HW 50955 SECRET c. A mechanism which ensures the rapid assembly and dissemination of the required information to the responsible agencies of the countries concerned, i.e., an alerting system. d. Improved communications facilities in the area. These measures can only be effective if the partici- pating Caribbean countries are willing to develop and improve their. counterpart internal security capabilities. Specifically, there is a requirement for additional effort on their part in counterguerrilla training, police operations, intelligence, and air and ground mobility. Listed hereafter are specific actions designed to fulfill the foregoing requirements.. SECRET - Docld: 32474042 a. Multinational Actions to Control the Surveillance Effort (1) Consult the Caribbean countries with a view to requesting the President of one of them to invite ministers from the other countries, as appropriate, to meet for the purpose of dis- por 4 cussing implementation of a multinational se surveillance program. Arrange at this meeting ev for the governments of the participating 3 nations, including the U.S., to issue a joint declaration that the export by Cuba of subver- sive personnel and material will call for all to take the necessary measures to safeguard the countries concerned. (2) Encourage arrangements between Caribbean states for mutual cooperation in coastal sur- veillance. (3) Make bilateral arrangements, as necessary, pol with each participating nation as to the con- Db ditions under which U.S. combatant forces may phen enter the waters in which we recognize the par- ticipating nation's territorial sovereignty. Page OF
SECRET b. Unilateral surveillance Actions (1) Continue general U.S. surveillance of Cuba pov and its contiguous waters, reporting all suspi- cious contacts to the U.S. alerting centers at Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone. (2) Maintain a continuing U.S. capability to respend to requests for interception assistance from Caribbean countries; this capability to in- pod clude facilities for communication with the U.S. a air and surface units (or headquarters). conducting close-in surveillance of Cuba, and with the prin- cipal units and command headquarters of the par- ticipating Caribbean countries. (3) Require the U.S. Coast Guard to develop.a program for exploiting the surveillance and re-. porting capability of U.S. commercial, fishing and pleasure craft in the Caribbean. (4) Propose that each Caribbean country estab- lish intensive civilian and military information | programs to motivate civilian and military parti-.. | cipants in the surveillance program. : (5) Propose that each Caribbean country organize pol, (or expand) its Coast Guard type force utilizing eee U.S. MAP-provided patrol craft for in-shore patrols.9 (6) Encourage each participating country to gov develop emergency procedures which will provide for rapid concentration of available forces in any Su eritical area in case of alert. (7) Request the governments of each Caribbean country to issue directives requiring that all of their ships and aircraft on routine operations or business be alert for and report suspicious con-= tacts, in accordance with a pre-arranged system. (8) Propose that the Caribbean governments in} * _ 9 | tensify the patrol and intelligence activities of pov € both military and police forces in border areas, ipgat to include the institution of coast watcher pro- ¢ grams where feasible. SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32424042 Page 56
Hi “50955 SECRET -.(9) Propose that the Caribbean governments | _ augment their military surveillance capability oV . by arranging for service, as needed, of local Dp C -. surface pleasure and commercial craft, and ae - private aircraft; the:.service to be patterned aN) after the Coast Guard Reserve programs and the processing and dissemination to countries con- Civil Air Patrol in the United States, c. Actions to Establish an Alerting System (1) Complete priority study on establishing . gt intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and ai Caribbean: Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid~ ( cerned via the United States Ambassadors, of Castro- ‘Communist subversive movements. (2) Propose that each Caribbean country consider the desirability -of establishing a central headquarters authority to coordinate. D iT its air and surface military and civil - 9° pot . patrols, its coast watching activities. and its intelligence and alerting procedures, *and to serve as a central point. of contact in the surveillance system, (3) Encourage participating countries to ~ 00 make maximum use of U,S. mobile intelligence D r) training teams, as well as spaces available an’ ne in’ UsS6 intelligence training schools. Co d.- Actions to. Develop Effective Communications - Sys. bem. 9 : (1) Encourage participating countries to make Do -maximumsuse of U,S,. mobile communications train- — oy ing. teams;. both air and surface. (fer (2) Continue emphasis on improving UsSe sis »o- communications. ‘in. the area and encourage par- D ticipating. countries to improve their own plead communication capabilities. a (3). Pending the improvement of indigenous communication facilities and capabilities, U.S. and participating country surveillance head- quarters exchange contact information on a priority basis, utilizing U.S. provided facili- PoD. ties described in c.(1) above. (PREING . SECRET Docld: 424274042 AccomPus red, Page 59
‘SECRET (4) Provide for limited scope combined exer- ~ Cises including U.S. forces and Caribbean country D navy, air force, and coast guard units, . together po with the necessary headquarters, to improve communications and procedures, and to develop. a rapid response capability in the participating Caribbean countries. SECRET a : 8 BY S0955 Docld: 3234274042 Page all .
