1 October 1968 MEMORANDUM FOR: Directoz of Security FROM ; Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff . SUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich 1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligeacc, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub- conclusions are coatained in the summary conceraing several majoy¥ areas which were given priraazy consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENSAO. . 2, Included in this summary are comments concerning conclusionea ia the previous summary and an annex containing re- 74 marke on three scparate subjects related to the NOSENKO caze. 3, In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 ~ January 1944, that NOSENKO was aot dise . patched by the KG, and that his previous lies and exagyerations axe not actually of material sizslicance at this time. Attachment: wUMMary SLSzkeo
14-00000 TABLE OF CONTENTS Intr oduction “oO. Summary of Developments in. NOSENKO Case Since 30 October 1967 “Ii, Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides. of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO _ .. . ‘ A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? s Po B. Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible? C, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of His Motivation in Contacting CLA in 19462 and For His Defection in 1964? D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and Organization Reasonably Commensurate With His ' Claimed KGB Career? E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be Considered in Toto as Having Resulted in Material Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit to Western Intelligence? ey . Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away'! in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which Would © Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched by the KGB?
14-00000 G, Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type ‘Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch 6f NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Goncerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Mis Sions ? -H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives During These Contacts or After His Defection? IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU ia Any of the Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed ( B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the | ‘Time He Claimed C.. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Scetion Throughout the 1953 ~ 1955 Period as He Claimed During the Period 1955 . 1960, He Was Neither a Senior Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section E, NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chiet of the American Embassy Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section During the Period 1961 - 1982 (sic) we : : ae ee a Bee ry EF. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and Was Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, Are Not Credible G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No Americana Embas sy Personnel Between 1953 and His Defection in 1964 i” 4 22ST are nr rear neeneetene enema,
“4 Me Annex Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text ; . Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers , 7 | G001005
SEGKeI - I, INTRODUCTION Exclatet aed autematic U U Ut OG 6 dawazrading and deelassificatian SECRET
14-00000 INTRODUCTION The following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi- zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished | : - “by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO., To attempt to do so would be repetitious oe and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of ‘ - a primary concern. vo This summary. will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying --aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily '” directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a@ reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that | these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance Co . SECRE] Oo LUULOGT Gaul? f “ecient ira satintatie myer asd
74-90000 ~~ but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature, fides'' as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged Primarily . aspects will be considered, but his admitted Previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not Per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a s '"bona fide" defector, , The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami- - anf nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," hag been considered in SECRET —. g6040Cg
14-00000 SECKEI the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary fim regard to apecific | 63828 oF sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this summary will not include a point-by-potat comparison ofall areas of | agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous summary. A positive decision in regard to NCSENKO based on all available information should be made in the immediate future. There | are BO ‘mown sources currently available to provide new positive | (nformation concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It ta recognized that there fa always & possibility in the future a new Source or sources | wili be able to furnish additional information in regard te NOSENKO. However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there i SO is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in the NOSENKO matter. SDL SRE PTE TE TSE OTRO OOS PE REE EAe At STORE UR woman
14-00000 it, SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE : SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1987 ae ee nel RC aguP 4 Excinded {rem automatic GUUL 10 towagradiag and declassifleatieg
14-00000 cry ¢ ine brass SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE ES ES OSA AA ETS Tee et GE EC rae eet SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 have been conducted a by one individual not previously ‘known personally to , NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962, Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have | been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews. NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and - the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the GO010411 Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO me
4 4 t 4 interviewer would not dispute or disparage his staternents without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the | interviewer, totally disappeared. During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months, _ NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately Ss sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de~ . fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB | organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities, As an qxample of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately (875) KGB, officers, .100) KGB agents, 35 GRU officers, and 400) other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha~ | betically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has - materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews. | Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related “memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the Cl Staff. Special : Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington oo Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 GO01C12 — fe TET
14-00000 SLUALS . ta addition, three professionala from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and aasisted in the retrieval, of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volurne of material; the number of individual cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB | perdonalities, procedures, organizational structare and activities. The 8B Division alse provided the services of an expert -- translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOBENKO by Petr DERYABIN and ene of the previously mentioned three pro- | - fensionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pestinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security. Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related rnate rial have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Com- ments concerning the value of tha information containad in the above material are contained in another section of this gummary. As of the present time, & complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material haz not been fully processed, in the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work oas not been completad; but it ia not censidered that, based on ail 3s 6004013
available information, the remaining work will materially affect the conclusions drawn in this summary, The pelygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on rs Auguat and concinded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty qoestions of a pertinent natura were included in the polygraph tnter~— view. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached isa - copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph — interview. interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph intervtew on a temporarily reduced scale in order to ) permit a review | of previous information and preparation of this Munmary. There is no doubt that futures interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thua far wilh permit & decision tn the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Attachment; 12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt G001014 “
14-00000 5. Ab be P og  s Chief, Security Research Steff 12 August 1968 - ; . a | FROM : Interrogation Research Division ° vi SUBJECT :; Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO _ TRD ff 6749, “IDENTIFYING DATA oot Le Subject is a 4O year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.. - BACKGROUND ’ eed ' Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de~ . - | prdlefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to _ '. resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements. PURPOSE , og - (@ ‘The primary. purpose of the polygraph test was to determine: | a 1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB; 2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information. ~ PROCEDURE Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at ‘a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to: / be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information a ' on & topic. 3 The following relevant questions were asked during the first test: Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes. Were you born in the year 1927? Yes. 4 Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your ® intention to defect? No. os, GOUL0LS Excludes tas anlenatte forncestine aad EVENT Sete ha He 5 ee, | ahow' . | 2 SECRET Fo eee Ro ey ge a eo
raf OTH. Page 2 Did you ever ‘tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with Anerican Intelligence? No.. Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No. Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No. | The following relevant questions were asked during the second test; .+ Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No. Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes. Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes. , ; Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No. t Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 807 Yes. | vere you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-617 G86 ; . Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No. Did you ever nave tuberculosis? Yes, an The following relevant questions were asked on test three: . Did you serve in Navy Intelligence fron 1951 to 1953? Yes. _ Nas \SHUBIN im the USSR during the period 1957 t0.19597 Yes, ~ To the best of your knowledge » were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes, Did you telephone the GRU about 'SHUBIN) at this time? Yes, ' Ro the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because . Of the letter Mr. Winters. mailea? Yes. oo -  G0ULDIG TO NT ee ee OE meee oe acm em
To the best OF your knowledge, Was PENKO SIIY e; KGB because 0? the ; Yes, : Pveillance on ritish Enbassy?. , Was ther PRY misleading information in the notes YOu-brought | . OU from the Soviet Union? yo, ; e information about your backgrouna? No. . Subject! Polygraph test Feflecteg no Significant Tesponseg indicative ioe fception rding the relevant Questions asked. No further Polygraph Were a; Stered on “His date because the examiner qig Rot want to fe Ne Yisk of fatigue Setting in and thus Possibly causing adrenalin Stion, oo _ . - Mae olygraph testing WaS resumed on 6 mt ques umed or August 1968. tiong were asked on test four: - mo £228 and 1950: Were on ene, DePUty Chier of the Amertoan. , tsh-Canaaian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes, - : January 1960 to Decénber 1961 were You the De Ee Of the First Sectio : buty to the. Of the First D Bo epartment? Ye ty to July 1962 were you the Chier Of the First Section © Seventh Department? Yes, 7 oo, you an officer + nN the Pirst Section, ‘First Department, Sep, F time op the Stalingrad Operation against Benson, Mule} ang b?). ies, u, - a ‘Senses, sui
/ your defection? No. The following relevant questions were asxed on test five: Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the’ | “, American Embassy besides ANDREY and (HOWARD?) No. Did the KGB know about the. notes you brought out? No. Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes. -- Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in ; CS cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? Wo. | es Did you intentionally give us any false operatsonat information? No. Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department’? Yes. ' Was an order actually prepared promoting you to ‘Deputy av5e) “the Calet of the First Department? Yes. In early 1960. did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility . was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes. other than you mentioned, are you hiding ¢ any other reasons for Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners vo : reeruited by the KGB? No. '- The. following relevant questions were asked on test six: Did you enter the KGB through the int uence. of General BOGDAN . KOBULOV? Yes. - Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes. ‘ Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chir of ‘the First Section? Yes. - “Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KCB knowledge? (Noe ° ‘oobi
IRD # 6744 Page.'5 To your knowledge was there any misleading information in the ; CHEREPANOV papers? No. : ee Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No. Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTEMEV ne Jd in the BELITSKIY case? Yes. a - uO : : _ Did you personally make an approach to(KEYSERS) at the Moscow. eG Airport? Yes. . OS So a - The following relevant questions were asked on test seven: 1°... Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes. | 1. Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments? mee ee , No ne : ' Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the : U.S. Embassy in Moscow? No. ~ é | Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in a 7 "4. * 1960-612 Yes. - - Bo - Are you withholding any information known to you concerning 2 | | | KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. re | ae Embassy? No. eo ; Lo Se an Oe Sif: Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did _ a ane you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN “a AOE to PUSHKIN street? Yes. | ee, DE, 4 Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV . Ce - in 1962 in Geneva? Yes. Cr CS _-Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document: i ee, a nee ' %o GORIIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes, i _ 2 fk | - The following relevant questions were asked on test eight: need ; 4 ‘While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter. 5 an? ,’» for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter -to Edward Ellis - ae GS SMITH? Yes. ; . ; : é So . a Co : _ GUOLG19
care re songs eae ES no ne A ee * inddeations of deception. _ CONCLUSION ‘been substantially truthful in anewerihg the relevant questions. | asked. oe ' . i Wee ewe’ ‘ : ’ | ‘ : et 6 . ‘ ’ . s . af : 0 * ne ; oth, 4 . wy Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his ecntact Bat mt with (JENNER) (JENNER) on & train from Ilelsinki to Moscow? Yes.“ ae ar ao Are you intentionally withholding eny infornation KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No. gonserning ¢ } . Is there any possibility that-tae KGB would dispatch an officer 2 . n°) defect to the Americans? No. 2h . “et . Subject's polygraph test of 6 August Likewise wefledted 1 no’! " 4 a i 4 ae eo ‘Based solely on the overall analysis of subject 's polygraph” tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject has. _ ; A se anne meme cit emmeenenenncnO : pee eek te, eg et ere ema Seem mae eet te REET eerT a ’ . ae »y ‘ di, ; eit a ; Poo . ‘ hes ‘ : i mo ‘ ‘ : ‘ ns “ \ a io a . t . ' 2 . ‘ ‘ wee fo ‘ . 1 , . wl ¢ ‘te , ‘ . a ' t . " 1 ,. : i \ 4 i. mo, . SEOREY . ea vey r) . : - my : Grtegeztine aad ; oe . 3
os. OT SECREI _ ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA PIDES 0 OS OF YURIY IVANOVICH NCSENKO aaa? SECRET | GU01021 Exc t Ee) eesle fy weerrecovnamaenronemnnacereneneitt
£4-D0000 SECRET ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi- trary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent. to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected t to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with wepresent- - atives of this Agency \ were known to the KGB. it was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be conside red but that his admitted previous lies and exag- gerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a “bona fide defector, !! The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration, Attached is a separate section ‘containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H. A. is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be? B, Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? an es) rm son} Gaur I ] Excluded trea automatic downgrading. aad declassification entrees eens SO eam ten aE AS
A-O0000. ( @ Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964 ? Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA . concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi- zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB career?— Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be con- ‘sidered in toto as having resulted in material damage te the KGB and/ or has the. information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit t to Western Intelli- gence? Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished ‘by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective ‘which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? ; GO0L023 AOrT SEGRE!
14-00000 H. SECKET, Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO. in 1962 or in. 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior « or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection?
SECRET | 4. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL LO THE PERSON | ae ent WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE? uowarradiog and Geelassifleatiog
14-00000 ‘se : SECRET | A, Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be? During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard to his family, ‘his activities asa . youth, the schools he attended, assoc-~ iates of his father and mother, and his own associates, The period ~ . _- under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry _ into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid- March 1953. Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and mother and his early life, together with other information such as a comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father . and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with | . Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship- building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also Satisfactorily Supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern- ing other associates of his father and mother, Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 {age 18) is of C s e SECRET 0001026 inaatereee eT Gao? 4 : Excluded from ay? tomatic} j cowagracins aad sittin |
14-00000 sECHET little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions . of which he has admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, Obtaining any collateral first- hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from . Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning | the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory t school in Leningrad. NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad- “uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945.. He -has explained that he should have graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final | examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations. Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co- students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement 6904027 &
14-00000 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation - caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 SECRET - by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950."' ,NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in “instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952. The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has | characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of ' @ certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has.in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically . portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate. The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of
14-00000 time are contained ina separate section of this summary, but it is considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub- stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953, | Attached is a typed copy ofa handwritten memorandum completed by NOSENKO on 31. October 1967, This is a biographical statement con- cerning his life and KGB career, No effort has been made to correct grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give NOSENKO a an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re- examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time. Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the — statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum, One change that has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement, NOSENKO also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"! 4 : pdog0rg- SECRET
14-00000 | ‘(personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature, An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between . errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by i _ NOSENKO, Attachment: = ° 31 Oct 67 Memo 5 _ 00041030
14-00000 . . r - ‘ . . . wo? ad PO a, Operational Memo # N=2 «SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich BRT Tae Te lene ee The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum a : “furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a mequest o on (30 October 1967: _ | “—" : : oH ‘ : a I, NOSENKO,,. George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city i L - ce i | Nicolaev, Ukraine. 7 | | i 7 a : ‘ ; My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working i : . ® : . at the > shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which | : 8 . : : | “he | finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKY), De 1908, a housewite; the brother ~ NOSENKO, Vladimir; be 1944, a oh, a : “student. In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) put ; studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went 7 3 7 in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, bie ; "Sudemech" from summer 1934, In Nicolaev I was living at the Street Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev. in Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938; at the Street Stachek (1934 ~ summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935-1938), st. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till SECRET oo UWUULE R41 GROUP 1 Exehuled tra 1 ated ; { Coy Tau aud | . ; '
14-00000 ofa ? ; wi : f . ‘ ’ : oan y 1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. pS i . ' ary : . ‘In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother no , tof went to live in Moscow in the end of this year, Ss she a i ' "In Moscow we were living at the St, Serafimovich, 2, Here . oe ., I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B, Polianka). In 1941;:; at finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi) Se : but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow. In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in “4 a : . Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In | | 7 . Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there I tried to run to - a the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned : vs - home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in : ; : July-August we returned in Moscow, . | | In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special ee | school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished ath class a . in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave’ in Moscow, This | . school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I . did not want to gothere, With the help of father Iwas accepted in the Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, | where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school | _L twice tried to be sentasa volunteer to. the front but failed, Soon 2 ae 4001032 OFADLT | oe . ; wii |g ;
14-00000 seh ¢ r c t x oa after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January | : 1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished oe - . 9th class and was accepted again in the military -navy preparatory : " a school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 L went in. cn ot | : : “ Au cadets of this school. were sent to forest (about 200 km. : ; i i: : from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been cna . oe | bs | | ‘months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was s put fe . in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to roman | i a : . : : “in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what Ihave a ‘ - _ . _ written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with uch i an rt ; my decision, With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school os : [. ‘and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in- January | 3 S | 1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWII finished and z ' decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college vs —_ . had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second "course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In : ; Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev). In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents (St. Granovski, 3). 3 7 a : GUULE33:-
14-00000 “@ . ™ OLE a of . : t : . . . | : ‘- In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter~— ae | national relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute. i ho . In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers - ih : ‘ er Sone i. -and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant, 7 mot te te : documents and a uniform). i In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 Iacquainted!, 5 “with a girl - Shishkov KLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married , . . her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and - / owe did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was - . acquai nted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re-« | ceived a flat in 1947 (St, Mira - former lst Uecyehckad, 162/174). In | ' November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married : <= - yo Ve her, The marriage was not successful, I foundout about her close » : : on 7 ‘relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological . changes, Iwas not the father of this child, After that I broke with her | Vy a and we were living separately (end of 1948 ~ beginning 1949). _In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working ; | 7 the commission, which was deal ing with future works of the students of my 5th course, 1 expressed a wish to work in any military organization _ 6001034 -
14-00000 i i t “4 : “and soon Iwas invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry, ot of State 2 Security), But MGB did not accept me, After that with the." Po . ‘help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the |: . a oS intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work, 0 tgs " Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a roup of fails Le was passing state exanis once rare, | In October 1980 : finished the institute and received a diploma, : = F L was accepted i in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 : ‘and in ‘March 17 went bya train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th he / Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department), Before going: .: : ‘t i H a ot 7 , “to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife, _ At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. wmamediately - . _ after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out, In the middle of May YY went to a. tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. in July I. ‘finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health oy could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of ho the navy intelligence ‘sent me to Baltic Sea {as a senior interpreter of _ the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet = in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district), When I studied at the institute las all the students received a rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the OG 025
14-00000 ; a second | course in 1947, In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also. : the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence, oe ; In September- October’ 19521 received a rank of lieutenant, : iy In Sovietsk the work was not inter eated and for me it was nothing : a if ‘ ’ = = Sree ee et fi in to do. Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided o change the job. ‘With thie purpose before new year at the end of 1952 I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents 7 oat the evening party 4 at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV; whom 1 . ao ai ; aid not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili-a : ia a . ; o | former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now L 7 z ; : : : P. was thinking ; about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me. : _on this theme and propose we work and his help ii in MGB, but nothing - : Cheeky ‘more definite was said about my work, This month I reported to ) the . : _ 7 head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN _ 2 about my decision and that I will be working in MGB. oe Inthe end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, ooo li: where Iwas in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to oo “Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working, There _ : Ihave seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said that he would settle my question concerning my job, After several days - > ‘in the middle of March Ihave received a telephone call from MVD to . a - 6001036
14-00000 . | . at&t. Gorky, 9% but after marriage was living with the wife at _ ca 1 4 * . a a rm) tb. me , 4 1 a . - ar 1 come to 5 KOBULOV. There Ihave spent about two hours in the res’) ‘ ; - 4 = ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant : f i SAVITSKI sent me to the ‘Deputy of the . Chief of the Second Directory ( re 7 [ - SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was | signed an order and I was o accepted i in the 4 department of 2 chief directory a asa case officer. a Me . i ; 3 SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1. department GORBATENKO o. af , ‘who’ was acting as the chief of 1 Department | because the chief of the = department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to » the special department. “of extraordinarily affairs (investigation) ). SHUBNIAKOV and 7 .GORBATENKO said to me that I would.be working in the 1. section of . iu i. : re t. Y. b. Lae ne, my, tte Lt mh. '- ( ; 4 | - the departments ‘Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department, was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV_ . ‘told me that I will be working against the American correspondents, - es Ns : showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were | “: working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV.. -: The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I tS "was said to come next day and began to work. When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatornzim I acquainted with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, and in June 1953 we married; Before it I was living with my parents
14-00000 | St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents), In 1955 I received a ‘fiat. a at St, Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family. In 1954 I contracted a disease \(gonor rhea) and on the advice ae rel wae of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya, Doctors. asked t to show a | document,, I had with ; me > only MvD certificate and an. ‘operative ; passport and showed them the passports, Doctors had given. ‘moa treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to. come once. ‘money but I aid not come, They wanted to see once more and eent a : “etter to the place of work, | which was written in the passport,: The - oe eA plant with MVD found out about it, The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV,. : was speaking with me. I had: written my explanation, and punished by # the O oN | hie of the 2 dizectory, F FEDOTOV ~ 15 days of arrest. The komsomol!s os | | oo ms ae “organization also punished me, I received a strict reprimand and was. aan Z . | oe : ee freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief mae 7 . 7 : I was a member of komsomol's orgariizdtion from, October 1943. . oad . . ~ is In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol _ pie “organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand. In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written — _ characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that . "I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-- | . guly Iwas ‘appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory a as a case | - 9001038 |
14-00000 . Natl AD pee AA Bt toe : | « officer ‘of 2 section, This section was new created (the work against we ‘The chief of 7 department ; “ PERFILIEV, the chief of the | oO ss ae a tourists). Be section - GUSKOV. oe . a “Tn 1956 Twas accepted as a candidate in the Communist Path | ‘| | ranik of a senior ‘ieutenant and got a promotion - “ a is “Boon | received a ra a senior case officer. “In 1957 I was a accepted in ‘the Party as a member. : oe “in “August 1956 my father died. ‘In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted | a deputy c chief of 2 section. In - ae 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to” . 1th department 1 was working till ion in the 1 department 2 chief a) “ . - work asa deputy chief of the 1 secti “ airectory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Vlad. ’ chief of the -) oe fd section - KOVSHUK). o daughters: Oksana, : My family was consist of the wite and tw born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial | ae . born in (1984, and Tamara, asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 243 months was in 7 hospitals. In 1960 Iwas thinking about change (temporary) place of a by o livin g and there was 4 pos sibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow IL would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of . to work in Ethiopia 2 department, ‘DPIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go  COULSS |
14-00000 See? | oe Hic | q) (counter -intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia), The. ; : chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided rf: ‘butin n the last moment the personnel de partrnent of KGB did not agree. P a i The reasons were the case of 1954 (ines and use of the [Passport for ae ‘that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife), I was working in the 1 department till 1962, in January 1962, ° I was appointed again ihithe 7 department as the chief of the 1 section (work against tourists from the USA and Canada). In December 1959 I gota rank of a captain, When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I yt must be promoted @ deputy chief of the department, when would free poy 7 = - & place ~ the deputy chief of department BALDIN was Preparing to go . en to work in eastern Germany, In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department ae ps (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working a till January 18, 1964, During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, only in 1953. 1954 Was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD- ° KGB at St, Kiselni, G00L0EH
14-00000 re or rr | Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a.: Poy ; ' : ce in 1958 was again i in England with a sport delegation; | ” : | : : i in 1960 Iwas in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industzy); | : 2 / ; ' Ig in 1961 I was sent in 2 Bulgaria with the aim to help t to 1 department. 2 ; ‘ vf : directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of dis- | ee ena oo oe ce 7 : 7: - : os . a utes : iz 7 os _ Working : in MVD- KGB every, year t had leaves for reat. “in. ey i 0 cores 1953 with the wife : Le was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium, In, 1984 ee : ; : : Be A was with the farnily « at the cottage. In 1955 I was renting at the cottage, 7 : : ct | fe 7 In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, ‘Czechoslovakia . 4 4 : In 1957 iwas in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at . a = ae “the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage, In 1959 i with the wite | ue : | rested in Sochi, In January-February 1960 1 rested with the wife in | | - - Kislovodsk, In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters i in @ : = Nicolaey, In October 1962-1 rested with the wife in Sochi. In uly 1963 as rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa. . - a 7 : 7 a bee oan ' ‘ “cousC4at
iS THE CLAIMED K SECRET [Sh SECRET GB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE? g001042
14-00000 B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the a G past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer 7 in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern- ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been 680 _ os oe extensive ag to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer, It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed . 7 ® Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has _not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as. date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given | in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day _ of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning @ SECREP  g004043 f Gh vue 1 lExelstog ivom na | touna Brauiag ad a ee
74-90000 his KGB career today is not Significantly different from the fragmentary . version he gave in June 1962, Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB ‘career of NOSENKO: Mid-March 1953 - ate May 1955, First "Section, & ‘First Department, ScD 7 Late May 1955 . December 1959 (1988 - - December , 1959 . Deputy Chies of Section) Seventh , ; | . ‘Department, ScD . . | January 1960 . December 1961, Deputy Chief of ’ Section, First Section, First Department, ScD vanuary 1962 ~ July 1962, Chief of First Section, Seventh Department, ScD July 1962 . January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD (NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being t used throughout this Summary, but the better terminology Probably is "Deputy to Chief," The Position of Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CIA, is not Synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used 001044 or = (SECRET -
14-00000 | Nef te Ld db Rome 3 in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the : Department. sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of - Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the 7 ‘most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only - . over designated sections or organizational components. ) During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are | t ~ - . contained in separate sections of this summary. It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart-. ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available g001C45 - SECRET
14-00000 at this time, On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would lay claim to the title of Deputy ¢ Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true > when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 1961 and of his conferences _with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time, NOSENKO has also mentioned a | number of {officers of the scp or former officers of the ScD who. transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also knowin to GOLITSYN, . A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Vladislav M, KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, ,Viadimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir - AS CHURANov, -Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIy and Vadim Vv. KOSOLAPOV, The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never Personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's, The description of GOLITSYN of this ‘meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit, In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this 0001046 4 SECRET
issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took piace but. that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it, There is no reason to attach Significance to this lapse of memory, oO to The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed | ' position of £ Deputy Chief, First Section, ‘First Department, during 1960 - = weg 7 1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements _ | relative to his KGB career, This particular aspect will be covered in — detail i in another section, but of note at this time is ‘the controversy over what duties the position of. Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, < + €ntails or does not entail, It is a fruitless exercise > to attempt to judge | whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the Firet Section was commensurate with the knowledge ofa Deputy Branch Chief “4 . . in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch, | Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular. assignment, The organizational structure of the KGB | may Or may not have some similarities to the | Organizational structure of CIA, but any Similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment om 6001047 i) ne ae) new
14-00000 R i f i a a8 to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis ofa comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent ina somewhat similar position in CIA, . One of the most important differences between United States oo ‘agencies 6 or oFganizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure - ow ‘of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is | the salary structure, Pay ofa KGB officer is based on military rank and on actual position held with . an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualification, Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige, As an n example, the difference in | monthly salary between a captain and j a major is twenty. rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military rank alone has limited Pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major who holds the position of Chief of Section, During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain | from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various REN ESI Cue Sie nn wow Wy grey ne ece claimed positions, The judgment on whether he held or did not hold PELE WOO the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual © oa Rade ay PAS 0001048 st
14-00000 SECRET in the matter of the >» bona fides of { NOSENKO, this’ category is. Probably _ 7 the most difficult i in which to present a logical position with 2 factual Support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent, _NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB Knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of @ personal nature. which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision, Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature, On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is “attached, The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review, The tenor of the memo-~ randum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime. ; wie! | 3 : i |
14-00000 * “ae een DnI: SCE BY ar t : vd oa Se ‘ U NOSENKO and others of his generation. have lived in a Soviet society “throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor - : of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment i is at best usually a gradual j process in which many y factors, some fecognized and | some ‘not recognized by the individual, have Played a role in varying 7 degrees, NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an . important if not the most important factor. in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason, The above should not be construed as any reflection on the. actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His a — Gate Bo SECRFT
14-00000 SECRET performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that . he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding. Ifa certain amount of speculation is 5 permitted, the — we ceteris . disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages , a x following the death of his father. including a: personal automobile, may enn a aaa have actually started soon.after the death of his father. _That NOSENKO LE ent ananer nero snre is undisciplined is supported by his admissions ‘relative to his life in. the USSR and his behavior both ; in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time . after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and ‘the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence, A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation .in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money . and would sell "two pieces of information. '' NOSENKO has stated that he: wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat. GO081053 SECRET
14-00000 » SECRET NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought ifhe approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected, NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through David MARK) whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence. The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information, " almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. ‘NOSENKO has during current  dnterviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous 3 evenings. However, NOSENKO has s during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the tt S taieticenaneal Americans, et * g001054
14-00000 ae WH he WELLL | NCSENKO hae stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his raturn to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, | made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realising that it meant leaving his wife, children, and | other members. of his family. im the ‘USs8R. Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and . wilt probably 30 remain, i would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or ig even certain obvious factors could be accurately dalineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any Hime in the future, What is important at this time ig a decision 2@ to whether the motivation of _ NOSENKO wes based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in i962 ot his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other informatica of a collateral nature. (See Section i, H.) Attachment: Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO
74-90000 meg I : fe ord | a poe r Operational Memo # Na4 . cs : i |) suBrece:. NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich / . and interior ‘policies of the Soviet government and th ness of the free world, It was not a decision which Was accepted or in a month or ayear, This decision was slow] : Living with my Parents and being in the Circles of and my acquaintanceg |] knew more then there wag Written j 4nd periodics and that was Propagandized by radio and TV the Far East and later being in trips in different regions a Russia I foung out much better the life and conditions > oS ” people of the Soviet Russia, So SECRET
74-90000 L : it ‘ : r : i r ! When I worked ll years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, ea eee ed a about methods of the work. of MGB -MVD-KGB and about their doings, 7 ° 7] TS SPT re 7 about hundreds of thousands of the-people of Russia who were (and Q ped in still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom » was oa fp : . (ana stil tis) going an active work of all organs KGB, { At the same. time when i was several times abroad I have’ fy. seen n personally the so-called "decay" at the West, Thave seen in De | reality how is living people. Several times when I was abroad Iwas thinking about Staying’ at the. Weet and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was Keeping oy ue 7 me «a my y family, In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the . os ae : _ Americans, From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show, I was thinking that they would 3 not believe me otherwise, In ‘when I was returning home in Vienna, In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia, In this period of time I have done | all my best to Bo | 48 .600n as possible abroad, 200 GUE? Oran m=.
