IOLSE SELECT COMMIT TTEER ON” ASSASSIN ATIONS: SPAPE SENDERS raneynaeinsniey — dente +e 4 saad AOS sn tat A! be ey FILE srete/wumber/voLUsE: CASE . aan wat (Mo) vee Ke a _ MOSENK ai Lez PBS aes — S/VDY CUSTODIAL UNI'T/LOCATION: SE ee _ ot i we siomacs feds oa ettwith sitet relate on ttiietionmads stchantiretn dened ak oot Sates: amd sbctdats ala es ee Bane de gt ee en LN DELETIONS, IF ANY: Gv GoiwG €7FROFT2L0-5 YATE A ea RECEIVED | RETURNED ae BY (PRINT NANE) STONATON OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL ; | 44 MAY 134 bE Chel fe eee eee nee : i ig | 3 | ; NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM ‘THIS FILE wet me me Tae ea MED MELE on MEETRRIRES oars ere seaman mR BFP TERR sess comentpyie TEMS
renee able Bam pes The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO February 1967 Rowen et beat BEO et  o ee
The Bona Fides of NOSENKO I. INTRODUCTION II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS A. Introduction B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962) C. Second Geneva Phase (January-Fubruary 1964) D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964 to Present) IIZ. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES . A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva “4. TRY in 1962 2. The 1964 TDY Cc. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO 1. Introduction . 2. Collaboration in 1962 a. Readiness to Report to CIA b. Attitude Toward Defection ec. Motivation 3. Decision to Defect (January 1964) 4. The Letter of July 1964 D. Pattern of Activity in Geneva 1. Introduction 2. Official Buties in Geneva 3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency 4. Association with TSYMBAL §. Association with Other Soviets 66 Availability for Meetings with CIA "B.. Timing of Defection . , FP. The Recall Telegram TOP SECRET oe Ww a wd ae] a O i) vob boa gland telat ci tate bbe) ee Seay oo Oo & w WwW es bua Ht nn an ao sn oe! a pete i on fs pe a ao ww WwW NH SN A hp o &® ® NN & & w @ ry i & pat 7 cc
74-00000 G. I. Soviet Official Reactions Repercussions Within the KGB i. Ze 3. 4e H.. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family KGB Handlers of Agents IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO's LIFE A. he B. c. a “ Dp. Introduction NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB -d. 26 3. 4 Soviets ' Family Life Venereal Disease Affiliation with Communist Party Organs Statements to Cthers by NOSENKO V. NOSENKO's KGB CAREER A. 2B. Pare Introduction Entry into the KGB i. 26 Date of Entry Statements About NOSENKO Circumstances and Procedures of Entry To June 1955 (American Department) i. Ze Introduction Operations Against Correspondents a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, and WHITNEY GILMORE, SALISBURY, b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents c. Information from Other Sources Operations Against Military Attache Personnel | ' -@ Agents Reporting on Military Attaches a3 - yf 85 85 86 86 89 93 93 93 94 95 96 98 im erne Avast ambos ae ai a * £ { i | i \
June 1955 to January 1969 {Tourist Department) i. Ze 3. 4. b. introduction Soviet Homosexual Agents Other Soviet Agents Operations with Foreign Visitors Be b. Ce ge he i. J- ke a. NOSENKO's Targets (4) (44) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955) Recruitment of BURGI (1956) Recruitment of HARRIS (1958) Compromise of KRAFT (1958) Recruitment of DREW (1959) Recruitment of Recruitment of Recruitment of Recruitment of Compromise of BARRETT (1959) - Compromise is snite deta fz «cher nts at atat nee veh ote eed trie ae et, “NG of BENSON, STROUD and MULE YAN LAETHEM Lede dahittbwee tens ‘ 3 5 ‘and Gee (1957) Contact with Gaus of WILLERFORD (1959)
14-00000 5, The FRIPPEL Case (1959-63) 129 m4 a. NOSENKO's Information 129 ; b. FRIPPEL's Information | 133 : 6, Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963) 136 a. Statements to the FBI 137 ; b. Statements to CIA 141 4) KGB Interest in OSWALD ; 141 . ; { (ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD 142 | (iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure 142 ‘ from the USSR (iv) OSWALD's Visit to the Soviet 143 Embassy in Mexico (v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible 144 KGB Involvement in the Assassination 7, Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge 145 of Tourist Operations | a. Information from NOSENKO 145 ; b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE 146 ce, GOLITSYN's Tourist Document 147 ; 8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958) 150 E, January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department) 152 ! 1, Introduction 152 2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy 153 Section 3. Duties and Knowledgeability 157 1 a. Introduction ~ 157 . , b. Functions as Deputy Chief and Acting 158 : Chief of Section (i) Access 158 F (ii) Duties | 159 ee (444) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's 163 i Absence ‘ 4 e@ .* o o~ ree ee Re Le ee es
ec, Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations 164 4 4 (i) 9 Introduction 164 5 ‘ 3 (ii) Approach to STORSBERG 166 a 4 (a) NOSENKO's Information 168 . 4 . M, 3 (b) Information from STORSBERG 177 4 (c) Information from PREISFREUND 179 Sih a rdtbecte te (a) Information from GOLITSYN 182 _(e) Information from Other Sources 184 (iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk 186 Cases (a) Introduction 186 (b) False Identity for Travel 186 (c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER 187 . Case) i (a) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND 196 Case) (iv) KCB-Polish UB Activities Against 201 MORONE (a) Introduction 201 ' (b) NOSENKO's Information ~ 201 (ec) Information from Other Sources 206 iv) Developmental Operation Against 209 ZIVUS {a) Introduction 209 (ob) Information from NOSENKO 209 c) Information from Other Sources 211 : (vi) Approach to KEYSERS ~ 213 po (a) Introduction - 213 ; (b) Information from NOSENKO 213 (c) Information from Other Sources 216 NOSENKO's Responsibilities for Coverage _ O£ ABIDIAN . ; (4) Introduction
(ii) Duties as Case Officer oy : ' (444i) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings 227 i ; | (iv) ABIDIAN'’s Servicing of the Pushkin 231 i Street Lead Drop 4 e. Supervisor of Activities Against American 236 4 Service Attaches a f. Knowledge of the Target | 240 ; (4) Introduction 240 . (ii) Physical Premises 240 F 242 ; g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. 248 ' Embassy : (i) Introduction . 248 | (ii) Microphones in the Chancery 248 : (a) NOSENKO's Sources 249 | (b) Number and Locations of 252 i _ Microphones ; (c) Receptivity and Audibility of 257 Microphones i (4) Amount, Type, and Value of 260 Production . (144i) Microphones in the North Wing 267 A (iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam 270 . h. Handler of KGB Agents 272 4 Overseas Assignments 274 j a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment to Ethiopia 274 . 4 (1960) ‘4 oe | b. U.S. Visa Application (19€0) 274 ve | c. The Cuba TDY (1960) a 276 . a. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case 979 §. Transfer to the Tourist Department 284 P, January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department) 285 1. Date of Transfer "os 285 ' 2. Punctions and Activities. a ces 285 i i Oe ee ey eee, “hel FI oy Sree ~ : : fee * eee 2 f; Cree ; dé Gee ae te letag ae, LQ pa ONE REI Re ata toner,
14-0000 Ieee une eae ee cee ee a eet I MRR SNE AT BNE TE TT ORR TE Se ae Sea PET PER SOR EPR FC ee Rare RE aR NOT age cai tee voy . tae 3 3 4 ’ 4 ; 3 Pace i £ ; ; t eel ' : 3, NOSENEO's Agents en] i a. Arsene FRIPPEL RD rea) 4) wed ee) ta eerste ne b. Johan PRELSFREUND i) c. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV 2788 a. 283 e. Marina RYTCVYA 283 4. Approach to W. E. JCHNZON 2B9 a. NOSENKO's Information 233 b. Informaticn from JOUNSON : 292 5. Attempt to Recruit PRAUNS 233 a. information fren OSENKO 2393 b. Information from ERALUNS 294 6. The SVENCHANSKIY Case 295 a. Information from SOSENKC 295 b. Information from Other Sources 296 7. KOTEN's Arrest | 298 a. Information from NOSENKO 798 b. Information from Other Sources Concerning 309 KOTEN | 302 ec. 8. Arrest Of BARGHOORN | 304 a. Information from NOSENKO 304 b. Information from BARGHOORN 308 9. GRU Agent: John Andrew SHUBIN 310 a. Introduction 310 b. NOSENKO's Information 310 c. Information from 311 eit tet ae ON &. Information from Other Sources 312 10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban 313 . a Missile Crisis : oe a. Introduction 313 i “4 * 4 oh Se 7 4 : ent i roy, $e . 2* . ° _ 4 ni au 2 7 fe iH oh 4
/ “page | b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis 315 4 F c. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV 316 " a. Information 3168 ‘ 3 G. NOSENKO's KGS Pronotions and Awards 319 : H ] i 1. Rank 319 2. Awards and Decorations 322 H. NOSENFO's Relationship with GRIBANOQV 327 i, Information from KOSEMKO 327 : a. Summary ; 327 b, Details 327 2. iInformaticn 336 I. Confirmation from Cther Sources 333 1. Introduction 338 2. 338 3. 340 4. 341 5. : 342 6. GAMKRELIDZE 342 7. GOLITSYN 343 8. 345 9, Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON 347 10, | 347 : 11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV 347 ; ‘+ VI, PRODUCTION _ 349 : | 7 A Positive Intelligence Information ; 349 . B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities 350 F C. KGB Headquarters | 352 3 . 1. Structure and Functions 352 j 2. Modus Operandi . . ; 359 : ee 3. Staff Procedures _ 360 on : a i os -- ; “4 TOP SEGRE = , | Oe
D. KGB. Act tivities. i. 2a - “@perations Against Americans e Tabulation of American Leads ‘ag b. Co a. Successful Recruitment Approaches Development Operations Unsuccessful Approaches Investigations Selected Cases of Recruited Americans Ge "SASHA" (i) NOSENKO's Information on the Agent (1i) NOSENKO's Sourcing (iii) GOLITSYN's Lead to "SASHA" "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH) (i) Introduction (ii) NOSENKO's Information - 1962 (iii) NOSENKO's Information - 1964 (iv) | NOSENKO's Sourcing (v) Results of Investigations KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON) (4) introduction (ii) The Lead from NOSENKO (iii) NOSENKO's Sourcing (iv) JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH {v) Information from Cther Sources (a) (b) (c) (a) (e) JOHNSON 's Statements JOHNSON's Illness rT) ate emenece 4 MINTKENBAUGH's Statements Hedwig. JOHNSON 's Statements Mental Condition of Hedwig JOHNSON | Soviet Concern about Mrs. 412 4l2b 413 413 413 416 419 419 427 427 428 433 436 437 440 456 437 Bs 24 4 iden ptth debtor aoe. ‘ ate sae Fah ed : soured he tan ied Srekl eee i 4
14-00000 (vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.S. 461 * ws Interests . : 7 4 ; 4. Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens 463 | : a. The HARMSTONE Case . 463 a (4) Introduction "463 i a (ii) Information from NOSENKO 464 (iii) Information from Other Sources | 465 F j b. Edward Ellis SMITH 468 . a Information from NOSENKO - 468 : fii) Information from GOLITSYN 463 (iii) Information from SMITH 469 c. The BINDER Case , 470 i | (4) Information from NOSENKO 470 : : (ii) Information from BINDER 470 . . } | -5, Operations Involving Other Westerners 474 | f F | a. Tabviation 474 i | (4) Introduction 474 : | (43) 475 , 4 475 i a 475 a : : 476 | 476 | 4 477 4 4 479 3 re ee 479 H TOP Gitvet co a, AT tensed Gene Chara pelt
14-00000 488 489 | 490 7 OY 491 : : 493 | 4 494 ; 495 495 : 496 496 : 496 | 498 i ; 498 | 4 i (444) Investigations and Development 499 Cases : : j . b. The VASSALL Case 503 4 (i) Information from NOSENKO $03 cnee (44) Information from GOLITSYN 505 i (iii) Information from VASSALL 507 | . c. The Illegal 7 509 7 4 . (i) Introduction _ 509 | | 4 | : (ii) Information from NOSENKO > \ re oop (iii) Activities in Germany (iv) Operation in Canada 6, The BELITSKIY Operation _ Be Introduction information from NOSENKO (4) Statements in 1962
Statements in 1964 (14) 520 : (aay BELITSKIY Photograph $21 ; , ‘| / Ce Information from Other Sources 522 i 7. KGB Investigations 530 i a. Compromise of POPOV 530 : ‘ (i) Introduction 530 ; (id) CIA Operation with POPOV 530 | ; (iii) Cause and Date of Compromise 532 : (a) Information from NOSENKO §32 ; (b) . (c) Infromation from the 533 CHEREPALOV Papers : : (ad) Informition from GOLITSYN 5330 : | b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY - 535 . | (i) Introduction 535 (ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Case 535 (iii) Statements by NOSENKO 536 i (a) 536. 1 (b}) Reports on the Compromise 538 | . | . (iv) 544 | { (v) 544 | a ae (vi) 545 ' (vii) 545 (villi) $46 os . (ix) Information from Official KGB 546 Report (x) Information from WYNNE 546 ¢c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV 548 (i) Introduction 548 - (ii) Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV mT (444) Reports by Americans . « a ne nae oan . : oy et Hed loa mea . . oe seg te 7 : . 4 uae ° ard : . ‘me a¥
later er nan ntee ant ar D inten Nel rence oe Ctr et nae PO hea een ©. U.S. Evaluations (iv) Information from NOSENKO -(v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) Contests of CHEREPANGY Package (x) NOSENKO's Cosments on the CHEREEANOV Papecs ad. Reports on KAZAN-ROMAHEK (i) Introduction: (ii) scatement by i.CSENKO (iii) Statement e,. Alfred SLELINGER: the PRL (i) Introduction (in) NOSENKO's Information (iii) (iv) SLESINGER's Information. Technical Penetrations o1 the West German Embassy a. Introduction be. Information from NOSENKS dad. Evidence of Technical Penetration Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S. Enbessy ‘a. Introduction b. Information from NOSENKO (i) «Braking U.S. Ciphers (ii). Handling Deciphered Cables (i1i) Methods of Cryptologic Attack. (i). NSA Report 569 569 371 571 572 $73 574 574 576 578 300 583 '§83 585 $85 587 sree manne = tee net mma « ee ee wee IE cee. ela cde Ms Tea etite ULE wt ot oe we tambon: pape ene me
74-00000° 7 (ii) USIB Security Committee Report 533 4 E. NOSENKO and GOLITSYN _ $94 7 1. Introduction ee 594 : 3 2. Background Information on GOLITSYN , 594 ; 4 3, COLITSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO 595 a. Microphones in the U.S. Emrassy 595 4 a b. Other Leads Corroborated by NOSENKO | §96 4 ¢. Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports 597 4 seh tt 6. Leads to Operations Against U.S. Embassy 5937 Not Covered by NOGSENKO ba aah Aone 4, NOSENKO's Information o1 GOLITSYN 599 F. Surveillance of Soviets in the United States 665 7 1. Information from NOSENKO 600 2. Information from Other Sources 601 : a. GOLITSYN 601 be . 602 ; : €. CHEREPANOV Document 602 be ss WII,»«- SPECIALISTS’ ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO 603 | A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality 603 i a 1, 603 ; . 2. Reports by Psychologist 605 a. Psychological Testing Results 605 b. Alternative Psychological Explanations 609 ce. Psychological Interrogation . 3. Report by Psychiatrist B. Views of Intelligence Personnel Le Statement by DERYABIN Be - Introduction | b. " DERYABIN's Comments ',. 2. Remarks by CIA Handlers . toe Introduction
F aatn, ‘inant creatinine wi ane etek oem geee were robe Laas. Se, Pore c. Polygraph Testing i. 2. Test in April 1964 NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings NOSENKC's Behavéior Under Interrogation (i) (i (444) Introduction 4) Manner of ‘Recounting Events Evasion, Defenses Immrovisation, Additional Observations (1) (4. and Other inquisitiveness about CIA i) Acceptance of Contrary Informacion from Other Sources Discussions with NOSENKO about his own Performance Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD Be b. Introduction Results * - ~ fe é i tev ne ‘em tr 630 6390 631 631 632 632 638 638 638 + i i \ i 5 {
NOSENKO 'S BONA FIDES: Introduction Evaluation of Production 1. Introduction . ; fo ae 2. KGS Organization, Personalities, Methods . 644 | ; a | (3, Operational Leads - . 645 | f 4 - 7 a. Introduction 645 -_ 4 . i ; 4 : b. Operations Involving Americans 646 : 4 (i) Completeness, Accurary, Detail and 647 } Consistency of Reporting ; i 3 a (ia) Damace to the Soviets roped 6) i = oe (ri importance or Usefulness 652 : 4 c. Operations Involving Other westerners 654 a : (i) Introduetion 654 ; ee Cii5 Discussion "654 | oars 4. Technical Operations Against the U.35. Embassy - 657 : a. Invroduction 657 _ b. Discussion 657 | ' j 4A Bo c. Remarks 659 i : an 7 5, The BELITSKIY Case 660 | a. Introduction 660 : b. Discussion 660 | J ec. Remarks €61 ‘ 6. KGB Investigations a . 663 7 a. Compromise of POPOV . . : 663 | i (i) Introduction 663 { ~ ed pete ree) Discussion ~* ; (6630 eee rere ' (iii) Remarks” “tp. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY | i) Introduction ' (ii) - Discussion Reet) Remarks “@. Compromise of CHEREPANOV WW Introduction (ii) —s The Operational Plan in Draft (i2i) The Summary on LANGELLE » Civ) Remarks ; no cenoey | Gy acta | Davee
74-0000 "7 Evaluation of Sourcing 1, Introduction 2. Discussion 3. Remarks . , 677 4 : BD. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Carcer (678 L 4 fe oe 1. Introduction 673 / os 4 rae 2. Naval GRU Service 673 ‘ 4 . . @. Introduction 679 _— b. Discussion 679 | F : c. Kemarks 661 4 : 3. Entry into tne KGB 683 4 . a a. Eligibility 683 b. Date of Entry , 683 a ec. Circumstances of Entry 684 d. Remarks 685 ; i 4. Initial Service in the U.S, Embassy Section 686 ; 4 oe " @. Introduction 685 , 4 : : b. Work Against American Correspondents 686 | 3 “ a . e. Work Against Army Attaches 686 | i i . m 7 d. Additional Reporting 630 | i . e. Remarks ; ; . 690 i . 5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960) 692 * s oe a. Intreduction 692 i 2 So _ b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958) 692 : (i) General - 692 Ie (ii) ‘The BURGI Case . -* 693 . / c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section Oo 695 | dad. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel : ‘ @. Knowledge of Section's Activities (i) BLAKE . Ga) GOLITSYN Document (idi) Tourist Agents | \f.. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper “ge The OSWALD Case rep seapey | 16 bey che Papeete dee “a amuncesnager day clgorminencaiete Inne tase tena ne ety petty Beg RE CI. amd tN ete dat Henao 3 elcalahe E ®
ROPERKO' = “Gnoratioaal Revive Tties “ ti) Ceneral AF (id) . The Homosexuals YEFRE MOV ard YOLKOV f {1ii) Homosexual Pntrape t Oprrations 699 i. 1 (iv) The Agent PRIPPEL | 700 | . i. Remarks : 702 aa 4 | - 6. UL. En bpassy Seetion (1960-136%)} 705. i 4 " a. introduction . 705 4 be Entry ante the Section: 705 4 F c,. Funetions as Deputy Chief 706 ; a. Krowl egceability as Deputy and Acting Chief 707 | : e. Enowledgeability of U.S. SZ .rassy Physical 703 1 Security \ ff. Knowledgeabi lity ubout American intelligence 705 } Personnel ; : g.- Knowledgeability of KOB Coge Clerk Cpe .tions 709 ; (i) Yhe STORSBEXG Case 711 : (ii) The JENNER Case 713 (i212) ‘The GARLAND Case. . 714 | i (iv) The MCRONE Cese 715 . { mo (v) The KEYSERS Case 717 | ; (vi) Other Code Clerk Cases ° 718 4 ; ; if h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN 720 i zy i + i. Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin 722 i : Street Dead brop ; je kesponsibiliny of Supervising Military Attache 725 : Operations . i" = | k. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case 7 726 - 4 “thn U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY gg pees a 1. Personal Handling of Agents | (i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV | (ii) ERIPPEL oe a Gia) DMITRIYEV, | | a (iv) RYTOVA : | Co ey LEENA “ : | | (vi). Johan PRE1SFREUND no : ". (vaii}
aa a. Introduction oe 733 not b. Absences from Moscow 733 fs oS c. Personal Participation in Operations 734 P (i) The WE, JCHNSON Provocation 734 | a (ii ‘The BARGHCORN Provocation-Arrest 735 os ; (iii) The Approach to BRAUNS 736. Pos : (ivi The Arrest of KOTEN | 73° ; d. Age.ts Handled by NOSENXO 738 ., j (i) FRIPPEL 739 ! (ii) SVENCHANSKIY . 739 4 e, The GSWALD Investication — 740 : f. The CHEREPANCV Investigation 740 : ge Remarks , 741 i E. Examination of Uther Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography 742 | j 1. KGB Awards and Ranks 742 a. Awards 746 } j b. Ranxs 742 a c. Remarks 743 | " 2. Affiliation with Comaunist Party Organs 744 i _  @. Introduction 744 | ; b. Discussion 744 | c. Remarks 744 | i: _— | 3. Schooling 746 a, Introduction 746 b. Discussion . 746 ce. Remarks ~ me rn 748 Appraisals of NOSENKO, His Motivation, and Other Operational Circumstances - i. Introdaction 2. NOSENKO “Be Motivation - 4 Operational Circumstances a. Presence in Ceneva (1962) be. Presence in Geneva (1964) Jf AAI he
14-00000 fec 333 to KOH R€l.cency and AValagbiasly da Timing of 1962 Contact @. Willingness to Meet CIA | £. The Recall Telegram ‘g. Remarks G. Sources Supsorting NOSENKO 1. Introduction ye 2. Corrczcoration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career a 3. Remarxs ne H. Alternative Fxplanatiors . 1. Introduction : 2. First Alternative : a. Faulty Memory ’ in b. Selective Memory | : c. Embellishment. Wey a, ‘Combination of Above @e. Insanity 3. Sccond Alternative to 4. Third Alternative 5. Remarks 7 "I. Summary of Conclusions Apo opens ners tee Te er ats eth thea ag emg te ' i t aida Tabs ok het aeteek Bea coaerieay By site de cade
ILLUSTRATIONS " Photograph of NOSENKO and his father, Facing Page 11 | 3 : the Minister of Shipbuilding Sr, i ode SO Photograph of NOSENKO and NCSENKO's Family Facing Page 43 | 4 4 . a “ Finnish Travel Manifests: March-April 1960: Facing Page 194 ; Finnish Travel Manifest: November 1960 Facing Page 197 . . : . * 4 TDY Authorization Facing Page 319 4 a Translation of TDY Authorization “Facing Page 320 i + 1 , i i ;
14-00000 ta: I. IND TRODUCTICN a - This review presents the facts and observations which bear ‘on the bona fides of the Soviet defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, The highlights of NOSE:KO's biouyraphy, as he has given it to CIA, are as follows: He was born 20 October 1927, the first son — of Ivan Isidorovich NOSEXKC, snipyard worker who in 1339 was to become Saviet Minister of Shipbuilding. After craduating in 1951 from the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, where he specialized in international law and the English language, NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator assigned to the intel- . ligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eustern) Fleet and then as a | senior translator and political officer at en intellicence unit i of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953,. immediately : following STALIN's death, SOSENKO left the Naval GRU to-become a I junior case officer in the KCB, He was assigned to-the U.S. i Embassy Section of the American- Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from 1952 to mid-1955. During this pericd he was initially respcnsible for operational accivity Surrounding Am- i erican journalists in Moscow and later for operations against i 3 U.S. Army Attaches at the-fmpassy. When transferred to the newly : I organized Tourist Departmenrn of the Second Chief Direcrorate in : 1955, NOSENKO had as his targets vi_itors to the Soviet Union ; from the United States and the countries of tne British Common- wealth. Having handled a number of successful tourisc opera- tions, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the { section responsible for operations against American, Eritish, i and Canrdian nationals, Eighteen months later NUSENKC returned | to the U.S, Embassy Section as its Deputy Chief. Between January { Sate ali berth ay Pap edited Hallet 2 tobe 2 1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activ- : ities against the U. ‘s. Embsssy in Moscow and personally super- i vised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the Second Chief Directorate's most important counterintelligence target at the time, and against American code clerks, collec- ; | tively the Directorate's most important recruitment targets. | [ ! i j 5 neater nei sheds Zola ata eats a At ths—0x December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to the*Tourist Department, thas time as Chief of the American- Britisn-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its First Deputy Chief. oe Deeateletthelare ELA Loot ete. From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva ,in 1962, i j * _ NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only gow, three ; ’ ‘4 years following his defection in Fepruary 1964, is definitive | 4 study of the bona fides question possible:. the voluminous and 4 diverse reports ts by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information, : pees required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investiga- H tion, and evaluation, NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his reports, constitutes a large part cf£ the evidence. This review also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, colla- tions with materials from other sources, and opinions by special-. ists of various kinds. These factual elements are presentec without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of NOSENKO is evaluated and analyzed. pees
On hes: eee ee Bere “yes ia 2M 4a * ae This review ia presented in the following format: 7 Part IT: "A summary of Gevelopments in the NOSENKO case from 1962 to the present, including his clandestine _3 H : 4 meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent 4 % debriefings and interrogations. 3 / ol } part Ilq:- A discussion of the operational circumstances of . | “a ry NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection , | ‘ 3 q ve : two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's : : information concerning NOSENKO prior to his First contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, NOSENKO‘s motivations first for establishing clendes- tine contact with American Intelligence and later for ‘defecting to the United Staces, NOEENKO's pattern of activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions of the Soviets. both official and unofficial, to the defection. Part Iv: The non-KG3B aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before and after he joined Soviet State Security Service, as he described them and as others have reported them. se setidinnesin gh eon Part V: The positions and responsibilities of NOSENKO in the 4 KGB, the operations with which he was associated, ‘ his travels abroad. the awards and promotions which ; ' he received and other Soviet sources' statements } on these points. ' Part VI: NOSENKO’s production, especially in counterintelli- gence matters not dissussed in the preceding section. Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads are summarized, ~— Part VII: Specialists’ assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA 4 » graphologist who studied his hardwriting: by the an ee CIA psychologist and psychtatrist who examined him; a a ‘ Loe by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA i oS case officers who handled him: and by the CIA poly- graph operator who tested him. 1 ! ‘ ' i : Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusiens about the bona fides of NOSENKO. 3 a { ' Part IX: The implications of the conclusions in Part vitl for certain other sources. * There are several sources currently or formerly associated with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred to in this review. They include the following: - Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who 3 aes in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December 2 ss Coe ee emp eR PARR HME mete Watt, pad ance medi BS Ties. te ar ae Sao
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14-00000 Re tet | IY. SUMMARY OF CPERATIONAL DEVELGPMENTS ‘A. Introduction “". + Prom the CIA side, the NOSEXKO case can be divided into i three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection handling of NOSENKO from Fecruary 14964 to date. The rest of. Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly. The NOSENKO case overed on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Dis- armament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him by sight from conference neetinys, approached U.S. Foreign Ser- + vice Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get to- gether for a talk thea following day. In the late afternoon of 6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he would like to taik to him privately as soon as possible. He told MARK that he was “not going to pump him for information, | ‘but simply wanted to tell hin seme things." A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, alchough the Soviet clearly preferred 4 an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explain- ing that he thought the upproach so unusual that it might be } an offer of cooperation or cefevtion. He said he belicved the i Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet i delegation to the arms talks. | j . B. Firat Geneva Phase (June 1962) ~, H i - “4 ad te en oeecnemanye or tenet ert titan SAU + we be wa eek ee usenet dan At the 9 June lunchecn with MARK, NOSERKO told MARK that he, NOSENKG, was a KGB ccounterintelligenca officer sent to Geneva to ensure the securit:; of the Soviet delegation. He knew i that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he wat connected with American Intelligence.* He needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American i Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of | . i i ! nis ante thcod RiselTan Tiawbastcestda ee Pandan 1962, was “near ciphers” in the Washington area; the second was the identity of a Soviet in Nosccw who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Al- though NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me ; * alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in : : Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave | i MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and profes- : sional past. MARK explained’that although he was not an intel- i ligence officer, he could place NCSENKO in contact with the : Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day. 3 a + i i . MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that i evening, and a three-nour reeting followed at a CIA safehouse in 1 wade Seles alec asin abienic Geneva. Describing himseif. as a KG Major experienced in opera- ‘tions against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA tae a ° < ‘KGB suspected MARK to be an American Intelligence officer;
| | AED IT Ape NEE PASE GAO Saban et Heise mae to a eb en erie ‘place in Geneva for at least two or-three weeks while arrange- De Post -Defection Han Handlin ng (Febr ruary 1964-Present) | turn to participate an a KGB conference on foreign tourism to Ge officer of his financial difficulcies and repeaced his offer to sell two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, althcugh in the en- j suing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the . a i i Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, never~ theless, that he had no intention of becoming an American agent--" this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite this original reticence, NOSENKO supplied consider- able biographic information on himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGb organization and operational methods in Mescow, He understoc1, as he had told MARK earlier in the day. that CIA *«ouid want more information than the t*o items which he originaily offered, and he agreed to meet again two days later. ees | aad eetadidn tus heed boetbRcive wintatepeenae er cat NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962. alwavs in the same saferouse. Wath the second meeting on 11 June. his initial reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions puc to him on KGB organi- . 3 zation and operations. most of his information neing concerned : with the Second Chief Direccorate. responsible for counterintel- jagence and security within the USSR, NOSENKO scemed to be what he claimed to ke: a KGB officer in 2 sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations, NOSENKO rerutned to Moscow on 15 June, heaving promised to do everything within the limits imposed by person ral security con- Siderations to collect information of interest: the areas of CIA interest nad been outiined to him. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence . to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA. via an address he was ‘ 4 given, when he came to the West again. 4 a nena mane venga mses ected PEt ear Ce Second Geneva Phase _(January- February_ 1964). NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later ses- sion of the Disarmament Conference fone having gone by in the interim without his participation). arriving in Geneva on 19 January 1964, The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accom- modation address announcing his presence, At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible. ne agreed to remain in ments for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB. operational activity collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, yary- ing in length from one anda half to six hours. dry tateatte nn cunneyamcaigmaenes ot “ On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO‘s defection, he reported that.a cable had- been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate re- en aspesy iby 4S oa ned ULES &. TETAS 2 ee ade Sate eae ante te tag?
a mig Soviet Union.*Exfiltration planswere.then-implemented,—reme “and NOSENKO was driven across the border tn Germany that game a ye hes: Bight. The de- a - .  ,, Gision wag reached on IT february to bring. BOSEN%O to the a «+ United States, and in the early even.ng of 12 February he and i . his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, wooly s.> ¢hence to a safehouse in the Washington area. At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO - j met on 14 February with representatives of their respective { . Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and .O Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of of _ oF his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no. ‘ tf 7 é i desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and ‘ vights as a citizen of the USSR. ; pares pte a whe wtebownioy vba CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 Febru~ . | ary, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of : the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his debriefers, both CIA and PBI; his nightlife in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and cisputes with his security escort. He explained these actions by saying that he was under great tensicn as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vaca= woe wvcobdbeneberneehit anscdial «. sali oes ba 2ded to NOSENKO's demand for tion. ' During NOSENKO's absence, cdnsultations were held with the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements Finds, and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were be- coming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Govern- ment, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The . FBI on ] April said it would "not interpose objection" ‘to’the : CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting SO : Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House i 4 were also notified of the CIA plan at this time. ae ate ie. witg ts Rca In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another. | safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only. for a poly- en ae ‘graph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a rou- . aie acces tine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he a whenent + ’ + oa a ee ~ 2 are -* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this eo ore cable. : H i i | i i an i Skt ‘ SFb BO a ae Bee Chiba
sree SSeS RERER ONRE ee nee "reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentions in defecting to the United States and other related matters.* He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which thenceforward was his regular place of residence. Since this time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media. Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had bcen reluctant to give in debriefings, and to clarify contradicticns in what he had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was termi- nated on 24 April 1964. . Despite the searching nature of the questions and the im- ‘plicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved him- self willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to -him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of his. bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were intro- duced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile man- ner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-Novem- ber 1964. . After further consultations with the FBI, a new sound of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENXO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interro- gators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous re- ports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that ne could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had keen basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interro- gation was broken off on 5 March 1965. Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's state- ments could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and its personnel as. the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American | security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the acti- vities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its Deputy Chief. . ; In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-~- called “protocols,” most: of which concern. the: period of. his claimed service in the American Department. . These_ were written by. the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate ("Bee Part Vil.c. for a further discussion of the polygraph. tests. . . - ., Loe o. L . cinerea pecan preamp a = . . er en a RFLP REE + a = 3 Z. do bbs Rl tiesto aen Saas alec Pare wh oer rae Sen 0 mts i. Heres 22 ban ct eee oh bey heme adntbdles Silken wede - Avvinecaa Cadi ih aba ks 14s te AT ee Pee fa GetiCibaane
