JFK Assassination System Date: TTH2015 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10138 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER: = 07-M-43 _ Document Information ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: COMMITTEE REPORT: THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY DATE: 00/00/1975 PAGES: 170 SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORT KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; iC CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/21/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 353 vO} HY 50955 Docld: 32433526 Page 1
08/07/95 1 as % 2 ® JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION SSCIA 157-10014-10138 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE 07-M=-43 A ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS eo 08 26 8 so ea of 20 8 OF #6 bf OF Be DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCIA COMMITTEE REPORT: THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY 00/00/75 170 SSCSGO,: REPORT KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION REPORT TOP SECRET REFERRED , POSTPONED IN FULL 01/05/99 CCBOX 353 [R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 2
COMMITTEE DRAFT: “CHE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND J 7 / THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY" “4 | i 3 Table of Contents I, Il. Iffl. IV. V. VI. HW 50955 Docld: 324253526 Page 3 Introduction Interest of Intelligence Community in Oswald Prior to the Assassination The CIA's Role in the Investigation and the FBI's Assassination Investigation The 1967 Investigation of Allegations of Castro's Connection with the Assassination Discussion Appendixes a ant NN Pe a ace
INTRODUCTION - Legally, the assassination of President Kennedy and the - subsequent murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, the suspected assassin, was within the jursidiction of authorities of the State of Texas. ‘But many Americans were questioning how a President could be assassinated despite the vast’ U.S. intelligence apparatus. Many were also openly skeptical of the FBI's stated findings that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted alone. Congress and the President felt that public concern could only be assuaged by what they believed was a thorough and independent investigation of the assassination. Two resolutions were submitted in Congress calling for congressional investigations into the circumstances ‘surrounding the assassination: The State of Texas set up a Commission for the same purpose. President Johnson, in establishing the Warren Commission by executive order on November 29, 1963, preempted the field. “The President's publicly stated reason for establishing the Commission was to ‘ensure a thorough and independent. investigation ‘of the circumstances surrounding the assassination.'' In that the only investigations of the assassination on record were the invest- igations that had been conducted by the Dallas Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation -- and taking into account the public criticism and skepticism directed at these two agencies -- it can be inferred from President Johnson's public statements that the Commission's investigation was to be independent from the HW 50955) Rentass242352f cBagerHe Commission's report noted: "Because of the
numerous rumors and theories the public interest in insuring the truth could not be met merely by adopting the. reports or the - analysis of Federal or state agencies." When. it began work in earnest in. mid-December, .the Commission was supplied with a.tremendous number of reports: from various Federal and state agencies. By far the greatest number of reports — emanated from the FBI; of particular importance was the five volume, December 9, 1963, Report summarizing the Bureau's immediate post assassination investigation. Subsequently, the Commission requested and received the field investigation reports upon which the December 9, 1963, report had been based. The Commission stated in its report: As these investigative reports were received, the staff began analyzing and summarizing them. .The members of the: legal staff, divided into teams, proceeded to organize the facts revealed by these in- vestigations, determine the issues, sort out the unresolved problems, and recommend additional investigation by the Commission After reviewing the accumulating ma- -terials, the Commission directed numerous ‘additional requests to Federal and State agencies. (Report, p. xii) The Commission's Report also states: Because of the diligence, cooperation, and facilities of Federal investigative agencies, it was unnecessary for the Commission to em- ploy investigators, other than the members of the Commission's legal staff. (Report, p. xiii) 1 | t - 1 Ly * ' HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 5
With only isolated minor exceptions, ‘the entire body of factual material from which the Commission -drew its findings was supplied by the intelligence community, and, primarily, the FBI. Even when material - was provided by an agency other than the FBL, however, the record reflects that the agency usually first checked with the Bureau before supplying information to the Commission. Moreover, FBI memoranda indicate that CIA and Secret Service “personnel reviewed Director Hoover's Commission testimony prior to the testimony of their respective agency head, for the stated purpose of “ensuring that there were no conflicts in testimony." Thus, by its own admission, the Commission was dependent upon’ the intelligence agencies for the facts. As a second step, “the Commission and its staff did analyze the material and fre- quently requested follow up agency investigations. However, if the Commission did not initially receive any evidence on a parti- cular point, the second step would obviously not -be reached, and the Commission's findings and conclusions would necessarily be drawn without the benefit of any information on the omitted point. ‘The Select Committee's investigation of alleged assassination attempts against foreign leaders raised questions as to possible connections these plots and the assassination of President Kennedy. and as to whether information about these plots was provided the Warren Commission. Thus, in accordance with its mandate to review the performance’ of the intelligence agencies, the Select Committee established a subcommittee of two Senators to investigate the role of thoseragenc kes in-events .leading..up | . ‘to the assassination of the Presiden ~ arid in the ensuing investigation. see PSY Noe ast ‘oot ett . HW 50955 Docla:32423526 Page 6 Rakes Sime sas A, tas
“Given the tremendous volume Hc BBA uy eepgyinverss gence Pr er relating to the assassination, the subcommittee, with limited staff and time, could. obviously not attempt to duplicate the work of the Warren Commission. Instead building | on ‘the other work of the Select Committee and utilizing its access to the agencies and its expertise in their function, the subcommittee examined how those agencies reacted to the Warren Commission" s investigation «a “It must be remembered that the purpose of chesZommittee's inquiry was to allow for an evaluation of the performance of the intelligence agencies (both prior and subsequent to the assassination) and the process by which information was provided to the Warren Commission. Deas SSion 1s: Cf ona It should also be remembered that all of our intelligence agencies were operating under tremendous pressures after the assassination. Literally thousands of persons contacted the CIA and FBI within days of the assassination, offering information which they believed to relate to the assassination. Much of the informa- tion so provided was irrelevant or of doubtful reliability. The agencies failure to. follow,a given lead or adequately investigate a leadfunder these circumstances, ts=in-mosteinetanees-underttundakte, The'xtommi ttee is not now attempting to look back with twelve years of hindsight and criticize these agencies. Nor is our discussion of the assassination ‘investigation intended to minimize the agencies’ tie Waal id. ae ral 7 “ob be + oe Fi te ot HY 50955 Docld:3242735276 Page *
extensive assassination investigation. The following report of the subcommittee details the evidence developed by the subcommittee's review of intelligence agencies in connection with the assassination of President | Kennedy. It seems clear that a: atisfactory explanation of the assassination may never be lpossible. Doubts will probably continue; and all weergeie M ompane never be answered. ea raft The subcommittes! agence t lial in Heal fits =e waa’ Avan UF — to impeach the process De which t ve conedecion ree eE a phe pygoess Mth ta~ CBPAVAEGELOIA « It. Ls “the thegn ee s recommendation that this evidence. impeaching the process of the investigation, should be further explored. For, if the intelligence agencies cannot be relied upon to investigate fully and to report candidly to a specially constituted body like the Warren Commission, then there is doubt as to whether these agencies can ever be relied upon to investigate their own operations and their own performance in eritical situations. Moreover, Lf the agencies withheld infor- | mation from the Warren Commission, or if their investigation of the assassination was deficient, the Warren Commission may have been precluded from determining the true circumstances surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. HY 5039355 Docld:324235276 Page 6
“Il. HY 50955 Interest of Intelligence Community in Oswald Prior to’ Assassination A.. Summary of Oswald's Activities of Interest to Intelligence Community Generally “While the Select Committee's investigation focused on the CIA and RBI because these two agencies were most involved in. the assassination investigation, many other intelligence agencies had been involved in investigating Oswald's activities prior to the assassination. In September 1959, Oswald received an early, hardship discharge from the Marine Corps, claiming hé needed to support his mother, but instead he left for Europe shortly after being. dis- charged. On October 1959, he showed up in Moscow. After a reported suicide attempt, he went to the U.S. - Embassy in Moscow seeking to renounce his U.S. citizenship. He also informed Embassy officials that he planned to disclose to the Soviets certain classified information he had on Marine Corps radar equipment. Upon learning this, the Office of Naval Intelligence reviewed Oswald's access to classified information and determined that any disclosure he might make would do little harm.» This _factuas- contsemed—by—the-Maxines—aiter—che-assasst ion, she whre b- OeuaddwSS oeattoned df Ft baweie Japan, he did nee=Kave~aceess—to—any Classified information about cho). Ccuald's half brother, John Pic, who was a sergeant in the Air Force, then became alarmed by Oswald's defection and submitted voluntarily to a background investigation by Air Force intelligence. By March 1960, the military concluded that there was “Little cause for concern about Oswald's defection, although the ing Marine Corps decided in August of Hee) FD @ ors F; ps a ie Bocld: 324234576 Page 9 FR GEAR :
o> —~ res 7 ig ft ab bet BA a aus discharge to an undesirable dischar eee: pEprik § ‘deed : ile } ‘ie Relevant. documents on Oswald were circulated throughout ce intelligence community, so that by late 1960, the Department of . Defense, CIA, State Department, FBI, and I&NS -all had intelligence files on Oswald. | | . Oswald spent two and one. half years in the Soviet Union work- ing in a television and radio parts factory in’ Minsk, In 1961, he met Marina and married her. They had one child born in the Soviet Union, and a second child born in the United States about a month before the assassination. | Oswald wrote his relatives while in the Soviet Union and these relatives passed some of this information on to the intelli- gence agencies. Oswald also wrote the State Department and the Marine Corps on several matters and this correspondence was duly included in intelligence files. “CIA's mail intercept program also acquired correspondence. Information obtained from this. correspondence was given to the FBI after the assassination. | By early 1962, it was learned that Oswald planned to return to the U.S. with his wife and daughter. ONI, FBI, I&NS, and State Department were all involved in determining when he would return. Oswald, in fact, returned by ship, landing in New York on June 6, 1962. There he was interviewed briefly by an I&NS agent. Oswald and his family then proceeded to Fort Worth, where he was inter- viewed by the FBI in late June .and again in August. Neither ONI's nor CIA's: files indicate their contact with Oswald after his return ‘These two agencies claim FBI was the appropriate ; agericy,. for: vany / SL sil 2 a, 2, mee id vi 4 NW 50955 ss abusing Lakom eo 4 VO) hut othe ‘bette - x
such contact. - J tien ts : fh wiealeagy certain of B bey } Oswald's activities in 1963. Other intelligence agencies got copies of CIA's and FBI's reports, but, With the-exceptionof . As discussed infra, FBI an ; Leen these other agencies developed-é : . se ibieertacttesdnelocs : Sahin ¥ . 3 le POE ne = lake a = —- %, OS es = cd ord “"° Heine, : me - ie * f : ry ae” . ; an acLartils wn 0962 peor le yore othe “Shear CHA 2s CET * T “Lovdbegso! Cee Caan cater /9EF. Ger | 4 wenin bea covesog wucltvtex y WL 2 | ts Mlercr ine pon 163 ra fe cod bets fee oe on be. HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 11
from New Orleans.. As discussed in detail infra, the Kaack report was first routed to the Counterintelligence section of. the Spécial. Affairs Staff, then to the Counterintelligence ‘Division in November 1963, Five messages related to Oswald's visit to Mexico City in Sept-— ember and October 1963 were ih the Western Hemisphere Division files on November 22, 1963. The information contained in these messages had not, as of that date, been incorporated in Oswald's 201 file. CIA's mail intercept program intercepted one letter which Oswald had written while in Russia. That letter had not been put.in his 201 file. | | om/ Finally, a message from CIA's AWAVE station in Miami indicates that its sources had limited information on Oswald prior to the as- sassination. This information and its significance is discussed in- fra, CIA recently informed the Select Committee fat this informa- tion probably did not come From files held at che {AVE station, but from files of Cuban exile groups connected with CIA, _ Technically, therefore, this information was not in. CIA's files on Oswald prior to the assassination. HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 12
FOL 5 | THE BUREAU'S PRE-ASSASSINATION OSWALD FILE A. Oswald's Defection The Bureau opened a file on Lee Harvey Oswald on October 31, 1959, some four . weeks subsequent to his departure for the Soviet Union. The opening was apparently based upon receipt of a UPI news ticker advising that Oswald was in Moscow, that he had applied to renounce his American citizenship and become a Soviet citizen for “purely political reasons," and that "he would never return to the United States. for any reason.” On November 3, 1959, the Bureau received a copy of an internal State Department telegram which / conf ned the news ticker and additionally noted that ex-Marine Oswald “has offered Soviets any information he has acquired as ar enlisted radar operator." On November 2, 1959, the Bureau determined through liaison with the Navy Department that although the Office of Naval Intelligence ("ONLI") did not have any record of Oswald, the United States Marine Corps. did have a record (Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to A. H. Belmont, 11/4/59). These records revealed that Oswald had entered the Marine Corps on October 24, 1956, to. serve three years. While in the service, Oswald attended the Aviation Fundamental * School and completed the Aircraft and Control and Warning Operators' Course. However, there was no record of a security clearance. The HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 13 '
and that ae Lo ao crcl Ty” & - . _ os “- . wT ae bs Buréau's stated conclusion was that:. bi Ey i Since subject's defection. is known to Department of the Navy, and since subject apparently has no knowledge of any strategic information which would be of benefit to the Soviets, it does not appear that any action is warranted by the Bureau ‘in. this matter. It is recommended, however, that’ this memo be referred to the Identification © Division so subject's service fingerprints can be placed in the criminal files and that a stop be ~ placed against the prints to prevent subject's entering the U.S. under any name. Espionage ‘Section should be advised if subject again enters the, Uy (2) (Memorandum from W.A. Branigan to A.H. Belmont, . On April 28, 1960, . Special Agent ("SA") John Fain interviewed Oswald's mother, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, in Dallas, Texas. She had recently received a letter addressed to Lee from the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland, indicating that Lee was expected at the college on April 20, 19650. Mrs. Oswald furnished S. A. Fain with a photograph of Lee and informed hin that. her son had taken his birth certificate with him (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/12/60). By memorandum dated June 3, 1969, the Bureau expressed to the State Department its concem over the possibility that an imnoster could be using Oswald's birth certificate, and requested all State Department information on Oswald. | Inquiries by the FBI's Paris Legal Attache ("Legat.") revealed that Oswald had by letter, dated March 19, 1959, written the college announcing his intention to begin studies there in the fall of 1959, Ie op HY 50955 Docld: 324234526 Page 14
cm ee ee ee iS | MVEG GSO al | | Oswadd had paid the $25 deposit. However, thére was no record of Oswald ever having attended the School. (Memorandum from Legat, Paris to Director, FBI, 10/12/60) On May 9, 1961, the Bureau's review of the State Department passport files on Oswald revealed that: (a) On 2/13/61, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow received an undated letter from Oswald post- marked Minsk 2/5/61, indicating that he wished to return to the U.S. if legal proceedings were not brought against him. Oswald explained that he could not leave Minsk without permission and- therefore was writing instead of visiting. (b) On 3/20/61, the embassy received a second Oswald letter postmarked Minsk, 3/5/61. Oswald requested a questionaire again explaining that he could not come to Minsk. (Memorandum from SAC, Washington Field Office to Director, FBI, 5/23/61.) On January 11, 1961, the Bureau was informed by ONL (District Intelligence Office, 8th Naval District, Yew Orleans, Louisiana) that Oswald had been given an undesirable discharge from the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve on August 17, 1960. (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/3/61). "According to the Special Agent in Dallas assigned to the Oswald case, the subsequent background investigation of Oswald -~ as discussed in the 7/3/61 investigative report -- was “predicated” upon the information received from Naval Intelligence. ‘(Report from: Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/3/61.) HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 15 A bern nt Mh dBA i I Ay HAN, MMe ERE MANOR er einen a ow
HY 50955 Te soa pe atet “ few NK A stibsequent FBI review of the State Department's Oswald file on 8/22/61, indicated that: (a) by letter, dated May 1961, Oswald advised Embassy that he had no intention of returning unless guarantee of no prosecution. He also advised that he had married a Russian girl, and that he wanted to return with her. (b>) On 7/8/61, Oswald appeared at the: American Embassy in Moscow with respect to his desire to - return now. - . (ce). On 7/10/61, Oswald executed an application for passport renewal at the. American Embassy. (d) By memorandum dated 8/18/61, the State De- partment authorized the American Embassy in Moscow to renew Oswald's passport for direct travel to — the U.S. .(Memorandum from SAC, Washington Field Office to Director, FBI, 9/1/61) Based upon Oswald's stated intention to return to the United States and the renewal of his passport for direct travel, the FBI decided to interview Oswald's mother, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, to determine (1) “if subject (Oswald) has returned to the U.S.," and (2) “if ‘subject has not returned to U.S., contact should be maintained with Mrs. Oswald to determine subject's expected arrival in U.S." (Memo- randum ‘from SAC, WFO, to Director, FBI, 9/1/61; Memorandum from SAC, Dallas to Director, FBI, 9/29/61) On October 13, 1961, a special agent in the FBI Dallas field office léarned during an interview of Mrs. Marguerite Oswald that Lee had not returned to the United States and that she had no idea when they might come or when they would be allowed to come. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas to Director, FBI, 11/20/61) Becld: 32423576 Page 16
HW 50955 The “Einal FBI review of the State Department Oswald file on 1/29/62, revealed that: _ Cd) By letter to Embassy, dated 7/15/61,-Oswald advised that he was continuing his efforts ‘to obtain exit visas for his wife and himself. (2). By letter, dated 8/8/61, Oswald inquired if it would be permissible for him to travel through Poland by train after leaving Minsk, -. pointing out that he could not-afford to fly from Moscow to New York City. (3) By letter dated 10/4/61, Oswald asked ‘Embassy to assist him-in obtaining exit visas from Soviet authorities. (4). By letter, dated 1/5/62, Oswald informed Embassy that he expected to receive exit visas within forty five days. (NOTE: Embassy had . ‘been notified by Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that. visas granted). (Memorandum from” SAC?" Washington, ‘DC field’ office, to Director, FBI, 2/19/62) - 1962, the State Department informed the Bureau that: It has been determined that Oswald, the ex~Marine is: still an American citizen; both he and his Soviet wife now have exit. permits, and the Department has given approval for their travel with their infant child to the U.S.A. There is a problem with his wife, however, in that SOV in the Department is trying to get a waiver of 243 G, which requires that Oswald's wife pick up her visa for entry into the U.S.A. in Western Europe. As soon as this question has been settled, they will be free to travel. (Memorandum from Director; FBI> “to SAC, D&lias; 5/31/62) Becld:32423576 Page i?
