202-10001-10172 Date Page JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM 08/04/98 1 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-10001-10172 FOIA SERIES DOC 173 ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE - DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD THE CUBA PROJECT 01/18/62 24 OPERATION MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET 1B, 1¢ RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/30/98 Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. by CIA, State, OSD. NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION Eire mee DATE: MAR oni Reviewed WW 50955 Docld:32424903 Page 1
Date Page JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM 08/04/98 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-10001-10172 FOIA SERIES DOC 173 ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE ‘CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD THE CUBA PROJECT 01/18/62 24 . OPERATION MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET 1B, 1c . RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/30/98 Bracketed portions withheld by Joint Staff. by CIA, State, OSD. Reviewed BW 450955 Docld:324274903 Page 2
Senne: Program Review by SENSITIVE , Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, 18 January 196 Chief of Operations * Cle, THE CUBA PROJECT 1. OBJECTIVE The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.. oO — ll, CONCEPT OF OPERATION Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute ‘people. a new government with which the United States can live in peace. The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement — ° , established within Cubz, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to- wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment, ~ The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives. ds The failure of the U.S.-sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook -the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S, competence and intentions in support- ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially. tion Recor 6) (PL102.52 FE f 1992 S of the JFK Assassinati Reviewed on_7/<3 © ion Collection Act o The preparation phase must result in a political action organization im being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm {small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this (It is reported that the majority of Cubans fact known to the outside world. are-not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards wnat appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.) — The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a , fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movement DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR ; ne . ie DISA(DFOISR)——-L-TS et \ RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT Ea ERI SIL , 2 ore 58D This document contains 9 pages. OC8L, bro ObfECrT70V He 2S JON Excluded from automatic regrading: DOD Inr. Copy No. 0 of fii copies. / Fn oe oe tm ry . . - ww los oat > HW 50955 DBocld:32424903 Page 3
EQ Se ae Ue ear a SENSITIVE will capitalize on this climactic moment by initiating an open revolt. Areas will be taken and held. If necessary, the popular movement will appeal for help to the free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The ~ United States, if possible in concert-with other Western Hemisphere nations, will then give open support to the Cuban peoples’ revolt, Such support will include military force, as necessary. een Ia. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION .Our planning requires sound intelligence estimates of the situation re Cuba. The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85-61} of 28 November 1961 contains operational conclusions not based on hard fact, in addition to its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error in the planning for the unsuccessful operation of last April. The planning indicated herein will be revised, as necessary, based on the hard intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence community. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba), due on 23 January, apparently has been postponed until 7 February. It is recognized that one result of the Project, so far, has been to start the collection of Intelligence on Cuba in depth, to provide facts on which to base firm estimates and operations. IV. INITIAL PHASE (30 Nov 61 - 18 Jan 62) A. Establish a U.S. mechanism for the project. Status: The President's directive of 30 November 1961 was imple- — GEE mented by creating a U.S. operations team, with Brig. Gen, Lansdale — , as Chief of Operations, and with tasks promptly assigned. His immedi- ate staff are Mr. Hand and Major Patchell. Representatives of Secre- taries and Agency Directors are: State - Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch) CIA - Helms Defense - Brig. Gen, Craig USIA - Wilson ~ _ B. Intelligence Support Status: CLA made a special survey of U.S. capabilities to interrogate Cuban refugees in the USA (1, 700 - 2,000 arriving per month) and on -— 16 January approved a program increasing the staff at the Opa Locka Inte rrogation Center in Florida from the present 2 people to 34. CLA will build up agent assets (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very limited and it has no counter-intelligence assets inside). Special intelli- gence assets will be exploited more fully. The Cuba project needs far more hard intelligence in depth than is presently available. CLA will require further aasistance from Defense and other U.S. organizations in this intelligence effort, and is submitting specific qualifications for pereonnel on 19 January. ee a even 2 BW 50955 Bocld: 324274903 Page 4 STATE TT VAT
SENSITIVE oo . . Cc. Political platform for peoples’ movement inside Cuba. Status: State has sketched in a broad outline. CIA is to produce i the firm platform statement of aims for which the Cubans who will operate inside Guba are willing to risk their lives, and upon which : popular support can be generated. , i - D. Nucleus for popular movement - Status: To date, CLA has been unable to produce the necessary political action agents for this purpose. Upon re-evaluation of its a capabilities, CLA now hopes to complete spotting and assessing eight e ; to ten Cuban political action agents by 1S February, from among . 3 Gubans available in the United States. The minimum need for the : Project to be effective is 30|such political action Cubans and CIA is i 4} tasked to make a priority search for them among Cubans in the U.S. and Caribbean area, E. Deployment of nucleus Status: ClA is tasked to select 20 ipcalities within Cuba where political action groups can be established. Initial selection and plans for establishing these action groups are now due 1 February. Havana, . and localities in the provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas will receive priority consideration, according to present intelligence. Planning on this roust be adjusted as firmer intelligence is acquired, { ¥. Diplornatic actions Status: State is concentrating on the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which opens 22 January, hoping to get wide Western Hemis- phere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the Hemisphere. A companion resolution, to offer OAS relief directly to the suffering Cuban people (similar to U. Ss. oe , relief to Russia, 1919-20) is being considered, as a means to reach ieeaioten the Cuban people sympathetically without going through their Com- an munist government. The OAS mg is to be supported by publi 12,45 . Cc / y4} demonstrations in Latin Americ exated by CLA, and a paycbon ot / 23a M4) logical campaign assisted by USI : The major task for our diplomatic capability is to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to this Pro- Ject, seeking gn internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist “Fegime. This is yet to be initiated by State and must be vigorously pressed. . G. Economic warfare zcononic * Status: This critical key to our political action Project is still in the planning stage under State leadership. State is basing future economic actions, including plans for an embargo on Cuban trade, on the outcome of the forthcoming OAS meeting. Meanwhile, State has chaired an Economic action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions, 15 Februar is set for CIA a report on implementing plans, so that actions can be initiatedy CLA was fe ( Le) unable to undertake action to sabotage the sugar harvest, which commences — =f. f* ———e -- ae cee . _. An LG / about 15 January, and upon which Cuba's one-crop sugar economy depends.<7 mpi: . (Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking and cane fields was explored.) 3 HW 50955 DBocld:32424903 Page 5 SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE Mrvated on a small vessel under CLA control. CLA plans to 14 OG attempt intrusion on i fuary during Castro's forthcoming speech and oye rade demonstrations ea Re ee te ee I. Special sabotage support . Statug Pstate has explored, with negative results, the feasibility C/A of pre-entieveaction with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship- ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms),/ CLA has initiated - | 2QWYE/ action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, Y on visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962, CIA is introducing "Lubzol,'t a corrosive additive, ¢ an,locormnotive diesel fuel oi] through commercial suppliers in It will be 4 months before the first locomotives break down. €Xpects to be able to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attey tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. jntroduc- J. Military actions — Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban an people request U.S. help | when their revolt starts 6 making headway. . This contingency ‘plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor ina people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action, Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel] are required. Re REA K, Major elements of the population Pa ie Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities (with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly operations through the Church to reach the women and farnilies, and through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration ie to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts, This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can pyt it into place. L. Outlook” ‘ Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in “tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CLA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a (a shift to overt t action. _ This outlook, al Ithough arrived at at thoughtfully within CLA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals. CLA must take yet another hard look at ite potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine pathic ° if it cannot make the greater effort required. 4 HW 50955 Docld:324294903 Page 6 SENSITIVE