198-10007-10033 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER: RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK Assassination System Date: Identification Form co Agency Information ARMY 198-10007-10035 [3000EI Document Information ARMY WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH WILLIAM B. ROSSEN JUWTFA AFTER ACTION REPORT 12/27/1962 18 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS - MILITARY EVALUATION PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Yop Secret . IB Redact 04/09/1998 Memo from Yarborough to Rossen re: military evaluation of Cuban missile crisis. NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION DAT PK Reviews 439526 ant of the Army EO pectassity tI Exclude “= Exempt PUTIN en Review Date £ By NO STATE OBJECTION TOD ASSIFICATIQN By SYS on WW50955 Docld:32424026 Page 1 RES CONCURRENCE OF 6/24/201
mame: . ” ATES ke HW 50955 COMJUWIFA ¢8 | | 18 December 1962 Nosaeree nF: ” an pra 5 Or 1962 by aieection of | ler. “the Joint Chiefs of Steff. Maser General (then Brig Gen) Willfen P. Government. ae - FASE FORCE, ATLANTIC ‘ Port Brags, North Carolina i, The purpose of thie report is to document activities of Joint Uncon- 7 ventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic (JUWEFA) during the CUBAN operations s from 25 October 1962 through 1 December 1962. ;  JUWEEA was: activated at Yort Bragg, North Carolina on 25 October. ae dew in Chief, Atlentic with the approval of . : 1 et aE ar eo ae Yarborough, Comeanding General, US Army Special Warfare Conter was designated Commander, JUWEFA as an additional duty by CINCLANT with the “concurrence of GG, USCONARE . b.  CRICIANE couponent commanders, » vith the exception af CIALAWE . activated JUWEFA eomponént forces required under Appendix IZ to Annex ¥ - _ of GINCLANT Contingency Operation Pian 314/316-61 and passed operational control to JUWEIFA on 26 October 1962. CIAJUWEFA was not activated during the emergency. OFCON of Naval forces listed fim Appendix II was not passed to COMNAVJUWIFA. Naval forces were made aveilable on an "as required". _— basis. Ge “Planning end operations commenced on 26 October 1962 and continued through 1 December 1962. 3+ MISSION. | _ @.~ ‘fhe JOWTPA mission was\to prepare, coordinate, and execute as a directed by CINCLANT, a detailed coumtry pien for the conduct of \mcon= yentional warfare (ui) operations in CUBA. ‘ b, As stated in COMIOWIFA (Draft) OPLAN 314/316+62, core gehen directed by CINCLANT,. {conduct ‘unconventional warfare operations in CUBA in stspport of and 4m coordination with plans and objectives o CINCIANT component commanders toi] (1) Reduce the combat effectiveness and morale of the CASTRD (2) Provide U.S. military personnel and other selected individuale the means to xenain fee from eneny control in unfriendly territory, . , % RT 12 YEAR INTER 1S: Dosey yo. => “SATICALLY PECLAS U7 ee i a ee 8D Y 200.10 OSD DIR 5200.10 J ZOOOC// \_ Docld: 32424076 Page 2
COMIUWIFA cs — 18 December 1962 § CT: Historical Record of JUWTFA CUBAN Operation — o (3) Reduce the military, psychological and political potential Le os fof the CASTRO Government. . a (4): Assist in establishing friéndly political control ‘in CUBA. | B “AUGMENTATION, | | | a. JUWEFA, 4 (1) Prior to the activation of JUWIFA, JUWIFA plaming and *63 functions were a responsibility of the Plans ‘Division (358) of CINCLANT, a At. activation, J A was organized in accord Table . why, . FA was augmented j =f . with addit Louat™ persomes a ed Sub-section 5, t : oi :SectLon-25-3CBPub. 2) da: ted: ts Unified Action | 4 “ Arméd Forces, (UNAAF}. “4 (2) The initial staffing of JUWTFA was inadequate and required Pe considerable personnel augmentation to provide internal and external. if security, communications and administrative support, liaison, and additional ae . staff personnel -to plan and conduct: operations. {3} Additional personnel and equipment were obtained from the Army and Air Force to provide essential communications on a twenty-four hour basis, provide adequate administrative and control procedures, and augment the ateff to meet all operational requirements. (4) Based on the augmentation needed to make JUWIFA fully % operational, re i. ere submitted by COMIUWIFA letter, dated “i 26 Noyember 1962, subject: "Organization for the Conduct o conventional z Warfare in the Atlantic Command Area."' This letter proposes a new Joint 2 Table of Distribution providing for a full wartime complement, a planning si staff, and the necessary staff ‘augmentation to bring the planning staff a to its full wartime complement. | = b. ARJUWEFA, (1) Colonel William Evans-Smith, Commanding Officer, 7th Special Forces Group Airborne, lst Special Forces was designated Commander, Army : Forces, {UWIFA (COMARJUWIFA) on 26 October 1962. A command and control the element, [Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB);\was activated at Fort 3 Bragg, and COMARJUWIFA was assigned operational control ‘of Army_Forces Jisted in Appendix II to Annex Y of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61, )less tlic] (eilitary police platoon, light truck company, and CIC detachment. . “ (2) Subsequently, CG, USA SPWAR Cen was directed by CINCARLANT ; A £0 provide ARJUWIFA, from within U.-S. Army Special Warfare Center resources at = the psychological warfare, CIC, light truck and military police type supporty 4 » 2 WW 50955 Docld:32424026 Page 3
pe 1OP SECRET a COMIUWEFA CS 18 December 1962 i ¢ SUBJECT: Historical Recerd of JUWTEA CUBAN Operation . bes : listed under Appendix ZX to Anmex ¥ of CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61. Augmenta- Eo z tion from ide U. S. Avmy Special Warfare Canter reseurces wes ired i. 3 provid silitary police type support for beth JUWTFA and ABJURTTA z ae “Quo offizera ond 66.4 ister | man. were attached. & te ARSOWERA Ba, % operational p ment sional plamming ext ugnenta tion [ # undertake éperationg in CUBA. Bocoumendations for chenges in 3 oo troop list were forwarded to CIMCIANT-by let. Indoraemont, this headquarters, fo poo dated 3. Becenter .1962,-t6. teeter, ‘Headquarters, 7th: Special. Forces Group = ol Abas Let Special Foress, dated 26 November 1962, subject: Recoumended 7 ae _ Shenges $0 Troop last 4 in COME A, OFAN, StA~6L a sroup, was designated Coomande#, APJUWIFA (COMAFJUWIEA).on 26 Getober 196 commend end eontrol element from the’. Jet Mt Commando Group was setivat: ‘at Eglin AFB Auxiliary Mesber 9, ‘FLORIDA, ond |COMAPFIWEFA was sesigned ~ erational control of Air Force: Forces iti in Appendix YZ to Amex ¥ of CINCIANT CPLAN 314/316-61. “a Colonel Cheater dack, commanding Officer, let Afy Commands a (2) Auguentation to APJUWIFA forces listed, vas not required. d. NAVSUWEFA. (1) Captain I. J. Superfine, USH, was designated Coumander, NAVIUWEEA (COMMAVIURTFA} on 26 October 1962 with no assigned forces. : (2) Raval forces listed im Appendix IZ to Annex Y of CENCLANT i OPIAN 314/316-61 were te be provided by CINCLANTFLE ‘to to COMBAVIUNTEA for oe support of SUWTEA operations: as. ‘séquived. OE . (3) fwo SEAL, Team Dotachments, ene officer-and five enlisted. men , were assigned to operational. eontrel of COMNAVIUWEFA on 5 November, . Ch) COMSUBLANT provided two submarines for support of fotat ‘Special Forces - SBA Team amphibious training (4-5 November and 16+17 Novenber) and for support of Bxercise DEVIL'S TRIDENT (30 Hev = 4 Bee). (5) Augmentation to RAVJUWIFA forces listed ‘above was not required, oF rc wee fT ze x peeve Zh Mae : 8 + yen db Fete i Ye gf “HW 50955 Docld:32424026 Page 4
aft — #TOPSECRET COMJUWERA co | 18 December 1962 SUBJECT : Historical Record of JUWEPA CUBAN Operation Ge + SEMEN. Q) a oe Meta WULEA on 26 October 4 . planniag iE far an : meclening was eriig 2 = . .& Liatgon = officer with CTALE rather ‘then “an tategral menber of the SOWTEA- tage. . @). The organization; resources and capabilities of GIAJOWTFA were uniciom to JOWEFA aot deneee the operation. Consequent y ite cugmentation needs ware ‘not determined. ; During the period 20 October 1962 through noni tored and/or conducted the the following exercises Cy _Bovenibe tuelve seloeted 4 Spectat personnel 2 ined| Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA) _ Loekrout training from submarine uss SPIREFISH, vicinity Horfolk, Virginia. _ Adverse weather and the iaability of submarines to bottom because of external SONAR equipment: precluded ful £iliment of Bll training objectives. . Howaver, familiarization was accomplished in lock-out procedures.ead the oe techniques of lung awim drills, shipboard training, and infiltration from mime | submarines, This training pofuted cut certain doficiencies in amphibious entxy techuiques. Purther joint: to perfect and standardize ®. Spoctat Parces in all phases of amphibious entry riz é 3-4 November 1962, )the tuo Special Forces ents ied bor ins tration from subsarinas participated in cophibious infiltration training vicinity Maypert, Florida. Utilizing _ submarines USS SEA CAT ond USS TIRANTE, training wos conducted in embarka- » tide, ecarkertons fleat oute and- towing, beach landing, end recovery - |: operatéons. Conatéanebie ‘asettoulty waa encounterad because the Special | Forces Detachmenta Lac ked proper’ ipment, subber landing baste, safety TS: previous ‘training in gubmarine operations. Results of training Waxed 5 unsatisfactory and additional training was requested, including the use of SEAL foam Detachments for beach reconnaissance, after receipt of proper equipment. ° ond euboar ine treining exercise was conducted in the. “17 November 1962 by two Special Forces "A" Betach- ts and two SEAL Team Detachments, who embarked on the USS SEA CAT and SS TIRANTE from Ray West, Florida. Ten-man rubber beats had been procured HW 50955 “DocTa:32494096 Page 5 ~
PRER REO WW 50955 Docld:39494026 Page 6 - - |motere £ TOP SECRET COMYOWIFA CS. 18 December 1962 SUBJECT: Historical Record of JUWERA CUBAN Operation and the Special Forces Detachments had conducted inflatable boat training | et OPA LOCKA. This training, the previous submarine training, the use of propery equipment and the use of SEAL Tean Detachments, all contributed tc =e Sey 4 ] ments echeduled for air inf ileration conducted « dvopa and tactical | exereiess from let Ate Commande Group C-47 and C-46 aircraft at Port ~ | Rroge, North Carolina. . Instruction and training included the use of the GIA procured HRE-2 Homing Bescon and the FP SEYCRAFTER rad commercially: | VEF (AK) radio for aireground coummication. Results obtained on both Re dE sts dott £3 Sacenede od, Ghe' Sleld.exerciag-ec c. Exercise Devil's Trident: This exercise wag conducted, as approved and directed by CINCLART, beginning with E-Day DEFCGN atand down on 30 November 1962 and endé: oxfiltration (D43) on 4 Decauber 1962. The purpose of the exerntse\y Ty todified prepositioning, infiltvation, and resupply phases of _GPLAN 314/316+62, follow-on infiltration was successful L: We and sil {lights were flows, on schedule, train / ing results were considered marginal ,because adverse weather preciudad eetual infiltration! and resupply drops, and adverse atmospherte eauditions {Starupted commmications. However, JUWEFA plamine for prepositioning, fafiltration, and resupply phases was considered valid. =. 3+ |». we a: _@. General: Problems were encountered in all the major JUWYPA functional areas. Im some cases these proble=s vere solved, in others unsolved because solution was beyond the capability of COMMIVEFA, The major problem ayess ere discuased in the body of this report. dithers, less significant. te affective performance are discussed in the seperate inclosures and appendices. a b. Personnel ond Admingetration: 3 SIND tr aation of DZ's, movenemit to gafe aress, and establishing comumtca |
WW. 50955. was b peurequisite to valid pl & TOP SECRET => - comgmerra ce ' 18 December 1962 SUBJECT: Historical Boeord of SUWERA COBAN Operation €i) Bo mobiLdeation designac restere wore maintained for JUWEPA in pre-elert plaming. JUWEFA was hastily manned with officers and. enlisted men eens for the wast art, no previous | » te uns ietonst ahem cae, eupply, aioe sets > undte oF activities hed been pravieualy “a aUPORE «<b Pere onit pO. finally. made available: wei vroperly qualifieg to perfors thade duties. Partientlar . difeteulty a arose with gespect to security. elearances . The headquarters wea. mmmed by sone key personnel whe vere not gleaged for op Secret material, and more serious, Btaft gockion chiefs nok sitheartsed: ‘scedas. to sentsittve Antal ligence which S: : wowe eine completely | tivatio: ae ‘ gonsequence, “Aversion of effort and RES backtracking to eorrect errors eocurred in the. formbive stage which were . injurieus to Ssperations aad | Plamatag. es “logtetics: {1} Logistical pleantang cn foaweth =| supplies had not pregressed | to the point of solid coordination ef quglitetive and quontitative requir = pee Specific requirenants, including ackaging and vipging a t determined. [forea) were the only 6 r equirenenta” to tneludo: ‘etorage oad. positioning 6 axe not fully met Rt t thi time. (2) | aa Advanced base geconneaissence and base sae = were noneexistent at the time of ‘the alert. JUWEFA support requirencnte ware Amposed ag ‘uaprogramied reap aponeibilitdes of installation. and ectivit ‘aovenont Kequdrenents | for ‘peepositioning ‘end ‘Adept of post~-link up logistic supjort of JUWYRA forces in: problen areas ave the subjent of coordination at thie time, d. Operations and Intelligence: (1) The largast single impedimant in the field SSE SDakERLeDe end intelligence wag the dimost complete gap which existed betveen. the ¢ @ Gingia’ tackor wma Sse SRG Cone mes in the JUWEFA i plane evolved daring the emergency an impossibility. The nature ef tmeonven- tional warfare is such that there mgt be a continuity in operations and intalligence in the transition from 2 condition short of war to militery operations, The lack of such continuity mekes unconventional warfare Docld: 32424026 Page