Doc ID: 6598243 Dist: HCF ST 300° | CI a WS 17544-17567 3/of _|12455-63 . o Pts, IS 17 Dec 22257 P EVALUATION OF JOHNSON, AND HIS “+s, 29 Nov 63. . . 2 = 0 ky sms ; Se ge [22-part message complete] a TAUSCOTOTENGOND) 7 bi) Tis KENNEDY 's murder and its causes’. a A. Since the announcement é the assassination,: there have been rumors in diplomatic circles, and in somé of the newspapers and radio broadcasts and various other quarters .about the facts and motives of the event and the . position ‘Of the Dallas sutbonities toward it, etc, J t Some are of the opinion that the crime was acvanged by some radical right-wingers who had‘been aroused by KENNEDY ' s policy which advocated éacial equality, by his position: toward some of the big industrial, forces, particularly steel, and by his strategy which [Part’2] called for a truce with the Soviets and for finding spheres’ of co-operation with them, Others'believe that the crime was set ‘up by the ‘radical Communists who oppose the policy of peaceful coexistence, .- ‘One faction of that [group} said that the crime was an individual: act committed by a fanatic or a deranged person, J . ; / a we Be The killing of OSWALD, who was accused of KENNEDY's murder, and the’ circumstances under which it was committed and the new suspicions it raised in and outside of America [I wd G] President JOHNSON (B val to instruct) the [Part 3] FBI and the Department of Justice to make a comprehensive investigation of the matter ,dnd not to be content with the investigations which were being’ made by the state in which the crime was ; a emir It was_ Ee 3 jo ymkss- 63 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 7 estan: | Released on 11-01-2017 under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2017 Note)
Doc ID: 6598243 [_ sro frots5-63, also reported today that the Senate J judiciary Committee would in turn request an investigation of the matter and also: discussion, o£ legislation ‘to make the murder of a President a federal crime which would noes Gadd under the legal jurisdiction. of any state, > C. te is “hoped that the coming toveskigettons will reveal the following ae Bel ‘ae Was’ OSWALD he’ ‘killer and what were his motives? If OSWALD was not the killer, who ‘committed the crime? Was it a conspiracy or an individual act? “Was it an American or an inter- national conspiracy? — al i The prevailing view among cizeles known fdr conser- vatism is that it is essentiai to make a meticulous and: public investigation to forestall rumors and in order to dispel unjustified suspicions, elevate the power (of the law and protect American honor in the eyes of the world and history. et . . F * Fauscz107 ene) IZ, The new President and his policy: (Part 5} (iii) ye The leaders of Congress from both parties and the top officials in the government and the press and radio worked energetically to prevent division and ccnfusion{(A)) life to normal, after it had almost come to a standstill, by supporting the new President and advocating unity and working for the future, In order to restore confidence and clarify matters, the President hastened to announce his domestic and foreign policy in a speech which he delivered to Congress in joint session, with the chiefs of the diplomatic missions and representatives of the international and American press also present. fPart 6] He announced that his foreign and domestic policy would be a continuation and implementation of the policy of his predecessor: A. From the international standpoint, he stated that he ~ supported the policy of seeking peace and exploring spheres of co-operation, even with antagonists, offering aid to emerging nations, bolstering the Western alliance and fulfilling America's obligations from South Viet Nam to Berlin, H& summarized his foreign
Doc ID: 6598243 & | | s/o }12455-63 policy by saying that America would be ready for peace or war, ' . ‘ B, From the domestic standpoint, he aiso aithered to . KENNEDY *s program and urged [Part 7 Congress to hasten to enact the racial equality bill, the tax reduction bill, the’ education law, etc, a . th ' ' wt aan ' Ms dae 1 ‘< . | This speech is the first official document’ hick, at least on the surface, reveals thit the new President will adhere to KENNEDY's foreign and domestic policy, The view which is current in some Western diplomatic circles is that the new ‘President is an expert in the metheds and. the directing of American partisan: policy and that he was extraordinary in his handling o£ the various currents in Congress; however j. [Part 8] he has net been sufficiently exper- Zenced in Screign affairs and he leans more toward thé conservatives than the liberais, Som of ‘these, ‘Gircles have also stated some apprehensions about him and have said that he is from ‘the re- caléttrant, conservative South and that his comection: with the oilmen in Texas is well known’ and that his long service in the Armed Forces Committee in the Senate has made him closely connected with the top men cf the armed . ‘forces, and these persons do not like KENNEDY 's policy which advocated trying. to reach an understanding with the Rii$Ssiens, Then » his fri endship-.with the American Ambassador in Bonn, [Part 9] Mr, MCGHEE, who: leans toward ADENAUER's views on Moscow, might make him more inclinéd toward a policy of toughness, ‘ not truce, with regard to the Communist Camp... Sore Britons "think it possible tht KRRUSHCHEV will have no confidence in him and that DE GAULLE may’. seize the. opportunity to activate his. plans in Europe, They, therefore, advocate that ritain take the initiative in playing a more prominent ‘role in the Western camp ‘in the directing of internationa 1 policy, : Névertheless, the prevailing view here at’. present-<if nothing happens to force him to change--is that he will ‘not change KENNEDY’s foreign policy [Part 10] nor in method and|___|to bive assurance, He, erefore, will retain most of KENNEDY ' s- advisers, the most important being his ‘number-one adviser in! ‘2aternational affairs, BUNDY. Since the new President has 2 propensity for domestic political affairs, they expect him-to, rely more ion the oF ee >} ¥ , re aT) 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D) b(iii)
Doc ID: 6598243 . | | | 3/0 |__)r2455-63 \\ = ~ ’ aa os ‘Secretary ef State, ff is well known that JOHNSON sspecially appreciates RUSK, \Poitt ical circles here also believe that [Pert 113 he will continue ‘the domestic policy of his predecessor, at léast until the presidential elections, It is, therefore, (B val supposed ) that he (B val Will 's eetain) most of his Cabinet and will enter the election campaign Yon vhe basis of KENNEDY's program, Also, they think it most likely chat JOHNSON will be the candidate“of the Democratic Party in the, coring presidential elections at the end: of next year, They think that the chances cf GOLDWATER, the right-wing Republican, have lessened and ‘that the Republicans might nominate |ROCKEFELLER or NIXON and that ° he tatter' s chances have’ » increased. ‘(Part 12] It is risky to \make any predictténs new about the! results of the coming rras {dential ‘campaign, Nevertheless, it appears that it will be between JOHNSON and a middlé~of-the-road Republican not a radical right-wingers, because the prevailing sentiment of public opinion is a demand’. t to repair the breach and aides the» “wound and to raise [to higher priority] the policy of reconciliatio atid interest in domestic affairs. fo Ny Some ox Peking's supporters ‘in North Viet Nam, jase and North Korea are reiterating that KENNEDY's murder reveals a victory of reactionary trends, Tt is to be noted that at present there is an increase in the activity of the Viet ‘Cong forces. in South Viet Nam. {Part 13] Also, the press of North Korea and the Pathet Lao in Laos have intensified their attack on Washington, They explain the position of Peking and its supporters that on the one hand, their view my be cepresented in [the statement]that the policy of the new President will be less flexible than that of his predecessor but, on the other and’, perhaps the attack is a Tans of . testing the’ | rigidity on. ‘the new American administration , ; ao Some ‘cizeles in Britain believe that JONNSON. is an astute politician who is skillfcl in figuring and evaluating anda con- servative who is practiced in conducting a policy obs, cone ul dation. [Part 14]. KHRUSHCHEV, on the surface, appears sympathetic but’. He hides 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D) (iii)
Doc ID: 6598243 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D) \WIr. The Embassv's observations: (ii) ' We My A. KENNEDY’s death has: created a new situation“in America and on the Luternational scene, the landmrks of which’: ‘are at present unclear. Therefore, it appears to us that the position which prevails : in Western and Eastern diplomtic citcles and in the neutral group ‘is one based on watchiulness and acting with extreme care and caution and attempting ts begin a careftl operation to disclose, on the “one hand, the reai leanings [Part 15] of the new administration\and its method of operati on and the forces which can influence it, witile working on the other hand to establish friendly, constructiv ra gelacions with it as far as possible, Be This has beeh, clear in the’ contacts of MIKOYAN in Washington and his statements about his government ’s desire to sontinue the policy of reaching an Asner standing and in the reports © of som Russian diplomats that ‘KHRUS HCHEV and JOHNSON must meet, etc. The same attitude is to be noted with the British, the French, the Yugoslavs, ete, {Part 16] / NO ZL a A C, Matters will refiain unclear as jong as the circum stances, motives and forces behind KENNEDY? s death remain undefined, Then, any basic surprise in this regard might have a longerange effect on domestic and external ‘conditions The present [situation] is that KENNEDY and his top aides, sensed the toughness, and (B val: despair) of the forces which opposed their liberal, realistic policy and therefore, had not concealed that from us, something which me had explained fully to the Ministry. CG. rete) Despite the obvious difference in ‘the personalities’ of KENNEDY and JOHNSON-the former was a blend [Part 17] of ideAlism, and realism, rare intelligence, broad knowledge ,/ deep understanding of the developments of history and the secrets of human psychology at its highest and lowest, loyalty to the welfare of the world and his country and of: courage and £1 idelity te the rule of reason and the bond of fri endship; also, he [1 wd G] drawing around him domestic and foreign policies while JOHNSON has more of an inclination and adherence than KENNEDY a5u
Doc ID: 6598243 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D) ror SEO TR | Ri. (iii) | | re ee | sof —fr2sss-63 - / to. the dconomic system haved on xee enterprise and, therefore, is smore inclined to the sight wing [Parc 183 and closer to the conservative policy and the past generation and further from the lage wing which is more intellectual and possesses long- range imagination and which KENNEDY had led--despite this,/it is [1 wd G] at present to make any predictions about the £inal ,course which the new President will follow, The prevailing view here is that there will be no basic change in KENNEDY's policy until the presidential elections ake held-the end of next year, Nevertheless, it depends on the development of events, {Part i9!, a N D. sin ons that KENNEDY’s policy will be continued apvear in the speech of \th ne new President tefore Congress, the statements of top officials here fn the State Department, ghe writings of top writers and the retention, so far, of che members of KENNEDY's cabinet and his top advisers and confidants in She White House, the State Repautaenk and other departments. -E, Then,’ the many complications domestically and exter- nally would make any minox, change particular ly:toward Mosgow, easy practically but dangerous reali isticalily, [Part 20] . ye Since it is likely that’ the new President will be less (B val able) to resist pressure than his predecessor and since, because of his long service in dofte stic politics, he may by nature be more prone to keep considerations of domestic politics in mind and to proceed in éonformity with their (B val requirements) and to endeavor to satisfy them and because his philosphy and his methods are different from thos ¢ of his predecessor, It would therefore be to our interest untii the presidential elections are held to follow a policy which would not expose him to pressure or embarrassment so as not to enablé eur enemies to draw hin (Part 21+ over to their side, This is the essence of the matter at present, It would appear that our oppénents -will: try at the first opportunity to complicate matters between us and the new administration by exploiting: the situation, in Yemen; or the Algerian-Moroccan dispute and our position toward it; or the Arab-Israeli dispute if they find a chance to raise it; etc, i. ‘In the light of the above paragraph, it would) appear to us oben
Doc ID: 6598243 | | | 3/0 (2455-63 at present chat. JOHNSON may continue the policy of his: ‘predecessor toward wee He may be encouraged to do that. by the: “[Part 22] positive results achieved by the policy of his predecessor in this regard and by. the supporters of this policy both in‘and outside’ the government; ‘the most important: being Secretary of State RUSK and FULBRIGHT, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a confidant. of JOHNSON. and one of the fist ones who supported him as a candidate for president in the 1960 electiuns. wf ((A)) Obvious omission. 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D) b(iii) ee