i v9.1 HW 53244 Docld: 32204721 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE : DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : ‘ DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK Assassination System Date: 8/27/201 Identification Form Agency Information ROCKCOMCOP 178-10002-10394 ASSASSINATION FILES ASSASSINATION MATERIALS, L. FLETCHER PROUTY Document Information ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION Released under the John F. Kennedy L. FLETCHER PROUTY Lesassination Records Collection bet of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Paset: NW 53244 Date: 06-13-2017 04/15/1975 15 ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES PROUTY, L. FLETCHER DEPOSITION Secret 1A; 1B; 1C; 4 Redact 07/12/1993 Page 1
178-10002-10394 STAPF INTERVIEW 178-10004-10418 7 PRESIDENTS COMMISS TON ON CRA ACTIVITIES = Se wm. l of 2 Thursday, May 15, 1975 ' Washangten, R. Cc. WASHINGTON, D.C. 410 First Street, S.E., 20003 Phone (202) 544-6000 HW 53244 DoclId:32204721 Page 2? {wisenaee vere FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA 4055 Chain Bridge Rd., 22030 Phone . (703) 273-2400
jo wEeKRET QO ty STAFF THTERVIEW PPESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 Washington, D.C. Thursday, May 15, °1975 The Staff met, pursuant to notice at 4:90 o'clock p.m., at 712 Jackson Place, il. W., Washington D. C. PRESENT: MARVIN L. GRAY, JR., Stafi member Li 12 713 14 WARD & PAUL i5 16 1? 18 19 20 21 ye, 22 , | , Sag Re 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 53244 DoclId:32204721 Page 3
ae) Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 wl 11 12 135 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 a | bo “Thereupon, L. FURTCHER POURTY called for interview by Counsel for the President's Commission on CIA Activities, having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows: EXAMINATION BY couNsZ FOR THE COMMISSTON BY MR. GRAY: 0, Sir, would you state your full name for the record? A ity name is L. Fletcher Pourty. oO, And you are a retired Air Force Colonel, who for a substantial period of time, anc narticularly around the -late c 1959's and early 1960's served as a CIA appointed liaison with the Air Force with certain support of a paramilitary nature is that correct? A, But it shovld he the other way around, I serves as an Air Force officer in support of CIA, I was in the Air Force. 0. And your office was in the Air Force? A Yes, my office was in the Pentagon, in the Air Force. 9 Before the reporter arrived you told me that in 959 or January 1960 or possibly as late as February Fe December 1960, you were approacned by the Air Division of the Covert Action Staff of the cra, wno saic they haG a special joh reguiring Air Force support, and tney wanted an L-25, is that = correct? —SECRET HW 53244 DoclId:32204721 Page 4
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 53244 WARD & PAUL Ll Gl Ss (>) 10 1i 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 29 24 25 2 And I don't think I can repeat what you expiained to me about the L-22, so maybe you had better repeat that. A The L-2€ was a special single engine plane that haa a) a (D K tq = ) bo bh ty been purched by the CIA called the MNelio Cou Force owned a number of these air craft. So we provided cover for CIA by giving them Air Force insignia and Air Force designation, the L-28, and Air Force serial numbers. And these aircraft, or at least some of them, were based at Eglin Air "S6rce Base in Florida. They were at Eglin Air’ Porce Base because that is where the CIA kept most of its aircraft in the country. Q. And how was this mission originally described to you? aA. Originally it was one of a number of missions that we were operating over a period of time. But it was one of the few that we operated with L-22's. The people who came over from the Air Division stated that they had a place to land the plane in Cuba on a road, on a small road, and they had a photo- graph of it. And they were going to let two men out there and then Ely the plane back with a pilot and copilot to Eglin Air Force Base. And-the men that were being left off would be eguipped with a high powered rifle and a telescopic sight. They were Cubans. We never saw then, of course. This is what we were told they were, because we didn 't interfere with who was on the plane, we simpiv put the plane in the air. But this Photocopy —SECRET rs Gerald R. Ford trary DoclId: 32204721 Page 5
was ot Gl Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ~ 10 Li 12 135 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 24 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 29° a 4 was a normal procedure. And the object of their mission in Cuba was to go to a building in Havana where one of the men knew his way around and was pretty sure tnat he could get into, ang if possible, he would shoot Castro. | 0. Did you recall who told you this? A. No, I don't, because we were working every cay with these people. And I think if you had a listing of the Air Division staff at chat date I probably could tell you it was one of four men, something like that, a Division of maybe 39 men, it would have been one of ‘three or four, or two of three’ or Four} The thing was, we were doing these things every day, it was not an odd thing that came up, it was something that we were doing ‘quite regularly. Q Tt surprises me that the CIA would describe the fe oa mission to you in this much detail, it doesn't seem consistent with compartmentation and neea-to-know particularly in view of the sensitive nature of the mission. . A. That is an awfully good point you are making. In those Gays it did, because the. more urgent part of my job was to brief my boss, the Chief of Staff, Air.Force, and through him the Secretary, Air Force, or the Secretary of Defense, or whoever, as required. 0. Let's go off the record for a minute. b “04 ~ , ce A yy kop, y (Discussion off the record. OP MPR MR. GRAY: Back on the record. % ¢ —SECRET— HW 53244 Docld: 32204721. Page 6
