Be. ‘[ieo-t0142-t0018 i'r Cau wet JS°7 gtonts oe po irebe = prov bf ht paw L Ge fehrv wy [a 180 - WI Y-‘Joo 15
Berk-Write-Ups 5 Q HON ANLYOR IS DOCUMENT Purpose and Scope of Study The Central Intelligence Agency's performance in its role of support to the Warren Commission has been a source of controversy since the inception of the Warren Commission. Critics have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated in a conspiracy designed to suppress information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy, During 1976 the critic's assertions were the subject of official inquiry by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC). ‘The Ssc,. in its report regarding "The Investication of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached the following concluSion: The Committee emphasizes that it has. not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. The Committee has, however, developed evidence which impeaches the process 000000
by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This. evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassina- tion was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the inves- tigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI the CIA, as well as oth of Governme with jatvestigating t sassina- tion/ ($$¢, feeK Epo) “This sought to examine in greater detail the general findings of the ssc. The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA. or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information relevant to the assassina- tion of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. “In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy. to information relevant to its investigation, the misinforming or withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission was the 760000 decesrege
result of a conscious intent to do so by the “Agency or its employees. | The Committee has sought to examine the — issue detailed above in both an objective and disciplined manner. In order to accomplish . CIAL this goal the Committee has utilized.a 1977 Task Ferce Report by the CIA's-Inspeetor—General (hereinafter V7 gS. . This Report was highly critical of the SSC findings and asserted that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of Limited effort by the CIA to assist the Warren commission in its work. The 77 toh was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect information in support of. the-wikcen - Commission. Additionally at conducted studies and- ‘submxtted= speetalfs lyses and reports." \ (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab ESD der-t6 demonstrate further the scope of support provided by. the CIA to the Warren wee +7 pe Commission, the 77 iGR. contained a comprehensive listing of CIA generated material made available 000642
to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassina- tion of President Kennedy. In this respect, . , TES . the Committee agrees with the 77 FGR wherein it is stated that "This compiliation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, . 3 to the extent that it reveals something. 77. tan, Introduction t ults of that effort." he reaules of oO Tab BE) _ In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA generated material referenced above, the Committee has paralled its review to the . structure given to these materials by the 77 f6R. In this regard the 77 ¥OR details four inter- related compilations of Kennedy assassination material. These four compilations are: 1) Agency dissemination of information to the Intelligence Community (Formal Y and Informal Disseminations) 2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission GO08G2
3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al regarding rumors and allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination | 4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the Warren Commission on Rumors ‘Allegations Relating to th President's Assassinatioyg? (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.) In r8¥iewing these compilations, ‘the Committee focused upon those CIA materials which the 77 TIGR documented as having made available in written form to the Warren Commission. During the course of tnis study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain * i issues created by the review of the Agency's compilations discussed in this report. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, app 1c gap files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive g00604
issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising an approximate total of ninety volumes of material have been examined and analyzed in preparation of this report.: The findings set forth herein are subject to modification due to the following considera- tions. During the course of the past fifteen years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of ‘information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. Ln-~epiteofcthé“Agency 's sophisticated-document-retrievai~system, Gertain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. ‘Whether these ‘documents merely have been filed incorrectly or destroyed, gaps in the written record still do exist. Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of investigative * E | . GiA STFKassas. matenals pruded the Rac ks feller Ce Mani sso, Cl A MOAT IANS Pectaining to Li Akisat atAe rancaallen, Maria Te Ga Petra, ) AmMMus- | (Cubantat clli gence Secvice Defector) Amiash, 2A Sser Flite" pertai aing to bee Harve Oswald CIA MAT als 3° necare. Ry Watlern Samant ss fan bit cA regins Ag enc: ad AS rE catlon
relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee, - certain files requested by the Committee for review . have been made available to the Committee in a sanitized fashion. Therefore, to the degreé reflected by the Agency's denial of access and/or santization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the best evidence available to the Committee thZough ‘this may not be all relevant evidence to which the Agency has access. | One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings,. and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA | representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance : 4 of these discussions; briefings, and ‘meetings may not always be reflected by the written | record made the _ subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session’ hearings with KK GIA Liles pertaining +O AMiee “|, Vac ia Te Ke rege Froenaa, andi jn Sut P BON OI Save Rowing DIETER PAAR avaylable he ths Comme tec Sib 5 ect + Agency
, a. 4 Classification: ha (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -~B— key Warren Commission staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to resolve questions that are not addressed by the written record. The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will beé a subject for discussion herein. “In addition, this report will examine the following subjects generated by the Committee's study as outlined above, in the following general order of discussion: 1) the - organization of the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination; 2) the working relationship of the Warren Commission staff and those CIA representatives concerned with the Warren Commission inquiry; 3) the standards of investigative cooperation which the Warren Commission staff believed to govern the quality and quantity of “information supplied by the CIA to the Warren Commission; ' 000697 Classification: oyet Classified by derivation: Cc. Berk = “GE. YS “GR “GEA “=. “GA “FR “GR = ~<a.
