Classification: : .(This form is to be: y d for. material extracted from ClA—controlled documents. ) “most, glaring omission ‘being ‘the absencé} SS erom ; ir oo ; ; . | . » ote 4 Calderon ‘ge hee 201, filefot, cryptic remarks mame Ee im Peoteetk more bon ecting PAE GA SEA GWION I ne This. Committee" s investigation of Luisa calderon has . revealed that: a defector from the cuban » Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi— a “ficant information about Lee Harvey. Oswald's. contacts : . with the DGI in. Mexico city. ‘This defector was as ae assigned, the. CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1. (A-1 hereinafter) oo “CIA. files. ‘reveal that . aA-1 defected. from the | DSI on April 21, seal When he defected, A-1L possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned over to the CIA. (CIA poc-|__|IN 6 68894, 4/24/64) - Following his defection, a CIA officer, sosept. Langosch, went{ to meet. acl, debrief him, and arrange for A-1' Ss travel. into the united States. (Ibid.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch' s oe *It is now known that A-1 ‘aid provide si ge pipes) F “Leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon’ t oS fur tér, ‘tg aitie ation that little of this information. SECRET “was mage @-py_the CIA to the Warren Commisenene. ae ae Oo Therefore, ‘the possibility exists: that. A-l had. ; a . oo provided other information td CR ashidd by | derivation: , Po to y af n Commission’ s WOrk ‘gle :
(This form ig to be used for material : extracted oe, oe inh le from ClA—controlled documents.) ne . . : tie . sate bint odanla med otninae stat wine xt onisncaccietnth . debriefing. of a-1 were, forwarded tof _|tcra Doc. Pispatenfocon, 7763, 5/1/64) ‘Effective on May Ly ACL was vunder | ‘contract with ‘the: (CIA ‘for operational purposes. + ok (cra. Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64) on mn oa ES tt ee mg en meneame (By June 23, 1964, ‘Langosch was convinced ‘that aI would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: ‘There is no. question in my mind that | AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with. accurate and valuable information concerning 7 Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, . t and agents.. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to ae Director of Security, 6/23/64) “9. cee - As an officer of the DGI, A-1. from August of” 1963. until his defection was assigned to. the DGI' Ss Illegal Section B (CIA Doc. EN 68894 4/24/64) which was responsible -for training agents for. assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi— a ‘bility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. » (CIA Doc. ‘Personal - ‘Record Question- — naire 6/4/64; CIA Doc.[__|fn 68894 4/24/64) A-1 identified for the CIA the. Cuban Intelli- @ * gence officers assigned to Mexico city. ; _Langosch described A-tt s “knowledge of DGI operations in — Mexico as. follows: 53 : v4 a an ‘Classification: _000085 , J Classified by derivation:
; Classification: = (This. form is: to. ‘be used. for: material ‘extracted - ‘from ClA—controlled documents. ). In Mexico . City,. che knows who the. - intelligence. people are. One is the. _. Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is. .. Galled- the Chief of: the Centre. = That ° . is his title but he is. actually the fe ' intelligence’ ‘Chief, or at least he "was until the 16th of- April at which. time a> replacement. was’ sent to Mexico. _to take over. This. fellow's name is. ‘Manuel Vega. -The. source says that — -. the Commercial attache whose name is. ' Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) ‘and another one is Rogelio. (.I might Say that some of these names. are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing . of A-1, | 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64) _ Thus, acl was. able to. Provide the CIA soon ae after his defection with accurate information | regarding DGI. operations and DGT. ‘employees in. oe Mexico City. #& “Een sect Fron Pte | | “the ‘Committee h has reviewed ‘the CIA! s- ‘files - concerning A-l. This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any — valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining: to the. assassination of President Kennedy;. and 2) e whether, if such leads were ‘provided, these leads. and/or. other significant information were made available to the Warren Commission. SECREL io Classification: = wo i Classified by derivation:
materials provided by the CIA to the’ Warren. ‘Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within SECRET,” Classification: _ _ (This form is to. be used for material extracted | oe from ClA—controlled documents.) The. ‘Committee’ s initial review of the | “Commission did not disclose the. existence of ‘the . AMMUG files. “However, the Committee ‘did during se the course of its. review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made xeference to Anh. Included in this: file was’ a | memorandum of May ‘Se 1964 written by “Joseph Langosch which concerned. information A-L provided about the Oswald case. “(CIA Doe. FOTA 68— -290 this file were ‘the A-1 debriefing memoranda of May Te and. “May 8, 964 previously . cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA 4687-295, ‘attach!s 3 and S$) Following review of the inemoranda, the | Committee requested access to all CIA files concerning referring to A-1. | . - Prom review of these materials the conmitteg. has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid~May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City. fe Classified by « derivation: ry : NG “SMR, GER,
(This forni | is to. be used for material extracted from CIA~controlled documents.) “ Ke! Warren Commi SS far, / Prior x toMearning of. (Oswald's probable contact with | DGI officers, . James Angleton, Chief. o£. the * 7 CIA's Counter ‘Intelligence ‘Staff passed an internal memorandum to. Raymond | Rocca, also. of the ‘Counter- 7 intelligence Staff, which stated. that he had been informed by the ‘DOP, Richard Helms, that. J. Lee | Rankin had contacted John McCone to request. that the Director. consent to. an interview before. the” Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar | Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone' s appearance. arren, Commission Report, iS tei29) (CIA Doc. FOIA 689- 298, _— Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) _aieiatin So also. wrote: I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of. the recent. information which you are ‘processing which originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source. I- ‘informed him that in your view this would. raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the’ _ Commission prior to the Director's appear- ance unless we have-first had some pre- liminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implica- tions since: it could well serve as the _. basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this care-- fully amd made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.) — Classification: _ 7 é | 5 ‘Ye, WA. Classified by deriv PA HOR fi aR.
Classification: | {This form is to be. used for material extracted — cunadi BESET Y CHS PEL BSc source referred to in Angleton’: s memo was A-1. This conclusion : is based in’ part upon the date of this memo which © was quite close in ‘time to Ar! s defection. i addition, Rocca's staff prepared prior to DCI McCone' s appearance before the Warren a“Brief rn Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission ‘outlining various positions adopted by. the CIA visa vis its investigative efforts and. assistance to the ‘Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695- ~302-A, 5/14/64) | At Tab E of this brief it states: ‘Within the past: week, significant infor- mation has been developed by the CIA re- | -.garding the relationship with Oswald of. certain Cuban intelligence personnel in ‘Mexico City and the reaction in Havana “within the Cuban Intelligence Service > to. the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. . THe Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the ‘Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab E) On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-1. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64) However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information — SeCR: EL Classification: __ . I - Clossified Py sod jooss 0 03 39 4 | ’
; Classification: ___secrer. | (This form is “to ‘be used for material. extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) was a defector then residing under secure. conditions. in, the Washington, D.C. area. ‘(1bia. . The ‘May 1s. communication did : a ‘state that the Agency had | "established contact "with a well-placed invidivual . who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General ‘de 7 7 Intelligencia." (Ibid. ) Attached to ‘the May 15 communication was a copy of: Langosch' Ss above ‘referenced memorandum of | May 3+ 1964 regarding knowledge of. Oswald's _pro~ “bable contact. with. ‘the. DGI in, “Mexico Gey. ‘The. . attachment made no reference to the. source’ s. status as a defector from the Dex. (bid. attachment). As set forth in the. section of this report. concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 1s, 1964, Howard Willens of ‘the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch' Ss. May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa~ ‘tion set. “forth in the. memo was elicited. Neither gthe questions nor the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source’ s status as a defector col- laborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64). wa) tv 3 rs oouna aie SiR. to Classified by derivation: ——
7 " merge) : Classification: - - this form is. to be used for. REGRE hs - from ClA-—controlled documents.) Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, “the. Committee has ‘determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon. specifically ' Of Nov. 22. details of her oe her conversation. ana-@Ssociation with Cuban. Intelligence :' were. withheld from the Warren Commission... ‘This . "information as described above, was derived ftom a fot ‘However, _ debriefings of A~l. From the Committee’ Ss review of. the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee. has not found any credible evidence indicating that. other information provided by A-1 to ‘the CIA was. “relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, » in its review the Committee has. determined that ae as specific document. » referenced | ain the AL file iss 0. 3 not present in. that file. The. missing itemis of considerable concern to the Committee. It isa debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case." (CTA Doc Dispatch [urcw-] _ 5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch | my records the transmittal of the report, along with | - - eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Ihid.) Next to the: listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "STL" A CIA employee who has worked extensively with the Agency files , a Classified by derivation ii O70 4. woe
oo + reert we os Lean ee s aten ne ve senabsbel ~ notation ¥ was ‘the symbol for the CIA component _Cr/sic. IN a CIA memorandum dated September 27, _ debriefing Report No. 40, is a. duplication of “have contact with the Warren Commission and does 7 - Gassfection: : - This farm iste be used far neti ete em lA—eeniralled ESEYMENS) aa 80. ~ system | told a Committee, staff member ‘that this EG known as ‘Special Intelligence. Other CIA. representatives believed the notation was’a = reference to the Counterintelligence component: : 1978, ‘the | CIA has adopted the position that : the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964 concerning ‘AMMUG' s knowledge of. Lee Harvey Yel ote ntact) cs Rada s pgssible contact , With the pet. e  Neverthel + ASS we auth, hag pet (Sinead, te (is Botitastie eae Kiger eet re 6 e ‘° , ‘ The’ Committed has” questioned’ Ans OM case Premera dion | officers regarding additional information. ‘hat a1 nay a have. supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, ‘when interviewed by the’ Committee, stated that. he did not. rn not know what information| derived from A-1's| de- , briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also Interviews of Hildago & Piccolo) He also stated that: he does not. recall that. A-1 provided shy oftes Enformatien | essen. $ secret . 7 in iti q RO. Ca GEE GR lam. Saas | h :
9 : - Classification: — : 7 form is. 49 be wes ig. set sates rom ClA—eantraied HSSHMENE) ~80a- _*The CIA memorandum ‘states in part as follows: When: CL Staf£ ‘learned ‘of ‘AMMUG-1's defection» and considered ‘the. ‘possibility that he. might have some knowledge of the Oswald. case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions - to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing AMMUG~1...WH desk records reflect that AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding _. this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive : Matter, it was dictated directly to a cr. (Counterintelligence) stenographer. on. 5° May. 1964. /Note: A-1 was debriefed on ‘several. subjects on.4 May 64. -‘The procedure ... was to assign each subject . discussed a. debriefing. number and they were written - up in contact report form by the WH case officer. The instructions from CI staff _ were to handle the. Oswald case debriefing .., very. closely . and not to keep any copies in. oo WED Division/. '.The "Oswald Case".was’ logged in the WH notebook log as. debriefing “report number 40, but the report itself _Wwas dictated by the WH Case Officer directly - to a CI staff Stenographer. There would. _be no.reason to include the number 40 on - the report of this special debriefing for -.CI. staff, since it was their only debriefing - report. We are'certain it is the debriefing _ report (#40) because the date is the same; it is the only. debriefing report on. Oswald ay Gy 063: listed in AMMUG-1 records; and it it (sic) the only AMMUG~1 debriefing report: in Oswald’ s 201 file. (CIA ‘Doc., Memorandum for the Record, Regarding AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report on the Oswald Case, 27 September, 1978, p. 1) | Gesstication SECRET ye ‘el % ti __ : ona. -000i03 |
Secret - Gesificction (ie form is te. be used for retort Ce a Syk—centraled documents) a ~81- ‘on os Oswald's contact with the DGI “except for ‘that set forth in: “the. Memoranda of May 5, Ty and 8 - as discussed herein. (Ibid. ) | | ‘In: a further, effort to clarify. the substance of information that A-L ‘provided to the CIA oo regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to locate BL. The IA has also attempted to - locate Acl,. whose, present relationship with” : the | Agency is: ; ambiguous, but has been aioe to determine his present whereabouts. x The- CIA® s oe inability to: locate A-L has been a source of! concern to° this: Committee, particularly in oe light of his long association with the. Agency. ‘(remaas Acemplcte uw «thc Par nies += Thus , + oh are mete rece hot ASSL” ‘information A-1 “may have. “supplied the CIA about Oswald. However, with a? the exception of ‘the Calderon episode and on the oy > * basis of the CIA! s written reocrd, it appears that & the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1 —_ q information of investigative Significance. A separate question remains, - however. The oe ( Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-~1 was present in- the a a a g = a perk eC 0G32
7: Session: sss ig. igen is 18 be. sed «5F materia sae em clA—centratled BOHEME) --Bla- Aaa April 1978 CIA communication: to ‘the FBI regarding “ASL. states in pertinent part: Since’ 1971 (A-1) has not been involved in any CIA operation in Miami. or. elsewhere. (Joseph Norris Jis the alias of a CIA representative[who ‘periodically debriefs . - / (An-1)_ on. personalities and methods of the. DGI. _JThere is no other CIA involvement with Rodriguez... (CIA Doc. 0807602, CIA 202417, vol. 46 A-1L File 201-749651) oo “However, a. CIA handwritten index: card concerning. the Agency status of A-1 States:. , “Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that (A-1) not receiving any. salary, but could be paid if _ and when used in.an operation. No problems - here. (CIA Doc., Handwritten: Note, — April 1977, contained in Vol. A of A~l" file . 201- -749651) | At: — seat 00010 a ‘a % sot ameter? sak PY re, ‘ Mi
Be ces eint e ys wm naa P ‘Rona | fides. : a ST a ’ his a was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an Classification: : SECRET. (This form. is ‘to be used for material extracted tashingtonroCer-cotaleber reece controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission.’ Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious, concern. “for protecting its ‘sources, the fact that A-l's Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it: concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as: the written. record tends to. status was. not disclosed prevented the Warren ; oe oe f ‘show, the. Agency ‘unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option. In Light of the establishment of ASL! s proven reliability and his depth of : knowledge of, Cuban intelligence activities, this. option might es well have. been considered by the Warren Commission. Book. cd During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General deh Lacks, € The AMLASH: Operation Cte be i Ine cok gis Ate issued a report which examined CIA supported “assassination plots. Included in this report | SECRET Classification: _ 009108 Classified by derivation:
gg — Classification: ; | (This form is. to be. used for material. extracted from ClA—controlled documents. ) - Agency project. referred to as the AMLASH | 7 “operation ( (CIA. Inspector General Report: 1967. - Be . pp. 1-74; 78-112). : “The " AMTASH operation involved | re high level Cuban ‘official ‘(assigned the. CIA oS cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to ; 7 assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). As a - - : xesult of AMLASH' Ss expressed objective and. the oe | 4 cia's desire to find a. viable political. alternative | § ' to: the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently ‘providea AMLASH with both moral and. material. ; ‘support designed to depose Fidel Castro. cia. -_ PP. ‘80- -94). _ The AMLASH operation Was - terminated Be 7 4 | by | the CTA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. — (Ibid. pp. ‘104~106) During 1965, AMLASH and. his ‘conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting at. Castro! s request the sentence was reduced to. ty oe . é t # 7 against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced ‘to death, but Oo g twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid.. pp. 107-110). : L In. its examination of the -AMLASH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH 's plotting. (Ibid. p. aL tr we Co id j SEC _ Classification: _ [ Classified by derivation: .
offer of Support to AMLASH reported by. fhe Loe gg ee a Classification: ___sECREL ) ’ (This form, is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) The most striking example of the CIA's direct ee 1967. IGR states: | "it is likely that at the. very. moment President. Kennedy was. shot a CIA officer - See as 5 was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving a him an assassination device for use against CASTRO. " . (ibid, ) or refuting castro! s knowledge of the ‘AMLASH operation prior to ‘the assassination of President Kennedy. The , 1967 IGR dia note ‘that: in 1965 when AMLASH was The 1967 TGR offered no firm evidence confirming g act tried innavana/Bress reports of Cuban knowledge . Of AMLASH! s. association with the CIA were dated from, : a &§ November 1964, approximately one year after President Kennedy' s assassination, | (Ibid. p- 111). SO Oe ¢ The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail, (ssc, Book. V, pp. 2- -7, 67-69) The Church Committee ¢ concluded: , . . | The AMLASH plot was more relevant. to the § Warren Commision work than the early CIA - assassination plots with the underworld. a 5 Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH Classification: _
. of Cuban government or ‘Cuban exile i A 2 Ae fe a a Cesetatns: (This. form j is ‘to. be used for: material extracted, ’ from ClA—controlled documents.) - va operation was, in “progress at the tine : Of, the assassination; cunlike, the earlier “plots, the AMLASH operation could ee clearly t be. traced. to. the cra; and” unlike. the earlier plots, the CIA had. "endorsed AMLASH! s proposal for a coup, ‘the first. 'step to. him being Castro! s. assassination, despite ‘Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i. e- the. ‘CIA and the FBI)” was told of | the AMLASH operation. No one investi-_ gated a connection between the AMEASH operation ‘and President Kennedy! s "assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro- Castro and anti- Castro groups for many months before. the - assassination, the CIA did not “conduct, ; a thorough - investigation of questions involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p- 5)... - Classification: _ | Classified by derivation:
| Classification: = “. (This form is to. be used: for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents. ). In 1977, the CIA issued a. second Inspector mo General's Report. concerning the subject of CIA. "sponsored. assassination plots. This Report, ino a large part, was intended as Church Committee's findings. ‘The cer ak ceases -The Report. (of the Church Committee) assigns. it (the. AMLASH operation) | characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassina- tion of JEK in order to support the ssc view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977. IGR p. 2) “the 1977, TGR concluded that. prior. to the assassination of President Kennedy, the ‘AMLASH “operation was not an assassination plot. FR Nevertheless, the 1977 bon aid state: co) ; HD would have served to reinforce the a credibility of (the Warren Commission) 4S its efforts had it taken a. broader view " dotay' _of the matter fof normal avenuesof. investigation}. The CIA, too, could. for! Sends have considered in specific terms what most then saw in general terms-~ the possibility of Soviet or Cuban _involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of. the time. It. is not enough to be able to point Ze" 3 Yeas rit 33 R Ra Classification: | _ Classified by derivation: SS a aa a os
_ _ Cleon, SECRET. (This, form is to ‘be: used for material extracted | . from ClA—controlled documents.) mo to erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken. broader. _ .. initiatives then as well.. That... - _., CIA employees at. the time. felt-~as - a they obviously did--that. the activities os about which they knew had no relevance | Sos ~~ to the Warren Commission inquiry does ts ~ . . not take the place of a record of coe conscious review. (Ibid. p. 1 Lat Copuckie~ Richard Helns, as the ‘Aighest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on Coa regular basis, testified ‘to the Rockefeller | ' The a . Commission that. ‘he did not believe the AMLASH a 7 - : é Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component : Sta St responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence operation was relevant. to the investigation of President Kennedy’ Ss death. | (Rockefeller Commission, ‘Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 PP- 389- ~391, 332) _ In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this. io ~ committee that the AMLASH operation | was not. designed to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, Pp. 26~ 27). A “contrasting view to the testimony | of Mr. . Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in: 1963 Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, SeCREL ctneecations- _ 7 ; | Classified by ie DBL 4
