104-1021f-10004 Aes LEED HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMEBERS FILE TITLE/MMGER/VOLUME: tet fh pace! INCLUSIVE DATES: CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DELETIONS, IF ANY: REVIENED B SICKATUSE OE COE PRINT NAME) REVIEWING OFFICIAL * : “s Pa Does NO BOCLMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE HOM A Cg Antal 2 plat Eris Pit Ever an, REGaesT Jee Re ea FT TERM AN ERT REPENTH Rear Penne peti mn mn HE fee mee enn e 4 ta eT aaeal FR wit 3
5 ce nT Ratt RROEEALEN Diet rr seomect ap ote nt AR pI SPOOR FEE TERESA BE a ele RE 6 OR SREP LEED OR 8 AOA en ane omnes etree mnen Abeer saa ois des fo u tient 2. SECRET & THE MONSTER PLOT Introduction . 2. 6. 2 6 6 © © © © © © © we © we ow i Chapter 1 Organizational Background: CIA's Handling of Soviet Positive Intelli- gence and CI Matters . 1. 2. 2 se wee 3 Chapter I! Biographical Data: 1927-1962 . ... » 7 Chapter III ‘Chronicle: 1962-1969 ......4646-. 12 A. Imitial Contacts . .. . 2 « 2 6 = 12 B. Bona Fides . . . . «© «© «© © © © @ © 13 C. The Case Against Nosenko .... .» 16 D. Defection . . 2. 2 « «© © » » e@ @ © @ 18 E. The Problem of Disposition .... 27 F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath 28 G. The Decision to Incarcerate .... 31 H. First Polygraph Examination... . 32 I. Incarceration and Intefrogation . . 36 J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory .. 41 K. Life in a Vault . . . « «© © «© «© « « 43 L. Inter-Agency Disagreement .... « 65 M. Voices of Dissent . . . - 2 © « « « 67 N. Helms Takes Control .... .« eee 73 Das 8 Hs ERT ER ae ae te Dw Hpac asm woe 2 Ee mene eee aes Eta cent ine ant ann at tote 7 ap DERG aR ee st cutee mee amet em A a rte a & ong Me ah yhbebn nde. Dh: 4
14-00000 ~~, ) / ‘ nemnnenatte a Pn ee se eG A ENTREE ibis ae Lew rir eNe tes eins MA aEene NMR rt att RNP neta At lene Pea raermmreo ener ermnannn scanners Cas ETB EMTALA ELLE, Aharon Mk aia ane Aer Ae APTOS SS SS ‘ ee Chapter IV Chapter V. Chapter VI Chapter VII eS a Seed ae Pe S sent -ii- 0. Resolution of the Case . . 1. 2. 2 « « Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary Evaluation . . 2. 2 +s © © © © © © © © » A. Information on KGB Personnel ... . B. KGB Recruitment Efforts Against US Citizens . 2... 6. 2 2 © © © ww C. Moscow Microphones . . . 2. «© « «© «© « D. William John Christopher Vassall .. E. Leads to Foreign Nationals .... . “F. Summary Evaluation a oe © oe wo The Analytical Foundations of the “Monster Plot . . . «6 © © «© «© = © » @ «@ A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation .. B. Faulty Record of Conversations With Nosenko .... +.» +6 « «© # « e C. CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's Life Story . . 2 «© «© « » « BD. Errors or Omissions in Available CIA Headquarters Records ....s « E. CIA Assumptions about the Second Chief Directorate . . . . « » «© « «© « F. The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases .... + Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and Application in the Nosenko Case .. . Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: A Comparison of Their Handling By CIA . . . 2. « « « «© » « SECRET 76 81 81 82 84 84 8&5 85 86 86 90 93 100 i021 166 113 123 A nes ema Bo oe ns eerie oa a 2 Bip yeah rR ~ooemrmenr rnaemeeaB ES ee Aen ten moreno ROTTEN me mtreerretaceme asa © tte tener ee eeeereen me ne rege Beep ete rpm Oats Rowe Sonam eoretag yet seem Rbin Seteceren edt * 7 git, eo drdbtn. a tatisy *
a * sf 4 ao, oPanry va ° \ ~ oy { >. Obie! C 7 j . - -iii- , |. { " Chapter VIII Use of the Polygraph in the Nosenko : j | iS ~ “4 Case 2. 1 we ee ee tt we ew wt ww ww wh CRG ane 3 sf - thapter IX Psychological and Medical Findings .. . 142 4 A. The Role of the Psychologist .... 142 = ney een on inners aimee B: The Role of the Psychiatrist .... 149 i C. Conclusions... 2... 2.2.6 © © ee) 1SF-4ST _ Chapter X Impact of the "Monster Plot” on CIA's Positive Intelligence and CI Missions . . 1539 nw ieee tee eutaenedt oe ghee hea eerie eS AED tlt eat A. The Case of ~_ ° “ew wee we ww 189 Ween ee empaane oe te oe ° RB. Effect on Other Potential Opera- ; tiONS 2. 2. 2 6 2 ee we ee ee ww 173 ° C. How CIA Worked to Defeat Itself... 175 } Chapter XI Methodology and Leadership .... « « « 177 A. Lack of Counterintelligence Methodology . . . e's + 2 ee se e @ « 177 | B. Influence of Chief, CI on | ; | Methodology . 2... 2 6 se e ee @ = 178 : 4 i —_ 3 C. Impact of Faulty Counterintelli- ' . gence on Positive Intelligence ; +, Collection . 2. 6 » 2 5 © © © © © © & © =6=6GB ‘ 7 eo g . D. What Went Wrong? «@. ... ++ +e + =<179 “| E. Summary... 2 2 2 2» ew ee ew wo = 6D oo : “4 ; Chapter XII Conclusions and Recommendations .... . 182 A. The Letter of Instructions ..... 182 i . ° e » ib B. Recommended Action ... . + © « « «@ 184 H ; | - os oe _ J i oe . og ee etait caged 3 A SE ERNIE cheek Set Tees N CUE SO Me Alene Me Leer EUR RRO ATTES At MAE TEE REMTETENED th OTS tr eA CROAT 4+ *eR Tans wee \ . peeve . i %
8 ene tse neat et lt un emery a sagen phe @ Zak ' | | ne ARR (nee Sneek mes e eReGene DEA Sate ae Ue CE at Caton coer rime natin neces | a arnt wae RR fs wee * : @ —_SEORET @ Introduction On S June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet official temporarily assigned to Geneva, contacted an American Foreign Service Officer in a move that was eventually to lead to Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of events that is unequaled in complexity by any other Soviet operation handled by the Central Intelligence Agency since its establishment. Because the case still has important implications for the overall Soviet intelligence effort of the United States, and because it raises many basic questions about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors, a reinvestigation of the case was commissioned by the Agency in June 1976: The results are embodied in this report and its annexes. Although United States officials of many agencies, up to and including a president of the United States, were briefed on the case and either played some role in making decisions concerning it or actively participated in running the opera- tion, it does not now appear that, between 1962 and 1976, any Single individual has ever been fully informed as to all its aspects. The complexity of this investigation therefore stems in large measure from the fact that the case has pro- ceeded along at least two, and often more, compartmented tracks. Thus, the effort to get a total picture of what transpired has involved an unusual amount of research in the files of various components of the Agency, plus personal in- terviews with a large number of present and former Agency employees. The actions taken in regard to Nosénko were not the result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a corporate entity; rather, in this case more than in most, decisions were made by a number of senior individuals on the basis of their own strongly-held views, which sometimes con- flicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of other senior colleagues. Thus, this report must, if it is to be comprehensible, attempt to depict the decision-making process in all its complexity by referring when necessary to the individual participants. : SECRET ~ r : £ ee tet elton, Ceacelbsoadih atte pee bene ws tadone wba Masideclee dteetne” eon whee te em eevee Lamecatate Ares fa” nee tatntes Lb he dL ysinlees we coi dit eatin tbat add moe 5 faa eB ls suse SE ed pou aptty inet ota + Ue
14-00000 " , cre ? 4 . . ie : ay See tee we “k & + PR ee ~ - i £. oe r v * i. rT L . 4. 4 22 ; a \ aed it 3. . : : i} ., The quintessential quality of a report such as this a5 that it be “bjective. We have not, on the other hand, + refrained ftom expressing our opinions. Even to have tried a ; to do so wauid have been futile for two rather obvious j reasons. First, into the reconstruction of events of the _. complexity herein described there always enters a degree ; 3 aor of selectivity and judgment; in this sense, “opinion pro- i 4 vides the essential matrix of our product. Secondly, we | _ 3) have viewed our task as one of constructive criticism. i 2 ; 4 ’ i . i ' . Hs % oo, ; ' i i i : | i I t | | | oO n ; va SECRET : 2 re ; . 7 a ma Cente Aa oranda. x ey ee eae i nhac enmeyrangecra reese cre muamneed ae nny tne netieers pet eR ens Se a yn Me tb ema Soe eee BN set epmamatee eemegen segeenae — arocemmenre fie ate tes omen plait. eaten NT oo sreinibiemtamemmnacuntiihinrseeter — ~apenatntei sideman 2 z ci ae k i of anntond, web Le { d S 7 4
14-00000 Bet rae fo @ EgnET S oy. oe co ers cence oomnmemensanen nis 4 ot CHAPTER I Organizational Background: CIA's Handling 4 Of Soviet Positive Intelligence an Matters : The history of the Nosenko case can only be comprehended within the framework of the organization and day-to-day func- tioning of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole. In fact, opinions regarding the handling of the Nosenko case may differ substantially according to individual's differing views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning. This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually func- tioned in the relevant period, the 1960s, as distinct from how it might theoretically have functioned according to Agency organizational charts and regulations. T ss ‘ << wis 2 EH Bibs San lid westerns Mine & nee ae enenRy tree Te ur neperrraemenig pane pee apt Bebe it cbenes ane Ve setae d The two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-day operations in the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc Division (known successively by this and several other names*) and the Counterintelligence Staff. In the nature and interrela- tionship of these two organizations we find the key to much of what was to happen in the Nosenko case. temo sarneecgreneerettecienen op emer sneskaantte ig! Blin E ee LUD ee “Cl Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organi- zation carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries. ° etn ate ees NanERe mi hte rican Sage + ‘ “ sete he nll Sint the Pa tt *This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used inter- changeably. te . > Sia tate dan d Giese en» i Rew end Sto HED AA were et SECRET | . Belkan eee tet ab ETRE etn ad oe oem ah area A cele IEE ARG © Ate MARNE eS SPATS RIED ESSE ANT ee A rn AB Tom 1h cere IO Bt No wet Coan babes i Btatte,, atateade tan Set bey haste ee ale eerpetisperiannge” . - | en a a :
14-00000 ee cane nm ene Remap at emer fama cmin eiOR bts setadten wean teat “Tags So” a EAA ee REET ESRI RETO ES PERS AR IDI SERA POEMS STAD Et ORR TEE Po ae MAAS TES Ee fee eet ad SECRET © 74- A third organizational participant in the Nosenko case was the Office of Security. This office had overlapping jurisdiction with CI Staff and, to a lesser extent, $B Division in any matter that involved a suspected Soviet or Soviet Bloc penetration of the Agency. While not usually a problem, the overlapping jurisdiction was considerable in both the Golitsyn and Nosenko cases because so much of the activity in connection with both operations revolved around allegations that the Soviets had penetrated the Agency at a high level. Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited Agency staff employees did net first originate with Golitsyn, it was he who lent special ferce to them by spelling out a complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi. He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the Agency were already predisposed. Golitsyn thus became the ideologue'’s ideologue. Prior to Golitsyn's defection, the Agency as a whole had been hard hit by its dealings with high-level Soviet penetra- tions of Western governments. There is no need to go into detail on them, since they have been well documented else- where, but they included British representatives such as Kim Philby and George Blake. Another important penetration was Heinz Felfe, who rose to be Deputy Chief of Soviet Mimeechery ete SECRET | Dcepeqne cena a aE dA MORE a DAUR STE? ELIS Sub S eUraiSaNCA LAL OUNU EMIT Sabi tgla tee abi maT LCHEANE AKANE ENS ecm Ber mew 9 0401 Moae Staten molt Mtn oat Al, eieeate emia NORE: i a ¥ pene er eanpaeerneee neem eps anette NY OTF SAR NN TE SEY TRA : . aapyriemuoreiaoremecenimpepuetaapien: §— ~Cegeadrnmrsmetirtnd eerie ENR TORRENS Se os mae + tbe -pampe: ay pie 23. a rn aaa ance ¥ iar ee, tbe” + . “ad, tad i ¢ abel Bevin eel, Led Rt Ee ERNE bia ee * qeoke die yedPosrcdele okt aaisitoncion gp bale hed Mle maton abl. eae sbaldcbubinncdim mis elie citi hidabitiy Zetia — Dba btin daira ut easier ace ad ms “ Re Sw rs a oa
+ ra . Mey =} «sesh , isda, — nalbitnasets aetanter ad lind amat este ARR nd vg se @&  —— SECRET @ Counterintelligence in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The Felfe case is particvlarly significant because it was believed by a number of counterintelligence specialists in the Agency that Felfe's career had been systematically pro- moted by the Soviets through what came to be known as the “throw-away" technique. According to the theory of this group, a considerable number of valuable and productive Soviet intelligence operations in Germany were made avail- able to Felfe so that, by detecting them and signaling their presence to the West German authorities, he could build up his reputation as a counterintelligence specialist. While there is debate about the value of the assets the Soviets made available, there appears to be enough substance to this theory for it to have had a strong impact within the Agency, particularly upon those persons who were members of the former Eastern European (EE) Division of the Plans Directorate. weer te mete trnee teil imareatin walla alate cee 5 ra ben Beat ae Phase et ened eben neg, chebimdls Safina sind Ae In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB success in penetrating Western governments made it the more feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services. Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place such as Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event. | | | Once again, it is not necessary here to go into details regarding Golitsyn, because this case has been covered exten- Sively in a recent study. However, two points are worth noting: t i 1. First, Golitsyn was diagnosed early in 1962 as a “paranoid personality.” Although account was taken of this psychological problem, it was ~.— sr ---@onsddered in the light of a threat to the con- . - - tinuity of the debriefing process rather than as a factor reflecting on the validity of the purported intelligence he gave us. It was apparently felt i that, if we could maintain his stability, we could ‘| depend not only upon the objectively verifiable facts he gave us but also upon his often very theoretical generalizations. tae ab dicattl Yiey Aa atten sanded wahe cable 24 Met teenie dhe eval dt see tng end ver 2. Secondly, Golitsyn presented us right from : the beginning, continually elaborated throughout : the years, a complicated rationale for believing : that the KGB was successfully pursuing a mammoth : program of “disinformation” to the detriment of the : i ov aint we ake BL Re manele soar RUAN eNO eer hE PEAY EAN SAE em Ae he Fe oe ny me noes Arie yy AD ines wae em ww tm * ‘ SECRET z \, ‘ - ° : . - =. aber ASA et ETTORE SITE Ra SERENE od METER SL Ae Means teeta main ae an Ree aemnmmmitas samen eS ~ Mow onmene est , tian  woraenteriy Baynes dite Susie me ao Seti Renn Se ea a wt Too Sin t
: @ SECKET «ss : y ; i 4 | United States and its Western allies. This ratio- JA i nale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of q | this report. “a It is against this background that we view the approach . 4 i to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling. In doing so, 2 we shall for ease of reference from time to time allude to , i the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions--claborated 4 by Golitsyn and others--as the "Monster Plot." In fairness, ° i it must be allowed that this term was in common usage not 1 : { by the thesis* proponents but rather by its detractors; yet i { i no other name serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers 2 i envisaged as a major threat to United States’ security. If ‘ ; the term carries with it emotive connotations, the latter i { : were certainly shared by both sides to the controversy; and ‘ * this fact alone is enough to justify including “Monster Plot" in the lexicon of this study. | i SECRET i . a ee ren xs _ LE NRRNEGp Taian Terence mre eee nnn mans anemic cammemnae mag mom oe seem AA AA, ey aise Santee <i né teraneae Teather ona neers niewlt eens nya gn get = ee Meese gmt ¢ ~ greener: pemmemenemaeey arm A bbled act Wuabbeant Redlel ta tet ee woe neat Dorm DRL A mR Fo = tye eomegaretspsen aR ‘ so AoC castes atotlnwrgy bansibaleee 3 tap enlbnterronrae th stan meats retabe & A bk eng hese calle Arka AD let ne ee NG 6 a aT a tate ae tsa PRR de & tae ee t a i
14-00000 ‘pe sRGB ren ca eth he aa AR She astra 8 a fe ERAN EOE ENE RE i re nt an A at end ae ‘ F picia wens raeceaneeannnn can ONPG “5st @ _ Sine iy -J- CHAPTER II Biographical Data: 1927-1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukrainian SSR, son of Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskaya. His father was born in 1902 and died on 2 August 1956. At the time of his death, the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and recipient of a number of the highest Soviet awards and medals. He received a state funeral, and he is commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall. Young Nosenko's brother, Vladimir, born in 1944, was a student at the Institute of International Relations as of 1964. From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev. In 1934 he and his mother joined the senior Nosenke in Leningrad, where the latter was working as chief engineer at the Sudomekh shipbuilding plant. Nosenke continued his schooling in Leningrad until late 1938, at which time he and his mother followed the senior Nosenko to Moscow, where he was to serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Ship- building Industry. In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenke and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the Urals. Nosenko stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the front, but they were caught and returned home. At age 14 Nosenko entered a Special Naval School that, in August 1942, was relocated to Kuybyshev. Later, this school was forced to relocate again, this time to Achinsk in Siberia. Nosenko did not want to go to Siberia and, through the in- fluence of his father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School in Leningrad (not to‘be confused with the Frunze Higher Naval School, aIso in Leningrad), which by this time had been relocated to Baku. . Some time after August 1943, Nosenko tried on two separate occasions to get to the front, but failed. He and a friend did succeed in returning home to Moscow with- out authorization. These escapades seem to form part of a behavior pattern that was eventually to culminate in defec- tion. By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School, which had returned to its SECRET . . . * -@ Hts catlBeh Alin th i OL Se cAAIT CAL ION LSAT AARP ENTI wr 1P8 BERS ATI SET EET TNS AYRE SR ERTS ER Ko Ob MC Io beneath Sea en er ot Nee A Ae PE | sepegenenrine mere eta a Cha re i 4 . 4 we aim Hb Bit neal hae te cents a Seti cantete t= 5 was rnethiae ol Esha fateh ep tt tet incat . . ae Sanunthoe ate tet te « ot “os wore het esp aden whe Nida iSite ied: eopte athe aere # an batdibersrgbie dbhectee DLR WAS ae natant aged, te aE thous Te ihiatedrhe tee ad aatintie pet
14-000H ys hata EL UO aber AR ATS Le an nila iaiaranabnmnedimentateemmbenramaneesnmeeneetdiate ame tee ee ne ete nee eae RS - @ SEGHET @ ~8- original location in Leningrad. Cadets from this school were sent to a forest (some two hundrec kilometers from Leningrad) on a wood-cutting detail. In about November of that year he wounded himself, seemingly accidentally, and was hospitalized. He decided not to return to the Frunze Naval Preparatory School and again, through his father's intervention in about January 1945, entered a shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in Leningrad. At the end of World War II, Nosenko returned to Moscow. He had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of the shipbuilding college that attested to his study in, and the completion of, the tenth class. At some time prior to July 1945, Nosenko accompanied his father, who went to East Germany with a group of engineers. For purposes of that trip, Nosenko received temporary rank as an Army senior lieutenant, with appropriate documents and uniforn. Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in July 1945. Upon completion of the second year at the Institute, and by virtue of his participation in a military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC, Nosenko received the rank of junior lieutenant in the “administrative service" (sic). (The exact meaning of this term is unclear.) In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his parents’ wishes, a student whom he had gotten pregnant. He obtained a divorce almost immediately following their marriage. In about 1947, he married the daughter of Soviet Lieutenant General (Major General, US-style) Telegin. This marriage, too, was neither successful nor long-lived. Nosenko reported he had found his wife in bed with her brother. A girl was later born with a harelip and a cleft palate. Nosenko in- Sisted that this was not his child. Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute of International Relations, but he actually received his diploma a year later, in 1950, because he had failed the examination in Marxism. He had had to wait an extra year in order to retake this examination. In March 1931, Nosenko was assigned as an English language translator in naval intelligence (Naval RU), serving first in the Far East. While on leave in Moscow. . . tz Aas nnn LAE aN tala MEER AP eet RE ERIN AP Ee EATEN RET NS TET anf he es SHA Hy «at a anata  aiotager F Baat bathediate salad ie sebdbintod Jom the AS eeipatabesan ed BAAR id, aabelatectl oe eee Sars phrah Levtacdeed! ante oT baunredd age @F 6 os Meche ta cae cdi icbirastipstalec ba bad de wean | ban soot -ighte dA hmasnn fi hydalin tall * th thelhe a ae etree tenes betes wane * a + . Roe OAL 2 ® . senbasere Suandiststineesians Aababanhnid 1 a a & 4 + vetiele tga his aTetbiee.! wand 4
14-0000 ‘ . Pat + ob PINs od Eee} vs @ — SET eS) Ene Fae ae (late April 1952), he developed an illness that caused him to cough up blood, and he entered a tuberculosis sanatorium near Moscow for treatment. For reasons of health, he did not return to the Far East but was sent instead to the Baltic area. Dre me ae me cae ar ee Mes Ta inet tenagancn steeremenneenerte  somngprerees pact, While on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompanied his parents to a New Year's Eve party at the dacha of a certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. When Nosenko indicated interest in changing jobs, the general made a vague offer of help in getting employment with the Ministry of State Security (MGB). In March 1953, while again in Moscow, Nosenko was called to Kobulov's office. Kobulov had just returned . : from Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs}. Nosenko did not see Kobulov : i personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the ; deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal coun- : terintelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he i was hired. nie bar etary wate a His first MGB assignment was in the First (American embassy) Section of the First (American) Department of the SCD. In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy Beriya emerged from the resultant reshuffling of the top leadership as chief of both the MVD and MGB. In March 1954, the new "Committee" for State Security--the KGB--was formed. Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student at the Moscow State University. Nosenko, a member of the Komsomol since 1943, was elected secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit in June 1953 and served as secretary of that unit until about June 1954. However, earlier in 1954, Nosenko had contracted venereal disease and gone to a clinic; to disguise his identity, he used operational documentation in alias in applying for treatment. When he did not go back for final treatment as instructed, the clinic sent a letter to his ostensible place of work as shown on the alias document. The MVD found out about this improper use of alias documentation and re- ported it to the SCD. Nosenko was not only disciplined by the chief, SCD (reprimanded and placed under arrest for . 18 days), but the Komsonol also removed him as secretary ' and expelled him from its organization. Sertegatecar oer anager iin ys Mcanmeemre setts ener rEmCR SERINE “RMR NGREH IMMER EEEToRyRIInS ristee ne cence saree SECRET : - Degen enema coer mesos nee amon ne WM oh Met AERTS EOCENE AG BoA COC TERR CT NNNC CN teretatY eneen enna memenar PMB nA HLm Ae A Mit Rata met NT Pct RN Hem RENAN saab eaPuactil ty , i | i i In June 1953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmila : . ee a a & ai
14-00000 | '. 2 & — SECRET @ -10- In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor kharakteristika (performance evaluation), which described him as unsuitable for work in the First Department. None- theless, he was neither dismissed nor transferred. Although Nosenko survived the 1954 episode as well as the poor performance report, these events caused him to go on what he has described as a “big drunk," which resulted in his having to spend a month under hospital care. To keep Nosenko out of further trouble, his mother intervened by making a telephone call to Petr Vasilyevich Fedotov, chief of the SCD. Seemingly as a result of her efforts, Nosenko was transferred in the latter part of May 1955 to the Second Section (which operated against tourists) of the Seventh Department, SCD. In late 1955, Lieutenant General Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov was appointed chief of the SCD. From a number of indications, Nosenko's relation- ship with Gribanov developed, despite the difference in rank and position, into a social relationship involving evenings on the town together, heavy drinking, and women. Despite numerous indiscretions, Nosenko'’s survival within the KGB and his subsequent promotions to increasingly responsible positions may well have resulted in part from Gribanov's patronage. To a considerable degree, of course, his rise must also be attributed to his being the son of a highly- placed member of the Soviet government. At this point in his KGB career, Nosenko had lost his Komsomo] membership and not achieved CP-member status. It was not until 1956 that he was accepted as a candidate mem- . ber of the CP, and only in 1957 that he was admitted as a full Party member. Once this happened, according to Nosenko, the Komsomo] removed its reprimand from his file. In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of captain. He held this rank until his défection in February 1964, despite having been promised he would be promoted and the fact that he had held several positions that were usually filled by officers of higher military rank. Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD until January 1960, when he was transferred back to the First Section (American embassy) of the First Department. Then he held the position of a deputy chief of the First Section. He was retransferred back to the Seventh Department as of late December 1961-early January 1962. In July 1962, he was appointed deputy chief of the Seventh Department. He SECRET heen Taggers wees veer mre sme nme <P SEN PT Tl EIS NESE oA BED ACBL SEO lt CREAR IE MEI AEE Et AD ONE GEE PT ORE EOE Ws eee NO alah hy r At wh ected bi ciel aes 8 weg S Desal oma ee ce mEE nee Fab gms > Uhptavelte - pmb aad £40 dar ith BE ae erecta re a BA Saino ti et ate ” Lope eRe RAR eas aber arte Rea rer diet SATB Looted ‘ wadtch dn Gna Wines Duan ga th me
