404-10143-10088 MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director of Central intelligence FROM : S$. D. Breckinridge APPROVED FOR RELESSE 1993 Deputy Inspector General wi IM poncona CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PRSGRAM SUBJECT : Comments en Book V, SSC Final Report, The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Parformance. of tne Intelligence Agencies. I. Forwarded herewith is fhe report of a review that. Mr. Knoche requested last fall. The undersigned + wa's das ignated: as chairman or coordinator of an Agency working group that was ta conduct. the study. It. proved a more ambitious undertaking: ‘than had been anticipated. The extensive files of €I Staff on the warren Commission 7 autry into President. Kennedy's assassination were reviewed in detail, were the very large file holdings of LA Division ion its Cuban a operat ions ducing the period preceding and Tel towing the death of President Kennedy. mes most pains- taking review and analysis was required, and the files proved. to 2 50 exitensi ye that the researca: became a major task. The files of the Office of Security and the Office of the Inspector General presented a Lass. formidable problem. § 2. The attached report, with its anrexes, Ts the formal result of the eff fore. Lf the attachments seem bulky, it is noted. that additional back-wo matertals. are beiiag noid for the res ord in the event of future ingaiey. These papers regresent = ‘ result of a4 consciantians and painstaking effart,- -eonducted with high standards of meview and testing kept foremo st invnind. He baitieve that there is Tittle Ti oF ignt iss one work. Was: Ye) exte DAS TA small ciaance of surgrises, rena ins tin ac maay 0 ihe bys c . tre 5 Dy SIO pcre OW | CO. Ds Co cf ame <= ¢ oo WO ©
14-00000 ” CIA could well haye perceived the usefulness of inquiring into specific sources of possible provocation of Castro at the time of the 1964 investigation; it is clear that the general consideration was recognized by all concerned, and pursued, but the concept of specific possible provocations was not. A review into such possi- bilities has now been conducted, with essentially negative results. 4. The report js not ta be considered a report of the Inspector General, as such, being the result of a representative working group. However, the report should be considered as being for internal CIA consumption only. It contains third agency reports, liaison reports, and involves sources and methods materials, as wall as evaluation and comment of a nature that Is advisory to manage- ment. Any release of this report and its annexes outside the Agency, even in classified form, would require considerable sanitization. It is recommended that this report be held against future inquiries, providing a basis for appropriate responses, and that it not be volunteered at this time. : S. D. Breckinridge Attachment: As Stated D/IG/S.D.Breckinridge:js (23 Aug 1977) Distribution: Original - Addressee w/Copy #1 of Att. . 1 - SA/DCI (Robert D. Williams) w/Copy #2 of Att. ~ SA/ADDCI (Lewis D. Lapham) w/Copy #3 of Att. ~ ADDO w/Copy #4 of Att. mo ~ Asst. Public Affairs (Mr. Hetu) w/Copy #5 of Att. - Chief, LA w/Copy #6 of Att. ; Chief, CI Staff w/Copy #7 of Att.. - D/OS w/Copy #8 of Att. a - IG (John L. Leader) w/Copy #9 of Att. 4 ~ - D/I1G (S.0.B. Chrono) w/Copy #10 of Att. - IG Subject w/Original Copy of Att. (UNNUMBERED) ee ees ee ee ee Ree ee ree eee '
14-00000 ROUTING UNIT : te 0 INDE} — ot "+ NO INDEX (J FILE'IN CS FILE NO. 7, cat Fins BOSS Aer: IR, NOGSRGS BUDE ae yO +: FRMEPAL BUSZAN OF INVESTIGATICN _ ~ a DEPARTMENT OF SEAMS ATEN: ER: ‘U. ATERIS scaesas ; FROM ¢ DIRECTOR . ° mee as a a a rr er we ‘he wim ew a ou ; oe ope, pop, c Gay ve TO 0 te - Ss 7 ; = ae . 7 : oe ° cite Rg 7 Ad. Ail et “eat THE E Frege Wane SKEROE senor ot TH PROGEESS OF 3 TEE vEET TCA OF ACTAS AL = TERARCCANEOH SIEBERT ADVARAIO, TICARAGEN WEOM BAS cLATEED HE SAY LES OSWALD t- —— ACIS 6500 DOLIARS of cas cozAs meAssY m MEXICO cxry on 18 SEFIRESA 1963, SIONS - os gs TS TEINS BOGENTALEE : SAMS SORE? cue MEEEECS 1S wg HS FAKLED Wo | : TENIA DORATT AS ‘aa EMPLOYEE oO THE ‘CUBA EABASSY, WEESEAS cee I SS DED 50 RECGGILES HSS Weed. TRPERRCCATED ERESIOUSLE BY CLA 7ERSOMIEL. Tae ecrcas OPFECEAL, pepe Ic Ta. RON Heel oP ATVARADO SAYS HZ "pouErs" ALVARATO!S ae AND... RECOIL A FROTOGAES é sosocteetes poe : s2ene WORK TO meer in. TETS “THFORMARTON WAS RECEIVED rm EXECO car a ss WISiS 139 3 B0uES WASHISGON THUS. 29 HOVEHEER 1953. oe fn, ES an. > _ _ SND OF MESSAGE Poe vse ae ee ony te? “3 . ee ES . . . ’ 7 * > Petar 2 LF S$ eee” on! . ops ¢ COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION . APPLICABLE TO vofen core vaies. 7 | So GRAS Number a . es . CLASSIFICATION Review cONOueTED cy2 4 MAY i976} "Document . : Snenteerenacttttemmeretane _ for FOIA Review on” - ‘* aks : Lo - : a . rrp? 7 Sse 3 7 : oe ieee 4.4% ay authority of . . . i ; _ RECEARD HENS | cus? 3 cr : . ° facleds3d trom automatic *  upweree be tee RELEASING : -t j a . caungrating and . AUTHENTICATING “ a te ca 7 : . ‘ Ceciasvecstion . oF FICER se, een PANTONE THERRE TUE PCCEHNI OLLIE 1 OO MLNAITES Conv i
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14-00000 2 pet re i. ~ “| os : onF oo 0 7 Pr er er eer: i ae ‘CRE T StAtF ‘d2004u7 DIRECTOR cone: e/453 WFO: FILE Du, Dla 0de3, ce /Ri- - . cate her P poo/ro- <f PS 6 2 . o og Tor rnnedzate 7 JP “UNINTEL RYBAT a ERTAL NAKES FOLLOWING STAT ENENT, UNTCH YOu SHOULD be. eee, RISE (RICHARD, HELMS. " SAID THE AGENCY NEVER HAD OR EVEN CONTEMPLATED 2 cog METH. OSHALD. .. NEWLY RELEA | TELL TGENCE INTEREST IN OSuALD AND pISCUSSES. “+ “Lor INTE! RVTEUS « END QUOTE. ¥ ne mt ; mn ats ogihe oe UR FORMA TION. “OSWALD MIGHT HAVE IN CONTEXT OF SOVIET REA ntt RESPONS ETO DCI. “CALL TO “ALL HANDS TO RECORD UHATEVER MIGHT JMYUEAD | CES. Tt THE BE RELEVANT ENO are DOES REC OR TO. WARREN COMMISSION INT TS3. BRANCH LEVEL sagcussron 2 Past CF PAGES MESSAGE ATAININCA Mn OR AP WIRE STORY IN WASHINGTON STAR ON FOIA RELEASE OF ‘gSUALD! S. : IN SWORN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE WAR BREN | comnizsafoniy THEN A BRANCH CHIEF AND LATER: cIAS DIRECTOR ANY contac THe LAY “ABOVE “MESCONST: RUED FROM SANITIZED =a R RELEASED, UNDER’ TEN BY FORMER OFFICER WHO WAS INTERESTED IN, Posst gue Use oe TIES. TH OFEZCER 4 i Relea? wean “DISSE? OY: fs ed HOES ; . RETURE-TO por AUARE mE TS. SED DOCUMENT 5 SAYS. Ee SHOUED che ING ON. @.. ‘ ee cn WRITER DOES “Not NOU WHAT ACTION UAS TAKEN. E-21 IMPS pare: 4, OCT 7h OR!S:'  gquauemempepensat ag cn . 7 | C/ISS: a \ xT: 1545 | ny W. by Jt 12 al f ~ . he Qe Se. COURTHMATING OF wiceas THEODORE” as Saad 7 ADDS suiincarion, é - : REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMIAITED 2 2 WEDST wie per! CL BV¥ipeaaq S ECR E | ~ RS2ty
14-00000 iad Cpy HS Gan? Table of Contents APPROVED FOR RELEACE 1993 | CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM Summary of Findings Tab A. Organization for and Conduct of the Review Tab B. CIA Performance on the Inquiries Tab om CIA Operations Against Cuba Tab 0. AMLASH Operation Tab —. Materials Forwarded to Warren Commission and FBI Tab F. Mexico City Coverage of Oswald Visit | Tab G. Selected Newspaper Stories with Comments tee MEE wt ey Say
14-00000 SUBJECT: Comments on Book V of the Final Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities 1. Book V of the SSC Final Report, titled The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, presents a number of issues that address themselves to the conscience of the Agency. The criticisms of CIA are based on a series of presentations of how various investigative leads were handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry. 2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations of the intelligence agencies against Cuba exercised a negative influence on the quality of their support for the Warren Commission investigation. The following statements appear in the Report: "Tt (the SSC Report) places particular emphasis on the effect their Cuban opera- tions seemed to have on the investigation." Page 2. "They (senior CIA officials) should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be con- sidered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts." Page 7. f - re
14-00000 The significance of these statements, to the authors of the SSC Report, is highlighted as follows: | "Certainly, concern with public reputation, problems of coordination between agencies, possible bureaucratic failure and embarrassment, and the extreme compartmentation of knowledge of sensitive operations may have contributed to these shortcomings. But the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information." Page 7. A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro had learned of these activities it would have provoked him into retaliation against President Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this theory should have been perceived and accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the Warren Commission) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal. The provocation theory, in the specific form postulated by the SSC Final Report and the press, is of more recent vintage than the perceptions that prevailed in 1964 when the Warren Commission was con- ducting its investigation. There was a general concern in 1964 that the USSR or Cuba might be behind the assassination of President 2 <qgnriittitre”
14-00000 ; ee Kennedy. “This was based on a more broadly recognized understanding of the tensions that existed between the Kennedy administration and the Soviet and Cuban regimes. The Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 must have appeared remarkably provocative to Fidel Castro, along with the array of American anti-Cuban programs. The humiliation of the USSR in having to retreat in the Cuban Missile Crisis cannot be dismissed completely as to how it might have been perceived by a foreign power as a provocation. To note these events serves only to remind the reader of the tensions well recognized at the time. The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention. This emphasis on CIA's Cuban operations as a possible source of provocation of Castro represents the result of an evolution in percep- tions. In response to it we undertook an extensive review of the various operational activities against Cuba and Castro. Organization for the Review ‘As there are no persons now in CIA who were directly involved at a senior level in the investigation of 1964, it was felt necessary to organize a fresh approach to the matter. The persons who, in 1963 and 1964, knew the details of the various operational activities are no longer available, for the most part, to provide the current and detailed factual familiarity that existed at the time of the investi- gations. Primary reliance had to be placed instead on the records for % eve ws at leat we ees ae tet daa gs
14-00000 Me as Pah 2 Sa ae the period preceding President Kennedy's death and the period following It was determined that a special research effort would be mounted to review those Agency files that might relate to this problem. The organization for this research is summarized at Tab A of this paper. It required not only the meticulous review of all Cuban operations, it necessitated careful analysis of the content and nature of the oper- ations with special attention to their security. Files relating to the Warren Commission inquiry were reviewed as well as those relating to . plotting against Castro. The results of the efforts of those assigned to the task are contained in this covering report and in the separate annexes to it, Tabs B through G. CIA has now conducted such a review -- looking at "the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where things theoretically could have started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, although it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. The emphasis sometimes became one of asking if this activity ten ine Ey * tn the Soe Badd Bie 1th oa
14-00000 LE aot! vee (whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy, had he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC; in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLASH operation actually Fit the theory for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored. (See Tab D.) We have looked at other operational activities with the SSC's theory in mind, but have been unable to provide tangible substance in support of the theory. In the final analysis the reviewer is compelled to fall back on the evidence. A wide variety of theories can be--as they have been--advanced in strident and challenging tones. Not all of them are susceptible to conclusive answers; the primary possibility of finding such answers was lost with the death of Lee Harvey Oswald. The fact is that the Warren Commission considered the possibility of Cuban or Soviet involvement, but could not find evi- dence of it. Were it known at the time of the Warren Commission, it would have been reported and dealt with then; that it was not is a simple reflection of the fact that it did not exist at that time in the minds of Americans knowledgeable on the subject. To hold dif- ferently would be to accept uncritically a social paranoia often prevalent today, which would hold that a significant number of government employees could engage in such a well-disciplined con- spiracy to suppress evidence.
14-00000 Operations Against Castro The-AMTRUNK Operation, starting in 1963, sought to develop a capability to join dissident elements among the Cuban leadership into a group that could oust the Castro regime. It was conceived by Cuban axiles and sold to the Kennedy Administration, which assigned it to CIA. The program was very slow in developing substance and momentum, with little concrete progress during President Kennedy's life. Ata later date, in 1965, it was believed to be compromised and CIA withdrew from its association; the key members were arrested later and tried in Cuba. There are basic questions about the security of the activity | from its inception, due to the involvement of personalities who are suspected of having pro-Cuban sympathies, including possibly having been foreign agents. While the suspicions cannot be verified, the reservations are sufficiently basic to consider the possibility that Castro knew of the operation from its earliest days. Its long range objectives--the overthrow of Castro and his regime--would have been an irritant to Castro; its inability to develop any substance and momentum until long after President Kennedy's death suggests that it is unlikely that it, of itself, would have moved him at that time to resort to assassination in retaliation. This is discussed at Tab C. Qperation AMLASH centered on a high-level Cuban official, AMLASH/1, who had expressed his opposition to Castro and to the Castro regime. The SSC Final Report undertakes to demonstrate that the operation planned Castro's assassination during the period preceding the murder of Nett temas
14-00000 President Kennedy; to the contrary, a full review of the operation shows that. prior to the President's assassination not only had CIA not agreed to give any support to AMLASH/1, but had rejected his proposals to assassinate Castro. When evidence supporting this view was offered the drafters of Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was dismissed out of hand as false, despite confirming evidence. The SSC Report, instead, having asserted that assassination was the character of the operation at that time, then undertook to show that AMLASH/1 was at least indiscreet in his conduct, risking exposure of the plot. Alternatively, it suggested that he may have been acting for Castro as a provocateur, to lead the United States into a plot against Castro's life which in turn was then to provide Castro with the justification to order President Kennedy's assassination. In either event, had Castro learned about the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA he would have known only that there was an inconclusive association that certainly had not progressed to the point that it constituted the basis for the postulated provocation. This is discussed in some detail at Tab D of this paper. The SSC Final Report discounts (at page 68) the possibility that actual plotting by CIA with the criminal syndicate served as a source for provocation for Castro to have President Kennedy murdered. There are new considerations that developed in the course of the present review that throw more light on the role of the criminal syndicate, but they do not provide a basis.for taking issue with the judgment of the SSC Final Report, which dismissed the activity as having provided Castro with the postulated provocation. This is discussed at Tab C. wean MEE See
14-00000 Sie E NAR [tems Selected by the SSC for Critical Comment The SSC Final Report picked out a number of selected subjects for treatment in support of its criticism of the thoroughness of the in- vestigation by the intelligence agencies. One of these had to do with the allegations in Mexico City by a man designated as “D". These al- legations were demonstrated conclusively by the Warren Commission to have been false; why they are discussed at all in the SSC Final Report is a question in itself. In another instance, reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Mexico City, awaiting arrival of a private aircraft with a mysterious passenger; not, only . was the Cubana flight on the ground for four hours (in contrast to the alleged. five hour delay in departure) it departed an hour before the | alleged arrival of the private aircraft. After CIA reported on a Cuban-American who departed on another Cubana flight, the FBI investi- gated the man extensively, as is revealed by the information available for use in the SSC Final Report; a single report that caused him to be dramatized is so full of errors as to be highly suspect, essentially being placed in doubt by other evidence in the record. In another instance considerable emphasis was given vy the SSC Final Report to a cable from the Mexico City Station, replying to a 23 November 1963 in- quiry from CIA headquarters asking for reports on contacts with certain named Soviets. The true name of AMLASH/1 was given in the Mexico City reply, but not as having had contact with the Soviets -- which was the
14-00000 LUNTIU ZY AL ed 1960 between a functionary of the Cuban embassy with a Soviet, concern- Fi a ing to be held in Mexico City by AMLASH/1, tr eit c Gem +967. AMLASH/1's name could have been omitted from the cable altogether, so far as its having any relevance to the inquiry about persons having contact with Soviets is concerned. In any event, the meeting in, 1960 was prior to President Kennedy's inauguration, which removes it yet further from any possible relevance to the subject matter. It really is not difficult to understand why the reference to AMLASH/T'' s name did not lead to detailed research about him. This is discussed further at Tab 0. Conclusions Basically, the research effort for the present paper produced two general conclusions. First, the SSC Final Report contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected opera- tion (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents. Second, while one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti- Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept Book V of the SSC Final Report went to such lengths in. its . - treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize jt more generously. ma very. real sense, the SSC Final Report has compounded the problem of public perception. On a flawed presentation it has accused | the intelligence agencies of derelictions and worse. While it has reinforced the public sense of unfinished business yet to be done, it has so badly beclouded the issue as to have done a disservice to
14-00000 a future attempts at objective and dispassionate inquiry. While -one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw then in general terms--the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point out erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then, as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. The present research effort has undertaken to conduct such a review; it is noted that the findings are essentially negative. However, it must be recognized that CIA cannot be as confident of a cold trail in 1977 as it could have been in 1964; this apparent fact will be noted by the critics of the Agency, and by those who have found a career in the questions already asked and yet to be asked about the assassination of President Kennedy.
14-00000 ~ ERMS OF REFERENCE ‘CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRA RELEASEAS SANITIZED *O REVIEW &®. 1999 ISSUES RAISED IN BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CIA MISTORIGAL REVIEW PROGRAM l. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses-- (1) the general idea that the intelligen¢e community--primarily CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provacative and may have led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection program to ascertain all possible information on the subject. Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review. 2. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back- ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these ; general activities were provocative. More specific, however, is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory action against President Kennedy. The failure of CIA to report this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information. Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in support of the thesis. pre cemn stones | EUS time omnes Seaton $
14-00000 3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot be restricted to the AMLASH operation. In itself it may be one of the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro- vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un- qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the Subcommiittee's treatment of the activity in this respect. a. The following questions are intended to serve as a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission. (1) What collection requirements were issued to the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination? (2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964? (3) What form did the follow-up take? (4) Identify and describe the records with regard to this activity. (5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters! requirements? (6) What dissemination and review was this reporting given? (7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to the CI Staff? (8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission? om (9) What review of Headquarters’ material was ordered through 1964?
14-00000 (10) What werethe parameters of these instructions? (ll) What responses were there and where are they? (12) What evidence is there that the "provocation! theory was considered during the Warren Commission enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission? (13) What action was taken with reference to this concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs? (14) What records are there on this and where are they? (15) Were there any efforts made to develop an Oswald/Cuban connection? (16) What form did they take? (17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject? (18) What action developed from these exchanges? (19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they? (20) To what extent were elements of the Agency other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in-in- vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission tenure? (21) What is the total CLA information on the two flights from Mexico City to Havana? (22) What was done at the time to develop further information on this matter? (23) Can further information be acquired on this matter now? J Sm om ae bh ee fF
14-00000 (3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office of Security officer may-have knowledge that was not surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division career agent may have some insights that could throw light on one of the operations), (4) There are a couple of cases based on agent traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of Pigs period to shoot Castro. What is the total CLA information on these? . (5) What is the significance on the subject of provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro? (6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly detailed reconstruction from a very complete record, there are points that should be addressed particularly, because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report. For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after such a long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings? (7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/1 when making plans for the 22 November meeting? (8) What was the security of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy? (9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive . Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot? -5- om meee cey re *
14-00000 c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection with the investigation? An effort should be made to list these, including consultation with surviving officials to determine not only what they considered the requirement at the time, but what was omitted and why. 4, In conclusion, these ''Terms of Reference" undertake to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S. policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which, therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions raised in the Schweiker report
om fal G ee be APPROVED FO RELEASE 1993 CiA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ORGANIZATION FOR AND CONDUCT OF REVIEW
14-00000 Se mak ADPAC TED Fon RELEASE 1993 ; at - ee 5 rory CHA HISTORICAL aniry PROGRAM Organization for and Conduct of the Review 1. Many years have passed since the inquiry by the Warren Com- mission. The persons who were most familiar with the activities of the Agency during the period preceding the death of President Kennedy, and during the investigation of the Warren Commission, are no longer in place in the same work. Someof the employees have retired or have been transferred to other work. Some have died. 2. To respond to the questions raised in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it was necessary to review old files and to assign to this undertaking personnel not really familiar with the activities of the Agency during a period of a dozen or more years before. A study group was established to consider the size of the problem and to develop a plan for conducting the review. Chaired by a repre- sentative from the Office of the Inspector General, the group also consisted of members from CI Staff, LA Division, and the Office of Security. Terms of Reference for the review were agreed upon in early August 1976. Points emphasized for the review, because of the thrust of Book V of the SSC Final Report, were (1) to conduct a full review of information and operations on the Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) to review the possibility that CIA activities against Cuba . did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassination of CONTE RTE —
14-00000 Ne President Kennedy. A copy of the Terms of Reference is attached. 3. The two main holdings of files for the period in question were in LA Division and CI Staff, of the Directorate of Operations, with less voluminous files being held in the Office of Security. and the Office of the Inspector General. The organization for the review of those files is described below. 4, LA Division: LA Division was the repository of the files for Agency operations conducted against Cuba. These files were known to be extensive. Under the Terms of Reference those files for the period |] January 1961 to 1 January 1965 were selected for review, covering a three-year period prior to the death of President Kennedy and the following year. A research group was formed composed of five full-time researchers, a group leader and a task force supervisor. An additional four researchers participated in different phases of the research, which continued to mid-May 1977. 5. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LA Division registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by Information Services Staff (ISS). On the basis of this it was originally believed that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus numerous related 201-files. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over | two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, CONFIDENTIAL
14-00000 “ — CONMBERRTTET™ both operational and subject, had been retired to Archives €aai® Berrien The remainder is held at Headquarters in the files or archival material of Information Processing Group. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job . numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LA Division research group files (too numerous to cite herein). 6. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and. organization of the material: a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed (1) Operational 1,729 (601 with findings and 1,128 with no findings) (2) Subject Files 547 (186 with findings and 361 with no findings) (3) Cuba Policy Files 101 (4) Chief, WH Division Chrono Files (Task Force W Chronos) 37 (5) Official 201 Dossiers __100-plus Total 2,514 b. Criteria Used in the Research As a guide the research group followed the Terms of Reference referred to above. In addition to the Terms of Reference, the group remained alert to other items of interest
14-00000 brought to its attention by the-IG Staff, on an ad hoc basis, and to additional questions raised in the course of the study. A name trace was always run, and/or the 201-file was reviewed, if available, on any individual allegedly involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. This task was made somewhat easier as the result of a memorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975, based on traces of the names in the so-called Black Book that Fidel Castro passed to Senator McGovern, which dealt with individuals the Cubans alleged were involved in assassi- nation attempts against Castro. c. Findings and Organization of the Findings Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting the subject of the folder(s) reviewed, a brief description of the activity, and a copy of those document(s) or findings which contained information believed to be pertinent to the review. Also included were job numbers, official file numbers, inclusive dates of material researched, and the number of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, at the request “of the IG Staff, the researchers also began noting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of information, to the extent recorded in Agency files. Separate finished memoranda were prepared, on the basis of these data, including the heading Findings. This heading lists the specific document number(s) and other pertinent data, and a few lines providing seed gai ye
14-00000 SOPTENTIAL -- 5 -- the.gist of the document(s) for- purpose of easy and quick reference. These memoranda, with a copy of the document(s) attached, are filed in alphabetical order, by project and subject, in hard-back green folders as part of the official LA Division research group fi 12S <jiniimiRiiiiItniisiEnmnnntet iis SEPUUNUEENNE, Vo unes XI through Xx). Also included in the records are two folders (Volumes IX and X) containing 1,439 draft memoranda with negative findings. These records are restricted in LA Division. 7. The LA Division research effort proved to be far more complex than originally estimated. Research continued to lead to new files, and the requirements for meticulous analysis and correlation of material further extended the time required to complete the under- taking. By completing this exhaustive review of files the Agency can speak with considerable confidence as to what the records of Cuban operations show, so far as they relate to the question of the death of President Kennedy. | 8. CI Staff: CI Staff assigned one senior officer to review its files on Lee Harvey Oswald, working under the general Terms of Reference referred to above, and also to generate papers on points not covered by the guidelines but pertinent to the general subject. 9. Since December 1963, the CI Staff has served as the point of record for all questions relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the
14-00000 LUT -- 6 -- Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Com- mission. The so-called "Oswald File" now fills 57 volumes comprising some 142 file folders and portfolios. In addition, the Staff has accumulated some 50 supplemental files including the master copy of those documents released under provisions of the FOIA to the public in March 1976 (first series) and those documents (second series) released in September 1976 and March 1977." 10. By necessity the documents in the file are held in chrono- logical order; however, the file has become much more than just a chronological file on Lee Harvey Oswald. It has now become the Agency's central repository for information and documentation that it holds on: a. The life of Harvey Oswald; b. The Agency's role in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission, 1963--1964; c. The testimony by various Agency officers before the several commissions and committees set up to review the validity of previous investigations. (NB: It should be pointed out that this portion of this file is not complete) ; and d. The point of record for Agency action taken in response to requests submitted to the Agency under pro- visions of the Freedom of Information Act. a
14-00000 -- 7 -- We In order to come to grips with the voluminous material in the Oswald files, it soon became obvious that, in order to be in a position to respond effectively and expeditiously to the Terms of Reference and to allegations and accusations in Book V of the SSC Final Report, it would be necessary to copy much of the file and to place these copies in folders set up according to general and specific subjects. In order to check charges that this Agency had withheld information from the FBI and the Warren Commission, and that there was “no evidence that the FBI asked the Agency to conduct an investi- gation or gather information," the following files were set up: a. Correspondence from the Warren Commission; b. Correspondence from the Agency to the Warren Commission; c. Agency disseminations to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI; d. Correspondence from the FBI to the Agency requesting assistance and information; . e. Chronological summary of information on and actions _taken relating to Silvia Tirado de DURAN; and f. Chronological summary of information on and actions taken relating to Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. These files provided a basis for checking statements included in the SSC Final Report and to determine what the Agency actually did do in relation to the Warren Commission inquiry.
14-00000 -- 8 -- 12. - The approach to the problem at hand was to assemble by chronological and statistical compilations the Agency's record on the matter, (a) its initiation of collection requirements for infor- mation, and the papers it originated on various aspects of the investigation for passage to the Intelligence Community, particularly the FBI and the Warren Commission, and (b), its response to require- ments and requests levied upon it by the Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission. Certain parts of the record were summarized to record what actually happened in those instances in which it differs from representations in the SSC Report. 13. Office of Security: The Office of Security assigned one officer to identify material in its records believed to have some possible relation to the Kennedy assassination. During the course of this review, approximately fifty subject files were identified as containing material of some relevance. This material amounted to the equivalent of approximately two safe drawers. The files reviewed included volumes on Lee Harvey Oswald, AMLASH, various individuals connected with the Criminal Underworld Plot, and a collection of files containing the results of name traces conducted at the time of the “Garrison Investigatian." 14. Office of the Inspector General: The Office of the Inspector General held the report that it produced in 1967 on plotting against Castro, as well as related materials accumulated subsequently. It also received files developed in 1973 in response to a 9 May 1973
14-00000 request by the DCI to Agency employees concerning questionable activities. Two members of the Inspection Staff were assigned to the project, responsible for overall coordination of the research effort. Additionally, because of the emphasis given to events in Mexico by Book V of the SSC Final Report, the Office of the Inspector General employed on contract a retired employee who had served as a special case officer in Mexico City during the period preceding President Kennedy's death and during the investigation afterwards. The retired employee recalled for this task conducted an extensive review of all Mexico City files and materials held in Headquarters or retired to Archives. The result of her research is found in Tabs B and F. 15. The file holdings in the Office of the Inpsector General are less than one safe drawer. However, the AMLASH file, held by LA Division/Directorate of Operations, was reviewed by a member of the Office of the Inspector General, as were parts of the AMTRUNK file, also held by LA Division. These two activities are discussed in Annexes 0 and C, respectively. 16. There were a limited number of interviews to clarify specific points. | ek we ke we ee Ke Detailed records of the research undertaken are held in the respective components participating in this effort. Selected back- up material for the final report is also held in the Office of the Inspector General.
14-00000 TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR REVIEW OF . ISSUES RAISED IN BOOK V, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 1. The Schweiker Subcommittee has two basic theses-- (1) the general idea that the intelligen¢e commiunity--primarily CIA and FBI--did not undertake a full review of the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy, and (2) the idea that CIA activities against Cuba were provocative and may have led te the assassination of President Kennedy. The former by itself is not too difficult a problem to address. Either there was or there was not an extensive intelligence collection program to ascertain all possible information on the subject. Either there was or there was not an exhaustive review of all. information in the Agency that might in some way relate to this question. Either the Agency did or did not report what it had to the Warren Commission for further inquiry and review. z. The second portion of the Subcommittee's presentation is somewhat more diffuse and complex. By way of general back- ground it summarizes Agency and U.S. operations against Castro's Cuba. There is an inference--almost subliminal--that these general activities were provocative. More specific, however, is the detailed treatment of the AMLASH operation as an activity that the report suggests could have provoked Castro into retaliatory action against President Kennedy. The failure of CLA to report this to the Warren Commission, in the context of the provocation theory, is advanced as a failure to report relevant information. Detailed treatment of the operation is given in the report in support of the thesis. FR ee toe ate 1 LO em ree nena em Amat me 4 “« : - ee eo ge EE SF horas | “ hs : ; rn ST i Oe Se cer rr 4 ee ons
14-00000 3. The issue of operational activity that could have provoked a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy cannot be restricted to the AMLASH operation. Im itself it may be one of the poorer examples of something that might have proven so pro- vocative as to stimulate a retaliatory strike by Castro against | President Kennedy. There were other operations with the un- © qualified objective of killing Castro. These contrast with the AMLASH affair in which the agreed purpose was not so clear and in which the sequence of events throws considerable doubt on the Subcormmittee's treatment of the activity in this respect. a. The following questions are intended to serve as a guide in a records review of the extent of the Agency's investigation prior to the end of the Warren Commission. (1) What collection requirements were issued to the field with regard to Kennedy's assassination? (2) What follow-up of these requirements was there during 1964? (3) What form did the follow- up take? (4) Identify and describe the records with re gard to this activity. (5) What reporting was there from the field in response to Headquarters! requirements? - (6) What dissemination and review was this reporting given? (7) Was dissemination made on this reporting to the CI Staff? (8) Was this reporting given to the Warren Commission? (9) What review of Headquarters' material was ordered through 1964?
14-00000 (10) What werethe parameters of these instructions? (ll) What responses were there and where are they? (12) What evidence is there that the "provocation! theory was considered during the Warren Commission enquiries, either in CIA or the Warren Commission? (13) What action was taken with reference to this concept as a basis for reviewing relating Agency programs? (14) What records are there on this and where are they? (15) Were there any efforts made to develop an Oswald/Cuban connection? (16) What form did they take? (17) What exchanges were there with the FBI on this subject? (18) What action developed from these exchanges? (19) What records are there on these exchanges and where are they? (20) To what extent were elements of the Agency other than the CI Staff and LA Division involved in in- vestigating the assassination during the Warren Commission tenure? (21) What is the total CLA information on the two flights from Mexico City to Havana? (22) What was done at the time to develop further information on this matter? Y (23) Can further information be acquired on this matter now?
14-00000 (24) What is the total CIA information on "D''? - (25) Is further information on "'D" needed in view “~ of the SSC Subcommittee reference to it? (26) What information does CLA have on Oswald FPCC relations? (27) What does CIA know about the New Orleans training activity and was anything provided on this to the Warren Commission? (28) What is the total CLA information on "'A''? (29) Who is the man photographed in Mexico City? (30) What is the CIA information on the 4 December 1963 report of an agent meeting Oswald in Cuba? (31) What is the total CIA information on Cuban assassination policies and programs up to November 22, 1963? (32) What is the total CIA information on Castro's 7 September 1963 staterments re retribution? (33) Does the testimony before the SSC of CIA employees contain anything on the above questions? If so, what? b. On the subject of possible provocation for the assassination plots against Castro, each of the known activities should be reviewed to the extent possible in order to determine any additional relevant information on this plot. _ (1) What is the total information on the plots involving the criminal syndicates? (2) Who was witting of the’ planning for the syndicate operation?
14-00000 (3) Are there current considerations on the syndicate operation not faced previously (e.g., a former Office of Security officer may -have knowledge that was not surfaced in the interviews with him with the SSC or Agency personnel. Additionally, a former LA Division career agent may have some insights that could throw light on one of the operations). (4) There are a couple of cases based on agent traffic (reported to the SSC during the study of alleged assassination plots) indicating plans during the Bay of Pigs period to shoot Castro. What is the total CLA information on these? . (5) What is the significance on the subject of provocation in the book given Senator McGovern by Castro? (6) While the AMLASH operation is subject to fairly detailed reconstruction from a very complete record, there are points that should be addressed particularly, because of their treatment in the SSC Subcommittee report. For instance, is there significance in the fact that CIA contacted AMLASH/1 in September 1963 after sucha long time? Or was it simply that this was the first time the opportunity had presented itself since earlier meetings? (7) Just what did the case officer tell AMLASH/L when making plans for the 22 November meeting? (8) What was the security of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy? (9) In what time frame was Fitzgerald's Executive . Officer speaking when he stated his judgment that the AMLASH/1 operation was an assassination plot? mwe gery rt
14-00000 c. What other action might CIA have taken in connection with the investigation? An effort should be made to list these, including consultation with surviving officials to determine not only what they considered the requirement at the time, but what was omitted and why. 4. In conclusion, these ''Terms of Reference"! undertake to address the entire question of possible provocation of U.S. policy and CIA programs in the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy. An aspect of this is the SSC Subcommittee's apparent view that CIA assassination plotting could have instigated a retaliatory strike by Castro against President Kennedy, which, therefore, should have been reported to the Warren Commission. Just as importantly, the final paper should reflect findings in the area of what the Agency did in response to Warren Commission requirements (both stated by the Warren Commission and those that could have been conceived by the Agency), and how it pursued these lines of action and reported them to the Commission. This will include consideration of specific new and unanswered questions raised in the Schweiker report
93 ROVED FOR RELENSE 192 ci HSTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM CIA PERFORMANCE ON THE INQUIRIES
14-00000 ty CIA's Performance on the Inquiries Book V of the SSC Final Report challenges the performance of the intelligence agencies during the Warren Commission inquiry, empha- sizing things that it feels should have been done but which it asserts were not. It is correct to say that CIA has not produced evidence or analysis that addresses every theory that has been advanced over the years. A record of the volume of CIA reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission is at Tab E. As a practical consideration, every theoretical question that can be conceived cannot be answered con- clusively; there simply may be no evidence at all, or if there is evidence somewhere it may not be accessible. The issue is what the intelligence agencies did -- in the present instance, what was the performance of CIA -- with Book V of the SSC Final Report portraying a patternof neglect or avoidance that is not supported by the record. The SSC Final Report offers a number of separate subjects in support of its case: a. It refers to an allegation by a person identified as "D" (pages 28-30, 41-42 and 102-103) that he overheard and saw Oswald being handed money in tiexico City for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy ; this was proven false, both by polygraph and by determining that Oswald was in New Orleans instead of Mexico City at the time the incident was supposed to have occurred. This subject is treated in a confusing and in- conclusive manner in the SSC Final Report. ¥ ¢ omy Bi dao a8 b8 ike
14-00000 TN lareerare Cone rren Tat b. A considerable portion of the Report is given to the AMLASH operation. The operation is described inaccurately. The Report assigns it characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of President Kennedy, in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. This is treated in some detail at Tab 0D of this report. c. Space is devoted to two aircraft flights from Mexico City to Havana, on 22 November and 27 November (see pages 60- 63). The first of these flights, as described in the SSC Report, is based on an inaccurate report about a delay of the 22 November flight to meet a mysterious private aircraft; the correct story removes the basis for the inferences of the SSC version. The | second of these flights had to do with a man whose significance arises from a patently erroneous report; the FBI investigated him thoroughly, as is apparent from the condensed summary in the SSC Final Report. These examples illustrate the problem of commenting on the SSC Final Report, the question becoming that of how to deal with Congressional criticism presented on the basis of inaccurate factual perceptions. To treat the problem it was felt necessary to review the record in-depth and to report the findings, whatever they are. Recognizing the possibility of error or oversight in 1964--both on the part of CIA and the Warren Conmission--consideration was given to courses of action CIA might have taken to throw some light on the
14-00000 UUWNTiViiai ari questions as understood at the time, as well as considering those questions that have developed since then. What would be the areas of inquiry? Oswald was an obvious subject of investigation. Oswald was known to have been out of the country twice subsequent to his return to private life from the Marine Corps in September 1959. These overseas adventures were appropriate for CIA attention. The first of. these overseas trips was when he went to the Soviet Union in October 1959 from which he returned in June 1962. The second of these trips was when he went to Mexico City in late September 1963, from which he returned in early October 1963. In addition to these two areas of obvious specific inquiry for CIA, there is the problem of general foreign intelligence collection that might in some way produce information on the subject. The SSC Final Report adds to these considerations operations being conducted by CIA as part of a general U.S. program against the Castro regime. These ~ PD ' four general areas of inquiry are covered below. Asin Ae I. Travel to and from the USSR 1959-1962 on Egan’ fadrid, » On 26 November 1963 a cable was sent to Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa giving biographic information on Lee: Harvey Oswald. It noted his discharge from the Marine Corps in September 1959 and his travel to. the Soviet Union in October 1959, including sketchy details as to his employment and marriage while in the USSR. The cable requested: “any scrap information which bears on President's assassination...."
14-00000 On 27 November the various addressee stations replied, with |_Jand London Providing additional details on the travel of Oswald to the USSR. "Additionally, London reported that a British journalist claimed that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 there was a U.S. gangster there by the name of Santos, who was living in luxury in jail because he could not return to the U.S.; the source stated that Santos was "visited Frequently by another American gangster named 'Ruby'." (See pages 24--25, Tab C.) Also on 27 November eee reported the "delight" of the Cuban Embassy staff over the assassination of President Kennedy although the staff was instructed to “cease looking happy in public," in conformance with instructions from Cuba to "govern their actions by lisa aye official attitude of Govt to which they accredited." on the — same date, reported that the Soviets were shocked, blaming the assassination on extreme right-wing elements. Otherwise, the initial responses produced no other information. On 29 November The Hague and Frankfurt were queried about Oswald's travel back from the USSR. This query was followed on 2 December by a similar cable to Berlin, Frankfurt, Bonn and The Hague. Various reporting produced details about the travel of Oswald and his wife from the USSR through Germany and the Netherlands enroute to the United States in June 1962. ‘The other stations involved in these inquiries had no traces or information on Oswald; liaison services were also queried without a iia Shey? te ? oe) axe nite punk pegih
14-00000 detailed results although there were some (Qaim operations that produced’ peripheral information about the reactions of various groups under intelligence surveillance. Considerable exchanges were held with the Warren Commission on Oswald's Soviet record and its possible significance. No evidence was found tying the Soviet Union to Oswald's assassination of Presidant Kennedy. Bock V of the SSC Final Report, in not criticising the Agency's performance in this aspect of the investigation, seems to have accepted it as adequate, and it will not be detailed here. II. OQswald Mexico Visit -- September-October 1963 | The visit by Oswald to Mexico City, in his attempt to get visas for travel to the Soviet Union and Cuba, has received extensive attention. The details concerning the coverage of Oswald's visit to Mexico is treated in another annex to this paper (Tab F). The concern felt by all initially for the possible significance of Oswald's visit, and his contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies, was obvious at the time. The following statement is in a cable to Mexico City on 28 November 1963: "We have by no means excluded the possibility that other as yet unknown persons may have been involved or even that other powers may have played a role. Qi ieeeeieier
14-00000 eee --2 allegations made by "D," about having seen Oswald taking money sega Cubans in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City, received intensive yetantion from CIA and the FBI, working together closely on the matter, ind with the Mexican authorities. This was demonstrated conclusively :3 have been a false allegation. Oswald was in New Orleans at the - time of the reported incident, and the person making the allegations wis demonstrated i have been lying. After the allegations pty "O" had been demonstrated to be false, Headquarters made the Following T statement to the Mexico City Station on 1 December 1963: "Pls continue to follow all leads and tips. The question of whether Oswald acted solely on his own has still not been finally resolved." gain, on ir December 1963 the Mexico City Station was cabled as “Plse continue watch for Soviet or Cuban reaction to investigation of assassination, evidence of their complicity, signs they putting out Propaganda about case. "17 December 1983 Headquarters forwarded a dispatch to the Mexico Rity Station stated as follows: ",..Mexico City has been the only major overseas reporter in the case. While this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's : waighya. Saas ta PAGAL Ee eer ye COPA Se PDP se ate D oAanly: w eseeeve ae pte gerd pc eis ghas Blea
14-00000 &¢ CERN seme life, we have not overlooked the really out- _ Standing performance of Mexico City's major . "assets and the speed, precision, and perception with which the data was forwarded. Here it was relayed within minutes to the White House, [Department of State] and [the FBI]. idioma the statements of Silvia ‘ail, on" “DURAN , and your analyses were major factors in the quick clarification of the case, blanking out the really ominous spectre of foreign backing." | Essentially, Oswald's visit to Mexico City was investigated as thoroughly as possible, producing no evidence there of Soviet or Cuban complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy. If anything, events during Oswald's visit there are more subject to being seen as counter to such a possibility, given his troubles with both Cubans and Soviets. We do not offer this thought as the final word, but more simply that if it bears on the subject at all it is inconsistent with speculation that he had some special relationship with either nation. It is noted that various allegations have been made in the press in connection with the House Select Committee on Assassinations inquiry concerning CIA information regarding Oswald's Mexico visit; these are commented on at Tab G. III. General Collection Requirements On 22 November 1963 all CIA stations abroad received a cable from Headquarters with the following statement:
14-00000 aes we SUE bie ema GAL: 4 hoe "Tragic death of President Kennedy requires al] "of us to look sharp for any unusual intelligence | developments. Although we have no reason to expect anything of a particular military nature, all hands should be on the quick alert at least for the next few days while the new President takes over the reins." It is appropriate at this point to observe the general reaction to be expected from such a communication. Without any leads, other than those arising from Oswald's identification, the requirements to. field stations were necessarily general. General reporting can be stimulated by general requests, if there is something to report, and this is what was undertaken. In addition, in any event, intelligence assets and liaison services overseas are quick to realize the signifi- cance of important information and will report it on their own initiative. It is significant, in the light of these considerations, that there has been the most limited reporting on the subject. Were there relevant or significant information on the subject it would have been reported either in responses to the expression of general interest, or spontaneously, if such information was known to Agency sources. H one believes that there was a conspiracy, with Oswald involved, one must accept the likelihood that his fellow conspirators would not have shared their knowledge beyond the narrow circle of those directly involved. Conversely, if there were no conspiracy, there obviously
14-00000 Vit ima @ 6 de he would be nothing to report in the first place. The absence of concrete reporting seems to serve, regardless of which is the case, as the basis for the apparent SSC view that no collection effort was undertaken. As has teen noted above, there weré initial CIA collection re- quirements to the field. What they could be realistically expected to produce must be related to whether there was any information to collect at all, and if so whether it was accessible. The requirements were issued, but in retrospect it is doubtful that they could produce much of the who- what-where-when-how information that typifies intelligence collection reporting. A reflection of the basic nature of the problem is found in the Headquarters cable to Mexico City dG December 1963 (note above) which contains the following comment about the limited reporting from other stations: “. , . this partly dictated by the facts of Lee Oswald's life. . ." The SSC Final Report speaks in rather unqualified terms at page 10 about the resources of the intelligence agencies, including a description of “an extensive intelligence network in Cuba," suggesting that it was only necessary to ask to get. It is correct to say that there were sources in Cuba able to report on events, such as trbop advenenes, but there were no penetrations of Castro's inner circle, where any infor- mation on the subject in question would exist. The distinction apparently was missed “- or ignored -- by the authors of the SSC Final Report. As stated by the Miami Chief of Station, quoted at page 58 of the SSC Report: “Now if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited." This does not mean that such assets as there were did not have reporting
14-00000 requirements levied on them, in fact, there was considerable activity in this respect. In the course of the present review a number of case officers at the Station during that period have described the frenetic activity in this respect. The characterization by the Chief of Station as to passive collection by CIA inside the United States should not be extended to apply to what was done with reporting assets outside the United States, as the SSC Final Report attempts to do at the bottom of page 58. ° The SSC Final Report has undertaken to paint this in very different terms than the record supports. The extensive reporting to the FBI and the Warren Commission provides a truer reflection of the level of activity by CIA (see Tab E), even if its sources did not bear on every question that has been concerved since then. IV "Unpursued Leads" At pages 60-67, in Book V of the SSC Final Report, there is a section that addresses leads that were felt to not have been followed by the intelligence agencies. This follows the section on CIA's Performance on the Inquiries. This section first addresses two Cubana flights to Havana from Mexico City on 22 November (the date of President Kennedy's murder) and 27 November 1963, raising questions about passengers reported to be aboard those flights. By way of background it is noted that during that period Cubana ‘flights traveled on a round trip basis between Havana and Mexico City every other day. More specifically, there were flights at this’ time on 22. November, 25 November and 27 November. The flights on 10
14-00000 peeeaee iti " = 22 and 25 November to Havana were passenger flights, while the one 4 on 27 November appears to have been essentially a cargo flight, with E one passenger, the man referred to in the SSC discussion. All flights | to Havana apparently carried some freight.- B reports to Headquarters. There was dnefunitateral| CIA s surveillance chy - rear Sa, that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, B reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests. 4 reference is made to a reported five-hour delay of a Cubana flight from Fe Mexico City to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, 4 22 November 1963. The SSC Report describes the delay as being from 4 of the report was that the reported delay was to await arrival at f— 10:30 P.M. EST of a private twin-engined aircraft, which deposited 2 an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs ro CONF CIA conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, Filing cable The 22 November 1963 Flight At pages 30, 60, 61 and 103 of Book V of the SSC Final. Report, 6:00 P.M. EST to 11:00 P.M. EST. The especially intriguing aspect Clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. The SSC Final Report emphasized CIA's apparent failure to follow up by inquiring z ETE AAMR SIT TREC MA AT ER. TEL WARE TD TILER ROMANE AY" TITAS LIP UTTER 0 AG Sars SC RRO OE RY ETE Sees further into the matter. ara ye PL en ry oats pepe sommes
14-00000 oN Ee BL oe meee perme n bei dod dae Book V of the SSC Final Report states that CIA could not explain, - Ae the time of the writing of the SSC Report, why there was no record of a follow-up. In fact, the SSC was advised that the Mexican authori- “ahr CREME A PE “ETD ties were asked about the reported flight delay, although there was no orded response. The current review revealed additional: information rom the surveillance noted above, which bears directly on the subject. n reviewing that information below, it is noted that the conversion f Mexico City time to Eastern Standard Time (EST) in the SSC Final eport tends to distort the time perspective somewhat. Mexico City imes are used in the following discussion. Records show that the flight arrived at the platform at the airport at 1620 hours Mexico City time; presumably it landed STELLAR Pe EEO TU PTET BAC BAER EDOTE PIR IE TENG SHR PORENEOT SATEEN TIEN WTR A en x — = i : : RES Sie cay ake ie -.gebo a e) cae ye SAGAS CLE eae ee The following facts stand out, in contrast to the presentation in che SSC Final Report: 1. The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. It was not | i 12 34 teh Fen Byes 230 testy prsee fv * ae Lstsehuemepetieehimaaiivs cenetnwini nett ce ie cit oe tare le aoe en ae Ae pe A AL LAS ee Ee oe ND ciate
delayed five hours, as alleged. time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a secret passenger. This also contrasts further with the alleged departure time of the Cubana flight. which the report stated to be 2200. Actual departure preceded substantially the reported arrival of the aircraft for which it allegedly was delayed. ® In view of the surveillance coverage of.the Cubana flight, it is 2. The Cubana flight took off at 2035 hours Mexico City oe gma ee ‘very doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twin- engined aircraft and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred. Personnel in Mexico City at the time were aware of these sources and probabiy knew the above facts, feeling no need to follow further. The report in question was in error, and misled the SSC in its summary of the matter. | The Passenger on the 27 November 1963 Flight At pages 61-63 and 104, the SSC Final Report describes in con- Siderable detail information concerning a Cuban-American who came to the attention of the CIA and the FBI in the period following the assassination of President Kennedy. The introductory comments of the SSC Final Report state that: ". . « One source alleged that the Cuban-American was 'involved' in the assassination."
The §SC Report states that the CIA reported the case to the FBI “almost immediately," but that the Bureau did not conduct a follow-up investi- gation “as part of (its) work for the Warren Commission." Further down the same page the SSC Report states that "(t)he FBI did investi- gate this individual after receiving the CIA report of his unusual travel." At page 63 the SSC Report observes that "...the suspicious travel of this individual coupled with the possibility that Oswald had contacted the Tampa chapter (of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee--FPCC) certainly should have prompted a far more thorough and timely investi- gation than the FBI conducted..." We do not know just what the Bureau did in this respect, nor have we tried to resolve the apparent incon- sistencies in the SSC Report noted above, but the SSC Final Report contains considerable detail about the man, presumably reflecting the results of FBI inquiries. While this section of the SSC Report is directed primarily at the FBI, we reviewed the reporting because of CIA's initial role in reporting about the man. There is also one implicit criticism of CIA, which will be noted. Book V of the SSC Final Report has the following summary statement at page 104, in the chronology section: “December 5 - Mexico Station cables that someone who saw the Cuban-American board the aircraft to Havana on November 27 reported that he ‘looked suspicious'..." At page 61 it states that there "is no indication that CIA followed- up on this report (that the man was "involved in the assassination"),
= except to-ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban- American's activities." The presentation of this matter in the SSC Report contains some inaccuracies. First, the Mexico City Station did not cable Washington that the man “looked suspicious." There was a cable, dated 5 December 1963, but it reported that the man had “crossed at Laredo, Texas on 23 November," that he registered at a certain hotel in Mexico City at a certain time on 25 November, that he chetked out of the hotel at a certain time and departed for Havana "as only passenger on Cubana | flight on night 27 Novenber,” sihtiGa iii EE EEReREER. re? =This was followed by a dispatch the same date, repeating the basic information in the cable, qa. QM, and containing the following cryptic statement: “Source states the timing and circumstances surrounding Subject's travel through Mexico and departure for Havana are suspicious." This comment is cryptic, at least, and--given that dramatic moment in history--doubtless reflects a preliminary comment of a person who was on the alert at that time for anything that might be construed as possibly unusual. The above quotation was the Station's actual report of the observation by the source, and is what was reported to the FBI; it differs from the quotation in the SSC Report. There was an internal memo in the Station that was even more cryptic, but which was in the nature of an informal reminder, which stated that the man was reported
me Fa han 74-00000 ; \ * . *, Fi to have “looked suspicious"; but this formulation never found its way into the more careful statements that usually characterize official reporting. The point is that the observation was cryptic and impres- sionistic, rather than constituting a tangible basis for dramatic activity or final conclusions. | ' There is one piece of reporting that could confuse those reviewing the record, but which is essentially. resolved when considered in the context of known facts. On 19 March 1968.7 ever ase cabled that a source MBBW~had information on a man; the description seems to have the } i j : i | same Cuban-American in mind. The following should be noted about the report: it misspelled the man's name; it offered a bare statement Ne RAEI ALARM sae ek wwe .that. he “was involved in Kennedy assassination"; it states that he entered Mexico “on foot" from Laredo, Texas (according to the SSC Final Report, the FBI concluded that he entered by automobile); it asserts that he stayed at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City (while the dates and times of his registration and check-out at a specific hotel in Mexico | City, where he stayed, were known); it gave an incorrect number for his Passport; and, it stated that his Mexican tourist card was issued in Nuevo Laredo (when it was known to have been issued in Tampa, Florida). The report, on its face, was factually incorrect on a number of known points. The source patently was extensively misinformed, the hard facts of his report being in error. The Chief of Base at the time, when queried about the report in the course of the present review, could not recall it. eee cae ne Ca Oe ee t
14-00000 ie et, Ei be tary’. Ea Br? gue git Lo There is one additional aspect of the matter, in which the record is confused. If we are to comment negatively on the pre-_ sentation by the SSC in its emphasis on report, we must point out that the Mexico City Station's response to the iovkerrey report contributes to such confusion as may exist on the matter. When Mexico City received the Monekersy cable the Deputy Chief of Station replied that the information in. the report “jibes fully with that provided Station by (Mexico City source) 4 December 63." It did not jibe in most respects, other than the date and place of entry into Mexico. The mistake of that. cable cannot be explained today, but wrong it obviously was. It does, however, serve to highlight the basic unreliability of the report and indicate how it should be considered responsibly. Implicit criticism of CIA's not collecting more information on the man is not well founded. It had-no real sources with access to information concerning him; when a defector from Cuba became available with such information he was queried and the results were provided the authorities.
APPROYED FoR RELEASE 1993 CIA HisToRICAL REVIEW PROGRAM CIA OPERATIONS AGAINST CUBA
14-00000 APPROVED FER RELERSE 1999 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM CIA Operations Against Cuba The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the Castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times; it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However, to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of | evidence that must still control how the findings are treated. It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962 (see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro. regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro-~ vocative. Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations,. ee
14-00000 sconomic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re- ceived recurring. publicity in the press), as well as a variety of | covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963 | president Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban F revolution; at the time the press, reportedly on the basis of what “White House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban people to overthrow the Castro regime. The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who- ; conducted their independent operations against the Castro government. some of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other elements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from | private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America Hand it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, whether CIA was involved or not. We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of-the tensions between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in | the public domain. That consideration was given the possibility of \ zie oe FE EL APR AR 86 OT - ves
14-00000 Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel- . , “ligence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations js being faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its staff as not directly relevant; in fact, to the specific issue of the murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of public perceptions Probably would not accept it without reservation. The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA=-for special attention in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro- voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life. However, in advancing its thesis, the $sc Report cautioned that it had “seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern- ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba." In response to this perception, conveyed in Book V of the SSC Final Report, we have conducted a major review of Agency Files (the
14-00000 od attr organization of that effort is discussed at Tab A of this report). This was for the express purpose of identifying any separate activities that could have Provoked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy had he learned of them, and to evaluate their security. Today, in 1977, it is difficult to reconstruct exactly everything that did and did not occur in the course of the Warren Commission in- quiries in 1964. Not all that happened is.a matter of record. For instance, in CIA at that time there were many individuals assigned to various aspects of Cuban operations. They were familiar in detail with those activities, with what they were and with their strengths and weaknesses. They doubtless made numerous conscious but unrecorded Judgments about what seemed relevant Or irrelevant to the considera- tions of the Warren Commission. Had they been aware of any aspects of those activities that may have related to the assassination of the President it is safe to say it would have been surfaced in some way. While CIA produced considerable material for the investigation (see Tab E) that more was not reported is a meaningful indication of what was known then by those actually involved, as distinguished from what might be hypothesized at a later date. To contend to the contrary -- which has been suggested by some -- would require a unanimous con- spiracy of many American citizens, employees of CIA, many of whom knew aspects of even the most closely guarded activities. 4 ~Sc_
14-00000 Se Today, the knowledge of the persons involved directly in the various Cuban operations in the period preceding President Kennedy's death cannot be recaptured in the form that it existed then. Those persons are scattered, their memories are blurred by time, and some are dead. The SSC, for instance -- in its attempt to capture ela- ments of the past -- seems to have led some employees into expressing opinions on subject matter they did not know in 1964, apparently in response to representations by SSC staff members as to the facts; this illustrates at best the difficulties in resolving hypothetical issues, today, on a responsible basis. . The SSC Final Report devotes considerable time to the so-called AMLASH operation, which centered on a high Cuban official who was dissatisfied with the Castro regime. The Agency had only a tentative relationship with this man during President Kennedy's life, although the SSC Final Report -- in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so exten- sively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in this paper, at Tab 0. The key point is that prior to President Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an under- taking. This will not be treated further in this section of this discussion.
14-00000 pyoran nee eS In the face of the hypotheses advanced by the SSC Final Report, ~ wo Sn 8 ere bom eaters aoaerrare menen. he eteneh ptecen heterotic Anite = TS RS OOPS RE RULER RI LL te i sperations conductad by CIA during the period in question, 1961~1964. the organization of the review is described at Tab A. It was not TEE EG I Tee ASS 5 5 sossible to predict the form that information turned up by this | st has been felt necessary to review in deoth all records of Cuban | inquiry might take, and special care had to be exercised in the effort. In doing this the "provocation concept" of the SSC Report was kept in mind. In the months that it took to complete this extensive review, it is significant to observe that three areas of specific operational | activity were found that either might meet some of the requirements of the provocation theory, or throw some further light on issues | already considered. To report this conclusion is not to dismiss the original questions that faced the Warren Commission as to whether } there might have been Cuban or Soviet connections with Oswald. That such possibilities remain unresolved in some minds.is apparent, but f that the records of CIA, in such a review, do not add significantly i to evidence on the subject, is the conclusion of the present inquiry. The areas of operational activity noted above can be described B sriefly as follows: . 1. Operations directed against the Cuban leadership (ANTRUNK),\ 2. Operations involving the criminal underworld. 3. Other reports of plans to assassinate Castro.
14-00000 - wie Cary sass AUIU YK There is one other general activity that was considered in the course of the present research, which is discussed below. This activity jeg was to develop a capability for splitting the leadership of the Castro regime and eventually overthrowing it. It never reached the point of implementation; however, because it suffered possible security vulnerabilities, it is treated here even though it never materialized. In our professional judgment this activity, because of its failure to ever develop substance, is not really rele- vant to the question. It is included simply because it might be viewed, by virtue of its security vulnerabilities, as fitting in part the hypothesis of the SSC Final Report; it seemed better to include it than try and explain at some later date why it was omitted, although the reasoning should be apparent. If its inclusion in this report is subject to question because of its lack of substance, perhaps it serves some purpose in indicating how little turned up in the course of this research to meet any of the rather loosely formulated provocation thesis of the SSC Report. In early 1963 there were Cuban exiles who wished to change the direction that events seemed to have taken in Cuba. Two of then aay ee : ___. developed an oper- ational ‘concept to overthrow the Castro government .Cwhi ch came to be known as the Leonardo Plany EU, nad been a public figure in Cuba, who had no apparent role in the activity following original inception ic of the plan. epee = lawyer in Cuba he had been involved in only a minor way in the anti-Batista movement.
14-00000 a DS valor 1 i ee wet s aay 4 # gg cefected to the United States in April 1961, settling in Miami-where he associated with anti-Castro exiles. Among his associates was Juul Ey. 2 Cuban citizen Gey WWII he married a Cuban national, and for a period operated his own business in Havana. Although avidly pro-Castro he reportedly was imprisoned for a few weeks following the Bay of Pigs invasion. As he held a valid U.S. visa, he left Cuba, arriving in Miami in May 1961. «1 scussed eos Plan with seme. He, in turn, discussed it with anaes a reporter ay i had reported on Cuban activities ip ee erie to the fall of Batista, during which time he had developed a wide acquaintance among Cubans. He was transferred to GRE ashington Qin April 1961, where he claimed to have an entree to the White House ep. He also claimed to have a standing invitation for direct con- tact with President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and McGeorge Bundy on matters concerning Cuba. While the actual nature of this entree is not known to CIA, it is through his intercession that the (Leonardo) Pan gained government-level support and approval. In early 1963 Be arranged an interview in Washington with Mr. Richard Goodwin, a White House advisor. aaa and GUM then met with Robert Hurwitch, a senior Official in the Department of State, who presented the concept to the CIA with Department approval. CIA assigned it to its Miami Station, where it became known 2s[ ATR NK a ~~ os 7 _ nl 8
14-00000 SEGRET _ ALISA was conceived as first identifying disaffected key per- sonnel in the Cuban armed forces with the long range objective of uniting them against the Castro regime. On 4 April 1963 CIA cabled certain stations and bases orders to identify Cubans who might be used in the activity. During that period the CIA Chief of Station in Miami questioned CIA control of the operation. Noting uncertain security considerations, he felt it best to fund the operation gen- erously in order for it to proceed independently. a Headquarters cable on 5 August 1963 to certain stations and bases complained about the absence of responses to the 4 April cable. It emphasized that activity to penetrate the Cuba armed forces was a t73 rch w
14-00000 In November 1963 the program was still trying to develop leads into higher echelons of the military and civilian leadership. The operation moved slowly, with preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes. Although it had success- fully recruited some persons during 1963 in Cuba, it had made prac- tically no progress in establishing an organization or any capability for action. At a much later date as its numbers increased its secur- ity became less certain. In 1965.its security was believed to have _ been. seriously compromised and the decision was taken to cut off re-- lations with it.
14-00000 The reason for selecting this operation for discussion here is just not its denouement in 1965, but possible security weaknesses from the beGiNning. SEU isce CPT ST bo be nee nT et ee al fal zutcorhas het Sspeck’ Since 1948 the Foy ecorded repapt’ that he was pf comunisty Re- f portedly fx Was inefrequent contactwith communi party & a f leaders and %, étionaries throughout Latin Ag frica. Sus- ¢ picions about. hi, , motives or. possible conpéctions with = vf “a a foreign -intel1 igen % services, have al been proven. = Nicole Szulc, daughter’ Tad Szuly, 1s reportedly an avid = communist. aa igé gne Company: A CIA Diar Pa 7 credits Nicole. Szulc with ANE “obtained vital research materials: in ‘New York apt WaShindag aa She is be- lieved,.to be an ageng# off the Cuban Oy - Doubts about Tad Szulc are unconfjé(med but remain, alive. “ty i Pol ish origin oer Szulc became PUA. citizen in 1954 by a soot bill of Congress. ff 7 ? ~ b. orge Ajbuszyc Volsky. Like szulc, he is of eglish orig#h. jHe and-Szule“becdme acquainted in 1959-T960=rht Peal Ca
Cuba. A CI Study of Volsky, dated 24 August 1964, prepared by SQIMWAVE anal atement: ~~ "VoPsky's knowlelige of clandestine methods, of operation, togetgér with his auss Ma prison background/and his ingenuity ag/a/middleman in U.S. Goverament/CIA activities, made him angexcellent candidate for a Nommuniét penetration agen fond that the pos- sibility existed that he might be a singfeton, sleeper or a stringer for the, RIS. "QThere has begg no confirmation of these suspicions. Volsky“gecame gnaturalized U.S. citizen — on 10 Apri?’ 1969. v c. ‘dose Ricardo RABEL find Born in Cuba, he was the 4 , son of a native born Ameyican ote Men. He was educated both in Cuba and in the Stgtes and lat b940) enlisted in the U.S. Army. After @ischarge he returned %@ Cuba but kept moving back and forth between the U.S<\and Wiba. Viewed in retrospect, off career presents a’patter of chagging alle- giances. fi enjoined the an}f-Batista forces in March 1952 first wig the Cuban exites in the United States andWater from ide Cuba. He joined the Cuban Army under Batis andgjwas t an Liai #4 "the U.S. Army mis-
14-00000 N he paajcipated in an attempted coup. After a short igérison- : ra .Ment he returned to the U.S. and worked with one of i$ brothers. In October 19 he returned to Cuba and becamaginvol ved with the 26th of July M@yement and later with ty@ Cienfuegos Group. Shortly after the Cast Oo victory, Casty® called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Cortg, a jobgfe held until 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief FG" viendos Campesinas (Rural Housing). Approached by Cp in July or August 1967. There were accusation In view of the later roll-up of the AiRevx operation the tentative opinion has been offered that the operation could have been an ingenious plan by the Cubans from the beginning, using access at high levels in the U.S. Government to learn the identities of
14-00000 Accepting the possibility of vital security flaws in the operation, it must be observed that there was very little progress and no concrete planning during the life of President Kennedy. The eventual objective was to develop sufficient support and organization to overthrow the Cuban regime. It never made much progress @» J An attempt to build support that might eventually have the capability to attempt a coup against the Castro regime obviously would have been irritating to Castro. That it never really prog- ressed very far during the life of President Kennedy is a relevant consideration to whether or not the tentative beginnings would have proveked Castro to order the assassination of President Kennedy. New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation In the course of the present review a by-line story by Paul Meskil in the New York Daily News attracted special attention because
14-00000 of one statement that it contained. One of a series of stories printed ‘20-25 April 1975, it quoted Frank Sturgis rg Sturgis has been something of a soldier of fortune over the years, having served in different branches of the U.S. military and having been in the anti-Batista movement prior to Castro's takeover. Sturgis stayed on in Cuba until mid-1959, during which time he reportedly had some role in the Castro regime's control of the gambling interests. He came to the United States in 1959. Sturgis gained notoriety when arrested on 17 June 1972 in the Water- gate break-in. He has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, although there is no record of any such relation- ship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency. 15
aan —*SEORET, stars. prior to its becoming known to external investigators in 1975, raised the question of just what Sturgis had known, and whether he could OT 9 eam! 16
14-00000 have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life. Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of information. However, because the statement by Sturgis in 1975 in the press to see»how it might fit in with other things that are known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach 4 g° the reliability of newspaper stories. The New York Daily News stories (20-25 April 1975), and another _ Story by the same author on 13 June 1976, refer to possible relation- ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, also mentioning <@qghhieiaadies,. : : { Si att oe omer q ane Ot.) oe UN © oy. gt ar ee eee a. ee ere
14-00000 The New York Daily News story of 1976 also reports a claim by a Marie Lorenz that she acted in 1960 in behalf of Sturgis, in an attempt to assassinate Castro. She had also been mentioned in the 1975 stories. Ms. Lorenz reportedly was Castro's mistress at one point, and her access, so the story indicates, was used as a means for getting to him. The 1976 news story concludes that “soon after vher murder mission failed the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters . . . to kill Castro..." In the news story she claimed that the plan involved the use of poison pills which she concealed in a jar of face cream; they dissolved and could not be used. On page 79 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots the following is extracted from an 18 October 1960 memorandum from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the CIA Deputy Director for Plans: "During recent conversations with several friends, (Sam) Giancana stated that Fidel §astro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this state- ment, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be
14-00000 on three occasions . . . Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the ‘assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a ‘pill’ in some drink or food of Castro." This seems to confirn some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the dating of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own. Following collapse of CIA's access to Castro througnfOrta Johnny Roselli, the man who had served as the Agency's original inter- mediary with the syndicate, stated that he knew a Cuban exile leader who might participate. This man, = headed (a: deuce on < of the exile groups that also received _ support from CIA as part of the larger Cuban operation. aa" dissatisfied with the nature and extent of that support; Miami Station suspected that he was not keeping his bargain with the Agency. In fact, it is possible that Gia rey was involved in independent operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to the Bay. of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination. The 1967 IG Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 December 1960, indicates support by the criminal rae
14-00000 es 7 underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 January 1961, suggests that eas one of those receiving that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of interest, as late as 10 June 1964 there was a report that gangster elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone who would kill Castro (an amount mentioned to the syndicate repre- sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an explanation of why ci MEE so readily available when approached by Roselli. It also may throw light on a question noted in the 1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something already ongoing in spite of the fa@t that the operation had been terminated a year earlier.. It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri- butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.
14-00000 Set What do these various considerations suggest? It is obvious that many. lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities. Clearly, the Agency's case officers felt that they were initiating a new activity that had the sole purpose of accomplishing the elimination of Castro. The additional considerations can be listed as follows: 1. The criminal syndicate may well have had some inde- pendent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involve- ment in late 1960. These operations could well have con- tinued after the CIA standdown following the Bay of Pigs, being ongoing in some form when CIA reactivated the plan in April 1962. b. The syndicate operations could have activities such as those that are reported in the New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976. 3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with the criminal syndicate, although from outward appearances he was not a member of it. He could well have been used by the syndicate in its activities. ° 4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source, so his “statements are treated with considerable reserve. He probably did know ane both of them were in Cuba. He was outside of Cuba, however, when was given the PE 8 oe 4, a : a od 2]
14-00000 -—~, | tabi role of assassin. Whatever he knew at. that time--and his. knowledge may be of a much Jater date=-~could have been ‘in the form reported fifteen years later in the 1975 newspaper stories. If there was such an operation it was not CIA's; it could have been an earlier operation of the syndicate. While Sturgis could have known of or have been involved in earlier activity by the syndicate, whatever its form, he may also have had no part in any of it; he may merely have fabricated a story from bits and pieces learned by him from gossip in the Miami community afterqay settled there Ss 5. If the syndicate was conducting its own operations, that would tend to reinforce the thought that the details of its operations would have been characterized by discre- tion--or security--despite the FBI report in October 1960. The authors of Book Y of the SSC Final Report felt that the operation seeking to employ the resources of the criminal syndicate would not have provided Castro the clear provocation that was hypothe- sized for the AMLASH operation. At page 68 the Report stated: ", . . Tt is unlikely that Castro could have
14-00000 distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA." In a sense the SSC made a conscious judgment, in the context of its provocation theory, that was made less consciously and in a different context in 1964 by the few CIA employees who knew of the operations with the syndicate -- that they bore no relation to the assassination of President Kennedy. 4 : x %, 7% Possible Ruby--Trafficante Contact There are fragments of unevaluated reports that leave one aspect of the involvement of the criminal syndicate as a question. This can only be noted here, as the means for resolving it one way or another are not within the Agency's capabilities. As noted earlier (see Tab B. page 4), a 27 November 1963 report records statements by a British journalist that during his own imprisonment in Cuba in 1959 he knew of a gangster type named “Santos who was in jail where he was visited by another American gangster type named "Ruby." Current speculation has considered the possibility that "Santos" was Santos Trafficante who may have been in jail there in 1959. An FBI report of 14 August 1964 recorded a statement by a person jailed in Cuba that he shared a cell with Trafficante.
14-00000 If the "Santos" in the British report was Trafficante, the British and FBI reports tend to support one another on the narrow point of his imprisonment in Cuba in 1959. This is a material consideration, as there are reservations about both sources. It may be that the FBI has more information on this point, but there is no further known relevant information in the Agency on the matter. ; The significance of this is that if Trafficante was in jail in Cuba in 1959, he could have been available for a visit by Jack Ruby if such visits were allowed. Ruby, in fact, did visit Cuba in 1959. The long time gap between 1959 and November 1963 removes the two incidents from candidacy for consideration as evidence of conspiracy against President Kennedy. However, if Ruby was running an errand for someone in 1959, it would provide an interesting lead for those inquiring into the possible signi- ficance of past assocations or contacts. Both the British report and the confirmation of Ruby's 1959 visit were known to the Warren Commission, and Ruby reportedly spoke at length about his visit when questioned.
14-00000 However, Ruby is dead and Trafficante has declined to testify at all. A later allegation of a visit by Ruby to Cuba in late 1962 or early 1963 is believed not to be true. Other Reported Assassination Proposals There were other references to possible assassination plots against Castro that seem not to have been addressed in the Interim Report of the SSC on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders. They are summarized briefly below: In May 1975 a Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in February 1961 he was given a rifle and the mission to enter Cuba to assassinate Castro. He claimed to have tried to enter Cuba three times, but failed each time in gaining entry to Cuba. Agency files have no further records on this matter. As a result of a column by Jack Anderson in May 1977, a check was made of Agency files referring to an Antonio Veciana, cited by Anderson as a CIA employee. The man was never an employee of the Agency, but he was connected with ALPHA-66, a Cuban exile movement. On three separate occasions (December 1960, July 1962, April 1966) he proposed to CIA employees the assassination of Fidel Castro. He was rebuffed on each occasion. -Again in 1970 there was a report of his making a similar proposal while an AID employee at an overseas post. The details of his actual role is unknown to the Agency, although the FBI may have more details on him, This is touched on in Tab G, which comments on selected newspaper stories published in the course of this research effort.
14-00000 Cu) ay “y TO’ ecm ty ete Agent Messages in 196] Mentioning Plans to Kill Castro 1. Ouring the investigations in 1975 five agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to. kill Castro, or proposing such action. Three of these messages related to the same operation, ‘the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative. The existence of these messages was mentioned during Mr. Colby's testimony before the Church Committee. In response to a request from the Deputy Inspector General, LA Division prepared a summary of the messages and on 8 August 1975 forwarded it to the Review Staff, then charged with serving as an interface with the congressional committees. ' Records of the Review Staff do not show how this paper was handled. The subject was not covered in the Church Committee's interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders and is summarized again below.
14-00000 Seat a “majof” effort should be launcheg he same agent, yeported that the perp i. i @y contact had arms or only 50 men. hy that the sabotage \ attempt on Fidel'/would be carrigg to do so would make it impossible to clandestine‘oyQanization in Cuba; "your military aid is dec ome that date we are lost." There is no indication Wy answered. No further reference to this plan has’ 3. We have reviewed the files of the persons identified in the’ cables, and have interviewed a case officer who was responsible for one of them, in an attempt to learn more about the matter. The four agents in question are commented on briefly below:
a ScCREP eres tomes ccunpsennagenrmery vememie 1 19 See i Le one a. AMBRONC/5 is the agent who sent the messages-gut= - | a lininggttie proposed sabotage effort-and’ attempt agagnst Castro.¥ N\ 201 file opened 1% July 1960. A BAA was not tsst¥iad until 18 Decémber 1961, and agy0A on 31 Januar\ 1962. A debriefing of him JX November 1960, priomAto the’ Kennedy Administrgzion, revealed that he had Re in touch with peogte who had | plotted the {Ayssination of Fidgi Castro, and claimed to have tried he elf to make gimilar plans. He was infiltrgted on 9 Be 1 961 cember 1990, exfiltrating 15 February (2) AMBRONC/5 Ae fy iltrated again 3 Marct 61 and exfiltrated Aydin 19 June 1961. Thy pvered the period sefnt essages and the’ Bay of Pigs. His sole mfsgion wax to organize’ resistance cage gyoups. j . / | (3) ANBRONGAS was inftltrmbed again on 19 December 1961, exfilt aging 29 March 196@\again with the same . miksion , 1 (4) 1942, wa 30: Augusy 1962.—He as been reported ash ever admitting that hdf was a CIA agent. His name is not Se of those «cepa QTE RRR OE RARER At FERRI SER ont peer tetas, ma arten tana tun ee RT inl talline Simona alent oes PER ore ee ae Ee gsi ee : oe eee OY ic 3 rd ee ee
14-90000 el SECRET aN a _ EOE A in book given Senator ee tha {aimed by Castro,.to-have plotted attempts ghainst B his / J | b. AMGOQAXAY was one of tHose AMBRONC/5 was He to ntact for Fas ‘general plan for April 1961. a} PO dn 5 Jayluary 1961. His mis Hn was to organize paratyj ipary activities in Cub He in- ated in July filtrated in Felruary 1961 and Y ; Js period covered Re-infiltrat he 29 Ju vg A961, withthe same orgafizing mission, he Res 9 ested on }7 August 1961, and is serving a thirty year erm. His name appears in the book given Senator ¥ wea c. AMPUG/1 was anothe gontact for his general plafi i (1) Recruited /i j (2) ~ine fy
14-00000 Co 513 ne = cay ae mee ela d. Ne was another of those that ANERONC/S | sy told to @ohtact for his general plan in April 1961. ° (Ty \ Tats—paiicwas.awalkains. Api LL gy, -a POA bey a/issued 30 sanuary Jat (althougyy here was j a MOC spe \12 July 1960). ,He was to orgy fize resistarte é _ group in| toe\ Havana and Pinar del Rio | i Peas. (2) tnt Y trated 3¢March 1961, hg : fas frrested ; 23 April 1961 9 4 serving & thy hey year term. Hiss name is among th poe in the book giv n Senator McGovern by Castro. if . (3) Records mY ating tos fii man mention his in-| Fittratiga into cuba x Augfist 1960 and exfil tration ' in November 1960 (prio \y his being issued. a POA). i His “mission” during thf per iod Ts nentiéned tersely] wan "to organize frosiX mounting Sabotage s gperations\ ance groups .. . for . “and assassination |
14-00000 \: F 1a that at the time the focus .was. on developtng peppers iy wan izations/for operations, be stat. a assa ks inat ‘On mission, such as attributed ta/AMPAN én ‘ fi on nidr jer time in Cuba, not ohly was fot wan ‘ di but ¥ ou AY compromised fe f tofo haze. , officer states, q AR such | me sassination mission, the oF Fen ie pte oe would have | ae gen t AMPANTC/7's dwn Aniviative. vars a} Se we ee i 4. It is clear tP at saw aie envisgoned a general uprising : i in Cuba, to commence with Ne Rabe tage of electric plant in Havang " and an attempt on Castpo's re Thg ‘third of his messages refle of pessimism, and the fact is that, che operation did notyéome off. ie While the man had no express mis on an from: the Agency to mount an. f se 4 operation against Castro persghally jt is clear that no specifid co i} objection was recorded to hj statementdgf 3 ‘tentions. @geral action and makes. . 4 The one - i recorded reply addresses fhe concept of ae is SNS % no reference to the prqafosal to make an attempt on Castro. é s i le 5. The fact isAhat the 9 Appil 1961 0 ek ation did not coma off, and AMBRONC/ Sgt as not been identified as an Magency, asset. Nor was his namefincluded in the -book given Senatoh, ‘McGovern e feeseernens none-of “whomshadamtssTON prrassassi] a That i |p by.castro. a nation frogf the Agency, are now serving thirty year tert iS echeir naj Med were included in the list. given Senator MeGove a4 by | try may be an attempt on Castro's part to enlarge on the Rep
14-00000 im et “ a e co | SECRET 6. The records are incomplete on the events identified by the three messages. The time in question predates the Bay of Pigs. The men mentioned above had more specific missions, other than that of assassination. They exfiltrated subsequent to. the event described in the messages, and were arrested during subsequent infiltrations into Cuba. There is no record that any of them had a mission from CIA to kill Castro. IT 7. Another agent message dated 4 June 1961 asked about a man who had identified himself as Moratori of the Italian Embassy, who claimed to work for U.S. intelligence and to be in touch with one Martin Elena and others (none identifiable), who “have plans for an invasion within 30 days, after the killing of Fidel." A reply, dated 6 June, stated that the information was untrue and that Moratori was not known and should not be trusted. (Insofar as CIA records show, there was an Italian diplomat of that name in: Cuba at that time. Little is known about him.) The originator of the agent message cannot be identified from present records..” 32 Leaner Cavite |
Cc | SEGRET we oN . N Itt 8. Another agent message dated 3 May 196] from a member of the Revolutionary Recovery Movement in Cuba said “will try to kill Fidel today." A reply to this message dated 4 May told the agent | and his companions to "lay low" for the time being, and "will advise when operations can resume." There were no follow-up messages on this subject fn the records. The agent who sent the but as noted earlier his mission did message possibly not include instructions to kill Fidel. His companions have not been identified. 33 Naletal
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 2893 CIR HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGHAR AMLASH OPERATION
14-00000 7  eaaiall I. AMLASH OPERATION Comment on the AMLASH operation, in the context of its presenta- tion in Book ¥ of the Final Report of the SSC, is complicated by the treatment given it in the Report. Rather than being treated in a unified way, reference and discussion is found throughout the Report. The actual nature and the significance of the AMLASH operation differs materially from that presented in the SSC Report. The Report leaves the inference that AMLASH/1 was perhaps an agent of Castro, with the mission of provoking a plot against Castro (pages 3, 74 and 79), which in turn provided Castro with the justification for launching Lee Harvey Oswald against President Kennedy in retaliation. Alternatively, the Report suggests that AMLASH/1 was so insecure in the conduct of his activities that the details of his plotting could have become known to Castro, thereby providing the same basic motivation (pages 74 and 75). - Whichever of these alternatives, so the reasoning would be, the AMLASH operation should have been reported to the Warren Commission. We believe that neither thesis applies. The character of the relationship between CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to Oswald's assassination of President Kennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no basis for *See pages 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 23 29, 31, 35, 36, 59, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, and 86 of the 97-nage text, and pages 190, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the eight-page chronolagy following the text. APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1893 CHA HISTORICAL RENEW PROGRA
14-00000 a acnatl ‘y io ww AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro. Whether one‘is inclined to.see AMLASH/1 as either a double agent or provocateur, or simply as a man who carelessly revealed what he was doing, there was little for him to report or to leak. kek kk eK KR HK RK In preparing the current comment on the AMLASH operation, as treated in the SSC Report, it was judged best to approach it in two ways. A sequential summary of the AMLASH dperation is intended to present the Agency's understanding of the true nature of the activity. Following that, selected points made in the SSC Report are addressed. It is hoped that this presentation will help establish a clearer per- spective for judging the actual substance of the operation. ee ee As early as March 1959, AMLASH/1 was reported as expressing directly to Castro his dissatisfaction with the situation in Cuba. At that time he also was reported as expressing his disillusionment and that if he "...did not get out of the country soon, he would kill Castro himself." by a CIA case officer stationed there. The occasion was AMLASH/1's The meeting was arranged by Pea . cseriaenes sf ANMHIP/1, a “Tong-' time friend of AMLASH/1. A dispatch in July 1961, giving a general round-up on operational activity against Cubans in
14-00000 ",..the Station made an unsuccessful ‘approach’ to (AMLASH/1)...the 'approach' consisted of a ‘friendly’ talk between a case officer, a mutual friend of (AMLASH/1) and (AMLASH/1) when he last was visiting § ® While (AMLASH/1) did not pick up the opportunity at that time, he apparently did not report the incident to his superiors and the ground work may have been laid for a similar action .in the future." Later Wa a there was a report that AMLASH/1 and another Cuban wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. Consideration of their exfil- tration ended with a renort that the Cuban police were aware of AMLASH/1's intention and plans. aes and that AMLASH/1 case officer's. The
14-00000 2£24ars - iS us J da de t In July 1962 CIA contacted AMWHIP/1, who made known his dis- satisfaction with the way CIA handled AMLASH/1's "olanned defection" in ee i961. Plans were made for a CIA case officer and AMWHIP/1 to travel om anywhere Gi necessary in an attempt to bring about AMLASH/1's defection. The first of a serjes, of méetings with AMLASH/1 was held cp eeAugust 1962. The original objective of his defection became one of recruiting him in place. AMEASH/1 was reported as feeling that if he could "do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba, he was interested in returning to carry on the Fight there." AMLASH/1 spoke of sabotage of an oil refinery and the execution of a top ranking Castro subordinate, of the Soviet Ambassador and of Castro himself. The case officer's report stated: "While we were making no commitments or plans, : we pointed out to [AMLASH/1] that schemes like * he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, information~- collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to _ ensure the value and success of such plans." (Emphasis in original). The security hazard of too frequent meetings : further meetings i AMLASH/1 was next met §
14-00000 The case officer reported on 17 August:. é “Have no intention give [AMLASH/1 ] physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry ase ei out on his own initiative." - The Headquarters cabled reply the next day stated: "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given [AMLASH/1]." Jin Gb Augusta AMLASH/1 left the last time that he was met until he next left Cuba in September mefor Havana. This was 1963. COMMENT : It is noted at this point that AMLASH/1 was not a recruited agent at that time--nor was he ever for that matter, as Operational Approval was never granted for this purpose. By the end of August 1962 the CIA rela- tionship with AMLASH/1 had made no real progress, ~ although he was viewed as an operational contact with potential. Qver a year passed between August 1962 and September 1963 when he was next contacted by CIA. In terms of ‘the relationship that he had with CIA the critical period, * for purposes of n° paper, is there- Geert and GG vovenber 1963. [qvisisu/+attonded_the (aaa or encUr Ween ae eae noses Gate fore between
14-00000 It is pertinent to what followed to note where the relationship between AMLASH/1 and CIA stood at that time. At page 13 of Book V of the SSC Final Report the following statement appears: # . the CIA took steps to renew its contact with a high-level Cuban official named AMLASH. The delA's previous contact with grimzhad been sporadic; ‘ he had not been in contact with the CIA since before the missile crisis of October 1962. The exact purpose the CIA had for renewing contact is not known, but there is no evidence the CIA intended at this time to use AMLASH in an assassination operation." The reason for there having been no contact since August 1962 was simply that AMLASH/1 did not leave Cuba after that until September 1963. If it is narrowly correct to state that the “exact purpose" for renewing contact was not known to the authors of the Ss Report, it nevertheless is quite clear why he was met. He was an important potential asset whose usefulness remained to be explored. At this point, not only was there “no evidence (that) . . . an assassination operation” was in@gnded, it is quite clear that it was not under a consideration. The problem,at the time was how to deal with the man. At page 14 of the SSC Report it is stated that the first meeting
14-00000 in September 1963: " . . . may have been to gain intelligence and to cultivate him as an asset for covert operations... A 7 September cable, cited on another point in the SSC Report, provides an insight as to how AMLASH/1 was assessed at the time, as well as emphasizing the uncertainty in the minds of the case officers of how to deal with him in the future: "AMLASH cocky totally spoiled brat who will always be a control problen . . ([]egqeuesieieemer “ . . _ ae RRgemOeINe. AMLASH also needs strong confidant inside who will push and serve as chaplain..." CIA headquarters replied on 9 September, saying in part: " . . . Based on what little feel we here have for subject however appears he is hopeless as intell performer and is best approached as a chief con- spirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert disciplines... " The cable then went on to spell out long-range requirements prior to any action based on such internal organization as AMLASH/1 may put together. | Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially important, he also was viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, requiring careful but long-range development for whatever course of action that might later ensue.
14-00000 Page 14 of the SSC Final Report cites the 7 September 1963 cable reporting the first 1963 meeting with AMLASH/1 as follows: .  "AMLASH was interested primarily in getting the United States to invade Cuba, or in attempting an ‘inside job' against Castro, and that he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action." (Empahsis added). | This suggests a plan of action targetted specifically against Castro himself. That may have seemed implicit to*the authors of the SSC Report, but the actual language of the cable states it somewhat differently: “AMLASH still feels there only two ways accomplish | change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough realize latter out of question. According AMWHIP, AMLASH still awaiting for US reveal plan of action." COMMENT : At this point, after a year out of touch with a man with whom there had been no working understanding, AMLASH/1's views were of interest, but were very general, as might be expected after such a long time. The actual reference to an “inside job" did not specify Castro, as suggested in the SSC Report, but was directed towards the more general question of how to bring about change. It was offered alternatively, in the context of con- sidering both external and internal action, and not with the specific connotation provided by the SSC presentation. Out 2 So emcee ore “act Lon
14-00000 38 a The point is, as stated in the SSC Report, that it left - AMLASH/1 “awaiting a U.S. plan of action.” There was “nothing substantive or conclusive. To the contrary, things were left very much up in the air. Footnote 17 on page 14 of the SSC Report states that “characterization of this phase of the AMLASH overation is disputed." (Emphasis added). The footnote observes that the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots concluded that the AMLASH operation was an assassination operation, which begs the question of what it was for "this phase" of the matter. In fact, the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots notes specifically that “From the first contact with AMLASH until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba." (Page 86). The point is that the SSC Final Report, Book V, itself describes the very general nature of the approach by AMLASH/1, and the absence of a U.S. response (supra). Any dispute over how to characterize the operation at that time arises from the presentation of it in Book V of the SSC Report. Reference to the dispute may reflect views expressed by CIA representatives on reviewing the draft of the SSC Final Report. The next paragraph in the SSC Report, Book V, presents in inferential sequence, an interview Castro held with an AP reporter, Daniel Harker, in which Castro inveighed
14-00000 APaAree Bg i oe ay”, 3 ae ats . 4 against anti-Cuban terrorist plans of U.S. leaders. The intended inference, as is known from discussions with SSC staff members, was that AMLASH/1 may have reported (or leaked) to Castro what the authors of the report elected to see then as assassination plotting. This characteri- zation is even more explicit at pages 3-4 of the Summary and Findings of the SSC Report, presenting the inter- pretation as categorically as though it were fact. The fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time. Whatever may have been the cause for Castro's remarks at that time they could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing. AMLASH/1 flew to; Paris | mel “intend to see (be interviewed by) your friend again" referring to the CIA case officer. On 3 October 1963 the case officer nevertheless arrived lin Paris)to meet with AMLASH/1. Station officers were already in contact with him, two of whom participated in meetings that followed. On 11 October the case officer cabled Headquarters reporting that AMLASH/1 claimed to have the “necessary people and equipment inside * . 7 aaa a .* . ' Newent oe > 10
14-00000 (Cuba] to accomplish overthrow without [U.S.] assistance." AMLASH/1 was reported as wishing a meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurance of “moral support" for any action AMLASH/1 undertook in Cuba. The cable recommended that the request for a meeting: “be given highest and profound consideration as feeling drawn by all who in contact AMLASH is that he determined attempt op against’ [Castro] with or without [U.S.] support." A 21 October cable to Washington reported a 17 October meeting with AMLASH/1--"Basically he wants assurance that [U.S.] will support him if his enterprise is successful." (Emphasis added). Desmond Fitzgeraid, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, was going|to pari on other business and undertook to meet with AMLASH/1. The plan for the meeting, written in advance, was outlined as follows: "Fitzgerald will regresent self as personal : representative of Robert F. Kennedy who traveled } to Paris) for specific purpose of meeting [AMLASH/1] and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba.” (Emphasis added). On 29 October Fitzgerald met with AMLASH/ in Paris} representing himself as a spokesman of Attorney General Kennedy. The third person at the meeting was the case officer, who served as an interpreter.
