of IS Agents 18. is, 20. The IS has no capabilities tor making false passports or in- ternal Gecume.ts trom any country cecause of the difficulty + of matching the paper and the technical problems involved in the engraving and printing process. [t also lacks capability for @rasicating entries in pasSports because of the problem involved in attempting to delete entries without defacing the documents. . F, sification and forgery is limited to filling in valid blank foreign passports, making photograph and page substitutions in Sona-fide forexgn passports, and placing false travel entries © ‘in foreign passports. Travel entries from western Europe and Latin Amertea can“bé forged. Source did not know whether the £S itself made the: photograph and page substitutions and for- geries, All documentS requiring forgeries and substitutions were turned over to 6éne"Alfonso,’ in the IS, who took them to a site unknown to Source. Source theorized that the forgeries and substitutions may have been done by the Departamento de counteriatelligence arm cf the Cuban Government, which he said has much nore personnel than the DGI. i Prospective agents recruited by the iS in other Latin American countries and brought to Cuba for training in methods of sabo- tage and other Subversive activities are provided with detached visas and spurious passports to conceal the fact that they ever entered Cuba. , In order that no Cuban visa will appear in an agent Lrainee’s bona-fide passpart on his way to Cuba, the Cuban mission in a Latin American country issues the Cuban visa on a separate sheet of paper. In 1963 most agent trainees were being brought into Cuba through Wexico, where the Cuban Embassy issued the separate visas. Early in 1963 Mexican immigration officers began using a rubber stamp bearing the notice "Salid para Cuba” (Departed for Cuba), with the date on it, which they automatically stamped in ail passports of travelers proceeding to Cuba. To counter this move the 1S began replacing, wherever possible, the pages of the passports bearing this entry with blank pages from valid passports from the same country as that of the traveler. Source also believes that in 1964 the travel pattern of a few prospective agents proceeding to Cuba way have been modified, thus decreasing slightly the number entering through Mexico. To conceal the agent's travel when leaving Cuba, he is provided for the first leg cf the journey with a Cuban ordinary passport in alias. The route of travel is from Havana to Prague, Czech authorities collect these passports upon landing in Prague. Source does not know what disposition is made of the Cuban passports by the Czechs, but he asserts that they are never returned to the agent. S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM * . Seguridad del Estado (Department of Stat¢ Security - DSE), the \ \
21, S-E-C~R-E-T M2? FOREIGN DISSEM ~5-—— CS-311/00866-64 For the second leg of the journey, carrying the agent from Prague via western Esrcve back to his native land, he is pro- vided in Havana, before departure, with a passport from another Latin American country. The non-Cuban passport may be the agent's bona-~fide doccnent which has been returned to him or it may be another valic Latin American passport pressed into service for the purpese. If the agent's own passport bears . no evidence of travel into Cuba it will be used for this pur- pose, being “brought up to date” with forged western European entries to explain the sap between the time when he left for Cuba and when he arrived in Praguc, but showing his mode of travel to be such that he never passed thrcugh either Cuba or Czechoslovakia. Should the agent's bona-fide passport bear the Mexican cachet showing that he proceeded to Cuba, the 1S replaces the page bearing such entry with a blank page from a »valid passport of the same country if feasible. If page sube stitution is not possible, either because no other -passport = from the same country is available or because substitution 22, proves too difficult, the IS will provide the agent with another passport,. from his own country if availabie, or from another Latin American country, The substitute passport may Fa ‘be a filled-in original, in which case a photograph substitu- tion will be made, and the agent will travel under the identity of the original bearer. In other cases, where valid blank passports are used, the agent may even travel under his trué identity after "surfacing" on the second leg of the journey, in western Europe, provided the passport used is from his own country. In such a case informa- tion from his bona-fice passport will be copied directly in the blank passport. If the passport is from a country differing ~ from that of the agent. his identity will be changed. As in the case of travel under the agent's bona-fide passport, in the case of Spurious ren-Cuban passports, false travel entries are made to account fer the agent's time spent in Cuba, placing him in western Eurcpe, but not in Cuba nor Czechoslovakia, during that period. Quality and Availability of Spurious Documentation 23, 24. Providing documentation for agent trainees is the responsibility of the IS country desk officer handling trainees from the par- ticular country. The country desk officers receive and main- tain custody of passperts coming from the Communist Parties in their areas of jurisdiction. Although the agent's training in Cuba may take several weeks, or even a few months, it often takes a year or more fer the ccuntry desk officer to be able to provide his trainees with the proper documentation. Source commented that invariatly a country desk officer will be short one Spurious passport in his “collection” of passports for a group of about six trainees. ‘Where possible the officer will “borrow” a passport fren his colleague from another country desk. On at least one occasion forged travel entries made in an agent’S passport were found to have a chronological error Shortly before the acext*s departure from Cuba. The error consisted of a false exit cachet for a given port of encry bearing a date precedics that furnished on-the false entry cachet for the same port of entry, a physical impossibility in true life. Despite tre discovery of tais- error the IS