- B. Oswald's Return to the United States | On May 31, 1962, an FBI headquarters supervisor instructed the Dallas Field office that Oswald should be interviewed upon. his return and that the interviewing agents attempt to ascertain whether he was recruited by. Soviet Intelligence, whether he made aay deals with the Soviets in order to obtain permission to return to the United States, and exactly what information he furnished to the Soviets. . The supervisor noted that if any doubt existed as to Oswald's truthfulness, the agents should ‘‘consider requestine his consent to a polygraph examination and thereafter obtain Bureau authority for such an examination." (Memorandum from Director. FBI, to SAC, Dallas, 3/31/62) On June 12, 1962, the Immigration and. Naturalization Service (ISNS") informed the Bureau's New York field office that the Oswald's were listed on the advance manifest of the "SS Maasdam," Holland- American Lines, which vessel was scheduled to dock at approximately 11:00 a.m., on June 13, 1962. (Memorandum’ from SAC, New York to | Director, FBI, 6/12/62) On June 14, 1962, FBI Headquarters advised the New York field office that the Dallas field office had been instructed to interview Oswald upon his return; the New York field office was directed to contact I&NS to verify Oswald's arrival and to determine his destination in the United States. (Memo- randum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 6/14/62) HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 136
a oe ee vee a & “On June 22, 1962, L&NS eonfirmed that Oswald! s family returned to the United States via Hoboken, ‘New Jersey, on June 13, 1962, and that I&NS Inspector Frederick J. Wiedersheim interviewed Oswald at that time. Wiedersheim orally advised a Bureau ‘agent that Oswald stated he had been employed as a mechanic in Russia, had threatened to renounce his United States citizenship, but never carried through - with the threat and had never voted in Russia. The Oswald's destin- ation. of Fort Worth, Texas, was also verified. (Memorandum from SAC, New York, to-Director, FBI, 6/26/62) oe | On June 26, 1962, SA's John Fain and B. Tom Carter interviewed Lee Harvey Oswald in Fort Worth, Texas. Fain reported that Oswald was “very difficult to interview,” "cold and arrogant," and "on the whole was generally uncooperative." Oswald specifically denied that he had ever denounced his U.S. citizenship: offered military secrets to the Russians, or applied for Soviet citizenship. Addi- tionally, Fain asked Oswald whether or not he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination as to answers given by him during the interview. Oswald refused, and subsequently, also refused Fain'’s request to take a polygraph as to "his negative answers to the questions as to whether or not he had been providing services or furnished any information to the Soviets or) whether he had made any deals with the Soviets in order to obtain permission to return to the United States." Fain indicated in his report that Oswald 3/24/76 Ambo HW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 19
ant {Pe Ps bk ater Ay (Report from Dallas Field oc Bite i i ddauarcers, business. '"! 8/23/62) By report, dated August 30, 1962, SA Fain closed the Oswald case.* C. The Continued Investigation - Dallas On September 28, 1962, the FBI's New York field office learned that Oswald had subscribed to "The Worker, which Bureau reports describe as “an East Coast communist newspaper." (Memo- randum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 3/25/63). SA James P. Hosty had been assigned the pending inactive Marina Oswald case on October 23, 1962, some five months prior to its scheduled status review. . On March 3, 1963, Hosty ascertained through a review of I&NS records that Marina was living at an Elsbeth Street address in the Oak Cliff section of Dallas. On March 11, 1963, Hosty was informed by the Oswalds' landlady that she had evicted them on March 3, 1963, for fighting, and his drinkinp. Hosty was able to determine that the Oswald's had moved to Neely Street; he verified this address by checking the names on the mailbox. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 3/25/63) Hosty subsequently reviewed the file on Lee Harvey Oswald and -- after noting that Oswald had subscribed to the paily Worker -- requested, on March 25, 1963, that ‘ the Bureau reopen the case. Hosty also reaquested and received permission to interview Oswald's wife. Lee Oswald's case was reopened on March 31, 1963. (Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 119) oS eee Fula Office tr FET Pea dguatler. 5 of i n teStified before the Warren Commission that he closed P72. the case because Lo S WANG Decent y , WKS Satan frtann— pew t Comes pant senegal Waontont with, Sovyet on pe Ze“ pagp. (Warm pak are O a enti) ee ‘YWeleacke. HY 50955. G vata: 3 Tce 20 [QL Pon fe ” Hay ie. a. s io PP phe Ad mf AY bik» Y25°
tag t | te jg SEA RS Ge et ee bE “On April 21, 1963, a confidential informant ‘advised the ry Dallas office that Oswald was in contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York City, at. which time Oswald was quoted as stating that he had: passed out pamphlets for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee ("FPCC") with a placard around his neck reading, "Hands Off Cuba, Viva Fidel.*' (Report from Dallas Field Office to ee at A de es ete Ce al A Sel Rese ctet eetten 20 FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63) Subsequent investigation, on May 27, 1963, revealed, however, that the Oswalds had moved from their last known Dallas address, and had left no forwarding address from that residence. dD. Continued Investigation - New Orleans . By letter, dated July 17, 1963, the FBI's New Orleans field office informed the Dallas office that it had received information that the Oswalds were living in New Orleans. This information was apparently provided by the FBI's New York field office. At Dallas' request,. the New Orleans office, on August 13, the office of origin (i.e., office of principal responsibility) for / 143, verified the Oswalds’ presence in that city. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 8/23/63) On September 10, both Lee's and Marina's cases was changed from Dallas to New Orleans. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 9/10/63). In the interim, Oswald had been arrested in New Orleans and charged with "disturbing the peace by creating a scene." More specifically, while distributing FPCC literature, on August 9, 1963, Rito bon! tid § boos By HY 50955 Docklad: 32423526 Page 21
HY 50955 Docld: 324234526 Page 22 : fie ho. sw ee oe -+ me tannins ne te = a oe ee et eee - eee ew . wee i ee eee 2/ OsWald had been ‘involved in "fight" with _Diewanic “be. On the morning of Saturday, August 10th, Oswald asked to see a Bureau agent, and he was interviewed in jail,.at length, by SA John L. Quigley. (Report . from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/15/63) On August 22, 1963, the New Orleans office was provided with a copy of the transcript of an August 21 broadcast of a radio program called "Conversation Carte Blanche" in which Oswald had participated. ' During the program, Oswald stated that the FPCC was not Communist- controlled and that ne Sea Marxist. On August 30, 1963, a local: & radio station manager told SA Milton R. Kaack (Oswald's case agent in New Orleans) that after the broadcast, Oswald told him that "the Russians had ' gone soft’ on communism, and that Cuba is the only real revolutionary country in the world today." (Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63) On August 23, 1963, the New Orleans office received a head- quarters air telegram instructing that office to: " ascertain facts concerning subject’ distri- bution of above-mentioned pamphlet including nature of pamphlet following which’ contact should be made with established sources familiar with Cuban activities in the New Orleans area to determine whether “subject involved in activities inimical to the internal security of the U.S. Submit results in letterhead memorandum form suitable for dissemination with appropriate recommendation as to further action. (Memo- randum from Director to SAC, New Orleans, 8/21/63)
~ a ee ee me ae EH Nn NET RR iN fa ag [emda ERIE eee nao 22 The-eOctober 31,:° 1963, report of SA Milton Kaack reveals that Bureau agents in New Orleans contacted two confidential informants -- one familiar with Cuban activities, the other "with some phases" of Communist Party activities in the New Orleans area -- who advised that they had never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald. | . On September 24, 1963, the New Orleans field office informed the Bureau that: ‘Investigation of Oswald is continuing, and a report containing the results thereof will be furnished to-the. Bureau together with -the recommendation of the New Orleans office concerning further action concerming Oswald." (Memorandum from . SAC, Dallas, to Director, PBL, 9/24/63) The subsequent New Orleans "investigation" of Oswald is set forth in SA Kaack's October 31, 1963, investigative report encompassing the period July 23, 1963, through October 10, 1963. The report recounts Oswald's FPCC activities, his arrest and subsequent interview, his letters to the FPCC and The Worker, and that the Oswalds had moved from New Orleans on or about September 25, 1963. | The Oswalds' landlord in New Orleans had told the FBI agents that the “same Russian speaking woman that had brought Marina to New Orleans had picked up Marina and her child in a station wagon with Texas license plates." Leads were sent out to Forth Worth (to attemot to identify the woman and locate Marina), to Dallas (to attempt to - identify the. woman and conduct neighborhood investigation at the Oswald's last known residence), and to Malvern, Arkansas (to inter- HW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 23
2s f “Ob . Joe, a 1 4 ide iota i view Lee' S. brother to see if he had any information on the Oswald’ S. whereabouts) ._ Additionally, it was stated that New Orleans would “continue its efforts to locate subjects." (Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63) On October LO, 1963, Bureau headquarters: through .CIA liaison was provided with a copy of ‘an Apency cable which stated that "Lee Henry Oswald" had been in: contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on September 23, 1963. Further details of Oswald's contact,. including an apparent meeting with Soviet counsel Kostikov, were. provided in an October 18, 1963, Gablegram from the Bureau's Lesal Attache ["Legat’’] in Mexico City to Bureau headquarters. That Legat also then advised headquarters that it was attempting to establish Oswald's entry into Mexico and his current whereabouts: A copy of each of these communications was sent to the Hew Orleans field office which eventual ly forwarded two. copies on to the Dallas office. (emorandum from SAC, New Orleans to Director, FBI, 10/24/63) On October 18, 1963, SA Hosty -- following up on the New Orleans field office's request to locate Oswald -- reviewed files at I&NS. Aithough.Hosty was not able to find a new address for the Oswalds, he did. learn from an I&NS agent of the CIA communication indicating that Oswald had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 10/22/63) On October 22, 1963, the Bureau cabled certain general back- ground information to the Mexico City Legat, and noted that addi- HW 50955 Docld:32493526 Page 24 DO ne Be
HW 50955 ay tional information on Oswald was simultaneously being sent by mail. Headquarters also advised that "Lee Henry Oswald" was apparently identical with "Lee Harvey Oswald." (Memorandum from. Director, FBI, to Legat, Mexico City,: 10/22/63) - . On October 25, 1963, the New Orleans office learned that Oswald had left a forwarding address in New Orleans on September 26, 1963, showing his new address to be 2515 West 5th Street, Irving, Texas. It asked the Dallas office to. verify that, this was Oswald’ s' resi- dence. (Mémorandum from SAC, New Orleans, to Director, FBL, 10/25/63) E. © Continued Investigation: Dallas On October 30, 1963, SA Hosty, through a neighborhood - pretext interview learned that Marina Oswald was living at the Fifth Street address with a Mrs. Michael R. Paine. SA Hosty also learned that although Oswald had visited his family at the Paine residence, he was not living there. He so informed the New Orleans ‘office on | October 31, 1963, noting that efforts to locate Oswald should be continued. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 10/30/63) SA Hosty. then reviewed Bureau indices -and checked with the Paine's employers to “ensure that there were no subversive refer- ences."' On November 1, 1963, he proceeded to the Paine residence to interview Mrs. Paine. Although Mrs. ‘Paine claimed she did not know Oswald's home address, she informed Hosty that Oswald was employed at the Texas School Book depository in’Dallas. (Memorandum from. SAC, Dailas, to Director, FBI,.11/14/63) Toward the end of the Becld: 32423576 Page 25
ro OH iene intetview Mrs. Oswald entered the room; however, Hosty reported that he merely exchanged greetings with her. Hosty left his name and office telephone number with Mrs. Paine, requesting that she contact him if she learned of Oswald's address. (Memorandum from SA Hosty to SAC, Dallas, 11/24/63) | 7 On November 2, 1963, Hosty by telephone verified Oswald's emp Loyment at the Book Depository. The other field offices were notified and instructed to discontinue ‘efforts to locate Oswald. | lowever, Hosty was not able to verify Oswald's residence; the Book Depository had it listed as the Paine's address. He returned to the Paine address again on November 5, 1963. Although Oswald had visited his family again on November 2, Mrs, Paine could pro-| vide nothing further as to an address; however, she did say that Oswald was "an illogical person and an admitted Trotskyite Communist.” ‘(Memorandum from SA Hosty to SAG Dallas, to Director, FBI, 11/27/63) By memorandum dated November 9, 1963, and November 15, 1963, / the office of origin for Both Lee and Marina Oswald's cases was i changed back to Dallas from New Orleans. (Memorandum from SAC, New Orleans to Director, FBI, 11/15/63, 11/18/63) On November 19, 1963, the Washington field office informed. FBI headquarters that Oswald: HY 50955 Doecld: 32423526 Page 26
has recently been in contact’ withkGénsular, & Office, Soviet Embassy, Washington, DC, at ™ which time he related he had recently met with Comrade KOSTIN, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico. At this time OSWALD indicated to Soviet Embassy that hé was unable to remain in Mexico because of Mexican visa. restriction of 15 days and that he could not request a new visa unless. he used his real name. According to informant, OSWALD had orig- inally intended to visit Soviet Embassy in Havana, Cuba, where he could have had time to complete his business but could not reach Cuba. The informant stated that OSWALD is. married to MARINA NICHILAYEVA OSWALD, a Soviet citizen, and has a new daughter, AUDREY MARINA OSWALD, born 10/20/63, Dallas, Téxas.. OSWALD's address is known to ‘informant as Box 6225, Dallas, Texas. This information was received in Dallas on November 22, 1963. (Memo- randum from SAC, Washington, DC field office, to Director, FBI, 11/19/63) F, Availability of Pre-Assassination FBI Oswald Documents to the Warren Commission By letter, dated May 4, 1964, J. Edgar Hoover listed and summarily described for the Warren Commission each of the sixty- nine items that made up the Bureau's headaguarters file on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. Although certain of the summaries in the letter contain misleading descriptions of the underlying documents, the Committee has not in its review HW 50955 Decld: 32423526 Page 27
Bye oeeey of F&I matetials seen other than these sixty-nine documents in the headquarters FBI Oswald file.* Nor has the Committee found any indication that there were other than the usual underlying reports in the FBI Dallas, New Orleans, and Washington, DC field office files, the contents of which are accurately reflected in the head~ quarters materials.** * By letter dated October 31, 1975, the Committee requested access to "all materials pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald that were in FBI headquarters files at any time on or before November 22, L963. In what we were informed was a complete response, the Bureau produced for the Committee the sixty-nine documents summa rily described in Mr. Hoover's letter of May 4, 1964. It should again be emphasized, however, that the Committee has not had access to FBI files. Under the Committee's agreement with the Department of Justice, the Committee by Letter requests either ‘access to" or "delivery of" FBI materials. Upon receipt of a Committee document request, the FBI reviews its files and produces those documents it believes responsive to the request. eR On oo ee Si stant FBI Director Alan H. Belmont offered the entire headquarterg's file on Lee Harvey Oswald to the sbi tna ed for their review. See 2_testimony of Alan H. Belmont, HY 50955 Oibedte4somhs Prage fa. Celproyt testi marcy | WOAD Lh oz — 09 bs &
need ST Se SOO ee eh eee TT STUER SS De cot) RE art TIE tee Te em ven OES TL yt Wb a tememattato nn RE UU ace 2g" oe 4 gy Are Ry att, oF Ah Foe ic Sh - DISCUSSION: THE BUREAU'S HANDLING OF OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION CASE AL Oswald's Defection _Upon learning on October 31, 1959 of Lee Harvey Oswald's defection and. announcement to State Department offi- cials in the Soviet Union that he intended to > Provide ' ‘radar . secrets" to the Soviets, the Bureau opened a "security case" with Oswald as the subject. (Memorandum from W. A. Brannigan y to A. H. Belmont, 11/4/} 9) The FBI then verified through inquir- ies with the Department of the Navy that Oswald did not have knowledge of strategic information that would benefit the Soviets. The Bureau's stated conclusion was that, although no further action on the case was warranted, a stop should be placed against Oswald's fingerprints to prevent him from entering the United "States under any name. (Memorandum from W. A. Brannigan, 11/4/59) Some six months later the Bureau interviewed Oswald's mother. They were informed that Oswald had taken his birth certificate with him to the Soviet Union; by memorandum dis- seminated to the State Department, the Bureau expressed con- cern that an imposter might attempt to return to the United States using Oswald's identity. (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 5/12/60). HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 29
B. Oswald's Return to the United States ‘ Despite the Bureau's expressed concern that an imposter might attempt to return to the United States using Oswald's identity, the FBI did not interview Oswald until-some three weeks subsequent to his return to the United States on June 13, (1962... Oswald was interviewed at the dock. by IT&NS Inspector Frederick Weidersheim: (Memorandum from SAC, New York to Director, FBI, 6/26/62) There is no-indication that either’ Inspector Weidersheim, or the FBI agents assigned. to the Dallas field office who interviewed Oswald were ever alerted to the possibility that an imposter might attempt to assume Oswald's identity. Indeed, SA James P- Hosty, Jr. testified that he had neither seen a copy of the memorandum which raised the imposter possibility, nor attempted to determine whether someone had in fact assumed Oswald's identity. (Hosty, 12/12/75, p. 75) On June 26, 1962, SA's John John W. Fain and B. Tom Carter interviewed Oswald in Fort Worth, Texas. According to SA Fain's report, Oswald was cold, arrogant, and difficult to inter- view. With copies of State Department documents in hand, Fain was aware that despite Oswald's denials he had stated to State Department officials at the American Embassy in Moscow that he HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 30°
4 ihe tpiae ab 44 (1) «was going to renounce his American citizenship, t a for Soviet citizenship, and (3) reveal radar secrets to the Soviets.” Indeed, SA Fain asked Oswald to take a polygraph test; Oswald refused. to be polygraphed, even as to his negative answers on deals or relationships with Soviet intelligence. (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/10/62.) %* SA Fain also reported that Oswald denied that he had ever been a member of the Communist Party in,the United States, or that he went to the Soviet Union. because “of a lack of sympathy for the institutions of the United States." (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 7/10/62) A second interview some three weeks later on August 16, 1962, went much the same way. Despite Oswald's attitude and demon- strable lies, SA Fain closed the Oswald security case on August 20, 1962; it was not to be reopened until March 26, 1963. (Hosty, 12/13/75, .p. 119) The only additional investigation of Oswald conducted by the Bureau at any time prior to March 26, 1963, were the reviews of the Oswald file at the Department of State, inquiring of two low-level Dallas Communist Party informants whether they knew of Oswald (with negative responses) and interviewing. three of ote Fann tex emery | Worn, (2 * Haeren-Commiestor—pesti actr aay ** The Warren Commission apparently was not 2 hevied: with the administrative cover pages of SA Fain's report which discussed, inter alia, Oswald's refusals to be polygraphed. Fain did not mention Oswald! s refusals to be polyzraphed when he testified before the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964, despite detailed questioning by Commission members Ford and Dulles as to the dis- crepancies in Oswald's statements, and-Fain's reaction to them. Dar Fle erty Werner. ME Vol ae oe HW O50955 Decld: 32423526 Page 31 dine
ets men Bn wi > yy Pos ieee it ja ewe creel? E Bid WE ehh, & Oswald's relatives. Despite the extensive use of sources and techniques to develop background information on subjects of security cases, no neighborhood or employment sources were checked or developed in-Oswald's case, Marina was not inter- viewed, and none of the Bureau's established techniques to determine with whom a person was in’ contact -- such as the mail cover -~ were employed” or their use even suggested.* | The Bureau's failure to interview Marina prior to the assassination is surprising. The documentary record reflects that Marina’s case was opened in a pending inactive status, i.e., although the File was not technically closed, nothing was. to be done in the case for six months. Marina Oswald had originally been considered for a Bureau program which monitored the , activities of Soviet immigrants and fepatriates who met criteria which suggested that they might have. . intelligence tics, Howe ver the Dallas field of fice supervisor concluded on July 25, 1962, that consideration of Marina for bec seo. this program would’ be postponed for six months im—tkhet her activities could be sufficiently monitored in connection with the subversive — case on Lee Oswald. As previously noted, the case on Lee Oswald was closed on August 20, 1962. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas to Director, FBI, 8/25/63) * * The Committee is neither suggesting that’ these techniques should have been employed nor that their use would have been pro- per. It is merely noting that its review of other FBI security files reflects that’ such sources and techniques were extensively used in cases similar to Oswald's. seneaseennnnannnen peer eene seme ew ene ee pene mn erm acct a in Sot oan haat a ee ne HW 50955 Docld:3242735296 Page 32
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“ with respect to Oswald's marriage to Marina, and her return to the United States, the Commission stated: Oswald's marriage to Marina Prusakova on | April 30, 1961, is itself a fact. meriting. consideration. - A foreigner living in Russia cannot marry without. the permission: of the Soviet Government. It seems unlikely. that. the Soviet authorities’ would have permitted Oswald to marry and to take his wife with him to the United States if they were con- - templating using him alone as an agent. . The fact that he had a Russian wife would be likely, in their view, to increase any surveillance under which he would be kept by American secur- ity agencies, would make him-even more conspic- uous to his neighbors as ‘an ex-Russian", and would decrease his mobility. A wife's pre- sence in the United States would also constitute a-continuing risk of disclosure. On the other hand, Marina Oswald's Lack of English training - and her complete ignorance of the United States and its customs would. scarcely recommend her to the Soviet authorities as one member of an “agent team'' to be. sent to the United States ‘on a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise. (Warren Commiss€oh Report, p. 274.) In contradistinction, a retired Bureau Soviet Section Supervisor told the Committee that of greatest concern. to him in the Oswald case was the fact that the Soviets had allowed Marina to return to the United States with Oswald. He felt that if they desired to ‘tap Oswald on the shoulder and make use of him at some “gy future date, Marina's presence would give them a great deal of leverage.", (Staff interview with former FBI Headquarters Super- AHowever, it should be emphasized that the visor, 1/ 6/76}, Supervipor is ngt aware of any evidence which suggests that the Soviets in facf used or attempted to contact Oswald.. mo pre naa gy} f- # pu - Saad Fi f, 4) ; barons m Pinata [ _ ne CFP prey a f —— He asu pow i Ee iat Yo ne HW 50955 Decla: 32423526 Page 34———~ be OWA ss
C. The C Continued _ Investigation -- Dallas On September 28, 1962, the New York field office. learned -- and subsequently informed Dallas -- that Oswald subscribed to. The Worker. Oswald's subscription to ‘this newspaper’ we ae SR pe _contradicted his “interview statements that-he was ; he "disenchanted with the “Soviet. Union" and ' ‘not out of sympathy with U. S. institutions." (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63)* The fact of Oswald's subscription was simply noted. in his security file; FBI headquarters was not informed of .the subscription until September 10, 1963, and then only after it had requested information on Oswald from the Dallas office. (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63) Assistant FBI Director Gale of the Inspection Division, in his December 10, 1963, highly critical report on the Bureau's handling of the pre-assassination .Oswald case noted: “In light © of Oswald's defection, the case should have been reopened at the first indication of Communist sympathy or activity." (Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63)** In October of 1962, SA Hosty had been assigned the Marina Oswald security case, which remained at that time ina pending inactive status. The case was reviewed by Hosty for the first time in March of 1963, at which time he located Marina Oswald, but did not interview her because of her alleged ; 2 marital difficulties. (Hosty, 12/¥8/75, p- hp) Hosty did, * SA James P. Hosty, Jr. recommended on March 25, 1963 that the Oswald case be reopened selely on the basis of this contradiction# Testimony of SA Hosty, 12/13/75, p. 118. ** Mr. Hoover noted on November 29, 1963 that, "In Oswald's case there was no indication of repentence but only one of. .cpenly avowed hostility,.and contacts with subversive clements.'' (Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 11/29/63.) None of the Bureau's internal criticism of the handling of the pre-assassination Oswald case ever reached the Warren Commission. See discussion, supra, et. S « —— i ope see . oper” sees hoe Be ae eer oe HW 50955 Docld:3242735276 Page 35 0 TBS ay ge
Hy 50955 was in effect, it would appear that Hosty's decision to allow “a cooling off" period prior to interviewing.Marina was entirely in : ae ae 7 Ay “if hae i however, review the Dallas Office! S security file on Lee Oswald and, on-the basis of Oswald's subscription to The Worker, requested. (and subsequently received), approval to open the case on March 26, 1963. (Hosty, 12/16/75, pout) With respect to Hosty's stated reason for not interviewing Marina -- i.e., in that he had developed information that Oswald had been drinking to excess and beating his wife, the relevant FBI manual provision required that_he ‘allow a cooling off" period -- Mr. Hoover commented on the December 10, 1963 Gale memorandum that "this.was certainly an asininé excuse" and "I just don't understand — such solicitude." Inspector Gale had written that a this | entire facet of the investigation was mishandled. Mrs. Oswald definitely should have’ been interviewed and. the best time to get information from her would be after she was beaten up by her husband. * The Director added the following notation next to Gale's conclusion: "This certainly makes sense." (Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63) . | | On April 21, 1963, ‘the New York field office was informed ‘that Oswald had written a letter to the FPCC. This is the first indication in Bureau files that Oswald had a relationship with this pro-Castro organization. (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63) Oswald then wrote that he had passed out FPCC literature in Dallas ‘with a placard around his neck reading “Hand{[s] Off Cuba - Viva Fidel." This information | * In that the Committee has verified! that such a manual provision +e 28S GG 08 yi th a ek gr cgulations. The arguments do not provide _ an nation *ehy StRer Hoover or Gale required. this: provision?!? "EP
: ; yl . . is Na bs Bigs Pe Lew ti wasenot reported’ to Dallas until June’ 27, 1963 (Memorandum from J. H. Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63) and not reported to head- quarters until September 10, 1963. (Report from Dallas Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/10/63) Once again, Oswald's activities appear to contradict his interview statements. On May 27, 1963, Hosty returned to the Oswald's Neely Street residence to interview Marina, and was informed that the Oswalds had’ moved fromthe Dallas area without leaving ‘a forwarding address. “Pursuant to leads sent out by the Dallas office seeking information on the Oswalds' whereabouts, the New Orleans office informed Dallas on July 17, 1963, that the Oswalds were living in that. city. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas to Director, FBI, to SAC, New Orleans, 8/23/63) The Bureau apparently learned of Oswald's presence in New Orleans from a letter he had written to The Worker on June 26, 1963. Oswald claimed in the letter to be a long-time subscriber and stated that. he was forming an. FPCC chapter in New Orleans. He enclosed honorary membership cards for ''those fighters for peace." Mr. Gus Hall (General: Secretary of the Communist Party, USA) and Benjamin Davis (National Secretary of the Community Party, USA). (Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63) On September 10, 1963, New Orleans became the office of origin for Lee and Marina's cases. (Memorandum from SAC, Dallas, to Director, FBI, 9/10/63) HWW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 37
ee a foe Be $ 3 i a ‘eo i ‘D. - The Continued Investigation --. New Orleans In the interim, Oswald had on August 9, 1963, been arrested in New Orleans in connection with his FPCC activities and , charged with “disturbing the peace by creating a scene. On ‘the morning of Saturday , August 10, Oswald asked to see a Bureau agent, and he was interviewed at length by SA Quigley. Oswald also repeatedly lied to this FBI agent. For example, he told. Quigley that he had met and married his wife in Fort Worth, Texas. (Report from New. Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 8/15/63) The New Orleans office learned on August 22, .1963, that Oswald participated in a radio program in his capacity as the secretary of the New Orleans FPCC chapter, and stated, among other things, that he was a Marxist and that “Cuba is the only real revolutionary country in the world today." (Report from. New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63, p. LL) On August 23, 1963, the New Orleans office was instructed by head- quarters to “submit results of their Oswald investigation to the a Bureau. (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to SAC, New Orleans, 8/23/63) On September 24, 1963, the New Orleans office advised the Bureau that the investigation was continuing and that a report setting forth the investigative findings would be furn- ished (Memorandum from SAC, New Orleans, to FBI Headquarters, 9/24/63) Agent Kaack's investigative report was subsequently t t HW 50955 Doclda: 32425526 Page 38 ‘ , =
eRe ye i } i : ~! f ae ae at gee Laat ig sent to the Bureau on October 31, 1963; it did not contaife dle any significant. information that was not already in Oswald's “headquarters file. The report reveals that.only two informants in the New Orleans area ~- one familiar with Cuban activity -- were asked about Oswald. . Neither informant had heard of him. (Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 10/31/63) | On or about. October 2, 1963, agents of ‘the New Orleans office attempted to ascertain Oswald's residence and place of employment. They learned that the Oswalds had left New Orleans. Leads to locate Lee Harvey Oswald were sent to Dallas, Fort Worth, and Malvern, Arkansas. (Report from New Orleans Field Office to FBI Headquarters; 10/31/63) - The evidence indicates that Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico City from September 27, 1963, through October 4, 1963. On October 10, 1963, Bureau headquarters through CIA liaison was provided with a copy of an Agency cable which stated that "Lee Henry Oswald" had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico: City on September 28, 1963. (CIA Cable from Mexico City Station to Director, FBI, 10/10/63; Memorandum from LEGAT Mexico City to Director, FBI, 10/18/63) . It. was not until October 22, 1963 -~ some twelve days subsequent to the date on which Bureau headquarters was first informed of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico HY 50955 Bocld: 324235276 Page 39 . . aaa .
