157-10044-10089 . =< Date : 08/06/95 Page : l JFK ASSASSINATION | SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION 'FORM me an ee me cee cee cee cee cee eee or ee come Sere cree coe coves come ems mids as nas Sa nn Nn Sn) nn AA GG GS EY ED EE EE CEE OEE EE OO OO OO Um ou "Ow um ceo wow rms nah anes anne nas mans aaah anne Gans anes “ASS 455 SEED SEK) SEKI XQ) GRD CRW CIEE CEL? AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157~-10014-10089 RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 11-H-08 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TWEEDY, BRONSON TO : TITLE : DATE : 10/09/75 PAGES : 92 SUBJECTS : CIA ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA, PATRICE OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C€ CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 Docld:3242?3477 Page 1
Report of } *roceedings eS Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Thuraday, October 9, 1975 Washington, D.C. (Stenotype Tape and Waste turns Over to the Committee for destruec:. WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. F. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 544-6000
id WARD WB FAL he ae EXHIBITS ho 3 2 Ll 3 2A 4 32 5 co 35 6 39 7 Al 8 43 9 46 10 . 57 58 TOP SECRET FOR IDENTIFICATION
1 CIONE amt EXECUTIVE: SESSION Thursday, October 10, 197% United States Senate, Salect Committees to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. Tha Committees mat, purguant to notica, at 11:25 o'clock a.m. ir, Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Richard Schwalker prasiding. a i a 3 4 a € c & € 8 Pragent: Senator Schwelker (prasidinga}), Also present: Fredarick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Profas- " $fonal Staff Mambers. Wena Nrreet Sb TOP SECRET
Sete “TO PROCEEDING Senator Schweiker. Would..you’ raige your right hand? DO you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to Mane {4700 7071 44-408 | give igs the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, ao halp you God? Mr. Tweedy. I de. Sanator Schweiker. It has been nice meeting you. Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much. (Whearaupon, Sanator Schwelkar left the hearing room.} {Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just received the oath from Senator Schweiker, who has now left the room, and you are# ‘under no obligation to continue to testify in his absanca, bit 4 2 « 6 4 i] t « £ ‘ ebviously the Committees would appraciate it greatly if you i would continue to testify. Ars you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's absence? Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully. Mr. Baron. You are willing to testify to thea truth as hes* as you can do it? Mr, “weedy. I will indeed. Mr. Baron. Are you @ware that vou havea the riaht to counsel? Mr. Tweedy. ‘ir. Saron. You are appearinoa here voluntarily without TOP SECRET
é 2 « a “a o « «€ & Waster: tN ALO Haast Nees i ; ' f f Ww " counsel? Mr. Tweedy. I am. Mr. Baron. Are you alsc aware that you may ceasa anawering quastions at any point if you wish to conault with counsel? | Mr. Tweedy. I am. Mr, Baron. Finally, ara you aware that all of your Consti- tutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amandmant - gighte to remain silent? Mr. Tweedy. I am. Mr. Baron. Ali right, then. Lat us proceed to reviaw a set of documenta which were not . available to us in your firse examination. Thea attempt here “today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered in your first examination but to focus our concerng on a few h main evants in the alleged story of an assassination plot ‘ againat Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of these documants. Let me introduce as Fxhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robart. Guthman on October 26th, 1960. (The document refarred to was marked Tweadyv Fxhibit No. 1 for identification.) TOP SECRET
4 3 « a * & a “ B TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY Mr. Baron. We discussed this cabla in your previous appearance, did we not? Mr. Tweedy. August 26th. May I correct the date? It is August 26th. Baron. Certainly. Tweedy. It is rather important. Baron. It is August 26th, Mr. Tweedy. Yes, wa did indeed discugs i¢ the Last time. Mr. Baron. After you took another look at this cable this morning before we want on the record, you made a ramark to /« the effect that this cable was & source of authority as far aa 5 YOu Were Concerned at the time. is that your impression now? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Let ms just add to that a bit. Tha cable per se I did not ad remember, but £t is perfectly obvious the cable is tha authorit. “When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly implied the only reason the subjact was being raised is because it had been of national policy laval concern. I do not thin it could be more clear-cut than that. This was basically, this “was the formal axprassion of that by the Diractor himself, T Cannot remember which came first, did t sea this cable first, or did I talk to Mr. 3iggal} first. tT suspect that talked to Mr. fissell first. [It must have been absolutely is TOP SECRET
4 3 a ey a oc « @ 8 the same tima period. Thia mearaly confirmed what I think I probably heard from i Mr. Bissell first. Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you ara || referring te the subject of gatting access to Lumumba for the | purpose of assaseination. Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably cama up in the sense that _ the thrust 6f the Amefican position was that thera was no solution in the Congo without the fall from powar of Mr. Lumumba, i e ‘and no measure should be overlooked to achiave this -- constitu- tional. ravolutionary and indeed, axecutive action, if you want to call it that. Mr. Baron. Meaning assassination? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. But none of these possible measures were excluded, and the main point was that averybody aqreaed that Lumumba. had to go or We Were in for very serious trouble in tha Condo. Mr. Baron. You were referrina a moment aqo in discussina this cable from Alls: Dulles to the fact. that when you first discussed tha possibility ef assassinating Lumumba as one Means of ramovirng him from power with Richard Rissell, Bissell rafarre} te this cabls. Mr. Tweedy. No, I would hava saan this cable whan it went out. Foam afraid you cannot pin ma down on this, baceuss 1 Canpnot remember the saqjuence of events. Te would hava hean 4 TOP SECRET
| Perfectly natural follow-up to my discuseton with Bissell. =[t is conceivable that this want out bafora I talked to Sissell, Mone three POP) 546-4008 do not exclude that, but the two were totally in tandem. Me. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents that we are about to introduce into the record today, before ‘we begin taking your testimony on the record, ara you ‘able to Pinpoint with any more pracision your initfal discussion with Mr. Biseell of the prospect of assaasinating Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terms of time? Baron. Yas. Tweedy. No, not in tarms of time. I can only assumes Baron. Te would have takan place shortly heforse this Allen Dulles cable? 4 Pa q « e c @ a g Mr. Tweedy. Fither shortly befors, or shortly aftar, because the next series of cablas obviously qet the show, 48 it ware, on the road. May I comment just generally on those cables as a group? There are ro surprises in them as far as I am concarnad, in terms of detail. Much of it, even to this dav, I still do not ramember . One aspect emerges ver; clearly for ma, that wa wery vers Careful about examining this on tha possibilities of doira anything against Lumumba. M"asically, thia wholes nariod was a Series Of exchanges with the field who wers seakina, as vou car gee from that cable traffic, various maasures that might narfor- SECRET
