198-10007-10007 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE : DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW: vot HW 50955 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Doctld: 32474000 - JFK Assassination System . Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form Agency Information ARMY 198-10007-10007 “CALIFANO PAPERS Document Information JCS A | COMMITTEE MEMBERS CUBA: THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES 03/22/1963 8 COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES INTELLIGENCE SHARING, LATIN AMERICA PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Secret IB Redact 02/10/1998 Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Memo to members of the JCS Sub-Committee on Cuban Subversion transmitting revised paper on the exchange of intelligence concerning Cuban subversive activities. EK Kavi ond Department of the Army EO 19526 | EaDeclassify “ Exclude 2 Exempt Authority [I Refer To Review Date OG /S "eyed ee ee Mont) Page i
oa HW 450955 SECRET tHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON 25, D. C. SUB-COMMETDEE CN CUBAN sliBVERSTON THE JOINT Sane 22 Maren 1963 MEMCRANDUM TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS 1, Attached is a redraft of the intelligence paper, prepared by CIA in accordance with the agreement reached by the Cottrell Committee last week. The paper is identical with the version which we agreed upon, with two exceptions: a. A section has been added (Paragraph 2, page 2) on categories of exchangeable intelligence; in other words, a delineation of the scope of the paper. b. Certain of the actions proposed in our agreed paper, which are in some degree in progress now, have been withdrawn from the action category and restated as "Existing Programs," (Section III, page 5) 2. The President, at San Jose, committed the U. 8S. to participate in a multilateral discussion of intelli- gence exchange in the Ministerial Meeting which will take piace in about ten days at Managua. Therefore, it will be necessary to move this paper forward rapidly, get the necessary approvals, so that the intelligence element of the Managua agenda may be prepared and our ambassadors in the countries concerned notified of its content. I therefore propose that our Committee come to a conclusion on the subject at its meeting on Satur- day, 23 March. TVA a PI Vv. H. ‘ KRULAK Major General, USMC Chairman SECRET Docla: 327474000 Page 2
HW 50955 SECRET CUBA THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES I. Tntroduction In combatting Castro-Communist subversion throughout Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement for intelli- gence -- gd requirement which involves the timely acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited, and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily con- cerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information regarding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it. II. The Nature and Scope of the Problem 1. Limiting Factcrs a. There are many inhibitions which tend to discour- age the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved. Compounding the problem further, where Latin America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and disputes which have characterized relations among the nations con- cerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are not completely healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full and frank basis. b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homogeneous entity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange of intelligence concerning this menace, therefore, cannot be regarded as attainable. SECRET Boclda: 32474000 Page 3
HY 0955 SECRUL Cc. Additional impediments to iritelligence exchange , are the generally low level of competence of most Latin American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the absence of adequate security systems, and the lack of security consciousness. Deficien- cies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence obtained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest . need for protection. SECRET d. These defects promise to persist, since the govern- ments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government. e. These realities all underscore the fact that multi- lateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be concluded, however, that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper definition, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of sub- versives, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, the movement of arms, and the movement of funds, it should be practi- cable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former involves the requirement to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromise. 2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence a. Travel information - Unevaluated information devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement of indi- viduals between Latin America and Cuba or Soviet Bloc countries. Such reports can be reduced to a few elements such as identification of the individual, point of depar- ture, date and time of departure or arrival, destination, and carrier. When presented in an abbreviated form such information offers minimum security problems with respect to exchange with one or more countries. 2 Boclda: 327474000 Page 4
HW 50955 | SECAET b. Intelligence information reports - Unevaluated information derived from clandestine collection operations or confidential sources reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or communist connected subversive individuals or groups. Because continued receipt of such information by the United States is dependent on careful protection of sources and methods of collection, the exchange of this information with other countries must be carefully con- trolled by the collecting department. c. Intelligence studies - Evaluated intelligence pre- pared by an appropriate element of the US government in a form which is releaseable to other Latin American countries. d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news stories drawn from press, periodical and other overt publishers. Selected for maximum impact on other countries particularly where such information is not freely availiable to security services, as in the case of foreign broadcast reports. 3. Current Exchange Arrangements. a. At present there is little organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is @ limited amount of informal exchange, orten on a basis of personal relationships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particu- lar matter. b. The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in those Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America avail- able to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passing of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. In 1962, CIA received information reports from services with which liaison is maintained in Latin America and released reports to recipients. Intelligence items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelli- gence reviews, name traces and travel reports. e. The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by SECRET 3 Bocla: 32474000 Page 5
HY = 0955 ‘SECRET the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities, communist infiltration, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy. and the U.S. Navy. - - 4. Exchanges of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Department of State. e. As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improve- ment), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possi- bility of achieving the results desired. f. United States experience in the matter of intelli- gence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrange- ments are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange. g. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings, put has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Under the Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a "Special Consulta- tive Committee on Security (SCCS)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating to subversion. Ail American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommenda- tions by the Council of the OAS on how to counteract them. SECRET . . 4 Boctlda: 327474000 Page 6