Ww oy et © “7 + © ° (om) i =i . 00 ~ =i nee er “AS Shegcbaa gd an —_ . er . LUP Sibel snis ¢  wment consists of_ 7 POs3s a lumber ef of Ze * Participants: Ambassador Whiting Willaver, Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin, General Gray, JCS, Cantain Spore, OSQ, Mr. Tracy Barnes, Mr. Jim Noel; Mr. Fran’ Holcomb, lr. Josenh w, Scott, Hr. Glion Curtis, tir, wym Coerr, and ir, Frank Devine The meeting ooened at 10:05 a.m. with Ambassador Willauer in the chair. There were some introductory renarks emphasizing the special Ssecur.ty restrictions on any metters discussed==Secretary Irwin noted that in the Defense Department only Secretary arskine, Secretary Douglas, Secretar}; Gates and Secretary-designate vicNamara will be informed, There was some preliminary discussion as io the nature of the job to be done which is brought out more fully in the remarks noted later one Ambassador Willauer indicated shat the reason for the existence of the Woricing groun Was to provide a thirs prons to the two-pronged approach, The two pronzed approach is the overt progran for Cuba on the one hand, end the accomcanying covert Drogram contained in the document dated December 6 and December 20, Ambassador “lillauer then vroceeded to read through the document, Stopping at various voints to com:ent or te respond to auestions, This record will not attempt to reproduce the content of the document, but merely to identify the place where the réading ceased and discussion took place, Ambassador Willauer read Part I. Basic Asswantions through the Sentence on economic dislocations (line 5, First parazraph). At this Deint he noted that he felt,and ne auotéd Jose Figueres as concirring in this viewdoint, that there was a nish vrobability that the Soviet Union would pump in enough economic assistance to make a Silow case of Cuba. He noted that dissatisfaction arising from economic factors is nov overlooked, He indicated that for all eractical curposes, he LDN, et the notion had ssen abandoned that there was any hope of overthrowing” the Castro resime with econo-ie warfare measures alone, even if they include an effective blockade, He then read through the rest of the Basic Assumptions section. He then read Part il, sugested Solution throush the first narasranph. Comment: Ambassador “illauer ineicared chat events had overtaken the. crovi-~ Sions of this pararcranh. He said wnat at this time no one foresees any Foreign liinistars Heetving oy February 1, nor do ther foresee any effective collective sanctions decision. Arbassacor Willauer then went on to note that an obdscure item waich apsears in the Mew York Tines of January 12 incicated an inclination on the part of President Betancourt of Venezuela to call an OAS Foreign Ministers meeting for the purpose of actinc against dictators doth of tre right and of the left. Ur. Coerr noted that the type of reaction whien nad occurred yesterday in Uruguay azainst the Canwnist and Castro activities could build up to an OS meeting, Ambassador Willeuer corimented that we nad not given up all hope, but we cannot count on such a : waking piace, Ambassador Willauer then read tne second varagramne DO NOTHBT then noted jnat ajain events have overtaken the vrovisions of the oaper roe ESS a) - ae in that the U fiad States has already Uroxen relations with Cuba, He noted P PLEASE BETO py ayup — ° that Peru TO ROO: ang uS/z ) 2 ATT mee a, Doerr a C2 CALL EXT, 4134: TGP Stake Photocopy + reer m Gerald R. Ford Library HW 56629 DoclId:32105622 Page 2
a” \ == that Peru had broken relations unilateraliy and perhaos Uruguay is about ‘. to do so. ‘he other Latin American countries. however, are reviewing their political sitiation and appear to be receding from their somewnat stronger attitude tcward breaking relations which existed prior to the United States action. He specifically cited the Chilean elections and the Argentine evidence of softening of its position. Ampassador Willauer then read the third paragraph of this section. He noted that this type of action is all overt, nevertheless, assistance to a government in exile, particularly in terms of personnel training and military materiel susport, brings in the Defense Denartment immediately. Secretary Irwin directed attention to the provision of assistance "after" recognition and raised the question varticularly with reference to training, as to whether it shouldn't be done ahead of time and be ready for use at the time of recognition, Ambassador Willauer quoted General Gray as having said that the force of 750 men could perhaps hold a perimeter of only 1,000 yards across. He noted that the actual amount of real estate : controlled by the government is not important and even expressed the possibility that one could be recognized without any real estate at all. In response to General Gray's question, tic. Scott noted that although the phrase used in the varer is government-in-exile, what is really meant is a provisional government. Ambassador Willauer then noted the fact that tne Agency is smuzgling into Cuba two Cuban leaders. These persons might - constitute a rallying point for the formation of a goverment within Cuba, ir, Bernes asked whether itis realistic to steak of recognizing a government in exile while the Castro Governnent is still in existence and asked whether this was really possible. Hr. Coerr replied, "yes" with the proviso that it would, of course, not be done if the situation were so flimsy as to be ludicrous. In response to lir. Barnes! question whetner real estate is essential or not, Mr. Scott replied that the vresent legal opinion is tnat real estate is essential. Secretary Irwin indicated he hnd the same concem as tir. Berness As he described it, nis nroblem is that it is not sutficient to establish control over a piece of territory but in addition there must oe an ability to maintain that control. His question is whether 750 men really ieee be able to do that. moassador Willauer made the point that nernaps there is alreaty sufficient real estate of one sort or another availaole in the Escanbray in dissident hands to warrant recognition of a government wnicn controlled that territorye Secretary Irwin commented that the real question was not one of recomnitic but rather whether or not we are prepared to do enough with sufficient speed to enable the »revisional government to estadlish its control over all of Cube Ye noted that he is currently very concerned with such a problem in Laos, wher. volunteers were encourazed but no decision had been taken yet as to now far WC would 206 Mr. Scott observed that this was one of the reasons for this current meets How do we make. recomition effective? How much de you need to provide for th? purpese? In this picture the abilities and limitations of the Defense Depart- ment constitute the third orong in the programe Ambassador wiLic--: 7RD are a: oe ry Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HW 56629 DoclId:321058622 Page 3
