HY 0955 already out of office (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 48).* When reminded of. the fact that Lumumba''s movement and communications were ot restricted by the UN force and. that the Congolese army continued to seek his arrest long after the NSC meeting, Dillon. acknowledged that during ‘this. period ‘Lumumba: continued to be "viewed by the United States as a potential threat and a volatile -. force in the. Congo: . He had- this tremendous ability to stir, up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and: started to talk to a battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them -in the palm of his hand in five minutes. (Dillon,. 9/20/75, p. 49.) John N. _ Irwin Ii, who attended the. NSC meeting as Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated ‘that although he had no recollection of the discussion, the language of the minutes was "broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2)... Richard. Bissell testified that, based, upon his understanding of the policy of the NSC toward Lumumba even after Lumumba was in UN custody, he would read the: minutes of September 21 to indi- cate that assassination was contemplated "as one possible means" : - * See Section 3,supra,for discussion of CIA cable traffic indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable of taking. over the government after he was deposed and that pressure to "eliminate" him did not cease. until his death. (Docld:32423539 Page 354
HY 50955 _-Lt0- of “disposing of" Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 70.) Bissell was not present at the NSC meeting (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60). Bissell's. opinion stands in opposition to that of Gordon Gray, the President's National Security Advisor, who likewise testified that he could not remember the NSC discussion in which he participated (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57). When asked to interpret the reference to "disposing of" Lumumba , Gray said he "put it in the same category .as ‘eet rid of", ‘eliminate'" (Gray, 7/9/75,- p. 57). Early. in his testimony, Gray stated that “assassination could have been on the minds of some people when they used these words "*eliminate’ or ‘get rid of'" (Gray, 7/9/75, Pp. 17). Nonetheless, when asked to comment on the minutes of the NSC meeting of September 21, he said: "It was not my impression that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, p: 57).* ee * John Eisenhower, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, said that he had no "direct | . recollection" of the discussion but he found the minutes of” the meeting consonant with his "recollection of the atmosphere" at the time: "the U.S. position was very much anti-Lumumba" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 9). He said:- oo I would not -conjecture that the. words "disposed of" meant an assassination, ;£ for no other reason than if I had something as nasty, as this to plot, lL wouldn't do it in front of 21 people. . - the number present [at] the meeting. Eisenhower, 7/18/75, P.- 10.) : Doclda: 32423539 Page 355 ete RHEE LETE SEIEAIIE SLANT
-lll- oat b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That. They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of © © Assassination | : The two members of President Eisenhower's staff who were responsible for national security affairs--Gordon Gray and . Andrew Goodpaster--both made general disclaimers of any knowledge of Presidential consideration of assassination during their tenure. Gordon Gray served as Special Assistant to: the President for National Security Affairs, in which capacity he coordinated the. National Security Council and represented the President at Special Group meetings. Gray testified that he did not recall | President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated killing Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 28).* When asked to inter- pret phrases from the minutes of particular NSC. and Special i Group meetings such as “setting rid of" or "disposing ot' P g & g ri P g Lumumba, Gray stated: It is the intent of the u the phrase that is contro have been in the Central Intelligence Agency plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but . at. the level of the Forty Committee [Special Group] or a higher level than that, the National Security Council , there was no active discussion in any way planning assassination. ser of the expression or lling.and there may well I agree that assassination could have A RA I * At the outset of his testimony on d that he did not have a clear, n the Congo (Gray, acknowledge tion of Lumumba's role i HW 350955 Docld:32423539 Page 356 the subject, Gordon Gray independent: recollec- 7/9/75, pp- 25-26).
-112- been on the minds of some people when they used these words ‘eliminate’ or ‘set rid of! _- am just trying to say that it was not seriously considered as a program of. action by the Presi- dent or even the Forty [Special] Group. (Gray, 7/9/75, P- 17.) 3 Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, said that he and Gray were the "principal channels" between the President and the CIA, outside of NSC meetings (Goodpaster, 7/17/79, p. 4). Goodpaster was responsi- “ple for "handling with the President all matters of day-to-day operations in the general fields of international affairs and . security affairs" (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, P- 3). He regularly. attended NSC meetings and was listed among the participants at | the NSC meetings of August 18, 1960 and September 21, 1960. When asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort during the Eisenhower Administration, Goodpaster replied unequivocally: . . at no time and in no way did I ever know of. or hear about any proposal, any ‘mention of such an acitvity. .- - [I]t is my belief that had such a thing been raised with the President other than in my presence, I would have known - about it, and. . - it would have been a matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that... - I would have recalled it had such a thing happened. ~(Goodpaster, 7/17/75, ip. 3.) SS ’ John Fisenhower; the President's son who served under Good- paster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, stated that “the use of assassination was contrary to the President's philos- BY S0955 Docld: 324235539 Page 357
a Ts cn ceetaesaetnacwemrparena mga iten Tamme ek ae sanr en tnatgeer nied staan amb AN BFE REN tte ESS seechngedi ah naan De SADE BE NTILIANS LOd otUOE NI Te -113-" sphy that "no man’ is indispensable" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 14.)* As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended dis- cussions. in the Oval Office relating to national security affairs, “John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his atten- | “tion in his experience at the. White House "ean be construed in. my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination. plots or plans" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 4); | | tt + Douglas Dillon testified that the subject of assassination never arose in his "direct dealings with either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 22). He was asked by a member of the Committee, however, to speculate upon the general philosophical approach that Presidents Eisenhower - and Kennedy would have taken to decisionmaking on the question of using assassination as a tool of foreign policy: Senator Hart (Colorado): I would invite your speculation at this point as a Sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisen- hower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think the Committee would be interested in your view as to the. attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say, the elimination, -violent elimination of foreign _ leaders? oe a pillon: Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way, most likely, simply weighed the process and con- sequence. rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle. That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy of the u.S., generally both. of them were very much opposed to it. (Dillon, 9/2/75; pp. 22-23.) Dillon served as Undersecretary of State. in the Eisenhower Administration and as Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy. HW 350955. DocTd:32423539 Page 353
HW 450955 -114- ae (Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active in the Special. Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of. Defense. John N. Irwin Il, Undersecretary of State for ‘Political Affairs Livingston Merchant _and Deputy Secretary of Defense . James Douglas--stated that they did not ‘recall any discussion about: assassinating. Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, (9/22/75, pp. 1-2; "Merchant atfidavit, 9/8/75, P- l; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Richard Bissell Testified That, Des ite His Lack.of a Specific Recollection, He Stron ly Interred That the Assassination Etrort Against Lumumba Was Authorized by President Eisenhower ‘and Allen Du les (c) Richard Bissell' s testimony on the question of high-level - authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob- lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection of receiving such authorization. and that all of his testimony on this subject "has to be described as inference” (Bissell, 9/10/75, P- 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject by asserting that it was on his own ‘initiative that | ‘he instructed Justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination | of Lumumba (Bissell, 6/11/75, 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based on his. inferences from the totality of circumstances relating - to the entire assassination effort against. Lumumb a-.-was that an assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62, 65). Docld:32423539 Page 3493 anes ace penne nib. 9 FE OEE IH EO,
-~115- wAs discussed: above, Bissell. testified that the minutes of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the NSC on September a1, 1960 indicate that assassination was con- templated at the presidential level as one acceptable means of "getting rid.of Lumumba” (see Sections 5(a) (44) and 5(a) (iii), > supra) . There was "ho question", according to Bissell, that the cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville on August 26; which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized ‘Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a. direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had . attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p- 12). “Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of. the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p- 32): It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the Special Group as authorizing implementation fof an assassination] if favorable circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done covertly. (Bissell, 9/10/75, PP- 64-65.) Dulles’ cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi- dential authorization for him to order action-to assassinate Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62): HW 50955 Bacld: 32423539 Page 360°
HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 -116- Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed? So . “Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't... Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously, through this kind of cable? Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.) oe As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho- yrization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell stated: 1 think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have: said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. LI think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and Lo would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48.) When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the - consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa- tion of a. plan, Bissell said, "1 probably did think I had {such] authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62). - When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony “about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said that despite his absence of.a specific recollection: T would strongly infer in this case that such an authorization did pass through me, as it were, 4£ Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the Station Chief. (Bissell, 9/10/75, P- 40.) Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, pi 40). Page 361
“-LLT- | -Bissell did not recall being: informed by Gottlieb that Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there ‘was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had snstructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility” that he would have issued such an instruc- tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p- AT). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb that the mission had the approval of President, Eisenhower (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47).° This led to Bissell's conclusion that jf, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were fully authorized: Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr. . Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that point? Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p- 65). Bissell further stated: Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is. literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instruc- tions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, P- 41.) With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 362
-L18- ‘a O'Donnell this assignment” (Bissell, 9/10/75, p- 59). But he said that this specific assignment was made in the context that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho- rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, P-: 50; see “also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62). HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 363
QLULGALL 7" 27/ Of FO) the "Executive Action" Capability - Along with the question.of authorization for actual assas-- Sination attempts, the Committee considered the extent and nature’ of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element, the development. of an assassination capability. (a) Introduction Sometime in early 1961, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director _ of Plans). instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish an “executive action capability” which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51; Harvey 6/25/75, PP. 36-37. 7 At some time within the same period, . | Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to. the President for National Security Affairs) hada conversation about the matter. Bissell, Harvey and Helms all. agreed that the "generalized" capability was never used" (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75, p. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52). oe Mie Con . "Executive action" is a CIA euphemism, defined ‘by the | testimony before the Committee : as a project for research into developing means for overthrowing foreign political leaders, includ- HY 50955 ing a “capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/2575, >. 34.) Bissell indicated. that executive action covered a "wide spectrum of actions" to “eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme" action on the spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The Inspector General's Report . DocTd:32423539 Page 364°
HW * sents, . (CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches). 0955 -2- described executive action as a "general stand-by capability” to carry out assassination when required (1.G., >. 37). The project | was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.* | A single agent (Vasset"), given the eryptonym QJ/WIN, - was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RLIFLE: project, but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts. Richard Helms described QI /WIN' s “capability”: "TE you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you had a tan who might be prepared to carry it out." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 53). ; Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however, to spot “individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, QS /WIN reported that a potential asset. in the Middle East was "the leader of a gambling syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins" - However, Harvey testified that: "during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project . no agent was recruited for the purpose .of assassina- tion, and no even tentative targeting or target list was ever drawn.” (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.) — Project .ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand- -* ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two. programs. One was the executive action assassination capability. The other was — another program which is not part of the subject matter of this report. (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section with general responsibility for such programs.) This second program was. genuine, but it was also to provide a cover for any, ‘executive action operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 49.) Docld: 32427354539 Page 365
by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved ~ "spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination '. techniques that*might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11 and 6/9/75. p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory' (Bisséll, 7/22/75, p. 32). The I.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-_ -QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that “after Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (1.G. pp. 40-41.)* (b) The Que’stion of White House Initiation, Authorization, or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project ‘There is general agreement on one fact: at some point. in early 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with Bundy. _ The timing of that conversation and whether “the white House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which the evidence varied widely. | | Harvey testified that Bissell had told him ‘that "the White House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability and the Inspector General's. ‘Report quoted notes of Harvey' S (no longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any specific conversation with the “White | House" However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey' s “notes, and stated - HY 50955 -* A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d), ~ infra. ; 7 ; oO Docld: 32493539 Page 366
- that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA offi Ss. Sidney conve that, while he could have created the capability on his own,, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however , Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of. ‘the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received. a briefing and | gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he never heard of the project. ia) William Harvey testified that he was ‘almost certain" Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Techniéal Services Division, and 7 Arnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action" (Harvey, 6/25/75. p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those meetings ,* Harvey testified that they. took place after his initial i t * As to the date of. these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no= | tations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS"" indicate that he spoke to Sidney. fied as follows: Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in. 1961, as opposed to 1962, Harvey testi- HW 50955 Q: And is it your judgment that. that is January 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action? po, “Harvey: Yes, it is. Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr.. Bissell that you have recounted? Harvey: . . . [WJell, when I first looked at this, I thought _ this, well » this. has got to be ‘62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were. several such discussions in varying degrees ef detail during the period in the spring, .and very early in ‘61 to the fall of ‘61 period, but I did find out ; fairly early on that Silver Docld: 32423539 Page 367°
we discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January". (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. - | 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p.. 10). had -- or that. Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-~- nation with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). llarvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in- structions to establish an executive action capability: the. first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoretical terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets, | , our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda- CoN mental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon: wt _ cof an American intelligence service, and B, even if you ~ assume that it is, is it within our capability within ° | — - the framework of this government to do it effectively: | - and properly, securely and diseréetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38). : : ; ee The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the early stages of the executive action. project as follows: Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. “Since-Silver was already cut in, tlarvey used _ him in developing the Executive Action Capability. ... 9 Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb].in this connection °° may explain’a notation by ‘Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associa- ting the discussion with the Castro operation. (L.G. Report, pp. 37-38). It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn- = over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). tThus, their initial discussion of executive action can, at the least, -be dated befére November 1961 and the "25/1". and "26/1" notations would have to refer to January 1961. oo . HY S0955° Docld:324293539 Page 366 ~
Harvey testified that the "executive action" “capability was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35). - His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26-meetings, pre-. served at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of . assassination-~and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last resort and a confession of weakness", "the "never mention word assassination". (Harvey, The Inspector General's Report did not mention these notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's initial assignment of. the ' ‘executive action" project to Harvey, it referred to another set of Harvey’ s notes, which were destroyed after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, “The White House had twice urged me-to create such a capability” (1. G. ‘P. 37). Harvey also’ i testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his. initial dis- Bissell. _eussion of ' ‘executive action" "with Bissell (Harvey , 6/25/75, Pp. 37). However, the testimony from Bissell and White House aides in ‘the Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey's | testimony as. to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to é L * Tiarvey® s notes also contained a phrase which supgests his con- _cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation BW 50955" from other governments: "dangers of RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) countér-action and monitor if they. are blamed. _ (ilarvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75). Docld: 324293539 Page 369 °° 00 UC
The following testimony regarding the relationship between "the White douse" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee: harvey : ‘Harvey testified that his missing notes indica- ted that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an “execu- tive’ action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that | he "particularly rememberfed]" that Bissell said that he received "more than one" urging from the White House (llarvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, p.. 59). However, he had no direct evidence that Bissell actually had any such discussion with 'the White House." ‘Ho specific individual. in the White House was named to Harvey - (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31). Moreover , he said that it would have been y "improper" for him to haye asked Bissell who he had talked to and . | “grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). . | oF Bissell: ‘Bissell specifically recalled assi to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. Sl). However, Bissell did not recall Na specific conversation with anybody in | the White House as the origin" of his instruction ‘to Harvey (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). | | om During the course of ,several ‘appearances before the ; Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had. been urged by the White House to develop an executive action | capability. a t : at i fy BW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 370
In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and) 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the “twice urged" “quotation (of Harvey’ s notes in the Inspector. General's Report, Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p..51). - Bissell accordingly said in his ~ initial testimony that as far as she knew, it was true that he was asked by the White llouse to create a general stand- -by, assassination “capability. | (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49). , Based again upon llarvey's missing notes (white House urging") and his initial statement that he had no reason to challenge ‘their: accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy (Id., 6/9/75, D. 49) , “Special Assistant to President. Kennedy , for a National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (1d.., p. 51), Deputy Assistant to President Kennedy during 1961, were the ‘two people from whom such a request was most likely to have come (ld., Pp. 53), because _ they were the two members oF the White House | state who were closest _ to CIA Operations. (La. p. 54). | | At another point in his’ initial testimony, Bissell said ‘that tthe creation of the capability | ‘may have been initiated within th ar unum? Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still later he said: there is little : doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and, possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 46). ~ When Bissell returned to the Committee on 1 July 17 and 22, his testimony, given in light of information gained since his earliét Oe HW 50955 Docld:324273539 Page 371
appearances, was that there was no White House urging. for thie creation of ‘the executive action project, although tacit approval for the “research” project was probably given by Bundy after it was) established. First, he was shown the llarvey notes which had been preserved and which, without any mention of the White House, indicated llarvey had received his assignment prior. to January 25/26, 1961. - Those - dates ~~ just 5 days after the change of administration ~- made Bissell. conclude that it was "'very unlikely that that. assignment 0 [Harvey] was taken as a result of White llouse urging or consul - _tation” (Bissell, M1717, p. 10). Bissell: said that Bundy did not have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties before’ ‘the. Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, Pp: 23). Bissell added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new ad-. -ministration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell, /7/22/75, p. 23). 7 - - 7 . | . a 1 i Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he -was con- vinced by. telephone conversations with stow and Bundy that based upon Rostow's duties -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with covert action -= he "never discussed" executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p- 10; 7/27/75, p. 22), As for Bundy , Bissell! s final testimony (after telephone con- tact with Bundy) “was that he believed that he had informed Bundy ' about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22). But Bissell ‘confirmed his original — HW 450955 testimony (6/9/75, pp. ) that he did not brief Bundy on the. Docld:32423539 Page 372
-10- actual assassination plots against Castro already under taken. by the. CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was’ "quite certain” that he would not have expected Bundy: to mention the executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell. testified: | QQ, Would. you think the development. of a capability to: kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient impor-: tance to bring to the attention of the President? : Bissell: In that context and at that) time and given the limited scope of. W0075 within that project, I would. not. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). . oS “Bissell said that he -and bony spoke about an untargeted "capability" rather than the plan or: approval for an assassination operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, ‘P- LL). | Bissell ‘said that although he does not have a specific. recollection, he “might have" mentioned > Castro, Lumumba , and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of ~ executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at: that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed. " (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50- SL). | Bissell said his- impression was that Bundy, in addition to. ex- pressing no unfavorable reaction to the ‘project, might fave aus, “given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25, 28). Bissell testified. that he might have interpreted Bundy’ S reaction - as approval for the executive. action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, D. 30). Q: ... I think the testimony of this witness is going further in saying what you received from (Bundy) . was, in your view, tantamount to. approval? - Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call. it approval, or you could. say no objection. *He (Bundy) | one HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 373
-ll- was briefed on something that was being done, as I now — ‘believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that, but this is a matter that probably someone listening to the conversation on which.such a person could have had: differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33)... Bissell's testimony on any conversation with. Bundy regarding executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and specific. and explicit approval would have been required" before any “actual-overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/75, Hi “50955 “to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy 's reaction, to Harvey 7 Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White House urgings confused account of. a conversation subsequent to the initiation of (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25). Bissell testified that the development of an executive ‘action capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell; 7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged om his first day of testimony - 7 that this would. not have been unusual: it was the normal practice in the: Agency and an impor- | ' Cant part of its mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be certain . ' whether those would be used or where or how or for what . purpose. The whole ongoing job of... a secret intellt- gence service of recruiting agents is of that character..., So it would not be particularly surprising to me.if the * “Bocld@is2423539 Page 374
HY 50955 _712- decision to create ... this capability had been taken . without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67- 68). Bundy ; | MeCeorge’ Bundy also testified that he hada smvteeaon with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was d dis~ ‘cussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5). a ‘Bundy’ S testimony comports with Bissell’ s on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability, ‘xather ‘than an assasSination operation (Bundy, pp. 4- 5) . But Bundy said that the capability included "killing the individual" (Bundy. p. 5).** Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction, not "seeking authority" (Bundy, p. 15).° Bundy summarized his testi- mony by saying: I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only: fair ‘to add that I do not recall that I offered any. impediment | either. (Bundy, p. 10) Bundy said that he did not. take steps to halt the development of the executive action capability or "pursue the matter. at all" (Bundy, p. 19) because he was satisfied that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, ‘that there should be a decision to move: against the indi- vidual. (Bundy, p. 7). * Lor example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, had requested a CIA officer to-go to the Congo to "inake plans and develop the capability" for an assassination attempt LE ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, P- 55).. me SBainst Bunun 5 he wate IH Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did not connect this to the conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy © Pre-bay of Pigs section, supra.) ee Docld: 32493539 Page 395000 Ce te ne
-13- un. oo» ‘Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had \ Mee been fulfilled. (Bundy, p. 7). Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sometime in, the early months of 1961." (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the dates in Harvey's notes, ‘Bundy rated the chance that the conversation, about executive action took place before. January 25 -- when: Harvey was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell" Ss directive -- as" ‘near zero" because the - new Administration had been in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National | Security staff (Bundy, p. 9). : | , Bundy ‘testified that he did not brief the President on the executive. action project: | Me - Chairman: And- you have testified that you did not take "the: matter to the President? Bundy: As far as I -can recall, Mr. Chairman. (Bundy, p. 16) . Bundy ‘explained that the division. of cesponsibility for national security affairs excluded Ros tow from jurisdiction over covert: opera- ‘tions, making. it unlikely that Ros tow would be briefed on a project like Z2RRIFLE (Bundy, p. 11; Rostow, p. ll). |  Rostow: Ros tow testified that he was "morally certain" that: during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference | to executive action: or “such a capability or such an intention to. act by the U.S." - (Rostow, pp. 10, 13). HW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 376 9 ~~
-14 = Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security affairs during the latter. part of the Eisenhower Administration was - borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. “However ,. there was no evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the development of an executive action capability. Both Goodpaster and Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11; Gray, p-. 56.) (c) Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Project “Richard Bissell said he was "quite certain” that Allen Dulles had full knowledge of the executive action project for two. reasons: first, it “would have come. to the’ DCL's. attention" at the - time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the | Agency to work on Cuban operations;* and second, Bissell "would imagine” it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation: of che project (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell and larvey briefed Richard Helms on Project. ZRRIFLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 63). But Bissell did not recall briefing John. McCone’ about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 1/1I/75, p. 11). McCone testified that ‘he had’ no ‘knowledge of such a. project a . (McCone, p. 43). - William Harvey said. it was assumed that. the project was, within the parameters permitted by: the DCL. But harvey testified that officially advising the Det of the existence of the project We Harvey! Ss transfer to ‘Cuban operations was not. completed until late in 1961. HW 50955 Docld:324293539 “Page 377777 fw neater nat centr qt canon win aoe nenamnatee eune aM Se se ea ee
~15-— was: "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until “there was either specific targeting or a specific operation Ora. specific recruitment . re (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59). (d) - The “Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was connected to to Any y Actual Assassination Plots ~The Committee ‘has sought to determine whether the ‘CLA de- velopment of an executive action capability was related in any way to 7 the actual. assassination efforts. One question raised by this inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations might have perceived the executive action capability as in :some way lending legitimacy to. the actual assassination efforts. | Ci) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy 7 In his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba , "and. Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing the project to develop. an executive: action capability (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). “However, Bissell testified that ait was "perfectly plausible that. I. would have used examples" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). “ile con- tinued: in such a discussion of a capability, I might-well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were _ the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed. " (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). | , Bissell and ‘Bundy both testified, however , that | their discussion of the development | of the capability for agsassina- tion did not, involve any mention of actual assassination plans « or ae. HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 373
HW 50955 Bundy was _ responsible to a new President for national security _ ~i1l6- attempts” (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary. ‘The account of this conversa-— tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly ‘in . withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts | f. Mike ne against Castro had alread been mounted. and were movin forward, one wana Opry affairs and Bissell was his principal ‘source of information’ ‘about; en ir covert operations at the CIA. (ii) Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Responsibility . for Underworld Contact: ‘November 1961 —_ Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November 1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with John Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 865 and 6/11/75, Pe 19)--which had been used for the: initial poison pill plot as part: of Project ZR/RIFLE. - Harvey's notes placed the meeting on November 15, 1961 (1.G., p. 39), during the period in ubich Harvey. was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against the Castro regime. | : According to. Bissell and Harvey, the November. meeting » involved only. the planning and esearch ofa capability ‘ather than a targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13; Harvey, 7/11/75,.p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose | of the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it. is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain Docld: 32423539 Page 379 -
-i7- it [the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating ‘that operation": (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19). Bissell stated that ' because the “assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs . . . and there ‘was no authorization to pursue it actively . . . the re- sponsibility that was given to him [Harvey] was that of taking over an inactive contact. “ (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14) ' Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over the contact in case any action. should be. required and further testi- fied that it was never required. | The Inspector General's Report stated: "After Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect (of ZRRIFLE ."' (1:G., p. 40)... Harvey recalled that during a dis- cussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability, ~" Bissell advised him of “a then going operation" involving the names » a of Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana, "which was a part. of the Agency’ Ss effort to develop ~ 2. a capability for executive action." (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of this discussion, the operation 1 had been "in train" for "approxi- mately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Ilarvey, 7/11/75, p.. 54). | Although his “net. impression" was that both the "exploratory project” and the'specific operation" were "fully authorized: and approved", Harvey | said he could 1 not testify that "specific White Ilouse authority. for this given operation was implied _ or stated"... (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.) Bissell does net recall telling anyone in the White. House that “something had been done “to BW 50955 Boacld: 324243539 Page 390
-18- bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61). HW 50955 Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three. months later, he did not recall that. ZR/RIFLE was ‘ever contemplated © as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75; p. 55). Asked whether the actual assassination. efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), “Helms testified: "Int my mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52)... However, Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the | syndicate which had- Castro as its target... folded into. the ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). -When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action, "capability oe for. assassination" - was Mused against Castro” Bissell replied that it was "in ‘the. later phase". (Bissell, snus, p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on ‘November ‘15, 1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CrA- syndicate assas-~ ‘ination operation against Castro by approximately five months . (iii) Use-of Agent QJ/WEN in Africa QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back- ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive ° programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project Docld: 32423539 Page 381
~19- ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN’s function after the advent of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of. potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use. | However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, “his ‘supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as:the Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked, had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147, 11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). [QU/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail in the discussion of the Lumumba case: see Section _, supra. | . There are two factors which may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop. an assassination capability before ZR/ RIFLE was formally initiated. ‘First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey, HW 450955 QJ/WEN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the. Lumumba matter and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of ‘ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of an assassination capability had. already been discussed with Silver and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38). _ ‘Nevertheless, there does not appear to be’ any firm evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and: the plot to assassinate Lumumba. Docld:324234539 Page 382
or Be FINAL DRAFT wt Cae Agreed to by drafting subcommittee on Summary August 28, 1975* Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Daminican dissidents on May 30, 1961._ . Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations approved or condoned supplying arms to the dissidents. Although there is no evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination plans. Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two ‘Administrations information. about the dissidents' assassination plots had been passed prior to the spring of 1961. | Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well known that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination. Thereafter, however , permission to deliver the machine gums to the dissidents was denied, and the gums were never passed. ‘Two days before the assassination, President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General ¥ The second parageaph under V-Ac3cc. and the paragraph under VIT.C. were drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been reviewed by the Subconmittee. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 383
in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but at: the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissi- dents and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo. HW $0955 Docld:39493599 .Page 384
S : : . ges - my val ae Ae gorse Poser Senter Nn i ieee soos on wer aa I. Background . * Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government supported him and he was regarded. throughout much of. the Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States. Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States ‘States’ image. was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many Latin Americans. Increasing American awareness vf Trujillo's brutality and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdi- cation or downfall. As early as. February 1960 the Eisenhower administration gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to Dominican dissidents. _ (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60). . In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that. if the situation deteriorated still further: "the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and -- if necessary -- military support." (Memo from Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60; Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.) Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. Latin re en) BW 50955 BDocld: 32423539 Page 385
‘te foe a Can dee! APS Bog ; American leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, pressed the United States to take affirmative action against Trujillo to dispel criticism. that the U.S. opposed dictator- ships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to power was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the Dominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9) II, Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for Arms During the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo's grasp. They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentary evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these rifles was approved both within the State Department and the CIA, the rifles were never provided. A. Dissident Contacts Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous of establishing a democratic form of government.* (Farland affidavit) Prior to his final departure from the Dominican Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief£- of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that * This loosely-organized group, with which contact was es- tablished, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and memoranda as "the dissidents” and is so referenced herein. ; at ha A hg rs WY 50955 Doocld:32473539 Page 356
~3-— Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA Headquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communi- cations link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable /stated/ that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R./ Rubottom" (Emphasis in original.) (HOS to Station cable 6/16/60). ‘Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the U.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop effective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow," but would not ‘undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic” (Station to HQS cable 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmed Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station cable 6/19/60). B. The Sniper Rifles During the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambas- sador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic sights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farland affidavit) He apparently did so after returning to Washington in May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61). * As used herein “Headquarters” refers to Headquarters of the Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the Department of State. . ol HW 50955 ° Docld:327473539 Page 367 *”
Documents: indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960, meeting with| Jof the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops. (CIA memo, 6/21/60) | Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view reyarding “To what extent will ‘the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them: c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?" King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CLA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit) On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's Signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, Rudy Gomez (1.G. Report, Pp. 26). The memorandum stated that An, g- a principal leader of the anti-~trujille-Spposieiow had SSkeI— Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such aris * Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, ‘King affidavit. ): BW S0955 Docld: 32423539 Page 366 af
HY 50955 “Docld:32423539 Page 389 — a me . oad re 7 4 Ny ati g | : a ‘ A Mi Pi? aot Ai fy 1 ran 5 F wa weal Ss abthes “presumably would be used seamen es members of the Trujillo regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided, since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable, and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as close as possible. ''Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end." (CIA memo, 7/1/60) Specifically, the’ recommendation was to deliver to dissidents in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile* rifles with reles- copic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition. | Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated: "A, Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment." (Id.} Gomez's’ recommendation was concurred in by Richard Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell, (I1.G. Report, p. 26). The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with - | telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime clearly indicated the “targeted use" for which the weapons were intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77). On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA Headquarters informing him of ‘the plan to airdrop 12 telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. the Sterile” rifles are “untraceable” rifles. (Bissell, 7/22/75,p.69)
~6- cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to realign the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14, 1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against any further action. in the Dominican Republic until after re- solution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending against Trujillo. The. dissidents reportedly believed that sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished -to the dissidents. | . | On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political officer. The dissident leader was reported to have lost. enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking of an invasion from Venezuela. However , by September 1, 1960, ° dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For the next several months, consideration centered on providing 200 to 300 guns. Ii. Summer and Fall of 1960 In August 1960, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and de facto CIA Chief of Station. , Consideration was given both to providing HW 30955 Docld:id2423539 Page 390
— martte i arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end of the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Trujillo| forces, both within and without the country, was approved. A. Diplomatic Development -- Withdrawal of U.S. Personnel Events occurring during the summer of 1960 further in- tensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan Presi- dent. Betancourt. As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and imposed economic sanctions. With the severance of diplomatic relations, the United States closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With the departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by both CIA and the State Department. Although on January 20, 1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic, Dearborn continued. to serve as a link to the dissidents. B. Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 391
HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 392°) °° ° WO teath wks eG Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved rrujillo's assassination He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that the dissidents were ity in ne way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy." (Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60) It is uncertain what portion of the information provided by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine, were, within the Latin American Division of the Department, aware of Dearborn's “current projects." (Devine to Dearborn letter, 8/15/60) * By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that Devine maintained almost daily communication with and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division ' (Devine, p.7) *¥Dearborn’s candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern with the Department and ne as advised that certain specific information should more appropriately come through "the . other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different recipient offices. (Id.)
7 9 - ». x tab! bin Nao es eh thon Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans - under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn replied in a detailed letter which concluded: "One further point which I should probably not even make. From a purely practical standpoint, it will be best for us, for the OAS, and for the Dominican Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo before he leaves this island. If he has his millions and is a free agent, he will devote his life from exile to preventing stable: government in the D.R., to overturning democratic governments and establishing dictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinating his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as being the first necessary step jn the salvation of my country. and I would regard this, in fact, as my Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will remember it was necessary to drive a stake through his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes. I believe sudden death would be more humane than tne solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and lingering illness." (Dearborn to.Mann letter, 10/27/60) Cc. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo into relinguishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican Republic. The use of high level emissaries, both from within and without the ranks of government, was considered. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60) None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960 Trujillo was still in absolute control. D. CIA Plans of October 1960 A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 393
“Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican besk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans which “have been developed on a tentative basis which appear feasible and which might be carried out..covertly by CIA with a minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part, for the following: "a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols, together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to secure cache on the South shore of the island, about “14 milesEast of Ciudad Trujillo. “b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an electronic detonating device with remote control. features, which could be planted by the dissidents in ‘such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo henchmen. This might necessitate training and intro- ducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained technician to set the bomb and detonator." (Emphasis added) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60) E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and approved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces. The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to both Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents. The exile groups were to be furnished money to organize and under=- take anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht for use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized HW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 394
HW 50955 Bacla: 32423539 Page 3954 rd tA Ma RT Send on ei cat wi to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not, of themselves, bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself." (Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60) | IV. January 12, 1961 Special -Group Approval of “Limited Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material" : . * On January 12, 1961, with all members present, the Special Group met and, according to its Minutes, took the following action with respect to the Dominican Republic: "Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents in- side the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call. for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61) A. “Memoranda Underlying the Special Group Action On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum ,sent through Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United States for its fallure to furnish them with any tangible or concrete assistance. Further, it reported: Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply them with ‘*hardware®’ of various types. This has included quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persis- tently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items and devices which they associate with revolutationary effort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61) * “The members of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs; Jonn N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. be | fs
aes Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision of token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents. Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would place some "sabotage potential" in the hands of dissident elements, but stated that there 'would be no thought of toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic) by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61) This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine. A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special Group meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that the Special Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's meno” and that the Secretary of State was informed of that decision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scott - to Merchant memo, 1/12/61) There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group, | other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to | Dp. be used by them in assassination efforts. While it is, of course, possible that such information was passed orally to some or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhaps even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no ¥Various CiA cables, including those dealing with the sniper rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles. coerce: Eel caw ts. “es . eo Soe HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 396
foes be Y documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which would establish this to be the case. On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Bisenhower administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that approval had been given for supplying arms and other material to the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable, 1/19/61). Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver "exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61) ~ Vv. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs) On January 20; 1961, the Kennedy administration took office. Three of the four members of the Special Group (all except Allen Dulles) retired. Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion .on April — -17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in which specific assassination plans were discussed, re- quests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage by U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside the Dominican Republic, -and the pouching to the Dominican Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.* een nnn err Ae A, A A A 8 Ne 6 at *AS indicated in the post-Bay of Pigs section, infra, permission to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never passed. HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 397
-14- These events are discussed below under subheading A. Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events ’ possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein, “senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group. A. Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S. to Dissidents' Assassination Plans 1. Assassination Discussions and Requests for Explosives At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot {to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo." (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following: (a) Ex-FBI agents wno would plan and execute the death of Trujillo. (b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire projectiles. (c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm of one's nand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing delayed lethal results. (da) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of several miles. (Id.) Other methods of assassinatiny Trujillo proposed by dissidents HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 399
a Boas # ecm NT : i 4 e.8 Whang wh t As -~ 15 - at the february 10 or February 15 meetings included. poisoning Trujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and attacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61; 2/16/61)* . The dissidents' “Latest plot", as described in the February CIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful bomb; which could be detonated from a nearby electric device, along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.) On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic oo asked for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next week or so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters on March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additional request for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons, and 10 64 mm anti-tank rockets. Yhis further request was also passed on to CIA Neadquarters. (Station to HOS cable, 3/15/61) There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to the dissidents. The documentary record makes clear that Frank Devine at the State Department was also advised of related developments in a March 16, 1961, “picnic” letter from Dearborn who complained that his spirits were in the doldrums because: ", . . the members of our club are now prepared in their minds to have a picnic but do not have the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have developed a plan for the picnic,which just might work if they could find the proper food. ‘They * There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the February 13.memorandum stated the view that some of the ques- tions raised by the dissidents did not reguire an ansvier. : a wy bet 4 Mig, . 7 Vie 2 et ro now a (AY MA BITE ke HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 399
have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly ~ more; and we are not prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples for.a party in the near future,but I could remember nothing in my in- structions that would have allowed me to contri- bute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to the area by another club. (Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61) After reviewing his "picnic" lettér, together with the requests in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con- cluded during his testimony before tke Committee that the "yineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27) 2. The Passage of Pistols a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station |__| reported ee " reece, that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: “Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor- dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary J z authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had Wer received pistols via the pouch for “worthy purposes” and, hey rr . HW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 400"; bik ge
pet AB, therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)* | b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell Dearborn Owen testified that he believed the “don't tell Dear- born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79) Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 1/29, p. 33) | | c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination? Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con- sideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed * The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that: "There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files ‘that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub- sequent request for submachine guns." (1.G. Report, p. 60) This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides: "C. Pouching} revolvers «and ammo=requested YRUI 0462 (in 20040) on:28 March. Do not advise(name Dearborn deleted) HW 50955 Docla:32426548 nade ubal being pouched. | Explanation follows."
HW 450955 — Docld:324293539 Page 402 :: the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol. | . Although. there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA’ memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by to Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con- om ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions. Both Dearborn and|__| testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current f assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, pp.3%8,73) However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HOS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961, *Dearborn is clear in his recollection that ne asked to! request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols. (Owen, p.72) The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HUS to Station cables,3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi- fied that, what he believed to be the one gun, came “wrapped up" and that he passed it. . (Dearborn, -7/29,p.30)
Yow “Bictsbant q cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had -.been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that Little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins. 6 Cutt be 3. Passing of the Carbines Cp ~ a. Reguest by | _|and Dearborn and Approval by CIA In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters,|_| asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Ml carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in Auygust 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61) b. were the Carbines Related _to “Assassination? ‘the carbines were passed to tne action group contact, Wimpy Berry, on April 7, 1961. (Station to HOS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HOS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn ana[__]testi fied that the in, 3 t - carbines were at: vail: ‘times "Viewed: ‘as “strictly a token show HW 50955 DocTd:32423539 Page 403
of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39) c. Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in Washington There is no indication that the request or the passage - of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until several weeks after the passage. in fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to tae dissidents. This cable was sent while was in Washington, and it indicated that upon his. return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com- mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence | with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station to HQS cable, 4/6/61) Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State De- partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 4&4) HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 404
~Z£a7 3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns a. Requests Machine Guns for Use in Assassination ~ The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64; Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, [co] cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61) The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in cable, as being sought for use in connec- tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to cable: "4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine- guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.) ’ In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. [was told that precipitious or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions."' It was Headquarters’ position that: it ..we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the after- math." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61) * “Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable. HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 405
~22- The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.* Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while [| was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and “especially on the insistence of the FMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifi- eally, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61) b. Pouching ‘the Machine Guns is Approved by Bissell Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a pricrity basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection."' (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61) The request, ' submitted on behal£-of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided: "3. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable L£ for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took *"FAis Same cable Of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched. a a HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page sod ik rita’ bs ABS ot bes
SPE Gl Se NS ij tf tsi doe A the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited’arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltra- tion." The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.) The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and Je were received by the station on April 19, 1961.”% (I.G. Report, p. 42; Station to Headquarters cables 4/19/61). On Avril 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued a memorandum which stated: “Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without we of. his approval.” (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61).** The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching had been approved. B. Knowledge of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs) On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons, but a month after the generalized approval of the passage of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance. * Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed in detail beginning at page ; ** Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic" prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51) HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 407
The minutes state that: - "nmr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of signi- ficant projects which artedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue." (Special Group Minutes of 2/14/61) In the course of the discussion, the following point, among others, was made: memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the hk a subject of what plans can be made for a successor af hot government to Trujillo." (Id.). be merauy ~ on WY A 6 Sater. "(a) Dominican Republic -~ Mr. Bundy asked that a Sag fer? The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Domini- can Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and Bissell briefed the new members. What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to i which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Specifically, it is not known if the new members of the Special Group were told that the dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was 7 HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 406
ay .7 hee . ern x path dbs i advised that the State Department representative in the bominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican government could not be overthrown without the assassination of Trujillo. Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection of the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unable - to say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted by the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102) Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Group in attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to the specificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at the February 14 meeting. He does not recall any mention by either Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate ‘irujilio. (McNamara atfidavit). February Memoranda The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum on February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning pro- gress to assure an orderly takeover “should Trujillo fall." The memorandum advised that: “Our representatives in the Dominican Republic have, at considerable risk to those involved, established contacts with numerous leaders of the underground opposition . .. /and/7.. . the CIA has recently been authorized to atrange for delivery : to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms - and sabotage. equipment." This reference to recent authorization for delivery of = arms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing [ey concerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961 hep mots vf 4 / oh vi by
Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo elements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective positions throughout the transition period. The Committee has so, been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or ! Under Secretary .Bowles were specifically advised as to the How ) 2 yl én . intentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly o~ nad knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not personally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42) On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paper on the Dominican Republic to MeGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's Wational Security Advisor. The paper made note of the out- standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms and equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents had been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide such arms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability to C receive them. ee a ke ee The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders " Aa/T f had informed CIA of “their plan of action“’which they felt could A944 filer cs be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation devices.” Various witnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300 # men would, standing alone, indicate a "“non-targeted" use for the ved me HY 30955 Docld:i 324234539 Page 410' I ; _ ;
arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell, 7/29, p.80), Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that: vs .e it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the time of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that these dissident groups were, and nad for a long time, been hoping they could accomplish the assassination ‘ of Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests since some seven or eignt months earlier was a perfectly clear indication of that, so that fact was not new knowledge." (Bissell 7/22, p.102) When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact that the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell replied: why J bd "ZI cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not a remember what considerations moved me. I don't. snow whether it was because this was common bat, knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to include it, or as you are implying, there was an element of concealment here. I would be very surprised if it were the latter, in this case." (Bissell, 7/22, p.101) a (fc In response to questions concerning the lack of information in the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to which the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents, Bissell stated: "lo. . T would say that the Agency's failure, if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to state in writing that the plans of the dissidents would include assassination attempts. (Bissell, 7/22, p.99) Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the assessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo HY 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 411
_ given to caching the requested arms and other materials. an earner nea and the internal opposition, “which will end either with the Liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll up of the internal opposition.” In this regard, the fear was expressed that existing schedules for the delivery of weapons to the internal’ opposition might not be sufficiently timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be (Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61) Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the senior members of the new administration, and in view of the "f for. cL AGAIY higher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumably (nA of L1G (ge Cw President Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding Special Group approval for the passage of arms and other materials to opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was no modification or recision of the “inherited" Special Group approval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard the approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new administration. ~n. During March and early April 1961, operational levels within both the CIA and the State Department learned of in- ed \q +l, uC hue creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinate Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group, Pay . ’ . rn) x if . fi iyi wy ok oy A ae Lat NW 5Og55 Docla: 324235359 Page 412
. eet alk oa Ra Koa foe. except Allen Dulles.” Similarly, there is no evidence that the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed to anyone outside of the CIA during this period." VI. April 17, 1961 ~- May 31, 1961 . (Bay of Pigs Through Trujillo Assassination) Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassina- tion attempt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Prujillo -were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would | result from Trujillo's death. The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and the guns never left the Consulate. Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a contingency plan for the bominican Republic was drafted. Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy. clo a — The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of associ-| yer ation with political assassination, since the U.S., as a natter | thee . | [are of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable * Gopies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable = A epen describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment © \) ( of his mistress were apparently sent to the office SCC ure of the Director of Central Intelligence. ** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns. tow: HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 413
further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of ee (U.S. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing the Trujillo government. The cable also reconfirmed the decision not. to pass the machine guns. A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccess- ful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had /operation was a failed/. (As a result, there developed a general realization that precipitous action Should be avoided in the ad ‘ Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11,-. p.l13) A cable from ‘leadquarters to the Station, on April 17, 1961, advised that it was most important that the machine guns not be passed without additional Headquarters approval. The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Pepublic on April .19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier ad- monition that the machine guns snould be held in Station custody until further notice was repeated in a second cable from {lead- quarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have been “based on judument that filliny a vacuum created by assas- Sination now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area." (Qs. to Station cable, 4/20/61) The dissidents continued to press for the release of the machine guns and their requests were passed on to Headyguarters cee | f Sct et HW 50955 DoclTd:32423539 Page 414
HY in cables from Dearborn and[ (Station to HOS’ cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, [ _ Jadvised Headquarters that Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. [___]also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available. (Id.) In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and reguested [ to advise the dissidents that the United States was simply not. prepared at that time to cope with 'the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, “Station to HWS cable, 4/27/61) . The following day, April 27, 1961, | _|replied that, based upon further discussions with the dissidents, “We doubt statement U.S. government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the U.S. government. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.52) §0955 Daocld:327493539 Page 415
HY 0955 ‘ Docld:32493539 Page 416 - : re ars La ‘On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt ‘was going to take place during the first week of May. The action group was reported to have in its possession three carbines, four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS cable, 4/30/61) | ae Dearborn's. cable set forth the argument of the action group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic re- lationship. _ ‘The cable concluded: ‘Owing to far-reaching political implications involved in release or non release of re- quested items, Headquarters may wish discuss fore- going with State Department." (Id.) B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine Guns In reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authori- zing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch, provided: "Since it appears that opposition group has committec itself to action with or without
- 33- | additional support, coupled with fact ref. = C items [the carbines] already made available to them for personal defense; station authori- zed pass ref. A items [the machine guns] to opposition member for their additional pro- tection on their proposed endeavor.” (Draft of HOS ‘to Station cable, 5/2/61). The cable was never sent. ‘In his testimony. before the Committee, Bissell characteri- zed his: reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as: ta . . . having made already a considerable investment in this dissident group and its , - plans that we might as well make the addi- KA tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127) The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert) Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted as liaison with the State Department in matters. concerning covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force on Latin America. A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert informed Berle that a local yroup in the Dominican Republic wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose. The memorandum continued: “On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. ilerbert wanted to know what the policy should be. "T told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have any thing to do with any assasSination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert said he felt the same way." (Berle, Memo of Conversation, 5/3/61) HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 417
HY 0955 Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr; the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and to Special Assistant Frank Devine. Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily- contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised bey Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed of the assas sination plans of the dissident group. In £act, cable of May. 2, releasing the machine guns for passage. | Lel/ benke C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961 On tne day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, the Special Group met and, according to the minutes: "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not, and ashed f fA what is the status of contingency planning should Wpat S .the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point ts is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in thé very-ness—future. " (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61) Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed speculative. Tt is not known to what extent and in what detail Allen Dulles referred to “recent reports" of a inew anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons. | On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the : i Situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the I I ti, | Bocld: 324293539 Page 418
minutes: " Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclinatjon to take a contrary position at this time. (Emphasis supplied) (Special Group Minutes, 5/18/61) D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns ‘On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department, attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr, with an urgent request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable . advised tnat the assassination attempt was scheduled for the night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were $0 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressed to Dearborn that if the effort failed,due to U.S. refusal to supply the machine guns, the U.S. would be held’ responsible and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations in Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization could not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearborn to State cable, 5/16/61) A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him ¥ Phere was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Domini- can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language “attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeliny of the Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the question Of passing these arms must have been raised prior to the May 18 Group meeting», Perhaps at, the, May: 4, 1961 meeting. ; ie. fs : WW 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 419 rE:
HW 50955_ to continue to take the same line until he received contrary instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in- advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61) . Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. (Memo .to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61) "Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum-on the same day, advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.” Herbert's attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott. (Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61) E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation -- Drafting of Contingency Plans At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was considered and it was: “Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long- range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the at te nner re nn ee ee i ee on me nee * By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State Doc DAlsPes 352 aye) 420
Dominican Republic. Noted the President's . view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral." (Record of Actions bv Wational Security Council, 5/5/61) (Approved by the President, 5/16/61) Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washing- ton at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961. While in Washington, Dearborn met with State Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger of the White House staff. When testifying before the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican Republic was discussed. He did not recall any discussion with Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin nad been reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.62) HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 491
HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 422 On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft” document which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted that means of stepping up the covert program were considered in separate papers. (Dearborn draft document of May 11, 1961). This Dearborn draft of May ll, 1961, was apparently used as a basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic -- Contingency Paper" discussed below. ‘ Two documents entitled, “Program of Covert Action for: the Dominican Republic" were provided to the Committee staff from State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the covert activities paper described in bearborn's May ll, 1961 . memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating it was attached to “Dominican Republic -- Contingency,” dated 5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very Similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310). Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered an \ tp" "lL. The USG should not lend itself to direct. // points including the following: political assassination. a . "2. US moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world.
nr f | thy ~ "3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to CO (unskilled) local triggermen. "4, So far we have seen no real evidence of action capability. Should we entrust ourselves and “our reputation to this extent in the absence thereof? "7, Can we afford a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons?" (Document from State Department files bearing Wo. 313) The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the Likelihood that any such involvement by the U.S. would ultimately be revealed. On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Pro- crams Authorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic". That document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommen- dation as to further policy, suygested that the Special Group review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61) During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was t i L. 4- bk } HY 50955 Docld:324293539 Page 423
prepared at the request of Richard Soodwin and was thereafter ; * circulated within the State Department. . This document, entitled "Program of Covert Action. for the Dominican Republic" reported: . "CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station) in Ciudad Trujillo, a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requestsfrom the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their. ‘ projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three. (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with / accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure | méans to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support." This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to anyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had been passed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. The oriyinal ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above ‘quoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize" is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Committee that he circled the above paragraph when first reading the. memorandum because the information concerning passage of the arms was new to him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 48,49) Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which ‘Require Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated that the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and a small number of grenades currently in the direct custody of the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing these weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in: * See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy of Goodwin: memorandum, HW 50955 Doold:32493539 Pagd i424 '. hr re )
cc t Y A ny hey | wee . gc v va . " by \: i personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to re- move Trujillo" could be developed by the Station. The memo- randum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage of these weapons... (Id.) On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another memorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received by Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an under- lying document which began: "Recent reports indicate that the internal Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly determined to oust Trunillo by any means, and their plans in this regard are well advanced." The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable for the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elements seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment recommended that Consul. General Dearborn inform the dissidents that if they succeed "at their own initiative and on their own responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance from the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documents from State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286). F. Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961 A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard Goodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin, the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 1/7, rae f HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page sod
~42- and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that -the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before knowing what government would succeed him. (Depart- ment to Dearborn, 5/17/61) . Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that kor for over a year State Department representatives in the havraf Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort Ip 264TH. to overthrow frujillo and had assisted the dissidents in numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo.” Dearborn invited further guidance from State. | In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a conflict between two objectives: "(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America; "(2) To disassociate US from any obvious inter- vention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur." Fon CPT HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 li
It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that "former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter." (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 ~ not sent) This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary || Bowles with the comnent that Goodwin considered it "too negative"\ and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present tomorrow morning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61) A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins: "Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meéting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans." Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not, however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic. If, as Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning .the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is not known what the discussion involved or what decisions, if any, were made. Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testi- fied that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United ‘, States: ee / CAy yee "2. . didn't want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo." (Goodwin, 7/19, p.32) HY 50955 Bocld: 32423539
At the same time , Goodwin's draft raised the issue of further covert action and transfer of arms to. the dissidents and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available’ to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them. . It was the uotola intent of the cable as revised by ns \ Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces of. the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the ‘New government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2) to avoid any action which might further involve the United ‘States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose is clearly evident in the cable which. advised: - . « we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, Since U. S. as matter in doubtful situation." (Emphasis added) * Sa aT ————— / «eK Ory brtal 2. "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. Car support for their position." Lote, 5 According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy. \ pene on hil— GF Or re SAE (Fo (Goodwin, 7/10, pp. 22, 23). With respect to the four machine guns which were in the Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable to transfer these arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was instructed to: "tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 426.
fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would " serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt.” The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. — to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61) . vil. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter: A. Trujillo Assassinated Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate: however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by . handguns and shotsuns. _  (21.G. Report, p.61) B. Cables to Washington After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief sent replies. According _to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75y p. 74). HW 50955 Docld:327493539 Page 4239 ~ —
' He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying: " > .we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want anything to pin this on us, because we aren't doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104) Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; thaé the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101) In contrast the CIA Station Chief, did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the questionof supplying arms. (__]p- 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter . and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissi- dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such sunnort. [___] responsive cable to Headquarters stated: "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn." (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61) i . Doan 84 Be HW 50955 DBaclda: 32423539 Page 430
j aw A7= piob if a tos Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the country and within a few days Consul General bearborn was back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning contacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not to destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dear- born. (Hos to Station cable, 5/31/61. c. Immediate Post-Assassination Period The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated, and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary, j | assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news -Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified | that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most con-| cerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also ‘in Paris | and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his | father's death from the press secretary to the President of the| U.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk, | 32, 33.) | | / nat HY 50955 Bocld:32423539 Page 431
Aa f * Fe 3 iN a ENE oy er = we SCHNEIDER REPORT Page I. Summary L | s, Il. The President's Initial General Instruction 6 — and Background : A. September 15 White House Meeting 6 B. Background: Tracks I and I 8 C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15 re III. CIA's Implementation of Track II i] | — A. Evolution of CIA Strategy 1? 1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach 1/7 2. Military Solution | ~ 18 ’ B. The Chile Task Force 19 z Cc. ‘The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency 20 _ Relations D. The False Flag Base 26 E. Chief of Station 27 “Iv. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup 29 F | A. The Chilean Conspirators 29 _ B. Contacts Prior to October 15. 30 C. October 15 Decision 34 Pos D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 36 E. The Killing of General Schneider 39 F. Post October 22 Events 4l V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II 43 A.. September o , oO a 7 er B. October 46 ake \" me pa oman C. December . . 54 D. Did Track II End? 24
without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without me 2 fON »"sctinerDER REPORT I. Summary § °° On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.”* Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a a joint session of its Congress decide between. the first and-second place finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro- forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session was October 24, 1970. On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a / Ze. f logs direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent | " & — fr bln AF ps card SP as “he che tt Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to take this action nr informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende'’s accession to races power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to re- port, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House. “Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident FOO L Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making Meg ‘his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero, Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes. out of a total of 3 mil-_ candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge. Alessandri i Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won ae 36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second with 35.3% of the vote. _ ae —— ye lion votes cast in. the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei i Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.
the, ‘by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively sup- In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assis~ tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its activities. — = Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both be- Sone fore and after a coup. One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Rene Schneider; who insisted the constitutional process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the or coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, y,y ora ~ porting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again un- ws successfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed on October 19. ‘That same day General Schneider was mortally a r wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted & kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspira- F tors other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier “ ‘ i a ee ot ~ ne mo Baa in the day. nye ‘ -— eo _ o Sboo ES
p vores a.) an ok 7 A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers, both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and to_kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of con- spiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were assoc- iates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General Viaux because the’ Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the military ‘court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being the "Sntellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General 7 Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile , — for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of office. The military court found that the two Cenerals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting. ae ee F The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all. — of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows: l. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat. 2. All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean mili- | ; | tary entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another. 3. United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean | Ie. plans for a coup after it became known that the: first step would be to | 7 : ‘ _——— kidnap General Schneider. se & pee Vredan te. Page 437 °°" SWI ae ey ee
4, ” Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19, the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge of, their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider. 5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abor- tive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those hes supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court — which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of the killing.* re 6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct . emo instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the coup efforts in Chile after October 15.. On one side of the conflict : is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the a other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on ts October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig agreed-- ‘that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA ; coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testi- : fied that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and * The Committee has not been able to determine whether or net ~ the machine gun at the scene of ‘the Schneider killing was one of the three supplied by the CIA. 2 RET Pegi UR TAT So dee 539" Ege nde Sea
, * thus authorized by the White House. This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves, un- answered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/ Haig view). * . The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of 3 its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized. No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by- step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that. if the CIA had proposed a persua- sive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer wea~ pons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA. Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer, but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to Karamessines' subordinates that he would approve their decision to do so. He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually were sent. ° Oo “ _
‘IL athe President's Initial General Instruction and Background A. September 15 White House Meeting .- On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting re- flect both its tenor and the President's instructions: 1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! _ worth spending not concerned risks involved no involvement of Embassy $10,000,000 available, more if necessary full-time job--best men we have — game plan oo make the economy scream 48 hours for plan of action In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled coming away from the meeting on September 15 with: .. (the) impression...that the President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared to make money available....This was a pretty all- : inclusive order....If I ever carried a marshali's re baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it | ; pieeeme was that day.* (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10,11) . Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with President Nixon may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washing- ton. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversa-— tion was the political situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio “and other anti-Allende forces. ‘According to Mr. Helms: I recall that prior to this meeting (with the President) the editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington. and . I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the ot hotels here, this having been arranged through Don , ben Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have — i this impression that the President called this meeting — where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard-from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening there. (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5) ae ge tae se ow aa
~j- Howeverjy"noneé ‘of | the CIA officers believed that assassination was within “(the guidelines Helms had been given. 2) . y . qe : Senator Hart of Colorado. ...did the kind of carte ie blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack, to stop Allende s from assuming office, include physical elimination? bgt i Mr. Helms. Well, not in my mind, because when I be- — came Director, I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I ‘was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they will tell you this. The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he re- lated to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instruc- a tions: 2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The Presi- W: dent asked the Agency to prevent Allende from com- ing to power or to unseat him. The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. eat Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State cr Defense. (Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970) Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms .* Although Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that: ...the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13) , RK & The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard testimony, are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not, -however, agreement Fae about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House-— a and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week between prose October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider ‘killing. :
a ; ; 2 ‘It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms) Ay to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or Ae to take the initiative in preventing Allende from oa taking office. (Kissinger testimony, p. 12) ow be. we Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive: 3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende as- sumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective. (Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970) : — KKK B. (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a military solution to problem. As part of authority we were expltcitly told that 40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were. ce not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any a matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21. September. 1970): 7 B. Background: Tracks I and II United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CTA. * For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda. be At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of — ‘the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be re done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile. At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will & Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in 1970, this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore — Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort. “8 (Colby testimony,. July 14, 1975, n. 5)
start is made. . On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved .a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recom-. mending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other activities-- -be. undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti~Allende activity. On June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende campaign. The second was. a contingency plan. to make “a $500,000 effort _in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970," Phase IT was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against. Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 elec- tion. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4 election. The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plural-— ity of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his instruction to Director Helms on September 15** at both these meetings the | Spe question of U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende was raised.: Kissinger stressed the importance of these meetings. when he testified be- fore the Select Committee: | ' *This and other references. to 40° Committee discussions and actions regard- - wh ing Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the \P ¢ CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action I[nvelvement » S$ in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970. / On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council MS \ documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Govern- ei ment to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On September 4, the Committee received, Af. documents Aron the, White: ‘House relating to Chile cover-
- 9a - **Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate .of Intelli- gence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of. an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated: Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that: 1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses. The world military balance of power would not be sig- nificantly altered by an Allende government. An Allende victory would, however, create consider- -able political and psychological costs: a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by | the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely. threat to the peace of the region. b. An Allende victory would represent a defin- ite psychological set-back’ to the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/ "Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, 7. September 1970) Bent Ree yz
oo -10-~ \ I think the meeting of September 15th has to be seen in the context of two previous meetings of the 40 Committee on September 8th and September a 14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look ‘at the pros and cons and the problems and pros- pects of a Chilean military coup to be organized with United States assistance. (Kissinger testimony, p. 5) cate “According to the summary of the 40: Committee meeting on September: 8, the following was discussed: : .-.all concerned realized that previous plans for a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn.... The DCI made the point, however, that congressional action: against Allende was not likely to succeed and that once Allende was in office the Chilean opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse -tapidly. While not advocating a specific course of action, the Director further observed that a ‘military golpe against Allende would have very little chance of success unless undertaken soon. Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported this view....At the close of the...meeting the Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold- blooded assessment" of: 1) the pros and cons and problems and pros-— pects involved should a Chilean military coup. be organized now with U.S. assistance, and , 2) the pros and cons and problems and pros- pects involved in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition to Allende. (CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970) Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a "cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We /the Embassy/_ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation of national chaos and: widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to say that "Our own military people /are/ unanimous in rejecting possi- are wl ME
a oe bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation." He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this ‘cold-blooded assessment! is that opportunities for further significant USG action cad with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's Response to Request for ‘Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean Situation, 12 September 1970) The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the GIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military ac- tion is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memo- randum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14, September 14, Viron P. Vaky) On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports -and what action was to be taken: Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared review of political and military options in the Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Com- mittee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg" gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second ‘election for the presidency.
~l1- Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President “ Prei ‘to see if he would be willing to commit himself to an this line of action. A contingency of $250,000 was co approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted team deem important." It was further agreed ; that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by. the Agency oe to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover... ° (CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970) Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts ; to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks. Track " i comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, in- cluding the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his. assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track “The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials in- ; quiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities. Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of a Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under- secretary. of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. Thus far the Committee. has received written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline. All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with Committee staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware of Track II. . 7 _ . > a % ee Acne ee, Toh ae a eka ee HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 445
- oem, ~12- , ot « “a; [Ll activities -in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon's (4 ‘September 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimony + EH Se n° before the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between Tracks ‘I and If: ...There was work by all of the agencies to try to prevent Allende from being seated, and there was ~ work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track I to encourage the military to move against Allende ...the difference between the September 15th meet- ing and what was being done in general within the © government was that President Nixon was encouraging a more direct role for the CIA in actually organiz- ing such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13) Tracks I and II did, in fact, move togefher in the month after September 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader and ed broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other. “appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to inten- sify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their willingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over of power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to run for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden- tial Election, 9 October 1970) In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in order | to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would : BEL: a _ . 4 "eS . HW 5095
HY 50955 “13. \ “have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."* (Korry to Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying, Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated “the degree to which Track EE I and Track Il were merging, that is to say, that individuals on Track I were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working on Track Il." (Kissinger testimony, p. 21) Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 and October 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track I and Track Il often became blurred. — For example, the Ambassador was authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if Allende were seated, the military could exp@ct no further military assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his own recommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that. all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, Ambassador Korry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary “Tn this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that — he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should — Allende assume office. Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed : for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, | for Frei to believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile muddle through, would be.strictly illusory. t The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and.the Chilean : military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions eo and of instructions to the field. Helms' notesi from the September aa on 15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation "make the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primary topic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger, Helms and Karamessines. ; Bocld: 324273539 Page 447
of State U.- Alexis Johnson: 2.  «..you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block ” Allende from taking office, we would reconsider’ the cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any, steps the military should take should result in civil dis- order, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and material that might be immediately re- quired. (Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970) The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track . II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both-had this objective in mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track IT matters were to be reported directly to the White House 'for reasons of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA contact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador Korry were excluded from Track II: That was not a decision that we made. But the best I can do is suggest that there was concern about two things. Number one, that there might be serious objections lodged, for example, by the State Department particularly if Track 2 were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting. And the only other thing I can contribute to that is that it was felt that the security of the activity would be better protected if knowledge of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122) LA ] aed lo a ce ye ry |
‘ ‘ak a “4A Aon one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in os -15~ . . . a i “4 a 7 . ~ . (: °C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project Track If is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely wt to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible, that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential order, and they tried to execute that order. A few excerpts from the testimony follow: Richard Helms, CIA Director - -».my heart sank over this meeting, because...the possibility of bringing off something like this ‘seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as anything could be. In practical terms, the Army “was constitutionalist....And when you look here at the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost inconceivable.... What I came away from the meeting with the distinct impression that we were being asked to do almost the impossible and trying to indicate this was going to be pretty tough.... (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7) ‘David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force - ---it is my feeling that the odds are unaccept- able, it is something that is not going to work, and we are going to be burned if we get into it -.-what are the chances of pulling off a-coup successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency?...we never even got to two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16) .--I assure you that those people that I was in touch with at the Agency just about univers-_ ally said, my God, why are we given this assignment?. (Phillips testimony, p. 53) ae — James Flannery.) Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division - There was just no question that we had to make this effort, no matter what the odds were. And I think that most people felt that the odds were just pretty long. (Flannery testimony, p. 20) Mas
-16- Further, CIA officials’ believed their judgment of the endeavor's _ difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the Septem- ber 15th meeting: "So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough." (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something, 5» ° oo there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10), t | aaa my oe Ra Eas 2 sane. Doctd: 3 2495599
~17~ i . & fo 4 ‘ fe Ny TTL. AgzAYs : “hiplementation of Track Il A. Evolution of CIA Strategy The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent i Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. —_— Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support. There was much talk among Chilean officers about . the possibility of some kind of coup...but this - was not the kind of talk that wa& being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning. pr (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32) e 1, The "Constitutional Coup" Approach a Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. ee On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago: Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump- tion of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective. : (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3) The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger) Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had Pe been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him MW 50535 Docld: 32423539" “Page 451
~18- with this message on\ September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23) . Thomas ‘Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified: col : So this was in a Sense not Track II, but in a ™ sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup....This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military....There was left as the only ‘chance of success a straight military coup. (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6) At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported: Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For. that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now . appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzueha) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split. (Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970) 2. Military Solution President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader- ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, censti- tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup. A three-fold program was set into motion: nw 50955" Boor
~19- wa. Collect .intelligence on coup-minded officers; ‘ rc * “b.- Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, _ and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to f ae, - DOES nT ee give a pretext for a coup;*(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970) mO af . ; . t67rt c. Inform those coup~minded officers. that the U.S. Govern- ber ment would give them full support in a coup short of direct COVE AIC U.S. military intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970) B. The Chile Task Force Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special task forcé was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it. The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Direc- tor for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most experienced and skilled operators. were detailed to the task force. *\ cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused on. creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated: 1, It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It i therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will prob- “ ably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism...You may. — wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel. , that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state....B)Economic Situation collapsing....C)By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes from Allende on this.) 2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With ew nom appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel report { : 4 i & : H which could even be planted during raids planned: “by ‘Carabineros. wo 3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plote: bee PP ters as soon as you can. Coup should have a justification to prosper. — (Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)
CON -  -20- “David 'A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head Pe of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the , —_—— task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon- sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago. and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis. - It should be noted that all those involved with the task force des- ecribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger “left no doubt in my mind that he was under the Sea heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac- ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Kara- messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was ‘ "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi- —_ mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just - constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55) C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army At- & — tache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the, Chilean military Lt ia Peta gag eat ae aw SOUP Ga cTe Bey tg
contiaéts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in- telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee: We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military represen- tative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to : enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro- —— cure intelligence. (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6) To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-— sage for the Director of DIA to send. to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of Pat the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache: -.--to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili- | tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende. Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At- tache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief. * General Bennett returned to” 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence. y ae HW 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 4455
at . t . , - very: well dueito ‘his five years of service there and his broad personal yes "contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief -_ of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in- telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee: We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military represen- tative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro- cure intelligence. . (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6) To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes- sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache: ..to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili- tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende. Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At- tache of this message, or give them any indication of its. portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief. 5 , pee ey Sa ALS * General Bennett returned tovthe,United States on the:evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott Wes icting Director in Bennett's absence. & HY 0955 Boclda: 324273539 Page 156
t t t P i t ys 1 ie] t a ‘this ‘message is” for your eyes only, and should not be dis- cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago) For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, he secret CIA communications channel was used. Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini- ifally the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in- elligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, . 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did n fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to he Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Ce hief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages which lee Ore” 7 stensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to Leg ne ; ake certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army . Attache to these Generals. General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did h G c fe) e ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache. eneral Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything onnected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman n September 28. (Philpott, p. 16) U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA, In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled, signing an authorization such as that contained in the first’ paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall. the’ authorizations and instructions in paragraphs tworand | hree. aw va HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 457
testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on , "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile." (Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such, the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message of September 28 bearing Philpott 's signature. Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended. The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to Mr. Broeé to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized: FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded. This action does not répeat not imply ._ change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary, ’ it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa- tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa- ‘tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters re 934, 21 October 1970) - 5 Roth. testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he te bate" followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on : i. r b. q Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA... Philpott also instructed him that * Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re- —: ' sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth, , Vol. II, p. ) HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 459
- 23a - | Toa ‘any further action on the subject would henceforth be. the responsibility of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth, p-. 8)* Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described | by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified: - * I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende, ‘ that. DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be help-. ful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of the instructions or the channels through which they came. .Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the highest level? Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi- cate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p- 11) Roth also testi-+ fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would be by CIA channels. (Roth, ROPE oN HY 50955 Bocld: 324273539 Page 459
. oan tana bet Teen to Colonel Roth. ‘That was my impression at the time. Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States? Colonel Roth. I would assume that. The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, Pp. ) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. ‘General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages: It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military | ' ‘ ‘assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I ; had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the Co s.. approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert rx action of this magnitude. This message would not have been v. . ‘ _ Signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p- 21) a According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to | prone issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi- mony, p. 84) , . - a . The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear~ ing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for’ the record which he prepared on re rk a rr ra “ie . po fo garesd ne 7 his activities are missing ;from the: files: (Roth,,Vol: II, p. ) pro \age MW 50955 Docld:32493539 Page 460
ora officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly 7 Ps forceful in this regard: | »+.-f can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what- ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his duly authorized representative. (Karamessines testimony, p-. 79). We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies. (Karamessines testimony, p. 79) - We could not.remain in business for a day...if this had been the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would have beén found out, a single. instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken ; — place would have put-us out of business. (Karamessines testimony, p. 80) Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's © role or that he authorized any messages: to be sent to the Army Attache. om ; t So Bi (Kissinger testimony, P- 22) a oe a i ‘The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the prov statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are _ 7 | ba. four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals - Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their general instructions.to the Army Attache. This possibility would be — a contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware is of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to — bins the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony. but would be contrary to Philpott’s sworn testimony and his duty to “a keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and, after receiving initial ‘authority:. from General Philpott, co- opted and ordered Pu HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 461
ta — - . . yo; wr he / ba: Po EY “the “Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to the sworn eae wot David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines, Slit by hark pn fAd! ne and William Colby. h, members of the White House staff authorized — the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff directed that the Army Attache’s superiors in the Pentagon not be in- hair aa my formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General Alexander Haig. D. ‘The False Flag Base In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a "False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as — nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts a with Chilean military officers.” Given the limitations of the Station's resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt. the use of tr "False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a age: chance." oligo (Headquarters 363, September 27, 1970) *The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, "an unusual practice," either by the CIA or, eaveige intelligence services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48) * Mf AY y $ h Pry , ii ye? rt ; ae | aaa HY 50955 Docld: 32423539 Page 462
~27- The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and — not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27) E. Chief of Station Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers. The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic: I had left no doubt in the mindswf my colleagues and superiors that I did not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall (to Washington) was.to be read. the riot act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not.too interested in continuously being told by me that certain proposals which had been made could not be executed, or would be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix) testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10) The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not 20 unnoticed. The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself. BR : HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 463
a] A Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his claim to have dissented: Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceed- ingly narrow and available options are quite limited and relatively simple. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970) Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism. It is essential that we not become victims of our own propaganda. (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970) Urge you do not convey impression that Station has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. (Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2) af ., % ; e.. roe : hy ” HW 50955 Bocld: 324273539 Page 464
A. The Chilean Conspirators Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Following the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the. Army, Viaux retained the support of many non~commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA oS om Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July — 15, 1975) Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was is in league with several other active duty officers, including | (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, r 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of [| aK were in contact with Viaux as well. *This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-~ tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup. ; a | *kThe record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with [_] around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that | |may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, was in contact with Viaux. ok ' ¥ Although a distinction can be made between thé: Viaux and Valenzuela. groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the , principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty / military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts. HY 50955 DBocld:32423539 Page 465
elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified: -l might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers were privy to what was going on in addition to President Frei and they were all talking to one another exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10) B. Contacts Prior to October 15 The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti- Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the Constitution” and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem- ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2) Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. * Government would support a coup both before and after it.took place. (Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) ‘This effort began in earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General ("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup “re *The military. officers were told, for example, that should Allende be prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra- cized, but rather can continue to count on us: for MAP support and main-~ tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970) HY 50955 DBocld:324293539 Page 466 ~ woe sora”
a oe * UiSi ‘policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6) Three days later the Chief of Station told that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu- tion and is willing to support it in ‘any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force. Log, 9 October) informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October) On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy — in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he kk would ultimately pass three submachine gunse#On October 22. At this meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even stud- ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October) “according to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970) “Ty his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was affiliated with| | (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in league with| | (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, ''There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Fotce ‘General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army _Lt. Colonel. However, as previously stated, both | and were affiliated with | General Valenzuela and | was in contact with General Viaux. z on ara HY 50955 Boclda: 324293539 Page 467
to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated: ..--This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to bring this new State of events...anything we or Station can do to effect removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire thought on both ends on this matter. (Hqs. 628, 8 October) During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented: President Frei and the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together to block Allende. The Chilean mflitary's tradi- tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government: and military are working against a military takeover. (Task Force Log, 8 October) The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October). This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: . "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October) If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals[ and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army.” (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the'’best hope for- carrying out .the CIA's Track II mandate. Mat BE vee ee ctl i i | ' I py HY 0955 Bocld: 324293539 Page 166
: -33- 4. 4 ms om et « “ ry Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with $ Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through an military Attache. The reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago 476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October) The primary purpose. of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux, and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the[ ——_—JAtttache of that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the "False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions.” (Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head~ quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of: $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October) On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within 7 the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527, ey a HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 469
7 SA by a mo 3 tad 3 Sak CAM a AS Ay B October)” This Viaux ‘kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta- tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October) At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded: Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other military quarters, specifically, an Army General (name deleted), Admiral | | the forces in Concepcion and Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa. (Task Force Log, 14 October) C. October 15 Decision To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con- tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had ifidicated he would deal with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen~ erals [Jana Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.* On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a run- down on Viaux, the | meeting withl | and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." (Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily:" * The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from Santiago to Headquarters: We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at- tempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re- porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this me re weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October) There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Logs Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at- tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October) GRRE. we Tre _@ + HY 0955 Bocld: 324293539 Page 470
~35~ S“y,\ .It was decided by those present that the Agency a" must get a message to Viaux warning him against ee me any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at . this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may re- duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve — your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conver- sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig) The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure —_ on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching cd orders are given. Mc. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."* The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White ; — House meeting to the Station in Santiago: 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to © . generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz- ing every appropriate resource. 3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out — by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo- ‘ ber) The message was supplemented by orders to “continue to encourage him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of ’ Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.) x . Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not on in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat- ter will be discussed in Part V of this report. HW 350955 DBocld:32423539 Page 471
wo A ~2u~ f Seer De Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 The decision to '"de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's’ on October 17. The Fesponded that it did not. * matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. —_——— (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting. of the CIA "False Flagger"™ and Viaux's on October 18, the Agency was in- formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, “and that the abduc- tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." gy (Santiago 568, 19 October) An “emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, .page 21) . ~ | As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter * for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts. Ag a CIA overview statement in Track II stated: Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General Valenzuela and Admiral had always seemed more promising than the capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the abil- ity and resources to act providing they de- ee cided to move and organized themselves ac- cordingly. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5) By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction. On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt. We _ Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades, nN ; ann *Two coup plotters, Generals | made one last attempt to A 4 tL persuade General Schneider to change his anti+coup'position on October 15,.' The Station reported that the meeting turned out! to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General[_____——siJeloquent presentation of: Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October) oof cA gee f Rtas t. pas aR Cre te HW 50955 Docld:32423539 Page 472
~37= three "45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy as AY Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified by serial numbers as.having been issued to him. Therefore unable to use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief — of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider. The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not involved. The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo- matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was mee puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will try send them whether you-can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters 854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Le. Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con- sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally. for Viaux.* * As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to ‘promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.-~ rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to’ provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action: ce Station plans give six tear gas grenades to . rN re Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces aly officers (deletion) instead of having False Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group. Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with \a active duty officers. Also False Flagger ; at leaving evening 18 October, and will not be > ; replaced but Wimert will stay here. Hence , he important that Wimert credibility with Armed Forces officers be strengthened. (Santiago 562, 18 October) HY 50955 DBocld: 32423539 Page 473