14-00000 ae a is mets grin: weet: dan gets, abe range PSST ES eS rng: A Ee ee Se SO SE [ a o Qu sate ee seas 3 3 e f a & with thes was everswicenisg. The last straw case in early June 1945. (Note: There 13 3 iserepancy in dates. Che senoran-um prepared as { the tine lists dates of 2, 3, and & May. Fron other evidence in the ‘ { file, it is apparent that the month was June--not vay.) One Victor i ESPIHOSA Rernandez, a former PM trainee who was terdinated.as a , 8 malcontent on 20 March 1951, contacted an I2S agent on 2 June 1965 A with @ story that Espinosa thought affected U.S. security. I&NS sweemme tomeareey heard him out and then seat him to the BE. The FSI listened to the “story on 3 Juns and then sent him to CIA. A CIA officer interviewed himon 4 June. Espinosa said that in May he head received a letter ne : frou a friend in Paris urging hin to meet in Paris vith a friend of 5 TG C Cubela. Espinosa vent to Paris and met vith Alberte Blanco, one o of Cubela's closest assoctates in the supposed plan to assassinate ‘ Castro. Blanco claired to have a message froa Cubela, which Cubela oo vanted Espinosa to deliver to CIA. Tue message was that Cubela and the _ = mete settoomtmmeslp tence 6 seememenpgeryremen! Fini omer + others vith hin were in a position to kill Castro ead others in the regine, but they needed some help and to know vhether the CIA and the ; a; Rit, U.s. Goverment were with them and willing to support them. If the ~ ansver were affirzative, Cubela vould ‘send out details on yhat he ® a = fm atarmant eons «oe os needed. Frow his story {t ves ebvious that Esploosa knew the full detafls of the Cubela Operation. ° ATC GAC REED eRe BARONS Ae EEG BERATED A « tte ED ween INERT GD Bm oily WON 9 sate « Prmteees : e ot we ot yl. te . . * ° ° . * . * . (Comment: here {3 no indication in the file that CIA ever - 105 -
14-00000 mn tte ogn apa itn ET £834 Cg B grile Oe eth oe nade ty me me EDO RA ee ton Oe atte Pe $3 * } ‘ am ‘- ‘ ee found out the sort of “kelp” Cusele cacught he needed. Ata ‘ i meeting in Paris oa l February 1955 te aszed Sor $10,000 “so ; 7 orgenize the intercal grovp.” CIA refused to give his the money ¢ * * e i and suggested he try to gat it frew Arzise. Cubela was quite L upset over the turn down. A fee days later, in Madrid, he : approacked a Cuben asset of the Madrid Station, claining ke ; : was stranded in Madrid with no money. Eeadquarters approved | 8 ° , . : a “personal loan” of $200. On 16 february 1965, Cubela asxed { . ra ‘ , Sanchez for $1,000, which keedquarters approved giving hiz. , : t* Ia a later meeting vita Carles Tepedino in Mew York City, : Tepedino sald that he kad gives Cubele $7,000.) { le, . On 23 June 1965 headquarters sent a cable to the stations | . l concerned directing termizatioa of contact vith members of the ° , § - 6 , Cubela group. It read, in part: ° ae . "42 + © » Convincing proof that entire AMLASH group  : insecure and that further ccntact with key members of group 4 eh constitutes menace to CIA operations against Cuba as well as { ve Oo . to the security of CIA staff rersomnel in Yestern Europe. | joe et ee wget, AE SO, “Under the circumstances headquarters desires that contact ieee de t" . . with key sezhers of the group be elixiceted as rapidly es | possible, and that essets who say be in contact with individual i i members of the group or peripherally favolved in AMLASH : | , coaspiracy be warned of danger implicit in these associations . . . and directed to eliminate contacts ASAP.” ° : i (— _— wee fede ae tet “, - ean owns i + Ps
Photenes o a me om * were Be PERN EUs LB onder Be Atotnaet PPP agteg Gaed A Reeth PO . . ‘ . - f ) fi I 1 | ee ee eee . . om « Oo { AG ate Ri tehir een AHIR eT Pe LERLP. ECR GAO TRILL oP CRONE 010% ERIN tal Rete MPR aR TN. 9 SEERA me oma ore sw Os a a ’ A oe . . . ay . e : o ~- wo, ines : 2 a : . re nice = oe 5 See * - Moe, . . 1 . - e eo . '° ° es + ~ Ad [ee Se ote See ee a mo . _ 7 . se . . 7 oe a re Tae tm pin age “ome “ ~ eS He Taney SET ON ABS a ae Soh Natit 2 cet oa ait 1 SECA Me ct tO odes : soe . eos ty . . . - . . we wee 2, 2g - er. oe Oe * re . - oe - 4 ot Tee wien 8. yt eeepc oy © Selig jet See e . . . ae - ed "pes woh ome A we OTE re eet ite eneciatis anate ahsirye tapes ote a ee eager me GA mee og eget hE Seegthagt wins oa th . : Ps - . Por a ve ane 7 T eB me ee SN te fe ae fa eit tere Pye Pato tee 6 cae ED Re betaling tol ty l6d mt, nae neler lane prec hr a tan Ok ne ot ey a tr merretarem salt, 1 Marsk 1955 Reuters reported few: Bavaaa that the Coben Recurity police : Bh ats had arrested two nilitary officers fer alleged comterrevolutiozary activities favolving “the U.S. Central Intelifgeace Agency. ‘They vere identified as Maj. Rolasdo Cubele aad Maj. Facon Guin. 7 March 1966 Fars quoting Havana Domestic Service: “The trial of the accused Rolando Cubela, Pamon Guia, and others wre are linked to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, was begun ia the revolutionary court of Havang district in La Cebeana today at 2500 hours.” The defendants are being tried for crizes ezeinst the integrity and stability of tre sation by having planned the assassization of Maj. Fidel Castro. : ; The defendants ave Rolands Cubdele Secades, Razon Guin Blaz, Jose Luis Gonzalez Callarrera, Alberto Blenco Remeriz, and Juan Alsina Navarro, ell of vhom confessed their guilt in the imputed facts of the case. Also appearicg in the trial were Guillermo Cunill Alvarez and Angel Zerrero Yeliz. ee Ede ore ese . . Fone Es Sa ea Tae mE won wou 8 March 1966 . Excerpts trom first éay‘s trial proceedings as reported by the Havana Domestic Service and copied by 7aIs: 4 Former Majcrs Rolando Cubela aud Eason Guin es vell as ae ee others who are uncer indictzent have confessed their guilt. =f ™ Cea, GAARA > wees ame *
14-00000 oo tan eT Peace aarti Oo ae eee wee mere mp arom Ge ew ° On gt aN . ® o ya - c% he accused Juse Luis Gonzales Gellarreta, who worked as a ; Giplosatic attache in the Cuban Eugassy in Spain, betreyed his ‘ country for 100,000 dollars given hia cy CIA agents vwiheg he ’. ecatecte’ only a month after his arrival in Spain. (Ee) met Po with an official of the aforementiosed organiztioa of , international subversion nazed James icel who covered his activities by appearing as an officiel of the U.S, Evbassy in Spain. Noel. demawied that hiograpnie inforsetica and - infornation ebcus the Cuban diplccaiis aisaica ce furnished him under this arzangenent. Cubela duricg his stay in Europe cakes three trips to Spain, on 26 December 1904, and on 6 ani 20 Feorcary 1965. ‘The : revolutiorary ringleader Artime goes to Madrid at the beginning fo. of February 1965. A neeting is held between Cubela and Artime in which they egree on the final pica. , {his plen would begin wit! a personal attack aimed at . Maj. Fidel Castro Ruz. ‘his crinimal act would be followed . . by an arsed invasion of the comtry 48 hours later by U.S. . troops. The attack against Comrade Fidel Castro would be made « using a 7.62 cn. FAL rifle that Cubelea owned. This weapon . would be fitted with a powerful 4ixt0 teflescopic sight and a sliencer. 8 ape la “ ‘ . eaten | | & Artime sent Gallego to the United States to get. the a telescopic sight ani the silencer. Once obtained, this ey equipment was delivered to Blanco Romariz. He in tura delivered i Ls i. it to Gonzalez Gailarreta who then delivered it to Cubela the we "©" day before he left Madrid. | ; ; { 4 i i i i : i é ae sone gem sagt dEiney tan, . aot . . . . ere ee re ' In order to insure the successpf his plans, Cubela meets _ ~. . with defendant Gufi=t’ Grin had been recruited since Septesber- 1953 as a spy for the Yankee CIA. This recruiting wes done by. * CIA agent Miguel Diaz who infiltrated Cute in order to recruit him, and did so. ’ ee ee « Seized in Cubela‘s residence was a Tasco bread telescopic : sight with accessories, the FAL rifle, lerge quantities of weapons and ammunition for them, frequentation end incendfary grenades, end other militery equipment and materiel. : ‘ “9 f SR pene Sect ERE LTTOANAT A MAP EAN AROIED (BR She REDS RY BEG Nae PSE = Ete Peek the an on : . se, 2 3 fa mee «gewithel ees, hee Sig Sed = a “amas, See Be 25 oa sedate . eed Sera SY LAS SRST ener tend oe acne aay aaa tebe hn ghee Spee te al ag tend” Se fen ling Ragin aaa Mattel © it nom gt Pid ERE lee ese yee eo wah a ie ble me.
ey pet gee “3 i by aceon ne Spey ign Tay ghah ii taeeerin tt Sead Sembee: SR 4 wee ite ee ee ee Oe ) fhe punishsenat to watch the defenZants are subjeat and which this prosecution wishes iesszed is as follaws: Far Bslaade Cubela Secades, Boon Guin dlez, Jose Luis Goazelez Galtarreca, and Alberto Zlanco Ronsrize-the death penalty by firing squad. For Juan Alsica Mavarro, Gufllesso Cunt ll Alvarez, end Angel . Herrero Veliz--30 years igoriscssent plus correspcodircg ; aéditional penalties. ee ee i eee ome ns SY Base, e 9 March 1956 FRIS report from Eavana Dosestic Service: “Prize Minister Fidel Castro has sent a letter to the prosecutor in the case . . . agairst . Majors Rolando Cubela, Faron Guin, and other defendants. Ia it, the Prime Minister says that 1t must be recegnized from all this, a bitter Fo ee an . but useful lesson may be dravn, edding, ‘XY suggest thet the court mot aek the death sentence for avy of the accused.” oN ( 10 March 1956 FRIS report of testimony given in court on 8 March: ERG y! HAR OAS a ER hnch eeamtS..y = ore oe wees: . Question: DO you recall when the silencer broke? a ; +. Gubela: The silencer? Actually, the silencer did not break. s Grae v%8 s+ + The silencer actually a4id not break. ao ° Question: Where is the silencer? Cusela: I threw the silencer away because it was burning sy Bends. Prosecutor: Have you spoken with Comrade Fidel Castro recently? _ Cubela: Yes.. aod . ” ~ 109 - a \.\  SUanaaremsEetone Sresemnehte semmeendeaseteeemanciaunite rent Maton Siete Be Le Le ea mires 8a) CS ome tgel Pe CS ee a a 8 fee” albedo TE: S| Prosecutor: Can you tell the court when you spoke with Cosrade Fidel? stron ere tye 2 BE tel, songs mg ustine sac ane “seep " “ee At rage eRe mR Gee + |
14-00000 - 0 ete pre me oe ® . ») z ~ at? Leet SH, @ hE a e ( ad Pirtriwes >-1er Pastetaere etary © & Toy * af ys teomnadtmpeeberane PURER core ae eOREP EER srreeetmAen a ty wy 's + cote. a are - Guillerzo Cunil Alvarez en? Angel Herrero Yeltz Were absolved cf i t A c . re Baty, brea his sangsoo ~ ’ ‘ das oon ‘ in Cubele: I believe {t was in January, let -e fee, in Jevary, in January. Prosecutor: In Janzery! Do you recall the conversation you bet Le with Conzede Fidel, and aid Comrade Fidel offer to help you? ‘ Cubela: Conrade.Pidel opened the doors, opened the doors to re. He gave ne, be gave ne to understand thet he mew wat I was doing but I did not heve enough courase to tell his. #228 4 Defense Attorney: Cubela Secades, what, in your viev, is the punishzent merited by conduct of this nature? $ H ' } . Cubela: The worst! 4 Question; What do you mean by "the worst?” Cubela: Deserved execution by a firing squad. 22 March 1 FBIS report quoting Havana Domestic Service of 10 March: ‘Revolutionary Court Ho. 1, which has tried case.108 in crimes against the integrity and security of the nation, has pronounced sentences on the accused Rolando Cubela Secades, Ramon Guin Diaz, and others. - . . Acconding to the sentences, Eolando Cubela and Recon Guin were sentenced to 25 years inprisenzent; Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta and Alberto Blanco Rormriz, 20 years; and Jvan Hilario Alsing Ravarro, 10 years. guilt. They were released provided they are not Liable to aay . other charges. - ae te a a es a , by “. PPT S TT os: . J ote ct at CoB Sth ao how Bhim d- sme . : : . ! Cubela: The vall. | Question: «What do you mean by "the wall?” ; . : f ‘ : remem ee ON op rit URN EES “ee -OT rs RID eR aE
any 5d @ ? 4 i 2 ROPE AABOU URAL, ° es ao 3 IP REP ew sy tate Stee 3 ube * Greve at reg ne te PE Ree oY Eis BL Baro a GR PRON NAT A ANNE: “eel PLE Say + % at af <b ‘sf Fa 4 * * Biter Ninn wrap tttiane nae 2 2 Of. ot e + *, ~ . at . 7 a . a . oot . " - et “ S 2 we yep C ) 1 . : : trae Seley - + aoe 7 oe e x : wT Mita he ee . i er Oe a ee a Se 22 & ee . ; - .- Teens oe ad we WW - : ae ee : ee a OO ree ae “3. “Sey G ‘ + . . . — cal See EL Srethweenitatens . ei ; es ° - aa Fe OP RX 5 a wee preee = oR sete ee te neem te sone wipes oyu: ents aSttnce <2 seg e ° . : 7 7 > « oe °% (Coment: It is worth noting chat nose cf Cubela's éealings with CIA fres March 1951 uncll Soventer 195: vere sentiozed in the trial proceedings. The first association of Cubela vith CIA. WSS im connection with his trip to Zurupe ia late 195% and early 1955 during vaich he had nis ree tings vith ‘Artice. The " trial evidence vas confined to Cutela's counterrevolutiozary activities groving out of those reetings with Artine ia . 3 December 196% and February 1955. Yone of his many direct : contacts with CIA officers, some of whom he krew by tree name, vere mentioned. There is not even a hint of the ballpoint pen/ hypodermic/Black Leaf ko episode. ‘The Cuban authorities may e 6 cane eroaetnpegian wm eu have gotten that information fro= kis and cecided mot to... . introduce it in evidence, but we can think of no convincing — reason vhy they would have withheld it. The closest we can cone to a decent reason, and it is pure conjecture, {s this: Castro a 1 orem Be enc eemart ‘ may have thought 1¢ politically iwprudent to allow the execution { ; ‘ . Of someone so close te his imer circle, who bad merely plotted oS wef ol without acting. if the full details of Cubela’s involvezent vith CIA had come out in court, Cestro might keve had little ‘ + stem ccm ewes excuse for asking for lentfency. )
PEO mmo em osu 1. one me ame | ° arity Tura eviy 0 i tf i& € . H Discussion of Assassizatio: a+ Zich-Level Goverrcent Meetings Drew Pearson clains to have a report that there was a high-level | i , neeting at the Department of State at witch Plans for the assassi=a- é . ot tion of Castro were discussed. we find record of two high-level, t . ° i? interagency reetings at weich assassizaticn of Castro was raised. The first (and probably the oze to which Pearson refers) was at the e SOMERS | eet ENP + ciate 80 10 we « meetings are described separately below. ay { 16 August 1 folloving are recorded as being present: EN PEPORRRRALHG er aseaMRONS pate * ER GHAR Whi poedtnGe ° , eds Semmedem UNSAID REREAD SI, + « ‘ 1 . Bie ote ET State | *. _ ‘Dean Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, . a, op ge, : ° 0 Richard Goodwin, Robert Hurvitch _ * 1 White House  Haxvell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (Bil) Harvey's . | . . notes record that Robert Kennedy was absent - | and that Bundy had nis proxy.) ; | FA , Devense Robert McNamara, Rosvell Gilpatric, Lyraa H ony a so Rhee cee en diene aR aptla D since Senge SA cau tvaere sce Sets gates Femina “ti ye Bee Peers tee vt pe » Prgron ls aime nem 2 pre AGS Bae oath ent HY = a «aaah entry Mpegs RTS et OTe a ce Sig eS en Department of State on 10 August 1962. It was a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). ‘The second meeting ve have identified was held on 30 July 196%. It vas a meeting of the 303 Committee and probably was held in the Walte House Situation Roos. ‘The tvo either in Secretary Rusk's office or in his conference room. ‘The The Special Group (Augmented) met at the Department of State, Feet bee: eons eve a ae Heme aon 0 ones ne euro 1m one see oo ae
14-00000 . 4 Stet etsy on “ a ae ne ene Soa wee i€ a & : . ‘. CIA Jcon2 Msfone, Wilillea Harvey pete: USI 0 ’—ts«éEAward Murray, Donnld wilsoa & . Secretary Thomas Parrott Tom Parrott’s eine tes of the sseting eave 20 mention of the i . subsect of assassination. Both Mcfone Zervey recall that McYarara raised the subject. Harvey's notes taken at the meeting were: ses ep cee Moree OR Got noes toe ek oenemany : - show that it was also sentioned by Murrow, but the nature of tke ‘ coments was not recorded. Mr. McCore states, im a memorandum of ; pe: 1h April 1967, that ke recalls meetings on 8 or 9 August in the 20 Cet aftins JCS Operations Roog in the Pentagon and on 10 August 1962 in Secretary Rusk"s conference rom. At one of these meetings (and. * MeCone now recalls it as being at the JCS) the suggestion was made (Cament: As it vill later be seen, Mr. McCone's recollection Far. f "1". ds probably faulty. It is quite clear that assassination caze REBATE on Apt Ane cREED edtea om nERENCINERNTENE atett © é oe £ “up for discussion at the 10 August neeting at State.) ot os 2 Ae a wie le Se gl Dt £ of “opp 8 te Panne a Rirhie «toy BF “Hr. MeCone says that he took immediate exception to the discussion and prouptly after the meeting called on Secretary McRerara persocally 2 eecapncnni an 9 oop hit to emphasize his position. According to McCone, McHarera "heartily 8 I i 4 “that top people in the Cuban regice, including Castro, be liquidated. . | q . : { agreed.” McCone states in his memorendum that at no tine did the ee] Suggestion receive serlous consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) 4 ) a ' ORR OR. AY UDP CORTE Aa OARANETVEIED & . a ' heal on ° o . ° . . ft ° (eH Pray) a : d ° € ‘¢ Loe . . oon tee ‘eB ode € . - a a - - we se os ee teeter ee : soeboms | - .. - Ten re omy ee ety. aii } Be se ” : GAR ALAM LES ET CIE ea AED = mere ae od Baw 9 age 4 cy eee gg er eer eae ei ay TEST ge : es et ee eS a * Sea = e ean Sl nt ie: se ticles ts cine te cet iubetpeewerctn A ees sdegtawtnnires and? a eR! oe Sip wart Poag ~ - 8 . “* . ar a « we" Spratc one. % ; “wastetee Rt * ar Parenting.” Bele 1 Met GATE Stok an, Oot Aah FR pee Ley 8 eter ao eelteansoel Busta Tete abe duct talin. aie Gran imma Seon tm as eee ow
ee . . woe an ° aye oe Ry geese e atte Pe rar cee od wade § or by any individual sespoastoie Yor policy. MeCose adds that throusy the years the Cuban. prodlem vag discussed in teras such as “él epose of Castro,* “resove Castro,” and “mock off Castro,” etc., but that , these phrases vere always construed <2 mean the overthrowing of the cOmaunist govermzent in Cuss,. Harvey recalls that, when HeCose & told hin of the McCone-McSasare conversation, McCone said that if ke, Polloving the 10 August meeting, and without reference to the reported exchange betveen McCore and HeNemara, Lansdale addressed & menorandica on 13 August to Willian Zarvey (CIA), Robert Hurvitch " (State), General Harris (Defense), and Don @ilson (USIA). The memorandum assigned responsibility for drafting Fapers cn varlous - subjects related to the Cuban operation. ‘Harvey's asstgnment included: “Intelligence, Political (splitting the regize, /cortion . ©Xeised from the CIA Mle copy] ). ° . On 18 August, Earvey sutuitted a memorandim to the DD/P (Zelms) "reporting the Lansdale ccamunication and what Harvey had done about. it. Harvey's nenorandum ta the ere Stetes that the excised portion = had consisted of he Bhrese: “including elixtnation or Yeaders". Harvey wrote that he had phoned Lansdale's office and hed spoken with. - Frank Hand fn Lansdale's absence. Farwey said ke hed protested the use of the phrase and hed proposed that Steps be taken to have i+ ww) -1k. a ao a} Seat ee Acs ba Snr ee Pode : = wae: Fe Se * eg an wi Nels one aera thing trainee © an el, fied Gite es at nao ol ATUL «hey eisehall as wenn Kd obae.: a ™ wap <a hfe Metin tr apace Sts! Sachs dary me ee tara ae er fs McCone, were to be involved in such a thing he would be excomuntcated, e asp he . «oe LF velo ot aa Gaon Caen Ses Tolpis gt Mitt eget ee Da Soo SNE Sm ae <1 aOR gate « bbe > tenemnpapimaden eneatecn + 3 t i i H i 5 H
a ee OF Oe acon om ~ Ce . n +8 eorueng 9°98 Ome $0 mace 0 . « a o. DER, aT! Ae, PRR ma anay - TRS Rue Tee Bae “on? he PRO eB." wos oy beet es ft aprenbeticlecingl ped ag sivas tgeenrneny: oie en nur Cte itt Glee Soca applet lr bn es ge aa ier be tanger ohne Sn! tet nant aoe tees wr mene WA tae eevee £ Co gta nisl Sabet adeets 52 excised from all copes. This was egreed to. Harvey teleted the Phrase from his om “copy and assumes that instructicas vere ei Ver to other recipients to do the sane. Farvey told us that Lansdele repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassization of Castro with Earvey over the next several weeks. Harvey says that be alvays avoided such discussicas. Tarvey estirates thet five persons in Lansdale's office were gererally avare of the sensitive details of Project HONGOOSE and of Lansdale's interest in assassization es 22, aspect of it. 30 July 1964 @ The 303 Committee met in regular session, protably in the Situation Room of the white House. . (Desmond FitzGerald recalls that such i meetings vere generally held there.) The folloving are recorded as being present: McGeorge Bundy, Cyrus Vance, Jom McCone, Thoras Hughes te " Col. Ralph Steakley was present for another item om the agency, but it is not shown if he vas present when the - Cuba item was discussed. - . . Peter Jessup as secretary ° The minutes of the meeting record this in the context of the discussiod of Cuba: “as we eg Y ¥ awe t, fe % « 9 ’ ee ee nein onauth ne Benak aren Serene pecan sgiit “
aa oP a . - at tt wet cee eens oO: ee ee e i a ‘ HS & oy MOHD rd a a”, { o*icpte Sicewtermat las ad welt ~~, kame @ Rae EHN® ohm ° oe ? oye” "It was azreed tha - FitzGerald A would contact Mr. Seq Fapich of the FSI én eaard to & the eerlfer cepors of an i alleged plot with Mafia overtones to essassinate Castro and waick the ttorrey ‘General sz sreecé to handle as a matter of . Jev enforcerent." . Tre reference is clearly to a 10 June 1954 memorandum infornation report fron the DD/P to the Director. The following additional soe mae eo “elite” dissemination was sade of {t: Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs, Departaeat of State Director of Intelligence and Research, Devartzent of State Director, Dezense Intelligence Agency The Attorney Gereral - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation . ‘ Deputy Director of Central Intelligesce Cc: Deputy Director for Intelligence «gape = ane 4 aot + + | ° whe report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro | that wes made to procinent Cuben exiles. ‘The Mafia appeared to be ite involved in the schese. The asking price for doing the job vas | oe * $150,000, with a guarantee of $10,000 for expeases. A wealthy Cuban Seet , , exile, Jose Mario "Pepin™ Bosch, President of Bacardt Bis Inter: cations}, “was reported ready to contribute $50,000. Bosch approached the chiet of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested that the U.S. Goverment also ° contribute funds. The suggestion was rejected out of hand. ‘The record indicates that CIA's only involverent in the plot was to report | | | | | - . information of its existence. Tae last record we find of the incident ++ SOIR RATER on eae TRH aE eet + et RD Mean An a a a . 6 SILL + + GH CUD ETT OE see Moms 4 eantth Amat ot th + aia en SAR os Ges 9 BE batt gs Haag eS Somes F 2 RRS ree esti mm A Smee Be Lon eo OF ae eB open Log 8 go he POPE EL me Dee AE A Oy BED Parke ante Bt eating  Reemenee yet eel are aed i t ? 4 : # t
14-00000 oo, OM On see mee tee ° ot ewe sore eee ) ' {s a semorandys from the DCI (McCoze) to Bundy, dated 19 Augsst 1955, reporting the results of FRE interviews with the ellezed parcici pasts. Ooviously, nethirg came of the plot. (Comment: It may be only coincidence, but we are struck he ee Le ee TT . . * *% by the point that this group o? pletiers, allesedly fincliting ‘ " gangster elements, offered to assassinate castra for $153,000, : which is precisely the sim that CIA offered to pey in an : | : . earlier plot that very definitely involved gangster elezents. i ; It could be the sane group of gangsters, or 1t could te that ; — the criszinal underworld knows the “gotng price.) + aBERD. + veg f \. As we have ‘said earlier, if Drew Pearson has fire inforzation on 2 meen apao tebe : @ high-level meeting at which assassination of Castro was discussed, it is likely that the reference would be to the 10 August 1962 meeting . of the Special Group (Augmented). The 30 July 1954 303 Comittee el _ Meeting is described only because its reference to assassination of 0 scece commen eopianmenae “the Pearson. story. . ; ‘»: er CL + ermecmunmmtions aes som Slee Ao \ \ 4, * &, oe ‘ é a E t ‘ j j | ae _ astro night be distorted to asmie cone of the characteristics of | ; i i e ¢¢ RREBL ECE POR RIRB IE CAE Stich Bak ARRAN. the WE) NAPotasra8ed Piadinn te sees AR fen optinee & ot, . * 8 4 ry . rae . Ltt tee . . cue ete . a ee oe _o Ean - : . ate TR ae ee ee Cee my re Street Me, ee tata eee ten Se cute yd oe. pete gee Terr Fen 6 athe S$ dab RE sa DEENA B TA Ee oot woe And leetee Meee ere Bees ne kar i aa oe . * a an an
74-00000 + 0 se aachartaeanndanscasiten tam exeosttnasidsomematantinotten te 00 ey ee ent cent ae +6 + edtmentpentontieD wipes * ‘ ns ap f) TIE DREW PEARSON STORY 4 i Publiiched Details ' The Facts As We Know Them " te The CIA hatched a plot to knock off Castro, True. Log : 8 . ; re Robert Kennedy may have approved an Not trua. Ho was briefed on Gambling Gyndicate-Phaca ‘ ne augausinatton plot. One after it was over. He wno not briefed on Phare Two, } of . Undervorld figuren were actually recruited True o ; ta carry out the’ plot. Three hired ansacsing wore caught in Ievana Ronelli informed Harvey on 21 June 1962, preownably : where a lone survivor 1s still supponed - on the basic of information from Varona, that a team : A i : fa identities nor what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actunlly dispatched. None of the announced captures and executions during this perled fite this team. to be languishing in prison, of three men wos inside Cuba. We do not know thelr Caotro learned enough at lonast te belleve the This reportedly has come out in the Garrison investie CIA was cecking to kill him. le le reported gations. It alse wae stated by Castillo in the 5 to have cooked up a counterplot against ' Philippines under direct interrogation. We hava no y. Prosident Kennedy. independent confirmation of any sort. (Note that " Garrison met with Ropelli in Lao Vegas in March 1967.) ‘> Unpubliched Details . Pills were sent to Cuba for use in the True. At least we were told by Roselli that the pills 7d : assassination. . : were sent in during Phase One and again in Phage Two. og . Toere wus 4 meeting at the Department of State True. The subject was raised at a meeting at State on "4 ‘ at which the aseassination of Castro was ' 10 August 1962, but 4% 1e-unrelated to any actual } discussed. , . attempts at assassination. It aid result in a MONGOOSE a ’ + cane cette Foe eRe at ant Mag POMS aE met é " ‘ f wom ome action memorandum by Lansdale acoigning to CIA action i : for planning liquidation of leaders. The offending 3 : phrase was lnter excised from copies fommrded to GIA, \ . State, Defence, and USIA, but the damage may alroady a have been done. . . . i ‘ mo, eae to ? ‘ Sort ome 8 ae mem aw ems 4 Nef 2 stom enn a ete SD SOCCER» ne Ff x eannnene = a tomer inn on . : ouse Sn ta
14-00000 Ta ete ty SGI crartgl rare eaebytea me pete belak Sais Sap Ss eh shape “eee Snisee je mila Lae — c ; { rote am oe sores, mere ee fre Fassidle Renifizations o2 the Gesslic~ Syatieste Overuticoa -s crescent ete rete tt Ea ethene acevenreaaetitapetn eemncratfoatvemonaerweonnanercanavnedicneaeaameernence The earlier sections of this report describe all of the CIA ee td schemes aimed at the assassination of Castro that we have beea able to discover. The accounts of the tvo phases of the genbling syndicate operation are factual to the extent that they are based A On what those interviewed recall or belleve the facts to have been. 0 6 Oe mere It is evident that some of those facts kave leazed, are being talked 1 epee about, or are being peddled. On the opposite page is a list of the i main “etafils of the story Drew Pearson has, as they are mown to us, 3 . together with a brief coment on the apparent accuracy of each. _ ; C7 There is support in fact for most of the details in Pearson's story. _He has a garbled account of the role played by Robert Kennedy, and | be errs in telling the story as if all of the details are part of , @ single story, which they are not. For the most part, though, | ‘his facts are straight and he has the truly important aspects of t ro the gacbliag syndicate operation. ‘ - § . Until James O'Connell returned cn 2 May froa his neetings in " Las Vegas, we vere faced with the difficulty of being unable to j estimate the dimensions of the problen facing the Agency unless we | could discover vhat has been leaked, by vhoa, to when, and for vhat Purpose. Hone of those things could ce deduced with confidence frca Py es wore “oe ee Tene Sone ded Gl oni ip Semon re aay ee anit hed em gore’ “hp m= eoengen p nan, snk hy le gatistphl bait ester tn 28 enal ere. me See ee AS NEE ETE eas NLT TEL at SL RK Te ON Se op nena Cia emetic ring Ma La mag tte He hm mat vette mee ie hare tape each. pet 4 s 4 | H i | i € | ' . ? ! $ eh Pe We. 5 cot cele dee de sete
ne pecker: bees nen a ees: 2 et rine aie Bette eran swe ees rhe rte teers nas 0 cmt tens $+ onan OM Lem eG ys 6k, went WE ot Teen teen & SA enema Sette IPR Rag a oe ae A wer ands Ame att Demet achEnte ep Hayy yA SA ae etl LES AT CLL ORGE SORT Cire oe SIT LEED taco Moe LITA TEE Ne gee tons Oedttuhastice , mee . ye tte , a . * . ‘ ‘ a of at a @ , ee, weed ae ‘ * ee " +3" . * . ” 9B apartment «mo * - . Ca ed = ‘ 4s \ / * Oe a ne Oma 8 OF A RTE the : formation then avallable cous. O'Conzell, who nas already [ reperted to you orally asi will be svimitting kis written report _ a directly to you, is able to shed sote Light on the Likely sources of Pearson's informatios. He has eiso briefed us om his conversations ' with Maheu. These ave the key pofncz: . a. Maheu did brief his attorney, Elvard P. Morgan, on : Meheu's Participation in Peese One. ' b. Maheu krew nothing of Pause Two walle it was under way and kas never beard of it from Roselli. “es, ° ¢, Morgan and Roselli were ecqminted, independently of - A Maheu, vel. before Maheu became involved with Roselli in the Gambling syndicate operaticn. Roselli was steered to Morgan by tet EK. H. Greenspum, editor and pohi{sher of the Ias Vegas Sun. @. Maheu suspects that Roselli is a client of Morgan's. & Roselli is drinking heavily. Morgan has been in Las too . Vegas once or tvice recentiz, was drinking too mene and vas "sndtscreet.™ - ; , a oo Sag? acre oe oe ne f. Jim Carxtson, Edvard Morgan, end Roselli, were all ia las Vegas at the same tine this past March. Garrison was in touch with Roselli; so was Morgan. it fs our impression that . Greenspun was alss Lnvolved in the conversations. We do not know the date, but it might be noted that one of Pearson's columns 2 ee - . ~ aS oa 2. -_ er a by : . : aa a ste emit PO RE, Fm +, os . . . ty ‘othe pee tse ee corer tt ER AE Ae Agee tw yn PUT a ng MA em ET b AI CAD Hw ap a a ee ee i cee a eS i vane te aves ps soot ce = : : i ' 4 rT | 1 4: “a ween eh wo ~~ N ‘ eealndhicn’ dase’ wot
14-00000 Bo ge eae MR aes ae ee ee . § ! 0 See ina * on cers ear a wit 4 5 4 * é i . : cri SAS Saad $e tribe ¢ . , . zi) t Lethal Pilis Briefing of fennedye Three-“an ween State Dept. Meetin aa ' ee ne Thréee-Man Tees Steps: Meeting . i Farvey Earvey * Harvey Rarvey j Roselli Rosell£ Roselli : Maheu Makeu ee mere tee, O'Connell O*Coasell Edvards Edvards 6 tet ae Houston Houston : nnd eon oe Meme soos \ Varona Varona Varona's Varona 's - 60n-in-lay s0n-in-lay Maceo Maceo . com Tfrafficante . Ao | cee SCE CaO es SRT AE GG OBI! «alge a « s 6 e Ot : oe oe : -¢ . a ee a ye - ee * an oa fe . - - ' ve EIt is quite possible that the fact of Robert Kennedy's having been me briefed, and Perhaps the substance of the briefing, is more widely ~ known to goverment officials than tis list would indicate. Ye oa know that Mr. MeCone om 16 August 1953 asked for and received a copy Of the memorendus record of the triefing. Others in Justice end the FBI besides Kennedy may know of the menorandia and of its - contents. a0e tata ame eran . . ‘ . * ’ ‘ . o; oP . obey 10 + aeavn cathe, AAO HA as An ‘ cee ee ee . 4 * ® @ ° Pm ro FO ate enema monamisee 6 : os ve oom . , : _) . . a. te t; if f ¢ . t : ag 8 Mh BoE He 3 ] t ‘ 3 A vg . a ’ * “f rel he 4 ta 4 . ‘ -- Stet tail 2 eros Sar, Septic a reer ee ale Seahen BS ee i cee? a Pasig oth r tls oe Poe ae . Ce ae ie 7 . ~. toe 5 ef we” = Pe Te: Baa Sa Oe OM EL a ete eerpae weet at er mesactyr sm MPI G  stiier tarts Hee . . to wt eee . eee att re ce, nd . . a Pee aE ETT PCT Tit be oe ne IRD made, So liken, igajoeds Spee Sy heap cio beta ee Em ee eet wn 8 Sa apitctepebA B taeege sety Latte ap atcha ite vetting wat = FN a! weer ee ee a nee or erp etpe ee ae * ee *
74-90000 ‘ C2 eT owe Fem ot age & = ghe'we.ad itis wasted oe ne comet & FRO, appeared on 7 March. &- Accoraing 4 HMaheu, Morgan end Jack «aderson, Drev Pearson‘s associate, ere very close. ~~ ' pis seems clearly to- point the finger at Roselli as the ulticate source of the information on the ceubling sysiicate plot and to confirms Morgan as Pearson’s source. We can test the accuracy of this assusption against analysis ve had done earlier in an effort to identify the lizely source of +8 OA we me definitely known +> be witting of certain key facts now in Pearson's possession. The list includes CIA officers vho knev more than one of the key facts, plus all imow outsiders. These vere our ° conclusions: “ . a. If Drew Pearson has a single source, and if Pearson's +e memaien + Hanes ethane en ahagn 6 CREA oy wohe e a. ea ote A te Reverie feb <BR 0 + i { i $ i : { { { | Pearson's story. On the opposite page is a listing of persons immediate source is the ultimate source of the leak, and if compartmentation was not violated, then Bill Earvey ererges naw.) ap the likely candidate. - He was the only person we found in the course of this inguixy vho knew all four of the key facts | at the tine the Pearson columms appeared. We preferred not to think that Bill Harvey was the culprit. We could find no_ persuasive reeson why he would wish to leak the story ‘ H deliberately, and we doubted that he would te so indiscreet as a one * 6 Oh deerme en gum Orem Ot ~ PAPO P arate st Cee ae PRADA mane 4P UREN ore Mere ED 9B ar AIDES EHE MEA BEE BANE te gee core 0 ° ve t . wtenwm ete, Tae no Gao naone Borde os enon oe. ° ¢ fo we tating re CONOR TESS edit Ad oil AM" rata CR 8 9 Oa Se 8 Bt Et ine CORR, RA IUI  aL CohPRGI OLGA ALT EELS LEA OE AT STRUTT GE, REE TG MG i ACR Rs sammy: fen," re 14 agg dee see de ? Bm ane e Ste fag + . a vat 8 ye “of ee ee es . ’ sonets . . . Sod ad ote be . é oot sae Z se: oe te ” a en OL A ee aR oer ae wok fond toes nee ao nee eee eas ra a
14-00000 Oh contre + rie or ty. SIDER Bey KB hte 8 ww oteatfbany s seGem bn HOO . P] eb Met ot > Bete een wom aes, soe . . we or ) ‘ “-~ ' to lesk it accidentally. Further, Lf he were the course, ve é Earvey knev the truth. e ke & be. If we ruled out Harvey as the source, then it appeared that there cust be at least tvo ultizate gcurces of leaks. The State Departzeat meeting vas not known to any of the other participants in the operation--asziming that Harvey cid not mention it to any of them. Therefore, Lt £3 quite possible 2 & heap. that the leak Om the State Department meeting has come fron 2 Me. TERRE + HOR RORMETTTETITE eT RT OD Go ap. GENRE * . . @ * e ‘ ‘ ° sozeone who has no direct knowledge of the gambling syndicate operation but does know of the meeting. oO ( Ge Prom the standpoint of who-knev-what, the next most likely source of the origiral leak is Jotm Roselli. Ee is, in fact, the only person with direct ané continuous participation throughout both phases of the gambling syndicate operation. He introduced Maheu to Saw Glancana as the first step in getting Ly ‘ @ ee the operation under way, and he was the one who made the final break with Yarona when the operation was abandoned. He knows everything that went on with the gangsters, with Orta, asd ‘vith Varona between those dates. He and Robert Maheu are the oaly . ; non-CIA participants with izvediate knowledge of the Robert Kennedy aspect.- Shef Eavards kad lunch with Roselli and Mabeu +P 1} GoRORITSCARRN OR DOTAP Le LAER E ne SORES OEE! come REE A . , e ‘ . ry . * C) a TT hates TO meg 7 RAR yA ory eure = sehen: mm tame” A could expect Pearson's story to be cocpletely accurate, because ’ t ’ 4 4 aS on ae ‘t s oh of 4 . if > ae ay it EE + pH mene denne tert ate
14-00000 ar ~ ts een ess Lens der samara 7 er aipecing YF Grea peng cornet a. a res ak ) eboeeghyies 1 ' in Los Asyeles in the sumer of 1942. Edwards snys thst Rosell knew Zévarcs’ true sare acd his positica in the Agency. Cdwards said he tcosz the occasion to <o express his personal apprecfation to Roselli; and told Roselli that he, Edwards, had personally Co mh erin ete EE ee. told Attorney General Kecnedy of what Rosellt had trie’ to do in the cational interest. we xoow that Kennedy vas nerely briefed on the operation--ard only on Fease One at that--but ;' Roselli. pay bave inferred that Kennedy hed an active role in the operation. d. We did not knov what Robert Maheu knew of the shes ome emweiin one ; operation firsthand, because ve had conflicting inforzatioa on C precisely vhen he was cut off fram direct participation. He . af any of the second phase (frou which Pearson's story seens a = tee 2 omen at eitlletetnrne * to cone). If Maheu kmovse of the second phase, he could have . ‘learned. of £t only from Rosellt. i } { i § H | | | - 7, has direct knovledge of the first phase, but probably little on ron ee TT “e. Maceo, about whom we know very little, wag “Roselli's man” in the second phase. He presumably knows of the pills see eran oe oe and of the three-wan teas, but the other details he could have ry known only from Roselli. ee + tone ctometl, «cot . "-#. Warona's knowledge and that of his son-in-law would, be ssc Fe Os oe a : : ine . ey ore Stew cee Pee ieee mes ania, wt ee i ac Ss - H 3 i | . ' Mimited to the pills and the team, but they should know considerably *< 2 serch etc cRa:k sande wiainne meta tee nen nas oy beacon Ce _ . - 7. ° * eat + ne - . wee . . ot oo i vite . fo Ae cant erg aA Han RBC BES Cvernateme ny «Fon deunl Oh a eg et once maayly | Sele Fulton Bice ttees de? hag met tall Oates Swe
POG FAE Oh EO 6 bree ease OH e a ee ee om | . more of the speci?iss; sich es, who received the sills, the cocposition of the cess, and the eventual fate of the -san. g- Glancans end Trafficante were presumably cut out of Phase Tso. They ccul2 tave learned of it only from Rosell. About all thet exerged fro this review of “who had direct movledge of what" was support for tte hypothesis that Drew Pearson's story probably is drawn fros more than one informant: one on the State Department reeting and acother (or others) on the gambling syndicate operation. We also postulated that Roselli is the most likely ultimate source of Pearsoa's story. This line of reasoning and the information O*ConnelL. got fren Makeu are consistent. -Our supposition until sov was that the immediate and the ultimate sources, if. different people, vere leaking or peddling the atory with ulterior motives in mind. What those ulterior actives wignt be were difficult to fathon--for these reasons: a. If protection vas what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of 7 getting it by a direct approach oe 7 to CIA for help. b. Maheu was the only known link assoctating Morgan with the syadicate plot, ext Maheu stands only to lose by baving his rele beccse common Inoviedge- . : . fe Tose who know Morgan, Maheu, and Roselli tho cught. it. ~ 125 - net es Me ES . Cmtmemttetintetins wm mettre oom
14-00000 SOR: cof ahs Qh Sabyepe mente ogahy 10 emi ses sen RUE ance anime ime agen : es .f ‘ an . . C | t e ‘ wt ‘ ° MV ry ’ & 1 a. . eee | . me RAE lt He eae oye EE SS Ago -ad gm me, a al Le Can al, a eT a a ae Bata Weim serene. - - we, . wre: ) +o tperosme @ nt ctmanm di nattat TREES # =, . Sow . ® 7 e | 4 openegeegy? quite out of character for asy of the tarde to be spreading 9 8 sete * the story deliberately for a private surpose. ; . In learning of the Roselli-Morgan link, we are relleved of the “4 need for speculatios as to how the story kas gotten out. It Is quite lizely that Roselli is the scurce, Morgan the channel, acd Anderson and Pearson the recipients. We cay also be relieved of the need for speculation as to why the story is being told. ‘The 7 _ _ inference to be dram fros O'Connell's discoveries in Las Vegas is ; . that Roselli is drinking too much and talking and that Morgan {s also i oO Grinking and talking to a newspapercan friend. lo | Put in itd best light--that there is no ulterior motive in spreading the story—Lt is questionable whether we are any better off -- - now than we were before; our position say be even worse than we ted suspected. ee eto eet eee Tey a.We may now assuze that Pearson's story is not patched together frax bits and pleces picked wp here and there. His 4 ultinate source, Roselli, ‘nove more about certain details of # the ganbling syndicate operation than we do, and he evidently . _has talked. ‘Trying now to hush up further leaks might 43 nore . harms than good; the story is already out asd probably in considerable detafl. a Ba an t da , co wo ' . : ° Toe pope 1s £9. GRaloneh DER AURGETT ATR eis cranes extn auintnenttead det stems ane aan terme tr SSSA SONA RGSS CAEAEEMTGRAS oe draw.» : a vs + wy . ‘ * - me . eet wee «, N a et” | jz : : id + te wo et Sia PETE aa eee PROM : cokers 8, TE «ary FE . : ee , aie g: = + Pan sae, ade le sate sage S ore go> . , wee bee See! ate ee ~ soe A am A, ‘ Aang Ge Tee he tere ete wegar te 20
a | i : t Bb. Tee Roselit-Garrison coatect in las Verns in March is particularly Cisturoing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to doe with the Kentedy assassination in. retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro’s Life. We do not kcow ow panatThG Ge ea. 8 that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do mow that ee ry there vere such plots against Castro. Unsbappily, it now appears we that Garrison say also know this. eet e  meapee ema gree The publicity on this subject has probably not yet mm its Course » a. Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we knov, used tvo 0 ble Ok ee ae é ‘ . ; the State Department meeting. sO b. Garrison bas not yet revealed his ‘full case. When he does, we should expect to find CIA preninently displayed. e. The Philippine National Bureau of Investigation has a Puerto Rican in custaly who claims he participated in a Castro- 7+. 7° daspired assassination plot in Tallas. He also clains that Castro made a speech in July 1952 threatening to try to . assassinate Kennedy in retaliation for ovo Xennedy attempts i g I _ of his best goodies: the atory of the pilis end the fact of . ;- on Castro's life. (se have found no record nor recollection of Castro having maze such a speech.) ‘The Puerto Rican is ia the _ 4 _ Be, a 5 epoch LINE CORNEA SUE SEMESTER WN Na e s oak? - ote wee Bam « ananst Hhicn SP ae at rat ttn Ciena sees le me + es “ta, * we ot Mee ete woe pe eT inte, ws aa Loe . iar ee. se meer ws feege ate MEP SN les Fe: rat . . ey oof ~ . . . re ee . : oz . Tt At mE I Ie eT ere eae “meget eed tie fem sy te kine On mes” be bi apathadtl dnb haiy sts Seton — npr peestberinrng AS pe eeNEs oe cnr a ttceree “pone ela ee Eee. o
FOL megs arom g ° sgt ators tem cme Philippices illegally end pretably will de depsrced to the U.S. j. We may expect the FBI ts faze his over and wring hin dry. We face the lixelihecd thes things will get worse before they begin to get better. In the follosing paragraphs ve explore some of the * renificatioas and discugs wimt aight be dare acces them. . . Should ve try to silence those vho are talking cr might later talx? . It appears to us that this tactic offers little chance of | | yee success. For one thing, the story is already out and probably in about es full detail as it ever will be. The only participant on ney C: vhoa we have aay real leverage is Mabeu, and he has already done all - | of the talking he is likely to do (to his lavyer, Morgan). We have uo ° hola on any of the others vio ight furnish confixa&tion for Roselli 's . i. *: story. . . : . : j Be Varona is alecst certainly not a friend of the Agency. : , ‘As the Bay of Pigs operation developed, /va was one of the most . . x Prepare exh tical of the lack of Cuban control of the operation and or Tet the people involved in it. He vas bitter over temtnation of . . a rrr es | , oe , Agency support of his exile group (and the consequent loss of ! his ow income). ‘The last we know of him he was in New York ; ‘ io living a hani-to-mouth exfstence as a part-time auto salesman. wre semis fey where rei meirens otitis x: . ° : : Dots mo, . . . . wo . ~ wy er Pacer eae . . . - - ig te at et Seat dae . .. = Leos ped NY tthe aoe (odin sane raat ataatnehoneh SEIS eet me wed ane aar a ery LE 1a ORM we ght Prete ol Seay © tating MED ty wy ont om ana et gone vag ae we Pedy ape rare wader, tiatind bat prema iets ti
14-00000 Fe a cram a re Ee AE ah oe dl et tye on ng +, PWG cern aren, , eee cate etree ey * we ee we ee - . seen ore ke tetb rah "ihe. gy ~ oe . e b. Poselli, Giunsena, and Traf“icunte have fallea oa “evil” days. Giancasa is reported {in a Chicago nevspaper of recent date) to have been deposed es the Mafia head in Chicego and was rimored to be hiding in Mexico. Hakeu reports that Trafficante is in jail {a Tanpa. Essellf fs persona non grata in Las Vegas, being required to register with the police acy tise he is in tom. None of thes would have cowpunctions about dregging ip his CIA connection wien be was being pushed by law enforecement authorities. Gieancaca has already done Lt when the Fal was crowding him in 1963. Roselli eppears to be dofirg it in his conversations with Morgan and Carrison. (Coment: The cover story used with Roselli, Glancasa, Trafficante, Varona, and presumably with Orta was that the sponsors vere U.S. businessmen vith interests in Cuba. Roselli soon concluded that CIA was the tzve sponsor ané so tci2 O°Conzell. in Roselli‘s subsequent dealings with Harvey and “Edwards he came to nov this for sure. Gfancana named CIA in 1963. We must assume that the others, with the possible ‘exception of Orta and perhaps Varozm, are equally sure thet CIA was the true sponsor.) _ i - 2 ee Nee te I ey tool Batt BEE WN cable 1a LAY TTT AOER carting Steed Gn mah gutted OM a et et ee net a ee e. Horgan may elvays retire tehind the screen of an attorney-= . $ 4 cf ' . . “: 4 . 8 ry ~ :
14-00000 SPP ety geet eee ee oe ¢ BS, Satin atresar arrears rere +e = 05 Sas we att fw mae — 6 1 ame PDy_eRandEe oe ‘aA aaa Cot ammrr ome ote a9 ibe his on the Pearsoa story. - @. Pearson, Anderson, and Greensmm (in Las Vegas) are TR coma, mevspaperzen with a newsvorthy story. Fearson has already - Some mee AY OF LS ae published much of it. me em A tomes o. e. Maheu Goes have geod reason for =o+ wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity =fsht cause him to lose his lucrative cliest, Howard Hughes. There might be some value . 08 nese tn seum ance tn be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Horgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion. What do other components of Gavernzert imow about this operation? Former Attorney General Robert Kennedy was fully briefed by - Houston and Edvards on 7 May 1962. A memorand:s corfirming the , " oral briefing was forvarded to Kemedy o2 14 May 1962. The merorandis: . does not use the word “assassinate,” but there is little room for + ny engeememeg eee ulsinterpretation of what was meant. Presumably the original ‘of that oo 33 . memorandus 1s still in the files of the Justice Departwent. It should be noted that the briefing of Kennedy was restricted to Phase Cne 8 EE Remar ats aera eT CET ste EI eR tn yee La Pat dee eeanaraee tans . ° . 2 . . \ . ‘ 6 comme enemaipactiven wunphes ecm  emtateie teem ane emptying 9 A ® € of the operation, which had ended about a year earlier... Fhase two r was already under way at the time of the briefing, but Kennedy was not tolé of it. ; o . AS faz es ve know, ‘he FET bas not been tala the sensitive - it 5 tm PO, . a? ’ vo 7? » ec epteetee Weg yok ge SP ieee pws de oes 1 i femnie ree bikie sgt wet pe hai ee eet cst ted ysecee ea eer same sie
soe Btw mrotce Cen ve plausibly ceny that we plotted with Sangster eleseats to . &ssassinate Cestro? . : . ae ae Castro? . , should by now have concluded that CTA Plotted the assissinatioa of " people." - _ in iain outside of tae Gover=zent erat would confirm Pearson's operational de Setatls, dus {¢ would be raive to assxe that they have not by now put tve and tus together and come out with the réskt ansver. They mov of CI4‘s involveress with Roselli and Glanceng - a3 @ result of the Las Vegas wiretapping incident. Fron the Chicago * a “Spaper stories af Augist 3963, and from Clancaca's own statenent, it appears that they knov this related to Cuba. Ween Roselli's story reached them (Rosellf to Morgan to Pearson to Yarren to Rowley eb oe to the Far), all of the pieces should bave fallen into place. They Castro and used U.S. gangster elewents im the operation. There is scue support for this thesis in the conversation I kad 2 REN GC 6 Ne eRRRINNE! SD nee & oeeies oe be ay ee ‘ with Sam Fapich on 3 May 1967 when I told him of the expected meeting between Rosell{ and Harvey. Sam commented that Roselli and Glancana have CIA “over @ barrel" because of "that operation.” He said that ce & oe Tot EERE YEE + A enmamenpmene oom agnOme + eras i he doubted that the FBI vould be able to do anything about either . sho ante tam idepemit tas # t ad ‘ : Roselli or Glancana because of “their previous activities with your Dos | Ro, we cannot. We are reascaably conzident that there is ‘nothing
14-00000 ee: 28 2 we wer OF gee Or By EP recog, ~ eres het Sra POO PWR Oe ee | $ 8 4 7 osroosy guage tg a 8. Sie ced wotse oon bear roan & 3 ; story of the gacbling Syodicete operation, bus the:: are plenty of . - : . Roa-gangster witnesses vio could leat coarizration. ° a &- Maheu can confine that Shef Edvards told Rosellt ae that Edvards had told the Attorne ney General of Rorelli's . activities on kezalf of the Goverzment. i. . b. Varora and Varoza's S$0a~Ln-law fan confizs the pill and . three-man team elements of the story. § i Ce Orta can confirm the pill elecent of hase One. a. If an independent investigation vere to be ordered, , | the fLovestigators could learn everything that ve have learned. C : ; Such an investigation probably would uncover eetails wilnown to . & | i i i =e ae searg tamserndts abe mabeeie re us, because 1¢ would have access to the non-CIA Participants. _ an CIA state or imply that it vas ferely an instnment of policy? Rot in this case. Waile 1¢ is true that Phase Dvo was carried f ” out in au atmosphere of intense Kennedy adnint stration Pressure ts - _. | Sle 3 ., ; . 8 something about castro, such is not true of the earlier phase. , wines Ove Was initiated tn August 1960 wader the Etseshover 7 administration. Phase Tyo is ascostated in Harvey" 5 mind with’ the . ; | ‘ *, é i Executive Action Capability, which reportedly vas developed ia ; | a 3 ‘ ' wesponse to White House urginzs. Again, Poase One had beea started poo U4 and abandoned months before the Executive Action Capability appeared macht Bee 4 i - . . : ‘ - ° ° , wees [: . a . . mets pat ws woes - . +t PB ye Ee amerrs Ee mt at rita = f * ; % ot s ei e ys pagmeeenne—————erncrts camer Sow ot fe : an. apes SECT er ene tt OF ait ern cess apt ae, i aan Sad ST petite ne Weaicxed ES reenn mene iy eat ee E - moe aad an . v Tote woe te et Ts me Te + oo . nr : cet . see te see a rE LG aeRAB OAL Seo SY en aaniyard ae 2h 08 5 meta a renner ST ta geod age giy mre oan pee events lll wPAtwcnetrenttinint adivatnes, 5 minha AL oehtisiaehit on & = Seneeizes eegthe 1 sented werent RNG Si Pasicteted eptk om /
14-00000 ce - t d a é = a a ee L cline ee, | wwe Be Oy meas i morc etd me . ~*; : oo, sweieccwl wom d “oodhed on the szene. When Robert Kenedy was briefed oa Phase One in May 1952, he strongly adnont shed Eoustoa ani Edvards to cheex with the Attorney General in advance of eny future intended use of U.S. criminal eleseats. This was not done vith respect to Phase Two, vhich was a@lready well under way at the «ice Kennedy was briefed. ‘The Pearson story, waich is now causing us so much distress, incluzes . | One detail that is found only in Phase Tvo: the three-man team. cence! as ee em + Ve see little to be gained from personal approackes now to Makeu, Morgan, or Roselli. wabeu has much to lose and might be adle . « te prevail upon Morgan end Roselli not to spread the story further. Zt is questionable whether easy such urging would be effective with i ! { | i { | : What measures might be taken to lessen the darage? , Roselli, because Roselli stants.only to gain frea‘haviag the story | “oss, , of his CIA connection known and accepted. We cannot now suppress fete. on ; ‘4 . 7 _the story, because it is already out and may boil up efresh from the . i | ; Garrison case. If we were to approach any of the participants and: : : urge discretion upoz hin, and if this became known, it would perely  . lend credence to a tale that now sounds somevhat toprobable. woe . « ae ey eee a ai e REPS oe Tals 7 “as” mw ete we a: ware we oer con ~ - e . ~ . - . 1 OE Be a OS lg io " Zee wg bee . a A . - . rat ool ee at ok aan conte tetas Sige? 1S abiaye Tessie eB | was tet ered ty bates get ctits fe wv res: ‘Brame aC = dentotes ae * ae aor es ask a ey eee Senge ore io Peet Dy afe Laat ates Se mat pea ipa SIR Met arcing S Alphabet tne tates de Mais TARR oh he to Be ip a 0 raga atte ae i eb Meet a at diy ho ae tae i hans tye plate by hte Sipmary EN eG