104-10099-10223 A Sal ee oe a rn QIWIN: According to statements by a senior CIA officer in 1967, made 7 to the Inspector General, the Agency was instructed to develop ao capability to conduct assassinations. Termed an "executive action a . capability, " such a 2 project was initiated in ‘1961, apparently assuming | an existing cryptonym, ZRRIFLE. At the request of the. case ‘officer (the same officer providing this information in 1967), a clandestine oe, - asset : in ‘Europes QIWIN, was to be used i in the project. The éase _ officer understood that arwin: had] been considered in . 19604 for use — 7 in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, but that the proposed | . operation was never carried out because the designated CiA case _ officer declined the assignment. The case officer in charge of ZRRIFLE also was involved i. in an _ . operation to assassinate Fidel Castro, running from early 1962.1 to.  mid- 1963. However, QIWIN was not used in this effort, reliance being placed instead on a Cuban exile leader. QJWIN was never briefed on the Castro operation, according to the officer handling - ' ZRRIFLE and the Castro operation. ; Records do show that QTWIN was dispatched to the Congo in 1960, being there in November and December 1960, prior to the BS anne 7 586 7 . ms istCret Ot ATT TO ae. vat
14-00000 8 . - — i as death of Lumumba at the fest re bongotese, However, there is no evidence to suggest that QJ WIN: was in any way involved in Lumumba's demise. The case officer who ' was the source of the information of the Contempleted use of (Qs WIN in 1 such an activity: understood that he was never used in this manner. ‘The following information 1 reviews existing knowledge beyond that summarized above. A 13 October 1960 dispatch from[___fransmite notes to - headquarters from one of the two officers who subsequently met QUWIN in Luxembourg. The notes list. the names of police officials oo - and criminal elements and allude to the } pos sibilities of finding Safe- crackers and document-suppliers. QUWIN was ‘met in Luxembourg on 19 and 20 October 1960 by two Agency officers and was asked if he would undertake a trip to. ‘Africa, presumably Dakar. (The appropriate dispatch, dated | 2 November 1960, lists ‘only Luxembourg snd[__ pe addressees. ) He was not given the true objective of his mission because of its ¢ extreme sensitivity and pending a final decision to use him. ‘Instead, he was told that the Soviets were operating in Africa among nationality groups, specifically Corsicans, and he was being asked to spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for . our use. He agreed to go on the trip. On 2 November Qs WIN was | met in Frankfurt by an Agency officer, and he accepted an offer to 2 re. = ee SLL, otln i
14-00000 (Crater meant can rie nly patente on | @ Sach @ proceed to Leopoldville. (P iden ably the idea for sending him there originated at headquarters because someone must have _ considered him ‘qualified to handle a ‘Potential operation there. ) The precise mission was not t conveyed to Qe WIN, and he was only informed that the mission might 5 involve a large element of personal risk. We do -not know and at present are > unable to determine what, the as signment . was. Subsequent cable trattic discusses | arrangements for or WIN to go 7 first to Leopoldville and then 1 to Dakar. a a On 8 December Qs WIN: was in Leopoldville where he cultivated : o a close personal relationship v with a Yugoslav Air Force pilot. ‘There | follow suggestions in cable traffic on what approach aay WIN should use - ‘to recruit him. However, a special channel FI/D cable of 14 December a “rates this target as ‘marginal when considered against the framework. of © - plans for QI WIN and instructs him to desist if action has not already . been taken. The first paragraph of this cable states that we “would ; : like. restrict Qs WIN 1 to: activity directly pertinent his mission . ¢ Leopoldville or forthcoming mission Dakar and pos sibly elsewhere a : (e. g- > Milan) for FI/ D purposes. He our only asset. of of this type 2 and - we wish keep him clean of any operational involvement other than that originally planned for him. " This cable would tend to rule out involvement in an assassination plot, since it is highly unlikely that _ “VES bance
