157-10008-10258 tee wn a &/pd g ed: 51% in Date: 10/05/93 al Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM 4/03: IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO AGENCY : SSCIA DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10258 RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R681 A nam nae tam a eal Ont Ome NO A mY OY UD ey rw rom my wy ED CEE GE GO xh mem ey OEE SD ED EGER Gs Sams ny ny Ome Na AO as ek me my vo VO OO UR UD OTR few fom omy roy cm CEE GEE GEE ts tes aso GE ES Gk, as as nnn ad a ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO : TITLE : TRANSCRIPT/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/EXHIBITS DATE : 08/01/75 PAGES : 86 SUBJECTS : ; TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS BY MR. WEATHERBY { EXHIBITS 1-5 DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT/TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : T RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : BOX 261-1 le eee eee ee eee eel eel el ed teeltadantan ken tetatantankenteniekentek kei OL [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DocId:32202448 Page 1
NATIONAL* “SECURITY. ** INFO Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions a m7 Ghe United States Senate Aes Report of Proceedings TOP SECRE I | wm }1%177 m 26 oo PSC! BOX 1 August 1, 1975 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO PELE ATION AND/OR . E OF THIS DOCUM Washington, D.C AS SANITIZED NT en? F Var 74 (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) 410 FIRST STREET, S. E.. . SE = c ; . WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008 CRET “ (202) 544-6000 HY 50955 Docld: 322024468 Page 2
gsh TOP SECRET c=) 3 3 = 1 CONTENTS F S nN 3 2 || TESTIMONY OF ; F 5 || Mr. Weatherby 4 |lexnrprrs 5 llexhibit Mo. 1 6 Texhibit No. 2 7 TeExhibit No. 3 & llexhibit No. 4 = 9 | exhibit No. 5 10 —- = = 11 at ‘ : 12 3 e 13 = 14 15 16 17 18 3 19 g a ¢ 20° $ 5 21 a 3 22 ° 24 wt HY 50955 Docld!42 02448 Page 3
TOP SECRET HANBACE: amt 1 . g . ( j 1 EXECUTIVE SESSION 5 5 3 Friday, August 1, 1975 4 -=-- 5 United States Senate, 6 a Select Committee to Study Governmental 9 Operations With Respect to 8 "Intelligence Activities, 9 Washington, BD. C.} 10 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 o'clock pom ll in Room 608, The Carroll Arms, Senator Morgan presiding. 12 Presént: Senator Margan (presiding). e920 Yo. flo, WARD & PAUL 13 ‘oo Also. pfesent; Frederick Baron, Robart Kelley, and John ja | Bayly, Professional Staff-Members. 15 - 16 1? 18 3 19 J fal € 20° FA 21 = 4 22 Co & 23 2 24 HW 50955 DoclaeS2tu2448 Page 4
TOP SECRET. 3 2 2 (8 1 PROCEEDINGS Se 8 é 2 Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, before we start there are q : E 5 a few: procedural matters that we should discuss. 4 First, is it true that you are testifying here under 5 alias today? 6 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. 7 Mr. Baron. And is it not also true that we have made an 8 agreement that you have signed to indicate your true identity 9 and to indicate the fact that your true identity will be on 10 |} file at the CIA available to the Committee if it needs to 11 verify it for some reason or other? ( 2 12 Mr. Weatherby. That is also correct. =e 13 | Mr. Baron. And is it your understanding that we also have ° 14 an agreement that we will refer to agent AMLASH by his crypton 15 rather than by his true name to preserve his true identity? 6 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, that is understood. 1? Mr. Baron. Okay. 18 You understand that you. have the right to counsel here g 19 today? : 20° Mr. Weatherby. [I do.’ 6 E 2] Mr. Baron. And you are appearing voluntarily without ‘ 99 | Counsel? fs : 23 Mr. Waatherby. I am. vo Ss : 24 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of the fact that you can stop ¢ 2 at any point during this examination and request to consult HW 50955 pocrd: 32 02448 Page 5
~~ Prone {Area 202) 544-6000 “aa WARO & PAUL 410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 TOP SECRET 3 1 with counsel? 2 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I do. 3 Mr. Baron. And are you also aware that you have all of- 4 your Constitutional rights intact before this Committee, 5 including your Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in the 6 face of a question that you might find incriminating for some _ y reason? 8 Mr. Weatherby. I am. = 9 Mr. Baron. Before we begin with the specifics related to 10 Project AMLASH, I would just like to ask a faw general question ll about your background in the Agency. 12 Can you explain at what point you joined Project AMLASH? 13 | 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° el 22 23 24 25 Docla: 32202448 Page 6
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ii 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 al a2 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 WW 50955 DocPbd: 20° TOP SECRET TESTIMONY OF MR. WEATHERBY Mr. Weatherby. I, joined Project AMLASH upon returning from an overseas assignment. It was a directed assignment into the general operation of which AMLASH was a part. Mr. Baron. So -- | Mr. Weatherby. It was essentially in June, 1962. Mr. Baron. That general assignment was in relation to Cuba? Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. Mr. Baron. And for how long had you been working in the Agency on Cuban affairs? Mr. Weatherby. Never before. Mr. Baron. .Since what time, in other words, when did you begin working on Cuban affairs? Mr. Weatherby. In June, 1962, Mr. Baron. I see. So your previous overséas assignmant was completely unre- lated to Cuba? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. How long had you been in the Agency? Mr. Weatherby. Since 1956. Mr. Baron. Did you have any other assigmments that related to Latin American affairs? Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever. 2202448 MBagSaron. Did you have any assignments in Vietnam?
Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 19 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 L? 18 19 21 re 23 4 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 MW 50955 Doch® 20: ate TOP SECRET Mr. Weatherby. I have, yas. Mr. Baron. And did you have any assignments in the Congo? Mr. Weatherby. I did. Mr. Baron. Let us go off the record a second. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. Let's go back on the record. Could you tell us what time you were assigned to Vietnam and the Congo? Mr. Weatherby. Yes. I was assigned to Vietnam from August, 1970 involved in affairs through August, 1974. I was involved with Congo affairs at the Headquarters level and affairs at the Headquar- ters level and on several TDY's during the period of approxi- mately May, 1965 to the fall of 1968. . Mr. Baron. Did you ever work on Dominican Republic affairs? Mr. Weatherby. I have not. Z Mr. Baron. Drawing your. attention now to the period of time when you were working on Cuban affairs, in what office of the CIA were you doing this work? Mr. Weatherby. I was working for the Task Force West, which was the original name of the unit. Mr. Baron. Known as Task Force W? Mr. Weatherby. Yes. 2027448 MfageB@ron. Under whose direction was that?
TOP SECRET 6 g . 8 . ( 3 1 Mr. Weatherby. Desmond FitzGerald and also William : 2 Harvey who preceeded Desmond FitzGerald. ; 3 Mr. Baron. When did FitzGerald take over from Harvey? 4 Mr. Weatherby. I believe it was in the late spring of 5 1963. I am not certain. 6 Mr. Baron. And can you describe the structure of Task 9 Force Wat the time that you joined it under Harvey's direction? 8 Mr. Weatherby. I could tell you only about the unit in 9 which I belonged to. 10 Mr. Baron. What unit was that? Ll Mr. Weatherby. That was Third Country operations, which 2 12 concered obviously operations against Cubans in countries other 13 than Cuba or the United States. ° 14 Mr. BAron. Did that unit have a cryptonym? 15 Mr. Weatherby. It did not. 16 Mr. Baron. What was it known as in Agency jargon? 17 Mr. Weatherby. I do not remember. It was an operational 1g | section, but the exact nomenclature I do not recall. my 8 19 Mr Baron. And its purpose was to work in relation to ™ J . a 29: Cubans or Cuban affairs in countries other than the United © o 2 2 5 21 States or Cuha? z ul 22 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. wi { i 23 Mr. Baron. Do you know how many such sections there were \ . i oo > - 24 within Task Force W7 = WH 50955 Doc®6: #2202448 “Bagd’gatherby. I do not recall.
° s Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 10 li le “eatlt WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 21 (22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 HY 50955 DocPes 13 20° Mr. Baron. TOP SECRET And whe was the head of the Third Country Operations section? Mr. Weatherby. During my time it was the late Mr. Mauraelius Mr. Baron. And how do you spell that? Mr. Weatherby. M-a-u-r-s-l-i-u-s. Mr. Baron. What was his first name? Mr. Weatherby. Edward. Mr. Baron. Did you work directly under him? Mr. Weatherby. I did. Mr. Baron. So that in your operational capacity as a case officer you would report directly to Mr. Maurelius? Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, or Mr. FitzGerald, or Mr. Baron. Mr. Harvey upon request. Did the Chief of Task Force W; namely FitzGerald or Harvey sit directly above Maurelius in the chain of command within Task Forces W? Mr. Weatherby. Hse had a Deputy, but this particular unit was the ~- was a senior echelon operational entity. Mr. Baron. What does that mean? Mr. Weatherby. That means there was no other chain of command between it and the Executive Head of the Task Force. Mr. Baron. So that Mr. Maurelius would have reported directly to the Chief of Task Force W? Mr. Weatherby. Or his Deputy. : 32202448 MiayeBagon. Or his Deputy.
” f ( \ Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 TOP SECRET 8 Who was Deputy Chief of Task Force W undar William Harvey? Mr. Weatherby. That was -- go off the record a minute. Mr. Baron. Yes. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. Go ahead. Mr. Weatherby. Let me say during my period of time there, which was some thirteen years ago, there were a number of Deputies and they have slipped my recall. re I do recall it, I will pass it to the record. Mr. Baron. Have you had a chance to refresh your recol- lection: generally about your activities on Task Force W? Mr. Weatherby. I have not. I was informed of this interview yesterday afternoon, lates. Mr. Baron. Did you have.a chance to read the IG Report before you came here today? Mr. Weatherby. I did read that this morning. Mr. Baron. And what sections of the IG Report did you read? Mr. Weatherby. I read only those portions that concerned my activities with AMLASH,- Mr. Baron. About how many pages would that have been? Mr. Weatherby. I think ahout six to ten. Mr. Baron. And did you discuss your coming here today to ansWer queStions before the Committee with anyone who is not HW 50955 Docdg: dzapagzentdge employed at the CIA?
Prone (Area 262) 544-6600 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, B.C. 20063 HY 50955 10 il 12 13 14 L5 16 1? 18 19 20: el 22 25 24 Dochs TOP SECRET Mr. Weatherby. I have not. Mr. Baron. And have you discussed it with anyone at the CIA? Mr. Weatherby. I have. Mr. Baron. Could you tell us who that was? Mr. Weatherby. I discussed it with the General Counsel's Office, and I discussed it generally with -- Mr. Baron. Off the record a minute. : (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. Let's go back on the record. With the AMLASH Case Officer who followed you on Task Force W? Mr. Weatherby. That's correct. Mr. Baron. And can you relate to us the major points that you discussed with the case officer who has testified before us recently? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I can. I purposefully did not discuss my portion of the operation with him on advice of the Office of General Counsel. I talked to him in general terms about, frankly, you fellows and your personalities, what I could expect, and we related at lunch today old times since we have not seen each other for probably at least six or seven years. But I skould like to reiterate we did not discuss each other's part of the operation in order to preserve the integrit :f22@fsany rays timony.
