478-10003-10244 v9.1 HW 450955 . AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : - AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE : DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : ‘DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS ; Docld: 32209993 JFK Assassination System Date: Identification Form Agency Information KISS/SCOW 178-10003-10244 MURPHY/ROCKEFELLER ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION--UNLOGGES...(5) Document Information ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION GRAY, MARVIN E. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 05/22/1975 20 GRAY, MARVIN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CIA ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TRUHLLO, RAFAEL REPORT Top Secret Consulted Withhold 07/20/1993 Part I of 2-part draft--Dominican Republic only. 22 Page 1 8/27/20 1
rr HW 450955 -approved a program of covert action as well. ~70- ‘DRAFT . oo, | | ; | 178-10003-10244 GRAY/sln 5/22/75 \ oe, yes BE. The Dominican Republic ol. Summary and Conclusion In late 1960 and 1961, the United States, having abandoned its policy of nonintervention in the Dominican Republic, sought to bring about the overthrow of the regime of Generalissimo. Rafael Trujillo and the establishment of 7 a moderate successor ‘government, To accomplish this result ‘several measures were undertaken on the diplomatic level ‘and the Special Group (predecessor of the Forty Committec) At their | ‘airection the CIA encouraged a group of internal dissidents along with several exile organizations. ‘On May 30, 1961, members of the internal group assassinated Trujillo. There was no direct american participation in the assassination. The idea originated with the Dominicans; | they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they did the detailed planning. They were never subject to | i | “american supervision or control, © A DoclTd: 32203993 Page 2 AUVdGIT quod -y aTwaa5 HHL WOYT AdOOOLOHA |
HW 50955 were passed to the. plotter 3. overriding and must ~Ji- On the other hand, CIA and State Department officers in: the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assassination, and they were well aware of the group' s lethal intentions. ‘The CIA had told the group of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans; it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of explosives | to kill rrujillo. As a gesture of american support, three revolvers and three carbines, along with Limited ‘supplies of ‘ammunition, s about» two months before the assassination. One of the carbines was reportedly left at ‘ the scene of the’ crime, Four submachineguns were also sent. to the Dominican Republic by diplomatic pouch. they vere with- rs because of Last-minute State. Department held Erom the plotte -objections. . . it appears that high- level. State Department and’. White House officials first learned guns had been provided to potential assassins some, six weeks after the transfer, and about two and a halé weeks prior to ‘Trujilio! Ss death. A state- ment of policy was prepared and approved by the President, "we must not run risk of U.S. association with | ,reading as a matter of general “political assassination, since U.S. assassination. This Last principle is policy cannot condone The prevail in doubtful situations. preparation of this message, and the required ‘coordination, BDoclda: 32703993 Page 3 KUWAIT God “A TWIGS. AHL -wOws—KaODOLONE OO
-~7J2- consumed about two weeks. There is no evidence of any -effort during this period to recover the weapons or other- wise interfere with the assassination plans. The polic . Yy statement was cabled to the Dominican Republic on May 29, the day before the successful assassination attempt. Both the Consul General and the CIA Station Chief in Ciudad Trujillo promptly protested this change in the policy which they had followed in the belief it had been approved by appropriate authority. Before these cables were received sin Washington, Trujillo was dead. HW 50955 DocId:32203993 Page 4 cee eee eee ae aR UE NR Eh een A ENN EA . "ad GIWYAD AHL WOUd. AdODOLOHA “RAVdaIT quod —
policy statement. ' goo activities: the approving prea) WW 50955 “consideration of the risks of supervision and co _ supplied to plotters of a _pRelation should be obse ~73- 2. (Proposed) General Conclusion and Recommendation fhe Comnission concurs in the position taken in the. We have concluded that there was an improper level of. American involvement in the death of Generalissimo Trujillo. That is so even though the assassins” might have been able to procure equivalent weapons from ‘other sources. We also conclude that despite the apparent - ad faith of the persons concerned, there was inadequate such involvement and inadequate ordination of the operation. . oo a We xecommend that in the Future, weapons should be Qa coup or revolution only in, the rarest, of circumstances, if at all. In passing on such authority should consider carefully jons” of the nation and ~ the potential damage to the foreign relat the feelings of the American people if such activities become known. In our judgment eventual disclosure is inevitable. he: procedures of the quire the concurrence of the pepartment of State before weapons, ammunition, explosives, and similar items are transmitted by The treaty obligations of the U.S., including “diplomatic pouch. “particularly those under the Vienna Convention ‘on ‘Diplomatic erved and fulfilled in good Faithoog Docld:327203993 Page 5 dail cued ad GIWaaS FHL WOU KdODOLOHA | CIA should be modified to re~-
' downfall but to identify, develop, and encourage a moderate _ whose support the United States badly wanted in connection with | GaSe a “ . - +: a wage ie Te re HW 450955 of assi eT4- | 3- The Chronology , | | a. The Background ; - Rafael Trujillo came to power in. the Dominican Re- public.-in 1930. By 1960 he was notorious because of the corrupt. and. regressive nature of his regime, because of his systematic use of torture and murder as tools of government, and because of his intervention in the affairs of other nations. The country was in considerable turmoil as the result of several ‘attempts to overthrow the government, sponsored by other Latin American countries. The policy of the United States at the beginning off swtio.aua-wows- naooosone- 1960 was to refrain £rom actions which would hasten Trujillo's - group which would take power in the event of Trujillo's death, flight, or overthrow. “This policy of non- intervention, although -KAWdGIT auos +a-a Clearly required by treaty, convinced many Latin Amex icans “that the United States supported and maintained the Trujillo regime. Leaders such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, operations against Castro, conditioned their support’on U.S. istance in toppling Trujillo. ©In April the President approved - contingency planning for a more active U.S. role in ‘the’ ‘event © —_ _ the political situation an the. Dominican Republic. continued tO0 “deteriorate. Bocld: 322703993 Page 6
ae of sniper rifles or other devices for. the removal of key b. The Rifles In May the American Ambassador to the Dominican Re-~ public returned to Washington for consultations. Both State Départ- ment and CIA files indicate that he reported the dissidents needed weapons, particularly a "small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses." The Ambassador has no present recollection.of any such request. He is confident that he made no serious effort to obtain them, . Nevertheless, the request went forward. Near the end of June, according to CIA files, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- ‘American Affairs approved the provision of "a small number f Trujillo people from the scene," and requested that they be supplied at the earliest possible moment, Neither the CIA -of£icer who obtained this: approval nor the Assistant Secretary, Ww 50955 ' now both retired, has any recollection of this meeting. Bocld: 322703993 Page 7 .. KEVAGIT. Gaod.. °u..CIVaaES- dHL-NOUS-AGOSOEOHE-
HW 450955 officer who served as Deputy ‘Chief of. Mission before ‘the it was his recollection that the dissidents. had no definite - assassination plans in mid 1960, although they did speak of that course as the only way out of the conditions under which : ' “‘trujilio. confixm this recollection. of an armed uprising, coordinated with other paramilitary -76- on Explosives “On June 24, 1960, Trujillo sponsored an. unsuccessful) attemot on the life of the President of Venezuela; as ao result the United States and other OAS countries severed “Y..CTWUA9 -aHs:-HOUT—RIODOTOHa— diplomatic relations in August. Consular relations were retained. The Commission StafE£ interviewed the foreign serviced severance of relations, and as Consul General thereafter. they lived. It was not until early 1961, as he recalls, that the dissidents began formulating specific plans to kill The cables and memoranda of the period tend to Nevertheless, the CIA continued at intervals during! , the dissidents means for the assassination Rawaart. quo -. 1960 to discuss with of Trujillo. ‘A memorandum in October 1960 reflects that the \ dissidents planned to kill Trujillo with a bomb, detonated from a remote point, and then to take over the nation by means action. cus more detailed proposal along similar lines, appears tO ‘have been “provided by the dissidents in December. Docld:32203993 Page 6.
“7 7- On December 29, 1960,. the Deputy Director for Plans presented the Special Group with a program for covert action to bring about Trujillo's overthrow. A portion of the program called for Agency and consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo to continue to work with the internal dissidents to promote an. uprising and the establishment of a moderate pro-u, 8. successor to the Trujillo regime. The plan, as initially” approved by the Special Group, contained no provision for supplying | arms or ‘explosives to the internal dissidents. ©. BHL WOud A.a000L0HE—-——— Two weeks” later, the Department of State, on its ow f “motion, obtained special Group consent to have the internal dissidents furnished "Limited supplies of small arms and other equipment," meaning explosives, subject to the condition : er that these materials be provided to the dissidents ata point outside the. country itself. The internal ‘State Department “memorandum which led to this” proposal stated there would be. AAWdGIT God -y aTwUa no- thought of toppling the government by any such "minor measure," but some sabotage potential would be placed in the hands of the pro-U. Ss. opposition with a corresponding poost to their morale and their opinion of the united States. The ‘station and the consulate were informed of ‘the Special. Group .f action on January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower Bae Administration, President Kennedy was informed of the Special Se OMe action not latex than mid- “Pebruary. ; ee HY 50955 DBocld: 322703993 Page 9
* likely believed that the Special Group had authorized support of the planned assassination and armed uprising. Peter eae mo a te es “HW 50955 ing of assassination weapons. However, ‘with the dissidents, | va =" -78- The Commission finds no reason to believe that, any ‘\ member of the Special Group intended to authorize the furnish- those CIA officials who had been involved in dealings with the dissidents very —-e “Revolvers. wee During the early months of 1961 the CIA Station | and the consular officials in Ciudad Trujillo kept in close touch _and they \ were aware of their various schemes to assassinate Trujillo. Although these officials apparently took — no active role in the development of plans, they did | va on occasion discuss and criticize plans developed by the dissidents. In mid~ February, two members of the. dissidents’ "Action Group", which was to carry out the actual assassination, came to the United States. They met with both CIA and State Department officers. During these meetings” they stated xepeatedly that the key to ‘the success of the plot would be the assassination of Trujillo. The evidence is insufficient to - permit a conclusion how far this knowledge went within the State Department. Boclda: 322703993 Page 10 ow: quay -amI-ROWE-Ka0SIOHE —————<—__—__ -AUWdaIT aoa
.on March 4, a letter on March 16, -79- -In March matters took an active turn. Ina cable and an airgram on March 22 the Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo reported that plans for Trujillo! s assassination. were coming to a head. He requested additional authority to supply the pro~ U.S. ‘dissidents with weapons. Americans. "aninundtton by diplomatic pouch. “He stated Similar requests were made by the CIA Station ‘Chief of his headquarters. three times headquarters responded that it could | not comply with these requests because the restrictions imposed by the Special Group precluded the introduction of arms into the Dominican Republic by _ | On March 22, the CIA Station Chief renewed his. request that headquarters send him three 38 calibre revolvers and | that without some show of support the United States would lose the dissident group entirely, while if it supplied weapons it might have some control over the timing of their use. HW 450955 ‘Docld: 32203993 Page aL
=80- On the same day, March 22, representatives of the CIA: met with the State Department officer who served as their point of contac® with the Department’ s Bureau of Inter- on March 254 the Deputy three days later, American Affairs. ion setting forth United Plans cabled the stat Director £or o the Dominican . ‘Repub policy with respect t vers: and ammunitt states Lic and stating that the revol h in the near future. AdOD0LONa—--—-----— ee on would be sent by - giplomatic poucl | ‘state Depart- - {here is nothing in either CLA or e whether the Departme nts axe “hazy on the. nt was consulted on thi ment files-to indicat ories of the participa S that. the CIA did dis ' The mem cuss the geciston. matter, put there are indication "introduction of handguns into the Dominican Republic,,and | pelieved it obtained approval. the. then Deputy Director for ed that-as the territ elivery at the request fe) ed the State Depart- ‘Plans testifi orial restriction on a £ the ally. imposed avddIT quod “a aTwagS als HOUT of. weapons was initi he would, have considexe pepartment of State, riction as . adequate authority | frent's willingness to waive the rest eturned to- the Special Group for ers of the Group ably would not. have © and .prob formal approval. ‘He observed that the memb ox their staffs might have been advised informally: HW ! 50955 Docld:32203993 Page 12
_ use of the pouch, e Chief of Station not to advise th ~81- The use of a diplomatic pou for such purposes was prohibited b t is also illegal under inter- Clandestine Services, and i national law. waiver indicate. that the Department nd the fac instructed th Gen ‘unilaterally in this regard. The CIA file passed to the dissidents, an dicate that one was p * by Agency officers. Neither Chief of Station has ; i ‘ 2 -e.  Carbines On March 26, nish the revolvers, the sta carbines in the consulate, personnel. it requested ma "permission to pass them to Assistant De _Powcn ins. the magazines “* eet TT be apse! “fae e, ed STS ey! HW 50955 Boclda: 322703993 Page i3 The Deputy Director. of Plans approved the of the internal regulations. eral of the use of the pouch sugges assed by the Cons any particular recollecti puty Director for Plans responded and that headquaxter* was "inclined to ch to send weapons y regulations of the CIA's There is nothing to of State was “informed of the t that the Maxch 25 cable e Consul . ts that the CIA acted s indicate that the revolvers were a the Department of State files in- ul General and. the other two ‘the Consul General nor the “former ion of the matter. ‘the day after CIA decided to fur-. tion cabled that it had found three M-1 left behind by departing naval gazines for. the weapons and the dissidents. on March 29 the that he was mS _ MANAETT Ga0d “a + ino nous nominees. —~ —
782- favor" passing the weapons. and ammunition, Another meeting was held with the bepartment of State on March 31. The State Department memorandum makes no mention of any discussion either of the furnishing of ammunition . place. or of authority to pass the weapons, but the Deputy Director for Plans granted. authority to pass the carbines the same day. Both the State Department liaison officer, who prepared the memorandum of the meeting; and the Consul General are clear in their ‘recollection that the State Department ‘in Washington ‘did not learn of the pass of the carbines until the Consul General was in Washington several weeks after the pass took. Nothing in CIA files indicates that this decision was» “coordinated in advance with the Department of State. It is - possible that the CIA understood its initial authorization HW 450955 -with respect to the handguns to extend to the carbines as well. It. is also possible that CIA decided the Special Group restriction on importation o£ weapons did not apply, as the carbines were already inside the Dominican Republic. | CIA cabled its Station Chief on April > to request ‘the Consul General not to comment in his correspondence with the "Depavtment that the arms and ammunition. were being passed, | A reassuring veoly from the Consul General was received two Bocld: 32203993 Page 14° io JOLO -AGVAGIT GUOd “a GIVYTD AH” WONT Ka
days later. The CIA.Station Chief, who would’ not have been ~ sion to provide the carbines was inadequate. -to determine from this evidence where the fault lies. - ; ; . ae . ‘ ~ tended to kill Trujillo when he visited his mistress---substantially the weapons were being passed. ‘tion in Ciudad Trujillo had been informed that the assassins in- ~83- \ involved in any coordination at the headquarters level, speculated that this injunction may have been designed to keep the State Department from knowing "officially" that Tt is clear that the coordination on the deci-. It is impossible f£. Submachine Guns As early as March 20, the consulate and the sta- the plan followed some two months later, Although the plan originally called for ‘Trujillo's dispatch inside his mistress’ xesidence using silenced weapons, the group requested five - M-3 submachineguns and 1500 rounds of ammunition for self defense in case the assassination plans went awry and there _was a firefight with Trujillo's security forces. [In its March 25 cable, headquarters replied that it was. prepared to HW 450955 provide these weapons when the dissidents developed the ‘capacity to receive them at sea or in a cache gn the coast, Bocld: 32203993 Page 15 -RUVdH TT UOT “a -@TWadD- AHL WONT RAOSOLOHS
&. HY 50955. "further approval. but that for security reasons they could not be sent by pouch. The Chief of Station returned to Washington for consultations in early April. He was able to convince his superiors that the pouch | was the only feasible and secure means of getting the weapons .into the ‘Dominican Republic | for delivery to, the dissidents. The Deputy Dixector for Plans approved on April 10, and the pouch was sent on. April 14. but with the restriction that the weapons not be. passed without The files show that there was no coordination with the. Department of state in Washington. Because of the the station and the consulate Rao Bay of Pigs landing on April 17, “were never given authority to supply the weapons to the dissidents and they never did so. On May 2, as ‘the result of “repeated entreaties from the station and the consulate, the: Deputy Director for Plans approved a cable for the ‘DCI! s release, stating that as (at appeared the ‘Action Group was prepared to act whether or not the submachineguns were provided, the station was authorized to pass them for the additional protection of the group. | Apparently someone decided this decision should not be ‘made without the consent of the Departinent of State, for on May 3 DoclTd: 32203993 Page 16 ones oon AMVAAIT (80S... OTWYES..aHE-NOUs- KdOD0L0Ha-——- ne
