157-10014-10008 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM SSCSGO 157-10014-10008 HEARINGS 01-H-03 Date Page 07/28/95 aasin sae cams see comes seen SSO ‘SEL SESE SU Sonu os susis cams) CED SEED GND SECUY SSP ah GE SHEED GET ETD Ener teh HNO) HNED ENED tenn Cente nen Mette nth GE IER SESS SESSH SSD SES MOSH Sethe GHD GAGE SED GOD GED GED GED GD GRD AED ANTS RED GED SEND GOED GOMES HEED tS ALY MenHD REN) ERD ERD EREY UERLW RNY ent GREE: SEND SETH GTR GET GETED SaTEH AY seh SE ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION _ RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCSGO HALPERN, SAMUEL 04/22/76 66 HALPERN, SAMUEL - CIA ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OSWALD, LEE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE _ KENNEDY, JOHN, ASSASSINATION TRANSCRIPT a TOP SECRET REFERRED POSTPONED IN FULL 06/25/97 Box 1 wow cee) ED SD GERD HFM GD SD EDGED GE EE er eee ND. ath nmnn cue ume) eth SSD SSD SND UES SORE) GR SND GEG GID GENE GEES WARD GR SEND GUY ED GED CY AN sn NEN ERD ELEY ERR ND ERGY GEER SHE GED SEES GED GaGD SASS Goaf> ED GD AED GE MED SE GD STEP OD cD cE cD mth HED AEP HRD snes Maem mR cee WD EEE GE SEED SD HY 50955 Docld: 324273396 {R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page i
a. 3 “genate Select Committee to Stud operations With R whursday, April.22, 1976 Washington, D.C. —— (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 3017 WILSON BOULEVARD ARLINGTON, VA 22201 (703) £41-0800
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Thursday, April 22, 1976. : "united States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, Dp. Cc. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 o'clock a.m., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richarc Ss. Schweiker presiding. Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding). 2 2 < & & a € 4 3 Also present: Jim Johnston, Professional Staff Member. 416 First Street, 5... Wainington, 0.C. 20003 TOP SECRET
ay Und ebb aba Rae CLS ARTE RMS others ae a Leama pats tralian facta ae F nt reg ee hae oO dae aie Mem 2 F) € & a Q & € $ 410 First Street, S.£., Wainington, O.c. 20003 ~'genator . If you'll rise and raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you're ) about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but. the truth, so help you God? ; Mr. Halpern. I do... Senator Schweiker. Be seated. Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record your full name and address? TOP SECRET
4 _3 < & 4 8 « « z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.c. 20003 "TESTIMONY. OF, SAMUEL’ HALPERN, Mr. Halpern. samuel Halpern, H-a-1-p-é-r2n, 2202 Popkins, P-o-p-k-i-n-s, Lane, Alexandria, virginia, 22307. . | Mr. Johnston. Mr. Halpern, you previously testified before the Committee, and I assume you know that you have various righth, the right to counsel, and that you previously have been furnishe a copy of the Committee rules, is that correct? Mr. Halpern. That is correct. Mr. Johnston. And you're testifying here today voluntarily}. “Mr. Halpern: That is correct. Mr. Johnston. What was your position with the CIA in the period, say, June to December, 1963? Mr. Halpern. I was the executive officer for the Special Affairs Staff of the Directorate of Plans. The staff was. responsible for operations against Cuba at that time. Mr. Johnston. And you were executive assistant to Mr. Fitzgerald, who was chief. Mr. Halpern. That is correct. Senator Schweiker. Were they two different capacities, oc the same? Mr. Halpern. It's the same. The actual title was Executivy Officer at that time. Senator Schweiker. Okay. Mr. Johnston. And prior to Mr. Fitzgerald's taking over the Special Affair's Staff, Mr. Harvey was in that position, is TOP SECRET |
<4 a aed HW 45 < on ON co. ron) © ee i WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington. O.C. 20003 a foe patna a aaee fe & : Ae Me. Halpern. That's correct.” We and was under Mr. Harvey. Mr. Johnston. And did you have a similar capacity under him? Mr. Halpern. Yes, i was Executive Officer under TFW. Mx. Johnston. And when did you leave the Special Affairs Staff? | Mr. Halpern. To the best of my recollection, sometime around late summer or around Labor Day of 1964. Senator Schweiker. When did you come aboard it? Mr. Halpern. The staff? Senator Schweiker. In other words, Task Force W. In other words, whatever it was called at the time, Task Force W I guess. Mr. Halpern. I was in the branch of the Western Hemisphere — Division when it was taken out of the Western Hemisphere Divisioh and turned into Task Force W, and that was in early '62. Mr. Johnston. What were your responsibilities as executive officer to tr. Fitzgerald? Mr. Halpern. Almost anything he wanted me to do. Basicalll it was to be sure that all of the papers that did reach his desk were in correct form, content and distribution and routing. i screened cable traffic for him to be sure he saw what I thougat he should see. The same was true with memoranda coming to his TOP SECRET é
“3 vo oO ne ion) RB com) G09 7 WARD & FRU 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 a paper-pusher, traffic cop on paper, people problens) my door was open to any and all to discuss matters that they themselves didn't feei that chey wanted to talk to. the boss. about, and I. acted as a screen in. that regard. But basically I was there to do whatever the bos wanted me. to do, as an aide does. Mr. Johnston. pid you have operational responsibilities? Mr. Halpern. Only those he gave me from time to time. Nothing in the line of command. From time to time I did get involved in operational activities. I had one specific field of endeavor, and that was liaison with Mr. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable of operational matters? | Mr. Halpern... Yes, quite a bit. I didn't see everything, but I saw an awful lot, and I was knowledgeable of. most operatiopal matters. Senator Schweiker. low Large a staff at Langley did Desmond Pitzgerald's SAS have at its peak at Headquarters? Mr. Halpern. To the best of my recollection, about 150 at Headquarters. Senator Schweiker. When it was Task Force W, how large wouf-i it be? | Mr. Halpern. 200, 225, something like that. That's ver; much a guess at this point. That includes officers and clerica!} that's the total force. TOP SECRET
1a 97 1 « is 4 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, 5-E., Washington, o.c. 20003 tr. Johnston: : Who diac. Fitzgerald report to on Cuban matters? . Mr. Halpern. To the DDP. Mr. Johnston. That was Mr.Helms at the time. Mr. Halpern. That's right. Mr. Johnston. Did he also report to Mr. Cane, J. Cc. Cane? Mr. Halpern. Oh, no, no, no, there wag nothing like that. It was taken completely out of the divisional, regional lines of command and made a special staff. Senator Schweiker. There was nothing that related to Cuba, Cuban activity. or anti-Castro activity, after that was done, that went, through: the formally normal channel. Mr. Halpern. Only in regard to seekiny the help of the Western Hemisphere Division and its stations, to help us in our activities. Obviously Cuba wag still part of the Western. Hemisphere geographically, and you need to have help, for example, if we are going to send people from TFW or SAS into Mexico or into Venezuela, you had to get permission of the holding division. $o in that regard we had an awful lot of work to do with and constant liaison and communication with the Western Hemisphere Division, the same kind of activity we had with other divisions such as Europe, where we had quite a bit of.activity in Spain because of the Cuban refugees in Spain. But most of it was at that time obviously with the Western TOP SECRET
2 3 < & 4 a & « 3 430 Fest Street, S-£.. Washington, D.c. 20003 mr. Johnston.» pia SAS in the fall of 1963 have any of its own people in Mexico City? | | Mr. Halpern. Yes. How many, I don't know, but we did have gome that were attached to the station there, under the station command. The staff had no authority to break the chains of command, and everything that was communicated to and from the SAS assignees anywhere else in the world went through WH Division here in Washington, and they saw the replies when it came from the station. Mr. Johnston. Do you recall whether Mr. pavid Phillips was one of the SAS people in Mexico City? Mr. Halpern. No, I do not. Mr. Johnston. You do not recall? Mr. Halpern. I do not recall. Me. Johnston: Who provided counterintelligence support to the Special Affairs Staff? | Mr. Halpern. We had our own small counterintelligence staff. I believe, if memory serves me, it was headed up some tiie during this period by Hal Swenson, who is a Cl specialist, anu we always had, of course, the support of the CI Staff of the vv under Mr. Angleton. y | but basically each of the divisions in this case, it was in effect a division, even though it was called a staff, had. o.r TOP SECRET
. Senator Schweiker. Going back to a question that: Jim asked, the SAS office in Mexico City was headed up by whom ? Mr. Halpern. I don't know, sir. We had people assigned to the station in Mexico, but I don'r know who was there. I don't remember. Senator Schweiker. SAS had people. Mr. Halpern. Yes. We had people there, we had some in Madrid, I believe, and we may have had them in other places. at various strategic areas around the world. Senator Schweiker. Well, who would the head of the SAS in Mexico City have reported to? Mr. Halpern. To the Chief of Station. Senator Schweiker. To the Chief of Station. Mr. Halpern. To the Chief of Station, that's correct. He was under the Chief of Station's command. senator Schweiker. The Chief of Station would have reporte): to the Western Hemisphere Division? | Mr. Halpern. That is correct, but the way it operated not only with Mexico but any other place is that the SAS people reported through the Chief of Station. The Chief of Station's messages were then sent to Washington, and all messages were addressed to the Director and the cable secretary who made the distribution because of the necessary slugs that were on there. 410 First Street, S.E€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 The action in most cases, because it was originated by an SAS ‘TOP SECRET | ‘| 4 Pe ,
cecutedh tet Lin teavemammnute nan es acti te sae von ent Ot EP! 810 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, O.c. 20003 d > re & a i] & C4 Ed the other way around, if it were sonething hat was Wm 8 action, they would get the yellow copy and SAS would. get an info white copy, 60 that there was no way of trying to keep somebody out of somebody's act. Everybody was in, with one man being responsible for action. Everything going out would then be coordinated. Senator ‘Schweiker. Now, following that same line of thought how did the JMWAVE station report? Mr. Halpern. Well, JMWAVE was TFW's, or then SAS's, field station, and it reported. Senator Schweiker. | What kind of station? Mr. Halpern. Field station. Senator Schweiker. I'm sorry, field station. Mr. Halpern. And therefore reported directly to TFW or Senator Schweiker. Did you have any other field station besides JMWAVE? Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Senator Schweiker. At the peak of the anti-Castro activity how large a group was JMWAVE, would you say, approximately? Mr. Halpern. The peak was about the time of the missile crisis, and shortly thereafter. I would say, including the commo people, who were technically not part of JNWAVE! s coma! . although -they worked almost exclusively for JMWAVE, I'd say “ncay. TOP SECRET
A 3: < a 4 i] & €< z 410 First Steeet, SE. Washington, D.C. 20003 “Senatoz’ Schweiker. And that was the oAly field station tha SAS had. | : Mr. Halpern. JMWAVE had a sub-base, not a station, but they had some: people. scattered through the Keys, the Florida Keys, and there was a small unit near Key West, which Was basically responspible for taking care of the boats and other activities of that type, and some training areas, but basically the station was UJMWAVE, and we didn't correspond directly with the Key West element, either. We went through JMWAVE. Mr. Johnston. In your previous testimony before the Committee, as I copied the quote, "Military intelligence units: were involved in working with Cuban exiles in the Miami area, and the Florida area along similar lines of CIA." My question is, would you elaborate on this activity? Mr. Halpern. I don't know too much about it. The militar then, as now, are supposed to coordinate their activities with us. In operations against Cuba, they not only coordinated them, but we provided, the CIA and TFW and SAS actually provided both communications facilities for agents, including agent gear, agent radio gear, as well as using our boats to piggy-back on our activities going in and out of Cuba, so that we actually did put from time to time one or more military agents into Cuba. We didn't always know the identity of the military agent TOP SECRET
sources and methods being sacrosanct. “Even in the business we don't tell each other our sources. But we do try to check as much as we can, and when the military coordinated with us, they tried to give us enough information to be sure that we are not going after the same body or stumbling over each other. Mr. Johnston. Did this relationship exist in the fall of 1963? Mr. Halpern. To the best of my knowledge it did. Mr. Johnston. And what Defense agencies were involved? Mr. Halpern. DIA and Army Intelligence, to the best of my knowledge. I don't think the Navy was involved, and I don't WARD & PAUL think the Air Force was involved, but I'm not sure about that. Mr. Johnston. In describing these operations, they are distinct from operations being run out of Guantanamo. Mr. Halpern. ‘hat is correct, that's correct. The ones I'm talking about are the ones run out of the Florida area, basically. Mr. Johnston. Who were SAS's contacts in the Defense Department in the fall of 1963? Mr. Halpern. fT don't know the answer to that. I'm not gure, I did not conduct the liaison myself, so I'm not sure. Mr. Johnston. Was General Lansdale still in the Defense Department at that time? 410 First Street, $.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003 saan tae me ie an tate Mr. Halpern. He may have been, but he was not on Cuban TOP SECRET ZO
‘activities is . SenatorsSchweiker. : 11, w an he “got ‘into Cuban’ activities) in what way did he coordinate or not coordinate with what SAS was doing? | Mr. Halpern. If I can change the terminology for a minute, Senator, SAS was after the missile crisis, and I think General Lansdale left the Cuban activity after the missile crisis in 62, so it would have been Task Force W. Such doordination, if there was any, was with the Chief of the Task Force Bill Harvey, and I just don't know. | Senator Schweiker. Then there might not have been too much coordination. J 3 < & a cs) £ « 5 Mx. Halpern. As far as I know there might not have been. There was no requirement on his part to coordinate with us. There was a requirement on our part to coordinate with him, and we did report to him weekly on all of our activities and proposed activities, some in response to his direction in which he requested reports on things he asked us to do, directed us to do, and some of our own ideas which we checked with him before we did it. | Senator Schweiker. WE11, the way his set-up worked, did he have any field stations or any troops, so to speak, to cali- on, ox was this more of a planning operation? 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.c. 20003 Mr. Halpern. It was a coordinating operation. Senator Schweiker. On policy levels and directing activitips. TOP SECRET
‘troops, because T I ‘think as t mentioned ‘to the Committee last time,- General Lansdale’ s. original, ‘idea, approved by the Attorney | Géneral but not approved by the President, after ‘objection. by. ‘the. Secretary, of state and Secretary of. Defense and. the DCI, ‘General Lansdale’ g original idea‘ in the fall of ‘61 when it started was to take _ ‘actually troops from each of the agencies concerned, Defense, CIA and State, and create in effect a small new agency of its own directly under the Attorney General. bd £ Now, this was objected to by the two Secretaries and the 2 2? « & 4 a & < 3 Senator Schweiker. ‘And was never implemented? Mr. Halpern. That part was never implemented. We stayed with CIA, and I'm sure the military, and I know that State, each component stayed within its own chain of command. Senator Schweiker. So your group, either Task Force W or SAS. would have had the main thrust of what activity was going on. | | Mr. Halpern. That is correct. Senator Schweiker. Now, you did mention DIA and Army Intelligence, but the main thrust of what you were doing went through your operation. 410 Fivst Street, 5-E., Washington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Halpern. That is correct, that is correct. And thax TOP SECRET
CS: és cathe) i WARD & PAUL 410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, D.C..20003 Cuban. scene.. Mr. Johnston. One other question.-on this topic is. that generally. the concept most people have of DIA is that it relies solely on the services for intelligence activities. Mr. Halpern. Uh-huh. | Mr. Johnston. Are you saying in this case DIA did have its own assets? Mr. Halpern. I can't say that for certain. .DIA may have been representing the Army when they came to talk to us about things. They were supposed to coordinate and be aware of what the Army was doing at all times, but I know we talked about DIA and to Army Intelligence, and I am not sure at this point whether each one ran its own, or whether they even talked to) each other. This was kind of really ina coordinating game with Defense. . Senator Schweiker. At the time that you were in both Task Force Wand SAS, Sam, who was Station Chief or Chief of Station of JMWAVE? Mrz. Halpern. During that whole period Ted Shackley, Theodore Shackley. He is still in the Agency as far as I know. senator Schweiker. And he would have reported, now, to Desmond Fitzgerald. | | Mr. Halpern. In '63 -- TOP SECRET
J 3 < a 6 6 & < 3 410 First Street, SE. Washington, D.C. 20003 y “And Harvey before that) that's correct. Mr. Johnston. Previous testimony before the Committee dealt with the AMLASH operation, and you indicated some knowledge of that operation. . . _ Did you know at the time that Fitzgerald had gone to Paris to meet with AMLASH in October of '632. Mr. Halpern. Yes. “Me. Johnston. Did he also go there on November 22nd to meet AMLASH? | - Mr. Halpern. No, sir, despite what the Committee's report has printed, he was not in Paris on November 22nd. He was hosting a Luncheon at the City Tavern, and ff the City Tavern’s records are still available, they should prove that point. And if the Agencies financial records are available, I am sure Fitzgerald must have gotten reimbursed for that luncheon. Mc. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable in October of ‘63 of the purpose of the AMLASH meetings? Halpern. In a general way, yes. Johnston. Did you know that AMLASH was proposing a Halpern. That is correct. Johnston, And did you know that as part of that coup he was proposing to assassinate Castro? Mr. Halpern. Yes. TOP SECRET
