HW 53216 5 August 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Cl Staff SUBJECT: GOLITSYN's comments on the NOSENKO Case Introduction and General Assessment l. In reviewing the value and validity of GOLITSYN's comments on the NOSENKO case, it must be borne in mind that although his current comments do not provide much that is new GOLITSYN himself has always been a key to our understanding of the NOSENKO case. In 1962 NOSENKO's in- formation was closely keyed to what we could presume to be a KGB damage assessment of GOLITSYN's defection, a fact which we only noticed on comparison of NOSENKO's informa- tion with GOLITSYN's. Similarly, what GOLITSYN had told us about Department "D" enabled us to see how such a high- level provocation could be run. Furthermore, his most recent comments do in fact provide useful support to our analysis which had already been completed. We do need now to assess how much GOLITSYN may be in a position to help in our assessment and future handling of NOSENKO and other ramifications of this KGB provocation. His value and future contribution can be assessed on several levels: a. How much new hard information can he contribute? b. How much new insight can he provide us through his own knowledge of KGB procedures and personnel applied to the materials of this case? c. How much guidance can he provide in our future ma wnipulation of these operations and in breaking KROTKOV and NOSENKO? 2. Point "a" is discussed in paragraph 5 below. While there are several useful items, the total of new hard facts is not great. On point "b", his insight, as reflected in his oral comments and analysis, is disappointing as one would have expected him to provide a more penetrating analysis than that which we completed carlier. And in point "c" he himself admits to having no idea about how to break Docld: 32404751 Page 19
NOSENKO and KROTKOV, other than to point out that it will be most difficult, that we need to do some more groundwork and preparation before proceeding to an active attempt to do so (including perhaps uncovering a penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow first), and that we should use well qualified interrogators. 3. We are faced at this point with the eminently com- plicated task of breaking NOSENKO. (While preparing to do so we are keeping him productive and examining the ramifi- cations of the operation.) Our great need now is for hard, incontrovertible facts with which we can confront NOSENKO, to prove to him that our conviction about his guilt is based on something more than analysis, which is what he now evidently thinks it is. For this, our only immediate asset is GOLITSYN, who looms so importantly as a factor in this operation. We therefore hope, despite GOLITSYN's ‘relative lack of contribution thus far, to exhaust ali pos- sibilities and get from him every possible detail. Therefore, since there are many loose ends and unclear bits from his ~ 29 June report, we are preparing followup questions for GOLITSYN which might assist our task. Some of these questions are attached hereto as Attachment A. 4. GOLITSYN's principal report on the NOSENKO case was contained in the oral presentation of 28 June 1964. As background for his study of the case, GOLITSYN was given a wide range of materials on NOSENKO including 113 pages of responses to specific questions GOLITSYN wanted put to NOSENKO (see attachment B’for a listing of all materials pertaining to NOSENKO which were shown to GOLITSYN). In addition, GOLITSYN:was given the CHEREPANOV papers with supporting documentation, as well as the KROTKOV case and manuscript, the BELITSKIY, the UNACUTE and POPOV cases. In general, this was nearly everything available to us in our analysis of 25 March, 11 May and 8 July, with the ex- ception of the SCOTCH case. What GOLITSYN said 5. Statements of fact: What GOLITSYN could contribute in the form of personal knowledge, as against supposition, 35 summarized in the subparagraphs below. Comments on each point are appended where appropriate. Several of these points are of real assistance, but certain aspects of their content or presentation weakens their impact or opens then - and the source's accuracy to some question, HW 53216 Docld:327404751 Page 20
HW 53216 a. This man is the person he says he is, Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, the son of former Minister NOSENKO, and he really was a KGB officer. Comments: (1) GOLITSYN knows this because he says he knew NOSENKO personally, having met him two or three times in II/1/1 in 1953 when GOLITSYN was there on other business, GOLITSYN also met NOSENKO occasionally at work in 1958-1959. In 1959, GOLITSYN asked NOSENKO where he worked, and NOSENKO said in the Tourist Department. GOLITSYN asked him about CHURANOV. In addition, NOSENKO and GOLITSYN know one another indirectly through their coimon friends CHURANOV, GUK, KASHEYEV, etc. (2} NOSENKO, however, could not identify the photo of GOLITSYN and, when told who it was, repeated his earlier statements that he had never met GOLITSYN and would of course remember if he had- He had once been shown a group photo of him. (It is difficult to see why NOSENKO would lie about this, since we clearly could check through GOLITSYN and a contrary statement would throw immediate doubt on NOSENKO's bona fides, and there would apparently be nothing for him to lose merely admitting it. This raises the question of why GOLITSYN might lie about this point, similarly not very easy to answer.) b. NOSENKO served in II/1/1 from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible during the period 1953-54 for American military personnel in the Embassy. In 1955-57-58 he may have had the same responsibilities, or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but was definitely in II/1i/1. Comments: (1) NOSENKO says he was in II/1/1, working first against correspondents and then against military personnel, from March 1953 until mid-1955, and claims then to have transferred to the 7th DoclId:32404751 Page 21
HW 53216 © ™~, (Tourist) Department of the Second Chief Directorate (II/7). (2) In our own analysis of NOSENKO's story (ll May report) we had expressed doubts that NOSENKO actually even served in the Ameri- can Department at all, since he was so vague about details he should have known, since he was suspiciously self-contradictory aout. when he entered and what he did, and since his later period in that Department (1960-62) is clearly a complete fabrication, - c. NOSENKO served from 1957 or 1958 in the Tourist Department (I1/7), where in 1959 he was a senior case officer. , Comments: (1) As noted above, this contradicts NOSENKO's story of having made this transfer in mid-1955, thus creating a period of two to three years which NOSENKO's legend is trying to cover up. This suggests to GOLITSYN that there was some success in the Embassy during this period, which is supported by other ob- servations (see below). . (2) There is reason to doubt the validity of GOLITSYN's statement, since NOSENKO is in- dependently known to have been involved in at least one, and perhaps two, strictly tourist- type operations involving U. S. citizens in the period 1956-1958. One was Richard BURGI, whom NOSENKO recruited in June 1956 in the company of Anatoliy KOZLOV, Chief of II/7, who has confirmed NOSENKO's story and identified his picture. There was possibly one other American, Gisella Harris, in 1957 (she tentatively but uncertainly identified his photo) and he claims to have worked on three foreigners, one of whom, Sir Alan Lane, British, has confirmed the story and recognized NOSENKO's photo. The two others (Hans GERKENS, a German and fnu SUENDER, a Norwegian) have not yet been identified. DocId:32404751 Page 22
(3) Supporting GOLITSYN's statement, however, are the following points: (a) DERIABIN considers it quite possible that an American Department man might be used in a Tourist Department opera- tion, if he had qualifications needed and others were not available at the time. There is an outside chance that this is what happened here. (b) In the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO claimed to have personally par- ticipated in the recruitment operation in 1956 against U. S. Embassy security officer, Edward Smith. When confronted in 1964 with this earlier statement, NOSENKO vigorously denied it. His earlier claim could thus have been a slip, or perhaps merely a gratui- tous beast (paralleling his 1962 claim to have been involved in the October 1959 attempt against Russ Langelle). (c) NOSENKO has reported personal par- ticipation in only a few checkable tourist- line activities during the years 1955-58 although his year 1959 is replete with them, almost all confirmed independently. (d) The only other independently known activity of NOSENKO during this period was two trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958. These, he claims, were merely to serve as watchdog for two Soviet sporting groups (and to give him some flavor of the West). They could presumably have taken hin from II/l just as well as from Ti/7. NOSENKO did not work in II/1 at any time in 1960, and therefore it is unthinkable that he was there for the one year 1961 either. Comments: (1) This confirms our finding, as reported in ll May report. DocId:32404751 Page 23 (2) GOLITSYN claims sto know this because he was a
aware in detail of who served in II/1/1 until his departure for Helsinki in July 1960, and because he visited Moscow and II/1 in December 1960 and talked with the then head of II/1/1, KOVSHUK. He would have known if NOSENKO were in the section then at all, much less as deputy chief. However: - NOSENKO was away in Cuba until 13 December 1960 and thus may not have been there at the time. Nonetheless, the fact that he had become Deputy would presumably have come out of GOLITSYN's talks with KOVSHUK, anyway. - GOLITSYN had earlier said that PETROV was chief of II/1/1, GRYAZNOV the deputy. Insofar as SR records show, GOLITSYN had never named KOVSHUK in this position, as far as we know, until he saw the NOSENKO materials. KOVSHUK was, of course, named by GOLITSYN many times as an active case officer in II/l/l. e. Contrary to NOSENKO's statement that GORBATENKO remained as chief of II/1 until 1959, GOLITSYN knew that GORBATENKO was sent as‘senior KGB advisor to Hungary shortly after the Hungarian Revolution, probably about January 1957. . Comments: (1) Since this is a high-powered job and represented a promotion, GOLITSYN thinks it may well have been given to GORBATENKO. as a result of success in operations against the American Embassy, specifically a recruitment, GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKO may be covering this up by changing the dates of GORBATENKO's transfer, and associates this with KOVSHUK's trip to the U. S. in early 1957, pre- sumably to follow up or complete a Moscow Embassy recruitment (about which trip NOSENKO also gave apparent disinformation, linking it to the "ANDREY" case, which we all agree is unlikely, especially . since "ANDREY' left Moscow in the spring of 1954). HW 53216 Docld:32404751 Page 24
Since the period involved here is the same one GOLITSYN thinks NOSENKO is covering up in his own biography (1955-57), this might indeed be a clue to an important penetration. (2) We are examining U. S. Embassy departees from Moscow during 1956, and are preparing a paper presenting the circumstances of one possible theory. £. NOSENKO did, in fact, have the woman trouble he claims, but GOLITSYN "recalls" that this took place in 1957 or 1958, not in 1954, and this was the reason he was transferred out of the more sensitive American Department to the Tourist Department. Comment: (1) -GOLITSYN also said that the events "must have happened" after NOSENKO became a CP member (in 1956-57), suggesting GOLITSYN is not stating a fact but making a supposition. It is not clear, in fact, whether GOLITSYN knows or supposes that this caused NOSENKO's transfer out of II/l into II/7. g. The post of Assistant Section Chief -- which GOLITSYN says NOSENKO claimed to occupy in 1960-62 -- was abolished in 1959, those holding this title being made senior case officers. — Note: _ GOLITSYN is apparently confusing ‘POMNACH (Assistant to the Chief) with ZAMNACH (Deputy Chief). NOSENKO also reported that Pomnaches were abolished and made senior case officers, while Zamnaches continue to this day. GOLITSYN must also believe this, since he has reported GRYAZNOV as Zamnach II/1/1. 6. Statements of opinion: In addition to the opinions connected with the facts summarized above, GOLITSYN provided a number of opinions, theories and suppositions on various detailed aspects of this case. by and large, these merely srovide additional support for opinions already presented HW 53216 DoclId:32404751 Page 25
HW 53216 Docld:32404751 Page 26 in our earlier reports on this operation. GOLITSYN concluded without doubt that NOSENKO is a KGB provocateur, that the operation could only have been run with. KHRUSHCHEV's personal approval, and that it is designed among other things to hide various penetrations, one perhaps related to the POPOV com- promise, and some of them threatened by leads provided by GOLITSYN. He considered that the NOSENKO operation is being run in close coordination with the KROTKOV and CHEREPANOV provocations, and that in order to carry out his mission properly NOSENKO must know many of the significant truths the KGB is trying to hide or protect. He believes that much of what NOSENKO has said is keyed to KGB knowledge, rather than supposition, about what GOLITSYN had reported to Western intelligence authorities. Since all of this has already been dealt with in detail in our earlier analysis, it is not re- peated in the body of this memorandun. € David E. MurpKy Chief, SR Division Attachments A and B
HW 53216 Questions for GOLITSYN based on 29 1e Interview What is your opinion of the general accuracy of what NOSENKO has reported on KGB organization and personnel assignments? (Aside from ops and special incidents connected with provocation) Any contradictions between your present knowledge and the information he provided re who was where when? (Aside from GORBATENKO's departure date) ; In your opinion, would the KGB give NOSENKO carte blanche to tell the truth re organization, personnel (including photo idens) and procedures? Would it feel safe enough to permit hin to make major lies on this, especially general organization. (such as Sluzhba, Directorate of II, etc.)? What are the specific points you think NOSENKO is lying about re personnel? You reported earlier that PETROV was chief of the lst (Embassy) Section of the American Department, and GRYAZNOV the deputy, as of 1960. NOSENKO reports KOVSHUK had long been the chief, PETROV never had been, and GRYAZNOV only became deputy after NOSENKO left in.January 1962. How do you explain NOSENKO's statement? What is your oninion about the general information NOSENKO gave on Tourist Department ops, i. e., the totals he reported (about 34 tourist agency owners and employees, about 25 non- American tourists recruited, and a few miscellaneous others), plus about 19 American tourists - practically all already identified, known or useless - and 5 American tourist company personnel? . Do you know anything about the relative success in recruiting tourists prior to 1961? Any considered solid or important? Did you have direct, earlier, knowledge of NOSENKO's career and activity? Had you heard about his trouble with women, the flaphe reports as having occurred in 1954? (The trans- cript leaves it unclear whether it was your belief that it happened in 1957-58 or whether it was hard fact.) Could you provide details of the approximate date, location, circunstances under which you met NOSENKO each time? DoclId:32404751 Page 268
