(104. totree tet . / SECRET/NO FOREIGH OISSEM | OO] A fate. 2 eet ONLY ~,» CT INFORMATION REPORT . THE FOLLOWING REPORT CONTAINS INFORMATION DERIVED FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE AND REQUIRES SPECTAL HANDLING. Ir: MAY BE SHOWN ONLY TO PERSONS WITH A NEED TO KNOW AND MAY. HOT RECEIVE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION WITHIN RECIPIENT OFFICES. FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE ORIGINATING OFFICE. SECRET /MO FOREIGN DISSEM i! ° . [#2 trot ck ov onsen — J ae ve 3187: aorteaas ott €th- ee. 405 Hp
74-90000+ COUNTERENTELLEGENCE INFORMATION REPORT foo . | ' Country: USSR rd. - 7 - Subject: Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN Lode ea pol: :1966 SECRLT/ANG FOREEGN DISSEM SBSR- 1632 Source : A KGB Officer Any dissemination of this information to Field Stations or to officers not on the initial distribution must betoordinated with “SE/CI/Xz~ As a general rule, [PDOSTORAGE information i707 not releasable to foreign or domestic liaison : . . Services or to any office outside the DDO. t. ; . 1. As of 1966, the KGB was attempting to locate former Soviet intelligence officers who had defected, in order. to carry out liquidation operations against them. Defectors so targeted were Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN, Nikolay Yevgenyevich KHOKHLOV, and Petr Sergeyevich DERYABIN. In August 1966 the KGB Residency in Washington, D.C. acquired the addresses of two Soviet defecters. According to source, the KGB was able ‘to locate certain of ‘these individuals by checking city telephone : directories after cbtaining their assumed names from Cengressiona] records, where they eppeared in connection with the defectors’ i -- acquisition of United States citizenship. ; 2. The KGB considered GOLITSYN an average officer. Thev believed that he probably did not provide American intelligence'with much information, as before his defection matters and also was Department for only 4 short study of operations. he was working in the Information Department and therefore did not have access to operational assigned to the 14th (Counterintelligence) In this regard, they considered NOSENXO's defection much more damaging to the xXO3. Although GOLITSYN knew more about First Chief Directorate matters, NOSENKO was in a position te provide information on Second Chief Directorate operations, as well as on the KGB as a whole. WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ANO METHOSS INVULYED E2 -IMPDET CL BY O11340. SECRLT/80 FOREIUN DEISSEM HG
14-00000 ; SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM . 2 3. Source comnented that he suspected that both NOSENKO ana : GOLITSYN might have been approached by American intelligence prior » to their actual’ defections, because GOLITSYN had had problems “with his Chiefs and NOSENKO drank. considerably and was involved with girls. OO COMMENTS: ST co , 1. With regard to the statement contained in Paragraph 1 above that in August 1966 the KGB Residency in Washington, D.C. acquired the addresses of: two Soviet defectors, Source stated that he knew. that one of the individuals in question was not NOSENXO and that he as 90 percent certain that one was not GOLITSYN. + eee en Oe SOY leet BS te i 2. The above information is being made available outside DDO { ° _ “to C/OS/Security Analysis Group in EYES ONLY: memorandum form without | reference to the(POSTORAGE cryptonyn. i . i | a Od : - 25 June 1975 : : Distribution: ‘il - C/SE/C ‘1 - SE/CI/ 2 ~ C/CIRA | yo 1+ C/SE/CI/1 . 1 2 + SE/CI/R (Young) | - | t j SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM