ETE & ¢ iy ae to the. Bpudéhites, aisorders “al: “probably s of a coup. Cr assacsinatica attempts en pettere -6 2 °° We orthrown by sone A non-Cemzunist the Viet Cong, put, Ly effective the commi tment he has wa nd the. chance fare again & will became ev combination of his non-Comaunist opponents. regime mignt be snitially ess effective against given continued support fron the US, could provide reascnaP jeadership for the government and the war effort.’ 3h August Current Intelligence Vers nh Vie trims” Curlte = Rumors in Sout SO, : and rumors “which have arisen since : ; } . e« The coup reports % some serious coup piottings - 3 . : the Buddhist erisis seco to reflec ! Joon put we ave no fira evidence of advanced planning by any &-OUP. to r attempt to overthrow the regimes + °° ° ae ; ; pi -August oe il - south Vietnam se troops and police attacked end gceupies puddhist _ ; pagodas throughout the country Picm imposed nation-wide martial law. 4 : per, DDP & on. Vietnam: raential Meeting Record © “C/FEs nded that ve con ntinue “to provide ‘asylup for the views the matter. Mr. Bal) recomme quo boizes -foutanist- monks, {t wes agreed that offic s/ tit Lodge arrives and Te should not be made gvadiabie fo 2 ial channels porters in Saigon On the 7 transmitting press aispatches bY American re matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it vas pointed out that there was no indication that piem was not in full ‘gontrol. ~2- ete 258 men! | aermenreSBAS Seteepdict Rte ats | Ce feos _sscFT-Et 8 b A
14-00000 ts Ried TUE reek as or verte aaeh o 21 August (continued) Current Intellizence Henorandis (OCI No. 2351/63): in South Vletnens" . : have been received. While there is no hard evidence of ispinent - Bet on, the Bo Awd st ise: oe om ce Pe St issue continues to make the siluaticu dangerous.” * ‘igs Saigon Station's Chronolozy of Ausust 1953 Coup hetivis ‘les At @ meeting between Conein fan officer of the CIA Saigon Station] and General Don, the latter asked for US Government assurances of support for moves against the Diem regime. “. g2 August _ GIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334) "Ref Dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Has. not yet seen): states basic line to be taken and directs it be pushed at all levels. . Hileman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station pointing out that this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and who real yover is. Pressing this line can maximize possibility of obtaining US objective. Even if it dees sot succeed, it can substantially assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary drive, abilities and ambition, © incore porate in our overall contingency planning and serve as focus of , buildup program. Hgs. will comment in further detail after seeing WESEARE, if necessary, but passes above at Hileman's request.” “Additional reports of plotting against the Dien government CIA~cadle—from Saigon” (SAIG~ 0208 Chief of Station John Richardson forvards his personel views re alternate leadership: * .... . Recent events have made us feel . that. hope for civilian goverment to replace Diem adsinistration is - er eee ne eT
unrealistic. The solution eens even. nore improbable. “than ever: ‘before. ; Would appear that we snail have either Diem or ‘military: Junta. 22. 2 eo. -View time factor have not coordinated this message with embassy but we have exchanged views my. on Subject matter.” : ‘ oh August Telephone call from Harrizan to DD/P.. Record by DD/P. . bo ' Mr. Harriman called Mr. Belns just before 2000 hours and outlined to him the substance of vhat eventually tumed out to be Deptel 243 ta Saigon. To Helms query, Harriman confirmed that the thrust of the telegrem contained an implicit pull out of American: forces and support if the Nhus* were not ousted. Harriznan said thet i a - °° -4he message had been cleared “with Hyannisport," with the Secretary of State, and with Mr. Gilpatric. State telegram to Saigon (Deptel 243) | The Department informs the Ambassador that the US government. : ; cannot tolerate a situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. If Diem is unwilling to rid himself of Aha, then Diem himcelf may, have to go. The Anbassador is. authorized: Q) to inform the GvE that actions cee a against. Ruddhists. oust. be- redressed; (2) to. teld_ key. military. leaders__ that the USG cannot support a Diem regime that includes the Mhu's ‘and that “ve will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdova toe ps es ees @entral government: mechaniem;"-(3) to-make statements in Saigon removing “SEORET-EVES G3Y -