Date : 10/22/97 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM ‘a in ee ae oar Seth mtr he sh Game hk ane at fF Sattler ee“ AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : JCS RECORD NUMBER : 202~10002-10024 RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER -: DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION FROM -: ; TO +; TITLE : THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES DATE : 00/00/00 PAGES : 49 ; SUBJECTS : LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY CUBA COMMUNIST SUBVERSION ANTI-SUBVERSION PROGRAMS DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : SECRET RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Taylor Papers, Box 7... Package of papers compiled. by the Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion related to effort to prevent Cuban subversion in Latin America. Docld:32276221 Page 1 Ls
B02 10002 - (e024. Declassification Review/Postponement Form Originator: (Mg/fA) Date: An aake® Su Original Level of Classification: SECRET Subject: Third Agency Equities: Remarks: Page # of Postponement — Reaeontos, Postponement IAW Section 6 of JFK Act The Deparment of OC (c) this docums Stale postpones the release of porhons oF ) BEN ‘s me ene con eer SOO eer Docld: 322762271. Page 2?
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION PAPERS ON CONTROL. OF TRAVEL BY SUBVERSIVES CONTROL. OF THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS CONTROL. OF THE MOVE MENT OF PROPAGANDA CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS SURVEILLANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES NO JOINT STAPF OBJECTION "TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF lA State WFC JUL 011997 DATE: GROUP-1 4 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC ) DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION Docld:322762271 Page 3
seinenatben rig encnnnngtdnin saat Docld:322776271. Page 4 The papers included herein embody a series of action programs designed to impede the Castro -Communist subversive effort in Latin America, They were developed by an inter- departmental group which included represen- tation from the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Treasury Department, Central Intel- ligence Agency and United States Information Agency.
singecinedi: CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES ‘ AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES Lg lars dadaeatndem toe es es soosneinerceanteaea Docld: 322776221... Page 5
a ‘ octld: 32276221... Page 6 SSE ee ee eT aE ee ee nr rrr str errr nrrr rr mnntrrr mcm terre TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Nature and Scope of the Problem The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel 1. Immediate Impact Actions as Administrative Actions b. Intelligence Actions c. Actions Related to Common Carriers d. Propaganda Actions 2. Longer Range Actions a. Political Actions b. Intelligence Actions Ce Administrative Actions d. Actions Related to. Common Carriers e. Propaganda Actions 3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions 10 10 10 11 1] 12 12 13
V. Actions Conce rning Illegal Travel l. Immediate Impact Actions ae Intelligence Actions b, Surveillance and Reporting Actions Ze Longer Range Actions ‘a. Surveillance Actions _ertbakeeniettatvage tiga cnt centimeter SERRE . be U, Se Military Assistance Actions Docld: 32276221 Page 7 14 14 14 15 15 15 16
CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES Ll. Introduction The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin American countries. Execution of any one or more of the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them all will not completely solve it, The practical problems involved are too numerous and complex. oe With respect to diminishing legal travel to Cuba, — we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes of those Latin American countries through which the Subversive traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations the direct actions required have strong - political and sometimes legal implications ~ impli- cations which cannot be overcome easily, even when | the leaders of these countries choose to do so. In the matter of clandestine travel, we are . confronted not only with the great depth of communist guile, born of two generations of experience in the international movement of subversives, but with the inexperlence, ineptitude and lack of awareness in. these same matters on the part of the Latin American community. _ an spite of this, the advantages do hot all reside with the communists. Cuba's insular character imposes eertain sharp limitations upon personal movement. Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone who enters the country must do so either by water, or air, There can be no slipping through the barbed wire, Docld:32276271.. Page 8 .
| * . : . i On. the other hand, this same geographic situation makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple. ‘There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpa- trolled Central American coastline, within 175 to 850 miles from Cuba, There are at least .93 airfields, other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and ‘capable of supporting the subversive ebb and flow,: number well into the thousands, Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a program of direct restraints, selected from among the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable effects, Under the proposed steps some travel would be stopped completely. More — probably much more - would be rendered difficult. Some hitherto legal movement would be driven underground. Previous ~ a clandestine movement would be impeded, complicated ~~ and harassed té the point where it becomes more costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, hopefully, less extensive, - _ II, Nature and Scope of the Problem We do not know enough. about the movement of subversive trainees, into Cuba and ~ more important. - out of Cuba. We do not know enough about the volume of travel, or the media employed, This is par- ticularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where our knowledge is extremely limited, Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate: Docid:32276221 Page 9
besa uss eum Legal Travel Into Cuba Country No, of Legal Travellers Country No. of Legal Travellers . Jan-Feb a Jan-Feb: 1962 1963 1962 1963 Mexico  4912* ——--«969 Argentina 500 ‘Unk Guatemala 80 Unk Uruguay 115 Unk. El Salvador 100 8 Paraguay 60 Unk. Nicaragua 50 Unk Brazil oo Unk. Costa Rica 216 LO Honduras 92. 21. Venezuela 200 Unk British KO. Unk , Guiana ae ae Colombia Hoo }-) =) Unk Panama 56. Lee Ecuador 208 Unk Trinidad Unk Unk Peru 181 Unk Jamaica | 593s Unk Bolivia 500 Unk Dominican None Unk Republic OSE Chile = 551 85 Haiti Unk = Unk * In transit, including about 300 Mexicans While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico, On the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912 travellers to Cuba during 1962, while the average monthly number passing through Mexico for the first two months of 1963 is even higher than the 1962 monthly average. Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central Intelligence Agency estimates that at least 1,500, and perhaps as many as 2,000,have received ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many Docld: 322776271 Page 10
oa 0 of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to their homelands; some by legal means; some probably by illicit means, There is no reason to presume, moreover, that the travel to Cuba of the remaining 3,000~3,500 was entirely consistent with the best interests of the hemisphere. Prior to the October erisis, Latin Americans travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered Cubana flights, Some travelled to Trinidad or Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or KIM flights to Havana, Others travelled to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Gubana commercial flights. to Havana, With the cessation of service to Cuba by Pan American, KIM, Mexicana, and Iberia. airlines in October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City and Havana remained the sole direct. and regular airline connection belween Cuba: and the remainder of Latin America, The Qubana service between Havana and Mexico is scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only a sirigle flight is completed per week, Aircraft now employed are British Britannias - an obsolescent model. Cubana has requested, but has not yet received, Mexican approval to substitute Soviet IL-18 transports for the old Britannias., Delay by the Mexicans in granting this approval can have the favorable effect of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition. If, in addition, the British and Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of spare parts, the planes will soon become inoperative, Tberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February. This flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana, KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles, However, it is now con-+ sidering doing so, In this regard it is concluded that resumption of scheduled flights by a United States carrier could serve as an encouragement to KIM and others to do the same. Docld:.32276221 Page 11
Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not stop regularly at any other Latin American country, though the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally Sought and received permission from Brazil to land at Recife, enroute to Guba, Some Latin Americans may have travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and, should Brazil permit this arrangement to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new order of magnitude. A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying both material and personnel. The Canadians have been unresponsive to our efforts to obtain identification of the passengers, a There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers operating between Latin America and Guba, However, a number of trainees from British Guiana have travelled to Cuba aboard“tns¢cheduled Cuban merchant®:  ~ vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana to ' Guba. Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin Americans through Mexico to Guba often involves illicit procedures, The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel out of and into Mexico. This procedure is obviously designed to impede any effort by the other Latin American governments subsequently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveillance over their activities upon their return, Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of travel by legal means, This must be countered directly. Beyond this, and perhaps of greater importance, is the problem of illicit movement both into and out of Cuba, which will undoubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at present most limited, Elimination of this intélligénce void must be accorded high priority. DT eriiuuninanacumamams Docla: 32276221 Page 12
