157-40041-10066 JFK Assassination System Date: - —-7/30/201 Identification Form . Agency Information 4 AGENCY:  SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10011-10066 RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUM AGENCY FILE NUMBER : Document Information ’ ORIGINATOR: ROCK FROM: ROETHE, JAMES N. TO.: FILE TITLE: FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE DATE: = 02/24/1975 PAGES: 13 SUBJECTS : ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE BREWER, GEORGE TECHNICAL OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS ~ CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : — Unclassified ' RESTRICTIONS : — Consulted; 1A; 3; Donor Restricted CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 05/31/1994 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : SSCI Box 286, Folder 11 v9.1 | HY 50955 BDoctd: 37203034 Page 1
Date:05/30/94 Page:1 - JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM _ IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10066 RECORDS SERIES : MEMORANDUM AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : ROCK FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N. TO : FILE TITLE : FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE DATE : 02/24/75 PAGES : 13 SUBJECTS : A BREWER, GEORGE “TECHNICAL OPERATIONS ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 3, DONOR REST., REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : X DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/94 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : SSCI Box 286, Folder 11 ek tae Ome mm tate ee seta mae teet ee meet ee fem met tenet eat fect emt fund Hk RE HRS WED Yate te Well es ee Hane teh el GE SG OOS mE OS MD So mL em [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBocld: 322703834 Page ?
a, - COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNTPED- STATES , Washington, DC 20500 SBb~l | Nelson A. Rockefeller, David W. Belin, Chairman February 24, 1975 . Executive Director John T. Connor , , , C- eet On NOTE? DBpesdents we Theunt pa ge ou Moers min IN, Grisw . a. . . ms Lane Kirkland iNdicgted Were Net spec Ofreafly Lyman L. Lemnitzear ey A . ’ Mentrenecd «mM the IV GAS CL 1 Ronald Reagan ig Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. . . SECRET/SENSITIVE 7 — SSCI Box 286, Folder 11 - MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE 7, Le sd ee FROM: JAMES N. ROBTHE ™ Record Number 157-10011-10066 — Ne eee SUBJECT: Further Information obtained from George Brewer (See February 18 Interview) 3” On Monday, February 24, I again spoke with George Brewer in the Commission offices from approximately 9:00 am until 10:15 am. The following additional information was obtained. Technical Operations In 1960 and 1961, Brewer was primary involved in Bay of Pigs operations (pro- viding support to the -liami Field Office in smuggling friendly Cubans into the United States). He was engaged in little technical activity during that time. Between 1962 and 1965, he was involved in approximately 30 technical operations, only four of which were telephone taps (the rest were mike and wire Cases). During that same perioi four or five other support agents - were also engaged in technical activities, each performing approximately the same amount of tech- nical work that Brewer was performing. Some of the agents doing technical work were Jack Cryer, and Bill Simpson, the latter being a former in- structor of Brewer's. Both Cryer and Simpson had been doing technical work for “quite some time (throughout the 50's). Hse (1151-52) In 1965 or 1966, following President Johnson's Executive Order precluding wire taps Without court order or without approval of the Attorney General in security cases, technical work performed by Brewer and others at the Washington Field Office almost stopped completely. Brewer can recall only two taps that were placed during that period. One of these was placed in a Safe House in the Washington area, and the other was placed in a New York apartnent in connec- tion with Project PARAGON. Brewer assumes that the appropriate approvals were obtained prior to his placing these taps. (11d WyahG (1141-43) Most of the technical operations in the early 1960's were performed at the re- quest of the Operations Directorate. While Brewer was not privy to the purpose for each technical operation that he performed, he believes that many involved CIA HAS NO OBJECTION" SCRET/SE : SIFICATIC® . . SECRET/SENSITIVE _ . DECLASSIFCE IS DUGUMENT AS SANITIZED 9 MAY A SF (1)CA) HW 50955  DocTa:32203834 Page 3
* @ seen ; - Z2- fe Safe Houses for use by defectors and the wiring of operations assets’ apart- ments or other premises where conversations with assets) would be forth- coming. For instance, in 1962 the apartment of a defector (Golitzen) was ( wired. It was believed that Golitzen had become unhappy with CIA treatment and was considering leaving the country. A telephone tap was placed on his phone to attempt to verify this. Brewer believes that these cases involved positive foreign intelligence gathering as opposed to being security cases. From the names of the individuals whose conversations were to be recorded, Brewer presumes that most of these technical operations] were directed against foreigners. aT fadaich Lacseeee RAIA beets eatee tee Brewer is aware of a few technical operations relating to security. One in- volved the bugging of the premises of a former employee in - about 1964 because of his questionable associates. Another, in 1963, involved a telephone tap on a newsman (although Brewer was unaware at the time the tap : was placed that it was being directed against a newsman) . (1/44) The Technical Division of the Office of Security may have been involved in rs some technical operations in the United States during the 1960's and earlier. . . However, their primary responsibility was counter-audio|work overseas. Brewer does not believe that they would have been involved in Significant amounts of technical work in the States. . ep ne a ‘ Tek Bice: segs . ar bee eT re? Jer rey rec of FNL rec é ae we Ve s) . , ‘ Eee oe fies py. f° 7 y Surveillance Operations ‘ Prior to 1968, the Washington Field Office was performing some unsophisticated : surveillance. This generally related to surveillance of defectors and training operations directed against perspective overseas CIA agents. The purpose of the training was to assist WFO in its surveillance techniques and to determine how well the perspective overseas agents could make contacts and "drops" without being detected. The Field Office had little equipment to undertake sophisticated surveillance at that time. (/4;3c- 28) r In 1968, with the creation of the Surveillance and Technical Unit, a much more concentrated effort was made in the area of surveillance. (12d) Assistance to Local Police Brewer remembers that at some point in time two sets of|/alias documents prepared by Technical Services were given to the Metropolitan Police Department. This included a social security card, driver's license, D. ch permit, etc. RERRRRERKRRRRE I again interviewed Mr. Brewer at approximately 2:30 pm on the same day, just rior to his leaving for the Commission hearings, at which he was testifying. indicated that it was the policy of the CIA to offer gratuities to various ~ SECRET/SENSITIVE HW 50955 Docld:32203834 Page 4_
SECRET/SENSITIVE 3. police officers in the Washington, D.C., area for their assistance to the CIA. Each Christmas a list would be prepared of those individuals from local police departments who had provided assistance, and appropriate gifts would be given to these individuals, ranging from candy and liquor to $25 gift certificates. The money for these gifts was taken from CIA's "Blue Jay'' fund, used for mis- cellaneous sy Some police officials would not accept such gratuities. neti AS ‘Brewer fs algo aware of one occasion when police officials from several de- partments were flown to a hunting lodge owned by the Agency in southern Virginia. Brewer recalls several officers from the Montgomery County, Fairfax County (in- cluding| nd Metropolitan Police ene eCnelading eo] but not -who refused an invitation) attending, as well as a high police official from Boston. Brewer himself attended this gathering and indicated that as best as he can remember it was strictly a social affair. Brewer could not recall ever having agreed to provide jof the Fairfax County Police Department with an automobile whil |was on vaca- tion in cal ymiee although he would not deny that he may have done so. Brewer indicated that all gratuities given police officials were approved by Headquarters and that none were specifically connected with any particular request being made of the police by the CIA. CLT ) (full distribu tion) _ JNR/vmnr SECRET/SENSITIVE HW 450955 Docld: 32203834 Page 5
; " COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Washington, DC 20500 February 20, 1975 SECRET/SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR: = FIL FROM: _ JAMES N. ROETHE ; * SUBJECT: . ' Summary of an Interview with George R. Brewer, Conducted on Tuesday, February 18, 1975, ia the Offices of the Commission by James N. Roethe andi Robert Olsen The interview commenced at approximately 4:00 pm on February 18, 1975, and ended at approximately 8:30 pm on the same date. Mr. Brewer appeared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff. Background of Mr. Brewei: Mr. Brewer is a graduate of the University of Marytand. He has been with the CIA for over twenty years and is presently Chief of the Director's Security Staff. The interview concerned itself primarily with the activities _ of the Washington Field Office of the Office of Security. Mr. Brewer first worked in that office from January 1955 to Februar: 1956, From February 1956 to April 1959 he was on Director Dulles! personal security staff. He served with the Headquarters Field Office (now defunct) from April 1959 to August 1960 and again served with the Washington Field Office fron August 1960 to July 1975, when he obtained his present position. Activities at the Washington Field Office or ne mere ee SSSr es | ee te The Washington Field Office is made up of 35-40 agents. Clericals bring the total cf employees to about 100. It is by far the iargest security field office. The majority of the agents are designated as field agents, whose primary activity is investigating applicants for employaent with the Agency and some covert investigations (investigations under cover, such as investi- gations of contractor's employees or individuals planning to be sent overseas under cover). The remaining agents are desienated as support agents (about § men) who provide a broad range of support to the field agents. In 1966 Mr. Brewer, a support agent, was desienated as the Wasnington Field Office's liaison with the local police (including the Metropolitan Pelice Department, most Suburban police departments, and the Virginia and Maryland State Police). In November of 1968, Mr. Brewer was placed in charge of a newly created "Surveillance and Technical Unit" of the Support Squad. He remained in both positions until he left the Office in July of 1973. Mr. Brewer emphasized that no activity was undertaken by the field office without the approval of eadquarters. Requests for action in Mr. Brewer's areas of interest would be eceived by headquarters security, venerally from the Operations Directorate. The "Security Support 3ranch" at headquarters would pass the request on to the SECRET/SENSITIVE HW 50955 DocId:32203834 Page 6
‘SECRET/SENSITIVE -2- "Assistant Special Agent in Charge of Support’ at the field office (Mr. John Hutchinson during most of Mr. Brewer's tenure), who in turn would ask Mr. Brewer to carry out the request. The following persons have headed the Washington Field Office as "Special Agent-in-Charge": Charles Kane 1960-1963 1 Marvin Gentile 1963-1964 | John Noble 1964-1968 | Ed Kiippa 1968-1973 Jack Cryer Present Covert Investigations by Field Agents Such investigations were conducted much less frequently than overt investiga- tions of applicants for employment. Several unofficial covers were used by investigators to prevent the person being investigated from being exposed as a CIA contact. fe Technical Operations Technical operations consisted of the planting of electronic listening devices (King) and the telephone taps (Queen). No technical devices were planted by the Washington Field Office after the formation in 1968 of the "Surveillance and Technical Unit." However, Mr. Brewer has planted technical devices prior to 1968: , 1. In about 1966 Mr. Brewer planted a listening device in an apartment at the Savoy Apartments in Washington, D. C. (a CIA Safe House). This device was later removed and Brewer was told it was never used, 2. About 8 years ago Mr. Brewer placed several bugs in a Washington Safe House. He believes they have never been removed. They have never becn used to his knowledge. 3. ; About 10 years ago Mr. Brewer was called back from vacation to bug 2 , cadillac to be used by two Chinese generals. 4." At one time Mr. Brewer bugged hotel rooms in the Washington area where unwitting U-2 pilot applicants were being interviewed. S.: In 1963 Mr. Brewer placed telephone taps on phones in a hone in Washington (MOCKINGBIRD case). At the time he did not know he was tapping a news columnist's phone, but he later learned that that had been the case. , 6, Four houses in Miami were bugged by Mr. Brewer shortly after the Bay of Pigs incident.  SECRET/SENSITIVE Hy 50955" Decia: 32203834 Page 7