1 pt apecialewnuabe bane sateen gia ae ean 3 3 < a @ 6 & < z 410 Firat Street, $.E£., Washington, .c. 20003 Pen device? , Mr; Halpern. I introduced’ the case officer to the medical officer who manufactured or made the pen. | Mr. Johnston. And did you know when the pen was ready, when the manufacturing - was complete? : ‘Mr. Halpern. I am not sure of that, I guess I must have because I remember when the case officer went with the pen, so I guess I knew it was ready. I never saw the pen but I assumed it was ready when he went. Mr. Johnston. Did you know there was going to be a meeting with AMLASH on November 22nd? Mr. Halpern. Not the exact date, no, not the exact date. knew the Case Officer was going to meet him, but I didn't know the exact date. | Mr. Johnston. Did you know that the meeting depended upon the pen being ready? Was that the main element of the meeting? Mr. Halpern. I don't know. Ijust don't remember that. Mr. Johnston. Was there a message to. the case officer on November 23rd, 1963, the day after the assassination, orderin: him to break contact with AMLASH and return? Mr. Halpern. I don't remember. There may have been but I just don't remember. 1 would have assumed that would have happened just cn the basis of being a professional officer, buc I am not sure. TOP SECRET
Z 2 < a 4 a & € B 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 ‘officer had | testified to. the effect that. i had planned to returh right after the meeting ‘anyway, and ‘that ‘therefore, “puch a cable from. Langley to him would not have been necessary. Mr. Halpern. I just don't know. Mr.Johnston.: Did you meet with the case officer or with Mr. Fitzgerald about the November 22nd meeting after the case officer had returned? Mr. Halpern. I don't remember it. I may have. But I just don't remember whether we did or not. Mr. Johnston. Did you see the case officer's contact report of that meeting? Mr. Halpern. No, I don't think so. If Tf did, I don't remember it. It wasn't my habit to see contact reports of case officers most of the time. Mr. Johnston. Do you know when the case officer met with Mr. Fitzgerald? Mr. Halpern. No, I don't have any idea. ar. Johnston. Do you know what happened to the pen that the case officer took with him? | Mr. Halpern. To the best of my knowledge he never took it. mean, the case officer took it but the agent never took the pen. At least that's what I was led to believe, that he never took the pen. He thought it was eilly and he just didn’ x take it. TOP SECRET
| eI 4 “| POON Ns WARD &® PAUL 410 First Street, S-E., Washington, 0.c. 20003 “believe it was from.the ‘somewhere along the way, in pull sessions sométine Later. Mr. Johnston. Now, is it your testimony that you don't recall that you knew the meeting was going to be on November 22n}\? Mr. Halpern. I do not recall that it was going to be then? Mr. Johnston. When you heard the President had been assassinated, did you make any association between what you did know, i.e., the case officer was going to deliver a poison pen to an agent, a Cuban agent, did you. make any association between that and the shooting of the President? Mr. Halpern. None whatsoever. Mr.dohnston. At the time you heard of the assassination. Mr. Halpern. At the time that we heard of it, at the City Tavern on the top floor, the only thing that crossed my mind -- and I even mentioned it to Bruce Cheever later, who was Fitzgerald's deputy, was I -sure hope that the guy isn't involved in Cuba in some way. Mr. Johnston. You said that. Mr. Halpern. For a very simple, practical, bureaucratic reason. We had been swamped enough with paperwork, and if he was, it would mean an awful Lot more paperwork, as it turned > out to be on our part, in terms of name traces and file checks and coordinations and papers to write and what have you, not tha I would have to do it, but I would have to be sure that it got TOP SECRET _
“news reports started coming out with Oswald's Cuban connections. At that point, did you begin making any associations with the AMLASH operation? . Mr. Halpern. No, no,.TI never have. Senator Schweiker. You mentioned Fitzgerald's deputy. What was his name? | Mr. Halpern. Bruce Cheever. ‘Senator Schweiker. How do you spell that? “Mr. Halpern. C~h-e-e-v-err. Senator Schweiker. How did he function? 2 2 < a @ a & € & Mr. Halpern. He was Deputy to Fitzgerald and he had also deputy to Harvey in the Task Force. Senator Schweiker. Where is he now? Mr. Halpern. In Arizona? 7600090 Senator Schweiker. Retired? Mr. Halpern. Yes, he retired before I did. Mr. Johnston. Was Director McCone told of the November AMLASH meeting? | Mr. Halpern. I don't know. That would have been up to Fitzgerald and the DDP. I have no idea. . Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether Mr. Helms was told by Mx. Fitzgerald? 410 First Street, $E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Halpern. Again I don't know for certain. I assume he it Me ponent tad dict SA ie Cth Bt TOP SECRET
that meeting? Mr. Halpern. No’. : Mr Johnston. -And you. would have | probably seen. At. Mr. Halpern. ass there. haa been: some’ paperwork, r might hav seen it. I didn't see everything. But F; don't think 80. Mr. Johnston. Was there ever any discussion that you know : me of about the connection between the AMLASH meeting and the | assassination of the President? Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Mr. Johnston. You never participated in a discussion. Mr. Halpern. “No. ad 3 € a 4 a = « 2 Johnston. You never heard such a discussion. Halpern. No, sir. Johnston. Was there any investigation of a connection? Halpern. Not to my knowledge. Johnston. Why? Mr. Halpern. I don't know why. Mr. Johnston. Did that question ever pose itself to you? Mx. Halpern. No. Senator Schweiker. Well, you sort of -~ and this is a general question. If we were out to kill Castro, wouldn't you sort of assume he'd be out to kill us or get even, wouldn't 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C, 20003 this somewhere along the way have been anormal intelligence TOP SECRET
Mee Halpern, | Well, we heard his threats against the President, but it never occurred, at least to my knowledge, to sit down and ask somebody to do a paper or do a review or | anything like that. I just never was involved in any question like that. It just never struck us in terms of the AMLASH operation because while Castro may have known about the AMLASH operation, AMLASH continued to move in and out of Castro's circles I think for a couple of years thereafter before he was arrested and tried. Senator Schweiker. Well, let's remove it for a minute fro: AMLASH. Wouldn't this be a question, knowing of the other anti- @ 3 € a @ a £ € 3 Castro efforts in terms of assassination planning with both Task Force W and here, that you would laryely assume that this is one of the risks that we undertook, and that this could well be a consequence of what we might be doing? Didn't somebody ae Diet lt ae bring up something like that as part of the contingencies? alt Sata Mr. Halpern.. They may have, Senator. I just was never involved in it, and I never heard it discussed. It may have been discussed at the CI Staff level or some other level. 1! A just was never involved and never heard it discussed. It may have been we just never gave Castro that much credit. And I think again it would be basically a problem of first seeing whe 410 First Strset, $.E., Wasnington, 0.C, 20003 and what Oswald was and did before you would start two and twu together to try and pin it on Castro or the Castro government. TOP SECRET |
ieee staal ne DLS satat Deb Leta de abe ORAS been a ARP e aac ete Dae nb Aetna 416 First Steeet, S.£., Washinglon, p.c. 20003 P] 2 < & 4 8 & < z astro's background’ and ‘connections. ~ Mr. Johnston. | You mean Oswald. | Mr. Halpern. Oswald. I mean Oswald. I'm sorry. And as long as we're on that subject, talking series, then and now, even to: this date, the one thing that disturbs ma as a professional and as a citizen is nobody has ever been able to zero in on -~- I don't think you can -- but nobody has ever zeroed in on what Castro did in the Soviet Union for the: couple of years that he was there. Nobody had a clue where he went, what he did, what he saw, what he was up to. He marries a Russian girl, and suddenly, out of the clear blue sky, she gets exit visas, which is very abnormal. Mr. Johnston. I think again you said Castro. Mr. Halpern. I'm sorry. I meant Oswald. And this has always disturbed me. I don't know where we can get the answers. The Russians aren't going to give us anything, obviously. I don't believe what Nosenko said, simply because Nosenko's bona fides have never been established, to my knowledge. And this is one big area which was never covered in all of the TV shows and all of the newspaper stories, and all of the millions of words that have been written and spoken about the Kennedy Assassination? What did Oswald do inside the Soviet Union from the tine he was there, and how did his wife --. I've even forgotten her TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL 410 Fiest Street, SE., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 manage ‘to'get»an exit. visa ‘so fast: when) everybody had “go damn much trouble getting out?” oes ah It's a question. That doesn't gay there's any connection at all, but there is a question that has never been really raised. Senator Schweiker. Did any of the groups that you recail working with directly or indire d&ly deal with these Fair Play fo ‘Cuba Committees as part of your operations, either infiltrating them or keeping an eye on them? J | Mr, Halpern. Neither SAS nor TFW, to my knowledge, no. Senator Schweiker. Not to your knowledge. Mr. Halpern. No, sir, not at all. Senator Schweiker. This would have probably come under what, counterintelligence? Mr. Halpern. Under the EBT, because we were not involved in this at all. Senator Schweiker. How about like Alpha 66? Would this have been something that Task Force W or SAS would have been interested in or directing or financing? Mr. Halpern. To the best of my knowledge, we looked at Alpha 66 originally mostly because of the nuisance value, and they were a pain in the neck in,terms of getting their boats in our way most of the time. We never tried to work out, to my knowledge, any kind of a system whereby we could use them is a front for us. There was talk -~- and again no proof that IT k.sow TOP SECRET
© N cat Fan 6090 WARD & FAUL 419 Ftest Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 that was just talk in ‘both task forces. Senator Schweiker. So to your knowledge CIA didn't finance. Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Senator Schweiker, Are you reasonably certain of this? Mr. Halpern. I am reasonably certain we did not finance Alpha 66. Senator Schweiker. And you're speculating that if there wab financing, it would have come from intelligence. Mr. Halpern. “Right. Senator Schweiker. Was this DIA or Army? Mr. Halpern. Probably Army. This is again based on my knowledge of the Situation at the time. I've got no facts. It is kind of analysis more than anything else. Senator Schweiker. Did you ever come across a CIA or an Army Intelligence person using the code name of Bishop, Morris Bishop? Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Mr. Johnston. After the assassination, the CIA designate: the investigation for a period of time as GPFLOOR, Were you aware of that crypt? Mr. Halpern. Now that you mention it, it comes back to mind, but if you had asked me what it was, I wouldn't have bec: TOP SECRET
“Who in SAS; if anyone} was designated to work on that investigation? : | Mr. Halpern. I don't remember offhand. I assume it was our Cl:unit,. but I'm not sure. Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether anyone in SAS ~- Mr. Halpern. Well, I don't know if anybody by identificati n was named as a focal point or what have you, but we must have had some way of coordinating our activities in terms of the file é searches and the papers that were written as a result of those searches with the CI staff, which was given the overall job, I believe, of investigating and coming together with reports and documents to go to the Warren Commission. There must have eM ee LAA Tae Renee abt per Comer WARG & PAUL been somebody. I just can't think of who it was, the focal : Ba q point. Senator Schweiker. Along the same line of the other question, did you ever come across a military attache who was stationed in Havana, Lt. Colonel Samuel Cale, who I believe at some point was with the American embassy in Havana? Lt. Colonc.: Samuel Cale. Now, again, he is not CIA. He probably was Army intelligence. Mr. lalpern. It doesn't ring any bell. Senator Schweiker. Doesn't ring a bell. 4L0 First Street, 5.€.. Washington, B.c. 20003 How about Ewing Smith, who was a political advisor of our embassy down there? TOP SECRET
Load 3 3 ¢ a a a £ € g - 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 the end of '61, and the’ embassy had been thrown out or we broke relations in '60, I believe, so I don't remenber those names. “Mr. Johnston, Did you ever see any written orders. to SAS or to anyone in CIA to. conduct an investigation of the assassination of President, Kennedy? Mr. Halpern. I never saw any such orders, no, sir. Mr. Johnston. Did you personally see any oral orders, or do you know of any oral orders to other than SAS to conduct such an investigation? | Mr. Halpern. The only thing I know of were the file checks that were made ad nauseum on everything connected with Oswald. Even the slightest inkling was checked, double checked, and file traces were run and cables were sent out to all parts of the world which might have had any possible connections with this. Mr. Johnston. Now, when you are saying traces and cables being sent out, were these cables being sent out by SAS and the traces by SAS? . Mr. Halpern. SAS sent out some. SAS coordinated on others. tt was under the direction of the CI Staff, to the best of my recollection, and we were just doing what we were asked to do in terms of doing traces. Now, a trace, once you get a trace request, you just start TOP SECRET
a 3 € a @ a & € 8 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 © “messages... But everything: was: : Mr. Dohnston. And who at the ron Staff? Mr. Halpern. I don't remember who the task*force was there}. ‘I mean: by taskforce it. was a small group of people put. ‘together. “I don't’ remember the name. It may have been Rocca, but I am not sure. Mr. Johnston. Was John Whitten in SAS?_ ' Mr. Halpern. John Whitten, at that point, to the best of my knowledge, was on WH Division. | Mr. Johnston. And what was his responsibility? Mx. Halpern. I think he had one of the branches, one of the area branches, a few countries put together called a branch, but I don't know which one it was. It may have been one of the Central American branches. Or it may have been Mexico, but I'm not sure. He was in WH. Mr. Johnston. Our investigation suggests the following structure for the investigation. The GPFLOOR crypt was used to designate the CIA activity between the time of the assassinat) and the time the Warren Commission got rolling, and that Mr. Whitten was or had principal responsibility in that period, which: may have .been a period of a month or more before Mr. Rocéa of the CI Staff got involved. . Do you- recall any meetings that Mr. Whitten had with SAS personnel relating to the assas@ination? _ TOP SECRET fe:
estas titel men Toten eA Dadin NAM Me te metab cm at ta e Ed ata Ld ad aE a 8 tw Ge esi ee 2 2 <. & 4 [s] € < 8 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, &.C. 20003 if they oécurred? Mr. Halpern. Not necessarily. Mz, Johnston. Do you know of any orders not:.to meet with Mri Whitten or not to’provide information’to him or ‘other | people in connection with the Kennedy assassination?” Mr. Halpern. No, not to my knowledge, Senator Schweiker. You mentioned thatAlpha 66 occasionally got in the way of some of your activities. Mr. Halpern. Yes. Senator Schweiker. How did that happen or occur? Mr. Halpern. Well, it could happen by we may have been planning a landing of an agent or a sabotage raid at Point X in Cuba, and unbeknownst to us, Alpha 66 may be going in the sain}: vicinity, and we would either hot up an area unnecessarily or they would hot up an area unnecessarily.’ "If they went in the day before we were supposed to be in, the area would have been really alerted to the enemy, so that way they would louse up our activities, and they. were a nuisance. They weren't a help at all, they were a nuisance. - Senator Schweiker. Then in essence, they were either operating pretty autonomously or independently, or might have. hat come financing from Army intelligence. Mr. Halpern. They may have. I don't know if they did, but TOP SECRET _
ot { i 4 “al 4 a Rosacea IE Son: ao hated 10 il 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 23 410 First Street, $.E., Wathington, O.C. 20063 ‘they were funning to have much. © Senator Schweiker. If Army intelligence had been financing them or guiding them or working with them, would they necessaril have kept you informed under the rules of the game at that time? Mr. Halpern. No, sir. They were supposed to, but rules are not always followed, Mr. Johnston. After the assassination of President Kennedy, was anything done with regard to using the JMWAVE assets to investigate the assassination? _ Mr. Halpern. I don't remember anything special except that they were asked to also check their files and to investigatb through their sources in the Cuban exile community anything and everything that they could come up with on Oswald and any of his activities. | | Mr. Johnston. Was there a message to that effect? Mr. Halpern. There probably was. I couldn't vouch for it. The only way JMWAVE would get that kind of information or directive would be by either a cable or a dispatch, and most likely it would be cables. Mr. Johnston. Did the CIA at this time period that we are talking about have an arrangement with Customs whereby Customs agents were detailed or affiliated or loaned to CIA in the Florida area? Mr. Halpern. I don't remember that, the detailed - TOP SECRET
t- \ : j i WARD & FautL 410 Fiest Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 action and coming back so they wouldn' t. get. afoul of both Customs and the Coast Guard and also unnecessarily make them waste their time and effort tovlooking after our boats as an unidentified boat on the high seas when they would know it was eurs and they could leave it alone and go on and do their job. There was an arrangement, but I don't know anything about detailing officers. There may have been in the local area. The Chief of Station was allowed and authorized, obviously, to make whatever local arrangements he needed to carry out his activities, and that is true anywhere. Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether Customs agents interviewed Cuban exiles about the assassination? Mr. Halpern. That I don't know. Mr. Johnston. wu previously -- or you said just a minute the WAVE station tapped its sources. you ever. see reports of those contacts? Mr. Halpern. I probably did, but I don't remember. Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection of seeing such - reports? Mr. Halpern. No, nothing specific. I just assume that_ since I did look through most of the cable traffic every day, I probably saw it, but I have no recollection of it. TOP SECRET
