DATE: 11-14-2 eT : di USC 2107 Hote). o17 JFK Assassination System Date: 3/31/201 Identification Form i Agency Information | AGENCY: FBI RECORD NUMBER: _124-10372-10290 RECORD SERIES: HQ . ~ AGENCY FILENUMBER:  62C-HQ-1029205-1182 t i —————— Document Information [ ORIGINATOR: FBI FROM: HQ. TO: WH TITLE: DATE: ~ 05/10/1996 PAGES: 15 SUBJECTS : JFKARCA OF 1992 DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT’ CLASSIFICATION: — Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 04/01/1999 OPENING CRITERIA: INDEFINITE ~ COMMENTS : INC PETITION a v9.1 4 | Docld:32319953 Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1997 (44 Use 3107 Hotey. DATE: 11-14-2017 O CO) . wa ae May 10, 1996 BY HAND The Honorable William J. Clinton President of the United State _ Washington, D.C. 20500... Dear Mr. President: ' For the reasons set forth in detail in the enclosure, this letter requests that you exercise your authority, under Section 9(d) of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, to postpone public disclosure of portions of thirteen documents ordered released by the Assassination Records Review Board. (U) : Consistent. with the spirit of the Act, the FBI has cooperated extensively with the Board and made the broadest disclosure of documents in our history. Over 600,000 pages of material have been transferred to the National Archives, and we are working to transfer another 250,000. We have withheld very a: little, deferred to the Board whenever possible, and appealed on only one previous occasion. Nonetheless, when vital national interests would be compromised by the release of certain information we have asked the Board to postpone disclosure. Unfortunately, in this instance the Board has refused to accede to our request. (U) : ; Disclosure of the documents in question would reveal investigative or surveillance techniques used to gather important information from foreign countries. Disclosure of this material would compromise those techniques and impair foreign relations | nate { 10490 5- | §2 1 -- Director 1 - Mr. Lewis - Ms. Keeley . 1 - Mr. Kennedy 1 - Mr. Collingwood 1 - Mr. P. Kelley ; deo Or, J ~ Mr. R. Bucknam 1 - Mr. K. O'Brien 1 - Mr. D. Evans some «1 - Mr. Bryant 1 - Mr. Maddock 1 - ALU Tickler sm; =o. = ‘Ms. Morris 1 - Mr. Bowman 1 .- ALU Library | Com iw. +1 —- Mr. Perry 1 - Mr. Divers & 6 Ale er cs ‘PWK: pwk (22) VE asritD py IGOSSD heh = — ONY TG pees Er omens to + ener one ome wet _ ere e ree pecon + egal Coun, Tech. Servs. ’ | teaeng ae _ SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED Om. of SECA _ aN UNCLASSIFIED ARATED FROM SIFIED ENCLOSURE & int, Affs, le ————meaae mm OM. of Puose . Cm. Ju. nin repechn_____ Ofion of EEO ene Ores | penis Nakai Sox we Soomnane Bin. _ . ——_——- s OfSce of Pubic & _ Orme Oftea marnoom Depy Obes Gen Coe AS Paras COS MAD Lis, BUDO Docld: 32319955 Page 2? : Wa
Released under the John F. Kenedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1997 (44 USC 7i0T Hotes. _PATE:, 11-14-2017 . fo © WY . SECRET | Document 10019 is a two-page document that relates to various investigative activities, including an interview of an individual named Cedric Younger Von Roldeston, who was also known. as Arthur Swift. Von Roldeston claimed to have visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. To confirm this claim, the document reveals that the "lookout logs" maintained by the Bureau on visitors to the Soviet Embassy were checked. Similarly, the document notes that Arthur Swift wrote to, and received a reply from, the Soviet Ambassador, thus revealing the existence of a "mail cover" on the Soviet Embassy. We seek to postpone disclosure of the words "lookout logs" and “USSR Ambassador." (ROCA) Document 10140 is a two-page teletype that originated in Boston and describes the activities of a mentally disturbed individual. The document is unremarkable from our perspective except for the portion which discloses that the Bureau maintained a "mail cover" on the USSR Embassy. We seek to postpone the word "correspondence" from the document. Similarly, document 124- 10027-10405 (HQ 62-109060-1739) is a three-page document that describes the activities of a man named Allen. We seek to postpone language on the second page which would reveal the existence of an FBI "mail cover" on the Soviet Embassy. 0004) Document 10396 originated in New Yo and concerns a telephone conversationfon a dedicated circui etween a correspondent in the United States of Tass, ‘a Soviet government controlled news organization, and an employee in Moscow of Pravda, a communist-party controlled news organization. We intercepted this conversation through technical surveillance of the ftransoceanic cable on which the circuit was carried) The convérsation focused on American press coverage of Lee Harvey Oswald and related matters. We seek to postpone disclosure of the Tass correspondent's name, his Tass affiliation, the identity of the individual to whom he was speaking and her Pravda affiliation, and language which suggests that the information was gleaned from a telephone conversation between the two. Similarly, document 10048 concerns a telephone [S conversation between a correspondent of the Polish Government's official newspaper, "Trybuna Ludu," and an attorney hired by the — mother of Lee Harvey Oswald. We seek to protect the symbol number for the "informant" mentioned in the document since the number reveals that the information was(really obtained from a telephone tap on a diplomatic establishment of the Polish |s) SECRET Docld: 32319955 Page 4
Released under the John F. Kemedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1997 (44 USC FIT Hotes. ‘ DATE: 11-14-2017 : é \ - SECRET (s) (governmen .© We also seek to postpone disclosure of other information in the document which would reveal that the information was derived from a telephone conversation. At least one of the parties to the conversation is alive and would likely recall that the conversation was Eelephoniefe this information en ce of four taph.) (=) Document 10222 is a two-page teletype that discusses a statement released to the press by the Cuban government. We seek to protect from disclosure those portions of the document, including the symbol number, [Chat reveal our interception of teletype traffic between the Cuban government in Havana, Cuba and the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York, New York-]@) Q&) is not protected, thus confirming the exi Document 124-10027-10133 (HQ 62-109060-2155) is a one- page memorandum that discusses an apparent crank letter sent to the Bureau alleging that President Johnson conspired with communist agents to assassinate President Kennedy. We seek to protect the words "Soviet official" and "Soviet officials in the U.S." since, in context, they demonstrate that we had typewriter specimens of Soviet government typewriters and fingerprint samples of some Soviet officials in the United States. (x) Discussion In executing its law enforcement and counter- intelligence missions, the FBI employs a wide variety of investigative techniques and procedures. Some of these methods are widely known. That we implement wiretaps and mail covers to gather information, for example, is hardly a surprise. How, when, where, and under what circumstances we make such interceptions, are, however, closely guarded secrets. Similarly, that we often attempt to "follow the money" through analysis of financial records may be intuitive but how, when, and why we do so are matters the disclosure of which may seriously erode our ability to carry out analogous operations in the future. Further, if the target of such activity is a foreign nation, disclosure of the activity's existence will inevitably prejudice foreign relations. (U) © In the second paragraph of the State Department memorandum of 4/3/96, the State Department inadvertently refers to the “name of the informant” when discussing this document. Although the document refers to an informant, the source of the information was, as indicated above {really ar an intercept of a conversation between two individuals] (S). SECRET 6 Docld: 32319955 Page 5
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1997 (44 0st 2107 Hote). , DATE: 11-14-2017 SECRET Even were Russia to pay little heed to the practical aspects of these disclosures, it surely could not diplomatically countenance this direct acknowledgement of our use of the technique to monitor its diplomatic establishment's bank accounts and financial transactions. We cannot with certainty predict the exact nature of the Russian reaction, but we are confident that United States--Russian relations will significantly suffer. The State Department concurs in this view. (® UU) Just as importantly, other nations that utilize diplomatic bank accounts and locally issued monies will be sensitized to our ability to monitor their own financial activities. In addition to employing their own countermeasures, we would expect such countries at the least to seek assurances from the United States that we will respect the security of their accounts--assurances that may prove diplomatically difficult