wIntroduction “The Nature and Scope of the Problem : ‘“l. Limiting Factors ae Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence’. 3. Current Exchange Arrangements vo oo HW 50955 Docld:32424042 Page 62
: SECRET CUBA . THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES T, Introduction In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through- out Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence -- a requirement which involves the timely acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the US Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited, and much remains to be done, Tt is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily. concerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information regarding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it. ‘II, .The Nature and Scope of the Problem 1. Limiting Factors a. There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage the See een intelligence on an international basis, even among allies National privacy with regard. to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be preserved, Com- pounding the problem further, where Latin America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the leng history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and Gisputes which have characterized relations among the nations concerned. The wounds of past. conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are not com- pletely healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the Rio Lauca and the question of Bolivian access to the sea, and, even now; Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the porders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries — would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full and frank basis.- SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:32474042 Page 63
HW 450955 SECRET b. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homo- geneous entity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange of intelligence eoncerning this menace, therefore, cannot be regarded as attainable. e. Additional impediments to intelligence ex- change are the generally low level of competence -of most Latin American intelligence services, their lack of rapid, secure means of communication, the absence of adequate security systems, and the lack of security consciousness. Deficiencies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence obtaine§,covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection. d. These defects promise to persist, since the governments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activities of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. More- over, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government. es These realities all underscore the fact that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be concluded, however, that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper definition, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of subversives, the production and movement of propaganda materials which threaten internal stability, the movement of arms, and the movement of funds, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence SECRET © 2 BDocld: 327474042 Page 64
HW 450955 SECRET gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former involves the requirement ‘to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be.of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromtse. . 2. Categories of Exchangeable Intelligence The following describe generally the categories of exchangeable matter, and exemplify the types of material under each: a. Travel information - Unevaluated information devoted solely to rapid reporting of the movement of individuals between Latin America and Cuba or Soviet Bloc countries. Such reports can be reduced to a few elements such as identification of the individual, point of departure, date and time of departure or arrival, destination, and carrier, When presented in an abbreviated form such information offers minimum security problems with respect to exchange with one or more countries, b. Intelligence information reports - Un- evaluated information derived from clandestine collection operations or confidential sources reporting on plans and activities of Cuban or communist connected subversive individuals or. groups; on movement of arms, propaganda and funds On shipping and air movements and on results of | SECRET surveillance efforts Because continued receipt of such information Dy the United States is dependent on careful protection of sources and methods of collection, the exchange of this information with other countries must be carefully controlled by the collecting department. c. Intelligence reports and studies -. Evaluated intelligence in all.of the above areas, prepared by an appropriate element of the US government in a form which is releaseable to other Latin American countries. d. Selected overt materials - Articles or news stories drawn from press, periodical and other overt publishers. Selected for maximum impact on 3 Doocld: 324274042 Page 65
HY 0955 SECRET other countries particularly where such information is not freely available to security services, as in the ease of foreign broadcast.-reports. oe 3, Current Exchange Arrangements a. At present there is little organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is a limited amout of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relationships between government ofdicials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter. b. The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in those Latin American eountries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passing of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countri In 1962, CIA received information reports from services with which liaison is main- tained in Latin America and released reports to recipients. Intelligencé items exchanged included collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports. e. The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral ex- changes .of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. . Infor- mation provided by the Army has been concerned with subversive personalities, communist infiltration, -weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal in- SECRET telligence received has been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive acti- vities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program forthe exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies and the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Air Force, through its attache system in Latin America, like- wise has an exchange program. This is accomplished on an informal basis and is bilateral in nature. _ Bocld: 32474042 Page 66
SECRET d. Exchanges. of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Depart- ment of State. -@, AS yet, however, the program for the pro- vision by United States agencies of information on subversion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and reliable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States sytem for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possibility of achieving the results desired. f,. United States experience in the matter. of intelligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are. more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO. Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that -multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange. g. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activities has been put forward at numerous Inter- ‘American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II.1l. Under the Punta del Este decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and =~ | a "Special Consultative Committeé on Security (SCCS)” is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist. activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the. Council of the OAS on how to SECRET UI HY 50955 DBocld:32474042 Page 67
HW 450955 SECRET counteract them, Since the Punta del Este meeting, the OAS has been making slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange. of intelligence throwgh its machinery. ; h, The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has also demonstrated an awareness of the need for ex¢hanging intelligence regarding communist sub- version, Annex 4 of the General Military Plan prepared by the IADB requests the American States to _ report information to the Board and’to establish agreements among themselves for exchanging infor- mation of collective interest. The United States has approved the General Military Plan, but similar action has not been taken by all member countries. i. This brief summary serves. to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral intelligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now. minimal at best, as well as a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange :between the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the possibilities of a multilateral approach within the recognized limitations involved. Ill. Existing Programs Enumerated below are the principal programs now in Progress. They are subdject to continuing improvement. 1, Bilateral exchange of intelligence is now being conducted by CIA, DOD and“bther US agencies with their Latin American counterparts in. ifstances where it has been found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for exchange of selected information consistent with security requirements. 2. A study is currently underway to evaluate. the feasibility and desirability of establishing military intelligence centers of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in con- Junction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissemination with appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activities directly to the countries concerned through the US Ambassador. SECRET 6 Docld: 32494049 Page 668
HW 450955 - SECRET 3, Intelligence is being provided to the Caribbean Command by CIA and other elements of the U.S. Embassies in Latin America as well as to CIA Headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate. 4, Various agencies of the U.S. Government are now | disseminating to Latin American governments unclassified studies and reports and other: .non-sensitive information concerning Castro~-Communist subversion. 5, U.S. Government communications ,systems throughout Latin America are being expanded and improved upon on a high priority basis.. 6. Programs now exist under AID, CIA, and DOD for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security \ and intelligence services. Additional programs gould be established in other countries where it is found ‘to be. in the best interests of the United States and acceptable to the country concerned. 7. All information received by CIA concerning travel to and from Cuba is put into a computer system capable of producing lists of name, by country, by point of travel, er sorted on various ‘other bases. -IV.. New Actions Recommended 1. Reinfotee:.:the present procedures. for bilateral y exchange of intelligence, as described in Section III,1. by pe ag recommending an-Embassy intelligence committee to coordinate FO procedures for ensuring timeliness, completehess and freedom from duplication or false confirmation in the bilateral exchange with ‘the host governments. bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist 2. Encourage Latin American countries to engage in pov ut er’ subversive activities. Su 3, Arrange for the electrical dissemination to -appropriate Latin American governments of daily summaries of ‘ba®to broadcast material as monitored by the FBID of CIAs. i. Make available to as many countries as security a permits, #®anitized results of the extensive travel coverage obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency, already processed py machine, (See paragraph III.7.) SECRET , 7 Docld: 37474042 Page 69
SECRET” 5. Discourage.the employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the United States except in instances where the United States can arrange to provide for the po? Res training and control of any third country intelligence 4 { advisor. 2 6, Arrange for the preparation of periodic studies ov « of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America which can 2 yeh be disseminated to selected Latin American governments. S 7. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate governments to keep. the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing basis of the nature and ineidence of subversive activities in their respective countries. 8. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense D Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Amnex 4 thereof, Do furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates eoncerning Castro-~Communist subversive activities. _ SECRET 8 HWY 350955 DBDocld: 324274042 Page 70
“TABLE OF CONTENTS’ : Introduction - — - Gene ral” “Agency for Inte rnational Development Programs Military Assistance Programs Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs - : _ Training in the Canal Zone | Cost of Existing Programs “.%. Difficulties Encountered i in” Filling Avail. 7 -. able Military Quotas in the U. Se Groups Appropriate for Expanded Training Efforts i, Aeticns Recommended - Security Personnel” “be ‘Personnel Concerned with, Operation of Vital Facilities ‘ HW°50955 DocId:32424042 Page 72 -
HY 0955 . travel to Cuba, it will be much more important to- pemove: their desire to travel there in the first place. a prominent among them are. the dissatisfaction of ‘the. ‘young: / people of Latin America, their impatient hope for. better: . things and their curiosity about the world at large... ‘The _- .younger generation of Latin Americans cannot be’ expected -. to stand still. They demand -rapid- and. revolutionary in- -. provement and. this ‘is what communism promises. them, how- ever falsely. We are faced with. the challenge,. therefore; farmer or labor leader that the progress. “he. desires. “Gan: _ best be achieved through the institutions.of a ‘free. soéiety One: of the best means of establishing this. conviction. Ls.07 _ SECRET TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS. IN THE UNITED STATES I. Introduction ‘The fact that 2,000. Latin Americans. have ° recently ‘been indoctrinated in Communist ideology and subversive techniques in Cuba is just cause for coneern, and warrants > an energetic response. . Our actions to frustrate this: " . ‘movement are already beginning to generate: momentum, - but © -it-will be idle to conelude that’ currently. programmed. : So, . impediments upon the movement of people, arms: and propa- “ganda from Cuba, will diminish decisively the: strength = of Castro- Communist inspired subversion in Latin’ America.” “While it-will be important, so. long as the Castro. regime» survives; to remove the ability of Latin Americans to. ‘The root causes of this desire are. numerous,” “bu of convincing the young and restive- Latin, American: stude at, to show him, at first hand, our own free “Society, in action, This useful influence is at work now “with. the: ‘Laban. American students who are receiving education and: train- ing in the United States. This group - considerably . greater in number than those who visit Cuba.or the. Bloc countries - are underwritten by various agencies of the _United States government, private institutions, and, in many cases, defray their own expenses. On balance, these: — young people return to their countries with a keener un- derstanding of what makes the United States function, | While their reaction may not always be completely favor-..08 - able, it must certainly be more accurate - and thus more. ° favorable - than any picture painted for them by the: Communists at-home, SECRET Docld:32424042 Page 73—
HW 50955 Americans which are already in motion, with the objective _ of determining what improvements can be made which would... ' increase our capability for countering subversion. -Atten- - with Castro- Communist subversive activities. secon school and college level education for Latin- * American students is also a most fruitful field, ‘whick training in the United States, is the broad variety. of. of State, Peace Corps, AID, USIA, the Armed Forces,. private “home to -U,5, citizens who are interested in his welfare, © While it eannot be divorced completely from in- country . SECRET In any case in. terms ‘of the numbers of young Latin Americans which we might reach in this endeavor, it is evident that our opportunities are not now being fully exploited. If our efforts can be given stronger direction and intensified, there is reason to believe that we may , exert a. powerful influence on the most impressionable - and most important - sector of Latin American society, the younger generation. ‘That. is the purpose of this study - to examine “these. U.S. sponsored training and education programs for Latin. tion has been.focussed particularly on subsidized. training. bee in’ police, military and certain other fields selected. on. a basis of their special significance in the confrontation Lo It is recognized. that the much broader area’ of. vu, U8. hy requires similar examination; however, that study is» a viewed as being conditioned upon. educational factors: o which are beyond the Scope of this paper. aoe : Another. important. field which is complementary. ‘to: in-country programs, now being. carried out by the- Departmen and religious institutions, and civil educational. : insti-- tutions, Through these, the Latin American is exposed ‘at. in terms which provide a direct rub-off of our values. training this paper does not concern itself ‘directly. with. cee that sector. It does, however, recognize the Importance of the in-country effort, and proposes to make use of» the U.S. presence in Latin American as a eatalyst to. attract promising young people towards training in the North, where they can see organized freedom in action and, cs by gaining confidence in it, become its champions in their: coe Own country, oa SECRET ‘Doold: 327474042 Page Fa