14-00000 _ (AMERICAN. EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962). > Comments. (Continuea) - , ee es * admitted that he. had: “painted himself": as. being: “> “gomewhat more active: and important ‘than’ facts :- ./...,/ justified, but said-this- ‘reflected only” oe “"“<"white lies": Which did not affect the otherwise. ‘complete accuracy of his’ story with - respect to 7). the position he occupied at: the time, nor the - “events. which then transpired. 2 . _NOSENKO! Ss: Information~ “1966 “During | the’ “1964 interrogations | NOSENKO had: “been vague as. : to ‘the ; timing and sequence of:events.in the: |STORSBERG e[opet2-o¥ os . tion,: and in 1965: he. refused to.specify dates” ‘for: ‘this or. J any. other ‘operation he ‘described, stating he- could. no ‘longer © oa be sure. when: any particular incident : occurred; Questioned obese about’ he RSTORSBERG ease in- October : 1966; NOSENKO . insisted that hé~had directed the entire: operation from we beginning to end, and that. it was his: most: important case,.° - LAt his interrogator’: Ss ; insistence, he Provided. the. following’ = _ chronology: oy eS ee ee ooh January 1960: <(GrORsbERC arrived in Moscow: “(NOSENKO. by. the: interrogator. y “Barly 1960 or {BREISFREURD was recruited by KOVSHUK. ~mid~ 19602 =. .» NOSENKO, after retracting his‘claim-:.— rn 2 he. recruited: ERPTSFREUNDY said he OG. “ first met(PRE! ISFREUND-|"a week.or so ae. Safter his- “recruitment ‘(which - occurred, according * ‘to most. accounts; in. early. ~2.1960). In October - 1966, however,  NOSENKO_ said that he and [B1 ea . . first met."in the: middle of ~ 1960, . 0. the: summer of 1960". es | Summer 1960: (PRETSFREUND) irst provided | a woman to erences STORSBERG}: cau qq: GRRE TIES STS No. 197124” Top Secret ©. Copy 10 -accepted: the-actual. date . as Supplied. eee
14-00000 - Top Secret (AMERTCAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) | | - 0 Early 1961: Compromising photographs of [STORSBERG| and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow. About May. Rese eReuN] was withdrawn from the 1961: operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced about three, weeks before the approach to [STORSBERG! —_ : Oo. June 1961: Unsuccessful KGB approach to [STORSBERG] in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier in the 1966 interrogations NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a_month or a month and a half 06 betore | stoRsp RG} left Moscow". Told (QL that |STORSBERG| was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in_June 1961, five months Ob before [STORSBERG!'s departure.) | . OL [STORSBERG] reported that the approac was in October 1961. See below.] | AG (STORSBERG|'s Information [StoRsBERG| aid not report the KGB recruitment approach until the NOSENKO lead prompted his being interviewed by the FBI on 14 September 1964. His reasons, he said, were that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and. he feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize his chance for employment with the State Department. He said that he provided no information to the Soviets during ox after the approach in October 1961. With the exception of the timing of the recruitment attempt, [STORSBERG! s OS account of the operation is fairly close to that provided by. NOSENKO, including the roles of | PREISFREUND} and SKVORTSOV, (6 whom he positively identified by their photographs. He was unable to identify photographs of GRIBANOV, KOVSHUK, or. NOSENKO. ; TORSBERG|said that he first became acquainted with -\5 ob BattsrnnonDidn February or March 1960, he was first intimate. with a female procured by| PREISFREUND] "six months or so" O001442 172 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy I5/6R
4.90000 ~ Top Secret : Suse EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1sso-gencary 1962) Tesgey” ca. gunel vafter: arriving in Moscow; and it was “not “until more.than a year later, in September 1961, that he . first met SKVORTSOV,. posing as the Frenchman "Marcel : ae oo was uncertain how'he became acquainted “with: SKVORTSOV, stating variously that I he met him through. ee code- clerk‘|Joseph~ MORON Jbthrough friends~ at the Finnish]Embagsy, ° or that he becamé acquainted with . - SKVORTSOV while he, (STORSBERG)*was serving as bartender in “the America Club. ' During. September 126) ORSBERD was of vintimate with female friends of SRVORTSOV: on two occasions _ in. . SKVORTSOV:' s hotel YOOM. . vo: Pot oo een trene attempt ,(S TORSBERG/ saw . SKVORTSOV ,<(MORONE},Otand “In. the ‘middle ‘of ese on the evening: of the. KGB ant unidentified : female sitting together in: ‘the. America Club. Comment: | ere not have cee flonan with "7 CSRVORTSOV’ in October 1961) ONE|Was trans~ ose ' ferred: to Lisbon . the ‘previous S Aug St.after he. -")... Himself was compromised by the KGB. See p. 198. As far as CIA is aware, (MORONF)-has- never. been D6 " questioned. regarding his “alleged _ association. . with,  SEVORTSOV/HICHAUD, or’ TISTORSBERG! OG . a : rn wee : ase a While(HORONE\was, dancing: with. ‘the “unknown ‘guise! ronsioee, foe was inVited “to visit: SKVORTSOV' Ss hotel ‘for drinks. RSENS “and SKVORTSOV left. the. America ‘Club, ‘and{STORSBERG| was ag again O46 intimate with a. Soviet’ female in SKVORTSOV' s hotel room... ~ It was immediately after leaving SKVORTSOV's room on this ~ night. when (STORSBERG]|was accosted by. the. KGB... gfe “In. a signed. statement: which. he gave | a: ‘representative of oe |e the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations on MM 99. July 196 5(S STORSBERG} gave somewhat different details. “According to this accotnt,: three or four: months after : ogy axxiving in the Soviet Union in. November 1959 (sic), he met” we | iseeer @AeLgrneing friends at the. ¥innishllEmbassy. There-— after (PREISFREUND]_ became a frequent visitér to the: areas EE - Club and a friendship. developed between. the two.’ On four a -- 604443 EE ae a a a TS No. 197124 Op oe a | a ee . Top Secret o a Copy. 10
14-00000 _ Fop Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) 5 p occasions|STORSBERG was intimate with females, in |PREISFREUND} s hotel roomS.(./STORSBERG last saw (PREISFREUND| around the end~ | of September or the beginning of October 1961, when [PREIS~ (96 FREUND \stopped coming to the America Club: At about that time, “he_first met SKVORTSOV through (MORON fat the America _ Club. 0% (MORONE| left Moscow the previous August.] (STORSBERG] O6 was not sure of the exact circumstances of his introduction goto SKVORTSOV nor ‘did he know the latter's relationship with MORONE| After meeting [STORSBERG|'SKVORTSOV frequently -, Visited the America Club and acfively cultivated (STORSBERG's O6 friendship. This soon led’ to an invitation to visit _ SKVORTSOV's apartment, where |STORSBERG| was intimate with a%%§ Soviet female acquaintance of SKVORTSOV. It was after a second visit to the apartment, about a week after the first, that the KGB made its recruitment approach. According to -~ \O this as well as { STORSBERG" s earlier account, the approach occurred in the Middle oF toward the end of October 1961. In connection with an OSI security interview on 5 August 19659 STORSBERG) denied having furnished ‘defense information | / to any "Communist intelligence agency" or having ever agreed - to do so, that he’had been contacted by a member of a foreign intelligence agency since his return to the United States, or that he knew of .anyone. at the American’ Embassy in Moscow. | who, had been contacted by a member of a "Communist intelli-~ . gence agency". He also denied having agreed in any way with an (> (PREISFREUND) to buy diamonds. (ib STORSBERG) s denial with — respect to the diamonds is in’ contradiction both with the specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN's more general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited | by the KGB after being compromised by (PREISFREUND | in illicit speculation.] { OL . ~ VUew.. . ce [ PREISFREUND|'s Information ~ | CIA interviewed {PREISFREUND |in July 1965 onay wala [NOSENKO himself had~ suggested that (PREISFREUND] would ( confirm his story of the (STORSBERG case. }y, While |PREISFREUND]D6 correctly identified photographs of. KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and MS STORSBERG, he maintained initially that he had only a | usiness relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO, that he never had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not even know what the initials "KGB" stood for. | 0001444 ura | | : ; Q TS No. 197124 © u'§ | Top Secret ~ Copy ____—
TopSecret © 9 > a | (RMBRICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) “(prersrReuni} finally admitted; however,. ‘that he. had ‘been an anteived in a KGB operation. against [STORSBERG] and he’ asreed OF cf So “g6 C611, Mthecentire truth". ~His version of the case, while’: * containing: some internal: contradictions}. only” part oNay Db . *) eoincided .with.that’ provided by NOSENKO.  C{PREISFREUND]. )6 oo oe claimed . to be’ hazy. on‘ the date of all: ‘events connected with: Jove, ‘his contacts ° with the KGB. The | dates, however, ‘could be *: “ yeconstructed . from the known dates of otherwise ‘related events oon which he ‘said- occurred about the. time he was recruited or Ne wht met [STORSBERG) or last visited thé’America House, and. Pos so-forth.].-He described: being’ recruited by” KOVSHUK, first” dating the. event as at'the end'of’ 1959 or the beginning .of | _ 1960, and: later as- ‘March-April 1960. . According ginning of 5 a { _ 2EREUND) he .was. "cultivated": neither by: NOSENKO or. by KOVSHUK. “The £1 st: time he met either was. when ‘he was’ confronted and . recruited: by KOVSHUK. undér threat of prosecution for. black~. “market: dealings. ~. -[NOSENKO™- is unaware of that feature. of. 8b PREISFREUND} srecruitment.]. "On" NOSENKO's and KOVSHUK's: “ Instructions ,: about six months ° after f[ PREISFREUND] s° recruit~ 6 co ment, he ‘became » acquainted: with | ‘§ TORS BE RC 3,, and “in: the summer D. . of 1960 on’ one’ occasion he: ‘lured /STORSBE! Glinto. intimacy with OG ~ 'a>female > ‘KGB: -agent (earlier identified by ‘NOSENKO)..in his. hotel room. » He never saw. ci al nor. did. he’ 06 participate. in: vany other Operations: _ Referring . to. ‘the, ight (Grow Bane wae intimate: with ‘the? female KGB agent: in{[(PREISFREUND. 's shotel ‘room, (P ge with 2s ‘bb “said he -slépt:in the hotel corfidor’ while-[STORS: SBERG ] and d the()l- girl: ‘shared his - ‘ped. “ At’ one» point. ‘during - ‘the evening: he. glimpsed: ‘NOSENKO: in the hallway ;° wearing’ a rubber: apron. “He. deduced from this’ that NOSENKO-had beén involved in, o ‘surreptitious photography Of(STORSBERG) and the. 2 GAEL ” NOSENKO- ‘stated: ‘that. photographs’ were | taken of” = ieee) G)and-a girl. in ehatalf poe rome He has. never. ‘said anything to suggest, .- “however, that he ever personally was- involved... pin, photographing’ any, of. the’ compromises ' he: claims to, have. arranged, nor has hevever”™: - |. Jclaimed any. competence ‘in clandestine photo*. » Sraphy coud 75 . sigh) 8. No. 197124 ~~ Top Secret Lo aa Copy - 10 oF - crete ne ct mene ier emt aan Reged ATT
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) 06 | Before his last meeting with CIA; PREISFREUND |mentioned. that he was planning to visit: Lening ad with his family, but that he had learned: from’ business’contacts in Moscow: that Soviet authorities suspected him of ‘complicity in NOSENKO's defection. He was apprehensive and particularly concerned that the KGB might suspect that he had related. his role in the [STORSBERG case’ to American Intelli ence. (6 | During his final”meeting with CIA’on 13 July 1965 PREIS~ O06 PREUND) asked His interviewers for advice as to whether he should or should not travel to the USSR. He was told that -. if the situation was as he described; it could be quite q dangerous for him to return. (PREISFREUND] stated then that{/( he agreed, that he would not go to the USSR after all. - OG > . Comment: {PREISFREUND|did shortly thereafter visit the - Soviet: Union as he planned, and according to \I (rinnish official travel records returned to: \Ol\delsinki\on 24 July 1965. From his apparent ere ' , immunity. to°'KGB pressure, it is concluded that ee 0& (PREISFREUND]is to some degree still. under KGB ee re ‘Control. | j | i } i  GOLTTSYN's Information GOLITSYN, who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate . counterintelligence officer. in Helsinki until his. defection. . { in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on - i several occasions in 1960[a Finn by the name of PREISFREUND] DY (6 ‘whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960. J | {GOLITSYN's passport showéd that-it took place in January — od 1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate's - American Department in Moscow to request the permission of | KOVSHUK to use (PREISFREUND] against Americans in[Finland} (4 l/ od a) ee ., .KKOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation that ye 06 (PREISFREUND] "helped in one recruitment now, and it is . “1'.  °. “weeessary to be careful for about six months so as not to | _ arouse American_suspicions". GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK | i that | PRETSFREUND| had met the target at America Club in e00L446 ve | , t TS No. 197124 Top Secret \5!° Copy
ee (an Ga EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January y. 3962) Moscow. ‘ana had involved him. in speculatory activities. and. “ts lured ‘him’ into’ intimacy. ‘with various female KGB - agents. “8: Recording to KOVSHUK,. the recruitment was accomplished’ ' “1960; at-the end of 1960"; (PREISFREUND| "had helped to. wn ob J) the' circumstances" and had been withdrawn from the operation. -.:. before’ the. actual ,approach, which was made by. KGB: officers. .. The: American ‘target of; (PREISFREUND) from what KOVSHUK relate “to GOLITSYN, was either a code: clérk"or diplomat. (GOLITSYN “later expressed | his personal belief that the individual | probably: was. unmarried. and might” have been . a “military , man" ae ce ae OP bb .. o -. Comment: — te GOLITSYN' S| lead ‘is’ not "co GFORSEERG) but to: Be -gsome other American code clerk against: whom ot (PREISFREUND\ was. used, NOSENKO's claim to have, a ipervised all such’ code clerk’ operations. 1s: refuted. a ; ; . ake: attempted Reeruitment sxe “Summary. and Conclusion - th ‘the: ‘absence of contrary evidence, ‘itis: “judged that - -GOLITSYN's lead refers eee ante The role of oe ae “is* the: key - ‘to: “this: detérmination.: While the time ofthe 7") peration: remains in dispute, - -GOLITSYN's timing is judged to -be.the most plausible .because..of the. circumstances. under .. hich.he acquired his information. ' These circumstances-~ 2 OLITSYN" s-visit to and discussion: with .KOVSHUK in Moscow, “:”. sabout.. thes use of (PREISFREUND|are confirmed -by. ‘NOSENKO and. ob. the, date, January™ 1961; -is~ éstablished by passport’ ‘informa “tion. It. follows: that..the- “operation against (STORSBERG} “thus” Ol “would have. taken | “place” ‘more than six months  prioy to-t e time * “ NOSENKO- and” “GTORSBERG)glainea Such a significant inaccuracy )) “by: .NOSENKO,- out an event which: he said took: place less than.a-: year. before. he described it to CIA. (in June 1962), undermines“ his claim to the role he played in the case and: hence. ‘to his position as Deputy . Chief of, the’ American “Embassy Section. and’ Supervisor. of code: clerk operations. re a GREAT 177 em LOIS Tg No. 197124 - . Top Secret Copy io
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) 06 a Attempted Defection of )KEYSERS | U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class [James KEYSERS) served in Moscow from: December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy Medical Officer/Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force Captain. 06, oY Oe KEYSERS\ was ' the Yeplacement of (Staff ‘Sgt. J.G. BRADLE who ol ad been earlier withdrawn from-Moscow because he was’a ; homosexual. Besides his duties with the Medical Officer, Ur (KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office Of the”Air Attache -A{KEYSERS] was trained also to perform back-up cryptographic duties” under (James | STORSBERG |in thelb military code room, but he was relieved of this duty in April 1961. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, Ob (REYSERS) was removed from Moscow by his American superiors on 16 June 1961. as\case. first spoke © of what turned out to be: the { KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962, but without naming the KGB OP CRexsass] or identifying him as{STORSBERG) s_ replacement. The(6 KGB and Embassy officials almdst simultaneously discovered the American to be a homosexual, he said;-and when the KGB found ‘out that the target was- to withdraw from the Soviet  . . . Union,.a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to the American. ‘NOSENKO himself followed up the letter by cad “ _ personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the oe , airport just before his’ departure. On 24 January 1964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt to recruit(STORSBERG; and then proceeded to repeat his 199? description of the KGB action taken againstfSTORSBERG replacement, whom he identified as[ ZUJUS).06 several age? _ later, NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse and requested an urgent meeting with CIA. At the meeting he announced _, that_he had made a mi stale s that (STORSBERG!s replacement was 06 Donot{ZugUS), but [KEYSERS|>° (KEYSERS jinot (ZUJUSPthe said was the HomoSexual Gode clerk whom ‘he NOSEN © had personally accosted at the airport. Go C1448 178 \aisé TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top Secret. ~<”” (AMBRICAN’ EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) pn ~ NOSENKO's ‘Information oo - a) ee . : . | ge eeharae replacement as military ‘code .clerk,.and the ‘sensed at once" that he was.a homo- °°... - sexual, ‘and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of : everything. else, NOSENKO and - other. KGB ° officers, for... 1. example, .chased)- KEYSERSP@11 ; over Moscow, ‘attempting (without. success) to confront their: target.in compromising circum. “stances. The American {ice ballet”. (Ice: Capades troupe): came. __ : to. Moscow, and {KEYSERS became « involved at America. House with. some of its male homosexual members. .The Embassy Security. Officer learned - of (REYSERS’. activities at about the same ‘ £606, _ ‘NOSENKO™ learned of them through ’a KGB agents né The -KGB would. “have preferred to. attempt ‘to. recruit KEYSER, enue. it learned that he was. to- be: withdrawn | ee the Soviet Union: - ‘The KGB. '. then sent aletter: tol KEYSER} at- his -room'in America’ “House, - | pointing ™ ‘out. the trouble he “was in, :and- offering: him asylum «~ “os in the. UssRJo{KEYSERS laid: not; respond .to the letter. On the « Ooday, of RBSERS) departure; KGB surveillants reported that he. had: le America House for the airport, accompanied by an. - Assistant Army Attache .~...NOSENKO. ‘sped to .the airport and.in. the terminal building: €ound occasion to: eee. the eee 0b. -in the letter, but! ‘KEY SERS) | did not: ‘respond ‘and immediately Ob reported . ‘the “approac A= tO: “Ehe: ‘officer | escorting Aim. valone.: - NOSENKO asked if({KEYSERS had’ thought abou In. ‘the “1965 interrogations. “NOSENKO added : only’ that at. the time. NOSENKO approached|‘KEYSERS]|at- the ° airport, the ae had concluded thatCKEYSERS|: ad: not reported receipt. of. the O&,. an letter inviting him'to defect, because no information to Co , this: effect was-‘obtained: from microphones or. telephone | ‘taps ce in. the. Embassy. a : a ae > Prior: ‘to: chis: departure 4 from ni Moscow (Rey Ses acknowledged _ “to his. superiors | his’ homosexual tendencies and he admitted. _ involvement: ‘in -three ‘homosexual: -incidents;all‘“at America - _ House. He was rebuffed .by a.Marine guard -in‘March 1961,. Pa and he twice- engaged | in homosexual ° acts with members of the. ‘Ice Capades' troupe in May. He denied any public:display of. his homosexuality’. but said he could not be sure that someone -had not entered his room at America House while. she. and. a » homosexual “partner were | asleep. . . : uae “TS No. 197124 — Top § Secret ; Copy 10
74-00000 . _ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) In a debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961,/kevsers] 6 related the events leading to his withdrawal from cOW., On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache 06 (Coronel URBAN, who advised him that he was being transferred rom Moscow the, following day for excessive drinking, and cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer. Comment: NOSENKO's information generally coincides with .,. that reported by KEYSERS} and Embassy officials.Ub b However, before tHe everits NOSENKO described, 0° (KEYSERS! behavior and reputation had already een discussed between Security Officer John ABIDIAN and Army Attache ; [Colonel HOFFMAN), a UG conversation which (HOFFMAN |concludes. was “among those sensitive matters compromised by micro- phones later discovered in the Army Attache | offices. Similarly,(Colonel URBAN/s conversa- ()b b tion. informing KEYSERS\of his impending transfer was concluded to have been monitored by the “game KGB microphones, from which the KGB would have learned, contary to NOSENKO's assertion, Ob that [KEYSERS'}dia report the receipt of the ‘defection letter to his superiors. Ob (KEYSERS] described the Russian who approached him at the airport as heing 40 to 45 years old, about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately 225 _ pounds, and having a dark complexion and light hair. NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is . several inches taller and not. rotund. When (b [KEYSERS| was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he . id not recognize him. . ad According to NOSENKO, the KGB “sensed at ~ Dvonce" that (KEYSERS) was a homosexual. He is unaware of cértain information relating to 06 CREYSERS! homosexual activities, drinking, and difficulties with his superiors, although that information was available through KGB agents in America House and had been widely discussed in Embassy offices in which microphones had been emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected SO 2/2 -CO0L459 180 BK TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top Secret - | 7 7 “(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~: January 1960 “January, 1962) and - Comment: . (Continued). Se “06. ; 06 "with the case could’ egard [KEYSERS) as- GrorsseRgys. ' replacement 0 KEYSERS}arrived in Moscow almost 8 year beforel- “STORSBERG} S departure, . and was 0b assigned to thé Air Attache office. (20IUS); OG b Sionceend" S replacement, arrived in MOsGéw and “phworkea- with [STORSBERG| about three months’ before. STORSBERG\ departed Moscow. (6{ KEYSERS|.stated OSENKO was not the person. who approached him at the airport. NOSENKO, _in asserting that he “was; forgot the name of the. single American ~ “target whom he ever. personally confronted. Fh " Developnental operation n Againae(BuUSTOL Oe, “In February. 1964 NOSENKO reported that. he had: Pe “recruited -and handled (‘Syrian army officer Samih WEISS). the o "main ‘agent" in -a:KGB- levelopmental™ ‘operation against tyes Any Sérgéant Matthew Peter 2UgU 0b(Zusus) arrived in Moscow in Septémber L961 to assume the. Military ‘code clerk duties’ . , of (STORSBERG). and he remained case until January 1963. | .JSNOSENKO did not recall the: Zusus | gase until. he was reminded 06 a of it‘by a reference. tof (Sani WEISS \which was among his. notes, which jhe brought: to £5 Geneva. OU mo, : — 4 ‘NOSERKD! ‘Information go tiers -NOSENKO- fecruited( WEISS): aByrian’ from Damaseus) in 1961. ” : WETS SS was @ Captain or major in the Syrian Army\ w O Was. “Studying at the-Tank Academy. “He visited the- America ‘Club, “and when he idéntified\zusus- by photograph as one of the ne _ persons: he had. met there, hé was ‘told to develop him, not ‘tO pay any attention to anyone else OS HETSS} and {ZUJUS had | 06. é er something -in ‘common in that | ZUJUS\had Been: stationéd in} "\ Lebanon” and the Syrian was “from Damascus}, “only a short: ~ 7 istance. away .b(WEISS \merélys studied an developed (Z2UJUS}.()6 © “durin conversations at the America Club. On one. otcasion, gbenen ZUJUS] agreed that it would be nige to have some [Lebanésé]{ {{ Bae vodka, thé KGB ) arranged - Or some to’be sent from the KGB B Legal . Residency in Beirud, a and [YEISS) presented it to (20703) as a (gitt from _-Fttends «iQ : NH = a OG ler: COLE | “gif ~ | Ce “TS No. 197124 Top: Secret os Copy 10
- Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) a [zuaus} case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the Od "main agent" ae NOSENKO supervised GRYAZNOV's activities with respect to [Z JUS|.0G NOSENKO read the Second ‘Chief Directo- rate file on the Amefican, as well as all reports as they came into the Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for America House), and his Own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan, which Called for thorough development 0b by (WEISS) in order ‘to‘learn everything about him and eventually to introduce an agent to (ZUIUS) through(the Syrian|, 0d Progress was slow because\ ZUJUS) was quiet and réServed and often Stayed alone, even in America House. Although (WEISS) ana (6 Ob ZUJUS became_acquainted, they did not become godd friends. Ho On t days [WEISS\planned ‘to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants, never in safehouses. . This occurred every week or two, dependin on{ WEISS} availabilityOb si zt ss fe } : i when they met ‘the ‘day ‘following( WEIS Omeetings with 2USUS} C)/ 1 CEETSS would report such things aS-wh h'Americans wer YinKing heavily and who at America House was involved with which girls from foreign embassies. Although WEISS |visited Ob .| America House once or twice a month, and drank™there with U° (zusus} he reported little of interest. - The KGB learned “something" about (vats family in the United States, the details of which N SENKO did not recall: he was sure, however, that_there was nothing unusual or of - interest to the KGB about | ZUJUS|' ‘family background. There 06: was no information on(gZugu reGeived from KGB microphones, (, telephone taps or sur eilYance, andthe KGB was unaware of cee #116 any vices G not Know OF ane gent ch (20IUS Jmay have had. (0 aes fi oe NOSENKO did not know of any other K “agents working against 7 ZUJUS. The KGB did not attempt to recruit{ZUJUS) while ii SENKO was in the Embassy Section. If there had been a. recruitment attempt later, after he left the Section, NOSENKO would certainly learned of -it from GRYAZNOV. Doe woe “Because no one else knew him", at the American Depart~ en ment's request NOSENKO continued to manage | EISS\' contact ()& AE bb with(2ugus\ after NOSENKO transferred to the~Seventh Depart-. eee ment in Jahuary 1962. In March or April-1962 it was pianned Obthat WEISS\ would invite(zugus\to a restaurant where he pj would be introduced to "a frfena", but the meeting had not CU0L452 182 | bik TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
: Top Secret ; (AMERICAN. EMBASSY “SECTION = January 1960-danuary 1862) » materialized’ before NOSENK turned [HETSS} over. to: ‘GRYAZNOV ‘sand’. left for: Geneva.: When {WEISS #eturné tofSyria] in Apriilf .1962,. he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate: his file. was, sent. to Second ‘Chief Directorate’ archives ; bE (Buses sansormation 4 ‘During. sydutine’ debriefing: by U.S. Arniy authorities’ ain bik (ZUJUS ‘\confirmed an'Embassy - Security Office report ‘that “in the summer of “1962(ZUJUS}had been intimate with an (JG. °. Austrian woman, "Lillian" (last name ‘unknown) , .who ‘had <wisited America “House ‘with someone from the- United. “Arab | .~ Republic and had: returned alone_a few: days ‘later, = when she ..-was picked up by (Z2UIU5}. JG Since [ZUJUS}was a. ‘cryptographer, 06 ° the-America House manager interViewed "Lillian" and learned . “= ‘that she-claimed to’ be. from: ‘Vienna €@nd to be travelling with cher. employer, a Czech.: “When the. Embassy - Security Officer. ‘learned from.the’ ‘Austrian “Embassy that no Austrian passport - had» been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport. ° * She replied that: ‘she had: forgotten: it and then left, -saying - “-shé was ‘going..to her’ hotel. for. ‘the . passports _ She, never - = meturned to America: House. . +, “NOSENKO described ‘this incident, ‘but in ‘connection. with: KGB’ attempts. to ot cepn pb. <MORONE]in’:1960;, ‘not[zuguS|in 1962.)b (See p. 194) “... (NOSENKO. was: not ‘in the Embassy Section:in 1962... “Interrogation of NOSENKO. never resolved how he . . “knew | OF. ‘this dneident.. © re . an Ab” ‘Interviewed’ by. a CTA. répresentative | ‘in. November. ‘1965, - OCausus| sala. that as: manager of the America Club he had oe - frequent dealings. with Ella. UMANETS 06(Z0IUS\ often used her — - an an. interpreter.in his dealings with ther Soviet employees. lief América House and was able ‘to. provide considerable. back— boo vs Ground information ° about her... 183 SO oe - 1s, No. 197124. Top Secret 22) Copy 10_
14-00000 cnn oh {i : age of 4 Z if ee ae Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: NOSENKO has in other contexts identified UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in America House. He never related her to ZUJUS| Ob - 0 | In that same interview with CIA[ zUgUS\described having : met in Moscow a Beira from Damascug,,who had been. in Beirug,| 0 cy or a person from[Beirut\"who Had been’ in Damascud,/vhe could not. recall which. (\ZUIJUS \met him while acting aS doorman at America House, but they conversed only for about 15 minutes Hbana 4UJUS could not recall what they had talked about. He “may ve seen the man on several other occasions, but he did not know his name nor why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description }b ZUJUS \did not recall that \l this person gave him|Leébanesé\ vodka, but he acknowledged he favored the beverage. (ZususYeontirmed to CIA that his father, [Matas|, is secretary of the({Lithuanian Roman Catholic 79 Alliance Gf erica], an emigre _organization concerned with the liberation of |Lithuaniallly @ugJUS\indicated that his father often travels abroad in comnection with his emigre activities. Comment :. Emigre organizations, including the (Lithuanian} have been traditional KGB targets and most have. been penetrated by KGB agents. The fact of the elder (ZUJUS),emigre activities is almost 1 certainly to have been known to the KGB, -making. Qb{Zusus\a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite separate from his cryptographic duties. From NOSENKO's unfamilarity with f2ususy pl father's activities?(ZUJUS}. intimacy-with KGB agent "Lillian" and rélationship with KGB agent UMANETS, it is. concluded that NOSENKO's role in the case, if any, was limited to his rela- OStionship with (YEISS) and that NOSENKO exercised no supervisory “function in the development of (Zusus). Ol, 184 pike G001454 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —____
Top Secret, ““" (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January: 1962) 9 me operations Against § ‘State Department Code Clerks. _ KGB. operations: against. code clerks,” for. which NOSENKO. claimed. supervisory responsibility, included ‘those - directed * against | State Department. cryptographic: personnel .as well’ as.- om military cryptographers atthe. Embassy: 9 In several’ such. Cases, NOSENKO" Ss. claimed. ‘subordinate,’ ROSOBAPOV:. pEigures © Development ‘off Baal SE Ene) 0b — fa “NOSENKO first mentioned he BERNER cane | ‘in a: 1964". - nterview with the FBI,. ‘when he wa asked whether - he. had, a “ever -heard.'of “a case- within, recent..years:in which KOSOLAPOV. had. travelled to.Helsinki: tovintercept. and establish contact - with: an American code Glerk. *.*NOSENKO "immediately | recalled" such an Sincident - which: ‘happened ‘in’ 1960-1961. °. He. explained” “that. because: Embassy ‘code clerks were not. sufficiently. vaccessible : to’ the KGB after they - ‘arrived: cin. Moscow ,., ic was” sdecided | to” ‘send, ‘KOSOLAPOV ‘Eo Helsinki. as. part’ of- an effort. : According: ‘to NOSENKO, -KOSOLAPOV made ‘but: one ‘trip to’ ‘Helsinki - in. this new effort, and it was not ‘tried. again by. others. oo NOSENKO. identified. KOSOLAPOV': Se ‘target |. in. “this. operation vas: al : : NOSEAKO's ‘Inf 9 DERI 0 Lope DLE PRES A month before GENNES)!Suarrival in | Moscow. the. ‘Embassy a ee ‘Section received a copy ‘of (JENNER Ss vanketa (visa STE ack listing thisé diplomatic™, title as: fecretary. Archivist. and: indicating: when: he: ‘Was. to enter ‘the. Soviet: Union. from - en Finland. by. train: "at. the: beginning: of: 1960, -in ‘the middle. of” ethe’ month" Believing. him-to be a code clerk’ {he was ~ . subsequently found ‘to béefa” ‘pouch “E1leER): ‘the group" ‘decided. to. Oo: send: KOSOLAPOV: to Helsinki with the, fission of accompan ing JENNER) onthe train to! Moscow to. eects GaanegT behavior .{) cee ot JENNER! land KOSOLAPOV, were about: thé same"ages KOSOLAPOV was . tobe accompanied by “a: female. agent. .O£*GRYAZNOV's,- “SOLISTKA", coe a> Russian ballerina, who was to board: the ‘train > after. it. : "_ Lasntered, the. USSR: at. Vyborg. os . oS les” Hep Be EE a ee? No. 197124. * Top Secret Copy. 10 es
14-00000 _ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approvai of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were assigned to Moscow usually only for one year ithus limiting their accessibility to the KGB for development] and that it was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even before they arrived in Moscow. When the Chairman's approval was granted, NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel Office. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that he was coming for two or three days. NOSENKO didn't sign the cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signa- ture and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European) Department of the First Chief Directorate for release. There was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow. NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and "maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before KOSOLAPOV left. KOSOLAPOV had JENNER!" s photograph and nish name, and expected that the HelSinki residency could obtain a ticket for KOSOLAPOV. on(JENNER!'s train.c& NOSENKO did not recall precisely when KOSO APOV left Moscow or under what name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and he travelled both ways by train. ‘NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) of. his trip, and the: report of the female agent, "SOLISTKA". | |. According to. those reports, KOSOLAPOV became acquainted on © the train with JSENNER| as planned, ‘as did "SQLISTKA", whom _. GRYAZNOV- took to Vyborg and placed in (JENNER! s car. 06 O\"SOLISTKA" gave (JENNER|her Moscow telephone number. While "in Helsinki KOSOLAPOV had spoken with the Rezident and Deputy Rezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, and about using Helsinki agents against American code clerks en route to Moscow. . Nothing -came of the discussion, however; although the Rezident and Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy Section later learned the Residency had "more important questions". — GU0L456 TS No. 197124 Top Secret : Copy
-. Top Secret a GHERTCAN BASSE ‘SeomteN * Sannaty ASeerTenany 1962), Pe Although the KGB later ‘discovered that JENNER) was not a “Wo Clerk but a pouch clerk); he remained 4 target for — evelopment. «“Sincé he did Hot telephone "SOLISTKA" after “one or two- months, the KGB arranged for“her to. encounter | - him at® the- ‘railroad station or airport when he went. ‘alone to | “meet the ‘couriers -OWENNER! saw her but did not approach her, (Gann away.:. .The KGB took no- ee ener ‘steps to cultivate’ > (JENNER The KGB “had. nothing on: ENNER\at all except aQb =Suspicion: he | may have been a homo rexua but there, was no Proof". vs ae ; On. 36° “October 1966 NOSENKO| confirmed the identification “of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as that of “Vadim | Viktorovich. KOSOLAPOV,- {born in Perm, 19. February 1928] — his former. ‘subordinate of the: Embassy. Section The ‘photo- --graph shown -NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich |. KOLOSSOV ; ‘employee’ of ‘Vneshtorg,- born 19 March 1927, in Perm; ic Who arrived in Finland by train from the:USSR‘on 31 March ob [the ‘day (JENNER) left] and departed on 2 April:.’. NOSENKO. acknowledged that that data accurately ‘reflected KOSOLAPOV's- 3 ias, cover, and itinerary during his. trip. to. Helsinki. to- accompany (JENNER}back, ‘to Moscow in 1960. On: 26. October ‘1966. NOSENKO was confronted’ with the ‘Finnish’. train: ‘manifest. “Showing ciara _JENNER] was the single O§ © ‘ SE de} ing i or Moscow’on 31° March 1960 ° ‘and-that. ‘KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV: travelled. on..2. April.-:on“a: train” -carrying no Americans.” Repeating the substance - ofthe KGB “Operation and citing his recollection from. reading. KOSOLAPOV's “report.of the ‘trip, NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV..travelled _. n the-same-. train: with (JENNER? and. that the Finnish manifests ust. be in” error. [See accompany ing exhibits. 1. re (Gamiek} sx Information | * my) ann After arriving: in Moscow: on iL april 1960 (Fennen) reported that he. ‘was’ ‘approached: con. the. train: from: Helsinki “by two Young | Russians ,. “"a boy -and a girl, probably- university — Students"... The: two. -Russians’ struck ‘up a conversation | ‘and © = ‘were soon baiting him on the question . Of racial discrimination: in the United States. They'‘said that they might see GENNER' oy") .in Moscow. About threé months later, on: 29 June , (GENNERS 06 a was ‘performing his” normal duty of escorting Embassy .c¢ couriers Se 0004457 187 Se TS No. 197124 Top Secret _ piRRy | Copy 10
14-00000 i i i i . Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) to Sheremetevo Airport when he was ‘again approached by the Russian girl, “Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside’ to talk. "Yuliya" explained that she was waiting to say agodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk (JENNER! had seen the Irkutsk flight 06 depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER| that her male OH6 companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in’ Vyborg. |Interspersed with "“Yuliya's" —Qbquestions concerning [JENNERY s impressions and personal activities in Moscow were Others about how often he came to fF the airport and ‘how he: liked: his job at the Embassy. When ) JENNER) said he must’ leave; she gave him her. telephone numbex in Moscow and‘insisted that he call her. She advised GENNER] Db that "it would be better if you did not mention our conver- ' gation to anyone". | ) Comment: As far-as CIA is aware , |JENNER has never been _ asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph. pb Besides information, about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, (JENNERJalso told 0-5. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by. his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid. Comment: Although NOSENKO has not identified either of these women as KGB agents, he has said in another context that all maids of American-code clerks were KGB agents or informants, xe | BR GUUL45& . 188 < TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
° a, Top Secret | Se BXHIBIT 1 - = “Complete, ‘Train Manifests, Helsinki- ~Moscow - Luettelo mothustaita, ‘ithe wy 4, na nad la “31 March 1960 VER |single. international | passenger on train. oo Soviet passengers who. may have boarded train in , USSR, -Aneluding at vyborgy would not be included. ) ty .. iettets| mitthostefiste, jute _ Fapédie an Ophir] rates cede nie == ee ee +. s[Rertiaest, Risug. ¥aibeam___. Bpebssde=h.0.04,88| Sensuen | Senskearpuaeven/y . _feonttoriass 20,0824, Rresiean - Bikhotnartosk./P___ [ee Sa., asa, : _ arkadLije 9208.27. Baliitoa_____. EXf@e« Hoste fovea Qeorewateld abtietapezose cilvazstotbs [27.0022 ee — Uvrtainen, mettt o1erd U_VosGhasranten., e089) 9 — : Rosie, Otto Aten | ltosns tease lon,ae.39 |. m|kGkd-Reinikke, antes <¢ | ages eine he Kaxukooki, Unto.satiies, Le WOFseIbe, 3.22010 Sunlia, . fifa = Mocks ___| (ispy.yiio : JGevinen, sexne. “junent_¢2 Es by yarastonde 22.04.84) Rotiela Bamtaan, JvAatn, Aopetioa £7... ita ep Deheint : oOS0L5 | Hela: 4 Paubintartantajet....». — Vabe Yiikonet, “£7 2 April 1960 NOTE: No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV. GUGL459 a a 7 a no No. 197124 OF . - Fop Secret Copy ATM ee cae waste canna ite Se ON feng
_ Fop Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION -— January 1960-January 1962) Information From Other Sources I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the chief of the Helsinki police on ‘af 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American “named(Paul F. JENNER) wilo was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.’ SERGEYEV explained that he had some “business" with/JENNERPObut he aid not specify its nature. Reportedly, this-was Fhe first time that SERGFYEV had made such a request of the police chief. GOLITSVN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence agent from “about 1945 on". ob Deve lopment of [SLNNER}: Summary and Conclusion NOSENKO's version of the (JENNER| case in some degree , resembles less the facts about JEMIER| than KGP activities 0% Alodirected against Gohn GARLAND | (See bélow), activities which _ NOSENKO asserts néVer occurred Jol CARTAN , not (JENNER, 04 by , ,exavelled on the same train as KOSOLAPO , and [GARLAND; not D Yb GENNER,, travelled "in the middle of the month"> The Helsinki esidency's query to the Helsinki police chief about (JENNER) ()t ., ,4ndicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about Ob JENNER}: :not just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki... _, dt was at the airport in Moscow, not on the train, that ()0 ."SOLISTKA" gave (JENNER)her telephone number, an event which would be presumably memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor of all code clerk operations) if only because of his futile Oo wait for! JENNER \to call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the actions OF KGB agents who were employed as maids by(_ JENNER), of From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSFNKO was neithér KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks. GI0L460 189 TS No. 197124 Top Secret ish Copy 10 _
14-00000 : | _ ‘Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Ob | | Development of John ‘ GARLAND ] ; The [GARLAND] case is of particular Significance to judging th validity'.of NOSENKO's claim to complete know- ledge of all KGB operations against American code clerks. NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken with respect to [GARLAND] he vehemently asserts no such action was taken. Db NOSENKO's Information =» NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans '. employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of | interest for various reasons to the KGB. He gave a short i vo L Statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was pi v GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said, “Code clerk, but nothing |. : doing" Later asked to review the list-and supply any Hed , additional information he might have, NOSENKO stated that Obthe KGB was studying [GARLAND] like the other code clerks, to gather enough incriminating material to’ make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not recall any agents working against (GARLAND Chor could he recall whether -he had read the KGB fil& on GARLAND, “but he thought he must have read reports concerning~him aS they came into the | , Embassy Section. There was no Operational plan drawn up Ob for (GARLAND because the KGB developed no derogatory infor- | mation concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned Po or attempted, NOSENKO could recall no background informa~ ' tion concerning (GARLAND), \isuch as his travels and acquain-_ | tances whike stationed’ in Moscow. Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence [see below] | i Of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki to accompany GARLAND| back Oo i to Moscow on 16 November 1960, NOSENKO was inSistent that | . there was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once , to Helsinki in connection with [JENNER] in early 1960, and 04 sb that the KGB had taken no such action with respect to | ) (GARLAND). (NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 until January 1962 and he would have had to know and to approve | \2'88 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret — Copy —___ GOULAGL 190
