In POPOV: after the second such contact, POPOV was .arrested.* - GOLITSYY named a KGS officer who had peen stationed in Vienna where he was working on Yugoslav targets; this officer was-aware of POPOV's association with the Austrian woman (see above), suspected POFCV, and although he reported his suspicions, nothing was done about them. All of this occurred while POPOV was serving in Austria (until September 1955). Some time in 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN, continued, the KGS was told by a source that POPOV was an agent. The KGB then assigned this KGL officer to Germany because he. knew POPOV and was familiar with the background.”** - General 1.4. SEROV was Chairman of tue KGB when the first information about FOPOV's agent status was . received. *** summary, what GOLITSYN has said about the compromise indicates that a KG3 agent provided the lead to POPOV and that this lead was received in 1957 cr 1958. ***SEROV was KGB Chairman until the latter part. of ‘19se, &s stated above, POPOV's message of 18 September 1959 said he had been arrestea in the previous February; if this portion cf the message is correct, the orientation there- fore indicates that the KGB observed the first LANGELLE- POPOV brush contact, on 4 January 1959, and POPOV was arrested some time after the second brush contact; on 21 January 1959. Although COLITSYN gave this officer's name as KOTCV, GOLITSYN's other facts about him make it clear that he was referring to KGB Colonel M.V. ZHUKOV., Stationed in Vienne during the 1953-55 period and, like POPOV, working against Yugoslav targets, ZHUKOV was personally known to POPGV. On 23 November 1957 POPOV said: "Can you imagine whom I ran into in Karlshorst two or three times? It was my competitor on Yugoslav operations when I was in Vienna. Do you remember ZHUKOV of the KGB?... He may be assigned here or /may bef on TDY, but he has just come recently.“ (A year later POPOV reported that ZHUKOV was still in Berlin/Karlshorst working, he believed, in Anglo-American operations.) It would thus appear that the KGB sent - ZHUKOV to Berlin not long before 23 November 1957 and in connection with the investigation of POPOV. . TOP SECRET wae I, wok alien fe we babble a ow Wade ae
FIG ae, In January 1964 NOSENKO gave a detailed account of the compro- mise of GRU Colunel O.V. PENKOVSKIY, the CIA and British Inteili- | gence (AL-6) penetration agent whcse arrest by the KGS was. announced on 2 November 1962. In «subsequent debriefings and; in- terrogations NOSENKO has offered further information on certain aspects of the PENKOVSKLY compromise, continuing to maintain that "it was brought about by KGB surveillance in Moscow curing 1962. Also according to NOSENKO, it was not until the latter stages of the operation that the KGB realized American Intelligence was - involved with MI-6 in this operation. The reports by NOSENKO and other sources on the PENKOVSKIY compromise are presented below, but to place them in context, they are preceeded by a brief summary of the PENKOVSKIY cperation from the CIA and MI-6 standpoint. (ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Operation In August 1966 PENKOVSKIY gave two American tourists a pack- age of materials to deliver to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. These materials included a description of a propos2:d dead drop site at Number 2 Pushkin Street, which PENKCVSKILY had selected for a pos~ gible communication channel; in the letter PENKOVSKIY enclosed in the package, he also gave his home telephone number and instructions for a call to be placed to him at a certain time to indicate that the package had been received and that the Americans were interested in further contact with him. Efforts to make this telephone con- tact with PENKOVSKIY failed, as did several additional efforts on “his part to establish contact with the U.S. Embassy. The Pushkin = keg f a utside on two occasions there- after by| who walked past th g cn 12 November and December On 21 January 19€1 went inside the building and checked the precise location of the dead drop site, behind the radiator in the vestibule of this puilding. (On 30 December 1961, John ABIDIAN, U.S. Embassy Security Officer and coopted CIA worker, also went inside the building to check for possible ioading ef the dead drop by PENKOVSKIY.) In April 1961, PENKOVSKIY succeeded in making contact in Moscow with the British businessman, Greville WYNNE, with whom he was already acquainted from previous trips to Moscow by WYNNE. Through WYNNE, PENKOVSKIY passed to MI-6 docu- ments and notice of his forthcoming trip to London in April. MI-6 promptly netified CIA, and the two services jointly conducted the operation until it was terminated by the KGB on 2 November 1962. Throughout this period PENKOVSKIY served in a GRU element under cover of the State Committee for Science and Technology _'(GKKNR) in Moscow, and it was under GKKNR cover that PENKOVSEIY . travelled abroad three times, to England in April-May and July- August 1961 and to France in September-October 1961. In addition. to PENKOVSKIY's personal meetings with American and British case* officers while on these TDY‘s, there were 27 exchanges of “ materials in Moscow. The CIA and MI-6 intermediaries used for these exchanges were WYNNE, on his business trips to the. USSR; Mrs. Anne CHISHOLM, wife of an MI-6 officer stationed at the British _ Embassy ;* ee ¥ "The KGB penetration agent in MI-6, George BLAKE, had iden- tified CHISHOLM as a fellow officer prior to the time this couple was posted. to Moscow. He had also identified[ sd to the KGB as a CIA officer prior tol srrvall in Moscow. : é ad 1 “4 Ee Bae 4 ‘ bt ihe ema bansied abe ated os dee oc asbe + bess
536. PENKOVSKIY himself reported having obsccved surveillance coverage at two street meetings with Mrs. CHISHOLM in January 1962,* and both PENZOVSELY and WYNRT noted surve:llance cf their meeting in early July 1962, The operation came to an end when WYNNE Was zrrested in Hungary and Richard JACOB, of the CIA Station, respending to an cmerygency signal to service the Pushxin Street dead drop, was apprehended et tre scene on 2 November 1962. In May 1963 3 pubiie tricl was held in Moscow, followed by am announcement of ERIKUVSKLY's execerion and ; WYRNE's imprisonment. WYNNE was reierred on 22 April 1964, in exchange for a KGB Yllegal jailed i: Lngiand, and he was gub- sequently Gebriefed by CLA and British authorities on his ax= : sa aa a itiaeedls, L periences at the hands of the KGB. ; : : (iii) Statements by NOSENKO i 4 . : 4 (a) Sef og AE i 4 oes! i 1 At the 1962 meetings with CIA 2 bout four Moaths “i before the PENKCV5SKILY operation was te SENZO made no | veference to PENROVSELY and the Fushki ji drop. (In t 19¢4 he said that before his first e a he nace known a of the visit to the dead crop Ly the U Security Officer, i + 1942 was RO reason For . John V. ABIDIAN, but thay as or June him te recall or report this incident.) In June l4e2, however, KOSENKO did raise a matter whieh appeacs to he direetly related i to PENKOVSKIY. This item concerned U.S. Marine Cor’ 3 Colonel Leo J. DULACKI, the Assistant Naval BRitache.** NOo XO volun~ teered that DULACKT was an active intelligence officer telieved 8 by the KGB to belong to CIA. The KGE "overheard" (from a micro~ : phone in DULACKI's office) that the Assistant Naval Attacia was { to meet an Indonesian in a restaurant, and the KGE therefore placed a concealed microphone at their restaurant table, From _ the monitored conversation the KGB lear it SULACKI was : attempting to recruit the Indonesian & B and was moma Ginwion cat ned ¥-RftEE the secone such observation, on 19 Jnnuary 1962, the last of their street meetings, PENKOVSKTY broke contact with Mes, CHISHOLM until 26 Maxch 1L9C2. prevt en toneene safer reneaanaenten Tenapem? sara #% DULACKI, who has had no affiliation with Cia, served in Moscow from August 1958 until April 1961. NOSERKO said on 29 January ’ 1965 for the first time that he personelly suprrvised American _Embassy Section operations against ail U.S. “Milatary Attaches, “which would have included DULACKT, from approximately January 1960 until May or June 1960. On 20 October 1966, NOSENKO indi- cated, also for the first time, that from about February 1960 until about April 1960 he personally vas the case officer for Naval oe Attache personnel at the U.S. Embassy in addition to his general supervisory responsibilities. (See Part V.E.3.e.) According to NOSENKO, DULACKI was neither recruited nor approached for ' recruitment by the KGB; he could not remember the names of the KGB agents who might have been targetted against. .DULACKI, and the only item of interest obtained about DULACKI by the KGB from_an source was that concerning this meeting with the <n ba gemeced ut gene ntn 9 une CE het arm ene . ror
teed Tate Je ag inne ati hememerenty nate MelepateeRiias mint bate waren lesan FH ay seeking information. from him on. snare Si HOSE meeting in 1962 NOSENKO adcdcd that the a: in - bet in ort different name for the Indonesian 1 there were two different ones. esien during the Uctober 19€6 interrag sacions: Question: who was DULACKI's agent? NOSENKO; AS I was telling you, Question: why only the Uavy? NOSEX Questions Can you give a more definite time? NOSENKO: He was sitting with ore or after the restaurant meeting with DCULACKI. APPR ar ete eat ae cups 537. > to Indonesia, * At a later recruited & 1961, Lut he dad not indicate wnetrer this Lad occurred MKC spelled che Indonesian’ Ss. name Speaking of OYLACKi's restaurant meeting, KOSEUAO - ola CIA 1964 that DULACKI was working against the indonesian " is vr Sys and he made no reference to the eae 4 or to the name CRRSRH. Asked why he haa given aa 1962, OSEIKO replied: “Maye ; | * 23 ta NCSENKO was questioned further about EVLATKI and the Indcon- Liadeoardta 28, i é oni maith he dit stent tie restaurant with ee pete cay iy agen of the Indcnesian “ines : In 1951 this was. I don't remember wren. “It was when I vas supervising we x against code clerks. When I began to work, after a month or zo, I took the files an havel attaches and then, after two months, IT gave iD Vil eeuddineet then co BELOGLAZOV. I immediately went on leave atter Ss 3 two weexs, for a month. I took the files either he- : 4 fore or after leave. : 4 actin. KO; It was decided by KOVSKUK. Take only the Navy while you're getting acquainted with the Section, At the [ same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring. He - i handled only the Naval cfficers. 1 didn't take the Army or Air Force. This incident tovk place later with 4 at a table. Their conver- eation was controlled by N-extra fa niniaturized transistor temporary microphone/, anata mae te etnias + . Question: How did you hear about this? NOSENKO: I was Deputy Chief of the section. I don't remember _ WYNNE explain its significance, “but WYNNE was unable to do SO: ; who reported it. .I saw the svodka (report) myself. in Moscow from Woke ng cebriefed on 22 Jan- uary 1965 about his post-errest interrogation by the KGB, WYusE reported that the KGB played back a portion of a Lape recording of his conversation with PENKOVSKIY at the Uudapest Restaurant in Moscow on 27 Hay 1961. This: portion, WYNNE gaid, dealt with PENKOVSKIY's remarks to WYNNE. about. 2 girl... friend with whom he had become acquainted Guring the l- May 193 ‘Jy to London: PENKOVSKLIY called the woman (or | The KGB interrogators indicated to WYNNE that they thought ‘'Cepwas a cryptonym, and they demanded that TOP SECRET
ea Question: Any other details? NOSENKO =< What I remembered 1 reported before. Question: ho gave you the name Spee a NOSENKO: DULACKI was also acquainted wich CE hut there was no [ A recorded conversation like Q@igya He knew BB also, ne 7 4 4n Indonesian. na : ; oar Question: How did you hear aieut this? bs 3 NOSENKO: Working in the First (U.S, Embassy) Section I heard ' maybe frem BELOGLAZOV, I don't rememcer who, I also . : heard this opinior, that maybe he was a contact or an *, 4 agent. But no proof, | a4 Question: What was his position? i 4 5 3 ROSENKO: A military officer. that its, intelligence. I don't remember anything else, ’ When esked in January i964 whether he knew how PENKOVSKIY was compromised, NOSENKG answered that he had "all the details" | (b) Reports cn _the_Compror mise | i . | and then gave the following account: aa tn Se @nilinsetbSis Sal SD da sae She 0 Ever since the POPOV case (see Part VI.D.7.a.) there had been intensive surveillance of personnel from the U.S. and British Embassies in Moscow, As a result of this sur- 7 i + tae babies veillance, Mrs. ISHOLM was seen ducking into an alcove, evidently following a Soviet citizen whom the surveillance team was unable to identify. Surveillance coverage of Mra, CHISHOLM - and, indeed, on all British Embassy per- sonnel - was immediately increased, and she was soon observed following the same Soviet citizen on the street in a clandestine manner. The Soviet citizen was identi- fied as PENKOVSKIY. Paver payee: SSL The KGB imnediately launched a full investigation of PENKOVSKIY, including a complete check of his back- ground. To avoid alerting him, knowledge of the investi- gation was kept to a minimum, and surveillance of him was - restricted to stationary points in the neighborhood cf -. Ris residence and office. As one part of the investiga~ tion, aman who closely resembled PENKOVSKIY and dressed _.. dike him was made to walk in front of Mrs. CHISHOLM when — “cess ghe was on a Moscow streets when she began to follow this man, the KGB thus obtained confirmation of its identification of PENKOVSK1Y. Another part of the in- vestigation entailed a search of the PENKOVSKIY apartment; to seccomplish this, he was given a drug which made him so ill that hospitelization was necessary, and. Mrs. 5 PENKOVSKIY was lured from the apartment on a ruse; nothing Was found during this search, The KGB next aimed a power- ful telescope at the window in PENKOVSKIY's apartment and obtained an apartment directly above his; fromthe over- hanging balcony of the apartment occupied by the KG5 some seston acer epecemartectets rite theron EDEL Ut sh Bete sre i etre cea cee alll et me trees oa '
SEE TY EEN ws, on SRT AE EEE Ce i EE TS, flower pots were suspended, one of them able to take pictures through the window of the épartment below; in this manner the KGS photographed PENKOVSKIY removing: "suspicious materials" from the back part of his desk; in the search of the apartment which followed, these materials were found in the desk, Eut the KGB left them there. By the time W/NNE visited Moscow in July 1962, both he and PENKOVSKLY were under surveillarce, and their sus- picious behavior in front of the Feking Restaurant on 5 July gave the KGL another conclusive indicator of PENKOV- SKIY's activities. Also, tne KGB was eble to monitor conversations between PENKOVSKLY and WYNNE in the latter's hotel room, despite the fact that PENKOVSKIY turned on water faucets while they were talking. PENKOVSKIY was errested only when the KGB knew that ' OY WYNNE was scheduled to go to a Satellite country. PENKOV- : a SKIY gave a complete confession, and it was only at this i point that the KGE realized American Intelligence was in- volved in the operation. After PENKOVSKIY revealed details about the Pushkin Street dead drop, the KGr correlated this information with that contained in the surveillance report of ABIDIAN's presence at the spot. * Nevertheless, in _aeranging a trap at Pushkin Street on Z November 1962,the KGB expected the dead crop to pe serviced by someone from ish Embassy. instead, JAcoa | | was apprehended there. a4 The KGB felt that it had obtained all pertinent in~- . formation from PENKOVSKIY and that he was “beyond redemp- tion" even for future interrogation, PENKOVSKIY was ; bos executed. eerre Yh Se LTO e nee ‘ qe baad ay malate int Fant rat etek metals tks deere data owen In subsequent questioning soon after his defection, NOSENKO repeatedly claimed that the KGB had no prior knowledge of 4‘merican Intelligence participation in the PENKOVSKIY operation until JACOB's arrest on 2 November 1962 at the Pushkin Street dead drop. . : wood NOSENKO was asked in July 1964 for details on the KGB (tee g official report (obzor) about the PENKOVSKIY case. He said that ° he had never read the report because, although printed, it had not been circulated as of the time of his departure for Geneva i in January 1964. By O.M. GRIBANOV (Chief of the KGB Second Thief i Directorate) and "various other case officers," however, NOSENKO was told of certain of the items which would appear in the KGB ‘official report and most of which he had already reported. The ; _ facet that the KGB surveillance team had failed to identify Peo d i -'" PENKOVSKIY at his first observed meeting with Mrs, CHISHOLM, . ot vz-fo.. --  .NOSENKO added at this time, would not be included in the report. ae kod i According to GRIBANOV, whereas the report would state the KGB : on eee knew PENKOVSKIY was working for both the British and American . ‘ services, in reality the KGB did not know of the Americans’ i involvement until PENKOVSKIY was arrested. WwWitn regard to this ‘ latter point, NOSENKO said that the KGB investigation of PENKOV~ of . SKIY was handled by officers from: the British Department: rather Ca | - than the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, -< @ See Part V.E.3.4a. for details of ABIDIAN's visit to the Push- kin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961. ; 4
