13-00000 | . [1] UNCLASSIFIED 0 "SE OMLY [1] CON**DENTIAL [1 SECRET “ ~ ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) = the CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks 0/SA/DO/0 DATE 2D0109 1542 8 April 1977 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom INITIA . i . | receive | FORWARDED re whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) SA/D0/0 ¢ fy William We co 610 “imsse* (] secret [[] CONFIDENTIAL [[] [NTERNAL = F)_« UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 | | \ | F pot | pp/0_27-_3/9¢ * 8 April 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions and Certain Staffs FROM : SA/ D070 SUBJECT — : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John Dv Marks 1. Subject book was published in 1974 with 168 deleted items demanded by CIA and involved court trial and decision. The lawyer for the authors has, in effect, requested that a review be made of the 168 deleted items to determine which can now be declassified and removed from the court's injunction, particularly in view of the official disclosures since the publication of the book. The Department of. Justice has advised that such a review is in order. 2. Since. the courts decided the 168 deleted items were properly classifiable and classified in accordance with the appropriate Executive Order in effect at the time of the initial classification, including Executive Order 11652, the review at this time must include two points: (a) Is the item still classified under Executive Order 11652, (b) Has the item been placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States, such as by an official in the Executive Branch authorized to declassify the item, or by a report of a Congressional committee, or by. the courts. 3. Each addressee is requested to appoint a focal point officer to review each component's respective items which are held by this office. This office also has the DDO documentation submitted in support of deleting each item in 1973. These can be reviewed by each focal point official as necessary.
13-00000 a "your focal poin A review will also be needed of those items which may have been cleared or released by CIA when reviewing manuscripts submitted by other authors ‘since the publication of the Marchetti book. A few items will need to be referred by some of the components to other departments and agencies of government for their review. 4. Please advise this office of the name of 0/SA/DO/03 1542) Distribution DDO - C/EA - C/EUR - C/LA - C/FR - C/NE - C/AF C/SE - C/DCD - C/SIA info only - C/PCS " 't - C/CI " tt - SA/DO/0 o>) ow pus ite) mM _ i ee i)
13-00000 - SUBJECT: Review of Déletions from Marchetti Book for Declassification - Request for Documents. 1. In order to po Tomst de from the Marchetti book, The Cult of Intelligence, must determine if any official of the U.S. Government placed any of the classified material in the public domain in open testimony before a Congressional Committee . The following material or information is required: a. Is there any index to public statements by senior government officials on the subject of intelligence? Is there any index to the Pike Committee or Church Committee testimony ? b.| would like to have copies of the open testimony before a Congressional committee by senior officials of the CIA; NSA, State Dept, Dept of Defense, _ FBI, which deals with intelligence, c. Any open testimony before Congressional committees by senior _U.S. officials dealing with the cutoff of AID during the Cyprus disturbances. , d. Any testimony (open) concerning American POWs (MIA) in Vietnam and CIA's method of communication with them.
13-00000 Hussein c King Hussein had for years taken secret payments from the CIA, NEWSWHEK’S Arnaud de Borchgrave flew to Amman’ ‘last week for an exclusive inter viene (oink : the King. The result was what Hu sein called “my first and very last words?” on The Washington Post’s revelation of the payments and their possible impact on chances for peace in-the Middle Last. Some excerpts: ‘DE BORCHGRAVE: How much truth is there in. the story that appeared in The Wash- ington Post? HUSSEIN: The whole thing is ridiew- Jous and insulting. But Lam prepared to answer questions about it. Q. Your government spokesman said the | story was a combination of “fabrication and distortion.” What has been fabricated: and what has been distorted? . ‘A. What was fabricated in the story was everything about funds handed over per- sonally for private benefit. When friend- ly Arab countries extend aid, it has been traditional for the checks to he made out’ to, the Head of State, which then are deposited‘ in the state budget account. This is not an uncommon practice. ‘All assistance received by us is handled in the same way. What is trne is that fora number of years, we have been offered security and intelligence assistance, which the government of Jordan acce'pt- ed gratefully. As for the story that the CIA paid for. the protection of my children at school. in America, my request was made to the State Department which kindly agreed to ensure their security. Re snember that there have heen many extremist plots against me and ny family and this was a perfectly normal request. Tf Amy Carter decided to come to school in Jordan, we would, needless to say,.be responsi- ble for her sectrity and would not be. sending a bill to the U.S. Gavernment for an elementary courtesy and’ security measure. a. How do you feel about President Carter ordering the arrangement—code- “named “No Beef” stopped? A. We had, T promise you, never he ard anything about all this before. H the teference is to the assistance we have been receiving for security and intelli- gence, then TP have not been advised about its suspension, either offic: ally or unofficially. Q. The Intelligence Oversight Board set up in February 1976 reported to President Ford'a few months later that they regarded the pay- ments as improper and he did nothing about 't. What do you feei was improper about those jyayments? A. What is a proper way to support a friend and ally is strictly your busine ‘SS. Newsweek, March 7, 1977 - Follow: ing the disclosure that Jordan’ s. His CIA Money > “The subic ci never came up hefore and L was totally anaware that this as stanee to Jordan had come into question last - year, What is proper in some minds is’. apparently improper in others. As far as-] am concerned, anything T can get for Jordarm and my pénple is proper. And _ five of your Presidénts [Eisenhow- ° ‘er, Kennedy,. Johnson, Nixon, thought so, too. _Q. Since you say the assistance was proper . and just another form of U.S. aid, why, then, the ecreey ‘and method of payment? : A. [f you mean the report that pave. ments were made directl to the King. ‘and for his [personal] benefit and with political conditions and obligations, this. Ford |) | /futtel« oled against us. It was hardly coinciden- tal that-these ‘attacks wore made as the ‘peace offensive was preking up steam tand on the very das that Secretary _ Vance arrived in Amman. It is obvious to me that those who wish to sabotage the peace process—and help Israel stay put in the occupied  territories—are even willing to engage in character assassination of persons whose dearest wish is for a just and durable peace. Q. Who: benefits? “A. Two quarters: One, in your own country, that has been trying to under- mine one of, your key institutions .en-. gaged in a-worldwide struggle to try to neutralize the actioris of the KGB in its efforts to promote Communism. The oth- er isa powerful group that is not interest- ed ina settlement and which also-feels it has'a score to settle with Jordan. Don't Alexandra de Borcherave-—Gamma-ldaison Choice of targets: Jordan’s King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range is a complete: fabrication. The assistance was designed. only to enhance our in- telligence and security capabilities period. ' To ous, the CIA is a part of the U.S. Government. We have sought to acquire know-how, equipmentand new capabili- ties to defend ourselves in the face of a. worldwide battle. be it hat orcald, which is still with us. And wherever there i isan ‘identity of interests between our fwo! countries, PT will Continue to advocate freittnl and mutual coope ration. a. What do you feel was the princip: cu motivation of those [sources | who contribut- : ed fo the Washington Post story? A. Vo ‘undermine the credibility au! integrity of those who are able and willing to contribute to the forces of peace: My people knew me and fF know them and these attacks are futile in _ terms of the | Jordanian scenc. We are. stronger than anything that can be lev Newsweek, March 7, 1977 | forget it was the Israchi lobby that launched the campaign to. block “the Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense sys- tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby * failed. Q. How much of a setback do you feel the story has been to the peace-with-Israel campaign? A. t fervently hope. of course, that it will not be asetback. Admittedly, it may ‘have a deleterious effect on our peace offorts, but T plan to persevere regard- le'ss of attempts to sabotage a just and durable peace. Q. What, for example, do you feel the story will de to your differences with the PLO and _ attempts io form a joint delegation for the .Geneva talks? Is. a joint delegation still a realistic possibility? A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this week and the whole question of a joint delegation is still very much in question, The d nian ¢ was € begul can hb thing few n tion o Q. |: ready | coexis Gaza: A.” But it the I: the P There ee Pales recog Qi PLOE tween Bank A leade struc ly p But [ misir confe if it then letda back fore. Q.. affect ed Sti A. ‘been of -tk frien your our resp yone relat deer jecti in. th M ham rity ; trem road perc Was beuw rece sam. ple» un ¢ very sons my free OF agai you ther not
13- 00000 aN™ aes ' ve -vear. What is proper His CIA Money | “ ny he sebject never came up before and 7 was totally unaware that this assistance to Jordan had come into question hast apparently improper in others. As far as‘Tam concerned, anything [can Hel for Jordan and my péople is proper And five of your Presidents [Eisenhow- ro Ford} ‘er, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, thought so, too. a - _ Q. Since you say the assistance was proper” and just another form of U.S. aid, why, then,’ the secrecy.and method of payrnent? A. If you mean the report that pay- ments were made directly te the King and ‘for his [personal] benefit and with political conditions and obligations, this _ in SOE minds: is. oled against us. twas bardly coinciden- tal that. these ‘attacks «ore made as the peace offensive was picking up steam and on the very das that Secretary Vance arrived in Amun. It is obvious to me that these who wish to sabotage the peace process—and help Israel stay put in’ the oceupicd  territories—are even willing to engage in character assassination of persons whose dearest wish is for a just and durable peace. Q. Who - benefits? ; ‘A. Two quarters: One, in your own country, that has been trying to under mine one of. your key institutions cn- gaged in a worldwide struggle to try to neutralize the actions of the KGB in its efforts to promote Communism. The oth- erisa powerful group that is not interest- ed in'a settlement and which also-feels it has-a score to settle with Jordan. Don't Alexandra de Borchgrave—Gamma-Liaison Choice of targets: Jordan’s King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range is a complete- fabrication. The assistance was designed. only to enhance our in- telligence and security capabilities period. ‘ “ To us, the CIA is a part of the UlS. Governments We have sought to acquire know-how, equipmentand new capabili- ties to defend ourselves jin the: face ofa worldw ide hattle. be it het orcold, whic i js still with us. And wherever there is an ‘identity of interests between our tyo' I will continue to advocate’ countries, fruitful and mut al cooperation. a. What do you feel was the principal motivation of those [sources | who contribut- ed to the Washington Post story? A. To ‘undermine the credibility aie! integrity of these who are able’ and. willing to contribute to the forces ul peace: My people know me and 1 know them and these attacks are futile in -terms of the Jordanian scene. We are stronger than anything that can be lev- Newsweek; March 7, 1977. durable peace. forget it was the Israeli lobby that launched the campaign to, block “the Hawk.-anti-aircraft missile defense sys- tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby failed. ; Q. How much of a setback do you feel the story has been to the peace-with- israel campaign? A. LU fervently hope. of course, that it will not be a setback. Adbnittedly, it may ‘have a deleterious effect on our peace efforts, but [plan to persevere regard- le'ss of attempts to sabotage a just and Qa. What, for example, do you feel the story will do to your differences with the PLO and attempts io form a joint delegation for the Geneva talks? Is. a joint delegation still a realistic possibility? A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this week and the whole question of a joint delegation is still very much in question. yy teres AG ed MERE Che dialogue [fnterfy niam civil wa'in 1OTC, ed by the Jorda- when tae PLO cwas driven dat of Amman] has barely begun. Yo what degree political action can be coordinated av ong us ifsome- thing we will be expio:ing aver the next few mouths. And the . hole Arab. posi- tion on this problem: < vet ta crystallize. Q. fs it your impression that the PLO is now ready to amend its basic charter and agree to coexist peacefully with Israel in a West Bank- Gaza state? © A. This is the decision they must face. But it is equally important to know what the Isracli position will be. Why should the PLO take such a step unilaterally? There must be a degree of simultane- ity—Tsracl recognizes a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state and the Palestinians recognize Israel. . Q. Is it your intention to negotiate with the PLO prior to Geneva a new organic link be- tween a possible Palestinian state on the West Bank and Jordan proper? : A. This has been suggested hy many leaders in the area as a possible con- structive development and we certain- ly plan to explore the possibilities. But I must caution vou against overopti- mism. The. resumption of the Geneva conference by itself means nething and if it doesn’t produce quick results .. then sthere will be the danyer of a letdown, of the pendulum swinging back and the extremists coming to the fore again. 'Q. How do you think the latest CIA story will affect relations between Jordan and the Unit- ed States? A. Throughout all these years I have ‘been very proud of the growing strength of the relationship with our American friends. We identified with principles your forefathers held dear. We built cour relations on the basis of mutual respect, confidence and faith, and be- yond that anything 1 did 10 cement relations with the U.S. was based on-a deep conviction about our common ob- jectives—stability, peace. and progress in.the Middle East. My duty is to develop my country, its human resources, armed forces and secu- rity and iitelligence services, to face the tremendous threats that lie ahead. The road is strewn with mines to sabotage the peace process. One has just exploded in Washington. There will be others. But bear in mind that Jordan is not unique in receiving such help. Isracl falls into the same category and is a far greater oxam- ple of all kinds of assistance. As faras T Jam concerned, these will be ny first and very last words on that matter. My per sonal pr ide is a very touchy subject. And my main concern is to preserve Jordan in freedom. Finally, regarding your media attacks against a branch of yeur government, if ° you choose to denude a vital arm that i is there to protect you, that is vour affair, not Jordan’s.
