14-00000 levels. manos den npewran (eae eT st following statement: * "the Ambassador and country team should urgently examine ell " possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how | we might bring about Dien's replacement if this ‘should cecome necessary. You will woderstand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to now this operation should proceed, but you will also know we will back you, to the ‘hilt sn the military taint on the pagoda raids. 5 Oly The telegram includes the on actions you take to achieve our objectives.” 25 Aurust Cable from Hilsman to Lodge (personal) sent via CIA channels - "State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest Course outlined is dangerous Dut all agree that delaying ‘@lear cut US stand is even more dangerous. you, but be assured we will back you all the way.” It won't be easy for: (Comment: This is a good point at vhich to break the narrative and insert a series of excerpts from ‘Marguerite Higgins* book; "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek trazedy, opened with a cable. it was a Saturday. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24, 1953, a date made more significant because Washington usually empties on surmer weekends or lapses into a samnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation. "The telgram contained spectacular new instructions for the It was drawn up at a meeting called ty. Under-secretary of State Averell Harriman and Roger Hileman, | Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs and head of . the Vietnam task force. The President's senior advisers vere, for U.S. embassy in Saigon.
‘California. Defense Secretary Robert McKamara was on- vacation. implicit blessing of the United States. . fram Washington Saturday evening after being eryptically summarized _ instructions should be rushed out on & weekend. But he did not ' feel that he ought to veto the telegram since + « « it had the ~~ erypticalily, “to Richard neins, deputy director of the CIA; Oe ‘who also did not ‘eel disposed to veto Something ‘approved by the most part, out of town. CIA Director John McCone vas in Secretary of State Dean Rusk was attendinz a baseball gere in Hew Yorz. President Kennedy was at liyanais Port. “Géieral Taylor « says ke knev nothing of the meeting until it was over and the telegram’ long on its ways) 007 ee re OL ; " . . . the cable proved hietoric. For the first time it gave the signal to 'imleash’ thé Vietnamese military, flashed & green light for the coup against Diem of which the generals had been talking for so many years, =” a ". . » the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the Previous philosophy of one war ata time. It envisaged the generals’ maxing war on their own government, and with. the “The substance of the cable was that the U.S. embassy was to. -- make an effort to persuade Diem to fire his brother, release : the Ducshist rebels, end press censorship, and restore other — éetocratic Liberties suspended under martial law. And if,. as, the cable anticipated, Diem would not do these things, then the © embassy was to contact the Vietnasese generals and tell them that the United States would no longer Stand in the way of a revolt. ° « « the controversial August 2h cable, vas dispatched to President Kennedy at the suzmer White House at Hyannis Port. “The acting Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatrie . .. had the cable described to him over the telephone. Mr. Gilpatric says he was frankly surprised that such an important set of ‘approval of the Presideat:" "In McCone's absence, the cable was described, again the President.'”
25 August. (continued) oo a hres a a ae ou cable to Saigon (om 63055) 7 te he "RYT CIA not consulted re cable being sent ‘separately, which | however cleared at highest levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy mazers and seek: ways: acccuplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact sext, understand it invites Lodge final judgment. ... . . Danger in present course ‘of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. ‘Thus suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in cur hands at same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we probably unable to affect it.) This boils dow to peeking some middle ground for at least interim period. ee # @ 6 fos. 2 .. |” + QEA cable from Saigon (SATG 0291) (Ci | Chief of Station Richardson reports that General Khanh requested . an immediate meeting with Spera fan officer of the CIA Saigon station]. ‘At the meeting Khanh requested assurances that the U.S, Goverment vould support the Vietnamese amy if it should move:against the Diem Regime. . GIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296) : "Richardson reports the results of a. conference ¢ among. Ambassador Lodge, DCM Truchart, General Harkins, General Weede, and Richardson. Tae ‘group agreed that” giving “Dies ane option had no chance of success. They accepted Deptel 243 /of 24 August] as a-basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions.