157-10014-10073 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Date : 08/06/95 Page il ee Him “ha anne over om son ork ety roe wats ATE US SEG SOM FEE LEED IPDS GOTT SOUP GT GED OT nS Ste eh Ah ll SIL AE Ee GOR AINE RN GRE HA ee eR Fe coke re en erm ve th A en sk ae end eee em tums sem nat ae Gum em sem corm ema ae wm ain Oewe fl Gene seme SS rua eau GD ern TITS Ne Sand att AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION SSCIA 157-10014-10073 HEARINGS LO-H~-G5 non jos Some ss We 02h or wns “IR CO) ID CD ARH oy ten ONT He ENS HER SNE SSCS NG GEG HD GEE Tu COND fm eH rt Hl ey Mn AED Ge NED CE ED om a Oey me Ste hh mttm Ante, mtn men mh ar we teh cet mee emu me Sem arr wm cy mone Gem mer arr ome ae tee cea nan cn wr tn ©17 aks Care en ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSTFPICATION : RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCIA MCNAMARA, ROBERT 07/11/75 145 OPERATION MONGOOSE ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES MCNAMARA, ROBERT CIA DOD TRANSCRIPT UNCLASSIFIED 1B RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/21/98 Box 3 seen rth nm sews Wine 28 Re OE ID RE. tn GA RE EERD Cem FI th Nt SSO in. ty eh OED IRE UD TEED rom i sy nh cn re wers AUR rd tO AED SA Am em ent ny ey Cun me ce anemia Lew. tore Has aim Gig SEE me rH Mint NY tm wee Wal uly wy aE ay Gres STAY NAR GU Tey MO, HY 50955 Bocld: 3242739461 [R] ~ TTEM IS RESTRICTED Page 1
eel oan Nite) States Senate Report of Proceedings... *é.. Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental | Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Friday, July 11, 1975 Washington, D.C (Stenutype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, 8. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (208) 844-6000 SECRET
TESTIMONY OF ’ McNamara Robert S. 1? & 4 [-*] bmg x % & McNamara Exhibits Noo. 1, 2, 3 and 4 7 McNamara Exhibit No. re whee € Gava x i; rene ay t% aoe sy ase gs OLE TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docla
EXECUTIVE SESSION Friday, July 11, 1975 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operatione with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D. C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in Room §-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) | presiding. Z 3 ¢ a 4 8 & € & Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Baker Mathias and Schweiker. . | Also present: “William Miller, Staff Director; Frederic A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Elizabeth Smith, Joseph diGenova, Charles Lombard, Frederick Baron, Patrick Shea, Robert Kelley and Michael J. Madigan, Professional Staff Members. TOP SECRET
The Chairman. All right. The hearing will come to order.) Mc. McNamara, would you please stand and take the oath. Mr. McNa@‘nara. Surely. The Chaircran. Do you swear that all of the testimony you are about to .e!ve in this proceeding will ‘be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. McNamara. I do. The Chairman. Mr. Schwara will commence. TESTIMONY OF ROBERT 8. MCNAMARA Mr. Schwarz. Mr. McNamara, I understand you have a prepared statement. Before making that could I just put 4 couple of things on the record. First, your name and address, if you could. é 2 a @ @ co] Cy 4 8 Mr. McNamara. Robert S. McNamara, 2412 Tracy Place, Washington, D. C. | Mr. Schwarz. Now, further, as a prccedural matter, we always go through this with all our witnesses and you know you have the right to counsel -~ a right to counsel. ‘ Mr. McNamara. I do. Mr. Schwarz. And if you want to stop to obtain counsel at any time you have that right? Mr. McNamara. I understand. Mr. Schwarz. - And you also have all of the Constitutions: rights, including those under the Bill of Rights. Mr. McNamara. I read the rules of the Committee and | TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld:374273461 Page 5
Hy @ 3 € a 4 8 8 € 8 a 50955 Docld: 324279461 think I am familiar with them. The Chairman. Your Constitutional rights are not ex- tended by virtue of any committee action. (Laughter) The Chairman. But if you do have a prepared statement, Mr. MoNamara. | Mr. Schwarz. Do you have extra copies? Mr. McNamara. I unfortunately don't. I gave one to the counsel a few minutes ago. It is a brief statement, three and a half pages. The Chairman. Would you commence with the statement? Mr. McNamara. Yes. On June 6, Mr. Chairman, as you will recall, I wrote | ‘to you saying, and I quote, “I want you to know that although I doubt that I have anything to contribute to your investigation if your staff or your committee wishes to question me about my knowledge of the events you are investigating, I will be very happy to respond." My letter waa written because my name had been associated in the press with repeated discussions within the Government in the summer of 1962 of a possible assassination attempt against Premier Castro. The Chairman. Did you mean to say repeated or reported discussion? Mr. McNamara. Beg your pardon. I meant to gay reported, TOP SECRET
4 It seems to me the seriousness of, the repeated or reported i seriousness of, the charges your committee was examining outweighed any question of the appropriateness of my teatifying, given | | my obligation as an international civil servant. ‘fhe firet thing I want to say is that X have no knowledge or information of any proposal for the assassination of Premier Castro coming from President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy. In fact, I would regard such a proposal as totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men. Secondly, it has been asserted in the press that in a meeting I attended on August 10, ‘62, with Secretary Rusk, John McCone, then Director of Central Intelligence, and MeGeorge Bundy, the question of assassination was raised Py 23 4: a é J a € & and diamissed but that shortly after meeting &@ memorandum was circulated by Major General Edward Lansdale calling for a number of actions relating to the situation in Cuba, including the preparation of contingency plans for Castro's assassina- tion; that when a copy of the memorandum recahed Mr. McCone he called me and I agreed with him that an assassination Me POOo. atttempt should not be considered and the item was in fact eliminated from the memorandum. ‘ Rartingenn, Other press stories appearing since my teatimony was acheduled before you have quoted General Lansdale to the , _ . cr effect he had been requested by Robert F. Kennedy to develo: I + assassination plans for disposing of Castro, and the project i 2 TOP SECRET a HW 50955 Docld: 324234 re it 61 Page 7
envisioned the whole epectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to assassinating him, although the then Attorney General it was said never used the word assassination. Lansdale was reported to have sald he developed the plans without the knowledge of myself or Mr. McCone, but that we beth had become aware of the planning later. Later news stories atate that Lansdale modified his atatemoent to say “perhaps gome place in the plans there was somathing to do about the leader who had threatened the lives of millions of Americans", and to claim that he, Lansdale, “ruled out assassination” because “that is not my bag anyway". Since reading these presa stories I have tried to recon- atruct the actual sequence of events and I have refreshed my Baad @ Cave recollection from documents in your committee's possession, from conversations with other persons involved, and from a file memorandum written in 1967 that Mr. McCone was able to produce for me. As I reconstruct it this is what happened. Following the Bay of Pigs and extending throughout the spring and summer of '62, there was a good deal of concern within the U.S. Government about attempted subversion of Latin Harrier ater DC POOH? American Governments by the Communist regime in Cuba. To thwart these attempts the continuing program of covert ac-~ AIO 6 wy: Street & F tivities directed against the Castro regime was mounted under the direction of an inter-Agency group. And I want to return TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32493461 Page @
ale Ee i 4 we is 4 Ee otto , 2 f Bf io) ¥ m4 1 later to the question of the appropriateness of these actions before completing my statement. oo | I believe General Lansdale had been attached from the Prone {ieee 202) 344-4000 % 4 | assignment in the Defense Department to serve as Staff early ‘62. In Auguet '62 several meetings of the group were | Director of this group beginning sometime in late ‘61 or 7) held. On at least one occasion principals, including Secretary & | Rusk and myself, were in attendance. 19 9 ; , In one or more of the meetings of the group the subject re }: ; of assassination of Premier Castro was apparently discussed. C lL: : Some news reports have asserted the subject was advanced at 3 . 1: " the August 10th meeting in Secretary Rusk's conference room @ . ¢ }: ' in which I was present, and one news source asserts I 8 Cc. 14 raised the subject myself. f. st The report does not state whether I supported or ~ i epposed such action. I have no recollection of even discuss- ing the matter. a. : No one of the senior officials present at the meeting with whom I have talked recalls me discussing it. Mr. McCone’s Oc 2600) ae recollection in his file memorandum prepared sometime five years later, on. April 14, 1967, is that the subject was La tingtan, fe probably raised at another meeting in the JCS conference a day oF or two before the meeting I attended. wt Mime In any event, apparently everyone agrees the subject wa" aioe an dismissed. It appears, nevertheless, that General Lansdale - TOP SECRET HW 50955 DBoctd:3274273461 Page 9
included a request for contingency plans for the assassination in the memorandum he later prepared in his capacity as Staff Director to the inter-agency group and addressed to the CIA laaigun officu:, vi. Mar.ey.  t did nct non the Tane- dale memorandum when it was prepared and did not learn of its exiatence. until Mr. McCone telephoned me about it when it was brought to his attention. At that time I expressed opposition to any assassination attempt and I agreed with Mr. McCone no such planning should be undertaken. I understand the memorandum was modified. ra T. have no knowledge or information about any other plans Or preparations for a possible assassination attempt against 4 2 4 ry @ S @ « 8 Premier Castro. | I believe now and I think Mr. McCone's memorandum supports my. recollection, that I believed then that the U.S. Government should not undertake or encourage assassina- tion openly or secretly as an instrument of national policy against people with whom we are not at war. It may be argued that given the extensive program of covert action against the Castro regime in which the U.S. government was engaded at the time that it would only be a _Rasstingtas OL FRAME we short term to attempted assassination but I can't accept that Pores argument on its face. Bribery and industrial sabotage are not the same things as murder. But having said that I want to conclude this portion of my statemant by saying that I TOP SECRET MW 50955 Docld: 324235461 Page id
believe we completely misjudged the seriousness of the poten- tial danger to this country from Cuba and that we overreacted accordingly. In fact, I have serious doubts about the value or the propriety of covert intervention in the affaires of another country in almost any situation except aa may be incidental to the completion of essential intelligence. Later, perhaps, Mr. Chairman, I would add two points to this. , , | | The Chairman. Mr. McNamara, may I just ask before you continue, because the last sentence you have read happens to 80 coincide with my own belief that I would like to reread it and then ask you a question concerning it. Mr. McNamara. Surely. - 2 € a @ eS & a B The Chairman. In fact, you read, "In fact, I have serious doubts about the value or the appropriateness of covert inter- vention in the affairs of another country in almost any situation except as may be incidental to the completion essential intelligence.” Was that your belief at the time you were Secretary of Oc 7OOnE Defense? Mr. McNamara. No. Waitingian, The Chairman. That has come to be your belief since that time? Mr. McNamara. Yes. It is based, frankly, on both partic:- ATO Bornt Sree 4 E pation in approval of covert action designed to intervane TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld: 32423461 Page il
in the affaire of another. country. Thies statement is based both on the fact I did participate in authorizing that and din observing the reaulta which I think were small in relation to the heavy cost to the country carrying this out, and particular- ly the cost in terma of -- I am using a- brief statement oo J will expand on this if you wigh -- cost in terms of eroding the credibility of a Democratic Government with its own people. The Chairman. Yes. You don't have to expand on that for my benefit, 1 agree with you, but I interrrupted you. Do you want to complete your statement? Mr. McNamara. The remaining points, Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to defer until the end and they may. not be P > 4 é @ & s a 8 necessary at the time. The Chairman. Very well, Mr. Schwarz, then, would you like to begin the questioning? Mr. Schwarz. .Mr. McNamara, I want to call your atten- tion to the meeting in August ‘62. Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. And we have previously marked and-I wil! sna@inn 1 20001 ask, Mr. d@iGenova to put in front of you four documenta: the Pash minutes of the August 10, 1962 meeting, which has been marked “NF as Exhibit A. seat Kee Does everybody know where these are by now in the books. aioe That is at Tab RB in the Lansdale book, the section market ae TOP SECRET HW 50955 DocId:32423461 Page 12
Tab 38-8. The second marked as Exhibit 2 is Mr. Lansdale's men- erandum of August 13, 1962 which is at Tab 38-D of the Lans- dale book. The third marked as Exhibit 3 the August 14 memorandum from Mr. Harvey to Mr. Helms. And finally, marked as Exhibit 4 Mr. McCone's memorandum to file of April 14, 1967, which is the second entry at Tab R of the McNamara book which you have sust obtained, the thinner book. (The documents referred to wore marked McNamara Exhibits Nos. 1. 2, 3 and 4 for identification.) a 2 4 & 4 & a 4 3 SOON 4 Je Wa gation ye iee “« bes HW 50955 Docld:32 eet 423461 Page 13.
Mr. Schwarg. Going back to your statement -~ Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir. Mr. Schwarz. Why don't you pull them out so he has them all in front of him. a oe | Going back to your statement, Mr. McNamara -- 1g ' Mr. McNamara. Yes, gir. Mr. Schwarz. -- would you state again whether you have any present recollection of the subject of assassinations coming up at the August 10, 1962 maating? Mr. McNamara. I have no such recollection. I should expand on that to say quite frankly I have no recollection of the meeting at‘all. And although I referred to it in my state- d -3 € & @ o € € 8 ment, my recollection or my reference, as I indicated, Was based on a reconstruction of the events of the time by refer- ence to documents that you and your associate have shown me and by conversations with certain of my senior colleagues who were reported to have been in attendance and by certain other conversations, including a conversation with Mr. McCone 2 OORT and reference to a memorandum which he had dictated in 1967, a copy of which he sent me. a : Mr. Schwarz. I want to come back to what all those r Watmingtes 1 ¢ conversations were. First, let me make clear what you do or do not now remember. ALO Fvcat Street SE Apart from the August 10 meeting, do you now recall TOP SECRET : 2 HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 14
eC ¢ ? @ ry a a & 4 8 Neemer ALO 0 oat subject of assassinations being raised at any meeting? ‘Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of that evar baing raised in any meeting. Mr. Schwarz. Didyou ever raise the subject of assassin- e ation, as far as you recall? Mr. McNamara. Tf have no recollection of raising it at any time, and I have talked to four of the people who attended the August 10 meeting who said they had no recollection of my raising it. When I say that I am aware you have a memorandum from Mr. Harvey you referred to a moment ago which indicates that I raised the question on Auguat 10, but I have no recollec- “thon of doing so. Senator Mondale. We have heard from John McCone whu said that he thought he heard McNamara bring it up; is that correct? Let's review the record. I think what we have heard from some of the participants ids slightly different than what you have said about the main principals; is that correct? Do you want to bring this up in some other -- I think you ought to know what we have heard and you can react to tha’. The Chairman. It is my recollection that McCone test: - fied that the subject did come up and he thought that MeNama: : had brought it up. TOP SECRET
"Sea Hw 4 ‘y » ¢ Waeatengtes CO POOR! vent Street OF 4106 50955 Docld: 3242346 Senator Mondale. That is right, and Harvey said that. Me. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey's memo says that. Senator Mondale. Did he say he heard it in testimony? The Chairman. Harvey was present in the meeting. Mr. Schwarz. I think he confirmed his memo. Can I check on Mr. McCone's testimony for a moment? Senator Mondale. Yes, 80 you know what he said. While he is looking, what did Goodwin say? Mr. Schwarz. Goodwin is going to be examined on Cuba. Senator Mondale. He hasn't talked about that. What have the others? Do we have any other direct testimony? Mr. Schwarz. Rusk said -~ Senator Mondale. Said he did not hear it. The Chairman. Incidentally, Mr. Secretary, we have no purpose and no intention to try in any way to entrap you or any other witness and we would prefer to the best of our recollection and ability to recount to you other testimony we have received so you can comment on it and help us try to ascertain what the truth may be. Mr. Schwarz. I think I ought to gay with respect tc McCone's testimony, at page 33, you asked Senator Mondale, who made that suggestion to which you refer in your memo, and you will recall that McCone's 1967 memo does not attri- bute the suggestion to any particular person. McCone anawered, according to the record it was Mr. TOP SECRET 1 Page 16
McNamara accogding to Mr. Harvey's record -- Senator Mondale: Do you recall who made the suggestion? Mr. McCone: No, t can't recall it from memory. I can only reconstruct it from the record. Senator Mondale. Is that the only reference? Mr. Schwarz. I am going ahead and doublechecking with McCone. Senator Mondale. Here it ig on page 81. Ne said he just doesn't know. Can you testify it was not Secretary McNamara? McCone: .No; it could have been. “You just don't know?” ry 2 @ & @ cs] @ @ 8 Mr. MeCone: “I don't know". Senator Baker. On page 32 there is another colloquy on the same point you might turn to. McCone: "I am not sure that McNamara used the word assassination, he could have used another word, elimination or removal. And Mr. Harvey in preparing this memorandum PHOS 1 for Helms, who was then Neputy of Plans and Information used ne the word assassination rather loosely." Might that be the rationale for the situation, might Pearmie gee: your views -- ut oe Me. McNamara. 1 don't think it is and I think you should be very careful in concluding that Mr. McCone recalls BBO Evens te ' that I raised the subject at all using the word assagssinatios TOP SECRET | i 1 $ HW 50955 Doold: 32423461 Bage i?
or elimination. The reason I say that, at the risk of diverting you for a moment to show you why this is a matter of great importance to me and why I asked for careful and precise action by thia committee, let me say that I perhaps more than anyone else, other than Robert Kennedy, have been charged with approving the concept and/or planning and/or action related to the assassination of Castro. ZI don't believe _I ever did approve any of those things. I don't believe I ever suggested it. None of my senior associates whom I havo talked to can reail it. But I have here a set of clippings from the press in Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, France, Italy and England, which states that 1 did. 2 ey 4 & on @ o 8 4 6 c And I have here a statement of the U.S. press, an artic!y in the Time Magazine of |August 30, which states that MecCone and another man present, that is to say, at the August 10 meeting, remember McNamara raiged the question of disposing of Castro. And it goes on to imply that I did. “The AP report indicates that Lansdale was my assistant and presumably acting under my instructions when he wrote the memorandum you referred to. . Parerngton OF € 7000} The New York Times quoting the AP five days later, by the most unbelievable error, says I wrote the memo to CIA veut Soeame inatructing them to plan the assassination. arae Now, this is serious to me ad an individual. It igs muc?: TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 18
more serious to the World Bank as an institution as to my role in the Bank. | So, I must ask your forebearance today if I attempt to be unusually preciae on matters. “And IY want to conclude by saying that because of the ?ime Magazine article it said McCone remembered, I raised this matter, I called “MeCone on June 25, and I have given a copy of the memo of conversation I made after that to members of your staff. And in that conversation, after I related to MeCone everything I knew up to that point which had come from Belin off the Rockefeller Commission and the press and others, ineluding a reference to the Harvey memo and all the rest of this -- the memo is in front of you, I asked John {if he could add to my knowledge what took place during or after the August 10 Pd > 4 6 @ f°] @ « g. ‘62 meeting of 54/12 Augmented took place in Dean Rusk's con- ference room to consider reports. He remembered the elimination of. Castro was discussed iv @uring the course of the meeting but does not recall whether or ‘not I raised the subject. Now, I have read the press that McCone states he re- .O ¢ 200) that he told me. He doesn't recall it. _Wegatergtar Senator Hart of Michiaqan. I think in the exchange betwee: nu Senator Daker and Senator Mondale the point is made by Mr. McCone he has no memory, that all he is reconatructina is from the fellow Harvey. This is consistent. ATO 6 cent Cereer, Mr. McNamara. This is exactly my understanding, sir. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 19
The Chairman. That is borne out by the transcript: Mr. McNamara. I think the transcript indicated I insisted asiing this be repeated on the record because I am facine some very serious problems around the world because of lack of un- | derstanding. of that partacular point, and i think misquotes of JOhn MeCone in Time Magazine. Mr. Schwarz. The most contemporaneous record, however, ia the August 13 memorandum from Mr. Lanadale which, ag you know, taska Mr. Harvey with developing a paper concerning, among other things, the liquidation of leaders. Those words were crossed out. ‘Mr. McNamara. — Yes, sir.. Mr. Schwarz. And the August 14 memo about Mr. Harvey a 2 « a @ c & € 8 that tells us those were the words. It says it was foolish to put it in writing. It says the matter was brought up at the meeting and was brought up by you. Now, there isn't any evidence that this matter led to anything. Indeed, the CIA in their own study of the whole Castro assassination matter specifically wrote that the August 10 meeting didn't lead to any of the actual events. So we are concerned, it seems, with the single issue of what was the attitude toward assassination expreased at the meeting, because that does bear upon other ultimate questions we have to deal with. The attitude is important. BUDO peee temo Isn't the best evidence of what happened at the meetinu TOP SECRET
contemporaneous memorandum? Mr. McNamara. I am sure that written statements carry | more weight than faulty memories. My memory certainly is faulty over a period. But even the written statement of Harvey, as I have seen it -- I do not have a copy of it but I have seen it, your staff showed it to me. Mr. Schwarz. It ie marked as -- .Mr. McNamara. In advance of the hearing. Mr. Schwarz. Marked as Exhibit 3. Mr. McNamara. Fven the statement of Harvey's memo doean't say I proposed assassination of Caatro. It saya the question of assassination of Castro was raised or was up, to be precise. c Pa 2 € a — € 8 £ @ 8 a) I don't wish to try to read into that more than is appropriate, but it doesn't say I proposed it, and I am not about to say I proposed it. I have no recollection of it. 7A The four senior associates I have talked with, Messrs. Taylor, Bundy, Gilpatric and Rusk, have no recollection of in raising it. It is entirely out of character with what I believe I thought at the time and I do not read into that those words a statemont I did propose it. Senator. Baker. Could I say a word?” I think pade 33 of the McCone testimony is helpful in this respect. As the Chairman says, we are not trying to push anybod, TOP SECRET * 4 “RW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 21
in a corner, trapping the witness, we are trying to find the baseline minimum of what was paid with respect to assasaina- tion or elimination of leaders. My interpretation of the record so far is that it is alleged, and I believe proven with good evidence, both verbal teatimony and documentary evidence, that the subject proposale came up at that meeting, but not beyond the shadow of a doubt that it was said by the Secretary. Let me tell you why I said that. Page 33 of McCone's testimony ia as follows: “T take it then that according to your best recollection. the subject of liquidating Castro and posaibly other top Cuban leaders did come up at that meeting and you did take strong exception to it?" WACO H Omapa McCone: "Yes." So it seems clear to me McCone does remember independent! 7 & the subject coming up. To continue with McCone’s answer: "I wag not alone in that. Mr. Murrow took exception. OEE T I rememver that very clearly." It seems to me the baseline minimum is that apparently egrar 1 the subjoct did come up and was shot down. We have only the 1 ame a remaining question of whether or not the witness before us now brought it up or someone else did. Then the question I will put to Mr. McNamara, do you AEO # segs Nor ees remember it coming up? TOP SECRET HW50955 Docld:324293461 Page
Mr, McNamara. I do not remember it coming up. Mr. Schwarz. One further question I think,was it shot down or not at the meeting, and in that connection Mr. Lansdale did send out a memo tasking the CIA? Do you believe Mr. Lansdale would have sent out a memor- andum tasking the CIA to investigat as a contingency liquida- tion of leaders if the matter had in fact been shot down at the meeting? Mr. McNamara. Mr. Schwarz, I would rather not answer that. I have certain knowledge of Mr. Lansdale, General Lans- dale, but I would rather not comment upon whether he would or not. I will report to you what I know with respect to that memo based on what Mr. McCone told me what his memo gays, but I Py 3 « a _ @ a & 4 8 would rather not speculate on Lansdale's willingness to in- dependently suggest that. The Chairman. Mr. McNamara, I think it is important for the committee to at least have the benefit of pur opinion, on an issue that is as central to our inguiry as this, be- cause we are confronted with a memorandum that Lansdale wrote soon after the meeting in which he -instructs or directs CIA to at least inquire into schemes for liquidating foreign leather Famer gton OC POOH Wasn't that the term? S€ Mr. Schwarz. Liquidation -- including Liquidation 6f leaders. ALO F went Rivas The Chairman. Including liquidation of leaders. TOP SECRET + Boe pias HW 509455 Bocid pee 232425461
Will you read the whole sentence? Mr. Schwarz. You have to put the two together. But it would read: i i Y | Mr. Harvey, intelligence political (splitting the. regime, in- “Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting: nd ! cluding liquidation of leaders,) economic sabotage limited.* Mr. McNamara. I do. | /The Chairman. Do you have that before you? iH i a The Chairman. Notice at the beginning of this Lansdale { memorandum is the following. The first sentence is "In com- {i : “ pliance with the dosires and guidance expressed in the 10 ‘August policy meeting of operation MONGOOSE", Then he goes on to instruct Mr. Harvey as indicated. WARD & Para Now, we know the words that are deleted from this memorandum have been since supplied to the committee, were including liquidation of leaders. ; Now, if General Lansdale thought that the qroup had “given him such authority, that could have been based upon a mi.- understanding of the group's intentions, or it could have been an enlaryement of his instructions. We don't know for sure what it was. But there it is and I think you ought to respon: to the question as best you can. Mr. McNamara. Well, T should tell you that at the mome:* , I am so personally annoyed at General Lansdale for what I consider loose and irresponsible and at times contradictory TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32473461 Page 24
testimony in the prese, in the whole matter in the last three four weeks, I don't feel I can speak in a fair manner with respect to him and I don't propose to. The Chairman. Then can you tell the committee apart from -- Mr. McNamara. I take it those in the room will hold this in confidence. Ed Lansdale is a fine human being. I am damn annoyed at the damage he has done to dead people. I am not an unblased reporter on Ed Lansdale's motives. The Chairman. I can understand your feeling. oops rd 3 ¢ a é 8 & € 8 But apart from General Lansdale and any feelings you may have toward him, can you give the committee any explana-- tion, any other explanation of why such words should have appeared in that? Mr. McNamara. No, I cannot. It seems to me inconsistent with what McCone has told me and what your record shows McCone said and what McCone reports Ed Murrow as having said, and the general tone of the August 10 meeting as it has becen reported to me. I can give you no explanation. : _ i Senator Mondale. Did you say earlier that you had cal. McCaone when you saw the Lansdale memo and objected to that language and it was then deleted? Mr. McNamara. No; I reported that when I read the Time Mayazine report dated June 30, 1975 <- ee : TOP SECRET cee H¥ 50955 Docld:32473461 Page 25
Senator Mondale. Then you called him? Mr. McNamara. That reported McCone ag saying that I or he recalled that I initiated a suggestion relating to the elimination of Castro. I called McCone and at that time he 5 told me that he had brought this matter to my attention after he, McCone, had seen the Lansdale memo in 1962, and that he, McCone, objected to the language in the Lansdale MEMO » and McCone reported to me in 1975 that I, too, objected very strongly and vigorously to it in 1962. Concurrently with McCone talking to mo in 1962, Harvey was apparently talking to Lansdale, according to McCone, and as a result of Harvey's discussion with Lansdale the words were excised from the memorandum. But in any case rd > a & CT] a & € 8 McCone and I, so McCone says, agreed that there would be no action of the kind contemplated by the Lansdale memo, no planning of any such action. Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. McNamara, in refreshing your own recollection you referred to a conversation, your recent conversation with Mr. McCone, and in that connection OC 2000) the fact that he had done a memorandum for the files, I think you said April 14 or August 14 ‘67 -- _ Wastorgtor, Mr. McNamara. April 14, I believe. Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you know in what connecti: 1 he did that memorandum? ALOE orat Seewee SF Mr. McNamara. I can relate to you what he told me TOP SECRET
relating to the memorandum. Thie ie from a memorandum I made of my June 23, 1978, conversation with him. Mr. Schwarz. That is Tab & of the McNamara book. Mr. McNamara. The last paragraph -- if you have copies of that in front of you -=- Item E statea in 1967, following a conversation with Jack Anderson held at Ted Kennedy's request, he, Mr. McCone, prepared a memo of conversation which referred to some of the events surrounding the August 10, *62, meeting: but that contrary to the impression I had received from Dillon and others the mamo did not refer to me. He will send me a copy of the memo next Monday when he returns to his office in Los Angeles. That was hia recollection on June 25, 1975 when I called aA 2 a a on @ 6 & 4 8 him, at which time he was in Seattle. The memo was, he thought, in his office in Los Angeles. . As it turns out, he was in error in one respect be- cause the memo did refer to me, and when he sent it to me I subsequently discovered that. In any case, the origin of the April 14, 1967, MecCone memo apparently was a conversation he had with Jack Anderaon at the time. Wast-neton 1.C, 20003 Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you. comt ST Senator Morgan. Mr. Chairman. wee &t The Chairman. Sanator Morgan. aioe Senator Morgan. Mr. McNamara, first let me preface TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32493461 Page 27
my remark by saying that I personally think who raised the question of assawcination is now not immaterial, but I think the fact that it has now been astablished to my satisfaction that the question was raised, that probably meets the needs of the committee as far as I am concerned and I am not interested really in pointing out or establishing precisely who did or didn’t. But there is one point that’ I would like for you to comment on. | Following the minutes of the meeting on Auguat 10, we have a number of memoranda which have already boen reforred to, and as the Chairman has pointed out, the memorandum of é 2 a a @ Q & a & August 13 from Lansdale, which was juat three days after the meeting, starts off, as our Chairman 80 well pointed out, “In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting”. I note,it seems to me, just three days afterward, it would be unlikely that he would write that into a memorandum if he did not feel that that was actually hia instructions, and disseminate that memorandum. Then when you go following that memorandum, that is the one you recall that he used the words that were later excised. The very next day wae have the Harvey memorandum which takes General Lansdale to task for raising the question of assapiination. Hut then he goes on to say that “TI was presen! TOP SECRET HW 50955 Doc Td:324235461 Page 26
Pd 3 4 a 4 i] @ « & POOR! BIO Bent Street SE Wark engian OC or "I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on ¢ the point®, and so on. x He says @ question of assassination, particulariy of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And the last sentence of a paragraph is “I took careful notes”, Now, add to that the Inspector General's report that was made in 1967, which was seven years ago, which says -- does he have a copy of that? It is under Tab c. The Inspector General report starts off saying that Tom Parrott's minutes of the mecting make no mention of the subject of assassination. Both McCone and Harvey recall that McNamara raised the question or raised the subject. Harvey's notes taken at the meating show that — it was also mentioned by Murrow but the nature of the comment was not- recorded, Mr. McCone states in the memorandum 14 April ‘67, that he recalls meetings on 8 or 9 of August in Joint Chief's operation room in Pentagon, and on August 10 in the section, and BO forth, at one ‘of these meetings and McCone now recalls it at JCS the suggestion was made that top people in the Cuban regime, including Castro, be liquidated, Now, this memorandum was made, as I say, seven, eight years ago %t the time when it seems that Mr. McCone's memory would be probably more keen than it is at the present TOP SECRET
& es 4 6 5 3 bs * J @ ba a 43 @ e ° Se $3 os . @ & 2 ® ba & Cy Sl 9 & 3 5 a] od 3 $ time. perhaps you did raise the question? would indicate that ® Not at all. Not at @ll and I think -- McNamara. Mr. i end nash 4 eb fols § 6 NAwe @ Bey aa Pag we 1 ogo Exel at ate a BW Pee ON shed DIP TOP SECRET 327423461 Page 30 BDoclId BW 450955
Senator Morgan. Would you tell me why? Mr. McNamara. Yes, because if you wish to put heavy ‘ - Fd ’ |) weight on what happened eight years ago -- read McCone's a memo of April 14, '67 <= 5 | , Senator Morgan. All right, leave that out. , 6 | Mr. McNamara. You can't leave it out. That is part of 7 eight years ago. z) | Senator Morgan. Let me leave it out for the. purpose - y of my question, if you will, pleaso. i 1 Why would General Lansdale only three days after the e L: ' meeting ina memorandum Prepared for general circulation make ~ be such a statement and than. the noxt day Mr. Harvey, the fourth day after, make such a statement and say that he made notes RAR & FA tL € 13 of it. . se Mr. McNamara. Well, I am just addressing your question - 16" to me, which, if I misstated correct me -- your question ‘is | ; ‘ can do not those three memoranda support the contention that I raised the question of assassination. I don't think they do. PRO s Senator Morgan. JT agree. I will accept your answer on me : that. aergtene Thinking back and just take the two memoranda made the . oe uF bee third and fourth days after the meeting, both of which had soe, te general circulation, were not made in secret, were not kept eke my in separate files but generally curculated. aime foe For instance, Lansdale's was circulated to Warvey, to ot: TOP SECRET HY 50955 Bocld:327423461 Page 31
State Department, to General Benjamin Harris, Defense. Who was ho? Mr. McNamara. lie mist have been a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't rocall him. Senator Morgan. Lon Wilson. it seems to me those two memoranda that quickly after that meeting for general circulation would tend to indicate that certainly in their minds and according to their notes that you did raise the question. Mr. McNamara. Lansdale's mamorandum makes no reference to me whatever as having raised the quastion so -- Senator Morgan. But it notes the question was raised. Mr. McNamara. But it dowsn't indieate I raised it, - 2 a & é 8 @ @ 8 and it certainly indicates I support it and not even the Harvey Memo indicates I support it. The Harvey memo simply says I raised the question, I could have raised the questio: in opposition. I don't mean to be trying to read into these statements OOO § words that aren't there, but [I must be very careful. IT have no recollection of it, my senior associates have no recollec:: ion of it, it is totally inconsistent with my moral standar.: Warring e 6 a now and then. Senator Morgan. Your moral standards have changed a !:'°% now from what they were? ALG Basar Stooge & G Mr. McNamara. lot my moral standards. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Bocld:d27423461 Page 32
_Senator Morgan. Your willingness to angage in covert activity? Mr. McNamara. But not for moral reasons. For perfectly practical political reasons and associated with the view of Domecracy. But I don't mean to be nit-picking with you on thig point, but it is a very important point to me, and there ig nothing in the Lansdale memorandum that in any way indi- cates I raised or supported thea issue of assassination. And the important point, if I may continue, sir, is that I didn't know of that memo before it was sent out, so McCone says. When he brought it to my attention, I immediate ly agreed with him there should be no consideration of assansination. It is unlikely I would have said that then if I had been é 2 @ rs @ Q & « 8 in. support of it two days earlier. Senator Morgan. ir. McNamara, 4s 1 said earlier, [I think it is really immaterial and I don't mean to be nit- picking but I am simply not willing to accept your statement in the light of the hard evidence that we have that as a: matter of fact you did not raise it. a a Mr. McNamara. It may be immaterial to you whether I raised it. It dan'tt immaterial to me, gentlemen, and T know Aan of no hard evidence you have that I supported aggsassination ue of Castro. , Senator Morgan. No question of supporting it, the quent: B10 fat Awer of raising the question. TOP SECRET re pete ‘ Saree HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 33
Mr. McNamara... That ia: why I used the word support, because the only evidence you have ia from a Mr. Harvey whom as far ae I know, I don't know, who says I raised the question. That is a long way from supporting. I don't want to jump to the conclusion that 1 even raised it, but in any event there is no evidence you have that I supported it and it sounds like nit-picking and I don't want to waste your time on it, but it is not nit- picking to me, this is my life and I am not about to -- The Chairman. It doesn't sound like nit-picking to mu, Mr. McNamara. It is a terribly important point for you. I think it is an important point- from the Hank, the institution you represent, and I regrat very. much that there has been 4 _? _¢@ 8 é 8 & @ 6 such an assortment of statement in the press about this matter. We live with that every day but this Committee has been very careful to avoid leaks. Mr. McNamara. You should be proud of it; you have. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Schwarz. Io think it may be helpful in light of MC 20003 the discussion of the meeting to read into the record what the CIA said, not about who raised it but about what happened Ye aren ate in connection with it. Senator Morgan. What are you reading from? Mr. Schwarz. From Page 118 of the CIA Inspector Genera: ALG Fone Rermee SE Report. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Bocld:327423461 Page 34
Senator Morgan. We don't have that. | Mr. Schwarz. It's not in there and this is a two | column get of rather cryptic conclusions that has on the left | hand column published detailea or unpublished details, and on the right-hand column the facts as wa _know then. On this subject the following is ‘atated in the left- ~hand column unpublished details. The Chairman. Does the witness have this hefore him? Mr. Schwarz. No, he does not because we didn't copy it. Mr. McNamara. I will follow it orally. Mr. Schwarz. The left-hand column unpubl ished’ detail there was a meeting at the Department of State in which the assassination of Castro. was discussed. Then under the right- 4 2 € ry a 9 & € g hand column under the heading facts as we know them, true, the subject was raised at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962 but it related to any actual attempts of assassination. It did result in MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action for: planning liquidation of leaders. The of fending phrase was later exercised from copies forwarded to CIA, State Department and USIA, but tho danger may have already been done. Wianamen geen Senator Schweiker. Mr. Chairman. we You say, Mr. Secretary, there is no evidence that Budges ta affirmative decision was made, yet the memorandum that: we are B10 6 est Stews talking about waa written on the assumption, in fact, the groun TOP SECRET Docld: 32423461 Page 35 : HW 50955
that you were in did make that decision and did proceed | 2 about, and the only correction that was made for the record 3 | wag that it was corrected te the point that they didn‘t want 4 iH to talk about it but they were going forward with it. 5 That ia exactly what the evidence is that we have, and 6 while you may contradict the evidence, wa do have evidence 5 7 of that. 8 | Mr. McNamara. I am contradicting the evidence or I am = 9 : saying I don't sce any evidence that you have that indicates ++ hk i 1 supported assassination of Castro. That is number one. 7 Le. Number two: McCone's Memory apparentyl in '67 and certainly in the memo he wrote in '67 indicates that he stronst we opposed assassination at the time, and I strongly Opposed ° ° BARD & Paws c h: planning for assassination at the time. }: That is in writing before you. I think that is rather ys clear evidence that the two of us would not have directed i] Or supported or accepted planning of the assassination of Castro. I know of no contrary evidence. Toon - Senator Schweiker. The .contrary evidence is that they going ahead and planning on that basis and only should the reference to the Planning and operation he deleted, and the Wa pieengine “fact it was on the assumption that that group did support ag the assassination. , T don't want to nit-pick either but 1 think we-ought ¢5 BLO © pat Steamer, keep the record ntraidht. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:324293461 Page 36
Mr. McNamara. I haven't seen the evidence, to use your ‘\ phrase, they were going ahead and planning on that basis. AS 4 Matter of fact, I heard the counsel read a statement from the CIA Inspector General which indicates they were not going ahead and planning on that basis, Number 2, MeCone's objection to the letter was not, or to the Lansdale momo, was not to the written statement that they should Plan. Uis objection was to any planning and my opjection was to any planning and hia memo makes that very lcoar. I am relying on his memory, not mine, but the memo was written in '67 and is very clear on those points. Senator Schwolker. Haven't you sean the Harvey meno? ; ’ Y Hasn't the staff shown you the Harvey momo? j 3 4 ry @ o & a & Mr. McNamara. I havo seen the Harvey memo and that gives no indication that the meeting of August 10 approved the planning or the action to assassinate Castro. It says in a very ambiguous way that McNamara raised the question unquote and doesn't indicate whether I raised it to dismiss it, to object to it or to support it. Senator Schweiker. I would like to reread it. Upon receipt of attached memorandum I called -- this is Operation MONGOOSE. Operation MONGOOSF as I understand it wan being directed by a man under you, General Lansdale. Mr. Mcliamara. May | interrupt you. Lansdale was not under me, TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 32423461 Page 37
Senator Schweiker. Who was he under? Me. McNamara. He was under the Committee, he was working for the Interagency Committee. He was not taking instructions * fue _ Senator Schweiker. What role did you have in Operation MONGOOSE? Mr. McNamara. If I may digress just a second, I am not entirely clear on the organizational structure at the time. But as I understand it, there wore several committees involved in covert actiong. One was the 5412 Group. So far as I know they were not concerned with MONGOOSE. The sacond was the ! BAG & Paw, . Special Group. My understanding of the Special Group is that they were a group responsible for considering counter- y insurgency actions. I was not a member of either the 5412 grou:. ra or Special Group. Senator Schweiker. He was only a Deputy, a member of either group? Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir. Senator Schweiker. And in fact did represent you? Mr. McNamara. Yes, did represent me, And let me digress again to say whatever my Deputy did I assume responsibility for. 1 had an extremely close relationship with them. 1 can not believe he did anything of any importance they didn't discuss with mu. [ am fully prepared to accept full respon - sibility for whatever my Deputy did in those two. In any TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32473461 Page 36
event neither one as I know had anything to do with: MONGOOSE. Then there was what I understand to be a Special Group MONGOOSE . And I am told that General Lansdale was acting as program director for that Special Group. He was taking directions from that committee and not from me. But I am sorry, sir, I interrupted you. ‘Senator Schweiker. That is all right. ; I think it is important’ to set the record etreight on that. | Paragraph four of the memo says: “Upon receipt of the attached memorandum 1 called Lansdale's office and in hig absence pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and a 2 @ a @ a € « 8 stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised. Frank Hand as far as CIA was concerned we would write no document pertaining to this and. would participate in no open meeting discussing it. 1 strongly urged Iland to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandun, including eoOn T those disseminated to State, Defense and USIA; Shortly there- . after Lansdale called hack and left the message that he agree :. . Wartemetan 1 © he had done so. NE Now, the point of this whole thing is that he isn't blowing the whistle and saying we agreed not to assassinate Castro or that was a misconception, he is saying just delete TOP SECRET BIO Foes Soe mee HW 509455 Page 39
it and delete it in the copy that your office had, but no reference at all about going wrong or not doing it or what | all, so the assumption certainly is very clear ‘to the authority - of the memo it was to go ahead but not call it that. I don't - -see how you.can say there ig no contradictory evidence. You may disagree and say it is wrong, but there certainly de. Mr. McNamara. AGain, I don't want to be nit-pieking. We ought to be clear what I am disagreeing with. (a) I am disagreeing with any statemont that there is evidence that I proposed or supported or authorized the preparation of plans or any action relating to the assassination-of Castro. I know of no such evidence. 4 (b). I agree that this language in paragraph four of s -3 @ a @ a & € € Mr. Harvey's memo of 14 August is ambiguous. It would be consistent with the CIA having prior to August. 10 been Planningassassination, and it would be consistent with them continuing to do so afterward. But I call your attention to the fact it doesn’t say that. [t states it only reports to, ‘ only relates to the discussion of assassination. It doesn't say we are not: requesting to discuss it. We are going to go ahead and do it. I think one has to be very, very careful: in reading this lanquage. ; ; The Chairman. Senator Schweiker, were you finished? _ Senator Schweiker. Yes. The Chairman. I think that it may be well to point out TOP SECRET 5 Docld:39493461 HW 5095 Page 40
een 454 2 F @ 6 4 & @ a & 5 Fe peBingtie vf tow? better. £ the Gelimma that faces thia Committec. We have received your testimony that you at no time, neither at the August 10 meeting nor any other time, advo~ i cated or approved, discussed, or undertook to authorize the assassination of Caatro; is that correct? - Mr, McNamara . ‘That is correct. Senator Baker. Stop a second. ‘Let's try to deal very precisely because I want to listen carefully. Discussed -- you intend discussed to be in there? | ' a Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection of ever discussing Senator Baker. I was relating that back to disagreement. Surely that is a discussion of it. Mr. McNamara. Well, I didn't state that I disagreed e it. In discussions. Senator Baker. I am trying to help, not hurt. “Me. MoNamara. I know you are and -- Senator Baker. Let discuss out and it will make me fee! Mr. McNamara. I would be happier to have discuss out’ because there is evidence from Harvey that I did discuss it and I would ho happier to have it out too, air. But; 1 have: no recollection of it and none of my senior associates have recollection of it. evidence from vou: The Chairman. We also have received TOP SECRET
senior associates that théy never participated in the authorization of an assassination attempt against Castro nor ever diracted the CIA to undertake such attempts. We have much testimony establishing the chain of command “whore covert action was concerned, and all of “tt has been to the effect that the Special Group or the Special Group Augmented had full charge of covert operations, and that in that chain of command any proposal of thig character or any “other proposal having to do with covert operations being directed against the Castro regime, or againat Castro personal l-, were to ba laid before the Special Group Auqmanted and were no-. to be undertaken except with the authority of that group ant .°. @ 2 a a e- o € @ 8 the direction of that group. iow, at the same time we know from the evidence that the CIA was in fact engaged during the period in a series ot attempts. to assassinate Castro. Now, you see what we are faced with is this dilemma. Either the CIA was a rogue elephant rampaging out of contro!, ? over which no effective direction was being qiven.in this matter of assassination, or there was some secret channe|] circumventing the whole structure of command by which the Ramrington Oe ‘ and certain officials in the CIA were authorized to procee.s x with assassination plots and assassination attempts aqains?: Castro. Or-the third and final point that IL can think of BED Taree Kee mee is that somehow these officials of the CIA who ware so TOP SECRET ws HY 50955
engaged misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of author- ity. Not it is terribly important, if there is any way that we can find out which of these three pointe represented what actually happened. That is the nature, that is the quandary. Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would assist us in finding an answer to this central question? Mr. McNamara. I can only tell you what will further your uneasiness. Because I have atated before and I believe today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization, fully under the control of senior officials of the yovernnent, é 3 @ r a iJ ¢ -4@. & 80 much 80 that I feel as 4 senior official of the government | I must assume the responsibility for the actions of the two, putting assassination aside just for the moment. But I know, of no major action taken by CIA during the time I was in the government that was not properly authorized by senior officials. And when I say that I want to emphasize also that I believe with hindsiaht we authorized actions that were contrary to the interest of the Republic but I don't want it on the record that the CIA was uncontrolled, was operating with _ Wartongter its own authority and we can be absolved of responsibility st for what CIA did, again with exception of assassination, again which I say I never heard of. The second point you say that you have, you know that f.. TOP SECRET < ear HW 50955 Docld: 32423461 Page 43
was engaged in a ceriles of attempts of assassination. I think to use your words. I don't know that. I accept the fact that you do and that you have information I was not aware of. I find that impossible to’ rdedie. I just can‘t understand how it could have happened and I don't accept the third point, that they operated on the basis of misunder- standing, because it seema to me the McCone position that ho was opposed to it, his clear recollection and his written memo of 1967 that I was strongly opposed to it, his state- ment that Murrow was opposed, a11 should eliminate any point of misunderstanding. So [ frankly can't reconcile. The Chairman. Just to give you some further information. We also have very ‘hard evidonce that McCone was not told about Bann & fauna the assassination efforts directed against Mr. Castro and that Helms agreed not to <- Senator Mondale. lelms and Harvey agreed not to tel! The Chairman. Helms and Harvey both agreed not to.tell peo a McCone. 4 ny ‘Senator Mondale. The other thing that is interesting in the Bequence of some of these events. These attempts _ We patengtien at Castro's live occurred hefore the Auqust 10 meeting, thac is many of them did know something was underway long hefore the August 10th meeting, and the Auqust 1lNth meetin:. BVO © oat Street OE if you believe the worst, simply ordered a paper from the TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:37473461 Page 44
é 3 @ & cf & @ « $ Ag’: > Woot ' 8 BIO © wees Ker mee CIA on the question of liquidating foreign leaders. It wasn't an order to liquidate any foreign leaders, Nor did Harvey at that meeting advise anybody what he was doing. So we are presented with the poasibility that we had some frae-wheeling operating on their own. We don't know. Senator Baker. Could I say a word in that respect? The Chairman. Yes. Would you like to comment at this point? Mr. McNamara. No, I will hear the Senator, then try to explain. Senator Baker. To heighten your dintress or discomfort a little more, I know in the opening lines of the [Inspector General's report dated 25 April ‘67 are these -- the Committe has heard me read them before. “The reconstruction of the Agency 's involvement and plans to assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an imperfect history. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the operations baing discussed or attempted as a metter of principle, no official records were kept of planning, of approvals nor of implementation.“ So, you see, in addition to the almost trreconciable alternatives that we have suggested to you, we have an exti: of policy by CIA that no document should reflect thin, an! implying clearly if plans were nade that we will defy you to find them. Turn to page 130 of IG report. What do other componer' | TOP SECRET
of government know about this operation, meaning aasasainations) Quoting from the IG report. “Former Attorney General | Robert Kannedy was fully briefed by Houston and Edwards on | 7 May ‘62. Memorandum confirming the oral briefing was forwarded to Kennedy on 14 May '62.° The memorandum does not use ‘the word “assassination,” but there is little room for ‘misinterprotation of what it meant. Presumably the original of that mamo is still in the ' a | ff1es8 of the Justice pepartment. It should ba noted the briefing of Konnedy was restricted to Phase I operation which. had ended about o yoar earlier. Phase If was already under way at the time of the briefing but Kennedy was not told of it. 4 3 @ a @ & & é # The Chairman. I think that latter part which Senator Baker was fair enough to include, together with some testinon, that corroborates the fact, indicates at one point the Attorney General was briefed about Phase I of the operation having to do with an attempt against Castro's life, but was briefed in such a manner that he Was lead to believe that that was over, that was over, and was not told at that briefing that this wan a Phase II, a new effort then underway. to assassinate Castro. “r. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, May I make one comment wits respect to this series of comments? The Chairman. Yes. “r..McNamara. It relaten to what T think Sanator TOP SECRET HY 50955 Bocld:327423461 Page 46
Schweiker raised a moment ago. Didn't Lansdale and Harvey receive instructions from the August 10 meeting to develop Plans to assassinate Castro? Prom what I have just heard, and I had no previous knowledge of what Lb have just heard, it sounds to me that something I still can't conceive uf was going on, tha the CIA had been planning assassinations and perhaps attempting assassinations against Castro for some considerable period of time prior to Auquet 10. . The Chairman. That is correct. Mr. McNamara. Assuming that for the moment it is not very likely that Narvey and Lansdale wore taking their in- structions for planning assassination from the August 10 4 3 a & e ] @ 4 8 meeting, and I think that interpratation should not be considered -- The Chairman. That is correct. Mr. McNamara. -- as @ likely one. Senator Schweiker. -I didn’t read paragraph 3, but right to the point of this issue and not indirect. The Chairman. What are you reading from? senator Schweiker. The game August 14 memo. This is (after the meeting... Lt is the best evidence we have o! happened four days after and we have nothing that is 1081S directly relevant in terms of the historical documentation. The yuestion of assassination, particularly of Pidel BER 8 eet we Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meetin: o' TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32473461 Page 47
the Special Group Augmented in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August, it was the obvious consensus at the meeting in answe to @ comment by Mr. Ld Mur.iow, that t' fn i- not a subject which has been made a matter of official record which ties into Senator Baker's point. I took careful notes on the comments at thig meeting on the point these notea are four daya old and the Special Group Augment te not expecting any written comments or study on this point. We couldn't have more direct evidence unless you had notes. Mr. McNamara. (a). I have no notes. (b). I think this ambiguous sentence can be read in a vartaty of ways. Tt can be read that some of us had begun to hoar of. assassination attempts and were opposed to it. and wanted it @ > @ a @ o & @ 8 clarified or we wanted no more talk of it. There are a whols serigsa of interpretations that can be made. What ie apparentls completely clear to you and again to upset me is that there is evidence that prior to August 10 there were assassination plans and attempts against Castro. The Chairman. Oh, yes, going bac’ to the Eisenhower Administration. ‘Senator Mondale. flad you ever heard about that? Mr. McNamara. JI had never heard about it and I stihl otasl it difficult to believa. TI accept the statement that you hav: evidence that is acceptable to you and I share the conclusic: you have coma to, therefore, but this is totally incensisten: TOP SECRET ed 3 50955 Docld: 32473461 Page 46 Hy
with the whole series of my briefings, one of which i# that the CIA was fully under control of the senior officials of the government and that we, therefore, must stand responsible for whatever. important actions CIA undertook. If have felt that way, I have said it publicly, I said it as recently as 60 days ago, and with the exception of assassination, z still feel that way. I can not reconcile why they would. ~ be acting on assassination plans or attempts without proper. authorization. i } The Chairman. That is the question with which we are faced. There is no doubt but what the CIA in fact did engage ina series of attempts against the life of Castro. We have all of the evidence. The testimony has been confirmes - -3 a e @ f>] a a rs by CIA's own investigation of the affair. The men who participated have so testified. The particulars have bean laid before us involving attempts to secure the assistance of men thought to have been long connected with the Mafia. It is all there. It all happened. - And though it ia gallant to assume a responsibility, you could only have one, the President himself could only have one, if he did not direct the CIA to engage in such activitios only in tho broadast military sense of a commander who Inust assume rosponmibili: for, the actions of his subordinates even if he does not. order,.even if he has no knowledge of it. Senator Schweiker. I think one other thing wae shoul. TOP SECRET ‘ HW 50955 Bocld:327423461 Page 49
gay in fairness to the BSacretary is that we mentioned General Lansdale, and it is true his testimony is contradictory, and in fairness to the Secretary we should also point out that in his interview with the Washington Star -- I am trying to get a whold of the one with CBS News.-- Senator Mondale. Do we have that yet? Senator Schweiker. No: we are trying to get it by tele-~ phone. . Where he tells a completely differant atory than he told our committee. He does not refer to you. Me refers in this interview to Robert Kennedy. So I think when we talk about General Lanacdale we should make clear, General Lansdale in this interview does not in any way implicate a 3 € & @ 6 a 4 8 you. Senator Mondale. Then Lansdale before us said the story was cockeyed, he hadn't said that. So I. don't know. Mr. McNamara. On the Lansdale matter, I don't want to speculate on his motives or what he would do or wouldn't do without authority. I would repeat to you only two points. (a). That your staff showed me a memo indicating he had bees detached trqin the assignment to the Pentagon, in sometime, Wash 1 forget whether it was late ‘G1 or early '62 to work for the account of one of these committees and, therefore, while he miaht still have carried the title Assistant Secretary of BIO Fat Soot SE Defense, he was not taking instructions from the Secretary TOP SECRET oe: - BW 50955 Bocld: 3274273461 Page 450
Defense during the period we are discussing, and secondly, I will report a conversation I had with General Lansdale, simply referring to notes I made at the time. The Chairman. When did this take place? Mr. McNamara. I am just trying to find the exact date. It was in reference to one of these newspaper articles. Give me a moment to find the particular reference. | A few wooks ago on the issue of whom he received his inatructiona from. | On the 30th of May, two conversations in the same day. This is because of 4 most unusual situation but let me rofeor to that becuase it relatos to this. It also shows my problem. rd . 2 4 a 4 8 & /@ 8 On May 24, the AP and Washington Star reported relatiny to the August 19 meeting, that I had been thera, and that it then says, AP says, while one source who has seen the minutes said the subject was immediately dismissed, i.e., “Planning of assassination of Castro, two sources say a meno was written two days later and by assistant to then Secretar: of Nefense McNamara directing the CIA to develop continyency teagan DC aaao! plans for a possible assassination of the Cuban leader. My the most amazing error, six days later the New York Times in ani article on the Mafia and the CIA, buried odeep in the article, states, quoting the AP: “The Rockefeller Commission who had obtained minutes of a meeting on Auqust TOP SECRET * so na Le Jy te eee eee BW 50955 Bocld:327423461 Page 51
attended by the Secretary of Defense McNamara, Rusk, McCone, Bundy, the meeting," the AP reports said, “included discussion of killing Mr. Castro." One source told the AP the matter was immediately dismissed but the wire service quoted two other sources. This is the important point. ‘The wire service, AP, quoted two other sourced who said a memo was written two days later by McNamara directing the CIA to prepare contingency plans for the elimination of Castro. Needless to say, when I read that I was deeply upset. Lot me complete this, if I may, Mr. Schweiker, then come back because this is a complete misstatemont of what the — AP said. I was concerned enough when [ read the AP because the 2 3 4 a @ é & 4 8 implication was that Lansdale wrote the memorandum under my direction, as Assistant to McNamara he must have been reporting to me, he must have taken instructions from me ani, therefore, I was responsible for Lanadale's memo. But Io have learned enough about this kind of problem to know that to try to get this point cleared was going to’make a two-day story out of a one, so frankly, I didn't recall the AP on th: On the 30th of May we qet this kind of story. I was so ups s I called Horrick, under whose byline this appeared, and sought to correct it, and he was shocked when I read it to him. tle hadn't head: the printed version of tha story. He BLD weer ees, said that is not the story I filed. The AP made clear you TOP SECRET . WW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 52
you didn't write it, Lansdale wrote it. I have to talk to. my editors. And he talked to them and called me back and said it is a horrible error and we will correct it, and I ‘don't know whether they have or not, I haven't seen a correction. “But assume for a minute they have. I said when you correct it correct the impression Lansdale wrote the memo under my instruction because he was not operating for me at the timo. I learned this in the interim. - Horrick said no, we can't correct that, wo can only correct our misquote of the AP. I said correct that and I will talk to the AP. hefore I talk to the AP to be damned sure I waa right, because my memory is very bad ahout this period, T called three people. é -3 € ry .@ J & 4 8 1 called Max ‘Taylor, Roswell Gilpatric and Lansdale to find out who ‘Lansdale worked for and who he was taking instructions from at the time, and it was with respect to that I will now answer your question. My call to Lansdale, Tt. made two calls to Lansdale.on May 30, and my note says, in answer to my question, Lansdale said he was not working for me at the time.of the August 14, me "62 meeting, but then I would rather not say what else he . said becaune I think it is wrong, for somebody else, and ! Vea ingten, probed him on it and hoe said not exactly something clase, unc Io probed him and got something else later on in the same dav wat Qeeort SE I cabled AP and reported. all this to them except I said that ayone I just wanted to make clear, Lansdale was not working for me ous: TOP SECRET sel pei §O955 Docld:39493461 Page 53 Hy
taking instructione from me. They said they would report that, correct the misstatement, correct the statement. But when they reported that they would have to report their source for the story. And I aaid I don't give a damn, report your .80urce. By the way, who was it? They said it was Lansdale. I said you had better damned well gat on the telephone and talk to Lansdale because I just talked to him and he said f was not instructing him at the time. Tt eaid, furthermore, when you call Lansdale and you ask him whether he was taking inatructions from me with respect to that memorandum, if he loaves you with any doubt on the matter, you call me hack because I want to sit down with the two of you in person that afternoon and get this straightened out. f am quite @ 3 @ a @ a 8 @ € clear Lansdale was not working for me, wasn't.taking inatruct- fons from me, 1 didn't have a damn thing to do with the nemo ; and I don't want any misunderstanding on it. I an not trying to hand it on Lansdale, I want to make this clear, I want to make it perfectly clear he wasn't working for me. That was about three o'clock on Friday afternoon, heard nothing more of it. I would just as soon have this off the record. The Chairman. Very well. (Discussion of £ the record.) Senator Schwether. On the record. “ar. Mcnamara, who did Goneral Lansdalo work for? Can TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld: 324 4 3 * 23461 Page 54
you clear that up for us? Mr. McNamara. The piece of paper that your staff showed me indicates that sometime, 1 think it is in the latter part of ‘61, at White House direction, he was assigned to work for an interagency group that was planning and perhaps authorizing covert action against the Government of Cuba. Senator Schweiker. Who would he have reported to? Mr. McNamara. lle would have reported to the: Chairman of this group and the group itself... Senator Schweiker. That would hava boen whom? Mr. McNamara. Well, you have the evidence much better Tq. | The Chairman. We have a record. ¢ Mr. McNamara. I am not trying to evade it, T jam con- rd 2 @ ry @ c & @ & fused about the groups and I don't have it clear in my mind how they are organized... I wasn’t chairman of the group and he wasn't taking instruction from me and he clearly understa: i1 that or recalls it. The Chairman. fir. Schwarz. Senator Raker. Just a minute. Senator Schweiker. May counse] tell us who was chair. of the group? Mr, Sehwarz. General Maxwell Taylor. Senator “Mondale. Special Group Augmented, and Taylor was the head of it. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32493461 Page 55
| 1 Senator Baker. _Mr. McNamara, tell us who those people 2 || were that told you who Lansdale worked for and who they claimed} 3 -he worked for. Mr. McNamara. I talked to Max Taylor or Roswell Gil- 5 i patric and to Ed Lansdale himself. The three of them, before 6 I called the AP, and the reason I did, I waa going to ask the 7 | nowspapors to correct my statement, what I thought was a mis- 8 | statement. . - 9 7 . Senator Baker. Who did they say he worked for? 7 r- set Mr. McNamara. Well, I would rather leave it that thoy) ~ said he didn't work for me. —3 .: Senator Baker. No, no. an @ @ ye Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor tole me he worked for him. | 8 c 1é don't want to draw Max Taylor into this. 7 -. The Chairman. General Taylor told us the same thing. . te Mr. McNamara. All right. a Senator Schweiker. He has been here. ‘ The Chairman. He told us that. Me. McNamara. I am not trying to broaden the net. : ‘ . don't want to blacken anybody. “Senator Baker. We don't want to -blacken anybody. ‘whe Y Y - we elae, if anybody? , al Mr. “AcNamara. Well, all TI can tell you, Max Told me tha’ ne Lansdale worked for him at the time. Ros Gilpatric told nm that it wag his understanding he worked for Max at the time. TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 3274273461 Page 56
Pape (Arete 207) 344-4008 ! weer & Faure BLO Ore HW 50955 4461 Bage i7 In any case, he didn't work for ma. That was the thing I ! wanted in and I wasn't as careful that afternoon to find out who he did work for. To be damn sure he didn't work for me and Lansdale told me he didn't work for me. Well, the Lansdale atory I don't want to repeat. Senator Baker. I would like you to repeat it. Mr. McNamara. I would rather not because It was two different stories. It was just a heck of & mesa and this ie what lead to thia damn CIA, I mean CBS report that evening. It just got all screwad up and it is still a mesa in the press. I got back to my office last Monday morning and my secretary _- I had been out of town on the weekend -- my secretary put on my desk, I guess it is a Washington Star Report, headline -~ you undoubtedly have seen it, but the headline of last Friday, you can see it from where you arc. And this indicated July 3, whatever that would have been, the end of last week. “LANSDALE NAMES RFK IN CASTRO PILOT". The Chairman. I know, I am aware of that story, we questioned Lansdale about it. . _ Mr. Mectlamara. You want me to talk ahout Lansdale. ! don't want to talk about Lansdale. 1 don't want to repent a lot of erroneous information. The Chairman. Mr. Mctiamara, let me just say this. \ One of the problems we have is to evaluate the testimony ©: that General Lansdale has given this Committea. The TOP SECRET
| credibility of Lansdale as a witness is one of the issues botors | us. Now, f think that Senator Baker's question is pertinent because what Lansdale told you beara upon his credibility. He has been before us, we know what he has told us, and we have had various appraisals given this Committee of Lansdale by people who know him very well. He claims he has been “misquoted in the press. In unsworn testimony he did not charge Robert Kennedy with having given him inatructiona as to assassinate Castro. . Now, that in the situation. If you could tell us what he told you it would help us in our evaluation of the testimony he has given the Committec. Senator Baker. Thank you very much. RAR & FAA Let me simply say for Mr. McNamara, let me make a statement that I think the Committee fully understands but I want him to understand. ‘Tn the course of my career in the Senate, I have never been involved in a situation of such great sensitivity as this aituation. In the course of this inquiry I think one of the most remarkable attributes of this Committee has bee: it&® calm in the fact of coordinated circumstance unfolding and unlikely paradox that appear before us. - f think that eve: > member of the Committee will aqrem that no effort has been made go far to'sully the reputation of any living or deat and that the temptation to do so for partisan purposes has TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32473461 Page 58
‘been totally and completely and effectually resisted. No one is attempting to do that now. The committee knows. 1t and I want to know it. Mr. Chairman, I would like the witness to answer the question. . Mr. McNamara. | I have tried not to sully anyone's repu- ‘tation and I haven' t commented ‘to the press except my own reputation being sullied, and one of the reasons I haven t Pets. ie that until the full story gets out, explanations of partial partisan is bound to stimulate’ other partisan respon- ‘gos and it simply perpetuates. thin speculation about ’ ; indivisuals, some of them dead, and. others incapable of é - 3 @ a @ a?) g « 8 defending themselves. So I have been very careful what I have said. “Now, I will answer, your questions, since you know more than I do already about Lansdale, I think in this situation. Put in answer to my question, to him as to whom he works: for, he said he worked for a committee and the chairman of the conmittce, but this was only’ after I asked him about the memo relating to the August 10 discussion that was referre.! to in the press as stating that Lansdale asked CIA to prepar . an assassination plan. | said’ who gave you the inatruction:. cee to prepare that memo and hin reply to me was the Preaiden:. And T said now, Ed, don't tell me that. Are you suggestin: BUDE eae we that you were in the presence of the President and he gave = TOP SECRET HY 50955 Docla: 32493461 Page 59
that instruction? I said I don't belleve it. Now, this is to disagree a second. That was a telephone | call. | I know Lansdale well. The last time I saw Lansdale personally, to the best of my knowledge, was in Saigon. Ellseberg was with him, civilian and dreaged in combat fatigues with a 45 caliber pistol on his belt and two of them were Playing God knows what games. T haven't sean him from then to now. So I tracked him ‘down to raise this queation. And he said, in response to. who authorized that memo -- he said the Prasident. So I sai:, Ed, don’t kid me now. I can’t heliove that you were in the Presence of the President and he authorized you to send that maemo to CIA. Ne said, no, that wasn't exactly it. I said é 3 € a . @ 2 8 4 # goddamn, tell me exactly what it was. Pon't tell me it was the President. I am not trying to put words in your mouth. : want to know what happened. The first thing I have got to get clear, it wasn't me, and he said that is clear, it wasn't you, and the second thing I have got to got clear, you weren't working for me. He said that is clear, I was working for the committee and the Chairman, and the third thing I want to gat, who did authorize vou to do it? He gaid, okay, it wasn’t the President. I said who was it. fle naid -- thin ie where it got vaque -- well dt waan'’t the President. Finally [I dropped it. This is all on the tale- phone. So T dropped it. 1 got it clear it-wasn't ma and TOP SECRET ats WW 50955 Bocla:32473461 Page 60
it wasn't the Prasident. And then I went back to the AP, and it was at that point the AP said well their authority for printing in effect he was my Assistant and t authorized him, 1 said you had better‘darn well gat him on the telephone, ‘which is what they did, and this is what. intervened between three o'clock and the time Ethel called my wifa and my wife called ma. Three hours fourty-five minutes Later AP went back on Lansdale and according to AP Lansdale in a sense gave tham the game point, the President authorized it. Said it was ultimately the Prasident. The AP reporter was amart enough to know that is unlikely, not really the President, it. was a high intormediary. At this point you é 3 @ & . @ J @ « 8 get two stories. It may be two different reporters. One of them said was the high intermediary McGeorge Bundy, and Lansdai- said no, it wasn't McGeorge Bundy, it was higher than that. And the reporter said well, I guess the only person higher than that ‘could have been ‘Robert Yennedy. I it a fair assumption {t was him? And Lansdale said that igs a -- I am “senor. “not quite certain now the exact words, but something, ~ Tae well that is a conclusion one could draw, or some such thin: gto ag that, and it was from that that the CuS qot. that story ae e that night at 7 o'clock. on the Cronkite Show. s tee? This is what han been going on, gentlemen, an. explanati BLO Barat we of my reluctance to speak to you. I don't want to sully Lanadale. TU -ssure as hell don't TOP SECRET BWW 50955 DoclTd:324273461 Page 61
want to sully Lansdale. I sure as hell don’t want dead people -- The Chairman. We know what has been going on, Mr. McNamara, and we have heard Mr. Lansdale's testimony under eath that it was not Bobby Kennedy and that he was misconsatruad in the press. All right, Mr. Schwarz, would you continue with the questioning. Mr. Schwarz. Would you look at the Exhibit L, again, which are minutes of the meeting of Augurt 10, and read into the record from the page 2 as far as this in at 38 2B in. the Lansdala Rook -- what is reported on a gubject that is not assassination, what is reported that you ealid on Pi > 4 & « & e « 8 another subject. Mr. McNamara. Yes, Paragraph 5 on paqe 2 of the mamo indicates that discussion then turned to the objectives. of the MONGOOSE program. McNamara questioned whether we can not separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from action that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of the world opinion. this lead to the suggestion by General Taylor we should consider changing the overall Oljective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of bausing its visible faulure. ' Mr. Schwarz. Tt suggests you were concernad about something, you wanted the U.S. not to do things that woul.! TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld: 3274273461 Page 62
é 3 @ CY @ a e « e hurt it in the eyes of the world opinion. Do you have any recollection whatscever what you had: in mind? Mr. McNamara. I don't. I believe by August 10, 1962 that the Bay of Pigs operation was a totel disaster, an error in every sense of the word, and certainly would have opposed any military action of that kind. As a matter of fact, 60 days after that Auguat 10 meeting, during the Cuban missile crisis, I strongly opposed Military intervention tn Cuba beacause I thought it would kill several thousand Cubans, kill several thousand Americans, run the risk of Soviet response in some area of the world and danger the U.S. in the eyes of the world opinion. So by this time f had learned the error of my support of tha Ray of Pigs of 4 year and a half earlier and I was quite conscious of the desirability of avoiding actions that would hurt the U.S., but quite frankly, I have! no recollection of what those actions were. | fir.Schwarz. In the MONGOOSE program, it ia correct, is it not, that the MONGOOSE: program was a program which was fully authorized hy the President? Mr. McNamara. I believe Bo. Letome start out again. You showed me or one of your associates showed me a memo late 196] establishing an oriqis. structure for carryiny out what was later called the MONGOD:: TOP SECRET
program. f don't know whether the memo referred to it as such and“ am sure, therefore, that the program in the sense of the original structure and action to consider what could be done to weaken the Cuban. regime was authorized by the President. I don't wish to imply that whatever actions we took, and I have lost recollection what they were ne don! t want to imply avery one of those individual actions was authorized by the President. I doubt (t very much. Mr. Schwarz. Was a program to overthrow the Castro regime authorized? Mr. McNamara. I think one would phrase it somewhat definitely. ‘T think a program to weaken the Castro regime: with the hope that it would be overthrown was authorized. a 3 @ a. e 6 8 a 8 I think that was the objective. I tried to recall as best I can what the objective was and I think that is the beat expression of it. Mr. Schwarz. ‘There is a memorandum which ia dated April 13, '62, it in the Taylor Book generally here or not? Senator Morgan. No. Nr. Schwarz. I can read the whole thing into the recor It as a memorandum from Maxwell Db, taylor for the record April 13, ‘62. Subject: Operation HONGOOSI, and it refers to you, Mr. Seeretary, and. I would Like to abk you to explon: if you can, what you understand the position attributed to to be after it had been read into the record. SECRET HW. 50955 Docld: 32423461 Page 64
“On April 13, General Taylor discussed with higher authority the MONGOOSE meeting of Apr4l 11 and 12 reporting the feeling of Secretary Rusk and McNamara that the ‘MONGOOSE Program should have no target dat. Taylor pointed out the probable personnel problems which would arise if the schedule were completely indefinite. “Taylor was informed that we would have to live with the consequences of no date, doing the best wa can to bolster motivation. Taylor commented that we can probably carry out the first phase as planned with the review of the situation about August 1. “Nigher authority favors a atrong offort to recruit Cubans for the U.S. Army. He was told that a now look is 4- 3 a & 4 & @ a $ being taken and that by lower administration standards we can do better than in the past.” Now, what do you understand the statement attributed to you and Secretary Rusk that the MONGOOSE program should have no target date to mean? Me. McNamara. Well may I give a rather long answer to this, Mr. Chairman, to try to explain what I think it meant: I want to qo ‘back to the Bay of Pigs. The Kennedy Admintiatration some 99 days after 1 came i:t office was confronted with a need to decine whether to proces: ‘ with or disban tha operation that later became known as Bay of Pigs. TOP SECRET HY 50955 Bocld:327423461 Page 65
I and others recommended to the President we procead with it. Thore was no opposition from anyone in a senior “position that the President counseled with that I am aware of other than Senator Fulbright, and we were all wrong, it was 4 clear error. This became apparant to some of us shortly afterwards. It certainly wasn't apparent prior to tho time’ but it became apparent shortly afterward. Despite our feeling that it was a sorioug error, there was also an opposing force influencing us, because during that. period from the Bay of Piya until this date of 13. April 1962, my recollection is there were continued efforts by the Cuban Government to subvert the eutabl ished governmont” elsewhere in the hemisphere. 1 think I am right, I may be 4 2 4 & @ [*) 8 a 8 wrong on the date, but I think I am right there were actuall: efforts to assassinate Betancourt, the President of Van zuela and at the time, for example, so we were very disturbed abou: it. The President was very disturbed about it. fut I think what you see reflected in this memo of Sones April 14 is a feeling on Dean Rusk's nart and mine that we should have learned something from the Ray of Pigs, we shou! segeaem Evy understand that it wasn't possible to, by military action Aan -and vrobably not by others and certainly not by a fixed date, which is the point of this memo. [t was certainly net possible by «a fixed date to go weaken the Covernment © Castro as to insure {ts overthrow, and it would be dangern- TOP SECRET Pee E ie s HW 50955 Docld:324273461 Page 66
So I think you can read in the memo in our opinion to have - a fixed date that is kind of objective, it is that kind of situation that lead to the miserable failure in the Day of Pigs. This is the way I interpreted this and I submit as evidence in support of that the action we took in October of *62 in response to what then was a very sorious problem of the actual introduction of missiles and nuclear warheada on the Tale of Cuba. A limitedaction that is to say, a Limited response, I should say, to the action. Mr, Schwarz. Would you put before the witness the document from McNamara Tab N, which is.some more record of the NSC standing group meeting No. 2/63, April 23, 1963. After this I am going to have just ono more question, 4 - 2 € 8 @ & 6 4 $ after this mamo.. You are cited, Mr. McNamara, as stating after Mr. Bundy aaa rae presented a memorandum or really before a memorandum was ' . ~ aa discussed, you are indicated as taking the position that before the group should discuss the substance you should consider whether the present policy would produce a major change, “and that Mr. Castro's position over the shortterm would improve it the U.S. took no additional actions. "He made clear his belicf that @limiantion of the Caste. regime wan oa requirement and that if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall we should develop a program for approval which would produce chanaes TOP SECRET = is WW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 67
rd J 4 6 @ a a a & HW 50955 Docld: 3274273461 Page 66 acceptable to ua. “The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidents within Cuba an to allow U.3. to use force in gupport of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR or the west.” And I call your attention further to the proposed three studies by the Attorney General on the following page, which include as atudy (a) a listing of measures which would take following a contingancy such as death of Castro or shooring down of the U-2. The committee has had lots of instances of language such 4s elimination of the Castro regime. Now, (a). did you take the position reflected there? (b), does what you say there, to the best of your recollection, include assassinations as a tactic? If not, why not? Mr. McNamara. — This is the first time I can recall secin; this memo in many years, and first let me get clear on the date. I can't believe this date is correct, April 23, '63? Mr. Schwarz. Well it does fit with some other Bundy documenta we looked at this morning, so T am sure it is correct. . “r. Mcotlamara. When was the missile crisig? Mr. Schwarz. October, '62, McNamara. Well, this sounda pre-missile crisis tuo TOP SECRET a
me. I can't believe it is post-missile crisis. Let me just leave it with you. It doesn't sound right to me and it looks to me to be April 23, ‘62. I would be almost sure that is the case. In any event, with respect to your question -= Me. Schwarz. I am sorry, incidentlally, if we do not show you this document «= Mr. McNamara. That is all right. Let me take a second too read it. The reason {£ mantioned it, you see, Item A ia reference to the shooting down of U-2. There had been a U-2 shot down x about this period. This is one of the reasons [ quoationed Py 3 4 & @ 8 & @ 8 whether the date is correct. I don't interpret any of these actions, and certainly not the three Listed on page 2 under the heading the Attorne;, General proposed three studies, A, B, C, -- I don't interpre: any of those as suggesting or authorizing preparation of plane for the assassination of Castro. I do interpret those three and certainly the further list of seven items on page three as indicating a belief that it was in the interes... of the U.S. to weaken the Castro Government and ultimately See its replacement by a non-Castro regime, preaumably Democratic non-Communistic reqime. 1! think that was the bas: desire of the Trasident at the time and the basic objective of the proyram. TOP SECRET chat WW 50955 Docld: 3274273461 Page 69
Mr. Schwarz. One of the studies proposed, as you gay, was a list of measures we would take following contingency such as the death of Gastro. | Asgume, if you will, with me, as is the fact demonstrated by the recrod this morning “= that in this period of time. there were a number of such studies, culminating, incidentially, in one that said it. would not improve the pogition of the United States. But ‘do you know of any other country whore stidies were made of what would happen if a particular leader died? Mr. McNamara... Toam sure - - T am sure there wore studios of that kind, There were. At tha time the government 4 of many partn of the world were unstable, there were frequent “changes. I remember in connection with the then Congo, _. é rd @ & - @ 8 @ 4 & for example, there were possibilities of raplacement of leaders, and I am sure that studics were made of action we would take if "x" were to be overthrown -or died or otherwise be replacéd. It was quite a customary contingency to dxamine. Shoe 1 ‘Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember specifically examining that contingeney with respect to Cuba or any other country? “Mr. McNamara. «No;- I ramember more in relation to the Rashingion Helqian Congo than I do in Cuba. I have no recollection o: at > studying the contingency in’ the case of Cuba. ‘In the case of the Belgian Conyo in the 60's, I guess, B10 8 rae Ser eee the first half of the 60's, the situation was so unstable we TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 70
HY 40955 Doct 2 _3 @ & 4a a & 4 & 7800 4 mea Waitengton 9493461 Page 71 frequently considered what would happen if "X" was replaced. fhe Chairman. That completes Mr. Schwarz's questions. Mr. Smothers, do you have any questions? | Mr. Smothers. Yos, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. McNamara, do you recall a General by the of Mr. Richard Goodwin? Mr. McNamara. Yos, I do. ‘Me. Smothers. In what capacity did you know him? Mr. McNamara. Woll, in the carly period of the Kennedy Administration he was assigned to the White House. I was going ty say to the Office of the Assistant for National Security. Affairs. I am not exactly certain of that... But in any event he was assigned to the White House. Then followin) that assignment he was assigned to the State Department and in both capacities my associates and 1 expect I had contact with him. Mr. Smothers. Was ‘your contact with him extensive enough to form an opinion regarding his reputation in the governnent at that time? or. ‘eo waara. Well, 1 have been lead to respond to one question on reputation, gentlemen, i am not yoing to respond to any more, Mr. Smothers. We will come back to that, Mr, Secretar. Do you recall a Cuban Task Force Chaired at one time f- Paul Nitze? TOP SECRET
Mr. McNamara. No sir, I don't. ‘I am not suggesting he didn*t chair one but I don't recall it. | Mr. Smothers. Do you recall an investigative effort out of the White House after the Bay of Pigs? Mr. McNamara. Well, I recall after the Bay of Pigs bacause with hindsight go many of us in sentor positions recognized it as a serious error, that Prasident Kennedy asked General Taylor, who was retired out of the military service at the time, to come out of rotirement and join with the then Attorney General and perhaps others -- 1 am not clear as to’whether there were others or not ~~ to consider what mistakes had been made and how we could prevent making similar mistakes in the future. Py 3 > @ a @ 8 & a 8 That group carried out the study after which my recollection is that a special group to consider counter- insurgency was set up, and that was directed. by General taylor, J believe, and carried on out of the White House. Mr. Smothers. May we go, please, to Tab P of the Metlamara Book, and this would be Exhibit a+ Mr. Di Genova. Sdven. “mothers. Let's enter it as Exhibi¢e 7. ‘ (Peocument referred to ie marked + Metamara Exhibit No. 7? for {dentification.) TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32423461.. Page 72
Mr. Smothers, Appearing at Tab P ig interview with Mr. Richard Goodwin, concluded by mambers of this starr on “May 27, 1975, and 1 48k, please, to go to paragraph number 1 headed Assassination. Reading from number paragraph one, McNamara Exhibit 7, we find thase words: "In goneral, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination @lthough it would not. have Surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one Specific inatance in which he heard talk of Aesassinating Castro. After the Hay of Pigs and the Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze, then hy Goodwin in his capacity 4g White House State Officer. At the meetin: of that Taks Force." Ig this document before the witness? Pa 3 @ a @ é & € 8 © ¢, Mr. McNamara. Yes, it is, Mr. Smothers. --="hejld at the State Department, McNamara suggested, ‘getting rid of Castro‘, Someone from CIA perhaps Bissill, then asked if McNamara meant, 'Bxecutive Action'*. ““4cNamara responded that he dia and stressed hig dnterest in the idea. “However, Goodin Aid nor tring Up the topic, Later tn the meeting after McNamara lefe the tdea wag AOL reasonal.: even ‘part fron al} objection, the Hay of Pigs showed political as politically different, because he would elther me replaced by Rao] Or Che Cueverra,” both words then. “Castr.: Does this relating of conversations with Mr. Goodwin TOP SECRET HW 50955 ‘Docld: 32423461 Page 73
HY SOS55 Pa 3 @ ry 6 & & € & OO ~ fam @ Am netic: BLO font Kee? 4 EF ra Docld:32473461 Page 74 bring to your mind any new recollections of any discugeions of assassination regarding Castro? Mr. McNamara. No, it does not. I didn't see this Gocument until perhaps two or three hours ago whan your Counsel showed it to me. T don't quite understand, aince I mot twice with the committee staff, it wasn't shown to me until today. f have ne recollection of it, it de 14 years ago, and it sounds extramoly unlikely to me. T know one thing. I didn't normally attend that group. I-am not saying I didn't attend, if Goodwin said 1 did that day, I don't know what day he is talking about. Ife doesn’t show any date. Mr. Smothers. We don't either at this point. Mr. McNamara. It just sounds so loose. I am not prepared to accept it as a reliable representation of what went on at the time. TOP SECRET #
Hiv 4509 enagh fola cb Pa 3 € & - @ 8 & a 8 | 54 Daocld: 3274273461 Mr. Smothera. Well, we know that Mr. Goodwin wae not a member of Special Group Augmented. We further know he Was not at the August auth meeting. 4 am wucey. Ae furtl..: know that his recollection as the question was raised did not come from the August l0th meeting. Without regard to how clear that memory is, this appears to be another incident of at least the memory of a discussion about getting rid of Castro, and in this instance appears to be attributed to you. Mr. McNamara. Well 2) Mr. Smothers. I am just talking here now about a meetin; which he chaired and which you apparently came in and left. I am asking merely is there any present recollection in your mind of such a session? Mr. McNamara. I have no recollection and Y am not even Clear what year you think the meeting was held. Mr. Smothers. Might we leave that? Mr. McNamara. May I ask a few questions? This memo on was not brought to my attention before I came here today and 1 hadn't thought alout it. Firat, when do you think the meeting occurred? Mr. smothers. Mr. Goodwin will be back before this committee, Mr. Secretary, and perhaps we will have a clearer. picture at that time. “Mr. McNamara. Secondly, as to getting rid of Castro, ! TOP SECRET Page 75
think there is no question but if that is what you are asking me about -- let me make a etatement if I may, sir. As to getting rid of Castro, if I am asked about that, it is clear enough that we were anxious to get rid of the Castro government. No question in my mind about that. Now, ag to executive action. Mr. Belin of the | Rockefeller Commission asked ma sometime this spring whether | was familiar with the term Executive Action. To the best of my recollection I am not familiar with the term. I didn’t know then and I don't know now what it moant, although I am told -- I guess I was told by Belin and perhapa also by mambera of your staff that Executive Action had something to do with assassination capabilities that wore begun or established in a 3 ¢ & a fo] a @ * the 1950's and carried over into the 1960's. I know no more: about it than what I have been told by either Belin or members: of your staff and I have absolutely no recollection of this meeting. | Mr. Smothers. Mr, Secretary, your answer satisfies me: at this point and I would like to move on to another matter. Mr. Schwarz. Could 1 state for the record why we didnt . show you that until today? Mr. McNamara. Surely. Mr. Schwarz. I told you when we did firat meet that oan -addition to the Harvey matter there was another pergon who we thought would say you had raised the subject. tT also TOP SECRET Hiv 50955 Docld: 324273461 Page 76
HY 0955 © Pa > 4 ry 6 i] & @ 8 BLO Beer Seem octd: 3234273461 Page Ti told you I didn't want to tall you about that until we had an opportunity to put the pergon under oath. Mr. McNamara. Surely. Mr. Schwarz. As we then had to put Mr. Harvey under oath. WE had thought we would have an opportunity to put Mr. Goodwin under oath on this matter but he is coming back on Cuba and, therefore, I decided to show it to you even though we hadn't reached that point. Mr. McNamara. I am grateful to you for showing me it lI wish I had been able to think about it earlier. Mr. Smothers. Can I take you back to the period when Mr. Roswell Gilpatric served as your deputy in the Depart- ment of Defense? Mr. McNamara. Sure. Mr. Smothers. Could you give tho committee some infor- mation or some feeling for the relationship between you and Mr. Gilpatric? Mr. McNamara. Yes, yes. Mr. Smothers. Was it a close working relationship? Mr. McNamara. It was very close indeed. We acted more ag partners than as Secretary and Deputy. That ia why | said earlier that although Mr. Gilpatric was a member of the 54/12 organization and Special Group and presumably of the ‘“. GOOSE committee, whatever it was called, IT don't believe that anything important was authorized or approved or TOP SECRET
supported by Mr. Gilpatric that he didn't discuss with me, and ; I am fully prepared to take the responsibility for anything he | gia in this capacity. Mr. Smothers. Did he report to you regularly on the “ MONGOOSE sessions -~ did he keep you up to date? i Mr. McNamara. I don't want to speak specifically about MONGOOSE because I don't recall MONGOOSF, but he reported to me regularly about everything he was doing. Mr. Smothers. Was he fairly meticulous about the dis- charge of the responsibility? Mr. McNamara, If he were active in MONGOOSE I have no reason to believe he didn‘t report to me. Mr. Smothers. And, of course, he was particularly é 2 a ry @ 8 & @ B meticulous in fulfilling his function and keeping you up to date? McNamara. Yes, sir. Smothers. How many years have you known Mr. Gilpatris? Mr. McNamara. 15, 14. Mr. Smothers. To the best of your knowledye, what his: Of memory did Mr. Gilpatric have? Mr. Meramara. Again you will have to determine that ¢: Waste Mr. Smothers. You talked to him about things that have appeared or happencd sometime ago, including the Lansdale BLO feat Ssemee 4 wituation you havo related to us. Is his memory good, ta:-, TOP SECRET - @ Ba Fede cee Docld:32473461 Page 78 5095 ba HY
Mr. McNamara. I don't want to characterize his memory. Pagne (dean PIP) Mr. Smothers. Mr. Secretary, is it you have no impression of it? e Mr. McNamara. ' I don't wish to give a personal opinion of other people's capacity. Mr. Gilpatric I know from the record has testified before you. You are qualified to ' = appraise his memory. Mr. Smothers. Without being disrespectful, I think this ig a perfectly legitimate question and I to desire a response to it. Mr. McNamara. I can. tell you that he is in a position WARN B Parry where his performance depends on his memory and his per- formance is highly regarded by his peers. Mr. Smothers. Well, again you have been in a position to assess his powers or recollection, and thia is a : question of some importance to this committee and if you can make that assessment I would like to have it. Mr. McNamara. Well, you are pressing me to do things ! am not qualified for and 1 don't wish to pretend to this committees loam in a position to appraise Ros Gilpatric s s . > . a memory. 1 can tell you [ am in a position to appraise his integrity. It is of the highest. I haven't worked with his: closely for seven years. TI can't report on his physical con: tion or mental condition or memory, and I am -- no, may 1 fins: — — TOP SECRET Le we HW 50955 DobTd: 32423 461 Page 79
my sentence, please. I am not trying to avade & question, but I don't that I should mislead this committee as to what I know what 1 don't .know. Mr. Smothers. I think your statement that you qualified to answer is fine. . 1 You mentioned earlier that you had upon learning of gome of General Lansdale’'s commants apoken with Mr. Gilpatric, amongst others ~~ Mr. McNamara. Yes, sir. Mr. Smothers.--segarding the job that General Lansdale : . ; f . performed while at the Pentagon. at the time that he was re- ported to have been working for you? re 3 ¢ a Cd] 6 Cy € £ Mr. McNamara. No, sir; I didn't. report that. atated I asked Mr.. Gilpatric whom General Lansdale was working for at that time. Mr. Smothers. When did this conversation occur, approxi- mately? OV Mr. McNamara. Let me refer to my notes 4 second me can give you the exact date. I believe it was May 30. ghar Yes, May 30. WA ane Mr. Smothers, If you could, Mr. Secretary, thia is again an important detail for us 7 could you recant that con versation?’ Do. you recall what the nature of the conversation BPO Beat Srewer SE between you. and Mr. Gilpatric was? TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 30
Mr. McNamara. I will relate what I related earlier. That on May 30 in connection with my inquiries to determine exactly who General Lansdale was working for at the time of August 1962, I called Maxwell Taylor, Ros Gilpatric and General Lansdale himself, and during my conversation with Mr. Gilpatric I asked him specifically whom Lansdale was working for in August ‘62 and Mr. Gilpatric stated that he was not working for oither himself, that is Gilpatric, or me in August '62, but rather for the committes that was dealing with the MONGOOSE operatiun. Mr. smothers. bid he olaborate further on General Lene dale's duties? Nid you touch on that at all? Mr.McNamara. My notes don't indicate so and I don’t re- 4 3 @ & 4 te) @ a 8 cali that he did. Mr. Smothers. Did you have any further discussions of Lansdale, per se? In this conversation? Mr. McNamara. Let me say I don't want to evade your question. I am not sure this came up with. Gilpatric. sonnt 1 don't think at the time. If what you. are driving at am I te aware there is a note some place in the record that indicates Gilpatric and I didn't think much of Lansdale? J am aware ©! We pee gt an, that but I don't think Gilpatric told me that. . Mr.. Smothers. That is not my purpose, Mr. Secretary. I am sorry at this moment I can't. share that purpose with ais you. TOP SECRET y HW 50955 Docld:39493461 Page 81
Mr. McNamara. I can't refresh my memory any more than I have as to what Gilpatric said. | Mr. Smothera. Let's not make it a tradeoff. My concern is that, going back to that 30 May conversation, you recall you said this guy Lanadale, who did he work for. Mr. McNamara. That is right. Mr. Smothers. And again Mr. Gilpatric said to you what; as beat you can recall? Mr. McNamara. 1 will refer to my notes again. If would like to be precise on this. Gilpatric said that in August of ‘62 Lansdale was not working for either Gilpatric or McNamara, he was working for a committee that had somethin: to do with MONGOOSF, or what I know called MONGOOSE. He said I think Cuba covert action. Mr. Smothers. Cuba covert action? Mr. McNamara. Covert operation, something like that. Mr. Smothers. You had also testified earlier that you had had a conversation with several other persons iss AD effort to put together the circumstances surrounding this August affair? ‘Mr. Mctlamara. That is correct. Mr. Smothers. And you mentioned General Taylor, Mr. Hundy, and Mr. Rusk, Again recognizing the purpose is not %-. have you testify or reveal any confidence, I wonder if: you coule recant briefly for the committee the substance of thos TOP SECRET = eee HY 50955 Bocld:327423461 Page 62
1 discusaionsa? 2° Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I don't wish to involve Prapre (he ee PO?) 344-4068 < : others. I don't wish to be unresponsive to your committee. I “ will be happy to report what my notes indicate. I don't wish / . to indicate they are complete. = € | The Chairman. That is fine. 7 Mr. McNamara. Max Taylor said, one, after receiving his Bay of Pigs report the President established a special group G " with Max as chairman to oversee tho government's counter 4, 2 insurgency programs. The. special group snt up special group © ve MONGOOSE to oversea the Cuban counterinsurgency activitica, infiltration of intelligence groups and low level sabotage. Threc, Lansdale was not an assistant to McNamara but was Rann & FH © “hae Program Manager of the Special Group-MONGOOSE. Four, Max served a8 Chairmanof the Special Groups Special Group MONGOOSE; and what he and I would call the BR. 303 Committee, which was a later name for what was then properly called 54/12. § a Five, Max has no recollection of ever hearing the word anpassination mentioned in connection with any of these ac- i : tivities. ‘ , - ne Mr. Smothers. Do you have the date of this conversati-:. ; . ‘ : Mr. MeNamara. May 30. : oo () - . 1 have qiven you previously the essence of my conversa: tion with Lansdale also on May 30, and my conversation with TOP SECRET a : Ly Page 83 HW 5095 3) Docld: 32423461
Gilpatric on May 30, and I spoke to Dean Rusk on June 9, who - atated that (a) at no time did anyone recommend assassination to him: (b), at no time did his representatives on the 303 committee -- and I think he would have included his represen~ tatives on Special Group 48 well =~ montion to him that the committee had considered assassination. {c), ho has no recollection ct assagainations being discussed at August 10 '62 meeting and he believes he would have recall it if there had been a serious discussion of it. Mr. Smothers. And the date of your conversation with Mr. Bundy? Mr. McNamara. t am sorry, I don't know that I have notes of that. Let ma check. _I have talked to him several times. He is president of the Ford Foundation. I am a trustee of it and wehave had frequent conversations primarily about Pord Foundation busi- ness, but I think interjected in that have been discussions of this and 1 frankly don't have notes I can give you. Mr. Smothers. Mr. McNamara, in Your conversation, your Most recent conversation with Mr. Gilpatric was when? - i: : Mr. McNamara. t think I talked to him after he had testified before this committee, whenever. that was. Mr, Smothers. You also talked to him just before his testimony, didn't you? Mr. McNamara. Yor, he had dinner with me and my wit’ TOP SECRET HW 30955 DBacld: 32423461 Page 64
5095 Docld: 32423: ¢ F] a e @ e 8 4 & the night before he testified. Mr. Smothers. Didyou spend much time talking about the subject of this investigation? , Mr. McNamara. Well, I am sure we talked about it. I don't know how much time. ‘t got home about 7:30 at night and i he was with us for dinner, my wife and I and him, and I took him back to his hotel around ten. My wile was with us much of the time and I am sure we didn't talk about it while she was there, because I haven't wanted her to dwell on this subject. And after that I am sure we did talk about it. Mr. Smothers. Nid you show him tha 1967 McCone memoran- _dum?- Mr. McNamara. 1 doubt it. I don't want to say I didn’: but, wait a minute -- I was going to say ! don’t think Tf had papers with me that night.Let me think. Let me refresh my memory now of dates. I didn't receive the ‘67 McCone memorandum until <-- it was mailed on June 25. When did Mr. Gilpatric testify? What was the date? | Nr. Smothers. July 8. So you would have been with har on the evening of July 7? ‘Mr. McNamara. All right, [ probably did show it to him because the mano was in my possession at the time and i think I took this folder home with me that night and I probably did show it to him. TOP SECRET
Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the orandum? Mr. McNamara. If I showed it to him I must have. Mr. Smothers. Bo you have any present recollection of that discussion? Me. McNamara. 1 am not completely clear. i think 1% must have gaid to him that 1 was deeply diaturbed about the problem of my own position with the preas because I have been following these pross clippings rather closely, ad I! indicated to you oarliar, and there has been a series of misstatements about my activities, including such aoone as an indication that I wrote the memor to the CIA I when the memo which you have is written by Lansdale, and McCone ? iH BARD & FAG | remembered me raising the question of elimination of Castro ~ when McCone said he didn't, and the memo indicates the memo ot ray conversation, which I probably also showed Mr. Gilpatric indicates he did not remember me raising the issue. So, I probably showed both the memo of my conversation McCone and McCone's memo of April ‘67 to Mr. Gilpatric. Me. Smothers. To the best of your recollection did memo in your discussions refresh Mr. Gilpatric'a recoller regarding the events of August 10th? Mr. McNamara. Frankly I don't want to comment, wish te comment whether it did or didniet. 1 don't remember whether “ito did. TOP SECRET a HW 50955 Docld:32493461 Page 86
“WW 50955 4 _3 @ a _@ & @ 4 8 Docla: 32493461 "Page a7 Mr. Smothers. To be sure I understand your answer, are you saying you do not remember or do you not wish to comment? Mr. McNamara. The stenographer can read what I said. Y think I said I don't remember. In any case, that ia what t wish to say, I don't remember. Mr. Smothers. You do not remember Mr. Gilpatric'’s response or recollection? ; Mr. McNamara. No. Your question was did my showing him these papers refresh hia memory, and frankly I don't know whether it refreshed his memory or not. t Mr. Smother. What, if anything, did he say after you had shown him these papers? Mr. McNamara. Well, you are asking me details that t 1 just can't remember. IT am not trying to hold anything back. I imagine he said he had not been involved in this- problem up | to this minute. I am the one who has been in ‘the press for ‘ two months. Rog was very close to me, I am very close to him, and to be honestly frank with you ina hell of a MEBs. Mr. Smothers. This was four days ago? Mr. McNamara, May 1 finish my answer; sir. IT am in a hell of a mess 80 my purpose in showing this. to Kos was to get his advice on what to do, not to refresh bh: memory. He is not ina problem, T am in a problem, AS oa TOP SECRET
friend I think I showed these to him to ask him what he thought I should do as far as the press ia concerned. This ia my ‘concern. | ; I have told you that press all over the world has me responsible for consideration if not authorizing assassination of Castro and this is a comp] ately untenable position for me, I cannot continue effectively in my present position as long as thin impression lasts. So, 1 have been talking to Ros and to others about what to do. This in not the responsibility of the committoe, you didn't cause it, but it do a serious problem for me and Tam concerned about it. Py 3 4 r @ 6 8 4 8 ‘The Chairman. We understanil, Mr. McNamara. It is that which I was talking to Ros’ about. _In the course of it I showed him the MeCone papers, I guess to indicate to him that contrary to what Time Magazine. - said, MeCone said something quite different,and I don't remember the conversation in detail but I am sure that was the purpose ot it and import of it. ‘Mr... Smothers. Mr. Secretary, I realize this is a tere rible decision that has been created. for you and I trust that you understand the purpose of this inquire-.is not meres: to recant ‘everything you may have discussed with a friend. Thig ig a terribly important.matter or certainly it will beco. before this Gonmittee and Io am asking if you recall any dcta.’ TOP SECRET OS55 DocId: 32423461 -
of his response to your discussion of the August 10 situa- tion. Did he incate to you, oh, yes, I was at the meeting, I don't remember hearing you gay that? Did you discuss it at all? . Mr. McNamara. Woll, we must havo but frankly I don’t recall any such details. Mr. Smothers. Ono final area of inquiry. Tho memorandum from Gencral Lansdale ia directed to General Benjamin J. Warris. Do you know him? Mr. McNamara. I have no racollection of having met him. I undoubt ly have but IT don't have any recollection of it. ‘Mr. Smothers. I havo’no further queations. -¢ @ 8 « co @ _@ % Senator Schwoiker. I had asked earlier, I should aay I asked, Mr. Secretary, and several Senators had asked your understanding about if assassination were feasible, if. the President did or didn't know about it. I got one impression from your answer. I have here your interview, I guess, of two days ago, July 9, by Mr. Joseph E. diGenova of the committe: staff, and I would like to read just a paragraph from this memorandum with a direet quote from you and see if to mis- understood or whether this is a change in your position. “ay far as the Presidential approval ‘fer aAspassinatires. attempts, which we indicated to him had in fact", we meanin: the investigator -- “to him had in fact been made against Castro” -- you said “it makes me uneasy to say it. If all TOP SECRET f a8 as WW 50955 Docld: 3274273461 Page 89
Aad Aba y ROT Wa a WMS ta) 7s ae “TOP SEC these things were going on, assassination, I can't ‘believe the top officials didn't know about it. It is unlikely that it was done without our knowledge. X don't believe that these things could have been going on without those at the top knowing it. I might not have known about it but not others at the top.* Ie that an accurate quote for what you told the committeo ataff a couple days ago? Mr. McNamara. I don't think the last sentence carrics the connotation I would have wished to imply. I think what Y said, 1 will repeat now, because it dous make me uneasy, it is going to make you uncasy. Senator Schweiker. Uneasy can quite reconcile with Py 3 @ & e 9 8 € 8 what you told us about half an hour ago. Mr. McNamara. What I have said here and what I said a half hour ago is completely consistent’. Senator Schweiker. 1 think you paid a little while ago -- we can check the record to see -- you couldn't conceive someth. like this could go on in terms of the CIA, in terms of the Pre aident being an any way involved, and that only covert actions. an TI recall, you said something to the effect that you under: wtood the covert action probably did go all the way to the to: you are sure if ansasninations occurred they did not ao all the way to the top. f am fairly certain, you can check the record, you said that. ‘TOP SECRET WW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 90
1 | : This is, as I see it, quite a little different approach. 2 | Mr. McNamara. Let me both refer to what I said half < |} an hour ago and if you don't think I am referring to it : correctly check the record, then algo let me refer to this. A half hour ago I don't believe we were talking about the President. What I was discussing was the control by senior of- ficials of the Administration of the CIA and I stated that I believed that there were no major actions undertaken by CIA that were not properly authorized by senior officials. Now, I did not mean to. imply by that every major action taken by CIA was authori:ed by the Prasident. tT thin* I very carefully naed the term senior officials, and I mean’ pareicularly the members of tha 54/12 committua, ool throw * ¢ 2 @ a . @ c 8 4 8 them IT meant myself and Secretary Rusk. 1 did ‘not mean to imply the President himself parti- cipated in a review of or authorization of major actions of CIA. Now, I state then that, having said that, I was faced with a dilemma of the kind you are when you tell me that assasfination attempts have been carried out by CIA, and 1 said] have no xnowledge of it bevause I belfeved that 1 would have had knowledae of that kind of event carried out te CTA, and 1 believe T would not have only had knowledge, | believe it would not have been carried. out without my authe: {zation or the authorization of senior officials reporting ¢ aa : ; TOP SECRET HY 132473461 Pag
me, my deputy, and therefore I am at a loss to explain this and I can't explain it by the third alternative mentioned of Gh the part of CIA officials. whet "aati tT welt oars haur adn is completely consistent with this except possibly for the last sentence of that paragraph, and this i don't think carried the connotation I meant to give, if T used that language. I might not have known about it but not others at the top. ft am not quite sure what this implies but I don't wish to way today that I might not have known of assassination attempts but others at the top of the government would have. 1 don't believe that. don't believe it for several reaBponk. In the first place, I believe that if that had 2 ‘ cS @ c & a e- been carried on in CI and if anybody in the government had known about it at the top, my deputy would have, because he closely associated with control of the CIA. Secondly, 1 don't believe the President or Attorney General, and I would include Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy. ave had knowledge of angsassination attemprs if they didn't impart Co me, and T think if thev say they had such know leer then I think IT must assume 1 did. I have no recollection of it but, 1 agsume 1 did if they say they did, And the rear I way that, the relationships among the top members of the Kennedy Administration on matters of this Kind were go clon: l cannot separate myself from them and if they said Toam pre TOP SECRET Ag Fae ear = 23461 Page 92 “HW 40955 Docld: 324
The Chairman. They have not said that. Prone meee FOP} Mr. McNamara. That is the firat point. That ia the point I wanted to make. And it is contrary to what is implied by this last sentence and I fear I may not have made my. t x meaning clear to members of your staff in relation to that last sentence and I want to make absolutely certain , that thia committee understands that I am not trying to separate myself from other sonior mombers of the Kennedy Ad- miniatration, number one. Number two, I find 4t almost inconceivable that the assansination attempts were carried on during the Kennedy ’ Administration days without the senior membors knowing it, an 4 6 ¢ G & a 8 I understand the contradiction that this carries with respec’ to the facts. Senator Schweiker. Just oné more point, Mr. Chairman. I am groping for understanding what you did mean because this ia just a fragment of what was aaid, apparently, at the same interview, where you said reference to General Lansdale and I quote: Hobby and JFK must have asked me if Lansdale should be appointed. Mr. McNamara. Yes. Senator Schweiker. And I must have said yes. What was this in reference to? Mr. Metlamgra. Let me just find it here. TOP SECRET eee eG ok als ae HW 50955 Docld: 324273461 Page 33
i was a piece of paper in a file that indicated that Giipatric 2 | and I had a low opinion of Lansdale, or at some point developed a low opinion of Lansdale. I think it Prag {Meee PEP} 344-4659 | da in connection with that L was asked if it is Likely that i : : eo 2 you recommended Lansdale. . And in late ‘61, and I can only 6 | aay that the probability is the President would not have appointed 7 | Lansdale to the job without asking me would I recommend him & | and, I probably did recommend him. ~ 9 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. .- i h That is all. oO a The Chairman. 1 think since this queation has arisen ~ >: we should put the full three paragraphs in the record. Senator Schweiker. Which three? ® Banh & FHI ra c 14 The Chairman. Which read as follows. These are fron t . Li the notes of the interview, the earlier interview with Mr. ~ ie McNamara which took place on July 10, 1975. ee) It is a memorandum to Fritz Schwartz and Curtis Smother “on the subject of Presidential approval. The notes read: + rane , "As far as Presidential approval for assassination atterm” which we indicated to him had in fact been made aqainst Cant: . oe he said: ‘It makes me uncasy to gay it. tf all these things . wat - .. * were going on, assassination, 1 can't believe that the top 7 ace : officials didn't know about it. It is unlikely that it wax | oy without our knowledge. IT don't helieve that these things cou: . aioe wet ., | have been going on without those at the top knowing it. Tom, TOP SECRET H¥ 50955 Docld:32423461 y (4 i scgreGtit 4, Page 95
not have known about it, but not others at the top.’ "He doce not remember. any requests for arms from in- surgents. Such a request, however, would have gone through the $412 Committee. -'We were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of pigs and thereafter.’ And there was pressure from JFK and RPK to do something about Castro. ‘put I don't believe wo contemplated assassination. Wo add, however, contemplate ovarthrow. “Neither Biasoll nor elma, hoa said, would have circum- vented MeCone and gone to RFK or JFK to get approval for plot ‘That's the least like of all explanationn tf plots actually occurred.’ Moreover, he cannot believe that "pick Holmn would have kept McCone in the dark about any such plots. “ 5 ? a & @ S & @ $ No matter what you think, Dick Helms im an honorable guy.°” Well, I think that ought to go in the record. The fact is, Mr. McNamara, that Dick Helms testified before this committee he did keep McCone in the dark and we know that the Cl was heavily engaged in assassination attempts. Whether or not it was sO authorized a another question. | the final irony of all we know if Phat one such auaaupination weapon was passed for the vwaurpose of: aswassinat: ing Castro on the very day, indend, the very hour President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. “ ® tf there are no further questions, TOP SECRET hie HW 50955 DBocld:32423461 Page 36
Senator Baker. One brief question that Tf think will produce only 4 brief answer. Mr. McNamara, are you acquainted with the Drew Pearson column of 3 March 1967, alleging assassination plots against. Castro? Mr. McNamara. No, Senator Baker, this ia something that 1 don't recall. ‘tt quite clearly was the article that led Mr. McCone to subsequently dictate that memo of whatever it wan. April of °67, but IT have not been 4 reader of Mr. Pearson's oF | Mr. Anderson's column for some year. Senator Bakar. You had no conversation with the Prasiden. Robart Kennedv, oF with tir. Helms about that column? “ir. MeNamara. Wone that I know of. ¢ 3 4 ry é a e a 8 Senator Saker. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairva:. The Chairman. 1 want to thank you very much for your test imony . Mr. Melamara. Thank you vary much, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. ‘May ! syugqaast to you that it would he helpful to the Committes if you would not discuss your tents. with anyons. T know that vou have an intantion to Make sore 4qansral character and we have ro ad statement to fhe Prash of 4 ubjectiuon to your doina that, ‘Mr. “ctlanara. 1 would likes to make just a ons line or -ewo Line statement 20 the Praga. - know they ars oue cher 1 think you can understand that will all of this relating °: TOP SECRET
¢ wr. e (heeas FET) ar aay ; Riad RASH & PHU _Bamengees, OC 20007 B10 Fost Sree SE bee de oe ‘ a { me on the record in the Press I can't go out and say no commant. that, Mr. Chairman. : “very unfortunate conclusions and inferences. i i i Senator Schweiker. “e certainly think you're entitled to The Chairman. Yes. Senator Schweiker. I certainly concur with the witness. Mr. McNamara. I just don‘t want to appear and say “No comment” and therehy endorse the “= ‘The Chairman. You can't say no comment. It only leads to Mr. McNamara. Yes, that ia «4 problen. Senator Schweiker. In fact, Y ceallv think, “e. Chairman, l think I can essure the Secretary that As can sav what ha Be pes wants to say, because there hava been so many stories, and is his opportunity to parfect it. oe The Chairman. Yas. ; _ We discussed this beforeyths meeting, and it is understco”’ oo @ that he should and intends to say what he feelea is necessary *- - | the Press. I had reference to ths details of your testimony. o Mr. “ctamara. Frankly. I tell you, just jotted this down before ths hearing, and I'LL tell yeu what t'm qoinga ¢ i say. I want to say that the haarinag was held’ in Rxecutive * Session, tha® undsr such circumatances it ifn inappropriate ‘.° the witness to comment to the Praan; oalv tha Chairman shot qo ehue T have ons atateamant to Make. T canno® babies TOP SECRET do gu, am
that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or any senlor member of President Kennedy's Administration approved of an assagsina- tion attempt or the planning of an attempt on any political leader, period. That ia all I want to say. Thank you again, Mr. McNamara. | fhe Chairman. That's fine. | | | (Whereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p.m., the Committee procesds:! to other business.) BASS & Fawe 3c 2o001 _ Re BR eo gt cee BED 6 cote Sermon, SE TOP SECRET
BW 50955 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meating of Special Group (Augmented) on on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962 PRESENT: Stato: Mr. Rusk, Me. Johnson, Hr. Martin, Hr. Goodwin, “7 Me. Murwitch “White House: .General Taylor, Mr. Bundy Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gtlpatric, General Leunitzer, General Lansdale CIA: Mr. MeCone, Mr. Harvey USLA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson 1. Mr. McCone safd that the conclusion of thu Board of National Estimates wan that the Sovieta will nut let the Castro  repdie fail because of ite own inherent weaknesses. Thies thouphe had not been contained as such dnothe NLE, Later in the meeting, Mr. McCone sadd that he believes we must face the facet that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his per- sonal opinion that the Soviets might consider catablishing an MREM base in Cuba, Ne noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred ‘in by the Board of Natfonal Estimates or by the USIB. ‘2, At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined dn recent papers. te then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase 1, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of cesistance potencial. 3. Mr. Rusk supyested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of berlin, the U.S. might wish to chanye its. powture toward Docld:324273461 Page Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retalfation against Sovlet shipprug, ete. Ne suppested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans sheuld be closely meshed. Mr. Meumara was uncertain oa this podat, saying that he did not believe Limited retallation of this hind would cone stitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide harranpmvont of Suviet facilities would be a different matter. HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT TS | FP 2° Op PROPERTY -OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the deslrabi{lity of attempting to create a aplit between Castro and old-Ling Communists. He pointed oul that auch a aplie¢ would be bound to be benefiedal to U.S. intercata no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretexe for U.S, military dntervention fn Cuba under any circumstances currently forescen. However, should reasonably viable realatance . develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose | the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give suppore to euch provincial of ficlals. . - In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed our that at the mument the previously-cited frictions batween Caatro and the sideline Communtats have been rasolved in Castro's favor, and no- fasue currantly exists. There has additionally been at toast a ; ; tcaporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moacow. ie indicated that ~ this of course may be temporary, Me said that there has been Bone succeas in recruttidog Cubsn offictals abroad to work for the ULS., end that there have bean some defections. 3. The dlacussion then turned to the objectives of the : MONGOOSE program, Mr. McNamara questloned whether we cannot separate Che buliding up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion, This ted co the euge gestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overeall objective from one of overthrowing the Castro fugime to one of causing t¢6 visible fatlure. -In this context Mr. McCone then prasunted an alternate plan (called hereafter the “CIA vartant') to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he paid had been Prepared as a resule of the conclusion that stepped-up I would noe in fact resule fn the overthrow of Castro. Me emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept ateributability fur the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military furee., Mr. McCone said that a steppedeup B will risk davicing an uprising, which imiphe resule tu a Mungary-type blood bath Lf unsupported.” Net only would the U.S, be blamed, but there a would also be a hiphonwise level in che presa and eventually a situation would be created whack would require (utervention, On the other hand, the CIA vardant now proposed would, (a Nr. MeCone’s view, avoid all of these danpsers because it would tt jovite wanouprisiug. Apaba lie repeated his view thae the U.S, midget, however, face a stronger Cuba tn the future. HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page i101
6. The principal menbera of the Spacial Group felt, after some discussion, that the CLA vardant should be davaloped further | for conaideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Nr. HcCone waa asked to stress economic sabotage, and to eaphasize measures to foment a Castroeoldiina Coumuntat eplit. It wae emphasized that ‘any actions under this gian must be so deslgned ue to avoid fa jor attribution to the U. &. ; os 7. General Lemnitzer, told the ‘Group that the tlavy docs ROE wish Guantanamo used aad base for operational activities, aa oe augneated by CLA. fle said that the other Chiefs have not yot given. - an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the - Navy, as ho himself docs. The view is that thie base is tov important: to tha U.S. and too yulnerable to Cuban preasure to take the chance. of proveking Cuban reaction, The State representatives agreed with this view, ; ; von 8. Mr. Bundy sugpestod that a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban extles on a strictly “dheeupgeged™ baaie; da other wurds, should they by given covert financial and material aupport, with the idea of seeing what they could generate on thelr own. -* 9. Mr. Rusk supgested that continued pressure should be - placed on Castro by keeping dntorcat in the prisoner issue alives 10. Action to be taken: CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with che above-sumnarized discussion. This should be ready by Wesnesday, August L5th. . Thomas A. Parrott cece: General Lansdal ay eee een de, ast afales fete Attachwent ° Agenda for Meeting, FROPEH LY Ut THE Whitt pause gebeet WW 50955 Docld: 3274273461 Page 102 . ‘
“> .h nn 9a 7 6 10 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962 PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwdtch “Whdee House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy ‘Defense/JCS: Nr. McNamara, Mr. Giipatri¢, General Lemniteer, General Lansdale , CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. llarvey USLA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson 1. Mr. MeCone sald that the conclusion of thu Board of National Eutimates was that the Soviets will not lot the Castro repdme fail because of lta own inherent weaknesses, This thosht had nut been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. MeCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two chan it is now; he added his per- sonal opinion that the Soviets might consider catablishing an MRBM base im Cuba, He noted that these two points are nut necessarily concurred in by the Board of Nattonal Estimates or by the USIB. 2. At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses Of action outlined in recent He then summarized progresa te date by saying that during papers. Phase L, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential. 3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps cagaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping, nested that the Berlin and Cuba .continjency plans should be clouely meshed, He. Hiehamora was anevrtain oa this polut, sayity that ha did net believe Limited retaldatten of this kind would cone stitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whoreds world-wide _harranninent of Suviet facilities would be a different matter. ete. dh: say e PROPERTY OF HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 103— THE WHITE natest Of Fice
+ / 4 Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attampting to Create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. Hu pointed out that auch a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S, interests no matter which way che balunce of power swung. In this ecneral connection, dt was hard for him ¢o visualize a valid pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen, However, should reasonably viable resistance develap to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose the Havana Government, than the U.S. might desire to give suppore to such provincial of ficlais. In responag to the above, Mr. McCona pointed out that at the moment the previously-cited (rietions batween Castro and the otd-Line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no fasuc currently existe. There has additflonally been at lonat s tewporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow, lle indicated that this of course miy be temporary. We said that there has been aome success in recruiting Cuban offtetals abroad to work for the U,S., and that there have been somo defectlons. . 3 The diacuasion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program, Me. McNamara questtoned whether we cannot separate tie bullding up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion, This led to the suge gestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro reyime to one of causing Les visible failure. , In this context Mr. McCone then preasunted an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variance") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he waid had been prepared as a resule of the conclusion that stepped-up Bb would not in fact result in the overthrow of Custro., He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actlons, fachuddng the eventual use of U.S, wilitary furce. Hr. McCone said that a steppedeup BD will risk invitiay, an uprising, which night result du a Hungaryetype blood — bach £f ussuppurted. Not only would the U.S. be blawed, but there would also be w biph noise Jevel in the press and eventually a situation would be created which would require ftutervention. On the other hand, the CIA vardant now proposed would, da Mr. MceCune's view, avuid all of these dangers because dt would not Qevite am uprindig. Apadn he repeated his view tha the U.S, might, however, face a stronser Cuba din the future. cael 7 : HW Docld:32493461 Page
6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some diacussion, that the CLA variant should be davealoped further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Nr. HcCone was. aoked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Conwmuriist aplit. Ie wae emphasized that any actions under this. yian must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S. : 7. General Lemnitzer(told the Group that the Navy doos not wiah Guantanamo used ag a base for operational activities, as sugnested by CLA. tle said that the other Chiafsa have not yot. given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as ho himsolf dooa, The view is that this base is too imporcant to tha U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban prosdura to take the chance of praveking Cuban reaction, The State representatives aprocd with this view. 8. Mr. Bundy sugpeated that a hard look be taken at the posoibillty of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly “dheenpaged” basie, du other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the tdua of seeing what they” could generate on their own, 9. Mr. Rusk supgested that continued pressure should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner Llasue alive. 1d. Action to be taken: : CIA to prepare a new version of {ts variant plan, in- accordance with the above-sumnarized discussion. This should be ready by Wesnesday, August L5th.. Thumas A. Parrott co: General Aanadaty an © Trane nt afdle do fe Attachwent © Apenda for Meet itp, | PHOPEKLY Ot THE WHET HOUSE yt beat OS55 “Docla: 32493461 Page
Thue mss ity ee SHECIMLHARDLING Ho, 7 ale PPROPN eG Wyden. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ; co . WABHINGTC NM &b, 0.6. 7. >! , n - 13 August 1962 “ MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CLA ROBERT HURVITCH, ETATE CEN. BENJAMEGHARLIS, DEFENS BX —— ek LON WILSON » USIA From: Brig. Cen. Lanadale Sct Subject: ‘Alternate Course B Path the dealroa and guidance exprerased in the n Wearation hionsoura, we vill procuce or oubrnission.: Tho CLA paper will be used as the starting in compliance 10 Aurnust policy mecting o an outline of an shearnate Gourne Uf “OQoerational ian (educee Lifort)! baglu. Since thin is ta be a bara outline, to permit further policy guidance to be aeveloned, 1 balleve the papot need contain only a tlatement of ovicciives anu a lint of ‘haplumenting petiveties. be unger the headings of: Iniellinence, The bist of activitien will Political, Lconomic, Hoycholopical, Paramilitary, and Loibitary. Vio will hold an Operational ieprenentatives work eveaton in my office, at 1460 hours, Tuesday, 141 Auruot, to complote the outline paper for suumission. Each of you is to bring 5 copics of completed asoiened worn to ini work suesion, te perenit cach ul us to work from a full set of drafts. Papece reauired irom each of vou for tie pueseRy meewns: Intell sence, Political (aplitting the rey Lime, Mr. Marvey: \, Feonumic (scbotanc, limited 4 y suzoationa for inclusion “deception), and Paramilitary: Alay, an in other sections of the pager. Starement of Cbjectiven, Political, and Mir, Hurwitehs ostlons fur inclusion ia other acctlons . Keonainic. tho, any Oy BG of the paper. | RACLUDED Pua Ayes ee i . 4 et ant a | are nest ote , * we te thi tee sien woe PEERS FOGETITLT AAD AAT CHD oS GATE ee Cope Oee a eat ; Trea Bae, vwoaf wrest Cob, eee ee en aoa) VWs prot vay se wubbab ort wil ra wait HW 50955 DocId:32493461 Page 106 . oe
HW 50955 Docld: 32423461 760700 11 96 1t Q Toe SECAEN-HOFGRN "1 SPECIAL HANDLING Oe ene Gen. tlarria: Feonomle (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sactions of the paper. Kir. \ilaon: ' Paychological (Including covert), Also, any eucppestiona for inclusion in other sections of the paper. é een fone eee eienns ees : Rene preven tee Page i107
BW 450955 Cc. Docld: 32423461 a Ay yt tice . 8 cftb os 7 , ‘ , ; ¢ ete “ / possTNLE ACTIONS TO PROVCKD. ene Ltd TARAS: AW un ren oe “y) CUOMO Section I « Economie , Soction II = Military . section III - Psychological | Section IV + Other 7 SXCLUDED FRU A OMT IC RPORLDITS: DOD Yan $FCG AG bse NOT aPELY saad prortkhy TH Lciuete tues Gus rH WHEE utist ott Page 108
a on Ob Ui) teh UE 0 bebe Pee 76900} 106] 2 4 & = Valal ial bn te) eee tes OS SUSE LG 1. Operation Baba aa a. Objectiva: Seek to maintain maximum mobilization of Cuban Arnad Forces (FAR). (2) Mislead Cuban authorities into bolieving prepara- tions’are being made for un invasion in the Clenfuegos- Trinidad area, bys (a) Interrogating Cuban refugees on the following items in the Cienfuoges-Trinidad area: a. Peaches, 2. Roads and trails. 3. Port facilities. 4. Military strengths. 5S. Known friendly psople. &. Prominent personcg3s. (b) Conducting survey to locate and recruit for future use, persons: 4. As interpreters. 2. Faniliar with -oat-channels, etc., to act as pilots. 3. Capable of operating commercial radio stations. uy Capable cf operating public utllltius, (c) Conducting amphibious oxercisos in Southeast US-Caribbean-Latin American areas and giving wide public dissemination to the exercises. (d) Circulate rumors in Cuba of impending Invaston. PROPERTY THE WHITE Thee HW 50955 Bocld: 32423461 Page 109
ce Sees SO955 Docld: 32423461 wh oe we tle Sperekion Obs) yk ne. Ohfectiyo: Olasuptian of Cuban econony. b Page 110 > Pasiihia, Gouraea of As tloa (2) Raduto sugar production in Cuba. (2) Destroy crops by fire or use of chemicals, ©!” (>) Inhibit crop grewth by sowing waribu seeds. .° ° (ce) Sabotaga sugar aljl machinery. ¢ (a) Dostroy supplies of cartons, bags and other containcrs for distrituting sugar. (co) Sabotage vehicis’, reeds, railroads, shins, cic,, usod for havilag ¢igur. (f) Cause syoilagr 2/' export sugar enroute for delivery to purchaser. (gf) At cana cutting time plart rumor of hirh in- tensity nuclour fallcut from Soviet nucloar shots wanted down on Cuba during the rainy season. Has tond- eucy to adhere to cana and especially dangerous to workers both in tna fields and in the mills. Even sugar will be contaminated. US discovers fallout in. Key West and southern Flocida, but is of low order and not doneerous because was tha edge of the pattern. As a reeult of the above, US survey is conducted and Lt as determined that Cute is iu the center of tho pattern and speculates that intensity 1s such that exposure for two op three days particularly fi cans, to Which it adheres roudily, cculd Jesd to seriuna effects. Publisn area of dangerous fallout as de- termined Ly this survey. Step Pan Am flights to Cuba daw te danger froa oxpesnure to fallout. “onduct nurvey of Guantunamo. Deteanina by rigged tustrus Petite tat neon Palsy am? “hot! aud fawve asa weched deva, Novs attle lesa thearlze that Then Nagu@esnk Ga Cabs tes vo ochdaagne est. Ory. Beattie tb adetaatg Meee CRUPUL b SUA EOUS Ne gael tha. gontasoratoed Pah meqehad Ube @apapen. ate ba, Y ay : cece PROPERTY Pas hac wth HOE
Conuandeor Cusnsanamo promiidt fistilng and tho conausptien of fEsh coughs locally... Varn tao native omployeas of tho Congeve. Pesail tnat in aaviy US tasts, Isicnts in pacific thoueht to te out of danger were contsminatad, that natives had to be evecnated and could not resarn for yoars. (2), Dury soft" Cubsn currency at ciscount prices. (3) Pressure IMB, IMP and GATE So restrict Cuban evedits (0), loans, otc. fusist that US Allies demand cacn paymont far goods - as varvor. Cel Introduce counted ovis vation cards = gasoline, food, clothing. | (5) Conduct selected sasaiage of othor major Cuban ‘industries and public uibldetes with priority attention’ -. being given to transportacion; communications, powor plants and utiliosos. ile satotege would be widerteken wzainst food supplios, medicel facilities, or divectly againes. (he population of Cuba, as such. Be potrolevm ghip- AO) el meats to Cubs. : (7) Encourage friendly nations to atep chartering ships to Flee esmtriss for trada with Cuba. (8) ixert infiuence on .riemlly countries to stop all trade with Cabs. ‘ | (3) Pay Cuhan employees at Guantanamo Nuval Sase in Pesuss . oo Oo . ARGS E. PROPERTY o: THE WHITE abate ene Oe rn ce or HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page lili
eae * on MreieVebded = Wa weeded. teeseved haeey Petre ewe’ 76000 FIN Gey 3. Tche all steps possihie to assalst other Latin Amoctsan countries in ecencmle pregresa, to increase ecntrast with Cuba, Ne | | PROPEP TY, THE While UT rc HW 50955 Bocld:324273461 Page 112
Et 6 t : ee nip oy beer ORO we oud b Mi Lady 7 SUL TIONAL = UIRATERY ). BOD cuntinua so develep and reflno eontingoncy plana 3 order to tata advantage of any twiCeresuen broaks. 2. DID continue to support OIA and other ageneias to the full extent of DOD capabllities ag requirei, 3. Muse subotage taterials available to rayistance elements cin Cuba. 4. Creato climate of continue alarm - particularily at night; create false scents hy si tucrgn of team landings; make dumny air drops, enone we SOC PROPERLY uy , : rr 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 113 HY
lu’ Okiuby 9 oveul. bidbevcorgbedte re 74690 00 TT VAY ? stp a. fisdectivea: The obfective 1s to disriupt/diaabio mili- tary and coumercial communications facilities in Cuba. po. Concert: This to be accomplished ty tho clandestina int rcuaction of a “special" vacuum tube into selcctod conminications equipment. The tubo, which 4a available, is virtually undotectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The chonical, when heated becomer a conductor, when cool a non-conductor. a pany ely vt my nee eat yet Wt HW 30955 DBocld: 32423461 Page 114
6. Orers tion MEQansogghn" a. Ohjective: To crash or force down Cuban HIG aircraft wits an all ‘vcather intoreept cavablliity by communications intrusion. . be. Concent: — (1) Closely monitor MIG air/ground cemmunications for the purpose of doternining frequency anc terminology usace for practice or real GCI oporaticas. (2) By uso of ovorriding transmitters and oither a decoy aircraft or solid weather conditions, override Cuban controller and have Cuban refugee pilot issue instructions which run MIG out of fuel or towards Florida, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, etc. PROPERLY iit HW 50955 Doclda: 32423461 Page 115
SECTIM 114s pave nea 1. Daqnationt slocredtt: Cnaten a. Obleckivi: To discredit the Castro/Conmunist regima. Lossible Courses of tgtton (2X) Publicize tho failure of the Castro/Comnunist repime to care for the health of the Cubans by: (a) Planting rumor of high Incidence of malaria due to the failure of the government to carry out ndequate mosquito control. | (b) Newspapors in US pick uy rumor, review history of yellow fever in Cuba atid US part in stamping it out. Call attention to other areas in Caribboan whore yellow fever occurs, Discuss possibility of travellers from those countries to Cuba bringing yellow fever to Cuba. Perhaps Bloc personnal brought it to Cuba. (e) US publicly, for humanitarian reasons, offem Grugs ond spray chemicals. | | (da) (2) Increase program of information to Latin Amer Lean countries. on the evils of Castro's communist regime and threat to thenselves. ¢ (3) Encourage Dominican Republic to table its complaint | ake oes on Cuban instigated subversion in OAS HOW -. to the Ul later. (ty Exploit Dominican Republic chargos of Cuban intervention. : (5) Make available to the International Narcotics . Cemaisston” limited documcate!d ovidence of Cuban oxportatiay baste data et Hace t bee | | (G4) Incrense puvliedcy of rar ash Ipa being ‘enivrod by Cuboar peg le em bene nr, eh: see OF ecraune four, gH ° usd ar chp wk. t ‘ PROPERTY , , ; , TM WHT Err Eo oan Pe ee ee ore | BWW 509545 Docld: 32493461 Page 116 — — iio Pe SAA
tue OUbwantd va bbls alatsaabredh tials Us. d 7AQMQDANLINGA 290 (7) Increase publ ies ty on lack of freedom of speech to criticize Castro dictatorship and cormunism - lack vf due process of law = failure of Castro rogime to hold free cleetions aad to rostore Constitution of 1940. (8) Emphasize that tno land has not really teen re- distributed io peasants under the Agrarian Raform Law bul that the persants ere mure tenants ef the state. . PROPERTY ot gg WHITE yuuse or Fe ae HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 117
ar bewe duasd a 0 11067 | ae OMe heat 70 Uisexedlt Uino-Govlet Bloc assistance pro.tsed to Castro/Communiat regime, (2) Sow dfstrust among Cuban pepulation of Stno- soviet Bloc .«3sistance provided Cuby hy: (a) Planting rumors “shat canzed oats being Supplicd to cuba from Bloe cowitries is horse meat. (b) ‘ V PROPEL NTs Us Peet weedy Bleseae ged Peg WW 50955 Bocld:324273461 Page 116
7ATDAAL, 1146 77% Re Manpe esi Para, AWMLG u. OPte Ahiar ‘ne objective ia to crease indications . “ to “tdel Castro that his value to tne raevoiutionary cause has diminished to the point wnore plans are beine made for his "removal." ; “ ‘be Concepts This to be azcoaplished by the use of intell'‘yenea means the crascendo Incressing until it culminutes im castro's discovery of the mechanism or hardwara,. (.. PROPERLY 6 Teeb sQias Te vives HW 50955 Docld:32423461- Page 120
Ut Ube Uabica vi kbd isetorumdoely siud wae. 7690A TI ANG V4 *- OVer oor: tion Cutout a. Ol jesiive: To tndicate to tho Cuban Government the case with which thoir international conmentcations channels can be cut, and domonstrate thotr rolfaunse on US communi- caiiors support. by Concent of Qnerattons (1) Most arternational communicavions channels from Cuba are routed through New Orleuns, Key Wast, or Miami, (2) With the cooperation of US commercial firms arranpe for all Cubar. cireuivs to he dLurupted simul- taneously. Vartoug logical rersens can be tiven, such 43 maintenance, e emargency, break in cables, atmospheric conditions, or even "uatnown, but we are checking." c. Theory: (1) Vuch action coul2 causa such consternation {in Vine tt would probably vasalt in requests for increased "Sloe aid" to provide eppropriste facllities and capi- bilities. This, at best bt, would be a3 tok year priority, profect, | (2?) The action would empaasiza the seriousness with which the US views Cuba's current affiliations and the determination to combat communist infiltration into tne ho ads irrere, PROPERTY oe tur WHER Min - HW 50955 BDocld:32423461 Page 121
eee aida Meese t be ost ee & G. Opereipen Rovnty a. OLjcetive: Te provide inducements to Cuban eitizens ta overthrow tho Cuban Communist Regine; to put pressure en Cuban Communists by crenting distrust and disunity. b. Concept of Operations - 74) Oneration BOUNTY establishes a system of financial rewards, comw:isurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive knowm Communiscs. (2) Rewards range from two cants to #1 million and are determined by tha position tno individuel concernod holds jn the Communist hierarchy of Cuba. (3) A reward will boa padd te-an individual upon. - ' presentation of a leafscc, togetner wlth conclusive proof of death and the party/revolutionary irembership curd of the dece.sed or daliveary to designated locations of known party/revoluticnary manbers, ch) Leaflets will be dosigned to indicate phases. For oxnaple: The first leaflcts will contain only names: of Cousunist leaders; the next leaflets will revise the names into chronological iistings; the next leaflets will further revise the names by job, 1.9,, cell lender, : infermer, party members, ate.3 any of tha above ox subse- “quent leafivis widd aiumwuuee the aucune of Lie Seuss, how and where {t may be collected. One final leaflet 8 may ba deemed advisable and that ono announcing a .O2¢ reward for tha delivery of Castro, (6) 4 propesed price list is as follows: a. Informer 3. 20,000 - $ §,000 b, Cell Leader 40,000 - 10,00 cw, Mbogh pen toy WG OOD 2 EaQyean ay Moet reg jamal eet gk oe Foreioa Cmonmmino st yO Le f., Covernvsnt Orfletal IGN ,0VO9 = 95,060, Te, Cutis Cus oh ae PROPERTY ph THE WHITE na, HY 50955 Docld: 32423461 Page 122
bul Okun orb: Lb saseiddedy. (diets } 7hHOMOILI1NG 26 itr a national orgundsation will tr ostadtishea co Aesune cesponsibiiity for dasign and dealvery of leaflots pad naymuat of rewards, Tha location of the organization shonla be 4n or around Miami, Florida, and it should ecteolish branches under suliable cover on selected nearby islands in the Caribbean, (a) Once this operation is implementod, covert actions hy US agents could be initiated to kidnap known party Tanber. thereby instilling confidence Jn the operation awocg the Cuban populace and appechension among the Cuca hierarchy, sb y PROPERTY 1 eur wie ee ‘HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 123
tee Vittoe Us tolltccle thooedidbebedts bid Weand 76990110622 bua 7. Opyratios Devestor a. Gitecti:a: To induca elements or individuals of the Suban iutlitary to dofuct with eguinment, . oo CQuseuss Thin activites when properly planned and wsaented has the effect of decreasing military capability. votald sevean system tne inrediate reaction is increased security accornusguted by decreased aclivity. It also creates maves “ieecurtly and intelligence ugencius, Could ba ace cnadptished uy intalligen:3 means and promise of rewards. ~ . ; , PROPEp He ., The wary. HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 124
7600011076 @. Gpersthen Misun | a. Oviertive: Tha objective Ls to desccoy confidence ‘in faci supyscied by the Soviet Alloc by indicating it is conta sinuted, ob. Cynsept: this tu be accomplished by nr Pha ey ta dl ye PROPERTY 0% exe ete TEE . WW 50955 Docld: 324273461 Page 125
Bocld: 324273461 QEUishs a todas. tabbeet. Seed eed aa 76N00 TIT A629 S. Sporutian TAs Back ‘a. OSgentisys fe eanvénce the Castro svogime thai resist- ance is revagunizing within Cuba; ov to create the impres- sion at an appropriate tine thet a revolutionary but acgally coastituted governmont has Loen establighel in Cutan ance ts requasting assistance, (1) Using savers) automatin transmitters which can he ciectranically keyou, make trunsmissions on appropr-ate HF Creqnencles indicating cuncuct with outside forces as well. as with groups inside Cuba. (2) The breadcases could be in clear text or in code or a combliation, These could bo dosigned to indicate establishment of a provisional "Frea Governaent" and mouncing suppers to ferces opposing Castro without a man ever going ashore in Cuba. — (2) To avoid accurate DF of transmissions they should be limited to 30 seconds in duration. C4) Transmissions would ve gre-tsped. Contents would be cesipneid to enable selectivity. (5) VYhe transmitter with antenna and internal power source, mast be fabricated to employ appropriste cucaou- ftage and tusk be capable of a minimum of 16 trans- missions. vesizns for such equipment are avallable and ‘the deseribed capablaity ds within the current state of the art. Equipaent would have to be especlally fabrt- cutel, all parts hovever are "sholf" ttoma. Lead timo is congidered to be GCF to Widayy. Coss por unit ts rated to ba aenrontcnsty "2,000 te 72, °O9 each, CO) 4 naval radto hemnet ublay veviou La nise avali- be Udell hearer et be ogre esp boty te al eoayte . Pe Ye ee Te COPE VEST TO EO CETL LL sos a? wt PROPE i VHE WHEEL thowuy « Page 126
Ue Us wo Vhs. shideesticoedus reed... 7HIMATINGA 395 resudwergas, This device, called the "“porpcise," could be ‘usec In conjimetion with tha equipment described above Lo further enhance the objectiva. This would allow posi- tioning of transmitters around the entire Island, if de- s.ced, or in lakes, wates reserveirs, rivers, etc.; where discovery would be almost. impossible, . (7) Devices could be airdropped or physically placed, The fabricstod unit would be more effective and of simpler construction if it wore desipnod to bu placed clandestine: ly, for autoratic eraction cf the antenna after airdrop. asthough not impossible, is difficult considering the destred size of the unit. (2) With respect to size and design of tha fabricated 9 2% should be at anal) ag oracticnole and san be G2sizee) into a container resambling local "Flora." (9) If approved, it 4s secommended that knowledge of this operation be restricted to an absolute minimum number of people. prancety O° yep wet ee WW 50955 Docld: 3274273461 Page 127
bese Wass OA 'S | 10, Increase program of information to Latin Amertcan countrics on the evils of Castrofs Communist regime and throat tothemselves. Y HW 50955 Docld:32493461 Page 128
ULL. Us lack abbe betpad i booed we ba ve Seaet 7HO9O0 901 1963 2 é 1. Orzre tien Symontaize a. Obiecti:a: To secure sympathy of people in Western Hemisphere fox hardships being endorsed by the Cuban pepulace. 'b. Concept: To publicize plight of Cuban populace. . Bass {blo Courses of Action (1) Publicize shortage of food and consumer goods in Cuba. (2) Publicize shortage of doctors and scarcity of madieal treatment. (3) Publicize lack of freedom of speoch in Cuba. (4) HY 50955 Bocld: 32423461 Page 129
vedo pyar Wiatibe ony pike rye 232423461 Page 130 40955 DBoacld HY
Pre MOA LEPULRA WoOvets Deputy Dice tye (iad thi ghey Dp Press RAOUNGGEICDS, by i. ka tien. Nowe. han ‘paresanve tasniebeaen in foot youre frsfero gsr abeesey , 4, Ne Ce gatsea is vinebes Pay crepe weve need bay cnet 13 a toes, eo cae Che evtereesese tarebeaeed oof OUnad cheater feeeray GGarser aed feces ob tee Attae hieeb deat euayey oof Uvdes tereesre teeter, cove Qeeeted Caspeey scdede Irie ees forse’ avisdebea day sesenel Dinner ef dace poouultiiaate pote byes, Va cont tae Be. thse se: festa seed ave ca: hae Vebicge Daqguaidetion ef Tete so, yy, thre equedion of wwe steed et iaat, pevettengd saly ef i ydeg a. 48 eee eee tad “up ly Siare eat “y bea erae ee OT thet “ot taq Cl veeag (Avis veuate oa) tp tse a et das vy tees nie corfge et seep PO TL acute tae aay Lenas terest ee, th ab Dbeek vipers Vieage, vy etete cegt foe ae s eteabeeae cat fey re i ee | Mee cia, WVeef Cteics dee aeeot vt voted of debs Ty Pon tee et te er ce ered tber a of othe ned gece ope ob, “f forest t cae e Ferd corte Set apteats ce reheat EYeb tees tavaye et Pate peeuad, coseh tdgee Mae aed es. tet geaeaite a ary freelance tla tet Net thera 4 betrpeaae sabeg cpa’ faed on} s ‘ sony aa thites gerrtaet . 4, Uypeenar ware vagal of tit tbe deed Paper aases Me paebeta sky Coe ed beed focer eb eder Ses cctfte ct seaveb, des deta ede saeran, gene tends rears eta PE eid we taredioriaueibality wath aeedity of peed bags hiss ty yee fr Src rrr! ines | ait stiecye ery “sabe hh af rer aeveae vif, { cory cecal oa asd Lees | Dat, ay fy rl ee CLEAN Cg eo cere toe anered, coat Swart eh se thet sace edase supasec asl pee bet etree an Vb dc cctded poets teeta da ea cpt tee bie Vb ee beet any yea Lfsced ty cae crbennene mabteo lf sescpade a fat speed bead Co cstay dds ope srt than “ae Vi ethe ate Pte Sate, FN Gey creed Pore edades ‘ cite ol Vive in vod }. ft Whe ‘i . eeeh thet das bb ate cay, is 2 Pe efi lee oe HW 50955 DocId:32493461 Page 131
HW 450 %. Bor youe infurimiation aloo, In your absence and ofieag the attached aacmorvadia abready Juul been fisteibotecl ainel dn eabity Unst Cin aertyhit cosas fer tha Wace toaln view of Cha pase Vere con Cher ede aan, vtleatpeset, { ifowrwally Veeder feel Wott i WILLIAM K,. HARVEY Chief, “Bak Weaea W Altice Teaver at ; Measa fe Gen Cansdada dtd bd Auge 68 | oe We va Gan
TO: The Director FROM: John A. MeCone 1, No memorandum can be located covering the August 10, 1962 meeting; however, itis highly probable that one exists, 2. Meetings of August 8 or 9, 1962, in the JCS Operations Room (Pentagon) and Auguat 10, 1962, in Secretary Rusk's Conference Room - were for the purpose of considering staff proposals for Phase U-of opera- tien MONGOOSE. Thie operation was under the direction of Genera! Lansdale, with Wm. Harvey handling CIA participation (under FitzGerald), At ona of these mectings -- probably the meeting in the JCS Room --1 recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regima, including Castro. ltook immediate excaption to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and tha idea should not be discussed nor should {tappear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds, 3. Immediately after the meeting, I called on Sacretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my ponition, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because operation MONGOOSE -- an intur-da@rartmental affair «- was under the operational control of DOD through the JCS, ~ 4, At no time did the suggestion raceive sorious consideration by the Special Group (augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy. §. Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as “dispose of Castro,'' “remove Castro," "knock off Castro," etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime, Terms such as the above appear in many -workmy papers, Memoranda for the record, cte., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban Government. N10 | | wu TON ng AION SS MENT Jéha A. AficCune ()t ECRET/SENSITIVE HW 50955 Docld:32473461 Page
Hy 509 55 DBaoc ag Td :a24 234 Puse- CO WAS, Mv diowe T AMOR Mie Cone A. Sownsen | Lanspace \hanvey “Dor Woasey Care eat cic Be oy ( REK PROM) Wuawired Lemanze & Me NAmMAR Ep  [*(aetw PaARRert Geode IN
Pie de. Pes ts r. WW 50955 Doocld: 32423461 TOV eS rere speaicrt ey, GEOR 24 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) SUBJECT $ Operation MONGOOSE 1. Action. None. This memorandum {is for your information, é 2. Reference is made to our Conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lanadale, Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. Those four words were "including liquidation of leadera." 3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 16 August. It waa the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer toa comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. Ltook careful notes on the comments at this mecting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point. ‘ 4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. Ladvised Frank Hand that, as far as CLA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to ‘this and woulda marlicipain im mo open meeting discussing it, Il strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all Cupies of this inermorandum, ine cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA, shortly thereafter, Lanedale called back and left the Meesace that he agreed and that he had done so, Page 136
Batiencicann at aoa ad A bal Tie bine) SERS wel ‘ $. For your information also, in your absence and since . the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in os . _ view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's . : attention, Ll informally briefed Walt Elder on the above, : . . 8 e * ' . one . co | ' WILLIAM K. HARVEY : . eT, «Chief, Task Force W Attachment oO Memo {r Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62 , . ‘ o fe, . al . , . . e . 1 Cc. ore ele . « swe GS . c: cor 7 . . : - . . S2e.-. 2% OCS839 HW 50955 Docld: 32423461 ‘Page “a7
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WALHINGTON 23, ®.¢. 13 Auguat 1962 - 74 (es MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA irs ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE DON WILSON, USIA From: Brig. Gen. LansdalesQ Subject: ‘Alternate Course B & In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy mecting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an allernate Course B for eubmiasion. The CLA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)’ will be used as the starting ° basis. é Since this ia to be a bare outline, to permit further policy , guidance to be developed, I belleve the paper need contain only a etatement of objectives and a lint of implementing activitica. The Met of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Paychological, Paramilitary, and Military. . We will hold an Operational Representatives work seasion in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the ‘ outline paper for submission, Each of you le to bring 5 copice of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit cach of us to work from a full ect of drafts. UMENT Papers required from each of you for the Tucsuday meeting: Mr. Harvey: ‘InteTligence, Political (opiitting the regime, . _l, Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and.Paramilltary.. Also, any supgestions for incluelo in other oections of the paper. ~ Pat OVSAD BJECTION TO TION AND/OR A RELEASE OF THIS DOC 4/4] + ore n 8) ‘ Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections CIA HAS NO DECLASSIFIC of the paper. eee Re EXCLULCO FROG APR UATIC RECHALESG; DID DLE 9200.10 DOES LOT APPLY STOP SPCKET- NOLIN nbsp: oa ‘ Thio docusont containu -* panes. COEC AL Wann ine Ae eee tte ‘ ‘ aantiag Raritan ye 2 SESS eee creer EERE i H¥W50955 Docld:32423461 Page 138
Gen, Harria: Eaonomia (imitad deception}, Paramilltary . (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. . Mr. Wilson: Peychological (including covert). Aliso, any , Suggeetions for inclusion in other sections of the paper... . OU SAL . > TOP SECIET-NOFCRN | HPA AL Te eeMe ban HW 50955 Docld:32423461 Page 139 .
1} Apeit 1962 ‘HEMORANDUM FORK RECORD SUBJECT: Operation Mongovse Ow Apetl 3, General Taylor discussed with hipher authority the Nenpoowe mectings of April Lb and 12, reportiag the feeling of Secrelarios Kusk and fh Namera that the Monpoore program should have no target date. Tayler pointed out the probubte pornonnel : problems which would arise if the schedule wore completely Core . tudufinite, Taylor won informed that we would have to isve with the Consequences vl no date, dotoy the bent we can to bolster mutivas tien, Taylor comucnted that we con probably CuCky ont the fara plase ae placed, with a review uf the situation saboe Auguat b, Mipler authority fovora a strony, effort to reecrute Cubans fer the Ul ob. Avwy. He was told Chat a pew look te belo taaen aad that by lowering adintasfon slandards, we can de better than in the Pept. saxwell D. Taylor ‘he distribution PROG Ea ee THe WHITE House Gries # octd: 324273461 Page 140 , ’ : WW 50955 ©
TOP SECRET Summary Recerd of NSC Standing Group Mecting No, 2/63, Ajprat 23, 19G3, 6:00 PAC -« Cuba The basis of the discussion was a memoranduin preparad by Mr. Bundy entitled "A Sheteb of the Cuba Alternatives," Secretary McNamara stated that before tha ygeoup dincussad nubutance, it should consider whether tha present polley we are folluwing would produce Atnajor change in Cuba, He oxpronaad his fiem vicw that Gasteots position over the shurt term wale linprove if wa took no actions other than Qhove now under way or projiuted, Henne clear his bellef that the elinunation of tha Cantvo vayine was ia reaptire- apentand Chat, eoothers apread our peagent policy would not result in ie duwafell, we should develop a proproot for approval which would prodgae changes acceptable tous. The progewi sioauhl win at orate inp sech a uitustion of disnidence within Cubaian to wtlow tbe USS, to use force in support of anti-CGastro forcus without Lesa to reteliae tron by the Oleh oa tha West, Me. MeCone suinmarized information leading hiin to helleve that Casteu's position in Cube would be strooper a year or two years from pow then itis at peuseat, He expressed hia belief that present policy would nut cause aomajur change in Cuba and that the Rungians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance tu peeinit the Cuban ecunumy to cemain about where it is now oF sliphtly improve, Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully apree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr, MceCone with respect tu the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime, lle cited evidence to ilicate What present measures are ceippling the Cuban cous, leading to shurtepen, lack of spare pacts, aod even sufficient food to puerat fall rostivsen for Couto aotlitia, Nie, Afaatia caw tas porndbabity of petting Cc. eu te defect Coes thar UES, Lhe said Mere wor ase wy be fitonece Cala aeanp the transition period util Cantea, by has deanta, head poeuved iathe had Taokhen bag ties with the UbSHK, Tbe sant, foe esaripla, Claspecit Gaede never wpprove the nun quote for wliatas waathy enuayh towsuid a collapee of the Cuban eaenunry cat howe fon tha iss aad teat yetoahod Dy the U,S.  Murthucmiore, har said Casto was the Kind tof Wtsete tee doadpcat para ker ptuitises atab not heep thers, ise. he duel rat POR SEC RRL
saree TOP SECRET atay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was nut feanible because Castro was a trae ruvoluth nary who could not he induced to give up hia revelation, The Attorney General proposed threa atudias: a, A Liat of invasuresd wa would take following contingencias puch as the dasth of Castro or the shooting slow of «a thd, , b, A program with tha objective of overthrowing Casteo in eighteen months, ~ : ce, A proyram to caune as mnuech trouble as we can for Convaruaist Catna duchy Gha pest viphtewn montha. Wanlew Secretary Wall stated tha view that wo should sot look at Cuba fru Dhe post of viaw of Gulia alone, Pio said the Coban peoblerms was wpartuf our rebeious with the USSR and with our plobab Latthe aipadiest Canoenist aegces ion, Ele urped that var policy tusdaed Cuda alweya | be hept io this perspective, The withdrawal of Sovect forces from Cuba and the dipappearance of the Suviat prescace in Cuba waa of mmajer ime poertones to us. USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a state tent of what we would think was an acceptable port-Castro Cuba, Sceretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Guba we could live with if it wove lower run by Captre o¢ tied to Muncow, Ile taid that Amerciqan cumpunias head written otf theie eS propriated papal propetties tn Gaba but the question romoineed as to who would own then prupes bins in the event Cattro seal Cussstecseisant isappeared in (ladon, Yherag wan a discvacsian on what we waoutel do faeg a roan -Comnuniat Clases saab what we ceeded sha ta geet Castro te defect fsuur the Usui, Vheve opeeeteed cod tes ber nae diffuring views as to whether UR OS INCYTE SURO SRCEy RTE OE) wear an lathe would weeek the Clalan aay oe whether he unly peoult warealel be la Podte the curt to tha irk af deveebebea dss ttags Cala, e
TOP SECRET Mr, Sorensen listed the seven Vbjectives ralsed at the mating as follown: xn, Improve our present coursa of action by duing some things that wo are hot naw deing. . hb, Apres on inilliary responses which we should make to con- tingencios, much as the shooting down of a U-Z plane, c, Develop a program to get rid of Castro, Masnares to disrupt the economy of Gaba, A program to induce Sovict withdrawal, The detachment of Culia from Mugscow, A pro yrain of support for lissident clements in Cuba, Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as the aAind of a regime we would want to sec in Cuba pust-Casiro, Bromiley Sinith
IUTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN ; ( ~ Ve . - Wushu Ua tes Datu: Muy 27, 1975 Time: 10:00 asm. Place:. Goodwin's residence, 1536 J2nd St. NW Partletpants: Sul. Com. + David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Grey Treverton “atebe ge ts feted dagen Acdivitdun in Latha Anerica “Submitted by: Gregory Feo Trevertun Dutlig the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did furoign policy work tor John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the. atest bent be weve fate the Mbbte Wnuw to hontle hatin Amertea. During Tiat pet tod fe npuke with othe President about a hatin Ameflean matter tn the “average once a day. Goodwin left the whita House ta che Call of i on : Y¥s7,) hecomtag Deputy Aspiatant Secretary of State for later-Amertean Cad Alflaitn unadet, farat., Hobert Koodward and then Edwin Mortda. After ‘thing fur the Peace Corps, Goodwin. was brought back to Che White Ctheupe by rresident Johnson, ia the spring of 1964, atter the Panwa Cerinas. At that time, however, he did not spectalize on Latin Amur lea, ustead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration Late ee ‘ in i965, J. Asaseis da yenerad, Goodwin bad mot -obeard mach specdtio talk Of ane eee dbation, abfbuueh Pt euuid net have surprised him Gf it had yone ou. tte ment dud one specific dtetunce an which he hast taba tab owed the Bay oof Page. a Cuba dank force wan: sevetod tte cabad days Uaret fu, evxtabbinhed, $brnt thud ved by Paul Mite sid Chea by Goodwin fa bis - Cupacity an White Houne Stal’ Obfieer. At a meeting of tte lank Force, © Bed’ at the State Departoent, Mohottala suppentad “petuiny raat at Castro? semeone Prom the CEA, poriapea Winoelb; Chen anked Gf NoNamara meant
“Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and Strensaed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic. up later im the meeting after MeNamara lute, To Goodwin, the idea was not Teason able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pipa had nhown tha Cuba wan politically atable;  Cantro would Merely have been roplaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, beth Worse Chan Castro, Somowhat later, Coodwin sat in on au interview Tad Seule had with Keneedy in whlch th. Prosident pledged not ta kill Camtro,  Szule Teportad that pledpe in an “A@Tiicle in Exquite. Rhen he Clnished hin period ax Chatrmin of the Cuba Wank Force, cumtwin wrote a meme recommending that the United Status Chet Castro alone; anything the United States did ty him could only bute — , . tress this position fa latin Amer dou. During hin tine at the State Department, Goodwin Del every Cveek or so wlth £. oC, King, Chief of the Western Jlumlaphere Diviston CBee the CIA, anu Kang never mentioned a plan to Ansasainace Castro. Nor G15 Robert: Keunedy ever ment Lon such @ plan tu Coudwin when Guudwin Morked for Kennedy, in 1906 and 1907, ‘Goodwin did believe, however, that the Undted States was in-~ volved, af leiunt indarectly, fa the successtul plot on Trojaite’. bite. buring the Lisceahuwer Administrathon, the United States had severed Siplesatie gebeldona with Trajaado wud attomored ge Peobate Chee busiteie oa Repablae. there were Pbeopeal beportas Cavett Vrajilde Wile aboot to be ae tame biota d, buat toa Coste tint don Hever cume ott. dn feet, the neve thie Mel Wem hur pr boed when rlowecurred.  Heory Pearbora, the Abericun Consul s @" Dante Deminye, had been thietped witha stuvaupe da Contact wieh ane de Veujadle fureen. Prior ty Phe instr bined fers, dae taal Craueterred some Weapons, premuneabiy hanudpuus, ta thone furces,  Gowdwin stipectesh thot 4
the Preaident probably did not know of the gun tranaler, but he said that the aseansinat ion and the U.S. role with fanpoct to it would have co@e as no svrprine te the Vronident. Ha doubted that the CLA even would have had to cloar the transfer, although a sencral poltcy of that wort at ght have beon panned by the Special Group. ' Guouwtn reported ho other mention of, askanainations. . fa face, he aaid hie ance heard a CIA man may that Hanaaatnat ton Wan @ trate idea because ence neat tod. it hever ‘ctwled. lluovever, am agent in the Sots aT alee tegucd RELL AnET of one wart wt another an within hin mination - in wGpourt tug ong polftieal faction over another . And of courae sumeuny Cc _ : oad gtet have pot ten cattled away. Tt wan clear from the. Bay of Pipe thea Pome the CIA tcameot met acted With, OF OVEN apaltint , ‘Anat ract done Cee, 4 ee brtugtay Bat dita followers inty the bay af Pips Lavanion team). in Ganeral, Latin. Auer fean work avenmed to attract. Che worst personnel tn 4ui Washington, agencies including the CIA. as 7 ClA Activities | fa Brazil: euudwin kivew bicete of ClA activities da tteagdl. The Untted. States had tet ree ty backed Quadros and never Liked Guulart. bi the pet ted belure 140%, the U.S. gave pulitheal support’ to ant a-ha factious: Tebbuwers of hubitechek and even ta the: Fut tate in Beet dion tea tleraets Tle lew. saad brent Luvel ver Ged tists veneer. steed ptenawatedy repent a pod deal the military tide, Walters wats Qerencagtet beeen Kasetas baa heap a cetebee tC wath the Sresiliaa milltary. Hew gach further oe aot veCben make tase vatended Goodwin dd nut Ale HW 309355 Docld:32423461 Page 146 .
J. CIA Activition in Chile: The Kennedy Admintatration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means of combatding communtat fufluence and promoting development in the region. That dectsion was applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched fis support from the conservas tive Aleosmamitt., Goodwin sat in on meetiaga of the Spectal Geoup unly rately, only ff Latin Ametica were the subject of the meeting. As he oo . . Ceomemberced i, the proposals Chat came to the Special Group were peneta e- atalementsa, polley papets, not descriptions of reetplents of nuapport or we . conduite. In line with the policy, support wan piven to left: demecrath: swOolitical clement, The UL. certainly provided aanistance te the ae Demuctate an the Poe crections, but Goodwin did: nat bnow Grow much. The fipare of $20 million, ment domed by Stern, did not eeom c fnconceivable to Goudwin. He contested, however, the assertion thot o mee the Chilean election was the most intengely watched election in Washing Se . . ton since the 1956 LTtaldan campaign. From his vantape point di the white House $1 dad tut seem Bo, the Julmsen Acmitiat rations Julinnen cated less abuut Latin Americw than hud Kerunedy-- Lin She dde ore nd nO minew Deo about overt Jott wan duterer ted onby weet cede Fte tbe be gaette,  Dteeteat Tit wet Pett tu tan barttis Awad. any pobboy, aithou ts tue Prenddent did become detive dt Che tweet i anes Pastime sted thet: the Potmdadesn Bepagbite.  Coudwia vow aoonbarp oe batype i I } : Q fis United States Quneervative eclemente di Latta American socvetios, athh Ameriega map poet eolley tueder fiaon. aan napperted the militucy and e3 ; zt 7 HW 50955 Docld ag neaeuea a 139493461 Page 147
for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himnelf purzled by Jotinson's axxertion that he had discovered a “murder incorporated” in the Caribbean, The only specific tustance Johnsen ever clted was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assisaination from the very beginning and so could hardly have “discovered” ft after he became Preaidont, S20 Covent Operations and Counter inet gency: When apked about the ethos surrounding covert actloun during en- . on the Reonedy Adniniatration, Goodwin responded that the major emptied ie es en counterinasutyency, net covert action. There wis certainly ne dag buctunce ty uee covert actlea, but ae ope buelleved that Amertean e7-rns could be secured Chrouph dt. Counterfoasurpency wate nome Ghing different. A good deal of money was spent tratning police throug c . AD, much more wan spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was a8 well some CLA activity. At Cheek point, ~ i. pie U.S. really believed that the communists could nut pet elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilicacy operat bons cenpidered by the Special Group Ccounterinsurpency). Latin Awef dou taatbern were conmdidered there, vn dm seme ways bLotda A aowan Considered oo Rind of traditdnys yeu bor Southeast Asda. Goode dth belecved tiat fiona US. Counteriteatyene v blunts tude Lbtiie Waele bee Cosethne ub events di bata Amer tea,  Uubtea conmadad poe 4 Moeane provisdte support te puecibla movements di Suath America Whthout pulotvnt sof wapyett Peano tte Soviet Union, and the gaertlba thiet Secu toad Eittle dadapemouss support. ‘ e Docld: 32423
UVMSWVIEW AND MUSTING SUMMARY Pa response Co a quention about NSAN' A, Goodwin noted that these came outoof the Butdy logy, whee 2a Tt — fare fimo eiten srety . decuments. They were both yeneral cad. cn SSR Se ry . see tee bear campo tant cried Kennedy wanted to ktiow the detabis of Amurteaun activities on ene tbe, 1. : Seoretetbn bediave d at anpossihbe te conmtras Che ae bavat ben at bated) igen se babs at dete wat hout beceind iy tivadwed bo theat hae faee ' te ge Past beta ew what bce ods spab dad des sath saa fata: Cori renneteacal avbertie oa. Hott do baa Phe be aferes Baber ents ‘ vote ceeunie ated be Compras. ' . I ze cambidence ia ien whl) got adhe: Oats denna Sanhe Pequibred, otecviewed, Coodwea ment domed Pu Meagoo tusetiened as a kttd of ree sage tale with tte Fil oerssc an Poerte iad levulde. t t 1 ‘ Frat Tay sot teat ted datere o. Ubiecattit : eit ba abe HW 50955 Bocld:324273461 Page 149
UVNERVIEW AND MUSTINO SUMMARY In Fespetee tara quer lion about NSAM' n, Goodwith noted Cdieae there came eet Sabet funds Whey, wher TS : _ far: AMEN hte wrt oehy ce beeen ts. They were both emer ad cated sens AME MAE eye ae . . . eso. tea bee sapporbar dt and et Kentedy eante “ale tad In of Amerfean activities en Wet avatbon af Qaete Ld tgectic ; toe Cheat shacetue- may ope tata : oro cE | HN eave Conptenntetad walters, t. Aterite hte tee Ciemand tb tae . pe bert bed Petia ber feet fate Wenpcated Cu Compress, seonb idence gnomen wil] HOt dees ota ta. denad whe to he Paterviewed, loodwan tal door eo Tune? ioned aia a Kitt of . ! byshet Cade with tue Fiat; yar + Puerco wend wits fad vale, ree, bets “that Npadn teak teen s : : Baas | ' ‘ ‘ Clastag tad Meus das Ged te
safe 9 BR Ore foors Declassification Review/Postponement Form Originator SEGA _ a Date: | WHA, ZS Subject: / PYYVO ETHIWWS F Vig ») Original Level of Classification: __.. 7” - Se y Third Agency Equities: Remarks: Page # of Postponement... Reason for Pos: onement IAW. Section 6 of JFK Act : ‘The Department of State releases this document | . TES te in Part and postpones release of portion(s) of i . OSb Pane | under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102. -526) Reviewed on & 78 wD ATTACHUEUTS COW Portion(s) Postponed Under AGES) ci HAS. NO OBiEcrtOn | a PEST AO MENT a REL ED u\a* WW 50955 Docld:32423461 _Page 151