JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY:  SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10127 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER: = 07-M-33 _ Document Information ORIGINATOR: = SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 03/12/1976 PAGES: 111 { SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY COMMITTEE BUSINESS DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: — 1B; IC CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 03/22/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 324 v9.1 Docld: 32423515 Page 1 Date: 7/7/2015
Date 8/07/95 Page :. ro JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10127 RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE : 07-M-33 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO : -TITLE : DATE : 03/12/76 PAGES : 111 SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY COMMITTEE BUSINESS TRANSCRIPT DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION ;: TOP SECRET ' RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 324 (R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Docld: 32423515 Page 2?
? : - . - + : t __ Senate: Select: Committee»'to: Study: Governmenta . Respect™to. Intellig “WASHINGTON; D. G::2 L... (202) 644-6000 Docld: 32423515 Page 3
4ARD/smnl 10 11 12. 14 1s 16 1? 18 19 20 21 - 92 25 24 25 13 TOP SECRET FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING Friday, March 12, 1976 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. ‘The Committee met, pursuant to ‘recéss, at 2:25 o'clock . p.m., in Room S407, the capitol, Senator Walter D.- Huddleston (Chairman of the Sabcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding) , Hart of Colorado and Mathias. Staff: William G. Miller, Staff Director; and David Aaron, Elliot Maxwell, Ric, Inderfurth, Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Al Quanbeck, Elizabeth Culbreath and Bob Kelley, Professional Staff Members. TAR erent DocId:32423515 Page 4
10 ll 12 14 155 16 1? 18 19 20 21 ee ks ' 24 25 13 to add to that, this is the problem of a lot of raw intelli- D. C. and Langley, Virginia, just don't seem rational, and it is in the hope that people will be rational and so forth. TOP SECRET i PROCEEDINGS Senator Huddleston. The Committee will come to order. Shall we go to 41(c). directly? Mr; Aaron. I don't see why not. 1 think the rest of it is pretty much accepted. | ‘Senator Huddleston. Why is this in brackets? Is there a question of whether or not this’ is a conclusion or whether it will be included in here? | | Mr. Aaron. It's whether it ought to be included “as an. example of these two things. | | I. guess I will state my view. Mr. Miller. 41(c)? | Mr. Aaron. 41(c). Mr. Kirbow. About half way down, where it starts, "The. Intelligence Committee staff" -- Mr. Aaron. My only point for including it is to try to make vivid the problem which is described, you know, in just plain general language in the few sentences preceding, and gence suddenly impact on analysts, as well as the other problem, which is that there is this difficulty of trying to predict, essentially, acts which’ from. the standpoint of. Washingto! I think there is some exception to that, because the term, TAR CEeCRET - Docld:32423515 Page 5
TOOP SECRET 1 || which is not mine but which is in the quote from the post ‘\ 2 mortem, uses the term "bias," and that may have a perjorative 5 quality to it. But the reason it is included is to simply poin 4 out that it is just an awfully hard problem to, -you know, use 5 “a rational. system and to be rational men trying to deal with 6 jl a situation which, from our standpoints, are not rational. ? . Senator Huddleston. Both of these instances - have been ~ «8 listed in the press, have they not, as intelligence failures? @9 Mr. Miller. By Pike. : a 10 | Mr. Aaron. The Pike committee has charged they were. The 11 community's own post mortem staff has viewed them from that 12. standpoint. | - : \ 7 13) . I am not trying to put the Committee on record as agreeing| l4 that they are failures, particularly, although I don't think 15 there is much difference of opinion in the Community as to 16 whether failure to foresee the Cyprus coup as opposed to some Wy of the things that happened after it, was a kind of failure, 18 because the situation there was - ‘that they had in fact | 19 predicted that | if certain things took place, you know, Ionides 20 || became head of the Greek junta; if Makarios moved against the 51 ‘Greek officers in the National Guard, that really there was 22 - a very good chance that there would be a-coup. 93 | | Mr. Kirbow. Wasn't all of that furnished by the oo” 24 analysts in the community to the highest. policy levels of ; the 25 government? —_ | | | | TAP Creeper Docld: 32423515 Page 6