404-10103-10079 a SECRET - SENSITIVE Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey Dated 27 November 1962 This is not a controlled item
14-00000 wae amen as 4 | Western He'aisphere, the United States éces bot intend [a= BECRET ~ a7 av November 1962 Hote: Discussed #7 Neyesher 1862 by DD/F with PCE end approved genere i!» in principle by CCI, Pully eoncurred (no by BD/P. - MKHORARDUM FOR: Director of Centrel Intelligence THROUGH: "Deputy Director (lens) SUBJECT: Operstional Pien for Cont inutng Spore tions Against Cube A ‘Action: This wemorandua is for. your information ' and pursuant to your request. . ‘Recommends tions for action ere conteined ia Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memoventys is to delineate an operational plaa for the ection which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cube for the predictabl: future. In summary the plan provides. for ecatinuing, even - Antensitying, the intelligence effort sgeinest Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into » long tern denied area type of operation of the highest priority. I. ASSUMPTIONS: ‘A. The United States Government will give public sesurances that, provided no nuclesr or offensive weapons fre , present Or | re-introduced into Cuba, end prov ided Cubs dees . nat teke action to threaten the pence: ond security: of the . HIS pean: up TS Anvade Cuba or support sn | Invasion of Cuba. A scuRCE Eo
14-00000 B. These assurances will preclude any ‘meaningful CIA - aetion ‘on a phased basis ‘to provoke a revolt inside Cube, since unless ‘there are major changes in operational and internal con- , ditions: in Cuba, ‘such a- revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in. a. matter of hours or, at ticle: few’ aay “unless “supported, by 8 haa jor, United States the non-invasion. assurances Mitten somaeeta. te addition, -e8 a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext “of. a contrived provocation such a3 an attack on Guantanamo. “ee CIA operations involving a. high noise revel and a “ diptinet, @lesient. of ‘attributebility, particularly paramilitery, " guerrillg,. ‘and coninando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of. policy. De The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for ‘the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, “but of making operational ; conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive wes pons trom Cube mey 7 serve to weaken and discredit, Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the: control of the Castro-communist regime over . Cuba hes been substantially weakenod, | Be: oThe. United States ‘assurances of. no invasion ‘and no "support ofan invasion will, in effect, constitute giving te "Castro and his regime a certain degree of senctuary. This will
eof, . Ca y Me . . om . . . pte tan! ad ; . : e ’ é ge | severely damage the aorale. and motivation of anti-regine Cubens both Angide end outside of Cube, ‘which will sake it ‘Ainerensing iy recruited, ang continue or intensify our intelligence and other effort against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime. : ie Despite. ‘the. above | factors,. Higher, Authority: probably | | ae 4 . difficult for us to. recruit agents, maintain agents already “will gontaimue heavy. _prenmurg,on the CIA: for o maximum ‘effort oo —_ -ageinst, ‘cuba. ‘end may. even continue to. contend that the ultimate. objective ie the overthrow of the. Castro-communist regime. / This. ae. an unrealistic objective, however, except. on a very | 4 Hes long-tera, basia a6 ‘the: Waited: States Governzient, We believe, poe will: be unwilling iia the- inuedinte future to commit: troops to ‘support euch, an overthrow. | The. United States Government din Ats overt. dealings with the Cupan. exiles probably will not - oxpreag. ‘the nove. factors to then. an the context. or with the " bluntness stated here. - @.. In view of these factors, the so-called “Track Tro", . course of action, 1.@., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control ‘or objective purposes _ in ‘the hope that these groups will be sble to shake the Castro regine will, although unrealistic, become _incressing ly Sttractive et various ‘levels in the United States Government. Be AB & matter of policy, political pressures and i . economic, pressures short. of blockade, raids, and ‘aggressive ‘sabotage against Cubs will be continued.
14-00000 I. ‘In view of the above assumptions prramilitary, commando and sabotege.o ‘operations, except in. rare selective instences — will serve little purpose; also they WiLL be counter-procuct ive since, it underteken, they will make the collection of intol}i- . gence more dtegioult and should only be undertrken in those very | few instances. where an unusually ‘high return crn be demonstrrted, Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for | action against Cube, it would eppear clear that Higher Authority will insist on 2 continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba. Joe ‘In view of ‘the policy factors, an iocreased use of , facilities, ‘real estate end ‘peeing outside the United States, : particularly in ‘Latin snerics, will be both necessary snd desirable. 7 om Adequate serial reconnsissance of Cuba will continue. “Based on the above essumptions, the following objectives: appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against “Cuba; A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in tsolat ing the Castro-communist regime in Cubs from, the rest of the Vestern Bemisphere and the rest of the , Free World. "B.! ” Fo. ‘the maximum extent, t possible, discrevit the Castro- . communist regine in Cuba and in the Nestern Hemisphere | and the rest of the world. . ~4=:
c. Mnintein through clandestine means, short of commando — - and guerrilla type. operations, ‘the ‘maximum economic and " politicel pressures on the Cuban reg ine and economy not only 7 for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regine, but for. the additional: purpose of dnmuniog the maximum possible drain on “ Bles 3 repources, used £0, support, Cuba. | i De Maintain. ‘maxim ‘possible: datelligence and counter- “Ante igence: coverage of Cube, ‘tneluding particular ‘emphasis — ae Capabilities and. intentions of the. governaént. cer Sg S Activities of the. Cuban G-2 and its other security orgaus. 3. ‘Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba. , 4. State of potential. résistance, including the morale. 1 and tenper of the ‘populace. oe gle “Militie and military order of battle and equip- ment. - a | 6. The loci of power and of possible stresses ‘and strains in the power centers in the Cuben goverunent. 7, Relationships between Cubs, USSR, Red Chins, the Bloc, Latin American nations snd other Free Wor td ‘end uncommitted nations. . | 8.. The level of and. the weaknesses in the Cuben “o-sogonony « _ oe ° | 7
ow, ae. , ee ® . B. Trke max Lenin action to induce & aplit in the Cuban rogine ond maintein the capability of capitalizing. immediately through clandeatine means to the extent possible on any ; aignificent uprising, revolt, resistance, eplit in the regine, a or strains end stresses emong Cuban leadership or in Cuben/ yp Bloe, relationships, a TIT, OPERATIONAL PLAN: 7 _-Bapionage and intelligence Collection - Aud fersible -_ effort should be uncerteken to continue snd intensify intelli- gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli- gence: ‘eollection, and elated operational activity at the : present time and its development ‘during the past eix months -is delinested in detail in Attachment A, which was preprred te . serve as the basis for. the ic's report on this particulser matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. “You will note that this lengthy: document bresks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed. by the Clandestine Service. Set . out below aro specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to: continue and, as possible, incresse tn- telligence coverage of Cuba. 1. Intelligence Exploitation < of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of sir ._ytravel the ‘heavy’ flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled “almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection -G—
with ¢ the cont ingency plenning for supporting any posible military action. vin Cuba, the Opa-Locke. Interrogation “ - Center as such was dismantled, although. the personnel of the ‘Center have been retained intect. In order to /_ Fe-eatablish, the flow of intelligence from refugees, at Ms proposed . that Pan Auerioan Airways and KLM be i - daducea: to. reiustitute ‘their: regular flights from - Havana ‘to Miami, This should be done s8 soon ag . - possible after the settlement of. the current negotintions and UN digcussions, Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be r re-established “with the game personnel. - : 2. ‘Resident Agente in Cuba: Every effort. will be made to 6 continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of. and, where necessary, re-satabligh connmunica~ thos with the 131 recruited agents. now: resident in Cuba. “To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort . will of course depend upon the stringency of future | Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to sccurately forecast. - 3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re- cruiting agents in third countries for diepatch to Cuba will be. reiterated. end strengthened and every effort ‘je WALL be nade to increase this coverage, both. through eae Acvelopment of additional resident agents in Cuba
14-00000 vo 9 Jo a a: 4. Operations: | We will continue to press the | | |who are aesisting us in the effort. : end through the development of additionnl legal travellers. 3 | agninst Cuba for additional coverage, including the i recruiting of egents within their own rerens for joint i dispetch to Cube. The most effectively co-~ “opereting at this point in this connection are the Direct ~ approaches to several of these[ sf either by you | personally or in your name, ss you prefer, sre being separately recommended. Personal ropresentation } by you to the bnderlined ebove would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other | . with which we are in contact and reiterate to those | appearing to have any assets usable sgainst Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. | In connection with the[ ss Pproblem generally, we will | endeevor to induce «ll of the to make greater use of their | assets, both inside and . outside of Cuba. Perticular attention will be given to | | | possible utilizetion of the| | eo. 8. Maritine Operations: In addition to increasing | efforts to get nt sermon sgents end other aaritime assets through | | we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen anc <7
14-00000 prrticulerly Cuban seamen, to increane the twenty officers und crew members aboard six Cubsn veasele we sre now rupning as controlled agents. | G2 Penetration of Cuban Installations Abrosd: At the present time we sre running 12 Cuben diplomats stationed outside Cube as controlled agents and have viable | ~ operations ained et an sdditional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current progren of attempting te recruit or defect every Cuben officin!} represeutstive abrord to whom we can gein access pod concerning whom we have eny reason to belleve ae susceptibility to approach exists. These additiongel penetrations will be attempted both through oo operations end where eppropriate in conjunction with Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Gee ww AB a. Abroed: At the present time we have sudio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban offici¢cl installations ————— | Ko mejor expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey eddition:t targets of opportunity and wherever possible instell coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-~- “gence from this type of source over and above whet we are now receiving would sppeer to make such installirtion - worthwhile, om Bon
14-00000 4 my éoununicrtions Intelligence: Ve will continues our present CIA Close Support coverage froma the KOLA station in[ at the same level end will continue to press NSA for cdditionsl coverage of Cuban comaunicer- tions. As the current situstion “nermelizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute end perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of: Cuban communications. . 9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed egainst Cuba either by dispatching the sgent to Cuba or by pointing the agent ageinst Cubrn targets, this will be done, except in those cases vhers such action would result in unacceptabl¢ prejudice te the operations in the sren where the ngent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there sre 65 penetrations of verious communist perties. Of this 65, the survey we bave conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 27 will be directed against these targets unlesa in uny cose eothere, ere overriding reasons. to, he. contrary, The a? oremaining cases, ‘in the total of. 65 are bein individually oo" qeamined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban trrgets.
“Tilegally Infiltrated Agents: The two sdcconstsa black infiltrated teans ‘(COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, ‘resupplied, end reinforced but pointed “primarily at continued intelligence collection and rt the recruituent for intelligence collection purposes of other, Cubans who already are legally resident in Cubs. in the areas. where the tenns are operating (Piner del “Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the nost carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, ‘additional _, Rgents. and teans will be: infiltrated black into Cuba ‘in an effort to. duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to. recruit and, ee | possible, train additional agents legally resident in _ Guba. “ane. Exfiltration: As feasible, sgents and potentiri recruits now dn Cuba will. be exfiltrated for | . training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, - and motivation, They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where ponsible, this will be done through legal travel] channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever . feasible through our black infiltration-extiltration | fachiities, prinmaity | our maritine assets. -ll-
te) weaken, | subvert. ox. B, Much of the: above effort, aa noted wiil be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences ‘of streas or strain within the regine and between. the regine and other _ uations, particularly the Blec, An intensive program will ba continued to teke advantage of any possible opportunity Lit the, xe ine in apy asible - fammtons, This Ae basically: ® Jong ‘tern effort. A great deal ar 2 work. elready has. gone into this and the current . status ca this. progran and the proposed . further expldtation of. ‘the ‘numerous’ ieads we ‘have developed is being.made, in the. interests of brovity in this memorandum, the subject of B separate ‘compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed rt actually splitting ‘the regine, i.e@., 2 palece ‘revolt, will of course. depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it 1s entirely possible that! any: ‘such effort might - fail unless supported with: military “forces which on ‘the basis of the. assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely. - Babe botage: On the basis of the sesumptions set out. above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acta of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve littie purpose end should: not. be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with eeceptibte rigk: to: do Bajor ‘damage to the: Cuban @conony . It. is proposed - to continue. searching for such Limited opportunities, ‘but. MO. ‘active or wide scale program is contemplated. SE a ee SE EE
14-00000 wy SN D. Paranilita Commando snd Guerrille rations: Given the Assumptions ia Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken, However, we : propese ‘to maintain in being our prosent fecilities and the onpebllity of undertaking such operaticns in order to {| fully exploit any ‘substantial change in internal Cuban con- _ ditions or eny substantial revolt or uprising which might occur, RE. Economic Warfore: | It is proposed to continue and " intensify the progran #lready undertaken to deny through ‘clandestine and covert means critics] materials to the Cuben tn eee. - 7 _ Sconomy. ‘This: consists primarily of deniel operations, possibly 7 gone Preclusive buy ing and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firns and governments to prevent the GShipmenta of atrategic materials, to Cuba. . os — FF, Sounterintelligence: The current couaterintelligence ) oe end counterespionage progran against the Cuban G-2 end | related services will be continued end &@ possible intensified. . This program hes developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming menths to incresse its effectiveness , considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intellt. : gence. operations mounted against United States interests : from Cuba, — , . oe . G. Political Action, Propaganda, Paychologien} Warfare: ; out In this tlenr tne following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified: | — \ “i. Assist and support State in any feasible acticn. . . «1l3-
14-00000 to develop end exploit current OAS and Latin Anericrn nO attitudes favorable.to the containsent pnd/or overthrow of the Crstro—communiat regine. ~ 2, 2 Assist State in ‘the development of post-Crratre concepts, leaders, end political groups. 3. Stimilate, support. and guide covertly the “Propaganda and political action activities of the cre end other Cuban political Groups tnd individuals, ra pppropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside he Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the - - Cuban people to resist Castro-commnisn, making maxinun use of the downgrading of Castro ond his regime during | the missile crisis. 3. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime ~ in Cuba, in the Heuisphere snd elsewhere, with emphosis on the theme the missile crigis demonstrsted con- clusively that Cestro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialisn, . 6 Continue "Radio Anericas" ond other CIA. Sponsored Cuban exile radio brosdcasts +a appropriate. 7. Leunch prepagands balloons after an operationn! capability has been established and policy authority is ' Granted to conduct Propaganda balloon operations, 8, Continue the infiltration of propaganda materin1 into Cuba via open mails, legal travellera and courlers, ‘with special emphasis on selective black operations. ~14..
om i OR, Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue a the clrhdestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collectina, psychological warfare and other 2pproved missions. “As fesaihle, we will act to mount ss much of this effort es possibie from areas outside the continental United Stater, end particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides “on | a “Track Two" concept. or on. any, ‘gBimilar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directad section operations of Cuban groups against Cubs, At is believed that efforts should be made to transfer &8 much as possible oh of the. responsibility for thia non-Glandestine, non-intelligences type. operation inte the political ‘field, which ig the province 1 of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed at would be rdvisable to press for tho creation within the | Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs te | menaie the overt government relationships with Cuban exile | groups. , - IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES : Maxioaun dup lementation ef the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementationof related programs as outlined, and the Tuintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity ag well as take advantage of any future substantial changes "4m internal Cuban conditions will, it-1s believed, permit and make adviseble the following: \ “ 15. each aie | a hoe is
14-00000 7 4 A, A gracual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and pergonnel of Task Force W. ee B, Consideration of the. re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly ss 6 major coaponent of the WH Divinion under different direction. C. The abolition of the operational longoose mechanism, Dd, The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operations] deteils and decision by committee cn points which tt. is believed ore completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision, Ve ‘RBCOMMENDED ACTION: A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan - Se recomended. B. -It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence. c. It is recomended thst you secure from the Special} Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Yan American Airways and ELM to resume their flighta between Niant end Hsvena ot the appropriate time. | bp. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concert is proposed, you endesvor to transfer to the Departaent of State all possible ‘overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled . ~16—
ge subsigy end support, of ‘Cuban oxtte. groups. | ae B.: It is eccnmended that. the Mongoose operations} mechanion be abolished. | ee iz you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be nade to you, concerning. the re~posttioning: of Teak Force | coe within the DD/P. 7 WILLIAM K, HARVEY | Eater, Task Force Ww 17
Draft) tie (43 Nev, 1962 vals wedit ‘the ‘Gesteo/, Communi at Fegine in Guba NS Eve a . | ele Coverage 9: onHIS pocuts ent 1S age of Cuban intelliger > 1A SOUF.CE REFERENCE -- "IN. oS ‘PISTORECAL - PAPER.. NO., - 00. Nor. DESEROY— a et A A A Pay : oy es a Bs Be a prepared to capitalise on any significant HTesjot iene peungradleg end chitiiieation Sit ad
14-00000 a fet wee to on Cuban-Bloe relationshiys. | ms - - “ Covertly support the. abave-cited ws 8. | national — with 1 partieular cophaste ca the following: s+ Capabilities and intentions of the Castro : Activition of Cubes ¢ o-2, Soviet aativitian 4 ta Cuba, is re ‘soviet/Cuban and Ghinese/Cohen relationshipe. oh Some | asotet. acd support State in any feasible aation to de roe develop active 08s and Latin-averican country supper! of Castro, GROUP 4 Excluded trom sotematic a “nerading and ftties ‘SilicatHon “er eareractanae SHHSITVE
14-00000 i | rentetance sxeup or wprtetag. oo Ore a » a, Be Prepared to support, approved "a 8. mi liters plank appa ne Te entertake = the ‘eye asad tas, cu would be required ashiys . ot third meet a who have ‘potential ‘access tn significant An fereren § 4 en Oe valk (tare pee sianSiond « San PORT) The pit cor - Expanaton of commmicati arel @ partiauler- | wt ta the: e2, "et and nilicte nets. (thir CRA: uP 4 Exely ta. ty. 4 automatic C8 cracne ang oS pating
14-00000 ARNUP 4 Feats oft trom ay fgreaite I 2 a4 fi '