176-10036-10170 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : : Bundy TO: TITLE : DATE : PAGES : SUBJECTS : FROM JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM - NARA 176-10036-10170 National Security Files Lodge DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW Cables. Box 2 : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam, 10/29/63-10/31/63, State XN
ON ce es ae ee we eee SER SANTIIED 7 VERS CON NK -GB 22g G y TOP SECRET EYES ONLY - vo | 10/30/63 VIA CAS CHANNEL | | | | EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM: BUNDY “ ' ‘Your 2063 shows important difference in cur views and we must repeat that we cahnot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage acoup. In your paragraph 12 you gay that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail] you would of course do everything you could to stopit. We believe that on this basia you should do everything you can to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not give better than even prospect of quick success. We recognize the danger of ‘appearing hostile to generale, ‘but we do not share implication in your message that only’ cea conviction of duensiaest failure justifies intervention, We believe _that your standard for intervention should be that stated abeve. 2. If than you should conclude that there is not a better than even chance of quick success; you should communicate this doubt ‘to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are better. In this communication you should use the weight of your best advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
re ere et ee teen cere _ TOP SECRET EYES ONLY o2- We recognise need to bear in mind generals’ interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt and you should maintain clear distinction between etrong advice given as & friend and choice of ‘sides by USG. | | 3. We dex continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We hope for continuous exchange latest assessments on thie topic. 4. On command enrengements outlned-paragvaph- To clarify our intent, paragraph 1 Ss our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires as follows: While you are in Saigon you will be chief ef country team in all circum stances and our only inetruction is that we are sure it will help te have Harkine fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance . for coup contacts and assessment. | We continus to be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with reapect to alignments of forces and levels of determination. . . (b) When you leave Saigon and before there ia a coup, Truehart will be chief of the country team, and our only modification of existing procedurds is that in this circumstance we believe that all instruction and debriefing of Conein should be conducted in immediate | ; | TOP SECRET EYES ONLY i =< Oe oe —_
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY — <3e .. 49 said to Conein and what he reports at all atages. i “4 nn Develops - coup occurs, we believe that euciugn situation K ws satbefartion requires final local U. S. authority to be vested in | consultation with Harkins and Smith eo that all three know what (ec). If you have left and a most experienced officer with appropriate background and that officer in our view is Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that this internal switch in final responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 5. Thus we do not believe that this switch can have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8. 5. This paragraph contains our present etanding instructions for U. 8. posture in the event of a coup. {a) U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct other resources will not be committed between the battle ines or in aupport of either side, without sunoribncte from Washington. (b) In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable te both sides, euch as removal of key personalities or relay of information. In auch actions, however, U. S. authorities will atrenucusly avoid | ! | intervention from either side, and U, S, -controlled aireraft and | | | | appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG | 49081 RanTFaeDrenrwen
nnn nnn ats oan tne sanapnnennenaunpennnntnane ste stpeatenen eaten Sette A EE Eee -. 4 TOP SECRET EYES ONLY age _ to be or appear to be instrument of existing government or instrument of coup. 6 We have your message about return to Washington and if announcement has not already been made, we suggest that it be ‘kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if ' possible you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now. Cerin Sn yw