AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Doclda: 32425007 Page 1 Date 04/29/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-10002-10129 NND 941071 DOCUMENT INFORMATION THE WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT KENNEDY 03/09/61 L7 CONCEPT FOR THE RECAPTURE OF THE PLAINE DES JARRES LAOS - POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION * PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET 1c, 4 RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 04/07/98 NARA RG 218, Box 6 of 8. Memo from the President re: authorization granted at 9 March 1961 meeting. Report on the concept for the recapture of the Plaine des Jarres. EXEMPT PER E.0. 13526 SEC 3.3(b)_ SOx DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED DILAM Te TRALEAS? AS RadneTCn ww {CIA Clnleuetonled
THE WHIT , TS TOP SECRET WASHIN N OFFICE OF THE Ata meeting in the Cabinet Room.on March 9, 1961, on the SECRETARY. OF DEFENSE general subject of Southeast Asia, the President authorized the following actions: 2. ‘Defense Departme CIA for CAT use. ¥ a 3. Defense Department to select{and sheep dip, with cia} 16 helicopter pilots. . 4. More maintenance and base support personnel for helicopters (300) (with consent of Thai government). 5. Defense Department to make available to CAT, appropriately marked, 4 C-130s. (On Okinawa or Taiwan) 6. CIA to supply 4 C-130 crews. (U.S. civilian plus ChiNat. ) V6 CIA to make available 1C-47 and 3 DC-4s, with crews. 8. In case of urgent supply requirements, USAF aircraft may resume delivery direct to Vientiane (C-130). _ ao ce vt) Negotiate with Sarit for immediate availability o(pte) - 10... PEO personnel will be augmented by approximately 100 officers and men, and the JUSMAAG personnel in Thailand by approximately 100. ll. Defense to make available 8 B-26s, plus necessary spares (at Okinawa). 12. Defense Department ° supply 16 sanitized B-26 crews to CIA. TOP SECRET Docld: 327425007 . Page 2?
TOP? SRCR iBT ay ise TOP SECRET b. CAS stocks on Okinawa can be increased to support 1 such a force, ° 3. Air Support and Interdiction Operations: 3 a. It will be necessary to sustain combat air opera iy tions designed to: 5 (1) Interdict Pathet Lao lines of communication (2) Destroy rebel supply cumps and installations (3) Fragment Pathet Lao concentrations, Alrcraft in the numbers and types needed to make effective 9 delivery and achieve shock effect should be employed, They 10 should be armed with guns, rockets, bombs and napalm, as id required by the targets to be attacked, Le b, There are nine armed T-6s (2/30 cal guns, 4/5" rockets, 2/100 1b bombs) in the Laos inventory. Five es combat-ready Laotian pilots are available for current AOC eee) operations; four qualifiedspnm “pilots are on hand, The 16 re [A] T~6, though slow and lightly armed, has a psychological LY effect considerably greater than its destructive power, 18 It has value as a supplement to more powerful aircraft. L9 (1) It is estimated that sixteen Sterile B-26s and 20 20 pilots are required to accomplish the missions en- el visaged in the attack on the Plaine des Jarres (PDI). eo (2) CIA has eight of these planes in Taiwan and the USAF can supply the additional eight, plus necessary spares Support, available in a period of 2-3 weeks, (3) CIA has four currently qualified American pilots, 6CXC) and it would require 3e4 weeks of training to provide _ [A] more civilian American pilots, Sixteen) sanitized USAF| crews could be provided in 2-3 weeks. Volunteers from the Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF), Philippine Air Force (PAF), and RTAF could not be trained in time, The former require 4-6 weeks and the latter two, 6-8 weeks, 38 TOP SECRET 3 Docld: 324235007. Page 3
TOP SECRET “yesS Volunteers could be processed through |"Sheepdip” (sani- 1 A] tiged and proper arrangements made in event of capture 2 [i or death). Sanitized usAF| crews to man the four unmanned 3 CIA aircraft can be provided in about 10 days. a (4) CIA can support approximately four sorties per day witn 2-4 B-26s based at Takhii. Additional sorties will require augmentation of the CIA task force with f operational planning, intelligence, maintenance, armament o and ordnance personnel, 4, Helicopter Operations: Additional helicopter support is LG fundamental to the success of the proposed operation, a. A total of 20 H-34 helicopters are required to provide Le airlift and pickup in the forward areas which lack landing a3 fields for fixed-wing aircraft, a b. At present, CAT has four engaged in operations. An LS additional sixteen can be furnished by the Department of Lo Defense within a week, Suitable airerart are not avallable Le on the commercial market, Ostensibly they will be owned 18 and operated by CAT, 19 c¢. CAT has four qualified pilots flying these H-34s and 20 is experiencing great difficulty in locating more as they ek are in short supply outside the armed services, ‘The Depart~ ment of Defense] can supply sixteen additional pilots within 2S [ ] about 10 days. They will be processed through "Sheepaip"\ and ostensibly be employed by Cam, ( (Cc) ad. Their present hourly rate of up to 100 hours of 26 flying per month is exceptional. It is difficult to estimate the sorties avallable because their mission times vary 80 drastically. TOP_SECRET M4 of Oye CeCe B oe gent Docld:32425007 Page 4
PAC Ns < 6 AUG A Gee VOR § CIR _ TOP SECRET 6. Artillery Support. During the final assault phase on A. Plaine des Jarres it is anticipated FAL will need up to four 2 105 mm artillery batteries in addition to present capabilities. 3 Because of the time frame involved, these units with equipment = 4. POChaGy will be obtained from | volunteer forces. 5 LA] 7. Augmentation of PEO and JUSMAAG Personnel. In order to 6 provide Chief, PEO, and Chief, JUSMAAG, increased advisory, v4 logistical, interpreter, and technical assistance, necessary ts) personnel augmentation will be furnished on a priority basis. Personnel requisitions for this augmentation will be forwarded 10 by these organizations as soon as requirements are determined, ji TOP SECRET 6 Docld: 32425007 Page 5
ea Print Date: 11/24/2014 SYSTEM RECORD TITLE DOCID NUMBER 32425007 202-10002-10129 vol Standard View: JFK. User:  IMATHIS TO FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY CREATED DATE 03/09/1961 NUMBER OF PAGES i7 Docid:32425007 Page 6
POP ae Was a TOP SECKE Ata meeting in the Cabinet Room on March 9, 1961, on the géneral subject of Southeast Asia, the President authorized the following actions: l. An increase in MECs from 3000 to 4000 by April 1.. (CIA) as Defense Department to-supply 16 H-34 helicopters to CIA for CAT use. 3. Defense Department to select and sheep dip, with CIA, l6é- helicopter pilots. 4. More maintenance and base support personnel for helicopters (300) (with consent of Thai government). By marked, 4°C+130s. Defense Department to make available to CAT, appropriately (On Okinawa or Taiwan) os CIA to supply 4.C-130 crews. (U.S. civilian plus ChiNat.) Us CIA to make available 1.C-47 and 3 DC-4s, with crews. 8. In case of urgent supply requirements, USAF aircraft may resume delivery direct to Vientiane (C-130). 9 Negotiate with Sarit for immediate availability of up to 4 105mm batteries (Thai soldiers, equipment, and supplies). 10. PEO personnel will be augmented by approximately 100 officers and men; and the JUSMAAG personnel in Thailand by approximately 100. th ll. Defense to make available 8 B-26s, plus necessary spares pe TAS 12. Defense Department to supply 16 sanitized B-26 crews to CL TOP SECRET Docld: 324275007. Page 7
TOP SEGRET zZ rs CIA is authorized to recruit non-U.S., non-ChiNat crews for B-26 and transport aircraft. 14. The Department of State will draft for the President's approval a message to Ambassador Brown giving the sense and meaning of the present steps. 15. General Boyle will go to work on Phoumi to lift the quality of FAL military leadership. 16. CIA is authorized to commit additional helicopters as obtained. 17. CIA is authorized to commit additional transport aircraft ag obtained. TOP SECRET Docld: 323425007. Page 8
Docld: 32425007 Page 3 TOP_SEGRET COPY NO. ok 9 March 1961--1300 istribution: Secretary of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense ssistea i” CNO CSAS CMC CINCPAC PEO Director, Joint Starr Secretary, JCS TOP SECRET 2 copies Ll copy Lo eopy 5 eoples 5S copies 3 copies 3 copies 3 copies 2 copies lL copy 2 coples 2 copies
TOP SECRET sonata nd 1300 ~- 9 March 1963 CONCEPT FOR THE RECAPTURE OF THE PLAINE DES JARRES shes antanetekin sang cane noma” we 1. Purpose, This concent outlines a plan for the seizure 1 of the Plaine des Jarres (PDI) Base Complex of Laos utilizing 2 forces available. ‘The concept envisases maximum utilization 3 iL of Laos Army (FAL) forces and regources; and a timely, selec~ tive and flexible employment of US transport aircraft and "volunteer" forces, i © Situation. 1 oman nn d a, On 1 March 1961 the Commander in Chief, Pacific, stated that the Pathet Lao "has become stvong enough in the Plaine oO OO Oo IF Om ces Jarres to block the PAL offensive and could take offen= 1 sive on their own at time of their choosing.” In addition, ll "it ig likely that the Communists will attempt soon to seize 12 Luang Prabang in order to consolidate their position in L3 Nerthern Laos." The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with this. 44 evaluation and believe that, if aecelerated action is not LS taken. to recapture.the Plaine des Jarres and reverse this Lo trend, the balance of power will continue to favor the LY athet Leo, Moreover, the enemy will continue to improve 18 his advaritageous vosition for furtner military action and 19 political negotiations. 20 b, Military action at present is characterized by small 21 units carrying out probes and adjusting their positions in ~ 2e consonance with assigned roles--the PL consolidating and 23 defending terrain in the PDJ area taken from Royal Army ou Forces during theskatter-pephae? January while awaiting a 25 political settlement, and the FAL attempting to contain and 25 compress these forces prior to initiating a full-scale at attack designed to recover the PD area, Although the Zé terrain favors guerrilia tactics, wy has ceahomed. 29 his eomisker demonstrated preference for these tactics dar [oo 30 favor of more conventional techniques, thus projecting his 31 operations into a new, more sophisticated dimension of war- 32 fare, SOP_ SECRET 1 weonsanatonsoaneres Docld: 32425007 Page 10
TOP SECRET OP SECRET 2 Docld:324275007 Page 11. ec. Pro-Communist forces occupy the key centers of Nieng Khouang and the Plaine ces Jarres, most of Sam Neua ang Phong Saiy provinces, and a number of pockets in the central and southern provinces. Pathet Lao forces through- aut Laos number an estimated 10,000, Those in north central and northeastern Laos number 4-5,000 and control all popula- tion centers and communications routes in Sam Neva and Xieng Kheuang provinces. Soviet airlift to the Plaine des Jarres is suoplemented by truck convoys using the road from North Vietnam which runs through Nong Het and Ban Ban. On 7-8 March, Government forces withdrew from positions east of the road junction of Route 7 and 13, in the face of Pathet Lao probing action, and established new positions on Route 13 just north and south of the road junction. The Pathet Lao have at least temporary control of this strategic inter- section on the road connecting the Royal Capital at Luang Prabang with Vientiane, the Administrative center of the country. On the southern axis to the Plaine des Jarrés, enemy forces located 20 miles south of Xieng Khouang are withdrawing slowly as part of a controlled withdrawal to improve their positions. 3. Concept for} ecution. D-day is the day air interdiction a. Mission. Utilizing PAL Forces to the maximum, conduct immediate military operations to seize the PDJ base complex for FAL use and to deny its use to the enemy. It is visual- zed that the whole operation will require 5-8 weeks. joie b. Interdiction Phase. The objective is to disrupt and io fragment the enemy effort anc thus enable FAL forces to resume the offensive. This will be accompli shea by: fo aa tas
ase (1) Conducting offensive air operations utilizing ‘1 suLtable combat alreraft armed with machine guns, 2) rockets, high explosive bombs and napalm, to attack 3 enemy alr transport aircraft in Laos, supply routes, 4, troop concentrations, and supply dumps. 5 (2) Conducting guerrilla operations, using MEO tribes- 6 men, against enemy command posts, troop and supply con- 7 yoys and supply points. 8 (3) PAL will regroup for later operations and exert 5 maximum pressure on the PL. LO (1) The objective of this phase is to seize assault 12 positions on the perimeter of the PDJ area by means of 13 a coordinated ground attack. This operation would be qh supported by combat eir support and air and ground 15 interdiction operations. ‘ 16 (2) On D-day, Task Force West, consisting of FAL Group 47 Mobile (GM) 11 (4 infantry battalions, 4 artillery bat- 18 teries, 1 tank company, 1 reconnaissance company, 1 engi- j neer company and available MEO) from present positions oC) in the vicinity of the road junction of Routes 7 and 13, e1 will attack east and seize objectives on the west side Oo of the PDJ. 23 (3) On D-day, Task Force South, consisting of GMA, B24 and C, (6 infantry battalion equivalents, @ artillery ae batteries and available MEO) from present positions along 26 the Paksane-PDJ road in the vicinity of Ban Ta Viang, OT WiLL attack north then northwest along the Paksane-PDJ ap road seizing objectives on the southeast and south side 29 of the PDJd. 30 (4) On Dt5 days, Task Force Northeast, consisting of . 31 available MEO tribesmen and FAL troops to be airlanded by 32 helicopter in the area west and north of Xieng Khouang- 33 Moung Phan, will conduct guerrilla harassing and inter- Qh diction attacks against enemy lines of communication, % re command posts and supply units along the Aleng Khovang~- 3 PDI road and along Route 7 northeast of DocTd: 32425009! page fal 3
TOP SECRET ad. Final Assault Phase. Sec Annex A (Mes) L (1) The objective of this phase is to seize the PDI 2 Base Complex area for FAL use and to deny it to the enemy. 3 This operation would be supported by combat air support hy and air and ground interdiction operations, both inside 5 and outside the PDJ area. 6 (2) An Airborne Task Force (1 full strength airborne 7 battalion equivalent and 2 infentry battalions) will 8 conduet an aivborne assault in the PDJ area. The air- 9 porne battalion will seize an available airfield to 10 permit the airlanding of the two battalion follow-on LL infantry force. . 12 (3) Task Forces West, South and Northeast will 13 lasnch a coord nated actack to effect early link-up ae with the Airborme Task Force, to destroy the. eneny 15 ia the PDI Base Complex, and to seige and hold that 16 area. 17 ée. Special Operations. During all phases, operations 18 will be conducted to: 19 (1) Jam and otherwise interfere with enemy air 20 navigation aids in the PDJ area. eal (2) Disrupt enemy communications. 20 (3) Deceive the enemy as to FAL capabilities and 23 intentions. at 4, Logistic Support O5 a. Concept. United States transport aircraft will be 26 used to alvlift supplies and equipment into Vientiane. 27 Supply of the Task Forces WLL1 be accomplished by eir 28 delivery from Vientiane. This will be supplemented by 29 surface lines of communication for Task Force West subject 30 to the vehicle transportation eapability and highway com- 31 ditions, Enabling administrative action will be taken to 30 make funds readily available to cover the cost of the 33 operation, 34 TOP SECRET A Docld: 32425007 -Page 153
TOP SECRET b. Operations. Sufficient stocks of materiel will be made avallable in Laos and Thailand including weapons, petroleum, ammunition, communications equipment, cargo parachutes, airdrop containers, and other critical items to replace combat attrition. Maintenance and supply aupport will be available for the helicopters employed. Sanitized US personnel on temporary duty in Laos and JUSMAAG Thailand will maintain the impetus of the logistics etfort, TOP SECRET 5 saath Docld:32425007  Page.14 a vd PQ Cad Whi = i, Ts Oo Oo