DWBelin:rj 5/30/75 SUMMARY OF FACTS -- INVESTIGATION OF “CIA INYOLYEMENT IN PLANS TO ASSASSINATE FOREIGN LEADERS The following is a summary of facts gathered by the Executive Director of the CIA Commission concerning possible CIA involvement in plans to assassinate foreign leaders. The Executive Director requested complete access to papers of the National Security Council including papers of the Forty 178-10004-10091 Committée and its predecessors and papers of any special groups, or special operating groups. Such access was not granted. Also, time did not permit examination of documents that might be available in the Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson presidential libraries. Consequently, the investigation is not complete with regard to the question of who, if anyone outside the. CIA, author- ized or directed the planning of any assassination attempts against foreign leaders. However, with particular reference to the pians directed against Fidel Castro, the investigation is sufficiently complete to show that plans were undertaken by the CIA. President Ford has announced that assassination is not and should never be a tool of American foreign policy. The Executive Director concurs and believes that it is against the constitutienal and moral principles for which this nation stands for there to bs any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United States Government in any plans involving the assassination of any person in peacetime. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library cant AA ES AO HW 54214 Docld:32112745 Page 2?
-2— A. The first knowledge that the Commission had con- cerning possible involvement of the CIA in assassination plans directed at foreign leaders was when. the CIA informed the Commission staff at the outset of the Commission's work, in response to an overall staff request for possible unlawful activities of the CIA, that such plans existed. The Commission staff was told that there was no evidence of murders or plots for murder against persons in the United States carried on by the CTA. However, the Commission staff was told that there had been discussion of plans for assassination attempts involving overt acts occurring within the boundaries of this country with regard to attempts on the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. Although there was some question whether or not an. assassination plan aimed at a foreign leader fell technically within the charter of the Commission, even though overt acts may have taken place. in this country , the Commission and its staff determined that because of | the nature and seriousness of the matters involved, the doubts would be resolved in favor of undertaking an investigation of the facts. Only after such investigation could the Commission make an informed decision as to its jurisdiction. Photocopy from ‘ Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:32112745 Page 3
Furthermore, fhe Commission and its staff felt that it was also important to proceed in this area because it related to the charges’ to the Commission and the President's executive order directing the Commission to "determine whether existing safeguards are adequate to prevent any activities which violate the provisions of 50 U.S.C 403" and also related to the charge by the President that the Commission should "make such recom- mendations to the President and to the Director of Central Intelligence as the Commission deems appropriate." TR eran att er en eR RE Se erty reams, ee nr em eet Oe Tt ewe sant On the basis of its investigation, the Commission has determined that agents of the CIA were involved in planning in this country with certain citizens and others to seek to assassinate Premier Castro. The Commission has also determined that the CIA was involved in shipping arms from this country to persons in the Dominican Republic, who sought to assassinate Generalissimo Trujillo (who himself had been involved in an attempt to assassinate the President of Venezuela.) | The Commission has not found evidence of any other attempts to assassinate any other foreign leader which had significant wert activities within the United States. However, the nature of the activity and the degree of: secrecy and compartmentation within the Agency is such that it is difficult to find any evidence of this kind unless specific facts are brought to the attention of an Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 4
investigating body. With regard to activities outside of the United States, the Commission has not found any evidence of CIA participation in plans to assassinate foreign leaders, except as described in the next four | paragraphs. However, the investigation of the Commission in such areas, which had no domestic aspect which might bring it within the Commission's jurisdictional mandate under ‘the President's Order, has not been extensive. In the course of the first stage of its investiga- tion to determine its jurisdiction, the Commission made a preliminary investigation of charges that the CIA was. involved in the death of Patrice Lumumba, who was killed in early 1961. The Commission has not found any evidence that the CIA participated in that killing, although there is evidence that prior to Lumumba's death some CIA personnel and others discussed the possibility of undertaking a plan to assassinate Lumumba.* *In an affidavit, C. Douglas Dillon, a member of this : Commission, stated that while he served as: Under Secretary - of State from June 1959 until early January 1961, he heard no discussion of assassination attempts against anyone, except discussions which occured in late July or early - August of 1960 at a meeting at the Pentagon which covered a great variety of matters in which "...a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 5
-~S- According to Richard Bissell, who was the CIA Deputy Director of Plans at the time, he was aware of dis= cussion of plans within the Agency concerning the possible assassination of Patrice Lumumba and that “a case officer was directed to bok into the possibilities. He reported back in a matter of weeks and convinced me that this was probably unfeasible, and probably an undesirable course of action. According to the case officer, who is now retired, Bissell asked him to go to the Congo and there murder or arrange for the murder of Lumumba, and the case officer said that he told Bissell that he refused to be a party to such an act.* Bissell said the Agency had nothing whatsoever to do with the death of Lumumba. Bissell also testified that there was discussion within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt on the life of President Sukarno of Indonesia which “progressed as far as the identification of an asset who it was felt might be recruited for this purpose. The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the point where it seemed feasible." He said the Agency had “absolutely nothing" to do with the death of Sukarno. “The case officer gave this information in an oral telephone conference at which time an appointment was arranged for the taking of his testimony before a member of the Commission staff and a court reporter. The case officer failed to keep his appointment. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 6
With regard to both plans, he stated that no assassination plans would have been undertaken without authorization outside the Agency, and that no such authori- zation was undertaken for plans against either Lumumba or Sukarno. Since the Commission found no aspects to bring the Sukarno and Lumumba matters within the scope of its investigative authority, no further investigation in these two areas was undertaken. However, the Commission did find sufficient domestic aspects in the Castro and Trujillo plans for the Commission to undertake an investigation. to interpret its authority so that the Commission would a ascertain whether the charges of assassination plots have a basis in fact and involve unlawful domestic CIA ‘activities and (2) determine whether existing safeguards ‘would prevent activities of that nature in the future regardless of whether they might involve domestic or foreign conspiracy. The following is a summary of facts pertaining to CIA participation in assassination plans to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro. The facts have been developed through a riview of the internal investigation of the CIA, examination of docu- ments, and interviews and testimony. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:32112745 Page Tf
-~7- An analysis of the involvement in the CIA in plots to attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro illustrates the development of larger schemes out of smaller schemes, and also illustrates how important it is to have adequate | internal and external controls on the Agency. The initial CIA schemes relating to Fidel Castro © were an outgrowth of large-scale plans by the United States Government to attempt to change the government of Cuba. There had been great dissatisfaction with the government of Cuban leader Batista. As Castro's influence increased, attempts were made to persuade Batista to resign and turn over the reins of government to a group that was more attuned to the needs and desires of the Cuban people, particularly in areas of democratic govern- ment and social reforms. According to an interview with the former Chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, an unofficial ambassador from’ this country approached Batista in December 1968, asking that he resign and turn the reins of government to new leadership. This request was refused. . ON Fidel Castro shortly thereafter took over the Cuban government. There was great concern on the part of American leadership about the presence of a government so closely aligned with the Soviet Union barely ninety miles from American shores. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 6
Therefore, the CIA, with appropriate authorization, undertook the development of an operation in support of Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow the Castro Government , the culmination of which became the Bay of Pigs disaster in. April 1961. 7 As the plans for the attempted overthrow of the Cuban government were developed, one of the considerations = seen Ghee eee ood eee ne related to Fidel Castro as the dominant figure. ; There has also been testimony before the Commission that at the request of the CIA the Air Force provided a plane in late 1959 or early 1960 which was used to fly two Cuban exiles into Cuba. The witness was unable to provide the. Commission with names of these two Cuban exiles or names of any CIA personnel which he said were involved. However, at the time of the events the witness was an Air Force officer who had liaison functions between the Department of Defense and the CIA. He testified that he believes a plane was provided and that the two Cuban exiles were to carry with them one or more rifles with telescopic sites to be used in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro. The Commission sought to investigate this matter. In a "Memorandum for the Record” dated May 15, 1975, the CIA admitted that in reviewing its files relating to Cuban. operations during the period 1959-1961: "a number of. | Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:32112745 Page 9
documents were found that referred to the intent on the part of some of the Cuban teams operating inside Cuba to | attempt to assassinate Castro....Additionally, the files indicate that there was considerable interest in procurement of Helio Courier (the civil version of the L-28), but there is no definite indication that they were intended for Cuban operations. Also, there is mention of the air drop of Springfield rifles with telescopic sights." 1. 1960-61 ‘and ‘the Phase T Plan The Phase I plans involved the preparation of poison botulism pills by the CIA, the delivery of those pills to organized crime figures who in turn were to get the pills delivered to contacts they had in Cuba, who in turn were to get the pills into the hands of someone who could place them in a beverage to be drunk by Premier Castro. a. When the Plans Began There is some disagreement about. exactly how the Phase I plans began. The two people in the CIA who were ‘the most intimately involved were Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of Plans, who was the person in the CIA who had direct respon- sibility for the Bay of Pigs operation, and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, the Director of the Office of Security of. the CIA, According to Richard Bissell, the plans relating to Fidel Castro started in "the very beginning of 1961" when he said he became aware "of the possibility that an assassi- nation attempt might be planned using Mafia resources, or Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 10
-1uU- syndicate resources. My very uncertain recollection is that I first heard of this possibility from Shef Edwards." According to Sheffield Edwards, Ais First contact with these plans "was about the time of the Bay or Pigs." He said he did not "remember exactly" if it was before a@ after the Bay of Pigs, but when asked whether or not it was in’ the Eisenhower Administration or the Kennedy Administration for purposes of determining the time of the inception of the plan, he said that "It was in the Kennedy Administration." Whereas Bissell testified that he "Eirst heard 1g ee eee mt ae tS se RN Mie Se EE Sree RMS AEN Oellien’ torr? Sere ape of this possibility (of using Mafia or syndicate resources) from Sheffield Edwards," Edwards testified that his first contact was a request by Bissell who asked Edwards "if I _had any assets...that would be available into the syndicate." an te ween eee ee _ ne tet mem A aot ats ae - Although oral testimony of both said that this ene gM ee cwain eve mene eee wee ie neem eee ee eee began in the early stages of the Kennedy Administration, there is documentation which indicates that these conversa~ tions took place in the latter part of 1960 during the Eisenhower Administration. This documentation includes a May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" entitled "Arthur James Balletti et al--Unauthorized Publication or Use of \ : Communications." The opening sentence of the memorandum states: "This memorandum for the record was prepared at Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 11
-l1- the request of the Attorney General of the United States following a complete oral briefing of him relevant to a sensitive CIA operation conducted during the period approximately August.1960 to May 1961." The oral briefing actually occurred in the offices of the Attorney General of the United States, Robert Kennedy, on May 7, 1962, and Attorney General Kennedy received a copy of the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record. . Attending the oral briefing were three people: Attorney General Kennedy, Sheffield Edwards, and Lawrence /| Houston, General Counsel of the CIA. The memorandum itself ~ was prepared by Sheffield Edwards and continued after the opening sentence: "In August 1960 the undersigned was approached by Mr. Richard Bissell, then Deputy Director for Plans of CIA,. to explore. the possibility of mounting this sensitive operation against Fidel Castro. It was “thought that certain gambling interests, which had formerly been active in Cuba, might be willing and able to assist and further, might have both intelligence assets in Cuba and communication between Miami, Florida and Cuba.” "The memorandum then related that an intermedian who was known to the CIA was approached’ by Colonel Sheffield Edwards "and asked to establish contact. with a member or members of the gambling syndicate to explore their capabili- ties." The approach was to be made "...to the syndicate as Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 12
—~12- appearing to represent big business organizations which wished to protect their interests in Cuba." The contact was made with a "syndicate" member who "showed interest in the possibility and indicated he had some contacts in Miami that he might use." The Syndicate member supposedly told the CIA intermediary that the syndicate person "was not interested inaany remuneration but would seek to establish capabilities in Cuba to perform the desired project." WD LP Ape ENT TOT OF a g ea mr ee The memorandum continued: "Towards the end of oe ee RR A Ae Ot eee September” 1960 contact with another syndicate member from Chicago, Sam Giancana, was made, and in turn an arrangement was made through Giancana for the CIA inter- mediary and his contact "to meet with a ‘courier' who was going back and forth to Havana. From information received back by the courier the proposed operation appeared to be feasible and it was decided to obtain an official Agency approval in this regard. A figure of one hundred fifty thousand dollars was set by the Agency as a Payment to be made on completion of the operation and to be paid only to the principal or principals who would conduct the operation in Cuba." The CIA intermediary reported that Giancana and the other contact "emphatically stated that they wished no part of any payment. The undersigned (Sheffield Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 13
-13- Edwards) then briefed the proper senior officers of this Agency of the proposal. Knowledge of this project during its life was kept to a total of six persons and never became a part of the project current at the time for the invasion of Cuba. There were no memoranda on the project nor were there other written documents or agreements. The project was duly orally approved by the said senior officials of the Agency." Te eee: ‘The memorandum continued that during the period from September 1960 to 1961, "efforts were continued" by the CIA intermediary and the Mafia personnel "to proceed with the operation. The first principal in Cuba withdrew and another pincipal was selected as has been briefed to the Attorney General. Ten thousand dollars was passed for expenses to the second principal. He was further. furnished with approximately one thousand dollars worth - of communications equipment to establish communications between his headquarters in Miami and assets in Cuba. No monies were ever paid" to the syndicate personnel. There was expense money paid to the CIA intermediary. The memorandum stated that “After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through" the CIA intermediary to the syndicate personnel "to call off the operation" with w the further direction that the syndicate person "was | Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld: 32112745 Page 14
told to tell his principal that the proposal to pay. one hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion of the operation had been definitely withdrawn." Only two copies of the memorandum were prepared -- one for the Attorney General and one to be retained by the CIA. b. - Pactual Background--Preparation of May ‘14, 1962 * Memorandum for Attorney General The factual situation underlying the preparation of the May 14, 1982, memorandum was that sometime in the fall of 1960 Sam Giancana asked the CIA intermediary to arrange for putting a listening device in the room of an entertainer who at the time was in Las Vegas and who Giancana thought was having an affair with another enter- tainer, who was reputed to be Gianeana's mistress. According to the Phase I CIA case officer, the request by Giancana came at a crucial time when plans were underway for Phase I. Giancana supposedly stated that if he did not get help to install the listening device, he would have to go to Las Vegas himself. The case officer said "this would have interrupted the project at a very critical time," and therefore he sought the assistance of the CIA intermediary to get a private detective agency to undertake the installation of the ‘Listening device. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 15
-15- The CIA intermediary passed the request over to another private investigator, who in turn contacted Arthur James Balletti (the name of the subject of the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record given -to Attorney General Kennedy .) Instead of putting a listening device in the room, Balletti put.a listening device on the telephone. The listening device was discovered and Balletti was arrested by the sheriff of Las Vegas, Nevada. At the time co the incident, the CIA did not know of the specific proposed wiretap. According to the Agency investigation by the Inspector General's Office in 1967, Edwards had once told the Agency intermediary that if the intermediary ever got in trouble he could say to the FBI that he was working on an intelligence operation being handled by the Agency. -An FBI memorandum on that matter stated that the inter- mediary claimed the telephone tap was ordered on behalf of the Agency's effort to obtain intelligence through hoodlum elements in Cuba. The Agency investigation file also states that a March 23, 1962 FBI memorandum confirmed a meeting with Sheffield Edwards in which Edwards told. the FBI that the intermediary was involved in a sensitive project and that the CIA would object to prosecution because it would necessitate CIA information and it could embarrass the United States Government. Subsequently there Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:3271127745 Page 16
-16- was a meeting between Sheffield Edwards and Sam Papich, the FBI liaison with the Agency, in which Edwards advised Papich that it would not be in the national interest to prosecute. At the time of that meeting, those who had ' initially authorized the assassination plans (Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell) were gone and no one else in authority (including Richard Helms, who replaced Bissell) had been "cut in on the operation." Thereafter, Sheffield Edwards briefed ‘Lawrence Houston, who in turn briefed General Carter, McCone's Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. “General Carter, “who is now retired, lives int Colorado. When interviewed by a member of the Commission staff by long distance telephone, General Carter said that he had no recollection of this. According to “Sheffield Edwards , prior to briefing Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he briefed Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the Agency. Edwards said that there was nothing that he knew about the pian to | assassinate Castro that he didn't tell Attorney General Kennedy and that the briefing lasted "about a half an hour, at least." He said that he told Attorney General Kennedy everything, and. that after the briefing was completed Robert Kennedy had no comment to him but Robert Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:327112745 Page 17
Kennedy "cautioned Larry Houston to the effect that he ‘was to know about these things. Words to that effect." When asked whether or not the Attorney General had told Colonel Edwards that "you shouldn't do this at all," Colonel Edwards replied "No." When asked whether or not the Attorney General in any way said "that he disapproved of whatever was done in the past," Colonel Edwards Said "No." | Lawrence Houston testified, "I was briefed on this ‘subject. ater it was dropped. I was not party to nor was I asked in aivance about it....By the time I heard about it, I think it had been terminated some little time, but there were personalities involved...who were both regarded as part of the Mafia ‘organization, and these were people” that the CIA intermediary "had introduced to us. They had former gambling interests in Havana, and at one time thought they may be able to take action against Castro. -After it fell through, my recollection is that. they had potential criminal indictments" against the Mafia people “and it seems to me that the bug in the Las Vegas hotel was involved more peripherally, but I cannot remember the details." | wo ; Houston also testified that he told Edwards "that I thought the only thing to do was to go and tell the whole story to the Attorney General. So with the Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:327112745 Page 18
approval of the Director at that time--, well, it was "63, it must have been McCone. We went down to brief Mr. Kennedy on the full story” that the Agency "had set up a project with its aim the demise of Castro, that the project had fallen through, that these following people were involved, and we gave them the names, and this is what made him unhappy, because at that time he felt he was. making a very strong drive to try to get after the Mafia. And so his comment was to us that if we were going to get involved with the Mafia, in the future at any time, to make etre you see me first." | (This is the only evidence in the record to show that John MCone knew about the existence of any specific assassination plan in 1962. There is evidence in the CIA files to show that the actual person with whom the matter was discussed was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and this evidence is supported by an August 16, 1963 memorandum from Helms to McCone, which will be discussed in the Phase ITI portion of this report. ) © c. FBI Memoranda Concerning CIA Assassination SS eS Eee Plans According to a May 22, 1961 FBI memorandum entitled "Arthur James Balletti, et al":, | “On May 3, 1961, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA} furnished the following information. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 19
-19- “Colonel Edwards advised that in connection wit CIA's operation against Castro he personally contacted Robert Maheu during the fall of 1960 for the purpose of using Maheu as a. ‘cut-out’ in contacts with Sam Giancana, a known hoodlum in the Chicago area. Colonel Edwards said that since the underworld controlled gambling activities in Cuba under the Batista government, it was assumed that this element would still continue to have sources and contacts ‘in Cuba which perhaps could be utilized successfully in connection with CIA's clandestine efforts against the Castro government. As a result, Maheu's services were solicited as a ‘cut-out! because of his possible entree into under- world circles. Maheu obtained Sam Giancana's assistance in this regard and according to Edwards , Giancana gave every indication of cooperating through Maheu in attempting to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba. Edwards added that none o Giancana's efforts have materialized to date and that several of the plans still are working and may eventually ‘pay off.'" The memorandum then went into the Balletti . Situation and reported that Colonel Edwards had no knowledge of the wire tap. ‘ The memorandum concluded with the following paragraph: Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:32112745 Page 20
~20- "Colonel Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program. and that Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, during his recent briefings of General: Taylor’ and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation told the Attorney General that some of the CIA's dssociated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against | Castro." Subsequently, | on 1 March 6, 1967, J. Edgar Hoover sent to the Attorney General a Letter with an accompanying March 6, 1967, FBI memorandum entitled "Central Intelli- gence Agency's Intentions to Send Hoodlums to Cuba to | -Assassinate Castro”. The memorandum referred to the Balletti wiretap matter and stated that the FBI "checked matter with CIA on 5/3/61 and learned CIA was using Robert Mahue as intexmediary with Sam Giancana relative to CIA's ‘dirty business’ anti-Castro activities. nBy letter 5/22/61 we ‘furnished former Attorney General Kennedy a memorandum containing a rundown on CIA's involvement in this. The originals of the letter and memorandum were returned to us for filing purposes. A copy of that memorandum is being attached to instant letter being sent to Attorney General. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 DoclId:3271127745 Page 21
" =-2)- "On 5/9/62 Kennedy discussed with the Director a number of matters, including admission by CIA that Robert Mahue had been hired by that Agency to approach Sam Giancana to have Castro assassinated at a cost of $150,000. Kennecy stated he had issued orders that CIA should never undertake such steps again without first checking with Department of Justice and stated because of this matter it would be difficult to prosecute Giancana or Robert Mahue then or in the future." | The memorandum continued that the FBI had learne: on June 20, 1963 that ‘the CIA contacts with the Mafia had "continued up until that time when they were reportedly cut off." The FBI memorandum also stated that it appsared that one Mafia member involved in the plans “is using his prior connections with CIA to his best advantage. * UA contemporaneous FBI memorandum dated March 6, 1967 stated that Robert Kennedy following his briefing in May of 1962 informed the FBI on May 9, 1962 about the ‘briefing. "He (Robert Kennedy) indicated that a few days prior thereto he had been advised by CIA" that an inter- mediary had been hired by CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying $150,000 to hire some gunman to zo into Cuba and kill Castro. The memorandum further continued that "Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA. had not cleared its action in hiring (the intermediary) and Giancana with the Department of Justice he issued orders that CIA should never again take such steps without checking with the Department of Justice. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 654214) Docld:32112745 Page 22
—-22- "Myr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecu~ tion against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact that the United States Government had approached him to arrange for the assassination of Castro.” © d. Statements of Colonel Edwards re May 7, 1962 ‘Briefing a When Sheffield Edwards and the CIA's General ‘counsel } briefed Robert Kennedy on May 7, 1962 concerning. the Phase I assassination efforts by the CIA, there is no evidence to indicate that during that briefing Robert Kennedy told the CIA personnel that he already had known of this information because of prior information received — from the FBI. Colonel Edwards confirmed the statement in the March 6, 1967, FBI. memorandum that Attorney General Kennedy stated that the CIA should never undertake the use of Mafia people again without first checking with the Department of Justice because it would be difficult to prosecute such people - in the future. a. Stat tements of: Colonel’ Rawards: re y Knowledge " inside CIA According to Edwards ° ‘the “CIA people that knew about the plans while they were going on were himself, his case officer, Bissell, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, and General Cabell, Deputy Director of Intelligence during this period of time. Both Dulles and Cabell are now deac. Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 23
~23- ff. Refusal to oO Testify of Robert Maheu, CIA . Intermediary Robert Maheu, the CIA intermediary, refused to be interrogated by the Commission staff. His attorney, Morton Galane, told the Executive Director of the Commission “that he (Galane) had advised his client to exercise his constitutional rights and not answer any questions other than his name, address, and the fact that he had under- taken work for the CIA. gS. The Carrying Out of the Plan The following facts primarily come from in- terrogation of Colonel Edwards and the Phase I case officer: The particular means by which the plans were to be carried out was "by placing botulism pills in his food." . The * Syndicate personne] were to get the pills toa Person in Cuba who would have access to Castro. Supposedly, the reason ‘pills were used was _that the syndicate personnel could not recruit personnel to undertake the assassination through gunfire because the chance of survival and escape was small... However, the case officer felt that it was the Agency itself that desired to have pills used rather than gunfire.’ Colonel ‘Edwards said that he, himself, checked out the pills on some guinea pigs "because I wanted to’ be sure they worked." Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library HW 54214 Docld:3271127745 Page 24