104-10422-10355 8 6 AUG 1977 ” MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM : S. D. Breckinridge Deputy Inspector General SUBJECT : Comments on Book V, SSC Final. Report, “The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies 1. Forwarded herewith is the report of a review that Mr. Knoche requested last fall. The undersigned was designated. as chairman or coordinator of an Agency working group that was to conduct the study.. It proved a more ambitious undertaking. than had been anticipated. The extensive files of CI Staff on the Warren Commission inquiry into President Kennedy's assassination were reviewed in detail, as were the very large file holdings of | LA Division on its Cuban operations during the period preceding and following the death of President Kennedy. The most pains- taking review and analysis was required, and the files proved to be so extensive that the research became a major task. The files of the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General presented a less formidable problem. 2. The attached report, with its annexes, is the formal result of the effort. If the attachments seem bulky, it is noted that additional back-up materials are being held’ for the’ ee record in the event of future inquiry. These papers represent the resuit of a conscientious and painstaking effort,- conducted with high standards of review and testing kept foremost in mind. We believe that there is little likelihood of oversight.or omission in coverage; the work was so extensive and carefully done that we feel there is small chance of surprises remaining in CIA files on this subject. \ 3. In brief, we found that many of the presentations of Book V of the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee were based on incomplete information or distorted perceptions. While the record of CIA was not perfect, the performance at the time, under the understanding of the period, seems reasonable. The fact remains that evidence of a Castro conspiracy. to assassinate President Kennedy still has not been discovered. The Warren Commission and TeEy RETURN 10 | ETT more =~ Do Not Reproduce 02a
13-00000 CONFIGS Mra wed ghia Pa CIA could well have perceived the usefulness. of inquiring into specific sources of possible provocation of Castro at the time of the 1964 investigation; it is'clear that the general consideration was recognized by all concerned, and pursued, but the concept of specific possible provocations was not. A review into such possi- bilities has now been conducted, with essentially negative results. 4, The report 7s not to be considered a report of the Inspector General, as such, being the result of a representative working group. However, the report should be considered as being for internal CIA consumption only. It contains third agency reports, liaison reports, and involves sources and methods materials, as well as evaluation and comment of a nature that is advisory to manage- ment. Any release of this report and its annexes outside the Agency, even in classified form, would require considerable sanitization. It is recommended that this report be held against future inquiries, providing a basis for appropriate responses , and that 7t not be volunteered at this time. S. D. Breckinridge Attachment: As Stated DIG/S.D.Breckinridge: js (23 Aug 1977) Distribution: . ; | Original - Addressee w/Copy #1 of Att. ka 7 “Je= SA/DCI (Robert D. Williams) w/Copy #2 of Att: Ap hte - SA/ADDCI (Mr. Lewis D. Lapham) w/Copy #3 of- Att. WEG - ADDO w/Copy #4 of Att. - Asst. Public Affairs (Mr. Hetu) w/Copy #5 of Att. pete 7, | - Chief,-LA w/Copy #6 of Att. ‘Chief, CI Staff w/Copy #7 of Att. - D/OS w/Copy #8 of Att. - IG (J.L.Leader) w/Copy #9 of Att. = pDatel ff - DIG (S.D.B. Chrono) w/Copy #10 of Att. wae i - IG Subject w/Original Copy of Att. tt WUMBERED) wooed cmt wren) seed coed cod cma med nul i
13-00000 / CONFIDEN Trap Table of Contents Summary of Findings Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review Tab B. CIA Performance on the Inquiries Tab C. CIA Operations Against Cuba Tab D. AMLASH Operation , Tab E. Materials Forwarded to Warren Commission and FBI Tab F. Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit Tab G. Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments CONHDERTIAL
13-00000 re a nod Ts SUBJECT: Comments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities | 1. Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address themselves to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry. 2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence on the quality of their support for the Warren Commission investigation. The following statements appear in the Report: "It (the SSC Report) places particular emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera- tions seemed to have on the investigation." Page 2. "They (senior CIA officials) should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be con- sidered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts." Page 7. TET APP DA | poeta
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL = The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC, Report, is highlighted as follows: | "Certainly, concern with public reputation, problems of coordination between: agencies, possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment, and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge of sensitive operations may have contributed to these shortcomings. But the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information." Page 7. A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal. The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con- ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President 2 CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 : CONFIDENTIAL Kennedy. This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs. The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at the time. The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention. This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in percep- tions. In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the various. operational activities against Cuba and Castro. Organization for the Review As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963 and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi- gations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for
13-00000 CQNFIRENTIAL the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper. It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations, ijt necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper- ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to plotting against Castro. The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it, Tabs B through G. CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at "the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL (whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLASH operation actually fit the itheory for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.) We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones. Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi- . dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif- ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con- spiracy to suppress evidence. 5 CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 Operations Against Castro The AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop ae capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban exiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum, with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. Ata later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity from its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign. agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C. Operation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1, who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime. The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of CUNTIDENTIAL 6
13-00000 CUNFIOENTUAL | President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation shows that prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1 was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot. Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail at Tab D of this paper. The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There are new considerations that developed in the course of the present review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate, but they do not provide a basis.for taking issue with the judgment of the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C. tf east iat GORABEATUL
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL Items Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in- vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as "D". These al- legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City, awaiting arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not only was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to -the alleged five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before the alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi- gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another instance considerable emphasis was given by the SSC Final Report to a cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 November 1963 in- quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain named Soviets. The true name of AMLASH/1] was given in the Mexico City reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the purpose of the inquiry -- but as the subject of a meeting in December CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL t 1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern- ing a press conference to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/1 in February and March 1961. AMLASH/1's name could have been omitted from the cable | altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the meeting in December 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to AMLASH/1's name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is discussed further at Tab D. Conclusions Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera- tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents. Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti- Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in its treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize it more generously. In a very real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to 9 CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry. « While one can’ understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader _ initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of President Kennedy.
13-00000 ee ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW 7 iy gel |
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL Organization for and Conduct of the Review 1. Many years have-passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com- mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are no longer in place in the same work. Some of the employees have retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died. 2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A study group was established to consider the size of the problem and to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre- sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in “early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL -- 2 -- President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached. 3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations, with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security. and the Office of the Inspector General: The organization for the review of those files is described below. 4, LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known to be extensive. Under. the Terms of Reference those files for the period 1 January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review, covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy and the following year. A research group was formed composed of five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor. An additional four researchers participated in different phases of the research, which continued to mid-May 1977. 5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk mach ine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL -- 3 -- both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives at aE. The remainder is held at Headquarters in the files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein). 6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material: a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed (1) Operational 1,729 ae (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings) = (2) Subject Files 547 (186 with findings and 361 with no findings) (3) Cuba Policy Files . 101 (4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files (Task Force W Chronos) 37 (5) Official 201 Dossiers __100-plus Total - 2,514 b. Criteria Used in the Research As a guide the research group followed the Terms of Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms. of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL w- 4 am brought to its attention by the IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis, and to additional questions raised in the course of the study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book - that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi- nation attempts against Castro. c. Findings and Organization of the Findings Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of those document(s) or findings which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were job numbers, official file numbers, inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of information, to the extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 the gist of the document(s) for purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LA Division research group files under the official classi- fication number 019-604-001 (Volumes XI through XX). Also included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings. — These records are restricted in LA Division. 7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation of material further extended the time required to complete the under- taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the death of President Kennedy. 8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject. 9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL -- 6 -- Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren. Com- mission. The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes. comprising some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy of those documents released under provisions of the FOIA to the public in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series) released in September 1976 and March 1977. 10. By necessity the documents in the File are held in chrono- logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the Agency's central repository for information and documentation that it holds on: a. The life of Harvey Oswald; _ b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964; c. The testimony by various Agency officers before the several commissions and committees set up to review the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should be pointed out that this portion of this file is not complete); and d. The point of record for Agency action taken in response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro- visions of the Freedom of Information Act. CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 CONFISENTIAL -- 7 == | a 11. In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in‘order to be in a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific subjects. In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there was "no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi- gation or gather information," the following files were set up: a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission; b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren Commission; | c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI; d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting assistance and information; e. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and f. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry. CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 COMFIENTIAL -- 8 -- 12. The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on’ the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor- mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b) its response to require- ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized to record what actually happened in those instances in which it differs from representations in the SSC Report. 13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one officer to identify material in its records believed to have some possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. “During the course of this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time of the “Garrison Investigation. " | 14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973 CONFICENTIAL
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL -- 9 -- request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable -activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector General employed on contract a retired employee who had served as a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards. The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in Tabs B and F. 15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed in Annexes D and C, respectively. 16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify specific points. kk RK RR KK Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the respective components participating in this effort. Selected back- up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the Inspector General. CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 ry TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR REVIEW OF ISSUES RAISED IN BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT 1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses-- (1) the general idea that the intelligence community--primarily CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection program to ascertain all possible information on the subject. Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review. Ze The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation | is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back- ground it summarizes Agency and U. S. operations against Castro's Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these general activities were provocative. More specific, however, is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report . this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information. Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in support of the thesis. mam yey? Si ale i So at ae rs
13-00000 PED % C 3.. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro- vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un- qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the Subcommittee's treatment of the activity in this respect. a. The following questions are intended to serve as a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission. (1) What collection requirements were issued to the field with regard to Kennedy! s assassination? (2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964? (3) What form did the follow-up take? (4) Identify and describe the records with regard to this activity. (5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters! ‘requirements? (6) What dis semination and review was this reporting given? (7) Was dissemination made ‘on this reporting to the CI Staff? (8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission? (9) What review of Headquarters' material was ordered through 1964?