or achieve the goal, including, indded assassination, but not , by any means limited to- that, that wa were in trouble finding i means which appeared secure, particularly means which kept the “ U.S. hand hidden. It is the to and from, and the atmosphara : of it which is very familiar to ma; the details of it, much of | te Ven on reading them, is rather unfamiliar to me. I found | no surprises in it. , Mr, Baron. Having refreshed your recollection by reviewiaa | | these cables, can you add any graater apecificity to the raceord about the substance of your conversations with Richard Bissell} on the possibility of assassinating Lumumba? Mr. Twasdy. 1. think what wa usad to go, as T ramamber it, when it came to tha technical exchanga with the Station on one 4 > ¢ a a a ® e g asset Versus another, the possible sacurity weakness of this man versus the possible strengths of another, Sissel] left this largely to me. I do not mean to sav that we did not from tims to time review it. He did not debate with me on whether(white } (Cama lg was somebody who was worth dealing with or not, because ‘he had Belaian connections, for sxample. Mr. Baron. You ara savindad hea would have laft the anparatio::! details to you? Mr. Twesdy. The opsaraticnal datails of trving ¢o come wu with some solution that lookud as if it made senses, and had a4 promise of su¢cess. JF do not racall that we would discuss this type of a cable in detail. As you can sey, he ralaased quits TOP SECRET
Frons (Aras 207) 544-4008 ? e e a c Ly a g & number of them, because ha wanted to remain familiar with | tham. (Discussion off the’ record.) Mr. Daron. Back on the record on this subject. Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of | detailed discussions with Bissell on this. On tha other hand, 4 At was perfectly clear that he remalned actively intereated in it. To am sure that he was the One that. had the idea of Justin : O'Donnell, for axampla, I think he undoubtedly came up with that idea. As you recali, I had forgotten untirealy that Justin 'O'Dornell had evar played a role in this. 1 am sure when he fixed on O'Donnell the pesaibillty tc essist the Thie® of Seatice (he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say [ remember it, but hardly. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Bissell  eaid to you in the saries of discussions on the prospect of assaasinating Lumumba about the lavelt at which the axploration of this prospect had beer authorized? Mr. Tweady. No. That is the ascect I was naver clear on except that it was parfeactly clear to ma that he was quite co.fide.t that this was -~ Tam now talking about tha eliminatic: of Lumumba by whatever means. I[ am not talking necessarily about assassination: I want to be quite clear on thet. Il was quite clear in my mind thet the policy lavals of y Washington ware aqreed that Lumumba must qo. tT cannot go anv TOP SECRET
further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell ‘paid I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on this or that this had baan discussed with the policy lavels of governmant. I do not know, and it was never made clear to ' Me. nOr:does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear i that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador, ! Me. Baron. Off the record. (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) Mr. Baron... We are back on the record now. When wa stopped, wa ware discussing your account of your ; meatinas with Richard Bissell where the subject of aseassinating ; Lumumba had arisen among other maans that had been considered Py 2 « * a a ¢ « * in disposing of Lumumba, Did Richard Bissell ever indicate directly or indirectly to you that he had tha authority of the ; President of the United States for moving forward with an ‘ operation which might include assassinating Lumumba ? Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly never mentioned the Presidant at all. Mr. Raren. Sy nama? ‘tr. Tweedy. fy nems, or aven by anv indication. It was marely my impression reinforced, cartainly, either befors or after, of this cable of Allan Dulles that this was a nolicy os level decision, but the extant to which the Executive had ,: | assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on. TOP SECRET
a 3 ¢ ry e S & < Bg It is perfactiy obvious that the Agency felt that it had ; the support of tha. Executive in afforts to eliminate Lumumba. i It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that “4€ it ever came down to the point where somebody said, I think we can do it, and we decided upon the means, that someone would | have said, well, before we do, obviously there has to be final approval. I would not havea known wheres the final approval | would have come from. I would not expect that my correspordance “with the Chief of Station in Laopoldville would result in the | > assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further reference. Mr. Raron. You Were under the impression that whatever Steps you Were involved in toward sliminating Lumumba, as you “put it, were fully authorized at the highest leval of the ' gOVernment? Mr. Tweedy. Yas, I was. Mr. Baron. That would include tha Prasidant? Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think IT can answer that question, Mr Baron. Wher. somebody at my level, fairly serior though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that ths policy leval wants something done, it is varv difficult fer him to judge whether tha Prasident per se has bean in contact with the Agency or that he hes done this through his "ational Security Advisor, the Secretary of Stats, Or whonver. There could he no way that IT could judqa tha. I think it would be quits misleading if I ware to try to TOP SECRET
F a a a a £ « g read into it either then or now. Mr, Baron. Whatever impression you had of the axtant of tha authority for the steps that you ware taking to aliminate Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard Bissell? Mr. Tweedy. And the cable. Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles. Mr. Tweedy. Which marely indicated to me that the Agencv \ was confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus i i acting accordingly. Mr. Baron. Batween this cabla on Auqust 26th which Allen Dulles dispatched to tha Congo and tha cahle we will now mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldvilla On September 19th, marked Fyes Only, Guthman from Jadwin-- {The document referres to wag marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.) TOP SECRET
Mr. Baron. Were there any other meetings that you recall between yoursalf and Richard Blagell where he asked you to move beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation staqe “in assaasinating Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. 1t Just do not recall that ever occurred. Mf. Baron. Let us turn, then, to thia cable. Thig cable indicates -- Mr. Twuedy. This is the ona on the 19th? Mr. fiaron. Yas. (Discussion off the racord.} Mr. Baron. Dack on tha record. This cable bagins with your indication to the Chief of 4 ? a a @ fs) ci Pa % Station that someone was proceading shortly to the Congo who _would announce himsalf as Sid from-Paris. First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this the Chief of Station, is that right? Mr. Tweedy. Correct. ‘ir. Baro. Who we agreed would be raferred to as tha Chiaf of Station or by hin alias, Hadamena, and Jadwin is -- Mr. Tweedy. My pasudonym. Mr. Baron. Did you have a first nane in the psaudonvmn? ‘ar. Twaady. Thomas Kk, ‘Ar. Raron. Who was Sid from Paris? 4r. Twusdv. To was trvind to think. The identity is Sia TOP SECRET
“ > a a a i} & a g Brown. Sid Brown @8 a name means nothing to me. Mr. Baron. If I reprasent to you that we have had tastimoay =~. ~, from Sidney Goteiieby that thia identity stood for himself, does that refresh your recollection? Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. Tt was my assumption that it probably was, but If could not Frecall, so I find == in other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would have expected... Mr. Baron. Do you have any independant recollection of ' dispatching ‘Sidnay Gottlish) on a miselon to the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. I have the most unclear racollection that 1 ; Ieee - discussed with Mr. Bissell Sldnay GottlieS's goind +o tha nlf Congo. I hava no recollections of any convarsations T had ~ ok Feed , with Mr. Gottliub; himself, although IT am quite convinced I had Ata anteeeeereen neh dit them. In other words, it is inconceivable to me that he would have gona €o the Congo without sesing me. I cannot- recall the substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imaqi:ns Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was all about, the opsrational preblems involved, so that he, in turn, could be somewhat sensibisa ahout what his own suppoertine rule 4: tnis miunt be. When IT say this, it is @ reasciahie assumption but it is not diract recollection. Mr. Daron. ‘ Nows this cable indicate to you that you did TOP SECRET
dispatch S{aney*Goeel Ler” to - patch ‘$ia@ney"Gottlieb* to the Congo on a highly sensitive | mission? Mr. Tweedy. It does indeed. : When you say I dispatched him, TI would say it would be u lh more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I j }! am sure the authority for him going would have come from he j ceener than ma, but we arranged the details. 8 fh Mr> Baron. Your comment about ‘the fact that the authority 9 : would have flowed from Mr. Bissell directy is borne out, is it } t 1c ll not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable? i i: Mr. Tweedy. Yas, axactly. Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have Pd > a ry 4 [=] @ ‘ £ both the DDP aid the Chief of the Africa Division sign «4 cables? D5-h Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization te on matters of either particular sensitivity or so important that. the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence on # Subjuct, the Chief of the Division would originata and send out cables and have it aetually siqned off by the DOP. That was quite a common practice in the Agency. Hr. Baron. Do you have a recollection, havina seen this Megsnemaree oT documart, of the fact that you get up 4 special channel using the YOPROP sensitivity indicator? y Mr. Tweady. I did not recall YOPROP, but I recall special Soeyr Sree NE channels. TOP SECRET
: 2 € Ly « z « 3 1 2 Mr. Baron. This. would have restricted all traffic from yourself to Chief of Station, ila that correct? Mr. Tweedy. Yaa. My Deputy would also have access to it 4 | ain my 4bBanca, i) 6 ? 8 13 9 1G | | | | | | Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Mr. Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it? Mr. Twasdy. Indeed hea would. Mr. Barone Allan Dulles also? Mr. Tweady. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely. Mr. Baron. Why was a snecial communications channel set jo cup in this cable? wy Mr. Tweedy. Because of the sensitivity of tha subjact. This, again, was a fraquent procedure in the Agancy on sensitive Matters. If one was about to mount a sunsitive operation, one “of the first things normaliv done was to set up special communications procedures so the dissemination of the messages could be restricted to what was raquirad. Mr, Baron. In this case, the aspecially sensitive subiect te: which you were restricting communications access was the elini- nation of Lumumba by ong maans or another? Mr. Tweedy. That is correct. “Mr. Baron. What was the assiqnmant hac Sidney moleliey was to explain to the Chief of Station wher he arrived in the Cougo? TOP SECRET
Prone (tree FO?) $44-6008 WARD ® POUL Mr. Tweedy. That, I do not recall. 1 Can only assume oT it Tagen nearer es that Sidney Gettliabtwould have discusaad with the Chief of ne ad Station instruments which TSD might have which could be of assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed -hie dnvantory, whatever it might be, and the two prasumably ware 4 trying to come to some conclusions as to what might have the » Bast Chance or the most practical chance of being used. This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that . Would have bean the purpose of the exercise. ~ . PI ane Reng Mr. Baron. Let me rapresent to you the teatinony of. Sidna co] ¥ y o Gottlisbyabout two conversations that he had at Heartquarters bafore he undartook the mission to the Conge in Septamber of 1960. First, when Dr. Gottliabi looked at this cable and some Subsequent cables which we will discuss today, he said thes« cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took a trip te the Congo and arrived on Santember 264th as is ineicaeted by a subsequent cable, and left On October Sth, as is indicated by another cable. Dr. Sortlileh}said before he left the Coneo -- T an sorry, before he left for the Congo ~- he had ¢ conversation with you end Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take a isthe} Material to the Conge and give it to tha Chief of Station with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it ware nossible and to instruct the Chi-* of Station in the technical means hy TOP SECRET
FARO & Pave LWathenat nf brake Stveee NE which this lethal material could be administered through Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest. ” : Mr. QSEETYabjalso testified that in that conversation you ! indicated to him u i I that thase instructions were being given at Richard Sissell‘s authority. Did that convargsation take place? (Discussion Mr. Tweady. memory. Tha only that he had an in “to use this mater if, di effsct, th To be frank, ‘ perfectly feasibl . am not going to d _ ji that I told him, ‘ sort of gat the s off the racord.} His testimony doas not basically refresh my aspect of it which IT would find unrealistic is struction from ma to tell thea Chief of Station jal and qo ahead and assansinate Lumumba, as at ig all thea authority that was nacessary. that does not make Sanse. Tha rast of it is @. 1 do not recall it in the detail, but ! eny whe SH gaia. I think his racollection in effact, to go to the Chief of Station anc how on the road and usa the poison and assassinate Lumumba without any furthar ceremony is just not ft). way it would have Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweady. happeancd. Why is tha? For tha simple reason that under ne circumstencss would that dastruction hava been given by me without reference. to higher authori Mr. paron. what do you mean? ty up through the chain of command. When you say reference to hicher authority, TOP SECRET
WARD ® PAVE 18 Tweady. My higher authority in the first instance Mr. Bissell. Mr. Baron. © Gottliey} did testify -- Mr. Tweedy. I understand. | Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for tha sat assignment you were giving to Gottlish. Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr {gover ab, would disanrae on is that thare would be no further referenca, which hia statement implies from Leopoldville befora thay took any action on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this matter, and that wag navar a matter, to tha hast of my recollec- i tion, that was aver delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words. ! Mr, Bissell never aaid, look, you have the picture, qo ahead and do it in your own good time without any furthar referance. * to me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence as I read it that way at all. 4r. Baron. Do you recall if Mr. Bissell ever want as far a8 telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the asSasSination of Lumumba in a situation whare it would hs practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances, authorized to proceed to assassinate Lumumba ? Mr. Tweedv. No, | do not. TOP SECRET
WRB &@ PEEL | 13 Mr. Baron. Do you have @ recollection about that one way i |-or tha other? Mr. Tweedy. I do not racall that. he ever put it to ma \ this way. Mr. Baron. Let us than braak down your statement about this heating with iDr. Gobel igp) into componant parts. You agrea now, having heard Dr. cottlias's teatimony, that « dt ia true that you had asked GF. Gott) Lebj to go to the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes. ne Mr. Baron. It is also trua that you knew that Dr: Gott lie}: was to carry a lethal material to the Chiaf of Station in the Congo? Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, T do not disagrea with him. I do not frankly recall thet at this noint, but tf ar par fact ly wedded to accant what he saya. Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the momant, that you would have required the Chisf of Station to check back with Headquarters before he carriad out an assassination mission, would it be true that vou assigned Br. foo Gort Linly the task of instructina the Chief of Station te assassinere | Lumumha on that basis? Mr. TWaeady. {Dbr. fii was the head of the Technical Servicas Division, or whataver it was called in those days “ar. Baron. Let me jump in for &@ momant. At this peint, for about a yaar anda half, hea was the Selence Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to Tachnical TOP SECRET
* Servicea shortly thereafter. Mr. Tweedy. The way you put dt to me was that I instructed: Prone {Ashe T0271 | Goce teprto aesassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am ‘sure I never inatructed Gottlieb; to assassinate Lumumba. This is the way you put it to me. Mr. Baron. Lat ma correct that. What I maant to say was, would you have askad “Gottifaby to convay the instruction to the Chief of Station that he was to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he confirmed it with Neadquarters?. ‘irl, Twaedy. My answer to that is almost cartainly not. That would have been covared in other correspondance, which 7 think is demonstrated by thasa cables, to tha Chief of Station & eae TAR direct jfrom me with authority of Mr. Biasall. TI would not have used, neither would ‘ir. Bissell, Mr. ¢€ 1rebsas tha channel for thi's instruction. wal Baron. qor. Gottlinb} has also teseifiad that, aside from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station anc instructing in their use and giving him an instruction eébour 4 mission to es3aSSirece Lumumba, thet he hac one further role in, the Cunge; he was ¢9 Sarve aS 4 tuchnical advisor to the Chisf of Stetion on the feasibility of using these biolestical substances to carry aff. * oe ee he *! . eee a As Coreryery pus: it, Gottlishj was to stay down there for a short period of tins to datermina tha tachnical feasibility TOP SECRET
of the operational plan that the Chief of Station might come up with. Frome (Aran POP) $08-GORS Mr. Tweedy. This seems quite reasonable to me. Presumably: with his technical knowledges of the nature of these materials he would be in a position to either commant on or advisa the - Chief of Station as he attempted to put togathar some kind of | operation. That makas good sanse to me. He would raquira,’ basically, a technical advisor. Mr. Baron.- gOr “Go. aleo testified that the materials wo he took with him were of a fairiy shert lifa. Their toxicity would wane within a matter of waaks. Given that bit of information to refresh your recollactten, WARD & FAL “doss thet make it more likely that yottliabywas there, to aid ‘the Chief of Station in actually carrying off tha administration of these drugs, &S oppossad to giving him qeneral instructions "dy the use of such lethal substances? Mr. Twaadv. I do not know really that T can commant on thet. If thea materials would deteriorate fast, tha use of then, if possible, I would stress the letter, would necessarily have to he exosditied, but the overwhelming concern of Headquarters and the fistd, aqain, demonstrated in this corresponflance was our concera that this thing could ba done at all, done right, sscurely, and that the U.S. hand should ha concealed. If this were at odds with the life of thase materials, TOP SECRET
think that would have just been too bad. But I think it is parfactly clear that we would not have expedited anything at j the risk of doing 1t unprofassionally. Mr. Baror. At the point that GotErtey lett for the Congo : after talking with you, would ha hava been énpowerad to convey i to the Chief of Station that an assassination of Lumumba could be carried off if he could meet the criteria you just laid out, concealmant of the U.S. hand and use of these materials before “ ¢heixy potency waned? Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that would be he would be in no position to do anything more with the Chief of Station if they reached that point in planning, that as of tha last time ha . was at Headquarters that there would probably ba an anoroval from Weahington. Mr. Baron. You would axpect, then, the Chief of Station ~ would have been expected to reconfirm with Headquarters ths fact that ha had a go-ahead? Me. Tweedy. It would never have occurrad to me otharwise. Mir. haron. It would ba your testimony that, although you do net specifically recall your conversation with Scones you would have made that clear to BET Ste SRD Mc. Tweedy. I woult have thoucht so, yes, but T could not comment any further. My, Baron. The reasen for that is you do not recall ths conversation? TOP SECRET
Proms | Arne 207) 344-5088 WARD &@ Fauve i Mr. Tweedy. Not only that: Orv Gottlieb) was as familiar | 48 Iwas with (a) the sensitivity of this particular project - and what was involved and the way that. the Agency did ite ’ business, which waa things of this kind were not dealt with on “ sort ef an offhand basis. Mr. Dawson. What is offhand? Mr. Tweedy. The fact that the field and Ory GottlLeb were » given something in the nature of a blank check as to how they ‘ would go about it and when, without further reference to Headquarters. Mr. Dawson. If wa are to tia this to the cables, then. “4s there somathing in the cables predating fottliah's, visit to- a | “ the Congo which would laad you to believe that it had previously best. authorized by some words in thosa cables? Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawaon, had praviously bean \ authorized? Mr. Dawsen. The authorization of the assassination affor-, the aliminetion of Lumumba. Mr. Tweady. Only in tha most general ‘terms. No oparetio:. had lbeen put forward by the fieaid. In our business, *thass things were dOne by operational nlanning, at which point one came up with an operation ¢hat was aqreed upon hy tha Station and by Headquarters, and this, then, would have been aither implemented or not, according to tha gav-so from Headquarters. “rg. Dawson. That kind of operational planning is TOP SECRET
WAM B eae after Mr. sGottliebjarrives in the Congo, is that correct? eet, ranaki.. Mr. Tweedy. This, in effect, is that (Indicating). You i can tell by the Chief of Station, there {1s no further : reference to Mr. Gottliabd, aa I recall. \ Nei Mr. Daron. In this cable traffic? Mr. Tweedy. In this cable traffic, was looking at all sorts of ways and meane of eliminating Lumumba, not restricted ‘ ¢o assassination, which coincides axactly with my recollsaction . of the: period between when the subject was first broached to the . Station and that rather indefinable period whan, in effect, it wag ali over, which, I suppoae, basically {a the disappaarance of Lumumba. I think all of this traffic supports my contantion thet under the instructions he was givan, the Chief of Station in “ Leopoldville set about exploring all alleys and found none “crystal clear. There were problema with all of them. Some looked more promising than others. Individuals who might be used obviously looked more promising than others. Some were discussed and discarded. We commented on some. And so it Wait. Mr. Meron. I think that we should proceed in a moment to go through these cahles with a closs eys, one hy one. One further point inQor.cottlich s] testimony, to be fair to him, he said he was under the impression that it was qanerel Agency procedure that in a mission like this one the Chie! ec! TOP SECRET
Station probably would check back with Headquarters, that any prudent Chiaf of Station would check back to raconfirm his Phone tareg PO?) 344-8008 ‘ Gott Lebjsaid in his conversation with you he was not told that ha should convey to the Chief of Station the requirement. that he should check back with Headquarters before he proceeded ‘with the assassination of Lumumba. Mr. Tweedy. I cannot comment on his statements, because I cannot recall what I said to him. It cartadniy is parfectlv - conceivable to me that I could have had this conversation with him and not mantioned this, that this would ba covered in al} the basic corraspondence that I was having with the Chief of Station. eaRD ds Faure Mr. Harou, So ther i¢ is possible ~- or {ts it probable wt tye >that dn your instructions to Sidney Gottlisbyabout his mission to tha Congo vou might nct have explicitly mantioned the requirement thet the Chief of Station return to Headquarters to reconfirm Ris authority to mova ahead with the assassinatios. Mr. Tweedy. It is, I suppose, possible. T am not qoina to say it is net possible. T am merely savind thet that is Lot the way we did business, and on the whole, Sidney Sotrliat would be aS familiar with thet as T would -- nerhaps not 49 femilier with it, becauBe he was on the technical side wheres | was cr. ths operational sids and used tc thie ehdtin of comma: thinad end the valetionship hutwean thes Division and Station ‘TOP SECRET
WER @ Hi Warstorgten 1 st Steaet SF fs Chiefs in the field,to a greater extent than ior. GOttl fen, woul’. The last thing I am doing is impugning his veracity and | his testimony. Mr. Baron. When you say it ia not the way wa do business, you meant to say it was your understanding in general Agency ! practice that the Chief of Station in a situation like this | would be axpected to chack back with Headquarters? Mr. Tweedy. When a Chiaf of Station wae givan the authority | to carry out somathing entirely on hig own initiative, that ‘was made quite clear -- I'm not talking about this case, I mean " ganurally -- this was made quita clear. Mr. Baro... When you vara talking about the face that s “this was not the way that we generelly did business,” you wer- not referring to the fact that vou would have made it absolute!" explicit in any conversation with Siaiey “‘Aott Lae or anyhody like him who was undertaking a sensitiva mission tha® the Chic‘ ef Station would be expected to chuck back? Mr, Tweedy. If I had not mantioned this to Aidnay Gottlia® and he said I did not, I am perfectly preanarad te balieve hin, it would be because it never occurred to me thet the Chie’ oF Station would act in any other wav. That is it. Mr. Dawson. Of course, Mr. Hedqeman also tastifisd thet it never would have oceurad to him to have carried this out withovt heaving checked back, an? he did so, of ccurse: the Cables will show that verv clearly, What we ara trying to fours TOP SECRET
Prawre (Mri 202) 14 SORS BAM & FAUE exactly what Mr. Gottli@byconvayed to Mr. Hedgeman, which, of course, you could not testify to. Mr. Tweedy. Y could not. Mr. Baron. Or what you said to him. Mr. Tweedy. I think it ia quite possible that I did not ‘gay to’Mr. Gotélieb, Sid} for Heaven's sake, do not have the . | ub ‘Chief of Station go off assassinating this fellow without | Feferring back to Headquarters. It would never hava occurred ‘ta ma to do that. It would have bean, in my view, superfluous. Mr. Dawson. You ara, of course, aware that Mr. iUiadqarar. “was aware of this practica in the Agency? Mr. Tweedy. Cartainly. Mr. Dawson. You had sean that happen. He had only bean Station Chief for a short time; in spite of that, he was still / aware of Agency practice? Mr. Tweedy. T think that it would be perfectly true to say that any clandestina services officar who had raachead a certain saniority in field experience whether he was Chigf o* Station or not, he! would have sucked this in with his mother's milk. We were, if I may say so, a very disciplined ordanizatin in that recard. Mr. Dawsou. Specifically as to Mr. Hadgeman, that woul? apply to him also? Mr. Tweedy. It would indseed. Mr. Baron. Let us proceed then to & document ws will TOP SECRET
HEY EP fe Pah gree FA ae rer, #SECRET™ Exhibit 3, which is a cable from Bronson Tweedy. to the Chief 2 | of Station for hia eyes only on September 22, 1960. Pane | Ares 2073 (fhe documant referred ’ to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 3 for identification.) 2 > a ry « 3 & « Fy G00 + TOP SECRET
Mr. Tweedy. Thia ia mostly diacussion of Mr. Baron. The man you raferred to waa at this time an Prone (Meme 207) $46-4009 agunt that was in contact with the Chief of Station? Mr. Tweedy. I remember him very well, I could not possibly ramember his name. I remember him vary well; I met him later. Mr. Baron. Ne proved to be a highly effective agant for the Station? Mr. Tweedy. ta was a very good intelligence agent, an excellant intelligence agant, for the simple reason that he was able to make contact with groups and madia in the Congo which was vary difficult for non-Africansk to reach. ile was, for « yaar or two, 4 first-class intalliqence source basically: not an action source, but an intslliqsaace source. wan & HAUS Mr. Baron. When you read the sentence that is at the beginning of paragraph B on tha first page where it says: “Concur this possibilfty worth watching, but if decided suppors. oA : . . . ’ for YOrrap objectives. Relieve essuntial such bs provided through third national channal with PRPRINF role completely concealed.” What ara you referring to thare? Mr. Tweedy. foam ,ot gura: 1 do not ramenber. recall what the incoming cable said. What ! am obviously seying is Sack, P quess. un wife Who was, at least had beer, i hi  emPUOPO A I think what IT was sa pod if wa wanted to use TOP SECRET.
Ft iva? trpet ji ; 3 1 pa etrecety in an assassination attempt, that I would { * | not dismiss it out of hand. Prone (Arie 207} 5446-6000 Mr. Baron. You would be concerned about its ‘security? Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. Mr. Baron. You then would say the phrase "¥OPROP objec- | tives” would refer to an assassination attempt? ] Mr. Tweedy. Yaa. Mr. Baren. That the assassination, discussion of an assassination attempt, was being restricted to the YOPROP ‘| channel? fir. Tweedy. Yes. Mr. Baron. On the last paqe of this document -- Mr. Twaedy. Tha only thing that worries ma about this WAR ® SAUL Conclusion of mine is this, the mora I read {t, 2-8 is anothar “ paragraph, which may not have had anything to do wip 4 at 611 and I do not fael, at least I cannot recollect, why any leaks would almost certainly hava included a u if£ were involved in this. Thus, I am inclined to feel T am talking about. somebody elise and not Mr. Waron. fo will represent 9 you dn other cable traffic, I believes, which we will review as we proceed here, thera was discussion of the usa of another cee, Mr. Tweady., This was probabiv the case. Tf da not think this refers to B hera I do not think refers to 1 cannot recall -- TOP SECRET
31 Mr. Baron. Who? YOPROP objectives would etill refer ‘to exploring possibilities S to an aesessination attempt? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, Mr. Baron. This may refer to exploring it with. a ( different agent? Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Mr. Raron. On tha last page, paragraph 3, it tells the _ Chief of Station: "Not intended you conatrua above comment.s : as basically negative. You and colleague understand wa cannot read oVer your shoulder as you plan and asness opnortunitias. Our primary concarn must be concealment PRPRIYME role unless outstanding opportunity emerqes which makes calculated risk AMD BMA first class bet. Ruady entertain any serious proposéls you make based our high regard both your professional judaments.” What are you referring to in that paraqraph? What message @fe you conveying to the Chief of Station? Mr. Tweedy. Wall, I think if you read the cahle you will e001 notice that we have found difficulty with a number of his proposals. Thess were exploratory proposals. T wanted ~-- wor Oe Mr, Baron. For carrying off an assassination mission? Leashes Mr. Tweedy. You keap coming off with an sssaasination Mission as if this was always just around the corner. What 1 am saying is, we are in a period here quite common in our RIG Pewee Geemet SF business of very intansive operational planning and axploratior. TOP SECRET
RAD & Faure nf Po004 gts Sree SF wage 41 bare e TAU PUL RAR OO aL 9 CaS All sorts of things were coming up from the field. I had commanted on it here; in the end, I Bay, do not be discourages because you do not see the Probable channel wa will use, I "assume the colleague wan (Sid Gottlieb, because I guess he was | still there. Mr. Baron. The first time he had not arrived, but you had already cabled that hig arrival was imminent? Mr. Tweedy. I assuma that that is the colleaque. £ do not think he would have talksad to anybody else on it. That is , a11 it means. ie 1s Tt is, if you like, a techniqua of managamant. Mr. Baron. Moving on to a document that we will mark Exhibit 4, the next cable, is from Allan W. Dulles of Saptember 24, 1960 and your pasudonym is also listed as one of the senders of thea cable to the Chiaf of Station. (The document refarred to was marked Tweedy ‘Exhibit No. 4 for ddantification.) TOP SECRET a
Mr. Baron. In this cable, in the firat paragraph, it says: | “He wish give evary possihla support in eliminating Lumumba |, from any possibility resuming govarnmental position or if ha falis treara {Ms9e 207) $44-4060 ‘dn Leaop" -- meaning Leopoldville -~- “satting himself in Stanley- ‘T ville or slsewhers ° First, for the record, any time your pseudonym “Jadwin” or ; Your name “Tweedy” appears in the upper lefthand comer of a cable or your signature appears on tha bottom, you dispatched , that cable? [Is that not riqht? -Toam raferrind ganarally to the cable traffic. Mr. Tweedy. What it maans is this. It could mean severe! things, but I personally dictated the cahle and dispatehed it without further refersunce, or for some reason I constructed he PRAT & Fay 5 «| Gable and had it releasad by a hiqhar authority, either “r. iv " Bheaseall or Mr. Dullas. Although those were not the only alter- “natives, if my name was on it, I was connected with it in ons form or another. I would guess that I dictated the cable and that tir. Dulles -- and I do not have any idea how this cams about -- Mr. Dulles wanted oOo Sse it, and Mr. Hisssall suaqqeste?! that it ao cur from Mr. Dulles and myself, I just de not enOw , . What this Means is, Oullas and Tweedy were totally aware of the cable. Me. Haron, Meturning than to the santenca I citad from the Cable where vou and Dulles were talking about giving evers powsible suaport in eliminatice Lumumba, what massade -- TOP SECRET
WARS & PAL Mr. Tweedy. "Eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position." This, i¢ 7 MAY BRY HO, Yravarta i to the original instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the U.S. position was that Mr. Lumumba must be ramoved from a i position of authority in the Congo and that ausansination was not by any means the Only way by which this might be accomplished. Thia, I think, Mérely reiterates that it is not a -~ being oy 1 & YQPROP Cable doas not refar specifically to assassination. Mr. Baron. Would this cable, in using the phrase “elimina- ting Lumumbe” in this context contemplata essaggination as &t least ona of the possible Means that micht be weed? Mr. Twaady. Foam afraid if 7 M2y Say $0 you are puttina words in my mouth. This is exactly what it says. Ha has two Massages now from Mr. Mulles. The first ona, I think, wags “ parfectly clear. Sincy then he hes had magsacdes from Mr, Dulles’ subordinates liks myself. This meraly makes it clear again that 'Neadquarters wishes to “give avery possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming govarnment«: positio."® and I cannot Sey More than thet, and IT think to sav that thia strasses essessisetion woul]? D2 quits untrue. Rut the Chief of Stetion in Leopoldville was already under instruction: to be consi-teringq this as on of the possibilitiss. Mr, Baron. Assassisction? Mr. ‘Tweedy. TRIS does not chants that. Rares. I think that is Fine. TOP SECRET
Phone [Aree 707) 3444009 RRO & Pars, The interesting Sapect of that sentence for me is the rast of the sentence where “it makes it clear that not only ia there a concern about Lumumba being able to resume his position 2 dm Leopoldville, but anywhere alse, and 1¢ would seam that | assassination would at least have to be one of very faw means that could insure that fact thet Lumumba would not resume a | position of power anywhere. Mr. Tweedy. I do not think x can comment any further. Mr. Baron. Lat us introduce as Exhibit 5 a cable ‘ dispatched from the Chief of Station On Sentember 27th, 1969 for your syas only, and this cable beqica with a referance to fOr. Gottlieb: a Tt says he was contacted 26 September. "We on sama wavn length." Than it continues, “Hence balieve most rapid action consistent with security indicated,” The next Paragraph says, "Rasis 2 talks considering possibilitias:” -- there follows a list of nossibilities from A to G and paragraph 3 on th: bottom of paqe 2? says, “Plan proceed On basis prioritiss as listad above, unlass instructed to cortrary.” (The document refarred to was marked Twaady Fxhibit No. § for [ idantification.) TOP SECRET
WARO a PAL, sea NG, bee Tanke 36 Mr. Baron. Dows that indicate to you that on the list of. priorities, priority A would have been considered by the Chief i of Station to be hia top priority? Mr. Tweedy. Can you read, by the way, paragraph i “Basis Mi | 2 talks considering possibilities" of dtapatching | | to Stanleyville and taking refuge -- that would be refuge, would it not? r. Baron. Yes. “Recall from Stanleayville” -- Mr. Tweedy. <-- “and have him take refuge with Big ’ Brother® -- Mr. Baron. -- "Would thus act aa ‘inside man to brush up datails to razor edga. Also would provide info on food anit fr, agricultural problem. Guthman recalling to Leop.” When Dr. Gottlieb) looked at this cable, he testified that this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th tof September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where * they discussed various operational posstbilitias of getting ric of Lumumba. The letter A reprasented their ton prierity plar:. Would you agree with thet interpretation of the cable? Me. Tweedy. T would think go. Mr. Baron. ould you ~- Me. Tweedy. When he says: “Plan procuad on basis prior- ities as listed above” this again is no* what he wags qoina vc do at the conclusion of this without further reference carr: phys out ar assaSsination. Ne says, what we see is TOP SECRET
Proms (Aeee 207} 344-4000 WARD G2 PAUL | best answer to our problem. Mr, Baron. Does he not indicate in this cabla though that he would proceed to implement these plana unless he were instructed to the contrary? In other words, this very cable 2 7 might conatitute his requast for a confirmation. Mr. Tweedy. I disagree. I think these various possibili- ¢ie8 still need further exploration is what he was suggesting , to Headquarters. he concentrate onthat.ie the best possible use fh . Of bn this including further operational intelligence on the situation which might lead to an aqreemant that we would use this man, and then all these othara, but. £¢ doas not-in anv SenBe, as far as I ain concerned, dt is not in anv sange “he Chief of Statio: saying, if A looks terribly aood [f shall just go ahead and finish the job without further reference. ‘ot at all. Mr, Baron. I do not understand how you.can read the phras- “unless inatructed to thea contrary” in that way. Mr. Tweuady. Secause there are other possibilities here. Il am sorry, but I am afraid looking at it fifteen years later -- in the subject that you are anqaged in, T think you would loar at it entirely Aifferantly than t would, working on a dav-to-du matter with the Chief of Station. There is absolutely nothin in this cable which seys that thay heave ths answer to uss. ov “Ur, Haron. Does peragraph A indicate that; vow TOP SECRET —s_—soits.
Bary S PALE t take refuge with Big Brother, Meaning move into Lumumba 's entourage? ee i Mr. Twaady. I think probably this would be -- I am trying ' to think how this waa. Waa this possibly Mr. Baron. I do. not know the operational detaila. Mr. Tweedy. He did have some access to Lumumba'e entour- heateneneeeee ee ages, which wags the reason we were 80 interested. Mr. Baron. Would you assume that thia cable ia suggesting a cnet be recalled to Leonoldville so that he might . i ea eer tee - move dato {Lumumba ' 8 antouraga? eahibelneaeenes Acetone aa Mr. Tweady. Absolutely. Mr. Baron. Where it says he “would thus act a8 insids mete "to brush up details to razor edge,” would you assume that refars to axploring the means by which Lumumba might be poisoned? Mr. Tweedy. I think that is quite a possibility. I cannes specifically say yus. I suspect he was our best potential source for operational intellidqence, if you like, on this. Then he says “Also would provide info on food and aagricni- turél problems." I have a vague recollection at this point the! he was reporting rather importantly on aspects of food anc acriculture which was 4 major nolitical factor within the Cor.19 then. I cannot put it any more clearly than that. Lthink it is that this woul? ba a byproduct of this, thc We would aat more good reavorting on the suhiect. TOP SECRET
Mr. Baron. You would raad that sentence literally instead of an oblique referance to gatting accass to Lumumba's food by which he might be poisoned? i | i Mr. Tweedy. I would read it much more literally than that. | Mx. Baron. Let us turn then to Exhibit 6, which ia a cable from the Chiaf of Station on September 30th to Jadwin, | which ia yourself -- | {The documant raferrad i} Exhibit No. 4 for identification.) | to was marked Tweedy i RAB A PRL TOP SECRET
SS earterse ge WOT ees Baron. -- in which the Chief of Station says: “No really airtight op possible with assets now available. Must rma {Aran TOP} 546-6008 choose batwean cancelling ep or accepting calculated rieks of varying degrees.” fi best assat available. View naceasity act immediately, if-at all, urge Headquarters authorize exploratory conversations to datermine if\. illing take role as activa agent or cut-out this op.” Firat, would you read the sentence or tha phrase “view necessity act immadiately, if at all” to refer to the fact Lo are . : that at this point Gottlieb had informed the Chia’ of Station al that tha lethal material was of a limited life? Mr. Tweedy. J cannot really comment on that. Thar is WARD & Pau cartainly a perfectly reasonable axplanation for that remark, but as I do not know exactly where Lumumba sat on that particu- t i} lar moment when this cable was sent, it miqht hava something to do with his availability or gomathina else, IT just do not know. L000 + Certeinly your first point is 8 possibility. tt aquall- tye makes Cleer, of course, thet althouc’ ha-t Dan Us+ ? in an operational intelligence support role, he at this votnt WN yteere gteet hat never been cut in on plans. Of course, Chie’ of Station did not knew whether he would be willing ‘ce a0 atong with thi: t 9 Or not. “ip, Haron. The Chief of Station hers is ectnsicdering an TOP SECRET
to first on a hypothetical basis -- Tweedy. Yas. Baron. It is clear here, is it not, that Crewe | Rs oe PO2) TRAST viewad as a potential assassination asaet? Tweedy. Indead. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 7? a cable on 30 September 1960 signad by Glan FPields to the Chief of Station, oe \ agaln in the YOPROP channel. | Lead | (The document referred | to was marked Tweedy Fxhtibit No. 7 for idanti*®ication.) Pa 3 a a 2 c & « & TOP SECRET
WAG mb PAUL a ery SECRET Mr. Baron. Prasumably, it is Fesponding to the cable that Wa just locked at, and in this Cable, Glen Fields B4y8, "You ; 6¥e. authorized have exploratory talks with to | &s3e9@ his attitudes toward possible active agent or cut-out role." Would you assume that Glen Fields consulted you befors Bending this authorization to the Chief of Station? Mr. Tweedy. Not necessarily. tf might have been out of . town that day. As you will notice, all he says is, “Youjare i authorized hava exploratory talks" -and “Agree with you initia} discussions should ba on hypothetical basia.” And, of COurge, at that point, we would expact a raport from tha fialid- , On how it want. He waa taking 1t one Step further. He micht ‘NOt have cleared that with me if 1 were away. Hie might also _ have perhaps cleared it with Mr. Bissell. “Mr. Baron. As your Deputy, it would have been perfectiv : Proper in your «vasa for Glen Fields to have issued this cab} + without consulting you? “ir. Tweedy. Certainly. [ft is quite possible, too, thar he even. told Mr. ‘issal] what he wes plarnnina to qo. T Cannot tell you Specifically. This is all “hat this cable authorizus. I find it entirsly within his deleqated responsibilities. Mr. Maron. Would it have bea. Standard srocydura for Glen Pields, in your absence, to m4ution to Richard 9issel) eras fact that such authorization to be sunt to the Chiaf of Statio.: TOP SECRET
Prone (Ares 267) $46-4000 RAB R Fae on an axceptional and sensitive mission like thig ona? Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again? Mr. Baron. Would 1¢ hava bean standard procedura for ’ Fields to check with Aiasell in your absence before he sent such h cable? Mr. Tweedy. No. Field's understanding of his authorities and his relationships with tha DDP on such matters were exactly “the same as mine. We would have seen eye to eye with him. If Il had sent the cable, undoubtedly IT would have lat ‘Mr. Bissell know that I was Planning to carry this thing thet much closar. The raason for thet is that we were qatting close to informing a third party thet this was in the wind. Therefor... before wa actually took this atep, I think somathing Like thig,a third party baind Mr. Daron. Ags Exhibit 8, we will introduce a cable on ‘Octeber 7th, 1969, from the Chiaf of Statin to Jadwin, which is yourself. (The document raferret to was marked Tweady Fxhibit No. 9 for identification.) TOP SECRET
PRED & PALL | Op. ‘ i) , Mr. Baron. This cable bagine with a fare : gin re erence to Sidney} ee : 1 ; Gottlieb, and he: : "Departed Leop for PBPRIME $|October, view expiration date his materials. However, laft cartain items of ' continuing usefulnass. Guthman plans continue try implement Do you have any independant recollection of receiving this cable? Mr. Tweedy. You know, it's terribly hard when you see * gomathing that clearly occurrad, and to me I read, it's . terribly hard at this stage. to gay, Of course I remember. It all} reads parfectly familiar to me now... To say quite specifically I recall receiving the cable will parhans qo a Little heyond my Mamory. Mr. Baron. MNRased upon having raad thia cable at that time, which you assume you did, is that correct? Mr. Tweady. Absolutely. Mr. Baren. You would have known that Gitney Forellent hed left the Congo on October 5th and that the Chief of Station Planned to co.tinue to try to implemuant the operation. | Mr. Twesdy. Which maans that he would continues his axploratory onerationel work to sue if he could coma to some solution. Ar. Beron. You would read thet santance still to app ds to an exoDloratory phase, a phase in which the Chief of Static:. was exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba as TOP SECRET
Crome (area P02) WO OE eR OO opposed to moving to implementing? Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything alse. Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one “than, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent f was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indead. That also coincides with my best recollection which is not. alii that damn good. It is parfactly obvious that was naver requested to assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody having basen asked to do this. Mr, Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, as e outlined in the pravious uxhibit. Mr, Tweedy. Yes. 0 fr. Dawson. Why is it obvious that was never askad *o assassinete Lumumba in light of the santence in this cable that reads, “Although did not pick up ball,” -- refearrinc to the fact that did not necessarily pick un the bell on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chi. of Stetion, the Chief of Ste*tion nevarthel+ss believed "he Prepared taka any role agcessary within limits security acce” plish objective.” Does thet sot indicate nat. wag 4% least vir. a8 SOMcOl.e ‘WhO WAS Prenared to undertake an assassination if he should be tasked with it? TOP SECRET
Prere (Aras POT) 444-4008 WARD & PAWEL Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time . a is the Chief of Station's best assessment of what the reaction would ba if tha thing was formally put to him go bluntly that he understood antiraly what it was all about. do not recall, I do not balieava any of thia rasidual traffic indicates that it ever got so far that we did that, and I Ghink, my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on vnethel would agrea to do it. I think probably in “limits security accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor. cannot really racall anymore. ‘ir. Dawson. Off tha record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Haren. Back on the record. This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station rufers “back to the exploratory conversations that ha mantioned ha waa -- Mr. Twsedy. Implied to by Fields. Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the previous cabic ef the 20th. Mr. Tweedy. Richt. My, Haron. Ag FPxehibit 9, we will introduce a cable siane' at Tweedy to the Chief of Station in the yYOrRoP channal. (Thea document referrad tO was markad TWweaedv Exhibit ‘lo. 9 for TOP SECRET
