Classification: — ae (This fort is to be ‘used. for ‘material extracted from ClA—controlled docunients. ). issues have arisen related to. the ‘kind and “quality of information, provided the Warren . Commission, ‘files have’ also been requested and. “reviewed in an effort: to resolve these issues. oa As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising» material have been. examined and analyzed. in preparation of this report... The findings set forth herein” are subject to modification due to the following considera a _ tions. During ‘the course of the past fifteen years, the CIA has. generated massive amounts of an approximate total of ninety volumes: of So ao f information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In- spite of. the. Agency’ 3. ' sophisticated document retrieval system, certain documents” requested by. this. Committee for study / | oe and ‘analysis have not been located. ‘Whether these, oe of | docunents merely have’ been filed incorrectly or. destroyed, gaps in the written, record still do 0000s 5 “secondly, due to dissimilar: standards of investigative: . relat Kast Lae Co reg secaet at i KE. Bany AH , Eg . Gia SEK FIRS « madecials prorded the Rac kof ller 6 mmission, eae ciati “a ini ; fo. Bdisa $0 al. Ag rentnller, ge Ny eee menos Caubda Tatell, : “vt Are “QA Seer Cele! ‘peetaiaing te weave a TARA WAC fn CS ss i) » bat careyi¢ of | exist.
“Chis ‘form ae to: be: used for: material ‘extracted: “from ‘ClA—controlled documents.) © ee relevancy adopted. ‘by the CIA and, ‘this ‘committee, g | seertain files requested by + the Committee. for 7 have been made available ‘to ° the. Committee in a saritized fashion: therefore, to the degree reflected by the, Agency? s denial of access and/or. saritization of certain materials, this study’ s conclusions are ‘based upon ‘the. best evidence available to ‘the Committee “the cough ‘this may not be all relevant: evidence to which “the Agency. has access. | | | One musty ‘moreover, give. due. consideration to. the, role. that oral, discussions, oral briefings, “and meetings of ‘Warren Commission and CIA "representatives may: have played in the supply of. “assassination-related information by the cra to the Warren: ‘Commission.’ The subject and substance 7 of ‘these discussions, ‘briefings, § and. meetings | = may not always be’ reflected by the. written record made ‘the ae subject of this. study. “gherefore, the. | committee has conducted interviews, | - depoatttons sae executive session hearings with” 000008 g A eA ot les. prtainiy tO iinoe -t “tacatennfoon) dedi in So fication Suez . a nS elds . 7 SAqiti akon, ie
© a ae ni 'g nus ¥8F Baie susie ntro documents ‘} ; rom Sah ro uments okey Warren Commission staff and members, and "former o or present ‘CIA. representatives in an | effort. to resolve questions that are not “addressed by. the written record. The results. of the Committee! s efforts ‘to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the ‘Warren ‘Commission. and. the. CIA will be: a subject. for. discussion herein. | — a - In addition, this report will examine. the Loe study as outlined above, in ‘the, ‘following general “order: of discussion: — “1) the "organization of ‘the | ‘CIA! s investigation - of President Kennedy' Ss. assassination; 2) the working relationship of the Warren Commission staff and those’ CIA representatives. “concerned with the Warren Commission andaigys 4 ai 3) ‘the standards of investigative cooperation - eo which ‘the Warren Commission ‘staff believed. to govern. the quality and quantity of “information supplied by the CIA to the So - following subjects generated by the Committee! Ss a . Warren Commission; 7
Secret : Gestation: - te em & te. be used: for: eter erected a, ra —eoniraled deeuments:) (=Ba~ 4) the 1 cra! ‘Ss concern n for protection « of its” ce = "sensitive « sources. and methods and the - "consequent effects of this concern oe upon the Warren Commission investigation; 7 and - the substance | and. quality of information | concerning Luisa Calderon passed to the | Warren: Commission and the results of, this” “Committee! Ss investigation of Calderon an her significance to "the ‘events of re f 6 f f f i { j Information Made available 1 by CIA to Warren | ‘Commission a see. cin PZ, aecest7 viben ae
| Gri em is 2 be ued far materi siracted Fam Sx oe —=<entrelied decuments:) Te be ingested prve- ~hs sete “ic. Organization of CIA Investigation | of President -Kennedy' s Assassination In his’ Executive Session testimony before ‘the | Select Committee, Richard Helms, the cIA' s Deputy Director for a “Plans during 1963, described the CIA! Ss. role’ “in the _ investigation of President Kennedy' s assassination as. a ") foldows: | a | This crime. was ‘committed on. United Federal government was "concerned, the pris mary. investigating agency would have been the & Federal. Bureau of Investigation without any: question.. The role of the CIA would = “have been entirely supportive in the sense oe of what material ‘we are (sic) able to ne _ “acquire outside the limits of ‘the United States with reference to the investigation. owe. For investigative purposes, the Agency States. soil. ‘Therefore, as far as the no | - ri
a form ste be. weed! fer aatrl oat a Pog an Gea—contralled documenta) : ee had no iivetujteics ssid inad wal aad 0 States at all... So when I used-here the word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the term. We are (sic) trying to support the FBI and ‘Support the | Warren Commission and be responsive to - their. requests, put we were. ‘not initiating ahy investigations. of our own (or; to my ‘recollection, were we ever asked | Pee ; (Executive Session Testimony. of Richard | “Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 17-18.) | | on November. 23, 1963 Helms. called | fa meeting of senior level CIA officials to outline the agency! s:  investiga- - : 2 4 des “tive responsibility vis avis the assassination. (ssc, EBook a Be “255 >) —At.. that time; Helms placed John Scelso, Has BY ad Ny a Foe > Brdhch Chief foz_ciA-operations in Haxico,. Central | Led america, ana{ jin charge of. the agency’ s initiate o "investigative efforts. (HSCA Class. ‘Deposition of: ‘John / Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 111-112, Exec. Session. | Testimony wi wa 7 rs) : ria 20 90595. 5 = es — a ee 4 Sf . r
ee front ~ Gastification == (oO ReUREE ——confro ed doc rom CiA—controlié SEUMSMS of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, Be 10. ay “Scelso, testified before the Select ‘Committee, — ‘that 1 he was given charge of the ‘Agency' s investigation. on the basis of two considerations: | ‘l)bRis prior oo nae gations and 2) the observance of Oswald by CIA ; surveillance in Mexico, (Scelso! Ss ‘operational concern) less than two months prior to ‘the. assassination. (ssc ~ Book” v, ‘pe. 25, “HSCA Class. Deposition of John scetso, 5/16/70, | pp. 1-112. a Scelso also noted that ‘duting ‘the course: of his investigative efforts, Helms oo) dia n not. pressure hin. to. adopt specific investigative oe theories nor ‘reach conclusions within a set. period of time; Executive Session ‘Testimony of Richard Helms 1 a g experience in conducting major. cra security investi-_ | 8/9/78, | PB. 9- -10)* & oe Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research ‘and Analysis for ® , . CIA's Counterintelligence Staff characterized Scelso's | responsibility. not. as a mandate to investigate but - Yather to "coordinate traffic (code facilitation, telegram or telegraphic consideration) for. working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over the whole world..." (HSCA. Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, 7.17/78, p..9.) : _ ° Rocca referred to this phase of CIA activity as - a the _GPFLOOR phase. (tbid. ) - pp001 f ——— ve
Sees Classification: _ ra : g o °: (This form: is to” be used’ for material. ‘extracted ves ae ae : ~ - f from ClA—controlled documents.) a oe "5 Seeiso 4 described ‘in: ‘detail to the ‘committe the g manner. in which he ‘conducted the agency" s investigas | tion: © | - | ; a. oe ss spractically my whole Branch participated — wy . in the thing. We. dropped almost everything — ade Se else and I put a lot of my officers to work ae in tracing names, analyzing files. — - pe _..We were flooded with cable traffic, with. Se reports, “suggestions, allegations from all. me Be over the world, and these things. had -to be - é Os oo checked out. We were checking out just dozens. My om and dozens of people all the time. (HSCA Classified. f : _Peposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70 p.- 131)* oo ee ‘During: the. course, of the Agency’ s | invetigation, Batson | of with the: FBI was. handled for ‘the CIA by Birch O° ‘Neal. pet i “(bids Pe “80. yo At the time of the assassination, Mr. “O! Neal, [ a former FBI: agent, was Chief of» the ‘Special Investigations . Group. of the ‘CIA's ‘Counterintelligence. Staff. (HSA. Classified sa f Deposition of Birch 0! Neal, 6/20/78, p. Te 52. ). Mr. O° Neal g characterized his ‘functions with respect to ‘the Agency _ Ff as follows: . ee | a " | "(This footnote | -- Footnote */ -- continues - on bottom of page 5). an [
" loslfcations = : . This fem is te be. ed far ptr anaes - & erk—centraled SeeumeRte) » Scelso stated uring his ‘testimony. that. CIA” ge stations worldwide were alerted to’ the agency’ s- i Anvestigation ° "and the key stations: were receiving | tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions. ‘saying everybody participate in the investigation." (Ibid. Pe “133. It was his "+ recollection, however, that throughout his tenure as: coordinator of the Agency’ s investigation, the Mexico oe . city Station was, the: only CIA. ‘field. station directly | —— , Footnote | Fo meee continued from. Bottom of ‘page 4 Lr knew. that. we (at CIA) aia. not have the . aes basic -responsibility for investigating the ee assassination of the President. If there was | a crime commited in the course of this activity, sit) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that it was. our responsibility to give the fullest. cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency ~ with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them | _ cooperation, and I was in close. contact with Mr... Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully. co-,, mo operated, and he’ always: fully cooperated with .° a (Ibid. P- (32. ) LO. O'Neal noted: that his office. (er/st6) at. the direction of the. Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was - . “designated the central point for. collection of assassination— ‘related information made available ‘to the FBI. (Tid. pp. 52- 53. ene
” ima foom ie 18 be used fet materi! axtasted Fan, crA—eentralie eeetmene) : involved | in’ “investigatory activities | related to. President "Kennedy's s. assassination. (Ibid. ) i a December 3 7 - “During the latter half of December, Scelso a issued a summary report. which described Oswald's activities in Mexico city from September 26, 1963 _- October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary, report | as incomplete by. ‘comparison to. assassination-related | | information then available to the FBI ‘but not provided to CIA’ until aalttce. 1963. (Ibid. p.. dds “115. d. (CIA “Document § Report by: John Scelso. to c/cr, be Dec. 63. ye. Following issuance of this report, Helms ‘shifted "responsibility for the. cra! S. investigation of: President Kennedy ' s assassination to the Counterintelligence - ‘Staff. “(HSCA Classified Deposition of John Seélso, 5/16/78, p. 136, cf. -HSCA Classified Deposition of. “Raymond, Rocea, 7/17/78, p- 15. wherein Rocca states that: responsibility ‘shifted from Scelso to cr Stati ‘on: oe eos + Approximately ‘two days after President. Kennedy" s° . assassination, Scelso prepared a summary Xeport,..- a provided. to- President Johnson by Helms. This report) adopted the position that Oswald probably was a .Lone’ assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban intelligence though. such ties could. not be excluded - ae Been, Site ares p.114.)° , 6p — January 12, 1964.) Helms testified that this shift ‘in | |" Sa 5 es — —
Senn — aa om con rom COT is form is le et asta snes eT "esponsibility w was: a. logical development 1 because, the investigation had begun to take on. ‘broader, tones. “(Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pe 14, see also HSCA. Classified Deposition of John . a — oO Scelso, 5/16/78, PR. 138.) 000 Be ee 4 oe Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond | | : ” Rocca who testified before ‘the. ‘Committee. ‘that ae eS (shige 4 in tesponsibility described by Helms was caused | in part by. the establishment of the Warren ‘conmission. “(SCA Classified Deposition of Raymond, Rocea, ‘pp. 12 13. J . * Rocca added: It. was entirely appropriate - in ‘the Soe ’ GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) “would. have that (responsibility for ‘che Agency. investigation. ) . But the minute you had ~ a commission. set up outsilde ‘the line | a obviously had to be the Director, and from - the Director to his Chief of.Operations overseas, because the spread. involved : _ then all of the divisions. | Here you had > on vs a - j __}e A ° . . Mr. - (Scelso). being: asked to_siqn off on. ab. at ha with | with and it would. ~have~seemed to- erly: dministratively See - simply a hybrid monster. (HSCA Classified oa ; Deposition of R. Rocca, TAIN» p. (12) ce : James Angleton supported Rocca ' ‘Ss belief ‘that “the oe _. spread (of investigative esponsibility) ‘involved... 7
"Gasification iis form is tp es —contro ed rom —controile all of the (CIA) divisions." Angleton testifed =» to this Committee that the Agency's efforts to gather and coordinate information related to 7 _the assassination undexwent a metamorphic mo “transition. Initially, Angleton. noted, _ the Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs. and” Case Officers approached Warren. Commi ssiona requirements. in a piecemeal fashion. “However, “Angleton testified ‘the Agency was eventually able: to focus its resources to avoid duplication of effort and provide a system for the central _ referencing of assassination related information as such information was developed. (asca, / Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, PP. 76- -77, see also. HSCA Classified ty Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78, pe 23.) &
ser - Gestation: —~ OS Be mt é ee 1 ued for gat sate et a | rom 28h ro “The. record: weveals that during ‘this: second | phase - of CIA information collection: efforts in 1 support: of the Warren Commission investigation” the concentration - of Agency resources shifted in emphasis from exploration | : of Oswald's activities in “Mexico ‘city to his residency Ss On 7 4 in the Soviet. Union during 1959- ~1962 and possible, | un ge - association with the. Soviet intelligence ‘apparatus. CEE ™ a (bias, 3 pP- 32- 33, 44, Executive Session. of Testimony of a 7 Richard Helms, 8/9/78, Pp. 23. y “Asesesingiy, Rocca, commented 4 that during this phase primary interest in support of, the oe § Warren commission was. to follow-up ¢ on ‘Soviet esas: ‘on. the assumption, that a person who: spends g four years** in ‘the: Soviet Union, “under his circumstances, had to be of. specific interest to Soviet | State security. ‘and their collateral authorities. (HSCA Classified Deposition of .. Raymond Rocca, PP. 32- 33. y. ‘ampae) y , on ‘therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas. the CIA tended to concentrate on: concerned the- Sovie ts == - oo00i7 | - ee by derivat ie : : : 2 S 6 :
"— lassifieation _ SECRET - (ibis fore is te ‘be Used for mesial atest from ClA=<centrelled documents.) *The. following ‘exchange. between. Mr. Rocca and Committee ‘Counsel: sheds further light on the difficulties encountered - 2 By. the Agency . ‘related | to° its. investigation of. possible: ‘Cuban'dnvolveiient, in. the. “assassination:.:" ae ot Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which .° aréas-of.the case received emphasis, I believe. that you . indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was _ the Soviet connection. say ¢ dominated. — looking at it from my point of view. Soe . Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known. about: the anti-.. Gastro: assassination ‘plots on. the part of -the CIA,- ‘would o you. have given more: priority, more emphasis, to the . oS , Possibility of. a Castro: conspiracy ‘to kill the President? . “Mr. Rocca: “Again, I say that it. would have simply intensified it, that there. was attention given . ; to it, not particularly By the staff. T had no ) capabilities ~ on the. Cuban side... Dae Mr. Rocca... That was certainly the one that I would fl “The organization of their service. ‘and their | cs operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely . (sic) | .. within ---it ‘was an enigma at the time.” They were just ot ‘getting started. This was WH's area. This was Win -— pe Seett's area of proficiency. So the defectors had only. begun to come out and ‘they came out. later, the Cuban defectors. ; : bo ; : So, I: can te -- I - really can't say that (a) the $ ; ~~. Cuban connection was. ignored, because it wasn' te The press was filled with - ‘it at the time.. “the Harker. interview should. have been “undoubt&@ly » oo given greater attention in a generalized ‘sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing. 7 ue _— Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was. the Cuban. connection investigated? Le , an Mr. Rocca. I don' t know. I don' t know this. That. side of the report strikes me as being inadequate. ope t SECRE auena: | -- Classified by detivation: 7 Classified by derivation: | Getto
| SECRET | | Gest — {fis fern. is ‘4g be sed: 66 a eat Far Gla—santroled decerten) «. Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when Ll said to what. extent: oS was ‘the .Cuban connection... ‘investigated, . I-don't- mean: ay “ov “the Warren. Commission. *~ cake mean to" what: extent did’ the” oS Agency ‘provide TT mS : .7 crs ce ‘Rocca. » Pine Feat ane epertiinaye - @idn' t do it. Se on : a Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me? Mr. Rocca. We certainly dian‘ t, in R & A. Mr. Goldsmith. — So, CI/R & A aia ‘not - Sted oo | | Mr. Rocca.” Go! into ‘the Cuban. side. of it: at ‘all. oe This. was something left to the people who were concerned | _ Specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation. : Mr. Goldsmith. But. ‘T. ‘believe earlier we he “established that Mr. ‘Helms - gave orders that. information pertinent to the assassination was ‘to go through | “your... ae office, correct? a Co wT f : : f f A Oo Mr. Goldsmith. “And once. information pertinent. “to. the assassination went ‘through: your office; I take (it) you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would: be relevant for the Warren Commission to. see. Is that correct? "Mr. Rocca. Well ~= ne | | Mr. “Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew? oo. 4 Mr. Rocca. ‘Well, everything would go; yes. an Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in “the position, it would seem, to know what information was © being generated in the field that was going to the. ‘Warren Commission. Earlier. t asked you: ‘which area received emphasis and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area. (did) . RET - tociications a ee nr Ney. Se ot 2600837 - - ae ee an Chassis Y derivation:
‘elassification: a es & form ist be used for rete ated €iA—<entralled socuments) a PST er Me. “Rocca. Primarily, primarily. ‘But I didn't mean: “by that that it: ‘excluded the Cuban, because there a ‘was.a lot.of material that came: ‘through:and- “went ‘to the 7 Commission. that concerned the Cubans... Mee Goldsmith. Let! s go" off the record. ok (Discussion off the ‘record. ) Mrs Goldsmith. Let! s continue. a “Mr. Rocca. My. recollection is that at the time a the great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who -. were :in touch with CIA had been: somehow involved in this. oe. This’. was’ the great. concern. 9 : Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. There are different “ ; ° Mr. Rocca. Questions - went down ‘to WH: ao you have. anybody who could Possibly | have gotten involved in. this kind of thing. . 4 “there was extraordinary ‘diligence, I thought, ae "exercised to try to clarity: that side. :" | a Mr . Goldsmith. -Do- you’ think that. the possibility of an assassination plot by Castro against’ the President was | adequately investigated? - (Pause) os Mr. Rocca. . With the advantages of 20-20 hind- . «sight, I could say probably not. But at the time it seems to me that they gave due attention to it -- within: tH «6 information that I. had at. my disposal. . eID sact, (19) spent 2 years, 8 months in the. Soviet Union October 1959 - June 1962 .. i: Ee, ‘a | SECREL | | : | Stig 008 ozo
a cRED ~ hesification: & form fs t8 be used for material veces ae aM Cra controlled dgeuments) = Shad traces; prior traces, as RGB™ Seople. they: were under consular “cover and obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a - consular. job in those earlier contacts.. (Ibid., p. 33) | However, Rocca . dia indicate that Cuban aspects” of the CIA investigation were not ignored “because a there was a lot. of material that came. ‘through and. went to the. Commission that concerned the Cubans." . (bid., Pp. 44) | Mr. | Helms also. testified that ‘the possibility ae of Cuban involvement in President Kennedy’ s | . assassination was a source of deep concern within the Agency. (Exec. Session Testimony of R. “Helms, 8/9/78, PB. 21) . Nevertheless, Mr. Helms Stated that development. of iste a tion pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participati®m fw in the assassination was very difficult to- obtain. (Ihid., p. 138) | : Angleton was in agreement with Rocca ' s analysis that during the second phase of ‘the Agency' s support role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its. ore) _ os _ moe no | “SECRET | |e es = Loe
: “SECRET “fie fom is 8: be sed far material extracted m A=<eniralied documents) laa (angleton, Be 86). “He stated for the record “with 2 regard: to the Warren ‘Commission’ s investigation - (with the CIA; s support) ‘of possible. Cuban involvement in the assassination: — a I personally believe that the United = States intelligence services did not “have the capabilities to ever come to. an! adjudication (of the ‘Cuban aspect) . oo don' t. think the capabilities were there. - (aScA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 20/5/78, Pe 93) eHERED,. cissi sed soaia ——
- Glassification: 2. This form is tg ‘be used for material sate om elA—eantraned GSEumans) oe As noted above, the CI. Staff assumed. responsibility | in. late December 1963 - early January 1964, for. the. os coordination of CIA efforts to assist ‘the Warren - Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond ' Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for cr Staff, _ was designated point of contact with the Warren | Commission. (HSCA Classified Deposition of James _ Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.) Rocea's Research and | Analysis component. was” concerned with: me a 6 re “analytical intelligence, analytical et Oo brainpower, which meant all source, ' 411 : i overt source comprehension; a study of _ ee - .. cases that had ceased to. occupy opera~ -9 | an ' ..- u-tional significance, that is, closed cases, -.°. . to maintain the ongoing record of overall “equality and quantity of counterintelligence being performed by the entire DDP operational - -component;... the Deputy Director for Plans _ (HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, aa _ 8/17/78; See also HSCA Classified Deposition : of James Angleton, 10/5/78, _P. 77.) & Me. Rocca testified that assassination-related_ € oS 4 990023 information generated by CIA components was directed to his. staff (as designated point of contact with ‘the | ‘Warren Commission) in the: normal flow. of aay | to day” sition SEGRE - = eel ys Senet cy _
—con docuim ae —con TO 2 ocumen a Bs, is 18. ¢ used — mater = so "reviewed by Rocca or his assistants who included “Thomas-Hall, (Soviet Expert), Pawl-Hartman (general we research and. search man for. the U.S. Intelligence 7 - community and . its Fesources), and. Arthur_Doeley: (sao | ' had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of | years prior to the assassination) (Ibid. Pp. 17. os - During the course of the Warren Commission. ore "gation, Hall,—Haxtman~and-Dootey worked with those” - CIA divisions ‘producing substantive information | _ related ‘to the assassination. (ibid. ye oe | Mr. -Rocea testified ‘that even “though - - CI/Rea was ‘the Agency! s | point of reference with regard to the Warren Commission, neither his state nor. the | - on staff in \ general displaced the direct relations of | “Mr. Helms or any other concerned Agency official with: the Warren Commission. (Ibid. ; Rocca testified that either 7 cI Staff nor his staff displaced the CIA! s Soviet - Division (represented by Dauid-oxphy Chief of the oon Glessicon: SECRET CRIT, “work (tbia., pp. 16-17. ) This information was: a ones HEED,
fhe form is 19 be used. fra steal ante ClA—centralled iia sR division | and» his assistant, ‘Tennant _Bagtey) in, “its contact with. the Commission; nor dia CI/REA displace John Scelso in his. contact with the Warren : Commission.) ~ Rocca testified that in some instances . a J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly oO to Helms with requests, and in) other instances David  Slawson, a ‘Commission Staff ‘counsel, conferred directly | with Tom-—Hall of Rocca’) s stafé. (bia. Be 36. )* ee | “The record reveals that « on certain issues of : = paged sensitivity Rocca was ‘not permitted to act as the Agency' s point, of contact with the Warren ‘Commission. "notwithstanding the fact: that I was ‘the Working level, point of contact. ” (HSCA Classified Deposition « of. ‘Raymond * Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct _., Superior. during the course of the Warren Commission investigation, . he did not. participate on a regular basis in the. Agency's efforts to supply - ‘substantive | oe information to the Warren Commission nor did he deaf. .« ad 4 -.On a direct basis with Warren Commission representa~- tives. (excepting Allen Dulles on: an unofficial. ‘basis; _.. .HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78, ®p. 17-18; HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 78.) However, Angleton testified to this. _ ‘Committee that he did attempt to keep apprised of. developments as the investigation progressed through | ' consultation with Rocca. (HSCA Classified Deposition. of” James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 81) Sec CRET TL a aa i: Se fe is = ae asstied | y derivation: | He testified that. "compartmentalization » was. observed” . fy ao f
7 : i at p 4 Rocca, afr/ie, pe 1a) "Rather, (as. ‘it: affected the Warren Commission sovesti- "assigned 4 ‘to Davidmurphy, Chief’ of SR k Division, tn addition to. Richard. Helms Cxeid) oe “the Agency" s- ‘support ‘role to” the Warren Commission. (Thid., ‘pp. 19- ~20. ) Rather, Taties: Angleton and Birch 5/16/78, Pe 113, -wherein | Scelso states ‘that cr Staff BL0G22. ” 7 | Classification his. form: Ag. ie be used far mate eet a om clA—eantrated dc) oe “Rocca. cited by. way of. ‘example the. case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca’ es testified that. he. dia not attend. any (Of the’ Agency. discussions: Pertaining to Nosenka! s. case. (Ibid. )- gation) © responsibility for ‘the. Nosenko case was. ad Rocca. ‘described ‘the cr ‘stafé. mail intercept’ program, oe ‘ETLINGUAL, as a second example ‘of: an Agency matter about which he. had no ) Knowledge nor input vis. a vis O'Neal handled. ‘the disposition of this particular material (aSCA Classified Deposition of J. ‘Scelso, ‘} including otneal, was: _ repository of. HTLINGUAL intercepts; ° luk See. WSCA Class De - o€ Bick Ole 1{20/ 78. tinea wherein Olaeatk stodes that he didnot Sig) Warren Comm i ss len had know ape eal the HTLINGIAL RCeAT EARN because. tt WAS Rot. A Ces pews: bil t te. rove Ad The? A arter COrArn; S51 with: maker als $ ARCS , Eran. o he - WT AIM GUAK pega ; . a : Session | ea if y 4 derivation: =
8 fern i is e be aged fy ast sae om ClAcentraned a SSeS) ° "In summary, it was R ‘Rocca! Ss. testimony. that an n internally. ~ decentéalized ‘information reporting ‘function best “characterized + ‘the organization of. this second phase - of the Agency’ s investigative efforts to assist the Warren. Commission. (thid., ‘Pp. 10; HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, P- 75, 80. a | See 2 also CIA Doc. Rocca ‘Memo for Record, 1 “April 1975, _ ~~ subject: Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1, 1978, wh wherein it is stated ‘that Helms ‘remained senior - an official ‘in 1 charge of the overall investigation, with. cr staff acting | as a coordinator and repository “of information collected. ): | essen. at vt ———
: - asefcation: —sectet RE form mis, te a 7 aaa arsed a ecumen 5 OA Opinions ‘of. Warten: Commission and CIA Representatives: a Regarding | Warren “Commission-cra Relationship ‘The. Committee has contacted both representatives of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of ‘the ‘CIA who. played significant roles. in providing CIA=" "generated information to the Warren Commission. The general ‘consensus of these representatives is ‘that. the... | Warren Commission and ‘the CIA enjoyed a successful - working relationship during the course of the. comission! Ss investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. ‘Rocca 1/11/78, p. 18). (See also Exec. Sess. ‘Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, Pe 24. J William Coleman, a senior staff counsel | for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters 7 § “4 j which utilized the CIA’ s resources, characterized the cra representatives with whom he dealt as oo “highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. > 6» - (See, HSCA stafé interview of William Coleman, | 8/2/78. ) Mr. - Slawson’ expressed a similar opinion — regarding the Agency" s “cooperation and quality op ei 8 da atiaR Se Berk :
— Gessi sification: . Secret _ assi ication: | (This form is to be used for. material extracted 4d§ EAD lnteolhea ase extracted from CiA—-controlled documents 71lo- “Of. work. (Gxecutive Session Testimony of Ww. I David Slawson, 1/15/77, p. Ali;see_ aiso JFK ‘Exhibit 23.) - J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren _- Commission and. its staff were, assured by the CIA . that the Agency would | ‘cooperate. in the Commission’ s oe work. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 9/7/78, p.4;3 HSCA A Class. Depo. of Jobn in McConey yn, p 9) | | John McCone, Director of ‘central ‘Intelligence : ‘ab’ the time’ of President Kennedy ' s assassination ‘and ‘during the Warren ‘Commission investigation, - - supported Mr. Rankin' s testimony ‘in this regard by characterizing the CIA’ Ss work vis-a-vis _ the Warren ‘Commission. as both responsive and | ee comprehensive. (HSCA. Class. Depo. of John ree nd McCone, 8/17/78, p.- 5) Mr. McCone was responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters. were enn f ; 6 sf mon Berk F - 20053. nied by ten
te sitica tion ne's Secret _ assirica ion: | . . (This form is to: be used for. ‘material extract ao eh in 5 WEAndenet|aterial extracted from ClA—controlled documents. ee : -10a~- a “conveyed by: the CIA ‘to ‘the Warren Commission. (Ibid. , Pp. 5-6) “In ‘this regard, Mr. ‘Mccone testified that: | The policy| of the CIA was to: give the Warren. _. Commission everything that: we had. I. a, personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my.office and took him down ‘to the .- Wault of our building where our information: is- - microfilmed and stored and showed him the ' procedures. that we were following and the - extent to which we were giving him -- giving ™ his staff everything that we had, and rt think | he was quite satisfied. (Ibid., p..9).: Howes VEG as will subsequent sed ene cia pelieg 12x At te re the Howees 4 mpnagsien ere thie alee ose See of BSS ss art a Lede ACTER Comm iin, Carth all manent Warten entrees f"that’ ALT Re Relevant” an Materials Be Made Promptly, Available. By, Joos CTA To. Warren Commission, - _ Mr. Raymond Rocca, - Tic .8 a aingloedimpremedter of cin ity - atrn Ee ee ae the. Warren Commission uo investigation, 7 characterized the Agency' Ss role as ‘one’ ‘of. & 7 . full support. to the Warren commission: Me. Rocca, who | served. as the Chief of the Research and. os yp 1 aio ce we
s 3 i i 4 | Analysis Divison for the Counter-Intelligence es Classification: _ “Secret Classification: ee _. (This form isto be used for material extracted | {his Chke—donhoolhed oeirhentsipterial extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) © ~10b- "Staff of the CIA, stated under oath that Richard Helms had given the following directive: All material bearing. in any: way that could be of assistance to the - oN Warren Commission should be seen oo : Se e staff and Rand A and marked for us woe | sued very, very strictly worded. a rest Cesiications) =" they were verbal in so. now -~ that we were to leave : no “stone unturned. — - ' (HSCA.Class.. Depo. of ‘Raymond . Rocca, UNITE ‘PB 24). | Crit, — sess | oe -Clestid by dervoons “Berk.
_ - Mr. - Rocgtisaddeds § abak, uke fai sodtaer laldeted Mee Helms . trolled d. t orders were 0 BB JAS to" the fetter by all CIA employees. — (Ibid. pe 24. Mr. Rocca concluded that. on: this basis: "the cIA was. to turn’ over and: to. develop 2 any’ ‘information’ “bearing on | the assassination that could be of assistance |g . to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., P- 26. ) - | A different view of. the CIA's. role regarding the ae oe supply of. CIA's information to the Warren Commission wae propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. ‘Helms, who served as- the CIA's Deputy. Director for Plans during ‘the wircen so, Commission. investigation was directly responsible for. the : ¢ -eTA's investigation. of President. Kennedy’ Ss assassination and 1h @S Fatal gheneaX of 1A. polrey vig.a ris tha Warren Com miss fede: 9. _ (ibid. P- 23. ) He testified to the Committee that the: CIA made every, effort to. be as “responsive as possible to. ‘Warren ‘Commission “requests. (Exec. Sess, Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, (Be “10. y Mr. Helms added further. testimony regarding the manner in. which the CIA provided its ‘infor- mation to the Warren Commission. He stated: a An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com omission). We ‘would attempt to respond to it.” But: these inquiries came in individual bits: ana® - pieces. or as individual items...Each individual - item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Ibid. pp. 10-11. - oe ; “However, it was Mr. Helms" recollection that the CIA _ provided information, to the Warren Commission primarily | a seat : og lassification:_ as wn 0D o03 32 ae | Classified by derivation: :
Classification: OO | en the basis, eer tet el eee. “Under a from CiA—controlled documents.) aS oath he supported this. Propositions!” Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it. your ‘position. that het the Agency gave. the Warren. Commission»: : information. only. in-.résponse to speci —. £ie requests by the Warren Commission? ~ That is ‘correct. ‘that by. saying that> There may have been — times or cireumstances under: which’ some= ‘thing different might . have occured, but my recollection. is that. we were attempting. to be-responsive and supportive to the - a PBI and the Warren Commission. When. °°. _> they, asked for something we gave” it to. me ‘them. a As far as our, volunteering - information. is. concerned, I have no recollection. of whether we volunteered it. Or not. (tbid., P- 34. do _ o Me. | Helms* characterization of fulfilling Warren "Commission requests | on a a casckbasis x ‘rather. than uniformly — “volunteering relevant information to “the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to Jd. Lee Rankin" Ss ‘perception o of the CIA's: | investigative responsibility. ‘Mr. Rankin | was” asked by. Committee. counsel whether he worked under - ‘the. impression ‘that the Agency’ s responsibility was: | simply ‘to respond to questions that were addressed to ‘CIA by the. ‘Warren Commission. In response, Mr. ‘Rankin testified as "follows: “Not: at all and if anybody had. ‘told me that I would have insisted that the Commission com- ~. municate with the President and get a different " CRRA we might . not. ask. the, raghty: “SECRE TL 90.033 _ Classified » ni .
Sst ication: —Sacrst ee assitl ication: — ee this form is to. be ‘used: for. material extracted we Chis pode niroied sciniehis pterial extracted oe : from ClA—controlled documents.}. Lede. a “questions. and: ‘then’ we , would not chave. the. information: and. ‘that. would | be absurd..: - (HSCA’ Class... Depo. of. J. Lee’ Rankin - 8717/78, Pe 4) . Mess Slawson addea support ‘to Rankin’ s s position testifying that Warren Commission requests to ‘the CTIA se were rarely. specific. "The | request was made initially ‘that +t ‘they give, us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation.” (Exec. Sess. Test. of | we ‘David Slawson, 11/15/77, B-. 29) ye Coe Aa Actin ~ wy ne ae learn” _ MD rN Nt “Su ia coe ; . fee gn unfortunate consequence’ “Of (aeren Coimeni yvion reldanee on. preter +o proride tna Comms SCO | wo CTR Wht rei< AAT CIA matics at po relic we Ae 7 mn the subsequent exposure of the. CIA's -anti-Castro "assassination Plots Z(ssc Book Vv) see also (Alleged “Assassination Plots Involving Foreign headers, ‘Interim e “ Report, SSC, 11/20/75)7. Paradoxically, even, if Mee ‘Warren Commission had requested information on such: plots, the ‘CIA s. point of contact. with the Warren Commission would not have been able to provide the NE we tne . cg aia hee ey o Kier En SUL ee < tan - 200052 Qi
assi ication: (this form is to be used for material extracted | _Klbin Conedertolted wieeenmpterial extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ci3aq ms "Commission with. information so requested. -As-- Mee Rocca's testimony reveals, he had no-  Rnowledge at the ‘time of the Warren Commission investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel castro. ‘isca Class. “Depo. of Raymond - toot: WANT, Pp. 50) Co ee oa Hels knee hast den s think el - :
(This: form is to be used: for material extracted - - from ClA—controlled documents.) ©. Had” Rocca, as ‘the CIA's ‘working level representative to the | Warren. Commission, beer requested ‘by. the. ee "Comission to research and report on any and al 7 ~ CIA. anti-castro, assassination operations, Rocca s- . efforts would have. produced *: no substantive informa- 7 ' tion. (tid. p- 49) this papers Kaontetye 7 a . The record also tate ais, that the CIA desk: : officer who was: | initially given the. responsibility oe by” Mr. “Helms: ‘to. investigate | - - ca ae ‘Tee: ‘Harvey ‘oswala, and the assassination of President: Kennedy . had no. knowledge of ‘such plots during his investi- "gation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John. ‘Seelso,, 5/16/78, - “Pps. 73, “ali- -112), Mr. Scelso testified that. jad he known of such assassination plots: the: follo ne saction would have been ‘taken: - _ oie ee Of ‘Wwe would have gone at rr and: heavy {- We would have queried the a§ent (AMLASH). - about it in great detail. I. would have ore! had him polygraphed byte best™ operative “gecurity had to see if he had (sic) been. . on 4 os - a double-agent, informing. Castro- about . Lo 8 ¢ our poison pen things, and so:on, I. -{ would have had all our Cuban - sources - Ute ph f to queried’ about it." (Ibid. , ’ Be 166) - “Gs a0003¢ As. the record reflects, these plots | were ‘known Z W Bocce cot fred b he was notin apesitr a» 40 AS wrt g UES HSAS nelabed H30 (& . nakies ates mgacaet Cartes bur thet prese haikite pe ane WoC By, orias wie ware sn tne chain & Des ” Goamard AM ne “aad rant Rand a “tec liyeotniatyect” (Baissea) nO So ee © Classification: SE ECRE Be Aare ages ‘also. HSCA Classified ‘Deposition a ames  pp.wo7Ptwherein Angleton statesfhawt ned, : te £5 Sud WE. Fidei Castres aarti arts ; Pars few within ‘the CIA.. Mr. Helms' testimony. regarding. : italy a
Classification: (this: form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents. ) these plots reveals. ‘that the Agency compromised She Talg t yes. Pirectoc : . _ ts: (Promise ‘to. supply. all ‘relevant. information. toe Ne oo See stottmentet Sonn Meton€; iF oa herein ) the Warren. Commission. The following exchange SIN S SS : > between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates | wha. the jextent a of ‘the Agency! s compromise: | Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms,* I ‘take. it. from your en a testimony that your position is .. that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the —| _.. Warren. Commission's work; and,.: _ ini light of that, the Committee « _° would: like to be’ informed as. to - '. why the Warren Commission was. not told by you of the anti-. Gastro assassination plots.” Mc. Helms: og have never been ‘asked ‘to’ ‘testify | a _ before the Warren ‘Commission: about _ ORE. operations. - “Mr. Goldsmith: © If the Warren Commission aia” ‘not ™ i "now of the operation,-it certainly .. was-not ina position | to ask. you . . "about it. “ Is. that not true?. Se Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do: you know they. dia - _ : °. ‘not know about it? How do you . ‘know Mr. Dulles had not told. them? : How was I to know that? | And. besi@gs, , Iowas not the Director of the Agency © and in the CIA, you did not go oe traipsing around to the Warren Con- mission or. to Congressional Committees. . or to anyplace. else without the Director‘ Ss permission. Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with. the Director, , whether the Warren Commission So “should be informed of -the anti- ‘Gastro assassination. plots? ———— rears ae a _ Classification: -S3 oo |: Classified by derivation: 1:0.9:6 37
' (This form is. to ‘be used for. material ‘extracted | from ClA—controlled documents.)  ” oe Mr. Helms: - I did not, as far. as r recall. mt ae {HSCA Exec. Sess. Test.- of. “Richard - Helms, 8/9/78, Bp. 30- 731. “4, emphasis. added)” ; Mr. McCone testifed that he. first. became aware” a - Of the CIA's: anti-Castro assassination plots. an os involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He. - stated that upon learning of these plots he directed o oS ; that the. Agency cease ‘all such activities. (SCA To ae f Class. Depo. of John Mecone, 8/17/78,. p. 13) an oo co "When asked whether ‘the CIA desired to withola | informa- | ¢ _ tion from the. Warren Commission | about, the Agency anti- castro, assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the ¢ Agency or. causing an ‘international. crises che gave othe, following response: 2 ME cannot. answer ‘that ‘since . they (cra. .. employees knowledgeable of the _- continuance: of such plots). withheld: the information. from. me. I cannot | answer that question. I have never | been satisfied as to why they with- held the information. from Me... ATDIGSs P- 16). : Regarding the xelevancy of such plots. to ce Warren Commission! s work, Warren ‘Commission ‘counsels ; | Rokin, Slawson and Spector were . in agreement that i such information should have been | reported to. othe. ~~ Classification: -
- Classification: = “(This form is thSkee Choker Bees ane enka, ¢ 7 3. f a eo from an Scerdents.) “ a ss ti _ wy Warren, Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of we ee ‘David Slawson, ns/77, pe 277 ies ade, ests "ef Arlen: ‘Spector’ ayye/77, PP. 45- 46; CFy ‘Exec. | Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, Ly/1s/T1, Pp. me . where he states that. possible witholding of - "information by ‘CIA about Agency attempts to. | assassinate castro, did. not significantly. affect: | Warren Comission, snresta ion) ot Ai pec ae 7 Mir Rocca aan oe on oe § | From the CIA's perspecti: testified that had he known of. the anti-Castro |. assassination plots. his efforts to. explore, me " -possibility of, a retaliatory assassination against. "President Kennedy by Castro would have been feet “flea. He stated thats a completely different oe °* précedural approach probably. would and should have been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. ‘Of. Raymond | Rocca * 1/78, pe 45) a John Scelso, ‘the. above-cited CIA desk officer. i who ran the CIA's. initial | investigation of President Kennedy" ‘Ss assassination. until that ‘responsibility was, given to. the CIA's» counterintelligence staff, "non-disclosure to the Warren Commission: offered a “highly. critical appraisal of Helms’ 7 La 7 ‘ ye - Clesied by derivation
Mr. Goldsmith: - DO you think Mr. Helms “was © foe Pe highly reprehensible act, which : "Cra Resportse to warren Commi'ssion Requests - yespond to the Warren Commission’ s requests for ae presented by the request ana 3) the extent to which the. ‘relevant ‘information. touched upon sensitive ‘cra, ‘Helms. testified that when CIA had been’ able to. SE CAEL a . ~ Clanatffeation: _ (This form is: to be. used for material extracted ‘from ClA—controlled documents.) - . acting properly when he. failed _ - to tell the Warren Commission: ae “, about the assassination Plots?) Mee Scelso: No, I ‘think. that. was a score an he cannot possibly justify “under - his oath of office, or any. other standard of professional . public service. (HSCA Class. -Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78) pregah Besponrbil ty conce m for the sanctity - of Sensitive Sources. and_ _Methods_ i: ‘Factors Affecting aa The _tength | of time required “by ‘the CIA to oe information was. “dependent upon 1) ‘the availability . of information; 2) the complexity of the issues sources “and methods. “On the first. two. points, Mr. > a satisty | a Commission request, the. CIA. would then send a reply pack: took longer than others. For example, some might involve angen . a - coe : "and some of these inquiries. obviously So me : _. Classification: _ ggoe10 ce a ho Classified by derivation:
ne Ts - (this ‘form’ is to be used for: material extracted. cb ae CO ee from CiA—controlled documents.) : oe — | checking a.file which. was in Washington. | . Other - inquiries might. involve trying. to. ogee, if we could. iocate. Somebody - in’ some» overseas: ‘country... ee | ibe. ‘Obviously; ‘one: takes ‘longer: to. per=. MSs we pe form than the’ other. sense Sess. Test..- He Oe Of. Richard | Helms, 8/9/78, 25) Xi FN oy %% At times the CIA's concern for protecting its x a u ‘Sensitive sources. and methods ‘caused the Warren Commission to. experience greater difsiculty in. getting relevant information than when ‘the protec~ ~ tion of: such ‘sources and methods was. not. at issue. oe Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency’ Ss. : effort. to. ‘protect. its sensitive, sources a nd methods, particle 7 usitin PEAK Fo Cif surkiffance sparse ons. 14 M2ti co Cty, are) @ffecttthe quality of the information to which | the, Warren Commission and its ‘staff were given ee “access. “(HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee. Rankin 8/17/78, 22) AS a result of the CIA's concern, in some. instances | the agency made ‘the unilaterial decision” to ee “VEE ‘Limit access to CIA materials by the Commission. - (SCA Class. Depo: of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p-.. 158) - elata. - 2 oO) vg The Committes has. identified two™. areas ofS concern in which the Agency’ s desire to protect. its sensitive sources: and methods impeded ‘the Warren | Commission’ s investigation. These are: a secneT _ Classification: oaott - ‘Classified by derivation:
SECRET 7 Classification: _ - (This form. is to be used for material extracted. trolled documents.) Witholdin y information from the. Warren : isSfon- ‘pertaining to -the—phote- _ © suewettrance [sna telephonic rorveisiance J operations, of, the cra's Mexico. City ‘Station 2) As a related consideration, the. Agency' s “reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph now referred to as_ that of the "Mexico o Seas a city M stery Man", de developed byreaas MexicaCety photo me a enREN T 7c and ocer . a mot. 3 EZ nitiok Concern tar Reveals: ng SEN Satie . Sour ty Conk Meth ols The ‘CIA's concern for. revealing the existence. - - of sensitive technical. operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of "the Warren Conmission. § “Scelso commented that "we were. “not. authorized at. first to. reveal all our technical operations." -(rbia., P- 158) - But Scelso did testify that: ‘We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the [telephone. intercept Jand the information — gy . gotten from the interrogation of Silvia ° « ‘Duran, for example, which corresponded -almost exactly with the information from the[telephone intercepts] Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported ‘by "examination of: the background to the. first major CIA. “report furnished the Warren Commission regarding a Classification: a I ‘Classified 1 by ¢ derivation: .
This” form is ‘to. be used for: material extracted” co : - from ClA—controlled documents.) ; ~ oo ‘Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico (City. (CIA 7 "Doc. FOr. #509- =803, 1/3/64, Memorandum for Boos hee. Rankin from Richard Helms) “Much. of the’ information provided to the Warren cnatsaion in this: xeport was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which: had - ween deleted completely from the report. . | | The CIA policy Limiting Warren ‘Commission’ knowledge. ‘of CIA sources, and methods was articu! lated as early as December 20, 1963, at which ae . time a cable was. sent from CIA headquarters to _ the Mexico city. Station which stated: Our present. plan. in passing information. .. to the Warren Commission is. to: eliminate. - mention’ of [tel ne. psy) in order to protect ‘your: contimifii¢“Séps. Will rely . instead on statements of Silvia Duran: - and’ on contents of $ ~Consular file -which Soviets gave ODACT PM CTIA - Doc. FOIA.» —#420-757, 12/20/63, 310 a SES The basic policy articulated ‘in "the December . : 20,7 1963 cabl is also set forth “in. a “GIA. memorandgn 6 of December a it specifically, concerned. _ / the: CIa' s relations with the FBI, > (CTA wenioranduin’- for File, 12/20/63, Bixch_O'Neal, includéd. in with ae 7 file materials) “In that memorandum, Birch-O'Neal of ‘the CIA counterintelligence/special 3 Investigations co Group a: wrot that he had. been advised, by Sam - lassi fication: - . | | a Seam, WH, x Se sn OOBOLS ”
_ SECRET. “Classification: _ _ ve. “(This form i$ to” be used for material extracted” an “Papich, FBiodiciAsannttdledlensbay) that the FBI was © anticipating a request from the Warren Commission ) for. copies of the FBI! s. materials. which supported “¢ ner the FBI! s five volume report, of. | ‘December oF 1963 that had been: submitted to the - Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with | ‘this report which indicated that some(United . States ‘Agency was tapping-telephones]in Mexico and asked: hin whether the, FBI could ‘supply the a Warren ‘Commission with the source [ot the telephone taps: ] 0° o' Neal's’ memorandum shows that he discussed | this. matter, with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, ‘Scelso- was directed by. ‘Helms to. prepare a cta material to be: passed to the. Warren Commission.
_ SECRE "Classification: _ _ (This form is to be ‘used for material extracted. from ClA—controlled documents.) oe He (Scelso).was. quite: sure “it was not. the Agency's desire to make. ‘available. to the Commission at least in this a manner~-via the FBI—-sensitive. informa- . tion which. could relate tof'telephone.-. taps, | (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, b you -Birch|O'Neal, included. in. Soft File materials) *. Nol whastler Hs 3 Agere casinos Yo -e47- Song VE Rel 4 ul | garg peed rs Were a Comm: sooo . The opinion expressed. by. Scelso as of December 20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a: formalized fashiong «ws‘hen. Helms expressed his. concern regarding exposure by. the: FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote - ' that the: CIA. had become aware that: the FBI had” on already: oo. a 7 , * called to the attention of. the. ' Commission, through » its attorney, — 'that we have information: as deter- - mined from Agency sources “coinciding with tie dateswhen Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing © _ on ‘his. activities while in: ‘that. areas ' . (CIA dissemination to FBI, ‘1/14/64, 7 _ CIA, $ csciI- 73/779/510. Fela Tt 141 Mr. Helms. further indicated that the CIA. might be called upon to provide additional ‘information -acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be- : ; employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively Ue with the Commission in a manner which would : protect CIA information, sources and methods. a = -Among the policies articulated were two which. Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information. - In a this way the CIA could check the- possibility of revealing its. sources and methods inadvertantly. The policies. articulated. were: : | Cosel -opg0a5 se fi ret CY . oe EE. _ Classified by ¢ derivation: 7
i Classification: (This. form | is to be used. for material extracted + me from ClA—controlled documents.) - a: “The ‘CIA policy. of eliminating reference ‘to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further ‘revealed | by examination of. an’ agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, ‘sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico. city: Station. | (CIA Doc. FOLA shos- ~204, 1/29/64, - DIR. 97829) ‘This cable indicated that knowledge of “Agency sources- "and techniques was still being with- ‘held from ‘the Warren Commission, and stated that on . ‘Saturday, February: L, 1964, the. ‘CIA was to, present a report on Oswald's Mexico city activities to the. Warren. Commission which ‘would be in a form protective of the CIA's. Mexico. city Station" s. _ sources and techniques (Ibid.). (Footnote cont" a from Pg. 23. ) 1) Your Bureau not disseminate ‘information re- ceived from this Agency without prior: concur | rence a =) ° oe 2) In instances in which this Agency has. provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compl€ments (6A) or otherwise — is pertinent to information developed. or — - received by your Bureau througa other sources and is being provided, by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will a. : advise us of such referral j rder that we may _ ee anticpgate. acci fies Behe es ere interest of the, re | ce ‘Commi : 2 ee es fa : : ; - ‘meeting eon! needs. (Ibid. ) tay aha
Classification: — nt “(this form is to ‘be used for material [extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) © es a” - [zstemnne Taps | qd. Mr. Helms offered | testimony regarding ‘the CIA s - xeticence to inform the. Warren commission, at least during. the initial stage of ‘the: Commission’ s Wor of the cra’ ‘s[terephonic andJphoto « surveillance operations in Mexico. city. The reason for the sensitivity of these. _ [telephone taps Jand surveillance was not - only becyflse it was sensitive, from ‘the - Agency's standpoint, ut the[telephone. ee taps were Gunning | in” Lonjunction with oe the Mexican authorities Jand. therefore, } -.if this had become. public knowledge, .. it. would have. caused[very .bad feelings between Mexico and the: United States, “J - and that was the reason. - (Exec. Sess. n Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp- ‘S1~ 52) é Sd ‘The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren — “Commission in the early stages of: its investigation of the above-described surveillence ‘operations is. a. source of concern to “this committee. It is indicative of an. Agency policy designed to skew, in its favor the form and substance, of information *® : the CIA felt unconfortable, providing the Warren Commission. (HSCA Class. - Depo. of John Scels 7 5/6/78, p.- 158) This “process might well have "hampered the ‘Commission’ s ability to ‘proceed in ee ss a ee es SB: : . Classification:. opnee? : al “Classified by derivation:
A + oo its inves this fot, sie “ag ie. nese ogee. it. i rom ie $.) : the: cra. provided the Warren ‘commission with: a "memorandum + that chronicled. Lee Harvey Oswald's | Mexico city visit during ‘September 26, “1963 So that Oswald's: various. conversations with the. Cuban _ xandum did not. ‘mention. ‘that ‘the CIA had[tappea and ranseribed conversations between ‘Cuban Embassy “Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was. mention made of. and. Cuban Ambassador to “Mexico Armas. which the cra’  hadfatso tapped and Jeranseribed. “SECRET | Classification: oo Ske A-—contro ocumen OAs. noted. previously, on January 31, 1964, Be ee, are ‘Doc... FOIA $509-803 - 1/31/64). October 3, 19637 That memorandum did not. mention and. ‘Soviet Embassy/Consulates had. been[tappea and subsequently Jtranscribea? : Furthermore, ‘that memo~ : employee Sylvia Duran and. Soviet officials at the the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos | On February Ly 1964, Helms appeared: before. the Commission and likely discussed the. memorandum of: January 31, 1964, “(CIA Doe. FOIA. #498-204, 1/29/64 DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, a. Lee Rankin wrote - Helms in “regard to. ‘the CIA memorandum of January. 31. (JFK Doc. “No. 3872: yy A. review of Rankin" s letter Z “Classified Py derivation: a by the Agericy's Mexico City Station -
. am (This form. is: to: be used. for: ‘material, extracted from CIA—controlled documents.) oe “indicates that as. of his writing, the Warren 7 Commission haa no. | substantive knowledge. of{tne “telephonic survéillance ‘operation 0: on: oF hs er]ehe tapes and, ‘transcripts [exon ¢ that operation. | Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter" “whether Oswald's direct communication with employees, 7 7 of the Soviet ‘Embassy (as. stated. in Paragraph i. lef. January 31 memorandum). had been facilitated by -.: teleptione or interview. “Manifestiy, haa: “the Warren. ‘Commission been informed of ‘the [tetepnonic. "surveillance operation and its success. in: tapping” 7]. ‘Oswald this, inguiry by Rankin would not have been made... Se “Raymond Rocea' Ss | testimony tends ‘to. support» : _ - . 4 : “this conclusion. It. was. Rocca! s. recollection, that between the time. period of January: 1964 ~ April 1964, Warren Commission" s: -_xepresentatives. had visited the CIA's ‘headquarters: in Langley, Virginia and. had - : been ‘shown various transcripts resulting confine ‘CIA's | telephénic surveillance operations fin Mexico City.  (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond ‘Rocca, 7/17/78, p-: 89). However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make — oe Classification: na ‘Classified by 9) 3059 -
. - * Ssecton: | - (This form: is. to be used for material. extracted - “from ClA—controlled documents: ) oo this material available - to Commission representa- tives: and was not, able ‘to! state under. oath “precisely, the. point: in time at which ‘the Warren oo ‘on February 19, 1964 the CIA. responded to - | Rankia's s inguiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had “phoned the “Soviet Consulate and was. also interviewed at. the oo a Commission, first. learned of. these. operations. (rbia.) i "Consulate. However, the Agency a neither revealed. the. Source: “of this information in its response to. the. Commission | nor. indicated that ‘this. -source . would be revealed by other means. te. a by oral briefing). (ibid. ‘ay Warren Commission. Knowledge cel CIA telephonic Surveillance David: Slawson drafted a series. Of memoranda. which among other, issues ‘concerned Warren Commission know= | During the period | of March ~ April 1964, oo : 6 a oo 5 ledge of, ‘and access to the production material - derived from the[cra. telephonic. surveiilancs] operations in “Mexico city. A review of these memoranda. tends Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, and | ( to support the Committee’ s belief. ‘that ‘the Warren - 7 7 & 900950 “Classified d by derivation ~
; Classification: See L ° and. Wille Mialamnisctoobe assed Seca fttenconontc .-.  from,ClA—controlled documents. surveillance [naterials until. ‘April 9, 1964. On oo that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with o 2 Win, Scott,” the cIats Chief ‘of ‘Station in “Mexico | City, who provided them: with various. ‘transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps } of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/consulates. (Slawson | "Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to / an 7 Mexico > City pan) ‘Prior to April: 9, it appears doubtful that "the | Commission had been given even partial access ne "to the d material. - Nevertheless, by March 42, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren = - Comini sion. had at least become aware ‘that (the CIA | aia maintain telephonic surveittance [os the Cuban "© Enbassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives) . _ Slawson' s- memorandum of March i2. reveals that. the Warren Comission had learned that ‘the CIA possessed ‘tran 7 scripts of ‘conversations between the Cuban Ambassador ° to ‘Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban ‘President Dorticos.. The - Dorticos-Armas. conversations, requested by the Warren = Classification: _ 4 Classified by derivation:
SECRET ; Classification: ~ (This form is ‘to be ‘used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documepiteyMacihha. Commission representatives at. weet 5 with CIA officials, including Richard Helns,. concerned: Silvia t Duran" s arrest, land interrogation by. the” “Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of. oe ' April 22, 1964, ‘Bp. 3, 19, 45-46) ‘Helms “responded to the Commission' S request for access, stating that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren po Commission’ s. “representatives to review . this material. (Slawson, Memorandum of ‘March - 12; 1964, Be 6) ‘Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, oe 1964 concerned Oswald's trip. ‘to Mexico. In that. memo coe Slawson “wrote that. the tentative conclusions | he had réached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip, . were | derived from CIA ‘memoranda of January 31, i964 7 ane February 19, 1964, /(Slawson Memorandum of. March “95° 1964,, P+ 20) and, in addition, . a Mexican £ederal A large. part of it (the summary report)’. -is simply a summation of. what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated. Mrs. ‘Silvia. Duran, an employee of the Cuban: - Consulate in Mexico City, and is there- ' fore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran’ ‘Ss testimony to the police. (Ibid. _) ce toed a er ao LS we i, hn $! wo 5 vet “|. ‘Classified by. derivation:44 4
Classification: 7 "(This form i is to be used for material extracted | from ClA—controlled documents. ) These comments indicate that Slawson placed) qualified _xeliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, ‘there is. no “indication. that Slawson had: fh been provided the. puran [telephonic intercept eran “scripts. _ In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would - appear | that ‘the Warren, Commission, as of March 25, had been provided - little. substantive information pertaining to Silvia ‘Duran. As Slawson reveals, the Commission had been ‘forced to rely upon | the two memoranda. that did not make reference to the surveil- lance operations, and a - summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police. | Thus, the Agency had Tage a for over ‘three months: =e exposing ae ie: sas the surveillance operations te thefreview of the concernéd Warren Commission staff members. As was stated. in ‘the CIA cable of December. 20,. 1964 to its’ Mexico’ city: Station: pe Our present plan: in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of[ telephone ‘taps,Jin order to protect your continuing operations. Will ‘rely instead on statements of Silvia oe Duran and on contents of Soviet consular =. .... . -_ . file which Soviets gave[ ODACID ere. | : (CIA Doc. FOIA #420-757; Dec. 20, 1964, “CIA p. 2144, DIR 90466)
_ (This form: is to: ‘be used for material’ ‘extracted | from: ClA—controlled documents.) ‘The Committee ' s belief eee [telephonic indereegt 1 not been given access to the Duran‘transcripts is further supported by reference to his ‘memorandum a of March. 27, 1964- (cD, 692) wherein he states his” oe conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban oe Embassy on- three occasions. (Ibid, Pe 2) ‘This , conclusion, hé wrote, was. based. upon an analysis ‘of Silvia Duran" Ss "testimony before the Mexican police, This memorandum bears no indication that he had” "reviewed any of ‘the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, had. ‘Slawson been given access to. these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated “into his. analysis and accordingly noted for this | purpose. His. analysis would have reflected the fact | : of his. review either by its corroboration or criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report. Logically, access to the[cra's. telephonic - surveillance]production would have clarified some | % 6 ambiguities. _ For example, on September 27, at 4: ‘05 p.m. (Slawson. Memorandum: of April 21, 1964, “Subj: [svereoe)) Ena! from: Soviet and Cuban Embassies. in, Mexico, ty ro pd il : .: Classification:. i i Classified by derivation:
- stall. not been given. access to. the aboversef ren - Classification: : a) : Silvia. Doge aelerhened. ibe Gevitt Pubassus and. stated ‘that on af /ansoteds Sea"Bbbentry at the Cuban Embassy. requesting an. in-transit visit to ‘Cuba. . -This american was. later determined by CIA analysts to. be ‘Oswald. . Again on. | September 28, at il: 51 a. me " Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that. | i” an american, ‘subsequently, identified by CIA analysts, : as Oswald was. cat the Cuban. Embassy. (Ibid. p. 4) corroborating Se balad viSets fokha Croan Fn Had this’ information\been made available to. Slawson,— 7 his calculations of Oswald's activities ‘in Mexico OS city would have been more ‘firmly’ established than oe pericced jn aS meme tanden | : they were as*of March. 27, 1964. “the record supports ‘the ‘Committee! s. finding that. as: of April 2, 1964 the: Warren Commission | had _ ca ted enced ocr euisiz ss series[of telephonic intercene&™ yrs ff memorandum of that date by Coleman and» Slawson,” 7 oo posed one. question. to the (CIA and made two. requests for ‘information from the Agency. (Slawson | - Coleman Memorandum of April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions. Raised by the anbas@aoe Mann File) ‘Coleman and Slawson wrote: 1) What ‘is the information source referred to, in the November 28 telegram that D- tf ees co Classification: a oe ry ue a a I Classified by derivation: d