datamatters24/research-document-archive huggingface dataset:
a Gir ie hae " | HW 55073 -Docld: 32969530 Page 156 All United States governmental components have some individual internal responsibility. for the security of personnel, records, and physical facilities, Aside from these basic security functions, the overall counter~ intelligence role in the United States Government is shared by several specific intelligence agencies, The conduct of counterintelligence overseas is one of CIA's original functions flowing from the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and specifically spelled out and developed in a series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives, The FBI has the general responsibility for conduct of counterintelligence operations within the United States - based on statutory responsibilities (enforcement of espionage, sabotage, neutrality, registration acts, and related matters) 7 as well as a series of Presidential Directives and Attorney  -----} General orders, Success of United States counterintelligence is ee proportionate to the extent to which it exists as an .. ee integrated, unified concept with fullest coordination among . the separate agencies. It did not exist as such until Le World War II; and only small progress was made after that war, despite the National Security Act of 1947, An integrated system'first began to take shape in 1958, when the National Security Council moved directly into the = -problem, Intelligence and counterintelligence directives . which established the basic: ground rules were formulated and placed in effect, .As a result the United States has a “+ set of counterintelligence concepts and precepts that ee organize our experience and hold us together, Throughout the recent years interagency coordination and cooperation ~~ --- _have become a working reality, becoming more and more effective as the level of coordination continues to rise, The effectiveness of counterintelligence also’ requires recognition of its separateness as a function, In CIA and elsewhere, before the mid-1950s, counterintelligence -  ~—. was often identified only with security and the ad hoc a exchange of limited amounts of information in liaison, It was sometimes regarded as an adjunct to other specialities,
Fd z Docld: 32989530 Page 157 SEC usually espionage, This subordination degraded the function to its lowest level, to sueh necessary but elementary work as nametracing and operational bookkeeping, But these are only the elementary building blocks of the masonry of counterintelligence, If it is restricted to nothing more than that, American counterintelligence will inevitably degenerate to parochialism and departmentalism, It will not be responsive to a central and vital philosophy, It will tend to yield the initiative to’ the adversary and to the writing of damage reports after ‘we have been hurt instead of seeking the adversary out and engaging him before he can hurt us, In summary, the value of counterintelligence as an integral part of national defense requires a continuity of doctrine, an organization of experience, and must be sustained by a full-time, experienced cadre of specialists with continuing emphasis on interagency understanding and coordination, AF he net cn, ee ee ee en Remap ener comeewnmenete spe nee 6 re ee ee ne enema ee |
55073 Docld:32989530 Page 163 . a CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION ww I. The names of agents, informants, covert liaison contacts and . operations or other identifying characteristics | of sensitive clandestine sources " _ 6 a, Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them. b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counter-~ - -intelligence purposes. . ; ” ~-The numbers, locations, times and other indications of — recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organiza- - tions, * an ~~Specific statements of the use of technical devices in agent operations. ; ; . — # ~-'The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness against any given target organization or individual, or lack we! thereofk, . ; . cos 7 oe tee --Names of selected agency and/or ex-agency ernployees if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility. oo --Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role. . Loo Il Relationships with Other Intelligence Services a. Identifying information on 1 intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries. Classifiad by > 7 . Exot from gancre f EO. 11532, va. ow £3 (1), (47) Fe . me
~ e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and b. Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within a jointly targetted third country. eo ~ ‘ c. The nature of suppoxt provided, or arrangements with foreign ‘intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations. d. Material and information provided to the US by | a foreign service under conditions of continued secrecy. |: . ° . > we Iii. Cxyptologic and Communications Activities _a Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material. _b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations. ‘ce. Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices in the U.S, and abroad, : d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations _ OL fusciyners or foreign facilities (U.S, and abroad). unfriendly targets in the U.S. and abroad. f. Covert signals intelligence collection including (1) assistance arrangements with commercial U.S. and foreign companies (2) taps (3) and from US installations abroad. g- Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved. , h. Protective communications security measures. i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions ; especially critical to our work in ASW. ~ IV. Technical Intelligence a. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity. 55073 Docld:32969530 Page Ime