idantifiaation:}‘-- fans Lag f° 4 9 Lad ct G.. (@) f= ANws 8 One me
RAR A FAULK Mr. Baron. It bagins, "Had good discussion your colleagues 7 October. Comments follow:* °A. Be ‘assured did not expect YOPROP © objectives ' be reached in short period and understand current situation « fully warranted return your colleague.* And then it continues to discuss the fact that you were ' considering dispatching a third country national operater and | a senior case officer from the CIA who would "run this op and ; outeide agent full time undar your direction." Doas this cable refer to the fact that you debriefed ‘ Sidney Gottliab? Mr. Tweedy. - am sure it doas. That is what it must ha, Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicata that 7 the Chief of Station should not feal that Haadquarters would be disappointed in the fact that ha did not pull off an ' assessination mission in such a short period of tima? os Mr, Tweedy. FI want to be caraful to how I raply to that. All 1 was saying to 4 vary profassional collaaque was that we hed no illusic:s about the fact that tha »lenning operation of this would be very difficult, at bast, and would takes time and thoroughly agrew with the fact that prospacts, immadiate prospects, wera such that there was no alternative for Sidney | Bat 0 me Gottliab to raturi.. That is all | was sayina. But to say cvhat I was trving to exprass to him was the TOP SECRET
AAD & HHL 2 fact that we were not overly disappointed that Lumumba wee not. assassinated at this point is just not the level of intercoures } that I had with a very professional Chiaf of Station. That is i i ! Mr. Baron. Ooes not the paragraph A here Andicate that I the objective of the mission that was discussed in the YOPROP | channel was to assassinate Lumumba in view or in light of the HT rie “ fact that GottlLeb\ had gone to the Congo with matarials that } “wera only going to be lethal for a short paritod of time? Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says. Mr. Baron. In othar words, what I am trying to explore ‘with you is your characterization of thia entire staqe of the ‘ " operation as one of planning and axploration when we know that Aa oem ee : : Gottlieb took materiala to the Congo which would only be lethel for a short period of time and prasumably was prepared to move ' from axploration to implamentation? Mr. Tweedy. If, as a result of tha Station focusing on the problem for the first time, as @ result of Haadquarters’ requast, they had come up with 4 plan that they thoudht was exceadingly solid and which Headquartars approved, it is not surprising, Derhaps, that we wanted the matszriais thare to tars advantages of such, if you like, an unlikely avent. But this would not chande tha normal sequence of svants, which would be that the Station would explora, kaen Headduartars informec, Ywadquarters woul! comment, it would then be a cresando of TOP SECRET
Pi 3 a ry 4 a & ¢ 8 SNARE YOISECRET™ agreement or no agreement at a@11 resulting from either a final: request for approval or either approval or no approval. ‘This would not have changed. Mr. Baron. . Because Gertie took lethal materials to the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality, were you not contemplating at that time that the operation might wall mova from the axploration phase to the implementation phase just as soon as Gottliebiand Hedgeaman determined that it wae feasible? Mr. Tweedy. I think © would put it quite differently. "I think that I would say that wa would have been remiss in not being in a position to uxploit, if wa raached the point where we 411 agreed that the thing was possible. If they had merely gone over and said we think wa can +o | it. by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that /‘iwould have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me. Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chiet of Station to cable back for Confirmation, but 1i* was cartainly within your contemplation at thea time that when Gottlisb went to the Congo, when the Chief of Station cabled for confirme- tion, you woul’) probably give him a go ahea:! to assassinate Lumumba? Mr. Tweedy. .1 did net say that at 41), My, Hare... Th the oneration wers feasible? “cr. NWuedy. 1 did not. say that at wall. It would not have TOP SECRET
Prone (tras 207) 344-4008 WARD & Fa Agancy, who in turn would have been reflected in the policy levels of the govarnmant, would have dona if it had come to the point where somebody said, wa can do it, do you want us to do it. Baron. You would’ have referrad that to Bissell? Tweedy. Yes. Baron. He would have referred it? Tweady. He would have referred it according to his lights. That was not my business. He was his own laval of authority. He was as aware of his authority as ! was at my leVal. JT only assume that this would have been discusssad at the highest level, certainly at thea Agency. f assuma that the decision would have had to have bean made by Allen Dulles and who @lse6 he wished to consult in Washington. These are nure assumotions on my part. Under no eireum- Stances would I have given the go ahead. Mr. Dawson. That is interesting. Mr. Baron. 1 Just have one more question on this line. i realize We aYe goind very closely Over this qround., We woul! not be doing it if it weren't important in trying toe det you to clarify for the record exactly what shade of meaning you wast to attach here. Would it ba falr te say that when you dispatched to the Conao you expected to hear back -- TOP SECRET
WARD mh PALE Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible. Mr. Baron. You were hoping? Mr. Tweedy. Gottiiebjassisting the Chief of Station in hia explorations. that time, aga indicated in the cables of Dullas and the cables from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that (ottliabjand tha Chief of Station would find « feasible means _ io | of carrying out an acsassination miasion and than inform you of that. ij i Mr. Baron. In view of the antira policy of the Agancy at Mr. Twaedy. I am not going to commant on the hope. not know what my frame of mind was on that. The purposyu of the axercise was to see whathar this was i posaible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrumant of policy in carrying out the exploratian which was antirely 4 professional matter. If the exploration had reached a point wheres we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan which we thought made some sense, at that point hiqhar authorit~ would have to taka the ball and run with it and let us know what they concluded. Mr. Baron. By higher authority hare, you mean any authority higher than yoursalf? Mr. Tweedy. It would start with me in my chain of comman:. L would not be concerned with the Mational Securlev Advisor TOP SECRET
ward & FAA to the President or anybody else, f was perfectly clear in my mind because of what had occurred and the way that theese matters had bean broachsd to the field by Mr. Dulles, that tha thing was in the national arena and was just not in the Agancy's arana. What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt hia authorities ware from higher authority I cannot tell you. Mr. Dawson. That would hava been @ matter that would between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, im that correct? Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, {ft would have been between Mr. Dulles and the outside world, ths Fxacutive. Mr. Dawsor Tha chain of commant! would havea bean, you would have talked to Hissell, you would not have bean expacte' or would have asked what Mr. Dulles’ view wera? Mr. Tweedy. ‘Mind you, We Ware algo an Agqancy that was very flexible. am not saying “ir. Milles might not have talked to me about this, that was hacause Mr. Nissell was not immsdiatsaly available, or something of thigs kind. Wheat T am saving is at the working level, tha oparetione: Level, the Pivisio:nal and tha Stetion lavel, we had come with @ plan which mad» professional sense to us which we sound anoudh so the® we woul? orasent it to our masters, WOuld have dons so and the resultart instruction to the would he davemdied . ¢ iro reaction far as | wags concern] ' within the Aqancy. Ms s . n Tocan:.
ww . ‘OIRECTOR LEOPCLOVILLE C/aF {CR MSGR, aF Oly NOTHFICD 1940 20 SEP) coe, 3/C 2 OPERATIONAL IMEDIATE IN 2005} DIR tO . Cle LEGP EYES CNLY JACWIN FROM GUTHMAN uh RYBAT YOPROP SiR 42 1 GLA REF: OR £3894 (OUT 75837 7” 1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSS IBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL) LEB MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED R:S<5 «oom | CF VARYING DEGREES. | ot ~ 2. RPE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE AVAILABLE. vilw NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, tF AT ALL, URGE tieg AUTHORIZE 2*PLCRATORY CONVERSATIONS TO CETERMIBC iF WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APCOCACH Ota HYPOTHETICAL BASIS. ‘ANO NOT REVEAL PLANS). 1F HE APPLARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, We BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL CRSECTIVE OF TO HIM IN ORDER OOTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POREMTPAL. ALTROUGH TOO EARLY SEO SPECIFIC COTAILS) BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED iF HE: LEAVES AREA BEFCRE EFFECTS OP A%E APPARENT. ee ne ita | 3. . FEAR MIGHT HAVE ayenstateo possiBiLi Ty bor ive - PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE. KE, UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TiC, VIEW f POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO ee REPORT ING aS .