157-10008-10150 JFK Assassinatic n System Identification Form AGENCY - RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Agency Inforn ation SSCIA . 157-10008-10150 MEMORANDUM cre trenrttinsetnnaannnnennhttnnettshsS AAs ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE : DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE }. CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS ¢ CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW: OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Document Infi rmation SSCIA JOHNSON, LOCH SENIOR STAFF SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS R :TRIEVED FROM LBJ LIBRARY 07/21/1975 14 CASTRO COVERT ACTION AGAINST Cl BA LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Unclassified Redact OS/L1/1994 ~ Box 393-1 vot NW 47129 Decld:32203658 Page 1 , Date: 2/23/20)
-~2- 5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 Decemb::r 1963. ey ee Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will present several options for discussion. including unleashing of Cuban . exiles and the intensification of the «overt program. 6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1‘ 63. This memo is mainly important becaise it reveals who in the Admin- istration was dealing with Cuban polic).. The list of people to attend the meeting on Cuba held this day inclided: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, — Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or les Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy, and Chase. 7. Meme, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, J32 December 1963. For a press conference, Bundy recon mends the following language re- garding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn back the spread of Conmunism in this hemisphere." 8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15 December 1963. “ pse Fad This table reveals that the CIA spent| jon Cuban Opera~ fs & tions, almost 50 percent of which was ¢pent-on paramilitary action c! Le | The total covert actijor budget (psychological and para~ military warfare) was approximately in this four-year period. 9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963. The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi- dent on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which in- cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans, and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular: one led by Manuel Artinme, the other by fanolo Ray. _Bundy recommends that-Lyndon B. Johnscijiiigke "a more vigorous line /toward Cuba/ than we have in the past."? = * a aod 10. Memo, Bundy to L -B. Johnson, 9 January 1964. one sep ; Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not support the program of sabotage, while ‘McCone and the CIA are for it, and 80 are most of the middle-level officers dealings with the Castro problem." Bundy concludes: "...in. your position, I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are i1]:gal, ineffective, and damaging a to our broader policy." . ; cor gaye gE Se. mmmme et aa . ae rr coin ae 2 a en ; ra vee ws ‘ - if te I nF, ui Fe a ag ee ae SE Eee to aig Bad a Sa EE aooy wpe a” WER raga ye een eS, " “ Docid: 3ea0tsse’ Page 26 fa PN ee Rw ee et aie ae Eel fe we! “, : to RRR * ae omme” - ia me a . - 3 . 7 .
as action up to or including invasion." 18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964. Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charg: of contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. 19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964. . This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was em "to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections. en Thus, the continued exile raids were view:d negatively since they increased a the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming : completely beyond U.S. control despite CL\ financial support to the groups. 20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964. Chase notes that Castro has executed -hree anti-Castro Cubans and jailed . a two others as CIA agents. CIA admits hav ng a connection with the executed - Cubans "but that it is completely deniabl.:." at 21. Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1961. Subject: ‘Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Gove nment Leaders" ‘The CIA was made aware of certain plais to kill Castro. The Agency told the sources, according to Helms, that "th: United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the plamied actions." Apparently on 2 March 1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile timed down the offer. Similar offers were make to other Cuban exiles in early larch. A leading figure in the negotiations was) | a shippin:-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale. An agreement was finally made to pay thd $100,000 for killing Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses. a weal thy Cuban exile in New York was to much of the noney, an pay the $2,500 on group remaine| anonymous, it was clear the Mafia paled that his contact was a police officer in the 22. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. ‘ubject: "Assassinationef Castro." Referring to the above memo from DDP 10 DCI, Chase notes that John — Crimmins feels the matter should be discu: sed at a Special Group meeting. ws . vat Pr i ca ae 2 OUR gam oe HW: “ag foe sound Siete ‘va ac Stee >i igs Sev rey wo Stet DR AE ie
ins "John's own inclination is that the U.S. (c any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, " notes Chase, "and should go all out to stop the plot."' In marginal notations, Bundy agrees with John and with the need to forvard the matter to the Special Group. Government cannot knowingly permit 23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, w.th attachment (Des FitzGerald's "A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations'') Tom Mann and FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Chase disapprove of the operations, thougi for different reasons. 24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964. Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Ciribbean crisis than the overthrow of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noice levels and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo {see Item 19). 25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964. In a reference to Helm's memo on assa;:sination (see Item 21), it was pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 Jume that "these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. " would look into the matter. The AG said Justice 26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964. a McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 Jime (See Item 21). interviewed many people allegedly invo ved, most_of whom denied the existence of such a plan. (The Bure: the courtry}. . The mogr3 4 Pi eS ee ad y 5 eau did not interv .ew | since he was out of resting findiig was that » Bunily” ‘10 November 196.1. ? The election past, Chase et al. agre:d that ‘we can usefully do some Se ae ‘4 vta ft od ne) Datla: 52905688 “Page sd. . ” “ae a” whet wh
basic review work on Cfifa."" FitzGerald pishes: for re-institution of CIA- directed covert program. 28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 Novembc:r 1964, with JCS attachment dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE }/ANCE.. A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army’ to , usef germ vartorg against Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Buidy agree that the White House should “remain aloof from formal consideration of ‘Square Dance’ at this stage." I believe this plan for covert action Gs even more shocking and unacceptable than plans for assassination.) nL cag Paes ‘eg mg nai PENTA, nae ; me S72" “board: 32203658 Mama ge Be
29. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently ae a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964). The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options “short of ; war to get rid of thé, Castro regime," including the possible contamination he i of sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a aoe Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating elements into Cuba. 30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964. The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA ' (as well as Bundy) all agree that it: would be unwise to try to interfere theres with him at this stage. ce 31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965. Chase reports a plan told to Crimmias and the CIA about an Artime plot to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be "neutralized." . D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed _ at an upcoming Special Group meeting on shether or not "to cut off Artime's ews water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation - ‘har of the Artime/Cubela plot." Sees 32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA document. : Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should Seals be authorized to reduce its commitment i1 the paramilitary field. | 33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1955. This memo indicates that not even Actime had his group in control. The memo also discusses CIA covert activitie : “CINR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff, a . 7 Fa dy yo 34, Memo, Murat Wi 23 February 1965. e Recosmends immediate termination of Artime support. © ys 35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965 Discussion of who is for maintainin; a covert capability against Cuba (presently on the shelf) and who is opposed. Chase guessed that CIA would sted be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out the Vietnam problem. ; . FE aa a cogent sa wr eg ten - : . ee - 5,7" On TO a he lr Re ann ht ie ees Sa 8 ea 2 ET ace ee pet aR ramet RE med a OE ae o oe we™ S . ee nel . ees te ® , . aa ees say oe e oP ise
36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965. es Chase recommend§$phasing out suppoit to Artime. The CIA is consider- ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics Lo mentioned in Items 28 and. 29 above and ire a manifestation of the moral vies bankruptcy of U.S. palicy. Also some t:lk here of backing a new exile a group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilit: ry capability, while DoD and State want the capability maintained. 37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Burdy, 18 June 1965. This is a summary of U.S. policy tcward Cuba. The ultimate objective tay: is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary Fein program involving ClA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started." 38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965. Adm. Raborn recommends reactivatior of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNemara, and Cy Vance are against this chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us ," Bundy writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's recommendations said nething about assassination. ay 39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966. Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise ek level of Castro's charges of ‘threatened Yankee aggression’ may go up.” e 40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967. This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile talking to them about their F activities. ee Se it Oe oi 41. Meino, W.6. Bowdlle “tontow, 18 De :ember 1967. a! The. new CIA’ empha is on developiig contacts within Castro's inner circle. Dave Phillipe was to be in char ze of the new CIA Cuba-program. Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is ‘looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieut nants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him." er ces ree ae 9 ~ % RT we - 7+ 7 Sr pemmnnnn pRRERAcoeRadooy aay yonmaoar ana © +. cao TTEEROO eo OesOSTTOSTOO NOON PORN SS Rterene an eRe ——— - ae cere sf wy ee