Glgssifiestion: _—Seeree (This ecm i& ts be sess! ar amsitetia! esateaster e irom ClA—searrated sesuments) vA -~80a- ENR *The CIA memorandum states in part as follows: When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's defection and considered the possibility that he might have some knowledge of the Oswald case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing AMMUG-1...WH desk records reflect that _ . AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive matter, it was dictated directly to a CI (Counterintelligence) stenographer on 5 May 1964. /Note: A-1 was debriefed on several subjects on 4 May 64. -The procedure was to assign each subject discussed a debriefing number and they were written up in contact report form by the WH case officer. The instructions from CI staff were to handle the Oswald case debriefing very closely and not to keep any copies in WH Division/. The "Oswald Case" was logged in the WH notebook log as debriefing report number 40, but the report itself was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly to a CI staff stenographer. There would be no reason to include the number 40 on the report of this special debriefing for CI staff, since it was their only debriefing report. We are certain it is the debriefing report (#40) because the date is the same; ' it is the only debriefing report on Oswald reg listed in AMMUG-1 records; and it it (sic) the only AMMUG~-1 debriefing report in Oswald's 201 file. ae 4 eee i &, is = = (CIA Doc., Memorandum for the Record, Regarding AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report on the Oswald Case, 27 September, 1978, p. 1) Glessifieation; —=SFERES_ gate | Cessifieds by, dgsivatiog, —————
Classification: tere fie form is to be used for moverial extracted om €lA=ceatrelled documents) a 130 io ~8l—- on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as discussed herein. (Ibid.) a In * eee effort to ey thé’ substance of infoymation ee A-1 via, “to the crn’ ra ing Oswald, the Com copii tt eg as attempted SEED. ocate mil The ok a has Aso attempted to! f oy, 74 Yocate A-l, /nose piesent Lelatio Ship with’ neta ct the Agency is amb guous/ but has been unable! a4 {See Pr axon %) to determine his present whereabouts/* Thé CIA's A 7 f inability vo fopatal a1 hag been " Sourse of a, e * = Hd concern to” this /Committee, particularly in light of his long association with the. Sgency - ‘ remains ar ae al erly, 4 +~ waa ode, etait, fier may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. wowerrer, @ith the exception of the Calderon episode and on the Pe oe . basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-l . ‘information of investigative significance. A separate question remains, however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-l was present in the aioe 2K Ue.)
Classification: secre This form is 19 be ysed far Aatssial £atceqted em €lA—certretled documents) --B8la- *An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding A-l states in pertinent part: Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved ‘ in any CIA-operation in Miami or elsewhere. Q 3 oseph_Norris\}is the alias of a CIA ..representativeLwho periodically debriefs (A~1) on personalities and methods of the DGI.jJ There is no other CIA involvement with , . ® -/€ Rodriguez. (CIA Doc. o8ea6oe;—CHA 202417, 4/2/72 “ VOL. 4y--A-1 File 20}-3#496532)-- However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning the Agency status of A-l states: Informed “Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that & (A-1) not P receiving any Salary, but cou e paid if and when used in an operation. No problems here. [SPOB will keep his contract in an active folder.] (CIA Doc., Handwritten Note, 15 April 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file 201-749651) SE Reames oO a2 EGAN Eat is wt 7k hi. Wee? Asons on : : : fete tah sey F ifj derivation: : 30 | Cees, eeixetion: eo perk | ponks Fé]
Ciassification: Fst’ (This form is to be used for material extracted Washing torfronDClA—eerdeolledndocumentelk controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for protecting its. sources, the fact that A-~l's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.@. to take the sworn testimony of A-l as at concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as- the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option. “In light of the establishment of A-l's Rona fides, . | ee , his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission. are The AMLASH Operation Cte be ince rpocaFeh 10K on Bis QA Gock, x) During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General ‘issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an Classification: Classified by derivation: Be wen, | en. So a a a, a a ' NH, OW! Soa CART? m0) GENO. 009106 ?
. Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). AS a result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political. alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency. subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material Support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated Se ee by the CTA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. (Ibid. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his SS. conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but ¢ ¥ SHS, at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to a twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid.. pp. 107-110). . In its examination of the AMLASH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. 8 : : Classification: RA. 009107 Classified by derivation: i
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<controlled documents.) “aa, The most striking example of the CIA's direct © offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states “it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meéting with a Cuban agent in Paris and ‘giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (Ibid.) The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy > ~.The 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was “~~ act tried in‘ Havana;press reports of Cuban knowledge of AMLASH's association with the CIA weredated from Se a a an November 1964, approximately one year after President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid. p. 111). € The Church Committee in Book V of its Final : Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. & (SSC, Book-V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Church Commite « ‘' * - concluded: | = The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the P Warren Commision work than the early CIA assassination pilots with the underworld. ; Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH Classification: —SeatiP “Oh, 9108. Classified by derivation: h
. | Classification: —_ SEER ET (This form is to be used: for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) . Me Cepia de In 1977, the CIA issued a oe Ticsocton a eeneral's Report concerning ‘the subject of CIA Sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in Cage Rte. cco. large part, was intended as a: Yebuttad of the - af Se Church Committee! s findings. the “1977 ‘IGR states: The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassina- tion of JFK in order to support the SSc e view that it should have been reported of we TT ke to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGK p. 2) The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot. Nevertheless, the 1977 EGR did state: — id et ~? o-7 - ve served to reinforce the pe It would e Warrep“Commission) \ . (a broader view RH i» ° of e of {gu o, cowld. j peci fic terms® neral térms-- Of Soviet or Suban involvément jn the Assassination because of the tepsions of the time. It is not ‘enough ‘to be able to point Classification: 00110 "Classified by derivation: "NOS, NORA. NUR, ERED, NORE, NET.
The —— EF, Classification: _ SBS (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) to erroneous;criticisms. made today. The Agency houly hay t n brodder initiatives the ell/ That’ . ‘ CIA employees At the time felt=-as AELE they obvYouslLy did4—thdt the sactivities about wHich ey” /knew/had ng relevance to the/jvareé en Commission inquiry does not t the place ofa record of conscious review. (Ibid. P- Ty) TERT ott Richard Helms, as the highest level. CIA . “> 4 3 employee in contact with the Warren Commission on @ regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26~27). A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 a) Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, Classification: “Wm, NON. XE NIN BS UH, SMD,
Grassiticatign: secre (ais form is tg be used for meteriol extracted Oa CYA—sentrsiied decuments,) ~BS— ‘WRAL Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1) The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp.. 3, 8, 79) Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban TER, WA A Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit of ‘Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). It was Use Langosch's recollection that: ««ethe AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the \ CIA. (Ibid., p. 4) ' iba me . oP mada te Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 sd tey an : it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence ga - ¢ Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA Jeep Ii atoc#) officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (Ibid., p. 4). ints However, the issue before this Committee is Giassificatign: —a-ceeres———_— @00ite By SeiWaleos. —K-—Rerk My nt thy 200053. | Cesiies | {
_— Gassifiegtign; eee __ This form is to be used for material extracted { ts torm 1s {g é used or RSESES exirdcted Zom —<controiie ocuments rom —tontroilad Gocuméent?é: ~88a- Nia *In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee has received from the CIA an affidavit executed by Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who “served as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff...and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." (CIA Doc., Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, executed Oct. 5, 1978, p. 1) Mr. Pollock specifically contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an assassination operation. In pertinent Part, Pollock - drew the following conclusions: , “GEA NEA So a To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objective of organizing a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it: as an “assassiantion operation." Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2) oom Ee M He also stated: ee tt Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an “assassiartion operation"; the . case officer did not; I,~as Executive Officer, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other + branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro. The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. /Ibid., par. 4, ov. 2/), (itbid., par. 6, p. 3) ~ Hts potion, 4‘ e c ne roe Ks ~ VASIVAULEIOTD) Clessifica@tion: —seceare __ 09113 Classifeds by, desivation, —c.—Bexk
Classification: mas: A not simp1ylTWAd eff 2 the caiitss  Sferial sextracted an rom ClA—controlled aocuments: ; assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission. in the case of the AMLASH operation this. determination is a most difficult matter to resOlve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operationai objectives. Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that such informa- tion, if made available to the Warren Commission, might have stimulated the Commission's investiga- tive concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin commented before this Committee: --.when I read...the Church Committee's Re ' report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any more or polish it off. I don't think that a a a - sw DA hes 4] . Classification: Classified by derivation: 900114 A oo ‘SE.. ~AHER, Gh, | RR, “Se, SiN Na. NG.