“TOP SECRET - NOFORN iP ® | SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN - SECRET. , OBE Alay as | erculAl HARING REPORT BY THE DO)/JCS REPRESENTATIVE OF _ THE CARIB 3EAN SURVEY -GROUP 10 the . . . JOINT CH:EFS OP STAFF — on PROCEDURES TO BE FOLL WED.IN HANDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT AND US INF )RMATION AGEN‘? KEQUFSTS FOR DOD SUPSORT IN CONNICTION WITH THE 2 °/LVZTIES OP THE CARIBB IAN SURVEY GROUP (5) 1. The DOD/JCS Representa vive of the Caribbean survey Group 1 recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff: - . — a. Note the contents o° Enclosure A and Enclosure B. b. Approve and forward Enclosure C, with Appendices, to the Secretary of Defense. 2 3 4 . 5 c. After approval of tie proposed procedures (Appendix 1 6 to Enclosure C) by the Se:retary of Defense, transmit 7 Enclosure D to the Chief xf Staff, US Army, Chief of Naval 8 Operations, Chief of Staf*, US Air Force and the Commandant 9 of the Marine Corps. a “10 EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DoD DIR 9260.19 DOBS NOT APPLY - “NO ne no eu SERRE . ~ EXCLUDED FROM GDS cy.._/_of 29 eapies TOP SECRET — NOFORN 7 SPECIAL HANDLING ~~ 1 Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - ‘ 20: February 196; eo : NW 47874 Doold:32276301 Page 183 —
NW 47874 TOP _SECRET-NOFORN . SPECIAL HANDLING _— a - ENCLOSURE A DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF . Subject: Procedure 1.0 be Followed in Handling Central In- , telligence Agency, State Department and US Inform- ation Agency Requests for DOD Support in Connec- tion with ihe Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group 1. The attached memorand:'n ‘for the Secretary of Defense recon- mends procedures to be foll: wed. for DOD support. of the operations of the Central: Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department and. US Information Agency (USIA’ in connection with the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group. Past experience indicates the need for. such procedures. 2. The recommended proce lures are based upen the results of a conference held with the De; uty Secretary of Defense on 30 January 1962 by the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG. 3. The procedures recomm-nded to the Secretary of Defense . will afford full DOD suppor’. to the operations of the CIA, the State Department and USIA ir. connection with the activities of - the CSG. At the’ same time, from the over-all point of view of the US Government, it will ;rotect the best interests of the DOD. 4. The procedures provid: for the submission in writing of requests for DOD support. by the CIA, the State Department and USIA to the: Secretary of De! ense, who will in turn refer the requests toé the DOD/JCS Rep) esentative on the CSG for evaluation. The pov/scs Representative sill secure the comments and recommend- ations of the Services and: “he Joint Chiefs of Staff and then forward the request with rec ommendations to the Secretary of Defense for decision. WILLIAM H. CRAIG Brig General, USA DOD/ JCS Representative Caribbean Survey Group TOP_SECRET-NOFORN an , _ SPECIAL HANDLING | 2 Enclosure A TOP SECRET NOFUn. SPECIAL HANDLING DocId: 32276301 - Page 184
sag de ENC .OSURE B MEMORANDUM FOR | RECORD subject: Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and his Rea:tion to Original Proposed Policy for CIA: Suprort by the. Department of Defense . of Caribbea aSurvey Group (30. January 1962) Mr. Gilpatric did not like this paper at all. He indicated the paper ‘was too negative and restricted ag though a policy towards an enemy like we are , dealing with the Germans or Italians, not a fellow cepartment of our Government. Tanis is a ‘ped line operation with the blessing of the President and approved by him as a most important | tak. This is probably. the most important. m. sseion we have - me) the government today. When a request. comes in from CIA, you (craig) ‘will evaluate. At and request the Joint chiefs o. Staff ror the ir evaluation and recommendations. The Secr :tary of Defense will determine, after considering the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what | the decision will be, not she Joint chiefs of Staff. This decision-is the prerogativ: of ‘the Secretary of Defense. We do not want to get involved in a case-by-case basis. We do not want individual actlons on eacn case. We do not want ‘masses of individual actions. This is a red line priority problem and must be handled with dispatch and without getting involved in minutia regarc ing expenses and reimbursement or other details. ‘Department of Defense may have to do it themselves regardless who foots the till. In some cases, CIA will be required to reimburse if :0 determined by the Secretary of ' Defense. This is a matter: which must be decided by the "Secretary of Defense - no: the Joint Chiefs of staff. The Department of Defense bud,ets for some CIA support. We have equipment of some. types liring around not being used and should not require reimbursement for this type, as 2a general rule. This must be decided by the Se:retary of Defense after considering an evaluation by the Services and the. Joint Chiefs of staff. TOP SECRET - a BOE ENDLANG SB _ Enclosure B NW 47674 Docld:32276301 .. Page 105
for geonan = worst TOP SECRET NOFURN There are some ascetoue rat PRNOLING without and should make these types available to the CIA without necessarily being reimbursed for it. Mr. Gilp atric does not object to the Joint Chiefs of Staff recomn2nding to the Secretary of " Defense what equipment shoul 4 be uséd for accomplishment of stated mission and specific srojects. TT explained to Mr. Gllpatric that we were not trying to obstruct the operation, that we read our message lovd and clear. I showed him Mr. Bob: Kennedy ' 5 L¥istructions _concerning which hs atated: "TO can't add anything to that." I discussed my rieeting with Mr. McNamara of last Saturday with Mr. Gilpatric. He indicated that Mr. McNamara had been _ “ préoecupied on the Hill and had not known of latest davelopments ‘on this project, that ne wo.ld inform him in regard to Mr. McNamara's apprehensions: as expressed to me last Saturday concerning security, number: in the Department of. Defense who  imew of the project, etc. br. Glipatric said I could inform ‘the people necessary ‘regarding the project in order to get the job done.. This was up 1o my judgment. Mr. Gilpatric made ‘it clear that I was the DOD Representative and he wanted me to make recommendations concert ing requests for CIA support. . I emphasized the urgert requirement that the Services and Chiefs should determine: the proper personnel: and equipment to be used for specific tas! since they were better qualified as to capability and limitation of their equipment and personnel than the CIA. In summary, Mr. Gilpairic recognized the need for the estab- ‘lishment of a policy on ‘this. subject. He was most. emphatic that the decision as to whether or not a request was approved was the prerogative of the hecretary of Defense NOT the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, «he. Secretary of Defense would like - . . oo \ to have: evaluations and reci. mnmendations of the Joint Chiefs of TOP SECRET - NOFORN . SPECIAL HANDLING ue Enclosure B | SPECIAL JANDLING HW 47674 DocId:32276301 Page 186
HW 47074 Docld: 32276301 - Page 187 ual aL Hannu NOFORN yp. SECRET is tHANDI Staff available for consider ition in making important. decisions on the subject. He consider2d the approach used in our original reconmendations mix A too negative and directed me to adopt a more positive approach in a new proposal. ’ WILLIAM H. CRAIG Brig. General, USA DOD/JCS Representative, 4 Caribbean, Survey Group - TOP SECRET - NOFORN SPECTAL HANDLING ~~ 5 . "Enclosure B 10 SECRET