(foatos2-o0d| weit 10 Cetobor 196) ME MOBRANDUs FOK THE RECORD SUBJECT: seeting with Dr, MIKO Cardona on 6 Cetober I, De, «LUG arrived about 9:50 a.m, for the meeting we had got at 10:56; again he wae driven by his secretary whem he introduced, As during the {irae meeting, she remained outeide la the car, Our meeting lacted uatii 12:06 noon, , 2. Fivet, Dr, MIRO ‘handed me a note in lengland Heting the toples diceussed with ma on $ Cetobor, These points are a Groups conducting propaganda, ete, with Agency support should receive theiz support aad be coordinated through the Council, b. A pPogaganda camsalgn should be waged by the Coune{) aimed at: (1) Cuba, via a tong wave radio station in Key ¥ ea. {2) Cubans in Milami and other U, 3S. area by: fa) Subsidising Diario de las Amerieas. arena ane ee ae (b) Contracting for time on radio stations. (3) Lativ America, with a plan such as the Operacion ! Grieta,” ¢. Vaderground Activities. {1} Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban peace to send te the seven-odd resiatance afoaps in Cuba through rellable channc ao previously cent through the (ot 4
(2) Commando action ag outlined In plan proseated to me on 6 Cctobor, 3. Commande Plan . Then Dr, 180 handed me a plas {in Engliah) for Clandeatine . action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named ag Colonel A’‘anuel VAKELA Castro, an officer of the Acadomy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel! ({nu) MONTE ACUDO, He otated. that they were of tha BAROUIN group and had boon prisonera, With raapect to the plan for clandestine Operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be Counted apon for commando action, pare of them herve, part in Ceba, Se reiterated that & Commande operation was essential to bolster merale Smong the antl-Castro elements in Cubs aad in exile aa well aa te conduct sabotage that would furthor weaken Cuban economy and tne Communist regime, He said that fer thie operation u. 3, he'p would be Brceseary in providing weapons, arnmo, deraelitiens, equipment, and funds, Sa proposed thar {f this plan waa considered te ' have merit, that I arrange to have someone moet with his military men to work out the detalis. After all preparations had peen mada and materiel provided, ete, the operation would be purely a Cuban alfsig, (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thoinpson at our oe eting at 15:30 on 6 Oetobar for tranemisstion, ) 4, Request for Arma, etc. to send to Escambray Dy. MIRO reroarked that over & month age he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro inguryents in the Eecambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request, He commented wryly, “Task but never hear an answer." He gaid that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRG stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and & meana for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ Ie chief of the Lecambray group, : COMMENT: Has anything boen done about this request? 5. Information on Arma Received by Castro Ra. ime mena terre ede St TO Kagine Dr. MING nanded me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba whon the latter came to the U. 3, at the time of President F RONDIZ]'¢ visit.* He sald the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the inforimatioa but commented, “You will know, "' *Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.
+3! a Or. MAIRG eaid there WSs ne way to detarmine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, ete. received {rom the Soviet blee (and aly and Canada) but even if the (igures were exageeratoed 100 per cent, they would still ba impresaive. - He added that Castro te daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia ef close to 300, UCO being trained to use them while the economy continues to Geteriorate, Perhaps aaly half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he eaid, the longer the delay jn positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the tash. ‘Ye puat Bel goon, vigorously and effectively, fo insure victory. Anothor defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubano, Latina Arnerteans and others believe Ceatro to be invincible, Thea would come accomrnodationa and even worse, the lraplanting of Castro-bached regirses in the heoalophere. And the U.S. would suffer worat of all, being discradited for defeat and “"zadlt of interforence, ' “In the UN no nation would stand beaide the U. 5. 6, Proposal that Counell go to Cuba with Cammandto Group and Eatablish a Government on Cuban Soil oe nna mre ON fF uban Soil Dr. MIRC then declared that he was ¢oavinced that Castro weuld never be overthrown by all the propaganda, tho sabotace, commaads raide, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and doterioratin etonomy, and that it was inconceivable to establish » governume nt-lmexile for nothing would ¢- me of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime wan for the Revelutionary Council to @o to Cuba and estab- lish a goverament on Cuban woll, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military aaslatance of its princinal ally, the U. 5., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces, ‘'This would all have t take place in a matter of 49 hours, otherwise it would fail, recognize that thie is s bold plas, but boldnesa is necessary, There will be many risks, many may be killed, As for myoelf, I don’t care If I die. Ll have fest all my persona! possessiona and my gon is a prisoner. He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there nriat be no vacillation, Svorything must proceed rapidly. Firet, a commaado raid in force to seize a plece of Cuban territory, preferably near Cuantanamo, and imme diately the members of the Council xO ashore, preclain a provisional goverament, broadcast by radio te all nations an Gppeal for recognition {and cables prepared in advance weuld algo be sent out}, request U, 5, Besistance, aod the U. $. should fursish such assistance at once in ados qaate strangth to cnaure victory. i)
ior’ e tatege. | te Before such an actica ta undertaken, the enerey must be softened by propaganda, Sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared te accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Coune ii and ite unifying efforts. - Der, BYRO asked me what 3 thought of this project; 6id J think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I adroitted thag Strong military action appoared necessary. I stated furthor that of course his plan would have to be atudied at the highest government levals. He proposad that ho micht elaborate a plan with his roll iter y collaborators, and | suggested that ho do thin so that it might be examined and considered, Dr. MIRO declared that he was Convinced that this Communtat dagger in the side of the states could only ba eradicated by euch action, that the U.3. is and will be blamed fsr all anti-Caetro Propaganda, Sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for latervention in Cuba, but that Uf the U. £, £08 to the aid of a {rieadly revolutionary regime established ia the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, at] friendly governments will applaud, “f have no personal political ambitions, declared BIRO, “I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission ia to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team ton't €on- sidered effective, than change the pitcher, But I believe the Council must establigh itself on Cuban oull, and seen. Time 43 against as. "The . unta del Este agreement will backfire avainst the U. 8, Lf Castro fe allowed to remain In Cuba. Ina year, after the politicos of the countries rea- ceiving U. 3. aid have gotten their hands on U. 5. gold, they will say, ‘Thanks to Cactrc, we got this.’ And they will Spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and econcmic welfare of the peeple, ” 7, Views about the Judges and Lawyers oan I LOWY CFB I queried Dr, MIRC as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their futare Status. He said he heaped that they could all reunite and that they could se sivon assistance as in the past. He dee clared that Dr, ALABAU wag not qualified to be a justice and that he,wag doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRC and VARGNA, Dr, ~llRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named - LABAUD te the
14-00000 OS teas adie Supreme Court, but that now he considered «LABAUY unfie to hold any judicial position, & Merbers of the Revolutionary Council Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a mecting of the Council en 10 Cetober. I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro- posed to add, Ho named the following as prosently in the Consejo: Rescate 30 de Noviembre MRR Accion Democratica 20 de Mayo AAA Independienta MDC Monteeriati He said he had invited to join: MRP Unidad Revolucionaria and awaited their reply, , He would also like to have ths Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He bee eves Batistiance and Cemunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, bot that all other groups should be brought together under the Council, He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by maombers of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO), 9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba De. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba, He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julie AMOF DO) «ta ordered to retura to Havana fhe had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentino Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MLAC) had received & phone call last night
14-00000 whl iE from a Spaniard (Nicanor FE RNANDE Z) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to goto Buenos Aires to arouse aati-Castro Sentiment of the pesple, inAemuch as seme Argontine action against. Cuba appsared imminent, (FERNANDE Z said he had already written MIRU a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. Ihave the Consojo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, Iam going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting.” - ce 40, MIRO to attend Homage tu LACE RDA Brazitian who Precipitated QUADKCS! rogignation) on October 13 ‘ Dr, MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City latter i} and 12 Cetober SIP meeting) until October 15ih to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Braail, MIRO . probably will stay at the Fark Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of hia location. I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might goto New York City to meet with him; if 60, I would get in touch with him and arrange a moeting time and place through Clark, 23. Propaganda Commission Lasked Dr. MIRO about hie ideas on the future organization and structure of tha Propaganda Cormmission. He etated that it ie oute aide the Conseje and not under his direct control, although the Counei! accountant hag been passing funds to it. He said CAT RILLO had resigned ac head of Propaganda and that he would ke CONTE AGUEROC to handle it. He claimed thet MESTRE had not dona anything with propaganda, 12. MIRO‘'s Views Relative to Su veme Court Juatice or PRIO being Kecounized aa Head af a Provisional Goverume nt we ibg Secognized ag Head of a Provis patel tt dls ak tasked Dr, MIRO if he believed that there were many antl. Castro Cubans (both in and cut of Cuba) who favored PRIG, oF the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soll, Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution ig @ fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former Fegirae. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de- went #
wheal nounced PRIO‘'a activities againat the Council and ite efforte to unify the anti-Castro elemente. He said that the People should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and Peestablishment of erdor in the ieland. 13. Officee of Council (Consejo Revolucions rio} When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO sald, "The business phone is also in my house, Lhave ne office except in my house, but that phone io always busy (JE iforson 23-4680), Se use the other phone (JE(feraon 4-2751) when you wish te call me, * “I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wile crazy. [ want to find something modest ao that no accusation can be made of ostentation « merely a room for myaclf, one for my secretary, and one for mestings. of the Council, ete. The FRD had a place but at that place alse was the press, the refugee center, ete. BR would not be satiofactory, The FRD is aow practically dead. H wae the forerunner of the Consejo aa the ualfying agency of the anti-Castro resistance, "| 34, MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Cther Exile G Foups After Dr, MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funde and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), ete., I said that I undez- stood that sore of theese eloments were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an . Activity Commities might be organised with a delegate from each of these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. Thie would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it, Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up cnother Consejo outside af and parallel to the exieting Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organisations to be able to discuss tho matter effectively. 13. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7. Cctober Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 Cctober, f telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airpert. He appreciated the call and asked if | had seen in the morning paper the action takes yesterday by 4 Yee wee tt
14-00000 ad oat rE tho ALABAU Lewyere' group in proclaiming Julio CARCE RAN fone of the chief justices tm exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He exe pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. Heo added his best wishes to ms and rerninded mo that he would probably go to New York on Ceteber 13th or 12th for the SLP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meetiag. 1 repiied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his srrival to give his location in Now York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seomed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO, He agreed with pleagure that this would be a geod procedure, I wishad him Gedgpeed and he replied likewise te me, 16. Comment During these first two meetings 1 andeaored to establish myself favorably with Dr, MIRO and thereore refrained from bringlag up details of budget or opposition to any of hie specific proposals, I listened, asked various questions, and ho talked at length, in future meotings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, 1 shall be able to discuse with him apecifie iseuss and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be - vequired, es i e