e . ge re f) fy ‘SECRET III. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations Success of many of the overt actions proposed in the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders the restraining actions must take place, Presented briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected. from the various sectors of atin America in terms of participation in a coordinated program of travel control. As a general matter, the imposition of controls on travel is not popular with the publie in any Iatin American country. This, coupled with their current lack of full awareness of the danger represented by Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the willingness of some governments to impose controls unilaterally, This is especially true since they recognize that unilateral restraints will have little effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to - Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also taken, It is likely, however, that most of the Latin American countries would respond favorably -- albeit in varying degrees -~ to US leadership in seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training. The Central American countries are more acutely aware of the danger posed by OCuban-inspired sub— version than is Latin America at large, and can be expected to react favorably to proposals for reé- ducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential meeting. However, their ability to carry out commitments which they may make will be limited by domestic legal and political considerations, as well as by their countries! technical incompetence in such matters Since Mexico is currently the principal hemisphere transit point for legal travel of sub- versives to and from Cuba, its attitude is of grea importance, Mexico, to date, has taken several Significant steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and Cuba, It has instituted close O(iyled SECRET 6 Docld:322776221 Page 13
Docid: 32276221. Page 14 SECRET Surveillance over travellers, to include stamping. passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA), ‘These actions all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even further cooperative steps, particularly on an un- publicized, bi-~lateral basis, wherein the political hagards of taking a public OAS position are not involved, In this regard, the Central American | Presidents would probably agree individually to seek the participation of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico in specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow of persons to Cuba through that country. . Peru now has regulations which actually prohibi travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered public resistance, and are not enforced, The Dominican Republic prohibits such travel, Haitt has no established policy, but passports and exit permits are reportedly issued only on the personal approval of President Duvalier, Colombia: could legally impose restrictions by executive decree, but has shown no inclination to do so. Other . 7 countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central American nations, plead the existence of legal or constitutional barriers which preclude the pro- hibition of travel to Cuba, but thus far, they have made little effort to remove these barriers. Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to the-left and gives little evidence of modifying its tolerant attitude toward the Castro government. Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises no. restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct or via third country, The elimination of all legitimate passenger service to Cuba from Latin America could be SECRET ¢
achieved through invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree to do so in the absence of some major crisis similar to that involving the Soviet missiles or a case of direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would =. probably create a growing willingness to take action Oriented in this direction. In this connection, however, it is concluded that resumption of regular | passenger service to Cuba by United States companies would render more difficult our efforts to persuade. . Latin American and other free world countries to. . take a grave view of the situation, and to partici- | pate in dynamic action, or Virtually, all the Latin American countries would be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their return to home countries, once they put their new training to use. The efforts of these — nations will not be dramatically effective, however,. since, in the area of internal security, all of them. =. suffer from deficiencies in technical skill, training, — equipment and sometimes from a lack of a sense of =... urgency. The United States can provide essential. leadership in eliminating all of these deficiencies, IV. Actions QGoncerning Legitimate Travel Listed below are specific actions contemplated to — impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba. Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose, as travel on recogniged public carriers, openly — “ arranged and involving travel documents which are. presumed to be in proper order. Certain of the actions, it wlll be noted, are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS - wholly or in part - by its Special Consultative Committee on Security. Docld:32276221 Page 15
SECRET ly Immediate impact Actions The following actions offer promise of producing early, visible and effective results, Qe Administrative Actions (1) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, induce each Western Hemisphere country to: we (a) Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba," (b) Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any | national of a third country who cannot produce a valid permit issued by his own. country for travel to Cuba. (c) Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which. is not an integral, non-detachable part of the travel document issued by the country of which | the traveller is a citizen, (a) Require accurate manifests of all. carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies. of these manifests to diplomatic missions of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected, (2) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the par ent country of the nationals involved. GO)(©) (3) Make sovert arrangements with police and other security and administrative officials in countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba to impose administrative impediments and harassment. on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the difficulty of travel and thus dis- courage prospective travellers, b. intelligence Actions (1) Intensify U.S, intelligence efforts in each country to identify persons who have travelled, SECRET 9 Docld: 32276221 Page 16
