detailed results although there were some Qaim operations that produced peripheral information about the reactions of various groups under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy. Book V of the SSC Final Report, in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will not be detailed here. II. Oswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963 The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at the time. The following statement is ina cable to Mexico City on 28 November 1963: . | | "We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers. may i a ; } have played a role. pBgeereee ss. peor ly ens ta aye ~ 4 . ka Law >-S% Ga ona 5
“+2 allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking, money seon Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive yetention from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter, ind with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively «> have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the tine of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations yas demonstrated gz to have been lying. After the allegations ty "D" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the following ce ecst vasepat 01 em PeIDERERONN Aetey “GRATER Nie, mayen Bea” Rey ene AT aR a + Ss Ge eS Jstatement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963: : "Pls continue to follow all leads and tips. The question of whether Oswald acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved." | gain, on 13 December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as foliows: | "Plse continue watch for Soviet cr Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out propaganda about case. ee December 1963 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico tity Station stated as follows: "...4exico City has been the only major overseas reporter in the case. While this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's 6 CONPISEN TIAL eee ee Bare At oon’, yh low ISS DRR FOE ANTS CRASS REASSEMBLED SLATH prc ou AT Lia LRN dias See ater] Parner wot Mare keoe ty Naren sore reg ep ce AettoediAaavse te Sanh ebtmdtaenia he dobanmow o-deadtntnitina «ihe ‘awren dbiacis eitentetid ahaa eH "yat, wd: OMB AP UABCIS > a Teal 29 Lithia EOE AER PREG Oe GET STH
° me Pe eae eres life, we have not overlooked the really out- standing performance of Mexico City's major assets and the speed, precision, and perception with which the data was forwarded. Here it was relayed within minutes to the White House, Uepartnent of State] and [the FBI]. the statements of Silvia ~ ean and your analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing.” Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation. It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit; these are commented on at Tab G. III. General Collection Requirements On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable from Headquarters with the following statement: Ne a a . : ice a sh ms 6 © 86
14-00000 _ _— VATS cra : af ash roren ee rnes "Tragic death of President Kennedy requires all of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes over the reins." | It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other ‘than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to. field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be ‘stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi- cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative. It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has - been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant or significant information on the subject it would have been reported either in responses to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources. _If one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously Cerereparee ied be es bb da — 8
NWiiko di bk af ame ves oe a - would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis * for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken. As has been noted above, there were initial CIA collection re- quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued, but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who- what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in ‘the Headquarters cable to Mexico City on 17 December 1963 (note above) which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from other stations: | ". , . this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's life..." The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10 about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description of "an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as troop movements, but there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor- mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently "was missed --‘or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As ; stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report: “Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct . an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited." | This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting
(Sete Teteceten, 22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with | | one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights to Havana apparently carried some freight.- CIA conducted regular surveillance of cupana flights, filing cable z f reports to Headquarters. There was one Ginitateral)crA surveillance Lan S, that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana fl ights, [ reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests. The 22 November 1963 Flight At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, 22 November 1963. The SSC Renort describes the delay as being from 6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at 10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs Clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring further into the matter. 1. a i eee y . IR AE AO sk i
Arve PATEL UisT moi diss Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain, - - fe the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record bf a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori- ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no ecorded response. The current review revealed additional information from the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject. in reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion af Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final Report tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City times are used in the following discussion. t the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed | sen minutes earlier. celina cewe | oe é oh A ors ¥ a. oo i ‘ mae: oe Bs “2 ap ecm sae to eget ncaa yt es ene AOAC ION Mette ENE A ey OTN ASR RAAI DASE ans eB deceit fit dasha a aon ay hac attcaptpd gh sty vt 9 rims Bie F exassserasiestenesletereeett bch iteteete ch TEA at Gnd hewn Es mee = 2035 hours. 21g tap op The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in rR CaN TED Sot ERR SRE Sp SAAD ARAGY SOTO: AT e she SSC Final Report: | 1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes, It was not FeSO OL nme cam Me UPSETS OIE AEER CURTAIN ot lS LASER he ‘Semremmtrerettvireen senreeaneeonent
14-00000 delayed five hours, as alleged. 2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a i. private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts : further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight. | which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded | substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it allegedly was delayed. ° . In view of the surveillance coverage of. the Cubana flight, it is very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin- H ‘engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported mo jhad it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of | ‘these sources and prababiy knew the above facts, feeling no need to 0 follow further. | The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its “summary of the matter. The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight : At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con- : "siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the = assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the §sc Final Report state that: | : " . one source alleged that the Cuban-American was ‘involved' in the assassination." Vetere) 13
The SSC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI “almost immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi- gation "as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." Further down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi- “gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had ' contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Comnittee--FPCC) certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi- gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon- sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the. results of FBI inquiries. While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will be noted. | Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement at page 104, in the chronology section: | "December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that he ‘looked suspicious'..." At page 6] it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed- up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),
except to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban- American's activities." The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains: some inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington | that the man "looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December 1963, but it reported that the man had "crossed at Laredo, Texas on 23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at. a certain time on 25 November, that he chetked out of the hotel at a certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana flight on night 27 November," 2 a This was followed by a dispatch the same date, repeating. the basic information in the cable, ae mmm, and containing the following cryptic statement: "Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious." This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI; it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the . nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported Guiir ENTIAL
4 H : i : to have “looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way into the more careful statements that usually characterize official reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres- sionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic activity or final conclusions. There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing the record, but which is essentially resolved when considered in the context of known facts. On 19 March 1964, Monterrey Base cabled that a source @a __ Ma had information on a man; the description seems to have the same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement that. he "was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he entered Mexico "on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts ‘that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued | in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa, Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number. of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time, when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could not recall it. ELS Ut oe Per Zemee sy Sepa me he ee. 8s . wise) gfe 2% 4 Ba Fo deh R G 16 228 Jatt
There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the record is confused. .If we are to comment negatively on the pre- sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out that the Mexico City Station's response to the Monterrey report - contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When Mexico City received the Monterrey cable the Deputy Chief of Station replied that the information in the report "jibes fully with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63." It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of entry into Mexico. The mistake of that cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how it should be considered responsibly. Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information on the man is not well founded. It had no real sources with access to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available with such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities. 17 Loe © rr.