(5) General sabotage and harasement — , sabotage in this program ig both an economic weapon and a stimulus to resistance. Since the approval of the program, four externally mounted sabotage operations have been successful (Santa Lucia —- Cagilda -~ La Isabela — Cayo Guin), Three additional were ready to go, but for several reasons including weather, were recalled at the last minute. While it is recognized that no single act of sabotage will materially affect the economy, we believe these gabotage raids have had a significant cumulative effect and should be eontinued, We believe the recent rige in internal sabotage and increased disaffection and demoraliza- tion in the armed forces are partly due to the impact of these externally mounted gabotage raida. (6) Support of autonomous anti-Cagtro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the executoa or the above course of action ~ in order to expand sabotage and resistance activities it hag become hecessary to accept the risks involved in utilizing autonomous Cuban exile groupe and individuals who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance, Substantial progress is being made in this part of the program and we expect the first infiltration and sabotage operations to begin in mid-January. B. Suggestions for Intensification of Covert Action Programs Directed Against Cuba. As wtated above, the ~ primary objective of the covert action program ig to create conditions and exploit all opportunities which could lead to a coup against the Castro regime.- Under the program approved in mid-June 1963, we have adequate policy latitude and we are now making maximum use of CIA's resources to pursue our operationg. In our judgment, however, the category of sabotage and harags— ment should be intengified, at least for the next year, both as to quantity and quality, if the overall program ig to have a chance of producing the desired results. With regard to quantity, the pelicy decision to ban non-CIA sponsored exile raids from US and Bahaman territory hag given CIA a virtual monopoly in thie field, but it hag algo Grastically reduced the HY 50955 DBoctd: 32423815 Page 7 . |
number of raidg againgt Cuba. With regard to quality, we have long recognised the importance of incapacitating the critical power plants and oi] refineries in the Havana, Matanzas, and Santiago areag of Cuba. But political repercussions of the capture of comma ndog gent on these missions, have militated against mounting such raidg., Moreover, the effective damage that can be done to thease heavily defended targets by small teang now uged covertly ig problematical. A number of these targets, however, can he effectively attacked from the air under acceptable rigk econditiong. We, therefore, propoge the following: (1) Relaxation of the present policy banniuy 811 independent (non-CIA controlled or sponsored) Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes againgt targets in Cuba from U8 and urge the British to do likewige for Bahaman territory. (2) Authorization to couduct CIA or autonomous group controlled air Strikes against selected :aujor economic targets such ag the power plants and oil refinertes in the Havana, Matanzas, and Santiags ar@as of Cuba, il, Act son PY Other Governmental Agencies, Supported by CIA as Kppropriate. Unless all governmental agencies accord the highes egree of priority and urgency to bringing about the downfall of the Castro regime, an intensification of the covert action program alone ig not likely to achieve the desired result, Accordingly, we recommend that the following Proposals be given renewed emphasis or be tnitiated if not already in effect: A. Actions Against Cuba (1) It 48 urged that President Johngon make a policy declaration on Cuba at the earliest Opportunity to make cleer that the Us continues to regard the Castro regime ae intolerabSé. A "no rapprechement with Castro" state. mént should be explicitly included go ae te stimulate and anti-Cagstro/Commaist disgident elements in the armed forces to carry eut a coup. Some iggen tions for a Presidential statement to further this objective are eontained im Tab A attached. . c Sots ots Naw 50955 Daoctld:327423015 Page @
C) (2) By an interplay of diplomatic pressure and political warfare to cause the Kremlin leadership to conclude that disengagegent from its overextended and precarious position in Cuba would be in the best Soviet interest, The President and his representatives can put the Soviets on notice via diplomatic channels and in private confidential diacussion that US rapprochement with Castro is excluded from conmideration, and that the existence of the Castro regime is a serious impediment to detente with the USSR. The US could offer to assist the Soviets in finding a face-saving way to withdraw gracefully trom Cuba without serious loag—-term damage to its prestige, a technique already succese@efull; applied during the missile crigia of Getober 1962, CIA could support this effort by covert political and deception Operations to exacerbate existing tensions between Caatro and the Sovieta by causing Castro to believe that the Soviets are engaged in secmet negotiationg with the US te climinate him. (3) There is still considerable opportunity for tightening the economic nooge around Castro if the Us is prepsered to incur the temporary displeasure of certain aliies and neutral countries. More severe US saactions against countries that trade with or ship to Cuba could be imposed. We are particularly concerned with te current trade and gwhipping practices of Canada, the UK, Spnin, und Japan, (4) US military feints could be undertaken designed to create and maintain a high state of anxiety within the Castro regime regarding US intentions. Supported by covert political and deception operations these feinta woulc cause frequent Cuban military alerts and constant movenent of Cuban forces throughout the island. (5) Initiation of frequent low level reconnaissance flights would provide additional useful intelligence on Cuban and Soviet military movements. These flights would algo have a positive peychological effect ingide Cuba in demonstrating US contempt for Castro in a vigible and dramatic manner. B. Actions in Latin Amewica. Ag Castro's domestic position deteriorates, he Ia likely, In desperation, to become increasingly ruthless and reckless in fomenting subvergion, violence, and revolution in Latin America. It thus becomes especially iaport- ant to make certain that Castre does not outflank US efforts by NaF 50955 Daoctd:3274233915 Page 3
nae : allowing him ® major success somewhere in Latin America guch ag he hag sought te achieve in Vesesguela. It would be umrealistie to expeet auch in the way of militant or aggreasive action aguinst Castro from the OAS or most of the individual Letin American countries strong enough or so geographically leeated as to make any significant contribution. But the wulnerability of O48 countries to Castro's subvergive activities provides all the more reason for an OAS that has the substance as well ag the forms of an allianee, For thig reason we would place nigh on the list of US actions » sove to revitalize the GA53. Although many of the actions listed beléw could be undertaken untlaterally by the US, a coordinated OAS approach would not only iscrease their effeetivencas, but reduce their risk. In cases where it ig impossible to get wholehearted and uganig@ous partici- pation by the OAS, it sheuld be our guidiag priaciple to bring ae many Latin American countries ag poseible along with us, by bilateral agreements if necessary. The following actions with respect to Latin America are egzeentially defengive in the senge that they are designed to thwart Cagtro's subwersive efforts in this region. We aggume that they will be acgompanied by long-term programs to build up the stability and strength of friendly Latin American regimes: (1) Perhaps the most important action the US could take to igolate Cuba from Latin America and ingulate these countries from Cuban subversion efforts ie to quarantine covert arms, equipment, ang personnel shipments by air or sea from Cuba to Latin America. For maximum effect, the eordon, preferably sanctioned by and participated in by the OAS, should be drawn as clo@e to Cuban shores ag ia tactically poggible. It must be recognised that this quarantine would sot be fully effective, but it would provide a legal basia for weiszing and searching Cuban, and, if necessary non-Cuban, vessels and aircraft at will to determine whether they are engaged in running arms, equipueat, "= and men to Latin America. (2) Early recegnitien ef the Dominiear and Heonadwran govermments would agpiet our effertes against Castro. Twe stremgly anti-Cagtre govermments would be added te the guppert eof the UG in the O48 and add@itiesal Caribbean bagem for operations againgt Castro would beceme availabie. Na 50955 Docld:32423315 Page 106
initio ; a (3) Appropriate Latin American countries should be encouraged to offer support and agg#ietance, including bases, to responsible Cuban exile groupe to permit then to operate ageinget Castro. (4) OAS-wide or bilateral agreements with Latin American governments should be negotiated for joint measures, to detect and to prevent arms smuggling by land, sea, or air into Latin America. Because of the urgency of the threat, Venezuela gmhould be given first priority and every effort be made to build up Venezuela ag &@ decigive defeat for communigm in Latin America, (5) We should strengthen on-site programa to increase he the antisubvergion capabilities in the Latin American ; countries. At present, the Communist and Castroite groups in most Latin American countries are not large, and for the moat part they are digorganiszged and poorly equipped. However, the capabilities of the governments of the area for detecting and coping with infiltration, subvergion, and armed upriging are very low. (6) We should attract world attention to Venezuelan effortga to expose the Castro regime for its plots and acta of gubvergion againgt Latin American governments and to help provide a legml bagia for collective actio:: - by the OAS*againgt Castro. , a: pone — DESMOND FITZGERALD Chief, ecial Affairs 1 Staff, DDP ." CHESTER L. COOPER Assistant Deputy Director (Intelligence), (Policy Support) Attachment: Tab A NF 50955 Daocld:324233915 Page 11
SUBJECT: Suggestion for Additional Admipvistration Statements on Cuba to Stimulate Anti-Castre: Action on the Part of Digsident Elements i) the Cuban Armed Forces 1, The uitimate objective of our covert action PLOLCP RE, airected against Cuba is tc create the conditions which wii? stimulate non-Communist dissident elements in the armed forces and other power centers of the regime to carry out # coup the Castro/Communist leadership and eliminate the Sinc~Sovis! presence from Cuba. With this objective in mind, Cif nes established and is seeking intensively to expand contacts with disaffected senior military officers in the Cuban Agim in go doing, we have been impressed by the unanimit, these contacts insist on pergonal and political essu cs the United States as a prerequisite to active cons yy the Castro/Communist entourage. These noen-Comiiui: List iti-Ce astro cissident Cubans argue that there is no persona! Baye bag geatriotic incentive br them to overthrow Castro when: (1) they yun the great risk of being liquidated themselves as Righ offi- viele is that regime and (2) there 1g a lixeliheod that 4 jo hitieal clock will be turned back and Cube wiitl Sgain fr wiser tie rule of Batista or someone akin to hin, - They asses: whieh fron that: they must-have solemn assurances from Bigh level U.S, spokesmer, especially the President, that the United States will exert ite decisive influence during and imuediately after Lue Coup to prevent their personal iiguidation and # politica? i a BBB, 4, CA has atteupted in e generrgl and very Limited manic. « peovide these assurances, but it remains for the Presiden: uc other Administrationgpokesmen to instill e genuine seng@ge of 225, comaitment to our efforts. President Kennedy's speech to the [nter~American Press Asseciation on 18 November alluded t:. this problem when he stated: ; HW 50955 Docld:32473815 Page 12
HY 450954 "No Cuban need feel trapned between dependence on the broken promises of toreten Communism and the hostility of the rest of - the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the band of friendship and assistance to a Cube whore political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban peapie 3. Our Station in Miami reports thet exile conserva— tives were depressed because they interpreted this possace as U.S. willingness to accept "Fidelismo without Fidel, while leftist oriented groups were encouraged to believe that “anti-Communist progressive and revolutionary clements" have the support of the U,8. Government, These Cuban exile reactions, however, cannot be taken as reflecting the views of people inside Cuba, It is typical of exiles taat they become oversensitive to the innuendoes of official public statements bearing upon their problems. Within Cuba, we believe that President Kennedy’s statement probably contributed significantly to providing political assurances to the relatively anmall number of potential coupstérs to whom these remarks are addressed, But vwe believe that action may be expected to follow only when these assurances are coupled with open recognition fron authoritative U.S. spokesmen that many Cubans now Berving in the ermed forces and other power centers of the Cestre regime will have to play a major role in its overthrow, These people need to be assured that the United States ds sympathetic to the personal problems they will tace in the event of a successful coup. To meet this and reiated problems, we recommend that the following passeses ie given some prominence in a Presidential prees confersuce, declaration or speech at the earliest. appropriate cccesios: "There are many in the ranks of the Cuban armed forces, and in the Cuban Government itsels. whe have viewed with gorrow and anger the end of Cuban liberty, the subjugation of the Cuban natic: to another state and to a foreign ideolegy that is alien to Cuba's authentic nationslist and demaaratic sentiments, Boctld: 32423815 Page 13
4 OO, {~ aoe - Le pogo y oe "To these men 1 Say the United States is ready to welcome to discussion without rancor and without reprisal a non-Communist Cuban leadership which truly represents the will of the Cuban people to Strike down the barrier of Soviet domination, renounce Communism as # way of life and re-enter the community of American republics. We recognize that many non~Communist Cubans who now appear to be a part of the machinery of tyranny, will uliti-~ mately be instruments in destroying it. and for this reagon should be entitled to special consideration," 4, The President may als« wish te refer te a speech celebrating the return of the Brigade menbers deliveres by President Kennedy at the Orange Bowl on 26 December 1962 _&t which time he declared: “Under the Alianza para el Progreso, we Support for Cuba and for all the countries of this hemisphere the Fight of free elections and the free exercise of basic human freedoms, We support land reforn and the right of every campesino to own the land he tills, We support the effort of every free nation to pursue Programe of economic progress. We support the right of every free people to freely transform the econonic and political institutions of Sectety SO that they may serve the welfare of all...and i believe these are the principles of tha great ' majority of Cuban people today, and I an confident that all over the igland of Cuba, in the goverment itself, in the ary, and in the militia, there are” ahy who have viewed with dismay the destruction ~ thelr Island d wi an, Pe) reedom on Siand and who are determines o restore that freedom so that the Guba pesoplc ee LE EPO may oncé more govern themselves, eB (Underlining oura,) The President might note that in the intervening year tre prospects have improved for a return of Cuba to the OAS family of nations and he looks forward to that day with confidence, | | ae S0955 Daocld: 327423315 Page 14