Phone (Area 202) 544-4000 LO 11 le “ggg 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 a1 22 oo 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 Doc ht x 20° TOP SECRET 10 Mr. Baron. At any point, did anyone at the CIA tell you what to say here today? Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not. In fact, if I might add, they cautioned me, they told me they were not going to Say because that is against the rules. They made a very strong point of that. Mr. Baron. So we have then the understanding of the fact that you have been asked to testify on very short notice and that your recollectiom.might not be pinpoint precise as far as names and dates go? . | Mr. Weathsrby. Thanks, that is correct. Mr, Baron. But we will try to do as much as we can to refresh your recollection as we move through the events we are discussing. Mr. Weatherby. Yas. I should Like to point out for the record that I have. not worked in Latin American Affairs before nor .afterwards, and tha it has been some thirteen years since I delved into this material, so, therefore, please bear with me, if -my answers are not as complete perhaps as you wish. I shall do my best. Mr. Baron. Turning back to the subject of the structure of Task Force W, you were unable to recall the name of the Deputy to work under Harvey. Do you recall who took over as the Deputy under FitzGerald? 202448 MPageWbatherby. No. It was the same man.
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Ll 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 L9 el 22 235 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 20° TOP SECRET ll Mr. Baron. Would that have been Samuel Halpern? Mr. Weatherby. Samuel Halpern was an Executive Officer, I do believe, who was essentially divorced from operations. Mr. Baron. Would it have been Bruce Cheever? Mr. Weatherby. That:is ‘correct. Mr. Baron. And Bruce Cheever was the Deputy Chief of Task Force W during the entire period that you served on Task Force W? Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. I believe he had a short tenure as Chief until Mr. Hart took over, John Hart. Mr. Baron. When did John Hart take over as Chief of Task Force WW? Mr. Weatherby. It was quite near the end of my time on it, so I would say approximately in early spring 1965. Mr. Baron. For how much of this time did you work on Project AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. I worked on that project shortly after I came aboard on the assignment, which would have been June: 1962, through turning it over to the previously mentioned AMLASH Case Officar in September, 1963. Mr. Baron. This case officer is the man who testified here under the alias of Garmire? Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, sir. Mr. Baron. What were your duties on Task Force W after HY 50955 Docimsgsb2da¥s ebb. PRoject AMLASH?
Phone {Area 202} 44-6006 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 a1 22 25 24 416 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 Docks x 20° TOP SECRET 12 Mr. Weatherby. I continued to handle Third Country Operations, excluding this particular operation, in a support capacity. Mr. Baron. With whom did you work on those overations? Mr. Weatherby. We worked, we were a focal point in a, and a coordination™pdéint with, the various desks of the countries involved. I cannot recall the people on the desks at that time. Mr. Baron. Were you responsible for operations, or was this simply support activities? Mr. Weatherby. It was, in the bureaucratic structure that we have I was responsible for providing guidance for operations which were run by the individual country desks in their countries. Mr. Baron. Did you work out of CIA headquarters at Langley? Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. Mr. Baron. Were you at any time stationed in Florida? Mr. Weatherby. I was not. Mr. Baron. buring the period of time that you worked on Project AMLASH, were there any other CIA officers who worked closely with you? Mr. Weatherby. Not at that time, with the exception of Mr. Maurelius who provided guidance, and subordinate officers opmaviding dnfonmation such as file checks and background and
Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 el 22 23 24 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 20° TOP SECRET 13 information of that nature that contributed for a batter knowlsdge of the operation. Mr. Baron. Would you assume generally that Mr. Maurelius would be intimately familiar with any operation: that you were running under Project AMLASH?: Mr. Weatherby. I do not think I would ~~ I would ask you to clarify the term “intimate.” Mr. Baron. Would he be aware of the major=contacts you Were making and any Significant support to those contacts? Mr. Weatherby. I should say at the time, yes, any major aspect of it. It would be difficult for him to follow every operation of every officer in complete detail. Mr. Baron. But he would generally be aware of any Significant development of your activities on Project AMLASH and in your relationships with your contacts inside Cuba? Mr. Waatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Would he in turn have made the Chief of Task Force W aware of any such significant developments? Mr. Weatherby. Of significant davelopments, yes. Mr. Baron. And was it a frequent practice for you to report directly to the Chief of Task Force W and to his Deputy and bypass Mr. Maurelius? Mr. Weatherby. As a matter of course, no. In answer to general questions of a professional’ interest, how I was doing, and how the operation was going, I could be called in on an HW 50955 DocK§$3R202448 Page 16
( Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 Ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL L4 15 16 L? 18. 19 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 O955 Dock: 20° TOP SECRET 14 ad hoc basis to chat ahout one point or the other. Mr. Baron. Do you remember any occasions in relation to Project AMLASH when either WillianiaHarvey:or .DesmondiFitzGerald asked you for a report directly? Mr. Weatherby. No, not -- I cannot remember now. Mr. Baron. Where is Mr. Maurelius now? Mr. Weatherby. Mr. Maurelius is deceased. He died three days ago. Mr. Baron. And do you know where Mr. Cheever is now? Mr. Weatherby. I do not. I think he may be someplace in the Southwest. Helis retired. Mr. Baron. I would like to review with you a few events that occurred before you joined Project AMLASH, but about which you may have become knowledgeable after you joined the Project. Starting in March of 1961, the IG report indicates that( | b who was a CIA officer assigned to Mexico City, met agent AMLASH in Mexico City to sound him out generally on his views about the Cuban situation. Do you recall anything that you learned about contacts aX between{ band AMLASH in Mexico City? Mr. Weatherby. No, I do not, other than what appears in the paper which you have just quoted from or referred to. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the reasons why that contact tock place? 202448 Ades tharhv. At tha fime T wac.
TOP SECRET g 15 © ( 5 1 Mr. Baron. Do you recall now? a : 2 Mr. Weatherby. I do not, but I presume it was to. discuss ; 3 defection or dissatisfaction with the Cuban regime. 4 Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever learning about the source 5 | of the initiation for that meeting? Did it come, in other 6 words, ro) or from AMLASH or from an intermediary? 7 Mr. Weatherby. To the best of my recollection, from an B intermediary. . os 9 Mr. Baron. Would that have been a man whose cryptonym 10 became AMWHIP? I am referring now to Carlos Tepedino. 1 Mr. Weatherby. Yas. ( 3 12 Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the CIA had contact with : 13 Carlos Tepedino prior to the time they came into contact with z 14a | AMLASH? 15 Mr. Weatherby. I don't -- I do not think it was ona 16 professional basis. He may have known people in Havana Station 7 on a social basis. 18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall being briefed about the state g 19 of contacts with agent AMLASH at the time that you took over as 3 20. operational officer? : 21 Mr. Weatherby. Would you reneat the questiog, please? rf 29 Mr. BAron. Do you recall being briefad? a : 23 Mr. Weatherby. Yes. _ 24 Mr. Barnn. At the time you took over? WAiv5s pecKS apzuzaas ME je Petherby. I read a file rather than being briefed,
Phone (Area 202) 544-6006 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 6.c. 20063 LO il 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20° el 22 ae) 24 4 TOP SECRET 16 as I recall. | Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of meeting with CT £0 be briefed at the time you joined Project AMLASH?. | Mr. Weatherby. I cannot recall. Mr. Baron. ‘What was the nature of the file that you read at that time? Mr. Weatherby. Well, it was either a file startea on AMLASH or a file on an intermediary that began the contact, or the attempted contact, with LASH. | Mr. Baron. Would that intermediary have been Tepedino? Mr. Weatherby. I do not think so. I'm sorry. I do nat recall accurately at this point. Mr. Baron. Would you assume the name of that intermediary would appear in the AMLASH file today? Mr. Weatherby. Certainly. Mr. Baron. At the point when you reviewed the file to brief yourself on Preject AMLASH, do you recall reading a cs information report that referred to AMLASH's expression of disgust with Castro to the point where AMLASH indicated that he would be willing to kill Castro? Mr. Weatherby. I remember reading that in the IG Report. I should -- as I have stated earlier, I have not read the official 201 file on the whole case before appearing before you poctaS3to0s4¥e Ube 14 Yecall that from the IG Report.
HF Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 50955 10. Li 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° 21 ae 25 24 TOP SECRET 17 Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of learning from any source about AMLASH's emotional state at the time that you took over the project? Mr. Weatherby. No, I never knew the man until I actually met him, in sufficient detail for me to form an opinion, and having never worked with Latins before and mostly with Germanic types; I prefered to form my own conclusions. Mr. Baron. Do you recall, however, being made aware by any source before you came in contact with AMLASH that he had a propensity to assassinate Castro or any leanings in that direction. Mr. Weatherby. I recall only that he perhaps had said or made statements that he was totally dissatisfied with Castro and I do not recall from my own memory if he used the word assasSinate as you did. Mr. Baron. Whether or not he used the word assassinate, at the time you took over the contact with AMLASH, would you have assumed that this was someone who was at least capable of doing that sort of thing? Mr. Weatherby. f think if I can recall correctly that my impression of the man was that he was quite mercurial and I did not understand him well enough to know whether that was whiskey talk or an expression or a Latin exaggeration. I remember saying that I had got to see the man and talk to him Dochsls 3? 203908r Page rHtmed an opinion.
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 2 a o ke x oo 10 ll | 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° el 22 23 24 TOP SECRET 13 Mr. Baron. Thé& whiskey talk you are referring to is talk that you Picked up from the file? Mr. Weatherby. No, it would be that someone had said that he heard him say that I am mad at castro and I would like to eliminate him. To me that is hearsay, and I put no stock in that. whatsoever. | Mr. Baron. And do you recall your initial contact with agent AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. I do. Mr. Baron. Where was that? Mr. Weatherby. It took place in HWalsinki. Mr. BAron. Before we pick up on that contact, I would like to ask a couple of other questions about events prior to that time. Do you have any recollection of the development of projects MHAPRON? Mr. Weatherby... I do. Mr. Baron. What was that program ahout? Mr. Weatharby. That program was an effort to pensatrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections or an attempt to produce information from dissidents, or perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then present government in Cuha. Mr. Baron. Was that operatian already mounted at the boca aqvobime when zrou joined project AMLASH?