35° City -- that information pertaining to Oswald' 5 Mexico City trip was 5 provided to the New Orleans Office. (Memorandum from Director, FBI, to Legat, Mexico, 10/22/63) Coincidentally, SA Hosty in Dallas had by chance ascertained similar informa- tion from the local I&NS office, and the report in which Hosty detailed this information was received in New Orléans on October . 22, 1963. Thus despite the fact that both the Dallas aid “New Orleans field offices were aware on October 22, 1963 of Oswald's contact’ with thé Soviét Finbassy in Mexico City; thére is not évidence that either of these field offices intensified their “efforts” to locate and interview Oswald. Most surprising, however , is that the "Soviet experts” at FBI headquarters did not intensify their efforts in the Oswald case after being» informéd that Oswald had met. with Vice Consul Kostikov at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico city. (Memoranduin from Legat; Mexico City to Director, FRL, 10/18/63) Not only wére these experts more familiar with Soviet activities in genéral: they knew that fostikav was KGB, and had reason to believe he was an agent within the KGB's Departiient 13, which Départinent tarries diit assassination and sabotage.* They were alsé aware that Américan citizen contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were extremely rare. (Testimony of Clark Anderson, 2/4/76) Ironically, the taletypes informing the Bureau of Oswald's Mexico City activities were sitting on a file of documents on a headquarte?s * ALL of this information was inade wwatlable boa ithe Warren Comntission. (IA letter to Commission of 1/22/64.) a a SO HY 50955 Doecld: 3274239576 Page 40 ; - oe
rete arte, wide bd BL , b 1963. That portion of Inspector Gale's metiorandum of December 10, - ; j Bes Uap supervisor's desk awaiting initial action of’ Nd 2 “+. ? 1963, which discusses these teletypes reads as follows: The SOG (Seat of Government) supervisor failed to take any action oti the teletypes, stating it did not appear to him any action was warranted. _Inspector (i.e., Gale). feels .. . the fiéld should have been instructed.to intensify investi- gation . . . and Oswald placed on Seéurity Index. (Memorandum from J. H: Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63) E. Continued Investigation - Dallas On October 26, 1963, the New Orléang field office advised the Dallas office that the Oswalds had left 4 forwarding Address - in Irving, lexas. Dallas was asked to verify the new residence . (Memorandum from SAC, New Orleans to Director, FBI; and SAC, Dallas; 10/25/63) On October 30; 1963, SA Hosty established that although Marina and the baby were living in Irving with the Paine family, Lee was not living there. On November 1; 1963, Hosty went to the Paine residence for the stated purpose of interviewing Mrs. Paine to "find oiit where Oswald was residing."* Mrs: Paine informed Hosty that shé did not know where Oswald lived; . iowever, she did state that Oswald was employed at the Tekds Book Dépository. Toward the end of the intetview Marina Oswald caine itito the room. According to Ilesty, she expressed fear of the FBI: his two or thrée minute conversation with her (with Ruth Paine translating) was cordial, and an attempt to eayded her fears: Costy; 12/12/75, p.5¥) * [Tt should be notes that vider the FRI manual. provisions then ih effect, any contact such as Oswald's wilh the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City required that immedtate investigative action at rhe appropriate field office.. flowever, these provision: also preciuded bf atsSab Ine Tbs. Gyinterviewine Csvaldiwithout the express, written HW 90955 pects yar OF heatauarters. - ot i
After the assassination, the Dallas office explained to Bureau - headquarters that the investigation had been held in abeyance to "be sure that it was. in: possession of all information from New Orleans." Inspector Gale commented on this explanation in his December 10, 1963 memorandum: Inspector definitely does nct. agree. New Orleans submitted sixteen-page report, 10/31/63, and only. leads outstanding in New Orleans were to ascertain Oswald's whereabouts: No indication New Orleans had any further data... . Even if New Orleans had not réported all information, in their possession, Dallas should have intensified investigation in light of Oswald's contact with Soviet Embassy in México City and not héld invest= igation in abeydnce. (Memorandum from J. H: Gale to Tolson, 12/10/63) . HY 50955 Docld:32473576 Page 42
a, C. The CIA's Role in the Investipatdbrths 1. Nature of CIA's Investigation Except for the requests from the Warren Commission, CIA received no written instructions to conduct an investigation. Uinlike FRI: CIA was not directed by the President to undertake. ar active in- vestigation; President Johnson only instructed Director MeCone to make CIA tesources. available to FBI in order to assist FBI's investigation. | Nevertheless, as'news of the assassination spread on November 22, CIA stations began reporting to CIA Headquarters any information they received that. appeared to have even the remotest connection to the assassination. Of course, information “froin Mexico city was of paramount importance to CiA Raadquarters since the station there had reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Consulate only two months earlier. Headquarters analyzed -hese reports and for several weeks after the assassination closely fcolloved the situation in Mexico City, ordering thé station ta investigate various ailegatiéns and to follow certain leads. After the Warren. Commission was establisted and after it was clear FBI had priricipal responsibility for investigating the assassination, CIA's work gradually shifted from the kind of active irivestigation it had béen condticting in Mexica City to one of responding to requests from, or passing along information to, the Warren Commission or the FBI. The possibili ty that CIA had engaged in plots to essassinate HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 43
HY 50955 42 “yee wise foreign leaders was first acknowledged publicly in the course of the Rockefeller Commission’ s investigation and was confirmed by the Senate Select Committee's investigation and report. The Rockefeller Commission investigated both CIA assassination plets and their connection with the Warren Commission investigation. David Belin, a staff attorney for the Warren Commission and Chief Counsel for the Rockefeller Commission, wrote: At no time did the CIA disclosé to the Warret Commission any facts which pertained to alleged assassination plans to kill Fidel Castro; (Memor -_ andum from David Belin to the Rockeféller Commission, May 20, 1975, p. 1) (T]he CIA withheld from the Warren. Commission inférthation which might Have beén relevant in light of the allegations of conspiratorial contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban government . Mr. Belin also discussed this matter with Raymond Ricca: Chief, Résearch and Analysis, Countetintelligence Division, CIA, who was the! ‘point of record" between the CIA and the Wdrren Commission. Mr. Rocca, like Mr. Belin, prepared a memoratidum stating hé was unaware of the plots until 1975 and expressing concern about thé Watren Commission's findings in Light of this new ihforma- we ; tion. Mr. Beliri also contacted former Warren Commission staff counsel, Burt Griffin, to get his views on this matter. Mr Griffin responded by .letter wherein-he expressed hig feelings that assassination plots against Castro thight have a significant effect 9 on the Warren Commission findings. * Mr. Rankin, Genera! Counsel of the Warren Commission, also advised. the Committee: he was rot aware of the CIA's asSassination plots until 1975. Docld: 32423526 Page 44.
Moreover, the Select Committee has, previously. cond Fadetes, x that one plot, possibly involving the assassination’ of Castro. , inderway in the Fall of 1963 and that the plot involved the passing of a poison. pen to a Cuban agent on tha very day of President Kénnedy's assassination. Because of the chronological relationship of this plot to the assassination of President Kennedy, the Select Committee investigated whether there were other connections between the plot_and President Kennedy's assassination. a. Background of Assassination Plots: Covert Actions Against Fidel Castro's forces took overt the government of Cuba . oh January 1, 1959, Although initially advocating teforim through socialism, Castro soon openly advocated communism and aligned tinself with the Soviet Bloc. The United States was preperly concerned with Castro's change in direction, not merely because a S6viet aligned regime in Cuba posed a threat to U.S. security, bit also bécause Castré seemed bent on exporting communist revolution throughout Latin Ametica. AS a result; the United States embarked on a policy Looking to the ouster of Castro and his communist regime. Implenienta- tion of this policy concerned all appropriate governinent agencies +- the Departments of State, Justité, aiid Defense included. The CIA was given prinéipal responsibility for implementation of the policy through covert action. | | , ; . The nature of the covert operations ran the paimiit of the techniques CIA had available: propaganda, coastal raids, agent ret- ete eden y ity [aor cee WW 50955 Docld: 324239526 Page 45
works, sabotage of facilities, defection of Cuban officials, out-_ right invasion in: the case of the Bay of Pigs, and coup planning and assassination. In addition to these operations directly controlled by CIA, there were various operations run by Cuban exiles. Two major exile groups. referred to by the CIA as a "autonomous operations," were assisted bv CIA and were controlled as well as could be by CIA. The CIA therefore had files on marty of those invélved with the two autonomous groups. As will be discussed infra, this meant that even though many members were living in the United States and ostensibly within the jurisdiction of the FBI; not the CIA, the CIA could have assisted Warren Commission investigators in inderstanding Oswald's Ctiban connections. | Thus, the Warrén Commission's investigation cf the assaséination of President Kennedy was conducted against a’ background of CIA's covert’ operations against Cuba. Knowledge of these operations was rélevdit both to the Commission's coriclusions aboiit foreign con- spitacies and to its investigation of Oswald's connections to pro- Castro arid ahti-Castro organizations. . -b. The AMLASH LASH Operation_ and Castro's: Knowledgé of It Without doubt; Fidel Castto had good reason to fear U.S. policy urider President Kennéd¥: Kennedy iad permitted the abdéttive Bay of Pigs invasion and had threatened niicleat war over Soviet placement of nuclear weapons in Cubd. His adiiinistration constantly focused on the custér of the Castro regime. On the other hand, Castro deemed to have little to gain from the death of Kennedy since ke wotild be succeedéd by Johnson who, Castra could have assumed, would carry or the Same policies. Castro CU we cays NO aces PePciy 33 t “ HY 50955 Docld:324234526 Page 46 , . — :
HW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 47 certainly noticed no difference between Kennedy's poli those which might be adopted by Senator Goldwater, his likely opponent in the 1964 election. For example, inoa report of an impromptu interview on Septéimber 7, 1963, AP correspondent Daniel Harker reported: Castro then launched into 4 discussion of the U.S:. political scene saying he expects no change in Washington's foreign policy even if there is a_ change in administratioris after the 1964 presidential élections. ‘I am sure it will be a fight between ' (President) Kennedy and (Sen: Barry) Goldwater . (R Ariz.)}. Both are cheap and crooked politicians, ' Castro said. . _3/ In any.event, speculation as to Castro's motives requires consideration of the specific actions the Kennedy dadministra- tion Was takihg in the Fall of 1963/ Of prime importance to Castro, hay have been belief or actual knowledge rhat CIA was then attempting to assassinate him as part of a coup. . After the resolution of the Cuban missile ctisis, CTA's covert opérations, then designated as Project Mongsose, were halted of, October 30, 1962. Castro seemed to be aware of this décision in his November 1963 interview with the reporter Jean Daniel. On the other hand; raids by Cuban exile groups could not be SO easily controlled. However, after exile raiding boats fired on. a Russian ship off the coast of Cuba in Spring 1963, the FBI, reportedly acting on Robert Kennedy's orders, started 4 craék-down on the U:S. based operations of the exilé groups: Mechanisms vere deviséd; however, to avoid FBI crack-down on the CIA operations. In June 1963, a decision was reached to step up vdrious ccvert opérations dpainst Cuba, includitig sabotngs operations designed to encourage dissident groups inside Cuba, to worsen economic condi- tions in the country, and to cause Cubans to doubt the ability of the : , he I pe, LA tpn, —— t hoo bose
Castro regime to defend the country. § Perhaps this decision prompted CIA to renew contact with a highly placed Cuban, code-named AMLASH, who previously had indicated interest in assassinating Castro and in toppling the regime. | In late August 1963, AMLASH was in Brazil and there met with CIA case officers. Although before this meeting CIA's interest in ‘AMLASH inay have been to gain intelligencé and to ctiltivate him as an asset for covert operations, the casé officers learned that AMLASH himself was interested primarily in attempting an "inside 4obt against Castté and was awaiting a U.S. plan of action, A message from CIA. Headquarters analyzed the contact by siiggesting AMLASH did not seein interested in routine intelligence missions atid should be dir- ected toward recruiting cohorts for sabotage and "more serious matters on an orderly basis." The case officer testified he was aware of this analysis. There is nO direct évidence that Castro was aware of these meetings with CIA; but there is teason to believé hé was: Shortly after the méetirig, CIA received information from another source to the effect that Castro was dware of AMLASH 's general sentiments. The case officer eould not recall receiving this information, but he knew that AMLASH had been rather openly anti- communist. | More importantly, on September 7, 1973, Castro gave an impromptu threé hour interview with AP reporter Daniel Harker atid ¢ warned against the U.S. "aiding terrorist plaris to eliminate Cuban HW 50955 Docld:324293526 Page 48
Castro chose a reception at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana 10 tt leaders. as the occasion for his tirade. The connection between Castto's. “ : id ‘ warning and the AMLASH meeting may only be coincidental. Nevertheless, AMLASH had proposed. a terrorist plan to eliminate Cuban ledders} and, according to'an informal briefing by a current CIA analyst of: Cuban affairs, Castro is prone to resort: to subtle nuances, “such ... as the choice of the Brazilian Embassy, - to put his statements © in context. Similarly Mr. Réeca hag edheluded: “There can be no question from the facts surrotiriding the Castro appearance, which had aot been expected, and his agreement to the irketview, that this event represented a more- than- ordinary attempt to @ét 4 tieSsagé 6n’ the récord in the United States." (Memotandum for DC/OPS, May 23, 1975.) According to Harkér, Castro went on to say the "United States ieaders would be in danger if théy helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba . .. We ate prepared to fight them and ariswer in kind: ‘United States leaders Should think that if they are aiding térrorist plans to eliminate Guban ‘Leaders. they themselvés will not be safe.” | Castro also talked about what he termed Hrecent us. + tt prompted raids on Githan territory" and "piratical attacks" by the United States against the Cuban people. Indééd the CIA had conducted raids on Cuban coastal targets in August. In addition an rir raid ve The case officer was: tiot aware of this wartiing at the time. He Bilefrd needed it ; tome the AMLASH opera- tion. HW 50955 Docld:324935276 Page 49
7 aoe - | a Wf Ur Seu by an exile proup, net related to CIA, in the same time period was” noted ina report.of September 4. to be of much conern in Cuba." Such raids, however, would not seem to- justify Castro's threat: Objectively the raids cannot be considered “plans to eliminate Cuban leaders." AMLASH's proposal was, The raids would not objectively call for Castro to threaten the safety of American leaders aiding the plans. AMLASH' s proposal might. In any event, Castro cotninerits at that interview clearly suggest he held Kennedy responsible for whatever he was concérned about. In the ensuing two months; CIA involvement in AMLASH 's pldt erau deeper. In early October thé cage officer told AMLASE that hg his proposal had U.S. support at the highest levelé nd found AMLASH greatly relieved and ready to return to Cuba to uiidértake the "big Sob.” Later in the month AMLASH denianded to meet with Robert Kennedy: to obtain his personal assurance that the United States supported his plan -- a coup, the first step of which was probably the assassination of Castro. - CIA did not arrange a meeting with Robert Kennedy, but instead. sent Desmond Fitzgerald; head of the Special Affairs Staff (the office responsible for ali covert operations agairist Ciba), to meet with AMLASH 4s the personal représentative of Robert Kennedy. On | October 29, Fitzgerald told AMLASH 4 successful coup would receive U.S. support. . AMLASH seemed satisfied with this show of high level Hé testified he meant the highest. levels of CIA. ** The case officer repeatedly refused tou characterize the AMLASH cperation as an assasSination plet. However, he testified that AMLASH was proposing a coup which im luded Castro's assassindtion as the first 5 SREP y . HW 50955 DobTd:32473596 Page 50 . a van
Peri ha re § Ai 3 i af, ey EY a fe oe cars xpr U.S. ‘support for his plans, but l U.S. was not furnishing him the necessary equipment, €.f., @x- plosives and rifles with teléscopic sights. On November 20, a CIA case officer telephoned AMLASH to arrange a meeting for November 22, saying he did not know if it would be interesting, but it. would be the meeting AMLASH requested. The cdse officer hesitated in stating that AMLASH would have understood this message as positive evidetice CIA was going to méét his Fequest for equipment. | At. the November 22 meeting AMLASH was shown a poison per device; piven Assutances that the requested equipment would be sup- plied him in Cuba, and showii a copy of Presiderit Kennedy's speech of November i8 in Miami. — The case officer told AMLASH that Fitz- gerald had helped virite the speech. Certainly these actions left little doubt in AMLASH' s mind that U.§. policy was fully in support of his ptoposal to do away with Castro and to forient a ecup’. | _ The contact réport brepdred ori November 25 makes “no mention 6f the poison pen or assassination. The case officer thought FitSgerald had told him to make no mention of it, However, a March 19; 1965: document in AMLASH'S file states: * thé. case officer said he also. agked for a device to protect himself: in close quarters. The poison pen device was dévéloped to Satisy this request. Wee Thé case officer does not think. he showed AMLASH Ehe. speech, but instead alluded to it. He testified that Fitzgerald had authorized him to make these representations to AMLASH. He did not know what duthority Fitzgerald had or what the President er anyone above Fitzpérald had been told about the AMLASH operation. HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 51 . oe theo
22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgeral and Mr. *** [the oH assured subject [AMLASH] that this Agency would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, - all the money he wanted). The situation changed when Mr. we* and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had béen assassinated: Because of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was de- Cided that this. Agency could have no part in the assassi- nation of a government leader (including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This included the following. "We would not furnish the silencer, nor _ scope, nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a4 finger to help subject escape from. Cuba should he aesassinate Castro: ‘The case officer took exception to the statements of fact contained in rhis document. First, he pointed out Fitzgerald was not at the Novembér- 22 meeting, but was in’tead in Washington. After repeated questions, he finally denied he had given AMLASH the assurance of “all the money he wanted:" He testified AMLASH never asked fot money. He and Fitzgerald had, however, assured-AMLASH of all the support he needed; and money could be considered part of that support. The case officer said te and Fitzgerald never discussed a connection between. thé AMLASH operation ard the assassination of Président Kennedy. Therefore, he thought the document's statement that plans changed because of Kenriedy ‘s assassination does not accurately -deseribe the situation. He further said that there was ne assiirance td aid AMLASH's escape. The case officer felt the document was a summary drawn from the AMLASH file; attributing statements made to AMLASH much later to decisions in 1963. There is no way to reconcile this document with the case officer's testimony. Fitzgerald apparently was not at the November 22 meeting with AMLASH. No other document; except a missing cable 7 : ee oer ae HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 52 eee pag . fF eye tet
of November 23, allegedly instructing the BP Be a Bilan contact with AMLASH , suggests plans .changed because of the assassina- ‘tdou? No other document so directly refers te the AMLASH operation as an assassination plot. No other ‘documents mention escape plans or money. If the case officer is correct in his testimony, the quoted portions of this 1965 document were cut out of whole cloth. And; if he ig. correct, many at the Agency, who had later responsi- bility, tor at least .a portion of the operation, were acting on very erroneous information if they relied on this decument. Two other events occurring in the .October-lNovember 1963 tine period deserve mention in this discussion of U.8.-Guban rélations. The first is that talks between the Cuban délegate to the uN, La Chuga, and a U.S. delegaté, William Atwood, were proposed by the Ctibans on Septémber 5. After discussions about the. location for such talks and Atwood's expressions of U.S. interest, La Chuga told Atwood. ox October 28 that “Havana didn't see exactly how a talk would be useful now; but he would be glad to maintain continuous contact:" On November 29, La Chuga again’ ingiiired of Atwood about U.S: intérest in talks. vt Sécondly, the French reporter: Jean Daniél, had a brief interview with President Kennedy on October 24 before setting eff on ait assignment in Cuba. At that meeting, the President expressed his. feeling that Castro had betrayed the revolution. - Daniel travelled to Cuba but got no hint of a similar ‘meeting with Castro. ‘Then of November 19, the dav after the Presi- dent's speech in Miami, Castro contacted Danie! and spent six hours a4 u P a a ve HW 50955 Docld:324235276 Page 53
talking to him wzbout U. S. /Cuban reldfibger “Daniel again. met 74 ul , \ eee bees ae Castro on November 22, spending most of the day te ere report of this meeting “When Castro heard the News"' describes Castto's reaction to word of the assassination. Significantly, after word of Johnson's succession to the Presidency reached Castro, he asked: “What authority does he exercise over the cra?" Of course Castro was well aware of the U.S. program of covert operations againat Cuba: Tn public speeches; he repeatedly attacked CIA operations, although he rarely distinguished between CIA operations and those of exile groups operating on their own. Présidetit Kennedy's speech of November is would have reinforced his belief that the U.S. was committed to his overthrow. The Select Committee attempted to determine whether Castro had actual knowledge of. the AMLASH operation either because AMLASH himself was a double agent or because Cuban/Soviet penetration of the CIA's Cuban operations would have given him such information. This brief investigation has not yielded a definitive answer. However, the following facts indicate Castro could have known of the operation. First; Castro's &tatemént on September 7 that “events of the Last few days" indicate the U.S. was possibly aiding terrorist groups’ plans to eliminaté the Leaders of the revolution is an accurate description of the CIA meetings with AMLASH. Second, the CIA received a report that Castro Was aware of AMLASH 's general sentiments. Third, CIA received information that employees of a Cuban Embassy suspected AMLASH was on scite Top Secret business. Fourth, CIA Learned that Cuban Embassy emplovees were angered by statements by AMLASH and others denigrating the revolution HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 54
53 , : 2 ' hoe Soe ten! ; Wettine ian « 7 during the time he was meeting with CIA case of Ftcérs CIA discovered at least one of its meetings with AMLASH was tinder surveillance by another intelligence service and CIA had to explain its actions to that service. Sixth, as late as Loe Stera analyst “ wrote speculating AMLASH might be a double agent’ and suggesting CIA compromise him; however the proposd1 apparently was not implemented. Seventh, the CIA received repeated reporté that its Cuban operations weré penetrated. For example one Cuban defector naitied a low level CIA agent who had been working for the Cubans for a long time and indicated there was a very highly placed Cuban intelligence agent in CIA's covert operations against Cuba. Finally, CIA's tontact with AMLASH was terminated in 1965 for reasons of Security. Thus; it is possible that Castro knew that CIA was meeting with. AMLASH and knew generaily. that AMLASH was dissatisfied with the regime. He could surinise the threat posed by CIA's meéting with AMLASH. — | 'c. Should CIA Have Disclosed the AMLASH Operation to the Warren * The case officer testified that AMLASH may have expressed to his friends his opposition to Castro arid admitted such conversations might have been overheard by others who would ndt have been receptive to. such comments. HY 50955 Docld:32423576 Page 55.
tinguished from knowledge of specific operations. The members and staff of the Warren Commission knew. Kennedy's policy towerd Cuba and knew CIA was involved. Allen Dullés; a member of the Warren Commission and former DCI, was completely familiar with operations conducted tintil his departure from the CIA in November L96L. He could have assumed that those operations continued. The more difficult question is who knew of Assassination attempts against Castro and who knew of details of the AMLASH opération. “John MeCone, then DCI, had been briefed about previous e assassination plots but denied knowledge of the AMLASH operation. Allen Dulles probably knew CIA had engaged in past attempts to kill Castro but there is no reason to believe he knew of the: AMLASH operation. * McCone testified he “had not related" assassination plots against CaStto involving the Mafia with Kennedy's assassination. McCone further testified that Allen Dulles was in a position to brief the Warren Commission generally on "any activities in the CIA" that might have been relevant to the investigation. Allen Dulles, my predecessor; was a member of the Warren Commission, and it seemed only natural that if there were any activities in the CIA that preceeded my taking office, which might ‘have in some way been responsible for this tragedy that, Allen Dulles would have Surfaced it with the Warren Commission; which he apparently. did net de. John MeCone Testimony, 10/9/75, p. 13. ‘ At HW 50955 Decld: 32423526 Page 56
+ ! ~ ft \; . ! ‘ ” The Select Committee's interim Report "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders" discusses at length who knew of CIA's assassination plots against Castro. So far as has been determined knowledge of plots involving the Mafia were known by a number of government officials outside CIA. For example, Hoover prepared a memorandum dated May 10, 1962, in which he recounted a private meeting he had with Attorney General Kennedy that day. Hoover noted: | . Maheu had been hired by CIA to approach Gian- canna with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire some gunman to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He further stated that CIA admitted having assisted Maheu in making the bugging -of Las Vegas. A copy of this memorandum was disseminated to Messrs. Tolson, Belmont, Evans, Sullivan, and DeLoach. Although these senior Bureau officials were in various capacities involved in the assass- ination investigation, the Committee has uncovered no evidence that the Warren Commission was ever informed of these plots. There is no indication in the documentary record made available to the Committee which even suggests that any Bureau official considered these plots 4 in connection with the assassination. Indeed, FBI documents do. not again reference these plots until February 1967. However, there is no evidence that the AMLASH operation -- far more relevant to thé Kennedy assassination than these earlier plots because it was underway in Fall 1963 -- was known outside CIA. * Similarly, CIA and FBI materials reviewed by the Committee do not reflect that the Bureau ever inquired during the course of the assassination investigation as to the details of the agencies’ Castro assassination plots or, more specifically, whether such plots were NY 50955 Qpekd: B2azR9P6 1 PapRO all of 1963.
Mr. Angleton testified he often met informally with Mr. Dulles during the Warren Commission's investigation. ~ He' and Dulles .dis¥: C ff “2 : cussed the Commission's inves tigation/and the,CIA'’s role. Mr. 4s Masiarhinal in Za: Angleton testified#h 10 Pek a gece? pr feel dovelorowd A meseyn. . wee te ete. Richard Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans and CIA c waste, yr liason with the Warren Commission, was informed about the AMLASH operation and approved Fitzgerald's being introduced to AMLASH as a representative of the Attorney General. Helms was questioned why he did not inform the Warren Commission of assassination plots Wy 0 Lang P (including both the attempts involving the Mafia and the AMLASH operation) since he had knowledge of both operations. Chairman. Since you had knowledge of the CIA involvement in these assassination plots against Castro, and knew it at the time . . . I would have thought .. . that ought to have been related to the Commission, because it does bear on motives, whatever else. x Mr. Helms. . . . Mr. Allen Dulles was a member of: the Warren Commission. And the first assassination plot happened during his time as director. What he said to the Warren Commission about this . . . I don't know. But at least he was sitting right there in (the Commis- sion's) deliberations and knew about this, and I am sure that the same thought that occurred to you must have occur- red to him. %*/ By] g yi Pn fo The “thought . . . that must have occurred to (Dulles)" in Helm's opinion would only have related to those assassination plans against Castro before 1961. Dulles did not know that in the Fali 1963 CIA offered AMLASH rifles with telescopic sights, told AMLASH that Robert Kennedy approved the scheme, and called his attention’ to one of President Kennedy's speeches as an indication of Kennedy's approval of AMLASH's proposal to eliminate Castro. Dulles did not know of key meetings with AMLASH held during the Fall of 1963, with the final meeting taking place at the very moment of the assassination. Helms also argued he did not think, the AMLASH operation x fers highip Leva T pats Limtbutte) 2/6 />b f° By. BA 90999 Beet 523429926,_ Page “Hestimony, 7/18/75, pp. 36-37.
was relevant to Kennedy's assassination. —_ ae 8 Questioned why he did not think ‘it important to give material about assassination plots to the Warren Commission, Helms indicated the Commission could have relied on public knowledge that the United States wanted "to get rid of Castro." I don't recall that I was either instructed or it occurred to me to cover with the Warren Commission the precise details of the Agency's operations not because I made-a significant judgment not to do this, but . . . -my recollec- tion at the time was that it was public knowledge that the United States was trying to get rid of Castro. —*/ Helms' assumption that early covert actions against Cuba which included assassination attempts “must have occurred to-! (Dulles)" is paradoxical to Helms' inability to recollect whether a 1963 plot which he authorized and which had a least chronological relevance to Kennedy's assassination "occurred" to him. When questioned why, in both positions of liaison with the Warren Commission and DDP, Helms did not inform the Warren Commission, Helms narrowly defined his position with the Warren Commission, Sen: Morgan. . . . €in 1963) you were not Loe. just an employee of the CIA. You were in the to echelon, the management level were you not? Helms. Yes, I was Senator Morgan Sen. Morgan.. . . you had been part of an assassination plot against Castro? Helms. I was aware that there had been efforts made to get rid of him by these means. Sen. Morgan. . . . you were charged with furnishing the Warren Commission information from the CIA, information that you thought was relevant? Helms. No sir, I was instructed to reply to inquiries from the Warren Commission for information from the Agency. [I MW 50955 DoelaRg7azatee HES Pestimony, 6/13/75, p. 82. | og
BRE Gh WwEkL bp was not asked to initiate any particular thing. Sen.-Morgan. . . . in other words (if) you weren't asked for it, you didn’t give it. Helms. That's right, sir. Both Helms and the case officer who met AMLASH have testified that no relationship existed between the AMLASH operation and the Kennedy assassination. Both.seemed to suggest: there was no reason for informing the Warren Commission about the operations -- the thought never crossed their minds. Helms testified as follows: Q. Now, after President Kennedy was assassinated in- November 1963, and after it became known to you that the individual, Lee Harvey Oswald, was believed very broadly to have done the shooting, that Oswald had had some activity in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee . did you hold any conversations with anybody about the _ possibility that the assassination of President Kennedy was a retaliation by Oswald against the activity, the talks and plans to assassinate Castro? A. Wo. TI don't recall discussing that with anybody. I don't recall the thought ever having occurred to me at the time. The first time I ever heard such theory as that enunciated was in a very peculiar way by President Johnson Q. ‘[ am not asking you about a story, Ambassador. I am asking you whether or not there was a relationship between Oswald's contacts with the: Cubans and his support for the Castro government, his attempts in September 1963 to get a passport to Cuba, to travel to Cuba, his attempts to penetrate anti-Castro groups. Did the connec- tion ever enter your mind? A. I don't recall its having done so. Richard Helms Testimony, Rockefeller Commission, 4/24/75, pp. 389-391. The AMLASH case officer testified that there was no discussion between him and Mr. Fitzgerald (his immediate superior) about any Link between the AMLASH operation and Kennedy's assassination; * AMLASH Case Officer Testimony, 2/11/76, Pp. 59-60. HY 50955 Docld:324234526 Page 60
however, he also testified he assumed that after the November 22 meeting with AMLASH the “whole Cuban operation was going to be reassessed after what happened to President Kennedy." Questioned if he ever made any link in his own mind between the AMLASH operation and the Kennedy assassination, the AMLASH case officer replied "none whatsoever" and suggested “that all the | public theories" have distortedthe context of the 1963 AMLASH operation. - The Case Officer insisted the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot and therefore there would be no reason ‘to make any connections; | | I have to preface what I have to say by saying ' that (the AMLASH operation) was not an assassina- tion plot, so there would be no reason why we would be connecting Kennedy's assassination with this assassination plot. (AMLASH operation) was not an assassination plot, it was not conceived as an assassination plot . . . so there was really in the context of the time the fact that this was not an assassination plot conceived as an assassination plot, there was really no reason to connect this one particular operation with the tragedy of President Kennedy. *  AMLASH Case Officer Testimony, 2/11/76, p. 76. **AMLASH Case Officer Testimony, 2/11/76, p. 87. With regard to his reference to "public theories,’ it is interesting to note the Case Officer testified he neither knew. in November 1963,nor does _ he now know that Oswald was pro-Castro. HW 50955 Decld: 32423526 Page 61
ig Bi su loy Fai ra ar of fice “nét ti fe standing, it does not seem credible that those at CIA knowledgeable The testimony of Mr. Helms and qe of the operation did not at least suspect there might be a relation- ship. Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that affirmative actions may have been taken to prevent those investigating the assassination from learning of the AMLASH operation. For example,.CIA files on AMLASH contain only the briefest report of the November 22 meeting with AMLASH. The case officer identified the document in the file as the report he prepared, but he could not explain why the type of the third page is dramatically lighter than that on the first.two pages. He explained its failure to mention the poison pen device by saying Fitzgerald probably ordered him to avoid mention of it in the report. Indeed, although the case officer's testimonyestablished the facts about the device, no existing document at CIA except for the 1967 L.G. Report, mentions it. Moreover, there is the documentary evidence, contradicted by the case officer's testimony, that CIA terminated the AMLASH operation specifically because of the Kennedy assassination. The 1967 1.6. Report and the case officer's testimony before the Select Committee point to the existence of a cable from CIA Headquarters to the case officer on the morning of November 23, ordering the case officer to break off contact with AMLASH and return to Headquarters. Neither the staff of the Committee nor the staff of the 1.G. in 1967 could locate this cable. The contents of such a cable might support the previously referenced 1965 summary of the AMLASH operation, which states the AMLASH "situation changed" when it was Learned the President had been assassinated. HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 62
6 Furthermore, the organization of CIA's investigation of the assassination and its work with the Warren Commission precluded dis- closure of the AMLASH operation. The case officer testified he knew of-no CIA investigation of a connection between the AMLASH operation and the assassination. | The AMLASH operation was the responsibility of the Special Affairs Staff headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. Although Mr. Fitz- gerald was nominally within the Western Hemisphere Division of the DDP and so answered to the head of that Division, J. C. King, Mr. Fitzgerald often worked directly with Mr. Helms especially on sensitive projects. For example, minutes of White House meetings in 1964 on Cuban operations show Mr. Fitzgerald's presence but not Mr. King's. Evidence available to the Select Committee is conflicting as to what Mr. King knew of the .Cuban operations and assassination plots. The case officer did not know if Mr. King knew; but it seems fair to assume. that Mr. King did not know of the AMLASH operation. For example, in a February 4, 1964 memorandum to AMLASH's case officer, King itemized intelligence requirements for AMLASH. This at least suggests that King was unaware of the September 1963 decision not to use AMLASH for intelligence and suggests he was unaware of the AMLASH operation. The case officer did not feel such a conclusion can be reached merely from the memorandum, but he did not recall receiving it. In any event the staff of SAS apparently was not put in direct contact with the Warren Commission. Mr. Angleton testified that "point of record" for the Warren Commission's contact with CIA was Mr. HY 50955 DBocld: 324235276 Page 63
Raymond Rocca of Angleton's staff. Rocca described himself as chief of research for matters of interest to the Warren Commission -- primarily Oswald's defection to Russia. Rocca had a staff of three who assisted him in. research. One conducted research on the Soviet services. . Another followed all FBI developments forwarded to CIA. And another handled Oswald's relationship to the DeMohrenschildts (a HY O50955 Decld: 324235276 Page 64
APT oe BDL wee tes aac Gd couple close to Oswald who were part of the Russian community in ~ Dallds) and he ‘followed overt references to Oswald and the Soviet services. Rocea said the Mexico City aspects of the investigation were handled by Mr. King and his desk chief, Mr. Jack Whitten, the latter usually reporting directly to Mr. Helms. ‘Helms, according to Rocca, was the major liaison with the Warren Commission and conducted any negotiation with Dulles or Rankin. Consequently, SAS was not involved in the day~to-day work on the assassination although, according to Angleton, it might respond to requests from Helms or Rocca. Thus, except for Helms, CIA personnel knowledgeable of the AMLASH operation were not in direct contact with the Warren Commission. However, SAS, it would seem, was the most logical office to be working on the-case in view of the fact that Oswald's activities since at least August 1963 had revolved around Cuba. For instance, he headed a one-man Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans. The FBI report of this sent to CIA was routed first to SAS, Counterin- telligence on November 15, 1963. Oswald attempted to join, and then argued with, members of an anti-Castro group. The CIA received. a message about this on November 22, 1963, through SAS from the WAVE station in Miami, CIA's response to the staff request for WAVE's files on Oswald was that there are none. | Indeed, the whole question of Cuban intelligence's role in the assassination could only have been analyzed by SAS's counterintelli- gence division -- a self-contained counterintelligence operation that was not under Mr. Angleton, CIA Chief of Counterintelligence. Whether intentional or not, CIA's exclusion of SAS from day-to- BDecld: 32423576 Page 65 ‘ ‘ day crantart with tha WMarrvan Cammiceaian nawilda canm tr khan af maine
significance, for it denied the Warren Commission ready access to: the CIA division with the most direct knowledge of both pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities, of the activity of Cuban intelligence, and of CIA's work with a high-level Cuban who planned to assassinate Castro. Finally, on a document which apparently is a biography of AMLASH and which mentions his contact with CIA is written, ‘Dec 1963, Not to leave this officer per [the case officer's] orders." All documents in this file are filed chronologically and this document appears with others bearing a December 1963 date. It probably was the top document in the AMLASH file in December 1963. The case officer testified that he did not recall giving such an order and he did not think such an order unusual. He testified that Fitzgerald indicated the AMLASH operation was very sensitive. Never- theless, he conceded that a request for the file would, by virtue. of this order, require that he be consulted before the file could be given out. It certainly seems possible that the order was given because Rocea and others investigating the assassination were requesting SAS files. Indeed, CIA personnel working on the investigation of Kennedy's assassination were almost immediately concerned with the connection be- tween Oswald and KGB and other Soviet personnel in Mexico City. On November 24, Mexico City station cabled all known contacts of certain Soviet personnel there. Among those contacts mentioned in the cable was AMLASH. Since all such names were presumably traced through CIA files, it seems likely that CIA personnel . investigating the assassina- tion would have requested all files on AMLASH. HY 50955 Dockld:32423526 Page 66 —
aoe 2. Of course, there are no documents indicating such a request was made or indicating the AMLASH file was turned over to CIA investigators. However, from the handwriting on the top document in the AMLASH file, one may infer that the investigators did not receive his file. 3, Mexico City Investigation On September 25, 1963, Oswald left New Orleans by bus and travelled to Mexico City, arriving there at 10:00 a.m. on Friday September 27. He left Mexico City on the morning of October 2 and travelled by bus to Dallas area, where he lived until the assassination. | After the assassination, intensive investigation by the FBI and by Mexican authorities produced little information about Oswald's activities while in Mexico City. The investigation determined the bus he took, the passengers on the buses (whom the FBI interviewed), his arrival and departure times, and the hotel he stayed in. One person interviewed by the FBI recalled seeing Oswald at the hotel when he left for Dallas and another saw him eating HW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 67
: oct | | tu GOthe @ lunch at a restaurant near the hotel. Otherwise, all information about’ Oswald's activities in Mexico City has come from the CIA and from documents furnished by the Cuban government to the Warren * Commission. Thus , although Oswald spent about five and a half days in Mexico City, CIA was the principal source of information about his activities there. On the surface, the information only indicated Oswald was in Mexico City. to obtain a visa to Russia with a stop-over in Cuba -- travel requiring he obtain the approval of both governments. It was this information which brought Oswald to CIA attention before the assassination. On October 8, 1963, the Mexico Station relying on this information reported to headquarters that Lee Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet consulate. Later in October, CIA-Headquarters passed this information with some background material from its files to the Navy, State Department and FBI: and the Mexico Station made a similar distribu- tion, including the background information it received from Head- quarters, to liaison contacts in Mexico City. Passing this informa- tion to these three agencies ended CIA's responsibility in the matter. Since Oswald was an American citizen and since FBI was the responsible * Documents furnished by the Soviets do not accord with this information from CIA. Infra. HY 50955 Bocld: 324235276 Page 68
