: ae . - - pad ] . a - of the chiefs and Geputies vf the KG® directorates and departments at KGB ieadquarte:4 ta Mosecw. In KGB Head- - quarters ticre are four separate dining rvoms for personnel who work there; one. such dining reom ig reserved for chiefs and deputies of departzents. Because of thia Fact, NOSENKO has @ vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the EGB. Comment: bOSENEO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the “chiefs' dining room” ‘Top Secret nese eo Sehr eraneiii tition Tr mtitemns te o at easter ne monrenenreesnesmaninn i eine Ye mare ere emn ree emtenonetanceaaennasegptantnpete co ee BR AEN he ne
74-00000 eran ’ (Annex A) oy 7 a8 : 23-March 1964 * : The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of ; ; NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plen for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children. -376 . a 7 ee a os ces VTS No. 197124 Sone . i ‘ -: yore : ad . 2 4 ; , ‘ pale
REEL, © hE Stee Bema mae mare ate os’ me EAI Dyer, Sy PRN REL ang ha ONE GT MOY Tod “ee ETIL™ Se art AMIR BO Thal» aah 27 March 1964 oC . . ; {Annex A) . / . fs According to a sensitive source SET (6 92 various unnamed KGB officers «Bie em ‘certain - fhere seens to be unanisous opinion among ee KGB " m@ that NOSENKO...could do the KCB a tre- - og mendous amount of harm. NOSENKG in hia position as 4 de- ; . puty chief in one of the déepartsents of the Second Chief ; Directorate would have been entitled co have one personnel : o directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the iden-. tities: of all cf the supervisory offictals in KGB Head- quarters, NGSENKU would also nave had a .OO-page directory ; j listing by nezxe and telephone number all the rank-and-file , employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by " some i eeew kGB “chicfs" €& eee that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories aveilable to American Inrelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come. SHIP a tie stat he farraskest it ws ab, af Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB direc- tories described. 1 March 1964 KGB officers lnaal | in told their agent [to c@ase all Tatél- ligence actieiey-ror-a-yewrs—co-wewcrvy! any incriminating materiale in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets with passport photographs so that “eecape"” documents could be prepared for himself and his family. [ ___sijasked whether the action had any connection with NOSENXO's recent- ly publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting HOSENKO "was just a secretary". 3 7 ee. inane
‘ 1 March 1944 (continued) ot , ae OS Conment: len recontactad| in February $965,/] | acknowledge cna SENRO had ” . : in fact Been the causa of KGB ec'ncern, that he : ‘ : had had sume connection with NOSENEO, and ; HOSENKO may have mathing of what the KGB was doing in NOSENKO deseribed a KG Tllegal, whose name- - wan unknown to his, who apperently is-identical.. Lol | . March 1964 Ace ording to a sensitive source “ho te Visa ot ae oe el 3 Nae at 3 >, Was by a Second Chief Directurate ¢ 2 Departments Personnel of that Deparcnoent, in which NOSENKO had served until hie defection, were 9 shocked at the event that they would net mentica it ae all. a2tha Me Vi ae he by eat armoeepmmennnen peaewanee 9 open a sensitive source ‘ Commenc: In thie and other contexts -has stated or implied chat KOSENKO gerved in the American Department in 1963-1964: -WOSENKO asserts he left the American Departgeat in January 1962 and served in the Seventh: ‘Department vatil bie defection. ~ a 8 . .,
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14-00000 - (Annex A) : . : VGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lae JOUNSGN in Paris, began to meat JOHNSCN on the street rather than in various restaurants as hed been their sabit. At one of thelr final meetings before JOHNSON returned to'the United : States, VLASGV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer 4 had defected to the Anwericans in Geneva, and Chat extreme “4 ; caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts 4 with the “GB. VLASOV said that the defector-could noe identify a JORNSON but that JOHNSON should dispoee of everything he had a which might ‘link him to Sevlet espionage activities. (Se ; p @4for a summary of the JOHNSON case.) . 3 i Piaf tes PUES : 4 SS 2h DST ERO SAPS ROTTER, , : ar a disse A SC ROSE A oa si BS SS alae craue aa ing EP ; ; af . “a 4 speeeiermniern sn teat ae SUE ‘times Waite ETNA CERI gsr LS ic RTC May 1964: According to a sensitive source . Re ERIE (from unidentified gource®, presumably from KGB an officers @ ee ee RTT 3 Two commissions have been. established by the cps’ for the purposes: (a) to . jdetermine why KGB employees auch as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN,’ - Sol cme pee gs - St and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt. - so _ 80 eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency vl Of the Kop. L .
ae ancnemengpent aaa earaena eee Pv) <j } a a; & pr & oP we teat oe (Annex A) . a 4 7 20 Mav )yo4 : : ‘ . ; conn ng toa sensitive source | from ae KGB officer : eo ta ian. a The KGB was Lusky that the Anericans -feund only “0 ulcrophones fa the U.S. Embassy in Moscew. Actually, about 260 microphones were concealed by the Sovieta in the hmoassy. “SOSENKU wag respeneible for furnisniag inforsaction: toa the Areriecans wnich resulted in the micrephones being found. NGSENKO knew only the general locaticn of the 46 microphencs which were found and deee not nave any knowledge of the ren raining ones. ‘ cas 8 1 eported at the American Emvasey at an unnamed Soviet official with when he was acquainted told hia that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Hoscow to be sometne they are well réd of. 22 June 1964 | . According to a sensitive source . _ s P(from various unnamed KGB: of fice rsa The consensus amon gpkGB eaployees Glgwineigd< aye ; is that in the fucure’ the KGB will be feeling sharply the . effects of NOSEXKO's eacape to American Intelligence. . NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either ‘ GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on — Several factors: Firat, NOSENKO worked against personnel Stationed-at the American Enbassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed ameng these Americans. Second, it ts. assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness” to eee bee Oke wat gas! Pon als . . : 8 inne a Bi oma i sn del sti dre ca Pathih tbe Licoweed eoasicandaree ac EOE — cary ei yen no etree mn pet ® Lae nates be BE passe Lanse Dh bere fens eee tele Fa % u a “a
14-00000 rsync epoca 3 _ ~ i ¢, enw. ign Hl a 1964 (continued) 7 i : . 7 e . . $ See he OB » ‘ a soem greene i the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be 3 . familiar with the number of microphones which had been _ oe ; F {Installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of ; D4 these microphones. Third, ae a Deputy Chief of a depart= : “ment, NOSENFO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a forridable one in the mincs ci other -GB employees, ta that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential cirele of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these conmente were cited as reagons for ROSENKO being an : “inportant catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in : ‘ the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO : -had concerning the KGB. . . i ah 4 + mingnt secpemgnness cnet prgrmme Se 4 ¥ i * wd taes ty esterthet nde ald Wd poten 9 June 1964 *~ GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the aon of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer E who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh 4 ‘Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while ‘ on his own First Chief Directorate budiness, met NOSENKO two. or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, . and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. . When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. ‘ NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for ” KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during -1953. For the remainder of hie service in the Enbeaey Section ‘until 1957 of 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same respongi- - ‘bilities or may have been working against other Embassy , personnel or correspondents, but he wae definitely in the American Departoent during the entire period. In 1957 or : 1938 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and : was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not ~- “work in the Arerican Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN wisited the Embassy Section on at least. three occasions from early ° 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been. dn the Section, particularly Lf NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period. - rt - . x eet ee me ete ah sietonesiines 4 ‘ tate dod advertise: neemeepe me Tanperstt ayn fab 0d enero snen epranyaons Fama tery wi tert tie Boshi ea tema Behe ae ee ae 7 Oo
— ‘Tep Secret o (Annex A) ow Se  G 29 June 196% (continued) , : . aot . Comment: NOSENKO claims he-lefe the Embassy Section in 7; ae ‘ (1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Departmenc B _ until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section ase Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did set Ce -identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied °* since defection that he has ever met or aven: seen hin. . vente ah Fins rg 8th Bhat 5, wad NelSt we negemtee x pe seme res emey compe terre are Eats mip erat : "Juet after" HOSEN NKO' a: defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets scationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disara- b ament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the serfouaness of the defecticn and urged greater vigilance againat such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some. sdxty Soviet officials stattoned abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB of f€icar with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have tc retura to Moscow. Yu. I. GUR who was knowns ee had been discharged from the KGB because he had. recommended ; i NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. ‘According to one rumor, the ; chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, ‘ would also lose his job. Pamtt hasnt amt hone arrehten sedans whet g Wo 4b seach dentn ' rates 3 * : os by .a sensitive source Comment: MEDVEDEV, a “KGB officer formerly stationed tn K _New York City, waa said by € .: ste ek of those from the CPSU Central Committee who © - et conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. : identified MEDVBDEV, we Another sensitive source - . Ne 97124" {0°
Top Secret’ (Annex A) June 1964 (continued) Comuent:. (Continued) : : Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nationa, as the Communtat Party organizer ~ . ‘ and possibly a member of the KGB, buec said thar MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Miniectry of Foreign Affairs. POCHANKIK, who NOSENKO had ideacified as eae” KGu officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966. my ° ee AR Doone Ua ee LS e i from unnaned sources, presumably KGB officers dem es Z a): An investigating commission of the CPU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSINKO's defection hag thue far been responsible i for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate | employees. These include GRIBANOV, who wae alao expelled 2 talk Ms tats from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant ‘generel., GRIBANOV has been: given a very: emall pension, Like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic actien was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition co being Chie? of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a persunal friend of NOSENKO and had more oF - less treated NOSENKO as a procege and had taken many steps 4 ‘to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt : ‘that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to an defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies ware else expelled of from the KGB, cone of whom was a Major General BANNIK , ot [BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate euployees expelled, some were found to have been personal frienda of: . NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to ROSENKO details of cperations in which they were working. $.M. GOLUBEYV, “a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for eo hae dee Moscow because the investigating commission had determined “ that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEY told ROSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himeelf worked with NOSENKO in KGB : wtehasle Mewstl Sid ee . (384 pO Pets te . 2 or wee g Y 7 at by: . ‘l,06C€«@~E 7 ; Laws ra Soe Ene sersenreme win Sl "ey dete? Stam tng ee, Paras
we . . (Annex A) 29 July 1364 (eontinued)- i oP, | Headquarters sometime ‘in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and COLUBLV were given different assignments within the KGB' and thereafter did not associate with one another in the | . course of their dally sectivit ves. wturttieter dates. 2a Ca Gorrent: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier clates that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his “ advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identt-: fied by nase and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he | Lad hnowna personally since 1959, bur NOSENKO ! said he nad never worked with him at KGB Head- quarters since GOLUBEV had°- always been in the Firse Chief vtrectorate. GOLUBEV lefe for the USSR on 28 Auguet 1964. wot maeneteneempie nenenntintewey pee % + aaa FF dae a wae giithedsiee ay i 2 G22 JdulyrAugust 1964 . Ac ording to a sensitive source: ~ i . te “t information NOSENKO was : ae the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed | fron ‘KGB Headquarters which reported | to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The | dot tee © owed MEAL an letcter, which was very brief, said that “the less was very Ae: — ‘ ? et Pabaly efficient in the future”. The Legal Residency had not before received any “reports or commentaries on NGSENKO's i a H . i 1 : eanrdanbe escape". a great and some new forns of work should be created to be: ea aitbet eye bene
BOOS kerb Oo cower ne Arte tt ta oe sets: nse Abeer + (Annex A) , . , : 4, i oe TSP REEOER rete = axe orn my x8 November 1964 Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian — people had been tuld of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet. mathematician .V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance thar they had not been told offictally but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine” in Moscow. It was in this way,;,GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he RE Aae tee ee? aye feo abated! 4 learned of the NOSENKO defection and of ita significance. According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the. Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United Ststea. - = . - so “oo. ,
714-00000 « ‘Top secret (Annex A) November 1964 (continued) Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his atatementa, actions, and unusual freedon of Ty solitary movement while on visita to the United States. GAMKKELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added chat he "welcomed the opportunicy to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet 7 Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparte. During thae 1964 . meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject : . of NOSENKO, describing hin as “obviously a : traitor to his country” | , 1 A 5 4 4 Sctemesty Dot 2 ey wo Salle Med wd cence nicer earn sete ie d 4 December 1964 : 2 : H source Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's reommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told & ® chat he had been interrogated by the KGB in connecticn with NOSENKO'’s defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK reported to mp the dismissal.of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRLBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, ; y thought the KGB might go so far ettietretes wr raamneagehiCapsi tate nn a ald eatt source = . mt, rs . . . - i . ES No. s97i24
‘ FoI SR RRSP ERE OAL, aM ha) SEAL ROL OE AT A BRR ARERR Tie OL EMER Tee Eee AT he Iw QE 'r: Pra ee Decemher 1964 (coatinued) ” (Annex A) 7 ; Sol oan 4 as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill ROSENKO,. later identified RESHETAYAK as & RGB officer.) . 2 - ° Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainiaa Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the_ staff of the Disarmament Delegation. : 29 January 1965 According to. to a sensitive source ; (from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers eee go: it is common knowledge among eed?) employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB aad CPSU and is now on pension, partial ratrer than full, as a result of the NUOnENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignuent to Geneva (in 1964), a Summary - statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate ang sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable. “coupromtsing information", concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, Lt would have removed hin frow consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary - material, ran a line through all of it, and added the nota- tion: "Send him to Geneva.” The general. feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to. overlook a let of NOSENKO's os deficiencies because of GRIBANQV's long-Cine friendshtp | with NOSENKO's father. - de, Ste Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in. 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his — -assignments,. he asserted that BANNIKOV. approved the 1964 trip. . NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted. , - 4 os 1. ‘ ‘ ty oe fart at nei te es Cee aan Ore)
14-00000 meg a a Top Secret (Annex A) & February 1965 According to a | sensitive source from a KGB officer ery PAu mas 3 Prior to NOSENKO's| : defection he was Be pucy to the Chief “of 2 department in the ; Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh . (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, dR ca three ~ che KGB officer. separate occasions participated in conferences between “Important people” of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Dicectorate. NOSENKO wag present at all of these. Although SOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held oniy the rank a cf captain in the AGB. GBpRIB ececriburced this (the the KcB officer | ! - 5 , disparicy between $ub and rank) to the influence which i GRIBANGY exerted os the behalf of NOSENE ' eo : the KGB officer - Comment: NOSENKO hae never identified & NOSENKO alvays claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KCB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been ouly a captain. ‘ wed F ae darieta card According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer ‘ “GRIBANOV has been dismissed fron ; the KGs, expe!led from the CPSU, and is presently living on 1 * @ small persion. His dismissal occurred immediately after i NOSENKO's cefection. In addition, net less than 50 other ' . - people were dismisizced, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates. with the mafority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment ; has mot yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (7.A.) wat * estcew ‘ , ee Reece a SHCHERBAK. ol, a 3 La qensatnarie myth panty set oo > PARLE us hvall 4 rs ‘| I. . a tees Semen ARES
14-00000 Top Secret (Annex A) - , ; - continued) 8 February 1965 ¢ Corment: GRISANOV wags reported in operational contact . with a senior Western cdiplemac until late : Lo . autumn 1964 (almost a vear after NISENKO's ° defection’, when he turned sver that contact tu another KGB officer G February, 1u65 ‘According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer i : i 5 , ! : 3 pals cine te fhe asount of damage caused , i A by NOSeS: 3's deiection is "unpredictable". NOISENKO knew : | } 4 few empicyees of the Yirst Chief Directorate working abroad, \ : but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by : virtue cf seeing them tu the dining reom which is reserved 3 fer chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB Jepartments. - ‘ . , i : ? ' peeurpenmpnnmetap nisms nace manne a ees a a enatenbieebe bichon eetoner are ® * j « : Eariy June 1965 : : . i , According to a sensitive source - i. : c ron conversations with KG3 officers Geese £ H : Major General BANNIKOV is currently }. j temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having i 1. A . ; replaced GRISANOV who was expelled from the KG3 because he a ae oy rete ee 7 supported NCSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a- J! ; i- i small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an ~ | i unimportant military plant and ig now a “nothing”. . . mes .
Gas who attended the Moscow meeting described): 15 Jul; 1965 According to a sensitive A meeting of all Firat Chief Directorate perecnnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meetiag wag devoted to “he clreumstances of the expuleion of tha Chief of the Second (Britian) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIS, about three and a half seacths earlier. L.A. BELOV and othe: officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and che nature of théir relationship. Curing this 1TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, contacts within the KGB. The-investigation determined, how- ever, that TAXABRIN attended severai parties at which NOSENKO das present, Girls tuvited by NOSESKO were also there. described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN waa ae | a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights. As a@ result he was expelled from the KGB Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met. GRIBANONV socially only three tines during his KGS service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said be twice prowided giris for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in Getobar or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of “Service ‘lo. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the Firse Chief Directorate. unt only casually and only because of Limited wm wetepregne een Sere cane : J by fae Feta adint aah eet cate tak Sta abe oe Aah Pig waXindelivtiade: rg By ‘ Staind ed BR AE a 4 pihEslan Je -
weet ve tay SERRE ttm ete te; mlaneeet er cnoy eter aa BR. we ey ROO oT aE IG GU NG TADIETE: ad hdeeelaataded iene get engi cena ON Aa a resul’ of HOSENKO sietiaced, aurelliel Eran che. ATU» ate $e .1.1hudged KLE Cseirzaen SERIV, and Secon Chief’ GRIBAN OV had been expelled from the Chief directorate Party anc from the KGh. GRYBANOV had been especially friendly with SOSENKO, had givea him many privileges, and they were "buddies and aight buddles”™. Comment: SEMLCHASTN YY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROVY became head of the GRU in 1958. Winter 1965-19566 Source, a ieraheraatel - @ self-professed former XGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her cee b and at the State Cormittee for Science that SVIRIN was letes head of a KGB unit conduct ing operations 8gainst the American Embassy in Moscow)? NOSENKO's fathe er was a Minieter or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering”. NOSENKO was not a KGB officer put a “civilian”™ connected somehow with the KGB. then KOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NUSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy. ource Pega thie ndty Deer om te ‘iSiabaud “ aa aS Sa aide dhe amt ts Peer hans sects Sade SAO Baer anid dhetbaboe soe t ES sao : +¢ a eet Bde he
2p batt Source March 1966 ; : 1 who was not personally known vo Qf} Tep Secret (Annex A) | : Winter 1965-1964 (continued). - } Source! s : . | OA Ta Geet apie a. allegation is the single report describinp NOSENKO ag other than fror. any source a KGS officer. According to a sensitive source, ‘pee (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENZO gee, Was an important besa in.the KGB. .hen- NOSENKO was a young man, he was in ; “the GRU Mili: ary Acadeny and wags then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhepe for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person ; while in the GRU and "not very good". He wan to have-been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was’ able to get NOSENKO trane%crred to the KGB. It was the opinion, of persons. to whom clu talked thac NOSENKO had. given very, very. good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB infornation which included all means of KGB coverage of people in - Moscow, microphone systems in che embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the ....-.... microphones. nagpa ane ees ye etd biaabme he dite aie ott wot adh peat by Wor ast. + we Bates a de —
AAS >, ai ten NOs Eee has claimed that. here jected an offer : to end tne Military Diplomatic. Acaden. i (ubich he, like called the GRU” ~—~—~Source , tt Military Ag Jademy), by chotce accepting assign- poo 7 ment fo. ‘the Far East on entry to the GRU in re rs “19526 Atuthe time, the Military Diplomatte o ; Acadeny wds a four-year course; Lf NOSENKO ; any did avtend the school, he could not heve : 2b setve? asthe claimed ina the GRU. CETERED 6s Source ~ 28 the sole Surce (Le sides NOSENKO) who alleged ~ NOSESKO. sérved in the GRU. fa ° 2 } STR Ag Tite oer pi es mat Na eee Se % ae tuoe! BcteSSd 8h te th by ah canine hen tinlie sea Ca RRE Bee Sen
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o” 4A agar eee een fa iecgi aiacisoobar So Ee « « * Mid-1966 Yuriy Deitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke: with representatives of the Freach magazine Paria Match. KGROLEV indicated that he would like to eerve 48 @ stringer for the French journal and proposed that he - begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". As KOXOLEV apoke only broken French and English, the magazine ataff did not seriously pursue the hatter at that tine. Comment; KOROLEV is believed identical with Yurty KOROLEV whe, as of 1964, wags employed part-time for the United Pregs International VV previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik, sad to Japan and the United States as s correspondent for Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer. by an official Soviet presa representative. of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent. October 1956 Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with - an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to. . . Provide a story on the life of the family of a “Soviet secret agent". The atory was to concern NOSENKO's family and their TS No. 197124 eee RTE REE MRC, en pee Tee TT DR et ear aet e Rey oe a eee ee hee hate nb ee PS auioshiane  natthonth aro = ALB « She abate te seen tA et baal tee 5 SoaTae Leal Relea ten Lee oot
~, knew these matters better than CAanex A) , 2 A rearee o oe Aetober 1966 (continued) statement KOKOLEV provided Parts Match editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Polic organization, defected to the USA withouc his family abou: ar two years 446 and asied for polttieal asylum in the U.8.: : ee | it was granted to him. This was the mest serious defeat of : : ; the Soviet Sucurtty organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions fn esptonape and counterespionarpe departments and algo was clonely acquainted with the ceuntry's leading families and hones. - NOSENKO!s family consists of a wife, 35, two dauyhters life in Moseuw since NOSENKO's defection. A short background - e » 10 and 12, a@ mother and a younger brother. The family tu nee prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident [the defection}. Very soon the wife will apply’ to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorcee and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given. nuch publicity, His wife has not heard from him since he cefected, but tt is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and : indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family _ could be obtained and that interviews with then and with , : an others knowf!ng NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspondent, ; i ; i j } \ | \ i Le i Wt 3 A F ae Shoe ands So akon | Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, i who is legally considered to be an enemy of the, . ,Gtate, is granted automatically upon the wife's. Tequest. ‘ wee SENS 1 (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own! * - knowledge of Kop organization, <@iaarvs said ££ NOSENKO heard ._. vt his explanation, he would call CHS a child, since NOSENKO a t Misuisg because he had served «=~ +; 1 1 is at KGB Headquarters longer. i . 4 Se ee : an - ° - watt Seiten GL RLRRIR AY Fo osm enim eam in wake era cn teen ahtayntan eee nr ene nt *
14-00000 syne 4 athe oy OG oA a ee ee Aer aR Sena on Ree 60 Reenter Sinn darte 1 anaes. yf tee ietenintaiiemetemmemiinreiens cnet ee ee ‘ae. 18 “cwhich he had not ., investigate him. “5S. June 1567. vo -*Fop Secret (Annex’.A) - , , moe ee February 1967 , “According toa “sensitive source (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow): NOSENKO vorked only in KU Information Departement of the GRU, and only for about five or aix months, after which he went to the KGB. May 1967 aet Mecording to a sensitive source assures Lhat NOSENKO ‘divulged the whole systed 3 surveillance of Americans. He worked on {t, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew aurvetllants by sight. According to a sensitive Source : When NOSENKO worked in the Gau information Department he worked only Pi the Cencer (Neadquarters) in Moscow. there, and received bad efficlency reports, as a result of which he had arguuents. Then with his father's help he wene te the KGB. HSE ean . According to a sensitive source i FP] te pak Os Mace Ra EES te: ; There had been some KGA suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts reported, and SHAKIOV. ‘Comment: NOSENKO claims he was gent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV. aay ‘ , “s ” Yonb oe . * tte . coe . <gat et ease, hee rrr Mehewerte cree 3 Tek eres bee th Le tm a : D i pereg * pratneew a yoko u . 4 4 : ‘ “ 3 . - + ™ : . “ ' . wy - ~ 4 . : 4 2 oe < ~ ae a oe ‘ we ‘ ene . " . - my tle worked badly NOSENKO was sent te Geneva to Rezident KULEBYAKIN ig etill suspicious of | a, 2 4 3 4 Sr : f PY soe MEE atges MeN oy, yt nee CaP Pa ates © Reed whe BABosene Ea ceae eee anes Latins vane i 3 j ;