| MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD | oe SUBJECT: Preliminary Debriefing Report on AMPANIC-7 . “© Activities in Cuba . oe - 4: ‘The substance of this preliminary report covers debriefing sessions ~ “4 held with AMPANIC-7 from 7 through 15 Novenber 1960. Both Mr. Pekich and the- undersigned participated in these debriefing periods. . The pertinent aspects o ase debriefing sessions are summarized into four specific categories: . a. AMPANIC-7's operational activities in Cuba from his-initial. - arrival in Cuba 5 August until his departure 5 November 1960. Te b. Internal assets developed in. Cuba for future operational, a c. Problems encountered by A-7 while operating in Cuba. é. Projected future assignment in Cuba. 2, Mr. Jemes Pekich, who was AMPANIC-7's case officer during his initial oy training in Washington,. wes contacted by phone from Miami by subject on . | 7 November. Subject reported that he had arrived in the U. S. by boat 5. ov. - and was plaming to leave that efternoon by plane for Washington.” A room was pooked at the Washington Hotel in anticipation of A-7's arrival thet evening. At approximately 1800 hours, A-7 called Mr. Pekich on the agent phone from. the Washington airport to announce his arrival and was directed to go to the hotel, where subject was ‘subsequently contacted by Hr. Pekich and the undersigned. 3, Upon contacting A-7 at the hotel, it was clearly evident that he was — in a highly emotional state which vartly stems from his recent escape From - aa Ww al Cuca. In his initial emotional outburst, A-7 stated that we had not lived up . _to our commitments to sul mort his activities in Cuba; that he didn't like the y 1 sdea of considering himself? as’ being expendable; that he was not. sure vhy we head no intentions to support his a ; wr . sent him to Cuba in the first piace if we : ~{ felt ve. let him down com- activities inside the cowitry. In short, A pletely and that he was fortunate in escaping. without losing his life. Aeter Me. Pekich succeeded ‘fh quieting down A-7 following this initiel .._ ' ‘outburst, A-7 was. first asked to describe how he managed to get out of Cuba without utilizing our channels to effect ‘this exfiltration. re
14-00000 ae ‘Boome story” to his Hava contact (AT : . precarious and. ‘that. he must get out of Cuba as.soon as possi, ible. Ace . ‘. .cording to A-7 his Agency. contact was unable to provide any definite . oT stat bed that on 438" October he had sent an urgent 3 nessege | ~L)Jinforming him thet his situation was assurance that his departure from Cube. could be. expedited. He. then attempted to lay on unilater: 2. to this end with first | his operational contact, and later his mother-in- lew introduced A-7 to a @ ps chiatrist jin Hevana, who offered. to assist him in getting out of Cu Ore the tourse of the | next,te -7's plans to get out of Cuba ‘began ‘to take shape, , after troduced him. a plastic O68 surgeon oo. Hovenber a negro drovesgto A-T's safehouse and took him té—ms—owrnouse hth Street 25pin Marianeo. ' On the morning. of 2 November at 1100 hours, ved at the Negro's house and told A-7 that he pianned Léavefor Key West Florida 5 November and would arrange to smggle A-7 out of Cuba by . hiding him in the motor room of his yacht. Arrangements were made - between the principals for A-7 to visit the yacht 4 November to in- ‘spect his proposed hiding plate on the yacht. In the interim period, A-7 stated that he began to suspect that he may have fallen into a trap and told the Negro that he was returning to the U. S. to bring Tony VARONA back with him ito Cuba.’ 4-7 felt this was a good girmick: to use in the. event came wm to turn him over to the G-2, 66 After inspecting his place on the yacht, A-7 told es. didn't like the idea of hiding in the motor room and suggést at - he Swim out to the boat, where he could. be ab sea. ‘That night (4 November) A-7 stayed at the home o he had a ‘ house close to the beach at Santa Meria del aboOWEs 2) Kilometers, from Havana. On 5 Hovember at ‘06 30 hours y A-7 began in rough, choppy waters and was finally sighted by dy yacht, here he was taken on board the vessel. . _(A-7 Staces That 1e was. completely exhausted when he was picked up by the vessel). of | teeth Csonzay) \ pilot bed by} eached Key OFridé 5 Hovember at Wi45 hours.—aA=7 managed to slip avay during the refueling of the yacht before the custom officials arrived and imuediately took off for Miami. Upon reaching Miami, A-7 went directly to his wife’ - home. reunion with his family. in query~. ing A-7 further on a to leave Cuba without any tacles pla th by the G0%, A-7 stated that ~ J told -him that he rebeived official approval for no) trip: - Oo re @ stolen vessel from his yacht club, (Casino Espanol)) ee Havana, which was bei him by American authorities iff _ ey West. Moreover, old AT that he Plenned to leave ‘the me
SS (Grortn about ies -000) in Key Est, Florida, which he ho ed to pat for-sale at. some. future date.. (It would appear. Sees afraid , that all such vessels: as-his would subsequently be nationaliz y the Castro- egime.) Prior to his return to Cuba anned to stay at the West (Drive Harbor Island) Miami - Tel: @ xs) .. kh, ‘EPforts.to debrief A-7-on his- operational ‘activities in Cuba were “ ‘Somewhat futile ‘in this initial meeting in view of his unsettled: emotional ‘state. His primary concern appeared to be his wife and his rather strained: relationship with his in-laws, who were now residing in Miami. In this con- nection, it should be pointed out that this emotional state appeared to stem, . ., in part, from his inherent suspicions that his wife (22 years of age and rel- - . ra ‘atively attractive) was being unfaithful to him. All indications are, however, “4 that A-7 has no real basis for these suspicions; other than those conjured up in his own mind. In any case, he requested if it might not be possible to wire- tap. his wife's house in Miami, so. that -he could have daily reports on her activi- ties. While no prémises were made, A-7 was assured we would attempt to look ~~ into this possibility, once we had more definite information tat there were _ some grounds for his suspicions. (Note: Subsequent discussions vith Security . office revealed that a wire-tap of A-7's house was a major project. in itself ‘and impossible to accomplish at this time without tieing up considerable personnel. ) A-7 was later. told this after we assured him that his Suspicions were groundless | where. his wife. was concerned. ° 5. Following. this initial meeting with A~T, it was apparent to both - bo. Mr. Pekich and the undersigned that: time would be needed to restore agent's . confidence in our capability to support his efforts in any future projected assignment in the field. Moreover, A-7's emotional state, which appears to stem from his problems with his in-laws and his concern about leaving his wife | alone, must be fully resolved before attempting to dispatch him egain. ; = 6..' In later debriefing session held from 8 to 15 November with A-7 ; : eonsiderabl e more light was thrown on the nature and scope of his operational activities in Cuba. As previously indicated in: paragraph 1 of this report, A-7's activities are summarized as follows: =. | ‘Be AMPANTC-T Operational Activities in Cuba: In line with his projected mission to organize resistance groups in Havana and Pinar del Rio for mounting sabotage operations against _ . key key target installations and assasination of prominent Cuban Communist members in the Castro entourage, A-7 appears to have made some ome progress in this direction from the time he arrived in Cuba in early August 1960, .to his subsequent exfiltration 5 November. Upon arri in Hevana, A-7 began a series of meetings with leaders of the OA, Triple-A and MDC ; with a view to establishing some degree of rapport in the furtherance 2 of his own_personal objéctives. It is significant to note that.in —- \ a period of approximately 5 weeks, A~7 made contact with. over ho indi- _ viduals, who represented various anti-Castro groups operating in the Havana and Pinar del Rio areas. A-7. frankly admitted that he had spread himself out too thin in this mespect and that, in many cases he should -
ce ) “"- have employed cut-outs instead of attempting to contact certain dndividuals himself. AMPANIC~5| Individual meetings were also held by A-7 with 7 a AMRUEG-1 with a view to establishing some degreé of rapport and coordination of activities in the area. ..In this connection, A-7 cleims he turned over a number of his assets. ever to AMPANIC-5, prior to his movement to the ESCAMBRAY, where he was subsequently. picked up by G-2. ‘>. Internal Assets Developed in cuba for Future - Operational Use: mn attempting to sift out specific assets developed by A-T during aa PS - his activities in Havana, three of the more prominent individuals with whom AT wes in direct contact should -be listed. - . : oS ob owner | of the ato Sverd)and uto-Centro) . A-T us or pla the . selection of suitable LZ's aii DZ°S in both Pinar del Rio and Oriente provinces, location of safehouses in Havana and _ use of his garages for storage of arms and military equipment which A~-7 anticipated would be dispatched - ‘to hin, — - (2) 2 lewyer by profession, who has unlimite ‘eontacts in Pinar déI Rio and who was working close RDO} A-7 to form a guerrilla group in the Sierra de los Organos%9 (NARDO also selected to handle the propaganda for the "Cuba Libre" group ‘being organized by A-7 inside Cuba. e o Cuban national. who had served git. in the Escanbrays against Patis laimea he had a. force of 150 men at his disposal and was planning to use them in a guerrilla action against Castro ' forces in the Pinar del Rio area. Moreover, once proper materiel support in the form of arms and other military equipment was made - available to him by A-7, he felt he could marshal over a thousand men in this area. (4) In addition to the? (mown to him a: Love assets, A- rendered him considérable assistance In moving sécurely about ia in the course of his operational contacts. In the case of AMERE gare A-7 highly praised his abilities as a highly capable Case Officer, and he feared for his personal safety. He suggested that AMCRE. fr 1o| should be brought back to the U.S. for a rest period, ‘before G-2 _ picked him up. . & , ne _ (5) Finally, ANPUG-1 who was trained in sabotage techniques in the U.S. and was later assigned to A-7, was listed by A-7 as an asset, . who could be channeléa@into more specific operations, once available materiel was forthcoming. He felt, however,.that he and AMPUG-1 _ were at considerable odds on’ certain aspects of. conducting operatiox
14-00000 tia 25 in Havana, but felt he could resolve these aitterenices' “upon ‘his own return. Tw . Some of the more ‘significant problems encountered by AT a during the | course of his operations in Havens are as follows: (2) “Security: Tn this connection, A-T stated that despite = the disguise given him, he had to be constantly on the alert . from the danger of being picked up by G-2 or Castro police — during the course of his numerous operational contacts. He ' sited several examples where he believed he was under sur- - ‘veillance by the opposition and subsequently succeeded in alilud- ing this surveillence, He complained that bis disguise, (hair- piece: and mustache) rapidly deteriorated in the Havana climate _and as a consequence he was forced to abandon “this disguise tows: the latter part of his stay in Havana. Similarly, he was forced ‘to change his quarters continually, by moving from one safehouse to another as a security precaution, since he felt that it.was generally known in Cuban circles that he was operating in the Havana area, and that he was. probably already under the sur~- . veillance of Castro. security forces. , yo (2). Materiel Support: In the course of thése acbriefing - sessions, one of A-7's chief complaints was thet despite his urgent messages sent through his cut-out’ ‘Unni to the Statio that arms and other military equipment were sorely needed by' his groups in Havana and Pinar del Rio, no action was taken to implement his requests. As a result, A-7 felt he was losing fac with his followers and this was one of the primary factors for . returning to the States to discuss this aspect with Headquarters (3) Need for Direct Communication: A-T stated that without the - services of a W/T operator who could be in direct commmication with us, he is fully convinced that any subsequent return to Cus in an operational capacity would be ineffectual. Hence, this: would be one of the conditions laid on us.that when he returned, a W/f operator would be essigned to him personally. 7. Projected Future Assignment of A-7 in Cuba: Predicated on the assum tion thet A-7 will be sent back to Cuba.in the relatively near future, -botn Mssrs. Peki es feel that his most significant contribution can be made in the Pinar del Rio area, where he appears to have known assets in. the hills. This, however, does not preclude A-7 from also operating in Havana in _ developing sabatoge operations with AMPUG-1, whom we assume will cooperate _ with A-7 despite their differences in how these operations should be conducte Moreover, should the AMYUM complex decide to move into other provinces of Cuba where military action is to take place, A-7 would appear to be the logic .
14-00000 ede oes “choice in taking over the operations in this area ‘against ¢ Castro: ‘targets.’ : In eny case, a decision has been reached that A-7 should not ‘be’ dispatched ae without a trained w/t operator who can be relied on ‘to work elosely on: operations with A~7 inside the country. a 8. ‘Case Officer Comments : Despite AT's. tendencies. to ‘operate: on: a grandiose scale, his disappointment in the lack of support received on his initial mission to Cuba; and his display of emotional instability at times, — it is believed that his efforts can be properly channeled to work effectively for us in Cuba. His motivation appears to stem from his personal. anbitions - -to make his mark on this counter-revolution against Castro, where he can . assure himself of a priminent position in the future government: to be formed in Cuba efter the overthrow of the Castro regime. A-7 has imagination and. . the will to succeed. His weakness is his inability to hide his personal .. embitions from others who may work with him and.who may have altogether dit- Regis ferent motivations and sense of values. Hence, it is believed that A-7 . es xo will encounter problems in handling pede recruited or assigned to. him in ‘the course of his activities inside the’ country. AMPUG-~1 can be sited as a good example, where a clash of personalities has apparently ‘already taken place. In view of this, A-7 will have to be dealt with firmly and mst be convinced that the success or failure of his projected mission will depend | on his ability to develop confidence and loyalty among his followers once hé is inside the country again. Similarly, A-7 must resolve his personal proble dealing with his-wife and in-laws, which has had an adverse effect on hin personally since his return, and may affect his operations inside Cuba. . The next several weeks will, therefore, need be devoted to re-establish A-7's confidence in our ability to support his efforts in Cuba, once he is sent pack, and working out his family problems to obviate any adverse psycholo- gical effect which may be ‘detrimental to his operations i Cuba. JOR. [8 it PM ad