13-00000 | WQNiNG NOTICE oo SENSITIV:: INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ; a Ati METHODS INVOLVED SEGCR Bs ‘SECRET 21 April 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA FROM > oM,. L.. Latta Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group Central Cover Staff SUBJECT : Fairways Corporation 1. Per our telephone conversation ‘today, attorneys | for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168 ‘items previously. deleted by court order from the book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora- tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in . this connection. 2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items (107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respec- tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on all four items is that they are still classified, since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S., and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652. 3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair- ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was cansidered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when . Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair- ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure. E2 IMPDET CL BY 026089
13-00000 SECRET 4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may have been placed in the public domain since the court order (i. €., since February 1975). 5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/0.. For your information, Room 6 D 0120, red line x9588, is preparing an overal response on the subject for the SA/DO/0. _. SECRET
13-00000 ® Ship 228 Pick arn y he apt, Gophecly (apn AT nome Rate
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13-00000 [) UNCLASSIFIED © (INTERNAL, | Cl conripentiaL =]. SECRET a? * ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET _ SUBJECT: . (Optional) DATE ; 21 April 1977 , DATE _ OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom: ; INITIALS to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.} RECEIVED | FORWARDED . : ‘FROM: Acting Chief, Latin America Division TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) _’ SA/DO/0 wd om 610 “iste (] secret ([] CONFIDENTIAL [[] [MTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 SEC RE T 22 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0O FROM 3 | cting let, Latin America Division SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks REFERENCE . : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 The following are the LA Division comments on the review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book. Item 1, page 11, Chile Classified. Dept. of State/INR Item 3a, page ll, Chile Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume. 7, Covert Action Item 3b, page 11, Chile Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 4, page 12, Chile Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action - Item 5, page 12, Chile Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action 'Item 11, page 15, Chile Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders E2 IMPDET CL BY 012180 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Item 29, page 49, Guyana Classified. Executive Order. exemption 5 (B) 3 Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, . Volume 7, Covert Action Item 89, page 106, to cuba > (39 Declassified. 7 Senate Select (72) Committee Interim footnote ty on Alleged Assassination Plots : Involving Foreign Leaders Item 201, page 222, Brazil Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2 | Item. 261, page 338, Panama Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI Item 292, page 420, Chile Declassitied. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 307, page. see, Cuba 139 ff. Declassified. Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Aileged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders Item 317, page 468, Chile Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Ttem 318, pages 469, 470, Chile Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There is no record that the intelligence report on which this item was based has been declassified. Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico Classified. Executive order | exemption 5 (B) (2) There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case. 2 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Item 338, page 508, Chile | '. Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile 1963--1973)}, pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action 3 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 22 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0 FROM 2 | — = Acting Chief, Latin America Division SUBJECT > The CIA and the cuit of Intelligence REFERENCE : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 The following are the LA Division comments on the review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book. Item 1, page 11, Chile Glassified. Dept. of State/INR Item 3a, page 11, Chile Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 3b, page 11, Chile ~ . BecTassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Seleet Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action | Item 4, page 12, Chile ec assified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 5, page 12, Chile Deciassified. Pages 10S, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 11, page 15, Chile Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders E2 IMPDET CL BY 012180 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Item 29, page 49, Guyana... CTassified. Executive Order. exemption § (B) 3 Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile Declassified. Pages 148, 165,. "166, 171 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume. 7, Covert Action . Item 89, page 106, Cuba eclassified. = Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders , Item 201, page 222, Brazil . ass ed. Executive Order exemption 5 (B). 2 Item 261, page 338, Panama . assified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI Item 292, page 420, Chile _.. eclassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 307, page af, Cuba eclassi fied. Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Ableged "Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders Item 317, page 468, Chile. Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile . ass ed. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There is no record that the intelligence report on which this item was based has been declassified. Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico | Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (Z) There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Item 338, page §08, Chile . Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile 1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action SECRET
“4 TO: (Office? designation, room number, and []_UNCLASSIFIED eee [] CONFIDENTIAL == [LA SECRET — | ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) EXTENSION GH-56 Has. 5407 21 APRIO77.— DA E OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom . ~ INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column ofter each comment.) RECEIVED FORWARDED Building) HAND CARRY CALL 5. C/LA 3 C 2019 Has. _ '  §A/DO/O | 2D 0109 Has. 13. ¢ CCCCPON RDEDSD Ne [] SECRET [-] CONFIDENTIAL (] se omy | CJ UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 WARNING NOTICE “ff 2 IMPDET . SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES - CL BY 026089 AND METHODS INVOLVED 02) 91 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0 FROM : | ; Chief, Central Cover Staff SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence y Victor Marchetti an ohn arks © REFERENCE .  : ‘Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs, fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject 1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its. files and effected coordination with interested components on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review. Results are described below. . 2. It has been determined that the following items continue to be classified under E.0. 11652, and are exempt from the E.0. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations in brackets: a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources: and methods of oper- ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)]- b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources — and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division con- firms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. c. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] AF-Bivister advises that . CA S fa pene YO ete rete SECRET}
13-00000 SECRET; ‘the African American Institute, which published Africa Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, g. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be con- sidered official Government disclosure of. Agency, sponsor- ship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. e. Item 48, page 7la -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET; describes. intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine. publications. [Section 5(B)(2).] | NOTE: CA Staf£ confirms the need for. continued classification and will comment separately. f. Item 48, page 7la -- ENCOUNTER. Classified - SECRET;. describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section .5(B)(2)] NOTE: .CA Staff confirms the need for. con- tinued classification and will comment ‘separately. g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET; . describes intelligence sources and methods as related: to.several magazine publications. [Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi- cation and will comment separately. h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of. operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica- tion and will comment separately. i. Item 51, page 72 .-- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5@) (2).] . j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources: and methods of opera- tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)] k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of opera- tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)] -2-
13-00000 SECREF 1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively -- FATRWAYS CORPORATION. Classified SECRET; describe: intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility. located in the U.S.. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency: proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but | there are indications that the DCI may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been con- strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. However, CCS. files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air Advisor confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. m. Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria. [Section 5(B) (2) ] n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section 5 (B) (2)] o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com- mercial company. [Section 5(B)(2)] . Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL’ CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)". ‘Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods exposing an operation. which provided cover. [Section 5(B)(2)] q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)] ~3—
13-00000 oA - 3. The. following items were heretofore classified SECRET because they described sources and methods in identifying a support base located in the United States, but are now con- sidered to. have been placed in the public domain. Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 -- INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9, and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218. 4. The following items fall into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorized Government officials: a. Item 49, page 7la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several newspaper. publications. - However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the ' Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA*s Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the © CIA, [Bross] recently called the arrangement ‘atypical’ of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is ~ questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered as constituting official Agency disclosure of this © information. b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe intelligence sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Featur referred to -- but not by name ---in Book T of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout". involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main- tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed to. by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two : ~4- SECRET,
13-00000 press services." It may be argued that although Forum ‘World Features continues to be protected to a degree cc: by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis- closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and will © comment. separately. C/AF C/EUR C/LA C/NE C/CA CONCUR: 1é 3 1Visio _ Date i | | a2. Apa 77 ce def, EUR Division _ Date te, Vee PE Date fpr€ 2.2.,/977 JPR AE Division . Date ; —> at/
13-00000 “SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES £1 APRIS77 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O FROM : | Chief, Central Cover Staff SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult. of intellige ence . y shett Marks REFERENCE : Memo fer All Div and Cextain Staffs, fr SA/DO/0, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject 1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its files and effected coordination with interested component s on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review. Results are descttbed below. z. It has been determined that the following items continue to be classified under H.O. 11652, and are exempt from the 5.0, General Declassification Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations in brackets: a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of oper- ations based in Jordan. [Section 5§(B)(2), (BST b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VERSIN, Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Seetion 5(B)(2)] NOTH: BUR Division con- firms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. Noe CCS record. ¢, Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM. ; Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. d. Item 48, page 7ia -- AFRICA REPORT. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and metheds as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2)}] AFP-Bivieion—-advises that CAPS So. EZ IMPDET ae UN CL BY 026089 SECRET; avo METHODS sNVOLVED
13-00000 fhe African American Institute, which published Africa Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for the list the book The invisible. Government, by Wise and Ross, pp. 247n-248n. * €: on should: not be con- sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor- ship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. 6. Item 48, page 7la -- PREUVES. Classified SBCRET; describes intelligence sources and metho#s as related to se@etal magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)]) NOTE: CA Staff confirms the rieed for continued classification and will comment separately. £. (Item 48, page 7la --  BNCOUNTER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine pubBications. [Section 5(B)(2)]. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con- tinued classification and will comment separately. g. Item 48, page 7le -- FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related tosseveral magazine publications. [Section 5$(B)(2)] NOTH: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi- cation and will comment separately. h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: 3 R Division confirms the need for continued classifica- tion and will comment separately. i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and “yi of operations based in Hurepe. [Section 5(B) 2 j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of opera- tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)] k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of opera~ tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2) -2-
13-00000 1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages (123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively -- PAIRWAYS CORPORATION. Classified SECRET; describe: intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are wn¢lear on the point, but there are indications that the DCI may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been con- strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. — However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship of .Fairways was considered still czassified as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air Advisor confirms the need for continued elassifigation and will comment separately. m, Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET ; describes intelligence sources and methods of operatfoms based in Nigeria. [Section 5(B)(2)] n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAPART AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Rast Africa. [Section 5(B) (3)] o. Item 226, page 257 «= GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a@ cover arrangement with a com- mercial company. [Section §(B)(2)] p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRBSPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover company which sold high s¢hool equivalency diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match boolis)" Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods exposing an operation which provided cover. {Section $(B)(2)] q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section §(B) (2) } -%-
13-00000 3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET because they destribed sourcés and methods in identifying a Support base located in &%he United States, but are now ¢con- sidered to have beenpplaced in the public domain. Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129,and 130 -- INTERMOUNTAIN " AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9, and in’the Report of the Rockefeller .Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218. 4. The follewing itens fait into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorized Governnent officials: Item 49, page 7la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several newspaper publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the ‘Goluabis Journalist Review which states, "Landon K. ress, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, * chen a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine,. and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement ‘atypical' of what the Agency was doing, ‘a bad example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered 2 ‘agenconstituting official Agency disclosure of this information. b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM WORLD FRATURBS. Classified SECRET because they describe intelligence sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to -- but not by name -- in Book 1 of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] “*fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main- tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed to by over 30 U.S, newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two -d-
13-00000 SECRET} press services." It may be argued that although Forum World Peatures continues to be protected to a degrée- by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis- closure 6 newspaper editors, if it in fact took place and depending on how it was handled, prgced the subject in the publi¢ domain. NOTE: EUR. Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and will comment separately. ec: C/AF C/EUR. ~C/LA C/NE C/CA CONCUR: thief, AF Bivision . Bate Chief, EUR Division Date thief, LA Division Date Chief, NE Division 7 Date er, ta Date —_ SECRET
13-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0O~ FROM | cting 1éf, Latin America Division . SUBJECT. ~=:+~=The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D.. Marks REFERENCE : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 The following are.the LA Division comments on the_ review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.. Item 1, page 11, Chile Classified. Dept. of State/INR. Item 3a, page 11, Chile Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action . . - Item 3b, page 11, Chile Declassified. Pages 105, i90 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 4, page 12, Chile Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 5, page 12, Chile Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 11, page 15, Chile Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders E2 IMPDET CL BY 012180 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Item 29, page 49, Guyana Classified. ‘Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3 Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7; Covert Action - Item 89, page 106, Cuba . . Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select ‘Committee Interim Report on Alleged. Assassination Plots . Involving Foreign Leaders Item 201, page 222, Brazil Classified. “Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2 Item 261, page 338, Panama - Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI - Item 292, page 420, Chile Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action Item 307, page 468, Cuba : Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders Ttem 317, page 468, Chile Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action © Item 318, pages. 469, 470, Chile , Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There is no record that the intelligence report on which this item was based has been declassified. Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico . Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2) There has never been official acknowledgement by either the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case. 2 SECRET.
13-00000 SECRET -Item 338, page 508, Chile Declassified. Appendix A (Covert. Action in Chile 1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action SECRET
13-00000 SECRET} MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0O FROM . . CHIéE, Central Cover aff SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks _ REFERENCE ob Memo for ‘All Div and Certain Staffs, fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same fs) ot 1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its files and effected coordination with interested components on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review. Results are described below. 2. It has been determined that the following items continue to be classified under E.0. 11652, and are exempt from the E.0O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated by paragraph citations in brackets: . a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of oper- . ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)]. b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN. “Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2}] NOTE: EUR Division con- firms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. c. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. No CCS record. d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publica- tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] AF Division advises that E2 IMPDET OURCES CL BY 026089
SECRET) the African American Institute, which published Africa ‘Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This Citation should not be con- Sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor- ship of the Institute.’ NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. e. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. £. Item 48, page 71a -- ENCOUNTER. Classified _ SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section .5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con- tinued classification and will comment separately. g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as related to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi- cation and will comment separately. h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of — operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica- , tion and will comment separately. i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B) (2)] j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of opera- tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)] k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of opera- tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]
1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively -- FATRWAYS CORPORATION. Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that the DCI may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been con- strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air Advisor confirms the need for continued classification and will comment separately. m. Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES (NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria. [Section 5 (B) (2)] n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section 5 (B) (2) ] o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com- mercial company. [Section 5 (B) (2)] . Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)". Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods exposing an operation which provided cover. {Section 5(B)(2)] q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods which expose an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2) ]
13-00000 3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET because they described sources and methods in identifying a support base located in the United States, but are now con- . sidered to have been placed in the public domain. Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 -- | INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION; INC. Intermountain Aviation, Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9, ‘and in the Report. of the Rockefeller Commission on. CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218. 4. The. following items fall into the questionable area as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by authorized Government officials: a. Item 49, page 7la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN. Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence _ sources and methods as related to several newspaper publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the | Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement "atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'’.” It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in'1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered . aS constituting official Agency disclosure of this information. b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe — intelligence sources and methods and identification of operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to -- but not by name -- in Book [ of the Senate Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: . "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] ‘fallout’ involved two. proprietary news services that the CIA main- tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two
press services." It may be argued that although Forum World Features continues to be protected to a degree by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis- closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place ‘and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject. ‘comment separately. ' in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff confirm the need for continued classification and will -ce: C/AF C/EUR C/LA C/NE C/CA ‘CONCUR: Chief, AF Division —— Date Chief, EUR Division ; Date Chier, LA Division Date | Chief, NE Division Date nier, ta | Date
13-00000 CI) uNtiassiFic> =|] RTERNAL [1] CONFIDENTIAL [1] SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) BATE FROM: EXTENSION 6343 1602 22 April 1977 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom . | receiven | rorwanoe | INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED | FORWARDED | 1. My, ys 2 He |W 3. C/SIA 9,2 APR 1977 A 7. 5 SA/DDO/O 2D0109 Has. ser 610 “tomexs* ([] SECRET ([[] CONFIDENTIAL ([] |MTERNAL = 7) UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 SECRET: 22 April 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities FROM ief, SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from Mr. Fendig, same subject 1... This office has reviewed the five items concerning Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has determined that all items are still not releasable for the following reasons: . a. Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon Weimar, the CIA's Liaison contact in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified "SECRET" under Executive Order (E.0.) 11652, Section - 5(B) (2) (intelligence sources and methods). b. Item 197, page 218: This item is still classified "SECRET" under E.0. 11652, Section 5 _(B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2). © c. Item 198 age 219: This item is still classified "TOP SECRET” under E.0. 11652, Section 5 (B) (2). d. Item 224, page 252: This item is still | classified "TOP SECRET” under E.0. 11652, Section 5 (B) (2). E2 IMPDET CL BY 059748 SECRET
13-00000 e. Item 256 age 329: This item is still classified "SECRET" under E.0O. 11652, Section 5 (B)(1) and (2). 2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be directed t{ | SIA/T, extension 1602.
13-00000 SECRET 22 Ap¥il 1977 . ee MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities FROM , 2 | | Chief, | | SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intel1i ence by Victor Marchetti? and ; REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from Mr. Fendig, game subject 1. This office has reviewed the five items concerning Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has determined that all items are still not releasable for the following reasons: a. Item 182. page 196: According to Mr. Vernon Weimer, fiiaison contact in the Federal — Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified "SECRET" under Executive Order (£.0.) 11652, Section $(B)(2) (intelligence sources and methods). the b. Item 197 pa e 218: This item is still classifie 1.0,. 11652, Section 5 under (B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2). ce. Item 198, page 219: This item is still . dy Iter elassifted (B) (2). E2 IMPDET CL BY 059748
13-00000 SECRET “~~ 9 ——“ hee S56, page $291 This item ts still ~~~ classified "SECRET" under £.0. 11652, Section § (B) (1) and (2). 2. An . garding this memorandum should be directed to SIA/1I, extension 1602. =2- SECRET
13-00000 th , SA/DO/O C] UNCLASSIFIED «== []_ INTERNAL (CONFIDENTIAL [1 SECRET ne ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) 2 Addendum to LA Division Memorandum dtd 22 April 1977 OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom . ENITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) EXTENSION \ Acting Chief Latin America Division TO: - (Officer designation, room number, and : DATE building) : . RECEIVED | FORWARDED . ? rom 610 “Ee [] SECRET [[] CONFIDENTIAL [] INTERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED USE ONLY
13-00000 SECRET 26 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O FROM : | Acting Chief, Latin America Division SUBJECT : Addendum to LA Division Memorandum Dated 22 April 1977 1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State, INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and item 337 page 509 are still classified. 2. Item .9 page 14, Chile According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry' through line 29 continue to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee" — through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170, 190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action. 3. Item 10 page 15 Chile Line 1 through "his nominal superior" and line 2 beginning 'Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through 11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action. 4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified. ey er ree SECRET
13-00000 ses acini SECRET Fa 2§ APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0O FROM : | | _ cting ief, Latin America Division SUBJECT ' +: Addendum to LA Division Memorandum Dated 22 April 1977... . 1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State, INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and item 337 page 509 are still classified. ‘2. %Item /9 page 14, Chile According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry" through line 29 continue to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee” through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170, 190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action. 3. Item 10 page 15 Chile Line 1 through "his nominal superior" and line 2 beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through 11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action. 4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T. Kelly, Director, intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified. SECRET
13-00000 “a ' c® oem, FS [] UNCLASSIFIED =]. {ATERNAL [] CONFIDENTIAL = [-] SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) Marchetti-Marks Manuscript C/CAS DATE / 25 April 1977 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment fo show from whom | receven | rorwaoeo | INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) . FORWARDED u ° . e - SA/DO/O fom 610 SME [] SECRET [[] CONFIDENTIAL [[] INTERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED
@% APR 87’ SECRET, ur Ys as MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O . 7 Chief, Covert Action Staff SUBJECT: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks REFERENCE: Memo for All Divisions and Certain Staffs, from SA/DO/O, 8 April 1977, same subject Following are Covert Action Staff comments on items 24, 48, 54, 55, 56, 236, and 280, which are among the passages containing classified information that were de- leted before publication of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript: a) Items 24 (p. 47), 55 (p. 80), 56 (p. 81), and 280 (p. 404) are classified secret, and are exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of EQ 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods of operation. Specifically, these items name RTV, Inc. and describe it as a CIA proprietary. that was used for clandestine operations in a variety of countries. In addition, items 55 and 56 are especially sensitive because they describe an opera- tion in Jordan, exposure of which could be harmful to United States relations in the Middle East ( Section 5 b 3). b) Items 54 and 236 (on p. 80 and p. 262) are classified secret, and are exempt from publication — under Section 6) (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods of operation. These items name Forum World Features, describe it as a CIA proprietary that was used for clandestine propaganda operations, specify that the clandestine operations were directed especially at the Third World, and further specify that the man who ran FWF was an experienced CIA operator. It may be worth noting that the Senate Select Committee declined to publish the name of this clandestine proprietary when the Agency advised the Committee that publication would damage the former director of Forum World Features, who had entered into a clandestine relationship with the U.S. Government in good faith.
13-00000 epee c) Item 48 (p. 7la) is classified secret, and is exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and methods. of operation. This item names African Forum, Africa Report, Preuves, Encounter, and Forum as magazines that received CIA subsidies. In the case of Preuves, Encounter, and Forum, these magazines were published by the former Congress for Cultural Freedom. The Government has not acknowledged covertédy subsidizing CCF or its magazines, although Encounter magazine's ties to CIA have been the subject of press speculation. Preuves magazine has been the subject of little or no press speculation, as far as we know, and it is our understanding that French laws prohibit covert foreign subsidies to French publications, which makes it especially important to protect the former CIA tie to that magazine. Exposure of the two Africa magazines would be damaging to a number of prominent people and organizations in this country and in Africa that have worked for improved social conditions in Africa and for good relations between this country and Africa, which would be harmful to this country's relations with Africa. (Section 5 b 3)
13-00000 | CJ. UNCLASSIFIED =] egal. (] CONFIDENTIAL [1] SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) ~ oN APR 1977 | TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE ; building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom INITIALS te whom. Draw a fine across column after each comment.) RECEIVED FORWARDED 1, $A/D0/0 ac. 4 Me] | _ rome 610 “EEN ] SECRET © [[] CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL =} UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight FROM:. | | Chief, European Division SUBJECT: Marks-Marchetti Manuscript: Review of Deletions 1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the original manuscript because of the Agency position they were classified information. We can find only one instance in which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has placed any of these references in the public domain since first publication of the book. The specific references are listed below, together with the grounds. for classification and the components who have been consulted.. 2. References which European Division believes are still classified and should remain so are: -E.O. 11652 -Name/Cite #/Page - Exemption Category Coordination Alex Springer (#50, p 72) : 5 (b) 2 EUR/G Rome Daily American (#49, | p 7la) . 5 (b) 2 . ccS, EUR/Italy Magazines: Preuves, Forum | (#48, p 71a) — 5 (b) 2 CA Encounter (#48, p 7la) _ _ See note Forum World Features (#54, #256, p 80, p 262) 5 (6) 2 CA, EUR/BC : t E2 IMPDET | CL BY 003283 |
13-00000 SECRET E.O. 11652 Name/Cite # /Page Exemption Category Coordination LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336,. p 483-4) 5 (b) 3 CA Bases in Germany (#234, ; p 262) 5 (b) 3 EUR/G, CCS Release of. Satellite photos to British (#62, p 86) 5 (b) 2 EUR/BC Liaison relations CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7, p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437) 5 (b) 2 EUR/BC Liaison, others (#196, 225, 333, p 217, 253, 483) 5 (b) 2 AF MAKARIOS, Base rental deal (#296, 298, 300 p 425, 426) 5 (b) 1 EUR/CGT Political subsidies: SPD, CDU, Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380) 5 (b) 3 ' EUR/Italy Willy Brandt (#18 .-20, 28, 52, 5 (b) 2 EUR/G p 42-45, 48, 77) were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural hyp | | veh 4 NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds faked Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act. Ne SECRET
13-00000 boii l uv 25 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight FROM: | 7 ief, European Division SUBJECT: Marks-Marchetti Manuscript: Review of Deletions "4. As requested, the European Division has reviewed the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the original manuscript because of the Agency position they were Classified information. We can find only one instance in which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has placed any of these references in the public domain since first publication of the book. The snecific references are listed below, together with the grounds for classification and the components who have been consulted. 2. References which European Division believes are ‘still classified and should remain so are: | ; E.0. 11652 Name/Cite #/Page Exemption Category Coordination Alex Springer (#50, p 72) 5 (b) 2 EUR/G Rome Daily American (#49, p 71a) 5 (b) 27 CCS, EUR/Italy - Magazines: Preuves, Forum (#48, p 71a) 5 (b) 2 . CA Encounter (#48, p 7ia) , See note | Forum World Features (#54, #256, p 80, p 262) 5 (b) 2 CA, EUR/BC E2 IMPDET CL By 003283 SECRET
13-00000 Bs Cc we, cane © iewwiti.d Neme/Cite #/Page LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336, p 483-4) . Bases in Germany (#234, p 262) Release of Satellite photos to British (#62, p 86) Liaison relations CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7, p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437): Liaison, others (#196,-225, 333, p 217, 253, 483) MAKARIOS, Base rental deal (#296, 298, 300 p 425, 426) Political subsidies: SPD, CDU, Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380) Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28, 52, p 42-45, 48, 77) E.QO. 5 (b) 3 5 (b) 3 5 (b) 2 5 (b) 2 5 (b) 2 5 (b) 1 5 (b) 3 ‘S (b) 2 11652 Exemption Category Coordination CA EUR/G, CCS EUR/BC EUR/BC AF EUR/CGT EUR/Italy EUR/G NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act. “4 DDO/EUR/FP/FC ] fe Distribution: Orig & 1 ~ Addressee 1 - C/EUR 1 - E/FP/FC (25 April 77) (x1872) -2- SECRET
CO unctassified = INTERNAL C1 CONFIDENTIAL Cl secret ae ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) . SE/OSG" 1705 "26 April 1977 5B4806 DATE "OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show ‘from whom == INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED FORWARDED TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) © — . SA/DO/O 2D0109 Ge “T eS = 610 “siere (] secret [] CONFIDENTIAL ([] {Sr omy © (1) UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 SECRET 96 APR 177 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight FROM : | | ié oviéeé ast European Division SUBJECT > The CIA and ‘the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 8 April 1977 1. We have reviewed the seven items relating to SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974 from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have determined that with one exception, the items are still properly classified under Executive Order 11652: A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains classified SECRET. It describes intelligence ‘sources and methods of operations directed against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3). B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation directed against the Soviet Union. They are exempt from the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3). C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation based in Tokyo directed against the Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under cover. WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 014652
13-00000 SECRET 2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote in their manuscript: ne of the CIA's most famous venture (sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky: Papers (sic). This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The Penkovskiy Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book IT, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows: "Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was published in the United States in I58% 'for operational reasons', but actually became commer- cially viable. The book was prepared and written by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials. Publication rights to the manuscript were sold to a publisher through a trust fund which was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any U.S. Government interest." 3. In view of this published statement by the Senate Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET : 7 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO. for External Oversight a _ FROM 4 oO _— po Chief, Soviet/East, European Division _[ suszecr : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence | : of - ‘by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks ee REFERENCE | - > Your Memorandum, Same: Subject, dated 8 April: 1977 1. We have reviewed the seven items relating to SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974 ' from the Marchetti and Marks! book, The CIA and the Cult: determined that with one exception, the items are still properly classified under Executive Order 11652: A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains classified SECRET. It describes intelligence sources and methods of operations. directed against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from ‘the General Declassification Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3). B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating.to the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an operation directed against the Soviet Union. ' They are exempt. from the General Declassification ; . Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption  . category 5B(3). C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the ~ AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They describe intelligence sources and methods of an ; operation based in Tokyo directed against the Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under cover. WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED SECRET E2 IMPDET . CL RY at4és?
13-00000 = =a ror SECRET 2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item — relates. to the Penkovskiy Papers. . Marchetti and Marks wrote. © in their manuscript: “One of the CIA's most famous venture (sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic).: - his chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin ‘appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal of the actual ‘Spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky.'' The Penkovskiy to Study. Governmental Operations with Respect. to Intelligence Revivitics, Book I a page 194, dated 26° April” 1976, as follows: i or , "Another CIA’ book, the Penkovskiy papers, was: . Joublicnng in the United States in 1965 7 , operational reasons', but actually. became commer- / cially viable. The book was prepared and written / by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case : “| materials. Publication rights to the manuscript a / were sold to a publisher through a trust fund if which was established for the purpose. The publisher was unaware of any U.S. Government interest. " 3. In view of this published statement by the Senate Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public ‘domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652. DDO/SE: (x1705 26 April 1977) c1h Distribution: Orig § 1 - Addressee - 2 - - SE/08G 1 - SE/RAO 1 - SE/CI SECRET
C] UNCLASSIFIED «= [[] INTERNAL [] CONFIDENTIAL — SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) pate Sy 7 a April 1977 Memorandum EXTENSION -1188 NE/COPS - TO: (Officer designation, room number, and . DATE . building) : . ” OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom . en : :  roRwanDeD| INITIALS fo whom. Draw a line across.column after each comment.) : . RECEIVED - | FORWARDED : . SA/DO/0 Attn: Tite, D 2 ° ° x * ree 610 “iene” [X] SECRET CONFIDENTIAL [—] {MTERNAL =.) UNCLASSIFIED O
13-00000 e oe) Te. — md - 27 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O ATTENTION “FROM Chief of Operations, NE Division SUBJECT — : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks 1. The following deleted items in subject book have been placed in the public domain as cited below: a. Item 72, page 97: This item, which was placed in A oe he public domain in Harry Rositzke's book, The CIA's Secret erations, on pages 173 and 174, is a problem area. The author ook is a former senior CIA officer who allowed the Ee wAgency to review his manuscript prior to publication. However, et did not approve the manuscript for publication and, there- fore, in our view Item 72 remains classified under Executive. Order 11652 under Exemption 5B (2). - bb. Item 152, page 165 and Item 28, page 48: These two items also fall in a problem area. The following references to CIA's special relationship with the Shah of Iran imply, but Svan do not. specifically state, that such a relationship exists. See Book 1 of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to o Intelligence A Activities, page 552, and Ray 5S. book . Af Om Cline's entitled, Secrets, Spies and Scholars; Blueprint : | of the Essential CIA, pages 151 an 132. Additionally, though ell eae cd Cline, a former senior CIA officer, allowed the Agency to " mo review his manuscript prior to publication, CIA did not approve pe) oe’ he manuscript for publication. Therefore, in our view Items Cet de 52 and 28 remain classified under Executive Order 11652 under Exemption SB (2). 2. The following items remain classified under Executive Order 11652: Item Manuscript Page nxemption 55 80 5B (2) 24 47 5B (2) 56 81 . 5B (2) 280 404 5B (2) 152° 165 5B (2) E2 IMPDET CL BY 056382
13-00000 f Item Manuscript Page Exemption 23 46 5B (2) 22 ; 46 5B (2) (3) 73 97 5B (2) 172 189. SB (2)° 74 98 5B (2) 331 ; 482 5B (2) (3) 332 482 5B (2) (3) 160 182 5B (2) 224 ; 252 5B (2) 159 181 ae 5B (2) (3) 160 182 SB (2) 161 183 5B (2) 162 184 SB (2)
13-00000 — 2ahstr x | a ea , ence jana 0 aa Oe Comer =e oat ( "C. Arratenyls Come Vgbleged , C je“?  ndlnetoe sohbet Spe oe far une sce . Here if a.
13-00000 [1 UNcLassiFieo = (7) gare | (1) CONFIDENTIAL []_ SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET : ] SUBJECT: (Optional) _ Marchetti/Marks Book " EXTENSION 1326 pr 21 APR 4977 OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom INITIALS a se whom. Draw a line ceress column after each comment.) Chief, Africa/Plans TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) SA/DO/0 anaes | a 610 “itera [) secret [] CONFIDENTIAL [] USE ONLY O UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 I SENSITIVE AND ME 2 @ APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0 ATTENTION FROM Chief, Africa/Plans SUBJECT : Marchetti/Marks Book 7 1,| has questioned our request that Item >» page ) remain classified on the ground that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the reference to the Congo. z. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification . of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse y effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. . We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo. NG HO TELLIGE Nee “WARAL E2 IMPDET CL BY 009904
13-00000 5 hel off ne atGecl 27 APR ‘1977 © MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0O ATTENTION FROM 1ef, rica ans SUBJECT Book . 1. has questioned our request that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an. official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the reference to the Congo. 2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo - is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agreée.to declassification of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo. SOURCES E2° IMPDET CL BY 009904 .
13-00000 CO unctassirrep © (7) {NTERNAL | (] CONFIDENTIAL . [[] SECRET } ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) E C/AF/PLS 1326 21 April 1977 TO: (Officer designation, room number, ‘aind | are building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom  romwaaneD | (NITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED | FORWARDED . SA/DDO/0O Attn: t- £6 Sz 610 “srrete" [] SECRET C) CONFIDENTIAL Use onty —C]_ UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000 SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES 21 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight ATTENTION FROM Chief, Africa Plans - SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject 1. The information which pertains to Africa and which was deleted by court order from subject book remains classifiable and classified. The information is national security information, bears directly on the conduct of our foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized ; disclosure. None of the items of information ordered deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified by any United States Government official authorized to -declassify national security information. 2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items are as follows: Item 29, Page 49 Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3) Item 79, Page 100 Exemptions 5(B) (1) (2) (3) Items 283 and 284, Exemption 5(B) (3) Page 413 Items 286 and 287, Exemptions 5(B) (3) Page 414 Item, 287a, Page 415 . Exemption 5(B).(3) Item 288, Page 416 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) Items 290 and 291, - Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) Page 417 E2 IMPDET CL BY 009904 WARNING NOTICE AND METHODS INVOLVED
13-00000 3. The following items, all of which relate to matters of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified: Item 41, Page 6#$ Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) Item 42, Page 65a Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) Item 47, Page 71 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) Item 48, Page 7la ' Exemption 5(B)(2) (3) Item 55, Page 80 Exemption 5(B)(2) Item 130, Page 133 Exemption 5(B)(2) Item 170, Page 189 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) Item 197, Page 218 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) Item 198, Page 219 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) Item 301, Page 427 . Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) Item 339, Page 509 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) 4, Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291 pertain to National Security Council proceedings. Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security Council: staff, have been informed by telephone this date that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.
13-00000 & 1 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight ATTENTION FROM ser, rica ans SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence _ REFERENCE ; $A/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject 1. The information. which pertains to Africa and which . was deleted by court order from subject book remains ' Classifiable and classified. The information is national security information, bears directly on the conduct of our foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized disclosure. None of the items of information ordered 7 deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified by any United States Government official.authorized to -declassify national security information. Zz. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items are as follows: Item 29, Page 49 “Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3) ‘Item 79, Page 100 =~ -~—- Exemptions 5(B)(1)(2)(3) _ Items 283 and 284, Exemption 5(B)(3) - Page 413. Items 286 and 287, - Exemptions 5 (B) (3) - , Page 414. re Item, 287a, Page 415 Exemption 5(B)(3) . Item 288, Page 416 Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) © : Items 290 and 291, Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) = Page 417. ; : > B2°IMPDET J CL BY 009904 -_ WARNING NOTICE ~ . SO | : | sensitive INTELLIGENCE SOURCES erppee. en
13-00000 » 3. The following items, all of which relate to matters of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified: Item 41, Page 645 Exemption 5(B)(2)(3) | Item 42, Page 65a Exemption 5{B) (2) (3) Item 47, Page 71 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) . Item 48, Page 7la Exemption 5(B)(2)(3) » Item 55, Page 80 Exemption 5(B)(2) Item 130, Page 135 Exemption 5(B)(2) Item 170, Page 189 - Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) Item 197, Page 218 ‘Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) _ - Item 198, Page 219. Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) Item 301, Page 427 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) Item 339, Page 509 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3) 4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291. pertain to National Security Council proceedings. Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security - Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of ‘Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.  & )
13-00000 “THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975 Part [¥V—Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador John Gunther Dean HEARING | SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON: INVESTIGATIONS | OF THE ; COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES — NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MAY 5, 1976 Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations oF ' U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 75-004 WASHINGTON : 1976
13-00000 672 made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to real requirements, to insure that equipment was received by personnel trained in their use aud to insure that material provided under MAP had reasonah'- expectancy of maintenunce support, items such as force structure, military orgs- _bization, technical assistance and logistics became matters that came under the: purview of the MEDTC. ‘fo have closed our eyes tu these axpects in my view, would have ignored congressional concerns regarding efficient: management. I did not consider these functions a violation of the congressional Lutent in banning advisors and these functions continued during my tenure. In wis belied the ban would have been violated had personnel been assigned to military units or activities on an around-the-clock basis and involved themselves in most of the matters affecting their units or activity. In prescribing the Lintits of our assixt- ance, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding our judgment. Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S. Military Attachkés serve with Khmer military units in the field? —What regulations did the U.8. Eubassy hare to govern the activities of U.S. Military Attaches and the Military Equipment Delivery Team? —Were any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Kampot involving Major Lawrence Ondecker in March 1974? Answer. No U.S. military served with Khmer military units in the field. U.S. personnel from both the Defense Attache Office and the Office of the Chiei Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely visited and reported the military status of Cambodian military units as part of their duties : however. U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which U.S. advisors dié in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arrival regard-- ing the Congressional restrictions against advisers to the Cambodian military. The Kampot incident occurred prior to my arrival in Cambodia. Shartivy after my arrival in Phnom Penh. 1 received the instructions in effect and determined that they were adeqnate. I did. however. personatly impress uwnon my military staff, on several oecasions, the necd to abide scrupuleusiy by these instructions and to avoid situations which might be interpreted ax infringements cf their prescribed duties. Question Tf. In Novemher 1974, the Washington Post reported and the De fense Department aeknowledged that data on potential hembing targets in Cambodia was gathered by American reconnaissance fights from Thailand and passed on to Cambodian nilitary authorities. — When dd this practice hegin ? —Did rou know about it, and did rou have a rele in it? —Do rou consider it a violation of the Congressional ban on American advisors with Khmer Republic forces? Answer. It would be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in Cambodia that military information which we had would he deliberately withheld or denied to a country to which we were providing enormous military and economic assistance. The information we had concerning enemy activities fn Cambodia was a by-product of our own inteHigence ecllecting effort on com- munist forces throughont Indochina. This information was provided to Cam- bodian military authorities but the decision on what action, if anr, would be tnken was one which the Cambodians made for themselves. The provisions of information preceded my arrival and Tam not aware exactlv when the practice may have hegun. I was aware of the practice although I did not play a pivotal port in the process and did not consider this procedure as violating congressional : Netions on American advisors. Question 12, Did CIA personnel in Cambodia ever act as advisers fo Khmer epublie forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos (even if on a smaller scale)? —Could you tell us what role China Airlines played in Cambodia and if It ‘was in any way associated with CIA activities? —What was the U.S. role in organizing aud applying the Khmer “Middle Range Reconnaissance Patrols” (MERVS) ¢ Answer, Haviug served both in Laos and Cambodia, and knowing the CIA operations in hoth ccuntries, I can honestly say that the CIA did ner act as advisers to the Khmer Republic forces in a fashion similiar to their actiyitie< in. Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America. transported supplies, nol including. weapons and ammunition, for U.S. agencies in Cambodia. The Middle Range Reconnaissance Patrols received military equipniunut as part of the Kluner Armed Forces and also received some intelligence collection tralning..
13-00000 ‘CQ cunctassiFien = INTERNAL CO CONFIDENTIAL SECRET = ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Vi nt Marchetti and John D. = CEA/CA EXTENSION 5D3102, Has ee aa 1383 15 April is aprit1977 nota designation, room number, and DaTE OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Oraw a line across column after each comment.) ph | OO DCEA we SUBJECT: (Optional) oy. 7. SA/DO/0 | A » fom 610 “ESN Ge] SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL [] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIEE CEA ©
13-00000 Say SECRET 16 APR 977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight FROM ; | Chief, East Asia Division SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks” _. . REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted subject book items per Reference request and conclude they are: 1) still classified under Executive Order 11652, 2) still not in the public domain through official disclosure; and 3) still not.contained in material cleared by the Publications Review Board. Attachment - Detail Listing WARNING NOTICE ; SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED E2 IMPDET CL BY 022438 SEC RET
13-00000 Item 26 27 28 31 38 41 42 43 46 47 67 152 197 319 320 321 SECRET Attachment E. 0. 11652 Exemptions for Items in Manuscript Page No. ds co co 9B CBU BU SB SB SHS Ss ss Ss 8S 8S 9S 3 47 48 48 54 63 65 65 a 65 a 70 71 92 165 218 470 ~ 471 471 SECRET 5 Exemption 5 B (1) (2) B (1) (2) 5 B (1) 5 B (2) 5 B (2) (3) 5 B (2) (3) 5 B.(2) (3) 5 B (2) (3) 5 B (2) 5 B (2) (3) 5 B (3) 5 B (1) 5 B (1) 5 B (2) 5 B (2) 5 B (2)
13-00000 16 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight — FROM { | Chief, East Asia Division SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted subject book items per Reference request and conclude they are: 1) still classified under Executive Order 11652, 2) still not in the public domain through official disclosure; and 3) still not contained in material cleare by the Publications Review Board. Attachment - Detail Listing WARRING NOTICE ; SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES - AND METHODS INVOLVED ; E2 IMPDET CL BY 022438 SECRET
13-00000 Ta Item 26 27 28 31 38 41 42 43 46 47 67 152 Manuscript Page No. Attachment 47 48 48 54 63 65 65 a 65 a 70 71 92 165 218 470 SECRET ay; n>, 7, ee Ys, 2; ns; ey; ey | iE. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in : Exemption TT); ent; n>, 2, ww St tll il il i iis es i le (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
13-00000 { had . . ° . : ‘a dl | | ; / DD/0727. 2536 9g APR WF MEMORANDUM FOR: | Office of Général Counsel FROM | >: William W. Wells ; Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT. :° Review of the 168 Deleted Items in "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks In reply to your oral request, attached is — the report of the review of the deleted items which are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate components of the DDO reviewed their respective items for classification and their findings are contained in the attached report. Specific classi- fication and exemption authority for each item which is still classified is available, if needed, in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O. William We wedis William W. Wells ' Distribution: Orig € 1 - OGC 2 ~ DDO 2 - SA/DO/O E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
13-00000 Sd pp/o77 27 April 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations Te VIA os | | . Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight FROM SUBJECT . : Review of 168 Deleted Items in "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” . by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks (U) 1. This is the report of the review done by the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi- bility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC. Responsible components did the necessary inter- and intraagency coordinations. | , (U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted concerning the completeness of the review, especially ‘as regards those items declassified by "official public disclosure" as defined. by the courts. While I am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done — by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely complete search is impossible for the following reasons: (U) a. .There is no index of any kind, let alone having the material in machine form such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), the six published hearings and proceedings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission) ;- E2 IMPDET Pal CL BY 018630 is a oe hs a. Wledataes y 7 ont Tartrree dors elansiaemaeemeeeaneest ees a aia
13-00000 Pen (U) b. There is no comprehensive readily. available record of precisely what information has been declassified. and released in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act. and the Privacy Act; there are separate collections with a limited capability to retrieve some such information; (U) c. There is no available record of the information that officials of the Executive Branch of government, with authority to declassify information, have said or written in public either before Congressional committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows, college symposiums, the general’ lecture circuit, other public forums, etc. In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee that those items which are still classified by the DDO components have not been deliberately or “inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as "official public disclosure." . (U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A lists those items of the DDO deleted items which have been declassified by “official public disclosure." These thirteen complete and parts of four other items can therefore be released from the court injunction. 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still classified but about which there may be some possible question. These are highlighted here so that cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with due regard for all legal and policy aspects. (U} 5S. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining items which the DDO components advise are still classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and cannot be released from the court injunction.
13-00000 H t- Item No. =) 9 (line 17 thru ninth word on line 24) 10 (last four words of MSS p- no. iil we 12 14 15 line 1 and first 11 ._- words of line 2; - and lines 5-11) ii 46 (line 20 thru first three words of line’ 24) 7 57 | 89 . 124 126 127 15 70° 84 106— 129 130 130 _ ATTACHMENT A Official Public Disclosure Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190- | -Church Committee. Vol. 7, p. 168 Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 190 Church Committee ; Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190 -" Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190. Church Committee | Vol. 7, pp. 160, 170, 172 Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171 Church Committee Book I, p. 194 Church Committee, | Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff. , Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209 Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 : Church. Committee Book I, pp. 208-209 Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church. Committee Book I, pp. 208-209
13-00000 oo MSS - Item No. _ . p- no. Official Public Disclosure | 292 . 420 Church Committee | Vol. 7, p. 205 ; 307 - 435. ~ ‘Church Committee, _ . Alleged Assassination Plots : ae pp. 139 ff. . 317 - 468 Church Committee So Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205 338 508° _ Church Committee . Vol. 7, pp. 144-209 339 (line 1, third, 509 ' CIA presence has been fourth, eighth, officially disclosed in ninth words; and the following only: line 2, first , . three words) , a. Congo - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassina- tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, pp. 13-70. b. Cambodia - Amb. John Gunther Dean testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representa- tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672° — _c¢. Laos - Director Colby, , 13 September 1974, in an © address to the Fund for Peace Conference on CIA and Covert . Actions and in Church Committee Book I, pp. 120 and 155; Book IV, p. 68. d. Vietnam - Church Committee . report on Alleged Assassination pp. 217-224; Book I, pp. 23 and 120. e. Philippines - Church Committee, Book I, p. 23.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (1) Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172 MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189 (U) NE Division has highlighted these items. (S) Item 22 states 2 part "A notable example of such a 'special relationship' Iran, where a CIA organized coup d'etat restored the Shah. to power in 1953. The Shah was _understandably grateful...'' Item 28 lists the Shah among ‘other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special — relationships" as. does Item 152 and a similar statement is made in Item 179. (U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and Scholars," pp. 131-132, states:. "J... a covert operation so successful that it became “widely known all over the world was carried out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful clandestine services officer who flew to Iran, hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian. -wnilitary men loyal to the Shah how to take over the local radio station, and paved the. way for the Shah's triumphal return." (U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. lil, briefly mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran" as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert operations." , -(S) There is a vast difference between the classified deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship" with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The former is still properly classifiable and classified. erane wk ii eee eee bee ee ere Sa ee OE US TS Tce net ah ae
13-00000 py eng em ee nates ATTACHMENT B (2): Item No. 49. MSS p. no. 71a. ‘ (S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily American is still classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and-methods as related to newspaper publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states; "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, — then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange- ment 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, ‘a bad example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross,who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered -as constituting official Agency disclosure of this’ — information.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (3) Item No. 54, 236 MSS p. no. 80, 262 (S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World Features is still classified SECRET because both items describe intelligence. sources and methods and identifies operations based in England. Forum World Features was referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church Committee Final Report, page 199,.as follows: "Another example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in - Europe... The larger of the two was subscribed to by over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services." While Forum World Features was not named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be “protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (4) Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25) MSS. p. no. 92 (S) Under injunction as classified information is "For its Tibetan operation of. the early sixties, the Agency constructed extensive support facilities. in | Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training." ‘Underlining @ine 25, ninth thru twenty-third wor indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly _brought to the United States for special paramilitary. training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado." This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and - appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book. or ae Wied
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (5). Item'No. 72" MSS pe 97 (U) NE Division has highlighted ‘this. item. (S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established. Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was. (U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could. be done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the. offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving him a channel of communication with, the West. "When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to . avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator who was able to keep Washington posted on his often hazardous progress." (S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA . "close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being "financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators being with the Dalai Lama.. These are two different — comments with the first being properly classifiable and classified. pee NS Fae ne
13-00000 | ae | . Cea eadal "ATTACHMENT B (6) Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279 MSS pp. 123, 132, 133, 403 (S) CCS states that all four items which refer -to -Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company are Still classified since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section.5 (B) (2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652. (S) According.to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of: sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that. the. subject be withheld from public disclosure. © .
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (7) Item No. 33900 MSS p. no. 509 David Phillips ‘in his book’ The Night Watch, chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970- °1972" describes his. presence as Chief of Station of CIA in Brazil. and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia. (S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509), Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presénce in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of © singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse ‘effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo." It is not a question of whether to agree or not to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church — Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made "official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the subject moot. In addition, as Item 339-in Attachment A shows, four other countries of the Third World are also mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What adverse effect could be expected now. by another public ‘reference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original 1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has. not changed since the 1975 release of the information by the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse effects there | might be have already occurred.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT C ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT Item No. MSS _p. no. - «<Item No. MSS _p. no. 1 11 63 | 86 9 (lines 14-16;. 14 | -67 920 oo: line 24, last a - 72 -- OF Te two words 73 97 thru line 29) 74 98 . 79 100 10 (linel, |. “15 107 123 . first 7 words; _ : 128 — 132 line 2, last 2 oe - 129 133 words thru 130 133 line 4) . 148 155 ; . 149 156 18 —C . 42. 152 - 165. 19 , AZ 159 181 20 | 44 an 160. 182 21 45 | 161 183 22 , _ 46 162. 184 23 , 46 182 196 24 47 194 215 26 ee ‘47 195 216 27 AB 196 217, 28 48. 197 | 218 29 49: a 198 219° 31 54 ~ 201 i 222. 34° 59 224 252 .38 63 225 253 , 4l «65 226 257 42 65a 234 262 —, 43 , ' 65a 236 ; ' 262 46 (line 24, 70 256 . 829 fourth word. 261 334 thru line 31) ; 273° 380 47 71 278 400 48 Tila -279 403 49 - 7la 280° 404. 50 72 283 413 51 oo 72 284 © AZ 52 77 286 414 53 78 287 414 54 80 287a 415 55 80 288 416 56 81 | 290 417 , 58 84 291 417 59 85 296 425 62 86 298 426
13-00000 . | ° : 7) 3 Item No. - MSS p. no. 300 [ 426 308 437 318 469 ‘319 470 : 320 -  . . 471 : ~ 321, 471 322 473. : 323 . 474 po — 331 ~ 482 332.0 482 333 — 483 334 483 335 483 336 484 337 507 - 339 (line 1, first 509 © ’ two words and fifth, sixth and seventh words) | | | | 4
13-00000 aera : = = ™ + ame tna e n neentteRRESEEDabatmncte e we eee ote TEE TCD aD SERPS A TRATES R EDIE ts re eres Fie 27 Agel 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: ; 7 Office of General Counsel FROM : William W. Wells Deputy Director for Operations “SUBJECT” _ t’ Review of the 168 Deleted Items in "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks In reply to your oral request, attached is the. report of the review of the deleted items which are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate components of the DDO reviewed their respective items for classification and their findings are contained in the attached report. Specific classi- fication and exemption authority for each item which is still classified is available, if needed, in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O. William W. Wells Distribution: Orig § 1 -.OGC 2 - DDO 2 - SA/DO/O ~E2 IMPDET CL BY. 018630.
13-00000 MEMORANDUM FOR: VIA FROM SUBJECT (U) 1 27 April 1977. Deputy Director for Operations Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight Review of 168 Deleted Items in "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks This is the report of the review done by . the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi- bility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC. Responsible components did the necessary inter- and intraagency coordinations. . (U) 2. concerning the (U) let alone Several points need to be highlighted completeness of the review, especially as regards those items declassified by "official public disclosure" as defined by the courts. While am sure that as diligent a search as possible was. done by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely complete search is impossible for the following reasons: a. There is no index of any kind, having the material in machine form such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published hearings and reports of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), the six published hearings and ' proceedings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission) ; - E2 IMPDET SEG LET CL BY 018630 I
13-00000 (U} b. There is no comprehensive readily available record of precisely what information has been declassified and released in accordance _ with the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act; there are separate collections with a limited capability to retrieve some such information, ; (U) c. There is no available record of the information that officials of the Executive Branch of government, with authority to declassify information, have said or written in public either before Congressional committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows, college symposiums, the general lecture circuit, other public forums, etc. In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee that those items which are still classified by the’ DDO components have not been deliberately or inadvertently. declassified in whole or in part as "official, public disclosure." | (U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A lists those items of the DDO deleted items which. have - been declassified by “official public disclosure." ' These thirteen complete and parts of four other items can therefore be released from the court injunction. (S) 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still classified but about which there may be some possible question. These are highlighted here so that cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with due regard for all legal and policy aspects. (U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining items which the DDO components advise are still classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and cannot. be released from the court iniunction.
13-00000 9 (line 17 thru ninth word on line 24) | 10 (last four words of ' line 1 and first 11 ‘words of line 2; . and lines 5-11) ‘Ll: | 46 (line 20 thru first ' three words of line 24) 57. 89 124 126 127 MSS p. no. 11 12 12 14 “15 15 70 84 106 129 130 130 ATTACHMENT: A Official Public Disclosure Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190 -Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 168 - Church Committee Vol. 7, p. 190 Church Committee Vol. 7, pp..166-170, 190 ’ Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190 Church Committee Vol..7, pp. 160, 170, 172 ‘Church Committee Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171 Church Committee Book I, p. 194. Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff. Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209 Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church..Committee Book I, pp. 208-209 Rockefeller Commission Report p. 218 Church Committee Book I, pp. 208-209
13-00000 292 307 “317 338 339 No Item . (line 1, third,- fourth, eighth, -ninth words; line 2,sfirst three words) and MSS. : Pp. no. 420 435 - 468. 508 509 ATTACHMENT A cont'd Official Public Disclosure Church Committee Vol. 7, 2[p. 205 ~~ Church Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots pp. 139 ff. Church Committee: Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205 Church Committee | Vol. 7, pp. 144-209 CIA presence has been officially disclosed in _the following only: a. Congo - Church Committee report on Alleged Assassina- tion Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, pp. 13-70. b. Cambodia - Amb. John Gunther Dean testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representa- tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672 c. Laos - Director Colby, ‘13 September 1974, in an ‘address to the Fund for Peace Conference on CIA and Covert Actions and in Church Committee Book I, pp. 120 and 155; Book IV, p. 68. d. Vietnam - Church Committee. report on Alleged Assassination pp. 217-224; Book I, pp. 23 and 120. e. Philippines - Church Committee, Book I, p. 23.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (1) Item No.°22, 28, 152, 172 MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189 (U) NE Division has highlighted these items. (S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such a ‘special relationship’ is Iran, where a CIA organized coup. d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was understandably grateful..." Item 28 lists the Shah among other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special relationships" as does Item 152 and a similar statement is made in Item 179. (U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and Scholars," pp. 131-132, states: " ,. a covert operation so successful that it ‘became. widely known all over the world was carried out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier, Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the local Communist (Tudeh). Party and from the Soviet Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful. clandestine.services. officer who flew to Iran, — hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian military men loyal to the Shah how to take over ' the local radio station, and paved the way for the Shah's triumphal return." (U) | The Church Committee, Book I, pe 111, briefly mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran" as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert operations." -(S) There is a vast difference between the classified deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The '. former is still properly classifiable and classified.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (2) Item No. 49 © MSS p. no. 7la (S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily American is still classified SECRET because it describes intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the. purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange- ment 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, "a bad example'.'' It is questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross,who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who left the Agency long before that, can be considered . as constituting official Agency disclosure of this information.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (3) Item No. 54, 236 . MSS p. no. 80, 262 (S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World. Features is still classified SECRET because both items describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies operations based in England. Forum-World Features was referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church Committee Final Réport, page 199, as follows: "Another example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in Europe... The larger of the two. was subscribed to by over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two press services."' While Forum World Features was not named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be - protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (4) Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25). © MSS p. no. 92 (S) Under injunction as classified. information is "For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the Agency constructed extensive support facilities in Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training." Under rlining @ine 25, ninth thru twenty-third wor indicates the questionable part.of the item since MSS_ page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly brought. to the United States for special paramilitary ‘training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado." This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and . appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book. ae
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (5) Item No. 72 . MSS p. 97 (U) NE Division has highlighted this item. (S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established. Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was..." (U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret ._ Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was | winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be. done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving him a channel of communication with the West. "When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa. to avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was ‘accompanied on his flight by a ClA-trained radio operator who was able to keep Washington posted on his often hazardous progress." (S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA "close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being "financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different comments with the first being properly classifiable and classified.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (6) Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279 MSS. pp. 123, 132, 133, 403 (S) CCS states that all four items which refer to Fairways Corporation as a ClA-owned proprietary company are still classified since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility .located in the U:S. and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained.in Executive Order 11652. (Ss) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby. was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation in connection’ with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways dnd asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure.
13-00000 ATTACHMENT B (7) Item No. 339. MSS _p. no. 509 . _ David Phillips in his book .The Night Watch, chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970- - 1972" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA in Brazil and-on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia. (S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509), Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification of the reference to the Congo. would have the effect of Singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We believe the item should remain classified and that exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo.’ It is not a question of whether to agree or not to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made- "official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the © subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A shows, four other countries of the Third World are also mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What adverse effect could be expected now by another public reference to CIA presence in.the Congo as of the original 1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has not changed since the 1975 release of the information by the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse effects there might be have already occurred,
13-00000 H * ATTACHMENT C ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT Item. No. MSS p. no. ° Item No.  °© MSS p. no.. 1 li 63 - 86 9 (lines 14-16; 14. ; -67 92 line 24, last 72 97° two words _ 73°. 97 thru line 29) » - 74 98. oo 79 100 10 (line 1, 15 107 123 first 7 words; 128 — ° 132 line 2, last 2 | 129: , 1330 words thru co 130.—( -° 133 line 4) 148 155 , , (149 ' 156 18 — AZ. 152 | 165 19 43 - 159 181 20 44 , 160 ' 182 21. .45 161 183. 22 _ 46 162. 184° 23 46 182 196 24 47 194 ~ 215 26 ‘47 195 216 27 00° 48 196 217. 28 -  . 48 197 218 29 - 49 198 219 31° 54 201 ‘ 222° 34 59 224. 252 38 63 225 253 41. 65 226 257° 42 65a 234 . 262 43 65a , 236 — 262 46 (line 24, 70 256 ' 329 fourth word | . ‘ 261 334 thru line 31) 273 380. 47 a 71 278 400 48 Tia | 279 403 49 7la - . » + 280° — 404 50 72 283 413 ; 51 " 72 284° 413 52 77 286 414 53 78 287 414 54 80 287a 415 55 80 288 416 56 81 290 417 58 84 . 291 417 59 85 296 425 62 + 86 298 , 426-
13-00000 Item No. MSS p. no. 300 426 — 308. 437 318 - 469 319 a 470 - 320 471 321 — 471 322 473. 323 (474 331 . 482 332 °°) 482 333 483 334.0. 483 335 483 336 484 337 507°. 339 (line 1, first 509 two words and fifth, sixth ‘and seventh words)
13-00000 SECRET MEMORANDUM’ FOR: Associate General Counsel FROM - : Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT . :. DDO Coordination on DDS&T's Review of — Deletions from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by “by Marchetti and Marks REFERENCE : -DDS§T-5193-76/1-dated 27 May 1977 1. Appropriate Components of the DDO have reviewed the following items (deletions) listed at Tab C of referent for coordination with the DDO and concur with the DDS§&T that they are all properly classified in accordance with E.O. 11652 and should so remain:- 2. In Tab D of referent, the DDSET deferred to DDO or OS the decision on the classification of Item 190, manu- script page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow. The appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain classified SECRET since it relates to cryptography and is -exempt. from the General Declassification Schedule of Item Manuscript Page — 25. 47 159 . 181 160 , 182 161 7 , 183 162 184 163 «184 i 164. 185 ! 205° oo 234 i 208 235 ; 209 ‘236 295 424 | 297 425 | 2990 | 426 i 301 . 427 E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630 SECRET
13-00000 | | ! SECRET E.0. 11652, exemption category 5B(2). 3. Specific classification and exemption authority for each item, if needed, is available from SA/DO/O. 4 William W. Wells 0/SA/D0/0 . (1542) Distribution Original §&. Ne Addressee DDO ADDO: . Ex Reg  DDS§T SA/DO/0 f SECRET
13-00000 DDS§T-5193-76/1 2 WAL S77. MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel. SUBJECT -°: Review of Deletions from The CIA and the | Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks 1. The responsible. and knowledgeable components of this directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject book per your request. The review was made to determine whether each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the information in each’ deletion has been. officially released by the . U.S. Government.. 2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed by this directorate. Tab B is:a list of those items of primary interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi- fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C is a list of those items which we determined are still classified under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be ‘released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be coordinated with other indicated elements. . Tab D is a list of items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list of the four items. mentioned above which we believe portions can now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified» and should not be released. 3. ‘Since many of the deleted items involved the National Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina- tions. through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any — — ; coordination must be handled between, the NSA and CIA General i Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other ele- ments was attempted. 4. This memorandum completes the DDS§T action on the court ordered review of the deletions from subject book. Abad f Eller ernest’s J. ZELLMER 7 oo Associate Deputy Director *. ‘for Science and. Technology Attachments: As. Stated
13-00000 Item 25 86 87 88 91 92 “135 136 155 157 158 159 160 161 163 165 166 - 167... _ 170 171 172 - 173 174 175 176. 177 178 i870 188 189 DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T Page 47 104 104 105 106° 107 134 135. 177° 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 185 185 185 189 189 189 190 191 191 © 192 193 194 200 . 201 202. Item 190 191 ‘192 204 205 208 209 245 248 254 258 259 260 267 268 269 275° . 295° 297 ' 299 301 302 304 306 312 329 | TAB A . Page 214 214 215 233 ' 234 235 236 — 268 269 327 331 331 331 337 337 337 394 424 425 426 427 427 430 431 442 450 474 474 475 476 480.
13-00000 Tab B ITEMS OF INTEREST. TO THE DDS&T _AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED Item Manuscript Page | 7 / | - 91 | 106 ~=~=—— «SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) | 92 407 SECRET, SB(2) and (3) 4135 "SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) .ti‘(s 136 © —«dY: BS SECRET, 5B(2) and (3). 155 oan SECRET, .5B(3) oo 1588 ~~ ‘180 | SECRET, SB(2) and (3) | 163. ~~—«184.Ss—i“‘<ié‘“‘=;*‘«S XCRET;«SBC2) and (3) (165° 185 a _- SECRET, 5B(3) 166 a 185 7 CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2) 167 —s—=<C~«SCSH CONFIDENTIAL, SB(2) 188 ~ 201, ‘TOP SECRET, $B(2) *Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000 iad & ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS§&T AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS Item * 25. _* B7- 88 157 159 160 161 162 163 164 172 | 187 189 . 204 205 208° 209 245 248 254 258 *Can be sanitized and portions. released. Manuscript Page 47 104 105 © 179 181 182 183° 184 (184 185 189 200 202 233, a 234 235. 236 268 269 327 331. DDO DOD DOD 0S DDO, -ppo, po, DDO, DDO NSA ' DOD DOD NSA DDO DDO DDO “pop DOD ' DOD pop (DIA) (DIA) OC, ERDA OC, ERDA 4 OC, ERDA | OC, ERDA ~ DDO - (Navy) | (Navy) and DDO “(SAFSS) ~ (SAFSS) (SAFSS), NSC Staff (SAFSS)
13-00000 Tab C , Continued ‘Item Manuscript Page 259° 331 DOD (SAFSS) 260 331 7 DOD (SAFSS) 267  -337-—~—=———~*~*~*«~OODs (Navy) 268 - oo 337 00 DOD (Navy) | 269, | —3BT DOD’ (Navy). *275. 0 894 OL 295 ry DDO 297 0 42s DDO 299 7 | 426 DDO, NSA | 301 42700 DDO, OC, NSA 302. s=<“‘«‘ TSA | 304, 4300 NSA 306° AB ~ pop ‘(Navy) 312 7 44200 - NSA 313 450 NSA - ‘3299 80:té“‘«‘;*‘(NSC«*St a - *Can be sanitized and portions released. 72
13-00000 Tab D ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS Item 86 170 171 173 174 175 176 177 178 190 191 192 324 325 327 328 Manuscript Page 104 | 189 189 190 191 191 192 193 194 214 214 215 474 474 475 476 0/DCI NSA NSA NSA NSA NSA NSA NSA NSA DDO or OS State Department State Department DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff DOD DDI and DOD DDI, DOD and NSC Staff
rc Gicl ‘Tab E ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE Item 135, Manuscript page 134 A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in fisey. when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research jjaboratory} - in the {Boston area. Item 25, Manuscript page 47 NOver the years, the CIA closely collaborated with, the fh ationalisté] first to run guerrilla attacks_ against imainland hinajand then in more recent years to use faiwant ‘as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist” pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at (China during the Cultural Revol- ution?" - Item 87, Manuscript page 107 "The Agency also had a project to determine where American, risoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to (Eonmunicate with them} Scale models of the prisons were constructed from aerial fand satellite photography] and from other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate. Some of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus, the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the families to send answers backi Meanwhile, the Technical. Services Division (of the" item 279 , Manuscript page 394 new optics for satellite ‘cameras and improvements in ‘over the horizon' radars? These technical contracts were almost always drawn up under: the cover of being between the scholar (or the university) and Some government agency other than the CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were the most" a ms [5 ; gle a, © mam oe . *
13-00000 Tab C sous OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN [ | CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS item, ‘Manuscript Page E®- Cine - * 250 an | Do * 87 104 DOD. (DIA) 88 105 DOD (DIA) | 157 179 Os Une/ dee > 1s9 | 181, DDO, OC, ERDA “ “ 1608) 182 DDO, OC, ERDA " u 16® 183 DDO, OC, ERDA , a 162 184 “DDO, OC, ERDA 0 ; 163 184 DDO “ 164 185. DDO 172 189 NSA 187 200 DOD (Navy) 189 202. DOD (Navy) 204 233 NSA and DDO WED 2088 234 DDO oe _ 208 235 DDO LA 236 pDO™ | 245 268 DOD (SAFSS) 248 269° _ DOD (SAFSS) | 254 327 DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff 258 331 DOD (SAFSS) ' *Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000 Tab C Continued Manuscript Page 331 _ DOD (SAFSS) 331 DOD (SAFSS) 337, «Ss * «DOD (Navy) 337. pop (Navy) _ 337 | DOD. (Navy) 394. ~~ :*~“<«* OC A240 DDO a oo a cp ce lensyhs ane 4250 ener = 299 : 426 |” DDO, NSA an - 303 OQ — A27 DDO, OC, NSA 3020.42 304 480 NSA 306 ae 431 “pod (Navy) 3120 442. a NSA 313 aso NSA’ 329 a 480 - sNSG Staff ji -*Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000 Tab D ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS : Item | Manuscript Page | 86 104 | O/DCI 170 189 -NSAW 0 : 171 189 NSA’ | | 173 190 NSA 174 191 NSA. : 47s 191 NSA : 176 192 | NSA 177 193 NSA 178 194 NSA — 190 ‘214 DDO or oS 191 | 214 | ‘ State Department * 192 215 State Department . 324 474 ~ pop (JCS) and NSC Staff - 325. 474 DOD | | : 327 475. “DDI and DOD 328 476 “DDI, DOD and NSC Staff
13-00000 oe ues a & Sage. | . . a [Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the @ j strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was notgnew), | 2 so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA | 4 expertise and management skills to put the station in operation. | G . Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special | 7 relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is - b not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent, | Premier Chiang Ching- Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the © / ‘State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something | i h of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all- / -night drinking boutsfatth the younger Chiang. ; i Fover the years, the CIA ‘closely collaborated with the Nationalists first sf to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in-more recent | f. years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist h pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland 4 and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at l China during the Cultural Revolution, | ; ! In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally yz conducting all important meetings, with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was 2 accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed. 2 But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for é many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. 2 According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has ; Zz served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal 4 a , meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. \ Z Personally with % Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu ponsonadadyytety m1111ons of Dy 2 [Bier the years, the CIA has provided thieu pnsonasintth oft fons of dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds, -treeddttiento the buadvadecst | ‘z
the information straight forwardly, thereby, handtcapring the . analysts in n making a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content. * | Some intelligence analysts, beth inside and outside the CIA, receives’ large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from actual agents. - But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance | (which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was edid) with agent . reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services ~ confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make decisions based on that intelligence analysts. In, the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and @® the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combindddféeces to carry. out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful) intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level | U.S. government officials were disturbed by repprts that Communist China was on the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's woutd play an important part in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti- ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzu, the Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia. | The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear- ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from — the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain ~ peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA tahoratories. the Clandestine Services took on the resoonsibilitv for the nost /
13-00000 [aitticurt plase of the operation -~ installing the machine on the mountain to “The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not ‘only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project. Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry the device, complete wéth its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it - into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experfenced CIA case officer. That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top-of Nanda Devi. Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international | mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport «= amtpserecmaremen suring ASE SPOONS A CLE PATA AAA plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda Devi. eens > Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the A o § o «eo @ 8A af a. aa 2 awn Pow ~
[[eoutd ao. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base — CD camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by: a small party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. | The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team ine an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now weel off schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its — target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures: well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news — of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging. area. But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been . sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to. fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station tn Delhi that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headgaters of the sacred — religious pollution, not ecological. The CIA reacted by planning another climbfof the mountain for the following year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team, led by Bishép, was gathered together again and this time it reached the . set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year_[
13-00000 | [ betore was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor devic /¢ ‘< stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical : | | malfunction. | At this soint, the Agency gave up on mountain~ ~top monitoring of the Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systens and new, tnproved — satellites for acquiring the information it was seg king. The Indians were thanked and compensated for their cooperation. 4 Phe American climbers were | Cn ean EnnEInnITRREERaEE a aas presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA. | I the fertile imaginations of the Ey SAT experts during the following ant SS won WW & years produced many more unique codIrction schemes aimed at solving the os mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential. The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man C: airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In | concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would ~ assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. | _ Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards. | a | A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could( /¢= ' be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, angaerial rising from later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a ' foreign and héstile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine vatcad carinie miactinne ac ta the evetam'e uftdlitv and warth. ‘The ESAT
[Specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however 44) oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile | 2 installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear . attack. Development of the €ostly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The. — technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device ob in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself several feet below the ground surface or $o jarring the delicate instrumentation — that the device failed to self-activate and function properly. 7 | [a third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, | 7 Vay such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which — could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either . to its lauach site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the CIA in research on this “baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency~sponsored spying mission. ] The technical difficulties involved in the fair-drop}system and the{modet | Hole airplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully — 7 developed{by their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite | surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement for these questionabls}and potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices «- a few more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being
13-00000 f restore_the-Shah 9 HOWE OVS on 3 ate hah had shown his—gre i ate by. allowing the Agency~ta_use Iran as a base for electron? and 1 radar surveillance = of the Soviet Union. The CIA Station chief“in Iran usually maintained much , closer contact with the Sha , n the AmerT@an~ambassador. (With the 1973 appointment of formér CIA Director Helms to the past of American ambassador in BD gai] haen os p als icts—than—presimabty speared: #, i“ yess. the Agency had developed a new type of over-the-horizan radar Ges AD which it wished to install nenrthe sovies tere | in Iran, As was normally §. Z - a} the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the Iranis.} However, when Ambassador Armin Heyer was informed of the details of 4 the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with the CIA station chief that x . blossomed into an inter-agency dispute. At this point Meyer cabled the State Department for instructions and advice. . In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas and Washington -- for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate code room for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a- senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA's communicators who work under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the messages they send for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is | well advised to show the CIA station chief cppies of all important State messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special - communications channels which sppposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA. _ | Gheb, in 1968, Ambassador Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief [a / / yh A re ¢ Dray ah : { 8 a in Teheran, Meyer switched his, communications, with State fin Washington, _ “ | .) =6He needed to be able to discuss the 7 6 7 ¥ 9 fC af 12 12
unrelated issues, and as-a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. [situation in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were 4 ‘one Step ahead of Ambassador ‘Meyer. They had figured. out a way to intercept og his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each _ 3 State message was sent, Bob would appear jin the CIA executive suite with a copy tf. of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Mritten on top of . “5 each fintercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be & kept especially confident because State was unaware thet the CIA had a copy. 7 Despite Agency knowledge of all of Heyer's instructions and information, / : $ Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield — 9 to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even-after these two men met at a yz¢ . CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, a ‘they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were. - _ ba unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so ; / aggravated by this continued resistance tha he personally telephoned Secretary _ of of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing © ) completely to the CIA position. | / Bob was also involved fn another series of events which started when FI/D Gp! : Gui worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of -a certain , i South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of j allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent 2 by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercppt 2 the ‘secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements were norma1} procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw ‘ nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which i cooperated in good faith. . , . FI/D's ltaison with the South American country continued fer a long period ‘ _ _ of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over : However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could P ee cnc ann nea naan Be petered 7
13-00000 ae ee 7 1 Sometime later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite GoD) - that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive - operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other | CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and frether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to. be a matter concer.:ing CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn na _ from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American — country in which Iiatson would be restored in return for a‘ Comsat channel (which rian! . CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme even with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office. | Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the - country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that country's secret messages. / Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the . - Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who . probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies within the U.S. government ~~ hot to mention the deceit he and his colleagues perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into liaison agreements with FI/D. Bob X is one of these éedinary looking people who mow their Tawn, love: their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA. | Few other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and fi Howard Hunt. Both had long, relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper- . middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt | was an oneratar whn nlaved a leadina role in the Bay of Pias and who took part 26 a) at 2" 2; 2
13-00000 C ‘Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced it to intervene militarily ina second country to ‘Pratect its operation against Cuba. ‘The. Presivjent way have set the original - policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agenoy paramilitary activities against Guatamala. | CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer= ican foreign policy” hey can subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong. For instance, after th (OLA silot was shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within rive days the US government approved the sale for local currency cf 37,000 tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on 31 million in small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that C | moment the / STA was actively backing-an armed revolution against | the Sukarno regime hese would have = been strange actions indeed for the US zovernmeat to take if it were not extremely concerned | ' about saving the captured pilot. A somewhat similer incident occureed in 1 Singapore in 1960" after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city . to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trugtwor thy. i” When the Agency technician pluzged las his polyzraph machine in a hotel room, ‘he blew out all the fuses in the building.* he *This was not the only time that the CIA blew major “uses uver~ C95 fease During the mid-1940s, the Avency added to iis nuseror? cone tte ata we Foe facilities on Taiwan by building e mege slectrunic ehoeayt
Rae pete ee nee pene vee eco. lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were soon all under arrest. The Si ingapore sovernment and the British, who were in the process of granting Singapore its indepandenc¢, - were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Kegotiations then | | ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore Prime Kinister Lee Kuan Yew, the (US government offeredS3.3 mil~ lion to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten tines as. | much ‘and consequently took nothing. In any ease, the two CIA -. officials were subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote @ Hecret letter of apology: ‘to ‘the Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech as an example of the type of activities en waged in bythe ClfA.s The State Depaztment then issued a routine denial furnished by the ClA=-State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee®s — charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk’s letter of d- pology, and State was forced to retract its original statement, although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered. As well, as embarrassing the US government and meking headlines around the world, the incident caused the State Department te revanp its internal system for making announcements about ine telligence matters, | Bg _ Blackmail was agin the theme in the rid-1960s when the — Gi) President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the ¥, “e, [installation for surveillance ef the Chinese mainland. When the - device was. turned on for the first time, it Knocked out a larde @77) part of the island's power. In this case, the local goverment 3 reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore’ Be
13-00000 Us gover 4t that he might oust certain intelligence instal~ 298, lations from his island. Ehe CIA had a major interest in the matter, S.-:.. it operated a Foreism Broadcast Information Ser- * vice “BIS’ listening post there, and the Pentagon was. also con= —é cerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveil- dance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was that Makarios had to be nollified at practically all costs. ee . Finally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the w ily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about $10 million in return for letting the beses renain. The CLA BY put up half of the money, using the Director’s Contingency Fund for this unforseen expense. In general, the presence of American intelligence facili- C ties in a foreign country can have an. importent effect on Amer= ican policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World. — 95 Closely aligned countries, such as/England, iermany, Japan, and Australia, have usually allowed the Unived States to set oy up electroriic sryinz bases as part of the gencral framework of cooperation between allics. | But to the less developed countries, ; ‘the presence of an American installation is both a threat and an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition for= ces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonisiica” . and use it a3 a weapon against those in power. The opportunity erises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment--and to ¢. keep it in place, as Archbishop lakarios] discovered. Cer. 13
military and economic assistance which had added up over the ' marily intelligence facilities. These are Kagnew in Ethiopia _ -and Kenitra in Moroeco. [potn host governnents have been severely criticized by internal forces and neighboring countries for giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both have been hands somely rewarded in terns of receiving American 4 years into the hundreds of millions of dollars. — while compara § tively modest amounts of aid would have probably beeri® ‘supplied, even if there had been no bases, the larse size of the programs | A represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intellicence } facilities. . | os ss | a) | Similarly, from 1956 until theend of 1959, the US Air soree t ‘operated a huge bas e near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was prie ! marily an intelligence facility. For several years before Prancis — Gary Powers’ abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960, CIA Ue? x planes used Peshawar as a principal ake~off point for recomaissance flights’ over and along - ‘the edzes of the Soviet. Uniion. In addition, fmivar tary intelligence set up a vast array of electronic Listening devices there to moniter activities within the Soviet U Union. {| From the early days of the Ei senhower administration, the United States had allied itself nore closely with Pakistan than with India in those two countries* “traditional struggle. Yet, at Least some experts on the region believe that an important factor in the American "tilt" toward Pakistan, at least until the late 1960s, wes the desire to hold on to the
13-00000 ° penetration, while clearly fortuitous, are not unique in clandestine operations. » f ; In 1964, it was learned that the American embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly 2- C bugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the 3 building. Counterespionage and security specialists determined that the - 4 | equipment had been installed in 1952 when the enbassy had been renovated, and s that the bugs had been operational for roughly twelve years. The darage report G asserted that during this entire partod -- at the height of the cold war -- 7 5 } Soviet ihtelligence had probably intercepted every diplomatic cable between | Washington and the embassy. [inis assessment was based on the discovery of 2G, | | audio devices in the code room which wowkklese al lowed the Soviets to hear *‘ f _ distinctly the sounds being maded by the typewriters and cryptographic equipment. It was a reasonably easy technological feat -- well within Soviet capabilities -- to. translate such sounds into their true alphabetical meaning. | . oo I - American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused Ht early in 1964 when Soviet leader Khrusbchev made a remark to Ambassador Foy Fey Kohler about Kobbler's role in bbocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of steel for an Important pépeline. Taken in context, Khrushchav's remark indicated to Kohler that there was a leak somewhere in American security. Kohler started a massive investigation, and within a month or two, forty-odd bugs were found embedded in walls throughout the embassy. Although Kohler would later claim , ; [ there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation “ : he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchev, the timing would seen to a“ | indicate otherwise. | | 3 - crucial years at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets almost certainly knew 2 : every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in 2 4 Moscow and Washington, The damage report noted, however, that this Soviet | | ae (C knowledge may well have worked to the advantage of the United States at least 2. in one instance in 1953 when the Korean War armistice was being negotiated. At 3% : the time, U.S. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that ff a particular 2
13-00000 i ” : ok \ \ dea omy con, og DDA 77-2412 28 APR 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Halpern FROM: H.G. Bean Acting Executive Officer/DDA SUBJECT: Fairways Corporation REFERENCE: Attached memorandum from Central Cover Staff 1. With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached memorandum from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the public domain.. There has been at least one newspaper article relating to Fairways and, in addition, at least one short television news’ item on the same subject. However, official confirmation of the allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations has been carefully avoided. 2. There has been official acknowledgement of the fact that CIA's Office of Training runs a proprietary to provide executive transportation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, here again there has been no acknowledgement that such an entity was identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation. 3. The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as expressed in paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's memorandum. Attachment cc: CCS
13-00000 SENSI: INTELLIGENCE SQURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED SECRET 9 «WAP TASS 21 April 1977 - MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA FROM : M. L. Latta Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group Central. Cover Staff ‘SUBJECT > Fairways Corporation 1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168 items previously deleted by court order from the book, The CIA and. the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-— tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in this connection. 2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items (107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respec- tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on- all four items is that they are still classified, since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S., and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652. 3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair- ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency . proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair- ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure. E2 IMPDET CL BY 026089 WARNING NOTICE ia Trt oy mt ma vol
13-00000 for the SA/DO/0. “SECRET 4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may have been pracea in the public domain since the court © order (i.e., since February 1975). 5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O. For your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subj ect 2 SECRET
13-00000 _ | MEMORANDUM FOR: [foc h DDS! IGC, | s EDETIONS
13- 00000 SECRET : 14 June “1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: ‘See Distribution. FROM , 07SA/D0/0 © SUBJECT . |. : ‘DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination | on . Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - “Marks - 1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele- tions in subject book for possible declassification, the DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached Gee page 3). . 2. Please review the deletions using the. same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive purview of.the DDO. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public ‘domain, please provide the details. 3. “The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1977: _ Item  -_ Manuscript Page | Review Responsibility 25 a 47— , EA Division “159 1817 . EA Division and NE Div. 160 182 ao . #e ae. Jet . ' 162 Lo "184 moo oat ay woo 164 oe 185 tf " mat ; 205. 234 - NE Division = - 208 235 LA Division , os 209 . 236 LA Division 295 . (424 -EA Division : 297) 425 . EA Division and EUR Div. 299 426 ' - EA Division and EUR Div. “301 "AZT AF Division —— * 190 214 ‘SE Division (Office of Security may be appropriate. ‘action office for this item) _ EZ IMPDET CL BY 018650 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET ) 4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions, please contact the writer on x1542. Attachments - As Noted Above 0/8A/DO0/0 kaw (1542) Distribution oe Original - C/EA/cA™ 7?" 1 - E/FP/FC 1 - NE/COPS 1] - C/AF/Plans “1 -. C/SE/OSG 1.- LA/FOTA™ . 2 - SA/DO/O SECRET
13-00000 DDS§T-5193-76/1 MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel ATTENTION. : | _ SUBJECT © + Review of Deletions from The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks 1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from. subject book per your request. The review was made to determine whether each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the information in each deletion has been officially released by the. U.S. Government. 2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed _ by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi- ‘fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C is a list of those items which we determined are still classified under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be released, but we recommend that all: of the items in Tab C be. coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and _ should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified and should not be released. : 3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina- tions through our contacts at NSA. . We were told that any coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General —_ Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other ele-. ments was attempted. 4. This memorandum completes the DDS§&T action on the court ordered review of the deletions from subject book. Aone! f Cello ERNEST J. ZELLMER Associate Deputy Director: for Science and Technology Attachments: As Stated tee@ieprer ct py.005166 SECRET
13-00000 wore! . -_ pO re a TAB A. DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T -Item . Page Item . Page’ 25 47 : 190 | 214 86 104 191 214 87 ~ 104 — 192. 215 88 105 204 233 91 106 205. . 234 92 © + 107 208 235 - 135 _ 134 - 209 _ 236 136 135 245 . 268 155 - 177 248 ~ 269 157 .179 254 327 158 180 - 258 331 159 - 181 259 , 331. 160 182 260 - 331 161 -183 267 © 337 163 184 268 , - 337 164 185 269 337 165 185 275 394 © 166 185 . 295 424 | 167 185 | 297 425 170 189 ~ 299 426 171 189 301 : 427 172 189 302 427 173 190 304 430 174° a 191 306 - 431 175 191 312 442 ee 176 192 | 313 450 : 177 © 193 324 474 | _ 178 . 194 | 325 474 187 200 327 475 188 201 | 328 476 189 202 - 329. ~~ 480
13-00000 Tab B ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED ' [tem Manuscript Page 91 - 106 SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) 92 407 SECRET, SB(2) and (3) _ *135 = sd: SECRET, SB(2) and (3). 136— 135 | SECRET, -5B(2) and (3) 155 177: ‘SECRET, 5B(3) | 18 iso SECRET, SB(2) and (3) 163 184 SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) 165 185s SECRET, 5B(3) 166 an 185 CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2) - 167 185 CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)° 188 ' 201 ' TOP SECRET, 5SB(2) *Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000 Tab Cc ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS Item .- Manuscript Page * 25 at po * 87 a 104° DOD (DIA) 88 105 —s:pod: (DIA). 157 7 179 -. Os | 159 | 181 : - DDO, OC, ERDA iso 182 ss: ppo, OC, ERDA ~ 161 183 DDO, OC, ERDA -16200~C~*~*~<CSs:«C DDO; OC, ERDA 163 . 184 DDO be | 1640 185 _ DDO- 172 | 189 | NSA | 187 200 DOD (Navy) 189 202 | DOD (Navy) 204 233 "NSA and DDO | 205 234 DDO | 208 | 235 DDO. 3 209 236 DDO | 245 268 DOD (SAFSS) | 248. 269 DOD. (SAFSS) ! 254 327 _ DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff 258 331 . DOD (SAFSS) *Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000 a | Tab C _  , —_ Continued | Item ; Manuscript Page . 259 331 - DoD (SAFSS) . 260 7 BBL DOD (SAFSS) 267 337 --:DOD (Navy) 268 337 pop (Navy) 269 «337 DOD (Navy) 8275 394 OL 295 424 | ppo 297 | 425° DDO 299 426 poo, NSA 301 427 . DDO, OC, NSA 3020002°si(<ité‘ TS NSA ' 304 | 430 NSA | 3060 431 DOD (Navy) 312 442 , NSA 7 313 aso NSA 329 | 480 | NSC Staff *Can be sanitized and portions released. -~2-
13-00000 _ Tab D ” ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS Item 86 170 171. 173. (174 - 4175 176 177 178. 190 191 192 324 (345 327 = 528 Manuscript Page 104 189 189 190 191 191 192° 193 194 214 214 215 474 474 475 476 0/DCI NSA_ NSA NSA NSA NSA _ NSA - NSA NSA. DDO or OS State Department State Department DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff . DOD - DDI and DOD © DDI, DOD and NSC Staff
13-00000 SECRET | Tab E ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE Item 135, Manuscript page 134. "A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in fioe7] when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research Laboratory} - in the jBoston/ area. a Item 25, Manuscript page 47 "Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the . ationalists} first to run guerrilla attacks_ against jmainland hingjand then in more recent years to use aiwanyas” a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs. as propaganda and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol-— ution?’ Item 87, Manuscript page 107 "The Agency also had a project to determine where American risoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to ommunicate with them} Scale models of the prisons were constructed from aerial fand satellite photographyy and from other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which ~ prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate. ome of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their © infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus, the Agency worked out Schemes, to use return mail from the families to send answers back} Meanwhile, the Technical ‘Services Division of the” Item 275, Manuscript page 394 ‘Bew optics for satellite cameras and improvements in ‘over the horizon' radatsg These technical contracts were almost always drawn up under the cover of being between the. scholar (or the university) and some government agency other than the CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were the most" SECRET -
13-00000 * 87 157 159 160 161, 162 163 164 (172 187 205 ' Item,_ * 25 88 189 204 208 | 209 - ng : | 248 es “258, Manuscript Page AT 104 105 179 — 181 182. 183 184 184 185 189 200 202 233 234 235 236 268 69 327 331 Tab C ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS DDO DOD (DIA) DOD “(DIA) - OS DDO, OC, ERDA. “DDO, OC; ERDA DDO, OC, ERDA DDO, OC,’ ERDA DDO DDO NSA DOD (Navy) DOD (Navy) NSA and DDO DDO | DDO DDO. DOD (SAFSS) . “ -pop’ (SAFSS) DoD (SAFSS), NSC Staff DOD (SAFSS) - ¥*Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000 Tab C Continued Item — Manuscript Page - —— 259 331, pop. (SAFSS) 260 331, pop (SAFSS): 267 337 =. «DOD (Navy) 268. 337. en DOD (Navy) 269° aap pop (Navy) | 4275 394 OL Oo 295 _ —  424-—~CO po 297.0 2s 299 4260 "DDO, “NSA 30l 0° ga - DDO, OC, NSA 302 427A 304 430 NSA 306 7 431 7 DOD (Navy) 312 7 4420 _ NSA 7 3213 450 | "NSA 329 | 480 NSC Staff *Can be sanitized and portions released. ~2-
13-00000 173 175 1921 192 325 328 » 86) 170 an 174 177 178 190° 324° 327° Manuscript Page 104 189. 189 190 491 ‘191 192 193° 194 214 “214 215 474 474 475 476 _ Tab Dy - ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS | ~ O/DCI —. NSA. NSA. - NSA. NSA NSA | NSA NSA NSA DDO or OS” ‘ State Department - A State Department DOD (JCS). and NSC Staff DOD | “DDI and DOD © DDI, DOD and NSC Staff.
13-00000 y *, DL UNCLACSIFIED. Oy NTERNAL ae - secret oe Pe __. ROUTING AND RECORD ‘SHEET I ~P’SUBJECT: “(Optional 7 EXTENSION ; Toate — (1542 | 14 June. 1977 . 10: omcer designation, room number, end . , building) . . ; ; OFFICER'S COMMENTS, (Number each comment to show from whom , ft INITIALS “fo whom, ‘Draw a line across column after -each comment.) : FORWARDED ai | _ EA Tams, ettsh ““CTEATTA -5D3102 Has. Shavtd. re Gute), |. ea’ arsed Seusad — “cto ored. nant '¢ ast | atte gt], et G10 “use secret CONFIDENTIAL [7] Yseomy  (C] UNCLASSIFIED.
13-00000 SECRET 14 June 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution FROM | | 07SA/DO/0 SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks 1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele- tions in subject book for possible declassification, the DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached - {see page 3). 2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive _ purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the details. 3. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1977: eee” Item Manuscript Page Review Responsibility 25 47 EA Division 159 181 | EA Division and NE Div. 160 182 cay tt vf re 161 183 et ef : te ve 162 184 at e¢ at ef 163 184 aF ft ? TF 164 185 ef tt ai et 205 234 NE Division 208 235 LA Division 209 236 LA Division 295 424 EA Division 297 425 EA Division and EUR Div. 299 426 EA Division and EUR Div. 301 427 AF Division 190 214 SE Division (Office of Security may be appropriate action office for this item) EZ IMPDET CL BY 018630 SECRET
13-00000 Attachments SECRET 4, Where more than one Division is involved, a single coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions, please contact the writer on x1542. As Noted Above O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw . (1542) Distribution Original - C/EA/CA ; - E/FP/FC - NE/COPS - C/AF/Plans C/SE/OSG - LA/FOIA | - SA/DO/O Nee i SECRET
[hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the B® ! desire to éounter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was notgnew), F strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a od Ghee so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. ACIA:. 4 eter ar Et et te tt PE : me ab owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical tenet eerste ESTES EEE EE ttt Te expertise and management skills to put the station in operation. | . Gg '§till another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special -— om 4 relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link ts’ ra} not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent, Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA. chief of station, Ray Cline, now the / State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something — - of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all- | / night drinking boutspiith the younger Chiang. . ws Fover the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first Cas to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent f years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights. (flown over China by Nationalist is pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland f -and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation, aimed at . i China during the Cultural Revolution, | oe - t In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally é. conducting al? important meetings, with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was 2 of station | . accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed. a But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for zz many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. | a; According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has — z served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal \ Z, meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. . \ 2 personally with N Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu ponsonadidyyite millions: of Ge? aun “i <e "black bag" funds, dollars in untraceable,
13-00000 a confident: judgment’ of the accuracy of the report! s content. Tage ne eo seen’ ' the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the. analysts in making Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive: - actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by. audio surveillance - (which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was edid) with agent reports which are. sometimes exaggerated or false 2, the Clandestine Services confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders, who make decisions based on that intelligence analysis. in. the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and G&® the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combindddféoces to ~~ carry ‘out one of the Agency’ S ‘most imaginative (if. ultimately unsuccessful) intelligence. collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level Lan RIS RR SOONER cw Se ncn U.S. government officials were distu#bed by repprts that Communist China was on - the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. They knew that. the threat posed by Chinese ICBH's would play an important part in the decision, then under consideration, to go: ahead with an American anti- | ballistic. missile (ABM). deployment program. As a matter of the highest | priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch' engtzu, the Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia. The. Agency" s technical specialists, responded by designing a nuclear- - ppwered device which could monitor certain key, electronic emissions coming from the missile site, well over a thousand miles. away, and then rely the information . to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device ona: ‘mountain peak called- the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than: 25, 000 feet, in the | Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "Vine-of-stght* to - the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA - i Re large nuinbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from é Tahoratories. the Clandestine Services took k on the resoonsibilitv for the mos Sfeney
13-00000 © [aieticut phase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top. @, The first thing that had to be ‘done was to gain the. permission of the - 2 Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the 2 CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not ky Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry —G the device, complete wéth its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it. 4 _ Into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered om Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced CIA case officer. . That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian tee ere nnn climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn how to assemble the monitoring device once they got {it to the top of Nanda Devi. Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda _ Devi. Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking as Sv ae too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the & A - & rr eee 7.) oA A. ha —_
[vould do. "Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the ‘team reached the base OD me camp ‘from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by i - a small party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the | group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the 7 staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. - The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in | | an effort to restore peace among the-climbers. The project was now wel off schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition sh because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency - : operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures | well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into | {oo _ operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news — of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging area. But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government L ' was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headgaters of the sacred Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about religious pollution, not ecological. The CIA reacted by planning another climbdof the mountain for the following year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring | system -~ this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team, (on Jed by Bishép, was gathered together again and this time it reached the | top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year _[ con ae
© page 2600 . . <4 spent qT stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical before was not-found. % malfunction. At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved | satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were thanked and compensated for their cooperation. 4 fhe American climbers were ne presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA. f | The fertile imaginations of the fg SaT experts during the following © years produced many more unique codIrction schemes aimed at solving the "mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be ; unworkable, and at Teast one entailed a frightenincly high-risk potential. The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the denied area where, after performing his espionage missfon, he would ~ assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor devic [¢2, A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could(/¢: be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, anjaerial rising from its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a foreign and héstile power to deliver the monitering device and additional similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine or & vaicad cartaue niactinne ae tn the evetam's utility and warth. The RELSAT é “ Mp oP
“in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself ' several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation | Sage eS SECRET 7 l Specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed , however G4) oblivious of the’ dangers involved. in secretly flying near a Chinese missile oo 2 installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite eastly appear - to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear ~ . 4 attack. Development of the Costly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device & that the device failed to self-activate and function properly._{. . t [A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird,  § (45 such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble | on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once | j over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be turned'on to record activities below and relay the information either to its laugch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated | Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the (in annette at rth erento CIA in research on this “baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in | the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency-sponsored spying mission. The technical difficulties involved in the fair-drop]system and the{mode1 ] {66 Jatrptane} ‘device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully 7 developedtby their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement for these quest ionablghand potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few ae Qe . more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being oe
13-00000 . So tg - SECRET C | Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced | it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its _ operation against Cuba. The Presijent may have get the original ‘policy, but there was no way he could hava ‘known that Simply by approving an attack on Cuba, he would. set in train Agency 2 - | paramilitary activities against Guatamala. GIA operations can have another unforseen effect an Amer= ican foreign polieys” Fhey can subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong. For instance, after th CIA /llot was | shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within rive days the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000: ‘tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on 31 miilion in small arm arms end other military equipment. Considering at that Co moment y thes SIA was 3 actively backing: an arned revolution against | the Sukarno ‘regime -nese would have - been strange actions indeed for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned about Saving. the captured pilot. | | | A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960 after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trugtwor thy. When the Agency technician Plugged is his polygraph machine ia a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building.* She *This was not the only time that the CIA blaw major “uscs uver= GIGS ssase During the mide1940s, ‘the Agency added to ite nusenor: Bease During She mice tZevs, whe Asency Beced 20 Ake Dune & Bree & ._— facilities on Laiwan by building @ hinge electronic eee maaie
13-00000 as t lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were soon all undér Grrest. the- Singapore government and the British, who ware in the precess of ¢ ranting Singapore. its independencs, were both: quite disturbed bythe indident. Nes gotiations then ensued to secure the men "s release. "According to ‘Singapore ‘Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US governnent offereds3. 03 mil~ lion to gét them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten tines as much and consequently took nothing. In any. case, the two CLA officials Were | ‘subseque ntly freed, the. newly inst sevatled Secretary of State, Deen. Rusk, wrote .a zecret letter of apology: to. "the Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in 2 speech - “as an example of the type of activities en gaged in. bythe ClAe The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by: the ClA--State's pregs office not realizing the truth of Lee’s” ‘charges. Lee reacted ‘by public ly producing 2 aU sk's letter of A _ pology, and State was forced to retract its original statement, although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered. As well as enbarrassinsg the US governnent and making headlines . around the world, the ineidont caused the State Department to revamp its internal system for making announcements about in= telligenca matters. . ; | a | Blackmail ; was agin the theme in the rid-1960s when the — CH). President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the oe [installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. ‘When the ° device wash turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large Z77) part of the island's power. In this case, the local government 7 3 ‘reacted in a much more’ friendly manner than did Singapore® Se Br ht | Sil 18
13-00000 t i i i i t 13 for this unforseen expense. Clos sely aligned cout untries, such as cooperation between allies. ggg SENET US AOvEl oat that he might oust certain Intelligence in stal-~ 296, lations from his island. ‘fhe CIA had a major interest in the. matter, B00. At operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Ser=- vice PBIS) listening: post. there, and. the ‘Pentagon was. also con- ‘cerned about the possible loss of Ats large electronic surveil~ Lance facilities. The view in the intelligence comunity was that Makarics had to be mollified at practically all costs. ‘Pinally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the w ily old archbishop, and: jhe received a speckal payment of about $10 million in return for letting the bases renain. Whe CIA _ put uv half of the money y using the Director's Contingency Fund— In general, the presence of American intelligence facili-~- pr ties in a foreign country can have an important effect on Aner~ ican policy toward that country. especially in the Tgird World. G up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of England, sermany, Japians and Australia, have usually allowed the Unived States to set. But to the less developed countries, the presence of an American installation is both a threat ond ‘an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition for ces who look on tHe base as an exampls of” "neo-coloniaiisa” and use it aS a weapon against those in power. The opportunity arlses out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right to install its eaves sdropping equipment~-and to keep it in places as [ixenbishop akariog] discovered. Zea SECRET
13-00000 re “TD UNCLASSIFIED.) INTERNAL a CONFIDENTIAL [1 SECRET ~ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET | "SUBJECT: (Optional) “FROM: po — “EXTENSION: | NO! ‘OTSAIDOJO.:C—~—~—C—stiC‘Cts~CSC a , —2D0109 : ; 9564 | 14 June 1977 = TO: (Officer designation, room number, and . DATE ~ ; building) . LS * OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show. trom whom : : = INITIALS to whem. Draw a line-ceross column. after each comment.) 27 RECEIVED | FORWARDED: . . . . . SA7DO/0~ |S. op To 53:2. ~O/SA/D0/0- . : Cc a . : oeVOVOS To the best of our. knowledge, items 208 and 209 ‘have not. been. made... public. ; 13. pv. 15. can te OO secret CONFIDENTIAL =) gseunty ©] UNCLASSIFIED _
13-00000 + 7 SECRET. 44 June 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution oe FROM 07SA/7D0/0 SUBJECT _ -: DDS§T Request for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions in the Cult of | Intelligence by Marchetti ~ Marks 1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele- . tions in subject book for possible declassification, the. DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are: attached (see page 3). 2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have: been legally placed in the public domain, ‘Please provide the details. 3. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1977: Item. - Manuscript Page - Review esponsibility 25 47 EA Division 159 181 | EA Division and NE Div. 160 + 182 " a n 161 183 a ef at tt " 163 184. . »  §? naff Pe of 164 185 : ve 8 ft ve 205 234 NE Division 208 ' 235 ' LA Division 209 236 _LA Division 295 -424 ' EA Division . 297 425 EA Division and EUR Div. 299 426 ‘EA. Division and EUR Div. 301 427 AF Division * 190 214 SE Division (Office of Security may be appropriate action office for this item) . E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630 SECRET
13-00000 “SECRET: 4.. Where more than one Division is involved, a single ““=—* - " * Goordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions, please contact ‘the writer on x1542. - ; Attachments As Noted Above oysa/po/o] kaw (1542) Distribution — Original - C/EA/CA oe = E/FP/FC - NE/COPS . - C/AF/Plans - C/SE/OSG _- LA/FOIA | - SA/DO/0 OND et eS et et pe t SECRET
13-000 00 PaeS So gas ”COSEGRET ("sitdatton. in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of each tintercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confident because State was unaware thet the CIA had a copy. i Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so aggravated by this continued resistance tha’ he personally telephoned Secretary of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing completely to the CIA position. an wo ~) GY aN ww mY / if Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D Gea! worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercapt the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements _ were norna1} procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which cooperated in good faith. FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period © of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could la tan nn nen nineties a Seene Ke prettered 7 4 d ps Lae A, &: S