SECRET/SENSITIVE ~3e 7. A hotel room in Los Angeles was bugged by Brewer several years ago. It was to be used for some kind of interview. 8. -A-home-in Bethesda, Maryland, was also bugged before being occupied by a Cuban National. a In all, Mr. Brewer believes he was involved in more than ten technical opera- tions, but less than 100 prior to 1968. In all cases he was merely supplying technical support for operations at the request of his superiors, and was not witting to the actual operation. In each case he assumed the propriety and lawfulness of the operation. Since 1966, Mr. Brewer has been engaged in only one technical operation (Operation PARAGON~-threat against Director Helms end Vice President Agnew) . When that threat was made, Brewer suggested that a line be run into the in- forming agent's apartment. Such a line was run from that agent's telephone (a telephone tap). This operation was approved by higher authority. Surveillance Surveillance was conducted off and on through the period from 1960 to 1973. However, active surveillance did not begin until 1968 when the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" was formed. Prior to 1968, surveillance was restricted to training exercises and surveillance of defectors. Mr. Brewer estimated that he engaged in about ten such operations prior to 1968. Trainings sur- ‘ veillance continued after 1968, but only one surveillance of a defector was made during that time. In 1966 Headquarters requested that the Washington Field Headquarters form a sophisticated surveillance. unit. Such a unit was not really created until Brewer took over the “Surveillance and Technical Unit" 1n 1968. After 1968 surveillance took up @ large part of the time of the "Surveillance and Techni- cal Unit's" time. The Unit consisted of 14 support agents and was expanded to 20-24 men during some surveillances. The Washington Field Office did surveillance for the entire country with regard to Security Office matters. If a surveillance was conducted anywhere in the country, Brewer believes he would: know of it. If surveillance was conducted in the territory of another field' office, that field office would have been in charge, with the Washington Office providing the Support. The following surveillance was undertaken by Brewer's Unit: 1 l. Surveillance of Employees or Former Employees SECRET/SENSITIVE 4 HY 50955 Docld: 322703334 Page &
SEGRET/SENSITIVE ~4- b. Project CAPUSTO (8 Ball): Employee associating with former defector was surveilled. c. Project TOMCAT: An associate of CAPUSTO was surveilled. 12 USES La POT RE OES YE PLT EIT | i ‘a. Project MONEY: A former employee planning to attend the SALT talks With his new boss was surveilled. ‘e, Project SIESTA: Surveillance on a former employee and the suspected Castro agent she was living with. eee spuemanete women prema £. Project PINEAPPLE: Surveillance of a former employee living above his means. Washington Field Office surveilled outside D.C. Anderson Associates surveilled in D.C. and at subject's Arlington home. Wash- ington Field Office did not participate in any break-in of subject's apartment. g. Project AMOS: Former employee surveilled to Champaign, Illinois. a Project PIXIE: (last job): Two employees and son of another surveilled for suspected drug use and/or sale. i. Project PARAGON: Informer who reported threat against Director Helms and Vice Presiuent Agnew surveilled in New York and Detroit. j. MARCHETTI: Former employee threatening to publish classified material (which he cold not have obtained during the course of his employment) was surveilled. Three cars were used in surveillance. No police cover. 2. Surveillance of Newsmen (to determine source of security leaks) a. | | Brewer knew that surveillance was to determine source of] fpublishing of classified information. Mr. Brewer ques- tioned his superior (John Hutchinson) about the case. He wondered why the FBI was not involved and understood that the FBI didn't want to . touch the case (rumor).Along with | | and{_swere surveilled. i — Kae NAAN TALE TEI IG ES HENLE PUNY SAT EYEE TE LET BEG LEME TEE Bi TE EET BS I a b Mr. Brewer also questioned this surveillance, but not ; strongly as| Iwas relatively unknown. Further, he really didn't a know the reason why __—_—swas'- being surveilled until later. Mer arene, 3. Other Surveillances - a. A nephew of an assistant to Director McCone was surveilled after he went berserk and threatened to go to the Russians. He was surveilled for two days. SECRET/SEXSITIVE _ HY 50955 DBocld: 322703834 Page 9
SECRET/SENSITIVE -5 - In all cases of surveillance, photographs of the subject and his contacts were taken. Further, the identity of the contact was also ascertained and reported to headquarters. No surveillance was ever placed on a Congressman, Senator, Judge or Justice or other public figure except the newsmen previously mentioned. Mr. Brewer believes that there were no cases of surveillance ~ undertaken by his Unit which did not involve either (1) a threatened security leak' to newsmen, or (2) a potential security violation, except Project PARAGON. The records kept on surveillances include the letters assigning the surveil- lance to the Unit, the agents! logs, photographs taken and the final report of each project. This information was all