TOP SECRET 8 19° v8 \. 3 1 Mr. Weatherby. I think the program was in effect, or it 2 was concurrently started. I do not recall honestly. ; 3 Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether your assignment «to work 4 with AMLASH was for the purpose of maintaining his participatio 5 in the project MHAPRON, or did it have some independent purpose? 6 | Mr. Weatherby. The original purpose, to the best of i y my recollection, was to oversee his defection, and to monitor 8 him through northern Europe, with’ which I was familiar, and to 9 help in a planned dafection speech, et cetera, in some ‘Western 10 European country. 11 Mr. Kelley. The word "defection", can that have more than - 2 12) One meaning? The meaning, the obvious meaning, is that the } p 13 person leaves his country and comes to another one. Is there z 14 || another meaning that he becomes disaffected from the government 15 or the country in which he resides but stays there? 16 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. 17 There is two, there are two defections, which means he 18 defects from their ranks and bacomes overtly an amigre from 19 his country, and the other term would be to defect in place 20: which is in effect means he becomes a recruited agent. 21 Mr. Kelley. And in your: later testimony, would you keep 22 those two meanings in mind.and tell us if you use the word prot, A “. 23 “defect,” which one we are talking about? DA Mr, Waatherby. Yes, sir. 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 MW 50955 Doclg:3#202448 MageKwlley. At the time that we are speaking bout now,
oN Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HY 50955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° 22 235 24 Doc Es: TOP SECRET 20 the original purpose of the AMLASH operation, you used the word defect. What was, the meaning at this time? Mr. Weatherby. The original, the original intent when he was sent to Helsinki was to aid in the defection, meaning for the man to leave Cuba and Fidel Castro's ranks and come to the West in the classic sense. Mr. Baron. One more question on project MHAPRON. Do you recall':whether one of. the goals of that project would have been to support an attempt by high Cuban military officers to initiate a coup against the Castro regime by killin the leadership? Mr. Weatherby. I would say no. The killing of the leadership was never a prerequisite for raplacement of the government. | Mr. Baron. Whether or not it was a prerequisite, would it have been one acceptable means of initiating a coup? Mr. Weatherby. I would say not. Mr. Baron. Why not? Mr. Weatherby. Because that was not, as far as ft know in any paper I had ever read, or any directive I had ever seen. Mr. Baron. What kinds of directives did you have as to the Means that should be used by contacts established through MHAPRON for the overthrow of Castro? Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall if there was a -- that a 20aper Page dasscription of the project ever spelt that out. In
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 side lb 5 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HY 50955 10 li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 £2 25 24 Doct2S TOP SECRET 21 other words, the means to be used. I think before that is going to be even addressed, you have got to look at the people and assets you have, and determine what course of action might be taken. Mr. Baron. So that you would tailor a course of action against Castro to the specific characteristics and capabilities of the contacts with whom you were dealing, is that correct? aoe Mr. Weatherby. One could do that. ™ Mr- Baron. Would that have been a normal operating procedure for you at that time? Mr. Weatherby. I would think that, that that follows from my previous statement that any activity would have to be looked at in the context of the paople who might be available ‘and willing to do it. Mr. BAron. So that you are saying certainly a major factor in determining what kind of operation to arrange with a Cuban contact would be the character and capability of that contact? Mr. Weatherby. I would think that that is an accurate statement. Mr. Baron. Did you carry on projects MHAPRON at the point when you joined Task Force W, did you have operational responsibility for that project? Mr. Weatherby. I did not. That was an overall project, o5Pse pad DY capacity, did not run that program. -
Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 10 LL 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 LS 16 17 18 19 el ae 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 20° TOP SECRET 22 Mr. Baron. Was Project AMLASH considered a sub-unit of MHAPRON, a subproject?, Mr. Weatherby. It fell into that broad category, but to the best of my knowledge it was not an integral part of that program which in itself was really a mechanism for looking at the problem, and AMLASH was a separate entity at the concept - pardon me, at the inception, of course, it was a defection operation. Mr. Baron. In relation to just one man? Mr. Weatherby. Yes. Mr. Baron. And Project AMLASH throughout related essentially to the use of just one high-ranking Cuban military officer, is that correct? Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, as the principal person involved. Mr. BAron. In your attempts to aid the defection of AMLASH, did you ever come in contact with a man named Juan Orta? Mr. Weatherby. I did not. Mr. BAron. Do you have any recollection of Juan Orta from any connection? Mr. Weatherby. The name is familiar, but I cannot recall the details. I do know, however, I did not meet him. Mr. Baron. Do you recall working with a CIA officer
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ii Coane 1l2 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 al 22 23 24 410 First Street. §.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 20° TOP SECRET 23 point? Mr. Weatherby. I,do not recall that name. Mr. Baron. Do you know Jim O'Connell? Mr. Weatherby. I do not. Mr. Baron. Would it refresh your recollection if I tell you that he was in the Office of Security working as a case officer with some special responsibility in late 1960 and into 1961 for an operation directed against Fidel Castro? Mr. Waatherby. That was before my time, and it would not refresh my memory. | Mr. Baron. Did you have any contact with Robert Maheu in relation to any Cuban affair or operation? Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir. Mr. Baron. Have you had any direct working relationship with Robert Maheu? Mr. Weatherby. I have not, sir. Mr. Baron. Did you : aver have any direct contact or working relationship with John Roselli in relation with Cuban affairs? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you know John Roselli? Mr. Weatherby. I do not. Mr. BAron. Do you know Santos Trafficante? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. HW 50955 DockaS3b202448 4“RayeBAfOn- Do you recall Mr. Trafficante's role in Cuba
TOP SECRET — 24 ( 3 1 in the early '60's? 2 Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir. 3 3 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Mr. Trafficanted' 4 business? 5 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, I don't, because until I 6 returned from Europe, Cuban was a non sequitur to me. 9 Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that Santos Trafficant 8 to the best of our knowledge, had gambling contacts inside 9 Cuba, and, in fact, ran some casinos in Havana. Does that 10 refresh your recollection at all as to any relation he may Ll have had to any operation of the CIA against Fidel Castro? . 2 12 Mr. Weatherby. No. I think now that you mention it, I 4 z 13 || have seen something in the papers perhaps. ° 14 Mr. Baron. Recently? 1s Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. But I had absolutely no 16 knowledge of that at the time. 17 Mr. Baron. Did you have any knowledges at the time, at 18 any point in the early 1960's of any connection between Sam 19 Giancana and the CIA? 20: Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir. 21 Mr, BAron. Did you ever have contact with a Cuban named > 22 Tony Varona? 23 Mr. Weatherby. I did not, sir. I did not, sir. 24 Mr, Baron. Do you know of Tony Varona? 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 50955 Doc pa: SO2446 MFageVegtherby. I know of the name, yes.
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL. 410 First Street, 5.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 z an o is] on hall 10 ii le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° el 22 a) 24 Docigs3 TOP SECRET 25 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of who he was, or any contact between, him and the CIA? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. When you joined Task Force W, what was the nature of your relationship to William Harvey? Mr. Weatherby. At the tima I was an employee of his. Mr. BAron. Did William Harvey give you orders directly in relation to any operation? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. BAron. Any orders from Harvey would have come through Mr. Maurelius to you, is that correct? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of an operation to assassinate Fidel Castro that was run by William Harvey? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you recall ever hearing about a plot to assassinate Castro by placing poison in his food? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. This was never mentioned :to you by anyone in Task Force W? | Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not. I would like to point out at that time I was GS-11 and GS-li's are not told a great deal. Mr. Baron. For the record, what is a GS-11? 202448 Miige Weatherby. That is a ~~
Phone (Area 262} 544-6000 10 il 12 13 é & WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 L? 18 19 20 21 22 235 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 WY 50955 DocRe sb TOP SECRET 26 Mr. Baron. Civil Service rank? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. How would you have characterized Mr. Harvey's style of leadership and operations at that time? Mr. Weatherby. Mr. Harvey was flamboyant, a hard charger, took care of his troops. Mr. Baron. In what way was he flamboyant? Mr. Weatherby. Well, I think he had a good lifestyle. He was a large man, and perhaps flamboyant is not the correct word. But he was ---colorful might be a better choice of words Mr. Baron. Was he a man that you would describe as strong-willed and independent minded? Mr. Weatherby. I think we can safely say that, sir. Mr. Baron. Would you say that if William Harvey determine in his own mind that a course of action was the correct one, or the most af fective operationally, that he would do everythin in his power to carry it out? Mr. Weatherby. I couldn't answer that, sir. It would be pure conjecture on my part. Mr. BAron. Did you ever have any contact with Bruce Cheever in relation to any operation targetted against the life of Fidel Castro? Mr. Weatherby. None whatsoever, sir. Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss assassination techniques as distinct from means of initiating a coup with Desmond 2448 Page 3?9
er , ~~ WARD & PAUL rn 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HYW 50955 9 5 6 9 s z wo ~ ni 3 a a e 2 < ‘ @ € E LO il 12 13 14 15 16 1? L& 19 20° el 22 23 | 24 Doclae3 20244 TOP SECRET 27 FitzGerald? Mr. Weatherby. I,did not, sir. Mr. Baron. Did Desmond FitzGerald ever raise with you the idea of placing an exploding sea shell in an area where Fidel Castro might be skin~-diving? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. Did he ever raise with you, or did anyone ever raise with you, the idea of sending a diviiig suit to Fidel Castro as a present which would be contaminated with bacteria? ° Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not, sir. This was the first time I have ever -heard of it. Mr. Baron. Did anyone in Task Force W or in the Technical Services Division ever discuss with you the development of any poisons that could be used for assassinations? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. .Turning now to your first contact with AMLASH, during that period of time would you place that contact? Mr. Weatherby. ‘The first contact, sir, that should have been roughly, roughly about the thirty day period from maybe the 26th of July, 1962 through maybe 18 August 1962. Mr. Baron. Do you remember how you first learned that AMLASH was going to Helsinki? Mr. Weatherby. That was brought to our attention by an asset, I believe, in Miami, and ultimately through AMWHIP in 6 Page 30
TOP SECRET 9 28 ( i L New York. | : 2 Mr. Baron. And whet was the purpose of your trip to 5 . : 3 Helsinki? 4 Mr. Weatherby. The purpose of my trip to Helsinki’ was to 5 ascertain if AMLASH was prspared to defect, and if so, to 6 assist him in doing so and to gain as much mileage for us from 7 information of a defector from a high-level Cuban official as 8 possible. Ss 9 Mr. Baron. This would be a highly publicized defection 10 from the country perhaps having AMLASH come to ths United Ll States? " 2 12 Mr. Weatherby. That had not been detemined, but a ” 2 13 defection announcement in a major city is always useful. z 14 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any contact batween Carlos 15 Tepedino, who ‘operated then under the cryptonym of AMWHIP in a) 16 the FBI? 17 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. 18 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of that contact? 3 19 Mr. Weatherby. I believe, and again my recollection is J ] 20. hazy, but he had been reporting, I believe, to an FBI asset 5 g 9] || Who turned the information to us through the normal course of 3 u 20 events. ae £ 23 Mr. Baron. Was he revorting to an FBI employee? Co z i. 24 Mr. Weatherby. I'm not sure of the background of that 5 contact at this point. NW 50955 DocYd? 3202448 Page 31
TOP SECRET 5 29 8 < é 1 “Mr. Baron. Does it refresh your recollection if I i 2 represent to you that the IG Report indicates that Tepedino ; 3 was disgruntled with the CIA over their lack of vigor in 4 providing support to AMLASH in his attempt to defect? 5 Mr. Weatherby. If recall that ~from the report, sir. 6 Mr. Baron. But you do not have any independent recollectior 7 for Tepedino's contact with the FBI? 8 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. I do not, sir. = have no 9 independent recollection. 10 . Mr. Baron. Do you recall receiving reports regularly 1 from the FBI on information regarding AMLASH that was coming (_ 2 12 to you. through Tepedino or to them through Tepedino? 13 Mx. Weatherby. I believe there may have been some ° 14 initially, but I don't racall, as a matter of fact, today. 15 Mr. Baron. -Did-you have face to face meetings with the 16 FBI at any point on this project? 17 Mr. Weatherby. r don't recall, sir. I think not. 18 Mr. Baron. Would the FBI have been awaré generally of 3 19 the purpose of Project AMLASH? : 20° Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not to my knowledge. z 21 Mr. Baron. Did you meet with Tepedino in. New York City i 20 in mid-July, approximately July 13, 14 1962 to discuss your (: : e3 || trip to Helsinki? 24 Mr. Weatherby. I made initial contact with him either NH soos poctassioos eRe Bkge GLY for that purnose, sir, in New York.
Prone (Area 262} 544-6000 LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 LS 16, L? 18 19 21 £2 23 aia 24 410 First Street, 5.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 Docks 20° TOP SECRET 30, Mr. Baron. And what was Tepedino's occupation at that time? . Mr. Weatherby. He had a, he was in a partnership with a brewery manufacturing firm. Mr. Baron. And did he receive money from the CIA at any point during your contact with him? Mr. Weatherby. As a salary, sir? Mr. Baron. Ahy money in any form for any urpose. Mr. Weatherby. He received money, he received money for tickats when he did any missions, if you will; for us, but there was never any compensation in terms of any monthly salary or a bonus. Mr. Kelley. You paid his axpenses, in other words? Mr. Weatherby. He would often not take that. He would take a ticket. He was a very well-to-do man, and he was patriotically motivated to freeing Cuba. That was his contribution. Mr. Baron. Did Tepedino ever offer to perform an operation directly in Cuba? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not to my knowledge. Mr. BAron. He simply served as an intermediary to AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Do-you recall the circumstances of your first face-to~face meeting with AMLASH? 202448 Mitge Weatherby. You are going back a long way, sir. I
2 Qo - © toe ° wt qa °° N s 2 < @ c é . af { 3 \ < enyyze * & Q fr < 2 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 z ut oo Wa A 1] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° el 22 23 24 Doci@ 634202448 Hxge 3 TOP SECRET 31 believe I contacted him in New York and invited him to lunch. Mr. Baron. I am referring now to AMLASH and not to Tepedino. Mr. Weatherby. I'm sorry. Would you please rephrase the question again for me? Mr. Baron. Yes. Do you recall the circumstances of your first face-to- face meeting with AMLASH? | _ 3 Mr. Weatherby. You mean how it was arranged? Mr. Baron. No, the circumstances of the meating itself; where it took place. Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. And what transpired and the approximate date? Mr. Weatherby. It took place in Helsinki in a hotel in the latter part of July or during the Helsinki Youth Festival of 1962. Mr. Baron. Do you recall what transpired at that meeting? Mr. Weatherby. Not any longer, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of any subject that was discussed at that meeting? Mr. Weatherby. Well, at that meeting it would naturally have been discussed, his desires for defections his plans, what he wanted to see us about. ron. Do you recall whether he came away from that
Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 4106 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HY 50955 10 1l le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° 21 22 235 24 TOP SECRET 32 meeting as intent on defection as he was when he went into the meeting? Mr. Weatherby. I can't recall that meeting. specifically, I could give you a general feeling of the period of time in Helsinki. Mr. Baron. ALL right. Pisase do. Mr. Kelley. Could I just ask a question first? Mr. Weatherby. Yas. Mr. Kelley. Did you have othar cases that you were working on at this time? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Kelley. How many others, more or lass? Mr. Weatherby. Maybe thirty. Mr. Kelley. And these all involved individuals, people you would meet like you met AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. in some cases, yes. .In others, I was a supporting officer, meaning I maintained a file, maintainsd the traffic, offered advice, wrote cables, talked to different . officers about handling the different individuals. Mr. Kelley. So this was one of some thirty different cases that ‘you would be involved in? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. At the time, I had a number of countries under my responsibility, and in each country were a mumber of cases which had many threads not unsimilar to this. Docig533#24dy S4GUSQ Me ~~
Phone (Area 202) 544-6006 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 LO ll 12 ‘13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° al 22 23 24 TOP SECRET 33 Mr. Kelley. Where would you rank the AMLASH case in terms of time you spent on it among this thirty? Mr. Weatherby. I would think it was certainly one of the most promising and one in which I put the most time, but it was the kind of a case which was on again, off again. When the man was out and we could talk to him, it was a full-time job. And then it would just almost go into abeyance for months at a time. Mr. Baron. Despite the amount of time that you put in on the project, would it have been on the top of your priority list at that time? Mr. Weatherby. If a development took place which required my attention, it would be, if that answers your. question, sir. Mr. Kelley. Where would you rank the AMLASH case among these thirty in terms of your own personal interest? Mr. weatherby. I think it was probably the best case, if it could ever jell. Mr. Baron. Did your superiors in Task Force W feel the same way about it? Mr. Weatherby. I think they thought it was a good case, but it was in the all-over spectrum one of a number. I cannot recall how they would rank it in terms of _- Mr. Baron. But was it clearly a case though that Maurelius and Harvey would take a personal interest in, and pocla Sstvu2adee rp Hject aGerald?
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO 11 es 12 Re 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 el 22 20 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 20° TOP SECRET 34 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Was it also a case that was important enough to be subject to inquiries from the DDP? Mr. Weatherby. I would think so. Mr. Baron. But you don't have any direct . recollection of inquiries by the DDP, or do you? Mr. Weatherby. I do not have any direct -- I am sure there was interest shown because of the potential it showed. After all, the man was probably number four in the government at that time. | Mr. Kelley. That's the way you conceived of him, you realized that he was number four? Mr. Weatherby. Yes. Mr. Kelley. You treated him, in other words, you were conscious of the fact that you were dealing with the number four man? | Mr. Weatherby. I thought he was. I think most people did. | Mr. Kelley. This meant that after Fidel, Raul and .Che, then came AMLASH. Mr. Weatehrby. I believe so, in tarms of personalities that you would focus upon. You have the Prime Minister, you have the Foreign Minister, you have a number of others in there but they weren't of prime concern to us. HW 50955 Dockas3b202448 “WayeBR@F On. Do you recall any specific instances where you
| TOP SECRET 2 35 $ ( s 1 discussed the AMLASH project with Richard Helms? S 3 2 Mr. Weatherby. No, I did not. 5 5 Mr. Baron. Or with anyone else in the DDP above the 4 | Chief of Task Force. W? 5 Mr. Weatherby. I may have gone -- again, I don't recall 6 myself, but I certainly may have gone along with Desmond ? Fitzgerald ~~ well, but I don't recall specifically now. 8 Mr. Baron. Do you recall being asked by Mr. Maurelius 9 or the Chief of Task Force W to prepare a report, reports 10 that were specifically to go uv to the DDP? | 11 Mr. Weatherby. I don't honestly recall. a J ( < 12 Mr. Kelley. We are on the verge of talking about what 2 é 13 transpired at the first meeting. As you told us, this meeting < 14 is with a person that you conceived of as the fourth most 15 important or prominent personality in the Cuban regime? 16 Mr. Weatherby. To us. 1? Mr. Kelley. All right. 18 Mr. Weatherby. As an operational target, perhaps. : 19 Mr. Kelley. To the CIA? ; 20° Mr. Weatherby. Or operational interest. : 21 Mr. Kelley. But at any rate, a very important person z ul 22 | even in Cuba, in Castro's ~- a prominent member of Castro's : 23 | entouraga? : 24 Mr. Weatherby. I can't speak for Castro. He was an < HY 50955 Dockagsp2dgagertemgé geerson at the time of the revolution and the overthror
Phone {Area 202} 544-6006 LO 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 al 7 oe 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 HW 50955 Dock: 20° 29 TOP SECRET 36 of Batista, but he certainly didn't figure prominently in Castro's cabinet. Obviously, he didn't hold much of a position, but he was kind of an old boy who had gone a little astray and a dissident, unhappy, but a member of the contributing guerrill movement which eventually overthrew Batista and, therefore, was always welcomed in most of their circles. Mr. Kelley. My question is, then, when you would meet him in Helsinki or wherever, did you take any precatitions to insure that your meeting was not observed by membars of Castro's. intelligence force who might be following this man? Mr. Weatherby. We would have countersurveillance. Mr. Kelley. And did that ever indicate that you were followed or being observed? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Kelley. Did you meet in out of the way places, or -- Mr.. Weatherby. Hotel rooms, sometimes in a car. Mr. Kelley. These would be safe house-type hotel rooms, or would he come to your room? Mr. Weatherby. Probably go to Tepedino's. I don't recall the exact details of that. It would not be in the parlance of a safe house. Mr. Kelley. Uh-huh. Okay. Mr. Baron. Youvre going to descrihe the general .. impression you had of the series of meetings that took place between yourself and AMLASH in late July and early August of 2U2
o o a .- ° (3 Lo b : Pe .. 5 Q N ag e Ms < e c é a - 2 ( < fs] & < F 4 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 HYW 50955 10 il 12 135 14 iS 16 1? 18 19 20. 21 Re 25 - 24 pocra? reer or nt nanan rrr TOP SECRET 37 1962 in Helsinki? Mr. Weatherby. Yes. The purpose, the initial purpose of my. going over, as has been pointed out, was to arrange for the defection of a prominent Cuban revolutionary with maximum publicity for the West. In talking to him -- and again, we are stretching back over thirteen years from memory -- he was still=very much interested in that. He was fed up with the sale of the revolution by Castro to the Russians, and it didn't represent what he thought he had been fighting for with the old DR at the time they overthrew Batista. He had a thread throughout his thinking though that he would, he would rather, if there was a reason, he would rather stay and change events in Cuba, if he possibly, if this possibly. could be done... In other words, to put the revolution back in its proportions as he had contributed to it and he imagined it should have been. But he didn’t have a real plan and he didn't, he wasn't sure how to accomplish this. The purpose became then to keen him in place rather than defect him, because an agent in place is always worth a qreat deal more than one who defects. | As you probably have heard, you get a debriefing of what he knows, you get a little Press play, and that's the end of it with the man normally except the contacts he might have and 3202446 Page 40
Phone {Area 202} 544-6000 10 ll { le Sie” 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 Lg 21 22 25 4106 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 HW 50955 Docke 20° TOP SECRET 38 so forth, but an agent in place is worth a great deal more. This then became my assignment, was to convince him to stay in place and to report to us. Mr. Baron. Do you recall what kind of proposals he may have made or prospects he may have raised ahout operations that would have been significant enough to merit his staying inside Cuba instead of defacting? Mr.. Weatherby. Well, he wanted to overthréw Castro, he wanted to changes the regime, or at the very. least’ bring Castro around to his concept of the revolution. Mr. Baron. Did ‘he ever mention that as a realistic possibility, bringing Castro around to his concept? Mr. Weatherby. Not really. He discussed it, but I don't think’ he really beliaved it. Mr. Baron. And how likely did he feél at the time the prospect was of leading a widespread coup against Castro? Mr. Waatherby. You know, I don't think he evan thought that far. He was ~- it was interesting. He was mercurial at times, thoughtful, and methodical in turn. He had a great Many things evolving in his mind, none of which were practical, none of which he could tie down. One of the interesting parts of meeting him was to attempt to sort out what the man really wanted and what he wanted to do, what he could do, and possibly what his friends could do. And this was the thrust of the ; balance of the tima that I was with him. 202448 Pa
TOP SECRET 39 4 L Mr. Baron. Do you recall his expressing such a vehement 2 intention to overthrow, Castro that it involved a willingness Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 o to kill Castro if the opportunity arose? 4 Mr. Weatherby. He mentioned, or he talked about this in $s) generalities, but my impression was that it was a manifestation 6 of intensity of feeling rather than really ever doing anything 7 to that degrea. 8 Mr. Baron. “But he did in one way or other=discuss his 9 willingness to do something like assassinate Castro? 10 | Li 12 a alll 13 WARD & PAWL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° 21 22 23 wot, 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 HW 50955 Dock@93#2702448 Page 42
40 HANBACK: GSH | TOP SECRET Weatherby 8/1/75 ( ~°32 Loy Mr. Weatherby. He never used that term. He didn't. like é 3 Mr. Baron. The term "assassinate"? | 5 4 Mr. Weatherby. Yes. 5 Mr. Baron. What terms would he use? 6 Mr. Weatherby. “Eliminate.” 7 | Mr. Baron. Or other euphemisms that clearly had the 8 | same import? - . 9 Mr. Weatherby. I like to think he meant to get rid of 10 in one way or another, either exile or ina coup in which 11 obviously blood will be shed on both sides. / ; 12 Mr. Baron. Was it not clear that whether or not he at — 13 that time had a specific plan or a specific intention to : 14 proceed to eliminate Castro by taking his life, he was interestdd 15 in the prospect of having support for such an operation if 16 it could be mounted? 17 Mr. Weatherby. He was interested in, as he put it, and 18 | again we are talking over 13 years, in getting rid of the man's . 19 regime, and he didn't limit himself to any particular method, ; 20 || nor did he dwell on assassination as such. : 21 Mr. Baron. .But was assassination, though perhaps mentione E 22 by other names, one means that was acceptable to him of : 23 getting rid of Castro? ( : 24 Mr. Weatherby. I never took him seriously. I think in E 25 | 4 fire-fight, in other words, if you are storming the palace HY 50955 Docld: 82202448 Page 43
41 TOP SECRET © - 9 ( nf 1 and the man loses his life, so be it. I mean, I might lose 3 é mine was his attitude. . é 5 Mr. Baron. Whether or not you took him seriously, was é 4 he meaning the prospect of assassinating Castro -- Mr. Weatherby. I think -- 6 Mr. Baron. Or the desirability to assassinate Castro? | 7 Mr. Weatherby. To eliminate him in theory, I think, or 8 he might have discussed it. I don't recall todas precisely 9 the exact terms or the exact seriousness of the man to do an 10 | act like that. 11 Mr. Baron. But the way that you recall that series of (_ 2 ie meetings, is it likely that he did express the desirability i < . : 13 1 of eliminating Castro by assassination? & 5 14 ‘Mr. Weatherby. I think as a possibility, not as a is desirability. L6 Mr. Bayly Perhaps you have been asked this, but I 17 | would like to ask you myself if you have not been to offer what 18 | you understand to be the meaning of the term "assassinate," or 19 | "assassination"? ‘ j 20 | Mr. Weatherby. I'm sorry. Would you -~ 21 Mr. Bayly. . What is the meaning, what is your interpretation £2 of it, or what do you understand the term “assassinate" to 25 || mean? 24 Mr. Weatherby. Well, I take that to mean deliberate taking 410 First Sireet, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 DodtTa/b@2ene 'Saded fa with the intent --
Ww o w Phone (Area 202} §44-6000 nN 10 Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 eal 22 235 24 410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, B.C. 20003 25 TOP SECRET Mr. Bayly... Well, is it'-- Mr. Baron. Off the record. (Discussion. off the record.) Senator Morgan. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have given this afternoon to this Committee and the testimony that you will give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Weatherby. I do, sir. Senator Morgan. I will sit in for a little while, if you don't mind. Mr. Baron. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Bayly . I haa one question pending, Senator. Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, isn't it true that we have been talking for awhile now using your:alias, Weatherby, and that we nave an agreement that we mentioned before that your true identity will be on file at the CIA? Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, sir. Mr. Baron. And I would like to introduce as Weatherby. ‘Exhibit 1 a statement regarding testimony in alias and ask you if this is an accurate statement of your true identity? {The document referred to was marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 1 for identification.) HY 50955 Bocldjs2202446 Page 45
TOP SECRET | " 2 . 188 4 Mr. Weatherby. It is, sir. a 2 & Mr. Baron. And you have signed that statement and I have q 5 ® signed it as a witness, is that correct? a = 4 Mr. Weatherby. That is correct, sir. 5 Mr. Baron. And it is your understanding that we will 6 . attach this statement as an exhibit to your transcript in 7 sanitized form, leaving out your true identity? 8 ™ - Mr. Weatherby. That is my understanding, sir. 9 Mr. Baron. Is it also true that all of the answers to 10 questions that you have given up until this ‘point in our Ll examination are true to the best of your knowledge, and le 3 you are willing to swear to the truth under oath now? a 13 Q Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely, sir. 3 14 Mr. Baron. Thank you. 15 . _ Why don't you proceed with your question? 16 Mr. Bayly’. You have already dealt with the matter of 17 counsel?. 18 Mr. Baron. We have. 2 19 . g You understand now that you are under oath and you still i. 20 a ‘have the right to counsel and can stop at any point to request § 21 ; e counsel if you desire? £ = 22 . * Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. 3 Mr. Baron. And you are voluntarily appearing here today a FA 24 rd without counsel? So 7 25 WY 50955 Doclajs22o24asMrpagdeadherby. That is correct, sir.
Phone (Area 202} 538-6000 fan) 10 ll - 13 14 WARD & PAUL 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 as) HW 50955 Doecld: SE nnn nnn ne TOP SECRET 4 Mr. Baron. And you understand that your Fifth Amendment rights are intact before this Committee? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Bayly.- My question, sir, if you recall is what you understood assassination to mean, the term? Mr. Weatherby. I said the deliberate taking of another man's life. Mr. Bayly... Well, then, how would you distinguish it from murder? Mr. Weatherby. Usually it has a political connotation. Mr. Bayly.. In other words, it is a singling out of a political leader for a political purpose? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, with the intent of eliminating that particular person. Mr. Bayly.. So as to alter or effect a political change? Mr. Weatherby. Possibly. Maybe vengeance. It could be a number of reasons. Mr. Bayly.. "But it is the purpose in the act, is that not correct, I mean shooting Mr. Castro? To steal his wallet ‘or avenge yourself on him because of some suspected adultery is not really the same thing, is it? Mr. Weatherby. No. I think you are describing murder perhaps more closely there. I am not a lawyer, sir, so I cannot get into these fine points. 2202448MPagBayfly . The reason I ask you these questions is so that
an Phone (Area 202} 514-6000 10 11 C 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 Ps \ 9) HW 50955 Docla TOP SECRET — ‘8 the Committee would have a better understanding of what went through your mind when you spoke about, for instance, AMLASH. What did you understand him to mean when he used: the term assasSination when an infrequent -- Mr. Weatherby. He didn't use the term, as I recall. Mr. Bayly.. He never did. Mr. Weatherby. No, Sir. He abhorred that and preferred, as I believe I said, and I think I recall whethé? it was eliminate -or to get rid of. Mr. Bayly:. And did you yourself in your dealing with him ever use the word "assassinate"? Mr. Weatherby. I discussed that with him when I was tryin to find out what he meant. | .Mr. Bayly.. And did you explain to him what you meant? Mr. Weatherby. He knew. I mean, I think it may have been a question of languages or a question of semantics at the time, but I think he understood that. Mr. Bayly... Did you ever use the word "kill"? Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall, sir. It has been 13 years Mr. Bayly.. I uné@erstand that. How about the word "murder" or any similar word? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. ‘Bayily.. ‘So your understanding of those terms is drawn from the sense of what occurred rather than from the 2NHAGé S@abanguage used?
2° ( 3 . zt a o i] so 2 < a & ° £ iy { 5 espa < a a Lid < 3 410 First Streat, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HYW 50955 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 20 Doclia 46 TOP SECRET Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Bayly.. Thank you. That's all I have. Mr. Kelley. Did you speak through an interpreter with AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. He had limited English. Mr. Kelley. Do you speak Spanish? Mr. Weatherby. I do not. Mr. Kelley. And he had limited English? Mr. Weatherby. Correct, sir. | Mr. Kelley. Who would serve as the interpreter in Helsinki? Mr. Weatherby. AMWHIP did. Mr. Baron. Mr. Weatherby, I would like to show you a ‘piece of paper that we will mark Weatherby Exhibit 2, which is an excerpt from the I.G. report that includes remarks said to have been in your contact report of your first meeting with AMLASH during the period of July 30 to August 6, 1962. (The document referred to was marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 2 for identification.) |s2z0zaas Page 49
“ aN, oy o Phone (Area 202) 544-6006 10 il a 12 13 WARGO & PALL 14 15 16 L?7 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HY 509545 Docld: TOP SECRET "7 (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. Does this document refresh your recollection enough so that you recall whether or not you wrote it or whether you wrote those excerpts? Mr. Weatherby. If it came from the file, sir, I am sure I did. Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollection of writing this document or of the events referred to in it? Mr. Weatherby. I don't have a personal recollection of these subjects in a discussion with him until I have seen the paper again. Mr. Baron. Now that you are looking at this excerpt from your contact report, do you recall that AMLASH felt that he would be interested in returning to Cuba and in risking his life by doing so, "if he could be given a really large part to play"? Mr. Weatherby. Yes. Mr. Baron. Do you recall -- Mr. Weatherby. May I interrupt, sir? Mr. Baron. Yes. Mr. Weatherby. I don't remember the precise langauge, but the thought, I certainly, I certainly do. Mr. Baron. And do you recall AMLASH expressing generally to you the feeling that “he wanted to plan the execution of 25 boSpales Rodriguez ( a top ranking Castro subordinate) and the Page
48 | TOP SECRET ~ 8 ( 388 9 : Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Fidel by execution, 3 ° if necessary.” . & 3 : Do you recall his expressing that feeling to you? . * Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall today his expressing the ° feeling in the words in the exhibit. However, I believe that ° | that represents at least a portion of his thoughts at the time, ’ only as an idea or an expression of the degree to which he 8 felt he wanted to do something and was totally frustrated in 9 doing it. I mean, just look at the large list he has, and -- 10 Mr. Baron. What large list are you referring to? i Mr. Weatherby. The one there in which he talks about ( 3 12 Rodriguez and the Ambassador and Fidel. I mean there is e : 1s no -~- as I say, I believe that represented a feeling he had 5 14 that he has to get rid of these people in some manner. a Mr. Baron. Do you really characterize this list of three 16 people that appear to be carefully selected as a large list i” of targets, or doesn't it appear to be, as I said, a fairly 18 careful selection of key people whose elimination would 8 19 seriously affect the stability of the Cuban government? & g 20 Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't feel that way. If I may digregs : #1 a little for the record, I think it is an expression of his § 5 Re frustration simply because it isn't a diabolical scheme the - oe z aS man is talking about if, in fact, he talked about these people a g eA because he's probabiy upset with the Soviets there. Therefore, S c 20 . : HW 50955 Docla|32he@2apetcpapedsnoft the Soviet Ambassador. Well, they put a new
ke Oo Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARR & PAUL, 440 First Street, $.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 HY 50955 Doe he ra) DH an oe orl 10 ii le 1S 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 fa: raed ‘ eee STS) 49 TOP SECRET one in, and that doesn't do anything to the stability there. And if you get rid of Carlos Rodriguez, Rodriguez didn't have a great following of his own, he was somebody that was probably a principal that came to his mind and, of ‘course, Fidel as” the head of state represents something to him that he would like to have changed. In other words, I'm trying to say that when you deal with a man like this and you have not met him very much, you have to let the man express himself, you have got to find out by questioning what he really means, what's really bothering him, what does he really want to do. Does he have any plans, how deep is his thinking, is he just an emotional type? Mr. Baron. But isn't it significant in some way that -- strike that. “Wouldn't his desire to plan the execution of Fidel Castro have appeared ‘to’ you at that time significant in light of the fact that you included it in your contact report? Mr. Weatherby. His statement there represents to me again as I have said before, the degree of emotion that he felt about the problem in Cuba and the Cuban situation politically as it turned out. A contact report, which is a piece of paper basically to refresh the case officer's mind about what took place, I wouldn't, I wouldn't read into it too much. Mr. Baron. Nonetheless, didn't you see his expression of this desire to eliminate Fidel by execution, if necessary, 02448 Page 52
o oe ce o ( $ . ahgll we x Qo Nw Od M < a c ° x ice f 2 \ > ‘wae < é a & < c-4 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HY 50955 19 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 £5 aS annsAsnnnnnnsnunn/?@as/e0 atanansnnnnnnnnansnsnsnanananannnsnnnt it Agha epee an 50 TOP SECRET significant enough so that there should be some record of it? Mr. Weatherby. I thought that it certainly should be a matter of record to indicate his degree of concern, certainly. And it also became a point for me to dissuade him of at that time. Mr. Baron. In the same contact report you indicated that you were "making no commitments or plans," but that you were pointing out to AMLASH “that schemes like he envisions certainl had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information collection, etcetera were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans." Doesn't that indicate that his mention of eliminating Fidel and other key figures in Cuba at that time were at least considered by you to have had a place in Future contacts with AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not, in that ee What you have got to do with a man like this who may have thoughts of that intensity, or even register thoughts of that intensity is not disabuse him immediately of his thinking because if ' I want him for something else I can't make a -- I would be -- it would be poor planning to alienate the man right away if I immediately turn off the idea he has. And this is all in one meeting, don't forget, as best as I recall. I have got to attempt to blunt that and eventually change his thinking, Docldall 32and4 seo upaweSh3 don't go off. And if he was going to do something
TOP SECRET 51 2 P=] . 8 1 ( jsh 12 like that it takes, if someone is going to do anything it a 2 s takes coordination and planning and etcetera. And you have < 3 8 got to gradually take the man from an intense thought and 5 & 4- perhaps mold it into something that can work, or something 5 that is acceptable. 6 . In other words, I wouldn't. 7 Mr. Baron. Doesn't the language here, though, indicate 8 “ that although you may have wanted to mold his deSires into a i) | workable plan, the fact that he had mentioned desire: to eliminate 10 Castro by execution, if necessary, wasn't something that was il rejected out of hand, that/it might be something that you : 12 ( 3 would want to work into a usable plan. . Fane: & . 13 Mr. Weatherby. Well, I think we are a little out of & < 14 : . : . > context by looking at just this excerpt. I think you have to 15 : . cas look at Castro to see how it develops and what is said ina 16 few words in a contact report, which is not verbatim, you 17 : would acknowledge should not be taken absolutely literally. 18 Mr. Baron. You have mentioned that these events were © 19 ; 8 a long time ago. fo] : 20 | G Mr. Weatherby. Uh huh. § 21 2 Mr. Baron. And that your recollection is not crystal $ 22 * clear about them. “ 23 fo 8 Do you have a very clear recollection of the context in \ re 3 24 . i é which this contact report was written? . iS 25 HW 50955 DocTd: 2202448! Ubagd aAtherby .« No, I don't remember every, you know
Bed Ee” oD ie te OE oO 3 1 (348 13 every point of conversation and every place we visited during Mn a 2 s this period of time. 2 Mr. Baron. Do you recall with great clarity what you é 4 |] | may have said in response to AMLASH when he expressed this 5 . desire to assassinate Castro? 6 Mr. Weatherby. I would not remember verbatim what I "% : had said 13 years ago, sir. 8 Mr. Baron. What would the purpose of a..contact report 7 = have been? 10 ; Mr. Weatherby. Contact or contact reports in general, Li ; sir? r le - . r) Mr. Baron. Yes. ( ao “egyege 8 13 3 Mr. Weatherby. Contact reports are reports produced : 14 by operations officers for the record to remind them of what 15 ; transpired at some future date and for other officers who 16 may assume a case in the future, so that memorandum for the 1? . ar record is what it is. 18 . . . Mr. Baron. To whom would a contact report be submitted? a) 19 . : . g Mr. Weatherby. Depending on it, depending on the nature S ; 5 20 5 of the case and the level of the officer, it would probably e i} go to his immediate superior, or could remain in the file. = . z 22 ; a Mr. Baron. Would your contact reports on your meetings a? in Welsinki have been reviewed by Mr. Maurelius? (3 24 Sa GS Mr. Weatherby. I would hope they would have been when [I So + 25 got back from the trip. These are not transmitted electrically 2202448 Page 55 Te, CEL RET HW 509455 DBoclkd:
Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL O First Street, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 = HW 50955 Do 10 Li 12 13 14 15 | 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 45 etd 53 TOP SECRET as you may know. These are hand-written or type-written and entered in the file as a matter or record. Mr. Baron. Would they have been reviewed by William Harvey? Mr. Weatherby. I doubt ~~ Mr. Baron. Or his deputy? Mr. Weatherby. I doubt that. Mr. Baron. And Harvey was Chief of task Force W at that time. Is that correct? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you recall relaying to Mr. Maurelius or to William Harvey or his Deputy at this time any sense of the importance of these sentiments that AMLASII had expressed to you in Helsinki upon your return from that trip? Mr. Weatherby. I am sure I did. I don't recall precisely but I do recall a cable which I wrote in which I expressed some concern about the man's mercurial temperament and disposition, and then asked for, I believe, a Spanish-speaking case officer because I thought that that would be -- there was more accuracy to be relayed in communicating than communi- cating directly with someone. Mr. Baron. And so you asked for a Spanish-speaking case officer to take over the operation from you? (82202448 MiageWimtherby. No. I asked for his assistance.
15 Phone (Area 202) 594-6000 *orgeor WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, 5.€., Washington, B.C. 20003 HY 50955 10 11 Le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 él 22 23 24 25 Doclal 32202448 pagdaFPn - 54 TOP SECRET | Mr. Baron. Did you receive that assistance? Mr. Weatherby. I did. Mr. Baron. And was that the man who testified here the other day? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Oh -- Mr. Baron. Under the alias of Garmeyer, being referred to generally as AMLASH case officer? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. That was another Gentleman whom I met in Paris. Mr. Baron. And what was his name, or was he the Spanish- speaking case officerf sd Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. I believe you have that in the excerpt tnere. Mr. Baron. Whose name is mentioned in the I.G. report? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, correct, sir. Mr. Baron. As a participant in meetings that you held with AMLASH and Tepedino in Paris in mid-August of '62? Mr. Weatherby. That would be correct, sir. Mr. Baron. You did return to headquarters in Langley from your meeting in Helsinki. Is that correct? Mr. Weatherby. No. I went directly to Paris. I did not directly. I went through Stockholm and I believe Copenhage and then down to Paris. Did you communicate to headquarters anything
TOP SECRET © 58 ° 3 L ( sk 16 other than the mercurial temperament of AMLASIi, anything else a 2 a || in relation to your meetings with him in Helsinki? < i) 2 Mr. Weatherby. I don't remember precisely, but I would fe] & 4 have sent some type electrical transmission summarizing the 5 | meeting and how it went, and any problems of security that 6 |i | might have occurred, and probably some initial impressions. 7 Mr. Baron. And that would be a cable that we should find 8 no in the AMLASH file? = 9 . Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. 10 . . . ‘Mr. Baron. Do you recall meeting with AMLASH in. il Copenhagen around August 10 or 11, 1962, for further discussion { P) le : . i 5 with him? ee 13 | 3 Mr. Weatherby. I met him at approximately that date. Mr. Baron. Do you recall what transpired in those . 15 . . discussions? Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir, but I would think nothing 17 of great substance. 18 . . . . Mr. Baron. Do you recall any discussions involving the Pa 19 . es 8 word "assassination"? % ; 20 . : q Mr. Weatherby. I do not, sir. That's in Copenhagen? § 21 1 ; 2 Mr. Baron. Correct. Was Carlos Tepedino present at that Pad 3 22 . * meeting? “ 23 (- z Mr. Weatherby. Yes, he should have been. aa a 24 g Mr. Baron. I am showing to you now a document marked °Q = 295 uw 50955 pocta:fodieathephye Byhibit 3, which refers to a contact report that you
“os, oa . Hy o Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 bh ~J LO | il 12 13 WARD & PAUL. 14 15 16 17 L8 19 20 21 22 29 24 410 First Street, 5.£., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 25 TOP SECRET wrote on your meeting in Copenhagen on August 10 and 11, 1962, and it is excerpted from the I.G. report at page 58. | (The document referred to was marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 3 for identification.) 50955 DBoclid}322027428 Page 59
57 TOP SECRET S (8 1 ggh 18 (Pause) g 2 “ Mr. Weatherby. Okay, I read it. < ) 2 Mr. Baron. Does this document refresh your recollection a 4 about the substance of your meeting with AMLASH in Copenhagen? 5 Mr. Weatherby. It is not enough to refresh my recollectio 6 of the meeting in Copenhagen per se, but I think in earlier } 7 testimony I discussed the use of the term in talking to him, 8 es "assassinate," and indicated that he was opposed to a term 9 ; of that nature. 10 . I think it would show that I perhaps was not sure where il that particular discussion took place, Stockholm or Copenhagen EA) or in Helsinki. FS a 13 . . : a Mr. Baron. In referring to the portion of this excerpt Sua from. your contact report that says "We used the term ‘assassinate. 15 The use of this term we later learned from Tepedino and from 16 So AMLASH himself was most objectionable to the latter, and 17 he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to, L8 . . . but rather merely the choice of the word used to describe it. Ps 19 oo . - 2 ‘Eliminate’ was acceptable. & j 20 oe . a Does that generally desribe your recollection of AMLASH's é attitude toward the use of the word “assassinate"? 3 22 ou. G Mr. Weatherby. To the best of my recollection, yes. Ao 8 Mr. Baron. Do you recall reporting directly to anyone a Fd 24 . . . z in Task Force W about AMLASH's attitude toward assassination? o T eB rere m z . . HW 50955 podta 2202446M Pagte@bherby. I think, I don't recall it precisely, sir, !
19 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 nt 10 11 12 ( “agypsiee 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 HW 50955 Decid ee a ratansveedorwowt 38 TOP SECRET but I would wager I must have. Mr. Baron. Do you-:recall a subsequent meeting in Paris between yourself and AMLASH and AMLASH and Tepedino and a Spanish-speaking case officer from Madrid? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you recall this involved actually a series of meetings between August 24th and August 23, 1962, as - pong indicated by the I.G. report? Mr. Weatherby. That’s correct. Mr. Baron. Was AMLASH given secret writing training and issued secret writing supplies shortly after that meeting? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Was he also taken to the south of France for a demolition demonstration? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. Why was this done? Mr. Weatherby. That was done to show him we were willing to dive consideration to his desire for some sort of support from us if he went back and undertook to establish a net, if you will, of dissidents. Mr. Baron. Was this training more than a mere gesture of support, but actually intended as preparation for AMLASH to enable him to perform an operation inside Cuba? Mr. Weatherby. Quite to the contrary, sir. It was given odmadm pagdysito assuage him to the degree that we could. In
No oS Phone (Area 202} $44-6000 10 lt Sergae” 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 235 24 410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 TOP SECRET 89 the use of explosives it takes a great deal of knowledge, and as I recall he prepared.one small charge himself, which does not entitle a man to do anything, and was allowed to set it off. And the several charges which, if I recall correctly, we demonstrated to him were done by a technician who was accomplished in the use of explosives. But he was, he could not possibly have used that, at least safely, had he returned ae — to Cuba, because that was not the intent. Mr. Baron. Was there any intention of assessing his suitability for performing operations of this sort during this period of time? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir, not in the use of explosives. Mr. Baron. So it was merely a gesture of support for him and a means of encouraging him to return to Cuba and continue with other operations? Mr. Weatherby. That's correct, sir. Mr. Baron. What was his primary mission as far as you were concerned at that point? Mr. Weatherby. His mission primarily was to go back and ‘ report to us any ability he might have to get into contact with his old friends from the D.R. movement or other dissidents to Castro and attempt to unite them and to build some sort of a workable net with them. We also wanted any kind of general information that we could get which would constitute intelligen 25 . . HW 50955 Doctalsdasormapign efor us.
TOP SECRET | 60 o ( 8 1 ~ si 2i Mr. Baron. Was it clear to you at that time that AMLASH a 2 a had direct personal access to Castro? < 3 e Mr. Weatherby. He had direct personal access to him as Qo & 4 far as we knew in the company of others. 5 Mr. Baron. Did he clearly have no access to Castro in , 6 any one-on-one setting? ? Mr. Weatherby. I have no idea of that, sir. I might say 8 - that Castro was constantly surrounded by an entotrage and 9 you would have to be awfully friendly with Castro to ever get 10 « ry . > into that situation with him. 1 | a Mr. Baron. It was true, though, was it not, that AMLASH f 4 12 . : . \ ee 2 was personally friendly with Castro and had a long history F 13H a Q i of personal relationship with him? 3 14 Mr. Weatherby. He was no longer friendly with him since 15 his movement was eased out of control of Cuba. They had 16 - ° a relationship probably as one conspirator against Batista 17 , to another. Ue had a degree of accessability and was still, 18 . . , | I am sure, held in some respect by Castro, but the degree «9 i9 ‘ . : : 8 ef friendship, I don't think you could say it was very deep. oO N . ; 20 . . 5 Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything that occurred in § 21 . Fy these meetings in mid-August in Paris that would have contribut a 3 22 ; ; i further to the belief that AMLASH had a propensity to carry a fis 8B out an assassination mission? “3 24 = Mr. Weatherby. He may have discussed it again. I don't co] = 25 HW 50955 pocra:pow@Gedl paZeGssely there. To the best of my recollection, he
22 ‘Phone (Area 202) 584-6000 LO ii ’ upper 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 25 HY 50955 Docld: 61 TOP SECRET still maintained an intensity of feelings against the Castro regime, but we had hoped by that time that he was prepared to go back and become a reporting asset and perhaps an organizer of a collection of an INTEL network and not pursue or even attempt to pursue any other activities. Mr. Baron. Let me show you the document that we will mark Weatherby Exhibit 4, which is an excerpt from a cable from the Spanish-speaking case officer located | whose name appears in the I.G. report at page 85, presumably back to headquarters issued on August 7, 1962. {The document referred to was marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 4 for identification.) 2202446 Page 64
gsh 23 . ° a o a { 8 . 4 7 g wa a o A a y < a c a & f a " i} a Cf Q [sq «< c4 410 First Streat, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HYW 50955 LO ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 24 wermcraunamonstasssnssanessnsssnnnsnsnansnanacacannnngnnnnnsnnn (nah PROP tate eer et a ar TOP SECRET © 62 (Pause) Mr. Weatherby. I have read that. Mr. Baron. Do you recall learning from this CIA case officer that such a cable was sent? ~ Mr. Weatherby. I am sure I knew at that time, or was informed about the content of that cable, and perhaps the discussions that the Spanish-speaking case officer had with AMLASH. I may have not been at the meeting as they conducted it in Spanish, and I do believe they had several meetings in which I was not in. attendance. Of that I am not certain. Mr. Baron. Do you have a general recollection of AMLASH making statements or behaving in such a way to indicate that he “could or might try to carry out on his own initiative" a “physical elimination mission"? Mr. Weatherby. He may have continued to discuss it, but I didn't feel that he really meant what he said. Mr. Baron. Would he have been discussing a physical elimination mission against Castro? Mr. Weatherby. With this Spanish-speaking case officer? Mr. Baron. Yes, or in the content of these general meetings? Mr. Weatherby. He could have been. That I don't recall precisely. It is one thing to have a man perhaps thinking or expressing feelings in these terms, and you are never sure when you have put that aside. DoclaiB2202446 Page 65
Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 LO il Neagegeee” 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 rate) rae] TOP SECRET 63 Mr. Baron. Was AMLASH being assessed during this period of time as a potential asset for involvement in any way in any kind of an assassination mission against Castro? Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely not by us. Mr. Baron. Would you consider the initiation of a coup by means of eliminating the leadership of Cuba an assassination attempt? (Pause) 8 ‘Mr. Weatherby. I would think that anytime you attempted - well, would you state the question again, please? | Mr. Baron. Would you read the guestion back, please? (The reporter read back prior question.) | Mr. Weatherby. By the elimination of the -- Mr. Baron. In other words, do you draw a distinction in your mind when you use the word "assassination" between killing an individual political leader out of any motive on the one hand, and on the other hand attempting to kill a political leader or a circle of political leaders as a means of initiating a coup to overthrow an entire governmental * regime? Mr. Weatherby. I think that would be assassination in any case if you target it against the individuals. That's something that bears thought. I mean, if you blew up a building, for example, to cause a distraction, and people 25 ' . . . NW 50955 Doctla sobs fie Et bere: I don't consider that an assassination.
gsh 25 “— Gl Phone (Aréa 262) 544-6000 an LO LL 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 | 19 20 el 22 235 » : 24 10 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 TOP SECRET CV 64 Mr. Baron. Was any thought given during the period of your. involvement with Project. AMLASH to utilizing AMLASH to initiate a coup by any means? Hr. Weatherby. Well, certainly not by assassination. But if he could overthrow the government, or take power, or divide it, that of course was an objective. Mr. Baron. If he could have done, if he could have accomplished that objective by means of physical“elimination of leadership of Cuba, that would not have been objectionable to you and to others in Task Force W involved in Project AMLASH at that point, would it? Mr. Weatherby. I really can't answer that question. I don't know what they think and I -- Mr. Baron. Speaking for yourself then, would it have been an objectionable means. ~~ Mr. Weatherby. To me it would have been. Mr. Baron. -- to overthrow the government? Mr. Weatherby. To me it would have been. Mr. Baron. Are you personally opposed as a matter of ‘morality to assassinations? Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely. Mr. Baron. Why? Mr. Weatherby. I don't believe in taking human life, period in that manner. If you are in a fire fight, or somebody NW 50055 pocka 3apbosipokdggeat you and you are shooting at them, then that's
gsh 26 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 li 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 Ae 20 ey 24 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C, 20003 20 PFU (OI NP mn tA, nese. Le |} TOP SECRET | 6s a different story. In other words, I draw a distinction between assassination of an individual, individuals, and those who lose their life in a battlefield, whether it is in a building or on a battlefield. Mr. Baron. What about killing the sentry who is guarding the door to the palace? Mr. Weatherby. Well, that's -- Mr. Baron. As a means of initiating an attack. Mr. Weatherby. That's sort of like asking me when I stopped beating my wife, sir. I would rather not comment on that. Mr. Baron. I am simply trying to point out that or to ask you whether there is not some middle ground between a combat situation and an individual murder where it might have been acceptable to you at the time for our government to be involved in targeted elimination of political leaders in a regime that we found unacceptable. = Mr. Weatherby. I had not really thought about that, and it is a rather philosophical question, sir. Mr. Baron. All right. Enough philosophy. Let me show you an excerpt from a cable of August 18th from CIA headquarters to presumably the Spanish-speaking case officer that sent a cable to headquarters on August 17th. We will mark this Weatherby Exhibit 5 and reflect that HY 50955 Docia |{s2262 emep epaige ak page 85 in the 1.G. report.
gsh 27 g g - s ; 5 é 4 5 6 "7 8 9 10 11 - 12 (3 a 13 Oo e 5 14 15 16 1?) 18° ‘ 19 3 20 a 8 21 2 22 . z 24 w < 25 HW 50955 Docld 32202448 Page 69 TOP SECRET 66 (The document referred to . was marked Weatherby Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)
gsh28 . &g ce 8 l a 2 & 3 E 4 5 6 ” 8 9 10 1 ae 12 3 , 13 io fe $ 14 15 16 1? 18 o 19 3 S 20 a 8 21 $ 22 ‘a < 23 SS ot : 2 TOP SECRET | | 67 z Mr. Baron. Can you tell me first whether you have an’ independent recollection of such a-directive reaching you in Paris; namely, a directly “strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given AMLASH"? Mr. Weatherby. Well, I can believe this as an exhibit. Mr. Baron. In other words it is credible to you but you don't have any independent recollection of receiving such a directive? Mr. Weatherby. No. But it is within keeping with my directions at all times, so, therefore, it seems to be perfectly logical. Mr. Baron. Why would such a directive have been sent at that point? | .Mr. Weatherby. Probably only to reinforce a case officer' judgement in the field that he's not about to condone such activity, and they are going on record, as in the bureaucracy, saying you are absolutely right. Mr. Baron. Can you tell me of any significant development in Project AMLASH that occurred between the time of these ‘meetings in August of 1962 and your departure from Project AMLASH in late 1963? Mr. Weatherby. Well, we had attempted on a number of occasions to get him to come out again and talk to him and see what he had accomplished. He had a S.W. system, as I 25 | Sgt HW 50955 Docraj329@Sfbl ph aspwasn’t very successful in communications, and then
gsh 29 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ~ iil fo: 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2l ad £35 | 24 416 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.0, 20003 TOP SECRET © <8 we learned that he was coming out to Porto Alegre in Brazil, and we made arrangements to visit with him, That's the other AMLASH case officer and myself. Mr. Baron. What transpired when you met with AMLASH in Porto Alegre? Mr. Weatherby. That was essentially a turnover meeting. We met hii and he was debriefed in.a safe house by the other case officer in Spanish, and I was posted as a idokout, and did not actually participate in the substance of the discussion Mr. Baron. Do you recall that AMLASH was told to assist a Cuban military officer who operated under the cryptonym of AMTRUNK 10 in intelligence assignments for the CIA? Mr. Weatherby. I do not recall that. That may be after the turnover. I am not sure. Mr. Baron. _Do you recall —— Mr. Weatherby. I certainly didn't. Mr. Baron. -- the nature of any assignments given to AMTRUNK 10? Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't. Mr. Baron. How soon after this meeting in Porto Alegre did you leave Project AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. Well, normally when you turn the case over you leave it immediately, for compartmentation's sake. I believe I may have heard or seen Tepedino once or twice after HW 50955 bon a so0nates apg that would be the termination of my portion of the
Js 3uU Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 8 9 10 11 ( 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 | 22 23 24 4106 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 29 HW 50955 Docld 69 TOP SECRET Mr. Baron. Were you present at any further meetings in Paris with AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. Ho, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you recall briefing thé succeeding AMLASH case officer at the time that he took over? Mr. Weatherby. I had to have. Mr. Baron. Do you recall briefing him on AMLASH's propensity for assassination? — Mr. Weatherby. His propensity to discuss it, I am sure, was common knowledge. Mr. Baron. But not his propensity for carrying out the ‘act itself? Mr. Weatherby. Correct. Mr. Baron. Did you mention to the new case officer AMLASH's, AMLASH's willingness to carry out such an act? Mr. Weatherby. I would never -- I don't recall having mentioned that precisely, but I would not have said his willingness, but his tendency to talk about it, because I personally didn't believe that the man ever really meant to do that physically. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any meetings that took place in October of 1963 at which Desmond FitzGerald met AMLASH in Paris at Red Stent's house and discussed the kind of Support that AMLASH could expect from the United States government? 2202446 Page 72
gsh 31 TOP SECRET — 70 la 2 1 Mr. Weatherby. I knew he went because it was very ( @ ~ ; 2 soon after, I think, I had last seen him but I wasn't invited é 3 for any operational guidance bu. then. 2 4 Mr. Baron. You weren't invited to brief FitzGerald at 5 that point? 6 Mr. Weatherby. I don't recall. I may have briefed him ? or talked to him with the other AMLASH case officer.about the 8 man, what kind of an animal he was -- can we..strike that? 9 What kind of a man he was, and maybe so. And of course his 10 idiosyncrasies, that's normal procedure. | al Mr. Baron. Do you: recall any discussion with anyone at ; | 12 | CIA at that point about the need to meet AMLASH's request ae é 13 | for assurances that a high U.S. official was willing to 14 stand behind his operations in Cuba, preferably Robert F. 15 Kennedy? 16 Mr. Weatherby. I heard, probably without invitation, 17 or by the by that PitzGerald would go over there, but I didn't 18 know the details. I knew -- : 19 Mr. Baron. Did you know that FitzGerald would go over 20 there to make a representation to AMLASH that people higher F 21 in the government than FitzGerald would stand behind AMLASH? i 22 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, I remember that. To the best of . : 23 | mY knowledge -- I don't remember who he represented, but during & é 24 the trip obviously he was preparing for it and ~~ : 25 Mr. Baron. Do you remember Richard Helms heing involved HY 50955 Docldp322024468 Page 73
goh 32 | TOP SECRET 1 . 8 f S 1 Ve g in any of those discussions prior to FitzGerald's trip to a 2 . & Paris? . & 3 8 Mr. Weatherby. Not specifically. He may have been. o & 4 | Mr. Baron. And do you recall any contact with Robert 5 Kennedy between the time that this assurance was requested 6 by AMLASH and the time that FitzGerald went to Paris? 7 Mr. Weatherby. I have no direct knowledge of that. 8 - Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of™“any contact i) between anyone and Task Force W and Robert Kennedy? 10 . Mr. Weatherby. Oh, I think Mr. Harvey had seen him. I Li | am sure they did. I simply don't know for a fact. (| 2 Mr. Baron. You don't remember any specific instances — 13 | 3 where Robert Kennedy met face to face with members of Task S14 Force W or called them on the phone or received phone calls 15 , ; . from them in relation to Project AMLASH? 16 Mr. Weatherby. Not in direct relation to that, no. I 1? , , knew they were obviously interested in the whole program, 18 . ' but again, I wasn't at that level. 3 19 Mr. Baron. Did you have any sense of the closeness of g 20 |, the relationship between Robert Kennedy and Desmond FitzGerald? 2 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. £ = ae Mr. Baron. Did you have a sense of the kind of relationship (- zg that existed between Robert Kennedy and William Harvey? g a4 Mr. Weatherby. No, except I think it was common knowledge a < 25 : uw 50955 Doctals2>qFuas! pHasH t the best.