or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host government, as consistent with our own intelligence pro- gram, and the requirement to protect our sources. (2) Intensify current efforts to introduce covert, U.S, - controlled agents from each country into the Cuban training program. ec. Actions Related to Common Carriers (1) Prohibit resumption of air service to Cuba by U.S. carriers, in order to provide : a favorable. Shample | to other nationse: woe ay ‘Expand current restrictions on foreign ‘shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by Closing United States ports to all ships of any shipping line which continues to send any ships to Cuban ports. (3) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to prohibit ships arriving. from or departing for Cuba from embarking or disem-. barking passengers in their ports, (4) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, request Latin American countries to deny their ports to ships of Cuban registry. Gd. Propaganda Actions aa _ Pursue a hemisphere-wide publicity campaign to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training of the nationals of other countries for sub- versive purposes, in order to discourage pro- spective trainees and impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba, Longer Range Actions The following actions should also be undertaken without delay. Their ultimate results may be of far- Docld: 32276221 Page 17 ES 10
se reaching importance, but probably will be longer in realization, a. Political Actions (1) Renew and intensify bilateral negotiations with the five Latin American governments which have not done so to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba. a . a (2) Through bilateral negotiations press countries. with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to CSA RE Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such travel and providing severe penalties for evasion, = = Recommend that rewards be offered for identification ~—. 9. of evaders, a pe ee (3) In separate diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate the need for full and effectii cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bi- — laterally among the several states, in the inter- change of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive ws activities, (4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of ministers of Government of the re American Republics to review the implementation. of steps taken by them to combat movement of subversives in the Caribbean. (5) Urge other Latin American nations to oe negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to en- list cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba, b. Intelligence Actions Intensify our action in making available.to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban sub- ith versive activities, as consistent with the require- ea ‘ ment to protect our own intelligence program, | Docld: 322762271 Page 16 ee 11
=_ 0 ce. Administrative Actions (1) Encourage Latin American governments to insti-+ tute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive ~ examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of passengers to Cuba. (2) Request governments of Latin American countries ~. which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations | '.. with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel docu- ments by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as re- quested. (3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries aids improving immigration and customs controls, d. Actions Related to Common Carriers am (1) Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines | a service. If unable to do so, seek to persuade Eons Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made air- craft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds, This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling — into disrepair. . (2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and any other potential supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft. (3) Gonduet negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Cakada and Spain to persuade those countries to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally pro- viding terminal service for any of the airlines in- volved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure. 12 Docld: 322762271 Page 19
e, Propaganda Aetions (1) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discredit- ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities, (2) Identify returned trainees who are dis- satisfied with their Cuban training experience and exploit their capabilities for provision of intelli- gence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities. (3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout LS Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, : - Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities for movement of persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive purposes. 3. Organization of American States (OAS ) Actions In view of the important political, psychological, and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from any success achieved through the OAS in combatting Cuban subversive activity, the following measures should be undertaken by the United States in that body, at times and under circumstances which give regard to the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, and give recognition to the fact that progress will probably be slow tz. a. Pursue adoption by the OAS of a resolution calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel of. subversives to Cuba by legal means, and at the same time, creating serious obstacles to other related Cuban subversive activities. 5 13 DoclId: 32276221 Page 20 aumento tango oat soletiteenanaseneaimuamume
by Propose. recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control ‘travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific recommendations set forth herein, : : ¢. Once the initial comprehensive program in b,. above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consulta- tive Committee on Security. 'd, Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution, binding upon all member states, to- terminate _ regular air and maritime carrier traffic with  . V. Actions Concerning Illegal Travel vreated As the actions outlined in the preceding sections - become effective, one of the results will be to force the hitherto legal travel into clandestine channels, it may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede illegal movement will acquire steadily in- creasing importance, The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the © preceding section, in terms of immediate impact spro- Jects which promise early and visible results, and longer range projects which, while of great importance, cannot be expected to mature as rapidly. 1. Immediate Impact Actions a. Intelligence Actions (1) Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and as 14 _ EE SS OR ened co eee pRe ERE RoR Rat Docld: 322762271 Page 271
Po on oo Q ne determine routes and methods employed. Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our own intelligence program, to host government, (2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine © aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade governments concerned. to institute surveillance and other control measures, — De Surveillance and Reporting Actions . (1) Continue current us sea and air sur- velllance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cuba. oe (2) Continue the development, at high priority, of US communications in Latin America, ~- in order to improve alerting, reporting and -eontrol capabilities, ae J (3) Establish intelligence centers at fot Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier _ Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemi- nation to countries concerned via the American - Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement of subversives. ee Longer Range Actions Be Surveillance Actions (1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean sur- velllance system. involvingt (a) Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by US forces, (b) A US military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American a . 15 Docld: 3227762271 Page 22 ed wees Be ssmusmminsnusucisulnpusoaiinunneiniptsiiiiasny i nkahh a c lr ia e ca iat ea ino i Rico ieia a iuuania ian
Ambassadors to countries concerned through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Qaribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command, (c’) A unilateral surveillance and inter- ception effort by each country in its own territorial waters, (da) US assistance in final interception _in territorial waters, upon request by the country concerned, . b. US Military Assistance Actions (1) Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected. .. countries, especially in the Caribbean and | Central American area, with the necessary small patrol craft, training and logistical support, including fuel for operations if required, to — enable these countries to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts, Provide necessary funds in addition to present programs. (2) Provide US Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard training assistance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military forces... This’ may. . take the form of a’ Canal Zone training activity, — employment of mobile training teams, or a com- bination of both. (3) Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at . preventing clandestine departures and apprehending — returned trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as required, BS Docld:32276221 Page 23 —
c ‘ 5 £ : e e CUBA CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS Docld:32276221 Page 24 — ;
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Introduction — | 1 I, . Nature and Scope of the Problem 2 1. General Methods of Transferrin Convertible 2 2. Intreduction by Individual Travellers 3 3. Transfers through Banking Institutions 4 4, Txaniefe rs by Diplomatic Personnel oe 5 5. Transfers through Trade Subterfuge “5 6. Relative Importance of Transfer Methods 6 It, . Actions Recommended 6 Docld:32276221 Page 25
CUBA DIRECT CONTROLS ON THE MOVEMENT OF FUNDS TO AND WITHIN LATIN AMERICA rT. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to recommend measures which will impose direct controls upon the flow of funds from Cuba to and within other Latin American countries. We possess evidence that Cuba is providing financial Support to subversive campaigns in other Latin American countries, but the full dimensions of the problem, in terms of amounts involved and methods used, are not i : known. We need more information,..The difficulty with ~. which this information. is procured underscores the prob= lems of counter-measures, since funds can be transferred internationally or acquired locally in many ways, all difficult to detect and harder to prevent. While we may be able to diminish the flow through some channels and increase the difficulty of Castro's subversive financial operations in others, we cannot hope to suc- ceed in stopping them altogether, and even if this were feasible, the possibility of financial support of subversion by the USSR and other Bloc nations would remain. Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that the impediments recommended herein are of insufficient importance to warrant their imposition. Impediments to the movement of funds can be imposed at, relatively little cost to the United States, and they will have some effect in interfering with Castro's pursuit, through subversion, of his basic objective of gaining communist allies in Latin America, This effect could be very significant when added to others that we hope to achieve through our over-all anti-subversion program. In examining this problem, it quickly became | evident that the most .effective countermeasures are to Docld: 3227762271 Page 276 Le - eee,
be found in the area of reducing the capability of Cuba to acquire reserves of free world convertible currencies, such as U.S. dollars, Canadian dollars, Pounds Sterling, Swiss franes, etc. Cuban pesos are usable only in Cuba. They are not convertible to any other currency and are therefore of little if any value elsewhere in the world. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange, moreover, have been steadily diminishing and are now estimated to stand at not more than $25 million to $50 million. If we are willing to intensify our efforts to weaken the Cuban economy, these foreign exchange reserves can be reduced further. However, it must hotcbe overlooked that the Soviet Union can provide foreign exchange for Cuban use. While of transcendent importance, this question of diminishing Cuba's foreign exchange through economic measures is properly related to the larger objective of. weakening the economic position of Castro-Communist Cuba, and thus advancing further toward the goal of causing the downfall of the Communist government. As progress is realized in this broad endeavor, there will be a reduction in Castro's ability to finance subvVer- sive operations in the Hemisphere. ~ The matter of intensifying our economic warfare against Cuba is regarded, however, as beyond the purview of this committee. Therefore, the program of actions recommended in this paper has been directed to the transfer of funds. This includes physical. transfers, transfers through bank transactions and transfers by subterfuge in connection with trade. TT. Nature and Scope of the Problem 1. The Castro regime may transfer convertible currency to subversives in other Latin American countries. by four general methods: a. Introduction by hand, by legal or illegal travellers. - b. Transfers through international banking institutions. . 2 ‘vonage Docld: 32276221 Page 27
a # } a ‘ce. Introduction by Cuban or Bloc diplomatic ; personnel, including couriers. d. The practice of subterfuge in connection with international business transactions. These methods are discussed in following paragraphs, along with steps which might be undertaken to diminish the effectiveness of each, 2. Introduction of Funds , by Hand, by Individual Travellers This is the least convenient and least dependable method in terms of the hazard of theft,.loss, misappropria- tion, confiscation or extortion. Nevertheless, we have evidence that this technique is employed. Funds can be introduced by legal travellers, where there are no effec- tive controls, or they can be introduced by smuggling. With respect to smuggled funds, it is noted that the measures previously approved for control of illegal — travel Will likewise be effective in impeding the. illegal movement of funds by such persons. In like manner, the measures previously approved for control of legal travel will affect the movement of funds by persons in that: category. Additional restrictions on the introduction of funds by legal travellers might be adopted by Latin American countries, in the form of limitations on amounts or administrative requirements for declaration of sums in hand. However, recommendation on our part to He institute such controls would be contrary to our estab- lished policy of encouraging the Latin American nations to maintain free exchange systems. These countries need foreign exchange, and would consequently be hesi- tant to adopt any actions which would limit their means © of acquiring it. Additionally, the adoption of controls on the importation of foreign exchange by Latin American nations would impose an undesirable burden on legiti- mate business and other travel from the United States, as well as from other friendly nations. ee 3 Docld: 322762271. Page 28°.
Docld:32276221. Page 29. Thus, in the category of movement of funds by travellers, it is concluded that little more should be done-at this time than is currently in motion. 3. Transfers through Banking Institutions In addition to physical transfers of currency, Cuba can transfer funds to subversives in Latin America through banking institutions, either by cable or by mail. Cuba's reserves of foreign exchange are held principally, in the State Bank of Russia, the Moscow Narodny Bank in London, the Banque Comerciale pour 1/Europe du Nord (a Communist owned institution) in Paris, the Bank Intra of Switzerland, the Bank of Montreal and the Royal Bank of Canada. Funds from these deposits are transmitted on order of the National Bank of Cuba, which controls all of the accounts. ae . U.S. dollars are the principal currency used in Latin America. The transfer of dollars from these overseas accounts to subversives in Latin American countries can be impeded, in a significant degree, through the institution by the United States of blocking controls against Cuba, under section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This blocking action would prohibit all transactions with Cuba by persons or institutions sub-= ject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and would effectively interrupt Cuban movement of U.S. dollars to Latin America through any U.S, bank. Movement by Cuba of dollars through banks of third countries would also be greatly diminished by this action. It is known and generally accepted in inter- national banking circles, that it is standing U.S. policy that any foreign bank which transfers dollars through U.S. banks in behalf of a blocked country is subject to having its own U.S. accounts. blocked. Because of the importance of U.S. banks in international trade, foreign banks cannot afford such a restriction. This policy. has been effective in the past, having deterred foreign banks, even those of Communist countries, from engaging in dollar transactions on behalf of Communist China, which have been blocked by the U.S. for over twelve years. ae 4 iii aaa