AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORDS SERIES : MEMORANDUM AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR FROM : TO : TITLE : THE SPECIAL GROUP ON OPERATION MONGOOSE. MINUTES OF MTG. OF DATE : PAGES : SUBJECTS : OPERATION MONGOOSE AS CUBA & CASTRO LANSDALE BUNDY, MCGEORGE — DOCUMENT TYPE : Date:09/30/93 Page: 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM "IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION Peleased under the John . Eennedy WSsassination Records SSCIA 157-10002-10102 ollection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#:i NW 53244 Date: 6-13-2017 DOCUMENT INFORMATION WH PARROTT, THOMAS THE RECORD 09/06/62 5 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : $ RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 245 Folder 12 HW 53244 Docld: 322731942 REFERRED Pp 09/30/93 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED { Page 1
f, General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical, The word was changed to selected, 8» Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be’ expected overnight. h. General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22 (submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter- measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail. i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S, is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in t irecking the Cuban 7 economy. Pe Aen Pott ; Renae, an Be, Le LL Le, aa Mun eure t y sc. ‘ o A " DY APTN Te ROT Te aE TRYIN SE DP 4. The Group then turned to a discussion of number 132. (agricultural * wabocage). mance 4 General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any al 3 e such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some- ; thing going wrong, paygtetilarly if there were: obvious attribution to? ; “he U.S. He went on to Say, however, that it would be possible to : accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in i . . é - a = foned specifically. the neewTtTy TI pov ¢ the paper. (He mentioned ‘specifically the possibility of producing crop j 3 - Some mien ee ee FPO EASON RET ICT TET TORT TT RL rm em Re Ee ee ee Om TO EE HW 53244 DoclId: 322761942 — “PROPERTY Of Page 2 , ae THE WHITE HOUSE 0 FIC
Sate no ft biological SRents. ire op fal Fur es=py mew inate Tot hich_would_apeear ’ any such sabotage hich could clearly be made to ) appear ‘as.the_result? yaelocal Cuban disaffection oF r Of a natural disaster, but that ve Gey ON ee re ee ee ee iene + @exeid. external activit activities | es such | as” “Felease of “chemicals, ete. -¢., unless! | fi 4 i (Co be of natural omipin.’ Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about i Mey could be completely covemedmup. f Wane cere Tree TRIN mpm So a «i t Me eee ee eee ceeee fet ete ge net ep nee ere ee ee, es ° 3. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary. 6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered. 7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertaké active operations on their own are contemplated. 8. It was suggested,that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further. 9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how ‘much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a, simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree, 10, Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum -of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program. ares prapentY OF . . . ae Docld:32281942 Page 3 ware WHITE HOUSE OFFIC