gsh 33 Pnone (Aréa 202) 544-6000 10 11 : 12 ( 13 14 WARD & PAUL 15 L? 18 19 20 el aad a5 24 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 TOP SECRET 2 Mr. Baron. Did you. have any sense of the relationship that existed between Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. | Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of drops into Cuba of caches of arms intended for AMLASH? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you recall any planning for such drops or even the discussion of such drops? 4 Mr. Weatherby. I may have heard it. I didn't participate and I don't know any details. Mr. Baron. Do you recall any discussion of dropping arms to ANLASH- or people associated with him during your period of operational control of the AMLASH Project? .Mr. Weatherby. No. It may well have been discussed at that point, but nothing during my tenure was ever done like that. The man didn't communicate. It woudd be pretty hard to drop anything to him at that point. Mr. Baron. What do you mean by the fact that he wasn't communicating? Mr. Weatherby. Well, as I said earlier, there were great periods when the man, we didn't know really what he was doing. We heard second-hand or they had seen him here or there, and he was well and healthy and so forth, but he wouldn't communicate with us. It's just simply not, it's not 25 . HW 50955 Doclai32dommstopayensider going any further in the development of
on TOP SECRET 1 o C$ o3 8 assistance to a person with whom we can't communicate, during a 2 s my time. Remember, after we saw him in Paris it was essentially ci 3 g nothing of significance until we finally found out the man E 4 | was going to come out. 5 - ; That was one of the frustrations of the case, that the 6 | Man wouldn't communicate. 9 Mr. Baron. Going to come out to where? & - = Mr. Weatherby. To Porto Alegre. “~ 9 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge from any source 10 about the development of a pin containing a hypodermic syringe il a, ; . capable of administering poison? ’ 4 12 , : \ 5 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Nace < a . a 13 a Mr. Baron. You don't recall the development of such a < z 14 . . . device in relation to the AMLASH case? 15 Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't. 16 . . . . Mr. Baron. Do you recall discussions with the Technical 1? : . oo, . , s Services Division or the Office of Medical Services about 18 eg, developing any devices capable of, you know, eliminating an - 197 2 ow, . 3 individual Cuban leader? a S 20 4 Mr. Weatherby. No. 8 21 ; e Mr. Baron. If I told you that a ballpoint pen was developad rf at the CIA which contained..a hypodermic syring and was capable “ 23 | ( 2 of administering a lethal’ poison, and that such a device was rf 24 . : = offered to AMLASH at a point subsequent to your involvement Qo ¢ 25 . . HW 50955 Doctal32¥adahs ipyyewRAt would you make of it?
gsh 35 | Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ~” om on ce Gl nm Ft oO 10 il 12 oe, S260" LS WARD & PALL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 eal 22 25 24 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 25 TOP SECRET ar Mr. Weatherby. I wouldn't think it was accurate. I really don't know. Mr. Baron. Would it strike you that either the story is inaccurate, or if it is accurate, that such device would Clearly be designed for offensive use against some individual? Mr. Weatherby. May I have that question again? (The reporter read back the prior question.) Mr. Weatherby. Well, I have no knowledge of.it. I think it is probably inaccurate. However, if it were accurate, — use the conjectural, then obviously it must be used perhaps in the manner which you describe. Mr. Baron. Wouldn't it seem unlikely to you that that kind of device would be designed as a self-defense weapon? Mr. Weatherby. I don't know. I really, I don't, I am not getting the train of your questioning now. Mr. Baron. I am simply asking in the abstract your opinion as, in effect, an expert, as a case officer with some operational experience, wouldn't such a device be next to useless as a self-defense weapon? Mr. Weatherby. No, I don't think so. No different than mace. Mr. Baron. Except that this device obviously can only be used -- Mr. Weatherby. Once. HW 50955 Doclalszzu2aadlYpageayen. Once.
| gsh 36 | TOP SECRET 7s - 8 | ( 3 1 ; OU Mr. Weatherby. So can mace. wy a 2 s Mr. Baron. In a tight spot. & 3 ; Mr. Weatherby. Yeah. é 4 Mr. Baron. Where there could be more than one, you know, 5 # person involved. 6 Mr. Weatherby. Yeah. That's such a hypothetical question 2 that it's difficult to answer. You know, if I were talking 8 ° 2s to you and you were a Russian case officer, and T said I 5 ; am not going to do something, and you decided that you were 10 ; going to turn me in, all I can do is get rid of you and leave. il If, on the other hand, in a cast of thousands it would not ( r 12 3 be worth a whole hell of a lot. ~ 13 : Mr. Baron. If somebody were asking you for a self-defense & < 14 . . . . 3 weapon, would you supply them with this kind of a device that 18 I have described? 16 Mr. Weatherby. Oh, I would have to think about that. 7 That's fairly -- that would depend entirely on the circumstance ; 1 Mr. Baron. After you left Project AMLASH, what was 3 19 the nature of the other projects that your pursued on Task 8 ¢ 29 |. porce W? § 21 a Mr. Weatherby. I would have to go back on the record on = a2 that but I would say it was classical FI defections, counter- ¢ ‘ 23 (3 intelligence basically. F 24 Mr. Baron. Were you associated with any aspect, other im] t HW 50955 peep s2bbeiusi neMel dence collection, of planning for a coup against
J ‘ -_—s, £ HY Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 10 Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 LS 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 20 50955 Dock TOP SECRET — 16 Castro? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. Do you-recall from your experience on Task Porce W plans for or discussions of the supply of weapons to Cuban dissidents at that point? Mr. Weatherby. Well, it's a matter of record that it was done or attempted, but I had nothing to do with the direct planning, and I have no knowledge of the planning or execution as such. Mr. Baron. Did you have any contact with a.man named Artime? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. x Mr. Baron. Did you know him? Mr. Weatherby. I knew who he was but I did not know him. Mr. Baron. ‘Who was he? Mr. Weatherby. Ne was a Cuban exile leader. Mr. Baron. Do you know Howard Hunt? Mr. Weatherby. I know of Howard Hunt. I never met Howard - Hunt. Mx. Baron. Did you have any contact in any way with Howard Hunt in relation to your service on Task Force W? Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. Mr. Baron. Throughout the course of this discussion, seo Riaye shave, been referring to Task Force W, it is clear in
yok wu | 77 i TOP SECRET ( : L your mind that that would also cover. any references to SAS, : 2 which was the same organization as Task Force W? é 3 Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely..: I am not interested in > E 4 subterfuge. | 5 Mr. Baron. Okay. In your intelligence collection 6 | operations on Task Force W or the SAS staff, did you make % | any use of members of the gambling syndicate in Havana? 8 | Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. 9 Mr. Baron. Were you ever made aware of CIA contact with 10 | members of the gambling syndicate that ran gambling operations 11 in Cuba for the purpose of intelligence gathering? ( ; 12 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. oe s 13 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any contact with gambling 14 | syndicate members? 15 | Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. 16 Mr. Baron. “And does that include gambling syndicate. rt figures in the United States who may have had an interest in 18 Cuba? | : . 19 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. ; 20 Mr. Baron. Did you visit the J.M. WAVE station in F 21 Miami as a part of your activities on Task Force W or SAS? : 29 Mr. Weatherby. No, sir. r : 23 Mr. Baron. You never visited the J.M.. WAVE station? \ 5 24 Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. : 25 Mr. Baron. That's correct? HW 50955 Docld:82202448 Page 80
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ~ co 10 Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 is 16 1? 18 19 20 2l 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 29 Are ge HW 50955 Docld{]3$2202448 “Pade TOP SECRET | 72 Mr. Weatherby. Mo. Mr. Baron. Are you saying that -- Mr. Weatherby. That's two separate questions you asked me. The answer on the first one was no, sir, and the answer to the second one was no, sir. Mr. Baron. All of which goes to indicate that you never visited the J.M. WAVE station at any point? Mr. Weatherby. During my attachment to theCuban Task Force, that is correct. Mr.. Baron. Did you visit it at some other point, that is? Mr. Weatherby. That is correct. Mr. Baron. Is that correct? Mr. Weatherby. Yes, sir. Mr. Baron. When was that? Mr. Weatherby. That was about 1967. Mr. Baron. In connection with what kind of operation? Mr. Weatherby. That was procurement of an aircraft. Mr. Baron. ‘For use where? Mr. Weatherby. For usé -- are we on the record? Mr. Baron. Yes. Mr. Weatherby. For use in the Congo. . Mr. Baron. I simply have one more procedural matter to mention to you. y, aware that since the time Senator Morgan left
gsh 40 | Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 ll 12 “nee 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 TOP SECRET 1s the room that you were under no obligation to stay here and continue your testimony? Mr. Weatherby. Absolutely. Mr. Baron. But did you voluntarily stay and continue to testify? “Mr. Weatherby . Yes, sir. Absolutely. I will stay as long as you wish. Mr. Baron. Okay. I think I have no further questions. Is there anything else that you would like to say or to add to the record to put our discussion here today into context? Mr. Weatherby. I think not. Mr. Baron. All right. Thank you very much. You have been extremely cooperative and informative. Mr. Weatherby. Pleasure. (Whereupon, at 4:45 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above- mentioned matter was adjourned.) HY 50955 Docldy822302446 Page 82
ew FC Op deni . — TO Khibel STATEMENT REGARDING TESTIMONY IN ALIAS I, onc ; iy ; hereby certify that on ——.* 1 August , 1975 I testified before Senator and members of the Senate Select Committee Staff after being duly sworn - under the alias of William E. Weatherby : 588 tment , “sat True Name ww ¢ wiv <j “3 ~ “~y "? xv PTA ese Ceretie Ce id “ Pree Witness ) | 2 Paes, . Tee Me": 2, t é b Jeeta er iy This statement, marked Exhibit / , will be retained in the custody os, { of the Review Staff, Central Intelligence Agency. t « a tbo os _ é s re rE : : a 50955 Doclda: 32202448 Page 83 sa
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Westhaby Sxl hd 3 AML ASH © WROTE IN HIS CONTACT REPORT: - August 1962) beets of Cuvela'ts future mate.’ Tre use of this, : 4 Prom Cuséle ninsel?, a he was visibly upset. rataer serely “the chaofcs nate was auceptabla.it { 55 Doeclad: 3220274468 Page 65
Lon ve rby - Shih t 4 AVLASA A 3S ( P2972 3 | Ah a CL) on 17 AUGUST: -25 AUBust 1962) tt - = * oy nee weet * * ary . as . * . nave no intention give Cusela siysical elininntion miccion : aq =. } ars SNP A oes om iad oes ‘wt + x ceded . as requirement tut recoynize tric so. thngs me coula or pow yy & “ ~ + - 7 te “aso ee 4 : a om, uw be ke CIV VO Carry cucu cA 2S OLN ERLULaAtLve. ; , ( "Saget . aoe rene ° a < / bs \ _! oo P0955 Docld: 322027446 Page 36
HEADQUARTERS REPLIED BY CABLE ON 18 AUGUST: Phy we re sae seep eng yee fe ts tse pis epee pee blve tee ety ee foge iene Rea Cet as Stronsiy concur tant no phycicul elininavion missions Ce give BW 50955 Docld: 32202448 Page 87 “ 2 Cauela.”