-24- Corroboration of the Phase I plans was also made by another retired medical officer who was familiar with the preparation of the pills inside the Agency. , Edwards said he did not know of any plans other than those that involved the use of these botulism pills. Edwards did not have any first-hand knowledge or not the pills ever got to Cuba. “ according to the ‘Phase IT case officer, he delive about whether ¢ r and was subsequently advised the pills to the “syndicate membe ._ by the syndicate member that the pills were in “Cuba, but the case officer had no direct knowledge of his own that the pills actually got there. - Richard Bissell said he did not have any . personal recollection as to whether or not poison pills of any kind | were ever delivered into Cuba. There’ may actually have been two passages § of pL to Cuba in the first part of 1961. The first passage was in late pebruary or March from the syndicate through their courier to a Cuban who supposedly had a position in: the Cuban Prime Minister's office where he had access to Fidel Castro. According to the interview of Sheffiel@ Edwards with the Executive Director, the Cuban asset “got scared” and did not try to pass the pill. Pills were subsequently delivered. to another "asset" who was in a position to slip the pills to Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 25
-25- Castro at a restaurant where the asset worked. This took place in the March-April 1961 period. Fidel Castro ceased visiting that particular restaurant at approximately_the same time the pills purportedly arrived. fhe case officer said it was his recollection that there were two passages of pills to Cuba, the second one which was made to someone who had access to a restaurant which Castro frequented. After the second attempt failed, the case officer said the pills. were. returned to the CIA. | There is inconsistency between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Colonel Edwards concerning how the plans got started. According to Bissell the original approach was made to the Agency” by the syndicate personnel because "they had their own very strong motivations for carrying out this...they had been powerful under Batista in Cuba, and they had a very lucrative set of interests for the syndicates, and they had been in effect been thrown out, and so they had the strongest sort of reasons for anti- Castro sentiment on their own." Bissell said he first learned about this from Sheffield Edwards and that he had also talked with Allen Dulles about the matter. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:32112745 Page 276
~26- Whereas Bissell testified that he "first heard of this possibility (of using Mafia or syndicate resources) from Sheffield Edwards," Edwards testified that his first contact was a request by Bissell who asked Edwards "if I had any assets...that would be available into the syndicate." When asked about the inconsistency between his own testimony and that of Sheffield Edwards con-~ “cerning whether or not Edwards approached Bissell first or Bissell approached Edwards first, Bissell stated that /. "it is possible that my recollection is wrong,...I think I will stand on that as my recollection...but I seem to remember rather clearly that it was from him (Edwards) that I first learned of the possiblity of this operation, and that he came to see me for this purpose rather than my Sending for him. Now, could. I just say that I had several conversations with Shef Edwards een ee sie cee sues ee i on this matter, and it is very possible that I, that ina | subsequent conversation I did take the initiative and send for and discuss.. it with him." | (The case officer stated that he believed it was Bissell who first approached Edwards about making the contacts with a CIA intermediary. The case officer further stated that although he ultimately became aware of the fact that the people contacted by the CIA intermediary were "syndicate" Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 27
-27- members, initially neither he nor the intermediary knew this to be the fact. Rather, he said he thought these people whom the intermediary contacted were gangster=type people who were not necessarily members of the syndicate. i. Possible White House Direction or Approval of Plans (1) The Testimony of Richard Bissell recollection" |. Bissell stated that he had "no clear Jot any discussion with anyone in the Eisenhower Administra- tion concerning any possible plan to assassinate Castro! but there could have been. He said that if it would have occurred at all during the Eisenhower Administration, "it would have been with Gordon Gray." Gray testified that there were no such conversations that occurred. Bissell testified that although . vo Dee De, my recollection of this i. far from cleareee  - | I am satisfied that very early in the 7 Kennedy Administration I aia participate" in conversations with someone in the White House concerning the planning of - what was called an executive action capability, which was defined in substance as a capability of the Agency to carry out assassinations, if required. When asked with whom these \ . conversations occurred, Bissell said "I am almost certain it was either Walt Rostow (Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security) or McGeorge Bundy (Presidential Assistant. for National Security), or probably the former, and possibly both." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 28
—~28~ When asked to state what specifi- cally was discussed in these conversations, Bissell Said: “my recollection, which isn't too Specific, is that this was a discussion of the desirability of developing such a capability within the CIA that presumably would be a small, special unit, and highty compartmented from the rest of the organization.” see \ Bissell said that he had no specific knowledge but; /that he “had a great deal of ‘confi idence that the two gentle- men whose names I have mentioned, would not have discussed this discussed with me or encouraged any course of action-that ns they were not confident the President would approve." When - asked whether or not he had any discussions with any official in the Eisenhower Administration concerning the development of an executive action capability, Bissell replied, "not to my recollection, and I think I am almost sure that I did not." a Later in his testimony Bissell said that the possibility of using syndicate people to carry out an assassinatic attempt against Castro “was discussed by me, again I think probably with Walt Rostow. It may possibly have been dis- cussed directly with McGeorge Bundy, but I suspect that it was through Rostow, who was then Bundy's’ assistant and on his staff. My impression, but again I must emphasize that this is uncertain impression, was that I was encouraged to go Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 29
