(98-1000740015) i tere ass SEES JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/20] Identification Form . : Agency Information . AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: — 198-10007-10015 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information ORIGINATOR: OASD FROM: — E.R. ZUMWALT TO: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR. TITLE: —ICCCA: EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES DATE: — 03/15/1963 PAGES: 13 SUBJECTS : COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES EXCHANGE OF. INTELLIGENCE, LATIN AMERICA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: — Secret , RESTRICTIONS : IB CURRENT STATUS : Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/10/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 10. Memo for Califano from Zumwalt re: second working draft of "Cuba: The Exchange of Intelligence Concerning Communist Subversive Activities.” Department of the Army EO 13528 Declassity [I Exclude Exempt Authority en ee ES Feter To HY 50955 DBoctd: 327424006 Page 1
"3 “a Be | OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ‘ 15 March 1963 MEMO NO. 42 MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army , SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Exchange of Intelligence Concerning Communist Subversive Activities With reference to your Memo No. 19, comments are submitted herewith in the form of hand-written . changes to one copy of subject paper. Efe UMWART, Jr. Captadn USN Attachment As stated above UNCLASSIFIED Woey fi ‘AT ARE DETACHED TACHMENTS See ay A $407. \ HY 50955 DBoctd: 327424006 Page 2?
i Osof/1 sa Me See4we a : | Gp 2 inaidaur YE Rr SECRET SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION 15 March 1963 ue) SERVICE, OSD AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS: _This is our final effort on the paper for exchange of intelligence. Please give me your views on the manuscript by 1500 today. -V. H. KRULAK Major General, USMC GROUP-1 SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSTFICATION HY 50955 DBocld: 32742740086 Page 3
HW 450955 SECRET SECOND WORKING DRAFT CUBA THE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IT. Introduction In combatting Castro-Communist subversion through- out Latin America, there is a fundamental requirement for intelligence ~- a requirement which involves the timely acquisition and processing of information as well as its rapid dissemination, on a selective basis, to countries concerned. While efforts are now being made by CIA, AID, and the U.S. Military Services to improve Latin American intelligence systems, success thus far has been limited, and much remains to be done. It is not with this broad problem, however, that this paper is primarily concerned, but rather with the narrower matter of the need for a stronger program of exchanging essential information re- garding Communist subversion in Latin America among those who need to know it. SECRET Docld:32474008 Page 4
HW 50955 It. SECRET The Nature and Scope of the Problem 1. Limiting Factors There are many inhibitions which tend to discourage the exchange of intelligence on an international basis, even among allies. National privacy with regard to the inner workings of an intelligence system must be pre- served. Compounding the problem further, where Latin America is concerned, is the divisive influence of the long history of rivalries, wars, jealousies and dis- putes which have characterized relations among .the nations concerned. The wounds of past conflicts among pairs and groupings of nations are not completely’ healed. There is lingering hostility between Peru and Ecuador deriving from their boundary war. Chile and Bolivia continue at odds over the question of Bolivian © access to the sea, and, even now, Nicaraguan insurgents are harbored within the borders of both Costa Rica and Honduras. It could hardly be expected that these countries would be eager to exchange intelligence on a full and frank basis. Beyond this, Latin America is not a homogeneous en- tity in social, political, or economic terms, and attitudes toward the Castro-Communist subversive menace vary Widely. A completely unified approach toward exchange or intelligence concerning this menace, there- fore, cannot be regarded as attainable. DHE Pa 424008 Page 5 2
HW 509455 SECRET DOCIATIFA21008 Page 6 SECRET An additional impediment to intelligence exchange is the low level of competence of most Latin American intelligenée services, their lack of rapid, secure meahs of communication, and the absence of adequate security eystenis and the lack of security conscious- ness. Deficiencies in security safeguards must necessarily limit the exchange of intelligence ob- tained covertly by any of the nations involved, and particularly the United States, which has the most sophisticated system and hence the greatest need for protection, This defect promises to persist, since the governments of some countries have little desire to develop a competent career security service. There is a fear that the existence of an efficient service would constitute a threat to further activi- ties of members of the existing governments at such time as they might find themselves out of power. Moreover, many Latin American intelligence services tend to label as "subversives" those of their own nationals resident in other countries who are opposed to the existing government. These realities all underscore the fact that multilateral intelligence exchange must be approached on a most circumscribed basis. It should not be
HY 0955 SECRET concluded, however, that nothing of value can be accomplished multilaterally. With proper defini- tion, limiting the problem of exchange to matters directly related to communist subversive activities, such as the movement to and from Cuba of trainees, the production and movement of propaganda materiale which threaten internal stability, and the movement of arms, it should be practicable to marshal a useful measure of cooperation. In pursuing this effort, it will be important to draw a sharp distinction between secret intelligence gained by covert means and information obtained openly. The former in- volves the requirement to protect national secrets both as to sources and acquisition methods employed. The latter, which can be of great value, can be exchanged without fear of compromise. 2, Current Exchange Arrangements At present there is little organized exchange of intelligence among the Latin American nations. There is a limited amount of informal exchange, often on a basis of personal relationships between government officials having a community of interest with respect to a particular matter. SECRET 4 Bocld: 327474008 Page 7
HW 50955 SECRET tained in Latin America and released reports to SECRET The Central Intelligence Agency has established working liaison arrangements in some Latin American countries where such relations have been considered to be in the best interest of the United States. Most of the intelligence concerning subversion in Latin America available to the CIA is derived from covert operations or through contacts with another intelligence or security service. This inhibits the passage of such information to agencies of a third country. There is, however, a substantial amount of intelligence available from overt or non-sensitive sources which can be provided to other countries. In 1962, for example, CIA received information re- ports from kervices with which liaison is main- recipients. Intelligence items. exchanged included ! collated studies, weekly intelligence reviews, name traces and travel reports. The U.S. Army, through its attaches, currently has an informal arrangement involving bilateral exchanges of intelligence with Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela. Information provided by the Army has been concerned An Boclda: 32474008 Page &@
HW 50955 SECRET with subversive personalities, communist infiltra- tion, weapons movements and related matters. Reciprocal intelligence received has been of small value. The Army also provides selected information on subversive activities to Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Mexico, without reciprocation. The Navy has established a Navy-to-Navy program for the exchange of intelligence among nine South American navies, the Mexican Navy and the U.S, Navy. Some information has been released from time to time to Latin American countries by the Commander- in-Chief, Caribbean Command, operating through the Military Groups, and exchanges of information are also effected from time to time through channels of the Department of State. As yet, however, the program for the provision by United States agencies of information on subver- sion to Latin American governments has not been developed to an adequate degree. Since the United States possesses the most extensive acquisition capabilities, as well as the only secure and re- liable means of rapid communication throughout Latin America (currently in process of improvement), the development of an integrated United States system for bilateral exchange offers the greatest possi- bility of achieving the results desired. D&HGREi271008 Page 9 6
HW 50955 SECRET United States experience in the matter of intel- ligence exchange in Latin America, and in other areas of the world, has led to the conclusion that bilateral arrangements are more fruitful than multilateral arrangements such as those established within the framework of NATO, CENTO and SEATO, Nevertheless, this experience has shown also that multilateral arrangements can be of some use, particularly in creating an awareness of the need for intelligence exchange. The concept of an exchange of information among members of the OAS with regard to subversive activi- ties has been put forward at numerous Inter-American meetings, but has not been implemented, largely for the reasons set forth in Section II.1. Under the Punta del Esta decisions, the OAS members were urged to cooperate in strengthening their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, sub- version or other dangers to peace and security. The Council of the OAS is charged with maintaining vigilance over Castro-Communist subversion, and a "Special Consultative: Committee on Security (Sccs)" is established to give technical advice on request to governments and the Council on matters relating SECRET 7 Boclda: 32474008 Page i160
SECRET to subversion. All American governments have been asked to furnish information on Castro-Communist activities to serve as the basis for studies and recommendations by the Council of the OAS on how to counteract them. Since the Punta del Esta meet- ing, the OAS. has been making slow progress in the countersubversion field, but there has as yet been no significant exchange of intelligence through its machinery. | This brief summary serves to illustrate that there is much room for expansion of bilateral in- telligence exchange arrangements among the Latin American nations themselves, which is now minimal at best, as well ag a need to create an expanded program for bilateral intelligence exchange be- tween the United States and individual countries, and finally, a requirement to develop the possibili- - ties of a multilateral approach within the recog- nized limitations involved. SECRET _. 8 HY 50955 DBocld: 3274274008 Page il
HW 50955 SECRET III, Actions Recommended 1. Increase the existing bilateral exchange of in- telligence conducted by CIA, DOD, and other U.S. agencies, where it is found possible to establish appropriate arrangements for the exchange of selected information con- sistent with security requirements. 2. Establish military intelligence centers at the headquarters of the Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier, Atlantic Command, for further dissemination of intelligence as appropriate in conjunction with our Military Alerting System, for rapid processing and dissem- 4nation when appropriate, of intelligence on subversive activity directly to the countries concerned through the American Embassies therein. ; 3. Increase and expedite the existing flow of in- telligence on subversion from CIA and the other elements of the American Embassies in Latin America to Caribbean Command as well as to CIA headquarters for further dissemination as appropriate. 4, Inerease the dissemination to Latin. American governments, by all U.S. agencies concerned, of unclassi- fied studies, reports and other non-sensitive information concerning Castro-Communist subversion. SECRET 9 Boclda: 32474008 Page i?
SECRET 5, Encourage Latin American countries to engage in bilateral exchange of intelligence on Castro-Communist subversive activities. 6. Continue the development at high priority of U.S. communications in Latin America. | 7. Increase emphasis on the provision of U.S. in- telligence advisors to Latin American countries. Dis- courage their employment of intelligence advisors from nations other than the U.S. 8. Intensify and increase existing AID, CIA, and Military programs for the training and equipping of Latin American internal security and intelligence. services. Establish such programs in additional countries where it is found to be in the best interests of the United States and acceptable to the country concerned. 9. Undertake action in the OAS to stimulate govern- ments to keep the Council and the SCCS fully informed on a continuing basis of the nature and incidence of sub- versive activities in their respective countries. 10. Encourage Latin American countries to approve the General Military Plan of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), and, in accordance with Annex 4 thereof, furnish to the IADB intelligence information and estimates 2 igen propo, week paca pehoeece activites: Te ect S Db ao LD On tthe, reef” oivnef otcecicy, SECRET HW 50955 DBocld: 32424008 Page i3
HW 450955 11, Take action to cause the IADB to be designated a OID Ae, el. as thefagency to provide advice and assistance to the Ud Ste Council of the OAS in regard to the exchange of sntertt Soca. of adn OF gence on Castro-Communist subversive activities. Leceoff . Lettetatly % the 12. Arrange for regional meetings of senior intelli 0G Mey gence and security service representatives of Latin XG Chtinthie American countries and the United States for the purpose . of fostering the exchenge of intelligence concerning Castro-Communist subversive activities and developing the necessary mechanisms and procedures therefor. SECRET bl Doclda: 3274274008 Page i14