SECRET produced would leeve important Loopholes for clandestine stockpiling oF war- heads. One might edd that in situations where AEM is legitimate, a constraint on fissile materials (suainty plutonium) would favor the US -- large numbers of AEM warheads consuming substantial amounts of Pu would be necessary for en "effective" AEM depl oyment, and here the asymmetry in stockpi Les would Pevor ‘US. 4. Possible Solutions a. Low Inspection Case This might be the case inwhich the only "arms corb rol" informa- tion on the taetical nuclear delivery vehicles of the other side would be the declaration of inventories of tactical weapons (and therefore of the tactical aircraft which could ‘serve as potential tactical nuclear delivery vehicles). . To this published accounting, there might be added the occasional information | &5 to the movement of potential, nuclear delivery vehicles, received from ixed ground post observers. | With this limited control, very Little change in the status quo . regar réing tactical nuclear weapons would be feasible - although the degree of risk acceptable in this area would depend on the strategic force relation- ship and other Torce relationships which had been negotiated. b. Medium Inspection Case . This might be the case. in which, in addition to the elements of the Low inspection case, the following controls were achieved: inventories of all tactical delivery vehicles and warheads were declared; occasional random inspection of geographical areas’ (Europe and portions of the US and USSR) were allowed; resident inspection were permitted at Pactories producizig authorized 36 SECRET HW 49061 DoclId:32626321 Page 37
SECRET replacement tactical nuclear missiles and aircrefs. In this case, some control over numbers and deployment, but not over yield, would be feasible. The uncertainties would te euch as to require substantial permitted forces. Reduction in mumbers might be on 4 ver rcentage basis (of tactical aircraft 5 plus tactical missiles) the extent of which (in the range of 10% to 50%) would ‘depend on the controls on and’ the relationship of retained strategic and. conventional Porces. Deployment constraints would have to be such that NATO's: preponderence of. tactical airorect in Europe was not Gestroyed. Removal of or reduction of numbers of tactical nuclear missiles frou Europe could be feasible. - ce. High Inspection Case : . In this case, to the elements of the other two cases, we might add: cutoff of production of fissionable material (which in any event would have to have been negotiated for strategic weapons to ereate the kind of military relationship in which major constraints on tactical nuclear weapons ~~ would be feasible) ; controls on numbers (Of warheads in production and stock- piles; inspection of declared inventories; resident inspectors at nuclear reactors; on-site inspection of suspected clandestine production facilities; "USMLM-type" roving inspection, on a Frequent basis, in all of Europe, and large parts of the US and USSR; and serial inspection, | | in this case, some more significant ‘tactical nuclear errengenent might be feasible. “This ‘could constitute the deployuent and nunber constraints discussed in IIT 03. To achieve the euplaced tactical missile situation ‘In Europe in which tacticel eirereft did- not rerain a nuclear threat in that area, inspectors would have to have sufficient access to. tactical aircraft to insure - 37. SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 -Page 38
SECRET chat tactical nuclear weapons were not loaded and. sufficient geogr phical. access to insure that nuclear bombs were not stored nearby or brought in. In the main- iands of the USSR (east of a Leningrad,. Smolensk, Odessa line) and of the US, cavtical airetaft would be subject to different rules. Here, storage of tactical nuclear boubs in the areas nearby to tactical air beses should be permitted but subject to the control that observers would be able to note any feployment of the bombs to the airerars. Here again, a possible trensitionel step might be to permit stockpiles of warheads sufficient to supply the permitted ta ystems with a reserve plus continually inspected additional stoekpiles in some as] tate of remoteness from delivery systems or in: some state of incomplete abrication so that there vould be a time delay in their availability sufficient to meke them useless for surprise attack but short enough to make clandestine withholding or concealwent of ttle value to the other side. oe D. BEARING OF CONCURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1. General.  Remenbering that the Communist bloc is essentially an offensive iliance while the Free World is a defensive one, the USG mast insist on certain political conditions in conjunction with any major arms control’ agree- ment. Moreover, the USG would heve to proceed on the basis that arms control . agreen ents must not limit US capability to rebuild to and surpass present armament levels if limited political settlements are violated. Within this general parameter, the extent to which the US might reduce its arms through negotiation would be directly related to: the development of political depolar- . ization of the satellites; the threat and extent:of the Sino-Soviet rifts; de- “velopment of effective domestic pressures on the Soviet - 38 ~ SECRET HW 49061 DocId:32626321 Page 39
y ! SECRET régime for improved Standard of Living and freedom from fear of War 5 the extent a to which the offensive alliance limits its ager ~ession to the subelimited portion _ of the offensive spectrum; and the degree of success Which the Free World experiences in ronteinizg at degree of eggression, Arms Control agreements Shovild not be negotiated which would permit the US to be Faced by superior ower of a remallied SinowSoviet bloc or which made possible contimring psc tt “5 communist victory in para. militery controntai tions In the present time Frame, there are 3 ar areas of the world in which the pressures of the Cousaunist - Free World are so critical as to require: special meation in connection with axcms control agreements. 2. Southeast Asia Political developments here, especially in Iaos and South Vietnam, have # important relationship to the tactical el nuclear and conventional portions of the arms control spectrum. It is conceiveble that the U.S. and the USSR might ecaieve an widerstanding on controls of strategic weapons without a resolution of political Problems in Southeast Asia. . However, itis aiftiult to visualize controls at less than’ the present levels in tactical nuclear and conventional forces if the Chinese Communists are continuing their direct and indirect para-military efforts in these regions. One exception could ‘be that reductions in tactical nuclear and conventional forces in the European area might result in a net overall reduction for both the U.S. and the USSR rather | than resulting in redeploynent against the Chinese Communist. Even the achievement or strategic weapons agreements and certainly the achievement of agreements in the other two arms control categories would require satisfaction on the part of the U.S. ‘thet the USSR was not cooperating with the Chinese Communist in the latter's pera~militery effort in Southeast Asia, The SECRET HW 49061 DocId: 32626321 Page 40 . ; ;
707 ae minimm political vequirensn’t upon which the US should insist as a prerequisite to major arms control agreements with the USSR inay of the three categor ies, then, vould have to be the practical assurance that the USSR had accepted the tm tatus quo in Southeast Asia, at the day should come when the Chinese Communist were Willing to urtail such peraemilitary ef ?forts, conventional forces end Kectical nuclear forces cuts on abroader basis could be conside rede Agreements with the USSR in the strategic weapons category would have to incorporate a prohibition against the deployment of such weapons by the USSR in Cuba, in order to have any possibility of domestic US acceptance. More important, the achievement of any major arms control reductions in any category of forces, would certainly require greater di sengegement from Cuba by Soviet forces than has taken place to date. This is not to say that Castro would have had to be deposed or that the regime returned to the Western Hemisphere orbit - but nerely that USSR forces with the exception of a fey ‘scores of military — advisers had been removed. On the other hand, greater likelihood of significant exms control arrangements would exist if the first major Soviet penetration of the Western Hemi sphere had been repulsed by the elimination of the Castro regime and severance of the Cuban ties to the USSR. Therefore, US political efforts to bring this situation about, ‘provided they are conducted with sophis tication, — are not inconsistent, with the arms control negotiations. hy Berlin and Burcpe | oe This pressure point is the most significant of all. Without the agreement between the two super Fowers es to the future of Berlin, and indeed, of Germany, no major political detente is foreseeable and therefore significant arms control. | Wo SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 41