104-10336-10022 : ‘ e . . OS CA L2-23 ~ vey DRAFT aa Boe ; Memorandum ins i inf ee a RELEASE « 3 February 9, 1998 IN THIS DOSURENT . To: Jeremy Gunn . o 4-298 Executive Director cc: Bob Skwirot test bt . CIA Coordinator M | 252-96 From: Michelle Combs Special Assistant for Research and Review ~ Subject: CIA¢IR-23 Watch Reports of the United States Intelligence Board In response to informal request CIA-IR-23, CIA has searched the records of the National Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff (NIPE), including the United States Intelligence Board Watch Reports, action memorandums, meeting minutes, and chronological files, for the period January 1963 to May 1964 for information relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The search produced eight United States Intelligence Board Watch Reports from the period 27 November 1963 - 27 May 1964. I have reviewed these eight documents, consisting of 14 pages, and have marked portions of six reports as assassination records: 27 November 1963, 24 December 1963, 22 January 1964, 22 April 1964, 29 April 1964, and 20 May 1964. Like the President’s Intelligence Checklist and the President’s Daily Brief, these _ documents cover multiple topics. I recommend that the portions of the document not deemed related to the Kennedy assassination be declared NBR and redacted. Once the six marked reports have been included for processing as assassination records, this response is complete. DRAFT
To: Barry From: Michelle Re: Watch Committee Reports Barry, I read through the reports and marked paragraphs relevant to the assassination in six of the eight reports. The Board almost certainly will want these relevant paragraphs . released in full. Given that these six reports constitute only eleven total pages and that the information in them is now consigned to the pages of history, it would be nice to have the entire reports reviewed for release. If this creates a sensitivity or speed-in-processing problem, see the attached draft memo. I don’t know if Jeremy will go for the memo as a full response to CIA-IR-23. If CIA will not release the six reports with reasonabte redactions, would you check with Kathy Dyer to see if my memo is unclassified. Let me know. ,
13-00000 AFNINDC, TSC-796-63 Hq., USAF WATCH REPORT . of the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD No. 692/ | | - 27 November. 1963 Conclusion i [No Communist Bloc count [in immediate future. (TOP SECRET) i: {. Bloc Intemational Developments The Soviet Bloc does not appear to have taken any new initiatives in the past few days, and it has already issued several unofficial but guardedly hopeful comments. Soviet Bloc news media continue to reflect Moscow's concern lest a dangerous contro= versy result from allegations that Cswald's acts were motivated by his Marxist political orientation. (CONFIDENTIAL) The Sino-Soviet dispute continues to be treated with restraint by the USSR, while the Chinese demonstrate n~ signs of moderating their public polemics ogalnst Soviet policies. (CONFIDENTIAL) i. Soviet Bloc Military Developments We have discerned no Soviet or Eastern European Satellite military reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy. A relatively low level of training, con- sidered normal for this season, appears to be continuing. (SECRET) iil. {_ Stitical Areas - {Berlin and Germany: The Soviet note of 21 November on Autobahn pro- me fogether with the Soviet oral statement of 16 November appeared designed te? énd the previous round of incidents but at the same time reasserted a Soviet claim to | determine Autobahn procedures. Since the underlying issue remains unresolved, the | aw Soviet statement could serve as the starting. point for a renewal of harassment. / (SECRET) | - (2. __| Cuba: The concentration of ‘tanks and self-propelled assault guns noted in ‘photography y of 23 and 24 November at the Loma de Tierra and Managua military’ camps near Havana apparently is in “preparation for the 1 January celebration of of the 3 TAD CEPDET
TOP SECRET — ee tl Fifth anniversary of Castro's revolution: Similar preparations were noted last December for this purpose. (SECRET) 3. Sino-Indian Border Conflict; We have noted no significant new develop- ments. (CONFIDENTIAL) 4. Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet Cong activity continues. Al- though confirmed figures on North Vietnamese military infiltration into South Viemam remain considerably below those of last year, newly acquired reports from prisoners are continuing to raise the 1963 totals, and we believe that additional infil trators will be confirmed as further reports are received. (SECRET) A renewed North Vietnamese propagonda campaign for the neutralization _ For the first time in nearly a year, the Communist-sponsored National Front for the Liberation of South Viemam reiterated its support for an international guarantee of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam, in line with the proposal of Cambodian Premier Sihanouk. North Vietnamese insistence on the withdrawal of US forces indicates that Hanoi is not seriously interested in a settlement at this time except on its own terms. The North Vietnamese premier reportedly professes to see signs of war weariness among the American people and says his government intends to keep up the pressure In South Vietnam. (SECRET) 5. Laos: The "cease-fire" between the neutralists and the Pathet Lao in the Plaine des Jarres area has proved ineffective and both sides have continued sporadic artillery firing in the area. Meanwhile, the neutralists have continued their limited offensive in the Vang Vieng-Ban Namone area along Route 13 north of Vientiane with apparent success. Pathet Lao units reportedly moved to the west of Route 13 and possibly are regrouping for o counterattock.. (SECRET) VBR There are few signs that the Communists are prepared to make any signifi- | ant concessions toward an agreement. While they appear to be seeking talks between ' Souvanna and Souphanouvong, they hove flatly rejected the establishment of joint patrols to maintain the cease-fire. Their principal objective apparently is to split the Kong Le forces from collaboration with the FAR. (CONFIDENTIAL) | | é. Cambodia: Peiping's reaction to Sihanouk's accusations of US subversion ments of all-out Chinese support against any US-supported invasion of Cambodia. | Peiping's public statements have dealt only with the contingency of armed attack and | _ have not indicated its attitude toward subversive activity across Cambodia's borders. | | Peiping and Hanoi have made the most of the situation by condemning alleged US \ violations of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and declaring their firm support for Com- of South Vietnam appears to be under way, with Chinese Communist and Soviet support. ond to the suspension of US aid to Cambodia has been basically cautious, despite state- . bodian "independence and J neutrality." ". (CONFIDENTIAL) TAD Creort ae : oo — 7 —— NAL
13-00000 TOP SECRET sete" WATCH REPORT of the . UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD No./696? | 24 December 1963 | Conclusion { F No Commu Communtst ‘Bloc country intends (the im nr mmediate future. (TOP SECRET) | c Bloc International Developments The Soviets, while attempting to assess the new leadership in the US since the assassination of President Kennedy, have avoided ralsing new frictions in Soviet-US relations. They have simultaneously been devoting considerable attention to their domestic.economic problems and to intra~bloc relations. However, we have noted no significant alteration in their major foreign policy goals vis-a-vis the West and we note that Khrushchev has recently reaffirmed Soviet support for “national liberation" movements and has reiterated Soviet "warnings" ogainst a US attack on Cuba. (SECRET) Soviet Bloc Military Developments ee —-——-—A_ further-analysis-of- the- Sovlet-1964-65 plairan and félated information leads — r s to believe that the chemical program will have a limited but significant effect on | defense procurement during the next two years. (SECRET) | eg | | | | Critical Areas | ~ | | 1! Berlin and Germa The possibility continues of incidents arising from 7 ithe large number of West Berliners visiting East Berlin during the holidays. Increased \ numbers of East German security and military units have been noted long the Wall | in| what appears to be precautionary measures. (SECRET) 2. - Cuba: No significant change in the status of Soviet forces In Cuba has [been noted during the past week. (SECRET) | | The Soviet cargo ship Krasnoye a, which a pl ember, reportedly unloaded te oe SECRET)@ ived at Martel around — ae TAD CEPDET
TOP SECRET ANID, Tea sbctt NINDE, TSC-56-64 WATCH REPORT of the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD No. 700_. 22 January 1964 7 —— | Conclusion —~ 7 ' ee ee ee No Cotiinunist Bloc country intends to initiate direct mili ion in the f | limmediate future. (TOP SECRET) a : | Bloc International Developments . | | Sino-Soviet Bloc policy developments are included in the relevant sections Soviet Bloc Military Developments | Bloc ground force activity continues to reflect winter training on a scale generally comparable with that noted last year at this time. The first restriction this year on travel of the Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany has been imposed for the period 19-26 January in an area west of Berlin which includes the Letzlinger Heide-Elbe River North training areas. The restriction is probably intended to screen on East German field exercise, possibly involving elements of both military < districts. L (SECRET) omer Ot : a ‘Critical Areas I: “Berlin and Germany: Ulbricht's latest | proposal for a nuclear-free Germany, 4) spplenenting Khrushchev's end-of-the-year world-wide peace proposal, appears to be | ‘largely a propaganda play to boost East Germany's political status. The East German | | | regime has kept open negotiations on a new pass agreement and the prospect is for pro= tracted and difficult talks. The East Germans have already tried to expand the scope of the talks and, as part of their negotiating position, have posed conditions they know to / | ‘be unacceptable to the West Berlin Senat. The Communists will wont to keep the nego- tiations alive, however, if only to secure tacit Westem acceptance of the principle of | | direct talks between the Senat and East Germans. (SECRET) 1 ws The rotation of a US battalion to ond from Berlin, concluded on 16 January 2. Cuba: There has been no co significont st change ft in the status of Soviet forces in | Cuba. (SECRET) TAP SECRET below. (CONFIDENTIAL) | | |
13-00000 “ tien . ot . woe eee ce eee TOP SECRET Khrushchev on 17 January at Kalinin followed o strong condemnation of the US position in Panama with a pointed reference to the US naval base at Guantanamo as “Cuban soil" that "must belong to Cuba." He again reiterated Soviet support for Castro's “five points," strongly stated Soviet willingness to defend Cuba and emphasized that — President Kennedy's “no-invasion" pledge was binding on the new US administration. While these remarks may have been primarily designed to reassure Castro, these repeated public statements of support tend to make the Soviet commitment to Cuba more binding. (CONFIDENTIAL) (Oe ee i or 3.__--/ Communist China: ~The authoritative Chinese Communist newspaper, People's ~~ ‘~-Daily, has echoed Mao Tse-tung's 12 January call for a global struggle on the broadest { | possible scale against "US imperialist aggression." People's Daily said all forces in the 7 | | | world including the American people but excluding US imperialism and Its lackeys" . | | | should form the united front. Asa further reflection of Communist China's announced | | implacable hostility toward the United States, Peiping is conducting a protest campaign __ | | against US actions in Pancma which now rivals and may exceed in magnitude and intensity _ ,@ similar campaign against the US during the Cubanictisis.. While it is less intense than | | ‘at the time of the American landing in Lebanon in 1958, it appears to be part of a de- | | liberate program to generate widespread anti-US hostility among the Chinese population. | | (CONFIDENTIAL) | | 4. Vietnam: Viet Cong armed attacks continue at a reduced level. The Com- | ‘ munists, however, are sustaining a high level of harassing and terrorist activity aimed | | at sapping the resistance of the rural population and paramilitary forces. The focus of | | 1 Viet Cong activity remains the delta, but we note that the slow but gradual buildup of | Viet Cong numerical and orgonizational strength is also continuing in the Communist | | Milftary Region V, the northemmost region of South Vietnam. The scale of this buildup, | : in contrast to the low level of Viet Cong activity in this area, suggests a future stepup | 4 Hof |. of Viet Cong attacks in the north. (SECRET) At the second Congress of the Communist-sponsored Liberation Front, held in early January, the chairman stated that the civil war had “entered a new and . | brilliant phase," but continued to caution that the struggle would be “protracted. " | | (CONFIDENTIAL) hy i } The military junta continues to be disturbed over talk of a neutralist solution for South Vietnam. Reports of impending French recognition of Communist China have | | apparently also caused a stir in South Vietnamese official circles. (CONFIDENTIAL) ( | | | | | | 5. Laos: Action is continuing In the Na Kay area north of Nhommarath. | ; | | Communist forces appear to have made some further gains west of Kham Keut although | | \ \the situation in the Na Kay plateau area apparently remains generally. unchanged. eT 7 ~ nn TT . 2 - TAD SFRRET
13-00000 Lf ee _ immediate future. (TOP SECRET)" Bloc Intemational Developments | were discussed. (SECRET) | the population. critical, and the government is in a race against time to devise effective counter- | been recently installed and a military security ¢ achieved, popular m morale © oppears to have improved. - . ; AFNINDC, TSC-76-64 Hq., USAF —~™S WATCH REPORT - of the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD No.'701 | oo ; _ _ 2 Sonvary 1964 1964 _ | No Communist Bloc coun Soviet Bloc developments are included in relevant sections below. (CON- FIDENTIAL) . Critical Areas 1. Berlin and Germany: The Soviet shootdown of a USAF 1-39 over East Germany | on 28 January occurred when the US plane became lost during a routine instrument train- ing flight over West Germany. This is the first such shootdown of an Allied aircraft over East Germany since 1953, although there have been numerous inadvertent overflight violations in the interim. The 28 January incident followed a Soviet waming on 25 January that US violations of the alr corridors would “lead to hard, undesirable conse- quences." The incident Indicates at least continued Soviet sensitivity both to border | violations by Westem aircraft and to any appearance of Soviet weakness on the German scene. (SECRET) 2. Cuba: There hes been no significant change in the status of Soviet forces in Cuba during the past week. (SECRET) The 22 January Soviet-Cuban communique reiterated previously stated Soviet commitments to defend Cuba in the event of an Invasion by the United States. Mention of Marshals Malinovskiy and Grechko, as well as Cuban military personnel, among the participants i in the Soviet-Cuban talks makes it a virtual certainty that military matters Vietnam: Viet Cong activity has increased somewhat, notably in the intensity | of armed attacks, but terrorism continues to comprise the bulk of their effort to control The situation in the Mekong delta and certain other areas remains insurgency measures. However, in several provinces where able province chiefs have ASECREN- TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET AFNINDC, TSC-298-64 _ Hq., USAF . WATCH REPORT of the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD No. 713 | a 22 April 1964 _. co cee eee ee ee . ae ee a 2 | I { | Conclusions ~ reas FO ns ee a i No Communist country intends to initiate direct military action in the ‘immediate future against the United States, its overseas forces or. its Allies.” (TOP | Laos: The intemal s situation remains highly unstable. The situation is | favorable for Communist gains, but we have thus far discemed no Communist i- | tary reaction. (TOP SECRET) § ‘Bloc International Developments | The celebration this week of Khrushchev's 70th birthday provided a plat- form for the other Soviet and pro-Soviet East European leaders to declare their support for Khrushchev's policies and program. There appears to be no serious domestic ‘challenge to his position and he has demonstrated a clear intention to continue to carry his full burdens of leadership. Khrushchev's announcement on 20 April of a cut in Soviet production of fissionable materials also suggests that he Intends to continue policies designed to convey a sense of reduced East-West tensions. | (CONFIDENTIAL) | Reports from refugees who arrived in Hong Kong from Sinkiang Province | of China on 12 April provide evidence that the Chinese Communists have a systematic | | program for resettling local inhabitants inland along the entire length of at least the | Sinkiang frontier and have established a 20-mile deep security zone. The refugees! | i \ report of substantial Chinese troop reinforcements to Sinkiang, however, has not been os confi rmed by available evidence. (SECRET) \ eritieat Areas ee ee 1. Cuba: Fidel Castro's 19 April speech on the third anniversary of the Bay of Pigs and President Dorticos' speech the following day appear to mark the Initiation - of a new Cuban diplomatic offensive against the US. The Cuban notes of 21 April indicate that continued US overflights and US occupancy of Guantanamo will be the chief targets of this diplomatic drive. Castro singled out alleged US provocations 7 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET aanna | a at the Guantanamo naval base for special treatment ond tte next day Dorticos con- demned continuing violations of Cuban air space. Castro stated that Cuba refused to sanction or legalize these provocations and overflights and wamed that the limits of patience are being "dangerously violated." Fidel indicated a willingness to utilize the forum of international opinion to publicize these provocations, but at the same time called for increased combat preparedness of his military forces to resist “physical aggressions" against Cuba “cost what it will and come what may." (CON- FIDENTIAL) oe ae on ne — so TO ee ao > —_ 7 ~ 7 —— [ro - ~A Cuban defector who had been assigned toa SAM complex i in Pinar del ol) / Rio Province has reported that an alil-Cuban crew was to be selected in May for an \ actual firing of a surface-to-air missile against a drone target. He stafed that if =| the firing was successful, and the target was destroyed, it would signal the tumover \ a of control to the Cubans and the withdrawal of most of the Soviet SAM personnel . (SECRET) \ 2. Vietmam: The Viet Cong are maintaining heavy pressure on govemment | i! forces in the Delta. Some of the recent attacks have been within 10 miles of Saigon |, and an increasing number of them occurred during daylight hours when the Viet Cong | 1 are most vulnerable. (CONFIDENTIAL) 7 3. Laos: The intemal situation remains highly unstable following the break- | down of the tripartite discussions at the Plaine des Jarres and the ensuing right-wing military coup attempt in Vientiane on 19 April. There is a danger of further precipi- tate action by right-wing elements. (SECRET) | ! | | Thus far, there has been no discemible reaction from the Communists, | other than the expected propaganda, and they probably consider it to their ad- | | vantage to maintain a wait-and-see attitude. If the coalition govemment should | | collapse or be removed, the Communists may move to establish a separate "liberation" | government. There have been a number of reports since last December that the | Pathet Lao and dissident neutralists have made plans, with Chinese Communist and | North Vietnamese backing, for the establishment of such a government in Phong | | | Saly Province should the Souvanna government collapse or become too closely committed to the right-wing faction. We have noted o number of other Communist | moves in recent months which could enable the Communists to exploit a collapse | pe of the coalition government. (SECRET) | / ee ne pene TAP SFERET
TOP SECRET gesygy-neas WATCH REPORT oo of the ee UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD No./714, 4? | Oo 29 April 1964 pee ~ ~ Some ae —_ _~ oe momen eee aa 7 oer ore —_ — —— ween 7 * aw [Conclusions | Oo pO | * No Communist country intends to initiate direct military action Inthe Im- | | mediate future agains overseas forces or its Allies. | | | SECRET) Gea | i Pathet Lao forces have begun to take advantage of th confusi n and further Communist militar action appears Ukely- (TOP SECRET) Bae oo | Laos: The intemal situation remains highly unstable. At the same time, \ i Bloc International Developments | i | The Chinese Communists are unlimbering fora new major anti-Soviet polemic. . | On 27 April the Chinese Communists reprinted the Suslov report, the CPSU resolution | and the 3 April Pravda editorial attacking the Chinese leadership--Peiping's usual | preparation for a heavy counterattack. These anti-Chinese documents were introduced | | by a lengthy ond sarcastic editorial note which promised further Chinese refutation of | Soviet “lies, sophistry and abuse" and taunted the USSR over its inability to supply | | either a rebuff or a joint condemnation of China. We have noted that the Rumanian | Party Central Committee has demonstrated a remarkable degree of independence in a | resolution published in Scinteia on 26 April proposing again a cessation of Sino= | Soviet polemics and further efforts at a negotiated solution. (CONFIDENTIAL) . | ! Soviet Bloc Milltary Developments 1 | | In East Germany, Soviet military activity appears concentrated on prépara= \tlons for the annual demonstrations and displays held during May In the Letzlinger | Heide training area, which may be longer in duration this year than usual. (SECRET) | | —____} : A marked drop in tralning activity by Soviet Bloc military forces fs specie’ _ LO “over- ‘the: forthcoming May Day holidays. (SECRET) Critical Areas wamings that the USSR will “side with Cuba" if the latter Is subject to an extemal TOP SECRET a 1. Cuba: A 22 April Izvestiya "Observer" article has reiterated previous Soviet 7
13-00000 TOP SECRET / . 29 April 1964 attack, but avoided any commitment to specific Soviet countermeasures in such an event. The article also asserted that Cuba has the “inalienable right" to take the "necessary measures to put an end to the intrusion of foreign warplones into its airspace." The article may herald a propaganda and diplomatic campaign intended to arouse inter- national alarm over the US overflights. The Soviets and Cubans may hope that agitation of the issue would in itself induce the US to eventually curtail or terminate these ° Hights. (SECRET) 2. | - Vietnam: The Viet st Cong are increasing ‘their ¢ pressure agoinst government .\ (ae in a the De Delta area and in the region around Saigon. The pattern of attacks and of [ sabotage actions against lines of communications suggests a Communist effort to isolate | | district and provincial centers. (SECRET) f | Our cumulative evidence suggests that the Communists are working steadily i | to improve their capabilities for expanded and sustained military operations. Recently | | | available information indicates expansion in recent months of some facilities associated | with infiltration routes through Laos--specifically a staging area in North Vietnam on \ | Route 12 near the Loos border, and another staging area at Ben Thay on Route 9 in | | southern Laos. (SECRET) | | 3. Laos: The intemal crisis remains unresolved. (CONFIDENTIAL) | | Communist attacks against FAR and neutralist positions in easter Xieng - Khovang Province have increased sharply since 26 April, although Kong Le's main | positions in the Plaine des Jarres area do not seem immediately threatened. Prior to ‘ the coup, there had been indications that the Communists were improving their ' _ capabilities for attacks in Xieng Khouang Province. A buildup of Communist strength | | has been under way in the Tha Thom area southeast of Xieng Khouang town for several | | weeks and Communist attacks in this area are also possible at any time. In addition, | the Communists have succeeded in reopening Route 7 from North Vietnam, and heavy ° 7 _ convoy movement over this road was reported in early and mid-April. (SECRET) | in south-central Laos, truck convoys have been reported over routes leading | | toward Tchepone and Muong Phine. (SECRET) | | | | Within the past several weeks, there have been a number of unconfirmed Jo. | | feports suggesting an increased Chinese Communist military presence in Laos. Some \\ || Chinese Communist military personnel are reported to have arrived in Nam Tha and | _ Phong Saly Provinces during February and March. We now have unconfirmed reports | \ \ of the presence of Chinese military personnel in Xieng Khouang Province. We are unable, | \) on the basis of present information, to determine the numbers or mission off these personnel . (SECRE ee - ee en: \_ GECRED ——— sl ee a TOE —_ 2 TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET szmnoe c.so-u Hq., USAF WATCH REPORT of the "UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD No./717) 20 May 1964 pee _ oe ee | Senctusions | No Communist country Intends to Initiate direct milltary action in the Im- , | | mediate future against the States, its forces or its Allies. (TOP ‘southeastern Xieng Khouang Province will place them in control of almost all of Laos lexcept for the Mekong Valley. We believe that current Communist operations will stop short of attacks against major positions In the Mekong Valley. We believe, how- ‘ever, the Communists can bring to bear the necessary forces to accomplish their objectives involving ultimate control of Laos at times generally of thelr own choosing. In our judgment, the primary limiting factor Is their desire to avoid escalation by stimulating US counteractions. The Communists can be expected to proceed ata cal- e within this frame of reference with their program. (TOP SECRET) | | | | Laos: The Communist capture of the Plaine des Jarres and other positions i in | \ “Bloc Intemational | Developmen nts The Soviet Union has focused specific attention during the past week on Its support of “national liberation" struggles. In Egypt, Khrushchev has repeated standard Soviet statements of support for revolutionary movements In colonial areas. The Soviet Ambassador in Honol at a press conference there restated the Soviet pledge of support . . for North Vietnam's aims in South Vietnam. Simulteneously, Soviet propoganda media have carried a number of statements on Cuba, condemning alleged US backing of Cuban exiles, linking the U-2 overflights to these exiles, and reminding the West of the still vogue Soviet defense ¢ commitment to Cube. (CONFIDENTIAL) ce ~~ —— Fon. -—~ The Rumanian regime- reportedly hos been conducting an ‘unprecedented Ay | anti- -Russion campaign among the populace within the past week. The campaign may. presage new steps by Bucharest to demonstrate Rumanian independence and will further | | complicate Soviet relations with other Communist countries. The compalgn will arouse "I popular hope for liberalization, although the regime has given little indication ¢ of yt | abandoning | its hardline- internal. | policies. (CONFIDENTIAL) - ene ~ 4 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET ina | i ‘Soviet Bloc Militory | Developments a ce A f i \ Soviet air operations during the past week Included reconnaissance flights | || against the USS Shangri-La in the North Atlantic on 15 May by four TU-95/BEARs Vi || and against the USS Midway in the North Pacific on 17 May by six BISONs. In both || instances fighters from the US aircraft carriers intercepted and escorted the Soviet | heavy bombers while they were in the area. This represents a resumption of recon- naissance flights after several months' lapse. (SECRET) | Activity in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany, hos been at a low level | since the May Day holidays. it now appears that the annual demonstrations in the | letzlinger Heide area, normally conducted during May, were concluded on 28 April z and were more limited in scope than In previous years. We have as yet no indications | as to the reasons for this is change. ASECRET) | ae | Critical Areas” i. Cuba: | | The-recent ‘delivery. ‘of from-10 to > 20 ‘additional missile. canisters ‘and, “associated components to one SAM site in each of the three air defense sectors, as well " [o to the Siguanea site on the Isle of Pines, indicates that on-site support areas are being established in selected defense areas. We cannot exclude the possibility that \ f | \ Le some of these sites may also have been chosen for live practice fi firings during the comin weeks. (SECRET) _ ee —— a wn ee ae R yearn Both Soviet ond Cuban propaganda is now linking the US high-al ttude reconnaissance program to the exile raids by stating that the former provide detailed information on Cuban military Installations which is used in planning and executing raids on Cuba. (CONFIDENTIAL) 2: — Vietnam: -Vier Cong: activities-ore e-Increasing © again in ‘number and severity Lo “after ¢ a gradual thre three-week decline, with an emphasis on armed attacks In the Delta and the area around Saigon. In the north along the low coastal plain, Viet Cong actions : ° continue to consist principally of harassments and terrorism directed against the populace: | in the New Rural Life Hamlets. The coastal railroad continues to be a spectal target _ for Viet Cong sabotage. (SECRET) | \ We have noted several recent low-level reports indicating a possible buildup | of Viet Cong forces in Tay Ninh Province, northwest of Saigon. Cambodian acquiesence | in Viet Cong activity in Sray Rieng opposite the critical Tay Ninh area will further = / / facilitate Communist operations there. (SECRET) if io | Note is also taken that the sizeable concentration of Viet Cong forces in | | | Military Region V hos experienced relatively limited military commitment to date ._ | \ (SECRET) - we ee — TOP SECRET
AFNINOC, TSC-394-64 WATCH REPORT | ARTE ofthe RWAL Use Okiy | UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 30ARD | oy , No71B/ . | 27 May 1964 ee TT _ ~ . TSS te id ~ a ee ese 8 oo A, q cee eee een tee ee ; ’ \Concluston / | No Communist country Intends to Initiate direct military action In the Immediate future against the United States, its overseas forces or its Allies. Bloc International Developments The USSR's general behavior on the international scene appears aimed at avoiding a direct confrontation with the US over current crises. Khrushchev's | recent remarks on the issue of US overflights of Cuba are belligerent, and the Soviets have documented for the record a justification for a U-2 shootdown, but at present this appears designed as pressure to deter the US from overflights. (SECRET) | sovte Bloc Military Developments _ | | The tempo of tratning within Bloc ground force elements in Eastern . ‘Europe is beginning to rise. Large-scale movements to the field for fleld training exercises are now anticipated with the level of training increasing as the summer training cycle gets under way. (SECRET) . Critical Areas ‘, Vietnam: There has been no discernible change in the pattern of Viet Cong military activities. A few small-scale attacks have been reported recently, but terrorism and road sabotage continue to predominate. (SECRET) Recent cerial photography of truck concentrations and traffic along Route 12 in North Vietnam toward south-central Laos suggests some increase in the 2. Laos: Continuing Communist pressure will probably be directed against nevtralist forces north of the Plaine des Jarres and d oppears | to indicate an attempt FAD CLPDET
13-00000 “TOP. SECRET 27 May 1954 f (te ‘eliminate # the Kong Le troops from Route Tand open ‘the route westward. South of the Plaine des Jarres, the Pathet Lao also are continuing attacks against Meo ' guerrilla bases In an attempt to eliminate the major remaining source of opposition to Communist control of Xieng Khouang Province. (SECRET) | | - There are reports of Communist movements in southern Laos which could |. Indicate preparations for action in the Attopeu and Saravane areas. (SECRET) Vi The Communist nations have laid the propaganda groundwork for a _ | withdrawal of recognition from the Souvanna government by their repeated statements that the coalition government Is disintegrating, and Souphanouvong has reportedly threatened that the Communist nations may break relations with |. Vientiane. (CONFIDENTIAL) | : The French call for the reconvening of the Geneva conference on _; Laos, which was promptly endorsed by Moscow, has been followed by a proposal from Pelping that the conference be held in Cambodia in June. None of the _ proposals have acknowledged Souvanna's conditions for a conference or included . : provistons for a cease-fire. All proposals, however, have been made in such o ' | context as to leave room for consideration of all Indochina as well as Laos. The ) | | (CONFIDENTIAL) ee L ger 8" BE ee cy Thh ecranrr North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attitudes toward a conference are not yet known.
13-00000 | | (TOP SECRET) TOP SECRET WATCH REPORT more AFNINDOC, TSC-394-64 Hq., USAF UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD 27 May 1964 ‘Conclusion No Communist country intends to Initiate direct military action in the ‘Immediate future against the United States, its overseas forces or its Allies. Bloc International Developments The USSR's general behavior on the international scene appears aimed at avoiding a direct confrontation with the US over current crises. Khrushchev's ‘recent remarks on the issue of US overflights of Cuba are belligerent, and the - Soviets have documented for the record a justification for a U-2 shootdown, but at present this appears designed as pressure to deter the US from overflights. (SECRET) | Soviet Bloc Military Developments The tempo of training within Bloc ground force elements in Eostern | Europe is beginning to rise. Large-scale movements to the field for field training | exercises are now anticipated with the level of training increasing as the summer ' training cycle gets under way. (SECRET) Critical Areas | ee | | \ 1 \ t ‘, Vietnam: There has been no discernible change in the pattern of Viet Cong military activities. A few small-scale attacks have been reported recently, but terrorism and road sabotage continue to predominate. (SECRET) Recent aerial photography of truck concentrations and traffic along Route 12 in North Vietnam toward south-central Laos suggests some increase in the 2. Laos: Continuing Communist pressure will probably be directed against ‘neutrallst forces north of the Plaine des Jarres and appears.to indicate an attempt — TAN CEADCT
13-00000 (2 2 March 1998 _ MEMORANDUM FOR: | | | FROM: J. Barry Harrelson Senior Reviewer, HRP SUBJECT: CIA-IR-23, Watch Reports of ‘the U.S. Intelligence Board 1. We have reviewed the Watch reports provided pursuant to referent request. Likewise an ARRB staff member has also reviewed the documents. 2. Attached is the proposed ARRB memorandum concerning what was search and what was found. In addition, the staff member has proposed that those portions of the reports which are not related to the Kennedy assassination be declared NBR and redacted as the reports are processed for release by HRP. Also attached is HRP’ memorandum in response to the request. 3.° Kathy Dyer reviewed the ARRB draft memorandum on 24 February and passed on its content as unclassified. In addition, Kathy agreed to a redaction process with respect to the reports which would leave in the headings of all paragraphs despite the redaction of the whole paragraph. 4. Would you please review both the ARRB and HRP memoranda and concur with same or advise if changes need to be made. In addition, do you have any problem with the plan to leave in all paragraph headings? 5. Thank you for your assistance on this request. ( Mery Loa, ceclbdl bul @w HS Zach; gascd sh. bed Abed ef oS by ex Guo feow tnls f“g sly lef leo Ay zt. te OMA Beefl were, wtered ig, hls pate! che wr hil be nH irl of Lng lave ev 6 Cake ln tt Clana hag | HB 2 MM GL
13-00000 , | ee tg tt jfile 7 ste CIA ‘SPECIAL:‘COLLECTIONS < RELEASE IN FULL 2000 2 March 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: TT. Jeremy Gunn, Esq. ' Executive Director, ARRB FROM: J. Barry Harrelson Senior Reviewer, HRP SUBJECT: CIA~IR-23, Watch Reports of the U.S. Intelligence Board l. This is responsive to subject request. 2. The Agency has made a concerted search of its ~ records for the records requested via CIA-IR-23. The ; results of that search are in the form of a number of Watch Reports for the period 27 November 1963 through 27 May 1964. The reports have been reviewed by a member of the ARRB staff and a number of paragraphs were found which contained information somewhat related to the assassination story. 3. The Agency has agreed to include the reports within the materials being processed for release to the National Archives. Lee 4. Accordingly, it is believed that this request is complete. If you have any questions about our handling of the reports, please advise. ee
MEMORANDUM March 3, 1998 To: Jeremy Gunn Lo, Executive Director rain Ee INF J rm i: 3 BOCs : 1 cc: Bob Skwirot CIA Team Leader From: Michelle Combs Wid lee. a Special Assistant for Research and Review Subject: CIA-IR-23 Watch Reports of the United States Intelligence Board In response to ARRB’s informal request for additional information and records CIA-IR-23, CIA has searched the records of the National Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff (NIPE), including the United States Intelligence Board Watch Reports, action memorandums, meeting minutes, and chronological files for the period January 1963 to May 1964 for information relating to to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The search produced eight United States Intelligence Board Watch Reports from the period 27 November 1963 to 27 May 1964. Ihave reviewed these eight documents consisting of 14 pages and have marked portions of six reports as assassination records: 27 November 1963, 24 December 1963, 22 January 1964, 22 April 1964, 29 April 1964, and 20 May 1964. Like the President's Intelligence Checklist and the President's Daily Brief, these documents cover multiple topics. I recommend that the portions of the document not believed to be relevant to the Kennedy assassination be declared NBR and redacted. . Ge Once the six marked reports have been included for processing as assassination records, - this response is complete. e:\combs\ cia-ir23 File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4
| ‘The search produced eight United ‘Sta -27 November 1963, 24 December 1963, 22 January 1964, 22 April 1964, 29 April 198 _’ documents cover multiple topics. I recommend that the portions of the: documen I DRAFT : CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO Memorandum _ DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION February 9, 1998 IN THIS DOCUMENT To: Jeremy Gunn ° Executive Director CC: Bob Skwirot CIA Coordinator From: Michelle Combs Special Assistant for Research and Review Subject: CIA-IR-23 Watch Reports of the United States Intelligence Board” Tn response to informal request CIA-IR-23, CIA has searched the records of the National. Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff (NIPE), including the United States Intelligence e Board Watch Reports, action memorandums, meeting minutes, and chronological. for the period January 1963 to May 1964 for information relating to the assassinatio President John F. Kennedy. mo period 27 November 1963 - 27 May 1964. I have reviewed these. eight documents; consisting of 14 pages, and have marked portions of six reports as assassination Teco and 20 May 1964. ce oe — = Like the President’s intelligence-C Chicékdist ks the President's +5 Daily: Brief, thes: deemed related to the Kennedy assassination be declared NBR and redacted. Once the six marked reports have been iticluded for processing as assassination n records, this response is complete. a 2 DRAFT
Te CIA LA- 23 Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530 , (202) 724-0088 « Fax: (202) 724-0457 December 18, 1997 a CIA HAS N 0 o2iscr . John Pereira Ce RELEASE OF. CIA INCORNOR Chief oo, _INTHIS DOCUMENT ION Historical Review Group a , Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency _ Washington, D.C. 02505 Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Requests for Additional Information and Records __ _ | Dear John: Iam writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious concern about the status of CIA’s responses to the Review Board’s requests for additional information and records. Although CIA has completed its responses to — " several requests, and.many.others have been answered in part, a significant-number of -:- pe " .. requests have not been answered — — including some that were made more than'two © _ years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and.go without answers. It isnow _ extremely important that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct - - a proper follow-up if n The issues that we can now identify as being of the © _ aprop Pp u necessary. « Ss highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks (**)' and we request that they be answered within the next month. We e request that the remaining requests be answered by April 1, 1998. _ The remainder of this letter i is divided into two 0 parts: first, a listing of the formal requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the’ following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies. ‘As identified more fully below, the issues are: CLA-1 Organizational Material, - CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CIA-IR-03 _ HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude . Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic “take” from Mexico City, CLA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports, CIA-IR-22 “A” Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison. Boaro Meénwsens: John R. Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff > Kermit £. Hall « William Ll. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson
13-00000 ue Mr. John Pereira December 18, 1997 Page 12 “CIA-IR-22 “A” File on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison. ~ In July 1997, the ARRB staff-was ‘shown an“A” file on Clay Shaw which pre-. dated a 201 file. We were also told that an “A” file on Jim Garrison also existed. | The Shaw file was declared to be an assassination record anditwasour understanding that both files were to be sent to HRG for processing. ‘Wehave not yet received confirmation from HRG that the files are in Process a as : assassination records. _.CIA-IR-23 Watch Committee Files... In his memoirs, George Ball reports that upon first hearing of the shots in Dallas. he called DCI John McCone and asked him to activate the Watch Committee. McCone replied that he already had. The Review Board requests f the files of the Watch Committee for the period January 1963-May 1964. CIAIR-24 Defector File. The ARRB staff has-identified documents on Léé Harvey. Oswald’ from: ihe Offices ae of Security’s “Defector File.” It is our understanding that these. documents are ~ - now being processed as assassination records. No further tasking on this 8 subject a is anticipated. +. | CIA-IR-25 Zapruder Film.. The Board has requested any and all | records, not previously lo located i in th ce Sequestered Collection, on any handling by the CIA of the Zapruder film! "In°° °° particular, we are interested in any records of NPIC’s handling of the Zapruder film or copies of the Zapruder film in November and December 1963. Any log: ae 1 books or indexes which would indicate the individuals involved inthe e processing and handling of any assassination films should be inclyded in this | request. CIA-IR-26 Jordan James Pfuntner. The Review Board requested that a complete search for any records onthis . individual be undertaken, including a search of the Interagency Source Register The ARRB staff provided HRG with additional identification dataon this individual. The Review Board seeks a full and accurate formal response to this