14-00000 wee On 13 November the case officer wrote a memorandum summarizing high- lights of the meeting. It reads in part as follows: - "Fitzgerald informed [AMLASH/1] that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leader- ship and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after a real coup has. been effected and the group involved is in a position to request U.S. (probably under OAS auspices) recognition and support. (Emphasis added). It was made clear that the U.S. was not prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished in a matter of hours if the present government is still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup period, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be turned back but will support the necessary economic and political reforms which will benefit the mass of the Cuban people." At the time of the CIA Inspector General's report on the subject in 1967, additional details were elicited from Fitzgerald, who re-
14-00000 5 F called that AMLASH/1 spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. He.wanted a high-power rifle with telescopic sights, or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance. Fitzgerald stated that he rejected this request. Fitzgerald's Executive Officer, although not present at the meeting, was kept posted by Fitzgerald and had a recollection the same as the one noted above. The case officer is reported as not recalling the exchange on the weapon. His memorandum stated that: . "Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Fitzgerald meeting. After the meeting [AMLASH/1] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him." On 14 November 1963 AMWHIP/1 was met. in New York City. He reported on AMLASH/1's reaction to the 29 October meeting fin Paris} The contact report on what AMLASH/1 understood, as relayed by AMWHIP/1, is as follows: "The visit with Fitzgerald, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high levels of the Government concerned with the Cuban problem satisfied [AMLASH/1] as far as policy was con- : cerned, but he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as he saw it. [AMWHIP/1] said that [AMLASH/1] dwelt constantly on this point. 13
14-00000 He could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to _ [AMWHIP/1], [AMLASH/1] feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date." COMMENT: At this point it is important to note that Agency documents summarize what AMLASH/1 was to be told, and what he was told, which matches a later report of what he understood. In essence he was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While that may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a government, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (page 18) to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1] inter- preted the put-off by Fitzgerald.
Interesting confirmation of AMLASH/1'S understanding y 1964 FBI report (mentioned variously ook V of the ssc Report)- ho stated that AMLASH/1 is provided by a Jul 72-and 74 of B at pages 35, This s from an FBI h the CIA response and th port the plan. t is apparent that althou informant w report wa at Attorney General was unhappy wit Kennedy had refused to sup Given the substance gh the of this aspect of the report i e report is June 1964, this particular information when AMLASH/1 was told by yr Robert F. date of th etober 1963 dates back to 29 0 g himself as speaking fo Fitzgerald, representin that he would not be ot the reason given support in this opera- 2 ws Kennedy; While this isn c Final Report, it prov tion. the FBI report was cited in Book V of the SS ides additional AMLASH/1 understood that he had clear confirmation that tober meeting- MWHIP/1 CIA reviewed On 19 November 1963 turned down at the 29 Qc been what November meeting with Al e contact with AMLASH/1- /1 he would be given 4 . high-power Following the 14 '¢ be done to maintain th "approved telling AMLASH cache inside tyerald if he requested it, include - 4. The cache could, fag w/SCOPe---" On 19 November AMLASH/1 t old a CIA officer that he planned to quarters cabled [Parig requesting “smn to Cuba. On 20 November Head rmit one more meeting which = [ML AMLASH/1 “delay departure. . .(to) pe n the same day (20 November TF RE TY ) in response to Waususy requested." 0 15
14-00000 fas a telephonic request, AMLASH/1 agreed to delay his departure “if it is something interesting." The case officer told him that “he could not assure it interesting but that it was to be a meeting which AMLASH had requested." The cable reporting this exchange noted that it was a "rapid conversation" inhibited by the presence of a second person in the room. The SSC Final Report (page 19) attempts to expand this brief and cryptic telephone conversation into the "first indication that he might receive the specific support he requested." More factually, and quite significantly,. the Report acknowledges that no specific support had been offered up to then. Beyond that it is at best a piece of highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence. The case officer from Washington arrived [in paris the morning of 22 November and met with AMLASH/] late that afternoon. As they left the meeting they learned of President Kennedy's assassination. They probably were meeting when President Kennedy was shot. Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of Pyesident Kennedy, there is every indication that during President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no basis for believing that he had CIA support for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting any actual CIA plot directed against Castro.
14-00000 or II. SPECIFIC SECTIONS OF THE SSC REPORT Section 1, 87 This section of the SSC Final Report, the Summary, states that "it places particular emphasis on the effect their (the intelligence agencies) Cuban operations seemed to have on their investigation." It states that the report “details these operations to illustrate why they were relevant to the investigation." It states that presentation of the AMLASH operation is to illustrate why that operation should have been examined by the Warren Commission. The view of the Subcommittee, as to why the AMLASH operation warranted such review, is summarized at page 5 of the Report as follows: "The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission's work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed _ AMLASH' s proposal for a coup, the first step to him 7 being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat of retaliation for such plotting." As stated in the preceeding discussion the AMLASH operation was without substance prior to President Kennedy's death; it is particularly
14-00000 es unsuited to make the Subcommittee's intended point. It is literally accurate to note a coincidence in time, of the contacts with AMLASH/1 prior to the death of President Kennedy, but that is all. It is incorrect to say that “CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal." There was no agree- ment with AMLASH/1, or commitment to him, and even had Castro learned of the contacts with him there was nothing to learn beyond the fact of the contact. The relationship was most tenuous and without any support promised to him for whatever he planned. Castro's "threat" ~-as noted above--must be considered irrelevant to the substantive nature of the AMLASH relationship at that time. | This viewpoint.was conveyed to the Subcommittee prior to publica- tion of the report. At the same time it was observed that theoretically there was greater possibility of leaks from the earlier operations involving the criminal underworld, although there was no known evidence of such leaks. While general rather than specific, this could have provided more reasonable support for the Subcommittee's view that there were CIA operations that should have been reported to the Warren Commission. The SSC Subcommittee saw otherwise, outlining its position at page 68 as follows: | *,..it is unlikely that Castro could have _* distinguished the CIA plots with the underworld | from those plots not backed by CIA. In fact, the methods the CIA used in these attempts were designed to prevent the Cuban government from attributing them to the CIA." 18 omegl TT
14-00000 The result this has on the present comment on the SSC Final Report may seem anomalous. It places CIA in the position of con- testing the interpretation given the AMLASH operation in the SSC Final Report, and to that extent the thests that the presentation was supposed to support. At the same time, however, we are inclined to acknowledge in principle the possibility--not seriously considered as a likelihood during the Warren Commission inquiry-- that other operations could have suffered the defects attributed to the AMLASH operation by the SSC Report. In protesting the presentation in one instance, and the specific conclusions it seeks to support, the effect is to disagree with a substantial portion | of the report as written. On the other hand we tend to not contest a general thesis that more specific attention could have been given by the Warren Commission to the anti-Castro programs of the U.S. Government, including CIA activities. ek ek ke wk te we eo we we Ke ee At page 4 of the SSC Final Report Desmond Fitzgerald, ina meeting with AMLASH/1, is quoted as having: "stated the United States would support a coup." Again, at page 19, the report states that Fitzgerald: “also gave general assurances that the United ‘States would help in bringing about the coup." The last version is attributed to the case officer who was present at the meeting in 1963, in his testimony before the SSC in 1975. This presentation of the case officer's statements in 1975 does not match 19 fee.
14-00000 , SE ik the report of the meeting in 1963, which was written by him at the time. In considering the processes by which this version came into being, it is noted that the following statement appears at page 37 of the SSC Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots: "Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in late fall 1963 and promised him that the United States would support a coup against Castro," citing testimony by the case officer who was present at the meeting. An interesting footnote (#3) on that page reads as follows: "3. The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated: ‘Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign city) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH/1 and giving him assurances of full support with a change of the present government in Cuba.'" (Emphasis added). The underscored portion--the word “with"--in fact read in the actual document “if there is." This substitution of language in a purported quotation may seem only a matter of nuance, but it treats with what Fitzgerald planned to say, which takes on special significance when matched with the expressly limited statements that he actually made (as discussed at pages 1] and 12 of this annex) and what AMLASH/1 understood (as discussed at pages 13-15). a -At page 5 the SSC Final Report quotes officers in CIA responsible As sew 20
14-00000 we | re a for the investigation at the time of the Warren Commission as stating to the SSC that had they known about the AMLASH operation in 1963 it would have affected the investigation. [It is only noted that it is likely that views elicited from CIA employees in 1975 probably were responsive to representations by SSC staff members as to what the operation involved, as distinguished from what it actually was. tek te we ke ke & te & we ee # At page 24 the SSC Final Report contains the following statement: ° "According to the 1967 Inspector General Report, CIA Headquarters cabled the AMLASH case officer on the morning of November 23, and ordered him to break contact with AMLASH due to the President's assassi- nation and to return to Headquarters." This statement is at least a literary extension of the statement of the IG report, which was in its entirety as follows: "(The case officer] states that he received an OPIM cable from Fitzgerald that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off." | The SSC was unable to get the case officer to support its expansion on the reference in the 1967 IG report. His testimony is cited, apparently despite suggestive prompting, that: "  . . he recalled receiving such a cable, but could not recall whether it made specific mention al ibs arom
14-00000 of the President's assassination as the reason for breaking contact .. ."_ It is noted that the cable was never. found; it may never have been sent, being a misrecollection of the case officer. In any event, the two sources cited in the SSC Report do not support its version. eee te ek ek ke ee Footnote 30 on page 17 treats the question of the security of the AMLASH operation. As noted in the above Yeview of the AMLASH operation, AMLASH/1 was on the record as expressing his disenchantment with the Castro regime. He had told colleagues of his meetings with AMWHIP/1.. ene know that other Cubans were aware of his fulminations against the Castro regime. We do not know, beyond these generalized statements, what he actually conveyed at that time to what persons. We do know how little substance there was to his relationships with CIA during this period, and how little he had to tell others were he inclined to do sa. Assuming that AMLASH/1 was to attempt to organize a coup, he obviously had to try and associate himself with people of a like mind. To crystallize their support he might have felt constrained to convey assurances of external support. To the extent that he may have, we do not know whether he would have claimed to have been promised things that in fact had been denied him. It was not until much later that the question of security--always a consideration, especially when more than one person is involved--became a point of sufficient concern for CIA to break relations with him.
14-00000 Some have speculated that AMLASH/] was, in some way, Castro's provocateur. Such a possibility is always a proper subject for consideration. There are questions that feed the theory, but the issue remains debatable. We do not offer an opinion here, xoSpam vided Senator McGovern with a list af persons the Cubans claimed had the mission of his assassination, although AMLASH/1 was among those included, the reported period for his activity also omitted this earlier period. 7 | ew ew we we ke ek eke Re we we Oe At page 26 of the SSC Final Report it is stated that on 24 November the Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for the names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City. The SSC Report acknowledges that the purpose of obtaining these names was to determine the significance of Oswald's contact with Soviets and to assess their activities. The SSC Report states that: "AMLASH's real name was included in the list of names on the Mexico Station cable." This i§ used as a basis for a discussion in the SSC Final Report of why the inclusion of that name in the cable did not lead to the identification of the AMLASH operation. The treatment of this point in the SSC Final Report seems to rest on a misconception of the context in which the name of AMLASH/1 was mentioned. The reference had to do with a contact between a member of 23 oa.
about a press conference planned ¢ojq exico Ci  Siiemmmmanerigame 1901. Tt was not a report of a contact between AMLASH/1 and the Soviet, which was the subject of the inquiry; the name of AMLASH/1 could well have been omitted from the cable. In any event, the Je 1960 date preceded the inauguration of President Kennedy, which further removes the question from any relevance to the subject. There was no-reason to check the name. The presentation in the SSC Final Report is confusing and mislead- ing on this point. a Page 72 of the SSC Report refers to a July 1964 FBI report con- cerning a CIA meeting with AMLASH. The SSC Report states “that the purpose of those meetings had been to plan the assassination of Castro." This is the same FBI report that helped confirm the earlier turn-down of AMLASH/1 at the 29 October 1963 meeting (pages 14 and 15, this paper). While it stated that "there is now under discussion some plan to kill Fidel Castro" (July 1964) it badly mixes times and events. In any event, this aspect of the report substantially post-dates the death of President Kennedy, and is not directly relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry. 24
14-00000 ew ke ke ee eR eR Ke * - At page 75, the SSC Final Report quotes the testimony of the Chief, SAS Countérintell igence. His recollections are very uncertain. He is quoted specifically as saying that he could not recall the exact time frame, which is central to analysis of the operation, and speaks of his “vague recollections:: that the Fitzgerald meeting was related to an assassination plot against Castro. The SSC Report nevertheless gives this opiniony}full play despite the extensive guati fication as to its reliability. kkk eR RR Re ek At pages 68-75 of Book V of the SSC Final Report, consideration is given to what was known of the AMLASH operation by certain CIA employees, how they understood it, and what conclusions they could or should have drawn from what they knew. The treatment seems to accept as a premise that the relationship was an assassination plot throughout, and overlooks the basically inchoate quality of the relationship with AMLASH/1 during the period in question. | There will always be uncertainties in the developing relationship with political action assets; that such was the case with AMLASH/1 jis noted in the discussion above. In the present instance the uncertainties were recognized and clearly recorded, as well as the limits placed on positions that would be and were taken with AMLASH/1. [It is important to keep this in mind in considering the testimony of witnesses, 4s presented in the SSC Final Report. 25
14-00000 SECRET Different witnesses before the SSC would obviously view the AMLASH affair in different lights, the basis for their understanding relating to different levels of knowledge at different periods in time. What did they know in 1963, and what more did they learn under what circum- stances at a later date? What they testified to in 1975--perhaps on the basis of representations by SSC staff member's as to what it wasS--required quite a clear and precise treatment. The SSC Final Report did not accord the subject that treatment. ok eee ke ek ke At pages 78, 79 and 105 of the SSC Final Report reference is made to a Cuban exile designated as "A," who informed the FBI and CIA in mid-1965 of activities of AMLASH/1 in Cuba to eliminate Castro, and of his involvement with CIA. A careful reading of the SSC Report made it clear that "A" was unaware of AMLASH/1's 1963 associations with CIA. This information, reported in the context of the badly blurred time frame of the SSC Final Report, was given a significance that it did not otherwise have. First, the information was a year and a half after the death of President Kennedy. Further, the informant had no knowledge of the earlier period of CIA-AMLASH/1 relationships. When this is placed alongside the clear record of the inconclusive nature of the relationships in the 1963 period, it becomes something of an irrélevancy. It is noted that a footnote in the SSC Report, at this point, records the fact that the book of material given to Senator McGovern by Castro on persons who allegedly had plotted his 26
14-00000 assassination also contained no reference to that period, although AMLASH/1's later activities were cited. - kee Rw RR Rk we ke ke oe * It i$ useful to recap the sequence of events. The record shows that initially there was uncertainty as to what AMLASH/1 represented as a potential asset. There was early consideration of his defection, which changed to his possible use for intelligence purposes. As his self-discipline was assessed as being inadequate for this task it was determined that it was best for him to go it ‘alone, developing his own organization for whatever followed. The reservations that were held. concerning his qualities were reflected in the specifically conditional arms-length position taken with him during the period preceding President Kennedy's death. He had to succeed with his own program before he could expect support from the U.S. Eventually -- but not until after the death of President Kennedy -- firmer indications of Support were offered. Even then the volume of equipment promised was not large, especially to a man who claimed to have the “necessary people and equipment inside [Cuba] to accomplish (the) overthrow . +." The nature of the relationship never did firm up. As late as the fall of 1964 (page 77, Book V of the SSC Final Report) CIA was telling AMLASH/1 that tt could not be associated with his concept of the first step of a coup, which he viewed as requiring the death of Castro. While One can reason that any association with AMLASH/1 included association with all his plans, it nevertheless appears that those directly involved structured their thinking differently.
14-00000 Seer The Inspector General's report in 1967 treated the AMLASH operation in its study of assassination, as did the SSC Interim Report on Al teged Assassination Plots. - At the time of the 1967 IG report there was no issue of how to characterize the operation at different times, and the question was not addressed. Facing that question now, it is clear that however the operational relationship developed after the death of President Kennedy, it was unformed and without substance during his life. During that time it was not an assassination plot. The treatment of this question in the SSC Report is both imprecise and misleading. 28 . ~~ a “piu:
p FOR RELEASE 1993 Oyen FOR RELEASE! sn SPOT REVIEW PROGRAM MATERTALS FORWARDED TO WARREN COMMISSION AND FBI
14-00000 Volumé V of the SSC Final Report conveys an impression of limited effort by CIA in the course of the Warren Commission inquiry. As is noted in other annexes to the present report, CIA did seek and collect information in support of the efforts of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports. The following pages list reports and other papers submitted to the FBI (which had primary responsibility for the investigation) and to the Warren Commission. It is felt that this compilation is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort. | The lists fall into the following sections: E.1 Oissemination to the Intelligence Community E.2 Dissemination of Information to the Warren Commission E.3 Disseminations to the FBI on Rumors and Allegations —E.4 Memoranda to Warren Commission
14-00000 4 AGENCY SUPPORT TO THE FBI AND THE WARREN COMMISSION Information received from the Agency's field stations was dis- ' seminated -to appropriate agencies and departments as soon as possible after receipt. The following list of some 100 cabled disseminations, CSCI's, and memoranda were forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al. The listing covers the period from 10 Qctober 1963 through September 1964. Se AGENCY DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (FORMAL AND INFORMAL DISSEMINATIONS ™ I II . IT] *10 October 1963 DIR 74673 Catt 3 Mextce} "On 1 October 1963, a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico City reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City . Recipients: FBI, [&NS, Navy, State. [Warren Com- mission] ’ *24 October 1963 DIR 77978 ~WH/3/Mexies-) Request for two copies of most recent photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipients: Navy. [Warren Commission] » 23 November 1963 ‘DIR 34915 HAS) Information relating to telephone call on 28 Sep- tember 1963 to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI I ~' Document Date II ~- Document Number III - Originating Office * = An asterisk indicates that the document was also made available to the Warren Commission. erent
14-00000 ‘SEGRE 24 November 1963 TDCS-3/565 ,829 Subject: Cuban Precautions following Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipients: State/INR, State/DIR, DIA, Army/ACSI, Navy, Air, JCS, SECDEF, NSA, NIC, AID, USIA, OCI, ONE, OCR, ORR, 00, EXO. 25 November 1963 DIR 84950 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. . Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 DIR 8495] (CI/SIG) Agency requests information relating to OSWALD's Activities in Mexico City. Recipient: FBI 26 November 1963 CSCI- (WE/BC) Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message. Recipient: FBI. . 26 November 1963 — CSCI-3/2785826- (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of President Kennedy. Epfchoses trapparnip le- | ember \and 1 ‘and 3 October 1963. Recipient: FB8I. 26 November 1963 CSCI -347787629 (WH/3) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of _ President Kennedy. (Encloses transcripts of tele- ~ phone calls made by OSWALD or concerning OSWALD between 27 September and 3 October 1963). NB: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of the document in CI/SIG file No. 568. Recipient: FBI.
14-00000 26 November 1963 DIR 85069 ~ _ (WH/3) ° Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress- man to Texas on 26 November 1963. Recipient: FBI *26 November 1963 DIR 85089 (C/WH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 that “on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy ,in Mexico City". Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 26 November 1963 DIR 85176 (WH/3) J wwe Subject: Marina Nikolaeva OSWALD (q@giitIniummisimmssdasstiy OF” Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 26 November 1963 DIR 85177 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: eras Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) ” Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816. Recipient: FBI.
14-00000 EGRET 27 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 881 *  (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963. Recipient: FBI. *27 November 1963 DIR 85182 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. —— ee Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 27 November 1963 DIR 85195 (C/WH/3) United States Ambassador to Mexico requests passage of message to Secretary of State RUSK, Mr. McCONE, and Mr. HOOVER. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 27 November 1963 DIR 85196 (C/WH/3) ret Service Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Sec received copy. *27 November 1963 DIR 85199 (WH/3/Mexico) Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. , Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] 27 November 1963 DIR 85222 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact of Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI.
14-00000 * 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 wa November 1963 DIR 35246 (WH/3) Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Also relayed to S-RAPIGH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.) November 1963 DIR 85471 (C/WH/3) Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. November 1963 DIR 85573 _ ° (WH/3/Mexico) Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. November 1963 ~-Unnumbered (CI/S16) Information on Ernesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by tele- phone to S$. PAPTEH. Recipient: FBI. November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Recipient: FBI. November 1963 Unnumbered (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S—PAPTEM with regard to OSWALD's presence in New Orleans in September 1963. Recipient: FBI. November 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3) On 26 November 1963 a British journalist named John WILSON-HUDSON gave information to the American Em- bassy in London indicating that an "American gangster- type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. yan
14-00000 Cc : | SECRET *28 November 1963 DIR 85662 (C/WH/3) Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] *28 November 1963 DIR 85665 (C/WH/3) Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 CSCI-3/778 ,893 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipient: FBI. *29 November 1963 DIR 85666 Acting upon FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation and investigation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com- mission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85668 (WH/3/Mexico) Highlights from interrogation of Horacio DURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House- *29 November 1963 DIR 85670 (C/WH/3) Recipients: FBI, State, Commission] White House. [Warren Az eH oy ea aes ae he ate bo
14-00000 “SEC 29 Novembér 1963 DIR ~ 85676 . ~  (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Travel of Soviet diplomatic couriers. Recipient: FBI. *29 November 1963 DIR 85691 (C/WH/3) Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. . 29 November 1963 DIR 85714 (C/'WH/3) Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. *29 November 1963 DIR 85715 (WH/3/Mexico) Subject: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD (October 1959 to May 1962). Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85744 (C/WH/3) Interrogation of Gilbert ALVARADO Ugrate. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. *29 November 1963 DIR 85758 (WH/3/Mexico) Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and _ Horacio DURAN Navarro. ~ Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] SARS
14-00000 a ae *29 November 1963 DIR 85770 (C/WH/3) Séries of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum  (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S--PAPEGH concerning rumor that Oswald had made a bank deposit. 29 November 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with S--PAPEGH relaying the Director's suggestion that FBI check all bank accounts and safe deposit records in New Orleans, Fort Worth, and Dallas.. 30 November 1963 CSCI-3/778/894 Subject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination. Recipient: FBI. *30 November 1963 DIR 86063 (C/WH/3) Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte admits his story a fabrication. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 3 December 1963 DIR 86496 (C/WH/3) Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico. Recipient: FBI. *4 December 1963 DIR 86702 (C/WH/3) Travel information regarding OSWALD and his wife, June 1962. . Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service .” received copy. [Warren Commission]
14-00000 at 5 December 1963 DIR 87189 (C/WH/3) Known Soviet intelligence officer in New Delhi demanding full probe into assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. *§ December 1963 DIR 87520 (C/WH/3) Correction of DIR 87502. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] *7 December 1963 DIR 987667 . (C/WH/3/) Reinterrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission) 9 December 1963 DIR 87731 (WH/3/Mexico) Recipient: FBI. *9 December 1963 DIR 87796 (WH/3) ad mest : . cee Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum  (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with SRARIGH regarding identity of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8658 IN 75902). . Recipient: FBI. 11 December 1963 TDCSDB 3/658,408 Subject: Comments of Soviet official regarding (a) Moscow views on international situation following death of President Kennedy, and (b) resumption of disarmament talks. Recipients: General distribution. pedals & _ me wala § ,
a 12 December 1963 CSCI-3/779, 048 ~— (C/WH/3) Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON, John; WILSON, John Hudson. ) Recipient: FBI. *12 December 1963 DIR 88643 Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Presi- dent Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Com- mision] 12 December 1963 DIR 88682 (C/WH/3) Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 12 December 1963 DIR 88747 (C/WH/3) Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. *13 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,136 (C/WH/3) Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 16 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,135 (C/WH/3) Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on Kennedy Assassination. Recipient: FBI. *18 December 1963 DIR 89970 (C/WH/3) “Ww Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] Le ate igkcs SE
14-00000 *18 December 1963 DIR 89980 Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 19 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,225 Subject: Nomenclature of Weapon Possibly Owned by Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 19 December 1963 CSDB-3/658 ,870 (WH/Reports) Subject: a. Disagreements between Fidel CASTRO and Rauo ROA y Garcia. b. Probable Future Plan of Action for Carlos RAFAEL Rodriguez. Recipients: State (Miami) and others (not identified. 27 December 1963 — CS8CI-3/779,297 Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese). Recipient: FBI. 3 January 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone contact with $=-PAPEGH on 3 January 1964 regarding newspaper article appearing in E] Caribe on 27 November 1963 and possible connection with ALVARADO's interview in the U.S. Embassy on 26 November. Recipient: FBI. *10 January 1964 CSC1-3/779,482 (WH/3/Mexico) z Subject: Second Mexican Interrogation of Silvia DURAN. | Recipient: FBI. (Warren Commission] 1 Fm ha ia ine.
14-00000 Soe 14 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,510 (CI/SIG) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Regarding liaison with FBI and latter's handling of information from CIA.) Recipient: FBI. 27 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,729 (CI/SIG) Subject: Possible Relatives of Marina Nikolayevna OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 30 January 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SIG) Subject: Jack L. RUBY, Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 4 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,817 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information on names, addresses, and telephone numbers relating to the Soviet Union.) Recipient: FBI. 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0860 Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of John F. Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DDP 4-086) Memorandum for the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0862 Memorandum for the Chief, United States Secret Service. Subject: Assassination of President
—SECrET John F. Kennedy. (Verification of entry in “Historic Diary" relating to OSWALD's attempted suicide.) Recipient: Secret Service. [Copy to Warren Commission] 18 February 1964 DOP 4-0864 Memorandum for Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy - . Verification of Entry in “Historic Diary". Recipient: State. [Copy to Warren Commission] 20 February 1964 CSCI-3/779,988 | (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Information regarding SETYAEVA and RAHM.) Recipient: FBI. 22 February 1964 DIR 03101 (C/WH/3) Subject: a Recipient: White House (attention Secret Service). 1] March 1964 CSCI-3/780,344 Subject: Summary of Findings in Regard to Allegations by Mohamed REGGAB Relative to Marina OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780,612 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Photograph of an individual closely resembling QSWALD). Recipient: FBI. 16.April 1964 CSCI-3/780,996 (SR/CI/R) = Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. ’ Recipient: FBI. 20 April 1964 CSDB-3/660, 704 Subject: Plans by British and French to Publish BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination. Recipient: FBI (7?) ¢# iV ad
14-00000 aa ,. 23 wee ante 22 April 1964 CSCI -3/780,881 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Information regarding Lydia DYMITRUK.) Recipient: FBI. 30 April 1964 Unnumbered Memorandum (CI/SIG) Telephone Contact with S--PAPTTH on 29 November advising PAPLEH to contact S@ETFE of the Office of Security for information. 8 May 1964 DDP 4-2351 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI. 11 May 1964 ~ CSCI-3/781,172 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. - (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book belonging to Marina OSWALD.) Recipient: FBI. 13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781,282 (SR/CI/R) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.) Recipient: FBI. 1S May 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service -to the Assassination of President Kennedy. 14
13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,351 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information about the U-2. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission - DDP 4-2444] 19 May 1964 CSCI-3/781 , 386 Subject: Paul DIMITRIK (aka Pavel DIMITRUK). Recipient: Navy. 5 June 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,543 (CI/R8A) Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. ( RTE ana esa 10 June 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,841 (CI/R&A) Subject: Information Concerning Jack Ruby. Recipient: FBI. 29 June 1964 CSC1-3/782 , 058 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 2 July 1964 DOP 4-340] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 6 July 1964 DOP 4-3470 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. _Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and . “Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD ‘and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy. Recipient: Copy to FBI.
14-00000 SECRET 27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64 Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union. Recipient: FBI. 3 September 1964 ppp 4-4600 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 1 October 1964 . pop 4-5110 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Joachim JOESTEN. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 6 October 1964 CSCI-316/01446-64 " Nhe oe Subject: i en on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 23 October 1964 CSCI-316/01709-64 Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE. Recipient: FBI. 2? November 1964 CSCI-316/01779-64 Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in the Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. 23 December 1964 CSCI-316/02545-64 Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of Cuban Involvement in Assassination. - Recipient: FBI.
14-00000 € SECRET 27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64 Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Soviet Union. Recipient: FBI. 3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 1 October 1964 . ppp 4-5110 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Joachim JOESTEN. Recipient: Copy to FBI. 6 October 1964 , CSC1-316/01446-64 u [be the Subject: We soy on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 23 October 1964 CSCI-316/01709-64 Subject: Raymond F. FRIESECKE. Recipient: FBI. 2 November 1964 CSCI-316/01779-64 Subject: Testimony in the Warren Commission Report in the Assassination of President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. 23 December 1964 CSC1I-316/02545-64 Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of Cuban Involvement in Assassination. - Recipient: FBI.
14-00000 at 2 March 1965 CSCI-316/00925-65 Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investi- gation of Lee Harvy and Marina OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 8 April 1965 *CSCI-316/01398-65 Subject: Correspondence to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico ' City. Recipient: FBI. [Copy to Secret Service] 30 June 1965 CSCI-316/02654-65 Subject: Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. 2 September 1966 CSCI-316/04482-66 Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey QSWALD's Intourist Guide in Moscow. Recipient: FBI. 9 May 1967 CSCI-316/02153-67 Subject: BEAUBOVEFF apparently to be used as a pawn by Jim GARRISON to show that OSWALD was a CIA agent and was to be used to assassinate Fidel CASTRO. GARRISON alleges he has letters signed by CIA representatives or by Senator Robert KENNEDY authorizing certain Americans to work with Cubans for the assassination of CASTRO. This memroandum is intended to record that such letters never existed and therefore could not be in GARRISON's possession. Recipient: FBI. 14 June 1967 CSCI-316/02669-67 Subject: Allegations of Unidentified Woman Regarding * Mario GARCIAS et al. Recipient: FBI
14-00000 af 24 July 1967 CSCI-316/03243-67 Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican newsman, that OSWALD visited UNAM Campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. CONTRERAS' statement of dubious credibility; information passed to Mexican authorities. Recipient: FBI. 7 May 1968 CSCI-316/01678-68 Subject: Promotional Literature Concerning the Alleged Assassination Conspiracy of JFK Written and Mailed by Joachim JOESTEN in Support of District Attorney Jim GARRISON's Allegations. Recipient: FBI. 16 September 1969 CSCI-316/03323-69 Subject: Charles William THOMAS. Recipient: FBI. DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS TO CI STAFF Since CI Staff held the Agency's official file on OSWALD, all cable traffic (theoretically) including disseminations by cable was sent to the Staff for filing in the official file. Ad- ditionally, cables disseminations were released by CI/Liaison. Copies were, therefore, available to the Staff. Since CI Staff released all long-form CSCI's, coordinated on short-form CSCI's, and maintained the CSCI log, the CI Staff received copies of all CSCI's. DISSEMINATION OF MATERIAL TO THE WARREN COMMISSION 13 December 1963 [Commission Document No. 100] Memorandum Subject: Analysis of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination. (Supplied by A. W. OULLES.) 18
14-00000 sechtT to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. QUT Message No. 97520, dated 6 December 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. . OUT Message No. 85715, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. OUT Message No. 85182, dated 22 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. OUT Message No. 85665, dated 28 November 1963, to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. *3 April 1964 DOP 4-1699 [Commission Document No. 710] 6 April “ery 7 April Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Richard Thomas GIBSON. Attachment: OUT Message No. 89970, dated 18 December 1963, to White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 1964 DOP 4-1739 [Commission Document No. 708] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Reply to Questions Contained in Your Memo- randum dated 12 March 1964. (“Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Files") 1964 DOP 4-1787 (Commission Document No. 726] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN After Her First Interrogation.
SECRET 7 April 1964 DDP 4-1786 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Mohammed REGGAB. 20 April 1964 DOP 4-1997 [Commission Document No. 817] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, J. Lee RANKIN. ote 21 April 1964 Letter from Raymond G. ROCCA to Mr. Samuel A. STERN. Attachment: CSDB 3/660,704 (Plans of British and ‘French Publishing Firms to Publish the Thomas BUCHANAN Articles on Assassination of President Kennedy. ) 24 April 1964 DOP 4-2099 [Commission Document No. 844] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lydia DIMYTRUK; Acquaintance of Marina OSWALD. 29 April 1964 DOP 4-2160 [Commission Document No. 871] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. SUBJECT: Photograph of Lee Harvey OSWALD. 4 May 1964 DOP 4-2256 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. 6 May 1964 DOP 4-2296 (Commission Document No. 902] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Criteria for Dissemination of Information to : the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central ' Intelligence Agency Relative to Presidential Protection. 8 May 1964 DOP 4-235] [Commission Document No. 911] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, ODP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook.
14-00000 ATE 13 May 1964 DDP 4-2444 [Commission Document No. 931] Memorandum for the Director, -Federal Bureau of Investigation. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Informa- tion about the U-2. (CSCI-3/781,351 - copy to Warren Commission] 15 May 1964 [Commission Document No. 935] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy. [Copy to FBI] 19 May 1964 DOP 4-2533 [Commission Document No. 944] *19 May *22 May Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. - Subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates; Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas; Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens’ Travel to and from Cuba. 1964 DOP 4-2534 [Commission Document No. 943] Memorandum from Righard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Allegations of Pfc. Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S. Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi- dent Kennedy. Attachment: QUT Message No. 85770, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 1964 DDP 4~-2624 [Commission Document No. 971] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States fmbassy in Canberra, Australia, Relative to Planned =: Assassination of President Kennedy. Attachment: OUT Message No. 85691, dated 29 November 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 25
27 May 1964 DOP 4-2688 [Commission Document No. 985] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy. Attachment: OUT Message No. 87796, dated 9 December 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with a copy to the Secret Service. 27 May 1964 DOP 4-2692 (Commission Document No. 990] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, ODP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Discussion between Chairman KHRUSHCHEY and Mr. Drew PEARSON Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD. 1 June 1964 DOP 4-2741 (Commission Document No. 1000] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, ODP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Attachments: OUT Message No. 85089, dated 26 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. QUT Message No. 85199, dated 27 November 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. QUT Message No. 85662, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. QUT Messagé No. 86063, dated 30 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. QUT Message No. 85666, dated 28 November 1963, relative to Gilberto ALVARADO. QUT Message No. 87667, dated 7 December 1963; subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Memorandum, dated 12 December 1963; subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. 3 June 1964 DOP 4-2764 [Commission Document No. 101] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by = the Soviet Government. 3 June 1964 DOP 4-2770 (Commission Document No. 1012] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject. George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILOT. 26 “SECRET
SEGRET Sn June 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. 5 June 1964 DOP 4-2844 [Commission Document No. ’ Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training School in Minsk, USSR. 10 June 1964 DOP 4-2922 (Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates. *12 June 1964 ODP 4-2988 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of Prasident Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. Attachment: OUT Message No. 88643, dated 12 December 1963, to the White House, Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 19 June 1964 DOP 4-3169 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques. 26 June 1964 DOP 4-3366 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Soviet Brainwashing Techniques 29 June 1964 DDP 4-3347 [Commission Document No. " Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. {Copy to the FBI.] 1041] 1054] 1089] 1131] 1188]
S 1 July 1964 DOP 4~3389 (Commission Document No. MeniOrandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD's Arrival Time in Helsinki on 10 October 1959. 2 July 1964 DOP 4-3401 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD (Remarks by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV). [Copy to the FBI.] 6 July 1964 DDP 4-3470 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Statements Reportedly Made by George and Jeanne de MOHRENSCHILDT Concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD and the Assassination of President Kennedy. (Copy to the FBI.] 22 July 1964 POP 4-3712 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Apparent Inconsistencies in Material Fur- nished the Commission by CIA and the Department of State. 23 July 1964 DDP 4-3769 [Commission Document No. Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Attachment: Affidavit respecting origin and circum- stances of a photograph of an unknown individual furnished by this Agency to the FBI on 22 November 1963. 23 July 1964 DDP 4-3770 = Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. '- Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Attachments: Translation (original documents included.) 28 1201] 1216] 1222] 1273] 1287]
“(SECRET 31 July 1964 DDP 4-3916 [Commission Document No. 1358] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to d. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 1964. 7 August 1964 DOP 4-4037 [Commission Document No. 1356] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Soviet Hunting Societies. 28 August 1964 DOP 4-4479 [Commission Document No. 1443] Memorandum from Thomas H. KARAMESSINES, ADDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY. 31 August 1964 DOP 4-458) Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City. 3 September’ 1964 DDP 4-4600 [Document No. 50, List 2] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, ODP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplies by the Cuban Government. [Copy to the FBI] 14 September 1964 ODP 4-4775 [Commission Document No. 1483] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Length of Time Required for Obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in WesterpEurope in 1964. 11 September 1964 DDP 4-4793 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, ODP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the «Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency. 11 September: 1964 DOP 4-4794 (Commission Document No. 1479] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Certain Questions Posed by the State Depart- ment Files. (Revised) (Attachment to CD No. 1479) 29 “SEOREL
18 22 17 SECRET. September 1964 DOP 4-4847 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: COmmunications from the Department of State. September 1964 DOP 4-4848 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. gee Seeeedeniemhneiiiiesinteeentesieeee, SC September 1964 DOP 4-4850 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, ODP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Passport and Visa Office. September 1964 DDP 4-4873 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Intourist Hotels in Moscow. September 1964 DOP 4-4982 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey OSWALD's Application for a Cuban Visa. September 1964 DOP 4-4886 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Resettlement of U.S. Defectors in the USSR. September 1964 DDP 4-4921 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Silvia Tirado Bazan de DURAN. September 1964 DOP 4-4922 * Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. .Subject: Eusebio AZQUE [sic - AZCUE] - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City. 31
18 September 1964 DDP*.4~4952 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Lee Harvey OSWLAD. (Information regarding OSWALD's stay in Helsinki.) 18 September 1964 DDP 4-4953 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI Photograph No. 0D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625). 1 October 1964 DOP 4-5110 {[Conmission Document No. 1532] . Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Joachim JOESTEN. [Copies to FBI, I&NS, State] 13 October 1964 DDP 4-§275 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Publication of Documents Furnished to the Commission by the Gentral Intelligence Agency. 16 October 1964 DOP 4-5334/1 Memorandum for The President's Committee on the Warren Commission Report. Subject: CIA's Role in the Support of Presidential Foreign Travel. 20 October 1964 ODP 4-534] {Commission Document No. 1545] Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. 29 October 1964 DOP 4-5558 ' Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. ' Subject: Transmittal of OCR Publication: "Foreign _ Press Reaction to the Warren Report", and Follow-Up Report, dated 22 October 1964. 32
AGENCY DISSEMINATIONS TO THE FBI ET AL REGARDING RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS REGARDING PRESIDENT KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. ge ‘ 10 October 1963 — DIR 74673 Lee Harvey OSWALD, Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City, 1 October 1963. Recipients: FBI, I[&NS, State, White House. 23 November 1963 DIR 84915 . _..... —— Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 DIR 84950 Subject: Silvia T. DURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic ~ Consulate] in Mexico City; Contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 25 November 1963 DIR 84951 CIA requests information relating to OSWALD's ac- tivities in Mexico City (from FBI interrogation of OSWALD). Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 - Subject: Reported Anonymous Telephone Message. Recipient: 26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,826 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Suspected Assassin of . President Kennedy. _ Recipient: FBI.
14-00000 26 November 1963 CSCI-3/778,829 Subject: Same as above. (Comment: This dissemination may be identical with CSCI~-3/778,826. The above CSCI number appears to be the correct one, according to a copy of the docu- ment , ¢-GL/ST4—Fi tenes 568, Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 DIR 85069 Subject: Travel of Pro-Communist Costa Rican Congress- man to Texas on 26 November 1963. Representatives of this Agency in Costa Rica suspect that Julio SUNOL Leal, pro-Communist, pro-Castro deputy to the Costa Rican National Assembly, will try to gather data in Texas to use in pro-conmunist-pro-Castro propaganda in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. “oes Recipient: FBI. ea 26 November 1963 DIR 85089 Gilberto ALVARADO, a professed Castroite Nicaraguan, stated to U.S. Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 [sic - 25 November 1963] that “on 18 September 1963 he saw Lee Harvey OSWALD receive six thousand five hundred dollars in a meeting inside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City." Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received a copy. [Warren Commission] 26 November 1963 DIR 85176 Subject: Marina Nikolaevna OSWALD ( ¢atttmimitnmeetemee Recipients: FBI, State, White House ; Secret Service received copy. 26 November 1963 “DIR 85177 ee eee Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy.
26 November 1963 Unnumbered Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10815. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered Subject: HUNTER Report No. 10816. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 Unnumbered Subject: Passage of IN 68291 from Mexico City to the White House. (OSWALD's reported presence in Mexico City on 18 September 1963.) Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 CSCI-3/778, 881 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD, Soviet Activities in sees Mexico City, 18 - 24 November 1963. Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 DIR 85182 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. On 23 November, Richard Thomas GIBSON, an American living in Switzerland, who was acquainted with OSWALD, made statements regarding latter to a close friend in Bern. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. (Warren Commission] 27 November 1963 DIR 85196 Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 27 November 1963 DIR 85199 Information solicited from Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission]. 35
27 November 1963 DIR 85222 Subject: Silvia T. OURAN, Mexican Employee of the Cuban Embassy [sic - Consulate] in Mexico City, contact with Lee Harvey OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 26 November 1963 DIR 85246 ee eee Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- | ceived copy. (Also relayed to-S<-PAPICH of the FBI by CI Staff on 27 November 1963.) 27 November 1963 DIR 85471 Subject: Rearrest of Silvia DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 DIR 85573 Information from U.S. Ambassador MANN for Secretary of State RUSK regarding Ambassador HERNANDEZ, Cuban Am- bassador to Mexico, and Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered Information on Arnesto RODRIGUEZ relayed by telephone to Sr-PAPEGH. Recipient: FBI. 27 November 1963 Unnumbered ad Recipient: FBI. - 28 November 1963 DIR 85657 _ wv on 26 November a British journalist qammunmbemeREpOre> of occu! ave information to the American Embassy in
SECRET London indicating that an “American gangster type named RUBY" visited Cuba around 1959. . Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 28 November 1963 DIR 85662 Further interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 28 November 1963 DIR 85665 Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 CSCI~3/778 ,893 Subject: Interrogation of Silvia Tirado de DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipient: FBI. 29 November 1963 DIR 85666 Acting upon an FBI request, the Agency requests ALVARADO be turned over to Mexican authorities for additional interrogation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85668 Highlights from the interrogation of Horacio OURAN Navarro and his wife, Silvia Tirado de DURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. 29 November 1963 DIR 85670 37 SECHET,
=S6thET que ee Ghee Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85691 Series of anonymous telephone calls to the office of the Naval Attache in Canberra, Australia, by a man claiming to have knowledge about a Soviet plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service re- ceived copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85714 Release of Silvia DURAN for second time on 28 November. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 OIR 985744 Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. 29 November 1963 DIR 85758 Translation of interrogation of Silvia DURAN and Horacio DURAN Navarro. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 DIR 85770 Series of incidents which have produced a report alleging advance information on assassination. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 29 November 1963 Unnumbered memorandum | Telephone contact with Sc~PAPECH concerning rumor that OSWALD had made a bank deposit. Recipient: FBI. 38
_SEGREF- 30 November 1963 CSCI~3/778,894 Sabject: Article in 29 November 1963 issue of Washington Post suggesting two men involved in assassination. Recipient: FBI. 30 November 1963 DIR 86063 Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte Admits his story a fabrication. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] 3 December 1963 DIR 86496 Information relating to OSWALD's presence in Mexico. Recipient: FBI. 7 December 1963 DIR 87667 Re-interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO concluded. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 DIR 87731 9 December 1963 DIR 87796 Letter mailed in Stockholm on 25 November 1963 alleging assassination arranged by Communist Chinese. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] 9 December 1963 Unnumbered Memorandum Telephone contact with $—RAREGH regarding identity of a source who claims plot to assassinate Kennedy prepared _ and executed jointly by the Communist Chinese and Cubans .= through intermediaries. (See JMWAVE 8@88, IN 75902.) ‘. Recipient: FBI. 12 December 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 Subject: WILSON, Carlos John (also: WILSON-HUDSON, John; WILSON, John Hudson.) Recipient: FBI. 39 “Cowie
12 16 18 . 27 thE December. 1963 DIR 88643 Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy Sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. [Warren Commission] December 1963 DIR 88682 (ite iin as stort we Recipients; PBT gtates White Houre, 7 December 1963 DIR 88747 Subject: Second Interrogation of Silvia OURAN. Recipients: FBI, State, White House. December 1963 CSCI-3/779 136 Subject: Mexican Interrogation of Gilberto ALVARADO. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] December 1963 A CSCI-3/779,135 Subject: web Ne: Comments on Kennedy Assassination. Recipient: FBI. December 1963 DIR 89970 Further Information on Richard Thomas GIBSON. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] December 1963 DIR 89980 Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN after her first interrogation. Recipients: FBI, State, White House; Secret Service received copy. [Warren Commission] December 1963 CSCI-3/779,297 Subject: Assassination of President Kennedy (arranged by the Cuban Government and the Communist Chinese). Recipient: FBI.
SECRET, ~ 11 March 1964 CSCI-3/780 ,344 b a Subject: mC, un Recipient: FBI. 20 March 1964 CSCI=3/780,612 Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (Photograph of an individual closely resembling OSWALD. ) . Recipient: FBI. 16 April 1964 CSCI-3/780 ,881 a Subject: Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. CEN Recipient: FBI. 8 May 1964 — DOP 4-2357 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. Recipient: Copy of attachment forwarded to FBI. (Warren Commission] 11 May 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,172 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Traces on Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an address book belonging to Marina OSWALD. ) Recipient: FBI. 13 May 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,282 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. (Identification of photographs sent to CIA by FBI.) Recipient: FBI. 15 May 1964 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Role of Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of the Service to the Assassi- nation of President Kennedy. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 43 EHET
a | SECRET. 5 June 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,543 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. Eee a cae ee peereraniersaacdl Fe assis ccihmeenenmnmemnmamemmnnt! Recipient: FBI. 10 June 1964 CSCI-3/781 ,841 Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY. Recipient: FBI. 29 June 1964 CSC1-3/782 ,085 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. , Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 2 July 1964 DDP 4-340) Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DDP, to J. Lee RANKIN. (Remarks made by Soviet Consul Pavel Antonovich YATSKOV. } Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 27 August 1964 CSCI-316/00856-64 Subject: No Indication of Subject's Defection Having Been Used for Propaganda by the Cuban Government. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 3 September 1964 DDP 4-4600 Memorandum from Richard HELMS, DOP, to J. Lee RANKIN. Subject: OSWALD Documents Supplied by the Cuban Government. Recipient: FBI. [Warren Commission] 6 October 1964 Dy CSCI-316/01446-64 . ov '. Subject:” ¥IABUCT Interview on 9 September 1964; His Comments on Seven Photographs Forwarded by the FBI. Recipient: FBI. 44 SECRET,
“Stthet™ 23 December 1964 CSCI-316/02545-64 Subject: Allegation of Unidentified Scientist of Cuban Involvement in Assassination. Recipient: FBI. 2 March 1965 CSC 1-316/00925-65 Subject: Marvin KANTOR, Possible Connection with Investigation of Lee Harvey and Marina OSWALD. Recipient: FBI. 30 June 1965 CSCI-316/02654-65 Subject: Silvia DURAN. Recipient: FBI. 2 September 1966 CSCI-316/04482-66 Subject: Rima ZMITROOK, Lee Harvey OSWALD's In- tourist Guide in Moscow. Recipient: FBI. 14 June 1967 CSC 1-316/03243-67 Subject: Allegation of Oscar COUNTRERAS, Mexican Newsman, That OSWALD Visited UNAM Campus Shortly After the Cuban Embassy Refused Him a Visa to Visit Cuba. CONTRERAS' Statement of Dubious Credibility; Information Passed to Mexican au- thorities. MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY CIA TO THE WARREN COMMISSION ON RUMORS AND ALLEGATIONS RE- LATING 10 THE PRESIDENTS ASSASSINATION 31 January 1964 Subject: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963. 45
5 March 1964 ee. ..rrCrrs=i‘CeS 18 March 1964 Subject: Article Alleging that OSWALD was interviewed by CIA in Moscow. _ 31 March 1964 DOP 4-1655 Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD. Enclosures include the following: Teletype Message No. 87515, 29 November 1963 - paragraph g - Marina SNETHLAGE. Teletype Message No. 85182, 22 November 1963 - Remarks made by Richard Thomas GIBSON. Teletype Message No. 85665, 28 November 1963 - Remarks Made by Maria SNETHLAGE and Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Em- bassy in The Hague. 3 April 1964 DOP 4-1699 \ ve Subject: ii ire g 7 April 1964 DOP 4-1784 \ whic a, 4 May 1964 DOP 4-2256 Subject: Additional Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. “A survey of Agency files indicates that all... information known to the Agency on OSWALD's association (with communists or criminals, either in United States or abroad) has been made available to the Commission." 8 May 1964 DOP 4-235] Subject: Marina OSWALD's Notebook. (Compilation of traces on what appear to be Soviet names, addresses, and telephone numbers from an ad- . dress book identified by Marina OSWALD as belonging to her.)
-dnghbte 15 May 1964 Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy. 19 May 1964 DOP 4-2534 Subject: Allegations of PFC Eugene B. DINKIN, U.S. Army, Relative to Assassination Plot Against Presi- dent Kennedy. 22 May 1964 DOP 4-2624 Subject: Anonymous Telephone Calls to United States - Embassy in Canberra, Australia; Relative to Planned Assassination of President Kennedy. 27 May 1964 DOP 4-2688 Subject: Letter Accusing the Chinese Communists of Plotting the Assassination of President Kennedy. (Comment: Letter received at U.S. Embassy, Stockholm. ] June 1964 DOP 4-2741 Subject: Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte. Enclosures: Out Teletype No. 85089, 26 November 1963. Out Teletype No. 85199, 27 November 1963. Out Teletype No. 85662, 28 November 1963. Out Teletype No. 85666, 28 November 1963. Out Teletype No. 86063, 30 November 1963. Out Teletype No. 87667, 7 December 1963. Memorandum, 12 December 1963, Interroga- tion of Gilberto ALVARADO. 3 June 1964 | DOP 4-2769 . Subject: Documents on Lee Harvey OSWALD Furnished by ‘the Soviet Government. 4 June 1964 DOP & Subject: Information Developed on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. 47 re
10 June 1964 Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates. 12 June 1964 Subject: Letter Relative to Assassination of President Kennedy sent to United States Embassy in Costa Rica. 29 June 1964 DOP 4-3347 Subject: Investigation of Allegation that OSWALD was in Tangier, Morocco. 2 July 1964 DOP 4-3401 Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. 28 August 1964 DOP 4-4479 Subject: Konstantin Petrovich SERGIEVSKY. 15 September 1964 DDP 4-4808 Subject: Information Concerning Jack RUBY (aka Jack RUBENSTEIN) and His Associates. 17 September 1964 DOP 4-4839 Subject: Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV. 17 September 1964 DOP 4-4922 Subject: Eusebio AZQUE - Former Cuban Consul, Mexico City. 18 September 1964 ODP 4-4953 - Subject: Identification of Persons Appearing in FBI ' Photograph No. D 33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625).
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