14-00000 SempooE ter Ls erare - @ bus «EYER ae yy poLY an individual picked for such a ES and dangerous assignment would be burdened with other chores or assignments immediately — } . thereafter. Lumumba was , still ative, albeit under arrest, as 5 of the middle e a io of January 1961, ‘and it seems clear that am WIN had lett the = Congo. in December 1960. A 19 December cable to Leopoldville authorizes oe his retarn to Luxembourg on 21 December and instructs Loucembourg - to pay him 1000, dollars | for December salary, which is the final payment for his services on this operation. Also, headquarters y was - - oo a working out the details of, a 1 Congo assignment. An il January 1961, —— 7 . 7 headquarters memorandum, which refers to. T/Ats « dated 24 December : 1960, states that the referenced amounts were given to QrwIN Py the oe Chief of Station, Luxembourg. This suggests that QIWIN was in. Luxembourg on or before 21 December. Subsequently, | it appears that Las WIN operated in Europe trying ‘to spot and assess individuals whom the Agency could use in ‘safe- ce - cracking operations, in line with one of the principal 1 missions of / FI/D. A 24 May 1962 cable to Luxembourg mentions that a decision was made to keep him in Europe and that the Leopoldville assignment LO had been cancelled. Atransfer to Baden-Baden is deemed a good choice. Also, a 24 April 1964 disptach from Luxembourg, which me om} arn ay ° tho foo Races ot
14-00000 a | Tame eee Oe mentions the termination of QJ WIN's contact, refers to the fact - that his only assignment since e January 1962 has been to , establish . | _ cover. | Agency « officers who were handling ar WIN in Europe e were almost - - certainly unaware of the fact that he was being considered as an n asset : by the senior Agency official | who had begun to become active in a a February 1962 4 in the , assassination plot against Gastro. An undated (EYES ONLY) ‘memorandum from the Deputy Director. (Plans) refers i toa 19 9 February 1962 memorandum and authorizes the retention 0 of. the : services of QIWIN 3 in activities which we . have identified as a coincidential with the assassination p plot against Castro. The date of Re : the reference memorandum coincides with the time that the senior - Agency official became actively involved in this enterprise. A memorandum of 27 June 1963 dealing with the further handling of - ‘QUWIN mentions | that this enterprise has been terminated, except ce ¢ for one ' Precautionary "life line. '"' amon Sqr eee ne et ees In summary, it is almost certain that Qs WIN had nothing at all | to do with the assassination of Lumumba, even though the contents ‘and : language of available files are often ™ and imprecise. 1 If ‘he had - been, it is highly unlikely that the number of Agency officers handling - Q and contemplating assignments for him would have been so large. The
14-00000 7 to his briefing in late 1961. socal ee ika| . headquarters division for whoo § he wo vida. was concerned, inter alia, with obtaining foreign cipher and code books, and it is reasonable to ‘conclude that Qs WIN's | primary and exclusive responsibility, was to find individuals who could do this kind of job. One of the officers who’ first met an WIN in 2 Luxembourg was ona trip overseas | to find a safe crackers and document-suppliers. ‘The By December 1960 « cable mentions keeping him clean and using him in Dakar and j pos seibly Milan, oo which was specifically mentioned in the B October dispatch a as s offering : | good possibilities for r finding safecrackers and document- -suppliers. - . ~ Further, good tradecraft practices would dictate that the last thing | that would keep | an individual clean would be involvement i in an a . assassination plot Although the Chief of FI/ D coincidentally v was” later assigned responsibility 1 for the Castro operation, there 5 is. "no evidence to ‘suggest that he was privy to assassination plots prior "While QIWIN \ was considered for use in the "executive action capability", ‘there is no information available to suggest that he had ever been approached in this regard, much less used in any of the _ ' planning. AES baw
14-00000 . 7 3 . in the course of our. research, two aspects « of the Lumumba story ° - - oN ° r of ; Se at e Based on available evidence ik Se A ga ééms clear that the Agency ee was in no way involved in: ‘the assassination of Lumumba. However, - surfaced that indicate Agency involvement ina . plot. In the, one - instance, our 1967 : source mentioned the name of an Agency « officer. os who was s designated : as the case Officer for an assassination 2 plot a against Lumumba, but reported that he had declined the assignment. oo a That officer was ‘the originator of a 19 December 1960 cable to . = a Leopoldville in which he authorized the return of Qs WIN to oe Luxembourg on 21 December to await further instructions and the a . 7 payment of 1000 dollars to him for his December salary by € the - Luxembourg. Station. The last t paragraph of the cable advises . ; Leopoldville that headquarters is working out the details of a Congo assignment for QaWin. The same officer was the originator of a oe 31 | January 1961 memorandum dealing with payments to QUWIN. In the ‘second instance, al? December 1960 cable from. ‘Leopoldville deals with the activities ofa newly recruited agent, | - WIROGUE, whose mission was to try to spot persons for a a surveillance team, intelligence assets (with emphasis on Orientale Province), and paramilitary assets. The second paragraph of the cable mentions that he resided in the same hotel as QJWIN (although neither knew of the others CIA connection) and that. he approached Fi Cai 7 Pr pS en f.
