aye) COVERT The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will be emphasized: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution. Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and per- formance of the Castro regime. Expose the encraochment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism. Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers. Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives. The following psychological/political warfare activities are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan: 1) 2) 3) Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups and individuals which have an existing or potential capability for com- municating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities in Latin America and other critical areas. Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled couriers. , Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations. (CIA proposal, questioned by State and USIA) HW 542714 DBocld:32424896 Page 2
Al 600) ()() Ce 2. Rural Cells: Three- to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm. small "legal'"' compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are seriously endangered or if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals. 3. Commando/Sabotage Teams: (Described in the Economic section above. ) F. MILITARY 1. DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks. 2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full extent of DOD capability as required. Iv. POLICY IMPLICATIONS The policy implications of the activities outlined above include: A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching (State and USIA questioned). "Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration __ _ missions using CIA aircraft with U.S. or other contract crews. D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications. agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban governmen i 10 = WW 54214 Docld: 324274696 Page 3 .- 6,
HW 54714 with additional issues to enable them to increase their alreatly existing Vor planned pressure on the U.S. retention of Guantanamo. ) "s tate and LAI Defense representatives disagreed to CIA proposal. a F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide specialized training for the commando/sabotage teams when such training cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities. ll Docld: 3274274896 Page 4