198-10007-10147) ° _ JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY : RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10147 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: Document Information ORIGINATOR:  ICCCA FROM: TO: TITLE : CUBA: THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES DATE: 00/00/0000 PAGES: 20 SUBJECTS : . MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES - CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Secret IB Redact 11/28/1997 Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 12. Report entitled "Cuba: The Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees.” JFK Reel 8 sarimant of the Army EO 1352 bs Declasslty CO Exclude & Exempt Authority I Reter To rt. Review Date a iS By, v9.4 HW 50955 Docld: 32424140 Page 1
=SSSTETT - TN TEE f i T 4 a a HY §0955 Doctd: 3274274140 Page 2? .
HY 0955 SECRET SECRET Doctd: 32424140 Page 3 P nce Ot -. CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES | AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES . Fo
HW 50955 SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. Introduction setrtrrtt ttt ee ee er ee nee ] TI. Nature and Scope of the Problem -c-.3er-- nee ee a sr 2 III. The Attitudes of the Latin American Nations ~--<crcrtt 37 6 IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travelrror ttt er 8 1. Immediate Impact Actions-~---~~-~ fe ee ene ee ee eee me} ae Administrative Actions- 9 ttt t ttt tr rar rrr renner nnn 9. b. Intelligence Actions - 777 ttt ttt t ttre eee ene 9 ce, Actions Related to Common Carriers-----3---""r= 10 d. Propaganda Actions em mee mmm =~ LO 2, Longer Range Actions--~---3 rer rent at terre eee en 10 a. Political Actions---- om — ee 11 b. Intelligence Actions ----7--- 777067 eS cal co. Administrative Actions------------- wo-nnn ene 12 ad. Actions Related to Common carriers etait 12 . ex, Propaganda ROECLONG mr em 13, 3, Organization of American States (OAS) Actions----- 13 V. Actions Concerning Illegal tpayel--nneeneoe eee n eee 14 1. Immediate Impact Actions-------- connec nner cen 14 ay Intelligence Actions-------- rr rtrr ttt 14 b. Surveillance and Reporting Actions-cerrr ttt 15. 2, Longer Range Roti ong~ nn nen 15 a. Surveillance Actions------7 ere rrr rere e ne 15 b. US Military Assistance Actions--~---------~ — 16 SECRET DocId:32494140 Page 4
HW 450955 SECRET CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES Ts Introduction The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin American countries, Execution of any one or more of the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution of them all will not completely solve it. The practical problems involved are too numerous ‘and complex. With respect to diminishing legal travel to cuba, we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes of those Latin American countries through which the. subversive traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations the direct actions required have strong political and sometimes legal implications. ~ impli- cations which cannot be overcome easily, even when the leaders of these countries choose to do so. In the matter of clandestine travel, we are . confronted not only with the great depth of communist guile, born of two generations of experience in the international movement of subversives, but with the inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in these same matters on the part of the Latin American community. In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside with the communists. Cuba's insular character imposes ‘certain sharp limitations upon personal movement. Cuba has no frontiers with other states; everyone _ who enters the country must do so either by water, or air, There can be no slipping through the barbed wire. . SECRET Doocld:324274140 Page 5
HY 0955 SECRET On the other hand, this same geographic situation makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple. There are 3,825 linear miles of essentially unpa- trolled Central American coastline, within 175 to 850 miles from Cuba. There are at least 93 airfields, other than ours, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft indigenous to the Caribbean, and capable of supporting the subversive ebb and flow, number well into ‘the thousands. ‘Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a program of direct restraints, selected from among the actions enumerated herein, can have favorable effects, Under the proposed steps some travel would be stopped completely. More --— probably much more ~- would be rendered difficult, Some hitherto legal movement would be driven underground. ‘Previous . clandestine movement would be impeded, complicated : - and harassed to the point where it becomes more costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, - hopefully, less extensive, II, Nature and Scope of the Problem We do not know enough about the ino vement of subversive trainees, into Cuba and - more important “ out of Cuba, We do not know enough about the volume of travel, or the media employed. This is par- ticularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where our knowledge is extremely limited, ‘Regarding legal travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate: SECRET , 2 BDocld: 327474140 Page 6
HW 50955 SECRET Legal Travel Into Cuba Country No. of Legal Travellers Country No. of Legal Travellers Jan-Feb Jan~Feb — 1962 1963 _. __1962 1963. Mexico 4o1o%* . 969 Argentina’ 500 | Unk Guatemala 80 Unk Uruguay 115 Unk “El Salvador 100 8 Paraguay - 60 | - ‘Unk Nicaragua 50 Unk Brazil. 400 - Unk. Costa Rica 216 10° Honduras 92 21 Venezuela 200 Unk British | HO Unk oo Guiana ee Colombia 400 Unk Panama. 56. 1 Ecuador 208 Unk “Trinidad Unk Unk Peru 181 Unk Jamaica 593 Unk Bolivia 500 Unk Dominican None Unk | Republic Se ’ -o Chile 551 85 Haiti Unk ———sUnk ~~ * In transit, including about 300 Mexicans While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico, On the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen’ that there cannot have been fewer than 4,912 travellers to Cuba during 1962, while the average monthly number passing through Mexico for the first two months of 1963 is even higher than the 1962 monthly average, Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central intelligence Agency estimates that at least 1,500, and perhaps as many as 2,000,have received ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many. SECRET - 3 Boclda: 32474140 Page 7
HY 0955 SECRET - of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to. their homelands; some by legal means; some probably. by illicit means, There is no reason to presume, | moreover, that the travel to Cuba of the remaining _ 3,000-3,500 was entirely consistent with the beat interests of the hemisphere, Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans . ue travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commercial. _ airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered Cubana flights. Some travelled to Trinidad. or Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or KIM flights to Havana. Others travelled to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial ° flights to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba by Pan American, KIM, Mexicana, and Iberia airlines in October, the regular Cubana service. between Mexico City and Havana remained the sole ._ direct and regular airline connection between Cuba -and the remainder of Latin America, The Cubana service between Havana dnd Mexico is: scheduled to operate twice weekly, but sometimes only. a single flight is completed per week. Aircraft now employed are British Britannias — an obsolescent model, Cubana has requested, but has not yet received, - Mexican approval to substitute Soviet IL-18 transports. ‘for the old Britannias., Delay by the Mexicans in granting this approval can have the favorable effect ~ of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition, If, in addition, the British and Canadians can be induced ‘to suspend delivery of spare parts, the planes will soon become inoperative. Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly flights from Madrid to Havana on 11 February. This flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana. Bo KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles, However, it is now con» sidering doing so, In this regard it is concluded that resumption of scheduled flights by a United States. carrier could Serve as an encouragement to KIM and others to do the same, SECRET 4 Boctld:324274140 Page 6
HY AOS SA _ SECRET Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do not. atop. _ regularly at any other Latin American country, ‘though. - . the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally sought and received permission from Brazil to land-at Recife, enroute to Cuba. Some Latin Americans may have _ travelled to Cuba on these infrequent flights and, should Brazil permit this arrangement to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new order of magnitude. A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying both material and personnel. The Canadians have been unresponsive to our efforts to obtain identification. , of the passengers. ne There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers. — operating between Latin America and Cuba. However, a number of trainees from British Guiana. have travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant vessels engaged in transporting rice from Guiana ton Cuba. Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin . Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illicit — 7 procedures, The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides .. the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel out of and into Mexico. This procedure is obviously designed to impede any effort by the other Latin | American governments subsequently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveillance over their. activities upon their return, Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of travel by legal means. This must be countered directly. Beyond this, and perhaps.of greater importance, is the problem of illicit movement. both into and out of Cuba, which will undoubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at present most limited, Elimination of this intelligence void: must | be accorded ‘nigh priority. - SECRET — 5 BDoctld:324274140 Page 3
