Tiod-10088-10035 rae a | SUBJECT Review of the ee — oT Lee Harve rding Allega- a SECRET Semonoeng tions of CASTRO Cuban vement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination ce ee ‘Letter by David W. “Belin to. . o Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April 1975, ae paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement a by . CASTRO, etc. dee attached . REFERENCE BACKGROUND i. ‘On. “Saturday evening, 7 7 Septenber 1963, Fidel CASTRO appeared ata Brazilian Embassy rece tion in Repepanegigaretatr RAO RANE R EIA ER ET RINT PEE ee ET Tite Ne 2 Ts Havana; even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to. an informal | interview by the Asso ied Daniel HARKER. — ve PROG - AACE TONT OTE TD, Ze HARKER's interv Bi TE. on ‘sunday, 8 September, and was in. print ‘throughout the county on Monday, 9 September. “there can ‘be no question from the ' facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been _ expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this - event ‘represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States. meson p TELE IELTS O AEE OTT LE LEED OL I OE CE ITIL IO IIT TEE TEA SEITE ESOC, e SECRET {19 co erm ere ED SEE TEEPE SERED OA SP IE SCTE Pe emt ones one ae nee: Rm nee Coe rR ARETE ERRTNRE RH RNe SECORRIAREED SESE + ape + Sr ED crs LONGMAN rieaebiiea tar aesnnenncn See * Cn ae
14-00000 ae . ' all time ... . SECRET 3. CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a ange of. topics but dealt principally with American political — “a leadership,. in particular President KENNEDY , whon he ee ~— aces . — coriated in extraordinarily provoca jon . os (" ... KENNEDY is Coretine >" eee the BATISTA of his a times ... the most ot REIN OOUCTION ™ President of 4. The interview -PROMSTED: unconpLinentary . _ reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing os _ the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the - New York Times and Washington papers, with a result ‘that. CASTRO's "message" was significantly modulated. a 5. In New. Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided as until the middle of September 1963, the HARKER story Poke ‘appeared in. the principal mornin gg paper,..t the Limes-Ricay une, 7 on Monday, 9 Sentember;—page-7, under. a three-column head~ line: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on ‘Cuba. Says. U.S. “headers 2 - imperiled by Aid to Rebels.” The story followed under. ‘the HARKER by-line: | elle Be "Havana (@P) = an Fidel. castro said Sa "leaders would be in danger if ‘they helped - in any attempt to do’ away with leaders of a OO a Cuba.' ® : el SECRET Cc» oO ON CG O Cc) PAGE en : ‘ - wt Shem eee tear sea cam Sp scent ne ORT Rs TEPER EASED EE SE SE a-nation eee eer ESTE . . COPY NO. 7 7
14-00000 used a UPI wire. servi ® vil RGMAOTED any reference : by ve . to the warning and. ial Ww " 2G "*The U.S. is always ll to ED ete significance. The Washington Post did an ‘abbreviated re SECRET ee “Bitterly denouncing what he called , recent U.S. prompted raids on “Cuban terri-~ tory, Castro said: "We are prepared to + ight them and answer in- kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terror- ist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they .F themselves will not be safe." e+. World affairs .s. seemed to be . te ; - _ - oS - . - entering a more aie st ys: 4 on oe 7 ago, but now this NIE ws a : and make promises which later it will not ‘honor. . This has happened to promises made during the 700: ce " October crisis. They have been broken as can ae be seen with new attacks. = "'But I warn this is leading to a very woe ie dangerous situation that could lead to a wore . crisis than PR ee . 6. The New vou we REPRODUCTION... on 9 September, ch- “gave the interview ‘its ‘real. write (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted " any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO*s remarks. SECRET cy co c rm ar oh) (+2) med pace 03. 63. op 188. ‘COPY NO. et eters assem nek ne cas Hoan
14-00000 oR 7 (“SECRET ~ fhe Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed_ the HARKER | “story nearly in its entirety in. the second section of, the paper (9 September 1963, page B-4) and reworded the content. os of the HARKER interview, placing the emphasis on the pow litical aspects - in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER a following up leads or in dealin S with the Warren Commission and its staff although Mexico Station S ecifically directed jeadquarters attentio othe AP_story very shoutly after ‘the Dallas killing. More important, ‘the interview appears | a request, is to “REPRE rrr activity « on. m the assumption that as ) r= which we know on elements and burying seer EytoNr United States: oe 7 . leadership in the mi —— oot reariill 2. ‘There is “no evidd _ assassination that this CASTRO interview was considered » ms ed _to have been forgotten in- the ‘contemporary political ‘consid- an eration of relations with CASTRO" s Cuba. There is. no ieviaions in ‘the Agency records, either, ‘that ‘the Warren Commission | staf Ttself pursued the implication ‘of the CASTRO interview! aa in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There ; is no ae evidence in the files that anything along these Lines was stated by any other Cuban leader beforé the assassination. cae 8. _ The > Purpose of this xeview, undertaken at Mr. ‘Belin’ s oe from testimony of Mar DIG : EO ~ he read ‘the - . CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results . . aa - a aS SECRET 902688
14-00000 | —  L | C.. s ECRET of “the review, admittedly heavily using the 20-—-20 “quality . - of hindsight, may be stipulated in ‘summary: | ae There is no increment of credible — <a eee etree EEE TT CIO evidence, applying this phrase st¥ictly, of | EES SaaS! Soviet and/or Cuban political, Intelligence or security service involvement in the as- sassination to what was developed and con- sidered by the Warren Commission and its | teen eeneeemenneeenneenennane aaa, staff. The Cominission’ Ss ‘finding ‘that. Pos a _ Lee ‘Harvey OSWALD was: ‘the killer of President aa a Officer. TIPPIT and dia S a - them in alone ae stands. San be 8 can POOMIDITED... “upset | or significantly modify this judgement ’ : . : so4 : toy 2 Sh cmon aereintee sine om eta gatrneete 2 en Ne a REI ene mie IA enti eM rhe + 4 AN EE ® . did (ana does) not exist ‘in Washington. — But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren aa Commission ° were minimal - “in \ quantity and - quality, designed to, cover ‘up any, admissions Of knowledge of, or ‘connection with, OSWALD - Be which might be. related directly or indixectly cy Ae with the assassination. ©. “Therefore, the belief “SECRET - PAGE 65 of 100" COPY NO. een ee cet ee os pgeemerme a emp ne tee dee yeeros
14-00000 ‘eo . —¢ weer” e . . t -s . SECRET i= grow until there has been a full disclosure _ by these governments of all elements of EAB ROT TOE BY OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren SD Fn should, have ve left a = . indeed, was the o ing level, a particularly in A com- oo ponent in ‘the cIA in. 1964. was indicated wider "window 00 by Mr. Helms. in his testimony before the “Warren Commission, CIA would continue to no -xyegard this aspect of the OSWALD case as )..~ still open.” , | Se Ce in the absence of additional or new elements of "credible" evidence, there are “nuances” in the record that emerge as note- “worthy, in the light of other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item- 4 - - - 7 September 1962 PROG BITEB ca rea 7 - : Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Hearings, Vol. V., pp. 120 - 129. See especially p. 124 —-""Mr. Helms: ‘Yes. I would assume —__. . the case could never be closed.*'" oe SECRET  — - |. ,.
14-00000 it in New Orleans - must be considered of great ‘significance in the Light of the > pathological evolution of OSWALD’: Ss passive/ — aggressive ara kill | General WALKER “? and his - identification with Pune ie BIEN. the ‘Cuban revolution which is directly trace- able as far back 3 as his Marine Corps , | service in El Toxo, California. CASTRO" s a - ‘warning and threat, given to AP corres- a - pondent HARKER, | irrespective of whether there was any formal mandate, or “even. security service’ contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the Russians - ‘was an act of singular irresponsibility and under no “cixcumstances was. excusable as retorsion for what the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963. CUBAN CONTACT WITH, NTA ne MTOR EARLY 1959 (?) ; | _ fe 9. The testimony ‘BROOD = contains an assertion | of germinal significance to any review of the packground of - Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling “toward and relations with CASTRO'S Cuba. . DELGADO | was } probably the closest peer group SECRET.
14-00000 - | — . Po "owt SECRET. “member to OSWALD during his specialist. training period | at El Toro Marine Corps Base December 1958 - September 1959. ‘The Warren Commission Report takes note of this: "OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in’ touch with Cuban > diplomatic officials in this country, aaa to be ‘one of his 1 | believed. rea PROHEITED - 10. “Actually ‘DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than | is reflected by the . language of the report, and its. implications. do not appear . to have been run down or developed d by investigation. Thus mn the record of the beginning of OsHALD!s. xelationship_ with Seaaenetenennnemnsammnaanmaaaalal the Cubans starts with a questi nmark. oO 2 7 . Ll. The period was one of transition in U.S. - “Cuban. -xelations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particu~. larly keen about how to —_ ‘the . island. DELGADO testi- . a e eee I di ROL Ml nam, so. se z told him: the PHBE was to Report to the President's Commission on the Assassination - of President John F. KENNEDY (Washington, +1964), hereafter — cited as Report, p. 687. 2 “SECRET. oSth _ foe) op) | PAGE of ~. COPY NOs ae ee Sempre Mr RD: et oie
14-00000 . a . ey FO | SECRET re get in touch with a Cuban Embassy you ‘know. © But at that time that I told him this - we | were on friendly terms with cuba, you know, so this wasn't no subversion or malintent, poet sade sin | contact with them eos. ee rs | " 1... I seen this envelope in his moor locker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to. him, and they had an official seal on it, and an as - far as t could recollect that. was mail from. one Los, Angeles, ana he was telling me there was | a Cuban Consul. And just after. he started - _ receiving these letters - you see, he would — . _ never ge out, but stay near the post all the - veo ARPRONICTION ane receiving letters ; br It was os _ aman, because I got the call from. the MP guara shack, and they, gave me a call that - OSWALD had a. visitor at the ‘front gate. ns man had ‘to be a civilian, otherwise they would — have let him in. So. I had to find somebody to = “relieve OSWALD, ‘who: was on quard, to go ‘down - oe 5 EC RE . covets , 86 a 63 286 ot ae eee ge
14-00000. SECRET ee soon there to visit with this fellow, and they spent . about an “hour and a half, two hours, talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the || man was or what they talked about, but he looked a nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who iT pes nothing. — oe ve nnn OSLER him, do you oll oS eo "Mr. “DELGADO : Abate il aired. half, Spor . two hours eve "Mr. LIEBELER: You never asked OSWALD - who this fellow was. that, he talked to? "Mr. DELGADO : - No. No ... "Mr. LIEBELER: Did you connect this visit | - that OSWALD had at that ‘time with the Cuban Consulate? hardly ever received mail; in: fact he seldom ~ received mail from home because t made it a. policy, I used ‘to pick up ‘the mail for | our unit | and distribute it to the guys in there, ana very - seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, after he started to get in ‘contact with — a oe ue a og SECRET PAGE “COPY NO. "Mr. ae ee i . ; ee eee "PRO a rg er at such a me Be late date - time. *? PROHIE The time he a 10 oe ceeptercirimeen penne gr ° ; . + serene ereenrerrinehtestterei-tese-sneabneieser testes PS ASEM : . $s eS EPEC ra ET ST TEP eat ge tte ete AF eFC e eye 8 tee ‘, : 0s eects eter amet Sates NEE 2 orem FoR Meat er oerip On ee menwen ame st wt te . 186
a | . SECRET a _---- ++ these Cuban people, he started getting letter | pamphlets and newspapers a oe * wee and he also started receiving letters, “you know, and no books, maybe pamphlets, you |. ‘know, ene ttee REPROD] church, | you ‘know, “P it wasn'ta "Mr. LIEBELER: id -" Spanish, any. of them, do you know? ‘from: "Mr. DELGADO : Not that I can a recat Ps - no. : oe a oH mr. LIEBELER: Did you | have hae to believe that. these things came to OSWALD a from the Cuban. Consulate? a ; . “Mr. DELGADO :— Well, 2. took it for granted ree that tt they did a after I seen ‘the envelope, ‘you nee KnOW «oe something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive ‘seal,. you know. | They had aif- 7 ‘ferent colors on it, red and white; almost - looked like our colors, you know. But I can’ Tt © recall. the seal. iene Latin, : eee oe hs ce United, ‘something p - I couldn't under ie FR aS stand. It was Lat ROR IBITED Ee. "Mr. LIEBELER: “You don't know for sure- whether it was from the Cuban Consulate? oo _ Lo _ “AL SECRET TA gh 88 “pace ft of. —_—_ - COPY yo. a emeervare-eoms oer: sects pee nt AAS RFE OTC ETT ttt ESSE SD IEA reentrant seit CSL TE PIEE : a ecco einpen mee an te @ sve sereentnern fsreniten meeemnetnt ts em ae Sense aR OH & if
14-00000 . _< SE cre T . "Mr. DELGADO oa No. But he had told me re prior, just before | a found that envelope. in bis ‘wall locker, that he was. receiving mail from a " them, and one time he. offered to show it) to wwe, but I wasn *t much interested because at the. oo “time we had “REPRODUCTION: ask to see that paper again, you know. — NG correspondence with ‘the Cuban Consulate was "Mr. LIEBELEH u what his: about? ci “Mr. DELGADO : No, he didn't. "Mr, LIEBELER: | ‘Did he ever indicate to you: that it had to do with the conversations that —— . you had about going over ‘to Cuba? . - a Mr. DELGADO : | “No. . The only thing he —o ‘told. me was that. right after he had this con- o = i"  yexsation with the Cuban people was that he was | : going to ~ once ani ROBUCTION ~ - he _ [ was going to MEDS ee 3 12. OSWALD's SPROUL amie cottese, Ope churwalden, Switzerland, | was dated 9 March 1959, ana he &, was presumably to report. there, on. 20 ‘April 1960. ‘Destined for discharge from the Marines | on 7 December 1959, OSWALD 3. } Z —_ i Hearings, Volume VIII, pp. 241 - 243. 0 ® . “SECRET PAGE Te of 186. Peres en ae ce aps ss
14-00000 accelerated his exit on grounds of family hardship. in early cM  - SECRET : : 4 September 1959. On 27 September 1999 he was issued a U. S. passport valid for travel ~ among other places to oe Cuba and the. US SR. He entered the Soviet Union from - Finland on 15 SOWETO | ; Soe 13. DELGADO's te B of RIED of credibility. - -_ ce to focus attention Granting that, it is 0 on the. male visitor who contacted OSWALD at El Toro Camp = *... and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO' s recollections, and actually there is nothing like it - on the record - in everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States before or after his return to the United States. ' The record reflects - . no identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO's presump- -tion is that he was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the questions are: Who was it, and was . there reporting: from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana that could, in effect, represent the opening of a Cuban file on oswap?4 » PREDICTION" OF ell PRODUCT a. BY COMMUNIST PARTY CELL LEADER * ORO TITE rer. 1962 0 : 14. Guatemala Station Joo! Le Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a 4 : u.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961. : % an a 13. SECRET race _/3 of 186 COPY NO. de ene oe Minted nh bg NGM GREED VEE Se 2 p07 UR epg reer e-em orenerteeerthiettetieeneteeeppennnte SAA TT.