14-00000 et the latter on 14 December with an offer of 300 dollars per monthto.__, participate in an intelligence net and to be a member of an nexecution . squad. When QIWiN. said that he was not interested, WIROGUE - added that there would be bonuses for special jobs. The cable ws mentioned i in paragraph 6 that the Station \ was concerned with the free > wheeling of. WIROGUE, ‘his lack of security, his inability t to handle e finances, and his ‘unwillingness to follow instructions. ‘The Station So |. was willing ¢ to keep him on , probation, but believed his recall would be the best solution. A . suggested alternative was to put him i in wes ~ ol Stanleyville to try t to obtain immediate intelligence on that 2 area. a In an a attempt to reconstruct events, Africa Division v was apprised . of the above and was asked to search its ‘records | in an attempt to clarify what WIROGUE was up to in the Congo and his reference to an - "execution squad." The research did not clarify the matter to any - . great extent, although some assumptions can be made on the basis of ~ - circumstantial evidence. On 19 September 1960, two members of s . | Africa Division met with WIROGUE to discuss an operational assign- . ment in that division. “In connection with the assignment, he was to Do be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization. mo In October 1960, a cable to Leopoldville stated that he was being prepared for : a deep cover : assignment to arrive Leopoldville late * Nenaiee TN an tala, i 4 ate bo 8 $ tee ST ee tooo
14-00000 re ee on a ce _November. sondquarters tet the-intent to use him as a utility . agent in order to (a) organize and conduct a ‘surveillance team: (b) | a “ dntercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other sestgne / - : * 7 a ; mente. requiring , positive : action. His wtilzation is not to be restricted. - | oe os to Leopolaville. Indeed, he may be subject to call L by other African, 7 Qf / a a stations although it it is. + expected for him to be resident in 2 Leopoldville. ne | |" WIROGUE arrived in Leopoldville on 2 December 1960. ‘His case . a “officer gave ] ‘him the following instructions: () to build cover or possty | fe . by © opening a hop; a: and (b) to try to spot persons for a a oS - : surveillance team, intelligence assets and paramilitary assets. “ Shortly. after arrival, WIROGUE ran into 0 Qs WIN, who later told the - station that WIROGUE : looked like an intelligence agent. © In attempting - : - to recruit awn for his “execution squad", WIROGUE exceeded his ; . i instructions to » avoid making approaches without checking with 7 . > a . - Leeopolaville Station. : | . — | In Tanuary 1961, at the > request of the Leopoldville Station, , oe ‘WIROGUE- was given permission to take fying lessons. By March, he had obtained the position of|| wd 7 a ” “with the in that capacity he was used by CIA for the purpose of gathering intelligence of _ By | April, the [were trying to use him to obtain arms and - fale len w0l Y 5 ° r Pr - oe
14-00000 & § & Ey “ ot _ instructors in Western Europe. Afso,; ne was then teaching the a He departed Leopoldville: in daly because & . “he had run into difficulty obtaining a residence permit, “and his ca 7 . | . . os _ 7 contract was terminated in September 1961. | ye an . Africa Division believes that WIROGUE was , recruited for his. ; 7 ' Oo ; me Congo assignment because of his. third country national 1 backgroud in order to establish a | support  mechaniem in | Leopolevitle. At the. , time the Congo was in chaos, we had few assets there, and the one | likelihood existed that the. political situation would degenerate | = _ 7 : - quickly. .The Station possibly also wanted to ) have a latent nt paramilitary ; capability. An October 1964 assessment of WIROGUE indicates little oo : 7 oe . . flap potential with him since he knew little about the Agency. He epent’ ; most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved ‘in any particular operation. -- | Be 3 Cali