104-10051-10250 SECRET Le cme SUBJECT : Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File. “Regarding Allega- i tions of CASTRO Cuban’ ‘Inyolvement in the 7 John F. KENNEDY. ‘Assassination TION, yy” ‘Letter by Davia, We Belin to REFERENCE : | 2 , Mr. E. ‘Henry Knocks, 15 April 1975, parag 73 eustding Public Statement by CASTRO, QECSY, attached | . 4 BACKGROUND _ 2 1. .On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, , Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy _keception in — __ a Havana: even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal SeEiaRaeepeaaS caccesteeiiamemiaiatiaianid interview by the Associated Press correspondent, a eel Daniel HARKER. ; 2. HARKER's interview reached New. York on Sunday, 8 September, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, 9 September. There: canbe no question from the De facts surrounding the" ‘CASTRO appéarance, which had not been expected, and his agreement | ‘to. the interview, that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States. ® SECRET COCiS og I) Fain’ 3 , ST A . . : : nee MODE COM | | i hy ! tf: , . al AD BUY | pace 63 orel ic COPY HO.
14-00000 ¢ . oy * SECRET, SS | a 3. CASTRO'S statements > to HARKER covered | a range of topics but dealt principally with, ‘nageican political leadership, in particular Président KENNEDY, whom he ex [ene coe coriated in extraordtharsd (" ... KENNEDY is Sore" ... the BATISTA of his times ... the most opportunistic American President of all time ..."). 4. The interview also contained an uncomplimentary reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing ‘the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the New York Times and Washington papers, with a result that CASTRO's . "message" was significantly modulated. a of 5. in New, Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided oo ir oeeeenmermumuenaeanal until the middle‘of: séptember | 1963, the HARKER story “> appeared in the principal morning papery, the Times-Picayune, on Monday , 95 piembesp—page—7, under a | three-column head-- line: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." The story followed under the HARKER by~line: | "Havana (AP) ~- Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: ‘U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba. ? SECRET CUCES 37 YOUN ia Tinh f , us Wy dud ij I _. PAGE 6 of * copy No. Pogeigeren 5H esd) - -
14-00000 f ot ’ SECRET ok. "Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted™ “raids on Cuban terri- ee Ee tory Castéo said: . Wey re prepared to ~ : ; ‘ i i i i fight’ them and ansie? in kind. U.S. leaders NC mee ishoulid- thank: abate if they are aiding terror- ist plans Yo eliminate Cuban leaders, they | themselves will not be safe.’ -® ... World affairs ... seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ‘ago, but now this trend has changed with . attacks. "'Phe U.S. is always. ready to negotiate . and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the oe " October crisis. They have been broken as. sean _ be seen with new attacks. “'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's ...'" | 6. The ‘New York Times, in its coverage on 9 September, used a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post did an abbreviated re- write (9 September, page A~7) which, similarly, omitted any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO's remarks. ® 3 SECRET , CUCi cas IVE TR AVATRAAN Na\S2a a erah UCAS ELL LS DOG asters a £3. dof 2he IRAs edi OPE
14-00000 t , , * SECRET. we wok | The Evening Star of Washington, Dd. C., printed_the HARKER story nearly. in its entixety in the second section of the paper (3 September 1963» Lage B-4) and reworded the content of tHe, HABKER dntenview, placing the emphasis on the po- . ONO litical asgeege— in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER elements and burying CASTRO‘'s warning to the United States leadership in the middle of the piece. “FJ. There is no evidence in the files on the KENN | assassination)that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission and its staff although Mexico Station specifically directed \ netomat epnar nerve Ua Ase tees ESO TICES enn I ELODIE EE ES SE ntsneetaatetdt Headquarters attentio tothe AP story very shortly after the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears nd ao to. have been forgotten | in the contemporary political eonsid~ eration of relations with CASTRO'S ‘Cuba. ‘There is no ‘evidence cin the Agency records, either, that ‘the Waxcen Gonnission | staf “Ltsel£ pursued the SSETIGGLNS GF Ua TRS Tocco in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything along these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader beford the assassination. 8. The purpose of this review, undertaken at Mr. Belin's xequest, is to reconsider Lee Harvey OSWALD’s “activity on the: assumption that. as an avid newspaper reader — which we know _ From testimony of Marina OSWALD and others - he read the ‘CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results % , 4 SECRET? COCLESS a *s hy cre wm ote mH op) a .
14-00000 ¢ . : . ra . SECRET. . PN ~.of the review, admittedly heavily using the 20-—-20 quality of. hindsight,” may be e stiblated in summary: <: x Be There is. no increment of credible C i Cen ne | ? 2 ae efidence,. applying this phrase stfictly, of saa ” NN woe" : . . . . . ‘ : oo Soviet ‘aadVor Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement in the as- xs tsb ss Grp GP pt ater eetataATaE AAT SEE AA DATE ELT P LTO EOE LTT S, sassination to what was developed and con- : LO — | sidered by the Warren Commission and - its | | staff. The Commission's finding that | ‘ Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them in alone and of his. own determination stands. . a | | B.  “Cxredible evidence” that would ae “upset of significantly modify this judgement . .. ‘did (and does) not exist in Washington. But ~~ team, such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or . Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and quality, designed to cover up any admissions of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD which might be related directly or indirectly with the assassination. Therefore, the belief that there was Soviet and/or Cuban [(K B_and/or See a eee Or a rien DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and ene P TENSE TEM TALE TE ALE TT CROSS RES aren: 5 SECRET ce een wilhyliiiiis edit td i al wen Wy
14-00000 | 7 REP NGL WoT PROGID ¢f . a. coe SECRET ae row until there: tiags een a full disclosure - katie ieee incense Saket os mmr —. by these governments of all elements of. EI ag: TERETE er oem, OSWALD! ‘Ss handling as tay in the Soviet Union ec NT sot eee a ae LO EIEN ena REadY of The oy Pears AI BD IH, ‘wider "window" for this contingency. ‘That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level, particularly in the counterintelligence com- ponent in‘the CIA in. 1964. As was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue .t6" <> regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as y % OO still open.” eos LES Ce. In the absence of séaigional of new ” _etenents of. “credible” evGende, ahepe are a "nuances" in the ‘record, that ene ge as note~ | worthy, in the light of other conclusions. | These are reviewed and summarized below, item- | by~item. , | . \ | d. CASTRO'S warning and threat of 7 September 1963 = “if OSWALD did indeed read ~ ny mS, 7 Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. -. KENNEDY. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Hearings, Vol. V., pp. 120 - 129. See especially p. 124 — "Mr Helms: ‘Yes. I would assume the case could never be closed.' : ® mS 6 SECRET ves G8 oe 212 core No.
14-00000 a Co . SECRET. | it in New Orleans “must be considered of - 4 great significance. in the light of the \ | oO pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/ \ ; . | aggxessive inakeup after his attempt to kill . General WALKER. early in April 1963 and his identification with Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly trace- able as far back as his Marine Corps . sexvice in El Toxo, California. CASTRO's| warning and threat, given to AP corres- pondent HARKER, irrespective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even. _ Security service contact with’ OSWALD: _ by the Cubans or the Russians - was an act - of singular irresponsibility and under no ‘circumstances. was - excusable . as retorsion _ for what the Cuban emigres were doing during) the summer of 1963. : A CUBAN CONTACT WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, EARLY 1959 (?) 9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of ~ Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group | 7 SECRET CUES ge.
14-00000 ~ To “member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine. Corps: Base December 1958 ~- September 1959. om wf The Warren ‘Commission. ‘Report takes note of this: ¢ ee "wt SECRET a t } <CPOswALD. kod DELGADO that he was in Kays Wii Saban diplomatic officials in SO} this country, which DELGADO at first took . to be ‘one of his lies, but later . _believed.'"2 10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the OIE EP LO LT TE nnn OID - | language of the report, and its implications do | not appear : oS ' aS a Se AT ke HiT to have been run down or developed by investigation. Thus - << _the record of the beginning of oswaLD!s relationship wi with the Cubans starts with a questi n mark. Oe a ile The period was one of transition in Ue Ss. ~ Cuban : “relations after CASTRO" s. takeover. OSWALD, and. DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particu~ larly keen about how to get to the island. DELGADO testi- fied: " ... I didn't know what to tell him, so. I tolé him'the best thing that I know was to 2 Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Report, p. 687. SO 8 SECRET Celgene iio ©) PAGS 10. of 12 COPY NO. oe eS
14-00000 _~ SECRET ¢ get in touch with a, Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time, that Bytold him this -— we oS were on friendly tems with Cuba, you know, so this wasn! cx nosubversion or malintent, < a ‘ass ae you kings. EGhaa' t know what to answer him. NS . x told him to see them. °after a while he told me he was in , contact with them... . - —~ o.. " we» L seen this envelope in his. foot~ Co locker, wall-locker, and it was addréssed to a hin, and they had an official seai on ity and” - . as far as I could recollect that was.imai}’’from Coe” vas ; Los Angeles, and he was tel? Ry Suigle was we, caer Cuban Consul. ‘And just after he started | “receiving these letters ~ / you see, he would: never go out, but stay near the post all the. time ... , " ..- he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visiter. Lt was aman, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at.the front gate. this mari had. “to be a civilian, otherwise they would . have Yet him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down 9 SECRET L 7 i
14-00000 “etme ¢ ~ SECRET. oo there to visit with this fellow, and they spent a - about an hour and a half, two hours, talking, ne e I guessx and he ‘came “back. I don't know who the man Was: ‘ox what! they talked about, but he looked nonchaianG about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing. "Mr. LIEBELER: How long did he talk to him, do you remember? no "Mx. DELGADO : About an se ahd, shalt, Se ; two hours ... Ny aod - "Mr... LIEBELER: rougher tee éswatn who this fellow was t mS sa tether’ to? "Mr. DELGADO : No. No . "Mx. LIEBELER: Did you connect this visit. that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban a Consulate? "Mr. DELGADO : I did; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a. late date ~- time. Also, up to this, time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom . received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used. tor pick. up the mail for our unit and distribute at te, the guys in there, and very seldom did I ‘ever see one for him. But every so often, after he started to get in contact with ? 10° SECRET | !
14-00000 > —. . os REPRELUOTION PROGIBITED ft . a ow SECRET ca these Cuban people, RNasarted getting letter i . I pamphlets and _nefsnaser | OM uae Sou Soe nn ete receiving letters, N . BRS , ate oat ow maybe pamphlets, you ww AN know, Hig te church, things we get from church, you ow, but it wasn't a church. mo - "Mx. LIEBELER: Were they written: ye Spanish, any of them, do you know? — “ nea "Mr. DELGADO : Not that | can an recall no. to believe that these things ¥ e@ to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate? | a Nr DELGADO : Weld, | I took it for granted. that they did after I seen ‘the envelope, you know eos _ something ‘like a Mexican eagle; with a: big, impressive seal, ou “ghow. They had aif- ferent colors on ite “red and white; almost looked like cur dolor you But I can't recall the seh giepnen it was in Latin, S2 S Sobhin eae. XY couldn't under—_ L . "Mr. LIEBELER: You don't know for sure United, s stand. It was” whether it was. from the Cuban Consulate? ll SECRET. cs Co on, ped 6 na cr) PAGE T 3 of ele COPY No.
14-00000 “we SECRET prior, just. befoxe 3 afound that envelope in his a Sp ~~ ° wall locker n, that newes receiving mail from ae "Mr. OS o. But he had told me . | Ress | but’ ~<A CN interested because at the \S) SS time we hati work to do, and I never did ask , ; i to see that paper again, you know. "Mr. LIEBELER: Did he tell you what his~% correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about? . | | ae Paes | "Mr. DELGADO : No, he didn ea — : wr gY "Mr. LIEBELER: Did he ovGx Gidincta tor you _ | that it had to do with the ne corel that: you had about: going over to Cuba? "Mr, DELGADO : ‘No. The: only thing he oo told me was that right after he had this con~ - versation with the Cuban people was that he was > going to - once he got out of the service ~ he was going to Switzer?and wee 73 : 12. OSWALD''s application to Albert Schweitzer. College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to xeport there. on 20 April 1960. Destined for dischaxge £rom.the Marines on 7. December 1959, OSWALD. . e .¥ 3 Hearings, Volume VIII, pp. 241 - 243. 12 SECRET
14-00000 "ow SECRET accelerated his exit.-6n. grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On: 27 September 1969 he was issued a Ne U.S. passport Walid” Fox. ‘travel - among other places to i) PES” a an < Cuba and tha\uSER,_“He, entered the Soviet Union from LAAN S AS oer \S LP ae Finland on Qs a 1959, - oe 13. veuanpa® vestinom, has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention — | | on the male visitor who contacted OSWALD at EL Toro Camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two houxs. The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, and actually Oe ( : there is nothing like it - on the record ~ in, everything else ‘we know about OSWALD' s activity in the United States before OF. after his return to the United States. The: record reflects “no: identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO''S: presump- tion is that he was fxm she Cuban Consulate ain’ ‘Los, Angeles. Assuming. that, the questions are: Who was at, and was ar there reporting from_ Los? les to Washington and Havana mn Sa? that could, in: 1 Getect “Fepresent the opening of a Cuban LE" file on OswRED? of fos SG SS " "PREDICTION Se IDENT KENNEDY'S DEMISE BY COMMUNIST — PARTY CELL LEADER’ MORSE BENITEZ ZABOLA, 1962 ~ 14. Guatemala Station forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a 4 u.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were. severed On 3 January 1961. Sy oP ® . . ~ 13 SECRET
14-00000 _preoccupy oursapvés over the politics of President KENNEDY - ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY | IN THE nage, * KENNEDY’ assassination, indicated that at the Soviet ‘reception . > “a a “\ - penetration dated 3. January 1962 describing events at the SECRET — “ : yearly Communist! Party ‘cen. meeting. The cell leader, | | Morse BENITEZ fabola, ‘said’that the Communist Party in 7 a Guatamata: should forw’& single new party; “We need not. ND vs because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present year, 1962.” 15. This report apparently had been discounted when - it was received and was not forwarded vitil the Station — ; re-reviewed all of its material after thé assassination. __ The file reflects no follow-up or formal dissemination of the report. 4 NOVEMBER (1963 16. A sensitive liaison source, reporting: after ‘the: on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids “on: Cuba and their implications with a host~country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: " ... Just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: . a . "Just wait, just wait." 17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have ~ ‘. oo? _— SECRET BURG Oo — . pace 16 ce Cle COPY Ho.
14-00000 SECRET Ve ~ |. a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled OY from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966. INTERCEPTED: CONVERSATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, LUISA CALDERON , _KFTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER 1963 18. “AE “ugs0giexico City time, about five hours after. the XS” oS KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named a *Luisa” received a telephone call in Spanish from an unide: =! tified male outside. 19. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. "Luisa” jokingly replied: “Yes, of ‘eours®; | Ea knew it almost before KENNEDY ... Imagine, one, two, three and “now; that makes. three [she laughs], what barbarians} | vied “20. Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the. -. assassination. “"Euisat 3 also statea that the party at. aN 2 ad ' Silvia DURAN's had been “called off so it would nok ‘appeae that they were. celebrating, the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have ‘the. party’ coindide with the burial. Finally she Saas ' said she planned to hove that night into the house of a doctor (a won friend. 21. Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion. of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation. 15 SECRET : |
14-00000 SECRET | : | : i i 22. The tenuous, enignmatic character ofthe conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts: a. “Luisa” was -probabl Luisa CALDERON, a.cadre worker of the Cuban _ Directorate. .Genéral of Intelligence (DGI). a aa NN Yeturned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported oe | “to be working in DGI Headquarters. | —————"}. fhe DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally ‘as the replacement of the Consul Eusebio AZCUE {departed 19 November 1963). The*deputy DGT_ . chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) ; was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez. . ae ¢. ‘The "Silvia DURAN” named in Luisa’s © - conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who dealt with OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 September to the Cuban installation§ in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness on the . record regarding OSWALD's activity in Mexico City. “Her testimony, however, in its — entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct 16 * SECRET
14-00000 a SECRET confrontation with her was requested by the > Warren Commission staff but rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia DURAN's ~ statements: ‘that it was learned that OSWALD» x . becameZ engaged in a personal altercation on 27 sept imber with Eusebio AZCUE. d. Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, _ Rogelis RODRIGUEZ Lopez, were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the activé development ‘and facilitation of the training of. Nicaraguan “agents for the. purpase of assassinating coe a . _. General Annstasio SOMOZA. VEGA, “it is estab 7 Be : Geren “lished, was on post. in ‘Mexico City during. : OSWALD’ s stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about VEGA that all individuals going to Cuba, legally ‘or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took fifteen days.° For example, VEGA would have handled the details of the visa action and facilitation of the trip to Cuba via Mexico City from 28 December 1962 ~ 21 January 1963 that. ® 17 SECRET
14-00000 SECRET There-is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that a 23. Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitative interrogation, ‘that would have related her dealings with * ns MRAM eB SPER RS asa rene, one . A-SISHANL WO Beta tenga applications to be handled solely by a local employee and | ‘were not asked at the time. seems unlikely especially because VEGA is “later ited by” ~ . va oo ostianny knowaioe confirmed by intercept, with the’ data held ~) SE on the Cubs DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD’s, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the a lame duck like ‘AZCUE whose slot had been taken, by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, ‘they . ot And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it Rave-happened without the knowledge, and participation of the DGI personnel. above cited? “This a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD It is clear made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. CASTRO'S overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfacéd in the DURAN ‘was taken by Vincent Theodore LEE, the organizer of the ' Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which OSWALD established relations from Dallas during the period 19 April - 2 November 1963. There is an overlap between LEE's and VEGA's travels to Havana during that period: VEGA departed Mexico City on 6 January for Havana and returned . on 13 February 1963. 18 SECRET. a COC4E 53 “pace 80 of 212 COPY ie.
14-00000 aa ° ’ + | SECRET ~ statements. Coming back to the beginning: “Luisa” - Luisa CALDERON -.as a meitber of the DGI unit in Mexico City - equid ver well have known something that would make what ' she said to. her unidentified caller less a matter of boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at the time. a nee oN? SILVIA puRANS SUBSTANTIAL AMPLIFICATION OF ADMISSION OF ALLEGED PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, 1967 24. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. {In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquin Hernandez ARMAS, "because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the ques- > ‘tion whether Silvia DURAN had been asked about Jor been EE 7 offered? ] money payments by her Mexican interrogators. y- 25. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN. was reported by a reliable and sensitiye source to have .-.. cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, Of how she had been taken. into custody and had been. interrogatea ae after the assassination repeated what was already . known. ~" She added, under circumstances that did nét permit the.” source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail; that Ss 19 a SECRET. PR ines i | | HP UARGAT yO] Hr
14-00000 ¢ | - : SECRET she had gone ont with OSWALD during his stay -in Mexico City and claimed she ha@ sexual relations with him. Con Los ALLEGATIONS OF “CONS PERATORIAL CONTACT BETWEEN OSWALD AND CUBAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ALLEGATIONS OF (A): :-ELENA GARRO DE PRAZ AND (B) OSCAR CONTRERAS, ° a. x. ea es _ 26 a Be warren Commission reported, "Literally ‘dozens of aNegations ofa conspiratorial contact. between rere parece aa NE A = neers PE EET SE CTE POPPE erent eaeererrresitertitintanetenaee ota EN a OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been ee investigated ..."® Among these cases, which consumed ne hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad aN a “ and Similarly the FBI in the United States, * was the” Hl 4 | | i H : i i SS Se Nicaraguan walkin in ‘Mexico City, 26 Novae E83, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. 27. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "Dp." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money some time in mid-September 1963 in a meeting in a patio of the Cuban Consulate in See Report, p. 305 ££. ~-Some of the others were the cases of Ylario ROJAS Villenueve in Cozumel and Guadaloupe, the allegations of Enrique Ruedolo GONGORA in New York City, the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT, Santa Clara Prison Farm, California, and the allegations of Ray DOBKIN's. 5 a a See Report, pp. 307 ~- 308. a . ° 20 SECRET
14-00000 Mexico city. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraphy\on which ALVARADO showed evidences of deception, and by bringing ALVARADO's former Nicaraguan ST EEE EEE al security service contrat into the case_ os. 28. The ALVARADO, story is a particularly acute repre- oe | | | | sentagion:of the gt#ticulties that beset the evaluation of observed egasice: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. ALyARAbO, ‘whose account “aid not become public ‘until the release’ of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistantly « of ‘the presence in the Cuban Consulate trangaction of a ‘Negro with red-dyed hair. yQ AS oa } . CS 29. j%$Elena GARRO de Paz.is a mecurial, argi¢ulate.and ~ socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official | is also the cousin of Horacio pURAN |) the: husband of Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Blena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism, 30. From Cctober 1564 until his retirement in the fall of 1959, a U.S. Embassy officer, Charles THOMAS, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRO's account of what. had actually ‘gone on between OSWALD, the . Cubans and: in particular Silvia DURAN in September. 1963, ‘including a repeated reference to a Negro with red-dyed hair. . 21 SECRET GoCiss6 “pes 8 3 ; op CL 2 COPY iid.
14-00000 | _ SECRET . __. - | i 31. ‘he first reference to the GARRO story was noted in a Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964: "Elena GARRO . [said] that she and her = 7 daughter were invited, ‘to a party at the Cuban Embassy ‘during the perioa she now finds out ed that'dSyatin was’ here in Mexico prior to the assassinStion: ‘She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband | a is a cousin of the GARRO family [Horacio DURAN]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place that - ‘she asked someone in the Cuban, Embassy ‘about them and was told that "they: were just passing through.’ She claims that on “the way ‘these three Gringos stood out she took’a good look at them as did her daughter. When the _ assassination occurred and OSWALD’s picture was spread into the newspapers, hoth Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos ‘without a doubt’ at the party.” ; . | 32. GARRO repeated her story to Mr. Charles William THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965: 22 SECRET
14-00000 ¢ * _¥ SECRET “in September 1963\after her return from abroad, she went ~ to a party ® ‘acconipanied by her daughter, at the home of ot on Ruben : DURAN Temphasiis added]. Ruben is one of the two -_ beothers: of Horacio DURAN, who married her cousin. She Nek oswiazn, ana two other young Americans. At the party she SS Siecouragea from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul AZCUE, General Clark FLORES, Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO and a Latin American . Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. ‘tn November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there." ‘shortly afterward, she and her Saughter. were visited by a. ‘friend, ‘Manuel CARVILLO lor. cALVEELO1, then an. official in the . Secretariat of tiie. Goberndcion and were told he had orders. y to escort eee! a _ sinabb and obscure hotel in the center wee yea’ of frowns They were: kept there for eight days under pretext SAS? that thes ger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the Ameérican Embassy and explain what she knew of © OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of © Communist spies... - | 33. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further” interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and 8 : These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers at the time. * 23 SEC RET eaciccs Mbacmiil out ‘PAGE or ; we Core wm).
14-00000 {- ae SECRET. in certain particalars significantly modified her earlier a account. She’ “also- ‘acknowledged that she and her daughter had been | fhterviewed by Embassy officers co whom she claimed they aid’ not give, a "very ‘complete story because the Embassy osticged did not appear to give mach credence to “A on . anything ‘they said. a 34. It developed that GARRO and daughter had been a xs interviewed by the Lega fouember 1964. Her information had beén similar to what che‘Glained i in her BY uiries a account to THOMAS but had not been subst Gtiated: by The FBI representative therefore considered the\mattex closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on. 27 December 1964 and to the Ambassador en 25 February 1965. 3: the embassy Balitical ofticer, however, persisted in’ his” interviews and reporting. In a memorandum of conversation, A 13 July 1966, GARRO identified the place to which she had been | CLLEGE LLL A CL CLEC NAN N ee c taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out_aifimmatively: -GARRO was at the Hotel 23 - 24, 25 ~ 27 and 28 — 30 november, 1963. }. In another, on 7 February 1967, GARRO's cotinling Wicissitudes with the Cubans are set out. And sina Sn ogecios's: xetirement from U. S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, — | | 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO interviews. ” 24 SECRET
14-00000 y ry vt, ( . ~ . yay ‘ei ie . a a ° os SECRET. "—~-" “36. There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the . “” events she described.as havin occurred_in_the Mexican mn capital in September 1963 never coincided with the confirmed data o£ SWALD' s presence there. Her story, however, had twa points co pgtuant’ {ett allegations by others ‘regarding | one corneas Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could, gS s allegations regarding the however, have been gleaned from the Warren Commission's published account of the ‘ . os ss cere rete nepnennann rte a EEE OTE ne ENE ENT tn RET REET ES EESMECTONONUNNENETNT —* ep case] and . o : aoe b. Silvia DURAN's later claim of KEIN a we a Ws Ee _ ae be '-37. ‘Beginning in March and amplified an Mag 3967, ‘the hey intimate personal contacts with osw American Consul, Benjamin J. RUYLE, in T ampica: developed « a ae eontact: with a ‘loca mexican journalist, . (Oscar CONTRERAS Lartigue, who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963. . 38. In June 1969 CONTRERAS was interviewed by a CIA officer: ee a 7 | He. “studied. law at the University of Mexico for three “yQe5) approninately 1960 ~ 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro~-CASTRO revolutionary. group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD. | | 25 . SECRET Cucil OG pags 87 , 2l2 or. COFY NO.
14-00000 ueTte a, 7 SECRET case he was extremely cautious and although he co was not able Qk wibling to give dates and names, he ei d.oswARD visited the University 5 ~~ of Mexig@ Gaitpust shprtly after the Cuban Ges ese Bie a visa to visit Cuba. ‘e) nef Ssauisies regarding pro-Cuban a groups at the University and was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend. | | | OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons. | | as they came out of a round-table discussion. . held in the faculty of Philosophy. “OSWALD told the group it was urgent. tat he visit . cuba, and the Cuban. Embassy ha@“dentea: him | a ad visa. He requested aid from GONTRERAS" group. oo - CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of the day, that night and part af the next day. “OSWALD ‘was very introverted and. apdeared | to be slightly crazy. OSWALD mades So, mingtn of an assassination plot but kept pinata . upsthe’ point he had to travel to ne timealae 39. At ane. ttn FBI knowledge, the matter was ‘turned over to the “wSocan authorities who determined that CONTRERAS was indeed at the University o£ Mexico but only - SECRET
14-00000 ¢ “e SECRET aia for the years 1959 - 4260 and that he had been publicly ~ associated in protest activity for the Student ‘Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in january “1961. However, the group ceased _ group. — 7 - oe —_ functioning7as such. in. ewe middle of 1962, and Oscar CONTRERAS. was’ siever one of its leaders. No further work ie Soe Scted’ in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. Apart from the unsustained claims made by CONTRERAS about his own presence at the University, there is an additional element that undermines the credibility of his, accounts . OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate: to get him meals “~~ near the hotel, seems hardly likely to pave. permitted “him to carry on for an extended period with @ University student 27 SECRET ort NO. a see caeee cee ee nen a hee ate canteen eteemangmareesate iteunannnnne peste tar reIPEEEREE TOSS of OL remote