“eee Pi Acetone eM ee Bi Te eee ae Cee ee es ee © Daas 689. anything about FELCHLIN's background, presutably well docu- mented by the KGB because FELCHLIN had been to the USSR in two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic courier, prior to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army Attache; also FELCHLIN had had prior official association with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States, and he continued to be in liaison with one of them in Moscow. NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or what had been done about them by the KGB. In speaking of FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSEKKO reported the KGB file noted that PELCHLIN had been caught taking photographs on some occasion, but he did not know that FEL- CHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in Kiev with another Assist- ant Army Attacne, F.J. YEAGER. (Erronegously identified by NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that FELCHLIN, with another Army Attache and two Air.Force Attaches, in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip through- out Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March 1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train. NOSENKO was unable to provide a date for FELCHLIN's expul- sion from the Soviet Union, and ne «new nothing of the un- usual circumstances cf FELCHLIN's Ceparture from Moscow; he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non rata along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was Epetled atong with Air Force Major ‘alter MCKINNEY, and the Soviets re~- fused to permit the two to leave “Moscow aboard the Ambassa~ dor's personal plane until ambassador BOHLEN himself protested. Confronteé by his lack of knowledge of the persona non rata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to now the details because this incident occurred after he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this was not true. - Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO'’s account of one of the best known incidents in the history of KGB operations against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the subject of reports by GOLITSYN and other CIA sources and the subject of training materials. This was the seizure of sensitive technical collecticn equipment on § May 1955 in “Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his role in developing plans for the successful operation in Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to give the entire story of the equipment seizure-and the persona E out non grata action, he said that the operation was carrie after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew no more about it. when told that the operation took place at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge. TOP SECRET . cee yates aeemineea eee
wee er (REL . a on | 690. . NOSENKO identified George VAN LAEZTHEM as an Assistant Air Attache in 1953 or 1954: he was a target of another U.S. | Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development - operation was carried out against him. NOSENKO did not know {| that VeN LASTHEM was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who left Moscow in March 1953-and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own , target Walter MULE (see above). What NCSENKO additionally did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache ‘eryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH (the subject of NOSE:KO's “ANDREY” lead--see below) and a friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent. NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955, again as en Army Attache, and only two years after being transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM-was again sent %o Mos- cow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on tempor- ary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN ; LAETHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics prograin at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in i ; Moscow invelved the planned use of the electronic equipment. ‘ which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still ™ in Moscow.) ~ d. Additional Reporting His information on two other operations involving Americans was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S, ; Embassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym “ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, ‘see Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruit- ment tock place before he joined the KGB buc that "“ANDREY" had left the USSR by then as well: he repeatedly estimated “ANDREY's" recruitment date as "1949-1950." At all times he has claimed certainty that “ANDREY" wes the last KGB recruitment in the Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964. In 1964, however, NOSE).KO changed his story and said “ANDREY" was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section ii. 1954- 1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C. above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters wnich had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955, NOSENKO said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled the surveillance phone-watch. SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 3 June 1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S. i . Embassy Section}, but he denied having had any personal meetings i with KGB officers. TN Ramer we Om cae aon ee ah ee | ae oe e. Remarks ermine + attime opener EA ee Di Sra at tye NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused, contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information, incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating his shift of responsibilities within the U.S. Embassy Section, in dating his. departure from the Section (viz., the timing of the Stalingrad incident and the approacn to SMITH), and in dating his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having ~ tn Serene an. een setae Rasarbe ote ARERR HE Memo 4 A q i é i ‘ TOP SECRET pa aU. tt Hh eh *
4 § hy ind SB Ae et ree aS ak Oe 7 ae a 0 Oe Ol a en al eel ole) aaa Lite pren Fg toe Be Bites 5) ee sees tet” Sam Tne ote Taher M2 one reg RET Fee TER conn FE Re a Ey SOT, 691. few new details of importance on the American correspondents, NOSENKO hag proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and acti- vities of the othera; and he lacked even the most important de- tails on security affaira involving the majority of his eight @lleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost noth- ing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy Section. The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold go little substance and the manner of his reporting was so uncon- vincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true. meee
4 4-00000 692. §. Tourist Ce -artment (June 1955 to January 1960) a. Introduction ; NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 19€6, his first period of alleged service with the Acerican-British-Canade jan Secticn of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Direc- torate, are descrited in Pages 1067-151. For the purjoses of the following diecussion, it is ccmvenient to divide this period inte two parts. The firse uf these covers the ycars from June 1955 to June 1958, when NOSENKO said he was a staff case officer, i handling and recruiting agents and planning and managing opera- ticnal activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service frois June 1953 to the beginning of 1960 as Leputy Chie?® of this sectrica. Apart frem his personal involvement in a number of recruitment ; Operations in the latter peried, it is thie service which provides a basia for MOSENKO to Cliaim awarencss of 42) impartint arrests of spies and recruitments from emong Amer.cain tourists visiting the Soviet Unicn; it is also this survice as Czputy Chief cf Sece tion which NOCENZO cites ag a baris for his involvement in the ease of Lee Harvey OSWALE anside the Soviet Union. a oe Tee r ry & F es e eel % b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958) (i) Gereral ‘aont Recording to NOSENKO’s story, he veg among the first case efficers in the Tourist bepartment. He arrived there just as the Department was beiry formed and took part with other officers assiagned in the acquisition of an agent network from within Imturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and in Generally “getting things going.” Several montns later he parti- cipated in what he says was his first operation against an Ameri- ean tourist. this was NOSENKO's bkehind-the-scenes (and hence unconfirmed) organization of an unseccussful attempt to compronise Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO'’s next case (the first operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a wear later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual en- trapment and recruitment of Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120). This recruitment, which cccurred close in time to the Minister NOSENKO's ~ death, was by NOSENKO's account a turning point in his personal i : and professional life. tith it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a : wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a re- { sult of this cperation, the first successful recruitrent in the then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came inte personal contact with Gencral GRIBANOV. according to ali ‘ accounts prior to October 1966, when he retracted ‘the claim, NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGS awards for opera- tional performance because of the BUNGI case--a letter of con- mendation. Within a month of this oreration, NOSENrO said, he was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last promotion prior to defecting eight years later. CURE WR STRATA She ERE OE TRB UI gh cate RG ce eeew ame es i E & } A k e x e “ ] é % Argh MARR re ota 5-5, ih Se de : NOSENKO's direct operational activity 3a the next two years, i before his appointment as Deputy Chief of the Section, was des- : : cribed by NOSENKO as follews: Sometime in 1957 he was involved. - ----dn-the-atterpted recruitneit of the German businéssran Glas ie ; (Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, NOSENKO ; ‘ 5 Ree eet ‘x na ATONE ce tne mies eet ee * ~~ snes TOP SECRET oe "heme seme &
F-00000 TR Ra Ee NT ee ee he. te ee 4 ms i% 4 * u phat gh Oe EB REBAR SE 693. personally spoke to him. NOSLNKO explained his (unconfirred) participation in this case, which was not among the responsibili- ties of his section, fat is ticer available who spoke German put “a little Eng- lisn,” @ language in whica ‘KO hed fair fluency. In 1957 NOSENKO was also irvolved in the sexval and blackmarket entrap- eiimems Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of NOSENKO's section, being neither Amecican, Lritish or Canadian): NOSENKO has rot explained how he cave ts be involved in this operation, but he said his role was that of involving Gre ew ith women and ee nas so that arcther officer, ARKHIPOV, could recruit hin. ag not identifieu NOSENKO, but reported on an indiviéva] whose role corresponds. to the one NOSENKO claimed as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENAO's third operaticn in 1357 was really not an cperation at ail. he was assigned to accompany the British Gaba send the latter's interpreter Gye e ion a teur of Seviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his purpose was only to watch (MBQ a suspected intelligence agent or officer. tlis presence was confirrec by @HSm who recognized NOSENKO's photograph. tr. . This is the sum of NOSENKO's ‘reported, ecretimes verified, operational role curing the three yvéars preceding his promotion in June 1958 to the position of Ceputy Chief of the Anmerican- Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the American Teurist Section. “ The onty case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which MCSENKO ascribed the greatest importance, was the recruitment 4f BURGE. For this reason, the BURGI operation is discussed in detail below, with particular attention being given to those aspects of the case which reflect upcn NOSENKO's own personal role. . (ii) The BURGI Case NOSEXKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with that BURGI proviced to the FBI in 1957. The part NOSENKO played in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two homosexuals in the Moscow restauran® on the evening of BURGI's compromise (20 June 1356) and in the fiev events (23-28 June 1956) would appear to be one normally taken by a KGB staf€ officer. The identities of the other two KGo participants in the Kiev recruitment, KGZLOV and PETRENKO, seem Clearly established. There were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGi’s versions, but most of these could stem from NOSENKO's faulty mezory nine years after the events. (Such discrepancies incluce \OSEINKO's Zailure to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI: the identity, role, or even existence of the person “Anatoliy” whom BURGI says introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI; the lecaticn of NOSENKO‘’s bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared to BURGI's; NOSEUKO's reference to BURGI’s “interpreter® when in fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to remember the unusual circumstances of BURGI‘s departure from Kiev.) Other contradicticns and omissions in NOSENKO*s reporting relate to matters of greater operationai consequence: data temer en are seein eee ene s wetemete es fe eee ce nes TOP SECRET
a DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the person- nel involved, the contenta of the file, and other mechanics of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory. 10? St St oC 694,  NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGB first learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember who first proposed an cperation against him. , i. @ NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his ; dealings with the Pirst Chief Directorate on this case. ~ HOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this opera- tion. The initiative for the operation came, he said, fron the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI. in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGI at the time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa application ; (which showed nim to be a professor of Russian) and a few agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow: BURGI, on the other hand, reported that during the recruitment’ KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the sister's occupation; detaile of BURGI's background, work, and military service, BURGI’s relations with the Russicum in Pome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR; and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY. NOSENKO cited “his” recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's > story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of KOZLOV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment. ee ES eR ee cae TOP SECRET Oo
695. G. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section i NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had i: formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized inte two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case offi- { cer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist ; Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most inportant in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he, in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but wags certain that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision. \ d. Knowledge of Section’s Staff and Agent Persornel NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The Soviet agents of his section whem NOSENKO has identified were mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted from case officer to case officer and hence it was “difficult to gay just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he had approxi- mately eight Soviet agents in 1958 ard about 12 or 14 in 1959, ~ most of them employed by Inturist (Pages 109-112). With the ex- ception of the two homosexuals, YEFPENOV and VOLKOV. discussed separately below, NOSENKO cannot suppiy personal cata on nis own agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB. e. Knevledge of Section's Activities As of June 1958, according to NCSENKO, the work of the section of which he was deputy chief was “just getting going.* Its mission was, first of ail, to detect Western Intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visit- ing the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists. In his new pogiticn NOSENKO was responsibie for supervising other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Be- cause of this and because at GRIBANOV'’s request he personally reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western _intelligence services and KGB counteraction threugh 1958 (Pages -145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these ser subjects during the 1955-1959 period. + Bh Aa ETED nem nro mo i More~ i ’ over, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not ; co know can be compared with information from other sources. These | i facts are reviewed below. Do (i) BLAKE fo A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning : for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE (Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959 ves of CIA a 5 This {
696. ” : ~ . While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity| i he has never mern- tioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting i. which described these methods in full detail. NOSENKO does : not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his im- portance to the KGE. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of BLAKE in his Gebriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962 about BLAKE, the KGB agent in Britisn Intelligence, he said that he had read the dossier and thet BLAKE had been “an agent of the Second (British! Depertment lof the Seccn] We ick Dire -- ho was not nearly es valuable 4s the Sa aes co br the other Englishman" (VASSALL). "COULG For recall any such egent of the Bricish Department. When the name BLAKE was mentioned, he asked: ‘Who's BLAKE?” BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of a 2l]-page summary 3p conference be- tween CIA and MI-6 nich was held in Washington from 20 to Apria KO, although not in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was). ---" received by the KG3, said that he reviewed all important ma- | es terials of the American Tourist Section when he becane its Chief , in January 1962. Asked whether the Tourist Department had re- ceived documentary information from any agent source while NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, Lote he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could have provided such documentary information. (ii) GOLITSYN Document NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time i of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official . i top secret KGB documert || : He 5 did not mention this fact in the Jure 1962 meetings. Although KOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by the Tourist Department, he has net been able to cescribe the : document in detail and specifically did not mention that this at vt _ particular document was in large parc based, as subsequent ' analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted te the KGB by George BLAKE. ipeeerieny eo oe ee oe ape ence fO0pP SECRET ;
wom . fur SEORE] - Aree A we Sed) ° : : . . | These years coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never men- tioned them. Purthermure, the annual reports cf the section which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of nis Claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section, presumably included all of these cases. ¥ & ? £ & & A # BLAKE’s confession that he passed documentary information on this subject to the GB, but more particularly the intensity ‘6 of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this atatement by NOSENKO must be errcneous. g. The OSWALD Case According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his partici- : pation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as ' Deputy Chief of the American Secticen. In this capacity, NOSENKO i said, he was the one who made the cecision that OSWALD was ®not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions NOSENKO has reported that he made this decision together with his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that “they decided,” or “it was i decided." NOSENKO’s information on the handling of OSWALD in OO 1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against : which it can be reliably measured. The resuits of the poly- graph examination in October 1966, hcwever, indicated that NOSENKO lied in naving said that he was personally connected OSWALD before the assassination of Presicent Kennedy. The polygraph results aiso indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKKO special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell i. U.S. authorities about it. , we er pe et ee De ~with-any-a spect—c €-the- CSWALD-case_and_that. he_hac. heard_of | poe ! i ' i i i: : 7 ate. eotteen Sow ear Fetes ° ° Fd é 2 @ a 2s
4) OLURE] €98. h. WNOSESKO's Cosrational Activitics 21950-1929) | (i) General NOSENKO appeared in one operation snortly afte: being pro- moted to the position of Deputy Cnief, tae reeruittient of the Rmerican woman HARRIS in Septcaber 1953 on the b.sis cf har romantic involvement with a Soviet mace. HARRIS centativesy identified NCSENKG's photograph as thet of one or two Soviets who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, fe was “@efinitely the man in charge.” She ceniec having had further contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In 2959, KOSENKO taid, he also supervised the sexual entrapment of Lag i but did not become personally involvei in the approach, which , was made by his superior DULAS. Scene time during this year, ROSENKO said, he recruited the second of his pair of homosexual agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the srping of 1959 he used the tvs in a series cf successful recruitvtent approaches 1 me , CE GE een] See See, wo as a commercial representative in Moscow, was not the ‘ reeponsibility cf NOSENKO's sect.on, SOSENKO was asned to make the appreacn because he was a "specialist" in this type of operation.) In 1959 NOSENKO aiso use: these agents in opera- tions against two American guides at the Sokoiniki Exhibit, BRRKRETT and wWILLERFORD. Finally, NOSEnNEO said, in 1359 he accomplished the recruitment of the Acerican Express Compary ore representative in Moscow, PRIPPEL-on the basis of sexual com- oe promise. eee eran its ons a % (1i) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV aad VOLKOV “ There is a preponderance of horosexual recruitment opera- tions in NOSE'NKO's account cf his KG3 carcer. He has referred to several homosexual agents with whom he nas worked on spe- cific recruitrent-entrapwent cperaticons, Put seid that he ain- self was never their cfficial case officer. They incluie *“LUCH," "“STROYEV,“ "NIMOLAYEV,* "SIBIRYAK"® and KOSHKIN. de has remembered only a few of their names end nas supplied no personality inforration about thea. He identified caly VOLFOV and YEPREMOV as his on agerts. NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptcnyn "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMUY (cryptonya i °GRIGORIY") and to have been their scle cease officer from the beginning of their KGB carecrs in 1957-1958 until they were deactivated in 1963 because they became too well «xnown. He met them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other nomosexual encouncers. NOSENKO took then with him whenhe transferred to the American Department in 1960 (but used them in no cperations during 19€0 and 1961) and Lack again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were used only cnce, immediately after his return). He gave a rela- | tively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), bats: i ~ He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's | patronya. ! - He does not know the home address, general area ef Moscow residence, family circwastances, job details, | _._oex_other_basic_informaticn_about either of them. ; i l = 72 oat Affi. 23.00
699. : ~ fle gaid that during the five or six years he handled them, he never was at their homes, never met thea in a eafehouse (only on the street), ang never met either of then alone without the otner's presence. ~ He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV'’s en- counters with and developrent of one Datch and five other nnecican3, independently known to Cla. Of the Americana, three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known fmerican diplomat and author Charles '. THAYER. = He told about VOLKOY'’s anc YOrfheNov's cempromise of Robert BRREETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did net know that they had met BARRETT again in 1961, shortly befo.e BARRETT was recruited on the basisof the 195% compromise. - He did net know details of why or how VCLKOV and YEPREMOV first cane into contact with their most recent target, W.E. JGHNSCN, nor how they set up the compromige which led to NOSENKO's entry as a “police official" under the name Yuriy Ivanovich NiXOLAYEW (Pages 289-293). (iii) Eomosexual Entrapee: t Operations Luring 1959 NCSENKO said he made recruitment approaches to five U.S. and British citizens cn the pasigs of homosexual entrapment operaticns involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV. All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners who have row been idertified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the ex- ception of the FRiPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of BARRETT and WILLORFCRD. (which did not result in approaches dur- ing NCSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were the only operations in which NOSENKO tock part in 1959 and they represented, in fact, the caly recruitments by the section during this year, 'OSENKO said. He claimed repearedly in 1962, 1964, end 1965 that at the erc of 1959 he received a comnenda- tion from the KGB Chairiaan for his recruitment of the five homo~ gexuals and FRIPPLCL (discusses separateiy below). In October 1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue. In discussing the GME case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had forgotten details which, from his confirmed participation, he certainly once knew. He said that (as with the : % case-~ see below) another case officer (IVAHOV}) had the file materials on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated that his agents -YOLKOV. and YEFREMOV reported to NOSENKO in Moscow on homosexuality and then “IVANOV and I and pessibly GUSKCV, the Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO couid not remember the arrangements for taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography took place. When Sgitagent to Leningrad, NOSENKO wa3 sent there to approach nim, flying alcne (as in the case). All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local kGe. Asked why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO repliei: "I was told to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answereds “ye was not considered capable,” his English was “not bad but he didn't have enough operational experience." NOSENKO did not remenber who wrote the reqves* for permission to make the eno eae Anoress emai
' 700. - 7 approach fevaybe 1 did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV") or whether @.¢&§was staying in the hotel where the Leningrad com- promice and approach took place. He named the Leningrad case officer, PERELETCV, tat gaid that he, NOSENKO, made the re- cruitment gaid another man was present. ; a [ NOSENKO' 8 account in general matches @B23 Nm statements ;: of on this approach (Pages 125-126). The discrepincies, ag well | ‘as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty of the facts, may be attributab? e to faulty memory on the part of NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO was at thia time Deputy Section Chief, when aaked to explain his own selection as recruiting officer, he said that he did net know why “they” chose him 7 and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "LCUBAS, I think.® when asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had the materials cn Set Tpig could not do *he jock, he answered: "i don't know." NOSENKO claims that he himself arranged the i transfer of a KG3 “agent or operational contact” (he did not remenber which} to Uzngcrod from Odeasa for this case, and said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written, i He gave a physical description kut had no cther knowledge of | this agent, neitner name nor code name nor job nor background ' nor KGB status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said, trevelled alone} NOSENKG did not arrange to receive hin in Uzhgorod because the local KGB tock care of everything. NOSZNKO met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other date he has also for- gotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow ahout progress and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this \ operation, nor obtain permissdon to travel alcne with the agent | : to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in ; Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk, where he said “the only thing I needed was a car from the air- port to the city." @jg& Gee said they travelled by train.) Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB proceduszes for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this operation. fh a 15 a ste ‘he ise (iv) The Agent PRIPPEL “FRIPPEL, (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his car-. eer (with the exception of QXZHRGM, pages 201-212, and "PROKHOR," Pages 173-181). The American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL was not recruited so that he could report on American tourists visiting the Seviet Union, or on official and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learn- ing about approaches being made to members of Scviet delegations visiting the United States. With a weaith of reporting assets in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did net need him there. When PRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency. FRIPPEL-is identified by. XGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was . considered such by the KGS is confirmed by statements of a self= bo: _ admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ROBERTS _ shi ce Ere ear bes Sees + acta RA i te Eee = a ty ae eee ER ROY EE eR eee me ae oe Neon eG # NR pn ee VSnwer zie, 5 ror Ave] an PS eo ia 4a we cdi ah ie att a ek nl ge
IOP SECREI NOSENEO said ?RIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly: *y recruited him myself." In 1962 no other KGB officer was mentioned by NOSENKO, who qucted from a number of his conver- gations with FPRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOEKOYV *h2d carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO wag the ease officer. According to PRIPPEL's account, CHELNCKOV was the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings. NOSENKO never met FRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL waa stationed - in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said, when PRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief ‘wisit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIP?EL's visit to Moscow {nm the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIP- PEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to PRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether: he cculd accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that there was no one in Odessa superior to nim, and as a Deputy De- partment Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway. NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and thelr wives dined at FRIPPEL‘'s heuse in Moscow some time after FRIPPEL‘s recruitment. NOSENKO acknewledged this to have been a most unusual procedure and eculd nane no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asxed why it hapoened, he said: “Because he invited me," and when asked why CHELNCKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: “Because he was also involved in the recruitment. * NOSENKO said he retained operdtional centrol of FRIPPEL, then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the Areri- can Department; Later NOSENKXO also maintained repponsibility for contact during FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR after FRIPPEL's PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own re- turn to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw no sign of change in NOSENKO’s reponsibilities during his rela- tionship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had Stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, prob- ably in 1960. FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically cn BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who Claimed case officer re- sponsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 19€0-1961 as well as for FRIPPEL said the two did not know each other; in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could re- call nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB, @igmissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never gave anything of value." The oniy question NOSENKO posed when he came to FRIPPEL in August 1962, FRIPPEL said, was whether the agent knew “what the newspaper editors he was es- corting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. Accord- ing to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed no questions and merely made polite conversation until FRIPPEL excused himself. ve ee fem oe nege eee oa sateen ent tennets TOP SECRET csormatee oAren, spnee: A panguse + -
ra he : af! 1 During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENZO volunteered: *“1f you had been clever you could have saue me werk insice the USSR; you could have ccntacted me through FRIPPEL..." NCSENKO was asked in October 1966 whether he had expectel or hoped CLA would attetst to establish contact with nim insice the USER This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations involving American (six) and British {(chree) tourists than any other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of other nationalities and having different status in the USSR. FRIPPEL and Bae ce neither tourists ner (according to them and NOSENKO) used against tourists; Goi eet from continental Europe; BARPETT and WILLERFUFCD worked in Moscow for several months. The tabulation also shows that, according to NOSENKO, his operational work was ccnsiceracly more intensive in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than. before, when as a senior case officer his administrative respon- sibilities presumably would have been far less demanding. Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the Ameri- ean Tourist Secticn is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five othere of different varieties--with corroboration by other sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belongec to that section as a senior officer. The Goubts are strengthened TOP SECRET through FRIPPEL. He strongly Jeniec this. t- t HOSENKO claims to have particirated directly or indirectly i in every recruitment operation with American tcurists in the “years 1955-1959. iis presence in KSU operaticns during this -period has sometimes Leen ccafirmed, but not aiways did these + cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--’American, ‘ British, and Canadian--f0: which NOSENKO said his section was : responsibie: ; i Years Name Nationality Status in USSR Confirmed| 1955 MALIA American "Tourist Ho 1956 American Tourist Yes 1957 German Commercial /Tourist No British Tourists (under in- Yes vestigation) Norwegian Quasi-official visitor No 1953. Anerican Tourist Yes KFAFT Americar. Tourist No 1959 Anerican Tourist Yes Britisn Tourist No British Tourist No British Resident Yes : American Tourist Yes. BARRETT American Temporary Resident No WILLERFORD American Temporary Resident No { FRIPPEL (to 1963) American Resident, later tour- i ist Yes a ey vas or ae ataannane = ce --Dnettene +: teenan nam ebteeRttettectoatcimntctttteattsnteetrtamen caer tester tne remem anfentte iterate ewan Gin oa mm ae Eros cess hs BS Ft
“LBA Rte eet 2 Beata steam ern 703. by the nature of his information about the four individual cases reviewed at length above: - In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge of the extensive background information on the recruitment. target which the KGE possessed at the tine of the approach; or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tour- ist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO has admitted lying about his having received an award for his role in the recruitment of BURGI. » Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen for the approach (made on the basis of hemosexuality) be- cause the regular case officer lacked operational experi- ence. By April 1959, however, the KGB had arranged “hur:dreds* of homosexual compromises in the USSR, NMOSENKO reported in another context, His earlier personal experience with Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in the BURGI case and a principai role in the HARRIS case, the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is difficult to comprehend how NOSENKO would have qualified for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not. --There are gaps in NOSENKO's infcrration about a number of significant aspects in the & Roope case, includ- ing staff planning and manejement of the operation, opera- tional support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain why he was selected to make the approach tog x - CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL. NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in Moscow as the American Express Company representative, . and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instruc- tiona at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occue pation and his entree into the American community ir Moscow, FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGS against tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted to report an matters to which he had no access; hence there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL case to have been transferred from the Arerican Tourist Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Al- ‘ though available information verifies the ccntinuity of NOSENKO as FRIPPEL's handler, it cannot be considered firm evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence. that he was not. Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the opera- . tional activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREIMOV, NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide rudimentary background information of these two individuals, who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section. NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and ey (note mR RDRERREmES ans dBi tern nit ae ne eee eee ee “wags at TOP-SECRET — treme at nese Bye ae
14-00000 POI cre Ping oo Sy peg eae ay Fine AE Be Rg ek age iE td eed Spiers i 704. ‘YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with hie other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an Operation between 1959 and early 1962. In further reference to NOSENKO's claims to having bean | the case officer in these various operationg, he has been unable to recount in any detail KGB etaff procedures involved in these Gperations, such ag name-tracing, coordinating with other com- | ponents, obtaining approvale for action, etc. Pinally, of his alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO’s described activity against foreigners accounts for | only about three months; if the bulk of his time was spent with recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be ex- pected to remember something about some of them. He can barely remember names (and only a few), haa given confused accounts of their recruitment, rememberea nothing about any of their spe- cific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no per- sonality background data on any of then. the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy: Chief cannot be substantiated. He hinself could his appointment to the job. { co when He was allegedly in @ supervisory capacity. NOSENKO knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the ute most interest to the American Tourdet Section, among all KGB Headquarters elements. These documents offered material that could have proven valuable to the preparation of. NOSENKO'gs own paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genu~ ine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to CIA by GOLITSYN. Aas with his status as a case officer in the American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not Gescribe how data on tourists was received, general and spe- cific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, anc lpads channeled. Even if it were asaumed that NOSENKO wag a case officer of | The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO ag not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the Ameri- an Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Depart- Bent are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGB (not necessarily the American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a ‘principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the OSWALD case but merely rule out the pogsibility of NOSENXO's having been involved with this case in any way prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.
795. % 6. U.S. Embassy Section (1969-1961) i a. Introduction ; 7 From January 1960 until Januury 1962 NOSENKY claims a to have been Dcputy Chief of the U.S. Erbassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285) Ss ig the most significant in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career for a number of reasons: Tse foe | mite ee NO gs A Pe - The section is the specific unit working against the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO'S cwn staterzats the #GB's most important counterintelligence target in the USSR. : Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly : a =ffect American security. The section has the two~ ¥ fold purpose uf knowing of and ceatrelling ali access of Embassy personnel to Scviet citizens and of collecting, assimilating, evaluating, and usirg informacion from * all possible sources to recruit Americans stationed in Moscow, parvo sts ~ NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief cf this sec- tion provided hin his access to “ost of the rajor counter- intelligence information se has recorted, inciuding recruitnents of foreicn embassy officials anid micro- phone operations against the U.S. Enbassy. Most impor- tant, it provided NOSENKO with his authority for atating that there were no successful recruicments of or agents among official Americans in “oscow for this two-year period, cr for a tite both cefore and after. (This is the same point made by incirection in the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is cuntradicted by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter did not serve in the U.S. Embassy Section, he knew mexbers of it and gave leads to KGS operational interest in and possible recruitments of official Americans in the Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear to be related to information items NOSENKO aas provided.) te eine ane ae amie y - The apparent importance of NOSENKO's information on this period contrasts sharply with that from other ¢ periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist field covering the five years prior to this assignment and the two years following have been checked thoroughly and not one of them represents 4 genetraticn of any ee government; none has access to classified information: : ' most were inactive, suspect, or already known to Western counterintelligence organs. a nn se day - NOSEX“O's work against the U.S. Embassy ia con- sensitive firmed by yjeeewand less directly by other Scviet Loot sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is Genied by GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in F the section during these years.) aed poten MBB RAEN PAD Aiba RDI One eapaTEe AEE vce ‘emi = te Mee + Oe Sotutet so Sra fees comin: nm wan Ae / | i | | | | i
14-00000 706. b. Entry into the Section NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has never given a precise date, usually saying ‘January 1960" or “at the beginning of 1960." As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at GRIBANOV's insistence and against NOSENKG's own personal wishes. GHIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview, at which KOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put new life into operations against American code clerks, the primary target of the Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Departe ment. (sec Part VIII.P.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not have been a result of his close personal relationship with GRIRBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's: NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directo- rate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few personal contacts with him outside of work: NOSENKO has also said that his father never met GRIBANOV. NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however, that BAKHVALOV was hie predecessor but left the secticn before he (NOSENKO) arrived. NOSENKO's confusion on this point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain files from BAXHVaALOV although the latter had transferred to another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did so are described on Pages 154-156. c. Functions as Deputy Chief In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief of the section from the same position in another section was definitely an important promotion: He now became of the entire Second Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUA‘s second-inecharge of the most important operational section | deputy, NOSZCNKO had the right and obligation to be aware of all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting Chief of the section when necessary. -NOSEKKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Sectionts activi- ties during the relatively recent years of 1960 ard 1961 and to know of all significant operational successes achieved in the years before and after this period, He has alsa_said he has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell Sir. swicCone that there were no recruitments. I was there.” When NOSEKKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed on a division of supervisory duties within the section. KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for { moe aampemE ape amare th cope ah mom ge Spee Se AUREL emaeeamnm meats sy we seer
14-00000 oe 707. the section's operations, to supervise in particular opera- j tional activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned { to the U.S. Fmabassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed by GRIBANOV and American Departnent Chief KLYPLIS to concentrate his efforts on the supervision of operations against the most important American recruitment target, the code clerks at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these acti- vities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed- upon division of labor, NOSENKO also assumed cese officer responsibility for John ABIDIAN. the Embassy Security offi. cer (identified by SOSENKO as a CIA officer. but actually @ CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining ' the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating materials from the microphones concealed in various uU.38. Eabassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said, I by his predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart fron these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part i of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), .the work of the officers responsible for operations ageinat.the Amorican Armed Forces Attaches in Muscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO reported that he was personally responsible during this period for the operatiozal activity against Naval and Marine officers in the Naval Attache's office. ne. art d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said, he was aware of all the operations being conducted by the section during this two-year period; by his own statenent, nothing was kept from him. There were in these two years a total of over three months when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section. In the Latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising the administrative work and operational activity of the en- tire section and, in particular, assumed KOVSHUK's work in directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs. & , NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual occurrences during these times. In answer to a question, NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUE 's which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going out of the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents. except GLAZUNOV (whom NOSENKO said in april 1964 was his own agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55). NOSEKKO also said that in 1960 KOVSHUK recruited PREISFREUND, : although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had dose | i this. (Regardless of who ‘the recruiter might have been, KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO'’s meetings with PREISFREUND. ) (Ba ren ane oe me tee ie ae eee ey
WCB, NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSEUR had per- gonal contect, under Ministry of Foreign affairs cever, with some U.S. Embassy offisers and was aware that one of these had been WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK'sS contzcts with (WINTERS, nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend and fowe- pS quent source of operational information LOPCYHOV, were also in ; f touch with WINTERS.| He could not remember who else KOVSHUK . i knew, cr what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO a r knew neither that william MORRELL (declared to the Soviet Govern- : ment as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL. Unlike KOVSHU:, ARTEMEV, KOSOLATrOV, BORODIN, BIRYUKOV, KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers, HOSLNKO never had any direct contact, even fer cultivation or essessment, with any American officials, either stationed in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English had been proven gcod cnough to qualify him particularly for tourist recruitments and his operational flair hed been tested. (It was this which caused him to be picxed for the. DOPE, br anc other approaches and tne cnly 1easor why he, an English speaker, weuld have been specially selected to work on the German Sig MB who spoke “some Englisn.") DERYABIN ané@ other defectors from the KGB have stated that the ceputy chief of a section working against a isreign exnbassy in Mosccw would be responsible for approving and retaining menthly schedules for the planned use cf safehouses by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting sciedules with individval case officers andi approve and retain a liste of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an indi- vidual basis; and that he sould approve the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer frou one opera-~ tion to another. By contrast, NOSENYO first did rot list these functions azong his responsibilities and later denied that he had them. NOSE:O did rot understand the questica when asked whether he had any responsibility for supervising the use of safehozrses in Moscow (Page 162) and said that as the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case cfificers, they could use them when ana how they Liked without informing anyone; only when they were meeting an active development agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only after the meeting. XOSENKO said that, while he was ceputy Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had gafe apartments, but he dia not remember the location of any of them. Neither NOSENKO ner his subordinates GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure *neeting apartments" (which are used in the absence cf the - full-time occupant). NOSEKKO was able to locate his own "meeting apartment" (which he said ne brought with him when he transferred from the Tourist Department and iater took . back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the lecation of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV. TOP SECRET ete fen hernasets ce ce sepoeesTDD th GUIDA Cape aes PC eI me intr kk ae nam eenat eh em Eneteenrs = ty neato aR, F< 7S
14-00000 REA GRR ee BR ey Pe a BR TERT att TS RN GS DERE a OBE GA Jem TO YE % ; e 5 it oR EPR RD TOA, ARG e. Knowledgeapility of U.S. Embassy Physical Security According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical security at the U.S. Embassy, apd it contained detailed floor plana and photograpns of the installation. NOSENKO was unable to give the location or the floor of the office of any single individual or component of the Embassy, including : those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the ! military code room, and the State Department comaunicationa room).  NOSKNAO sata that att taportaint Rabaady wt tliod were located in the “gone of security.” which he han varloualy reported as the “seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth floors," or “seventh and up," or the “top four floors." NOSENKO did not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor was he even sure how many floors were included in the restric~ ted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.) #. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel KOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every officer in the section cculd identify the known and suspected Anerican Intelligence personnel in the Embass: New neless, whom the KGB had definitely identified assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. Por » | was officially ¥ @ Embassy to the Soviet urnister of Foreign Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSH UX and the KGB First Chief D:rectorate officer K.N. SMIRSOV in 1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked i d given hints) and did not identify Four of the seven officers shom he said the RGB sispec to be CIA had never had any such affiliation. He could not give any information at_all-on, . |e exrema either on his Moscow activity and contects ‘OF Gf é d results of KGB coverage,.or on his per- tuation and backgrpund. He could not explain why was considered to | but said that ! “every officer thought he was." g. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity he closely guided the work of case officers CRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.* NOSENKO shared an office with his two sub- ordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of al *According to GOLITSYN, wo knew both men well. GRYAZNOV was "a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB in the American Department and was a specialist in code clerk operations. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had about ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing against code clerks in 1960. oe cel en elanecetee te aca 6 EECA «smi PF retin eta a nnn en nt cate ms eI 9 wa TOP-SECRET
710. one anothcr and used a single safe, which contained files on the American code clerks and the agents involved with them. NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV . and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases with thems, taking part in operational planning, and approvirg or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally asserted that he had also read and studied all the files kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on indivi- dual cases, however, he retracted these statenents acd said that he may Lave skimmed some of the files, that he did not study any of them, but that in any event he rcad all the current incoming materials on the code clerks from microphones, agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer concerned. ‘ CIA has two types of information against which the reo ports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of the detailed cebriefings of code clerks returaing frem Yoscow, administered routinely by the Department of State and the military services; it also includes the special de- briefings and interrogations of the Departnent of State, the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB opcrational activity which has become known from various sources, On this basis, CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section involving United States code clerks during the period NOSEN~ KO said he was its Deputy Chier, The second type of infor mation is the reporting on KGB operations by GULITSYN sho, from contacts with U.S, Embassy Section officers in Moscow and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's infore mation thereby directly contradicts NCSENKGO's statement that the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment opera~ tians from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of the subjects of GOLITSYN'’s leads have been positively identi- fied. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally substantiated by other sources. In one case, this confirma- tion has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the STORSBDERG operation, onthe agent PREISFREUND's role in it, and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREUND pre- sents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order’ to estab- lish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-~ Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of the code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His in- formation concerning KGB activities invelving five of these Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and *As discussed below, there are important differences in the accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the outcome of this operation. . OF a BED Ble tobe tg se cena apt ree me PD = scrapes = tery scones ont .
Re Me Me tea oe Bi anPinege 9 8 Lt Mara! Ad be BS cu acd ict la EE re 2 PN gS WOH gee km yah! Joy seman fr Se Ee BS Oo keen ons eebiae? Gey sree g ake Fe : “TL. his lack of information conctining a sixth (GARLAND) is discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSINKO's information on @ number of other cases, less important in his opinion, is deseribed in the tabulation of American ease leads given on Poges 364-410. Certain of these cases are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO's knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting chief of the U.S. Enbassy Section could reasonably be expected to know and retain. (1) The STORSBERG Case The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was, NOSENEO said, the must important case he had as supervisor of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with military cryptographic systems, and therefore NOSENKO “dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the development of James STORSBERG, the military code clerk at the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an evaluation of NOSENKO'S story of this case. NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly at his first meeting with CLA on 9 June 1962. He told how GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960, at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, a Finn. in his own opera- tions in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was being used in operations against Embassy employees Living in America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that GOLITSYX had passed this information on to the Americanos following his defection, for the regulations governing visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened. At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or apecify his involvement in any particular operational acti- wity nor did he date the visit by GOLITSYN. Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave & detailed gummary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccess- ful recruitment attempt against an Americar military code clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American, gaid that he personally conducted the recruitment confron- tation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts vere full of quotes of what SOSESKO said to the American and vice versa. descriptions of the American's reaction to the confron- tation, and statenents of NOSENKO's admiration for the Ameri- can despite his refusal to work. Following his defection, NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact, in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identi- fied the Finn as PREISFREUND ard the American as STORSBERG and described ard referred to the case whenever possible (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk eases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against code clerks in general. After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally con- fronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role ¥as Limited to directing STORSBERG into the hotel rooa where the approach was made; after first saying that he had never clained any other role, he admitted that he may have been "painting" re epe am ag renee en ee,
14-00000 712. hiswself (exaggerating) in his descriptions of 1962. This aduission came only after the tape of NOSENKO's 1362 statezents had been played to him and he had successively said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was Gruuk in 1962, («) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made hin nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of tape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKO said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end, and it was his most important case. Interrogated further concerning his role in the STORSSERG operation in October 1956, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file on STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV. . GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the American - Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND operae tionally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late 196] following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that, in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an-- American Embassy employce, possibly a military man and pose sibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said, PRETSFREUND: could rot be used for six months or so in other opecations, for otherwise the Anericans might become suspi- ciuus. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said only that GOLITSYN was instructed to drop interest ia PREIS= FREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate. _ . NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that he was on leave outside of Noscow on the occasion of GCOLITSYN's visit to the American Department. Since defecting he has insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place in the late spring or carly summer of 1961 and has described his leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN's passport and CIA travel data show that GOLLTSYN was on TDY in Moscow in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue, that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after his return from leave in July 1961, and that he was certain that he C(NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961. NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in only one operation, that against STORSBERG. Thus, as to the outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSEN- KO's information and that earlier provided by GOLITSYN. There is also a conflict between NOSENKO'’s statements that the recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961 (NOSINKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961, STORSBERG. said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's state- ment that this approach had already been made in January 1961 when he learned of it. GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case. GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department ne cee #GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit. +s meee oy wera + spn ' spree oa eeemtgrnecotts mamenemee © ee Se ee Pa od CLT TOP SECRET
14-00000 POUET Sirota Poaceae say oe. 713. = omens in the spring of 1960,* he lcarned from GRYAZNOV that he (GRYAZKOV) had developed an operation against an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 ' per cent" certain that a recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN said that CRYAZNOV told him that this would be the first recruitment of a mili. tary code clerk (as contrasted to a State Department code elerk) in the histury of the American Department. There were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in Woscow at the tine GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG ard HURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY per forned back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absence. If NOSENKO's report that there was no developacnt of or approach to HUKLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whoreas NOSENKO (as well as STORSBEPG) asserted that the STORSBFRG opvration was just under way at this time and wes long and drawn-out. . . (ii) The JENNER Case Apart from the STORSBEPG operation, NOSENKO has been able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Departrent pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly after he arrived in the U.S, Embassy Section. Because of the ipaccessibility of American code clerks to the &GB in Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Hel- ginki in order to strike up an acquaintance with a code ‘clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-Yoscow train. The first (and last) time this was attenpted, NO- SENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KCB learned that JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist'’ and thus assumed by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit Helsinki en route to his assignnaent at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER.’ Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agert to the town, of Vyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the same train. Botn KOSOLAPOV and the female agent met and spoke with JENNER en route to Moscow, and the girl gave him her telephone number, asking hia to call her, After JENNER’s arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV subnitted written reports to NOSENKXO describing the contacts on the train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only a@ pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female agent, the two were brought together in a “chance meeting" at the Moscow airport. JENNER would have no part of the agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore went no further. *When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June 1960, he dented that it took place, saying that he reces- sarily would know if it had. TOP SECRET 0 GB at geet ae ee eR een ot Safes mae = snateory » weap ane meteeme Reggem se Ye a oom LEELA rman tyes sgn RA Lan lh Ringe EN let ga “oO
Embassy vpon his arrival that he had been contacted by two Soviet students from Vyborg, @ young man and a Foman, on the Helsinki-Moscow train. He alse reported having been given a telephone nuzber vy the girl and lator reported having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport. 714. E e pple PI: JENNER reported te the Security Officer at the U.S. a as i } KOSENKO identified KOLOSOV's photogr2ph &s tat of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. (XOSEXKO earlier said that he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for'‘this trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV had an alias passport: he agreed that he would have had to authorize such a passport.) When he was told of CIA evidence that KOSOLAPOV did not travel on the same train as JENNER and therefore could not have met and talked with him as WSENKO had reorted, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he in- sisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and . GRYAZNOV, and that the events were exactly as he described j then. ae ; (iii) The GARLAND Case a GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was i stationed in Helsinki, probably in Novenber--not March,..1960, \ KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial ‘ cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code clerk on the Helsinki-Moscow train. KOSOLAPOV's arrival had been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the Helsinki Legal Residercy. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal Residency learned which train this American was to board and succeeded in placing KOSOLAPOV in the sane compartment with hin. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this Ameri- ean. Later, when another American Department officer visited Helsinki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAFOVY's operation with the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to answer, } GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success. KOSOLAPOV made a second trip to Helsinki in November (566, again under the KOLOSOYV alias. C_—_________________KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one -< his travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page 198). There were no other Americans on this train. November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train as an American code clerk, one of his own targets, NOSENKO said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case ef KOSOLAPOV'’s trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily have been involved in the planning of such a second trip and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when NOSENKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would } | { j | Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in ' | 5 t cee ee a Pape 10P SECRET
44-00000 cecemeneee ot a at ABARAT tren Mens se eae wes eae TOP SECRET 715. ae Vie have been known to him upon his return, and he would not have forgotten about the trip. (in fact, CIA travel records show | that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 Noveaber 1960 and that NOSENKO left Moscow for Ansterdam, en route to Cuba, on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that there was no such trip. (iv) The MORO*E Caso Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case Was menhe- tioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited it as an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using third nationals to obtain access to Anerican code clerts who were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens. According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early 1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS) planned to travel to Warsaw on leave. KOSOLAPOV thereupon drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHLE and approved by GRIBANOV, proposing that a female agent of the Polish UB be introduced to WCRONE on the “oscow to Ware saw train for the purpose of obtaining comproxising materials. KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Moscow to haye such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she arrived, and briefed her on the uperation., She was then placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compro- mise. Events went according to plan: MORONE. cet the girl and was intimate with her on the train, but when the teche niciar reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordings were of low quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose. In a further attempt to acquire compronusxing material on MORONE , KOSOLAPOY later brought the UB agent to Muscovy, and on this occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in a doscow hotel room. Still, the 4#GB felt, there was not enough blackmail material to ensure recruitment, and it was further planned to have the America House maid LVANOVA attempt to lure NORONE to a room in Moscow where truly compreoising photographs of intimacies with a Sovjet citie ven could be obtained. Possibly because they noticed MORONE's interest in IVANOVA, NOSENKO said, the Americans ordered KMORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken. Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of detail on HORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous variations in his different accounts. In 1962 he said that he had handled the entire operation himself, including telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw and that several months lates the female agent was brought to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSENKO said, was successful and MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent. While still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave & different version: "We," he said, arranged for the girl by a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw, moreover, the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in War= Saw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping the best oncs for themselves, and this is why she had to be brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in February 1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in War- saw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had 1GP SECRET. oy errs
ary 716. given instructions that no actions were to be taken which might embarrass then existing good relations with the United | States. When in February 1365 it was pointed out that MOPRGNE arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left for Cuba on 15 Ncvember 1960, KOSENKO revised his story of receiving the pereonal report of the technician to say that he had perhaps read the technician's report after returning from Cuba in cecember 1960. re In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has con- gistently named KOSOLAPOV 48 MORONE's case officer. KCSOLA~ POV drafted tne plan for the eperation on the train, discussed it with NOSEN“O and KOVSHUK, met with a U3 official in Mcscow to arranue for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and briefed her on her assignment. NCSENKO hes not been asked and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the 14th; from “12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLATOV is confirmed to have been in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation in- volving the American code clers CARLANID (see above). It is also noted that NOSENKO, the officer supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's trip . to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a dele- _ gation going to Cuba. NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. He reported that an Egyptian agent visited Anerica House, met MOPONE there, but did not report anything of interest con- cerning him. NCSELKO also mentioned IVANGVA, a maid at America Bouse, who knew MORONE and whom the &SB wanted to use to lure MOPONE into a compromising situation (see above}. NOSENKO said thac he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several times to discuss MURONE, but that he could not recall any- thing specific of interest or use that she reported concerning mt Shee | | . fee rene Phnom +
14-00000 eo nn oe wer: eer}, %." 7i7. bim. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO gaid, wae an East Gervaan girl sient to Ancrica Howse to pose as an Austrian; NCSENKO was not sure what she might have reported or when this was, other than it occurred when he was working against “ORONE and thet Lt was durirg ABIDIAN's tour in Moscow, for he had cove tu America House to queation the girl. Various reperts indicato that VORONE was. involved in dllegal currency speculation with the Egyptiar acent and that on at least une occasion the Feyptian introduced MORONE to a Sovict female, with shom WORONE was intimate. NOSE KO did not know that XORONE was also involved in illegal cure rency dealings with GRmigggmehon NOSENKO has identified as KOSCLAPCY's agent aid who, ne said, was involved with and reporting on NOSENKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not know that ILYANOVA once incroduced WORONE to a Soviet fenale, with whom MORONE was intinate; additionally MORONE was reported by a nuaber of his co-residents at America House to aave been intinate with IVANOVA herself (which WORONE denied). Some wh of these samc Amcricans reported also that NORONE was inti- mate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identiticd by NOSENKO; MORONE hinself said he knew UNANETS "Jeli." Finally, the incident tovolving the East German girl posing ag an Austrian involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place after NOSENKO clains to havo been transferred frem tne U.S. Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ABILIAN's successor, HONTGOAERY. ‘ fv) The KEYSERS Case Tho approach tu KEYSERS is the only tine during his service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSFENKO claims to have had direct contact with an American stationed in Slose cow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only face-tueface cncounter he could recall; and, on another, _ that it was possible that STURSEFRG--the only other possibility-- may not have seen hia on the night he was approached in the Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent American source who could confirm that SOSENKO was involved in operations against Adcrican Enbassy personnel in 1960 or 1961. \NOSENKO himself pointed cut, however, that this cor= tact eas of very short duration, and that it was possible that KEYSERS would not recogn’ze him. This was the case: KEYSERS failed to identily NOSENKO's photograph and described the officer wno approachcd his as @ man considerably older, shorter, and probably of a much heavier build than NOSENKO was. Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of this incident, he did not know much about the overall KGB cease against KEYSERS and a nuaber of discrepancies have been noted. In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS, without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORS- BERG. Since defecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to identify him as STCRSBERG’s replacement. In fact, KEYSERS was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Emhassy medical officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as # collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under training in the military code room as a "back-up" crypto= grapher for STORSLERG. STORSBERG's replacement in Moscow was ZUJUS. . JOP SECRET,
14-00000 716. On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, KO- SENKO incorrectly named ZUJUS, who he seid was STORSBERG's replacement, as the target of this operation. On 2 February 1964 KOSENKO called a special meeting with his CIA handlers to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS : was STORSBERG‘’s replacement, and the approach had been made to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one : American Embassy official he ever approached. ) In February 1965 NOSENKO said that the KGB belleved that KEYSERS did not report the receipt of the defcction letter and that there was no indication that he had fron microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. In fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of the Military Attache, where a microphone as discovered in 1964. NOSENKO had earlicr said that this particular micro- phone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB. (XEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems kad also been discussed widely in Embassy offices. NOSENKO was unaware of these discussions.) ". \ NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB. delivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport approach which NOSENKO claimed to have made. (vi). Other Code Clerk Cases Frark DAY: KNOSENKO identified DAY as a State Nepartment code clerme and the target of either KOSCLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew of eny interesting information about DAY, whether he knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NOSENKO answered “no” to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulner=} abilities he might have had, and that no operational mes- gures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was io Moscow from way 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he tra- welled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricule tural Attache BROWN, (a later reported that the two were under survelliance y five persons at all times on this trip, that on one eccasion they found four “repairmen” in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during this trip an “attractive and available Soviet female’ was placed in their train compartment. John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department code clerk ard the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not know of TAYLOR's previous service abroad or of any back- ground information the KGB might have had about hin. He described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around bis intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sym= pathy towards the Soviet Union and its people. No compro= mising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid, however, and no approach was made to hin, possibly because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORS- BERG case by creating a “flap."" According to TAYLOR, he was _ intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until the beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in 8 “friend's apartment’ in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that the maid told ‘TAYLOR she was pregnant or that TAYLOR ‘offered i Oe eed See é srememe sey
14-00000 eee oe Prersanipea > msn tls ets cSO A IER TESTE CTEGG Siti Weenies 719. her. money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961, «whereas the epproach to STORSBERG wes reported by NOSEKEO and STORSBERG:to have occurred four to cight months afterward. Naurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code Clerk who was “actively sorked on” during the 1960-1961 period. An Fgyrtian egent. whose nae NOSEN. KO did not recall, introduced ZNANG to e# frerale KGB agent in an attesapt to obtein compromising phctcgraphs, but the agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercourse with hie. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embessy Sec. tion in January 1962, there was no further activity sur. rounding Z¥ANG, The KCB had no agents in cortact with his, and there was no vulnerebility data concerning his. When ZWANG was interviewed by the State Departrent after returuinog from his Moscow assignment, m2 polygraph exanination indicated that ZWANG hed had intercourse with his Russian raid, else- where identified by NOSENXO as a KGB agent; 2¥*4NG admitted visiticg the maid's apartment several tixes hut denied intimacies. In March or April 1961, en Egyptian intreduced ZWANG to another Soviet female; Z#ANG also acmitred visiting her apartnent on several cccasions, but again denied having had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various other Americans stationed in Moscow to have been accive in currency speculation and blrckmarxetecring with the Egyptian and MEPS and agent of KOSOLAPOV according to XOSENKO. NOSE.ND Gas unaware of this. TOP SECRET
720. bh. Respons bility for and Knowledse of “GED. NOSENLO said tnat, as Deputy Chier of the U.S. Tmbassy Section, he was Cirectly scsponsible, £8 case officer, for all coversye of the Embassy Security Officer Joba VY. ABIDIAN. Thin was NOSEXEO'’s only individual target responsibility, end no KGB officer shared it with hin. NOSENKO ssid that he opened the AGA ?ile on ABIPITAN before ABIDIAN'sS arrival in Moscow in early 1960, and that he turned tris file over officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from the U.S. Embass, Section at the end of i¢cl. It wes NOSERKO eho wrote the kG plan for operations against ABIDIAN in about October 1989. ARIPLAN, secording to NOSENKJ, wes con- sidered by the KGB to be a Cla officer aid, as LANGELLE's suceessor, vas also Considered to be the most important counterintelligence target in the Enbassy. ABIOIAN was thus made a special target uf surveillance fron the cay of his arrivel in the USER: this meant he was alweys under surveil- lance by suveral teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate. The intensive coverage of ALIDIAN included mail censarchip, telephone taps, and agent rerorting; it was instituted, NOSENKO said, “in the hore that he miyht lead the KGB to anotner PCPOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO continued, in turee letter-mailings--ali to agents already under KGB control. ie vas scen to enter a suspected dead drop site on Pushhin Street, the Significance of which did not becone known to the KGB until later, wnen it was learned that this site sss to be used by PENFOVSAIY. In the hostile interrogations of earty 1965, NOSENRO agreed fiat ue was the single person in the Kub responsible far kKnosing everything possible about “hIDIAN. KOSENKO said he krew nothing abcut APIBIAN's personal background, his educatio:., his studies an France, his mille tary service, his date of ertry into the State Department , his State Department rank, his previous foreign assignments with the State Department, or his status as B Foreign Ser- vice Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FER, FSS, FSO). NOSEKKO said he tried to learn these thangs, but the inforna- tion was unevailable in the Second Chief Directurate cr in KGB Central files. and although he requested information from the First Chief Dircctorate, nothing was received. The only information the KGB had on ABIDIA’, insofar as NOSENKO knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in a report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be a CIA officer. NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN's background, he replied thet this document wes not available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently. recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register “from about 1956" in KOVSHUK's office, but That it contained no information on ABIDIAN. NOSENKO reported that one of the reasors ABIDIAN wes considercd a Cla officer was his behavior «thile serving as a Department of State Security Officer with KERKUSHCHEV 's delegation when the Latter visited the Lnited States in aks ates ial A ene oeneeg mney, | ome PRekentsremeneeen e eemiyies mene ae
72l. 1959. NUSENKO never wentioned that KOSOLAPCY. who ne said was his immediste subordinate and shared SOSENKO'’s office in KGB Headquarters, was a member of this same delegation. NOSENKO did not know shere ASIDIAN's office was Located in the U.S. Exbassy. He said ne did not know and was unable to find out who ARIDIAN's secretary was. He reported that some arent told the KG that ABIDIAN Fad a sign on the door of his office shich said “Security Officer." There was no stich sign. ‘ SOSENKO did not know where ARIDIAN'S apartuent was Located. He did not know its conteats and said that the KGB was not interested in this. He did not znoe whether ABIDIAN changed apartments in Moscow, whith he did. NOSENKO ide::tified GROVAKOVA, an Embassy language teacher, as a HOD agent who was valuable because She was intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on her students tasved on classroom discussione. He never associated ABIDIAN with GROMASUVA. ‘sien told that ABIDIAN had taken language lessons from ier. SCOSELNKO recalled that ABIDIAN took “several” lessons from GHOMAKUVA at the beginning of his tour but discontinued; she reported 1othing of sigri- ficance and there wis no regular reporting froa her on ABIDIAN, ABIDIAN, however, resorted that he took regular, private Pussian lessons frem GRUM“OVA throvghout his tour in Moscow and that they discussed is class &:s past personal life. travel, education, fiancee, and his trips sbroad to see his fiancee. NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN :ravelled out of the USSR two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took place or what countries ABIDIAN visited. SOSENKO said that, as ABISIAN's predecessor LANGELILFE was known to nave travelled outside the USSR for opcrational reasons in consection with the POPOV case, it would have keen of interest to learn where ALIDIAN had gone. but the KGR hal no way of finding this out. (Note in the previuus paregraph that CROMAKOVA knew.) When NOSENKO'S interrovator pointed out the possibi- lits of photographing ABIDIAN’s passpore upon Lis return to tre USSR, NOSENKG replied that the &GB dues not photograph the passports of foreign diplozats entering the soviet Unio... NOSENKO said that ABIDIAS sade no trips outside Moscor within the USSk and explained that. a8 case officer, he would necessarily have Leen aware of any sucsh trip as he would nave had to Wandle ail arrangements for surveillance during it. When NOSENKO was tuld that ABIDIAN travelled to Soviet Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO said fer the first time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted in October 1956 that he krew nothing of ABIDIAN'’s trip. ROSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow or his friends and profes- sional contacts among forcigners there. MOSENKO said at the erd of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that tue reason he knew so lattle about ABIDIAN was because ne was “working badly” as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he aise gprs a ene pe ie arn a Bi
BG are orem oo red. said, was that he hed to concehtrate on Supervising tie work against code clerks ard therefore had veey Little tise left for ACID:AN (sce abov> concerning code clerks. In 1262 SCSENKC correctly described all of tos three clapdestines letter mailiogss carried out by ARTDIAN it Mos~ com He also provice! ace curate information on CIN Yettor-mailings in gencri:. pointing out that none et all were mailed for a vear and a half after the arrest of LANGELLE in, October 1959. (Xo letters were mailed from /2 February 1960 until 1 April 1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) SOSENKO explained that the KGB completely centrolled this activity through the use of metka, a thicf powder applied to the clothirg of forcignérs in the USSR; a trace is lefr on anything coming into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected by special machines through which all mail passes. .Despite the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB double agensts and would therefore have been detected enyway, it was metku, NGSENKO said, which in each case led to their initial” ftdentification. After his defection NOSENKO described how the metka had been applied to ABLUTAN’s clothing (anc hence to the letters) by the agent PLOOROVICH, who began working as ALIDIAX's maid several months efter ABIGIAN ar- rived in Moscow in March 136U. NOSENKO insisted under inter- rogation that FEDOROVICH was the anly agent who had access to ABIDIAN'’s apartment, that he, NOSENKC. had persenally briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was sure that ABIDIAN's letters were detected by means of metxa. From a CYA debriefing of AIDIAN, however, it appears that FEDOROVICH did not begin working av ABIDIAN's maid until some time in July 1961, whereas ABIDIAN matled his first letter in Yoscow on 1 April 1961 and “is second Tetter on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 Septem- ber 1961, after PELOROVICH began to work for him. i. Reporting on ABIDIAN’s Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead op er tt NOSENKO’s account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY déad drop site on Pushkin Street in Mosocw is described in detail on Pages 231-225. In summary, NGCENKO reported that at the end of 1560 or early 1961 KGB surveil~ lance followed ASIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street, where ABLDIAN was noted to enter @ residential building. Upon examination it was decided that this was 8 Likely dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was as- sigsed to watch it. After three months, since nothing sus- picious had been noted, this post was renoved. jne true significance of the location did not become known to the KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962. NOSENZO said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section ard was ABIDIAN 's case officer when this event took place. He heard of it while sitting in KOVSHLK's office on the day it happened. visited the site the following day with V. KOZLGV (Chief of the Asericen Departsent of the KGB Surveillance Directorate), placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN'S file, and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV on an almost daily vasis during the first monta and periodi- etily thereafter until the post was removed. It was ECZLOV whe told NOSENKO that after three months the stationary + ree on meenempERoe. ~ seormtpnete
Ettnge eee Ve. suTrvéeallance had becn @isyeontinucd. NOSPNYO did rot tell CIA avout this incident tn 13962, he seid, becaust 30 kreew that the watch Lad betn @incontinued and thet noining Sugse- piciocus had becn noted; therefore. he thavght the ancidest would not nave Geen of futerest to ‘serican Intelligence. WOSLKEO hes stressed that ALIDIAN $35 vender special surveillance by at least to survedllacce teams at Bll tines ang tat, oa the agy he visited Pastkan Street. ALILIAN was under cuntinucus watch from the gonert he left ube rEnbassy- NOSENSC has teen able to give a detrilee deser.otion of \ ABILIAS’6& movesent to the dead dsup nite. : j- inspite tke special surveillasec coverage of ALIDIAD, : NOSENKU seid, he #85 Urawnre of acy UNUSUAL “OVemENtS UF . ! ABIDIAS during tne deys immediately preceding his visit to Pusakin Street. SOSENKO said tha: Ke knew definitely that surveillance had reported nothing unusual during this period and that ne ses Sure ABIDIAN had not cluded the sur- veilia.ce et any time during it. Arcoréing to CIA records, three cays before ABILEAN went to Fushkxin Street in response to indications tnat tne dead drop had beer loaded. AsiDIAN left tre U.S. Imbassy in his private car for Spasevo ouse at about nine o'clock inthe evening: at about two o'clock the next sorning he and GARELER (CTA Chief of Station) went in ABILIAN’s car to check the telephore pole fcr the signal PENKOVSELY was to leave us part of his signal that the drop had becn loaded. Two days before ABIDiAS went to Fushsin Street ke drove ois cir to the apartment of Air force Captain DAVISON; he again checked the telephone pole frum 6 window in the apartzent and then salked by it on Poot. SOSENKO identified GARGLER Jas a U.S, pavel officer but not as @ CIA enplosee (see above). LP pea nel UTS: de GPa ata Le we ge eek EUS et Asked why. in his opinion, ABILTAN went to Fustkin : to . Street at the tine he did, NCSENKO replied that ia about i : P6U an Anerican icurist or delegation mexber had gone to this address. It was the “opinion of the Secure Cuief? Directorate” that this American had selected the site as ® i dead drop lvcetion, rnd that ASIDIAN wert there merely ‘ to check the suitability of the site for this purpose. In fact, ABIDIAN scent to Pushkin Street in response to what . appeared to be 4 prearrenged telephone signal froa PENKOVSaAl? | g 3 4 i a H ; B a By = ‘ : signalling that ae had loaded the dead crop there. It has 4 t been confirgzcd that FANKOVSEIY did not give this signal ; and, Lecsuse of the circumstances and type of signal given, | : the possibility of coincidence 285 been ruled cut. CIA hes i therefore concluded that the signal came fron the AGB. : The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by : PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 Letter through which i ‘ he initially contacted CIA, There 18 nO record that @ . td : “tourist or delegation nouber" visited this eddress. The ! - . only known visits by Anericans to the building on Fusbkin Street--the only ones having any connection with its use : as a dead drop. locatica~-occurred on 12 November and 4 i Decenber 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the address from outside, and on 21 January 1961 when MAHONEY | : entered the building aad dhecked the specific Iscation of ; tne dead drop. AAHONEY is known to have been identified : to the KGB as a CYA officer before arriving in Voscow aid was tke target of heavy surveillance throughout his tour. (NOSENKO did not know about MAHONEY or bis CIA statue.) Fill oa, 2 PAG e ant > ERR ce wn Mb
744. NOSENKO’s Cate of “Late BGO or carly 1961" a8 incorrect, almost exactly by a year. SCSEXKO uaid he turned AGIDIAN's file over to GKYAZNOV about 28 Ueceaber 1961. ABIDIAN cheexed the Fushkin Street dead drop en 20 Tececreber 1961. NOSESKO hes described his perticipatio: in ai approach to the American touriet W.E, JOUNSON as happening “right after returnirg to the Tourist Departrent in 1962. Beceuce NOSENKO'’s partacipation in thiga cese was confirmed by SONKSON. and because the approach to JOHSSCN took place on 5 January 1262 (:e reported it to the U.S. Favassy at once), it car be said with certainty that NOSENKO's ertire story of his own participation in the surveillence of the Pushkin Street cead drop sitc is false. NCSENKO: (a) could not heave visited the dead drop site with KCZLOVY (who in anv event was not in Moscow at the tise); (b) could rot have placed the originel surveillance report in ABIODIAN‘'sS file, ‘ hich GRYAZNOV held ag of 28 December 1961; (c) could not | have received alaust dally reports from KOZLOV for about a month and periodic reporta thereafter; and (d) could not have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drép in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street i head been discuntinued after three months without anything \ guspicives beirg noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March yy, . i bore meee 4962, only two and a half months after ABIDIASN checked the dead drop.) NOSENKO has refused to admit that he lied about his part in this incident. The page containing tre contradic- tions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only page of a “protocel" waich NOSENKO refused to sigh duricg the hostile interrogations of early 1965. In October 1956, wnen he was again asked whether he went to the Pushkin Strect dead drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could not remea- ber whether he had gone there at all. nes 6 ere te mettre ener 2 ete come
14-00000 CR Rm ie kets pgm eae took piac . 725. j- Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Sperations Gn 23 January 1963 NOSEXKO told his interrogator that for the first five or six months of 1960, fmmediatoly after. transferring to the U.3. Embassy Section and as part of his :- responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second Chief Directorate activities against American service ate taches in Moscow. By thia. he meant, NOSENKO said, that. when GAVRILENKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches), KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would . come to hig rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section, After about six months he was relieved of this duty because his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this function and because it was considered more suitable that ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility. NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on his resmesibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never before mentioned this one. NOSENKO told CIA in June 1964 that when he reported for duty in the U.S, Enbassy Section in January 1960, DRANOY was the responsible case officer for the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival, NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and his receponsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had earlicr been as=iiting DRANOY against these targets. NOSENKG said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon, or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either immediately befOre or right after this leave KOVSHUK told him that he would be responsible for activities against the Naval Attaches. DHANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO the files on Naval and Marine personnel. This was NOSENKO's first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel of the Naval Attache’s office in sfloscow. (At the same time he said that he had lied about going on leave in November 1960. ) NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had said in 1965 that io 1960 he waa supervisor of operations against all U.S. service attache personnel, NOSENKO re- plied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on [supervising] all of thea.” KOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S. Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all. attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI* 'g contact with (or attempt t recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent » which he has described in detail (see Page 488) after he was relieved of these functions. TOP SECRET oa l + pamenege P opaeees  mencgp toes Mate coe ee tame « Biden
Wh tf Logs 726. k. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case In the spring of 1261, NOSENKO said, four months after returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that-in. about —-— - a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult with : the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR concerning operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages 279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where he was met by A.S. KOZLOV, an advisor there and a former employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria until about the middle cf May. While there he discussed both general matters and particular cases with the Bul- garians, gave several lectures on operations against Ameri- can installations and personnel as well as against tourists, - and finally directed the successful honosexual operation against the American Professor LUNT. . Aside from being told that he would be advising the Bulgarian service cn operations against Americans at the Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no preparae tion for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions that nobody told him what he was sunposed to discuss with: the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of responsibility, 0: problems of the American Department of the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia. NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact that he was extrenely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy Secticn (see above discussion of his responsibilities for ._code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a “very experienced officer” and has said that KOZLOV was. Chief of the American Departeent until 1953 and then from June 1955 until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist De- partment, Second Chief Directorate. (XOZLOV, assisted by . NOSENKO, had recruited BURGI in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away from active operations in Moscow too long. . NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties. as an advisor on operations against the American Legation. On the other hand,:he accidentally became involved in a homo-. sexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual . compromise.) NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed greatly between 1962 and 1964. During the first meeting - series he described in detail how he set the operation up . and what he said to LUNT when he personally confronted the American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, how- ever, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at the time.) B nleshe, on eee cate nate ong ieee eee fe vem meme em mS
727. “ NOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service hecane a: are ; : of LUNT*s homosexual tendencies only after he saw LUAT's~ : — name or heatlit mentioned; he recognized the name as that..of ny = a professor who had been assessed as a homosexual when x earlier visiting Moscow, and traces With the KOR Second Chief Directorate confirmed that this was the same man. In gtatec- ments rade to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said he had had hotosexual relaticns at least five difrerent times with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia. LUNT- gave this Bulgarian travellers’ checks, which the latter planned to sell cn the biacknarket, was on one occasion stcpped on the screet with nim by a Yulyarian civil pelice- man, and corresponded with him in the interim between his first visit and the one during which the arproach tock place. LUNT had written the Bulgarian hemosexual that he was retyprning to Sofia tefore arriviny on the second occasion. The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TvY NOSENKO said that’ in October 1966 he was essicned to nen accompany a delegation of autonctive specialists cn a visit mee 7 to the United States but that when this trip was cencelled, oS a he went on (DY to Cuba (ages 274-278). after he had conm- . pleted arrangements for his passport and had submitted his ; true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets were informed by U.S. authorities that the dclegation could not then be accepted in the United States. At about the same time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSEN"G explained, it was not considered necessary for a security officer to accompany this delegation to a friendly country, but at the last noment, two days before the delegation was scheduled to leave Moscow, the Central Committee o! the Communist Party demanded that such an officer go along. Because there was no time to do otherwise, NCSENKO was chosen for this job F since he already had a valid passport and authorization. to travel abroad. Visa arranyvements were made for the transit countrics and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to Moscow in mid- or late December 1960. NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Em- bassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this ° name in connection with travel abroad. (He travelied to England in 19587 and 1958 as NEKOLAYEV, NOSENKO saia he had used this name with Uritish citizens epee Hots Z in the Soviet Union; a3 @8G8BH... suspected of veing an intel- ligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity. He applied for U.S. entry:under true name, however, Gespite the fact that he had also used the NIKOLAYEV naxe with Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NCSENKO further explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEY because the automotive delegation cover he plarned to use in the United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this. would be ncticed when the American and British services ex- changed notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, Ccon- i flicts in the same way with the Ministry cf Foreizn Affairs . cover NOSENKO used, again under true nane, in Geneva in 1962. eine caw wien eee etre s AERA A tt A ELEN ns eae oe we TOP SECRET : eee cece en meme ee fe a ; ot epee Ont
14-00000 Ghee wis TOP SECRET 728. NOSENKO snaid that the decision to send him to Cuba was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because @ security officer vas required ard he happened to have & passport and authorization to travel. ~The delegation left-—- Moscuw on 15 November 1960, acd therefore ‘this decision was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSENKO, who had been transferred to the U.5. Embassy. Section in order to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks, the Section*é& most important recruitment target, consequently left Moscow on the day that HORONE aleo departed by train for Warsaw and at a time that his subordirate KOSOLAPOY was in Helsinki (12-16 November 1960), apparently in connection _ witb an operation against John GARLAND. KOSEXKO has given widely divergent accounts of the purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban— intelligence service was operating against Americans sta tioned in Havana, particularly intelligence officers. and described what he did to fulftil this mission. Since 1964, however, NOSENKO has claimed merely to have been the security officer with the delegation. TOP SECRET
14-00000 ae ee on \ 729. 1. Personal Handlirg of Agents When NOSENKO transferred from the Tourist Department to the American Department, he took along a number of the agents he had used in tourlet operaticna with him: YEFREWOV and YVOLKOY, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV,. and RYTOVA. During this period he also handled LEVINA, @ Librarian and language teacher at the U.S, Enbassy who was turned over to him by “y.S. Embassy Section case officer WASSYA in 1960; and PREISFREUND and eae who were used in code clerk opera-~ tions. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of thea are dig- cussed below. (i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV | NOSENKO continued to mect with these t#o homosexual sgents during his two years as Deputy Chief of the section. He did not use ther in any way, however, accordirg to his eccount. The ocly contact of the tzo known to CIA ass 6 mecting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1999, while in Moscow end a Cle agent, BARRETT was compremised by YEFRENOV and VOLKOY: in 1961, shortly after en apparently chence teeting with them, BARRETT ves recruited by the KGE on the basis of the materials obtained in 1959. NOSENLO descrited the compro- sise cf BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he haa been recruited in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFRE- WOV and YOLKOV in 1961. (i1) FRIPPEL NOSENKO said he continued to handle TRIPPEL during the 196u-1961. period, despite the fact that he never provided anything of value, because he and CHELNOKOV (the Chief of the Tourist Department who was always present at these meetings) “kept hoping he would give something." FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be registered as his case officer. * (iii) DMITRIYEV DWITRIYEY, a specialist on Jepan and Thailand who spoke Japanese and English, had teen NOSENKO’sS agent during the 1935-1960 period. DUITRIYEY was then eaployed by the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate how he was used in tourist operatious. NOSENXO did not describe any operational use of hia in 1960 or 1961. {iv} RYTOVA RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Department after 1956 or 1957, at which tise she was employed at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. An Englisa speaker, ghe reported any interesting information concerning visitors to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB oper@- tions in Moscow in which she participated during his service there. (v) LEVINA LEVINA worked as a language teacher and librarian at the American Enbassy and NOSENKO handled her because she had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He TOP SECRET pee tebe oe ee
7390. eet with TEVINA @ nunber of times, bat she never reportcd anything jateresting and Fes never used directly in opecree i tione involving tie Arericans. ‘She s28 fired froa the , Embassy ut the eud of 1960 or early 1951. As described in Pases 173-131 and discusse’ above, PREISFREUND as, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 1960 ard was bandied by NOSENKO in the operation against Janes STORSBERG. (Coth NOSLNKO and PREISFREUKD seid thrt this vag the only operation in which he took part. NOSZINKO suggested ' to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his 7G description of this case, and CIA interviewed PRELSFREUND in Helsinki and Stockhola during the sunser of 1965. PREIS- =. . FREUND's account generally agreed with SOSENKO's ond he wag Cc able to supply a considerable anount of personality and background information concerning his former case officer. From PREISFREUND's menner during these interviers, the nature of his responses and statements, and his actions after the doterviews were completed, there was ho reasonable doubt that he remained under KGB control while meeting the CIA representatives. ATE j (vi) -Johen PREISFREUND — ; “SAPDAR') was recruited by NOSEN= mai(KGB cryptonyna A Syrian gfe eee aE in Moscow, tae eee was firet targetted against Wooerice House in General, but wag then used only in the development operation against ZUIUS, the successor to Janes STGKSLERG as military code : clerk in Moscow, @X@amet and developed ZUJUS, but nothing had come of the opersetion at the tine NOSENKO transferred from the American Department. No other use was made of this agent and there was Lo approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first ed that CIA actempt a “false flag" recruitcent of Reusing his (NOSENKO'S) name for this purpose; he pro - d CIA with Qhmmtgeuarn oi eeewain Danascus so that Shea, .ater NOSENKO said that qe de Se like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO's position as his — handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA inter- wiexwed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled havirg met CES Ae i recall his name and denied that his relationshi was as close as NOSENKO reported. ses ae nee fh eres ane me te see rere one mare eo TOP SECRET | sen eettan 5 ae REL Someone sitermenenemetemia te eosin me tee
LCR ee 2am GRRE Reema heen. enema» 731. . a. -Tranefer to the Tourist Department Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard of GRIBANOV's decision to promote himto the position of Deputy Chief of the eatire American-Department. NOSENKO,-—- however, knew that nis chief and friend KOVSHUX wanted the job. and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appoint} ment would therefore place him in a difficult position and wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returnirg there. At CHELNOKOV's suggestion, NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that he would be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department upon the retirement of the incumbent. BALDIN, in July 1962. To this GRIBANOVY agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did - not discuss with himhis reasons for wanting to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing. him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did ne discuss with NOSENKO his personal requirements for these positions. On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was because GRIBANOV “thought I was a tough guy, a good case officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved in a lot. of questions which were reported to him." According to his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred from the American Départment at the end of December 1961 and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about 3 January 1962. KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Deputy Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this po- sition, according to NOSENKO and COLITSYN. He had been per-~ sonally involved in many of the nore significant American Department operations during the previous decade. These in- cluded the recruitments of RHODES and SMITH (the latter one of NOSENKO's most inportant leads. according to NOSE*KQO); the handling of ‘SHAPIRO: the attempts to recruit. STCRSBERG, | STONE, and MANNHEIM; the development of the CIA officer [WINTERS|) ard the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with he POPOV arrest. By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate for*the job, NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOV recruited BURGI, and himself recruited HARRIS and five homosexual tourists who visited the Soviet Union in 1959. Furthermore, NOSENKO's perfor- mance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. as he admitted under interrogation, was ‘not good.” ; NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his transfer to the Tourist Department. [1 1962 NOSENKO said at various times that this took place in January 1962 and in February 1962: in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling gome time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E. | JOHNSON on 5 January; (On this basis, he said that the official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several days later.) SOSENKO contradicted this Latter estimate. however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of 10? SECRET - — meee wyeene apie + ween Set ee erent mine
14-00000 (peter nstee 732. the Pushkin Street dead drop, ive., until late March 1962, and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist Department by the time GOLITSYN defectod; he placed this on | 15 January 1962 aod refused to believe the correct date of 15 December 1961. . pn. Remarks For no single reaponsibility hag NOSENKO substantiated hia alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1960-1961. His statements about the appointnent to and transfer from this position have been inconsistent; bis comparatively narrow experience and his acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, dispel the likelihcod that these personnel assignments were made in the way be claims. Repeatedly he has been contra- dictory about his activities during this two-year period, shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how each succeeding version made all of his clains increasingly incredible. The limited extent of NOSENKO's information betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties, targets, and most of the operations which he has ascribed to himself; in a certain few instances, however, such as his description of ABIDIAN's route to the Pushkin Street dead drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where col- lateral information has covered the few subjects on which he provided details, it has almoat invariably contradicted him and showed him to be ignorant of significant facts. The reporting by NOSENKO thus was 89 superficial, so in- “complete, and go demonstrably erroneous as to suggest, without reservation that he never eerved as an. officer. in the U.5S._. Embassy Séction, much less ags_its Deputy.Chief.. All availe ‘gable evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were CIA and FBI sources (see Parts VILI.H. and VII.1. below), combines to formulate this conclusion. i eect on mae = so ene te rN
BH iin em td tt en a % , ® Jeera aust she 4 7 i Moa Oe ee 733. 7. Tourist department (1962-1964) a. Introducticn NOSLNKO agreed during the interrogations at the beginning of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the -pmerican Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this job he was responsible for pianning and supervising KGB acti- vities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encom~ passed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 225- 287). In July 1962, in conformity with GRIDANUV's intentions, NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of close to 160 staff officers, was responsible for handling opera~ tions ayainst all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintained the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Department, 4 "paper" promotion as there was no other deputy. During this pericd in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervi- sory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents. It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two € the most widely publicized cases of this pericd, the arrest of BARGHOORN.and the case of OSWALD. b. Absences from Moscow: During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after ‘the approach to JOENSON on 5 January 1962; NOSENKO spent sev- eral weeks “getting the feel" of things by talking to case offi-~ cers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tour-~ ist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assign- ; ment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has oy said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Depart- ment of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation of suspected American agent SHAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did™ this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties, but has noted in another context that these preparations required sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On 15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section. (He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.} Thus, according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief eq"this date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have occurred on 5 January,| | + eae rey meee ip a ners ORR a Beam a = Oe te re noe ae
14-00000 734. i of the Americen Tourist Section, he wis an Moséow only three months ard for much of this time was involved in breaking in abrozcd. WOSEKKO said ne hed “no accomplishments.” in this } period. . : In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a month in Sochi with his wife urd mother. HOSENKO has estimated that 31x months of 1963 were spent cn verious temporary assignments in the Soviet Union outside cf Moscow, plus 2 one-nonth's vacation in 1653. From 15 June 1962 to ms arrival in Geneva on 19 Janu- ary 1964, a period of 18 months, oZENKO was absent from KG8 Headquarters for eight months. Tres in the period 1962-63, holding supervisory positions, NOSEIKO was absent or "reading in" for about 13 months, or about 50 percent of the time. on his new job or in preparing for his temporary assignment — j & { | H c. Personal Participation in Cperat:ons HOSENKO had direct operational corcact with three Americans during 1962 and 1963. Tro of these (the approach to JOHNSCN and the interrogation of bérGHOOls) were unusual an that they were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target; NOSENKO could nane no cther examples of. such operations. In poth cases, the victim of the provocation has verified KOSENKO's presence. The third cate, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS, was unsuccessful, Additionally, SOSFSKO supervised the homo- sexual compromise ot KCTES, who was closely tied in with gives a sensitive source and related. eee ee tee sa meets RR nem ateraerccmeeracs St JOHNSON (Pages 789-293), NWOSENKO said, was in Moscow as a tourist in early January 1962. ard was considered for recruit- ment, but a decision was made thet he was net worth the effort i as he had ro access to classifies aatertauls and lived too tar | ; from the KGB Legal Residencies in *ashington and New York City. . i (SCHNSON's home was in Texas.) Severai days after this deci- sion was made, postal intercepts showed cnat JCHNSON was writing abusive letters concerning the Soviet Union. They were "so bitter" and critical that the KGb decided that something had to be done to stop him. At about the same time the KGB received an indication that JOHIIZON was a nemosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when wo he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected — by use of NOSENKO's homosexual agents, and NOSENKO was able to j describe the confrontation scene, his second meeting with JOHN-- SON; and JOHNSON's frigntened telephone call to the U.S. Enbassy reporting that NOSENKO had recortacted hin. meee te Po oe a NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in this operation “in January." When he contacted CIA in Geneva : in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's j name and the date "5S January 1962." This was the actual date : : of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no . i relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took cet 2 ate met more * pe etn ACETONE ON 2 eee os wee tO te TOP SECRET ;
44-00000 735. place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly be- cause he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with : official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that the apprceach was in January and recalled that it was made immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department. * NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value. Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up through postal intecept. ‘About the same time there were indi- gations of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted ‘. against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOKRNSON * arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; NOSENKO said he reported _— for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported ; his first contact with NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV the ‘ evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on § Janu- ary. Me FRA @ abate ehh age’ Sa hale malate dS inner aims a3 ae sige Cig gy Mean at os Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were the ones who criginally determined (JOHNSON "s homosexuality, he said in 1964 only that there were signs.” ~ NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or a where they came from. JOHNSON reported that he first met the : agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter gat down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV ine vited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited anc set him up for the approach without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact, been signs of his homosexuality beforenand and tnat operational plans had been laid by this time. MBSE, NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual entrapment cases and has named several which were called off because of a risk of scand@al. it is, therefore, unusual that the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting let- ters and articles. : . NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this opera- tion the’day after he reported for duty in the senior position of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, told him to do it. Ouring his talks with JOHNSON, NOSEKKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as *“Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV,” (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV) the "Chief of Police.” | . (£4) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest ; The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took . place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO has S“liow NOSENKO'S Self-stated and confirmed participation in a’ i i fourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries . : implications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the , | . -- PENKOVSKIY dead drop is discussed above. sent ae mms mtfenae ie reg
oer. epee * 736. info fron sensitive scarce described in cetail the selection of B.2GHOCPN as & hestege for IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested ehortiv befor: in New York City as a result of was ‘hke ta eae et es Sy the plasring of the provocation, Oer Fub activibecs so: ShEcing BARGHOORN which were not related to the provocation, BANGHOORN's arrest | in Moscow, and the early stag?3 of his interrogetion. Except for gone variation in datcs, KOSENKO's accounts of BARGHOD2I's © movements and of.the sequence of events in the provocation-~- arrest matched that of BARGHOORN. This case is in two way3 similar to the approach to W.E. JOHNSON: It was an operation in which there was_no thought of recruitment, and BARGHOOM! was able to identify NOSENKO as a participant. BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he was questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the evening before abcut the “compromising materials" which had been planted on hin. With this officer on this one occasion was his “chief,” wnom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photo- graph as NOSENKO. NOSENKO has said that he was told by the Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO) present in the interrogation room ut the time when BARGHOOPH admitted that he had the. compromising information in his posses~ gion at the time cf arrest. NOSENKO did not knew why hig pire ticular presence was needed or desired, tut he complied deszite the fact that he did not want to reveal hig face to BARGHOOPN as he knew BARGHOORN would be released. KOSENKO said that ne stayed in the interrogution room only until the interrogating officer secured this admission and then he left. BARGHOCRI has reported that NOSENEO attended one of the interragaticn sessions, that this session covered only biograpiniec and background matters, and that the compromising dceuments and his possessicn of chem hed been discussed the previous evening, right after his arrest. In describing the planning of this provecaticn, NOSENKO told CIA that the suggestion to provide SARGHOORN came fren GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chair- man SEMICHASTNYY, Dut did not @ivulge to him thet it would be. based on provocation. *4is was on the day before the arrest. SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest ard secured permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KHRUSHCHEV was out of Moscow at the time. Reliable scurces show, however, that KHRUSHCHEV was in Mcscow on 30 October, the day when SEMI- CHASTNYY allegedly called BREZENEV, and was also there on 31 October, the day cf the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen Ly Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1363. iii) The Approach to BRAUNS NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tour@ ist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until World War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually settled in the United States, where he was a technician working at an “interesting company making computers, adding machines, or other instruments." NOSENKO had originally instructed hig TOP SECRET 4 vipemee see renee ie OBEN ee entre get ib ene oe nt es eee eats eee EERO Sta a name nn
737. subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KRUPNOV was not able to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach called NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO went to the Mosco# Hotel where KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured: EBRAUNS! agreement to cooperate, against threat of imprisonment for treason on the basis of his wartin> flight from the Soviet Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and be- cause NOSENKO felt the recruitment was “shaky,” KRUPNOV was” sent after him to consolidate the agreement. BPAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV however, 80 again NOSENKO went to help hin. It was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was 8¢ friohtened that he would never work for the KGB; NOSTNKO thereupon decided to terminate the case, and BRAUKS wag sent on his way. NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached BRAUNS, he did not know why BRAUNS had visited tl. Soviet Unics, and he was unable to name any Soviet citizens with whom BrAUNS came into contact while in the USSR. ERAUNS, in fact, had spent almost a weck in Moscow before the approacu was mace.. During thie time’ he spent his days with an Inturise tour and his even- ings with an old girlfriend he had knowa tefore the war. She had been writing to BRAUNS in che United States for about a year, telling him of her unhappy marriage and itpendiry divorce. ERAUNS hed written her cf his intencion to visit the USSR, and che travelled specially from her heme in “enincrad to Moscow to spend this time with hin. According to the account given by ERAUNS, the man (NOSENKO, accoréing to NOSENKO) who jcined him and nis original interrce- gator in Moscow was the person who first epproached him in Lenin- grad. This suggests, if correct, that it was NOSENKOG who was sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPNOV. BRAUNS was unable to-identify NOSENKO's photograph but expiained that he was so frightened that he prebably eculd pot recognize any- one involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be ccn- H TeaBi Lhe) age thw LD peed asic Fb EP ero wert PS Sa AR OP RT fused. i (iv) The Arrest of KOTEN 4 5 NOSENKO said he supervised the horosexual provecation anc Fa arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the develop- ‘ ments in the case were reported to him (Pages 298-302); he was . & not in face-te-face contact with KOTE. NOSENKO explained that j KOTEN, &@ member of the CPUSA, had frescently visited the USSR y since the war, he numerous suspicicus contacts there, and was ¢ considered possibly to be a "plant" (presumably of the Fal) ir. Ba he Copmunist Party. Prior to his arrival in’ 1963, GaRRGr suai But. hafecoaLegal Residency reported thas KOTEN was in contac. with an c=uportant SeMcseat in : that he was carrying the addcess of relatives of this agent with wim on bis trip, znd that he intended to visit them. Cn this basis, it was dered that he might have the mission cof invescigatine we ert inside the USS2. GRR ae eet ie ae Stores AS it wast Buspe i rips that KOT was a homosexual, the KGB planned to compromise hic, arrest him, break him, and provide time for the GHEE agent to make his escape from the United States. KOTEN was arrested, but the Gam Riptwe. cen 8 We ree ELEC os antes econ te ne AE at RRA «RG GEARS eee TOP SECRET * en en
738. the United States, and wien tha CPUSA agent refused to lcave f one of its members, KOTEN was released. protested the arrest oO KOTEN was 4 long-tine Communist, and there are no apparent reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. Nis hemogexuality was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as & tour guide for the New York firm “Afton Tours," which is owned by | SVENCHEANSKIY. {NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Communist, was his. own agent at the time of KOTEN's arrest.) NOSENKO was able to give a considerable an ing data on the *important agent" BERT ass This eaent had bee i Py been arcested on chargas of homo- igt to press services two days The fact that KOTEN had i sexuality was leaked by Intur} after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide pub- licity in Western pewapapers. (fha U.S. Tebassy was nc” noti- fied officially until =wo days later.) There was no apparent reason for this extreneiy unusuzl step by the KG, which can 2 assumed to manipulate Inturiat for operational support pur- poses. After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was re- leased from prisen. He was rold that che ancident was 4 mistake which had been corrected, that he was free co go anywhere he in the Soviet Union, and that te co.id return anytime. ate the @yyacert, has since repatriated to the Soviet 1 ime d. Agents Handled by NOSENKO When NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to i the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homosexual | agents VOLKOV and YEFRIMOV, PREISFREUND, BERRA, and PYTOVA (Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his H i TE FI ME Sraceg A RI a sR PR RP Ps TR eR ee return, in the operaticn against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their the fall of 1959; they were never inated at the end of 1962 or early "too well known.“ PREIS= ..° €iyst operational use since used again before being term hed SPP Lee RRS 1963, NOSENKO said, because they were FREUND was considered compromised to zmerican Intelligence following the defection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used again, although NOSEKKO met hin socially when PREISFRELND re- turned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1903. During | _ the first part of 196Z, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the / -Chief of the american Department, with who was still involved in the deve the American code clerk. NOSENKO last saw before going to Geneva in Maren 1462: WEISS left the Soviet Union to return | to Syria while NOSENKO was away. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had | { H { | | va rom NOSENKO continued te meet lopment of 2UJUS, been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute TOP SECRET wit we someettin mean tei decease 4
739. of International Relations to a position in the school of the CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Althezgh she was inactive, NOSEZNKO continued to be registered ag wer case aa officer until 1964, when he defected. , ae I t ‘lan ep eM ny Ba (4) PRIPPEL ; Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, FPRIPPEL (Pages 129-133 and’ Par§ Vi11.D.5.) returned several times to ‘the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his case officer although PRIPVEL now lived and worked in New York City, met him each time. FRIPFEL said there were three such — i} eccasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and : . CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa, when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met PRIPPEL : in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met 7 twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. — ‘ The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIP~ PEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors tour- ing the Soviet Unicn. FRIPPEL gaid NOSENKO called briefly at his hotel room to enquire what questions ‘the editors planned to ask KHRUSHCHEV during 4 planned intecview. When FRIPPéL. ’ gaid he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later re- rted that he did not see NOSENKO again on this trip. (NOSENKO said he called again after the interview to learn the *reactions® of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL, visited the. Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when’ he was “ drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided a no information of value during any of these meetirgs. . Same mie cere ir ee aan wae gn Agee 7 Pe a o ES & ‘aA co ri $e as sh = ral as 3 3 a = ests Pt ete 62, Ae AYES IS are eta “ - (44) SVENCHANSKTY aoe Rte alata aire ae es NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym “ANOD,” as -~ an example of the Second Chief Directorate’s use of foreign travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant. Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had been, considered, NOSENKO said, “of definite operational interest.” In September 1963, NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer, NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the . responsible officer. | re ‘Gate ide ae ts: a NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file BR : and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He 4 2 po met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once : “4 * later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present. € i oe * j a : pistes . ; A TOP SECRET fee
740. NOSENV.O said that at the time SVENCHANSKIY #aS recruited in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKLY waa known to have had con- tacts with AMTORS in New York, there was some suspicion that ve he mignt be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more pre~ “ cise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how . ; i NOSKOV had resolvec them, was able to say only that NOSKOV . od ®felt” that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent. OO NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department: He did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise of commercial favors, that he had 2t one tine been detected in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition 1 to hig travel agency. SVENCHANSKIY ran 4 Russian-language book~ j store in Chicago. FBI and CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY © has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government { organizations in the United States since the early 1930's, : that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Committee concerning alleged subversive activity. and that both his travel agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Sov- : jet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegation; on file of | SVENCHANSKLY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espion- age activities cate back to the Second World War. In August 1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKLY to the Soviet espionage in the United States during the war. The PBI has re- a ; ; a & Py z 2 s & ia Py oad 3 A ts : AES outer pase 5 CCP ini wD SST tng se one time been tre . os & rdential secretary of GOLCS, the “director of Soviet espion- ; age in the United States.” (NOSENKO knew that someone called Sonya worned for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she ig not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa ‘ applications.) e@. The OSWALD Investigation As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO © said, he was directiy involved in the investigation of OSWALD's ; activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination r of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.)- It ig from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB file on OSWALD that NCSENKO derived his authority to state that the KGB “washed its hands of OSWALD® after his attempted sui- cide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either - OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he : lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation. . say Tie dees ie Tam OF <a ce pe meeereenpte eT ORADESRPE . waaithcerramenseayantnte te sg ee i e £, The CHEREPANOV Investigation Ba : ; ‘ Se t Part VIII.8.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV . case, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in Novem~ ber 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. i] poate ear Ate, Geer me % bat, SPIRO TRY CEO TOP SECRET
741i, g- Remarks Leaving aside NOSENKO'Ss unsubstantiated claims to puper- visory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1963, when he indicated he was absent frop KGB Headquarters nearly half of the time, his persorsl role in operations and investigations of the period appears artificgal in some instances and im- plausible in others. KOSENKO’s knowledge of the origins of the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other activities attributed to himself, the expressed purpose of tne compromise in unique, and the outcomes seems to have little consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO appeared in it. Although BRAUIS may have been in a position to corroborate NOSE.KO's appearance in that operation, he has rot done so and his statenents contradict NOSENKO on the part : the latter phayed. So too do the statements of BARGHOORN, who { F recognized NOSENKO a8 a person who was seen briefly during the : interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources Con@ tradict NOSENKO on one important Cetail (KHRUSHCHEV’s presence ir. Moscow) of the EARGHOORN arrests exolaired as_a retaliation- hostace acticn for events in Eee en ae eae BATE Come , EGRET OTT Oe HOSEKKO's inftormatiey VEC Grres of wae merican Communist KOTEN seems simply to have confirmed ' . earlier information Bjeeee Ei ate aah ris balls NCOSENKO's information on the bacagio " " ; . L | ‘oe cpoeration La fragmentary, lacking even the most impertant facts krown fron ‘several, mainly overt, scurces) his attendance at meetings with SVENCHANSATLY: was confined to the two times when the . original handler wes also present. The position of NOSENKO in the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VI1I.D.5. Jn summary, NO ENKO'S operational work was not commensurate with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the participation of NOSENK.O in Tourist Department activities has been or might be confirmec by other sources, it is therefore __ - unproven that he was in a supervisory position in tae KGB or C that he was even a case officer. aaat i naan oe OP SECRET we inte os 4 6 .
14-00000 te Pah BEART Aer RE TRA adhd de Oe PR Bh KHATER Rg Rae ee SRT BGRETA Aa Sad SPL Re Tran” 2 PAP Baneel OPS ep eit om ae peg nba all ek bee 8 ay. VARS 6? 0s GRUB as catmenengenn toate EB. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography 1. KGB Awards and Ranks a. Awards At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO described a series of awards and decorations which he received over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief Directorate (Pages 313-321). He claimed to have received the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from KGB Chairman SEROV for nis role in the bURSI recruitment and the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the Ameri: ean or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a number of other commendations which he received--almost one a year--for his "general good work.” In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational performance, only a medal for satisfactery completion of 10 years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal. b. Ranks NOSENKO’s descriptions of his various rank promotions fol- low a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326). He has given two separate sets of circumstances for hfs first promotion, frem junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to the first of these, the one NOSENKO adnered to during 1964 and 1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while serving in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning cf 1951. NOSENKO explained chat the required time in grade is sometimes cut in half for cfficers serving at this undesirable post, and that this is why he was promoted after only six months of active duty. In 1966 NCSENKO said for the first time that he did rot enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB with the zank of lieutenant as this had been his rank in the naval GRU.* During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962 NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant Colonelcy. NOSENKD gave an apparently accurate description of the structure of his salary as 4 major (so much for rank, go much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was fill- ing a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the TDY authorization issved for the CEEREPANOV search,**. which ¥Sée Part VIIL.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that NOSENKO served in the naval GRU. @* See Part VIII.B.?.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV case. cee mest “Nema cenmmyme ea + eect et RIERA Co te deter RAEN RENE © ment any .
14-00000 a : oo - 4 coat cee conecta meets AMeetiOnSebAi EG ZOLERSDA 8 0 Cees + anne on at ae Aa ne ee tee oe De® ABR wee 743. gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colone* and was signed by GRIBANOV himself and testificd to it by his signature on the “official biographical stetement" prepared in Frankfurt. The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promo- ticns came during the interrogations of January 1965 wnen he volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he hed never held the rank of major but rather, because of a series of administrative slip-ups and GRIBAXOV's advicz and help, had jumped directly from the rank of captain, which he received in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant coitonel in late 1963. NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that he was a major.* In. an unsolicited statenent given to CIA in April 1966, NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and tnat the TOY authorig- gation for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error. Cc. xemarxs NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions directly affect his self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly rising KGS officer. They also have a beari ok oen — the alleged reasons for this rise §&& GRIBANOV's favoritism. NOSENKO rs ' BANOV's name to each cf the awards he earlier cl received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who ceCided that NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was GRIBANODV who physically presented the award to NCSENKO. The same is true cf NOSENKO's account of his rank promotions: GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be pro- moted Girectly from senior lieutencni to major in 1959; when the Personnel Department made a mistaxe and only promoted NOSENKO to captain, GRILANOV adviscd him to accept this rank ang promised that when he had completed sufficiers time in grade for promotion to maior, GRIRANOV would sce to 2% that he was promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. fhis is what happened, NOSENKO sai@ in 1965, and after he received his rank of lieu- tenant colonel, GRIBANOV called him in and congratulated him. On the basis of NOSEXKO’s admissiois, there is aiditional rea- gon to quegtion his relaticnship with GRIBANOV.** NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against G2 regulation and for no reason he could explain, an official KS document listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV him- self as well as by two provincial authorities. This suggests strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSENKO's alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV papers were fabricated by the kGB, then there was no genuine search ’ €or CHEREPANOY and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and not a mistaxe ag NOSENKO claims.) *~fhis change of story coincided cleseiy in time with a change in the information reported by §% a Shortly after NOSENKO’s defection had said that remarxs by his KG3 associates ba SENKQ «vag 4 lieutenant colonel. that _#@ NOSENKO's retractions and changes of story concerning his personal and cperationa!l relationship with GRIBANOV are discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336). TGP SECRET t f seagate pee et a com man Sem BEY 8 + ce ne nnn 8 Aetna eo soo ERs shew *
‘ vlu itl 744. i 2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs a. Introduction eta tba ering’ Sate NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomo., he said, in 1943 or 1944 without giving the step any thought whatsoever. All of his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENKO did too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist youth organization throughout his scnool and university years, in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Depart~ ment in 1953, NOSEXKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of the emall Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Director~ ate, a group of about 17 members. CI cy RP agate ay SREY * ER TENET: te ene cenmne (+ eee yee pene ore Se b. Discussion NOSENNO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Kom~ somol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a super- i ficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of i certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this position should have. Thus, for example, NOSiNKO provided a description of the system of levying dues on Kemsomol members which was substantially inccrrect and was unaware that a Kom~ somol Congress (the first in many years and therefcre a major event) had been held during his claimed tenure as Secretary. NOSENKG said that he held the position of Komosmol Organi- zation Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954, when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately after this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from nis position and a “strict reprimand” was placed in his Kom- gory) file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was . admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party cf the a ' Soviet Union, he was the only officer in tne KGB who was neither _a Komsomol nor a Party member. NOSZNKO's account of his expul- gion from the Komsozol on reaching his 27th birthday is con- tradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect at that time. These regulations stipulate a meximum age of 25 years and NCSENKO should therefore have been forced cut at the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This i was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member until he became 27 years old and that no speciai exceptions were made in his case. ec. Remarks The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limi- tation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretary~ ship is true. The date which he gives to this incident is after that on which he should have been expelled from the Kom- gomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent; gee Pages 0-81). cette ern eet otters ne ne ee Sy a aac +
6 conc earners satiate CREED OG NE er b we we VIL’, 745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.). TOP SECRET sree te cere einen my | trata eee ee ere cme sc crupamerte ct pemasieeie fe +
atte * ww BR mee 746. 3. Schooling a. Introduction : There is relatively little reliable collateral information ! concerning ROSEIKO's schooling up until 1950. Other than what . he himself has reported, available information consists of overt! ‘press releases pertaining to the Minister NCSENKO's career (and. giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with f references to these other sources, is surmarized below, i With the exception of minor variations in dates, attribut- able to memory, NOSENKO's. story of his early years until the : ‘beginning of World War If, when he had just completed the sixth grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Lenin- grad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions - and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In con- ' trast, the pericd immediately following, during which NOSENKO : allegedly received his early training in naval matters is char- acterized with freyuent changes of story, contradictions, and admitted falsehood. b. Discussion In 1964 and 1965 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacucted with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September to begin studies in the seventh grade. (An article in the Sov- fet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 Jenuary 1967 confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in the Soviet Union in April 1940. Ore of these was in Moscow. However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed! the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow! school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENHO remembered that he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been evacuated to €hnelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh grade of a regular school. 1964 ard 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the sumer of 1942 and secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, along with which he was evacuated Ly train to Baku in the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved ail events up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the : Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of | { i { In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in | j ! 1941. NCSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the fall of 1943, not 1942.* * Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval ‘Preparatory School, NOSENKO explained that the Moscow special . naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and i ‘that this was farther from heme than he wished to go. The Red Star article menticned above said that the special naval schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school - apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, -but was shut down. + ce ad TOP SECRET
lu, vlUite 747, Rgain to accomvedate the added year in Chelyabinsk, NOSENKO gaid in 1966 thet he spent half a year factually, according ty the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before rune ning away from school back to Moscow in January 1944. In _@arlier acccunte he said he was at the preparatcery school there from October 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also giver. expansive anid charging accounts of his escape from school to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he admitteé thet this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in Baku from 15 months to about three, KOSENKO also admitted im- plicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received in the preparatory school, of the sumer he spent working at the school rather than returning to Moscow on yacatica, ard of his “certainty” that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku were also false. NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the events of 1944. In 1364, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of studying as 4n “external” student in Moscow to complete his ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from Baku when the naval preparatory school returned to Leningrad in the autumn of 1344. On several occasions during 1964 and 1965, NOSENXO described how he and his classmates spent Octcber and November 1944 working in the woods near‘Leringrad before beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted this account from nis April 1966 autobiography. NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. {In the latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that he attended the Frunze Maval Academy from 19643 to 1944, that he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945, and that he wes shct in the hand by a jealous young naval offi- cer in 1945.) According to the account given under interroga~ tion in April 1964, KOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the ; preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, re- spectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February or March 1945 and that he shot himself in “early” 1945; since the 1964 interrogaticns he has claimed only that he received a statement of the courses te had attended at the preparatory gchool and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuild- ing Tekhnikun in Leningrad. The earliest collateral information specifically concern- ing NOSEKKO' 8 educational backg roureyiniie tes to £4 Nate Shapes aeneral vericd Coes e SS aba Oe Pee fey Wer at ay ANS e Soviet Kavy defector A&TAMON preparatory school with NOSFNKO during the period 1944 to 1946. ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO'S defection was publicized, said he had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the navel school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, according to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two somes “1 A rhe
in pag nga Rae nn “ar wees TAC. classes behind ARTIMONOV, and would have been at the scnoo)] for only about two months. It ts conceivable that the presence of the son of the Minister of Shipruilding woule be widely known in the school and later remembered, but 60 would that son's self-inflicted wound ard disappearance, which ARTAMONOY has not mentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20 years later) celiably recognize 4 pheto of a person who had been there such a short time and not in ARTAMONOV's clags. (NOSERKO claims not to have knewn ARTAMONOV nor to recognize the name.) In all eccounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO has said that he entered the Institute of International Rela~ tions in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of cuurses, events and fricnds are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of his earlier schooling. He has given various cates for his graduation and has explained that he did so to cover up the fact that he failed his fin2l examination in the subject of “Marxism-Leninism,” of which he was asnamed. tOSENKO inost ree cently ciaimed that he received his @iploma in the end of the 8] c. Remarks NOSZNKO's own admissions, es well as the small amount of collateral informatior available, make it clear that much of his aecount of his education has been false. ‘Nhe reasons for tris are not at all clear and pernaps, in fact, there is no logical explanation. The CIA psychologist “no tested and questioned SGSENKO about his youth sucgested that, under corditiorns of interrogation, he may lie for mo other reegon other than his neea to Save face. Tnas view is an accurate aescription of HOSEXNKO's behavior when questioned in Getarl on this and other spects of his pre-«GE life; it is not so with regard to ques- tioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist's view appear to explain why NOSENKO forgot or «as unwilling to tell CLA about an entire year of his life, particularly such 4 significant one, after consistently ard apparently accurately (judging from the Soviet press accounts cf the Minister's activities) describing the years preceding it. It is rot apparent why NOSENKO originally voluntecred the story of his travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrte, OF why he said that the Mosco™ Special Naval School was evacuated to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was closed, if he was there.‘ ; ; * The possibility that ROSENKO is not the person he claims to be (and with a completely false life history, Or Ons lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but no clear conclusion can be drawn o7 the basis of available evidence. ; TOP SECRET _ eee Eten:
14-00000 ° . . G49. rY. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivatton, and Other Opera- Tional Circusstances 1. Introduction Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his sotivations must be founded, 86 with any source, on factors which are often immesaureable, but fewer reservations need be attached to an appraisal of the other eircumstances affecting the course of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. These opera~ -_ tional circumstances can be analyzed and evaluated in much the same manner as were NOSENKO ‘'s production, sourcing, and biography for they ere tangible pieces of evidence. In the . next portions of this paper are presented these appraisals, which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man), Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30— 43 (for the operational circuzstances). 2, NOSENKO The CIA specialists who assessed KOSENKO foubd hia to be of above-average intelligence, cne of them saying that “his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intele Llectuality. morse shrewdness than efficiency. He_is capeble of good memory and, as illustrated »» bis_repesting certain facts_in The Bane se uence , capable of whas. appears to he good memorization oF details. On the other hand, there were numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory, and he was the oxceptional defector by having been totally debriefed within a relatively short period. Parts VITLD. and VILI.E. discuss KOSENKO's truthfulness with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personal backgrounds. Here may be added other observations by the CIA specialists: KNOSENKO can exercise decepti on cleverly, he improvised and was evasive uoder interrogation, and he has a “remarkable” disregard for the truth where it serves his purposes. The results of the polygraph examination were that NOSENKO “attempted deliberate deception." The gaps and errors in ,NOSENKO's testimony therefore do not seem attributable to low intelligence or to consis- tently poor memory, but to a conscious attempt to mislead American Intelligence. Independently; then, this conclusion raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB and {if so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latter point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: “This man is capable of playing & role and playing it effectively," and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO- 'SENKO looks very good {to his KGB superiors] as a possibie penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired." It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations, that NOSENKO displayed an imebility to explais the gaps and errors in his reporting. . _ TOP SECRET
_ Oo Wh BLE bbe se 750, 3. Wotivation Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source might not want or be able to adnit even to hinself. Thus, what XOSENKO said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and for this reason the whole question of his mativation must remain a minor weight in the overall asscssment of bona fides. NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explazatioa and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He initially insisted that he had no ideological motives but Simply wanted to ‘make a deal" in order to get out of trouble; yet thisclaim is open to question: The amouct of operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace was hardly enough to have driven hia to treasoa, especially since ‘ there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV wko might have helped him make up his loss. Furthersore, only two days after CIA_had rescued him with the funds, NOSESKO “Spent the CIA_monocy in another drunken debauchery (with the Same companion) and came back needing more. The discre#- pancy between the degree of the need and the seriousness of of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented . to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added sew reasons: His distaste for certain aspects or the regize, his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, aad his Liking for Americans. SA By his defection ic 1564 NOSENKO changed the ccurse of his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully aad unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute danger. In 1964 he could give no conerent explanaticn for the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the first time, thati:hehad said in 1962 that he would not de~ fect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel abroad any more. (This contradicts NCSENKO’s 1962 state~ ments: anticipating imminent promotion to Deputy Department Chief, he said that he would Ieave the USSR at least once @ year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising career, an undisturbed tamily life and children of shom he was fond, cast shame on his father's menory sud his ree maining relatives, and departed forever from his orn country. His own unease concerning his motivation evidently con- tinued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explasation. No part of this statement was ever borne ovt by his conduct, attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, wherever his reactions seemed spontanedus, to dislike the United States, to have no interest in it politically, culturally, or scenically, and to preserve a preference for the USSR. A CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's “strong emotional ties to his traditionel background,” while @ CIA psycholo= gist reported: “Emotionally he has not defected in spite of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he bas." The psychologist also said that it is “almost impossible to determine his true loyalties and true beliefs.” Top SECRET. .
14-00000 a A oo ce as cept tee ete REE ee tn ote ae LO en HM omen HF OTD af, pe Paycited GRIBANUY's personal authorization of NOSENKO's 751. “ # ana 4. Operational Circumstances a. Presence in Geneva (1962) 1962 When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962,;-NOSENKO was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chie? Directorate, havirg held this position for t#o months. He himself acknowledged to CIA that it eppeared. strerge for the KGS to send a new Section Chief on an extended trip abroad unconnected with his ovn wurk. His reasong for being in Geneve have varicd and to some degree contradict one ; gnother: The Disarnanent Conference was not expected to - os last core then "a few seeks,’ but NOSEN KO did not tegin his ; work egainst SHAKUOV (one of the main reasons for bis being there) until six weeks after arrivals GRISANOV played a role in his TDY, but NoSe:xXO Tater denied this; there vere in 1962 “new reles” requiring & staff officer to accompany a Soviet delegetion, but in 1965 NOSENKO said he did not renenmber such resulations. He was permitted to go to Geneva in 1962 and 1964, as well es to Cuba in 1950 and Frgland in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint cespite his claim to a rceeord so bad that he was not cleared by the KGB for persencnt posting to Ethiopia in 1960. b. Presence in Geneva (1964) \GSENKO said on one occasion that GRIBANOY was cne of those who allowed him to come to Geneva in January 1664, as a personal favor;* he later not only denied this tut saad in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew nething about the TY. Ue re~- ported the 1964 TOY might, tecause of his new position, be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of his superiors to permit his this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO said he had the assurance that as LTeputy Department Chief (which he knew he was about to tecore) he would in the future cone to the #est at least once @ year. Also, XOSENKO could not explain why @ First Deputy Departacnt Chief, if allowed ' out of the USSR as & “treat,” would go abroad for a conference ‘ which could be expected to last many seeas, probably months. : This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENEO would © ‘ be needed in Moscow: He Said that a KGS conference to plan , the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about this time, and he stuck to this story even aiter admitting that the telegras recalling him for this Moscow conference was an invention (sec below). c. Access éo KGB Residency and Availability to CIA NOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Resi- dency in Geneva every weekday morning, although be claimed that he had ne reason and that it is noreally forbidden (as other sources hive confirmed).#¢ When a&ked how end vhy he sensitive source ove, Tip in the face of derugatory information as ore cause of _ GRIBANOV's dismissal. . #*NQSENKO said he did not visit the KGB legal Residency in London nore than once during his visits there in a similar capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip te Cuba in 1960. yop SECRET .
14-00000 752. did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different ansvers at different times. His stories of sizply “dropping in and hanging arourd” for lack of anything better to uo are unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice. His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or or intervention were contradicted by: First. his otc con- fused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second, his own statements at other tines that it was GUK who tag primarily responsible for NOSEXKO'’s visits to the Residency. NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on 11 June 1962, although thereafter he limited meeting tines to shortes and shorter periods until his departure. This seemed natural at the time since he would presumably huve his own responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet colleagues ia his proper surroundings. However, in 1964. he seemed not to nave any official responsibilities or any calls on bis time: He was willing to spend all his time in mectings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless would have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about to become a defector. Ho showed no concern at the time, but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact efraid; it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall telegram, in order to hasten ois defection and put an end to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties, that he would be required to participate for cover reasons in more of .the Sovict delegation‘s official activity. He said that any absence could be explained as “security duties," since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions of other Soviets conforms neither with obsérved Soviet practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet intelligence and security officers under cover go to some pains to hide their true affiliation. NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom and availability in 1964 and his limited free tine in 1962 by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him in his free time. (This story does not explain his ability in 1964 to get away during conference working hours; neither . GUE nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.) d. Timing of .1962 Contact WOSENKO had been in Geseva for three months in 1962 when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it was only two weeks before his departure. He came to David MARK only 10 days before leaving. This had the effect of limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO’s contact caze only about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who hed been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during earlier visits to the West. NOSEXKO, as one of the two primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BeLITSKIY had been under KGB control from the outset (Page $17). FOP SECRET , - oe ie 2 oe tne nape rstie t cite apeebeppeeemmare tame t
A Pa IPT ETE 7g PRET Me Pan’ ae * Marcy eo 4 io ene einai ee sare me cour tntnee ttn pu e 753. e. Willineness to Meet CIA Although in 1962 HOSENKO Claimed that he wanted to sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and then disappear, there were indications from the outset that he expected and planned to come back for further meetings with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwilling- ness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample details about himself which would inevitably have compro- mised him to CIA and forced his future ccllakoration. Before he finally agreed to return for more ineetings, he said: "Mayte I'l] meet you again Monday* (two days after the first meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducements, to meet on the intervening Sunday. In fact, wren he did return on Monday, ne said that he had spent Sunday with friends, drinking and “discussing recent USSR foreign policy moves and speeches by KHRUSECHEV.® . f. Tre Recall Telegram NOSENKO's confession that ho tabricated the story of his having been ureentl resailed te “Mescow by a telegram Pept accor back Ram Es ESE Cee, leaves only two possicle anterpretations: - There was a telegram, but NCSENKO'Y mind has slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between fact and fancy. ‘This, however, is not borne out by his general conduct nor his performance under interro- gation in 19€6. - There was, in fact, no telegram. (This is borne by Special Intellicerce.)  shus, the invention was Secs SR! Pee aa ae TRE not NOSEXKO's but the KGB's; the KGB Drietec NOSENKO to report to CIA that a telegram was sent; anu HCSENKO made an errer in later admitting that it was not. out g. Remarks : , The operational circumstances so far reviewed point out the facts that: 6 - NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and 1964; - He had unusual access to the KGE Legal Residency and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to impinge upon his security; - He was willing to return to meetings with CIA al- though having at first said that there were but two items of information for sale; - He was “in place” as a CIA source for the last six of his 100 or so cays in Geneva in 1962, thus restricting the amount of time he could provide eontinu- ing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and , - After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which appears to have been a fabrication. Top SECRET fa en | 5 { i
14-00000 754. ‘ Taken torcether, these fects suggest the possibilities that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on toth occasions for the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wented the opportunity to gauge ‘CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962 and to the defection plans in 1964, end that the KGB gute. d NOSENKO after contact was established in both years. A further examination of the operational circumstances in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the 1962 meetings. NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions by saying: “I will have toe think about that tonight," or “7 will have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a good answer for you," or "I don't cant to give you an answer to thet right off--1 am afraid to mislead you." He would return to a later meeting with the information, efter having visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other examples of what may have been backstage guidance by the KGB: . -He called for an urgent special meeting to cor- rect sumething he had said in an earlier meeting. Initially KOSENKO had named ZUJUS instead of KEYSERS es the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally approached. in 1961. This seened remarkably urgent and important to him at the time, and in retrospect this cease gains special importance: It was the only time he claimed to have had direct contact with s U.S. Embassy staff employee during hig alleged tour in the American Department in 1960-1961. If he could not remember this one name, it might call his entire story into question. It is hard to find another explanation; had he simply made a careless mistake, with his cus- tomary indifference to names and dates. XNOSENKO would be unlikely to mull over what he hed said at the meeting nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement. Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency meeting to do so. ~He ceme to meetings with ‘chance"™ items picked up eat the Legal Residency. esch of which would require quick action and the commitment of assets on the pert of CIA in Geneva. Aliso, NOSENKO originally said in January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but various steps taken or plenned by his CIA handlers kept him in place for a time. Each step, however. was quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some information NOSENKO had picked up by chance. ~He asked, out of context eod without any explana- tion, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not eoherently explain where he had heard this, why he had not toid CIA about it in 1962, and why he had asked. in addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for exanple, the Soviets’ avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYN'’s defec~ tion in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet Government created publicity which had the superficial effact of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing him as @ public figure, confirming that he had pa family, and veri- fying that his defection was of slarming consequence. These TOP SECRET : _¢ A eee RAND BEET OH ene EOLA NE t | 2 Ne TTC ee
14-00000 ee 755. reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paria Match; the photo- grapher passed photographs of NOSENKO’s wife and children as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abandoned fanily of a “top Soviet intelligence officer" whose cefec- tion had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence.® Ther¢ ia no independent press in the USSA, no Soviet journalist*Mllowed to publish as he pleases, and the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposi-~ tion to dramatize defections from its most secret agency. The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on KGB instructions. TOP SECRET ee ae | i a eel me meme meng + ceos Penge seine ay <1 te eat elena = +
14-00000 6 emangemme oie porting tc CIA and the FBI. because their ovicence generally -~ (uP SECKEL, > 780, G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO The preceding portions of Part VITI. present an analysis of the NOSCHXO casu without qiving -etailed con~ cideration to information about him fron Soviets re= runs counter to the results of the foregciag analysis, it ig revicwed here separately eo that the concentrated examina- “jon of NOSENKO would not bs diverted hy asides as to the authenticity and reliability of there Soviets. 3 indicated below, the CZA and FBI sources who have directiy sucocrted NOSERKO's intelligence background are ing fs RENE: Meeks and the ccfectors Ges NOne Eacupt GULITSYN claimed tu hnow eer furoenakly Or to have worked with him, and GortNKo contradicted GOLITESY by saying they hac never ret. Som: of then, as well as CHEREPI NOV, susperted NOSENKO fnudirectly through overlapping information on specific XGB Cperationsy, Lut this asgect of their reporting is reviewed in Part IX. sae ae amare mg eee * = ea" 2 2. Curroboraticon of KOSENKO!' # Intelligence Career cade ea Ye es wetter oa . The statements of epee: the sources confirm that’ ROSENKO was 2 KGB officer .ith access to sensitive information: aaa? a NCSiuXO wan a KGB livutenant colonel (Later changed to captain), a friend and protege cf the head of the KG3 Secunda Chief Directorate, GRIBAIOV, who a roved NCSFNEO'S Gereva. : a tye 1 mig rT . Pas Se se ‘ ak aa OP a Nees é was a KGU "Chief," with actecss to detaris on- KG opera tions against the U.S. Ercassy, an! was most recently ' beaputy Chief of the Tourist Department. fic also stated i that NCSENKO, with his information un U.S. Embessy micro- \ phones and KG8 operations involving correspondents and i. tourists, was “more valuavle [to American intelligence] i than PENKOVSKIY,”, SOSEK/SG "could ¢o tremendous harn to the KG2," Qgguseuhee ceases and rorecver, tne KGB “will not be able tu operate normally tor cwo years” (i.e., until 1956). Ne cescribed the repercussions in the KGS caused by NCSENKO‘'s defection: new KGB regu- lations to increase secucity, the lismissai of many KGB officers inclucing CRILANOV and the recall of ~asy eS aA 9 Rha oe aaa (<a d  fe ie Waa ASKes fo re pr m whether NOSENKO could be a “trick,” i.@., & y provocateur, TRIS essed the viction taa3 NOSENKD was not. 7 a ANC ea raee Sele pi epee or tai Apeoe Fe ate" ONS 3 a ST sensitive source efiea stated that NOSENKO had attenied the GaU's Mili-  . 4 ary-Diplomatic Acacemy (NOSENKO has indicated he de- clined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic intelligence schcol in the early 1959's.) ‘Afterwarés, 4 NOSENKO served in the GRU and then entered 4 d ! Fi ang GOLIT ° : ate
}4-00000 - According to Sg7A5: Ses) NOSLIKO was in *tIntelli- gence.“ His defection Lrought about the recall of a KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of scme 60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the dismissai of KGB personne) including NOSENKO's friend GUK, whe had recommended the TOY to Geneva. In addi- tion, ae” PER reported, immediately after the de- fection a “presentative of the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee went to Geneva to sneak the Sovict Government employees there. cgi =; said that NOSENKO had been tried in susentia in “oOScow for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and 342). to - GOLITSYN feiled to comment wen Shown SOSENKO'S name in poet ane there 15 WOT recors ef N Se re faving MERELOneG whoenn UPTO ES Nees ern press anacunce= ment Of c.le Gafection in 1964, 2veEn ehough 1.2 had nanea peosie Known to him in the ApOTican Teparticnt ef the Peopie Kaen rer Divectorctes (Snerelyatter Cefecting GSTTISIN saiGc taas ne Hac visited tnis Deparctzent in 1960 and at tne turn of the year 1360-1961.) After NOSENKO defected, GGLIISYN was given a swenery o£ NOSENKO's Liography. ‘hereupen GOLTTSYN reported that NOSENKO was a KGB officer whom he first met in 3953 and last saw in 1959. Fren 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN stated, NCSENKG was in the U.S. Embassy Sceticn of the American Department, responsible for coveraye of U.S. military personnel and later either for others in the Mos- | cow Fmbassy or for correspondents. As of 1953, GOLITSY! said, BOSEUKO was & senior officer in the Tourist Department; as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Depazt- ment. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHUPANOV, and KASHCHEYEV | : were friends in the KGB whom he shared with NOSENKO (see : feces 343-344). ; . RGB friend SVIRIN that NOSENKO was” fo3 : *civilian”; he hac nevertheless provided information on oe! ' i microphcnes in the U.S. ©=-5 caused “consicerable : ® damage.” oT ee at geckos = cere eee? | SO have core is roborated certain non-Inteilagence aspects of background. 3. Remarks ene : phave certified that NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer, amu a 1 asserted or implied that he had access to information valuable to Amerie can Intelligence--the mic <cpmmanoS in the U.S. Embassy being one item in comnon, &@ ae aE Sg mi : x t is rj cane eenmemennenene © a : op Secret
i 1 i | 2 oe + Apne ona ra . ov pte dea * Most of them have described the serious repercus- sions cf NOSENKO's defection, The posaihilities with regard to the accuracy of | jreporting are: 7 MCSENKO ig what he claims t6 \ JOP SECRED “ 758. First, they are correct. If so. the foregoing analysis is in error, and : be fs ve fector whose previous positions in the KGb enabled hir to ' divulge all inportant details on operations against Westerners, mainly Americans. Second, they are misinformed. If so, the fore- going analysis is correct, they may Le valic sources, and NOSENKO has always been under KCB control, For this to Le true, it would have been necessary for the KSB to dispatch NOSENKO with only a highly restricted number of FCR pexsonnel Cincluding CRILAIOV) aware of the actual circumstances of the oneration. The K.38, at the same time, would have propagated within and out- side of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction that NOSENKO was an actua) bet aisloyeal KGB offacer and would have supported this fabrication in vari5us id fo PL FST SCAM INE PTE A PNP ONE VS eet “ES the rsvor spreadin a BS. (i ng Sag Pee oid anges ere toout the severity of tra 208s Of NUSLIEO, etc.). Third, they have been purposefully misleading. BRnerican Intellicence for their own or KGS purposes. Y€ so, the foregoing analysis is correct, have participated in a KS5S conspiracy to SUppor “bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGS-controlled source. These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX, ee ea
we Pn! cian satiate ctetcnate squnacnmnmiagen nee aoe vote in miban GARE meetin nie mt oe TOP SECRET 759. “ H. “Alternative Explanations 1. Introduction -“parts VIII.B. through VIII.P. have discussed the inaccuracies, self-admittec contradictions, inconsistencies, and incompleteness of WOSENKO's reporting about himself and the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation for his actions and the nature of his information. There are thgee alternatives: Pirst, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a combination thereof; or {b) he is insane. Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to gave face. : Third, NOSEKO has misrepresented himself, either on his own or at the instigation of the KGB. Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed below. 2. First Alternative According to one postulate, NOSENZO was an officer in the KCB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory, and/or has embellished or boasted: a. Faulty Memory NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding that “different pecple have different memories" and that his own is, “funny,” and this is supported by his forget ful- ness and errors concerning events he is known inderendently to have lived through, such as the BURGI and ee) Cases. But it cannot be said that he is, in general, “very bad with names," because he nas almost total recall of names and positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the "merican and fourist Departments. He has a good memory for teces and rarely failed to recognize photcgraphs of people he claimed to know. He remembered consistently details about certain operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY, the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER . case, the arrest of ‘BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV, to cite a few examples). NCSENKO was precisely accurate in his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel from June 1962 onward. b. Selective Memory Although having a selective memory is probably true of mearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as a@ psychopath who would register each passing event only in relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics of other people, for example, anc to the sequence in which events transpired; the aspects important to him might rot appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would 9 SECRET,