14-00000 é .@ ~ "CLASSIFIFD MESSAGE ves On0 eee for ns _ _ UNIT: . . | SECRET bom am ROUTING — @xf 2 . pj oT TT BaATe: > . . [2 TO : trom. DIRECTOR CONF: ” INFO: 10 INFO . CTE OR me Fe DELEGATION SUBMITTED MEMO UROINO CREATION NUCEEAR-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL SUROPE. MEMO BASICALLY FOLLOWS LINES OF FORMER PROPOSALS RAPACKI PLAN. SOVIST DELEGATION IS CURRENTLY URGING GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE TAKE UP GUSSTICN NUCLEAR-FRSE ZONES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF WORID. | F. SINCE RAPACKE PLAN INTRODUCED HAS HAD STRONG SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW. SOVIETS HAVE EVEN URGED EXTENDING ZONE TO INCLIDS BALTTC (ND RALKAN COUNTRIES, IN CENTRAL EUROPE,-ONE OF MOSCOW'S MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY OBJSCTIVES. G. US STRONOLY OPPOSES RAPACKE PLAN, VIEWING If AS BLOC DEVICE To NEUTRALIZE GERMANY, DEEPEN AND EVEN PERPETUATE DIVISIUN OF GERMANY, AND TO - SSCURE DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY, IMPLEMENTATION OF PRCPOSAL WOUID ALSO BE MILITARILY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO WEST. US HOLITARY FORMER ZI! EUROPE WOULD BE DIMINISHED WITHOUT A CONCURRENT DECREASE OF SOVIET STRENGTH. Tf WOULD WEAKEN NATO. H. WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT ALSO VIGOROUSLY GFPOSED TG RAPACET PL ayn ALJ, SUCH "DISENGAGEMENT® PLANS IN CENTRAL EUROPE FOR SAMS REASONS. BONN ALSO CONSIDERS SUCH PROPOSALS AS SINISTER AND SUBTLY INTIQDATORY TO VEST GERMANS, WHO Do NOT CHOOSE, BR PRALT WITH Ag IF Exefeged treca eebesnatis RERBASING OFFICER - Goungreg ag ved REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. . Copy Mo ECTS, AND PUTHERTICATIANG OFFICER
14-00000 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE _—_ _ ROUTING 4} one [d [ccecaee : ; CRE? Feom, DIRECTOR , PAGE DEFERRED COMP, ROUTINE to INFO | CITE o1R an ikg , WHO DEFECT IN SUCH SCHEMES A CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR THEIR EVENTUAL _ COMMUNIZATION, I, PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF RAPACKT PLAN BY MEXICAN PRESIDEN? WOULD MARK FIRST SUCH SPECIFIC APPROVAL BY COVERNMENT LEADER OUTSIDE SOVIET BLOG HIS ENDORSEMENT WOULD BE WIDELY PROPAGANDIZED BY POLES AN} SOVISTS AND COULD SET PRECEDENP YOR THEM TO SECURE SUCH APPROVAL BY OTHER NONBLO? LEADERS. END OF HESSAGE C/S COMMENT: #REQUFSTED INCLUDE POINTS THAT COULO BE MACE BY COS TO DISSUADE ; LITENSOR FROM POSSIBLE PUBLIC BACKING OF RAPACK! FLAN OURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP POLAND, Ss Te a Foun M. WHITTEN v. C. KING — COOHOINATING GFEICERS ¢ Eacteded fro entonstic c/wn/3 RELEASING OFFICER downgrading 320 AUTHENTICATING a eRe Soatgasiticgtion OrriceR REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy he. BP we °
14-00000 ra) . > append try Teen Caw ltr _ 13 March 1963 | ae cel f,. LIP euseR bo fry See COG 1a be? The Rapacki Plan . 1. The Polish proposal for a Central European nuclear-free zone was introduced at the 2 October 1957 session of the UN General Assembly by the Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki. Acting as spokesman for the Polish Government, he formulated the proposal: should both East and West Germany agree to a ban on the produc-— tion and storage of nuclear weapons on their territories, “Poland would simultaneously introduce an identical ban on her territory. Rapucki did not mention Czechoslovakia, but the head of the Czechoslovak UN delegation, speaking after Rapacki, supported his proposal, declaring that his country would join the agreement, extending the ban over her territory, too. The East Germans subsequently warmly endorsed the proposal. 2. Rapacki’s proposal had obviously been cleared and coordivated with Soviet leaders prior to its introduction. Moscow promotly reported the proposnl aporovingly and the Soviet press stressed that stch an agreement would be wel- comed by the peoples of Europe, would facilitate agreenent on disarmament and cessation of nuclear tests, and would “help improve relations and bring closer together" the two German states, 3. The proposal was formalized in a 9 December 1957 Polish government memorandum, which was presented by Rapacki to the US, British, and French ambassadors in Warsaw. The then Soviet Premier, Bulganin, promptly endorsed the pro- posal in a series of letters to heads of governments through- out the world. : 4. In 1958 Rapacki modified his plan, allegedly to make it more palatable to the Western powers. The new version of the plan, published in November 1958, called for a two- stage program, in which: (1) current nuclear stockpiles and bases would be frozen and preduction of nuclear weapons would be banned in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and kest Germany, and (2) existing nuclear steckplles and weapons would be -~ CES see
Ran “euye | eliminated as a part of a general disarmament agreement for the four-nation area. The revised version of the Plan also called for "air and ground control' with NATO and Warsaw Pact countries participating in the control systen.. §. Polish leaders have since 1957 pressed for a formal agreement on the Rapacki plan. Shortly after the opening of the Geneva disarmament conference in March 1962, the Polish delegation submitted a memorandum urging creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, The memorandum basically follows the lines of the former proposals of the Rapacki plan. The Soviet delegation is currently urging that the Geneva disarmament conference take up the question of nuclear-free zones in various areas of the world. G. Since the Rapacki plan was introduced, it has had strong support from Moscow. The Soviets have even urged extending the zone to Include Baltic and Balkan countries. Soviet leaders undoubtedly view the proposal as a means of eliminating German power in Central Furope--one of Moscow's major foreign policy oblectives. - 7. ‘The US strongly opposes the Rapacki plan, viewing it as a Bloc device to neutralize Germany, to decpen and even perpetuate the division of Germany, and to secure de facto recognition of East Germany. Implementation of the proposal would also be militarily disadvantageous to the West. US military power in Furope would be diminished with- out a concurrent decrease of Soviet strength. It would weaken NATO, _ 8. The West German government is also vigorously op- posed to the Rapacki plan and all such "disengagement" plans in Central Europe for the same reasons. Bonn also considers such proposals as sinister and subtly intimidatory to the West Germans, who do not choose to be dealt-with as if they were inert objects, and who detect in such schemes a creation of conditions for their eventval communization. 9. Public endorsement of the Rapacki plan by the Mexican ‘president would mark the first such specific approval by a government leader outside the Soviet Bloc. His endorsement would be widely propagandized by the Poles and the Soviets and could set a preeedent for them to secure such approval by other nonbloe leaders,