cng nt flip de * ** This Directorate is responsible for counterintelligence and except for V.M. KOVSHUK of the latter departmefit.: “F NOSENKO stated, the KGB interrogators attempted to fo to admit he was a British citizen.* | ae Of the PENKOVSK1Y compromise and the KG3 investigation which ensued : ; -¥ _ pictures. Above his flat there was a balcony with “JACOB has not indicated that such an attempt was made. Security in the Soviet Armed Forces. rthermore, ree JACOB In February 1965 NOSENKO provided his most.complete zccounr : Po bs “The first that PENKOVSKIY appeared in life of the KGB was during one of WYNNE's visits to Moscow. The KGB knew cf PENKOVSKIY's acquaintance with AYNNE and that he was even visiting him in the hotel where WYNNE was staying. The KGS checked with the GRU, and the GRU answered that PENKOVSKIY was working on WYNNE as a target. PENKOVSKIY was working in the GKKNR as a cover, and dYNNE was one of his acquaintances. Later, there was massive surveillance of the employees of the British Embassy - I don't know exactly with whom - but PENKOVSKIY was noticed being in contact with someone from the British Embassy. but sur- veillance lost him... Later he was neviced with the wife of British Embassy officer CHISHCLM. At this point, the KGB didn't tell the GRU anythinc, because the GRU had no right to have any contact with any foreign embassy people without telling the KGB - except at official receptions and functions, and éven here they have to tell the KGB so that surveillance will know. And when surveillance noticed PENKOVSKIY with Mrs. CHISHOLM, they immediately recognized him as the guy they had lost. , ‘ al sated iedahb sad inbetate afb aagieles Abate tery stem ental Sedobabieduaees sot ot “This was the beginning of the very active work on PENKOVSKIY - without telling the GRU, They (the British Department, KGB Second Chief Directcrate) were checking his work at the GKKWR, They managed with the help of the KGB Third Directoraze«**to leok at his file. And they tried to control him et home. They were afraid to put him under regular surveillance because he would immediately find out - he was a capable officer - but. they put surveillance on him from time to time. However, they set up a closed (fixed surveillance) post in a building opposite his apartment, about 200 meters away. They got a flat there, set up a post, and watched his i " : windew with a telescope. They also used the flat directly “neat above PENKOVSKIY's flat. Here they even put microphones a : to hear his conversations with his wife and tapped the telephone of course. Then they noticed that he was hiding something in his desk, taking the drawer out and putting something behind, And when-he was taking off his shirt he was putting notes (inside). They noticed him taking flower boxes. They put a camera in the flowers somehow which could be lowered so that it could take pictures through PENKOVSKIY's window by command (remote control) from the closed post. This was to get evidence, to see the documents he was working with. “There was another meeting: with WYNNE, PENKOVSKIY met WYNNE in WYNNE's hotel, They spoke in the bathroom 1 4 an Lote se eh seme tbteR «+ bane
$ ¢ ate tp bene At ~ he couldn't call out, no one saw it. _WYNNE's arrest, but I know that BANNIKOV returned with with the water running. But the KGB manaced to intercept the conversation - not everything, but several words indi- cating there was something incriminating. PEUKOVSKIY called WYNNE and they agreed to meet at the Peking Restau- rant, put PENKOVSKIY was checking (for Surcvelliance) and did not go with WYNNE into the restaurant as they had agreed, but walked akout the city with hin. Surveillance tried to monitor their conversation from a distance of 200 meters with a special microphone like a long pipe. one meter long, or maybe a little less. . “They decided to enter PENKOVSKIY's apartment and see what was hidden in his desk. In the GRU they controlled what documents PENKOVSKIY was taking... "They used a drug to put him in the hospital, a pre. paration which they put on his chair. He inhaled it inte his body and got sick. His skin became reddened and he felt pain and had to go tc a doctor, a military doctor who put him immediately in the hospital. He wert to a military hospital - they were ready for him there -— and was hospital. ized... They considered his wife. then his Wife s mother, or his mother, or maid ~- I gon'r know — and the elder girl in school, On the second day of his illness a KGB officer disguised as a soldier caine to PENKOVSKIY's flat and cold his wife that the coctors wanted her to be checked because it Was possible PENKOVSKIY had a contagious disease. not serious. She went to the hospital, and the flat was en- tered. Keys had been mace before, They took pictures of everything. They found many things, code pads and so on, which showed that he was really working. After that they decides’ to arrange his arrest. “PENKOVSKIY was supposed to go abroad, and the KGB did everything to prevent it, but in such a way that he “wouldn't understand. They even cancelleé a whole deleca. tion.* This was while they were still tr ing to get’ proof. ¥Y Y g Pp. "Then WYNNE came to Hungary. They arrested PENKOVSKIY and I think one or two days later they took WYNNE, "The manner of arresting PENKOVSKIY was such that even GRU wouldn't know about it. (D. M.) GVISHIANI {head of tne GKKNR) took part. He told PENKOVSKIY to come with him to the Central Committee, and when they were down in his car he said: "Wait here a minute while I get a docu- ment I forgot." There was an entrance on Gorky Street, but the car was in the courtyard behind. .The KGB was waiting here. PENKOVSKIY got in the car, and that was “Two days later I know that (General S.G.) BANNIKOV ' (Deputy Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate) flew to Hungary and took WYNNE. I don't know the details of WYNNE. «¢ aaa anes thaal eR RERREIRn tnt tated steenamenen te . . ” , — * PENKOVSKIY was scheduled to travel to the United States in April 1962, but this visit was postponed because, allegedly, the Soviet learned the Americans' plans. to conduct provocations &gainst the delegation PENKOVSKIY was to accompany. BA ee eR a A teeta ote Ma ns pebctbyite. Ua 4 5 thee sdS ie feds aA EYE i saa? peda datsod
Naha utget ade : aD Ta "I know that during the search PENKGVSKIY's daughter - came heme from school early. I know thet one of PENKOV- SKIY's female relatives or one of his wife's female rela-~ tives was a former KGB agent, and she intercepted the — girl... “Mrs. CHISHOLM was walking on the street and they. dressed aman just like PENKOVSKIY - he entered a telephone booth or an apartment house entrance or something. She saw him. I¢ was necessary that they see each other at a dis- tance Lefore making contact. JI don't remember exactly, but there was a little pack or square, and there was some- thing connected with CHISHOLM's child, something connected with candy. “And about the Pushkin Street you know - that was for PENKOVSETY, "The investigation was a big secret. I found out only when he was arrested, It was in 1962. Maybe a month or half a month before the arrest I micht have heard that there was something hot in the Second (British) Department... The Second Depactment officers were running around, (G.V.) EONDAREV (of the British Department) was running to GRIBANOV and didn't have to wait. Something was up, but wnat? May- be (A.V.) SUNTSOV (of the British Department) told me: ‘Soon we will nave an outstanding success.' I think that he said that to KOVSHUK and me, because it was obvious that some- thing was going on. In GRIBANOV's outer office it was ‘noticeable that BONDAREV was running to GRIBANOV every day... GRIBANOV then dismissed others, even turning away his deputies. BONDAREV was always there. So I knew some- thing big was going on, but I didn't know what - maybe it was @ recruitment. “Of course, I could have heard something from surveil- lance. I was going to the dining room with Venyamin KOZLOV (Chief of the American Department, KGS Surveillance Direc- torate}. I was close to him in 1960-1961. I went with him in the general's dining room occasionally... KOZLOV would say: ‘Something is going on in the Second (British Depart- ment, KGB Surveillance Directorate).' Because he knew the chief of surveillance for the Second Department... “I don't remember where I was when the arrest was announced... The officers in the First Department didn't know what was going on. BONDAREV asked JACOB to confirm that he was an Englishman. They were expecting an English- man, not an American. The First Department was stunned ‘ when they found out that an American had come to Pushkin Street... "The first time the KGB saw PENKOVSKIY and WYNNE © together they asked the GRU apout it, I think even (GRU | Chief I.A.) SEROV himself, whether PENKOVSKIY was working with WYNNE. And PENKOVSKIY had-written-up something-about - his contact with WYNNE. The GRU replied that the contact was official... WYNNE was coming as a businessman. The GRU doesn’t have a counterintelligence mission against businessmen, The Second Chief Directorate does, and they | noticed. Maybe PENKOVSKIY went to WYNNE's hotel room, TOP SECRET Lomein sepvesteneemes oat yg a A z # 4 4 4
officers. GRIBANOV gave lectures, and BANNIKOV too, ..GRIB- __ ., COny. There was something in the case study that SUNTSOV' something $ gecussas heard these things from SUNTSOV ane from different” ASCV in Caucasus (IT heard it myself). GRIBANOV spoke for. three and a nalf or four hours without stop. During the ooo. first half hour GCRIRANOV spoke about the work of American 90) Intelligence. Then he told them about the PENKOVSKIY case, -> talking £rom notes. when I left in January 1964 I heard. - ta that the case study on PENKOVGHKIY was finished but not yer. : printed.  BASNIKOV also gave a lecture, for the officers © of the Second Chief Directorate, which I.did not attend... - "I even visited the trial, not the first day end not the last day. I went with some of the officers...- #e-. got tickets from the Second Department. I went with one. of the officers from the’ Journalists Section and stayed there. for about an hour. Sone of the officers from the Seventh Department also went during the trial, I sat in the third * row from the end. It's a small hall; there were about ; twelve rows in front of me. While I was there they were putting questions to PENKOVSKIY end WYNNE and they were answering this and this. It wasn't interesting. .For me it was interesting tc look at PEMKOVSKIY. In GRIBINCY's and BANNIKOV's lectures there was a big stress on PENKOV~ oat. SKIY the man, that in Turkey he was acting badly, and that ~ 9. ~ oe there was a bad knarakteristika (fitness report) in his Le file... In the trial they never said that he was a colonel or that he was in the GRU, In the case study there was more. They said many things ~- that he didn't give money to his wife, only five rubles a day. weeded bee "I don't know the exact date that the surveillance Saw PENKOVSXIY and lost him. Maybe already in 1961. I remember that wnile 1 was working in the First (American) Department in 1960-61, maybe in 1961, there -as. a period when - maybe once or twice - they took surveillance teams away from us, despite the need for several brigades for . ABIDIAN, and gave them for a time to the Second Depart-- ment. ae . "I learned these details after the arrest. I heard — ‘ it from officers in the Second Department, SUNTSOV told.” 0°” me, (S.K,) ROSHCHIN could have told me. GRIBANOV didn't ‘ mention surveillance losing PENKOVSKIY in his lecture... i think the massive .surveillance on the British Embassy was November-December 1961, but I don'c know exactly. PENKOVSKIY was in contact with someone else before this. woman, Mrs. CHISFOLM. The KGB knew who it was. It was &@ British employee, but I don't know who... This might . have been in GRIBANOV's lecture. But GRIBANCV didn't speak about surveillance losing him, or give the technical details of the closed post or the details about the. bal- | wanted to change, but I don't know what ~ the case study. hadn't yet appeared in January 1964. I didn't read it | and don't know what it was, If it had appeared I could - have found out. SUNTSOV would have said: ‘Here we changed .
BB Tact OD xe ohh ths Rb od Ese 0 he Prion ERS i met reise | BEBhe KGB had been aware “SF PENLOVSRTY "S"SOSEOPAEION” Wi the the mnnne Americans, and in particular with JACOER, for alout two and a half ronths prior to the arrests.* This awareness resulted from a sories of talks between members of the KGB and PENKOVS: LY : : that every asset of the KGB Sur- velliance Directorate was utagived against U.S. Embas3y targets dur- ing the several montiheg prioz to the arrests, and@ that this coverage - resulted in the detection of an American entering 2 Pu apartment building. The Rou sstablished a 24-hour sur shkin Street veillance on & this address. Eventuaily, vbhu KOUERTY Was Obeort ring the ae apartment an sd was immediately suv Pr yOw olen cebriefed a ~ conce snag his cols taboraviun and &rericish Intelligunce. [ cy report: When i massive a eee ee Gn eS. cd an American visiting this eddress tha firey not fcliowsd inside vy surveiliants, but ‘ha was followed closely and the gurve-diant kauweling down, i apparently tying nis Ssiva.* thas, aithough ry this was not very unusual 1s suspicion in view of the faut tron tai a Visiting the sane address on two gS rm. Therefore tre KGB establishe ad 24-hour reudt bY camers equipment. PENKCVIRIY was 1 fmecican wis ¢b- : : cerved losing a dead Groap behind a lowby me unit (radiator); : the KGB tagged the drog material with a raciescti.e substance; PLN} : _ VOVSZLY was cbserved unloading the drop anu procneding to his office, ' 4 where he gecereted tho material in a concealm ont area 1a his desk; ; 2 utilizing a radicactivity detector, the 2G iocated the concealment a 1 area in the desk; the KG also veo ontinued in surveillance of che ye ; Gead drop site, observed PENSOVSRIY icad tne cead drop, anc seizec an American who cane to unload it. EENKOVS? LY wis then confronted { 3 with photographic evide ca of the loadings and u.loadings and could i offer no defense. | f @ 7 CESS NTT VOTE Ee re : #* -In his official report of his check of the Pusnkin Street dead : . drop, ABIDIAN noted that while he was in the vestibule a woman i entered, and he kneit down and pretended to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and cn un the stairs. 1 : tee ‘ “Go : “ t : H 4 on a % . i = A : { ee ‘ : ig * t Ed : . a iy : and .
penne enece nme AAS SBME bon te nema ty Anemos stains 9 banieencicnghte Sree oon CUSTARD fellow GhU Gifit ar un tne cause of PENACVSKIY ner Be OS om to HEE cf | ial i ty PENKOVSKIY as a fs ‘et coret rewered ; pmite “Os BR attricuted “Li's prac. i: ,7corein ae fs : 2 ne US eLcbes «rich bh z surchasccd on nis trips to Durops, wut the heb ain re: Lnis adequate ercunds to warrant inveseigatrcnr. veers hefore PENKOVSKLY's Gefectiona” ifuraply @hoat 196%, two years hefore his first contact with Britis:. end eer icen re i KGB cificer whe was 3 freon 2 ‘ GRP eee ritéei relatinn cesmission.” Although the mene KCB officer LEMROVSGKIY advised main when ihe : ey “asa aout ile Subse. quent ely ; cerning Eo? Own indiscretions. -: er eLang ior ~owiie 2 ts “Cp sencs” haa geo ba sw veillance for chou ved spice ome ther aan ( Oct@ber or Nov : ie : ae hm about hoverber Pol 5 ain nad ir ber buscand to stcy sway cron PENS OVER the arrest she learned that PENKOVSKIY nas eg: che KGB" when he attended her husband's bircnday purt 1962 Tino said Sv1Riv was one cf several offic ers wha re- SENE ceivea@ awards for their part in uncovering PENK OVSALY. 3 . f i : i H 5 é s A Fae te cent emer entree oyna = Bin teehee
bo Peete ete son + by the KGB, In trying to obtain a confessi aay ¢n ie horort A document proviae tle official KGh renorse According to this docunmen eurse2il e Of Urs re 30 Lecemker 1961 reveal: ad ner suspic Saviet male. ‘his person was rot identities i CHISHOLM wag observed at wnat cpreared to ke possibile meet places ‘on 5 and 12 January, 1 Was secon or January Getected a coun identifies as PENKOVSKIY. * 1952 surveillance of her anda Soviet men, (x) nformation fron w¥hkne WYDNE's statements to CIA and Mi-6 in lating to the compromise and investigation 9 larcely based upon events during his (YNNE' } interrscgation , WYUNE said, the 2 operation and n. WNNE stated fe) <GB insisted that it knew everything about t that PENKOVSKIY had made a complete confessi * PENKOVSKIY reported on 23 March 1962 that he hed observed surveillance on Mrs. CHISHOLM, but not.on hiwself. on § and 19 January. te had not: observed surveillance on the 12.January meeting. (‘As a result, PESHOVSKIY broke fith Mrs. CHISHOLM, ‘ ft | TOP SECRET Meee a vente ee. eqaeset
that he himself resisted confessing, whereupon tie KGB produced evidence consisting of tape recordings of conversations, photo~ graphs, and WYNNE’s own business diaries. ; erate evr ne nee ow é ‘ : The KGB played for WYNNE two tape recordings of conversa- tions he nad had with PENKOVSKIY,; and WYNNE (who was convinced that the recordings were genuine) pinpointed the dates when tae cunversations were heid: 27 May 1961 and 2 July 1362, The 27 May 1961 conversation was the one in which PENKOVSKIY mentioned his | girlfriend “ZEP"; it further consisted of an excnange of cryptic remarks as PENKOVSKIY indicated to WYNNE that he had material he wanted to pass to him. WYNNE told him not to discuss it then and there but to wait till they were out of the restaurant. wee sae hen pm etatyen He 2H ve rere The photographs were of WYNNE alone, of WYNNE with PENKOV~ SKIY, of WYNNE with unknown Soviets, of PENKOVSKIY with Mrs. i CHISHOLM in a park,* and of JACOB at the Pushxin Street dead drop. Concerning tne photographs of himself, WYNNE was able to give the dates when they were taken, and the earliest of these dates was 27 May 196l--the same day ‘is restaurant conversation with PENKOVSKIY was recorded. ‘This photograph ghowed WYNNE approaching the CHISHOLM residence in Moscow. Another photograph, \ taken during his August 1961 visit to Moscow, cemonstrated that the KGB observed an exchange of materials between PENKOVSYIY ; ; and WYNNE. At the time the photograph was taken, PENKOVSKIY : had brought a satchel to WYNNE containing materials for British 3 Intelligence. (The satchel appeared in the phctograph.) WYNNE . : took the satchel from PENKOVSKIY, left PENKOVSKIY waiting while he-went upstairs and emptied it, came back downstairs with the : empty satchel, and returned it to PENKOVSKIY. wey argos Note : . tae ' wore et : a ' ‘“¥-"PENFOUSKIY and Mrs. CHISHOLM met twice in a park, in July io and December 1961; WYNNE believed that the photograph he saw showed trees in full foliage. Hs en ve iii} SEGAET ae a FEL i PAO nbn ORME ween neo cele aura ve EN Oe ET Ohare ete ene
(i) Introduction . in: 1963 as captain. See Part V.G. ce Compromise oF CHERE] LEPANOY | HOSENKO brought to his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 an official KGE "temporary duty authorization” showing that he had been permitted to participate in the USSR-wide search for A.N, CHEREPANOV the month before.* At this meeting and subsequently NOSENKO gave details on CHEREPANOV's mw background, his transmittal of KGB papers tv an American in Moscow, his. compromise, his efforts to escape to the West, and his cventual fate. Essentially, according to NOSENKXG, CHEHREPANOV was a dissatisfied former KGD cfficer who provided American authorities vith genuine KGB decuments and whose treason was discovered as a result of the U.S. Bra sassy panding Otner Soviet sources €& : ¢ an OSES, have verified the eu henticity of the Cuenee” PANGV pavers and their information tends to conf-rm SOSENKO'S account of events efter the Embassy placed the documents in MFA hands. There is, in addition, from non-Sovici sources con- sidereble information on CHEREPANOV pre-dating th? November 1963 inciacnt ws well 2s reports from Americans involved in this incident. ao gS In the following sections are presented available data about CHEREDPANOV and what ensued after he gave the papers to an American tourist for delivery to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Also given below are NOSeNKO's connents on the con~ tents of the CHEREPANCV papers. . (41) Earlier Information on CHFREPANOV CHEREPANOV's nanc first was brought to CIA's attention in October 1953 as a potential Suviet defector. Jack RAYMOND, Belgrade correspondent for the New York Times, telephoned a Third Secretary of the U.S. Embassy there to tell him that he had a wan in his office with in- formation “from behind the Iron Curtain"; RAYMOND suggested that someone from the Embassy would find the man of interest, but the man allegedly did not wont to come to the Embassy. The Third Secretary went to RAYMOND's office, where he met the unnamed individual in the presence of RAYMOND’s Yugoslav secretary. RAYMOND explained that the man had been writing to him from his home village, but. RAYMOND had not replied until recently when he told the man to stop at his office, -’ as he had just done that day. RAYMOND added that the person : ‘had offered information of a kind that he did not feel he pifunge! us gutta therwencente could use in his news reports. The Third Secretary took the- man to his quarters and interviewed him, then interviewed him again later the same day in his office in the Embassy. *According to the. "temporary ‘duty authorization” NOSENKO - fe — held the rank of lieutenant colonel, as NOSENKO hinself as told CIA. He later retracted this claim, placing his rank aie orannas Fontes Qhibohe 4 Ladies e+ Ge atone wnt hd ectbiRak Ratt wane ation aa |
ae te cnovese uae axteaunren qo mnie tereeetene etna dnellatinaseesase a4 jonemaentessiamemertiinte # GPS Sabet etitian AD Nt 6m 1 ree eilet sente cm, weston ' The man, Tihon DUNAYEV, was about 65 ;ears of age and claimed to be of Ukrainian origin. He said re had seen “mixed up in the Balkan wars,” had fought with the White Russians, and in 1920. had escaped with General WRANGEL to Ist anbul, coming to Yugoslavia the same year. de recounted a history in fugoslavia which included botn military ane civilian service with tne Yugoslav Government, by virtue of which he was retired on a government pension. He indicated that in 1924 he had made the acquaintance of Captain kase : NEDELJKOVIC, who had been. a close frierd ever sitet... Tne Latter had told nim of. having been in Russia 1: 191.5 «ith 2 Prisoner of War Commission, and claimed to have tives with a Russian family at that time. NEDELJKOVIC allegedly had a picture which was taken of him with this family. %EDELIKOVic, according to DUNAYEV, was in 1953 enployed at the post office near the raiiway station in Balgrade, and had mst several Russians during the past year or two. (These Russians called at the post office for packages which they received from Switzerland.) Several weeks prior to tne Octouer in~ terviews, an official had come to the post office, and NEDELIKOVIC, in conversation with nin in Russian, toid him of his experiences in Russia in 1915. [It secn developed that this Russian official was tre son of the renilw with whom NEDELJKOVIC had stayed, and a fast frierds-ip had ree suited, Arter several meetings the Russian finally ‘oid NEDELJKOVIC that he was “up to his neck" wite *tn+ situation in the USSR and that he wanted to defect imtediatsiyv. he would if he were in the West, but being in Yugositivia, he was afraid that the Yugoslavs would return nim to the USSR. He allegedly told NEDELJKOVIC that when he lst¢ ths Embassy he would not leave empty-handed--he would “brirg scne thing with him," material of intelligence value. DUNAYTEVY under- stood from his friend that the Russian was the sasistant to the Soviet Military Attache. (In these two interviews, DUNAYEV claimed he knew only that tne RKussiazc called hire self "“George.") After NEDELIJKOVIC had told the story t9 DUNAYEV in order to get his advice, DUNAYEY decid2d that the New York Times correspondent was the man to put him is cone. Tact with the U.S. Enbassy. DUNAYEV was informed that the Embassy could give ro guarantees, although interested in the case. First, however, it would be necessary to know who the Russian official was, the full story on his relationship with NEDELJKOVIC, and the firmness of his intent to defect. DUNAYEV agreed with this -and added that if this did not work out, "we will trv to gat him into Austria illegally." DUNAYEV left the Embassy just minutes before mobs gathered before the building and stoned it, in protest against U. 8. ~British action conzerrnircg Trieste. He returned to the Embassy 15 days later, exslainisg that he had been unable to report imuediately on his dis- cussions with. NEDELJKOVIC because the militia had been pre- venting people from approaching the Embassy. He Said he had visited NEDELJKOVIC the night. he had left th: Enbassy ard . had told him that he had contacted ‘interested :persoas," without saying they were Americans. . NEDELJFOVIC had given him a recognition phrase which he and the Soviet had agreed -wpon should a third party. contact the Soviet. NEDELJKOVIC kad - given him identifying information on the Soviet: His name was CHEREPANOV, he was a Soviet Embassy official working Lente Vn Senta aencbede amet 2 EEE to Boy wher dne 2 stivsidthidan vdeo!
559. "under cover" of consular duties; his z2g2 was given as 35 to 40, and in addition to giving a physical dzscriptior., DUNAYEV reported that he was single, spoke good Serbian, some French ard English.* DUNAYEV further reported tnat CHEREPANOV was pow prepared to deliver intelligence docu- ments and escape Yugoslavia. From *EDELJKOvic's daught=r, however, DUNAYEV said he had learned that after certain recent demonstrations~-two days after he had last seen hin-~- NEDELJKOVIC had fled Belgrade planning to escape fron Yugo= slavia and had rot been heard from since. . DUNAYE?/. nonethe. less was prepared to help the Russian nimself, acd said that he now knew that CHEREPANOV visited c warehouse at the railway station twice a week to pick up packag-s for the - Soviet Embassy. He described his plas for approazning. CHEREPANOV there, using the recognition phrase, ard setting up @ meeting leter the same day in @ park, where he couid then pass to CHEREPANOV the Americans' instructions for communicatirg:-via a dead drup. (The dead drop had ben designed so that the site could be monitored :y Americans surreptitiously from inside a U.S. Mission building.) This was the last time DUNAYEV appeared in ths case. He apparently never came back to the Embassy, and it any event further contact with him was forbidden by tae Ameri- can Ambassador who wanted no U.S. personnel personaiiy ine volved further in the case. The dead drop site was observed as planned fer the several dates which DUNAYEV had been instructed to give CHEREPANOY, CHEREPANOV did not appear on any of these dates, but, on the day after the first date, what appcare2z to be surveillance was noted by the U.S. observers. CHEREPANOY's failure to appear at the drop site was considered to be th» end of the operation because there was no way i:ft to cone tact him. ; An American military attache lived in the same apart- ment building with CHEREPANOV, and he agreed to tzy to extice him into his apartment to discuss defection and asylum. This was planned for the end of December i953, but the unexpiaired absence of CHEREPANOV and his family from 25 December until Ay *Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV was identified from dip- lomatic lists as Second Secretary and Consular Officer at the Soviet Embassy. He was known to be married. TOP SECRET A a i 3 43 a 4 ae
re _gesetime late in January 1954 delayed the approach, It was. “then fourid because of many other Soviets in his apartment pudiding, there were no opportunities for a secure approach. Before an approach could be made under asy set of circun- gtances, the same American military attache had a halfenour conversation with CHEREPANGV while attending the Soviet En- basay's Red Army Day reception in February 1954. The ate teche used each of the aoveral occasions when the two were A gione to proba under various pretexts for CHERESANOV's desires regarding a further contact, but CHEREPAXOY réespondec eitaer with noncomitral answere or not at all. The attacne reported hia impressions that CHEREPANOV was a “confirmed and lcyal Boviet official of no special statura," and thet he was “neither interested in nor desirous of further contact with the West." Two yeare later, in February 1986, it was reported that CHEREPANOV maintained limited social contacts with the U.8. Air Attache and Consul in Belgrade. In April 1956, at a "farewell intizate luncheon" at~- tended by @ representative of the American Embassy, CHERE= PANOV stated that he was roturning to Moscow where he hoped to be assigned for a year or two, but he was not certain. According to a report dated June 1956, CHEREPANOV had been active in courting people from the U.&. Embassy in Belgrade, and as of the time of the report, had gone back to the USSR "probably to work in the Foreiga Office." More exto:sive information on CHEREPANOV was provided in 1957 by Milos GREGOVIC, a Yugoslav who defected to the Britieh in Octobor 1957. He hed been a UDB agent working in Belgrade against foreign diplomats. CHEREPANOV was one of hia operational targets. According to this source, CHEREPANOY was first posted to Belgrade in 194@ or 1949,* and was one of the very few Soviet diplomats who remained in Belgrade after the break with the Cominform, at which tine he was charge d'affaires. In 1952 or 1953 he became First Secretary and head of the Consular Department.** At this time he was identified by the UDB as a Soviet intelligence officer, The main reason for the UDB certainty about tnis was the wide scope of his contacts with Yugoslav workers Ege ESA MOLEC TTT ah *The break between Yugoslavia and the Cominform took plece in June 1948. There was no formal break in diplomatic re-=€ + Jations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, although there waa ‘po Soviet Ambassador present in Belgrade from 1950 to 1633, and there was no Soviet military attache representation pre- gent from 1851 to 1953. According to the Yugoslav diplomatic lists, Aleksandr CHEREPANOV arrived in Belgrade sometime in 1952, appearing on the diplomatic list for the first time in November 1952, as Second Secretary. He was one of only seven Soviets appearing on the diplomatic List at this = -° time. The new Soviet Ambassador appeared for the first time on the November 1953 list, bringing the total diplomatic representation up to eight. - . **CHEREPANOV was Second Secretary throughout his tour in Belgrade, according to the diplomatic lists. TOP SECRET RoE, SORT cee ee atte de tae Tih geal ee ere fee ne ran ee art tee
and students, a number of whom were arrested by the UDB on suspicion, On several occasions the UDB had felt it had almost enough evidence to enable the Yugoslas Government to expel CHERFPANOV, but the evidence was never completely satisfactory. . Thus in 1954 GREGOVIC was assigned the task of com. promising CHEREPANOV's wife, Irene. Approximately three months after he met her, CREGOVIC personally.succeeded in compromising Irene. He continued to handle her as an ine formant over a period of about a vear and a half, during which time he also maintained their personal relationship on a spasmodic basis. IJréne’s information enabled the UDB to discover that CHEREPANOV had established a network of informants among workers and students, mostly in Belgrade and its vicirity. Subsequeat information established the fact that he was also in close contact with trade union leaders and particularly with river port workers, a number of whom were subsequently found to be anti-Yugoslav and pros} Soviet in their outlook. aAnother Soviet, an intelligence officer who had been recruited By the UDB, confirmed to GRECOVIC that CHEREPANOYV was a uember of Soviet Intelligence. The Soviet said also that CHERLPANOV had beer an intelligence officer during the war and had at one stage bcen parachuted behind the German lines on a special services operation which resulted in the kidnapping of a German general. GREGOVIC described CHEREPANOV as “always smiling but in fact an extremely cold and cruel individual." although .he did not appear to be emotionally attccnsd to his wife, “he was extremely jealous and watchful of her. He frequently urged his wife to use her exceptional beauty and seductive charm in cultivating Yugoslav cfficials in order to obtain information. GRECOVIC also said that CHEREPANOV sas very fond of hunting, which “appeared to give relief to his exe cessively sadistic nature.” CHEREPANOV was recalled to Moscow in mid-1956, according to CREGOVIC. cottan SW dee Ee EAS oe Ebene | 4
a a ag pags He ne EN ’ (141) Reports by Americars in October ard November 1963 2 university librarian - from @ midwest campus visited the (55K on a book-buyicg -. misgéion tor his universit. He had not made aiv official arrangements to contact VEZEKNICA {internatioral Book Agency, under the Sovict Ninistry of Foreign trade) in oo advance of his trip, but called at its office in the Ministry e of Foreign Trade building after he arrived in Moscow. He , . explained his interest in obtaining second-hand books. eet In a few minutes an English-speaking Soviet was sent to og the lobby, and he identified himself as Aleksandr Nikoew layevich CHEREPANOV. After discussing the librariaa's needs with him, the tan agreed to cooperate with the American. There were three more contacts with ChEREPANOV, all in the lobby of the same building. SRetes "he last contact was on 4 November, at which time CHEREPANOV informed the librarian that the book procurement: listings, except for a few items, had been approved for release. Then, speaking softly and quickly in Russian, he passed the librarian a thick envelope which he said contained information of ro value to.the Librarian but of much value to the. American Lebassy. He asked wnat it be passed ime . mediately tu “"r. Morton" who worked on cultural affairs in the Embassy, and, if Mr. Morton was not there, to give it to someone: clase whom the librarian might know or recog= nize as trustworthy. CHEREPANOV further requested ‘that the i librarian call him from outside the Embassy to Ict hin know . (by use of a code vord) ii the envelope had been delivered ‘successfully to ths Embassy. He cautioned the librarian not to mentior his--CUEREPANGV's..rame in the Embassy. (The envelope was dativercd t» the Erbassy according to CHEREPANOV's instructioz:s, execpt that in the Embassy the librarian did mention CHERLPANOY's naxe as the Soviet whe had presented tna package.) S.idsequestiy the Librarian called CHEREPA.OV, as instrected, to confira the safe delivery of the package.* ohio herd wee The envelope fron CHLREPANOV cortained a bundle of documents, some typed and some narderitten. Unon examination they appeared *5 be classified KGB file materials. Fearing Soviet provocaticn, which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy on the grounds of possessing classified Soviet Government ducuments,7* Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, turned the originals over to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. placed a phone call to a man who identified himself as - CHEREPANOV in order to follow up on the $12,000 order for books left by the librarian; am innocuous telephone conver- sation resulted. The individual who called himself CHERE- PANOV said he had written to the librarian ths day before (i.e., 15 November 1963) concerning the matter. Tre librarian jJater confirmed that he had received such a letter from . CHEREPANGV dated mid-November. ee 7 “s P<" “eat the librarians's request, on 16 November the Embassy ' **Such a provocation had actually been directed against another U.S. Embassy in another Iron Curtain country shortly before these events took place. Ayre ELA oe Pea a tt RRR RRE Ree ererony cate reat eI EeR cotati hina se: + met . . 7 . went nr s ‘ ee ot be te
‘ sDpadncennsccaters one-tanen ane nyeten merses tity te oe 2 Aye sana oe met tee anv mene able Civ) Izfornation fron \OSEXAO aa Note: All of the information enrich folioss was fute nished Sy NOSENKO, CHEPEPANOV was morn sort 1920 or 1921. Turing World War IT he vas a KOA officer working with partisan groups henird the lines, Later he was in Yugoslavia for four or five years, the dates not known. CHEREPANOV was probably Deputy Chief of the KOE Legal Residernsy in Belg-ade. While there, his wif-- tad an arfrir with either an Englishman or an Americar. . Wren CHEREPA*OV rvetusred to Moscow, he had some (une specified) problics: getting a job, but finally tne KG Second. Chief Directorate took cim into the i.8, Eusassy Section of the American [epartea-n2, working against the Actsairsistrative Section of the Enbansy. Me worked an tha same room as Via. KUSKOV, and was responsidl: for ture+ targets: Fishard SNYDER, 4 consular officers john NcViChKAR, a corsular of- ficer; and Marion ALSAMONIE, secretary to the personnel of- ficer. CHEREPANGV's work 95 a cate Officer was tons, and as it grew worse, “io: ReoB @r.nacd to retive iw. H-lause of his service in Worud War Ji, for «hich he received three years' pension cr-:dit for sach year of military services, he had erough time to tis errdit sto tb: e1.igible for retirement. Also, he was just over the minimus age (40) Yor retirement from the KiB, Upon retiring ia Joiy oc Acgust 1961, CEEREPANOY got a job with WEZEKNICA. Unrappy absut nis enforced retirement and angry at tre Ki«, he bocans €vin more aiscatisfied when MEZUKNIGA termed doen nis Sevaral att2epts to go abroad. +e Prios +o leaving the Kb, CHEREPANOV stsi- draft copies of documents bs had tard@led ir tne 1.8, Emnasss Section. In one case, Le copicd te: cortearty of @ report in Las own hand- writing, evidently being usable toa st-al tie document hime self. All of the doecurents La had stthen were intended for dsetruction. h When the U.S. kybassy officisis sas ths CHEREEPANOY documents, ‘they were atvaid tra the documents were part of @ KGB provocatior., and the. said to themselves: “Wrat are the Russians trying to do to ust" The Embassy officials ‘photograpred the dowuneszts and om the next day returned -them to the Ministry of For-ign Affairs. When the Ameri. Cans gave the documents to ths Ministry, the FCs said: . “What did the Americans give this back to us for? Maybe they were afraid of provocation, but maybe arotner thing--maybe they are trying to destroy the American D-apartzest, ta cone fuse them. And it did, i¢ did,” In November 1963 Yu. C’K came to visit NOSENKO and brought news about ‘a catastrophe” in the KGB, GUK said he had the story from &.F, MAKASHFY, a-m:tual frierd of GUK's . >... - and- NOSENKO!s,* --MAKASHEV -+-e+ ben in Forsign Minister-Andrey —-: GROMYKO's office when the CHEREPANOY papers were brought there, after their delivery by *homas FAIN of the @.S. Ene bassy. NMAKASHEY saw the reame of O.%f. GRIBAXOY (Chief of ' the Second Chief Directoratz) on some of the papers and saw a that one of them was a pian for agent operatiozs against an  eemtansteintae *NOSENKO said he firer met VAKASHEY in Ceteva in 1962, when both were there with the Disarmament Delegation; he subse- quently saw MAKASHEY cccasioraliy in Moscow. a woe ~ : OO ae et aed Cte pacshs teak sete a wea ae catia ote " iy bine Mba ate. bk, se os rs A Pee: Be
‘of all the people who had working in the Americ during the time period covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961. The whole matter was held very taughtiy in the KGB, and its investigation went on for no wore than 26 cr 25 days. When the KGB examined the doc:ments. some were round to be in CHEREPANOV's handwriting, but no documents were found wnich pertained to CHERE- PANOV's own case work, or that of the U.S. Embassy Section where he worked. (NOSENKO also noted that the KGB found no documents dated later than 195)--rone for i962 or i363--only 1959, 1950 ard 1961.) Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV, who had lett the section in :9€1. The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, but in- stead mounted fixed surverllance posers at his home and office. In order to provoxe CHEREPANCV into some precipitous action on the basis of these fusprcicus points, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him and, in the cour-e of conversation, to mention the great disturbance in the KGB be:ause someone had passed stolen KGB documents to the Americans, CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the néws and was quite cool about the matter. The -next day the fixed surveéiilance post opserved him leaving his house in the morning at nis usual time, apparently on his way to work, but the fixed surveliiance post at his office soon re- ported that he had sot arrived at work. He had ‘simply dropped out of sight.” , o ceinabab eda cpa te oyna ste beta Thee ae ante An intensive search ‘all over the city of Moscow” ansued _then spread throughout the soviet Union. Borde: controls were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to Republic and local KGB and militia offices, all means of transport were covered. Reports began coming in from various places that some- - One who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV's description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there. Reports which came into : 4 KGB Headquarters frcia Gorkiy Oblast stronglv indicated the possi- ‘ bility of CHEREPANCV's presence there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check the reports.’ NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHEREPANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, “where a person could lose himself for life." On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border. peewee nt te ees * When NOSENKO first told this story, at the first meeting in 4 Geneva in January 1964, he pulled from his pocket a document 4 row which he said was his official KGB “temporary duty authoriza- CO tion" to go to Gorkiy Oblast for the CHEREPANOV search. He noted that he had brought it out illecaily, to show CIA. The hea ae »~ document, authorizing the Gorkiy KGB office to extend cooper-~ : ation to NOSENKO, was valid from 15 to 30 December 1963. 3
"556. A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.Mz PEDOSEYEV and several other American Department officers. They picked him up and headed immediately back to Moscow, interrogating CHEREPANOV on the plane.. He immediately con- fessed to having given the documerts to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was “angry at the KCB, very angry," and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an Ameri-~ can tourist who was a Librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to this American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign ~~ Trade was also housed. ~ . Because of the fact that CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered consider able criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-~ the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that had he detected surveillance on himself he | would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution," and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof, CHEREPANOV was in prison when NOSENKO left the USSR - (on 18 January 1964) and would be shot, but the affair would not be publicized. In addition to his wife, CHEREPANOV would leave a daughter as a survivor. WPSERET = Siig ante: toes ary os
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he becare bitter acduxeventful. After he had tivaily ob- tained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, he tried to gain revenge by passhig Ministry docunents to a-U.3, Govern= ment official visitingf the Ministry. Because tay u.5. Government Lelieved this act tu have bean a Soviet provo- eation, the documents were subsequently returned tou the Soviet Government. CHEREPANOV was arrested, trict. and shot. His widow, Irina, works in a nairdressing siop at 15 Petroy= ka Strect in Moscow, which is patronized by wives of Eremlin graduation fiom the silitary Diplomatic Academy tn 1929, and . officieais; he alsu left a daughter, about 19 years oid. i i aes RA PRE EN seid she could pravide no further cetalls. In the course of a CIA interview oitn ee eae wo in QRweEp 1966, she described the Soviet Union as being ‘Vike a cage, like prison, where people sometimes run RvBy, but they {the aurnorities| ure able to track trem anyvnere."” She stated that she knew for a fact that a person was shot in Mascow, CHEREPANOV, who worked in the same (iiiitarye Diplomatic) Acaccmy as her huaband. During the war CHERREH PANOV was an officer in intellipence, and was a “geod, brave and rescureeful soldicr. Then he cane tu the Academy, where he was unhappy. Ue wasn't a cood vorcer there, considering it a personal sligut to agve been sent there with all nis background.” He becano so bitter that ne gave lap rpant:- documents to the Americans about 1963 cr 19890, ghey aterte ° cans, however, thought that the documents vere “4214, so they gave them to the Soviets. In two days CHEERED ANOV -was arrested and in two menths he was shot. dtm age et SUGRCE said that she knew this man personally, and his wife as well, though only sligntiy. Her husband, huovever, was & friend of CHEREPANOV's, and being ‘very loyal,” re weat to sce his widow, although he had only met her once. (She was unable to recall from whom ner husbend had learard of CHER PANOV's death.) CHEREPANOV's wife told j Se # ae ile that CHEREPANOY had “really, meant to do what he did; he- Source's husband . really had taken~miggg@igirs 2qx-Shl quoted CHEREPANOVA as saying: "I remember how he took these papers out of the . 4 house. Then he returned ard toox something from the cabinet er something. aAnd I asked hin, ‘What ts that?’ He said, 'It is semething waimportant’.' And two days later he was arrested.” 2, Gi eecoumented that CHEREPANOY had not known the Ancreeae@Séry well when he gave him the papors, put he was "a foreigner, 7%. friend." When asked if CHEnE- PANOV was a GRU officer, Cam’ Repeetiees said she thought he was a KGB officer, but was hot celthin of this. flowever, the docrments were “very important ones, important enough that he was shot." | . f rewinie i caine tion caidh ca i j i I i i }. } i t t at Beds tac ALS st nad inthe i oe + ssbabbeitittee toil an atta star eat om eB BRT aDenl Le wut,
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fala Ae aE Ste Reems we 562. Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.5.A. in 1957-1953."* The report bears the signature of Colonel A. FEKLISOV,** whose title is given as "Chief, First [American| Department, First Chief Directorate, Committee fur State Security under the Council of ; te Yinisters USSK.“ Attached to this document is a sheet of 16 signatures, with dates after all bur four, indi-- cating that these individuals had read the report (CHEREPANOV's. is included). At the bottom cr this sheet is indicated the fact that the report was typed in two copies, copy number one, which this copy is, uddressed tu the Second Chief Directorate, and copy number two aduressed to a file, No. 1976, volume 5. The cest of the documents pertain entireiy to KGB coverage of the U.S. Embassy and American diplomats in Yoscow for a period of over two years: The earlisst is dated August 1958 and the latest 15 October 1960. Most of them were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the U.S. Embassy Section, First Department, scp, Major V. KUSKOV, *** Two reports are on, Americans who had already left the Soviet Union: in addition to sumnaarizirg the infor- mation collected on them while they were in Noscow, these reports indicate the processing required for the file's contents prior to retirement to KGB Archives. ‘The sub- jects of these reports are Edward L, KILLHA", Second Secretary from July 1957 to July 1959 (documect dated October 1960) and Wallace L, LITTELL, Attaci: from June 1956 to July 1958 (document dated October 1960). Phere are four operational plans for ager work against American diplomats stationed in Moscow at the time the plans were prepared: Richard HARMSTONE, Second Secretary (document of August 1958; Lewis. ¥. BOWDEN, Second Sceretary (document of Fepiuary 1966°; famss A. RAMSEY, Second Secretary (document of Febrwary 1960); and George WINTERS, Attache (no dare). *4** entero menoeeteetetet *One paragraph of the document refers to American surveil- lance of Soviets in New York City, and tne next paragraph begins: "The intensity of surveillance was uneven. From . November 1957 to April 1958 a decrease was noticed in the num- ber of surveillance teams assigned to work directly against Soviet employees. This did not mean, however, tmat the Ameri- can surveillance service reduced its surveillance of, Soviet employees as a whole.“ The dates cited here aoproximats the period, from late November 1957 to mid-March 1958, when the FBI was conducting surveillance of two Iliegals in New York City as an outgrowth of an operational lead from CIA source POPOV (see Part VI.D.7.a.). Information from NOSENKO rela- ting to FBI surveillance is discussed in Part VI.F. **FEKLISOV is the true. name of. the former KGB Legal Resident . . : a who served in Washington, D.C., under the alias “FOMIN, ** &NOSENKO identified VA. KUSKOYV as, ap officer in the Second Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, . and said that CHEREPANOV worked in the same room with KUSKOY. : ###%For a further discussion of the role of George WINTERS in the POPOV case, see Part VI.D.7.a. : a TOP SECRET ete Tbe bee be SRE adit. SB: BSCS ees wed ele he ets eet eten ne saints Sate nate DIES mackie tedivee ee Rat tae shelllatten
Anothcr document is typed on @ preprinted letter- head form entitled “Agent Report";. the form has all of the KGE organizational titles printed on it, with blank ; : space left to be filled in-for the date, the rumbcr of a 2 the section, department, ‘and directorete, the name of . . p< 7 the agent source and that ‘af the case officer who ree i 4 ceived it. This particular report is taat of the agent "LILLANA," concerning her. contacts with WINTERS between 3 and G March 1959, The report describes how she made his acquaintance and what transpired at each of her meetings with him thercafter. Following her report is a brief statement of future plans for the use of this agent against WINTERS, A notation appears on the first page that the report was translated from Sparich, al- though the name of the translator is not given. (This seems to suggest that the agent wrote her ovn account of her activities, as she is identified in the report as having recently repatriated to the Soviet Union from Argentina.) The typing date appears as 1% April 1953, and the signature line was prepared for Major KOVSHUE, “Deputy Chief, First [American] Departzent” of the K3B Second Chief Directorate.* KOVSHUK's rame also appears as the case officer who received the report fron the agent. One handwritten document, entitled “Corclusions on ; i the Matter of Operational Development LANCELLE,"** is ; 3 on a kind of paper different from that used for any of ‘ 4 the other doaiments; it is lined and columned, and the headings at the top of the columns (e.g., number and date of document, to whom addressed or from whom sent) suggest that the paper is a record sheet or log of cor- i respordence. It buars the date of October 1960, zrut is | not Signed, nor does any designation of section, depart- | i ele ee BEd ment, or directorate appear. The document is a summary of LANGELLE's activities in the Sovict Union, primarily details of his activity as an intelligescce officer for CIA. One facet of LANGELLE's operatioral activity is described in some detail, as follows: “On tre 28to of May 1958 L. loaded a dead drop at Lenin Hillis. He ate . ‘ tempted to give the visit to Lenin Hills for the pure H { fae ASF atta oa poses indicated above the outward appe2zrance of an inno- cent outdoor recreation trip with chilcren. Incidentally, prior to loading the dead drop L, had previously cased the travel pattern of his surveillance, the situation at Lenin Hills, and had visited that area with his wife. “As a consequence, it was established that this dead drop belonged to a person recently arrested by the Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers  semactapean at ee SES CEPT SPADA ee *NOSENKO identified V.M. KOVSHUK in this position around this time. : *#For a further discussion of the role of Russell LANCELLE in the POPOV case, see Part’ VI.D.7.a. .... oe ey, - sreattare oe , a » & TOP SECRET Uses
goeaeve of the USSR for the City of Moscow, REPNIKOV, who had been recruited by Americéa intelligence....°*° His meetings with POPOV in Hoscow are set out accurately, with dates. WINTERS' mailing of a letter to POPOY is | mentioned, but in contrast to exact dates used throughe out the paper for other avents cited, the date of WINTERS’ mailing is given only as "January 1939.” There is a handwritten document comprised of nanes and addresses of Soviet citizens, headed with a state- ment that these are authors of letters addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Yoscow, but intercepted by the KUB. Where dates of the lictters are given, they are for Octo- ber 1960. In a few cases the contents of the letters are charactecized (e.g., “request for financial aid-- 5,000 rubles," “complaints about inability to live os persion"). Under two of the names a note appears, which looks as though it had been added at a different time or with a different pea, but in identical hand- writing; the pote says “Letter enclosed." ‘these two letters were enclosed in the package of docunmerts. The two documents described apovee-the LANCELLE "Conelusions' and the list of Soviets who wrote to the U.S. Embassy--appear to have been written by the sane person. Although the sample on the document described next is only a signature, it may well be the game hand. The name is CHEREPANOV's. This document, the only docu- ment having for its subject a Sovict citizer, is a type- written summary of derogatory information oa a Soviet youth who began to lead 2 dissolute life ia 1957, becoming a black market speculator and a homosexual. As a consequence he was expelled from the Komsomrd] and from the Institute at which he had been studying. He nonetheless continucd his criminal activities, including contacts with foreigners for purposss of flezing the USSR, despite warnings by the militia and ihe Kite, and he had two long mcetings with Attacne Richard SNYDER, "Consul of the American Embassy,’ to discuss his wisn to go to America. The document, dated February 19¢0, is Signed by Lt. Col. A. CHEREPANOV, “Senior Case Officer {no section indicated], First Department,” of the Seeond Chief Directorate. (Presumably the document is relevant to the American Department because of the contact with an American diplomat.) #0n 24 May 1958 LANGELLE visited the area of the dead drop site referred to herein with his wife to case and photograph the site area. The site had been described to him as a certain section of a wooden staircase in the park area. When his report was received at CIA Headquarters it was ebvious that because of inadequate, information, he had cased the wrong staircase, so he was told to go back. as . soon ag. possible and repcat the casing for the other .stair- case. He did this on 28 May 1958, bringing his children for cover. He did not put a drop down at this or any other time. A legal travel agent actually put the drop down on. 7 June 1958. This drop was not intended for the agent re- was - ferred to in the CHEREPANOY document, REPNIKOV, who in fact not even a recruited agent at the time, although efforts were being made.-.unsuccessiully~-during this time to recruit hin, nor At no time was any dead drop put down for REPNIKOV, were any ever planned for him. _- AS sd tered duct bet diene botea dee crenata Mideoanth “om moet ime be : “ad ‘ aah aiabnn ai Hts ete hed se. waned meat oleae atte
te Soke Ne ee 565. The remaining papers are handwritten drafts of reports pertaining to various of the Americans named above, some incomplete, and extensive rough notes which appear to be extracts from surveillance reports, most of them on WINTE2S, <All these notes are in the same handwriting, which appears to be that of K SKOY. (x) NOSENKO's Comments on the CHEREPANGV Paners On 3 February 1964 NOSENKO was shown all the CHEREPANOV papers with the exception of the FEKLISOV report on opera- tional conditions in the United States. Just before thev were given to him to read, NOSENKO was asked if he had been shown the pepers before he left Moscow; ne replied that he had not. He said he knew that the documents pertained to BOWDEN, RAMSEY, HARMSTONE, WINTERS, and LANCELLE, but he had not read them, Asked who in the Second Chier Civectorate knew exactly which docunents were involved, NOSENKO named S.M.FEDOSEYEV, Chief of the American Departrent ut the tine; GRISANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate; sad G.I. GRYAZNOV, Chicf‘of the U.S. Embassy Section. These three officers, he said, had possession of the documents after they were returned by H1D to the KCB. NOSENKO then proceeded to examine and read aloud the contents of the documents, making occasional «xplanatory comments as he west along. He identified the candwriting of CHEREPANOV hinself, as well as that of KUSKOY, KOYSHUK, and: BELOGLAZOY, Concerning the substance of the documents, NOm ‘“SENKO made very few comments. In discussing tne operational plan for work against WINTERS, NOSENKO noted that this docu. "bent, which was a handwritten draft, had been sigsed by KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section: SUSENKO then said: “He should not have signed this, I do net know why ne signed it. He should not have signed it." Asked why not, h* said: “Because it is a draft. He should have signed the typ:id copy. And why he signed the rough draft I do not know..." As he studied the agent report which KOVSHLY recsived from source "LILIANA,” concerning WINTERS, NOSENKO- commented on KOVSHUK's failure to fill in the line which is intended to identify the safe apartment or operational apartment “where the report was received. "It is obligatory to indi« cate the place, in the second line," he added. “It is obligatory to write in the number of the persoral file [this did appear in the document] and where the contact took place." Reading aloud the agent plan for BOWDEN, described therein as the FBI man in the Embassy, NOSENKO came *o the section which states: “Ironically one day as though by chance he [BOWDEN] blurted cut to our agent 'SHEDOVA' ‘ARTUR's* affiliation with American Intelligence."' He was interrupted to be asked who "SHMEDOVA" was; NOSENKO said: “Cleaning woman undoubtedly. An affiliation of 'ARTUR' with American Intelligence." He was then asked: “What connec- ‘ tion did ‘ARTUR’ have with American Intelligence?" To this *"ARTUR" was the KGB eryptonym for NOSENKO’s agent Arsene FRIPPEL; see Part V.D.5. a 3 a Ey | ceeratelintmeereneamtins steer. ee ie ete eneceittintetare eRe nena mrwepim re et oe Aa Bhecbimine « FeiersASh ihe bet spite abe sail ta ak Eta bambi Either ernie ns, wD be Re Miele sad e in whith ae ee
NOSENKO replied: “That I cannot say." The CIA case officer remarked: “Why, you should know, you're his case officer..." NOSENKO ignored this comment and continued to read.the docu- ment aloud. A little further on in the document reference is made to usc of future agents to report on ROWDEN; again "ARTUR is ment.oned, and NOSENKO identified nim this time as FRIPPEL, Then he said: “I asked FRIPPEL, and he said ‘But 1 know nething.' ‘How is it you do not, when he is the counterintelligence man in your Embassy? He interrogates you!’ And he ansvered: ‘But no, he is a good man.‘" In reading a draft report which appears to nave been an attempt to summarize the KGB information on WINTERS, NO- SEXKO read out the sentence: "During his stay in the USSR, WINTERS sent eight espionage letters,* and loadec a drop jn connection with a game the KGB played with American Intel- ligence." He was asked if _ he t those eight Iette) } said he did not. KASENKO retorted: “But at that time I would not have run hin down. He did not know that he had Metka on him.** Prior to the year 1962 did you know about McetKe?” No, I don't believe you did." At this, he was asked:” “Oh, you mean those eight letters were detected from Metka? NOSENKO said: “Of course." The case officer asked: "Not from surveillance?" NOSLAKO Said: "No. Beyond the fact that he could be seen mailing then, the rest Metka gives... Well, that letter which was ; mailed by WINTENS to FOPOV was without Metka. That which was for POPOV definitely was without tietka.” Buf the other ‘letters, that was not so. I would not blame him. How would he know? He put them in his pocket--that'’s all." NOSENKO added that the lettey which was sent’ to POPOV was one of the eight letters to which the document refers. NOSENKO then reviewed the decument concerning Richard HARMSTONE.*** He repeated his earlier statement that HARM. STONE had been compromised and had been approached by the KGB, that he turned down the recruitment offer, but that he did not report the approach toe the U.S. Embassy. He was asked how the KGB knew that he had not reported the approach, to which NOSENKO renlied: “He was monitored and we would have heard by audio if anything about this matter had been re~ ported.:...Undoubtedly if he reported it something would have been heard from the Minister Counsellor's materials as to what this might be. And they would dictate a message about this. "** Later NOSENKO was asked who tried to recruit HARNSTONE. *#The first source of information on KGB use of Metka, the KGB code name for thief powder or detecting powder, was NOSENKO, in June 1962. . ¢*#See Section VI.D.3.e. for a discussion of the HARMSTONE case. *t**HSRMSTONE did report the KGB approach, and the Minister | Counsellor's office was the site of a discussion of the case. bn ed Sw OTe ' were PIR ee a a, ace oteal soa un etfs REAR “catlae Sats ace 1 me tS i icinn sa atau stt bona dt nyt we (date shih cictadtativd 2 Sele ts eeetdendim itt ae Da St ttle Fetithee sacme “aba edio me? eryad VEE went Popetrey
FER eon ete ce ‘CYA. Neither was. He answered: “I do not know; -that was prior to my coming into the department. This was in the year 1953 or 1959. I don't know who was the case officer who spoke to HAKs- STONE." \CSENKS was asked: "Is he still in the Department?" He replied: “I don't think he is. i don't think he is eoncersed with it any more.'"* NOSESKO read the document which set forth highlights of LANGELLE's operational activities in Moscow, chiefly devoted to the POPOV. casc, but also including information (inaccurate in detail) concerning a dead drop site in Lenin Hills.** As be read this section he commented: '"*{Incidentally, they [the KGB] found the dead drop and contents by accident. Little children, children.“ Asked if te knew anything about this incident of Lenin Hills, he answered, "Kids. Russian children found it by accident. For after LANGELLE had left the area, surveillance checked over the area, but they found nothing...." Reading rurther he came to the statement that it was later established that the dead drop was intended for the person already arrested by the KCB, REPNIKOV. Tos this he added that REPNIKOV was known as Stanisiay "Slava" REPNIKOV, who nad been recruited by some tourist; these de- tails were nut included in the CHEREPANOY document. He was asked if REPNIKOV had been arrested and was thereafter working under KGB control, but he said this was not the case. He explained that he had been arrested, and the KGB there# after “roughed him up once in a while” because he was of the category of Soviets who were known to essociate with foreigners. He did not know what American tourist had recruited REPNIKOV, °: but he was aware of the fact that REPNIKOV had not been arrested until after the tourist had left the USSR. *** When he was reviewing the summary; of information on LITTELL, who had left the USSR before the summary Was pre- pared, XOSENKO was asked if he knew anything about one of the Soviets named as a one-time contact of LITTEL's, B.P. VORONTSGY. The document, a rough draft with corrections, contained a statement that a meeting between LITTEL and *KOVSHUK was identified by HARNSTONE as the KGB officer who made the approach. *¢See the foregoing section on the contents of the CHERE. PANOV package for details on the inaccuracies included in this document. ***REPNIKOV had been reported as a dissident Soviet youth as early as 1955, and in 1957 he told one of his American contacts that he had once been arrested and served time’ in a Soviet prison at some time for one of his attempts to escape illegally from the USSHK. He was arrested again there- after for a second plan for escape, and he was given psycho- logical treatment as a result. REPNIKOV was in contact with a number of Americans and other Western travellers..again in 1958 ard 1959. In September 1959 another Soviet, a friend : of his, told an American tourist that REPNIKOV had been ar . arrested after receiving a letter from an American. which thanked him for his interest in being an ageat and. gave hin. directions for future contacts. In the summer of 1960 there. _ was a long article in Komsomolskaya Pravda about the arrest . ‘ of REPNIKOV and a friend of his on charges of being agents of | £ ere epee eine emma i ete rm ment mae ay secon germ cork er yet Fe Hr c- FOE Te Tr os Sane en wr ceeal parr’ eA ee Secandncoin ef DelnneeEeunbs tie se Lnwadidee Faas tab bp hesaBds chlanlabe be wie theme at View dhe ta aed she Seed be AIG AEs Bee Achat or
VORONTSOV took piace on the strect, and they went to a restaurant together. It further said that VORONTSGY was continuously in coatact with foreign tourists. These two lines are crossed out in the draft, and in their place is _written: “The Second { Counterintelligence and Security} Department of the UKGB for the city of Moscow is fully . oriented concerning -him.‘' NOSENKO was told that VORONTSOV most recently worked for. Inturist-at. the Hotel Metropol in Moscow, and that he had had a nimber. of meetings with American students and with tourists. NOSENKO commented: "This is agent work, He is an agent." He was asked, "But to you nothing is known?" NOSENKO said, “Absolutely nothing. "* NOSENKO went over the rest of the CHEREPANOV documents Yapidly, for the most part simply reading them aloud, with side remarks on topics unrelated to the donoments or the Americans discussed therein. _*In the summer of 1963, VORONTSOV had contacted two different groups of young Americans and told them of his plans for es- cape from the Soviet Union. He also told them he had informa— tion about KGB agents through his Inturist employmest, and that the American authorities should be told of him and his: | Plans; he passed on an elaborate code system which.was to be used to get in touch with him to assist him in his escape . plans. He was so open in his contacts, unrealistic in his plans, and insecure in his conversations with the young _Ameri-~ cans (none of whom had any intelligence connections) that when they reported to American embassies. in the West, VORONT-. SOV was immediately assumed by U.S. authorities to be either _@ Clumsy provocateur or 4a fanciful, immature youth. . Nothing further was heard from VORONTSOV. There had been no previous record of him in CIA files; the CHEREPANOV document was the only confirmation of his other contacts with foreigners. | anianr | ~ EP, adipic eee oo cae . . . . RE ar i Cree never TT We AE TE RN MOD cratering, ooze tetas soy ine LF eee me ets i i i wie BE tind wees weieadn woe de eben tehethtire mad ae ania dA, corner emeeytOpOTeR peer iemeaten- —— onangrempmemnaneeperse hoe rs ae tO atte a iydaiar 2 oid tee ls eltlcdias
on KALA‘: ROMALER d. Report (i) Introduction em atte Viadirir cusentn RATAN. FOnAR .to the FST by beth hOSENED their intcrvation, the Sovi Auerican to the | i ; tTravei i een thes eet 8 ale eon 7 Che yi ere totem wae amr wey A eo awake é bee ot snaasbt oi, wolf eh ery 19 ming inforn NGOGUNRG giving he sare or sin . Varned by e FR) in March 164 : é, ae ay wo t Seviet 'iec, NACAN-RuMARLE wend ta tia: { en Inturist travel agents! conrerenses. i to The Sovret taion had tanen place van y PGS ., : ; scow 10 Paris after the conperenve ended, the Avrefict plane cn ; ch he wis # passtnper was divert.d te frague. There KAZAN- was removed from the aiveraft and placed under arrest by : ech authorities. it sub:cquentiv cxamines EALAN-RUOMAREN'S i backgreund as a native Croech and former agent in Cnechoslovakia : of a MPP’ inte: ligence service, restiting in svulation oy CIA ‘third i that ne mignt have been gider AGE contra fron the time of his : : : oer - , a an am count Clundestine activitics for the @ePpM yin tie carly f9a%'s, ahery i {ii} Statement by NOSENKG * heen eR eA EEE 2G February Lact interview of NOSENKO ean fottea S : C445 rOr,~cw Ft Teer 8; a A. Ae Abie gach or wea pat Bos Re “sf ES spade na EOE Caste abd ie te we areata ast we Sener naanet er agen taper oe dhe ete! wit EE etait nme kibah stats. Lecntine - The FBI reported the following on its interview of eee) ‘ ey ‘ yegarding KAZAN-XOMAREK: Do a ree)
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Alfred SLLUSINGER: -Suspeci¢d Source of th Fé a AA ED scores aan AEP 2 {i} Introduction NOSENKG first reported on Aiftred Lazarevichk LESENGER (also. srelied SLEZINGER) of 3 July iSud when he seid aa American of this last mane, owner of a photographic snup in hew York City, wis suspected by the xGB of having connections witha the Fal, Consequently, NOSENKG said, when SLESTNGL2 traveiled to Moscow the KGB Tourist Departmen: arranged to place him in contact with an agent of the departnent, and while SLESINGER was in ‘Odessa the Tourist Department instructed the 462 organization in that ity to have him “surrounded” with agents.- selP has I tries ubuut his asgso- in te Udessa and’ naving Leen que ciation with tie Fai, again while visiting there in 8 Se Details from NOSENKC pote ject are presented below. ‘H SENSED og this sub- (ii) NOSENKO's liformation YGB Firat Chief Direc- 5 SLESINGER was under suspicion by tac ¢c business transactions ; oe terate, accerding ty MOcENKO, because of hi with a nunber of Soviets who cane to his ster¢ anid in when kh seemed to cisplay mere than normal interest Tae First Chief ‘Nipectorate was cf the opinion that SLESTNeLR was .rying to be- come Closely acquainted with some Soviets aul was trying to study them. Upon learning of fis forthcoming tr:; t3 the USSR the MGB suspected that “he mijht nake some centacts or do sometning interesting.”** The KGR, NOSENKO said, wanted ta study SLESINGER as being a possible agent or operational contuct er the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESTAGER, and ccsponsible for this case was Ye.M. DVORKIN, a senicer case officer in the American Section of the Tourist Lepartment. An agent ef the Tourist De- not give by NUSENKO Sa pis cet ee S was director of a photographic shop in hoscow, and on KGB instructions he became friendly with SLESINGER during - the latter's trip to Moscew, NOSPNAD thought that the two me later exchanged correspendence. SLESINGER went to Odessa, ae : ot 5 4 4 ‘
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CEA fas  emnnee nee enti rene x Te . hoe + . - oat States on 12 June that the KGB had been successius in effecting clandestine entry into foreign embassies in Moscow and had, ia fact, been able tc get into all of them with the éxception of those of the United States and Great Britain. NOSENKO was then asked whether the GB had also been able tc enter the West German Embassy. tle replied: "The situation is worse with the Germans. It is worse. It's a different matter with the Germans. They are being listened to. EROLL, the Ambassador,* is a very intel- ligent and skilled analyst, and he provides a great deal of solid information... KROLL dictates evervthing and even his own menor- anda. The memuranda he dictates are very interesting, very interesting memorada. that is, the information we receive from .the ticrophones is very solid information, very sclid informatica, because he knows everything. He knows what ADENAUER will think ahead of time. A very intelligent. man and an excellent, excel-. lent analyst. His analysis is tremendous. Also, [U.S. Ambassador] THOMPSON visits and taixs with him, and we know that THOMPSON was ‘there and what tock place. Valuabie information. He is very talented, this KROLL." - "Fans Anton KRULL became West German Ambassador to Moscow in 1953. From 1953 to 1955 he had been Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and from 1958 to 1958, Ambassador to Japan. His only’ previous Soviet tour was during 1923-1925, when he was the German Vice- Consul in ‘Odessa. In March 1962, KROLL received a consider- able amount of publicity in the Western press when, according to the New York Times (2 March) there was “an. ‘outcry in the West German press all week over reports in Die Welt and Bild, Hamburg newspapers with the same ownership, p, that Dr. K had recommended major concessions to the Communists for a Gernan-Soviet settlement." As a result, ADENAUER publicly. recalled XROLL to Bonn for consultations. He had been under fire for similar reasons the previous November and was re- calved then, too. He left Moscow permanently at the end of 1962. ; sae ee ea { ' cr “s 3 tate wea baths vo mold » obits sib catgtraSREEbS I, Sy Seth eine
wore atinee te eo a mavcsraeqtmee st a.renggeenenry wenn fomuttamengn inant # naar Jie tony ene aoe tet eem arate Embassy Section, American Department, Second Chief Direc- torate. During these visits she.would open her bag and Source could see the large documents which were destined for the Chief of the Third Department. The cover letter read: ‘List number . To (Cna¥ef of the Third Depart- ment). Translated from German by ; . -* . Source often joked with Tatyana and in this vicw would complain to her that she always brought very thin documents for the American Department but very thick documents for the Third. Department. On severai occasions Tatyana would be late delivering material to Source's section, and she would state that the typists in the Operational Technical Directorate were busy doing something for the Third Department. On the basis of his experience Source knew that something important must have been received from the microphones concealed in the German Ambassador's office. — "All cf the intercepted material obtained by the Opera- tional Technical Directorate was sent first to the Informa- tional Group of the Second Chief Directorate. This group decided which information should be seen by the Central Com- mittee. According tu Source, a large amount of this mater- ial was considercd very significant at the time and was sent to the CPSU Central Committee over the signature of the Chairman of the KGB. "Source never read any of the above material. Source does not know if the microphones are still in place and still cperational. "Source does not know if the KGB was able to break ‘the German codes." ¥ 4 : oe ccinatib tel tata bate ined a + i re ieee aS heise wtties wet aheidae may janet oe ban _ wes
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ares ene 9. cryptologic Successes Against the U.S. Enbassy .Introduction “4 At his second meeting with CI@ipiget June 1962, NOSENKO b2 ressed fear that the U.S. Pen aoe Moscow might be advised “eee g&his contact with CIA. This;xeWlge be a fatal meve, he said, - 'gGhee' the ‘KGB was reading a1f; State Department etciphered cable t¥affic between Moscow aw Washington, NOSENKC expiained that hg knew this because, as Mi gentor officer in the U,S. Embassy Séction of the american, ~separtment, he saw trea Mt ipiered cables eyery day. On this-€gone*tg9is and also bysfimrSyST his personal and direct respangtSyiity for the section's opttations against American code clé#ks; NOSUNKO assured hisgeésA handlers on sev- eral occasions that the KGB could not, ance Db. never heen able to read traffic enciphered Pthe U.S. Armed Forces (attache) cryptographic systen.*° “ 2 Meeting with Cpe the next day, NOSENKO tempered his earlier Statement about k% wif Slate’ bopartnent ei He reported that “only certain’ of $-@ State Department ciphers were being read by the KGB, and thagfhe personally saw the deciphered plain text only cn rare occasi@s. This information was further qualified during the interrogations of February 1965 when “OSLNKO said that State Department enciphered traffic was broken "very, very sel- dom" curing the 1960-1961 period and that "we [the U.S. Embassy Section] never saw these documents." NJOSENKO has not changed his original statement that the KGB has never been able to break the military codes. NOSENKO has stressed that he has no aptitude for technical matters and had no interest in or access to information on spe- cific techniques used by KGB cryptologists te break the American codes. He suggested in general terms, however, that KGB suc- cesses in this field were made possible in part by information obtained from American cryptographic personnel who defected and were recruited in the late 1940's and the 1950's, in part by- information from the microphone installations in the two milki- tary code rooms and certain U.S. Embassy offices. NOSENKO has not specified how this information was used or which of these two categorics of sources was of greater valuc, although he did re- port that the loss of KGB ability to read the State Department codes coincided with and was largely a result of the installation of an acoustically secure enclosure for cryptographic operations. (The date was late 1961 or early 1962, according to NOSENKO, but actually late 1962, according to U.S. authorities.) At the same time, NOSENKO indicated, the microphone in the military code hich was probably effective until late 1060,[ | was of little use. - There is a degree of correlation between NOSENKO's informa- “tion on KGB cryptologic successes and that earlier,.reported by *~Yt was for this reason that his own and the section's “number- . one mission” in 1960 and 1961 was to recruit a military code clerk, but this had not been accomplished; see Part V.E.3.c. en t BE OtECLEe FES Ose ae et : Nee we tw og b ache Medi) tae he bat ete ond ek 0 cated ate dibs tube salts o eidume tas bb atten bien, « Bieta wate bikes ine ” .