14-00000 GECRET “  o& oy ‘penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the - . yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, _ 15. ‘This report PPC had been discounted when * “it was received and was 2 comic the Station’ concluding with the ‘admonition: * cee gust! wait and" you | Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatamala should form a single new party; "We need not me preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President SRENNEDY. because we know, according to: prognostications, that he! won aie within te ARE RODE TION xre~reviewed all ‘of its material after the assassination. - The file reflects no follow-up or. formal dissemination of the report. | go). ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE HAUGE, ‘7 NOVEMBER 1963 ns eee 16. A a mettin ol reporting after ‘the os KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet zeception a on 7 November 1963, ‘the Cuban Third Secretary, _ oo Oates ws Ricardo L. SANTOS Pasa, discussed the recent refugee | raids _ on Cuba and their implications with @ host-country diplomat, : will see what we REPT (oni soon.” . Asked to be more specific wh ANTOS: replied: "Just wait, ‘just = PRORIBITED OSE 17. These data were ; passed to ‘the Warren Commission 7 oe by memorandum, 31, March "1964. “SANTOS | was s reported to” have "44 - : SECRET
14-00000 SECRET ° ae a history of medical instability and was summarily | recalled S ttmaneaemeere cee from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that Fact oo in April 1966. INTERCEPTED p cowandaH Fm REAR Ns EMPLOYEE ¢ oe LUISA CALDERON, AFTER NEE 1963 . 18. At 1730 vente AUT ED. : five hours after the. KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named _ "Luisa® received a telephone call in 1 Spanish fom an vuniden - tified male outside. ; “now; t that makes ‘three [she Laughs], what barbarians! .2." 19. The caller asked her aif ‘she haa heard the latest _ “news. “Luisa” jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, x knew feel it almost before KENNEDY | eee Imagine, one, “two, ‘three and os ‘20. Both speakers" agreed on the seriousness, of the 2a assassination. “Luisa” also stated, ‘that the party, at Silvia DURAN's had been callea off sO it would not appear Be doctor fa woman) frien that. they were ‘celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would | they have the party coincide with the burial. ‘Finally she said she planned to SSH < of a - ‘21. Latin hypexbold! st facto suggestion of foreknowledge? | This: is the only, item in the intercept: arene that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation. | coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the. ‘assassination | “ SECRET we ds eee mnmecnne wea comipammemiana.ae 6 6:7 seen mit stem tent) ettnerinienenites Spe snemanpeetiie ee sens sites Hes tata et 2s Hen OY a we AA Mle HON Ne eS Hm .
14-00000 7 as SE CRET. 22. The tenuous, enignmatic character of-the-conversation®. °_ is sharply highlighted by the following facts: a. "Luisa" was probably identi ith Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban ee Directorate Gene fall of 1963 was, headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 Septenber 1963, formally | ‘as the replacement of the consul, Eusebio. AZCUE (departea 19 Noveriber 1963). The deputy | DGI. chief (and as (of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Engenio ‘VEGA Perez. — - c. The “Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa’ so conversation ° was the receptionist, a . Mexican | national, who dealt with OSWALD during his known visits on 27° and 28 Septenber to the Cuban Anstaliation§ 3 in connection. with | a Cuban se ee Silvia DURAN is’ en. ‘the : aaa oe : _xecord regarding of OTE oe oo ron Mexico City. Her testimony, neo in its entirety was. taken, and presented, solely, by the : Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct e ceureee : 16 ot 186 PAGE