wes —ZJECGNEL - 1 THE “ITNESS: And since that was a real serious respon- 9 || sibility, we wouldn't fly the mission unless we knew that it nad the approval of the Security Council, or that at least OG! the overall program had approval of the Security Council. And Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 5 this was understood for years. We had no problem with that at 6 all. = don't think that I ever sent out a mission that we didn't Know what they were going to do and where they were ? 8 going. And this seems, at least in certain applications, to 9 have ceased in this day and age. But I think that is due to 10 || other things. But in 1959-60 we would know where it was going 11 || even to the voint that I would want to know when they came back, 12 LT would really want to know if tney went where they told me. a Z af 13 Je were pretty sure about how we did it. & t < BY MR. GRAY: 3 14 15 0. Do you recall briefing the Chief of Staff or any of you 16 other superiors on this mission? 1 A, Yes. My usual arrangement was to brief the Directer 18 of Plans, the Major General who was my immediate oss. 0 Did vou remember who that was at that time? 0 19 3 . g A, In 1953 I would say that was General Cary, or possibly d 20 ; fs) . . . . . . 5 General Martin. . Again, it is a question of who was where at 2 21 s . s that time. Put I think if we put those two names down we will = 22 ul . vj be awfully close to it. “ 20 Q a a Yas this mission concernec at all as to the proprietary z 24 a . . : + , : , = 25 or morality or whatever? Did thoughts cf that nature concern v you when you neard it? from HW 53244 DoclId:32204721 Page 7
2 (orl Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 24 A, The concern that we would have was that the military woulG not be involved. ‘We just wouldn't participate in it. Ang actually the CIA had the same icea at that tine. What we we Going was nelping Cubans. And if the Cubans, with their own little command structure, wanted to operate and could, you might say, convince CIA that this was something that was import-~ ant to them, or that they thought they could achieve, cn their own, 1£ we would just give them so much as a little nelp, the ‘ missions would be sent. As a result, we didn't concern ourselve with too many of them, for the simple reason, we weren't asked for. Tt was almost like mechanics, you know. There were missions that we turned down, but mostly because we thought they wouldn't suceed or that we would not be able -- the favorate phrase -- to disclain plausibly that the military or th Government of the U.S. was involved. And we vere serious about that business in those days. 0 Did you recall anyone else that you briefed on this raising any questions about this particular mission? A No, with no, what you might say barriers to the operation, with everything cleared and laic on in a perfectly normal manner, we got on with other business. We knew right away tnat it didn't succeed -~ I say right away, within 19 days -- and there were so many other things going on, it was on with the rest of it. Q Did you ever hear what happenec to interrupt tne from Gerald R. Ford Library HW 53244 Docld:32204721 Page 6
° 3 1 3 Plans? < wo 2 2 A I don't think I have a clear memory about it. But 3 ; < ° all of us in that business kin@ of felt that most of those . 4 Cubans were not able to do what they thought they couid do. 5 Castro was operating the bloc system, and T think it was a 6 lot more effective than we gave him credit for. 7 2 How are you able to place a time as to December 195° 8 or January 1960 or February 1960? Why are you sure it is in 9 that two- or three-month period. 10 A = < will tell you why that is pretty easy to figure. 11} The Agency wasn't running what I would call hard missions until 12 || late in 1959. You know Castro came in at the beginning of 1959. ‘13 | and things didn't really jell until later in the year. And WARD & PAUL 14 || a good reason for that; the training of Cuban exiles hadn't 15 || produced really professionals in terms of pilots or drop teams 16 || or saboteurs or what have until after they had had quite.a bit 17 || of training. At the other end of the calendar, General Eisenhowe: 18 || had made it very clear to all of us who were operating over- 19 || flights that nothing was to be done. A little later in 1960 20 |} when he was supposed to meet at the summit with Khruschchev 21 || and other world leaders, we haulted every overflight. And to 22] this day I can't understand why the U-2 went out. Sut all the 23 | flights that I had anything to do with, the Tibetan flight, the 24 || Lactian flights, the Cuban flights, all of that overflight 410 First Street, $.E£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 || program we haulted on direct orders. And since the meeting in S Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HW 53244 DocId:32204721 Page 9
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ~ WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 53244 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 r4 25 ee tw Paris was scheduled for May 1, I doubt if we flew anything after March 15, or even maybe March 1, because there would be no interference with it. So I can put it between those dates without any trouble. 0. You said at times it. was a matter of concern to male sure that the operations you had requested to support, or at. least the type of operation, had been approved by the National Security Council, or whoever elsé was required. Did you recall when you made any such inquiries in this case? A, ‘The way we would work that is, having briefed, you might say, the Air Force chain of command, if I was not tol: to stop, it was gone. Again, it was a matter of working with people that I had been with for years. It wasn't one kind. hey knew me, they knew the program. And if I briefed them ang there was nothing to interfere within a day or two, we would go. Now, sometimes they would want additional briefings. But I don't remember one in this case. 0, I believe at some point one of the news coverages had the name of one of the Cubans involved. A I don't put much story in that. I looked up some notes that I thought might be pertinent, but I don't -~ we didn't work with the Cubans -- there were a few Cubans we yot to know, like Artemo, but they were not involved in this w cr a KK a ‘ , OL L 107] get a projects name for thi Photocopy —SECRET— tom Gerald R. Ford Library mo z) bee f. fe) G @ <i 0) R DocId:322047271 Page 10