457-10014-10117 AGENCY: SSCIA | RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10014-10117 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-23 am Decument Informati on ORIGINATOR: SSCIA . FROM: TITLE: RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER DATE: 00/00/1975 PAGES: 103 SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1c CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/21/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 453 v9.4 HW 450955 DoclId: 32423505 JFK Assassination System Identification Form . Agency Informati on Page i Date: VUTU2015
; Date : 08/07/95 7 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM - a AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10117 RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : j TO : | TITLE =: RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER DATE : 00/00/75 PAGES : 103 SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES _ DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99 ; OPENING CRITERIA : . COMMENTS : CCBOX 453 EAR ite ca ae [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED } HW 50955 DBocld:324273505 Page ?
M HW 50955 Docld:327493505 4/26/61 5/2/61 5/4/61 5/5/61 5/24/61 6/10/61 7/8/61 9/1/61 11/1/61 11/2/61 y/4/o. 11/22/61 8/10/62 8/12/62 8/14/62 5/27/75 | Page 4 : 4 . _ TABLE OF CONTENTS GOODWIN TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK | | Sumary| on Richard Goodwin by DiGenova. Memo to Bundy re "Cuba Problem’ from Goodwin. Memo to! Goodwin re "Possible Covert Activities against Cuba," from Bissell. ' Draft of NSC Action No. 2413. Draft : Record of Actions, 483rd NSC meeting (5/5/61).. Memorandum of Conversation with Dick Bissell, Tracy 'Barnes,: by Goodwin. 4 Memorandum for the President re "'CIA Reorganization," - £rom Schlesinger. Memorandum for Mr. Richard Goodwin re ''Cuban Covert Plan,"' from Schlesinger. Memorandum to the President re Cuban Task Force _ Meeting, 8/31, from Goodwin. Memorandum to the President, ‘Eyes Only for the President ,"" re concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, from Goodwin. Memorandum, Eyes Only for the President and the Attorney General," re "operation should be organized — with five staff components,'' from Goodwin. , Memo, "Eyes Only,'' re recommendations that "the Cuban Operation be organized. in five components.' Memorandum to Sec. of State, Sec. of Defense, Director of CIA, AG, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Lansdale, Richard Goodwin re"...summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba’ Operations'' from Goodwin. Memorandum for Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special Group , (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August, 1962. Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, Robert Hurwitch, State, Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense , Don Wilson, USIA re "alternate Course B," from Lansdale. Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) re "Operation MONGOOSE , " from Harvey. Summary of Goodwin Interview w. Aaron re “Intelligence Activities in Latin America."
| 4 ; ; | |. Table of Contents - 2. , be 6/10/75 Szulc Testimony before SSC, excerpt. R,. 7/17/75 Summiaty of documents produced by Goodwin on 7136/75, by Dennin. S. 5/13/61 Memorandum to Goodwin re "CIA Covert Activities in - — the Dominican Republic." — T. 5/29/61 Drafts and original of cable from State Dept. to { , (date of cable) Dearborn. { i | : ; HY 50955 DBoctd: 327423505 Page 5
ot gi HY 50955 To: F.A.O. Schwarz/Curtis Sm From: Joseph E. DiGenova a Re: Richard Goodwin Material ‘Summary A. Goodwin Interview of July 1 | July 17, 1975 . thers . s and Summary 6, 1975 Mr. Goodwin was interviewed for a second time on July 16, 1975. He indicated that he chaired the "Cuba | Task Force" after the Bay of Pigs. Paul Nitze had pre- . { po viously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force . | that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project. In this regard, Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be during the conversation between (See Szulc's testimony infra.) i He spoke with the President very efficient. Goodwin indicated that he was present - : { President Kennedy and Tad Szulc concerning the question of assassinating Castro. after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about assassination: "We can't get i nto that -- we'll all be targets." He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything to him, Goodwin, about assassination attempts. With regard to the August 10, 1962, meeting, which he attended, Goodwin Docld: 32423505 Page 6
follows: . | In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have|surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific in- stance in which he had heard talk of HW 50955 ro, Se BE as Docld: 372255909 Page 7 “oy yo noted that McCone never made any oration upon the immorality 7 . of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meet- ing and said that "assassination was not shot down". “When pressed for details at this point, and after being shown the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda, he said he wanted to think about the meeting before he made | any more statements about who gaid and did what. He noted, however, that in 1966 while in/Peru with Robert Kennedy that Kennedy, in a fleeting retort to a series of questions about U. S. assassination attempts against Castro, said "Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro's) life." | | At the conclusion of the interview he turned over to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he had found in his personal papers. Those are appended to. this summary... -B. Goodwin Interview of May 27, 1975 fl \- During the course of |this earlier’ interview, Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as cars poarrse ers ee peter rf
assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, Ses first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by , BRIS Goodwin in his capacity as White House ee Staff Officer. At! a.meeting of the Task i Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro", someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant “Executive . Action". McNamara’ responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. (See interview infra.) Cc. The Goodwin Documents The documents which Mr. Goodwin has furnished. the Committee are of no startling significance. One docu- ment, the May 2, 1961, memorandum from Bissell to Goodwin, : | is noteworthy because it does not advise him of the Roselli - connection or the efforts to assassinate Castro. Bissell notes, "I have not attempted to, provide you with much detail." A May 24, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation with Bissell by Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An Arthur Schlesinger memorandum of June 30, 1961, to the President discusses the need for revamping of the “ intelli- gence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not ‘able to Se eit cee control its operatives once they are in the field and of the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo.) pee HW 50955 -DocId:32423505 Page 8. ° - re os a a
WW 50955 ~ 44 The other documents indicate the thinking that went on up to the point where the Lansdale group was established as the coordinated effort against ‘Cuba. Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin -~ What, if anything, does Goodwin remember of the August 10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group which he attended? -~- Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to in his initial interview where McNamara broached the sub- ject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused them and are they one and the same? --. How does he explain McCone' s recollection of having given an oration on the immorality of assassinating Castro when it was brought up at the August 10 meeting? -- Was McNamara the person whojbrought up the subject at that meeting? -~ What discussion, if any, followed? DocId: 32423505 Page 9° mY 3 . -
ew — “Be 4 SECRET “MEMORANDUM “| To: McGeorge Bundy Oo, From: Dick Goodwin Here aro a few scattered thoughts on ths "Cuba" problom, Cuba is a threat to the security ef the United States in eve basic waya: | 1, As a direct military meszce in the Cwitlicn, o recmace which will ' be inten soiled aa communist arras gi nipracst gcoativuc. “Eowever, even this _ increased danger will bo minimal, Our treaty obligations <. cams us to ti - Gefonse of any Amevican notion which-is attacked divectly. Any militar; , mice 1. moves by Castro could bd immediately by our forces. | Gicailasty w we cout: i intervena in case of Gastzo militory oid to guoriila opevcticns in the Americas. i { « Zz. As an exporter of revolution: Theve io no couli that Cuba is being used as a base for export of the commurlist-fidelista revolution, This is done through the actual supply of gunds and technical assistance to insurgent 2 elements, through widespread and reasonabl bly effective pro opaganda apparatus 2 including a news ccervice and radio netevork aud through the use of Cuba as an example of the allinnce between fideligmo and nccessazy social reform +- identification with ¢ u welfare of the people. Sig nificant == copecicily in the Carzibcan areca. However, -} Ss bart ct te Ae t is £3 cP Po) even here, in the last si: months therg has been a significant decline ia Cuban effectiveness, This has come because of che growing isolation of communist-- fiedlista elements from tho Democr atic loft ao Cas trols pro-Sovict bont has HW 530955 Docld:32423505 Page 10 --
HW 50955 ve ary A SOL facr Galas Prange pacems more apparent; ani as Castro has bec s pexsozcl tLeohevior., Phere are citns, infact, thet, fhe cowunu Satake’ rey Fe looking fsz eRomery rore stanles 3, While this | { = be te Pe ss 4 movernents; dees mot necessarily lessen ‘ re ogre PEE Le tie bad = Vio vw PL Lie we Chinese mates por stant to x bee ™enw bay cust oyVS ae ty erratic in ot otte og syne an eet ~ 4 £4 ne not have solved tag pre lem of COM ANAISS junusnce 4h aa fis wbaSe a t ean cay tment ge vm gm foe ow To oe wa Gein & Kms 24 2 3a Se « Ps most of the grentest enqges soota (2,G, Nostacasy Drauik, Cosme bache 3 hes a wage nites lm, ov at ashacent reuvolnGeSs ta,) do mot owe Glenes ad a COURLTY:s coraraunis’ dorminates a 4 rt ct 4 aan © ie : rere tes Bethe... | ange ov strength to Gace, but ta dec 5% weet PME ERNE wae ct some tcl spate cses owe EF erow le ey Laon CC te be danger has boos ae & Piasan 4 Oe an de ant ea lODina: pew rele ranye mde Gee wererre tia me a4 7 Creerce tad Marea ot Act we , At vaged At Coggins ‘ ‘ i oo aioe . divectly against Castro, ia Lk, Refare ncklng | an grace {the velnerasn ity ef his regime -- the corazicte rensGess 22 yp position of the Cu é wlar support, tic prov . Po, ; Fond +. ‘ | , a a e g whe its impact oa tre Coupon people, tho efficiency of his police sve bilities of undcugrounad organizations etce % ‘ DocId: 32423505 Page 1 without guch ca acscs eed 2 ~~ SR cen set of onomy 2m te, the possi- smens it 13.
SsCcRetT ion cro - imposeil ble to. realistically determine want alterz rnative cousses of act -  opentous, | . 2 To mect the military, thrent we can work out cefense agreements wath Ceutval dane vican nations aleny the acs csuvgested with Professor Berle, 3. We should approach the government of Chile to coll an Inter=Amorican . res a €? i c . arms limitation conference, hi agere ence ohould ccal with mothods of \ stopping external arms yhipmoutea in the context of the overewall limitations . * which are desparately necded in Latin America, We chould decide, before i t this meeting, whother the risks in on OAS blockade of arms shipments to Cuba are outweighed by the dangers involved in halting and searching international i shipping £, Immeciczt aty consult with heads of imajor nations in Latina Amavica tee of re to see how far they ave willing to go in ermo of collective action, This chould be done via a personal cmissary. Although we should have a reasonably clear 4 re ecentl idoa of what we want to do, this sho ald ba 2 gonuins consultation among allies. Au the myt sied proposat ais for OAS action, Site, Gepend on tha wea ction of other _ Latin nations -« a roaction as yot uncctermined Be Underlying all these propossie is tho fecling that we should not move - a quickly in direct action against Cuba, ‘Edo net believe that there is any course | of dizect action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and as oe : conditions. . t HW 50955  Docld: 32423505 Page i2 ’ an ae nneeneetenne maaan ie tne ne A A A A et ree
HW 50955 (oneal eee Erie! hOnsrl Paw wo Aa o & & ot ae . # Pra, & Sthemmuts 69 stonpctract emsmort wf Cnsterniom vanenaae l. Wo should provice Carribcan nations with the technical help (e.g. satay to cpst incoming plones) and navy prtzel agcisteuce to meet the danvers of arms chisments from Guta to insurgent elements in those nations, 1 f 2, Theve are two or taree verk danser cpots (Lem. Dar nisloan Res subts ree of . 3 . te, , Py ee oF joe ee . ae A teen, ¢ amd Haiti) where we shovild now bo Coveleping democratic gitormatives to th “a wn nr ants _ " ome pyar ede OP euon 7? ape pty bt present regime e= oreniininy ropiccemenat coveramentc, ifwe do not co this then the inevi table changes in veverament miny he followed by Castro-t: ype » - meg em dS ee Loan abode . mane, ay eas nog, ~ 4 eT. of rerimes Whea sa Dererocvatic alternutives ave oxeauisced we should consider 8 e . ie : £ . 4 Hh hgewe S849, aes eetun ee oe a | oc means of pres joltating the £21) of Weeiilic and Duvalfer and possibly Gomoze. In this way we can oner¢ mona contrel over the type of replaccniont povern- ment ew the timing and initiative should De curse Je Uolp x nrovide countes-prop. “aida agcistance ta Latin governments “= @ ff. raciotransraitters, Tie more! ws can work threurh Democsratic- ye Seam liberal forces ia Latin America, “pathes than ths wOUA VoL alone, the more 2 fas om, ae ot fective will be our propaganda. Coneral enusates ecovaninict anareiions Fer nce et ate \mericas should have Ovo basic clementss anization of a strong political counteveforce. We have ae am veady tnetresent in the mow Ay orgenined League of Democratic parties. BDocld: 32473505 Page 13
We ahould assist these parties «= fineucintt and tochnicoliy «= ta develos protyressive political rnsvements (Inisome cases rey oiutionary m ovements, 4 ecpectally dn the iess } procressiva countries) theouch heleine 3 them 3 ia teche_ niques of organization down to the villace level, ideolostcal warfare, Cole on social and economic Advance ig tho veal hove of preventin if a communist takeover, The Aiionza is proceediag phout as ropi¢ly as pascibic given present 4 - we, man oprg ae Peng ot £ - . Sraeaet of Organization cf eifort, and tho MMO GAEGG Gs avaloabis funds. Dowh of th i) vovice fow ha atiscutioa of 250<350 million é 5 « ss : es ate weds . wate? tf Big fo mt POL Le’ Collars worth of economic ascuctince to Latin Amecica ba dives? 1952, Bis is cut of os total of 2.4, billion. (This'auca dvca not include to voctal develope ' + montfond), Cre hundred m edition ef this we3 wlestha to (“Drak to pet thom ovey theiz curront Snancial exis is. kam 10 clear thet muy potential allocation | . could be made riven the enormous nes oR5 in Asia (cencelotty in India cad . Pokistaa} e= alvnetgh its seve there con ba some ancreace, However, theca Q funds are pr robably uot Saufticions te make a vecl and effcctive start in econoraie develoemant, i | eecond, the Alinnsa pave el pz ' ovreso, This Provram with tts emphasis Organization. Lf communist tulesver comes in La vila fimerica it =pt} , we . ¢ Bard Blamearg ety & a“ protably will uct come through quer rita Woreare, buf through the capture cf WW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 14.
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? tau ebb 2 May 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin’ ‘ Assistant Special Counsel to the President SUBJECT: . Possible Covert Activities ayainst Cuba ; 7 Attached is a brief statement regarding covert 9} erations % . ~e eo) YP i t against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject and our conversations over the past few days, Ihave not an attempted to provide you with much detail. ad : i i [dalla M. Bissell, et Deputy Director (Plans) Attachment: Paper as stated above . a i reha ate 4 be Mec) pig same wa 2 2 a ” + oe ; 7 i be 6 \ are any ee 1 I | |
~aF Se ' tu. “> . 1 5 : yee mee ' sve 2 May 1961 | / MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin Assistant Special Counsel to the President | SUBJECT: Possible Covert Activities against Cuba Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations ‘against Cuba, In view of your familiarity with this subject and our conversations over the past few days, I have not i attempted to provide you with much detail. (Rip , | ' |. Richard M, Biseell, Jr, ee te Se es » Deputy Director . mo! re - (Blans) t t _ Attachment: Paper as stated above yt 1 we es Saad : 5 ree Fane 0%, teary fey ‘ pire A is se “pay ha, L hay, 0 ae Eve na alee ae Ao Docld: aad3505 Page © i?
Hv gags very pee o 7 ‘Spike byte eae amie eet poten meerty 2 May 1961 ka eee eae d As indicated by the combined INR /ONE estimate, anti-Castro activity within Cuba will probavly be muted at least for the next several months. Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way suspect have been arrested, A recent report from the Swiss Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100, 000. All internal services will continue to work ona theory of repression plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties, Consequently, it will be difficult to.carry on any clandestine operations and itis doubtful that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening the Castro regime. ' In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition to the regime among individuals still atilarge and that such opposition is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover, there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces and communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with these individuals. At the very least the'se agents can and will continue to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. ‘In addition, certain of these individuals, plus some | aditional ones who night be infiltrated, could attempt to carry out’some sabotage, Individual acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small amounts of material, Successive acts of savotage or extensive ay t% 3 Re ca DB syytes . , Ae ot wee BIS ee, eater Pan ze ee, Pesci ost See cae “poeta: "32423505 Page 18 - ay rod 0 t =, a eeire a i bs ‘ * et aade teeta ae cee ee é
pens oO ” “7 sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in terms of loss of men, Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting in the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining ‘ its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased program . might be developed. | A capability also exists for types of maritime operations including t infiltration and exfiltration of individuals} landing and caching of arms, under-water sabotage of shipping and sinall raider operations, Under present circumstances it would seem wrong to atteinpt these except on a very limited scale and,in all likelihood, raider operations should not be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been obtained, i t ' The Agency also has a small air armjincluding some transport aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26). ae Although it is not absolutely certain, these is reason to suppose that on Cuban crews also are available for operational flights, At the moment, i air operations should be substantially eliminated with the possible i exception of supply flizhts to support opposition elements unable’ to ‘ survive without such support, Even with lrespect to such operations, ae however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful E i } be night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great . 4 . to justify the risk, B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against | chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if 14. CTE OB Le Tone at a eae RUS pa hy RoE AT a ISNT. Rage TI
successful, might have the effect of xtensive sabotaye, In. view po ee (Pan of the risks involved, however, and the poor denialbility of U.S. ' support where aircralt are involved, /it is recommended that such operations be avoided at least for the present. Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted an independent MAP capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage fe and defection operations into Cuba, He recognizes a necd for U.S, support but is very firm in his. desire to operate as independently as possible of any official U.S. connection, His initial request is for five boats, some materiel andjsome money, He admits, however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real . estate, some help with training and communications will be required, He offers to share his information with the U.S, Goverament, seek U.S, advice and, at least for a period of time, be willing to operate : : , ; : i with the Revolutionary Council, The|Council's views are being canvassed and Ray has been asked to prepare a prospectus giving - if ae in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future ‘ ‘ ‘ and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts - prove successful. The xray proposal should certainly be examined and given support within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the - Council and with the U.S. are satisfactory. ae ee ryket She Se Ss FS: iV aaa ee pats coe ‘ ° 3 wer “Beg red tigW Se Oo a SENS rena, eRe HW 50955, “‘pocla: SP493505 woe ‘20
‘In addition to the activities described above, propayanda activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines and newspapers can be continucd independently by the Agency or in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council, Moreover, limited ‘political action operations are possible. As to both propaganda and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type of activity undertaken will depend to a larse extent on the decisions with respect to the operations described above, Consequently, these will be noted here as mere possibilities, ve i Y 4 & ae Hi. NOSE, HoeTa Gaps: Pad. EY SS
‘TOP SECRET (SG Action No. 24l3-c3 Mame “for usc, same subject, dated May 4, 1961) a. Agreed that the political objective of U. &. policy to~ ward Cuba 1s to bring about the downfall of the Cestro regime. b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake mil- | itary intervention in Cuba nov, but should do nothing r co Sha La dn}! moe WAr. Wwe te vention in the futures eS pat fas inks EAA LS ye ‘UA aaa ; . - - ; oy gc. Agreed that the Cuban situation should be kept under that would foreclosa the possibility of military inter« constant review, in the Light of tha possibility that actions by Castro would prowpt @ reconsideration of woe ene the decteton got to intervene... i tees . ens eee d. Agread that the United States should not txpose a naval or ale blockade against | Cuba at thia tine. ae ted. Go Noted the inpertence the President » attaches te obtain= *. a ing timely and adequate intelligence aa to Cuban mili-” tary capabilities, especially the enhancement of such | capabilities by Sino-Soviet Blee military assistance, taking inte account the possibility of U. 8. tnter= jh vention at a future iis date. | TOP SECRET. Boclda: 327473505 Page 29
DRAFT TOP SECRET &- Noted the iapoxtance the President attaches to publica Sp ™ tion in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Caatre onesie: Tal ar 7) 2b. gt? we -~ ‘ fT and . & Noted the President's direction that tha Taek Forca oa’ ffinw le! oe - .) Guba make @ detatled study of possible weaknesses end - oh pte . wulmerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba tadsy. under t {rection of prepare a ne Soi portions with fespekt to Cuba, tet {deration of/the Presidedt. 4. Agreed thet no separate Cuban militory force should be for the a aE : fo ne — organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces and trained in-speoiel_unirs-comrtuting-of-Sparich- opcaking-uationsts, under a plan te be presented ea by the Secretary of Dafonse in connection with hie review of U. 8. conventional forces, .
DRAFT GOR SECRET 4 Agreed that Cuban nationals new in the UVaited States will ba given refugee status and assisted, under a... en a program te be daveloped and directed by the Secretary AWN 56 Win dine treet of Health, Edueat ton & Welfare, in carrying. on their 7 wiley &. a ry Wf “ . me sels 2 ©" | former oceupations. ‘Refugees now in Hiemi will ba ae real 7 sia ’ G encouraged te locate in other areas, Cuban nationals entering the United States will ba given refugee status. ke | Agreed net to impose a complats trade exbargo on Cuba for the present, but Lf later actions by Castro resulted in @ dectaien to do so, all trade with Cuba would be.” “stopped. The Secretary of State agraed to send to the : Prosident wa an gnalyois of how a U. S&S. embargo on trade vith Guba would effect our trade relations with .,., Otheg eountslog under the Battle Act. 1. Noted that the President would discuss with Canada the position of Canadian subsidiaries of U. 8 corporations in the event of U. S. impositions ia trade embargoes on Cuba, | m. Agreed that tha United States should at once initiate negotiation te enlarge the willingness of other Aneri= can states to join in bilateral, maltilateral and GAs | fs Be 4 ees “ arrangonsats tea quarantine Castro, euch as Qi) breaking eo UE  Atplomatie relations with Cubay (2) controlling hae sitar Gees eb 3 5 Wa eee Docta:
DRAEI . . joe SECRET eubvereiva eavtvitien of Cubso agentss (3) preventing © arus shipments a Castro; (4) Limiting economic tela- . tions: with cubes (5) creating & Caribbean security “£OKCO} (6) tatttating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other etates in the Caribbean; and (7) deo qumetation of Castro as an agent of international come muniena by — all nations of this honispheree n. Agreed that ghe Alltance For Progress should be strongthencd by such measures as ree rapid implementa- | gion of selected social development projects; (2) ace “| egleration of ‘hie ‘tgp Lenentation ‘ef other Latin Amor ve tean aidy and @) provision ef additional rogources for Batin Auerican economic and soctal developments - including consideration 2 of a aupplenantal eppropr las. a a Coe a : tion for davelopnent loans. Qs Agreed chat tis U. &. Information Agency would pect 8 | expand its exiating progran ia Latin America rather chen initiats electronic warfare egainst the Castro regime. eo, fie pe pp ar cee ate Lh Leo pe Agreed that Ue S. military officers, wmdor genesal guidancs to ba prepared by tha Department of State, would discuss, the Castro threat. f° all Letina America. - with Latin. smarieen ¢ officers. ni “50: | 38 Wocta: 32423505 Page 25
' TOP SECRET copy No, 45) | DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS 483rd NSC Meeting ty (5/5/61) t t “4 H | ee - Us S, POLICY TOWARD IRAN Agreed that a Task Force should be established under. the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate sn @ report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19. 2. %U, S, POLICY TOWARD KOREA Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for bat a Far Eastern Affairs should be catablished to prepare and circulate | - a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19, . a 3. U.S, POLICY TOWARD CUBA oa (NSC Action No, 2413c; Memo for NSC, sama subject, dated May 4, 1961) oa a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall a of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not I. likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at | intervals with a view to further action. | | be Agreed that the United States should not undertake military in- ; | tervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would fore« 7 closa the possibility of military intervention in the future. son a a. re TOP SECRET
tt Toa ' - 4d DRAFT | TOP SECRET 3. Wr-8, POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) |. OO - ce - c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade ne or attempt an air war againgt Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joing Chiefs of Staff, Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely 1a. e and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, e2- pecially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet biee “military assistance, so that U, S. capabilities for possible in- _ tervention may be maintained at an adequate level. e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the ‘Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regiue, and to possible political action to end the current terror, {rr Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of _ possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today, & Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized a8 & government- in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent. substantial Cuban sentiment, iz Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S, armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense, 7-2-2. . TOP SECRET ae MA ng “ye! day aS HY 50955. *Docta: 32493505 ° SAG, fr ‘ee ‘Page 26
DRAFT | TOP SECRET 3. Us S, POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) | i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S, visitors’ visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under & program to ae be developed and directed by’ the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carrying on [their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee’ status, All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizen- ship. : 4d. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade. embargo on Cuba. “The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U. S, embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is im- posed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain excep tions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs. in e Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) control- ling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms r shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Carib- bean; and (7) denunciation of Castro. as an agent of international et H communism by all nations of| this hemisphere. ~3- FOP SECRET Sanath gn Ay pean a re ela pa WW 50955 Docta: "39499505. Page 29
DRAFT. ; TOP SECRET 3. U, SS. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) 1. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social de- | — velopment projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of. other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional re- sources for Latin American economic and social development, in- cluding consideration of a supplemental appropriation for devel- opment loans of the order of $200-$400 million. | . | | m, Agreed that the U. S. Informat {on Agency would expand its exist= | ing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should. be made available to non-U, S. groups, n. Agreed that U. &. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers, o. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action. pe Agreed that pending appointaent of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affaire, the Task Force on Cuba should ‘be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assis- tant to the Special Counsel ‘to’ the President, ~hew - . TOP SECRET wee as FS, ry ¥ ™ “Dget a i HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 30
sO DRAFT. "JOP SECRET ” 4, US. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITL Agreed that the Task Force ‘Cuba would prepare promptly both emer- gency and Long-t ange plans for anti- ~communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or ee Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the ae mee eee : re? overthrow of ‘Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed . him, and that any action against Trujillo ‘should be multilateral. 5. U, Se POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA “agreed that the ‘Task Force | on Cuba would consider what can be done in cooperation with the british to forestall a communist take-over in that country. ; ' i } a 6. U, 8. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA Noted that efforts snoyi be made to reassure Sarit and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia. bs Noted the president! 8 view that Sarit could be told that we aré considering inclusion of U. “s. troops in SEATO forces to be sta- i tioned in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference. Noted that the secretaries of State and Defense would be sending recommendations to. the President promptly on the number of Ue. training: troops to be stationed in Thailand. TOP SECRET
May 24, 1961  semegene” MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH: Dick Bissell Tracy Barnes Mr. Bissell agreed that no major decisions concerning covert activities ..., 4a Guba should be made before the President returns from his European _ trip. | ‘However there are a few things he thought should be done immediately: 1, That he revise the internal CIA organization in preparation for possible covert activities. This means changes bothehere and in Miaml. oe Z That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban! 'pilots be continued as pilots under commercial cover in Central Americal and perhaps one or two American . companies. No commitment should bel made to them that they would be used in future activities. They would be trained as individuals and not . “2 "" ag any group or "movement." This is primarily to keep their skills “alive and to keep them available. | 3. He wishes to clean up the Nicaraguan situation, We have left a lot of Military hardware there as a residue of the Cuban operation. He would ‘like to pull this equipment out of there, turning some of the B 26's over rete Somoza and allowing some of the Cuban pilota to remain there to train . ‘ " Nicaraguans in flying these planes. This would be at Somoza's request us and would only be done If he insisted upon {t as a re-payment-for services | gendered, I stresged that no Americans should be involved in the train- : ing of Nicaraguan pilots. . I} 4. He would like to train a few Cubans as radio operators, They would be trained as individuals and would not know each other or that any others were being trained. This amounts to training some individual agents for possible future use. No commitments would be made to any of the men trained. ‘It is felt that this much activity is necessary in the next few weeks. 5. In addition, the Agency * would like Ni survey the varioug potential incur- recthonary groups which now exist. There are several of these groups, - three or four of which claim to have ait underground in Cuba. We should speak to them, We should tell them we could. make absolutely no commite  ._ 2:7 | gent_as to any future activities. However, he would Uke from them an rns BEBO sment of what they thought they could do in the future and -- if they ‘were to-be active -- what help they would require from the United States. I a TOP SEGRET att tees ene be ee hanes dee Wey. HW “S035 5 “Beeld: 99493505 Page 32
} TOP scRet j ' This would enable ug to make a judgment ag to whether we should en-. gage in covert activity based partly upon this information -- informa- tion which would tell us what help in specific terms would be required and what we could expect from these groups. This has already been done in the case of Mirona Ray. The groupe contacted would include thetCouncil, the MRP, UNIDAD and MRR. eater gey Sate vine 6. In addition, he waa informed that Swan radio could not be used by the “"*  “YSLA, They are unable to assimilate it into their system, I suggested owes that we might try to find a good Letin American group, e.g., The League 7 of Democratic Parties or the Inetitute lof Political Education run by Jose Figures, to use it, I said that for the Council to operate the station did not seem to me to be desirable. | ss. 9, [discussed the general situation in Miami and the various newspaper reports. I pointed out that the RIA agents now in Miami were known to everyone, including the press, and were the same people who were wi. identified with pre-invasion activities,| Their presence I felt only in-  tensified the rivalry among Cubana groups and served as a focal point of | discontent, I requested that this group be broken up and that to the ex- tent agents were necessary new peopls <- people not identified with the pre-invasion activities -- should be gent to Miam. cv 8 It was agreed that no future covert|hetivitios should be conducted in - re ““" the Miami area and that the groups with whom we dealt should be scattered cs" in other cities throughout the Sout%eastern part of the country. I said that. . working in Miami was like trying to carry on covert activities in the city : room of a newspaper. 9. We also agreed that Dr. Miro could be informed that we were making a survey of other Cuban groups but that he should be. told nothing more | specific than that. 10. I also referved to the newspaper stories wl which reported that Batistiancs - were being used supported by U.S. “CIA funds. They said this was not -accerate. They said that this would be very carefully looked into and that the most specific instructions would be given that absolutely no Batistianos should be supported directly or indirectly by the U.S. government. TOP = apt | ipa SAD . sj ‘ge Cw sha Boh ara itr ne Ma! yy ne ie aN HW 50955 Docld: 32423505 Page 33 ys
1 a TOP SECRET a i | ao ew. . AL Dam strongly of the opinion that wa must clear up the Miami j area ta ae goon as possible. Therefore, I will get Ribicoff to expedite the vos Refugee program, probably through the use of Mutual Security funds -° . in erder to get these people inte jobs, Bchools, etc. in other parts of the country. Unless we do this we ure|going to have continually in- ke ~ creasing problems in the Miami arene a ‘| Richard N. Goodwin | 7 TOP SECRET \ en 23 5p Byte ° ms pc ii bith Gudea sieisedst Bote Be ye r ACs wae nes,
. . mie 1 Iyae BG, P20) - i t . rope, Pa gee ~ ore I, megat ER SOR EA Aeoepeniget 20D : . facie tet iMinwduis views a3 gaa whe worked in C&S dartag the Ley Rad teeved 29 w pomiedy @ OLA conwaliant in thee yenee diner. : tae Nap ' teh Oy en er ene a ro badencea, COs weaurd | a protaimy bean very york, In the neture of clnodesiing spremzels ond, the irianpha ef aa bstelligeans nygeney Are uornaoee;, gah thet pubdic lrarae about (er awed boas atoertt ars ida carvers, Bi, agains in the natere of the case, aa gganey dadlesxice i alnadeat’ we activity con affowl gasmned few with ide ATE EE. Ths Aipertan’ thing te recogaiss taday, Ea ray jodgeisat, ta thet the fA, | iss ai pracant murine aa qurekitest ee, Ban nhwews mad ws ite quate, itn svoarcin dor fu2ure grwoy ie syactinalty TEA EMEOTOOR, Lee ree CLA dabacte will shake fata gancidsenniy in UY poblev, a& hoe ae ont zeatread, ud, ung CLA je vinioly roerpusiead, Ub will (aa iv thé Algerica fostancey be sadaly Lhamed for davalonroangs af which is to] whstly inaceg rt, i ; tho gygiunsid of thia men ie rancher. in thet CLA's cresble can be cracad to tht aulancusy wilh we eh ahs x geoay bae buen partmitd toe opsrcteg avd tot tate autaueamiyp fa i: wi toe these matin cayaunr EL} gy den, tauaete “iene lice Of lwendnaaina cpersiions (0) om Luastenaats soma tdon 2 tid caistlenhip betweas B epemations Gta palicg; {3} ae inehequaty OR PLO A REO TE TE AIRE ET 8 ASR OES 9 itn ERI MANE BEF 1 a8 FOE EG ON MH, OH ET Be Hiren da Yn ow eo abteerareNtD: t vis Oy at homid he ~= M9 ayoae Feb wapagdeds CIA tntira howe bien Lh ocnanicatl rasdinges 2 ee to bie dencptomtemae ad Spoorais publidkty, Tha Cereus ermgi gaa crwh iynantar spnuntte Ca CEE Birds > milled by the Grea ab on Mea aogier ide vain Bed baer coe thao (ecg, the gatlelas } a Reha and Ol pter Tete ng, “De ty sterloua Lalngs af WIA, i $3, A284}, retwe eon eerie Bo ga tin + ee id Se) Sern: u et en ak a ante. hae -, ef mee nw boss" abe tgs ae 5 age
&. evnaception of the relattonrhin. between cperotiens and imalligence, Tha memeraatany also cugesate waye in which gama cf thase prob- lems can perkeps be alleviated. “Tai i CIA Autonomy: I . : A . . GIA candneta three mein for me of aecret works clandestine intelll- gemce collections. covert political operatinng; sod paramilttary -getivities, It carrics on tbolge functians with relative autonomy. ; . the renoans fer ths -Rutonen.7 are nistorical, ‘ When CLA began, the bate Lenartinent, etith th inking tee much in torma of ite traditionnt misetons in fersign alfaleg, loeked on this new veoture with scapicion abd ronpunced the oppostunity to gelize fire: control ef CIA operations. It did not, for onamele, try to estebliah any afinctive eystern of clearance for CIA activitioss and gorae ambacsadors frankly prefazred not to know what CIA wan uate inthele countries. After 1953: the fect t thas the Seeretery of Stata and the Director of Ceutral hitelligence were brothers further confirmed | CIA's independoncs fronn avpery Ssion by Rate Department desks. _ Tn the meantima, CIA grew ih sins end power, Dnying ths fifties is began in seme areas te cuistrip the State Department in the quality ol ite perreencal. Partly because CLA paid higher otlaries and even | more perhaps becaune Allen: Eullen gave hin people eourageera pro- tacticn againgt McCarthys attacks, CLA wae eble te attract and hold ' 9 large number of able and lidepondentoralmied mon, Tke more it  eGded brilliant activicts te its eta, the mere momextum [ie orsraticas develeped, and the greater role it played in the inliietion of policy. i Ry the time that Bieta had begun to be fully avere of the problama ervested by as active and Bitonemous CIA, it bed leng since missed the chance to establish ita orm ulfimmte eutnority. While Stnte re- tained a nominal suparyisicalover covert political eperetions, this was, . : to ecme dogras offset by CIA's famdoncy to pregent a propesed epazation Co _ almcot as a ints acemolt: Stat to never hed title to central overt ; clamiestine inte ry ney Tae GUections and it hed lem araonnd ia euch a #POR8 2S. overt pulitient reperting all eren ia tae rofindontnce et | crart diplomatic contacts. t t $ oe oe rhe’ mi ere Be
- he . a i Se CRt | . il . . . : Be - ia part, CIA had developed a whale erries af functions paral. lating already existing funeticns of the State Department, and of the Defease Deoartamumnt as | well. Today it bag its own politics desks and oullltary staife; 1 has in effect {te own feretga gorvice; it kag (or haa had) ite ewn cembst forces; it even hae ite own afr farce. He arnval budget is akovt  tlires that of the Scato Deyare- mast, The contemporary CIA possesaes many of the characteristico - yf @ state within @ eteta, | 7 : |  &. Moectrins f 7 Th ous ALLA 's entonomy developed tor hletorical reaaone, it has ten: ahlo to endure because there ia oe doctrine governing aur conduct a clanceating cperationsa, Tia problem cf doctrive for CIA ts the eutent to which ite varicus clamieatine mieaions ave compatible with a free and open society. ; ‘ It in idlo te argue that, because the Comrounists can do guch-and-mach, we are {roe to da ittea, Communisra is a creed surtered i con- epiracy! and the whals pole of Comraunist social and political er gani- zation ja to make conepiracy effective, If Mighting re with fire’ 1: GANG contracting the frecdeams traditionally enjoyed by Americass in ordor . to give more freadom to CIA, no one seriously wishaa to do that. Yes Fido nat feal that we have tried rigorously to think through the liriis which tha maintenance of an open soriety places on secret activity. Urall thig ia done, CIA's rele will not be clearly defined and under- steed. The preblers which must be faced ia: what cort of sccret activity ia conglatent with the preservation ef & free gocial order’? . Via must begin, I believe, ky accepting the fret thee the Unitad States will continue te be @ nation: in which politictaas vill ack questions end roake epeechss, ripor2erva will dig aut aterios, newnpapere will pub lish editoriala, individuals,’ riven by prosmptings ct congcience, vill hlurt ont things harraful to tha etale, andeaoan We do not wish to change theses things and could nat do ao olthpnut vielatine the eggenca ef our society, Thess thinga roake up the framework in which ClA must operate, ia vhort, they conatitute the problem; acd, aa Cenoral Marahall used to sey, "There'a ne point in fighting the problen. " ! i i i if | HW 50955 Docid:329493505 Page 37°
can tae 4. ‘de (i f 0 Taare fellows fram thie, I winid think, the couclugina that cearct netivitiag ara parmis ible tt! alleng ae they ds don net t corrupt the the pringiplaa a aged od practicas | aR "ef ¢ CUE socia Ye Ou ond pd bsg they esacs to ES prrnlecthla when thay efined, is is to carrupe ¢ i there principles aed eo aD ea CEE Agee t pract sees, F zach form of seernt activity Kresanta ite own problarn. Clanddoxrtine iwalligence collection bag heen a traditional functian of the aztlonal einte. Its ruleg and usagsa ore falrly woll astablished, In the main, aeplonega, M cecsucted with diecrotien, should present no  « ‘geaat problem. Hewever, when canducsed with.an open chockbook aad a broad wandste, even esolonage cen bagin te pweb against tha limite of eearet activity in an cpen sociaty. Sl censider later, for eanzopla, the aisetion ed the Contrells sd Amorican Source (CAS) and whethor the overtaing of CAS 43 net beginning to harm other activitioa ef tho gowarnment, . 4 Cevert political operations pragent a trickler prahlem. Osengiens. ariss when it is necessary te.eubsidles newopcrers, politicians ard organizations {n other countsies. But corruption of tha political Mla of another nation ia net a respenaibility to be lightly gesemed, I wonder whether CLA bea ant done tea much of this for the Joy of i. Pararmiliiary activition areate on oven more cilieult preblem, if enly becacso the protlems ef contaalinent ere so moth more difficult In genera], Lomuld euggect that any secret oparation whess succesa is dependent en the eupsrension of nows, on lying te Cangsesemen and jourcalista and o2 the Cecaption of tha electorate chould be undertaken only whoa the orlate is oe comoliavable that the gains really seni to cutwaigh the disadvantages. | Thig cuggsete thet (hs sine af the pre- posed eparation may be of crucin’ npertence. Sxsall eperaticnas can be done with a minimum ef agcomparying coreugtioa, The grosier the vieibility ef the cnsration, the more ite guccase Cepends cn thwarting tha impelece and denying the valuce of aa open sectety, the rloklor it becermes, and the ragyve urgenk it ig that an overwheluilng caae be mada for itn necausity. | fa short, when conkrs ated with a propessd eperstian, wa myst Bot only ank whether tha oparation ie tachnically fensibla in {ta awn tarone; we must ask whother We gquecare recuiras our apes eyaiesy te bs In any gaviows way falso fo ita own principloen. fn * ‘Wee ene HW 50955. Docld: 32423505 "Page
5. . i . ute, Sipe pa choos and 2yuicy amare ree re mye faetaes Pe tote SER em OR SN eTEE Clandestine activites dheuld ba asngsned net enty in the contest nf emoiy relationship by an apen sechuty fst shee in tne egmext of thelz ralationabip to United States {eroign policy. . CIA eperations have nai Beer pated eliectively eckordinate to WU. &. feredign pole Fs pe . Segte Liagartracne cioteot, this fact anpores American foreign policy we nomoltiteds of guncQeFadanesrs when CLA te dMecoverad geaqgruiting gg_ente OV Aswilepisg geurced in & fyiaedly coumrye The recess Singagore ches, whoo CRA, without natlre fo the Cengul Genored, Ba Lrled ta subvarxt & mavabes of tha Spacieal Exanch ef the Singapore Police provides as inoteuctive evancpls. After complications cf Quliexrous canalandtys ineinding an attempt to gabject the recruit to a He-dstector tent, it tarned out that the reosruit ked long since informed hia supericts oi the CIA appreach awi wee leading CLA imo a trep which, whin gprmg, produced eenaiievakie embarsas3- meet to relations betwaen tha US and the Hingagere OveRDMCat. Thare hays been trovtice of a comeparable sert in Pakictaa sad in Jagan (ehere a group of Chinsao Matiansie wera enniggied late Sasobe to work ina CLASNDA apevation). CIA has said that, in such ensae, neither she Erckosay ner the Daperi ment in Washington is nermelly informed of this type of aperation. tn short, no ong krows how many potential yrobiams for UB foreiga polley «+ end hew mach petantial frictlen with Eniendly states -- are being created ct this mamert by CLA clendestina teteliigence eporeiis. Surely thera is on argumant fox pevmiiting Siste t dycide wheshes th edventage to be going by the apsration (2. fro the inforrantion desive fyarn on agent within the Special Branch 8 the Singapore Polie2) eut~- weighs the gle (8.5. axnenorating tho lecal govwramert are ciekbog ite confidence bata in onr gurpeese mod fo cur sensah, Clandeatine ingolliganes oparations pheue plainly be clanzed Toth with tha Dapert raert of Stnte and (cave for encertiozal inetaos as and su agreement & the Beeretary of State) with ahs Local U.S. AEN OBORORs i ue i t? t 1 bh if | i | { i HW “50955"' Doc “os —— ana eldys2 Bo Baga: Aan e cteg nel E
SECRET 6. - a Caves calttiens gph caer aitgaa tochnieily seqsize inte Department Askanne In po BOUCA,: homever, CLA haa often bean able to eeiza the initfeNve in ways which reduce State's rele almest to that ef a rabbdor stan, Thie hug bese partly tha eenosquanca of tha supesior drive aad activiarm af CIA pardennel, gapaciaily o9 compared with the diffidence . of State Department pertonnel. for czample, whan men coms to CLA with the aasignment of develening covert political campaigaa cr organizing ceupa or propszing for garamLlitery warisre, theee men naturally fall to work with ingenvity and seal; they prebably feel that =” they are not carning theiz pay unlese, say, they organize aa many coups 20 possible, || Vhe concept of ‘contingency pleaning’ has legitimatleed tha coucrate preparation ed operations sil presumanly in a hypothetical ata ga; people did nat st flret aatiee thas 'eantingaucy ginnning, ' whan cogried to the ctoge of recruitment and training of porscnael, crastee!a vouted intorest which cften traaclorms contin~ gonctes inte apparent escossities, Thus, if e groep lo assembled and revved up on a contingency baais, then the failuge to carry the project through (it to argued) wilh Invite the Gloagzointmant end elienation ef the greup; ¢e the preosure increaces to follow thraugh oe. what had etsyted 29 & pore epeculation. Thia wae a cantral factor, of eqarae, in the Cuban detiocion -~ the fact that distamiment of the Cuban force in Gustematn just ocamed te crents teo raany probloms and erobarygesemante, having esterad inte relaticns with porencalities in foreign lamde, CLA koe sometimes ssemed te fer] that we must thera-- after do pretty much whot ghey went -- er eine thay will Diew eecurity or even go over te tha Communists, This eppresch bas mode us on — eteagien the prisenszs of car own agents. 9 2We becowns prisoners of oust agents in anther songs tee, Tho Cubsa spiaode loaves the atrong imprecaion that CLA te not able te cendroi lie own low-level operativas. While the CLA peegle in Washingion ara man ef eutaptioualiy high’ quality, tho men attracted to field Jobe ara some- times tough aed even vicious pregle motivated by ézives of their oun end net necesenvily in pellttes or cren moral eyo pethy with the nurpoaes ef the enersiion. Such actions os locking up tha Revolutienagy Coungil, such enterprises es Operation 40 in Miamd where CIA egevts copcrtacly trained Cobans la motbode of tortura, auch evicedss e2 the detention and third degrees reportedly administered to Dr. Aodulia Nodal Tarsia aod 16 cther damoeraiic Crbane this Poteumy -~ all thies seegeat that things go om under CLA epcoporehtn, ped which CIA in Wagningten te only wAroky acquainted. CO . HW See eens Baha
TNS ete. wi” st ae ff Ve ta) sa pteas nae i Spee se 1 | ‘|: She ar - ! 4 lt has meant too that the Stata Bepartment, ates appriscad ef an operatian only in ite later atagon, ia umier great preacure te — endorse the sporstion as already mountsd becaues of the alleged evil consequences of onarcietug a vete, Lwell remember Tom Mann's remwerk the day the decieion wae mada to go ahesd on Cuba: "l would never have favored initintiag this cperation: but, since te kae gone ag far ao it has, Ido not think wa can wiek cailing it off, Moreover, mi @ titas whan there {a increasing pramium en activiem, Siates, whan it quastiqons CLA coaretionsa oF Initiztives, caste toslf ta aprieay, sisey, asmative rele. The advocate cf clandestine activities . geema ‘tough’ and roalietic) the eppeosat hee te invoke evch istsnatkiloa &3 the reputation of the United States, world publie epinion, "What do wa cay inthe Unitel Mations?", ets., art sete hopelessly ideallatic, logalintia end ‘acde. ' The veoult of ClA's initioties in cavert polities] enerations bas boon to ¢raste altuntions which have forced pelicy on the Stats Departront.: This wae not the ortainal idee behind CIA, As Allen Dullss wrese in hie 1947 memorandum te the Sonate Armnad Services Cammitics, "The Central Intelligence Agency shawd hove nothing to do with polley. " ; Yat, in tha ycare elnce, ClA has, in effoce, ‘made’ pelisy in many parte of the world, A number ef gowarnments still in power kvow that they have even been targets of CIA attempts m4 everthrax -- not B& Btate of ting cele ulgtod t> etimulate frieally feallngs toward the United States, consuls, cf SeSEEe, isa prime ounrmple, This experience auggeests thet the pressat syetam by which CIA rotifies - Etate of a projected covart operation to inadaequmte to protect US trtereate, Thart most be zome means by which Stete can be infezmod ef such operations a¢ an carly enough etaga te alfeet the conception and prellrminary planning ef the eparstian, Ctharwise CLA will coa- tinve to confrom Reta with Fropogitions having potential limpmct on foreign policy but st too late | & poing to subject? that mrnct ta reasen- able Gontrci. — Age's
gain. sae Fae vs BY abeee fe snk: HW ‘
3. aerate Dae wry SE tyae nS ne Tar wi spe “Dae i os we Rae ple ae t 4, Fayamilitas: marten, { gather, ta regarded tn gore qamriarse a6 a purely technics, moos, eaugily detachalie {rem policy and there. fore a praper function ol the Department of Dofense, Yot thera ia aimest no CIA function ragee pecullarly dependant ca the solizics! context then paramilinry warlore. “These ave several ronsong fee this, Foy ona thing, a nasamilitarcy egeystian is in ite nature a iares end atizibishlie eperetion aad Shareby, ao suggested above, clavresloith the pregurreritions of eur epen sockety. (Theas conriderations nead not soply, hewevey, to th troining of, emy, the Enuths ¥ issoarnece in guderilla taction gr ts tha curpart of alrogdy ant tyting querritie activities,} Fer aucther, Vio morel and polltical z price of direst peremilitery fstiere is acute for va, Commuriate, whon they stimulate paramilitary activity, avo dang what the works auoects|fvee them: when we de it, wa appaae to hetray aur cwn proisesed | princioles and therefiexs canes’ alinzd ta eoropoand delinqurary by defeat \ Boreover, en tne reqent Alsoriag apeoda cherad, ence we ox Hines tha werld that wo are Gemnanitt alte a paramilitary endeever, we will bo blamed Ine #32 eorta ef this: Atte ns the recent tractera far -prizanara exisede ghia, when wa "to band raga to poasthia fsathy ea camaat Mahtly write trem off aad clare tho beooka, Tks Ceraraantste, on ths other haw, have po ecrmm)ae abcat Uquidasing @ lasing 6 phew : i : ! f
Doctld: 32423505 . Page 44 PEGHE [ 22, ! tiereaver, puarecilla warfare bs foug@, much essere than milflary mtn ordirary realisa, fa esi! iMieologheat ceotext, Ths gnarrilia sucecacde when hie pregram onliers qracerests appari and it is yory Giffiealt indecd to beet he m when the couxtryoise i6 with aim. Yau Mook told Conared Maxetell in $9446. act to worry ebost the quorrilian in Indonezlag “wo are sending 50, O10 men ont there asd will clean the eftustion up in tha threa momhe,"” bieeghall, wire had had onpertesce fighting guarrilias in the Piilippiase, _veplied, ‘It won't be lea enty. You will fied thet thay will biced you to death," Cypzus and Algeria Ulustrate the difficetty. of ever coining guerrilla resistance through shear welght ef military force. ° Sarioue guerrilla mov voments! ‘have bean defeated analy threo times cince the end of the Second WorkG ¥ ars in Grasce, bearaues Tito! a defection closed the narthern trosdae In the Philippines; mad tn Malaya. In. Sho last two canes the puereilla rosietance ended totauss ef tas combination. cf clittead | esd will edit {gary couatormeecuzes. The ® otrurgle ‘in Malaya, ae Field Mozehal Te ampler under toon fend said), was for. the minds and hearts ef the peoples it therefore invelved not aly paramilltary operations bul ® vagt educational program, exsgoaisation of trade aatons, polittest reforny sot en offar of national independence, ifthe guerrilla’s powsy lea in hie revalutiocary program, te encoer lieg in past in meating the neade which onable the guarzilie te rowse the esuntrycide. my fthie ut 2, political goal, wrele Mao Tea-tung, “guorrilia warfare nragt fath, en it must Wf ite poligiesl ebjactives do not ectacide with the napissticns ef the precio ant if their eymoathy, eccoperetion asi aesismnas cannot be gained," He aided, “De wa want the suppore of tha marnses? BM wado, ws ment ga ameng the | ™MmAH9G0} aroues them te activity; concern ourselves with thois weed aed woo." | For thoes reasons, poreilttery variance eennst ue coaaiierad ag primarily a milleary OEP ORs Rt to primarily & pallties’ wanpen end a saust therefore be aub§ ected ta clove and earelul retitical overaly Bb prebebly shauid be retained ino recesatitizad CLA rather thao ‘ twanslerred to Dafens | | \
bh. “ _ 5 Haw to _Estantion Felicy Cantrel? Hera leondar whether tha | Pridoh exprrignes “milght nat ba of valao, The notehle foxture cf the British intelligence system ia the determination to keep clandestine ectivity undar otrist Foreign Cifles contrcl, This contre] le achicved : in a sumber of ways! - a) Seerat itciNgance Aervice (Mi-8) itself opoezntes umtor the erection of the Joint Intelligence Cemuniltes, which has a Forgign Office chairman (vetil recently Sir Pidrich Dean, who . is now tha Britieh representative et the UN) ard which includes . the Service Intellicence dircectera end representatives of the Colental Offics aud the Cemmonwwalth Relations Office ae well os the Chief of S15. b) bnale political waxfare directives are eriginated, net by 355, but by tha Dfermation Research Department ia the Fereign Officer, often in consultation with an interdepertmental Working Croup oo Esternaticanl Comremict Frente, asd uniar the ultimate centrol of the Superintending Undar-Jeeretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary’ & Degartmert tn the Foreign ro, . CMhtee. ¢) SIS covert pelitical actlon campalqas muat not only tone form to Foreign Cifies divastives but mvaat ba cleared with the erpropziate Foreign Office grogrenkical ceaka, ot ae &) working groupe under IRD cheisman chip _wreva opsrae tlone la epecial arces, such ea, for exernplay Gino-Suvist vola- tone or the Waxid Youth Featival, e) a Pereign Offices Stinks Lisieen Officer eite nowt te the 618 Chief, and Feratgn Ofiee a officiate sorve ture af daty in tal sections, AL thens devices might ba adapted for use by ene State Nopartmcet, Organizationally, this would mona ibsg the intailigence agonsty weold retain oporetional auiarassy but Chat Le orertiions wenki be mt ahh points eubjincs to Miele Doypartus ot clearance «= © elsarencs ta bo HW 50955 “Doct: 9423505"
| | enforces by directives, by Sata Departmert chaivsngaehip ef —_ to . working greape, and by the infIltration of State Degarimant porsennel ints the Intelligance aguacy. . Cirviousiy thie esteups wonid net succeed, hawover, waleaa the ° Ssate Dapartrocat Waclf ware pregsred te overcome ifs labrod habits cf duiusion, neguitviem aed delay ami to take a firm ; aod purpoesiul Esp onthe situation, IV. Operations and intelligence : Tha gelationship batwaon eparstiona and inteMigeace ralees particu. lasly perplexing questionn, ‘Intelligence’ includes tee separable activities: elancentinn cellecthes; and reacarch, analysta amd ovaluation, The ties deeig with that amall portion ef raw intelil- gones procered by azerat meang (Mr. Dullea estimated in 1947 thet "a proper snalyaio cf tho inteiiganes obtainatie by. . . overt, ; nermal, and sbevebsoryd means wenld sugply ws with ever CO percent, I chould estimate, ef the information remirad for the giidance of oor ne national palicy"}; 2 secand inveiver the colletien and ininspestaticn ee _ of alf ferme of intelligoaca, howaver obtained sof the productica of | ostimaice, — Under the Britteh system, clandestine cclection ie entrusted to tho &sesst Intelligence Service. The sestarah, ensiyets and estimating © function te loceted in the Foreign Office Research Departznent. clacdtecting collection aud reasearch and analysin, Tho Stata Depart- -mert's Bureau of Inteliiganca and Rerrarch eles has vascareh ond analysis raeponsibilities; ba®, in practice, CLA hag ectabilehed contral over the rmadiiaeyvy fer praducieg national eatimetce la euch & way ag to redueo State's contribution te aubmitticg ite views to CLA fay acceptance or rejection, | in cthar word, where in Groat Britain the Foreign Odfico playa the evardinating rete in the latelligense kields in the United Statee that sale hea boon aasumad by Cli, | | Under the Amorican eystam, CIA hae reaponsthility for both po | we ee ee a ee ee HW. pore pages Seis pale: ages ase ons
| 13, | The argument against incorporating the research an& estirante function in State wos made by Dulles in 1947: “For the preper -— . Judging of the situation in aay foreign country It ts important that ; information should bs processed by an agency whore duty Uf is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions frem those facts, without having either the facta or the conclusions warged by the inevitable. and even prepor projudices of the mon whose Guty it is to determine policy and whe, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy te be faulty." a . a oe ss Precisely the eame argummsdt cen be used with equal effect against of tha incorporstion of the research end estimate function in CIA -- | 7 i.e., if intelligence ia toe cleeely connected with operations, then thone committed te a particular cperetion will tend te select out the intelligence which validates the operatica. Obviously beth arguments conclude in a case fer the establishment of @ fairly independent rescarch and estimate gram. But, if the KkE _ group fe teo independert, one runs inte the opposite danger! thet is, . that neither policy nor cperaiions «will be gubjected te adequate - taselligence checks, The trouble with the Cubes cperation, for example, was ast thes intelligence and operations ware combined, bat preciasly that the Cuban operation evntied systematic intelligence judgment. The in- talligence branch (DD) ef CLA was asver informed of the extotence ef ths Cuban operation, The Office of Natlenal Eetimetes cas never asked te comment on the agaumption, for exemple, that discontent hed reached the point in Cuba whare a onccesstul landing cpermtion would proveke uprisings bebind the lines and defestiane from the Militia, Ia December and Febsuacy, the Offices of Nationnl Estimates produced genesal appraisals ef the Cuben pituation, but these wore eheotly independent of the Cuban cperation, I guthoy that, tf ite epinien had been invited, DDI would bave given quite a diferent eotimate of the state of epinien in Cuba from that oa which the cpera- tlen was baged, There exizted, in short, the riiiculovs situation t Cg te . eee Phage at gt Eee RS yp pe eye ager eS HW’ 50955 DocIda:324
14, ~ thet knowledge of the Cuben cporation, Meuated ta Miarnl bers by any number of low-level agents in the cperations byanch ef CIA, = - wae denied to even the tap officinis af the intelligence branch. Tho Bureau of Intelligence end Research cf the. Dopestment of Stare know oven lees about the Cuban operation. . Ths pretlam, then, te to have en R&E greug exifictently iadepoadent ef both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the cane fos veoted idese arnt imtsrestp -- yet sufficiently cless to be able to . subject projected operatiang or pelicies to the meet imtenze and gaarching scrutiny. Where could this uroup ba located? UW the CIA were te became. subordinates to Sgato, ag Mi-6 Is to the Foreign Office, then the Kk function might be vested In a cosrdinate aubagency, somewhat inde. penient of both State and CLA, yet closely cagnected with beth in day- toudny operationa. The R&E esuhagensy weald receive intelligence from CLA and from State, as woll ao frem tha services and, of course, from public saurce3, H would represent, In effect, a fuaion ef CLA/DDI and State/Intelligonce and Research. HE might eles take over certain . of the service fuacticns new confided to CIA «- phategraphis interpre- tatien, blegraphical data, fereign broadenst monitoring, overt cellec- 7 tien, maps, etc. There wight be ia addition o Joint Intelligence Board. with representatives fram all the intelligence agencics and with a  * Stats Department er Whita House chairman, Vo " Consluston. The argument of this yoorngrendum inplica a fetriy dvsastic rearrange> ment of eur prozent intelligence aet-up, ales implies tha capacity ef the State Department to aseume cammaad of the situation and to do fo oo in an effective and puzpaseful way. Mf the State Department.es at present staffed ie not capable of assuming elicctive commend, this ie not, in my judgraent, on argument against a regional reorganization of | intelligence. It io an er aunond fer a dragtic overhent of the Erate © Department. ' | | + o Ast ye ‘ial mye veeeae or ‘ watt 4° ips a a Faa9 we eh spp haga a te ty S4° Podla: 32423505 Page
15. The structure whieh would mntat the crite: «ugeeeted dn this memorandum woud be ae follows1 1) The Sate Bepartmens weold be granted genoral eleavonce guthority over all clavdestiaa activity. This might be affectuated on tha Dyitiah raodel by the appointment . Of s Deputy Uncervecretary of State for baalligence, who would act for tha Cocratary in thece mattere aed who might BOEve as chairman of a Faint imalligonea Beard, . 2} The Jaxt Ingalligance Board wraadel include FOpTe sentatives from all elomeonte in the intalligonce community ard aleo from the White House. 3) The operating bra: nchas of tha pregent CLA weld be reconstituted undér some biameless titie (the Mationel Informa tion Service}, This new agency weeld be charged with recponsl- bility far clandestine cellection, fer covert golitical operations andi for paramilitary activities, It would submit proisets to the Deputy Undergceretary of Nate for intelligence fer clearance. In gonoral, the ageccy would bear someuvhst the sams rolatione ship to State ae thy Disarmament Administration and ICA presently da 4) A second semi-independent agency would be eet up, again buaring 4 Mlarmeleas title (the Foreign Nesenrch Agency), coordie nate with the operations agency. This agency wereld be chazysd with responsibility for collasicn and interpretation, & waul includes CLA/DIN, the Bureau of Intelligence and Reorarch in State, and the varleua eervice functions new carried cn by CLA (phetographic interpratatian, biographical files, foreign bresdcast monitoring, scientific 4 intelligence, MER, Gvexrt cellection,. cin, }, it might weil ba located in the CLA building in MoLaan, Arthur Cehlesgingoy, jr. cect The Attorney General Mr, Bundy _ Mr. Dungan tte, Ay eer} : (Se EPS BART PE etn HW 50995 Docldr32494505 Page 49
5995 Ee RQuid:@2423505 a EB fe Qs, SECRET | be THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON July 8, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD GOODWIN ; SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) ''an island-wide resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations bases'' inthe US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient to overthrow Castro. . Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups most eager to control their own operations. JI.e., the plan discrimi- nates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria elimi- nate the Manuel Ray group; yet I ¢an find nowhere in the documents any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people. Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical effect is to invest our resources in-the people least capable of generating broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key prob- lem: i,e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes, My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and demand that it be recast to make political sense. The key is the SECRET: wey SR, | he
te SECRET Qe statement that our covert activity "should be viewed only as the - covert contribution to any national program designed to. bring . ; about the eventual replacement of the Castro government." This [ce is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity . should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba ' most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper. ° It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out in a political vacuum. Arthur Schlesinger, jr. “SECRET: Te rea vie Le SMa es uw’ 50955: “Docla: 32423505" Page 51 meet OT EE eens
6 W609 25." “Dawes SPPIS GOT Baye BI Te I ea EA AIR Re September 1, 1961 fe tee a MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ... formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basia of interaal political - ‘eonsiderationa in the United States. - oy The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thuraday, August 31.  Deeaent were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two -. | members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself, ~ ‘*: sguld accornplish the objective of establishing the force without running "The following decisions were made: 1, We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Carribean govern- ments the poasibility of organizing a Carribean Security Force, Thia could be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a --formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization _ would depend on the judgment of other Carribean countries aa to how they  serioua internal political riska, The United Statea, for ita part, would pre- fer the formal multi-lateral arrangement. Such a Carribean Security Force would have at least four major aspects: : (1) Advance committment to come to the aid of other signatories ... threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation | of specific units for participation in necessary multi-lateral actions, oi (2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information con- cerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of such information. , (3) The establishment of a Carribean air and sea patrol to watch. for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents. (8) A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police organization and procedure, etc. , . 1m —* tt was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if | necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seck a more . SECRET ’
-2- 2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should.be as quiet as . passible -- trying to ignore Castro and his island, «3, Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of _ targets important to the economy, ¢.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equip- ment, etc, This would be done within the general framework of covert opera- _ tions -- which is based on the principle that para-military activitles ought to , be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for * establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within _, that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose des- -° ¢ruction will have the maximum economic impact. — . oe “4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and especially U, S. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal ‘mathods to attempt tmdllvert this trade -- depriving Cuba of markets and ’ gources of supply, I understand that we have already had a few succeases in  thia effort. oo 5. We will establish next week -- in the State. Department -- a psychological “warfare group. This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietiza- ‘tion of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, ete, - -« much of which has been hitherto classified -- putting this information into . . readable, popularized form, and developing, methods of disseminating it through _, Latin America. Such dissemination would“be primarily through USIA channels “* but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories,. helping to . “prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list _ of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc. ' The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin American communica- tion, instead of treating it as official U. S, Propaganda. We have selected “gomeone to head this effort -- Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was © a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday Evening Post) for many years and who Ball highly recommends, 6, The CIA was asked to come up =~ within ithe week -- with a'precise, covert procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government. The object of thia dialogue. ~~ to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split -- was fully de- | . tailed in my last memorandum to you. This is an effort to fing an operational. _ technique. | Richard N. Goodwin SECRET: ~
_EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT November 1, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: I believe that the concept of a “command operation” for Cuba, asdliscussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all- © out attack on the Cuban problem, Since I understand you are favorably dig- posed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot de the job effectively. The beauty of such an operation over the next few months ie that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at lease we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affectus. The question then is who should head this operation. I knew of no one current- ly in Cuban affaire at the State Department whe can do it. Nor is it a very good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activi- thes. Ido not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking oo and this will be very hard te de fram the inside. I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of — such an operation. Either I er someone else should be assigned to him as Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time ‘to it, The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of | success are very speculative. Tiare are a few answers to this: (1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs -- in and out of govern- ment -- ia aware that the United States is already helping the underground, The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it. EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT @OP SECRET ape WOE > HW 40955 ‘Dpoctla: 39493405 phe. cr rr Ammen pepe OT ,
HW 50955 Docid: 32423505 Page 55 EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT -Z-. -(2) Eis role should be told to only a few people at the very top with most of the contact work in carrying out hia decisions being left to his deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct | of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came through these channels. There are probably three or four people who could fulfill this criterion, 7 This still leaves a substantial danger of Identifying the Attorney General as the fellow in charge, This danger must’ be weighed against the increased _ effectiveness of an operation under his command, Richard N. Goodwin EYES ONLY FRR’ THE PRESIDENT TOP SECRET
5 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 2 November 1961 — | MEMORANDUM I believe that the operation should be organized with five staff components: | lL. Intelligence collection and evaluation 2, Guerilla and underground . _— ofa! 3, Propaganda | 7 Rise 5, Diplomatic relations 4, Economic warfare (exclusive of covert activities within Cuba) tr Each of these divisions would be headed by someone directly responsible to you. In addition you would have 4 deputy who would do the actual contact work [ between this operation and the various government agencies involved. He - would be the one identified as the source of orders and directives when direct ta : contact with the agencies was needed ——eE- ee = ell - ; i : He should be from CLA for reasons discussed below. I would act as Staff Assistant to yous My primary job would be to see that | current questions for decision were presented to you at your morning staff ; meetings. with the alternatives fully discussed. 1 would have no direct opera~ tional duties; thus keeping in the back grounds . I have talked to MacNamara and he has promised to supply 4 topflight guerilla a and underground man, as well as whatever additional. personnel we need I * think this is the best way to handle it. However, it will be necessary to use the CIA apparatus and agents for this. That is why it will be valuable. to assign a CIA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happy and Ey deeply involved at the command level. In this way we can probably avoid an internal struggle between the CIA field operatives and the Defense 4 reper command. Both the diplomatic relations and economic warfare people can come from State. I have some ideas on this and -- if you give the signal -- will discuss : it with George Ball. EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TOP SECRET Od HW 50955. ect te en TY — Doclda: 324934505 ‘page 56 To es ee
i TOP SECRET EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL . =o Bo . . omy . < One of Bob Amory's brightest young men should be assigned to intelligence . collection and evaluation. _ As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times.and work on this one =~ although we should check with Ed — Murrow and Dick Bissell. These people should have @ headquarters. It should probably be at the Pentagon . because (a) we might get better security; (b) MacNamara will be easier to work: with in terms of getting whatever staff services, secretarial personnel, etc; (c} Itis a relatively neutral place between State and CIA; (d) you could re= arrange your schedule to stop in on the way to Justice every morning ~~ perhaps for a breakfast or post-breakfast meeting. creer George Ball (and Rusk, of course), MacNamara, McCone and Bissell should. know of your participation. When they are named, the five section heads will have to know ~~ thee the initial organizing work and contact work should © be done through your Deputy and myself, If this subject is discussed tomorrow then already too many people will know, about it. : ot - i This operation should not be discussed at tomorrow's meeting. Initially only” bis 7 oT oh ETY FE ‘The first steps are {a} name the section chiefs (b) review with them all current operations in their field,- establish their authority over operations, get nec~ ett hed eh taan essary staff assistance (on as small as possible basis), and start them to work; (c} establish the physical headquarters; (d) arrange for financing ~~" ‘aan presumably coming largely from CIA. , | If this meets with your approval 1 will begin work on the above items with all , final decisions on personnel and other matters subject, of course, to your t approval. , , |: ; Richard N. Goodwin | | « carag ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY CENESAS 1ds32420508.-.Bage iS qe aC SIN AMON Ses et
EYES ONLY  Noverober 4, 1961 Tne following are some tentative recoramendations meant to gerve as & basis of discussion: I would recommend that the Cuban operation be organized | fv five componente: . ge Intelligence collection and eveluation b. Underground and guerilla c. Propaganda d, Economic warfare (other than covert activities teithin Cuba) . Ge Diglomatic relations Although these sections will make use of available agency capabilities the operational authority for each of these agpects of the operation will be in | " ” the hoods of the section leader who ta responsible to the chairman of the group. All of these activities will be cornpartmentalized as much as possible, $.@., only the chalrman will be kept completely iaformed on all aspects of the eperation. The operation should have its physical headquarters in the Department of a Defense, both for maxiroum secerity and to detach it es much as possible — ‘The first steps ares Ti and guerilla activities. r cae we mi daesoaiaies _... from identification as a CLA activity. i, Designation of section 1. chlefe; 2 A complete survey by cach section chief of current operations in his field; 3. The establishment of controk over operations by the section chief; 4. The expansion cd operations where feasible. Beb Amory should be asked to designate: ons of his beat men to centralize the intelligence collection and evaluation, — The Defense Departmect should designate the section chief for underground EYES ONLY 7 TOP SECRET : Beh 5c eit an
EYES ONLY ~20 mae WO should discuse expansion of propaganda operations with Ed Murrow | “e""" and appropriate CLA officers -~ not relating it to stepped wp operations in other fields. With these people we should select a single person te be the propaganda chief, coordinating CLA and USIA operations. Thave suggested that Tad Sgulc -- if he can be persuaded to take a leave of ab- sence -- would be a useful person to advise on this aspect of the operation. - Both economic warfare and diplomatic relations should be handled bya’ _. designee of the State Department. It ig important to keep the diplomatic — ‘ gelations aspect of this operation under some sort of control so that we ~- gon't involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing situations in the OAS, e.g. voting te send an investigating committee to Cuba when our operations are at a height and Yidel has evidence to present of U.S. participation. ; The Deputy ahould be from CLA. yu: The President epould not talk to the presse It may be that same contact@ with a few key newsmen should be made <= in the most general way. Butif the President approaches thera personally and the operation docs not succeed it ia inevitable that he will become the focus of another Cuban failure. There are two types af newsmen invoived here. There is a rather large group which . will heaxy rumors and stories of various kind, There is nothing to be done +, about them, Thera are @ few newsmen whose contacts in the Cuban comxaunity ... “= ae@ go extensive that they might be able to put together 2 coherent story. Ifo. .- any approaches are to be made it should be restricted to these; although they should never be told we are going to wage an all-out operation. In addition, sa rauch contact and operational work as possibile should be done outside the Miami area. Lhe | , Our next step should be to desigm te section chiefs, eatablish their authority and have them make 4 complete survey of pessent operations. Thia would in- clude a survey of current covertioperations and capacities here and in Miami {and anywhere else they are going on), as the first task of the Defense Depart~- ment desigace with CLA assistance. The physical headquarters should be established. - Although the Attorney General should maintain a general operational super - vision, it is probably unwise for him to be the formal chairman of the group oa because the risk of identification is fairly highe = oe a e Sy eee oe . TOP SECRET EYES ONLY i Bo . Per a Ne peg ea Ee toe ELEN PE te ag tae el% 50955 DopeRADBARAbG a Pagans teh Lee Ae af Pr
a EVES CNLY - =}: * coor lf such identification is made, and the operation is not successful, ane / gther Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard this as fairly remote in this type of operation kat the danger can be de- creased if the operation is formally headed by someone who is not ao clearly acting at the direct behest of the President. The Attorney General ' can give assistance and maintain general supervision on behalf of the President, .:. Working with the Chairman alone -< ° rather than extending his contacta ta ine a - clude all the operation chiefa. i Boo . TOP SECRET : EYES ONLY | i He aaeeutse: Spatitas Seanson. Bee BO NT
Bob «« | If you approve this tie is based on a brief memo from General Lansdale) 1 will send it on its way. In addition you thould have a meeting -- as, soon ae possible <<. with Lansdale and the senior representatives of State, Defense and CIA. if you want to cali mo on this after . you have read the memo I will suggest &@ procedure for getting | them together, " Richard N. Goodwin i TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY ony wet 2 ate ol HW: BOOKS : Doel: 304235R5.. Page. 64 ~
HW ‘50955 MELIONANDUM. TOr The Secretary of State The Secretaay of Defense The Divectar of CIA The Attseney Oeneral General Taylor General Lensdaie | . Richard Goodwin November 22, 1961 The followicg ta a eurmmary of the major decisions which have been mare iu | regard te the Cab Operation. | i, We will go ahead with the discsuseed preject to s help { Subs overthrow the come muniet regime and establish a free Guba. All evallable escets will he directed to this end as a matter of urgent national prlarity, 20 ‘The program will be conducted undies, the 3. The program will be reviewed in two weoke in order to determize whether. geoeral guidance ef th Attorsey re a General, with General Lanedale os hia cates af eperations. . General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, | 4. Tre NSC 5412 group will be kept indarmed ef activitica. . , & The Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intellie = 8 == — gence Agency will appoint sentew officers of theiy department as personel topre- 7 sentatives to acsies the chief of operations ae required, These senior officers should be able to exercise ~~ either themcelves or through the Secretaries aad . Director «+ effective operational control aver all aspects of thelr Department’s = r operations dealing with Cabs 6 Kaowledge of the existence of thia oppration should be restricted to the recipients: of thia memorandum, members of the $412 qvoup, ond the repregentatives eppointed — | by the Secretariva and the Director. Any Gurther discemination of thia hnowledge will be only with the authority of the Secretaries of State or Defense, the Attozpey Generel, av the Chief of Cperetionss SOP SECRE Pee EYES ONLY sb Dovid: 304035: Page. ‘62 oh
10 August 1962 Cenera] Taylor, Mr, Bundy have Yoas. O a ree £, 8 eH Oye bee MAS 4%} “Lf NONGOOS fF 10 Auguste 1962 (Augmented) on Rusk, Mr. Johhson, Mr, Martin, Mr, Goodwin, SUBJECT. Minutes of Meeting of Specia] Croup Operation HONCOOSE | PRESENT: State: Mr, Mr, Uurwitch White House: Defense/jcg. tlic, HoNama y CMNilzer | Genera] Lansda CIA: Mp. MeCone, vr Harvey USTA: Mr, Murrow, Mp. Ll, Ne ‘eCone said thae had Not been COnLainad 4S such Mr, NeCone Said thar he believes we W1LL be Slronger ln a Year or L£WO than ie is Now; he added hig. pe song] °PLnton thay the Soviets wighe fONSidury “Stablishing 40 MRM base jn Cuba, He noted that these ¢ Sicurred ip by the Loard of Nationg Papers, lie Chen SUMMA rized POtrass Pay G L, now Comp leteag . ; ae eg. | . - Nr. Rusk SUSvestad Cha Possibility. thay in the Cvent of the U.S, eagle Wish to Change its POSLure Coward Cuba rhaps COP aria, in dirvee FClaliaviog a s I VO y ‘ maeckade of Lertin, os WSKESLEd “tiag be Closely Meshed, tr, Mchamera Wags Chace he did noe believe limited . . . | SCicute ay Mediate Pesponse Lo a Berlin blod! . harrassment Of Soviet facilities woul 3. . : Page 6 5 Docld:32423505 5 HW 509 Wilson Estimates "as thae tho Novices Wil] noe let the Cas Pegine fail because OL its Own Aherent) weatmescag, al Mr, Cilpatric, Genera] 1 le | Sdinse Sevier Shipping , ON ingency PLaag Should PHO-CRTY OF - ME WH OTS Hauer a TT eeemges e
B... a. MONGOOSE program. Hr. McNamara que SA 4, Nr. Rust emphasized theld create a split between Castro and Old-line Comnunists, esirability of attempting to lle pointed Out that such a splic would be bound to be beneficial to U.S, interests no matter which way thelb alance of power swung. In this General connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext for U.S, military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen, However, shoul develop to the extent for example It the. Havana Government, then the U.S to such provincial officials. In response to the above}, the moment the previously-cited fru -Old-line Communists have been resol issue currently exists. There has tcriporary rapprochement between Pid this of course may be temporary. success in recruiting Cuban ofFficia and that there have been some defec 5. ° The discussion then turne d reasonably viable resistance hat some provinces might oppose » might desire to give Support Mr. McCone pointed out’ that at ctions between Castro and the ved in Castro's favor, and no additionally been at least a el and Moscow. He indicated thae ¢ said that ‘there has been some ls abroad to work for the U.S., tions. d to the objectives of the the building up of agent assets wit hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world gestion by Ceneral Taylor that we 5 over-all objective from one of over of causing its visible failure, In this context Mr. MeCon plan (called hereafter the "CIA var stioned whether we cannot séparate hin Cuba fron actions that would Opinion. This led to the suge hould consider changing the throwing the Castro regime to one @ then- presented ‘an alternate tant’) to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he paid had been Prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepp in the overthrow of Castro. He emp Should not be undertaken unless the attributability for the necessary a ed-up B would not in fact result hasized that the stepped-up plana U.S. is prepared to accept ctions, including the eventual 2 “use of U.S, tiilitary force. Mr, MecCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a llungary-type blood bath if unsupported, would also be a high noise level ‘in would be created which would requir Not only would|the U.S, be blamed, but there the press and eventually a situation eyintervention, On the other hand, the CIA lvariant how proposed would, in Mr... MeCone's view, avoid all of the invite an uprising. . Again he repea se dangers because it would not ted his view that the U.S, might, however, face ‘a stronger Cuba in the Future, HW 50955 Docld: 32423505 Page 64 PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 65 - 3 - 6. fhe principal members|of£ the Special Group felt, after sone discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next. Thursday's meeting of the special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions undér this plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S. 7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA.’ He said that jthe other Chiefs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself docs. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure -to take the chanee of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view. , 8. tr, Bundy suggested that. a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly "disengaged'' basis; in other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they. could generate on their own, . 9, Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should. be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive. 10, Action to be taken: CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wesnesday, August 15th. Thomas A.. Parrott ce: General Lansd if eter. 4 la ude ene Agenda for Meeting Attachment puuPERTY OF rue wa Te HOUSE Qh FIC i }
nv 50955. fore even ue CECHEIOMUFUAN | FECIAL HARNDL ING fucetreceneD ose OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTCN 25, D.C. . | | 13 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE < LON WILSON, USIA ‘From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sek Subject: Alternate Course B In compliance with the desires and @uidance expressed in the j 10 August policy-meeting on Operation iionvoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Overational Plan (Aeduced Lifort)’ will be used as the starting basis. Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a liyt of irmplementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headinns of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Paychological, Faramilitary, and Military. f We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1460 hours, Tuesday, 14 Aurust, to complete the outline paper for submigsion. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assiqned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of draits. Papers required from eacn oF you lor the Luesday meeting: ~ Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, - ; . “4, Economic (sabotaze, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paver. Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. :lso, any Suge estions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. Eat anata ef: a eran, GUS — 6 r PCLT ED : - . : eewveme ed: Retin atid ACAD FOP SEC P-Or Orn aes meres BPG This document cantains 7 oopaute aod ves tte a Shiba 1S r pee ian eigen Ere tern « seme cae 3 ee a a SR CAB ae E+ RON HE co mner oxen b Copy No. ep - Vice ; cee EY ; rae aan aad —— * i _ : cya, . ~ “ . Qa. Dongtd: 32423505 Page 66 be. _ EXCLUDE ‘D FROW Acmnosente
ae SO TOP SECHEI-NOFORN™ * (SPECIAL HANDLING _ Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper. 2 arts HW 50955 Bocld:324743505 Page 67
HW 450955 SUBJECT BDocld: 32423505 Page 66 : mo oO 14 August 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) ee Operation MONGOOSE 1. Action, None, This memorandum is for your information, 2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 Anyust 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date. from General Lansdale, Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised froin which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. ‘hese four words were "jncluding. liquidation of leaders," 3, ‘he questi ibn of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the mecting of the Special Group (Auginented) in Secretary Rusk's orfice on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer toa comment by Mr. Fd Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. Itook careful notes on the cominents at this mecting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not})expecting any. written cominents or study on this point, 4, Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Tansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to rank Hand the | inadmissibility, and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in sucha document, I advised Frank Mand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recominend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question froin all copies of this mernoranduin, in- cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USTA. Shortly thereafter, Tansdale called back and left the rnessage that he agre ced and. that, he had done so, | | ei Paw preiay an I . ar -t 3 ah aye | ee fe oe : \; ! iN : uns ” SAAN
HY R0O55 5, or your. infgxmation also, the attached memor andu view of the possibility th a Attachrnent . Memo fxr Gen Lans Docld: 327423505 Page 69 soak ’ : ‘ ies ’ . %, pes ro a Geb ttention, I infor mally bric a , e . “ 1 2 - van . eo, ae ‘ , . Larrea dere S| Ys \ vo j eons. . in your absence and since da been distributed and in n already ha rom Director! 8 at this right corne to th fod: Walt elder on the va WIL! LIAM. LK. oA RVIEY *. Chief, Ta: sk Force W dale did 13 Aug 62. a #e am ook ee py cera yd . r\Pts a va \ i ; Yo. rt 230 =P! . “au Bas ew “£8 a. oS ea:
a : INJERV JEW AND MEETING SUMMARY ane l | ; mS NS NY 1 Ae ie INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN. Sul Wy ii, he. o Date: May 27, 1975 Time: 10: 00 a.m. Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. ‘NW © Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron,. Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America Submitted by: “Gregory F. Treverton | ‘ During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant |Secretary of State for Inter-American 1 Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama crisis. At that time, however, ; he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late i in 1965. 1. Assassinations: t In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as-~ sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was ‘established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, HW 50955 held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro,|' 1 4 someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant Doclda: 327473505 Page 70 ; (
INTERV [EW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 2 of 6 FILE: "Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, | Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown tha Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba | Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but- tress his position in Latin America. | During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and, 1967. Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in- volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominica Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo. was about to be as- -sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern- ment was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti- Trujillo forces. Prior to the ssassination, he had transferred some ' ; weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 7i | | Ss
1 Smee m. INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY — Page i the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He, doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by ithe Special Group. | | Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort or. another as within his mission in supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA. 2. CIA Activities in Brazil: | Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. ‘In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congres- sional elections.On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome HW 50955 to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know. ‘ DoclTa: 324273505 Page 72. i
INTERV{EW AND MEETING SUMMARY . Page 4 of 6 FILE: 3. CIA Activities in Chile: The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile,.and the U.S. switched its support from the conserva- tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat ta on meetings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were genera statements, policy papers, not. descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. .In line with the policy, support was given to left democrati political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, ‘however, the assertion that the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washing ton since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem so. 4. Changes during the Johnson! Administration: ‘Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy-- Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American policy, although the President. did become active in the two crises-~ Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States’ policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 73 ?
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY 7 Page 5 of ¢ for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated" in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he | became President. 5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency: When. asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no 1 . t reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was some- thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police throug AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations ‘were considered by the Special !Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. “Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla. movements that began had little indigenous support. HW 50955 DoclId:32423505 Page 74
HW 50955 Daocld:32423505 Page 75 | INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page _ 6 In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good- win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on occasion, specific, indicating. groups to be supported and the like. Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin ' 1 America. 6. Goodwin Suggestions: : . Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to- day operations. “What is required is an active Congressional committee, on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional checks are required. With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned Lo that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub- director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szulc. In response to a ; a ; . question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of that. ' ' ‘
aint Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL _ $10 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 32423505 Page 76 1OP SECRET the United States. Several months later, I presume because of that trip and several other contacts I maintain with representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations and the Organization of American States, beacause of my personal friendship with a number of people at the White House and i Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Donnegan‘and others, in a conversation with Mr. Goodwin it was suggested that I come and see the Attorney General. I was invited to lunch with Mr. Kennedy at the Justic Department. We discussed in considerable length the situation in Cuba following tha invasion, the pros and cons of some different possible actions by the United States government in that context. At the end of this conversation, the Attorney General asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his brother. the President. Issaid I would of course be pleased i i. to do so. The following day I received a call from the White House indicating that the President would like for me to come in at 11:00 o'clock in the morning on that day in November, which I -did. And I was received by the President in the company of Mr. Goodwin in the Oval Office for a conversation which lasted, if.memory serves, in axcass of an hour and a half, in which the 7 | | | President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning my conversations with Premier Castro, a general review of the TOP SECRET
fu 2. rt Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ll 212 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 el ad 235 24 4106 First Street, S.E., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003 25 HY 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 7? 130 20 - TOP SECRET Situation in Cuba, you know, what the United States shou! could do, might do in terms of either in a hostile way o establishing some kind of: a dialogue, most relevant of w i a } I suppose was that at one. point the President rather une | , turned to me and: said what would you say, what would you if. I.decided to authorize! the assssination of Premier Ca (26 ‘id do, roin hich xpected y think, stro? | Let me add for the record that the precise wording appears’ in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time. I am now paraphrasing from memory. This was a rather -- ° ot Mr. Aaron. “Let me read this into the. record. “We chatted for a while about Cuba, and then Kennedy ‘leaned forward |in his rocking chair and hurled ‘ question: at me : | “if ‘I ordered Castro ‘to ne passaseanakes™ Mr.- Szulc. ‘What would .you think' i 1 i ‘ I was taken aback and so indicated . to the Preside) Othe best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a t practical matter I thought this would not make all that much 1 a) ' difference even if he were because I thought that by then the Cuban structure had been established to a sufficient degree i. t where the murder ‘and disappearance of Fidel Castro would necessarily mean‘the collapse of the governing system, were-the purpose of the United States government. In the second place, it was more important to me, I) inot | if this | | & said to the President, that my personal feeling was that the United States government should not be party to- murders and political | assasSinations at which point the President leaned back and TOP SECRET | 6 f '
soe POR SECRET 2 3 l smiled and said, ell I was. testing you. I agree with you 5 2 completely. : A 3 And then he went on for a few minutes. to make the point 3 4 || how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United State 5 for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having 6 recourse to assassination in foreign policy. Again, the 9 precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article 8 and again I'm paraphrasing from memory now. | | 9 And the President added in this context that the ‘reason I. 10 have raised it with you, or words to this effect, is because ll I am under very, very strong or powerful pressure from certain ; y. || People, whom he did not identify, to authorize an operation os 13 resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think 14 we talked about this for few more minutes, and r think I 15 | Yepeated the points I made originally and the President said 16 he felt very strongly that same way and the fact he was testing 1 me or trying to see what rly response as a reporter or as a ‘Le citizen would be. | | . 19 I might: add that several days ago Mr. Goodwin and I had : 20 the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective ) ; | ; 97 recollections of it, and Mr. Goodwin's recollection is exactly : . 29 the same as mine. We discussed this at some length, this z. oe a 93 being last week, and the subject being relevant to the current C 5 24 flow of news and Mr. Goodwin made the point to me, obviously if 25 '.President Kennedy were planning to authorize the assassination TOP SECRET - HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 78 ” ;
amt Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 il - le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24. 20 Docld: 32423505 28 of Castro, he would not likely: be discussing it with you in the full knowledge ‘of a reporter and if Castro were killed | or an attempt to kill him professional duty to rush conversation, even though would surface you would have the to your typewriter. and report on ‘this it was on @ personal basis. And _Mr., Goodwin's judqment, and in which I concur, was that presumably the President would not have floated this issue ' with me, and this is really responsive to my own effort to re-evaluate after the passaqe of time the President's sincerity in disclaiming any desire Lo My impression at tha to do so. time’ and today fourteen years later sincere and serious in affirming his is that the President was Mr. with Mr. Goodwin? Mr. Szulc. .The most Mr. Aaron. .YesS, the Mr. June of this year. Mr. Aaron. May I re paragraph from your artic smiled, and said that he. under great pressure from community (whom he did no that he himself violently _ TOP SECRET Page 79 Aaron. Let me a: revulsion to such an idea! of assassination. | sk you, when was your conversation recent ona? one you just mentioned. Szulec. Last Friday which would have been the 6th of { ad. into the record ‘the following le. “Kennedy leaned back in his chair had been testing me because he was advisers in the Intelligence it name) to have Castro killed, but ' | opposed it on the grounds that for
HW.5095 - GOODWIN] (TRUJILLO) The papers produced by Mr. Goodwin on 7/16/75 contained some Trujillo-related material. Certain documents were selected from this material and are pro- duced herein under Tabs Sand T. All of the attached Trujillo-related documents have been produced before the Committee, and Mr. Goodwin has been questioned concern- ing them. They are attached again herein for possible use in connection with questions concerning handwritten notations appearing on the documents. TAB S. May 13, 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin ; re CIA Covert Activities in the Dominican epublic Page 2 of this document contains, on the Original ribbon copy, a pencilled-in circle. Goodwin stated on/7/16/75 that this circle was placed on the original copy of the memorandum by himjand indicates that the _ encircled material (a report of the passage of revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin as both significant and new to him. Further, the word "neutralize" is underscored in pencil. on the original copy of the memorandum. Goodwin might be questioned concerning the Significance of this underscore. TAB T. - Various drafts, together with the ——“oTiginal of the 5/29/61 cable from the State Department to Dearborn are attached herein. Goodwin stated on/7/16/75 that the handwriting on pages numbered /237, 238, 239, and 240 is his handwriting. The handwriting on pages 233, 234, and 235, a subsequent draft of the same proposed cable is not Goodwin's. 7 Goodwin suggested this handwriting may be that of President Kennedy. “Docld:32493505 ‘Page 80.0  - wf ge OO geet
4 elu. : | 4 ; i ae 13 May 1961 : MEMORANDUM: - ef SUBJECT : CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic Attached is the special briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed | against the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin of ; i. the White House. ‘| | | | aba ar php HW 50955 Docid:32493505 Page 8i
It. - = PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION FOR |THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BACKGROUND - A. On 29 December 1960 the special Group approved a plan of covert action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which involved provision for increased propaganda directed against Trujillo, and the financial support of selected exiled groups. Additionally this ‘authority included authorization for.CIA to make available to selected exile groups communications end equipment support necessary for them to develop a capability to 7 undertake the infiltration of personnel and equipment into the Dominican Republic. Since none of the exiled groups had an existing underground organization within the area, it was the Special Group's concept that this delivery capability could be eventually used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with _ whom the Agency and the. Consulate are currently in contact. B. On le January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make available to Dominican dissidents a Limited supply of small arms and other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop the capability to receive’ these naterials and that the materials be in- troduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves. CURRENT COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS | A. In late January 1962, CIA advised selected internal opposition leaders that we were > prepared to make available to them limited supplies of arms, communications, panipment, ‘and sabotage materials which they had repeatedly requested provided they developed a capability to receive 4 : pyre + AML ‘SECRET
or. C Ss na —* r} a aa a 3 Ps a ve teh pet ee ok on it via air drops’ or sea infiltration.’ To date the internal opposition has not been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to - nominate training candidates for code; radio operators or saboteurs. ‘Trujillo's security services, the understandable- fear that prevails ; me, ! throughout the Republic. of being caught or suspected of anti “Trujitde_ e activities,-and the fact thet the organized internal opposition ‘apparently ~ consists of only a few indiviadals with no real underground structure. a a cuy/ has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent equests from the internal: opposition leaders for personal defense | | + This turn of events is primarily aue to the comprehensive nature of , | } i : i weapons attendant ‘to their. projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, Coenen, ‘pree (3) 38 Cal revolvers! and three '(3) carbines with accompanying ET Tg ms aman ven have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have: repeatedly. requested | ladditdional armed support. B. CIA has established working’ ‘relationships with selected exile” groups. These relationships have taken into account that{ nn seve gerne sree ate Fe lhas in effect designated as his emissary and representative to work with poninican exile groups. Through Jand with the knowledge of CIA is providing financial support and technical guidance to the following activities: | (1) The developnent of a Dominican ‘exile council in San Jose, Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations, HW 50955 “Poctd: 32423505 “Page 83°" 7
~ a representative designated vyf | and chaired by The council had its first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961. ne eee rr en oe a et Subject to cTA'ts review of the council's proposed program and with the r TA has indicated: t ¥ concurrence of andl that it is prepared: to support, the council's program in the amount of $15,000 & month. It ia[____}anitesd concept that the a4 against Trujillo, eouncil will undertake propaganda activities directe process administrative skills, and train selected Dominicans in , democratic and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of res- ponsidt ity in any successor government . hes also proposed that an exile paramilitary, force be trained, put CIA has discouraged this activity to date since neither PF ri have indicated & clear plan for its eventual use- Tt is CIA! s judgment that the exile groups represented onl eonneth have Little if any popular sup- port among the internal dissidents. However one of the chief advantages that can and is being gained by support of the council is the number of credits that this gives to the United states Government in its dealings vf. atilizing them in other operations. ee ne been adamant that no action be taken against Castro until Trujillo is disposed of. ‘This support has served to neutralize his — attitude on that point since, it anounts, to a guarantee] ~ lof the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo. Likewise it serves to solidity the attitudes of aissident exiled Dominicens so that they are 4 not anti-U. §. and will make them more approachable and amenable to oop ar an ne Sena ai . Pee _ ~ a | cenit cos cee eden eth neon ae ra ve a ‘ vee = ae ined # . pe ane Lo 4 (2) The conduct U.S. Government objectives once prujillo 4s overthrown. 7 a 7 ~ EYES sit | _ SECRET HY 40955 _Docid:3
of radio propaganda from Ponce, Puerto Rico, which is under the direction oe | pf Vanguardia Revolucionaria Domini- . cana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as the voice of the | organization. (3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht so as to give it the capability to deliver small quantities of arms or _Personnel into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability , has not been ‘utilized to, date. Tt is contemplated that both shel propaganda program and ‘this Limited boat capability W will be absorbed by the exile council now being formed | support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing 4 para-military capability in Venezuela. ij D. CIA has recently re-located from 4 Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico, is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence of the internal opposition. He isicurrently working with the Puerto Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to pro- vide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes and selected administrative skills. ‘Through| fan a small group of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition, | CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the in- ot ternal opposition which will supplement those currently in being: through EYES ONLY “SECRET Minho ! HW 50955
IIr. IV. our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. E. CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets through- out the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo. | COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA iS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED A. -Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf".at our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. However, this program has not been ini- tiated due to the internal .opposition's failure to provide individuals | who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican Republic and willing to run . the risk of having the radio equipment in. their possession. ' B. Train selected nembers of the opposition in sabotage and under- ground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition has “provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive explosive materials through clandestine channels. POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION | A. CIA has 4 supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and 6 small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons to the internal opposition; for their use in personal defense attendant ' to their projected efforts’ to remove ‘Trujillo can be developed by the 4] : if: ' Station. B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic, i, ; in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime. YES QALY SECRET
C. While to date the internal opposition has developed no cepability to receive arms or sabotage materials by either air or sea delivery, CIA : could initiate operations to cache jeuch supplies off the coast of the Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when they develop such a capability. | D. Initiate the training of pera-militery cadres. CIA has, been . reluctant to recommend the initiation of such training since current information indicates thet any invelsion of the Republic unless massively supported by overt action would be impractical. _- autre the | re } HW. Suo8 4 > "padTd rae sGas Pages BH OCC" eas
ae i ~ ‘ L LOC LA RO we OE re el Firm be rome ee + "¢ : THE write i 4 USE © OFFICE ( newene 10L2 che Ky yy Hor wrt an . ° it Oe ene pea ue Oey : . ~ ' SECRET mThis document consists of 2 pages : Copy ho. of 9 copies; Sezies me EOR DEARBORN FRCM! DEPARTMENT i. President has now approved contingency plans sonewhat revised subsequen: 4 your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will resolve uncertainties reflected ref but your comments and requests for any necessary a . clarification will be welcomed. 2. Department appreciates valuable work performed’ by Amb. Farland and your- seif and) ]in developing pro-US attitude among dissident clements. Viould hove this could be retained and strengthened but only if ata cost acceptable fron oe standpeint US national interest. If price tagX for friendsnio or dissicents, whose action capabilities and realistic proszects thus far remain unknown quant: ) . places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stances «. al involves risxs which in our considered judgment sneuld not be accepted, sccl sur you will agree we should stand firm. 3. While fully congaizant unique circumstances within Ogominican kepubi: which precluded normall operation, Department is none theless decpiay conccras: by degree to wiih covert setivities this case have been rorecd to cevicte sron normal cover end cut-out safeguarus with xexnfix result ISG too openly idenvifie , . with what should be clandestine activities 4, Running through entire Kigt dilemma has becn conflict between two objec '(1) Teo be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to cerive ere among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America; (2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican fot Republic and. even more so from any political assassination which migns occur. oer ee HW 50955 DBocld:32423505 Page 86 .
PROPERTY OF : (HE WHITE ROUSE OFFiCt ee siete ne naire tae . ! i. { - In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily: a override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted opposition leaders at this x time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver copy to them. 5, In May 19 meeting here with, Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman «soush disabuse -them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be party to any political ‘assassination, At same time assured them this sovernment’ continuing sympathy for legitinate aspirations Dominic an pecple achieve represent ee ‘tive government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens. 6. In response your comment ‘re covert activitics program you should be aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made conte:. ~ upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to ai sessociate USG. “thhold further action and to =EzXx extent onan nO ee Z, In light foregoing suggest you Wi : ' 4 ; feasible substantave conversations with dissidents pending receipt documents now t | ! to be pouched, | i : END OF MESSAGE it & i t : ARA:PJdewine: jsr f2uft) et ' { 7 4 a 3 i 5 HW 509 5 Docld: 32473505 Page 89 ,
| * ' SECEET sl THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON May 26, 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. HeGeorse Bundy ; The White Hovse 5 . Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Snecial Group, I am forwarding you a draft telecram which we would like to send to Heniy Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplement.iny the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans. The text of this draft telegram has been snown to the Acency and agreed to by them. I am also forwarding copies of the exchange with Dearborn leadine up to the present draft telegram to hime I know it will. be. aifficult for the President to find time before he leaves to have a look at this but, in view of the situ- ation in the Deminican Republic, I feel that he should approve it. personally so as to be sure that it is consistent with his views as stated in the HSC Record of Actions for May 5. Chester Bowles Attachments: oe . Tab A ~ Proposed outroing | telegran r Tab B = Previous exchange | of telegrams . | : a { |
Neneh coe SECRET PROPOSED TELEGRAM to US Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT ‘ i 1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subse=- quent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope -this will resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of May 21 but your comments and requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed. 2. Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb, Farland and your= self and in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from standpoint US national interest. If price tag for friendship of. dissidents, - whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown quantity, places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted, feel sure you will agree we should stand firm, ; - bs im 3. While fully cognizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republic he which precluded normal] operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identified with what should be clandestine activities, 4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objectives: (1) To be so. associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal clements throughout Latin America; (2) To disassociate US. from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur. SECRET . 1 a ES, aed rg ee! HW SOT54° “Decl
SECRET -~2-. In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter. For. this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted op- position leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras Se Fi Department's telegram of May 17 fulfilled, you may advise trusted opposition leaders that you assume any friendly group seeking to establish authority after overthrow of Trujillo would promptly declare itself provisional government and request armed assistance from OAS, US, Venezuela and perhaps other governments. ! If reply affirmative, you may advise them orally lines you think such request a 4ee ey ay Should take. Se In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sought disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be party to any political assassination. At same time assured them this government's continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represen- tative government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens. “6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made con- tingent upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG. 7. j%&In light foregoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substan= tive conversations with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents now to be pouched, END OF MESSAGE _ SECRET TTF & ERR rh a er ce EES oP aah nat f ey eames th Ny cm tpg go We Foes weeidsaa FR si5.- Page D
eu: ae )) i . wee, oVyywa st HW 50955 — os, TOP SEC TOP SEC ! | FOR DEARZORN FROM STATE 1. méjor exception: cussed during your stay here with one to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican di groups. 2, We consider it essential that you continue to strengthen pro-U.s. sentiment among dissident groups. work along “his Line has been invaluable. However, we 3 rot run risk of. U.5. associarion with political assagi 4 VS. cata pont dbA Wy Adaavets Perley Cone bk, walsh, Oe eres Tc a is overr= ding and must preveil in 4 This last p+ -inciple there is much you can do .e * a, ranework of policy; situation. mowever, ~ Lr interests within ~ o the. measures in wnich you are wow engaged. Specific tions follow. na 3. of U.S. Continue to inform dissident elements 7 aes for thar position, In case of Gpcduationuny over Cnror qrujitlo--wheeher oF, not inkerctes vy pro- U.S. pro-U.s. group should promptly * itself as reasonable and plausibdle proves ional goverhim lt should inmediately declare itself such from U.Se3 Venezucla, Colombia and OAS. “s . T ©) vp S: er, “0 WT. Decid: 32493505 “Page 93 “ye EMC LUGE, we wane every effort to cons: ana request a if advance discus THE While HOUSe OFFICE President has now approved contingency plans dis- You are no LSS Zdene c WOrK Your, ao Woe 2 - ratior ye ren cope y Que ctlel to precect Vic. st Go. - OL groupr7 tee peuec counen esgasvtceance SLOnS. - ee woe teat s wo? fn . aye” Cael
a ; = a LHC RE | . a TOP S1.CRET eHOPLELY. OF | rue WHILE HOUSE OFFICE “show that dissidents are favorable to this procedure discuss é . | ‘the specific ‘content of such a request and procedures for handling it. - AL1 possible preparations should be made short of actual formulation in writing of a |eigted/request in advance of the event. Underlying this procedure ig the policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist — type takeover sn the Dominican Republic even 4£ we must intervene without 4 request. This last possibility should not be discussed | with the dissidents. 4. Reference to multilateral action in record of actions pase ‘means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral; (® “and that jn the case of direct sntervention it would ce pre- at ferable for forces to be multilateral. Ho broader saterprecation ib is justified. “ALL other U.S. actions--whether propaganda OF ) covert activities--will be continued on 4 bilateral basis. 5. Covert activities are, as you know, Very small. due CO jnability of dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies which will effectively disassociate U. S., and failure to provide candidates for training as radio operators OF saboteurs. Our offer to help along these 1ines--provided chey develop capacity 7 and effective cover--remains Opens However, you must request ie NS + . . . ‘ TOP SECRET . ZY beets . . . a oe NT HW 50955 | “pocla: 32493505 Page 94
: TOL SECRET PROPERLY OF 3 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ‘ \eue/ : and receive further specific instructions for any specific covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer. 7, arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transier mey be unsafe. In actual fact we feel that rhe transfer of arms would serve very little 4 purpose and expose the United States to great danger of [eleiease «- greeter Ce NG . , disclosure of participacion =) assassination attempt. The basic | policy is to continue to hold open offer of covert help, while carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested. This is feasible because, in actual fact, the covert helo is a o very slight except for verbal encouragement and exchange of © | ; . 7 information. 6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo propagenda campaign ts _ and other external pressures. 7. “FYI, in event overthrow of Trujillo milicary foxces will” ae ran bee, be dispatched inmediately to fprosinvesian] positions. On receipt of request from provisional governne ent, and your concurrence, ak La gvigareed DG cep ee th Lh, . -o we vibbsepem TE no request is received and there appears be any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made “ in Washington wine ther to intervene regardless. This makes ic te imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FY! wom, ™~, : . eo . TOP SECRET HW 50955. Doecld:32423505 .Page-95-
, . LTO. SRUREL VE WED Ue 0 : . THE WHITC RUUSE OFFICE 8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents in- Ce forming them of U.S. request. If they are favorable to this procedure take all possible measures to prepare for the immediate transmittal of such a request short of the actual preparation of a written document for advance transfer to you. TOP SECRET position and the necessity for an immediate
an . ra teen ar on ee _7 woo ee —-——— THe Wwe AGT £ OF FICE oo Bre oom 1. President has nce approved contingency alanz discussed during y-ur stay here with one scm major excentions You are nov to request a pre-s igned re- quest fer help fren Dominican dissident groups. , ree 2, We consider it essential that you continue to work to sivtrgtnen prcel. Se : . Paved te ' sentiment among dissident crouns, Your work along this Line had veen incnumtiscwade, 7 ke RG Stee cass saa oO i However, we 346° must not sidonanisxe permit ane danger of disclosing /\.S. association : with politica> asodination jue tatervention in the dominican Repub, This last princisle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situatiom However, there is = . | | mach you can do to protect U.5. interests within this fre emework of policy: including ‘ \ N j most of the measures in which you aré Tow engacede Specific instructions follows cL 3. detox Conitane to inform “dissident elements of U.5. support fcr wheir position, /In cas? of assassingtion or overthrow ope Prujitiow-uhecher or not initiated by pre- U.S. gre oupe-the gr. cup “should seven hestssitis0 mane az immediate mids request for assistance fron U.Se, Venezuela, Colorbia and the o wha Ben WBiE requess | - - eo ogett it tae wee BVees will be responded to favorably oy the TatEol siates, ces GaP Uecker’ selye3 the provisional fovernment and request help whether or not they actually Pe gets es wate we t- . ! are able to agsune power. If are’ “tauareble to this procedure rouiscdt | Meme me care - eee wok” as
a _ ee rag WHITE HOUSE OFFICE en Decl rom Sire nce approved contingency plans discussed during 1. Presicent has =o stay here with ‘one wxce major excentions You are nov to request a pre-Sigte- . — quest fcr help from Dominican diss+ ident ‘groups. . | ae “9, We consider it essential that you contimc to work to syne ae! 1 ‘ : . Lr? ° i sentiment anong dissident EPIUNS four work along his Tine had peen ue © . mo, . rer 2 x a m, s o . However, We greo mst not Slyedaop pert save danger of disclosing’ CE. Be e with politica : asséinati jun txtaventon ine sorcen ans Tis * - princinle 4g overriding and must prevail in dovotful situation, “owevers i mich you can do ta protect U.S interests within this pramenerk of nore most of tne measures in xhick you ar® ner Cowart - . : : . nethe™ .sy 107 of qrus> ' od cnrow comet) oot overt . . snout ? ‘ pee SEITE couP £ase*" y.s- ® spe se ° pre ne Pr? . and piavs* rea bY P sere 2° preett eae eeyte * rare res® | eort © onst™ cely gec*® effort + ned + ond: et gt . jg YE e every te grovl? 7, rome O at Co- al cove met ; onezve , . oo" . Jovi bone © ace £FO™ Very ee - og hote™ 4 Lavorabie to this procedure rekennhak 3 ceques® e , i uch an : . . oes : ' § , ye ° i ; . y % e . . ent a . toe — ‘ é , e ‘ . . ‘ ‘ * r ’ okey . ° ys . : ee . oe ; reece fe tem felt ween ‘ > ~ et Tae eye ty ete + a HW St 5 “Poca: 32423505 Page 98 ee erent cyte
~ - re Ce | joererreo . CO , . . ot ; | ROUTINE Zope PAGE FOUR. ouT 60694 a , Tid (OPL) TOP SECRET INFO ceo a3 TO YOU. | END OF HESSAGE Se , ire , officer co nme to State in which he asked what ne could give dissidents, if he could t document recuest \..°./0:S assistance clarification of -ainst Ti JiLLC should be WH/Coment: Ref was nessa c fron CIA/ . . - guidance and encouragernent provide dissidents with draf $n event Thi JL LLO overtarown, and asked President's state:ent that any action a multilateral. | . ” om ww co : erent ANOTH _ “S$ COMMENT: “DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION. ae . 7 So —_ i aa, . . Nees 4 oe, ig Eee F t oO hey ° awe, = o/ai/3 C/eHDe © Sv , an COORDINATING OFFICERS - AUTHENTICATING OFFICER - RELEASING OFFICER. 7 = REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. "Copy No. om a ° se. rs 7 . hg, where or a “ nee 2t r om a ee nar EL te ee eT eomrer ne ea r aed fete gies Ye SMe gne oe wih yeee Oe ath aethe te ete tos ey rns . LATIN FEC aN we ee ityece Tar Ate Mag Lye roe gtk fey ony ny 80855 “nectars9ao3505"" Page 104°" ONE get PEE abot ae Ny