oe forces are adequate to "shield" the Socialist camp and that the present nuclear balance is in the interests of the Commmist movement. It would appear that this ideological position could be readily extended to cover an agreement to freeze the present balance of forces. Certainly if the Soviet Union takes the position that the present balance of forces has changed to their advantage » they should not find it hard to argue that freezing the present balance would be in the Soviet interest. In order to increase the likelihood of Soviet acceptance if such an agreement were worked out, we should indicate to the Soviet Union that we would be willing to include in a separate commmique a statement that “at such time as all militarily significant states have signed this treaty, the original signatory powers agree that they shall confer. to seek agreement to reduce their military forces as a further step toward the common objective of ’ general and complete disarmament." This would put the responsibility for disarmament failure on China and possibly France. To date, the lack of any lengthy substantive Soviet discussion on ‘nuclear delivery vehicle limitations may be due to the fact that they have no expectation whatever that the United States would agree to such limitations at this time. The Soviet leadership, like the U.S. leadership, must be very wary of proposing new agreements which are rejected, parti- cularly if they include concessions. Last October at the U.N. Mr. Gromyko indicated Soviet interest in eutting back strategic vehicles and this spring Mr. Tsarapkin said the Soviet Union would permit on-site inspections as controls on an agreement to limit strategic delivery vehicles; but neither statement evoked any apparent interest in the U.S. The US Government HW 49061 DBocld:326276310 Page &
has never made clear to the Soviet Union a specific proposal which would result in a freeze or a reduction in nuclear delivery forces. Therefore, the very existence of a firm U.S. proposal would profoundly change the existing situation and require a searching reappraisal by the Soviet leadership. | The US View Military Analysis While this agreement would significantly alter existing US military plans, its military advantages appear to out-weigh the disadvantages. ‘According to. present plans (SIOP-63 and future force projections) on 1 July 1965 the strategic power of the U.S. measured in initial. delivery capability will be stabilized at approximately 4100 warheads and 9200 megatons. Therefore, despite appearances such an agreement will not have a major effect upon the size of U.S. strategic force. NUMBERS OF WHAPONS Fy 63 FY 64 Fy 65 Fy 66 FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FY 70 Missiles 436 834 1034 1178 1378 41507 1507 1507 Bons 2800 3000 3100 2850 2850 ©2850 2650 2650 Total 3236 3634 hi3zh oe8 4e28 4357 4157 4457 MEGATONNAGE FY 63 FY 6h FY 65 WY 66 FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FY 70 Missiles 1250 1890 2130 2300 2390 2450 also. 6 62k50 Batts 6350 ©7200 50 loo © Too JLo 6650 6650. Total 7600 9090 9280. 9400 9490 9550 9100 9100 If we provide weapons from our existing stockpile, either to[ | JEK Act 6 (1) (C) ma meray 74 2 € HW 49061 Docld:326276310 Page 9
or to a MLF, this would result in a relatively small decrease in U.S. strategic forces but no net decrease in NATO strategic forces. The major impact would be a freeze in the qualitative strategic arms race. The current transition from manned forces such as the B-7 and B-52 to invulnerable missiles such as Minuteman and Polaris would be halted. Nevertheless, by 1 July 1968, relatively large invulnerable forces will be in operation. The following chart shows this transition. U.S. STRATEGIC INVENTORY 1 July 1964 1 July 1965 1 July 1966 Aireralt Operational Total Operational Total Operational Total B-52 630 705 630 699 630 695 B-4.7 483 1LO71L 257 1065 fe) 1063 B-58 8 __ 89 80 _ 8 GB _8 TOTAL Aircraft 1193 1865 967 1849 = 705 18h0 Missiles Atlas 138 = -:« 183 137°—s«d21:773 131 173 Titan 117 149 117 1h9 117 149 Minuteman 600 656 800 82h, 950 999 Polaris 346 3h6 Lg 591 608 853 Regulus ©) 121 @) 110 @) 110 Mace B 5k 105 54 105 54 _105 TOTAL Missiles 1255 1560 1557 1952 1860 2389 Such an agreement would, of course, stop the deployment of any pallistic missile defense system. At present we probably do not know how to build a ballistic missile defense system with high-kill probabilities against more than ten warheads each equipped with 10 heavy objects and known penetration aids, due to HW 49061 DBocld:32626310 Page 10
i tre 4 interceptor self-kill, decoys, etc. An agreement to freeze Soviet ballistic missile forces would not seem to increase the vulnerability of U.S. cities and strategic forces. While the level of Soviet bomber defenses will influence our attack capability, it is recommended thet we do not explicitly negotiate such an agreement but privately convey to the Soviet Union that increases in Soviet or U.S. air defense would result in abrogation. (An attempt to limit air defenses would raise major inspection problems and would undoubtedly ultimately require Limitations on all aircraft because of the air defense capability of tactical aircraft.) Similarly, we would have to insure that the Soviet Union did not suddenly launch a major civil defense program. Since this too is amenable to intelligence checks, it is recommended that this be made clear to the Soviets in private but that no explicit agreement on this be established. The cut-off of fissionable material would in itself limit two basic areas of future weapons development. First, the development of a ballistic missile system which would already be forbidden by the treaty. The other area of emphasis is current fissile material production for tactical nuclear weapons, particularly atomic artillery. ' The develop- ment of more efficient small nuclear weapons would not be ruled out by such an agreement for these ‘weapons could be fabricated from fissile material in the stockpile including material fabricated from obsolete weapons. Because of the short life time of tritium, which is essential for a number of our strategic weapons, it is essential that, explicitly 10 ET Se ANSI WE HW 49061 DBocld:32626310 Page 11
te ' or implicitly we be permitted to maintain our tritium stockpiles at existing levels by producing sufficient quantities to compensate for losses due to radio-active decay. Relatively small quantities, a few kilograms, are involved. | Finally, while it is unlikely that this proposal will immediately lead to a cessation of Chinese efforts to build atomic weapons, it might well be the first step in a series of events which would lead to this result. Certainly the position if agreed to by the Chinese would make production of Chinese weapons impossible. In summary then, an agreement of this kind could well be in the interest of the United States Government. Political Analysis A successfully negotiated agreement on these terms would probably gain broad support throughout the free world including many "neutralists". By opening the treaty to all nations of the world a clear line would be drawm between those governments supporting limitations on nuclear weapons and those rejecting such limitations. Probably all European countries with the exception of France and Germany would support the agreement. The Germans probably could be persuaded to support it by continued as- surance that the U. S. would maintein arms in Germany and/or by US/FRG cooperation in a miltilateral force constituted from nuclear delivery vehicles in existence prior to the effective date of the treaty. (The multilateral force would have to be constituted by transfer of some existing United States weapons rather than the construction program which is now envisioned.) HW 49061 DBocld:326276310 Page 12