agency, there seemed to be nothing further CIA could do. -The CIA: did obtain photographs of an American-looking male, in Mexico City at the time Oswald was there. The station reported his description to Headquarters, and asked for a photograph of Oswald to compare with the photograph of this man. After the assassination, the Station sent the photograph to Dallas and simultaneously realized from television pictures, the individual was not Oswald. CIA to this day maintains it does not know who this unidentified individual is. | In any event, after the assassination CIA concentrated most of its efforts on Soviet Embassy personnel in Mexico City who may have contacted Oswald and on other alleged contacts of Oswald there. The great mass of material the CIA holds on the assassination has precluded exhaustive analysis of the thoroughness of its investigation in Mexico City. The Select Committee staff, operating on the assumption that information received by CIA immediately after the assassination‘; probably the most reliable, analyzed: this information Closely. The staff attempted to determine what, if anything, was done to pursue the leads contained in this information. it must be remembered that both CIA Headquarters and the station in Mexico City were operating under tremendous pressures after the assassination and were receiving a great deal of irrelevant informa- oll se old £: Danes cae! o¢ Pe “fe estiebe
Meet OE lL lo aug) tigating the assassination, but only to note the unresolved leads. ‘Furthermore, the Warren Commission staff travelled to Mexico City and was given access to files there and at. Headquarters. The Committe. staff did not attempt the difficult and tedious job. of determining precisely what documents the Commission staff actually read or what documents it had access to. : There are summaries of the documents the Warren Commission staff reveiwed in Mexico City and from these summaries it seems the staff did not review many of the Station's files; but these summaries are not necessarily accurate or complete. In any event, the Select Committee's review of CIA files on Mexico City yields a different picture of Oswald's visit there than that painted in the public version of the Warren Report. Moreover, these documents disclose unusual activity by both the Soviets and Cubans in Mexico City, which may or may not relate to the assassina- tion, but.are, in the least, coincidental with it. Oswald went to the Soviet Embassy on September 27, sometime after arriving in the city. He visited the Cuban Consulate in the afternoon asking for a visa and indicating he had previously been to the Soviet consulate. He dealt with a Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate named Sylvia Duran. She attempted to determine whether the Soviets had granted a visa and learned they had not. She told Oswald he could not get a visa to Cuba for travel on to Russia unless he had the Russian visa first. This is substantiated by the documents furnished by the Cuban * We do know that the files we have reviewed may contain docu- ments not seen by the Warren Commission staff. HW 50955 Docld:324273576 Page 70
government. , . 3 Phe aie bi The next morning Oswald apparently visited the Soviet Consulate again and then went to the Cuban Consulate. He had to return to the Soviet Consulate later in the day to give the Soviets his "address" which the Cubans had. | a oo | There is no explanation for why Oswald had to get his address from the Cubans, nor is-it known whet éhr it-was his address in the “ United States or in Mexico City. - However, in 1967 Sylvia Duran reportedly said that she had sexual relations with Oswald. She denied this in 1963 when interrogated by Mexican authorities. Either on this day or the previous day, Oswald allegedly got into an argument with the Cuban consul, Asque. This fact was initially brought out in the interrogation of Duran by Mexican authorities immediately after. the assassination. It was substantiated by Oswald's letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington of November 9, 1963, in which he complainecabout the attitude of Asque. However, in mid- 1964, it was reported that Oswald had also told Asque that he intended to shoot Kennedy. A 1967 article in the National Inquirer and the Mexican newspaper, Novedades, reports an interview by a British journalist, Comer Clark, with Castro in which Castro said Oswald told Asque that he planned to shoot Kennedy. : Oswald may have met with the Soviet Consul and KGB agent, Yatskov, while in Mexico City. Oswald may also have met Vice-Consul and KGB agent Kostikov; Oswald's letter to the Soviet Embassy refers to a * The Warren Commission Report tends to suggest Oswald did not contemplate assassination until a mid-November slight by Marina. HY 50955 Docld: 324234526 Page 71
discussion with "Comrade Kostin." Oswald easily could have been confused or could have forgotten Yatskov's name, so there seems to be no significance in the fact he met .Yatskov. Kostikov is believed to have been in the KGB's 13th Department, specializing in sabotage and assassination. However, Kostikov, as part of his "cover' was responsible for issuing visas and CIA developed no evidence that Oswald's contact with Kostikov was other than for the purpose of obtaining a visa.’ | | Nothing is known about Oswald's: activities on September 29 or 30 -- although his visa application furnished by the, Cubans in- dicates he wanted to travel to Cuba on September 30.: The Cuban documents show his application was-not approved until October 27 and then only on the condition that he have a Soviet visa. On October 1, Oswald again contacted the Soviet Consulate about approval of his visa application. He was told there was no ray further information but a telegram had been sent to Washington. CIA developed no further information in Mexico City about Oswald until the assassination. But shortly after the shooting in Dallas the CIA learned ¢ at least one Cuban and one Communist Bloc official Y in Mexico City nepertedty said something to the effect that they knew "almost before “Kennedy.'' This possibly means word of Oswald's threat against Kennedy, expressed to Asque, had spread throughout ‘the Communist Bloc establishment in Mexico City before the assassina- tion. After the assassination CIA received a report from a source, later determined to be prone to exaggeration, that a reporter in * The Soviet Ambassador in Washington turned over to the State . . ; - om, ww 50995 Teeta Ass He fibes in the Washington Embassy and Consulate. There is no telegram or other message from Mexico City.
i i ' t ’ ’ Mexico ‘said the Cubans had met Oswald at a-restaurant on ‘the out- skirts of the city during his visit. ‘The Mexican reporter denied the story to FBI investigators. Employees of the restaurant were interviewed and, after being shown pictures of Oswald and various . Cuban officials, stated they could not recall seeing. them at the restaurant. The day after the assassination Mexican authorities arrested Sylvia Duran, the person Oswald contacted at the Cuban Consulate. Her arrest was strongly protested by the Cubans. Even if Cuba had no involvement with Oswald, the Cubans would be concerned about U.S. suspicions. In any event, the Cuban Ambassador met with Duran and reviewed what she had told the Mexicans. He then summarized what she told him in a report he sent to cuba. Despite this report the Cubans remained concerned about allegations Duran might tell somethine about "money" ‘and Oswald. Only after the Cubans were sure that she hadn't, did they decide it was safe to act on the information they had. Shortly after the assassination, CIA learned of unusual activi- ty on flights to Cuba. First, it was reported that a Cubana airline ‘ flight from Mexico City to Cuba in late afternoon on November 22 was delayed some five hours in order to take on an unidentified passenger who arrived in a small aircraft and who boarded the Cubana flight without passing through customs. No further information was ever received by CIA and there is no evidence that any further investigation was ever made. Second, an American of Cuban birth (referred to herein as rhe Cuban-American) was reported to have travelled from Tampa to Texas where he crossed into Mexico on November 23. On November 25, he arrived HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 73
in Mexico City and departed on a late evening flight to Havana on Navember 27. He was the only passenger on the Cubana airlines . flight which had a. crew of nine. Information available to CIA also indicated that Soviet couriers were engaged in "unusual travel between New York, Mexico City, and Havana .both before and immediately after the assassination. CIA drew no conclusion about this unusual activity. 3. Major Deficiencies in CIA's Investigation a. Nossenko . In repeated testimony before the Select Committee, Mr. James Angleton, who was head of CIA counterintelligence for 20 years, emphasized the strange case of the defector Nossenko as a basis for his concern about Warren Commission findings. Nossenko, a high level KGB officer, defected to the U.S. in early 1964. Among other things, he told a story of KGB's belief that Oswald was unstable and of KGB's resultant disinterest in Oswald during his stay in Russia. Nossenko claimed to have reviewed the complete KGB dossier on Oswald shortly . before his defection and assured interrogators that KGB had no connec- tion with Oswald. Mr. Angleton testified that neither he nor other CIA personnel responsible for Nossenko's interrogation believed him to be telling the truth -- in Mr. Angleton's parlance, Nossenko lacked bona fides. Current CIA counterintelligence officials, who strongly disagree with Mr. Angleton's policies generally, now assert that Nossenko is bona fides. HY 50955 Docld: 324234526 Page 74
J? : d (fF? a Of ke Thus there is a difference in opinion between the STEN te spence experts as to the reliability of Nossenko's story. If Nossenko is not bona Fides but is instead a plant, then ‘there is a very troubling question as to why he defected and as to why- his story exonerates the-KGB from a role in the assassination. Per- haps his defection was designed to give CIA incorrect information on many aspects of the ; KGB's operation -- in which case his story about Oswald could still be true. .However, there seem to be inconsistencies between his knowledge of the Oswald case and the known information about Oswald. For example, he claimed to have reviewed the entire KGB file on Oswald, yet he had no knowledge of Oswald's visit to Mexico City other than the bare fact that he went there. He did not tell interrogators, what surely must have been in Oswald's file, that whe rae Oswald met Yatskov and Kostikov ~-- both KGB agents. In any event, the Nossenko defection remains as mysterious now as it was in 1964. b. Pursuit of the Cuban Connection With substantial evidence pointing to Cuban involvement. in the assassination, CIA would logically have been expected to use its resources to conduct a vigorous investigation of that connection. “fast did not happen. . The Mexico City Station informed Headquarters immediately after the assassination that the Mexican government, like CIA, knew that Oswald had met with Sylvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate. It - - ¢ , ° : - . . i ; j H rans * This is the same deficiency in the documents furnished by the Soviet Ambassador. HY 50955 Docld: 324234526 Page 75 1
further cabled that the Mexican authorities planned to arrest and inter- rogate Duran: Upon learning this Mr. Karamessines, then assistant to. DDP Helms , ordered Mr. Whitten of the Mexican desk of the Western Hemisphere Division to telephone the Chief of Station on an open line to call off the arrest. The telephoned order was too late for Duran had already been arrested. However, Whitten did not agree with the order and wrote a memorandum for record stating that he. carried out the order despite his personal objection to it. Later that day, a’ message From Headquarters cautioned Mexico City Station about the interrogation of Duran because “it could jeopardize U.S. freedom on the whole question of Cuban responsibility." Neither Mr. Karamessines nor Mr.. Whitten. have been questioned about this order, but Mr. Angleton testified he was-umaware-of—it--and cannot understand why it was issued. . More importantly, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Thomas Mann, apparently was at this time extremely interested in investigating the role of the Cubans. CIA cables from Mexico reveal: he was exerting pressure on CIA, FBI and State Department personnel to investigate the Cuban connection. He proposed that Mexican authorities arrest Maria Louisa Caleron, a Cuban consulate employee, and the Cuban Consul Mirabil. The Chief of Station cabled headquarters about this pressure and warned of the ''flap potential" of the Ambassador's continuing along his line of investigation. The Chief of Station 1s now dead so he cannot explain the meaning of his cable. The FBI representative in Mexico City who sat in on meetings with the Am- bassador and Chief of Station testified that he was not aware of HW 50955 Doecld: 327429526 Page T6
x f t . . ; ; los i > rr a ree ae aa any CIA reluctance to pursue Cuban involvement; ‘and, ‘he’ expressed surprise that the Chief of Station sent such a message to Head- quarters. Moreover, Director McCone's calendar reveals he met with Ambassador Mann and Mr. King on December 13, 1963 in Washington. The Select Committee has not yet been able to obtain records of this HYW 50955 meeting. Indeed very little is known about the actions of the Cuban diplomatic/intelligence personnel in Mexico City either before or after the assassination. Unlike the Soviet KGB personnel, Cuban intelligence officers were not closely watched by CIA. Maria Louisa Calderon, who was alleged to have been in contact with Oswald, moved her residence on the afternoon of the assassination and moved into the Cuban Embassy after the arrest of Duran. She returned to Cuba on December 13. Furthermore, CIA undertook a major review of its Cuban policy immediately after the assassination. In early December, Head- quarters first approved and then called off several operations against Cuba. CIA's Florida station ("WAVE") complained about the confusing orders, but Headquarters assured WAVE that everything depended upon the high level review of Cuban/Caribbean policy. Indeed White House documents of January 1964, note that orders had been issued in early December 1963 delineating the types of operations that could be conducted pending final decision by the President as to future Cuban policy. CIA has not yet given the staff access to its files on this review process. | Throughout January, February, and March, review at the White House level continued. Notes of discussions at these meetings are quite detailed, but the AMLASH operation was never mentioned by Docla: 32425576 Page Ft
soa mame, nor so far as we can determine, by even a general description. There, is no reference in these notes to the events of the Fall of 1963, although almost every other CIA operation is detailed. In November 1964, AMLASH was again in. contact with CIA through an intermediary and the White House staff was duly informed of this. However, the staff was only told that AMLASH had been working for CIA since 1961 and had provided valuable information. ‘The staff was not told that CIA had met AMLASH in’ connection with a coup or assassination attempt. | Memoranda for Record prepared by Director McCone of his meetings with President Johnson from November 22, 1963 through January 31, 1964, were reviewed by the staff of the Select Committee. There is no mention in. those memoranda of the AMLASH operation or the possibility that CIA plots. against Castro prompted him to re- taliate. | In 1967, Mr. Helms orally briefed President. Johnson on the CIA L.G. report on assassination. . Helms‘ handwritten notes prepared for the briefing do not refer to any activity after mid-1963 although the 1.G.'s report detailed the AMLASH operation 2s an assassination - plot. As previously mentioned, Mr. Helms has testified he did not regard the AMLASH operation generally as an assassination plot. HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 78
Hy ce. -Sbdecial Affairs Staff Information on Cuban Groups As mentioned previously, CIA was engaged in a variety of covert operations against Cuba. At Headquarters, the Special Affairs Staff was. responsible for Cuba. The WAVE station in Florida actually car- ried out the operations. WAVE had at least two major ties to the Cuban exile community. First, it employed: exiles in CiA-controlled operations against Cuba. Cuban exiles were used as members of agent teams landed in Cuba and as the crews of boats and aircraft supporting operations. . Necessarily, WAVE personnel were actively recruiting Cuban exiles for these operations and probably had a great deal of information about Cuban exile groups. | Second, WAVE apparently had responsibility for liaison contact with the two “autonomous groups." Both of these groups had extensive contacts in the Cuban exile community. Despite WAVE's potential for assisting in the investigation of’ the assassination -- especially regarding Oswald's connection with Cuban exiles and allegations he was seen in the company of Mexicans or Cubans -- WAVE was not directed to give such assistance. Although the Warren Commission requested FBI to furnish what in- formation it held.on various Cuban groups, it made no similar request of CIA. The Select Committee has not been able to learn why the Commisssion did not make such a request -- particularly significant in view of the fact that FBI's response noted CIA might have an operational interest in Cuban groups. In any event, a large and possibly fruitful area of investigation, the CIA's ties to Cuban groups, was not investigated by the Warren Commission or the CIA. 50955 DBocld: 324234526 Page 79
d. The Cuban-American As mentioned previously, CIA learned that the Cuban-American crossed the border from Texas into Mexico on November 23. CIA knew that the border had been closed by Mexican authorities immediately after the assassination and reopened on November 23, so such a crossing was itself cause for investigation. The Cuban-American arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed in a hotel until the evening of November 27, when he departed on a late evening Cubana airlines flight to Havana, using a Cuban "courtesy visa" and an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on that flight, which had a crew of nine. In March 1964, CIA received a report that a source alleged the Cuban-American had received his-permit to enter Mexico on November 20 in Tampa, Florida. The same source also said the Cuban-American was somehow "involved in the assassination." There is no indication that CIA followed-up on this report. The FBI did investigate this individual after receiving CIA's report of his unusual travel. The FBI's investigation terminated after publication of the Warren Report, because the Cuban-American was then in Cuba and so outside the FBI's jursidiction. The FBI's reports on the Cuban-American are confusing and ducuuplete but they are the only available information about him. ine following information is taken from those reports. The Cuban-American applied for a U.S. passport at the U.S. Consul Office in Havana on June 2, 1960. He presented proof that his mother was an American citizen although she moved to Cuba with her parents HY 50955 Docld:3274734576 Page 60
vy) re : ap es : . : . ; : a4-e af : when she was eight months old. She married the:,CubartiAmerican's 2 th Sey father, a Cuban national in 1939 and the Cuban-American was born -in 1940. His mother, in documents submitted with his application for passport indicated she planned to remain in Cuba. On July 13, 1960, the Cuban-American was issued a “passport, but it was only valid until January 25, 1963, the date he would become 23 years old. The Cuban-American requested Cuban authorities to permit him to return to Cuba on May 15, 1962. The Cuban-American's cousin said the Cuban-American had spent several weeks in Cuba and apparently he did travel there sometime after May 15, 1962. | In August 1962, the Cuban-American married an American woman, ll years his elder. They lived in Key West until June 1963, when they moved to Tampa. In August 1963, his wife moved back to Key West because of marital problems. His wife and others characterized the Cuban-American as pro-Castro. The Cuban-American allegedly told FBI's sources that he had origin- ally left Cuba to evadegitititary service, but Selective Service records disclosed that he registered for the diraft on July 29, 1960, at Key West -- shortly after his arrival in the U.S. He was classified 4-F on February 23, 1962, because of a language barrier HY 50955 and because he hada physician's letter stating he had grand mal epilepsy. Nevertheless, some sources told FBI that the Cuban- American had returned to Cuba in 1963 because he feared being drafted. Others attributed his return to his worry about his parents or about his own health. BDecld: 32423576 Page 61
It was also reported to FBI that the Cuban-American Shad a “SrBther in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union. On November 17, 1963, according to several sources, the Cuban- American was at a get-together at the home of a member of the Tampa Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, where color slides of Cuba were shown.. [T]here was some talk about [the Cuban-American] having been at the residence for some time waiting for.a tele- phone call from Cuba which was very important. It was understood that it all depended on his getting the "go ahead order" for him to leave the United States. He indicated he had been refused travel back to his native Cuba... .. */ On November 20, 1963, the Cuban-American obtained a Mexican tourist card at the Honorary Consulate of Mexico in Tampa. He crossed the border into Mexico at Nuevo Laredo on November 23. Apparently because the Cuban-American was not -listed as the driver of any vehicle crossing the border that day, FBI concluded he crossed in a privately owned automobile owned by another person. On December 10, 1963, at the regular monthly meeting of the Tampa ‘FPCC, a woman told the group that she had telephoned Cuba at 5:00 a.m. and learned the Cuban-American had arrived there safely via Texas and Mexico. On January 16, 1964, the same woman reportedly said he had borrowed $190 prior to his leaving for Mexico. On September 3, 1964, a source who told FBI that he was acquainted with the Cuban-American said he borrowed $150 for his travel but repaid only $25. Another source reported that as of September 1964, the’ Cuban-American was not working in Cuba but spent a great deal of time playing dominoes. ate vas ' President Kennedy made several public appearances in Tampa on Hy 50955" D ech a ead Fa26 Page 62
The preceding was the extent of the FBI's and CIA's investi- gation. So far as’ we can determine, neither FBI nor CIA told the Warren Commission about the Cuban-American's strange travel. Warren Commission files contain an excerpt of the FBI's check on the Cuban-American at the Passport Office, but nothing else. In responding to the Commission's request for information on the Miami chapter of FPCC,.FBI mentioned the Tampa chapter had 16 members in 1961 and was active in May 1963. The FBI response did not mention the Cuban-American or the November and December 1963 meetings. Moreover, a possible connection between Oswald and the Tampa chapter of FPCC was already indicated. Oswald applied to V. T. Lee, national president of the FPCC, for a charter for a New Orleans chapter. Lee wrote Oswald on May 29, 1963, suggesting Oswald get in touch with the Tampa chapter, which V. T. Lee had personally organized. Thus, the suspicious travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investigation than FBI conducted and the results should have been volunteered to the Warren Commission, repardless of its failure to request the information. © C/A ampdasee tek heh Hho US Pager! fect - fee a det b, Decent We 3 lly BLE OF, Ble Ag Ailal bald fy mg /9§ J a ce fect f! or lube 14. oa bul hon ndirvlee i, yA A: “eat Ln Wig Wife trek» HW 50955 Docld:32423596 Page 83