-—-29- ahead with the investigation and planning of this operation, and by investigation I mean simply to find out what would be involved to make some assessment of the likelihood of success, and other aspects of the matter." According to Bissell, he was "vague as to the final outcome of that attempt." He said that he had "no recollection of a specific authorization that it should go forward. I believe, however, that we probably did move to be ina position to-carry it out, or authorize it, if authorization were received." He said that he believed "my own recollection of the final stages of the plan is vague" because the plan. involved "furnishing probably some money and such items as pills or other devices through a number of ‘cut-outs or intermediaries to a group which we ourselves, of course, did not, in any direct sense, control. This was not an operation of such a character that the communications would run through Agency channels, or that authorization on the spot would be by Agency personnel, or that the Agency could precisely and tightly control it. | | (2) (The Testimony of Gordon Gray Gordon Gray testified that he had no conversations with Richard Bissell or anyone else pertaining to assassination plans. (3) The Testimony of Walt Rostow Walt Rostow testified that he did not Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 30
-30~ have any recollection of having any discussions with Bissell pertaining to any attempt at assassination plots. (4) The Testimony of the Phase I Case Officer The case officer stated that he had been told that the project had been approved by Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, but he (the case officer) had no knowledge of whether or not there had been any discussion or approval from the White House. | (5) The Testimony of Colonel Edwards Edwards said that he believed the plans . were developed by Bissell.and that he was "sure that there were not" any people in the White House that knew about these plans. He also said that he did not know of any attempt of plans to ‘assassinate people other than Fidel Castro. (6) The Testimony of McGeorge Bundy McGeorge Bundy said that he was never aware any “actual decision” to go about seeking to assassinate any foreign leader. However, he said that he did "have a vague recollection od. the existence or the possible existence of contingency planning in this area. I am sorry to say I cannot help you much with details about it because I ean’t fish them out of my memory, but I could, not exclude that there were contingency plans, and a contingency capability of some sort, or plans for such a capability -at some time." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 31
-3i- He said that he did not know of any case where plans went beyond the contingency stage "and I know of no such authori- zation or any involvement by anybody in the White House staff or anybody else, for that matter. " | When asked whether or not he ever heard any discussion concerning a plot or plan to assassinate Cuban leaders, Bundy replied, "Not that I can remember. ..I certainly cannot exclude the possibility that you could have had the kind of discussion in which one or another individual would have said it would be, that there is a possibility that thus and such a Cuban group, if landed and infiltrated, might have as one of its missions the following, which might have included an attack on one or another Cuban leader. I do not have any direct recollection that that did happen, but I cannot exclude that it did happen." pepe Bundy testified that. he did not know of any decision to go ahead and actually undertake a plan of assassination. "Phat contingent capability may have been authorized in this field I cannot exclude, although I have no direct recollection of it. It is the decision to go ahead ‘that. I am sure I do not remember." Bundy said that he would have been "surprised" if any effort to assassinate a foreign leader had been under- taken without his approval as the President's Assistant for. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 32
Security Affairs, and said that he himself would "not have authorized anything of that kind without’ much higher authority than my own. I could not exclude that there would be com— immication with the President by other channels. Neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson always used any one channel.” . ‘ an Cincue was divest access of the Director of Central | Intelligence to the President, according to Mr. Bundy. He said that based upon his experience, "I would not have ex- pected...the Agency would have undertaken anything like an attack on the life of a foreign leader without direct order from. higher authority "oo .Tt did not happen in the time I was | ‘there...but I can conceive of the President saying to some- body, I do not want to make this decision but giving some indication of the kind of decision he wanted made." (After Mr. Bundy completed his testimony before the Commission, he contacted the Executive Director the next morning and volunteered that in thinking about some of the interrogation overnight "I have had a vague recollection, which I cannot pinpoint in time, that there was discussion. that I knew about at some time of a proposal or scheme or project" in relation to the Castro regime "that did involve poison, and the characteristic that sticks in my memory is that it would have involved a rather large scale use. of poison and, as I recollect it, it never came anywhere near approval." Proposals under the overall plan with regard Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 33
~33- to Cuba “which did come from time to time (mostly not with respect to assassination) were reviewed in the first instance for practicalibility and only after that for wisdom or peliti- cal rightness, and I recall no proposal for liquidation that ever got past the first stage to the second." ‘A memorandum of the interview with the Executive Director was prepared the next morning to record these addi- tional comments. In this memorandum which was signed by Mr. Bundy and sworn to before a notary public in the form” of an affidavit, Bundy said that. "I simply have no recollec- tion of plans" that "existed in January or February 1961" which involved the attenpted poisoning of any Cuban leader. "I: believe my memory tells me in a more general way that my knowledge of a scheme or idea of using poison probably re- lates to the year 1962." | Gundy further stated: "I am absolutely certain that I never knew of or believed that there was any authorization . to go ahead with an effort to liquidate Castro, or any other Cuban leader." @iith reference to his testimony concerning an execu-— tive action capability, Bundy said that uy recall the words ‘executive action capability’ more clearly today than I dia yesterday...but I do not have any recollection as to what I knew about that or who requested it or how much was done under it. I don't recall having any particular continuing Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 34
—34- _gntexest in or information about that particular activity" which was "something like“ a "plan to have some kind of stand-by capability for action against individuals.” (7) _ Documents of the National Security ’ Council : The Commission requested complete access to papers of the National Security Council, including documents of the predecessors of the Forty Committee, documents of the Special Group, or Special Operations Group, and any other docu- ments which might pertain to the possibility of assassination of Premier Castro. Complete access was not granted. The Com- mission did not have time or staff to undertake an examination of documents in the Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson presidential - libraries. The National Security Council in response to the request for access by the Commission Council files -On Cuba and the Dominican Republic for the period 1959-64, delivered to the Commission what it said was all of its.documents which pertained to the question of pos- sible assasSination attempts on the life of Castro or Trujillo. One of these documents was an excerpt from a papex on "United States Policy Toward Cuba" dated May 4, 1961 and prepared for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on . . \ . ‘ . May 5, 1961... —— . a , . ; « . . Cparagraphs No. 79 and No. 80 from this excerpt are as follows: Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 35
~35-. 79. Castro. A political vulnerability - of the regime lies in the person of Castra himself. It is not clear whether the regime could continue to operate for long without him. There is no question that the bureau- cracy operates relatively freely, and pro- bably makes many decisions without consult- ing Castro. However, it is equally certain .— that the Castro personality and his appeal to the Cuban people is an important element in maintaining popular support for the regime. tf Castro were removed from the scene the regime might collapse for lack of this cen-. _ tral rallying point. On the other hand, the bureaucracy may now be so firmly entrenched that it could function independently-~~although admittedly without the degree of popular sun- port now enjoyed. Further, by using Castro as @ Martvr it micht be possible to generate at least 2 temporary support for his successor. 80. A further possibility attendant upon the death of Castro would be the attitude of the PSP. The party would like to assume a more open and dominant role in the Cuban Government. Castro's death might force or encourage the party into a precipitate move to seize power. If this happenec it would probably have an adverse reaction on - Latin American opinion, though principally at the government level. General Maxwell Taylor, who was referred to in the May 22, 1961 memorandum, when interviewed by the Staff said that he had no knowledge of any assassination plans directed against Castro. (g) June 13, 1961 Taylor Report According to the June 13, 1961 paper, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed President-elect Kennedy in November 1960 at Palm Beach. The Taylor paper was HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 36 Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library
-36- “prepared pursuant to an April 22, 1961 direction by the President to Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arley Burke and Allen Dulles for an overall analysis and study of governmental practices for military, paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity with special attention "to the lessons that can be learned from recent events in -Cuba." There is nothing in the June 13, 1961 Taylor report > 4s which specifically discusses assassination. Glowever, during the time the study was being under~ taken the aforementioned May 22, 1961, FBI memorandum was ‘prepared and sent to Attorney General Kennedy. . j. | ermination of Phase’ r Plan Cr fter. the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, ac~ cording to Sheffield Edwards "the plan, as zy recall, petered out." Edwards said that he did pot become involved with any other person, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, to try to get the pills into Cuba. \ k. Relationship of Phase’ I Plan with Bay of Pig a a a ay OF F1gs GSheffield Edwards, himself, thought that these plans were. developed in connection with the Bay of Pigs, and it was Bissell who was in charge of the overall coordination of the - \ Bay of Pigs operation. Bissell denies that these plans were part of the Bay of Pigs planning. He testified that he was “quite clear" that the plans for attempted assassi- nation of Fidel Castro were not developed as a part of the Bay of Pigs operation. . | _ Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library Sn HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 3?
-37 1. Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba G@issell also felt that to the extent individuals in the Cuban exile community. in Miami may have been involved, "our belief was that Castro was extremely well informed on what was going on." Gissell stated that he did not think the actual at- tempt was ever made, although it is physically possible that the poison pills did reach Cuba. “He also said that although he did not remember having any evidence that Castro knew of these attempts, “it is perfectly possible that, with some time lag, Castro would have come on some evidence of this operation.” (While thé Phase I plans were underway, the Agency received confirmation from contacts in Cuba concerning possible assassination attempts inside Cuba against Castro. Most of these contacts took place in the first part of 1961 immediately preceding the Bay of Pigs landing. In particu- lar, there were several cables received referring to a possible assassination attempt against Fidel Castro on April 9, 1961, during a public appearance at the Sports Palace in Havana. There were also messages received from dissident Cubans inside Cuba in the first few months after the Bay of Pigs invasion. In some of these messages there were references to trying to kill Castro. None of these possible assassination attempts from dissidents inside Cuba appsar to have been ‘coordinated with the Phase I plans. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 36
-38- 2. 1962-63 and the Phase If Plans ‘In late 1961 or a early 1962, which was shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, recalled asking a new case officer "to take over a part of our reviving effort against Castro and the Castro Administration...I probably urged him to look into this plan...which had been the subject of active attention nearly a year before. I have no recollection of authorizing him to revive it, except to look at it as a plan, or to proceed with any action along those lines.”) According to the case officer, he knew of no other plan to assassinate any other foreign leader except Castro. a. The Testimony ‘of ‘the Phase II Case Officer ihe case Officer said that he had a conversation with Richard Bissell, which he believed took place in the latter part of 1961 or early 1962, in which Bissell told him in _ substance that someone in the White House had raised the question whether or not the Agency should develop what was callea an "executive action capability", which was a capability of assassination or liquidation of leaders of foreign countries. The case officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation against ‘Castro "had been mounted" and "that it had been handlea through Sheffield Edwards." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 39
-39- The case officer said he was then briefed by Edwards on the operation that had been previously conducted. This . testimony was corroborated by Colonel Edwards. Both. Edwards and the case officer stated that Edwards did not have any further contact with any subsequent phase after Phase L..4 Colonel Edwards put the Phase It case. officer in, contact with the. case officer who had been involved with, Phase I for a briefing. The Phase II case officer ‘then took over this entire operation for the Agency. Ghe Phase Ii case officer stated in a recorded inter view that after he was briefed by the previous case. officer and discussed the matter with Sheffield Edwards, he then discussed the matter with Richard Helms. The Phase If case officer took over the direct contact with the Mafia per- sonnel, which to the best of his recollection occurred "apout early April 1962."" Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 40
~4 O- waren _‘The Phase II plans involved two possibilities of assassination: rifle fire and the use of poison pills. Delivery of funds for the acquisition of rifles and handguns plus some medicinal drugs and anti-biotics took place in the summer of 1962. According to the case officer, it was Somewhat less than $5,000. The money was delivered to the Mafia contact, and the case officer received a report . . from the Mafia contact that the Cuban contact had called to report that the arms and poison pills had gotten into Cuba. The case officer stated that during the period of time he was involved with the overall operation, he felt he was dealing with a very volatile situation that “in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs failure" was the kind of an operation that the Government, the Agency or anybody else could not afford to have surface. "ort was quite obvious that there - was. an explosion potential here~-an explosion not in the 4A technical sense~--a flap potential, if you will, but it took some time to find out just what could be done and how it could be done, to try to ‘sanitize the possible reper— ‘cussions of this.” In 1975 the case officer stated that very shortly after taking over the operation he reached a tentative conclusion that the plan had little chance of success and he decided to "wind down" the plans gradually. the winding down was completed in the Spring of 1963 and in June 1963, the case officer went abroad to another position wholly unconnected with the Cuban operation. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld: 32112745 Page 41
-41~ Gwen asked any the operation did not meet with. success, the case officer said "I don't know if I have any valid opinion why. There are a great many things that could have happened. It wasn't tried, it was choked off, it was penetrated from the start--at least on the Cuban end--that is the end in Cuba. When I say I have no personal knowledge of this, I am aware that Castro has ' Glaiméd there were a number of attempts on his life. I am aware that he has blamed those on the U.S. in general and the CIA in particular. But I have no personal knowledge of facts which would prove that there was ever actually, if you will, a shot fired or any poison administered, or any other attempt other than in the inchoate stage." ! . | Ghe case officer also stated that "given the capa- bilities of Castro's security apparata and the general seive-like character of the community in exile and the. number of people who knew at least something about this particular incident or operation, before I had any connec- tion with it, or later as a result of things that occurred before I had any connection with it, I think and thought at the time that it was conceivable that it had been penetrated. I cannot honestly state that I had at that time any firm reason to believe that Castro was aware of this operation.” | Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:32112745 Page 42
-42- b. The Testimony of Colonel Edwards re Knowledge of Phase II is ‘According to Colonel Edwards, at the time of the May 7, 1962 briefing of Attorney General Kennedy, he did not know that the new case officer whom he had earlier briefed was undertaking another plan along the lines of Phase I and therefore he didn't tell the Attorney General at the time of the briefing that there was a Phase II plan underway. G. ° The Testimon of Richard Bissell re .Authorization of Phase II Bissell stated that he had no recollection of _ authorizing the case officer to revive the plan except to look at it as a plan or to proceed with any action along those lines. . d. - Knowledge ‘of John McCone,' Director Of ' Central Intelligence re Phase If @The Phase IT case officer stated that sometime prior to August 1962, he had a conversation with Richard Helms, who had succeeded Richard Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans. The case officer said that the question was raised - whether or not the new Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, should be briefed of the operation. "T did re- commend to Mr. Helms that since this 'operation' and the possible repercussions from it all stemmed from actions which had taken place long before either Helms or myself had had — any personal connection with it, and before John McCone had had any connection whatever with the Agency, and since the Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 43
-43- decision had been made at that. time that this should be sanitized, tied off and terminated as soon as practically feasible, I saw no reason why the new DCI should be briefed on it, and TI stronyly recommended that he not be." | G@he case officer said that to the best of his know ledge McCone at no time in 1962 knew of the fact that Phase II of the operations were underway. | John McCone testified that he first learned about Phase IT when he was first interviewed by the Executive Director of the CIA Commission in April, 1975, and McCone further stated that the only knowledge he had of Phase I was knowledge he received on:August 16, 1963 upon receipt of a memorandum from Richard Helms together with a copy of the May 14, 1962 memoranda of the record delivered to Attorney General Kennedy. CHeims said that although he had no recollection of any discussion with the case officer not to tell the Dixector ‘of Central Intelligence, Mr. .McCone, in 1962 about the existence of plans, "I have no reason to cavil" that this was the fact. er ee Speen ( > Helms was then asked whether he remembered any dis- cussions with the case officer concerning the furnishing of either arms or poison pills to Cuban exiles to have them and try and carry out any assassination plans. Helms Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld: 327112745 Page 44
~44- replied "I don't have any question that we tried to line them in Cuba,to bring down this government or to kill any- body they could lay their hands on." But he did not recall: that “a specific project was approved which was designed for a man to go to point B and actually shoot or poison or do something to Castro." . (Helms testified before the Commission that. “he was not aware of the CIA ever having assassinated any foreign leader. [I certainly never authorized the execution of any such operation while I was Director or Deputy Director and when I was Deputy Director for Plans I don't remember it coming forward. I certainly never recommended such an action to the then Director." The case officer said that he had a conversatiol with Richard Bissell, which he believed took place in the latter part of 1961 or early 1962, in which Bissell told. him in substance that someone in the White House had raised the question whether or not the Agency should develop what was called an "executive action capability", which was a capability of assassination or liquidation of leaders of foreign countries. The case officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation against Castro "had been mounted" and "that it had been handled through Sheffield Edwards." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library ' ‘ HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 45
-45- g- The August 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) The Phase II case officer said that he was at a meeting of what was known as the "Special Group (Augmented) i the State Department in August 1962, when someone brought up the sibility of "liquidation" of Castro. John McCone was at that meeting and according to the case officer, John McCone "got rather red in the face" and made a remark which "was a clear effort to stop any such proposals, suggestion or any. discussion thereof at that meeting within that forum imme- diately." 5 Gohn McCone testified that he was at that meeting at . the State Department which took place on August 10, 1962. : The Special Group (augmented) was a group of senior people in the Administration who were involved in overall planning with operations directed against Cuba. Included in that group were the Secretary of State. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, the Attorney General of the United States, Robert Kennedy, the Assistant to the President for National Security, McGeorge Bundy, and General Lyman Lemnitzer (who is a member of the Commission). The coordinat- ing officer. of the Special Group (Augmented) was Brigadier General Edward Lansdale. (Robert Kennedy was not present at the August 10, 1962, meeting.) Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327117745 Page 46
-46- » The CIA case officer who was in attendance at that meeting under date of August 14, 1962, prepared a memorandun for the Deputy Director of Plans, who was Richard Helms, in which he attached a copy of an August 13, 1962 memorandum prepared by General Lansdale. The CIA case officer's memorandum to Helms said: 1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your informa- tion. . 2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate para- graph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders. 3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secre-tary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject. which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is. not expecting any written comments or study on this point. 4. Upon receipt of the attached : memorandum, I-- called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document per- taining to this and would participate in no open meet- ing discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those dissemi- nated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 47
~A47- The attached Lansdale memorandum under date of August 13, 1962 had excised from it a phrase. The blank space was the approximate size of the phrase, "including the liquida- \ tion of leaders". Caccording to Robert M, McNamara, he had no recoilec- tion of being present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. "f'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no recollection of it. I do seem to recall. that there was such a group, I doubt very much if I was a member of it." He said that he “might ‘have been a participant" at one or more meetings. When asked whether or not he heard anyone discuss the possibility of “assass sinating Castro or any other foreign leader, McNenara replied: "NO. I should interject here another point I made earlier, as I have no notes--I did not take notes of any meetings I attended with rare exceptions, and I have no other’ basis for refreshing my memory and my memory of those years is very bad. I'm not saying this to in any way qualify what I'm saying except that it is a fact that my memory is poor in relation to the period." CicNamara stated that "I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated, which seems to me...extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been.taken to move in that direction, it would have had to receive the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other officials at that Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DocId:32112745 Page 46
-48- same level, including my deputy, I think, and my deputy never would have approved anything like that without dis- cussing it with me." Secretary McNamara said that he "couldn't imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was known to the President and was not known to Mr. Bundy. TI can imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy, not known to- the President’ either because they were not that important or conceivably because it was thought desirable to protect the President from certain knowledge. ..I can't imagine Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though to do so would by that action involve the President. I say I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign - leader without the President's knowledge because it is the President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it ever became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest of us, the importance of protecting the presidency as well as the particular president, and particularly protect- ing his ability to govern." (2) The Testimony of John McCone — (Sohn McCone Cestified that he was present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. He said that he objected }to the discussion of liquidation of leadership as a possibility of consideration and he later talked with Secretary McNamara and exoressed the same view, and he said Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327117745 Page 49
-~A9- Secretary McNamara agreed. John McCone testified that at the time of the August 10, 1962 meeting he did not know of the existence of Phase I of any assassination plans nor did he know that at the. very time the meeting was going on Phase II was a continuing plan in the CIA. (3) The Affidavit of General Leinnitzer 8 Lyman Lemnitzer, now a member of this Commission, was also present on the August 10, 1962, meeting. In an affidavit he declared that he has no recollection of the question of liquidation of Castro or other Cuban leaders being discussed. (4) The Testimony of General’ Lansdale General Lansdale said that the possi- bility of assassination may have been discussed at that meeting. He also said that it was possible that the excised phrase from his memorandum was “including liquidation of -leaders," but he stated that this was merely a matter of considering a possibility, one of several alternatives. G@ansdale had no specific recollection of the August 10, 1962, meeting although he said that "it is quite possible" that he might have attended that meeting. He also had no specific recollection of his memorandum dated August 13, 1962, and the words whited out. When asked whether or not those words might have been "including liquidation of leaders" Lansdale replied "I doubt it. I just don't recall anything f ~ se Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library at all on liquidation of leaders." HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 50
~50- (5) Interrogation of General Taylor General Taylor said he had no recollection of an assassination being discussed, although he said that it might have been. General Taylor was at the meeting. (6) Additional Testimony of General Lansdale — ccording to Lansdale, during 1960 he was, Deputy Assistant Oo to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. He said. he had no knowledge of any discussion of possible plans for the assassination of any foreign leaders. Stn 1961 Lansdale was appointed by Secretary McNamara as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. Lansdale said that he had a discussion with President Kennedy. "I do not recall exactly on that. He asked me if I would think about the situation in Cuba and if I could come up with any suggestions or recommend..tions from such a study. It was a rather vague assignment by him, but it was to be done for him personally.” (Lansdale "suggested an intermediary" to whom he would report and Lansdale said the President "appointed his brother, who was the Attorney General." CRecording to Tansdale, he made an initial series of. recommendations in late 1961 or early 1962, in writing, addressed to the President, "to see if there was a possi- bility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their political thinking together to see if there would be any Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 51
-51-+ feasibility of a revolution in Cuba." He says he thinks he gave the written report to the Attorney General for delivery to the President and that he later saw the paper "in the files of the President...he received it and he had possession of it." a Guring the first part of 1962-there were discussions about Cuban exiles possibly going back inside Cuba to harass the regime. Lansdale stated that the possibility of these exile groups trying to assassinate Castro "might will have been mentioned." However, he said that "rT don't recall a single instance of any serious action being undertaken" on any plan for assassination. He went on to say that what- ever discussions took place concerning assassination related to possibilities rather than actualities. ——— oD ‘nansdale said that if there were directions to submit ‘papers, it was-an authorization for submitting papers and not an authorization for necessarily carrying out the action: Lansdale admitted that "there might well have been" a request for the CIA to come up with, as a possibility, a plan for liquidation of leadership. a? Tf that request was made, he said it could have been \ one of his requests and that he "quite probably would have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense" and “possibly the Attorney General with whom I was in contact." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 52
Photocopy from ; Gerald Ford Library ~52- oo a) Guansdale said that at no time during 1960, 1961, 1962 or 1963 did he have any knowledge of the existence of any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader or any other leader. Lansdale testified that ne. never heard any discussion of "executive action capability. ' ne: Additional interrogation of General Tayior General Maxwell Taylor said that he was not aware of the existence of any plans to assassinate Castro. He said he did not have any discussions. with the President concerning the possibility or the existence of the plans to assassinate Castro. However, " ..in the case of Bob ‘Kennedy and Allen Dulles, we talked about so many things at the time of the Bay of Pigs as we sat around the table I couldn't say--that the desirability of the disappearance - of Custro or what would happen if he were assassinated in Cuba--that was not raised, I don! t recall. He said he didn't recall any conversations about assassi- nation with McGeorge Bundy or Walt Rostow. "I couldn't say that discussion in the abstract twouldn 't it be a nice thing if someone bumped Castro off' that could well have been said, but I just don't recall ite’ Graylor said that he never knew of -any authorization fox the CIA to undertake any assassination. He also said he had no knowledge of the phrase “executive action capa- bility” ox any proposal for -the CIA to Gevelop a general standby capability to assassinate foreign leaders. HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 53
-53- i. Additional Testimony of Richard Helms 2 Gachara Helm, now Ambassador to Iran, also testified that "there was a flat-out effort ordered by the White House, the President, Bobby Kennedy who was after all his man, his right hand in these matters, to unseat the Castro government, to do everything possible to get rid of it by whatever device could be found and that was the reason for mounting this large operation in Miami to work on this very problem. And the Bay of Pigs was a part of this effort and after the Bay of Pigs failed, there was even a greater push to try to get rid of this Communist influence 90 miles from the United States shores. (vone business about the assassination of Castro, I have read about this in the papers. I have heard about it from | . associates. It has been kicked around whether. this was a viable proposition or not. I have no doubt it was written into various plans as one of many options but I don't recall any successful effort that was made in this direction and since Castro is alive and apparently well in Havana, the extent to which this was serious I have never ascertained." Ganbassadox Helms said he did not “recall ever having heard anything about poison pills or any of that". . He did recall that “at some juncture” a decision was reached "that it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the Attorney General.“ about “various things that the Agency Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 54