a 3 € e 4 6 @ 3 s 436 First Street, S.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 fie. Halpern. 1 ‘there must have been a tremendous amount. The, paper. was just overflowing all over.” “Mz, Johnston. Where would those files be. logated? Me. Halpern?” Now? a have no idea’ what: happened. Mr. Johnston. pid they carry the GPFLOOR crypt? Mr, Halpern. they: should have if the GPFLOOR was the. crypt slug for this, that slug automatically directed distribu- tion on the messages coming into the building. It would have to have. Senator Schweiker. There was a Customs agent who I understand worked for the CIA by the name of Diosdada in Florida. | | ‘Was Diosdada a Customs agent who was CIA? Does that ring a bell? | Mr. Halpern. It' doesn't mean anything to me. He may have been, but I just don't know. It could have been a local arrange ment between IMWAVE and Customs locally, or he may have had sone special knowledge or contacts or what have you that needed to be used, and the local Customs people would have made such arrangements with our station. Senator Schweiker. Okay. Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any discussions within SAs on possible Cuban involvement? Did you sit in on any meetings TOP SECRET
‘e. ape *y So eeoT nate ao Ral th hide F 3 « Ly 6 0 & « 3 41G First Street, 5.£., Wasnington, B.C. 20003 hava happened such meetings. As I say, this never crossed my chin at all at the time. _ | . oo Me . Johnston Hould:théaf acti.that"you 'dideohot ; hear.any such discussions to you indicate that they dia no taxe place? Mr. Halpern. I just wasn't privy to it if they dia take place, I just didn't know. a : | . Mr. Johnston. Would you normally have been in such discussions? | | Mr. Halpern. No, not in every discussion, no. Mr. Johnston. Did you ever see any paperwork relating to a suggestion of Cuban involvement in the assassination? Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Br. Johnston. Did you know that on November 25th, the Chief of Station in Mexico briefed the President of Mexico saying that they suspected Cuban involvement? Mr. Halpern. No. This is the first I have heard. Mr. Johnston. Would that be at variance with the activity at headquarters? Mr. Halpern. Not necessarily.- It could have been somethiin thought of in WH Division. It would have been thought of in the CI component of SAS. I just don't, this is the first I have heard of that. Mr..Johnston. Let me ask you now some specifics about sone TOP SECRET
i 5 Fi 3 4 u 4 4 | a od Seek etetGt Lahde wate Shel etes aatcesn. Lm atten “ a - a 3 € & @ -) & & FE 410 First Street, S.E.,. Washington, O.C. 20003 ‘anything: about it. pia you know that on Novenber 22nd a Cubana Air Lines fligh aut of Mexico City was delayed some. five hours, from §:00 o'clock in the afternoon until about. 20: 00. xs) ‘clock in, the evening, and that a twin-engined aireratt arrived’ at the airport: in’ Mexico city, let out a passenger who bypassed Customs and rode in the cockpit of the Cubana Aircraft to Havana that night. Mr. Halpern. This is allinew to me. I never heard of that. Senator Schweiker. You never heard of that. Mr. Halpern. This is brand new. Mr. Johnston. No information like that came in? Mr. Halpern. It might have come in. I just didn't see it. That's brand new. | Mr. Johnston. Did you know of the travel of a man named Gilberto Policarpo Lopez who crossed the border into Mexico apparently on November 23rd, and then on November 27th left Mexico City as the only passenger on a Cubana Air Lines flight to Havana? Mr. Halpern. No, sir, I don't know that. Senator Schweiker. Originating in Miami, Florida... Mr. Halpern. This is all brand new. Mr. Johnston. Would you have seen that kind of informatio:F Mr. Halpern. Normally, if it had the usual slugs, I wouls TOP SECRET
iecBteale te ae an} BS ‘and Fras —G aon a WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Johnston. Did you know a woman by the namé of Jane Roman? | Mr. Halpern. Yes. Mr. Johnston. What was her capacity? Mr. Halpern. She was on the CI Staff, and at that time I think in liaison with the Bureau, and I think aiso had some other liaison responsibilities with other intelligence and security services in the community. Mr. Johnston. Do you know or would you suspect whether she was knowledgeable of the AMLASH operation? Mr. Halpern. If she was, we've got lousy security, or we would have had lousy security at that time if she knew about it. That wasS very tightly held. Mr. Johnston. Did you ever see a and again I'm on the November 22nd, 23rd, 24th time period, a name trace coming from CI Division, asking for a name trace on the true name of AMLAS!? Mr. Halpern. No, but I wouldn't have gotten -- a name trace request .of that type would have gone directly from the requesting unit, in this case Cl, directly to our name trace unit in SAS. If the normal requests for traces came through the front office, we would be swamped. I would not have sean thac anyway, Mr. Johnston. Given the sensitivity of AMLASH at that TOP SECRET
4 ; i 4 z -_ a S a @ Q 8S 2 3 < & @ o € < é 410 Flest Street, SE. Washington, D.C. 20003 Mr, Halpern. No, I don’ ty ‘but it .wouldn' it have “unusual. AMLASH was a fairly senior officer in ‘castro'a: -entourage, . ‘and if they had: picked on: him and only. him,.. I would have said there may have been a cause to question: it an terms of, you know, why they looked at him only but it they looked at him and a dozen other people then I would:not have. questionec it at all, even at that time. Mr. Johnston. And the name trace would have given what? Mr. Halpern. The name trace would have given whatever we knew about the individual except our operational contacts with him. It would be biographic information. Mr. Johnston. Well, if CI Division asked for information on AMLASH, @éven if they were furnished biographical information it would not contain the fact that he was involved in some assassination plot. Mr. Halpern. That's correct. That would normally go to the case officer concerned, who would be alerted by the name tracers that somebody had asked for ANLASH. Mr. Johnston. And what would. the case officer have done in that case? Mr. Halpern. Well, in thismse I'm sure he would have gone and talked to Mr. Fitzgerald about it. .Mr.Johnston. Do you know whether the case officer did? TOP SECRET |
ot wna be Sh SE 3 on S&S & & ro 2 2 € & 4 a & < B 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, B.C, 20003 pardon me,” “has, a document in Lt which appears ss to bey would have been the top document in his file in this kime period of Novembe December 1963; and handwritten on it is the- phrase not to leave this office,” per". and it uses the name of ‘the: case. ‘o iticer. An -it is dated December 1963. Do you know of any instructions to that effect emanating from Mr. Fitzgerald or yourself or anyone else in SAS? Mr. Halpern. Not that I know of. It's possible that Fitzgerald told the case officer not to release it without his knowledge or something like that. That's the standard practice. It’s not unusual. Mr. Johnston. But again, in the context of investigating the assassination of President Kennedy, and the indication that the name, trace was proposed on him, would it appear unusual? Mr. Halpern. No, because again, even if it happened that way, it would have been up to the case officer to tell Fitzgera that somebody has asked for the file. The file would then be handed by Mr. Fitzgerald to whatever element needed it. In other words, it wouldn't be handled routinely. In other words, what you are talking about are routine name trace requests going through some researcher.sitting in CI to some researcher sitting in SAS. Mr. Johnston. So, in other words, the fact that CIA TOP SECRET
d 3 € & « o « « z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 intelligence. investigators. Mr. Halpern. It would have been he1d back ‘from the ordinar case officer, yes. Whether it. would, have been. ‘held back from the men . in charge, I don! te “know. that would have been “up to the ‘chieg of SAS, in this case Fitzgerald, and the bP. a Mr. Johnston. Did you have any knowledge that. that question was posed to Mr, Fitzgerald or Mr. Helms? . Mr. Halpern. No, I did not. Mr. Johnston. And you never saw any paperwork. .Mr. Halpern. No. Mr. Johnston. Were you told or did you know of orders that apparently emanated from the President to restrict Cuban operations. in early December 1963? Mr. Halpern. Early December 63? There was a s low-down of some type of activity and it was basically, I believe, the large scale paramilitary, sabotage . raids of that type, but it was not a complete’ standdown. | Mr. Johnston. Were you told the purpose of that Limitation Mr. Halpern. I am trying to recollect. I remember Fitzgerald coming back from the. first meeting he had with President Johnson in which the Cuban activities were discussed and something to the effect -~ it is running around in my mind --which was something we had been saying ourselves, that TOP SECRET
“4 “4 at cid a iH - 7 2 3 < a 4 a ® q g 436 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 “git backiand take another look at what wa ought! to'b ‘doing, something Like that. Mr.Johnston. Do you know the approximate date of that meeting? | , ‘Mr. Halpern. It was sometime in I think-4t was early December, but I'm not quite sure just when it was. The first half of December is about the best of my recollection. Mr. Johnston. Do you know where he met with the president? Mr. Halpern. As far as I know, it was the normal situatio room in the White House when the then 303 Committee met, and it was a 303 Committee meeting that Fitzgerald went to. Mr. Johnston. In early December 1963. | Mr. Halpern. Something like that. Mr. Johnston. Was Mr. McCone there, Mr. Helms? Mr. Halpern. I don't know for sure. I would assume Mr. McCone was there. I'm not sure about Mr.Helms. I'm just assuming that because of his position. Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald or anyone else tell you that they had briefed President Johnson about the AMLASH operation? Mr. Halpern. No, sir, it never was discussed. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a Cuban policy review in early December 1963? Mc. Halpern. I don't remember anything about it. There ji