THE FBI'S ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION Preliminary Discussion The FBI's investigation of the assassination was a massive effort. Literally thousands of leads were followed by hundreds of agents, many of whom during the days immediately following the assassination worked round the clock. The investigative files total over five hundred and ninety volumes of materials. Although the “ommittee reviewed FBI materials in areas where allegations of disclosure or ‘investigative difficiencies had been advanced, existing limitations of personnel and time precluded Committee review of the Bureau's entire investigative effort. Rather, than randomly selecting for examination a limited number of other substantive investigative areas, the Fommittee directed the staff to review documents and examine Bureau employees to determine whether there were any limitations placed on the assassination investigation, or whether the Bureau withheld evidence from the Warren Commission. the Committee began this aspect of ies investigation with the impression -- subsequently confirmed -- that the Warren Commission had not been informed of the CIA's attempts on Fidel Castro's life. Whether knowledge of these attempts, or existing Bureau activities, or the Bureau's relationship with the Commission, is likely to have affected the process . by which information flowed from the Bureau to the Commission or.the Bureau's assassination investigation, is discussed in HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 64
Se ny wets bid in next three sub-sections of this chapter. The remaining sub-sections consider certain aspect of the Bureau's investigative efforts in Dallas, Mexico City, and New Orleans. HW 50955 Docld:324235296 Page 85 ,
(a) The internally admitted investigative deficiencies in “ the Bureau's’ handling of the pre-assassination Oswald case : Immediately after the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover instructed that a complete analysis be made of “any investi- gative deficiencies in the Oswald case." By memorandum dated December 10, 1963, Assistant Director J. H. Gale (Inspection Division) reported that there were a number of investigative and reporting delinguencies in the handling of the Oswald case as follows: Oswald should have been on the Security Index; his wife should have been interviewed before the assassination, and investigation intensified --. not held in abeyance ~~ after ‘Oswald contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico. In the paragraph immediately preceding the section of the report which sets forth Mr. Gale's recommendations for disci- plinary actions, he observes: Concerning the administrative action recom~ mended hereinafter, there is the possibility that the Presidential Commission investigating instant matter will subpoena the investigating Agents. If this occurs, the possibility then exists that the Agents may be questioned con- cerning whether administrative action had been taken against them. However, it is felt these possibilities are sufficiently remote that the recommended action should go forward at this time. It appears unlikely at this time that the Commission's subpoenas would go down to the Agent level. to which Mr. Hoover noted: "In any event such gross incompe- tency cannot be overlooked nor administrative action postponed." HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 66
~ The following addendum to Mr. Gale's report was written Sonat vate j * © - oF As, ie Bote ee by Assistant Director Cartha D. DeLoach: I recommend that the suggested disciplinary action be held in abeyance until the findings of the Presidential Commission have been made public. This action is recommended inasmuch as any “Leak” to the general public, or particularly to the communications media, concerning the FBI. taking disciplinary action against its personnel with respect to captioned matter would be assumed as a direct admission that we are responsible for negligence which might have resulted in the . assassination of the President. At the present time there are. so many. wild rumors, gossip, and speculation that even the slightest hint to out- siders concerning disciplinary action of this nature would result in considerable adverse re- action against the FBI. I do not believe that any of our personnel will be subpoenaed. Chief Justice Warren has indicated he plans to issue no subpoenas. There is, however, the possibility _that the public will learn of disciplinary action being taken against our personnel and, therefore, start a bad, unjustifiable reaction, immediately below which Mr. Hoover noted: "I do not concur." On December 20, 1963, 17 Bureau employees (5 field investigative, agents, 1 field supervisor, 3 special agents in charge, 4 headquarters supervisors, 2 headquarters section chiefs, 1 inspector, and 1 assis- tant director) were disciplined (i.e., censured and/or placed on pro- bation) for “shortcomings in connection with the investigation of Os- wald prior of some of to the assassination." Although the transferring these agents was discussed at that time, certain transfers were held in abeyance until the issuance of the Warren Commission' 3 HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Ss report on September 24, 1964. * Menage wre Ad At freer ah + by. Ge ie hy C, io 4S on ) 9/30/% y . en oN , Page 67
H Reo tO, One of the. investigative shortcomings idéntified by ... ° if “ , as AS eae Assistant Director Gale was the failure to include Oswald's ‘ name on the Security Index.* Indeed, of the seventeen agents, ‘supervisors, and senior officials who were disciplined, not a single one believed that Oswald met the criteria for the Secu- “b The rity Index. In this regard AssistantaDirector Alan Belmont noted in an addendum to Mr. Gale! s. 12/10/63 memorandum that: It is significant to note that alli of. the ‘supervisors and officials who came into con- tact. with this case at the seat of government, as well as agents in the field, are unanimous in the opinion that Oswald did not meet the criteria for the Security Index. If this is. so, it would appear that the criteria are not sufficiently specific to include a case such as Oswald's and, rather than take the posi- tion that all of these employees were mis-~ taken in their judgment, the criteria should be changed. This has now been recommended by Assistant Director Gale. Mr. Hoover made the following handwritten notations next to Mr. Belmont's addendum: "They were worse than mistaken"; "Certainly no one in full possession of all his faculties can claim Oswald didn't fall within this criteria." * The Security Index and the criteria pursuant to which names are selected for inclusion are discussed in detail on pages 195-199 of Tab D of the Committee's Domestic Report. With respect to the Oswald case, however, it is important to understand that under the procedures then in effect, the inclu- sion of Oswald on Security Index would not have resulted in the dissemination of Oswald's name to the Secret Service. HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 68
On September 24, 1964 -- the same day the Warren Commis- Sion's report was officially released ~- Assistant Director William C. Sullivan: wrote: In answer to the question as to why Lee Harvey Oswald was not on the Security Index, based on the facts concerning Oswald which were available prior to his assassination ‘of the President, it was the judgment of the agents handling the case in Dallas and New Orleans. . The Dallas field supervisor and the SAC in New Orleans as well as supervisors at the Seat-of Goverment that such facts did not warrant the inclusion of Oswald in the Security Index. The matter has, of course, been re-examined in the Bureau and Mr. Gale by memorandum 12/10/63 expressed the opinion that Oswald should have been placed on the Security Index prior to 11/22/63. ‘The Director concurred with Mr. Gale's opinion and administrative action has been taken.* Mr. Hoover's handwritten notations on the above-quoted Sullivan memorandum were with respect to the Bureau personnel who failed to include Oswald on the Security Index, "They could not have been more stupid," and with respect to administrative action, "And now that the Bureau has been debunked publicly I intend to take additional administrative action." Special Agent Hosty testified before the Warren Commission gS. . on May f, 1964. He had previously requested to talk to Mr. Hoover, and he learned from Assistant-Direster Alan Belmont on the morning of May 6, 1964, that he would be allowed to see the Director later that day. According to SA- Hosty, the *Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 9/29/64. HY 50955 Bocld: 32423576 Page 69
HW 50555 Dag rd: 32423526 Page 90 Abe, . . a pi eet . YE \ Fl ya 120 fom al Pan 2 UP by is hed; Hee ctor could not have been more pleasant i $* Hosty estrited "Cony Pram wonton dts prank Tart At fed © me Ghat—E-red nothing to worry Fo is exactly what_S& Hosty recounted to SAC Gordon Shanklin upon his return’ to Dallas.** Mr. Hoover's version of the meeting differs con~ siderably from S&Hosty's. According to the Director: [I] discussed with him the situation which had devéloped in Dallas .. . and of embarrassment which had been caused, *** On September 28, 1964 -- some four days after the issuance of the Commission's report -- eight of the Bureau employees against whom disciplinary action had been taken in December of 1963 were again censured and/or put on probation (and some this time transferred) for reasons identical to those that led to action being taken against them in December 1963. In addition to the above eight, three other employees who had not been disciplined | as a result of the Oswald case in December 1963 were disciplined as follows: -1) A Special Agent in Dallas was censured and placed on probation for failing to properly handle and supervise this matter: 2) An inspector at FBI HQ was censured for not exercising sufficient imagination and foresight to initiate action to have Security Index. material disseminated to Secret Service; 3) An Assistant. to the Director at FRI HQ was’'censured for his overall responsibility in this entire matter %*! Testimony of J. Gordon Shahklin, December 20, 1975, p. Posig , pfs / rs, Przt. - f. fdas
x, j a ‘ . oa RP By lhe 4 In a memorandum disseminated to senior bureau officials on October 12. 1964, Mr. Hoover noted: There is no-question in my. mind but that we failed-in carrying through some of the most salient aspects of the Oswald investigation. It ought to be a lesson to all, but TI doubt if some even realize it now. J. Edgar Hoover did not believe that the fact of discipli- nary action would ever become known outside the Bureau, It did not until October 1975. Neither the testimony of FBI personnel nor the materials made available to the Commission suggest the slightest investigative deficiency in the Buréau's pre-assassina- tion Oswald case. Indeed, the record gives just the opposite impres- sion. However, the documentary record made available to the Committee reveals that Bureau offictals were continually concerned with the it possibility that the FBI might be regarded as "responsible for negligence that resulted in the assassination of President Kenneedy because of pre-assassination investigative deficiencies in the Oswald case.''* sous? Memorandum from Assistant-Btrrector Alan H. Belmont to {LhesLiekantere-rtre Director Clyde Tolson, 10/1/64. Cf. Discus- sion, infra, subsection (b). HY 50955 Bocld: 324235276 Page 91
frie o eof Ma te - ¥ Py (b) ~The Bureau's: perception of the Warren Commission 2d GMeadbersary. Not only was the Bureau subjected to its first major public criticism in years for its handling of the pre assassination case; a majority of Americans were skeptical of the Bureau's stated in- vestigative findings that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted alone. The Warren Commission itself noted in its report that: "Because of the numerous rumors and theories, the public interest in insuring the truth was ascertained could not be met by merely : adopting the reports on’ the. analysis of Federal or state agencies." Assuming, arguendo, that the Warren Commission reported either ‘that the Bureau's handling of the pre assassination Oswald case was deficient in some manner, the FBI would have been open to em- barrassment and criticism: and charged with responsibility for the assassination. Given this possibility and J. Edgar Hoover's known hostility and established reactions to either criticism or embarr-_ assment (be it personal or of the Bureau), it is not at all sur- prising that from its inception Mr. Hoover, and therefore the Bureau, perceived the Commission as an adversary. J. Edgar Hoover had, by November 23, 1963, informed President Johnson of the Bureau's preliminary investigative findings: viz., (2) a that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted alone. In a (1) Warren Commission Report, p. X. (2) 2 shud aloo be. yoksl Fhet, ay letter tethe Warren Commission dated December 9, 1963, Deputy. Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach recommended that the Commission make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a loner. DeLoach had apparently learned of Katzenbach's letter from a Commission member. Memorandum from C. D. DeLoach to HY 50955 doch BSeoabsd 14482 ‘92 , a
7 - rf a ag FEE November 9, 1963,’ memorandum, Mr. Hoover recounts a telephonetoff- versation he had that day with President Johnson: The President called. and asked if I am familiar with the proposed group they are trying to get to study my report - two from the House, two from the Senate, two from. the courts, and a couple of outsiders. I replied that I had not heard of that but had seen reports from the Senate Investigating Committee. - The President stated he wanted to get by just with my file and’my report. I told him | I thought it would be very bad to have a rash of investigations. He then indicated the. only way to stop it is to appoint a high level comm- ittee to evaluate my report and tell the House and Senate not to go ahead with the investi- gation. I stated that would be a three-ring circus. . ved # I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation wrapped up today but probably won't have it before the first of the week as an. angle in Mexico is giving trouble - the matter of Oswald's getting $6,500 from the Cuban Embassy and coming. back to this country with it; that we are not able to prove that fact; that we have information he was there on September 18 and we are able to prove he was in New Orleans on that date; that a story came in changing the date to September 28 and he was in Mexico on the 28th. I related that the police have again arrested Duran, a member of the Cuban. Embassy; that they will hold her two or three days; will confront her with the orig- inal informant and will also try a lie detector test on her. a a) KR OR The President then indicated our conclusions are: he is the one who did it;. . . whether he was connected with the Cuban operation with HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 93
Fz apie NE 43. i money we are trying to nail down. I told him that is what we are trying to nail down; that we have copies of the corres- pondence; that’ none of the letters dealt with any indication of violence or assassi- nation; that they were dealing with a visa to go back to Russia. , On November 29, 1963, President Johnson issued the executive order establishing the Presidential commission. Bureau documents reflect that each time Hoover received word that a particular person was being considered for the Commission or its staff, he asked to be informed as to “what the Bureau had" on the individual. Although derogatory information pertaining to members and staff was brought to Mr. Hoover's attention, the Bureau has informed the Committee staff that there is no documentary evidence which indicates that such information was ever disseminated a. >, BMA Ne Lenten On December 10, 1963, Hoover informed Asststent—Bicector Alan Belmont that he would be "personally' responsible for reviewing every piece of paper that went to the Warren Commission." Hoover also designated Inspector James Malley -- who had previously cosupervised the field investigation in Dallas along with SAG Shanklin -- as the Bureau liaison with the Warren Commission. In a memorandum re- counting the December 10 meeting during which Malley was briefed (3) The Committee and the Bureau defined their terms, such that “dissemination" includes informing the person himself of the derog- atory information. Additionally, in order to ensure the protection of individual privacy, the Committee. directed the staff not to request access to any derogatory information. HW 50955 DBocld: 324235276 Page $4
as to his my re new assignment, the Director wrote, Wiles By I told Mr. Malley that I wanted him to establish the closest and most amiable working relationship with Mr. Rankin. I told him that I had personally: known Mr. Rankin quite well since he had served as Solicitor General under Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers. , I also alerted Mr. Malley that there were indications that the Chief Justice, who headed the Presidential Commission, was endeavoring to find fault with the FBI and certain inform-- ation had been leaked by the Chief Justice to Drew Pearson which was critical of the FBI's functioning in Dallas prior to the assassina- tion. IT told Mr. Malley and Mr. Belmont that the Chief Justice has now demanded all of the so- called "raw' reports upon which the FBI report of the assassination was predicated, and in doing so the Chief Justice had characterized the FBI report as being in "skeleton form." I stated the Chief Justice had further added in his statement. to the press: ‘In order to evaluate it we have to see the materials on which the report was prepared.'' I stated that this statement by the Chief Justice I felt was en- tirely unwarranted and could certainly have been phrased better so as not to leave the impression; at least by inuendo, that the FBI had not done a thorough job... On January 28, 1964, Lee Rankin met with Hoover at the Commiss- ion's direction.to discuss the allegation that Oswald was.an FBI informant. According to a Hoover memorandum of January 31, 1964: ‘Rankin stated that the Commission was concerned as to how this matter. could be re- solved, and it was for this reason that they asked him to see me. He stated that the Commission did not desire to initiate an in- vestigation on the outside. . . as it might appear the Commission was investigating the FBI. HY 50955 Docld: 324234526 Page 95
“4 + bad Je FON fem xs er a dd ees SER . os Sa tyre tal ; . ee - I told Mr. Rankin that Lee Harvey Oswald was never at any time a confidential informant, under- cover agent,.or even a source of information for the FBI, and I would like to see that clearly stated on the record of the commission and I would be willing to so state under oath. I commented to him that I had not appreciated what I interpreted as carping criticism by the Chief Justice when he referred to the Bureau's report originally furnished to the Commission as being a ‘skeleton report." Throughout the Warren Commission's existence, Mr. Hoover was kept informed on a daily basis by Alan Belmont as to (1) the internal Commission meetings and decisions; (2) the areas in which the Commiss~ - ion was requesting information or further FBI. investigation, and (3) (4) the materials which the Bureau intended to provide to the Commission. On various occasions, Mr. Hoover learned that the Commission members and/or staff members had stated that they were impressed with the testimony of Bureau personnel and the investigation conducted by the (5) Bureau, His handwritten notation on an April 4, (1964, memorandum succinctly states his usual response to such complimentary remarks: I place no credence in any complimentary remarks made by Warren nor the Commission. They were looking for FBI "gaps" and having found none yet they try to get sympathy. .In his April 3, 1964 memorandum to William Sullivan, William Branigan eee e eee ee ee a snannnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnannnnnnannnnananannansr nar de —rTnanans, (4) See, e.g., memorandum from €. D. DeLoach to J. Mohr, 12/12/63; memorandum from A. Rosen to A. Belmont, 4/6/644 (5) See, e.g., memorandum from, A. Rosen to A. Belmont, 4/4/64. PRL dawns alae woul Ma diylbln ACMA passe cofpngelie 2 LAE iS Ub he Keitel aba, Zhe é Me igeer LOL! ager wel tir Oe. Ltt bie Guvaar CMH 's wpe ah La Wp, dng: Liv abe lo pe ae gi LaF! * 9? based? ¥y oo Li Md, Me's what ar connpetan © WW 50955 Déerd: 32423526 Page 96/ CG " , 2 ORS )
wrote While complimenting the Bureau for its cooperation, the President's Commission, by letter dated 3-26-64, forwarded what purports to be 30 questions (by actual count there are _52 as some of the enumerated questions have ‘more than one part) to which they request a reasoned response in reasonable detail and with such substantiating materials as seem appropriate. , The questions are those of a cross-examin- ing attorney and it is evident that this is a cross-examination of the FBI or a part of it. in the case of the assassination of President Kennedy. Mr. Hoover noted on the memorandum, "Their so-called compliments of the Bureau's work are empty and have no sincerity." Similarly, upon being informed that the Commission intended. to send two of its staff members to Mexico City, the Director “expressed concern as to how lawyers on the Commission could spot gaps in our investigation." As is more fully discussed in subsection (c), supra, Special Agent Hosty met with Hoover the day after Hosty's Warren Commission testimony. On that occasion, Mr. Hoover mentioned that "the Warren Commission would exonerate the FBI completely" and that indications were that "the Commission would vote five to two in the Bureau's (7) favor." (6) (7) Testimony of SA James P. Hosty, Jr., 12/5/75, p. 68. wen HY 50955 Bocld: 324235276 Page oF
a7 PNP om, aot ie ae ~The Commission did not "exonerate the FBI completely" and, in fact, criticized certain aspects of the FBI's handling of the Oswald pre assassination case and the Bureau's failure to inform the Secret’ Service of Oswald's presence in Dallas, Texas. For example, the Commission concluded that the "FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence (8) - ‘work, prior to the assassination. (8) Warren Commission Report, p. 443, HY 50955 Docld:324234526 Page 96
(c) ..The Bureau's Reaction to the Warren Cominiis gion Report Upon receipt on September 25, 1964, of a copy of “the Warren Commission's Report, the Director noted: "I want this carefully reviewed as it pertains to FBI shortcomings by Gale. Chapter 8° tears us to pieces."' On September 29, 1964, Mr. Hoover, after reading a Washington’ Post article captioned "Praise is Voiced for Staff Engaged on Warren Report," directed that the Bureau's files on the 84 staff members listed in the article "be checked." By memo- randum dated October. 2, 1964, the Director was informed that "Bureau files contain derogatory information concerning the following (1) individuals and their relatives." On September 30, 1964, Assistant Director Gale pre- Assoup7. DSminya- sented Assistant-tethe Director Clyde Tolson with a memorandum that reviewed the Commission Report “as it pertained to FBI shortcomings." (1) On November 8, 1966, memoranda were furnished to Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to President Johnson, at his request, setting forth background information -- including derogatory materials -~ on seven private citizens who-wrote unfavorable articles concerning the Warren Commission findings. A February 3, 1975, FBI memorandum which dis- cusses these memoranda and their dissemination in 1966 to the White House recounts: No information was developed or furnished to the White House concerning immoral conduct on the part of the seven above listed critics of the Warren Commission with the exception of the information furnished regarding [identity of individual deleted for reasons o privacy. ] fu~ HY 50955 Docld: 324234526 Page 99
