Neste terete bec "A duteetebees Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Soviet Russia division's American Legal. Traveler program, wee which utilized Americans traveling in the Soviet Union as a means of obtaining information and identifying possible subjects for recruitment, informed the Committee that they met with each person involved in this activity and that Oswald was not one of them: These Agency officials also advised the Committee that only "clean-cut" college graduates were used in this program, and that Oswald did not meet this criteria. Finally, the Agency officers in charge of the Soviet Russia division's research section in support of clandestine activities indicated that, had Oswald been contacted by the Agency, their section would _ probably have been informed, but that this, in fact, never occurred. Classification: Classified by derivation:
Nise ate cate . wy . . ee te ea Classification: ay A (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The Committee investigated the allegation of former CIA employee | ] who testified in executive ‘session that shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy he was advised by fellow employees at the CIA's ome | hat Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent who had received financial disbursements under an assigned cryptonym. [sjexplained that he had been employed GFP. by the CIA as a finance officer from 1957 until his resignation from the Agency in 1966. In this capacity, he served és a 13-. , fiscal account assistant on the support stafé( | ) from June of 1960 to June 1964. [___ ] advised that in addition to his regular responsibilities, he had served security duty on his off-hours in order to supplement his income. This additional job put him in contact with Classification: Classified by derivation:
1 eden eed, Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) is: other employees of the| who would come by the office and engage in informal conversations regarding politics and their work. [ _—_sstold the Committee that on the day after President Kennedy's assassination, he was informed by a CIA case officer that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent. further testified that he was told that Oswald had been assigned a cryptonym and that, ss |himself had unknowingly disbursed payments for Oswald's project using that cryptonym. Although vas unable to identify the specific case officers who had initially informed him of - Oswald's Agency relationship, he named several employees 1. . of we Cotes whom he believed he had subsequently _ discussed the allegations. Jadvised the Committee that after learning Classification: YOR, RIERA, UE. “RD. SEP
"Seaside “Stead annus ote -of the alleged Oswald connection to the CIA, he had never “the allegations to any formal investigative bodies following Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) an - imal . rechecked the| | )aisbursement records for evidence of the Oswald project. He explained that this was because at that time he viewed the information as mere shop talk and gave it little credence. Neither did he report QED, the assassination as he considered the information to be hearsay. In an attempt to investigate Jaitegations concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the CIA, the Committee interviewed several present and former CIA employees who were selected on the basis of the position each had held with the CIA during the years 1954-1964. Among those persons interviewed were individuals whose responsibilities covered a broad spectrum of areas within the ( € during this period, including the chief and deputy cnies Ge by Classification: aa \ C Classified by derivation: MEE ae
Na veeleemuees Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) 0% [ fas well as officers in finance, registry, the Soviet Branch and counterintelligence. _/ The Committee's investigation refuted | | allegation. During the course of their employment a fnone of these individuals interviewed had ever seen any documents or Heard any information indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent. / This allegation was not known to anyone until the time of publication of Warren Commission critical literature and the Garrison investigation in the late 1960's.  / ‘Some of the individuals, including the. chief of counterintelligence within the Soviet. Russia Branch (_ i expressed the belief that it was possible that Lee Harvey Oswald had been recruited by the KGB during his military tour of duty in Japan as the CIA's Yi ( naa identified a KGB program aimed at recruiting Classification: | | 7 4 (op — Classified by derivation: - Ra Le RECO,
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ‘U.S. military personnel in Tokyo during the period that ? Oswald was stationed there. An intelligence analyst whom | [had specifically named as having been involved, - following the assassination, in a conversation regarding : st wot hw hy, 6 . Sterne the Oswald- CIA agent a told the Committee that he was not in in the [~ yee that time. A review of this . individual's Office of Personnel file confirmed that, in | fact, he had been transferred from thef| to the ‘United States in 1962. d . ; : “ate % oe The chief of the (| } exon 1961-1965 stated that, had Oswald been used by the Agency within their — rz 2 etna aie jurisdiction, they certainly would have known about it. Similarly,-almost all those persons interviewed who worked pS in the Soviet Russia branch]]_ lindicatea that ‘they would have known if Lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact, Classification: | Classified by derivation:
mullite Nats a pmamaintcanith Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ‘been recruited as a CIA agent when he was in Japan. _/ These persons expressed the opinion that had Oswald been recruited without their knowledge, it would have been a rare exception contrary to the working policy and guidelines of >. the | Nee 3. Lee Harvey Oswald's CIA File The CIA has long acknowledged that, prior to the President's assassination, it had a personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald. This file, which in Agency terminology is referred to as a 201 file, was Opened on December 9, 1960. The Agency has explained to the Committee that 201 files are opened when a person is considered to be of potential intelligence or counterintelligence significance. The opening of such a file is designed to serve the purpose of bringing all of the CIA's information pertaining to that Classification: | 5. ; Classified by derivation: - cA NETS », SE, EIEN.
a Ndiematie vite ot hn cat esouncnemce Nt aint ., wthee! Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<controlled documents.) individual into one centralized records system belonging to the Deputy Directorate for operations, that component of the Agency responsible for clandestine activities. | The existence of a 201 file does not necessarily connote any actual relationship or contact with the CIA. For example, the Oswald file was purportedly opened’ because he was considered to be a potential counterintelligence - threat. Oswald's file contained absolutely no indication that he had ever had any relationship with the CIA. Nevertheless, because the Committee was aware Of at least one instance (in an unrelated case) where an Agency officer had apparently contemplated the use of faked files with forged documents, _/f special attention was given to procedural questions that were. occasioned by this file review. i Classification: - | Classified by derivation: : : i '
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—-controlled documents.) a) Why was Oswald's 201 file opened on December 9, 1960, more than a year after his attempt to defect to the Soviet Union? — A confidential State Department telegram dated October 31, 1959, which was sent from Moscow to the CIA, reported that Lee Harvey Oswald, a recently discharged marine, had appeared at the United States Moscow embassy to renounce his American citizenship and “has offered Soviets any information he has acquired as fan/ enlisted radar operator." _/ At least three other communications of a confidential nature which gave tore detail on the Oswald sm case were apparently* sent to the CIA during the same x g *Two of these documents, Warren Commission Exhibits 917 and 918, contained routing notations indicating that they had been -sent to the CIA, but the documents themselves were never found‘in Oswald's file. Classification: __ | ee —— .
ceemibln ane it Ne vied mat ae Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted — from ClA-—controlled documents.) seme approximate time period. . / Agency officials questioned by _ the Committee have testified that the substance of the October 31, 1959 cable was sufficiently important to warrant - the opening of a 201 file. In fact, however, Oswald's file was not opened until December 9, 1960. The CIA was requested by the Committee to indicate where documents pertaining to Oswald had been disseminated internally and stored prior to the opening of his 201 file. In response, the Agency advised the Committee that because document dissemination records of low national security Significance are retained for only a five-year period, they ‘are no longer in existence for the years 1959-1963. — / ' Consequently, the Agency was unable to explain either when these documents had been received or by which component.
fo Classification: (This form is to be used for material’ extracted ‘from ClA—controlled documents.) 'An Agency memorandum, dated September 18, 1975, j indicates that Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1260 ; by virtue of the receipt of five documents: two from the FBI, two from the State Department, and one. from the Navy. fs) This reasoning, however, is inconsistent with the presence in Oswald's file of four State Department documents dated in” 1959 and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. It is, of ‘course, j . possible that the September 18, 1975 memorandum is referring - 4 to State Department documents that were received by the DDO aa in October and. November of 1960 and that the earlier State 4 “Department communications had been received by the CIA's ? a . Office of Security but not the NDO. In the absence of “Wdnataaes oes dissemination records, however, the issue cannot: be i -resolved on this basis. ‘The September 18, 1975 memorandum also states that Classification: | Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald's file was opened’ on December 9, 1960 as a result of his "'defection’ to the USSR on 10/31/59 and renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible | reentry into the United States." / There is no indication, So ethan te ine, however, that Oswald expressed any intention of returning to any United States government official until mid-February: Mey dtm che ne of 1961. Finally, reference to the original form that was ‘used to Start a file on Oswald does not resolve this issue because the appropriate slot which would normally indicate Ne eet tee rent on ae the "source document" that initiated the action makes reference - to an Agency component rather than toa dated document. The Committee was abie to determine the basis for the oe _ opening of Oswald's file on December 9, 1960 by interviewing and then deposing the Agency employee who was directly. — responsible for initiating the opening action. This individual - Classification: Classified by derivation:
“Se ieeinentd te 0 "ine tS a ae eas Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) creer xplained that the CIA had received a request from the State Department. for information concerning American defectors. After compiling the requested information, she responded to the inquiry and then opened a 201 file on each defector involved. __/ This statement was corroborated by review o£ State Department which indicated that such a request, in fact, haa been made of the CIA on October 25, 1960. Attached to the State Depart ment letter. was a list of known defectors; Lee Harvey Oswald's name was on that 1st. __/ The cra responded to this request on November 21, 1960 by providing the requested information and adding two names to the State Department's original list. Significantly, the Committee reviewed the files of eleven’ individuals on the original State Department list Classification: |. Classified by derivation:
a og oe e " aaenahte em seas Nos en orm alin, Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) and determined that the files for each of the five (including Oswald) who did not have Agency (201) files prior to the receipt of the State Department inquiry were opened in December 1960. ‘In each case, the slot for “source document" miade reference to the same Agency component: vather than to a dated document. Even so, this analysis only explains why a file on Oswald was finally opened; standing alone it does not explain the seemingly long delay in the opening of the file. To. determine whether such a delayed opening was necessarily unusual, the Committee. reviewed the files of 13 of the 14. persons on the CIA's November 21, 1960 response to the State Department and of 16 other defectors (from an original list of 380) who were American born, had defected during the years 1958-1963, and who had returned to the United States Classification: ‘| Classified by derivation:
emn'vn Naan, eae "inant Nes ‘ Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) . em during that same time period. Of 29 files that were reviewed, eight individuals had been the subject of 201 files prior to the time of their defection. In only four of the remaining | twenty-one cases were 201 files opened at the time of defection. The files on the 17 other defectors were opened from four months: to several years after the time of defection. At the very least, this file review indicated. that _ during 1958-63 the opening of a file years after a defection was not at all uncommon. In many cases the opening was triggered by some event, independent of the defection, which . drew attention to the individual involved. b) Why was Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file opened under x the name Lee Henry Oswald?. Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file was mistakenly opened under the name Lee Henry Oswald. No Agency witness was able . Classification: | Classified by derivation:
“Neem eek wie Nags tN oN haa ainsi ee . on _ Ne ectateadtoutiess die, Nocee enue Soacandee ‘specifically to explain how this mistake was made, All Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) seer Agency personnel, however, including the person who initiated the file opening, testified that this must have been occasioned innocently by bureaucratic error. Moreover, the Committee received substantial testimony to the effect that this error would not have prevented Oswald's name from being elicited from the CIA's filing system during a routine name trace done under the name Lee Henry Oswald. c) What do the letters: "AG," which are written ‘in the space for “Other Identification" on Oswald's 201 opening form, connote? The form used to initiate the opening of a 201 file for Lee Harvey Oswald contains the designation AG in a box) marked "Other Identification." Because this term was considered to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of Oswald's alleged Agency relationship, the CIA was asked to ~ Classifications | Classified by derivation:
Namen bet cpa be x Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted irom ClA——controlled documents.) red explain its meaning. The Agency's response indicated that "AG" ig the OI ("Other Identification") code meaning “actual or potential defectors to the East or the SINO/SOVIET Bloc including Cuba," and that anyone so described could have the OL code "AG." This code was reportedly added to Oswald's opening form because of the. comment on the form that he had detected ‘to the Soviet Union in 1959. '.An Agency official who was a DDO records expert and for many years had been involved in the CIA's investigative efforts concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination, gave the Committee a somewhat differént explanation of the circumstances surrounding the term "AG" and its placement on Oswald's opening form. This individual testified that "AG" was an example of a code used to aid in preparing computer listings of occupational groupings or intelligence affiliations: assification: Classified by derivation:
chee ate tne ate a a on Miser eae | gilebas a area aiasenr cancer Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) He explained that these codes always utilized two letters and that in this case, the first letter "A" must have represented Commur.ism, while the second letter would represent some category within the Communist structure. His recollection was that at the time of the assassination the "AG" code was not yet in existence because there were no provisions then in effect within the Agency for the indexing of American defectors. ‘He recalled that it was only during the life of the Warren Commission that the CIA realized that its records system lacked provisions. for indexing an individual such as Oswald. Consequently, the CIA then revised its records handbook to include authorization for indexing American defectors and established a -code for its computer system to be used for the category of "American defectors." Although this individual did not know when the Classification: _ | ' Classified by derivation: |
"nn sete tabi i. creo eee ee ce ed wee eee ete ee Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) notation "AG" was added to Oswald's opening sheet, he presumed nw that it would have to have been following the addition of the American defector code, thus placing the time ‘somewhere . in the middle of the Warren Commission's investigation. ‘He explained that it was difficult to determine when any of the notations on the opening sheet were made, since it was standard . procedure to update the forms whenever necessary ‘so that they — were as reflective as possible of the available information. Finally. this individual testified that the regulations regarding the use of this occupation and intelligence code specifically prohibited indicating that a particular person was either an employee of che agency or someone who was used by the Agency. _/. This prohibition was designed to prevent anyone from being able to produce any kind of categorical listing of CIA employees, contacts, or connections.  /- Classified by derivation:
' Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) d) Why does the opening corm for Les Harvey Oswald's 201 elie indicate that the file was to pe restrictea? The form that was used to initiate the opening of Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file contains a notation indicating that the file was to be "restricted." This indication was considered potentially significant because of the CIA's practice of restricting agents' files to persons on a "need to know" basis. Further investigation, however, revealed that restricting access to a file was not necessarily indicative of any relation- ship with the CIA. The individual who actually placed the restriction on Oswald's file testified that. this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of any developments that might have occurred with regard to the file. This purpose was achieved because. any~person seeking -access to the file first: -had ton 1S asst ication: Classified by derivation:
Ke Medea ee then, "Nona dk bape, ee Seed eet ad os wren Oe ale tee mettre Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) notify the restricting officer; at that time the restricting of ficer could be apprised of any developments possibly necessitating access to ‘the file by someone else. | whi testimony was confirmed by a CIA records expert who further testified that, had the file been permanently changed as well as’ restricted, the possibility of a relationship with the CIA would have been greater. There was no indication on Oswald's form that it had been placed on permanent change. Finally, the Committee reviewed the files. of four’ other defectors which had been opened at the same time and by the . 4 _ Same person as Oswald's, and determined that each of their. files had.similarly been restricted. Each of these other individuals had been on the list of defectors that had been exchanged by the CIA and State Department. None of the files pertaining to these other defectors had any evidence suggestive Classification: Ce eee ene « '
"sto ord canon afoeeis atten is ins me Classification: . (This form is to be used for materio! extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Lane of a possible intelligence agency association. e) Were 37.documents missing from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file? In the course of reviewing Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, the Committee discovered an unsigned memorandum to the Chief - Of Counterintelligence, Research and Analysis, dated 20 February 1964, which stated that 37 documents were missing from Oswald's 201 file. According to the memorandum, this | statenent was based upon a comparison of a machine listing of documents officially recorded as. being in the 201 file and those documents actually physically available in the file. _ While the memorandum mentioned that such a machine listing was attached, no such attachment was found in the 201 file at’ the time of the, Committee's review. The memorandum itself bears the classification "SECRET EYES ONLY," and is one of the Classification: Classified by derivation:
Nocatee sae Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) documents that had been fully withheld from release under the mae, Freedom of Information review. In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA advised that because Oswald's file was so active during the course of the Warren Commission investigation, up-to-date machine listings were produced periodically. On this basis, the Agency stated that “it must be assumed that whoever was responsible for maintaining the Oswald file brought thie file up-to-date by ‘locating the 37 documents and placing them in the file." Because this response was incomplete, the author of this memorandum was deposed. He testified that once a document had been registered into a 201 file by the Agency's computer system, physical placenent of the document in the file was not always necessary. ‘on this. basis, he explained that the items listed in the memorandum were not missing but Classification: 9 es Classified by derivation:
Neca tee aw NS usidhiths Neuve Nenana Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) steer rather had either been routinely placed in a separate file because of. their sensitivity or were being held by other - individuals who needed them for analytical purposes. He further stated that in the course of his custodianship of Oswald's file, he had requested perhaps as many as 100 computer listings on the contents of the Oswald file. While -there had been many instances in which one or more documents had been charged out to someone, he stated that he had never discovered that any documents were actually missing. According to his testimony, the 37 documents, in fact, vere available, but simply were not located in the file at that time. f) Was there any evidence that the CIA had for some reason maintained a dual filing system regarding Lee Harvey Oswald? ‘Although the Committee was: aware from its outset of the possibility that a dual filing system -- using one of Classification: - Classified by derivation:
tages Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ares ostensibly innocuous file and one which contained the actual operational defail indicative of an Agency relationship with the CIA ~- could be utilized to disguise the existence of an actual relationship between ‘an individual and the CIA, this awareness heightened into a concern with the discovery of certain files which indicated that at least two Agency officers had contemplated the use of fake files and forged documents to protect the purpose of the 2R Rifle project. from being disclosed. “The ZR Rifle project was an executive action ({i.e., assassination) program which bore no relation to the Oswald case. Richard Helms testified that the: assassinations aspect of this project was never implemented and, in fact, x ‘was discontinued as soon as it was brought to his attention, _/ but the implications of this discovery in terms of the potentiality for a faked Oswald file were troubling. Classification: __ Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be uséd for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In the Oswald case, there were two items which received 7 a J scrutiny because they were potentially indicative of a dual filing system. The first involved a photograph of -him that "Socata mtn had been taken in Minsk in 1961 and the second concerned a “eanee athens 5 aman copy of a letter that had been written to him by his mother during his stay in the Soviet Union. At the time of President Kennedy's assassination, both of these items were in un J the CIA's possession but neither was in Oswald's 201 file. The photograph of Oswald taken in Minsk shows him posing with several other people. . According to the CIA, the picture was found after the assassination as a result of a search of the Agency's graphics files for materials potentially relevant to Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union. _/ The Agency advised that this photograph, as well as several others not related to Oswald, were routinely obtained in Classification: Classified by derivation:
Classification: “eee sey Aieeree (This form is to be used for material extrocted from ClA—controlled documents.) 1962 from some tourists by the CIA's Doniestic Contacts ee, Division, a component ‘that frequently sought information on ‘a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad in ~w Communist countries. 4 4 , ? Committee interviews with the tourists in question | confirmed that the photograph, along with 159 other photographic slides, had. been made routinely available to the “*s vemtidiee Agency's Domestic Contacts Division. Neither tourist had heard of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination or even Ne tts siden he knew which photographs had been of interest to the Agency. CIA records indicate that only five of the 160 slides initially made available were retained. __/ . Committee "Net tase se interviews with the two CIA employees who had handled the slides for the Domestic Contacts: Division established that Oswald had not been identified at the time that these Classification: Classified by derivation:
Nebbdintaniinalla, Ne tn ne me Nee ne it ncemt:inetedne Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) photographic materials had. been made available. __/- One owe, of these employees stated that the Oswald picture had been retained because it depicted a Soviet intourist guide; the - other employee indicated that the picture had been kept because it showed a crane in the background. _/ The employee who worked at CIA headquarters confirmed that the photograph of Oswald had not been discovered until a post= assassination Search of the Minsk graphics file for materials. pertaining to Oswald. Accordingly, this photograph is not evidence that the CIA maintained a dual filing system with respect to Oswald. The picture apparently was kept in a separate file only until 1964 when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its subjects. The Committee's investigation of a letter concerning Classification: |. Classified by derivation:
Nate atte ar a a a EGE simpy were sneer Ar AS * Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald that was in the Agency's possession Similarly did not Se “result in any evidence of a dual filing system. This letter, dated July 6, 1961, had been sent to Marguerite Oswald to her» _ Son, but was intercepted as a result of a CIA mail intercept Program. / This program, known as HT-Lingual, attempted to intercept letters being sent between the United States and © Russia in an effort to obtain both positive intelligence and counterintelligence information. _/ typically, intercepted letters and/or their envelopes would be photographed. and then | returned to the mails. In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA explained that because of the project's extreme sensitivity, all materials generated as a result of mail intercepts were stored - in a separate projedrs file which was maintained by the counterintelligence staff. _/ Consequently, such items were Classification: __. Classified by derivation: G8 cd.
