404-10179410135 Sroper ™ 19 June 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Manolo RAY 1. I did not have the opportunity to discuss many Cuban problems with Manolo RAY during the period 4-13 June in both Sun Juan and Paris, Our meetings were largely devoted to the effort of contacting and attempting to recruit or cause the defection of Carlos FRANQUI, The following, however, are the conclusions of my brief effort to discuss the general situation with BAY, 2, Manolo RAY's Attitude Towards KUBARK: It has become ebvious to me on this second meeting wit Olo RAY that: a. RAY is convinced that the Agency had in the past purposely and actively attempted to destroy him as a political leader, In this connection, RAY feels that the Agency, following the Bay of Pigs invasion, was partially responsible for the break up of the MRP clandestine net~- work and resistance potential in and out of Cuba, RAY stated that he has proof of the participation of at least one KUBARK officer in a plot with certain MRP officials to remove him from the MRP as a condition for KUBARK's assistance to that organization, RAY added that the officer in question has been fired, He either did not know or could not recall the individual's name or pre- ferred not to mention it, . b. On the strength and position of the State White Paper on Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs, RAY’s MRP joined the FRD QGater the CRC}, While his organization was a member of the ERD, the attention of KUBARK ahd the U, 8, Government was. called time. and time again. By the FRD and by the MRP to the infiltration and usBief notorious Batistianos. in anti-Castre activitfés, Despite these: ‘warnings, nothing: #as done. to fekove these: people, ; pither did not Know what wo were self-senving. giving RAY to feel that we: were doing or that our purposes He specifically: reminded me of one 6f- the - Sented. concepts for. action, a. plan tor. fr Which gees back to RAY's relationship: with futil}o. to preseh® Us with any:.i we have nevor helped, have #lwa Stamm nee we 2d Rages am ee ata
peertee ’ (JURE) would proceed day after day, and mon SECRET 3. RAY told me that he felt it possible to Speak in a completely frank manner with me. I urged him to do so, stressing that only in such an atmosphere was there any hope of our eventually arriving at some constructive understanding, I attempted to assure RAY that our motives were never Sinister, that every action we have ever taken was based on a need to use Cuba. He replied that he believed that this might be an honest Statement on my Part, but that I could not speak for the past actions of certain individuals. At this point I told him that bse had many friends in our Agency as well as in the U.S. Government, but that naturally there were people who believed him to be too far to the left. I also Stressed that our assistance to anyone could not be a On€-way street, and I reminded him that I made the same point to him in our first meeting almost a year ago. I pointed out that we naturally work best with those who cooperate, f told him of our need for intelligence, not with any desire to snow all the secrets of his organization and its political Plans, but with the end of gaining that knowledge which could help in more quickly restoring freedom and democracy to Cuba. Toward the end of this phase of our discussion, I askec RAY if he would be willing to give us the intelligence product of his activities inside Cuba if we were, in turn, to give him certain material support, His reply was an emphatic yes, En eee I PHAE LS yes 4. The Present Plans of the JURE: I asked RAY what he &@ pos ve nature Inside Cuba today. He told me that the major effort of the JURE at this time was the caching of resistance materials and Supplies inside Cuba. 1 commented that the caching of supplies implied the existence of individuals inside Cuba to recélve them. RAY did not respond to this comment, leading me to believe from Previous conversations that it would probably be some time before he is willing to trust us with the knowledge of his assets inside Cuba. Naturally I also concluded from the silence. and from remarks made later on that he does not, in fact, have a large organized resistance network inside Cuba. RAY went on to comment that with help or no help they th after month in a plan that they were certain would bring about a change in Cuba, ie stated that their path is sure, albeit, frought with pert) ifficulty ust certain. The “way” apparently is based: da these assumptions: j —&. Cuba is a “mess; #¢ will become facreasingly . ehaotic, eiteneting Ierger and larger: segments of. the : population. : -_ b. The JURE. is politically atid morwhly clean. It Kas : not compromised: iis principles. for any advantage, Ft ig, and will fncreasingly become acceptable as the heir to the revokution.
14-00000 copie from —~—, ors re aw tte d ~3- e. fhe JURE represents a group of men of unquestioned integrity, intelligence, organizational ahility, or general competence to run a free Cuba in the tradition of the revolution. d. The JURE has a sense of timing, the patience that must go with this, and an appreciation of the need to create a truly Cuba "mistique”™ in a movement to fight for the liberation of Cuba. (In this connection, it is important to note that RAY did not, and would not, expose himself to an effort against FRANQUI without some assurance of success. He stated openly that it would ill-—become him to associate himself with failure.) e. Place and ready for use, will have the personnel] ready. This was clearly implied but not actually stated. RAY stated that no purpose would be served, except to expose those who will assist them, by engaging in clandestine activities that do not have the necessary material and logistical support. a The JURE, when they have the logistical support in 5. While we covered various aspects of the above ground different angles and I reiterated again the fact that cooperation is a two-way street which RAY acknowledged in seemingly sincere tones; he was completely forthright in stating that whereas they needed assistance and would gladly take it, they passed to ask, for without it or not, have always been refused it and in essence the time has their role and goal are Clear and in one manner or another they will succeed. 6. Recommendation for Future Relations with RAY CJURE): a. RAY cannot be overlooked in the struggle for Cuban freedom; of all the Cubans I have- met, hé is the most purneseful, methodical, as wekl as: the most experienced clandestine operator. I think--he does Know a sure way of overthrowing. Fidel, but it will te’ a Tong, bard struggle _Without aid. - . Bb. For the U.S. or KUBARK ta: continue to pass up the _ Opportunity to. work with HAY may, prove: to _be at costly error in. gur Long: term relations with important political segments: of hatin America. in additio ; s0 hat wet Sum (perhaps. $5,0 maintain a steady: contact with: fo. 3. recommend: that we: aubsidize. SURE for. t oy telat te dbs
14-00000 i e ‘see - SORT one year. In return for our assistance, RAY is to provide ‘KUBARK with.all manner of intell-gence derived from JURE operations inside Cuba. d. The’assistance to RAY and coatact with him should produce enough informatioa to judge his true effectivenss and make possible his neutralization when and if this should become necessary. i 7. Conciusions: @. Because the cables sent in to Hqs beth from San : Juan and Paris are an accurate, if conadensed, version of. : sy relations with RAY in his operational efforts against” : Carlos FRANQUI, Enrique CABRERA Infante and Gustavo ARCOS, @ separate memorandum for the record will not be prepared unless 80 desired by the Chief, SAS. 3 i ? | j | 3 I { ' | b. RAY has known we as Alfredo Fernandez, but : because of operational limitations. (false identity : documents, reservations in true name) it became necessary for him to call me in my true name. He was not, however, told that this. latter name was in fact true. In all our personal meetings he continued to call me "Fernandez." 3 recognized and remembered having met : Growery~-P) in Cuba years ago. j . , } 6 | j So i hoe - _fifonso Rodriguez . of oe,