Oe ne ey et ee en or ee t : And now in sp ite of everything I do not regret. ‘to leave the family for ever,. Se ae te a
74-90000 SECRET HE IS THE INFORMATION FURNIS on TIONS, PERSO CONCERNING KGB OPERA NALITIES, AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE . WITH HIS CLaAr MED KGB CAREER? G001059
14-00000 i i SECRET. D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen- —————————————— ea ad surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor~ ree et mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed . career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February 1964, | 7 : ' In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given | to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each department, . Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is is any indication of * deception or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind, There is, of course, nu " accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter- mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall ail past events or could be attributed to willful deception, SECRET GROeP 4 j Excluded trom astamatle Sownzrading aad teclassificatian G0uLCEO
14-00000 An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas _have been noted, -NOSENKO, in n fact, has an unusually good memory “as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO > purely 7 | h from recollection, Tn addition, t there has been 1 no ‘material reluctance . * oat the part t of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has ae We _kmown, KGB ‘organization and procedures, or other topics of interest. _NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his: entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently ' added certain 1 details which he recalled at a later date, Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to = the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in- formation is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was as signed to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions, Con- sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during ; go L064 SECRcT re
14-00000 ahi i 4 hoe g ‘indy a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information fe furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SGD. it has not been possible tq substantially . confirm through collateral « sources. ‘that NOSENKO served i in a his claimed — he / Positions. Neither has it been \posetbls to obtain from other sources an- holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958, It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and : senior case officer during 1953 - 1957, As regards the duties and responsibilities of a ‘Deputy’ Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various ‘claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO. NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices _he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four pri- mary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - ' 1963, He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers 3 O0ULCE2 ©
and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the scD during 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not 7 immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or . another officer who has defected since nid 1964. if these diagrams “and memoranda “were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite | astute in ‘matters of ‘counterinteliigence, would hardly have voluntarily _ prepared t ‘the material in such detail. This type of information is ‘peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a mowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive con~ “elusion that /NOSENKO was. lying oF fabricating information. | _ NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB spexations during the 1953 ~ 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - . 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 -- 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly deserved a low rating. goodie 6s SECRET
The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. | The : scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto, is broader after 1957. than before, which is compatible with his claim of - increased responsibilities. . ‘His Knowledge ‘of the work of other departments - of the SCD fromi the late 1950's:on is also more extensive, which is also a - further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions | during this period of time. H x
14-00000 SECRET Of - ‘(a> E, GAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE - CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED _ IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS AL ESSE chee Ear SSS aE Sooo setts THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE? g001Ces che i Excluded from automatic downsradiag and dociassifica lion SECRET
&. Can the information furnished b NOSENKO be considered — in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/ or has 4 the information: furnished by NOSENXO been of signi ifican t benedit to” . a West stern 1 Intelligence? ‘The conclusion in regard to. ‘both of the above: questions is aitirmative, even thou; ga it as "reali zed that gltimate loss. at » to ‘the KGB and ultimate nenefit to Western Int chigence axe oth pestly ve . of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate. measurement, NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished, voluminous snformation during current and previous interviews. An accurate § total | of specific cases is not possible at this time and woule at best be only © an interesting figure, the actual si gnificance of waich would be mar ginal. Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, or . information of counterintelligénce. i interest and it is expected te that this eeEeEeE—E—e———e—e—EeEeeeees product tion can continue for a considerable period of time. This shoule a ng: not be construed as an indication that NOSENX Ois intentionally with- holding information, but rather. that s cimulasion of his memory tascugh normal questions and discussions hes been and can continue to be produ ctive.
a ( NOSENXO has furnished infoymation concerning perhaps KGB officers and \300) KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used <o refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately(250)former or current First: Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside * the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future, There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, ‘the vossible value of this information to United States Intelligence ‘He Pp ; g cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be esii- mated. Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would bea necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to che West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a sO DO pool 67
14-00000 limited perioa of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector . status, However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the ex- “posure of the identities of approximately (2, 000)KGB officers and(several). | (hundred) KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance, Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or | KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a comsider- able amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even ) Pp ¥ acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type * . * of information about the KGB, which operates in.a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the icentifi- cation of! 2, 000) CLA employees and (several hundred)agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information, Prior to the defection of N ENKO, [ttle was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed» and extensive, That this information is of value to the United States oe intelligence community is hardly subject io Qu ispuce, although analysis o001C68 Lex)
can differ é as to t the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information, NOSENKO has furnished information concerning, SCD, KGB, recruitments of f United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the peziod of 1983 through | 1963. “This. Should not be interpreted asa . statement t that NOSENKO has furnished information in, regard to all- . ‘SCD x recruitments, even of Americans, during this period, . His infor~ mation based on . Personal knowledge is in general limited to the Firs Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning | cases ‘of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was j in ' general acquired indirectly from social or business ‘conversations with other Kon officers, NOSENKO has furnished inf orm ation in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value’ ‘of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which + NOSENKO has provided ina number of cases cannot be cismissed as being of no value to Western intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there igs no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for SuSDicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information, gov1ces
| NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligen ¢ NOSENKO has furnished information in regard toa snumber of ‘recruitments, by the KGB of non- Bloc nationals 5 who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro- Communist or even connected with Communist organizations, The identification asa recruited KGB agent of an 2 individual previously known to be Pro- -Communist is of considerable value to Western Intélligence and may be considered to ~ have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admitt tedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than . that of a “Politically clean" individual, However, “Prq-Communist" or even “Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent, '" NOSENKO has furnished. additional inform ation on cases in. which there was some > previous but limited information, Ina number of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has per- mitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an en “Uaknown Subject" case, In such instances the information from : Ce. since tne incomplete information } “nown previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest, This category of cases must be considered as having result ed in damage | to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence, ’ 5 rg 0ULC'70
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both Amer ican and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the AGB and concerning whom Western Jateligencs had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of f these cases, ‘mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly i in 1 the ‘tourist category, ‘would 1 probably = never. have ately materialized as + productive KGB agents. ‘This could ibe a 7 graphical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of ScD recruitment « or later in a position t to furnish information of oo wee interest to the KGB. Tn this regard, "NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Depart tment to. make a | "recruitment" asa statistic for the end-of-year report even _ ‘though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that, - " it was highly unlikely ‘there would be a potential in the future. ee NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads toa number of. cases, . primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has - ‘been unable to furnish sufficient Getails to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identi- fication is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Inielli- gence cannot be estimated, but that there may bea potential value
14-00000 “cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove — "the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver thé codes to the KGB for a ‘photographing, and’ then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as 3 yet. unidentified, his. current ; access to information atiecting ~ the a sacurity of the United States cannot be gauged. ~ inal, the information from NOSENO in the category of cases “ where Western Intelligence cid not previously have Significant infor- . mation must be considered on balance as having resulted in material - . damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence. Quantity alone of Cl or Fi information from a KGB defector is. not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether — the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his tts claimed positions in the © KGB. ‘This question as regards NOSZNKO . a has. been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper. A few exampies from the above cited categories of information ‘surnisned by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance. to gu0Lg72
14-00000 “ :. 1 we et a be Comme ve - : ‘- Tie case or Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case. of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON. Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA) | | NOSENKO identified’ Herbert HOWARD)as having been recruited by. . the First Section, First Department, ScD, in 1962 and was positive ‘that (HOWARD) furnished valuable information to the KGB. When interviewed in 1964, (HOWARD) did not admit he had been recruited, . i but suspicion of ‘HOWARD’ was great enough so that his contract with . [USIA} was not renewed, we Ii indeed|HOWARD)was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible - to determine how much information would have been compromised by ee [HOWARD} while in the USSR, he did have cer tain access to the United employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963.00.09 States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if HOWARD was. _ recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of & - potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to establish contact using’ HOWARD)as intermediary. NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to'a "ZHARI" {apparently a KGB code name, although NCSENKO thought it was a true 8 6501073 hao. a Toe tw 8 at > ns ls ee
14-00000 ‘pwame). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fouzi Mitri HINDALY, a former NBA employes who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information trom NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated. | ‘Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets ia the fall of 1967, & BD information concerning KGB knowledge _ of American code clerks was being nvestigated: and John Discoe SMITH was & a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Sovists, it became apparent that SMITH, zather than HAMILTON, was identical te "ZHARI," Investigation disclosed that no definite informa- : tien, could be established in regard to the actual whersabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate favestigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI” lead would have led to the identi- | fleation of John Discos SMITH as "ZHARI," However, auch identifi- cation would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have af least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise announcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967. NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which» Wiiltam VASSALL could be quickly identified, GOLITSYN, in late 1960 sasly 1961, nad furnished information concerning a Sowlet pene- tration of tha British Government on the basis of GrRiGs the British 9 cy ges CECH]
14-00000 Services had compiled a List of twenty suspects, including VASSAL, Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty enspecta would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL wag ‘the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO ia June 1962 resulted tn the earlier termi= notion by the British Services ofa still valuable: productive KGB i agent. | ~ Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the micro- phones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned, GOLITSYN, following hie defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones. in the United States -, Embasay (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected to central cables, location of OnB » microphone world Jogically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appro- priate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prios to June 1962 when NOSENKO firet contacted CIA. if NOSENKO ts a dispatched KGS agent, itis not clear why the - KGB would attract specific attention to & syatem of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrate evidence of such an advanced aystem is available and it should be noted tha it GUU1075
; interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in appioximately seventeen a was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to “locate and remove the microphone system to which GOLITSYN had. _given a lead in late December 1961 - early January 1962. A few general comments in regard to the or information fur- nished by NOSENKO \ waald t be appr opriate. in this particular section, of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. “Cutrent “new American leads which are being examined by the FBL The inter- views have also resulted in more specific information in regard toa number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting additional developme ment of ¢ these se cases by the F s FBI NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. "Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals ‘of such countries as indonesia, Austria, | Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, italy, and a number of other countries. included in the more important of these agent or other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal GoULC TE
support assets. Also included ar ‘foreign correspondents, repre-" . * entatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists. ee oo eae ee A summary of the foreign leads s arbitrary defined as of major ; wo | significance shows nineteen ‘leads Dighly ‘pla aced or. + formesiy highly Embas sies (but 2 not the British or “American Embassies). " NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain CD foreign ss fo - . national agents, “his information. on several being derived during his . : \ three months in Geneva in 1962. tis impos sible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by 1 NOSENKO. That they « are of signi- ‘ficant value to Western n Intelligence : and damaging to the KGB is s hardly” susject to dispute, _ This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous. foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited | ae at tnis time, ' aot, Oo SF As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive ~~ . °
14-00000 QOUNL! intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt thas NOSENKO has, as of this time, been faliy debrieted in many areas of positive intelligence interest. 3B gates CEORET
14-00000 wr ome Se coe ' F, IS THERE EVIDENCE OF-KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY! IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH .. _WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT, NOSENKO ' WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?
14-00000 SECRET F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away'' in EO OT ELVES Bway aD information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion na a ne nnn EE Ge CORCIU SION | that NOSENKO was dispatched ‘by the KGB? ‘The conclusion in 1 this Petes inane thitaetsiatetiad Metetehdcchor ie ‘summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched ‘by the KGB. In ce -Feaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has _ . been both a necessary and integral part. It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by - NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration “in arriving ata conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not t dispatched by _ the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely, been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO _. was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown, ‘ An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case, G001079 at ner SE Ail
14-00000 NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two . oo pieces of information"! was his own n idea | as to. what was most likely ‘to ‘be successful, NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to. make a. contact . _ with the Americans, \ was not psychologically adapted to defect at the v time, and felt that if, he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter - intelligence officer who wanted to give information, " he very possibly ' would be ejected. It should be noted | that NOSENKO even during his — first contact dia not limit his remarks to the ''two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters. If NOSENKO was 8 dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks - or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any . suspicion. in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead. a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 ' indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO _ and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva, G001080
74-0000 pre mre NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment _ 8Pproach ty Russel] LANGELLRE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview, > (c) NOSENKO Said he recruited ' LUNT (Horace’ \LUNT) in Bulgaria, (Actually NOSENKO never met { LUNT, ) Ww
14-00000 ( , : (4) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with Edmund } 'STEVENS) who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited | by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met ‘ STEVENS: and only had seen(STEVENS)once at a distance. ). {e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished x information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to \ , Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952 ~1954. (£) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer ‘met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation. ) (g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this,'' or 'We did that," in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits 4 a Gg SOL082
14-00000 he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. ) In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had, been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. . These similarities were quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because 7 5 he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered ( : already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted. (a) Both furnished information in regard to | (Johan PREISFREUND| (b) Both furnished information in regard to a ‘military code clerk case (James STORSBERG)! (c) Both furnished information in regard toa trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was. Cy | connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in os GES Vs 5 PR mee
14-00000 Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO related it directly to the 'ANDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used, ) 7 {d) Both furnished information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow, (e) Both furnished information in regard to ‘Edmund STEVENS, and\Isaac Henry SHAPIRO) The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate — | question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. The ‘above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or | greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence poo 084 rN one rk er eae
14-00000 that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost every instance, In a few instances he has said he did not recall how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious. The general area in which there was a | similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States. Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering - around or in the First Department, SCD. It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN ggo1 08s | ae) | Pv) SEC rd sora, #
14-00000 i ai i. | 1 i | i knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities. of the First Department, SCD, primarily to-his association with certain officers in the First Department, SCD. Itis recognized that there are’ certain conflicts in information . furnished by GOLITSYN and. NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily. Correlate ‘certain : information from GOL IDSYN with information from NOSENKO. “Pages 162 - 163 of the previous summary refer to information from GOLITSYN whichis characterized as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960 - 1961,"' The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 « 1901, that his primary responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in, the same work and under his supervision, The statement by GOLITSYN (O0LC86
14-00000 that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary. 'GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re- ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. _. ft , . In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was - previously considered to be evidential of deception or tying on the part of, NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real, In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate frag mentary information froma GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed. as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d): (a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he | received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an C001 0a Oo Cr ¢ rn a) wd ri nen |
14-00000 é _ Pi, Sr neiet wa RAY j 4 Ms ca American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment, He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German j ‘s oundin g")name. NOSENKO has furnished information in regard toa recruitment attempt against’ Collette SCHWARZENBACH) -who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. “However, ( SCHWARZENBAGH) was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but) chad been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador) _BOHLEN during 1955 ~ 1956 and from 1958 ~ 1959 was employed) \as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow.) The recruitment attempt against|SCHWARZENBACH} according to NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD, OJvLU88 10 | annancy
14-00000 aS (b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains infor-. mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited, This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of (James STORSBERG) who was actually the subject of a recruit- -ment approach in 1961. : ‘ There is considered to bea good possibility that GOLITSYN actually 1 learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland, This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous | summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January ~ 1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the _ successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy. (Johan PREISFREUND) was used in the/STORSBERG, operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also _ CU0iCR9 ll Cy/> my CS Ad re \
14-00000 neti fal oe SEU aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about “PREISFREUND) since GOLITSYN wanted to use (PREISFREUND in Helsinki, NOSENKO has stated he was not present during . the above conversation, It is very possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use \PREISFREUND) as an ‘agent. NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the James STORSBERG) case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of | NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report- ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV > concerning what is considered to have been the’ James | | ‘STORSBERG) case and detailed information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the’ James STORSBERG ‘case. ‘The exact date of the recruitment attempt againest\STORSBERG) has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by/ James J GdvuLU9O 12 SECRET
14-00000 'STORSBERG| that it occurred in October 1961 is com- pletely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by STORSBERG. himself, (c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding, in 1960. The, previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve, NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of Robert BARRETT, who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and 'GRIGORIY'', two homosexual GUGLCSL } mr ae rey ieee |
14-00000 agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted, Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were participating under the direction of the Ninth Department. | | One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving ‘BARRETT in homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO, although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material and information on BARRETT) was later given to the First Department and that. BARRETT, was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he veturned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation, BARRETT, following his return: H0010992
14-00000 } CD rey oD ne rr Fla to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow. “Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possible that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to the (Robert BARRETT) case. It should be noted that ‘Robert BARRETT )could not actually be characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy - in Moscow." | (a) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor- mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy . code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was ( 6 GOOLE. ro oe net {ua i eo tomo CD cD wey
14-00000 ar DD; ere Sched considered by the 2 KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transier of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN . might have the code clerk as an ‘agent i in’ Helsinki, | Be a : Se | | NOSENKO has furnished 1 no information which can be aan 4 correlated i in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the ‘information from GOLITSYN '- vesulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is _ ® considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during'1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous — | remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks | in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible, The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is © | . 16 goo1(c4 “$
14-00000 ~ 4, at'sodtnet ae y also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow. The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was undoubtedly (John GARLAND) and the train manifest lists’ John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity of John GARLAND but claims. no knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip. NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities. such as his trip to Cuba in November~December 1960 but it_cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of, 17
14-00000 A theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it: should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way — | ‘be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD, " or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that," ‘In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of | NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain . events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961, NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962. . It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, 13 6001098
14-00000 SECKEA select * NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to couriter~ | | act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to his departure for Geneva in March 1962, Therefore, if NOSENKO . was ‘dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans. for this would have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN — aspect could only be a telated aspect and not the basis for the original | . plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO \ was dispatched, - 7 it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA. & . ‘The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Government, particularly CIA. This isa theory which should and has been given full consideration, but itis not possible to factually a er substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist. Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts gooit]e?
14-00000 7 SECRET of American counter-~intelligence td determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government, The only answer to this question seems to be . & . that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli- . gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value, The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-~ sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In this area 2 his statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American Personnel in the, United States Embassy | in Moscow from 1953 ~December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" ‘(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and\Herbert HOWARD; The basis for this t 4 expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary | and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENKO. NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities, In addition, he does not claim . : . . : ; e “¢ to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an gooitee 20 PON Bee ee
14-00000 i i ! : | i. SECRET 4 example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, - and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or @ component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best ' mainly of a collateral nature. NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active > Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name. ‘These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an _ opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department ‘and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases, al QIN DET
14-00000 G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCE: QF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK a Oe PERMISSION TO. SEEAK a ae . FREELY TO CLA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC — MISSION OR MISSIONS ? 901498 ERG? 4 . Excludes fraca automatic Gsvazrading and declassification
a 1 i } : i i i f ot ears tee G. Is there evidence ofa political or any other type objective “which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB wish permission to speak freely to CLA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and withou NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions ? The above possi~ ROSENSO being given a specific m cane tte O BEODS £ bility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications ' are practically incalculable. The conclusion is tha as regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political or ‘other type objective which could be co asia ered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a‘specific-mission or missions by the KGB. It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection € t to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no limitations on the KGB intelligence information he mignt reveal providin 5. & that such act would, in the estimate oz the leadership, result ina aet political gain for the USSR. For sucha possibility to be seriousiy entertained by the Soviets, however, it wouid have to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leacership and presumably would have to go01ict Tet ee at Renee T
obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of achieving we desired end and of having a very high probaoility The only area touched upon nin any wey by NOSENXKO which migat meet the above requirements is the as sassination of President Sennedy: the involvement of lee Harvey Oswaid in the assassination and his association with the Soviet Union. "Given (a) speculation assassination, {(b) the premise that in fact there was'no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irreversable actions, itis conceivable that the Sovict leadership might have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passaze a to the United States Government of the alleg gedly complete Soviet « consuia file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act. ) . OSE a SE a SS SR MOE a Tae NOSENKO case warrants examination in the adove regard in Ligat of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was "inside" KGB information on OSWALD : information waich purpoxvsdly goo1ice
‘ wy we 4 revealed the substance of the content oi the KGB files on OSWALD. This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that as amatter of fact OSWALD. hed presented the KGB witha . continuing series of problems. Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable: L a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for sucha theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CLA: in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. een ante OTS reenter ete OTISTINGN te Prager b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interesting and pertinent, itis not, in nature, scope, and content, sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be expected to conclude that it vepre sented unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement. c. Itis implausible not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume Ww go01103
14-00000 extrernely narrow Soviet compartmeatation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB oiticex other than very senior persons and an individual of group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the. above very limited category. It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated. * The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might e : ’ ° have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non~-valuable ot non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the Unitec States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve a major portion of its personnel an efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The asove nossinility cannot be wali 34 Viewdantalt Ste eet Saq7} wei in-eg et Tie te on ae : J stat BYOrarily @ilminated without full comsidexation. It is not believed that go01ic4 rhs
‘ : i ‘ NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission ox missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to. the conclusion that full , ext loitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB. Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent offect on others of the conviction and senter.cing of persons who have committed { a crime or:crimes has long been a part of the legal theory o< why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished, The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of a William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKEN- ee SnD BAUGH should not be underestimated, The KGB also could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge. goo1 165 wm
14-00000 en SECRET NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN 10 THE . | KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO , “WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS 3 EHAVIOR OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR AFTER HIS DEFECTION? - GROUP {. ‘ Q L Apr Excluded fram automatic wie itn dowagrading aad essigset icailan
14-00000 1 | iF H i } ' H I 3 the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning rei Boel ee) rv c> aU H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 - orin 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The . -conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO “in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB. - The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. Itis being treated here as a separate area of interest since itis a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration. _ It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as f ' whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be | based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non~significance of each item of available information. The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is 44G7 gobs t CEasindd ia aimahe App deaaaraiiag acd
14-00000 necessarily based in part ona judgment as to whether any of his activit i ies or information logically warrant'a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction’ or control. One of.the particular areas considered was his apparent . behavior during his contacts with CIA i in June 1962 and the conclusion ‘was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time, Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CLA were not known to. the KGB: but became knownto. the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was con- cluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious s consideration | of the above possibility aside from the separate | conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect, ‘Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, _ during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his ' personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the 20 gg0ii88 Cy) re C ae rey
14-00000 i i i 7. ms, Fone Uaited States Embassy in Moscow concern ing Bis contact with CLA and nat he did not wish to be contecte a2 and would not reco contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also Zurnished information as to tae yeason fox his concern that no information ve gaxvdaing with CIA become Known in the United tates Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or ate tempted contact with NCSENKO | in the USSR. itis recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSE NKO about his personal secuz rity is not substantial evidence that NCSENKO was not under KGB contr ol; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO Wes not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NCSENKO wethin the - {treet cesarean ERASERS ee aseeey greene nner eesrerpirtrererr ie lht teppei eter AAA ren eet eter nett ee, USSR, which very likely would } id have been cen an aim of the KGB if N \OSENK sO was under KGB control. ann ne = Oe The material which NOSENK KO furnished to CIA in, 19642 nas been caxefuily reviewed to determine if there is.any evidence that the KGB e . . participated in any way in the assembiing of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable BS type and, on the contrary, it appears that NCSENKO could 3 have furnisacd ail of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming awave that the material was actually missing % ‘ Lim tan, “Ae “OF agi ge tty n mee gral flaps we Tiny wa mee ep od Loe iatter statement even includes the travel document which authorised
14-00000 The txip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate an the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. Accor ing to NOSENKO, this pax vicuiar document was not accountable in that it was. only necessary co turn itin when requesting reimbursement for travel ‘expenses. NOSENKO siated that ue had not claimed the rather small ‘amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he ‘really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank | . of Lieutenant Colonel. NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Coionel, stating that even as a Deputy Chiet of Depart- ment he was only a Captain although he was ent itled to and expected to- receive the rank of Major in early 1964, NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was tae error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and . that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 4+ The above explanation by NCSENKO may well be consider ay ‘ foe readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NCSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been pro-- oe viced with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, In addition, it would seem that the KGB 6001110
couid have provided NOSENKO with Some type of document waica Would support at least | one of his claimed positions in the S cD, KGS, Liven the Cherepanoy Paper § do notin any Way support the claim of NCSENKO that b Be was Deputy Caies of the First Section, First - Deparment, ScD, in 1960 - 1961, ‘nor do they even Support the claim of NOSENKO that there was Such 2 & position in the Pirst Section in 1960 ~ 1962 Or even in 1958 or 1959. CU0Li11
SECRET IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO NOSENKO g004442 a)
14-00000 SECRET COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS ~ TY IN REGARD TO NOSENKO Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 ~ 360 of the "Examina-. tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) _ primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence), _ and KGB career of NOSENKO, These conclusions or findings are | . independently treated in separate attachments. With the exception ¢ of "G, " the conclusions in this summary are | in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was | a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection i in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period, * For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated, Attachment; ” Cpy Pgs 357-360 of ''Examination ‘ of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector". godiiis meaner wrote CRSP 4 . Excluded Wan auicnae SF ORET cowngeadiag aad H tat a _ dachasiticali¢a
14-00000 ao re SEURE PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO FREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" The following is a quote of the. previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A- G for purposes of easier correlation a with other sections of this summary. ) | | “SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES' "NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of auhority from which he derived exitensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera- tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's ‘ claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensiiive positions, who CO00L114 er a andr & reer ene
14-00000 SEU enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal short~ comings, and whose defection, ‘the greatest loss ever suffered a ' by Soviet Intelligence’, paralyzed the work of @a KGB @@e - Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assas~. sinate him, !! “The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts 2 "This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently: A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed. CG. NOSENKO did not serve in the American GOOL4L5 Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed. PN ENN ee
14-00000 NA bee ted bomen D, During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section... E, NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a. senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. . (sic)’ F, NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible, | G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty . that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance. " "The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence | of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts “of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make ‘his claims as a whole unacceptable.. While truth and fact in this case frequently | | gooLiis oto, wR ree are kee Wohi!
14-00000 cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates, By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, - or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector." "Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, itis necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information — he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Neverxteless, the question cannot be ignored, . The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some oi his false c laims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made." "Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suifers irom a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB oooqi47 agent." AT AS oe
14-00000 As | A { ‘ + a 4 4 { % ? { _ | SEUNE I "The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That _ NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal |. advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself." ' "Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the’ possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind." "It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag- gerated his positions, rank and access to intormation, and - invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, . NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be justa product of his own invention, since these were the subject of ane comment by other sources." CEADET
14-00000 iy woe “, —— "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable. " "In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be ~ regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor- mation should be assessed accordingly. "' sooisss
SECRET A.  NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU © IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND . TIMES HE CLAIMED 9004428 t -yalntod 4 oo atic c “t 8 “73 ating sa CORET Lee classifiea ian
14-00000 . SECRET. A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion) pn a a TNE On The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated: and should be accepted. | The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted _ significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time. It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his ‘stupid blunders'' as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March SECRET gous 24 Excluded tram autainaife dowagradiag and dachissUleaiiag Belge Peer pastatebentemn teen 7 re
14-00000 PRESS. SLU, 1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable, It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59. and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope. The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either'the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visite to Geneva, '!: | Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval | RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time, The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately (875) KGB officers, '100)KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and ‘400; other Soviet nationals. 20 povii22
14-00000 Tt is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers. whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period, In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelli- gence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period, Page 52 of the above eummary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence | and even question his geographical knowledge of the area, Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy . . Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area, The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of . his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate, NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENK O° for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non- existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen, LUULELS :
OCU: The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures, It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet. Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee Of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy. Attachments: . List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO yUU1124 C/O ry
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14-00000 SECRET cb _ B. _NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED a Pree eras meee. Cnieet t G0utL31
14-00000 B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time. claimed. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered ~ | the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and ‘that his : entry was not only facilitated by put due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV. Oo og Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 asa case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con- sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted, | The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed “was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN. SECREF g00141232 GaGuP 4 j excluded from an | downgradiag gad _ declassifteatioa
14-00000 Oy ae ae Y RUNS In 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an-effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949. The previous summary gave considerable weight. to the statementa / of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what - are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not . given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. “An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB. procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD. . The previous. summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not contro- vertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO GOL 133 SECRET
14-00000 was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA. The previous summary also states that according to KGB - defectors familiar with the standards in force at the > time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement | “which it i is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully tg tt I enema substantiate; namely, that itn ne ever happened, . Until and unless it is terete medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, itis accepted - that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium ~- rest - place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB | - after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated, The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks’ and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB (MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that BO (001134
14-00000 NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his . processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General - KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not. consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD). The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD ‘would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era, The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any person fficers or visit the personnel office, It would ent rie mee nen, seem that the influence of General: KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he com- pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD), Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly so LOOL135
14-00000 entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the _ time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second ‘Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of designations occurred in March 1953, | . STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the - oe MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA | as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June 1953. BERIYA was ‘succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less thana year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places: | it as the end of April or early May 1953, GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective date of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD). There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD. NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is 5 GUULLIE SECRET
14-00000 ees ee ore + LOTT in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and 7 * .¢ GOLITSYN,. all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for . _ the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal . of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However, the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in we this issue. NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing - | the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no | contacta with either office during 1953 ~1955 and there is no adequate reason to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations | were organized or ceased to exist.
14-00000 . Or were ee Clea ee. b Bentene The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO | ‘in the KGB should have ended or he should have at t least encountered : difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the ; brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the > BERIYA group i in early June 1953. ‘NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he | encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. - Under other circumstances NOSENKO | would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only -met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated | that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no ; ' way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.
~ SECRET C, NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY . SECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 -.1955 PERIOD “ renee penPe te ESSCSSSSSSSSOOTS 000 le SEEDERS AS HE CLAIMED * 6001139
14-00000 C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, 5CD. This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO wo during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that as . . both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than. a slightly lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his , personal be- havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization" SECRET a 6004140 j Guai uf q " iy j Excluded trea autematic’ ; dai faaradeag gad i i Geciissitealian —¢ Mob aren mareeten panera |
14-00000 | : . Hy | - to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component. The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his ditt iculties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf i in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was ‘transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB. The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain - dn the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party, This isa valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid~1954 he was respon- sible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news- . paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers, NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his Do GOoLLL
14-00000 information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor- | respondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954, ‘From circa mid -1954 until i his transfer t to the Seventh Departs ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an_ | officer of the First Section with the ‘responsibility of work against the _ Military Attaches (Amy) at the United States Hmbasoy 4 in Moscow. It | is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that | NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 ” late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired, In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during — this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of 3 a gooi44e cy rm} Cc> a ri |
14-00000 SECRET the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an ' officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related ' by him. NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches .on ‘rips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as exceptional in this re gard the recruitment attempt against Gaptain Walter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches to Soviets in the United States in that period. NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. it is submitted that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his : | 001143 oa rr cD ew) rr —
14-00000 e *. oo hud wee ee wy nd team hl nen, Lk en . mae Lenin Dag apn mewn anne < GeligMsu UMC. Gns, # ae Tha X28 wo a@tiuwance for the uncertain perso. “ade ~ 1 ap dey oo mT TON SO eet meget ogy dee : ay status oc NOSENSO- whose actual suture in the KGB was in jeopardy re . ee ee ere OOP 33 ws Gavel BMian-L.y oe. NCOANKG has previously indicated and still indicates a definite & . 2ack of anowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximatciy farch - May 1955, This, according to NOSENKO, was when a an un- sacisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a ao ecision was being made on his case, anda period of time in which he o. went ona "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 , days ‘ wacex nospical care Decause of the possibility of recurrence cf his crevious wages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest thas NCSENAS bet ey ph $a not susnished Sswiticient: details about his alleged agent aetwork fur ‘use against the Military Atteches, It is considered that NCSENZC Pee’ current incerviews has furnishec adequave acceptabl 2 Getalls, 20 as DLE om roe yn eyes 4 foe man m” J o.e — : _— 2 mrar ont TRO an exemple SUCTISREeC specific unforrmation concerning ') DLODINA nama ete fans : ai hy ome ye 7” ~y ~ om Pade ano ne 225 VAAR SE Sun (poe 83). “would appear that there was ao item by Om ee gta ntl few Fine tt an on im? en me en ann, ae Lee earen tan RO wo wiathnascie infercccation COnfCS TAI sg t..836 INGav tauals, Oe wae A otk nO WAG EVES Go WOO Wo GILL lo BD eVIOLs Lasik. Pere velce GO0LL44 ay
14-00000 . re oo mAs ri kee The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late. May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer | in the First Section during this period of time, It is felt that information . furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable. COUi145
14-00000 SECRET D, DURING THE PERIOD 1955 ~- 1940, HE WAS NEITHER A | in ereenereeaeeeeeraeaeeaaamnemaemmmaaaaeeaamaaas arecmmmmnaaaaaaacaaaasamaaaaeaeaamnemaaeanmemeaaaaeameaman eames SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF, ee nee ee an eed THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION f t GO01147
14-00000 D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion 'D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was . Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959, é During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject. _ of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally in- volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959, These activities include among others the recruitment of (Richard BURGI/. in June 1956, contact with({Sir Allen LANE) and (Arthur ‘BIRSE) in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of(Gisella HARRIS)in 1958, the re- cruitment of George DREW) in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of — C011 48
14-00000 SA SECREL 0) r a William Stanley WILBY)in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of\Gerard MERTENS) in July « August 1959, and the recruitment of ‘Arsene FRIPPELjin 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who | was the KGB target. \Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY) and ‘David TAYLOR) were British) citizens and the other above-named indi- viduals were) United States) citizens, This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common- wealth tourists in the USSR. In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against Martin MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. ‘MALIA \has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955. case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved, GoUsLA9 - 2 Ar A SEP ROT CULL!
74-00000 scans ss 2 etree error cae seursaraomamae seen, aie A oP ARTES SI A OME SCE RE TR BS eR AS a NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain | | o | United States Government officials, including Congressional : represent- atives to the USSR in 1955 ~ 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously | mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists. during the late May 1955 ~ December 1959 period, NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not available for operations against American and British oy oo tourists, This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was jwt ina formative stage, | NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he de- veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV"' and "GRIGORIY (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com- promise operations, | The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 ~ 150 in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of G41159 NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those ‘fifty io oe
14-00000 ri SECRET ry pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there, would still not be an adequate basis fox a conclusion that NOSENKO: was not an officer in the claimed positions ; in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it con- ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any 7 evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. ' However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the — previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification. On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, nota counter - intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation : of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit-~ ment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart- ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English- speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB gfiedr| wien fet Sow COR arT OLUAC
14-00000 considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact. | Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven opezations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against (Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, . (Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (imu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, | ‘Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William, \TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other ' than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Depart- ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department, The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible, A detailed explanation of the notes furnished _ by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi- mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes, guULLS2
14-00000 During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including ‘William ) | TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE, It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and William TARASKA: were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory 7 ; explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British ‘Common-~_ wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives ; in the USSR, the case sutomatically was assigned toa group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO. NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and USHMELEV, " two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO. has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual GOOL15s CAf3 | Co" i ama |
14-00000 S CREEL 7 was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information. was just maintained for possible use at a later date if if the individual returned to the USSR. NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the’ Patrick’ /PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVERN) cases; and, the listing of the (Sofia } | ‘'SHATTAUER) case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in com- _ plete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing. The ‘previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual, An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation " was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is ; logical and normal, No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases. | The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether Gis ella HARRIS)was necessarily a Seventh Department case, guu1is4 SEARCY
14-00000 This question seems quite superfluous since|/ HARRIS) was in the USSR. - on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department, Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an indi-~ ' vidual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i.e., whether ona tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, ' as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, ag a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc, There are also various other factors ._ which affect the determination of which Department oF organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case, These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual isa businessman, In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD. On pages 148 ~- 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at — least some of the substance of the information furnished by George | BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR, This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information  G0G4155°
14-00000 although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source, The ¢ references by. NOSENKO to the > KGB having such infor- mation were > not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established | that NOSENKO had teagan at ee AN CACC LAER AY LE LOE : oe See ae ante rermnnmeemi actually ¢ seen ‘excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE, According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the scp and could only have come from an agent. = The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA. acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the | Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his de- fection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter- intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO. | claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth — Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time, What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. g00L1S6 oe) rm | A Pe} ware} Fal ton Fy
14-00000 aie i : woe SEui ere NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against . American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 -.1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in - the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Common- wealth Section, or another Department i in the SCD. NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in. 1958 ~ 1959 were ; acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view. ‘NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the’ Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN, NOSENKO stated he was not in. the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and follow~ ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for tne FCD. NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN, In current interviews, however, the descriptiqn 4S 4NOSENKO 10 eo me me cee eres)
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14-00000 o- i { i I t "year my te ane " assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that justifiably can be said at the presens Vime is that, even if the story - of NSO SENKO i is snaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such : inaccuracy should be intexpz eted as ; indicative of deception or ‘dispatch, or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the oe Ameri can-British h Commonwealth Section of tae Seventt Department in 1 1958 - 1959; neither would. such an snaccuracy reflect on his claimed | - ss service in 2 1962 ~ 1963 in the Seventh. Department, gou4159
14-00000 SECRET E, _.NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN renee en LCC ieee eeataneinnnreoeertnnnnn ne EN, EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE PERIOD 1961 ~ 1962 (sic) PERIOD 1961 ~ 1962 (sic) GROUP + Extladed from automatic} . Aevse-raciny sag
C/D iT] OD j Biwi on? ri "y ae: BE. NOSENKO was neither Desuty Chief of the American as en Ye ee omerscan Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion) rrr ann mraseseantenttnen aaeonterareettoerinr ebay It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the position of Deputy ‘Chies, First Section (American Embas sy Section}, SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961, The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 ~ 1961 has been the most dificult claimed position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of. eae yee neice his claim to have held this particular position isa critical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career | is valid. Tt is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department, prior to December 1959 ia the absence of any indication that he was cemoted, he should have been at leasta Deputy Chief of Section during 1960 - 1961, Position in the SCD, KGB, and t throughout the KGB is impor tant from a monetary point of view as well asa prestige point of view. if
NOSE NKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer, in 1G) 1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with result ant loss of both money and prestige. F On this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Caiet in 1980 - 1961 would raise con-~ siderable doubt as to whether he held his claimed positi on prior to 1940, _as wellas whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963. tis apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NOSENKO actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section. According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chieis of Section in the entire sob and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section, in addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NCSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department. Go041462
