TOt Sere tei t avawee SS OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE H WASHINGTON 25, D.C. SENSITIVE 25 July 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Subject: Review of Operation Mongoose This is the Operations report at the end of Phase I. It has been compiled to assist you in reviewing Operation Mongoose thus far and in determining the best course of U.S. action for the future. This Operations report contains the contribution of each major participant, on objectives, on the planning and operational activity to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be soverned by the policy framework. <A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-2-62) is being submitted separately for consideration in connection with this report. , As. Chief of Operations, I am indicating in this covering memorandum what I consider to be the most significant aspects of our policy and program picture. The full report of each major partici- pant is appended, to ensure that you have access to the exact reporting © as submitted. . OBJECTIVES As desired by higher authority on 30 November 1961, the U.S. 2 2 undertook a special effort "in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist . regime."' After a review of operational planning and programming con- cepts, the Special Group (Augmented) provided guidelines on 14 March 1962 for Phase I, Operation Mongoose (roughly until the end of July 1962). The main objectives were seen as: a. The acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Excluded from automatic regrading: DoD Dir 5200.10 — does not apply. EXCLUDED FROM GDS HW 542714 DBocld: 32977056 Page ?
s—- Dl Nees I b. Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention. c. Be consistent with U.S. overt policy, and remain in position to disengage with minimum loss in assets and U.S. prestige. d. Continue JCS planning and essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention. ACCOMPLISHMENT Elements of the U.S. government were organized to reach the goals set for Phase I. My assessment of where we are on each . objective is noted under appropriate sub-headings below. In general, this has been a remarkably quiet operation, well within the "noise" and "visibility" limits imposed. Higher authority has been kept informed of progress through the Special Group (Augmented), by frequent reports. The Special Group has provided policy guidance, as required, in Phase I. The Chief of Operations has coordinated the efforts of participa- ting departments and agencies, through meetings of the Operational Representatives and by constant review of progress. The Operational Representative of each major U.S. participant in Operation Mongoose are William Harvey (CIA), Robert Hurwitch (State), Brig. Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USIA). My assessment of the organization, planning, and actions to reach the goals in Phase I: Intelligence. CIA had the main assignment to acquire the "hard-intelligence'' desired. The headquarters and field staff of CIA are now well organized for a major effort for this aspect of Operation Mongoose, being strengthened by a number of CIA officers experienced in "denied area" operations elsewhere in the world. Planning and actions rate superior, in a professional sense of intelligence collection. | Jd& ‘CIA established the Caribbean ission Center at Opa-Locka, . Florida,/and an interrogation activityJin Spain. fIt undertook a priority |. 4 ibae Gove) -FOP-SECRET- bia pep WW 54214 Docld:32977056 Page 3
HW 54714 plan to collect information on the target from third country areas in Latin America and Europe. Inside Cuba, the recruitment and place- ment of third country nationals and initiation of Cuban collection nets, particularly in urban centers, has made Operation Mongoose numeri- cally the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state. However, the effort in more remote provincial areas of Cuba, where guerrilla resistance was expected to be spotted, recruited, and organized, was short of the hoped-for goal; this was due to the regime's security precautions and, to some degree, to policy limita- tions on the risks to be assumed. Defense contributed the majority of personnel to staff the Caribbean Admission Center, stepped-up SIGINT collection under NSA despite changes and improved sophistication of Cuban communication procedures, and brought into play the available assets of Service intelli- gence organizations, in coordination with CIA. State stepped up its information collection from diplomatic and refugee organization sources. Justice (FBI and INS) and USIA provided significant support to the Caribbean Admission Center. Political. State appointed a representative to devote full-time to Operation Mongoose and to develop the required political actions. During Phase I, the Punta del Este conference was a major U.S. political action to isolate Castro and neutralize his influence in the Hemisphere, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. The successful visit of President Kennedy to Mexico was another major U.S. political action, with a potential impact upon our special goals, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. Two Operation Mongoose efforts in political action were attempted in Phase I: to counter Castro-Communist propaganda exploitation of May Day and to arouse strong Hemisphere reaction to Cuban military suppression of the hunger demonstration at Cardenas, in June. Ambassadors in Latin America were asked to undertake a special effort, as possible, with the help of their Country Teams; political action results in both instances were mostly negative, due to lack of capability and the local attitude in Latin American countries. . State is responsible for refugee political policy matters, assisted by CIA in daily liaison. This is an area of major interest to Operation Mongoose, since the Cuban refugees have an open objective of over- throwing the Communist regime in Havana and recapturing their homeland. FOP-SECRET DoclIda: 32977056 Page 4
HW 54714 They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of "audibility" and "visibility" apply directly in considering the handling and use of this dynamic refugee potential. As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the understanding that any real Political F program must be developed by the Cubans themselves. Psychological. Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U. S. government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly; USIA disseminates any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service) and generates "gray" or non-official information (5 million cartoon books and thousands of Spanish books on Cuba disseminated in Latin America); CIA passes information appropriate for "gray" and covert psychological channels (radio, mailings to Cuba, and dissemination inside Cuba). Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the Cuban people, but short- wave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S. competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference ‘of U.S. commercial broadcasts over a fairly wide area of the U.S. Clandestine broadcasts from a submarine (appearing as broadcasts by Cuban guerrillas inside Cuba) have been initiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and get passed among Cubans by word-of-mouth. Dissemination of leaflets ‘and propaganda inside Cuba by balloon or aircraft has not received policy approval. Economic. State has the main responsibility for developing economic actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated DoclIda: 32977056 Page 5