HW 54653 v9.1 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : DoclId: 32253573 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information HSCA 180-10090-10131 NUMBERED FILES 006256 Document Information WH CHASE, GORDON BUNDY, MR. FBI/SECRET SERVICE AGREEMENT 01/25/1965 1 USSS FBI MEMORANDUM Unclassified Consulted Withhold 07/30/1993 122-5; FBI, 122-13; USSS, Box 122. Page 1 Date: 9/30/201 Released under the John Kennedy Wss5asesination Records Ollection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#: NW 54653 Date: n1O-23-2017
-CONFIDENTIAL— THE WHITE HOUSE a EYES ONLY heeneneteeneeeneeeneneeen en enen anne WASHINGTON A Ys January 25, 1965 oN MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY Athen pt, Lesasste, bd VESIF SUBJECT: FBI/Secret Service Agreement By Aig ___, NARS, Date LLL] 1. Attached, for your clearance, is a draft agreement between the FBI and the Secret Service concerning Presidential protection; it is acceptable to both the FBI and the Secret Service. 2. One point of interest appears on Page 2. Under the agreement, the FBI, in connection with its responsibility to investigate subversive organizations, ", . . will be alert to and promptly notify the Secret Service of any information indicating a possible plot against the person of the President. It can be argued that more active verbiage would be preferable, which would make it the respon- sibility of the FBI to actively dig for information regarding plots in subversive organizations. The FBI, however, resists more active wording on the grounds (a) that the FBI would have to redirect its whole investigative effort with respect to subversive organizations to comply with more active verbiage and (b) that such a large-scale redirection of effort is not called for. Another point demonstrates the same sort of problem. In the last sentence of Paragraph 2 on Page 2, it is made the responsibility of the Secret Service to initiate action in the neutralization of a plot. While both the FBI and the Secret Service want it this way, it can be argued that the initiative should be given to the FBI, (In practical terms, it would seem to make little difference - in the event of a plot against the President, the Secret Service would undoubtedly and quickly call on the FBI for assistance, and the FBI would undoubtedly and quickly respond.) 3. Ithink we should approve the agreement. First, the FBI and the Secret Service, _ who are the ones who have to live with it, favor the agreement. We should give it a chance to work; if it doesn't, we can revise it. Second, the agreement is a long step in the right direction. For one thing, some good work has been done in the area of defining criteria for the identification of persons dangerous to the President. For another thing, the process of hammering out the agreement has done much to improve coordination between the Secret Service and the FBI at all levels. Third, in practice, I don't think we need worry excessively about the general FBI reluc- tance to dive deeply into the field of Presidential protection. The FBIlis a good organization, is now very sensitive to the high-level interest in Presidential pro- tection, and, I think, will turn in a good performance. Ina related regard, I worry far more about the performance of the Secret Service in doing its job; but the core of the problem is the supervision of the Secret Service and, as such, is beyond the scope of this agreement. | I 4, Does the agreement look O. K. to you? ae conde Gil me = HW 54653 pocta:aa253573 Bage 2° ae