_ ade as] ° NW 55072 Docld:32989599 Page 2004_ . , SEC “ON 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATION EB, INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUALS ~ INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES General ALL pertinent information concerning subject's background and subversive activity must be fully developed and reported to assure accurate evalua-~ tion of his dangerousness. Use discretion to prevent subjects from becoming unnecessarily aware of investigation. Members of law enforcement agencies are not to accompany Agents in security investigations without prior Bureau authority. Scope of investigations Following should be obtained: a. Background 1} rue name and aliases 2 Residence address . 3 Occupation or business and employment address ; . 4 Citizenship status, including. date and place of birth and pertinent data concerning naturalization of aliens (5) Family background me If possible, ascertain from sources contacted and report date: and place of birth of subject's parents and spouse and parents of spouse. Do not conduct investigation solely for this information, . (6) Military record , Determine if subject has served in U. S. armed forces; tims, place, and circumstances of such service; type of discharge received; and any membership in veterans' organizations. If subject served in armed forces of any foreign government, determine pertinent facts. (7) Close relatives ; Determines whether subject has any close relatives in U. S. armed forces or in other positions of trust and confidence, whether public or private, relating to national defense, (8) Identification record (a) Be alert for identification record showing arrests and/or civil data. Check local police records. (b) When subject is approved for security index, submit FD-165 to check records of Identification Division and to post flash notice if fingerprints on file. FD-165 will be returned if positive identification cannot be made with fingerprints on file. Office of origin is responsible for. resolving identification when record has been furnished by Identification Division as possibly.identical., If positive -identification cannot be made, it is not necessary to communicate further with Identification Division. -(c) When office of origin is changed for security index or reserve index A subject after flash notice has been placed, form FD-128 (changing origin) should so indicate. Send extra copy of FD-128 to Identification Division so its records will show new office of origin. (4) Cancel security flash notice when subject dies or.is no Longer of security interest, i. (9) Physical description ‘ a Obtain and report detailed physical description. b Hach subject should be personally observed whenever complete security investigation is conducted. Such direct obser- vation is mandatory for all security index subjects; however, @o not delay submission of form FD-122 (recommending subject for security index) when it has not been possible to observe subject. Keep case open until personal observation accomplished. When subject is outside U. S. or Puerto Rico, this requirement may be followed administratively until subject is personally observed upon his return to this country. 22 8-13-70 . . —— \ ‘es » . - . - . . ' a . x my . - . . . . % . . Fs . : - . ° : . Li alfa Nal Eh tah Bl la Akeni A Bt ILM Ble al tL ed id RS hd Salada LAA escheat ae Sams anneal EM aha aad) ee Med seed Seana nas ae ah ae das ers nach saat rdessetha lds nite aaet lasihecalaraantmarosethindietetinad there tea inderaes eter ntact Lataa® ate teaaetexstenet ts taateseeuetnitenmens eases eer tree irate ee
HW 35072 SECTION 87, SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS , 878 \ ‘ : (10) Phot ver (11) (12) Make reasonable efforts during investigation to obtain phota- graph of subject. Maintain cases on security indéx subjects in pending status until suitable photograph is obtained unless ' circumstances dictate otherwise, in which case advise Bureau. Once photograph has been obtained, be alert for more recent photographs. Forward copy of photographs of security index subjects to Bureau for dissemination to Secret Service, Handwriting specimens . if readily available, obtain handwriting specimens for possible future use and maintain in subject's Pile. Case is not to be kept pending merely to obtain such specimens. Labor union membership If subject is member of basic revolutionary group, ascertain his trade-union affiliation and what, if any, position he holds in labor organization. : b. Subversive activity (2) (2) _BDocld: 32989529 Page 2005 ° . ; . : ‘ Membership or affiliation : Obtain admissible evidence that subject is member of, or affili-- ated with, one of basic revolutionary and/or front organizations. Some more common types of evidence are: (a) Oral or written statements or admissions of subject made publicly or privately (b) Statements of informants and others in position to know and can testify to facts (c) Official letterheads, documents, and membership and dues records identifying subjects with such organizations ‘2 Selective service records in which subject admits membership e Attendance at closed meetings and conventions of such organ- izations i, (£) Letters to publications, public officials, or others signed by subject and admitting membership in or adherence to principles of such organization (g) Recruitment or attempt to recruit members for such organi- zation {? Solicitations or contributions of funds for such organization i Seeking public office as candidate for such organization Communist Control Act of 1954 sets out list of 14 criteria to be considered in determining membership, including acceptance of organization discipline. Knowledge of aims and purposes Obtain admissible evidence that subject knows aims and purposes of subversive organization to overthrow Government by force and violence. Mere proof of membership or affiliation is not suffi- cient to prove knowledge. Proof that subject has knowledge includes: ’ (a) Direct admissible evidence, such as oral or written state- ments made by subject, or by responsible officials -of subversive organization in subject's presence { Length of time in subversive organization Official positions held in organization, especially in educational, propaganda, or policy~making capacities (a) Charter membership in organization, participation in orig- inal establishment of organisation {e) Extensive and long-continued participation in various . organizational activities “(f) Attendance or teaching at organization schools or classes, especially leadership classes g Preparation or distribution of party propaganda Recruiting and fund-raising activities Possession of Marxist or revolutionary literature or urging others to read literature of revolutionary character 23 > a -8-13-70 - ¥ ' , | . ‘ 2 were rat ar veeseviren tmwiae: ey | (21TH TTA PEAT NOT TT YTS TTR N EINE ON CF TEL EDN ATONE TEETER PEYOTE BT PENT PA CEA UO IE EY FE TSE IN RITE FIER WORE PERT I ICAI Sa I CDT AD REID EN SV AN ORISA YE UO OE Pr HN FIEUR Re trey vectra mdrwaentunrermanris: 4
87E . 8 eo 87. SECURITY THVESSIGATEC gy While none of the above may be of sufficient value alone, a , combination may constitute convincing proof. Revolutionary ( purposes of subversive organization are frequently cloaked in veiled language or in language significant only to persons familiar with Marxist or revolutionary terminology. Such statements should be fully reported. Davelop and report all revolutionary statements and circumstances under which made. (3) Position and importance (2) Information showing importance of individual to sub-- . rod versive organization or movement should be fully developed and reported. Member or affiliate may be dangerous or important because of his position, influence, or activities | inside or outside organization, or both, (b) Concealment -:of membership and underground activity Member or affiliate may be highly dangerous although he takes no part in overt activities of organization, Subject -may have assignment in underground and is not to contact or associate openly with others in subversive movement. By virtue of this assignment in secret operations, such in- dividuais must be considered most dangerous. Be continually alert that individual may be serving in underground capacity. A1lL logical investigative techniques should be used to de- velop fully individual's activities in underground; identities of other individuals engaged in underground operations; and _ method of operation, extent, and purposes of underground. Coverage must be sufficient to insure underground activities of subversive movement are known. Identities of individuals who are directing underground operations; location of hiding places of fugitives and underground leaders; and locations of secret printing presses, mimeograph machines, and large ‘stationery supplies must be known at all times. ; c. Missing security subjects — ( (1) Location of all dangerous subversives must be known at all times. Each subject remaining out of control at time of national emer- gency represents threat to national security. (2) When subject of pending investigation fits standards for security index and his location is not known, recommend for unavailable section of security index, (3) When information is received that security index subject has changed his residence and/or employment, case must be opened and assigned for active investigation to locate subject. (4) If subject has deliberately absented-himself to avoid detection by us, has gone into hiding, or is working clandestinely in underground capacity, he can be classified as missing subject and should be included in unavailable section of security index. When FD-122 is submitted to Bureau placing missing subject in unavailable section, also send cover letter advising of investi- gative steps already taken to locate him. (5) Investigations to locate missing security index subjects must. be €iven preferential and continuous attention. Investigation must be handled as thoroughly and promptly as fugitive investigation, (2) Advise Bureau each 45 days by letter of steps taken to locate missing security index subject. Do not submit reports which merely set forth negative results of investi- gation to locate subject. (bd) Tf subject may have gone to Mexico or Canada, requast Bureau to alert appropriate Government agencies to this possibility and to seek verifying information through liaison channels. If subject is reported to have gone to any other foreign country, request Washington Field Office (WFO) to check records of Passport Office of State Department for verifi- cation. SLEW YERETIVOV MONA WE ARI RTNENTE wa HEE LOE one oo esti Gl - . . Coe on Xe Toon Ke Ke es Et Dt 0 oes Ze Fs Ve Doe Vee Bone ne oes ines Kot Does Foon Vos Lae Yaseen Cann Fes Nes Saees Laan Lea Lana tone Cem tn Romi ie ee Serre taka eeeena eet eed SLE POT | NY, ULE e Earns Boers 2 mene Econ Fro 0 coe noe Foe ee Ee eee toons 0 ee Bes A on Does aoe Sows 0 nee} rm 24 * 8-13-70 ' ane , ’ . . [REE RRM Beer ET ET AAG ERENT ME EAR ITIS NO 2 UTI EAS FS TPMT FON AE TORY ES ENTS 2H PEGE OTE YEU 2 MW S5072 Doold: 32809529 Page 2006
se ee me 0 re mao Dee De De 2 ae ne De 0 oe 0 soe De 2 to 0 ee 0 Dee oe ne De ee De 0 Ee oe Toe Bo Dene Be ees Bae Be Bee Seems Boon sot 1 tos aoe tae nn Tne A oes Ve: ae A dan aoe oe fe an es nen tee oe een es ee Mw 55072 SE“TON 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATION” 875 3 (c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information. d. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 1LO5G, volume IV, of this manual.) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroa or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of current security investigation, subject in agitator index or priorities I and II of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage. (1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issaed, number of passport, and issuing - office, if known. Include full description of subject and all aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese ‘telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers}. Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence. (2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Depart~ ment of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check, (3) Information conserning subject's proposed travel abroad, including information concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches, If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of . three copies to each legal attacha involved. For each of these legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover letter should so indicate, Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LH. Request should not'refer to legal attache or request investigation by particular agency abroad. (4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details regarding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why. (5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or organization, identities of individuals participating in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CIA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available \ information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pértinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour. (b) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit - LHMs on those in one of categories described in first para- graph under item d above, Refer to LHM previously prepared ~ under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information. 25 8-13-70 Doold: 325895259 Page 2007 ; ¢ ' . . * . + * , LAHTI RETEST Ane SERENE TREY TY EEO TIE RP RPTL AE RTTISA TOBE BEN FELT IA VON ORNOETT EELS VEFSEPEYE ONY SOY PENA T: OF UATE SLY PUT EC IPE FY SER LENDS NEW RUT OT REY PERE YOLEN ROW SOCE RA AWNG UCHR) Pree TPT Srp BAA DOCTORS ET OCALA BST RNA FDEP SUNTAN WIRES PECLR UTE PR CPTNTV EEL OA MPR IVT RAT STW CUTE WAIL TET UT AU TUE SE UT MSL MATE RRL