f | 38 lu? SECRET a Ambassador Willauer raised the question of training volunteers such as Argentines or Cubans. Tracy Barnes estimeted that there are now 70,000 Cubans in and around the Miami area, of whom pernaps 10,000 conld be of military age. aAnoassador Willauer then contimed with "Suppose we figured on the basis of 10,000 Cutans and perhaps 5,000 other Latin American volunteers for training, then questions might be: Where could they be trained? Wheat would be required for the purpose? and, How lang would it take? Tracy Barnes noted that there may be a question of what types of peoole would be acceptable. For example, he said that a military wackgyi-nd of soma sort may be necessary, Ambassador Witlauer suggested that this was a Department of Defense judgment. Mr. Coerr observed that the size of the force - may be, dependent upon the lcind of victory which is considered to be necessary, Y-In amplification he said one sized force might be sufficient to knock Castro. ‘ off, but to eliminate his government quickly and thoroughly might recuire Vane more people, Captain Spore asked whether the first step isn't really to surface a new leader before recognition of the government. Ambassador wWillauer commented that it would never be possidle to puil all the Cubans together. Captain Spore inquired about the need for some massive program within Cuba. At this point Secretary Irwin left the meeting. General Gray, ressonding to Captain Spore's last qiestion, indicated that the document will answer that question. Ambassador Willauer then noted that it will be necessary to make several assumtions. One is that whatever government is recognized must be assumed to ve satisfactory for our survoses. 4 second is that Castro is in power in Cuba and has certain military equipment and. capabilities. One of our questiomis, in the light of these assumptions, what is required from the cutsice to assure success of the provisional govern- ment? At this point Mr, Devine made three comments. He noted that with reference to our recruitment of volunteers » Castro is alse ousy recruiting tin Anerican volunteers for ais own purposes. Secondly, ne noted tnat *the principle, point ixplicit in the element of establishinz a safe haven perimeter Within Cuba was ine expectation that this would encourege and in fact procuce large-scale adherence from defectors within Cuba. Thirdly, he wished to be sure that the fact that two Cuban anti-Castro leaders are being infiltrated into Cuba’at this time does not represent a cécision already taken that these are the chosen instruments. ir. Devine was reassured on this latter point. There was then en exchanse between Ambassador Willauer and General Gray. General Gray indicated that nis directive fron General Boresteel wes that — tnis working group was to write an overall plan with all three elements; that SuDordinate tc this zeneral pian was to be a lamily of plans for detailed operations in sucport. Arccassador Willauer indicated this is correct. The reading HW 56629 Docld:32105622 Page 4
Fd O ie SuT 8 The reading of the document continued from the third section "Measures to implement Proposed Solutions." There was no further comment or discussion down through paragrapn d of the section "Recognition of a Cuban Govermment-in- exile," however, Ambassador “illauer did note in passing that unilateral action by the United States has already been taken and that the collective action section has been overtaken by events. He also noted that the language calling for recognition of government-in-exile inamediately upon breaking relations has been overtaken by events. Secretary Irwin returned to the meeting at this point. Mr, Barnes then noted that there is a group of 00 to 1,000 Cubans who exoect to make some calls on Fresident fisenhower and elsewhere during the course of tocay and tomorrow. Ambassador Willauer then continued the reading through the end of Fart I. . Ambassador “illauer read Part II - Covert Action, Section 1 = Objectives. He cormented that the Agency is doing a trerendous amount of work--Tracy Barnes . indicated that there are 1&0 cifferent sroups of Cubans. Mr. Barnes also said that two representatives of ortosition crouns are about to go inside Cuba. Cne is a member of the FRD, the second is note He continued by saying that perhaps Arellan{ Sanchez Arango might also go ing Sanches Arango cleims to have a lot of surport, but so far has not identified any of it. Ambassador Willauer then read Sectiai2 - Fresent Stetus, and noted that the support spring boards are located in Guatemale, Nicaragua and the Canal Zone. The Ambassador then continned readings secticn 3 and l and then invited comment by Mr. farnes on the geographic score, the main thrust and the broadcast activity in the political_acticn and propaganda fields. ilr. Barres Ae GOK ay) reportec in considerable detail aet activities of Swan Island, the three newspepers, anc the magazine, as well as trins throvch Latin America vy the jurists, laner sroups, representatives of Cuban women, end students organi.za- tions. He noted the political stand taken last Mey oy Tony Varona in Mexico City and Caracas, tre develovment and announcement of a volitical pletforn, which he cnaracterized as oein: sonewnat negative. He indicated in some detail the reasons wny 1% wes felt that a more positive acprozch to the platform provisions was not cesiratile at the stage reached when the vlatform was released. He then indicated that #adio Swan is commencins to discuss vericus approaches to sucn importent ouestions as land reform, elections and other elements of a platform. General Gray asked who was the leading candidate, ltr. Barnes indicatec that he has lists from many sources with deteiled informatien about the incividuals. He saic that he is reacy to sit down end consider the candidates and reach a decisicn as to who ere most appropriate, He noted that at this staze we should not go so far as to select one individual who might be snot, and that the selection of a sincle candidate should follow some denonstration that he can survive in Cuba and does in fact have a sub-. stantial political following. a ™. ~ . Ambassador Photocopy m Gerald R. Ford Library HW 56829 DociId:32105822 Page 5