HW 450955 @ o SECRET III. The Attitudes of. the Latin American Nations Success of many of the overt actions proposed in the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders — the restraining actions must take place. Presented. briefly below is an estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors of Latin America in terms. of participation in a coordinated program of travel control, As a general matter, the imposition of controls. on travel is not popular with the public in any Latin American country. This, coupled with their current lack of full awareness of the danger represented by - Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the’ willingness of some governments to impose controls. unilaterally. This is especially true since they recognize that unilateral restraints will have little. effect on curbing the travel of their nationals’ to. Cuba, if supporting multilateral action is not also taken. It is likely, however, that most of the |. Latin American countries would respond favorably --— albeit in varying degrees -~ to US. leadership in: seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training. The Central American countries are more acutely aware of the danger posed by Cuban-inspired sub-. version than is Latin America at large, and can be expected to react favorably to proposals for re- ducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential meeting. However, their ability to carry out commitments which they may make will be limited by domestic legal | and political considerations, as well as by their countries! technical incompetence in such matters. Since Mexico is currently the principal hemisphere transit point for legal travel of sub- versives to and from Cuba, its attitude is of great. importance, Mexico, to date, has taken several significant steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and Cuba. It has instituted close SECRET 6 Doclda: 3274274140 Page 10
HY 0955 @ a SECRET surveillance over travellers, to include stamping. passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by © Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA). These actions. all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even | further cooperative steps, particularly on an. un- publicized, bi-lateral basis, wherein the political hazards of taking a public OAS position are not-: involved. In this regard, the Central American |... Presidents would probably agree individually to seek the participation of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico. in specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow’ of persons to Cuba through that country. Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit ~~ travel to Cuba, but the regulations .have engendered public resistance, and are not enforced. The Dominican Republic prohibits such travel. Haiti has no established policy, but passports and’ exit. permits are reportedly issued only on the personel ae approval of President Duvalier, Colombia could . — legally impose restrictions by executive decree, but has shown no inclination to do so, Other countries, such as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central American nations, plead the existence of legal or constitutional barriers which preclude the pro-. hibition of travel to Cuba, but thus far, they . have made little effort to remove these barriers. — Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, - Uruguay, Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to theleft and gives little evidence of modifying its tolerant attitude toward the Castro government..- Chile, with a legal Communist Party, exercises no restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct or via third country. The elimination of all legitimate passenger service to Cuba from Latin America could be SECRET t Docld: 327474140 Page it
HW 50955 SECRET achieved through invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree to do so in the absence of some major crisis similar to that involving the Soviet missiles or a case of direct Cuban intervention in another Latin American country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part. to develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would probably create a growing willingness to take action oriented in this direction. In this connection, however, it is concluded that resumption of regular | | passenger service to Cuba by United States companies would render more difficult our efforts to persuade Latin American and other free world countries. to take a grave view of the situation, and to partici- pate in dynamic action. Virtuaily, all the Latin American countries. would be willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their return to home countries, once they put their new training to use. The efforts of these nations will not be dramatically effective, however, since, in the area of internal security, all of them suffer from deficiencies in technical .skill, training, equipment and sometimes from a lack of a sense of urgency. The United States can provide essential leadership in eliminating all of these deficiencies. IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel Listed below are specific actions contemplated to impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba. Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose, as travel on recognized public carriers, openly arranged and involving travel documents which are presumed to be in proper order, Certain of the actions, it will be noted, are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS - wholly or in part - by its Special Consultative Committee on security. SECRET 8 Bocld:327474140 Page i?
SECRET . 1..immediate -Impact Actions “The following actions offer promise of producing early, visible and effective results. ma. Administrative-Aétions Ol) Both through the OAS and bilaterally, induce each Western Hemisphere country to: ° aren | < (a) Stamp passports or other travel “ documents issued to own nationals "not valid Vv" for travel to Cuba." (b) Refuse exit. permits for Cuba to any ©. rf . national of a third country who cannot produce yw a valid permit issued by his own country for travel to CUPe fi odeekenly pep pmol f mefina) (c) Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which | R is not an integral, non-detachable part. of the (v an ow, travel document issued by the country of which the traveller is a citizen, departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions uv of other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected. (d) Require accurate manifests of all carriers k (2) Persuade Mexico to fingerprint, in addition URE to photographing, all persons leaving for or — yw arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the par- ent country of the nationals involved. (3) Make covert arrangements with police and ah other security and administrative officials in i jon countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba a _..4y to impose administrative impediments and harassment * yr on suspicious Cuba-bound travellers, in order to increase the difficulty of travel and thus dis- courage prospective travellers. b. Intelligence Actions (1) Intensify U.S. intelligence efforts in A each country to identify persons who have travelled, SECRET 9 HY 50955 DBocld: 324274140 Page 13
HY 0955 SECRET or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host government, as consistent with our own intelligence pro- . gram; and the requirement to protect our sources, (2) Intensify current efforts to introduce ws covert, U.S. - controlled agents from. each: country into the Cuban training program. C C.. noreens Related to Common Carriers | ~ favor ae’ iat tom 6 ther nations. (2) Expand current restrictions on f eigt ing oe in es re Py 7, t ig United states p tl ph a : rp ae neg) ppt ign ofeair service ae! S cunt i. | SAearniel 55a! der to wr to pre ide”* a a a gat p ny 81 eee nitoaes MEL CO sentra a ships -to Cuban ports. —_/. (3) Both t ‘barkin Sssengers in their pores (4) Both through the OAS and ptieteralty, Ca. . request Latin American countries to deny their vy ports to ships of Cuban registry. — a. Propaganda Actions Pursue «_homtopneve=wrae-puurserey lea bEten) ough the OAS and bilat srally\ abet - IN. i a\ count s to ohibit ome amoiyvwnge (f°. ~ Meromsor dep i or fr ar inge6r Xa Sem-. 2 OU . +> to expose the scope and purpose of Cuban training wi of the nationals of other countries for sub- versive purposes, in order to discourage pro- OR spective trainees and impress the governments and the peoples concerned with the urgent need to halt the travel of Latin American nationals to Cuba. 2. Longer Range Actions The following actions should also be undertaken without delay. Their ultimate results may be of far- SECRET 10 Docld: 327474140 Page 14
SECRET reaching importance, but probably will be longer in realization, w Qa Political a a (1) Renew oe inten, fy bilateral gottabeig with the fi Latin merican acta sesottas of have opine seeto sever diplomatic spssitioh | With — Cuba (2).Through bilateral riegotiations press aan with inadequate legal restrictions on travel to Cuba to adopt laws enabling the prohibition of such’ OR travel and providing severe penalties for evasion, Recommend that rewards be offered for identification << of evaders, (3) In separate. diplomatic approaches to each country, reiterate the need for full and effective cooperation with appropriate OAS bodies, and bi-. CR laterally among the several states, in the inter- , change of information concerning travel of persons to Cuba and other Castro-Communist subversive activities. (4) Propose periodic regional or sub-regional meetings of ministers of Government of the 70 American Republics to review the implementation of steps taken by them to combat movement of . subversives in the Caribbean. (5) Urge other Latin American nations to- negotiate separately and/or collectively with Mexico Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile in order to. en- Ck list cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba. eee —_—— b. Intelligence Actions Intensify our action in making available to. each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban sub- 0 ment to protect our own intelligence program. a versive activities, as consistent with the require- SECRET li HW 50955 Docld: 32424140 Page i5
_ SECRET ec. Administrative Actions (tr) Encourage Latin American governments to insti- tute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive Lo examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of . aircraft, baggage inspection and inspection of health a and other documents, all designed deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult the carrying of passengers to Cuba. Ss (2) Request governments of Latin American countries - ; which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations: «=~... ae with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel docu-. ae ye ments by Cuban embassies or consulates, and take , ria punitive measures, such as the expulsion of Cuban '/ diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as re-. quested... (3) Intensify technical assistance to Latin. @R ‘ American countries in improving immigration and yr customs controls, ad. Actions Related to Common Carriers (1) Persuade Mexico to halt Cubana Airlines service. If unable to do so, seek to persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made air-/ eraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical m,) ' grounds. This will create an obstacle to Cubana, Since the Britannia aircraft now used are falling into disrepair. (2) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and 6 , any other potential supplier that they cut off the. Ve. supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britannia aircraft, (3) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, | Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries to stop,.or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of. , other Western Hemisphere countries normally. pro- vw) viding terminal service for any of the airlines in- volved, such as: Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying. pressure. SECRET 12 HY 50955 DBocl@:32474140 Page 16
HW 50955 eo | a3 SECRET e,. Propaganda Actions {1) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discredit- ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the hazard rA , which it holds for Latin American tranquility, and mM discrediting persons who have undergone subversive —— training, in order to discourage possible volunteers and develop popular opposition to such activities. (2) Identify returned trainees who are dis- satisfied with their Cuban training experience and  V-- . exploit their capabilities for provision of intelli- ape! yn gence and propaganda material for exposing and ‘ discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities, (3) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout Latin America, not attributable to the United States, wi which focuses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities for movement of persons of other countries to and mweee from Cuba for subversive purposes. 3. Organization of American States (OAS) Actions In view of the important political, psychological, and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from any success achieved through the OAS in combatting Cuban subversive activity, the following measures should be undertaken by the United States in that “body, at times and under circumstances which give regard to the need to preserve hemispheric solidarity, and give recognition to the fact that progress will probably be slow.« , a. Pyrsue adoption by the OAS, of a resolyfio calling/fuupon a¥Yi membe?Y Istates /to severydiplpmali relatigns withf quba, #¢hus impeding the bray ell sulvergiVes t¢ Guba by legal means, ardfap ti time ,. brdati & slriofs obstadgles 0 of hey reMated Cuban Bub*¥erdive \acfivities SECRET 13 BDoclda:32474140 Page i?
SECRET be Propose recommendations by the OAS to member governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the WA ‘ay proposals in the report by the Special Consultative ‘ Committee on Security (SCCS) as well as the specific recommendations set forth herein. ec. Once the initial comprehensive program in b. above is undertaken, utilize the appropriate é OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through yt such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consulta- tive Committee on Security. J. § V. Actions Concerning ITllegal Travel As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, one of the results will be to force the hitherto legal travel into clandestine channels. . Tt may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede illegal movement will acquire steadily in- creasing importance: The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the preceding section, in terms of immediate impact <:pro- jects which promise early and visible results, and longer range projects which, while of great importance, cannot be expected to mature as rapidly. 1, Immediate Tmpact Actions a. intelligence Actions (1) Increase greatly our penetration and vr other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and SECRET 14 HW 350955 Docld: 32424140 Page i6
SECRET determine routes and methods employed. Report selected information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our own intelligence program, to host government. (2) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine * aircraft. and small boat. traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with yv special attention to Mexico, Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Use evidence obtained to persuade governments concerned to institute surveillance and other control measures, b,. Surveillance and Reporting Actions Actions - _ (1) Continue current US sea and air sur- ian veillance of the Caribbean area contiguous to w Cubase L control capabilities. (3) Establish intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier er Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemi- (2) Continue the development, at high priority, of US communications in Latin America, | in order to improve alerting, reporting and mation to countries concerned via the American Ambassadors, of intelligence on the movement WE of subversives. 2. Longer Range Actions ae Surveillance Actions aod Ane “i (1) Establish a coordinated Caribbean sur- .veillance system involving? . (a) Continued close-in surveillance of ps yn Cuba by US forces. (pb) A US military alerting system, by . which intelligence of subversive movement will mM be rapidiy transmitted to the American SECRET 15 HW 350955 Docld:32424140 Page i9
SECRET it pr? Aw tc } Ambassadors to countries concerned through A intelligence centers at. Caribbean Command ia and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of ‘7 the Atlantic Command, (c) A unilateral surveillance and inter- ception effort by each country in its own: Cf * territorial waters. (d) US assistance in final interception c= _ in territorial waters, upon request by the - vw country concerned. b. US Military Assistance Actions (1) Establish Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected — countries, especially in the Caribbean and. Central American area, with the necessary small . (fe patrol craft, training and logistical support, ineluding fuel for operations if required, to enable these countries to establish an effective’ patrol of their own coasts. Provide necessary funds in addition to present programs. (2) Provide US. Navy, Air Force and Coast . Guard training assistance, as required, to ~~ | po develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities ty of Latin American military forces... Thif’.may a take the form of a Canal Zone training activity, employment of mobile training teams, or a com- bination of both. (3) Urge the accelerated improvement of internal security forces and police forces in Va Latin American countries and the intensification of patrol and intelligence activities aimed at preventing clandestine departures and apprehending returned trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as required, SECRET 16 HY 50955 DBocld: 3274274140 Page 270