b. Details of specific covert communications systems, including " secret writing, special agent equipment, etc. c. Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country, d. "[dentification of technical counter- measures techniques. e. Characterization of emplacement of ‘devices for technical ; collection of foreign intelligence, incliding techniques of emplacement, £. Details of secure U.S. communications systems. . V.. Other oo . . i ‘ set . - o° . ~ a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass _ the U.S. Government or frustrate the purpose of the operation. . me, b. Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and -foreign banks, investment houses, etc. , in support of foreign intelligence operations. ; . c. Specific information on special relationships with private firms - _ established-with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged . customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations. d. Names of firms collaborating with U.S. intelligence agencies _ ‘in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles). . wot le +. e. Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and covert tax arrangements. ee ; f£. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations 8 against foreign intelligence targets. , . g. The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRG diplomatic or military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our intelligence on military technologies of these nations. | HW [55073 Docld:32989530 Page 165 - 77 iL eeennneee
fi eather butettent nbd it ; AW 55073 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee This Committee's inguiry and its conclusions and recom- ' mendations can open a new era in American intelligence and even in the intelligence profession worldwide. Historically, the intelligence activities of a state have been considered an essential function, but one conducted outside normal Gov- ernment processes. Indeed, one foreign official recently expressed some surprise to me that our intelligence rests upon legislation enacted by the Congress and is subject to oversight and annual appropriation by the Congress. He com- mented that he had always considered it a watter private ‘0 the Executive. This Committee's charter demonstrates the contrary in America. America has made many innovations in the intelligence _ process, and I believe we have brought ours to the highest peak of efficiency of any intelligence service in the world. Our Government's policies can now be based on factual in- formation and demonstrable analysis rather than on hunches, circumstantial evidence, and overly qualified judgments that alone were available afew years ago. With the assistance of my Intelligence Community col- leagues, I hope to give this Committee the broadest possible look at these intelligence efforts of the United States. Hrnoei é - ALLER TO CONTAINED . TaN YRC Sp 2 bm rags GR -I/OS9S8 - Bo / . Docld: 32989530 Page 166
is l. ° ! 55073 e ry I will also offer ideas for improvements that could help us do our job”better. It is important that our intelligence activities be viewed in proper perspective and that the few instances of failure or error that may have occurred in the past be understood in context. | We will welcome clear statements of the authority and mission assigned to American intelligence. I believe the public, including those engaged in the intelligence profession, are entitled to and are prepared to accept clarifications and new definitions. The Congress and the American people do not expect intelligence to be carried on in the shadows of euphemism and ambiguity. Nor can we operate effectively without more precise provisions in the law to protect our secrets. I believe our nation is ready to accept the nec- essity of reasonable secrecy in our intelligence operations in the same way it accepts the need for secrecy in diplomatic negotiations, in development of war plans, or in protecting newspaper sources. ne I. The Importance of Intelligence Mr. Chairman, American intelligence helps protect our country, it helps maintain peace in the world, and it helps our Government make better decisions affecting the welfare - of every one of our citizens. It is not only responsible Docld: 32989530 Page 167
HW 55073 ® @ 7 for warning us of imminent attack by a hostile power, these days it must also look into the future and warn of the research and development of new weapons systems which, unless countered or negotiated away, would affect the security of our citizens ten years hence. ° ‘ ' : Perhaps the most dramatic example of the contribution of intelligence to our security occurred in 1962 in the Cuban Missile Crisis. But this story began long before in the secret development of the U-2 aircraft to give-us access to areas where we had always been blinded. Its flight over Cuba on October 14, 1962, provided the first certain evidence of the deployment of offensive missiles there, but intelligence during that crisis involved far more than the U-2. Through the entire apparatus of intelligence, a close watch was main- tained over all the ways in which our national security might ‘have been jeopardized, and it was precisely this centralized analysis of thousands of individual bits of information that provided our Government with reasoned assessments and estimates during the critical days of October 1962. These assessments drew on all types of, technical, diplomatic, and “a” military intelligence, and they were substantially assisted by the contribution made by at. least one foreign agent who paid for his commitment with his life. BDocld: 32989530 Page 166
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community has not been idle since the development of the U-2, and the improvements that have been made have added a new dimension to the importance of intelligence today--its contribution to the maintenance 7 : | of peace in the world. ! As I believe is well known, the breakthrough in the Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations followed the development of our j ability to monitor whether or not the other side is complying with the agreements made. To do so with respeét to closed and suspicious societies, intelligence has had to invest hundreds of millions of dollars and heavy doses of imagination and technical genius. We have not yet convinced all the nations that might pose a threat to us that our system of openness is the best for them as well as for us, so we must depend upon our intel- ligence to give us the means with which to negotiate with them and, at least, to limit, if not eliminate, the risks we both run in today's world. The peace-keeping role of intelligence goes beyond strategic j arms. There are a number of, situations in which our knowledge of some local situation, around the world was better than that of the participants. By bringing this knowledge to both sides, or to the one about to make a mistaken military move, intel- ligence has several times assisted in defusing a potential e eee ere rvee eels eet ome binean ween mF wee i WW 55073) Docld:32969530 Page 169
terra oh ee! mere em: ms Bice dee men eR en em . crisis and thus disproving our own predictions. This is a contribution of which we are proud, for our purpose is not merely to record facts pertaining to foreign situations but to help maintain security and peace as well. | Intelligence likewise contributes to our internal secu- rity. The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate ovr society and to manipulate our citizens are well documented. There are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence operatives in this country seeking information about the United States and its plans, and their efforts must be met by &. Within th States, this is the function of the Federal Bureau of invest- igation. Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the foreign agent before he arrives in America or to learn of the plans of foreign groups to try to subvert our institutions. To this traditional danger has been added a new threat of international terrorism. CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic intelligence activities have collaborated to frustrate several plans to bring to America and its citizens the kind of hijack- ing and indiscriminate rervérist bombings that characterize too many areas of the world. Intelligence has also contributed to the identification of international narcotics traffickers, reducing the threat this pernicious activity poses to the health of our citizens. HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 170
Major political and economic decisions are regularly made by our Government and by our Congress with assistance from our intelligence. These decisions range from the appropriate level of our defense budget to economic and monetary policy. In the past several years the Intelligence Community--CIA, and parts of State, and Treasury in particular--has paid considerable attention to international economics and related political issues. The interdependence of the world with respect to energy, food, raw. materials, and service industries is-increasing at avery rapid rate. The accompanying shifts in economic power and control can require future adjustments of grave importance to our country. American intelligence keeps watch on such foreign activities. Stated another way, it is becoming as important to our national security to watch the machinations of foreign cartel arrangements as to follow Soviet or Chinese missile development. Intelligence is critical to our coun- try's economic negotiations and we are contributing materially. Mr. Chairman, I indicated at the outset the importance of this Committee's getting a full appreciation for the con- tribution intelligence is making to our country. But foremost in this process is the Intelligence Community's reputation for : objectivity in our intelligence assessments. We do not claim that intelligence analysis provides a scientific procedure for ° reaching decisions. We do feel it provides an essential ¢ + t om Bow 6 , H . 0 Td: 329895350 Page Avil
F,gneeearmnescie meee eae _ ) | HW 55073 © e ‘mechanism for giving visibility to the issues for the policy- maker. Our job is to provide an independent and objective analysis based upon a wide range of confidential sources and technical inputs. The organization of the Intelligence Com-~ munity is designed to provide this independence and objectivity. Tt. The American Intelligence Process Mr. Chairman, r would like to cover briefly the American intelligence process, as I believe it is grossly misunderstood by many quarters who associate it almost exclusively with the spectacular images of James Bond, Mata Hari, or even Maxwell Smart. American intelligence is first and foremost an i -Lectual.exercise that encompasses the following steps: 1. The collection and assembly of raw informa- tion from all sources available to the U.S. Govern- ment, ranging from overt news dispatches to data from the most secret technical devices or agents; 2. The assessment of the validity of the raw information; 3. The analysis of the.information and the development of objective conclusions and judg- ments; and no 4. The presentation of the findings to policy makers in a clear, succinct, and timely fashion. Doclda: 32989530 Page 17?
HW 55073 The collection process involves acquiring open informa~ tion wherever this is possible. This information largely comes from abroad but also here in the United States from knowledge- able citizens and Government officers whose missions are well understood and accepted in international life, such as Foreign Service Officers, Defense, Treasury, and even Commercial and Agricultural Attaches. To this is added the information col- lected by technical means. Today these give us access to areas never before seen. Electronic marvels identify details we never hoped to know, and computers select and store masses af detail never before manageable. These ways to collect are supplemented by clandestine collection for those matters and in those societies where open or technical collection cannot provide the secret war plans, the research idea before it is visible, or a perception of authoritarian political dynamics. After the material is collected, it must be processed or analyzed. Again the electronic and computer worlds have added new dimensions to our potential to extract valuable information from hitherto incomprehensible indicators, al- though, alas, the computer“has also increased the incompre- hensibility of some of the systems we try to identify. Doclda: 327989530 Page 173
HW 55073 DBocld:329899530 Page 174 The analytical process is the smallest of our categories of expenditure, but upon the integrity, the objectivity, and the expertise of this body of men and women rests the real fruit of the whole process~~reasoned assessments of develop- ments abroad today and in the future. An essential element of the process is the presentation of intelligence to ‘those who make the decisions for our nation. In our society this is not restricted to the Executive but also includes the Congress and the public. Asa consequence, intel- ligence has endeavored to bring its product to the Congress and even to the public through unclassified publications where possible, through classified testimony in executive session that is later reviewed so we can release all information that does not reveal our sources and methods, and through informal discussion with journalists and the academic communi ty where conclusions “can be debated but sources omitted. * In addition, the Department of Defense has regularly made available the results of the intelligence process, the best example perhaps being the way we followed in the news media the development and testing-of tthe generation of Soviet missiles now being deployed. When such material is consciously released, it can be done in a form that allows the Congress and the public
| HW 545073 n enn ‘ @  ) ae 4 to benefit from the conclusions and assessments involved but still protects the sources and methods by which we reach them. Unfortunately, their revelation by individuals without author- ization can result in the exposure of the source or technique by which we learn the information. - : Mr. Chairman, the National Security Act of 1947 was the foundation stone for this American intelligence process. At that time, intelligence was deemed by our country to be a mat- ter which should be protected from public exposure. Thus, the specifics of the intelligence process and its authorities were deliberately expressed in general language and left by that statute to be specified in classified directives by the National Security Council. The CIA Act of 1949 further rec- ognized the importance of this secrecy to intelligence and specifically exempted the CIA from the publication of the "organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, ‘or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. The intelligence roles of the other members of the Intelligence Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and in part from separate legislation, such as that charging the wh whey % on -_ . FBI with responsibility for internal security, the AEC, now ERDA, with its security authorities, and other laws such as Public Law 86-36, which provides the National Security Agency the authority to function without disclosing -10- Doclda: 32989530 Page 175 ~ . . - . . teers
HW 545073 ® — @ information that would endanger its cryptologic functions. All intelligence elements operate within legal authority. All are given further direction by the National Security Council. Those Acts, however, were not the end of Congress' role with respect to intelligence. Intelligence Operates on an- nual appropriations, it reports to a variety of Congressional committees, and the.Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence are appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate after hearings which, in the cases of General Walters” and me, included open sessions. Congress long ago made special arrangements to handle oversight and appropriations for intelligence. The consistent position of the Executive Branch in this regard has been that it would respond to any way in which the Congress organized. itself to conduct this oversight and appropriations process. To this, as indicated earlier, I add my own concern that this process be conducted in a manner that preserves the secrecy upon which intelligence must rest. In tune with the times, we have in more recent years, ~ and not just in my Directorship, become increasingly re- sponsive to Congress both in executive session and in open session. For example, in 1974, I appeared before thirteen committees or subcommittees on twenty-five occasions. -1- e Docld: 32989530 Page 176