e is. 17. oo 18. 19, - i - CS-311- Q0866-64 the various countries are obtained by the [TS through the tocal Comcunast Parties an the countries coneerned, Forgery ana Fa Isifica Lian Capabai ttics The iS has no capabilities tor maxiag ftulse passpurts or ine ternal decuments trom any country vcecause of the difficulty . of matching the paper and the technical problems involved th the enriaving and printriag process. [Ut also lacks capability for cracicating entries in passports because of the problem invelwrd in attempting to delete entries without defacing the documents. F.isificatiton and forgery is. limited to filling in valid blank forcign passports, making photograph and page substitutions in Sona-fide forcign passports, and placing false travel entries in foreign passports, Travel entries from western Europe and Latin America can be forged. Source did not know whether the IS itself made the photograph and page substitutions and for- gerics. All documents requiring forgeries and substitutions were turned over to one "Alfonso," in the 1S, who took them to a site unknown to Source, Source theorized that the forgerics and substitutions may have been done by the Departamento do Seguridad del Estado (Department of State Security - DSE), the counteriatelligence arm of the Cuban Government, which he said has much wore personne] than the DGI, Prospective agents recruited by the [5 in other Latin American countries and brought to Cuba for training in methods of sabo- tage and other Subversive activities are provided with detached visas and spurious passports to conceal the fact that they ever entered Cuba, In order that no Cuban visa will appear in an agent trainee's bona-fide passport on his way to Cuba, the Cuban mission in a Latin American country issues the Cuban visa on a separate Sheet of paper. In 1963 most agent trainees were being brought into Cuba through Mexico, where the Cuban Embassy issued the separate visas, Early in 1983 Mexican immigration officers began uSing a rubber stamp bearing the notice "Salid para Cuba" (Departed for Cuba), with the date on it, which they automatically stamped in all passports of travelers proceeding to Cuba. To counter this move ‘the IS began replacing, wherever possible, the pages of the passports bearing this entry with blank pages from valid passports from the Same countiy as that of the traveler. Source alsu believes that in 1964 the travel pattern of a few prospective agents proceeding to Cuba may have been modified, thus decreasing Slightly the number entering through Mexico. To conceal the agent's travel when leaving Cuba, he is provided for the first leg of the yourney with a Cuban ordinary passport in alias, The route of travel is from Havana to Prague, Czech authorities collect these passports upon landing in Prague. Source does not ‘snow what disposition is made of the Cuban passports by the Czechs, but he asserts that they Are never returned to the agent. 5-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
21, 22, ‘ ° S-F-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSE ~ hm CS~311/00868-64 For the second leg of the journey, carrying the agent from Prague via western Europe back to his native land, he is pro- yided in Havana, betore departure, with @ passport from another Latin American country. The non-Cuban passport may be the agent's bona-fide document which has been returned to him or it may be another valid Latin Amcrican passport pressed into service for the purpose. [If the agent's own passport bears no. evidence of travel into Cuba it will be used for this pur- pose, being “brought up to date" with forged western European entries to explatn the gap between the time when he left for Cuba and when he arrived in Prague, but Showing his mode of travel to be such that he never passed through either Cuba or Czechoslovakia. Should the agent's bona-fide passport bear | the Nexican cachet showing that he procceded to Cuba, the IS. replaces the page bearing such cntry with a blank page from a valid passport of. the same country if feasible, If page sub- Stitution is not possible, either because no other passport from the same country is avallable or because substitution proves too difficult, the 1S will provide the agent with another passport, from his own country if available, or from another Latin American country. The substitute passport may be a filled-in original, in which case a photograph substitu- tion will be made, and the agent will travel under the identity of the original bearer, In other cases, where valid blank passports are used, the agent may even travel under his true identity after "surfacing" on the second leg of the journey, in western Europe, provided the passport used is from his own country. In such a case informa- tion from his bona-fide passport will be copied directly in the blank passport. If the passport is from a country differing from that of the ayent, his identity will be changed. As in the case of travel under the agent's bona-tide passport, in the case of Spurious non-Cuban passports, false travel entries are made to account for the agent's time Spent in Cuba, placing him in western Curope, but not in Cuba nor Czechoslovakia, during that period, Quality and Availability of Spurious Documentation 23. 24. Providing documentatioa for agent trainees is the responsibility of the IS country desk officer handling trainees from the par- ticular country. The country desk officers receive and main- tain custody of passports coming from the Communist Parties in their areas of jurisdiction, Although the agent's training in Cuba may take several weeks, or even a few months, it often takes a year or more for the country desk officer to be abls to provide his trainces with the proper documentation, Source commented that invariably a country desk officer will be short one Spurious passport in his “collection" of passports for a — group of about six trainees. Where possible the officer will “borrow” a passport trom his colleague from another country desk, a ’ , On at least one occasion forped travel entries made in an _agent’S passport were found to have a chronological error Shortly before the agent's. departure from Cuba. The error consisted of a false exit cachet for. a given port of entry bearing a date preceding that furnished on the talse entry cachet for the same port of entry, a: physical impossibility in true life. Despite the discovery of this error the IS S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
S-F-C-R F-T ‘) PORLIGN “TSStM -6- . CS-311/00866-64 made no attempt to make a correction, hoping that no immigra- tion inspectors abroad would notice the discrepancy. 1. Headguarters Comment. Presumably Juan Nilo Otero Rodriguez, Director of the Secretariat of the Forcign Minister, - $-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM