(104-10192-40233 4. PECE IVED RETURNED a sence RR a Tt AEE EMPORIO PE eID Me engenea N HATERTAL REVEEWED AT CVS HEADQUARTERS BY HOUSE SELECT COUMETTEN OM ASSASSIGATIONS STAFEF MEMRERS FILE TELE pau r VOU unl: : Direc Asa OS fj yo = r* INCLUSIVE DATES: CUSTODIAL. UNI T/ LOCAT TON: DELETIONS, IF ANY?___ 7 STGONATURE REVIEI WI NG OFF TcrAn: DARE tED BY~ yA (PRI NAUE) NO RUCUMENTS MAY BE corer OR RE Nove: DOFROM THIS FILE, . + et a peo on ta sorte metered . or .
14-00000 CLASSIFICATION A : le On 5 Decenber 1962, the: Bntassy Consular Section informed ‘the. Station that an Marjan SD EMBINSKI : wens nnn " “DPOB: 6 Decénber -1913, New lew Jerseys. USA. ! - . “Residencei, ; 17. Carollyn Road, Eli jzabeth, tow JerseysUSA_ ges, ‘ + s Profession: Chief, Steward, S.S.* pe SAGA Moore JicCormack ck Idina: 7 Coast Ci Guard Identity Humber. 2-6 70lD ty a . «, fh pense f . oO aia Caneron “Pe. josecuh’ t 5b. Polis bee f fossel had come. to the Exbassy. ‘to report cortald inet tdents wht bg “hmerdeeal eamen and}. Fey! the Polish’ authorities, The’ subsequent interview with DEVBISSY T turned “P the. Se following. ‘infermation of possible interest to Headquarters -. 28 ep ks é. sup; esd Jo ey Gon / Taw Bi ee agEey a 26 on 1 Decenber 1962, when. the. MOR” “ACSAGA was docked: in ¢ in Gdynia, Poland» |: baad ‘DEMBINSKT was-aprroached by a. Polish official who had come onboant with tro other ~~ ‘innigration officers to iséue lamling cards to the crew. The official in question anf requested DEMRINS*I to. come ashore where the two could talk privately. - DEMBINSKI declined Stating that they could talk just as privately in DEVSINSKI's cabin. After ’ going to the ‘cabin, the Polish official again insisted that DE!BINSXT meet‘ with him - “privately ashore. Unless DEMEINSKI agreed, the officer threatened’ to refuse: DEMBINe. SEI a landing card. DENDINSXKT became angry, said a few dirty Polish words: to the official and the official departed in a rages. Later in the ship's dining room where- the. landing :cards were being handed out, the same efflctal once. more: asked if DEMPINSKI had: changed his mind. When DEMBINSKI replied in the negative, the officer tore UPS the dandirg card and threw it on the deck» . “3s Later, the same day, DEMBINSKI had a chance to apeak with the Polish driver (name not: knorn} of the official automobile owned by Moore McCormack. The driver rmed DENSINSKI that the official who had tried to pressure DEMSINSKI was one | pruners whom the driver: described as “a very rough man", The driver cautioned DEMBINSAI: to be very careful with this person. The driver further pleaded with ORUBINSKT. not ‘to divulge the fact that he, ‘the driver, Had tipped of f DEMBINSEI as to the name of ‘the official. DEVBIi ‘SKI | considers the driver to.be friendly and pro— ‘American.’ DENSI SKI ras asked te ‘deserts, “SZ YMAS ed but was able only to say that > BEB Ce ao: Yd ak red i os. . 5 ~ ‘ che DATE TYPED GATE DISPATCHED Sistributien: “Tr, : ; Q 2 = Chief, S57 6 Dec. 1962." 1 7 Dec. 1982 DISPATCH SYMHECt AND NUMBER 2+ endet, FES ‘CDCA=10892 HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER r bo-- S72,
2 { OWSMAT DE EMEA ant Manas | . : QUCA-MIS Se GLASSIE Carry, CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH he ds about 5'1)" fn height, about 1320 lbs, ani circa LO years of are. DEYSINSET Rever sar S2YMANSK] until this incident, . so "+. Ie DEMBINSKI noted that another seaman on the MOEVACSACA, one AS PAU ; WOUCHIEHOWSKT, was alse Seen talking to SDYVANSKI, Tais seanan received a pass and Kent ashore. DEMBINSKI also mentioned that an unidentified desi on the MORMACRYN. has had meetings with a suspected Tolish Security official. This dosun, a naturalize American, returns te Polamwl every year to spend his holidays. a "§. In addition to the foregoing, DEVEINSKI stated that he at one ft became quite friendly with ; H abe letee cA copes ct mops ee EAP MS IO” ; , . ~ fee _ . _ nat ce io ce ce | Stanislew*uosion > ste 77 BAe OR eG Sak ; . 5; Current addrass:, Shepena 2% m 2? irsesecn, Poland. a felrsh . SEPT | ae ve wer ke df “a former, imnipration/securit. officer i ayn nsk ar Accemding ormer ISK Areas, § wrison. He was later DEMDINSEL,, (USION was fired from his job and s pent some time in released and currently works in a radio shes. On a number of occasions DEMBINSEI befriended COSIOR by giving him fool, clothing, and Cigarettes, They becane friends and “COS IOR used to warn DENOINSKI when the latier was reiug followed or under suse Picton. To convince DENBINSKI of hig sincerity, COSIOR once offered to show DENBINSK a copy of the official dossier held on DENSINSKI by the authorities. In view of the. jatest incident with SZYUANSHL, DEMSINSKT ds not planning to ever go ashore in Poland unless he has pretection. He would, however, like to see GOS1O5 again and considers him "a good man ‘to know", dut DERBUNSKI does not wish. to risk his neck in so doing. LE AS h rad Syke. a Las oe hae ae barges » 6. , there are no Station traces on any of the above mentioned persons. Kenneth Sy Pre xwoo! — eer ee acne ee . CLASSIFICATION {mass nc a EDITION © | 2 . i US« PREVIOUS (J CONTINUED se to
Gy The nate 4 al contains “ff mi tt ton ‘affects ‘tie, National: : Defers of the Caited Btates witnia the weading: of ‘th Esbie fidge Laws, POLAND ‘ounray . sunvect. / (6)! RECRUIT G27 OF ASST IN we Sate or -1957\= "SEP 1962 FEB A 1963- | cutie 18, Wc, Secs, 193 Gd TH “owbith Paany Ganher, to’ ‘an-usauthors WO, OF PAGES REFERENCES TMA Sh the. local jail. "fail; alley ’ formation. from WEIMANN about his contacts and about whoever might him about. the above incident. edly;;‘the security pare aca,’ GERMANY/32. OCT 62. ea ag | 7 Se  evanuation, “Fab | pred | J0R-4; 7000:Sw (USAFE) | os gogece PREPane BY ‘SAL $ scenes :. + (€)° Personal. deseription and biographical. data of an agent of the Pclish Secret Police. . po. | Recruitment methods of Polish Secret Police. .. Lo. .. oo. me ot Tere TTT ETT bees tteouaeere cecneeeees ceeeeee cteoeesece ae eaee cesses eens eangeaeeens aeeeeees save cesecesneee 4 ee GLIWICE $018K~-1839S (34U-CA~338 7h). yo on ‘All information contained in this report is based on statements of SOURCE's _ | ' .Qrotherin-law in GLIWICE, who personally had the experience dascribed in this report, i , / and discussed same with SOURCE. There seamed no reason to doubt SOURCE's reliability, ! ' who was’ cooperative, anewered questiona willingly, and no inconsistencies in his stat : ments were noted. SO . yo TTR. : EET: . SOURCE-furnished the following Tnformation about his brether-in-law: | os Georg, DOB: 8 Feb 1926; FOR: GLIWICE, ‘trddéts mechanic, present: occupation? "| laborer + , : in coal mine*GLINICE-SOSNICA, present reaidencet/\ # 20 Hine Trine, SOORTCA, GLINICE Pe And :. WRIMANN iv married to a French national, WEIMANS, Leona, DOS: 1927 or 1928. The couple ; oo has two girls, 12 and 10 years old. fis AS EAT mc , During 1957, while working together with two other minars in the above mentioned | 1 coal mine, WEIMANN discussed a recent upriae of the leborers-of another nearby coal mine i i: " againgt their, administration, with his two co-workers. Dering this discussion, he took : . the part of the rebels, and made several unfavorable stataaants about the present commu- : -y nist regime in Poland. When leaving ‘the coal mine at the end of his ahift, WEIMANN was ae arrested by the Polish Secret Police, who had obviously been tipped off by one of the VT twe co-workers of WEIMANN, The police questioned WEIMANN thoroughly about the people ” "adhe had told hin about the uprising in the nearby coal’ mine, and firally interned hin. in For. a period of two months, WEIMANY remained imprisonai in the GLIWICE this time to gather in- have possibly informed Finally, after two months, WSIMANN was told that he could secret police as police constantly attesptoi during .choose one of two things: he could either agree to work for the Polish an agent end -would then be freed immediately, or-he could turn dewn that offer, but would uld definitely end up with a longtime Jail sentence. ~ 7 then be prosecuted in court am wo I gs COP 60S DXSTAIBUTION SY.ORIGINATOR . OUTRBUT ITN BY MQUSAP . USAFE (DUP M/CZ)_ cn 7 stare 5  RELEASARLE TO: U.K CA AD% cowrtoairtaL : aks
14-00000 nee oes 95, ‘Y59,070. 1 acives, “netehbors, wand eotkata ‘anid reports. ‘about local _pepulation:.- 5 “atage Re . od ‘1 " k : Want: “Gormiany’ aaa . 2 nis Fast. ontise tions. with ‘the oe police: might” make an. enmai— - gration: “aposeitie, ‘but. wh: most * probably inpke ‘an attempt ‘to: procure a passport An the: very. near ‘future. - . Ne ‘further information. : } MAJOR UCAP ve -- F : fer MEREDITH H. SHADE a 2 noe oa Colonel, USAP | Ho, Commander | t : { L oe CCKPIDENTIAL a
14-00000 hg ish: eratains g the, Natiocat y sane to ea unauthor=” POR Btted by las. Pace et io 2ROROR. _paewees oy. MULDERURAND/RURBS recruiting repatriate for i (U))  Lesation of secret police office, wetiod of . SPY work, description of: secret police agent. ase etre ene s oe eee eocoreawooeee ee " I. BYTON: 5021LN~1858E (Qy5147). ATOWICE: SOLGN-190LE Province Adsial- 11. In Dec 62, SOURCE had applied to the K 2, still waiting for an. OG atration for-an exit permit to West Germany. In Apr & answer, he vas approached by a secret agent who tried to talk hin into-colla- borating with the-Polish, intelligence service. Because the agent had invited him to the: Hotel. "DHISTOL" in DYTOM, SOURCE obtained reliable confirmation ef the assertion by friends that. this hotel was the location of the BYTOM branch office of the Polish intellixzence service. SOURCE, .an artist of above average intelligence: _ and experience, soon understood what the. agent was driving ‘at, and refused on the © grounds that he was completely incompetent for intelligence work. ‘SOURCE related: his experience in the desire to draw attention to the subtle methods applied by ~ ‘the Polish intelligence service. = His statements were accepted as credible o / of the honesty with which SOURCE described Lis own attitude and reactions. . oe ae S pesen ep HS The agent introduced himself to SOURCE under the name’ WZAKRZE' KI" and as ERS an enplorec of the KATOWICE Province Administration, He cane ‘to. SOURCE's hore : i : in BYTOM afeer first asking for SOURCE’s permission over the telephone. ; ; ; Ae chi Ce DF CUTPEAKD OCC EIS APE (Ci RE AXMIOWIEE 5 wen) ZARRZEWSKI wa's about 38 or 40 years old, stScky DUI Te, about 170 ca, fecae? dark-brown hatr, black eyes, thin eyebrows, fleshy cheeks, closely. shaved, ; unfurrewed forehead, fleshy hands with short and thick tingers. He was conser vatively and elegantly dressed, his movements were lively, and he spoke a cultured Polish without any accent. His behavior aud way ef speaking were of axanner characteristic of the former pre-war educated Polish society. ALLEN PLES VO Rie RT GE pri Aa Ro VATRIAT EO , Mp, SAKRIEWSKT opened he ten Set TWECIE RAT _BPOLOSTES wenience he way causing, and assured SOURCE ‘that his mission was by no means disconfort SOURCE. He also showed SOURCE an. which, as SOURCE observed after a casual Payee) . Fer 1S) wert - ‘intedded to embarrass or otherwise identity card with his photegrapn. DISTRIDUTION BY HQ USSF ~ ca 4 ' $TATE Ss i . no 45 ; oo 2) BST RABUTION By pasinaTon | an 8 3. i USAFE (DUP M/0Z) beer pe
wr tH! We : : a} I as . a He *: < . ; \ Ad. 1 cis . a . ao . a we Mfas pili salsa) acegar aw LSPfARL ery a i” PACE 2 ys Boesch. - CONFIDENT IAL ar “Faee joka; 70 Od Sw “ inspection, “identified Mr. ZARRZEWSKI as employee of ‘the passport division ‘in the - KATOWICE Province Administration. tig] TARMEEWSNT’ then explained ‘that he was. authorised te offer SOURCE a strateht : deal. which, ff SOURCE only cared. to consider {t realistically, ‘would ‘turn out to . thelr rintual benefit. SOURCE'9 "personality, particularly “his academic education: .., atid Ada réputation as a painter together with hi knew loyal-attitude towards. ~ “the state, qualified SOURCE as the ‘ideal partir ta-a si what delicate under-.... taking... The ‘personalities of influence, for whom Mr. RIBWSKT was authorized. 7%." ape could: not think of-any one with ‘qualificati “bettér tlian SOURCE SS”. . . SOURCE ‘replied that, of: course; hie would gladly become a partner to ary efforts interided to" promote the arta because -they were the only ‘things he really cared” ‘for. SOURCE had, after Hr, ZAKRZEWSKI'' introductory rénarks, quite correctly . » - Suessed what was meant by the "straight deal" and-he, therfore, tried to dvoid: “the subject... Mr. ZAKRIEWSKI then asked SOURCE frankly how he did with hia 3. Piaintdag. . SOURCE could only truthfully renly that his art was definitely not -;) Sultéed. to provide a living for him and his wife. This was also the reason, -7.. ‘SOURCE emphasized, that he wanted. to leave Poland because-he could no longer: ' '" bear to live from his wife's income. oo nd . _."This {a all well known to us” said Mr. ZAKRCEWSEI, “but do you in all seridusnése believe that you will do better in Weet Germany? They have painters --. by the thoisands and you, as. a newcomer to this crowd,.will only be sorry to’ have joined them. You will have to depend on your wife's income more than with us in o" ° -Poland"., Mr. ZARRZEWSKI..then ‘continued: that the aid which SOURCE would receive ' “ would' enable him to better devote hinself to hia art because financial worries - would be taken from his mind. ‘Is not this a straight deal?", Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI asked, "you help us and we help you, and we know that your help will be worth the . money", When SOURCE asked what was meant by “ua and "we" and what kind of - "help" he’ was expected to offer, Mr.. ZAKRZEWSKI cautiously replied that, before . . being more, specific, he would need SOURCE's agreement to the proposition. 7 "Please try -to: understand", Mr. ZAERZEWSKI said, "I represent, as you have seen, the government, and it is part of the deal that details of your mission will be | be made known.to you the moment we know that you are wllling to help." SQURCE then I, ob ““o-  pefuged by emphasteing that, as an artist, he fole in ne way competent for the poh mission which doubtlessly will te assigned to him in.Garmany. His nerves would he ‘not stand the strain and, sooner or later, he would fail, and thus ruin himself. rt Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI..accepted SOURCE's refusal without the Sslightest.sigen of dis- . : a appointment, impatience or anger. He Listened to SOURCK’S words with a friendly Poe .. Smile on his face, and commented that such a reaction was only natural and even /) . > Feasonable from a man like SOURCE, and it was only furthér proof of SOURCE’ s i inordinate intelligence and integrity. He assured SOURCE that there was no ‘ hurry, and important things quite naturally need some time to be carefully thought | ; over. . Inviting SOURCE to carefully reconsider the offer, he asked for permission. , 4 pol ' to approach the matter a second ‘time in a few weeks. On this occasion, SOURCE anf o no should be prepared, after Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI's telephone call, to cone to the hotel | Po "ARISTOL"-on ULICA PIERSCEGO MAJA” (First of May Road}, where matters could be Po, discussed more easily. SOURCE agreed to this arranvement because he was afraid ks os" that, by a flat and uncompromising refusal, be would joopardize his exit permit. ne The hotel "BRISTOL" was an impressive four-storied building with a tavern i i ; and a night-club,-which had been renovated in 1960. It was patronized by well-to- | to ‘do members of the intelligentsia and tourists. He remembered having heard from joo. | He fellow members of his painters’ club that the secret police had rented a wing in poe .one of the upper sterics of this hotel. . The rooms, number unknown, were said to ih PoE ' .be furnished as offices and club rooms. vo Between above conversation in Apr 62 and SOURCE's departure dn June 13th, 1962, Ci deky 9 Efe dors tii — _ CONFIDENTIAL
Be meee ee sperceme om y fer too CONFID ENT EAL aePoRy, vs pase 3 prov JOE-9, 7OOO Si’ 1Y4. (USAFE 262373) Fasis Mr ZAXRIESSKI or another member of the secret colice tried to ring up SOURCE In his howe four times -and told the caller that her husband was not at home and that she had no idea where he was. be at haze. up and where he would work at a certain time. with which the callers seemed to be satisfied. SOURCE obtained the exit permit without having seen Mr. ZAKRZEWSKI or any The callers always asked her politely when ahe thought he would ; SQURCE!s wife would then explain at great length that her husband's occupation was guch that he himself could never tell when customers would show In all four instances, SOURCE's wife answered the telephone She would then give a day at random other member of the Polish secret police a second time. ont hemes Ohhrnrag ser USAF ‘i ARNOLD F. YON MARBOD Major, USAF Element Commander APPROVED: AJOBR USA web y ia Colonel, VSAPF Commander Locket. we adie} CONFIRENTIAL f ber 2 Lo ~ So SQ
74-00000 hot i " MILIGYA (milit Kteh ta: any manner to. 62° urauthor= “ited. ‘person Ag prohibited by law, » fracn 3029, 7000. usar ___ PREPARED Bv JULES Babay  guneadame | 5 =. The Rlteged secret police | official ‘Fesided at the eastern. outskirts of ZABRZE: SOLON~1847E (34UCA425745) on ULICA PIOTRO SKARGI (street name). The house number was possibly Is, 17, or 19. : Ir. Fro 1949° to Oct 61 SOURCE personally ‘observed the individual about twice per month on: ULICA PIOTRO SKARGI... SOURCE resided in vicinity of the individual, on ULICA GURNICZA: #23." ‘SOURCE gave information freely and no inconsistencies, were: noted. (TEL. ALLEGED SECRET, eoltex OFFIctaL; eco: UB eFriciot. pe ta 0 aeiadaypte ce re edeow’ gst FELAnD DGUMACE HOLAND cs Family names; eal DOB _cirea a 1930, 175 ca, stout appearance, dark hair, round — Pod face, erect posture, cynical -fé ‘face expression. SROKA was observed by SOURCE either . _ dressed.in ‘civilian clothes” ‘or-vin' the’ greenish-grey uniform of a Polish secret. police officer.’ Time : of obsérvation-was between 1700 and 1600 hours during weekdays... SROKA was usually cafrving ‘a ‘dark-brown: suitcase in his right hand. SOURCE was several times warned about SROKA by. Focal ethnic: ‘Germans, who considered SROKA a very dangerous informer and. ardent’ hater | of. Garmans, although’ SROKA” had been affiliated with sone Oermian-Nazi_ youth organization : German residents of “ZABRIE. after. several years with the MILICIA, SROKA had jained the : local - ‘secret: police in. ZABRIE. According to hearsay, SROKA had: become a leading secret ‘Police of official in GLIWICE: “‘SOL7N-1840E. in 1957 or 1958. No further information. _ APPROVED: 7 ty he beds + MAJOR "USAR. whl for MEREDITH H. SHADE Major, USar : Colonel, USAF. Element Comidider’ Se . Conmtander CISTRIBU TION BY onigiwaton” USAFE (DUP M/0z) DISTRISUTION BY HQ USAF” cta. Oo STATE é w iGladsitcationy CONFIDENTIAL ro 34 AELeASAsLE |
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acs aS two sisters, oe av tAP AAS Y sa oe oe 7 . - 934 | JX-27989 ‘Y f 24 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, EE/Poland SUBJECT: UB Penetrations of Israeli Embassy in Warsaw ' REFERENCES: A. YT-1103, 25 November 1961 wie . B. YT-AZ51, 6 February 1962 _. .'], During the course of investigations into the information contained in paragraph lL. a of Reference A one of Juliusz HIBNER's fou [2.677 are living in Isracl, has been contacted. She ie fui" “ ‘¢Mra)- Rache ¥7¥ OSENFELD, born in.1909, who settled in Palestine ‘in 1929 and is currently employed as a clinical psychologist in -Haifa,-In questioning her, she waa sincerely cooperative and , there is no reason to doubt her loyalty. “ap ag G63 7 a ie 9807 ) _ (wles3 ~ | ae Caster werid War Il, Mra. ROSENFELD went to Poland on two occazions. | ‘In. 1946 she was sent there by Jewish national inath- tutjons to make arrangements for.the transfer to Palestine of ” Jewish children wherfiad. survived the Naz? holocaust. She met her \, two brothers, oe a cet MISNER both of. whom were sym- ‘pathetic and assiated her with her misaion. © Mrs. ROSENFELD's _« second visit to Poland took place in August-September 1955 when _ishe accompanied her daughter, Tamar, and her sister. During. her Bix weeks stay, 6l:e lived at the house of her brother, Josef,. ‘but met Juliusz HIBNER frequently.) 1:3, Mrs. ROSENFELD is certain that she didnot attend any official function at the legation building or at the home of an Israeli “diplomat in Warsaw. However, ashe visited the legation several — ‘times and also had several talks with one of the legation employees Lin the latter's lodgings at the Bristol Hotel. She believes that, on” ‘these occasions, she may have mentioned certain matters of in- terest which she had gleaned from conversations with her brothers. 03 COY
i hi i a , H 1 i} : , . e _ . 8 . cee . Ee.) \ - ' 1 ° ‘Mra. ‘ROSENFELD stresses that questions pertaining to Israel, (the situation of Polish Jewry and emigration were frequently . ye ‘discussed'with her brothers who showed a keen interest in these op. po subjects: |On one such océasion, Juliuaz HIBNER atated that he en an ‘and other Polish leaders were in favor of Jewish emigration to Fo, |. , israel and intimated that official authorization to this effect was 2 sede about to be given. Mre. ROSENFELD is virtually certain of | ae ‘having passed on this item of information to her acquaintance fad _« at the legation. She cannot remember where the talk in que stion ft ‘|, took place, but is inclined to believe that they met at the Bristol m4 E _, Hotel. ; : , ; 4. With reference to paragraph 3 of Reference A, no useful comment jis available at the present writing. Spee ee STEPHEN C. MILLETT, JR. 7 re on , ae Chief, C1/SPG . th | ‘ a
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S-0aHRT pig _ DEFECTOR RECEPTION. cover oS Po. Yana “county ‘Date DISTR. a2 JUN 62 -Suaiect. : Pobish. ‘fonder seoirtty ‘Tropa’ Oyerationg) 9. oo . . pare or icouuanon 1 September. 1955 to July 1961 «REFERENCES! PLACE ACQUIRED = t Germany “dub 7 182, OCs MAS . THIS 1S" Ni jALUATED. IwrorManion? ' SOURCES 08-962," a “Pol tah Border. Guard ‘iteutenant, defected in Casablanca; —_ ‘: Moroées, on 12: July’ 1961 while serving as a student.on the Polish | - ‘Navy training ship ISKRA.- Hie’ ‘atated reagon for defection. was his “dissatisfaction with cond tions in Poland. He was born on-5 Novem= ° ‘ber 1936 in Szwejkow, » near “Mcenasterzyska, formerly Poland; now | a Ukrainian SSR. He attended: elementary schools in Monasterzyska and -Zloteryja and secondary sehool in Zlotoryja, graduating. in 1955. ‘ In 1955 he waa inducted into the Border Guard Brigade... He graduated - . ; . ' from’ the Frontier Security: Forces, Officers’ School in Ketrzyn t; : an August 1958 as a second: Vieutenant From August to November 1958 ; oy - he was: assigned to the Baltic: Border: Guard Brigade, in “Koszalin and - was ‘gent: to & counterintelligence course in Gdansk. Upon completing | the course, he became assistant to the command ing officer of the Border: Guard counterintelligence post at Dziwnow from November 1958 to-June 1959. From July 1959 to August 1960, he commanded a Border ' Guard: counterintelligence post. vat ‘Sliwno. From August 1960 to July - 1961, : he attended the Westerplatte Higher Naval School (Wyzsza Szkola : Marynarki Wo Jenne) imienia Bohaterow Westerplatte) in Gdynia as an , officer student. . He was a member. oF the Union of Polish Youth in — '.1955- 1956 and Joined the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party in June, 1956. His standard acore on the Army Non-Language Test ine dicated: well- ~above-avacrage native intelligence. His bona fides has. been established for intelligence exploitation. purposes. The infor-_ mation in this report waa acquired by source from observation and. hearsay » when he served in the Border Guard. This report was prepared ‘by the Army: unit at DRC and is eireulating : in the Department of the Army as Report No. 962-P-3403. 7 4 DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. . . DOD DIR 5200.10 . we OR C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-IeA-L Ae H iis af
oo a. ,coastal Sia ee ONAN “pousit BORDER sicuntTy. TROOPS! OPERATIONS (a) “Pave of Contents De Ge ‘Grlterta for. Selection of WOP. Personnel -----~--.-5- woeenewen ee ‘a. Border Sentry aeaaen genase mda meee eee en en enna eneeee ee (. BR. Guard Checking Patrol-----2---2--s--22--n2enesnenn een enn= . ‘if. Observation Patrolecn---<s000~ Sor ee ene newer ene ewnweneene ce. Border Inspecting Patro] --<-9ne--e- nnn een nme nen meme om d.: Listening Patrol~----~---- ‘a0 a 0 Hm Sa Ot SO am as e. Roving Patrole~««2-0m0~ a a oe a eB "gs Technical Inspection TRAMs --an enna nnn nnn nnn men en oe ee mee = -h. Ambush Patrol-+~ ee ee enon! oe eee ” > oo Pursult De tal lq-cnccnen come ene nem enn eee ee Screening. Detail----------e--2----- pe eee ana enna neannee -. Gangplank : ee tet 50 a a is Border Convoy~+00-<---- scene neem enn neers een n en emenennewe ; * Search Detalle--«-e-cceecnane on wneewn Outpost Sentry --<-- 22 ee meena nme rene we ee en ee tm mm mee p. Charge Of QuarterS-2-<--an ann n mmm nnn nme m anew aa aman mmm | Alert De tal] --2-2--2---enenenne nen enna ener ene ee aren - 2-P-INOS | S Page We) Qs “Duty Officer-~--------nanennerannnnerntnanennnnn nanan tees . a. Defending .Force------------0---- enn wenn nen enn n enna enen ene b. Attacking Force-----------~ sone t tere nne tetera e nn enna eeen C. Umpire Staff-----2-n cen. en nen nanan nn nnn n nnn en nee e enn e een Miss {on-as->---+ com A ee a an es we en om $e ee nab A eo aD Wen AR am ew ae A HRN ane A Ae ee A em So SA on 0 AE OE SN Se As SS tl ED ath St Rh) a mn ea SD RD HD ne SEL Ey ae OE Area of ‘Ope rations~ 7 Execution of MAneuver--e-a-nneea-nnenannnnncnnsnnenananennnnen CONFIDENTIAL c ‘10 10 LL Ll Ll 12 12 12 12 Heat a Bl Ne hk Bis ra or en eee ae
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL 3 962-P-3403. ; : RC-6514 _-POLESH BORDER SECURITY TROOPS' OPERATIONS (U) Table of Contents (Cont'd) Page Nr C. AIR AND HOME TERRITORIAL ANTIAIR DEFENSE FORCES----~------0---0---00 B COMMEND LB ma wo mw mm ee me mm an we ta a a a 13 ANNEX Aron cen nec enn nn enn ee ee ene nanan new ee nen 15 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 4 962-F-3403 RC-6514 © POLISH BORDER SSCURTTY TROOPS' OPERATIONS (U) . Intreaiue tion Source obtained most of the information in this report from November 19538 e serving with the Polish Border Security Troops (Wo jako Qehreny Pograniéza-soP) as counterintelligence officer at DZIWNOW and SLIWNO Posts of the Baltic wOF Brigade. Before this assignment, he attended a 3-year ; course at-the-Serder Security Troops Officers’ Sshool at KETRZYN, from which he zraduated in 1955 as a junior Lieutenant. From September 1960 until his defece wu & ° tion he attended the Higher Naval School at GDYNIA for WOP Officers. ra to August 16% 2 Source's over-all knowledge of the Polish Border Security Troops ' operations can be credited to nis interest in the service and to his assignment as a counterintelligence officer, which gave him the opportunity to work with WOP units on all levels and with Local police and security organs. Listed below are the names, UTMs and geosraphic coordinates of iocations used throughout this report. Coordinates are not shown for well-known locations. LOCATION UTM GEOGRAPHIC BIALOGARD 53 OON 16 00E wy 6504 DARLAWO 52 25n 16 255 WA DL3L DEIWNOW ‘ 54 02N 14 46E , vv 8587 KARWIA 58 S1N 18 1SE XA 2079 KETRZYN 54 OON 21 225 EE 2492 LEBORK 34 31N 17 285 XA 7847 MIEDZYWODZIE 35 OON 14 41E vy B04 MRZEZYNO 54 0SN 15 18E “WA 1900 NIECHORZE 34 C6N 15 025 WV 0694 NCWOGARD 53 50N 15 O7E WV 0746 POBLEROWO Unknown , Unknown PUSTKOW Unsnown Unknown REWAL && O8N 15 OLE WA 0193 ROWY 53 30N 17 O3E XA 3260 SADLOWO , Unknown Unknown SLI#NO 53 04N 15 OLE WV 0291 SLUPSK 53 25N 17 OLE KA 3138 TORUN 53 O1N 18 362 cD 4077 TRZEBIATOW 53 O3N 15 165 WY 1790" USTKA 54 35N 16 SLE XA 2050 WRZOS CHO 5% CLIN 14 48= vv 8785 ZOLCIN ‘Unknown Unknown CONFIDENTIAL
ast aS F CONFIDENTIAL . . -RC-6523 POLISH BORDER SECURITY TROOPS’ OPERATLONS (U) Introduction (Cont'd) \ 1 Listed below are the official abbreviations, English translations, and transliterations or names in the original language of organizations used throughout this report. ‘ ABBREVIATION ENGLISH TRANSLATION NAMES IN ORIGINAL LANGUAGE Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza WOP J Border Security Troops MO “. Citizens’ Militia, Milicja Obywatelska WKR , District Military Headquarters Wojskowa Komenda Re jonowa PZ Counterintelligence Post Placowka Zwiadoweza GPK Border Traffic Control Point Grantegny FPunkt Kontrelny AK Home Arey (underground during Armia Krajowa ; World war IT) . WSW . Military Internal Security Wojskowa Slusba Wewnetrena Service KBW Internal Security Corps Korpus Bezpleezenstwa Wewnetrenego MSW ; Ministry of Internal Affairs inisterstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych PKM2 14.5-ms antiatreraft heavy Przeciw Lotniozy Karabin machinegun, ZPU-2 Maszynowy Dwu Lafowy MOM Ministry of National Defense Ministerstwo Obrony Naradowej A. OPERATIONS OF THS BORDER SECURITY TROOPS l. Border Area Tne border area was established by a Law passed by the National Council dated OL March 1958, which revised the existing law governing the security of the Polish frontier. Source could not recall any details of the law, except that it stated that the border area was divided into three parts: the forbidden strip, the border strip,and the border zone. a. Forbidden Strip (Pas Wzbroniony) This was a strip of land, also referred to as the border control path (pas Drogi Granioznes), which was completely under the Border Security Troops' (Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza-WOP) administration and control. There were no markers indicating its Limits. The Width varied, depending on the terrain; it was never narrower than 10 m and seldom wider than 100 m, however. The forbidden strip was an evacuated area, but by special permission the local population could enter ‘t for a Limited time to remove firewood and harvest hay. The forbidden strip was 6 m wide and was plowed; a telephone line ran parallel to it; and wooden obServation towers on it were spaced 3 to 5 km apart, depending on the field of vision. To the best of Source's Knowledge, there were no physical castacles, such as barbed-wire fences, electrified fences, and trip flares en the Polish frontier, except west of SZCZgc in. 5 CONFIDENTIAL
14-00000 ~ the border or trom th All persons desiring to r “additional 3 nautical miles. CONFIDENTIAL | & 202-P-3403 RC-6515 eastal areas the forbidden. strip remained off Limits to LS Qstober to 15 April, ‘and from sunset to sunrise fron There were no movement restrictions within the Strip. on from 15 April to 15 October. . . In thee pedestrian traffic from 15 April to 15 Ovtoder. in the daylight hours during the vacation seas The physical security means alongs the coast were the same as along the inland border except that radar towers were to replace the observation _ ‘ towers sometime in 1902. : b. Border Strip (Strefa Nadgraniezna) . Souree described the border strip as an area over which the Border Security Troops exercised operational control. It extended 2 to 6 km from @ coast and {t was marked with a sign "Strefa Nadgranicenas eside within the border strip were required to obtain permission from their county Citizens’ Militia (MO) office. Upon arrival in the border strip area, they were required to register for permanent or temporary residence with the local Registrar's Office (Biuro Meldunkowe). In the coastal area, during summer months (15 April to 15 October) tourists and vacationers were not required to obtain entry permits from their local MQ; however. Transient passenger traffic through tA veg they were required to register, the border strip required no special authorization. c. Border Zone (Zona Graniczna) Source defined the border zone a8 4n 4rea over which the Border Security Troops brigades exercised limlted operational control. The zone extended up to 30 km from the border. The entrance into the border zone was sot marked and no special documentation was required to enter or reside in it. da. Coastal Waters The coastal waters were divided into two zones: the territorial waters, extending 3 nautical miles from the shore at low tide, and waters of the adjacent strip (Strefa Wod Przyleglych), extending Into the sea for an The WOP exercised complete operational control It was within the WOP authority to enforce ‘avent fishing within the limits of arch all craft, ror over the territdrial waters only. existing water traffic regulations; to pr the territorial waters by foreign fisning fleets, and to se stowaways, proper documentation of the crews, and contraband. 2. Criteria for Selection of WOP Personnel The WOP enlisted men came from normal conscription channels. Source did not know the criteria for Selection used by the District Military Orrice (Wojskowa Komenda Re jonowa-WKR}, but he thought that to qualify 4 conseript had to have only a clean police record and a minimum of 7 years of education; political reliability and membership in the Communist Party were not factors. Conscripts with ll years of education (gimnazium) were selected for raduation,© and sent directly to WOP Orficers' officer candidate training upon : d to port battalions School at KETRZYN, or for NCO training, or were assigne or to border traffic centrol pests. 3. Training After passing the medical examination at the local WKR, early in October, e conscripts received orders to report directly to WOP Brigade 6 CONFIDENTIAL
14-00000 ‘to about 1600 hours. Garrison training was re CONFIDENTIAL | 6 | 962-F-3403 RC-6514 headquarters. Here, they were assisned to the Brigade Recruit Training Center, where they underwent 2 weexs of nreliminary training and cursory medical examination, and were organizai .nto training companies, platoons and squads. Following the 2-week preliminsry training they were given 14 wees of basic infantry training and basic borger security training. The conscripts were sworn in after 8 weeks of basic training, usually on New Year's Day. Upon success™l completion.of the basic tratning in early February they were selected for specialist training and NCO training. The specialist training prepared the craftees for duty with pert battalions or with border control posts. The training lasted from 6 to 12 weeks. Con- scripta who were selected for NCQ training attended the Brigade NCO School, which lasted 9 months.. The mandatory training in the outposts was conducted by officers and noncommissioned officers. Because of the staggered hours of border duty, the training was conducted twice daily, from Od0O to 1100 hours, and from 1300 ther inefficient and the schedule was not rigidly followed because af the shortage of personnel. The main stress in garrison training was placed on border guard subjects. The men were taugnt the methods used by border violators, border regulations, detection and intere- rization with decuments pretation of tracks left on the slowed strip, famillariz and permits used in .1e border sone and at border crossing points, types of patrol duties, searching and conveying of arrested personnel, and use of service dogs. All WOP personnel were required to quality with their individual weapon twice @ year. suspended from September through February, during Garrison training was spe ripts were discharged while the new conscripts nin which time part of the old conser: were still undergoing tasic training. 4. Duty The duty of securing the (element) consisting of at least patrols, each charged with a spec fie duty. rorder was always asSigned. to a patrol wo enlisted men. There were several types of cs a. Border Sentry (wartewnix Graniczny) The patrol consisted of two or more stationary guards designated to guard a limited sector of the sorter, a road block, a bridge, and road and railroad barriers. The tour of cuty was 7 nours every 23 hours. Their equipment consisted of an AK Kalisnnikow suomachinegun ani 70 rounds of live ammunition; a flare pistol, PS-ss, with six white, three green, ard three red flares; a flashlight; an indivicual first aid kit; and Steld glasses. The equipment was considered standavti fer all types of patrols. bd. Guard Checking Patrol {Slement Kontrolny) The patrol ‘consisted oF an armed officer ari one armed anlisted man or noncommissioned officer. The duty of the patrol was to check the performance of the patrols posteé along the entire seeter of responsibility of the outpost. The patrol was regcired to maxe one check of the s&tor every 4 hours. The tour of duty was 4 hours. : ce. Border Inspecting Patrol (Element Badawezy The patrol consisteé 22 two or more walking guards designated to guard @ well-defined sector of use borer, or the entire length of the sector, of In localities responsibility. The natrol inspected the plowed strip far tracks. 6 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 7 | G2-PF-3403 RC-6514 \ where civiltan population Lived close to the border, Uie patrol alao checked documents and passes of all persons permitted to work within the forbidden strip. The length of duty was 5 hours. t 1 d. tstening Patrol (Podsluch) The patrol consisted of two stationary guards designated to guard natural approaches to the border. It occupled a concealed position with a good field of observation and maintained absolute silence. A service dog ale ways accompanied the Listening patrol. The Length of duty was 4 hours. e. Roving Patrol (Patrol Wahadlowy) The patrol consisted of two or more guards designated to inspect a border sector area in the forbidden strip and in the border strip. Their _mission was to intercept all unauthorized civilian traffic in the forbidden strip and to check documentation of all suspected persons in the border strip. The length of duty was 5 to 7 hours . f. Observation Patrol (Obserwac ja) The patrol consisted of two or more armed enlisted personnel, — designated to observe an ascigned border area from a tower or from @ con- cealed position. The length of duty was 7 hours. a Technical Inspection Team (Element Kontroil Techniczne j) The patrol consisted of two comminications maintenance men designated to check and maintain wire comminications, trip wires, and flares, {if present, in the sector. In addition they were used to maintain observation towers, road barriers, guard booths and existing physical security means along the border. Their length of duty was & hours. h. Ambush Patrol (Zasadzka) It consisted of five or more enlisted men, armed, with an officer in charge, designated to apprenend border violators, acting on a warning from the CI officer, who vave the approximate route of escape and time of escape. Accompanying the ambush patrol were a dog and dog-handler team and walkie- talkie radio operator with a radio, type unidentified. i. Pursuit Detail (Grupa Poscigowa) The composition of the patrol was similar to the ambush patrol, except that the patrol acted on a confirmed border violation and pursued the violator until aporehended. j. Screening Detail (Grupa Saporowa) The strength of the screening detail varied, depending on the echelon of the unit to whicn it was subordinate. The detail was designated to seal off penetrated areas within the entire border zone. If the situation warranted, the border zone could be sealed by screening details of the whole brigade and adjacent brigades. k. Gangplank Guard (Sartownis BlokuJjacy) It consisted of cné or two armed guards designated to control leaving and entering traffic aboard ships berthing in harbors. The guard 7 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 5 2-¥F-3405 RC-6514 was responsible for survelliing the loading and unloading of ships, for ‘ eheck tng passes and passports of all persens boarding or leaving ship, and for maintaining a sign-in and sign-out beox for all persons boarding and leaving the vessel. The length of duty was 7 hours. 1. Border Convoy (Konwojent} The patrol consisted of two or more armed guards, destygnated to escort apprehended violators to the higher headquarters, or civilian authori- ties. m. Search Detail (Ekipa Kontrolna) ‘It consisted of up to 20 armed soldiers designated to. search ships, fishing crafts, truekS and trains for stowaways and contraband. length of duty was 8 hours. The n. Alert Detail (Grupa Alarmowa) The alert detail consisted of about 10 men or more designated _ to stand by for immediate deployment as directed by the duty officer. The alert detail was always commanded by an officer. The detatl used its own personnel to organize the varied patrols necessary to apprehend a border violator. The strength of the detail depended on the echelon of the head~ quarters to which it was subordinate. o. Outpost Sentry (Wartownik Straznicy) A single armed guard was designated to guard the outpost, keeping on the alert for approaching personnel and vehicles, and reporting by telephone to the charge of quarters all unusual accidents, Guch as pistol flares and illumination from trip flares. The tour of duty was @ hours. p. Charge of Quarters (Podoficer Sluzbowy) The duty was performed by an extended service NCO designated to assdst the outpost duty officer in carrying out the outpost operations for the day. His duties included: ta wake up each guard 50 minutes before duty; to issue each enlisted man amminition and equipment necessary for per- formance of duty; to assemble the patrol; to bring the patrol to the duty afficer for orders and instructions; to receive the patrols returning from duty; to follow the training schedule and get the proper personnel to the proper places at the proper ‘time; and to raintain telephone communication with the patrols on the border. The length of duty was 24 hours, beginning at 1400 hours. q. Duty Officer (Officer Sluzboxy) ALL outpost officers and qualified carrier noncommissioned officers (podoficer zawodowy) performed the duty. Tne duty officer was responsible for tne over-all operation af the outpost and for the security of the border sector in accordance with the operational plan for the day. His duties included the dispatch of border patrols, maintaining telephone Liaison with higher and adjacent headquarters, organizing and dispatching alert details in case of border violations, reporting all border violations to the outpost commander, battalion duty officer, local wOP counterintelligence officer, adjacent outpost duty officers, and the local commander of the Citizens' Militia. The length of duty was 24 hours. beginning at 1400 hours, CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL A typical order of the officer of the day to a patrol being pusted was as follows: "petyates ANIOLEK and PENTELA, I designate you to safeguard the borders of tho Polish People's Republic as @ roving patrol. The patrol : commander will ba Private ANIOLEK. You will perform your duty on the right ‘ flank of the outpost from the big oak tree on the extreme limit of the sector ta the firat road crossing. Your dut,; will be to prevent unauthorized violation of the border within your sector; upon arriving at the designated border” ~~ sector, to patrol ita full length and to pause every half hour and observe it from concealment. Your route march: Dirt road towards the weods, then along the northern edye of the woods. “At the end of the wooded area turn right and using the path along the plowed Strip walk to the big oak tree. Halt all. persons and identify them. In case of suspicion of any one's identity, notify the outpost by telephone. Your return route: the bituminous road to the road crosuing with the bus stop. You will be there approximately 0730 hours, at which time the morning bus should arrive. Upon tts arrival check documents of all passengers. Improperly dosumented persons escort to the outpost. Your duty on the border will begin at 0400 hours and end at 0600 hours. On your right flank until 0600 hours there will be a listening post, (names given); on your left flank until OS800 hours will be a border nentry patrol (names viven); you will establish contact with both of them. Maintain eomminication with the outpost every hour by telephone, and in emergeney by flares. Fire two green flares in case of penetration into Poland, three green flares in case of penetration out of Poland, and two red flares in case help {sg needed. The password for the day is trayonet! (‘ Bytom"). When crossing the plowed strip mark your foot prints with a letter X inseribed in a cirele Do you understand your orders? Repeat your order." The patrol comrander was required to repeat only the pertinent parts of the order. §. Planning of Border Security Phe outpost commander was responsible for the security of the border sector charged to his outpost. In preparing his plans for the safeguarding of nis sector he wulded himself by orders and instructions recetyed from higher headquarters (battalion and brigade); by the analysis of the Local situation by the CI officer and his recommendation; and by the terrain features existing in the sector. The commanding officer could order normal operations or reinforced operations (sluzba wzmocniona). The reinforced operations were ordered in the event of border violation, or an expected border violation; during political unrest, such as the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and Poznan events of 1956; during national holidays, 1 May and 22 July; during Christmas, New Year, and Faster seasons; and during locally organized political eonventions, bazaars, county fairs, and local celebrations in the border strip. The reinforced operations were ordered under the assumption that during the increased traffic near the border the incidents of border violations increased and the alertness of thé border trocps decreased. During reinforced operations the number of posted patrols was increased by 40 percent and the tour of duty was extended up to 10 hours fer enlisted men and career noneommissioned officers and to 6 hours for officers. Upon deciding on a plan of securing the borier for a given time period the commanding officer entered a detailed plan of action in the outpost opera~ tions logbook (Kslazxa Operacyjna). In his plan, he decided whether normal or, reinforced operation would be conducted; designated by name the various border patrols and their sector of responsibility; organized the area of patrols’ responsibility so that they were overlapping and mutually supporting; 9 | CONFIDENTIAL
i CONFIDENTIAL. 1c 962-F-3403 nC-6514 \ rt plans for border violations, fire, air attack, and in case Long the Baltic Sea, against airborne and waterborne attacks. Source had no information on the alert procedures except that troops were required to form in full field equipment in credes ignated assembly areas, and that the next higher headquarters were notified about the alert, : : 6. Pasnword and Sigas \ of the password for ‘the The challenge (Haslo) and the reply (Qisew} day were fixed by the brigade headquarters. The challenge was always @ come- ponent part of & weapon and the reply was always the name of a city> which started with the same letter as the challenge word. The procedure for challenging and replying was a5 follows: "yale! Who goes there?” (Stoj! Kto idzie?) and prepared ale of the outposts 4 1 Challenger! Challenged: “Border Service” (Sluzba Granicsna) Challenger: "challenge?" (Haslo) Challenged: “prigger." (Kurek) Challenger: "KRAKOW; thank you; free passage." (KRAKOW; Dziekuje; Droga wolna) means of mutual igentification known to Sources There were no other a strip described in paragraph ‘ir, except marking of the crossing of the pLowe above. 7. Reporting Procedures of Border Violations , or ather indications of unauthorized Whenever tracks on the plowed strip on tpest headquarters at once by movement ware observed, the patrol notified telephone and by flares. The outpost duty officer alerted the entire outpost, the CI officer, the battalion headquarters: ang both flanking outposts. He dispatched the service dog and the dog handler team to the place of violation, deployed the alert detail in the expected path of the border violator and ordered reinforced operations within the sector of responsibility. fficer alerted the brigade head- n headquarters; and deployed the attention to securing by road cad stations within a radius of At battalion headquarters the duty © quarters, the CI Seetion and adjacent batta battalion's reserve detail, paying particular blocks all road junctions, bus stops,and raiir 15 km of the point of porder violation. At brigade level the duty officer alerted the brigade headquarters and deployed the reserve detail in the porder zone, blocking road junetions, bus stops, and railroad stations within a wadius of 30 km trom the point of border violation. _ When it was determined that an illegal border crosser ned left Polish territory, the outpost duty officer obtains through command ehanneis permission to pursue the violator into the foreign territory- By mutual agreement of the Communist bloc countries such permissions were promptly given, and border guards on both sides of the border mutually cooperated. Simultaneously, the outpest duty officer notified the local Cl officer, who, assisted by the service deg handler team, tracked back the probable route of eScape in order to establish the point of departure of the border violator amd to determine whether any help was rendered to the violator by & local accomplice. The CI officer also alerted nis "arentura” in order to determine whether any Strangers were ob- served in the area, and to obtain any inforzation on the suspect. 10 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL Ll y62-F-3403 RC-6514 Berder viclators apprehended in the outpost area were first interrogated at the outpost hea‘iquarters by the CI officer, then convoyed under armed guard through channels to the brigade headquarters for final disposition. ‘In order to test and stimulate the alertness of the Border Security Treops and the confidential informant net, the chief of the CI Diviston at brigade headquarters dispatched a fictitious border violator every 4 to 6 months. Upon apprehension of the violator the personnel responsible for the apprehension were rewarded as if a real border violator had been apprehended, and were never informed of the true circumstances. The usual award to WOP personnel was 14 days of home leave, a radio receiver or money. Confidential informers were rewarded financially. B. JOINT MANEUVERS 7 - _ : : : ; . rc In July 195y, while assigned to the SLIWNO PZ Post as CI officer, Source received orders to report to the Baltic WOP Brigade headquarters at KOSZALIN, to participate in joint maneuvers scheduled to take place on the coast from 25 July to 10 August 1959. Upon arrival at the Brigade headquarters, he was briefed by the chief of CI Division, Major BRZOZOWSKI, (fnu), on the general Situation, them on his specific assignment. Source was assigned the duties of a CI officer in Lebork County with a mission to organize a civil observation and reporting force, alert to airborne and seaborne hostile forces. Source recalled from the briefing on the general situation the following alignment of forces: l. Participating Units a. Defending Force . { . . - +. Lope Me Tek The commanding officer of the force was Brigadier General Waclay KOMAR, who until his retirement in 1y60, was commander of troops of the MSW. Upon ‘his retirement the position of the commanding officer of the MSW Troops was abolish Subordinate to General KOMAR were the following elements: ; Baltic WOP Brigade; . Elements of the Pomorska WOP Brigade, consisting of one or two companies and an unknown radio-telephone element; Elements of the Lubuska WOP Brigade, consisting of at least one radio-telephone communication platoon and a battery of elgnt ZPU2; A separate KBW battalion from KOSZALIN, strength unknown, but observed major items of equipment consisted of unknown number of O5-mm AAA guns, M1939, unknown numbers of 76-MM AT guns, and 82-mm mortars; One or two company-size units from an unidentfied KBW maJor head- quarters from KATOWICE; : One or two company size units from unrecalled KBW major headquarters; Unknown, number of KBW helicopters and fixed-wing reconnaissance planes; ‘ Unknown number of WOP cutters and motor boats from KoLopnzec.* The commanding officer of the WOP force was Colonel Jan TRAN;? the commanding officer of the KBW elements was a KBW colonel, name unrecalled. ll CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 12 y62-F-3403 RC-6514 bh. Attacking Force The command Ing officer was unknown, ‘Cne battalion of naval infantry from DOIWNOW; Elements of an airborne division, Commandos (Komandosi), believed to be stationed in the vicinity of WARSAW, consisting of 200 paratroopers, (Source had no further information on the unit. } ce. Umpire Staff The chief umpire was an unidentified military colonel from MON headquarters, WARSAW, assisted by a team of military umpires. é. Mission Tre object of the maneuver was to test the ability of WOP CI organs to organize the population into a civil defense force with the cooperation of all Tocal civil authorities, social and political organizations, labor and industrial enterprises; the adequacy of existing WOP SOP's; radio and wire com- munication means along the coastal zone in the event of a surprise enemy attack from air er sea; and the alertness and reporting procedures of the WOP outposts deployed along the Baltic coast. 3. Area of Operation The mits of the maneuver area extended along a line from NOWCGARD through arebegarD to LEBCRK in the south, and along the coast line from DZIWNQW to KARWIA in the north. 4 xecution of the Maneuver y) The Line units of the Baltic WOP Brigade remained in place and conducted their norsal border Security duties. The remaining elements of the defending force were assembled in a wooded area in the vicinity of KOSZALIN.: G6 August the CI officers organized the enonet in the maneuver possible landing beaches the CI Division at KOSZALIN; tured paratroopers who maneuver area for the ruction of radar, radio From about 27 July to about civil defense force and radio-telephone comminicatio area; recomnoitered their areas of responsibility for and air dres and received, interrogated and further processed were dropped in small numbers (three or four) in th purpose of Sisrupting Communications, Simulating stations ani Oridges. : It was establisned from the interrogation of the POW's that the enemy preceded by a massed air drop, would land en beaches in the vicinity : i sea force, > of ROWY and MSZEZYNO. A fully motorized reserve force, Strength unknosan, was kept in the headquarters of the Baltic WOP Brigade, and in the assembly area near KOSZALIN as mobile reinforcements to be used when and where needed. about 80 paratroopers was to penetrate south An unidenti- Abort 3 August 195y, under cover of darkness. in the vicinity of LEBORK. Their missio were dropped as deeply as pe essible | and destroy bridges and communication centers. fied KBW unit captured the paratroopers. : . . . 12 CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL ls. ae On y August at about 2300 hours a detail of about 15 naval infantrymen, unit unidentified, landed in small pneumatic assault boats in the vicinity of HOWY. The detail was met by WOP troopers performing their normal border security duties and was quichly captured. About 10 August at O400 hours a battalion-size amphibious force landed inthe vicinity of MRZEZYNO. The force identified as the naval infantry battalion from DZIWNOW captured MRZEZYNO, but by 1000 hours joined forces of WOP and KBW, reinforced by the reserve elements from KOSZALIN, surrounded and captured the force. The maneuver terminated on 11 August, followed by a critique given by the chief umpire and Brigadier General KOMAR. According to General KOMAR's statement the maneuver was well executed and was a total success. C. AIR AND HOME TERRITORIAL ANTIALR DEFENSE FORCES (Powletrzna Obrona Przeciw Lotnieza Obszaru Kra jowego-POPLOK) (See Annex A for Source's schematic concept of the organization.) Source could not give a detailed description of this organization, but from Lectures heard at the WOP Officers’ School at KETRZYN® and from briefings attended during ‘the Joint maneuvers described in paragraph B above, he described it in the following general terms: The supreme headquarters for the organization was the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Forces, through the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Source did not know the structure of the Warsaw Pact Forces headquarters and the Ministry of National D. fense. The Minister of National Defense was Lt Gen SPYCHALSKI. Subordinate to the minister were the Ground forces, the navy and the air force. POPLOK waS a component element of the air force, commanded by Gen BIELECKI. Subordinate to Gen BIELECKI was the deputy for aviation matters, rank and name unrecalled, to whom were subordinate the flehter units, the bomber units and the special aircraft units (transport, reconnaissance, and observation); the deputy for aic home territorial antiair defense matters, Col MANKIEWICZ, (fMmu), to whom were subordinate the radar units, the AAA units, the rocket AAA units, the searchlight detachments, the smoke generator detachments, and the civil terrltorial air defense, consisting of the three military districts (Stlesian, Warsaw and Pomeranian); the Fighter Pilots’ School at DEBLIN; the Bomber Pilots’ School at an unrecalled location; and the Officers’ Radar School at JELENTIA GORA. Comments: For the description of the physical obstacle area, radar towers, observation towers, organization, equipment, and function of WOP units see Army Interrogation Unit report Y62-E-354L, entitled "Order of Battle Information on Polish Border Security Troops (C)" also published as RC-6490. 1. For the eriteria for selection of personnel for WOP officers and officers’ candidate training see forthcoming Army Interrogation Unit report "Border Security Troops Officers’ School at KETRZYN, Poland (C).” Source's biographical details on this and other field grade WOP officers mentioned will be provided in a forthceming Army Interrogation Unit report entitled “Polish Border Security Troops Officers (¢)." 13 CONFIDENTIAL
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL \ 1 : YyOoa-F-3403 RC-6514 Comments (Cont'd) a, Por Seurce's additional information on the unidentified separate naval infantry battalion, see Navy Interrogation Unit regert entitled "Aotivities of the Polish Navy" circulating in the Department of the Navy as CINCUSNAVEUR Frankfurt Report F FieS-61, dated 25 November Tycl, also published as RC-6403. 14 CONFIDENTIAL
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL SOUPCE'S CONCEPT OF THE ORGANIZ/-TION OF THE POLLH ALR HOMZ TERRITORIAL ANTIALR DEP PORES (POWLETRZNA GIBANA PRAMCIW UOTMICZA OMZAnY intense Vth SOWEBO) ppistry o Fighter Units Annex A Chief, Warsaw Pant ‘ (Soviet marsha names unrecalled) Date of Info: July 1461 Pantin of Info: Luctures at WOR Officers! ‘Scnool at KETRZ(H and briefings at Baitia WOP Brigade at KOUZALIN during jotnt mMAnGUYEers, July-Auguet LYSY. Source had RO Ouethe- job contact with the organiza- tion, and had no further information on any of its components. National Defense SPYCHALEKI) Naval Forces Air Porce (General BIELESCKI) Deputy for Aviation Matters Air Defense of ignhter Pilots’ Bomber Pilots’ Officers’ Radar | of the Polish ; School, DEBLIN School, Location School at JELENT [Territory unrecalled GORA | . uw mo CONFIDENTIAL . Bomber Units | | | Special Alreraft Units (Transport and Reconnaissance Radar Units Searchlight Detachments iAAA Units | Smoke Rocket AAA Generator | Detachment | Warsaw Mili-- tary -Distriot Territorial Civil Air Defense ‘Pomeranian Milite tary District | i 4 met