197-10002-10084)] = Date :09/30/93 ; Page: 1 -JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM. aid IDENTIFICATION FORM gy AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10084 RECORDS SERIES : TRANSCRIPT AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ; (am tam ca GD ED GO GD oa aE GED OU Ow) foi cmt Gin emt com oh ith MD el Ae RS eS EE I EG GS IG GEG OH GD GE GE TE ate GED GD MEP CED ome om com ten wh cmb 2 ee MD OE EN we wer oe, ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO : TITLE : TESTIMONY OF MR. HALLEY (ALIAS) DATE : 08/19/75 PAGES : 132 SUBJECTS : AEP SSASSINAT IONS ee ASTRO 5412 COMMITTEE CUBA CIA DULLES, ALLEN JMWAVE STATION OPERATION MONGOOSE BISSELL MCNAMARA, ROBERT KENNEDY, JOHN F. KENNEDY, ROBERT F. 303 COMMITTEE SPECIAL GROUP ‘40 COMMITTEE LANSDALE, EDWARD PARAMILITARY - CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS COVERT ACTION POISON ROSELLI, JOHN TRAFF ICANTE GIANCANA, SAM MAHEU, ROBERT. ORTA, JUAN GODOY, ARTURO [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 DBoctld:322781974 Page i
Date:09/30/93 Page:2 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AMLASH~1 HUNT, HOWARD ZRRIFLE QUWIN ALPHA 66 FBI VARONA HARVEY SHACKLEY DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : T RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 245 Folder 5 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBocld: 3227819274 Page 2
HY Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 te WARD & PAUL eat, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 410 Firsheg 0955 16 | 7 18 20 el ee 23 24 29 Boctd: | charge of the operational activity in Miami. That team was : Special Group in the White House which was part of the National TOP SECRET 9 matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in essentially headed Pyne, AL Cox, who has 6! eo dle Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station? Mr. Halley. Yes. @IW@ohAwas the head, then, of what would rae be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station. Mr. Baron. Was he the head of JMWAVE until the wint when | | you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the JMWAVE Station? | Mr. Hallay. That is correct. He was the head of that unit until such time as I replaced him. Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called Security Council structure and used the project nameac MONGOOSE for anti-Cuban operations? Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General Lansdale. and Mr. Helms. | This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical purposes the task force unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey. i I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you TOP SECRET 241974 Page 3
TOP SECRET 42 1 | put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use 2 a silent outboard motor if the surf was high. } Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts 4 would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly? 2 2 A>. -? = ¢ a] a fo] N “a 2 i 2 2 ° £ a a> 5 | They might be agents, evan non-paid agents? 6 i Mr. Halley. No, they were not paid. For instance, they 7 | might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I 8 am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC 9 Shipping Company. That shipping company’ was a subsidiary of 10 the Station, if you will,and the ABC Shipping Company ran ll |} maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it ¥ 12 | could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy- 4 < . : 13 | five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them a ; = : : 14 | was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I 15 || would have to go and look at each vessel. | 16 Does that give you a feal for the size of the problem? 17 | Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in 18 | existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries 19 || or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with 290 || personnel or with equipment? 21 Mr, Halley. We are talking about all of these companies, 22 || they probably Gwent I distinguish between 2t, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 : Ls 23 | companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed 24 || to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms 25 | mean different things to me. The nature of the Agency's TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:3 281924 Page 4
Phone (Area 202) 544-609 WARD & PAUL me, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 26003 410 First S® HW 50955 10 Li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 £0 el ee £9 24 25 TOP SECRET 43 involvement in each is different. I am having a little trouble -- Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of companies you were receiving help from at that point, and about how many of each there might have been? Mr. Halley. I do not think I could.do that. We are talking about a NN EN . . juncdiged’s aotecompanies that we used during that period of time. Some of them might simply have been a company set up and registered and run out of some attorney's office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of the small boat. | Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even if I had access to the files to answer your! question, it would take me weeks to pull all that together ko give you an answer. I don't think there is an overview statement. Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had ccoopera- tion on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private enterprise.in the Miami area, or in Southern Florida? My. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had extensive cooperation.—~ I do not like your word “grand” -- that we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of this clandestine mission. 4 | Mr. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation from DoctTd: 34261974 Page 5 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6660 WARD & PAUL my re) 3 3 N Y Q c g a £ = ad @ 3 ui a HW 450955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 25 24 25 | between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatived | or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station | ultimately were channeled out through you? |; during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that TOP SECRET | og i Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you | know this Station went through several mutations in organization existed for the longest period of time was something like I am | going to describe to you. There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a ' \ \ Deputy Chief of Statiom for operations. |' That is the gentleman | { who is now retired, I think he is still! alive, by the name of | i I had a second Deputy Chief of Station and he was for Support Patterns. That is a gentleman who is also Then the rest of the Station was organized into a number of branches. Each branch was organized along functional lines. Let me give you an example. There was a Foreign Intelligence Branch. These were people in, what in my terminology would be classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to | recruit a . Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with, you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in i | Havana. They are working with resident :agents in Cuba who might live in some city like Havana and have a legal job as a baker or DoclTd: 322819274 Page 6 TOP SECRET
HY Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL | D.C. 20003 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0955 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 20 24 25 Boctd: aetivity than I did. That is a question!) of looking at such 52 So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were reporting to them along the same lines that we did. ‘they'dia work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a4 couple of groups -- in other words, they | had contact with Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general | 5 rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not ! ! ave contact with. So they were working|with these kinds of } h eecer exile groups. The Task Force also specialized in much more economic Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an ’ \ assassination operation had been run by Task Force W, would you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have been aware of such an operation? Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that. / . | Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial | | practice to let you know that there was an operation that might lave been run through Florida into Cuba? Mr. Halley. No. You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism. You know, lat us dispel one thing very promptly here. If you are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with the Mafia -- and I think I can tell you frankly at that time I. 241924 Page 7
Pnone (Area 202) 544-88 Ki WARD & PAG ™” e) 3 ° 4 Y Q ¢ £ an = = ud LI 3 w at HW 50955 LO ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 él 22 25 24 Z£9 Bocld: 84 TOP SECRET attempt against Castro. | | Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the i '72-'73 period, seeing any evidence of that in the file at the | Pomc COCR colders in the AMLASH file. time. Mr. Baron. There are Did you read all of those files? Mr. Halley. No, I did not. Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that was in the AMLASH files? i Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry a the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or discussing it with my staff and so on. Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of the contact with Artime? | Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime? Mr. Baron. Yes, Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Artime thing was looked at as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to See if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some aquipment, some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban | solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know, 2261924 Page 6 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET 1 money. I was opposed to it at the time. | i | 87 ! And once it was set 2 | wp, and I did what I was supposed to do, 'which was to train 5 Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an Pnone (Area 202) 544-6008 a awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up, 5 | you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period, nH and talked to officers who had, you Know, more intimate knowledgé of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had g jj occurred. 9 Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was 10 | supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating 11 || Castro? 12 Mr. Halley. No, not for the specific purpose of assassina- 13 || ting Castro. WARD & PAUL 14 Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH-1 15 || was a reliable agent? 16 Mr. Halley. I really do not know that much about him, t 1 e know. This was an operation that was run at that time out 18 i Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it newspaper 19 || to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Qiu 20 articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe. 21 Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling 22 | Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were 23 connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational a >.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 94 || Purpose including the intelligence gathering? vi ~ a = ve ° ot v 25 Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that { HY 50955 DBocld: 3261924 Page 9 TOP SECRET
s ¢ ra] a ° N i] a ha & oo c 3 £ a WARD &@ Pau oe i) 3 3 N g a ¢ g oa & & a Kd 3 ui 410 First HW 450945 10 il 12 13_ 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld : TOP SECRET °0 years I have seen literally -- (Discussion off the record.) { Mr. Halley. Let me go back. You asked me about ZRRIPLE. This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms. Every day Ij)read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask me do I know what ZRRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of my head no. I have tried to be helpful. ' I have asked you | i several times if you could give me a steering tiv or show me | what direction you are going, I might be able to try to comment on it, but ZRRIFLE as such means nothing.to me. You really | could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these things that come across my dask. Mr. Baron. That is absolutely understandable. I want to try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed recollection from you, then I will go back over these two, aspecially the next one, QUWIN. Do you recall a CIA asset who went by the cryptonym QUWIN? Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Kriowing the system, and so forth, normally it would have something to do with & does not ring any bells with me. That is all I can give you, al sort of Pavlovian response. You flash QUWIN on the screen, Ij am telling you now I do not know, but it probably has something to do with Sean . | Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the davelopment of a capability of carrying on assassination was :$22d1924 Page 10 FOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-66 LO Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 Y, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 20 wi % 24 = a o S dl Z£9 TOP SECRET 105 -Mr. diGenova. Were there any restrictions, once, for example, those weapons caches ware delivered either by land or air -- and we have spoken to Miggguupeayawho was in the Havana Station, for example, for awhile and aches Ais none wha | rT haad of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that they were aware of the weapons drops and, were intimately familiar with where they would be. Mr. Halley. That was all before my time. f have no knowledge of that. During my time,: we made no drops by air. Mr. diGenova. Were there any Limitations that were Placed of how the weapons would be used that were daliverad into Cuba to these internal resistance groups? Mr. Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are addressing. Mr. diGenova. During your period. Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued essentially as self-protection for the people who were living in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at guch time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids, ambushes, sabotage operations. Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in this article that I would like to ask you to comment on. He is quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some of them wera very special weapons for special purposes. They | HY 50955 Docld:3 opi924 Page ii. TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ae) 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 t, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 23 24 410 First. z25 14 TOP SECRET 116 Mr. Baron. Ara you aware of the doy program? | | Mr. Halley. Yes, I am. , Mr. Baron. How was that spelled? | Mr. Halley. Mr. Baron. What was that program? Mr. Halley. That was a program involving a Cuban emigra group that was used as an operational support mechanism to i Support the Miami Station. Mr. Baron. What kind of support aia they provide? Mr. Halley. They weze interviewers’ of refugees who came out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate the Spanish language publications that were of interest to us. They provided information on the various’ mainstream activitias that were going on in the Cuban exile community. Mr. Baron. Did they orovide support for paramilitary operations against Cuba? Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they thought we should interview or look to or see if they would | fit inte ether paramilitary programs. In other words, they | had the contacts in the Cuban community. Say we had a require- ment for a diesel engineer. We would say to the (Aion organiza- tion, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel engineer who has a first engine's license, and they would go through all of their contacts until they would come up with one, a week or ten days or whatever, having identified. : HY 50955 DBocld:3@2?61974 Page i2 TOP SECRET
be Ps as ¢ “ x foe) N 3 a) ¢ ® 3 £ a 10 il 12 PAUL” tape 7 13 & WARD 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 410 First SHO S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 20 HY 50955 DoclId:3 TOP SECRET 17 the fellow, where he was, what he was doinq. We would then send somebody around to talk to him independent of them and pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities. It was that kind of operational support. Mr. Baron. Psople who were vart of this program were not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they operated under the aagis of this program, There were some of them who may have been in the paramilitary program and then th organiza- ] eee it and were subsequently picked up in the my tion. Could we go off the record for a moment? (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Halley. “We are now back on the record. also worked with us on a common project, which Pemomicomlay Cuban mawal. cratic, things like that, $0 thev were used across the board for operational support tasks. Mr. Baron. One more general question. Did the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationshio with the FBI? Mr. Halley. I would not -- Mr. Baron. Was.the FBI involved in supporting your activities in any way? | Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language, because I think -- Mr. Baron. Go right ahsad. 261924 Page 13 TOP SECRET
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