13-00000 (10) What werethe parameters of these instructions? (ll) What:responses were there and where are they? (12) What evidence is there that the "provocation" theory was considered during the Warren Commission enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission? (13) What action was taken with reference to this concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs? (14) What records are there on this and where are they? (15) Were there any efforts made to develop an Oswald/Cuban connection? » = (16) What form did they take? (17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject? , (18) What action developed from these exchanges? (19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they? (20) To what extent were elements of the Agency other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved inin- . vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission . tenure? (21) What is the total CIA information on the two flights from Mexico City to Havana? _ (22) What was done at the time to develop further information on this matter? ty (23) Can further information be acquired on this matter now?
13-00000 (24) What is the total CIA information on "Die (25) Is further information on ''D'' needed in view of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it? (26) What information does CIA have on Oswald “FPCC relations? (27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans training activity and was anything provided on this to the Warren Commission? ' (28) What is the total CIA information on '"'A''? (29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City? — (30) What is the CIA information on the 4 Décember 1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba? (31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban assassination policies and programs up to November 22, 1963? . (32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's 7 September 1963 statements re retribution? (33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA. employees contain anything on the above questions? If so, what? _ , b. On the subject of possible provocation for the ‘assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities ‘should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine any additional relevant information on this plot. (1) What is the total information on the plots involving the criminal syndicates? (2) Who was witting of the planning for the syndicate operation? -
13-00000 (3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate operation not faced previously (e.g.'5 a former Office of Security officer may have knowledge that was not surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division career agent may have some insights that could throw light on one of the operations), (4) There are a couple of cases based on agent traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of Pigs period to shoot Castro. What is the total CIA information on these? (5) What is the significance'on the subject af provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro? (6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly detailed reconstruction from a very complete record, | there are points that should be addressed particularly, because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report. For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a long time? Or was it simply that this was-the first time the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings? (7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1 when making plans for the 22 November meeting? (8) What was the security of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy? (9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot?
13-00000 “3 wre") mak a) otf parse} os, ag ro © —. : ‘ec. What other action might CIA have taken in connection with the investigation? An effort should be made to ligt these, including consultation with surviving officials to determine not only what they considered the requir ement at the time, but what was omitted and why. 4, In conclusion, these 'Terms of Reference"! undertake to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S. policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which, therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those. ‘that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how if pursued these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions raised in the Schweiker report yD. Qe (Wk S. D. Breckinridge O/Inspector General Robert Wall CI Staff . William races LA Division Oia ) eR aymont Reardon ‘alsees ity
13-00000 +9 CIA's Performance on the Inquiries a Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, empha- sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts were not. It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission is at Tab E. Asa practical consideration, évery theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con- clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the intelligence agencies did -- in the present instance, what was the performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying a patternof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record. The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in support of its case: a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as "D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and saw Oswald being handed money in Mexico City for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy; this was proven false, both by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans ‘instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in- conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report. CONABENTAL-
13-00000 Wi fie bi ee b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately. . The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in order to. support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab D of this report. c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60- 63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report, is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC Final Report. These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions. To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth and to report the findings, whatever they are. Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both on the part of CIA and the Warren Conmission--consideration was given to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the
13-00000 Vaid PLUG bike Iter questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those * questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of inquiry? “Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation. Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959. These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The first of these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in October 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from which he returned in early October 1963. In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA, there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that . might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These four general areas of inquiry are covered below. ; I. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962 On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Paris, Rome, Madrid, a As Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa giving biographic information on Lee Harvey Oswald. It noted his discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his employment and marriage while in the USSR. The cable requested: “any scrap information which bears on President's assassination...." mal |
13-00000 On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with [Jana London providing additional details on the travel of Oswald to the USSR. Additionally, London reported that a British journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source stated that Santos was “visited frequently by another American gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.) | Also on 27 November Ottawa reported the "delight" of the Cuban a Le Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although the staff was instructed to "cease looking happy in public," in conformance with instructions from Cuba to “govern their actions by {Geo official attitude of Govt to which they accredited." eT on the © - oe same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial responses produced no other information. On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the United States in June 1962. The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without Tul2
13-00000 detailed results although there were some technical operations that produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible Significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's assassination of Presidant Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report, in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will on not be detailed here. II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963 The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F): The concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on 28 November 1963: "We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Please continue all your coverage of Soviet and Cuban installations . and your liaison with Mexicans."
13-00000 ¥ UNF IOENTIAL The allegations made by "D," about having seen- Oswald taking money: from Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive attention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter, and with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively to have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations was demonstrated by polygraph to have been lying. After the allegations by "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963: "Pls continue to follow all leads and tips. The question of whether Oswald acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved." Again, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as follows: "Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out propaganda about case. FYI only, Soviet Intel in India had letters sent to [U.S. Government] leaders demanding full investigation of case." On 17 December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico City Station stated as follows: ‘,..Mexico City has been the only major overseas reporter in the case. While this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's
13-00000 CONFIDENTIA Wa fucivil a life, we have not overlooked the really out- standing performance of Mexico City's major assets and the speed, precision, and perception — with which the data was forwarded. Here it was relayed within minutes to the White House, [Department of State] and [the FBI]. "Your LIENVOY data, the statements of Silvia DURAN, and your analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing." Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as _ thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation. It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit; these are commented on at Tab G. III. General Collection Requirements On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable from Headquarters with the following statement: CONFIDENTIAL 7
13-00000 PREIS my 5 CONF ial t ta ad "Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all “ of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes over the reins." It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi- cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative. It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant or significant information on the subject it would have been reported either in responses to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources. If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of thase directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously vile 8 md ne ii al
13-00000 *-¢ CGitiic oe ir Ak would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken. As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection re- quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued, but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who- what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above) which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from other stations: ". . . this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's life. . ." The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10 about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description of “an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor- mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently was missed -- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report: "Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited." This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting Amma nt er
13-00000 WAVE fal te ih VLIWiTAL se rn requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be . extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of page 58. | - The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every question that has been conceived since then. IV "Unpursued Leads" At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the - intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported to be aboard those flights. By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this time on 22 November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on 10 CUNT UCN TIAL
13-00000 22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights to Havana apparently carried some freight. CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to Headquarters. There was one Jcra surveillance team (LIFIRE) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests. The also had a surveillance team of its own at the airport, which provided photographs of passports and also provided copies of passenger lists. Additionally, a telephone tap operation (LIENVOY) against the Cuban embassy provided transcripts of conversations with the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control Office. _ The 22 November 1963 Flight At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, ; _ reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, 22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from 6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at 10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring further into the matter. 1] UU Cit i IAL MeZ
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL Book V of the SSC Final Report.states that CIA could not explain, at the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori- ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no recorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject. In reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion of Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City times are used in the following discussion. The LIENVOY transcripts record a series of discussions about the status of the 22 November flight--when it was to arrive and when it departed. These records show that the flight arrived at the platform at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed a few minutes earlier. At one point prior to arrival of the aircraft, one person speaking on the telephone stated that the aircraft was due at 1630 hours and “it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick turnaround that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as servicing, to a relatively short period. However, the key report on the departure of the aircraft was a statement at 2040 hours that the aircraft had taken off five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours. The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in the SSC Final Report: 1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not 12 bas ake fo Me ae Via a
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL delayed five hours, as alleged. « 2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight. which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it allegedly was delayed. In view of the surveillance coverage of the Cubana Flight, it is very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin- engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of these sources and probably knew the above facts, feeling no need to follow further. The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter. The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con- siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the SSC Final Report state that: " - One source alleged that the Cuban-American was ‘involved’ in the assassination." MMI 13
13-00000 CONFDai tab The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI, "almost immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi- gation “as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." “Further down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi- gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC) certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi- gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon- sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the results of FBI inquiries. While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting: about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will be noted. Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement at page 104, in the chronology section: . "December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that he ‘looked suspicious'..." At page 61 it states that there “is no indication that CIA followed- up on this report (that the man was “involved in the assassination"), 14 CONTIUCA TIAL
13-00000 fan PRET EY "acts uur WiC i jc LIAL except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cubans American's activities." The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December 1963, but it reported that the man had “crossed at Laredo, Texas on 23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at a certain time on 25 November, that he checked out of the hotel at a certain time and departed for Havana “as only passenger on Cubana flight on night 27 November," and that there was a good photograph of him taken at the airport. This was followed by a dispatch the same date, repeating the basic information in the cable, enclosing the photo- graph, and containing the following cryptic statement: "Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious." This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI; it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal ‘memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported 15 CUNTiGEN TIAL
13-00000 to have "looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way into the more careful statements that usually characterize official reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres- sionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic activity or final conclusions. There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled that a source of a local (Monterrey) "agent of the federal judicial police" had information on a man; the description seems to have the same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement Oe that he “was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he entered Mexico “on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa, Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time, when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could not recall it.
13-00000 There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre- sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of Station replied that the information in the report “jibes fully with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63.". It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how it should be considered responsibly. Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available with such information he was queried and the results — were provided the authorities.
13-00000 eceRey CIA Operations Against Cuba " The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times; it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However, to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of evidence that must still control how the findings are treated. It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962 {see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American — policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro- vocative. | Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations, SEGRET
13-00000 SECRET economic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re- ceived recurring publicity in the press), aS well as a variety of covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963 President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what "White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban people to overthrow the Castro regime. The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who conducted ‘their independent operations against the Castro government. Some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America and it is likely that what they reported. back to Havana assigned to CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, whether CIA was involved or not. We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of
13-00000 eet whnseel Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secrets clearly, reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel- ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation. The. SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention in considering the question. “Implicitly it accepts the theory that there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro- voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life. However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern- ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba." | In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency files (the gyre, bo oe iCoiaers Es oe
13-00000 ‘SECRET. # organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security. ’ Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in- quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is a matter of record. For instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded judgments about what seemed relevant or irrelevant to the considera- tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of those activities that may have related to the assassination of the President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way. While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary -- which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con- spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom knew aspects.of even the most closely guarded activities. 4 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some are dead. The SSC, for instance -- in its attempt to capture ele- ments of the past -- seems to have led some employees into expressing opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in response to representations by SSC staff members as to the Facts; this illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues, today, on.a responsible basis. The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten- sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in this paper, at Tab D. The key point is that prior to President Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under-~ taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this discussion. SEGRET &
13-00000 In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report, it has been felt necessary to review in depth all records of Cuban operations conducted by CIA during the period in question, 1961-1964. The organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not possible to predict the form that information turned up by this inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort. In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review, it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds is apparent, but that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry. The areas of operational activity noted above can be described briefly as follows: 1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (AMTRUNK) . 2. Operations involving the criminal underworld. 3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro. a rey €3 aka |
13-00000 ae wide fp Operation AMTRUNK s There is one other general activity that was considered in the course of the present research, which is discussed below. This activity, AMTRUNK, was to develop a capability for splitting the leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity, because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really rele- vant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed, by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis of the SSC Report. In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of them, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez and Enrique Cayardo Robera, developed an oper- ational concept to overthrow the Castro government, which came to be known as the Leonardo Plan. Cayardo had been a public figure in Cuba, who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception of the plan. Moreno was the son of a Cuban senator and Minister of Public Works; as a lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in the anti-Batista movement.
13-00000 Moreno defected to the United States in April 1961, settling in Miami where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his associates was Jorge Ajbuszy Volsky, a Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Volsky had been in prison in the USSR in the 1940's, and enlisted in the Polish Air Force during WWII under the British Air Command. After WWII he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own business in Havana.. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961. Cayardo and Moreno discussed the Leonardo Plan with Volsky. He, in turn, discussed it with Tadeus (Tad) Witold Szulc, a reporter with the New York Times. Szulc had reported on Cuban activities for the New York Times prior to the fall of Batista, during which time he had developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to the Times Washington Bureau in.April 1961, where he claimed to have an entree to the White House through his uncle, Ambassador John C. Wiley. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con- tact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that the Leonardo Plan gained government-level support and approval. In early 1963 Szulc arranged an interview in Washington with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. Volsky and Szulc then met with Robert Hurwitch, a senior official in the Department of State, who presented the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known as AMTRUNK.
13-00000 SECRET AMTRUNK was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per- sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain - security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen- erously in order for it to proceed independently. On 17 April 1963 Szulc informed Hurwitch that the Miamt Station had given Volsky responsibility for the decision of whether or not the operation was to proceed; this was not consistent with CIA intentions, | In August 1963 things still had not progressed very far. A Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable, It emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a high priority objective. In early September 1963 AMTRUNK had three intelligence sources in Cuba: Miguel A. Diaz Isalgue, Ramon Guin Hector Robello, and Modesto Orozco Basulto, One of these sources, Guin, .was reportedly close to AMLASH/1, a man with whom CIA was dealing separately through a Headquarters case officer <-~- but at 9 SEGRET
13-00000 SEGRET that time unsuccessfully -- in trying to develop an operational ap- proach similar in some respects to AMTRUNK. The AMLASH operation is discussed at Tab D. . It was decided at the end of October 1963 that Moreno should be separated from the operational details of the AMTRUNK operation be- cause of numerous indiscretions and poor security practice. Arrange- ments were made to involve him in a radio program to be used in con- nection with the Rebel Army that eventually it was hoped would arise against Castro. Moreno threatened to appeal this decision through Volsky and Szulc to the President. In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had success- fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac- tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur- ity became less certain. In 1965 its security was believed to have been seriously compromised and the decision was taken to’ cut off re- lations with it. Various figures were arrested, including Guin, Diaz and AMLASH/1. 10 SECRET
13-00000 SEGRET The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses from the beginning. Szulc and Volsky are considered to be highly suspect and they are discussed below, with another person who became involved in the activity. a. Tad Szulc. Szulc has been suspect since 1948 when the FBI recorded reports that he was a communist. Re- portedly he was in frequent contact with communist party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America. Sus-_ picions about his motives or possible connections with foreign intelligence services, have never been proven. Nicole Szulc, daughter of Tad Szulc, is reportedly an avid communist. Philip Agee's Inside the Company: A CIA Diary credits Nicole Szulc with having “obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." She is be- lieved to be an agent of the Cuban DGI. Doubts about Tad Szulc are unconfirmed but remain alive. Of Polish origin Szulc became a U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special bill of Congress. b. Jorge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like Szulc, he is of Polish origin. He and Szulc became acquainted in 1959-1960 in VW SECRET
13-00000 SECRET a Cuba. A CI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared by a JMWAVE analyst, makes the following statement: "Volsky's knowledge of clandestine methods of operation, together with his Russian prison background and his ingenuity as a middleman in U.S. Government/CIA activities, made him an excellent candidate for a communist penetration agent and that the pos- sibility existed that he might be a singleton, sleeper or stringer for the RIS." There has been no confirmation of these suspicions. Volsky became a naturalized U.S. citizen on 10 April 1969. c. Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez. Born in Cuba, he was the son of a native born American citizen. He was educated both in Cuba and in the States and later (1940) enlisted in the U.S. Army. After discharge he returned to Cuba but kept moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a patter of changing alle- giances. He enjoined the anti-Batista forces in March 1952 first with the Cuban exiles in the United States and later from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batista and was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mis- sion in Cuba from November 1954 until 1956. During his l2 SEGRET
13-00000 entire period in the Cuban Army, he was involved with dissident army elements. RABEL was arrested in April 1956 when he participated in an attempted coup. After a short imprison- ment he returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers. In October 1957, he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement and later with the Cienfuegos Group. Shortly after the Castro victory, Castro called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendos Campesinas (Rural Hous ing). Approached by CIA, he refused to work in place but was willing to defect, which he did in December 1962, being recruited by JMWAVE Station where he was used in AMTRUNK activities. He returned to Cuba on his own in 1965, reportedly to attempt the exfiltration of his family. Upon return to Cuba he was arrested and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967. There were accusations that . RABEL was a Cuban agent as early as July 1963. The accusations were never proven. In view of the later roll-up of the AMTRUNK operation the tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of
13-00000 individuals in the Cuban hierarchy who were disloyal to the regime. Whatever the later penetrations by Cuban intelligence, the role of Szulc and Volsky, in the early phase of the operation, could have exposed both its members and eventual objectives to Cuban intelli- gence. Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The = eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress, although it did lay down caches and conducted some infiltrations and exfiltrations in 1964 and 1965. An attempt to build support that might eventually have the capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog- ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because 14 3 Fy gee | wich ith dthe .
13-00000 of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories printed 20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis as follows: "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. ‘I had access to the Prime Minister's office,' Sturgis said. ‘I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the embassy (American Embassy in Havana). '" Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's takeover. Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959. Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water- gate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation- ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency. The particular feature in the above excerpt from the newspaper story is that it constitutes the first public reference to Juan Orta in the role of an assassin in plans against Castro. Orta was,
13-00000 ~ SECRET, in fact, the first man who reportedly was to have been used in the operation that CIA had, with the criminal syndicate, to kill Castro. Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late February or early March 1961. Orta's role in this connection was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 196]. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in February 1965. As for Sturgis’ assertion that he recruited Orta to work with the embassy, CIA files have no record that Orta was recruited for CIA by anyone during the period there was an embassy in Cuba. While Orta was reported in early 1961 as being used in the CIA-syndicate attempt against Castro, CIA had no direct relationships with him until he left Cuba, at which time he was used as a source of information on. the Cuban leadership. The fact remains that Orta did at one time have the role of intended assassin. Sturgis’ identification of Orta in this capacity, prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could
13-00000 have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life. Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable Sources of information. However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975 indicated a familiarity with Orta's availability to play the role of assassin in 1960, additional attention was given the statement in the press to see how it might fit in with other things that are known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach to the reliability of newspaper stories. " The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation- ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning a Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. The Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975, in conjunction with the first set of New York Daily News stories, noting that there was a connection between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports. It is pertinent to note here that in addition to the role Sturgis is reported to have had with the Castro government in relation to the gambling activities, Juan Orta's availability for the assassination assignment ‘was understood to be due to his having lost payoffs that he had once received from the gambling interests. One can deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections 7 Ener eT
13-00000 with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling organizations. | The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by. a Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the 1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used aS a means for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that “soon after her murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters - . to kill Castro . .." In the news story she claimed that the plan involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face cream; they dissolved and could not be used. On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA Deputy Director for Plans: "During recent conversations with several friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this state- ment, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be B en eeny
13-00000 SECRET on three occasions . . . Giancana claimed that * everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the ‘assassin’ had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro." This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own. Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro through Orta, Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter- mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader who might participate. This man, Tony Varona, headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front, one of the exile groups that also received support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. Varona was dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal SEGRET 19
13-00000 underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 January 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre- sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an explanation of why Varona was so readily available when approached by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the 1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something already ongoing in spite of the fact that the operation had been terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself - involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri- butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.
13-00000 SECRET What do these various considerations suggest? It is obviols that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be listed as follows: 1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde- pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve- ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con- tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs, being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan in April 1962. b. The syndicate operations could have activities such as those that are reported in the New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976. 3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the. criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he was not a member of it. He could well have been used by the syndicate in its activities. 4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his statements are treated with considerable reserve. He probably did know Juan Orta when both of them were in Cuba. He was outside of Cuba, however, when Orta was given the SECRET 21
13-00000 SEGRET role of assassin. Whatever he knew at that time--and his knowledge may be of a much later date--could have.been in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975 - newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate, whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits - and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami community after Orta settled there in 1965. 5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations, that would tend to reinforce the thought that the details of its operations would have been characterized by discre- tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960. The authors of Book VY of the SSC Final Report felt that the operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe- sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated: " . .. it ts unlikely that Castro could have : SECRET 22
13-00000 distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA." In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment , in the context of its Provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination of President Kennedy. Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another are not within the Agency's capabilities. "As noted earlier (See:Tab::B;; page 4), a 27 Novenber 1963 report records statements by a British journalist that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named "Santos" who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type named “Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that "Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in 1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.
13-00000 a If the “Santos” in the British report was Trafficante, the British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material consideration, as there are reservations about both sources. It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but there is no further known relevant information in the Agency on the matter. The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963 removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signi- ficance of past assocations or contacts. Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's 1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.
13-00000 gEOREL However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify “ at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late 1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true. Other Reported Assassination Proposals There were other references to possible assassination plots against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. They are summarized briefly below: In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract emplayee stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter. As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement. On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966) he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro. He was rebuffed on each occasion. Again in 1970 there was a report of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas post. The details of his actual role is unknown to the Agency, although the FBI may have more details on him. This is touched on in Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the course of this research effort.
13-00000 CoD eoyy Paeane erry eens Agent Messages in 1961 Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro 1. During the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro, or proposing such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation, the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged with serving as an interface with the congressional committees. Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is summarized again below. I 2. Three of the messages involved the same group of agents, and seem to relate to the same plan. The first message, dated 27 March 1961 (prior to the Bay of Pigs) was sent by an Agency asset, AMBRONC/5. The message requested the Agency's opinion on a proposed sabotage of the electric company in Havana, stating that this could be coordinated “with attempt against Fidel in public “appearance (at) Sports Palace." The cable expressed the view that 26 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET an “attempt against. Fidel (is) in accordance with general plan." There is no record that this message was answered. Two days later, on 29 March 1961, possibly because of the absence of a reply, the same agent sent another message. This stated that the plan was scheduled for 9 April. Castro was to speak at the Palace, and an “assassination attempt at said place (will be) followed by a general shutting off of main electric plants in Havana." General anti-regime developments to follow this were then outlined. This message was - answered on 30 March agreeing that a “major effort should be launched Havana on date you selected." I[t recommended contacting other named persons, looking to a more general uprising. The message addressed the general issue, making no comment on the proposal to kill Castro. A third message, on 5 April 1961, presumably from the same agent, reported that the persons he had been directed to contact had arms for only 50 men. While stating that the sabotage of the electric company and "possibly attempt on Fidel” would be carried out 9 April, he emphasized that to do so would make it impossible to maintain a clandestine organization in Cuba; “your military aid is decisive. If it does not come that date we are lost." There is no indication that this message was answered. No further reference to this plan has been found. 3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The four agents in question are commented on briefly below: 27 SECRET
13-00000 SEGRET a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages out~- lining the proposed sabotage effort and attempt against Castro. . (1) 201 file opened 15 July 1960. A POA was not issued until 18 December 1961, and an OA on 31 January 1962. A debriefing of him in November 1960, prior to the Kennedy Administration, revealed that he had been jin touch with people who had plotted the assassination of Fidel Castro, and claimed to have tried himself to make similar plans. He was ' infiltrated on 9 December 1960, exfiltrating 15 February 1961. (2) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again 3 March 1961 and exfiltrated again 19 June 196]. This covered the period of his messages and the Bay of Pigs. His sole mission was to organize resistance groups. (3) AMBRONC/5 was infiltrated again on 19 December 1961, exfiltrating 29 March 1962, again with the same mission. . (4) AMBRONC/S was infiltrated finally 2 May 1962, was arrested 29 May 1962, and was executed 30 August 1962. He has been reported as never admitting that he was a CIA agent. His name is not one of those 28 seGael
13-00000 SECRET in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro, listing those claimed by Castro to have plotted attempts against his life. b. AMCOAX/1 was one of those AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan for April 1961. (1) POA on 5 January 1961. His mission was to organize paramilitary activities in Cuba. He in- filtrated in February 196] and exfiltrated in July 1961 following the Bay of Pigs. This period covered the above messages. (2) Re-infiltrated 29 July 1961, with the same organizing mission, he was arrested on 17 August 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name appears in the book given Senator McGovern. c. AMPUG/1 was another of those AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan in April 1961. (1) Recruited in September 1960, he was in- filtrated that month, receiving airdrops in December 1960. He returned to the U.S. 15 May 1961, following the Bay of Pigs. (2) Infiltrated again on 29 June 1961, with the mission to organize resistance groups and conduct sabotage operations, he was arrested in July 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those in the bock given Senator McGovern by Castro. SECRET
13-00000 SEGRET d. AMPANIC/7 was another of those that AMBRONC/5 was told to contact for his general plan in April 1961. (1) This man was a "walk-in" 15 April 1960, a POA being issued 30 January 1961 (although there was a MOC since 12 July 1960). He was to organize resistance groups in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas. (2) Infiltrated 3 March 1961, he was arrested 23 April 1961, and is serving a thirty year term. His name is among those in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro. " (3) Records relating to this man mention his in- filtration into Cuba in August 1960 and exfiltration in November 1960 (prior to his being issued a POA). His “mission" during that period is mentioned tersely as being “to organize resistance groups ... for mounting sabotage operations . . . and assassination of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro” entourage . .." The records refer to “his own personal objectives" during this period and criticizes how he functioned during his stay in Cuba from August to November 1960. The record then specifies how he is to conduct himself and focus his efforts on his return, which was to develop sabotage operations. We were able to contact one of his two case officers, who has retired SECRET
13-00000 SEGRET (the other had died), to ascertain his recollections, Stating that at the time the focus was on developing organizations for operations, he stated that an assasSination mission, such as attributed to AMPANIC/7 on his earlier time in Cuba, not only was not authorized, but would have compromised the effort to organize. Any such assassination mission, the case officer states, would have been at AMPANIC/7's own initiative. 4. It is clear that AMBRONC/5 envisioned a general uprising in Cuba, to commence with sabotage of the electric plant in Havana and an attempt on Castro's life. The third of his messages reflected pessimism, and the fact is that the operation did not come off. While the man had no express mission from the Agency to mount an operation against Castro personally, it is clear that no specific objection was recorded to his statement of intentions. The one recorded reply addresses the concept of general action and makes no reference to the proposal to make an attempt on Castro. 5. The fact is that. the 9 April 1961 operation did not come off, and AMBRONC/5 has not been identified as an Agency asset. Nor was his name included in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro. The other men,. none of whom had a mission of assassi- nation from the Agency, are now serving thirty year terms. That their names were included in the list given Senator McGovern by Castro may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the facts SECRET
13-00000 SECRET rather than to report what he truly believes. They were not executed, a consideration that may support this view. . 6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs. The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to the event described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent infiltrations into Cuba. There: is no record that any of them had a mission from CIA to kill Castro. The person who proposed the act in 1961 -- AMBRONC/5 -- never acknowledged that he was & CIA agent, and is not listed among those Castro reportedly believes had the mission of his assassination. II 7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy; who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who “have plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name in Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator of the agent message cannot be identified from present records. 32
13-00000 SECRET ITI ' 8. Another agent message dated 3 May 1967 from a member of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said “will try to kill Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent and his companions to “lay low" for the time being, and “will advise when operations can resume." There were no follow-up messages on this subject in the records. The agent who sent the message possibly was AMPUG/1, but as noted earlier his mission did not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not - been identified. SECRET
13-00000 SEREI I. AMLASH OPERATION | , Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta- tion in Book V of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated ina unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report. The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79), which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively, the Report suggests that AMLASH/1 was so insecure in the conduct of his activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75). Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. We believe that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy, was sO insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for *See pages 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 29, 31, 35, 36, 59, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, and 86 of the 97-page texty- and pages 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the eight-page chronology following the text. EoD tae Fr Bie
13-00000 AMLASH/] to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro. Whether one is inclined to see AMLASH/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to Teak. kk RRR RK KR RK RK In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH operation is intended to present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity. Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed. It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per- spective for judging the actual substance of the operation. kkk Kk Ke Kk K KKK KK As early as March 1959,. AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba. At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment and that if he "...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill Castro himself." Two years later, in March 1961, AMLASH/1] was met in Mexico City by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/1's presence at the leftist-sponsored Latin America Conference on National Sovereignty, Emancipation, and Peace. The meeting was arranged by AMWHIP/1, a long-time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961, giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in
13-00000 Mexico City, described the meeting (along with others) as follows: "...the Station made an unsuccessful ‘approach’ to (AMLASH/1)...the ‘approach' consisted of a 'friendly' talk between a case officer, a mutual friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last was visiting in Mexico. While (AMLASH/1) did not pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently did not report the incident to his superiors and the ground work may have been laid for a similar action in the future." " Later in March there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil- tration ended with a report that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/1's intention and plans. | In August 1961 AMWHIP/1 reported plans by AMLASH/1 to attend the French National Student Union Cultural Festival, and that AMLASH/1 wanted to meet with a "friend" of the Mexico City case officer's. The files do not reveal that such a contact actually occurred. In June 1962 there was a report that AMLASH/1 would be travelling via Prague to the World Youth Festival in Helsinki. AMLASH/1 was reported as wanting to defect, and also that on his return from Helsinki he would pass through Paris where he hoped to meet AMWHIP/1. The FBI, which was aware of CIA's association with AMWHIP/1, met with AMWHIP/1 in Miami and took steps for him to be referred to CIA if he should contact the Paris Legal Attache. at] rot ers matic? res toad
13-00000 In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/1, who made known his dis- satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/1's "planned defection" in Paris in August 1961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and AMWHIP/1 to travel to Helsinki and anywhere else necessary in an attempt to bring about AMLASH/1's defection. The first of a series of meetings with AMLASH/1 was held in Helsinki on 1 August 1962. The original objective of his defection became one of recruiting him in place. AMLASH/1 was reported as feeling that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there." AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oil refinery and the execution of a top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro himself. “The case officer's report stated: "While we were making no commitments or plans, we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information- collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans." (Emphasis in original). The security hazard of too frequent meetings in Helsinki led to further meetings in Stockholm and Copenhagen. AMLASH/1 was next met on 16 and 17 August in Paris where AMWHIP/1 and the case officer were joined by another case officer. AMLASH/1 was given SW training and supplies. On 20 August he was taken to the south of France for a) ee ys ;
13-00000 a demolition demonstration. He refused to be polygraphed. The case officer reported on 17 August: "Have no intention give [AMLASH/1] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated: "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given [AMLASH/1]." ~ On 29 August 1962 AMLASH/1 left Prague by air for Havana. This was the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September 1963. COMMENT : It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever for that matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA rela- tionship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress, although he was viewed as an operational contact with potential. Over a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship that he had with CIA the critical period, for purposes of this paper, is there- fore between 5 September and 22 November 1963. AMLASH/1 attended the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, Brazil from 5 through 8 September 1963, as a representative of the Cuban
13-00000 Government. He was met there by AMWHIP/1, and by the CIA case officer who was to take over the relationship with him. AMLASH/1 said that he had written two SW messages {only one had been received). He expressed his reluctance to use this form of communications because of Cuban postal censorship. It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears: "", . . the CIA took steps to renew its contact with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. -The CIA's previous contact with him had been sporadic; he had not been in contact with the CIA since before the missile crisis of October 1962. The exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination operation." ° The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September 1963. If it is narrowly correct to state that the "exact purpose" for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the SSC Report, it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this point, not only was there "no evidence (that) . . . an assassination -operation" was intended, it is quite clear that it was not under consideration. The problem at the time was how to deal with the man. At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting
13-00000 teat in September 1963: ">. . may have been to gain intelligence and to cultivate him as an asset for covert operations..." A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report, provides an insight as to how AMLASH/1 was assessed at the time, as well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers of how to deal with him in the future: “AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always be a control problem . . (he) will not take time or have patience prepare or receive constant stream S/W messages,let alone OWVL. AMLASH also needs strong confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain. . ." CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part: “. . . Based on what little feel we here have for subject however appears he is hopeless as intel] performer and is best approached as a chief con- spirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to Tong - distance and covert disciplines..." The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to. any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/1] may put together. Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, -requiring careful but long-range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue.
13-00000 aE res | SLUnL Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963 cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows: “AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an ‘inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added). This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro himself. That may have seemed implicit to the authors of the SSC Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently: "AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish " ‘change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of action." COMMENT: At this point, after a year out of touch with a man with whom there had been no working understanding, AMLASH/1's views were of interest, but were very general, as might be expected after such a long time. The actual reference to an “inside job" did not specify Castro, as suggested in the SSC Report, but was. directed towards the more general question of how to bring about change. It was offered alternatively, in the context of con- sidering both external and internal action, and not with the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation.
13-00000 ae The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left AMLASH/1 "awaiting a U.S. plan of action." There was nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things were left very much up in the air. | Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that “characterization of this phase of the AMLASH operation is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination operation, which begs the question of what it was for “this phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that "From the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba." (Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V, itself describes the very general nature of the approach by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra). | Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the SSC Final Report. The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed
13-00000 against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.S. leaders. The intended inference, as is known from discussions with SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri- zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter- pretation as categorically as though it were fact. The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing. AMLASH/1 flew to Paris on 14 September, ostensibly to attend a meeting of the Alliance Francaise. The trip actually was for an extended vacation, which AMLASH/1 intended to report to Castro after the fact. On 16 September he wrote AMWHIP/1? that he did not "intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to the CIA case officer. On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless arrived in Paris to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed. On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the "necessary people and equipment inside
13-00000 [Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without fu.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1 was reported as wishing a meeting with.a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of "moral support" for any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that the. request for a meeting: "be given highest and profound consideration as feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that he determined attempt op against [Castro] with or without [U.S.] support." A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] wil] support him if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added). Desmond Fitzgerald, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, was going to Paris on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1. The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows: "Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled to Paris for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1] and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (Emphasis added). On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/1 in Paris, representing himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.
13-00000 On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high- lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows: "Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United — States is prepared to render all] necessary | assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader- ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after a real coup has been effected and the group involved is in a position to request U.S. (probably under OAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished in a matter of hours if the present government is still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup period, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be turned back but will support the necessary economic and political reforms which will benefit the mass of the Cuban people." At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re- 12
13-00000 1 called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. He wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer, although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum stated that: "Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him." On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met in New York City. He reported on AMLASH/T's reaction to the 29 October meeting in Paris. The contact report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as follows: "The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high levels of the Government concerned with the Cuban problem satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con- cerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as-he saw it. [AMWHIP/1] said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point. 13 SEGRE:
13-00000 He could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final * solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to [AMWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date." COMMENT : At this point it is important to note that Agency documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told, and what he was told, which matches a later report of what he understood. In essence he was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if- he was successful. While that may not Seem a | very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a government, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18) to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 inter- preted the put-off by Fitzgerald.
13-00000 Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/1's understanding is provided by a July 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously at pages 35, 72 and 74 of Book V of the SSC Report). This report was from an FBI informant who stated that AMLASH/1 was unhappy with the CIA response and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan. Given the substance of this aspect of the report it is apparent that although the date of the report is June 1964, this particular information dates back to 29 October 1963 when AMLASH/1 was told by Fitzgerald, representing himself as speaking for Robert F. Kennedy, that he would not be given support in this opera- tion. While this is not the reason the FBI report was cited in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it provides additional clear confirmation that AMLASH/1 understood that he had been turned down at the 29 October meeting. Following the 14 November meeting with AMWHIP/7 CIA reviewed what | could be done to maintain the contact with AMLASH/1. On 19 November 1963 Fitzgerald “approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache could, if he requested it, include ...high-power rifles w/scope..." ~ On 19 November AMLASH/1 told a CIA officer that he planned to- return to Cuba. On 20 November Headquarters cabled Paris requesting that AMLASH/1 "delay departure...(to) permit one more meet ing which AMLASH/1 requested." On the same day (20 November) in response to 15
13-00000 a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure “if it is something interesting." The case officer told him that “he could not assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH had requested." The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person in the room. The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and quite significantly,. the Report acknowledges that no specific support had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence. The case officer from Washington arrived in Paris the morning of 22 November and met with AMLASH/1 late that afternoon. As they left the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot. Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/] following the death of President Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro.
13-00000 erAgeT II. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT Section 1, B This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that “it places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies) Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states that the report “details these operations to illustrate why they were relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been examined by the Warren Commission. - The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as follows: "The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission's work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat of retaliation for such plotting." As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly
13-00000 SEGRET unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1 prior to the death of President Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect to say that "CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal." There was no agree- ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat" --as noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time. " This viewpoint was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publica- tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission. The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68 as follows: ".,.it is unlikely that Castro could have distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA." 18 SEGREI
13-00000 SECRET The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of Ccon- testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC Final Report, and to that extent the thesis that the presentation was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry-- that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed . to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.S.. Government, including CIA activities. kkk kk Kk Kk Kk Ke Rk ER At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, in a meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having: "stated the United States would support a coup." Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald: “also gave general assurances that the United States would help in bringing about the coup." The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This ‘presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match 19 SECRET
13-00000 (SECRET the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time. In considering the processes by which this version came into Being, it is noted that the following statement appears at page 87 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots: “Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and promised him that the United States would support a coup against Castro," citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting. An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows: "3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting - stated: ‘Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1 and giving him assurances of full support with a change of the present government in Cuba.‘" (Emphasis added). The underscored portion--the word “with"--in fact read in the actual document "if there is." This substitution of language in a purported quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made (as discussed at pages 11 and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1 understood (as discussed at pages 13-15). kk eK RK Rk KK At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible CREE 20
13-00000 for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it would have affected the investigation. It is only noted that it is likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was. a ee ee 2 At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following statement: "According to the 1967 Inspector General Report, CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on ‘the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi- nation and to return to Headquarters." This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows: "TThe case officer] states that he received an OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off." The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited, apparently despite suggestive prompting, that: " . . . he recalled receiving such a cable, but could not recall whether it made specific mention 21 SECRET
13-00000 ae of the President's assassination as the reason for | breaking contact .. ." | It is noted that the cable was never found; it may never have been sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event, the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version. keke kek kek KK Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the AMLASH operation. As noted in the above review of the AMLASH operation, AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1. Through sensitive sources we know that other Cubans were aware of his fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were he inclined to do so. Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he. obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind. To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA ‘to break relations with him.
13-00000 SEGAET Some have speculated that AMLASH/1 was, in some way, Castro's provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, although we do note that he was rewarded strangely if he was. When finally arrested he served ten years of a thirty-year term. His public trial did not mention his Agency associations for the period March 196] to November 1964. An interesting consideration is that when Castro pro- vided Senator McGovern with a list of persons the Cubans claimed had the mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this earlier period. a ee a ee  F At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. "The SSC Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to. assess their activities. The SSC Report states that: “AMLASH's real name was included in the list of names on the Mexico Station cable." This is used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification of the AMLASH operation. The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of 23 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET the Soviet embassy and a Cuban cultural attache -- in December' 1960 -- about a press conference planned for AMLASH/7 in Mexico City’ in February and March 1961. [It was not a report of a contact between AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In any event, the December 1960 date preceded the jnauguration of President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any relevance to the subject. There was no reason to check the name. The presentation in the ssc Final Report is confusing and mislead- ene ing on this point. KK KKK KR KKK KKK Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con- cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states “that the purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages ' 14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry. 24 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET kkk Kk Kk KK Kk KK KK Ke At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief, SAS Counterintelligence. His recollections are very uncertain. He is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks of his "vague recollections" that the Fitzgerald meeting was related to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless gives this opinion full play despite the extensive qualification as to its reliability. ke kK RK RK KR KR KR o= At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot throughout, and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period in question. There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 is noted in the discussion above. In the present instance the uncertainties were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. It is important to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, as presented in the SSC Final Report. 25 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET | Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding «relating to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum- stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps on the basis of representations by SSC staff members as to what it was--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final Report did not accord the subject that treatment. kkk kek KK Re KE At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/1's 1963 associations with CIA. This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an irrelevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his SECRET
13-00000 assassination also contained no reference to that period, although AMLASH/1's later activities were cited. s i i i It is useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection, which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was determined that it was best for him to go it alone, developing his own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were held concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his own program before he could expect support from the U.S. Eventually -- but not until after the death of President Kennedy -- firmer indications of support were offered. Even then the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a man who claimed to have the “necessary people and equipment inside [Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow..." The nature of the relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964 (page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1 that it could not be associated with his concept of the first step of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While one can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those directly involved structured their thinking differently.
13-00000 \ GOINGS | Serpe The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim , Report on Alleged Assassination Plots. At the time of the 1967 IG report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC Report is both imprecise and misleading.
13-00000 Volume V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report, CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports. The following pages list reports and other papers submitted to the FBI (which had primary responsibility .for the investigation) and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort. The lists fall into the following sections: E.1 Dissemination to the Intelligence Community E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission
13-00000 SECRET AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis- seminated to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as possible after receipt. The following list of some 100 cabled disseminations, CSCI's, and memoranda were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al. The listing covers the period from 10 October 1963 through September 1964. AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISSEMINATIONS opm I II _ III ots *10 October 1963 DIR 74673 (WH/3/Mexico) "On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico City reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City ..." Recipients: FBI, I&NS, Navy, State. [Warren Com- mission] *24 October 1963 DIR 77978 (WH/3/Mexico) .. Request for two copies of most recent photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipients: Navy. [Warren Commission] 23 November 1963 DIR 384915 (WH/3) Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep- tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI — i Document Date II - Document Number III - Originating Office ° * = An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available to the Warren Commission. & SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 24 November 1963 TDCS-3/565 ,829 Subject: Cuban Precautions following Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR, ORR, 00, EXO. 25 November 1963 DIR 84950 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 DIR 84951 (CI/SIG) - Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's Activities in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI 26 November 1963 CSCI- (WE/BC) Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,826 (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. Encloses transcripts of tele- phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and 3 October 1963. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,829 (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. (Encloses transcripts of tele- phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD between 27 September and 3 October 1963). NB: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of the document in CI/SIG file No. 568. Recipient: FBI. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 26 November 1963 DIR 85069 (WH/3) Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress- man to Texas on 26 November 1963. Recipient: FBI *26 November 1963 DIR 85089 (C/WH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 that “on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City". Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 26 November 1963 DIR 85176 — (WH/3) - Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (information volun- teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed REGGAB studying in West Germany). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 26 November 1963 DIR 85177 | (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Telephone communication between Cuban President DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Ambassadro to Mexico. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816. Recipient: FBI. 3 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 27 November 1963 DIR 85246 (WH/3) Dr. Jose GUILLERMO Aguirre of Mexico reports information regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Also relayed to S. PAPICH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.) 27 November 1963 DIR 85471 (C/WH/3) Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 DIR 85573 (WH/3/Mexico) Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban - Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SI1G) Information on frnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele- phone to S. PAPICH. Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Information regarding photographic coverage of Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City passed to S. PAPICH of the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH with regard to OSWALD's presence in New Orleans in September 1963. Recipient:. FBI. 28 November 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3) On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em- bassy in London indicating that an “American gangster- type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. SECRET
13-00000 SECRET *28 November 1963 DIR 85662 (C/WH/3) Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] *28 November 1963 DIR 85665 (C/WH/3) The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963, a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy. SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. LEE [sic] who murdered President Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] ~ 29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,893 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipient: FBI. *29 November 1963 DIR 85666 Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation and investigation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com- mission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85668 (WH/3/Mexico) Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House- *29 November 1963 - DIR 85670 (C/WH/3) Sensitive sources ... have reported that when the 23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great deal of discussion. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission]
13-00000 SECRET a 29 November 1963 DIR 85676 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers. Recipient: FBI. *29 November 1963 DIR 85691 (C/WH/3) Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85714 (C/WH/3) Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. *29 November 1963 DIR 85715 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959 to May 1962). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85744 (C/WH/3) Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. *29 November 1963 DIR 85758 (WH/3/Mexico) Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 7 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET *29 November 1963 DIR 85770 (C/WH/3) Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor that Oswald had made a bank deposit. 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH relaying the Director's suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas.~ 30 November 1963 . CSCI-3/778/894 Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination. Recipient: FBI. *30 November 1963 DIR 86063 (C/WH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 3 December 1963 DIR 86496 (C/WH/3) Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico. Recipient: FBI. *4 December 1963 DIR 86702 (C/WH/3) Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife, June 1962. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] ‘SECRET
13-00000 SECRET cf 5 December 1963 DIR 87189 (C/WH/3) Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi demanding full probe into assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. *6 December 1963 DIR 87520 (C/WH/3) Correction of DIR 87502. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] *7 December 1963 DIR 87667 (C/WH/3/) Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission) 9 December 1963 DIR 87731 (WH/3/Mexico) Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with — Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. wT Recipient: FBI. *9 December 1963 DIR 87796 (WH/3) Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging assassination arranged by Communist Chinese. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum  (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902). Recipient: FBI. 11 December 1963 TDCSDB 3/658 ,408 Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding (a) Moscow views on international situation following death of President Kennedy, and (b) resumption of disarmament talks. Recipients: General distribution. SECRET.
13-00000 SECRET 12 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3) Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON, John; WILSON, John Hudson. ) Recipient: FBI. *12 December 1963 DIR 88643 Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi- dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com- mision] 12 December 1963 DIR 88682 (C/WH/3) Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not to comment upon the assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 12 December 1963 DIR 88747 (C/WH/3) Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. *13 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,136 (C/WH/3) Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 16 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,135 (C/WH/3) Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination. Recipient: FBI. *18 December 1963 DIR 89970 (C/WH/3) Further information on Richard Thomas GIBSON. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 10 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET *18 December 1963 DIR 89980 Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 19 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,225 Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 19 December 1963 CSDB-3/658 ,870 (WH/Reports) Subject: a. Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and - Rauo ROA y Garcia. b. Probable Future Plan of Action for Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez. Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified. 27 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,297 Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese). Recipient: FBI. 3 January 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964 regarding newspaper article appearing in E1. Caribe on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November. Recipient: FBI. *10 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,482 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 1] SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 14 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,510 (CI/SIG) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of information from CIA.) Recipient: FBI. 27 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,729 (CI/SIG) Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 30 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SIG) Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 4 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,817 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names, addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the Soviet Union.) Recipient: FBI. 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0860 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0861 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0862 Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service. Subject: Assassination of President 12 SECRET
13-00000 SEGRET. John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in “Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.) Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0864 Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy - Verification of Entry in “Historic Diary". Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission] 20 February 1964 CSCI-3/779, 988 (SR/CI/R) _ Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding SETYAEVA and RAHM. ) Recipient: FBI. - 22 February 1964 DIR 03101 (C/WH/3) Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan Student Mohamed REGGAB. Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service). 11 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,344 Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,612 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Photograph of an individual closely resembling OSWALD). Recipient: FBI. 16 April 1964 CSCI-3/780, 996 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Recipient: FBI. 20 April 1964 CSDB-3/660, 704 Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination. Recipient: FBI (?) 13 SEGRET
13-00000 mets - Ae aeer ROPE, 22 April 1964 CSCI-3/780,881 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Assassination of: President John F. Kennedy. (Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.) Recipient: FBI. 30 April 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum ‘(CI /SIG) Telephone Contact with S. PAPICH on 29 November advising PAPICH to contact SOLIE of the Office of Security for information. 8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI. 11 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,172. - Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address bbok belonging to Marina OSWALD.) Recipient: FBI. 13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,282 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.) Recipient: FBI. 15 May 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service -to the Assassination of President Kennedy. 14
13-00000 SECRET. 13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,351 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information about the U-2. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444] 19 May 1964 CSCI-3/78] , 386 Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK). Recipient: Navy. 5 June 1964 CSCI-3/781 , 543 (CI/R&A) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla- tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROASRIA Milina. 10 June 1964 CSCI-3/781,841 (CI/R&A) Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby. Recipient: FBI. 29 June 1964 CSCI-3/782 , 058 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 2 July 1964 DDP 4-3401 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 6 July 1964 DDP 4-3470 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 18 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64 Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union. Recipient: FBI. 3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 1 October 1964 DDP 4-5110 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Joachim JOESTEN. - Recipient: Copy to FBI. 6 October 1964 CSCI-316/01446-64 ck Subject: [VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 23 October 1964 CSCI-316/01709-64 Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE. Recipient: FBI. 2 November 1964 CSCI-316/01779-64 Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in the Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. 23 December 1964 CSCI-316/02545-64 Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of Cuban Involvement in Assassination. Recipient: FBI. 16 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 2 March 1965 CSCI-316/00925-65 . Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi- gation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 8 April 1965 CSCI-316/01398-65 Subject: Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Secret Service] 30 June 1965 CSCI-316/02654-65 Subject: Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. 2 September 1966 CSCI-316/04482-66 Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's Intourist Guide in Moscow. Recipient: FBI. 9 May 1967 CSCI-316/02153-67 Subject: BEAUBOVEFF apparently to be used as a pawn by Jim GARRISON to show that OSWALD was a CIA agent and was to be used to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. GARRISON alleges he has letters signed by CIA representatives or by Senator Robert KENNEDY authorizing certain Americans to work with Cubans for the assassination of CASTRO. This memroandum is intended to record that such letters never existed and therefore could not be in GARRISON's possession. Recipient: FBI. 14 June 1967 CSCI-316/02669-67 Subject: Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding Mario GARCIAS et al. Recipient: FBI V7 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 24 July 1967 CSCI-316/03243-67 Subject: Allegation of Oscar CQUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman, that OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. CONTRERAS' statement of dubious credibility; information passed to Mexican authorities. Recipient: FBI. 7 May 1968 CSCI~316/01678-68 Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged Assassination Conspiracy of JFK Written and Mailed by Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim GARRISON's Allegations. Recipient: FBI. 16 September 1969 CSCI-316/03323-69 Subject: Charles Willtam THOMAS. Recipient: FBI. DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad- ditionally, cables disseminations were released by CI/Liaison. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff. Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordinated on short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's. DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION m 13 December 1963 [Commission Document No. 100] Memorandum Subject: Analysis of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination. (Supplied by A. W. DULLES.) 18 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 21 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 300] Note from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Attachments: a. Recent Soviet Statements on Lee Harvey OSWALD. b. FBIS-28 on OSWALD case. 21 January 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Draft Questions for Submission to the Government of the Soviet Union. 22 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 691] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN: Subject: Suggested Questions for Marina OSWALD. 25 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 321] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Chronology of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Stay in the Soviet Union. Alphabetical List of Persons in the Soviet Union Who Were Known to or Mentioned by Lee Harvey OSWALD or His Wife. 31 January 1964 [Commission Document No. 347] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. rod Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity. of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963. 5 February 1964 Note from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES to J. Lee RANKIN. Fourteen attachments including recent Soviet State- ments on Lee Harvey OSWALD (as of 5 February 1964). 5 February 1964 [Commission Document No. 361] Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN forwarding three copies of Appendix B, a summary biography of Mrs. OSWALD and her relatives. 19 SECRET 4
13-00000 ‘SECRET 8 February 1964 [Commission Docjment No. 1182] Letter from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee.- RANKIN regarding Soviet weapon mentioned in one of Lee Harvey OSWALD's documents. [Information passed to FBI. ] 18 February 1964 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi- nation of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for information which might be helpful in interpreting available materials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad. ) [Copy to Warren Commission. ] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0860 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi- nation of John F. Kennedy. (Request for information relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide. ) [Copy to Warren Commission. ] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-086] Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, attention Mr. S. J. PAPICH. Subject: Assassi- nation of President John F. Kennedy. (Request for copies of 47 photographs found among the effects of Lee Harvey OSWALD. ) [Copy to Warren Commission. ] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0862 Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service; signed by Richard HELMS, DDP. Subject: . Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide. ) [Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.] 20 [SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 18 February 1964 DDP 4~-0864 Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. HUGHES, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of Entry in “Historic Diary".) [Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI. ] 19 February 1964 [Commission Document No. 384] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. (TS No. 187908.) Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, September 28 to October 3, 1963. 19 February 1964 DDP 4-4581 -_ Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City. *21 February 1964 DDP 4-0940 [Commission Document No. 426] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Translations of Interrogations Reports of Silvia DURAN. Attachments: OUT Telegram No. 85758, 29 November 1963. Translation of Interrogation of Silvia DIRAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. CSCI-3/779,482 of 10 January 1964. Trans- lation of Official Mexican Polic Report on the Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. 5 March 1964 DDP 4-117] [Commission Document No. 448] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohammed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD. *6 March 1964 DDP 4-1224 [Commission Document No. 692] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information in CIA's Possession Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963. 2] SECRET
13-00000 SECRET. 18 March 1964 DDP 4-1423 [Commission Document No. 528] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was Interviewed by CIA in Moscow. 24 March 1964 DDP 4-1555 [Commission Document No. 674] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Disseminated to the Secret Service but not yet made available to the President's Commission. *24 March 1964 DDP 4-1554 [Commission Document No. 631] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN.  _ Subject: CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD, Dated 10 October 1963. Attachments: OUT Message No. 74673, dated 10 October 1963. OUT Message No. 77978, dated 23 October 1963. 25 March 1964 DDP 4-1576 Note from Richard HELMS to J. Lee RANKIN. Attachment: Five copies of "Rumors about Lee Harvey OSWALD", dated 23 March 1964. 27 March 1964 DDP 4-1606 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to Thomas L. HUGHES, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary". [Copies to Warren Commission and the FBI.] *31 March 1964 DDP 4-1655 [Commission Document No. 698] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD. Attachments: OUT Message No. 86702, 4 December 1963, 22 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. OUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. OUT Message No. 85715, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the ~ Secret Service. OUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. *3 April 1964 DDP 4-1699 [Commission Document No. 710] 6 April 7 April Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON. Attachment: OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December -1963, to White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 1964 DDP 4-1739 — [Commission Document No. 708] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Reply to Questions Contained in Your Memo- randum dated 12 March 1964. ("Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Files") 1964 DDP 4-1787 [Commission Document No. 726] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First Interrogation. 23 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET 7 April 1964 DDP 4-1786 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Mohammed REGGAB. 20 April 1964 DDP 4-1997 [Commission Document No. 817] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: BND Report Pertaining to Allegations Con- cerning Anton ERDINGER. 21 April 1964 Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN. Attachment: CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and French Publishing Firms to Publish the Thomas BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President Kennedy. ) 24 April 1964 DDP 4-2099 [Commission Document No. 844] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD. 29 April 1964 DDP 4-2160 [Commission Document No. 871] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD. 4 May 1964 DDP 4-2256 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. 6 May 1964 DDP 4-2296 [Commission Document No. 902] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information to the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection. 8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351 {Commission Document No. 911] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.
13-00000 13 May 1964 DDP 4-2444 [Commission Document No.* 15 May 1964 19 May 1964 DDP 4-2533 [Commission Document No. *19 May *22 May SECRET 931] Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Informa- tion about the U-2. [CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy. [Copy to FBI] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates; Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas; Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from Cuba. 1964 DDP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Rixhard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S. Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi- dent Kennedy. Attachment: OUT Message No. 85770, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 1964 DDP 4~-2624 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States Embassy in Canberra, Australia, Relative to Planned Assassination of President Kennedy. Attachment: OUT Message No. 85691, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 25 SECRET, [Commission Document No. 935] 944] 943] 971]
13-00000 SECRET, 27 May 1964 DDP 4-2688 [Commission Document No.* 985] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy. Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 27 May 1964 DDP 4-2692 [Commission Document No. 990] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEV and Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD. 1 June 1964 DDP 4-274] [Commission Document No. 1000] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. OUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. QUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. OUT Message No. 86063, dated 30 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. OUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. OUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963; subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. 3 June 1964 DDP 4-2764 [Commission Document No. 1001] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by the Soviet Government. 3 June 1964 DDP 4-2770 [Commission Document No. 1012] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject. George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT. 26 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4847 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: COmmunications from the Department of State. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4848 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Departure from the USSR of Soviet Citizens Married to Foreigners. 18 September 1964 DOP 4-4850 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Passport and Visa Office. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4873 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4882 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa. 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4886 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the USSR. 22 September 1964 DDP 4-4921 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Silvia Tirado Bazan de DURAN. 17 September 1964 DDP 4-4922 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City. 3] SECRET
13-00000 SECRET. 18 September 1964 > PDP 4-4952 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWLAD. (Information regarding OSWALD's stay in Helsinki.) 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4953 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625). 1 October 1964 DDP 4-5110 [Commission Document No. 1532] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Joachim JOESTEN. [Copies to FBI, I&NS, State] ~ 13 October 1964 DDP 4-5275 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency. 16 October 1964 DDP 4-5334/1 Memorandum for The President's Committee on the Warren Commission Report. Subject: CIA's Role in the Support of Presidential Foreign Travel. 20 October 1964 DDP 4-534] [Commission Document No. 1545] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. 29 October 1964 DDP 4-5558 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Transmittal of OCR Publication: "Foreign Press Reaction to the Warren Report", and Follow-Up Report, dated 22 October 1964. 32 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET. AGENCY DISSEMINATIONS TO THE FBI ET AL REGARDING RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. 10 October 1963 DIR 74673 . Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 1 October 1963. Recipients: FBI, I&NS, State, White House. 23 November 1963 DIR 84915 Information relating to telephone call on 28 September 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 DIR 84950 Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 . DIR 8495] CIA requests information relating to OSWALD's ac- tivities in Mexico City (from FBI interrogation of OSWALD). Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message. Recipient: FBI.- 26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,826 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. Encloses transcripts of tele- phone calls made on 27 and 28 September and 1 and 3 October 1963. . Recipient: FBI. 33 SECRET.
13-00000 SECRET 26 November 1963 | CSCI-3/778,829 Subject: Same as above. (Comment: This dissemination may be identical with. CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of the docu- ment in CI/SIG file no. 568.) Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 DIR 85069 Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress- man to Texas on 26 November 1963. Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Communist, pro-Castro deputy to the Costa Rican National Assembly, will try to gather data in Texas to use in pro-conmunist-pro-Castro propaganda in connection with the assassination of | President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 DIR 85089 Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 [sic - 25 November 1963] that “on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City." Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received a copy. [Warren Commission] 26 November 1963 DIR 85176 Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD (information volun- teered on Marina OSWALD by Moroccan student Mohamed REGGAB studying in West Germany). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 26 November 1963 DIR 85177 Subject: Telephone Communication between Duban Presi- dent DORTICOS and Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, Cuban Am- bassador to Mexico. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 34 SECRET
13-00000 26 26 26 27 a7 27 27 November 1963 SECRET. Unnumbered Subject: HUNTER Report Ne. 108175. Recipient: FBI. November 1963 Unnumbered Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816. Recipient: FBI. November 1963 Unnumbered Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the White House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico City on 18 September 1963.) Recipient: FBI. November 1963 CSCI-3/778,881 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 18 Recipient: FBI. November 1963 - 24 November 1963. DIR 85182 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard Thomas GIBSON, an-American living in Switzerland, who was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding latter to a close friend in Bern. Recipients: FBI received copy. November 1963 , State, White House; Secret Service [Warren Commission] DIR 85196 According to information from Nicaraguan Security Service, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte was a Nicaraguan intelligence source from 1962 to August 1963. Recipients: FBI received copy. November 1963 » State, White House; Secret Service DIR 85199 Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 35 { SECRET
13-00000 SECRET London indicating that an “American gangster type named . RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 28 November 1963 DIR 85662 Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. ; Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 28 November 1963 DIR 85665 The Hague Station reports that on 23 November 1963, a local Castroite named Maria SNETHLAGE talked to Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy. SNETHLAGE claimed she knew the Mr. Lee [sic] who murdered President Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] = 29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,893 Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipient: FBI. 29 November 1963 DIR 85666 . Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85668 Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 29 November. 1963 DIR . 85670 Sensitive sources . . . have reported that when the 23 November arrest of Silvia DURAN became known to 37 SECRET,
13-00000 SECRET the personnel of the Cuban Embassy there was a great deal of discussion. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85691 ' Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85714 Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service ~ received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85744 Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85758 Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85770 Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 Unnumbered memorandum Telephone contact with S. PAPICH concerning rumor ‘that OSWALD had made a bank deposit. Recipient: FBI. 38 i SECRET,
13-00000 SECRET 30 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,894 Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination. Recipient: FBI. 30 November 1963 DIR 86063 Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte Admits his story a fabrication. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 3 December 1963 DIR 86496 Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico. Recipient: FBI. : 7 December 1963 DIR 87667 - Re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 DIR 87731 Richard BEYMER, American movie actor, in touch with Cuban Embassy, Mexico City. Recipient: FBI. 9 December 1963 DIR 87796 Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging assassination arranged by Communist Chinese. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum Telephone contact with S. PAPICH regarding identity of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658, IN 75902.) Recipient: FBI. 12 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON, John; WILSON, John Hudson. ) Recipient: FBI. 39 SECRET
13-00000 12 12 12 13 16 18 18 27 SEGRET December 1963 DIR 88643 Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] December 1963 DIR 88682 Cuban Ambassador to France received instructions not to comment upon the assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. December 1963 DIR 88747 Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. December 1963 CSCI-3/779 136 Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] December 1963 CSCI-3/779,135 Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination. Recipient: FBI. December 1963 DIR 89970 Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] December 1963 DIR 89980 Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation. . Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] December 1963 CSCI-3/779,297 Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese). Recipient: FBI. 40 SECRET,
13-00000 ‘SECRET 3 January 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum Telephone contact with S. PAPICH on 3 January 1964 regarding newspaper article appearing in El Caribe on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 No- vember. Recipient: FBI. 10 January 1964 CSCI-3/779 ,482 Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 27 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,729 Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 30 January 1964 CSCI-3/778,814 Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 4 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,817 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names, addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the Soviet Union.) Recipient: FBI. 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0860 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy. ("In connection with our efforts to assist the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy by providing information which might be helpful in interpreting available ma- terials relating to OSWALD's activities abroad,
13-00000 SECRET, 4 we have considered the entry with regard to attempted suicide. We consider this entry as being of consider- able importance and one which might be subject to verification.") Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0861 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (". . . 47 photographs which were among the effects of Lee Harvey OSWALD, . .. . It appears that most of the photographs were taken in the USSR and depict Soviet contacts of OSWALD or scenes in the Soviet Union.") Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] - 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0862 Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in "Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.) Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-0864 Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy - Verification of Entry in "Historic Diary". Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission] 20 February 1964 CSCI-3/779 ,988 | Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding Annette SETYAEVNA and Lillie May RAHM.) Recipient: FBI. 22 February 1964 DIR 03101 Subject: Further Information Provided by Moroccan Student Mohamed REGGAB. Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service. } 42 : SECRET,
13-00000 SECRET, 11 March 1964 CSCI-3/780 ,344 Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,612 Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Photograph of an individual closely resembling OSWALD. ) Recipient: FBI. 16 April -1964 CSCI-3/780 ,881 Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.) Recipient: FBI. 8 May 1964 DDP 4-235) Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI. [Warren Commission] 11 May 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,172 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book belonging to Marina OSWALD. ) Recipient: FBI. 13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,282 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.) Recipient: FBI. 15 May 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of the Service to the Assassi- nation of President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 43 (SECRET
13-00000 SECRET. 5 June 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,543 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Use of Machine Colla- tion Program to Check Out Cubans Mentioned in Letter of 27 November 1963 from Mario del ROSARIA Milina. ) Recipient: FBI. 10 June 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,841 Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY. Recipient: FBI. 29 June 1964 CSCI-3/782 ,085 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. - Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 2 July 1964 DDP 4-3401 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. (Remarks made by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV. ) Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64 Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Cuban Government. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 6 October 1964 CSCI-316/01446-64 Subject: VIADUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 44 SECRET.