Classification: a (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -8a- 4) the CIA's concern for protection of its sensitive sources and methods and the consequent effects of this concern upon the Warren Commission investigation; and 5) the substance and quality of information concerning Luisa Calderon passed to the Warren Commission and the results of this Committee*s investigation of Calderon and her significance to the events of November 22, 1963. II. Select Committee Study of Commission see cIA Pose Zoceos tT rata OC ‘beg inning of TNS Section f aG9G0G Classification: ___ Sg¢#et Classified by derivation: f ; f
Classification: - (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) “L. Organization of CIA Investigation of President Kennedy's Assassination In his Executive Session testimony before the Select Committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during 1963, described the CIA's role in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination as follows: ‘This crime was committed on United States soil. Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the pri- mary investigating agency would have been the Federal Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of the CIA would have been entirely-~-supportive in thé sense of what material we are (sic) able to acquire outside the limits of the United States with reference to the investigation. ... For investigative purposes, the Agency Classification: ___ | Classified by derivation: \
-2- Classification: _. (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) _ had no investigative role inside the United States at all. So when I used here the word “supportive,” I meant that in the 6 literal sense of the term. We are (sic) trying to support the FBI and support the 6 Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we were not initiating 6 any investigations of our own or, to my recollection, were we ever asked to. (Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 17-18.) On November 23, 1963 Helms called a meeting of senior- level CIA officials to outline the Agency's investiga- tive responsibility vis a vis the assassination. (ssc, J Book V, p- 25.) At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, Branch Chief for CIA operations in Mexico, Central America, and Panama, in charge of the Agency's initial investigative efforts. (HSCA Class. Deposition of John OPO Pye ee 000615 Classification: Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 111-112, Exec. Session Testimony f mf mY | - Classified by derivation:
Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) Scelso testified before the Select Committee, that he was given charge of the Agency's investigation on the basis of two considerations: 1)ihis prior experience in conducting major CIA security investi- TS pea Pee @ gations and 2) the observance of oswaid by CIA ; : surveiliance-in-Méxiéd, (Scelso's operational concern) less than two months prior to the assassination. (SSC Book V, p. 25, HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70, pp. 111-112.'; Scelso also noted that during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms did not pressure him to adopt specific investigative theories nor reach conclusions within a set period of . HSCHR Class. De pesrrory ox Yolwrn Sas! se time; eutive--Session-Testimony~ _of-—Richard.. elms. Sfie) 2%, Pr ll2. 7--ppz—-9-10,) * CIA's Counterintelligence Staff characterized Scelso's responsibility not as a mandate to investigate but rather to "coordinate traffic (code facilitation, telegram or telegraphic consideration) for working with the DDP with respect to what was being done over , the whole world..."  (HSCA Classified Deposition of. \ R. Rocca, 7f17/78, p. 9.) Rocca referred to this phase of CIA activity as ) the GPFLOOR phase. (Ibid.) 0001: Classification: * Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for ¢ Classified by derivation:
Classification: _ (This form is to be used’ for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Scelso described in detail to the Committee the manner in which he conducted the Agency's investiga- tion: ..-practically my whole Branch participated in the thing. We dropped almost everything else and I put a lot of my officers to work in tracing names, analyzing files. We were flooded with cable traffic, with reports, suggestions, allegations: from all over the world, and these things had to be checked out. We were checking out just dozens and dozens of people all the time. (HSCA Classified | Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70, p. 131)* * . During the course of the Agency's invetigation, Liaison with the FBI was handled for the CIA by | { (Ibid. p. 80.) At the time of the assassination Mrz | a former FBI agent, was Chief of the Special Investigations Group of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. (HSCA Classified Deposition of 6/20/78, p. 7.) Med | characterized his functions with respect to the Agency as follows: (This footnote -- Footnote *. -- continues on bottom of page 5) Coe 3 Classification: gagedz | Classified by derivation:
Classification: . _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's investigation "and the key stations were receiving tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions saying everybody participate in | the investigation." (Ibid.,p. 133.) It was his ‘ recollection, however, that throughout his tenure as coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the-Mexico CityStatien was the only CIA field station directly Footnote * -- continued from bottom of page 4. I knew that we (at CIA) did not have the basic responsibility for investigating the assassination of the President. If there was a crime commited in the course of this activity, tsic) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that it was our responsibility to give the fullest cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them. cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr. Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully co- operated, and he always fully cooperated with me. (Ibid. p. 52.) noted that his office (CI/SIG) at the direction of the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was designated the central point for collection of assassination- J related information made available to the FBI. (Ibid., pp- 52-53. Classification: g00Gi2 Classified by derivation:
J LF LE LT Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) involved in investigatory activities related to President Kennedy's assassination. (tia) ” During the latter half of December, Scelso issued a-summary report which described Oswald's activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related information then available to the FBI but not provided to CIA until late Dec. 1963. (Ibid., pz 114-115.) (CIA Document Report by John Scelso to C/CI, 24 Dec. 63.)* Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination to the Counterintelligence Staff. (HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p.- 136, Gf. HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p- 15 wherein Rocca states that responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI Staff on January 12, 1964.) Helms testified that this shift in * Approximately two days after President Kennedy's assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report, provided to President Johnson by Helms. This report adopted~che position that Oswald probably was a lone assassin who had no visible ties to. Soviet or Cuban intelligence though such ties cous not be excluded -/ ohFE. from consideration. | (#bid. 114.) able? Classification: Classified by derivation: Loe ad | $ HSC Bias | O2po. of Toh See sp 90G14 —. SS “ER “Ea. “EE
SP £F £F £2 £F £S ~ Classification 2 (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) responsibility was a logical development because the investigation had begun to take on broader tones. (Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, “ p-. 14, see also HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138.) Helms! reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond Rocca who testified before the Committee that the shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused in part by the establishment of the Warren Commission. Y (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca pp. 12-13.) Rocca added: It was entirely appropriate in the GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would have that (responsibility for the Agency investigation.) But the minute you had a commission set up outside the line obviously had to be the Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions. Here you had Mr. (Scelso) being’asked to sign off on cables that had to do with the Nethertands, with-G-®7T, with Austratra, and it would have seemed to me utterly administratively . simply a hybrid monster. (HSCA Classified ‘ \/ Deposition of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 12.) James Angleton supported Rocca's belief that "the spread (of investigative responsibility) involved... 000015 Classification: ee ee Se ee Se ee ae Ae y s " ke NP | Classified by derivation:
/10/5/78, pp. 76-77, See also HSCA Classified LE LS EF “FF * Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) SIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT V all of the (CIA) divisions." Angleton testifed to this Committee that the Agency's efforts to gather and coordinate information related to the assassination underwent a metamorphic transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and Case Officers approached Warren Commission. requirements in a piecemeal fashion. However, Angleton testified the Agency was eventually able to focus its resources to avoid duplication of effort and provide a system for the central referencing of assassination related information as such information was developed. (HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 7 Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78, p. 23.) Q00016 Classification: a GA DA A 4 SR GE VTA ER SR. Classified by derivation:
- a 6a 6a A - 9 Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The record reveals that during this second phase of CIA information collection efforts in support of the Warren Commisssion investigation the concentration : of Agency resources shifted in emphasis from exploration © of Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency : in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962 and possible . association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. « P40") (Ibid., pp. 32-33,44,Executive Session of Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 23.) » Recording ly Rocca commented that during this phase primary interest in support of the Warren Commission was to follow-up on Soviet leads: on the assumption that a person who spends four years**in the Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific interest to Soviet State security and their collateral authorities. (HSCA Classified Deposition of - » £.. 08: Raymond Rocca, pp. 32-33.) (seep q & for ) Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended \ to concentrate on concerned the Soviets: f Classification: a Ogogi7 | f | Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) *The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered by the Agency related to its investigation of possible Cuban involvement in the assassination: ; Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, IT believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection. Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti- ; Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would os you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the . possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President? Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side. The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic) within -- it was an enigma at the time. They were just getting started. This was Wit+s area. This was Wén- Seett’s area of proficiency. So the defectors had only begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban defectors. So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time. The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given greater attention ina generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated? Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate. Classification: O00Gids Classified by derivation: Za WA “HA “2 “Gas.
~ 9b - Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the Agency provide -- Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly didn't do it. Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me? Mr. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R & A. Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not -- Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all. This was something left to the people who were concerned specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation. Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information pertinent to the assassination was to go through your office, correct? Mr. Rocca. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent to the assassination went through your office, I take (it) you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would be relevant for the Warren Commission to see. Is that correct? Mr. Rocca. Well -- Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew? Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes. \ Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the position, it would seem, to know what information was being generated in the field that was going to the Warren Commission. Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (did). Classified by derivation:
- Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that. concerned the Cubans. Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Goldsmith. Let's continue. Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this. This was the great concern. Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. There are different -- Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WH: do you have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in this kind of thing. There was extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised to try to clarify that side. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility of an assassination plot by Castro against the President was adequately investigated? (Pause) Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hind- sight, I could say probably not. But at the time it seems to me that they gave due attention to it -- within the information that I had at my disposal. “.° **In fact, LHO spent 2 years, 8 months in the. Soviet Union October 1959 - June 1962 Classification: Ey F Classified by derivation: H90Hz4 ™ , f : f
- 10 - ‘Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) because the people he was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB “people. They were under consular cover and obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular job in those earlier contacts. . (Ibid., p. °33) However, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects of the CIA investigation were not ignored “because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans." V (Ibid., p. 44) Mr. Helms also testified that the possibility of Cuban involvement in President Kennedy's assassination was a source of deep concern within the Vv Agency. (Exec. Session Testimony of R. Helms, 8/9/78, p. 21)- Nevertheless, Mr. Helms stated that development of informa- tion pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation in the assassination was very difficult to obtain. ." (Ibid., p. 138) Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis that during the second phase of the Agency's support | role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its resources Oo xp ing, possible Soviet influence on Rod Classification: 000622 WON A MEL DE | Classified by derivation:
Classification: : ea - (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald. Y (Angleton, p. 86) He stated for the record with regard to the Warren Commission's investigation (with the CIA's support) of possible Cuban involvement in the assassination: I personally believe that the United States intelligence services did not have the capabilities to ever come to an adjudication (of the Cuban aspect). I don't think the capabilities were there. “(sca Classified Deposition of James Angleton, ~ ~ 10/5/78 iP 93) Ny Classification: Be IEE Be | Classified by derivation:
Classification: _. (This form is to be used for material extracted - : from CiA—controlled documents.) As noted above, the CI Staff assumed responsibility ‘in late December 1963 - early January 1964 for the coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for CI Staff, was designated point of contact with the Warren Commission. GHSCA~Classified Deposition-of James , f “ang bketon; 1075/78 p. 77.) Rocca's Research and Analysis component was concerned with: "analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant all source, all overt source comprehension; a study of cases that had ceased to occupy opera- tional significance, that is, closed cases, to maintain the ongoing record of overall quality and quantity of counterintelligence being performed by the entire DDP operational component;... the Deputy Director for Plan, (HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, 7 Aa /78§ See also HSCA Classified Deposition sf / “of Jam i Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.-)° a Mr. Rocca testified that assassination-related ( information generated by CIA components was directed to his staff (as designated point of contact with the Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day to day es > Ca) ™N von Classification: Classified by derivation:
Le va -~ 12 - Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) “work (Zbid.., pp. 16-17.) This information was then reviewed by Rocca or his assistants who included Thomas Hall, (Soviet Expert), Paul Hartman (general research and search man for the U.S. Intelligence Community and its resources), and Arthur Dooley (who had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of years prior to the assassination) (Ibid. p- 17.) bo During the course of the Warren Commission investi- gation,Hall, Hartman and Dooley worked with those CIA divisions producing substantive information related to the assassination. (Ibid.)L° Mr. Rocca testified that even though | CI/R&A was the Agency's point of reference with regard to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the CI staff in general displaced the direct relations of Mr. Helms or any other cancerned Agency official with _/ the Warren Commission. (Ibid.; Rocca testified that neither CI Staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet Division (represented by David Murphy, Chief of the Classification: Classified by derivation: p f ; ;
~ 13- Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) . SR division and his assistant, Tennant Bagley) in its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/R&A displace John Scelso in his contact with the Warren Commission.) Rocca testified that in some instances J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly to Helms with requests,.and in other instances David Slawson, a Commission Staff counsel, conferred directly “ with Tom Hall of Rocca's staff. (Ibid. p. 36.)* The record reveals that on certain issues of particular sensitivity Rocca was not permitted to act as the Agency.'s point of contact with the Warren + Commission. He testified that “compartmentalization was observed, notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level point of contact." (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond * Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct superior during the course of the Warren Commission investigation, he did not participate on.a regular basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive f ‘information to the Warren Commission nor did he deal on a direct basis with Warren Commission representa- tives. (excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis; . HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca ,|]8/17/78, i | p. 17-18; HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 78.) However, Angleton testified to this Committee that he did attempt. to keep apprised of developments as the investigation progressed through consultation with Rocca. (HSCA Classified Deposition of V James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 81) O0eb2 Classification: orc € o st Tat Classified by derivation:
-~ 14 - Classification: | (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) : 7. Jj Rocca, 8/17/78, p. 18) Rocca cited by way of example the case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca testified that he did not attend any of the Agency . discussions pertaining to Nosenko's case (Ibid.)“ Rather, (as it affected the Warren Commission investi- gation) responsibility for the Nosenko case was assigned to David Murphy, Chief of SR Division, in addition to Richard aeims.(Ebid) — Rocca described the CI staff mail intercept program, HTLINGUAL, as a second example of an Agency matter about which he had no knowledge nor input vis a vis the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission. “ (Ibid., pp. 19-20.) Rather, James Angleton and | _|handiea the disposition of this particular Material (HSCA Classified Deposition of J. Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 113, wherein Scelso states that CI Staff including was. repository of HTLINGUAL intercepts: louxk See HSCA Class Dep. of hay Ro (7 marae whertin ls teskes thok he didnot ae v | ‘ j Warren Commi st ion Dak Know ledge #€ +h WTR Ivecns. M Wee csi becanse ce das not res pe eee fo provide Warten Comm Shion with. maker (als Ari Fron wT KIM GUAR pregam iND ee 009 Classification: Classified by derivation: | Sf Ss
Classification: _ _ | (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In summary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally decentralized information reporting function best characterized the organization of this second phase of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist | nfm toy 1“ the Warren Commission. ci. "YO! usca Classified a! Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 75, 80. ‘See also CIA Doc. Rocca Memo for Record, 1 April 1975, Subject: Conversation with David W. Belin, April l, 1978, wherein it is stated that Helms remained senior official in charge of the overall investigation, with CI staff acting as a coordinator and repository of information collected.) e0ebe7 Classification: BeBe OY or Classified by derivation:
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -~9~ A, Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA Representatives Regarding Warren Commission-CIA Relationship The Committee has contacted both representatives of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA- generated information to the Warren Commission.. The general consensus of these representatives is that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78, “ op. 18) (See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel | for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. (See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman, ” 8/2/78.) Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality re] 809628 Classified by derivation: _C. Berk
+e ° ro Classification: sp (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -1l0- of work. © (Executive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17;see also JFK Exhibit 23.) J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured by the CIA that the Agency would cooperate in the Commission's work. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/7/78, p.4; HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, Pp. 9) John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John ‘;McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5) Mr. McCone was responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters were Classification: —— “t 4 | Classified by derivation:
EF £F £P LE ~ Classification: Soph (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -~l0a- conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission. : (Ibid., pp. 5-6) In this regard, Mr. McCone testified that: The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the - vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him -- giving his staff everything that we had, and. I think \; he was quite satisfied. (Ibid., p. However, as will subscquently be df iscyssed nec policy Ya not te G ive the airen Us mnist ee ee SEK, fie wh eatnge ‘ 9, al ZA “DR “ “EA @ Ze th 105 Sith gd Fxg. other ¢ barn gegen y seh Ad mactiod: Tit of deemed Ceevaey Fe ovis’ That All Relevan * Materials Be Made Promptly Available By CIA To Warren Commission Mr. Raymond Rocca, . tis A at ainylovd pmpiteenter of ciA Pipe auth ore onvestiaat _ the Warren Commission - investigation, characterized the Agency's role as one of full support to the Warren Commission. Mr. 1 Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and y f OG 8G3 8 Classification: _ Kah AIG : | Classified by derivation: __C + Berk
Classification: soe (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -10b- Analysis Divison for the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA, stated under oath that Richard Helms had given the following directive: All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CIA staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded indications -- they were verbal in so far as I know -- that we were to leave no stone unturned. \ (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, N7/17/78, p. 24) | Classified by derivation: _~" OU
on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under ‘oath he supported this proposition: Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to speci- fic requests by the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms: That is correct. I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which some- thing different might have occured, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be-responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to -them. . As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not. (Ibid., p- 34.) Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren | . Dey COE ; ; Commission requests on a caseAbasis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the. Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as follows: Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission com- municate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right co
Classification: s9fte € VA (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p. 4) Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of . W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29) B co cra'ts Gailucre 4o ‘PRiscles so Oph anti Lar re  Pest os! IES Pyan’s che Warren . Coe TY POTS DED ; , . Co . So unfortunate consequence’ of Warten Commission reli ane on Thea CliA +o proride Phe Comernri Ssfon se ttrh ®t rel< fant CIA material jacretie tod rin the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots /(SSC Book V) see also (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, SSC, 11/20/75)/7. Paradoxically, even if the plots, the CIA's point of contact with the Warren Commission would not have been able to provide the Classification: Warren Commission had requested information on such ( RR EE e, | Classified by derivation: Cc. Berk
Classification: shee (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) -~l3a- Commission with information so requested. As Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate i Fidel Castro. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 50) | fo y006 Classification: a / Classified by derivation: _C. Berk
Had Rocca,as the CIA's working level representative to the Warren Commission,been requested by the Commission to research and report on any and all CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's efforts“would have produced no substantive informa- tion. (Ibid., p. 49 ye The record also Pét2aizs that the CIA desk officer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr. Helms to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investi- gation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 73,™.i1=142) Mr. Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots the following | action would have been taken: "we would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. TI would have had all our Cuban sources. t J queried about it." (Ibid., p. 166) 090636 As the record reflects, these plots were known by few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony. regarding Ay Rocca 4eo4 ifyed € was netin apesiteenr to ansurer gues tions peluked te ¢ (Hasse Nakina plots agacAtt Carte bas Pred Prese hatte be ans WOEA By otha who were nthe Chane Commankankiaiv Weaid Kant A ch tain matiod Enidy pa) *See also HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/ $/78, pp-$o~7wherein Angleton statest hed hedid not icand Ayeny Ch to 055255 Co Rider Gastro until aK He Warren Geren jssi9n Had Competed iTS oN Kot | gations.
these plots reveals that the Agency compromised he polvey of its Pirec tor bec—peorise to supply all relevant information to oo - (gee stacker entef Sonn Mton€, Pr [oa herein ) the Warren Commission. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the extent of the Agency's compromise: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the ; Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti- Castro assassination plots. Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify ‘ before the Warren Commission about our operations. Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it. “Is that not true? Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not krmow about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go t traipsing around to the Warren Com- mission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission. Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?
Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall. _ (HSCA Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard \| Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31.4,emphasis aaAded ) Mr. McCone testifed. that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots he directed that the. Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA Lee N Class. Depe. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13) When asked whether the CIA desired to withold informa- tion from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti- Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he gave the following response: "Y cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld Ve the information from me. I cannot ‘ K answer that question. I have never 05 been satisfied as to why they with- & ry \ held the information from me. (Ibid., fe bets me nes t Y Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the 6. | | “ Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels — Rapkin, Slawsen and Spector were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the 800638
-: - 7 - sch C lass. Depe 6S. JeeKankin ) 4 | (7 / 7B, Warren Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test. - of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec. Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71 where he states that possible witholding of information by CIA about Agency attempts to assassinate Castro did not significantly affect Warren Commission. investigation) From the CIA's perspective, Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots his efforts to explore the -possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi- fied. He stated that: " a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca _ 7/17/78, p. 45) | | John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms’ non-disclosure to the Warren Commission: —68OG39
It. yt -Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed. to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots? -Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any _ other standard of professional public service. (HSCA Class. / Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78) \/ fF (53 g. | Agency Concern for the Sanctity of Sensitive Sources and Methods - Factors Affecting CIA Response to Warren Commission Requests The length of time reguired by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information was dependent upon 1) the availability of information; © 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request and 3) ‘the extent to which the relevant informatian touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back: | | "and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others. © For example, some might involve 00 O04 J
xt \i p.” 22) As a result of the CIA's concern,in some instances checking a file which was in Washington. | Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody .in some overseas country. Obviously, one takes longer to per- form than the other. (Exec. Sess. Test. on of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 25) -At times the CIA's concern for protecting its sensitive sources and methods. caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in  ° getting relevant information than when the protec- tion of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods, pac ticrlac la. witn PESTA to CiAsureillance BPRC AE ano in Mafice City, -.. @ffectadthe quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78, aaz the Agency made the unilaterial decision to limit access to CIA materials by the Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 158) The Committee has identified two“areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These are:
1) Witholding information from the Warren Commission — pertaining to +he=phete- telephonic surveillance © operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station 2) As a related consideration, the Agency's reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man" developed by Hea’ Mexicalrty photo - ___ surveillance operat tons . QiA' Enitiok Concern for Rerealing Sensitive Souc ces ana Methods The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." \/ (Ibid., p. 158) But Scelso did testify that: “We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded y almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts. A fT ps aS Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding 00064?
i g Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA DOC. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this. report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report. The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu- lated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission’ is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing ops. Will rely ‘instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA Doc. FOTIA. #420-757, 12/20/63, Dir 90466) ~ , The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cableais’ alse set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 10, 196% as it specifically concerned ; 5 \ the CIA's relations with the rat,J (CIA Memorandum for File, 12/20/63, includéd in with Soft file materials) In that memorandum, of the CIA Counterintelligence/Special Investigations Group Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam- 000045
Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials. which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico and asked him whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of the telephone taps. | _Jemoranaum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. beote:
* He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI-sensitive informa- tion which could relate to telephone taps, (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by included in Soft File materials)* The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized fashion. When Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already: called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information (as deter- mined from Agency sources) coinciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64, CIA # CSCI-3/779/510. SO “Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two. which Helms claimed would enable the Agency: to control .the flow of Agency originated information. In this way the CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. The policies articulated were:
The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. (CIA Doc. FOIA #398-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) This cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being with- ‘held from the Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission which would be in a form protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques (Ibid.) (Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.) 1): Your Bureau not disseminate information re- ceived from this Agency without prior concur- rence ° 2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider’ that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments (sic) or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau througn other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible future interest of the Commission and initiate certain preoaratory steps to meeting its needs. (Ibid.) Sanna 00626
: Fence Cs pres Pia werrind Pressly Sti 1% RIONG = 1o00 57 i Bue ra. SPC Bax 22. Yeer (F : Rs ay - “Hele phone. taps... Hepes top: Weve, ranean wre tim auch, wt Th Yhe Mey cax auVhey) bine: e | Pg 74: no tedachens, ie, UR6w sa By 3}23/ 43” wer Celease2 3 $0 +S Ws Suk 1a = 10142-10080" — > AF IK ax 22, ss "1, O72, 8 & arn” tela plone tops... tele ph ore deps-+. Nawacn eee onr meee eae at : ® 8 ‘ a . aa Guth otras es < to @s, ata eum auchin ud ody The ws feleasiad %@ | Pg TT ARGUE wos redlact e | . Yap yO Vw, etna | ay i - Cy a te e 2 ta Saver to TD * Pq a. Uw Meyjcau autho: tram. « Gehueey Hayice au) the Cai ted Stata.” ¢ ite. bo telephone top phress au The ty tome juschen wth yh rose wave uot yelbeus Layhegh> ) Pev RBalvy + Heese Shurteak heck. Maar aricmel fee tees xD: user There te CMe | Ps 78: “URGUL mob bx phlichte 2 Ces sO-aa MAES wae ¢ 1¥o+10142- 60are pe , ak iZe. 2% Fis’ O1G : Po as”; " Mey one auther dian... bedureeu Mexico wud fue alee shee Lend . Usibe> Stales ” Cia, 4 ellews ai qlaticletony ts The Saste ay he 242 copy, 1% -10(42-108¢137 abou, | Pe 24: At Gw 13 Yellas hichliphted ¢s ry 30 “0, ave he ve. —~with ne prepared Te do chon i } t, SE Gow a2 oar) ol: Pa 2e r _ hight ght? wet. We Setond ‘tele phen « taps phrase an the Nex; Cau author hes” Thy Vattion, Ted eudad IUYtS19¢ , nears feeaetidetatin, * | Pree Rat: Crleasny “Lhe ghen. tape pes prdblua, Thm the abaw releegenn - Pa 24 UFGU nak hrghli cabe 2 Pes VoL ave waster |
- 25 = hence CC Sa) nak “ , pe 4h ot QL Cancern Soc Sins itive Sounresand Methods wiSavis Ici pRenl ce And TRoTo Same tlance Operakroat of Manico Coty . SEE Telephone Taps Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform.the Warren Commission, at least during, the initial stage of the Commission's work, of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City. The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not . only becyase it was sensitive from the > 7 Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authorities and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, - _ , and that was the reason. (Exec. Sess. \“ Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52) The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren Commission in. the early stages of its investigation of the above-described surveillance operaticns is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of information the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the Warren Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, “ 5/6/78, p. 158) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in 00047
its investigation with all the facts before it. As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - (CIA Doc. FOIA #509-803 1/31/64) October 3, 19632 That memorandum did not mention that Oswald's various conversations with the. Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and ge the Agency's Mexico City Station subsequently transcribed’ Furthermore, that memo- . \ . randum did not mention that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed. On February 1, 1964, Helms’ appeared before the rar Cormission and Likely) Giscussed the memorandun of January 31, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #498-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) on February 10, 1964, 3. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. (JFK Doc. No. 3872 ) A review of Rankin's letter
- indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephonic surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts from that operation. | Rankin inguired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees» of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1 of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, had‘the Warren Commission been informed of the telephonic surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. | ‘Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico . city. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, ; p- 89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make