HOG00 aso is - ACR UR nce Te ie ie ates gear ataper ig ee SECRET REET ARH INE RI IE ft 276. Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name fer all travel abroad. j c. The Cuba TDY (1960) In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKC travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men- tioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with "CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: “I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. Y wags in Cuba in ‘63, Well, as NIKOLAYEY. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it cver to see what kin@ of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, So to speak, én accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asxed kow they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is worsxing for you. One, two, three, five days went by... YF had unlimited funds, any arcunt. I could go to any resvanrant, any show, So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: ‘He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, put for a month or two, to provide an opinicn... I worked pretty cleverly on trem, He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: ‘He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be cbserved there.' I would go and observe him in the mir- ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that’s all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an in- telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. Tey didn't know a thing... They had turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it.” In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the sudject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re~ called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer. Question: When did you travel to Cuba? NOSENKOs 1960, November and December 1960, Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV? NOSENKO : No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been gubmitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there . .. {Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that . ; this delegation could be accepted, but a little . « ater. And my passport had already been issued. | . My passport had already been signed authorizing travel ; abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to a the U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January . PocebSB aed 8 Degen ee com etneaeemet cee oe jane + ? £82 * ‘ wh cn om ' = SS sp CA A) cae) pares) es)
14-00000 eee, ®Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready. His passport has been formalized. NCSENKO. He was supposed to Bp 2 Z . es BE 277. ‘ Saas go to Cuba. GRIBANCV's deputy [S.S.] BANNIKOV, Said that a worker [KG3 officer] should be sent. But they decided not to send 2 worker to Cuba. "Why bother?” [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?* ane Suddenly there wags a phone call from the Central ; Committee {of the Communist Party]. Scmeone fron ’ the Central Committee said: “No, there is a direc- ‘ tive that one of our workers must go nevertheless." And only two days remained before the departure of the delegation. Wno could they send? Question: The first person they come across. NOSENKO:;: Trose who have passports. I had a passport. I was . —_ veady. And they Gecided: “Get going immediately." We flew thrceugh insterdam, through Geneva. We spent a night in Amsterdam and then made a short step in Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we were supposed to fly to Curacao. But we had a head- wine and the pilots were evidently afraid that we wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went cut of its way an2 made a landing on the island of Bar~- bados. This was net a Soviet plane, hut KLM. we flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104% and then went by KLM. Then from Curacao we flew to Arube. We also spent a night in Aruba, an interesting island; the water and natural surroundings are beautiful. Prom Aruba we flew througa Kingston, through Jamaica, and then to Cuba. And we flew the seme route back, but we @id not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we landed in Curacas for about 40 minutes, and’ through Parararicc--Sntchn Guianar-acrcss tne ocean, some island or anotner there, and from there again Lis~ bon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. Sut here the entire Gelegation flew [to Moscow] after a day or two and I took a train through West Germany [to East Beriin]. All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1562. His Story has been as follows: In the latter part of 1960, at the game time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special celegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was prepar- j ing for departure to Cuba. The delegaticn was a routine one, 2 consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the : Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of sus- picion, the Eleverth (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chief Directorate had Gecided that it would not be necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the Lo departure of the group, however, the Central Committee cf the : Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining be- i fore the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh to Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suit- ‘ able person and get all the necessary papers ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said: oa rs oo gape +e a 4 4 go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO‘'s statement con- tinued: °’So somebody said: ‘How about a visa?‘ And KUZNETSOV
00) REE RS. ' @@ [¢ appears possible that his name was not removed from the Re he RF 2 a Tee REN SLE RELATE EL NII NTA TY 278. a gays ‘Never mind. The Cuban3 will give nim an entry visa.’ and then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately anc Tae Netherlands issued their visa aiso right away.” NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this deleca- tion were purely of a security nature. He flew with the dele- gation to Cuba in October or Noverber and spent abouc a month and a haif there. During this time he accompanied the deiega- tion everywhere it went: “I was with the delegation. They go to a plant--I go with trem to the plant. I was with them all the time. They went co ‘ifferent plants, te watch the produc- tion. They met with some representatives of the so~called Insti- tute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people and they would have many discussions about how to increase produc- tion.” HOSENKO's cover assignnent was deputy chief of the deie- gation and shortly befor ceparting Mosccw he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delega~ tion and dzeveloped several “eonficential contacts" wuring the trip, which turned cut to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO, somewhat long and dull. ile explained that se would not have accepted the assignment had he hrown how A eee tap ot e and that he nad really wanted to go ony c- the United States. un his return trio to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport,’ the KGB Legal Resident in Cuba, 4.1. ALEXSEYEV, handed him a package with in- structions to deliver it to Moscow. NUSENKO did npt know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO toox the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of “letters betweel. MIKOYAN and KHRUSHCHEV concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulyaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Arriving with his delegation at the airpert in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was toid that a message had Leer. received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the packaje was to be delivered “urgently” to Che GUEVARA, who was touring the Sateilite countries and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found that GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in Berlin, and NGSENKO then returned to Moscow. CIA travel records show that NOSENEKO, listed. as a mineral engineer, transitted amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960; and that he transitted Caracas from Amsterdam on 17 Novem- ber 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas en youte to Havana.* Our records also show that NOSENKO again arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 Decem- ber 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December. There is mo record that he travelled to Berlin.** . @-CEN obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO’s passport while he was ‘passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas. original passenger manifest fer the 15 December flight to Boscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went un- noticed. leng the trip was to be, oa 38 4 eT ttn eet oh + — Se te ae ae
yaouooo 7 ot - | @e The Bulgaria TDY¥ and the LUNT Case - . ° Sn the spring of 1961, four monthea after returning from Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a . month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a. security Lobe. "watchdog" capacity. According to NOSENKO, it happened this ae wy ways "I think I first heard that I was going to Bulgaria, a 7 week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGORCY, Chief of the section having contact with the counterintelligence representa~ 7 ; tives of the Countries of the Pecples' Democracies in Moscow... . ’ He said: ‘Ycu must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV has decided.°* . He asked, ‘Do you know about this?’ and I said ‘No.* He said: i "KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] must tell you.’ But this was the first I had heard about it. YEGOROV said that the Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the a KGB to send an officer from the American Department of the Sec@ ona Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the , F ‘-> ---American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria... — —.---— —-- Oe 20 ee “After one or two Says KLYPIN told me about it. He repeated” —~— Smo ee the same thing and after about one and a hali weeks I flew to Sofia.” The discussicn continued as follows: Question: What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before you left? What briefings or discussions were held concerning what you were to do in Scfia? NOSENKO: I was told: “You are goirg for consultations. There are KGB advisors there. They will discuss it with you." No one was speaking with me about my trip. Question: What discussions did you have with your department chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this ‘ trip? . NOSENKO: Nothing. He told me: “You will go. You will see , 4 : ; what they are doing. You will tell them how to " work.* Question: Did you have any meetings or discussions with the : vepresentatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow be- ‘ ; fore you left? TlaraWean ‘'NOSENKO: No. Question: What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his section about what you were going to do in Sofia? NOSENKO: YEGOROV said: “You will go. You will tell us what they are doing.® - Question: Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know any~ thing about the size of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR? eee re ff No. Nothing. pe . Did you know the names. of any of the officers. of the i. American Department. of the Bulgarian MVR? : : “ls ar
Question? Did-you know what any of their. particular: problems.”  NOSENKO: No. Nothing. Question: Did ‘you know just what was the area of responsibility een ees: j of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR? , | NOSENKO: No. Nothing. NOSENKO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met . at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.* The follow ing morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV’s office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was told that "they want to know about how to work against the Ameri- can Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about how to work, right from letter 'A.‘" NOSENKO was.then intro- duced to the Chief KGB adviser in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and ‘to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases with individual Bulgarian officers working agsinst the American target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers on the principles of operations against foreign military person- nel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance post opposite tne American Legation. He discussed.KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressed the entire American Department for about five hours and told them boa “what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work." 4 At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred’ 3 with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been ; : accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations against Americans. ‘ j 4 a As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has pro- . vided one lead to a case in which he said he took pérsonal part. . | About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of : a April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were i a scheduled to visit Bulgaria’ in the near future, and he came se ' across the name Horace G. LUNT, NOSENKO recalled that a man named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him in 1958 or 1959 by one of his homosexual agents, VYOLKOV or YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO de- cided to check his recollection against KGB records and an i Ee) immediate phone call was placed to Moscow,: asking for traces. at mht tee wit Eactebe nd ta tet wn Oo Babak Gann Sheds hated a oe : ; ; ®-"HOSENKO had earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the Lt - Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, - until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to — _ Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been L- MF ee _ Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years : ot immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been. Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief . _ Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked _why KOZLOV was unable to “advise” the Bulgarians. in this - -dmstance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on | higher levels and that he had been.away from the work for’. a number of years.: : Bie j he
porary te A reply was received almost at.once:. "Yes.. This is the same" - approach, I told them I would not leave. ‘If you need my they should have an apartment ready... not far f + ot es 2B Ee wee LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual." NOSENKO told Cla. that the KGE had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's: homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not pre- viously known of then. ane re HOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows: oo i *yOoZTLOY and the Chief of the American Department were very in= . terested. KOZLOV said: ‘George {NOSENKO]. you must help them. They never recruited an American.’ I said that I would do what Y could. The three of us went to see General DUMKOV, the Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR. I asked them . i. if€ they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they ; 4 hed one who is an operational concact. J.) I said, acquaint : them, prepare a flat, make the pictures. This is the first ’ stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he had been tnere, why, who his acquaintances were, etc. Then we wert to YEGCROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV. called GRIBANOV. GRIEANOV, I later found out, was in a meeting with the department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't understand what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANCV thought that I, myself, wanted to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the pucne. GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. ‘Whit are you doing?’ he said. ‘You are not at heme, you are abroad. You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if you were at home.’ I said: ‘'O.K., 0.K. I wasn't going to do anything.’ He hung up. I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgar- jans were to ask me, I could not do it myself. YEGCROV became . upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians ; : were asking. ‘What they ask, I will tell,' I said, ‘but I am - 4 not leaving the office to go any place or do anything. I can - . only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is . caught. I can dictate the questicns to he asked. But the approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.’ “The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active participation, but they didn't know what to do. I told them : to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one. : The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there Long. I told them that if they wanted to take pictures and make a pitch later, that’s one thing. But if they wanted to do it all in one step, that is another. Tf told them they should consider the time element... The Chief cf the American Department, KOVACHEV ,. and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was made at the end of April, I think." oe NOSENKO went on to say: "I was in the office during the ‘advice,’ I said, ‘come to me.’ KOZLOV and I were sitting in i his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next ‘day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they approached. LUNT. I only advised them that after the first conversation with . him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. [f said 7 " a4 rom Sofia. I | told. them that if he agreed, they should change the place right away. Take him some place nice to finish the. conversation. That's what I suggested.” |... eases bi PC ah ‘oth
ree . The outcome was not. known to ROSE! ? didn't read any report of the results, and I didn't ask to see . ‘one. I.took a neutral position. They said everytuing was OK. oe gen 2 aoe NKO;forhe said: "2° ' The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief. cen . I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part .of 30 April, 1, 2, and 3 May. ‘hen I returned they said everything was O.K. and that he {.uiT)"had left. I asked them what they had decided for the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in 1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference.” Thig account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs somewhat from what he had said earlier, .on ll. June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimec tnen that he per- sonally participated in the recruitment of LNT against GRIBANOV's wishes: “They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria. ‘The Minister of Internal Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them. I went to help. An {American] professor arrived, a very prominent special- ist on the Slavic countries... They [the Bulgarians) had never tried {to reerzit} an American. ‘Let's try,’ I said. The Sov- det advisor in Bulgaria telephoned GRIBANOV and reported that NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American. GRIBANCY wes in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said: "Where the hell's NOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are you doing? I sent you only as an advisor.' Then he hung up. What ccuid I do? The Buicarians had already mace all prepara-~ tions... iI was embarrassed, but what could I do? I left the office of the advisor and they vere waiting for me... I de- cided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work. I felt that it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited... I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians. TI told trem to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell me and I myself can recruit him. Well, they beyan and I came there. He [NCSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was poor... I said: ‘You are a pederast.’ He also proved him- self to be a homosexual there [in Bulgaria}... ‘Well, what will society think of you, those whose know you?’ Well, what did this person decide? He agreed." The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still in Geneva. He volunteered the following: “In Bulgaria in ‘ April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate in this, I went there, and-I helped them there with the whole process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bul- . garians with what to do and how. He was the professor of philolery, LI.T." ' WOSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation “against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the ye approach was made the day before he left on his. May Day holi- day. On 24 April 1964 he said: “I remember that it was at the very beginning of May that this name came up. And we got the informaticn from Moscow the same day, telling us it was the same LUNT. I went on a trip the lst, 2nd, 3rd of May. - That is the 30th of April, lst and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of | ‘May .in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning: after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away, ee 3 ret 3 4 5 a oR a 4 i q euladanees i 4 4 3 3 a 4 i
14-00000 given all the: data, aia they. ‘called. back “pight away and ‘gaid: "Yes, this is the samé .LUNT who: was in Moscow...’  As.:s00n as. ‘this was established, ‘the next. ‘day the Bulgarians planted this. homosexual on him. They planted this man either next to him or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got te- gether and decided to meet with each other the same day or the next day. This was all.done very rapidly.* According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. Ee travelled on $ May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once re- ported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George “ENNAN,.an aca- demic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA, that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to 28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homo- sexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to whem he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian — civil police while walking cn the street with LUNT. After leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, cn 25 April 15961, LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning. a eo i aor | i 3 aan ithe,
RAID cen nmES eee re ie idl CR OOo : area 5, Transfer to the Tourist: Department in January’ 1962". “In the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis - Of NOSENKO's own request, to return him to the Tourist Depart- ment. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO from. — the position of Deputy. Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the | post of Deputy Chief of the American Department; NOSENKO's superior and friend KOVSHUK had leng had hits eye on this job, ‘however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the Ameri- can Department for it. (in fact; NOSENKO said, KOVSHUK had once held the job, lesing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.) NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation which his own promoticn to this post would have created. NOSENKO .@escribed his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations. The following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965: "The decision for.me to return to the Seventh [Tourist] Devartrent.in January i962 was actually made in about Septem« ber or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First [American] Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FELOSEYEY,wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEY, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred hack to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had aiready spoken to [V.D.] CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department as Chief of the First [{American-British-Canadian} Section with the understanding that I would be appointed - Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this position would be vacated by [B.A.] BALDIN [who was retiring in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not teli me his reasons... for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Depart- ment in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for. each of these positions." Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tour- ist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, ‘and discussed current operations and operational possi- bilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal erder for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 Decem- ber 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file _ and the U.&. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the -next few'days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy Street with him when the wturned to the Tourist Department in 1962.. Pa "these specific dates were arrived at under. interrogation in . i. February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said . that he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date); he said in. February 1965 that he was "“officially® transferred. — at the end of December and reported ta his new position at ‘the beginning of January (see below). =. : pet ainstiehs one veatsndas enidiedail, sinbademnde te tebe sty ehh ete wheat o bai ane denbtes,
re ~ to January 1964 (Tourist Department) . -l. Date of Transfer NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Departmert to become Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 he said on -@ifferent occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in February 19627; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the - date as 2 or 3 Canuary 1962, He has also reported that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus placing NOSENKO in the U.S. Embassy Section until late March 1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by the time GOLISSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January 1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 19613).* W.E. JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operaticon** con- firmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962, In February 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct) date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962. The CIA interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described on several occasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin Street and his receipt of reports from the surveillance post for three months afterwards; during ail of this period, NOSENKO had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Depart- ment. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDTAN made only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six days before the approach to JOHNSON. He answered only that he might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the "facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any corre~ lation of dates. Ze Functions and Activities As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the fourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required several months at the beginning of 1962 “to get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the influx of American tourists .during the forthcoming 1962 season. consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the | tourists as in the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965 . ‘¥ Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in - dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d. -#* See Part V.F34. for details on this operation. wih « Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street Ne Do nannenets name een perme Je et EERE alle dh ribet tet a 3 3 i aaitohedieas. oe ons alt
ce lear cectecenane hea dame oaeee tant as accented SEF seacoast tee romeicraiee ae oe. ROT Se ae — = ao yo) aie ag 2 er NAS tna a an AERIS ASL ICANT Ripe Dearing PUNT AM BOS a CL a Sea A AO ca wanes SO a RT Re # whether, in his €irst several, months in the Tourist Department, he had originated any new methods for operations ageinst Am- erican tourists. he replied that during this period he ‘nad proposed a study of representatives of foreian tourist firms in Moscow with an eye toward the KGH attempting to recruit j them.* This suggestion, NOSENK®D said, had been accepted. j In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked whar new knowledge con- cerning the use of tourism for esplonag? purposes py foreign incelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied . that. the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and ‘ ‘ that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational ‘ tourist groups. NOSENKO was then asked what new information concerning the use of tourism as a cover for espionage activity had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during thir period, NCSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new information nor had he heard of such an acent.** NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief of the KGH Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIRANOV, he was pro- moted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department in July 1962, immediately efter his return from Geneva, A year later he was made Firs: Deputy Chief of the Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title as there was no Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apert from saying he was V.5, CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962 to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tour- ist operations, NOSENKO has rot detailed the functions attached to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically concerning these duties, NOSENKO's first operaticnal activity after transferring to the American Tourist Section was supervision of a homosexual approach to W.E, JGHNSON on 3 January 1962. Additionally, during the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO tcok part in the recruitment approach to Horst EBRAUNS, in the interrogation Of Yale University Professor Frederick BARCEOCRN, and in the arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KCTEN. For a short time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexarder SVENCHANSKIY, owner of a tourist agency in New York Cizy*** and a Russian language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois. By virtue of his *- NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation (see Part V.D.5.). ** See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George BLAKE, a staff£ officer of MI-6, who confessed after his 4 arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by an CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington aduring April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate the American and British programs fer leqal travel opera- ‘ i tions, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union. Part V.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on Western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which vas peepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. This document, which the . ‘ defector GOLITSYN gave CIA, quoted verbatim certain ; fo pactions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE. i svat Beer reet cee ng a SUSROTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR by this tourist agency. + oh? 2 a ean AES AC Od gM IN me oe ee poets i a cre eee TOP SECRET ee
| j i i i H i ‘ ' ? 4 re rr es ae “gupervisory posit!on in the Tourist Department ‘NOSENKO: also be-. . came involved with John SHUBIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases - JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the. approach to Natalie BIENSTOCK (see Part VI.D.2.) was prevented by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962, Finally, NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB invescigation of Lee Harvey OSWALD after P-esident KBINEDY's assassination in Novem- ber 1963 (see Part V.D.6.). NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962 to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above hecaurze of the considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962, soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOS. ENKO estimated that he had spent a tocal of six months outside > Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two- day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for a conference on tourist travel with KGS representatives from the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eight- or ten-day inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a team headed by GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gérkiy Oblast on 16-17 December 1963 to. assist in the search for CHERESANOV, who had passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see Part VI.D.7.c.). 3. NOSENKO's Agents “hen NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's com- ments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.* Be Arsene FRIPPEL: FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case offi- cer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he eaid he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said: “FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was a weak agent... I recruited him but, speaking honestly, he - ‘was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future date. When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in 1963, NOSENKO met with him, once in Odessa and once -in Moscow, *.. The only other gent. whom NOSENKO handled during this -' period was the American Alexander SVENCHANSKIY. (See Part V.F.6.). os ' a ansihh hada aditel ee) Pe te rz Z| H i 4
es Ft TET . 7 ~ ae Teeny ae | a Fa pono 9 eT et tee mon I a ae a a} 288. but FPRIPPEL provided nothing useful on theze occasions,*® Whereas NCSENKO had normally met FRIFPEL in the company of CHELNOKOV during FRIPPeL's Moscow tour, he went alone to tne tvo 1963 meetings. . ; b. Johan PREISFREUND: After GOLITSYN's cGefection, NOSEIKO said, the KGS considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore ineligible for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason NOSENKO was told by the U.S. Embassy Section to continue to tandle PREISEREUND while serving in the _. “‘Pourist Pepertment, but as PREISFREUND spcke only Finnish and - Russian, he was of no use against English-spexking tourists. - Although NOSERKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to ‘Moscow in 1952 end 1953, this agent was not used operationally. 2a Cc. VOLKOV_ and YEPRIMOV: ROSENKO's two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV took part in the entrapment approach to W.E. JOHNSON several days after NOSENKO returned to the Tourrst Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not been used in any homosexual operations while UOSENKO was in the U.S, Embassy Section. ic was, accorcing to NOSENKO, the last tire they were engaged in KGB activity. At the end of 1962 or the beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their Files were senc by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSELKO explained that VOLKOV and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate. when NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department, he was instructed by the Americar Department Chief, 5.M, FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief® of the U.S. Embassy Section, to continue to handle G@RURES ROS We ee TEI a eae Sees ea al studying in Moscow, NC raocruitedGsse ang had used him in the developmenc cf U.S. military code clerk Matthey ZIJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1901, an operation which was still underway at_the time of NOSENKO's transfer. NOSENKO continued to meet GER curing the first months of 1962, end he recalled that in February or March of that year FFE to attempt to arrange a social meeting with ZJJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that 2nother KGx agent . could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not taken place by March 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva. Just before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NCOSENKO turned CSRS over to G.l. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief cf the U.S. Embassy Section. Gizgm? was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO be- lieved he left at that time to return to Syria. & i } ; } - © FRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV . im Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended i i. +@@ visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was  * lg@ guch meeting, See Part V.D.5. . 7 ‘ , saceceny pera itt Ee «
en Marina .RYTOVA: pale we we ; : “s oe 5 Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTAN-— TINOV of the Tourist. Department in 1956. or 1957, At that time- she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she became an instructor of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations, and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unicon. Thereafter — she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964. He cid not undi- cate that RYTOVA took part in any operations, from January 1962 until she began work for the Central Committee. ms 4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSON a. NOSENKO's Information: -NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1952.° He did not nane JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year f recruited /an American/. I cannot remember his name. Ee is from California, a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fac, and he turned out to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network capable of anything and, in particular, althoush I head a section there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., = have beautiful girls... and I have young pederasts, homosexuals. In partic- ular, I have one special pair /VOLKOV and YEFREMOV/ ~ I'm afraid that they are known to you and the English... Here is what happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: ‘Write it your- self.’ So he typed it on a typewriter. I sardr ‘No, I don't want it typed. write it out longhand.’... He had a very re- actionary attitude toward the Soviet Union. His attitude was such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups. ‘churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the coverrment horribly. He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e., the government is lousy and everything here is poor. i said to him: ‘Write, damn it, that the best country /in the world/ is the Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government. Weite, write.’ In general he did everything fi asked/ but then, right away, he ran to the Embassy_and told everything. This was in January of this year /1962/. He told everything. I : know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. .1 was there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying. Tf sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the job. ‘Tell me when he comes,' /I ordered/. I sat down. ‘He_has come, ' ithe surveillance_team reported/. ‘where is he?" /I asked/. ‘in his room,’ /they said/. ‘We'll wait,' /I replied/. They re- ported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went there at once. He was sitting alone, I approached him: ‘Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him. _I knew that he had told everything in the Embassy. /I said:/ ‘How . _ @re you? How about our connection in the States? And our | work in the States? what. do you think about it?' Tf said to ¢ him: ‘Will you work? Can you: give us something important or got?’ He answered: ‘I have nothing." I. said: -‘And i€ 2 _.* Other sources, personal. acquaintances -of: JOHNSON, have. reported JOHNSON's having homosexual tendencies. © .... i 5 ed 7
make “it public. chat’ ‘you are a ‘pederast, what wilh’ happen then?’ Se ‘No,’ ne said, ‘I will do anything you.want.'’ But I couldn't. (90. °° - tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said: ' ‘Listen. brother, I don't believe you. You are a bad per son, ' i We decided that we couldn't do anything with him. ‘Go home, t damn yo * I said, ‘3ut if you write one insulting article . t i a about ussia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. Amd “I left. He. pushed aside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called . fthe Embassy/: 'This afternoon in a restaurant George was frightening me.' we know he called the Empassy. de heara everything." . NOSZNKO's first reference to CCHNSON in 1964 was at a meet- ing on 2 February, wren he produced a note ‘bearing that name and the date 5 January 1962. “Here I have a name jotted down, Everett #allace /sic/ JOHNSON," NOSENKO said. "The date was .§ January 1962, but what took place i have absolutely no recol- lection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some . sort of contact, or he was being’ studied or worked on, or some- ‘ thing like that. But I remember nothing." seaward oni 5 NOSENKO next mentioned his approach to JOHNSON on 17 April 1964, Although not immediately recalling JCHNSON's name, he eventually rememtered that “it was scmething like JOHNSON, - JOHNSTON, or something that starts with a ‘J'" ard that he was. @ Baptist from the California coast. NOSEYKO placed the opera- ticn sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered wearing “just a coat, nO overcoat at the time." JCHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked whether the KGB First Chief Directcrate would have any use for JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest “ im JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact. + bE ene Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON ! . mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were ms i : found to be_“so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, , ' : that they /the KG3/ decided something had to be done" to stop. ' yo : him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on ; oo his return to the United States. At about the same tame there ; was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided i a ohne abe wie... +.,., ©@ @ntrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt ot ee JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR ~ no recruitment was attenpted, i because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had deters mined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal anyway. . NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach to JOHNSON, except. that "BOBKOV said I should go." (PF. D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, . os gupervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSEN- , aa ’ KO’s homosexual agents. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were’ ‘Selected to , Compromise JOHNSON .* we ae tele oe 7 indication o£: “JOHNSON” s° Rgnosexuality from one. or both. . these agents.
74-00000° Metropol Hotel. They told JCHNSON that they had recently ar- ‘kived in Moscow and invited JOHISON to visit their hotel room. JOHNSON agreed because “they uncerstood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came, and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and , one militiaman." Photographs of the incident had been taken, but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first confrontation of JOHNSON, A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another room. By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office, ard he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in accordance with KGB orders, NOSENKO discussed the situation with JOmiSON, then asked him to type and sign a statement that he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union.” JORNSON did as he was told. | JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the) 9 \ | I 4 [ vata lieaithncachasnbsa he Sul cendbar bs tdtta ded itive The following day, after the incriminating photocraphs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the Metropol Hotel ard esked nim whether he intended to Keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO presented him with an envelope containing copies of the pheto- Graphs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later: learned that JOFNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later ver- sien) the U.S. Embassy and assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation. Questioned further on 24 April 1964, NOSENKO said that, upen his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise, the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's pre- sence. Addressing JOHNSON, NOSENKO had said: “How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from five to eitht years for such relations. It used to. be three to five, not it's from five to eight." Frightened by this, JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate I the Soviet Union in the future, Po, i . . t NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an i wo Operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary ye i. - fb wea. letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't . Fe corfondiee snes ie. jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this. way. And not sO : everything that is written this way gets into their nands.: In this case there was a coincidence. - There was something we could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he is a - a homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably just say: ‘All right, to hell with him. We have to get rid .Of him. Let's see that. his trip is cut off,'"- of erewede + mieteratentd Ghetto - movenne eneaieemee ea a ae dtebSeavae, dhile discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January the following dialogue took. place: . MOSENKO: This. (the ‘approach) took place ‘in the summertime 1965; ef *62 or''63. ° Question: In your notes,’ you. have. the date 5 January 1962.:_ | BOSENKO: _ No, it: doesn't concern JOHNSON’ at ell. vemember . : it was\ summer; I think it_was:.'63.. capa
=": gg the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV, _“eourse,. because we haven’ t seen: “him yet.” “But even that first - ' gignal is very. helpful. So if he: goes on a Soviet plane, they will start watching him from the time the flight starts. ‘Now,. as soon as he crosses the border, he will -be watched by the border guards; he will.be watched the entire route of his travel. “This is a very important busiress, because the main task in re-. gard to tourists is to uncover within the general flow of tourists those persons wno are of interest from the operational point of view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and, wren the processing is almost finished, another person is added to the group. Nebody knows this person in the group... but he was added_at the lest minute. So this is an indication. This is what he /the agent/ was taught to pay attenticn to when he was being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government agency makes a request that a man ke sent to tne Soviet Union as .a tourist, this imnediately arouses suspicion, of course... In ' guch things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or twice a year. You krow, such a little Jewisn fellow - an emigre ‘from Russia - in the past, you know, scared of everything. The ; . last time he came he told us: ‘You know, I'm thinking about it ™ ° oa all the time,' he says. So they @sked him: ‘Are you afraid? any are you shakang? He says, ‘Well, T'm not afraid: I'm not shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiet...' His pseucoayn is 'ANUD' and his last name is SVEXCHANSKIY. Well, ‘ll give you all this later." z ‘ fd NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer Ye, N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY hed sent the KG3 many open code messages such as those described above, and a number of these messages have been considered to have been of definite opera- ‘ ' tional interest. NOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the presi- dent of “Afton Tours” in New York City and the owner of a ‘Russian-language bookstore in Chicago. at seers i . There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time | of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO reported on 1 March: : : 1965, because SVENCHANSKIY had had contacts with AMTORG in New 4 i . York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in con- : Po tacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this .- was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was de- ~  ._ termined that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO re- | : i ‘plied: "NOSKOV felt it;:" he had no further explanation.) The i recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that. Inturist , ‘ > . . . + Would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated. a - NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested for black- soe marketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement. - NOSENKO took over the case from NCSKOV in September 1963, and to his name was entered ‘in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY — verdes be naked nes NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKLY when the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September ne end one towards. the. end. of 1963. ; | Se. fone 2S are RRR ERE ene e ae por _ Information from. Other Sources: : “CIA records reflect: ‘that. Alexande SUENGHANSKIY was’ born | ‘He: immigrated to. the
aiae father’s papers in 4929, His’ earliest’ etiloyars t were ‘the “ALL- Russian Textile Syndicate" from February 1928 tc March 1931, by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by the Soviet Governmenc burchasing Commission in Washington from May 1942 until December 1942. Oucing the Second World War, SVENCHANSZIY served in tne U.S. Arcy Air force as “official translater“ at the white Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had frequent ccntacts wien members of Soviet aircraft crews. Frora October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for re- fusing to answer questions by the McCarran Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of Afton Tours, Inc., New York City, and president of Cross World Books and Periodicals, Chicago. Afton Tours is a branch of the Package Express and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent of Inturist. Cross vorid Books and Periodicals wes registered in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodinaya Kniga, the Soviet Foreign "rade édministration dealing with the cistrikution and sale of Russian-language books, periodicals, films, end visual aids. SVENCHANSKIY has made numerous trips to the USSR, including one in August and Septenrer 1903. Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and pro- bable Soviet espionage “Wa ee 2 Force service in Ai#s ka, 4gohae oe ; Ker en 3 pares: f his strong pro-Suviet las ene Suapicioasly close COn- ea with Soviets. In Auyust 1950 Harry COLD, then in prison as an a@mitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States.* GOLD stated that in. March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWIN, had been in- strumental in intrecucing his "co-conspirator" Abraham BROTHMAN to “another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A CIA report of 14 Sovember 1950 sites a “tested source" (a Czech national employed et the United Nations) as stating: “I believe that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, employed in the Sadio Section of the Russian Division of the nited Nations, is a comment ot and cae i ; Identif ied as a Soviet agent by ELiza- beth BENTLEY, KAcaKEVICH has since emigrated to the Soviet Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate by COLITSYN and by NOSENKO, Virtualiy all the individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had con- nections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet Intelligence Services. His business dealings have also brought him into frequent contact with Soviet officials in this country, including a number of identified intelligence officers. (two of them reported on 1 by NOSENKO) . _ - The * Bi October 155} edition of ‘the New York Times carried “the story of ‘GOLD's ‘testimony under.’ “the headline "Ex-U.N. , Aide linked to’ Spy Ring by Gold;" the Times reported. that ‘befor had executed an affidavit: to this effect the week : ore.’ aerune 4 semanas Ne eneraremn ei bid Hes iaketnt udestutade q 4 = 3 “3 ? ted Ely tos gies
perenne iene ones o An FBI report KOTEN's Arrest ar.3 NOSENKO was asked in Ceneva Gn 2s . had been involved in the arrest of an Ame ‘USSR in the fall of 1s3 Almost at ee this as the cese of fernara KOPN, @ ¢ Kew York City (znd hence an enployee c 64 whether he rist in the rec ized se# below) who had kein apprehended cn 25 NOSLN¥O explained that, while he had sor personaliy perticipated in the errest ard hat never met KOTON, ne hed supervised the case : from KGB Heedquarters and “the cane was reported to ma. NCOSENKO said that Kort had long boon @ mamber of the An- erican Conmunist Party and vas a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union after World War LI. On these trips he had a large number of contacts with dissident Literary figures ani with soviet citizens in general, particularly among Russian Jews.** Because of these many suspicious. centacts, bath the KGS Firat and the Second Chief Directorates had come to the conclusion that KOTEN might well pe a provocation agent planted in or recruited from the ranks cf& the Communist -arty of the United States. Mere- over, on the eve of KOVTEN's 19632 trip, the Tourist Department learned froia V.b. BARKOVSKLY of the First Chiel Directorate's Scientific and Technical (S&7) Directorate tiat KOTE. was carrying with him the address cf relatives of an important gent of the KGB's QS) Legal Residency, and that KOTEI i <5 imtended to visit them while in the US2h, NOS ENKO said he did ne a not know the name of this ayent Ete This agert was a naturalized Averican citizen, about 40 to 45 years old, an engineer born in Russia, who was employed in an “interesting industrial company or technical organization in the New York City area." For some time he had been working * CIA told NOSEKO of this information about SCKCLOW. in March 1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for , SVENCHANSKIY¥Y but said that “we considered thac he (SVEN. CHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to, SOKOLOd, .#* NOSENKO hes explained ‘in. another: context that . the. Second Jews because: the Israeli “Intelligence. Servicé has fre-— quently: sponsored such-contacts.”.. > ee “8 Chief. Directorate. is wary of forezgn contacts with. Soviet: ~~: | snenene EERE tee ee me besadet meet eet + andl
ak 4 ‘here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right - actively for th¢ KGB with "good, solid ar “formation” with “very. valuazke material for technical intelligence:" at the same time the agent had been | asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet eitizen, but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's production hed recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the acent de- clined, saying that "he was not ready to go just yet. First he was practically begging to come to the Soviet Union ard now he was balking.”" This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, kut in addition, it was about this time that the agent ceme into con- tact with KCTEN NOSELKO learned from BARKOVSKIY that KOTEN. “used to go to some booxstore that sells Soviet literature and through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEI knows, he became acquainted with the agent. who also used to go to this store. After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady," On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store in order to meet and ‘work on" the agent and that, having learned that the agent had relatives "in Stantsiya Loo, akout 17 kilo- meters from Sochi... he had evidently received tne assignment (to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on him." The KGB also had suspicions concerning the relatives, former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was known to the KGB, for example, that the agent hed written his sister in Stantsiya Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union, and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?” KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When they arrived at KOTE!:s hotel. however, the hotel administrator told them that KOTEN was on an excursion ard refused to allow @meeting. KOTIN then took it upon himself to travel to Stant- siya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoke to the rela- tives. In the course of. this meeting KOTEN took photographs of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along. From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get documentary data" and it therefore decided to “try to get hold of KOTEN. There had already been some indication during KOTEN's ‘earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments, the situation had now changed. Although NCSENKO's superiors. ‘were absent from KGR Headquarters at the time, immediate action . was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on’ myself because everybody got excited. . Everybody said: ‘Let's go. American Intelligence is active, none of our bosses are now.,'* By this time KOTEN had travelled to Thilisi, and there *@ homosexual KGB agent managed to. entice him into relations. - im a public park. These were suitably documented, and he wag ; then. Picked: up by the jocak Militia. © ‘(in the. absence. of. his fone =e arene = Ladin. abate fate obi tous 0 nahin gid tbh oobi’ ce teen dRrablee nba gee.
Set tad fap ent wean ADE hob bee ‘euperiora and fear ‘Russian people and believed in the bas ina publi¢ pizta, ¢ aporenension.) 3 permitted to con- yo to Kiuv, whore he wat sche luled to stay voy ra ‘ore’ Lesvang the USER insisted that t> Lleay. acts te erd that the REN not participates Z After cquestionirs ane Milatia. tinue tas itine for two €ays & Meanwhile, the Faret Chief Directorate, which was growing increasingly concerned that the MEd erent of the SEP are Residency *oula £t apprehended by the rP., wanted TO gst Gin OL of the United States Lefore this hapsened. fo ‘establish the true purpose” of HOUTEN 5 presence in whe USSR and whether he w2s an Anericen agent, as well as to hold him untal the E3BB agent had arrived eafely in the YSS% (as NOSEUKG «old the FBI on 24 Feb- ruary 1964), 2% wes requested thet KOTE! ce detained in the Soviet Unicon, The dicigien was made to arrest him at once on the basis cf the cempromising materials cotained in Thilisi. Following the arrest Ly the Kiev Militia, KOTHI was turned over to the KCB for interrogation; the purpose, NCSEMKO said, was t9 “break him, to s@cure tue edmissior ty ot heaocwas an American intelligence agent. At the game time © VR, the Gey agent — ; “SRM Claws hea failed tO Keep @ Nuaber ck scheduled meetings with nic KGB case officer, end ths Legal Residency teared that something nad gone wrong. He did «eventually appear. however. and NOSE.KO nas descrived the subsequent meetings as follows: “They askec hims ‘Are you going to leave the States?’ hea said: ‘well, I aon't knew. I have tou think ehout Lt sone moce.' So we said: ‘No, you have to leave or else wa will wash our hands of the whole affair.’ ©o he said: You gnow I was thinking of leaving with my wife, but my wife does uot want to leave.‘ To make a long story shert, they scent three meetings trying to talk him into leaving, and he kept hesitating. He Gicn't seen to want to leave, so then they tolc him: Loox, we are breaking off con- tact with you. If you decide to go. you kro how to do it. You are to oo from the United States to some place in Europe and go to the Soviet Embassy there. They will give us a gignal and the visa will be issued to you. But as far es we're con- cerned, we're breaking contact with you.?*" After this, according to NOSENKO. the KC3 released KOTEN when the Ameracen Communist Pasty and other orgenizations ‘gtrongly protested his arcest and imprisonment. b. Information from Other Sources Concerning KOTEN At the tine of his arrest KOTEN wes an instructor of Russian at New York University  dtrector of the Library for Intercultural Studies. aid a regular cor.tributor to the New dorld Review amd the magazine Jewish Life. Both the Library . for Intercultural Studies and Jewish Life have been designated “Cormunist fronts" by the House Committee cn Un-American -Aetivitiesr the New World Review has been cited as @ propa- ganda organ of the Soviet Government. KOTEN has said that, * despite his. arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes. to return there in the future and that he “still loved the ic humanitarianism of he Soviet Government.” . aL? vel $ “Re ard@ing the arrest ‘Times on 29 August 1963 carried an article under® he ‘headline’ “U.S, - Guide: ‘Misaing - i a 2 4 ee e 3 ‘f aadbiat ora,
i échericar. to at hew whith ihe st fied xe Fernacid b.. wifiinc a’ 23 Auguse, Seva . Yueurist travel Filed in Mor BIG Wes 4nros Cf Inturdise ¢ ent on tho. aed - & Vienna; che purtes Mr. K *, and caccumstences of hic arre.t. e Gibby NEEOLSMAN, a New York luvyer, self- n, and allegedly Tosi by &n ~ Eda : ao ‘clese associate or office manacer of the Feur Continents Loos spok ouclet an New York, termed tre i estic' and a “farcication.” : - SVENCHAISELY, who returned to the tn Moscow while KOTLN wes still bein, cic, st morals che. st wag trae ba had been 2 matter woul that KOTE:. } a ated that tae SVENCHATIEZS TY) e@res tp and bas et ca fi) Fy ome rat ad FbI sources ‘remarks concern: a 4 cote %
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14-00000,, : , anes rpiiece Merit HO fe cannon Be Information. from NOSENKO: At the first. of the 1964 meetings in Geneva | NOSES iKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in ‘late 1963; he was ques-.— tioned farther on this case on 3 February 1964 and again while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs vere largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1864.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the pur pose of the KGB oreration against BARGHOORN was to retaliate fer persona non grata éction taken against three Soviets in Néw York City In the case of John W. BUTENEO and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN “was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the ‘jailed Soviet], not because of any spactal importance of IVANOV hinself." NOSENKO said that in 1963 four EGR First Chief Direc. torate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauf- feur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity. ** GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGS Chairman SEHICHASTNYY to take “necessary measures," GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZ= NOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the Ameri-~ ean Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV | asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on any American--U.5, Embassy employee or tourist--that could *The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, fur- nish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length. ; BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the general outlines of cther operational activity centering ' around BARGHOORN during his 1962 trip to the Soviet Union. **Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 Octo- ber 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent, BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A. ~ » PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mis- sion to the United Nations; they. claimed diplomatic immunie ty and were released; a few days later they were declared - persona non grata along with a third. Sovtet, V.1. OLENEV,.- who was Pamed In the charges. by the U.S. Government, but: ‘was - not arrested. Another Soviet. citizen, I. Ae * for AMTORG, did aes "ce ~~ sansa MEY ! a 3 3
ote. Pienaetd naan - . -gerve as material for an arrest: ‘RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV | eae -gaid that at that very moment there were three or four - ; American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It sas known that they. had cameres, that they had been taking photecraphs, and that they had been observed taxing notes. If permitted, they ~ could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to Know what other pos- sibilities existed and instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on this. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the military attaches. . , GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were ré= jatively few American tourists in the Soviet Uniton at that time:* these included PARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRI- BANOV along with one other (name not. recalled). -NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the ECB had no. "strong" materials against them, They were ordered to make an ime= ‘mediate study of the situation and to report back to GRI- BANOV as soon as possible. Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything worth consideration. All the materi@ls or BARGHOORN were gathered together, and NOSENKO end KOVALENKO took them to GRIBANOY, explaining that he was the only possibility. GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with then;.. he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Toilisi and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special item which had been used to make BARGROORN so violently sick to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been nade of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found, In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements ard offered BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the pait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew. from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening. It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving “materials” to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this .|.. would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made . Bo difference to hin. . He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO ¢0n, another: occasio Aeq chew etmeamer eRe IM simiabeise ee sade.
306. to locate an agent ‘who ‘could be. used t materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second.. ; Chief Directorate arrest him “when he odtains materials which are of interest to American, Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to SEMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV's Signature; the letter was not ‘to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials (i.e., the-fact of provocation was not to be mentioned). ; GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along we ages with a similar letter from GRYAZNOY and RASHCHEPOV con- , oe cerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTAYY. While the four--NOSZNKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOVALENKD=- were waiting is GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the local KCB organization in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, = GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well as BARGHOORN. {KHRUSHCHEV was absent fron Moscow at the time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval. *) When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he bee came furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." | Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department bY (the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the provocation. BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (mame not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S. Embassy in the American Ambassador's car. He was #lone but for the Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was there- fore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at . Cad the hotel. ; : a San *NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN ree turned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN _Was arrested. As indicated below,. BARGHOORN returned from . Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested.on - ot .31 October 1963, six. days later. CIA records show that on | - , wie ge -30 October, the day before the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV greeted - ; ny ‘Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and Ce ; “ater in the day attended a luncheon in his: honor. . On 3h | ‘ we . . ‘Qetober, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SQUYANNA at~- _ tended a-per formance of: Swan Lake‘ in Moscow. . BREZHNEV was... |... "got seen in. Moscow from 29 October until. 2.November 1963. “4
“ahdlg vs foe bret bey Ho sooner had BARGHGORN stepped out of the. car. ‘than So a -----~ -"the-agent approached. ‘You are an American?" the agent. -> , ,--asked, "Yes." “Please take it," the agent said. The | : agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry oa : dn* BARGHOORN 's inside coat pocket and then ran off. fe bis " BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was -. geized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of ' the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest.. _A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the. ear, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treate ment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where a room had been prepared. “4 . L. I. YEFREMOV and K,.G, KRUPNOV from the American me Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHCORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. _When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an “incidert report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours, Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home. . ‘t+ ne, KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1060 a _ hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARG~ 7 HOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV: fa ' fhad.told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they — . ue reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the damaging materials.) The first. sessions concentrated ' on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.* . ‘After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, ‘but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. /+.,-,H@,said that he thought they were "newspapers or something,’ a that? he did not know what they were. -The closed package . “° was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN: it contained about “-  * 720 t6 25 pages of information on missiles. ."BARGHOORN ae an | jnote of course, given a close look" at the materials. 2b WE GE aar a a + JRerGnee © bas een _*Iin October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had . : a .been present on the day after the arrest. At this interro- os . oS Of '-gatton NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning 20° “ESBS, -? “personal background, employment, etc." -Then NOSENKO asked’ Vaid. vess BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials - to the Fig n hte person at the time of his arrest. When BARGHOORN could. te tT ted this, NOSENKO left. As noted. below, BARGHOORN. mentation. reported . that the materials. were not discussed at this par=- __ LONE interrogation: |. ° ; DN *=Apart: 1 the USSR» to the: Soviet TOP SEoRET
‘The CIA interviewer then read to him. the. report which fixed ; ‘the date of the approach as § January 1962, the date contained : in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that-NOS=IKO used the name } NIKOLAYEV. (see. below). Acknowledging that “nays e”" he had used a the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with.JOHNSON, NOSENKO mo | said: “I don't know why I made this mistaxe with the dates. I i think it (the approach) was the first or second. day that -I was in t the Seventh (Tourist) Departmen:. I saw myself that he had i (homosexual) intercourse... . Your Gate is absolutely right, but i this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?" Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department? NOSENKO:. Now I remember that it was immediately -~ one or two days. I know I returned in January 1962. i knew I would be going to the Seventh (Department) alréady in December. I was visiting the Seventh already then. I had not too many papers to turn over to the First (Arerican Department), and now I rememper that I moved to the Seventh immediately (NOSENKO's emphasis) after 1 January 1962. b. information from JOHNSON: JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he experienced an “incident with Soviet plainclothes- men in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." UCHNSON, who arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer that “he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON, little conversation transpired because the Riga ‘doctor’ spoke English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the ‘doctor’ said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who spoke English well, JOHNSON then agreed to come by the ‘doc- tor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JCHNSON said that he dropped by the ‘doctor's' recom about 10:00 the morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the ‘doctor' and his ‘student' friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV) . began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he i protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen i suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under I arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was i asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this state- j 1 ment and was taken tO a man in a third room who identified him- self as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated i and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein fer se NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriv , Evanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally ;, Called SeOrgiye @ variation of Yuriy, by family and friends — of int att Proce sinclad aR “eat webb dniee 52 it. on bal sated 2 tabs ses Seder wha’
. a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power - to dismigs the whsle affair, provided JOH 30" would do him a 7 favor. The faver turned out to be a signed comaitment that he - would mot speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States.” ; oo . ; ” Semen ent enareen say In the afternocn of @ January, JOMNSONY callea the Embassy . to say that he had been recontacted by the Cnief of Police, who ; it reminded him of nis pledge and showed him four pictures, JcHnscea : Said: “I den't xnow where they got them, rut they were diltie:." During the interviews by the FBl B27g3m) ee 33 se 1965, JOHNSON repeated substantially cr ¥e Continuing. to dery that ne sad actually been compromised. In addition to letters to his parents, ‘JOHNSCN sizid he wrote to about 20 other people, mostly “minister friends" abroad; apparently he die not : tell the FBI of their content. Shown picteres of VGLKCV ar : HOSENKO on 13 May 1965, JOKNSON said he had seen VOLKOV “some- ; where” and suggested that the photogrepn of NOSENKO was thet of @ younger man wnom he had seen in Djakarta in 1962.1963, 5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS a. Information from NOSENKO: NOSENKO made the following statement cr 2 February 1964: "In 1962 come U.S. citizen by the name of Forst BRAUNS came to the Soviet Vnion. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that time could not recall his name.* we tried to recruit him but did not succeed. He lived somewhere in Leningred, and in 1962 he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served - in the.German Army, and after the war Le changed his name and went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is either a i skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different.- it is I. Russian ~ kecause he changed his name when te was in Germany." , “3 3 4 é ang ewes Aw NOSENKC wernt into the operation against BRAUNS in greater detail on 17 April 1964: "This was /K.G./ KRUPNOV's case, This fellow was a Russian and lived prior te the war in Lenin- grec. In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad,.when the Gernans came, and when the: Germans were retreating they took him along and some other people, local people, and so he found himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, he — - + Was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he trot worked in West Germany and_then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - It : don't remember. “which year/ - he came to the United States ané ; i . settled down. «hy we became interested in this fellow... : : ZNOSENKO thought his name was something like ‘BRUNKS' or . "BRONX!/ is because he came from Russia. So, according to Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving ., ,. With the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor - ~ @£ your country. So there was something to talk to him about. - -*, Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section ~@f gome other section /cf the KGB First Chief Directorate/ =... ,_ that the. man is: working’ in. some very interesting: company that. < bakes computers:or adding machines or-some. other instruments. : But.when iI talked. to him he already left the company. He HAE ee EIS Leh tint pen sate shows, ¥ ing to“travel records.
ae te TRS YAPS ICT SERPS ne "They. called hin’ td Interist: They gave him a room in the _- -Sntugcist, fHotel/. Then KRUFNC. cransferred him from the Inturist ‘ to another hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and stzrted talking to him... Tren ne left him in his room and callec us up - said that ne neeceld help, that he can't do anything with the mim, I thought that he would ce able to handle him ali by hin- self, so I said to KOVSHUK:* ‘I'm serry. I thought he'd be able to handle it. He tells me that he doesn't seam te get anywhere, * - go I guess I'c have to go help Aim." 7 got t!lere and I see that the man :s scared stiff. He joesnic talk about anything, doesn't want to lastern to any cf these reasons. Keo wes told that, after 2il, he is a traitor to his ccustry, that he wene with the Ger- : BMNSeee This Fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his censent, he agreed to help us. re iio, NE 4a ants meee een eae me menetinmeerin 7 rane Ba WAvaNe seer cy “4 a “The next day he wernt to Leningrad. so 7 felt -that this acréement wasn't very fir, ralrable. 20 the next cay KRUFNOV esd. T went to see CUIELNCKCV /chief of the Tourist Deparement/. ; 4nad I ¢old him: ‘i feel that this acreement of his is quite : sheky. Iomonot sure akout it. S33 @fu «we to follow through? Ié£ we decide to do so, then we'll meve to go to Leningrad. £9 BRUPhOV went ena called th2 mar. anid the ran urciused to taik to ham. co tren Io was told to go. Se fl wen: Sto ieningres and... : a3 Went to nis hotel recom. He itockei che door , and he wooldn't let me in. The only thing, fortunately fer us, the lock in the Goor wain't a very ylod one, so we called a lovksmita, and he founc a key that opencd the door. “So we entered che recon, and we started talking to him. ‘The fellow was terribly scared, : s he was sheking. so it was quite srvicus that he would never work : fer us. $0 we finally decided: ‘Look, it's okay. We don't want anything from you. Go ahead, isave Goodpye.‘ And that was ali: that was the end of it. I ds kuow whether it was BROOKS Or BRONX or. some neme like that which he used in the States, but his true name was IVANOV." Perera In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came ‘A “to be involved in the BRAUNS cese. He also said that he dia Ms mot Anow why ERAUNS had visited che Ssviet Union, and that he ad could not name eny Soviet citizens with whom FRAUNS was in con- ; " tact in Moscow. b. Informatior fron BRAUNS ported, V.M, KOVSHUK was not inthe Tourist Department but — _in the Anerican Department.’ He may mean :V.D.. CHELNOKOV, Chief-of the Tourist Department. — ; a La ee lg & ;* NOSENKO. is apparently in errer. at this, time, he has re-
=<" ay 8 BT we’ 6.- Fhe -SVENCHINSN Iv ca a. anformeticn ire or: as vs SuRE oO: NOSENKI provided the lesa to Alexarder SVENCHANSKIY, KSB . Cryptinun "lob," on ts January i'¢54 an the course. of discussion. @f KSB use of foreign travel bureau persennel to spot tcurists of pessible. operational incerest. “Yell, her2's an example ne. of cur agents is.the directer of a smell. tourist agency. ' NOSENKG said, “He takes the tourist's application form which “hes a phcetograph, aud if he suspects the tourist of having ties (gte- American, Intelligence, he. gill. move the. Pee dave tase: for .. £.3 . _ scnanneenanee -terentenge sneer ee ib Tea bie Sy a lita
a Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution _ was drawn up by: KRUPNOV and signed by KRUFNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KHUPNOV then took it to the. office. . Lo of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first. os interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were , reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MISHUSTIN), the First Deputy to the Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV further directed that all . materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB _ 4 Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the . XCB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against BARGHOORN., After this, all-interrogations were conducted by this department; KRUPNOV. was dropped from the case, but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter. we SLL bi a ath We we oti ia Do etates 6 b. Information from BARGHOORN BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the ; Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. ; The purpose of his visit, as stated in his visa application, ; ; was to gather information for a book on how effectively the Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political ed- ucation and political system. His itinerary took hin to Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 Octo~ ber, Tbilisi from 10 to 17 October, and short visits to Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alma-Ata from 17 to 25 October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Noscow on 25 October and was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October, On the laiter date he was arrested and held by tne KGB until 16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no intelligence mission. Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA, His information indicated a high degree of KGB operational ine terest in him throughout the trip, including. encounters with at least five probable KGB agents during his first week there: an attractive waitress who invited him to "do the town, a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attrac- -tive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental in the drugging described by NOSENKO. At dinner in his hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a. . an young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music - _ So Conservatory. They left the hotel for a walk and ran into De Pe pe deme eee Bae a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the ae F three of them went to a. cafe for coffee. None was available, — a ne *Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that : BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, was - ‘of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely ree ; ealled the girl on the plane but either did not know or had ., forgotten details of any other specific activity. NOSENKO said that none of this activity was directly related to the. - -~-- provocation operation, which. was: based. ona. last-minute de-. > @i@gion. . NL  , So ‘ oO:
eee Sapper seen mes 3098, | but the young student went to the kitchen "to arrange things," and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting cofiees" appeared... Within an hour, BARGHOORN was in the hospital, acutely-ill. He wae assigned, to a room where there was another patient, and a woman doctor took care of his. case. lle was in the hospital for four days. During this period his. clothes,-. notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authori~ - ties. . : Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October,. BARG-. _ HOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The next six days. were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with his research, ‘In the late aftérnoon of 31 October he called on friends at the U.S, Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910, already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for a dinner appointment (prearranged. by telephone) at the Metro- pol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat. BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taker to Militia Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uni- formed Militia officer, The KGB was called. Within 30 minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name night have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him, assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* <All question were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of them in English. The package of materials was opened and con- tained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of rockets. This session lasted until about midnight and centered around BARGHOORN’s possession of the photographs and his “intelligence mission." He was then taken to the Lyubyanka prison. . Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARG~ HOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The '. Questioning concerned BARGHOORN’s biography, and nothing was asked about the compromising materials. The following day the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu)- PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as “clever and quick- witted" and as giving “the impression that he vas not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he. seemed not to care about what he was. doing, but doing a good ; job nevertheless." ob tasked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interro- gations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons, that he had to sign documents connected. with the interroga- tions. BARGHOORN confirmed. that. ‘YEFREMOV had participated — throughout the.entire series of. interrogations and had. -gigned interrogation. reports. attesting ‘to the accuracy of translation. . ee Sanit elds ik eon the print inboard te tem a”
obn Andros ShUUEN end his voar of birth es which NUSEMKO trough’ te the 1964 in Geneva. SOSENKO icentitsed SEUBIN as a of Russian extractiuna, @ Russian speaker. professor in New Yor. Caty. necording to rsonally isvolved in SHUAIN's fourth trip 12 o- 1963. SHUBIN had becom: Enown to gent: during his third visit te tae Soviet a0 fessor of cconoemics at New vor ; as Bae tee, Te) Me PaO Be yiously Kn e FRU Gieibsd Rites: ye 2a Moar e ee Z She following paragraphs srmation grom NOLENAO and other sources on ormation been baprecise 20 daring SHUBIN's third t Unions He saad on 25 Januiry 1964 that cow pome time during the prriod 1959 to 1 1964 NOSEMKO said ac was unsure of the t by SHUPLN but thoucat it occurred in any event, prigr tu 290 sud whiie ho was tour of duty Clune 1055 to January 1960) t Department. SOSENKO indicated on 26 June LIYSKLY vas tae ease officer in the Tourist sible for SHUBIN, and since at another tine VELITSRKIY ctraasierted from th department would urpuarc that he was placing the date trip es sume tine before the transfer. rted that ‘SHUBIN was placed under surveil during the third trip. He Las of fered as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO: as that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet wi fetal (Aeneas mime En at pig arek-on 2-February 1964 he-explained the illance as having been founded on the KGB's ing for this trip, as variously given by aflict with the fact that SHUBLIN had no rt between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according xplanation for this discrepancy, however, JBIN went to the USSR without valid docu- N's own admission about having gone. to , there is ne uther evidence of his teavel ion prior to 1961, _ ee ye tte Cettlntrrpitined* res oe nti te iad 7 whadhd biel tceatmdw awe 60
10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the ‘Cuban Missile ‘cris is — a oo tb Be Introduction - ade NOSENKO volunteered at his second meet mg with CIA in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOY was his “old friend" and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On. 26 January, te cesteladt attics LSet 1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKCV’s , 3 name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good : friend.“ In the 1 February interview, after displaying an. initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a “sensitive” . : subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's : ; alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said, derived from his friendship with BOLSHAXOV in Moscow, where BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following .a tour in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the magazine USSR). SOSENKO claimed a personal role in this ‘affair, in that: he personally proposed to the KGB leader- ship that the KGB. take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) cone tact with Robert Kennedy. NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of cone munication between BOLSHAKOV and-the Attorney Ceneral had developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detalii the circumstances of their introduction at # social function by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he "thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSMAKOV wa: “military intelligence officer," and he implied that they \ regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a ne useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the s KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way.- NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States “during the Cuban missile crisis,"* no one took over his. - role as a confidential channel to the White House. After Spe ! the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the . io : Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through their close ftriend, the artist Willian WALTON, during the : latter’s visit to Moscow in December 1963, NOSENKO reported ; - that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert. ; Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he hed proposed two plans which would have enabled this to take place, the ~ second involving WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSENKO said that the Ce ee GRU had “played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell er, Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. whereas . i there actually were such weapons there. According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington | for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 ‘October 1962. On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently to the President that “something new and different" was going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Ambassador DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the President) that the United States had no need to. fear Soviet. Stet a naan debe wi ott Le oe
tit bsp ain eens tepaes name Sanat cena Geen at eke aye the President": - KHRUSHCHLV pledged that he would not stir- agtivity-in Cuba.’ On 4 September POBAY-IN gave Robert poe Kéfmedy "an unusual personal message fron: KURUSHCHEY for —. ae up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. cleeationg. On tho same day, the Ppcsident stated publicly chat tha United States had no proof of a Soviet. offeasive missile capabiiity in Cuba. Also on the sane day, the Soyiot Union sent @ harsh pote to the U.S, Government concerning the Cuninten- ticnal) violation of Soviet airspace by an American U-2 | plane on 36 August; the note threatened “appropriate re- taliatory mezsures” against U.-2 bases should such ineidests be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-?, flights over Cuba were temporarily suspended, and they did not re=- sume until 14 October. Gn 6 September DORRYNIN again told SORENSEN that the Soviets had “done nothing new' in Cuba and gave his assurances that all thoir steps“were defensive in mature Ord did not represent any threat to...the Unitec States." On 13 October DOBRYNIN irforned Chester BOWLES (2 Special Representative and Advisor to the President) that the USSR would never sond offensive weapons to Cuba, Sini- lar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEY to U.S. Ambassador YOHLER in Moscow on 16 Octcber {the same day that the Pregi- dent was shown the U-2 photographs which vevealed the prece sence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GRONYXO to President Kennedy in person on 18 October. aeRO “ a ‘ 4 4 3 3 a i ee eat pe ey he AMS fem Two days later TOLSHAKOY told #asnington correspondents Joseph ALSOP acd Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had ro offensive wi aprons in Cuba, and satd he had been instructed by KURVSHCEEYV and NIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before nis departure fron Moscow) to inform Provident Kennedy of this tact. CIA hes -po indicetion that BOLSHAZLOV deulivercd this message ta the . President, or eve: dircetly to the Attorney Cereral, or : that, prior to his neeting with BEGLOY in Yew York City. he made any remarks about Sovict weapons in _ rte A soothe NS A oO ‘ peport of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP ard BARTLETT. Discussions at the White House, State Departzert, . and Defense Department about the erisis culminated in the ot a - -decision-to—imposea blockade onCuba; tnis decision wes announced by President Kennedy over nationvide television -—— qT ses and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overturcs for @ peace= — ae ful settlement of the situation were initiated on 26 Octo- ‘ ; ber by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.5S. FEKLISOY, ** , in contacts with the American journalist John SCALT. FEKLI-~ SOV's proposals were along tha same lines as those received *BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the “fhird Un- . = official US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held et . Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962... AIso. present at. this conference was Boris BELITSKIY,. identified. .— ‘by NOSENKO four months earlier as a. KCBecontroiled. source - of.CIA. (see Part VI.D.6.). BELITSKIY indicated st that’ time that BEGLOV might be affiliated with the KGB. ~~ be ee _ ---eaPERLISOV; wia-served in Vashington under-the abies, FONE __., Bapers (see Part VI.D.7.c-). was—the--suthor“of-ene—of- the d a among. the CHEREP.
a etn Oren. ° at the White Housé. late that right in a secret: letter: from - KIMUSHCHEV, At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in Decernber 1962, Presidential Press Secretary Plerre SALINGEH asked BOLSHAKOV who would “do his work.’ FOLUSHAKOY rerlied that . og s no one would de preeisely the sage job, but that if SALIN.. rn qe GER had “anytning special to say," he night contact Al, . j ZINCHUK, * , a CY b. Soviet Soure 5 During the Crisis — ; Ls NOSENKO has rot indicated that BOLSEAKOV had an tnfor- mation-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As H for Soviet sourc+s at this time, NOSENKO stated on several | ; : occasions in 1964, ie different centexts, that the KCR “had ; not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government’ in October 1462, On sore than one oc .casion he said that the KUB agent “SASIIA'** was unable to — furnish any information of value in this régard. Ile said this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned about "SASHA" on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO - said: ‘During the Cuban missile crisis the [KCB] First _ Chie? Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the U.S. will do. KNRUSHCHEV*** was rot satisficd with the work of the Intelligence, No ascents were producing inforszation on this." NOSENKO co:tinucd by saying that "SASHA’ re. : ported nothing to the KCB during the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, “he couldn'c kno« anything. 1 heard that this was very tightly held information, here wore just a few people around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they *ZINCHUK was: identificd ty DERYABIN by name and photograph in October 1954 as a KCB staff officer. NOSENKO has said ; that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptce rather than a staff officer. **For-a discussion of-the "SASHA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d. em ern ae ***Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962, KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the United States for a peaceful settlement of the Cubar situa- tion had been influenced by “information from our Cuban . i comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This informa« j tion had been received, KHRUSHCHEY stated, on the morning Co, ne con of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). .As previously indicated, ce © however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to — Sod CE the President was received at the White Hous?.on the night . Co a ane of 26 October 1952. =... oo : rr |
NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized BOLSHAKOV's CRU affiliae _ tion and the fact that the KGB was in no way -¢his channel to the U.S. Government via _ He first volunteered BOLSHAKOV's naze during a discussion . of the use of Novosti as a cover organi mine." Two days later, out of context with the preceding - discussion, he introduced the name agal this BOLSHAKOV, He is from GRU who was States." NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very in- teresting case" and added: “we shall talk about it later." When his case ofiicer trereupon turned NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say: Robert Kennedy. involved in zation for Soviet Intelligence officers. “Yuriy BOLSHAKOV of the GRU also sits there,” he said. “He is a colonel and a friend of - n: "Then there is in the United to anotner tcpic “{ know BOLSHAKOV ® very well. He is my old friend...] met him through Yuriy GUK...[who}was with him in the United States...and we are ‘now very good friends. He calls me up and consults me for advice...’ On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military inteiligence officer; “yet for some reason they chose hin" as a channel between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. BOLSHAKOV, 0- SENKO added, “reported direetiy" to the Chief of the GRU concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy. NOSENKG said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy . by an American journalist (unnamed) at United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for aoreception in the a walk, and as they strolled “down an alley," there was a man sitting on a bench direetly ahead of them. malist said: ‘Listen, Ceorge BOLSHAKOV|, are you acquainted. "The joure with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President and the Chief of the Department of Justice?’ BOLSHAKOV said: Of course, I have heard of him.’ ‘Would y introduce you?' ‘Of course, * BOLSKAKOV said, He led him to the man on the bench. There was that all this had been pr2-arranged." This contact"was at the personal de - BOLSHAKOV was called ia for this. As you know, idea of this contact was to pass information #rom KIRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEV to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKO have the meeting....Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV was a visitor in Robert Kennedy's nouse. ‘No. ou like me to ‘please do.' this feeling sire of Bob Kennedy. .« the whole to Kennedy a+-eIt happened ¥ who sought to Thay would first talk about ordinary things, and thea the conversation—~ turned to other matters...Robert Kennedy. did not say: ‘Please tell KHRUSHCHEV so-and-so.' He would say: tYou - know, some of these problems seem insoivable." And BOL~ SHAKOV would say: ‘And you know, at home they think this and that way...’ without actually saying that this was coming from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was clear without | ; explanations. It was af exchange of views on important. poil- like an intermediate , point..." NOSENKO commented that he personally thought... that it was a "case of mutual ‘feelers’ being sent out ‘by both sides--exploring some given current political situation.” tical questions of the moment. He was _ After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, KOSENKO stated,, no one ‘yeplaced him. as a channel to the U.S.’ Government.. “whether ZINCHUK could have taken over” upon BOLSHAKOV"s Asked: awe Got 7 ParOP erect Sy ect vrew gers Sees Tne pean
‘like there was befcre. It was broken. at the tine BOL-. “RO more messages. ” “told CIA on 26 January 1964: “You have shown. considerable departure, NOSENKS said: ‘Oh, no... There fs no contact. shectl SHAKOV left. | ZINCHUY was an agent or @ cooptce....No, there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOYV left. He passes Referring to the Kennedy=BOLSHAKOV ‘contacts; NOSENKO nea aati Fes ane tA dee interest in him 'BCLSHAKOV], even after his return to the Soviet Union...because all this was done by by- passing CIA." He said on 1 February 1964: “It was pretty obvious-that — this relationship between BOLSHAKOYV and Robert Kennedy had nothing to do with C1A, and CIA was not witting of it. It wag at the perscnal desire of Bob Kenredy.” he KG8 determined that CIA was unaware of the exchange between Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, beceuse when BOL- SHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, two CIA officers~-Kenneth A. KERST and Malcolm A, TOON*=—-tried to elicit information from him about his relationship with President Kennedy. "The most. important thing" they had tried to find out, according to NOSENKO, was whether the President and BOLSHAKOV had met personally. Although BOLSHAKOV did ‘not adait the fact to them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy--"he was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door into the White House," NOSENKO said. NOSENKO reported that William WALTON visited Moscaw:in Decem- ber 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOY, whom'he had * ‘previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy ‘a future political plans: ‘WALTON said that Bobpy...did not expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presi- dency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of running for Goversor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he felt that there were “some feclers sent out on the part of WALTON-onot exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion. WALTON was trying to sound them out, but 1 think that every= thing was left without an answer....My personal opinion. was _ that these things were told to WALTON so that ke could pass “: them on as, so to speak, Bovoby's plans for the future." . affiliated: with: cla any. any way. _> *88e0 also Part’ WD: &, on NOSENEO's. inforastion concerning  Leg_Haryey_OS¥ALD.. wee er AE Another topic covered in the WALTON-~BOLSHAKOV discussions, NOSENEKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy. ** “As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion re- flected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was “no Russian—involvement in’ the murder-of-the President. - -No-- aa cercpo orcs suspicion at all." oe NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the EGE could take over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would : 1 j personally invite the Attorney General to come” to the Soviet _.. - 2 Union. There the KGB would “set him up.in private living =. 3 4 quarters, give his everything he wants. .-S0 that. he would be mt f j *Neither KEKST, who NOSENKO: seid was. “guapected by: ‘the. KGB. of being the: Cia Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was.
pleased....Not' to make an regent or couptee out of has, a re _—- : Lut just to prosete a rapprechenent." Ia additioa, on the. “ wr fg. basis of vaat LDOLSHAKOV had tald NUSENAC about Ndbert Kenney’ Ss interest in a Sovier ballerina, this: slain called for the two ta ve brought together, and the ballertra; whe “is quite free in her bebavior sith the cpyestie sen, ": \, would do “everything necessary for the State." Sefore ‘ of NOSENKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, 5 the Fresident was assassinated and the ~atter vas dropped. 1 SOSENKO conecived his second plan during WALTON's trip to _¥oscow in December 19C3: "“BOLSHAKOY told me that ho wag going. to meet WALTON, and asked me whether ve bad an ine terest in it....I told the chiefs about ut and said: ‘'"Bet's utilize WALTON ourselves, Why should we let the GRU use hin?'' NOSENKO suggestcd that the KGB "tell BOLSHAKOV that we are scerking on WALTON.--that-this 4s a Number One target 23 far as we are concerned. BOLSHAKOV will do any-~ hing we ask him, HWowever, “the boss.said: ‘Well, you ; - . me Know, it will worsen relations between the KGB and the GRU, 48 Jong as they are working on it, let then do it.'" NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually essuned authority for the operation in Moscow frusa the GRU, as he iad proposed, the KGB Lexal Fesidency in Washington would have then taken over, and "someone new" probably would have been sent from KGB Headquarters to develop the association. this KGB officer would have betn "someone with a broader outlook wero covld carry himself well in social contacts." d. Information frome ie In nddit ion to KOSE*KO, one other Septet fource ad r Gnu officer, a. JAR ; repari qd that esidency e Ae ee nad set "recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOV an informant who was | an incr isagecgeursarion based in Washington. This jour- nalist, & ice ui had accompanied Vice President Nixon to the USSR in July 1959 and while there had agreed to coop . erate by "furnishing political information." BOLSHAKOV was 7 to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."* been dee tebe ta nedestore Me Lt
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prtsenbennnerepersis ret be Committee for State Security “Under the Council of Ministers Le USSR as December 1963. “Issued 4 to: Lieutenant Colonel 7. —————KO te uri vanovich | __ , For duty tor TGR of Cort kaya i Length of ten-"— ‘porary assign- . | ment: 15 davs through: ecemoer ~, Authorization? directive oF Z  Ghiet of a Chief Directorate ——— Effective on presentation of Adentity decument No.:  NK- 2513 Chies S. /GRIBANOV of Directorate : of Department -" Gonmittec. for State Security Under the, Council of Ministers, USSR oy Front | ' NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE ‘IN’ PLACES” a OF TEMPORARY DUTY a "Arrived in city of Gor’ kiy 16 Decenber 1963"; bbe the ‘ ', “Arrived in city lof Shakhun' ye. 17 Xt 1963 Did not use free quarters" s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia | “Departed Shakhun'ye 17/X11-63 Did not use free quarters" s./Chief of Shakhun'ye chief. Militia: Section, Militia Major ——(illegit , | Section, Militia Major eM diteg oot "Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963 Did not use free quarters" s./ (igtegibie) | — 7” Reverse (endorsenents only) TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO . a in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV a tl } [" j { ar Soe, te 4 ( obey *
| Ry i ain a ide madqeagges sane OW AAR bNLaS-O OE EONEEES CHROME RIE HOMER MB ee neEA et ae an rele dee bt eeeen rot Rank - NOSENKO's- KGB. Promotions.and Awards../" _ NOSENKO has been questioned at length concerning his.” "progress throu ~ant colonel. -this subject himself. . chronological order. 11 June 1962: "As a 2,500 Trublés per month] plus pay for longevity. 450-470-460 [rubles per month] in new money. gh the KGB ranks, from lieutenant to lieuten- He has volunteered additional information.on His various statements follow in Chief of Section, I now receive » plus 700 for my rank, for major, | l receive more tian 4000, i.e., ; This is enough for me...J am now a major but I should receive Lieutenant colonel soon. in grade. to lieutenant colonel it We have a system of tine in grade. I have already completed my time From major is necessary to have four years... “My time in grade was up in “December, in-December”-of last ~~ ~~ year [1961]." 23: January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings with CTM In Geneva SOSENKO had in his possession the ten- porary duty authorization which he said he had been issued in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in connection with the search for CHEREPANOY, * This official ¥GH paper had been signed by O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chie? Directorate, and authorized."Licutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organiza- tion in Gorkiy Oblast on 30 December 1963." official business between 15 and It bore official stamps of arrival and departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the town of Shakhunya, 10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting OX filtration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case officers on the basis of statements he had made during the 1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated thet it was correct. The biography included the inforratioz that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic] to 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, before leaving Moscow for Geneva. . _ & April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned when He bécame @& senior lieutenant, and he replied: maior shortly - about the think in the end of '53 or the beginning of '54 I got the senior lieutenant.” , Question: ‘That's less than a year after you entered the service [KGB]. | *#See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and ., Of NOSENKO’s claimed part in it. , ligt nlkaladceabst nnignne hae voor aes . Rib ead
= <:ROSENKO? © Well, I had. the GRU service. © That counts’ two years, as military service, of course. _it was. considered as a continuance of military service. .Question: So you got it when? At the end of 19537? “NOSENKO: . At the cnd of *53 or beginhing of '54, Then I got captain in 1956. , ‘Question: When in 19567... . _ NOSENKO: I don't remember. You see, they are not given — exactly in February or in March. Sometimes the scheduled time passes before they give it. So, '56—-Captain, '59--Major, and ‘63--... . 16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the date Of his promotions within the KGB from the date of a A 3 3 3 ¥ entry, NOSENKO stated: “Il began in the GRU as a junior lieutenant. While in the GRY I became a lieutenant, and I entered the KGB with this rank in 1953, Not long after I entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but 1 don't know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became a major in 1959. I don't know the’month. In October 1963 I wes made aw licutenant colonel....Personnel called me on the .elephone and said I had Leen promoted. Later I was told that GRIBANOY wanted to see me. I-went to his office, but, of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew . that I had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations. You never see the attestation. It goes into your official file." 26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case offictér Tor U.S. Embassy Security Officar John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never offi- cially been a major. He explained this situation as follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, he vecame eligible for the rank - Of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was ‘pot promoted because a senior KGB official held against him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover_treatment for gonorrhea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible for promotion to the rank of major had he received his — captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NO- SENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieu- tenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an admini- strative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had ine stead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963.° NOSENKO: there~ fore was a captain from September or October 1959 until October 1963 when, as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted |
tenant colonelcy. . made. it wappear quite certain” that . ‘KOSENKO was: a eTectetey a : “eotonet. ae wet Sones “ : eres directly to tha rank “of 1iéiteraat: colonel. -“ In this manner- tt turned out that he never offierally held the’ rank of major.*© 10 August 1965: Under questioning by. DERYABIN, KOSENKO - 1865. He again explained that he:was put, up for captain in ; . 1956, but this time said that the-promotion had been blocked . oe on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of | po shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the " repeated the chronology of his promotions. given an 26 January ae a 4 i “biography prepared in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied: that he thought the true story would not be believed. 17 April 1966: In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote . the foTiowing: “Tn March 1951, with the rank of junior licu.- ‘ tenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh. . , ; Fleet in Sovetskaya Gavan....From Auyust 1952 until 1954, 2. - oe es worked at the intelligence base of the Naval Intolligence of — - oo - a the Fourth Fleet in Sovcetsk, whérée I received the rank of Jieutenant of the Administrative Service....In 1956 I received the rank of senior licutenant [in the KGB], in December 195 . the_rank of cnptain, and at the end of 1969 I l vas vonenaended for the rank of major. I liave never held the rank of lieuten. ant colonel] ond the travel erder which you know of, with the rank of lieutenant coloncl, was filled out erroneously. ** 19 April 1966: In a new version of his eutobiography, NOSENRO includéd the following statement: “in July 1956. % - became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I ree ceived a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer and was given the rank of senior licutenant. In August 1957 I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of 1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of thre Second Section, Seventh Department. On 29 December 1959 I was promoted to the rank of captain. — — 26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant ecolonél in T9064. Twas only a captain." Asked why he had -, Said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied: . “Phere was no conversation about rank in 1962. About my po. sition, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all.” To. summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while. ‘serving in the KGB: He became a senior licutenant in 1952, ‘ April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/Octo- 7S ber/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.)- On the other hand, _ NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was - : Oo 4 captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a Llieue .- ” ; oe apna ememnpanten gene *At about this time, | in early 1965, & : ee aad tent : img-t to the rr authorization. ain. December “1963...
+ Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA-in- ' January 1964, NOSENKO mentioned that he had received the =. Order of Lenin “shortly after the 1962. meetires" in Geneva :-as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "ene... - large the experience and improve the quality" of KGB Second. Chief Directorate. staff .personnel in Moscoy, * Diring the first series of interrogations, .NGSENKO on 6 April 1964. claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for: . his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Direce torate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962 for his performances while in the American Department. The following discussion of the subject took place on 6 April 1964; -- NOSENKO: -  Yes;—-I-received a big gold nedal. -—-- - Sree mee: Question: It was the Order of Lenin? NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Ranner~the Red Star, I mean. In ‘63 I received the Order of Lenin. In ‘63. Question: What for? NOSENKO?: GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long period in tue Second Chief Directorate--[V.D, ] CHELNOKOV got one, [A.G.] KOVALENKO got one-= many, many [received the Order of Lenin}.** Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant service? NOSENKO: No. For working in the Seventh [Tourist] Depart- ment, which is considered good, Question: What is good? Were there recruitments? What recruitments? WOSENKO?: You must know that the main task of the Seventh Department is rot recruitments. The main task is countering the intelligence activities of the op- position. Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department got the Order of Lenin? NOSENKO: Yes. *NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest. decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible. — : ##In June 1964 NOSENKO said that the only Second Chief Direc- . torate officer whom he knew to have received this award was ¥.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who re~ _@Fruited Willian. Joho VASSALL (see PART. VI.D.5.b.). On the — he, the CIA officer, had received a medal for his: part in: i _..+ game general topic, .NOSENKO: aske his CIA case officer whether te foreclde semntemnere nteretems eansticewsiim extarten en eseshs ms senate mam tatten ries «oth __vthe: 1962 meetings with NOSENKO, He asked this in January
3420000" /* Question: CHELNOXOV and KOVALENKO? ~ NOSENKO: Yes. And CHURANOY got avd > got and.-who else? {[S.M.]| FEDOSEYEV got ard ‘¥.M.j KOVSHUK also got the Order, the second Lime. The first time he got it several years ago, and this wis the second time. 3 4 e x q 3 + Question: When did you get the Order of the Red Star? NOSENHO: Red Star FT got---t don't know for what. “ ; ; Question: Hut then one year Tater they gave you another . ; - ~ one, because this [irder of the Ned Star] wasn't 3 enoush? NOSENKO;: Because the awards are give. out--now, walt one ——  OmMeNnts up until 1961, af there were any awards for the Chekists : KLUB personnel] it was very rare, and they were only awarded for a specific thing. Such as CHURASOY, for instance. Ue was rewarded for a specific decd i the recruitment of VASSALL]. But in 1962, 1963--these first yearn--whether it was the idea of the Party to encourage the workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate] declare his medals and GRIBANCY to declare” his medals. They get together with their deputies and decide to whom they will give them. They don't say to whomeethcy say, for instince: "One order to your department; you decide «no Should have it.’ Like that. Then we vould get together, I CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, acé se decided [who would get one}. In our departaent. [v.t.] YAKOVLEV got a medal. Who else got a mcdul? In 1962, I got one, and then LEONOV who eas Chicf of the Second Section --he got the Order of the Red Star. a We decided on these individuals. As far as we ourselves were concermd. trut decision was made - by GRIBANOV and his ceputy. Question: Did the Seventh Department catch any spies? : ' NOSENKO: Well, as I have already told you, there was this H _ ' Italian fellow € ® This was considered a i good case because the First Department later-- : , ; the Seventh Department cas only’ involved at the oo : . time of the arrest--began meeting with hia. 2 : - boo, _ Question: So you got the Order [of the Red Banner] in 1962 © a foe . because of your work in the Tourist Department? : : FS ane wrens NOSENKO: I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for a, ; . . the Seventh Departmént, but for my work in the ae : First [American] Departrent in 1960, 1961. Bhi Question: You think so? | NOSENKO: © - Question: . without. any explanation?: The: Order just came
4 renner i winoaaioh necseaRE LAL ee tng ett ‘ '. fOsENRO:; It-was just:done. et the order-of the-Chairman, Question: And the Order of Lebin was the sacs? NOSENKO3 - The sare. Wall, the way it aays,:"For work well —————~ — @one ‘for the organs of the KGB" there ia ro indi- | cation exactly what it io for. _ > NOBENKO admitted on 8 April 16643 "In 1964 [in ‘Goneval -I told a 116 acout the Order of Lenin,...Ghy?. It waa @- - 2." boast." NOSENKO. then explained what be said to be the: true circumstances and gave. the reason for which, he wes to have. - received thig decoration, GRIBANOV, NOSENKO ateted, nad” promised in 1983 that NOSENKO, CHELNOXOV;, and ROVALENEKO - would get the Order of Lenings “He said; “$y; awn pubmitt ing ‘your namea for the Order of Lenin for oreating the TaOPS = -_ Central Operational Communications Byatem of the Socand” - Chief Directorate}, for thig new thing you have tried to ereate in tourist work.’ Sut December fi963} hea gone bye - I left [for Goneva] and nothing happoned,"* — NOSENKO was asked on 15 April 1964 to list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses ke had received during his KGB career, as well as to indicate from whom he had received eash of these. Kis reply wea . as follows; "I received nothing in 1933, 1954, and 1955, In 1956 I received a coxmendation and one month’s pay. SEROV, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded ne this far the recruitment of Richard BURGI [see Part V.D.4.b.}] while 1° was working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department of the Semond Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairman, and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of. the Chairnan of the KGB was circulated, and I snd a11 case officers saw my name listed. There is no cortificate or anything. Personnel just makes a note in your official file that on a certain date you received the commendation frou . the Chairman of the EGE. ae “ "From 1956 on, I received sonething almost every year, but it was nothing special, Perhaps it was the KGS annivere gary or May Day or Army Day. In. 1957 or 1958, I got sone thing from GRIBANOV, Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Army. I don't remember. It was given to me end & group of people in the hall [auditorium] between the third and fourth ficors [of the KGB Headquartera building]. PER= FILYEV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direstorate, nade _ the presentation. ; foros foe "In 1959 I received # commendation ‘and one month's . pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several Pow .-.- @muitments,/among them the professor frou Tennessee { MERTENS *ROSENKO later reverted to his original’ statement, which. - _, the Tourist Departments. = —. related the award to. his efforts to “inspire” the work of _ . DREW, FRIPPEL,. and three British people, There wore ix in -- ATRIA AeiBagc me aon
etter nero tated AEH ck aSaptcn se nents ono in general. the Order of the Red Star. “In 1960 1 cot a commendation from GRIBANOV for good work A lot of officers gor this. ‘all; three Americans and three British. ‘British names just now. * .I can't remember the In 19€1 I received With @ group of case cfficers I got this for general good work in the Second Chief Directorate. KOVALENKO and KOYSHUK cot this too. IVASHUTIN gave it to me (made the presentation). file, but you can take Personnsl maxes a note in your official the medal and the litcle certificate that goes with it and either keep it at home or in your study rcom (office) .** good work. "In 1962 I cot a commendation from GRIBANOYV for general giving it to me. Chief of the ke j-, and K., See Parts V.D,4,1l.and h.., respectively, ment operations end NOSENKO‘s ‘role in them.- I also received the Second Chief Directorate, This 15 not unusual. and they were late by Part V.D.5., Unbiemished Service Award’ -for-ten years'-services “Fhey counted this from October 1950, when I joined tne GRU, two yeers in SHCHERBAK, Deputy gave it to me in the and Parts ¥.3.4.i., for descriptions of these recruit- NOSEXKO also said during interrogation by DERYASIN :on 10 August ° 1965 his name was submitced for the. Order of the that, Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, in 1959, but that he did not get it, probably because he was transferred to the First Department at that time (January 1950). NOSENKO has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third ‘highest award a KGB officer may receive. officers had received this award, .,4964 that GRISANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, ranking KGB officers were awarded it for the imporcant role Asked what KGB NOSENKO said on i0 June and several other hagh- they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the Order of the Red Star, Chief Directorate officers, along with a group of other Second at the end of December 1962. He recalled this because they were planning the presenta- tion for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but the presentation was delayed and was not made until the end of the month. the Second Chief Directorate, NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of ancluding KOVSEUK and G.I. GRYAZNOV, received the award “simply for achievements, for good results in work." | that the order accompanying his award had read: ceptional performance of mission.” NOSENKO told. DERYASIN in August 1965 ; "For ex- . When asked what mission was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for good work in general. _ Top seceeT  mpencicew negate remem: “vene or ; q i a 3 4. 4
ena along ‘with: a. ‘certificate “In. 1963 Y received. ‘an aS 4 ae. 2 commendation from GRIBANOV for " generat good work. Also, °° 0 08). OE a GRIBANOV told me that 1, along with some others, was to” oe ; _- ‘veceive the, Order of Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB ' anniversary date, but I left for Geneva.**I was to re- - ceive it for arousing [ inspiring] the Seventh Department. oo i NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never re- . ; ‘ ceived any KGB award or decoration for his operational - , 4 work. The only awards he received during his KGS career, , : , he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal and the award =~ — we co : for satisfactory completion of ten years of service. | : - , ¥NOSENKO's wording here reflects earlier intensive ques= ‘ tioning concerning the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in the KGB and got a medal for unblemished service. It is ; usually given for ten years and to KCB men only....That was ; oo, : f -.~F $n 1962. I had ten years of service then." When it was ist rn: : pointed out that, according to his: most recent statement, oo ot ” i '. ke had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would - 7 ; H oe have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he ee did not understand why but that he was certain that he had ; i .. ° been given the medal. after his return from Geneva th 1962.. . Cy | : (The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements ; ; that he joined the KGB in 1952.). The following day, 17 April - 4 i .. 1964, NOSENKO said that he remembered why he had received | io . the médal im 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled, oreo aed setepeen Seti di 7 -is-awarded to servicemen as well. as KGB. officers, and. prior |. re es pe . military service is taken into account im computing the <. - a an service time for the latter, NOSENKO had:entered the GRU. 2 ~ ee . ‘im 1950 and ‘therefore should have received. the ten-year Z a . ty _'., Medal in 1960. . Beeause-o..-a. mix-up ‘in. the- KGB- Personnel - pom eae ‘ - Department | he. (did: not: receive it until 1962. . r Coa OF Sy te
Lent ta sensi RONEN PED ew Od -.. He. NOSENKO's. Relationshi will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the . with GRISANOV. 1: “Information from NCSENKO a. Summary From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and profetsional relation- ship with Major General 0.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of tre Second Chief: Directorate, NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in. which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on opera- tional matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promo-~ tions and receipt of various awards, and his afterhours carousing with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate ccuntecrinteiligence officer Ye.A. TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also freguently mentioned the role which GRIBANOV played in nis, NOSENKO's, professional advance~ ment within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly respensible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in January 1969; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make him Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged his return to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American Tourist Secticr and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO's remarks concerning his direct involvement with GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are-included in other parts of this paper. Among them are his early.statements on the approach to code clerk James STORSSERG (Part V.E.3.c.), hig 1962 account of the arrest: and attempt to recruit CIA cfficer Fussell LANGELLE (Part Vi.D.7.a.), and his early reports on the attempt to réCruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he originally attributed to himself and denied having had personal contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his original accounts to say that he received no awards or decoration for operational activity and that he had not received the promo- : tions he claimed. ‘. b. Details The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his .. personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRISANOV assisted his rapid rise within the organization of the Second Chief Direc~. torate. ; 12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy. A real pal. We, so to say, used to meet one ancther illegally and had women together... ‘GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on . me, It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to beccme Deputy Chief of [the Tourist] Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promot- ing young pecple, new people, who already have experience, good experience, who have made recruitments. .I know two or. three -fof the people he is moving ahead]. I personally have about 12 re- cruitments, four-or five of them were British and the rest Ameri- cans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the question: of my advancement is right. now under consideration... I rfepeebncy poe inn ar ea Nanmune aoe mats aL me nan erhalten sel anhibe
r i ; Aree RTAN RE MARANA rt NEO NO I sone ne cna 1 fact that 5 have been talking with "you. I have a career. I have bright prospects. sty boss GRIBANOV, ny highest boss, has a very high degree of respect. for me. Well, I make it look like this is une. pleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a pleasant thing because, -. am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I. if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He - calls me personally {to his office] and suys: ‘You times bawls me out and I-- inside, I know that sometimes come with me. I have to meet an ambassador.’ I go with him. We arrive comes out and have the conversation. He is there all night. He and says: ‘Well, where shall we go for a drink?' Tf know beforehand {that he will say this] and everything is ready at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there ‘well, what shall we drink:' [GRIBANCV says]. I answer: ‘Well, Oleg Mikhailovich, cognac, of course: He is the highest chief. ‘I' don't drink cognac. I'll ‘have vodka,’ I say. ‘Well, we'll have -vodka then,' {GRIBANOV says]}..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older | brother would. ‘NOSENKO replied: "That's his attituce toward me. 23 April 1964 Question: «Did you ever go to GRIBALOV's house? NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO : Question: ’ NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: _ NOSENKO: “I never went in the house. I have driven to it. Did he ever come to your house? No. Were you ever out at night with him, after work? If so, how, under what circumstances? After work? Yes, once, Who else was there? TARABRIN. What was the occasion? ‘No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me. at midnight. I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked me how long it would take me to get dressed and come ' down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room.. Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at ‘& 00 AeMey gave him some pills. to help him: . When did you first pergonally meet GRIBANOV? I might. have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but f aid not have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two group operational discussions (about 15 people present) ‘about work against Military Attaches..in A954 that was the. first time I. ever. spoke to. him.. oo oO “You can ruin everything. -He some- se Dap Rp epee tome mbm tem acetate 4 ee ae
Question 3 NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO:. | Question: “NOSENKO : Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO : Question: - NOSENKO: when did you first have any personal conversation with him? - ; . I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. . Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist Department [i.e., between 1955 and 1969). when did you develop a personal relationship with him? It is difficult to say how it. got started. I was_ still working in the Seventh Department. It was in 1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and said I should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, ‘and GRIBANOV said.I should quickly be ready to go to a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him and Vera [Ivanovna] ANDREYEVA. . Why you? I don't know... (pause) Oh, yas, this is the story. this is it, this is why he started favoring me. Parlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA, friends of (Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.} KOVSHUK and [V.A.] CHURANOV, CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's dacha one night. The girls were talkative and’ told me all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did, and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it;-.he re- marked once: "You are not a gossiper...” How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell any~ one? I don't know, but he did. who wrote your fitness reports? My last one was written by [V.D.] CHELNOKOV. The one before that by {V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department. Before that in the Seventh Pepartment it was written by (K.N.] DUBAS, before him by [V.A.] KOZLOV, then {S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Depart~ ment, by {A.M.] GORBATENKO. . Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you? He may not have actually written them, but he signed them, those reports written in connection with pro~ . motions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general reviews of personnel. : 15 February 1965 (from a protocol signed: 20 February 1965): ~ "Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of - . Gleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV. and knew nothing: about him. As. fE.G.] ’ SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was. the Deputy: Director of. the. Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the acti- vities. of the. First’ Department: of the Directorate, where I. worked, ~~ fe acere a ne menage Wee ama Rete Rete cove ye eevirgr ee 4 Abetitahe tate abies ye os . ? a oA a 4 4 : i. seis
i - it may have been several months after I began my KGS service that 9. i fo a . but at these meetings I called him ‘Comrade General.’ In 1959" | Z’also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with tne. 23-24 February 1965 (from_a protocol signed 26 February): “®GRIBANOV was never in. my own office, my home, my-parents hoze ..- tional apartment: with GRIBANOV. I. never introduced any of my: 2 wae = GRIEANOV first came to my attention. JI don't know when I first a nr saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 ata meeting  - | . i oS before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I’ would not necessarily remember this as I frequently met much more important people, who : were friends of my father, and seeing GRIBANOV wouldn't have been ‘ , ! particularly important to me... Sometimes during 1954 and 1955, it i was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the . : 1 Second Chief Directorate on a cable that. I had written and, if. os SHUBNYAKC’ was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV . ; for approval, Though I was only a junior case officer at the : time, I would take the cable, after it had been approved by the , Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directly to GRIBANOV, who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not remember how many times I toux cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remember the contents Of any specific one of them. ‘he first meeting with GRIBANOV that I specifically remember was in the summer of 1556. I think it was : in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing a Spravka on BURGI, PERPILYFV, KOZLOV, and I went to see GRIBANOV. ‘KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, but GRIBANOV knew that I was NOSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation said that I would participate and because PERFILY<V had made an appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANUV at this time. The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOY read the re~ port on BURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLOV answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking what Ukrainians took part in the operation, I can recall none of GRIBANOV'’s questions nor do I remember any of tne conversation which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV. Perhaps the first time I was alone with GRIBAYIOV was in 1958 when I attended a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel in Moscow. Usually [A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such “occasions, butyhe was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV- usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I Was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the . i Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know , why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was : to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to ; introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use the last name NIKGLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used the name Vera Ivanev.ia. After work, I went home to change my clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel : Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on 1 saw him more frequently. fot Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of sections and their deputies and I would take part in these. I had begun tc - call GRISANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1958, when I a was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department, ; FPRIPPEL case and, sometime -between Nay and October 1959, took him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations.” - . : ; Deamigh @ LAR arb ation at ow : 4 : sige Or my parent's dacha. My father. never knew him. I was. never in. GRIBANOV's. home or his: dacha.. I was never in-any KGB opera~..°.... tps i.
GRIBANOV. © GRIBAKOV knew about, agents Cee a Sey and. (ARTUR (FRIPPEL), but. fb never ececificaliy disccased them with GRISANOV. ‘I 2id4 discuss with GRIBANOV the agent 'PRCKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions 1 have been with GRIBSNOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we had parties with yiris. I don't remember when tie firet tine was, but the last time was in Saptember or Octcrer 1363. On this occasion tuey called me at home late et nignt and agked me to join them at the Prague Restaurant. Tf arranged for female companionship and this party lasted until early morning. *® It) was at this party that I gave GRIPANOV sone pilis 1 had fsr hengovers. I nad brought a supply of thes2 bacx from Geneva in 1562, A few days after this party {GRIBANOV's secretary ¥Ye.S.] KIRPICHNIKCV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of these pills. ‘Thig-is che note I gava to my. CIk case officers in 1964.*%* JI have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an indien Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with - the drinking parties with GRIPANOV and TARABRIN. GPIBAUOV played absolutely no part in my entry into tae KGB. i chink he could not have played any personal part in ny assignrent to the first Section, First Departzent, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANOY was Deputy Chief cf the Second Chief Direc- torate supervising the Second bepartrent ana not the First De- partment. I do not know who mace the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventa Department in 1955, but Xi did rnct have any personal cantact or conversation with GRIBAKGV concerning this decision. I do act know if GRLBANOV played any personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chiet cf Section in the Sevencn Departmenc in 1958. I da not remember dust who wis responsible for my appointment to this position. i did ast per- gonally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANGV decided at the end of 1939 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of che First Section, First Department, Second Cale: Directorate, and this appointment took place sometire in January 19t6. DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh Departmeat in 1989, told me that GRIBANOV planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get . GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself abcut this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who hac recommended me for this new potition and did not tell me any. reason for my having been selected. GRIBANCV did tell me that my appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more t~ ~ senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Saventh Department in January 1952 was actually made in. about September or Octcber 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief ef the First Department, but the new Chief of the First Separtment, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. | Since I did not ®""See below for a more detailed version of this affair. — #¢ when NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1968 he was carrying a note - addressed: “Personal to NOSENKO, YusI.* In translation the note read. in. full: “Yu.I., get me please some more tablets = like: the che you gave me once.- {signed}: GRIBANOV.” © tthe ten tee she AS, 4 i a 4 q a i
own agente to “GRIBANOV..- GRIBANOV knew about agents We had parties with girls. I dén't rexember when the first time . this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my - October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the a é below for a more detailed version of this affair. “8 o She an . 7 cane ee ee ‘and ‘ARTUR (PRIPPEL}, but I never ‘seecifically. discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the o, agent "F ROKHOR* iPREISFREUND). On three occasions 1 have been” y with GRISANOV in social circumstances... On all three occasions. | _ TARABRIN was also vresent. After two of these occasions, we: °° : was, but the last time was in September or Ostoter 1963. On i i this occasion they called me at home late at. night and aeked me to join them at..thé Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female companionship az@ this party lasted until early morning;* It was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for hangovers. ' I had brought a suppiy of these back from Geneva. in 1962. A few days after this party [CRIBANOY’s secretary Ye.S.)- . KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking me for some more of theve pills. -This is the note I gave to my CIA case officers in 1964.**. I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an 6 nebavtale tative’ rite a: - Indiar, Embassy reception in 1955, perhaps two or three times to meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with the drinking parties With GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRISANOV played absolutely no part ia my entry into the KGB. I think he could not have played any personal parc in ry assignment to the first Section, First Department, Second Cnief Directorate in 1953 since at that time GRIBANCY was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc- torate supervising the Second Department and not the First De~ partment. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but I did uct have any persone: contact or conversatica with GRIBANOV concerning this decision. I do net know if GRIBANOV played any personal part in ry appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not per~ gsonally discugys this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, Secend Chief Directorate, and . this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS, i the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV - : planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself abcut recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any — ewig set ree appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more - senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself : and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh } ok Department in January 1962 was actually made in about. September or. . 3 First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did ‘not pr Ahdhabie Bre dibstacy + Caen, aie rt. RY Lae EEE A ptaneatieente = #*@ When. NOSENKO. arrived in Geneva in 1964. he was carrying a. note - addressed: “Personal te NOSENKO, Yu.1I." -In translation the ‘mote read in full: *Yu.I., get me please some more ‘tablets. ; like the one you gave me once: signed} ‘GRIBANOW.. an LL te
Bh age He In AP RE OTRO AE He eget ae nat so want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of PFDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be 7 transferied Lack to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already spoken to CHELNCKOV, who wWa3 then Chief of the Seventh: Department, about this’ matter, and he had suggested that I go to: GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Departmert. GRIBANGYV - finally agreed that I should return to tne Seventh Department as Chief of the First Section with the understanding that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this . position would be vacated by [8.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was appointed Deputy. Chief of the Seventh Department. Vhis Gecision = waS made by CHELNOKOV and GRIBANGV in accordance with the intentior stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed to this position as secon as possible. I had no further personal discussions with GRIRANOV about this appointment at this time. In 1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's. Depucy, F.D.] BOBKGY, and GRISANOV decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh= Department. ‘they Gid not discuss this with ma beforehand and no order was igsued about this appcinrment. I was sinply told that from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the Department, At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, since KCROBOV did not come to the Saventh Department until about November or December 1963. GRIBANOV did net tell me his reasons for appointing me Pepucty Chief of the First Section, First Department in January 1969, for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or -for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the Seventh bepartment in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I thin« that the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV, since he was tne Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc= torate who supervised the Seventh Department. I did not personally discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My candidacy for this assignment was supported by BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative fiie ‘on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected -Of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My assignment was approved by the Eleventh bepartment, by the Person- nel Office of the Second-Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of-the CPSU. GR[EBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV. For the T9¢@q"trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of .the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. KHLOBU- -. STOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as” A personal favor to me. I. did not discuss my 1964 trip to Geneva with GRIBANOV prior to my departure... In fact, I was even afraid that GRIBANOV would find out that I was going and would object to my making this: second trip." Sag Ane etrdatdy de, 7 at nace ]
23:1 Febru sary (1965 19653). NOSENKO: commented: further 6 an his social . - _ | encounters r§ With GRIBANOV and TAPABRIN.. “The following; which was’ “mot ineluded in the. protocol. ‘quoted above, is taren. fom case officer notes. Question: Teil me about: the’ eecasions when you were with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. NOSENKO: Three times--drinking in cafes. twice afterwards there. _ were girls. The most recent time was in September or October 1963. I don't remember the first time... In — 1963 I received a call from. TARABRIN at home. ~ Then ~ GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car ‘and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. 1 didn't” take his car. because I didn't want te call the duty- officer. 1 took a cab and went to the Fraga, They were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I joined them. They were drinking champagne, but I took cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about. 1230 and GRIBANOV made me go tc the office to get my nutebook,. I called one girl I knew-~her and her sister. When I got back to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and TAPARBRIN still there. We went to tne ygirlis' (apartment). They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before. Question: Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurant (i.e., to provide girls)? NOSENKO: I think so. It was the second time I had participated in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Cnief Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna. Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't remember her last name. GRISANOV was drinxing and she told him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV . told her that he would give her a job and told me to arrange for a job in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV'’s driver drove him. home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830. 3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must have Gaused the KGB, NOSENKO said: “I believe they will punish people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... . He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing _ me ahead.” Question: What sort of punishment? sae Clee abot tenant rioee no, al a nbatietes ad ee NOSENKO: Even firing. Question: Do you think any others would be punished, or even | fired? neato eee o NOSENKO: Maybe. KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and people in the Eleventh Department. _ Many others. £00. a — en a ns a a
Later in the same session the interrogator: returned to this. subject: roe The following is a transcript of the. discussion: Question: ' NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: Question: NOSENKO: You said you think GRIBANOV might ke’. fired. Yet, there” ig nething in the protocol you signed’ {see abave}] about your relations with GRIBANOV which would teem to make him personally responsible for you. Is there something else, something you haven't told me? , No. Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired? (no answer) . (repeats) Don't know. Well, what is your opinion at least? Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this. why not? It's simply my opinicn, that’s all. I don’t know why. Well, what is your cpinior:? He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of Department. But you had already gotten ahead before: you said he didn’t help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958. Yes. Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you? It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief of Section and Deputy Chief of Department. Why would BOBKOV be punished? He was “my supervisor, and in ‘61 he was Secretary of the KGB Party Organization. Would others in the Party Organization -be punished?__. «awash tel one rida so anda ott el Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh Department and of the ScD. a ao . Would BANNIKOV be punished? “No. He did nothing, just supported my y candidsture for Geneva. Would ROVSHUK be punished?
NOSENKO: - 335. Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, 2 Pe . t { & es _ e ~Presuma _ disease. Chiefof" Department. in “59-660. but didn't: - He was in an. “. dnspection group: of the. Collegium, checking the Seventh. Department... sty this 1s a4. ‘reference: ‘to [NOSENKO"s contracting venereal . (see Part IV. €.2, a who talked to me. 4 = 3 Question: How about the First Chief Lirectorate and the Seventh 4 Directorate? a J NCSENKO: No. I wasn't close to them, except GUK. 4 Question: How about First Chief Directorate resicencies abroad? , : NOSENKO: [S.1I.] GAVRICHEV might be-recalled from Geneva. i Question: + You must be withholding something about: your relation- : ship with GRIBANOV. 3 NOSENKO: No, I was telling you: I visited his office. He told ; me: ‘'I found out you're drinking too much.’ I said . no, not especially. He said: ‘Stop this ‘drinking : with KOVSHU It's not good for you.' : “Question; But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's pesiticn now. NOSENKO: They would review my file, and find that it contained j the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking, . scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved i my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Department) anyway. : Question: Why did he promote you? i NOSENKO GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six re- cruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds great for the First Department, which was having ne success with Americans in the Embassy. Question: But why make you Deputy Chief of Department? NOSENKO: He thought I was a tough guy, good case officer. In j ‘59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of ‘operations which were reported to him. Question: But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you ef ae Deputy Chief of Department. ‘ i : NOSENKO: (shrugs) : i | Question: Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Depart- ao oo, ment? ee = NOSENKO: Must be higher than a Department. Chief-~bec. :se 3 H GRIBANOV: signed. They could get hin for has, especially: i | those who are against GRIBANOV. 4 i 4 Queation: who? — 4 - NOSENKO: ‘Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted t to _ Deputy. 5%
Accordirg to ‘source when Creation: But GRIBANOV must have approved all tt teputy ~ Departsent. Chiefs, ¢0% if om: 5. Would the sume happen of them defecte 1? - ot NOSENKO: Well, if 21t was from the Second Dep: sent, for example, no, because GRIEANOV wasn't? personally supervising it. “Tt woule be someone else's proposal. [:. my cas2 it waa his own. initiative. r 1 * Directorate punishes ag ti ? ‘ Guestion: Wag anyone in the Pir a result of GOLLT ‘ NOSENKO: Ne, absolutely not. rere 2. Information from $3 f AS indicated in Part ILI.I., a number of sources have | that GRIBANOV and other KGB officere were digcharged from in the wake of NOSENKO's defecrion.* @2EGCS IER See Te Ae a te ee Te RE eee ay ars 15 KGB ofricers had aiready been dismissed from the KGB Lecause of the defection, and that SRIBANOV and three of his deputies ware. ineludéd in this number. Ore of the deputies wés named “BALNIK" {BRUNIKOY). GRIBANOV's guilt was said to rest in the facts that, as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, he had been. ultimately responsible for NOSENKG's flight; that NOSENKO was his pereccnal friend enc proteye; and that, therefore, he snould have been aware ef NOSEN“O’s intention to defect. 72etve co uta SEsaQ Was Leing consice at ovaet dele- gatior. to go to Geneva, a summary statement ct NCSENKO's activities and capabilities was prepared by employees of tic Secona Chief Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... Gage said he understood _this summary contained considerable ‘compromising’ information re- garding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed hye ROSENO from future consideration for the trip to Geneva. ea Sensit i stated, however, that he understood from conversations with other_. oN baa lta, Ke SAT alent wot KGa employees, whom Re could not recall specifically by name, that GRIBAKOV read the sumnary material, ran a line through ail of it, "Tp addition, a western Ambaseador with whom GRIBANOV was in Saute of. tal oe Ata i. _pperational_ccontact—in-Moscow—has—stated—that—GRIBANOV-disap~ another KGB handler. (He has algo indicated that GRIBANGYV.. peared from the scene gSometime in ‘mid-1965 and.was. replaced by. -- disappeared about the time Of KHRUSHCHEV'S downfall in October _ 1964.) ce . ” ee
and’ pat the notation | ‘en the surmary, ‘Send hits to Cs névad! 5 rye eee eee. the geneval feeling arong. KGa ‘person .. nel RTD ANOY Was willing Lo overlooz a lot of deficiencies ee about NCSENKO because of (GRIBANOV" g long- tire friendship with NOSESHO'a father." : oo Races Le to ene» itive. SOUPCEy ek: ° ce eres is os te wee: Face he LG ete themanligheL. te ve bee Ee ? Abie ats citys, GRIBARKOV' a ox < place i eefastion in Pebrsary “1964 and -no. less than 50 other otficars, nost of them from the Sucond Chief Pirectorate and many of then cicse friends: ot Gu BANOV, had been fired subsequently. & ee rere aT Srey ate 3 prior to NOSENKO's defection, NCSENKU had been tia deputy to a Department Chief in the Second Chief Direc~ torate but that he held on ly the rank of captain in the KCB. CUE attributed NOSENKO's high position te the influence which GRIBASUV exerted on hia kehalf. GEE'S : BI EE ees G2BG rather than being fired, Major Genéral "BAUNTA" (BANSIAGY) had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in GRIBANOV's atead.* . LP after the defectica of NOSE! vKO, the Koh sonductes tensive investigation: cf ‘pergonacl in GB Headquarters to find out which KGB officecs knew him, One o1 these questioned was TAPRASEIN, who saic he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relation- ship was only casual and was Limited to cccasional official con- tacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however,” that TAPABRIN and GRIBANCV were close friends socially end chad attended several parties which NOSENKO had arsanged and attended. Girls provided by > SCSENKO were at these parties. ** As a r2sult of his willful conceal ‘ent of this information, TARABRIN, like GRIBANOV, was discharged from the KGB and dismissed frem the Commun i st Party of the Seviet Union. : nomen ghtin hue tee goer, ata ws 2 Mm BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the © Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that ‘BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection, NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who ‘sponsored NOSENKO's ; 1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it 4 or the 1962 trip. i beep vadind autescetedm. sae *@ These evidently were the parties ee eribed by NOSENKO (see oe above). & aS, : Yee. at the time of . 4 his_remova. ELECT Lef—of -the-British— 7 5 ° ---— promoted to the position of- Deputy Chicf of the newly established ~ Department of the KGB First. Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said ee that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time. he wa3 . "Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief ‘Directorate. va nerve ‘hah ot At Ach ENN A i A res, wns nee sme Meaney eee oo de | . PATHOL
14,0000 * I, Cenfircatios fron Other Sources © i. weerenitien Since NOSENSD's defection several Seviet svurces and defectors. have provided information supporting | AGSENKG's clains of having neli certain positions in the X55. a8 cer- ere ed + bay taNias: o b eee dgeade om, tuin times, te ue peo deo x aan te PST eS a rete #) Drs ae cama Eat "eek: eee Se ffusins ca Malia ‘eg Soviet acitntist wath suspected intelligence connections | who vas appreaciued by CIA, Soviet caso officers for an GR. P double asent (a? OSENKO lead),and the KGB cfficer handling Robert Leo JCIINSON (also 2 SGSENXO lead), a Sov- iet journalist who contacted the magezins Paris Mets h with a proposal to write an article on NOSENKO, and two defectors, Scene of these sources had supporte.i NOSENKG directly by reporting that he was a Second Chicr Diroce torate officer in the various. positions he say: he WAS. Others have offered indirect support by confirning : rOSENKU' i knowledge of particular pieces of intormation Gr cone firming the validity of enForaats on which NOSENKO said he learned while in particular KGB jJcts, As will be noted, . the informeticn froa one source sometines contradicts that learned from another sor fron NOSENKO himself, e er, yD eee eae Aas oie Re) has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly by “Kis HOS riptions of the reparcussions of the detecti LON within the Ko a ce eg tae firinz sgt: ERTRANOV) 8 by his statements concerning thes preosbiper tutes, hat thea defection would have on KGS operations. Gite ne 3 Sas i STARS I eae pase RE z YET ay pene idee ocd. gyi So cs AP Bae ALG. reported at oe various tines that NOSENKO. is Mnore Valuable than PEN« 5 KOVSKIY," that ne is "vastly more important than DERYABIN 2S or GOLITS YN," that the KGB "will not be able tc.operate. 7 j normall for two vears,. that it 3 1G coed 8 imous opinion” 3: ” 4 oe LR Le a RTE oO ee ee ES a eee SS j of PRESS Gis ees could do tremendous harm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severo "for several years to come", , , , ye 20 4 alee has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's . : seed, ie Was Deputy Chief of ,the U.S, Embassy. . Soction,* cy ee allt ego. NOSE: {KO asia "chief". had. ee —_ a access tO Peiaghracn ~C3 activities against the U.S.Em- — Lo bassy, and S208 et eee he loss suffered by the — a KGB as a result of sOoctal's knowledge. of. the mi¢rophones 2... -- 7 installed in the Embassy, (NOSENKO has said that t is ine) o — formation was available to hin onky | bec aus eats was Deputy __Chief of the-Anerican—tnbassy : a? Reta Se reported that NOSENKO's. position ag &. “uchiet™ an the Second. Chief Directo rate gave him access to the names and backgrounds A +7 St -Knoun We Wave stated specifically oo LE a thes: SOSENKO wars 3 * senior: efticial in the Anecrican Eabassy ns Sr Section of “the: american Department in 1960. and: ASG. Sot ee _ ‘ . ; ; j . imeaneadie mend meee weet ee aes ASR ReAEOED Abie ’ Lapis iach
cfimany KuB cftiters in and to sensitive inform. land meched@.. ° This statu toNCLEnYO a : ‘phone last fiom Moscow Headgear te cs. shot eae . . ene , . So Lo operational Leans.. su ete ad tee AER” Ti aceite cote det oc @ agent was Jonn RUPS, neased by NOSENKO a3 a. fereca recsuated in Leningrad in-January i?€2 on homosexual grounds; this information NOSENKO saad he learned as Chief of the American Tourist Sectic: of tha fuurist Db pirtc nt. Gea Further exacples of @asg Supporting NOSES i: wav are rovic ‘iar 2 an this Pel CoE aD j and the CHE y . \4 Sy TR ets, ad Sia: le elas a: ‘ emp? ; : the “RGU NOSENKO «werkea-in the Second Pirectoritt ; he once worked against personn2l of the U.o. Ernassy | : cs . in Moscow; later he was assigned to work agéénst &.S. . oo * journalists in Moscow, During his last years with the -KG3, he. was assigned to the task of working against fmerican and
14-00000 GSE “Lieuternnane Eurcpean tourists: in Moscow, Hise jertnent, Second. chief. Virectérate, Syl NOSENKO secured ‘tnis rebar voduse of nelp he.receives- be Chief of the Second Directorate out NOSENKO's ccreer, GRERANOL suw that he was promoted;.." ee e @ through- im and,--. with regard to NCSENAO's KGb i; ha Be iS ad ta BE ans Ri "it appeared quite coftain ta Colonel.in the koe." & aS BM reported having lesrnetrcn Goes ; oo chat NOSENKO vas ia: fact caly a-captain,** -- ein RLS: SCE eas Reg te : rated ‘ igh Ue VEG x oe ae a ae a5 agreed tf ne feels that NOSENKO has actually detected or whether ae feels that this might be a ‘trick’ by tne KGB. ve Eee replied that from his own knowlédge of. this matter, he is eae ‘ ‘convinced that NOSENKO's defection is net 2 ‘trick!’ by the -tinued that when NCSENKO was a young KGB." ass “8 said thate"he h from various, persons in Moscow... Hes NOSENKO personally. lie” Saic -NOSENKO’. inthe KoB, Ile said he did net know me had never kncwn an important boss  dirsctcrate oF Lin seeey CON ; —3A.ne was in the GRU Military Academy *** and ‘then [was* gent to the Infer- - i mation Department. cf the. GRU for a short time; in all, | department NOSENKO had been in. Zee *® Until January 1905 NCSENKO waintaingd that he had pro- | oo ee gressed through the, KGS ranks in-nutmal: sequence, trom eS ; On26Janusry-1905,,-=—=—= _.__liéutenant—to_licutenant_colenel., however, he said that because of administrative confusion and GRIRANCV's advice he had skipred the rank. of majer and . - fad-moved directly from captain: t9 iieutenant- colonel St late 1963, In April 1966 NOSENKO teld CIA that he had _ &8@ The Military-Diplomatic Acadeny - | .. . _ i never held ‘the rank of lieutenant celons] and was really | I only a captain (see Fart ViG.T.).. ° — t isthe strategic intel- ~~ re aa sesgogeaee net tag nteanecannrens ane Sle svete nema Ea aranntetnry he Mate wb oa sapere w rae sete og.” attended various naval-type scheols-deiore joining. the. . GRU, he insisted that he was never enrolled in a. fermal “Entelligence course of any traiai giestablishment of the Soviet Navy. “He claimed to ha attend the: Mibitary Diplométi ligence school of the GRU... Althouga OSENKG said he _ ae Po are
ve “after his Cetcetion and that x perhaps a& year, oe ; been a very undineipicuea person very goud.’ He wab oe have been dascharged from the Gh, white an the GEL and 7not. however, tus dather. wae cas & Very intlueatdal person in’ ne Ministry of Shipourlding, | sons from vhom Le heise information about VOSTA XO tha NOSENKO Dad given very. very Gor tpdorigetiog fo the ULS. RO had had preat accers in FGO anfermation which iacluues ave of people it flows wae mierosaot sviibenie . ; i oGeak oo. R ve Wes cde? dace bt.G ‘ht ae Se 2 bassy bad fenud sanyo. . infosmation.”* Bist: Meany nonfdared @heraiions . Vide! PRIESTS foo Padeed of SOEEN ae) pnttes 4 ec ag avent bemesd by POO) TE aho sanre:d his knowledge of io an incident which oe cuired about b95o, white NOSENKU £ he was ia the Tourist Department. *? alle to get NOobNKO- trata ferred to the GB. Gi DeLee t wes che omipien of bbe pepe : be * e ne ans OF ROP covere- b.S. Er- aid TiS TndiGated Tr Part V.E.3.p.. the final senteme 1s Largely __ ee Mite uate ub er corb sa del Sale rane but not entirel correct... lf Pans Fy ¥*Scee Part V.F.8.0 0. a - _ _ ea sgranieeniiie ” ES Stes wht insabcnn! apse tniba tm = sine .
er ESET RESHETNYAK had been interrcgated uy the KGB in- | @ FRSA er a NS aes seit Wk ; at the time cf the defection, NOSENKO was rooming. ih Geneva with. Nikolay RESHETNYAK, a representative of the Inter- : national Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SESHETNYAK toldW@Eyvey eee that NOSENKO often left his quarters withcut saying where ne was going, ~ but it was assumed that NOSENKO was “‘lntelligence” and had | gone mission.to acconplish.**  <caiecReatEers Cea thoes fy fn Rasa ccm ection with the NOSENKO- defection. RESHETNYARK also told "235 oS that he had attended the Noscow. trial of NOSENAU, heid in absentia, at which NOSENKO was found gui treason and was sentenced to death. SeewE h 7 the KGB might go so far as to sence someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he-has -reported -on the dismissal! of large numbers of KGB officeys, in- cluding GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions within the KGB of NOSENKO's detection (see Part LiI.1.4.) 6. GAMKRELIDZE | NOSENKO's service in the American Department was con- fimmedin the fall of 1964. by the Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE.**® At that time an American scientist brought. up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchango®*** w See Part @ if ¢ aCe #&  NOSENKO identified KESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of ' Foreign Affairs officer on the stafr of the Disarnament Delegation, Asked on 24 January 1904 whether RESHETNYAK might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with CIA,. NOSENKO replied: “Me thinks I'm KG3,..so of course there's no problem if I come back late." SP eee Ly eSme ported that RESHETNYAK had been disigssed: 2 @ result of. the defection cf NOSENKO. CIA has no other - yeports of RESHETNYAK having served in the. KG3, #*® GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as we 1 as his unusual freedc=s of movement, often alone, while oe on visits to the United States, When approached by a CIA = *  . .). | representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAM-. — : KRELIDZE declined but. added that he "welcomed the op- portunity—to-meet-with—an-Americen fiiteltigence officers. Since this enabled him to compare the Soviet Intelligance officers he has met with their American counterparts," , During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of NOSENKO again, describing him as “obviously a traitor to his country." : : Ss : : s#8* The exchange of the KCB. Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL — So _ for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2. pilot, took place in -February—1962.—— po Se eG
and asked whether the Russian pecrie had been toleb about dt. ‘GAMKRELIDZE replied that they had not bocn teld officialiay but knew it had taken place since there wes ‘dhe a grepevine™ in 7 4 Moscow. AS an ex ample, he said that it In this way thac he | ; ; oo “h had heard about the NOSENKO defectsea and ttn Significance. Ez= i panding, GAMERELIDZE stated that the “qraceyine” indicated that 3 the ccsfection “was very desnauirs ts Soviet Intelligence in that ; NOSENES was the Chief of the American Necetion, and he xnew the identities of all Soviet agents ano the ungt: ad States," “7, GOLITSYN . ; The defector GOLITSYN is the NOSENSO's KGB career who claims been parson iy acquasnted : with him. GOLI?SYN. said that ne mot NOOENKD tor the faicst time in 19353 when visiting the American Depairiment of the KG Secand Chieé Directorate cn business, ance that he Suw ard spoke with NOSENYO on (2 number of cccasions subsequently, mont fecentiy in 2159. © This _ first-hand information from GO... Yh, huwevor, 1s not always con- sistent either internaliy or an vomparison wath that guoplied ny -NOSENKO. SOUCY oF anformation on Deret -C1lA has no record that GOLITSYN, pricr to the publicity attending NOSENKO' s defection, ever mentioned him by name or in connection with ene KGB Second Chiert Directorate. On 19 March 1962, prior to NOSENKO's first con each with CLA, GOLITSYN was shown tiGSELRKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo. the Cisarmament Conference. He faried to comment on it. On 26 June 1962, after CIlA'S initial mectings with NOSENKO and kecause of the large overlap of NUSENKO's information and contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CLA case officers who had met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to cbtain his comments cn some of the NOSENKO material. GOLLTSY!I! was told thar CIA had received in Switverland an anonymcus let:.ecr which reported cer- tain information from within the nGB; the CTA official stated _ tO GCLITSYN that the aunformatieon so closely overlappes ALS own : reporting, including promanent meatLon Of COLIPTSYN's friends GUK, : KOVSHUK, and CHUPANOV, that the possibility of disinfernation . , waS suspected, perhaps in relation to GULITSYN's cwn defection. Ten major items from NOSENKXO ware discussed with GOLITSYN, ali pertaining to Seccnd Chief Directorate: operations, and a list of 15 names was shown him, identified as namcs of Second Chief Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named Among these names was (fnu) NCSENKO, and GOLITSYN indicated he had previously reported on him; CIA records, however, show that . GOLITSYN had reported only on:one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO,. . who had been a KGB officer in Japan when -RASTVOROV defected to — to the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made no further comments on these : names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that . organization in 1961 for the MVD.. GOLITSYN said that in general, Lacking the full details ‘necessary for an assessment, he could say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he had seen; he wanted to. seé the full information on the case. Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this informa- eS ee woe tion, complaining_to Attorney .General_i Rokert_KENNEDY—and-senior- i ‘CIA officials because his request nad’ not been granted. : ; ; On 16 February 1964: NOSENKO’ s: defection from the. Soviet: Disatma- ment eee rage in Geneve _Swrezer hands was puplicized,-. including ion? NM heara’this ews: Re imm esate sy. ta tte “he thereupon stated: that he- “fecalled NOSENKO”a: an of ‘the: ‘Second. Chief Directorate. working. against | American: citizens. 3 particigarion 2 : . Some. bi aehground aps q cCRET
LOWnaM eta te Stans eenesen Pen eed asters oo sen — eth him after work, and fad once ® ‘entertained KASHCHEYEV at" 7 “reservations”; akaut NOSESKO" ‘s°bona Fides. “Cver the next’ sev er r OMe a mor.ths GOLITSYN was provided with mas meetings with HOSENKO in Switzerland, an plied wath all. the available ‘hiogrephic daz . : ial. frem the 1962 and 1964 a@ a2 his request was sup- 2 to-assist him in: . analyzing the KGB operation; On 29 June 1$54; GOLITSYU was inter-_ viewed in detail on the subject of NCSENKO. de confirmed NOSEN. KO's identity as the son of the former Miniéter of Snisbuilding and said that he wes a KSB officer who hac sorked in tne American Department and -the Tourist Department cf the pre Second Chier Directorace, He was shorn a photograph of NOSENKO inet buriéd in a photo spread, but singly} and he said a. the photogrash _ depicted NOSEUKO, GOLITSIN guid he knew this because fhe wed per- sonally acquainted with KOSENKO, having met him two of three tines an the U.S. Embassy Section While tnere on KGE Firs: Chief Lirecterate business im 1953. He nad also ceen NOSENKO cccasion- a5 ally at work du:ing 13688 and 2959, and when GOLITSYN ked him whore he was working in 1959, A.SENKO told nim that he was in the Tourist Separtment. Fineliy, GOLITS@ ssid, he end NOSEUKO knew cre another through their fvetta L friendshi ps with Ku, ZL. GUK, V.a, CHURANOV, ana. Ye. G., KAS! iCHEYEV.* A.cordaing to GOLITSYN, NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 uncLl 1957 wet or 1958 and was specifically responsicle for KG coverage of Aner- ican military personnel wn Moscow during the first year of this “period. For the remainder of his service in the U.S. Embassy . Section, until 1957 or 1953, GOLITSYN said. NOSENKO may have had these .same responsibilities or ne may have been working against '. other Embassy personnel or correspondents. He was definitely in the Anerican Department during this entire period, In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and was a senioc case officer there as of 1959.°* GCLIPSYN was certain that MOSENKO did not work in the Anerican Department of the Second Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. ‘This he said ne xnew because he had visited the U.S. Embazsy Section on at least three occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about Decem- ber 1960 (sic, accually January 1961).7** COLITSYN sa:d that he knew in detail who was in the section, and that he wou.d nave ‘known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were the Depucy Chief. saee photograph and has consastently. denied ever seeing cr meet ing him. After the Gefection, NCSENKO was asked what he knew of GOLITSYN, He imnediately gave a@ detailcd account of an incident which GOLITSYN himseif had previously reported to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 of 1952 had written a letter to the Central Committee of the Comnaunist Party proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief. Directorate intelligence. activities: as a result of this letter COLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV an@ STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, but he added at this time that he was personally acquainted with him, ‘had: seen him periodically at KGB Headquarters, sometimes had a drink ‘his dacha in-1953 of 1954. GOLITSYN. saw NOSENKO's reply to his question prior to. making the above statement, and NOS=N.. ae: ] +t shame aeptaeron Raabe eae ee tre ere KO's claims of friendships with. Yu.1. GUK and V.A. GEERANCV were includea in the file COLI TSYN- studied. {roornotes. continugd en nexé-paye-d =~
wine 6 patent (Continuation of footnotes fron preceding page.) Ree ** This chronology différs fron that) provided by NOSENKO ane described previously: - Accarding to NOSENKO,- he served in the American Depar tnient to mid-1955, in the Tourist Depart- ment from 1955 until Januasy 1960, in the American Depart- ment during 1960 and 1961, ard again in the Tourist Separt-. ment from 1962 until his fefecrion. NOSESKC's confirmed 1955 oper ct BYRSI and his 1957 operations against @ and Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm ae .€ | | his connecticn with tcurise operations in 1956 and 1957. . *##** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December i961 of these visits to the U.S. Embassy Section. ***e*GOLITSYN had earlier reported that Ge tL. GRYAZNOV was acting as the assistant of the ch:ef cf section at this time. He has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S, Embassy Section nor indicated that such a position was on the table of organization. sn steer siomeverebe ong onnir ten vere tr oA Rute pan eRe eee em Hen ' ? a fl 1 i ' ‘ we Bs
s : = eee ew that. NOSENCO- nad told the Amerie the micrcphones—it th Enbags: - in Moscow. The following ia , i from the tranucript - 7 coe i Question: Do you know anything about hos ENKO, the one who f Gefected in Geneva? I didn't have any real infcrmation. I heard: acme gossip, and the gossip was that he is the scn of ; a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that hiég ; ; : ; nother was always involved in sone Dlackmarketing, oo : that his father had great concern over the family. This ia, you know, idle talk. I don't really Know-- it was just gossip. Question: Would you say that this idle talk wus among FG _ people or-~ - You know, 1 didn't knew many EG people. It wag only Mr. SVIPIN,* But he told you about this? We didn't tell me, he told CRB WEARS husband], ahe-you know, they libhe Lo think they are all-powerful, that this man of course will be exterminated one cay. They always repeat it. well, somelcdy committed suicide. The old de~ fector, thut GUZENKO, (€ think. Yesae-l read in the paper. Questions But what vere you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? * His mother is Jewish, his tather was a general. What was his father in? I really doen't know. ‘ - © Question: Were there others who suffered as a result of this? I really don't know. .I never heard. I never knew : that defector. I never knew. He wasn’t a KGB " ; "4 person, we - Question: I beg your pardon? He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO. (to have been a KGB. officer under cover of the State “Committee - for Science: and . : Technology (GKKNR) during the period of| lem=.— i ee { ployment (1960-1962) there and later | head OF a unit. _con= ae - —ducting_operations—against—the—t a friendly association with (272 . _the date of defection. Accor ding to NOSE as 4 a@ KGH Officer who participated inthe PENKOVSKIY™ “envestigation ee : (see. Part ViI.D.7.b. ds —_ an — wVlG. SVIRIN was Said by 5 Watliteca sh saaaiphld sn |
. _visit ae E ‘The fellow from Geneva? No. He wasn't a KGR persona, No? What was he? He was a civilian, F think, - You never heard anything about his family, his friends? No. But you say he was not a Gd perscn? I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have much gos$Sip on these things. It isinever safe. So gossip isn't popular. sesides, ‘each of then have their own grudge, sort of department, and he knows very little except gossip, very little gos- Sip from outside. And so, for imstance, maybe Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in a position to know about this person ‘straight, so he repeated the tiny scraps he heard. ; Question: | And that was only that he had a Jowish mother and a general for a father, but nething about hin. . Nothing... I don't Know. , Everybody, was saying “that he was detestable, when he ran away. He tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans about the sicrophones and things in the Embassy. Question: : In the Embassy in Moscow? ct : In Moscow, yes. Question; But yet, he was not a KGB person? But you know every Russian who is allowed to see foreigners is. connected [in some way with the KGB}. You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person who works at this place, as an officer, and every- body else involved is somehow related to the KGB. but not KGB persons themselves. During a later debriefing by CIA, m Clarified sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning ‘the microphones in the U.5 oe SVIRIN when he- wisited the ste he a fe: The infor- mation that NOSENKO had compromised the Aad microphone system to the Americans was also received from SVIRIN dif ing. another social Em th as sv so-nmcasriycne Gm “vote ——-| ——anthorities == —— — eid parked to te : SEN CO had: done considerable: danage to the Soviets by Fevealing the: fact (of. the microphones: to Uu. “Ss erate Oye aatde ene
e i’, Clse Offdcers P SL Amc abeaiioel 1s ~~ 1d. Soviet Journalist KORGLES | ; In Getober 16¢e, Yu... AURGLEV,. whe sad oo wos 4 Soviet . journalist, offered to write a stery on the dite of the family of a "Soviet secret asent" for the drench aesurtive Maris Match. *#* - The stery was to concern NOSENKO'S family and their Tife In ios- cow since NOSENKO's defection. A short bisivround statement ¢n NOSENKO which KOROLEY haaded | Paris Maceh editers stated ba part: O'NOSENLO, about 36-38, un of fTcoer of the Soviet Secret Police. ergeanizution, defected to the USA without Lis fantiy abeut two years ago and.ashed for politics] asylum in the Ui.s., it was F emenacs rere Fal dts AOA ah ce ENED be thee qe e te awa ak be The JOMNSCA Lead’ fren NUSENKD is cisescsed in ddtail in ws inenast wdob aetd a oo Te . — . a ; . St OrENKC provided information oi QEFRB isce vert Vi.Os5.¢.).. t. for more details conoertirs ROLOLEY's orler pte aeons yeaa es
ee eerees ee cree a he ae he as en oct ae tet ate oF oy, SRR phere ate TT wees te granted to him. That was.the most serious defeat oJ the Soviet Security organs as NOSENAO occupied important positions in espion- age and counterespionage denartsents and also was closely acquainted With the country's leading tamiltes and homes." ae aan ’ * . e a Se 20: ; fiig @Py ~ whe fue SPUR r oo ee Bet 4 Ro TERE re ORES o *- _ a ge te Paani dt Die 949 corns ee -. se,