ae & 4 3 4 “ . . H 3 li Pos continued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date he left Moscow on TDY to Geneva. : Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving 4 behind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters. { % His prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to : England in 1957 and 1958, a TDY to Cuba in 1960, and the ios first TDY to Geneva from mid-March until June 1962. He , also went on TDY to Bulgaria in 1961. Details of his de- ; fection and subsequent developments are covered in Chapter i III. : : { | - t r H | | i i | H SECRET | "even dee es NSE oN AS Sc, tae cnt fo tment sos amnnamehmeneenoge! sitsandtnnne Misses, ee aT. sep a win ee 4 a ,
14-00000 PDE eA bes 4A «ASTOR CONF OM a ghee PUB Lae nN SA lA ENEMA TN st ttn nett gee on men aes a8 era Wee o epee ine ee canara ee . jawe anne neg? tt A. + Sia aocceseeactnsnanmcen enact RADE i nad rho As Ses @ SRT : Pes -12- CHAPTER III Chronicle: 1962-1969 Initial Contacts When Nosenko first approached the CIA on 9 June 1962, he had been assigned, as a representative of the os KGB Second Chief Directorate, to be security officer of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference being held in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Taking advantage of the fact that he was the watchdog for the delegation whereas its members could not watch him, Nosenko used his freedom of movement to approach the Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assistance. As he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with a Swiss woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs of official funds that he had on his person at the time; inability to reimburse this relatively trivial amount (about US $250 at the time) would jeopardize his career. In ex-- change for 2,000 Swiss Francs, he therefore proposed that he provide us with two items of information. These items, subsequently verified, related to: - 1. KGB recruitment of a US Army sergeant while he was serving in the American embassy in Moscow as a “code machine repairman.” 2. A Soviet official whom the Agency had ostensibly recruited but who was being run against us under KGB control. At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming in response to general intelligence requirements on which we tried to quiz him, excluded the possibility of becoming an agent, and flatly refused to consider meeting Agency representa- tives inside the USSR. Nevertheless, he “agreed ‘perhaps' meet us when abroad" again at a later date. For our part, our interest in him was whetted by his identification of his deceased father as a former minister of the USSR. ' In addition, such information as he gave about himself indicated that he would be of high operational interest. Inter alia his most recent assignment in Moscow was as : head of a KGB sub-section working against American : tourists. Veter AORTA EATER OBE ST NE LE Riedl Beg pRB en AN EM SiG RT AEGEAN RRR, FRE Lilla rare CN PRINS va Reece men ee Crem 8 mem om Meas | Yel Be Rm Sena BALA Ps a get ~Er ee 4 % age Car e. s « eat bres ook ditue be ont. ere au pie, tent Se thteheee cee wea ate tert Benenden eee = Tb ee mee etaliayanete al tae nadhge takin ith Cased POEUN ae ote”
14-00000 me wensatesgbio Yon eA he rts SME LRU rent HMR ARE DAT mete tt Roe a WaPte e W8 ntee enerneaN neta - #® SEIT  @ -13- Bona Fides _By 11 June, the two case officers (one a native Russian speaker) who were hasdling Nosenko sent a cable to Headquarters that read in part: SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PRO- VIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY, SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE. With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved, the principal case officer flew to Washington carrying the tapes of the meeting. His arrival and sojourn at Headquarters were described by Chief, CI on 23 July 1976 as follows: Chief, CI: .. . we got the first message... on Nosenko from Geneva, and [the principal case officer] was ordered back, and we had a big meeting here on Saturday morning, and [the principal case officer] thought he had the biggest fish of his life. I mean he really did .. . and everything I heard from him was in direct contrast from what we heard from Golitsyn. I mean, we had no agents, this, that and... yet » here was a Second Chief Directorate man im Geneva peace talks on disarmament. So I got hold of [the principal case of- ficer)], and I brought him in here on a weekend. Q: What you're saying is that it was unreason- able for a Second Chief Directorate man to be there... Chief, Ci: Under the circumstances, getting drunk and needing $300 to . . . “not to be recruited but to give us three full, big secrets" for an exchange for the money in order that he could replenish the account from which he embezzled the money on a drunk. So I brought [the principal case.officer] in here one evening, I think it was. Friday, Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about SECRET alae ke ARE Cake RE oa tain nb ee ted Rah SURI ENG HOA. Pah Fie COT ak te a yg hays Ebene a aes poeta tind Rie LOIN see Line ALO Mae mire oN raneactte Suomen matte athe etek ER, tafe *, , “Eden, EE a? ae vie au te j ‘
14-00000 we i i : i f : Brecoltenmice cen ctusencreaae: soda daha eres matinee ste nanennnnn seiner estore: ene ee let HERS, GE . - i ; thar. o SET  @ ok -14- 10 to 18 volumes of Golitsyn's interroga- tion, without prejudicing him in any way, just to read it, and he had all the books out, and at the end of it all he said that there was no question about it, that they were being had. I mean, mind you, he was of split motivation because this was the big case of his entire life and yet there he was reading material, etc. So we went to Dick [Helms, then ! DDP] and we put up a proposition that we | should permit Golitsyn to read the real material, I mean the transcripts and * everything from Nosenko. And he wouldn't agree to that, but we made a compromise and that was to take the material and falsify it as though it was an anonymous letter sent to the embassy by an alleged KGB person. So the anonymous letter was drawn up, and [the principal case officer] interviewed Golitsyn with the anonymous letter, and Golitsyn's statement was that “this is a person under control, I want to see the letter" which created a situa- ‘tion because we didn't have a letter. But he began to point out in some detail exactly what was instigating and inspiring-- in terms of what he'd already given to us and he very wisely stated that he wanted everything on tape, because he knew that @s time passed in hundreds of interviews and their counteraction took place, there would be people accusing him of not having divulged certain information. ! i j } ‘ i 3 { 1 a The principal case officer's réview of the Golitsyn information had indeed converted him to the view that Nosenko's defection was bogus. Equally convinced, as clearly indicated by a number of documents that he drafted, was his superior, the person who had become Chief, SR Division in December 1963. The reasons for Chief, SR's conviction may not have been the same as the principal case officer's, but for all practical pur- poses the views of the two men at the time were identical. A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was therefore made to Richard Helms, the Deputy for Plans, SECRET a : Sg, feta alee ork, RS ‘ : enim ase ete apetertetginiennd © ratemegieniners —_secnimtner enemies i iad . eta cethtneletiael ee Ete tee ald he Takia monet ty bene otebuabeee aa tlotel terse a aber MB eh auto cotati ehel Leed le Mileage eae that ar, fpr manda oe il Eh del eAl a oP labs atte matinee Sinem get
14-00000 were waste catld dn + 4 t i 4 | i . Bip aae arte 0 vesemermrteenervernin rt gh Rettenien SEPA i aaah? ts BEL MAY Hh A, 2 Pre REDSA LS DPA OD Amc IRB Gt temattee mitre S Arrears tier toromntrtrtet An ak MARI ace Met REBAR Mt Wt AS Ta he we 2 ~ hooey et Be aay we 8 . . Bosra oe MS -15- 1 that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings be made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed, with the single reservation that Nosenke not be identi- fied by name as the source. As a result, a number of items of information from Nosenko were embodied on a letter ostensibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source; .in this form, it was assumed, the information could be shown to Golitsyn without disclosing the source. (This ruse seemed plausible enough, since a previous defector, Michal Goleniewski, had written CIA a number of anony- mous letters before eventually defecting and disclosing his identity.) In carrying out the plan, the principal case offi- cer made his own views clear to Golitsyn: I told [Golitsyn] that . . . I thought it quite possible, in view of his own statements about disinformation, that this was the beginning of a disinformation operation possibly relating to this] defection. Golitsyn felt, in general and without having the full details necessary to an assessment, that there were indeed serious signs of disin- formation in this affair. He felt such a dis- information operation, to discredit him, was a likelihood, as he had earlier said. A KGB of- ficer could be permitted to tell everything he knew, now, if he worked in the same general field as Golitsyn had. When told that so far this source had not done anything to discredit Golitsyn, and had in fact reported that the KGB is greatly upset about Golitsyn’s defection, and asked what he thought the purposes of such a disinformation operation now might be, Golitsyn agreed that kidnapping was a likely one, “to arrange an exchange for me.” Also, to divert our attention from investigations of his leads by throwing up false scents, and to protect their remaining sources. He also added, "There could be other aims as well. The Matter should be looked into. It seems serious to me." He thought the KGB might allow a first series of direct meetings with the KGB officer, to build up our confidence, and then in the — next session do whatever the operation's purpose SECRET * eR Iie! wer eaten rc tate a Ln is & ce EMMI ro A0 He aUEREOHI SOE “eth fete ery ene fe mer NT * -~ 2 Loeypeneesanrap. pee e = + 2 ‘ i : . vos aie my Ogee ont! SHAS war Batten aetddtile hee wakes on Sa bee bers se eee REA Bly Aah Ree + ate anneal abinaoalsl 2p deca Laid anetine echt abe tla ches tres getnge oteSlancbang nad acts « babetbathaiant ae 2c
14-00000 might be (discredit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass serious disinformation items, etc.). C. The Case Against Nosenko During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division continued to build up a case against Nosenko. Virtually any information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by i him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation." If his information was in accord with that from other sources, this fact not only confirmed our suspicion of Nosenko but was interpreted as casting doubt on the i other sources as well. While the above aspect will be covered at length in Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight the attitude that prevailed. Nosenko had, during our meetings with him in 1962, contributed information that materially aided in the identification and arrest of William John Christopher Vassall, a British Admiralty official who was also a KGB agent. Because Golitsyn ' had previously provided similar, but less specific, : information, the usefulness of Nosenko's intelligence was discounted; once Vassall had been identified, it was concluded that Nosenko had been allowed to expose him in order to support his own bona fides. The argu- ment ran that Vassall would in any Case have been identi- fied sooner or later on the basis of Golitsyn's leads. i i i é In January 1964, Nosenke reappeared in Geneva ac- ‘."companying another Soviet delegation. By now, the case against him had been well established in the minds of ‘: | those dealing with the matter, and the record is there- * fore replete with manifestations of suspicion. A particu- | lar example of our tendency to interpret unfavorably al- most anything Nosenko said is provided by notes that Chief, SR forwarded to Helms on 27 January 1964, with the suggestion that they “convey very well the flavor of the man... and the complexities of the operation." By way of background, although Nosenko's cryptonym at i this junct FOXTROT, he had previously been : designated | i This bit of history led to the following incident during a safehouse meeting: vive eee ye I cannot attribute to coincidence a bizarre remark AEFOXTROT made on 24 January. As I went , SECRET =~ + a. ener meee sane ns ate etre LNG Santn. SEERA REEL 2 <r en OR” Wikre IIHR RE Me etc om en erate” te A A emt RH Se ee NE ESM fy ee ee ee eee : ae gree ee car enna outing re RRR OM A AY ee sot area coneun poppin ere cmnemntngmns meets i i neaieiie mene tina eee beets  opslacattdpaadilly u ‘ abated beatae Aaa ade gba oe (Sevatgmmecn: —_ “oaamrnenbrepostmemtnnemanptgsrep Mee i 1 fea Rata bese wntaeti tse 3 we candies uy Ph os Ve teead eae 8s ome den thane te eiabtalnn Asbslbue dub seantene de. wa 4 Bidetet! wel nuettadiba: Rated
14-00000 whee & a nee tn tte ennuttanetntn teeeeaneurneennen cuts nett neat eens a teuiraetentiettit einranses ianeaersnenmarnatniitt minal aia ns gpg ates ni etanen emu sieeten mentee ER nee eee ° ag Queene so earienE eo + + ae ve 3 ee SECRET @® ~17- behind a bar which stands in the apartment, te serve drinks to AEFOXTROT . . . AEFOXTROT Saw me standing there behind the bar and his face lit up and he said with a smile, “Ha. You are Ue but it is not funny as AEFOXTROT seemed to think it was and I ° eans that he knows his own CIA ecryptonyn. The above incident cxemplifies a main theme that CIA was itself penetrated. This fear had existed before Golitsyn defected, but it was fed constantly by the lat- ter's allegations that information concerning him was leaking to the KGB, and the conclusion that the leaks must have originated within the Agency. Thus it was that a memorandum from Chief, SR on 27 January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began as follows: Our goal in this case must be eventually to break Subject and learn from him the details of his mission and its relation to possible penetrations of US intelligence and security agencies and those of allied nations as well as to broader disinformation operations in the political sphere. Ideally, our interests would be best served if Subject were broken as early as possible but since this is wm likely, our actions must be conceived and carried out in a manner which contributes to our basic goal without alerting Subject unduly at any stage. a Far from “alerting Subject unduly,” on the surface the Agency welcomed Nosenko with both cordiality and generosity. The following excerpts from a 30 January 1964 meeting make the point clearly: Nosenko: .. . the only thing I wanted to know and I asked this question, “What should I ex- pect in the future?" Principal case officer: The following awaits: As I presented it, you wanted to come to the United States and SECRET orate IRL ttt ale tema SOE Th ATARI MARIAH TAD abet anc, cum een anes eoenrfonmity seem aateenr tema 2 Pe Ry me nA Oe wheat A ibeererestpmtiies TA PRe Ane ae tee ts « whey aS are eo operon mcr comnts Sarre stare * pos + i I | t : i i i 1 erm Ley ae - a Fk Sc; ene vod dibteads tl Stidactandh hiec. we darecredbcn Bente da bestn tab itsls aM as «ie cates teat eAiarrag ti nha bla p-chts sam Tu. sae dees apt ne Poy ag Ty oth et ete DUasieh eect at Bie we abies wets ae ae Bek Fai he tel edad he MCLEE cae sentlns : { :
14-00000 Pree 4 wee cerca cree ae anette bate SOW EE e saggy on se cere te ete Seep arenes memes a ecemmeraai arate st tn teen erent te et ERED NERA AE Are amt =e “nt manned aes an a wk nem tumen omnes emerge = HAS Se etn enc RSET TECTED METAS SAGAS LAR ease PRA Pe a AD PO Lat e St -18- have some job, some chance of a future life, which gives you security and if possible the opportunity te work in this field which you know. Is that correct? Nosenko: Absolutely. Principal case officer: Mr. Helms said yes, flatly absolutely yes, in fact I would say enthusiastic ... that's the only word to describe it. We talked about, and since this was a business discussion I'll repeat all of it whether it was pleasant or unpleasant. So the next thing will be some details that we spoke . about. We talked about the means by which [you] could have a solid career with a certain personal independence. Because of the very great assistance you've been to us already and because of this desire to give you a backing, they will give you a little additional personal security... [salary details follow]. ‘Defection As might be expected, the principal case officer devoted a good deal of effort during the second Geneva visit to persuading Nosenko to stay in place. Nosenko, however, dismissed out of hand the possibility of remain- ing in contact with CIA from within the Soviet Union, and he became increasingly anxious to defect immediately. When the principal case officer continued to press him to remain in Geneva long enough to effect an audio pene- tration of the local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the issue. At a meeting on ¢ February, he announced that a cable had been received from Moscow ordering him back home for a "tourism conference." Though this claim was subsequently to be the source of almost endless contro- versy, it was accepted at the time without apparent question. Preparations therefore immediately began for evacuation to the United States. A layover in another country en route to the United States lasted about a fortnight. It was used for further SECRET eedaettersn pan o ee reo oe ee a wey . vow, 5 13 a a “A 3 “f toate ibe thease ioe it ty RRL os Heat 8 Baki i ek ton Pincreese sine 2 Minnee tba trediinden we te aA BAR ee ae S cceeaneal aim etidiartthe laten
14-00000 “F nt ce eceuee oe wrk EE OTS ee rae ee ESE TCE EE NC SEONG AANA gg Et MIN RSPR natn Aneth Poa Ane Hebe Hen tne Nee wet oo ME Rae Sg th AR PA TEA ERROR ° . . . * : . ~» . - Prat RRM lH Na PANS se Pans MOAN S ARI TAL A DRS ART Imo Aah tntnhaae Ene ar nimacctnnic rm me munmr tne rene ents, meer ree FARR Um. VAUD “Satins Pepe hae ready well-formed views. principal handlers he wrote: -19- debriefing and assessment, but, while useful from the operational handlers‘ standpoint, the delay raised problems as their charge became impatient: CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES. SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD OPS KNOWN TO HIM WHICH HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND PRESENT TO HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID ARRIVING WITH EMPTY HANDS. WORKING ON THIS MATERIAL WILL OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ NEEDS SOONEST SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS REACTIONS AND PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TRANSITION. HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND INDEFINITE DELAY. REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST MADE AN ENORMOUS DECISION AND FACED A TURNING POINT IN HIS LIFE. SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE OFFICERS FULL TIME IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY WHAT HE EXPECTS. REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEAD- QUARTERS PROVIDE SOME RECOGNITION TO SUBJ. AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN SUGGEST ARE: A. [CHIEF, SR] TRIP WITH ONE OR TWO DAYS DIS- CUSSION OF LONG RANGE OPS PLANS AND AD- MINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ONWARD MOVE... . - ra The above cable triggered a visit by Chief, SR. Nothing that happened during this visit modified his al- After a conference with the two Both . . . were unanimous in their view that Subject was not a genuine defector. His contact with us in Geneva and supsequent defection were, according to these officers, clearly undertaken at the direction of the KGB. I was particularly interested in [one officer's] statement that he had suspected Subject from the very first meeting on the basis of Subject's emotionless and mechanical delivery of his statement announcing his intention to defect. After my talks with the case officers, I had my first visit with Subject at the safehouse. - SECRET * i ao emnearng wemmmedta ot aw wets J. | . | | I | | ontgnse, = remo” CRETE — UREA REURRNITTTIRATNN eR, OEP EID
ae 7 . x + 4 se , aot « . ; a ‘ ~20- | : ae cs) SECRET a : | aa - This lasted from 2000 to 2230 and included ft dinner with Subject and the case officers, a Conversation during this first meeting was oO | general in nature and followed no special agenda. However, it did give me an oppor- tunity to. take Subject's measure. I started by telling Subject that I had come to form my own impressions of him as a person and an intelligence officer who desired to place his } knowledge and experience at the disposal of the United States government. I added that I wished to determine for myself why Subject had come to the West, a most serious step which. neither we nor Subject should under- estimate in terms of its lasting effect on Subject's own life and those of his family left behind. Subject rose to this opening by first assuring me in a most fawning manner ° that he, as an intelligence officer. fully : understood the need for a senior officer to make his own judgments on the spot. He then went on to explain his motivation for first contacting us, his reasons for defecting and i his intense desire to collaborate with us in Soviet operations sire he has no specialty other than intelligence. These remarks were repetitious of his original statements delivered in the same mechanical fashion, the major difference being that Subject was intensely nervous at the outset, calming down only after it appeared that I was accepting his statements at face value. ape meee oe ce tennee tecmee eretamnene weed Latee Stier bee Sane nade tee aeeee mnt amantectmetidt date ote Tae . ; | i t 1 | By the end of the evening I had come to the I same conclusions reached by [the principal handlers]. The totality of our conclusions are treated in detail in a separate memorandun. i However, in reaching them, I was beset by a : sense of irritation at the KGB's obvious con- . viction they could pull off an operation like this successfully and by a feeling of distaste for the obvious and transparent manner in which Subject played his role. | Chief, SR's distaste was sufficient to overcome any interest he might otherwise have had in a recruitment opportunity suggested by Nosenko: SECRET : | 9 naa sTULEmar: etnaren bi dasctEN ghia SERA WRAPS BUD. Rom sa se en -sevtnanmemnetonremiramt te tare meena = nyo net manwnratimnms snd si att: mtn aemineeetne me eddy steeds a aBic Fe] t. os oP is
14-00000 SECRET @ -21- ae a iNet i ~ * Tae he Ve hae hE abe dna Sorel : i en eens woestnbind aed & ssible recruitment off One other subject toucned upon... was the. 7 fe.) SUByECE : described]| [as a playboy who liked liquor and women y ould be easily blackmailed into cooperation for fear of hurtine his career I objected T Ez it could cause a tremendous political flap if it back- fired. Undaunted, Subject modified his position to assure us that it would not have to be "crude blackmail" in which we would have to get directly i I certainly got the impres- Sion that [recruitment is part of the plan and that We Would succeed no matter how half-heartedly we tried. . . ea (irene ern nm ene pimtnetenewmererT ai r oe ™ end t Mita Bi ap I TL meet Meee th ante Lalas ts ohemadt rooree seamranpywrenien rime meg arene temeeartnt ag Aecwe oe Despite his misgivings, however, Chief, SR remained convinced thet the Agency must continue to dissemble: It will be necessary to maintain an effective degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge of Subject's true status and our plans to try to secure from him a full confession. If Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our intentions, we will probably be forced to act _Pprematurely. cent ated oleae te ltenetes od ot nh With these considerations in mind, he therefore re- newed the commitments previously made by the principal case officer: ® ae BRIE TAL De, Moca sien b ati oncen tt } | i q { i | H i I informed Subject that I was satisfied that he was genuine. Based on this and assuming his ‘continuing "cooperation," I said we would pro- ceed to make arrangements to bring him to the States. Second, I confirmed our agreement to { 4 i Ree SEM — IRLRYRRER EEE IEReTTINEB yo Toeem—n onrergpermerrn aura —raanerece evar crane mtnena os naametaroenbadntietie Lach deat. pay him. . . (financial details follow]. On 12 February, consistent with the above commitments, Nosenke was flown toe the Washington area and lodged in a safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of Security. Now that he was in the United States, the Agency (and the US government as a whole) found them- selves faced with a seeming dilemma, much more crucial than the problems facing them while he remained abroad. me epeqcyngre merits Botan « . ' ene TS SECRET + Fagan ow once nna nA hs 2 Bea AAT II A AONE ed JEM Ze Ni lg ABB AE BD A 40) Sts tartar een: ate nT ame er crores Ms genres rms one acer, oe meee aaa AS eA . 4 " SRM A cheek och Lipab calcd aniuty Sens theme nb telala tear renga veoegenet cher y . at oan ett . arty iden pith tne DD ch ete Ser Br cores a, fj = .
SOR TRE a pe vt o a -22- + pall oe: ts jane pene gee ot, The Agency's perception of the dilemma, and the possible solutions to it, are covered in paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7 of a memorandum written by Chief, SR and approved by 3 Helms on 17 February 1964; : While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB directed mission, it has been generally agreed by both us and the FBI that he still possesses valid information which we would like to obtain. At the same time, we, at least, believe that Subject must be broken at some point if we are to learn something of the full scope of the KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and the role played by others in it. In addition, we must have this information if we are to decide what countermeasures we should take in terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in our security practices, and planning for future ° operations against the Soviet target. Admittedly, our desire to continue debriefing to obtain additional information may conflict with the heed to break Subject. Clearly, the big problem is one of timing. How long can we keep Subject, or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our aware- ness of this operation and how long will it take us to assemble the kind of brief we will need.to initiate a hostile interrogation in conditions of maximum control? a 3 8 g q 3 R| T dt 4 a “4 3 2 a 4 4 4 4 i 3 : tener Eat mr cans 148 asset Bteba ttt Boca nibs bode iw atadein 5 { | | If we are to proceed along the lines indicated above we should accept in advance the premise | that we will not be able to prevent Subject from evading our custody or communicating with i the Soviets unless we place him under such : physical restraint that it will become immedi- ately apparent to him that we Suspect him. This may not be an acceptable risk and if it is not, we should so determine right away and decide on a completely different course of | action. If this is to be the case, we should i | | an botnet ak ta td A agree to forego additional debriefings, place Subject in escape-proof quarters away from the Washington area under full-time guard and com- mence hostile debriefing on the basis of the material we already have (although the prospects ° for success would not be great). Disposal would : probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press Abbe tMes adeeb hacer sat tage, SECRET hada atllg esi pinata a =? - « tt 7 DARA em eer HOR ta Hn oN ADO seAstid Tatlerme Lahaih Pn nance Cee Reeeae een ern? an re ee mae anes ne emo as ie, Caine EO EN tr A a te OS tt mE “Fe e «
wae ve ne mmrnspenit tes FO ekg s wo e - & : “senna an STS NN aS NOSE EOWA I REAR rss sateen cere rere meer mens meee matt ene at SECRET te . -23- release to the effect that Subject had con- fessed to being a plant and had been allowed to return to Soviet control. {In the meantime, SR Division would: ] --Advise Subject that during this phase he will continue to live and work in the safchouse and will be escorted at all times when on shopping trips, visits to movies, etc., because of his faulty English and unfamil- iarity with the country, customs, etc. While we can explain this regime as needed for his security, we cannot keep him locked up in the house 24 hours a day. _inevitably give him some additional freedom. --Make available to Subject a portion of the {money} promised him which he can use for purchases of clothes, cigarettes, personal effects, etc. --Agree that whenever this first phase is over (four to six weeks) that he be permitted to take a two-week vacation with escort. The vacation period will be of greater benefit to us since it will provide us with an opportunity to review and make judgments on the vaiue of the information already obtained and also to con- sider the progress made in the other aspects of the case outlined below. During the vacation we ; can decide whether we should proceed to the : second phase or are ready to commence hostile interrogation under controlled condicions. I£ ; it is the former, we will have to reckon with : the need to modify the living and working arrangements for Subject in a way which will a Le Vt Penh Mite Ht MEME Be AMEE Batre Pome mi? rormemMNRNEe 95 , os SECRET : a es. smears TERE ka se is Sacre ” oF ihe RCT UCL Next NU eon or . a4 4 weedeat thetat fed we BB tae that rat tet vee oat anced Ba wae bah artes Somat corte EB, paket per re Ge be
14-00000 ; . a nee.) eee , q * ¥ £ ” ated dice Atanas i, ibis. aad j @ SECT @ aS T oi vera ied -24- ers are queen anette Lf ee it will be terribly important to make the pror-7r decision at the end of phase one. This decision will depend not only on our evaluation of the material obtained during the debriefings but on how far we have been ; able to go in clarifying other cases which i are related to Subject case and form an impor- : tant part of any explanation of the KGB's goals in this operation. fom nema ne? Pets teenoer aera tennntg en A ae nabiSoeatbeekahes Lifes baw Libsling oath Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambi- ‘ valence and uncertainty. On the one hand, he was housed 7 | ; in circumstances that his principal day-to-day handler 3 ; describes as “our typical, luxurious style..." He ; continues by saying that “there was all the food and drink } ! one. could possibly want .. . I remember all of the effort af : and the money we sper: to get a billiard table..." : On the other hand, this handler, who was assigned to this i case after having worked on the Golitsyn affair, was told at the outset that Nosenko was “dirty, that he had been sent by the KGB..." po nati te cane ne a Syerneerearen en ne opr greene oF det iene sorkTsan di Writing of his first meeting with Nosenko on 13 February, the handler recorded his first impressions of Nosenke: In this brief meeting lasting actually less than two hours, I couldn't prevent myself from putting him in three ,successive categories. In the first few minutes I put him in the cate- gory of a Cuban exile living in the Harlem section of New York City. This impression came to my Bind strictly on the basis of his clothing (dark trousers and sport shirt, black elevated shoes, Sharply vointed and with a design) and his mannerisms ... Ray a ee Sn SE eset ashen taht nfetenabecceee | | . Half way through the session I put him in the category of a big city but small-time con man. | q ned While dictating ... from his notes, he knew rare exactly what he wanted to say and how he wanted , 2 to say it. But when I had brief conversations with him on other topics, or when I saw him stealing glances in my direction to size me up, I could almost see the con man's wheels turning rapidly in his head. I had an urge to check my wallet just to make sure it was still safe. Here ca coaatn bee mimi Neen Ne ¥ 8 LE Sit nth cdtedlosinats aticitey SECRET ? ‘ 2 - : 5 ke sear tea eas stan net faa 20 re tea HINA aS KA naa Tig Devsetatenoe ame tae ente emer nts + ott, attri mate at + feast ee mot una emt NL rN GER BE 4 uP ae . saktatbdefdedlor 08D Re oro one |
As the session ended and we moved into the living room I pvt him in a third category. Before leaving the debriefing room I noticed : . how he touched [another case officer] on the bo .. Shoulder. When [that case officer] went down- ' stairs for a few minutes, [Nesenko] and I walked into the living room. During that -r, brief walk I decided to give him a President . Johnson handshake (hand and elbow grasp, Texas ~ style) on departure and a few sincere words about how pleased I was to meet and talk with . him, but his actions soon changed my mind. “Ye As soon as we reached the middle of the living room he gave me an unexpected and prolonged hug around the shoulders and waist, the type that one man gives another well known to hin : ; only after some achievement such as making the ‘decisive point in a football game. His i embrace really took me by surprise and I had to pull away from him without hurting his feelings. At this point I realized that I couldn't go through with the President Johnson handshake; he'd have to settle for less. In this, the third category, I saw him as a jazz musician who sells heroin on the side and has homosexual tendencies. A week later, on 20 February, however, the handler reported more favorable impressions, those of the Office of Security personnel assigned to guard Nosenké at the eee tenets ie ne + safehouse: . Subject is not at all concerned about his own security or the threat of assassination or kidnapping. He seems to think the present security system is fine... [This was in marked contrast to Golitsyn's behavior. ] i steamer = Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never i “under the influence” ... Subject is not a heavy smoker... ‘ At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table with the guards and acts as if he is one of . the boys. He does not sit at the head of the table but to the side. He always offers the ears Oh clone we a SECRET . Sagar aoe errr ener ea LEBEN ESE ACRE ST fot MegaR ee ARES URE emt nneN = BARONE moOTer ¢ Sarg emntnes ttreg mht tr atueeunun ctu eet O-tle beNi te AA SSR Re EE WEN deh tly enna REEDS TE be ee ae she - semnenagrens ean tere ae | 3 a <t 74 j i "4 y } te eee eenadmemnannetind e cererperets waren oo cot * oR oe % a ‘J eT A a ate pe eee be ate 5 ose Bhai ka + yrs fete a ve vent add bale Sate ator wehe! 2 mag teed aw thiptplendiatie maatontbaabeRths stoners to “alutp ale anse: hie ne : deter Lait, op?
14-00000 oo vata EMT Tt ceesenen arte BEE F siraemeeaneeleeseneneeneimetementeaaneaaeenemeiestenansneneenmaemertameeaiaameneeaneneeaacmeaaamemamaaaatlinnd dete nee tne nn ee eee ee gece ’ "ha apietraeneeeeeeries ment commenters en tote = 1 se ot eRe treet tert umm te Ammer" mr mm ne a atm ~ 26- 2 boys a drink, asks them to take more food, and kids them... He does not play cards, has shown no interest in chess, and has not mentioned checkers. He dees not gamble and doesn't seem to have any ‘hobby or inside activity to keep himself busy. He has shown a desire to play pool... Subject does not say anything for or against the USSR or the Communist Party. Even when viewing the Olympics on TV Subject never once commented on how good the Soviets were and how poor a showing the Americans made. The same could not be said for... [Golitsyn] .. . On the con- trary Subject wants to be an American as soon as possible. Subiect's sexual desires annear to be normal... Subject has not commented one way or another, for or against, any person associated with him, including the housekeepers. Compared with other cases he is ideal. He is polite, likes to kid, deesn't have a drinking problem, doesn’t have @ mental problem, and wants to become an American and work like and with Americans as soon as possible. Subject became angry only once and even then it was not a loss of temper in the true sense. The day that [the principal case officer] dis- cussed the schedule with him, Subject became. moody and started to drink alone. He told the guards that he wants to use his brains and work hard as Americans do. He feels that the present schedule does not utilize his talent to the fullest. The “schedule” referred to above had been outlined to Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which the principal case officer had assured him that “both [Chief, SR] and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about SECRET om necro era ee ere 8 eet ae eaten aed a, eeeel te a heratcgte tetd wate Coe ter eet rf . es arene re purernenapsromeananetene I~ “meme ceetm emt epene: tment ee ap Ry fe + Tt & vee ys gig aubhwtitie sedating, oBiaisialdlea B! a + © tamer te Seeding bias, tart th attad eat Mee ate” Le alee Awe ee ete ed 1 site NY Mee AS LGOTNE LA 88. 22 Anas ate Abvont ade Saga wht om et neimitinten date! belaabwmretae 5,
14-00000 dew ter ar ee we oD AT ERPORRINEA O R ine oe FG RA AP ERE A tnt emmenanccremnmnetnn se Ae niet eTERmTANE ett REET os Fe Pe ete ene a ae een cate me dee + eenntnaeti m ar OP aenaneRear Mae aA BLOBS Ldap Behe aR _ SECRET ae -27- future cooperation with him in operations against the USSR." Nosenko greeted plans for a period devoted to systematic debriefing with the statement that this “might represent an attempt to extract all his informa- tion from him, after which he would not be needed.” He also said he needed a vacation at "an early date in order to help him forget and get over the strain and worry of his abrupt change of situation, particularly the strain of leaving his family behind." The Problem of Disposition Far from being optimistic about our “cooperation” with Nosenko, SR Division was discussing the possibility of forcibly returning him to the Soviets if the “overall effort to break him" came to naught. In addition,-an alternative plan was being developed for the incarcera- tion of Nosenko, so that “there can be no question of {his]) escaping after he becomes aware of our attitude." Finally, it was agreed that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile recognized Nosenko as the author of the ostensible ‘anonymous letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought into the operation to back up our interrogation. Helms originally had some misgivings about this procedure but appears eventually to have agreed to giving Golitsyn *full access" to material from Nosenko, but not to Nosenko himself. The FBI viewed Nosenko much more favorably than @id CIA. As early as & February 1964, Chief, CI had sent a cable reading in part: « « » (FBI liaison officer] STATED . . . THAT FRIEND OF HIS KHO IS EXPERT IN.FBI QUICKLY SCANNED AEFOXTROT PRODUCTION AND CAUTIONED US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD" IN TERMS OF CASES ~~ KNOWN TO THEM. Later, in a memorandum to Helms on 9 March, Chief, SR Stated that “the FBI personnel on the case have so far indicated they believe Subject to be a genuine KGB defector." By implication, both Chief, SR and Chief, CI regarded this divergence of view as a serious problen. Their concern is understandable, because a subsequent paragraph of the Chief, SR memorandum contained plans for the following action, to be initiated around 1 April SEGRE Rie d . te Lee R ARN © Bem ae Becton A pimtich — wbabealbld cee © 7, v . veld castaeablbal Tah L me Tbe setae bal orate Le SA dele te nneiyigius beta 2 £4 Of ahPatedth nine wands im hernias Tiw ered be monte + - . . » «fk Et ce nai Rind an
14-00000 . oo _ aber ETRE RP LER SSE AER EE CASE LE A TEESE SETA EN SE TTT DED aS ERED ETE 0 TRENT: Ec COT ghy Mt SUPE OR EOE Opts Re LO te SE we ROY cane = * een d we eee on ase Amst es * 7 ‘ : fea “ eran ~ SECRET -28- 1964, which would not be appropriate if CIA were forced, as a result of inter-agency consultations, _ , to treat Nosenko as a bona fice defector: a. Subject to be moved to a high security safehouse under maximum guard. b. The BCI to inform the President, Secretary of State, Director, FBI, and USIB principals that Subject is a KGB plant whom we intend to return to Soviet control after (1) trying to break hin, and (2) publicizing his case. c. Retain Subject incommunicado for about three weeks during which time we will continue efforts to break hin. ° d. At the same time, commence the publicity campaign which will precede Subject's deportation. As a first step, there will be a brief official announcement probably by a State Department spokesman to the effect that Subject has confessed to having faked his defection at KGB direction in order (1) to penetrate US intelligence and security agencies, and (2) to discredit the act of defection by Soviet citizens. At the same time, a press back- grounder will be made available which will characterize this KGB operation as an act of desperation following a decade-of defection and disloyalty to the regime on the part of e @ score of senior Soviet intelligence of- ficers .. . 3 F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath While planning was going on for his confinement and hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken on a trip for two weeks" relaxation, beginning on 12 March. During this period, his consumption cf alcohol was enormous, and his behavior became increasingly erratic. Prior to his departure, he had on several occasions been violent; on one occasion he took a swipe with his fist at the princi- pal case officer and on another tried to strangle one of the Office of Security escorts.. SECRET , 23 Gige aSHs ‘ = ai ges FSi eon evantI 8 that Ren mnttaas wee men emrmaerrnee momen, ne mens ee RS OS me P See rmny menace oye cn te RE I a a ath eed aa, aie arate mene eneteaearrnerain tn ieee trene Vea agen meettton eum sega a - - + eR METI RET ete lei eres en antenna gp a . maesreae re cen wk a pene sense on eros paces Bath ctoree ate a" . wo BBR Tg ee - \ ‘ + DSA etaie Na Ale Rarer a Mz +. hatelldatds bay Seen S i tad Heth «9! : Bah rh Protas tne x Pare seeee} WE Ue threes se nn Pata bt wes! Rabe dng athe - ad . ae ware SUSE EP wh ak wadbadcandia iste Wee's arin got
=29- fasts} agit oe ceomontan MAY a eee tea ctabameale Hee 8s The handler who spent the first part of the vacation with Nosenko recorded these impressions: In my opinion Subject is under extreme ten- Sion and pressure. Any man who skips break- fast and starts the day off with alcohol is on his way to becoming an alcoholic. He drinks not for the enjoyment of it, but ; ; with an attempt to erase or lessen problems : of a serious nature. I suspect that these : tensions are the result of two things: _ one, fear on his part that he cannot follow Sant through with his assignment; and, two, his homosexual desires. I predict that the : Situation will not improve but grow worse. Yet the handler concluded on the following note: Despite our oral arguments and the various incidents we experienced, Subject and I parted on the best of terms. He gave me an affectionate embrace on the night of my departure, and in front of [the principal case officer] thanked me for my attention to his needs and patience in dealing with him. We agreed to see each other upon his return to Washington. During the last half of the vacation, the principal case officer arrived and took charge of the escort team. Nosenko was more restrained in his presence than he had been previously, but the principal case officer had no success in eliciting information from him during this period. Not only was Nosenko uninformative, according to the principal case officer, but he was also very tense and unable to sleep more than a few’hours at a time. i ! i t ‘ | t ’ i | Although debriefing was resumed upon returning to Washington, it cannot have been very successful. Nosenko was still drinking enormously and had by now discovered unfettered night life; it is doubtful that he was physi- cally able to respond meaningfully to interrogation during the day. On 30 March 1964, Chief, SR wrote a memorandum to Helms entitled "Final Phase Planning,” which Helms initialed and returned without written comment. Inter alia, Chief, SR had this to say: SECRET 4 no : = ° 2 2, - ‘ gine a nner re AENEAN OES Ll SAAD hE ERIE edn HO TAM Re aren Eee acest ~ a ARR EERRION RRREIN A oer met ignmne® mam ene EN HNO EE I Pm NRG 8, t eo ® ore fee or + t aa t ; aeoter roe ey ape an fet € foveal ta ea Re ak ae teers og ay roe: cece at net ae habe! fate te, te tae, soabehastl wGloeatd. o002 abe Le Des a hn bates? SBA MM 0 ne AE 4 Ahannat Badal Sanll ent oy dear + kahit ghee} we vibe 2s optim as si as a
74-90000 ; Caan Fano co -30- sy is mbna Maine bik. ; We have concluded that there is little to be gained by prolonging the status quo beyond next weekend and every reason to mo suspect that if Subject learns we doubt { him, he will try to escape. Accordingly, i we have instructed the security guards to ‘ be alert to any attempts on Subject's part ‘ to elude them... eh oe dn i Se mene exe rimnenet  poeenettmemeeticoetniienhiveiannnetinm sp aeREN iS ae Further scheduling must depend in consider- . able degree on the results of the interroga- i tion.- However, since we do not anticipate that Nosenko will ever break to the point of becoming completely cooperative, and since we must assume that within five or six days after the confrontation begins, news of our . action will have leaked out throug: the briefings (however necessary they may have been), we should be ready to take this action: the anetneee ed cues reaes Abe whe AKAD Lowel te te de wet bh ate vom a beteb die se anime eine one enema aen tn + t phe nda. ha Se ne eee gute! Mt ene eee an eree Have State Department spokesman issue low key statement indicating that Nosenko is plant with mission to seek out and report on bona fide defectors living in the United States. so Je eeabitederncntseligindtnten. — gheliled. bi tismdend casei dane merch LSC TET MENON CEEEE DA, owe om: Vaeaarotin ote VRE eoreeere ow aeeraw vo SECRET per mn AP Hint GPOGA etd es DPA RE an aN ee At eae armani a pm aetna toe ane ee HN putt TC ARERR ANNE RIOR RSNA AIEEE AA EINE TIT TREE AMES ORNL AN Ae re eee wi tne tie ay = | meer «grange pe * ate epee = sta Shimstabinn ducati tee sgh dan pay ea a ws — * Chews overtone hoe Saat +
14-00000 . soe € -31- Since failure to "break" Nosenko--i.e., force him to admit that he had come to us not as a penuine defector but as a KGB-dispatched agent--was considered virtually certain, plans were also being laid to re- i turn him to the Soviet authorities. Before doing : this, however, it would be necessary to: ee a at ch Bee ats ae wed oe DUE tod « « « Discuss with Legal Counsel the legal problems which might be encountered in ar- ranging Nosenko's deportation. The simplest method still appears to be [flying him] to Tempelhof in Berlin. Thence to 5-Bahnhof ; Tiergarten where Subject, in his best ; : civilian clothes, with diplomatic passport, , ro would be placed on an S-Bahn which then stops inside East Berlin only at the control point S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse. ‘ 4 . eae seen se ent OMe magne & doce . 2 + ’ . , oa ot tye a ro Siete eer PERN neta nee NepRR EN IEEE ECE “EERE NN: aE ple = : , ca eae) toot & Lobe LOS idea, Bch AS simi 8d aR enh tole ahead oy tabbewaue wt ae wet G. The Decision to Incarcerate we beet sc eneree sree ees tenn gang nate ame Although Nosenko had already contributed con- siderable intelligence of value (see Chapter IV), in- cluding information that led directly to the arrest of Vassall in 1962, there is no indication in the files from this period that the possibility of his being a bona fide defector was given any credence whatscever, either within the Agency or in discussions with other ; parts of the government. ; neatgp | tevin Suen avtenter mie nett ee oe s ted aatée eet Aah bee. wre | On the contrary, Nosenko was treated as one whose guilt had been established. Nevertheless, even while Chief, SR was registering with certainty his lack of hope for a favorable resolution, plans were drawn up for an “arrest,” strict confinement.and hostile interro- t gation. : : ‘ oy sete thle Bai 5 Ht tee The long-delayed polygraph evaluation was administered on 4 April 1964. It did not, however, take place under standard conditions. In his report of 8 April 1964, the ; polygraph operator stated: : ,During the pre-polygraph conferences with repre- sentatives of SR Division, the undersigned was informed that the polygraph interview was part ef an overall plan to help break Subject and elicit the truth from him. SR Division's ' ‘ RAI a tape haieahee toe eee a awe a = Sacabtatas SECRET int petra re ace ASS AA IS PEPE ATV El ANNES ARSE a APE ATL MCAS ER A OTE OAM TH UA ELMS ARRICARERREEI ILL, Totem en oe 6 arcs mee atc me ta te AGE * Wiel Fo aN MG by SRR SOR PHERECE O h ' seadota ; : 2 Bondalldlinatianebiaditedets salen erthi
aH nen) eos eatnbiren { { ry } i i 4 | | i aed . 3 « A grener a 32. instructions were that, regardless of whether Subject passed his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his polygraph interview that he was lying, and had not passed his polygraph interview. First Polygraph Examination Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding the examination, the polygraph operator's conclusions, as stated in his report of 8 April 1964, were categorical: It is the undersigned's conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific Mission or missions. According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and “soft.” On no occasion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the ques- tions which were asked of him. When the final test questions were completed and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic re- sponses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed. Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being SECRET sagen Hatin An expend naete poo PR ay Pet ne te nee Se aes ‘SRedhatg hind leu rena SRR RCE OLE OATES IRE ETE SE NER Olt Tak Sb RARER SARA ARTETA Ce ere ate en emt acre wnat Ween mercenary staan niet te AES aN ER ttt SRA AUT fade tow eS ities Las nbedaetingad Ree alisha Baie ge Sone ste Cane RE! wks. we ete tale Be ls cee wt Be ew © Manet abs is fa witiettetingg Kinds onlebeacat woe ht wo. toot ate ates peed phe ty . a lille 5 AE en teat batig rine Pes Bt: cock BY, 5
14-00000 wee 1 ata hes gore, ccoseye) cote i I I i 4 i i i { t 2) ge ' t . “C apprantmnr rem-rn el So een et gt terme wet re we ee ee ee % ~33- a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to the undersigned's direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence. After completion of the interview, the SR repre- sentative at the safesite was informed, in front of Subject, of the undersigned's opinion that Subject was lying and was a dispatched Soviet agent. The Subject was taken into protective custody and escorted to his new place of resi- dence. , Once arrived at the place of confinement, Nosenko was confronted by the principal case officer whe broke the news that Nosenko had been under suspicion since, 1962. The record of the meeting, a stormy one, is too long to reproduce here, but the foilowing excerpt will convey its tone: t @ Principal case officer: « » « Everything you have said in 1962 and 1964 is prepared, based on disinformation . All disinformation is true in parts. That's all right, we know that. Now if we can talk--what I want to do is talk the real truth ... We want to talk about the opera- tion which sent you and others to us... Nosenko: (In Russian} .. . I don't understand. What has happened? What has happened? What's the matter? I don't understand. SECHET inte Te On nen myrnencntenbiipicrenrammrmar tan” -caapmeinintgtagt nee aairenans aN - ee Ra ose eheclliende at st emomare oo” AP ay, re ae. eR VLBA ott eae beaming sao dont gdh Sb 5 enone evant a Mtwathtt tie hae nites : GaBr beast Dee ea taolth he. ebenad aie ehd eotadne yoke aw AMAR pe Serhan. Sabato ndbteg RUSE De bb Sande . 30 ue . tte 15h deaygt
2 nara marist aie | | \ a“ _ SECRET sea -34- Principal case officer: What happened in 1962? Nosenko: What happened in general? Principal case officer: Your operation was known from the beginning. Nosenko: (in Russian) I can't understand anything. I give you my word, but then my.word means nothing to you. I can’t understand anything. All that I could do I tried to do. I tried to do it for my soul. Chief, SR reported these subsequent developments as he saw them to Helms on 7 April: The results of che polygraph were reviewed with the DDP on the basis of our sessions on 6 April. with the polygraph examiner. He obtained \ but also uncovered for us that Subject is soméntdw concerned about his biography. We were all gratified by the fact that Subject was ready and eager to explain himself and in responding to questions under tense cross- examination, particularly with regard to the sourcing of some of his information, he became quite erratic, contradicted himself many times ° and became upset physically. carey pitino SET A SEEN Behe SECRET | * Despeesppestnoemene ecmememna ttst pede DATARS jab TG! ! eipcabtntsanisrav eee tern arent meena tareesin = wom romen en mnnam ne coag crammatmeciaretneh <acnaviatennat Oe URED HAE See Foy — 1 t a ale ee pie po Bite means OE MEE aie ne DERE Meet a BE eg, EES oe Gekatihh sen 4 cf ar laa denen Seats Bie ae bi mene teat eae, ot naskieilas Wbwcerameiets Lote bet et Seca Gg vee + nee tad alten trate. sts B
Behn cane Restreete Me ims et fates cme, east mditey Sably 17 elie HERS" oT abeat See aaa Had tA AES em epcaes tO ate ROR RE SACP ODS ESIC en ot aang « ~35- As a result of this session, we know that Subject can be thrown off balance by aggres- Sive questioning in those areas which we know to be important parts of the entire KGB opera- ; tion. Thus, we will continue along these ’ lines for several days with a specific inter- rogation plan mapped out for each session. Whether Helms was informed of the peculiar conditions under which the polygraph was administered cannot be as- certained from the record. Chief, SR simply told him that the examiner had “obtained significant reactions" and that “Subject can be thrown off balance ..." In this connection, it is useful to note here that, in a number of documents related to this case, this polygraph examination is referred to as valid’ evidence of Nosenko's duplicity, without giving the reader any hint of the unusual circumstances surrounding it. Even in the lengthy study of February 1967 (commonly referred to as “the thousand-page paper"), and in the shorter "green book" formally published in February 1968, one finds no cautionary notes. To put in perspective the developments of this case, both those already reported and those still to come, we shall therefore jump ahead briefly to quote from a formal Office of Security report covering a review of the 1964 examination. The senior of the three poly- graph specialists who reviewed it stated his conclusions as follows, in a memorandum dated 1 November 1966: ne ee eer SECRET 7 Sos [GRiats Saari abies inl a tata Spelt baclet Ech ty IRGOT yt et RANI Tne abe CAR NRE IN RL PN TM Na Fete cons Set et ta mea AT sae ego Fs Bibel LATS Grbatiche bien! neh oth meet Hee Bade ees aa fuabid bac ds). wits Che ahs wnbv te al eum his ancora ededat ana senda neve abd astsuer ch, ceects. tbe tat o toae Per be item net Rn domes wets Mab ad FR POL wad a oie? Abe ah es ete wo bd odin ten. Jansatiasabtaiettibones seh stata, ae
ar idee vot SECRET “= -36- dan penne MAE aL oT Even without the review by reviewing examiners, I considered the formal report dated 8 April 1964 to have been in error in that the con- clusions reached in the case were a gross misinterpretation of the extent to which the reactions added up. In fact, in some instances the Subject was deemed to be lying when it is known he was telling the truth. with the re- view by the reviewing examiners, I can conclude only that the initial examiner did exactly what the requestor asked; i.e., he was told to collect reactions and he did. The fact that reactions were not consistent (and indeed may not have occurred) was not important since it had already been decided Subject was wrong and the polygraph was used only to support his de- cision. eae te I. Incarceration and Interrogation . Many aspects of this case did not go according to plan, but one that did was the incarceration of Nosenko. : An Office of Security representative who periodically guarded Nosenko from November 1964 to May 1968, when questioned on 21 July 1376, described the regime as follows: Security Officer (SO): i i i j i t i | i i { | - . While he was [incarcerated], he was being held in a room in an old safehouse down there ... it was an attic room .. . and he was afforded 24 hours visual custody observance by the security team. : Q: What does visual custody observance mean? You mean there's somebody in the room with him? SO: No, the room had a special door. The top half of the door was a metal screen type where we were actually positioned outside the door on a 24-hour basis. There were two security escorts on duty 24 hours a day, and we were instructed to maintain visual observance of him--just ob- serve his activities. SECRET . aa * cpewenvine a mete 8 neem ane Fe rene NOREEN EPR KORE Cina aI ainT MAKOTO Penne stmuer tne when Ferre + a temo napennrcmnircmmr se acne s ea fin Tatanatmamcmtintte rte MS mR sihes! us 4 ca 4 4 -4 ie wneemttaied BAe hygglit diated. Ant Kaitcna be eitibned Ateavntnabese § ce vince cab ibaaabanees sina dee nad takes re ered whe adtan ah eather beta adele ae ow tp : milan Releer nen tat tewtoey sete if erecta acl bag Rial 5 pa ieee tate SEB a aubl he
ae tocar ovat RSE oe ATE 8 AAR Es IAAT eSATA as A ct tcc ft AANA aN REE AE aR an ay rent Meera tetra nae EN SRE TT Fone tn tn ON Feet Scuranemrwsnnenatinemnat neem abi ss BL tnt S Es AD in sia Sm EAR ASB OA ECP UCR IA." E as RACY i OPN east Dern sahara ae ne bemrtaemn ns Me os SECRET. «=m Q: Now, what was the purpose of visually observing him 24 hours a day? SO: Apparently to see that he made no attempts to escape, made no attempts to injure himself. There were never any problems along these lines. For much of his confinement, the principal break in a day's monotony occurred when Nosenko was under interrogation. It is not necessary here to cover the various interrogations in detail; suffice it to say that, although they were conducted fitfully, with bursts of activity followed by long periods of quiescence, almost every technique of interrogation short of physical violence was either tried or at least considered. A few of the high points will be summarized in the succeeding para- graphs. Meanwhile, Golitsyn had been brought into the case and was being employed as a behind-the-scenes consultant in connection with the interrogations. Golitsyn was given for analysis voluminous material relating to the case and was told that ‘one of the most perplexing aspects of the Nosenko case to us:at the present time is not whether he was sent (we all certainly agree with your view that he was sent on a mission) but the exact nature SEGRET rt rg ee ster enemy caeamba” Bhae totem Ge tae A epee? ii % ne 4 i] § “Fh, “8 af ya Ad % 4 i oh a bt es a j | if ; 4 | aan "2 t i . +1 i } + +t } i t ; ; ‘ 5 i i i : ' “1 ’ 1 1 3 : ? 2 t * a x ‘ 2 by & ? . : : , 4 j i ; i : } i a ; i . i $ 1 z i é 4 : 4 2 at 3 :| ; iy 4 ‘ , ae ae ree gece So . i ’ a ’ vey Seg Gotta “otto: ~ fy
a a ttebees donee heen 1 ofS SECi * = 38- ~ of his service with the KGB." Golitsyn's role will be covered more thoroughly in a separate chapter. To ensure cooperation in the interrogation, an “Outline of Action to be Taken Should Subject Refuse to Answer Requirements" was drawn up on 25 August 1964. The tenor of this outline, which essentially set the basic| juntil late 1967, is conveyéd by the following excerpt: | fo, ' } } | i however, will any of these privileges be removed i except with the prior approval of Chief, SR. The basic policy to be fellewed during interroga~ tions was outlined even more fully in a lengthy memorandum of 2 November 1964. Like all other documents on this sub- . fect, / fr _ _ How the Interrogation will be Begun: | i H . i , Sos SECRET i Fo i “GpRar cc nee renee once an Pen rata RECT ABE te ett te itn eteremtneh ath te AITO LPR ID fot SUCRE Gy ARTE aK remem eer ew ute mnrneniemmmtet tats commana fk Ree ae tere net Aen H ? * Fa : > : : ‘ Dumper eaermire + « Pelee octet ae cibpateeyteAm om “ TMM 85 Nie Aiedand, Pinitihebe Wiesbaden dnlhabucd then eet int fab Sythe ee ldG iver ote abr cton, ome racbeonse ath pel Dbonadlr, se delaie by alate data wide wet tee rl erro Sas dee ‘ ww suNatlngbemunbg plies, ” atege ‘ ASR. et ted fBaSaat ara»
fue an goss oeepet ome Cm ane os dtl a € & ¥ i i | we ! L i 5 t 2 ‘ : > [3] 1 : | 2 i _ om } i 7. ] tag Fl) = | e5 74 ‘ ta | nist fr o ea ae be ° 3 | c Po Cond i = ‘3 a | es Fc i _ | & 8 i : 3 | ond © oy he be 4 nN | 3 o et 2 , ong Pm ; % a } Ae 14-00000 epee Darren eee om eae = arte Oo EE ERMINE Go ree + Rene Teee op rngariae” licens!
14-00000 ne aw ernest HI eae WETS ve ! H . ‘reaaRgRAtno santas amenmnenrentc eters ARREST Jao BTA ta Bens DUANE USRONERHe EE i 0 ee Tn ere MEEREN nA SUNS Ue Neen AA merce emem a +o Hm Sn enn aI, et ebiters di ‘ - 40- The possible outcomes foreseen as a result of the interro- gation were also based on the assumption that he had been lying about his reasons for coming to us: Full Success: .If Subject confesses fully, he will have broken with the KGB and will become depen- dent upon us for. his security and well-being. After full debriefing and establishment of bona fides he will presumably be returned to a con- ventional safehouse and a life similar to the January to April 1964 period in which he will be permitted to go out with a security escort while we continue his expleitation and plan his future. F Partial Success: If Subject makes significant admissions and falls back on a second level cover story, he will be kept in the present safehouse. His personal circumstances and intensity of interrogation will be determined by the situation obtaining at that time. Failure: If the interrogation fails, we would pian to put him “on ice" for a period, then interrogate him again. For this interim period, Subject would be transferred to visibly more SEGHET 3 ; ai 5 ‘ EI . +t a re : OE 4 . a . 4 rod 14 a t ‘ * i - q , 3 \ . f [ a ; ; i } . ¢ 7m 3 ~ E : ' | 3 i 3 ' i { t j Sermemecpenppmeteeeyeas wrererriw” “nee trent raenr etme mn en * Wife tte mhllent Babe Sento i) A ae be eat abe ayy bee ST nm ey ne he tne entene * a Sn ir ioc ray ' t Kotys lo hae Ne hal seep Seiad a. werd BRA fe tat be ant z ? oy ae fa venes in said betednns fe
est . grnney ra) -4]- wet ce taremnantareare oF permanent and more secure quarters. From the makeshift physical set up of his ; resert quarters, the large number of guards who rotate weekly and the round-the-clock visual observa- tion by two guards, it is obvious to Subject that his quarters (and therefore his situation) . is temporary. As long as he knows that, he can hope. Our only hope of breaking Subject will be to allow him to convince himself that he has got into a situation from which he can extricate himself only by cooperating. This could be best achieved by breaking sharply with the present situation, placing him in permanent quarters, preferably remote and more primitive than his present quarters, physically secure and resembling jail, and capable of being manned by a minimum of guard personnel who would not * keep him under constant direct visual observa- tion. No Headquarters case officer would visit him, until he has given sign that he has changed his mind. This period would last for several months, pending another attempt to break him based on information obtained in the interin. he J. Elaboration of the Plot Theory 3 4 | The stringency of the rules governing treatment of | Nosenko varied from time te time, but the general trend was to take an ever harder line towards him. Since it i was assumed that he was a KGB-dispatched agent, he could only satisfy his interrogators by admitting that such was the case. But, while he would from time to time at- tempt to placate his questioners with admissions of having lied or incorrectly reported certain past events, he would i. mever admit to the key accusation of being KGB-controlled. The inevitable result was not only greater harshness toward him but a gradually spreading suspicion in regard to other agents, past and present, who seemed in any way to support his bona fides. This development is mirrored in a memorandum that the principal case officer wrote ; after a visit with Helms on 19 November 1964: : H g In connection with Nosenko, Mr. Helms referred . to it as one of the greatest time consumers he had ever seen. I remarked that I felt the time was well spent since our examination of this r > ? : % SECRET | Bartiggcn setae. MvmumemsconpreER fo ENT al Btn cHSY eALERTS EERE REINS th! SttaA NF PALER MIRA ite ALE en to aan etteenerta percent sot ane OTOL e when tHE eg Meret Rw Vo ah L onnanth ddd Babe. we tebete oe * tyes ee ee ee ao Barthes Cie tet seen + sande
wa smetnawiee Tat Soh SF nan tei a prt et Ee te I te AS ESN Ee IR tn SA OTEENTERE AS arts ME AOE NRG HE ne + on ‘ae sede e Eh ETET TEP TERAE EEN RAEN oh, EPSRC MERSIN RZ Ct hy IED ay MG IR SUN DEB DHCD UR noe OER ANE 1Hthme A ee anptnetas SECRET a -42- case had opened our eyes not only to security threats in our own midst and within the US government, . Because Nosenko refused to “break,” however, it was hard to adduce proof of Golitsyn’s theory substantial enough to convince Helms, the FBI, and other officials and organizations not so deeply committed to the theory. of facts, and suppositions masquerading as facts, on which the case was based. The theory was therefore difficult to challenge; there may even have been reluctance to do so, because the main proponents of the disinformation theory frequently referred to unhappy consequences that would flow from abandoning the course upon which the Agency had embarked. Should the Agency change course, for example, by simply returning Nosenko to Soviet hands, terrible, though ill-defined, consequences would cer- tainly ensue. As the principal case officer said (again re ns} 20 November 1964 memorandum of conversation with elms): I pointed out the potential dangers of return- ing Nosenko unscathed and within a short time. SECHET “od BR rage elie AR etn ee reat Fee mete eee emer remnant oy eemnsem ttt omer apes “Hen platen 9 & nw na lututnbsvekseboaed dbase cede Tt ar geuter terra nmenoe ln  SPeneienaanrdine meet are 1 etal amc 6Gee debi mth liad OBE 025 tw Sou gd K rants se deme Se yee te tche wanda ba othe el oe get hae wee Saas ONE oe he Le tue Actua Mabe he AS Rhee — ~athfilomt A dedy abanwnnee te te wae tds A q
14-00000 fees I ht avemetee tae aetnennasmetete men wet fetae aerere mn wpe tet or cannons weomnslaste oo ou tease F ~ e"" I thought the KGB would be . . . concerned [by implication, amazed and delighted] only by the fact that a defector thrust into our mits [sic] could expect such an easy fate if uncovered. Life in a Vault The unforeseen stubbornness of Nosenko had meanwhile brought SR Division to an impasse from which there was but one escape--the more-or-less permanent incarceration of Nosenko. Nothing that the latter said would be be- lieved except the one admission that he steadfastly re- fused to make (i.e., that he had been dispatched by the KGB), and, although Helms wanted to solve the problen thus created by simply turning Nosenko back to the Soviets, this solution was resisted by the division. The upshot was that, on 27 November 1964, Chief, SR wrote: , « « If he fails to convince us {which he can't) and refuses to confess what we already know, the US government has every intention of protecting itself against this dangerous provocation by detaining him indefinitely. SECHET aekige Sent eka ernnS Y detepire eed _ : = ogress rennet mie eters A ey en nme ny one tment ere PRE era emetomeni ete va ute mean oy me re ew or mere anaeteel ra URRbY, oa te . see epepentee meeesgegm ay ' wt é secemeneebae ent: ureprimetsmraa ST sreieanseens As . eo my ndash Rana Reco dente. < ew her ab ata . ‘ we tiled ei alia dey babe ee peed chin ead hmennaddie byeld dd te aa ve ernie Blinn ass td oe we 7 tT EA eos OY, aie F onthe 1 on
14-00000 . # ‘ Pe SPAS an gph sof OCA Ne Bat DORN menermermee unset tere ws th | Fy grenry “ pean ITS eB RIS US DR eh cae las potnaaeoe emai rent mentee cA RGR TAT INT As the new installation neared completion, Chief, SR on 15 June 1965 wrote Helms: We believe that we have gone just about as far as normal interrogation techniques will take us, and that the time has come to prepare Sub- ject for his more to the ostensibly permanent detention site . .. It will be ready for occupancy on or about 1 August. Chief, SR/CI visited the site on 11 June and reports that the installation is excellent frem every point of view. Before returning the memorandum, Helms penned a marginal note next to the above paragraph: "I would like both you and (Chief, CI] to examine this site." If Heims had had any doubt about the site's suitability, he must have been reassured by a 28 July 1965 memorandum addressed to him by the Director of Security: On Tuesday, 27 July, the Chief, CI Staff, the Chief, SR Division and the undérsigned [in- spected] the newly constructed special detention facility .. . As you know, .. . it is planned to utilize this facility to hold AEFOXTROT for an indefinite period... By mid-August, the time had come for Nosenko's transfer. The events surrounding it are recounted in a 19 August 1965 memorandum for the record: As planned, . .. [the principal case officer] had a brief "confrontation scene" with Subject CY SECRET . . e bo seppeerecuee go cme anes te elon ween end oe mee ce aa ma ‘ make t Aa athe “Ghee wo te smccibtilalion phe abi “aA Sn eed ~ ae ‘ bic Aa Rv peal Eas ate ey ~ bk ctednatadobdndd sSlres cmbtne stesens mdesten § oe Beek wanes 0 Ge tm nee es OE ents ceteutlens gw Moke 8 Ne Brgate ut wren ab te Bs 3 af
$ ‘rict’ e OTe adons SECRET " ~&5- on the same evening, immediately prior to his removal to new quarters. The purpose of this session was not to deliver a new message of any sort, or to give Subject "another chance to confess"; everything that could be said had already been said by .. . the previous inter- rogators, and there was no doubt that Subject understood perfectly well the meaning and importance of what had been said to him; also, it was recognized that Subject would sense an impending move or change of some sort, and that it was inevitable that he would hope that the change would be for the better until he saw otherwise. The purpose of the confrontation was rather to close the circle: to show him that although [the principal case officer] had not seen him for over a year nothing had changed, and nothing would change until he told the truth. An additional effect would be to empha- Size that the interrogators who had worked with him in the interim were fully responsible and authoritative, and that just as Subject had been told when he was first locked up in April 1964, what he was up against was the collapse of the operation in which he was involved. Finally, [the principal case officer] would stress ... that the "investigation is closed" and that Subject had only prolonged and tetal isolation to look forward to now unless and until he decides to confess. The meeting took place just about as planned. It lasted for 15 minutes only (2100 to 2115) and was essentially a formality, although it is hoped that Subject will have reason to re- flect on it in the months ahead. As can be seen from the attached summary transcript, Subject did not display any hesitancy or indecision, and his answers and statements were made in a mechanical manner. ee pee Fo meee BA HE cee ae oe SECRET 2 “Sag Sond at oat z paki Nasir moe Bea iaan wilh dip seat That QAR ST ORS SO EOT id aeRO RANE” SAK te mes ik mae ten ir rome mem am 2 RO AE ghee tay 4 6 oe er merteteneten eo RB . ; en wanes mente ereer encima scene nt vetelae lb nal bemelagdettliem mall ia wa ales BEDE chitsencb button, audit bisdcirened stale bE SGT BTR RET BAU Zee pace ae Con a MEIER ad pallele cette, nes tare tag . 3 arin ttbeeeaR, ea ce ee eg . dk & cioadaticed ae of) ead é ate! are ete matwtlaslan Pane vane 1 eh Biprndecte der tatin ane attion gd
14-00000 2 ~ 46- : ae c ia ie Bs es Sa dye Sele Sere 3 ie i hes 8 elt dobbs Be Gabel A Neds + ai ene h2 ine ah heal a at etcrelicahics tae daie See ene meermmcon inde ne tegen ne se te 1 etal DDR ot eats to rest ecutews ot cane boa aitlern” Ste ae Seana, waco renee ee dele ate stg Ties Mee atm Seite Ie SNE CeOONT CRRA | Nt ore + ses ne A Laan ee mene e At this point, we must pause to consider for the moment how the period that follows is to be covered. Because there were long periods of time when no human being other than the guards was in contact with Nosenko, and because he was not allowed to keep a diary, the story of his sojourn from August 1965 to October, 1967 does not lend itself easily to narrative presentation. at ype piraeprenar oe oqemtI retres Yet this period cannot be ignored. It constituted over half of Nosenko's solitary confinement. And that three-and-a-half-year period amounts to five percent of i the total life span of a man who lives to be 70. ores be eatin ayer A GRR. 7 ‘ snd atandnatniathvaiyideestest.. — dbllabigsai bell et Scbanaas ee * Obviously, then, this period will weigh heavily } in the findings made at the conclusion of our study. “ For these findings to be valid, they must be made on the basis of as much empirical evidence as can be gathered. Because the effect on Nosenko of this long period of confinement can only be dealt with speculatively, such few remarks as we have on that subject will be pcan eras arede atod $04 ps. 0 + melnpetieinesrmabnee iq entgetre skeen 3 a Sc aS DD IPE ofA eC PTE SABA eS LEE EECA SEH Sle SAO POSES ALT OEE RA ® ir eh ee SECRET Pappas ee nme eeeentmemtttanen et SRN RIS 0 SERS MBE ae DER MEE AIRE AHI & Sanat mmcttnmamantenn malintes —w ewwnue tee mveveabemne *4 ewnne mints Lee + 0 ecenreaqesrananeay . eel at re ae
14-00000 oe obs de career sot 3 : “ SECRET “ a : ; ‘ 4 confined to the relatively discursive chapter on "Psychological and Medical Findings." Within the body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to coverage of the main recorded events, none of which are seen through the eyes of Nosenko himself. . ‘ We now resume our narrative. i a i 7 e e 2 e Cd I | ' On 13 August 1965, before Nosenko was locked into 1 his cell for the first time, he was read the following i instructions, which outlined the basic rules to be fol- ‘ lowed from:-then on: i Cell This is your cell. You are to keep it clean ; ° and will be given cleaning materials for this purpose. | Reading Privilege t . You will be permitted one book a week which you may retain in your cell. Smoking Privilege . - You will receive a daily cigarette ration. , Exercising Privilege Every day, weather and other factors permitting, you will have an exercise period. Writing Material ; ; Writing material will be provided only for correspondence with the appropriate authorities concerning your confession. Schedule This prison operates on a schedule. You will . become familiar with this schedule and adhere to it at all times. i “Bag ceotenr rere cere en AT ACP BE SEE . pia Set Race teen Re ORT aw Renate ea tram eminent ie neater ae meres TE RUN ce RAE ae Se RCCRNORE EEN re POST RB ETee  ~ — ee Ren reece Cre eo Or eet ae +" + teeters te cnenernee “cermin memmniNee mepecyrem 3° earner Reena i ee rena ec mmemre nmin inet AGUILAR werk atone Mba ie t wooed ted Citak adied, a wea ane weal Shaseae’ anatalpetm aston mara tebweder. whether? an or es ae eee at dee wk ete se gheriicdeeone auch”
ae en eire centenary Me | | SECRET “Diba iat tik at enorme itn cnarmen neraenson am cma menace “a SECRET “y -48- Withifithe framework of the above rules, which were Strictly enforced, Nosenko's only diversion was reading the one book per week that he was at first allowed. He did not even have the distraction of being questioned, for, when queried by Helms on 12 January 1966, Chief, SR stated that no one from SR Division had seen Nosenke since the beginning of his confinement there, five months earlier. . On 1 November 1965, his privileges began to be re- wae +e fro wacmonten ote eercnetuap enemas spon enema * mt » x. fa eter a tl End oe duced, for reasons that are not always clear from the a ee Some time in January or February 1966, Nosenko claimed to be suffering from auditory hallucinations. In a memorandum dated 18 February 1966, Chief, SR re- ported: aot oearnteres te emer tame weer s macernues enaEeY a 3 + smohvite oitigtnas tu c? ae snvkntibea tlatan! allt. eas Baste te sb ket, f pbc em myae ate gare ae ee de lead toe tobe, Rb AS ng ati itt ane oe Ne ° vempogmgegpae neta cose es “Sarasin Reine ARSE ATR TE ~ermpinareuvagane apgenenRpyemarmere-rrem samy arm ewantencenytan 8 = 4 4
a are a meeeeane mene RN LR eee a mn a at A oe Rect eee name —arattn nis etm Amdt | i “Blggieastsa cedenervemimeneremeren entre weermcsmananrs setae i A SRE ARSED BIRAI HERON Me Pe BANG ere ee TOT oe mmamcemn a RIN ATTA Aiea Gt Te “ks § i t i e vi y ar > aa? poem meen crmeren cinik apgee 7. + “4 SECRET i -49- shoe and his spoon, the engine of an aircraft overhead, and a bird in a nearly tree. When emanating from various objects, such as his | questioned, he said that the voices were say- A omnes. ween 884 3 ok 98 | oni Nosenko's | |triggered a special meeting on 24 February 1966. The resultant memorandum for the record, written by a member of SR/CI, is worth quoting at length: pater eeeet areas venir semi het seman wet acreeenpeener tae sear stem reny camer ee The undersigned entered the Conference Room ' after discussions had begun, so some of the- initial remarks are not noted here. aeebed iho! wihone a bhablaeitind ewe vate nde ihe aCe beng athe door aol ned a da 4) raphe 2 bs SECRET 7 : a gdriediautadh at hed Seed
14-00000 wil ~F : ~50- a2 of zi + “4 fe E psychiatrist] didn't describe how, but presumably the technician commented on it to Nosenko) and Nosenko, in [the psychiatrist's] opinion, has now picked this up and is trying to recoup by saying that he now does everything in ; English--think, speak, everything. pee cmp Bore meee + At this point, [the principal case officer] described Nosenko's recently begun word games, in which he takes a Russian word and then figures out aS many root derivations as possible, as ; an illustration of how ridiculous Nosenko's j claim is. [The psychiatrist] continued to say that Nosenko is now agreeing to take medication and is asking ; for additional medication to help raise his spirits. [The psychiatrist] has teltd the base ' ! . medical technician not to answer Nosenko directly, but to “let it be known" to Nosenko that the medication he is now receivine will helo him. SD asahnieameeteenaeemeniennhibaiell epproanewr egreebigryapepn Tee probably feeling the effect of isolation and is making this try to get out. When he finds that this doesn't work, he may eventually decide "to hell with it’ and start to talk. ... [the principal case officer] said that he and [the psychiatrist] agree that, should Nosenko raise the issue of his alleged insanity during the upcoming examination, the best response should a ed SECRET | Jpaeainne acre sc nemettires meen gta igenen an momar nen EU tis akan Co aKa dons naan cermemcnanae es FN oak Sesh atman NRE + Ne MORIN IRORA ORNs ty erent el diser DeteaitinteettteiaAED ee St tain bt tantenttn  eete t HE tty HR EE EL RIRETTN  RTN Re  tecet an gig ~ ®
tet + ved whet ow ey SECRET 4 -$l- tee tee etn ett that the wording of any such response would, of course, be up to [the psychiatrist]. In support of the above, [the psychiatrist] then said that he had gone over things very carefully during his January visit and, on this basis, can see no basic change in Nosenko. When [the psychiatrist] arrived at the site he had remarked that he had come for Nosenko's annual physical examination and when he was leaving he told Nosenko that he would see him again next year. In [the psychiztrist's] opinion, Nosenko reacted to this by saying to himself: “How can I get out of here?" He has apparently decided that the best way to escape his present ; Situation is to be sick with something that . can’t be handled locally and then it will be , necessary for him to be moved to a hospital. {An Office of Security represehtative] then asked if, under conditions of prolonged con- finement, there is not a chance fara nersen- _. | [The psychiatrist] | “@6es Not believe however that Nosenko fits in . this category. san ch at SRO CRNRSORNRSE Aeetcte ecemmetasreciomcamcsei enamine tte Sin yy nine ee ven orate st wee $s ig] e e pk) food pm Ms = oe ror fend acd 6 fo] rR my — fede Fa) 4 © 2] = 4) og aa SECRET fe F came 1 i adap nate Se Ra ni sn neni three oe statin mene 48 oad ne. . ae pep F 2 , ’ J webs ne ae de Ante ote, eateries nem sewn A oh ctvetoet 7 ORE mene nate onam pe Rome ean seetiiean  omeie Regt cree me ene in meaaeanery mre eet: gt teat hace ais 1 ' agent tet tem en pean etmene ee 1 BS OTe a ee ve ee * : rhs arc re te
14-00000 . ard ic wh \ e a meee sagan eAenpenee cenmyrenn come ww . “ grener “a & -52- ce cence A ES [The Office of Security representative] then asked what sort of behavior can be expected in 4 person who is actually so affected by his imprisonment. Whether he could be ex- pected to become violent or behave errati- cally. [He] said that he was asking this question from the point of view of his respon- Sibilities for guarding Nosenko. [The “! psychiatrist] replied that such behavior ' can take almost any form, that there may be : changes in physical b ior __eatinoe and i oo / {The Office of Security representative] next commented that Nosenko is again asking for reading material and asked [the principal case officer] if he wanted to cive him representative] then a5 whether Nosenko has . . any sort of skin disease, pointing out that the guards have to wash his shirts two or three times to get them clean. Both doctors said that Nosenko is not afflicted as far as they i | j | i | . The Office of Security : | [The psychiatrist] expressed the opinion ‘that nothing should be changed, at least until after the examination on 1 March. seenges [The psychiatrist] remarked that things are ~ bound to change as far as Nosenko is concerned-- he is either going to stop faking or things will | | SEGRET i mat aS ae it  ncs es eigen ayy tA RW kal ae tnievi8 bah Tn POTD EDT ON oc aA NOT OPER Hee en cacateT, ¢ mp atm nce tometer Rr eA gd ; * Foie es enanianiia Scere ace + RORY Gece aA Hentai aie tle Me Se Mme resem MEOH may Aeente Cw #7 ‘ aw — beers Ps F ~ a rs ae as’ a . wo ste dept mmr contagtlag agit ans * iis . i prota, ‘ a
14-00000 seer et : SECKET oon a 7 ; a é t *S { ~53- ° . . i : get worse. [The principal case officer] added ; ; 4 : that we (SR) are working hard on other sources : ' of information, that things seem optimistic ‘ ‘ : right now, and that this is no time to falter. i “i : He added that Mr. Helms is keeping current of | ; : the situation and goes along fully with i ; present plans, without changes. ‘ , f s [The psychiatrist was] ne ~ | ; Nosenko is now receiving. i + : i | | : | 2 i i i On 1 March 1966, the principal case officer and : | and SR/CI representative accompanied the two doctors b to another examination of Nosenko. One doctor conducted - i : i the examination, while the other members of the party 7 : observed it on a television screen. None of the four 3 men gave much credence to Nosenko's claim of hearing i voices, but the following was noted: J 74 ee int ; a Po, i } . | a 4 ~ whewee “ AO a hd SNE Fa Be But, beyond this, it is difficult . _ SECRET . . ne enum aero : ose ve cna «sate SERED EE OEE SSR EERE EEC e ~ ‘ oo r) FPS “thet © AR ph BBE GENER We WOU AFB Neo ST are ore fine cy Mactad ah ne ae - Pte F tember: y os TESST RINT aA i BEE eR TRE met Ocoee conan ws eaten a 6 $4 4 cere mee mn eho momar (anit ROTOR SIT RESO et a meet 64 ham um inten ay At neem mR, eter oan . .% 4 ’ 4 * o q ‘ { , : : * . bom *
grr tent ire Beater rh ee SECRET ' nt ~S4- to interpret the significance of his remarks and behavior during [a second doctor's] inter- view--on one hand there were indications of deterioration; on the other Nosenko is an astute actor, who was clearly playing a role for [that doctor]. Bearing in mind that these superficial indications may well be a part of this act, Nosenko appeared far more subdued, almost despondent, compared with six months ago. For most of the interview, he slouched or Sat listlessly in his chair and only sel- dom did he lean forward and, by the motions of his hands, attempt to reach and to secure the understanding and belief of the interviewer. There appears to be a slight deterioration in his English-language fluency (see transcript below) and his replies were broken by frequent pauses, incomplete sentences, and confusing revisions. Nosenko's changed outlook next took the form of two letters to the principal case officer, written in mid- April 1966 (although incorrectly dated, because by now his calculation of the passage of time was no longer completely accurate). The first, and briefer of the two, read: I ask you to excuse me for my baseness in 1962 and 1964. Now I have completely realized ail my delinquencies and have reevaluated my past Life.” I want to live an exclusively honest and modest life and I am ready to work in whatever place that it may be possible, taking into account my knowledge of Soviet Russia. I believe that I have sufficient strength to live only a real life. I ask you toe help me. The second letter was even more self-accusatory, and was clearly modeled after the self-criticisms exacted from prisoners in the Soviet Union. It began: My despicable behaviour from the beginning of my acquaintance with you in 1962 led to it SEGA AUN ihe peepee Heat oatedBe ROL 8 ot wee mnmeee ciauacenamecinen mito “athe stey  —ne tee ce ent cee ES BE feng tere i i ! earutaracde dba te a! amelie oa atnse atteds wie ted, tee wumnon! bates hte cee SE waht rad ba 3 ater cua BR ats seth at kat take Seach aden Sailb Pa ateSbiee, eaten eee tall na edt af me mene neon alates BB BaS Le
14-00000 Fs eeenaaenmensaniinndmminetiotanmannnedanatennenenaenteepemetnennammennmemmnineimrenemenamemmemmnasaememnammmemmmmnmiammmameneme deneieemetmmemmmEetiememtaneee Eee Ee ° : e are -55- |G we ence he entaben tet be? BPE ELS PTE being necessar~’ to create special conditions : for me and to assist me, which has finally helped me to realize all my delinquencies and mistakes and to reevaluate all my past “life.” I should have honestly told you everything about myself, about my moral principles and my,life in Soviet Russia in order to start a conscientious life in June 1962. This’ letter next summarized Nosenko's career from childhood until his arrival in the United States, and admitted that although he had been documented “errone- ously" as a lieutenant colonel he had actually never held a military rank higher than captain in the KGB. It concluded: ‘ Work in the KGB was the chief and deciding ; period of my degradation--drunkenness, debauchery, baseness, and falsehood. ee ce eo I should have told you all about this in 1962 or in 1964, before flying to America. I started my life in the United States of , ' America absolutely incorrectly. My behaviour ’ was base, dirty, and boorish. The creation of isolated living conditions ? and the appropriate assistance were necessary for me. But I was unable toe honestly and . directly tell everything about myself in 1964 or in 1965, right up to the last con- versation with you. And only in 1966 did I gradually begin to realize ahd to correctly understand all my mistakes and delinquencies and to think about my behaviour. And only here was I able te reevaluate all my past “life.” Now I can think correctly about real life and work, and therefore I address myself to you because you know me more and better than anyone else, with the request te decide. the - question of my future life. By work against the Communists, and only with real life, I will try to justify the confidence placed in me. Ra eA MR apie tiny URGRiie te AERA OIL TRIO Ls ET nem se Pal fe de SECRET repre teem erent ate eeu AT te at tk cfemid mine eontea ermine ANA MeaeR deerme Nt Aten etnetnwtieah 1 anaconda Pr 1 eC. . Te ep : oe rE: S24 Te ome te we 4 . : Ash es i ek age He bs Tots wepithtlaeh attested oldie  meedbbetil Sb eeenabinotltiveden — onadidy ap cbitebedd: tear abe b baths teenth. aes onder Aids ahiciehted baa ad tchnne 6 5 at tad dyjnda taba Bind . ee tM a . bn Tt te! Lad Sea ote 0 'tooe aa a
14-00000 -56- - The Chief, SR commented: The letters themselves do not represent a com- plete break but they reveal that his defenses are weakening and he may be seeking a way out. He tells essentially the same story as before but with more discrepancies of detail which Suggest further deterioration and, by this time, an inability to recount his legend i consistently. The most significant change i is that he now admits he was only a Captain in the KGB and not a Lt. Colonel. On the other ——tion,// crn anes WENT A FF + termini emma At em CORRES SNM ++ “NOR Se 8 Ke . : 4 1 bincdst le phd UES and ed.2 ant, * e ae ye A a Gade te et ate Beg ae ate Ae = ey bn) ivy ww ia is] ml oO pS) ia! al iS) El 154] Ce [ay ty tS] md pmo 4 io ES) le] tow o o a) (pate t tents alton ® ee edabtine ered Tbe atone t+ = pen reepeneeees On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the rank of Lt. Col. was part of the KGB pre- pared legend for Nosenko, and not simply his own improvisation. This is proved by the fact that one of the personal documents that Nosenko brought with him to Geneva in 1964 was a TDY travel order which Nosenko claims to have used to travel to Gorkiy .. . [and] was clearly a deliberate plant by the KGB and there can be no question of its being filled out erroneously. Furthermore, the rank was necessary to sustain the fiction of Nosenko's high supervisory posi- tions, which in turn were necessary to explain his access to the information he claims to have. sedlateadete, ly wlansanichumals atin NawssPitacantih, Cingyinb! 1 Aside from the hope they offer for success in breaking Nosenko, the most interesting aspect of the letters is their tone. He does not com- plain of our treatment of him but on the con- trary expresses appreciation for it and says that it was entirely justified. They are the : latest in a series of indications that Nosenko . ; me is weakening. They follow an attempt to feign . . oo insanity, an abortive hunger strike and some erratic behaviour concerning his exercise period. SECRET Reagan ee Panriteraete teen DEE TOEUENGANE RIE AED? TOR STONE DES Pane SAE DEEN A eet aN A 87 wee oe eh ep mmstanne erect RoBi agen Or ents cane? c aretenatemmccneene wa vt ence asm) peat eciaasly Te RRA OY: GNA EO Se PG Se SY CHEESE a RET Re EE te gy ‘ ceemattteentparmrtereremrate +? erences anon arte ectaeeaasersaasneentorgtesttae Bale BRA aol bo SM bE, ot, ee en ey t ero ra « 3 tees eer ee ran x. ser 1, ty we wes 2 ve
14-00000 oy -57- We plan to answer him along the lines that we are willing to forgive his “baseness and falsehood” and discuss his rehabilitation but only when he is prepared to drop the legend which he seems to maintain in his letter. If he is, as we think, getting desperate to get out, he may reply with further admissions. (The reference to "special interrogation techniques" harked back to a 13 January 1966 discussion with Helms, during which the latter had stated that "he was inclined to try special techniques on Subject in the hope that they might somehow provide the answers we are seeking." In this context, “special techniques" was a euphemism for the use of drugs as aids in interrogation. As will be shown later, although Helms was willing to discuss the use of such techniques in this case, he in fact never gave his consent and they were never employed. Nevertheless, the use of drugs for interrogation purposes seems to have been contemplated for some time, since it is foreseen in handwritten notes made by the principal case officer as early as November 1964, and Chief, SR and the principal case officer continued to press for permission to employ them until a final negative decision by Helms on 1 September 1966.) On 26 April 1966, Chief, SR again wrote Helms to say that a response to Nosenko's letters had been delayed ' in order to allow time for discussion with Chief, CI and the psychiatrist. Their combined judgment seems to have been that the letters were “an attempt to relieve the isolation by reestablishing personal contact, if only with his interrogators." He bolstered this view by an appeal to medical authority: It is (the psychiatrist's] opinion, in which . we fully concur, that any such contact would . in fact constitute a relief for Nosenko and that it would be a serious mistake to grant SECRET oe orn weeny tae * Tpaiteetargen reas cea ort Api me a anasto Sanaa FAS ERE ak Ryda ta bc tier a art tinct lee meronsanoapins arabe: carnemnacniomrermaronaie smear e—e SSS Ee RS 4 Sere mm Toon mae ew accra eT iye ee eo nem Nera 28s aon Tt ltaabestaly Hdtars emp ieny Tice Abbot pre co omiderneran erase Statins ns natch eR edatantiewe safichnc de oath & Penna’) emer ency Gen at Ga ree farrran er rarterts ote ABTA cote rete, Sot beBes oes e eS ve et arab De! Unie iba little iphones
cn eemente doerepeetin CRETE 5 case ST -58- him this at the very moment that his psychological defenses may be cracking. On the contrary, [the psychiatrist] feels we should cut off any hopes Nosenko may harbor that he can alter his present situa- tion without a full confession. Since it is the technique of isolation and rejection that has led to the recent promising changes in Nosenke's attitude and behavior, we believe that it is logical to continue along the same lines and that there is a reasonable expectation that this treatment will produce further results in the near future. We therefore intend to send Nesenko the attached letter and to wait approximately 60 days before changing our tactics. The letter thereupon sent to Nosenko in the principal officer's name read as follows: I have received your letters and so-called “autobiography.” We understand fully what degradation the Soviet system has forced you into and as you have been told, we are willing to help you establish a real life. As I told you in August, however, we have no further interest in reading or listening to the legend (or its variations) that you con- tinue to repeat. We are only interested in evidence that you really want to talk truth- fully. In the future we will reply only to a true written account of your life and how your legend was prepared. Do not waste our time with the lies of the past. This legend cannot be the basis of a new life for you. Chief, SR's next report, dated 11 May 1966, was the following: As previously agreed on 28 April, a brief note was passed to Nosenke in response to his earlier mote and slightly amended biographical state- ment. He made no response upon receiving our note (although he did not touch his meal that night); but on the evening of 4 May he asked FOé e, ———_ SECRET ARGH ES Moreh AD ALOR ARRAS Mle RI APE TSCA TREC Prenat menermnmmemre metre tant ort eer 4g + cmenemveruranses inte vevwonnananinneine +s nlnunteatme ten op ceerens cerns s | * ue 4 | ‘ det Aet lab dehs dt scandal! BEL ote 9 tet Aa ct «wal fot tera! mbatediey “an 3
14-00000 pee nbventretetedls # SNE REMAT + eedatenetant eats ete wien Onmartncaene seinen Seti nn on > RS SECRET -59- for a pencil and paper, indicating, in reply to a question from the guard, that he had a statement to make in response to our note. After writing his note, he sealed it in an envelope and gave it to the guard to be delivered. The note, written in English, states: Allow me to thank you very much for your kind letter. Now I understood fully what degrada- tion to the Soviet Russia had forced me into. At last I can tell you that I really want to talk truthfully. I want to begin the job against the Soviet Russia. My only wish is to establish a real life with your help as you are willing to do so. _ {signed} George Nosenko We have discussed his note with [the psychiatrist], who feels that the final sentence of the first paragraph probably reflects no real desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truth- fully at this time, but is rather a further attempt by him either to generate a personal dialogue with us or at least to continue this written exchange.’ We feel that it would not be in our interest to answer this latest note with another note, thus permitting additional and, to Nosenko, psychologically necessary contact and involve- ment--albeit impersonal. In order to cut off this effort on his part, but at the same time to allow for the possibility that this - latest note might actually convey an intention to talk truthfully, we intend to deliver to Nosenko the attached statement. The require- ment for direct “YES" or “NO” answers accom- panied by his signature allows for no mis- understanding of the questions and does not . permit lengthy discourses on peripheral: matters. SECRET a tyre ari e wi ee Riva giban ents i en ae SEE ened 4 ewer opucerrenaatiitnete prot amieR aA fw Ane name tapi rp hime REF Wa “Sacer gag siprte ssaweamnrnretacemencceamesir Gitte eee NC HSER PAID 3 Tao IMGISD IME a IS SC a POETS Eon {eitirsomsty sven eemater weaenee tie ot et TURRET LY EA NF Ree RE IE ‘e — cart cad etn ee + fours a wtten in hele a agate eaytt Jah, * alee EuCuRA as welie en ' Me eect bee che Velie ae Wee Oh che ay ster wns phone Seles er eval heme 6 te edt uk lee Bo a cleSpicesebigess vataten ayacers eee wgab f, aTinlaw Cece aah. = 4 ew hanes: pads cn centinstiee ba aS wet + ~ er, whee a eRe tia2 se peharebs
14-00000 ae * Tae - wae — SECRET " eh [The psychiatrist] concurs in our plan and : ; recommends that it be carried out as soon as ‘ 3 } possible to achieve maximum effect. If we : 4 : get a positive response we will follow up 3 3 immediately. Lf 3 . In accordance with the above memorandum, the follow- ; : ing form was passed to Nosenko on 13 May 1966, apparently : a i by the Security guards: ; Answer "YES" or "NO": : ; i : 6 i : i. 4 i J : 3 i : 4 i ! +z. + i a H fo 4 The next major maneuver on Nosenko's part was a : hunger strike, in the course of which he lost some forty ‘ pounds. This tactic was counteracted with the help of a medical officer while administering a physical check-up on 22 June 1966: dren watering gmoney weet ttt ohne Pg a Ses In the course of the examination, [this doctor] i questioned Subject on the reasons for his fast } and got him to admit that this was a deliberate : tactic. As planned, the doctor showed no ; concern, assured Subject that he was still in : good health, described to him in some detail . { the physical and mental consequences of prolonged , } undernourishment, and emphasized that Subject ‘ 3 . would not be allowed to do himself any damage : : 4 in this manner. The doctors’ description of some j § of the standard methods of forced feeding and his i 5 - : re | | SECRET : : | . _. 4 PO 2g A IT SE ES I SE TE EEN TE IEE SO NESS ESE SET BEE SOA ERTL HOARE WT FFE AS BRI Ft BIT ASL TS Tener aan ames aera hs SU a % Sine Pare adele edited tan ela age ls, eo .
14-00000 rma Aes rae, . . ° . ae “ geerep -61- > cae ence mmernarh MAF s 7 og ' deat ‘ atot ° 7 . ra ia ee staan et ro * % nin 5 ' ’ . By thee 7 a . a . . vi ' . »* “6 ‘ . wet Wh : - aE a matter-of-fact emphasis that all appropriate medical measures could and would ve taken at the present site made an instant and evident impact on Subject, who nevertheless continued to assert that he had no need or desire for more food. (Despite the weight loss, the re- sults of the medical exam showed that Subject = is in good overail condition.) me emer rent ere peerage EES BS ‘ On 23 June, the day following the doctor's visit, Subject began to eat ravenously and he has been consuming all his meals since. By 6 July he had gained 15 lbs. perenne seems rene The Agency's next step was to have the principal case officer see Nosenko. This interview, which took | place on 6 July 1966, lasted for about 45 minutes and i “was the first time that a case officer had talked to } Subject since he was moved..." The interview re- sulted in another stand-off, the principal case officer insisting that Nosenko admit to being a KGB agent and the latter refusing. Once again, however, Agency offi- cers in charge felt they were making progress: 8 {The psychiatrist], who monitored the entire - interview, was impressed by the fact that Subject had used it solely to appeal to the pity and ‘ sympathy of the interviewer, and felt that the way in which the interview was conducted would a very effectively slam shut still another psycho- : logical door. It is believed that fer the first time Subject has come to appreciate the measure ef our resolve and determination, and that he is actively grappling with the realities of his present situation. Subject's pattern of behavior i over the past few months suggests that he will i need some time to fully digest the import of the : {principal case officer's] interview, but that ; . he will then be impelled to initiate some new . ! effort to releive (sic) his lot. Very few i alternatives short of confession--real or false-- ; appear to be left to hin. : On 23 August 1966 Helms, who had become DCI on 30 : June 1966, instructed the DDP and Chief, SR to ciose the : case “within about sixty days assuming there are no new developments which would warrant reconsideration of this development.” Chief, SR gave this account of Helms’ reasoning: t Ae ane MEO Roe cet SECRET : ® . t 4 q SpeGge Rabe armen a RTO NERC LAOREET NN RT A EOE A a a Toe neeareccceemati: meres Sti } bretioghe 4 et * af . .
7 ae, SetR RI wan neers ere tat Od ne ety nee cee tttnenrctne en ceme ott ate tone 2 ea ae eat gRERRRRS Paden cenmcanseOmatTRASae AARON. wy HRODIETLEPRED Hurt. eemeieht Mar HOA. Netth ttre Meme taSht AN AO RUNNIN Ae ti ang nn ted . 9 najpenenirama ee 0 mm wean ey 8 HAE RPE RITE EN Re  emnrernmr ama aminees = eae emcee as ae -62- - « » the Director advised us that in his view tie time had come to consider disposal of Subject. He was willing, he said, to proceed with the immediate plans we had for the sodium amytal interview and to consider proposals for use of special techniques within the time frame we suggested but unless these steps developed new information or indicated definite progress in resolving the case, he wanted us to wind it up. Helms' decision triggered a new rash of activity within what was now the SB Division. Chief, SR, noting that "there is no appeal ... unless we uncover new, compelling data," reconstituted a special Task Force to work on the case, headed by the principal case officer. A problem which the principal case officer found particularly thorny, to judge by his notes, was posed by the FBI's unwillingness to accept CIA's evaluation of Nosenko. Our case is based primarily on analysis, not confirmed by juridically acceptable evidence, and this analysis is so complex that it pro- bably could not be made more understandable to laymen than it has been to the FBI, which has largely failed to understand it. Despite Helms‘ expressed preference for returning Nosenko to Soviet hands, the principal case officer con- tinued to have misgivings about such a course: Danger in the Nosenko case lies not only in holding him, but in bringing his case to public notice again, and especially in allowing the Soviets to regain possession of him. (Our denial of Nosenko to the Soviets, particularly if they are in some doubt about his real status/loyalty, is a form of guarantee that the Soviets cannot take the many damaging actions available to them if they had the body.) The course of action therefore must balance the respective dangers. rs SECRET ee eae AON eh 1 GORA ERE Foto DeMARNNE MhtNLGH eH eRe NeTrEY OTR HRA Ee te veneer enarmraerssnmmineTnm wi yy st ae ecg aman tg mE WF ee t |
sree st se neenatnd Sethe MAES fee Ot + REESE Ut—onaR ORNATE oe enennthenten eI EY PS ne omen 5 Anta MS seerer ” ~63- Ame ri nee eee # Helms, on the other hand, hardened his position. ; a4 He was perhaps influenced by [the psychiatrist's] = pointing out that in his experience with sodium amytal it had only worked once, and then by accident; Helms promptly revoked his permission for use of this drug. Helms remarked that Nosenko was “one person on whom these techniques were never going to be used." The upshot was that, on 1 September 1966, Helms limited the interrogators to the polygraph in any future interrogations, and reiterated his preference for “having Subject turned back to the Soviets ... "™ On 2 September, Chief, SB saw Helms again, to ask that under’the new circumstances the sixty-day deadline be extended. Helms agreed on an extension until the end of the year. A discussion of a final report and "disposal" then ensued, reported by Chief, SB as follows: « « » it would be imprudent I thought not to have ready for any eventuality a detailed gtudy of our findings. This would provide backup to our final report to the intelligence community principals, the Secretary of State, Attorney General and others. In the case of the FBI, I added, we would most certainly have to have such a document. [This remark stemmed from the fact that the FBI had never fully agreed with the Agency's views on Nosenko. J a \ As for disposal, [Director Helms] believed that return to Soviet control is the only practical solution. Third country disposal , ' _- might only delay our having to face the same - 7 ; problems and if accusations are leveled at . the agency it would be far preferable to have Subject in Soviet hands. The Director aid not believe the Soviets would refuse to accept Subject and felt we could take the sting out of any Soviet reaction by our own ; statement concerning Subject’s mission. If ; i our position is publicized first, anything i 4 the Soviets or anyone else says about the i case thereafter will have very little effect. In the conclusion the Director emphasized the ° meed to bring this case te an end in a manner which will permit us to arrange events and timing to our advantage. He dees not want SECRET 2 nek HOE SF Ante eA GARRIED ee EO7E EMA - (Rego cup sta caps es, 2 Been S wt a ATTOE LAP amo CHL SRT SR AE IRD RT ibe CAEL ih Stth ABD eeastincrmret Cee St EOD, SS Ra Le oc ce cate zs ee sae aan gates '§ on . oa Fy 4 wy aay “ted hh ede ria bdtate fa HE anew Cab si Ui de ope oee ay ee een é x - end » 5g eget .
ret iam By str gre ste ate are ete Te bo Ae tA Be CNET AGE DARE FEES Ce ARE AE REPRE Ne A ick EN he ee} ane Jes : seer (‘™ to be stampeded by publicity beyond our control. . Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the preparation of the above-mentioned final report, was recommenced on 18 October 1966. Assisting in the in- terrogation was the polygraph operator whose 1964 polygraph tapes were at this very time under review by the Office of Security; on 1 November, thirteen days later, they were officially and in writing pronounced to have been invalid. This is what Chief, SB had to report on 25 October 1966: . Nosenko knows he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrying him because he is not sure how much we know or how we learned it. Nosenko's reactions have given us hope that we may be this procedure have begun to strike home. We do not know what it is that keeps this man sitting month after month in his present situation. We speculate that one factor may be confidence that the KGB will get him out. Related to this may be the thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply pene- trated that it would be unhealthy for him to confess. Our current line of interroga- tion, expanded and used even more forcefully, might break down some of his obstacles to confession by showing us in a different and stronger posture. Despite eight days of interrogation employing the ' polygraph, however, SB Division did;not achieve their goal: Nosenko did not “confess" to being a “provocateur.” Operating under the constraint of Helms’ injunction to wind up the case by the end of the year, the principal case officer made one last attempt to shatter Nosenko's resolution. In a long letter, the principal case officer outlined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation and adduced a number of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication, derived in part from a fictitious "KGB officer . .. sent out as a provocateur" whom the SB Division leadership | invented for purposes of this letter. A possible tactical error on their part, however, was the inclusion of informa- tion about Nosenko, ostensibly received from the notional nen ae SECRET | sue ear FTUR inn 1 NS te NA” A pot Rel aati tA on PE SRLS DBS OD ALTE ACA G Ta ae: et ne tet eI PAPE NB ce netsh Sas Ses sa Rt aOR SOMIC ON i anbOnetemir ney eter FS Emme TORINO Ny HARI at renter ne epeaen anenertecmenmits matter ‘ 1 eT crepancy mtnresent me Param dene met eae “op td i if a 4 . ‘ fc wwe ceompemmpeess eect meno vg ewe if awa hel ote att ahem 4 Daye ne we een ater A miead eb AO ae be A eet oe
74-90000 * 4 y { 3 + t at > A = SECRET = ~63- sernmteeeee bat cae tm -amaemnests pada HE i ro eens fy Ce oe entneteen tae een De ee od ERR tema Fara ee source, which Nosenko himgélf would obviously recognize i as false: “He heard that''you had been in prison in the : USSR, and that you received a Government award for your meetings with us in 19627"" According to the SB Division officer who delivered the letter, Nosenko responded to this allegation with a belly-laugh, but he certainly was 4 ; depressed, as his rambling remarks to the $B Division emissary showed: i - « « I know about my lies and I corrected all ‘ my false statements, my chattering. I know everything what is necessary for me to know. And 1 will be here, I understand this, I will be here so many years as you will ccnsider it necessary. You consider five . .. I will be five; you consider ten .. . I will be ten. I have no, I have no exit and 1 have no way i - out of this situation, and... eemaree tae invtenrenmie rene ot L. Inter-Agency Disagreement Meanwhile, enormous effort went into preparation of SB Division's “final report" on the case. This docu- i ment, frequently referred to as the “thousand-page re- . i port,’ was described by Chief, SB as follows: | Q | a tee peat ateeee [It] will reflect all of AEFOXTROT's state- ments concerning his personal life, alleged KGB career and other matters as well as sub- ‘ sequent contradictions or denials of earlier ; Statements plus the results of our investiga- tions at home and abroad of these statements. arBe Cae 2 dPrvenaRSEAN EA EOEON ATryn. eset hshke anh vt vasa weet aaa This factual portion will be followed by analysis and conclusions. The latter will be absolutely unequivocal on these points: tek omheate Apkeataut oat a. AEFOXTROT is a dispatched KGB agent whose contact with us and . ultimate defection were carried out ' at KGB direction. Be. oe, t BLT ORT ey AE gate eas ee ee * 4 : SECRET - Bupa ne AR A SEAMEN PSEA AOR AMOR wy momar nnm eae ohm eneeemncy mares meamenits ames «tacts eS gt
14-00000 one rere nmaaths art ARETE 4 | | | | | RB AES EPL are ea Es ARRTDD REMEBER get ath Spee AGS TRION ACTS" HRI rom antes we mm paearyman asgre wrammueeiananc eamrrnartar suaee * semcemnrnckan awuny oe am mice te tee SECRET ~66- b. AEFOXTROT'’s claim to service in the KGB was an integral and vital - part of his KGB agent mission, forming as it did the basis for all that he has had to say about KGB operations and personnel. Yet, the results of our interrogations of AEFOXTROT supported by polygraph examination demonstrate conclusively that AEFOXTROT did not and could not have served in any of the specific staff positions he has described. c. Whatever the ultimate goals of this KGB operation might be, it has been possible to determine that among the most significant KGB aims in . directing AEFOXTROT to us were: (i) ~ to persuade us of KGB ineptitude and lack of success in developing technical and human penetrations of the US . government, its security and intelli- gence services while at the same time « Preparation of the report was somewhat complicated by disagreements between CIA and the FBI, as well as between SB Division and CI Staff within the Agency. The intra-CIA disagreement stemmed from differing views on the validity of Golitsyn information. Whereas SB Division insisted that Nosenko, during his KGB career, had never *served in any of the specific staff positions he has described," Golitsyn had in some respects supported Nosenko's claims regarding his KGB service. After a con- ference with Chief, Ci, the Chief, SR summed up the problem on 29 March: reat dren ste + Chief, CI said that he did not see how we could submit a Final Report to the Bureau if it con-~- tained suggestions that Golitsyn had lied to us about certain aspects of Nosenko'’s past. He SECRET eet ue tc eaaieeteeenamnn roe 4 sorpmew,cerarqaranh Tarenmas,  —arnpnamniemenrarmepegnn om “Damm ewmnmimneritcnumenmins ris cenpcae ons cen ” ' ee denne ste ERB ye Neue OERS OE por, 4 3 { Bees cereeeenesrarmein vrei cu ae “Stent et nds Landi Sorta tet tle eotte” eqenreterens Odette fe deel on = e ore wake othe nceewe wey a daetRheto edan at Lele Al adhonabinens 8 se, “0 wl cotati d ES CELEB AE T Meret
14-00000 2 rr ‘ F dtnawe shake “te tame oe eek . . . See 4 A “4 4 a ~SEGRET Heck Bliadshe atoll recalled that the Director of the FBI had stated that in his cpinion Golitsyn himself was a provo- cateur and penetration agent. On the other hand, most FBI agents have accepted that when Golitsyn was speaking on facts known to him he was accu- 4 rate even though they doe not accept most of his : hypotheses or inferences drawn froa facts. Chief, CI went on to say that if we submitted to the FBI a report on Nosenko in the form we now have it, it would most certainly cause us difficulties. It might cause us to lose whatever impact our report would be able to make on the overall question of Nosenko’s bona fides ... . ofa ‘ .\¢ ees eck asp eedeed nae st tenhtinatee AE ta areal taverns Sans ee . ’ The disagreenents between the Agency and the FBI were i a never to be resolved as long as Nosenko remained within ‘ the jurisdiction of the SB Division and the CI Staff. . Within house, Chief, SR and Chief, CI eventually papered over their differences sufficiently te publish a second, compromise report on the Nosenko case in February 1968. But by then the case had been taken out of their hands, and the report was a dead letter even before it went to press. tee esata hoe Mistiratnathows Late uv eteantalldsl HM. Voices of Dissent : Meanwhile, although the top leadership of SR Division 7 remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding Nosenko as a KGB-dispatched agent, there was some dissent at the lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were not well received by the leadership, however, and thus had no effect on the handling of the case. A former member of SR/CI remembers that it was sometimes possible to discuss alternative ways of presenting very specific points in preparing the written case against Nosenko (which was eventually to becoze the so-called *thousand- page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis was tolerated. t ie seer peimarenetem pated = The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from ; outside SR Division, and it was a tentative one. A senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to ; interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during a series . | of meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965. As a result of . ! his questioning, he became convinced that at the very least Nosenko was in fact Nosenke. Even this rather as ehegen cenw ey ep tt at Stns hetatetrenteacace bkivmbate etree teen ete etter tisacealeaenle ne Stn mies ener NY. Ho ARAL ARN smn vee te At sae ornenhietasunmerle “ ee en aay ite GE ome te ee tigen toys 4 AB eRe Wh chaser ee SECRET Auris eRopomnew inet neta cesatl Sgn BMG DORRIT en 6 eeneonmrma renee 7 wan pemamary mmeceermenneniner, + me oor ms Sanna a ta PBS eee nch, ‘ ‘ fe Som ae = Be rela eee tegen Anand oe EE aes a ad erro : 4 it
14-00000 oye -68- enema a Meg en RO <i bland assertion, however, was met by Chief, SR with the statement, “there are things im this case that you do not know about.” Nonecheless, in summing up 4 the sessions, the psychologist had this to say: : eu, bb teens ceded bls Zi pote I am totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing ; could be served other than to discredit the i man to whom it was assigned. In some remote { sense--to me--it might have been felt it would | evoke sympathy but this is really far out and | a very dangerous gamble on their part. The manner in which he has told his story and the nuances he has introduced would require great ingenuity and preparation. From my standpoint, he has been essentially convincing | and accurate in general if not always truthful in detail. Here I am talking about the psycho- logical data only--I am not prepared to ex- [ press an opinion on other aspects. Within i whatever frame of reference I can operate, I | am forced to conclude that all the psycholog- ical evidence would indicate that he is Nosenko, . thdematre catbeknassne Ge garter wihertins | tinldendsce lerheres tl eta the son of Ivan Nosenko. His life story is essentially as he has described it. It is obviously distorted in places but in each case there is a probable psychological reason for the distortion and deception. No man is a good reporter on himself and we all use , rationalization to avoid seeing ourselves as ethers see us. My opinion, for whatever it is worth, is that Nosenko cannot be broken e outside the context of his life story and personality structure. It shoyld be noted here that the life story is completely com- ' patible with the personality structure as 4 projected by psychological tests. * », a eshaarte ilcadhayp Meee, . nent aR NACE ITAL NSCS BELITTLE ee ANE Sra NL CORRE IN ONL Hts nes gg te een men 8 The psychologist claims now that he had more doubts j- 4 about the validity of the SR view of Nosenko than he ‘ I i felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from a : Fe J memorandum of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives ; oo 4 his memory of the situation facing him: ‘ } 4 In discussing his lengthy series of inter- . 4 views with Nosenko on 3-21 May 1965, [the ' psychologist] said that he was very hesitant SECRET “Sotennsasartawerstnian sa shat GRE Pe Noles MASSES cap 3 Bie ath eg Se heat tle Taine HM A eT PE DACA ON rican Lemon anne RRataAtET thSreim et OUR NTIEE te whet EPRNRND @ ot The mE ervmmee oe t § i . eo 2 > :
we ee emcee eres BRE BE spe cee nites 6 pote phase dar nate satin oan ee «stn AORN ieee ARR Bente SpnttasenteseeeL At a ene a Scones ‘ert nec" ESSENSE AHOLD Ail Terao ebro Je Ase PO hi Ppa PC OEE RESTON Serta wrteer—n rears vee ome estnte mee Ti eee 3 SECRET -69- to express the full extent of his doubts about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB- dispatched agent. The reason for his hesi- tation was that, when [Chief, SR] got a hint of {the psychologist's] doubts about the theory, (Chief, SR] told [the psychologist] that such doubts might make [the psychologist] Suspect of himself being involved in the KGB/ Nosenko plan. There is no evidence in the files to indicate that the psychologist's doubts were accorded any impartial consideration. Chief, SR, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum to Helms (who was by then DDCI, but still riding herd on the case), described the interviews as “unrewarding in terms of producing new information or insights ... It was obvious that Subject had given some thought ... to improving and smoothing over some of the rougher Spots in his story." By the end of 1965, there were others in SR Division whe doubted the thesis, and one of them was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a $1-page memorandum to Chief, SR commenting on a “sterile” version of SR/CI's “notebook” documenting the case against Nosenko. It began: Introduction At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko notebook and I hope you will honor my right to dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a bona fide defector far more convincing than the evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as a KGB agent. ; It is because I am concerned about the serious ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to set forth my dissenting views in considerable detail. If the present verdict of “guilty” is right I believe there must be satisfactory answers to the questions raised herein; if it is wrong--as I believe it is--it should be rectified as soon as possible, Intelligence Production There are several references in the Noserko note- book to the extent and quality of the intelligence SECRET me enh aene arene oe . . , fr nonhdendiunilbds ties Mcudn, — shicPbuminandtenbiialine delaAb tae fo withhold! an reliideetime da amas cicaaceee —‘Lbizatiial tense @abieediee eahantrsteane biten — igih dele Randan anlnnbetsteh taba Onde +6 nbabsbekouidesl Men Shite Metab at = ate ap ae at 2 a z oan tint ae wit s t
14-00000 ’ re ; : 4 SECRET “ ~70- ‘ ne ee ne EFS PORE IE OT ‘ he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of his positive intelligence with thai f other . _Soviet Bloc intellipence officers! : Lo _— . j Shows : that all of them were consistently bétter able : to provide useful positive intelligence than i has been Nosenko."" Tab D of this same memo : States “His positive intelligence production i is practically nil," and later: “Viewed i overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelli- : gence production has been so meager for a man i of his background, training and position as to i case doubts on his bona fides, without refer- i ence to other criteria." AIT of these state- ' i Ments are incorrect. The ‘three persons in the Clandestine Services : with the background and experience to make such ' a judgment regarding Nosenko‘s production and i access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB : officer has been able to provide more useful ; intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has , shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB { officers in general is “practically nil." i Golitsyn'’s was nil. Viewed in the proper con- text, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence produc- tion cannot be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast any doubt what- soever on his bona fides. In the realm of sub- Stance, judgment regarding his bona fades must therefore be made on the basis oF his counter- intelligence information. Counterintelligence Production. The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko’s bona fides, as of March 1964 DDP memo and others indicate, must be based on his production--how @uch did he hurt the Soviets. I believe that the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet intelligence effort more than all other KGB defectors combined. Chief, SR later wrote: . I have read this document and am of mixed minds. First, it shows clearly that the so-called SECRET © a emsca mreereote mtn pe ape at “ante a hc 8 RENAN A ROR Cre NOR HRT NS Tut eet natin eim ante ROE oie AS Oe Oe gS ate nee ean dae ee Le St Shwe pie tne GARDE 6 ng eee SN arte emi PAE Natal Madtuetinen Uners earevtos Ramen yt ee sate meen ume eiae Rabe Retine aiid ail te Ladies. 5, stabbed feabies tbtayta ines — dultidhsennlion ot ateansstsiild Sone sobre tiblacanes dunt caaeey babe anal Gi sibeledut niadioamnoticdl tet Bin btbate. aye alge tbe Aer fateh hacer ' antmnclotal lata: tad ta Lively nidAnndies ote
14-00000 cee reteset TRE ROR eg GE il 3 Si ID re eA A Ot EN I HARRIES A et Manners ane We oars rn a SG a mmaaig ay aratarmaee naarmmmaeg @ atnns seer “sterile” book in the hands of a person with none of the other background on other cases or appreciation of the penetration problems affecting us and the FBI can be a very damaging document. I question seriously whether we should make it available to others in its present form. Second, the book's weaknesses are principally its language and the fact that it was made up of memos from various periods and as our evaluation matured, or we developed additional information, the tone of the subsequent memos changed but the reader can suggest our approach has been superficial or inconsistent. Third, we cannot make the book available unless we are prepared to deal with the totality or near totality of the picture. Fourth, if a book is to be used at all in briefing individ- uals, it should be re-written and questions of the kind posed by this . . . paper trrated [sic] no matter how irritating we find them to be. If one person has this view, others might at some point... In replying to Chief, SR, another SR officer also attempted to take a balanced view: The paper suffers from many faults. These include bias, intellectual arrogance, and lack of CI background. Needless to say, the conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I found it to be a useful paper, and I think that we would be wise to treat it seriously, because it does highlight some problems which we have all been aware of for some time. It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us who contributed substantially will feel personally attacked by many “OE tke uninformed judgments and intemperate comments contained in [this] paper. I urge SECRET here Se eee eemmng maperge: =e neta tae rene at . oko domes manera rer ay 4 AER aN Bea Ce ope ERE NP RRO La weet tees Ho atts men ereemase ng tre deter SS ab Sad oe 4 Py . fabbinteivedslt abbott. t we lhel sethcs Mla woe wae £4 sae benh Bel he ie Hahah rant * 4 4
14-00000 . ooo Nye so 1 ha ¥ rN Sara % le cetrcemran : ‘ Dy 4 i 4 . £ ane se . | -72'- 7 oe This is not the first indication we have had | : that some of our analytical methods, and : i particularly the style and language we have ot 4 become addicted to, are not easily understood 3 by “outsiders.” We have all been on this prob- : : : jem so long that we've gotten into the habit | 4 : of taking mental shortcuts and using elliptical , proofs, considering the gaps and omissions to 3 be self-explanatory... ; | When the author of the dissenting paper wrote to Helms on 4 April 1966, he included the following com- , j ments: . : 4 j j i } | fl i H q i : | 4 ; 4h BJ Not long thereafter, Helms called the author by i phone and told him he was having a great deal of trouble with the Nosenko case. He said that he was therefore “4 going to turn it over to the DDCI, who he hoped could x get to the bottom of it for him. Helms also asked the ; of author if he would agree to Helms’ passing his paper to ‘ 3 _an Agency psychologist. A few days later, Helms again q called the author by phone and asked if he would agree j to his paper's being passed to both the DDCI and the 4 Director of Security. : 2 ‘ SEGRET : { be EURASIA rt msn ements eutmemnmares © watem <x Sm = ment mnataneer—mrertn cece eaten eae gra wy ee ree een “Soren remaamanstn mag Se, . : ea! y ‘ a “ey rele thE nay Bh he He
14-00000 rae th \ -73- N. Heims Takes Control With the third anniversary of Nosenko’s confinement ; drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight. ” The FBI continued to take what Chief, SB described as a “neutral position” in regard to Nosenko. * 4 4 ; as 4 i i 4 4 The conflicting views of the various interested parties are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes of | this study to require a detailed coverage. What is relevant is the fact that the stand-off increased Helms' impatience with continued delay. He therefore initiated a number of measures that gradually took handling of the entire Nosenko matter out of the hands of the SB Division. The first of these measures was to instruct the DDCI to undertake a thorough study of the Nosenke case. a wenn eee net eae he ahr Mite rte8 Livebeate -2 tt When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21 September 1976, the former DDCI remembered his ‘nvolivement as follows: DDCI: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms {saying] that there was a matter that worried him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst the people in the Agency who handled it so far to arrive at any kind of a really objective solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive indeed, would I please look into it and let him know my conclusions. Then he went on to tell me about Nosenko, the defector, who was at that. time incarcerated . .. And he mentioned that there was a dichotomy of views in the DDP as to ; whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or whether he had been sent on a mission, and that in any case he, Helms, felt that it’was wrong to keep him confined and we had to do something with him one way or the other. SEE Sr a ereeccenve eer cette ot that tn tate te ee i Aen Ae re Se EE eR et EE ne sn cee corm arena medi tv SAREE wee te eto meng merety mee oni D a my omneTtmete = rete cee nnag sregreneey chest ee oesmala aac tb ghabdatine —stbobileatyn teneedaotniterteiaon Cahn} mened stones Fattan tien ve cale wedrace Lievens cosas Q@: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined? DDCI: Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that this fellow had been in confinement so long and that they had never been able to arrive at a con- Clusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved and something had to be done to get this fellow ina... oh, I've forgotten just how he put it, SECRET Sis Giana tba anatase ee cn re cenit on feed nine aetna is
14-00000 con nme mn ONT AT “miosis eens it eA TOE NN SSR LAA SRA SE 8 EE ESRD NN NAP gy ont Ae Nene at a Ante meee “Gene ar tesen eat me see eastoaitnt ih Staats ie Nn ALC! 12 K-O LOONEY pornaconerermeeammnt resent” tenn armaments Ser os > wkd *'SECRET ~74- but in a more acceptable position. So, I said, yes, I would undertake this job an: I sent for all the background papers on it and studied them first. Then I interviewed [Chief, CI and Chief, SB] and arrived at the conclu- Sion... I think I talked to some other people in the Soviet Division of the DDP also, but I arrived at the conclusion that people had their feet so mired in concrete of opinion as to one side or the other of the case, that it was just damned near impossible te get any worthwhile information out of interviews. And I then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I indicated that I had, after reviewing the... making a preliminary review of the case, that I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was a plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he was” planted for. Nor could I get out of anybody else what he was supposed . . . what his mission was supposed to be, even in their hypothesis ... . » My second memorandum to Helms was to the effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with the idea of rehabilitating him. And [the Director of Security] then had him moved... Q: Well, do you remember anything about Dick Helms‘* reactions to your recommendations? . . DDCI: He seemed rather pleased with the information. I go® the impression from discussing the case with him that he never had been able to get what he felt was a really fair appraisal of it from anybody; and I got the impression that he felt at last he had a fair appraisal of it. Qn 26 May 1967, the DDCI called the Director of Security to his office, and the Director of Security re- ’ corded the meeting as follows: {The DDCI] started by asking me whether or not I had seen the eight hundred page report summarizing the Seviet Bioc Division’s interrogation and ex- ploitation of [Nosenko]. I said that I had not SECHET “nate oe ie ere sam Sete Gate naaitomebanges ae tne g oo emer aananamnn tee omen deste, odtel stl & ieee ‘ Pe UL RRindial tors. jortneitiee mlb d tet cee tinwne oi het nthe db vaindneliadonste 1SlAtbi asses { ! ? “4 i i b i windtnetes ob en reas anes meng roemee nee et on tahed baibilin 2 ae weme etna Pa es JaiReestchaitiligs Litthmaeln ate i ; i ;
14-00000 Atte ee an tetne tem ee ate id | | ‘ Sy iat eect Si WT IB ter Src 8 ree ary tina wetter tepsonmrtteamie eo atesaere SECRET -75- read it personally but that [a member] of my Security Research Staf€ was now in the process of reviewing it and commenting on selected por- tions of it. He then asked if I agreed with its conclusions. I told him that I did not; that it had been the consistent position of this Office that while we did not, under any circumstances, consider him bona fide, we were not convinced that he was a provocation dis- patched by the KGB with a specific mission. Rather, our position has always been that there is something wrong with [Nosenko] and his story but we do not know enough in order to make a final- decision. I went on to point out to the [DDCI] that I had thought, and had so recommended on numerous eccdsions in the past, that it would make a lot of sense for [a member] of my Office to take over the interrogation of [Nosenko] in order to resolve several discrepancies that had always concerned us. Further, I said that the polygraph examination given [Nosenko] at the outset was. designed only to “break him” and was not an ob- jective polygraph examination designed to establish or deny his bona fides. I indicated that the Director had approved this idea but that I had been unable to sell the idea to .. . SB Division. (The DDCI] said that he thought this was an excellent idea. He agreed with me that we had everything to. gain and nothing to lose through such a course of action and that he would so recommend to the Director. I pointed out to him that one of the things that had always con- cerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had . never released any verbatim transcripts covering their many interrogations of [Nosenko] and that we could make our judgment only on the basis of written summaries prepared by the Division. Thus, acting under the DDCI's orders, the Office of Security transferred Nosenke to "a decent, respectable safehouse.” SB Division was cut out of the case, as was the CI Staff. ; . SECRET - @ DO NY wee ae Sieh ete we a ie teternn nent tr on REE eee erent ae ememnemene ee ee eens WA ener = aleaetetetatenmeteneeenentensaoeneitaillinas Lemmesinne’ tin meadneetin Mmardiiniied fe * 7 o* . > ot . o ‘ ” a oe OD n vey ORs ahs arb idetastes Aufl. <a 0 eta wi gate Eon DEBS ath vntobesodl ise .9 daaeaeads shold « wn oa tana esti andsies — Staaadadaags ab eb ae cana o ANC meee rinmnenteptiie: entre as ny a.¢ ‘ static toaey was Peaaat 2 oa: eet HIER see Bdhedty wae RSet te whe Satta nearer bth wm oad ot Phat ia esttsea bic a
-76- ! i 0. Resolution of the Case . The Office of Security took over the handling of Nosenko in October 1967. The officer in charge immedi- . ately inaugurated a rapid transition to normal living conditions. Throughout this process, he found Nosenko fully cooperative, and without any tendency toward drunkenness or other aberrant behavior. The following is a summary report prepared on 16 November 1967: Nosenko was moved to his current location on 27 October 1967 and the first interview with , Nosenko occurred on 30 October. During the } first interview, particularly the first hour, Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain reticence to talk. This condition ameliorated H * rapidly and it is considered that the current situation is better than could have ever been anticipated in view of the conditions of his : previous confinement. LES Ae allah De come a pete ee at en RE HEE Hh et mee Cree Nosenko on his first day indicated his complete willingness to answer all questions and to write his answers to questions on areas of specific interest. It was determined that his English is adequate both for interview and for prepara- tion of written material. Interviews are not . usually over two and a half hours a day, six } days a week, with Nosenko preparing from six to . ten pages of written material each day. Pre- . i pared material has included life history, in- : dividual cases, trips of Nosenko, reason for ; defection, and detailed drawings of pertinent : offices during his claimed period of KGB employ- ment. mee PPT etn PE cae eM ar] ee ce There does ‘not appear to be any impairment of his memory. His current living conditions, although physically secure, are luxurious com- pared to those he had been in during the past three years and have resulted in a relaxation of physical tension. tne thea Niece ot adn itherde <w - Definitive resolution of the complex problems in , ; this case will require a considerable period of crops Sen saa steers Aetna eters ROHN mn ERA ttt nmaemstta ctarEomen ete heme Stn et 1 ttm mt tennis # meee Sy Re ROE whey eyes ta hee oot ' faene? erates = ors ae sritat een a vonegly 2 pment btn SECRET «* » . oe . t Siberteeadlect A Pinner CLOUT Iene Drs Aree ener i nti note me am naRtaae tne nae manana as mvuncsamin¢ tamer ont mentemymmmuaranates tre ig matuatter vod ay, tine wena pL AO ENA NNT A RRO OD “MRO ey Pete ate ON 5 IT ol aC aE NT AE BetRuaae ° 6 a e : i en a oe #8, - 4 I a a ieee a oa ‘ we states oi se Hb Pam BER cas car . rte id bind a tle iano Oba os satan at fn see a te tore Frees de en be cnet ete Reto ery Senate Po err tents “than 38 tie ioe PLS elton een te gots g etree is 6 Ch eS ne thal ty j sa ty tibia inal . me yey witha se gh aid Reb btbeeeled a 42
io c 2 fe -77- wait ts re’ Hehe Seco smeenat et ER My a Se bie bes ated nad tO or time for further interviews, preparation of written material and a comparative analysis against his previous statements and information from other sources, interviews and investigation. Nosenko freely admits certain previous lies con- : cerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and : having received certain awards or decorations. an cer nennenntmrnmapmemene = ym vntnatppene aay eb mee sdosendou bt ty fhe an Phytases LEG ed, All interviews with Nosenko are recorded and transcripts of the interviews are being prepared. | In addition, all written material from Nosenko is being typed with certain explanatory re- marks .. . In addition, the Deputy Director of i Central Intelligence has been orally briefed by the Director of Security. As of the present time, it is estimated that there are 1,000 pages of material completed or awaiting completion. All of the finished material is ° in a form which will permit dissemination to the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemina- ' tion is considered appropriate. se be dd froma ate os tee pane ee eh Uhiewn en mp ene trea te amd 1 debe d ek te onete Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a clarification of certain areas of previous controversy. As an example, it is considered that.there can be at this time little doubt that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approxi- mate period which he claims to have been in the KGB. The matter of the actual positions held by Nosenko during the approximate 1953- early 1964 period is not considered adequately resolved at this time and any speculation con- - cerning the dispatched agent aspects would be completely premature. + Seg eh Tae ORE mi tondaterigelitertiln — aguitbutitiiy Maatatslenntone ener If even a degree of optimism i$ realistic, it 1 “4s felt that the additional interviews and work H in the Nosenko case together with a detailed : comparative analysis of all information will ' provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion ‘ of the Nosenko problem. Nosenko has been very responsive [to] the normal consideration he is now receiving, e.g., our current work with him, and if it accomplishes nothing else, will at when nranpmanmemangmamniteampsceetts TE ERPURARIER Gent Pes ecrTES Tee ' * abe ertene ud ca daedgetumnty tans . least condition Nosenko more favorably for what-. : ; ever future action is taken relative to his dis- ~ position. | SECRET . - . ° - wet eter ore reenter tee 8A DR REIT i a lh VARS Wa ROARS SANT rc eS Momma eRe eh MeSH GAPE ED yeh SEH asf TNE th ROG Saba Pte anaes Nera Ste atttteaaE & server vine en ee am anon oa: e 7 fe . eer aaa rig atete wanna Te tne te om TTS ee 8 Nahe one te eat eae tte, tan “cape nmtamementyeeee commalgprtngpommendnimmigeivestajemen — cewittaney anteater os es * te ae beeps hago cree * pliant sos whee ae
14-00000 SEM ee ee oe eee meee ee mae re agate | $ | | SS ke ase kat thinner menmrmerannem rent aes emma Chait RINMONS RM Mme TE Sa eR Re emetenmk co mi ar nbn 4 statis ents wamnnmnntt mA et SECRET -78- This questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a separate investigation conduc ed by the FBI. Results were covered in two reports published at about the same time, the FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA Office of Security's on 1 October 1968. The essence of the Office of Security's findings was expressed in a covering memorandum to the Directc. of Security: In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that Nosenko is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953-January 1964, that Nosenko was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his pre- vious lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time. The conclusions of the FBI report were more sweep- ing: 2. The current interrogations and collateral inquiries have established a number of significant omissions and inaccuracies in the February 1968 CIA paper and have invalidated the vast majority ef conclusions on which that paper relied to discredit Nosenko. 2. The current interrogations and the poly- graph examination* disclosed no indication of deception on the part of Nosenko. He is know- ledgeable in the areas and to the extent he should be; he furnished logical explanations for acquisition of information which would not normally have been accessible to him in his claimed positions. There is no substantial basis for doubting his bona fides as a defector. 3. The variety and volume of information provided by Nosenke is such that it is considered impossible that he acquired the information only by KGB briefing. It is also illogical and *Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph examina- tion of Nosenko performed by CIA between 2 and 6 August 1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken by the Office ef Security. ue SECRET sapetieatee + Aewette cast hee Sette an eae ane ee ete e ne nr the tae ce ea — . sy t asides and eben esate Mikche asta ad ps pdt Zs a S sdeuidetuciebeliiiiwakn tintiadanttn,ceigeiban. win Oe wt ts in stb ba yaraw at vase B, is ents a lat cake the ehetine ppdatedliny sSitndnedtabeierut . 5 san Lotion Mbene to be frst tie Pinas Eueinga
enemies cnr tny ee NEE up it On 31 Nosen only time this SA DraeteN LORN EORIRLCRR ft Bte CERRO MN LEAL ostoh oe etenemmen namin © hemmante cenearetetitne Retain ate ggg Son na le mera LNDR he RS Oo gig rr emecmnemate ens romana . aie Rate a SRT | implausible that the KGB would have dis- patched an officer of his caliber with in- structions to disclose the variety and volume of valuable information furnished by him. No compensatory objective is apparent. 4, The current interrogations show that Nosenko is in possession of information not previously obtained. In the interest of both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the government, interviews should be con- tinued to exhaust his knowledge. §. There should be a thorough re-examina- tion of all information and cases emanating from Nosenko and other defectors where the decision for action, or lack of action, was previously influenced by the presumption that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector. Despite the above findings, the CI Staff never gave S contention that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. January 1969, the CI Staff argued that to accept ko's bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, “the proven reliable source about the KGB for a period of which appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA." An undated memorandum written by the Office of Security officer in charge of Nosenko essentially brings chronicle to a close: Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own private residence and since June 1969, his own automobile. Even prior te April 1969, Nesenko could have, if he chose to do so, acted in a way seriously adverse to the best interests of this Agency Since control was not of such a nature as to preclude independent action by Nosenke. . It is the opinion of Agency representatives in ‘ gegular contact with Nesenke that he is genuinely interested in maintaining the anonymity of his current identity, that is, not becoming publicly known _as identical to Nosenko. ° | However, he has on numerous ~~ occasions indicated his interest in participating under the Nosenke identity in some action or SECRET ° e i RE RT SNOT RTE LAGAN Ha See RAEN ain AONE MURAI Hallet a stipes aati 8 TOU OMe AD A SOA OEE Me a. Les AT Li Artie ey muremnmrs grog samen SM YY 4 metas ee a DIONE pa otra aleontpes tee nome ate Te ree entertternet semen mae eur cnr ncnitin Stet seenentaneR cn mere sme Ans en erAaRS Ae: i" : o a eee wacame eG db i ree 9 per remtrnctrmsentn mmeinareer mee T ees  aaaad i we Rea nacido Gent samndy pusianoige : “ ) ne ave on he , 4, . ‘s ty RAL Snake atsbereitalveier oRebd, t ‘ S60 Sah alenatbeen ssa ces . , a ate bela tate what! tatreee sstmtomnt Bh lee prereory wet Mt adhe eat Renin van halve Mase alge Brats belabded 5 ~ Ashi aationtes neds Bhs 23k eatin rina Sablasaliee aim int
14-00000 | & frit, ; ! f° +. o ; ~80- i - activity which would “hurt the KGB." Nosenko i 3 considers that he has certain capabilities z and knowledge which could be useful in the 4 a effort of the United States government against 2 j the KGB. This interest has not been associated f j : with any particular curiosity in regard to the i 3 i activities of this Agency... H 3 1 Nosenko has consistently expressed his deep interest in obtaining United States citizen- ship as scon as possible. He realizes that ; under normal circumstances, citizenship could ; not be obtained until February 1974, but also ‘ is aware that citizenship can be obtained in less than the normal waiting period by legisla- tive action. Be z i ! ‘ wa eee se oe gersenneeney wend Cob rdesere 6 Rit Lente Nosénko is considered by Agency personnel and FBI personnel in contact with Nosenko to have made an unusual adaptation to American life. He lives like a normal American and has an obvious pride in his home and personal effects. His home life from all appearances is quite calm. The fluency of Nosenko in the English language has greatly increased and there is no difficulty -in understanding Nosenko or in his ability to express his thoughts. Obviously his accent and occasional incorrect sentence structure (and misspelling of words) has not been eliminated and probably will never be entirely eliminated. fs eeceeegen crane we ne ee) eo plas ali Bedar tes Wh a dues i j i : Nesenko continues to complete work assignments expeditiously and with interest. As indicated above, Nosenko is very interested in doing “something active” which is understandable. | Full consideration should be given to this i : i l ' cn ncentanemmctnemrtgreemmenpeneyivrere — getiageage panmnamagreateag: een + * eee Nae ante shana df, sobaann interest since if properly controlled and channeled, could be used in a way adverse to the best interest of the KGB. repmperens vieansp ot Meee Nosenko has since become a United Stated citizen, has married an American woman, continues to lead a normal life, and works productively for the CIA. a ene te tte en secbsaiiaits vn ae fave tly er SECRET 2 FACS Te 8S ae eh TREAT LPM BL a Be Tes tonearm rr ne pe nate mtntteaaeten connec ate Len si ote menentetasa ate a JERCB TTI BNE an ONE NRE cee PT Fa wf seem ninenmen too menmnpreyntm ae ate te Eb oy Sel ca Secanth ase? ke sal a Aesachiny: Dla alaleneleeaess ae or 4 + . | os
14-00000 ee met HSA Tie? LRT Oy ARE NRE Barks Nah Raita + tiie a3) wee 4 a no hey SECRET ~81- 2 CHAPTER IV Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary Evaluation - Any attempt to assess Nosenko'’s value to the US govern- 4 ment must begin by pointing out that he might well have been * able to contribute more had he been permitted to do so. 4+ Unfortunately, we were unwilling to give serious considera- i tion to his stated desire to assist us in making recruitments of Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's suggestions . along this line as possibly part of a plan to embarrass the US government. There is no telling what potential recruit- ment targets might have emerged had we, soon after Nosenko's defection, briefed him with such targets in view. In this part of our study, we therefore confine our- selves to a summary of the contributions that, despite con- siderable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take them, very briefly, o:.e by one. A. Information on KGB Personnel The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up Nosenko’s contribution in this field as follows: Nosenko has furnished information concerning perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agents Or operative contacts (here the terms agents Or operative contacts are used te refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately 250 former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considérable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by Nosenko who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out some time in the future. SECRET ° nN ok pele PEE aad cath tee tyes eee & Sosa —_ sane nes se te SEMEL ALTON LORE Renn eo mene te 2 =o meinen “het + oem Get omaha i 2 24 war hnatedinund tees tBIne int rlaaes at ARilab el waemitbw cient pe thin an Cadad bebe a cee ul othe ‘ eee Ste RTS eee esas aod ene a ai i t ie . eta sada atten hasan 6 sleet em Aebetivatina ads ale, 2 Little, anna eatl taba trae eR goat
14-00000 > pti Peete + ARMA, + ‘ tae fen consent hae & f | ® Le. or. oe ‘ sie nae SCOR ities ac sicRus meen unmsneionomeins « comayanierlnn sven ce antevne ” SECRET “ ~82- . KGB Recruitment Efforts Against US Citizens Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with the KGB involved efforts against US citizens, either visitors to the USSR or members of the US embassy in Moscow. As a result of this background, Nosenko was able to provide some 258 identifications of, or leads to, Americans in whom the KGB had displayed some interest. Some of the KGB operational efforts culminated in *"recruitments” that, according to Nosenko, were more Statistical than real; the KGB played the *nunbers game, for purposes of year- -end reporting. Nonetheless, Nosenko'’s reporting did result in the uncovering of certain US citizens genuinely working for Soviet intel- ligence: 1. US Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, who had been recruited in 1953, was arrested in 1965 on the basis of a Nosenko lead to an agent assigned to a US military installation outside Paris who was providing the KGB with inportant documents as of 1962-1963. Johnson was custodian of classified documents at Orly Field Armed Forces Courier Transfer Station during this period, and he provided documents from there. Excerpts from a preliminary damage assessment are included below: The full extent of damage will only be known when the current review of documents by all affected agencies is completed. The damage assessments prepared by the military services, how- ever, based on a review of their docu- ments to date, indicate that as a re- sult of access to documents in the Orly wault, the Seviets may have learned: SECRET ~erepeentern ame nemam wemrearsocen Ane A aie me “ 7 - an a . . sak eh sagd ; bey son rs a Ranta Bore ssatianbtle as ES ats acide sheer gotlmae Tales hash donb teariahlidlea a hdalted able sie athie . satin dectdiceacats ta wedee ee ete tanat nied ‘ - 1 ota canned Lantie -eevanarcettenepengitaneserienict attire samen Weak a gS ae Bie sedtee aedeetentete a Quetta ee o ett ete act ec toned attr wh fading MOE.
RY 4 tenet eee vas came sere traneeneenetl, Hb, MPR TI FEE iy t eentmeeennentrttnareiirnntnn ager nent ena niin tree ee mr ” -SEORET = 83- {c]. Daily US Intelligence sum- maries including our comments and reports . on military and political developments around the world. [f]}. A wealth of material for use in crypto-analysis. From these preliminary reports ... it is evident that Sgt. Johnson's cooperation _ with Soviet Intelligence has resulted in most serious damage to US national security. 2. US Sergeant Dayle W. Smith, a "code machine repairman” who confessed to haying been recruited by the KGB while serving in Moscow during the period 1952-1984. Smith, while initially denying any con- tact with Soviets, finally admitted he had been recruited and had passed information to them. 3. James A. Mintkenbaugh, formerly a member of the US Armed Forces, later in the real estate business as a civilian. In connection with . Nosenke's lead to Johnson, Mintkenbaugh was inter- viewed after Mrs. Johnson identified him as a friend of her husband's. Mintkenbaugh unexpectedly volunteered that he, too, had been recruited, by Johnson himself, to provide cover for and assist S=CRET are ete RTD meee! ~ BiRRadierbasraamea mao rcers eer emer RTI TT EN oO RSS TR SL ee BASEN PY DT TS * ERRATA eo he MEE, + nae eme rads See tnee aepetme Samu e “hoe wuneee Laue Nae SER anculRNenmar RETIRE oy be ‘ eRe’ WSdiichbe. as edldhceach Abs nasowetbedles chee ty oneal fret ae ane 4 seearnsthien worocbebed th athidens * afin rn mont alti entre Png talent — oephRadad bE aed AA ole ve 4 etal aheiate nt asa, eet Anal Bescon ah ore oa chilbeeds Gunite Lobb Maat cou,” cred 4 eat a . o Se | Sihina rh seeded Urtasbbhecas 4
ee eee enters a een en Hoehne! eemenh tntranettn etn -Atapten lineman ee tranaitedhe snenee mera atrte a e aret ean snare nt one Sn yer Ele ste WORIRSIORARUIR ORIENT ee NRE NONI NRTINIICEE eran cients ras Ae a RA tn Tee EWN Pi! ce MORMON TONE be ENO Mtn. 8 meme at” NNT RS Ta dba eat - oe . & “6 Cc. SECRET . ~84- the latter in his work on behalf of the KC3. Mintkenbaugh described his KGB role as a Spotter, collaborator with Johnson in clandestine photography of documents, and later as a courier between Johnson and his KGB handlers. Moscow Microphones In 1962, Golitsyn had in general terms reported on the existence of microphones in the US embassy in Moscow. This information was promptly sent to the Department of State, but no action was taken; lack of specificity was cited as one of the reasons. It was not until Nosenko's more detailed information was communicated to the Depart- ment of State in March and June 1964 that action was taken that led to th: uncovering of a system of 52 micro- phones, beginning in April of that year. Of the micro- phones found, 42 were active at the time of discovery. These: microphones covered most of the offices in the embassy most significant from the Soviet standpoint. William John Christopher Vassall Nosenko, in June 1962, told us the KGB had an agent in the British Admiralty. Though this information eventually contributed to the arrest and conviction of William John Christopher Vassall, CIA for some time tended to give Golitsyn credit for this success. The British counterintelligence service stated in 1976 that, although Vassall probably would "eventually" have emerged as a “leading candidate” for suspicion as a result of the Golitsyn information, it was in fact Nosenko's information that “was to clinch the identifica- tion of Vassail as the spy." The British added that “[Nosenko's] information affecting UK interests seems to have been consistent with his position and we cannot recall any indication in the leads of UK interest that [Nosenko's] object might have been to mislead or deceive." ° SECRET plies ata taf ~ adate oS te 4 id % * r cy i y. svi dudbbeddlte <cbaibtide abn. Bsa dbatigetarmee Yh Hl oe danbilety ccaad Manet whi ees phaao #obomeee feet tires mates ene SRR | me em Pate Sate oe tert eo a em : aty at a tet Stat aI ARH ada vf wtb StLab Uy aiheaLremer te bebe « Sm, td Lame eraibatetho amr dh gilts Hee iy stow! taitesatariuincuiint alates vag wt Sine tet ale at
acer | < | : SECRET ' y : : -85- ‘ "* E. Leads to Foreign Nationals ; Altogether, Nosenko is estimated to have provided : some 200 identifications of, or leads to, foreign : : nationals (including recruited agents) in some 36 : i countries in whom the KGB had an active interest. ’ F, Summary Evaluation It is not feasible, within the terms of this study, i to make comparisons between Nosenko's counterintelli- i gence production and that of other similarly qualified { defectors.: Enough has been said, however, to demonstrate i on an absolute basis that, both in terms of quantity and quality of information, Nosenko's contribution was of great value to the US government. } | } | . | i i } PF * 9 ya gagpenemceneenane wenn maida nnd AR AEA intr n= nmr “ . te ay ee oe cate Ria oe ci epee yan o Ratier Refit cw aot a iaed nen nO SE A ERT ad tee width sited altbwasion, -eanbetets aoweatiies oSitiech eb ter tty cress athe sen abies ada Moe 6 BTR eget wen ks mehr ccatae uted beads inae Gaeet ne UeiishtDbbodeat-ce Uiintepe or dew eed ee nats son ee Lie” . . Er etttbpane SeR AR ate. ren Oe 2 Seema webbed 208 a
14-00000 1 ey ae ane rs panei meen eememe earaettt e AD ca ge cod r ra SERET | - 86- CHAPTER V The Analytical Foundations of the "Monster Plot" For the purposes of this study, we have not chosen to duplicate the mammoth effort put into analyzing and validating Nosenko's information by the Office of Security in CIA and by the FBI; we have reviewed their work and can find no pos- sible reason to challenge their findings. There remains, however, the question of how senior officials could have drawn so many erroneous conclusions from data tendered by a source whom we now believe to have been cooperative and acting in good faith. A. Lack of Systematic Interrogation At no time between June 1962 and October 1967 was Nosenko afforded the kind of systematic, objective, non- hostile interrogation by well-informed professional in- telligence officers which had otherwise been standard We now examine the manifestations and consequences: ef this problem at various stages of the case, 1. June 1962 Meetings The transcripts of the 1962 meetings reveal a disastrous problem of communication: e --Nosenko spoke fair English, but he preferred to use Russian for the sake of precision. He spoke Russian very rapidly, and his voice ranged from loud and dramatic to excited whispering. Se Se aa eS SECRET i Depiaaramnrcenacrcr wo anemone rant eaee BNE eS SIT SAID CON AEA Be nt ET ee secon nara ane ocenrenetmenneiete ete sega i ere Yona ty war tg At Arnen wma dE nat . ue y Ms, nated Tebaediee SawTME Ne, 3 a oar z 3 3 i t PONS oe, Lett abs coucdsart ent! oon ede atti wat dtr epsra Sh oichdcein, SiteSind Labi Viren wteadasnhs « tis ce penta Taig aaah ne ‘y + + ~
“em x oar ices SRS, sag “ te t on a SECRET A % it i ad at ——_ --A second case officer, with native Russian, 4 arrived on the scene for the second meeting A filled with assurance derived from his involve- a - ment in two imnortant onerations [ a 3 : a a i # ! 7 . i a | 5 1 ‘ 4 i @ t The second meeting, the longest of the five, 4 a was further disorganized by the fact that Nosenko : arrived half-drunk from partying the previous day j i and most of the night. Even during the nearly eight- i i hour interview, Nosenko continued to drink. This é | point was consistently overlooked or ignored in later 5 | ; examination of boastful claims Nosenko made during a j this meeting; e.g., Nosenko personally handled the | 2 Langelle/Popov case, Nosenko personally ran the _ 4 operation against a US security officer, Nosenko ‘ personally talked to a US code clerk to try to re- 3 ° cruit him, etc. When confronted in hostile interroga- % tions in 1964 and 1965 with these claims, he denied 4 personal participation in all three instances (other Jg . than directing the code clerk case behind the scene) od and said that if he had said such things in 1962 it “4 was because he was either drunk or under very strong i tension at the time. Such explanations were not con- : Sidered acceptable by his interrogators, and the 4 claims were let stand as evidence of his mendacity. 4 4 While Nosenko provided a substantial amount “4 of information during these five meetings, there . i * was little or no follow-up questioning on most of it, partly because of lack of time but also because of the case officers’ lack of background on the KGB. in ; eneral and the Second Chief Directorate in particular. oF. at Bibs. 3. edt asta ipetagad t : Joe re SECRET . rs Ton tn aM ase AE WOME sic AN DN msi a LPM NTO AB Ui 0S VARINA BAER Nt HENNE. Ti aS Ror LT LAO ane eter mmrenr meena ecmmaremrons <a Wr renee So = aan + eauten serum fy aseptic tetas (0 APCD ERE Senet eats ABs attached ete PE ACE Rat ER et tet Xx. de baass. a te
nae ce ements na ernie aM MRE oY SECRET -88-. January-March 1964 The second series of meetings in Geneva, in January and February 1964, were somewhat better organized, but--given the already prevailing belief that Nosenko was a KGB controlled agent--he was not carefully questioned on the information he gave. This was partly because it was considered of primary importance not to reveal even by implica- tion how much we already knew, lest his mission include elicitation of information CIA had received from Golitsyn or other sources considered bona fide. Debriefings in the United States after Nosenko's defection were similarly limited to noncontroversial generalities and were not noteworthy for attention to accuracy and detail. | April 1964-October 1966 The hostile confrontation that took place for some two weeks in April 1964 cannot be considered systematic interrogation; “shouting matches” would better characterize these sessions. During one period--May to November 1964--Nosenko Was systematically debriefed in neutral fashion to obtain additional information on leads to Americans and other Westerners recruited by the KGB, in part to meet requirements provided by the FBI. The other two objectives of this debriefing period, of greater importamce to the CIA concerns in this case, were: --to obtain answers to questions posed in writing by Golitsyn, whose aim was to trap Nosenko into exposing his ignorance or “lies” about ‘topics Golitsyn considered central to Nosenko's "KGB missions." ; SECRET “eRe steer fe eee Fen RRS ENOtERCetat Wer epee ete met sehen cay ABE Fanaa ae Sn SPEEDO RET Hay BREIL SEMEN. tm LT BLS HEE GitemcRapt aagnecindy reson 6 2a Le ead AR SAP OAL ROCA TET CE . . : ctettenrmnen amuse gi ~paparezr nant 7 veneer e tee cemetery Serie Nee parton amnnerante | | ie . . ‘ ye a Paes, vtatein Sct Ride, nina acndS tka bol in, Sree ntviias Lata the on 4 Wag aedhne 6 e eae ah Mame litter « Heebiwen, cecrbone atertent stern path LSbpulicca ale lena ‘ * ‘ t . iia abbnetiicatieg} “alles Se. fe deus Stade
14-00000 ce esate o>, a ster os ele Nona eth i A Ele ne nt nt a gay eee ta net Senehe emett pett nee | | | | SECRET -89- --to acquire fuller background on Nosenko's alleged duties and activities in his various KGB positions in order to use his own informa- tion against him in the hostile interrogation period that was to follow. The January-March 1968 hostile interrogations were carefully structured and systematic but were not designed to collect information. The information Nosenko provided in these sessions was consistently and intentionally ignored, as the stated objectives were to force Nosenko to agree with his interrogators that (1) he did not know what he should have known (according to CIA assumptions), and (2) that he had not held the positions in the KGB that he claimed. This objective was “successfully" achieved in the eyes of the interrogators by bringing Nosenko to Sign statements that purported to summarize his statements of inadequacy of both knowledge and performance in regard to each of the positions he had held, Each time, in signing these so-called “protocols, Nosenko objected that the way they. were worded distorted what he had said; however, he acknowledged his inability to get his interroga- tor to listen to what he was trying to tell him and therefore his inability to reword these papers in any manner satisfactory to him. When given one key "protocol" to sign--one that was a "confession" that he nad been sent by the KGB to deceive CIA, and that he had lied purposely on behalf of the KGB--he said that, if his signing this document would serve some good purpose of CIA or of the US government in general, he would do so, but only with his interrogators' clear understanding that the entire "confession" was untrue. . Under these circum- stances, his interrogators declined to have him sign this document. Thus this series of interrogations failed in its ultimate objective--that of “breaking” Nosenko. aan Subsequent interrogation sessions were not con- structed to collect information any more than the previous ones but were designed to collect further damaging evidence of Nosenko’s ignorance about the KGB and of the areas in his reporting to which he was “most sensitive” and that therefore were most revealing of his "true KGB missions.” In sum, while a@ greal deal of personnel time was spent in talking SECRET aoe oie Corn Bem: Fd aE CR en atten eaten ~~ EG Ee TN REAL IRS Startle s AK Ain I RATIEIS oBh Tt A NSIS erent Eten iach saeet ctein came me ma rtmane casera sst be te Saul 4 " s as Lesa t de a oe ae ved we guely bide Bese dei ealed Me, a dase eb des, I gta x tien gisbaDuadio VO
14-00000 ere e B. oY SEGRE ~ -90- te Nosenko and a large amount of paper was generated in consequence, the canons of proper interrogation were rarely observed. 4. Time Devoted to Debriefing or Interrogation A point that can easily be overlooked is that, of the total period of Nosenko's incarceration, a relatively modest amount of time was devoted to actually debriefing or interrogating him. The most generous estimate we can make is that approximately 292 days were at least in part devoted to debriefing or interrogating Nosenko, out of a total of 1,277 days' incarceration. Thus, from the standpoint of obtaining information, about 77 percent, or more than three-quarters, of the detention period was downtime. Faulty Record of Conversations with Nosenko The outcome of the Nosenko case was prejudiced at the outset by the establishment of a faulty record. I€ anything, the role of the second case officer, who had a native command of Russian but little nari. i etail. simply compounded the errors. The so-called “transcripts of the tapes” from the five meetings were then prepared by the second case of- . ficer between the week of 19 June and mid-August 1962. Contrary to the usual procedure, the second case officer did not first transcribe from the tapes into the combination SECRET oe _ peste ere somone aE BLE ER SIE ICED Raaeeie venti seer ientowecovprsnns mot ¢ cannon aoe att sammy mine anton “hain Sownae tut ®t i tmeenpy eA He ly Shak Hi a Ap etteren eet . pe eee tee ee Pros seth Al dian Wheels yg 5 Seeh bi, tt dite aa ake + Gide al ay oFiadend the edd (4 0 weet peadleae tF : t i i ! i steed dele <6 a coer s Helin dthie'dlemed iit Hee tat abicaubesiiaishtrccumetiee tabas mdAeL Hea tang OL ibns Conlapi eve
gepner “ -9]- bmn camesnamnactien nee D We at ec bot EW 82 FA In March 1964 a KGB defector of 1954 vintage was brought into the case to examine Nosenko's reporting in terms of his own expertise on personalities, file procedures, reorganizations, etc. He concentrated on the early years of Nosenko's career, particularly 1952 and 1953. In a resultant memorandum dated 12 March 1964, he commented as follows: <o+ emmremeeeiin ne sane, kurimnenne” a ttn meme eanegy recreupee aN ns +4 mena ' . . The undersigned began work on this special project by reviewing the taped recordings of the meetings i only, without reference to the meeting transcripts, | believing that it would be possible and preferable i to get all the necessary information and other i material firsthand in this way. From the begin- 5 ning, however, it was obvious that this would be i ' . very difficult, if not in many cases impossible; the early tapes (Nos. 1-6 and especially No. 1) were very poor in quality. (These are the tapes for meetings No. 1 and 2.) ah After proceeding thus far in a review of the tapes, the undersigned then switched over and began anew, reviewing the transcripts alone and without reference to the tapes. This method also quickly proved unsatisfactory; from his memory of the discussions as actually presented on the early tapes, although poorly reproduced and hard to “catch,” the undersigned soon was able to tell that the transcripts are, to say the least, faulty. et telat Dee ath ws vo Sei teeny tr meters hateeremseteert ects Secdivnd tielbe ame betel n Be A point-by-point review of the tapes and tran- ‘ scripts was then initiated and has been pursued : until the present time by the undersigned. In the course of this review, a large number of errors--omissions and other discrepancies-- ; ; . have been discovered scattered throughout the . ; transcript coverage of the meetings recorded on . the tapes. ee oe ky SECRET Sch ean He OO CIS. neo naman waren ata nes eas oS antec abet we Hae eb oteebtee nade
14-00000 ae SECRET -§2- It is impossible to make enduring pronounce- ments of the following type without knowing the whole situation and being fully aware of all the motives and factors--personal and profes- : sional--involved, yet it should be noted that : the undersigned in many places throughout the records of the meetings has encountered examples of what he would consider errors in the handling and conduct of those meetings. Let it suffice merely to register this point here; notes on this subject will be drafted and presented in later papers. - - . caste “AY : seep me eengenceecmeteementes natn APE MIT n= oa . . ? ' y He then proceeded to cite nine major examples of errors, omissions, distortions, and procedures characteristic of the second case officer's transcripts (and performance during the meetings). He concluded by saying: cave spammer a cans a popes Ftp The foregoing present but a few examples of errors, discrepancies, distortions, etc., to be found throughout the transcripts. <A com- plete report of all such errors, etc., will be prepared upon request. a The “complete report” was never prepared, and it may never have been requested. es @ * stem peeagnemermammennlelyeaetep — ~Nrenat etre ttneeNa ERRATA — “PME Pewee reser ee” SECRET *S eemsmyincemene streets - oo re NNER AE AEE ame acne Nereis ats ATO TG A et ARSENAL AERTS oa . abe org satighr ast oS rtae ante tetenekifn he i teat et the Bde RACETAB EO te BERS: ARE CRANE RNR EIT PI th NIE ES oY cra 8 fare? ae cagen tt mee et ace: o i ee = Ar a ed ALTER OT GIOE