HW 50955 - presentation stated t - that the real plan was to ass " approximately a year, the Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division met with Professor Adolph Berle, Chairman of the- ‘Interagency Task Force on Latin America. According to Berle's memoranda of the interview, confirmed by one of the witnesses the initial he group wished. ‘the arms in order to overthrow Trujillo. After some examination, Berle determined sassinate mrujillo, and that the guns were wanted for that purpose. Berle responded that he but that the united States could not care less for ‘trujillo, ‘aid not wish to have anything to do with any assassination The Agency . officer, who had been 7 plots anywhere, any time. in a supervisory position with respect to this. effort for told Berle he felt the same way. It may be. that the CIA “ruled: on May 5 a cable informed the station that a high- level “state Department decision on the submachineguns was pending. Nothing in the files indicates. what this cable might have Yeferred to.. In any event on May 8 the station was informed that the State Department had disapproved passage of .the submachineguns, and this ended the matter. Doclda: 32270359935 Page i? tried to get Berle. over- neers ee a a aay ene ee tne Nt _ ABW yal aTT quod 4 CHES IHL WOT AdOoOLONA
HW 50955 . defense “Trujillo. technically did not apply. “ready been passed, ~ -86- g. The Policy Statement: In mid-May, as a result of increasing indications that events in the Dominican Republic were Yeaching a climax, the White House requested situation reports and contingency plans. This exercise was overseen by a member of the National. Security Council Staff. .A CIA briefing paper prepared for -this purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines’ WOW AdODOLOHA had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal “attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize " The report implied that both the revolvers and the ammunition had been in the consulate with the carbines, and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization The CIA Liaison officer at the State Department called to his superiors’ attention the fact that weapons had al- and apparently submitted a memorandum outlining the “reasons why the ‘united States should not be involved in this activity. Among them were that the United States Government should not lend itself to direct political © assassination, that the moral posture of the United States “could ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world, that the United States would have encouraged the action, Docld:32203993 Page 18
_~87- supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned over only the final execution to. (unskilled) jocal triggermen, and - that the United States could not afford a precedent which might convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver ‘assassination weapons. - On May As a joint CIA- State Department memorandum was sent the President! s National security Adviser informing him that the plans of the pro-U.S. group were well advanced in the direction of ousting Trujillo "by any means. This memorandum aid not call attention to the fact that the United States had supplied weapons to the group, In the midst of these discussions, the Consul - General, who had been in Washington Lor consultation cabled on his “return to the Dominican . Republic that the dissident group “planned to "execute action against Trujillo" that evening. The Department replied that it would consider this. timing particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of the ‘consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom. “This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer, The state of the covert action program in the ‘Dominican Republic was discussed in the special Group on May 18, and-again on May 25, @he Commission has not had access to lye. oy “the minutes. — DoclTd: 32203993 Page 19 “XKAODOLOHA __-awvatie-quoe “e-ereece-an-woen
HW 450955 ~ if ‘he could do so "most inconspicuously", ~88- On May 24, the State Department liaison officer provided the undex Secretary with a draft cable, stating that the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter= vention, and even more so from political assassination, overrode - the need to secure creait with the Dominican dissidents This draft was approved and with Latin America generally. at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was sent to. the White House for presidential review. After some redrafting in the White House, the final version in another hand, stated "We must not run risk of U.S. association with 1 political assassination, since U, S, asa matter of general. | policy cannot condone assassination. This version*was approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican It. arrived the. day befor Republic. rtment instructed its -Consul General, On June 1] the State Depa to destroy any s and any related records concerning contacts with the plotter matters. Docld:32203993 Page 20 e Trujillo Ss death on May 30. ~~~ FEWAGIE GYOr- se tiyns ina ier meen
FEF. Conclusion Lon president Fox tion is not and should The Commission joins an thi constitutional and mox stands for there of any agenc involvin WW 50955 Dacld: 32203993 g the assassination of -~B39- TOP SEGRET cy -Q@ has firmly announced that assassina- never be a tool of Unit 5s statement. It 1s against the al principles for which this republic to be any direct or indirect participation y of the United States Government in any plans any person “in peacetime. ‘fs Sy vem “I PP cry Page 21 ed States policy- xaVdGIT quod i LOHa “4 atwige -dnt-nowa—nagoot