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) not placed in 201 files. ~ This explanation was confirmed by se, Name dott. , the testimony of- a senior officer from the counterintelligence staff who had jurisdiction over the HT-Lingual project files.* / Nee ceattan soe, g) Was there any evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald had 3 _ ever participated in a CIA counterintelligence i staff project? .The Committee's review of HT-Lingual files pertaining to Oswald** resulted in the discovery of reproductions of four index, cards, two pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and two *Since Oswald was the subject.in approximately 50 communications during his stay in the Soviet Union, the Committee also questioned why the Agency~ostensibly had just one letter in its possession directly related to Lee Harvey Oswald. . In essence, this may be explained by the fact. that HT-Lingual only operated four days a week and even then only on a sampling basis.  / **Although the Agency had only one letter in its possession directly related to Oswald, after the assassination the HT-Lingual files were combed for additional materials potentia! related to him. Approximately 50 pieces of correspondence wer discovered. None of these were ultimately judged to be of any Significance. These materials, however, were stored in a separate Oswald HT-Lingual- file. Classification: _ Classified by derivation:
Classification: | (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) eee pertaining to Marina Oswald, which were dated after the assassination of President Kennedy. The pages containing the reproductions of these cards are stamped “Secret Eyes Only." The first card regarding Lee Harvey Oswald is dated 9 November 1959 and states that Oswald is a recent defector to the USSR and a former Marine. It also bears the notation — Ne ence nt deb "CI/Project/RE" and some handwritten notations. The second ~ card on Oswald places him in Minsk, USSR. It contains background information on him and states that he "reportedly Ne aaa be mss 6 expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions." This card is dated 7 August 1961 and also bears the notation "WATCH LIST." These cards, particularly the “reference to "CI/Project/RE," raised the question of whether : | Lee Harvey Oswald was, in fact, involved in some sort of cI project. The Committee, questioned former employees of the CIA who” Classification: | Classified by derivation:
i 3 ! Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA——controlled documents.) may have had some knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual program in general and these cards in particular. Some of these employees recognized the cards as relating to the HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identify the meaning -of the notation, "CI/Project/RE." However, one person testified that the "CI Project" was "Simply a name of convenience which was used to describe. the HT-Lingual project"; another person testified that "CI Project" was the name of the component which ran the HT-Lingual project. The latter explained that "RE" represented the initials of a person who had been a translator of foreign language documents and that the initials had probably been placed there so that someone could come back to the translator if a question arose concerning one of the documents. _/ Another employee testified that the "Watch-List" notation on Classification: Classified by derivation:
ete oe tnt ae Classification: _ ‘(This form is-to be used for material extracted from CliA—controlled documents.) the second card referred to a list of persons who had been identified as being of particular interest in the Agency with respect to the mail intercept program. The Committee requested the CIA to ‘provide an explanation for the terms "CI/Project/RE," and. "Watch List," and for the Significance of the handwritten notations appearing on the index cards. In addition, the Committee requested a description of criteria utilized in compiling a “watch list." In regard to the meaning of the notation "CI/Project/RE," the CIA explained that there existed an office within the _Counterintelligence staff that was known as "Ci/Project," a cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the office's functions. In fact, this office was responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by the HT-Lingual project. The response further explains that "RE" represents Classification: a ‘Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) the initials of, a former employee who is presently retired under rs a cover. { as ay . - . i In responding to a request for the criteria used in compiling a "Watch List," the CIA referred to-a section of 3 . the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within-.the United States, which states: Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence > interest (one should also add counterintelligence interest) were specified in Watch Lists provided to the mail project by the Counterintelligence Staff, by other CIA components, and by the FBI. The total - number of names on the Watch List varied, from time to time, but on the average, the list included approximately 300 names, including about 100 furnished | by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of United States citizens. | Thus, the full meaning of the notation is that on 9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the "Watch List" for the HT-Lingual project for the reason stated on the card -- that Oswald was a recent defector to the USSR and a former Marine. Ciassification: . Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) oo - The response goes on to state that the handwritten i . ote number , #7-305, which also appears on the first card, is a reference to the communication from the CI Staff to the Office of Security expressing the former's interest in seeing any mail to or from Oswald in the Soviet Union. Finally, the : | other handwritten notation, "N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59," signifies that a name trace run chrough the central records register. " indicates that there was no record for Lee Oswald as per that date. The Agency's explanation of the meaning of the second card is that on 7 August 1961, ucs. Egerter requested that “Oswald's name be placed on the "Watch List" because of Oswald's expressed desire to return to the U.S. as stated on the’ card. The handwritten notation indicates, in this instance, that Oswald's name was deleted from the "Watch List" on 28 May 19¢€ Classified by derivation:
oe eae enti 8 Pe aa AT: SS er a oe a Fe a ee ascakensr Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) In reference to the two cards on Marina Oswald, the ied Agency stated that her name was first placed on the "Watch List" on 26 November 1963 because she was the wife of Lee Harvey Oswald. .The second card served the purpose of adding | the name Marina Oswald Porter to the “Watch List" on 29 June 1965 after she remarried. Both names were deleted. from the list as of 26 May 1972. Thus, the statements of former ‘CIA employees were ‘corroborated by the Agency's response regarding the explanation of the index cardsin the CIA's HT-Lingual files pertaining to Oswald. The explanations attested to the fact that the. references on the cards were not. demonstrative of an Agency | relationship with Oswald, but instead were examples of notations routinely utilized in connection with the HT-Lingual project. Classification: Classified by derivation:
me, Nee ne wet sete ite ‘seta oon .A66 new eres Se net aleve eed Ciassification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) 4. Did the CIA ever debrief Lee Harvey Oswald? The CIA has denied ever having had any contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, and its records are consistent with. this nonclandestine basis from americans traveling abroad, the. absence of any record indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald, a returning defector who had worked in a Minsk radio factory, had not been debriefed has been considered by Warren Commission critics to be either inherently noncredible (i.e., the. record ‘has been destroyed) er indicative that Oswald had been a ‘contacted through other than routine Domestic Contact Division channels. After reviewing the Agency's records pertaining to this issue, the Committee's. initial point of inquiry was to interview Classification: Classified by derivation:
Classification: ‘(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) "S\echen ear « nubs the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research o 7 related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union who -had written a November 25, 1963 memorandum which indicated that, upon Oswald's return from the Soviet Union, * this officer - i "had considered "the laying of interviews fon him/ through 4 ex other suitable channels." This individual indicated that Oswald was considered suspect on . Nisenteare se because the Soviets had appeared to have been very solicitous ‘ of him. For this reason, a nonclandestine contact, either by the | llox other “suitable channels" such as. the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, \ *The memorandum indicates that the possibility of an Oswald contact was discussed during the summer of 1960, but the author . indicated that the conversation actually took place during \ the summer of 1962, shortly before his transfer to a new i , assignment. During the summer. of 1960, the author was not ; on an’ active assignment. . Classification: Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) was considered... The officer stated, however, that to his knowledge, no contact with Oswald was ever made; moreover, if : a debriefing had occurred, the officer stated that he would | have been informed. Finally, he stated that Oswald was considered a potential lead, but only of marginal importance, | ' and therefore the-.absence of a debriefing was not at all unusual. The Committee interviewed five other Agency employees eee Woe. ag tant ie at aed who were in a position to have discussed Oswald in 1962 with the author of this memorandum, including the person who replaced the author of the memorandum as chief of the research section, but none of them could recall any such conversation. Interviews with personnel from the Soviet Russia Division's. clandestine operations section, the American legal travelers program, and the clandestine activity research séction failed Classification: i. Classified by derivation: saree,
"hh cm dee ne, Nee ema atecnne Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) to result in any evidence suggesting that Oswald had been contacted at any time by the CIA. The author of the November 25, 1963 memorandum also . informed the Committee that the CIA maintained a large volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which Oswald worked. This information was stored in the Office of . Research and Reporting. _/ Another former CIA employee, who had worked in the Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised the. Committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, this individual claims that during the summer of 1962 he reviewed a contact report from representatives of the CIA's; who had interviewed a former Marine who had worked at the Minsk Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This defector, Classification: i Classified by derivation:
~ Neate te et le fre Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted: from ClA——controlled documents.) s, whom the employee believes may have been Oswald, haa been - living with his family in Minsk. 4d . ~The employee advised the Committee that the contact report was filed in a volume concerning. the Minsk Radio Plant 3 which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch, : then a component of the Office of Central Reference. Accordingl: the Committee requested that the CIA provide both the above- 4 described contact report and the volume of. materials i concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. A review by the Committee of the documents in the volumes on the Minsk Radio Plant, however, revealed that no such contact report existed in that file. - The CIA has stated to the Committee that between 1958 ana 1963 it had no procedure for the systematic debriefing of overseas travelers, including returning defectors. Instead, Ciassification: Classified by derivati on: . AEP lll EF LF LF
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CliA—controlled documents.) the Agency relied upon the FBI both to make such contacts and waa, "See cgaee ae ns report any significant results. To investigate this question further, the Committee reviewed the files of 22 individuals (selected from an original list of 380 possible Soviet defectors) who were born in America and appeared to have returned to the United States between 1958 and 1963.* Of these 22 individuals, only four were Be a interviewed at any time by the CIA. These four instances tended to involve particular intelligence or counterintelligence needs, but this was not always the case. Based upon this file review, it appears that, in fact, the CIA did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter *An effort was also made to review only the files of American- born individuals who had defected during these years. Not. all of the 22 individuals, however, met this criteria. Classification: Classified by derivation:
Neaneldadiel a. Sete st we nn aterm, Classification: (This form is to be used tor material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) of standard operating procedure. For this. redson, the absence of any Agency contact with Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union cannot be considered in any way unusual, particularly since the FBI did fulfill its jurisdictional obligation to conduct such interviews. 5. The Justice Department's Failure to Prosecute Lee Harvey Oswald for Offering to Give Intelligence Information .to the Soviet Union | When Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959 for the purpose of renouncing his American citIzenship, he allegedly offered to give the Soviets information that he had acquired as a Marine Corps radar operator. _/ “The Committee sought : to determine why the Justice Department did not prosecute Oswald for his offer to divulge this kind of information. - Ciessification: Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form ‘is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) A review of Oswald's correspondence with the American ova -embassy in Moscow indicates that on February 13, 1961 the embassy received a letter from him in which he expressed a "desire to return to the United States if...some agreement /could be reached/ concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against /him/." __/ On February 28, 1961, the “embassy sought guidance from the State Department concerning Oswald's potential liability to | criminal prosecution.  / ‘The State Department, however, responded on April 13, 1961 that it was "not ina position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his desired return to the United States he may be amenable. to prosecution for any possible offenses committed in violation of the laws of the United States..." _/ On May 10, 1961, Oswald wrote the embassy demanding a “full guarantee" against the possibility of prosecution. Sf Classification: Classified by derivation:
We eee wires ae Classification: _ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) He visited with embassy consul Richard Snyder on July L6, wae, 1961, and denied that he had ever given any information to the Soviets. _/ snyder advised Oswald on an informal basis that, while no assurances could be given, the embassy did not perceive any basis for prosecuting Oswald for an offense involving any severe punishment. _f There is no record that the State Department ever gave Oswald any assurances that he would not be prosecuted. Upon his return to the United States, Oswald was interviewed twice by the FBI. On each occasion, he denied ever giving any information to the Soviet Union. _/ In a response to a Committee request, the Department of Justice indicated that prosecution of Oswald was never considered because his file contains no evidence that he had ever revealed or offered to reveal national defense information Classification: Classified by derivation: ST . GEES
Classification: : (This form is to be used for material extracted pk from ClA—<controlled-documents.) Nee eeteotes to the Soviet Union. _/. In a subsequent response, the taco wma, ] Department ‘acknowledged the existence of some evidence that Oswald had offered information to the Soviet Union, but stated that there were, nevertheless, serious obstacles to a 1 possible prosecution: It (Department file) does contain a copy of i — an FBI memorandum, dated July 3, 1961, which : is recorded as having been received in the Justice Department's Internal Security Division on December 10, 1963, which states that the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence contained a copy of a Department of State telegram, dated October 31, 1959, at Moscow. The telegram, which is summarized in the FBI report, quoted Oswald as having offered the Soviets any information he had acquired as a radar operator. The FBI report did not indicate that the information to which Oswald had access as a radar Operator . was classified. Oswald returned to the United States on June 13, 1962. He -was interviewed by the- FBI on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth, Texas, at which time he denied furnishing any information to the Soviets concerning his Marine Corps experiences. He stated that he never gave the Soviets any information which would be used to the detriment of the ‘United States. - . In sum, therefore, the only "evidence" that Oswald ever offered to furnish ' information to the Soviets is his own . reported statement to'’an official at the | Classification: i Classified by derivation:
Nemec ne ve a? 2; Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA-—controlled documents.) U.S. embassy in Moscow. That statement, - of course, was contradicted by his denial. to the FBI, upon his return to the United States, that he had ever made such an offer. In the prosecution of a criminal case, the Government cannot establish a prima facie case solely on a defendant's unsupported confession. The Government must introduce substantial independent. evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant's statement. See, Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). Accordingly, in the absence of any information that Oswald had offered to reveal classified information to the Soviets, and lacking corroboration of his statement that he had proferred information of any kind to the Russians, we did not consider his ; prosecution for violation of the espionage statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 793.  / Based upon this analysis, there is no evidence that Oswald received favorable treatment from either the State Department or the Justice Department regarding the possibility of a criminal prosecution. | 6. Oswald's Contacts with Americans in the Soviet Union a) Priscilla Johnson McMillan ‘Priscilla Johnson McMillan, author of Marina and Lee, became ‘a@ subject of the Comiiitteé' s inquiry” “peGause she was Classification: Classified by derivation:
Nate oe ee Classification: (This form is to be~used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) . one of two American correspondents who had obtained an interview me with Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in Moscow in 1959. The Committee sought to investigate the allegation that Ms. McMillan! -interview with Oswald had been arranged by the CIA. John McVickar, a consul at the. American embassy, testified that he had Oswald's case with Ms. McMillan, and that he thought "she might help us in communicating with him and help him in dealing with what appeared to be a very strong personal problem if she were able to talk with him." _/ McVickar stated, however, that he had never worked in any capacity for the CIA, nor did he believe that Ms. McMillan had any such affiliation. The Committee's review of Mr. ; McVickar's State Department and CIA files confirmed that he had never been associated with the CIA. Classification: 4 Classified by derivation:
Aes uni EELS fa Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) According to Ms. McMillan's testimony about..the events ee, surrounding her interview with Lee Harvey Oswald, in November | 1959 she had. just returned from a visit to the United: States where she covered the Camp David summit between President _ Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. On November 16, 1959, she went to the American embassy to pick up her mail for the first - we meaner time since her return to the Soviet Union. The mail pickup facility was in a foyer near the consular office. Consular Officer John A. McVickar came out of this office and welcomed McMillan back to the Soviet Union. They exchanged a few words, and as she was leaving, McVickar commented that at ‘N her hotel was an American who was trying to defect to the Soviet Union. McVickar stated that the American would not speak to "any of us," but might speak to McMillan because she was a woman. She recalls that as she was leaving, McVickar Classification: “Classified by derivation:
+ aed eee Mike ARE | LEAS Alter fie ASSES Arcee actin Pare ed Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) told her to remember that she was an American. McMillan proceeded to her hotel, found out the American's room number, knocked on his door, and asked him for an interview. The American, Lee Harvey Oswald, did not | ask her into the room, but he did agree to talk to her in her room later that night. No American government official. arranged the actual interview with Oswald. She met with Oswald just once. She believes that MeVickar called her on November 17, the day after her interview with Oswald, and asked her to supper. That evening at supper they discussed her interview with Oswald. McVickar indicated a general concern about Oswald and felt that the attitude of another American consular official might have pushed Oswald further in the direction of defection. McVickar indicated a personal feeling that it would be a sad thing for Oswald to defect in view of his age, but he did not indicate Classification: Ciassified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) that this was the U.S. Government's position (p.18). mee rere Td Ms. Millan also testified that she had never worked for the CIA, nor was she connected with any other federal governntent agency at the time of her interview with Lee Harvey Oswald. J _ According to an affidavit that Ms. McMillan filed with the Committee, her only employment with the federal government was _asa 30-day temporary translator for the Joint Press Reading Service, an organization that was operated by the American, British, and Canadian embassies in Moscow. Finally, Ms. McMillan testified that because of her _ background in Russian Studies, she applied for a position with the CIA in 1952 as an intelligence analyst. The application. 4 was withdrawn, but the CIA completed its security check on her and denied her a security clearance. - She acknowledged being debriefed by an Agency employee in 1962 after returning . Classification: . Classified by derivation:
"heen ae isle Nee eines tae ad eee Classificaticn: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) from her thrid trip to the Soviet Union, but explained that this ne, contact was in some way related to the confiscation of her notes by Soviet officials.* The Committee's review of CIA files pertaining _ to Ms. McMillan corroborated her testimony. There was. no indication in the file suggesting that she had ever worked for *In November 1962, I had a conversation with a man who identified himself as a C.I.A. employee and gave his name as either Donald Jameson or James MacDonald. I agreed to see him in part because the confiscation of my papers and notes had utterly altered my situation -- I now had no hope of returning to the U.S.S.R. and was free for the first time to write what .i knew. I was preparing a series of articles for The Reporter which would contain the same information about which Mr. Jameson had expressed a desire to talk to me. Finally, during the latter part of my 1962 trip to the U.S.S.R., I had been under heavy surveillance and the K.G.B. knew what Soviet citi- zens I had seen. Many of those I had talked to for the Reporter articles were Russian "liberals" (anti-Stalin and pro-Khrushchev What reprisals might befall those whom I had interviewed I _ did not know, but since my notes were now part of the K.G.B. files, I felt that it might help them if the C.I.A. knew that - which the K.G.B. already knew. My meeting with Mr. Jameson, which occurred at the Brattle Inn, Cambridge, was a reversal of my usual effort to avoid contact with the C.I.A., and the subject matter was confined to my impressions of the Soviet literary and cultural climate. Classification: _ Classified by derivation:
samen, tat cada, Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted: from ClA—controlled documents.) the CIA. In fact, there -was some evidence suggesting that the wee Agency was reluctant even to debrief her after her trips to the Soviet Union. an interview with the former Agency official who had been deputy chief and then chief of the American legal. travelers program during the years 1958 to 1961 confirmed that Ms. McMillan had not been used by the CIA in that program. There was information in Ms. McMillan's file indicating that on occasion during the years 1962-65 she had provided cultural and literary type information to the CIA. None of. this information, however, was suggestive in any way of a clandestine relationship. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Ms. McMillan ever worked for the CIA or received the Agency's assistance in obtaining an interview with Lee Harvey Classification: Classified by derivation:
“tains ate ‘. ee ae Classification: {This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald. * ee, b) Richard E. Snyder Richard E. Snyder was the consular official in the United States Moscow embassy who handled the Oswald case. It was Snyder with whom Oswald met in 1959 when Oswald sought to renounce his ‘American citizenship. Two years later, when Oswald initiated his inquiries about returning to the United States, snyder again became involved in the case. Warren Commission critics have alleged that. Snyder was associated in some way with the CIA during his service in the Moscow embassy. In his Committee depositon, Richard Snyder acknowledged that for an eleven-month period during 1949-50 he worked for. *Nor is there any basis, based upon Ms. McMillan's testimony, CIA files, and an affidavit provided by McMillan"'s publisher, Harper and Row, to support the allegation that the CIA. financed the book Marina and. Lee. Classification: . Classified by derivation:
Nate ace eve Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.)- the CIA while he was on the waiting list for a foreign service appointment with the state Department. Snyder testified, however, that, since resigning from the CIA on March of 1950, he has had no contact’ with the CIA other than a letter written in’ 1970 or 1971 inquiring about employment on a contractual basis.* The Committee reviewed Snyder's files at the State ‘Department, Defense Department, and the CIA. Both the State Department and’ Defense Department are consistent with his testimony. Snyder's CIA file revealed that at one time prior to 1974 it had been red flagged. and maintained on a segregated basis. The file contained a routing indicator which stated that the file had been red flagged because of a IS *Snyder also denied contact with any other intelligence service while active as a foreign service officer. Classification: Classified by derivation:
Classification: . (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) "DCI statement and a matter of cover" concerning Snyder. ie Ne i In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA indicated that the DCI statement presumably refers to comments which "het att oor a “former DCI Richard Helms had made. in 1964 concerning the © 1b cawene ek Oswald case when Helms had been Deputy Director for Plans.* | i _ The CIA also stated that Snyder's file had been flagged at the request of DDO/CI to ensure that all inquiries concerning wes . Snyder would be referred to that office. The Agency was unable _to explain the reference to "cover" because according to its records Snyder had never been assigned any cover while employed. Further, the Agency stated that "/t/here is no record in Mr. _ Snyder's Official Personnel File that he ever worked, directly a eee . . mens smanadannt | end *Responding to a newspaper allegation that Oswald had met with Cli representatives in Moscow, Richard Helms wrote a memorandum to the Warren Commission on March 18, 1964 in which he stated the “desire to state for the record that -the allegation. carried in this press report is utterly unfounded as far as the CIA is concerned." Classification: im | Classified by derivation:
bees Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) or indirectly, in any capacity for the CIA after his resignation on 36 September 1950." The Committee does not regard this explanation as satisfactory, especially since Snyder's 201 file indicates that for approximately one year during 1956-1957 he was used by an Agency case officer as a spotter at Harvard University because of his access to other students who might be going to the Soviet Union, nor was the Agency actually able to explain specifically why someone considered it necessary to red flag the Snyder file. The remainder of the Snyder file, however, is entirely. consistent with his testimony before the Committee concerning the absence of Agency contacts.. In addition, the CIA personnel officer who handled Snyder's case in 1950 confirmed that Snyder had, in fact, terminated his employment with the Classification: Classified by derivation:
Ley” Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) "Natit aene CIA at that time. Moreover, he added that Snyder did not go ae tw a yom ra to the State Department under any kind of cover arrangement. / This position was confirmed by a former State Department _ official who was aware of procedures for State. Department cover for CIA employees. In addition, this individual stated 7 that at no time from 1959 to 1963 did the CIA use the State Department's overseas consular positions as cover for CIA intelligence officers. (Insertion to follow -- Analysis) c) Dr. Alexis H. Davison \ . Dr. Alexis H. Davison was the U.S. Embassy physician in Moscow from May 1961 to May 1963. In May 1963 he-was expelled from the Soviet Union in connection with the Penkovsky spy case. After tha assassination of President Kennedy, it was. Ciassivication: Classified by derivation: 0 Ay SES
aT ML CY i<ay <a Classification: (This form is to be used for material. extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) discovered that the name Of Dr. Dayison's mother, Mrs. Hal pavison, and her Atlanta address were in Oswald's address book under the heading "mother of U.S. Embassy doctor." In addition, it was also determined that the flight: which Oswald, his wife and child took from New York to Dallas on June 14, 1962 had stopped in. Atlanta. For this reason, it has been alleged that Dr. Davison was Oswald's intelligence contact in Moscow. In a Committee interview, Dr. Alexis Davison stated that he had been a physician in the U.S. Air Force and was stationed in Moscow as the U.S. Embassy physician from May 1961 to May 1963. In this capacity, it was his duty to perform physical examinations on all Soviet immigrants to the United States. -He recalls that most of these immigrants were elderly, | but he remembers two young women, one who was a mathematics Classification: _ Classified by decivation:
_. Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) teacher from the south of. ‘Russia and one who was married to } an American. The latter was very frightened by the prospect of going to the United States. She stated that she was going to Texas with her husband. Davison said that if she and her husband traveled through Atlanta on their way to Texas, his mother, a native-born Russian, would be happy to see her. He gave his mother's name and address in Atlanta to the woman's husband, who was "scruffy looking." This was not an unusual thing to do, since his family had always been very hospitable to Russians who visited Atlanta. In retrospect, he assumes that he gave his mother's name and address to either Lee or Marina Oswald, but he is uncertain in this regard. _7f \ After the assassination of President Kennedy, pavison was interviewed first by a Secret Service agent and later by an FBI agent in connection with the entry of his mother's Classification: _ Classified by detivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) name and address in Oswald's address book. The FBI agent BA also interviewed Davison's mother, Mrs. Hal (Natalia -Alekseevna) Davison. — Davison indicated that the Secret. Service and the FBI were the only government agencies to | interview him about his contact with the Oswalds. / Davison admitted his involvement in the Penkovsky spy case. Specifically, he stated that in connection with his assignment as U.S. Embassy physician in Moscow, he had received Some superficial intelligence training. This training mainly involved lectures on Soviet life and instructions on remembering and reporting Soviet names and military activities. During his tour of duty in Moscow, Davison was asked by an Embassy r \ employee, whose name he no longer remembers, to observe a certain lamp post on his daily route between his apartment me, and the Embassy and to be alert for a.Signal by telephone; Classification: Classified by. Jerivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Davison agreed. . oe, (according to his instructions, if he ever saw a black chalk mark on the lamp post or if he ever received a telephone call in which the caller blew into the receiver -three times, he was to notify a person whose name he no longer remembers. ) He was told nothing else about this Operation. Davison performed his role in this operation for approximately one year. He participated in no other. operations during his tour of duty in Moscow, but he did perform some desk work for the Air Attache. On just one occasion, toward the end of this year, he observed the mark on the lamp post and his wife received the telephone signal. As instructed, . he reported these happenings. “Shortly thereafter, the. Soviets reported that they had broken the Penkovsky spying operation. ‘The Soviets declared Davison persona non grata just after he left Moscow because his tour of duty had ended. He does not | Classification: | Classified by derivetion:
on Oe a AGE = KE Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) recall any intelligence debriefings on the Penkovsky case.  /. ~ Davison denied participating in any other intelligence activity related work during his employment in Moscow, and provided the Committee with an affidavit to this effect. The former aeputy chief of the CIA's Soviet Russia clandestine activities section during 1960-62 confirmed bavison's position, and characterized his involvement in the Penkovsky case as a "one shot" deal. In addition, a review of Davison's CIA and Department of Defense files was also entirely consistent with his Committee testimony. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that Dr. Davison was Lee Harvey Oswald's intelligence contact in Moscow. Classification:
Naa ab non fy Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) 7. George deMohrenschildt George deNohrenschildt was a prominent member of Dallas' White Russian" community who befriended Lee Harvey Oswald. This friendship has engendered considerable speculation because of the contrast between the backgrounds of the two men. DeMohrenschildt was described as sophisticated and well educated, one who moved easily in the social and professional circles of oilmen and the so-called “White Russian" community, many of-whom were avowed right-wingers. Oswald's "lowly" background - did not include much education or influence, and he was,in fact, shunned by the very same Dallas Russian community which embraced deMohrenschildt. DeMohrenschildt committed suicide in 1977 shortly after having been contacted for an interview by a Committee investigator. In his Warren Commission testimony, deMohrenschildt | CiassHication: i Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) sea . I ‘Stated that hé believed he had discussed Lee Harvey Oswald with J. Walton Moore, whom deMohrenschildt described as "a Government man. ~~ either FBI ox Central Intelligence." _/f . DeMohrenschildt said Moore had interviewed him when he returned from Yugoslavia and that he was known as the head of the FBI in Dallas. __/ DeMohrenschildt said that he had asked Moore and Ft. Worth attorney Max Clark about Oswald. to reassure himself that it was “safe" for the deMohrenschildts to assist Oswald r Tf and was: told by. one of these. persons that "the guy seems to be OK."  / (This admitted association with J. Walton Moore, a known employee of the CIA's Domestic “Contacts Division, gave rise.:to the question of whether deMohrenschildt had contacted Lee Harvey Oswald on behalf ‘of the CIA. fication: a . Classified by derivation:
Newnes body Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CliA—controlled documents.) In 1963. a was employed by the-.Central Intelligence Agency in the| sd According to CIA personnel file, ‘he was assigned to the Jin 1948. In a fitness report for the period April 1, -1963 through March. 3l, 1964, huties in the Dallas office included “supervising ‘and managing a resident agency; exploitation of source's complete intelligence potential by debriefing...; writing reports; keeps informed on foreign situations and intelligence xequirements in order to better orient and exploit sources; and searches for and-develops new sources." ‘ In an Agency memorandum dated April 13, 1977 contained - in George deMohrenschildt's CIA file,[ et forth facts to counter a claim which had been recently made by WFAA-TV_ in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald had been employed by the Ciassification: | Classified by derivation: re
ana esti es atom fee i Faomas anmate 6 Std ate atte Serer Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) CIA and that] had known Oswald. In that memorandum, | lis quoted as saying that according to his records the last time he had talked with George deMohrenschildt was in - the fall of 1961. ~~ |said that he had no recollection of any conversation with deMohrenschildt concerning Lee Harvey Oswald. ‘The memorandum also says that Moore recalls only two occasions when he met deMohrenschildt -- first, in the spring of 1958 to discuss the mutual interest the two couples had in mainland China; and then in the fall of 1961 _when the deMohrenschildts showed films of their Latin American walking trip. - Other documents in deMiohrenschildt's CIA file, however, indicate more contact between [Jana deMohrenschildt than was stated in. the 1977 memorandum by{ | In a memorandum dated May 1, 1964 fron{ to the Acting Chief of the’ | Classified by derivation: SEY RF KEP ET
Classification: (fhis form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) aad tehs bf the cra,| ~ ftated that he had known George wna, Neca | _deMohrenschildt and his wife since 1957, at which time{ | - got biographical data on deMohrenschildt after a trip to Yugoslavia for the International Cooperation Administration. a | 7 [says also in that 1964 memorandum that he had seen | detiohrenschi lat several times in 1958 and 1959. Deltohrenschildt' CIA file contains several reports submitted by deMohrenschildt to the CIA on topics concerning Yugoslavia, including “Lack of Interest in Communist Ideology," "National Pride/Feeling of Superiority over Soviet Satellites," and "Effect of Decentralization in the Oil Industry." 7 DeMohrenschildt testified before the Warren Commission that he had never been.in any respect an intelligence agent. _/f The Committee interview with nd its review of the CIA's Moore and deMohrenschildt files confirmed that deMohrenschildt Classification: 2 Classified by derivation:
Classification: {This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) had never been an American’ intelligence agent. In this. ales regard, it should be stressed that, upon returning from trips abroad, .— of Americans annually provide information to the CIA's bn. a nonclandestine . basis. Such acts of cooperation should not be confused with an actual Agency relationship.* 8. “William G. Gaudet William G. Gaudet was a newspaper editor who was issued the Mexican tourist card immediately preceding Lee Harvey Oswald's on September 17, 1963. . Two days later, he departed for a three or four-week trip to Mexico and other Latin *DeMohrenschildt's file also makes reference to an occasion where he may have been involved in arranging a meeting between a Haitian bank officer and a CIA or Department of. Defense official. A Department of Defense official interviewed by the Committee stated that the meeting was arranged by Department of Defense officials and that deMohrenschildt's presence (in the company of his wife) was unanticipated. The Committee does not regard this incident as evidence of any Agency relationship because there is no indication that any United States governmental official actually solicited deMohrenschildt's assistance with regard to this meeting. Classification: Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) American countries. This happened to coincide with. Oswald's visit to Mexico City betweén September 27, 1963 and October ’ 1963. After the assassination, Gaudet advised the FBI during an interview that he had once been employed by the CIA. Speculation about Gaudet's possible relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald was created when it was discovered that the Warren Commission Report contained a list, provided by the Mexican Government and purporting to include all individuals who had been issued Mexican tourist cards at the same time as Oswald, which nevertheless omitted Gaudet's name. 7, At a Committee deposition, Gaudet testified that his contact with the CIA was primarily as a source of information reflecting information that he had obtained during his trips abroad; in addition, Gaudet maintained that he occasionally per-~ . - formed errands for Agency personnel. Gaudet stated that his Classification: Classified by derivation:
Lr MS ey" caer ee aor Suse” fet easioee” Pr a Pacer rad Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted ve - from ClA—controlled documents.) last contact with the CIA was in 1969, but that the relationship waver ‘had never been formally terminated. The Committee reviewed: Gaudet's CIA file, but found CE neither any record reflecting a contact between him and the : Agency after 1961 nor any indication that he had "performed errands" for the CIA.* A memorandum, dated January 23, 1976, TDS 9 seemed to confirm the absence of.any further contact after. this time: The | | has an inactive file on William George Gaudet, former editor and publisher of The Latin American Report. The file shows that Gaudet was a source of the Resident Office from 1948 to 1955 during which period he provided foreign intelligence information on Latin American political and economic conditions resulting from his extensive travel in South and Central America in pursuit of journalistic interéests.. The file further indicates that Gaudet was a casual contact of the New Orleans Office between 1955 and 1961 when, at various times, he furnished fragmentary intelligence and tried unsuccessfully to obtain financial loans from the Agency, *The file did contain a routing indication, which the Agency has failed to explain, to the effect that someone “agrees. with the manner in which this case is being handled." / Classification: Classified by derivation:
cen tid fete & oe fi : Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted - cere ' from ClA—controlled documents.) through[_—sjto support his publication. ‘There is no correspondence in the[___] file on Gaudet after 1961. Gaudet could not recall whether his trip to Mexico and other Latin American countries in 1963 involved any intelligence related activity. He was able to testify, however,. that he ' did not encounter Lee Harvey Oswald, whom he had previously seen On occasion at the New Orleans Trade Mart, during that trip. Gaudet was unaware that his Mexican tourist card had been . issued immediately before Oswald's and could not recall having seen Oswald on that day. Finally, Gaudet’ did not have any information concerning the omission of his. name from the list published in the Warren Commission Report. Based upon this evidence, the Committee does not find a basis for concluding that Gaudet may have contacted Lee Harvey Oswald on behalf of the CIA. Although there is a conflict between Gaudet's testimony and his CIA file concerning: Ciassification: Classified by derivation: a a a a NUR,
7 hota NS emer Fe at Ay Classification: — (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) the duration of his Agency contacts as well as the performance of errands, there is no indication from his file or testimony that Gaudet's cooperation involved clandestine activity. Again, it should be stressed that the [ which was the Agency component that was in touch with Gaudet, was not involved in clandestine operations. 9 Oswald's Trip to Helsinki and the Issuance of His Entry Visa into the Soviet Union Oswald's trip from London to Helsinki has been a point ‘Of controversy because his passport indicates that he arrived in Finland on October 10, 1959 and the Torni Hotel in “Helsinki had him registered as a guest on that date, but the only direct flight from London to Helsinki landed at 11:33 p.m.; according to a memorandum signed in 1964 by Richard Helms, ."/i/£,Oswald had taken this flight, he could SSITICaTION: Classified by derivction: SEI  £OF SEF LEFT a - SEs . ra & 3 a dee ¥ 43 geen a
Seescaiamnabadlte, Nenetee ent \\ desetien then tibeon "Gade, eth ah Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) not normally have..cleared customs and landing formalities and reached the Torni Hotel downtown by 2400 (midnight) on the same day." Sf Further questions concerning this segment of Oswald's trip have been raised by his ability to obtain a Soviet entry visa within only two days of having applied for it on October 12, 1959.* The Committee was unable to determine the circumstances -" surrounding Oswald's trip from London to Helsinki. Louis Hopkins, the travel agent who arranged Oswald's initial transportation from the United States, stated that he did not know Oswald's ultimate destination at the time that Oswald x booked his passage on the freighter Marion Lykes; consequently, ‘Hopkins had nothing to do with the London to Helsinki leg of *Since Oswald arrived in Helsinki on October 10,. 1959, which was a Saturday, it is assumed that his first opportunity to. “apply for a visa was on Monday,: the twelfth. Classification: Classified by derivation: “By TTS Ty, EE cM Ne oy
Newterah ane “Nilay ten sal eo Pane TS Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted aa ' from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald's trip. Infact, Hopkins stated that had he known Oswald's final destination, he would have suggested sailing on another ship that would have docked at a port more convenient to Russia. Hopkins indicated that Oswald did not appear to be particularly well informed about travel to Europe. The travel agent did not know whether Oswald had been referred to him by anyone. A request for any files that the CIA and Department of Defense may have pertaining to Lewis Hopkins resulted ina negative name trace. The Committee was unable to obtain any additional sources of information regarding Oswald's London to Helsinki trip. In contrast, the relative ease with which Oswald obtained his Soviet Union entry visa was more readily wa ication: amenable to ing et & tigation. This issue is one that was also mm Classified by derivation: LEB SE Ey WV SyA ~~ ema “EEA & Ex Be ”
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA-—controlled documents.) wee, of concern to the Warren Commission. / In a letter to 5 the CIA dated May 25, 1964, J. Lee Rankin inquired about the : apparent speed with which Oswald's Soviet visa was issued. Rankin noted that he had recently spoken with Abraham Chayes of the State Department who contended that at the time | Oswald received his visa to enter Russia from the Soviet gee a Embassy in Helsinki, at least one week ordinarily passed: ad between the time of a tourist's application for a visa and the issuance of the visa. Rankin contended that if Chayes' assessment was accurate, then Oswald's ability to obtain his tourist visa in two days-might have been very significant. . The CIA responded to Rankin's request for information on July 31, 1964. Richard Helms wrote to Rankin that. the Soviet Consulate in Helsinki was. able to issue a transit visa (valid for 24 hours) to U-S. businessmen within five minutes, but oy ym Cjassitication: aa . a Classified by derivation: _
Naa at eae Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) if a longer stay were intended at least one. week was needed wee, to process a visa application and arrange lodging through Soviet Intourist. A second communciation from Helms to ‘Rankin, dated September 14, 1964, added that during. the 1964 tourist season, Soviet Consulates in at least some Western European cities issued Soviet tourist visas in from five to seven days. In an effort to resolve this issue, the Committee has reviewed the CIA file on Gregory Golub, who was the Soviet Consul in Helsinki when Oswald. was issued his tourist’ visa. Golub's file reveals that, in addition to his Consular activities, he was suspected to have been an officer of the Soviet KGB. Two CIA dispatches from Helsinki concerning Golub are of particular significance with regard to the time Classified by derivation:
Ciassificetion: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) i necessary for issuance of visas to Americans for travel into the Soviet Union. The first dispatch records that Golub disclosed during a luncheon conversation that: Moscow had given him the authority to give Americans visas without prior approval from Moscow. He (Golub) stated that this would make his job much easier, and as long as he was convinced the American was “all right" he could give him a visa in a matter of minutes... (emphasis added) The second CIA dispatch, dated October 9, 1959, one ea) day prior to Oswald's arrival in Helsinki, illustrates that Golub did have’ the authority to issue visas without delay. ‘The dispatch discusses a telephone contact between Golub and his consular counterpart” at the American Embassy in x Helsinki: \ j « fe xe . lassification: _ Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ---Since.that evening (September 4, 1959) Golub has only~phoned (the US Gonsul) once and this was on a business matter. Two Americans were in the Soviet Consulate at the time and were applying for Soviet visas thru (sic.) Golub. They had previously been in the American consulate inquiring about the possibility of obtaining a Soviet visa in one or two days. (The U.S. Consul) advised them to go directly to Golub and make their request, which they did. Golub phoned (the U.S. Consul) to state that he . would give them their visas as soon as they made advance Intourist reservations. When they did this, Golub immediately gave them. their visas...* (emphasis added) Thus, based upon: these two factors: (1) Golub's authority to issue visas to Americans without prior approval from Moscow, and (2). Gemonstration of this authority, as reported ina CIA dispatch approximately one month prior to Oswald's appearance at the Soviet Embassy, the Committee has found that the available evidence tends to support the conclusion that issuance of Oswald's -tourist visa within *Evidently, Oswald had made arrangements with Intourist because upon his arrival at the Moscow railroad station on October 16, he was met by an Intourist representative and taken to the Hotel Berlin where he registered. as.a.student.. /... Swi Issiricghon: i Classified by derivation: ee
Neelanae nea Aide, 23S 3 ERES Ciassification: (This form is to be used for material extracted. cee from ClA—controlled documents.) two days after his appearance at the Soviet Consulate was not necessarily unusual. 10. The Oswald Photograph in the Office of Naval Intelligence Files The Office of Naval Intelligence's Lee Harvey Oswald file contained a photograph of Oswald, taken at the approximate time of his Marine Corps induction, that was contained in an envelope which had on it the language “REC'D 14 November 1963" and "CIA 77978." These markings _Yaised the possibility that Oswald had been in some way associated, with. the CIA. In response toa Committee inquiry, the Department of Defense stated that the photograph had been obtained by ONT as a result of a CIA request for two copies of the most recent photographs of Oswald so that an attempt could be made ’ Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) to verify his reported presence in Mexico City. ‘The requested copies, however, were not made available to the CIA. until aiter the President's assassination. . Because of the absence of documentation, no éxplanation was given for how or when the Office of Naval Intelligence received this. particular « photograph of Oswald. The Committee's review of CIA cable traffic confirmed that cable number 77978, dated October 24, 1963, was in’ fact a request for two copies of the Department of the Navy's» most recent photograph of Lee Henry (sic) Oswald. Moreover, review of other cable traffic corroborated the Agency's desire to determine whether Lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact, been in Mexico City. Ciussification: Classified by derivation: . Le
“Ne ett eee wterrent oases Regrene y Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) 1. hee Harvey. Oswald in Mexico city The Committee aise considered whether Oswald's activities and possible associations in Mexico City were indicative of a relationship between him and the CIA. This aspect of the Committee's investigation involved a complete review both of alleged Oswald associates and of various CIA operations outside of the United States. The Committee found no evidence suggestive of any relationship between Oswald and the CIA. Moreover, the Agency's investigative efforts, prior to the assassination, regarding Oswald's presence.in Mexico City served to confirm the absence of any relationship with him. Specifically, when apprised of his possible presence in Mexico City, the Agency both initiated internal inquiries concerning his background and, once informed of his Soviet experience, notified other Classification:
= ea ase ones wo? ed Od ond Ameen aeaeonmnsnta ed DT soem anepaint? Classification: (This form is to be used for. material: extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) potentially interested federal agencies of his possible contact with the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. Finally, the overt nature and frequency of Oswald's contacts with ea at ee, the Cuban and Soviet Consulates (i.6., a total of at least five visits) also tended to indicate that Oswald was not under the direction of any professional intelligence officers. 12. Lee Harvey Oswald's Military Records The Committee reviewed Oswald's military records because of allegations that he had received intelligence training and had participated in intelligence operations during his .term of service. Particular attention was given to the charges that Oswald's early “discharge from the Marine Corps was designed to serve as a cover for an intelligence assignment and that his records reflected neither his true security clearance nor a substantial period of gervice in Taiwan. These allegations were considered relevant to the Classification: Classified by derivation:
LES £9 £9 L889  £EP L893 Classification: | (This form is to be used for. material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) question of whether Oswald had been performing intelligence wee assignments for military intelligence as well as to the issue of Oswald's possible association with the CIA. Oswald's Marine Corps records bore no indication that he had ever received any intelligence training or performed “On any intelligence assignments during his term of service. As a Marine sering in- Atsugi, Japan, Oswald had a security clearance of confidential and never received a higher classifi- cation. Based upon the Warren Commission testimony of John E. Donavan, the officer who had been in charge of Oswald's crew, that all personnel working in the radar center were , required to have a minimum security clearance of secret, the allegation has been made that the security clearance of confidential in Oswald's records is inaccurate. This allegation, however, was refuted by a review of files belonging Classification: Classified by derivation: __ Fa Pats
teeth dh cae LREG SEEDS Pers. a rere aed eR MERRIE MAT LSA Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) ' tofour enlisted men who had worked with Oswald; each of them mee had a security clearance of confidential.* Oswald's military records also dispelled the allegation that he had served for a substantial period in Taiwan. ‘These records state that Oswald served in Japan from September 12, 1957 until November 2, 1958. Department of Defense records, however, do indicate that MAG (Marine Air Group) 11, Oswald's uni was deployed for Taiwan on September 16, 1958 and remained in that area until April 1959, but an examination of the MAG Il unit diaries indicated that Oswald had. remained in Japan as part of a rear echelon. Oswald's records also State that on October 6, 1958 he was transferred within MAG 11 to a Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron subunit in Atsugi., - Japan. The next week he reportedly spent in the Atsugi *John E. Donavan, Oswald's immediate commanding officer, did have a security clearance of ‘Secret. Cass sificat ion:
LF Jey Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Station Hospital. On November 2, 1958, Oswald left Japan for duty in the United States. “accordingly, there is no indication in Oswald's military records that he had spent any time in Taiwan. This finding is contrary to that of the Warren Commission that Oswald arrived with his unit in Taiwan on September 30, 1958, _/ but the Commission's analysis apparently was made without access to the unit diaries of MAG 11.* Finally, with one exception, the circumstances surrounding Oswald's rapid discharge from the military do not appear to have been unusual. Oswald was obligated to service on active duty until December 7, 1959, ‘but he applied for. a hardship discharge on August 17, 1958 and two weeks later the application | *Similarly, a message sent on November 4, 1959 from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning Oswald, which states that he had "served with Marine Air Control Squadrons in Japan and Taiwan" may have been issued without checking unit diaries which indicated that Oswald had not been so deployed. Crassification: Classified by derivation:
ee POR 2, coats SESE alee Pas mas wt Classification: (This form is to be used. for material extracted from ClA—conitrolled documents.) was approved.*.' It appears, however, that Oswald's” application was processed so expeditiously because it was accompanied with all of the necessary documentation. In response to a Committee inguiry, the Department of Defense has stated that "to a large extent, the time involved in processing depended on how well the individual member had prepared the documentation needed for consideration of his or her case." / A review of. Oswald's case indicates that his initial application was accompanied by all of the requisite documentation. Oswald had met the preliminary requirements of having made~a voluntary contribution to the hardship dependent and of applying for a dependent's quarters *By September 4, 1959, Oswald had been: informed that he would be discharged on September 11, 1959.. This explains why he was able ‘to tell passport officials on that day that he expected to depart the United States on September 21, 1959. Classified by derivation:
Naa ean me 6 ont +n sls er See ane elon ate Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—-controlled documents.) allotment to alleviate the hardship. His application indicated that these measures had been taken, and was accompanied by two letters and two affidavits attesting to Marguerite Oswald's inability to support herself. Documents provided to the Committee by the American Red’ Cross indicate that he sought their assistance regarding this matter, and therefore was probably well advised on the requisite documentation to support his claim. Indeed, Red Cross officials interviewed Marguerite Oswald, and concluded that she "could not be considered employable from an emotional standpoint." _/ . The Fort Worth Red Cross Office indicated a quarters allotment was necessary for Marguerite Oswald, rather than a hardship discharge for Lee, and assisted her in the preparation of the necessary.application documents. Oswald nevertheless informed the Red Cross office in CWiassinicahion: _ " Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This. form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) El Toro, California, where he was then stationed, “that he desired to apply for a hardship discharge. The unusual aspect ao of Oswald's discharge application was that technically his " requisite application for a quarters allowance for his mother should have been disallowed because Marguerite's dependency | affidavit stated that Oswald had not contributed any money to. her during the preceding year. _/ ee : | Nevertheless, the first officer to review Oswald's application noted in his endoresment, dated August 19, 1959, that "fa/ genuine hardship exists in this case, and in my ‘opinion approval of the /quarters7 allotment will not sufficiently alleviate this situation."* / In addition, five other officers endorsed Oswald's application. The *This ‘quotation suggests the possibility that applications for quarters allotments and hardship discharges are considered independently of one another. Classified by derivation: a a a ae EF ar a ae a i § ?
"ee oes armament LF LF LI LF LI LF Me Classification: (This form is-to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Committee was able to contact three of the six endorsing officers; two had no memory of the event, / and one could not recall any details. - f The Committee considers their absence ‘of memory to be indicative of the Oswald case having been handled in a routine manner. Based upon this evidence, the Committee was not able to discern any unusual discrepancies or features in Oswald's military record. 13. Lee Harvey Oswald's Military Intelligence Pile On November 22, 1963, soon after the assassination, Lt. Col. Robert E. Jones, Operations Officer of the U.S. Army's ii2th Military Intelligence Group (MIG), Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, contacted the FBI offices in San Antonio and DaIlas and gave those offices detailed information concerninc Oswald and A.J. Hidell, his alleged alias? ~This information man Classification: Classified by derivation:
ingen Bae a, fe ede ems Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) suggested the existence of a Military Intelligence file on Oswald, and raised the possibility that he had intelligence associations of some kind. The Committee's investigation, however, revealed that military intelligence officials had opened a file on Oswald because he was perceived as a possible counterintelligence threat. Robert E. Jones testified before the Committee that in June of 1963 he had been serving as Operations Officer of the 112th Military Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.* Under the Group's control were seven regions encompassing five states: Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Jones was directly responsible for counterintelligence operations background investigations, domestic intelligence, and any *In his’ testimony, Jones also clarified and corrected the errors that appeared in communications that were generated as a result of the activities of his military intelligence 3 Ciassification: { Classi fied by derivation: -—
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) , special operations in this five-state area. He believes: that Oswald first came to his attention in mid-1963 through informatio provided to the 112th MIG by the New Orleans Police Department to the effect that Oswald had been arrested there in connection with Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities. As a result of this information, the 112th Military Intelligence Group took an interest in Oswald as a possible counterintelligence threat. The Group collected information from local agencies and the military central records facility, and opened a file under the names Lee Harvey Oswald and A. J. Hidell. Placed in this file were documents and newspaper articles on such ‘topics as Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, his travels there, his marriage to a Russian national, his return to the United:-States, and his pro-Cuba activities in New Orleans. Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) t Jones related that on November 22, 1963, while in his quarters at Fort Sam Houston, he heard about the assassination of President Kennedy.: Returning immediately to his office, he contacted MIG personnel in Dallas and instructed them to. intensify their liaisons with federal, state, and local agencies and to report back any information obtained. Early that afternoon, he received a telephone call from Dallas Nene advising that an A.J. Hidell had been arrested or had come to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Jones checked the MIG indices, which indicated that there was a file on Lee Harvey Oswald, also known by the name A.J. Hidell. Pulling the file, he telephoned the local FBI office in San Antonio to notify the FBI that he had some information. He soon was in telephonic contact with the Dallas FBI office, to which he summarized the documents in the file. He believes ‘that ‘one Classification: - Classified by derivation:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) person with whom he would’ have spoken was FBI Special Agent a : . ee f in Charge J. Gordon Shanklin. He may have talked with the Dallas FBI office more than one time that day. Jones testified. that his last activity with regard to .the Kennedy assassination was to write an "after action" _ report, which summarized the actions he had taken, the people he had notified, and the times of notification. In addition, Jones believes that this “after action" report included . | : , information obtained from reports filed by the eight to. twelve Military Intelligence agents who performed liaison functions with the Secret Service in Dallas on the day of the assassination. This "after action" report was then maintained \ in the Oswala file. Jones did not contact, nor was he contacted by, any other law enforcement or intelligence agencies concerning information which he could provide on Oswald. To Classification: _ ae : ; 7 . Classified by derivation: al aberaeaa
RUE dae BEM a LEST Pe MRT a a od Classification: (This form is to be used for materiol extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) "Nab da clase oe Jones' knowledge, neither the FBI nor any law enforcement agency { } ever requested a copy of the Military Intelligence file on Oswald. To his surprise, neither the FBI, Secret Service, CIA date cece nor Warren Commission. ever interviewed him. — No one ever directed him to withhold any information; on the other hand, he never came forward and offered anyone further information relevant to the assassination investigation because he "felt that the information that [eZ had provided was sufficient and...a matter of record..." Communications Jones’ contact with the FBI office in San Antonio is reflected ina teletype message sent at 4:25 p.m. on vo November 22, 1963, from that FBI office to the FBI Director and the Special Agent in Charge in Dallas. . Classification:
RS ee 5 ES a . "Neen Sc onmtiabe tt Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The Committee found Jones' testimony to be very credible. time, His statements concerning the contents of the Oswald file: are consistent with PBI communications that were generated as a result of the information which he initially provided. Access to Oswald's Military Intelligence file, which the Department of Defense never gave to the Warren Commission, was not possible because the Department of Defense had destroyed | the file as part of a general program aimed at eliminating all of its files pertaining to nonmilitary: personnel. in response to a Committee inquiry, the Department of Defense gave the following explanation for the file's.destruction: 1. ‘Dossier AB 652876, OSWALD, Lee Harvey, was identified for deletion from IRR (Intelligence Records and Reports) holdings’on Julian date 73060 (1 March 1973) as stamped on the micro-.. filmed dossier cover... It is not possible to determine the actual date when physical - destruction was accomplished, but is. credibly surmised that the destruction was accomplished _ “within a period not greater than sixty days -following the identification for deletion. Classification: _ Classified by derivation:
AES LP. Te ar: a arn a a a a eT Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Evidence. such as the type of deletion record availabte, the individual clerk involved in the identification, and the projects in progress at the time of deletion, all indicate the dossier deletion resulted from the implementation of a Department of the Army, Adjutant General letter dated 1 June 1971, subject: Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (DOD) (Incl 1). Basically, the letter called for the elimination of files on non-DOD affiliated Persons | and organizations. 2. It is not possible to determine who accomplished the actual physical destruction of the dossier. The individual identifying the dossier for deletion can be determined from the clerk number appearing on the available deletion record. The number indicates that Lyndall E. Harp was the identifying clerk. Harp was an employee of the IRR from 1969. until late 1973, at which time she transferred to the Defense Investigative Service, Fort Holabird, Maryland, where she is still a civil service employee. The individual ordering the destruction or deletion cannot be determined. However, available evidence indicates that the dossier was identified for deletion under a set of criteria applied by. IRR clerks to all files. . The basis for these criteria were established in the 1 June 1971 letter. There is no indication that the-dossier was specifically identified for review.or deletion. All evidence shows that the file was reviewed as part of a _ generally applied program to eliminate any dossier _ concerning persons not affiliated with DOD. 3. The exact material contained in the dossier cannot be determined at this time. However, discussions with all available persons who recall seeing the dossier reveal that it most probably included: newspaper clippings relating to pro- -Cuban activities of Oswald, several Federal Bureau of Investigation reports, and possibly some Army counterintelligence reports. None of the persons indicated that they remember any Classification: Classified by derivation: 7
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) signifieant information in the dossier. It should be noted here that the Army was not asked to investigate the assassination. Consequently, any Army derived information was turned over to the appropriate civil authority. 4. At the time of the destruction of the Oswald dossier, IRR was operating under the records disposal authority contained in the DOD Memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments, OASD(A), 9 February 1972, subject: Records Disposal Authority (Incl 2). The memorandum forwards National Archivist disposal criteria which is. Similar in nature to the requirements outlined in the 1 June 1971 instructions. It was not until 1975 that the Archivist changed the criteria to ensure non-destruction of investigative records that may be of historical value. _ Sf Upon receipt of this information, the Committee orally requested the destruction order relating to the file on Oswald. Ina letter dated September 13, 1978, the General Counsel of the Department of, the Army replied that no such order existed: Army regulations do not require any type of specific order before intelligence files can be destroyed, and none was prepared: in connection with the destruction of the Oswald file. Asa rule, -investigative information on persons not directly affiliated with the Defense Department can be retained in Army files only for short periods of time and in carefully regulated circumstances. The Oswald. file 2... ' . Classified by derivation:
Ciassification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) was destroyed routinely in accordance with normal files management procedures, as are thousands of “intelligence files annually.  / The Committee finds this "routine" destruction of the q } Oswald file extremely troublesome, especially when viewed in Renae han ltl we ‘light of the Department of Defense's failure to make this file 4 available to the Warren Commission. Despite the credibility of Jones' testimony, without access to this file the question of Oswald's possible affiliation with military intelligence cannot be fully resolved. The absence of this file, however, . has no bearing upon the Committee's conclusion concerning ' the absence of any relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA. Classification: . Classified by derivation: