SeECR-E-P Security Information the means of hi rting the whole radio propaganda war balance in our favor. They would be indispensablé in the. event ; of hot war. We, therefore, aré impressed with the necessity of developing our capaci-. ties in this direction to the utmost, and proceeding immediately with the covert procurement, of bases and equipment ndeded Lor the task . To recapitulate, 4b would. séem desirable for. _ CIA to Limit ite ba present and future conventional. radio broadeasting  acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any § new: undertakings. : tdesg and capabilities. | : . should provides > A mastimum transnittel power of — | 100,000 watts copatile of eecommodating: 2 Bult in Jeuming evasion capabili~ 3 uit’ in snanvntona broadcasting & Bases in secure and protected areas: which permit tie - use of the jamming evasion tecshiique without inter ference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is now being made by this office. 7 - Be Libed Léad Time G) (a) Radio: ‘prondoasting facilitiss cannot be created. ; over night. From the time that plans are finally. approved, it tekes  :12 to 18 months to design, construcé. and install 4 transmitter. ° HW 50955 .Prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotia~ tion for bases, the staffing problem, ete o (b) Deep cover penetration of” extating radio sta- tions or systems likewise require tine for development ° (2) All in all; at would be prident. to- estimate that” upwards of two years are: required from the conception of a project for broadcasting and its impLenentation, Hence, the planning mst te long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabil- ities for targets of opportunity, guch as Stalin's death. : (1) Control by CZA of the substance of broadeast and the management of broadcasting cperations should be ‘absolute and through officers directly responsible to. agency control. (2) The doctrine of. compartmentalization should be strictly enforced. No. ones excepting the hamdful of technicians required to eperste Qs $= me Rol Doclda: 32427402732 Page i135
. Security information te operate a transmitter, should'be allowed near the transmitter . site, The. delivery of tapes, ete., should be through a cutout. Likes — wise, the studio and programm activity should be separated from the operation of the transmitter as well as from'any other activities of — the cover organization,._ If. two or more language: groups .use the seme . facilities they should be compartmented from each other &## 2 . (See Para. 4ia.(1))° | g- Evaluation . | . a oe a GQ) Im the Preliminary Survey 6f Radio Broadcasting (25 February. 1953-—TS 86889) -attention was called to the need for a . continuing evaluation of all radio broadeasting- operations with partic- ular referencé to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential information were outlined.  ~_ | _.._ , 42) PP/0PS, in collaboration with this office, has - initiated this much-needed undertaking. he ° Personnel (2) There is a shortage of proféssional and technical personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any plans for new radio projects. ee Se (2): A training program in covert broadcasting techniques should also be initisted: This training should be undertaken in safe houses by detail of qualified instructors from covert training for basic indoetrinaticri; te be supplemented by area: instruction by the area desks and ‘specialized radio training by Commo. and this office. 5. Recommendations a Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the . cold war we have made certain assumptions as to. the criteria which should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting.» Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions: — - @ That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other - overt media.” oo : 7 | be That any eontenplated operation follew strict cone cepts for clandestine operations, including BS I ne (1) Positive and direct agency control of both management and policy. . ms te : ‘.. (2) Strict security requirenents ineluding com- partmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations. 7 “1L0- - (3) Maintenance of HW $0955 Docld:32424022 Page 14 —
S-l-GoRof=P Security information Q) Maintenance of sufficient. Cover to permit credible st of official connection by UB | or. host + country y govern ment. a, That no direct brbadeast opereiion be undertaken by: ‘om until wet possibility has been exhausted to have the task under . . taken by another country (or countries) through; ‘penetration, manipula os facilities. HY 50955 tion and/or eontrel * fe or covert : -parehase: of tame On, ‘Andigenous radio Our forenost objective should ihe to eqloit the : prosdeastiny, siyatems of friendly a and neutral countries. This generally is possible - din “two wnyss pe (1). fo stimlate. our friends. eo greater sgeressive effort ia their international broadcasts to the Soviet orbit; and (2) To influence the output or the domestde ser vices of friendly and neutral states in the interests of the: ‘Western _ cause. fo , w-thin this frame of reforeneé we made the folowing recor. endatdonss _ 7 (1) Proceed +3: eiploit the nny possibilities to. MBs: indigenous raie systens in- -frdondly and néutral. nations with the objectives of (a) inereasing the .anount and effectiveness of their .. propaganda éfforts against USSR and the satellites, (b) exposing and | iihibiting Coumun‘.st fifth column activities. and fe) ‘the maintenance. ef pro-U S. anid pro-lestern attitudes. These miasions should be undertaken in closest . collaboration with the USIS miseions to the end that all that. can be secompl.ished overtly. (2) Undertelce. a recruitment’: and training progran to make availab: © highhy qualified and thoroughly. indoctrinated officers | preferably with: natural. cover to undertake and ‘to support ‘such ndseions. (3). tn eoopera don with Staté, develop a positive program for information ‘support. of all propaganda activities through nei use of ini elligense and defector sources. . (4). Strengthen and streamline the machinery for policy , guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for. broad — policy only and the. field missions to be given the widest. possible . latitude in the application of: thase policies to Local yequirements . - and the exploitatior of targets: G&© opportunity. A mature staff officer. experienced in PW. should be-dvailable in the migsion to (a) feed propaganda Maes, (a) expedite Pell ‘support (e) coordinate with. USIS . and. (a generally Docld: 324274022 Page 15 S-EC-R-E =P |
S-EC-R-E-P Security Information: and (a). gener -aay backstop the operation. | . (5) Establish machinery for evaluating the eubstance, eoverage, impact and managenent. of radio operations . a 7 (6). Proceed. with thie: @evelopment of capabilities to electronically invrude upon: and othervise exploit the Communist radio broadeasting to their own and foreign audiences. I% is important .to. . . hawe these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible . U8e.in the cold war--Not to have then available at the outbreak of © hot: war. would be a tragic mistake. eee ee as ue fore: Recoumendataons with respect to specific ‘targets haye been transmitted. to the © SRPESETAAte divisions (io). A ‘small staf? element should be created to supervise GIA planning anning and operationa in eovert radio broadcasting. This’ staff. should be: lnstructed to expedite the implementation of the above recommendations and provide..a contanuing review of CIA Policy and Program for the use of this Media. def c. ‘ioyd Egner 6. Low BONER "15 May 1953 HW 450955. S-E-C-R-E-# BDoclda: 3274740272 Page 16