HW 49061 ' SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM army was capable of. united action only in support of regular pay and in resistance to UN moves to disarm the ANC, In the chaos reigning in Leopoldville at that time, Mobutu's ability to position a few hundred disciplined, armed men proved sufficient to seize power. -Lundula was dismissed by Kasavubu at the same time as Lumumba. Lundula did not im- mediately resist the move, enabling Mobutu ‘to move -into the oe spot and ten days later to proclaim his c oup. ; Mobutu's Emergence 7 Mobutu energetically set to work providing himself with an officer corps -on which he could depend and which had some rudimentary training. Only aminimum of Belgianassistance | was available. After the mutiny, only seven Belgian officers, three of whorn were chap- lains, remained with the troops. Mobutu had been able to exercise some in- fluence over the designation of officers in the Leopoldville, Equateur, and Luluabourg gar- risons, which gave him relatively secure con- trol over a portion of the army. In Stanley- ville, the struggle for the 3rd groupement was crucial to the power contest between Lumumb- ist’elements, seeking to regroup at Stanley- ‘ville, and those elements disposed to accept the authority of the College of Commissioners at Leopoldville. The contest lasted from Sep - tember to November 1960, withthe Lumumbists ‘finally winning. On November 26, 1960, Gerieral Lundula arrived in Stanleyville and’took com- mand. Shortly thereafter, the Gizenga govern- ment announcéd its claim to be the sole legal authority, with Lundula andthe 3rd groupement under its orders. Thus, by the end of 1960, the ANC had broken into two group5, one at Stanley - ville under Lundula, and one at Leopoldville ‘under Mobutu. Meanwhile, South Kasai and Katanga had created new armies from scratch. No less than four armies roamed the land. Between the two fragments. of the ANC proper, the Leopoldville group by 1961 was clearly somewhat better led and disciplined. The heart of Mobutu's army was the 800- man paracommando battalion stationed at Leo- poldville. The other detachments at Leopold- ville and Thysville were alsounder reasonable control. By 1961 the troops in Equateur had ceased.to be a serious menace. Lundula's army. Lundula himself is an offi- cer of considerable wisdom and integrity. His allegiance to Stanleyville undoubtédly grew from a sincere conviction that legality lay with the Stanleyville government, In Stanleyville he faced several handicaps: 1) Although Leopoldville continued paying ‘this insurrectionary group, wagés often did not reach outlying units, especially in Kivu, North Katanga, and northeast Kasai. 40 control over much of his army was tenuous, He never was able to check the units in Kivu, Kasai, and North Katanga. Even among those in Orientale, he faced the problem of "political officers," who. were susceptible to direct influence by Gizenga and other MNC/L leaders. He op- posed politicization: of. the 3rd groupement, but could-not prevent it, . 3) Lundula lacked access. to external ma- terial support. Beginning in 1961 the benefits 2) Lundula's of the overseas training of the new ANC officers loyal to Leopoldville began. to be felt. ‘Further, the Leopoldville group re- ‘ ceived some foreign assistance in the form of military equipment. The Katanga gendarmerie, In Katanga, the first act of the Tshombe government was to call in Belgian troops to disarm and expel ANC detachments. Under Belgian Major Crévecoeur, a Katanga gendarmerie ‘was created at'top speed, starting froma nucleus of only 300 former Force Publiqué troops ethni- cally compatible with the Conakat regime. There was substantial Belgian technical as- sistance, All of the 25 small aircraft of the Force Publique were flown to Katanga and placed at Tshombe's disposal. By early Sep- tembér 1960 the Katanga ‘gendarmerie had ‘received 100. tons of arms and munitions, 89 officers from the Force Publique, 326 junior -officers and non-coms from the Belgian army who volunteered for detached service in Ka- tanga, and 70 agents of the Belgian gendar- merie. Beginning in late 1960 European mer- cenaries ‘were recruited for a special "in- ternational company''; by mid-1961 there was said to be nearly 500 of these. The exact total strength of the Katanga gendarmerie is not known. Estimates range from 11,000 to 19,000, The South Kasai army. The -kingdom: of South Kasai also organized its own gendar- merie. In 1961 it had some 3,000 men and was assisted by nine European officers, Its commanding 'general'' was a 22 year-old youth, Floribert Dinanga. Reunification of the ANC One of the most difficult problems in re- unifying the Congo has been knitting together the military fragments. In the case of the two wings of the ANC, a major obstacle was the question of who was the "legal'' Come mander, Lundula: or Mobutu. The government of reconcilation emerging from the Lovanium parliament did not immediately resolve the problem, It was not until November 1961 that Lundula agreed to come to Leopoldville to accept Mobutu's authority as Commander, When he did, however, the end was in sight for Gizenga's campaign to re-establish a dis- .Sident ‘power. center at Stanleyville, In De- r SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 32676338 Page 49
HW 49061 Docld: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM cember 1961 Lundula cooperated with the central government in dismantling the cabal of Gizengist officers in Bukavu that was a constant threat to public order. It was Lun- dula who finally arrested Gizenga in Jan-_ uary 1962. Thus the last major center of ANC dissidence was eliminated. Slowly, dur- ing the course of 1962, "political officers'! in the 3rd groupement were transferred. The process was accelerated in late 1962 when Lundula was replaced by the able and energetic Col, Leonard Mulamba. Absorption of the South Kasai gendarmes has not posed ANC units. The remainder apparently may join the ANC if they so desire, . Mobutu has opposed complete integration of the Katanga gendarmes., They are so numerous that the ethnic regional balance of the ANC would be upset. Approximately 1,300 have been brought into the ANC. The rest are presumably now "technologically unem- ployed." ; ANC Gendarmerie Function Of great political importance is the fact that, in contrast to the general practice in former French Africa, the ANC is responsible not only for external security, but also serves as a national gendarmerie. This means that in addition to being stationed in approximately 12 major military camps, ANC detachments are posted on gendarme duty in each of about 125 ‘territories, Ironically, during the .1954-1959 period there was a prolonged de- bate within the colonial administration on whether the gendarmerie role should be re- assigned to the territorial police, under pro- vincial jurisdiction, The army finally won this debate, Had the decision been other- wise, there would be little real power left today to the central government. Since to date the external security mission is largely theoretical, the key function of the army re- mains its constabulary role. The Security Problem Evaluating the role of the ANC in the po- litical system entails examination of the Con- go's security problem. The Congo alone of African states has experienced bloodshed on a massive scale since independence. There is no way to estimate the violent deaths since 1960.: No one will ever know, for example, how many died in North Katanga. A reason- able guess would be about 100,000 for the Congo as. a whole, including perhaps 100 Europeans. We examine the categories of violence and proceed to an analysis of the present dimensions of the disorder threat. insuperable problems, By. -mid-1963 the majority were integrated into 41 ‘earlier ANC Post-independence violence can be usefully divided into several categories: 1) Anti-European Acts a) Violence associated with the July 1960 ANC mutiny. For the most part, the civilian population did not participate in these atro- cities, except inthe Bas-Congo and the Tshuapa : District of Equateur. Actual deaths were few; less than two dozen Europeans lost their lives, Men were forced to walk barefoot and were. spat upon, Women were violated in the presence .of their husbands and children. Priests and nuns were paraded nude. These acts were infused with the sadism ‘and wanton cruelty of mob behavior, but their symbolic humilia- tion of European colonial society is also striking. b) Abuses and intimidation of various sorts associated with the Kashamura regime in Kivu, January-March 1961, There were few casualties, but the entire European popula- tion crossed the border into Ruanda. c) A narrowly averted St. Bartholomew's Day massacre in Stanleyville when the news of Lumumba's assassination became known. Lundula alone saved the European popula- tion of Stanleyville (about. 1,500) ‘on that February night. d) Acts of savagery in Luluabourg, Kindu, and Kongolo, November 1961-January 1962. These are all directly linked with the abortive ANC invasion of Katanga, In Luluabourg a search for a radio set which had been trans- mitting to Katanga information on ANC troop movements degenerated into a drunken orgy of rape and looting. In Kindu 13 Italian avia- tors, suspected of being Belgian parachutists, were slaughtered, cut into small pieces, and eaten (the present Minister of Finance in the Maniema provincial government reportedly partook of the feast), In Kongolo 16 Catholic missionaries were massacred, purportedly for their Conakat sympathies. These incidents demonstrated the danger constituted by ANC units when under the tensions of combat. They had a pervasive fear of ''Belgian paratroopers" and European mercenaries, ‘e) Southern Katanga. Since the arrival inthe area of the ANC following the defeat of Katanga in January 1963, there has been a series of incidents, and several Europeans have been killed, Individual acts, the killings have not involved collective rampages as did incidents, The ANC retains a deep-seated fear and hostility toward Ka- tanga's European population. ANC troops re- call that European troops earlier threw the ANC out of Katanga. European officers and mercenaries were the backbone of the Ka- tanga gendarmerie, which inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on the ANC, notably at Kongolo, ; SECRET/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 50
HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM 2) Anti-civilian Acts a) The ANC invasion of Sud Kasai in August 1960 degenerated into a: massacre of several thousand Baluba. b) Katanga gendarmes went into action against Baluba irregulars in North Katanga in September 1960. After a brief, UN-imposed lull in December-March, the offensive re- sumed until it was again halted by the UN in late April 1961. Apparently a minimum of 20,000 civilians were slaughtered. c} Serious hostilities broke out between the ANC and irregulars of the Ngweshi (Bashi tribe) dynasty (Kivu) in March and May 1961, The number of deaths was reported as 800. d) The South Kasai gendarmerie caused numerous casualties during incursions in the Dimbelegne- Lake Mukamba area of Kasai in early 1961. e) ANC patrols acted similarly in the same area shortly thereafter. f) In April 1962 approximately 70 casual- ties ensued from ANC operations in sup- pressing a local insurrection by a religious sect, mpeve, near Mangai, Kwilu. 3) Recent ANC Incidents. In 1963 there have beenthree major incidents involving the ANC: at Kakenge (near Mweka) in Unité Kasaienne, in the area west of the _ Bushimaya River in Sud-Kasai, and in Boma, Kongo Central, a) Kakenge. There were a reported 400 death, including those of the two Europeans, in these incidents, The blame for this violence appears to lie not with the ANC but with - Lulua Chief Kalamba and the present Lulua- bourg government, Kalamba, in a radio speech September 17, called for the Lulua to press outward in several directions to expand the Luluabourg provincial boundaries. Two Euro- peans were murdered by Kalamba's thugs. The UN magistrate in Luluabourg has in his possession a letter from Luluabourg Presi- dent Lwakabwanga, an ocolyte of Kalamba, ordering the assassination, When armed bands of Lulua youth pressed toward the | Mweka area, which had been awarded to Unité Kasai- enne province, the ANC intervened. A patrol was ambushed, and several soldiers were killed. At this point, the ANC intervention became brutal. But the brutality was pro- voked, and the action was clearly inpreserva- tion of law and order and to put down an insurrectionary act. b) Sud-Kasai. In January 1963 ANC patrols were dispatched to deal with armed bands of youthful supporters of former South Kasai ruler Albert Kalonji that were roaming the’ countryside. (Their arms reportedly had been provided by Luluabourg Minister Mukenge, a 42, “foreign” - ranked the territoral administrator. close relative of Chief Kalamba of Lulua- bourg.) The ANC was attacked and went ona rampage. Casualty estimates range from 30 to 12,000. It is indisputable that villages over a large area were burned and that the entire population fled into the bush. In this instance the.ANC was acting on behalf of the legally constituted government of Sud- Kasai, but its brutality seemed out of pro- portion to the seriousness of the provocation. c) Boma. In March 1963 a riot occurred . between ANC troops and the civilian popula- tion of Boma. There were a number of in- juries, but no deaths. Triggered by a. banal incident involving a parrot and some women in a bar, the clash was based on latent hostility that had been developing for some time. The intensely self-conscious Bakongo tribesmen at Boma regarded the ANC as a force camped in their midst. "Bangala go home'' slogans were scrawled on walls, Local hotels, the ANC alleged, refused lodging to officers. Soldiers could not find the sort of recreational activity to which they were accustomed. At the same time, the administrative demotion of Boma from a. district to a territory, which followed the creation of the new provinces, resulted in a claim by the ANC commander that he out- Mutual smoldering grievances ignited. The transfer of the local ANC commander and the in- stitution of joint local police-ANC patrols seem to have considerably reduced the tension. These recent incidents do not constitute evi- dence of generalized indiscipline in the army. There is a sharp contrast between the inci- dents in Kasai, where the ANC was guilty of an excess of brutality in defense of legally constituted government, and the anarchic acts of 1960-1961, where the ANC was a threat to-legal government, 4) Political Assassination . There was a wave of murders in Elisabeth- ville, Bakwanga, and Stanleyville in February 1961, Although there had been a number of crimes of this nature in late 1960, the virtually simultaneous execution of 26 leading figures in early 1961 represented the real low point of the Congo crisis. Since then, this technique has generally ceased to be used, except’ for two members of Tshombe's cabinet who died under mysterious circumstances, A symptom of the total impasse of the political system at that time, the situation has nowclearly changed. 5) Ethnic Clashes Tribal disorders on a massive and serious scale have been restricted mainly to ex-Kasai SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld:376276336 Page 51
~ SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Province. There, conflict was triggered by Lulua-Baluba animosity, with peripheral groups drawn into the maelstrom. The bulk of the disorders have been on the fringes of the homelands of these two large, aggressive groups. The most recent example of disorder inthis category occurred in Sankuru Province in May 1963. The hostilities there involved two sub- groups of the Batetela ethnic cluster, whose principal differentiating element (see chapter II) seems to be whether or not they were subjected to acculturative contact with the Zanzibar Arabs in the late 19th century. Trouble of this sort may reoccur in many areas if an effort is not made to settle the question of the disputed territories. ; 6) Present Security Threats Southern Katanga is the only area of the Congo where security remains a matter ofim- mediate concern, Hostility between the ANC and the Katanga Europeans remains sharp, and there is a threat of serious incidents, possibly leading to a European exodus when the UN troop buffer is removed, The whole of ex-Kasai province remains an area for concern, but disorder there is less of a threat to the fundamental stability of the country. Security of the main rail line will become more important when Katanga copper again is exported on this route, How- ever, the UN forces have never been able to contain the sort of disorder which occurred in Kasai. Accordingly, UN troop withdrawal from Kasai may not make an important dif- ference, The ANC as a Force Promoting Stability Although the exact figures are unknown at the present time, the ANC has about 35,000 men, On the whole, and excluding troops in southern Katanga, the ANC has been a posi- tive element in the political system. It:has developed a nucleus of officers of real ability, It retains the vital principle of ethnic inte- gration at all levels, which operates to im- munize it against local and political influences ‘and gives it.a commitment to the nation that is shared by few elements of Congolese so- ciety. In most areas, sufficient discipline has been restored so that it is not a real threat to the expatriate population or to the govern- ment. It is capable in many dreas of acting as an adequate constabulary in the interests of the central government, It would be of little use in protecting the Congo from external threats -- but there is no pressing immediate need for it to be more than a constabulary force. 43 ANC Retraining Plans for retraining the ANC are finally crystallizing. A retraining program was drawn up by a US Special Military Advisory Team headed by Col, Michael Greene, 22 Although the program has gone through several subsequent metamorphoses, many of its salient features remain. The report concluded that key em- phasis should be placed upon the training of the officer corps: In the final analysis, the ANC can ac- complish its own basic individual and unit training provided that it receives as- Sistance in training of its officers, an increased number of foreign military ad- visors placed in specific positions, in- creased school quotas in foreign officer .and specialist schools, observer/orien- ‘tation visits in foreign countries, and some material and equipment support to fill known gaps and to effect modern- ization, Following abortive efforts to obtain from the UN a commitment to coordinate ANC retrain- ing, an adhoe consortium was devised tocarry out the program. Belgium agreed to provide over 100 officers to train the ANC; Israel undertook to provide paratroop instruction in Israel; and the United States will furnish equipment and other material support. Several other countries, including Italy, interested in aiding in ANC and other military training, subsequently may make firm commitments. Because under current plans the bulk of the training personnel will be supplied by Belgium, the program presumably will bear a strong Belgian stamp. As a result of prolonged un- certainty as to the extent of international cooperation in the scheme, the precise details have remained vague. However, there appar- ently has been considerable divergence of views among interested parties as tohowthe retrain-~ ing would operate. On one hand, asimple rein- forcement of technical, consultative personnel in headquarters positions was recommended. On the other, the placement of Belgian officers in the regular command structure of the ANC, even down to the small unit level, has been proposed, Until very recently, the Belgian military group seems to have desired the latter, while the ANC leaders preferred to use Belgian personnel as advisers. ; If real value is to be derived from the re- training program, the foreign role must go beyond a mere presence behind headquarters 22. Report of Special Military Adviso) i . July 23, 1962. (CONFIDENTIAL) 2 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM HW 49061 Docld:32626336 Page 52