mo eh tra al Beran IE eS ser EEE ERRATA a oP faba a 200 ty ea HONE be Ene achat telett AES APR ee ATT 4. 29 SEP 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM : Robert W. Gambino © - Director of Security VIA a, : Acting Deputy Director for Administration SUBJECT : Probable Compromise of Information Furnished to the House Select Committee on Intelligence _ 1. Action Requested: Your approval is requested to assemble an Agency-wide task force to conduct an overall damage assessment of the classificd documents and/or information previously furnished by the Agency to the now defunct House Select Committee on Intelligence (HSC). 2. Basic Data: I have been concerned for some time with respect to the improper manner in which classified information supplied to the HSC by the Executive Branch was handled from a security standpoint and which culminated in the leak of the HSC's draft report to Daniel Schorr. As you know, leaks of classified information to the news media by the HSC began shortly after its creation and continued throughout the life of that Committee. In addition to the news leaks, there have been several ‘allegations (both substantiated and unsubstantiated) concerning classified Agency and Intelligence Community documents which have found their way from the HSC into the hands of unauthorized persons. Two of these allegations have been referred to the. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and in at least one instance (the classified Agency documents found on the West Coast by R&D Associates) the FBI is conducting an active investi- gation. The -House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the leak of the ~HSC's draft report to Daniel Schorr generated substantial testimony by former members and staff of the HSC regarding the apy -B2 IMPDET Cone 4BEN TIAL "CL BY 063344 bo 64274
a . degree of protection afforded to classified Executive Branch nn information by the HSC Staff. This testimony clearly demon- strated that the HSC Staff failed to provide adequate storage and control over classified documents, to include little or no control over the copies made or access to classified material. Further, the magnitude of this situation cannot be determined through an inventory of the sealed cartons stored | at. the Agency attendant to the "missing documents" allegation, oe since there is no way of knowing how many copies have been an made of these documents nor to whom any such copies may have Sp been provided. In view of the inadequate security practices employed by the HSC Staff, it would seem to be a fair assumption that much, if not all, of the classified information provided to them by the Executive Branch has been compromised. The allega- tions and disclosures related to the documents and information provided to the HSC continue to surface at resular intervals, and with each such occurrence the Agency is required to react © and prepare a damage assessment on a case-by-case basis, Se ne ace init enh cee tee Ce EO | I feel strongly that the Agency, and perhaps the entire Intelligence Community, should initiate an overall review of the classified information provided to the HSC with a view towards preparing a comprehensive damage assessment. Admittedly, this is. an overwhelming task. It could, however, be reduced somewhat by limiting our review to that classified data supplied to the HSC the disclosure of which would compromise sensitive Agency sources and/or current Agency projects or operations. — The above review could best be accomplished through the creation of a task force comprised of representatives from all Agency directorates and preferably of those individuals who were previously involved in preparing Agency information for | transmittal to the HSC. As the Review Staff Registry has been kept intact, it would be possible to determine precisely what classified Agency information was provided to the HSC. From a community standpoint, it is suggested that the Intelligence Community Staff initiate a similar review by all other Executive Branch agencies which provided sensitive and classified infor- mation to the HSC. - sree atienah sepetbintenes 5 evade See eee ey The resulting study would be of value in terms of. our ‘commitment to protect the identity and. safety of Agency sources and in our future assessments of various programs and projects Mart aR aie ADS irate nd MAL eterna a gene nee ; oo 2
3 s con ; 4 { 2A ett ena eat ert iota t abn sed og mete Be mnt ee preach tO ee tas oe Tabatittr cadbivene Braet 1 Sey eDiabDeal Jor Date as 20 ee bok earn cet hoe. a rtey ath sttohcace were ie Rider URI a oa oe 000- . DISAPPROVED: with regard to their success and/or failure, In short, the Agency must be prepared, in advance, to.deal with the problems that arise through these unauthorized disclosures of classified information. 3. Recommendation: It is recommended that you approve the creation of a task force, chaired by the Office of Security,. comprised of representatives from all Agency directorates to conduct a damage assessment of the classified information and/or documents provided to the now defunct House Select Committee on Intelligence. . - oe Dea W. Gambino — APPROVED: Sb bor artha— FoOe#t PE Distribution: Orig - Return to OS via DDA 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 ~ DDA . 1 - Asst to the DDCI
O00 ce, DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT {| + TRANSMLTTAL DOCUMENT boos ~~“ Review Staff Number: Date: : Classification : DOCUMENT ASSESSED Number : Date: Classification: Subject:. , nel Component Performing Assessment: ; Analysts Name: Date Assessment Completed: Coordination with Other Components: GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE: 4 DETAILS OF DAMAGE: ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED: i i wey OE PREETI = eM 8
VAMAGL ASobLoOSoMLUNYT REPORT erent TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT | Review Statf Number: Date: Classification : DOCUMENT ASSESSED , “Nuinber : Date: 21.5.73 Classification: SECRET Subject: Potential Flap Activities i | Component Performing Assessment: CI Staff Analysts Name: R.B.Holmes Date Assessment Completed: 21.1.77 Coordination with Other Components :None Mbsgrupetonar weteshin dee oe e seetiten GENERAL STATEMENT / SUMMARY OF DAMAGE: In the IG's Memorandum to Mr. Colby of 21 May 1973, the IG identifies those "activities that are or might be illegal or that could cause the Agency embarrassment if they were exposed".- The information contained in the attachment to the IG's memoran- dum was summarized from a longer listing of questionable activi- ties known as the "Jewels Report" or the "693 paces". Although those remarks pertaining to activities involving the ' CI Staff no longer apply to active operations or present: CI Staff officers , public knowledge could be detrimental to the Agency. eM eae Re atin na nen teem 8 DETAILS OF DAMAGE: For specific comments see attached sheet. safle Reet REBRE Oy oe Wd oot nett Meera me tetas + cee ne eae ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED: ie ew ROA AA ALT ANI Ps es atthe heaton wath b olism Actbter eee Rita 8 ANG Ese He ALE eae oN a 3 é
nn eats mm te omens et 4 ecb acto eC omnia ese « Seater A cM usm EaE Atoka wits vet etealeleese tm Aj das co tt ae ont ARE OR ER CN oat te «LEN eter iea n Gi Aa et atin al ° . | Sat nat a 6 ast : SUPPORT Group operated Project (ENDOMORPH.)a]/ Project now termi- nated. <A more detailed”description than-appears here was given in the Village Voice of 16 February 1976. Damage: Although this operation has been terminated, detailed knowledze of CIA's involvement in the training (in the United States) of foreign police services under the auspices of Public Safety, AID, could, even now, be damaging to the Agency's present and future relations with police services of friendly countries to tie point that the U.S. Government misht lose their support in Maintaining a united front against the common enemy. Page 6: Police rorect (Bh - CI Staff's former Police DETAILED PERSONNEL Page 15: John HART - was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury, along with four other Agency employees. Damage: Probably little - HART is now retired as a CIA employee. 8 my . for over[__ years was Director of the Of Safety of AID. Damage: Although is now retired, he re- tired under cover.d3Exposure at this time could cause him considerable embarrassment. NB: In the Village Voice of 16.2.76 appears the state- ment that the Director of OPS (the Agency for Interna- tional Development's Office of Public Safety) k IPS' CIA status. Should it become public that 3 who was the Director of OPS, was in actual fact a A) 2H employee, he could find himself the object of attack.
13-00000 HIGHLY SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES Page 11: Project SIESTA - not a Gi Stale operation. Project PARAGON ; [Theme King) a Latin American revolutionary, and her asso€rates were under surveillance by the Office of Security from May to September 1971 at the request gf CI Staff. Damage King) identified as the objective in an illegal surveillance operation set up by Security in the United States, thus providing. more evidence to the “enemy” that CIA operated in the U. ol Page 13: Project Gonna) not a CI Staff operation. Project SRPOINTER - mail intercept program; became HTLINGUAL under CI Staff. Well documented in overt publica- tions. Project AELADLE - "based on false documentation, the Office of Security obtained passports for Golitsyn, his wife, and daughter by documenting them as U.S. citizens. Damage: CIA use of false documentation to obtain an American passport, a violation of the law. Page 14: Project REDFACE I - does not appear to be a CI Staff operation, although the Staff may have had an interest in the defector. . Damage: Surreptitious entry into an office in Silver Spring, Md., by Agency employees. Another example of illegal activity carried out by the Agency in the United States. Page 16: Project ANTLERS - movement of defector out of a European country and into U.S. without leaving any trace of his true identity. Used false passport of another country. Damage: Although defector not identified the fact he brought into U.S. under false identification a violation of American law. Page 19: Audio-surveillance - not sponsored by the CI Staff, although the Staff may have been aware of it. Page 20: Project MHDOZEN - Technical surveillance of new Soviet Embassy. Although this operation may not be active - the new Soviet Embassy has not yet been built - the fact that CIA and the FBI were cooperating in planning a surveillance operation against the new Embassy, could cause the Soviets to increase their own attacks against the American Embassy in Moscow.
.  -FRANSMIYTAL DOCUMENT ae Review Staff Number: Date: Classification ane . 4 DAMAGE ASDSESOMEN) REVURE DOCUMENT ASSESSED Number <_ Date: ? Classification: SECRET 2. Subject: "List of HSC [sic - CIA} material reviewed at Hqs" | Component Performing Assessment: CI Staff Analysts Name: R.B.Holmes Date Assessment Completed: 21.1.77 Coordination with Other Components: None GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE: This document is a list of. material reviewed by HSC representa- 7 tives at Headqu rters. The only set of: files pertaining to a | | CI operation is (ENDONIORER/ENCAGE)O| The Village | Voice of 16.2.76 i gives a general this operation on page &9, escription of srernbe. atrt omens DETAILS OF DAMAGE: Althoush this operation has heen terminated, detailed knowledge of CIA's involvement in the trainins of foreign police services under the auspices of Public Safety, AID, could, even now, be damaging to the Agency's present and future relations with — police services -of friendly countries to the point that the U.S. Government might lose their support in maintaining a united front against the common enemy. According to the Village Voice (citing the"Pike Report") "AS many ¥ as 5,000 foreign police officers from over 100 countries, many of : whom “have become high officials, unwittingly received training fror og | Q, n of these foreign police officers may have actidn Ghken The MoshtEs” en + me aren tnd be Ha me ete te been damaged when, in 1973, lPs (Internatio- nal Police Services) jas revealed as a CIA front. Presumably the files on Project! :NDOMORPA would contain the identities of those police officialS trained under IPS auspices. NB:. The (ENDOMORP} fttes were reviewed by HSC representatives here in neadquartees. No CIA officer was present to supervise i the situation. The Agency has no idea what notes were taken ‘ by HSC staff menibérs.. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED: None
& i fraNsMUrraL vocummnr °° Review Staft Number: Date: Classification DOCUMENT ASSESSED Number : Date: 22.9.75 Classification: SECRET Subject: OIG Survey of OS, Annex IT SGLATERAL/HGLINGUAL Component Performing ‘Assessment: CI Staff Analysts Name: R. B. Holmes Date Assessment Completed: 21.1..77 i . ct eee ig DAMAGE ADOLOOMUNE KiiUidd i t i Coordination with Other Components: none GENERAL STATEMENT/SUMMARY OF DAMAGE: Project SGLATERAL/HGLINGUAL was a sensitive mail intercept pro- gram which, until 22 December 1974, was highly compartmented within the Asency. The operation was first described in the New York Times of 22.12.74. It was covered by the Rockefeller Commission in its report of June 1975 and-by the Senate Select Committee in volume III of its final report (April 1976), pages 559-677. . me annette ee DETAILS OF DAMAGE: None nba test ental Oe as moO MEGAMI sok ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED: None Fe Cone a eee Saath bal RaReiE Te a Be tee Ett ne a Ey tht treme tse errs eerie tttreteerer een eee ener ATE PEAR ger tw ae ee