HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM , territorial administrator in the local power structure, However, the bureaucrats progres- sively have had their revenge, Now, nearly everywhere, these positions are filled by career civil servants, Like their colleaguesin the central administration, they are "anti- politician'' and view their task, like the Bel- gians before them, as one of maintaining peace and order, and supporting the local economy. These values are to be cherished in the period immediately ahead, especially where "politics" in the. countryside has meant civil disobedience, ethnic hostility, andnon-payment of taxes, The method of nominating territorial admin- _istrators has had important implications for the balance of power between the center and the provinces, assign a functionary from the central govern- ment to a province, which would post him in turn to a district, whence he would be assigned to a territory, The province, however, had the final authority in naming theterritorial admin- istrators."This procedure after independence took on entirely new meaning. The provinces assumed the right to name the African re- placements for the departed European civil servants. Thus the key to exercise of power in the countryside, the territorial adminis- trator, was beholden to the province, and not to the central government. Lumumba recog- nized the importance of this, and in some areas tried to intervene in the nomination process, But he was unable to impose his own choices, One result was an ethnic unscrambling of the territorial service, The provinces had every incentive to install local persons in the top slots. Where there was some ethnic integration, it was always within the confines of a region, For example, MNC/L-dominated Orientale Province prided itself on its refusal to follow tribal criteria, But the nature of parties in that area meant that political criteria gave a similar result. Thus all the MNC/L- appointed administrators came from _ the MNC/L zone of Orientale, and the Batetela- Bakusu areas, The PSA also ruled that no territorial administrator could serve in his home territory in Kwilu. But the other side of the coin was that the candidate had to come from within the Kwilu District, The Circonscriptions Indigénes A profile of the structure of the Congolese polity would be incemplete without reference to the very local administrative structures, the circonscriptions indigenes (CI's, sometimes called "sectors'), The surprising solicity of these institutions stood in sharp contract to the breakdown of government at the top levels during the dark days of 1960-1961, Their stability provided a significant buffer against widespread chaos in the countryside. The colonial practice was to’ 23 'Build-from-the-ground-up'' was a Belgian policy axiom. The commune is the hero of _ Belgian history, Medieval townsmen asserted the rights of the people against the foreign feudal overlords, Thus there is a veritable mystique about the innate virtue of local institutions, In the. Congo this value was in complete harmony with colonial convenience: let there be local institutions; let our wards learn first to handle the humdrum problems of streets and sewers before they are per- mitted to taste the delights of policy-making on a grand scale, For this reason, the first meaningful institutional reforms with a view toward decolonization were decrees in 1957 providing for elected councils in both urban and rural areas, In the cities the reform has been of less lasting value because of particular urban circumstances, Structurally, the town com- munes were established on a Eurafrican basis, with paritary European representation, Pari- tarism ‘ceased to be relevant in July 1960, but the legal structure remains unchanged, More importantly, the initial municipal elec- tions attracted a larger number of the African political elite, However, new opportunities sub- sequently arose at much higher levels, and able individuals deserted the municipal organs of government, But such was not the case in the country- side, The indirectly elected councils were grafted ontothe administrative circonscription structures which had been developed over a long period, The chiefs selected by the councils were rural in orientation. Very few were tempted by the electoral campaign of 1960, Thus there was a substantial continuity in personnel at this level, Further, the functions exercised were not new, and a considerable backlog of experience already had been acquired by most. The CI's have been the effective capillaries of modern government, The territorial centers are equipped with the external symbols of administration: a respect- able office building, several permanent functionaries, typewriters, files, account books, and a treasury. They have auxiliary agricultural monitors, who work under the supervision of the more highly trained agri- cultural officer posted in the territories, Also present is a tribunal, and usually a marketplace, -As any officer in the terri- torial service will tell a visitor, "If the territories and the CI's function, the whole country can function,'' Only in the Bas-Congo was there a systematic political purge at the CI level; elsewhere the continuity was re- markable, What Belgium really sought to do thoroughly in the way of political construction was done with competence. The local institu- tions remain a credit to the colonizer, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld:32626336 Page 32
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Belgian Personnel _A handful of Belgian functionaries stayed throughout: the crisis period of 1960. Be- ginning in the’fall of 1960, a certain number. responded to appeals by central and prov- incial authorities to return. At the moment of independence there were 10,000 Belgian civil servants, not.counting Belgians with the vast parastatal organizations or the 8,000 lay teachers, In January 1961 the Congo em- ployed only 2,268 Belgian civil servants (in- cluding 1,168-in Katanga), By early 1963 the total was 1,590. None of the Belgians occupies a position in the command hierarchy of the administration. ‘They are attached as ''tech- nicians" or 'advisers,'' mainly withthe central’ government, former Equateur Province, and Katanga. Their role has a thousand variations, de-- pending upon the personalities of the Europeans and Congolese involved and their working relationships. In a number of ministries the Belgian technicians visibly perform a great deal of the important work; in others, they are. assigned to tedious tasks. The feeling is widespread among them that they are not being used effectively. The Judiciary A non-political organ of government, the ' judiciary was extremely hard hit by the 1960 exodus, In large. parts administration of justice simply stopped. The judicial system has two branches, modern. and traditional, The latter, which operates at the circonscription indigéne level and judges by customary law, generally con- tinued to operate. However, the maximum penalty which could be imposed by a tradi- tional court was one month imprisonment, or a fine of 1,000 francs, Serious offenses and infractions of written law had to be judged - by the modern courts. The modern judiciary began at the ter- ritorial echelon, There the territorial admin- istrator sits as judge (and prosecutor) in cases involving penalties not exceeding two months or 2,000 francs, The lowest echelon with professional magistrates was the District Court, which could sentence to five years and judge civil suits up to a value of 50,000 francs,. The old- provincial capitals had a Tribunal of First Instance, with general penal and civil competence. Finally, Appeals Courts ‘operated at Leopoldville and Elisabethville. In 1959 the modern jurisdictions had a total of 168 magistrates and were considered seri- ously understaffed. Following the continental model, the magistrates were in part assigned to the bench (magistrats assis) and partly to the office of the public prosecutor (magis- trats débouts), These departed almosttoaman of the Congo the. 24 in July 1960 (except from Katanga). Curiously, the judiciary was one field where there was no pressure for Africanization. The Belgian magistrature had a tradition of independence and integrity. Congolese na- tionalists expressed no desire to purge the judiciary as they did the civil service, nor did the Congolese court clerks demand im- mediate promotions, They knew all too well that a bench without an executive to protect its independence and carry out its sentences was an unrewarding hot seat, Gradually the Congolese employees of the. judicial system were named auxiliary judges, In some cases” they hear cases; in others, they maintain the records of the public prosecutor's of- fice, : A few Belgian magistrates returned to reopen some tribunals, Beginning in 1962, UN-recruited magistrates from Greece, Haiti, the UAR, Syria, and Lebanon began arriving. . The target of 50 qualified magistrates has never been reached, however, and the whole” structure operates by fits and starts, There can be no long-term solution until at least 1964, when the Ford Foundation-sponsored. Ecole Nationale de Droit et d'Administration begins graduating 60 Congolese magistrates a year, Conclusions \ In sur, the heavily, bureaucratic tradition of the Belgian colonial system has left an indelible mark on the Congolese state, For all its shortcomings, the bureaucracy is a crucial element in the political system. Es- pecially in the countryside, the position of the territorial service is paramount, To be sure, the administrators are handicapped by com- munications problems and by their own limi- tations in training and policy-making experi- ence, But there are no effective challengers to the power they hold, The Hmits of their authority are the limits of effective organi- zation of the political society. . At the center, decision-making and initia-— tion of policy are not really in the hands of the bureaucracy, But the limits of the capacity or desire of the civil service to carry out policy are the boundaries of the effectiveness of government, Political ideologies never took root in the Congo, and there is accordingly no alternative offered for the Belgian-instilled administrative criteria of good government: public order and increased production. / At the same time, the bureaucracy poses some vexing problems. It has won for itself a level of remuneration beyond the capacity of the country to pay. The Congo cannot be viable until some adjustment takes place in the pay scale, perhaps through a depreciation in the Congolese franc. As one observer has wryly commented, the once-militant civil serv- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM HW 49061 Docld:326263356 Page 33
% HW 49061 DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM °° ice union, APIC, will no doubt undergo "pro- found modifications'' in outlook, as "for the first time since its creation, its objectives seem to. be fully realized," formula must be found for absorbing the emergent university generation ‘into the civil | ~- service, But this should not obscure the real merits of the bureaucracy. The failure of thetransfer of power left the clerks with the sudden re- sponsibility of managing a vast, complex coun- try.. What is remarkable is that so many. of the routine administrative functions were continued in the central administration, and Also -a .better™ 25. _ public order, that trator in many territories the new adminis- maintained a reasonable degree of Perhaps thie explanation for the lack of _revolutionary social credo to accompany the ‘revolutionary power transfer-lies in the bu- reaucratic origins of the Congolese elite. The administrator is not by naturea revolutionary.’ His rationale is the governance, not the transformation, of society. The political, pro- gram of the bureaucratic elite in the Congo was the Africanization. of .the administration, not a root-and-branch remaking of colonial society. SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM ‘Page 34
HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM _ POLITICS AND PARTIES: THE PROSPECTS AND RISKS OF ELECTIONS IN 1964 | .The Fragile Roots of Nationalism The most fundamental characteristic of the nationalist movement in the Congo is the lateness of its emergence, Throughout British and French colonial Africa national political parties were beginning to function by the end of World War II, In the Congo overt political movements began only in 1957 and were not ‘launched in earnest until 1959, Lack of ex- perience is-a trait common to all Congolese political parties. This difference between the Congo andother ‘parts of independent Africais largely explained by the character of the Belgianadministration, which was highly authoritarian compared with its British and French counterparts, For ex- ample, a vigorous and colorful African press dates back to 1858 in Ghana. In the Ivory Coast, L'Eclaireur_de la Cote d'Ivoire was launched in 1935, On the other hand, the first independent Congolese papers, Quinze and Con- go, began only in 1957 and were quickly sup- pressed, Although political action was not unrestricted in British and French colonies, . it was recognized from the end of World War II as legitimate in a broadening area. In the Congo, African (or even European) politi- cal movements were prohibited, as indeed was any kind of political activity. The low level of political sophistication of the elite and absence of an awakening sense of nationalism among the mass made it possible for the Belgian authorities to forestall any African nationalist movement. ; The complete isolation from external in- fluences of the Congolese elite was another key factor, For decades the emerging elite in British and French Africa had been educated in the universities of France, Britain, and the United States. The leaders knew one another, at least within the confines of the English and French linguistic barriers, The latter group had years of working together in the French National Assembly, one of the world's toughest political schools, In the Congo the contrast was stark. Before the Brussels Exposition in 1958, literally only a handful of Congolese had travelled abroad. At that time there were only 15 Congolese students overseas, mostly at Louvain Uni- versity, Rigid censorship was maintained on all material entering the Congo, External events did not begin really influencing the Congo until the independence of Ghana in 1957, The Bandung Conference, for example, had passed unnoticed. The year 1958 was a turning point. In that year, Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Ngalula (now Sud-Kasai President) attended the All- African People's Conference in Ghana. General de Gaulle's speech in Brazzaville in August 1958, announcing that independence was avail- able for the asking, had sharp repercussions across the river in Leopoldville. The Brussels Exposition provided an opportunity for large numbers of educated Congolese to visit Europe. In the first decade following World War H, however, both the Belgians and the Congolese considered that the most important issue con- fronting the colony was the status satisfaction of the new elite. Colonial debate focused on the 'immatriculation"' card (a device to grant Africans limited access to certain privileges reserved to Europeans), equal status in the civil service, and discrimination. Mrs. Paul Robeson, after a session with Leopoldville's African elite during her 1947 African tour commented, ''The évolués did not seem visibly interested in independence, nor emancipation, They were unaware of what was going on in thé world," 16 There was no explicitly nationalist statement of a comprehensive character until the Con- science Africaine Manifesto of August 1956, a document of Catholic antecedents, This pro- ’ voked an almost immediate riposte by the Al- liance des Bakongos (Abako) of the Bas- Congo; which for the first time used the slogan of "immediate independence.'' The next major statement was Joseph Kasavubu's inaugural speech as burgomaster of Dendale commune in Leopoldville in April 1958, The word "in- dependence'' was not publicly uttered beyond the confines of Leopoldville untilafter the riots there in January 1959, The Messianic Sects Symptomatic of the high degree of frustra- tion with the colonial situation and the lack of a nationalist outlet for these feelings. was the prevalence of radical messianic sects, These - are a synthesis of pre-nationalist expressions 26 of social discontent and traditional ritual symbols, both animistic and Christian.. Al- though syncretistic sects are found throughout tropical Africa, their activity has been most intense in the southern third of the continent, There, conflict with the European settler colonial complex has been greatest, and a 16. A.A.J. Van Bilsen, l’Indépendance dy Congo, 1961, p. 47. SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld:32626338 Page 35
HW 49061 DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM secular solution has seemed most remote. There have been dozens of these sects inthe Congo, all having in common a radical re- jection of European domination. But they responded through the escapism of the apo- calyptic dream rather than the development of nationalist programs, Associational Experience Related to the late emergence of nationalism was the mediocre level of pre-nationalist as- sociational experience, Group activity involv- ing Africans prior to the emergence of parties took at least five different forms: 1) Unions. These suffered under legal re- strictions on their operation and the efforts of the Belgian trade unions to organize and control their activity. The only really African union prior ‘to: 1959 was the Association de Personnel Indigéne de la Colonie (APIC), the civil service union, 2) European political groups, After 1954 the metropolitan parties began establishing po- litical clubs in the major centers and sought to attract satellite African clienteles, -The Belgian Liberals and Socialists were parti- cularly active; in contrast, the Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) tended to oppose the intro- duction of metropolitan parties into the Congo. The African role was always subordinate, and although a number of leaders went through a phase of association with one or another of these clubs, they did not consider them a very useful training ground in political organization. Attempts by these groups tocirculate informal electoral lists for the 1957 urban elections were an abject failure and ended European illusions of being able to enlist the African elite as foot soldiers for their own battles, 3) Cercles des 6volués. These were set up by the administration immediately after the war, often with attractive club houses, as social centers and controlled forums for airing the grievances of the elite. The cercles probably did fulfill the limited purposes for which they were established, but again were not very helpful for political training. 4) Alumni associations. These were more important thanthe preceding groups. Sponsored by the Catholic missions, they brought to- gether in an African-led organization many of the future leaders, The federation of alumni associations, Union des Intéréts Sociaux Con- golais (UNISCO), was the closest thing to a comprehensive African movement, It dates from immediately after World War II, Kasavubu got his start when he was elected president of UNISCO in 1946. Some political grievances were channeled through these ‘bodies. They were, however, by definition elite groups and tended to articulate the spe- cific complaints of the elite. 27. 5) Tribal associations. These were by far the most important of the pre-political as- ;sociations. They were the only effective, wholly African organizations, formed to help adjust to the colonial situation, both in the humble functions of mutual aid and in the assertion of comprehensive political pro- grams, They can be traced back to about 1925 both in Leopoldville and Elisabethville. However, there was a fundamental change in their character after the war. In the early days, leadership was in the hands of tra- ditional: elders; after 1945, young, educated elements took over, Only in the tribal as- sociation did the mass and elite establish a working relationship. Two ethnic associations, the Abako and Lulua Freéres, stand far above all others in effectiveness, Both played a determining role in shaping the fragmented, ethnic nature of the eventual nationalist response, The Abako was the real founder of militant Congolese nationalism, but it never sought to become a comprehensive organization, Lulua Freres was a tightly disciplined, ethnically organized, and terrorist body whose cohesiveness was based on acute resentment of the Baluba, especially in the Luluabourg area. Parties Prior to Independence Thus the Congo lacked the exotic flowering of politically oriented associations which Characterized so much of West Africa; valu- able leadership training ground accordingly was not available. And the tribal associa- tions, although found in every African city, had an unchallenged position in the Congo as the most important group activity. This was particularly apparent when the first élections took place in the urbancenters: Leopoldville, Jadotville, and Elisabethville in December 1957; and Coquilhatville, Stanley - ville, Bukavu, Luluabourg, and Matete-Ndjili (Leopoldville) in December 1958. Political parties were not permitted to contest these elections, and accordingly the ethnic associa- tion was a logical organizational structure for candidates to utilize, Many of the present parties are in fact lineal descendents of the during the urban elections. Other influences inhibited the development of a unified political life: the regional character of Belgian colonial organization; restraints on population mobility; and lack of African social and political communications between the main urban centers. As a result, not one elite but six provincial elites emerged with virtually no contacts among them until 1958. To enhance their claims to political leader- ship, the provincial elites traded on tribal themes, strengthening ethnic self-awareness on SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSM Page 36
HW 49061" _ Brussels. . SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM. the part of the mass, and widening cleavages between ethnic groups. National politics were subsequently’ ‘dominated by this development in each of ‘the Congo's component parts. ‘Especially in the face of the rapid dis- solution of the colozial. power structure in 1959-1960, removing any externally compelling reason for national unity, there was virtually no possibility of forming a coherent national party. Lumumba had’many of the charismatic qualities of other single-party state leaders in Africa, but in seeking to extend his party, the Mouvement National Congolais/ Lumumba (MNC/L), outside its Stanleyville womb, he was faced in virtually every instance with the insurmountable task of working with po- litical leadership in the provinces that was sharply divided, mainly on ethnic grounds, In most cases, -he had to choose one faction, and in the process earned the bitter enmity of the others. Parties, when they finally did emerge, had agonizing problems in sorting out leader- ship in the short time available before elec- tions and independence. Most major parties experienced ‘serious internal tensions, Abako leader Daniel Kanza formed a dissident wing of Abako, Relations between Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) groups in Leopoldville (under Gizenga) and Kikwit (under Kamitatu) were subject to periodic crises. The MNT split into Lumumba, Kalonji, and Nendaka wings, with the’ second becoming a Baluba party and the third having little following, The Centre de Regroupment Africain (Cerea) party in Kivu developed Kashamura, Weregemere, and Bisukiro wings, There is little realideological. divergence underlying these splits. At :the time of the December 1959 elections for territorial councils and municipal offices, only the Abako and PSA had organizations extending into the countryside, as demon- strated by their successful electoral boycott. These elections were suspected of being part of :a.- Belgian maneuver to install, with the sanction of an electoral process, a govern- ment subservient to Brussels. Thus the par- ties did not enter wholeheartedly into the electoral campaign. It was really only in the period from February to May 1960, after the Round Table which had set the terms and timetable’ for independence, that political organization got underway through- out the country ona grand scale, The parties were thus working under enormous time pres- sure, and every available shortcut was taken, In some areas, there was intimidation and violence; in most, unbridled demagoguery, extravagant promises, and appeals for ethnic solidarity. The parties and the political leadership were not placed in a position of bearing any responsibility for,public order or the main- tenance of good government until literally 28 ‘the eve of independence, ' tions, This contributed in large measure to the irresponsiblity of the electoral campaign, An effort was made to establish an "Executive College'' to share decision-making responsibility with the Gov- ernor-General in March 1960, and_subse- quently in the administrative hierarchy at provincial, district, and territorial levels. However, this idea came too late to prove effective. The situation was at-complete vari- ance with all other African experiences of decolonization, with the exception of Algeria; and even there, a structured revolutionary movement existed which could supplant the colonial administration, Elsewhere in Africa, there was a transitional’ period when the prospective African leaders were forced to ‘restrain their attacks on government becausé they shared in its operation, In their brief life prior to the electoral campaign in the spring of 1960, the Congolese parties had performed only two concrete organizational functions: the sale of member- ship cards and the preparation of electoral lists. The second task did require a certain degree of sophistication. In a system of multi-member districts with proportional representation, a great deal was at stake in the ordering of an electoral list. , But. in general, parties were built ‘upon sand despite some impressive feats of high- speed organization, such as MNC/L's rapid growth from a party limited to Stanleyville in January 1960 to one Sweeping all Orientale and several other districts in May of that year, Organization was a furiction of the immediate, short-term objectives of the elec- Even without the 1960 breakdown of law and order, all parties would have experienced major crises after independence, when or- ganizers in the provinces attempted to collect debts of patronage. The characteristics of the ten major par- ties emerging from the 1960 elections are summarized in the appendix in Table E ac- cording to five differentiating criteria: mass- elite; national-regional; pan-tribal-ethnic; unitary-federal; radical-moderate. A "mar- ginal! category is included where a party doesnot fall clearly into one or the other polar type. Where the classification might be considered debatable, a justification is in- cluded in the footnotes. Table F, also in the appendix, records the results, by party, of the May 1960 elections!” Parties since Independence The bewildering sequence of’ political events 17. A glossary of the principal Congolese parties may. be found in Table G in the appendix. Map C in the appendix shows the geo- graphical distribution of major party strength in 1960.. SECRET/NO FOREIGN. DISSEM Docld: 3276276338 Page 37
a HW 49061 DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM since 1960 almost defies coherent summary. 18 The circumstances’ of independence pro- duced simultaneously a spectacular promotion in social and economic étatus for much of the elite’ and an ‘abrupt ‘drop in the standard of living of the mass. This inevitably ruptured the briefly established mass-elite relation- Ship ‘and resulted in what might be termed a "social demobilization," The mass, failing _ to comprehend what had happened. and lack- ing an easily identifiable scapegoat to. blame for the disappointments of independence, could only react by an apathetic withdrawal from the system, politically and economically. Politi- cally this was .expressed by resentment at the’ betrayal by "politicians"; economically, by a tendency to secede. from the market economy. Symbolic of this was the general strike called in March 1962 by the Union des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC) to protest inflated salaries for politicians. . Party roots in the countryside shrivelled almost as fast as they had been implanted. By 1961 no party cards were being sold any- where in the Congo. Lotal sections hadceased to function; political meetings were outlawed; deputies rarely returned. to their con- stituencies, This was even true of MNC/L, PSA, and Abako, which had achieved high levels of organization, The revolt of the army in July 1960 was followed by the collapse of the constitutional framework, the dismissal of Lumumba, and the subsequent establishment in Stanleyville of a competing ''legal government"! with some intérnational ‘recognition. The Loi Fonda- mentale provided no means by which ‘the situation’ could be resolved, Thus force and negotiation between de facto leaders became the only means of re-éstablishing the legi- timacy of the centtal government, Only the presence of the UN, the strong international commitment to preservation of a single Congo, and the vigor of US policy’ prevented the per- manent disintegration of the country during 1960-1961, The UN provided a framework of: minimal order while sporadic negotiations took place between the two competing ''central" governments, and the two seceded fragments, Katanga and South Kasai, The armies rarely fought one another, but all became involved in: bloody conflicts with civilian populations, At the nadir in January-February 1961, civilian-ANC clashes resulted inmassacres of 18. It is beyond the scope of this paper to record this history. Summary chronologies of major events since independence may be found in RAF Research Memoranda Nos. 16 of December 22, 1961;- 20 of January 29, 1962; and S of February, 5, 1963 (UNCLASSIFIED). For highly detailed materials, the reader is referred to the series of volumes published by CRISP in Brussels (Jules Gerard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen, Congo 1960,°2-vols.; Benoit Verhaegen, Congo 1961; Congo 1962 will appear in mid-1963); and the excel- - lent monthly, Etudes Congolaises, published by the Institut Na- tional d’Etudes Politiques i in Leopoldville. 29 civilians. at Elisabethville, Bakwanga, and Stanleyville. : : The Alienation of the Politi¢ians from the People. . With the attrition of the parties and the establishment undet international tutelage of rudimentary authority, the primary ‘source of power now. lies in access to the organs of influence, force, and money at Leopoldville. What the outlying areas feel is no longer relevant--unless and until new elections are held. The political system at the center re- sembles’ Spanish moss; its roots are in the air, rather than in the ground. ; A symptom of Leopoldville! s isolation from the mass is the contrast in leadership style between Lumumba and Adoula. The former had remarkable talents in mass mobilization. At a time when political power depended upon this, Lumumba was a well-nigh .irrestible force, His prestige derived from his eloquence in French, Swahili, Lingala, and Tshiluba. Almost anywhere in the Congo, he could pro- ject a. compelling image of himself in the Nkrumah-Touré-Nyerere fashion. Adoula en- tirely lacks these characteristics. He was in eclipse in the heady days of 1960. But with the transformation: of the nature of politics, his talents suddenly became relevant. Heis a mani- pulator, an- arbitrator, a broker. He has mastered the art of making himself indispen- sable, of balancing competing demands of a shifting constellation of caucus groups. Andhe has made able use ofthe diverse types of inter- national support most useful in the present situation: US, UN, and Belgian. The Failure of Lumumbism ‘Another symptom of alienation between the politicians and the mass has been the failure of efforts after Lumumba's death to construct a 'Lumumbist bloc,'' a mass nationalist move- ment akin to the radical African nationalist model, Lumumba's strategy at the outset had been to weld a national coalition of parties -- MNC/L, PSA, Cerea, Balubakat, and at times Puna--alleged to share his three-point pro- gram of nationalism, anti-tribalism, and cen- tralism, This was. only briefly successful. The. Lumumbist bloc did vote with discipline for. the election of officers of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.in June 1960, but barely mustered enough votes to confirm their lead- er as Prime Minister. Again there was a brief moment of united action at the Lovanium Parliament in July-August 1961, but this failed to elect Gizenga as Premier. Despite periodic proposals in 1961.and 1962 for the establish- ment of some form of Lumumbist national SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 335
HW 49061 The DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM party, Lumumbism as a political force steadily eroded until by mid-1963 it had entirely fragmented. The following reasons may be adduced for the failure of the effort to build a mass movement around the martyr image of Lumumba: 1) The inefficacy of a corpse, The departed ‘hero may be mourned, but he cannot lead, 2) The divisive aspect of the Lumumba memory, Although Lumamba was adulated ta large areas of the Congo, he was despised in others, There was no possibility of achieving unity about this symbol. 3) The Gizenga obstacle. Gizenga, an inept individual lacking the sseential prerequisite of audacity and personal magnetism, was able to pre-empt the top position, He could not be ousted without fatally dividing the movement, nor could he supply the necessary leadership himself, 4) The incompetence of other leaders, None of the major contenders for the mantle of Lumumba possessed the necessary leadership characteristics, Only an exceptionally gifted person could have had any chance, and politi- cians like Christophe Gbenye and Antoine Kiwewa are the incarnation of mediocrity, 5) The irrelevance of radical nationalism. Lumumbist message of national unity against the Belgian colonists became irrele- vant in the post-independence situation, The "enemy'' symbol’which might have served, as elsewhere in Africa, to rally a nationalist movement was dissipated with the Belgian exodus, To some extent the Congolese "poli- ticians'' serve as scapegoats today, but ani- mo'sity toward them remains diffuse. 6) The lack of access to effective means of support. MNC/L was anathema to'major do- mestic forces--the Catholic Church, the large corporations, and the Western governments represented in the Congo, The assistance of the Soviet bloc and Casablanca group of Afri- can states was insufficient to sustain. the Lumumbist drive. Political Power Clusters in Leopoldville Politics in Leopoldville has become es- sentially a bargaining process betweenclusters of leaders; ideology plays only a small role. The most important political cluster to emerge is the "Binza group."' This group in- cludes a cross-section of leadership which collectively forms an interlocking directorate of influential persons, who between them con- trol or have access to a broad spectrum of influence and power, Although membership fluctuates somewhat, tion began to emerge in 1961 and did not really become a major importance until 1962, The key members are described below: there have never been more than ten in the inner caucus. This coali-- 1) Victor Nendaka, head of the Streté since September 1960, is an intelligent man of will and courage, He took over this key agency at a moment of total disorganization from Christophe Muzungu, who was personnally loyal to Lumumba, The Sfreté's national or- ganization, power of arrest, and files of compromising information on many political figures make it a potent instrument, 2) General Joseph Mobutu had by 1961 firm ‘control of ANC units close enough to Leo- poldville to be ableto exert political pressures, His involvement guarantees the support of at least a good part of the ANC, 3) Justin Bomboko was Foreign Minister in all governments until the most recent Adoula cabinet shakeup in April 1963, Despite some character defects, he has become a skiNed politician and able operator in the Leopoldville environment. In addition, he has constructed a solid popular base at Coquil- hatville, He has excellent access to both Bel- gian and US sources, ; 4) Albert Ndele since 1960 has headed the Monetary Council, shortly to: become a Na- tional Bank. | 5) Damien Kandolo began as a member of Lumumba's personal cabinet charged with supervision of the Surete. He then defected from the Lumumbist bloc, was for a time Adoula's Chef de Cabinet, and was subse- . quently Permanent Secretary in the Ministry 30 relatively effective caucus groups, of the Interior, Adoula himself is not a member of the "Binza group,'' but is very close to it, There is no ethnic element to the group; Nendaka is a Mubua, Mobutuan Ngbandi, Bombokoa Mongo, Ndele a Mukongo, and Kandolo an Otetela. The success’ of the group lies in the nature of the Congolese political process; there is no need for formal organization, ora structure capable of developing a web of political communication with the mass, There are a number of other caucus groups, based in large part upon the activity of Parlia- ment, The most effective and coherent is the Abako, Although there is no clear leader of the Abako group, its representatives in Parlia- ment maintain remarkable discipline, There has never been an occasion when Abako mem- bers have taken opposing positions in debates or votes, This cohesion has been used in the systematic pursuit of the objectives of the ‘Bakongo peoples, in the furtherance of which ‘the Abako has been extremely successful, PSA Kamitatu and PSA Gizenga are both Part of the Cerea-Reko party delegation from Kivu, under the leadership of Joseph Midiburo and Edmond Rudahindwa, also has shown capa- bility for group action, Parliament has become a major focal point for political maneuvering, especially in the last year. It had very few meetings in the SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 39
HW 49061 ‘teachers), DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM summer of 1960, then was put on vacation by Mobutu in September 1960, It did not reconvene until July 1961. From that time forward, Parliament has been in session most of the time. As the techniques of parlia- mentary action have become familiar, its strength as a branch of government has in- creased, The powers vested in Parliament by the Loi Fondamentale are vast; as the depu- ties have learned how to make use of them, Parliament increasingly has been an obstacle to effective executive action. Provincial Political Consolidation Adevelopment of major significance in recent months is the rapid consolidation of a series of local power clusters centered on the new provincial institutions, Where. a homogeneous leadership has emerged, it is virtually un- challengeable from inside or outside. The provinces have three major trumpcards: 1) Control of the police forces. These are frequently overt political instruments. 2) Control of the local administration. Ter- ritorial administrators are named by the provinces; the territorial administrator is the unchallenged authority in his zone, 3) onopoly of direct contact with the opulation at large. This is not significant in the normal process of decision-making in Leopoldville. However, if and when national elections are held, it would be a critically important asset. The ability of the central government to intervene in the provinces grows in situa- tions where provincial leadership is -spht. It has proved to date virtually impossible to dislodge an incumbent provincial govern- ment, Dissident provincial political groups have developed the habit of carrying their grievances to Leopoldville, trying to secure a vote (by a procedure of dubious legality) of one house of Parliament to request central intervention and arbitration, But once sub- stantial accord has been achieved within a rovince, there is ver little the central government can do to influence the situation, The Role of Labor Unions, Students, and Youth Like most under-developed countries, the Congo does not possess many functional in- terest groups, Labor unions and student and youth groups, however, are worthy of brief mention, The Congolese unions are not proletarian . the most effective ones are ~ organizations; white collar groups {i.e., civil servants and In a society such as the Congo, the bargaining power of the relatively scarce skilled, educated person is by nature vastly 31 superior to that of the unskilled laborer, who lives in the shadow of a ''reserve army of unemployed" willing and eager to take his job, The organized, white collar groups have through union structures been quite success- ful in registering their grievances, Unions have relatively little concrete to offer the unskilled laborer for his dues. Union leaders are accepted on consultative bodies of an of- ficial character, but do not participate in real collective bargaining, except in the’ govern- ‘ment-level negotiations establishing the legal minimum wage (which is the salary in fact received by the majority of workers), The major unions are: 1) Union des Travailleurs Congolais,(UTC), This union has the largest membership and probably must be rated the most important, It is of Catholic inspiration and was initially organized under the patronage of the Belgian Catholic union. Its leader, André Bo-Boliko, is a keenly intelligent and able person. 2) Confédération des Syndicats Libres Con- golais (CSLC), This is a very close second to the UTC in importance. It is accused by its opponents of being remote-controlled by the American Embassy. Its leader, Alphonse Kithima, is Adoula's brother-in-law and has had the informal support of the Prime Min- ister. CSLC is an ICFTU member, 3) Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Kongolais (FGTK). Formerly head by Adoula, this is the stepchild of the largest Belgian union, the FGTB, associated with the Socialist Party. There have been periodic hopes that it would rally to the CSLC, but to date it re- mains separate. It suffers from the absence of a single national secretariat, At the top, there are merely two regional offices. Though union leadership has been effective in articulating the widespread resentment of the privileges of the politician class, unions probably do not have the capability of mo- bilizing widespread positive support for a political movement, , On the student level, the Union Générale des Etudiants Congolais (UGEC), dominated by the Lovanium University section, unites loosely the farflung college student com- munity. Thus far, it has not exhibited a great capacity for action, It participates both in the International Union of Students (IUS) ‘and the International Student - International Student Conference- Co- ordinating Secretariat (ISC-COSEC). The uni- versity students are at present an alienated group, They feel that access to opportunities commensurate with their intellectual talents is blocked by the former clerks now holding government positions, UGEC is far from being an extremist, Marxist- Leninist body like the Union Générale des Etudiants de l'Afrique Occidentale (UGEAO) in Dakar or the Fédération des Etudiants de l'Afrique SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 40