a 2 « a & 6 & € z 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 At least Fitegeraid said to me, let's take a look at where we areigding. - Mr. Johnston. Did you ever see any paperwork? Mr. Halpern. If such a. paper. was written, I probably saw it,.but-I don't recollect any of. it at this point... Mr. Johnston. Was the case officer, AMLASH's case officer still in headquarters throughout December 1963? Mr. Halpern. Unless he went off on TDY, he was assigned to headquarters. Mr.. Johnston. But do you know of any instructions to him to look into or to re-evaluate the AMLASH operation as part of this Cuban policy review? Mr «Halpern. Nothing specific, not to my knowledge, no. Mr.. Johnston. We have seen papers going over to the White House coming from Mr. Fitzgerald in early 1964 discussing the Cuban operations that the CIA had. Absent from that is any detail of the AMLASH operation. . | Do you know of a conscious effort to withhold that fron those papers? Mr. Halpern. I don't know that it. was conscious. I think it was just normal security. If anything like that was told to the President, it would have been told to the President directly and not through the uses of pieces of paper which go through dnnumerable hands, both in our end of the building and TOP SECRET
d 4 A 4 palachn toe Oke ose catael told about something like AMLASH would have been. orally. Mr. Halpern. I would ‘think ‘ 8O0° .. 6 || °° Mr. Johnston. And would Mx Bundy have been privy to that og information? —_ 9 Mr. Halpern. Not necessarily,. ae 8 "Mr. Johnston. Was he privy, to your knowledge? ahs 9 Mr. Halpern. Not to my knowledge. 10 . Mr. Johnston. On November 18th, 1963, President 11 Kennedy gave a speech in Miami saying -- very mich anti-Castro. 12 Do you know whether Mx. Fitzgerald had an input to that 13 speech? WARS & PAUL 14 Mr. Halpern. I do not know. I would doubt it, but I don't 15 know for sure. 16 Mr. Johnston. Did you know the case officer proposed 17 telling AMLASH that Mr. Fitzgerald had drafted that part of 1g | the speech? 19 Mr. Halpern. No, I did not know that. It may have been u 20 good ploy in terms of case of ficer-agent relationships, but I 21 don't know of any like that. 22 Mr. Johnston. You talked previously of your feelings about 23 Oswald's time in the Soviet Union. Did you ever see -- did 416 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 24. |) YOu know a man by the name of Dr. Porta-Villa, P-o-r-t-a Vri-l-l-a. TOP SECRET
‘ 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 = co Os cm. =) a _ WARD & PAUL ¢; Johnston. Halpern. No, I don't. Mr. Johnston. Did you know that he apparently provided CIA with a message he claimed to have. gotten out of Cuba indi- cating that Oswald had met with. the Cuban. anbaseador while in the Soviet Union? | a Mr. Halpern. . That is new to me, too. That would be interesting, though. Senator Schweiker. You are familiar with the discredited Garrison investigation in New Orleans. Mr. Halpern. I've never read it all, but I've heard about Senator Schweiker. Now, some of the people that he dealt with there, such as David Ferry and I think there were one or two others, did have some relationship with CIA. Tam not linking Oswald there. Can you shed any light on what that anti-Castro activity was? | Who would that anti-Castro activity such as David Ferry's kind have come under? Would that have been under JMWAVE?. Mr. Halpern. I don't even know what Ferry's activities were supposed to be. I have no idea. Senator Schweiker. I believe he was smuggling arms into- ‘ Cuba. TOP SECRET _
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 ‘didn't need anybody like F ' Senator Schweiker. . Guy Bannister? ~ . Mr. Halpern. No, it doesn't mean anything to me. No, we had plenty of ways of getting arms into Cuba in terms of our own boats, our own agents on the island, | Senator Schweiker. Okay. Go ahead. | Mr. Johnston, Let me ask you one more question on 1963. Was the CIA actively involved in the relocation of exiles in Miami to other parts of the country? | Mr. Halpern. Yes. We tried to help some of the people, particularly the ones that were working for us, our former agents, relocate them in this country or others. Yes. I don't know who. I can't give you names of people, but from tine to time we helped them, and we helped them in terms of intercedihy with HEW, with monies that they might have been getting from HEW. That's all. Mr. Johnston. Catholic Charities and Catholic Cuban Relief was also involved, is that right? Mr, Halpern. That's right. Mr. Johnston. Was there a liaison between the Catholic Charities and CIA? Mr. Halpern. Not that I know of. Not an official one. There may have been an unofficial one down in Miami, but 1 don't know, or one in New York, for that matter. TOP SECRET
a 3 < a « 2 & @ ) 410 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 the New Orleans’ , Mr. Halpern.” Not Mr. Johnston. Let me go then to 1967. What was your position in 1967? | | Mr. Halpern. Iwas the executive: assistant to the DDP, first Mr. Fitzgerald from January to the day he died, which was July 23rd, I believe, '67, and then Mr. Karamessines who replaced him. Mr. Johnston. Well, then, did you know other than as a witness that there was an IG inspection on assassinations taking place? Mr. Halpern. Yes. Mr. Johnston. . And you knew that in your official capacity? Mr. Halpern. No, no. | I only know because I talked -- I was asked about it. Mr, Johnston. So you don't know whether Mr. Karamessines came and asked. Mr. Halpern. The first I know, I was asked to come and talk to King Greer, who was the IG officer involved. Mr. Johnston. ‘Did you, in 1967, see the IG report? Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald see it? Mr. Halpern. . I don't know. TOP SECRET
altos ya rive Maadiaced baal alee > se tagtett F 3 @ & 4 Qo. @ « 8 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 “investigation? ©. " “Mr. Halpern. I asked Ken: Greer, and to the best of my recollection he said the Director wanted it. That. was good enough for me. The Director then was Mr.. Helms.’ I was not in the habit of questioning the Director's wishes. Mr. Johnston. Do you recall when you were first aware that there was such an investigation taking place? Mr. Halpern. No, no, I don't know the day or the month or anything like that. It was while Fitzgerald was still alive, so it had to be sometime before he died in July. Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Greer ask you about any connections between the Kennedy assassination and CIA plots against Castro? Mr. Halpern. No. The only comment I think he made was something to the effect that it was strange and ironic that the day Kennedy died the case officer was trying to give AMLASH a poison pen. That is the only connection that I remember. Mr. Johnston. And to your knowledge, had all plotting. } AMLASI stopped prior to November of 1963? _ Mr. Halpern. I only knew about AMLASH. tididn't know. about anything else. Mr.Johnston. That was the only operation you knew that was active at the time against Castro. | Mr. Halpern, That is the only thing I was invelved in. Mr. Johnston. Were you ever, again in 1967, told about thu TOP SECRET
a 4 J 2 < a @ a & @ 8 410 Flest Street, SE. Washington, D.C. 20003 briefing of the President? ne) _ Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Mr. Johnston. when Mr. Karamessines tock over, did you tel him about the fact that there was an IG inspection on assassi- nations? . | } a “ | 7 Mr. Halpern. No. I was told when I talked to Mr. Greer not to talk about it, and I didn't. 7 @ ; Mr. Johnston. And other than Mr. Greer, you talked to no one.else at the CIA about it in 1967. .Mr. Halpern. Well, I then talked to the IG himself when he called me back up to go over. some of the points. Mr. Johnston. Mr. Earman? Mr. Halpern. Yes, Jack Earman. Mx. Johnston. And what was the nature of that? Mr. Halpern. gust to go over the same things. over again that I had gone over with Greer. He wanted to be sure that what I said was what I.said, I mean, what he had on his paper was what Iosaid, that’s all. But he again told me not to talk about this, and 1 didn't. Senator Schweiker. pia Bobby Kennedy have a desk or work out of any area of CIA during the time you were in your group? Mr. Halpern. Not to my knowledge, no, sir. Mr. Johnston. Would you be in a position where you pretty TOP SECRET
eee ee 810 First Street, $.E., Washingion, D.C. 20003 3 2 « & @ & & < B OUMES Halpern. Not necessarily.” et Director wanted to make’ space.for him on the seventh floor, Z would never have known. There might have been rumors in the‘bulléing, but I didn't even hear rumors about “it. He may have tised the office over at the CIA building, the old oss buildings on 23rd & E, the old Public Health Service buildings. oo | Senator Schweiker. They were still in operation? Mr. Halpern. I think the Agency still has some of those buildings,,and the:old “Admin building, which used to be General Donovan's headquarters or office was a very VIP type of arrange-|_ ment, and it's possible -- it's possible that he may have used that, because that has been used from time to time by other VIPs. Senator Schweiker. By other VIPs? Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir. . Senator Schweiker. Like what do you mean? Mr. Halpern. When Senator Humphrey was Vice president, his liaison with the Agency used one of those offices down there I think his name was George Carroll. He used to be training officer, and then he was liaison officer. Senator Schweiker, To your knowledge, would any of the SAS group have an office where you are talking about? Mr. Halpern. No, sir. Senator Schweiker. Everything was over at Langley?
og 3 < a 4 f) & < 8 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 thing we did use’ down’ there” as the ‘Technical Services Division was down there, and so we did a lot of Matson with them. Mr. Johnston. We discussed basic facts about possible Cuban or strange events that point toward Cuba,. and let me ask you if you knew, to put you back in the environment o£ °1963, if you had known about this flight from Mexico City to Havana on the afternoon of the assassination, and if you had known abou the Lopez travel and the Porta~Villa allegation, and the fact that AMLASH or AMLASH's name, had come up in the course of the Mexico City investigation, would you have felt that those facts would have justified a more complete investigation? Senator Schweiker. If you had known them at the time. Mr. Johnston. If I had known them at the time, I sure would have tried to find out more about them, and I would have’ sat down and really sat down with Porta-Villa and asked him a hell of a lot more, and tried to find out where he got the information, how, the reliability of his source and so on, and I sure would have worked with the Mexican police to try to find out more about those flights. I don't -- this is all new to me, and if it hadn't, somethiny was slipping. It really should have been gone into with a vengeance, not that we would have gotten any answers. I'm not predicting that, but -~- Senator Schweiker. Are you finished with that? ae
- Steet Nag | JupapUbta inbeda tied ban eac Renan een A mE Be te a bh 2 5 € . , @ t) . 6 4 3B 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.c. 26003 no followup on it. Especially gince’ ‘it affected 1 cuba, woulén' t a followup have been within SAS? - Mr. Halpern. If it. had to deal with: working with, the Mexican Government and following it UP, ‘no, the action would hav been the WH Division, using SAS people in: the Mexican station, but the action would have gone to the Chief of Station for his action, since he had the liaison with the Mexican police and the internal security people. | Mr. Johnston: With regard to the Lopez matter, again in March of that year, March of 1964, the Mexico City station was informed through a source of unknown reliability that Lopez was somehow involved in the assassination. You don't recall receiving that information? Mr. Halpern. It may have crossed my desk, but I just don' remember. I think I might have remembered if I had seen it. ‘Mr. Johnston. And is it your testimony that SAS did not form a task force.or any kind of organized effort: to investigaty Cuban connections? Mr. Halpern. Not that I know of. We responded to, I know, the CI Staff in terms of traces and whatever else they asked for, but -we did not organize our own task force. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the fact that the FBI TOP SECRET
te. angie Ve wasn’ Ne aware. of it, but: I. assume” “he ‘would have been. a Mr. Johnston. - That wouta jhave been logical? Mr. Halpern. If they had Fair. Play for Cuba. on: Ate we would have gotten a copy. from ‘the B Bureau ‘and the 1 front ‘office wouldn't have gotten it. It would have gone right to our CI people, and the file people and the research people, and they would extract the name and ecard it and have it available for future reference. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of any other information on Oswald that arrived in SAS before the assassination, specifically WARD & PAUL. his contact in Mexico City? Mr. Halpern. No, I wasn't even aware of the Bureau's report, but it is not unlikely for that, in just normal bureaucracy, if the Bureau puts out a report and it has the word Cuba on it, and it gets over to CIA and you take a look at it and you see Cuba, then it goes to the people who work on Cuba. That's the way we get the information. i i H é Mr. Johnston. And let me again make sure I understand Did you testify that you knew of no senior staffer within SAS, specifically assigned to the Kennedy investigation? 410 First Street, SE. Washington, O.C. 20003 Mr. Halpern. Not that. I remember, no. TOP SECRET
ry Soa _ “e oN yo =: _@ _* oN 3 2 > « a 6 8 & « 8 41G First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.c. 20003 re Halpern. : was in WH. He may have been pulled out of WHE CO workon that or he may have been an element of WH staff that had to: work such. | Mr. Johnston. Are you aware of any direct contact between anyone in SAS and the Warren Commission members ar the Warren Commission staff? Mr. Halpern. I don't remember at all. Mr. Johnston. They never came around to SAS. Mr. Halpern. Not that I remember. It is possible that some of the staff may have come and talked to some of the SAS people, but I just don't remember offhand. | Mr. Johnston. Wotldn't that have had to have been cleared Fitzgerald? Mr. Halpern. Yes, it would have? Mr. Johnston. And you would have seen it? Mr: Halpern; Not necessarily. No. It could have -- if it came in from the Warren Commission, it could have been handled directly from the DDP to Mr. Fitzgerald, and he may have just said at some staff meeting that Warren Commission people will be coming around to see some of you, and I wouldn't have made any note of that. It would have been assumed that TOP SECRET
Bruce Cheever. Was there: “anyone else. tn SAS: who would have been knowledgeable of the matters: we have. ‘discussed today? Mr. Halpern. The only other one. ~< “he wouldn' Me have been knowledgeable of AMLASH -- “was: the chief of ‘the ‘Fi vanity, who has since died. Senator Schweiker. Chief of what? Mr. Halpern. Foreign Intelligence. Senator Schweiker. In SAS. Mr. Halpern. In SAS, we each had the components. We had the CI unit, an FI unit, and a covert actions unit, just small branches. WARD & PAUL Senator Schweiker. What were they? Mr. Halpern. Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and covert actions. Senator Schweiker. They were the three basic elements. Mr. Halpern. The three basics, and oh, one more, para- military, which was technically part of covert action but was set up as a separate branch because of the heavy involvement in paramilitary activities, but Ed Morelius was Chief of the FI unit, the Foreign Intelligence branch, and he would have St tane sate been involved, if necessary, in some of the Warren Commission stuff, but I just: don't know for sure. 416 First Street, $.E., Warhington, Oc. 20003 Mr. Johnston. Do you know a woman by the name of Grace TOP SECRET
é 2 € & 4 -] z € 8 416 First Street, S-E., Wasnington, o.c. 20003 “was a Cl.researcher.” I m not. pure, but t ‘know ‘the nane. Mr. Johnston. pia. she. have any operational responsibilitic any decision. responsibilities? : Mr . Halpetn, I 8 would: doubt deer am. not, sure, but Iuwould doubt it. Mr. Johnston. And the initials C/RR were what branch of Mr. Halpern. Probably records, Chief, Records and Reports, or something like that. But I'm not sure. I just don't remembe for certain now. Mr. Johnston. And would they have access to the AMLASI! file? | Mr. Halpern. Not the operational file, which would have been held by the case officer. They would have had access to the biographic file on the man, which is everything we knew about him except the operational connections. Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether there was any instructio}: any discussion after November 22nd, to break off with AMLASH or to have a cooling off period with AMLASH? Mr. Halpern. I don't know of any instructions. I'm just conjecturing now that there probably would have been a cooling off period. I doubt if there was an order to break off completely? TOP SECRET
off period?” | Mr. Halpern. “simply because nobody knew, which way anything was going to go on Cuba once it came out that Oswald was connected in some tangential way with something to do with Cuba, and things. just, got held, period. Mr. Johnston. Do you have any “— - what is the reason. ‘for your statement that there may have been a cooling off period? Do ‘you have any actual information? Mr. Halpern. No, except what later developed in the 303. Committee meeting, where our paramilitary activities were in effect held, then. We were going to take a look, which is something we have been taking a look at for a long time ourselves 2 2 @ & @ 6 ‘a @ Mr. Johnston. And you associate the hold-down of paramiliaty activities:with what, the Kennedy assassination or the new oN President? Mr. Halpern. — I think the new President taking a look at what we were doing on Cuba, and that the paramilitary activities were “hot having the desired effect, and I think as I testified before, we on the task force, both under Harvey and under Fitzgerald, kept saying this ain't the way to do it, but we kept on doing it. Mr. Johnston. Finally, do you know, Or were you present in any discussions in December 1963 in the course of this 410 Fivst Street, $.E., Wasningten, O.C. 20003 apparent policy review about AMLASH and what should be done TOP SECRET
and ¢ the ‘meetings would have just ‘been ritzgeraid,. the ease officpr cand me, probably, or- Fitzgerald : and the case officer, because as far as I know, the Deputy, ‘Bruce Cheever, was’ snot involved in’ the. AMLASH activity. © Mr. Johnston. Was there any concern at the time by Mr. Fitzgerald or the case officer about what happened to the poison pen? Mr. Halpern. Not ~~ that may have been when I was led to believe that he didn't take it, and when I asked what happene}i to it, I don't remember what kind of an answer I got. WARD & PAUL Mr. Johnston. Were you concerned about what happened to the pen? Mr. Halpern. No, because it wouldn't have been useful for anybody. You know, if somebody found that pen on the street, if it had been thrown away, they wouldn't use it as a pen. It couldn't have been used as a pen. Mr. Johnston. What if AMLASH had taken the pen with hin? Mr, Halpern. ZI think if he took the pen with him, if he was going to use it, he would have had a complete change of pohetbtee heart. As he told the case officer, he thought it was silly and it wouldn't work, and if he took it, I don't know why he would 410 Fisst Street, 5-E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 take it. He wasn't going to use it. TOP SECRET yo
4 3 @. & 6 a &. € 8 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 ro~Castro ‘automation, if AMLASH chad ‘taken the pen with him? a Mr. Halpern. No, ‘no, _ because if he wanted to get rid of Castro he would, have, gone “ahéad and. gotten: rid of Castro anyway, “whether ‘Kennedy was assassinated or not... If he was going to have a coup, he was going to have a coup. The fact that he didn't -- the pen didn't surface at his trial leads me to believe that he either -- A, he didn't take the pen, or B, if he took it, he didn't use it, he threw it away. Mr. Johnston. You were present at the time and I was not. Let me just put to you the fact that if AMLASH had possession of that pen, CIA was in a very compromising position. Mr. Halpern. Not true. He couldn't prove that CIA gave it to him. Mr. Johnston. Although he could identify the case officer. Mr. Halpern. No, he couldn't. The case officer was under some kind of a pseudonym. Mr. Johnston. But he could identify him by face. Mr. Halpern. Well, he'd have a difficult time trying to find him, coming up with a drawing, a police -- Mr. Johnston. And he could idéntify Mr. Fitzgerald who he met a month before as the Attorney General's personal representative. TOP SECRET
eo peitenah abet nen cme ere me ee Fy 3 @ e 6 6 « « B 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 go ‘through the whole. office and couldn 't.find that face. I don't think the ‘CIA was on ‘the hot. spot. I ‘don! t ‘think the CIA was under: ; any kind, ‘Of: problen uniess they, ‘stood ‘everybody up ina police. line. Senator Schweiker, Well, refresh cette Where did he meet Fitzgerald? . Mr. Halpern. In Paris. Senator Schweiker. The month before. Mr. Halpern. In October, yes, sir; not in November. Mx. Johnston. And you indicate there was no concern whatsoever. Mr. Halpern. Well, I didn't have any concern. Tf don't know about other people, but I didn’t have any concern. Mr. Johnston. That any attempt to investigate Castro and Castro's motivation vis-a-vis Kennedy might be very a@ifficult if AMLASH had kept the pen. Mr. Halpern. No, I didn't. As I say, the fact that the pen never surfaced in the course of the trial -- it was a big show trial as I remember. It was an indication to me that aA, he didn't take it, and L£ my initial information was correce, or B, if he did take it, he didn't use it and threw it away, because’not much was made of the pen as a pen, and I could see them making all kinds of publicity gimmicks out of that if they TOP SECRET
Jf 2 € & 4 i) & 8 410 First Street, $-E., Washington, 9.c., 20003 just your recollection, what kind ofa role was Army ) intelligenc playing with the Anti- Castro activities at ‘the time? Iama little puzzled just as. ‘to why: the role was even, there at all in “what they were. doing. What existed then that does not exist now in terms of Army intelligence, of what mission they had?- Mr. Halpern. Army intelligence was to get tactical or strategic intelligence from clandestine sources, and they were in there trying to do as much as they could, getting intelligench on Cuba and what the Soviets might be doing on Cuba. Mr. Johnston. But if they were working with a group such as Alpha 66, it was more, it would get into the paramilitarl covert field, would it not? Mr. Halpern. It would. Senator Schweiker. Who would have been directing that Army intelligence setup at that time? Mr. Halpern. I don't remember who it was, and I don't remember who the chief of the intelligence unit was at that time, and again, they may have been dealing with alpha 66 for intelligence purposes, and Alpha 66 could have been usiny gome of that money that they got for paramilitary. | Senator Schweiker. For paramilitary purposes. Mr. Halpern. In other words, I'm not saying the Army had TOP SECRET
"Senator "Schweiker. “But they could, d. have: been is] Mr. Ra}pern. That" F corrects, ‘but : even Intel gene e the Army to run our boats with their, - agents, “put our, ‘agents aboard, so that the Army wouldn't have to ‘Ay, create ‘dts own capability, or use Alpha 66 or any other kind of boats in the area, so that they would have a source of boats, namely, us. Senator Schweiker. In other words, you eventually worked out an agreement with them? Mr. Halpern. Oh, sure, we worked with them.. As I say, WARD & PAUL we helped -- Senator Schweiker. When would that have been? When did the agreement come out, roughly? Mr. Halpern. Oh, ‘63, '64, something like that. Senator Schweiker. And this was to avoid duplication anc overlap? | | Mr. Halpern. Overheating areas. Senator Schweiker. And your deal was to provide what? Mr. Halpern. We provided radios, radio training, and alse pect a ate tee the ferry service. Senator Schweiker. The boats. 416 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 WTS Catia tn ee Mr. Halpern. The boats. TOP SECRET cept tee abot taster aan esate ib,
‘Mr, Halpern, That 18 correct. © they got ‘some intelligence out of the operations, too, just as we did. . Senator Schweiker. © Welly, ain: those’ operations. aid: they do some paranititary work or “not? "mr. “Halpern... Not that r know of, ‘Senator Schweiker. Primarily intelligence. | Mr. Halpern. primarily intelligence, yes, sir. Senator Schweiker. Do you recall this famous picture of the guy entering the embassy in Mexico City that nobody can identify? Mr. Halpern. (Nods in the affirmative.) 2 3 g a é. a: « .€ 8 Senator Schweiker. What's your recollection of what happened there? Was he ever identified? Did they ever find -- Mr. Halpern, Not that I know of. I remember we kicked this around in bull sessions and lunches and what have you, but how and when and where and why, we never came up with any answers. | Senator Schweiker. and do you have recollection of the lie detector test that was given to the Nicaraguan, Alvarado, as to whether or not he in fact was lying or telling the truth about $6500 going from a black Cuban to Oswald, AlNarada? 410 First Street, S-E£., Wasmington, D.C. 20003 Mr. Halpern. No, sir, I don't have any recollection of tha TOP SECRET
WARS & PAVE 410 First Street, 5.E., Warrington, D.C. 20003 “ana how it operates; And they tested it on: “him, “to be tested... And they gave him’ a 2 box, a" aitel box with a key in it, and they said, ‘take ‘the key out. took the key out ‘and he held, it. in his hand. “And, then the question is, were ‘you, given ‘ab box: with a key in Ae? And not a blip. pid you take. the key | out of the box? - No. “Not a blip,.and.so on.. < So the use of the polygraph is a tool, it's an extra file check, it's an extra drawer that you have to ook in, but it is not the be all and end all of all questions. “I mean, I saw this happen. Senator Schweiker. So you are a disbeliever. Mr. Halpern. I am a believer in that as long as you use it as another file check and not as the answer, and this is why people say he's on polygraph, he's off the polygraph. That ‘is fine. You've got to use it, but don't believe everything that comes off of that. And these polygraph operators have learned a lot since them. What I'm talking about goes_back to about 1950, and in 20 odd years they have learned a lot in terms of trying to equate a persons mores, his social background, his upbringing, TOP SECRET
set eeRELAL DiMatteo i tn me WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 cases ‘where ‘Soviet agents dispatched From. ‘th ‘Soviet. inion have passed through polygraphs ‘just. like a breeze, no problem. . So it can be done. And it ig a matter. of == well, the Hindus have been able to control their breathing and respiration ‘rates and so ony, and people ean, be trained 9 vate So when you mention something about a “Wicaraguan being on a polygraph, it just brought back to mind that’ s not the only thing that you have to look at. | | Mr.- Johnston. What about the other side? If the polygraph indicates deception, I assume you put more reliability on that. Mr. Halpern. ' No, not necessarily, not necessarily. “At least I don't, and I'm no polygraph operator, but not necessarily. To me it is an important check and it should be done, but it has no greater weight or no lesser weight than good human sources Or documents. Senator Schweiker. Well, we want to thank you, Sam. We think you have been very helpful, and we certainly appreciate it. Nice seeing you again. (Whereupon, at 11:25 o'clock a.m., the hearing in the above~entitled matter was concluded.) TOP SECRET
Sener cts Seid kek eermee st tenne: cieaehe fe Memorandum For: Clerk, Senate Select Committee on. Intelligence Activities : ‘Subject: ; Corrections’ to ‘Teanséript, ‘of. Testimony ‘of. Mrs. Samuel Halpern’ given on a2 ? Apri 1976. The following is a list of ‘corrections to the transcript of wy testimony given on 22 April 1976.- | 3°91. 17 1. 24 20 "FitzGerald" vice vrteegereia” ditto. : ditte ditto ditto "Hr King, J. C. King" vice "Mr. Cane, J.C. Cane” "owning" vice "holding" add "Mr, Halpern” at beginning of line as responding to query of Senator Schweiker at end of p. 12. “waa actually to take" vice “yas to take actually" . "FitzGerald" vice “Pitegerald" ditto "Agency's" vice "Agencies" "FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald" ditto ditto ditto ditto ditto ditto - ‘ditto "put" vice "start"
"“sertously" vice "series". Sant vice Von"? ; "ken" vice "chin" . "PitzGerald” vice "Pitegerald' ditto ditto ditto ditto ditto ditto ditto “where” vice "when" "FitzGerald" vice "Fitegeraid” ditto , ditto ditto ditto ditto Ss B®, CS _& ditto "Ken" vice "King" riezGerald" vice "Fitzgerald" ob ditto Want vice ton" 2 and 3. should read "...the Technical Services “ Division which was down there..." of delete the word "waa" on line 3 "FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald" ditto "Marelius” vice "Moreliua" "FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald" ditto ditto ditte
~ the word ‘automation ie obviously ““dneorrect "FitzGerald" vice "Fitzgerald" and “whon" “wice "who" Lo, ; ” WpiezCerald" vice "Fitzgerald" — “their vice "our" tor B use" vice “or use” '. "then" vice "them" Lain Mefpe—$_ Samuel Halpe 2202 Popkins Lane . Alexandria, Virginla 22307 765-1388