Y404-10241-10001 ° Ae et ee ee eens et aes oe ow ume Fmce ee eae . ee re zr ™, ‘ ee ONE ee Sen * = peepee hat ° - Ui heseuike a mane ~ is aati . o itp mito, — TE Pe (ES FSS CUSTODIAL UNI'T/LOCATLON: So7 ROOM: DELETIONS, IF AY: CA ATA OP ECdTI(Ane. Arg DDT ( - DATE | DATE oo ~ . RECEIVED | RETURNED | OE‘ SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFF iui). KO DOCUMENTS MAY BE.COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE | epee F REL EESE 159! GUA GHBRORICN! REVIEW Fuca a ere gem EOE Oe GE ALERT ey eee ning ME an au pny nants wane penne SORT SRR, TE REG? GERD Se ay oP TT SPM OR oy He tem ve otee
14-00000 wae teem VII. SPESIALISTS* ASSESSMENTS OF HOSRKO ‘Ae Opinions on Intelligence and Personality i. | Three pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made by NOSENKO during en early debriefing g CGriy Genriefing s ion were submitted on 25 March 1964 to _| together with a nunter : Mes : sed by the CIA officers handling NOSENKO. The ‘ feere told only that the writer Was @ Rucsian male - aged 36, that he had a university-level education, and that he was én intelligence officer by professton | » Their report, which was | qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting . Specimens submitted to them, is quoted below. oreo g = i
2. Reports Psychologist a. Psychological Testing Results A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.
mre atta ECAR "eee ASDA AACE cme estemerirttestetit iit AS aPC rt ay stearate! ED OE — wae NOSENKO °, er-Persgonal Effectiveness: : 8 a9 an@ Int i10ns “Social Rela Enh Bes aR ag ae soa lies F : es a
Neots Lee Mata e pee Eo ttt Tt is apparent to His Parents 4 ond Gh i] e 6 ole a Olk coal BS 4 c] oli ve [4
volumes have Mari 4 c is) <q 4] © cq pod ical E ve Psycholoa Alterna
7480000 Eee nr ne Terr erry '* A comparison of information obtained during this series of e. Psychological Interrogation: psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history, from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KG6. The main purposes were to collect additional information on this period,* to gain further psychological insights into NOSEIKO's personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful account. Although conducted under the. physical conditions of interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid eutline.: There were relatively few changes of story from pre- wious versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be - untrue. An extract from the psychologist's report of these interrogations is given below, interrogations with information given earlier and later by Por fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA 7
440000 During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSENKO at regular intervals, usually weekly, to examine him ohysically ard to listen to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation. The psychiatrist femiliarized himself with available materials on NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months immediately following the dcfection. A report which he submitted on 20 December 1964 is given below.
tenet em esatnteyh er Oba wes tee mat Coe te an g~ TOP SECRET GiS. B. Views of Intelligence Personnel 1. Statement by DERYARIN a. Introduction Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and his information. He took pert in the interrogations of NOSENKO in April 1964, January-February 1965, and Octoker 1966 as an ob- server and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal past and early KGS career. On the basis of his direct, personal knowledge of conditions within tha Soviet Union and of KGB organi- zation and procedures prior to his @efection in February 1954, _/esupplemented by continuing study of later information from a “variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what HOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authorita- . tive comment on many aspects of HOSENKO's story, the follo#ing _-gection of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning HOSEN - KO's entry into the KGB (then MYD) and his Communist Party affili- ation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN #as active as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer. DERYABIN personally interro- gated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965. Since DER- YABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then “GB and MVD) in Moscow, #ith long experience in Communist Party activities, at the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story. DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, as graduated in 1945 from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counter- intelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he @orked in Naval. Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate. Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Cnief of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN trans- ferred with him to the Guards Directorate. he served as a Guards Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the ranks from case officer to the position cf Chief of Section. One of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service in various units of the.Guards Directorate, and he was also in charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning one of the Directorate’s surveillance sub-sections. After requesting a change from personnel to operational @uties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German Department’ of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in the Counterintelligence Sektcr (desk) of the Austro-German Depart- ment. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the intelligence _Sektor of the same department, a position he held until March - {953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. _ In September 1953 he #as transferred to Vienna, where he became Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency respons- ible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to American authorities on 15 February 1954. whey
14-00000 vil Fee Beg, sonal DERYASIN joined the Komsomol in 1936 wad remuined a memnver until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Conmunist Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party memoer in August 1941. During his Party career he keld a number of responsi- ble posts. Before the war, «hen DERYABIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he das the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultan- eously served os a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the reyon where he lived. Prom October 1940 uncil November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had perticular responsibility for counterintelli- gence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in 1951, In the MGA DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro- German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in Sep- tember 1953. . Re ee oan . “ rr rt Medes Memes Db. DERYASIN's Comments Tne following statements by DERYABIN are based on his question- ing of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions asked ana the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as Subject) sere during this period. Although the Soviet State Secu- rity Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN’s ecomments folloa@: "NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security* oO - “faking NOSENKO‘s. own statements at face value, it is highly improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this regard: e a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children cf high government officials. : b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain éntrance into the service, had no influence inside the MGS apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 1G March 1953, KOBULOV had no office inside the MGB or the “VD buildings... I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad) ** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was located.on Chkaiova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad Station (three blocks from my. former apartment) .. 5 EE EO AS PSEA SPOOR, @ See also Part V.B. #* WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO join the KG3, see Part V.B. cae ple 2 ne * ee a Bee, “Re o- ly ed ARERR SAMMI * ewes 3
Ce ee en eee @-~ = jup SECRET @ - 617. ¢. It was physically impossible at the time for NCSENKO. to be recomended for and accepted into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts his earlier version that he had kis talk with KOBULOV in Jan. uary or February, his account is similarly impossible because KCBULOV was not then in State 6ecurity.) It weauld normally have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was a@ pericd of reorganization and the personnel staff was not actively conducting their work at that time, and pemnanent staff officers were not sure that they would retain their positions. dad. In March 1953. NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a half years old and orly a member of the Komsomol. He had no recommendation for Party membership. and could not become a member for a full year because of his transfer from one ser- vice (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday ne would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or Party membership. ven for the son of a Minister, the Secre- tary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGS would have to talk with the Personnel Cffice and would not give a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintel- higence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of @ Minister and one #¢ho is recommended by KOBULOV, the secre- tary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party membership from the members of the Communist Party where NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year. , "However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and "contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also’ remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's file contained the foliowing negative points.* They are serious factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection: the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him: a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security. b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter and TELSGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security. c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on "IOSENKO's father in which compromising material was collected on - -. - Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of infor- _ ation that would-have-been in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary.. ; d. The social status background in the life of Subject 's mother was nobility. tte nenrnrerenenen * ‘See also Part IV.B. i t i cee eae MeN ate mt irs cee Os eee con cage abet ete we enh ene es ae
mem eee es eS en ae He a Oe oa . : mn a : act wee © «op secrel eae. 618. e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World es War Il and his desertion froi the Naval School in Baku no would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security. f. Subject never completed high echool in the normal fashion. nee g.- Subject was a poor student at the Institute of Inter-~ national Relations. h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely kro# that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB, i. NOSENKO would never te allowed to enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB, “In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would have been noted in the file and would have piaved a negative role in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after KOBULOGV's arrest in June 1953. . “I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.** I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and the fact that Supject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was searched--that he had been accepted into the KGS, particularly in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these nega- tive factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection. *I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage tc the KGB, He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned * NOSENKO firs mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mertioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a - “glass of blood“- at-a-time. Although DERYABIN’s ‘questioning ~~ covered this part of NOSEIKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. _DERYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here for purposes of context. **?he anketa and DERYABIIN's questioning on this subject are dis- cussed further below. monmneriemantaremts wie: ~ rome Se tad Re ee meeinenee-welghaneeepenatie no «
S qopscoret © oo 619. it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he haa unofficially run 4 name check on his prospective bride (which was ‘clean'), and that after the marriage he had filled out another arketa ir which he included * [ all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After con- \ siderable prompting, Subject gaid that he had indicated thet she ; ana her parents had heen in France, but that he had concealed tne 74 fact that her grandmother had been in German-occupied territory | during the war. {He admitted that the KGB would have Jearned this in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the | negative security factors mentioned 2bove, adding the arrest of . | KOBULOV, the fact that his ne@# wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol i put not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject of received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and in- curring venereal disease, and asked if he didn't think that his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the KGB, Subject said \ that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added that another important factor was probably his language qualifi- cation and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad it was impossible that her name check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was SO. "NOSENKO's Knowlecge of KGB, 1953-54 “Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had pre- viously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KCB. He replied that he did not remember the exact date, but he was sure that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 45 March — (15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in .° - 1952.*, In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it ig used to compute length of service and must be entered on vari- ous forms from time to time. € "Numerical Lesiqnation of the Intelligence and Counterintelli- gence Directorates in 1953: Asked to aescribe what directorates existed in the MVD while BERLYA was Minister (March-June 1953), NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change that took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for. a few months only, the FCD became the ScD, and vice versa. NOSENKO stuck to this even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not Know or aia not remember. perhaps realizing that he could not claim not to remember «hat directorate he served in. (Actually, the change in numerical designations wag instituted by BERLIYA right after . STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was - - wee eee organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for the entire first year of his alleged service there. _@NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he told CIA that he joined the KCB in 1952. See Part V.B.
> Top seuter “Ee a 620. “MVD Leadershi 1953-54: Asked ts nane the chiefs cf the directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA and KRUGLOV, NOSFNKO named nine out of 78. He was unable to name the Chief of the Intellicence Directorate, saying that he remem- bered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief umtis 1955). asked to name KRUGLOV’s deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV ans SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNFV a4 SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of ‘he CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), Nos- ENKO flatly denied that this was possible. “Organization of KGS: NOSENKO did not know when the KGS was organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right. "Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He does not know many of the things that he should know about en- trance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he claims to remember, The disparities are so great that they can- not be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance pro~- cedure for NOSENKO, "The most important document filled out by prospective em- ployees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsiainoco naznacheniysa sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to forget. A background investigation ig run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers _ filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was re- quired in ore copy only, and was never permitted to be taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in) * : “NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical exam- ination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such an examination wag a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.** * DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no anketa was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN.,. This- statement is given in Part V.8. an **See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for . tuberculosis from 1952 to 1952. i _ OS : SL 7
-agreement he recalls signing resembles the secrecy agreements -.after joining the KGB, Told that this was impossible, and that “ga few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB-Head- —  — “-" -~quarters for-over-ten-years-as. a- staff. officer. and particularly... .._. _and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well. omm Top secrer © oy 621, “NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreemen® that he signed when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees. It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of tha secrecy that were taken from agents. “NOSENKO insists that he did not Fill cut any other forms, questionnaires, Or papers when entering the KGa. Actually, there were a number of other routine forms that had to be Eilliled out by applicants and new employees. “Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his entry processing was handled by a personnel officer ramed ROZHEN- i KO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO‘s office, which NOS- _ ENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Ozeczhinskiy Street. In fact, ‘ neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel De- partment were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of Building No. 12.* "Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to work in the KGB, NCSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles as a case officer, 500 rubles for hig rank of lieutenant, plus secrecy, language, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was correct, even «nen told that KGB officers were no longer being paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remempered that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank, he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers in September 1952 ard was not restored until April 1954, ° "Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly . no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSENKO replied that i he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had re- ceived his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible: all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953. éyisitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit to. the KSB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to re- eall the procedures employed by the KGS Pass Office in issuing visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact,. the name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the inter~ viewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors, ne @NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B. ae oe : 7 i
~ Jor stckel 622. "Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In describing his first day at work, NOSENKO saic tnat he went from the Pass Office, where he optained 2 visitor's pass, to the 4th entry of the Bsilding No. z, where his pass was checked by the guards, and then went unescorted to KCBULOV's office on the third floor. Challenged on this point, he said he wis sure that it was possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was arsolutely impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without escort if you did not have a properly stamped KGS (MVD) identity document (see below). "KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connec- tion with this document at that time. He replied that he knew of nothing unusual, He was then reminded that af:er STALIN's death and again after EERIYA's arrest it was netecsury to have special stamps placed in the identity documents to validate them. With- out the right stamp it was impossibie to ente: the KGB building. NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything about it despite a number of hints and leading questions, Actu- ally, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were tem- porarily withdrawn in order tec have special validation scamps placed in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the KGB kuildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have for~ gotten it completely. "Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB Club, NOSEXK9D said that he did not remember any sign (there was one in 1952) but mentioned that there was a Castronom (food store) pext to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastroncm was epened, he said. fgrmly that it was already there when he started to work in the KG3, In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as of 1954. It was opened sometime between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow Girectories show. The KGB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building ~ Ro. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and iOSENKO would have hac to pass it every day he went to work. "Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Direc- torate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was located on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located next to the main KGS building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have fre- quent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia. "K.I. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelli- gence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NCSENKO replied that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy ho. 2, the Acricultural Exhibition, the K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is ‘a confused ahd incorrect answer. “Asked for clarification, NCS-"" ~ ENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus, HOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since 1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agri- cultural Exhibition were one and the same place. ones eter fame omen aime ee ag EE cae es ea oe + Fa
““NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol' Secretary in the Second Chief Directorate, KGs . "NOSEKKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March 1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have : served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was re~ moved because he used operational—alias documents in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to have been excluded from the Komsonol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th birthday in October 1954. "Asked to describes how he transferred from the Keinsomol Crgan- ization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Kom- somol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure, both as reyards deregistration from the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB, He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic; this is impossible. "NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will convene separately to elect the Secretary. “NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific manrer. "NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate _ to him and would deal with him frequently. took place while ne was K/O secretary, saying that they took "NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there. *“NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Kom- somol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Kom- somol for over-age in 1954. ; "NOSENKC maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries, This is incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding ecale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent: those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, ~~ and must’ know the” right” amount. — ee oe oe Som ee ween ~ “NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustay). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved
> jue SECRET * in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which waa & big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and could not be forgotten, " ‘ Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGB procedures bas heen urmiat it a has ¢aid about KGS procedures, DERYABIN stated: “Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Seviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in 1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial descripticn of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe this process in detail, and he mace several blunders which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know wnere the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia about this, NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unabie to stretch his limited knowledge to provide a description of now these various repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and re- fused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Speta- proverka, which means a check for clearance. "It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubt- ; edly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures : in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking | NOSENKO the difference between the Ist Spets Otdel (Special | Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operati:no-Uchetniy | Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for | the lst Special Department). He answered that the lst Special Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases «rile the | Operational Reports Department is for political and ¢spionage ' cases. It scems he invented this answer on the spot. In addi- tion, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate | from criminal cnes in the lst Special Department, They were in my time and must still be combined in one card file. k “NOSENKO states that he' knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten | years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able | to check information on foreigners, especially on American En- i bassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of aay files they may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO ' should have been doing this type of thing the whole of- his ten i years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to -He- _ the American Department or the Tpurist Department." oe Scat
14-00000 a - 4 ‘ * top secret > ea 625. tome meee 2. Remarks by CIA Handlers wate a. Introduction inate Sery Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observaticns on his behavior and actions. - The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and inter~- rogat Ltori em f-stage) since then; A second case officer, who participated in among them, they command an extensive knowledge of a Sovie ntelligence Services, and they have had a variety of agent- and defector-handling experience. NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of circumstances: = In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none : , of which could be covered in detail. : ; ~ In cgncentrated, but somewhat longer meetings in place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the know~ ledge by all participants that items not adequately covered then could be dealt with after the defection. . area, where a spectal effort was made not to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his ' statements. ~ Under detailed hoptile interrogation (especially “April 1964. and January-March 1965). ; | - In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which . i NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965, i July-August 1965, and Ogtober 1966). ; Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reac-_ oe tdons under varied degrees of stress and control. ; fhe features of NOSENKO's conduct, manner, and. techniques @iscussed below are confined to those which were clearly and con- sistently observed by all of the officers involved.
& top secret & 626. b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings and the debriefings.prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonably con- vincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hur-. ried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did not allow tine for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer in commenting on NOSENKO‘s conduct mentioned “the ease of his manner, the aureness of his knowledge of matters which he should have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided.” NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be *“urder little or no restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us” and “made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigerous, temperamental and vital man.” Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO'S manner caused doubts on the part of the Fal representatives who took NOSEMKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964. It beceme apparent, how:ver, when the cases hKOSENKO had mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could not add facts consistent with what he had said before. He was unable to recall related incidents or additional Circumstances which did not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by questioning from different angles or in different coatexts. The same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on GB procedures, installations, and operational methods: Having once reported on these general topics, NOSENKO could offer nothing more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of question- ing tried. Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate his points; new stories did not emerge. In a perica of nine months, NOSENKO was drained of information 6n nis p2YstMas and professional experiences and knowlédge., Never before hag the | CHER icger countered a.defector who was totally de- briefed. — . . weno : A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his in- wm ability to supply details and to forestall further questicning a has been to claim poor memory. “Different people have cifferent Stvypes of memories,” he has said on many SCCaSIONS, OF ON Others? ¥T Rave ola what I remember.” The case officers who have handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excel- lent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one: NOSENKO did not always recall most easily those events which had occurred most recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris and to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role; he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the dates on which many of them transferred from one component of the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to Gescribe their — responsibilities at particular times. Yet NOSENKO forgot where he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently dis- cribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a consistent date for his entry into the KGB and fer his transfer from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962. Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which, like the “ANDREY” case in 1953, took place in the relatively dis- tant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and activities of his own target,_cohn V. ABIU.AN or details of opera~- tions against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961. — ecacon’ gusttaen refetsesEaheneACED ECDSA! Eset nnenMNERSAGAEDne cater =n abe anus un em enemas @ * ot arses ¢ : Pe eet
and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets: . | TOP SECRET tant “oy 627. These limitations of xrowledse ard quirks of memory were evident not only during meetings when ROSENKO wae being desriefed. They were also apparent in the interrogations whiich supplanced the debriefings. . Ce NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation (i) Introduction In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged habits of behavior noticeable t> each of the CiA officers present. Trese characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting events and his evasiveness, improvisécions, and other defensive techniques. They are reviewed below. (ii) Manner _of Recounting Events - Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were the following points: - Talking about operations he supe:vised and about his per- sonal role in the KG8 Headquarters aspects of other operations, NOSENKC habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or indicated that he was not alone in these activities ("there was no atcounting on who wag working on any code Clerx case--it was GRYAZNOV, KOSCLAPOV, NCSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBAN~ OV," or “We made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or “I - and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him.") “hen asked where a par- ticular conversation took place, he rarely located it in his own : - 4 office ("I was in KOVSHUK's office when KCSLOV called him about the trip" or “I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to KOVSHUK"). ; - At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO some- times quoted conversations in which he took part (-I then said,” “he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that NOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g... his relationship with GRIBANOV and his part in the recruitment approach to the American Code clerk James STORSBERG). - In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOCFN are examples) NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition or omission. -In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed he learned “little by little’ from several different sources, he _ presented the facts each time in neariy identical order. Asked for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the im- pression that in such instances NOSENKO had celivered his infor- mation by rote: Statements like “I don't remember what I told you before" when queried agair. on a particular case; detachment who, like himself, had cooperated with American Iatelligence: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANCV: an inability to correlate dates and events in different operations which he said he was handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to W.E. JOPNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop. and conflict between the dates of his participation in the MCRONE case and his travel to Cuba).
> TOP SECRET .7 - NOSENKO, with a few excepticns (notably the compromise of PENKOVSKIY and the AZ{DIAN visit. to the dead drop site), could not supply specific or approximate dates for operational activi- ties during the period of his service in the U.S. Embassy Section. Beyond recourse to the phrase “1960, 1961," he refused to estimate the dates or to associate these activities with the time of the year or events in his personal life. ek Be Newbie dest {iii} Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses In the debriefings before the interrogations, KOSENKO avoided questicns and topics not of hig own choosing, saying that he would give full details “later,” when systematic debriefing began. When the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing, me would plead fatigue or boredom and propose: "This morning we drink; tomorrow we work.*® Prior to 4 April 1964 he provided only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only after 4 April 1964 that he could be, constrained to reply to de- tailed questioning on other matters. - Prom that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar to his interrogators. He would try to change the subject or to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how such things were done in principle. He would claim bad memory on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy personnel were hopeless and useless anyway. le would dismiss the details or the entire operation as unimportant (for example, the microphones in the U.S. Embassy). He would set out reasons for his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own “poor performance," preoccupation with other matters, inattention to duty, absence from the KGB while on vacation, lack of time to master details because he was a superviscr). Unable to name or talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, in- cluding those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO disparaged the quality of, such agents ("they never reported any~ thing of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational level and their inferior status as servants and employees as one reason none of them could give the KGS operationally useful information. In fact, the record of many indicated previous em- ployment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college degree or certificate from a technical institute. Numerous maids were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist. fr ore When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that NOSENXO improvised his answers. Some of these evident improvisa~ tions led him into unacceptabie statements or positions. To use his responseg to the questioning on Jchn V. ABIDIAN as an example: Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, he said the KGB could not get at it. (In fact, the car was held by Soviet customs for two weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used Embassy chauffeurs for access to cars.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN‘'s trips out of the USSR, he claimed that tne KGB had no way to find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of the country...(In fact, ABIDIAN had told his language teacher — each time and she, as NOSENKG said, was a KGB agent; also, ABIDIAN - arranged his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his des- tination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which he latter admitted to be false. Asked why he did not know personal we won de Cee eneeiete eifeanercemane | enone compress prt we iesenpnens egen be Ri RBROR
- ‘2 + 10P SECRET 629. data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Biegraphic Register, he said “only the First Chief Directorate” uses ber when tac interrogator pursued the point, NOSENKO said he roamembered that KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, “but an old one, 1956, which didn't list ABIDIAU." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the FGB thought that ABIDIAN may not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earl- jer given extensive details about how the KG3 had analyzed the precice number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to determine where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he “ag initially asked about Geosge BLAKE, tl.2 KGB agent in MI-6, the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief Directorate operations. NOSENKO Jabeled it as such and said it ®wags not as important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was men- tioned again, he asked: “Who's BLAKE?" On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed out or when he admitted ignorance of matters hea acknowledge he should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon cne of the follow- ing lines of defense: - "What I know I tell you; what I remember I tell you," or “I don't know," “I can't cxplain," -- or a shrug. - The details, even if confused or contradictory, are not important. What is important is the “whole” or entirety of the facts, their importance and their “reality.” It is this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not de-~- tails. ~ = He must be genuine because otherwise “how could I have been working with ‘SARDAR' and ‘PROKHOR'?" (Johan PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonym was "PROKHOR,” did con- firm NOSENKO'’s role.) “How else could I ’tell you about STORSBERG?" "The KGB would not use a staffer as a provo~ cateur,” nor would the KGB supply information on “live eases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL, and reveal the names of its officers abroad. ~ If American Intelligence checked his story ®fully,* it woula learn that despite all this confusion, he was genu-~- ine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check via an independent penccration of the KGB--there it would verify that his name is registered as the case officer who opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that he was a KGB officer.* e NOSENKO referred to this method of correborating him at least 20 times during the interrogations of January-March 1965. He said on 1 February 1965 that “maybe the day will come when you have a source to check and you will find out” (that he was ABIDIAN's case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added: -®F see how poor and miserable I'm léoking with ragarc to ABIDIAN's file, but anyone who can check in {KGB] Archives will see.“ On § February he said, “I greatly wish that you will have as. s00n as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the Was the only such source at the time. TAN orearcr. ¢ ne oe thames r lad
file on ABIDIAN. Yuriy Ivanovich, opered this file’.* On 1lé February he said: will show Xt am what I say." On in one hour to a check via such a source. that “time will show" that he is not a provocateur. > Top SECRE] 630. > On the first pege is written thet ‘I, NOSENKO, "Tine: 3 March he referred nine times with- He repeatedly stated At one point he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators: NOSENKO: INTERROGATOR: NCSENKO: NOSENKO: INTERROGATOR: NOSENKO: INTE RROGATOR: NOSENKO: INTERROGATOR: NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find that I'm right. We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB. We're disputing that you held the positicns you say you held in the KGB. That's what I'm saying. I£ you ceuld check you would find thet I was only in these two departments and only in these positions... (later in the session) I can't tell you anything rore. Tf can't prove anything. Maybe the future will shew. What can the future show? I don't know. But from what I understand the check- ing has not gone very far. Maybe you can check further... I mean, if you have any possibility now, I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends. You mean our acquaintances, don‘t you? Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check wi someone, because anyone in the KGB should know that, yes, there was a NOSENKO. Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV? No, of course not, because Lt gave you their names. Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be gure. @. Additional Observations qi) Inquisitiveness About CIA NOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of . Soviet Intelligence defectors. discussing his own KGB responsibilities: and I will remember details.“ -tdiveness- include--the- following? _ Frequently he asked, even while “you tell me about a case, Other examples of NOSENKO'Ss inquisi- we Ke ewe A Soett Fiat en ee ee SOR AON RE EO LETT = When shown the CIA publication during the 1964 meetings in “NOSENKO made inquiries about what organization prepared “t and to what part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.
_ : . (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he made the foregoing inquiry.) ~ NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence col- lection in the USS8 is directed and coordinated. The CIA case officer responded: “What was that question?° NOSENKO there- upon said: “It was not a question--just general interest." When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he re- fused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other mattera. - He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washing- ton area. - NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA offi- cers in contact with him. ~ NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA offi- cer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a medal for that phase of the operation. (li) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources Under interrogaticn, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSC- LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that CIA knew more than he did on tovics including ccnditions in the USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility. -He never challenged DERYABIN's statements abcut KGB procedures, although aware that his own information was more recent. fe) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance After admitting his inability to respond to questions about operations in wnich he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He rculd admit that it was “impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable (“In your place I wouldn't believe it either,* or on another occasion, *It will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his per- formance under questioning was bad and unacceptable. largely useless. Out of the 150--or—so--he-said_he_had_ provided, eb hi tee nae OE Sere pee a ee min ene Neem he stated that the great majority were “no good," unimportant, or people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe “ANDREY’ became _..__ He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were . _. mot interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any more"; "some of the agents recruited by the. Seventh. Department —__ weren't meeting the KGB"; etc. He consistently estimated, how- ever, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads. : tue SECRET -
74-00000 , TOP SECKcT 632. L A Cc. Polyqreph Testing “a, «Test in April 1964 Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a polygraph examination which tre CIA handlers had told him was a routine part of his defector processing. He was informed on 3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him to get a good night's rest and to refrain from alconolic Leverages. NOS- ENKO @rank heavily on the night of 3 April, did net enter his bedroom until 0290 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at 0730 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tornics. Subse- quently, when NOSENKO thought he was not beinc observed, he was seen to remove nis hand from his lips hurriedly.*. Pollowing a medical examination by a physician who noted ; that KOSENKO had been drinking, ne was urnctroduced to the CIA ' polygraph operator. An experienced interrogaor, Ziluent in the Pussian language, this polygraph operator conducted the test in i Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April. His report is quoted ' below. “The question of Subject's (NOSENKO's) willingness to par- ticipate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration, since he had, on previous occasions, agreed that he would take the test. However, whether Subject wouid contanze with the polygraph testing if confronted with atcempted deception after an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Con~ sequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's terminating the test prior to its completion. 1t was decided that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph technique would be used during the polygraph testing: specifically, to insure that a polygraphic rece:e of Supject's reections to all i the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on | any significant polygraphic deception indications his charts might reflect... This plan was followed throughout the poly- graph interview... ne a nS ESET EE # On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis of six types of tablets which had been taken fren NOSENKO's personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, and in- strumental analysis including the use of X-ray: “Sample No. 4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece of paper with the name ‘Phenomin' written in Russian. Micro- scopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of ° Se bee oe a -Small.amount_of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of Pee eaten mE lactose, and a small amount of corn starch? al-azpheéetamine is—— - = a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as 4 central nervous : system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate decep- . i i tion responses especially for a weak reactor. No phenothi- ‘ i azine (a tranquilizer) which 1s the active ingredient in ; 'Phenomin' was present in these tablets. The tablets do not appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...As a result of the above examinations it was established that none of the items sub- mitted are of the barbiturate family. Although either sul- faguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240) could be used (and indeed nave been used) as secret ink, they are also normal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and there $a nathing in the farmatation of the tablets to suadest ceemenenanentene ep mecncereeseain = Sn 18
EE LTE LL! hed nv ios wo: iL 633. 4 “Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown na drug prior to testing, there is ne guestion, based both on analysis a { of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation dur= ing the interview, that Subject has attempted ccliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this repe:t. "It is [my] conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Inteliigence for a spe~ cific mission or missicns. “According to the pian, the differert phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polyarapnhically. Chal- lenge of Subject's reacticns was indirect and ‘soft.* On no occa~ sion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygrach reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything ts any of the questions which were asked of him. when the final test questicns were com=- pleted and a record was cbtainec of all of Subject's poiygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed. se eegenme eres "Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent ques- tions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to [my] direct accusation was that ne couid not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volun- teered to American Intelligence. toe ee "Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected com- plete self-control and ccnposure, now exhibited a completely dif- ferent picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior te being confrontec with (my] opinion thac Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) 1f he were sent to penetrate Ameri- can Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembiec... "Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject. “Series #1: Were you born is the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction) Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction) Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction) Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction) Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth? —----~¥ess---(Reaction)- -- - sore Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? No. (No reaction) ; Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidlirg? Yes. (No reaction)
Die you deliberately give any misinformation about your work and service in the KGB? No. (Ko reaction) Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education? No. (No reaction) Did you ever comait a major erime? Ne. (Ko reaction) Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military service? No. (No reaction) “Series #2: Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962? Yes. (No reaction) Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction) Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No reaction) Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the Americans? Yes. (No reaction) Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans? No, (No reaction) : tare ° rrp ate are em = a me Rrneteapereatri teehee sO san etn
14-00000 GC jye secre OC 4 oO hed in 8 ata Le oo Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union . | { i i sometime in the future? No. (Reaction) Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence organs? No. (No reaction) Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No. (No reaction) "Series ¢3: Did you defect to the Americans in 19642 Yes. (No reaction) i pid you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yea. (No re- action) Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatis- fied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction) *Series #4: : . Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your i trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction) Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1964? Wo. (No reaction) . Cie naman mine gene ate mae
14-00000 genase ce et OOP EEE A IAI I SI jue SECRET 636. Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction) Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction) Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1958? No. (Ko reaction) Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957? Yes. (Reaction) Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (No reaction) To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964? No. (No reaction) Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction) "Series §5: Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 19622? Yes. (No reaction) Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964? Yes. (No reaction) Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yeas. (No reaction) Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes. (Reaction) Did you bring with you personal identity documents which were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction) Did you give truthful information about the structure of the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGa? Yes. (No reaction) Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Dis- information)? Yes. (Reaction) fo your knowledge, was PEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964? Yes. (Reaction) 2 Ne RRR oo aR wR = Oe De ee oat edad tee OE me
14-00000 ®Series §6: Did you drink more than you told me? Wo. (Reaction) - (Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior to testing.) pid you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? Yes. (No reaction) : Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction) Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not told me? No. (Reaction) "although Subject later admitted that he had two types of pills with him which he brought froa Mescow and which [were] in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor than he told [me], that he had received specific instruc- Sort tions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."
14-00000 638. 2. Test in October 2.966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD a. Introduction CIA conducted = volygraph examination of NOSENKO on 18 October 1966 on she subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD. * Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO had been under close security guard, his movenents restricted, and in the interin had been interrogated in detail and accused of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities. NOSESKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six monoths prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or drugs, his food consumption had been normal, and his sleep had been adequate. . NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had first met on 4 April 1964. In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian) were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained, and clarifications of the questions ard his answers were made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed by the conclusions of the polygraph expert. b.. Results "Series No. 1 1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union? Af'swer: Yes. (No reaction) 2, Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961? Answer: Yes. (No reaction) 3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case? Answer: No. (Reaction) 4. Did you personally meet OSWALD? Answer: No. (No reaction) oe eae eT ead 8 ‘ H i i ee er ree ae nee enacts TON ammeter ibetaa ee. = ernest rene ee aL 5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent? Answer: No. (No reaction) 6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed? Answer: No. (Reaction) 4%. Other than what you told me, did you' actively parti- cipate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963? Answer: No. (No reaction) se PST PE CSI EE SCTE & FL. Me ae TP OR OE Be Bat ET oe MOTTE
14-00000 639. 8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963? Answer: Yes. (Reaction) 9. Was Marinu PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB? | Answer: No. (No reaction) 9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD? Answer: No. (Reaction) 9b. After her marriage to OSWALD? Answer: No. (No reaction) 10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA? Answer: No. {No reaction) ll, Did OSWALD have eny kind of contact with the l3th Otdel of the First Chief Directorate? Answer: No. (No reaction) 12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations? ; Answer: No. (No reaction) 13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President : Kennedy? Answer: No. (No reaction) 24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination? ; Answer: Yes. (Reaction) “Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on ‘ this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions i of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10. | “Series No. 2 20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you? [ Answer: Yes. (No reaction) | 215 Did-you ever read thé OSWALD case? 7 : Answer: Yes. (No reaction) | 22. Was this the full ana official KGB case on OSWALD? , Answer: Yes. (Reaction) 23. Did you give us any kind of information about | | OSWALD? Answer: Yes. (No reaction) ' *Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator 1 at ecm fat +
14-00000 € ) C) Top SeGrel mf "Phan me ae bine tent bo i A cweaerpep gre | Ry 640. 24, Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President . Kennedy's assassination? Answer: Yes. (Reaction) 24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President Kennedy's death? Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no answer, Subject answered: ‘Before and after.‘ When the question was repeated, he again ansvered: ‘Eefore and after.' Only when the question was asked a third time on a subsequent test did he answer ‘No.' (Reaction) (Subject reacted when he answered ‘Before and ot after,’ and when he answered ‘No." sean at Ons oma 25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD abnormal? Answer: Yes. (No reaction) { 26. aAs far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy? st weeneerpER ne sen emegie Smee Answer: No. (No reaction) : 27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer i in Mexico? Answer: No. (No reaction) 28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961? |, Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction to this question was inconsistent when he answered ‘Yes.' hence tne (No reaction) notation. However, it is noceworthy that Subject did not attempt to correct the date of OSWALD‘s departure te the U.S.; OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962 and not in 1961. papa we me beens pen 29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your legend (cover story)? Answer: No. (Reaction) 30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959? ~~ Anewers "Subject's most significant reactions were to questions 22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30. “Series No. 3
fe 16. 17a. 3a. were -"- TOP SECRET 641. Did you personally order RASTRUSIK, in 1959, to collect material oc: “SWALD? Anewer: Yes. (Reaction) Did you personally talk oo the V. Ch. with Mirsk about the OSWALD case in 19637 Anewer: Yes. (Reaction) Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of the KGB operational officers? Answer: No. (Reaction) Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was a bad shot? Answer: No. (No reaction) Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of opera=- tipnal interest to KGB? Answer: Yes. (Reaction). Did KGB give the OSWALDs any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union? Answer’ No. (No reaction) “Did you receive special instructions from the EGB about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD? Answer: No. (Reaction) "Subject ’s reactions to the questions so- indicated about equal in consistency and significance. . ® “On the basis of ap analysis of the polygraph charts obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and ‘testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my] opinion that: a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 chile OSWALD was in the Soviet Union. b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's assassination; however, he was not an active partici- pant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a EGB officer. os co Subject-received-special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it." TAD CEPRET
14-00000 642. VII. NOSE:KO'S BONA PIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS Ae Introduction ae Yt is standard procedure to assecs the bona fides of each intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care i3 required in assessing sources of information relevant to the secu- rity of the. Uniced States. A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however, is NOSENKO‘s own testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information wa3 studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides waa thus assembled. These details, as well as direct evidence from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with CIA, have been presented in Part ITi. throuch Part VII. of this paper. The basic questions with recard to the bona fides of NOSENKO are the following: . Is there reason to question the general accuracy and completeness of NOSENKO'S accounts of his situation and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting, his personal life, military service, positions in the KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, know- ledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned of them, and his associations with KGB personnel? -~ If there are grounds for doubting the general \ accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the ; j nature of the information he has provided, and-for - — aa other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal life and KGB career? In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of this operation. These points, wit the conclusions drawn from each, are reviewed belod. Tne discussion continues with a survey of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO's background and . status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO'Ss bona fides.
14-00000 B. Evaluation of Production i. Introduction Se coe eT There are several standards which may be applied to the assess- ment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified: none is likely to be conclusive by itself; and ali of them togetier may not permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a broader assessment cf bona fides. The standards are: First, how does the information| | . ee . . Second, dees the information| «| (This point (ts _cisky to ludse, for a qenuine source - Aliso, information which seems May not actually be such in Soviet eyes: for ex- the Ioas of an apparently valuable acent | | point may in some cases ke irrelevant, for Third, is the information important or sesh tome ‘formation may not balance against the time and effort required to process and investigate it.) These standa.dg have been applied in evaluating the production _. of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below. [ Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence _conse--.—-—.—-- quence is expected of NOSENKO, alttough some question might be the __tt—CTTTCCCSCSstSCSCSSSSC_CSa ong posi- tive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.
. co ronan aennnnnenennen ened RETIN er a A A - - 7 — rm yee cent = 644. NOSENKO's counterintellicence production includes all of his information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs: — their structure, functions, methods, and procedures; - their officers. and their agents of Soviet citizenship; - theic operational activities inside and outside the USSR. For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Part VIII.C. through Part VIII.P.) follows a format in which the evidence is gummariazed, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented. Zo GB Orgenization, Personalities, Methods Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely minimal requirement for anyone who clains to have beer erployed within that service. At the same time, current infomation or the organization of an intelligence service is of classic interest to opposing intelligerce and security services.. Organizational changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the ser- vice; shert of a penetration of the service's leadership, such changes are pechaps the most reliable reflection of changes in operational emphasis and tactics. | | Had NOSENKO‘'s information en the organization of the KGB been novel in this sense, it would have been of corsiderable value, while the exposure of this iunformation--although perhaps not a major loss to the Soviets--woule nonetheless have been against the KGB's best interests. NOSENKO's repects on the organization of the KGB in 1964 (Pages 352-358) agree with and are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization t : newly revealed py the 1961 sources, but this weighs reither for 2 3 nor against him as the source: tn the absence of contradictory : + information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion : because his reports show ro redirection of the thrust of the KGB. Purtnermore, NOSENKO's statements indicating that there oo have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 re- : organization and 1964 are acaeptadie in the light of available imformation from other sources. The information which NOSENKO provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports nor discredits his bona fides. cnereee earntnrtenetataoeceseceest «+ ROSENKO's information 0; some 1,000 Soviets connected with intelligence and security activities is en impressive echieve- ment of memory. These identifications, however, must be evalu- ated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his exposure of these personalities. In this respect, the discus- sion must concern new identifications, for intelligence person- alities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by a@ repetition of their compromise. This discussion mist be fur- ther restricted to new identifications of staff personnel, be- cause the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a Soviet employed at the U.S, Embassy in Moscow is an agent re- porting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already been taken for granted, and besides, no action on such infor- mation can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also ae oe eee be
14-00000 a ere eevael a 645. must be ameng persons who are tdentifiable are accessible, or the informaticn is useless to Western services an? is ro less to the Soviets. On this kesis, only KGB First Chief Lirectcrate as well as GRU identifications merit inclusion ir this -veluation, since theee are the officers who normally appear atroad and participate in agent operations. Alcthougn KGY Second Chiet Directorate per- sonnel have in the past transferred to the Ficse Chief Directorate, this is rot a predictable event and cannot be considered in dis- cussion of current damage. NOSEMKO idertified 165 First Chic’ Directcrate personnel, (er 37, there were 24 who either resiaea abroad at the _time of NCSENKO's defection or were cen. aprosd since that tiime. l Assuming that NUSEIKO was correct in his ider.tifications of all 24 members of the KGA wno were accessible, ** it cannot Le said that the nurber is so large that the dcnage tc 4GB agent opora- tions vas substantiicl. None of NOSEXKO's unigue GRU idenvifica- tions were abroad et tne cine of Fis defection of have been elnce. These personality sdentificacions hence do not serve as evidence of NGSENKO's bona fides. At the sate tine, mis inability to do further measurable t.arm to the #Gu ir this réegacd cannot be: held against him, either, for he has Claixsed service only an the Second Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot be expected to know a high percentace of the First Chief Lirectorate comple- ment. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications do not constitute a factor in finding for or acainst his bona fides. NOSEKKO has Leen the source of many interesting details and examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while useful for illustrative purposes end waluable because of the fact that the meterial was easily coliatable for study purposes, none of the methods described could be consicered new and revealing, and their exposure in any event would rot prevent their continued use in the future. NOSENKO's dciscussior of the only double agent case in whicn he claimea to have played a role, however, demonstrates his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an operation. This case. PELITSKELY, is a subjeat of senarate * CE ti.ese 24, ten WEFe ide YY Epi eee weg as KGB and thereafter, and two became pr mainently active in insecure KGB eperations shortly after NOSEXKO identified them. *#Cther evidence has contradicted staterents by NOSENKO to the effecce that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; fm in Geneva, for example, «here he had daily access to the KGB aoe Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete know- ledge of KGB personnel, he named _15 of a KS3 staff which he said totalled ac the most 18; [as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets station- @da there--(a proportion which ts consistent with other areas and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate eoncerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva, as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of ROSENKO's original idertifications,. positive or negative, cannot be accepted without question. TOP SECRET aetam ee ern om eorensceeneen tri AIEE emt
pins EAE Q mE ere tg sO nmrterneinm@ anew aeee an terse rege —_ oe TOP SECRET 646. discussion below. This subject, too, must be considered neutral evidence in the bona fides assessment. ; NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate in nis answers to questions on KGB Headquarters staff procedures (Page 360 and Pages 619-624). He has been unadie to contripute any new information, although there has been no detailed reporting on the subject since 1954. (GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some new material on procedures but was never comprehensively cebriefed on the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date forms, co~ ordinaticn requirements, mechanization of records and tracing mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution to our knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this sort. When he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering his entry into the KGB, on which previous reporting is available in detail, he answered incorrectly oa numerous points. NOSENKO's tendency to improvise wien he did not know the correct answer or when he had. forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychologist as the behavior of a pathological liar saviny face in a tight psychological situation. When he could not produce a correct answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised because he is a liar or because he is concealing an ignorance | based on Act having been a KGB Headquarters officer. 3. Cperational Leads a. Introduction Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into account the KGB positions and personal associaticns (with attendant access to information) which NOSENYO has claimed for himself. He dinticated that the breadth of his knowledge about KGB agent ofera~ tions and development cases increased as he rose from case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 and in the American Yourist Section in 1955-1958 to becone Deputy Chie£ of the latter section in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Secticn in 1960-1961, and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. Simultaneously he established Lasting contacts with his KGB colleagues so that, for exampte, even after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO kept abreast of its most important activities. On these grounds NOSERKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who could detail the successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from 1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides. b. Operations involving Americans NCSENVO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow showing that: . ~ Since the—"ANDREY"-case of the early 1950*s* the KGB recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeed- ing only in recruiting one contract employee who was in Moscow on TDY. NOSCNKO reported on recruitment approaches to six American officials stationed in Moscow, all of whom So HYTTNEY placed the rocradiment: date prior to hia entry into the wat in earty bavet, fagt bayle W. RMETH tran eryptonym PANDHEY") said he became 4a Kul ayguiut an November OF December 1953. TNo Oran —..
0000 647, refused to collaborate with the KCB, He discussed 14 develop- ment cases which never culmicated in recruitment approaches to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named (V1 officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by the KGB. These operacions, NOSENXO asserted, compr ised the total KGB activity against Embassy personnel with the ex- ception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII, B. 4.) ~ meme - Seven American correspondents in Mescow had been re- cruited Ly the KGB, four of them known to NOSENKO from the years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.5. newspaper- men. Another two were under development by the KGB curing «hat period. : - The Anerican Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIFPEL, had become a KGS agent in 1959; NOSENKO was the case officer. . ~- The number of American visitors recruited by the KGS { in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NCSENKO H would have known about them in light of his senior position in the Tourist Cepertment curing tnat period. Moreover, for the years kefore 1962, NOSENKO provided leads to 19 other i American tourists whom the KGB recruited, plus one who was ; serving the GRU when he came to Moscow, NOSENKO. also de- scribed 18 developnent cases and nine invectigations in | which the targets were American tourists. As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conver- sations with KGB associates:. a U.S. intelligence officer having the KGB cryptonym "SASHA" (still unidentified), a pen2tration of Orly Courier Transfer Station (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee JCHNSCN), and two agents in Geneva (naines not given and as yet nct positively identified). NOSENKO leagned of the KGS agent status il free G. LUNT A an Aserican professor, because he co part in LUNT's |recruitment while on ar eRARG Es be: i between Gere. an American tourist with whose case NOSENKO was nereonally involved. In addition, NOSEVKO de- ascribed two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his know- : ledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB had no ager.t sources able to supply information concerning the a i Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. . 4 (i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of. Reporting If he occupied the various KGB pesitions as claimed, if his access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a. ce . couprehensive. review of KGB operations “involving Americans in the USSR. Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKC's assurances that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working at the U.S. Exbassy in Moscow: - _~ GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code .Clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY (Pages 166-182). NOSEINKO, the supervisor of operations , against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that ve ten mgr 9S ee aii) ne A ERD On tS SPER Ane RA Se ea
400000 weg a ce, eater MONEE AAEERES EEA oe 8 # gp SEUREL. s agerenrparenee A AO de ih BN 648. oy : STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when inter : viewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed . - this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part of 1961. wae ones ee . GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages 595.598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KG3's recruit- ment of a female employee at che Embassy in 1957, the pre- sence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KGS agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female sec- retary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGa plan to complete the recruitment of en Anericen diplomat following his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitmerc of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee (possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy’code clerk - traveliing py train to Moscow, (There is documentary evi- dence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about the last of these cases; see beiow.) see nem NETS a epee oe er CONSE On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tour- ists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering nee (Pages 198.150)." > 7 Hieh NOGENKO was Deputy Chief of the Ame: 4a See year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist geason) and in 1960; NOSENKO wpsnot fami lise with any aspects of on American tocrist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been found to be incomplete. #1 the KGB--Doenala@ ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER... none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.
14-00000 jth} orerane bur chlail . 649. NOSENKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was 4 per- sonal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, con- tradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited aid visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known to have been of operational interest to the KGS, as NOSENKO said. The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are of major importance in themselves and in reference to his claimed positioris in the U.S. Embassy. Section during 1960-1961:* NOSENKO U.S. Embaysy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO was the responsible KGB officer, visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site in 1960 or at the begin-~ ning of 1961, Later that same day KOZLOV, Chief of.the KGB Surc- verllance Directorate] went co the scene. _ “ Gita? On KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct sub- ordinate, mace but one TDY to Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; ’ NOSENKO would nave known about if . not approved other TDY¥‘'s in these years wher. he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. Returning from his single TDY to Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad the same train as his target, the American military code clerk Paul JENNER: as supervisor of all oper- ’ ations against code clerks at the U.S. Enbassy, NOSENKO was familiar with the details of all such major activities. The KGB knew that the U.S. mili- tary code clerk James KZYSERS, whom NOSENKO personally contacted in an effort to persuade him to defect, did not report the earlier recruitment approach by the KGB. Collateral CLA records on the PENKOVSKIY case, in which the Pushkin Street dead drop was used, show that ABIDIAN visited the site only once, on 30 December 1961 at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New York City on the same day, travelling via France, at the completion of a TDY in the United States. (Pages 231- 2357 this subject is discussed at greater length in Part VIII.B.6.) that KOSO- LAPOV was twice in Helsinki during 1960, in March-April and again in November. (Pages 186-200). JENNER and KOSOLAPOV travelled on. separate days. (Pages 186-200) KEYSERS reported the recruitment approach immediately after it occurred, and the report was submitted in an Embassy room later found to have a concealed microphone. (NOSENKO stated that he was a customer for microphone intercepts at the time and that this micrcphone was monitored on @ continuous basis by KGB per- sonnel.) (Pages 213-219) ting ne @ An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later Service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the arrest of American Professor Fr ederick BARGHOORN: According to NOSENKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had 4 per- sonal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARG-~ HOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZH- NEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November . eng tags tNN ANNE HY nee c < ase, masts 1 ee ener get Meee se vm
pew In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, dilliam WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having keen recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been. The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the HARMSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the -., KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality, and in his advice on how to identify “ANDREY"--that he was the only | witness to testify in Roy RHCDzS' trial and that he did not testify at Roy RHODES! trial but was only interviewed in the pre-trial in- vestigation once. Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his Knowledge about American cases in which he took part personally or 4s & supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did net give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his per- sonal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam GAFFE, the KGS agent in France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in. Geneva); three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney: General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN) ; three unsuccessful recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHE. LEMY, Lewis BOWDEN, and George WINTERS). WNOSEIKO's alleged asso- ciates in the KGB thus gave him the names of four recruited agents and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations nave been identified. (ii) Damage to the Soviets Three criteria can. be used in assessing the harm to Soviet interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans: First, the originality of nis information on recruited agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches; i . Second, the agents' access to classified information : ; at the time he reported on them; and ‘ Third, the possibility of identifying them on the : a basis of the details provided or in ceviir: tion with details : : eoceived from other sources. ~- . There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22 ; Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged i , the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In an- -..- -- --@ther-category, -NOSENKO's leads. to.35..Americans under development____ (Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their impor- tance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with con- fidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these i targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with : spasmodic or even continuing KGB eccess to the target, would be i no guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following : the criteria listed above, NOSE..40's statements on KGB operation- ‘ al interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the : recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S. ! Embassy in Moscow. ‘ were: est : | i i { i ; fee perttee eres ee ate
651. NOSENKO was the first source to report on the KGB recruit- ments of 22 tourists inone with access to classified meterials and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information) ; four correspondents (one said by NOSLXO to have becone inactive and on two of whom there was previous derogatory informat.ion) ; the American Express Company representative in Moscew; a contract. employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry a Soviet national; and two agents whose names were not known to NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were: ~- Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in 1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement tnat "ANDREY" was current- ly supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost hig access to classified information through retirement from the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before NOSENKO first reported on him (Paces 413-426). - U.S, Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSCH, who with his wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KG5 in i952 and who made James MINTKENBAUGH am agent of the KGB in 1953 (Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOUNSCN discontinued her role in the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining know- ledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKEN- BAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost eccess to classi- fied information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1963 (about three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on JOHNSON) ; JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S. Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSEKKO reported in January 1964 about the existence of this agent. Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one agent had access to classified information as of the date when NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the preceeding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which un- covered JOHNSON, It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead consti- tuted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document while in charge of the "C‘assified Control Center" at Camp Des Loges between August 1963 and May 1964. His KGB case officer later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could pro- vide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown dis- interest in his proposal to obtain for the KGP a top secret document he. (JOHNSON) thought_of greater importance than any other to which he haa access. (NOSENKO indicated that JOHNSON =~ lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable. Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly dis- regarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities and to observe other routine security precautions. The KGB seems to have avoided full exploitation of JORISON in the latter stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig’s mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the ® TAN arannrr +o saneymeenrsemergmemmemogeere * _ cern vt | | i |
en Pee Dern OP eres enemmnetonte DEEP _tecting the security of the U.5. Government, NOSENKO brought to. | | WRong these 32 agents were many whom the XGB had not recontacted a eet ey RE | eT eee v Y To? SECRET a 652. ere map” threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent factors, the NOSENXO lead may have been consicered expencable by the KGB, without long-lasting adverse effect cn the fulfillment of its overall intelligence requirements. NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBEFRG, a U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a target who had rejected the KGB‘s recruitment offer (Pages 165- 185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the basis of this infornation, STORSBERG generally cconfirmed NCSENZO'S . reporting on the c3se. GOLITSYN had earlier repertec cn what may i: have been the same KGB operation, but GGLITSY.4 believed the mili- tary code clerk had veen recruited; from what GOLITSYN had pre- viously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible that the KGB recruited either STOKSBERG or Wiliiam KURLEY (who i NOSENKO said was mct recruited or approached by thé KG3). If it is assumed that STCRSBERG was not recruited in the approach ce-~- scribed by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN, the KGS suffered no loss in the American services learning of this case. 1f€ it is assumed cn the other hand that STCRSBERG or : HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENKO assisted the KGB-- : not the American services--by deflecting security investigations : from a recruited agent of the KGB. . RETR ee pers my, Fee: oe eee ate Reet oe -(iii) Importance or Usefulness ‘@pne American leads from NOSENKO enabled U.S. security author- ities to: - Confirm previous information on the recruitments of 13-tourists and three correspondents; ~ Verify previous derogatory information on 11 tourists, two correspondents, and perhaps one military code clerk, STORSBERG; - Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow; and ~ Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig COHNSON and MINTKENBAUGZ. * : One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD) in the past had been in a position to pass classified infcrmation to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classified information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals at the Moscow Embassy (APMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had | - access to classified information. From the standpoint of pro- -. - an end the JOHNSON operation and the KGB's potential for recruit-—— ing ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN. . 2 ral Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. secun rity authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO’s information on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful recruitment approaches, ard 33 investigations by the KGB--a total of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing : and interrogation of NOSE:KO on these cases, but the investigative after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union, Lt others who had breken contact with the KGS, some who were known a
14-00000 on, © ivy SECREL © 653. ge work in the United States was accomplished mostty by other agencies. It would seem, however, that the JOHNSON operation was the only NOSEXKO lead to be important or useful. (av) Remarks Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable in- completeness in some of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authori- tative or reliable source of information on operations against Americans by the U.S. imbassy Section and the ¢merican Tourist “Section. Proven uatrustwortny in other categories of operational :leads, there is no reascn to accept at face value NOSENKO's state- ‘ment that SMITH was the only Mosccw Empassy enplcyee working with the KGB from 1953 thrcugh 1963; indeed, evidence to the contrary exists. The same may be true regarding American tourists and correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitmeats not mentioned by NOSENKO could have occurred. Purcthermore, with the question- able exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage by occupyirg the attention and facilities of American security authorities. It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold infor- mation on recruitrents of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did net _hold.the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American ‘Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations about the bona fides of NOSENKO as a genuine scurce, and these reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads.. By itself, this evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possi- bility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKXO to report to CIA, and that the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security services. ® TOP SECRET Poe ets wt 6; Sem: fen eg eeneaty apie png on = aes seme ee ene + ema fea eee cee Mat alcbsinaditinns meen
pt-00000 c. Cperatiors Involving Other Westerners (4) Introduction As alxeady indicated, HCOSENKO's principal knowledgeability of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union. With the exception of one German ‘and one Norwegian tourist case, his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non- American) operations stems from his ageociation with the section of the Tourist Department concerned with United Kingdom and Canad- ian, as well ag fimerican, tourists. Where he has commented on eources for the rest of his tnird-national leads, he indicated his knowledge was acquired either through conversaticns with other officers or through his position as Deputy Cnief of the Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no claim for com- pleteness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy and full details on ery one case. No attempt will be made here, therefore, to compare his infcrmution with cther sources, except in terms of whether NOSENKO's reporting harmed the Soviets and assisted American security. i e : 7 : i t (ii) Discussion } Of the 90 thire-naticaal vecruitment leads (Pages 474-502), ; 22 have nor yet-been positively icentiticd. These cannot be evaluated at all except to point cut that only tO 26 then eng. potentially significant, the #ATO penetrarion_in Belgium in i262 (which may be the same as a lead from another source) and a code cler¥ in the west Gernan Embassy in doscow in T3967 Without knowing the status of these two oreraticns at the time NOSEUKO told CLA aboxwt them, it is not possible to measure the value to ‘us or the damage to the Soviet Union tnreugn the compromise of these cases. Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No conclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of these, but the majority were said by NOSENKO to be travel agency employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the .39 held positions of trust in their respective governments; these five leads are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.S. security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO information four denied hoinz recruited by the KGB, includingdgamaeeraeeas (the. only one er those interviewed holding a government rositicn), discussed below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been ques- tionea while in the USSR. Among the’ 35 new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had ks positions of trust, with known or presumed access to sensitive ae etree information, in. their respective governments: - - — . aRey SS ae 30 ~ ; Soviets whom he suspected of being intelligence officers, ' , and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom . a end renee ee ATER CREESTCPE ee ed eat ROT REAL ITOIIS
: é : a 5 aes 8 . “9: ar ; ; * : ; Ji twee { 65s. os Ietaipviewed diractly he had known in iinscow, Ke fr. on the casis of the ACEcNES 1 cruitment approach. or hes he reported a re- z ik. ed we a * ys . we & : ikO rH - SACS IGE .OSENSO has identified him as GB agent, with we further information. ccationed at tha fan Embassy in Moscow frum 13%? to 1961, £2 SEeRAey RY <¥ ry wre o. wag Be SEE - Indonesian =a 3% >? im Moseow: Im i3cl iSGENKS report g tat erieor to. 1960 oo tha Kis: 3 pe! Ten. rigs 1$¢4 he coulda recall no ner. 4 mistake for the ee eha spelled out the mamé in 1326, 18 ¢ such case bat thought this must haye ec Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO, five might be considered to be important sezaise of their posi- tion in government. In two cases QRS Rye he was not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while a third (assuming that there was no further cortusion on NOSEN~ KO's part) cannot be considered an importiit lead because of che Communist bias of the Indonesiin Government. SEBS position as an agent or contact loses significance in view of ais previously reported support cf o powerful leftist: puliatical figure. The possible importance o: the (CW teed carrot be assessed oy without investigation results. , , The William VASSALL case (Pages 302-507) was the one third- national lead which NOSEXKO himself considered most important. He invariably included this lead wher talking about the impor- tance of his reporting. The Eratish security services neverthe- i een EEE +e omg
TOP SECREI 656. less were vell on tne at to identifying the source of the _pamiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN.! | \ ARADRRR Pa — aaca-ncrommerarsteemsremenisetaat When they received the fragsent of NOSENKO information which focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced to VASSALL and one other. Although the NOSENKO information apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL, there is rease! lieve that the identification would have peen Sccomplished without this information. The lead was there~ fore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself ad- mitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the casé from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department. Of the identified thireg-nationals whom NOSENKO said were being tergetted or investigated by the KGB, nor? held positions of significance, with the ole excention of the then member of the British Parliament. (oa ope whose personal life ana career the Soviets supsequen attempted--wiath considereble success--to cestroy through a campaign of scandal. (iii) Remarks On the hasie of the above examinetion, NOSINEO's information on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered a positive factor in the assessvent of his cona fides. As &-poss- ible negative factor in consideration of his pona fides, the in- significance of NOSINKO's reporting on third-national leads must be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and con- trary evidence. In the case of foreign tovrists his leads showe-- ard he himself has comnented--that such recruirments Were of no particular value; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy thier cf the Tourist Department, he snould be able to make such @ statement without challenge. To cate no independent evidence of foreign tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Opera- “eions against other western embassies in Moscow are a slightly different matter. NOSENKO'S information, or lack thereof, cane not be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made no claim to full access to such information or to positions which would have given him better access. _Except for tnose he said he was informed of in connection with possibie use against U.S. Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the responsible case officer. ‘It would not be valid to argue that a source cf one lead should have told him of others, OF that he should have had mere close friends in the KGB. Thus on all applicable criteria, the NOSENKO leads to operations against third-nationals must be exciuded ag a factor weighing for OF against his bona fides. ; TOP SECRET + 4m qiienene wt. 4 ; { i i i | i {
14-00000 ¥ bare tr ae t hea .. mor... = af 4 w’ 657. oe 4. Technical Operations Against the u.S, Embag sy ae Discussion a ‘In reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S FLY ee ge our 248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were @t rae a nations or five points," later adding a sixth, from which ae counselor, were heard. They included the offices of the Minie vohe one the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Alf Me ricultural (unidentified) "State Department employee, " and the Mee in the Attache. He also referred to a non-productiva inion NOSENKO code room but did not count this as one of the pull xan obtained did not suoply details of the information which the Pee ions i general @ from any of these microphones except to make Q reine offices of to the importance of the materials from those | trussed the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. tle wrbs gust that the existence of these microphones was the Kans me CLe secret" and that only a very few people know of Liiehte af tha NOSENKO gave more details and provided & written List O60 and offices where microphones were actively monitored 4 1961. . NOSENKO's information on the microphones would Ape gener - the basis of the findings of the sweep team in 1904, te auction ally accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there wae Il) ald be ex- but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy cul tea after plained by KGB technical failure to receive th int er 6D OSENKO they left the point at which the sweepers tested! yee Ateache's reported materials were obtained (such as from the Ait it could office) and the sweepers found the microphone inauditles and be conjectured that the microphore diec between wat ly ting did. the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKG ' a pepore on not_harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and had ot com- one specific microphone, and another earlier (ated pees ore promised) source had also reported that the micrapheded Ws ® raced: there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, whan fovated uid lead back to the point where its wires left the build ite “ ct happen- to the uncovering of all the other microphones, in 6a ed with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256). ‘ ; ation NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphene tafort the after his defection. Questioned repeatedly (ut dat operation or examples of the product of those micreynoness Te gave almost no cperational details* and could supply only had already three generalized exemples of their product whieh he lacrophone? given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code pout Mae : *"One of the few concrete incié ” 1 @ One of the few concrete incidents which NOSENKO recounted (with the except connected to the microphone operation ; uf @ of the North Wing planning, see below) was thé nae sjones? document reporting the product from one of the BO ee COLI T GOLITSYN had already told the same story (tage an® dncument SYN said he was present during the search for Une ne en and it was under these circumstances that he Jeat nod the fically that there was a microphone in the office © nie Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 atreaaed that Ul microphone was the most important in the EmbaaBys IOP SECRET
Lr eceacd , 658. the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports Which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGAR but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned; and the Military Attacre’s planning of trips which permitted the KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad 1n 1955, Of these three examples given by an efficer who said he cuiled all the micro- phone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and therefore useless micrcphone, the second concerned a microphone (in the Minister Counselor's office; already reported by a pre- vious defector, and tre third concerned a well known incident which took place years earlier (and which NOSEIKO should have learned and halped corduct, according to his claimed position in 1955; KOSENKU said he played no such role).* In 1964 NOSENKO brought to CIA a sheet of paper which he said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in 1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 260-251). This, he said then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively reveals sim- diarities which may not be coincidental. _ NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): “We are listening to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they wane to find out. We know what machin- ery and what targets interest rem... Some of the things they say are surprising. They ciscuss, among other things, where to go, what to See, what to cake with them - electric equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely cer- tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to steal it. We-now have authorizetion to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equip- ment. .We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..." pe “ees All rooms are being monitore y @ KOS Tse é ap’ involving the American directior. - finding specialists in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955 «as organized by the KGB because conver~ sations were overneard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, ag 4 result of this flap, the KG3 seized valu- able direction-finding equipment from the American Intelli- gence officers...” . Ie is possible that both NOSENKO || were reporting a well-known event, because GOLITSYN reported in 1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB training materials a3 an example of Second Chief Directorate work. The training version may have included the role of the microphone informat1on {although GOLITSYN did not report that it did), which moy thus have come naturally to the attention of NOSENKO However, this would call into question N ITS a EF direct access to all of the microphone product. oO TOP SECRET | i se sone canta Caos eynramante 8 ar oie | | Ph wane -anin
14-00000 - 659. i comeadaa monitored and productive “points” in 1960-1961. NCSENKO was not able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting, and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Sim- dlarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962 that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than the four-to-gix NOSENKO reported on in 1962. NOSENKO's account of how the product from the microphones was distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section since the microphones were installed would know of their existence--despite any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as “agent re- ports.” NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that “it is a tremendous secret thet we are listening to you," and that the microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could reflect dangerously on him as’ the source.* . Accepting at face value NCOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude and interest in technical matters, and therefore his inability © provide specific technical details concerning electronic oper- ations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that: - NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called "Moscow beam,” sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy communications and at other times that it was used to monitor them. ~ Although he claimed to have personally participated in the planning for the installation of audio devices in the North Wing of the Embassy, he dic not know of the ex- istence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill found there by American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the North Wing at the time of its, renovation for occupancy by Americans.) . - NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research and development to substitute for or improve the fading microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. These three points relate to aspects of the KGE's audio-technical attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude, could have been detrimental to Soviet interests. phones suggests that NOSENKO exaggerated the sensitivity of the microphone cperation, which had moreover always been assumed by the Embassy to be active. TOP SECRET
659a. Le i b. Remarks ed papers en NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic opera- tions against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely. His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones, as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic operations directed against the Embassy, was not commensurate with his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section and his particu- lar responsibility for audio sperations. Significantly, the essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report, the existerce of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have been compromiBbtads]x months earlier, with the defection or COLit- SYNv—Discovery Of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on : GOLITSYN's informstion, would have ted t2 all the others. Thus the Embassy microphones must have been cersidered by the KGB to have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoxe of them in 1962. ?dded to this 1s the fact (supported by NCSENKO himself) that Le efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole had seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first, normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the installation of secure rocms and the implerentation of more stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Mosco#, it cannot be considered that the information provided by NOSEXKO in 1962 and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KSB nor helpful to mexican authorities, NOSENKO's denial of any installations in the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to a have been responsible for the operational planning for the north amemreap yp reae eet mmaiens GF cme ae oe teenie wing at the time it was being prepared for Anverican occupancy, would appear to be purposeful deception. lel <2 <ntins- ot Aa alec oder te meme apes te pe Ht 1 res eee aeRO «= *@ r c wo J Pichi bn eee er ne VR
[ue vet nat 660. 7 ° 5. The BELLTSK!Y Case_ a. Introduction cos NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items , ( he wanted to sell) that Ohe of its agents, the Soviet interpreter BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this wa3 a case run by the Second ("Active Line") Section, but thet he personally had a role in the management of the case in May 1962 in Geneva. NOSENKO was able to give certain inside information on this case; for exampie, he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the egent. b. Discussion NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was correct. CIA had been running BELITSKLY as an agent, and the CIA case officers (alias "Bob" and “Henry,” the latter from Washington as NOSENKO said) nad just completed a series of meetings with BELITSKLY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were inaccurate: HBELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's clain that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at en- ticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the history of the case or by PELITSK1Y's conduct, although it cannot be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in it had been as claimed. NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not. consis- tent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic. NOSENKO said in both 1962 and _1964 that he had had orders to supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of 1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in Geneva .(ARTEMEV) was young and inexperiencec and had not even worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in effect--with the authority of direct knowleige and official re- sponsibility--that BELITSKiY, a prominent Soviet citizen having personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Govern- ment, @ man who had been under the ostensible contro! of a hos- tile intelligence service (CLA) for four years, was sent by the : KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with pre- i pared information, but that the KSB did not send with him the : responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible i for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsi- i bility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who : had@ had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even i local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was : already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO, who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section Chief responsible, who had no experierce or training in handl- ing double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva vuP SECRET woes K
seepatmaneneneoumatetintt ec EAAOTtn NA AE AIT tt ERA LLIN Oe ONS aoe 661. oo a . 7 7 et by chance with delegation security functions, shoulé guide the other “less experienced” case officer.* As NOSENKO showed under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the positive intelligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinfor- mation; he did not know BELLTSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of British involvement, nor the operational details and contact arrangements. NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to *find® and recontact him. ** ec. Remarks The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO'Ss version of the case and his own access but also suggest that NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double agents are handled. The examples he gave of his "guidance® to ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1963 that he had arranged the actual introduction to VELITSKIY of KISLOV, the TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's neca of a notional subsource for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had appar- ently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KIs- LOV had had no cennection whatever with the BELITSKIY case. NOS= ENKO claimed to have met RELITSKIY, but did not recognize his pheto when shown it in 1966. Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the KGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite freguently expressed doubts of BETITSKIY’s bona fides, CIA was handling the operation i as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets insice the USSR). (The KGB is © "HOSENRO has reported that he handled only one American agent (PRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even vicarious exposure to the substance of any ot uble agent operations. rerearl had had extended contact as early as August 1958, a role in other opera~ tions against American tourists in 1959-~including clandestine search (see Page 148), and continuous American Department service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1933-1959 operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they fell in the operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. #@ NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact. Trane se ; . f
14-00000 oe ere mimes ome gene ee de ae me ge eT Sg Ie at eae camara emt mt nse Se 662, “eens aware, as Soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates, of the dangera inherent in having disinformation recognized as auch.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the point of diminishing returns. it is perhaps significant that NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until 10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final a@ppraisal of the operation‘s potential. NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KCB operation which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to.this information except that the KGB briefed him about it. ; 10° SECRET | a: FS
663. al ot smart 4 6. 3B Investigations’ : 8. Compromise of POoPCcy {i) Introduction : Fixing the date and cause of the compromise of POPOV, the CIA penetration source in the Cx Pages 530-534) could affect the evaluation of NOSENKO's production. If what tlIOSENKO has said is basically true, his story of FuPCV's compromise ) is now particutarly important and ‘ has not harmed the KGB nor measurakly assisted CIA: The KGB assumes an ewareness by CIA thet it conducts surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel, especially those heving known cr suspected An- ; erican Intelliyence connections (as with LANGELLE and, WINTERS). If NOSENKO or the other hand has been incemplete or inaccurate in his statements about te cempromise of repoyv, then his claims to knowledgeability on this subject mest be questioned. (ii) Discussion The information from NOSENK2 | jon the POFOV compromise may be collated and summarizea in tabular form: Cause vate implied Source KGB surveillance of WINTERS” 21 January 1959 HOSENKO** KGB surveillance of WINTERS . 21 January 1959 CHEPEPAIOV document KGB intercept of WINTERS 21 January 1959 POPOV message letter - of 18 September 1AsAres KGB surveillance of U.S. | none Embassy officer KGB surveillance of LANGELLE 4 January 1959 GOLITSYN, from . ; the KGB orienta-~- -—' ce” ? tion paper on . Lo. . , the PCPOV case ~ . “" aGane KGB agent . ; pricr to 23 Nov- GOLITSYN****** - ember 1957 , ee mem nt * “Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are considered; there i3 insufficient collateral material available for an evaluation of NOSENKO's information on Vladimir KAZAU-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER (Pages 571-575). #* NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS] mailing a ae letter which, upon being checked, wag found vo be addressed i to POPOV; he has contradicted himself about wnether the KGB oy applied metka to this letter. . ; ***pOpOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing (Footnotes continued on next page.) TOP SECRET * . ret ae ary ee erm aatlaye eteslbl atvann itm atthe ee tN Katty ORIN. ethige 2. oattrrtremerenetieetnteitme eed nctestty wettest Renn wet 1 Ane saaesinanteD = Bo ANN mem nem es eens ES Em eS ce cor gee BN oo BRCM REE A RF
va 664. The only other evidence available is anaiytical. POPOV was transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 26 June 1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October 1957. - Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January 1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where Illegals and productive GRU sources of antellicgence were not ex- posed to him. Hetween March and November 1958 there were signs of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling. unit where POPOV formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in: Rovember of that. year. These facts can be interpreted as follows:: | . POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before his transfer to the Illegals handling unit. . POPOV's status was compremised before his recall to Moscow in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time earlier. The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets‘ knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one- half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October 1957. - The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other CIA sources. ’ This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's in- formation that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before 23 November 1957. ene ee (Footnotes from preceeding page.) ##t**Since such orientation papers are written for general circula- tion within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security prac- tices would permit their conterts to reveal sensitive infor- mation; other sources have indicated that orientation papers ‘sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however, reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence had a source which had provided GRU information. #eeh@tThig date, which is consistent with that cited in the final sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to ’ Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as being a source of CIA. oe
to 665. Tp cps i . Soy esis (144) Remarks 7 5 The completeness and accuracy of POS EK OW £. on on the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is DY the ' LG CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contrauicte ; 4 4 UGOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot be finally evaluated. : book Only with reso.ution of the bona fides of NCSENKO can a judgment i be made on this part of his production. i | - J i | i 4 { i é : ' | > t | UP SECRET 4 { af
14-00000 op ey eh ee i 666. «pone Recauce his direst resporsibkility for coverage of ABIDIAN 1s an essential element an NOSENKC's story ef his 1569-2951 career, becouse he insists that the -GH had no idea of U.S. Invoivencnt in the FENKCVSKIY case until Richard JAGR wert te the Fushkin Street . dead drop on 2 Novemrer 1962, and precause he is alamarnt on the , : Foint thet the KGs uatil a@imose the end cf the SFLROVEKTY case knew ef no connection between PENKOVEKIY and the fusnain Street gite which ABIDIA visited, NOSEIKO's story of the cocpromise of PENKOV. EKIY appears to bear directly on the question of SOSEUKO's bona fides, Each of the various versions of the compromise cf PENKOV-~ ; S*#IY mast Le examined and compared with NOSENKO's story and with m4 the establishea facts.** b. Cocpromise of PENKOVSELY* (1): introjuction meer ern or) (ii} Discussion hcrce en the caus3s, and two cn. the timing. NOSENKO, Gogee ee and the “official KG& report" attribute the compronite to the facet that survelllance Getected a meeting be- tween Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet wnem tre KCB Llarer identified @s PENKOVSKIY. NCSENKO dated this as around noverber or December 1961, the official report stated this cccurred on 39 Decemper 1961, 3 a Sah gave the cause as surveillance, tut of Greville WYNNE i end PENECUCZLY rather than Mrs. CHIEYOLM, ard stated that the com- ; | i promise dated from May 1962. Gzae gave two different accounts, one that FENAGVSKIY was investiyitea for reasons unre- lated to eny suspicions of espionage and was tnereby fourd out as aspy, the other that his excessive spending erd sale of foreign mercnandise led to an anvestigation which resulted an detection of his espionage activities. Sha placed the timing of the first ver- sion in 1961, without citirg the tame of year: ia the second, she associated the timing with a warning against association with PENKOVSALY which ene end her husband roceived in Brut Uy emer *#7¢ does nct seem unusual for several sources to have reported on the compromise cf PENKOVSK1Y: Fresumably this was the sub- ject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services, 7 for it was covered in the Soviet press and ir. at least one wk “official report" disseminated by the KGB. Although their "34 differing situations within the Soviet services could partially , explain the differing versions thet these sources have given, 4 some of them nevertreless have claimed either direct knowledge of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. There- fore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, ana the facts on the handling of tne case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent +o the question of NOSEIKO's bona fides. Zo taps vs Fe Bape ets * See Paces 535-547 for discussion of this case. - ; |
14-00000 pate 4/4 4/ 7 7 LOST/MISSING MATERIAL THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE. DOCUMENT NO. DATED: PAGE(S 667 FROM: CIA JOB NO. . pox no. FX Ree/ WG FOLDER NO. 2
PENKOVSKIY that he had visited the cite after he chose it {in 1960, (7 although it is poss:ble, especially as he had not been informed of ABIDIaN having been sent to check on a ssitle signal fron him about the dead dron,. 3 aad ae Baty: fy however, makes it clear that the ABIDIAN visit «as not the ‘first observed activity =< ; at Pushkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the’: site. As the report states, when massive surveiilance of U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this address the first time, he was not followed inside by sure veillants, bet on the second occasion he was followed closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling down apparently tying his shoe.* 4 hoe WEN ON to say that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American had been observed visiting the sane address on two occasions for no apparent reason. There is no question about the fact that AGIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on one eccasion only, and that #as on 30 December 1961. The reference to this as a second visit to this address by an i American from the Embassy is a clear indication that the ‘ KGB hed surveilied the first such visit, which was made , ky the CIA officer MAHONEY AA, 39 Jeary 1SG1, and not by i ; ABIDIAN,. Thus where EtG Pnahnes eye erred by indicating | ' one American went to Fusha«in Sireet twice, the KG3 must have knoen that MAHONEY went there first, in January 195% and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December. 1961. aes: aye | said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted frem | { the second visit, and beccuse of it PENKOV3SAIY was sub- sequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address ‘ but did not visit anyone there. .it was determined that no one living at thet acdress knew PIUNKOVSKIY and he be- came a target of KGS suspicion and investigation. The rest of the Keuiies story is completely in disagreement with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here. It must ke noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance j among all the versions which places the compromise cn the Aner- ° i fean side of the case, and the only one #hich makes a direct fol & connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB ; an detection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise : to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claim- ed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participa- tion until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct conflict with NOSEXKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S, Embassy official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In this regard, NOSENKO insisted that the date of ASIDIAN's visit * BRBIDIAN reported that a woman encered the vestibule behind him while he was in there, and he kneit down pretending to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs. **NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer well before MAHONEY's October 1960 arri- val in Moscow. TCP SECRET ray
14-00000 FE Rad ldots enema mtseeoee tte 669 was the end of 1560 or the very begirring of 1541. wrereas in fact MAHQUEY's visit was in Januery 1961. Despite? the errors relating to loadings and wnioadings of deacurvps of ehe Pushkin Street location aiter the second (ANLDIAT) viaie there, this story cron, GEL cst abl ishe: KGB knowletge of MMicdEY's casing of Pusnkin Street. Greville aYNNE's testimony cor.cerriag his anterrogations by the “GB alse farroducec elements contradicting the versions of HOSENKO, GEeWR GaP ea ee ay poe ae and G3eeSF Fae he indicated in aiscessiun Of NU 2 stury of the & Seg con- versation with LULACKI (rages 536-538), tne KB was con cunced that PINKGVSKIY's question ibout his girlfriend “ZeP" was an im- portant allusion ana they demanded tnat AVsine explain if. ENE either had forgotten tne name cr kad never known it, and he was unable to tell the KGB who “ZEP" was. The fact that tre LGB had a recording of this 27 May 1961 conversation snows also that the KGB was at least suspicious of the relationship before that con- versation took place and must have then tecone aware of the con- spiratorial aspect of the PENKOVSKLY-eMiie relationship ty virtue cf the cryptic nature of that conversation, The additional fact that the KGB surveilled #YNNE to the apartment of en unidentified officer of British Intelligence on the samc day the “ZEP“ conver~- sation between WYNNE and PRAKOVSKIY was monitored 1s evidence that coth s¥NNE and PENKOVSKIY were under strong suspicion of espionage as of that day, if not earlier. Mor could those sus- piciens have been explained away by the fact that PEIXOVSELY ard WYNNE hed legitimate cover reasons for contact. in view of the content of their conversation--there was nothing in their overt relationship which requiced secrecy or ever. caution in conversa- tion. The indication from ES), pe ED that the KG2 was aware of MAHOSEY's visit to the snside vesct:buie cf the Pushkin Street site in January 1961 18 not only missing from 311 other versions, but conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story? he claimed to know everything the KGB knew about this Anerican dead drop site, be- cause of ADIDIAN's visit there. NOSFNKO on one occasion said that he thougnt an Anerican tourist (rot a U.3. Embassy officer) - might have visited the site 4 year or tw eartier than ASIDIAN. (411) Remarks ‘@ NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the only other American who hed visited the Pushkin Street dead drop area was MAHONEY. This fact suggests that either NOSZEIKO was deliberately withholding from CiA information of vital import- ance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise. oF he was unaware of the KGS's possession of this information, despite his claimed posi- tion in the U.S. Embassy Section and responsibility for coveér- age of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PEXKOVSKIY¥ compromise, like the “official report” of the KGB. does rot show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGe's possession as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of ine formation on the subject of the timing of PEIKOVSKIY’s compro- mise, which was definitely no later than this date. If€ NOSENKO was deliberately withholding information on this subject and lying sbout the PENKOVSKLY compromise, then he is mot a bona fide defector. If he is unaware of the information which the KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 or 1961 as claimed, and hence his bena fides would be disproven. TOP SEURET bi ar «mere ret tien eter AreannO ES Pa .
SSL TOMB tet aan, Tastee nitive tgnts Ateneo emanreeimeae, wan na entyten eOvtnneiiten e G04 486: Ns 6706. e¢. Compromise of CHEREPANOV (4) Introduction NOSENKG’s stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOV~- SKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause. In the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-568), there is no question about when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB epenly learned of the U.S. Embagsy's possession of the papers. The chief question ia the authenticity of the documents tnemselves, with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for CHEREPANOY, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel authorization (see also Part VIII.D.8.). (ii) Tre Operational Plan in Draft Examination of one draft document--the - operational plan against the CIA of £i cer 'WINTERS--reveals ‘the following points related to forn: - Although only a draft, the title of the case officer, the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor a$S approving authority, and the designaticn of his office component as well as the title of the confirming authority (the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. KGB practice, as reported by cther sources and as logic would dictate, does not require that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are, and the typist routinely fills them in as the official copy is typed from the draft. ~ Although only a draft, this document has been signed by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common sense and KGB practice, NOSENKO himself noted this dis- crepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done’ this. ~ Although only a draft, the name of the target of the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the mame is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing pool will not know the identity of the subject of the report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to- appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after the document comes back from the typist. - On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV, this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been de~- tected in operational letter-mailing, and had been associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this TOP SkURET. —* fee Shee 1 smears po oe +a
the CHEREPANOV package cited a KG3 cryptonym for hia, and he is always referred to in true name, but this is contrary to the usage in the other operational plans in the package. It is also contrary to KGB practice, 4S described by NOSEI- KO and other sources. - The draft cited several technical aids to be used in the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB cryptonym of metka and “Néptun-80" for two of these techni- : ques, but immediately thereafter explains for what purpose each one of them is used. In the other operational plans from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established | KGB practice of inserting ecryetonvms for such devices, | these preparations are not only not described, but the blan& line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand after typing. operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in ; | , | In addition to the above points of form, this same document contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and i which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an . approved draft. One of the objectives announced in the plan is to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetic- ally as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been observed in contact with an identified officer of American intel- ligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the KGB, This is in contradiction to all available information con- cerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the Soviet Union, not to mention Western Intelligence officers. The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be sum- marized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contra- dictions: ~ To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence activities in the USSR. six special tasks will be carried out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka, “Neptun-80," hidden microphores. other. audio-devices. and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens. ~ Because he already been identified as an intelli- gence operator, and he has a hostile attitude toward the USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be carried out because they might alarm him and cause him to leave the USSR prematurely. ' - Despite the statements of the second paragraph, which indicate that recruitment is out of the question and which precludes putting into effect the measures : ; outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph i sets forth the expectation that just before \WINTERS* : ; scheduled departure and depending on further accumula- i tion of materials on WINTERS, ard the prevailing polit- i ical climate # the time, an opportunity is likely to arise which will permit testing the possibility of recruating him. f oboe ‘ | ee ony oe Eee et ee Steen een a
Ig the (WINTERS\ operation plan were a draft like the others in this collection, the atove conflicting and confusing paragraphs might be explained as variations jotted down as possiple ap- proaches to presenting a plan for the future, as ye* undecided i in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to | NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved and signed in draft by ; KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, fnericen Depart- ; ment, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer, KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter of official KGB record. 672. . | a og | The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and dis- regard for security considerations in preperation constitutes evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft cocument. (4i4) Tue_Summary on LANSELLE A second document, a handwritten note in what NOSENKO identified as CHEREPAIOV's own handwriting. alse is pertinent to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO‘s account on CHEREPANOV, This is a short summary of the operational activity of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POFOV. The document says in part: “In January 1959 a letter with secret writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow, WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed to a Soviet citizen, POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Atmy. Accord- ing to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established that POFOV was an Averican agent..." This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's compromise (see Pages $32 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollec- tion of the official report which he read, there is no reference in this document to che report of about 1957 from an agent source that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference to the indication that the KGS knew that LANGELLE had been posted to Moscow in order to nandle a special agent, for this reason placing LANGELLE under heavy surve1rllance. If botk of these items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their omission from the sumaary report in what purports to be CHERE- PANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/ POPOV cperation was investigated by the KGB. The latter posi- tion should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the com- promise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN-~-informed only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had more detail, as well es conflicting information, on the same case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case Summary would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the dis- covery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed un- necessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing 4t to an agent source. In thus supporting NOSENKO ard ethers as to the cause of POPOV's compromise, and contradicting GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated in- dependently), this cocument too appears to be a KGB fabrica- tion. ; - date mete tii CRATE Do ae ea nm Re Te The authenticity of another passage in the sane document is likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE‘s two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for *
14-00000 -* fw wr a | 673. on the purposes of casing & drop site end putting cown the dead drop, respectively. The document further stated that the ¢ead drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of Anericen Intel- ligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Two errors of fact in this passage belie KGB practice as known from meny sources’ ~ There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed \ LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills, both times to case a proposed dead dron site, oth sites involved staircases, but they were two different etair- cases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park. Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead drop on either occasion. KGB surveillance could not have seen him do so. If the KGB nad reason to suspect that he had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not there). the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put 2g-hour surveillance on the area for @ reasonable length of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it was intended. The dead drop was not actuelly put down until 7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second casing. Assuming the KGB had not stepped its coverage of the area after only ten days. the CIA agent who did put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this. CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which the KGB almost certainly kne# someone else had taken. . . oN . “SN _ At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not ~ : been Gesignated for any agent, REPNIKOV included. It i was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some time in the future as necessary? the agent for whom it might have keen designated could conceivably not even be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded. REPNIKOV, identified in the document 45 the person in- tended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of Ameri- ean Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading , or at any time thereafter; neither was any cead drop . contemplated for him in the event that he might be re- / eruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have sug- gested REPNIKOV as the intended recipiert. Again, CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned ® the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop was unassigned by CIA. : If this document were or purported to be the official version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the KGB investigative work look better than it was. As it is a handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of.the person who intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access to the true facts, the absence of some comment further indi- eates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and in- complete. “8 Leeman, sas... ee eat Domai a c= ance ee nttingstDN tenet
674. (iv) Remarks That at least two of the documents were not authentic is evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB for American Intelligence consumption. ol, There ig no sensitive information contained in any of the documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing either in helping the West or damaging the KGB. It is further questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources. It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the CHEREFANOV case, some dating from the eariiest known history of the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary. It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a’ provocative plan of the KGB. HOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity of his own information on the same topics which those documents also covered. we. - eemrenmep putea ameter eeenigenea oes = ihc i wae Setanta asm anv arms ein 7 ms = sy ay & = see eepeht @et rs LG me eRe OO
14-00000 ‘VAN LAETHEM as ‘cryptographic security officer and SAITH'’S Super : | C. Evaluation of Sourcin 1. LInatroducticn SOSENKO was able to provide logical ana plausible sourcing ' - gd for nost of his Auerican leads, through his claimed professional , | assignments. Asaong his fereiqn leads, these to which he haz no ; plausible direct access have been various!y sourced to hearsay from case officer friends (as with VASSALL, from nis friend CHURANOV) and inveliverent in peripheral ctivities (such as his 7 TDY to the city of Viadimir after the Eiguay ei : had been spotrec as i homosexual during a vasic Scere). Cuestion- able sourcing by HOSENKO has occurred in hie statements cn his one couble agent case, four american cases and three involving . foreigners. They are review.d below because they include the oth ott most impoctant leads NOSENKO has provided. ; DT | 2. Discussion There are two KGB Secon! Cnief Directorate operations in- volving imericzas which i SENKO has sourced inconsistentiy or falsely. He denunstrated uncertainty in his knowicdse of the facts of the “ANDRKEY” case (Pages 412-426) by making vigue allusions to having heard of it in “bits and pieces” from a runber of case officers involved in the case at gifferent tines; his first know- ledce of it, he said, was due to his own evployment in the U.S. Exbassy Section in 1953-1955, “although I worxed there quite a bit iater. But it was known." {In 1962 he repeatedly dated the recruitment as “1949-50.") . Dayle SMITH, identified ag “ANDFEY", fixed his recruitment cate around December 1953, ene he did not leave Moscow until April 1954. Since SMITH wes directly sub- ordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible for the Embassy's code roon, NOSENKO as case officer for the Army Attaches had a lcgicai reason for knowing rore than he claimed about the case, including the agent's name. MULE, who guccecdea cr ee visor, was supposed to be one of NCSENKO’s more active cases at this time. It is clear from NOSENKO'sS inability to claim direct knowledge of the case that he was not aware of these, facts. In the cease of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 4689-469), the U.S. Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1¥55, NOSENKO’s ignorance of the objective facts of the case led him into statements con- cerning his own knowledge of the case which cannot be true. In 1962 he claimed to have played a significant role in the attempt to reeruit SMITH, but he admitted after the defection that tnese claims were exaggerations designed to make him look better than he was at the time. He said the case officer was KOVSHUK, and GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that in a sense he did play 2 role; he was assigned to a pnone watch in support of surveillance during the final phase cf the case. once again it is clear that he did aot know the dates of SMITH’S assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) ner did he know that the operation he has described tock place between 1 and 5 June 1956, and that SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956. This is a full year after NOSENFKO said he transferred fron the U.S. Lmbassy Section. . ; - TOP SECRET ae
676. »} . NOSENKO clained to have had a direct role ag the sunervisirg : ‘ease officer in the BELITSKIY case in its 1962 Geneva phase. AS i ca first-hand source, however, he was wrorg about the origins of “the operation and ignorant of the content and the operational plas- ning of the 1962 meetings he vas supposedly supervizing. In this ‘¢netance, ag in the Edward SMITH case, XOSENKO's information is inadequate for his sourcing. -NOSENKO provided leads to nine Ku8s operations which had orig- inated with the First Chief Directorate. ‘£1x of these he claimed to have learned atout through his friend in that Directorate, GU. who was personally tnvolved in most of these oprrations.* Of the other tbree, two--the Paris agent (JGHNSON) and the Brussels /NATO case--ne said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of the Second Chie’ Directorate's Special Section sho had assisted in them. For both of the latter operatiuns, nuserous coincidences : were alleged by KOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragaene- j tary infornuation froa his sub-suurces, and he was never able to . : clarify what parts he learned Prom which cf the four tecnnicians be named as sub-sources. ode ees Au In describing his acquisition of informaton on the riath case, "SASHA," NOSENKXO has eostradicted hinsetf: He first said he hed learned sbout “SASHA" fron SHATYAPIN, providing lergthy and dovolved explanations of how he becane aequainted with SHALYAPIN at the time of the latter's retirement fron the KGB in 1962. Later, under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that CHALYAPIN was the original source of the "SASHA story, first : attributing it to others and later saying that he could not réesem~- . i ber wher and from whos he first heard it, but SHALYAPIN and others ; had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time he heard of “SASHA” he had already met and agreed to cooperate with CIA; furthersore, when asked if “SASHA” was an important lead, ne agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one occasion he had consistently failed tu appreciate the significance of such-a lead, indicating that it was not considered importast ia the. KGB. | | ‘Also casting doubt on his sourcing of “SASHA" is the fact : id that, in his first reference to “SASHA” and the Cuban missile crisis rn of Octcber 1962, NOSENKO said he had learred of this item from _ SHALYAPIN, whereas Later he said it was rot from SHALYAPIN (but he could not identify a:other source fros whom’ he had heard this de- tail). & Recardi erners. the case of th ar ' RCMP ‘s sigur t "yee OLE eat al ae ied eae LE . BOSESKO first said 7is friend GUK had told hin of the case un- . officially, GUX having been involved ir the operation in Soscow. : When asked why GUK should be involved in a Caradian case in 1963 i when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Diilectorate'’s F i American Department against American targets, NOSENKO. retracted : i his initial stateaecst and said that GUX somehow got in contact with hin, not as a KGB officer but sinply as an acquaintance. : Despite the non-official nature of GLUK’s relationship as thus im- ' plied by NOSENKO, Ci¥ as able to tell him all the operational de- } tails concerning GFs except his name. This case has an odd *Although he had met GUK many years before. NOSENKO indicated that they did not becoge fricnds untal his visit to Geneva in 1962. and only then did GUE begin to reveal operational details to hia. « . ; Lt a : ‘earame. A tee-teempmmemen cm Qlpewenar anime da neeth estes nanan secure: 6 re me
14-00000 e see iba zl . 4 tee aspect which NOSENKC failed to see: ite sais that ehis mea had ccme to Moscow on a Soviet visa issusd on a separate plece of paper, rather than extered jin the man's paxcport, so that there would not ce a certanent record of his travel te the USSk. This implies, and @& Re confirmed, tnat he travelied uncer Ais yruc . Se furthermore confirmed that he had gone name to Moscow. &Y 3 mo! as a tourist, entering the USSR cn a Seviet toursst ship. In view of the First Chief Directorate's operational jurisdiction in this otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coor- H ot dination between the First Chief Directoraite's Accrican DCepartnent ; "8 and the Second Chief Directorate’s Tourist bepartrenat, to prevent any slippage (such as NOSENSO described in the SHUSJIN case, when the CRU failed to ccordinate with the KuP}. Yes despite logical rofessional need-to-know on NOSENKQ's part, he first made his own xnowledzge unofficial, and then his subscurce's knewledge unofficial as well. . why Ser cntactiedinne cae ve weote + SOSENKO was unable to eypizin how he had learned of the case eres Gare eee, hen pressed for a subsource, he claimed that he had attended a reception at the Indian : Exbassy in 1953 or 1959 wit) GRIEANOY, and when GFIEANOV es ah to SO take a glass of wine to & he understcod scnehow that ee mwas an agent of CRIBANOV's. His sourcing for the case of the French businesssan, @ieorets * (Page 484), is not unlike that of Qeereeae ne said he had known that there was a French husinessman ¥nc bas an ascent. On one occa- sici when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chief Directorate a call for GRIBANGY cave in and he ashed who was calling. When he wes told it was @SamMGERe then he knew somehow tnat this was GRIBANOV's agent. | cee ye meee seme te ee 3. Remarks NOSENKO's errors concerning “ANDREY” (particulariy his early insistence that “ANUREY’ had left Moscew years before NOSENKO en- tered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned of the case in the way he later said he did. NOSENKO's acecunts of how he learned cf the “Paris agent“ -are wague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coin- cidence. It is noteworthy too that he claimed to have been told of this one operation by no less than four individuals, wnereas the rest of what he learned of First Chicf Directorate operations in eleven years of KG3 service caze from only two cther individuals. Furthermore, his knowledge of “SASHA” sternned from elaborate and apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to recon- struct when pressed fcr exact details. NOSENKO's inability to . give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the "Paris agent" or “SASHA” must be judged ia tne light of the fact that he first heard of beth cases only just after proaising to collec such infortation for CIA. because these were amcag the most iapor- tant and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could ne reasonably be expected that he would remenber how he did so, espe- cially since only a little over a ycar elapsed until his next meeting with CIA. , fon leads seeas NOSENKO*’s sourcing for the CEH nc = in 3 illogical and fabricated. It also appears that SUsENK<O has given an dnaecurate version of the way in which he would have learned of © ‘not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent). mosnaatnedifintypemeeadafrmtirs = —~nitrasaptentionaipatiinaycypinmee: oe REESE DIT “aro TOP oc (REI ‘ . . } . . ty, . . © . ~¢ . aan ee OT a .
678. D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Carcer 1. Introduction What follows is an examination of KOSENKO's accounts of his Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the yearge 1951 and 1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 vearas in the U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Departrent of the KGS Sec- ond Chief Directorate. SOSENKO's naval service opens the dis- cussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided @ springboard for bis entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the rank of Lieutenant. The discussion of each period in his career has two cen- tral topics: First, NOSENKO's own descripticn of his positions, Fesponsibilities, and access: and second, an assessment of this description from the point of view of internal consistency, accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, uperational activities, and performance with his claimed senior and respon- gible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This assessment is based of a comparison of the information supplied by ROSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt, official, defector, and clandestine sources. NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are, of course, cumulative in that his claimed positions and activi- ties during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated within itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached. TOP SECRET ake : £ | 2 cman me wt emt Neg Mie aenntnee > i ' t \ H ' : :
0 Raph ABD 10? ub Co “. - , 679. Ze Naval GRU Service a. Introduction | “ROSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages 64-77) have: teen. reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility, and examined for accuracy against information from other sources. b. Discussion Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military service are about as follows: - He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, 9th and part of 16th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to co with military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the mili- tary oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the age of 16. {According to available collateral information, the oath--fcorm:t entcy into the military forces-~-was at no time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of *show® or “morale” as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He . clains to nave deserted this school after taking the oath. Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months after starting anew later the same year in the naval school un Leningrad and never finished school properly. - He was commissioned in the “reserves*® in 1947 after completing his second year at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot remember what branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by volun- tarily doing military translations at the Institute. while at the Institute he contracted yenereal disease at least twice and this went on his record. - In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he failed one of his examinations (“Marxism-Leninism”) upon completicn of the Institute of Fnternational Relations later in 1950 which delayed his Ciploma--and hence entry into the service--until successful re-examination later that year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned down by the KGB [then 4G3] Lecause of his scnool record, drunkenness, and. other bad marks in his record.) - He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in 1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel cffice several times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and write his personal history in connection with the required security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in "There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO's life which can ke examined because NOSENKO has altered the cire- cumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next. 1OP-SEGRET co tent dla tree BP 0 2 = me 9a Ste ee an te oem ee om me p ms ote tame ne
680. wartime, drurkenness, vencreal disease, stili-valid marriage to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB employ- ment, and a bad academic record including failure of a course in Marxism-Leninism just at thie time. - He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant on 12 March 1951, and without any indoctrination er train- ing, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes for his fisst duty station, Scvietskaya Gavan in the Soviet i Far East. NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, con- ; | sidered generally to be the least desirable of all naval assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father that ne wis a man. (The above was his account in 1966, in all earlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far East in the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months' leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However, according to the 1956 account, his service there lasted only one year.) { - In fovetskaya Gavan KOSEKKO's job was to extract in- i formation from American publications reporting naval de=- velopments, Asked in April 1564 for any personal account é of his own work, KOSENKO was able to think of oniy “four or five trips* on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and three to Hukkaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role, he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along oniy “to iearn how it was done;" he himself never trained or disvatched any agents, nor did he know the identities cr missions cf any others. He also could not descrite the ships he had travelled : on. Questioned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan’ in 1965, - NOSENKO insisted that this city is lccated in Primorskiy Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.** we tee crt tine memes ne ~ NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, accord= ing to other accounts, because of having contracted tubercu- ; : losis) in April 1952. He then spent two months either in = his parents’ Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in a sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis. He said he was coughing up “half a glass of biood at a time. (X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have detected no indicaticns that NOSENKO ever suffered from ‘ tuberculosis.) i - At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was i offered in Moscow am opportunity to attend the GRU strategic i intelligence school, the Military-Dipiomatic Academy, but turned it down because he had already studied most of the course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; ba- sides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces. : _= NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to the Far East--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet at Baltiyez. He invented a story in 1964 about going there ein October T5S6 HOSERKO was asked whether he had ever been to Sakhalin; his answer was no. *¢ This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Port~ land, Oregon and thinking oneself in California. BOD Te eenemen meer cte a mn ~ |
681. via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sass- nitz, but then said this was a Lie he told because he felt his interrogators would not believe hin if ne had said he successfully turned down an assignaent to these points, : then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk. ~ (As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold, - : | damp Baltic climate of a recent ‘TB-sufferer appears unthink- able, particularly when that person ig a Government Minister's gon; he acknowledged this but said, “There were no other positions available.") - He could not remember the name of the place he served near RBaltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which fitted his description of its size and location) but from 1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city ; by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away. . i He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that ; , a rail line went to Baltiysk frem Primorsk. geen oreo epee —eenyie toe = - ~ In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had ‘ trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of : war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description of his functions, saying he merely prepared training mater- ials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with or knowledge of the agent work. His service there was limited to about six months, since he said he left there at ; the beginning of 1953. He either had had cne or two leaves from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964 HOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Mos- cow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife; in April 1956 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave before going to Sovetsk. ~- NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initia- i tive and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the i end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what leave status. It was during this period, he said, that his conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift to the KGB. - In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to 4 : the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while . : gtationed in Sovetsk. In earlier accounts he said that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in the Soviet Far East. ‘ ; ec. Remarks The notes above on NOSENKO’s career do not treat most of the changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in : NOSENFKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to : faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. If all : the details were to be considered, the story would become even _- more confused. ; Se Certain general aspects stand out, however: TOP-SECRET. OO
eee Wemor eran tees eetnimeenminanGSsnGrass Sears 5 ate fe aeest met ee oe me nae sma so eemectnctertrtran coma Titi LOE emeeaerntemt we 10? 632. y: If his story of his persona be eg ane ET Ent” BAS ee: Fae fh cate atcoraing to x ae M3 DA CR CE en oa SOSENKO would, ail avallas.e information, not have been accepted into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GR’'J officer Service is, or both. {z) Yhe story is vague, unsubstantial, and contra- dictory; no substance has been added to the Fase outlines of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec: of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recol- lection of military service completed 10 years earller--the locations whece he served, whether he did or did not have TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to another, and what he did or what he experienced. (3) NCSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of the navy, and of the units with which he served is practic- ally non-exiztent. He has provided no reason whatever to make one believe that he actually wag a naval officer. (4) The functions he claims to have fui filled involved no direct involvement or persona respongeibilities:; They gound like the bare outlines of a legend, not Like real life or personal experience. That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings of the psychologist (Pages 665-611). NOSENKO's description of his naval GPU service cannot be accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any other regular military service. Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such for- malities ag medical examination, personnel interviews or question- naires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff status from 1952 or 1953. oo @ TOP SECRET oo eee ee
et i i 683. 3. Entry into the KGB a. Eligibility The previous section discussed NOSENKO's eligisility for admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that, on the basis of what NOSENKO has told CIA about his earlier ‘life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from several knowledgeable sources, the *GB has more stringent entry requirements than any other Soviet organization. The candidate's family background, personal conduct. and Party or Komsomol rec- ord must be impeccable. NOSENKO would have American Intelli- gence believe that in his case the KG8--specifically the offi- cers responsible for signing their names to tie approval--accepted a person whose record showed (as noteu on pages 679-680 above) desertion from the armed forces self-inflicted wound in wartime, drurkenness, venereal disease, previous salrriage tc the dauenter OFS state crifinal, A bad a@az6nte record including Failure “of-— a~CUUYTE in-Mareism—Leninism; and a prior réjection by the KGB itseliv” Ire cnty trange since the earlier rejection had been, ~ according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military ser~ vice in the Naval GRU. . re Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had con- tracted tuberculosis, for which he «as still under treatment at the €ime he entered the State Security Service. NOSENKO has indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter _ of record with the GRU, and that the reason he did not have to take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the avail- ability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB regulations at that time would have preciuced admission to KGB ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though already arrested. b. Date of Entry . NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty with the KGB and has provided several reasons for his changes of story (Pages 36-89). During his first meeting with CIA, when NOSENKO gave a brief personal anc profeasional autobiography, he Baid that he had joined the KGB is. February oF March 1953. In 1964, however, first while still attached to the Soviet Disarma= ment Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a bio- graphic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account, NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates, NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two Gif~ ferent reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in Octo- ber 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations, he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced hia to take all his exams over again and celayed his career: This was “unpleasant,” NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it from CIA. In the October 1966 interrogations, NCSENKO gave a new — and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for — employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB. NOSENKO's change of story tock place in 1964 while still in the relatively relaxed circumstances cf an operational meeting in Geneva; he came back to his original account only during the April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO's explanations of why he re- vised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into | t f | i 1 j
664. further inconsistencies. Because of this and, in the absence of any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explana- tion for this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1364 either when he joined the KGB and/or what he had told CIA in 1962. DERYABIN has commer.ted on the significance which the date of entry holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date. NOSEKKO was cuestioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619) concerning the t:uing of his entry on duty with the KGe. As a result of this interrogation it was determined that NOSENKO was unaware that at the time he said he joined the kG3, the present First Chie{ Directorate was designated the Secord Chief Direc- torate and vice versa. ‘Therefore, NOSENSO would have joined a component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953, not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO did not know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date that the MVD was redesignated the KGB, and misstated the loca- tions and existence of various buiidings and offices in the vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1933. Ir June 1962 NOSENKO said several times, in different meet~ ings, that the KGB agent “ANDREY“ (Pages 413-414) had been re- cruited and had left Moscow before he, sOSZNKO, entered the KGB. He estimated the date as 1949-1956. NOSENKO knew that "ANDPEY® was associated in Moscow with RHODES and when told that RHODES was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might be wrong. NOSENKO continued to say, however, that “ANDREY” was recruited before he (NOSEUKO) became a K38 officer, and later reverted again to his estimate that "AND&E1" was recruited in 1949-1950. Wher he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S. Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY® case. NOSENKO was unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the "ANDREY® case was before nis time; when ne said in 1964 that this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in early 1954. ce. Cirewrstances of Entry NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Mcs- cow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with KOBULOV at the NOSENKO dacha while on leave in March 1953; during the April 1964 interrogations he changed the date to February 1953; in April’ 1965 KNOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived at home and was at the “disposal of GRU personnel” during Febru- ary and March. Finally, in April 1966, NOSENKO said he first spoke to KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that he was subsequently "resting" at a sanitorium connected with his tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to _ KOBULOV or. the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days from the sanitorium.,. lt was at this second encounter with KOBULOV that the letter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB. as cmegtety | oy. ano MAURER antananseplabstne ahen tna ss 5 nt Ab AA ED SESE GY gM UD oem ESO Am RS Rt rr oe tratipeapteee ee cere ane ete te
In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he entered the KG3, volunteering that there was nro need to fill out a questionnaire (arxeta) as the KGB already had his files from the GRU. In April T96T when asked if he had not been required to fill out any questionnaires or other documents, NOSENKO des- cribed the anketa and other forns he completed (saying he took them home to co so) and his various interviews with KGB per~ sonnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these ciaims by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit in- accurate, of the varicus forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel. In 1966 NCSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and in- plied that there were no forms to fill out. : d. Remarks According to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KG3 as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission according to the early version was facilitated by the availability of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA nas concluded that NOSENKO was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he wag ever in Primorsk under any circumstances. On the basis of generally available information concerning Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the FGB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at the time and h-d been himself a KGB personnel officer until leas than a year earlier), a person with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection. NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications add to the unlikelihood of his account. It is concluded that, as in the case of NOSENKO's GRU ser- vice, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not enter the KGB. 1 OE pt ame + + mo gmeon- ! Se co money entrees emo neite + A ERR EET IS | aoe LP-SECREE-—— >
TOP > | - 686. 4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section a. Introduction HOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Fmbassy Section of i the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, during the period. from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955. His targets during these two years were at first American correspond- ents in Moscow and later American Aray Attaches at the Embassy. NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion cf his o«n-or.other KGB activity dering this period and on occasion he has tried to dis- miss the whole period as “not relevant" and “cf ne consequence,” NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he “found himself” only after his initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section. (He varicusly dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to the Tourist Department: in June 1956, in conmecticon with his par- ticipation in and award for the BURGI case; anda after Auoust 1956, when the death of his father forced him to puil himseiz together.) Before this, KOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and “did not pay attention to the work.” b. Work Against American Correspondents NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953- 1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operaticnal files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the corresoondents. Although able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then re=- cruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the corres- pondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's de- velopmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the “agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four. of the correspondents (two of whom were recruited ¥G5 agents at the time); he met with them periodicaily to determine whether they had. developed any important information. Even here, however, NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: His superior KOZLOV often went alcng to the meetings with NCSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward when- ever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a “hint” that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he re- called neither their names nor personalia concerning them. @. Work Against Army Attaches Regarding NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he alone was accountable and one about which something was previously known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is lO P SECRET oo sna te GREED ee + cee a en magne mere me
. rane the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility . to divert hig attention from personal operational duties. NOSENKO could not remember when he tous over responsibility for the Army Attsches, and he named two other KGB officers before settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the Attaches' files. Y¥hen belittling his earlier responsiLilities for correspondents, he has said several times that he had been in that job “only about gix wonths." Assuming that NOSENKO entered the KGB in the middie of March 1953, this would date his transfer to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In dis- eugging this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently gaid that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO has variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954, and Mey 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO re- fused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has always said that he turned over these duties and transferred fros the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department @as established within the Second Chief Directorate. : NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for cperations against the U.S. Army Attaches he received and ‘was responsible for assinilat- ing the product of a wide variety of sources on the indivicuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information reccived froma the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; microphones which were explaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Enbassy who together provided little useful information: permanent and roving surveillance patrois outside the Embassy: fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Mos— eow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this infor- mation, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches were doing in Moscow ard thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of re- eTuiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several in- stences when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed. The KGB’s principal interest in control rather than recruit- ment has been ROSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds ard personal lives of his targets--such informatioa, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of On some occasiong NOSEXKO has said that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of informa- tion on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed to have Known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.
Ba tPF btse Le et TORR FER we ae ETA, AR Sei ermal OP Dah et i nen eh ee Saas ah ie A EE NTE 2 co th en Meee SR TT mNRTES” ° 8 PIT 688. control.* He has also used this’expianaticn to support his claim that there were no recruitments of ailitary attaches during this period. a : “An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compile a great deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104). On the basis of these expianations, NOSENKO'S knowledge of the official and unofficial activities of nis alleged targets in this period deserves attention. NOSENKO knew almost. nothing about the personal backgrounds and families of the eight ‘members of the Arny Attache Office whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he wag able to identify each by rank and position in the " bassy~--some~ times inaccurately--and in a few cases to Gescribe certain cf their operational activities, he was unaware of or had forgotten such facts ag: - Colonel Earl L. MICKELSCN, the Army Attache in 1954 and 1955, was arrested twice Ly the Militia outsice of Mos- cow in 1954. m Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB egent); by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data from him during the lessons. ~ William STROUD, the Assistant Arny Attache, travelled to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defector. (NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD; as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.) NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he claimed was his direct, personal responsibility: ~ NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 191-103}. He ciaimed to be receiving agent information on him but could not recall the names or cryptonyms of any such agents. (ge said, for example: “I think FELCHLiN must have had a maid, and she would have been a KGB agent.”) NOSENKO describeé FELCHLIN as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember © HIOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence,. NOSENKO con- tinued, he could not be expected to remember as many such de-~ tails as would be possible had he been a cas? officer working daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO explained why he was unable tc supply the details of planning and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955- 1959; he contrasted operations acainst tourists, who often cane and went in a matter, of a few days, to the work against the Military Attaches and dipiozats stationed in Moscow on . permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and slowly. — TOP SECRET. TSG coo greene nes pee