RSPR S a RI a A OE TILA SA RIT SOE RET SAR ST SAT BR eet eres ni —_ : ae Shackled to the political old guard of the right, the ie true | . FBI has interpreted its latitude in civil rights narrowl 3 itably P g y 7 ’ a) and failed to apply the “tricks of the trade,’ as Hoover A O ove ir h a S 7 lo refers to FBI techniques, quite as enthusiastically as in | kidnappings, bank robberies and other pet crimes. Thus “a ‘Styles has the director remained loyal to the powerful faction g rown mM O r e y later under whose aegis he has stood firm through the treach- - Wiley | erous shifting sands of a half dozen administrations. distant and Ts ) . . . | ppi. it Indeed, it may have been these entangling alliances of : ‘forty years’ standing that prompted Senator Everett actices . M. Dirksen of Illinois to introduce a bill limiting the ee f. & BS : a in term of future directors to fifteen years (another pro- U n a i. p r O a C h a b | e enneth vision of the 1962 bill: appointment to the post must ‘ill that ¢ ¢ Confirmed by both the President and Congress). The same sacrosanct longevity that has allowed aking Hoover’s parochialism to color official policy has gen- ie IS THIS UNTOUCHABILITY, this realization of a supine e Ken. rated serious internal difficulties in the Bureau. For . 4 Congress, that is most disturbing to the agents. Cer-: istence the past decade and longer, agents in the field have tainly, they agree, a bureau chief must have full author- seat on 4 Viewed with misgivings a definite trend: Hoover has __ ity, but it must be tempered by higher authority. It is rd. grown more distant and unapproachable, more acutely _ basic to our democratic processes that Congress eval- wuthern sensitive to his own image and more insensible to the uate the manner in which government agencies — par- wing 4 problems of the field. ticularly police agencies — discharge their public trust, ck Le 4 AShistorical precedent would suggest under thiscon- _ but evaluation requires information, and the looming station | dition, a cult of the personality has sprung up about figure of J. Edgar Hoover has effectively choked off ag, Le. the director. Traditionally, the cultists are those who the unorthodox voice. The FBI operates at its own . stwhile q Tequire the institution more than it requires them. It pleasure, unrestrained by customary checks and i rustean 4 13S been their formula to isolate The Man from the _ balances. iolitical 4 gfass roots and instill a megalomania about his office. So it would be the agents’ preference that the new Thus “embarrassment to the Bureau” (read: “...to J. face in the director’s chair be a moré anonymous face. d. | Edgar Hoover’’) has become the cardinal sin, and fear = There are other reasons: they do not consider it the inched | °f Committing that sin, however indeliberate, has trans- place of a police chief to mold public opinion, but to sbe” of formed the Bureau into a society bordering on the implement it, and frequently disagree with tentative nternal | Paranoiac. Every agent has witnessed its syndromes: public statements of Hoover that are beyond the | amittee for example, veteran agents slipping out the back door bounds of FBI interest yet carry the weight of his ded air) When a bank robbery alarm sounds, not out of fear of _ official position. And they are a bit chagrined by the facing a gunman but out of fear of a situation loaded = Hollywoodization of the FBI, feeling that constantly re with potential of “embarrassment to the Bureau.’ Every trying to live up to an image detracts from investigative ch was} 2gent has seen its irrational wrath: the agents who had § objectivity. Icasting | # hand in the Oswald file were censured, suspended If they had their say, the agents would insist that amunist | 22d transferred despite Hoover’s public protestations \ their new boss be a professional law enforcement officer 4 called | that the Warren Commission was wrong and the FBI and did{ WS blameless. As each agent knows, there have been far too many _ ter equipped to understand and deal logically with the —a man of substantial field experience, not merely an organizer and administrator — so that he would be bet- Ernest capable men lost through this attitude, but as he also problems of the field. As they are aware, this qualifica- nerican | Knows, anything less than complete obsequity labels tion would eliminate as candidates the so-called Anony- > sacred him'a “disruptive influence;’ the mortal culpability in mous Nine —the assistant directors reporting directly ; sinned} 2 bureaucracy. And this is economic: he simply cannot _ to Hoover. per” : afford to see the doors of industry and commerce slam There is not a paucity of able candidates. One who " About shut at Hoover’s frown. Moreover, and perhaps more —_ comes immediately to mind is Richard V. Ogilvie, the ‘ge Lin- to the quick, there is nothing to be gained by candid _ outstanding sheriff of Cook County (Chicago). Ogilvie ad John expression. I once discussed this dilemma with several emerged from World War II duty as a tank commander Pacifical. ™embers of Congress. Representative of their collective and Purple Heart recipient to earn a reputation as a ed over] ‘“isposition was the comment of Senator Henry Jackson _ tough and incorruptible foe of organized crime, spear- etuam of Washington: “Congress long ago awarded Hoover _ heading midwestern operations of the Attorney Gen- . | such sweeping powers it is now powerless to do _ eral’s Special Group that investigated and prosecuted an : . . : anything about it?’ the Cosa Nostra overlords who conspired at Apalachin RAMPARTS e MARCH 1965 7
i i i j 1 H 7 “HW 54756 DoclTd: 32245514 Page 33 [Piweetmamene ict Nmacty Sees th As ENS ee ad C4 Bs eNO Lib Latins LEE OTN fe neon Aaa NAAN PFW a AOA Ne et sn nent neck tas 4 eine ran oe in 1957, Despite being relatively unknown, Ogilvie recently was singled out by Life magazine as one of the hundred most important Americans under age forty. Many others of his calibre are available. A number of factors weigh on the FBI’s future makeup. Perhaps the most vital is whether the agency should continue to be burdened with both criminal and security duties. The combination is unique: no other major power in the world houses these totally unrelated functions under one roof. Originally they were blended by chance: Roosevelt found it convenient, under the exigencies of impending war, to drop security in the FBI’s lap. Practically, however, the two fields are as immiscible as oil and water. Techniques that catch bank robbers and car thieves don’t necessarily catch spies. Coun- terespionage is a subtle cat-and-mouse game totally unsuited to the cop mentality that tends to be heavy- handed and light-thinking. The FBI was designed as a crimebusting agency and remains so orientated —I have seen agents detached from security duties to help in programs to bolster lagging criminal statistics. Agents are not selected for any particular adaptability to counterespionage work and are frequently rotated to different assignments. True, the Bureau has thoroughly infiltrated Com- munist Party ranks. But the CP is essentially an overt olitical activist organization, not to be confused with the cloak-and-dagger Soviet spy apparatus whose so- phisticated operatives work under strict orders never to risk exposure by contact with the Party. The FBI's slate against the real pros — the “illegals” who slip into the country surreptitiously — is not reassuring. In only one instance has the Bureau been able to ferret out an illegal completely on its own, without tips from the CIA or other sources (the agent who accomplished the feat was shortly afterward ousted from the service for contesting personnel policy). Another factor bearing on counterespionage efficacy is liaison. Under current delimitations the CIA, answer- able for worldwide intelligence and counterespionage, cannot tread on the FBI’s toes at home: theoretically, CIA can’t even chase a spy around Foggy Bottom but must call in the G-men. Thus, in a field in which the tiniest scrap of information may crack a whole spy ‘ring, the inherently awkward process of liaison must be relied upon. Obviously, all hinges on total magna- nimity of exchange. Yet the same obstacle looms as with Secret Service in Dallas: interagency jealousies and friction. As veteran Washington reporter Andrew Tul- ly puts it in his book The CIA: An Inside Story: “It is a fact that over the years the CIA and the FBI have not always regarded each other with the warmth of kissing cousins.’ In the long run it might prove advantageous to trans- fer the FBI’s counterespionage obligations to the CIA, , 72 RAMPARTS ¢ MARCH 1965 ERT EL PET SL DIPSET PVA TE SM ters A Te FESGRY ANGST SIT aT which specializes in the type of work and recruits its agents because of particular qualifications. Addition- ally, this would release the FBI to concentrate more intently on today’s Public Enemy Number One organized crime. / Since the thirties the face of major league crime has changed drastically. The egomaniac Dillinger would spin is his grave to know that housewives, plumbers, salesmen and mechanics now infest the bank robbery field and that auto theft is largely the sport of juvenile joyriders. A self-respecting professional hoodlum now only enters a bank to deposit a bagful of revenue from the lucrative organized rackets that range from labor racketeering and illegal gambling to business extortion and high-class prostitution. : The FBI, by virtue of its afluence and prestige, is the logical agency to be thrust at the vanguard of a con- certed program to wipe out the syndicates. But under Hoover the Bureau has been a reluctant dragon: it is one of the more perplexing paradoxes of history that ma- jor crime and the FBI have flourished simultaneously. Hoover clearly wanted no part of the fight: he alter- nately claimed that organized crime didn’t exist or shunted it aside as a local problem. Bobby Kennedy knew better; when he became At- torney General he was brimful of determination that something should be done. The something hevhad long advocated was a national crime commission to direct the effort. But out of deference to the sensibilities of Hoover, who acted grossly offended by proposals to create a separate agency to do the job he demeaned, Kennedy resorted to the devious means of setting up an anti-organized crime nerve-center within the De- partment of Justice. It was not a very likely base, but as a pro tem measure to resolve the stalemate Kennedy's brainchild has been remarkably effective, hinting at what is in store when the FBI finally sounds the clarion call to battle. : A genuine offensive against organized crime would entail cooperation between police groups along the bat- tle line — federal, state and local. In turn this would necessitate a rapprochement between the FBI and the others, who have come to resent its highhandedness and air of superiority. Fourteen years ago Senator Estes Kefauver, after hearing the bleat of police officials throughout the country in the course of his commit- tee’s rackets probe, concluded that exchange of infor- mation was pretty much a “one-way street” running in the FBI’s direction. For the most part this feeling has smouldered subsurface — few police officials will talk about it openly — principally because the local agencies depend on the Bureau for fingerprint and laboratory services and for invitations to the prestigious FBI Na- tional Academy. But recently it erupted in open feud- ing: the Los Angeles police were fuming mad over the FBI’s shroud of secrecy in the Frank Sinatra, Jr. kid A AAR OBA HOO IS: nappir over | fugitis aware being exact] Thi: eral w extens their c nation with t for the ment 1 ping a1 some local 5 to larg traffic approy move | ameas ing ser tive cr Fina teratec of bla figure politic: cess isr sometin The
Uits its dition : <apping; the California Highway Patrol was incensed wer tight-lipped G-men not advising of dangerous > mor Le? . -O . 2 ‘ygitives in a patrolled area; the Dallas police, acutely ® 4yware of their own shortcomings, didn’t appreciate ying blamed for the Bureau’s. Things never have been me has “{ aactly famous with the New York City police. would & ! a. . . imbers Hl This Big Brother concept could be softened in sev- ” #1 sal ways. For one, the fingerprint files, used most obbery ; . uvenile stensively by the local police, could be returned to neir control (the FBI took them over from the Inter- : fon : national Association of Chiefs of Police in 1930) along n labor with the federal appropriation now allotted to the FBI tortion 3 for their maintenance. For another, the federal govern- Hf ment might yield jurisdiction in a number of overlap- e, is the i ping areas essentially local in nature, notably stolen cars, a cone “4 2° 80 percent of which are physically recovered by t under f local patrols. The FBI could then confine its activity itisone 2° large car theft rings and other cases where interstate aat ma- i traffic is more than a technicality. At the same time the reously, fs ppropriations committee of Congress could abet this e alter- fj move by declaring a moratorium on naked statistics as exist or is ameasure of achievement, thereby soothing any linger- ing sense of loss by the FBI and formulating a qualita- me At & tive criterion of performance for the future. ‘on that |! Finally, there is the question of. the FBI’s unadul- ad long 4 terated files, hoarded over decades, that contain a surfeit 5 direct of black fact, gossip and rumor about every public lities of | figure and common citizen that has crossed its path. As osa | political satirist Fletcher Knebel has expressed it: Suc- meantd, * cess isn’t always what you know or who you know, but ting up sometimes, what you know about who you know. the De- if The upshot of these files has been to grant the FBI ase, but nmedy’s ating at 2 clarion e would the bat- 5 would and the idedness cor Estes officials commit- of infor- inning in | eling has will talk agencies ° boratory FBI Na- ven feud- | s a kind of uneasy immunity from official scrutiny and censure —a devil’s advocate has never materialized to plead the case contra to Hoover’s canonization. But of more automatic concern is that the files might serve as a bridgehead to an omniscient, authoritarian central police. Where Hoover has shown admirable restraint, . his heir or succeeding heirs might not. The only certain way to cancel the intimidatory peril of the files is to dilute them; the only way to dilute them is to disperse the myriad functions responsible for their concentration. Several proposals in this direction have already been mentioned. Perhaps the most urgent measure would be to distribute non-statutory inquiries at the behest of the executive branch among the several federal investigative agencies, thus ensuring that no one agency retains all the dossiers. Centuries ago the Roman poet Juvenal asked the ° ageless question: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” It was a rhetorical question, for Juvenal well knew the an- swer: the people. It is the people who must keep eternal vigilance, it is the people that must draw the police reins tight. And as they watch the watchers they must take care that they really discern what they are seeing. ro WriiiamM Turner served from February 1951 to July 1961 in the F.B.I. where he was a special agent, an assist- ant supervisor, an inspector’s aide and a technical spe- cialist. He is currently an author and editor of police science at the National Lawyer’s Cooperative Publish- ing Co. and Bancroft-Whitney. RAMPARTS e MARCH 1965 73
—_——__—_——_———— the President. But in the Times’ re- *BRAQUET TE MIRO-MIRO... on the-wall.’ Braquette frames - you, large or smali frames most pictures in a wink Picasso, Wyeth or Chagall (Photos too). At leading . frame stores, or postpaid. Lucite, , Black or Stainless Steel $2. 00. : - BRAQUETTE Lenox, Massachusetts heads, or their 1 herve, or their tempers, , and produced the most brutality. since _ the battle of the Selma Bridge two and | "| society ‘is approaching a point of crisis, - anhistorical. moment which will divide ~ a half years ago.in Alabama. . The great police. riot, a any story, ‘but the reporters who covered ‘and. weré profoundly disturbed, staged a quiet editorial revolt: “A week. later, they in effect rewrote. the story, 7 with an about-face in point of view. . The «|. original report ended with a quote from _ -a press photographer: “These people’ - [the marchers] were like animals. All 1 can say is that the police did: one hell. of . a good job.” The revised version ended - “with a line from a “demonstrator: “An | : the-violence was initiated by the police.” The City ‘Council, bitterly divided, ’ voted in midweek-to support the police. The police chief's rationalization for the , ‘| this is reprinted), will write a regular col- © wan for Ramparts, __. attack was.that he had “inside informa- tion” that “agitators” were planning to rush the hotel.and, presumably, threat-. _ any such scheme. In any case, there was A no evidence of it in the behavior of the ‘crowd. The American Civil Liberties taising funds for it. Governor Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, thinks that ‘have always been. extraordinarily. ag-- . fascism.” It. shows up everywhere: peo- ~ ple: strolling in Beverly Hills in the eve-. m ning. are often stopped, frisked - and: “questioned on the assumption that only - the war mood. It i is not confined to Los. ~~ Angeles.: ‘Raids-in, "New-York; Philadel-- -|- ‘sphia, Chicago, Atlanta and Newark:and : _ there is a “new brutalism” in the way - authority acts to put down resistance..: - Some claim it is an’ inevitable “‘back- . and moderation on ‘the part of the re- | sisters. More likely, it is a response, per- . ’ haps,.an inevitable" ‘one; to the frag- ‘ mentation of a national consensus; : the - as. it is now . called, sits uneasily on the conscience of , the city. The Los Angeles. Times did its: own hatchet-job on the march in its first- |. US. has known the luxury of continuity : | ” Andrew Kopkind, Washington correspond- vised coverage, the full report of an undercover agent who infiltrated the march committee makes no mention of Union i is preparing a broad legal assault, and the big local ‘‘rock”’ radio station is “the police did-not use excessive brutal- . ity. ” Just the ordinary kind. For.somé- reason, police in’ Southern California gressive—the common phrase is “blue | thieves, murderers and subyersives don't Tide in cars. - : But what aggravates even that natural tendency | of the. police to aggression is a score of smaller cities suggest that lash, ” and the antidote is more caution | breaking of trust, ‘the death of hope.. There is a sense this summer that. the that which went before. from that, which . follows. For more than two decades, the . despite the small wars, the economic dips and the nasty incidents, this is still the post-war era. There has been no sharp - break, nothing like 1929-1932 or 1941-., (1945. But the _tocking.. and. the rolling that many now feel may be the beginning. _of the new social earthquake. The war : triggered iit, but there were’ obviously deeper causes. It is. not inappropriate that in California, which gave the world ‘Watts, ‘the hippies and’ Ronald Reagan; the major cracks are appearing. ent for the New Statesman (from: which | , _THE PRESS VERSUS GARRISON _ ‘ee: Cronkite during the four-night CBS ' which began on June 26. Presenting an expertly. blended mixture of gimmickry, .-| -out-attack,on New. Orleans District’ At i ’ was only’ when Jim Gartison propounded ; ‘rolling « down: ‘Washington foreheads -_ by] William W. Turner: ° Lee HARVEY OSWALD. assassinated , - Président -Kennedy. “beyond. a. » reasonable doubt:” intoried Wal- special series on: the Warren Report ‘dubious experimentation and selectivity.. . of witnesses, ‘CBS rubber-stamped. the Warren. -Report practically point : by point’ without-giving its critics a chance | for specific rebuttal. Only a week before, ff ‘NBC had ‘broadcast its own special; ae _ Slapdash but nonetheless damaging fla torney Jim Garrison. and his assassini: tion conspiracy probe. ‘The charges and | conclusions of - both (programs were ; ‘widely . feported i in the daily press, : what Americans witnessed was a strange, and _ dangerous : new * pheiomenon * ‘in, which - the networks synthesized news—leaving.. it’ to the television/radio columnists to. pass. judgment on the: accuracy ‘of their. "exposition of evidence. . 7 One could sense. an urgency in both 7 ‘productions. that betrayed any pretense | cat objectivity: ‘Why? When- Mark Lane's: Bas “Rush to Judgment and. Edward Jay Ep. amet T stein’ Ss: Inquest were published. ast Suni- _mer, casting.a. national pall of doubt on “the Commission’ s findings, there were no signs of panic: in the: Establishment. ‘It a counter: theory to the Report, pro.” duced evidence tending to support it, and indicated that he would use the full powers of his office to prosecute the con: spirators’, that beads of sweat started Bf Six months in'the making; ata. co a quarter. million dollars, the CBS ser ries was: ‘obviously ‘designed to: revitalize _ sagging public ‘confidence:in ihe Warren ee : Report—polls showed that a meager 35 per cent were true believers. The.C BS effort was not without internal struggles. ws