« po wy ae : Ag vacateay scene welll D Sf cedtunsennatneres tbatineese fx. cntdeattiemmtrettettanieett a teuinemsomeminmrh camenetntnnts % Hen lenettesctmatetinesstnee HF +  ” GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN told CIA that “three or four messages of State Department cipher traffic were broken sometime in the period 1945 to 1950; past traffic could be read on this basis. I have not seen the evidence, but they read the telegrams of the Foreign Service in Moscew in 1960,and evidently later.” GOLITSYN then went on to say: “I am*sure they had as an agent Rid ih reed Rate ae neta dle lente, “ a-code clerk of the Foreign Service." NOSENKO's statements con- tradict GOLITSYN.* i ~The following sections summarize NOSENKO's information re- garding KGB cryptologic efforts, methods, and successes and, since they have a bearing on his report, provide excerpts from NSA and USIB damage reports on the KGB microphenes found in the | U.S. Embassy in 1964. a é a” f + ee Part choo dele ° a . . be ang chant rime Carats diag ten batik eat x et apetuelibwelieth a. - -atet dade viet etek oe eal, teeta TS af ee ae oe na Bade ate Se erm keer Ra Bas nite and et | Hy j
feat-sreres Information from NGSENKO From his personal experience, NOSENKO said in 1962, he knew that the KCB Eighth Directorate had broken the enciphered mes- sages of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow but not those of the military elements there. At the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962, however, the KGB cryptologic success ended, according to NOSENKO in 1964. He has furnished some details on the types of Embassy enciphered traffic being read in clear text and on the way in which the clear text was treated within the KGB Second Chief Directorate; in addition, NOSENKO has indicated that the KGB used microphones in the Embassy and exploited human sources to further its cryptolegic work. These points are reviewed separately below. (i). Breaking U.S. Ciphers The first reference by NISENKO ‘to KGB cryptolergic successes against U.S. Government enciphered traffic was made at his sec- ond meeting with CIA cn 11 June 1962. At that tire he raised the subject in connection with his personal security new that he was in contact with CIA. We said: "If possible, handle things in such a way that only a small group knows. Listen, I don't trust your records because there are people even there. I will tell you something more. We are reading certain of your cedes. -There- fore | don't trust this business and, therefore, ! ask... 1t is better to list me somewhere in your records as an intelligence ,Officer who you have uncer development. But don't indicate my rank anywhere.* Listen, here is what 1 fear--] even had the idea of going home and putting a bullet through my head and ending it all. Because [ don't trust you. 7 don't trust your methods and I don't believe that you can keep a secret ‘secret.’ 1 am afraid that something will go wrong. “Listen, we are reading your ciphers. We are even reading your ciphers. Certain of your ciphers are being read. We are reading [them] at the present time. [ am afraid co tell you this... Why? You will change them and they will guess at once why there has been a change after everything had been going smoothly for sO many years. You must give some.thought--Let them read [the codes}. Nothing has happened, America has not disappeared. America is just as strong as it always has been, "We are reading ail the State Department ciphers. Under- stand, [we are reading} all the State Department [ciphers], but not the military [ciphers]. This is the situation: We are read- ing all the State Department ciphers. [Several words unintelli- pidle, as NOSENKO is whispering.] What THOMPSON has said, what is present Counsellor, McSWEENEY, [has said]. All this is being read, i.e., these ciphers are being read, but the military — {ciphers] are not. The military are not. {I know this because] I worked in this business, against the American Embassy... I was a deputy section chief. I know everything and I am telling you everything. And my main work was with a code clerk...** *~Yater in this meeting, NOSENKO said he was a major; for a further discussion of NOSENKO's rank, gee Part V.G.1. #* James STORSBERG, see Part V.E.3.c. (ii). + 09 Se decks deceminbe mett Sa2 BK wali ee eA frvatine odie Aa, HARE ae wre hsie. hinds
cinta AS ERE RECREATE RON Sra Ty SAG CMa uN tm ee ‘end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962.* (Earlier, on 24 January ‘Directorate was then having no success in breaking enciphered I can even tell you that we tried to get him there, but it didn't work out... "So, we are reading all the State Department ciphers. But if you change something right now, they will understand at once that it could have cone only from me... All ciphers that go frem_. “4 Moscow to Washington are being read, but not the military [ciphers], : the State Department ones. Because we still are unable to under- : stand the military ciphers, but the State Department ciphers are - ; being read. But, if you wish to protect me, you must--I don't eS know what to dco--let them be read. Listen, I saw them every day, oo every day, i.e., the ciphers, ail enciphered State Department cables which went from tne Embassy. We had them all, down to the last one. I saw them every day..." During the third mecting, on 12 June 1962, NOSENKO revised his statements made the day before, He new said that only cer- tain of the State Departnent codes had been broken, and that he had only rare!v seen the clear text of deciphered cables. NOSENKO i repeated that military cipher systems had not been broken. His 3 statenents were a§ foliows: "“[We are reading] not all, not all, ‘ of course. Some are being read... All things which are sent in : cipher are, of course, intercepted, but not all are being read: It is impossible. to read them. It is necessary to knew the Ciphers to read them. Well, let's suppose that we send [encipiered i cables] from ‘the United States. You pick all of them up, but you : cannot read them. It's the same with us. Everything that leaves ; the Embassy, everything like a teletype machine, all this is noted, everything, no matter how it is transmitted. But everything is — not read... The State Department ciphers are being read, not all, but they are being read... I mean that what the military sends we are not able... but we can read some of what your diplo- mats send. Not we [the KGB Second Chief Directorate] but the [KGB] Eighth Directorate. They are reading some things." SoSPR LETS fe nh sehen Ras atone dome ote? Asked whether the KGB was reading all the State Department's enciphered traffic or only a small part of it, NOSENKO replied: 4 "Not all. We are not reading all the State Department [traffic]." He also said, contrary to his statement of 11 July 1902 that he saw the deciphered traffic “every day," these documents reached hin "very seidom"--at the most "ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 196i. eehemgetee op te be oy Following his defection, NOSENKO reported that he had learned in discussions with G.I. GRYAZNOV of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, during 1962 and 1963 that the KGB could no longer break State Department enciphered traffic by the- 1964, NCSENKO said that he knew "definitely" that the KGB Eighth traffic of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.) At about the same time that State Department traffic could no longer be read, NOSENKO reported, various U.S. Embassy officers were less often heard “Oana ebbes Los wKecording to NOSENKO, he was transferred to the Tourist Depart-_ ment from the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, about . this time. Sib id aie howe
*bepe SAS tok Perot cirsaerett waten AAPM discussing significant information over the conc+3ied microphones in their offices. This devetopment had led CRYAZNOV and S.M, FEDOSEYEV (Chief of.the American Departzent) to conclude that a *room-within-a~room” had becn installed in the kLmoassy and that other security measures had been instituted ‘there.« After his transfer from the American Department in carly 1962, NOSENKO con- tinued, he also had occasion to discuss the KGB loss of code- breaking capability with GRIGASOV, Chief of the second Chief Direc- torate; from him NOSENKO learned that tne Central Committee of the Communist Party was exerting considerable pressure on the Chairman of the KGB for cortinuation of tne material formerly obtained in this manner; consequently, the KC& Cnairman vas demanding maximum effort from all officers in the recruitment of cade clerks. In the second series of hostile interrogations, on 20 February 1965, NOSLNKO made the following statement concerning KCB crypto-- logic success during 1960-1961: “Occasionally the E:gnth Directo~- rate would break messages, but very, very séidom. and we never saw the documents." (ii) Handlirg of Deciphered Gables In mid.-1964 NOSENKO was debricfed or the procedures used by the American Department, during nis reported tenure there in 1960-~ 1961, in handling tne clear iext of deciphered cabies of the U.S, Embassy. The report of NOSENKO's statemeats on this subject is as follows: “The Russian text of those Siate Department coded mes- Sages which had been broken was sent to SENICHASINYY, the Chairman of the KGB, who sometimes forwarded it to Oleg Mikhaylovich GRI. BANOV, Chiet of the Second Chief Directorate. SRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the materiai to Vladimir Aleks zyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, or KLYPIN’s successor, S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO saw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on FEDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it. NOSENKO knew, however, that tne reader had +o Sign for tnose articles that he read. Nikolay Z4EN=SKOV, from the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate, brougnt a book containing the broken State Department messages to KLYPIN or FLLDOSEVEV, He would open the book to certain pages which had red paper and permit KLYPIN or FEDOSLYEV to see the material. This was Eighth Directorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how ZEMSKOV got it... At times portions of this material were read aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but they concerned the position of the American Ambassador or the U.S. Covernment on political ques... tions and were of no significance to nim. In.frequently there was mention of the expected arrival of Americans who were not per- manently assigned to the Embassy, and NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the arrival of one or two men, a 'commis— sion,' to check the work of the Political Section. Ine attitude of the Secretary of State or the American Ambassador was some- times expressed on certain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest in the information as it did not relate to agents or ° *See Part V.E.3:g. for a .further discussion on SOSENKO's in- formation on the decline in quality of intercepts resulting from the decreased efficiency of the KG& microphone installa tions. in the U.S. Embassy. TOP SECRET a “A 3 4 4 und bbhns cde ar, tb va adewolet arsenite deuce I res Sra tLe TAT a dae eet TCS Oe APOGEE ar
Siew se oee a : agent activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material con- cerned. messages from the American Ambassador, Moscow, to the Secretary of State and from the Secretary of State to the Ameri- can Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensitive, ‘and few people were permitted to see it or ever to know of its ‘existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated nore carefully than Top Secret information.” (iii) Methods of Cryptologic Atiack Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Direc- torate in breaking U.S. Lepartment of State cryptographic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate various methods applied to the problem as known to him from his position as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and his responsibility for handling the pro- duction of KGB microphones concealed in the Embassy. One method, mentioned by NOSENKS on 12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts were picked up cn the KGB micropnones,* the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered trafric intercepted by other means. The two other methods indicated, analvsis of - equipment sounds and exploitation of human Sources, are dis- cussed in greater detail below. ‘ i: _NOSENKO has twice referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest in equipment sounds and snatches of tecanical ceonversa- tions picked up by the microphones in the State Department and military code rooms. He said on 24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of inter- ference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations] .** In the military cc.le room--that was where [James H.] STORSBERG and later [Matthew P.] ZUJUS worked--we didn't get much. he could hear STORSKERG swearing on occasion, and then he would men- tion a group of numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we turned it over at cnuce to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding snd decoding. Of course, all other intercepts were turned over to them also." NOSENKO reported on 14 May 1964: "tn 1960 and 1961 from the State Department code room [we heard] always the sounds of machines only. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several numbers. Jim STORSBERG was sitting alone in the military area. The reception was good. He seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself and sometimes a mechanic of code machines came to him, a military guy, a sergeant... I forget his name.*** They said two or three phrases: ‘Did you ¥ See Part V.E.3.g. concerning the KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy. #& Until December 1962 when an acoustical room was installed within the State Department to enclose cryptographic equip- ment, teletype and code machines were vulnerable to the one microphone later discovered in this area. Since that time presumably only the teletype equipment could be heard. Here Doe NOSENKO is speaking of the earlier period. On 20 February. mo, * 1965 he said, however: “The microphone is not in the State . A Department code room, but next door where the teletype , machines were located." This information was true only after the secure room was installed. ; #@8 William Stanton HURLEY, a Warrant Officer who supervised mili- tary communicaticns, repaired cryptographic equipment, per- formed stand-by cryptographic duties when STORSBERG was un- . . evailebies and supervised other’ sensitive activities (see ; Part V.E.3.c.). . EP ogi. pst ERA Se fee ORT beeen bes teccede hte oa osetia bt my nh FPF ed cabin a GCE ice
; check this? ' and 1961, and everything from these two rocas--State and ‘military-- A Tae ee aee This side good.” And so on. This was 1965 Yes. was put in one special place. Colonel Aleksandr (Nikolayevich] SELEZNEV from the Eighth Directorate came and looked at then. | There were numbers. He took them for one or two days and thea returned them." , NOSENKO was more specific with regard to another source of ‘analytic information. Questioned on 24 January 1964 concerning the recruitment and use of code clerks by the American Departaent, ‘NOSENKO enumerated the recruitments known to him and then said: “As I.recall, way back in 1948 or 1949, there was a man of yours who defected. He stayed behind. I believe his name was McMILLAN.* I don't remember his exact name, but he stayed tehind in the USSR and I know he helped thei a great deal. Then, after him, was this ‘ANDREY.' Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes.** To date we have never been able to read your Military codes. ‘ANDREY' was not a code clerk. I believe he was a code-machine technician. After that there were many efforts made, but there were no successes. Right now I know definitely that the Eighth Directorate, which is involved with decoding, does not have anything at all. In the past they have submitted reports to KHRUSHCHEV and the Central Committee on their inter- cepts. But now they are not getting anything at all. Therefore, right now the highest priority mission given to the First [Ameri- can} Department and the Second {B8ritish] Department is to get _at code clerks. But in any event, they never were able te got at your military codes." The debriefing continued: Question: But did not 'ANDREY' bring out military code material? NOSENKO: No, I believe it was.only State Department material. What he mainly did was to describe the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made.*** Then, of course, those two who were very J James H. McMYITTAN, a code clerk cn the staff of the U.S. Military Attache in Moscow, defected in 1948, because of his devotion to a Soviet woman. a* Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym: “ANDREY") was in Moscow 1952- 1954. It is not clear from NOSENKO whether the benefits of SMITii's information were limited to this period or extended to 1960-1961. Apparently the same type of cryptographic equipment was in use by the State Department for the entire time. See Part VI.D.3.b. for further details on this case. &&% At the time of SMITH's Moscow tour there was only one code room at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, used both by State De- partment and military personnel. As the only cryptographic machine technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both State and military cryptographic equipment, although he was an Army sergeant assigned to the office of the Mili- tary Attache. In his statements to the FBI, SMITH has - a Claimed that, in fact, the only information he gave the Sov- iets in Moscow was fabricated by himself and therefore use- less. Sy “TOP SECRET srinpee ae set PPE CC eee ertren. (oe ear a ce ein bts ethane ay x 40 ‘2 " 4 at a 4 ihe Hand rity, meen caine Sree Waar vine ee omneeaa wt Baws dhniea Sava odd Sotate
et koe sonatas oe PRS Ane EN a A een) Bd AAP oti bennett ne bee they gave tremendcus help.* Then there. was some American code clerk who they brought into the USSR, I believe, via India. Question: Was this HAMILTON? **  NOSENKG: I don't know his name. This was after MARTIN and MITCHELL... He helped them.a bit. No question about it. To some degree anyway. After that so far.as I know there was nothing at all with results. Now they. are attempting to get a.code.clerk. Question: Were there other attempts made? NOSENKO: Yes, there was an attempt against Jim STORSBERG.*#* # William Hamilton MARTIN and Bernard Furguson MITCHELL were NSA mathematicians who defected to the Soviets in July 1960. Both had previously served with the Naval Security Group in Japan and were familiar with U.S. intercept and cryptologic efforts. No indication is available that either had any detailed knowledge of U.S. cryptographic procedures -and equipment. . @@ Victor Norris HAMILTON (also known as Fouzi di Mitri HINDALI), a@ native of Palestine, worked as a linguist in the Arab Section of NSA from 1957 to 1959, when he was released for medical reasons (paranoid schizophrenic). He defected to the Soviets in Prague on 12 June 1959. He was not a code clerk. . #** See Part V.E.3.c., which describes the STORSBERG case and other unsuccessful KGB recruitment operations involving American code clerks during. 1960 and 1961. — . knowledgeable of such matters, MARTIN and MITCHELL, nem anng vee rtnentt pees By - 4 4 i 4 solidavties aii wats oe
Eom h TA ome oF ‘e. U.S. Evaluations NOSEXNKO's Statements about the KGB microphones in the Ameri- can Embassy led. to investigations by U.S. authorities which re- sulted in damage assessments, part of which are germane to the NOSENKO reports on KGB cryptologic successes. NSA examined the question of cryptographic security in light of the microphones. found in the State Department and military code rooms at the Embassy, while the USIB Security Committee studied the security ramifications of other microphones which were discovered in the Embassy. Extracts from the NSA and USIB Security Committee reports are given below. Although the latter report does not specifically mention the cryptologic potential held by the micro- - phones, it states that classified cables were dictated in the Internal Political Section offices until Decenber 1963; most of the military cables, the report adds, were typed by the origina- tor, but certain ones Were dictated in the Military Attache offices. (i) NSA_ Report " . There were two code fooms in the Embassy, one serving the Department of State and the other serving the attaches. An operating microphone was discovered in each of these two rooms. * . “During the fall of 1962, special enclosures were built for each of these rooms, and all cryptographic operations were per- formed in these enclosures beginning in December 1962. Erclo- sures of this type are built to rigid specifications and have been exhaustively tested. They are designed to protect against just such networks as discovered in Moscow. Thus, we may conclude that there has been no compromise of information in Moscow due to cryptographic operations since December 1962, so long as the enclosures were operated in accordance with the proper procedures. Between 1952 and 1962, however, the code rooms were not protected against this type of surveillance... * ~. It was technicaliy feasible for the Soviets to have re- covered the plain texts of the messages encrypted and decrypted by machines; in these code rooms. This stems from the fact that teleprinters and cryptographic equipments do not run Silently; they emit acoustical and electromagnetic energy--that is, they make noise as they:type, print, and punch information. The sounds emitted by the machinery involve minute differences in amplitude, frequency, and timing as different letters and charac- ters are processed by the equipment. Relatively insensitive pick-up devices can detect these differences if they are placed .at fairly close range to the equipment as was the case in: each of the Moscow code rooms. When these sounds are recorded and analyzed the plain text of messages can be reconstructed. Con- sidering the specific equipment used, we must conclude that the Soviets could have recovered the texts of most messages sent to or from the Moscow Embassy from the time of occupancy until _ December 1962 in the case of Department of State traffic, and _ through 1960 in the case of attache traffic... "In addition to the recovery of the plain texts of indi- vidual messages being processed during this time period in Moscow, it is possible that information on the cryptographic operation | €Kecording to all knowledgeable sources queried in the investieg | gation of Dayle SMITH, all cryptographic operations, both military and State Department, were performed in a single room on the ninth '. floor of the new Embassy building in 1953 and 1954. Separate code rooms were established sometime after this and before 1959. - “ abated) wine glad. reece sane boca Soe en cosa : Ebb etd She 4 vata sileldada. aefe aot sands enkin i bo 8 UT Le wei. Chelidenthtle 2 taliitas Aa went hie tee dd SRM ath oe ‘ ae ae . EG tach we - t
ie ninth. Rall tig i lca Ai leit ee -of the MCB (State Department cipher machine) and the KL-25 (Attache cipher machine) was recovered... This results from the fact that the sounds made by these equipments reflect the internal mechanical workings of the cipher machine; these sounds can be recorded, analyzed, and the cryptosystem itself could have been reconstructed. If this did occur, not only the nes- sages processed in Moscow, but also those messages processed by other posts using the same machines and the same cryptomaterial . i could have been lost to the extent that they were intercepted... : "The attache cryptomaterials are similarly compartmented. _ During the period 1952 to 1960, various rotor machines were used. 9 °.°:.  .. ot Fron 1955 to 1958, the KL-I was used, and from 1958 to date the KL-7 has been used, In October 1960, the KL-7 was an] placed in a special sound-pruof box which prevented any attache + - traffic from being recovered after that time, since all attache messages were processed either in that system or in one-time pad... Bante carer napdite Batata. "In Moscow, the Department of State during the period Octo- ber 1960 through February 1961 enciphered nearly all messages classified Secret and Top Secret in one-time pads, resulting in : the loss only of the Confidential traffic during that period. ; : Department of State found it necessary to revert to the use of © : 3 one-time tape machines for messages classificd up to Secret from , 3 March 1961 until the enclosures were installed. Therefore, most ; Confidential and Secret traffic was probably lost during that period; but Top Secret messages were still enciphered in one-time ‘pads and thus secure... np “We must assume that all Department of State communications oe - that were mnachine-processed in Moscow could have been compromised from 1952 to December 1962. These consisted of messages of all classifications until October 1960; Confidential. messages only from October 1960 until February 1961; and Confidential and . Sec- ret messages from February 1961 until December 1962. eter ogaemmenrtmenpat san re "Most Department of State classified messages involving Iron Curtain posts exclusive of Moscow should also be assumed to have been compromised during 1952-1959 through cryptomachine information derived at Moscow. It can be assumed that such messages during 1960-1962 were not compromised by this means. State Department classified messages which excluded Iron Curtain : osts would not have been compromised by the Moscow penetration a because of the isolation of crypto systems. abies te seat ith . “Machine enciphered military attache traffic processed in |... Moscow should be assumed compromised until October 1960, but was’ secure after that date. cs 4 qe we AB, Litas wth SF See By we ne ptive er eemeneg ane "During 1952 to 1954, all traffic in the entire attache net which included Moscow could have been, compromised. ‘There is no reason to believe that any information was uO compromised through cryptographic operations after December 1962 when special enclosures were installed, so long asthe enclosures. were operated in accordance with the proper procedures..." 1 Tae ror) i t t +. t 4
sora . (41) USIB Security Committee Report . /. that the day-to-day operations including analysis of develop- . "The security. practices and procedures [at the American Embassy] appear to have followed a. pattern from April 1953 to wo May 1960, at which time the first plastic [acoustical] room DS was installed. A change occurred in the work habits {in May 1960) in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic recom for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and, accordingly, a number of classified discussions were held outside of this secure area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice of the Ambassa- dor and the Deputy Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dic- tate classified documents and telegrams. Extremely sensitive ; matters such as high-level political decisions, matters perti- . a4 jent to the most sensitive U.S.-Soviet relationships and positive ; : intelligence operations were not dictated and if discussed, : were mentioned in a cryptic manner... a8 ay + Biante « Den. ted rere "In the External Political Section during the 1955-1960 ‘ period there were daily staff meetings... Work assignments ~ were given at these meetings to individual officers who, in turn, prepared classified dispatches or telegrams to the [State] De- : partment... It was reported that the officers of the External : Political Section frequently dictated classitied material, includ- : ing telegrams, within their offices. Officers of the Internal , Political Section generated few classified telegrams... These i were, however, typed in the offices. From May 1960 to date [1964] : the Ambassador-DC™M operation conducted their most sensitive clas- S sified digcussicns and actions in the acoustic room; however, routine classified day-to-day operations were discussed and dic- : tated in the offices. Ambassador KOHLER reported that since pos August 1962 he and menbers of his staff working on substantive — or sensitive matters utilized the secure room and that all ma- terial to be encrypted was drafted.in leong-hand or dictated in ce the acoustic room. a anid oy tins Catan wi Bs "The pattern for the External Political Section and the Internal Political Section remained basically the same during the period of May I960 to the present time; however, the most sensitive matters were discussed or dictated in the acoustic room or drafted in longhand... In September 1962 the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handl- ing of sensitive classified material. From December 1963 to date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been dictated outside of the acoustic rooms. It was stated, however, ser pemerenne smetenpanesne ener ep webbie ide ine fides ments within the Soviet Union were. openly discussed in various offices and the conclusions reached later became the basis of classified documents or telegrams... ‘ omeenllce si bnand beth ais ect - "The military attaches reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned over to the code clerks for transmission. In certain instances cables were dictated in the offices..." roo :
i. Introduction ‘Legal kesidency in Hels in the Second Chief Director » Headquarters NOSENKO, a& previously indicated, came to Geneva with the Soviet belegation to the Disarmament Conference in mid-March 1962 and established contact with CIA in June of that year. His arrival in.Geneva and his first meeting with CIA thus occurred three:monthns and six months, respectively, after Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN defected to CIA from the KGB inki, on 15 Lecember 1961,* and was @x~ filtrated to the United States. A discussion of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO appears in’ Part V.I.7. Presented below are, first, a summary on GOLITSYN, then a survey comparing GOLITSYN'’s and NOSENKO'S leads, and finally, a protocol on GOLITSYN which NOSENKC signed. 26 Background Information on GOLITSYN GOLITSYN, a KGB counterintelligence. officer, was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in July 1960 under the alias of Anatoliy KLIMOV. In defecting to CIA, he previded more than 20 documents taken from the Helsinki KGB Legal Residency files as well as extensive information about KGB officers and opera tions acquired during his 16-year career in the KGB. GOLITSYN had had a variety of job and training assignments in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow and training assignments ate.** The bulk of his career was spent in work against the American target for the First Chief Directorate; this was his responsibility in Helsinki and had also been his principal area of responsibility during his pre- vious tour abroad, in Vienna from 19£3 to 1955. (In the lat- ter assignment he had been known to Petr DERYABIN, who defected to CIA in 1954, and this was the reason fer GOLITSYN being assigned to Helsinki under alias.) Among the GOLITSYN documents was a study of American in- telligence operations exploiting tourists visiting the USSR, the so-called “legal travel programn."*** This study, which runs to sixteen pages in translation, was prepared in KGB ters and was sent to the Helsinki Legal Residency under a cover letter, dated 7 April 1961, which suggested a number -of steps to be taken in order to counter such operations. The study was based on two principal sources: -% Recording £o NOSENKO, GOLITSYN defected on or about 15 Janu-~ ;- ary 1962, after NOSENKO had been reassigned to the Tourist ‘Department. tk As a result of this service, GOLITSYN was the original source of numerous leads to identifiable penetrations of Western Governments, including agents with access “to classified information such as William VASSALL (see Part VI.D.5.b.) and the French officer in NATO, George  PACQUES. #t#See Part V.D.7.¢. for details. A, ant at allaRY tps niet mares gee mstg mb oy  s or | i caer renee ete ata oar Fi d “4 4 3 7 ote cold endear ncn Sk a ee aubewrtidineten cee mu a ase aithensinde ee re miveit oBronk dab SeaiTer At aiden tide: ie,
nt ctr trre ne. ances tin Annee JOR BAAN 9S Slt OLE EE Haden PEAR es te ed $95. ~ The manutes of TI and MI-6 joint conferences on legal travel operatiors, held in 1959 ard 1960. (The KGB agent George BLAKE <oniessed that he had passed these documents to the KG.) - Actual cases of American legal travel operations in the USSR which had keen revealed to, or uncovered by, the KGB. (Some of the cases had peen publicized throuch Soviet announcements of arrests and trials, but -the majority of those cases cited by name in the study had noc previously been knovn to be compromisea. In a few instances acrivities of the American Intelligence agents appear to have been embroidered upon by the KGER. while in some others innocent tourists were wrongly accused by the KGB a Among recommendations made in the cover memorandum was the in- struction to recruit or place agerts in tourist agencies handling travel to the USSR, ‘These egents couid then provide information on the use of these firms Ly foreign intelligence services in work against the Soviet Union. ‘ GOLITSYN had information on certain aspects of the KGa Second Chief Directorate work against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Prior to his assignment in Helsinki he had conferred several times in April and May 1960 with cfficers of the U.S. Empassy Section of the Anerican Department, Second Chief Direccro: ate, concerning possible aSsistarce ne couid render them in their work against american code clerks transiting Helsinki en route to their’ Moscow posts.* Durirg his assignment to Helsinki he travelled to Moscow on TDY in January 1961, at which time he discussed with these same officers the possibility of his using in Helsinki a Finnish businessman, Johannes PREISFREUND, who had seen recruited by the Second Chief Directorate for an operation against an American code clerk in Moscow.** GOLITSYN acquired furcher information about such operations on at least two occasions, when Second Chief Directorate officers visited Heisinki on TDY and either called on him for support or chatted with him about officers and operations. 3. COLITSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO a.': Microphones in the U.S. Enbassy ' In his visits to the Americar, Department GOLITSYN learned by accident of KGB technical operations against the U.S. Embassy as -* NOSENKO denied that GOLITSYN visited the American Department at any time in 1960. **Although knowing that GOLITSYN went to the. American Depart- ment in 1961, NOSENKO said that the month was not January but July, for it was in July that he ‘NOSENKO) was on leave; GOLITSYN's passport, however, verifies he was in the Soviet Union in January 1961 and shows no entries for July of that year. See Part V.E.3.c. for further details on PREISFREUND, TOP SECRET i “t i 3 mimiereceretrermrmnprmennie tees nen were ema eT seers eembipeneg ey REMETETY meet nee ot le ikatbees SiS ae. i { Hae aan oe Rao yntb STG Aa ‘ ibs at dew ys hihi bartels i ad Rte oadihat.
in Moscow. When asked in April 196? about the product from such operations, GOLITSYN said he had heard akout results many times, . but the only concrete.example he was in a position to give was ‘the following: During one cf his visits to the Anerican Depart- ment in 1360* he heard and saw that a report cr reports of the - results of audiosurveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been lost. While he was present, the Department Chief ordered 211 the per- sonnel to search once more for these papers, and as COLITSYN steod there they went through ail theic files. GOLITSYN said he could sce that there were many such reports, each having a red line on it, which signified that these revorts were the property of that department of the KGB Operational Technical Directorate (OTU) which was responsible for making the installations. He explained that this meant that the American Department had to re- turn the reports to that Directorate, and this was the reason for a search being made. The only cffice in the U.S. Fabassy which was specifically menticned in connection with this search was that of the Minister’ Counselor.’ * * Other Leads C: rokorated py HOSENKO + b There are twe Ve KGB Operations on which both GOLITSYN and NOSENKO have given mutually confirming information, although their respective reports do not always cover the same data. These operations, all discussed elsewhere in this paper, are: “= Henry SHAPIRO Part V.C.2.a LY BENSON, HULE, and STROUD Part V.C.3.b. ~ Thomas BARTHELEMY Parts V.D.7.c. & VI.D.2.d. Carmen TORREY Part VI.ND.2.a. * “Elsewhere GOLITSYN ras stated that he visited the American Department several times between April and June 1956 in preparaticn for his assignment to Helsinki in July 1960. He has also incorrectly stated that he visited the depart- ment in December 1960 (his passport and CIA travel records show this was actually January 1961); GOLITSYN therefore may have been referring to this later visit. ** In June 1962, NOSENKO:told CIA that there were microphones in the offices of the Minister Ccunsellor at the U.S. Emb- assy, and he said at that time that he had seen intercept ete, FOPOFES of conversaticns or dictations by successive Mini- “ster Counsellors. In 1965 NCSENKO volunteered a story about “emer /che loss of one of the intercept reperts which the American “Department had received in 1950 or 1961; he identified it: «= ° as one which recorded the Minister Counsellor giving dicta- tion. According to NOSENKO, the American Department was turned upside down for a month, December, in the search for the missing report. Althcugh the document was never found, neither the Chief of the American Department nor O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, was Subjected to any punishment because the draft from which the missing report had been typed was found to be in the .. possession of the Second Department of OTU. From this the’: investigators concluded that the document itself had pro- bably been returned to the OTU and burned, and that in- advertently no paper had been executed to record its des- truction,. ? wets le t eee wee ft Laid, eens Set te 2 rent reper: erent mt cnet corer me te EMO Tyme nie et ay nme} 4 4 “3 4 j 3 3 H 3 SO ae ee a Eo ae if sbi and a.
ELENA IRD NNER ENS A NETAN AN RE Parts V.D.J.c. & VI.D.2.b. “part VI.D.4 " Part VI.D.4. Part Vi.D.4. - Canadian Code Clerk Part VI.D.4 (name net known): Part VI.D.4. - William J, VASSALL Fart Vi.D.5.a. ~ Clandestine entry into Swedish Embassy Part Vi.D.9. c. Leads Confiicting with NOSENKC Reports Either through direct contradictions on a key point or through omissions by NOSENKO about a major feature, there are five operations on which GOLITSYN and NOSENKO have supplied conflicting infcrmation. These operations, all discussed -@lseewhere in this paper, are: - James STORSEERG ¢ Jonannes PREISPREUND Part V.E.3.c.* - Adam BROCHES | Part VI.D.2.a. i Gerald SEVERN Part VI.D.2.a._ - "SASHA" (KGB Part VI.D.2.a. eryptonym) ~Edward E. SMITH Part VI.D.4.b. d. Leads to Operations Against U.S. Embassy Not Covered by ROSENKO - GOLITSYN reported on six operations against personnel of the U.S. Embassy in Moscew which have not appeared in the re- ' porting by NOSENKO.** These cperations are summarized below. GOLITSYN heard in about 1357 of the recruitment of a female “~employee--"like a secretary"--of the U.S. Embassy. With another American girl, she had travelled to Georgia in 1957. ‘There the KGB placed in her path a KGB agent, a Georgian male. They be- gan living together, and this relationship continued in Moscow where she was recruited. , *~GOLITSYN's Tead to the American recruited with’ PREISPREUND'S help is equated to STORSBERG on the basis of NOSENKO's and “PREISFREUND's statements that PREISPREUND participated in no other Operation. GOLITSYN reported that the target of this operation was recruited; NOSENKO reported that STORSBERG re-... |... ... jected the KGB approach. ‘#* By virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Emb- assy Section in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, he was directly responsible for knowing of ali KGB operations against person- mel at the Embassy in that period and definitely would have known of any successes since his earlier tour; he knew that “ANDREY" was the last successful one (1953-54). coon Sarit Soe sth tee Dette te a + ae pererneesequpremraitinn omen amensen pte nee (mT OAe cae aren wna cathe tem ote gnats daifunl ie, LS ati Ae yan attelecis FSM Ute ettenden ade abtace cetamab ht tehiecesetbiacet ceveunlaede bees q oak
sea ~the-U: 8: Embassy Section that™ the-latter-had-es- an agent “aaee eode clerk in the Emkassy who was scheduled for transfer to Hel- sinki. This subject came vp in a discussion of GOLITSYN's forth- coming assignment to Helsinki, and GOLITSYN was told that if the agent was transferred to Helsinki, GRYAZNOV might let GOLITSYN have him as his agent. GRYAZNOV gave GOLITSYN ro details about the operation other than the fact that the agent had provided the GB with some information and the KGB considered him “a real agent.” Also in the spring of 1960, GOLITSYN learned from GRYAZNOV i that he, GRYAZNOV, had developed an operation against a military ; code clerk at the U.S. Embassy to the point that the KGB was °99 4 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited. “From the 4 accounts given by NOSENKO and STORSBERG, this does not appear to concern the STORSEERG operation, which.wasy just beginning at this time, NOSENKO has mentioned no other Operation against a inilitary ecde clerk. I.¥. KURILENKO told GOLITSYN that while serving in the U.S. Embassy Section he had followed an American diplomat returning to the United States in 1959, and there he had completed the recruit- ment which had begun while the diplomat was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. * According to KURILENKO, he had travelled to the United States under cover of the Soviet Exhibit Committee | 4 4 t i 4 4 1 - + GRYAZNOV inforred GOLITSYN in April or May 1360 that an ‘American, vossibly a code clerk, but definitely an employee of. “the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on a hemcsexual basis beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographs of the American in varicus homo- gexual acts. However, SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of ‘the KGB, was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruit- ments at this time; SHCLEPIN said that this method of approach was } . "too dirty” and the KGB should find another way. SHELEPIN did ; not exclude the future use of the photegraphs, which the KGB would hold in reserve. ahh oe tk seme EE Arother case mentioned by GRYAZNOV to GOLITSYN was that of the attempted recruitment of an American female secretary on the basis of her relationship with a KGS agent, either a lover or a close friend. The agent, with the help of a KGS officer, tried to influence her, bet failed. She left the USSR prior to July 3960, but the KGB pianned to work on her again, as she was to return to Moscow. Mee ae Naar a axl. ted it tee eh ten ; On a TDY trip to Helsinki in November 1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV of the U.S. Embassy Section told GOLITSYN that he had come there in order to ride back to Moscow on the train with a U.S. Embassy code clerk with when “he planned to strike up an acquaintance to be continued in Moscow.** In about September 1961 a friend of °. . KOSOLAPOV's came to Helsinki on TDY, and GOLITSYN tried to get _ him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's train operation, but he would not . discuss the case. From this GOLITSYN was certain that the re- comes cruitment had been successful. etede ad or tet e wee * . at GOLITSYN learned from V.M. KOVSHUK, apparently in January 1961, that the Finnish agent. Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of.an American at the U.S. Embassy. —- Soot NOSENKO has described no successful operations in- which PREISFREUND ; j ' took part (see preceding section). —~ a a i "peed ncretbase 3 tw ne Ks ceaated eee €“HOSENKO said that there was no “operational reason for KURILENKO's travel to the United States at the time of the Soviet Exhibition in New York City, and that KURILENKO's duties related only to security; the KGB Resident in New York City, NOSENKO added, could have given KURILENKO some special task if he wished. #@ See Part V.E.4.b. for discussion of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to Helsinki. daavlia gy re ene an pare a ut ied ager te ‘TOP SECRET
4. NOSENKO's Information on GOLITSYN Lid Sindy sienna ant entire enaanereney In February 1965, after he had been questioned by ’ CIA about GOLITSYN, NOSENKO signed the following state- . a “4 ‘ment concerning his knowledge of GOLITSYN: 'T have never met or seen Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN. “During the period 1960-1961, while I was serving as Deputy Chief, First {U.S.Embassy] Section, First {American] Department, Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, I remember that Anatoliy GOLITSYN visited the Section to discuss the proposed use of my agent "“PROKHOR" 4 {PREISFREUNU] in the operations of the Helsinki Residentura. : : I was away from Moscow at the time of GOLITSYN's visit, but I know that he talked to V.M.KOVSHUK, and that at -KOVSHUK's request he also telked to [Yevgeniy] GROMAKOV- SKIY {of the American Department] about American diplomatic couriers travelling through Helsinki en route to and from Moscow, and to KOSOLAPOV about American code clerks. I do not remember what. they specifically discussed. I learned about this visit from KOVSHUX after 1 ‘“eturned to Moscow from leave, and also heard about it from KOSOLAPOV and GROMAKOVSKIY. "Y do not know the date of this visit of GOLITSYN's, but I do know that it was after hewas posted to Helsinki. Il believe that it was in the summer of 1961, I know for jcertain that 1 was away from Moscow at the time on leave, because KOVSHUK told me about. it after 1 returned from leave. Since he discussed code clerks, I would have met ‘ him if I had been there. . i 4 74 4 m a 4 ; "I have been told by my interrogators that this visit of GOLITSYN's took place in January 1961. I do not believe this to be true because I know that I was : saway on leave when he came and my leave was in July 1961, r “) never heard of any other visits by GOLITSYN to the First Section, First Department, during the time that I served there in 1960-1961. "] have been told by my interrogators that GOLITSYN visited the First Section, First Department, three times: in May-June 196@ before going to Helsinki and that he. talked at length to KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV about what. he could do. in the Helsinki Residentura to assist our Section , ook in its operations against code clerks coming to the OF American Embassy in-Moscow. I am sure that GOLITSYN did. not make any such visits in 1960 and that. no such conver- sations took place at. that time. Since I directly super-- vised the work of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAROV and shared the _ same office with thea,any professional discussions by them with GOLITSYN ‘about code clerks would be either with. my — ' knowledge or would be reported to me. If he.did in fact . make such visits in May-June 1960, I cannot explain why I do not know about then. _ Bsa ti hiten apinibiabe diticone fh Beare Se TOP SEtRET
“{ have been told by my interrogators that KOSOLAPOV - visited Helsinki in November 1960 to accompany an American . code clerk on the train to Moscow. I have also been told that on this trip he had official contact with GOLITSYN concerning this cede clerk and concerning one of GOLITSYN's assignments to assist the<First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate by developing infornation on. | code clerks before they left Helsinki for Moscow. I do net know that KOSOLAPOV went to Helsinki in November 1960. I do not know that KOSOLAPOY accompanied any American code clerk to Moscow from Helsinki, except Paul JENNER. .I do not know that KOSCLAPOV met with GOLITSYN and dis- cussed the subject of code clerks with him in Helsinki in = | Nevember 1960 or that KOSOLAPOV ever saw GOLITSYN in © Helsinki. ascents teas abet ea et "] do not remember that exact date of GOLITSYN's defection, but I know that it was in January 1962, I believe cn the 15th or 17th cf January. I do remember that he defected on a Saturday and that it was not discovered until the following Mondav.* I am certain that GOLITSYN's defection took place after 1 had trans- ferred back to the Seventh [Tourist] Department in January 1962. In the ensuing investigation within . oO : the KGB, I was never questioned on what code clerk ‘ operations GOLITSYN may havé known about. wet tacked att white td ddas a "I know that no written damage report on GOLITSYN's | defection was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate. . In the Seventh Department, where I was serving at the time. of GOLITSYN's defection, I remember that V.D. i CHELNOKOV, the Chief of the Department, was questioned Ss about the orienterovka [study] on tourist. operations which GOLITSYN was Known to have taken. "Y have been told by my interrogators that GOLITSYN defected on the night of 15 December 1961. I cannot accept this date because I know that I was no longer in ‘tthe First Department at the time of GOLITSYN's defection. I agree that the true date of GOLITSYN's defection must be known to the CIA, and I can only assume that ~v inter- rogators have either made a mistake or are trying to trap me, In any case, I still maintain that GOLITEY! cs fSoeted after I moved to the Seventh Department in January i272." tn OL! ine Mkenin at ive wiv bowdbe é He edioit yoo F, Surveillance of Soviets in the United States —. 1. Information from NOSENKO At the second meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO i. related that V.A. KOZLOV, Chief of the American Department : bel of the KGB seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, had gone to 1 i ” the United States the year before to investigate the suspected cessation of surveillance of Soviets stationed in New York City a Looks ti meh wccbane mame e ISth of January 1 ell on a Monday. ' v, , TOPE theses . . eLUr tie fh
caneenat cunt eodeor tia giatesetteqn nine tee vensterenudi tt 2 SRREABL' = RELA Par MRR AIMEE ML Re Qe ns and Washington, D.C.# "We have sensed that. something has happened: in-.America," NOSENKO said at that time: "We do not feel surveillance. There is no surveillance." The KGB Legal Resident in New York City, B.S.IVANOV, had reported the situation to the KGB First Chief Directorate which, in turn, had scught the Second Chief Direc- torate's opinion as to why no surveillance was being noted. Unable to suggest a reason, the Secand Chief Directorate asked whether the surveillance of Soviets could have been called off temporarily, The First Chief Directorate doubted that this could be the case but did state that radio traffic normally. used in U.S. surveillance “was not on the air.‘' KOZLOV con- sequently was sent to the United States to assess the situ- ation, and in the course of a month, NOSENKO said, he visited both New York City and Washington. KOZLOV discovered not only. that there was no -surveillance of Soviets but also that "they dropped our democracies -~ Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary. They temporarily took them [surveiliance} off." Also at this meeting NOSENKO commented that: - "I€ your surveillance comes up on the radio, they {KGB monitors] pick thea up everywhere." . So - The practice of KGB case officers was not to preceed directly from a Soviet installation to a meeting with an agent, but rather to use other Seviets as decoys "so that you will think we are working on somebody, where- as in fact we are not working on them. {American} sur- veillance is onto everybody as soon as they come out the door" of a Soviet installation. NOSENKO's only other reference to surveillance in the United States was made on 29 January 1964 during a discussion of the "ANDREY" case.**® While V.M.KOVSHUK was in the United States trying to reestablish contact with "ANDREY", NOSENKO said, he’ was usually accompanied by two other KGB officers. KGB monitoring of FBI surveillance communications revealed that KOVSHUK and the others*** were referred to by the FBI as "the Three Musketeers." ; 2.Iinformation from Other Sources a. GOLITSYN In early 1962 GOLITSYN reported that the KGB was well “EROTLOW WEST WSI-VSFE-CIY-FROE IS WOVEREST TS WU DEES 1961, except for a two-week period (from $ to 19 December) when he was in Washington, His departure from New York City fell on the same day that John ABIDIAN. visited the Pushkin ‘Street dead drop in Moscow: and that, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV later went to the dead drop site (see Part V.EB.3.d.). KOZLOV had earlier been in the United States with the . '. Bolshoy Ballet, from 12 April to 14 June’1959. — @@ For further details. on the “ANDREY" case, see... “Part VI.D.3. b. @@& The others, V.M.IVANOV and A.K. KISLOV, were not named by NOSENKO. be bs tat chavs 8 ee r 3 ae eek tae penn + Wine AED, Ae tare ¢
acquainted with American counterintelligence surveillance tactics, and since about 1953 the KGB, through special ap- paratus, was able to monitor radic traffic stemming from American surveillance of Soviet Embassy personnel. While at the KGB Juridical Institute in 1957-5&, GOLITSYN said, he hed read studies on the methods used by U.S. counterintelligence in fonducting surveillance cf Soviet officials in Washington and New York City. obtained through KGB agent sources, ccntaining instructions .. for carrying out surveillence on Soviets. The KGB, GOLITSYN _ added, used this information defensively abroad and in adapting its own surveillance techniques within the USSR. >, CHEREPANOV Document Gne of the documents provided by CHEREPANOV in Novenber 1963% was entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A. and tre Activities of American Cousterintelligence Organs Against Seviet Installations and Seviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in 1957-58." Nearly half of this document, signed by "A.5. — FEKLISOV,*%* was devoted to a discussion of the organization and methods cf FBI surveillance of Soviet officials stationed in New York City and “ashington. The informaticn (sources ‘not indicated) covers radio communicaticns between fixed surveillance posts and mobile surveillance posts. e The CHEREPANOV documents are reviewed at greater length | ‘in Part VI.D.7.c.. &* FEKLISOV, under the alias FOMIN, previously served as KGB Legal Resident in Washington. _ The studies included some American documents, Bae ae Sasa getaney oT 5 dela disnarts  eapouer BAERS Mideast e < arc 4 3