The memorandum is: captioned "Shortcomings in handling of Lee Harvey Oswald matter by FBI personnel." Gale wrote: The Commission has now set forth in a very- damning manner some of the same glaring weak- nesses for which we previously disciplined our personnel such as lack of vigorous investigation after we had established that Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. Gale notes instances where the testimony of FBI agents makes the Bureau look ridiculous and taints its public image.'' These instances include, inter alia, the following: One agent testified that conditions in the Dallas police station at the time of .detention and interrogation of Oswald weré not "too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, may- be like Yankee Stadium: during the World Series games.'' It is questionable whether the agent should have described conditions in such an ed- itorializing and flamboyant manner but rather should have indicated conditions were crowded. More importantly, Gale's memorandum reveals a dichotomy between the Bureau's “public position" and what Bureau officials regarded as the truth: The Commission report indicates that we did not have a stop on Oswald's passport with the De- partment of State and did not know Oswald applied for a passport in June 1963, to travel to Western European countries, Soviet Union, Finland and Poland. This is another specific example of how this case was improperly investigated. The same personnel are responsible for this example as were previously criticized for not using appro- priate techniques and making a more vigorous and thorough investigation, to determine with whom Oswald in contact or whether he had intelligence HY 50955 Docld:327423576 Page 100
perce ete NT at . cy ey N n r he , t 4 oa assignment. The Bureau _ by letter to the Commission indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop ‘on the passport as our investigation disclosed no.evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign Government or in- strumentality thereof. Inspector feels it ublic" was proper at that time to take this position. However, it is felt that wit Oswald's background we should have had a stop - on his passport, particularly since we did not know qerinitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time. emphasis added] . Not surprisingly, Gale states in the "observations" section of this memorandum: We previously took administrative action against those responsible for the investiga- tive shortcomings in this case some of which were brought out by the Commission. It is felt that it is appropriate at this’ time to consider further, administrative action against those primarily culpable for the derelictions in this case which have now had the effect of publicly embarrassing the Bureau. [emphasis added. | After reviewing the aforementioned Gale memorandum, Assistant - Director Alan Belmont forwarded a one page memorandum to Clyde Tolson on October 1, 1964. Belmont argued that I think we are making a tactical error by taking this disciplinary action in this case at this time. The Warren Commission report has just been released. It contains criticism of the FBI. We are currently taking aggressive steps to challenge the findings of the Warren Commission insofar as they pertain to the FBI.¢2) ft is most important, there- (2) These ‘aggressive steps" are discussed in an October 6, 1964, memorandum from Cartha DeLoach to John Mohr, discussed, infra. HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 101
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HW 50355 re ke ” fore, that we do not provide a foothold for our critics or the general public to - serve upon to say in effect, ‘See, the Commission is right,.Mr. Hoover has taken strong action against personnel involved in this case and thus admits that the Bureau was in error! Mr. Hoover disagreed with Belmont's observations, writing: - We were wrong. The administrative action approved by me will stand. I do not intend to paliate actions which have resulted in forever destroying the Bureau as the top atest investigative organization Gy Gant hE Bureau necords reflect that on or about October 1, 1964, a senior Bureau official instructed Inspector James Malley (who had handled the Bureau's liaison with the Committee) to telephonically contact Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin and inform him that "he did the Bureau a great disservice and had out-McCarthyed “McCarthy." A memorandum dated October 2, 1964, reflects that this (4). request was dutifully carried out. On October 6, 1964, Assistant Director Cartha D. DeLoach for- warded to Assistant Director John Mohr a memorandum captioned “Criticism of the. FBI Following the Assassination of the President." ‘DeLoach wrote: . The criticism concerning the FBI and its role in events surrounding the assassination (3) Mr. Tolson also disagreed with Mr. Belmont. In an addendum to the Gale memorandum Tolson wrote: "Most of .the administrative directions with respect to the Security Index, the prompt submission of reports, etc., and not the Oswald case per se." Ww Mas coud. Fer Rete AA. Hi. Yas PY (4) This~mernerandundees-net identity/the Bureau of who instructed Enpectox- Maibley to make the phone call. eu" . Shy Tahaan, 3h 0/6), Docld:324273576 Page 104 ficial
4 aI which mérit consideration at this time. (1) What is the public image of the FBI at the present time? Certainly, it cannot be denied that the public image of the FBI has been affected in certain areas by the criticism made of the Bureau and its role in the events taking place prior. to the assassination of the President. It is believed this situation reached one stage during the days. immediately following this event and was climaxed by Dallas Chief of Police Curry's. statements which left the, implication this Bureau was seriously dere- lict in discharging its responsibilities as an intelligence agency. The second stage, the most acute, followed the issuance of the Warren Report. While there is admittedly no absolute way to assess a public image, it is believed the image of the FBI improved steadily since the week following the assassination, and it im- proved immeasurably up until the release of the Warren Report. At the time we suffered a rough setback. Following the release of the Director's testimony, we have been well on the road back to good prestige. There is every indication this improvement will continue if we follow our current program regarding this situation. (2) What has-been done to counteract this criticism of the FBI? ; Immediately following the assassination, we undertook a program designed to eliminate the misunderstanding as to the statutory respon- sibilities of the Secret Service and the FBI which existed among the uninformed. . . -Fvery appropriate medium such as the news media, radio scripts, FBI tours, correspondence, speeches and police training was used to clear the air con- cerning our responsibility. HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 165
n For the more educated group, those who were not necessarily biased, and who were aware of the statutory authority of the FBI we furnished full explanations for our actions prior to the assassination with respect to Lee Harvey Oswald. This was designed to convince them that this Bureau did not fail to. properly evaluate the information available on Oswald prior to November 22, 1963, and that, in light “of the facts available and the authority granted . within which to act, we were not derelict in disseminating pertinent information. to proper authorities. ate ale ate "v “ ray (3). What, should be our future course in this matter? The liberal press, with the exception of the "New York Times,'' and its friends will continue to make a determined effort to place the FBI on the defensive; however, it is not felt we should engage in any prolonged debate with them. By keeping the argument going, we are diverting public attention from Secret Service and the State Department and their culpability. - nn RW OW The Director has said that "nothing is more - devastating to a smear than an offensive of real outstanding accomplishments." Our attention and energies should be directed toward this end in the coming months. At the bottom of the last page of this DeLoach memorandum, Mr. Hoover made the following handwritten notation: The FBI will never live down this smear which could have been so easily avoided if there had been proper supervision and initiative. HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 106
lox = ASSASSINATION {INVESTIGATION IN THREE CITIES ' MEXICO CLTY The information developed by the Bureau's investigation in Mexico is discussed in détail in part two of the precéding sec- tion “The CIA's Role in the Investigation." The fol- lowing section discusses certdin facts which taken together give rise to the. issue of the adequacy of the supervision and scope of the investigation in Mexico. A. Issues as to Adequacy of Supervision of Investigation Prior to November 22; 1963, all the information which the "3 Ruredu had on Oswald's trip to Mexico (September 27 through Cctober 3) was generated by the CIA station in Mexieca City On Cetober 13, 19463 the FBI's Legat in Mexico City, Clark Anderson, infermed head- guarters that his office would “attempt to establish Oswald's whereabouts and date of entry into Mexico." A subsequent Movember 22, 1963, Legat airtel toa headguarters ¢hates: Invéstigation Mexico has failed to determina any information concerning subject's entry into or departure from Mexico City. Last known. infcrma- tion CIA advised subject in contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 9/28/63, and 10/1/63. Investigation continuing. (Ca ablegram From Legat, Mexico City to Headquarters, 16/18/63) HW 50955 Docld: 32425526 Page i107
AnSerson wan che bvahest raniine Pourenu ef Gitetiel ant eb ta bas Try, ny npye . . : . . + . ; mies, Phe Bureau's assassination ipvestiaation thenre vas under ry mrs vid. direekion. Anderson achatkted thot while coneuckine ih inveskicgation. he was mréceeding under the “impression” that Oswald was the acsassin and that ho agkecd ablena., Me skated: Our investigation was dedicated or directed toward establishing Oswald's activities in Mexico and looking to- ward trying to establish whether he had been accompanied by anyone while he was in Mexico. ** Fawther He succintly summarized the results of his investigation as follows: We were able to pet him in, get bim out,where he stayed. T don't reéall that we were able to establish where he was every sleet ote day in Mexico. **% The Buresuls intelligence nebvork in fleniea was fb was almost entirely dependent on Liaisen with CFR and the tet Mendean covernment For intelligence, Th thie reeard, meny GF Clark Rnderson is instructive: O: Paid the Bureau hevea souress in the Cuban area in Mexico Caty? AL Yo the best of my recollection the Bureau did nek. MO: To am keine to understram! what bhe Mirdau in fiextca City could have Gone to track down whether er net therc were ony connections between Osuald am? the Ouha: and tiles poviets. Wouldn't that have more of a matter For the MTA? She “" Clark An@ersen testimony, OLA LES, Pur Fe ate Noy ele oF, Vesqees . oleae . . - Clark Andersen teskimeny, 2/44/76, m. 292. eves: *Peyaels A rete be sare DFAS TG Clark Anderson beshhnauy, 274/775, 3s. 22, HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 106 Sen bees ki aeune pone
A: It would have been. Q: ° Do you recall conducting an investigation for that prupose? A: We were limited. The Bureau . . . would have been dependent on the CIA ‘to help us Q: Were you able to identify any contacts that Oswald may have had in Mexico or Mexico City? A: To the best of my reenllection, we were not. Q: Do you know whether or not the CIA was conducting an investigation in Mexico City of the assassination? A: I don't know. I would assume from the recollection of conversations with [Mexico City CIA Station Chief] that they were alert for any information they might get. ** Indeed; in a memorandum dated January to 1964; Mr. Hoover informed certain senior Bureau officials that he was "not at all impressed with the thoroughness of the investigations nox teks the supervision of the investigation.” Upon subsequently being informed of the impending Mexico City trip of Warren Commission staff members, Hoover is noted by a subordinate to * Indeed, Mr. Anderson testified that he did not even know who within the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic esteblishments was, or.was suspected of being either KGB or DGI. wx Clark Anderson Testimony, 2/4/76, pp. 25-26. Our review indicates that the minimal active assassination investigation undertaken by the CIA was gradually phased out as FBI agents and the Mexican authorities began their investigation in early December 1963. ole ste 2, We HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 109
HY 50955 1) 87 bey Bt WERE f have "expressed concern as to how lawyers on the Commission could spot gaps in our investigaticn." Responsibility for the investigation in Mexico City was corifused. . Both the State Department and the FBI had claim to supervising it. One of the major areas of investigation soon after Kennedy's assassination was an allegation of a Nicaraguan named Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte. Alvarado walked into the American Embassy in Mexico City on November 25, 1963, and alleged that he had been at the Cuban’ Consulate on September 18, 1963 and had observed Oswald receive $6,500 from a consulate employee. Alvarade eventually admitted that he had fabricated the allegation. The Warren Commission reveiwed Alvarada's original claim and concluded it was false since overwhelming evidence indicated Oswald was in New week , Orleans on September 18, 1963. Cable traffic discussing investigative responses of the Legat office, CIA Station and Ambassador Mann to the Alvarado allegation indicate problems of coordination and raise questions of the adequacy Surrounding the investigation of the assassination especially in the area of possible Cuban involvement. When the American Embassy heard Alvarado's allegation, Ambassador Mann requested that a Bureau representative ‘some dowh from Washington to Mexico City." . CIA cables reflect Mann's belief that he was not being fully informed on all develicpments in the FBU's investi- Docld: 324273576 Page 110
. mr 4 wg ee ie> Fite pet en REE Sereay an | gation in the United States. Mann was also concerned aboyt gravity of Alvarado's allegation and requested that .the investiga- tion of Alvarado's claim be given the highest priority. J. Edgar Hoover shared Mann's concern over the Alvarado allegation noting. Ambassador Manu may be one of the pseudo- investigators, a Sherlock Holmes; but he has made a lot of statements which, if true, throw an entirely different light on the’ whole picture. * In apparent response to Hoover's stated concern; and the ‘Ambassador's request Assistant Director William C. Sullivan, Domestic Intelligence Division, instructed Supervisor Lawrence Keenan to proceed to Mexico City where he was to “direct and t coordinate” the investigation. However, in a memorandum to Alan Belmont dated November 27, 1963, Sullivan wrote: - Supervisor Lawrence Keenan, in complying with the Director's request; has been selected to go to Mexico to direct and coordinate our entire investigation there and to pursue it vigorously until the de- sired results are obtained. ** Mr. Keenan's presence in Mexico City was short lived. He arrived on November 27, and returned to FRI headquarters on December i, 1963. A Sullivan to Belmont memorandtin of 12/3/63 reflects that once Alvarado admittéd he had fabricated his story, the Ambassador "advised that it was no longer nécessary for Keenan v4 to stay. Sullivan's previous statement that Keenan was "selected to go to Mexico to direct and coordinate the entire investigation 3, “* FBI Memorandum, November 27, 1963. Memorandum Frem #@. CC. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, 11/27/56: Se HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 111
=! . ah r fat _ - Yee he aera he there and pursue it vigorously until the desired results are Ma at obtained, cannot be reconciled unless the thorough investigation , * and desired results were the "breaking" of Alvarado. Indeed, CIA documents reflect that Agency's confusion as to the role Keenan was to play. On November 26, 1963, the Mexico City station cabled Helms: Believe FBI in Mexico, as. does station, has: all information needed to investigate Mexican ‘aspects, leads on cases. In my opinion; it is desirable that FBI send officer to Mexico to satisfy Ambassador, unless Mr. [Alexis] Johnsen can convince Ambassador that chief FBI Mexice Will receive and make available to him all inform- ation of interest to Ambassador concerning U.S. angles of these casés. Or November 27, Helms cabled back to the station: Mr. Johnson has informed me that Mr. Katzeén- bach spoke with Chief, FBI who contended that Mexi FBI office possessed all relevant informa- tion and that he was not rpt disposed to send © FBI officer to Mexi. Would you please let us know a) whether FBI Mexi does in fact have necessary information, b) is it desirable in your opinion that FBI do send agent to Mexi? — However, on November 28, Headquarters cabled: Note FBI man Larry Keenan now in Mexi was sent especially to follow up.leads on entire assassina-~ tion. Pls cooperate with him fully. On November 27, 1963, Ambassador Mann showed Clark Anderson two State Department cables in which Alexis Johneon is quoted as - ‘ ’ stating, "FBI is considered to be ju full charge of investigation. ¢ * Clark Anderson testified that he was never informed that Keenan was being sent down to direct the investigation. (Andersen testimony, 2/3/76, p. dF  .) Keenan told the staff that Lt was his understanding that he had been sent to Mexico City te direct the entire investigation. HW 50955 Docld:32423596 Page 112
WITT iy 73 5 and CIA and State have made it clear that we expect FBI to call - . “e . the shots." In a cablegram dated November 28, 1963, Keenan "strongly recommended that Johnson be immediately contacted and that he be straightened out," adding that he “unequivocally advised Mann that FBI was not directing investigations here. Keenan also stated in the cablegram "Anderson and I following most closely and will assume no initiative from which it may be ‘ ate we construed FBI is calling shots here.’ A subsequent ftemorandum af -reflects that Assistant Secretary Mann was “Eorna lly advised iii that the FBI was net in charge cf the investigation According to Anderson, the FRL'’s dinvostigation was WQ “independent” and “overt" from—tha—Buxean, and, as stated pre ree ted te AD SCUACE? a oral viously, the investigation was “dedi cated or directed toward establishing Oswald's activities in Mexico and Looking toward trying to establish whether he- had been accompanied by anyone else when he was in Mexico. wx * B. Issues as to the FBI's Pursuit of the Cuban Connecti in Mexico City : As discussed infra CIA's investigation of possible Cuban * Pane trvirn dai AL yo yk. Wy Crrowrag rene Yo W- yw tans BAA y i} 24 J v3. s toa VO apap cin ae iver in {> ft. Ye P:) Soete , j af xs th a La pe Pak FORA AD Ad pe ri, ME A BAA } ' rp 7} 53 wx The Bureau's ststed position was that “the Srate Department and CIA have furisdiction in dealing with foreign gevercments and in getting investigative results and intelligen e r that th ; - 4 i rr rah where we are cooperating fully with Stat and CIA in Mexico, the resp nsibility in this matter should rest with State and CIA. Nemorandum from Courtney Evdns te A. Be linont. 11/27/63, 4 WW 50955 Dold: 934945836 : Page ‘117 a fufsa, ee
Oo PUT documents Bo pipe Py BLE of - Ubanwane a iz” AY : & te 23 ny . By cablegram, dated November 23, 1963, Legat infornied? head- pe fay . fe f Tae: A o oe ee Rca also reveal a reluctance to follow leads in“the quarters that: Ambassador Mann is greatly concerned that Cubans behind subject's assassination of President. He feels that both we and CIA doing everything. possi- ble there to establish or refute Cuban connection. In a subsequent cablegram sent on November 24, 1963, Anderson stated: stake payed es = “e the a he ae fas poe ane a fs) aes a = on Ul oe te in direr is o3 of ass buds the eartiet excarnk oO te a pede 3 my nw be case, it would appear likely that ¢ contyact wenla have been “ade with suidecth in U.G. aim! purpose cf his trip to Hexice WAS ES sehounm geb avay rouke, Hures. ; ds ation to petling abl of & L a yma = YM ua Pa m 7? ye a Ke <t QO O oO a bet oh, or refute this theory, , . : Thare Le ono ipttieabtion thakb the Euveau over abburted to sentir er refute this theory. Endleeet. om Dice surerrisor's handwritten try notakicn on bhe cablecdvam states: Mok woulel serve 1 to promote ruesors. My, Welmd" sentiments coincided with this Buxesy super atation chief, Lielms staked: For your private information, feeling here in all three agen State}; that Ambassador dis oushidad tee bard 2. 2. o. and toak sre eceule 1 Slam with Cubans ehioh ecw TEPercussions, 2 at ~ t. My) Trewern gry phe * pe 3 tea 7 rs oO ay ‘ t c i tm ‘ alesse eaves de ete fede Vy on pre dees Vite hed Grats Vm eee TLE Per Nom aya ht eres bares : HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 114
car bers, HY 50955 Docld}: 2423526 Page 115 On On December 3, 1963, b lowing information: - Hove ember 27, 1963; At one point in the lengthy release he was quoted as saying that they do not have the slightest doubt that assassination of President iennedy and subsequent elimina- tion of his assassin is work of Communist direction. To back up this statement he alleged that Fidel Castro in his speech made at the Brazilian Embassy in Havanna on September 7, 1963, accused CIA and President ‘Kennedy of planning attempt against Castro and that Castro stated, ‘Let Kennedy and ‘his brother Robert take care of themselves since they too can be the victims of an attempt which will cause their death.’ Anderson @cain cabled Rayveaw head iw ° this time inforinine thatk: Neither Legat nor, CLA office here has been able to identify unknewn subject who visited Cuban and Soviet Embassies here and who at first. was thought to be identical with subject because af timing of visits. re should be noted that CIA states have additional in- formation, indicating this person visited Cuban Embassy October 14 last, a number of days after Oswald's departure from Mexico City. This would make it appear unlikely that UNSUB had any connection with ‘Oswald. Anderson informed headquarters of the Reliable source today furnished -inform- ation which may have bearing on instant case. U. S. citizen nained [the Cuban-American], 23 years of age entered Mexico at Nuevo Latedo. Although means of travel not known [the Cuban-American] appar ~ ently proceeded to Mexico City. He was only passenger aboard Cubana Plight 465 which depart - ed Mexico City for Havana on November 23 Last on November 27 last.
In view of travel of [the Cuban~American] ” during significant period of time and fact he was only passenger ori Cubana flight going to Havana it is requested that Washington Field Office check passport records to obtain full background information and photographs of {the Cuban-American] and that investigation be conducted to fully identify and establish connections. Subsequent CIA and FRI investipation of the activities of this Cuban - American are discussed, infra, Section C, HY 50955 Docld:3242352796 Page 116
HS NEW. ORLEANS . : wf 8 23 ov P p The Committee has not been able to fully raview the Buteau's investigative efforts in New Orleans: However, our preliminary examination has revealed certain facts which give rise to the issue of the adequacy of the investigation conducted in that a: clty, and suggest the need for more ‘detriled review The Warren Commission's Report. estates that Usvwald moved fron Dallas to New Orleans on “Apri 2h, 1963 | and suecests the following as reasons for the move: When Ruth Paine visited the Oswald's their apartment on April 24, she was prised to learn that Oswald was pack ready to leave for New Orleans by bu Ye explained that he had been unable to find employment in or around Dallas, and that Marina had sugreested that he go to New Orleans since he had been born ener . Marina has testified that the real reas behind her suggestion was that she nanted him to get out of town besanse of the Walker incident.* at sur- ed and s There is no indica tion in FRI documents or the Commission's reeord that Oswald was in Hew Orleans on any erceaston hatween October 1959 and April 24. 1963. However, an Inmaieration and Naturalization Service Inspector testified hefore the Committee that he is absolutely certain that he Interviewed Lee Harvey Oswald in a New Orleans jail cell sometime shortly hefore bis April LO. 1963, transfer out of Mew Crleane.**- Althoueh the * Warren Commission Report, p. 725. Oswald's only known attempt to find employment in Dallas during the period between his Anril 6, 1963 discharrs and his April 24, 1963 move to New Crieans ves s single visit to the Texas Enplovment Cemmisston on April 32. 1963. «* Testimony of L&NS Tuspector, 12/11/75, p,?90 . The Inger -eetor does not recall whether on this occasion he went ta the colice station in response to a routine call, or whether he Learned that Oswald was HY 50955 Docd&ndad2as2e.oPaue ah?alien during a routine visit *e the station (pad).
inspector is not now certain whether Oswald was “using that. par- ticular name at that time," he is certain that Oswald was "“claim- - ing to be a Cuban alien" and that he "interviewed Oswald to verify or disprove this status.i™ The inspector neither recalls what Oswald said nor what language or languages he conversed in. He ‘does not recall anything unusual about Oswald's dress or demeanor, and believes that he quickly ascertained that Oswald was not a Cuban alien, at which time he would have Left Oswald in his jail cell. Senator Schweiker: Well; what if the person is claiming to be a foreigner and he isn't. How have you run that down? Inspector: Well, I have never rin into a case where a guy claimed to be a foreigner and he. was a Utiited States citizen, where he didn’t treak individually, because when the Imnigration Service comes inte play and you advise them, if you aré in the United States illegally and you're subject to deportation, and these kinds of things. Senator Schweiker: So in all probability, something Tike that would have happened in Oswald's incident? Ik Inspector: I am sure; Although the inspector did state that based upon his experi- ence it was mest imitsual for an American citizen to assert that he was an alien, hé noted that visits to jail cells to verify an individual's citizenship statis were frequent and routine, and reports were not filed unless it was determined that the individual : : Ak de was illegally in the United States. “* Inspector, “12/11/75, rial. Qsald told the rresting New Orleans police officers on August 9, 1963 that he vas Cuban born, “Ye oTnspector, L?/11/75, vo. a8 wee te wwe TENS headquarters officials informed the Committee that the ITZHS had no documentary record of the interview, uoting. that inter- views of this nature were generally not written up. HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 118
We 7 oe , tke le eg et Gy Hise BE On January 6, 1976, the Conmitthed- staff telephonically. con- tacted the New Orleans Police Department: and requested that they 7 review their Osweld arrest records to see if he had been arrested other than on August 2, 1963. On January 7, the staff was informed that there was no record of another’ Oswald arrest, and that the -New Orleans Police Department, in fact, had no information on Oswald prior to August 9, 1963." | Oswald distributed FPCC handbills in the vicinity of the U.S.S. Wasp on June 16, 1963, and, subsequently, in dowtitown New Orleans, on August 9 (on which o¢easion he was arrested) , and - August 16. On August 17, he appeared briefly on a radio program, and on August 21 he participated du a tadio dekake about Cuba. The Bureau was unable to identify anv persons Lit the New Qrleans area whom Oswald may have been in contact in connection with his pro-Castro activities. Indeed, the. Commission's con- elusion was that “Oswald's FPCC activities may be viewed as a very shrewd political operation in which one man single-handedly created publicity for his cause." * The police official told the staff that procedures in 1963 would have required documentation of an arrest; unless “someone was in on a drunk charge," Although the I&NS inspector does not know the charge Oswald was booked on, he testified that he would not have interviewed Oswald if he was drunk ( Tus pcta., p3s d; Special Agent Hosty testified that investigation after the assassi- nation established that Oswald neither smoked nor drani: C thin, wyo/es ) . tek S *" ee%* Warren Comntise HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 119
‘During a staff intervies on Pacember 1, 1975. a New Orleans resi ident familiar with the Cuban community in thet eity, un- equivocally asserted that in the summer of 1963 Oswald associated with various Federal agents in New Orleans. Ne specifically identified an inspector who was then with the T£NS Border Patrol Station in New Orleans and an inspector who was then with the United States Customs Service. Although this I&NS inspector sub- sequently testified that he had neithet met nor spoken with Oswald, he recalled that he "may" have seen Oswald on one occasion passing out handbilis near Jackson Square in New Orleans, The inspector also informed the Committee that T&NsS din 1963 had some resporsi- bility for surveilling certain Cuban groups in New Orleans.” Although the inspector could not vecall the dates these curveillances were in effect, he believes they had been requested bv the Depart- ment of Justice. *™ The former Customs inspector had nok heard of Lee Harvey Oswald (under that name or any of his known aliases) prior to Nevember 22, 1963, Neither of the [&NS iuspectore who anpeared before the £ Committee had been questioned during the assassination investi- gation: the inspectors do not believe that any L&itS New Orleans tokok personnel. were questioned. * The IS&NS inspector identified was not the ipvspectar chm had interviewed Oswald in a New Orleans jai! cell prier ta apeti JO, 1963. t : a wk T6NS Inspector, 12/9/75, p. . either T&es nor the Depart- ment of Justice have records of ar» such survetllance wee The other T&l3 personnel intervieved by the Comnitcee srakf HW 50955 Docld:324235276 Page i120
a K "hy id Although the naine ee _ {a Tulane University professor] does not appear in the Warren Commission Report, inaterials available at the Archives reflect that the Commission was provided with certain FBI reports containing information on the professor developed during the assassination investigation. A brief review of the Bureau's handling of allegations of an alleged Oswald acquaintanceship with the professor is instructive. in that the Committee finds it exemplary of the FBI's investiga- tion of persons with whom Oswald was suspected of having been in + contact. . On Hovember 27, 1963, the New Orleans FBI field office learned that sometime in Late 1962 some FRc literature had teen found in the street in the 1200 or 1300 block of Pine Street, New Orleans, near the residences of two Tulane University professors, one of wiLom was the professor referenced abeve.* The teletvpe from the FRE's New Orleans field office; pursuant to which this information was disseminated to headquatters, noted "investigation beins con- dueted to determine any possible association with Oswald.” ‘On November 30, 1963, New Orleans Police Captain James Arnold informed SA John Quigley that this wrofesser "had bean mentioned as being possibly affiliated with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, fie Fol Univt ail pif tau 's * There was falso a separate allegation that FPCC literature wags observed in Eetenen-e] car in early 1963 ho aS, Foxe Teletype froin SAC, New Orleans to lirector, FRE and SAC, Dallas, 11/27/63 me Report of SA John f.. Quigley. LI/S39/63, * Booey HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 121
oA wt “a fea re & i. A ps Arnold -- who was present for the August 9 interview of: Osvald :i-_ a cd Seg recalled that Oswald mentioned during the interview that soma of a) . the meetings of the FPCC had been held on Fine Street, According to SA Quigley‘s report on the Arnold interview: Arnold asked Oswald if [the professor] was a member of the FPCC. Oswald did not give a verbal answer to this question, but Captain Arnold said he gathered from the expressicéns appearing on Oswald's face and from the words he uttered at that time, which he could not recall at this time, thet Oswald knew or was acquainted with [the professor]. He said he attempted to pursue this further, but Oswald refused to admit any Knowledge of [the pro- _ fessor] or ever ha¥ing been at [the professor's] home. * On November 29, SA Milton Kaack interviewed Lt. VFraneis Martello of the New Orleans Police Department, who along with Captain Arnold Was presenk at the August 9 arrest interview of Oswald. According to Kaack's report, Martello stated: Se ee tren ee en ae nee * _ When questioned by Martello about, Fair Piay for Cuba Corimittee, Oswald said that some of the meetings of the FPCC were held on Pine St. in New Orleans, refusing to sive _ Specific location. Martello reralled that” Fair Play for Cuba Committee literature had been found in the past in the one thousand block of Pine. St., which is close to the residence of [the professor]: Martello further recalled that [the professor] was reported to be a member of the New Orleans Coiincil For Peace- ful Alternatives; which vas a “ban the bomb" Broup established in New Crleans and which a i wag Me rete Report of SA Quigley, 11/39/63. HW 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 122
1G had conducted two or three demonstrations ae here, Martello asked Oswald if he knew 2 Ae Ing [the: professor] or if he had held FPCC - - meetings in [the professor's] home. Oswald evaded the question and appeared to Martello to have a nervous reaction. Martello ad- vised during interview he asked Oswald if he knew [another Tulane University professor]. Oswald refused to answer this question. * On December 2, 1963, John Rice, Chief of the New Orleans Seeret Service office, spoke with assistant special agent in charge, Sylvester, of the New Orleans FBI field office. Rice then related that Charles Steele -- the person photopgravhed with Oswald passing out literature in front of the International Trade Mart Building -- recalled Oswald having told him that someone at Tulane University had given him this literature, Rice also te- counted a Secret Service interview with Dean Andrews, in which Andrews recalled Oswald havinp stated that he vas “patting $25 a day to do this fi.e., pass out FPCC literature] ." According to a subsequent December 6, 1963 repert, on Deceriber 3; 1963, the FBI requested that the Secrét Servite not interview [the professor} .*** However, [thé professor] had already been interviewed by the FBI on Decembér 2, 1963, According to the two-page FRI teletype otk Teletype from SAC, New Orleans to Directer, FRI, and San Franciseo, 11/30/63, AG's Dallas A ros Secret. Service memorandum prenared by J. Rice, 12/6/63. ' wk = Secret Service newmorandum prepated by J. Fiee, 12/6/63. HW 50955 Doacld:327423526 Page 123
recounting the interview, [the profassor] “eould not recall ‘ever. 2 having known Oswald."' He stated that. "he never ‘new of thie! existence of a FPOC chapter’ in New Orleans and never had any connection in any way with any so-called left wing organizations.’ This cursory interview apparently satisfied the FBI that. “the professor-had not had any contact with Lee Harvey Oswald; The documents made available to the Committee fail to reflect that any of the professor's friends or Pine Street néighbors were ever interviewed by the FBI. Nor do these documents provide any e explanation for this apparent investigative oversight. * Teletype from SAC, San Francisco to Director, FBI and SAC's Dallas and New Orleans, 12/2/63, HW 50955 Docla:32423526 Page 124
Dallas: Wovember 22 and 23 the President's Dallas visit nor Preside 1y for the trip itself. Bureau agents assicgnet to the Dallas field office wu in Movember 1963 have told us that the Secret Service did not advise that office of the Presidshti's trip: they learned of the imrencding visit through newspaper accounts duty agent vas ifistructed by his: Superviser not te. a , MOreaver, an off- attend the echéduled November 22, 1963, Presidential Luncheen because “the + ERI and Secret Service were having some <4 dictional lines.” z ifficulties over juris- Tn that the assassination of the Presiderkt was not then a Federal orime. the Pallas agents Functioned merely Qingervers, For enanele. SA Robert BRarfett was mresent 2h the Pallas Theatre when Dallas pelice officers tool Gswald Inho custadsy. ae 3f the ehtire time Oswald was in the theatre: Barrett positive that the Theatre's houde lights were of F The police and patrons who testified before the Warren Conmigssion swore that : A/ ; ; ; ee: the lights were on.- Barrett was not asked to testify 5 / the Commission. l/ See e.e., testimonv of SA James Hosky, wy, T2/5/ ey estimony of FRE Special Agenk Panes Seat a eed é r 2f 3/ Veabimony of Sh Robert Ranrelt. 7/1? (35, ps9 rep Corraiesion teshimon: of 9, N rare And ‘ohn Preece, 4/2 fey, HY 50355 Docld:324235526 Page 125 af Barrett, Lal, pide. . ; . oe shoe ee hefore h sOonnla, IPSfey
2h s Tinmedinkely upon beings taker into enstody _pelice, Oswald was transported te the office of Captain J; Will Brits. Special Agent Janes Boolkhouk--whe was then serving as FRT lfadson with the local polics-cwas present when Oswal-] was brought in. Upon learning that Osvald weet a euspeck in the dgcassination, Hosty immediately informed SAC SKanklin that 7 Veo the Biceau had a security file on Qsuald. Hostv snent the’ next Few hours in Shanklin's of fice sistine ain the relaying 7, as Of all Oswald data to Belmont.-- Jelmont subsequently instructed SAC Shanklin to direct Hosty to proc eo] to the police sta eden and “narticipate in the interrogation of Oawald.°" Umoeh arriving at the Station, fosty ran inte Dallas police Lieutenant ach Revill, whe later rnd capable of assassinating the President. Tha mention of los ty's name as he entered Cankain Fritz's office provoked Oswald: he attempted to jump ouk of the chaix to which he was Toye “ handeutfed and screamed, "you're tha any who's been “othering my wife. Although the questi toning of Csvald was conducted exclusively by lecal police officials, Wosty dic sugcesk certain giestions 6/ Hostv, 12/8/75, pv. 108 ; ‘ 7 Hosty 12/18/75, n 103 2/ _Memoram rau , Jack “evili; ke ate ‘ bee + Py 10/ Host, 12/8/75, yn, 26, HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 126
’ to Captain Frits. Interestingly enough, whan Hosty bsucaested. = Re alien! a? “x cd ss on? sé . . that Fritz ask Oswald about Waxico City, Qsvald inkerjec ted, Pra screaming "How do you know about thak?", before Fritz was able to ask the question. 2/ Oswald subsedvently denied ever having been to Mexico City. Uowever, Khe did admit to having ; Le/ been in Tijuana. 503) at wt 3 oO al 5 aad a Tv cn red « — i oS ke | * ~ The interrogation was interzupted whah Oswald was called in for a linenn. fosty was then informed by SA Ruokhbout that he was not to mention Cswald's Mexico City visit to anyohe.. Hosty later learned that these orders had come 13/ . From headquarters. Although he was never teld the reason for the order: he helioves that it was intended to pretect the sen- ditive CIA methods which had verified Oswald's presence in that city. Tt was apparently Curing this same ‘hreak" for rhe lineip that Secret Service Auant William Pathorson recalls Hosty informing him that “Oswald had been in contact with two haown a / gubversives kyo weeks before the assassination." within minutes after receivind the aforementioned instruc- tions through Agent Boolihoukt, fidsty received a call from ‘the A1/ Hosty, 12/5/75, vw. 26. L2/ Hostv, 12/5/75, no. 35. Tt is not clear whether Oswald's response indicated a recent triv to Tijuana. 13/ Hosty, 12/5/75, op. 40-41. 14/ Wostv, 12/5/75, b. 32. 15/. Testimony of Patterson mémerandn si, LL/S/75. p.20. Although the » L863, which recounts Hosty's “nusilahle. to kha Go a} babouentk, WES wT SS Ton, Pabharagoan vas met ley bhe Comp PCE}, HY 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 127
7 Jey say . UF ef field office directing him te vererk to Shanklin's’@ Ik is on this occasion that “hantlin confronted Hosty with the 7? . note Oswald had left at. the Pallas field affice.~* The cir- ctimstances surroundina the destructior of the note are discussed, ene ; ea . Seehiiene oe in“Gection pt supra. President Johnson called tir. Heover at 1:00 p.m. on November 24, 1963. According to Hoover, “the President was areatly dis~ kurbed about this incident [the murder of Oswald] and deareed thak the FRT conduct whatever investigation nessible inte this : 4s/ . makter i... without regard fek techmicalities:’ There was alr early morning meeting of all agents of the Nillas Field office on November 27, yaaa then asked by the etakf whether any Limitations were placed upon the invectiga- tion, one of the agents “ho attenced this peetina initially as Follows: The morning after the dssassination Mr. Shanklin called all of the agents together in a conference and did relate to us that Washington; was the term he used, is quite anxious that we do not make any inflammatory statements or ask any questions or delve too much into the Soviet aspect of this case, that we are to soft- peddle that .and not to bring this up too much. ' Ti resbonse to Senator Gary Nart's aneskion ag to whether this reant that leacs relating to inhkernational conspitacias vere not 16/ Hosty, 12/8/75, vo. 1Y + 1?/ Hosty, 12/8/75, p.N4 Sager. See cee een Co [Oe 13/ Memorandum ftom-Directots FRE, Ap co 12/24/63, iof Hosty, 12/4/75, 0. td- HY 50955 Docld:32423526 Page 128
‘Zs rs . . is pias 3 be A on y oyt to jr@ pursued, the agent Pestendse: "2 hind of yiy et fel - 4. i S " However, this ausnt laker teld the Committee: pvession. ZI want to emphasize that TIT cid not mean that we did nok investiaate Oswald's possible Soviet involvement, just that. . . this [aspect of the]. “investigation was tightly centrolled by PRT head- quarhers. , Although SAC Shanklin recalls the early morning meebking on fi) y heaving made the stahement. mm November 23, 1963, he dentes oy khedbuted to Him ky the agents: AAditionallyv, ef the ebher agents oy > who wore present ak the imareking who were interviewed hy Committee staff, none réceli such an instruction being sanveyed by Ghankling OR Prin. BHAA , HW O50955 Docld:32423526 Page 129
THE.RECEIPT AND DESTRUCTION OF THE. NOTE WHICH OS SWALD_?EI PERSONALLY DELIVERED. TO THE FBI'S DALLAS FIELD OFFICE (1) Preliminary Discussion On or about July 2, 1975, Thomas Johnson, of the. Dallas’ Times Herald, advised recently retired Dallas SAC Gordon Shanklin that an individual, whose identity he would net reveal, had told him that Oswald had visited the FBI office in Dallas sometime prior to the assassination; that Oswald left a note -- allegedly threatening in nature -- for the Agent who had been handling the Bureau's investigation of Oswald; and that neither Oswald's visit nor the note was reported pricr. to or following the arsassina- tion of President Kennedy. Shanklin suggested that Johnson should contact Deputy Associate Director James Adams. | On July 7, 1975, Johnson met in Washington, D. C., with Adams and Director Kelley repeating the aforementioned allega- tions: The Attorney General was advised of, the allegations on July B | 1975, and informed that the Bureau intended to conduct an inquiry regarding them. On July 8, 1975, a conference was held in Director Kelley's offices. In attendance, in addition to Mr. Adams, were Gordon Shanklin (former SAC Dallas), i Theodore Gunderson {SAC Dallas), the headquarters agent presently assigned to the assassina- tion case, and Harold Bassett (Assistant Director in Charge of L/) In that Shanklin had recently retired from the. But the alleged destruction of the note involved the Fiéld } which he had been in charge, pis cagtendance at this hea HW 50955 Dowdetaiaag34a spayerisding. 4 he Bo yee
HW 50955 Docld: 32423526 Page 131 ~ oe - . . ' 5 the Inspection Division). The handling of the iavestigation was discussed, and Bassett was assigned personal responsibility for directing it. The Bureau's initial file review did not develop any inform- ation indicating that Oswald had ever visited the Dallas Office of the FBL or that he had left a note. Interviews of personnel assigned, in 1963, to the Dallas field office did establish that: (1) Lee Harvey Oswald did; in fact, visit the office some two or three weeks prior to the assassination: (2) That Oswald asked to see SA James Hostyv; and upon being informed that he was not in, left a note for Hosty: (3) That the note was destroyed after the assassination. However, as to certain of the most basic facts, the evidence developed by the Bureau contains sharp conflicts. The FBI's investigation failed to establish: (1) whether the note was threatening in nature; (2) at whose instruetion the udté was destroyed. Each of these questions raises important issues. Lf the note was thredtening in nature, then the FBI would have been on notice that Oswald was capable of violence. If the orders to destroy the note emanated from FBI headquarters, the inference that there might have been orders to destroy other pieces of avidence is stronger than if the note had been simply destroyed for entirely personal reasons by egents in the Dalles field office.