PUR SCH abe pbcianan > Rie URNA tment ne maect iowa seg eet A nec seat reese een oe wine mia 7 . ‘ se ™ wo s oe NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various s Sects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a “confession,” but vather as distilled and final statements of what he dié end did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom te indi- cate that he underatood and agreed with its contents; he was | allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any gtestions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed dy NCSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading. each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, “I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two - of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presenta~ tion which would. make them more accurate. Commenting cn the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 19653 "My life story is absolutely correct. Anytning I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing ‘when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being abso- lutely correct." . In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights into his charac~ ter and personality. A A) Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 1% August 1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB offi- cer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's per- gonal and professional background. There were no further debriefings or interrogations until 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the case of Lee Harvey CSWALD. ; ; During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB opera~ tions. Questioning was in both Russian and English. cecific sub- wend wba Ba Bane, sou. ante dat hides e teetlepe iene true ath
: i i i i i { i ; sees tg everett nae aS nt BR cope 2 A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO ‘in Cenéva OPERATIONAL CIRCCHSTANCES - ee boast A Capsaicin ace The first of these occurred in April 19€2?, At a cocktail party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female sceretary employed ky the British Foreign Office. Ne saw her several days later in the corridors of the P:lais des Nations oud asked her to have dinner with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. Ac- cording to the sccretary's later account as reported by her superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a. desert island."' The girl felt that NOSFNKO probably was not interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO she was able to report that “he had been in submarines curing the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of Commander. He was e member of the Communist Party. His father was in the Minictry of Shipping. He himself had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had appareatly ry oe and later resigned from the Foreign Officc, *Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) con- cerning recruitment approaches to fmcricane in Moscow prior to Wis first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these re- ports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO, The name NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports. st had end Sine ets Pear eE STR aebet o 4 saber stn bo te 150 nani a Bots Wate ret sf oy ata eee ak Se
14-00000 ae Ci tn tse fn tt OAR ett AE On tr RAE OOP tte Ren ert + At his second reeting with CIA on 11 June 15962, NOSENKO described the same incident, in the context cf reporting a pcs~ akle KGB penetration of British counterintelligence: “I decided to try to take this English girl to bed. And this had nothing to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)...And Yurna {Yuriy GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneva] said to mez — ‘Listen, Yura. Be careful, because we have peovle cven in British. counterintelli,ence.'" NOSENKO described the incident as follows: "After I had been here a week or two there was a reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me, and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to make my acquaintance, and that's all. M.S. ROGOV (TSYNBAL) was there. He said to me: ‘Yura, it loaks to me lixe you are going to bed with that girl.’ I answered: ‘What do you mean, Mikhail Scepanovich? “She just interests me.! I had already decided to try to get her in t.ed.,.But, listen further. After this she used to go to tue Disarma~ ment Conferences. Weli, to make it short, I asked this girl for a date. She is Scvuttish, Seottish, not English, and works in an office here. We agreed to reet ata restaurant. I asxei my friends which restaurant here is the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went tos the restau- rant and sat there all evening--all alone. ‘ihcre were just she two of us. The restaurant is urder the ground and is called ‘Day and Night' in Russian, "Jour et huit.' We sat there and then she asked me where we could reet ayain, A day later we met again. Again in the restaurant and then we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the brush-off. I called her once. She wasn't at home. I called again. Again she was out. I called a third time. She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence officer and that I was interested in her for this reason. : This, honestly, wasn't so. I had onty one thing in mind. She was quite a woman...But the English yirl felt that she was being developed. I met three times with her. Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them ther superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian. She told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently sig- nifying that they terminated the relationship] at once. She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things-~ walking on the quay and I said to her: ‘How about going up to your place?' she answered: ‘I can't.’ ‘Why?! I gaid, ‘I'll take off my shoes: and come on tiptoe." She answered: ‘Is it: possible for me to come to you?’ I said: ‘You can't come to my place. There would be a knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.‘ . 4 So all I could do was have her next to the parapet. But 7 the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but TOP seener well, you know--so to get her into bed. Well, we were vom i Lf + ne ane Lara ra cme meh chm Encuepegtny mem eutceanens atoreim Ret Serial Breath SS odhtids n wbitiecte MSMR eee ee - 4 4