(ros-tort0-10245] Fane” . c, Eo ge rr * aa ene ee ee a | Ny af MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Support Branch DATE: 1 July 1963 FROM. : Mr. Ramon R. Hart , ‘SUBJECT : Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa #210 838 1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS /MOB/PM, extension 6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials, including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concern- ing the "new program" for the exiles. Od. ver. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located | Maryland, had recently been arcu GO- VLE G Goes e-exLIES to serve as the meeting place for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed in the house to monitor their comments. 3- Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days. . The audio coverage was requested for this entire time, Mr. Matt " also said that the house would be retained for several more months “EF and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more =; times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably £E85 | be requested for these latter visits also. apt 4, Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr. ” . Matt that the coyert site was a private dwelling place in an ~---t expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two _ methods of making an audio penetration of the premises: | ABYURM i: ooo Backoround Cse Ok Do Not Fasradung
14-00000 ff) rt Oy rf trim Page Two #210 838 (a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, base~ ment, or garage, and using a voice-operated relay to actuate the recorder, (b.) With the use of directories, search the environs of the safehouse for the purpose of locating a potential listening post where radio transmissions could be monitored. 5 After checking with Mr. Joseph Tangan, Acting Chief, Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises would be impossible and that the only method. would be the use of @ transmitter and a nearby listening post. 6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of .the covert site eh —t (#57 328), ‘Maryland, to be @ Staff employee. Through telephone Information, I located the Langley Headquarters Building and personally contacté in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr, that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood whic ed to "pug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of an tion @m him for us to set up a listening post Mr’ xplained that he was scheduled to depart for on a PCS assigument in approximately a month bir é WO glad to make his home avai listening post. He confided that his primary mission im B to be the audio! 6 penetration of thd| d_so he would look ira uf forward to the neiv-ween so uperatiums ui ais home as valuable training. The next step I took was to set up & meeting among George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS ; and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the SECRET oh
14-00000 } SECRET .- Page Three #210 838 audio surveillance appeared to: be technically feasible since I had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter" to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive equipment; Mr. Halpern mist arrange for TSD to transfer this equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem after he would make a few telephone calls, I then returned to. my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to contact in TSD to obtain it, 03 7. After checking with Mr. le the Audio Opera- tions Branch of TSD as to a t and after check- ing through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD, I selected the following: Iwo voice-operated relays, QSC~2, $2,200.00 $1,100 each Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 = 1ho 550.00 MCS, SRT-6H, @ $275 each Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops., 50.00 UWB-7, $25 each Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2 F 1.08 $ . 54 each One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A~30 1.87 $1.87 each TOTAL $2,802.95 8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from Mr. John W. McBee, extension aks, of TSD, who told me that every~ thing had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any
14-00000 iN rm OQ It] | _ Page Four #210 838 equipment necessary for this operation, Mr. McBee directed that I £111 out a Form #88 and have the technicians hand carry it to the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed from Mr. Halpern that he would. arrange it so that TSD would turn over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88, listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the SAS Cost Center #3132-5455-3400, was completed and returned to me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach, who drove with it immediately to the Franconia Depot. I called ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to meet Mr. Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had eyer had any experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list. Mr. Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request. 9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment. I; received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the $2,802.95 for the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr. Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment with the Form #88 y» but that if we needed anything else, I would contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse, but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee. If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor Artime was going to be the only person living in the house after each day's discussions were completed ~ no Staff employee would be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Artime would be W) ri] 7] | a a ne -4
14-00000 W) ni ne ri | u Page Five #210 838 holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a micro- phone installation to cover the whole house if possible. 10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to pick up the radiations from the two SRT=6H transmitters. It was suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to be used to commmicate during the installation between the listening post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them and relied solely on telephonic commmications. The "A" and "B" batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4 receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters, A report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of the DFO agents. 11. The first test of the SRT-6H from the safehouse to the listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the ‘receiver, 2/10th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the distance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post P and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations. 12, When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-7 transmitters. I telephoned Mr. Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a possible furor within SAS. Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up. An opportunity to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because epee having foreign visitors in for cocktails fuuiehesie t on. But the equipment was installed and tested the next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily. SECRET (#2