wd a] o> DoclId: 322763410 1-103 if just the basic Nosenko story were fundamentally disproved, without our taking the next step and saying that Oswald is a KGB agent, what significance would that have on the overall assessment of Nosenko's bona fides? Mr. Helms. Well, if the man had been demonstrated to have lied, it would have had a. good deal of an effect on the estab- lishment of his bona fides, I would think: . What was his motive for lying? Why did he lie? Mr. Goldsmith. Would you take the analysis so far as to say if Nosenko was lying about Oswald, if it were clearly proven that he were lying about Oswald, that in fact he was not a bona fide defector? | . | Mr. Helms. That is one of the problems exactly; you put it very well. Mr. Goldsmith. Is your answer to my question yes? Mr. Helms. Yes. — Mr. Preyer. If I may ask one question on that score, of key concern,. of course, to the intelligence agency, was the broad question of whether Nosenio was a: bona fide defector or a disinformation agent. Is it not conceivable ‘that he might have been a bona fide agent and been basically telling the truth about that, and this other information concerning other security matters would be ! | | | | | accurate? Then, on Oswald, maybe to ingratiate himself, perhaps or to convince the intelligence agencies that he was more bage 104 TAD Creorr . 1 { i |
aan tn re?) 24 | DoclId: 322763410 e 2 730i Ur oLuNcl 1-104 important than he really-was, trying to put a little extra maybe lied on that. That would still not necessarily determine whether he was bona fides or not? Mr. Helms, 1 think that any of these explanations or possible or conceivable or may even be the accurate one. But let us not overlook, Mr. Chairman, the fact that if I were down here trying to defend that thesis in front of you, I think I would have a pretty rough time. Mr. Preyer. Yes. Tr think you put it very well. Why would you lie? | | | As you have. made very clear, this might be a question on his bona fides-that we do not know how to resolve right now and may never resolve unless there is a flash of truth from 1 some area. oO mith Excuse me, Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Goldsmith. The question that arises, Mr. Ambassador, in’ light of your statement that the Agency did not have a position regarding Nosenko's bona fides in 1968 is why, in ligh of the absence of any position one way ox another, the Agency never the less “paid Mr. -Nosenko approximately $80, 000° after taxes in 1968 and then put him on its payroll as a consultant. Mr. Helms. These figures are yours, sir. I do not recall any business about. his being put on the Agency payroll. bage 105 TAR CEPRET | spin on the ball, that he perhaps overspoke himself on Oswald,- |. wine ne ee ce ee ne —--—- F- —-~
1Ur wlunil | 1-105 | aS a consultant. JI thought that any monies that were paid to him were in an effort to sweeten him up a little bit and get. nd him prepared to be resettled. I do not recall anybody's ever’ ™= telling me that he had been hired as a consultant to the in Agency. Mr. Goldsmith. If, in fact, it were established by the record that Mr. Nosenko was made a consultant and is, in fact, a consultant today, would that indicate that the Agency has apparently resolve the issue of his bona fides? | oO: —————————————————— Mr. Helms. I do not know, sir. I did not know that he was considered a consultant at the time that I was Director. I do not recall ever signing off on any piece of paper that made him a consultant. Mr. Goldsmith. In order to have made Mr. Nosenko a consultant, would you have had to sign off? Mr. Helms. Not necessarily. I think I would have been informed that this fellow is now considered to be a consultant | - to the Agency and we are sending people down to talk to him. I never agreed to any such thing. | I do not care what the recoré shows. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know to what extent, if any, SS SSS ee ooo oe a ee Nosenko's story concerning Oswald changed in 1968 from the n> oO ; "3 one he had given previously when he was first confined? 74 Mr. Helms. No. I do net remember those details at alli | as i Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether an independent Docld: 32263410 bage 106 THD ecpory
1-106 | investigation ever confirmed any aspect of Nosenko's story | | | | * || about Oswald? a oo — 3 Mr. Helms. I do ’not know that, either: aa Mr. Goldsmith. Are. you aware that Mr. Nosenko was given polygraph tests in 1964, 1966 and 1968? 6 Mr. Helms. That does not surprise me. I would have -thought he should have been. | Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Mr. Nosenko have been given three tests? Mr. Helms. To find out if he was telling the truth. i i | Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Mr. Nosenko failed a —— : : | the first two tests and passed the third? | | Mr. Goldsmith. Are you aware that Nosenko was given the | | \ | | Mr. Helms. I did not remember those figures, no. | | | 1$ | final polygraph test, the one that he passed, approximately | |e | | t | | | I | 16 ! one “month prior to the issuance of the 1968 report issued 7 Vy by Mr. Soley which concluded that he was a bona fide defector? = | Mr. Helms. “Maybe that was a part of what Soley was going 19 | on when he made. that determination, the way he came through on 20 | the polygraph test. | | a | : Mr. Goldsmith. It is also possible, however, that Mr. @ : | 22 i Soley had completed his ‘report, realized that Nosenko had . ve , 2 failed two polygraphs and decided that, prior to the issuance | _ 24 of his report, another polygraph test would be administered. 25 Mr. Helms. I think that he would have, in those days, been DocId: 32263410 Hage 107 | THB @rpPottT
iwi) ¥. a ll DoclId: 32263410 Seoee ae natn vo en nnan ane tree eee ee oe eee ee ee ee eee ee ee = ik. 1-107 in a position to make those judgments or decisions. He was conducting an examination of this case. I would have thought that he would have Liked to have had another polygraph test to see if it would, in any way, support the findings that he was maybe establishing in his own mind. Anyway, my recollection of those days is Soley believed in _Nosenko. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Nosenko was asked numerous questions about Oswald on the second test, the test that he failed, and was asked only two questions about Oswald on the | | . | | | | | final polygraph test? | Mr, Helms. -NOo, I do not know. | Mr. Preyer. Mr. Goldsmith, I regret that there is another | vote on. We can recess for ten minutes. I will get back just : | as fast as I can. | The Committee will recess for ten minutes. | (A brief recess was taken.) [=> Mr. Preyer. The Committee will resume its session. | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, prior to taking this last : recess again, we were discussing, in general, the question : whether the Agency had a position concerning Nosenko 's bona | fides. Perhaps you or I are defining the concept of position | very narrowly. By "position," I do not necessarily mean that | the Agency had, in writing, a specific position regarding, | specific posture regarding, Nosenko. By "position," I am saying age 108 FAD ChPOCT
wd da DoclId: 322763410 1-108 | was there a prevailing opinion one way or the other in the Agency concerning Mr. Nosenko? Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know the answer to that question. When you say a prevailing opinion, I see what you are trying to get at. Obviously, I do not know what opinion prevailed. | | | | Some. people hued... to one line, some to the other. 2 was my impression that he hued to it with equal fervor. | And I do not know that this question has ever been satisfactor-| ily resolved. As I say, I have been away from the AGency for ' five years and maybe some other things have happened in the | interim. But at least as of: the time I left, I do not think | | that the issue had ever been resolved between these conflicting forces. May I say when I indicate that these views are strongly held, I mean it. It is like Catholics and Protestants; they simply are not to be swayed. I think, in order to answer your question properly, I would have to say, since there was a division, it was not have said, well, I think. this and I think that, without having read the 900-page report, without having been thoroughly conversant with the details. In other words there were not many other people in a position to have a calculated, informed i ! | | | | possible to get a prevailing view, as such. Some people might | | t i | | | t i | | opinion. | | | | { baye 109 Th O@rPoCrT os
ja ea) Y 22 33 24 ’ t Docld: 322763410 Page 110 1-169 Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying there was no prevailing opinion? Mr. Helms. I do not think so. I do not know what the prevailing opinion would have been. | Mr. Goldsmith. At the time chat the responsibility for handling Mosenko was initially given to the SR Branch or SR Division, did the SR Division enter into the situation as tg a neutral party, or did the SR division pretty much think from the very beginning that Nosenko wes not a bona fide defector? : | Mr. Helms. I would have thought, at the beginning, u everybody would have entered into this with some objectivity in: an effort to establish the truth. As events unwound, | I think that this became clear to everyone involved that this was a terribly important case. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. ‘How early in this process did the SR Division form its opinion that Nosenko was not a bona fide, defector? Mr. Helms. I am sorry. I do not know. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. When Mr. Soley began his investigation, did he enter the situation as a neutral, outside party, or | someone who represented one of the factions within the Agency concerning Nosenko's bona fides? | Mr. Helms. I really do not know the correct answer to that. It was my impression -~ and I can only give it as my TAD CrProrT
UP ScbAcl a KR —~— own opinion. ‘ aa teTy having a positive viewpoint on Nosenko. Mr. Helms. I think he developed a positive viewpoint. ae) oo “Ss a 19 | It was my impression. — iy | I do not know how early he had it. I think he had a a positive viewpoing. ot — w—e oO. ta * cular assignment? © | into this. It seemed to me Howard Osborne, Director of 17 | Security, recommended that he be given charge of this case 13 | to take it over because we were trying to find a way to ; 19 | resolve it, to resettle this man, and we were looking for a 20 | way to do this. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Did the President ever ask you whether this issue had been resolved? Mr. Helms. Who? Mr. Goldsmith. The president. Mr. Helms: Which President? DoclId: 322763410 Page 111 TAB CLrPacrT : 1-110 impression -- that he had agreed to take on this case, and I thought he came to it without any particular prejudice one way or the other, and that he was going to attempt to form his If other testimony on the record does not confirm that, I do not insist on what I say. JI simply give you my impression Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, you made reference to Mr. Soley Mr. Goldsmith. How was Mr. Soley chosen for this parti- Mr. Helms. I do not remember anymore what details went - a: an i | | | | | | |
1-1il : Mr. Goldsmith. President Johnson. . 2 Mr. Helms. Let-me answer it, no President ever asked me. 3 | Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency, did the Agency ever receive = © 4 | any pressure from above to resolve this issue? , 5 Mr. Helms. Not that I recall. 6 Mr. Goldsmith. What was the Warren Commission told about 7 Mr. Nosenko? 2 | Mr. Helms. Well, I do not know all the things that the { 9 ) Commission was told about Mr. Nosenko. I know that the FBI io told them certain things. I believe the Agency told them n | things. I know that I, personally, met with Chief Justice 2 Warren privately in one of the conference rooms over in the ~ | .. © . iz building where they had their Headquarters. I do not remember . is the date of this meeting with him, but I know I cleared it 15 | with Director McCone before I went down there. 2 I believe that it was not terribly long before the 7 Warren Commission was going to conclude its hearings because _ 1a | my point that I felt had to be made to the Warren Commission 9 | was that we had not been able to establish; to our. satisfac- | 20 | tion, the bona fides of Nosenko and that the Warren Commission | must take this into consideration in compiling their report. ‘And the means chosen of my going to see Chief Justice | 24 | i Docld: 32263410 Page 1123 TAD ECrotT | Warren seemed to be the proper way to do it under the circum- stances so that he could make a determination as to whether he wanted the matter handled differently or whether that was . oe eee ; en
in “-d 20 2] 73 24 ’ t DoclId: 322763410 1-112 satisfactory to him, or what the case was. Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission told anything about the substance of Nosenko's story about Oswald? Mr. Helms. I do not know. TI do not know what details wound up in the hands of the Warren Commission about Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith. What other information, besides this issue of the bona fides, did you convey? Mr. Helms. That is what I personally talked to the Chief Justice about. Mr. Goldsmith. When you met with Chief Justice Warren, for purposes of clarification now, did you tell him that the | “Agency had been unable to resolve the issue:of Nosenko's bona fides, or did you tell him that the Agency did not think that Nosenko was bona fide? Mr. Helms. I told him we were not able to resolve this, my point. being that, since we had not been able to resolve it, that. they should keep in mind the contingency that maybe _ the statements that he had made about Oswald's having no identification with the KGB were not. accurate. Therefore, they | could not lean on them in the report and therefore they had to face the implication that, if he was not bona fide and come for the purpose of covering up the tracks of Soviet intel- ligence, that this had implications which should be weighed in the scales. Mr. Goldsmith. At the time that you met with the Chief age 113 | TRE QrPorT | | | { | | | | | | | | | | | | | | i | | | | | | | | |
wD ~N ob Docld: 32263410 UP Sf2bak i 1-113 Justice, I take it, in some way, you must have been apprised of the basic Nosenko story concerning Oswald? Mr. Helms. I believe that the basic Nosenko story con- cerning Oswald was given to the Warren. Commission very early in its deliberations by the FBI. Mr. Goldsmith. What was Chief Justice Warren's response to your analysis? Mr. Helms. Well, he was obviously -- he was not pleased to hear it, and by that I do not mean that he expostulated, or anything of that kind, but he was not pleased to hear it . in terms of the difficulties that it made in completing their report, but that he was perfectly fair and reasonable about it and accepted what I had to say and said he would report it to the Commission. Mr. Goldsmith. Did Chief Justice Warren or any Warren Commission member or staffer ever request to interview Mr. Nosenko? | Mr.Helms. Not that I am aware of. | Mr. Goldsmith. Was the Warren Commission informed in ‘April, 1964, that Nosenko was being placed into solitary confinement? | | Mr. Helms: The Warren Commission? - Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. about the circumstances under which Nosenko was being 2° age 114 TAD ecnarT MR. Helms. I do not know what the Warren Commission knew ‘
nD “NE as ~~ DoclId: 322763410 oun 2225S we —————————— ee interrogated. I did not say anything to them about it. custody of Nosenko; they certainly were aware of that. wie This was part of my statement to the Chief Justice. I could not tell him that I could not resolve the bona fides | | | Whether anybody else did, I do not know. But’ the CIA had ! | 1 | without explaining to him that this our responsibility. Mr. Goldsmith. Other than yourself, were any of the ‘other individuals responsible for handling Nosenko in contact with the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms. I do not know, but I would not have thought so. | | | Mr. Goldsmith. If the Warren Commission had been informed by the Agency that Nosenko have been placed into solitary confinement, I take it that you would have been the person who would have so informed them. Mr. Helms. Mr. McCone might have informed them. Mr. Goldsmith. Or Mr. MeCone. Whose decision was it to place Nosenko in solitary confinement? | Mr. Helms. I think this was a decision taken by various people. We had to find a place to interrogate him. We had to try and resolve the case, if we possibly could. WE spent months trying to do this.’ And putting him into solitary circumstances was just part of the effort to see if we could get at the truth. . 0 age 115 «FAR StporT
a so oO -+ > r 22 33 24 DoclId: 322763410 lt eS ee SSS SS eS ee eeenne meee ee eee ee ee re ee ee Fe ne te ee a nn ee tt ee ee a te ce ae ener + ane es or aoe teres eee ee = r= 1-115 Mr. Goldsmith. What individuals were involved in that decision-making process? Mr. Helms. I do not remember who all was involved ‘anymore I certainly was involved in it, but there were others who were involved. I do not know the extent to which Mr. McCone was involved. I do not recall anymore. Mr. Goldsmith. What input, specifically, did you have at that time? Mr. Helms. By input, I assume you mean what influence did I have on the decision? Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Helms. I certainly agreed to the fact that this shoul | | | i | | | | be tried. This would. have been proposed to me; not something that I would ‘have proposed, because at this. time someone would have had to have made up their mind that the method of inter- rogation that they were using was not getting anyplace. Mr. Goldsmith. Please describe, to the best of your knowledge, the conditions under which Nosenko was placed when he was put in solitary confinement. Mr. Helms. “He was put into a small house in the country- side where he had a perfectly sanitary and satisfactory living condition. they were just not particularly spacious or padded, let us say. “His bed was perfectly adequate, his chair was perfectly adequate, the lighting was perfectly adequate, but it was not. particularly comfortable in the age 116 TAD QrrorT | t
i) 13 24 as an DoclId: 322763410 1-116 normal, American sense of the terms. You will recall that this question of what to do about _ him was taken up with the Deputy Attorney | General at the timer Nicholas Katzenbach, at a long meeting as to how we were goi to continue. to handle this case, and the problem before the “house was clear to everyone but nobody was able to come up with a very satisfactory solution except that we just had to go ahead and do what we were doing and see if we could even- tually come up with a satisfactory resolution, and that satis- factory resolution never emerged. . Mr. Coldsmith. Was the CIA ever able to establish that it had legal authority for placing Nosenko in solitary confine- ment? Mr. Helms. t do not know how you answer that question. As you know, I am not a lawyer. I would say that he was there without the blessing of a court. I would have: thought that having held him that length of time that it would have been preferable if we did have a court order to hang on to him. Mr. Goldsmith. YOu indicate that you consulted with Mr. Katzenbach? | Mr. Helms. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Were there any other government officials consulted prior to taking this action?. Mr. Katzenbach. There were other people sitting in the room with Mr. Katzenbach from the Department of Justice. I do Bage 117 TAD CCPascttT : : =. ! "| : | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ‘ ee
a in eet ~w —4 Aw? DoclId: 322763410 ———— UF eLunc i 1-117 not think this was brought up with the State Department. going on. ; Bares Mr. Goldsmith. Was anyone senior to Mr. Katzenbach in the | The Inter-Agency Defector Committee was aware of what was government apprised of this action? Mr. Helms. I assume that he told the Attorney General. I do not know. We went to see him in the absence of the Attorney General; I think he was Acting Attorney General at Since rT ee TTS the time. _to have offered as an exhibit a notarized statement given by Mr. Nosenko to this Committee on August 7, 1978. Mx. Preyer. Without objection, it is so ordered. (The document referred to was marked JFK Exhibit: No. | { j | | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would like | oo. | { | | | | 129 for identification.) | | Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Ambassador, I am going to read Mr. _ |. Nosenko's statement to you for the purpose of asking you whether you agree with his characterization of the conditions under which he was held in solitary confinement. This isa statement by Mx. Nosenko given. to the Committee August 7, 1978, | "In accordance with the request of the staff of the Committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I make 3 the following statement describing the condition of my | | - nena age 118 TAD SEPRET
aa in ~~4 o@ DoclId: 322763410 | iUP Sivas i | 1-118 imprisonment from April of 1964 until the end of 1967. | "On April 4, 1964 I was taken for a physical check-up and | a test ona lie detector somewhere ina house. A goctor Hire - given me a physical check-up and after that I was taken into another room. for the test on a lie detector. After finishing the test, an officer of the CIA, John, has come in the room and { | talked with the technician. | "John started to shout that I was a phony:’ and immediately | several guards entered into the room. The guards ordered me | | to stand by the wall, to undress and check me. After: that, I | was taken upstairs in an attic room. The room had a metal bed attached to the floor in the center of this room. "Nobody told me anything, how long I would be there or | | | . | what would happen to me. | "After several days, two officers of CIA, John and Frank, started interrogations. I tried to cooperate and in the evening hours. was writing forth on whatever I could recollect about the KGB. These officers were interrogating me about a month or two months. The. tone. of interrogations was hostile. Then they stopped to come and see me until the end of 1964. "I was kept in this room until the end of 1964 and the beginning of '65. The conditions were very poor and difficult. | XZ could have a shower once a week and once in a week I could shave. I was not given a toothbrush and toothpaste and food | i given to. me was. very poor. I did not have enough to eat and i Hage 119 TAD QEPOoCT ' yore ! ‘
: , al | 1-119 | was hungry all the time. I had not contact with anybody to | ee) } | talk. I could not read. I could not smoke. I even could not have fresh air or to see anything from this room. The only window was screened and boarded. The only door in the room had a metal screen, and outside in the corridor two guards were § | watching me day and night. "The: only furniture in the room was a single bed and lightbulb. The room was very, very hot in the summertime. o "At the end of 1964, there were started again interroga- Oo tions by several different officers. The first day, they kept | | | ne under 24 hours interrogation. All interrogations were done | in a hostile manner. | | -"AT the end of those interrogations, when I was told it | was the last one and asked what I wanted to be relayed to is | higher ups, I said I was a true defector and being under arrest about 386 days, I wanted to be put on trial, if I was found guilty, or released. | a "I also asked how long I would continue. I was told that 19 | I. would be there 3,860 days and even more. 0 "This evening I was taken by guards, blindfolded and +1 | handcuffed in a car and delivered to an airport and put into . e@ 39 a plane. I was taken to another location where I was put into | a concrete. room with bars on the door. In the room was a yo 1 single steel bed with a mattress. No pillow, no sheet, no blanket, During winter it was very cold,.and I asked them to , ' Docld: 32263410 page 120 TAD CTPRET .
(UP Scbacl 1-120 give me a blanket, which I received after some time. wn) { | | . "Except for one day of interrogation, and one day for a test on a lie detector, I have not seen anyone besides guards and a doctor. Guards were not allowed to talk to me. ros wm "After my constant complaint that I needed fresh air at ; the end of 1966, I was taken almost every day for 30 minutes 7 | exercise to a small area attached to the cell. The area was 8 ) surrounded by a chain-link fence and a fence I could not see 9 through. The only thing I could see was the sky. | \ cS "Being in the cell, I was watched day and night through the TV camera. Trying to pass the time, a couple of times, ~s, bo | | | , . 8 | I was making for friends a chess set and every time, when I finished those sets, immediately guards would enter into my | cell and taking them from me. I was desperately wanting to read and once, when I was given toothpaste, I found in the 16 toothpaste box a piece of paper with a description-of compound 17 of this toothpaste. I was trying to read it under my blanket, |- 1a | but guards noticed it and again it was taken from me. 1g "Conditions in both first and second locations were 29 | analogical. I was there until November of 1967. Then r again was transferred, blindfolded and handcuffed, to another @ . 22 location. In this new place, I had a room with much better 73 condtiions and Mr. Bruce Soley, CIA officer, started to questio 24 | Me every day, excluding Sundays, touching all questions oo ae en se f concerning my biography, career in the KGB, and all cases of a Docld: 322763410 age 121 TAD CCPRIT
da 9) Ur ScUxE! i 1-128 | Mr. Goldsmith. Would any decision concerning the use Mr. Helms. It:might have. You see, I do not remember of drugs necessarily involve Dave Murphy at some point? whether, all during this period, Murphy was in charge of the SR Division or whether he was in charge for a time when someone | else took over. I do not have the agency -- | Mr. Goldsmith. I believe for this entire period Mr. | Murphy was in charge of the SR Division. ! Mr. Helms. He would have been involved in it. He is in | charge of these people in his division. He was obviously attempting to counsel with them how it was to be conducted, so I would have thought he would have been a party of any inquiry at that time, or reference to me for permission at’~~ Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my line of inquiry with regard to this area. Do you have any questions? I would defer to you. | | | | that time. | | i | . - Mr. Preyer. I have no questions on that area, but before | you recess to go on your deposition hearing, I have a couple | of questions in another area which I would like to ask. | Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Mr. Craigy. Before leaving that area, I might inquire, | | you mentioned, you asked a question whether Ambassador Helms would dispute any evidence to the effect that Mr. Nosenko » was drugged. If such evidence does exist, you might be able Docld: 32263410 Bage 129 TAD CLPDeT .