LO ll 12 14 15 16 1? 18 . 19 20 el 22 - 25 photography and a number of other things to make assessments ~ _long before even the Soviets knew what they were going to be. 13 don't know. what it means. rose SECRET | | 19 the staff felt it would be important to give them some additional encouragement. | Senator Hart of Colorado. ‘What is that? I don't understan what that means. | | Mr.. Aaron. Well, it means, for example, ‘trying to come up with a new v technique for assessing -- well, we have an example of a new one that they just put in, and that is a new _ technique for assessing crop yields, and they use a combination of getting, and that would be an analytical methodology in. that . particular area. | Senator Huddleston. They apparently changed their: method on the Soviet Union' s defense spending. | Mr.. Aaron. That's great. Maybe we should encourage them : to do that every year. | | | Senator Hart of Colorado. Will everybody who reads this know what it means?. | | Senator Huddleston. I think the people who wrote it ~ (General laughter. ) Mr. Maxwell. Would it be clearer if you don! t have the last five words? | | | | Mr. diGenova. Which: five? Mr. Maxwell. “At all levels of management ." . TAR CEeRET Docld:32423515 Page 22
Mr. Aaron. How about just saying, on stimulating the & || development of new tools of analysis? ~ ° Senator Huddleston. Yeah, I think that probably would be better, tools and methods. I don't see any reason for not having them both because : ieee “ Oo on ee they do refer to two different things. 7. Mr. Aaron. The final paragraph in the recommendations . ‘suggests that they encourage tours of duty outside the CIA, both outside the Government and other agencies of the Govern-. 10 || ment, and it goes back to your recommendation about the rational| Yo} [oe 11 behavior, in a sense. This is not to suggest: that if they go. 12 || to the State Department they will learn what being irrational . ™~ 13° is all about, but -~ 14 || _.Mr. diGenova. May I make.a suggestion, that we say that > wo | é 15 it they do go to. academic institutions, that they do so overtly 16 | Mr. Aaron. * I think that is a good point. 17 . Senator Hart of Colorado. t think you ‘have got some. 18 problems there. | 19 7 _ Mr. diGenova. I think that really jumps out at me, after “20 : that whole schtick we went through. | I'm serious. I'm not 21 kidding at all. | | | 22} — Mr. Kirbow. Every agency of the government has their own 23 || major postgraduate program. oN ~ 24 ||” Mr. diGenova. But not the CIA. | 25 Mr. Kirbow. Do you want nothing but dummies in the CIA? TOP GECPRET Docld: 32423515 Page 23
10 ll le ‘yt * . . 1 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 NO, 24 25 /gO. I am just wondering if that is an issue. We can: spend alo ‘CIA people. in it, following the Subcommittee consideration? version. 23. together in a new book because we are creating a new book. TOP SECRET 21 Mr. diGenova.. No, Charlie, I'm not syaing they shouldn't of time worrying about people being who they are. . Ms. Culbreath. Analysts aren't. under cover. _ Mr. Quanbeck. Generally they are under DOD cover. Mr. Miller. No, as a whole, they're generally known as Mr. diGenova. No problem. Mr. Aaron. We can just say we encourage analysts to - assume general duties on an open basis with. other agencies. Mr. Miller. Yeah, that's good. - Mr. Aaron. Well, we are through that one. Now we come to Section D on the reorganization of the CIA. That is page number written 52, Section D.. | Ms. Culbreath. Can I ask a managerial question here? These handouts that we have been getting, like the one on proprietaries and covers, is this the one with our changes Mr, Aaron. I hope not, but I can't assure you. Ms. Culbreath. It's dated March 12th. Mr. Aaron. If it's dated March 12, it must be the new My instructions to the staff were not to redistribute the things we have been through but to hold them and put them TAF CF eRe Docld: 32493515 Page 24
_ 10 ii 12 i4 15 16 1? 18 19° 20 el 22 25 \ 24 25 13. TOP SECRET 22 Now, you may have gotten one anyway, but please treat it accordingly. | | Ms. Culbreath, I guess I did. Senator Huddleston. Where is what you just referred to? Mr. Aaron. ‘Page 52. | (Pause) Mr. Aaron. Mr. Chairman, at the risk of opening a a chapter which we have already gone through, and of not taking a good » suggestion from Mr. Kirbow, not that they all aren’ *t good, but instead of using the China example on not being informed, we have a record’ before the Committee on Chile. | Mr. Maxwell. Fine. “I ‘think that, is important. Mr. Aaron. In which the activities, the TRACK II and TRACK I, for that matter, were not available to the Chile analysts, so that their analysis didn’ t reflect what. U.S. policy was in the area. Mr. Kirbow. I'll 11 go along with you if you will go along with the fact that Mr. Kissinger withheld it. from the Secretary of State and from everybody in the world that we beat the | Chile thing to death. It's no longer chili, it's all has. Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, a point here is whether the analyst is deprived or- is lacking information. about national | policies and programs at the time he is doing his analytical thing, and we do have a good record on Chile and most recently on Cambodia, and I think that if we could fit this to that point | | TAR CFeReT ‘Docld: 324235515 Page 25
10 11 12 Near 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 25 ‘Docld:32423515 Page 26 - constant daily thing which no one at the analytical level has in the New York Times, and they: have no way to weigh what is | coming out of the Middle East on a day to day basis in the level. In fact, I don’ t know that ; anybody but he and the _policy maker, and filtering it back to the analyst. But howeve Mr. Chairma, but the only point I am making is if you are tryin to draw a person's attention to a real problem, it doesn't do. TOP SECRET on the production of finished intelligence, I think we could stand behind it. 7 Mr. Kirbow. I thought we were just trying to come up with an example to demonstrate the fact that very high policy decisions such as the President' s impending trip there and Mr. Kissinger’ s negotiations in the Middle East had been a been told anywhere where they stand until it is finally publishdd light of his negotiations because as he is shuttling back and. forth, none of that stuff, to my knowledge, is fed down at that President know what is going on at all, and the President probably kind of at the convenience of the negotiator. Ms. pavis. That's: precisely why Colby swat up the National tntelligence Officer, and that person has on oecasiona bases been privy to this so that he would get it from the well it. is working is open to question. © Mr. Kirbow. I don't have any objection to using Chile, much good to dredge up yesterday's mashed potatoes, because people don't pay much attention because Chile has been overdone 7 FAR CF AR ee
10° ll 12 14 15 16 av 18 19 20 21 22 29 TOP SECRET 24 on the dealings of this Committee. If you want to draw a few. new examples, I think it might be meaningful, and if you want to use Chile also, I don't have any objection, by the way. The ‘recordiis clear on the position this committee has taken on Chile. | Mr. Maxwell. Well, Cambodia does add some fresh meat to the dinner table. Ms. Davis. We could use’ Cambodia after Mr. Helms response to our cable. Mr. Kirbow. ie may have difficulty in getting it back in time, and also in getting the Cambodia thing cleared, but use any tough example that you like. You might as well pick one that you don't have any idea that you won't get cleared at all, and then you'll pick another one if it doesn't clear at the last minute. Ms. Davis. Well, t have it-cleared, Charlie. Mr. Aaron. We will do something with an example. on the reorganization, the next ‘thing vat we tern crt less” in order is the issue of reorganization of ‘the CIA, _ and if -- I would suggest, it is only two pages long, and I would suggest you might want to take a look at it. Mr. Inderfurth. I have his. comments, and I might just mention these to you now, something I think I might gave mentioned:earlier. — In the latest draft that I have. u don! t state where Tar cre ner Docld: 32423515 Page 27
end 2a. - 4 begin 2b. 10 11 12. 14 15 16 17 - 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 TOP SECRET) ss covert operations would be. The end of the first paragraph you ‘simply. Say another for clandestine collection of foreign . intelligence from human and technical sources and covert operations. - (Pause) Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry. The question: went to the question of where is covert action? Mr. Inderfurth. Yes, and right : at the end of the first paragraph, if I’ ve got an old draft you could just. say “and covert operations, one for analysis. under the. ‘DCI, and another for clandestine collection ‘and. covert operations. Mr. Aaron. Yes, that is the thought, nothing more “conpli- cated than that.. Mr. Inderfurth. - And the other is that Senator Hart though that it: omight .be: appropriate to put: in a little bit, just a couple of sentences on the executive order and how that relates -to this, just saying that there are two deputies, and. the fact that the Deputy DCI will be running a CIA, and it's a step sort of in this direction. Mr. Aaron. Well, this raises a little broader question whi we might want to consider, that is, you make the recommendation concerning consideration of dividing up the functions of the DCI, and we also make some ‘recommendations here. about consider- ing the possibility of dividing up the Agency itself. They don't have ‘to go together, but they can. In particular, if TAR CEeR Er Docla: 32423515 Page 26
- LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 “uy 1g 19 20 21 “oe 235 25 yet wish him to retain a strong analytical capability, by silence either Ms. Culbreath or myself indicate any kind of TOP SECRET 26 you separate the functions of the DCI from the head of the Agena, you could still retain line authority over the analytical portion of this now-divided Agency, and while having a different. commanc arrangement for the clandestine. services. We. could: consolidate those two recommendations: in. the same. place, if you wish, and that might make for a somewhat clearer discussion of the problem. In other words, it would start. out by saying something alo g the lines” of that final paragraph. If all the. recommendations made ‘by this committee are: implemented ‘and the. proposals of the President are implemented, we could take a ¢lose look at dividing them up, and in addition, we also think there are other issues which would fit in with that. “It is worth taking a look at whether the functions of the Agency shouldn't be further subdivided... : | | | Charles? / Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, so. that you don't think that agreement with this, ‘Senator Tower has personally askedithat he would be reserved on this entire section on the ‘reorganizatio of the CIA. | | - "Senator Huddleston, All right. with ‘that notation. we will accept the proposed alteration that ‘Dave mentioned. TAR 2@rer rr Docld: 324293515 Page 29
TOP SECRET — oa | Mr. Maxwell. May I just ask, would | both of those go 7 \N 1 here’ rather than earlier, and the reason I raise the: ‘question 5 is that although they are closely ' tied, the DCI recommendation | 4 flows’ directly form that analysis ‘that has been done on the . 5 DCI section, and the reason for placing this here in the’ first 6 instance is that it flowed from the question of collection, 7 covert: action and. production. 8 |r I am not sure whether we. might hot lose something for the 9° - reader by amalgamating. them. | 10 Mr. Aaron. Well, I think you clearly, you just have a 1 choice. You can either lose the reader because you have now 12 || got to refer to a set of other similar and if not integral, © _ “4137 congruent proposals which are, you know, some 40 pages earlier, 14 || or you are going to lose something by virtue of having that a5 thing here, in which case the reader is going to have. to rememb r 16 sort of what’ transpired, and in either case -— 17 | Mr. Maxwell. And: another suggestion, that is, that the 18 || first paragraph of this, that it be left here, the first i9 paragraph be the Committee has "see Section X, proposed 20 || strengthening the DCI in the following ways," and then intro-_ 21 || duce it, introduce that idea here and tie it to this, rather 22 than trying to force them together. 293 Mr. Aaron. I think that's a good idea. I think you have NOG 24 to recapitulate what you have said ina brief compass. 25 |. Mr. Inderfurth. May I ask, just so I know what we are TAP CFepPeErT Docld: 32423515 Page 30
TOP SECRET ss 1 ||veferring to, what is the basis for the reservation? I mean, I “. 2 |jam not challenging-it. 5 Mr. Kirbow. I want to make it absolutely clear for the 4 |}record that the Senator, by letter to the Chairman, asked that - 5 |lhe be allowed to just note his reservations, and his reservation 6 |/would not be stated by the staff but would be stated by him at 7 the appropriate time before the Full Committee, and the Chairman 8 had agreed ‘that the State Member would. be allowed to do that, an 9 I don ' t think it is proper at~ this time for me to try to 10 || decide what the Senator' s position is‘on it since he. has. not ll explained it to me in detail. 12. | Mr. Inderfurth. Well, the only reason I ask is that we we 13. are recommending the oversight committee look at this, not that 14 they exclude it. | ; 15 “Mr. Kirbow. I don't think Senator Tower can be compelled 6 at this point to debate with the staff, and I didn't debate it . 17 || with him. 18 . Mr. Maxwell. May I just make two further comments? One 19 is the first bullet on 52, is the problem seen by some people “po, | in the intelligence community ; and secondly, on 53, I think 2] || under the proposal that there be two agencies, one for analysis 99 under the DCI and another for clandestine collection, that would 93 || raise the question of the DCI's - a strain being put on the | \ - 24 || DCI's time as well in regard to managing another not inconsiderab] 25 |p agency of 2000 people and a fairly substantial budget, and that | TAP eran Docld: 32423515 Page 31
10 ll 12. 14 16 17 18, 19 20 21 22 25 25 TAP SECRET “29 I'm not sure whether that shouldn't be noted as well. Ms. Davis. The point is that he wouldn't lose the strain on his time because he would take with him some part of the. agency. | | | | “Mr, Maxwell... That's right. Mr. Aaron. Well, would you -like-to propose a fix? I might just say that he is supposedly doing that now, so the net effect would be a reduction, that the implication that it would be a total reduction was not correct. So how would. you like to put that? | | Mr. Maxwell. Simply ‘that if the ‘DCI, the présent proposal -— ‘the other proposal | was to y split the DCI from any responsibility for a particular agency because that was the thrust of the consideration, and that here, too, there would: be. a problem for those ‘people who believe that the. DCI should be split from any managerial function, direct Agency managerial function, that there: still would be a managerial responsibility. I can try to draw a sentence. Mr. Aaron. Well, wait a mimite. If you're trying to. make a case, I do not: know of any recommendation that the DCI should have no managerial authority. The point is that Ae manages an operating agency operating in the sense of ‘collection. Nobody has. challenged ‘that there is some conflict of interest inherent in both managing resources and producing , TAB CEenRET Docld: 32423515 Page 32
10 ll 12 14. 15 16 1? 138° 19 20 él. 22 235 25 TOP SECRET | 30 finished _intelligence, nobody.. ‘So far as I am aware of, there hasn't: been any problem adduced in that direction, The probl is adduced in the direction of allocating resources and running a large collection operation anda research and development activity. That is where the conflict would be | seen. | | | ' Mr..Maxwell. I thought it at. least implied, and Mr. Graham'* s comments about the Der! s, there’ was a question of whether when military. people produced. finished intelligence, the DCI was not as well” ina possible conflict of interest position with the. finished intelligence ‘produced by his. agency. Mr.. Aaron. Well, that is a- point of. view. ‘Mr. Maxwell. That was my understanding of at least one thrust of Mr. Graham's testimony. | Ms. Davis. Well, they had considered him, just put him in with just a very small staff and leaving the analysts over there. | | | - | Mr. Maxwell. It's not an important point, but that I thought it might be important. | | ri try to make a ‘fix on it. Mr. Aaron. ‘Well, if it's not. an important point, let's not make a big -~ : | ‘Senator Huddleston. Make it a small fix, will you?. ‘All right, where are we now? | Mr. Aaron. We are now at the Section G, Intelligence , Te A A ee Docld:32423515 Page 33
TOP SECRET. 31 al Liaison, which picks up with page No. 73... 2 All right, the next section, Intelligence Liaison, on page 3 73, it is also extremely brief, but I think important. We have 4 || run into the question of liaison from time to time, but we have 5 ‘|j not made a careful examination of it. My own view is that that 6 was a sensible thing to do, given the sensitivity and importanc 9 of these activities, and the fact that we were not particularly 8 | looking into the propriety of those activities, that an g || investigatory approach would not have served us well across the 10. || board. But it is an extremely important dimension to our - Ll intelligence, and if one. does not--understand it, one does 12 |) not get involved in knowing something about it, you miss an 3 | 13-{| awful lot of what the intelligence community, particularly the | | 14 || CIA, is all about. 15 We ran into quite a bit of it, or I ran into quite a 1g | bit of it in my travels, particularly in Europe, where our 17 principal liaison arrangements. take place. It is, I think, 18 - something certainly worth preserving and: protecting. | 19 On the other hand, because of its importance, it seems to 20 || me that we really also ought to simply point for the oversight 21 || committee in the direction of making clear that this is an 922 extremely important element. | | 23 || Now, the recommendations go ‘to the suggestion that, in Y 7 24 the point that treaties are approved by the Senate, executive 25 agreements are reported, and we believe the Director of. TARP CFeRET. Docld: 32423515 Page 34
TOP SECRET 32 1 Central Intelligence should report to the oversight committee S 2 || on the nature and content of all liaison relationships with rs) other intelligence services. | 4 Now, that. phrase "nature and content of all" is in. 5 || brackets, I think out of concern for the sensitivity of these 6 activities. The question is where does one draw the line. 7: || My own view. is that "nature and content of all" captures the 8 || kind of authority that one would like to see the oversight _ 9 committee exercise. The discretion that they exercise would lo really be up to them. The notion of simply reporting on the | 11 relationships is a much vaguer one, perhaps it is broader, but ‘ae in any event, that is the alternative, — ca 13 | Mr. Quanbeck. I have one: comment. This may be a little a 14 misleading because it is my understanding, although we have 15 | never received official information, that elements of the 16 DOD, including the individual services, also. enter into 17 aqreements with foreign intelligence groups, and I don't know 18 how .well these are coordinated with the DCI ox CIA. certainly 19 NSA does, and I know of a couple of eases where the Navy does. 20 too. en 21 Mr. Aaron. Well, it might be well to add here the . 22 “Director of Central Intelligence and any other intelligence Lo | agencies should report. - | ( \ oe 24 | Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, the brackets on that were to -. 95 || highlight in this recommendation the problem that I think we Docld:32423515 Page 35
10 11 12 14 15 16 19 18 19 20 el 22 23 a 24 25 13, 4 TEOP SECRET 33 are going to have. Our recommendations are not necessarily at this time planned to be exposed to the agency for clearances or to see if they do not have, or it they are classified, rathe I just believe that the nature and content of these liaison relationships probably > is the most serious sources and methods information available in which: they engage, ,and I just point out that to require ‘that this should be reported goes to a thing that I think the oversight committees and these committee have very carefully avoided over these investigations, | Senator Huddleston. Well, I don' t think it does any great abuse to the paragraph to leave that out, if your case is strong enough. Mr. Kirbow. It is obvious ‘that a good oversight committee, or-an oversight committee should be aware that you would have a. rather close working relationship of some sort with the XYZ country and the agencies, or even more important is in certain of these countries, even where they are not friendly to us openly, we have very close working relationships with their intelligence groups. It would be very -- this is very | tenuous. | | Mr. Miller. You want to know what obligations the United | States enters into as a result of this relationship. Mr. Kirbow. What do we owe them type thing, and not necessarily the day to day working relationships between _ how you are going about doing your collecting and trading-offs TARP Crener Docld: 32423515 Page 36
TOP SECRET —s__is, 7 -and things like that. 2). Senator Huddleston. You have got to know something. 3 You couldn't enforce No. 2 if you didn't have some 4 || information. | 5 Mr. Aaron. - that is correct. Let me give you an example 6 of one which I have some extensive and very fascinating on discussion during my travels, and I think we should go off 8 the record here. 9 - Senator Huddleston. Off the record. end 2b 10. (Discussion off the. record.) begin 3a Oo pO, . . oo. - 11 Senator Huddleston. I think in this case we ought to ‘ie take the brackets out and == | | | [oe 13 | Mr. Kirbow. And leave the words in. 1 7 | Senator Mathias. Well, let me give you an example of 15 why that might be desirable. I made a-visit toa friendly (16 |} country not too long ago, and the other day when we requested 17.|) our RBI files, one of the items that I discovered was a complete 18 “memoranda of my conversations in this friendly country. 19 | ; Senator Huddleston. That was in the FBI file? 20 - Senator Mathias. tt was. in my FBI files at the -- ol. - ; Me. Kixbow. What that really means is that it was. picked “902 up under our cr feedback, counterespionage or counterintelligen e 93 ||. feedback, through the CIA. | or pa - _ Senator Mathias. I know who did the recording. I can 25 || put a name on him and everything, but I was not aware at the DocId: 32423515 Page 37
. 1 ‘time that the conversations were taking place. | 2 Senator Huddleston. That Senators would be under surveil- oe lance, you mean? | | 4 Mr.’ Kirbow. ‘I will say something that Senator Mathias 5 ‘didn! t hear earlier. My earlier comments, and the reasons the 6 | brackets were put | there by ‘Mr. Aaron initially was that it ad felt that when you use the words "nature and content ofall 8 liaison relationships," that we might be speaking to sources 9- and methods, but you know, the oversight committee is going to 10 |} avoid sources and methods like a plague anyway, so I don't ” 11 see anything wrong with leaving the words in. 12 | Mr. Aaron. well, I think just to echo that, and to argue \ ; ae eS the other side of the case for just a moment, the only real 14 reason: to be less explicit about this is that it might deter 15 || other countries from wanting to enter into such agreenents 16 ‘because ‘they would think “that this is going to be open 17 sesame with the Congress. 13 Now that, I think, is the most telling reason to be purposel: 19 vague. The oversight Committee will do whatever it wants, you 20 know. | 21 | Senator. Huddleston. That's true. The thoughe occurred 22 | to me a moment ago, just announcing that might cause some of 9% ~ them to be a little reluctant. But at any rate, I don't \ 24 see how | we can carry out the responsibility. | 25 Senator Mathias. Well, but. that! s in writing, and these Te! ererer Docld:32423515 Page 38
TWP SECRET € 36 1 friendlies.are nervous as hell about this. Embassies just =~ 2. twitch around town hearing mention of the subject. 3 it Mr. Miller. You have to give in order to get. 4 fl Mr. Kirbow. In that respect, Mr. Chairman, and since “5 || the minority member is present, too, one of the other minority 6 || members of this Committee, specifically Senator Baker, had ”% asked ‘me to make mention to you as. the Chairman and any of 8 the other members his concern that the recommendations were _ g |} not -- the findings and recommendations were not in some way - 10 going to be carefully considered by the Agency to -prevent 11 just what you discussed, that mere publication of this being 12 made available to the oversight committee may cause. some: ~ 13 serious effects on the relationships, and that we could ask the ‘1a agency not to change this, necessarily, but to.state a position | 15° on what effect would this have if it were made publié; or that 16 type of thing, that he was going to make a formal request to. 17 || the Subcommittee, and wanted to kind of have your feelings 18 | on that. . | | | 19 |. r feit at this time it was appropriate to make his request 20 || known here. | 81 I think the problem arose’ on the Domestic Task Force 29 where the General Counsel had advocated against any contact ; 23 between the executive branch and. the findings and recommen- N 24 dations part of the task force. | 25 senator Huddleston. I thought Chairman Church had indicat d TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 39 .
TOP. SECRET 37 ~ Le that they would look over the whole report. 2. Mr. Kirbow. I | thought that also, and he had,.and that — 3. |) is why he asked me to broach it to the Subcommittee. Specifical y 4 “you recall a couple of days ago we were talking about, with a 5 group of witnesses from the CIA, what would be the effect of 6 a public announcement that the CIA had relationships with 7. 480 something academic institutions, and so many individuals: 8 there, and they said it. would cause serious harm to their 9 activities in. that. That is the sort of thing that 1 think 10 he was specifically wanting the agencies to be able ‘to go on th 11 record, so they fully understood what the committee. was doing,’ 12 not: necessarily that they were going to change their position. » 13 Mr.. Inderfurth. The appropriate. time,. I think, would be - 14 after the full Committee has completed its review and approval . 15 of the recommendations. | | 6 Mr. Kirbow. . He did not move to an exact procedure, but 17 just that the desire should come out. 1a Senator Huddleston. well, I can see that this kind of 49 recommendation here on the staff would cause some nervousness 20 ||. oF the part of -- 91 Mr. Kirbow. And you could find out, you know, well, it 29 bothers us and we can live with it, is one. level, or it | 93 . creates harm or serious harm, or it is a disastrous escalation: \ 24 ' or whatever the positions are. a Mr. diGenova. Mr. Chairman, in that regard, and I was. TAR REAP ET DocId: 32423515 Page 40
10 VW 12° 14 15 16_ 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23° t * 24 29 ‘TOP SECRET i thinking about this the other day, I think -- and the Committe has looked into an area and done a study on it, and certainly. ~ wants to make a recommendation. It could still decide, for example, after consultation with the Executive Branch that this did pose a sources and methods problem, put. there is nothing to | stop the Committee from having a classified version of its. recommendations which would be transferred to the President _of the United States, which would eventually set out. for the Agency, so there, would be no misunderstanding, that it was in _ fact, going to look into liaison services. You wouldn't neces- sarily have to say that in public. That's just an example of 'the kind of thing that the Committee could do. The Chairman could transmit a letter to the President of the United States testifying to the fact that he was making an effort to protect some valuable information, but the Committee was not giving up any authority by not mentioning it in the public document. I think that is. something the Committee may want to | consider. | Mr. Kirbow. Me Chairman, I don't want to call for any kind of decision. “Obviously I don't have the authority. But he just wanted me at. some appropriate ‘time to make that known “to you, and I. had elected to do it-- today because these are “to go to the Full Committee next. week,. and I waited until Senator Mathias has arrived. Senator Huddleston. Do you have any further. thoughts, . Docld:32423515 Page 41
TOP SECRET | | 39 1 || Mac, on this? ~ | e _ Senator Mathias. I think maybe Joe's idea of a classified 5 j| section may be the answer, either that or Senator Baker's, . 4 = Senator Huddleston. ‘tr don't think we need to be too nervous 5 about No. 2, the fact that we are going to require them to not 6 get involved in things through liaison that we're not permitted 7 I to do otherwise. | | 8 Mr. Aaron. I think Joe's recommendation. is a ‘good one. 9 | te you read. Recommendation 3 against l, if you deleted the mated 10 || in the brackets, it would tend to imply that: you got much less il “in 1 than you would get in 3, and liaison people could not be Oo 12.|| too unhappy about 3 because they're really talking about non- ) , . . 13 intelligence. matters-~being used, just using’ secure intelligence 14 channels to do it. | 15 However, if that: were the case, I think you really would 16 want the content of 1 as it is now. — | 17 Mr. diGenova.. Absolutely. 18 || Mr. Aaron. And we might put a footnote on it to the 19 || Committee here in that this would: be supported to a classified 20 letter. to the President, the Director, the Agency, and the al oversight ‘Committee whenever it came about, stating that ee || Our recommendation was in fact fuller than this, and was, you 23, know, made mor ambiguous in the public text in order to protect ‘ 24 || sensitive channels, or| something to > that effect. 25, Senator Huddleston. I think that I would approve of that ™ are mm me Docld:32423515 Page 42
10 ll 12 13° (14 15 216 17 18 19 20 21 | 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET ay t t i | approach. I think that! iwe can work that out. Mr. diGenova. The | ‘Committee may wish ‘to.do it in other instances, or they may say | no, they don't: want to do this. Mr. Aaron. I take: it the second one. doesn't cause any { 1 problem. . | 4 Ms. Culbreath. Elliot had a suggestion. on that one which ‘I'm going to try to interpret here, on the second one, on the second sentence. | | Mr. Aaron. Well, let me say, the second line says, "encoura with action," and the "with" is a typo that comes out. Senator Huddleston. “should be prohibited from engaging," shouldn't it be?_ Mr. Aaron. . From-engaging and causing, funding or encouraging. Senator Huddleston. The. way it. is is prohibited to engage. Mr. Maxwell. I wanted to try. to make the second. sentence a little. bit clearer, and IT ‘can read it and see if it does. | Furthermore, ‘the fact that a particular projecty action N or activity of the CIA is carried out ‘through or by a liaison ' { service does not relieve the CIA of its responsibilities for ‘clearance within the Executive Branch or with Congress. We may be making it a little bit clearer. Mr. Aaron. Well, |}let me just say one. thing here, then. ‘We really in the first’ sentence have to say, liaison So _ TOP SECRET Docld:32423515 Page 43 ne
1 2 3} 10 11 12 14 15 16 1? ~18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25: ‘an intelligence channel, in order to give it a sort of super~ 13, had a number of barriers to its dissmination, appropriate or Senate. TOP SECRET oa relationships with other foreign intelligence services, ‘first of all, and then down here, through a foreign liaison service. Mr. Maxwell. Okay, through or by. . Mr, Aaron. Through or by. | Okay, I think that's a good fix. The third recommendation, let me explain that, there occasionally, a:negotiation or agreement will be struck through secure > quality, and I think that because it has been done in Liaison, that has been a way of protecting it, not only from_ unintended public disclosure, but also from disclosure to Congress which had little or no access to these. kinds of information. Once it was labeled intelligence information, you inappropriate. This. simply requires that if this takes place, and there are real agreements that occur asa result of it, that these have to be brought to the attention of the Committee. | Ms. Culbreath. How is this related to the existing requir _ ments regarding treaties and agreements with other. countries, fe) any other kind that you might have? Mr, Aaron. Treaties, as you know, have to require advise and consent. Executive agreements must be reported 7 the oo Ms. Culbreath. Even secret executive. agreements? TAP CFeRET Docld: 32423515 Page 44
LO 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 25 i49P SECRET 42 Mr. Aaron. That is my understanding. Mr. diGenova. They have a specific definition, however, and I don't know if a liaison type service -- Mr. Aaron.. This doesn't fit into that. It is kind of a further refinement. Ms. Culbreath.. This is just intended to get~ at contracts with liaison services to do things for us? Mr. Aaron. .No, it is not for intelligence or intelligence related like covert action. It doesn't deal with that. It deals with really other matters. For example, I think certain nuclear agreements are worked out. in intelligence channels because they provide a supersecure way of doing it. Ms. Culbreath. But those would also have to be reported under existing requirements. to -- . “Mr. Aaron. They have not t been, or I'm not aware of it. Ms. Davis. Well, that's ‘something -- 1 don' t know. | Ms. Culbreath. Well, that's what I don' t understand. I'm trying to figure out if this is already required somehow or another to go to Congress. Mr. Aaron. I don't believe so. Mr. Miller. Well you see, Elizabeth, this. is the whole. problem. there is a whole range of activities ~ that range: from the kind of thing that David describes, which may be simply a technical means of obtaining an agreement, to exchange of equipment, money, people in some cases. TAP GECPET Docld:32423515 Page 45
TOP SECRET -— its ~ i Senator Huddleston. Is this within the agency of governme t 20 now? | 8 Ms. Culbreath. I mean the Agriculture -- for instance, 4 ‘if the Agriculture Department has a secret agreement with India | 5 would that have to come through this channel or go to our | 6 oversight committee? 7 . Mr. Aaron. Well, let's take a hypothetical but I think 8 || a real kind of example. | | 9 If there were a. special agreement made with ‘Iran. concernin 10 | breaking the oil embargo, and how money was going to be spent — 11 and how much oil they were going to try and get out and what 12) have you, and this was negotiated through an intelligence y ‘as channel because that's how the Shah or the United States | 14 wished to negotiate this, if you will, cartel type agreement, 16 that agreement would not ordinarily come to the Congress in | 16 any other way. Congress would have no knowledge of it.) 1? Ms. Davis. And it probably wouldn't, even if it came thro 18 intelligence channels. | 19 | Senator Huddleston. What we are asking is any time the 20 intelligence community is used asa negotiating instrument for 21 |) the government, that we ought to know about it. | 22} Mr. Aaron. That's right, and the fact that it is being 23 used is not an excuse or justification for not following \: (24 through with these other reports. | 25 ‘Ms. Culbreath. Well, that helps me to understand it. I TOP SECRET Docld:32423515 Page 46
10 el 14 15 16 1 18 19 20 el R22 25 25 report. 44 TOP SECRET don't know about anybody else. Senator Huddleston. All right. Let's move on. | | Mr. Maxwell. The budget paper is on its way over, and here it comes now. | | (Pause) ‘Mr. Aaron. Turning to Section VIII, let me explain a little bit of the history of it. | | | The Defense Task Force did the primary work on the budget along with a consultant that we had, formerly associated with the Bureau of the Budget, but I think it is safe to say that in essence this distills the analysis and judgnent of - the Defense Task Force concerning the intelligence budget . ‘questions. It cannot, do justice to it because it is an extremely rich and useful and ‘interesting analysis that they put together, and I. think we are a long ways toward getting a good portion of that declassified and available for the overall ‘ Now, it doesn't appear under the Defense Department section because in terms of findings and conclusions and ; yo | recommendations, or findings and conclusions in regard to the ‘budget, it doesn't go/to so-called budget issues, in other words, are we spending too much: or too little or so forth, but | 4 oO , they go to the question of how does the budget fit into the Congressional oversight problem. TOP SECRET DocId:327423515 Page 47
10 ll 12 14 15 16 . 17 18 “19 20 . el R22 25 25 a debatable question. 45 TOP SECRET And we went over this paper a couple of times, and most recently, even after we last went over it, it contained both a section on the numbers relating to the budget and its structure as well as the arguments for Congressional oversight and the constitutional requirements, and what we have just done -- Elliot made. the point that it really made more sense to start out with the basic charge of the Committee, which was what. about the Constitutional questions, what about the Congressiona part. So it starts out now with something of the introduction to the Constitutional and congressional issue, and then ‘goes on to the issues of the numbers. Now, there is apparently a sentence missing. -Mr. Maxwell. Yes. on page 107, the first full paragraph ends with the sentence, "While this represents. 1 percent of the Federal budget, it constitutes 10 percent of the control-~ lable Federal spending." A sentence was dropped in the typing that should go before that sentence, and the sentence is "The Committee found that the foreign and military intelligence community spends roughly. $10 billion a year on intelligence | activities." Then the next sentence,. "While this represents © 1 percent of the Federal budget,. it constitutes 10 percent of controllable Federal spending." | Mr. diGenova. Elliot, .the word "both" after the "U.S. Constitution" should be in brackets, also, because that is TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 45
OP SECRET | 46 Mr. Maxwell. - That is correct. Mr. diGenova. The word "both. Mr. Maxwell. In the third full paragraph. Mr. Aaron. I just wonder if it wouldn't be useful to add just. to the very first: sentence that the Committee finds that | a full, understanding of the budget is required for effective oversight. I think that is the first of our findings here. Mr. Quanbeck. ‘In .the second sentence, I would recommend the budget procedures, that should be-the secrecy procedures presently employed. The budget procedures are. straightforward, | are the same used for the rest of the Department of Defense, but the secrecy. Mr. diGenova. How about the secret budget procedures? - Mr. Quanbeck. The data is what is kept secret, the procedures are not. am Mr. Aaron. can: you say the present secrecy surrounding the budget makes: it ==] | | | Mr. Kirbow. I don't want to necessarily dwell ‘on that because obviously it is the cause and effect of everything that goes on in this area, but procedures adopted by the Congress . “Hl is not made more fully aware. | | | | 1 don't want to make it appear that just. because of the big secrecy surrounding this, it is totally secret, and as long as we adopt a procedure, that we are going to recommend that it -stay secret. Really, it is the Congressional procedures that TOP SECRET Docld:32423515 Page 49 ~
| — 10 SECRET. | 47. 1 | are preventing the Congress from full exposure. ~ 2 _ Mr. diGenova. How about "employed by the Congress itsele" 3 : Mr. Kirbow. “Budget review. 4 - Mr. Aaron. Well, it isn't entirely fair to put:-the 5 entire burden on the Congress. There is no question that the > 6 ‘executive has gone to great lengths to insist that this be 7 “secret, and the Congress have complied, the appropriate 8 committees have complied. | | 9 || ‘Now, whether in the absence of! that they would still want 10 || to do that -- | ' | 11 | Mr. Kirbow. I think secrecy surrounding the budget 12 procedures -- | 7 ‘ 13° | Senator Huddleston. Is it necessary to put "public" in 14 there also? is | ‘Mr. Aaron. I refer to you. 16 Mr. Maxwell. It may not be appropriate in that sentence, 17 but the problem is that the thrust of the Constitutional require- 18 | ment goes to the public rather than’ to Congress alone, and 19 ‘because the public was to serve as a check on Congressional _ 20 || procedures, the public is unable as well. 21 ||  . ° Senator Huddleston. Lunderstand. 20 ‘Mr. Kirbow. We could ~~ it certainly doesnt exercise 23 || Oversight. ‘ 24 ' Senator Huddleston. We could use the words "full 25 understanding," which would seem to imply to me that the TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 50
10 11 le 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 eal R2 23 25 48 TOP SECRET ‘public ought to have all of the details. Mr. Maxwell. ‘That could be dropped there because 1 think . it is clear later on. | | | 7 Ms. Culbreath.. Well, Mr. Chairman, that gets to some of the discussion about how much revealing of the pudget is. necessary in order to meet the requirements of the Constitution and that is not something I'm sure we're going to fully step up to. | a | a | _ Senator Huddleston. I've got a feeling that we're not goi to suggest that the full Constitutional requirement be adopted, it would be my guess, is that right? | | _Mr. Maxwell. I certainly would not recommend full disclo- sure of the budget. Senator Huddleston. But here we seem to be implying that they have to have a full understanding, even down to the general public. . Mr. Maxwell. Well, why don't we strike public there, because I think the -- we do make the point clear in other places. Senator Huddleston. Well, we mentioned Congress. Make it “even Congress." ‘Mr. Maxwell. Well, let's focus initially on Congress. — I think it goes to the public after. ‘Senator Huddleston. All right there, Dave? Mr. Aaron. All right. TOP SECRET DocTd: 32423515 Page 51
LO oll 12 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21. 22 £95 20 I would have. 49 ita? SECRET Let me see if I understand it. You want ‘the "even Congrees"? Senator Huddleston. Well, what about that? That seems to me to. emphasize it.) | Mr. Aaron. That's fine. It's "even Congress as a whole, to make use of this valuable oversight tool." | Senator Huddleston. — That makes it possible for Congress to exercise its appropriate oversight responsibilities. Senator Mathias. Generally that whole section looks all right to me. The Recommendation 94 is the only question | Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, since I asked that it be brackete the discussion I had with the staff, and I suggested that the current statutory law of the nation, and the rule that you. have adopted in: the Senate, require any Committee oversight on intelligence or otherwise, to do whatever it has to do with the Budget Committee, and you don't want. to recommend ~ against it. ‘It is already a rule. | Mr. Miller. We have had inquiries, for example, from the Budget Committee to this Committee. : ‘Mr. Kixbow. As to how you would do it, or whether or not? Mr. Miller. Whether you would and how you would do it. Would an oversight committee -- 7 Mr. Aaron. Be the people to do it? -- senator Mathias. I just think that they are going to work TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 52
wo am Gi @ Ke] 10 11 14 15 16. 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 32423515 ° Page 53 somewhat different. There is a recommendation that it -- it TeoP SECRET —_ . 50 those out. _ Mr. Kirbow. Obviously if there were inadequate security arrangements, two chairmen could decide that the Committee itself is able to get more information than would be made publi I think you can spell out more here, and it becomes kind of a recommendation that later becomes a: law that you can nake it more rigid, then flexible. | senator Mathias. Well, you also. have a problem, if. you talk about the Budget Committee, you're also going to have to talk about the Appropriations Committee, so I would say strike ‘this. Senator Huddleston. Strike 94. Senator Mathias. Otherwise I have no problems. Mr. Aaron. Now, 93 has two brackets on it, and they are ‘ vd has three recommendations in it, if you will. The ‘first:is to authorize the release, both authorize and release an. annual figure. To be more precise, it is to authorize a national intelligence budget and release a total figure. The ‘second recommendation is that it release the figure for each Major agency. “Now, I think the authorization point is picked up in the prévious sentence, because if you're authorizing the budget as a whole, you're really ‘going to have to authorize things, not . ee only the agencies, but maybe even categories within agencies. TOP SECRET
i TP SECRET 51 1 So the real issue here is whether these agency budgets ”~ 2 would be made public. ‘That would include NSA, CIA, DIA, the 3 “Joint Reconnaissance programs and SO forth, -the total for a each one of these. 5 Now, . back in the text of the findings we make some 6 comments about those organizations, and some of their costs, suct 7 as’ the Agency. itself. If we do not want to. ‘release those sub- 8 findings, we may not want to include those costs, particularly g || those of the CIA. | 10. On the other hand, we had: some discussion at the staff. 11 || level about. the possibility of recommending that on an annual 12 || basis there be released a global figure, if you will, for the ) as entire intelligence community, and not a more detailed breakdow , 14 but that this one time for the purposes of our investigation Le "and so as to give a relative -- an appreciation for the 16 | relative allocation of.effort within the. intelligence community 17 || we might give a detailed breakdown, yet recommend that this — 18 is the last time, in effect, that we are only going to do this 19 || once. 20 You can see how it ' works now. This is evidence of what ©) || it is that goes on in the intelligence community, but that for 22 || security reasons we don't think this ought to be a common prac- 23 tice. 24 |. - the further recommendation in that paragraph, in the 25 last bracketed sentence really urges the oversight committee TOP SECRET Docld:324243515 Page 54
10 il 12 14 15 16 17 Le 19 _ £0 ind 3a el begin 3b 22 7 23 a 24 29 iisr SECKEL , 52 to do more in the way of releasing information in this area. It should be contrasted: to a finding on the top of page 107, wh is in brackets, which has the opposite thrust, and it says ‘that the Committee Opposes a more. detailed public itemization than © whatever it decides to release’. So the last sentence in Recommendation 93, the Committee really has two choices. Tt can either urge the oversight committee to try to expose this problem more within the bounds | of national security, or it can try to go on record as “Saying, really, it shouldn' t go) any further than this. The argument | on behalf of | the last alternative, which is to go on record as Saying this is as far as we ought to go, is that Iothink it will help assauge the fear that exists in the executive branch. that. once you refeal any numbers, even if the: numbers: themselves are probably, not going to be detrimental. in any way to the national security, this will only feed pressure for more detailed exposure,: and that: it we agree with the point that: there should not: be more detailed exposure, this will be / most reassuring to the executive branch and help keep from happening a process which both they and the Committee would find undesirable. Mr. Quanbeck. By way of explanation, the analysis we did would be that we can release the aggregate figure every year,and it would be virtually impossible to | pick out changes, | ve significant ‘changes in programs. It's so aggregated and there TOP SECRET. Docld:3274293515 Page 55
are so many variables that you couldn't do it. But I believe ‘if you went on an agency by agency basis, especially the NSA and National Reconnaissance prograns, that it would be possible to detect the addition of new programs or major cryptological “effort or something like that. | So I don't think -- our analysis would lead us to believe that the aggregate number is what we should work toward. Mr. Maxwell. There is some conflicting testimony about that. I think Charlie has gone over the record, and I have. ‘The past Directors of the CIA have come ‘down at varying positio with regard to component disclosures and their effect on | national security. They all agree that there is.a substantial danger of people nickel’ and diming on’ figures, so that sooner or later an enormous amount of detail gets out. But Mr. “Schlesinger did not take a position that component surveys posed =- the component figure, the aggregate figure for CIA posed a real danger, while Mr. Colby did. Mr. Helms again | took a position that he was not generally opposed to it, and . when the former comptroller of the Agency, Mr. Clark, was asked precisely the point about revealing new programs in. regard to CIA, he took the position when he was Mr. Colby's “Comptroller, Mr.’ Colby asked him whether in fact it would it did. : | Mr. Quanbeck. But that's the CIA, but t'm addressing NSA TOP SECRET ‘Docld: 32423515 Page 56 reveal new programs, he said he.couldn't find the evidence that
47 4 wo LO ~ ll le: e a 13 14 “a5 16 17 (18 19 20 210 22 23 24 29 FOP SECRET “sa and the National Reconnaissance Programs. I think it is a different problem there. “The NRO is much more system oriented and doesn't have that vast overhead that remains constant. | Mr. Kirbow. “tt is almost solely constituted ‘in major hardware expenditures, and if we can go off the record just a moment. | | Senator Huddleston, off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Senator Huddleston. “My personal feeling all along is that if we showed an aggregate budget, it would be trouble. Mr. Kirbow. I would say in regard to Elliot's position, in regard’ to the Constitution, that he's not calling it a “cure-all. Is an aggregate budget enough. to satisfy the Constitution in light of the National Security Matters in the eyes of the Congress. It seems that if we tried that. the first time and got beat, either on the floor or from the oversight committee or. wherever, that you'd have to live with it, but if you sold it. a couple of times and no real harm accrued to either the “American public or the Congress, you might find that. as times change you could do something different. But clearly you could very much harm yourself. Now, not a single witness has said they couldn't live with the total aggregate. Mr. Quanbeck. There are other programs: going on in the pet a Fell ell ate ote eee DoclId: 32423515 “Page 57 .
_ TOP SECRET 35. 1 ‘|| Department of Defense not related to intelligence that are done a» 2 |} in complete secrecy. 3 Mr. Kirbow. And indeed they are. and are approved by the 4 ‘Armed Services Committee as classified projects, and- not even 5 || revealed in detail there. 6 |. . Mr. Maxwell. I think Charlie sums up accurately ny own y feeling about the need|to protect the. national security, and a 3 the fact. that total disclosure or even disclosure in significan . g || detail would not be appropriate at this point. I think, how- | 10 ever, that the point should be made that the purpose of the ll Constitutional requirement should be facilitated as. much as 12 possible, given the limits that National security would place a 13 upon it. — - oo | - 14 If one took the aggregate budget, I think Congress would 15 be in a better position: to make some judgments as to whether . 7 they would like this amount of money spent. At the same time, 17 the public would be able to see that ‘$10 billion or roughly | 18 $10 billion was being spent, but there, my own feeling, based 19 || on the record that I have taken a look, at, is that to say that - 20 the CIA, for instance, was receiving $750 million, would not 21 pose that threat. _ It is already clear from Mr. Marks and Mr. 22 Marchetti, for whatever fortunate reasons exist; _ that the budge 93 || is pretty widely known, and I think it is pretty unlikely . 24 that ‘we could maintain as a serious matter. that the \ p5 enemies of ‘the country don't know what the rough figure is. TAP GEEDET Doclda:32423515 Page 58
LO -ll 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el 22 R95 - 25. z TOP SECRET 56 if, in fact, there was a new program either in NSA or CIA. You also have to understand. that Mr. Schlesinger took the position that that could be done, if one did it, in’ regard to outlays rather than obligational authority. For instance, the | KENNAN program was funded over a period of time, so it wasn't as. if the total cost of the program showed up, and I think the same would be true with the situation in regard to other intelligence agencies. I mean, that is one possibility. The second possibility is, if. there. was a bump, according to Mr. White and other people in the DOD task force, even in regard to CIA's budget, from my discussion with them, CIA was unable to explain bumps in their budget process, that there were a number of explanations, internal cuts in personnel efficiency or whatever. |The only point that I am trying to 1 4 make is that insofar as we can provide information to the public which helps them. exercise their function in deciding whether Congress is allodating their funds properly, and inso~ | far as we: can facilitate | ‘congressional oversight by saying that funds are appropriately addressed to particular agencies, we increasé the Likelihood of better oversight, and that each time that we have to Look and see what the effect would be on national security. | } ‘My own sense, and that's a personal judgment, that it | | could be done in terms of aggregate program, or the total in. CIA, if. this were in fact seen as a particularly, as a figure TOP SFCRET Docld:32423515 Page 459
‘10 11 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 “21 22 93 20 TesP SECRET “10 The national objectives of an intelligence community are determined in probably Lo percent of the -- excuse me, for 10 0 percent of the amount: of money that we. know we are going. to continue to monitor the Soviet Union with our “Spies in the Sky, and you can pretty wert estimate, what that kind of budget is going | to be. : | “lf the Congress or: the executive had any way of truly i determining ‘what the national objectives would: be in the \ intelligence community over a. five year period, I think then you should require the Agency to come forth and put its plans against those, but I just don! t see how in this case here, } having the oversight of the intelligence community, that you could compel them, becau: e that! Ss. what you' re really going t Ss to try to do, to determine what the national objectives | are ; . | out to the fifth year, against which they are going to match each and every one of their requests for funds. . ic ' m, ‘The second part on Phe hardware ‘system, I don't see any — serious objection to it., Someone has to authorize those things So you can get the handle on proper costs and whether you're getting other systems out of the sky, when you are putting _ up new ones, and I think! it should stay in there, but I think that as it is worded, it) is an. unworkable situation. 1, Mr. Inderfurth. The first part. Mr. Kirbow. Principally, yes. ' ‘Mr. Aaron. Well, I) might say ‘that! my understanding -- and TOP SFCRET Docld: 32423515 Page 60
end 3b 5 ‘begin 4a 10. 11 12° 14 15 16 “417 19 20 21 22 23 29 believe me,. this is strictly personal; this is not Committee -- my understanding is that the efforts to get the Department of Defense in particular to provide five year force budget projections which they do for themselves, to get- them to provide it for’ Congress has not been successful. Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, I think that is wrong, because at its initial inception of five’ year planning, when Mr. McNama was Secretary, it has been ‘furnished to the Senate Armed Services Committee, at least for the six years that I was ‘" in the Senate. I don't know if they were in the detail that everyone thinks they should be, but they have the five year forecasts. Senator Huddleston.’ Well, I don't see requiring anything there the Committee would ask for. You know; when they come up before the Committee they are going to ask: for it, but I'd ;- i let it go. | Mr. Kirbow. You just want to deléte that, Mr. Chairman? Senator Huddleston. Yes. | | Mr, Aaron. The next recommendation deals with a point which I think is quite important to keep in mind, and that is that we have talked about. the National Intelligence budget and control over it and what! it should do and authorizing it, but much as we give the Director of central Intelligence earlier in the paper the authority to keep an eye on the tactical ' budget, we sort of have to give that or recommend that ‘the TAR crepe ; Docld: 32493515 Page 61
10 li 12. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | 22 23 20 oversight committee also keep an eye on the tactical budget, | Committee"? | ; - the GAO be empowered to conduct full audits. We took out Something of this character from the proprietary section you iW SECKES 72 simply to insure, for its own sake, that the tactical budget is really, contains just tactical things. ; . Mr. Kirbow. Not used to : hide. national programs. Mr. Aaron. That's right, and also there are some simple questions which are going to have to be resolved, for example, Like the Kennan, and what is tactical, and they are going to have to ‘define that, and |you really can't define it. without looking at what is tactical. And so this is by way of making that point. Ms. Culbreath. An editorial point. Do you want to delete the first four words and. put "The Mr. Aaron.. "The oversight committee should"? All right. I don't think "carefully’ adds that much. , Our next recommendation goes to the recommendation that i will recall, on the theory that we were going to be providing for it here. | | Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, David, didn't we take it out because we already had it: in the oversight bill? Mr. ‘Inderfurth. No In fact, it was also taken out of the oversight bill. , . . . at oo Mr. Kirbow. It was taken out because we have the authorit TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 62
LO ll 12 14. 15 16 17 . 18 19 20 21 22 235 25 TusP SECRET . : to do so at any time.. Mr. Inderfurth. But some of us were concerned about that because although GAO aods have the authority ~s Mr. Kirbow. No, they don't have any authority by themselves. Mr. Inderfurth. They have the authority by the Committee ,'| if asked by Congress. However, despite ‘the fact that GAO has been asked by Congress on occasions to look at various componen of the intelligence community, it has had a great deal of resistance from the CIA, fron NSA to do that, and so I've got a numberof comments on this one that at the. appropriate time I want to raise. | Mr. Kirbow. Well, I think the latter part where it says “should be authorized to have access to all files and records — of the intelligence community for the purposes of conducting a . full audit as requested by the Committee" is something we should be sure that the executive understands that that's: what we want done, that they don't cut them off at the door like they did at the FBI. That first part of it, the business by statute, they should be empowered to conduct. — They are empowered: to conduct by statute now, Mr. Inderfurth. It! s ESP or. something. ‘The comments Senator Hart wanted me to make about this, Elliot, you wrote this and maybe: you can explain why. Mr. Maxwell. I didn't. Bill White wrote this. I am TOP SECRET Docld:324273515 Page 63
10 li 12 14 -15 “16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 25 “TIP SECRET 74 | willing to defend Mr. White. : Mr. Inderfurth. . BY’ statute is inappropriate, and GAO would be opposed to that; Mr. Maxwell. I would be opposed to it also. Mr. Inderfurth. In the last sentence, the results of this audit. should be made available to any oversight. -- well, ‘since the Senate is doing it -- Mr. diGenova. That's the issue that the intelligence community is going to make, and that is that there should be GAO type people on the intelligence community. That is going to be their thrust against this, and the answer has to. be that Congress picks who it hires to. do its jobs and makes sure that they have security clearances, and it should be‘clear in here that we are: talking, about the oversight committee probably literally doing that, bringing these people into: ‘the. committee quarters and having them do this operation out of the committee quarters, and whether or not we want to say that is another question. a | Mr. Maxwell. We might wart to change this to read ~~ ' Mr. Kirbow. Excuse’ me, let me ask, do you mean that you would think that the oversight committee would have the audit conducted within its spaces? . Mr. diGenova. No. '’ The people are going to be operating my probably out, of committee, will be consulting the committee | during this audit process, and they will be operating from out TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 64
10 ll 12 14 15 16 ‘1 18 a9 20 al 22 235 ~ . 24 25 ~_ SECRET 75° of its quarters. They will be conducting an audit within the confines of the agency which they are investigating. Mr. Kirbow.- Well, normally they conduct it from downtown. They don't conduct it from the committee spaces. a Mr. diGenova. I'm just. talking about the problems which are going to come up, which is what the FBI said before. Mr. Maxwell. CIA, for instance, has raised objection for having GAO do certain audits: for the oversight committee, that that material ‘would 99 into the data base that would be available for the GAO, and I have. suggested that: in order to prevent that, that the Committee have staff who would be able to perform similar functions to those conducted by GAO. | That is the objection | that Joe was trying to raise. | Mr. Kirbow.. Mr. Chairman, ‘I think the ‘Problem with this - and we tried it out for several years in the Armed Services Committee, was to have two permanent people, staff members , secunded there from the GAO, to do only investigative. It never worked, and, we. finally had to send them back because they've got to have the Same ‘support from downtown anyway. . Two people ‘cannot do this kind of audit, or more. i Mr. Maxwell. I think that’ ‘Ss right, and I' vit Just Saye “at the request of the oversight committee, the GAO should conduct audits both for compliance and for management of every components: of. the intelligence community. ' _ Second sentence as is. And the third, we can amend ‘simply, "In order to conduct TOP SECRET Docld: 324293515 Page 65
10 11 le 14 (15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 25 ’ Docld:3274293515 Page 66 at # Tes P SecReT | 16 these audits, the Gao should be authorized to have full access to all necessary files and records ‘of the intelligence community. 7 Mr. Inderfurth. Leave off the last, about the idea of sending the GAO auditor! over to the executive. Mr. Kirbow. yeah,’ let the Committee send it if they want, ‘Let the GAO furnish the audit to the Committee is what | you are saying. — a Mr. Inderfurth. ves. Mr. Kirbow. I would agree with that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Maxwell. Is the other way it was read to you acceptabl : Mr. Kirbow. Yes. | a Senator Huddleston. I think we've got that one pretty well whipped then. | Mr. Aaron. “Okay. I'm not too well sure I understand the language fixes that go with all this. Can I get your fixes? Mc. Kirbow. Yes. We are clear on this. Mr. Aaron. All right. | Now, you may think we are done, but we are rot. We can now turn to Chapter X, General Recommendations. (Discussion off the record.) "Senator Huddleston. Let's go back on the record. Mr. Aaron. . would recommend that. we probably cannot it . . ui ' : ‘ clean up the different , language points in here. What I would suggest is we sort of focus on the. principle involved. TOP SECRET
Oo oo 10 11 12 14 15 16 1? 18» 19 20 el 22 23 =! 24 29 House uses a variety. Over time it has. used a variety of isn't something you want to ask.the FBI to do. TOP SECRET 77 Senator Huddleston. let's take the first paragraph.. Mr. Aaron. The first one essentially Says,.or is ; explaine by the very first sentence, and. the rest of it is a finding. Senator’ Huddleston. Does anybody have any serious ‘problem with’ that? | | | | Mr. Aaron. I have some problems, even though I am here to defend all of this. | - | | ’ Senator Huddleston. As it is done now? Mr. Aaron. As it is done now, you have every agency essentially conducts its own security clearances, and the FBI does a lot of leg work, but doesn't necessarily serve as the sole organ for establishing security clearances. The Agency does: some of this, the State Department has its own security office, Arms control in my experience uses the FBI. ‘The White instruments, Senator Huddleston ., What are we suggesting _ here? Mr. Aaron. That chore just be one place that does the security clearance and consolidate it. | Now, the problen is ‘your military services. You have 2 million men under arms in this country, and they give clearances up to the level ~~ I think there are 2 million con- fidential clearances somebody quoted to me, and that really “So I would just say that with the exception of the militar TOP SFCRET Docld:324235515 Page 67
10 li ~ 12 14 7° 15 16° -17 18 19° 20 él 22 23 29 , Docld: 32423515 Page 68 that the FBI not conduct! these investigations. ‘in certain instances the itis.) . fy “developed any record on, ~ think, I don’ t know what their reasons are to hola onto their. GOP SECRET 78 services, security clearances on access to sensitive informatio should be conducted by one Agency, the FBI, and just let it | Mr. Kirbow. Well, that would be a conflict with - our Domestic Task Force, both because I think < they are recommending “Senator Huddleston), ‘Really? Where do they want to put them? an hi Mr. Kirbow. I'm not sure. Mr. Maxwell. I don't -- maybe that's not -- I think they Jot have not centralized itl in one agency. ‘They have said that el cra would be conducting its investi~ gations. | | Senator Huddleston. Essentially they are leaving it like Mr. Maxwell. Except putting firm limits onwhat- can be. done in the course of ‘al background investigation, the kinds of methods that can be used, the techniques that can be: employed. ‘Ms. Culbreath. ALL I'm saying -- ‘have we really . this? I don' t know what the agencies own clearance processes. I haven't seen any discussion of | Mr; Kirbow. The Commission on Atomic Energy downtown has had such serious restrictions that they would not take me TOP SECRET ; : '
10 11 12 14 15 16 1? 18 19° 20 21. 22 23° 25 | Top SECRET 19 . today without doing. another full field background, Mr. Chairman if I had just been. cleared by this Committee. Senator Huddleston. They don' t accept anybody else's. | Mr. Kirbow. No, sir, they don't. | Mr. Aaron. That's /kind of the problem here, and I think that most of the people! I would agree, I don't think we have any testimony on it. Almost everybody has had an experience with it, or has had the/same experience. The real question, - there are some practical difficulties. I think Joe might. attest to some in regard ‘to the Glomar Explorer, when, in order to get. some security clearances for operational purposes, ‘to | clear ‘people who on the ione hand may be witting and maybe even people who are unwitting of the true purposes of the program, building this huge ship; for example, the Agency, if I am : correct,on this, Joe, or incorrect -- please ‘comment one way or the other -- the Agéncy used a proprietary investigative Le agency in order to do the security clearances. Now, this kind of recommendation would presumably set that aside. That isn't the problem ¥ we are trying to get at, and I think that! s the kind of thing you want to get around; the general point that security investigations for intelligence | purposes -- there are others -- ought to be consolidated in ‘one place, that one agency should. do the investigation, that this would eliminate a lot of duplication. Senator Huddleston: Well, there's a lot of others. They TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 69.
- 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 20 21 (22 23 29 Mu SECKES | _ 80 check prospective judges. That's a clearance, isn't it? Mr. Aaron. And the whole notion of a top secret clearance doesn't necessarily relate to intelligence information at ‘all. Senator Huddleston. We want to be concerned with the intelligence operation. - Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, the biggest single area is not even the military area. It. is the Defense contractors, each employee of whom must~ have this type of clearance. Itis done through an industrial clearance. It is a massive problem . il ot ; t . . . I . on which we should receive -- Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps we should recommend to the oversight committee -~- Mr. Kirbow. Why do we recommend in this area? It really doesn't fit our intelligence manual. Senator Huddleston, Are we thinking of the necessity to - centralize or to standardize? a | Mr. Aaron. I think both problems exist. Centralization is’ important in only one. It is important, .A, because it makes| _ it’ possible to standardize, but also I think that in connection with the notion of counterintelligence, counter= espionage, being sure that you are not giving an intelligence clearance to somebody who shouldn't have it, one of the concerns. is in the countérintelligence function. This is one of the arguments for the FBI doing it. They presumably have TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 7o
10 mal 12 14 15 ; 16 1? 18 19 20 21 25 R29 ‘TOP SECRET 81 ‘files and all that kind of business. ‘I would tend to support Charles' suggestion that this is a kind of an idea to which we would like to give a little greater push,, but we probably. shouldn' t try to be too. specific about how you really solve the ‘point. Mr. Kirbow. gust point it to the oversight committee without mandating. — | Senator Huddleston. . If Dave and Charlie are on the same track, 1 think we ought to move that one real quick. | Mr. diGenova. - This is an area that. is going to be of cnosiderable importance because the CIA has used its investigative proprietaries, which are literally security agencies, to do, as we know before, penetrations and probes © not only of contractors, but to do sensitive background investi gations of employees of contractors as well. ‘They did it once, they went out and set up a proprietary in St. Louis and in six months had investigated very efficiently an incredible number of people who worked on highly sensitive Defense contracts, and then closed up shop and left, and there is something to be said for that, but there is also something to be said for whether or not: they. ought to do it at all. Mr. Kirbow. Let's go off the record. ‘Senator Huddleston. Off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Senator Huddleston. Well, we point out some of the TAR QFePET Docld: 324293515 Page T1
10 ll 12 14 15 16 uy 18 19 20 £1 22 23 25. iJP SECRET 82 things that happened, and let's just suggest the whole system ' should be studied to see whether or not it should be: eliminated Mr. Aaron. The second recommendation goes to the point that intelligence Operations can have, and they are not alone in this in the government, but they can have important impli- cations for the rights of citizens of America and for the obligations under the Constitution, and that in this area it would be advisable to make an extra effort to have the ‘personnel involved in this fully aware of what the Constitution says and means, and they take an oath to uphold and defend most of them and they don't read the fine print. So we suggest that maybe they take a look at the fine print. Senator Huddleston. I see nothing wrong with that. Ms. Culbreath. Mr. Chairman, if I could just comment on this for a minute as somebody who worked in an agency on the General Counsel's staff, and one of the things you run 'into when you get other people in the agency being concerned. about. what the law is, is folks trying to make decisions about things that need to be referred to the General Counsel's office and one of the strong recommendations that we have made, and I think we have all agreed to, is. that any. important matters that the Agency is involved with’ should go to. _the General Counsel's office for review for the very thing as to whether it isa legal thing to do or whether it is “being handled TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 72
10 11 7 12 ca as 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 |- 21 22 ae) ' \.. 24 RO. TOP SECRET 8 appropriately. I certainly wouldn't object to something that emphasized this for employees, but I think we have to be carefu in this area not to assume that because we do that that we are not going to raise questions and we are not going to have people deciding that they can look at. it and because they have |: had this course they know that this is okay. | | Mr. Miller. The other side of this is -- and I speak from 4 “personaly experience, for example, in the Foreign Service in the initial training courses for the junior officers going in, and I believe it is: the same -in the Agency, that there is tradecraft training to some extent. There are courses in international law as it,is useful to Foreign Service Officers. There is a course in consular practices, which involves legal situations and various matters, but nothing on the hws of — the United States with tegard to their own-activities, just laying out where it can; be found, what the nature of it is, 1 | just a straight, simple'-- it doesn't have to be terribly detailed, but an exposition of the ramifications of the work “that they do, how it impinges on citizens and on government, that is all. ‘anda at all levels, it seems to me a very sensible thing to do for it tells them. about their own country, how the activities of their agencies impinge upon others. Mr. ‘Kirbow.. But, Mr. Miller, this would apply to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This would -~- Docld: 32423515 Page “F3
_—_ for) on AS ot no r=) 16.0) 10 ll 12 / 14 15 17 18 | 19. 20 21 Be 23 24 20 iii SEC KES | 85 te. Mr. Inderfurth. The second sentence, "all intelligence agencies." - | Senator Huddleston. ‘We say that in the first -sentence. We. should also say it in the second sentence because that is where our obligation is in this particular inquiry, and the objective of our committee relates to intelligence agencies. I further would suggest that we restrict that training | program or. informational program to types of activities that. intelligence agencies are involved in such as clandestine > activities, and how this can adversely affect the rights of citizens. | | I would leave out on 114 there, starting with the first sentence, leave that full sentence out, as far as legislative, executive and judicial: | Mr..Aaron. So that entire sentence can come out. Senator. Huddleston. ‘Right, and 1 think they ought to be’ aware, just.as a policeman is given to be sure he. is aware, he is given a little card to read the rights of any person he arrests. This is not totally analogous, but -he ought to be | aware that the kinds.of activities that he is likely to_ . participate in. may have some adverse effect on his rights; and secondly, we have already put in here, "We recommend strongly that any person who sees something he believes to be wrong has _an obligation to report it." So let's give him something to TOR SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 75
LO ll 12 —— 13 14 15) 16 18 19 20 235 24 25° . Docld: 32423515 Page 76 ; , . | 4P SECRET as hang his hat on there. Mr. Kirbow.. Mr. Chairman, in view of that last sentence, I find this, an appropriate time to ask the Subcommittee to consider whether Or - not in adopting many. of the other things that have been recommended by the ‘President, be codified into law, as he expressed then in his executive order. Does this Subcommittee intend to consider that provision that he has put forth in his messages to Congress on having a statute that would prohibit the Agee problems and those other | former employees? | Senator Huddleston.. It is in here someplace.. Mr. Miller. If you read D, Charlie. | foo ; . i — Senator Huddleston. Which makes me wonder why this particular sentence is jin this particular place, the Last | ‘sentence on 114. Mr. Aaron. It might well go down to D. Senator Huddleston. It seems that when we are talking ; ' . : about protecting secrets, it all ought to be down here. Mr. Kirbow. It alt ought to be in that one section if we are going to deal wilth the employees! obligations to do so.. a fF ; Mr. Inderfurth. “1 have a ‘hunch, although Elliot can wonfirm it, that Recommendation C on. security, ‘functions would ‘t tbe bea major finding and recommendation of the Domestic Task Force or the Domestic Subcommittee. Elliot can tell us if that is a fact. That goes to quite a few. of the CIA domestic TOP SFCRET 1 | ‘ | $ tor '
LO 11 le 14 15 16 1? 18 ~ 19 20 21 22 a5 295 Docld: 32493515 Page 77 . domestic functions? | people from revealing Tee SECRET ey | H od ; ee eet td a ay practices about infiltration and the rest. a Ms. Culbreath. Did' you. mean to ‘restrict this C to ' | 3 oe | Mr. diGenova. Noy 'no. | i 4 Ms. Culbreath. Welt, you don't want the FBI looking into “ what CIA is doing in. Rome, do you? Mr. Miller. No, Of course not. | . t agency's personnel, which means personnel overseas. i Mr. diGenova. Tel ‘says the CIA's particular intelligence Ms. Culbreath. ‘And facilities overseas. Mr. diGenova. “exactly. cake ies ‘on tt Hag aS a Mr. Quanbeck. Th: po poses a problem for the military. You know, they have groups| that do both. law enforcement and XN security. hairman, “here we talk about. security of Mr. Kirbow. Mr. the people and installa rions. A great part of the Office of ——p Security is involved wth the security that prevents their 7 a ae ; _ - ‘Secrets and other things like that. Don't we wish them) to continue that operation? Senator Huddleston: The Office of Security where? Mr. diGenova. At| the Cla. Mr. Kirbow. And in the NSA. That's one of their major want. te functions. Mr. diGenova. It! says: "and security 1 related to the 7 ; ; : particular intelligence. agency’ s personnel .' That covers it. TAP RRA ee at a me Meee =
< wy ag ‘an re hae 88 | 2 Mr. Kirbow. Well, the security of ‘the personnel ig the ; 2. physical security. That is the way it.is written. I£-you are 5 talking about the security of the government that are in their 4 possession, that is where the bulk of .their investigative and 5 security work is done. | | 6 Senator Huddleston. What is the abuse we are shooting at | 7 here? | | 8 Mr. diGenovay CHAOS and the Office of Security proprietar{e 9 were used to infiltrate antiwar groups. First it: grew that” 10 there was a "perceived threat to the physical facilities of the 11 || DOD and the CIA ae ee Asa result of chat, ‘12° ]) they penetrated domestic groups to gain information concerning | \ . 13 attempts on the Agency} ‘and it- grew into a ‘counterintelligence| 14 operation of disrupting their speeches and marches. 15 | Mr. Quanbeck. This is gone into extensively in the 16° “Domestic group. | 17 Mr, Maxwell. They are going into CHAOS, domestic 18 security and investigations. . The White House used that as an 19 Senator Huddleston | 20 excuse, | 21 MES Maxwell. I th ink in. essence it comes out this way, 22 but it: is in much seen detail with the fact statements | 93 behind it on, the other bide. . 24 ; “Mr. Kirbow. Why don't we just verify | that that 95 which you wish to have: accomplished, Mr. Chairman, is taken TOP SFCRET Docld:324293515 Page 738
10 11 12 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 - el 22 23 || “24 - 25 information by the FBI! 4 the ultimate-part. . TEP SECRET er) care of in that other recommendation, and that is that it be -both physical and department security, so to speak, secrets type protection, if it ig in the other one. If it is not, _ we will work with them. Senator Huddleston.. What do we do about this law enforcement activity? | | Mr. Kirbow. that's clearly over in their bailiwick. Mr. Maxwell. they have made statements. Senator Huddleston. It has been pointed out that some ‘of these activities are abroad where the FBI ‘would not be. Mr... Kirbow. that! is correct. Mr. Maxwell. the} recommendation w will be that the CIA 4 would be barred from law enforcement activities abroad except - where, they were specifically requested to, let! ‘S say, get ‘There is an approval mechanism set.up there so that in the a ‘ , , normal course of events CIA would not be providing law enforce- ment information. Mr. Inderfurth. So: this Committee should recommend to the other Subcommittee that they look into their recommendation, Mr. Kirbow. What I am saying, if you want to prevent the law enforcement activities of agencies overseas, you immediatel get into the drug business and the business of the terrorism and whatnot, and I would sure hate: to see us. adopt that sort of ‘TOP SFCR FT Doclda: 32493515 Page 79
10 11 12 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 93 24 25 . Docld:32423515 Page 80 Tt9P SECRET ; 90 procedure. I. hove it is not intended to be included in our part of the recommendation. Mr. Maxwell. Even on the domestic side, the focus is | on the rights of Americans, so that insofar as the CIA might intercept a conversation between two foreigners overseas relating to drug trafficking, they would be able to supply that to the FBI. . The focus has been on how to be sure that the rights of Americans -- ||. J 4a, ; Mr. Kirbow. That the American drug trafficker can't get caught by the CIA. | | Senator Huddleston. well, I think we understand that: i a Mr. diGenova. There is going to be a fight on that one anyway. Senator Huddleston. It seems to me what we are trying to do here is avoid using tthe security function of the Agency as ; poo an excuse for doing other things. -Mr. Kirbow. And we should proscribe against instead of describing what they should do. - Senator Huddleston. That is what most of the first. sentence here does. § ; Mr. Inderfurth. are we just going to leave this one oo out? Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps what we could say to make sure that people understand we are concerned about that, leave the headin and say "See Domestic Report," and that way they can understand TOP SECRET
10 ll le 14 end 4a 15. ‘' begin 4b 216 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 295 (ir SECKE LE . 91 4 that we want to coordinate and make sure that is covered. Mr. diGenova. Maybe we should bracket the whole reconmen- dation. | | | | Mr. Miller. No, just say see the other report . Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, there is a major effort under way by the other staff on this one now to see whether we have either compatible or differing recommendations, and we should reconcile those and point them out -to this committee as well as to the other subcommittee. - 7 oo oo! Mr. Aaron. So is it suggested we just set this aside. for it now? os Mr. Miller. No.’ Just say "See the Domestic Report." . Senator Huddleston. See the Domestic Report and determine what is the best way here to refer to that report. We might want to make some statement. Mr. Aaron, I'll leave in the subhead, but I'll take out the other. I'll just take out the text and say "See Domestic Report." Senator Huddleston. That is where we stand right now, and. I'm not sure whether it's good or bad or whatever. Yes, and we ‘ought to say whether a general sentence ought] to be there. All right, Secrecy and Unauthorized Disclosure we get into Mr. Miller. Yeah, this addresses Charlie's point. Ms. Culbreath. Could we have the executive branch proposal TOP SECRET _Docld: 32423515 Page 41
10 11 ‘12 14 ‘15 16 ium 18 ‘19 - 20 al 22 3 24 25 Docld: 32423515 Page 32 TeaP SECRET 92 to look at while we are talking about it? Mr. diGenova. This is the one that was included in the President's message. Ms. Culbreath. I don't have one. Mr. diGenova. I don't think it's here. - Mr. Kirbow. ‘We have a copy of it in the Committee spaces, Mr. Chairman. | a | Senator Huddleston. Are we going to add a- penalty for unlawful classification? Mr. Aaron. ‘I think I can say that Senator Mondale would . Support that. Senator Huddleston. I would agree if we can figure out how to.do it. a So | . Mr. Kirbow. What! "unlawful classification" means. Senator Huddleston,, I think we should make a clear, valid i ee definition of national secrets, including a precise definition | of sources and methods. I hope I-am not on the committee that has to draft it. _ Mr. Maxwell. I think we may mean here that there should be a penalty for overclassification rather than unlawful classification. Mr. Kirbow. Not. .overclassification. You don't want. to punish inadvertent classification. "Unlawful" ’is the key word, and unless you want to describe the parameters of that, ‘you can't pass a statute. ; TOP SECRET
10 ll 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 - . 20 el 22 23 25. dtr SERREI 93. Mr. Miller. Well the point is, where there have been instances where things have. been classified not because of thei value to national security, because they are protecting the hides of those who are involved.in some particular activity. Mr. Kirbow. Well, that's classification to cover wrong- doing is exactly what that is, but there is classification, Mr. Miller, which does not go to national security. It is in the national interest, and they go with a recommendation to that extent. . | Mr. Maxwell. There is also very little lawful classi- fication that is done pursuant to an executive order rather tha by statute. “Mr. Miller. All right, de novo classification is what you are saying. - . | | Senator Huddleston. You are saying "over" and Charlie says "unlawful," and I think if we are going to write the definition and put it into law, I think "unlawful" is the correct word. | Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I just don't think I have ever seen a time that you could draft a legally technical section — like this. The CIA and the executive branch spent over six: weeks just trying to draw up a two page recommendation on. . amending the 1947 Act, and unless we look in some considerable- depth here with the lawyers as to the terms and’ phrases, we can get you in over your head on a recommendation, and I suggest. TOP SFCRET DoclId: 32423515 Page 63°
10 1l 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 £2 23 24 25 Docld: 32423515 Page ga. 13, TOP SECRET 84 we do that with this particular -- o Mr. Miller. I respectfully digagree. It seems to-me. that | sources and methods is an area that requires definition, and it jumped out of the proposal of. the President. The question of disclosure is addressed by the President's recommendation but not the idea of allowing for proper disclosure. Mr. diGenova. I tell you, the President is going to have to define it because if they try to prosecute anybody they are going to ask for a definition of sources and methods, and they are going to find the statute unconstitutionally vague and not be able to prosecute anybody . They are going to have to come. up with a definition if they ever intend to prosecute ‘anybody. Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Miller, I don't disagree with you that there should be a balance between classification, overclassi- fication and underelassification. What I'm saying is I've. never known the time that I could off the top of my head, and I'm only a fair country lawyer, can draft a legal document that will stand the ravages of court cases and tests sitting at a table like ‘this, viewing it for the first time. Mr. diGenova. Nobody is suggesting that it be done here. Mr. Miller. We're not drafting it. Mr. Kirbow. We say there should. also be a penalty for — unlawful classification. What do you mean by unlawful classification? TOP SECRET
n | TOP SECRET > 95 ~ ol _ Senator Huddleston. Well, we will let somebody else | £ || figure that out. | 5, ‘You won't know it, Charlie, until you write a law. 4 Mr. Miller. We are just saying that it is a problem, an 5 | issue to be faced, that's all. — | 6 - Senator Huddleston. I'm wondering whether or -not we can 7 take out the line referring to " seriously deficient." 8 Ms. Culbreath, We can make our recommendation’ because 9 || we are not criticizing theirs.. LO |: Mr. Aaron. Well, perhaps the thought is. 11 || Mr. Kirbow. The oversight conimi ttee does not consider 12 that legislation.:. That was. an amendment to the 1947 act. Unless ‘ 13 || we do something here in'a recommendation, it. is going to be 14 considered by the Committee: on Armed Services. 15 Senator Huddleston. You are talking about -- 16 | _ Mr. Kirbow. The otie the President sent up. 17 Mr. Miller. . The oversight - committee which would have 18 ||: legislative authority would draft an omnibus bill. “We have ‘19 || recommended that all the way through, which includes recasting 20 || the 1947 Act. | | | 21 a “Mr. Aaron. I might just suggest that for the -- 22 | 7 Mr. Miller. only the portion that deals with intelligence 23 agencies. ik | | NO 24 ||. Mr. Aaron. ‘For tlie portion that deals with seriously — 25 déficient, perhaps the -best wayto put this would simply be TOP SECRET : Docld: 327423515 ° Page 65.
10 1 12 14 15 16 1? ‘1g 19 20 21 ee 25 - penalty or provision for.dealing with the retention of infor-. mation that really ought to be disclosed, and to try to come to leak, it doesn't punish him. of what we have come to. find out about this problem in the ~and one of our greatest safeguards is the ability of people to speak out. The > country has lasted 200 years without ‘provisions like this, a8 it has done reasonably well, and he TOP SECRET “| “~ . 96 to say it should be amended. Their proposal should be accom- panied. This is, I think, the thrust of the thought here, that if you are going to. increase the penalties for the disclosure o information, the concern is that there might well be some. some way to balance ‘that. I. don't know that it is any harder to define one than’ the other, probably, but ~-- | Senator Huddleston. What does he essentially do in here by amending Section 102? “Is he adding penalties for dis~ - closure? “Mr. diGenova. It is an official secrets act, isn't it? _.Mr. Aaron. For people who have clearances. Mr. Kirbow. It doesn't go to. the newsman who gets the - Mr. Aaron. But it. does deal with the people’ that have the information, and a the concern that has been reflected -- and T will simply try to reflect. what I know to be Senator Mondale! concern which he holds very strongly, and that is that a lot ae hy : field of intelligence community has been because of disclosures feels very strongly that, we must be very careful about any TOP SECRET DoclId: 32423515 ‘Page 66
10 11 le 14 15 16. 1? 18 19, “20 21 22 23 25 heh SECKEI 97 further steps that we take. “Now, I think the real problem with this paragraph, if I can say so, lies more, and I am speaking for myself, the real problem lies: less. in the question of whether one should try to frame some additional legislation that would try to | protect us from our secrets as well as from their disclosure, but whether or not we want to endorse the President! s proposal, because this is kind. of.a backdoor endorsement of those particular proposals. — t f I think the Committee may want to consider that step extremely carefully. | “Mr. Miller: ~ And the issue of whether there should be legislation to protect national secrets. | Mr. Aaron. ‘Whether | there should be additional legislation to protect, of the character the President: has proposed, and I don't know where the Cénmittee comes out on it, but the thrust of this, while it jtalks about this additional area, - is to assume that yes, chat is good, now let! s do _Something more, and I" m not so sure -- Senator Huddleston. Well, it seems to me you come. down ‘right here, and I don't know how this fits in, but we come. _ down on the fact that yes, there ought to be laws and penalties] for unlawful disclosure of classified information. Secondly, i there ought to be laws and penalties against unlawful classi- : “| fication. Third, in order to accomplish either one of these, TOP SECRET Docld:32423515 Page 687
10° 11 12. 14 15 (16 17 18 ‘19 20 21 Re 2) 24. 25 “out. ‘Charlie. a hee some other place. where you don't know yet’ what you mean. OP SECKES ry we have got to have definitions for valid secrets and I guess precise definitions of sources and methods . | | Mr.Aaron. Valid secrets including Sources and methods. Senator Huddleston. We need those terms clear. Ms. Culbreath. And also for the terms themselves, the terms "lawful secrecy," "lawful disclosure," and "unlawful classification," you've got to have definition for that, too. Mr .Miller. And that's something that has to. be worked Senator Huddleston.| The legislation should. include the wai vey sags “idl a precise definitions ror Fhese. ' Now, can we do that? - “tt oo, 1) . Charlie, we are not} trying on our own effort here to defin these things. | | . . Ny ‘Mr. Kirbow. We can| take a shot at trying to draft those definitions. . mi Mr. Miller. Well, 'I don't think, we can or want to, Rly Senator Huddlestonii You'll have to get your oar in there Mr. Kirbow. I just hate to recommend terms and phrases an —_ Mr. Miller. Because we use them every day, because we right now as a committee, you know, we are going to the agency and saying, because we are declassifying our documents accordin TOP SECRET Docld:32423515 Page 66
TOP SECRET 99 1 to some understood thing about sources and methods -- ~ P) 7 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Miller, sources and methods is no 3 concern about you and I. You and I are in agreement on the 40 subject. The only other thing, Mr. Chairman, because we > 5 || certainly don't want to go away from here thinking you want 6 all of this in, ‘in addition, the Committee believes that 4 Federal employees who have some reason to suspect that unlawful 8 or improper acts are being conducted or are about to be conduct a 9 ‘under the guise of secrecy should have access to authorized 10 II institutional groups independent of the organization that they. 11 serve. The new Intelligence Oversight Board is one such j2 || group." | | : ‘ 13 ]/ Are we intending to cover all federal employees? ual Senator Huddleston. Wé argued this out the other day, 15 didn't we? i | 16 * Mr. Miller. Yeah) we endorsed it. ha ‘ “417 Senator Huddlestoy.. I don't like the way this is written. - ag Mr. Kirbow. Now, do you intend that all Federal employees ‘19 go to that group, ‘Mr. Miller? “You say, "In addition, the 20 “committee believes that all Federal. employees." 21 7 Mr. Aaron. There's ‘no “all” in there. 92. | Mr. Kirbow. Well, that includes all of them, doesn't 93 || ite | : a \: 24 Mr. Aaron. © It's hard to Say. os | / Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, r don't think you want the peopl TOP SECRET Docld:32423515 Page 89
LO 11 12 14 15. 16 1? 18° 19 20. / al 22 23 25 Oversight Board. finally I guess to us. :/ a P SECRET | 100 down in the Department: of Housing and Urban Development who feltthere was ‘something unlawful going on to report to the Senator Huddleston. I think we Ought to. attempt to confin¢ as much as possible our suggestions to the Intelligence Community, whether that ought to be -- in that way, it probably should. . | | | | Mt. -Kirbow. And directed. Here| again, encouraging -the Federal ~~. Senator Huddleston. Well, what we were trying to say the other day was that it could come to the Select Committee or | al to the oversight committee. Mr. Kirbow. Direct. Senator Huddleston. Now, we went through that, how to go through the Counsel; !the IG, and the Intelligence Board, and| ‘ fo ‘ i Mr. Kirbow. “What you are really ‘saying is the door here is open, as the court of last resort, | Senator Huddleston. Well, what I want to do,. and what I think is appropriate is that any Federal employee, really, al-- though we are not addressing ourselves’ to the whole Federal Bureaucracy, but any person in the CIA or the FBI who feels: in his own mind that’ there is wrongdoing, going on, whether it is. unlawful classification or whether it is some other, ought to | ' be able, with impunity, with impunity, ought to be able to go TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 30
10 11 12 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 . 24 29 Committee, Mr. Chairman, not all agencies, but frequently -thos don't have someplace to go. TOP SECRET nts to some source and reveal that. - Now, that doesn't mean that that autbmatically is going to mean that somebody is doing something wrong, but if it isa group such as the oversight committee, then there is a method of checking it out. ; | Mr. Kirbow. Fortunately, the majority of the Federal employees are covered, because all of the Department of Defense} civilians and all of the military employees are authorized in the. regulations of those agencies that they can contact their Congressman directly and have been, I guess, since the very beginning. | | "Senator Huddleston. But just a Congressman. If they had a specific place like the oversight committee, I think most of them would be inclined to go there, and I think that would be a great plus for the Agency. | Mr.-Kirbow. That's what happens with the Armed Services complaints. . Senator Huddleston. They might go to the press if they Mr. Miller, ‘Which is what they have done. Senator Huddleston. ‘which is what they have done. Ms. Culbreath. Is it the sense, then, that if we revise . the first paragraph to’ include the revisions with regard to the definitions and the injunctions to the follow-on committee to TOP SECRET Docld: 324293515 Page 91 —
dt SECKE t 102 1 make these definitions. and get them into law, that by what we - ” 2 did yesterday afternoon on establishing the procedures for peop € 3 to go directly to the oversight board or up through channels as 4 may be appropriate, that we really don't need the second 5 ‘paragraph, but because that. gets taken care of by getting 6 these definitions. |e Senator Huddleston. It does, except this would be a ° 8. logical place to put this when you are dealing with secrets.” 9: It would bea logical place to lay out the fact that a person | 10 || who is charged with keeping secrets would not be deemed to | 11 | have violated that charge if he-comes to the proper committee, 12 is not going to be indicted for unauthorized disclosure if he. > 13 || comes before the Senate oversight committee and tells what he | 14.) thinks. | “as . “Mr. Maxwell. A particular fact on that is Mr. Cotter, who 16 was a devoted Federal. employee, worked for the CIA and later 417 || for the Post Office, felt the burden of the Secrecy oath. that - 18 || he had: taken in regard to disclosure to his superiors in the | 19 Post Office about the CIA mail opening. 20 7 Senator Huddleston. And frankly, I think it would be ot more reasonable to restrict it to this type of group. | 22 | - Mr. Maxwell, | I think if it should go anywhere, it should 23 go to the oversight: Committée. . \ 24 Mr. Kirbow.. You mean the military man in Paris should 25 go to this Committee instead of to the Armed Services TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 92
10 11 ‘Le 14 15) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 29 _ could open: the door is what you are trying to do. - 24 4” SECKEI - 103 1 { Committee, or do you Imean just the intelligence community? We should stick to the intelligence community as an oversight committee. | Senator Huddleston. That's my judgment, and if the court. wants to expand’ it to everybody -- | | Mr. Kirbow. Let them do it.. I agree with that concept. - Mr. diGenova. . The intelligence community employees. Senator Huddleston. If it was the FBI, the FBI, he ' could have a choice.. Mr. Kirbow. He could go anywhere he wants to, : but you © \ Senator Huddleston. Do you see. anything wrong with that, ‘| David? Mr. Aaron. The only thing I would like is if the author of the original text would help me out in redrafting it. Senator Huddleston. Did you write the original? Mr. Inderfurth. | The last sentence of that paragraph ought to be made a new paragraph. The question is, should these principles instead of provisions, perhaps, in consultation _ with the Judiciary Committee, should that be a part of this _ as well? Mr. Aaron. Should join with another committee to draft this. Mr. Miller. That is a question that has been raised. Now, Judiciary has been working with this in several committees TOP SECRET Docld:32423515 Page 93
iP SECKEL 104» 1 . it's been working in the area of secrecy legislation for 2 2 quite a number of years. There is a big body < of experience 3 there, and it would be a sensible thing. . - 4 || Ms. Culbreath.. all right, would this, this last sentence 5 would maybe fit better at the end of the previous paragraph? 6 Mr. Aaron. _I! 11 leave to. you. “the fix on this. a Senator Huddleston. _ I think the Committee should 8 instigate with. the proper or appropriate other committee. The 9 main thing is somebody has got ‘to give ‘the impetus to do ity 10 || and if we are setting up a committee for that purpose, it. will ll have to go through the normal legislative processes anyway. 12 -— So the gudiciary Committee is -- the committee is going ) ‘13 to wind up there analy. | 14 | Next isa Federal Register for: Classified Executive | 15 Orders be established by statute. 16 | Ms. Culbreath. This would mean -you couldn't..have an “17 executive order that ‘could be immediately effective. 18 . Mr.. Aaron. Sure, “It means all you've got to do is 19 go downtown.” 20 | | Senator Huddleston. well, suppose he has to move right 21- “now? | | | 20 . Mr. Miller. Constitutional authority. _ 23 oo Mr. Aaron. Yeah, but the Constitution has no suicide 24 pact. 25° | Mr. Kirbow. Bill, would you explain on the record what "yo TOP SECRET Docld: 32423515 Page 94
po np “10 ll 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 29 Docld: 32423515 © Page 95 295° rap SECRET ‘105 | ‘mean by the sentence "No official of the United States could’ ‘undertake a secret intelligence. activity except under a lawful executive order pursuant to statutory or Constitutional authority." Mr. Miller. Statutory authority. Mr. Kirbow. Do jou mean executive order or statute or constitutional authority? You mean three different things. » Mr..Miller. No, an executive order is only lawful if it. is a’result of constitutional authority or statute. Ms. Culbreath. You mean everybody has got to go out ; | and find out if it is lawful before they do it? Mr. diGenova. Well, you know, Congress passes statutes and that is no difference than anything else. Ms. Culbreath. Well, my question is, do you need lawful? a | Mr. Miller. welll, all that is contemplated here is a place for depositing ‘all of the implementing regulations, ‘executive orders or whatever names they are called. They have been called various things throughout history. “Mr. Kirbow. Why don't we stop after the word "lawful" then, It goes very nicely and succinctly in that first two sentences, your requirement to put it in'the Classified | Federal Register under appropriate security procedures, by whatever name called, before they are lawful, and once you have TOP SECRET