14-00000 Pr on gh Re tes According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and tne Guties of the particular Deputy Chief 2 ae egy Aas Re engagement were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties. . The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict _ between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First t Department, and his subsequent ry claim that he replaced Mikhail BAK :VALOV. as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK anc various other officers in the Section with previous respon sibility £ for certain wh a _ matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters, The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions, In the light of the present: clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV a arenes er I oe nae and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with wnom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chiei of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he wa Ut a oO 65) 3 o +e] i apie for certain areas which later jell to NOSENKO, On the other | | a gov1169 u
14-00000 tee 8 hand, according to o NOSENKG, the principal reason for his being ‘assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code. clerks), There could of course have been no specinic pr edecessor for a substantively new area, Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was the predecessox of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSZNKO on this issue as - being in conflict appears to be the result of coniusion on this point by all concerned, et According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the Firs Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to a sign NCSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Himbassy. & : & y NOSENKO felt that the propos ed assignment ‘by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB. policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment. After a short period of time, NCSENKO was anctormed by GRIBANOV that he, NCOSENKO, had been trans erred to supervise the Ri, . work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United 1 States Embassy. GRISANOV defined this work as being of the Lat & Gy ry @ fw ch re) ay Ta
14-00000 Si Reem ik wei be * importance, and the recruitment o£ code a asa priority aim of the KGB. KLYPIN 1 who s was Chief os the First Department, later re peated the above and a group consisting. of NOSZENKO, Gennadiy de. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V." » KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. “GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV “were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKC, NOSENKO does not claim’ that i he 2 had to train either officer or to minutely ‘scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their _ work, | According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take pr ecedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his respon- sibilities as follows: (a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy. (b) Responsibility for preliminary review of re- ports trom OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take! from microphones in the United States ambassy. g004.4165
(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy. (d} Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chie, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent, As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA, An analyst éan either accept or reject the theory that there j is necessarily = an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and cae KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must oifer some supporting evidence on this point: Pages 151 ~ 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service a of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Departm ent, 1960 ~ 1961, The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks, The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later, Comments will first be mace on the respon- sibilities listed in (a) ~ (d) above. g001 166 os
14-00000 Pages 205 - 222 of the prévious summary contain a cetalled basis for tne previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion : is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is mater ial is whe ther NOSENKO reas onably fulfilled the: requirements of the KGB for work against the particular target, John _ ABIDIAN. It is Zelé that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did. According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework, Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware ora considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand it the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the AGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV, " it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had goULL6?
‘Little material value for the SCD. ‘The *CD had advised the SCD prior ‘to the arrival of ABIDIAN: in the USSR that ABIDIAN was consideréd to be NAmerican Intelligence, " and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A, LANGELLE, who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD | was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" _ or not. The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSZNKO, which are erroneous, This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion chat NOSEN KO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1966 he prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement ; is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results. invalidate the previous conciusion that FEDOROVICH could not neve treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka priox to July 196i, COULLES
ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention that he would not t employ « a Soviet maid, “Appr oxi~ | mately three months later his close association began with Myra . KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued . until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. ‘From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit entry for cleaning purposes, - ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet 7 Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there . lu“ hoe is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three h id r,t 2 operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all ent eerenn ttn snnteer ttre ne -showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting t to note that NOSENKO | in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal pene aaende ate eee, I tains ot mee oan Re, letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel, ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a. 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigace to cover ABIDIAN, The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the goGL LES Oo ‘. YO me ee
© wens oe eeaer ea re te First Section, First Department, NOSENKO, as the tesponsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and 5 give any appropi rlate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but under the KGS or ation he would : not participate in the szveillance activities of the ‘seat Directorate, ; NOSENKO stated that had sur- veillance or agent information disclosed any personal wealmesses of. ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them, No personal weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the patt ern of coverage to | see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to another POPOV" remained ‘unchanged. Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information, According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a4 request for "operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN aproad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD., Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be of little or no practical value to tne SCD, goo 79 ps Q Tree oe LET TE A TN a8 eS Oe ty spe en hee LETETS va herNRERneunLasutnes © ae wee ye vee
Pages 216 ~ 221 of the previous summary contain a summary — on the matter of the Pushtin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December i961, jt should be noted that a current review . | of the 1964 -.1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and dia much to confuse the issue, Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved 7 the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of _ conilict or confusion. - It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. Itis also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. | NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time ox shortly after the event, There is no reason.to question his assertion that he read the report - Since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relateit to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report, NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street jeaddrop area ledto the KGB setting una stationary surveillance post : o “az Fs gou41a74
14-00000 odie! near the site which was maintained for three months and that he was informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raisea further problem . since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to ‘Geneva in mid-March 1962. / It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to NOSENKO Since 1953, or Viadislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, = Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, (First Depart- ment. Even.so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that -he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mail- ings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring- summer of 1961, | It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not spéecilically asked for any additional information regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond | g0041172
14-00000 en et os ) at) this, NOSENKO hims eif has siatec < it did not occur to him to tell us because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealed nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore he had regarded it as insignificant. This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however, derived from the already noted imability of NCSENKO to pin down a date » for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not of the visit itself after his meetings with us in Jume 1962.. ‘It should be noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY a casein the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Strect deaddrop undoubtedly became the subject of widespread interest within the KGB. ‘That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear from the record, While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has con- sciously exaggerated hig involvement with the visit and its aftermata, it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the : affair derive from honest confusion. Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inter- views leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961, These visits by ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and vreceded his start of operational goc1t7s
14-00000 i ‘ ' ' letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished Grawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission shop, a next-door axt shop, and a local post office in the area were xnown to and considered suspicious by the KGB, The entrance to the art shop, according to NOSENKO, was sO. situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, ‘and a mobile surveillance was placed « on the ar t shop for a a pert of time following the visit of ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of “ABIDIAN at the e time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO, ra Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no refer ence to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area, Jt is also clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no, differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area. circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the. Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that sit (30 December 1961). ii is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debvriefin ot NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have permitted the clarification of all issues including the ab
14-00000 there is no Goubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to _the point where compiete clarification appears impossible. In any event, . one thing is clear ~~ since he may weil have transferred out of the First Section, 5 Eaixrst Department, by 31 December 1961 and most cez tainly had transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied , ‘confus ea information regarding the Pushkin Street a affair canno tbe used . to i impugn his claim to having been case office: £ for ABIDIAN from early 1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO i a8 not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative | of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would nave had the date right. In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary re- Sf view of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGB} of "take" from micro- “|. phones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not sustained, | 1 It is not felt that the previous conciusion made suf fi pe ry i i) pte G& Ss} cr ®) jp & i¢ = i ance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually , entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone inter- epts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone reports, io prevent wide dissemination even _ a | oc GU HOLA 75 wthin tae First Section, were brought Gaily to the Deputy Chief or id his absence to the Chief and then were distributee to tne individual responsible
14-00000 a) 1 z i case officer. In this way, according to NOSZNKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chiez was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States ; Embassy as received by the section, As regards political type int ration, and according re) NOSENKO this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO had no ‘responsibility for review or timate dissemination of the infor- mation to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD. NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was Naying! and that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having difficult ty obtaining a sufficient | Q number of qualified monitor -translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all conversations in aréas covered by active microphones would have been = of interest to responsible officers ofthe First Section, OTU, according TU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An ofii
14-00000 #irst Section couid listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU to Go s0 anc as a result this was done very inirequently. It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or - transcribed all conversations even in tne thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is mot reasonable or even realistic. Itis also unrealistic to presume that any conversation con- ducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption. een mater eepennnennenntensenptenp ens AT At AL eA os ee cae that NOSE ‘NKO had to have been aware ot ‘this « or © this just because some- one had a conversation in in one ne of the xooms in which there was an active . microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the 'take!" from microphones in the United States Embassy. it is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover suff ficient portions | of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and even if he did, whether ne would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim ox in summary form, in regard to (c), the claim of NOSE NAO that he was responsible ” for maintenance of the physical secu vity file on the United States Embassy,
a er i it is not considered that there : is an adequate basis for questioning ‘this claim, The previous summary contained é conclusion ¢3 that the claim of NOSENKO + that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was - an invention, ‘The ba sis for this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted. In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place "of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUX was absent, itis considered that this claim is accepraple providing it is not con- verted into'a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything that KOVSHUK knew, NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section, These officers normally reported directly to I KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. Asan example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy. rie has stated he is sure he would have mown of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First pe w \ os gouLi78