sent to Headquarters. The Field Office would also retain copies but never made any use of these files. Break-Ins: t i ? H F E Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was only involved in one break-in in connection | with Project SIESTA, involving a former employee living with a suspected Castro sympathizer. A photographic studio, jointly operated by the employee and her Cuban boy friend, was broken into. This didn't bother Brewer, as there was strong evidence suggesting a possible security violation. Further, the suspected pair wis soliciting passport photo business at CIA,which would give them information about the travels of CIA agents. A second break-in was effected by Anderson Associates (a CIA proprietary) in Project SIESTA. Brewer doesn't know who headed up Anderson Associites, He believes that Ralph True, Joe Langen and Don Connor may have hac. some connection with it. | E | ie t Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was disbanded in June or July of 1972. Brewer is not sure why the Unit was disbanded. The Washington Field Office still does training surveillance and surveillance of defectors. There have been no in- stances (to Brewer's knowledge) of potential employee security leaks since the Surveillance Unit was disbanded. Activity with Dissident Groups On three occasions (in 1969, 1970 and May 1971). tne CIA participated with the Washington police in monitoring peace and anti-war demonstrations. In each case a request was made by the Washington Police Department (MPD), through for assistance. The Washington Field Office of CIA HW 50955 furnished six vehicles with communications gear and men to operate the gear. Mr. Brewer believes that two CIA agents and one police officer occupied each car. (More CIA agents than police were utilized,as MPD didn't have the neces- sary manpower.) The only purpose of this operation was to monitor the move- ments of the crowds. There was no attempt to penetrate any dissident organi- zation or to photoyraph the crowds. The CIA agents involved in the May 1,197], operation carried police ID's. CIA also provided a fully-staffed communica- tions center at MPD to receive communications from the cars. This provided MPD a second radio frequency and freed MPO's own channels for other police business, SECRET/SENSITIVE Boclda: 3227036834 Page i160
- SECRET/SENSITIVE ~6 - Brewer believes that the primary purpose of ‘this operation was to render “communications assistance to the local police.’ The secondary purpose was to monitor crowds sc as to protect CIA installations. (For example, MPD had obtained some information that various dissident groups planned to picket CIA Headquarters and planned to harass Director Helms during a planned. speech.) All of these CIA operations were verbally approved by Headquarters Support Branch (Mr. Cryer). Total period of time devoted to monitoring dissident groups with MPD (for all three occasions) was about five days. Brewer is not aware of any instance where the Washington Field Office tried to penetrate any dissident groups. Collection of Information on Dissident Groups During the period of the demonstrations in 1969-1971, all field offices and resident agents were requested by Headquarters to look out for literature and other informatior which might in any way affect the CIA. No conscious intelligence gathering of literature was requested. Items to be looked for included campus news clippings, etc. This project was not a continuing one over the three-year period when most “demonstrations occurred, It was renewed from time to time as flare-ups in activity occurred. Mr. Brewer does not know the quantity of material collected or the use made of that material. The only information that Brewer knows was collected by the Washington Field Office consisted of the weekly intelligence summary prepared by MPD. Headquarters specifically asked Brewer to get the summaries (either Jack Cryer, Tex Mills or Curt Rivers),and they were forwarded to Headquarters. No effort was made by Brewer to obtain information concerning any dissident group's intended activities. Police Cover Operations Mr. Brewer indicated that Washington Field Office agents have received police cover from the following police departments: 1. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) During the May 1971 demonstra- tions, MPD furnished ID's to those CIA agents monitoring the crowds along with police officers, These ID cards were in fact used. No other police cover was obtained from MPD. 2. Fairfax Citv Police Department: In connection with Operation SIESTA (which included a break-in at the photographic studio in Fairfax City, operated by a suspected Castro Agent) cover was obtained from the police. One CIA agent was given a Fairfax City police badge in case some one walked in on the break-in. The badge was never utilized. Brewer didn't actually remember obtaining this badge, but it was obtained by some one. SECRET/SENSITIVE HW 50955 Docld: 32203834 Page il
"SECRET/SENSITIVE -7- 3. Fairfax County Police Department: Apparently undercover CIA agents in the county (imder DOD cover) were being continuously harassed and challenged in the county while on operations. They feared their cover might be blown and felt it would be good to have police cover to prevent this from occurring. Mr. Brewer himself may have suggested getting badges and identification from the county police. In any event, he thought it was a good idea and Headquarters approved it (per John ieee Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Washing Field Office Thereafter (latter part of 1971) Brewer went tos PF See A ETL PMNS BAN CORI 84 A Enemies a gemma mere cts we aes gid asked about obtaining somé badges and Ss, reported tha vas originally reluctant to give CIA the badges and ID, but in early spring of 1972 he chanced his mine and relented. Brewer does nct know if Osborn called a : L or if there was any arm-twis tatig by the CIA. Brewer himself | did no arm-twisting. Nine patrolman's badges and one sergeant's badge were obtained, plus ten blank ID cards. The true names of CIA agents were placed on the cards by Brewer. It was understood that if the badges and ID's were ever used that joule immediately be notified. In fact, they were kept in a safe at Washingtcn Field Office Headquarters and never used, They have recently been returned to Fairfax County. No police cover was ever obtained by Washington Ficid Office, or used by them for the purpose of performing police activity. Brewer stated that local police were always kept informed of CIA activities in their jurisdiction. Other Assistance Rendex red CIA by Lecal Police ae x —— Project SIESTA: This project involved the break-in into a photographic shop in Fairfax City. Three Fairfax City police assisted in the operation. One entered the apari- ment with several CIA agents; one stood watch on the front steps; and one waited in a squad car outside the building. Much material in the photographic studio was photographed. Surveillance was constantly maintained on the opera- tors | of the studio. while the break-in was being carried out. Use of Fairfax County Facilities: On at least one occasion the Fairfax County police station was used for CIA training purposes. CIA desired to assure themselves that new recruits for covert overseas duty could not be "broken"! if siezed by foreign authorities. Consequently, CIA officials would "arrest" these unwitting recruits on some bogus charge and take them to Fairfax County jail where they would be subject to strong interrogation to see if they would "break". SECRET/SENSITIVE HW 50955 Docld:32203834 Page i?
SECRET/SENSITIVE - 8 - Other Assistance a, a oe a Almost every police department has agreed to immediately notify the CIA if one of its agents is arrested. Assistance Rendered to Local Police by the CIA ATT arte pa Om RE SPO ENR, AEB NET PRESET Training Programs: In late 1971 a course in photography was offered to officers of local police departments by the Washington Field Office, and in 1972 courses in both sur- veillance technigues and photography were offered. Representatives from MPD and most large suburban police departments attended. These courses were stopped after the printing of a New York Times article criticizing the train- ing of New York City police by the CIA. . Metropolitan Police Department: 1. May Day - 1971: MPD was furnished six cars equipped with communications gear, plus two men for each car,from the Washington Field Office (WFO). WFO also furnisheda central communications command post plus operators. The purpose of this assistance was to permit the monitoring of crowds. 2. In about 1972, Brewer performed a telephone tap for MPD in connection with an interna] affairs matter where eleven police officers were poten- tially involved :n a bribe. Brewer understoca that a court order was obtained before the taps were put on. | Jof, MPD made this request and CIA Headquarters approved it. 3. During 1969 demonstrations, | fof MPD asked Brewer if he could wire a lamp in thé apartment of a witting police informant © who had penetrated anti-war dissident groups. Brewer passed this re- quest on to security headquarters, and the Technical Services Division performed the wiving. CIA did not monitor or receive copies of any con- versations recorded. aos Shortly after a CIA surveillance training course which several MPD ‘officers attended, MPD became desirous of maintaining surveillance on one of its unwitting police informants to see if she was doing what the police paid her to do. MPD asked Brower if his men would assist the new . trainees in the project. Brewer's surveillance unit did furnish assist- ance, including four cars and at least one man for each car. These CIA agents, together with MPD officers, surveilled the subject for one and one- half days. This is the only time Brewer's surveillance team actually provided manpower to assist MPD in a surveillance. S ECRET/SENSITIVE \ HWY 350955 DBocld:32203834 Page 13
HY 0955 SECRET/SENSITIVE -9 - S, On two. or. three occasions between 1970 and 1972 the Washington Field 2. On one occasion Brewer accompanied a county police representative to U.S. Office loaned the MPD Morals Division a device to, tap a touch-tone ~~ _ oe : sphone. The request came from. " land Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with an for equipment requests. Dollard or Foran would call Sayle, who in turn would direct Brewer to provide the equipment. 8 Sg SRIRAM PL AE CEN 6. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972, Sayle directed Brewer to provide receiving devices to MPD. Once of MPD per- sonally contacted Brewer and requested a receiver. It was provided (ostensibly for training purposes). MPD on an indefinite loan.’ 8. The Washington Field Office also gave MPD personnel technical advice on use of double tape machines and advice on photography from time to time. MPD received no assistance from the Washington Field Office when they set up | their Intelligence Division in 1967-68. No other assistance was ever rendered MPD concerning solving particular crime or interrogating a particular witness. Sometime after Director Schlessinger became DCI, the MPD was asked to return all equipment previously loaned: to it by the CIA,and most was returned. Appar- ently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other police departments as well). Montgomery County Police Department 7. On several occasions covert miniature transmitters were furnished to é é In about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some transmitters to | (Ret.) an of the county police. They had already been loaned some re- ceivers before Brewer came with the Washington Field Office. Fairfax County Police Department 1., Years ago the county was given an old Ampex 601 recorder equipped to take a telephone tap off a dial phone. Recording on S. Capitol Street to help him pick out a dial recorder for telephone taps. 3, In 1969-70, Brewer loaned some photographic equipment to the county police forces intelligence unit. The equipment has never been returned. No personnel have ever been loaned to the county. No assistance has ever been given concerning a specific crime or witness. SECRET/SENSITIVE Docld: 322703834 Page 14
*SECRET/SENSITIVE _ - 10 - Other | 1, In 1969 or 1970 metal detection demonstrations were given at CIA Head- quarters to representatives of all Virginia and Maryland Police Depart - ments. 2 SNE SA PEED OORT ER ME BB BOAT 4 2. Director Helms owned a beach house near Lewes, Delaware. On one occasion Brewer met with the chief of police there concerning the security of the beach house, as Helms had been receiving threats. Apparently Osborn gave the police chief a box of flares and other equipment (as a gift to the department) for the chief's assistance. prieeaecppeeqercin cneyemaen tan ona ag re ame “ be. a gay lene RREKKEKEKKE REE At some point during the interview, Mr. Brewer indicated that he had not discussed his testimony with any representative of the Agency prior to the interview--except the General Counsel. IMPRESSIONS Mr. Brewer was originally somewhat reluctant to be interviewed and at one point was considering whether he should retain a liwyer. However, as we went along he opened up considerably to the point where [ now believe I have a pretty good understanding of the Office of Security's Washington Field Office. It would appear that the Washington Field Office did conduct much, if not most, of the physical and technical surveiliance directed against American citizens subsequent to 1968. In every case the surveillance was directed by higher authority. It also appears thet the Washington Field Office gave substantial assistance to. local police departments in the Wash- ington, D. C. area. Much of this assistance was onoviously an appropriate exchange of information between two intelligence units. Most disturbing is the incident where CIA agents assisted MPD officers in a bona fide police surveillance (a law enforcement function), but this seems to have been an isolated case. JINR/ vir H 3 ee < 3 § bed ee > ny i i SECRET/SENSITIVE HW 50955 Docld:322903834 Page 15 — Le