Occurrence: In the briefing a Bh Novenbér"TO80 3 e i BB ont-elect KENNEDY by DULLES and BISSELL, under close questioning BISSELL states that KENNEDY was not told of the use of the Mafia because: 1. KENNEDY was President-elect and it was inappropriate to tell him of © this, even though BISSELL himself recognized it was peculiar that he should be advised of the planned invasion of a foreign country, but not the assassination of its leaders; 2. Neither he nor DULLES were following the matter closely enough to have operational knowledge; or’ 3. It was DULLES' responsibility in any event. BISSELL then allows as to how it was "quite possible" that JFK was told but, if so, - only in general terms as neither CIA official had detailed knowledge. His best recol- lection, though, is that the subject did not come up. Then, pressed :on when the CIA put a contract out with the Mafia, such — knowledge is shared with t he Presidett, he retreats to saying he believes it was the Director's responsibility to do so. Further, he believes that through some channel of DULLES', JFK was briefed on the use of the Mafia, but concédes he is only guessing. “Persons/Entities: Dates: Categories; KENNEDY, John F. (President-elect) late Nov. _ DULLES, Allen. 1960 BISSELL, Richard MAF TA Sources: Staff: Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 35-40. R. Dawson 11 July 1975 HW 54653 Docld:32493557 Page 4
amen 2 i ET ETE Ne HW 54653 TO: FROM: Test Frederic.-Baron McGEORGE BUNDY imony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ‘ACTION TAB S (pp. 48-54 -- 6/9/75} Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could have been BUNDY" (49) or ROSTOW (51) who asked him to do this. Bissell does not recall any specific conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are "the names of the two people from whom it /the request for such a capability/ is most likely to come from." (53). TAB T (pp. 58-59 -- 6/9/75) Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW would have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request (58). TAB U (pp. 80-83 -- 6/9/75) Bissell testified that the "urgings'for an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly _ luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and represen- tatives from STATE, CIA, and DEFENSE (81-82). Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he would have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82). "When I reported to him /ROSTOW/ it would have gone to BUNDY as well. (82). TAB V (pp. 16-19 -- 6/11/75) IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, |HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of these ZR/RIFLE programs to Cuba. . HARVEY says that Bissell instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate, and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO. " Bissell testified that he did not recall ‘directing the reactivation of the project but, he said, "I think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY 's responsibility for Project "RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact. (19). Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact / Docld: 3274273557 Page 35 Fritz Sc arz P o"E: July i0, 1975
HW 54653 DoclId: 32493557 Page 36 -2- had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it /the contact/ unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (19). TAB W (pp. 42-53 -- 6/11/75) | Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (46). Bissell said he discussed ‘all aspects of the creation of the capability." (50). Bissell said it was "quite possible" that he discussed _ CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assassination targets. (50). When asked a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he recalled discussing the assassination capability with . ROSTOW and BUNDY, Bissell replied: "I am not sure about BUNDY, but I think ROSTOW, yes, sir." (52)