HW 53216 Do you know for a fact (or did you hear from KGB personnel) that NOSENKO entered the KGB in 1953? Or is that merely the first year you personally saw or heard about him? Had you ever heard of him before 1953? Did you ever hear anything about Nosenko's background other than his father, i. e., his GRU service, schooling (especially Institute of Foreign Relations), residences (including dacha), neighbors? Can you describe the Obzor you saw on the POPOV case, par- ticularly its format and length? (NOSENKO has described it as hard-cardboard covered, only about five inches wide by eight high, and about 20-25 pages long.) Are all obzors produced in this or other standard format? You have reported that a KGB officer named KOTOV, formerly in Yugoslav ops in Austria, suspected POPOV and was sent in 1958 to Germany on the POPOV investigation. We know of no KOTOV in Vienna in the period concerned. Did you mean Mikhail ZHUXOV? Another? Could you give us more details on KOTOV, such as full name, description, career? . Do you have any knowledge of direct contact between NOSENKO and PREISFREUND? NOSENKO claims not only to have been a case officer for PREISFREUND, but to have been his close friend, even prior to the time you left Helsinki. Can you comment? What can you say about the selection of NOSENKO for the trips to England in August 1957 and October 1958? Would this be likely for, Tourist or American Department officer? How about the Cuba trip, 1960, and Bulgaria 1961? Why, in your opinion, might he have changed his "traveling" name from Nikolayev, which he used in England trips, to NOSENKO, which he used for Cuba trip and for application for U. S. visa earlier in 1960? Docld:32404751 Page 29
HW 53216 Materials made available to GOLITSYN listed in chronological order of passing to GOLITSYN, with dates passed. l. 10. ll. 12. 13, Copies of first four substantive cables from Geneva relating circumstances of his contact with us in June 1962, including first meeting with MARK and first meeting with BAGLEY. (2 March 1964) Copies of transcripts of all meetings between CIA and NOSENKO in 1962 (3 March 1964) Copies of all transcripts of Geneva meetings, January- February 1964. (All passed to GOLITSYN by 13 March 1964) Report of biographic information provided prior to hostile interrogation. (17 April 1964) Final chronology, with our notations, of NOSENKO's life and KGB career, prepared after hostile interrogation. (Attachment A to ll May 1964 report) (Passed 11 May 1964) Copy of NOSENKO's handwritten notes and documents he brought out with him in 1964, (Passed in mid-April) Resume of first week's hostile interrogation. NOSENKO's comments on KROTKOV's manuscript "Fear", (Passed in mid-April) Complete collection of photo identifications made by NOSENKO to date, with explanatory note re method of notation. / Questions re NOSENKO for GOLITSYN (passed in mid-April). Special questions passed on 15 June and 22 June. CHEREPANOV papers. (22 April 1964) Information on American personnel named in CHEREPANOV papers and otherwise of interest re Moscow Embassy security ($INTERS, including his ops activity; BOWDEN; LANGELLE; LIEBERMAN; Edward SMITH; WASHENXO; Leonid GRAN). 4 May 1964, List of questions KROTKOY suggested be put to NOSENKO in order to confirm and clarify info given by KROTKOV. ent DoclId:32404751 Page 31
HW 53216 14. 16. 17. 18. 19, 20. 21. 22, 23. 24, 25. Copies of two reports prepared on KGB audio technical operations, one prepared on basis of GOLITSYN infor- mation in 1962, another based on NOSENKO information 1964, KOZLOV case (AEFOSDICK) 4 May. Case summaries: REPNIKOV, SIDOROVICH, AGAFONOV, IZHBOLDIN, RAFALOVICH, REPNIKOV, MARYUTIN (4 and ll May). JUNG, PRIBYTKOVA (15 June). . Transcripts and chronology with background sketch on BELITSKIY. File summary on FEDOROV aka RAZIN. (11 May and 12 June) Charts re NOSENKO CI production (leads). (11 May) Chronologies on KOVSHUK, GUK, FOMIN and IVANOV. Outline of information on KGB structure and personnel assignments as reported by NOSENKO. (11 May) ARTAMONOV case. (November 1963) PENKOVSKIY case. . (November 1963) POPOV case. (November 1963) Answers to special questions posed by GOLITSYN and asked of NOSENKO in interrogations in May 1964, Total 113 pages; all questions answered and passed by 12 June. DoclId:32404751 Page 32