if not impossible to provide. Foreign nations could also be expected to argue that our use of such techniques against their establishments and officials violates international treaties and law, as well as diplomatic standards. For these and similar reasons, neither the State Department nor the FBI officially acknowledges that the FBI uses particular techniques to investigate foreign officials or establishments. Given today's uncertain and evolving relationships between the United States and many countries, particularly Russia and the other former members of the Soviet bloc, we cannot afford to reverse that long standing policy now. (KX) We seek to postpone portions of Document 10396 for Similar reasons. As noted above, this two-page document originated in New York and reports on a telephone conversation between two Soviet news correspondents, one in New York and one in Moscow. The Board has agreed to postpone disclosure of the symbol number. We are gratified for this action since disclosure of the symbol would have revealed that the document was the fruit of a telephone intercept in New York City. The Board, however, refuses to postpone the name of the subject--the correspondent in New York--and his Tass affiliation, the identity of the individual to whom he was speaking and her Pravda affiliation, and language which suggests that the information was gleaned from a telephone conversation between the two. In other words, the Board refuses to protect the very information that we sought and the Board decided to protect by postponing disclosure of the symbol number. (®)(U) For virtually identical reasons, we also seek to ’ protect the indicated portions of documents 10048 and 10222. The former concerns an interception of *Ferephond) Conversation 9) SECRET 8 Docld: 32319955 Page 6
ot 1992 (44 USC FIi0T Hote). > 11-14-2017 SECRET between a Polish government news correspondent and an American attorney while the latter reports onfan intercepted teletype sent by one component of the Cuban governimént to another =] (S) Again, one may surmise that the FBI has an interest in eavesdropping on the telephone and teletype conversations of the agents of its adversaries without being privy to any classified materials. That, however, does not mean that the how, when, where, and why of such electronic interceptions are well or even hardly known. On the contrary, our abilities in this regard are, and should remain, closely guarded secrets. Electronic intercepts of foreign conversations is an investigative technique that we employ on a daily basis. We cannot afford to compromise its effectiveness by admitting that, as long ago as 1963, we were able to and did intercept aftransgceanic telephone conversation conducted on a dedicated circui etween two foreign individuals, one of whom was located in the Soviet capitol, or that we were able to and did intercept alwire transmission from Havana to New York city|©/pisclosure would also reveal the speed with which we were ablé to translate and digest these conversations and transmissions, our interests and priorities, and what we considered important or trivial. Such information will be used to develop and deploy effective countermeasures. Dad Similar arguments apply to documents 10019, 10140, and 124~-10027-10405 (HQ 62-109060-1739) concerning mail covers on the Soviet Embassy. Together these documents show that we were able to track a wide variety of correspondence going to and from a number of Soviet officials at the Embassy. Our abilities, interests, uses, and priorities can all be cogently surmised if this information is released. Perhaps more importantly, official acknowledgement of this technique will cause the government concerned and others in which we have investigative interests to reassess the security of their written communication systems, complicating, if not weakening, our collection efforts. Portions of document 124-10027-10133 (HQ 62-109060- 2155) should be protected for essentially the same reasons. Here, however, we would note that our ability to compare typewriting specimens and fingerprints to known samples from Soviet officials is not commonly known or even suspected. Even if it were, an official acknowledgement that we employed such techniques as long ago as the early 1960's under the circumstances outlined in this document would provide foreign governments with ample reason to tighten their security, change their habits, and deploy false leads, making it all the more difficult to execute our counter-intelligence mission. (R{W) SECRET ' PocId: 32319958 Page 7