1-57 was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary for the Mexican officer in charge to ask the American officer | | 2 I for the telephone numbers? 4 i Mr. Scelo. The Mexicans were probably tapping other | = 3 | things at that time, not these targets. They were tapping | : 5 other Mexicans, and so on. We had our own unilateral tap | S - | operations .-~ : a | Mrs Goldsmith. I understand that. | . | Mr. Scelo. “7 on those important targets. : 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior.to 1962 | 5 r the liaison operations with the Mexicans did not cover the | = i = 3 Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies? | © 2 ir Mr. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really | = 2 a recall. That would have been in mid-62. That was just | : 7 about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk. | : 16 And I do not recall what the previous status was. ! > o | I do recall that they certainly did ask -- they suddenly - 13 | disclosed the intent to tap certain lines which we were | = . i - 15 | tapping unilaterally. - : : at Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that the liaison operation : 7 had taps on 30 lines. If it was. not. the Soviet, Cuban and | nos i e a BE? 2 satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have | 32 been. | @ 24 Mr. Sdelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; , Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or | i | | =n 001838 _ SEDRE! Docld:32277215 Page 58 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
ae) ey Sa, Bate tial five Mexican Communist Parties. 1 i | of Mexico, political rivals and. so on. | Je 2 | They were also tapping the phone of previous Presidents | | However, I cannot swear that this statement is correct. 2 7 I do not. know that the July envoy was not previously tapping : 7 some of the phoneswwhich are indicated here. = : . You see, Mexico City, at that time, had the most compre-} S | hensive, extensive telephone tap facilities and surveillance 5 | facilities of any station ‘in the world; and although Mexico : of was a-big, and very well-run station, it is in the nature. : nl of things -- they had far more material to deal with than a they could possibly handle. - i i @ : 13 This is something which everyone in the intelligence : 7 business knew, you see, but no one ever said it. in writing. & E is | You did not like to go.before your bosses or put on the 2 | record the fact that you have far more, like ten times, work | A 7 to do than you can possibly do, especially when you consider | 7 that the Agency has a counter-espionage responsibility for ! = I } : 9 | the United States government abroad and that the FBI had | 5 °| no business in these operations at all in Mexico City, but | j . : . i = a1 | they were doing so well that nobody tampered with it. Feawd 22 In vast parts of the world, the agency was unable to 4 i ' 1 i even lay avhand on the counter-espionage task, because they » ee did not have the personnel. In African. countries which were Ww tn being taken over in front of our eyes by Communist groups, | __ Seered _ 001839 Docld:32277215 Bage 59 ALDSSSON REPORTING COMBaNY
DoctId: 1-59 wa two officers and a secretary -- so that Mexico was regarded .t 4a | in a number of important. critical cases, it performed the ” | = 5 i task. 7 | “ | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. en & : Mr. Scelo. To say we were doing it. comprehensively would . | = * | have meant that we would have had an organization. there pro- 8 ” || portionately as big as the FBI in Washington. < . { = oy _Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the transcripts, I would like = !1 + you to look at CIA number 13, which is the transcript. of aA f| = ' October 1, 1963, and that apparently is a transcript in which Oswald identifies himself, and it is a transcript where the contact with the Soviet Embassy that triggered the cable REUPGRIEES BUPLDING, i } | | | P| . . . > } from the Mexico City station. | | S| (Pause) ” 7 | Now, the transcript, or the translator, indicates in : © | brackets that this was the same person who phoned a day or an ye = FI so ago and spoke in broken Russian. And Oswald also indicates 5 ne in fact, this was Oswald -- "I was at your placé last wee?! | saturday." pe Re October lst, for the record, was a Tuesday. 23 | “Then we have the next transcript that appears in CIA | Number 14, Oswald's contact on Saturday, September 28th. Ww ls Have you read a this? : | 001840 | SERRE 32277215 Page 60 ALOSESON eon NS COMPAALY as an outstanding station because in some discernible way,. and | mainly Russia, even Red China, we would have a two-man station i-- a © Ye
Doctld: 3 4 2 4 3 w = 5 pa Pe) « i n P ws fo} a ~N : c ad ~ é _— > ™ oa a Lag ~ . * rae Y a - {0 S & _ ty — tt a = = ° = 12 . % = 13 ~~ = tA is Ped o . al tw oC = 4 > an \7 « bed ’ s ig ae) = 19 ~ co = 29 Say 3 7S - aN 23 44 33 ao 32277215 Mrs Scelo. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. When would this transcript have come to the attention of the personnel of the Mexico City station? | | | | Mr. Scelo. That, I do not know. As you noted from the 1 other writings, when Russian was involved it had to go to a Russian transcriber who often had a backlog, of a week. Mr. Goldsmith. That is right. Mr. Scelo. It might have been a week or more before they saw this. | | | | | | Mr. Goldsmith. In any event,.Oswald indicates in the | conversation on the lst that he had been at the embassy on the previous Saturday and the translator also indicates the same person who phoned a day or. so ago, so there is. some sort of clue that this person, that there had been a previous Mr. Scelo. .That is right. -----"~ | | | | contact? | | Of course, he might not have identified himself in that previous contact. Mr. Goldsmith. In fact; in this contact of 9-28-63, | : there was no identification by him? Mr. Scelo. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. There were two other. contacts on September 27, 1963. One at 4:05 in the afternoon and one at Oswald identify himself. : ECR Bage 61 ALDSSSCN REZSORTIN we a fr “i 3 COMFERY 4:26 in the afternoon... In neither of those two contacts does | 1 | 001844
DoctlId: you of Oswald's -- of any of these other contacts prior to the | 1-61 Butmy question is, did the Mexico City station inform \ 4 001842 2 1 | assassination? | Mr. Scelo. No. “ 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think they should have? - tt , 2 a] Mr. Scelo. No. & - | Mr.. Goldsmith. Why not? z : | Mr. Scelo. The gist of all the conversations was the ; , | same, that the man was trying to get a Cuban visa to go to : _— in order to get a Russian visa, and there was no other i 1, | Significant information. 2 al Mr¢ Goldsmith. Did you know from the October Ist cable z aie the October 9th cable that arrived in Headquarters that 5 |, | Oswald was trying to get a visa? = al Mr. Scelo. I do not remember. Whatever the cable says. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Lét us look at the cable for a moment. = | Mr. Scelo. In other words, in the dynamics of the - - .g | security business--- = \ | Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to CIA 177, does that. make any : ra | reference to Oswald's visiting the Cuban Embassy or to the 1 fact that he was trying to obtain a visa? ESF x | Mr. Scelo. No. No indication about the Cubans and 37 || nothing about a visa. 7 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that information should 2 | have been communicated to Headquarters? t 32277215 Page 62 Mie RLY