14-00000 Top Secret oe (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January. 1962) | -in advance any. Operational ° travel performed. by his sub- ordinate outside of the USSR.) .: :. Reminded that he transitted - Amsterdam on a direct £light to Cuba on 15 November 1960. ‘(the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki: with|.GARLAND) , ; 6. NOSENKO stated. that he would “have. learned: of KOSOLAPOV's travel in any” case, whether ox not he was in Moscow. Oh. - Ob Garuand}s S. Information | ; > (Gartann was first interviewed ‘on 17 duly: 1962 by. the : Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the oe “GOLITSYN: lead. [see below]. In this. interview (GARLAND. denied Ob having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description “during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied... yehavin -been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July * 1963-[GARLAND) was. interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he’ .,.. ~Was.given a. polygraph.examination. | The. latter, . according. “ay. to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that " ‘GARLAND was deceptive in his Statements to us denying’ any. ws association with Vadin. Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying. ever. vats _knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence ‘agent",. ~ ee (GARLAND). by his own statement, took the train on 16. November — 1960. .f¥om Helsinki. to Moscow; ‘to. assume the- duties.as | Supervisor Of the Beate Department ‘Code™ “Yoom) in the. Embassy: GoLITsyN! ‘s Information ie eee a ~ “GoLtTsyn,. ‘who was: ‘not: posted ‘to Helsinki until July. 1960, . reported that. "about the end of 1960, about November ox.” > - possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second | Chief bos. ‘Directorate | sent a telegram: to the Helsinki> Legal Residence: _‘advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki dn transit to Moscow. The telegram statéd that the respong= oc .Sible case officer, KOSOLAPOY, would be sent to Helsinki ~ Do alias and under Vneshtorg cover. for the purpose of striking “Up an acquaintanGe to be continued with the American. ain sr i. “. Moscow... The Residency procured. for .KOSOLAPOV a placein --°. ~ 3 the American's. compartment. GOLITSYN himself went to ‘the. ae ‘train to see off" a ‘Soviet delegation returning to Moscow, “.. ", and he talked with KOSOLAPOV.. Later in the summer or fall ... ©£ 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief. Directorate’ offi cer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired i COULAER | BR <)> TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 0
14-00000 Top Secret {AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. From the Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case GOLITSYN concluded that it must have resulted in a success-~- Ful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer would have eb willing to talk to him about it. 4 shown{ GARLAND} s photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962, COLITSYN “Failed to identify it “as being that of the unknown individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki with KOSOLAPOV". Information From Other Sources KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960. The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, andj|John W. pb GARLAND} the only American. [See accompany2ng exhibit. ] As he had with regard to Gennen) (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 11 November 1960 asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) for help in locating (GARLAND) an American who would arrive there on 14 November. ob Development of \GARLAND;: Summary and Conclusion _ Whether or not GARLAND) was aware, and contrary to NOSENKO's assertior,’| GARLAND \clearly was the target of a KGB operation entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki. NOSENKO denies (with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately ‘ reflect) that KOSOLAPOV,,travelled to Helsinki except in connection with| JENNER) and his assertion thus cannot be . ‘smissed as the product of fault recollecfion in which he donfuses the casescof (JENNER| and GARLAND), » _ NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND|case is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, and that he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks. , Moreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO' styb claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy code clerks. 192 | GIOLAES | IG& TS No. 197124 , | Top Secret Copy —_—
f 4-90000 | EXHIBIT 2.- Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow~ Oe wie 2 Rea , . _ Huetielo mathastafiste, jute 2... . » Zumalia, eee wee Fodnsttea en a ae! oe “196. Y |soasmin.,. (adphe |. wstiston___ hisssstto. injetliga |: ...210289, [Giprotouxe_ldiph. . ‘|Houraviova ;Honaa. & Farve,. Ralf. wii taietidea, 2 Laria.. ‘ : gl my Kolos:o7,, Viktor eb .? AgséJanov,. Caxoile # : 8 Akoloine,. Potr.. “. ofnete, Jean Baptiste Gi sends. 3 Joun.  ) Kultink. 2.3.83, Bet. alae V7 Le ltincrd i __ Bs Beukkonen : _G001464 . TS No. 197124 + Copy de
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~- January 1960-January 1962) KGB/Polish UB Operations Against) MORONE | ‘At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female Potisn: UB agent in contact with an unnamed American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further compromise the American. On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls. “He had several such agents, he said, and he sometimes asked the East German and Polish security services to supply him with such agents. As an example, NOSENKO cited the case of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who travelled to Warsaw. The code clerk was intimate with a Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in . .Moscow. — : - In an FBI: interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO referred to the case again, and- when the names of code ~ ; belerk Joseph MORONE | and Embassy Marine guard|Frank BEGGS| D6 were méntioned, he immediately identified them as the men involved. , Ob yo: _ (MoRONE}' s case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and _.-, Specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read 64 the file on | MORONE) and saw his visa photograph, but never saw him in pérson. NOSENKO discussed the [HORONE] case with v KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occaSions. Several. KGB agents were employed against [MORONE) including foreigners as well as Soviet citizens. | er cS q|. a SS NOSENKO's Information j : q| | | 193 « . : | TS No. 197124 a] Top Secret 7/68 Copy 10
yb Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or Waltress at America House reported to DEMKIN, her case officer, everything she saw or heard concerning [MOROND .‘\b KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN”to discuss MORONE,,)band NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one Of thé two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information from IVANOVA on [HORONE|which was -interesting or useful. wa SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, visited America House and met {MORONE], but he reported nothing of value that NOSENKO recalled. ore Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing Specific that CECCHI had reported about (MORQNEL In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two ‘German women who could be used against the residents of -America House.. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented as a West German. NOSENKO never met her but instructed (PREISFREUND) (see the (STORSBERG)'¥ase) to take her to America House and Ieave her of her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may. have reported on{MORONE)N, The second East German ¥ ! “girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never met her _but he recalled that she was asked for her documents at America House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned, (NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.) From one of these agents ,V Yr possibly in some other Manner, the KGB learned that (MORON was planning to go on leave in Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him, KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after 194 ava tA | ‘SUCL 466 TS No. 197124 Top Sécret 0/98 Copy
7” Secret nas (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION. - "vanwary 1960- “January 1962) some editing: by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. “cwith a Polish UB: counterintelligence fe) ‘quarters. to discuss tne: plan. ‘target was an American Embassy = “was a code clerk; this _ fact: was = Botese. ts . “ROSOLAPOV next. met _ fficer in KGB Head-.. _ The Pole was’ told that. the employee, but not tnat he... > deliberately kept. ‘£xom the: e As a ‘resuit. “Of this’ meeting, a Polish | girl was obtained‘ by the Polish UB and sent to ifloscow by’ train. ‘Upon-her \Parrival she was met. by. -KOSOLAPOV,. ‘wio ‘took her. to a Moscow» “hotel, where he- gave ner. instructions: concerning: Her» ‘role - train, flirt with him, .have- hin fall in love With Her, - * continue the association, ‘and . study him... ‘Sne was -to- tell “ Rim that-she had been. in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a “member -of. the Polish ‘Trade. ‘Representation in Moscow, and ae that she. “could meet Aim again. on: her next visit. | - - Arrangements: were made. with . Directorate for a technician to the: compartment next to that - of fi ob Oo{BEGGS), “for audio and: visual. (bu the KGB Operational ‘Technical. be. placed on the train’ in : NOSENKO aia not. ‘recall. wren Gol ana BeOS ree Moscow. The Polish agent. did, _ however; ‘Stcceé in making: HORONET's . Ie acquaintance, and the- technician from. ti torate reported back .to ‘NOSENKO. the day after the. train . reacned- Warsaw: ---The -technician’ ‘told NOSENKO the girl had:. “engaged, in sexual. intercourse: witir HIORONE! “ The. technician. also reported that. the. tap tained were’ (OF Boor quality Oe Comment: _ | -he-was reminded that he was en route. to Cuba '° On. 15 November - 1960 and did. not: return to. cane Moscow- until mid- ~December, and that. State. — gle Bepaztment: récords indicated that [MORONE ana Ob [BEGGS}1eft: Moscow on 13 November and arrived on the following. day... NOSENKO responded ‘that. ‘instead of naving talked to the technician’ «= = Personally, he may. have read the fecanician' s.. vin the operation: .The. girl was told to meet [MORONE]-on the Ob MORONE] and his. companion, Of ~ “not pucrogr ante) coverage... - aes: 7 PS 7 c00L467 he Operational DERE ON At ‘this juncture: ‘in. ‘NOSENKO" 's interrogation ceo tet 4IGRTS.No. 197124 Top Secret. a Copy 10 a
Tep Secret {AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960~January 1962) Comment: (Continued) | report and had seen “the film Strips" after “his return from Cuba, NOSENKO, it will be noted, had said earlier that there was no .  phdétographic coverage of (MORONE}' s train * compartment. og Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought. to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her. visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a 7Specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE] at Americal6 OGuouse, and MORONE/ subsequently visited hervin the hotel room two or thrée times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on (MORONE}, O"He did not - fall in love with the. girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him. . Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficiently incriminating to. attempt to recruit MORONE)..é The KGB wanted to trap him in .the apartment. of a Soviet woman, to catch him-in something that was definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE) out of (¥% America House to somewhere in Moscow, but before anything _ . . further could be. done, the Americans ordered} MORONE out of (JO Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. . There- fore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no attempt to recruit (MORON. Og _ | | NOSENKO has also explaidga (to the FBI) that no attempt was made.to recruit[{MORONE !because Khrushchev instructed -the KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the United States. MAA : TS No. 197124 COCi4ggg ——- Top Secret Copy 196
Top Secret ae a : ; a - (AMERICAN: EMBASSY Some ~ January “ase-qenyery 362) Followitig receipt. of information’ about his compromise, - xeceived’ from a sensitive.Polish source, ‘(MORONE} was first’ ae interviewed about” the’ allegation in May T9611: ~On 19 August. 1961 he was transferred: from’ Moscow. In an October 1962 _ security. interview, |} MORONE) stated that he had travelled wen Ob - ob eheenk steal s\.to Warsaw on Bh November 1960.° On the train © he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment. and asked her. “. 7” what languages she. “spoke, ... Later she entered his compartment, oo Vand when he tried to engage her in sexual- relations, she... : a Slapped his face.. A’ day or. two:after they arrived in Warsaw, .- . the girl-contacted him at:his hotel, and he went. to her ro where they had sexual relations. | According tol MORONE};. neOe | had sexual relations: with: at. .deast.two-other women w he in: D° Yarsaw.: He and|BEGGS}returred to Moscow without incident. .° On 6 February 1961, -@ ter (MORONE. had réturned to dncidene .-°the Polish girl from’ the train” €alled- him at America House, -. and the: following day he visited her in ‘her room at the: ” Peking. Rotel, where they ‘were. ‘again intimate. - On. either. oo «“this-or: an.earlier occasion the girl told him. that. she had “San uncle “in: Moscoude| “MORONE ‘has. denied: "Dein. approached « or. / recruited by Soviet | ntelt: tgences “Information From Other. ‘Sources wo ‘A ‘sensitive Polish. source ‘réported: in. 1961 that on ee 8" November’ 1960 a Polish femalé,-an’: experienced. English= “0 ., Speaking agent of the Polish ‘UB; arrived.in Moscow where She was. met by a-KGB case: officer. named ~ “VOLODYA".. - She stayed at ‘the: Hotel. Warsaw. in. Moscow. -: “The -KGB..case. Officer, apparently -from. the American® ‘Department of the KGB Second. - Chief Directorate, on.10.November 1960. (sic) pointed eee out.to this agent. at a railroad‘ station in .Moscow. : Under. KGB :. instructions,” the Polish.female. met(MORONE. ~and was” “Ob _ intimate. with him: on the train to Warsaw. “In “Yarsaw. on. 12 November 1960°(sic)  shé was quite “friendly with. Nokon) DB but. pursuant | to- instructions, ‘she refused all overturés to a “€ngage in intimacies..: The next.day she took{MORONE] to ae. -. Suitably-prepared Polish’ UB’ safehouse where incriminating ~ photographs. were clandestinely. ‘taken of (i See ro herself. ok ~The female agent again | travelled to. Moscow on | February’ 1961. oe otacg ag No. 197124 (9°, Top Secret Copy 10 |
74-00000 at _ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising OYA photographs were taken of her and [MORONE Jon this trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13_February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and (MORONE]. Bf . ra QoThe Marine guard |BEGGS} has confirmed that the Polish girl and [MoRONE] were intimate on the train to Warsaw, and Obthat (MORONE) had been recontacted by the Polish girl in. Moscow. in February 1961. LMORONE} s fellow code clerks and residents of America House deScribed him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies’ man. Various reports indicate that MORONE] was involved in a currency-speculation ring operated Ly_SARWAT EL SHAZLY, the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, anc MORONE] OG confirmed that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the Ob introdugrion of MORONE] and other code clerks to Soviet. females! {MORONE was intimate with one of them in SARWAT's apartment in the spring of 19619*[MORONE]was also said to | be a close friend of the Embassy cook, And KGB agent Pietro Obceccur, and MORONE}had admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles “illegally from CECCHI. One report states that CECCHI asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to (MORONE in th State Department code room, (a restricted area t6 which ECCHI had no access). A number of reports indicated that [MORONE) had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO. fj {MORONE) denied having been intimate with IVANOVA. He said, however, that he had told his friends that he nad, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well. and that he had once asked IVANOVA. to arrange dates for him arid ariother code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued, The Army code clerk [STORSBERG] has reported that [MORONE | je was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who,. aS “MICHAUD", was involved in the KGB attempt to recruit Gf [STORSBERG, (See p. 173. )O6|STORSBERG] recalled meeting MICIZAUD ‘at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there. In one version of his recruitment (STORSBERG saic that \MORONE| was ob D6 193 061479 : | Top Secret ails Copy —__ Ob TS No. 197124 |
‘Top Secret (AMERICAN. EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-ganuary 1962) "in SKVORTSOV's .company the night .SKVORTSOV lured SToRSBERG] 6 - to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him, (Operation Against /MORONE: ee RT Oe _ » “NOSENKO relates. but ‘one aspect of the({MORONE} case, the. use of ‘the Polish UB. female agent. He is apparently unaware floes information known to KGB-agents (and hence to the KGB),. Summary and Conclusion” .~ js Ob6'such as|MORONE}'s sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends. =~ -) and _at SARWAT EL SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit’ currency oe - ,4Gealings with CECCHI, and his rélationship with UMANETS, 0° .. ONHe errs: in relating to{MORONE) the Ease German female.agent.° .-- 6g Sent. to America House: the’ incident occunmed, but later, °° foe, _.QDwhen (HORONE) was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself... o) -Still in.t e. Embassy Section... (See p. 183.) The KGB did. os 4 not lack’a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit). © °°. , OM{MORONE}Y if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other “.. . “reasons. . KGB inaction. did not ‘relate’ to Khrushchev's concern “for Soviet-United States relations; this was.the period’... ‘between the U-2 incident. (May 1960), and the.Berlin crisis. © (August 1961). rn re . Even with respect. to the Polish. UB agent, there is) °°. ,persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV 3/2.) : “Played the roles. NOSENKO described: _NOSENKO was. travelling: £0 Cuba and KOSOLAPOV was:in Finland: in. connection with the.” (GARLAND) case.) -, It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO,‘iii“this instance, was. not: supervisor’ of all KGB operations against. American code clerks nor would he nécessarily have known of | Tecruitments among Embassy personriel.. |. re ‘Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks _.. .In.connection-with his responsibility for directing’. KGB" operations against American. code clerks in 1960-1961, | _ ROSENKO has. commented on five other State Department code. i _.- Clerks ‘who. served“ in Moscow during. that period.. Their brief.” treatment in this paper: réflects not their unimportance but.” ’. NOSENKO's limited comments and the lack of collateral...) 02° Top Secret Copy 10 |
14-0000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) information. The significance of these cases is the extent to which information provided by NOSENKO accurately reflects - the KGB's knowledge of each target, . | Hauxice ZWANG] \& ol NOSENKO identified zinc Jas a State Department code : clerk who was “actively workéd on" during the 1960-1961 eried, An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced NE ZWANG |\to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incrimi- | nating photographs, but the female did not like ZWANG/and (6 - | refused his sexual advances. In January 1962 (When NOSENKO i ! { claims he left the bassy Section) the KGB was engaged in no activity against(ZWaANG fb The KGB agents had no agents in contact with him,~and had no information indicating [2WaANG|was vulnerable. We etna tance tte ETNA RC att ws retreat menteenpetnis its eocivniet tow ett Comment: In connection with a State Department security interview conducted after ZWANG |returned from Noscow)} GiiaNG)related that in March or April 1961-an Egyptian. introduced him to a Soviet female whom he visited in her apartment on "several occasions but with whom he was not intimate. Although ZWANG \denied it, a poly- 06 graph éxamination indicated that he was intimate with his maid during visits to her partment. _ no. (ZWANGH s maid has been identified as a KGB “agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow have reported that (2WANG\was active in currency Ob Speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI. ; 200 CUCL E72 a TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
- Top Secret | _ (AMERICAN EMBASSY‘ SECTION ~ January 1960-ganuary 1962) _ orn nwoi 7 wo, a NOSENKO: coseetapa la a ‘State. Department code clerk and. the target. of KOSOLAPOV. The “KGB was inter- oo pects in GAYEOR) because | of his intimacy with his: Russian "maid: (a K 3s agent).and- “his: sympathy towards the Soviet. onl Union and its. people". No. attempt ‘was madé to reeruit «De YLOR -because of the lack. of compromising photographs of - ObPRavOR| and the maid, and because the KGB did‘not want to.- : _ Jeoparc ize the more. important (STORSBERS) case, by risking a _ Scandal witht M{PAYEOR Nb oe ~ Ob 7 ei kta bo | oe oy Sense Grane acknowledged that he was intimate. ee “ with. his: maid from about September 1960 until. chis” departure. in early 1961, on: one: occasion. maid ‘had told| TAYLOR) she ‘was pregnant and. © QhftAYLOR offered -hér money for an. abortion. . §e (TAYLOR \left Moscow in February=1961 and the ~ RGB. attempt ‘to recruit STORSBERG| did not ose Ob Suntil June. 1961, according to ‘NOSENKO, ‘Or | (October: 1961, according | to ° GPORSBERS: Db: 1 nooS (Erank ‘bay "Day" 60 eo Se | we  NOSENKO. “aeses seat ae a a ‘State Department code: ‘Clerk. atthe Embassy. who was a target either of KOSOLAPOV:.- or: GRYAZNOV. -The’ KGB. knew. nothing interesting ‘about him ‘such as who his. friends: ‘in Moscow were, or his’ travel in - »0Y outside.of ‘the Soviet Union. °.The KGB: had no derogatory °°: “information about. him and was unaware of. any vulnerabilities. oo he may. have had. No! operational’ méasures were taken against. hin, aa cot, | GOLAN 201 ; os | eo Ts “No. “97124 “Top Secret oo os oo Copy. 1.
14-00000 ane ‘Top Seeret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~- danuary 1960-January 1962) Ob Comment: [Day }was in Moscow from May 1960 until October T961L. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend and formerjovert cra OF OL employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN The two ) wete under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip. On one occasion they found “repairmen"” in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and on another an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment. gob (Robert DWELLY | Reviewing an American Embassy telephone list _in September 1964, NOSENKO said that he “believed” [DWELLY] was (f -. a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period. There was no (lb approach to |DWELLY and he knew no details of the opera- bl tional plan agains (BWELLY|nor the identity of any agent who might have been used against him. (DWELLYT s case officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV. 06. meaaee nncpmrermetnnttatien mentarianen sae aia me Qinn tm senmee9AE NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 perecent sure" that he was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting a public men's room", There was a "big hunt" for [DWELLY] and Db on a number of evenings when [DWELLY was known to be free Ob from work, NOSENKO himself, 'YAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in b vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DHELLY} wou1dO visit downtown Moscow and puipywere obtained: contact with sat neeaam bent tne fay me Tepermabanete note ce ety | Under interrogation in Fébruary 1965, however, . him. No photographs of [DWELLY were obtained: there was no approach and no recruitment. i . _ NOSENKO later added that "perhaps". GRYAZNOV's | homosexual agent "VOLODYA" had: spoken with DNELLY) in a Ub public toilet in a_museum or a park and it was on this basis that he concluded [DWELLY| was a homosexual. 0b Top Secret (GA =. Copy | | TS No. 197124
Top Secret. oad “(@MERICAN | EMBASSY ‘SECTION = "January. 1960-January 1962) Ob. » Gabbe assigned to Moscow asa: code. clerk. rom April-1959 to July, 1960. -In. a: Department — “Of State security interview in March- “1966 - ”. (prompted by NOSENKO's information) ,. che cate-_ i gorically: denied being a homosexual.) He “- "adscribed: two .occasions. in ‘Moscow when, while walking alone,: two men, who by their general a appearance - and actions made him think .they “were “queer", were: trying to attract his. _ ~ attention. He recalled that, on one of the — . two occasions, — one’ asked Aim. the way. to the toilet. “ vg ; oe ae a yb Geen came) « “.NOSENKO- originally ‘identitiea[@arrEvlas’ a a” “military ‘enlisted man. in Moscow. ‘during the 1960-1961 period, and an operational. target: of DEMKIN, In- February 1965, however, | “he identified: him as'a State Départment. code clerk for whom the responsible case. officer. was -KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO © supervised. ‘The KGB ‘attempted to lure: GAFFEY into. downtown ol Moscow. using) “Svetlana. IVANOVA, the maid in America House. .: -who'waS.one of” DEMKIN's: ‘agents, but(GAFFEY jrejected her. pb repeated. invitations... The. .KGB was unawaré"of any-vices. ‘GAFFEY \might. have. “had and: had no. derogatory 3 information ° regarding . him pe. : an “Comment: » eee ne neg eruiow that (6 with a girl : - “America House )-\|GAFFEY | told RADERA}that he aia lo “mot. ‘know: She.was Russian: until hé was walking -her: home.’ and met IVANOVA, who identified her Jy) as ‘such. America House manager |Péter BINDER ws oe reported. xcumors. in America: House» that | GAFFEY™ E\06 - 203 : TS:No. 197124 ~ - Copy — 10 ey Top Secret
14-00000 es Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) _ was having an affair with IVANOVA in America. House. He described (GAFFEY) as the heaviest 0b _ drinker in America House and said that occasion- Ob ally [GAFFEY| coulda not report to work due to his drinking. In describin the KGB approach b made to him in early 1963, (BINDER) (see 405) O* quoted his interrogator as Saying that /GAFFEY]]6 took IVANOVA to(BINDER's room in America House, a\, implying that he “was Intimate with her at that - time. pb(GaFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962, before the expiration of his tour, because of drunkenness. During a State Department security interview, [GAFFEY |admitted Ob being intimate with IVANOVA at America House and at her apartment Hj) GAFFEY|reported that IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had asked for money for an abortion. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations: , _ Summary and Conclusion According to NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section, operations against the American code clerks were the Section's priority task and thus his most ‘important Single responsibility as Deputy Chief. He asserts to be complete his awareness of what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files . and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations. Without exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes there are facts substantially. at variance with his account, in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information available. - , Conclusion From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all operations against American code clerks. Consequently, he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among other Embassy personnel. 204 GOCL4ATE | TS No. 197124 a 4 Top Secret
_ Top Secret - (ANERECAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January: 1960-aniary: 1962) . oo “Case Officer for. Embassy Security | Officer ae " Sohn ABIDIAN | : “Comment: | John Vv. - ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security. he. - Officer:in Moscow from'2 March 1960 until — : _ February: 1962,.. approximately ‘the same Period | as ' NOSENKO's claimed’ ‘service in the Embassy. _. Section’ of -the: American ‘Department. The State 7 Department replacement for CIA officer Russell - -LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was. coopted by CIA to perform . a number of operational tasks, including a |. performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA . agents” inside’ the Soviet Union and. servicing. ... deaddrop” emergency: ‘communications from CIA. — . source GRU Colonel 0O.V.. PENKOVSKIY. . Sa - ABIDIAN ‘studiedin Paris in 1949-50. and. ‘then “secured ‘employment with’ the Department of State “ as. a clerk/typist.- He remained in Paris until ~./ 1954, After special training at the CIC school - at Fort.Holabird and the Secret Service. school, . “ABIDIAN served from-1956 until leaving for | > Moscow -in 1960; as a special. agent. in the State ce “Department! Si Office. Of ‘Security. “AY ‘large’ part” ° “of: his’ work in: this period was. accompanying... . . foreign dignitaries visiting the United States,. .. including. Soviet. Foreign Minister Shepilov in . --Nevember™~1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 1959, .- “and: Khrushchev at ‘the end. Of (19596. These . a GOGLgT7 (205 5 TS No. 197124 . / Copy | 10 Top Secret
1400000 { “y i Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) _ . duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington as well as among the Soviet delegations. One of’the members of the Khrushchev entourage was KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy Section, , During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in 1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Directorate. ‘TE ARN) Duties as a Case Officer When he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO was told by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one of his duties would be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was then expected in the near future. ABIDIAN was to be. the only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN. ‘Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to that report, which was based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN | G00L478 506 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
ead Top Secret |. -(AMBRICAN. EMBASSY SECTION - January’1960-January 1962) | had served asa Department of State Security Officer concerned .-. with ‘the safety of Premier Khrushchev when he visited the. - . United. States. in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time, _ the Legal Residencies concluded. he. was an intelligence officer, “probably with CIA. That report. and the fact that ABIDIAN was. replacing the ‘known CIA officer Russell. LANGELLE as Security _ “Officer; made_ABIDIAN one of the most important counter- - ' intelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore ; of, the entire Second’ Chief Directorate... an +: NOSENKO ‘personally ‘opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and ~ ' later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by .; personnel of. the. Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the: . Second: Chief Directorate. _ NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more ~ 4 about. the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief Of the. American’ Department of’ the KGB First Chief Directorate, but’ that unit had no information not included in its original. _xeport. NOSENKO requested that ‘the KGB Legal Residencies in * the United States” be asked for further details, but none were : ever received.:. NOSENKO thus never’ learned of ABIDIAN's:.) =| y-into the Department - cc a + education: and study abroad, date of entr of State,’ promotions, personal rank, previous ‘assignments, military service, or foreign.service statusi).0. 9.0. “Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival:in Moscow, .the: KGB decided not. | to ‘work. aggressively against him with agent contacts Or ey provocateurs unless he’ first demonstrated some personal :- vulnerability. ~It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance’ coverage’ inthe hope.that, as LANGELLE's _ Successor,’:he might lead “to another POPOV". -[POPOV, a - GRU. Lieutenant Colonel’ and CIA agent, according’ to KGB .- sources Was apprehended in: 1959. ]. cee a Because ABIDIAN. was .considéred:to-be a CIA officer, he. was made a “special target"’of surveillance from the date of AL ~hour surveillance by’: .-: 7 at least. two. and often three. KGB teams, so that..at. any hour. ° [a team was available’ to cover him if he left. the Embassy.- - (The only time this intensity.of coverage might have been © reduced, NOSENKO said,. was during a period of about one and  .he-half months -in' 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy. : “his arrival... He was always under 24 > 3 GOCLaTg 207 — co 7 — a ~ TS No. 197124 -  TopSecret = copy 10
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case. As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by information from surveillance reports, In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the opera- tional plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960 called for no direct action but Specified that: oo, _ “ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an “operational contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and "NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes, (According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a trace on anything with which it comes into contact. Its primary purpose is to.aid in the detection of operational letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers and agents. NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long after- wards can follow with a dog.) The only item of information received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was “unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment. , ~Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever -he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. ‘“ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest to the Embassy Section, -Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE~80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if. '. necessary. —~ ue - 631480 208 TS Ne. 197124 Tep Secret Copy ____
“Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be: continued "Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two other KGB agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA and "Kano. i KGI os agent..7: whose identity NOSENKO. did not recall). were’ involved with ABIDIAN, —GROMAKOVA, a language instructor.” _for Embassy person i nel, was an agent handled by Embass ~ 7 Case officer GAVRILENKO. - ABIDIAN took " ~ Although “he ‘had earlier identified GROMAKOVA as _.@-KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated: her with | ~ - .. ABEDIAN Until tola that ABIDIAN had been'one of | __ her students. : In actuality astpiay oot a "regular language lessons from GROMAKOVA, ‘normally | 1 three one-half hour lessons per week, from Shortly after his arrival untss his departure The second..KGB’ agent, “KAMO", was an agent of the Moscow by destncer ganization who met abrbran at ne meta ee MescOe. eeiceeident. When informed that ABIDIAN Geog “KAMO". his telephone number ,. “NOSENKO recommended that -"KAMO" try ‘to- : develop @ relationship with ABIDTAN. After arguing that - this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or — _ -, Byovocative action against aBIDIAN, Povenee ees KLYPIN = | ~ finally agreed, and “KAMO" phoned - ABIDIAN twice on KGB || St ~ instructions. “ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet. him,. and Sngg O0CL ges. . | TS.No. 197124: Copy ; ‘Top Secret. _
14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident, but one which occurred in Armenia. ] NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was. located, but he could have checked, if necessary, with a copy of the Embassy tele- Phone list published monthly, since it contained the office - room number of each American employee, [The -Embassy telephone list contained apartment, but not office room numbers, ] ABIDIAN's office was in the “Zone of Security" (i.e., secure ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office". (There was no. such sign.] -NOSENKO was unable to determine if . ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation was monitored in _ ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was installed there, {In 1964 a microphone, albeit then. inoperative, was ' £ound in the room occupied in 1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.] NOSENKO } recalled no particularly interesting or important information | - about ABIDIAN obtained from other microphones in the Embassy. -NOSENKO did not know the location of ARIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished, since “data of this nature was not Operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development". Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three: times while Stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips - were made. Such information would have been of interest to . him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier =. trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed.to be for a Operational purposes. However, there was no possibility for _ Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate “would not -. accept a request for Operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow". COOL4gq a | . | 210 TS No. 197124 ss | Top Secret Copy
Top Secret . : _UBRECAN EMBASSY ¥ SHEPTON > January 1960-danuary 1962). oe with: ‘yeference: to whether the KGB ‘could have photographed ... ABIDIAN's. passport on ‘his return to Moscow, NOSENKO. said - .. that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph pags-. «=. ports of. foreign. diplomats - entering the. Soviet Union. While - this procedure would not be impossible, it was not. considered — (780. important as” ‘to. justity the special effort involved’... : ‘eee oat Comment: According ‘to ABIDIAN, he openly | ‘discussed his an “ » - travel plans with Embassy. language teacher ~~ ce .;..'.GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent),-and on at. least -* some occasions used international telephone o ~~. calls ‘to arrange ‘for accommodations at his 7 “.4: destination in ‘Europe. Also, .the™ Foreign: * -o Ministry .- ‘UPDK (which. office provides adminis- -‘trative services to foreign diplomats | in: “MOSGow) ¥. to which ABIDIAN sent his passport’ for’ . €n exit visa-for each departure,. could have -:.“noted from passport entries the. whereabouts of oe Jhis, earlier ‘travel. “ ABIDIAN, ‘took no. trips. in. ‘the: ‘Soviet: ‘Union. ‘outside Of “Moscow, since if° he | -had, NOSENKO would ‘have known and — “remembered: them, as it was:his responsibility. as case officer to. ‘take . cértain | actions... - Among the latter he = \ - “Receiving. notification. of ‘ABIDIAN' Ss  Fequest.’ ‘to travel | from the. UPDK. (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which = provides: administrative services to the diplomatic : community. in. Moscow) . Le . Boy Advising. the UPDK of. KGB. ‘approval, for the. trip. a. ~“aavising: appropriate ‘local: KGB offices of ABIDIAN' Ss: _, itinerary and. giving. them. instructions for. surveillance » and: any other - necessary operational activity. = | Snetaes TSN. 197724 Top Secret Copy AQ ,
14-00000. +, ! } ! i i ? t i Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) ~Receiving, reading, and filing ' Surveillance and other operational out by various KGB units. NOSENKO was certain that he took none if he were absent when such a request he would have seen all documents upon not recall seeing any such documents i all reports of activity carried of these steps. Even for travel was made, his return; he did n ABIDIAN's file, ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks to Armenia between 5 While in Armenia ABIDIAN attended a service in After being told ABIDIAN had attended a . NOSENKO recalled, was collection concerning With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to . | ‘NOSENKO recalled However, of the timing of his In 1966, NOSENKO that his 1960 leave Comment : the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency, made a trip and 9 October 1960. visited with various churchmen, their parish- ioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. ABIDIAN Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession ‘of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also visitéd some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but _ ABIDIAN refused to see him. Service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent: had reported a contact with | him there. This agent, a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had ‘no further contact with him. NOSENKO said | that this was his sole re ABIDIAN's trip... Armenia in October 1960, having. been on leave at the time, NOSENKO's reconstruction alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at the time of ABIDIAN's trip. “stated that he had lied, was taken in January, not October. 21 G301484 ; Top Secret TS No. 197124 Copy _____
7 . Top Secret. | (AMERICAN, EMBASSY, SECTION ~ January 1960-January, 1962) i , Except, for the ‘American woman with whom ABIDIAN’ was ‘thought to have .been. intimate, -NOSENKO knew none of .. - ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow nor his close friends. and professional: contacts’ among foreigners there. | we “NOSENKO | received and read. transcripts of all telephone . calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and . - > apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he - recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because "there: was nothing, of- interest. in’ the. conversations. - _ At ‘the: end of the January-February. 1965 ‘intertogations oo) Soneeentne. ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little’. - », about .this important KGB target. He was "working badly" as - - ABIDIAN's case.officer, he said, because he ‘had had to a . - concentrate on: ‘Supervising = the work against code clerks. ~ ABEDIAN' s “Letter Mailings vs During” ‘the 1962 meetings with: NOSENKO- in Genéva,-he “reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least ... ‘ “three .clandestine letters, in each case to KGB-controlled. » , agents... ‘According ‘to .NOSENKO, the KGB detected: all. the. . . =: letters mailed.by. ABIDIAN through.the use of metka. He- oi .seautioned the CIA representatives from further use of. Embassy — oo “employees for” “mailing letters to- agents in the Soviet -Union.:. He” noted ‘that after LANGELLE, no. ‘such. letters’ were . ‘mailed. for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN. mailed several. Hes ‘explained that’Embassy employees" ‘servants applied an- ‘odorless substance (metka) to. ‘clothing. pockets,. and. traces— Of. the substance rubbed off on any. ‘thing it contacted, such > aS a lletter.: All “the ‘letters mailed in Moscow were passed ': through: a machine which: identified letters bearing. tracing _ “of metka, he said, and this was. how ‘letters ABIDIAN mailed - - were intercepted. ©. [NOSENKO said the machine was a fotoapparat, “. literally. a camera, ‘but: presumably he-meant ‘some sort of _¢ light-sensitive: devi:ce.]~ NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had .- Maliled.a letter to someone in Odessa, and two to the Baltic area, - ‘probably. to Riga, ‘and ‘all were detected ‘by metka, not ~ by ABIDIAN's. surveillants.®: According -to NOSENKO, no new _ -agents were. discovered, | however, since all of the agents to a whon " ‘ABIDIAN mailed’ letters were - already’ controlled by the - KGB. . 4 cotL4e5 213 | we te No. 197124 Top Secret == — copy 10
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: NOSENKO's information is substantially correct, that no letters were mailed for one and a half years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa. No letters were mailed from February 1960 until ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was to Odessa and one each to Latvia and Estonia. CIA has conducted tests to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device. titra-violet, chemical and microscopic analyses developed one possible use of a metka like substance, Analysis of an article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in Moscow who served as a CIA support agent produced a sharply positive reaction. NOSENKO later described how metka was applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this. led to. the discovery 6f the letters ABIDIAN mailed.to the agent in . Odessa and to his parents in the United States. bp -"ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. aon She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. ae ' She started to work. for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met: her shortly after she began to work for ARIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this © meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I fbn. - wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa Po October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated a that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly i on ABIDIAN's clothing. GOOGLAEG 214 7 . | TS No. 197124 | Top Secret Copy —_—
eek ‘Top Secret. 1 MERTEN. BMPASSY SECTION ~ January lesthsanyery. 4862 a ““PEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN' Ss. clothing during” the entire period that she worked for him. She did.” ‘this. every two. or three weeks except. for a few. times. “when ° ‘she was;sick or on leave. No one else had’ me ~access to ABIDIAN's apartment.and therefore no other oe _ “ “person had. the. possibility c of putting 4 metka on his. excelothing, - ae , ey have said that ABIDIAN ‘mailed an operational “letter. to the. KGB..double: agent “"“ARKHANGELSKIY': (in : Odessa). He mailed it at the mailbox on. Tverskaya - “Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier...” Surveillance: ‘did not see ABIDIAN mail the. letter - but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to “"ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to. -ABIDIAN' Ss. parents». Both of these letters had metka so ~on them, as. I was told by SUMIN (a. KGB secret oo writing. specialist) .: “I cannot remember, the date - that ABIDIAN. mailed: ‘this: letter. except that it was :-ABIDIAN had no, maid in Moscow until ‘sixteen “~months-.after his..arrival; FEDOROVICH worked for. — + _ him part-time from July, 1961 until he left. =~ Moscow. ‘Thus FEDOROVICH could not ‘have applied | - - the metka which as:NOSENKO claimed. resulted’ in. - the: interception. Of. the.: letter .ABIDIAN. mailed - Cet es vo L: April 1961, and. probably was not yet employed — | by ABIDIAN even at. the time. the letter to co aS _/ “ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2. duly 1961. oS , ~ ABIDIAN"s third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, while. ‘FEDOROVICH was. working. for: chim.: cs 215 | | | Se TS "No. 197124 |
14-0000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the WARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no - one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he himself briefed her on the use of metka, that the letters were intercepted’ by use of metka, and that FEDOROVICH was responsible. -ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960 or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street - in Moscow. He provided additional details when questioned again in 1965. NOSENKO's Information In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible case officer, ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A KGB stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. ABIDIAN's surveillance team followed the car to a -pookstore.- Both Americans.entered the bookstore, but shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked around the corner, where he entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Direct- orate, and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV, the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance > _ Directorate, and MATVEYEV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department. Taking into account © the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the _ suitability of the hallway ~ particularly the radiator in it - for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leader- ship of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance GCL 4e8 216 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Tep Secret _ | (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION -, January 1960-January 1962) Directorate that a. stationary ‘surveillance post should inmediately be set up. to cover this location. Because. of © . ,the short time available, it was not possible to place- this... '.. post’ ‘inside the building, so it was set. up across the street. In. addition, -the radiator was checked daily to see if. any- pe . thing,. such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind je) dite" The post was manned around the: clock: for 30° days, after | cols. °. which it was maintained from. 0800 until midnight for another > - “two months. .If a package or: ‘magnetic. container had been o.. £ound behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, -it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a » signal should someone. remove :the package. At’ the same time . “ a'member of the surveillance ‘team would be stationed‘ on the ©. .< landing of the. staircase in this building, out.of sight from: -. the hallway. below. During’ the three months: that the post | .was.maintained, nothing. was found concealed behind.’'the radiator, - nor were any Suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the :. _ . building. > The-post was ‘then discontinued, but. the. address © “.. was-placed ona. list.of suspicious places inspected daily “by the Surveillance’ Directorate. The true significance of -; - this:location became - ‘known to the KGB. only later, after, ‘the. ht AEESSE of PENKOVSKTY - An. 4962, Oo : a NOSENKO_ ‘gixst: ‘néard. of “ABIDIAN' Ss. visit. to. the: suspected - . deaddrop’ site on: the .day it occurred... He was sitting,in’ -— ‘KOVSHUK's > “6£fice when ‘he ‘received a telephone. call from. - - MATVEYEV" telling him of. the’ incident; « Although ‘NOSENKO was: ok “ ABIDIAN's case’ ‘officer and KOVSHUK was. Chief .of the Embassy Oe -<$ection,;, the. decision. to. place, the : “stationary » surveillance ....- post at the site was made at.a higher ‘level; neither of them. : was involved in it or in the later. decision to discontinue the: post... ‘NOSENKO- himself visited the. building on Pushkin . Street the following day. or’ the day after, but ‘he remained — : ‘oniy a few minutes and did- not. recall any details of- the’ : hallway... except that: theré. was: a radiator. there... : hs. ABIDIAN' s case. “OfEicer; | NOSENKO . recalled ‘yeceiving the “ surveillance © report of his. visit to the Pushkin ‘Street: building. vos and “placing: this. ‘report in ABIDIAN's file. -/(This case: “file ~ *~ NOSENKO turned over to his successor,. GRYAZNOV, about. ' 28° December. 1961, (just | before he transferred _ to the ‘Seventh Department. i) 0 L469 tS No. 197124 _TopSecret =. Copy 10”
14-0000, Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the Stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter “with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month of surveillance, and periodically after that. These discus~ sions took place either by telephone, when KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO,'s office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred during the period of the stationary surveillance. NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period that the stationary surveillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections. NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had already been discontinued without anything unusual or suspicious having been noted, and he thought that this incident would be of no particular interest to CTIA. When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I dontt remember. I do not want to say that I visited the deaddrop. I don't remember now whether I' visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it. with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes', and I cannot say 'no'." . Co : 218 CUCL420 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
_ Tep Secret © “(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~. January 1960-January 1962} “>. Comment:°. ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop — Sed a . Site.only once, on 30 December 1961, a:fuli.- year after the time reported by NOSENKO. As. ’ NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy. ‘Economic Officer, ABIDIAN left the Embassy in . ~an official car.with a Soviet drivér and proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of: _. Pushkin Street. Leaving the bookstore., .ABIDIAN . entered the building where the site was located, ... determined that the drop.was empty, and left. - -one minute later, réturning to the Embassy. ~":.° The deaddrop was propo IKOUCeTY in” - August 1960. CIA officer lke bythe site on’ 12 N “4 December 1960;. | On 2] January 1961 briefly entered the-08 | building to confir e's nrecise location. .. .I£ the KGB*had surveille Visits and OF | - had put the site under surveillance, NOSENKO ©. . omight be relating ‘those events by mischance in - 0) attributing -the visit.to ABIDIAN. In such’a -- circumstance, howéver,.NOSENKO, as ABIDIAN's oy case officer, would have known that his target” .. Visited’a site which had. been previously noted dn connection with. the suspicious movements of. - |. another Embassy official. - Further, NOSENKO's °-° | "description of ABIDIAN's route,: companion, and sequence of movements is so precise as to refer- Clearly to’ ABIDIAN_. ly, NOSENKO dislcaims  . “any knowledge .of or his activities; he 0§ asserts tha was neither the object of. 67 oc KGB suspicis ern. For reasons no. . cera ;-combination of circumstances nor NOSENKO Himself - ., €an plausibly. explain, NOSENKO can describe - - .,ABIDIAN's deaddrop’ site visit although it mos occurred at a time when NOSENKO was no longer | _-° ABIDIAN's case officer and when he was assigned. - “-: to another Second Chief Directorate department. wes | TE: he turned over’ ADIDIAN's ‘file. on 28 oo -- December 1961 to another Embassy Section officer, - as he claimed, NOSENKO could not have received |. So 6064404. (219 ae
14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) nor filed the initial surveillance report of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street site. If he transferred to the Seventh Department two days after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed (and NOSENKO's participation in the(TI.E. JOHNSON] case OG indicates that he was working against tourists. by 5 January 1962), he could neither have visited the site as he described nor could he have received thereafter the daily surveillance reports. He could not, of his own knowledge, assert that the surveillance was terminated after three months, since well before the: three months’ surveillance ended he was abroad in Geneva. Lastly, it cannot be for the reason NOSENKO claimed (that the surveillance was unsuccessful) that NOSENKO did not mention ‘ABIDIAN's activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962. Case Officer for John ABIDIAN: Summary and Conclusion If for no other reason than ABIDIAN' s security functions with the Khrushchev entourage, files of the First Chief . -Directorate would record his name: If NOSENKO states to the contrary, that traces were negative, NOSENKO did not run the traces himself nor know the results. According to NOSENKO, ABIDIAN was “one of the most important targets of the Second Chief Directorate"; all KGB resources were . employed for two years, including 24-hour surveillance, the exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio sur- veillance, and technical aids, with amost absolutely negative _ Yesults. The results could not have been negative:. for - . NOSENKO to so assert -can only mean that NOSENKO was not informed of the results. In the two instances NOSENKO cited of Embassy agents' activities against ABIDIAN, he made fundamental errors: ABIDIAN's maid was not employed by ABIDIAN- at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the metka, and GROMAKOVA taught ARIDIAN Russian throughout his stay in Moscow, not just “several times". NOSENKO acknowledges f, vn 220 V3 6501490 TS No. 197124 Top Secret ~ Copy ____
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January. 1960 7 that ABIDIAN's travel ‘been approved by the KGB, and that the officer would: have issued . 1 orders for his surveillance out~ 5) ~ side of Moscow and would‘h * ‘target's. activities. a Embassy Section assi —“". the ‘Pushkin Street 4 “when NOSENKO by his a present in the Embas oos-Questioned in deta “that when he arrived: _. he haa among his- Of supervising o So involved, although _ made. ~ Lastly;: although NOSENKO. claims: It is concluded Fro “ease officer for’ Embas the Embassy Séction, NOSENKO claimed no nee case Officer for the Naval personnel, including the “Military intelligence personnel, including service attaches, ‘Top Secret gnment, details of eaddrop, “the event Own account couldn Sy Section. il in 1964°on his erican service atta in the section, -DRA in the Soviet Union would have he belatedly reca Conclusion..." —_— m the foregoing that NOSENKO was not sy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, ! “January 1962) had to responsible case ABIDIAN's visit to a occurred at a time mo ot have been physically _. Supervisor of Operations Against . .. AMerican.Service Attaches (0) MERE BEewace Attaches responsibilities ‘in’..- personal role in’) ches. He said only NOV was thé. respon~ _ ' and when ‘DRANOV was transferred — “ne PhyJenuary 1965" NOSENKO claimed for the | other’ responsibilities as Deputy. Chief that , Perations against American 221 Top Secret , first time. that “service attaches, 6004493 © TS No 197124 Copy 10
14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities against American targets other than ABIDIAN. He related how, at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section in January 1960, KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume super- visory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff of the Embassy. NOSENKO stated "supervising" meant that the case officers for the service attaches referred their ques- tions to him, not to KOVSHUK. These included case officers GAVRILENKO, responsible for Air Attaches, KURILENKO, for | Army Attaches, and DEMKIN, for enlisted personnel of all services. "While he was getting acquainted with the section on DRANOV's retirement", NOSENKO himself took case officer responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel. This res- ponsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV's former assistant, BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO could not initially recall how long he supervised service attache operations; he later said “several months" and finally “five or six months". Neither could NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or duties caused him to be relieved of this function. He said this resulted from KOVSHUK's proposal that supervision of the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate's American Department and coordinator for Second Directorate operations against military intelligence officers of all nationalities. Supervisor of Service Attache Operations: ae Summary and Conclusion Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO's claim to have been responsible for operations against service attaches and because he was not able, when challenged, to substantiate his claims by providitig any details of KGB activities against these targets, it is concluded that this aspect of his claimed KGB service’ is a. fiction. GUUL494 222 oo TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —___
74-0000 | Top Secret co ©". (AMERICAN EMBASSY. SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) | Custodian of KGB File. on Embassy Security: '.. “As former Deputy Chief. and occasional Acting Chief of the '-American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of KGB - -knowledge of its American Embassy target. “Specifically, .. \NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second’ Chief. | / - Directorate's file: on Embassy’ security. Be ' » NOSENKO's Information . . *. ‘NOSENKO's knowledge of the’ physical’ layout of the Embassy ~ ., derived both from his general supervisory functions during .:- . 1960-1961 and from his. responsibilities as the officially” = |.  xegistered custodian .of the KGE file on the Embassy security.: - ‘He received the file from-the Section Chief, KOVSHUK, when ~~ -' he arrived in January 1960. . AS. was permissible under KGB. ...: ” procedures, as long as the custodian was. still in the same ©. directorate, the file was charged to BAKHVALOV. [See p.. 153. - -. for NOSENKO's various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV.} © _NOSENKO ‘had. custody of the file charged to himself, and -from-. January. 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section on 25-28 December 1961,: only KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and GRYAZNOV and‘ )-° oe KOSOLAPOV'(both of whom shared NOSENKO's office and. safe) had access’ to the files 0 00 Ge ee ‘The file’ consisted. of: two‘volumes, one for the old) building on Mokhovaya Street ‘and the second (about an inch’. = thick) on. the new Embassy building occupied in .1953 on-:- 0} and photographs ‘of both buildings... ..No Operational analysis or: planning “by NOSENKO: or others” |. in the-Embassy Section: It was used only for reference | *:.: ae 2. TS. No. 197124 Chaykovskiy. Street. The: file contained detailed floor plans. was done on the basis ofthis “file during NOSENKO's two years: 9 ~ = purposes, since the KGB had concluded that it was’ impossible.
’ Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the restricted areas, “the seventh through the tenth floors", were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest ‘in these offices. [The secure area barred to unescorted local employees | ES comprised of the eighth through tenth ' floors.] NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file, while he was custodian. None of _ the information was of interest or important or useful enough for him to remember, and he recalled none of the KGB agent sources. [In another context NOSENKO cited an instance in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported [erroneously] that ABIDIAN's office had a sign on the door reading "Security Office*.] Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified | trash, which was always burned at an unrecalled location by a non~commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by an officer. [At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed — for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone. NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U.S. military . security procedure requiring a commissioned officer to witness and to certify, ,the destruction of classified documents. If NOSENKO is aware of any such . procedure, he has never indicated it in any context.] In 1960- -1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either knew the location of all offices and personnel within the Embassy or he could obtain them from the monthly Embassy telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents. The lists gave office numbers. [The Embassy telephone lists contain names, apartment numbers and telephone numbers, but omits office room numbers. j In 1960 a “metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. None of the technical specifications of the room were known, nor was its location. An unrecalled source reported only that meetings were held in the room, which was in the restricted area. ne | 224 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
7 Top Secret oo (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-dJanuary 1962) _. The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material “during 1960-1961. A charwoman who was’ an agent of BELOGLAZOV _ and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval. -. _  Attaches' observation of ships and factories on a trip to-. | poo. Leningrad. The .report was only of ‘routine iriterest to. the’ Be KGB.: The charwoman was. granted a cash award. . » Custodian of Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion’ "= NOSENKO cannot describe the location (even by £loor)of | - ‘any of -his own targets, such as ABIDIAN, the military code’. “room, or the State Department communications center. In - *.fact, he cannot describe the location of the office of any - ° individual or unit in the Embassy, even. of the Ambassador.” When challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of Ue the Embassy security’ file,’ NOSENKO asserted that he had never — --read it nor paid any “special attention" to its content ‘in: “the two years he was file custodian. It is concluded that. -. NOSENKO's claim, that he was custodian of the file is an...--* invention. -0 .  , CR Audio. Operations Against: the’ American Embassy. 2 -NOSENKO''s “knowledge of: the KGB-microphoné ‘system in the _ Embassy ‘derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy © tions. Also, in’ his “capacity as Deputy Chief and custodian =:".-: of the monitoring reports ‘logbook. NOSENKO: claimed to have ~ . attended-a. meeting at the end. of 1960 or the béginning of o/s. 1961 at-which he learned details of the locations of specific. ”: microphones hidden in thé Embassy. Lastly, NOSEMKO claimed: ne obtained. information on’ the KGB audio operations against- the Embassy,:-even*after he-left the Embassy Section, from his former subordinate GRYAZNOV... NOSENKO. regarded the information about! the KGB microphones, first mentioned in Geheva in 1962, es the most important he provided CIA. 0) = re fe | C21 409 225 7 . aS No 197124 Top Secret =~ copy 19. / .. stole a bag of papers from the Naval.Attache office, The:torn |
Top Secret ' (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO's Information Handling. of Monitor Reports According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB personnel, all in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor reports. These included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies), KOVSHUK, NOSENKO himself, and GRIBANOV, to whom important items were shown. The existence of the audio operation and its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB Departments. The reports were produced by the Second Special Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU). The OTU Second Special Department has several sections, one of which was the English Section under Colonel N. Ya. KUZMIN. -KUZMIN's monitors, fluent in English, listened to and transcribed the tape recordings. Their reports of the _ preceding: day's product were brought daily by Tatyana GRISHNYAT (of the Second Special Department) to the American Department. (In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he received the reports first, at other times that they went first to KLYPIN.) NOSENKO reviewed the reports, marked significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours. returned the reports to the Second Special Department. . In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK.or GRYAZNOV reviewed the reports. The Second Special .Departmerit. prepared sterile ‘abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts which disguised the source of the information contained: the abstracts were returned to the American Department for the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy Section and for filing in the delo-formulyar (developmental file) kept on each American omproyee in the Embassy. . Location of the. -Microphones | “In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the © service attaches and particularly, to conversations held in the office of the Minister Counsellor. In addition, he referred to “points" [microphones] in the office of an unnamed State Department employee, in the Agricultural Attache office shared by BROWN and HORBALY, and in the Embassy code room. 226 COGGT 4en UL4S8 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ____— | | | |
7 Top Secret | \(AHERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced | a handwritten note which he asserted listed all the micro- phones in the Embassy which. were operative in the years — “1960-1961.. NOSENKO. explained that at the. end of 1960 or _the beginning of 1961, he and KOVSHUK met with Department : Chief KLYPIN. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss... the possibility of. releasing monitors from some of the - Embassy microphones so. they could be assigned to Vladimir 4. PETROV, Chief 6f the American Department's Second Section “ :: for. use against non~Embassy targets. (PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitors from the Second Special |. Section, but-had been told that English linguists were ~.. _ _ engaged on priority targets.) . At the meeting, KOVSHUK and _ KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coveragé of the Embassy =” -, Chancery to decide which rooms offered ‘information of little poo value,’ so that: the monitors for. those’ microphones: could be . 4  ..¥@leased to PETROV'S Second Section:  KOVSHUK used NOSENKO's —. /. =. notebook in which: to list’ Embassy apartments: and offices... 1 ¢.. then.being covered ‘on a full-time basis and to note those of lo lesser. importance. KOVSHUK decided to relinquish, tempor= " j.) Jarily, monitoring of Embassy apartments. He continued the. “monitoring -of ‘the code room, despite the limited value of - on “the information obtained. “At. the end of the meeting KOVSHUK - “gave or NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in’’. _ ». his. office safe until bringing it. to CIA in 1964.0 °° 0 We. "|. .NOSENKO'S list showed that “microphones were located in 97" the, following offices of the noted occupants:.. "Office of the.Minister Counsellor, FREERS; - ~ “Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON; — ..’ Office of the Army Attache, URBAN;, - "Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN; Poe . “Office of the Assistant: Air Attache, WINDSOR}. - “ “Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO.: wo: “? “Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON, ) >. REITZ and WILSON; (9-00 srg Ss ao | “(Office of. the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN; oS i "OFFice of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;. - os le "Military Code Roomp ee "State Department Code Room and Telétype Office; onppogements of (EREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN] and(NETLSEN -“Eighth Floor Bar (Marines) *) oi ~~ a - 227. —- '. GOb1 499 TS No. 197124. Copy 10 - Top Secret
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in the chancery building before the Americans occupied it, but he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's list, or where they ‘were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and microphones emplaced there were less vulner- able to technical search and discovery. According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted military personnel. In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of using KGB agents employed there to emplace temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans, ‘as well as in the Embassy garage- These plans were vetoed, however, because of the risk of discovery. For the same reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace a device temporarily in Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence, or in the apartments of Embassy officers. The KGB was afraid that they would be detected and there would be a scandal... - Performance Characteristics of the Microphones According .to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the. microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero, but the microphone system was deteriorating. The KGB could do nothing about it because they could not gain access to the inside of the Embassy. Referring to the. microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said that it was becoming increasingly difficult tovwork with its product. The microphone was fading, and the recording tape sounded as if "somewhere far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper". - KUZMIN, the KGB officer respon~ sible for the monitors, satd that soon the KGB could recover nothing. Of the microphones then (in 1962) in place, about twenty no longer were operative. , In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. NOSENKO learned from DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of OTU.Second Special Department] how difficult it was to 228 CECt &e 1500 TS No. 197124 Top Secret _ Copy —__—
Top Secret .. _” (AMERICAN BMPASSY ‘SECTION ~ January 1960-January: 1962) _./ monitor conversations in that office. ‘Only very experienced. linguists were used, but evén they had to listen "ten, > 0~: ' fifteen, even twenty times" in order to.understand portions - -of the. recording. After NOSENKO left >the Embassy Section,:: | on several occasions in 1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his. former sub--.- ordinate and his successor, referred. to the microphones!" decline.. GRYAZNOV said the microphones were picking up. -” _- only snatches of conversation, and that in a year or two. 2. . they would be completely inoperative.” As a result, GRYAZNOV - ' told NOSENKO, .GRIBANOV. was insisting.on the recruitment of | code clerks at all costs. ‘Besides the fading quality of ...- "the microphone's signal, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV... -. attributed the diminishing value.of the audio operation to .. “the Embassy use of the “room~in~a-room". [NOSENKO said.” that in. 1960-1961. the KGB: had. information that, in ‘prepara= tion for’ President Eisenhower's visit, a “steel chamber" had -been constructed within ‘the Embassy where Secure conver- |. . "+. gations could be held. j - Microphones in’ the North wing oo / = Recording to NOSENKO, no microphones o other audio oe .. devices were ever. installed in the north wing (as distinct 2°... «from the. chancery) prior to.the Embassy's occupancy of the. ~. pudlding in 1962. In his first meetings with CTA in. Geneva he described how he knew... When it was décided to permit. :).~ _ the Embassy to construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote a “Proposal that audio-equipment. be installed. Approval was. “held. up by KGB: Chairman Shelépin, who had réservations |” the time Shélépin approved the. proposal: two or three months’): | (later, renovation was: far advanced, and..Embassy Security aera Officer ABIDIAN was already inspecting the previcee The “~~ Opportunity was lost and. the KGB installed no: microphones. =»Consequent ly, NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the Minister °° “ounsellor, the service attaches, and: others presently . _ Secupying rooms in the chancery which had microohonee’. be. “moved gradually ‘to the north wing, where the KGB had neither: .. : 8udio equipment’ nor the capability of. installing anys. 8 229° woe nee & TS No. 197124 7 _ ‘Top Secret; noe ketene tg freemen ne crite eae
Tep Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information _ the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service attaches. According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified, GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman immediately. FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy personnel from which the KGB learned of various American officers' personal weaknesses. With respect to the service attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find out.. In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details. He said that audio reception was good from the military code room, but that the occupants rarely spoke, When one of them ‘was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers. Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and teletype room because of the interference from the noise of the teletype machines. The microphones in the apartments produced rarely anything of interest. An exception was advance information obtained of a social affair, for which _ the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special Department would be asked to pay particular attention. There ‘was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN's (a political officer) office, but no secret information was obtained. Similarly, the conversations were overheard in the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant was obtained except “something" which made the KGB suspect HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence. .In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by the KGB via microphones in the Embassy: 230 GUGL5C2 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —__.
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January /1960-January 1962) 7 "TE regularly reviewed all of the ‘transcripts from~ microphones. in’the American Embassy for a period of | approximately two years, from January 1960. to. January ~~ 1962.. The following is the only information which | - XY can remember as being ‘important, interesting. or: operationally useful to the’ XGBt ; "From: the microphone: in ‘the office of ‘the ‘Minister ‘Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he. occasionally : ‘dictated:cables about. the Embassy' s evaluation of - | certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government. and advised-the State Department.-on. positions. for- negotiations: with the USSR... This information was .. O£ such importance that. special reports were written » “to, the .Central. Committee: of the CPSU... However, I- ..@annot .remember any specific incidents or events “which these cables reported nor any specific: re _ evaluations Or. recommendations made: in. these cables. "AL so. ‘from. the microphones in the: “Minister. - Counsellor' s office, I remember. that: he dictated: .. ) £itness reports. (kharakteristiki) © on about: twelve’ - “s. officers in the Embassy. I cannot: remember | who: any . c->,.O£ these. officers were or. any details. from the” i -xeports... There. was. nothing in -these: reports which Was of. interest: “or useful to. ‘the. RGB ei . © "Bron: ‘the microphone ‘in ‘the: Amy ‘Attache! Ss office I. remember’ that the service .attaches- regularly: ie discussed plans for’ trips within. the USSR and the. o targets that they’. wanted to° cover. . ‘They ‘also diss cussed - ‘the? results of. these, trips ‘after. ‘their. return.“ ‘However, I cannot ° remember * any information’ about - “specific trips. planned by. Specific. ‘service: attache. ce Ban _ personnel or any. specific ‘targets. that -they. planned= 00)  to-coever or.any specific operational : activity taken > _. by the organs. of..the KGB. ‘against service attaches”. — -., ON trips. within the USSR “which was based on infor- “v2 Mation obtained from-this microphone. : There ‘was no. :-interesting,. ‘important, or useful information about the personal ‘or. professional lives: or about..the- _ vulnerabilities of anyone inthe service attache _ Offices (Army, Navy and | Air). obtained : ‘from ‘this, “microphone: Be GOLL5C3 : "TS No. 197124 Top Secret - oe . Copy 10
- Tep Secret _ (AMERICAN. EMBASSY SECTION, - January 1960-January 1962) oo ey. remember ‘that: ‘from the microphones in the ‘State . Department code room occasionally.‘a ‘code clerk would ' xead numbers; These numbers were only of interest .- to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and ’Cryp= “ tology), of the KGB. I do not. remember any conversa-. . tions from this microphone. “There was no information: _. £rom this microphone of any-of the code. clerks which -.. was interesting, important, - or useful to the Embassy ss Section, | First Department, Second Chief Directorate; - KGB. go ; a : - ” "During the: approximately two years in which’ r daily: reviewed the production: from-all the micro- . ~ phones in. the American. Embassy I do not remember. any: _, information on’any American in the Embassy which. was . dnteresting,. important, or useful to me as the. - Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section (except. the points noted . cin: the- above paragraphs." : "Results | of ‘fechnical- and Physical. Search ss NOSENKO' s ‘information {no action had been ‘taken as a. : result. of- ‘GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was: a micro~ “phone. in the ‘Embassy. office. occupied by the Minister: ~Counsellor] . Was, as far as. it went, confirmed by a search |. “Of the Embassy.chancery “in ‘spring: 1964... According to the ° USIB. Security. Committee damage report which followed, a -microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the Outside ‘wall behind ‘a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery. fIn-1960. this room. had been the office of the Army Attache, | » where’. -NOSENKO. reported a microphone was emplaced.]*-The _..-microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran — “ ~horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of ~ the east face of the. chancery, .to the roof area of the’ north ~ » annex... A. number. of vertical‘ cables were found to run: to the . “various. microphone: installations. | Fifty microphones. were ; . positively. identified (ultimately, fifty-four were found], . although the system apparently. was devised for’a considerably » - gyveater number. --The microphone system covered all outside rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions. The USIB damage report. concluded that the microphones were “installed, before the, Embassy took occupancy of the. chancery in. 1953. . — GOOL5Cg -  g32 Oo a SO , | TS. No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —___
- Top Secret. - (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION = January 196 Sryanaary 1962 ) we The ‘discoveries in the chancery led: to. ‘the discovery of - . other Soviet. technical equipment installed in the. north wing. i“. Parallel to thé audio cable running from the: chancery to the’. Li. -snorth wing “KOoE, there’ were: found three coaxial cables, -all terminating in the concrete floor-of the. north Wing. attic, | The coaxial cables. appeared to be of more recent installation,” probably” prior: to the Soviets" " evacuation of the north wing, "an. 1962. an = Whi Le. not: ‘definitely established, it. is: ‘assumed’ “that ‘the ‘Soviets, before the Embassy ‘occupied. ». the north. wing,.used.it.as a listening post for _ monitoring microphones in the chancery. - In. . a ‘preparation for American: occupancy the main cable - _i. £rem the. chancery . was concealed. and run from the — --nerth wing roof to the basement, and: presumably ., from there.to a listening post elsewhere. “The | . three ‘coaxial cables May have been either — - .- “installed at that time or ‘earlier. Their purpose ~-i; 28 -still unknown, but) they may have been a ° feature - of a. highly « sophisticated electronic: attack: against. the code room, the existence or fe “. character of which ’NOSENKO did not know and need — .. Hot .have. Known. When. NOSENKO was. informed. in 1965. by’CIA that there had been .a ‘technical.:\ - discovery in the north wing, he offered his personal -assurances:: that nothing was. installed. » inthe north, wing ‘and ‘insisted that whatever - * was. found must be. something. unrelated " tO an. audio: Systeme ne — ae "D amage: Estimates. ; With reference to. ‘the ‘damage’ caused . by | the audio. penetra- ‘tion, the previously-cited ‘UsIB’ damage. report stated that "it | must be. concluded that due tothe extensive period. of. penetra~: _ tion; the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to . the United States . The Soviets Ahave , gained considerable © ee 1s No. “Rew. Top Secret = “Copy 10
14-00000 - F ! 7 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U-S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probably Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must. have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel ‘assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future." Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen months of NOSENKO's claimed two years' service in the Embassy Section), has been more specific. Interviewed by CIA, Col. HOFFMAN recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just the conversations held in his. office, could have become aware of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code pe clerk [STORSBERG| was reprimanded for absenteeism (unavailable for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl © .  £riends"); HOFFMAN's conversations with America House manager (% Peter BINDER {the personality probiéms, drinking ‘habits and other incidents relating to America House residents and visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances , prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk | KEYSERS) (6 _'£rom Moscow (homosexuality)... [Besides his general duties as | - Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special: responsi- bilities for each of the persons mentioned. He supervised | the KGB. officers operating against code clerks and residents | of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in . ‘the KGB attempts to recruit {STORSBERG\ and (KEYSERS j6/(The KGB attempted later to recruit [BINDER)*as well.)j] In summing up his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that ... some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all 6f our personal weaknesses were compromised." 234 COCGLSCE TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy | GISK
1400090. | . Top secret | oa (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION -. January 1960-Januaty 1962). - Budio, _ Operations ‘Against ‘American ee Summary. and ConéTusion— a Given that NOSENKO' is! information: about microphones’ ‘in the “chancery has been ‘confirmed, that information's. significance. ‘remains the extent.'to which it ‘substantiates his: ‘claims,: e@.g., that his knowledge derived from his! position. as Deputy «, Chief, and that. he for two*years “reviewed - the reports of. - what .the KGB monitored: from microphones’ emplaced in the - ehancery. “ Sat a - NOSENKO! s ‘knowleage: ‘of the. inicrophones" existence’ ‘is not . «proof that‘ he was Deputy Chief of the: Embassy Section, (or even proof ‘that he’ served.in that: unit). KGB soiirces serving» elsewhere than in the Second: Chief Directorate . earlier. - reported the. microphones' _@xistence; GOLITSYN © specificalif identified one as being: in ‘the Minister. Counsellor" s Offic “ NOSENKO' ‘s . acquisition: of. the: list of interophonés’ in: a e1beoe -~1961" ais ‘Singular - (the more so since he never hinted:- Of the. list’ s existence. while describing. ‘the: microphones. in. the. ‘chancery to CIA in: 1962). He asserts that he had no. me ee plan to defect: in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired se 0. that for. no- apparent. ‘purpose jhe. risked’ keeping ‘a. highly ™ sensitive document. in: a~safe. he. shared with’ two ‘subordinates: (GRYAZNOV and‘ KOSOALBOV) , and. keeping. it .even after. he’. left. the. ‘Embassy..Section:>for the Seventh Department. © NOSENKO- has never. _plausibly. explained “the circumstances which - pieces prompted — his retention.of the list until 1964, when | he: mae Produced ite ‘for: ‘CIA an Geneva 6 P "Recording to: ‘NOSENKO,” he® ‘reviewed what” must: have’ ‘been ~ yekerally hundreds: of ‘monitor - reports: in the course of* two. / years, important ones of’ which were forwarded to Second. Chief Directorate Chiéf GRIBANOV, and “others of.suéh" signic'’ | ficance that ‘they were’ ‘the subjects: of special reports. ‘sent. ~ to the Central. Committee of the CPSU. ~ Yet when. challenged. ne cites not a singlé example, despite the fact: that this Period _ included. such critical. events. affecting. Soviet~ “United » 00167 tg No. 197124 Top Secret ; | ; Oo Copy 10 | 235
Tep Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB), as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit. Of the micro- phones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of the Army Attache, and in the code room; when challenged to cite examples of information obtained, he>asserts that none produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section. Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery . , microphones as sources of information on which he rdied to direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy personnel, he again can describe no actual instance. In the single case in which he asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones, (KEYSERS} failure toOb report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error.» Conclusion From the foregoing it is concluded that, NOSENKO's claims to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally - reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. ‘ Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. He has consistently asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communica~ tions of the service attaches [for which reason he claimed GOCL5C8 236 (68 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ~ ———————— A
“Top Secret vosary 1962): AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962). 2st. .to the KGBhe recruitment of a Military code clerk was h Of the micro-ask in 1960-1961}... He "knew", however, that NKO describesjrectorate was-reading at least some Sta : Office of:. -nbassy traffic. © | 70 Ur oe is priority — the Eighth «| te Department’. -_s NOSENKO's Information ~*~ chancery | At his second meeting with cra in 1962, NOSENKO expressed ~he rdied to. sncern that the American Embassy in + ahd : tance. In ‘reading all the State Department ciphers". He knew this lied on | Lo absenuere S3W the clear-text messages every day on an failure scubsequent meeting NOSENKO revised his earli ‘ead, certain State Department .codes had been broken. He. 2 -ad only rarely seen. the. clear-text of deciphered cables, _ t the most, "ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961. - - ‘The Russian text of those deciphered State Department... ° essages was sent to KGB epairman Senichastnyy, who some-._ NKO's -claimirectorate. _ GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the --. a ¥ microphoneaterial to Vladimir Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American eputy Chiefepartment, -or KLYPIN's successor, S.M. PEDOSEYEV.. NOSENKO | || rSonz aw such material. on the desk of .KLYPIN and later on = _ EDOSEYEV's desk, but was nevér pe ikolay ZEMSKOV,° from the Secretari irectorate, brought a book. containi 12: eG partment. méssages to KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV. -He would open’ . he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit. .---. _L¥PIN. or FEDOSEYEV to. see the material. This was Eighth. . ial, ‘but. NOSENKO did not -know where or-how. ~ cad aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but. they. _., OSition of the American Ambassador -or the A political questions and were. of’ no.s ., BErequently. there. was mention oF the expected arrival of.  Mericans who were not. permanently assigned to’ th : ble. 7d NOSENKO remembered that one such’ item concerned the |. : erted that! the tpor, 2, Me-or two-man “commiceionen £o check the work erted that”! the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of © d communicaate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on: |. he Claimed “=rtain. unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest U.S. Government. * eee GovLscg. Pa : ve TS No. 197124° oe | . ; Top Secret _ - ignificance to him.) 0°.
14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensi- “tive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated more carefully than Top Secret information. Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State crypto- graphic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods as known to him. One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on 12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts were picked up on the KGB microphones, the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by other means. NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations picked up by the microphones in the State Department and military code rooms. "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations]. SL In the military code room--that was where {Games H.]0 STORSBERG |and later (Matthew P.] ZUJUS)worked--we Ob didn't get much. We Gould hear[STORSBERG\ swearing(j, on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we turned it over at once-to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding. Of course, all other intercepts were turned over to them also." With respect to the use of code clerks by the American Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB was helped a great deal by [James H.] McMILLAN [a military code clerk of the Embassy staff who defected in 1948], and by "ANDREY" [Dayle SMITH, see p. 33]. It was thanks to 238 GO015140 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ———-—- __8(BR
Top Secret a (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January eeevenuany 1962) | ““ANDREY'! st help that the KGB were able to ‘tead State Depart - he ment and ciphers. - (At. the time of. SMITH' s tour -in ‘Moscow » "a single: code room was shared by State. Department and: * military code clerks. . As. the only. cryptographic machine. fou _-- gechnician. assigned to-the Embassy, SMITH had access to. “both . State: and military cryptographic equipment. } Loe : “NOSENKO also’ named MARTIN and MICHELL [NSA mathematicians ---who defected to. the USSR in July 1960] and. "an American:  code-clerk brought to the USSR from: ‘India" - {unidentified, | 2860- “1967, when. his: presence in. ‘the. USSR was. publicizeds,, “ NOSENKO ‘said’ ‘the ‘Eighth Directorate: ‘was “submitting ee - vegular’ Yeports.to Khrushchev and the Central Committee on: . their. intercepts..until "the end of: 1961 -or. the beginning .. - OF 1962". He learned - this. from GRYAZNOV, his SUCCeSSOr . in; -. the Embassy. Section, At about-the same. ‘time he learned” oe - that various Embassy officers were less..often’ 6vérheard . from a >) RGB. microphones. in their offices discussing . significant. :.-l, information. . This development ‘GRYAZNOV and American Depart" .. ment Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to. a "room-within-a-room"*. +" ».- installed in the. ‘Embassy and other Embassy- security. measures. {The acoustical room was installed. in December 1962; '].: “After > “his own. departure - from the..Embassy. Section, NOSENKO also. . -learned of ‘the KGB's. ‘loss of. its‘ code breaking capability. from Second Chief. Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV. ' GRIBANOV-” -told-him that the Central Committee was exerting consider~ able. ‘pressure. on:..the KGB. Chairman for continuation. of .the.. information formerly. obtained in this manner}; consequent ly ;- officers. concerned with the recruitment: Of code ‘clerks arn CO0LS11. “239° noe TSN. 197124 Top Secret © Copy 10 \ but possibly. John Discoe SMITH,- State Department communigac- a '. tions technician who defected to the USSR sometime between © , the KGB Chairman: was. demanding maximum effort ‘from all KGB Pe
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications: summary and Conclusion From USIB and’ NSA damage assessments following the discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine Bmissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department traffic during 1952-1959. “ANDREY" (see p- 33), the code machine mechanic the KGB allegedly recruited in 1953, ° serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service attache code room; his access was not limited, as NOSENKO indicates, to State Department traffic. On the basis of these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO was not knowledgeable of the extent of KGB cryptologié attack on Embassy communications, and that such information. as he provided can not be related to his claim to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy As Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section,’ NOSENKO claimed that he would “necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy. Within the section, “special emphasis" was placed on the ‘identification and development of. American Intelligence. personnel, with the objective of an eventual recruitment. The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, and Marine guards would not be used to perform intelligence missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect gIG4542 eae TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
14-00000 . Top Secret = (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION. ~ January 1960-January'1962) _. American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA. Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to ‘the _ Embassy. during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who... ‘ were known or suspected by the KGB to be. CIA officers, and ..- . on some officers, -who were not...’ rr OE “(Boris Kiossom\.OL - oe oe - cURLOSSON\ was ‘considered to be. cra - | Bo. “€or. reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced - Bo han _»«, Ob{Bavid MARK) who had been regarded as "Resident'"’because of 7" » Enbassy Personnel ‘Suspected to be CIA Officers * ee is behavior under surveillance and. of his clandestine.letter mailing .)sKLOSSON}s. case officer ‘was MIKHAYLOV. -NOSENKO. 9 “““recalled. the names of none of the .KGB: agents working -, Specifically, against [KLOSSON)0¢ He never read*any agent or... ;- ». surveillance ‘report. indicating that (KLOSSON| was engaged in 06 any. clandestine. activity. NOSENKO was unaware of [KLOSSOM's “), Job. in. the Embassy, whether “his family was ‘in Moscow OX _ @hy: other. féatures. of his peysonal lifé, of his travels 00" -\ ., amside the Soviet Union, the. identities ? Jl asso¢iates or any of his Soviet’ contacts. .NOSENKO never OE a be Mt OER OT a fomment: “(KLOSSON was ‘not a CIA officer and had’no -.., connection with CIA in Moscow. | “John ABIDIAN = °° ~ tional letters and visited. a dea «= Be 206) 2 eo 6884543 . 241 : : _ es ee TS Now: 197124. Top Secret’ 582 copy 10 "Resident" in Moscow; a of his close American ..°
14-9000, 5s. ap Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA. Although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961. f [Steve WASHENKO| (HASHENKS! was identified as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. Additionally, from a KGB micro- phone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly-after he returned from a field trip. Comment: [WASHENKO \was a CIA employee detached from his Washington overt assignment as an{économic or analyst) to be assigned to Moscow. ‘He was used there for limited operational support activity, including clandestine mailings. He reverted to overt CIA employment after his Moscow assignment, ‘Lewis BOWDEN ' BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons unknown to NOSENKO. KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover. Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA. GUCL514 242 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
. t - ‘FUNKHAUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because j _ “he was a specialist on the Soviet. Union, particularly on." Dus. ~. -.e¢onomie matters. NOSENKO remembered .thé names of no KGB’: | -  * agents working against #UNKHAUSEk, ‘nor any information about Po echim which was regarded.as derogatory by the KGB. : Comment: FUNKHAUSER ‘had no affiliation with CIA. 0° oo. 3 William HORBALY «0 00°" “>” HORBALY. was’ suspected of being’a CIA case officer or... “| cooptee because the KGB monitored. through. a:microphone in “  o “the Embassy his diécussion or dictation of observations made _ ff... 0n a field trip.°. NOSENKO knew. the names of no KGB agents. ‘working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ‘ever obtained: any. derogatory. information about him...The. KGB.did not try. to recruit HORBALY. .- "(bike WASHENKO), -HORBALY. was an overt employee’ -s. 8nd GconomicTanalyst. ‘of CIA before’ being.) 2.) : “appointed to a State Department position in... - - _ Moscow,. where he openly discussed the fact 9. | foreign Agricultural Service of. the Department of Agriculture. While in.» Moscow -HORBALY had NOW ‘connection with or knowledge of. CIA clandestine ne 7 . COCL515. 243 ; SE, os ae TS No. 197124 ., VopSeeret Copy 10 a a SO VBR
14-00000 . . Fop Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1942) George WINTERS | — | | WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given — ; special attention because of his operational activity in the { POPOV case (see p.207 ). KOVSHUK was in personal contact with WINTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs. In addition he was Overheard from a KGB microphone | dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip. Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer, CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB Stanley BROWN NOSENKO did not recognize BROWN's name, whose name was on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA in 1964, a list in- dicating that BROWN shared an office with HORBALY. In that office there was a KGB microphone providing good reception, but insignificant production. Comment: are Or ALY and |WASHENKO), BROWN was an overt employee of CIA ‘who was transferred to the De- — ~ partment of Agriculture prior to being assigned to the Embassy in.ifoscow. He was engaged in no clandestine activities during his tour. In T1960 ne-wvisitedsLeningrad with WINTERS, whom OSENKO correctly identified as a CIA officer. BROWN and anotner member_of_ the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR in 1961 ey 244 GUCL5SiG TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy , 2kR . nee TS TT
14-0000 | Top Secret ; ‘ry 1962) oo gpRTCANI EMBASSY | SECTION = January 1960- “January, 1962) _ ‘uu N. MOREL) oe “as given Ceenetipwas. not, suspected of: being a “CIA officer, ‘stivity. ‘in: the “OG ay wal contact =~ oe Foreign Af-- 0 40.4 : | | 3. microphone “coimelie? Gone vas | an. “overt ‘employee of CIA who was ne ves Bden tte bed: as such» to..the Soviet Ministry. of. he returned ror _Foreign Affairs prior: to his assignment. to. the Embassy as a Minister Counsellor. In —- | “attempting to. recruit (Franéis”~ “STEVENS } (see 490) 06 ca a KGB officer: allegedly commented to{STEVENS) ( oe Ob ee eerie acknowledged himself to > be - -a CIA employee. - KOVSHUK, .under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was cuueivaing QREEEg-S 06 - NOSENKO* identified ‘name as that ‘of an employee the Administrative Section of the Embassy. | Nothing. was © oe hose’ name. was, a4 list in-. one “In: that Oe” of “such as ‘his - ‘previous career, whethér he: 4) “‘Feception slew Rus en he arrived: or: departed: Moscow, or. where ‘a-lived: while there. ‘The KGB dia not” Suspect that he © was og a a” CIA officer. OO vas" an overt. ad :to the. ‘De- LWas | a. CIA ‘officer ' who. ‘served in Moscow i 96 s eing. assigne.. aa engaged in. . a oo -_ _ STSpecLrLre _— lis tour.) ; CVUIA MISSION Was" tO Support communica “? tions with PENKOVSKIY: inside. the: Soviet. Union. oS) From the start. of his tour he was active in '" attempts. to familiarize: himself with Moscow. _ and. he’ frequen’ “various areas of the - city on foot. (jé went to the vicinity of ‘the Pushkin’ Street deaddrop site on two occasions during. November and” December (1960, WINTERS, - whe . CIA officer... ibassy Staff. wots luring a-trip “7 2, - o0tEs 547. + ce gag oe 7 Ts No. igri Ce PAR TS No. 197124 Copy Top Secret’ “> 10
14-00000 Yop Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: (Continued) and examined the site itself on 21 Janu 1961. See p. 219.) Throughout his tour OS was subjected to intense KGB surveillance. On 25° October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I frnd this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to a barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only ~ inference is th B has at least strong OSsuspicions of primary role as a CIA officer." (ABIDIAN's own surveillance at the time was occasional and extremely discreet.) 2 lived throughout his tour in Moscow in America House, for which NOSFNKO's subordinate _ DEMKIN was. case officer and which NOSENKO had described as thoroughly pen by KGB agents among the local employees | _[spoke Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed him more than most Americans to KGB agents and informants among Embassy local employees..— Paul GARBLER GARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the names of no agents working against GARBLER. The KGB obtained no interesting information concerning GARBLER from microphones , telephone taps, or surveillance. NOSENKO "did not know" whether or not he had read GARBLER's file. -(It will be recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO sdid that all Service Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.) yj6& 246 GUCL518 | | | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —___
44-00000 . Tep Seeret "(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January. 1960-January -1962): ~ —° Comment: “The CIA ‘Chief of. Station. while in. 1. Moscow, oe a ‘GARBLER had been detailed d he served CI. from January 195 yo “AS d his naval. commission. ‘in 1955, . and © in 1956 he was assigned as a CTA officer to”. co gune 1961 and on: 31 August 1961 he was formally '~- proposed as a candidate for the position. ‘of _ Assistant Naval.Attache' in Moscow... .In. response .. toa request from the Soviet Naval Attache °° - -- @ffice’ in Washington, in September. 1961 GARBLER — _ forwarded-to-‘the Soviet Embassy an: official .. biographic. summary, followed by an official: *. :@all.on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER. . arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961. net Prior to his affiliation with CIA,- GARBLER * had served in Korea where he was acquainted — with George BLAKE...  GARBLER was a participant eéin the joint -CIA/MI~6. discussions in Washington. “in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE: had. a «. admitted passing to the -Soviets.. . (See pe oA). CIA thus assumed GARBLER. to have ‘been.’ identified “to .the KGB as a GIA-officer prior tovhis ">. . arvival in: ‘Moscow.. This assumption was confirmed by. an. article ‘appearing in Izvestiya in October: . 1963 in. which the author alleged - that GARBLER had earlier been involved in Subversion and. : espionage 2 See od an oS a TS No. 197124 Top Secret =~ Cory —l0_ | yee
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy: ummary and Conclusion With the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is most evident in the cases of[MORELE} and GARBLER. It is a 06. fact that both these individWals wére known to the KGB as CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware. His claim is thus false, that he would necessarily know whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated. Personal Handler of KGB Agents NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during 1960-1961. . mo YEFREMOV and VOLKOV -NOSENKO continued to manage these two. homosexual agents whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he trans- ferred to the American Department (see p.11l1). They were used in no operations during the period 1960-1961. [NOSENKO described the compromise of (Robert BARRETT] in 1959 and knew ()G of his later recruitment in T961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO does not know of | BARRETT|'s contacts with YEFREMOV and voLKov 0b in 1961, when he Claims” to have been their case officer.) 248 (6801520 Q TS No. 197124 3/8 Top Secret | Copy __
oo - oo : a . 7 Top Secret mo | (aMBRICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) Gams) ‘NOSENKO continued to. manage the Moscow manager ‘of ‘the oes “Expréss Company|,during the 1960-1961. period,.as “Re had earlier. during his assignment to the Seventh Depart ment. (See p. 137.) Seport ing on an uncooperative ‘and oo | eproductive source reporting on his acquaintances, in. the’ _ American. BMbassye ee gl ae © paTenyEy - NOSENKO' Ss “English: ‘and Japanese- -speaking agent. auring the “1955- 1960 Seventh Department period was employed in.the- Japanese Exhibition in. Moscow. (See p. 107.) . He was not ' used operational ty during 1960 or 1961. ~ Marina RYTOVA- 7 - NOSENKO' ‘s. “agent from 1956. or 1957 (see. p. 108) at the - ‘Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not. used | ‘» operationally during 1960- 1961. — : °LEVINA. was a language ‘teacher ‘and. ‘Librarian. at: ‘the - “Embassy. used as an informant. on her. American. language | '.. Students, .among whom were a number of code clerks. © She: “provided no. worthwhile - information. on any. American nor was - s.ghe ever used in operations. At’ the end of 1960 or the — _ beginning of 1961 she was fired by [Paul SMITH}, and NOSENKO 06” “ turnedsher. over to another Embassy - ection “officer. The. — . British, Department planned later to use her in either ‘the a British” or Canadian Embassies.” ' [LEVINA was employed at the - - Embassy from: Jahuary..1958. through. January 1962, [eultural, 0F 0S | Affairs ; Officer’ SuiTi) left Moscow. in- September, 1961, and ~ _: eould-not have been irectly involved in LEVINA's. termina~ tion. LEVINA thus was. employed..at..the Embassy throughout, | NOSENKO' s tour of. duty with, the Embassy Section.] , 7 Eset . 249 a eG 6) ‘Ts No. 197124. orn :  . Fop Secret te ‘Copy | _ 10
14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~- January 1960-January 1962) Os’ [PREISFREUND \ Recruited by KOVSHUK, PREISFREUND \was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against STORSBERG | (see p. 166). He was OG used in no other operation during 1960-1961. [werss) Ob ok The(Syrian Army captain| studying in Moscow was first targettéd against America House occupants, then used in 06 the development of ZUJUS], GTORSBERG}s successor Ot_The latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the Embassy Section in January 1962. Personal Handler of KGB Agents: Summary and Conclusion Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh Department assignment, none was used operationally during 1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy served throughout his Embassy.Section assignment and_was not fired earlier, as he asserted.()/PREISFREUND] and{ WEISS] (), are discussed in.considerable detail“in connection with . _the KGB operations against (STORSBERG and (ZUJUS).4 NOSENKO's claims regarding the agents he handled during the 1960-1961 period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy — Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or did not serve in the Embassy Section. OR 62301522 250 - TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —
a : Top | Secret. “- (aMBRICAN. EMBASSY SECTION .- January 1960-January 1962) —_ | Temporary Assignments Abroad - NOSENKO ‘claims that» the: was: scheduled. ‘to: travel ‘to. the ° United States in November "1960' (a trip: which was cancelled). - and- that he travelled’ to Cuba in November~December 1960 ° -and..to Bulgaria: in April-May ‘1961,. on KGB assignments. The. significance ‘of: his travel is the extent to which'it . relates to his. claimed position. and functions in ‘the’ Embassy » Section, - ‘and to operations. in. Moscow | for, which he claimed "supervisory responsibility... cs : Planned: Gravel ‘to. the. ‘United: states / In. ¢ one of the. ‘initial meetings ain 1962 ‘NOSENKO stated that he had been in the United States.. He later amended “this to:explain:that he had been. ‘scheduled to.make a txip- to the United States, but, that’ the trip had beén cancelled. He was to travel. under’ true name, he said, to avoid: being - connected to the: jiame NIKOLAYEV, under which he travelled . te the United Kingdom iin 1957 and 1958. -In.his early « account he ‘claimed -that the decision to use’ his true .name- was. his,. ‘personally; ° later he asserted that the decision: “Was. made by "the people in charge. of such operations" » NOSENKO:, stated: -‘tchat-he was -to travel under the. cover Of. an. employee. Of: ‘the. ‘State: Scientific- Technical ‘Committee ~ (GNTK}.,~and was.:to: accompany an. automotive. delegation. The’ visit, however, - was. part of the Soviet-U.S. exchange’: ce program,: and when the- visit was Postponed - in’ ‘A96t, , NOSENKO' s travel was cancelled. at. : oa sy *ahe | ‘name. ‘of ‘NOSENKO- ‘appeared along with: aL “i. others on a 20 October 1960 request to the: . Embassy. in. Moscow for visas: for. members. of. a Soviet automotive exchange ‘delegation .which - .:-was scheduled to visit the United States in . | November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as.an ~ CE, oo... /'.engineer. e:mployed by. the, State Selentific-. Poe eo a as Technical Committee ». , a "TS No. 197124. Yop Secret = Copy —10_
14-00000 Yep Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Travel to Cuba (November~December 1960) —— — eS ee eee cee rou as a security officer. NOSENKO's Information departure for Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, to find a suitable officer who could get his necessary immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa. October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation gac1524 252 When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in 1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the sont te NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his piesiings | activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy | there for operational possibilities. In subsequent versions NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name, and that - his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosptan, the Soviet State Pianning Commission, was preparing for consist-ing mostly of engineers from various sections of ‘the Soviet Union. Since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Depart- ment of the Second Chiéf Directorate decided it was unnec-~ essary to include a security officer. two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Direct- orate officer accompany the group. Because of the short time remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible _ travel documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been supposed to go to the United States and who hada valid passport (in true name). The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —____
‘alg « Top Secret - oe | GMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) | everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet repre- -. sentatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform ~ “to: discuss how to increase production: | NOSENKO's cover © /assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly - before departing Moscow he was:introduced to the other . “members as such... He. had -one agent within the delegation. | and developed several "confidential contacts" during the =. v«tripi ‘“NOSENKO would not have acceptéd: the assignment had: - he known how long and uneventful the trip was.to be; he 7 had really wanted to go only to the’ United States. wy -On his. return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a Special. | mission... As he.was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB. _ ! Legal Rezident in Cuba, A.I. :ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package _ vith instructions to deliver it to Moscow. \ NOSENKO did not. “th a . 2 age until -he arrived in — . Amsterdam en route home, . There’.the wrappings became. loose it was -bound only by. thin string) and NOSENKO took the - .- “Opportunity to. determine -that it contained copies of "letters . between idikoyan and Khrushchev concerning the prices. of::° |. .- Sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and . ‘East Germany, Bulgaria,. Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. On 2 9) ‘arrival at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that @ message had been received from the Central Committee of |: the Communist Party vastructing that the. package was to be . elivered’ "urgently" to Che Guevara, who was touring Eastern“. Lot Furope:.and was then. in Berlin. While'the delegation continued. Trg o. Moscow, .NOSENKO.was driven to the Soviet Embassy dns es ane Hague, and in the late evening -of his. second day in The | Cher] s he le in fi East Berlin. When he © a Hungary, one aoe vera was found to have left Berlin for.” Hungary, ‘and NOSENKO Gelivered the papers to "Guevara's. yin. Berlin .and continued: nto Moscow. :) ee by CIA, which ‘include h Amsterdam and Caracas ervice passport and’: _confirm. that .NOSENKO, transitted Amsterdam én ember 1960, was in’. “ O£ NOSENKO's true name RLS passport. photograph, iy) @, “minerals: engineer", "route to Cuba on. 15°-Nov ge 6001525 Se ye TS No.197124 2 .. Yop Secret Copy 10
14 (0000 ee an at Desk ot Comment: asserted he . - [professor Horace G. LUNTI. . 6001526 254 Top Secret . (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962} (Continued) Dy Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas for Havana on 19 November. According to flight manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December, NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport; he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is . thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a courier, bearing documents of the nature he. described as he claimed, . NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States “and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his claim that he was supervising Operations during this period against Embassy code clerks in Moscow. The trip occurred at the time his alleged target, State Department code clerk fn Ob fMoRONE, was to be entrapped on the train en route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November) in connection with another code clerk target, [John GARLAND}. ob fravel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961) . - | In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent. to Sofia as a-KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (MVR) request that’ the KGB provide a Second Chief: Directorate American Department officer to discuss opera- tions with Bulgarian counterparts. While in Sofia NOSENKO played a key role in the compromise of American Ol NOSENKO's Information Consultation with the MVR NOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow. YEGOROV 2168 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
MER PRMEI RICAN. ‘EMBASSY SECTION | - January 1960- “January 1962) oe, said that. ‘the Bulgarian Minister of’ the Interior. had 7 oe “requested. the-KGB Chairman to provide-an officer. from the. “pmerican Department of the Second Chief Directorate: for — -. consultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia. ' cAmerican Department. Chief KLYPIN subsequently. instructed . “NOSENKO to -go.. “ NOSENKO » was told, that -he-was going for “consultations” ‘and that KGB ‘advisors would ‘discuss his-. - “g@uties with him. . ‘KLYPIN ‘told NOSENKO only that he should ‘see -how the MVR worked, “and. ‘tell them how the KGB: managed | “3¢s operations.. NOSENKO - ‘had no meetings or discussions with - MVR representatives in. Moscow before his departure,.and~ . knew nothing. about the size. or responsibilities: ‘of the MVR - American Department, ‘the names of any MVR’ officers, or. what, aoe MVR’ S. :particular Problems, [WeXE c, " NOSENKO ‘flew ‘from: Moscow: ‘to. Sofia in. early: April 1961 and was met. at the airport - by A.s. KOZLOV, a ‘former Second ‘Chief Directorate: officer whom he had. known'.in’ Moscow. The following’ morning: he ‘was picked up- in.an official . - vehicle and.was- taken. to. KOZLOV's: office in. the Bulgarian “MVR buildings: -NOSENKO: ‘asked KOZLOV: what was expected of © “him and was ‘told. that "they want.to know about. how to work  -° against. the. American: Legation,: everything, right from. a letter: TAH NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB . at _ advisor in Sofia, Mikhail ‘YEGOROV, -and to the Chief of ‘the’ “UMVR's American:.Department, after. which he. was” assigned |.an.. office: in the MVR: building.’. During. the ensuing weeks he “, discussed both general: matters and particular cases with: _ andividual Bulgarian officers working. against the American 5 .targete:. On: “one .occasion he’. lectured interested MVR. officers. Loe - On the:® ‘principles of operations against ‘foreign military. - oo oypersonnel ‘in ‘Moscow, and‘ on another he visited an MVR. surveillance’ post‘ opposite the. American: Legation... ‘He OP ~discussed--KGB methods of - operations against foreign. tourists.» or. He also addressed’ the’ entire..American. Department: for. about : Eive | hours to. teli ‘them, "what is-necessary;, what to pay attention to, how to work". At the end of his. visit, some _ time-in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the. First Deputy: . Minister of the MVR about. what had been accomplished and |. Als recommendations for improving operations. against Americans. - BEE oe a on co oe TS No. 197124. ee oe - » Top Secret: Oo Copy: —10_ ;
Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~- January 1960-January 1962) Comment: NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to consult with the MVR in Bulgaria. As far- as is known to CIA, such consultation was a function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom | NOSENKO himself described. The American “Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demon- strated that it had lost none of its earlier : demonstrated efficiency in controlling the votre activities of resident foreigners and in © establishing the basis for mounting operations against American diplomats. There was no apparent necessity for NOSENKO's Sofia assign- ment, and therefore his account is judged to be untrue. , Compromise of Lunt | a | Ob In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of ([uont in graphic, terms, including his own personal confron- _ “€ation of LundM In his subsequent accounts he had stated Nothat while he never saw LUNT\ personally, he supervised the activities of the MVR officérs who dealt with [LUNT) About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across the name of \Horace G. LUN?) NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic linguist of ‘that name had™been reported to him in Moscow by VOLKOV or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual. When MVR af officers confirmed that this[LUNT] was a Slavic specialist, Ub NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow. _An almost immediate reply confirmed that this was the same (LUNT/ who DG had visited Moscow previously, and that he was a Homosexual. (The KGB had never exploited its knowledge off LUNT's homo- (6 sexual activities and the MVR had not known that LUNT |was Og a homosexual.) ol 0301598 206 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
See gee - (AMERICAN JENDRSSY SEEN - vanvaty 29g enuaty 1962) > rn KOZLOV and ‘the Chief of. the. MVR American , Department “s were very interested in NOSENKO*s lead, and KOZLOV appealed © So to. -NOSENKO- for his. help, since "the MVR had never ‘recruited - > an. American". ‘The ‘three discussed: the matter with General. _DUMKOV,. the. Chief. of. ‘the ‘MVR Second: Chief Directorate; and | . NOSENKO suggested ‘that.a° MVR homosexual agent should be employed, . an- apartment . prepared, and preparations made. for -Glandestine. photography - They then advised YEGOROV,,. the --genior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called . GRIBANOV in Moscow. . GRIBANOV prohibited “NOSENKO's personal involve~ _ -ment in the entrapment. wi cece ‘NOSENKO's’ role thereafter. - was merely advising” ‘the MVR oO ficers, “who didn't know what .- to dome. wa mS es : ‘NOSENKO | “suggested that ‘the. ‘MVR officers get ‘two. oo “homosexual agents, since "maybe [LUNT|wouldn' t like one “of Ok ._ them", and” he advised them to weigh the time element in - :  aeciding whether 0. entrap(LUNT|with a view to attempting 06 ~ £0 recruit. him. at once, or merely to obtain evidence for — later blackmail.:. “The MVR. American: Department Chief and his . _ Tourist” Section chief.were’ to attempt the recruitment... : 5 “; NOSENKO remained .in /a. MVR office where he could -be reached | by telephone - in the event. the MVR officers needed ' further, assistance." oy Ley . a eae . “WosiNKO“1¢amed éxom the: MVR - officers involved’ ‘that. the recruitment. had ;been- successful, and that \L LUNT had ita greed to meet them: again on the. following da SENKO 2. (ow arrangements Oe : ‘later was told. that ‘the MVR. did not give({CLUNTpa for a contact: in.the ‘United | States because he was. expected. ‘to return to Bulgaria: for, a. ‘Slavic. Banguage.. conference. in. "1962. ‘Or | “1963. cod Information | Gove exaverica ‘@irectly | ‘Exom. Sofia: to. ‘Belgrade and. there. an ..May 1961 he reported. to American Ambassador’ George © oa Kennan and to. CIA that he had’ been ‘recruited under. duress. 7 by the MVR. in: Sofia on 5. May. After being entrapped. with ae homosexual and. accepting recruitment, he iwas instructed -:. to meet clandestinely with a MVR ‘officer in Paris, en-route .. back to the United States. He was given ho other tasks. CO “18:1 No. 197124 | ‘Too Secret Copy LO
ria wate Tlte Fite ees a rar | GICL530 ‘ 258 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) Ob [LUNT| stated that while on an earlier trip to Sofia in November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions. He had ‘given ALEKSIEV American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to sell on the blackmarket. Once, while in LUNT}'s company, Ob ALEKSIEV had been reccgnized and questionéd by the Bulgarian civil police.0{LUNT| corresponded with ALEKSIEV after departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia. OL - Comment: [LUNT? s account refutes NOSENKO's claims that the MVR had no evidence of LUNT}s vulnerability (6 prior to receiving NOSENKO'S information in May 1961, and that NOSENKO*s personal partici- pation in the MVR operation was such that he knew that/LUNT])was given no MVR contact in the United States. ()o NOSENKO's involvement in the [LUNT|case is unrelated to the assignment he claims at the time. Although NOSENKO cites the LUNT \case inO6 . connection with his Embassy Section duties, . . it resembles most of all a Seventh Department operation. . — - NOSENKO"'s presence in Sofia in May 1961 . (when he claims his operation against [STORSBERG 06 was approaching a climax and when his Subor- dinates were apparently planning to exploit bb (kEYSERS) newly-discovered vulnerability) _ indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow. was dispensable, The (LUNT\case is thus not ( evidence supporting NOSENKO' s claims regarding Embassy Section ‘service in April-May 1961, nor regarding supervisory responsibility for all American code clerk operations. Ue TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
“(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ~ January 1960-January 1962) ~ - Promotion. and Transfer to ‘the: “NOSENKO , stated that. his return to. the seventh. ‘Department - -yesulted from -GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy , (Chief. of the Embassy | Section to Deputy Chief of the. whole . American Department, °. However, according to NOSENKO, the .- "new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, warited as his ~ - deputy KOVSHUK,. NOSENKO's superior. Under. the circumstances, . ~.. NOSENKO.. said he. ‘preferred ‘to. be. transferred back to the. ae _« Seventh. Department, in any capacity. NOSENKO: ‘reported that» oo He spoke to Seventh-Department Chief V.D.. CHELNOKOV, and the. latter proposed’ that: NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV. to be returned to. «the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section, = with ‘the understanding “that he ‘would: be’ appointed Deputy - “ "Chief of ‘the. Seventh Department. as soon as. the incumbent: deputy » [B.A, in BALDIN retired in July 1962. ' NOSENKO asserted -..i his proposal was. made and’ approved by GRIBANOV. in September ‘or October. 19615. GRIBANOV,. according to ‘NOSENKO, -néver -), indicated his reasons - for. planning, to appoint: him. Deputy. - * Chief, of the American Department. or. for. later promoting him to. Section: Chief’ and. then’ Peputy Chief. of ‘the | Seventh Depart~ : , is. impending ‘transfer, Starting in: Deceinber — $61. NOSENKO. ‘said he. spent. several hours’ each. day in the. Seventh. Department; :There he, stated he talked with. Depart~_ ment.Chief: ‘CHELNOKOV y. familiarized. himself with certain. files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed. current operations .and: ‘operational possibilities with ‘the officers- assigned’ to this. section. °. NOSENKO said the formal order for the- transfer. was: signed by-GRIBANOV on ‘24 or.25 December. . “1961,. and within: the: next. few days NOSENKO officially.signed- over the. ABIDIAN. case ‘file and the. Embassy, security file. to: vhis successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy ‘Section, ..° -: ©. GRYAZNOV.”..:As ‘he: had. when he transferred into the ‘American’ Department’ in, 1960, ‘NOSENKO said he took his active agents . with him when. he: returned’ to the Seventh Department... Se 259 . ee a a TS No. 197124 oo. Top Secret Copy A.
14-00000 Top Secret (AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962) Comment: NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring "before. GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists. a occurred in mid-January 1962 even after. learning from CIA that the correct date is 15 December 1961. Obliged to take the latter date into account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing chronology of his departure from the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Seventh Department. Repeated interro- gation has never resolved the reason NOSENKO attached so much significance to the date on which he believes GOLITSYN defected. In claiming to have transferred from the Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962 (when his participation in the Seventh Depart , ment compromise of |W.E. JOHNSON jis confirmed) Jb NOSENKO's account makes it impossible for him to have played the role he claimed in the events - connected with ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. (See p- 216.) NOSENKO's assertion that he was GRIBANOV's candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the American Department is implausible. . In contrast to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished 7 performance, KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief of the American Department who had been personally _invotved in such American Department operations of the previous decade as recruitments of Roy | RHODES and Dayle SMITH, and the development of CIA officers WINTERS and MORELL\. and the interro- (fF gation of CIA officer LANGELLE, and the more recent attempt to recruit |STORSBERG. ()(_ s/BR 260 — G0CL532 : TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy __— j
- :. Top Secret _ "(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION '- January 1960-January 1962) _ +» DEPUTY CHIEF of the AMERICAN. EMBASSY SECTION - 1960~-1962:. a a _' ; Summary and Conclusion ns -". Aécording to NOSENKO, between January 1960 -and January: “21962 he was Deputy Chief.of the American Embassy Section, .in which capacity he was. occasional Acting Chief, super--. ‘visor of all operations against code clerks: and ‘for some - ‘months. service attaches, case officer for priority KGB me -target ABIDIAN, custod-ian of. the Embassy security file, and . «reviewer of all information obtained. from microphones ~ |... | “emplaced in the Embassy. From a comparison of NOSENKO's | “'.assertions,.amendments, and retractions with collateral '.. information, he was none of these. Further, while he may. _.have béen familiar. with the activities: of. some agents of - the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in. . the manner nor circumstances he claimed: * From‘his position as Deputy Chiéf NOSENKO claims. complete ‘knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among -* Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961.and thereafter, of CIA personnel’ identified by the KGB.on the Embassy staff,-.-. | and. of the status of the KGB. cryptologic attack on Embassy: 7.) ‘communications, His. apparent ignorance of -KOVSHUK's rela-~°- ae Sionship with{MORELUQ and .KOSOLAPOV's connection with (GARLAND| OG refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB- recruitment attempts; that he was:seemingly unaware of such events. while. Deputy Chief demolishes. his claim that he- would. ~ necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned — elsewhere.:' Contrary: to his claim, NOSENKO does not: know of.” CIA personnel on’ the Embassy staff who were identified: by the KGB. NOSENKO-\s information on the KGB cryptologic ....:-: attack. réflectis'.no. special knowledge;. it is superficial and ane Conclusion” © NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy i0n nor a supervisor in ‘that Section. — aa Sect a Se) 8001533 ee TS No. 197124 Top Secret 7 | Copy _-10 |
14-00000 Comment: Top Secret CHAPTER VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ‘January 1962 to January 1964; © By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist agent program in the USSR. The information ocb- tained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, in-- cluded accurate details of the objectives and targets of those Operations, as well as the _ practices employed for the selection, recruit- ment, training and briefing of the agents in- volved. As a probable consequence of reports received from BLAKE as well as by the indepen- dent confirmation of tourist agents identified in the USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all of its resources to counter the threat. The KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase in bona fide tourists to the Soviet Union, the numbers of which were increasing by thousands annually. Evidently uncertain of the success of domestic measures it was taking, the KGB © extended responsibility for countermeasures to KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Direc- torate. To that end, selected First Chief Directorate residencies abroad were instructed to exploit all of its facilities ‘in developing tourist agent countermeasures. In describing the magnitude of its tourist agent problem, KGB Headquarters cited the scores of American - tourist agents who had been identified in just. one year in the’ Soviet Union. In fact, by the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department in January 1962, the threat against which the KGB was deploying had passed. By early 1961 the tourist agent pro- gram was suspended when technical collection programs and other agent operations made the use of tourists unnecessary. — The statements of NOSENKO with respect to Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department counterintelligence operations among American CUUL 534 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 _ 263
14-00000 Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~— January 1962-January i964) Comment: (Continued) . tourists during this period must be examined in light. of the foregoing facts. Since NOSENKO claims to have held key KGB positions from which vantage he asserts he was particularly well informed about KGB operations against American tourists, it is appropriate to hold him closely accountable for his statements... NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department, . first as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the entire Department, extended from January 1962 until his de- fection in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO re~ turned to the Seventh Department for this assignment, the KGB reorganization of 1959 had been completed, and according to NOSENKO, the Department was divested of all of its former functions unrelated to tourists. A newly-created Service ‘sluzhba), NOSENKO explained, assumed responsibility for foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union, and persons: travelling to the USSR to visit relatives. The Seventh Department's former responsibilities for operations against foreign seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth were similarly transferred elsewhere. In addition to performing supervisory and administrative | duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally was involved with KGB operations launched against six Ameri- 7 can tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey ' OSWALD and of a disaffected KGB colleague from the American Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV. In this period, also, he travelled on two occasions to Geneva on missions unrelated to his Seventh Department. duties. OF . Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed full awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists. — 6004535 264 a | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
”. (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~'Janvary 1962-Ganvary 1964) ~ “Chief of the. American-Brit British Commonwealth: Section ve | (ganvary = y - July 1962): ; _— AS ‘Chief’ of the: ‘Amex ican- -British Commonwealth Section -NOSENKO | said he was responsible for planning and coordinating - all KGB activities against American. fand British. and. .Canadian: tourists in the‘USSR as. well. as for supervising the operaticn- lal: work of. fifteen subordinate case officers. He had no no deputy, - sand - he. did not. indicate who assumed Ris: duties in his| absence. He required several months at. the beginning of .1962 to."“get, the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" ‘on his part in the ‘initial. ‘period on this new job. In mid- February 1962,:within a.few weeks of his transfer, he. began ‘preparations for his assignment to Geneva’ with the Disarma- ment. Delegation... This involved ‘discussions with the Eleventh . ‘as well as with.case officers. ‘responsible for the investiga- tion: of one particular. ‘Soviet delegate to Geneva, .SHAKHOV- — “NOSENKO. claimed that his preparations. for his trip were only | ‘part-time and ‘in addition to his other ‘regular. duties. . He spent his. ‘early. weeks talking to case officers;. reviewing. reports of:the section's activities’ during the previous two. years, and ‘a€iscussing. plans~for™ the coming tourist: season. He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist. /firms: ‘in. Moscow. with an eye “to their recruitment bythe’ KGB, proposal which was” accepted. {NOSENKO elsewhere attributed “the proposal to his earlier’ assignment.- in:the Tourist. Depart—_ “ment: in 1958- 1960,. which. he alleged resulted in the! reccults | ent. of Jearprey. 1 06 NOSENKO' s- Agents. NOSENKO claimed that ‘when’ he ‘transferred. to: the. Seventh | handling. in. the. American | Department, Embassy Section: Arsene ‘rxrpes) ob hy ‘pb. “. Gmierican ‘pupress manager VRESPSE) departed - £ £om" Moscow - in-early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he. continued to be the : “Second: Chief’ Directorate. case officer since(FRIPPEL| had no 0S. “contact with the KGB in’ New York Citys and that he“met a b ERIPPED twice f in. the USSR in® 1963. According | to, NOSENKO, oe co ae coots36. : Is No. 197124 ~ ‘Tep Secret. - Copy — 10 Soviet. Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate, — Department — he. brought. with him the: agents. which he had- been. © a ee ee
14-00000 but did n Top Seeret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) FRIPPEL| was a weak agent: “he was afraid and gave Ppracti- Cally nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, “honestly Speaking, [FRIPPEI] was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL|] would be reassigned to MOS~ p/ cow at some future date- (See p.137 for details of the (ERrereD case.) 0b | Comment: (FRIPPET] agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice ,. - in the USSR in 1963, However, [FRIPPEL| asserts 06 he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. PRIPPEL] is. known py, to have planned to travel to ¢t Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. | Johannes PREISFREUND | Johannes PREISFREUND The KGB considered (PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence -after GOLITSYN's defection {in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em- — ‘bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take (BREISFREUND|with him when he transferred to the Seventh De- partment. “As the agent spoke only Pinnishildna Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO |. met with [PREISFREUND| the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, ot use him in any operations, Comment: [ERETSPRMVRD] asserts that he was no longer a KGB — agent after the [STORSBERG operation (see p.175,0¢ and that although he saw NOSENKO on his freguent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking. , 266 wife CUUL537 | 4 egg No. 197124 foep Secret Copy
14-00000 pen a Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964) VOLKOV and YEFREMOV According to NOSENKO, he used the two homosexual , agents in the entrapment of [W.E. JOHNSON| several days after le returning to the Seventh Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, because they were employed in no operations during the entire period he was their case officer while assigned to the Embassy Section. After the Ob JOHNSON| entrapment, these agents were not used again. NO- © ENKO claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives. (For details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's activities see p.110 Comment: There is evidence that VOLKOV was invclved in . € KGB entrapment operation directed against American tourist (William J. ZUBON}in July MIS 1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his case officer), an event of which NOSENKO ap- parently is uninformed. | Samih werss | . After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed he was instructed also to continue directing! Syrian j| 6 military officer WEISS], who was targetted against military ! Olcode clerk [ZUJUS\ (seep. 161 ). NOSENKO continued to meet 06 {WEISS| during the first months of,,1962, and in February or March_he attempted to have (WEISS arrange a social affair . Howith ZUJUS |so that another KGB agent could be introduced to - the code clerk. Just_before leaving for Geneva for the first time, NOSENKO turned |WEISS\"éver to. GRYAZNOV, NOSENKO's suc- . cessor as Deput Chief of the American Department Embassy. we Section. (WEISS! was scheduled.te finish his studies in Moscow | in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to _ . [Syria | \{ Comment: Because of the political climate in \syraal there has been no opportunity to query WEI S\ regarding NOSENKO's allegations. ™~ Ob. 6004538 BE anal] Fm Pe) 267 TS No. 197124 Top Secret | Copy 19 Bendeiatd
14-00000 O¥lze Top Secret (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT ~ January 1962-January 1964) Marina RYTOVA Until-1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the Institute for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all agent work. Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was offi-~ cially registered.as her case officer until his defection in 1964. NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and Conclusion NOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sus- tain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department opera- tions. Operational Activities (January - June 1962) As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department during the period. January-July 1962 NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of (W.E. JOHNSON | Ob in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his asser-. tion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY. Shortly after his return to Moscow in June he claimed he recruited {Horst BRAUNS\, OL Entrapment of {W.E." JouNsON] ) a NOSENKO's Information . Q NOSENKO first referred to GOHNSON) in Geneva in 1962, when he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been used in the homosexual entrapment of a tourist, (JOHNSON) a (9h young Baptist from California The KGB was angered that the erican was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union. Although, the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy. 268 TS No. 197124 Go04539 | . Top Secret Copy 4/8
FH 4-90000 Top Secret ; : | (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT. 7 dannne! eearvaeniney 2904 ook “In February 1964 NOSENKO. produced | among ether notes ‘which me he had brought with him_to a meeting with CIA (see p.319}) | “one bearing the name of |Evérett ' Sees the. b ‘date -"5. January 1962"... Quéstioned about the note, SENKO |. ‘recalled the significance’ ‘of neither the name nor. the’ ‘date, ‘and. stated that the Gase was nota recruitment but "Some . sort _ Of: | developmental. operation). : ot . “-NOSENKO next mentioned [GOHNSON| on 17 April 1964. Ale though. not immediately recalling[J OHNSONT's name, he Pe oiwol remembered that it was something Tike: [JOuNSoN} or (JOHNSTON): and 0G ob that he was'{[a Baptist from the” g tike (JOH coast} iy NOSENKO « . placed the operation sometimé in the summér of 1962, after’ his: ‘Yeturn to. Moscow: from Geneva, ‘because he. also remembered. he. wore no: overcoat at the. time. Hof OHNSON), who had come to the we Soviet. Union as a tourist, . ‘Was. Tiscov sred to be. a homosexual, -andon this basis the KGB Sec snd Chief Directorate considered chim. as a recruitment target.(b The. Second Chief Directorate on ane ENG was not: ‘interested » in JOHNSON |as | an agent because he had: no; access. to’. -important information and he lived too far from the ‘KGB Legal. ‘Residencies. in: the, United States for convenient con- — tact. be several. days later KGB “surveillance » observed [SORNSON) . ailing. ‘some letters: in Moscow...°-When: read by the KGB they: were ‘found to be '"so- bitter. toward the Soviet Union,: -ANGLY ," itical, ‘that the. KGB decided - something. had to be done": to’ 7 revent his’ writing letters and making anti-Soviet. statements -on “his ‘xéturn, to .the United: States.p| "At about the same time”... -theré was“'some’ sign that (GOHNSON}:was ‘a homosexual, and it was” | ecided; to entrap him on this basis. ... The sole reason. was: fon : alt(s GOHNSON) s-, criticism of the USSR... No recruitment.'was ‘to | - ; ‘tempted because: neither. the. First nor the Second: Chief - ee KGB had. concluded that he. was unlikely to accept. recruitment OSENKO: did -not know. why -he was. ‘selected to make the approach | 0 (ZoHNSON, ° ‘except that "BOBKOV said’ I should: go." (NOSENKO . id he had ‘reported on duty inthe. Seventh Department. only | ‘the Gay! before... F.D.. BOBKOV,. a Deputy Chief of the Second: ‘Chief. Directorate, supervised the activities of the Seventh ‘Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual. agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. ere selected to. ‘compromisey, JOHNSON) “conse 269 aa ce TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 | | ER