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14-00000 i ‘ t + wa , ; ’ Ocicber 1968 Re MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security oe im] @ AD f ~— C) gs eee c Gey, = i de ° A GS of oe fag Pe @ & e ¢' we He a E ron FROM Cee : SUBJECT | s NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich 1, Jn accordance with the reaucst of the Deputy Cirector ‘.. of Central IintcHMigence, attached 13 a sumrary/ with conclusion ; . ; . | Gomceralny the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sube ~ 4 3 " _. gonelusions are coniained ia tLe sumraary concersiag sever ; t major areas which were civen primary consideration in iae fatter an *< of the bona fides of. NGSENKO. So oe ; 2. Included in thie cumraary are cocoments concerning conclusions in the previcks summary and an annex containing va60 marks on threo scparate suujects reisicd te the NOSGINMO caae. - ot ry fe that fe) | i H t i i fo , is the person t he ¢ claicns SO Be, this ke beid bis claimed positions in i : : the KGS during 1953 ~ January 1954, taat NOGEXHO was not dise H ‘ patched by the 1G, and taat his previcus Mes and exagrerations i ae . + &8e not actually of material GlenZicance at this time. | j i Bruce L. Soli Attachment; Senmary . CGO01°G2 ae oo. Cheb Bd Birt ov amare . “
om A. _B. G, dD. . ER Fe. TASLE GF CONTENTS - introduction ‘Summary of Developmexis in NOSENKO Case Since 30.October 1967 Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENZKO . Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims to be? oe is the Claimed X33 Career ci NOSENKO Piausible? * - 1 - Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable _Explazation of His Motivation in Convacting CLA in 1962 and Fos His Defection in 1964? Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CLA Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and Organization Reasorasty Commensurate With Kis. Ciaimed KGB Career? Can. the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be 4 - 2 Having Resulted in Material . . or Has the information Been of Significact Ben Considered in Toto as t Damaze to the KGB ané Furnisnaed by NOSENKO to Western Intelligence? fig pose Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away" in Information Furniszed by NOSENKO Which Wox _ |Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched . . by the KGB? . So COLLECTS 4 a PR Rape ha Io er ae ec eo a ihe Bayt tee ere eer wees tees prnereres on ran tteve wee “ TOD caliente hab damn aBtbata “A
14-00000 te Sh EH “me vn ihe 6 & SA Fees wt 4 G. is Taere Evieeuce of & Poliv.cal or Any Gtler Tyse é Py . Oodjective Wrich Could Jusiily a Sispaich of "NOSEN: KO met by tae AGS With Pesmission to Speak Freely to CL Concerning ris Mnow.edge of the AGB and Without , ° oO ‘os Lo. NOSENKOG Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions? a H. is There Any Evicence That the Contacts of NCSENKO ir. 1962 or in 1964 With CLA Were Known to the KGB P to His Deicction or That NOSENKO Was Sver Bricied by the AGB RAelai.ve to Mis Behavior or KGS Opjectives ‘ During These Contacts or After His Deiection? Qn Ce] o& w bots as th +} 5 & ¢€ 4 a rr i) 9 fv ? 3 ic] a < wo IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regaré to NC Lv) by “A va ie) Aw NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval. RU in Any of che a Capacitics or atthe Fi és .B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the ; Time Ae Claimed ‘, . we at 4 C.: NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed D. During the Period 1955 ~ 1960, He Was Neithes a Senior . Case Oilicer in, nor Deputy Chief of, thé Seventh Department American-British Commonweaiih Sect: boy E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy - Section nor a Senior Ofii icer or Supervisor in the Section . ' During the Period: 1961 -- 1952-{sic) » F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chiei of the , American-Britisn Cormmonwealth Section and Was i pot - Thereafter a Deputy Chici of the Seventh Department, Ave Not Credible G. NOSENKO Has no Valic Claim to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between 1953 and His Defection in 1954 ecoLon4 auf oe a aT oafha yt
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INTRODUCTION ~ The following summary and analysis is not intended to be - all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi- : : { ‘ , { zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished - by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO: To attempt to do 80 would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the So ‘formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of . ‘ primary concern. ms This summary will not contain a detailed psychological ane 4 oS ‘assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain'a fecitation of the numerous (© 7 theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying ‘aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily . directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not ; an . : ~e dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in — a a ‘reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that . these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance - Lone ’ ore * ° . .
weal ty ‘ 7 7h r me : . wen =~ a town ot 7 : but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational , “s or policy nature. In orcer to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily ; oof on whetocr he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this , Agency were known to the- KGB. | Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion. that NOSENKO is not a - . os re) “yona fide" defector. There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement og against which information concerning NOSENKO | can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer, For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether thie arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it . is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other . 7 _ sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader . _* to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate. ; - _ ae . ; _ . a “ The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, “The Exami- os nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, * has been considered 1 ine “gg eR ery SATA Es Sere io agit ake Bhp datemptie marten enact " T
14-00000 vo a Pee be ee at ie eee atts, the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part = . a 7 and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primery conclusions set forth on page 388 of the above summary. | Sots Remarks coacerniag certelu errors, inconsistencies, omiastons and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary ia regard to specific cases of sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this eumumeary will not include a point-by-poiat comparison ofallareas of — a : agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous . | oummary. | : A positive dectsion in regard to NCSENKO based on all : avellable information should be made tn the inimediate future. There : fe ae are no known sources currently avallable'to provide new positive oe ee eee: ph information concerning NOSENKO and bie bona fides. It te recognised i thes there fo always a possibility in the future a new source oF sources will be able to furnish additional information in regard te NOSENKO. ‘However, this poseibillty ie exceedingly tenuous and it te felt there fe sufficlent information avellable on which to base a conclusion in CO, - . the NOSENKO matter. rate ee eve _, RABBI aN emit ati: 5 Cette eH cn paneer pee rrttmmed nearest, aoe we ieee, ipeaes
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14-00000 . 4 Lena tact Fen k os ast alt 9 Sg + Onnnry ope eu ; herr Se ee as 2 Sands te Soave we SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE . | SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 a sO Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO . . | a : have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962. | i 2 Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have on been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and caree? : of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been. covered during previous interview or interviews, NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the firet few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no gignificant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a 7 : ‘ . reluctance to maxe positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the ’ SECRET | 6001011 PO TTT mremmne tee am erat eterna net anti ane etra eee Tt , re
14-00000 Sc vice d Bee & & hen interviewer would not cispule cr disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared. During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six monthe, SNOSENKO materially assistea ine interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de- fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities, As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included _vb remarks concerning approximately [875 |KGB officers, [loo\xca agents, td 35) GRU officers, and[a06 other Soviet nationals. These lista were alpha- beticaliy arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him curing current interviews, Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENHXO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBl and the Ci Stafi. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBlin particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter- viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information. 2 6001012 s wat . . . _. _ . an we ° To Came tet Re oe a tpeaatete Baw EET Ta ee X 4 : SITU TAT BBgergne coe ghee stag te es
aired ot 4 < t en ; tn addition, threa professionals from the $B Division have reviewed tha current information and asefated in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous informatk-a. The latter {s a tremendous task because of the volurne of material; the number of individual cases irvolved; and the extensive information tn regard to KGB persenalities, precedures, organizational structure and activities. ‘ The 8B Diviston elso provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of HOSENK? | od . os _ by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioaed three pro- | fessionals completed & new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security. , Apprezimately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated aince late October 1967. Carn-< | ments concerning tha value of the information contained in the sbove po - rnaterial are contained in another section of this cununary. As of the - x present thne, a complete anslyeis ig not posible since a considerable . portion of the material hae not been fully proceseed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. oe of ; : Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and ‘collation work i ' we has apt beea completed; but it ie not considered that,. based on all etek senaee ta Mieerg el
14-00000 ad OL a eT aan) pis, 4: 3 ,5 5-5 ¢ of g sfaages @ = Za & bg 8 3 i § 23 8 * g ° G2 Fas § £ o #2 & By a a 5 gad 24 3 ei gg s zg i ET ER TE GE oO 32s 39535 8 2 aga 2 7 3 éfa8 a = # e ee ee -_ FS 4a 44q i paabiega 4 g 2 bit asd. $a S234 83 i interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permita review s ¥ preparation of this, summary. and of previous information no éoubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will parmit * a éecieion in the cage of Yurly Ivanovich NOSENK®. é ‘Attachment: * “2 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt ac or tard Le ae AAAS of BDAY R DT RRO RAR
A ‘ ; g 5 wanbe x a 2S vat . °  & bbe 8 2G : Chief, Security Research Staff 12 Auguss 1968 4 FROG ; interrogation Research Division .° : ° ~ RE Rees ewe =, a t " oot SUBJECT «86; Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD # 67492 astis 4 ’ Gubject is a 40 year old foruer KGB Stailer wae defected yo the ‘ eo U.S. in i964 in Geneva. , ; a! oe BACKGROUND - ‘ , ae) 5 we. Bruce L. Solie of tne Security Research Steff has been de- ° ; ; ; . : ant sriefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967. in order to . : — o resolve the issue wnetner Subject was a dilapatched azent of the KGB. ; ‘ sie has conducted 4 vast amount of research and checking with sources H ' an an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements. i “4 oo: ' She ‘primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine: Le “Whether Suoject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB; oS : 2. whether Subject had intentionaliy given Mr. Solie any faise Inforuation. 8 6 eee PROCEDURE i Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a a sofesite in the vicinity of Wasninston, D.C. The examination was conducted in the mngiish language. Suoject's comprehension and tne ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for ‘ purposes of polygrapn testing. Suoject was completely cooperative in all respects. Suoject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave inforzation . - en & topic. : :¢ a > 3 . . tee eee The following relevant questions were asked auring the first teat: is your true name Yurly ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes. Were you bora in the year 19277 Yes. - ns @ ,, Besides the Acericans, did you tell anyone else about your a intention to defect? Xo. . a ; BEGRe » Eagheéed Goo safensie Crvecrscios ag duotevattinwtion _
14-00000 ins ? 67h. Page 2 5 =e 2 apa . ry . 4 oad you ever teil anyone in the AGS about your contac® with ‘ fserscan Intelligence? h0.. vere you given instructions by the “GB to get in contact with fmerican Intelligence? io. were you told by tne 4G3 to defect in order to carry out an : Inteliigence mission? No. . me following relevant questions vere asved during the second test: : a Did the KGB actualiy serd a coucmunication for your recail to . tne USSR on the Gay of your defection? io. ' Were you acquainted with CHEQEPANGV? Yes. ; : Did you actually travel to Gorziy in Novexber 1963 to hunt for . CHEREPAROV? Yes. . : ad Are you deliberately witnhoiding from us any information about . . - te | -, ‘the £463 recruitzent of Acericans? io. ‘ 7 Does the KGB have MECKA and Nepruus 607 Yes. Were you the responsioie Case Officer for Jona Abidian in 1960-61? - os , Yes. wo you snow the true name oF ANDASY or SASHA? No. Did you ever nave tucercuiagsis? Yes. Gane folowing relevant questions were assed on test three: Za you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes. _ ; Was] SuuBiii|in the USSR during the periog 1957 to 19597 Yes. . . * . : To the best of your xnowledre, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes. i Did you telephone the GRU about! SHUBIN{at this tine? Yes. : : Go the best of your knowledge, was POPOV csomproaised because . . oF tue letter Mr. dinters ualled? Yes. . o 7 / .. 9001016 ee ne ae eee ‘ a ~~ me : - . on . ° sortie 5 : . : . “ :
- # tne aad ° Grk PULe 3 ° To wne dest OF your wwledse, was TiNGVGGY e:moesed to the 3.53 Decause Of the n1s3 Gurveliiance om tne Britich Embassy? = \ SCG. . waG thom any misleading inforuation in tae netes you-brougnt out frou the Soviet Vaicona? io. Did you intentionally exaggerate ycur personal association wits GRBALOVT = hoe . are you hiding any adverse information avout your background? No. Subdiect's polygraph tess reflected no significant responses indicative of deception regarding the roievant questions ased. iio further polygraza tests were aduinistered on t213 Gate cecause the cxaminer did not want to ran the risx of fatigue setting in and thus possibiy ceusing adrenalin ‘ exhaustion. . Polygraph testing was resuceé on 6 August 1963. Tae following relevant questions vere asned ca test four: ~ ; Dad you join the KGB ia tarch 39537 Yes. . Were you a KGB officer frou 1953 to 19647 Yes, - ' Were you a Deputy Chie? cf the Seventh Deparment? Yea. Were you only a Captain at tris tine? “Yes. J Were you an officer in the U.S. Exoassy Section frém March e, an 1953 to May 19557 Yee. , In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chie? of the smerican- Britisn-Cansdian Sectica in the Seventh Departmens? Yes. Frou January 1960 to Decexber 1951 were you the Deputy to the Caief of the First Section of the First Deparment? Yes. From January to July 1962 were you the Chie? of the First Section | an : of the Seventh Departzent? Yes. Were you an officer in wxe First Section, First Department, SCD, at the tine of the Staiingrad operation against |[denson, sule] and eo mr 06,06 a - 7 | . 001017, —_ BAe nemesis © 4 % mene ee we” wane > cry ) =v) ~| 4 7 a. oe * ESS TITERTSS AEG SSE SATAN Sout et DEAT ORaSLS ota oest anes
Tay it 67-94 age & Tne Toliowing relevant questions were asxed on tess five: Since 1953 do you snow of any other NG3 recruitccats in tne _ American Enbassy besides ANUREY and {iouARDR Ne. ° + a * Ob . i : Did the KGB xnow about the totes you vrougit «.*.7 fo. Nave you told us the complete truta about your “U3 career? Yes. " Did you intentionally exazcerate your nersonal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 ia oréer to miciead us? iio. Did you intentionally give us any faise operational: information? xo. Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chie? of the First Department? Yes. iy Was an onler actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Departuent? Yes. in early 1960 cid GAIBANOV <eli you that your prizary responsibility a was to wors against Auerican Code Cierxs? Yes. 3 a Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defections? ite. Are you delioerately witnnoiding any inforaation es any foreigners — reexuited oy the AGB? No. Gne foliowing reievant questions were asked oa test 6ix: Did you enter the KGB througn the influence of General BOGDAN KOSULOV? Yes. Did you succeeé BAXHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? . Yes. . Did GaYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Crief of the First Section? : : Yes. : .. Z ‘Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB . vo Po, knowledge? No. . . CBMs -. e ® é 004048 | * 3 ‘ . 6 . * « ® a *@ 4 . 7 . ~~ t ‘ ' 7 . : o. : eet ROD 2 rin meee ee a Aa eat neers we on ems - ' ’ 5 8m teers Rs we cee : a i ; a : ;
PLEe.5 “ ; ; : TO: vnovledge way there any ulsiending information in the Chin soy papers? O56 i ad ° ot . no Did you ever personally meet GOLLTOYI? to. . ws . “4 Was there a cable sens to Geneva for you to assist ARTSY . in the SculTSecl¥ case? Yes. a . . 1 Did you personaisy nase Gn approach to|KsxSEA3 at the Moscow : Airport? Yes. : . ne following relevant questions were aszed on test seven: Did you actualiy review the AGB file on OSWALD? «Yes. , : . Did LEE HAAVEY OSWALD receive any KGB trainiag or assignments? met i Noo . . Were there any microphones instailed in the North hing of the , an U.S. EMoassy in Moscow? io. ¢) Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in . os a 1960-617 Yes, . ot _ Are you withholding any information known to you concerning , i : KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. i ' Enoassy? xo. i Before your official tranefer to the Seventh Departrent did : J you read the surveiliance report on the visit of ABLDIAN wy. ‘ . to PUSHAIN street? Yes. m bid you personally conduct 4 certain investigation of SHAXOV . ii in 1962 in Geneva? Yes. Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel docunent . . to GORY only a mistake by AASHPEROV? Yes. ; , The following relevant questions were asked on test eight: " ‘While in the U.S. Exbassy Section did you obtain a typewriter ange , + for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter-to Zdward Zilis SMITH? Yes. . a 001019. © wre weer e samme ast ° . t $ moe “os : - os a Ht |
- ° taf me WF 8 6 tue & Dad you reaé tae offleini repose of KOGGAPOY on his ¢ont Wath venea\ On & train orc.. BCLGaNKL to Moscow? Ves, o€ act ™ Are you antentionilsy wWithutlaing tay intonation conceming ’ . KGB knowledge of CLA personnel ia mOGCOW? No. ; a6 there any posoiuciity Las whe X60 would Gispoten an o. tO Gezect to the Anericans? No. i Subject's polygraph test of 6 Awnust aizewise refieoted no! vu r whiey hae) 4 . inGications of éecepsios. . car ott CONCLUSION , ' 4 . .¢ ’ of 8 Based soleiy on the overall anuiyois of Subject's polygraph . , testa, it ia the opinion of the wilersisaed that she Suoject has DOOR BUdstantially trutnckul tn anewershy the relevant questions tee asked, . ene me ee cence een \ * ' . é * 2 t . 4 : oa ® ° ® . . - . ‘ a é e- * . : . 7 . a so . . t oo ' a. 6 : we a - ° s J . . .? . . > . . ° of . : . . . : -, . - a . . : e . : . - e . oo. . " : at 8 GOOLE QN vee a ‘ e : . . Ba 7 oe . . i . ! ° , of . ’ . . . ry . . . ~*~ ere * . willie _ . . omg 4s CSS A tone Meet sonae gronlhs 4
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14-00000 i) SECRET Bg ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF | oo YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO ; As indicated in the iztroduction to thie summary, information in | i regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi- | } trary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of : whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB | é ; a knowledge,’ and whether his. 1962 and early 1964 contacts with represent- | — ‘ atives of this Agency were known to the KGB. , : aiid . 4 ° It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects | : t Se would’ also be considered but'that his admitted previous lies and exag- . i ’ “ , gerations. would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a : os | : "bona. fide defector," : . The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which i are being given specific consideration, Attached is a separate section ; | | - : containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A- H, ° | A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims . | ‘ 7 ee to be? , | | va, B, . Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? - SEE. 4 x ; : - a ectacelticutioa Pe a Oh et CL EaS. BARRENS oAbs I fatten Sar ars” aneteie oe woe ee po 7 TST omen ecewarat = seneicee aninie grates ait Unt” no : ' 4 tro ote aU cay Sethi, Ts
Poth tess C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable expianation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his hoe defection in 1964? . , os D.. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA , E : : . concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi- | ' zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB . : , , : career? ape kt oy E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be con- no sidered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by ; NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli- e eo ro gence? Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in hf : ; information furnished by. NOSENKO which would warrant wh a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? % G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective @ : which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB , a - : with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his z - \ i po knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? AS at a combh tein demed aus $a LL. aS STylemciee . Fi SERERE TRE SS: seae eS : PER BOM: \
14-00000 H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO : in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB oh : prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed , a : 1 by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives | ee during these contacts or after his defection? ' See “ sore ora ARM sete Be att stew fat!” Re RRR ahh dahl tt. o i ‘ fe sheath preven aptamer Pratt s base Nomen on went amma Fey
a SECRET , * . e on . i : ; . : 2 ; ; &, IS NO KO IDINTICAL TO THE : . . WEOM Sk CLAIMS TOBE : . : : : : : ? . + H . . . ° y i : ¢ : enna ete oe » es eee) CRRA ONAN Ta FE OF a : . a . ssvngration rn feclossification aan A to , . yo . . Soph en  cn t aneftat Dah Bay e Meee Aedre w ctne ore fp oases a’ fy Le a oe gy 0001025 ah Lad ered a a - : ' { \ i ; e | t . 3 1 . ' ' , i t 1 . to 1 . pee Fs + bee nett em tehhitpeten Woes beret
14-00000 BA SEC! : A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be? : , ve f. 2 During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard “| : : ; to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, assoc- A Coe jates of his father and miother, and his own associates. The period ; : under consideration in this section is the period preceding his. entry mt , ° ' 0 1 into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, -in mid- March 1953. — : SS vo an 3 ° Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and. . oO “ - ¢3 mother and his early, life, together with other information such as a E: comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father cae 7 E and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he.is Yuriy Ivanovich ,; . 7 ‘NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship- building in the USSR prior te his death in 1956, This is also satisiactorily . ~ ’ ‘ : - supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKXO concern- ; : : “oy ' * - - ‘ : . , . t . . ing other associates of his father and mother. : , ; a7 % a Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt - = a 2 that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of F Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of: Peo. } 7 \ so SECRET , goutoes. P oe, . ChIP 1 er “od viptaly andgittonisa fd ; sw rgraciag ang , - . ra . 4 Lge fecinateiey : . wt se eee reat manent iets :
14-00000 Ce | siithe or no value in assessing ti.c bona fides or non-pona fides of SOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he nas admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NCSENKO Was or was not Gispatched by the AGB, Obtaining any collaterai first- hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from Nikolay ARTAMONOY, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory school in Leningrad. NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad- a) uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had attended the Institute since 1945, He has explained that he shouid have graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations. Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co- students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that ee ~ he had graduated from the Institute in 1949, | Actually this statement We _ 0001027 ae eee aman ga Riis MB Ee i aol Sitti 2 eae athe ‘ SUMITTTG a aay ST RUNES aN ay 3: at A nt iy t ‘ aly Be BS 1 . « eS See a os)
14-00000 by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conilicting information since NOSENKO on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he "completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950," NOSENKO has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to | 1949 because he did not wish to admit that ne had failed to graduate in. . 1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950 instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952. Z . The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has ' characterized as his “stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt: | aD characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not ” evidence’ that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB." It is evidence of © °"~ a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which he had knowledge but did not personally participate. & The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of = Deen We ah Saad BP HAN DRED ANE we SiC WRAL HOTS nti Ms MP He he rare ae ead? _ tortth cated ytimnne tae itis * ee Be
14-00000 3 wah “be _ time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is ; : oy considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub- | ; i stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951 a to early 1953, 7 Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed ot : ; by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement con- oo a i cerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct , ; 7 grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give . es eee’ ‘ NOSENKO an opportunity to recdunt his life.and activities to permit a re- “examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of 29. 3 Jun tug NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time. ; _ Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since re ’ 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum, One change that . | late a has-been miade by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the’. ‘First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh : , Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather . non, of ‘than June - July 1955 aa indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO ’ also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization" AEE SON ADR Mut) eR uae werent Y
14-00000 w u # ue #4 ! - Ne ne 2 hem & oa | 5 ; (personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKO in March - April | ; 1955 rather than May - June 1955, Since the unsatisfactory personnel | , report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department, neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature, . An- effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between ‘ ‘ errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by | NOSENKO. OS 7 Attachment; . 31 Oct 67 Memo Lo: _ SECRET a atte em Se ge 0001030 OL eR ROE Ae iE beth é.: «patie ~ wm ggag : an . Lee tne mamma neemnetanm cee sant an Meet panenen rst ‘e Peo  aaealll ARNO Bl ia ig 2 wate Bkiaannart meres oH ' Se “iat ao SRR NE ca Tne Se N * ; ‘ : ' - - : he
14-00000 sey ORABELADS ast ADRARSIND TED D5 A OMEN OLS Was adie AT STS eee a Seo Oreo: Ne. ; . OLUasce ; 4 i Operational Memo # Ne? ‘SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich : ' The foliowing is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on ., 40 October 1967: ° nibs . I, ‘NOSENKO, George; was born 30 October 1927 in the city tas, . Nicolaev, Ukraine. ade | My family: the father - NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working -at the’ shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding inatitute, which “he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI), 1908, a housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, -etudent, In September 1934 1 began to study in the school (0 class) but _ Studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went "in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, _ "Sudemech" from summer 1934, In Nicolaev I was living at the Street . Nicoleki hw All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev. in Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938: « at the Street Stachek (1934 ~ summer 1935), St.. Canal of Griboedov, 154 (1935- 1938), St. M.. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till oe , Enchoded tras antemaile . | tee Be . EiFd Sook} 255 y .- . . Ne teeing ea IT Ao LE TTS ee . vee tye meee 4 + pee: 4 3 4 ad a ‘ 4
ot ‘ « . - a : . ~, “ee , ey tees é 1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother went to live in Moscow in the end of this year. Y, ; In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here 6 I wae ‘continuing to study at the school 585 (St. Be Polianka), In 1941 pois" °° I finfahed 6th class and went with parenta to rest to the soutn (Sochi) if but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow, thelee a Mp In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in ws eweh ee ce Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In . Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, beirg there I tried to run to , * the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned home, . In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother.in city Gorxi and in July-August we returned in Moscow, | ao . _ In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special - 7 achool, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class 5 “+ in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This . foot '; . school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and 1 - _ did not want to go there, With the help of father I was accepted in the 880 See Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku, r where Iwas studying at the second course (9th class). In this school - ¢ |. ltwice tried to be sent as a volunteer to.the front but failed, Soon , DT BOR, cena RANE NG ‘ 7 oa “? ote am mas owe are “2 ; - SEpper . CRAB ION a a Ne A eis ME ig ade S eh og Pars ni Re weer tee 2 ON ae at : neat ek Se et ee ee «ee SH ensmter eh me sw Aree peas aS oa hed
14-00000 se iter ne ‘ Leningrad. _Leningrad I was living in the-hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev). “after that I run with a friend (RADCITZENKO) home in Moscow (January ; , 1944), In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished ° 9th clases and waa accepted again in the military-navy preparatory school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in heat 1 <All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km. . tre ry gee - from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two “months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put in the navy hospital, When I was in the hospital I decided-aot to return in the school. but to finish 10th clase in Leningrad about what I have written a letter to'my father asking his help and agreement with such my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the echool and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January 1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWII finished and I decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second course and finished this course {though I was not passing exams). In - In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents * (st. : Granoveki, 3).
+ pay : . ics deel $ i _ , In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter~ national relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institure, In uly my father went in Germany with the group of engineers wee and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant, .. © ' documents and a uniform). ' t+ ‘ , ’ : In-1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 1 acquainted - with a girl.- Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine insiitute. I ' was.in close relaGione with this girl, because of the pregnancy i married i "her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and a we did not live together and we soon divorced, In the end of. 1946 I was | ~ _acquai nted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re- ; oe ceived a flat in 1947 (St.. Mira - former lst Uecyehckad, 162/174). In vs November ‘her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married ’ her. The marriage was not successiul, I foundout about her close . relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological changes. iwas not the father of this child. After that I broke with her i. andwe were living separately (end of 1948 ~ beginning 1949). ‘ in spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working PNB ear tO mak eae am rea rd a the ‘commission, which was deal ing with future works.of the students of my 5th course, J expressed a wish to work in any military organization | oe ie TARY ICR Gib FPR Eee LE EN et BUA OD « Sal celgy ath wing be Mere east eb be theo Boh i
14-00000 i? eer oe ae . we? 1 ‘ _.and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry 4 ' of State Security). ' But MGB did not accept me, After that with the help of the father I began to deal with the personne] department of the ligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my, future work. t intel Sonne: . Passing state exams I] failed Marxism-Leninism and with a ne group of fails I waa passing State exams once more, In October 1950 . at finished the institute and received a diploma, . - ‘ F tke . I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 i ' .-and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th : Fleet, as an interpreter.of the information department). Before going “4 ‘to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife. At the end of April 1952 1 went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out, > the middle of May ‘I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health . “'Y.eould not return back to the Far East and tHe personnel department of ‘ the navy intelligence sent me to-Baitic Sea (as a senior interpreter of : ithe navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet + in Sovietsk, ‘Kaliningrad's district). “+. When. I studied at the institute] as all the students received a a ‘ ‘rank of junior lieutenant. of administrative service after finishing the i ea wen eee te emoreh .Y S2lre Abeba ata ® enya sremegpes ni esa Ae eee PRS —Stererereneenteneh Ae esa
14-00000 We beetle oles h second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy nad given me also . . - : the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence. 7 In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenani, | In Sovietax the work was not interested and for me it-was nothing to do. Besides this the clim:te was not good for my health and I decided to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952 tials ote : 8 “are, . a i ee took a leave and went to Moscow. January l Iwas with my parents ° - wh , - 1 at the evening party z at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom 1 fo Es Ae . did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili- a * former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I wae thinking about change of the Job. KOBULOV. was Speaking with me ‘on this theme and propose we work and his help i in MGB, but nothing 4 . more definite was said about my work. This month 1 reported to the _ head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN eb - about my decision and that I will be working in MGB. . In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, . i ma co _. where Iwas in,1952. | In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to a ie i ~~ Moscow and visited ‘the ministry where my father was working, There - ‘ : wT have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said ‘ ; } ‘that he would settle my question concerning my Jobe After several days 4 J e ! - 4 2 SY Dake ME “ vie Re y ore oy . z ee i { ae eeeeeeerge SURES
14-00000 RN eee mange atte ve Fae ste eS, '- ee ad + 5 at St. Gorky, 7 but after marriage was living with the wife at . en come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the re- ° ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory ; SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I wae accepted in the 1 department of 2 .nied. jirectory as a case officer. SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO (whe was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department of extraordinarily affairs (investigation) }. SHUBNIAKOV and ‘GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1] section of Was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin, KOSLOV told me that I will be working against the ‘American correspondents, showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were working in this room; KUTIREV, RACOVSiI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV, The laat officer ‘rnust give files on the correspondents and agents. I | wae eaid to come next day and began to work, o When I. waa resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted ‘with KOJ EVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University, “aud in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents the department, Then I with GORBATENKO.went to.the | department, -., ' i i q 4 ‘
14-00000 aay oh E rd cer west WE TORR ANTE Site + St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents), In 1955 Il received a flat ' at Ste Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family. : In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had. given me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once ‘more, ‘but Idid not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a letter to the place of work, which was written‘in the passport. The plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy. of the chief, SHUBNIAKOVY, was speaking with me. Lhad written my explanation, and punished by the chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's organization algo punished me, I received a strict reprimand and wae freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director, Iwas a member of komsomol's organizationfrom October 1943, ' In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of Sge) the komsomol organization of AGB took off this strict reprimand, In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written _ characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that -I.did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory, In June- - July Iwas appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case 8 a) $ AG REGO a as wig Xs , i ARISSREUS EARS UL EE LA NEATH SUR SES cae cies eae OUD aan rs Dime RTO Maes pT TT
14-00000 or HOURS RSE tegen amy | a A 2 department, PIATROVSKI, Proposed tome to go to work i in n Ethiopia — oe - 8 ocvibraae cacnstranmaawstons ¢ oo eieabtdenebectatietn meneame oenet ee te officer of 2 section, This section was new created (the work against tourists}, The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the re ' x a 2 section - GUSKOV. 1 4 , dn 1956 Iwas accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party, ‘soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion «a i . ot i senior case officer. . - oS . | In 3457 Iwas accepted in the Party as a member. mo, . 74 In August 1956 my father died, } In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In ote 7th department i was working. till 1960 and in January 1960. was sent to work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in ‘the 1 department 2 chief directory (chief. of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Viad., chief of the i section « KOVSHUX). ‘My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana, born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958, Oksana waa ill (bronchial asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in ste ety ttre SRE es en be ewarE 8 hospitale. In 1960 Iwas thinking about change (temporary) place of livin g and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments. KGB ‘in Lvov and Odessa, But there was another question if I go from Moscow JF would lose the flat in Moscow, At this time the. chief of the section. of ° a 5 See CENT © ONO NY ANAE  nE E EALOTO A OD oe ae On eos. SERRE T Sh eee eater aN SRT
14-00000 PL ee eee BO ee em one ‘but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree. .l.was appointed again in-the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section to work in eastern Germany. only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD- * re. Dnt nt GARB E emer een ee ein ee eS EIEL +s sides a Bee per y —— ra Pe? Cote) ree ' , (counter-intelligence worx among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia), The _ ' chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided Jot oo The reasons were the case of 1954 (ilincss and use of the passport for “cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agenta report that drink and on this base have quarréls with the wife). - ; . - : Il was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 (work. against touriste from the USA and Canada), In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain, . ne — - When I began to wor« in the 7 department I knew that soon I te ; must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free a place ~ the deputy cnief of.department BALDIN was preparing to go we tam tak oee oo In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department (the chief of ‘the department was GHELNOKOV) and here I was wor king till January 18, 1964, During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, - * iN "4 et ce erm te 4, aeatonn +
ds PSE ri enemterse: mma ee eer ae - 1953.with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium, In 1954 - ‘In 1957 I wae in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at _. the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife | Neg ‘ees, te they : ; Siuci ; . ; : . : ' a * ‘ toe , ot : 1 * ray oot i -; : Five times ] was sent abroad; in 1957 Iwas in England with a , ' . . . . * ’ eport delegation; in 1958 was again in Engiand with a sport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; . ‘in 1961 I was ‘sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to } department 2 — | directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland = the conference of dis- armament, * Working in MVD-KGB every year Ihad leaves for rest. In I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia, ‘ foarw “| rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I] rested with the wife in Z i Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - lL rested with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev, In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 I vested with the wife and daughters in Anapa. 5 . a emer oo ee nant en mao meaner sno le IE A ae * 4 ok ep me ene AR Re 6 ORNS CTEM E Ee TSE tab Ae Ao y ee ee Fah Fat eet AED oI Ren Sy ee wom wae, i “t . . apy dee nee enables ele CHEM WA oe Sabena.
Ce Sod s O& PLAUSI3: oe aA CSEN ROPN —o ae ae, ° iS THE CLAIMED KGB CA ° An portman cee take D
14-00000 aperercnceeerensie AgHEwereRee Nes pp WPS oe RIPUPRS PPO LUERE GR RE ty EERE AE LAY BOD SATIN AKAD 86 \) * Siluaies ! B.. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer : in the KGB. information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern- ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, naa ‘been 50 extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer. » It is considered that NOSENKO was a XGB officer in the claimed: Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed positions in each Department. It is interesting to‘hote that NOSENKO hae not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his” original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as "date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given. in 1962), There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature, as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day: rs . of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical | or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false are ‘ ormation in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning SECRET. we ee saeviast yyabgad ne abc ERS Ae oe a NE at A i hago ae law steeaee toad Adres Hae 4%
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14-00000 sae Net ane WAG owe in Soviet organizations and more spécifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura aoroad _ may. have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of wnom is given the title of \ First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in genera} has supervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the . most important section, Other deputies. have supervisory functions only. over designated sections or organizational components. ) ' During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, .NOSENKO woke ..j has, furnished detailed information which it is. considered substantiates -his. claimed positions in the KGB, . Detailed. remarks on these topics are contained in. separate sections of this summary. It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO . was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, ScD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, Po First Department, in 1960, It is impossible to correlate this information "with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department “in jate May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart- 7 ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available gouLc4s tore ood x
nacre + one AGES eRe RETIN OP BRE Aasctintarte 22. Bend Cf ene 6+ 1 Sha art e, + 4 a te sw 7d “~ CIE bee ‘ 1 at this time, On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO 4 would lay claim to the titie of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1900 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time, ; NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN, A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has : stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware we of cértain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. . GRYAZNOV, Viadimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy 1. GUK, Vladimir | Aw CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim ¥. KOSOLAPOV, The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard ef GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict. with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSE NKO in the SCD in the late 1950's, Tne description of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the nalls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such . ‘an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this: 9001046" & an sat. 2 S - Seer ana R OS SO OER se I ET Agnes Ea tat Eee ae et Le Sr te wae Peet
14-00000 * N ey : ee LEE bie & . ! n issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took : place but that NOSENKO simply hag no recollection of it, There is no reason to attach sign..icance to this lapse of memory. The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed position of Deputy Chiei, rirst Section, First Department, during 1960 - . . : 1961 has had the most mer:t in the controversy over his statements | : relative to-his KGB career, This particular aspect will be covered in... 7 detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in tne SCD, KGB, mo entails or does not entail, It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge , ‘ ‘ whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 7 - on the basia of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the Firet ; 7 Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in GIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch, Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in | * : the particular assignment, The organizational structure of the KGB | may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment 5 004047 + Rte m agen atte! Tenn. a aet me cu mT? in Coe - Tr soe arena sed meemcmeniieatncmmeee | fs ghee ci ery
14-00000 satin 6 Ne ee eeenn ey as to wnether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent Log: in a.somewhat similar position in CIA, : One of the most important differences between United States — 7“ agencies or organizations, inciuding CIA, and’the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the a ‘salary structure, Pay of a KGB officer is-based on military rank and i H i on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity ' ' and language qualification, Actual position held is important from a ‘monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the po, ened verate gas '. ‘difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles, An increase in military rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant ‘ e Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major tee peeve os who holds the position of Chief of Section. - During current interviews, an eifort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold . ‘the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual VU N ANDES A LAR SR LOETTEOG ee IA Foe SHIM THEM Deg Soren oe Seen ® a ewpraeeh oss, GOOLEAB | BT ra 8S RIOT Bey gotta tll aparwet We emer eTae SoS ! Aah ede ates
ree ane Bee Bree - . soe 5 ~ a ® re) ee a * , ° “s Pr fq » . 3 8 « . ry © C = a vA ad . a Bo» & e ee) > . - @ o 9 a vo ~ Cy E o 6 @ ae ‘ bs E he Cd ~ ; = het a cmt a 3 oa » + § & >. . 8 e 3 ord nat - £ 3 oy : ae ° ry oo) 2 3 PF 2 2 g § 38 L, a ery a . ’ mo 3) a ro) 2 # 9 a 8 9 e se 6 8. 6 32 2 3 é nm OD . wet he £ EN : Oo a «4 ‘ & 2 ¢ ° hb. 6 2 og gs. fo] +o ong t @ g od ey ae 3 hee a tea 3.8 4 & Ma , rt a seed ae) ond + . . s. @ 2 2 Boom 3o : oe : a Caml &§ %S& 3B 8 e oo 8 6 Me o06USlCU lO % ° «a £ a & ¢ 8 3 Loe . a 9 < o a > : rues) tne et eee a St er tS ce res
mts , : ° . fe Q “ 9) a4 . ts . «t! % Feo. $6 — 2 ad Ni ? - ai « “S ’ Go a . . fl ie & ; 5) ee 3) Lad ig) “4 ©) CS o a (r, bad : “ O £4 io?) “ ‘ A 7) y aad Ha 4 « a : : ' Saaciees : Se c : . . . 7 Bad -7 a] ~ q . ° * . . . - Eee emer nate SEE LTO i ae Oe oT RA
) S 7 C2 rr C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CLA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration ‘ in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual . support, There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation . problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a ‘dispatched agent, NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in . 1962 and-defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature “which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defecters are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit ~ unfavorable information which-they consider of a personal nature. On 31 October 1987 NOSENKO, following.a request, furnished a. handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, his quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memo- ney _Tandum ‘is ‘one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime. rae es ste avatomiothtadenaae: where « Karin td aE Retin some
14-00000 ears eR re wenn Buse te J cr rm Cc. a gry NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives, The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized : - and some not’ recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees, ‘ a NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibiy until'the death of his father ‘lin August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy ‘parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains - employment. perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of me, the: luxuries he has enjoyed; ‘The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name.oi bis father undoubtedly was an 2 _..  4d&mportant if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being ‘y permitted to enter the Naval RU and.the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason. The above should not be construed as any reflection on the ae a actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how OSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His Bo gpg pee ee en Rigen met meer nee om nena ented te atiotte bette ot eatin ge oy eae . ‘ : sot u enti Rts septal a asbeshaitset Pats nema ante ae eet oor mt ie an Og "
14-00000 ' Boiete te of ot : ; . . ce ee cme vs “e performance in both prior to 1956 by nis own admission was such that be probably would have been summavily terminated if he had not been ” the son of the capable,. respected Minister of Shipbuilding. a . . 7 “Lu a-certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages en following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may ~ i have actually started soon after the death of his father, That NOSENKO. | : oS ; : is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in mo a : . ‘the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time 7: after his defection in 1964. _NOSENKO was addicted:to women, ‘liquor, ‘and | . : : . ; . «the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through .-influence. . to A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation - ; co in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money . | - , * and would sell "two pieces of information. '' NOSENKO has stated that he — ce 1 Hae cement wanted to make a contact with the Americans, thathe vas not emotionally | . ‘ m ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a . — mo, . contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could oo, : uv no longer retreat. oo a BRD Pet oA A: od ant Ha RAROTMAAATON ork As UNL aDU Eien mei OL tee Fe ena TT rere ncimnr mene ee canara 8) ee col a Gry gan neamtemnnenntrenty Snape sali pentt mitt nat
Serer des SPIE Ee, BORNE CE cn GRRE I Leen Fee LIE Eee Vm SLIT gay information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the decided to do it through (Basia vaRIG whom the KGB considered was with . interviews stated, as he first.stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive . amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO S Cecr ' | She § : : NOSENXZO nas stated that he gave considerabie thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some. Americans stating ne was a "KGB counter intelligence officer who wanted to give information, " he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected, NOSENKO stated he nad difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally American Intelligence. Bo The above statements by NOSE NBO TS net in conflict with the. ,o© record, . NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces oi information, " almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards, NOSENKO has during current has during current interviews stated 4 that’ he could have covered his ' een mente eevee expenditures i by other means without 2 receiving any money from the ata fot Fee Americans, sree tnd alge Oa tect Sm nO hse SHEEN Ss ay SO %: 8 tess ote obs vette ae nets Saka! at
eta tee - SECRET tae bye ee NOSENKO has ptated that the night before bie departure from Os Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but wae not . Does emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his raturn to the . Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during @ period of time, made his final decteion to defect -at the first opportunity, realining that it meant 7 ; entrar a SA leaving his wife, children, end other members of his far-ily in the USSR. Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so ramain. It would be preferable If an exact detailed . - . : - ghrenology of all the factore involved could be prepared or if even be | ~ , certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both | ' - ae impossible at this time and Probably at. any. time in the fatare. What is. important at this ime te a deciaion 26 to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB 4 '. Glepateh. It ie considered that the explanation of NOSENK®O concerning bis motivation ia acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americana in 1962 me of bts fatent to dafect in 1964 ts supported by other information of a collateral satmre. (See Section HI, H.) . Attachment: ee ; re uo Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO - — ca ; SECRET Te mee secretin abt fey, penne een + SI APURTIRSTIT TST HTT: tet ert COREE ETS i SAREE SURES ENT ANS RATE RY
14-00000 Operational Memo # N-4 SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich : . ae ‘ ‘ ‘ ., The following is a typed copy of a nandwritten memorandum mo _ + fuxynished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967: . , I, What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite isan - -= = i: understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge-of the real foreign . a and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the right. > 9: ar nese of the free world, It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted . i Q , ina month or a year. This decision was slowly growing inme, I | . : ; | 7 think that the beginning wae in, the studentship. ‘ , : a ; 7 { Living with my parents.and being in the circles of the parent's. i) : . { and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV, Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of i in Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the é: .. " " people of the Soviet Russia. , ; eo ta 24 > . , ‘eeladed treca avlersalle 7 : i, “| a prieting and \ : ; ' darteoa tinction ww y e a te
14-00000 a When I worked 1] years in MVD-KGB i understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, © . OS oes: om about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was {and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB. At the same time when I waa several times abroad I have . - i seen personally the so-called "decay" at the Weot. ‘y have seen in © reality how is living people, Several times when I was abroad Iwas thinking about staying’ |, at the West and not returning in Rugsia, but only one thing was keeping ..- me «= my family. In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the ‘ . '. Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show, Iwas thinking that they would not beiieve me otherwise, In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay Fe ne emer eenglT sae oe i i | +, abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even Oe Se 4 when Iwas returning home in Vienna, In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could : not live more in the Soviet Russia, In this period of time I have done. " J ar -° all my best to go as soon as possible abroad. . . a mo = Sloe, : a New an aa) . ; H ae bey an > _ . . _ ’ eae CRP LS Milter ABBE ALS ay 4a My sey Ds adap iw eT EIN dab Rll Sa 6 nen BH ne POU E OREN G MERU GRD A 5
PGB A ete HEP eri he Cah nis a y difficult it was ver nis decision, not easy to make t. It wae were er we ae . . . tee a to leave the family for ever, .- t sails , ~ te a wo . Cet .. Le, ~ : i : : ee 7 . ae we le tem . cone counnm amp | = . . . vay, * » * . wae + . 1. * ‘ te . @ . \ ay Sat . . it . I do not regret ne 1 re + rn ite of everyt an 6 wy ® And no — . . wee FN “Te . ° 5 " mo, . non mn aag eet ewe ee Sart a ¥ . ae ata Se Ne sete a a ed * , . - Bs : ‘ 5 - 2 . 1. te : wo, . . “ my . ! es eee . of . ‘ wet d oa + . Bee noe ‘ . . . . . 7 ee - > + Gere. - wanes eons mene ape nae” te eu eae caren: ar oentr erent natant oe enn AO te ET OT SS COLONES OLB ET oe - a ra pee mgt rene eee cee merece tere serene ats eran mam aves sore 7 - > 4 sre aE = : * : ce nees «4 enencennneneort A eset amet sowed :
wad i So . «i a ) * ce) wn . 4 ( t-4 _ a = ' . e aT.) fi te . ' O P fe “n Y 5 { % re . pp Ea 4 frm a hay ‘ . = ON) og wm) es rs >? ; 4 ts . : ‘ mes “4 . ery prs Cc ‘OP MA NG KGB O e) oe AND ORGANIZATION 2 , by ff : . r fd -¢ — fq UO . . on % : . : . i fe) : . ’ iH z $3) ae
14-00000 seme et he ae 4 é ad C43 rey —) > 4 Pwe i oe , ' -D.. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CLA concerning _ KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen- surate with. his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor- mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities, Ree ’ ' . and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed * : + * Gareer in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his: defection in early February 1964, ‘ »~ ly reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given aa . to his. claimed. departmental assignments and claimed positions in each : department, Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception or whether the failure to recalia particular item of interest can logically be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no -’. ‘accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter- “ '. mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is os . actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events ’ ' ’ or could be attributed to willful deception. 8432 4 Eatieted tax sotematte dewayratiag 23g. Ceccassitiectiaa a
+ no WA Gb heme og ~ ws . vee . 4 An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall : _ specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas oo have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory : as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely i oo, from recollection, In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has lmown, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest. . i , NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB : officers whom he has known at various. periods in his entire KGB career, j . He. has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently | «ls added certain details which he recalled at-a later. date, - : Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in- formation is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, : during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Con- Peele al sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether-his : indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during roe - “  ouuesE Ohta eee eames Ay RAAB OMtnE ath oe
a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held. It is considered that information furnished by NOSENXO supports : . on = ‘his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially . ; : 4 confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed . positions. ‘Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an ae : - applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual ; . holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It | is felt there: can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of = “4 junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities ofa Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, ‘and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO. held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in 7 iE as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in , 7 . regard to: the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO. ’ .NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual officés ° . my i he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four pri- mary ‘periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 ~ 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -. 3963." & He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers a ~ : a ce Pate
14-00000 and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during’ 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO . Pt ere ee eerie te ke could not: possibly have known that this detailed information could not wee immediately be ¢ checked for accitracy,, at least in. part, with a source of another officer who has defected since mid-1964, If these diagrams arid memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another . defector ‘and could, if not relatively correct, permit a ‘rather positive con- clusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information, NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 ~ 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is jess.éor the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude: until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently ; { . bt y 3 ena substantiated even though his actual job performance. undoubtedly ' : -.,:- deserved a low rating. G001C63 - * a - ‘ cette ten tac Me mente yee so ecetn amet tao pafeton, So  emsraratone tate ame ne Sn et tmernman Ser ecm pa a Sees ane whe ete I ae we oe ee
Cen a : . ° : . . -- -2 & . . - z i The knowledge of NOSENKO- concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department . . rr and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The Do en :- scope of his knowledge ‘of his own department when considered in toto ° : - is broader after 1957 than before, which is comoatible with his claim of 2 ‘increased responsibilities. His knowledge of thé work of other departments . : a . Be of. the SCD from the late 1950!s on is also more-extensive, which is also a. ns 4 further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions - ; . uo a : : during this pericd of time. t wre, “~ Ry. bt fo a 2 - e. , . ye Rersateonrtsadt "7 . + ert nee sme etn ar ene entheaneaehe ek ne nme ae
: S oy aie eats : mie . % rt Scores reat en. Beg i ed RY FA Sees o ¢ ‘ 5 oy i ‘ * 4 vf e Wy ay i a weet atari een ot etna ier asstie | SEN: TID: RR FLA, ae 7s —_ = = o~_ we F 0 ~ Sut / mon 7) one ey yw ai. LY “= RE & > AS ¢t ve 3 . Does ha 2a AGB 1 cd ’ ap oe weap SEO Lae e o . ‘ , yet 33 De ne “oy wo : au fy . . ; ran »f 4 ; f+ - . . po ate a uy? Ps . : f-a fea ‘4 weet a o ® ON Lond f ET ats re a ao on aN Ni nad FORMATE ~ a ENEFI B ~_t wm a ORMATION FUR FICAN - be HE IN SIGN CAN TH IN MATERIAL DA or & wet E.
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14-00000 * panme MOSEN 603 mas aT boete Bad Coe CONCEMUNE POLAALS|Z, vue rod FOS OE ad wor tla A Sr eee Se 44GB olicése Gnd suv lS ayeio Of wvecrative conmiacts youre Tae cerines ware gWthe OF GbeTalive Colaete Gye uses ov Féler to Soviet nationals), : : . . sree a ety ee DL ee A we me tm ope ee - Vakitay in the Seco. Chiel Directo cate of iterna: AGL organisctlons. -. — ~~ eT v. steer gma Ce thm me ehOOrsS SEWED tad ol anG Juas. 25 wOU LOG, BUITETGUS ..2Cers the SCD and other internal KG3 organizations travel abrozé with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exh Such a& Wor.d's Fairs, it is immoseisle at this time to estimate the mumbes of AGS ofiicers ideniiiied by NOSENKO who have been outside tee Sovi et Bice since his cefection or who wili be out sometime in the guture, There has ocen very little atiempied exploitation of ir informe? ed furnisned sy NOSENKO concerning other XGB oifice 3 anc, theréiprye, the possibie value of wis information to United States Intelligence iron) Cannot De estimated nor can the potential Camage to the AGB de esti- mated. Disclosure of inJormation concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any disvatch of a AGB agent or officer to the @ West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for GO0LCE7 a ro es i
14-00000 ey ne ates we rae VirmiteG Becios Gl tie UF fae te * serataee,, We im ° Vesey Ue t ce ee ee me SGV GGad am ao Gelieciue sOe bane rlowever arr cers ETT a eee * ee Pa we Ve ane Bias, PaGsWOVET, saGeaalinreusis Vs hes Geers OF uyents [6 % Coter amluliigence is neCtaearuy & Muller of mnene. tO tae AGS anc uie che posure of the identities of ap; i negiigible impovtance. ee, iy Ostaining speciiie inforraaiion in vegacd to KGS oflicers o- KGB assets. is important to Uniied Siaies ieiligence anc a consicer- abie arnount of manpower and money is spent on this activity, =ven acxnowlecging that it is much more Giicicult for CLA to obtain this type of information about the AGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the icentity of CLA employees, it is believes Goubiiul any reader of this summary would consid oa. me ’ o % et b+ a oy re od oa & re t. ¢ 2 + f > ' * cution oil2, GoO|CLA empioyecs anc eeverai runcred|agent BSSELS tO the KGB wouid be any .ess inan a very serious compromiise of vascatle r ingjormation, . Prior to the dezection of NOSENKO, litte was known Gf the organization of the SCD or other internal AGS organization = oak pet Py aac ingjormation provided by NOSE NAO concerning both has been detailed and extensive, That this information is of vaiue to the United S:ates , Intelligence community is hardly subject to cispute, although analysis Pa ae & c001C68 SeOXe] ne ge, crt NT ee ot aT see wot ee ace . ene APE ERAS ERS ARTI 9 Hm 9 soowee spmaecar nes e+
14-00000 can differ as to the weight which snoulc be given to Ure value of this & a type of information. NOSENKO has furnished iniozrmation concersing SCD, «G3, recruitments of United States ciiluens and ioreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not de interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all 3 + » S$CD recruitments, even of Americans, Gurizg this peried. His infor- ‘mation based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department, He hag furnished information “concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some < f . ‘ FCD cases, but this information was in generai acquired indirectly frorn social or business conversations with other KGB officers. NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which weré previousiy known to United States intelligence. Wail the value‘of such information cannot be considered high, the additional ; detaiis which NOSENKO Ras provided in a number of cases cannci be - dismissed as being of no value to Western Inteliigence, even if the “. : information cannot be regarced as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, “inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information " already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information. .. 6004069 setiedeiainamermeaibatiaieda 2 TSA Leta ae NE See ET alee Ma nee
14-00000 ” Ween sa tecntteeraemerinp cn ces camentn ne 9:0 Hla RR Sai Ar nai ae BS EE cas wba do dae geet? a ue * recruitmenis by the KGB of non-Bice nationals who were. known by ‘ ® Communist organizations. The identification as a recruiteé KGS agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western intélligence and may be considered to have resulted in some Gamage to the KGS. Admittedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than - that of a “politically clean" individuzil, However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent, ayo. . *’ NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limitec information. In a number * - 2 . « oi these instances the additional ini . rescenrsgeten ere mete een ng re Ae ee Perera mitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an oan . "Un«nown Subject" case. In such instances the inforrnation from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate idextizication of the individual of interest. .  Zhis category of cases must be considered as having- resulted in damage _ to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence, , . ' “54 ° 5 cnr ' : o e NOSEMNZO has furnished informa:ion in regard to a number of * o ormation from NOSENKO nas per- TO ne Tn ae Bhan Be Rhy Wwe eh a abner
14-00000 ¥ ~ Ne ord fesenisne as Sm are gana rs NOSENKO has furnisned iulosriacion in regarG to a sumber of & individuals, vols American anc non-Glec foreign, who were recrulied * _by the AGB anc concerning whom Western intelligence nac ne siygalilcant wormation, Itis recog : t NOSENKO, particularly i have uctusls materialized as productive NCS agents. This could be Re o ° ¢ 4 cu as 4] ga iy for various reasons inciu ares SEIUSEL ce) cooper Fett, tee graphical inaccessibility to tie KGS, oF not be cing either ot the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish iniormation o- sy " interest to the KGB. in this regard, NOSENKAO has steted that at lias oa _jantil 1962 there was a de eiinite. tenceacy } am the Seventh Derariuent te oe ae had no potentias esa, Thee twas-highly unlixely there wouid Se a potentiai in the future, hee “NOSENKO has furnished eniozmation on or ieads to @ mucnoer or s 8 cases, primarily third nationais but some American, in which he has “been unable to furnish sufficient detaiis to permit identizication ait th S ‘time., In certain instances it is bellevec that an identification wisi be “possible after additional research axc investigation. Until an iceni- fication is made, the value of any particular lead to.Wesiters intelli- : gence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential vaiue oouLC 74 a ah Cena wen cern pie tee ene ‘- Maitre Hts at ooh Bi cae + a Bema «+ Pfreee whaer a
14-00000 EXa ye G aD as de ignored, ished farn propa a4 eed | i a tan Amer > bly %O q Can, Wao ency Codes," « BF ta ey } es mer e' NATO & ae or 2 aus F aoe ccuss to rs ¢ » cn is curr he bound is as ye the security o agent m the category 6 rom NX ceases ae CSENKO i a 2Oo% ormasi ins nall, the og poy ¥ a here'Western Intelligence cic we infore gnizicant, ave si 7 ew Y + * & ot BrEVion - as on must be considered on omnat @ lance a ba 4 BF ? sKGB and'o ge to the gence. Pe eae 27 Xe aoe aad « esver penesit to ¥ ot aCe ne Aa sign & ae 4 : dama y alone of Ci or > ene bas Quan to 5 . froceres Ne not a stancard on v £ 2 ha oh ary : 5 ” “ O “ ‘ 2 4 wd " 34 "g: 3 by awd bel eo 2 & oO : * ny Oo. (Uw u st 7 2 “9 Hy .Q a “§ Y a we 4 A Qo ons he rhs 4 ‘a t ted a4 bd 3 fQ OG rod G 83 c) 34 he Oo + “g rt od ord a ° q * fs] ord 54¢ ae. 2 Mourns Of L358 d-pes es é  §. “3 ce. “ eT a8 s-been exam = es * Ber section oO: Zs, in anot oT) aase! a PsmE UVES i ned, w 4 ‘this paper, xamples from the above cited ca A few e 8 o 2 a 3 I fog {4 y ° > fq ood 3 ca) eed 9 "aq fa ° | & a 69 Be a 3 ¢ nh & gg un y 53 rey a ENKG are listed below. ned by NOS urnis llustrations and pow fret mportance, fi isted in order o hy ii re nos necessar a Pe
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14-00000 co cere wee penne A, EDEN TELIA  SNE RETOPSE I P AIA oC TSE IIIT A PRETRIAL ETT TS TIE iatiay a oy , meme). He identified "ZHARI" (phometic) ae an Americas code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. Am internal assurnption wag made based om the original lead toformation from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" wae Vietor Norris HAMILTON, aka Feu-t Mitrh HINDALY, a former NSA empleyes who deflected to the USSR In 1962, and the information fgom NOSENKO was never disgeminated or investigated. Prior to the surfacing of Joba Discoe SMITH by the Soviets ta the tril of 1967, EGt" ieee taformation concerning KGB knowledge of American ecde clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was o leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the ; ® Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, wae tdentical te "ZHARI," Investigation disclosed that ne definite informa- tien could be established in regard to the actual whereaboute of SAU TH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate investigation im 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identi- fleation of Johan Discos SMITH as "ZHARI," However, euch identifie cation would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State amt CIA, sad could wery well kave permitted certain action which i would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise aanouncement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967. i NOSEKKO, in June 1962, furnished informatioa from which Wililam VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOCLITSYN, tx late 1960 » carly 1961, hed furnished information concerning a Soviet pene- tration of the British Government on the basle af which the British Gul ca,
14-00000 UR cadet y } Services had compiled a list af twenty suepecta, including VASSALL. . Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL wag the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termi- notion by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent. Although not the case of a KGB agent, the maiter of the micre- phones tn the United States Embassy should also be mentioned, GOLITSYN, following his defection in Cecernber 1961, furnished certain {information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones we.¢ connected te central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exporure of the antire set of inicrophones. However, appro- priate action wae not taxen on thie information and the KGB would have been aware fant no action wes taken prior to June 1962 when NCSENKO fivet contacted CIA. i NOSENKO is a dispatched KGS agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract spaciil< attention to a eystem of microphonsa which mnat have etill had some value ae of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO waa a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system ig available and it should be noted that it 10 GOU1C75 cL a ve | SEU Arete nt RN aL ETRE Sit ate ere it Rao pe ORE TTI NET A ne ARN iene 3 hier ee eee Sets | E eT
14-00000 ™ mane? 3 , ; . & . w % . -@ WAS 1eO Vides CITCE ADSia bse orcs ay weet aR BOLE ee Warm deco Ou ” . oo” ~ ey ~ mae La we . . mee FEE 7, . locaie SnG remove Uae clo eae. 2 waren GOLIYSTN bos large sy lene’ ie 7 . ’ . mer 1G. 7 geVern @ .eaG aie Qi ae sie ao fue =e, wre hale e a Fimwe 8 Fee oem eee se ie : PS gee nt : ae GGW BONE Tas . eect BT SA Mi we Ne Sere te Dis ea tebe ties due oi these leads have Seen mex interviews with NOSENKO have reaunecs in appr mew American ieads which are bein: eee ne te neg - roo. : BS eS Sas ey a ep eitianal peu enc est ate Ce san ber the Ut BCEMWiONAaAL GEVELOMNEeAL OF Tutod Cases Dy the SL. MAO bAS provided leads te aver 100 thire-coun.cy AGE “A 2 9 9] serene wlan ita ft “ea ate ea Sarre agers. COGTayiCalay tatoo seas &le Wace 2% SCGSe, Inc.uc.ng . etieenia of euch eepee ee 22 Tepes acte rare Wee cee ote a! Hoticsais OF SUCH COUTtY.cs G5 ancenesia, Fusicid, Uruguay, the Unies Wangagom, France, West Gernany, Geljium, Swecen, Australie, Japon, MexicG, italy, and a number of otier countries. . anciuced in the more insportant of inese agent or other leads *, ae «ae > are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for Arnericin targets, to actual or possible ile COOLCTE ow
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14-00000 “eg aaa ’ i eern my oma! rs sof intelligence information ie wot a sigalfieant factor in a determtnatiza - of bhe bons fides. The qualification should, however, be adied that it te not felt that NOSENKO has, ag of this time, been fully debrialed im many ageae of pasitive intelligence interest. 13 o001077 SECRET
14-00000 $ ‘o SECKEI L _, . 1 F, «IS THERE EVIDENCI OF BOL LETEPTION OR VOIVE AWAY? IN INFORMATION FPURNISE II LY NOLSINAS WHICH WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSZENHO WAS DISPATCHIT BY THE KCB? : , . e 1 * * 5 ‘ moe dry 7 . * weg woe ee eee mew MO Be iT neuer Sma + wea meme ee a a a . me et ee ee kt PCa ae, i ff , + . ay bab é i 3 } 3
14-00000 2 oe oe natin seems cA re > mo ra = F. 1s there evidence of KG deception or ''give away" in inforrsation furnished by NOSENKO whicn would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGH. In reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above «.‘ .iion has Sein been both a necessary and integral part, It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving ata conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown, An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during thése contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case. SECRET wed a. Senne; Sena
NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to ‘be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted te make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter- ' intelligence officer who wanted to give information, " he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his rernarkes to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters. lf NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite* likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva, | a 2 | . 0001080 a : SECRET | | ~ 6 ahhanim dey *
Fa NOSENKO, during hig five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossioie, and the investigation oi which could only have raised certain questions con: 2rning NOSENKO. Tne following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or mace incorrect or impossible statements. (a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to[Tames sUasazad (This was a lie and an interview with BronSSzad}wita digplay - of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate. ) (b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment ’ approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a He and LANGELLE was available for interview. ) Dé (c) NOSENKO said he recruited |LUNT (Horace LUNT)\in Bulgaria. (Actuaily NOSENKO never met [L0Ny}) 0 co01Csi 4/6K a
7 @ ayiets SP am Fo vee dy (4) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with] Edmund O6 STEVENS} who, according to NOSENKO, hac been recruited by the KGB. (NOSZENKO actually had never personaly met (STEVENS) and only had seen[STEVENS |once at a distance. } (e} NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At ithe same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (whe is considered identical to ‘ Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Mescow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954. (f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation, } (g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying “We did this," or "We did that, * in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits 4 Go61082 3/&R
Oe RA tn eee ete sgogsapentagy Gk TET nf, he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the 4.03 should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question ; ¢ concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. } In 1562-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered i. ae already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted, (a) Both furnished information in regard to | Johan PREISFREUND} Ob (b) Both furnished information in regard to a {military code clerk case (James STORSBERG}, 0, OG {c) Both furnished information in regard toa trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, C to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in -yeevterctempetetmprenccectmrectfectertentitts * \eexmecggrmerppcemnctatie Se eb a PERE sh Pg sefOah, To  RR AD  T e oteek ce in (GO0LDB% . ge. - a APF OTe eR Sd eR,
14-00000 es one 5 Ly Ramey Ste rer eae oF i OI OT Sb SA a PEN Ae abe REA te sone lg Moscow, or a recruitment of an Arserican formerly with the United States Embassy in “ioscow; and NOSENZO related it directly to the "4 wNDREY" case, giving the assumed name which KOVSHUK used. ) (a4) Both furnisned information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow. (e}) Both furnished ae in regard to (Bamund STEVENS |and{isaac Hens HA PIRO} The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, ov situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence g001C84 SECRET ee i wee ate 26K
: wee ‘ ¥ Wamsd bin & ; 3 ‘that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisiaciorily sourced his information in alm: st every instance. Ina few instances he has said ne did not recall « how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious. ; The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 ~ early.1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around or in the First Department, SCD. : It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN 7 me — * ry - . a . cows. - 8
ey, ACW B5G WES in CGNs OW nade UR Crewe OTS OL bee iu i ¢] Pa » ae - weap GOLITSYN nas ativiouteG nis RNG Se en CNT tae CASS OF ales Ve erat =: Te ee mem TTT el ee el ee te Be ee te ie oa %e 28h SaaS we pa Tien, Ole area Be Med BBSOCIELON WIG - a a Poa a rs mifinnwe fen tha Sle ce Dervart, see cme ClTtaw™ Gaal TS 1.42 wo a aoe OULD AT Cts eae ae — cod wee aae COs, a a ey = aCe atk LT ee ee a 2 ~ cee sohe FCT wee Ce furrisned by GOLITSYN and NOSENMNO one at ins time hol. nat sgt em Oe me 7. ee eee FP ee ee am Ca ee OT TEN POsSi4.8 1G SAUSLECTOP LY COPTe.nte CEVIL I. UNION TP Ol GO see SN with information from NOSENKO. Pics 162% + 163 of tne previous . wee 2 one Faw 2 Som te am £ . Te nett " ree) ; = rte rege susimary refer to iniormation from GOLITSYN waics is charccterizce as “Ixformation about ACB Operations A tm to4° my, ¢ cy se fun Pw woken ae oe tem oe, i 1906 - 1961," The reicrences are to intormition from GOLITSYN cesce : on remarks by Geanadiy Ivanovica GAYAZNOYV and Vadim Vistorovich KOSOLA POV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an Section, First Department, SCD, duving 1966 - lel, that his gvimary resnonsibility was word against coce cleraxs at tie United Siates Dmcassy is ue Eaeat © wi 4 z 0 3 fle & ry) er o S iS av Oo 17) Oo s 'g '@) w ee mu ia] yd La J k ” 3 y oO < z * € 9 es fe ot G fl. Ry 8 | caui Css xX my t
fe ter OS that NOSENKO was noi Deputy Chief of the First Section in 19600 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary. GOLITSYN has furnished certain injormation which he re- ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD. t In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real, In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate irag- mentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way refjecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below vepresent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d): fa) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV ‘ that an atternpt had been made by the KGB to recruit an | | co SECRET.
14-00000 ’ was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but OT Te wea hea eeed, American female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaxen to efiect her recruitment, He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was] a long and "German OS sounding" |name. NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against {Collette SCHWARZENBACH| WIS who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However| SCHWARZENBACH had been-employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador } BOHLEN during 1955 = 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow, The recruitment attempt against| SCHWARZENBACH} according to. OG NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD. g001088 ©? ain, o> Ed) A 4 e @, ° ob, DE
denviege eae NLU {b) Pave 163 of tie previous summary contecrs infor mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZ>.OV in the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNwV had developed an operation against an American Embassy rnilitary code cler« in which the KG was "99 per cent sure” that the target would be recruited, This is believed to undcwiiedly be a reference to the case of [James STORSBERG|wio Was actually the subject of a recruit- ment approach in 1961], There is considered to be a good possibility that GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was ‘preparing tor his assignment to Helsinki, Finland, This theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January 1961 from Viadisiav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section) that|Johan PRESTREUNB|pad recently been used in the | successful recruitment of an American employee of the Embassy. [Johan pais! Reuni|ves used in wne{St ons BERG] operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also 6001089 il SECRET Y&R eocete  t antennnenn SM,
—_—® QT. t UiLUiiee aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about 6 06 [PREISFREUND]since GOLITSYN wanted to use[PREISFREUND | in Helsinki, NOSEZNXO has stated he was not present curing the above conversation, It is very possibie that KOVSHUK exaggerated a liitie in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use PREISFREUND}as an agent, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to thi James STORSBERG case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report~ ing by-GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what ie considered to have been the James e STORSBERG)case and Setaited information furnished by NOSENAO concerning th James STORSBERG| case, The exact date of the recruitment attempt against|STORSBERG| has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period, The statement by{James 06 6001090
14-00000 “ ve CTS OL [Storspzacinat it occurred in October 1961 is com- pieiely unaccepiable and is even contradicted by other statements by ST Ween pimeci (c) Page 103 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960. The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideoiogicai rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN Gid not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve, NOSENKO hag furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of[Robert ARRETT, who was a guide at thé United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual ' cooLest mt
ts tse ote agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted, Work against the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments were particip. iting under tne direction of the Ninth Department, One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in involving BADR homosexual activities which were photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKXO, _ although the photograpns were of a good quality, the KGB was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because ofa general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment of the United States Exhibition guides due to the pianuned visit of President EISENHOWER to the Sovict Union. NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material , De . and information onf BARRETT Iwas later given to the First 0 -_ Department and that(BARRETT| was recruited by the Second Section, First Department when he returned with another Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in the recruitment operation. [paRRETT, following his return 06 - 6001092 SEC! rm ry ae] Fi » A 4 ! av sng RENTER * PERE te OTIS AEE AS OLS LOUTH rier i ee ee le stim ey te “ . a en ee eee ee oe es 3S enemamenmemmmrmeunran meinen semen renee a erevee ra EEE nie oumem.
—, eC ARTY ow Wied cum a, to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of a compromising photographs which had been taken during his 1959 trip to Moscow. Although it cannot be established at this time, it is possibie that the information furnished by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV actually refers to tne[Robers 9 RRETT pace, it should be noted that |Robert BARRETT |could not actually be t characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, " (4) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor- mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki. GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was 15 - G001093 216R
AEE PURE $A TEEN Depene Hentn ene bee ane | 6. goons Snake pean = _ reaaeaian ; pica Bari sk in preside mr et a es OR BL Seed mR A Se sie t /bmbint Aros a ory a -t ye toy 5 . caw tba d, considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if. the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki. NOSENKO has furnished no information which cas. be correlated in any way with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN which has been conducted in the matter, Although this is considered to be a, valid lead, it need not necessarily refer 4 te to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in an ‘ . Moscow. during 1960 ~1961.. It is also possiole that the previou remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk'' who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible. The trip of Vadim Vv. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is t z g resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation an) i * q ‘ : po a ot Renee sawn tes oie ts 08
14-00000 considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki. NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be correlated in any way. with the above information from GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is @ considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk"! who might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible. The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is. copper LOTT
8 RENCE Ie RtoREonenmaCN ETON AEE HES sen + amen = knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities e . roe . pA SOROS bt ge REE Pew et Tao tee ae - Torte ite ve Ree bet me dee weds SECREL also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki to accompany an American Embassy code clerx on the train to Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow. | The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was Ob undoubtedly|J John GARLAND|and the train manifest lists(John GARLAND] and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the - game train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the identity offFohn ee claimé no 5 knowledge of the above trip of KOSOLAPOV to Heisinki, although being well aware of a previous trip. | NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section. specifically . charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lacx of t ‘ such as his trip to Guba in November December 1960 but it cannot be interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if ? he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, ag this was an event the “KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of. 800108 5 ‘SECRET 7 2 cad
A theory which has previously been given consideration and - warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American intelligence and/or to denigrate the. value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. ; In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way oa bé construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does . 3 not claim to lave any detailed Knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been. broached with NOSENKO, “his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD," 1 ‘ ot h or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that." In-connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN,: the timing of certain events should be noted... GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961, e NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, ne where he remained until 15 June 1962. ‘It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, Teaser, ANE ene cota nee en oe eT Ar ete eee eee we te hn hmm ome eT Seem le wet my ~ ely ley any RNSROOTRT AMEN al eae SREY SR dated, Faetaes 2
Po me Cr Peco e ° oo Aare UFnee ~é select NOSENKO as the individual who would be Gispatcned to counter- act tne possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior te | . . | his departure for Geneva in March 1962, Therefore, if NOSENKO . ; d . | was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would | have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN oo 7 . : aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, ‘ | 4 it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA. . | . The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have been dispatched to confuse and divert American intelligence and thus ‘to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United States Covernment, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should / and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually “Pp Ja substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist, Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts careemammseracntieanse +6 Perma meet Yn with ont bt At renal oo u devon! ~h : aan > Rn EE Nee aE ae eae MERE Pan ee rear werent Soe otal ‘7 PERRET RTE BRAGA: TENT LEHRER Tes SRR oe RSS
wie fred .(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and|Herbert HOWARD} The basis for this to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. Asan . SECRET | OO of American counter-intcijigence té determine the identity of and take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United States Government. The only answer to this question seems to be . . “ that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli- 7 gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value. The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con- sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow. In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there were no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with.the exception of "ANDREY" expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this surnmary and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements are made in good faith, it should be noted, however, that at this time there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the expressed opinion of NOSENKO. ; , : NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any particular knowledge of FCD activities, In addition, he does not claim o e 4 e - e 7  gooitee ea ede cee ‘ 20 nn > : soe rt Bg cee cers me ey CART? : 4 ; 1 be epee arly At gees at net
14-00000 example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities : against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students, . . . ard individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best mainly of a collateral nature. NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD, nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh _ ; o Department was aware. The latter is.specifically supported by certain notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code name, These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventn Department and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases, , 1 | SECRET : meals ates cin Ladin gfanh tadareemerreee Tenet bene reecten nae . a wee came as amt, q 1a at eaten deed ahd ee Ea 2 3 3 3 4 6838 SEN z ‘ RAEN AEEREAREST AS MN SERS
eptareinrennees (nit SRP asseate aratoteatngemeienttttr ei ttin wn Natt Antaris RMR enee ee ew ine ‘ t { HATTON TT TULARE YLT See SECRET % G. IS THERE ZEVIDINCE GF 3A POLITICAL OR ANY EPRMSSION TO SPEAX fe) ry 6 t4 4 oye re) tw re 4 Si 5 tJ 4 nt r al FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE XGB 5 AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFI CRG 4 + ye eutrnstie Scwagrading ang declassificstign NPS MST
fo wie pe Ths Glove oe her tom orm Nt ob te yard 74 : = 7A oven aa at : fe ethene : nee Nc pore sey mer als fae me ne a ~ ~ an ae «pe tes ole ee eal ees Be Cue ie wank Ces Cewaels aD eee GS SUL GLE we ees m= : * a en le exception Getullic Uilow, there is ne evicunce cla oo 2 the knowlecse of NOSEZNAG to speik iveely with CLA without als Sein Te Pee, “ Ps er - me pe, itis accepted that the Soviet ence iniorrnation he mizht reveal providing what Such act would, in the estimate of the leacerszip, re . loin a net political gain fox the USSA, entertained by the Soviets, however, it would Save to involve an issce of «, major importance to the Soviet leacership and presumabiy would Lave to ' gootd04 2 t nee
ve wee aca dst Ad ESE TLGans oF q eos ° 7 - ‘ - * + 2. - 4 : BCRLGVIN tae GEssrGe CNG anc oF Lavin | : me, a7 ee a a od eae ae ~ TS ale et ow ae Clu wea wi ok Goals Weer bee CH eee” af NOSENKG “ee means Noe ote yalgat weet the above reGuivemints ts ; : ay = = a ime ne me Fe te eee ee spo ge =e ee oo , “ Honnecys the ADVGsVe Geers Gs ashG Sues Sy GovlinaG’ 44 tis wSS5E55 euch Be law? a) fae Pan ollie mY pen mete et foe : : oo : ‘and bis association with the Sovict Usiesn. Given (a) speculation : . , . ” 2 *, oe? ~*, ee Dales Ve. ee : mo SON obtaining at the time taat there wis Soviet involvement in the - cos - = ceivawt 4 af ~ s a a oe wm Seat le nn y &SSaSSination, (2) te premise tcat in tact tnere was no Soviet 4 6 woe involvement, and (c) a hypothesis tha: cee Soviet leadership wes ccezly. concerned lest erroneous cone.csions be érawa waics could load to ivvreversable actions, itis conceivable that the Soviet leadersiin might us ’ have been prepared to take extreme ste vs to convince United Siuvtcs . att sae thal : , ble ot ‘net nl nen “ee -42054 é , autnorities of theiv non-invoivemoint in the assassination. (Doe paseaze i to the United States Governmen: of the allegedly complete Suvict consular gg file on OSWALD was, in itseli, an unsrecedénte oo . - cceeeeneietanta aati ieee ee - . . . The NOSENKO case warrants 6xa light of the fact that among the informati N“nside"™ KGB information on OSWALD: information oo eggs med ts got ce tantnertaaneA SH ettne tester nae aH Oat ML HA een are nena ened FR ee PAE aE ce AA ET eR oF ee enti enn pa eke beret yer rm Ae se es NER
~ 2 a. sy% em we ot Pee eg wee we me Oe 22 2m ee Sue revealeé tha subsiance of the cowcunt of the HGR Miles on CSWALD. Tsis iniormation clearly incdleciun Uo these was no fe mur? 7 “oe ee Mee Pe see el mie Tage me. te Faded ” with OSWALD, that the KGS hoi us. opovational interest in OSWALD, and that aS a mater of Zact OSWALD me & continuing series of problems. i _ Upon examination, aoweves, NOSENNS COeS NOt mect the , ‘req sirements premised above for serious Soviet considezetion OS & 2566 |. KGB defection. The following reasons rencer this unaccep v '. @ The chronoiogy, in itseli, p problems, for such a theses, viz. NOSE in June 1962, 17 months pricy to the assassination of Pre er ar = 2GG20 AGBnecy. nee ~ a m, 3% we a mein oe a Od asad ee a wre t fn b. While the information irom NOSEZENKO on CSWALD is ors et a ne ee a ae ee ee — ee er ARCGTEStNE BG POTUUIG Is, 26 2S Ge, 2 MECUTE, SOGpPE, AG CoOmtENs, . * . suificiently cenvincing ior United States, authorities to reasonac.y Se ‘ - expected to conclude that it resr presented unequivocal prooz of Soviet 1 ' non-involvement, ‘ c, Itis impiausiole not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorizies, in any examination of the _ possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume naam He ae es eee ous on LAD. Tepe ete ton aces OE soe - 15 Sy pw, in beap- Se” eine, 3S * RS Liew rie ‘ Senin 4 ALFA IILTES: : Dee OMe me ats cae Eats
ne ane eo sene flere ae a < + : ESE SECRECY rs Ramdeenmersass ERS . A UREA EASA : RNS SRNR SSUREM GER OIESU SRE » - t BRIG Lar Low Sovict Fale Fo eah Toba et SER OTEN BM SUC OG GUGPOUGN we aegeneenesitcrmnrn marmite cena eens bd + comparumentation v Viet tensile by any MOR : . GOST eee cmentation Nii, WOU. CXCLLGG KNOW Peck Opaeersne ye Sa ey AY wate ne AN VORP ebn.Gl Teta G 2 ee inclvicua. of 3S ec pttiaw Inf fatoueto ailing tt mm teen el gett ls wee men sn tee Seas ae Va bases SDC Cosel Coe CE I Wa mee Te TS Oi Tals AETGIL. we 3 KGS career os NOSINAS would not cermit even serious “~ =<" Pe ee me atl Dose tne Te “lew Syn oe consiceraiion that NOSENAG could sive woglca lly Seen <itted inte wre a>ove very limited category. 2 Itis accordingly concluded wtact cha poselsility of a politicaly motivated free dispatch can in the cus2 of NCSENKO ve satisiactorily a eliminated. - _. oo wo - . . The’ possi ibility has also Deen considered tnas the AGE might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an oflicer, with numerous leads to non-valuable ov non-currenat KGS agents o: ane : - ~ ee TAS cases, the facilities of tne United Sta.ws intelligence community would : & be practically neutralized for an extonced period of time. This coulc - only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community. would involve a major wOrsion Of Lis personnel and ecioxzts in the investigation and resolution of cases wich had Nttle or no curvent . . 7 . . . : . e 8 or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be Pr. ° ° e car itrarily eliminated. without full consideration. it is not believed chaz g00L104 co cee ape a Raabe 1 er te Nt a Tm Pie tr sme a Tak Tips San EE arama te . - en Rinse . Tue fee he ae ETN, Seba
: iy t i o—, j ‘ —_ WEN Hy : eatagetedypetete TOE NOSENXO in the absence of a7. TCS Waniate bas VIOVE CECE OF M.S8i0Ns TO 2G eee ee angn te, Bs wal cine Stee TT OVGEVass. &SSESSITMENY Ga lho LALOS Tae Gs 1OGGS OO 21S CONC Sto ehal cu. . exploitation of his information would information from the Ciszatehed agent or officer. The deterrent cfice: on others of the conviction auc sente..cing of persons woo have commitisd a& crime or crimes Las long bean a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or-punished, 9 °°. The detenrent effect on others of the trials anc convictions of — ent ee William VASSALL, Rébert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen NMINTKEN-~ Te erence eet rere unary eA LO NR meres Lan rekd BAUGH -snoule not be undecestimiiedc. . The KGS aiso could not have known that information furnisked by NOSENKO would not result in the et vial and conviction of other KGB agents of recruitments concerning & » aan whorn NOSENKO had some knowledge. *e on mre eh chad OR vale fet are ine teen a nat we TART Sea eay eH b ee tee se TE
cr rae ate ts Sse e re — tat ox cj Lod ‘ . oe) pr ort smepteg cen oNG 2 THAT NY EVI. 2 IS THERE ono ot deci) VN TO wen ANOY SRE v He * owes ae Ne ane he sree pee © wee is D 3 C R ¥ Vv S OR TO F5 BEHA ‘TACT LATIVS Tao CO BOREL o~ iC N < TIVES DUR EC ‘WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE ‘OR KGB OBJ FONE ep Ate eR NE peg eRP MO eee Frew Oe trerew eee Sao TLON? = he DE eS) ‘a, ER AFT phen ote on Berg tem emt tne wt Bm, sa tanabatt A Ne mR ect paeA CPE CRT uN Re REET
14-00000 H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the XGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives Guring these contacts or ater his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO . 7 in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were xhown to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB. The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in | _ previous sections. It is being treatec here as a separate area of interest 7 ‘since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration, It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKXO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be : - : based on the full review of availabie information from NOSENKO, , collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of ‘each item of available information. oe - The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 >) “and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is gooii0? j Cale t qEacigita sd asacalt i on soos SECRET. Ss oes PRE a DT ert by seosrae Satin oie LR NORD RP nk eater ee ends aetna ee eee eo te eet ah ph te 4 Meme Raat mete oe Sage eid
- necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion Lo that they were or could be in any part the result of AGB direction or control, One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB : . : . ~ control at that time. : oo ; : ' ‘ . Gonsideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 . contacts with C1A were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by’ the KGB, it was con- a A cluded that’ there was no Basie for « or "information which ‘would warrant : serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traiter in | KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect. ; Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, :dur ing his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his Personal security, requesting that knowledge concezning his identity be “kept to an absolute minimum, that no ‘communications be sent to the
- Sten qee steer eben We TES 2 3 > COL nee bate < wm esaoe NF me ates CMe d WOGi orn’ ecm t ed ote O also womens a New! matey oe Ole Soviss Uni rremrave ss) te ¥ COn GSS e rz) vt coy ab BO oy * ot) 3 ad &) a re) 9 2 ‘d eg ray we ‘s pa) i) “a u Fe) : t iP) “7 6 '¢ 3 “4 4 nh 8 2 q of : 5 J i a ty oa rv “ s 12 ‘a at } y QM GS 3 3 « * i) a 4 ad “4 fe 3 6 st NS¢ 3 4 ws ' “ «f te | » 0 or 8 3 cy Gar ~ i) NS aon Per t one Mi wone x e © ¢ te tm CG oS NOSENAG in any con. ow gers dal evi a sae gee SuSE 2SKe. boro we S Swatates YW. ee cs “ alae wane te $ @évicence “ever, 22% Row. * CONS Ue - GB mot uncer / was Oo ot toe fmt Soe eres NOSZENAG w act Oo: oot a ane Dare whaals we 4 ; 9 i i ae * a i! NOSINK OF] ek ak! he ‘ale waich very 8 USSR’ Y wou 4 ee contre AG3 Was UNGer oo oe pad Ps] 2 o 9 8 a : 0 V4 u nay d a ad 3 ‘9 os ‘3 3 °o . Pid ae us rae 4 Pr’ “ ‘en q ond ” ; cs) 4 4 8 A mn ’ Yo @ 3 b $a a > a a8 tr 3) > ad & + a 3 M4 8 ‘a [o] ny ‘3 4 4 “ Mog re) ee) ! “ ) ne) ay ve rR) Q “3 3) mF. qo F ay) 9 5 4% @ & [s] 3 2 2 “4 ve! >= 3 cs) g 3 2 3 ct ~ >] a eed 4 & > " ‘ 4 ae] q * 8 i oo 4 et . 90) 4 tet rey 8 g 33 . Pay fe 6 a ‘9 Fhe a, — Pe?’ Le fe fo wi None o. l. rs of mater NAO S55 NG. May moe ie Py me contra ¥. type and, on “G3 ~ OVS tLe aa poe > G returned to the Sovict Unisn wi ara 1 to CIA ia = & the mate 7 ail o * y missing. a alt etn ) orize Sa WAS BC whics q ‘f@ rh | 4 nr? 3. U8 6 98 g ov o @ p. 4 ui d 3 @ 4 t - 3 3 z a 3 vo OO HY | ao. 4 Q > 9 ~ 48 G by fi ; 8 § ie] ever ata latex date be ie 1963, ECemoer aiy in D WKO to Go ‘<a. port - how estes ome mee ry its Oe oe Ae nae Rien tam To by Tan 6 Fe ee at oad at
ener tenner ae hh A ennui Coren vt Basen tememneenas =~ Se edt 1 AS Sune) renee ee Rae cot ae 3 ° é * e : va) Se a7 : yo . cs rs . . a res . oes ° en Be ce Pee e * = : ¥ a a . Storecettrt gal a we on EN putea nes Bad RTO Ht ims atenttne nie . 40 om & . weet ne” sal Pra arars st Tr ro rer) tap das DEC rae E iYus, GOCGLUNG 20 NOSZNAG, ieS vO WETUCI2GLG i te badCn Lor AleKseucs CLEAN PANOYV, stcovelin & 2M thas it was ~ ™ -~ a rs . “a ~_= ae ae om ae eo a cs eae Gxpensés. NOSONGG w.Gtcd Sede he LAG Nol CleuneG Whe Poeces Soe ®. « . veaily Drougat the Gocurnent clong Geccuss if geve Rin wae os 3G TOI Of Lisutenan: Coloaci, bree ee! . oa oom mene TT me ee re ge ee we oe Ve te NOSENKO. has completely retwactec Lis cieku 66 aaving 22c tae. yank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even a5 @ Doputy Call ul Gepost} snent he was only 4 Capiain although he was entiaed to anc expecicd to veceive the rank of Major in early 1665, NOSENNG cas stited that giving him tne rank o. Wieutenant Colonel in the above Cocument we tae error of KASHPEAGV, the odficer on cuty in the SCD on Sunday, aad t practically all Deputy Chiefs of Deparnment in the SCD nad at lezst “pe rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The above explanation by NCSENAG may reid we CODSiGered SY readers with at least a degree of skepticism, However, it NOSENAO was dispatched by the KGS, it would seer teat he could have Geen sro viGed with something a little moze Suostanitas te Cocument his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, In eédicion, it would seem that the KGB G001110 ate yey PRA BEIT OTE kee ey enayateaa, Tre
} at as i oO 3 “4 | Q 4 at g i | 4 ‘ tt fs) 4 2 2k i 4 a 3 a 13 9 a He 3 3 | i * : 43 be ba {3 * a) . | 2 he 9 ™“ 3 . Py Lf . . 2 2 : | 4 od “~ 2 ° ; a 3 : : 3 , ; , a H o 9 a m4 3 e a 3 “ nd a ° . . to at 3 ‘3 : ; sa fd at ‘ 9 5 8 | . a os “ 3 . . 3 2 “wy ‘ ie : 4 aN S o 4 : t 3 : ave ° ” a : - oo) ra “4 a Pp u | ie 9 fa 3 ' , 3 . ‘ ; ] YQ 3 eS 3 ‘ | ano ot 4 : % 9 3 : 8 . a oe . Q 9 A mM." o * a ‘ | . “ ry " 74 ? mt | 7 ‘3 n ° aad c 4 » a a en) ; - Ps) 3 3 gd Q ot 3 ° ~ | | eee s # ev ag gd 3 re) ns ré| 43 wo ) : , 2 & O g 8 Moos : 3 2 8 CM eG Bf | a | 2 ao og & fh a | . "3 d “ ‘ a ‘ . | | | | | : ‘ef si i a 2 ‘ | . : ; o 4 . ie) o bo ag - nN A 2 | 0 2 f+ yg 3B . | |
COMME NTS COMCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLU oe IN REGARD TONOSENKO Do, . ' , . ; 7 e . ” . , rs - - wot, .. . So, 5 . : TO Te Setar da eon ae ey Le ee ns the Laub ~ 0 . ‘ . ; ' ” . , . - : HEB Dabo ci I Ae TOPE 9 Ce 6 P3 oS ELTA ECS ARTI ICD E AIL at Sad 5A” el C8 I attomnsooie! Ph OE COR oe MB oy abe sg, UES Pe ee
14-00000 COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS . a A IN REGARD TO NOSENKO = . Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 ~ 360 of the "Examina- : 3 tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector! which contains seven {A - G) : primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) cand KGB career of NOSENKO, These conclusions or findings are oS ; 4 = independently. treated in separate attachments. _ With. the exception of "G, "' the conclusions in this “‘surnmary are : - | in diréct conflict with the above conclusions ‘and are basically that - ‘ . * | :... NOSENXO served.in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was. oo 4 , a KGB officer from Maxch 1953 until his défection in February 1964, FS 4 | and held his claimed positions in the *XGB during the March 1953 = : ; 3 February 1964 period, 4 ; * For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the. - . Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations, . — a g : SS "unless otherwise indicated, : a ; me “Attachment: ee ee iCpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" wo . ° . Ehou. 4 Encaded G29 socamic cowagtsciag aad cechassitecstion $y ARNON eters vOm Chae afte OO me seta 8 OO TEI Oe a rr ’ eteBaB TEPER TE ne gas rotten ee at ae wt gtaradts , Pave ss
14-00000 . ~ . mm N SURE 5 . wmUsrine, PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF "THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR" “ y The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of thia summary.) | "SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS | CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES" "NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively: senior positions of auhorily from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americana in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive. array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera-~- tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including wy ems eee oe intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a .. senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensiiive. positions, who Po I Sand ane on Sat EF benno me PTE a oe oe i 8 » ot TTR seme eRe EN AN AoA RM 2! Ao Sty o anedtiod ai ban im
14-00000 ~) | SEU . enjoyed considerable authoriiy and trust despite personal short- comings, and whose acfection, ‘the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence’, paralyzed the work of am KGB - Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assas~-. sinate him, " "The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known © facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put; whether his accounts are - internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether | "s. He actually gained the information ne has from occupying the, KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he. saye he is, according.to nis own-accounts?" “This examination hed led to the iollowing findings, arrived : ; ; ‘ at independently: A. NOSENKO ci¢ not serve in the Naval RU i in any of the capacities or at the places and times he /. Claimed, . B, NOSENKO did not enter the KGBinthe - - “manner or at the time he claimed. C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American. risen GOO145 - Embassy. Section throughout the 1953+1955-period as” ee | Se Claimed, : a rere : ArAArt Pa RE a PRAT fee Len kates cee erm abet wate HEL a eee nyt Pa Ste ean ne BOR AA nee Ot eh MS aE an 3 eS ayy aan EC Tere, Se oe a a eure Teer ete Seg ET ge be Canna! tym at ee AR ae
14-00000 ‘or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence eet ton eh Be D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither , . : ‘a senior case oiiicer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American~Britisn Commonwealth Section. E, NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the a Lor , American Embassy Section nor a senior oificer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic) F, NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962°he was Chief s : , io =? of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are . es . . : ‘not-eredible. +.” G, “NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty’ a :.that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and nis defection in 1964. o: oy These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability in éach instance." ; ' "The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts , : of his. life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as avy hole unacceptabie. While truth and fact.in this case frequently — - we ; ae wo ae re - eet oe ARTI eRe ONG SATAN tee Macmnatoa res od gl Ay Oger Be AR ata s Boo ancl tI he te abe PemN RTE cere
14-00000 Raed ome ed 6 hom & fe ae tA ee ’ ‘cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by iact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NCSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector." "Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American intelligence and for providing the information - he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely ; , — consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal a conclusions, Neverxthtiess, the question cannot be ignored, The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made." : Trey the reasonable explanations advanced ior NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers irom a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has ~y,- greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for Lo simply personal reasons; or,. finally, that he is a dispatched KGB a Simply persone’ coee pevene G0O1117 - coe nate E wyHhee RFA Bay foe ed “SECRET oe e > + stom i Sab deonsmnna me pone fo soba Eatin, -" 7 . ef ete wie ature a , ae te ts aft : ae be enantio Lone Be oe
14-00000 Cf ri c re “The first two possib bilities are easily dismissed, That NOSENKO is not siinply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGS officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which couid only derive from within the ‘KGB itself," : "Second, as noted in the ext, extensive psychiatric and ‘psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the’ \ ' > ‘possibility. that NOSENAO's actions and testimony are the product ofa deranged personality or unbalanced mind." - oot ; oe is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO i, isa | KGB - ‘officer who served in at least some of the components for some ii i PRO bea cena, BOB ame AS He i or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag- . gerated his positions, rank and access to intormation, and ; invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with : American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, ~ NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOYV'a -patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be justa ~ ty >. tow te . + io : - product of his own invention, since these were the subject of 0001118 TOS tt oe ae eee - be Tiga nas Dos eda og ee ee re PE LOPE
14-00000 suayoat Cr f or . re "Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable. ' "In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor- " w mation should be assessed accordingly." ’ Seaaheieenibe achlene teen? a ~ 3 woe a pape eae —, ote ~~ OE OES cay a MED IO yi nt STE FB gd! PAH 7 ebeatserhel emetts ee Qe sitar. Lh acy, oa beggars Da + » 4 a8: ath Tear a : fed wetenge we SN Stes
een res seats ee a oe + . + Catt ta Taaeteym Basra nye . te ine woe bee , a rere. * Hy ate ro cee te te, be yan : oo wo * , ' . . 7 . woe tt “ t . - £ refs” . ° se . ce = > a Y - ° . ‘ . a3 ° . . - . ‘ . aoe 7 . a , ° - . . eye - an . eye . . . soe . . * : t . . * 1 ‘ + ; ° H= NAVAL ER E Cc NT T =D a - Cae nl o ra 7 an A oe aN A. Vv tare eer MP phmunewege ee on annnine ATT So OR CL: — Lut a= a) baw or - 3 z = S = or BS eres awe db Fy ° TIMES NKO DID NO ~ ae NOS IN ANY OF THE CAPAC . ‘ oe . iJ 3 ad - . . ‘ . . \ ° . z vf eae “eenmatrame ene mttnegee te Qype mtn a ttre ates cot aS toe mE weet s pemattgtbain Siig fgsutes {annem ay : tae . wee Se Remi ce mei ee te a Dm eens ON ee ee OF etme 9 rte een in ametnee Sere ae ema E Se ee Cy ERE NES a oni TRG 6
14-00000 cen my cD ted pry treme} oie A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Navai RU in any of the cavacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of : a NOSEN KO in Navy Inteliigence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated _ . ot and should be accepted. The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated -_. by. NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation irom the Institute of ‘International Reiations from 1950 to 1949. because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of hie class. However, ‘previous eiforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted — Significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time. It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his “stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal | matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March t "SECRET Tero) Estladed free aetanatle Gowcgralaz asd Secsesificgtiay go01i2t 2 Fa As
14-00000 ARO atiND see ote Crete ee 8 abe : a , OLEAN Oe am Reta on, epee ae ls cme as 1951 to eariy 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fuliy acceptabie, it is not considered necessary to comment concerning all . . of the ‘remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be Limited in scope, The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole " Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN, He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs, Sorne 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits ‘ , ‘ to.Geneva." Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late i967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included a by 0 _ NOSENKO regarding ap roximately| 875 GB ottcers, {00 KGB agents, ‘ , "35 GRU. officers 2 and 400 other Soviet nationals. cw  B, GOOLAR ee * ae SeNeHT? POTTRAE TIIEN AraC CMETRTATAT STACY LT UATE RATATAT TNS CHOSE RMORT TEP NTie CATACH oe ee 48 fags SNR ss ROSEY : $ $ SENN SSR SOROS tia i SS oP verre 4
It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names . ‘of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENXO relates to the eariy 1950's period. In ad sition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews a E : and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelii- gence, personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period, : . : Page 52 of the above surnmary and other related pages question “whether NOSENXO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence , - ‘ ; , and even question his geographical knowledge of the area, Attached is a “| copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by ‘NOSENKO on 21 February. 1968 concerning his.assignment with Navy i a oe intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area, ‘The memorandum was .. completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate, NOSENKO nad previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fisnermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENCKO for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non- existent, A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the > , place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and : ro) “ that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen. saat eNO SeRERNes ENE Re Benton ORI “meter ary + Melee tap’. - ’ @ oe ‘ SSeS a BER OME ESB ce ‘ Te Ds SUTAPSTERA SES CHEE SENT EMOAT RSENS? % SEAR CARL SARA P TAB RG x ee uk Ae ECS REDS aay ORANG AM TERRE Bitbees reer,
14-00000 Nd ne Ug bine The previous summary a4:s0 stated that despite nis claimed active cornmissioned service in the Navy, NOSENXO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures, It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being.an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee an of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navye te Attachments: | List.of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO ‘Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO Pane Snare so atte dene bute, nae Boa : > yt a ee fous 6001124 cata ts s cae Pie a tae, Teena WeR Se th ast Tt wobec ey tou fy me tne is t 2 a 3 % &,
14-00000 ON keener meencd = WUC F454 en 4143 a deputy of chief of nacy Mm Ah Ga ag tndy é be, “ence, Thee a chet f if of nety aleltigtnce , blader he wid & a deputy sfioteif f i. fia ( Jezel dren a aad Jea a feelin), Jk tea of ke ad a a ary allacke t er le Aff _ tolled ; L, Lespeler ~ & metfe , em “cadke cag if hes peo, bile “tile eja pu be ep Elle, aa ts Sovak farbrers resco 4 457-196, ; x oS. be dates rss at iy “ty of chefs f A wey ipa a Shit (o om agewts) tn ATH | tA Eubakh -- — ae ofives ef lhe fete vihdtgtos, pocatl off os Clty Ces af Me YI Fbct in Sovittet.  Kakeriny nds destiat txA. So Chiles -~ & fat a colh a vawsh ae atedpatioet of. L frtecjn o ay, eit if The minigtey fill feaee, , se : a Curil: Sher a elruel | ti tot aevled athade Lpaetiaait aan fe OUCH aftacrs f tee ti ies 14 (fa Ae feel. ae a . |g Mencherks bE, Libeerr acy ulelliseace posi be intel pence | we fb poe: te Soviets, sab icer, eed | f bibiek a Aedseule - in Wht-Lve a military wtnche Posse tu Beth, Se Boll sh bial Jom oa hes ffl eel trad te Ue LEA, tones wher corer of frees - We Uecas? a } ee erctetee meee | ne mamemntin nn ne he wo came ge aa te 2 be bubpesin Lor KO lr arorbed bn Vie oe te Sallyere as fics vs gt i tert (oa Serb). ce fe 2. bebeshin 46 ecbuek, by ASD LG, ae bib if porsennel dipeatient | of: te heey buleCigruce . cnn BOUTA2S . . “| es fe teanonple = ts Lap) Sacked ‘inl p é ff lnlereal ionel eclatie p : TG (A abe ¢ Me co eg! ert epee, afr pad sot ternal tes beelinlEneses . Cala afte ee “ ieeeanbanareieaaiaied tay ‘XN
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ion a 7 . se ' a . ~ 4 , we. Wel ncker Inclear Se weg — a chan jeg é; f fete “f tite Le, “Meade &, Lt Hist tin sR, . ape ‘Hemaagkadg ~ a youctely a elacfl ¢ fey tufelizace tale Black see, WES : 2. Lepeye - om HB eegeneee ~ ftae Celned a4 Secor fffteer f Aewey a! wleblrjonee af 7 Jeet” ke GID -Sh [carbs a he sovrked te te Farteg} , {f, t Sctlorick ~ te LFLp. Lok st ce menini vedic f- jacy rudder detec lageit ofl voney sated este. ft He Fick, | | i wee oe Srishelaner - eu [fie t ee, “ied a ie Ups Let ysess a in fem achere tong eeoekl:: of. 7 a Te Tishle, ~ a rene nlite ty CHD a ipely eo lif if. h fetes ble! Leipoare op the miniebey of nileiry tng a i - a: desler hey Yara: - wvrds ty GRU, fue be eer thel flier, 7 mS Be boron ter A ifat he officer els any wale Cie ff Heck ‘eo LI, | ‘ ot, J. borentser fide LE - a bie. aebnicrnl a fosnece che pif: haces iuklliy ute i 2) epilegi fetal pmo i ie ed cf a ie -teed, Tate Licclen. ph et racrobeerprst Heyer, _AagEE TON inarayedorelye : . BS 4 eeshes” - ah flecr tf petsetuce , yi Pte. haney  ialeldipe ast, cf 9 ZTbet~ fy v3 4-83, Cues a chine. Je oy an fo . a a Tet ememeeteantnpmemacmaentnt Sens oie o soe ae + - LE ee eR OR em amon EMM 2 o: se fore i a et ere een ne eae ~ = wee ee ee cee ee ee ee ~ a ee t en en en ne ae ENT enna 2 ena rere etn tinny coments» 0 eto oot a Nd ee : a . we tienes Tt rae samen lie ant Hi Slaten Raie he Bett Seed’: ane?
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” oy 1 NOSENXO DID NOT ZNTER THE KGB IN THE : : MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED . x £ & ; vs . .. | | . | | | | vt e . : at : Esciaded frag scivas..t : ae ‘ nn woe Cyw2gi..2g 80d . SEOei DLR HIN Era 1 nl nr pH “ede of” tw kee, OE TR te erate 7 * oh rem em me meet ame wee ee . oo Oo . ; SEMAINE Sedov gnth: BEN
14-00000 ; wn erro et eens cent B. NOSENKXO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion) The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard . te NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chiei Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and tnat his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KCR J LOV. Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will net be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the Firet Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con= sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted. The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed ‘was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN. _— _ SECRET 0001132 Glee? 4 Excladed bem antouatic . dowagraciag ead gechrssification PRD con Dey, Ligh, SPetaday "eae EB eeare tase e" . . : oan 7 ‘ ' n 3
14-00000 cat ry : . » ‘ og WanUelona in 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to‘admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949, The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he. did not enter the KGB (MVD} under what are considered normal KGB procedures, Proper allowances were not a - given tor position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, '. and the influence.of General KOBULOV: An analyst can either accept or : '' xeject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through . -the influence of.General KOBULOV;.but,. if the statement is accepted, ‘then ithe failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal, KGB, procedures - : sw _should.also.be.accepted. _ A Communist society or.a Soviet intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD. te - The previous summary raises several points concerning the ‘ ha a . + * ‘ “eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD).’ It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, . . vhe was no more. eligible for a KGB.appointment in 1953 than he was at _the time of his previous rejection in 1950, This. statement is not contro- rete : and: is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO Soest eT tape ae | comune mere a ce e- me ~ Tsfatuk Suédien ME atta est . ‘ . . PAS tes AT RAE tS Ite lie bet wad enable, BEIM one meee fake Im a eu LE ad
-was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953 with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy to BERIYA. The previous summary also states that according to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statement which it is doubtiul any defector or series of defectors could fully oe eens TT . . -- te substantiate; namely,, that it neve? happened, Until and unless it is medically Proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, itis accepted i that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was ata sanitarium ==, vest. place in n Kubinka. | Iti is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB. ' vs ¥ a after mid-March 1953. The influence of XOBULOV could undoubtedly have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously ‘ had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated. The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks , and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning these-will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at this ‘time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB . ew (Mvp) as an officer: in mid-March 1953, .A comment was made that’ . o ae minstotecnenecanatatimoons ‘ams cme . a iw |e mite whan tenn see Fa ee eMiiagenle Meme REE ANTE, eatndle ete AME. oN ode geasented et ‘
. ed ome tt a 2 tem & NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection-with his processing jor KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influcnce of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not ccnsider the fact that. the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD). a The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent iniormation in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD. 7 ae . oe : would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry _ ef NOSENKO into.the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN | oo ! > wy oar | efa. The summary also states’ that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not . , te speak to an ersonn fficers or visit the ersonnel office. It would Pp ny personnel of P dice, ee ~ enema A arene seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he com-~ pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD). Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know.the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly a damage at ccOmrcRnED a soe a6 ces om seated na eek es oe [Poke oot ‘ TEENS LEARN
14-00000 entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While ‘ Le : NOSZENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second , “ . , j Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN unas stated this reversal of designations occurred in March 1953. ; / - aan | STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the . - ; ; MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June ee . a i 19535. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less _ than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV. was recently queried concerning the a ws ea a Bh po date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD,and SCD and places it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the MVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective cate of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the *CD, it is es unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation of his Directorate at the time of his entry into ‘the KGB (MVD). There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the. SCD. _- ‘NOSENKO is of-the opinion that it occurred undér: KRUGLOV, which is : : . 8 Fy, GOULL36: + Mat bac Sha geihe IU VATO GARB eat Rey fo - ‘ og i H . . wieme- eraman tutes morn Memes sine § etPteone tee ea a Rio ead SEARS
14-00000 in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and -} C. ee .GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for ; st the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is inerror. fiowever, the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of ccna a upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in ~ ne cee eee oe . this issue. . NOSENXO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the KI (Gommittee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason , a ° : to disbelieve this.statement. He is not aware of when the XI ceased to exist (1951 given ia the summary, but other information indicates the KI continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain 7 position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own . memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at | oe any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations were organized or ceased to exist. . | a SECRET . e . x ‘et “A - i : Pesnses > mee ena een ee ae eee ces esate one agy FNS WL Mee ETO es ste » 2B gant 7 Aetna = eee ~ > ° ew RT eth ty ote She te ate saesees
14-00000 saa toned fe) BRI Ge ARE GORE Oe te Ape AR RRO et cr x Le am wet The point nas also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when nis benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General XOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed.by an officer from the Personnél Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only. met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be ‘considered a member of the BERIYA group. x WTOC Nt” San So io EAE rg tin a6 AEC BB yet Lata a pcBigingn Tomer ot 2 Oy 1 saemee baie Lt cele BE ee ee N
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14-00000 SONA es mete ee mm a a z ke fae ~ of time,: together. with-his ‘knowledge of other. KGB. officers and his _ . ; 3 ; aan pom Po, to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transierred to some other component. The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since oO his father was advised ot his difficulties: in 1954 by an official of the Py ° KGB ane his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB. The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain ‘ , PS oA in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and ~ cad . was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This . wane is.a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO has stated curing previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon=- sible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news- paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced . officer.. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period - cr “GOOLL44 Wane MRL na Shoes any fe eel hfeda lye EN Nea tM aD cre VE ETE oe mere © Gaserames! EYEE any
information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept tne statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor- respondents was his assignment irom mid-March 1953 to mid-1954. From circa mid-195¢ until his transfer to the Seventh Depart~ 4 ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military’Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache - : + personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that : NOSENKO was an officer. of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955. period of time, that his primary work was against members undoubtedly left much to be desired. of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of hia work ° | In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the | Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the & & First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circurnstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if net undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of at epee Sn eS TL ee Ee T i eel ae ANP: penaiesiietapsn tiated ieee Gh bates
14-00000 Cn ee ee nd PERO ERED EE RRA, SRNL ENGEL INNATE A ESD SEITEN BEI IES IOS I TIER SO NEI AE A RITE IRIE EHF Ee gta nates et =o Pei -~ ts ri the Military Attache supports the claira of NOSEN?TO that he was an oificer oi the Firs? Section with the indicated assignment as rvelated by am. NOSEZENKO has stated that the work against the Military ‘ Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB would appear to be compietely plausible and NOSENKXO noted as exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Waiter MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches to Soviets in the United States in that peri NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the details corcerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time, it is submitted that this rnay be evidence oz his failure to satisiactorily fulfill his s 4 | 0001143 SECRET meee . nae - - oe - aS ete ns
14-00000 PAPAL OLR ATMEL BRP REL POEL Oo SOMA Revo muti meee neers Ate eat oot + heRkente eh Gire Sis y Were a ras Sate we be Oe wl ~ eo em ae 2 es 2 Sate ef og Me ae NGLONERG oe WERSGLO Lio. Bon comceraing i.e3e@ imciviteale, but < Toe 2 , tee és..gnid sanctiots, bal ve tes Lo allwaerce Tne the Uscevtah. Poe Ree. a Sta.us cf NOSED NDS waese octuel (ture on the KGB Wiaein jeoperd : NOI LaKG ane peoevewasly ancieated anc otill indicates a Gcianice : evoncerning iis assigned wrgeis during &PPTOraee LY . : Thio, SCCOTGING 6 NOSENKO, ‘ : saiislactory "characterization" was bein ; Gtcision was deing mace on Ais case, anc a period of.time in Wi KE 5 ‘went oma “big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 46 days andes Ausvital care Decause of the possibility of recurrence ci his :ccvicus wages 34 - 387 of the previous summary urnisned swJiicient decails about nls alleged agent acoverk toe wes wee Elhiaat the Military Attzches. Jt is considered that CSON. = as * 3 % Po wane CUsSTreni is. Prv.ewsS Gas sarn. & e i no « adequa.e accepiav! : amu ab o a * . t AM Oh: Ape EONS Bed a cclils uocmation concerning '. “LODINA : and “RADET.." (2,265). iweuld appear that wnere was no utc. by oo. ae Does = . oo , . . ele Whe OE WES REVET EL. ee ESO Y Gl PP OVIOL.. Can ae Peels oe et ¢ a6 @ & Cod pa Hi i pa Ni F e a 60041144" Pa ae ~. WOOP yreee oi Ope oval . satp hak eae ram aenmnred tine Mee TO ak
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; = Con : 2 | - { ‘ - 4 q@ On 3 Rd : . 5 y fo) ia — . fh hd bs 2 Lid . > ny A fa : NRE . 2 “ ° ” fz & . , bend } ye mt (« f: i . : tole © Q ay fo) ; ox : - . ee rel. . . ; . -o ey. hy fa 5 ; ; hr ne on af oo] mt 6 Lo Tn ee : 2 G fq - | - 4 a, . a FI i no, . ° oa “ . aoe he ee ai ee ep EEE Re ae casey mente cote HG ienenseiNNNNR so “SONAR Hen 8h Pe EEE AE FOOTE! .
SHOR NERY SUSE Suse Sa SHIRTS saguenasarensnes? cases states sats agyaartionegsty sera oy AHERN SERED xe cape senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chi Zoi, the Seventh Department, = American-Britigsh Commonwealth Section, (Previous conclusion) , D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a . The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh ‘ Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Sevenia Department from 1958 to December 1959, Bae ae NOIRE my EE at we nino artae ora eT During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive - information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department oe or rere during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject . of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally in- « volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI| Mg 0 0 in June 1956, contact with/Sir Allen LANE }endl Arthas BIRS in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of[Giseifa HARRIS fin 1958, the re- Vv, . cruitment of George DREW|in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of 6001148 Sas SECRET Gro? fy eo. Exctated Yea delaatic \ fe ee pbhipaaed i ® t vie cae . : q ‘ 5/64 PEAS BAY CAAT seek + lite Mahle ARs tt OS howe | pill me ORE ne OR be Oh Eee Ne Th emnecea te dee gts o
oo | (4 [Wittiam Stanley Wii BY jin June 1959, the recruitment of Davia TAYLOR] - inthe summer of 1959, the recruitment oi|Gerard MERTENS |in July = August 1959, and the recruitment of [frsene PRIPPED in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in whicn NOSENKO claims pexsonal invoivement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who 06, 06, OG [Sir ‘Allen LANE, gas PIRSE, Winiam Stanley WILBY, and was the KGB target. ohn TAY LO|werefBrtisietiizen and the other above-named indi- viduals werelUnite Preven citizens, This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common- weaith tourists in the USSR, in addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation againsi{Kearsie MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximatcly September 1955 to December 1955, (MALIA has not been interviewed and evill not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement ox personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved. gocit43 gyms cet tere wens cee Se ee a ee oe le mol tee a rc os 7 sho
14-00000 ee Det, , ’ QA BA 0 a new NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United States Government oiiiciais, inciuding Congressional represent- atives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when consiveored with the previously \ mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his . _imed service in the Seventh Department and work against American-b ritish Commonwealth tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period. NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not .vailable for operations against American and British tourists, This seems quite logical since the infiux of tourists into the USSR was jit in.a formative staze. NOSENKO has spoxen in detail about an agent network he de- veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRiGORIY" (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuais who were the subject of homosexual com- promise operations. The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard'to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of gou41159 NOSENKO, To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty “es ol ae ae a
14-00000 pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfiuous. Ii is considered that even ii the staternenis were accepted in toto, there woud still not be an adequate basis for 4 conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventa Department curing the period of late May 1955 - December 1959, Nor is it con- ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepied without quaiification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment ané which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification. On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter- intelligence officer responsible for the identification of forcign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit- ment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart- ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English- speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not'a KGB Gaedri wien 4 ; ‘SECRET | a 3s. Se
considered with the detailed information NOSENZO has provided on Seventh Departrnent personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not consigered to have any foundation in fact. Page 145 of the above surnmary lists eleven operations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1900 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against| Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Ob 08 bby 0b, D4, Ob, Db dp Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (inu} KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW] Marvin KANTOR,; Michael GINSBURG, and William Ob, 0 ‘i TARASKA\ The criticism made in regard to the above eleven casea was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded tne name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed.the activities of the Seventh Depart~- ment in 1962 following his return fromthe First Department. The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it snould be noted here that a fuil review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently availabie indicates that his Sen Seat NONEMRNU MPR TERE SPEIRS sR ptt tir ke gaHtKA ETE ATES, SOSA SEER! AEF ' statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes an are completely piausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost. necessitate a separate listing of the approxi- mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes. G0 OL152 SECRET
14-00000 eee Rete 8 me Whe DO During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including|Wiliiam . mam nes Seppe, apes pamemts 4 66 pb, 0b Ue DF TARASSHA, Bernare PeCHITAR, Micnaei: GINSBURG and John RUF a pe pop a It should aiso be noted that certain of the cases suchas Marvin KANTOR. and Wiliam TA RASKA| were cases in wnich the tourist was visiting G os 2 relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO haa given a satisfactory expianation of how he iearned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in ' discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Gommon- wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in tne USS-., the case automatically was assigned toa group of officers in the Section who reported directiy to the Chief of Section and were, not under the supervision of NOSENKO, NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the . 4 individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV' and 'GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual gou1153 FAB re we 7 SECRET 3 «.
14-00000 he was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information Was just roaintained for possible use at a later date if the individual revurned to ithe USSR, ob NOS@NKO has also explained how he learned of the[Patrick PRESSMAN land (Gerald By ER pases: and, the listing of the)Sofia O SHAT TAUER \case in connection with the 1955 ~ 1959 period is in com- plete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During ‘current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects ie very convincing. The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual, An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal, No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases, The summary also. noted that there was a question concerning whethez| Gisela HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case, re go01154 7 SFORFT TP sn soem RET ee SE OLE FELIS HO ERT OT OT OY HE
14-00000 Cor ef eeu This question seems quite superfiuocus since fia. | 38 in the USSR on a tourist visa and "reai" tourists are the respousiility of the Seventa Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an indi- vidual traveiing in the USSR is decidea on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i,e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member ‘of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a iormer diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a Ciplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as amember oi ihe Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending auniversity inthe USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has tne responsibility for a tourist case, These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman, In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest-to the FCD. e On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents inthe USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information Gd01155 oo 4) ry Lad poe ry Seer |
14-00000 a) ‘ S m althouga he dic then ane still suspects that William VASSALL waa the source, The references py NCSENKXO to tne KGB having such inior- . ® mation were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was : not until current interviews inat it was estabiisned that NOSENZO had ‘actually seen excerpts of information passe’ by George BLAKE. According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCG by the SCD and could only have come from an agent. 1 The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 C1A acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was iurnished by GOLITSYN following nis de- fection in December 1961). it was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 ~ 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter- intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB icentified no American Intelligence agents curing this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967. g001156 om
Maks eee” ra Ue eee NOSENKO Las never claimed to kiiow all activities against American traveiers in the Soviet Union curing 1958 -~ 1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in tne Seventh Departinent, other than the American-~-Britisn Common- weaith Section, or another Depariment in the SCD, NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view, NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an efiort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists nad been. compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and foliow- ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised, The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never béen reviewed with NOSZENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he waa aware had been prepared by tne Seventh Department for the FCD., NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the docurnent furnished by GOLITSYN, In current interviews, however, the descriptiqn Wi {MOSENKO 16
4-90000 CONT Tea GR met mae Cem St ew me ee “em eca nce mae Ned oe” tee e- : - . + ee ee RN Vee oe od - oan - =e . =o ° ~ . Pant : - - - al oy le a oe ween fe Ue datonerm mates Ae 26a tsaslercsan scare ae are pee aed Be Send WG ys wn wf Sree - ~ we - + wee, wars . cate butee UO he’ ewer, - te Bed eile es OL sete SUITING UP peer Ones ORemy nD Ores Maw cee8 Sa deeasen ) Wm camte tptewme Fem eel bl “7 ° “oe a a a a er rs a mi wim aa eter aS es GS eel of Poy e as eer wee Ce ee ed nS te SFE eee ann - eee wine * ee ied woe tl, ae fw em tp Tbe ew eth De Tee u tmonmer ly, ach beets O eke ere dae Ea bow | calewce my UU ee BO oe Sn ne ys we A ee - “0” eer ee ee vee tet oe foe eS ee rs wee En Fonte tYaveuing Ot ae re oe LOR Veo, GNC G&G Dore on at aad ~ con = ao Daan ty Ge tac Tourist 222..00% 04 the S& we ae oe eee "en + ene ~ wn TUDE fa tee oe Ste eawe oh whee OO LISS Go WEVELENS LG Wis tet ee gman sateen, . ope wwe tenes, tiem ee me fee ee ot foe Cagle meee sleet oe ate T00, DETSOLS Waveney Gia an VatinenOm OF & Soviet Sy Setewm ieee Teg Sees eee Thane el tm eV Domes, ChCe y SDG MOe HOw te BT BG ACW Concert Ban c u o Fonte ane he tered Paes ©] @ m4 ‘ th ge f o i ped mo me geen te on” a ne ca wae a ae a aes oat Oren f UT ESGAVEG PLOG.CI CD..stOesea G. ass aby NOSENES 24: ~ oy Oo ead OS BLS olated oui that, since lotetemeienote eel Pad ~ “4 ne “Rem - ts we tee ame nn snc a 2 x Joan SHUBIN|cia not Zave a valid United Siates passpovi setwees L750 , e-em, a4 fae wm fame wg at Oe Ee + Ene Gune Gui, it was imposs.ole coy Rim. to have been & tourist uncer ~ bee ne Zan ¥ ° a 7, rg os, = be % * ee TR ee trGe mame in the USSR anc, therefore, a target of tne Sevenva Dezirt- ment, 28 NOSZNKO claims. Altnough several avenues oc possisly gous158 fyultccl investigation Lave not yet been Sully exploved, there is no a OE a ~