wee te Sarees] ES | ~~ asication Secret Fis form fg 18 8 used for material axa | . te RE dseuments) : -88-— | Sept. 14, 1978, pe The ‘Special | Affairs. Stafe . owas headed by Desmond FitzGerald and. was ‘responsible. for the ‘AMLASH operation (ssc, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) - Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence gor” the ‘Special Affairs Staff, was responsible ‘for ‘safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign : intelligence services, particularly the Cuban "Intelligence Services| ‘(HSCA Classified Affidavit ‘Langosch's_ recollection that: Oo westhe AMLASH operation. prior to. the - ‘assassination of President: Kennedy was ‘characterized by the Special Affairs: Staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination — operation initiated and Sponsored by the oy CIA. (Ibid., p.. 4) | Langosch further recollected that as. Of 1962 — de was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services. were aware of AMLASH and his association . with the CIA and that the information upon which _ of ‘Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). Tt was f _ he based his conclusion that the AMLASH _- seep 3% on ree ie) _ operation was insecure was available to senior Level CIA. &y officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. ‘(ibid., p. 4) 4 | However, the issue before this. Committee is _ Seen: ace - eal cat
© Seine ees | { i Orm {s i 9 used oF eit axe & astse | : om —=controlie Umen rom om ONT PONE: 3 uments ~88a- *In response to Langosch's sworn “statements, this: ren Committee has ‘received from the CIA an affidavit we a. executed by Kent L. Pollock (CIA: pseudonym) who. "served as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the : entire period in which he was Chief of the Special . Affairs: Staff...and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it. progressed." (CIA Doc., Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, executed Oct. 5, 1978, p. 1) Mr. Pollock specifically. contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH. operation. was characterized. by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an- - assassination operation. | ‘In pertinent part, Pollock drew the following conclusions: . To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald. , a f considered the AMLASH operation to bea. political action activity -with the objective of organizing «= a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the -  ¢ Castro regime by means of a coup d'tetat.. I heard” os Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation oo frequently, and never heard him characterize. it as an "assassiahion Operation." Mr. FitzGerald Stated within. my hearing on several occasions. his awareness that. coup d'etat often involves” loss of life. (tbid., par. 3, Pp. 2) He also stated: Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an “assassidntion Operation"; the. case officer did not; I,”as Executive Officer, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the otheg branch chiefs and the special assistants coulda” not” have so characterized © it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by ro.) for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) | The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy' S death. AMLASH rejected. the pen with gy Stead + par. 4, p. 2/), (Thid., | par. 6, p. 3) ~~ 2000635 — Clete esas —— ge rey 7 its saci ei Ca Berk
| Clesification:— not . simpy Tia dog ds tae ed for spate segs an from CiA—tontrolle jocuments.) assassination plot prior to "President ‘Kennedy' s x death. - The broader and. more significant issue, 7 as" the 1977 TGR, has identified it, ‘is. ‘whether the AMLASH “operation was of sufficient relevancy. to have been reported to the Warren ‘Commission. ° In the ‘case of the AMLASH operation this Co, a détermination isa most difficult matter to | — § resolve. “Reasonable men may: differ in. their , characterization of the Agency's operational | 6 objectives. “Based upon, the presently available evidence it is the Committee" s position that such informa 7 tion, aif made available to the Warren “Commission, ; might have stimulated the Commission' s investiga- . tive. concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As d. ‘Lee Rankin commented before this Committee: -...when I read...the Church Committee! Ss. 5 report--it was an ideal situation for © ® 6 3 them to just pick out any way they . wanted to tell the story and fit it. é in with the facts that had to be met ze and then either blame the rest of it 7 ¥ ; on somebody else or not tell any more or polish it off. I don't think that . Ss Pit CR area .. Classification: _ onodi4 y i ; Classified by derivation:
me 6 cement tel dona wens + maumomutenesabe < the past. decade. Classification: , (This form is ‘to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents. ) . . could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better. chance | of getting to. the heart of it.’ rt might have only revealed. that we are involved — in it and who approved it and all. that. But I think that would ‘have at least come out. {HSCA Class.. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91) The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH operation ‘been disclosed to the Warren Commission, the Commission might have ~ been able to foreclose the speculation and - conjecture that has s. ;urrounded the AMLASH operation during 7 , operation remains" a footnote. to the turbulent Felations between Castro's Cuba and the United States. es Classification: _ SECRET | i As history. now records, the AMLASH |. Classified by derivation: