t F . ¢ a * a nn . . . . 4a a a a of . we SS - : ” ; : Pe ar : Summary of Contacts with oo P : AMNHIP/1 and AMLASH/1 a pb no a , 1. Events of 30 July 1962. | | | Sh : AMJHIP arrived in Helsinki on 30 July 1962. He called HEFINCH rare: ; : according to plan, and after his second call (due to his hotel porter's — : abysxmal understanding of English), Fallucci established contact with i AMsHIP without further difficulty. ‘the meeting took place in the ai E restaurant of his hotel, The yaakuna, and later in his room. We had | . : : not at this time located AMLASH, so the time was spent briefing AMAR IP : é on the local scene, and on his conduct with AMLASH when they met. The ; ; meeting lasted about one and a half hours. i r | z Later the same day we called AMWHIP at his hotel to report oO : ho progress in locating AMLASH. Feeling it advisable to keep AMWHIP : 3 occupied, we took him out to dinner at Fisketorpet, located in the . suburbs of Helsinki. The evening lasted until 1200, terminating with a ao . y drink at the roof bar of the Yaakuna. During the six hours, we had an F cpportunity to explain carefully to AMWHIP that in order for us to help his friend, AMLASH must be willing to follow our directions and agree to certain conditions (already agreed upon by interested Hgs. parties), BESS BASES Oe eres eet 1 AMWHIP realized that this wag necessary, and agreed with our ideas, However, & - - he ig attached to AMLASH, and will contime to look upon him in the most 2 * | | “ penevolent and subjective manner, This being rather far removed from our BY intended approach to, and opinion of AMLASH. AMWHIP will require handling y of a close nature in order that he ne MLY ia and is aware of our . togme ye
14-00000 wae EIU wo ot ORES Pept w USER Uz AER TARR gene tats it ore ee EOES PERE ey ADT NC, i se RT position in this matter. We closed the meeting by telling him that we would have an effort made in the morning to lecate AMLASH, and that he might as well relax, sight-see is he wished, and that we would te in touch ‘with him at intervals during the day. 2. Events of 31 July 1962, Our efforts to locate AMLASH through UNRUMBLE/2 proved to be fruitless. Theadore T. Wintergrst, who was handling UNRUMBLE/2, said that the latter tried his best, but had not been able to do us any good. The Station also reported that its contacts had been unable to aid us. We reported to AMWHIP the fact that we had not located AMLASH, and Suggested that we have dinner together, to which he agreed, We met AMWHIP at 2100 at our hotel, the Kamp, and proceeded to the Royal Restaurant for dinner. AMWHIP was obviously getting on pins and needles because we had not found his friend. He suggested that we call up the Cuban Festival delegation, or try some hotels that evening. We persuaded him that it was not the best idea yet, and to give other people more time to locate him. He agreed, but kept coming up with ideas all evening for ways to locate AMLASH. He suggested that AMLASH liked night clubs, and that after dinner we could perhaps try several. We agreed, more to placate him that with any thoughts of success. We tried several, the Bruunsparken and the Theater Grill, beth of which were filled with @rinking Finns, but no Signs of AMLASH. The Finns, engaging in their national pastime, obviously irritated AMWHIP, and after being pushed around in the Theater Grill for an hour, he said that -. he thought this was a waste of time. We agreed, grabbed a taxi and went home. During the evening, we told AMWHIP that tomorrow morning, if nothing ' had turned up, we would start by calling the better hotels in town ourselves, and try this rather laborious method to locate AMLASH. We agreed to meet cen SOUT Sere san speenpemrecpen Y eiadie fishes ot aoa beri: t pte ew Diemer tg ‘ nn ee ee apes RSE a deed eda oh atlintumtadl” - /comecab! aoe
4 lteghr oe yo. sees Fone ae BNA AAG Fatal ae igen en an Bn MONEE AE Pau aKa ene BH PE eDALERR PACS BOMBER REMED BASRA Se IPE Ieee RP te eg VT between 9 and 10 o'clock at our hotel. 3. Events of 1 August 1962. AMWHIP arrived at our hotel at 0945 on 1 August, and we retired to our room to telephone. Securing an outside line, our friend began . to telephone. We decided to try the local "pink" hotels first, the Klaas Xorkki, and the Torni. AMWHIP had no luck with the Klaas Korkki, but when he called the Torni, he was told that AMLASH was there, and was connected with room No. 201. A Spanish-speaking man (who was later identified as the newly appointed Cuban Diplomatic Representative to Finland) answered the phone in 201 and said that AMLASH was in the shower, and call back later if it was important. AMWHIP left a message that he was from Mexico and that he, "Carlos", would call back. During the break, we instructed him to be careful on the telephone, and to talk as if the opposition was listening. He was just to be casual, greet AMLASH, arrange to see hin, saying that he was in Europe on business in Scandinavia, France and Switzerland, and that hearing in Helsinki that AMLASH was attending the Festival, he had decided to stop over and contact him. When AMLASH answered the phone, _AMWHIP's face lit up, caution was abandoned, and he was off at a rapid rate in Spanish. AMLASH said that he would be right over to see AMWHIP in his room at the Yaakuna. We briefed AMWHIP once more on being careful, and showed AMWHIP to the door. We arranged to have AMNHIP call us when he could at the office, urging him once more to be careful and discreet. We hope he has been. It was later learned that finding AMLASH in this hotel room was pure good fortune, as he was just using this room to take a shower, since he was still residing in the quarters of the common delegates. + hate ate 1 RE OECA A A Cpl cated
ERECT FIR re cS AS LEAP ar RNS, CPT CD LY = = TOO RITE renee Le PTI Pr pION WI Gy Fae raed r - 1000 in the morning until approximately 1700 the same evening. When AM/HIP SSB REPO AEN ER oad tee tae tandem Taeethe ects eee oe ee eee @ Sauer eM bue re Lmetegorn geameper een pn te ie AMJHIP talked to AMLASH for at least seven hours, from about called us at 1730, he presented us with the fact that he had convinced AMLASH to talk with us, and for this purpose, he had arranged a dinner meeting that same evening for approximately 1930. We would have preferred , to talk longer with AMWHIP about AMLASH's reactions, but time did not permit. We arranged a dinner for 2100 at "The shite Lady", a restaurant some way from the center of town, and succeeded in obtaining a@ private dining room, a practice not uncommon in this Station-recommended restaurant, as it is often used by businessmen to have private dinners and afterwards, business discussions. We arrived at the White Lady first, arranged for the dinner, and . awaited AMWHIP and AMLASH, who arrived at 2110 by taxi. Although AMNHIP had suggested to us that the discussions should be merely devoted to getting acquainted the first evening, AMLASH commenced almost immediately into a discussion of his feelings and, his position concerning Cuba today. As reported in our cable, 1609) AMLASH was quite intense, and showed the strain of his unexpected meeting with AMWHIP. Although obviously _ under emotional strain, AMLASH presented his feelings in a relatively calm manner, and was given to discussing them throughout the meal. He said he was considering not going back to Cuba, but after talking to AMWHIP, he felt that if he could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the fight there. : He said he was not interested in risking his life for any small undertaking, : but that if he could be given a really large part to play, he would use ‘himself and several others in Cuba whom he could rely upon. ‘These he said \ &
rom. OP EEA TEN NRA SETI EO ANGE ty, mie COE te sence, et FREED SERBS LES PRE Seas sroncesaNb roi atsrbemt ne aon, ee" screenees + aan fn ee an included two majors (one of which AMVHIP later reported was a militia commander in the center part of the island) » two captains, and several others whom AMLASH said he could trust, but whom he would not name. AMLASH said he had had plans to blow up an oil refinery, as he felt that the continuing existence of a semblence of normal funeticning in Cuba depended upon a continuing supply of petroleum, supplies of thich, as we know, are at a critical stage today. He also wanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriguez and the Soviet Ambassador » 4nd also to eliminate Fidel, _ by execution if necessary. He feels that if Fidel is eliminated, it would be much easier to effect a take-over. (We listened for the most part, but at this point tried to explain to AMLASH that men like Rodriguez could easily be replaced by Moscow, and that the killing of the Soviet Ambassador, would have only the briefest effect on the Soviet control of Cuba.) AMLASH was not too interested in listening at this point, and contimied by saying that if he could achieve all these actions, plus others, in one master stroke, a take-over, during the ensuing confusion, would be mich facilitated. He did not feel that Raul or Che would be able to rally the people in sufficient time to prevent opposition forces fron forming. His arguments and plans had many flaws, but AMWHIP could not help admiring (to himself) AMLASH's professed desire for vigorous and, hepefully, effective actions, designed to alter the situation in no uncertain terms. While we were making no | committments or plans, we pointed out to AMLASH that schemes like he envisioned. certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, plarming, information- collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success ' of such plans. AMLASH said he agreed with this, but we weren't too sure just how much of this argument AMLASH was willing, or would be willing, to buy. 3 t : ee eee eee ; i
BP ALEI, ae, Wee aN Pie EE eeRIE NOLEN ETL MELTS ON IE, DP Rit YE AREER TI OLE ERIS IT PR PALER PLENTY REI ET Im NEAR EE TE ELTON EEE EIEEY GE RES: 00 te ROLE SATETY RE TY EES Lg - . ae fea, PRAEEEE et wees MES a G Stag be olga MERE a thee Seertunataee tet isite a gee ters . re eo 1 AMLASH made it clear during the discussions that he was completely against Fidel's use of Soviet help from the first, but he had never envisioned, that even if it were used, just how ineffective it really would be towards solving Cuba's problems. He still feels strongly, he said, about the plight of the lower classes in Cuba, and in any future Cuba, he would still insist on a new deal for them. AMLASH said that although he had not been effective in helping the formation of a beneficial new Government in Cuba, he was now prepared to work towards that. end. This time, he said, he wanted to look more towards the future, both for his own interests and for Cuba's. The last time, he said that he thought only as far as the elimination of Batista » and had not given consideration to planning for a government he favored after the fighting was over, We felt that AMLASH meant that he was as much concerned about his (AMLASH's) position in the government and personal stake in a new Cuba, as he was about anything else. It is our impression that AMLASH feels that he did not get his share of the spoils or power from the Castro regime, in proportion to his contribution against Batista. AMLASH is a complicated personality. It is difficult te fairly nnn . judge, at this time, AMLASH's degree of concern for a truly revolutionized Cuba for the people's benefit, vs his concern to see a new government in Cuba in which he gets just recognition. This does not necessarily mean that AMLASH wants high political office » but he does want credit for his efforts and the resultant power and prestige among his countrymen. In addition to his concern for the manner in which the Soviets are using Cuba for thelr own designs in Latin America, AMLASH is worried about . the extent to which Castro is using the Soviet technique of capturing the minds of the young people and the mass propaganda efforts against the masses. ules? ime 1 i t i
saree ERR SEIRR ESA tee torec ccc artreenptorm monumnpa causes TES By AAR APA ES I YA TATE Cote? Ly a ponents , } He feels certain that in a couple of years, the young people will be canpletely and irrevocably won over to Castro, and that the masses will begin to believe the intense anti-American, anti-West propaganda to which they are subjected. Just as great as are AMLASH's fears about the Castro's winning of young minds, is his concern thrt the USA will begin to consider a status guo for Cuba, and in the event of any intense and successful anti-rezime activity, such as he plans, and which looks as if it might depose the regime, PBPRIME will withdraw its Support from such efforts in the face of serious threats from the Soviets. Although AMLASH did not say it in so many words, it was apparent from the discussions that AMLASH would prefer to be able to free Cuba without any outside support (and by inference, obligations), but he is a realist enough to concede that any efforts to overthrow Castro must have the support of PBPRIME. He is, therefore, willing to enter into discussions with a representative (s) of PBPRIME towards this end. | AMLASH agreed to meet. in Paris for the purpose of further debriefings and to give any information in any field which he has. He is also most willing to discuss any plans which may lead to an overthrow of the present government. AMLASH stated many times, however, during the course of the meetings, that he was only interested in involving himself in a plan of significant action, and which was truly designed to achieve rapidly his desire to help Cuba. (He told AMWHIP later after we had left the meetings, that -he was afraid that PBPRIME would continue to pursue its present course, that of providing money. and ideas, but no ACTION!) AMLASH was also most adamant about not becoming involved in any way with the Cuban refugee circles and organizations in Miami. He. said that he feels these are still . the same people who left Cuba, i.e. » Willing to wait for the chance to return and again pursue their only interest , that of making money. He also said yt ten ate ae Serta Sern er een os
Ke gale ane edt aage Srey, Ft ARN eR TRU RA NOE Se SN Wspieen i ee, coe 9. RD ne cence ot nnanae aunaie renee. Seen Nee Reh 8 REALE ETH AAS OT RENN AP TSE MEP TOP ON W Beck ae eee reta caer ee tae td Pia he felt that the Cubans there were completely penetrated by Castro informants ’ and that for them te know of his cooperation with PBPRIME, would be the same as telling Castro, and thus his future would end against the Wall! We assured him that maximum Security would be practiced, as far as tiuese people: were camcerned. He also does not wish to trust or be involved with, any ; f ral i Lyte contract Cubans. Only re PBPRIMERS does he wish to deal. (Along this Line, | AMAHIP stated that he did not think it advisable to reveal any of these negotiations to AMCONCERT/1, whom AMWHIP has known for many years and is quite friendly, but whom he does not feel can keep a secret of this nature.) This meeting terminated at 6030 on 2 August. The three participants took a taxi together back to tow. AMWHIP and AMLASH stopped off at a local night club, Teatey) Grillen, while we continued on to our hotel. No incidents of a security nature were observed, and it was felt that the meeting was held without the knowledge or observation of the opposition. h. Meeting of 2 August 1962. We met with AMWHIP in his hotel room (No. 1h2 at the Vaakuna) at 1700 hours on 2 August. We discussed the events and talks of the preceding evening for some time, At approximately 1800, AMLASH arrived, greeted us affably, and joined us for a drink. AMLASH used this meeting to re. state his position concerning his desire for participation in a really significant action against the Castro regime. Having decided by this time that further discussions and debriefings of AMLASH should take place with a Spanish-speaking C/O, we outlined the idea to meet for such a purpose in Paris. AMLASH did not like the idea of too many people being aware of his cooperation with PBPRIME, but agreed that it would be best in order to an allow himself to express his ideas and plans better, and to be able to provide us with his information in the greatest possible detail.: 2 dee Aare 1S Serene ow. Te omeERAN.. a ‘ 4 f, eG SS te settee epee
. ESBS ranean ments en ne eNO kar ae OC ELMORE TN te ELMER TEER 5 A FEE ty renee Lae et 4 ee meg us “eet We persuaded AMWHIP and AMLASH that it would be best not to have further: meetings with them in Helsinki, but that we could continue our talks in greater safety in Stockholm and Paris. They agreed. AMLASH also said that he felt that he shouldn't sc2 AMWHIP too mich more in Helsinki, as he was beginning now to make some public appearances, and his presence was now established to everyone in the city. Incidentally, prior to Thursday, 2 August, AMLASH had purposely refrained from making any public appearances at the Festival because (1) he and the other Cubans had been aware of the AMSPELL group and their announced intentions, and (2) AMLASH did not feel very disposed to play the "Public Relations" man from Cuba and espouse the "peace and friendship nonsense", as he called it, However, AMLASH also said that he felt that he had better perform this role‘ to some extent, as it was expected of him by Fidel, and he did not wish to provide any unnecessary chances for unsatisfactory reports to be sat back home concerning his lack of cooperation with the Cuban delegation. In making the arrangements for @ Paris meeting and further discussions, AMLASH said, in response to the questim, that it would be quite normal for him to be in Paris, as he had already cleared this with Fidel, with whom, he remarked caustically, one had to clear everything these days. He then expressed the idea that he ' would like to return to Paris, via Stockholm, and at AMJHIP's suggesticn, spend a few days there just relaxing. From there, or Copenhagen, he would return to Prague for two days at most, in order to pick up his luggage, then come as soon as possible to Paris. There, he intended to visit a hospital or two, as agreed upen with Fidel, and spend a total of at least a week there. He said that if he was to return to Cuba to begin his . efforts, he did not wish to be away from Cuba any longer than necessary. (qsar esea es reese 8 wil -9- Beng sapyirap ee AE EIU ASEM REA OF iets Biot, cement aeeoimey
wa Satay Shr Sor gs," serpy be ALES BE PAT FON IRR A OES earner NBS A AAA ate AeA nt WORLEY AAT ADA SG REST RTE SACS MALENLR Hs arnt Ge ere x oo ey ‘(He has, it is noted, a sense of ‘urgency in beginning action against the 7 oa ‘ regime as soon as possible.) AMVHIP told us later that AMLASH also was f interested in a Pan American Migzieshased stewardess, whom he would have ‘come over to stay with him. AMMHIP suggested to us that he thought the ‘stewardess might be connected with PBPRIME. He based this apparently on a remark which the stewardess made concerning AMLASH's political frame of mind last year. We answered that as far as we knew there was no basis for AMWHIP 's thoughts along this line.) AMWHIP will try to get the stewardess full name for us. . Meeting arrangements for Stockholm and Helsinki were laid on at this meeting. AMLASH felt he had to stay until the end of the Festival for cover purposes. Since AMJHIP had already accidentally run into several people he knew, it was agreed that he should leave town for Stockholm in the near future. We would remain behind until AMLASH left, serving as an emergency contact in the event of change in AMLASH's plans. It was arranged to meet AMLASH if absolutely necessary, at either 1200 or 1800 each day at a given restaurant in the center of the city. Normal security measures for the "emergency" meeting were laid on. In Stockholm, meeting arrangements _ for Paris will be established. AMWHIP departed Helsinki § August and is presumably staying at the Palace Hotel in Stockholm; he will make arrangements for accommodations for AMLASH there. We will follow AMLASH to Stockholm. 5. Helsinki Meetings between AMWHIP/1 and Pallueci. AMWHIP and Fallucci were in public together only three times for any length of time. Other meetings were held in their respective hotel rooms. One breakfast meeting (the Sth of August) was held in the near-deserted 3 tae . CARSON Lottie ee ' z f i 6 &. Babies SRB eile
14-00000 : ‘ canst dey ne att nba om SORRY AONE tw ehtttcinemem. mene etn nt vet EGMY AEB Scr ERT Ts EMEA ARRAS END. a5 UN GARIN E tee EBA SG ad ATA HY te oUt Ue 432 aan oro, me ee we : ™ at dining room of the Vaakuna Hotel at 1030. AMSHIP and Fallucci met at least : once a day during the sojourn in Helsinki. AMWHTP used the name William Thompson, as instructed, when calling HBFINCH to make initial contact. There were no incidents of a security nature observed during any of these “meetings. — . . 6, Other Youth Festival Targets. DIR eit ouch: >: oe oe re This area covered by cables. 158), and[ _]1609. The best Peat and, actually, only possibility among the participants was Jose Venegas. Kehoe However, both AMLASH and AMWHIP did not want to become involved with him ‘ as they felt that this, in both their cases, might compromise their interests in AMLASH's returning to Cuba. AMWHIP felt, for example, that Venegas would almost certainly connect his presence here with an attempt to é do something with AMLASH. AMLASH also felt that he did not want to disclose i any indications of his real sympathies to Venegas, if he (AMLASH) were going : { to return to Cuba. Without doing this, it would be difficult to get any meee tee, reactions or opinions from Venegas, thought AMLASH. Venegas, it is felt by AMLASH, might very possibly be counted on at a later date if this was F desirable. An approach could then be worked out at that time. As reported, AMLASH came to the Festival as a "special delegate,* after his request to Fidel was approved. AMLASH claimed to Fidel that he i was fatigued and sick and needed a good rest in Europe. ‘The Festival provided the excuse, Fidel bit the bait, and AMLASH got to Europe to see AMAHIP, his original intention. AMNHIP felt that this is a logical and on! honest explanation. It is interesting to note that neither the local ‘ ; rae } service, 0/2, or any of the Cuban delegates he asked, could determine the whereabouts of AMLASH. It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the Cubans Whee pe were told not to tell of his presence to anyone not from their immediate delegation. a at ee fh. 1 oes Sey | fer ba J. Ps TED
14-00000 i al ont) a sie * pe {pet tR, - 7. AMA 's Role in AMLASH Talks. neerneancnmeapinceneeenamnnem et A LK AMNHIP has been most helpful and cooperative in establishing bo the initial contacts with AMLASH, and he undoubtedly does have much « influence over AMLASH, AMLASH also trusts AMWHIP explicitly, as evidenced — Cd = by his remark to us that AMWHIP was the only one whom he felt that he a | g could fully trust and to whom he could speak openly. Of course, he did i it a ty speak openly at length to us at the behest of AMWHIP, cat it is also oS obvious that he des not tell us everything. AMWHIP has given good advice ce i in the handling of AMLASH, but, as he has a tendency to interpret AMLASH's | remarks and feelings subjectively, and to attempt to guide us a bit too : much, it might be wise to eliminate in later portions of the talks in Paris. , With a Spanish-speaking C/O, this should not be too difficult to do, and : without alienating AMWHIP. AMWHIP has no clandestine training to speak of, . | . - as evidenced by his actions in this case. However, to his credit, he : - responds readily to directions in this area, and follows rather well suggestions oo i ‘y for adding to the security of the meetings. His remark about the fof advisability of keeping his old friend AMCONCERT/1 out of the operation or. i from any knowledge thereof, is gratifying. AMWHIP also has gently explained Bob Rs to us, that while he is a Cuban at heart and loves the Cubans, they simply oo “cannot be trusted to keep secrets among any of their friends who, for no real tested reasons, they consider safe and discreet. As a general 3 statement, we feel that AMWHIP is a good security risk operationally, and that with more exposure to the game, will become a good and useful asset under almost any circumstance. He is » however, somewhat subconsciously _ subjective about his evaluations of AMLASH. He is completely honest, and is wt using a considerable amount of his own money, not to mention time, in this operation. We only hope his faith in AMLASH is justified. ee ni Se mah Aes = Be gee datan ata ttn Bh ec ee RNA AT, Hg hina te soo RAS Eee STE Rit la et ORES Bie Catala As yess bagi thaw HOR, ALIA Tort ht BP a MCE CA RE we, Hoe ee ane aes pe ONE
BAGS pe GEA RR eee PERS ne? Re ORCAS ear LER 225 ST ATT HAIN te ch Lana mn eE <P IE Ne Es CR E Ra A ors INGA baa 8.. Evaluation of and Comments about AMLASH. LL aaa ; Our initial comments forwarded in cable Hels 1609 remain unchanged We have seen too little of, and cannot converse in the native language of AMLASH, to make an: strongly valid ass second meeting with AMLAST, he was considerably more relaxed than in the first, but just as intense about his comvictions...or seemingly so. AMLASH stated that, having decided to return to Cuba, he would enrole in an officers! refresher type course at Matanzas in an effort to renew old Army contacts, re-assert his position as a major in the Revolutionary Army, and attempt to re-establish some recognition and following in Army Government circles. For the sake of completeness, we repeat our comments regarding AMLASH fran | 1609: Ao a ote om cy ony essment of him to date. In the He appears capable of rash, thoughtless, violent action under the strain of pr or frustration. For example, ovocation, tense situations, he stated to us that last year during a period of dejection and frustration, he had con- templated suicide. Although AMLASH appeared to concede some validity to our arguments for planning and for carefully prepared actions, w difficult control and directi Situation. He himself stated is not the type to sit tight, e feel that he will present onal problems in any op several times that he but prefers solutions to problems by violent, positive actions. AMLASH showed the strain of not trusting anyone. ' to AMWHIP, overjoved to see him, and talked very, very ‘much about many, many subjects. It is not possible to comment at this time about loyality to friends or causes AMEASH's capacity for » nor his willingness to see a job through. However, AMNEIP assures us that when AMLASH sars he'll do something, he will. We don't know at this point, AMNHIP also told us that in discussions subsequent to our meetings with AMLASH, he expressed the hope that "Bill" and his friend (s) follow. Otherwise, he said he might drop the whole an - will have a really fruitful, forceful idea and plan of action for him to 2 te wreemaenetd na tt ee oath + He was according ioe PME WIA te eG + et oe get oh in Paris idea and not go back, |
Del EE ies, Aue but to forget the whole problem, leave the Cuban fold quietly, and work POS TRL et "in Paris or elsewhere, forgetting completely Cuban problems and Cuban Agent SO polities. AMWHIP also told us on Sunday that he was truly surprised when 8 . “AMLASH said he wanted te go back and fi ght. AMMHIP was sure, as were we, ‘ that he would defect, period. AMLASH told AMVHIP that he could not see é the point of making a statement regarding defection and the state of affairs in Cuba, and then accepting a dole in Miami. Nor could he see any use in car MCNEIL Bete STS propaganda efforts in Latin America or Europe. Later, after our talks et das Wih him, AMLASH told AMWHIP a little different story, i. e., that he wald not want to make a public defection statement, because of the probable repercussions against his friends in Cuba for no good rea-on, This area of thinking needs to be examined at length in Paris, 4 Spanish. speaking C/O might well do the trick. STOCKHOLM: « g; Travel to Stockholm. AMWHIP departed Helsinki for Stockholm on 4 August. Both AMWHIP and AMLASH felt that they had been together enough in Helsinki. AMWHTP quite curious as to why AMWHIP was there. AMLASH departed Helsinki in the afternoon of 7 August; we took the same flight unbeknownst to AMLASH. No problems were encountered in arriving at Stockholm. We took the next bus after AMLASH to the eity. Both AMLASH and AMWHIP stayed at the ‘Palace Hotel, room 828 and 970, respectively. Talks of a general nature were held in our hotel room (the Carlton) and during the several dinners. It was obvious that AMLASH had such on his mind. He can return to the i } : 4 i A i i H i i | i | | also-ran onto a refugee newspaper friend of his in Helsinki who was { p , ere enon en aman te re tr PRL ttre AMEE Jibs Steet ean Sy th fete Lo [unseen nmiuoinamaneptiintaen oe _
gene Se tate a ae PA PORES STL Se | sath ley stop gear vgn 1 fees tee tA eh hee SENAY FRAO ULTRA ERO smuemestire nae saa AROS“ neMny BER, Se EEA oF MOR TERT ae TANT ENS Brutmaniss | g » prerees eubject of Cuba at anytime, with a questim, suggestion, or comment upon it, regardless of the context of the general discussion. It was during the talks in Stockholm that AMWHIP revealed that AMLASH had told re Naranjo, Revellon, Venegas, and the "Mayor of Gawa » Manuel. DBONReES Vetdez (23, (in Helsinki) that he was seeing AMWHIP. In Heleinki, he also told tng Tiayor Demingues to tell Raul that he was going on his present itinerary, and that he wanted a refresher course in the Army when he returned home. COPENHAGEN: 10. Travel to, and stop in Copenhagen. AMLASH and AMSHIP took SAS flight 107 to Copenhagen on the after- noon of 10 August. In speaking at length about meeting in Paris, AMLASH felt sure that there would be no problem in getting permission to visit Paris after returning to Prague. He felt that he better not visit Paris first, as it might cause some undue interest in Prague Cuban circles as to why he was away so long. He also had some trouble in getting the Air- line to approve his side trips to Stockholm and Copenhagen. They wanted him te fly direct to Prague from Helsinki. He refused their requests, aid said that he would pay his own way to Stockholm and Copenhagen (or the difference) if need be. This he finally had to do, for which AMWHIP footed the bill. (perhaps we should later absorb). (We felt that this ability to pay for the extra routing might cause some suspicion among his colleagues. AMLASH said "no", but we are not so sure. Perhaps he can tell then, should they be curious, that AMWHIP paid the bill, as all know he has money and has, in fact, paid bills before for AMLASH during the time ‘of the Batista regime.) 5 GER prea ARG a arnt cement tae that neater natn ett ct eat ett Es ne ARC NUN CaS Re ie iat bat ee ed ssftpree oto oy wd Reese antonio, + 3 y i 3 ; t 5 : |
ML. Copenhagen, 10 August 1952. pe AMWHIP and AMLASH arrived as scheduled in Copenhagen and obtained ‘rooms at the Richmond Hotel. AMWHIP phoned HBFINCH as planned and we - ' in turn contacted them by phone at the Richmond at 1845. A meeting was ee . | ; arranged for 2000 at the bar of the Terminus Hotel. After a drink, the Le . ae has, “Ea party retired to DPiyan I for dinner. Apparently the spell of Tivoli, . Danish food and snaps, and beer at the student's inn, Faergekroen ( in ee Tivoli), served to mellow AMLASH. He for the first time appeared to talk - ! to us as a friend, rather than as a PEPRIME representative. During ., : : . | supper, and for most of the evening, at intervals, AMLASH talked about oa | himself, his thoughts, and problems. The evening was well worth it, in re | terms of the rapport and insight gained. 12. AMLASH's Thoughts and Personality. Fania enasanaannes = stan talsiadantetmaneiet Anal os mere AMLASH feels basically that he would like to live in a world in peace under an acceptable political ‘system, practicing medicine, thus giving expression to his desire to help the less-fortunate people, and from : - this to find happiness for himself, something he seeks, but which heretofore ; has eluded him. As a young student he got into the struggle against Batista without thinking much about the future, particularly that it | could be less than perfect. He soon found that the opposing parties in mS mt 2 Cuba, and in particular the Communists, were not about to bring true peace and contentment to the people, but rather through mismanagement and poor . r . | planning, had created unnecessary hardships for the people. After his fighting time was over (or so he thought), AMLASH became a student again and leader of the FEV. This did not satisfy him and he sought to leave 7 : politics all together, and return to medicine. The political climate,  Searenenes fpomecpt on Enc mt! Mt . * te eke emyretetettel ORIENT <ee oe \ BREA cmaansassenmtennan peter ect elie wehenane mere Poh Reptrt ten Aste atch mim RRL terete: mtb ink AAR, ERIE OETA PNET RADE TEAS LEE EB Lory GMS RE SEES i cet ‘>
14-00000 . ’ ry —“ ot me “OT : . . 4 ! 2 “4 Po i however, and the acceptance of MASH as a military leader by the people | \t rather than as a doctor (Hello Comandante! not, Hello Doctor!) forced AMLASH to reconsider his future, ana to decide that he mst flee Cuba oF! 4 fight againat what he considers a ruinous future for hia country and +. wd oa oon her people. This time, however, he hopes to make the "operation" successful, and never again subject the patient to another such ordeal. Then when he is sure that the political and social outlook for the Cuban people and the country are sound, he would like to try once more ERP Ce eT to enter private life as a doctor. He is not sure, however, that this . i PR ALERT ERBARIO PR ODEON CANS MARU PCI R PREFER NE EM IB NBOAE REINA HACK ARREUT ASC AMEE he LARS OBE Bape will ever cane about. AMLASH was also quite frank, we thought, in his conversation with us concerning his views on the PBRPIME position vis-a- vis Latin America. (And, although he had nothing to say which has not been said by many before him, they were interesting to hear from a disenchanted Cuban revolutionary.) He feels that PBPRIME is simply not getting "through" to the youth and students of Latin America, as are the Communists, and for ; ' . this simple reason alone, the next ten years (when these students become the political and economic leaders in Latin America) will see us lose ! i i t h the struggle for Latin America. We replied by using the old line that "> PBPRIME realizes only teo well today that there were serious short-comings in our Latin American policy for a number of years and that now we are doing what we can to correct this. However, it is not our policy (said : | with tongue in cheek) to attempt to alter these conditions or influence : | future events by going behind the backs of the established governments in ; i the various Latin American countries. Instead, we must take the often | slow, laborious path of working through these governments, however bad they may be, in our attempts to guide and influence the minds of Latin Cee os ra - et kaanes Gr Piper tee ee se] Bait. Rag Butera =lj= Pe ees * * aes 2 yy RAG MMe ARLE OSE Bh SAL IVS wh eM RT Phan HABER ata oye TRIN, eae TA et wee too teat enh re Soe aS awe Cee kame ae pea
14-00000 La. PY Po MAT eet RAE say 0 oe ARR a REG BOP RE RE tt A MNES pe pti oet - TERS hit teemeentensepnn sire ammenveneerenegpenenenneen oon ‘ . “ American youth. AMLASH said that he understood why we take this point of view, but nevertheless, ‘Af we intended to win- the struggle, we must do as the Communists do, and disregard the archaic and doomed old-line govermeents in Latin America. We agreed that this was undoubtedly the more agressive way to deal with the problem, but that such methods would leave us open to the old familiar charges of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. AMLASH smiled and replied that from a practical viewpoint this didn't make any difference, for if we didn't act forcefully and soon, there wouldn't be any opportunities there for us to be open to anything! He then cited Venezuela as the next obvious Communist victim and thereby a loss of another opportunity for PBPRIME. Obviously AMLASH was correct in mich of his thinking, but rather than stand- ing still with our shoes untied, we gave him the ball by soliciting from him, as a former student leader and politician, any ideas he might have for combating the Communists in the struggle for the minds of Latin fmerican youth. He replied that he would be glad at any time to disucss this problem and to offer what ideas and suggestions he could. As a result of the discussions of this evening, we felt that . AMLASH now was genuinely interested in getting Cuba out of its present predicament with the active aid of PBPRIME. AMLASH seemed more sincere and interested in discussing his thoughts and problems with us than at any previous time. He no doubt skimmed over in his own mind (or at least declined to reveal this to us) his record as president of the FEV. The full story of this period from his side would be most interesting. However, we felt that a discussion of this particular subject required the use of Spanish and the propitious moment. bogs! enue tan 5 8 Soe Pyne BT 6 AE fe - oe Low Rye a Ee Se SAE tater s ha eR eae Peay LECTED cae et AL ARERR EET wrt
14-00000 & ~ Cte eee As a matter of ‘record, AMLASH stated during the evening that he F had met Algeria's Ben Bella at one time and knows him more than casually. . He felt that the man bears strict watching by the West as a measure of protecting its interests in developments in Algeria. AMLASH thought vk Ben Bella was a clever man, devious, and ambitious, and not to be taken too literally at his word. In dealing with AMLASH, one trait of his which confronts the c/o an Sas, at every tzfan is his tempermental reactions over points which would ; : } i t i i { ! te generally be considered minor. For example, at one time when we were COIR Sage discussing the various aspects of AMLASH's future role in Cuba, we used the term "assassinate". The use of this term, we later learned from _ AMWHIP and from AMLASH himself, was most objectionable to the latter, and he was visibly upset. It was not the act he objected to, but rather merely ‘the choice of word used to describe it. "Eliminate" was acceptable, but , : | 5 obviously the term "assassinate" had a distasteful connotation. From Giscussions with AMWHIP, this lablé of "assassin" had been given to AMLASH after some of his escapades against Batista supporters in the . 3 i t. Aske pre-Castro era. Another example, which AMWHIP discussed with US, occurred during a meeting in Mexico City in March 1961, when a KUBARKER said to +e Meee ee, AMLASH, "I'm prepared to help you in any way within my power". According to AMWHIP, AMLASH later turned to him, shrugging his shoulders in a manner BG of saying, "So I need help from him?" ‘hese examples are pointed out aa 1 here in order to indicate the degree of pride and Sensitivity one findts ' in AMLASH, and to note that however tedious this attitude may become to the C/O, it is, from persanal experience, quite necessary to adjust one's . approach accordingly in order to secure AMLASH's maximum cooperation. * EERIE CLIP ERLE TTI NSTI: ANTE es ore eye A sien sae reper AC SRO NEA CERN BEER AOA NEO RNAS CRANFORD a NER DOOR 29 PALER TA PH Pees Bea RNS AF mk Bite NT ERE I nH etn TARE TARP NEEDS te ERED hy AD Ce OS Aaah NALS Ne eGR Rte etn nate Mati Baa thise' rans TE ads Be AL bee ett
14-00000 * eo. . . 5 ° . . : > ~. 2 Oy ey 13. Paris Meeting Arrangerients, - one en ram ET ES o AMLASH has been given AMWHIP's hotel in Paris » Franklin Hotel, Bebe Teme geen 19 Rue Buffault (telephone TRU 6910). AMWHIP will reserve a room there for AMLASH, who can come there directly after he has landed in Paris. We . % SEE RE ee at . also had another contact address in the form of the office of a jeweler . friend and business contact of AMAHIP's; M. B. Rosenblatt, 20 Cite-Treuise : (Telephone TAI-7438). Rosenblatt's number has not been given to AMLASH. i In discussing security precautions with AMWHIP, it is obvious, that he I still is not possessed of a good gense of security by normal clandestine _ ‘ 4 ops standards. This, however, can be improved over a period of tine. : i Note: Subject expressed interest in obtaining : expert instruction in use of silenced-equiped ; ‘ rifles and in use and handling of plastic i 3 explosives. This can be handled from France i on priority basis, it is felt, after preliminary \ discussions in Paris. PARIS: ly. Events of 12 August 1962. : | i According to prior arrangements with AMNHIP and AMLASH, AMVHIP would see AMLASH off to Zurich fron Kastrup Airport on 12 August, then take a late afternoon riftght dam-to Paris. As it turned out, however, AMLASH was able to book a passage on a Rumanian Airlines (Tarom) flight to Prague, via East Berlin's Schoenfeldt Airport. AMVHIP later took the early evening flight to Paris; we ‘took the 1150 AF flight the same night. In Paris, AMWHIP took a room (#60) as planned at the Hotel Franklin, . . oy seamen Cinriewnantines mene cna eee ee ee where he remained throughout his. stay in Paris. He also booked a room for AMLASH. We arrived in Paris at OLLS, 16 August, booking a room Mat ROECERAN o . (#l1) at the Hotel Roblin, 6 Rue Chaveau-Lagarde (ANJ-5700). aa SPO Sear ORE PT, POC ER AE ET ION TEL ES EI CRYT EUT BK O BN, AMP EN ECR OS tat NaI RR a ar een Reena eS pata AL AES sae eth ee ets ‘ . * Bales oped oe Oe PERE Toh teed Sie PMCS MENEAME NE, ae oo ater SRE ae wey * w ry i Sod al Feet El wet ae —
14-00000 & 5 . ¢ —, fe ee re P ate ‘ i 15. Events of 13 August 1962. " | ; On the morning of 13 August, we checked into HBFINCH to discuss : q . i the Paris meetings with Peter J. Kymingten. Thru his good officeSwe were i i able to arrange for precautionary surveillance of AMWHIP and AMLASH, casa ggdronaqeartcs aps obtain use of a Station safehouse, and effect other arrangements as oe i necessary. The cooperation and help of the Paris Staticn was excellent. od Following this meeting, we went to a small bistro near our hotel, phoned me | AMWHIP, and arranged for a meeting in our hotel room at 1830. 4 This meeting took place in our hotel room (#1) at the Hotel Roblin, at 1830. The purpose was merely to meet AMAHIP and re-assure him that arrangements for AMLASH's meeting were laid on. We also made : _ arrangements to give him his expenses for the trip and account for same Pod during a meeting the following day. ‘This will permit him to leave for fp Milan without delay at the close of our business with AMLASH. He was getting "nervous", as he called it, and will be glad to get this business : | over and done, We agreed. He wanted to remain wntil the conclusiona of { the talks with AMLASH, however, for he felt that he could be of use in handling AMLASH. We agreed. He did not, of course, want to be in on : | any operational discussions, but just to be on hand to guide his . 7 po! . tampermental "charge", He was very anxious to meet Wallace A. Groweryg in order to ‘point out to him in advance some of ‘the quirks in AMLASH's personality. In talking to us, AMWHIP said that a person with the background of ‘ .. pibemmnmvonahe mya E ouev rmtntetn steatcaene = AMLASH, must be handled in a certain manner, and if done, he will respond. - AMHHIP told us that while he is of course subjective about AMLASH, he also papdierns tae PsA ET Ie SEES fener abes: sera a3 Bes : a Sesh f pes ARES LEN Se ePID, Bag ENTE TIS SRE LES BAY ASR eA EMI EE PRT AN NS OCR ESE Fe ot BTR APY HE TEEN POR tv aN \ : realized that he is of a different background and make-up (flattery?) than either we or himself, and that in order to get him to produce and -eooperate, the problem must be approached in a certain way. He said i. PEE AM aE AS GAL, Ate RL ay SAREE Be ATED AMET tn Uyje AR Rats wae kad hee ot Bag BRIE eepethe bie Aad RRaby were Rab abe TS. Ete AL ty S ES iiytin Pia tant Oo Begs ft My RE TRS Rie BE GRAS ERs q
14-00000 aceon SG SARS AN EN RE NTA TI De EET SERPS ke wt art} dates ety - that AMLASH is very proud ard independent. He doce not wane tw feel he has : to take help from anyone. AMAHIP said that this is a rather naive way to look at it, but AMLASH does, and for this reason, one must be careful not to appear to be buying him. We said that we understood this, aid were cooperation, but that eventually AMLASH mst be made to realize that, . though he is of no little importance to us, he is after all, the only one man with one man's resources. x AMWHIP continually stressed the point that to work with people like AMLASH, it was necessary to have them first accept a person either by personal contact over a period of time or on the recommendation of a newer pre good friend. He felt that while it was necessary for us to spend some time to go slow at first. This, we sald to AMVHIP was all right, up to a point, but that we felt quite enough time had been spent with AMLASH already, and proceed as necessary to conclude business as rapidly as possible. cows agent ‘We felt that AMWHIP understood our point. . During this talk, AMNHIP again expressed the feeling that if Cuba is not returned to freedom within two years, he was going to set up business permanently in Paris or Southern California, and forget the i idea of returning. He was obvious moved by the finality of such ‘a decision, as he is a real Cuban patriot. Or so we believe. vers We agreed to contact AMWHIP by telephone at his hotel at 1200 on 1) August (Tuesday). Subsequently a meeting at 1700 in our hotel room. ~22— CIN tess chinie | ‘Seteeserer Re een aae Rew were ur ene? ue i , 5 2 '  ” willing to advance our arguments in any manner necessary to get AMLASH'a : ot f oe becoming acquainted with AMLASH, it also might be necessary for Growery . 7 . and that the meetings in Paris were going to get down to business quickly, 7 AE AE ne dete PR. eR intice, iat ty EA RoC L Ss cos Ree AO deege dd >
16. Events of 14 August 1962. As agreed, we called AMWHIP at his hotel at 1200 on 1 August and arranged a meeting for 1700 in our hotel room. At the 1700 meeting AMWHTP informed us that AMLASH hac arrived as pranised from Prague about ‘noontine, and was already inquiring about a meeting time with "the man from Washington". AMVHIP was told that "the man from Washington", (whom they in the future called "Jaime" as they could not readily pronounce Growery's true first name) was net able to arrive before that afternoon, and that a meeting with him could not take place before the 16th. Also, AMWHIP was reminded that he himself had stated that it would be best for him (AMWHIP) to talk to Jaime first in order to explain AMLASH's personality. AMWHIP was unhappy that this meeting could not take place immediately, but said he would explain the matter to AMLASH. This meeting, it is noted, took place initially at a amall cafe across the street from our hotel, so that we could finger AMWHIP to two survelllants of the Paris Station. The two principles then retired to our hotel room for the remainder of the meeting. We said to AMWHIP that we would check in with him by phone the following day and inform him whether there was any chance of Jaime arriving on that day, the 15th. At this meeting, AMSHIP was alse paid $350.00 to cover hotel bills for him and AMLASH in Helsinki, Copenhagen and Stockholm. 15. Events of 1) August 1962. We phoned AMWHIP at his hotel at 1300 to inform him that there “was no change in plans and that the best we could do was te call him again that evening. AMWHIP said that he would be out all evening; arrangements were then made that AMWHIP should call us at our hotel at ete eS . eee’ goo os ne po 3 atin in nan Lae A ce, pte dugatech are sintered iat evant nen nt eee mtn, hernias sane pte cone . aE SEE AN ak Saat ree senna nnn _. ot t + Fee Mare ae aces vrei 4 i } } rae commit an vm ot oa
14-00000 » ® . . To . t . . . ¥ : 2200. Subsequently, AMWHIP did call as agreed, and was informed that he could ko 3 plan to cone to our room tomorrow, the 16th, at 0900. ‘The hour bothered Z him (too early) but he said he could make it. , : bo in ! ‘ a Later the same evening, Kymingtom; Growery and Me met to ed § ' discuss plans for the meetings tomorrow. At this meeting Kymingten ~~ ; opps t disclosed that his team had detected what was believed to he surveilance of AMWHIP and AMLASH. To be positive he planned to have the meeting the - . 7 next day surveilled. . Growery agreed to come at 0900 for preliminary talks Jf 16. Events of 16 August 1962. a Growery arrived within five minutes of appointed time at our hotel room. AMMHIP arrived later at 1015, apoligizing for his tardiness (a late evening!). Breakfast was provided and, after introductory amenities, the two began their talk, in Spanish. The talks terminated at 1230. ap cbs The second meeting of the day was postponed until 1600, as AMLASH was not feeling too well. ‘ . he Later at the Station, Kymingtcit revealed that he now believed the morning meeting had been surveilled and that efforts were being made ' to detemine who was responsible. It was readily established that it was mo, Gendt “tla te : no Cuban or Soviet exercise, but rather one by one of the French services or local police. Since it was pointless to stop the meetings now and , | the address of the safehouse had not been mentioned verbally, it was ’ | decided to contime as planned. Paris will forward account of surveillance an and outcome as soon as possible. (When we left Paris, it was determined that this "Surveillance" of our meeting might have been a truly freak coincidence, and the. subject. of the surveillance was another target, not us. We don't think se. However the Pending Paris report should resolve this.) SRR RSE taser ner. neces enecaubeorecreteter ub RAL PY GA ENer Sen fo mc MR IER BAY WE arcane tema tee Ue SURE TCDA (obit a ety 23 oy — Pa = aR Selgin WES, ENE ahs Sista scr 7-S ae ey SINE STL Bagh auch foc ne tates se tee ele wield eo San gael Swine 4
i Pin Ont we deg hs BN Aggeows ay EP sce PRUE Se RET OEE EI CS BD ER AIP NEEM WHT wT VCH MPI MRET ct PPA P TED SFL AE NY CBE REESE MITER ENTE UND OT EAS PORES eS ERE HO RTS AA AT IG ESTE OTS ve Pe oe ey eee , eres, Growery and we arrived at the safehouse (9 bis rue 5 Spontint, DO +0 x1) ahead of AMLASH and AMWHTP.. A tape recorder was installed. At 1615, AMLASH and AMWHIP arrived. Shortly after introductions, Growery and AMLASH were talking business in Spanish. After about 30 minutes, we took AMHHIP out of the flat on the pretense of buying food, in order that the — Loy ‘ 7 ba? two principles eould talk freely. Procuring food and beer, we returned after a two hour absence, and made a cold supper for the four. The meeting terminated about 1930, AMLASH and AMWHIP leaving some 15 minutes before us. Arrangements had been made for a meeting at 1000 the following day for further talks, and beginning §@ S/W training. 17. Events of 17 August 1962. | At 1000 Growery met with AMLASH for several hours. Arrangenents were made for AMLASH to return to the safehouse fo. S/W training that afterrioon at 1400. (See S/W training report for account of meeting.) Before breaking up, arrangements were made for a continuation of the S/W training the following day. 18, Events of 18 August 1962. (See S/W report for account of training this meeting conducted . : at the aforementioned safehouse. Account of debriefing of AMLASH during . . this meeting and others to be filed by Growery. All debriefing of AMLASH by Growery was conducted in the Spanish language.) 19. Events of 19 August 1962. Meeting was held at 1900 at safehouse. Account of meeting to. be included in Growery's reporting. Be Rane nee et
.? . Ma Tg la q - & . De eg F Bi ee 20. Bvents of 20 August 1062 _ : . Kymington and Growery picked us up at Madalaine church at 0600, , { a 3 . . and proceeded to rendezvous with AMLASH. Counter-surveillance detected | i ‘ no apparent observation of the pickup of us. The four then proceeded by . [ : car to the Army Air Corps Support Element at St. Andres » for te demonstration . “4 . and instruction in plastic explosives. The classroom work and the field : demonstration lasted until 130, at which time the four proceeded back r to Paris. AMLASH was let out of the car in the suburbs and told te i take a taxi back to his hotel. Kymingtes- took some snapshots of AMLASH gles’ eps en RPMA SP EUCLA PEE WALDEN ORTON Mb et PACE le NRT OT BORN EN EVI OTT PCED TRIER EDM A ARLES SOE TENNER AVE Lge ey ! . - ° ave receiving this instruction. These are not too satisfactory, but never the- , less, will be enlarged and forwarded for the files. : OO The participants met later that evening at 2100 for a drink and : _ eritique and comments of the days activities. AMLASH seemed quite : 7 satisfied with the demonstrations, but was interested in having smaller : i ot explosive packages with more force, and a remote control method for uo | , ‘ detonating them. The meeting was short and broke up at 2200. It was | agreed to meet once more on 22 August for a final briefing sesson at : | Growery's hotel room (in the Crillon) at 1200. , ; | 21. Events of 22 August 1962. ——- AMLASH came alone and on time to this meeting. A tape recorder was in operation. About one hour was spent on a review of S/¥, followed by requirements, and tasks to be performed or looked into upon AMLASH's | ‘return. (See Growery's report for tasks and S/W report for this section : of meeting.) Arrangements for emergency contact in Paris were set up ; 7 on - : using the phone of a contract KUBARKER of Paris Station. AMWHIP and . , _ we made arrangements for a meeting at Queenie's for 1000, 23 August. 2 . Hee
14-00000 BES et aL Met SoTL DENS =p Gteb M a Pe Lead ai Ma otgegpons ray PPR ER corsa ite tr teewran acca I TDena ie uEe ExrEaE brent eaverdeve:sran NwaY'erCnomprten, SRI TR 08 wt Se PRE E+ HOPE TREY NES SEIS TST TEPER Ret VY NG OME BEEP TM 05 me Re ee eng . 22. . Events of 23 August 1962, nee UBUS ELIE o At the morning meeting, AMWHIP sa‘d that AMLASH wanted to see ‘Us on a matter concerning S/W. The meeting was arranged for 1300 at the . Tue Spontini safehouse. This meeting teok only a few minutes as te - problem wag minor. AMLASH and AMWHIP departed the safehouse at 1325. We left a little after. This was the last time we were to see either AMLASH or AMWHIP in Europe.. 23. Events of 25 August 1962. AMLASH departed for Prague. We left Paris at 1045 aboard PAA 119. for New York. . 26. Miscellaneous Comments on Case, Personalities, and Actions in Paris. AMLASH's attitude in Paris was essentially that which it had $ been during the previous contacts in Scandinavia, that is, changeable as - the weather, varying from occasional flashes of wit and mirth to degrees of discouragement and perhaps despondency. He was generally receptive and interested in procedures and conversations during the meetings and during periods of instruction. He makes little attemt to disguise his feelings, should he become tired, bored, or disinterested. His social graces are not the sharpest honed. He can, however, be reasoned with, even in some of his contrary moods. AMWHIP was particularly effective in reaching him during these. We are in complete agreement with AMHHIP when he describes AMLASH as being full of complexes. But further than that, AMLASH not only tt has complexes as such, but it is felt that he is generally preoccupied eee onal a CARH eat Uk ae with his thoughts, presumably about problems Cuban, and is often seemingly | incapable of maintaining his interest in things about him for any length arb et Bre BE . ¥ . MT ERA trerens 8 fr 27. Ext! sree Nh we fm | cf : * 5 awe | 4 _. .. Seas tiemawaiiershin Sa isa Pa Siar a acted Taha ut DH aa nie tS che ae ein Pray, POE We Bee an de la vege tay ta BT NY aterer Secallaeeetnnenmeatetaretn : a ere OR eee
14-00000 te pers ® of time. If one is discussing Cuba, however, he obviously is very . interested. Therefore, it might well be that he is actually 80 pre- occupied with thoughts about problems at home, that all else is secondary 4 ‘and treated accordingly. hen, on occasion, he "opened wp? a bit with us, it was obvious that he had done, and was doing, a great deal of thinking about Cr Cuban problems. It may be that Growery will have much nore to say “d ' on this point, as their discussions were in AMLASH's native tongue. On - 7 | : many occasions, AMLASH is rather exasperating tc deal with, but we feel on a Cece renee that this 1s a trait of his which is a normal fact of his personality, . and not assumed to try the metal of his case officers. We may be wrong, — | “ : D but doubt it. 27. Physical Appearance: . : . i AMLASH is about 5'11", weighs about 175 lbs., dark wavy hair, oo } thinning noticably on top and usually needs combing; brown eyes, small, almost peftulant mouth, small nose, pale complexion, eyes are a little small for his face and very intense in expression. He prefers dressing i. informally, and is prone to wearing jackets with no tie. (He could mingle with the typical small town corner-loungers without difficulty.) When dressed up, he presents a good appearance in a mascvline way, and WP RNG apparently from AMWHIP's stories, does quite well with the women. Concerning _ the question of his being a homosexual, we cannot say whether he has a hidden bent in this direction, but if he does, he is not at any rate, a purist but rather AC-DC. _ 28. Language, , ‘ - a Native Spanish, fair to good English, but with limited vocabulary. He can be successfully conversed with using English, but it has to be done slowly and with basic constructed sentences. It is not possible to be articulate with him, if he is expected to erase | ths. fut meaning of the conversation. RAPED OLLI MS TELL DY BERLE POLED FONE EHD NE MERE CDG EET IN APD EERSTE PSHM WN LY APN EOL URES UOMO nO ALCS RL ett EA Iratam apenas na ker ve oe © ceeetnnt ape tee eee or at melee . seth atid dikrpameneaotmenntesemomesenete nt EA to tet e oct a cn te Saat bk Samadi te vi Rea bedi de Feiss Banani creer ree see vinmseeacen tema ne re mad ; * rth vn MEH he BE ah a
14-00000 Be Mee age nea, Mae oe ede * tae. ae es AES ESTO ESN AEN PRIE SN. HG AS ES. I Aa APEC EE a of RE I BC AREA SNES wt Pe MES RIES SMS ATES OT ETE! IN EL HOSEL EY AS in good taste (somewhat) and most of the information in this report was ete) 4, 29. Family. | oe 7 F AMLASH is separated fron his wife, and stated that since he is going to undertake to work sgainst the regime, he could not go back to her if he wanted (which we don't think he does) as she has been too outspoken — in her dislike of the Castro regime and of her desire to get out of Cuba. of. ‘a f | AMLASH's mother lives with him as she is divorced from his father. AMLASH's father is in the tailoring business and has recently married a girl many years his junior. AMLASH does not approve. 30. Girl Friends. AMLASH is on good terms with a Pan American stewardess of French descent who is based in Miami. . AMWHIP said to us that he thought she was with us, but we replied we really aid not kmow. AMLASH also is friendly es OL with the Cuban dancer Sonia CALERO) whom he telephoned from Paris to give CALERO the return date to Havana. ; i so 31. Pastimes. AMLASH likes nightclubbing and dancing. He is also interested to a Limited degree in architecture and historical buildings and sculpture. Py It is interesting to note that. AMWHIP was reluctant to answer many questions about AMLASH's private affairs. He felt that this was not os od obtained by elicitation rather than direct questions. 32. AMLASH's Original Schedule in Paris. *#MLASH was interested in coming to Paris, executing his business. vhs : res with us in the first three days, then checking into the Cuba House or a | small hotel on the left bank, and socializing with the Cubans at their | Embassy in Paris. He also wanted to spend some time on the Riviera Chir xeee a SEBEE -29— EN Wh oe hoe thin cee Sot tM gia ttaene ee en EE, ote
aadie bees EES NE EERE ELA SIS BITES NU Si Rat ters yene thst eae AT Bika eovae ae seat oe oP8 gitkiorw eRe Prat ofeat the Embassy was not a problem at all. No plans had been laid on for hig ‘ (several days), as he.felt, or so he told AMVHTP, it may be some time before he would see this area again. As it turned out, scheduling for the Growery meetings, sf training, and plastics demonstraticns precluded his taking the Riviera trip, and ale’. postponed his seeing his Cuban ; ; 4 13 friends. He finally went to the Mtbassy on Tuesday, 21 August to make i what contacts he felt were necessary. As it turned out, Gramatges and most of the men were away on vacations, etc., so that his late showing at entertainment by the Embassy, and no one, it turned out, was expecting him at any definite time after his leaving Prague. He felt mech better, , AMWHIP reported, after he had made the Embassy appearance and learned the above facts. 33. Money Banked by AMLASH. ; At our last meeting with AMWHIP on 23 August, he said that 4 i AMLASH had given him $500.00 to be banked in Paris or elsewhere against | _# rainy day. It is also interesting to note that while AMWHIP said that j _ Mais any offer Of money to AMLASH would be an affront to him, AMLASH readily allowed AMWHIP to pick up the tabs for the hotel rooms and all expenses incurred during the trip, including a number of new pieces for his wardrobe, 7 . i and the plane tickets to Prague from Paris. AMWHIP said that when they i. dined together on 22 August, AMLASH insisted on picking up the tab, stating . i ° that he felt he should get this one, then expressed surprise at the expense of living in Paris. Neither did AMLASH seem to worry when it was ‘ L F we who picked up several tabs in Scandinavia. Funny sense of obligations 7 ; op a and finances! Sey (a RICHARD M. FALLUCCI fF im te tb PAR ace ®