198=10006-10011] JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form sem teemaeeeeseseaeaeaasaaianeaeasmenamaeaaieessmcacessaaasaasseacaaasaaascaasasasasasasacasaasasasasasasasasausascasacaaaasmasacaaassacccceccacaaaiasaaacasacascacaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaiaaaacauaasasacaasauauasasususuasasaa ta taiiiattaasadasataceemeaemeamesameannstaniatieeaeemn near emmenaaeanaaaaaeatieen ema AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : Agency Information ARMY 198-10006-10011 CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : . Document Information ORIGINATOR : OASD FROM: ZUMWALT, ELR. TO: CALIFANO, JOSEPH TITLE: INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN AFFAIRS: MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES DATE: 03/07/1963 PAGES: 27 SUBJECTS : CUBAN SUBVERSION TRAVEL TO CUBA MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES KRULAK COMMITTEE DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : — Secret RESTRICTIONS : IB CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/04/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.1 HW 50955 Docld: 324273826 Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 12. ISA comments on the Krulak Committee's paper on the movement of Cuban subversives. Declassity, the Amy EO 13606 . f Authority Exclude 3 Exempt = Reter To Page i
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS T March 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Movement of Subversives Reference your memorandum of March 7, 1963 » Same sub- ject, one copy of the second working draft on“Cuba -- The Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees is returned herewith with ISA comments written thereon. B. R. tea ° Capt USN Director for Arms Control Attachment As stated HW 50955 DBocld:32423826 Page 3
HW 450955 SECRET | db ep FL00 p.m Et atteeptuterenparrere——~ 4 7 March 1963 TO SERVICE, OSD AND JOINT STAFF CONTACT POINTS: This is the second draft of the paper which you examined on Tuesday. It embodies changes resulting from your suggestions as well as from a meeting of the Inter- departmental Committee. Please make suggested final alterations and return them to my office by 1400 today, Thursday, 7 March, since the Interdepartmental Committee must put it in final form tonight. | | Service contact. points are urged to ensure that their superiors are aware of the developments on this paper, since the Office of the Secretary of Defense will probably send it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their urgent consideration. Vv. H. KRULAK Major General, USMC GROUP-1 SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFIC ATION Doclda: 3274273676 Page 4
HY 0955 Doctlda: 4324738276 Page 5 _ SECRET eS a Second Working Draft CUBA THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND ‘SUBVERSIVE TRAINEES I. Introduction The actions proposed herein are designed to impede the flow of subversives between Cuba and other Latin American _ countries, Execution of any one or more of the enumerated actions will ameliorate the situation; execution .of them — all will not completely solve it. The practical problems involved are too numerous and complex. . With respect to diminishing legitimate travel to Cubas we face multiple problems in the policies and attitudes of . those Latin American countries through whieh the subversive traveller must pass. From the viewpoint of these nations the direct actions required have strong political and some- times legal implications; implications which cannot be over- come easily, even where tne leaders of these countries choose to do so, In the matter: of clandestine travel, we are confronted ‘not only with the great depth of communist guile, born.of two generations of experience in the international movement of . SECRET —
HY 0955 SECRET subversives, but with the inexperience, ineptitude and lack of awareness in these same matters on the part of the Latin.American community. In spite of this, the advantages do not all reside with the communists. Cuba is an island. Its insular _character.imposes certain sharp limitations upon personal movement. Cuba has no frontiers’ with other states; every- \ one who enters the country must do so either by water, or air. There can be no slipping through one pee wire, On the other hand, this—same—geographic Eb 7 Alo makes clandestine entry and exit reasonably simple. There are 3, 825 linear miles of essentially unpatrolled Central ‘American coastline, between 115 and 850 miles of Cuba.. There are. at least 93. airfields, other than United States, within 700 miles of the island, and the ships and craft, indigenous to the Caribbean and capable of supporting the subversive — ebb and flow, number well into the thousands. | Even in the face of these unfavorable factors, a “program of direct restraints, selected from among the actions _ enumerated herein, can have favorable effects. Under the. proposed steps some travel would be stopped completely. More - probably much more ~- would be rendered difficult, Some hitherto legitimate movement would be driven underground. SECRET 2 Docld: 32742738276 Page 6
O ) SECRET — Previous clandestine movement would be impeded, compli- cated and harassed to the point where it becomes more costly, more uncertain, more hazardous and thus, hope- fully, less extensive. SECRET . 3 HW 50955 DBocld: 3242365276 Page 7
SECRET Ir. Nature and Scope of the Problem We do not know enough about the movement of subversive trainees into Cuba and - more important. - out of Cuba. We do not’ know enough about the volume of travel, or the media employed. This is particularly true in the area of illicit traffic, where our knowledge is extemely limited. Regarding legitimate travel to Cuba, CIA presents the following estimate: Legitimate Travel into Cuba Country No. of Legal Travellers Country No. of Legal Travellers Mexico Guatemala El Salvador Nicaragua Costa Rica Venezuela Colombia Heuador Peru Bolivia Chile SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 324273676 SHOuld use. Sra ré sia weg Le Stud ea¥s ang  Cedege TERS 4912 80 100 50 Page @ 1962 Jan-Feb 1963 969 Unk 8 Unk 10 Unk Unk Unk Unk Unk Argentina Uruguay Paraguay Brazil Honduras British Guiana Panama Trinidad Jamaica Dominican Republic Haiti 1962 Jan-Feb 1963 500 ~— Unk 115 Unk 60 Unk 4OoO  -  ~=Unk 92 ers ho Unk 56 1 Unk Unk - 593 Unk None Unk | Unk ‘Unk tepid ‘Yo Numbers 3
_ SECRET © | | (2 While some of these travellers proceeded to Cuba by other routes, the great majority passed through Mexico on their way.» Ori the most conservative basis, then, it will be seen that there cannot have been fewer than 4912 travellers to Cuba during the year 1962, while the average monthly number passing through Mexico for the first two months of 1963 is even higher than the 1962 average. te Of the total number visiting Cuba, the Central Intelli- nt gence Agency estimates that at least 1500, and perhaps as many as 2000, have received ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many of these are still in Cuba. Others have returned to their homelands; Some PY asl legitimate means; some probably by illicit means,“ | Prior to the October crisis, Latin Americans travelling to Cuba usually moved by regular commerc4al airlines or, on occasion, by specially chartered Cubana flights. Some | travelled to Trinidad or Curacao and thence by regularly scheduled Cubana or KLM flights to Havana. ‘Others travelled to Mexico, and from there by Mexicana or Cubana commercial flights to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba by. Pan American, KLM, Mexicana, and Iberia airlines in October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City | and Havana remained the sole direct and regular airline connection betwen Cuba and the remainder of Latin America. — SECRET As HW 50955 DBocld: 324235276 Page 9
SECRET a | . G The Cubana service between Havana and Mexico is scheduled to operate twice. weekly, but sometimes only a Single flight is completed per week, Aircraft now employed are British Bri-_ tannias -- an obsolescent model, Cubana has requested, but has not yet received, Mexican approval to substitute Soviet IL-18 transports for the old Britannias. Delay by the Mexicans in granting this approval can have the favorable effect of impeding travel, as the Britannias are now in poor condition. 7 If, in addition, the British and Canadians can be induced to suspend delivery of spare parts, the planes will soon become Carr 1 inoperative.. +o venlett. Iberia airlines resumed its regular twice-monthly VANE Ton pe flights from Madrid to Havana.on 11.February. This flight makes one stop, in the Azores, before reaching Havana. °- I KIM has not yet resumed its regular flights to Cuba from the Netherlands Antilles. However, it is now considering doing so, In this regard it is coneluded that resumption. of scheduled flights by a United States carrier could gerve as an encouragement to KIM and others to do the same. . | Soviet and Czech airlines serving Cuba do net stop regularly at any other Latin American country, though: the Soviet Aeroflot line has occasionally seught and received permission from Brazil to land at Recife, en route to Cuba. ‘ SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 32423676 Page 10
- ; SECRET c © Some Latin Americans may have travelled to Cuba on-these infrequent flights and, should Brazil permit this arrange- ment to become regularized, the movement of subversives could achieve a new order of magnitude. A Canadian non-scheduled line has operated a few flights from Canada to Havana and return, carrying ‘both material and personnel. The Canadians have been unrespon- sive to our efforts to obtain identification of the passengers. There are no regularly scheduled sea carriers operating between Latin America and Cuba. However, a number of trainees from British Guiana have travelled to Cuba aboard unscheduled Cuban merchant vessels engaged in transporting rice from 7 Guiana to Cuba. | Clandestine sources report that transit of Latin Americans through Mexico to Cuba often involves illict pro- | cedures. The Cuban embassy in Mexico City provides the travellers, whom they identify as tourists, with special Cuban entry papers: no entry is made in their passports, and they are given pseudonyms for travel out. of and into Mexico. This procedure is obviously designed to impede any effort by the other Latin American governments subse- quently to identify the travellers and to exercise surveil- lance over their activities upon their return. 4 SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 324236276 Page Li
def wa SECRET §©@ eG Evidence at hand portrays a substantial flow of travel by legal means. This must be countered directly. - Beyond this, and perhaps of greater importance, is the problem of filitett movement both into and out of Cuba, which will un- AAT OAT 7 . doubtedly assume growing proportions as legal travel is curtailed, and about which our intelligence is at present most limited. Elimination of this void must be accerded high priority. SECRET 8 HW 50955 Docld:324293826 Page 12
_ SECRET 1 uestiou III. The attitudes of the Latin American Nations Success of many of the overt actions proposed in- the sections to follow will turn upon the attitudes of the Latin American nations within whose borders the restraining actions must take place. Presented briefly below is an’ estimate of what can be expected from the various sectors af Latin America in terms of participation in a coordinated program of travel control. | As a general matter, the imposition of controls. on is AlmesT travel is not popular with the public in any Latin American AN Lountn~<o ave Some Comal on ants pr least PF Cerne country. This, coupled with their current lack of full pawareness of the danger represented by Cuba's training of subversives, will diminish the willingness of some govern- ments to impose controls unilaterally. ‘This is. especially true since they recognize that unilateral restraints will have little effect on curbing the travel of their nationals to Cuba, if supperting multilateral action is not also taken. It is likely, however, that most of the Latin American | countries would respond favorably -- albeit in varying degrees ~-- to US leadership in seeking to reduce the flow of persons to Cuba for ideological or subversive training... The Central American countries are more acutely aware of the danger posed by Cubaninspired subversion than is Latin America at. large, and can be expected to react SECRET 9 HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 Page i3
HY Can ,) ve, ye oe) aw 1 XY ray ow SECRET favorably to proposals for reducing travel to Cuba which President Kennedy might present at the San Jose Presidential meeting. However, their ability to carry out commitments made under such circumstances will be limited by domestic legal and political considerations, as well as by their countries! technical incompetence in such matters. Since Mexico is currently the only hemisphere transit point for legal travel of subversives to and from Cuba, the attitude of that country toward the problem is of great importance, Mexico, to date, has taken three significant steps with respect to travel between Mexican cities and Cuba. It has instituted close surveillance over travellers, to include stamping passports to evidence travel to Cuba. In addition, the Mexicans now photograph, covertly, all persons arriving from or departing for Cuba, and have given tacit approval to suspension of Cuban service by Compania Mexicana de Aviacion (CMA). These actions all suggest that Mexico might be induced to take even further cooperative steps, particularly on an unpublicized, bilateral basis, wherein the political hazards of a public OAS position are— not involved, In this regard, the Central American Presidents would probably agree individually to seek the participation : of President Lopez Mateos of Mexico in specific cooperative moves to restrict the flow of persons to Cuba through that country. SECRET : LO 50955 Daocld: 3274238276 Page i4
SECRET pts gen Peru now has regulations which actually prohibit OY ee travel to Cuba, but the regulations have engendered public resistance, and are not enforced, The Dominican Republic Ano Sen prohibits such travel. Haiti has no established policy, 4 but passports and exit permits are reportedly issued only on personal approval of President Duvalier. Colombia could legally impose restrictions by executive decree, but Ret b has shown no inclination to do so, Other countries, such Veneurelan . . oo, ton rach oH as Venezuela, Chile, and the Central: American nations; | vale erie etch preclude the prohibition of travel to Cuba , but thus bet wre the existence of legal or constitutional barriers far, they have made little effort to remove these parriers. Five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Undusrre) at Mexico, and Bolivia) now maintain diplomatic relations with nv’ And An in lor policy ws Cuba. Brazil continues its drift to the leftyand gives q ee A uy little evidence of modifying its tolerant attitude toward “ow xt ep\ the Castro government. Chile, with a legal Communist Party, 004 ar no | can ‘bee exercises no restraints on travel to Cuba, either direct yo" r via third country. It is to. be expected that<these five countries, with some possible exceptions in the case of WZ Mexico, will be the least cooperative in restricting travel : to Cuba. The elimination of all legitimate passenger service © to Cuba from Latin America could be achieved through SECRET Ll HY 50955 DBocld: 324238276 Page 145
"owe lpn pur HW 450955 mie SECRET SECRET aa G invocation of the Rio Treaty, but it is unlikely that the hemisphere countries would agree to do so in the absgénce of some major crisis similar to that involving the Soviet missiles or a case of direct Cuban intervention in another Latin ¢ American country. Nevertheless, a campaign on our part to develop a full awareness of the danger represented by the flow of Castro-trained subversives would probably create a growing willingness to take action oriented in this direction. In this connection, however, it is concluded that resumption of regular passenger service to Cuba by the United States - would render more difficult our efforts to persuade the Latin American. countries to take a grave view of the situ- ation, and to participate in dynamic action. Virtually, all the Latin American countries would be Willing to move against Cuban-trained subversives upon their | return to home countries, particularly when the trainee's conduct gave clear evidence of his subversive intent, Ah essential factor, however, is-the realization that the efforts of these nations will not be dramatically effective sinee, in the area of internal security, all of them suffer from de- ficiencies in technical skill) skills training, /equipment)anda some- times from a lack of a Te ot urgeney. The United States eas The: eliminatieu can provide essential leadership 1 Girepeade| of thes deficieneies, 12 Docld: 32423826 Page 16
Go © SECRET IV. Actions Concerning Legitimate Travel Listed below are specific actions contemplated to impede legitimately executed travel, to and from Cuba. Legitimate travel is characterized, for this purpose,. as travel on recognized public carriers, openly arranged and involving travel documents which are presumed to be in proper order. Certain of the actions, it will be noted, -are partially in effect. Others have been proposed to the OAS ~ wholly or in part - by the Special Consultative | Committee on Security. a. Immediate Impact Actions The following actions offer promise of producing early, visible and effective results. (1) Intelligence Actions (a) Intensify U.S# intelligence efforts in | each country to identify persons who have traveled, or intend to travel, to Cuba, and report selected information promptly to the host government, as may be consistent with our own intelligence pro- gram, and the requirement to protect our sources. (o) Intensify current efforts to introduce covert, U.S. ~ controlled agents from each country into the Cuban training program. (2) Administrative Actions (a) Induce each Western Hemisphere country to: SECRET 13 HY 50955 DBocld: 324235276 Page i?
HY 0955 SECRET i. Stamp passports or other travel documents issued to own nationals "not valid for travel to Cuba", eé. Refuse exit permits for Cuba to any national of a third country who cannot produce po a valid permit issued by his own country for travel to Cuba. | 3. Refuse to honor any visa for Cuba which is not an integral, non-detachable part of the -travel document issued by the country of which the traveller is a citizen. 4, Require accurate manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba, and furnish copies of these manifests to diplomatic missions of: other Western Hemisphere countries which are affected, | (b) Persuade Mexico. .to fingerprint, in addition to photographing, all persons leaving for or arriving from Cuba, and to provide data to the parent country of the nationals involved. | (c) Make covert arrangements with police and other security and administrative officials in countries now being used for legal transit to Cuba to impose administrative impediments and harassment on Cuba~-bound travellers, in order to increase the SECRET : 14 Docld: 324273826 Page 16 \
oe i nie re enry OLA tra ue, oa SECRET difficulty of travel and thus discourage pro~- , Mm ~. spective travellers. Paneer ea (83) Actions in Regard to Common Carriers faa (eb coetian (a) Prohibit resumption of. air service wb sna Cuba by U.S, carriers, in order to provide a favorable example to other nations who may be 7 contemplating similar steps. = . eps yn (bo) Expand current restrictions on foreign N° | @ a aed rato ’shipping engaging in commerce with Cuba by © 1 . wy ye wane LAr closing United States ports to ail ships of ie otro _yt any shipping line which continues to send any Walaa ships to Cuban ports. _ wae an a ee! Wy cat (c) Request Latin American countries to gi? | yo > ‘prohibit ships arriving from or departing for wo Th Cuba from embarking or disembarking passengers \ A ove thier ports. | | lr ~ fase (d) Request Latin American countries to deny 4 Sul v> . ys 4 a on } thedy, ports to Cuban ships. Bo are on 4 - fi a vn eet ad } (4) Propaganda Actions “ te tena al (a) te a thas th. blow wide publicity cape tan a ci chi Wong bleac we he Adtadl ta “|G ety wy he, Thea S to od ose Wnty fJopé “and purpos f Cuban training 4 of the nationals of other countries for sub- pig gto Ch Seon rae) versive purposes, in order to discourage pro- spective trainees and impress the governments SECRET 15 HW 50955 Docld: 32423826 Page 19
>  e SECRET (d) Propose periodic regional meetings of ministers of the Central American nations to review the implementation of steps taken by two or more of them to combat subversive movement in the Caribbean. - / | (€) Urge other Latin American nations to UM? negotiate separately and/or collectively with ° . he” ' Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Chile in order to enlist y cooperation in adopting specific measures to prevent | 4 the movement through their countries of third country personnel to and from Cuba. (2) Intelligence Actions 8) Intensify our action in making available to each country selected intelligence concerning the extent, nature, and insidious implications, of Cuban subversive activities, as consistent with the ES REERIRA °° WHER PR” ansehen (3) Administrative Actions (a) Encourage Latin American governments to institute administrative procedures, such as exhaustive examination of manifests, air-worthiness checks of aircraft, baggage inspection and inspect- , ion of health and other documents, all designed ‘deliberately to delay and otherwise make difficult SECRET 17 HY 50955 DBocld:32423676 Page 21
SECRET the carrying of passengers to Cuba. (b) Request governments of Latin American countries which persist in maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba to expose the falsification of travel documents by Cuban embassies or con- sulates, and take punitive measures, such as the° expulsion of Cuban diplomatic personnel, to bring such illegal activity to a halt. Provide U.S. technical assistance as requested, (e¢) Intensify technical assistance to Latin American countries in improving immigration and , customs controls. (4) Actions Related to Common Carriers ; of Dy (a) If unable to cause Mexico to halt Cubana Fila Airlines service altogether, persuade Mexico to refuse the introduction of Soviet-made aircraft in the Havana-Mexico City route on technical grounds, This will create an obstacle to Cubana, since the. #Brittania aircraft now used are in disrepair. SO if (b) Request again of Great Britain, Canada, and any other potential supplier that they cut off the supply of spare parts for Cuba's Britania aircraft. (c) Conduct negotiations with the Netherlands, Mexico, Canada and Spain to persuade those countries SECRET’ 18 HY 50955 DBocld:324273676 Page 22
HY 0955 SECRET o py yk we SECRET to stop, or refrain from reestablishing, commercial air flights to Cuba. Enlist the cooperation of other Western Hemisphere countries normally ‘providing terminal service for any of the airlines involved, such as Venezuela and Trinidad, in applying pressure. (5) Propaganda Actions _ (a) Intensify USIA and CIA input of propaganda in Latin American public information media discredit- . ing the Cuban training effort, exposing the. hazard which it holds for Latin American tranquility,and discrediting persons who have undergone subversive: training, in order to discourage possible volunteers. and develop popular opposition to such activities. (b) Identify returned trainees who are dis- satisfied with th@ér Cuban training experience and exploit ther capabilities for provision of intelli- gence and propaganda material for exposing and discrediting Castro-Communist subversive activities. (c) Initiate a publicity campaign throughout | Latin America, not attributable to the United States, which focusses unfavorably on the use of Mexican, Uruguayan, Brazilian, and Chilean transit facilities for movement af persons of other countries to and from Cuba for subversive purposes. 19 Docld: 3274273876 Page 23
SECRET’ Ce Organization of American States (OAS) Actions In view of the important political, psychological, and, hopefully, material benefits to be derived from any Success achieved through the OAS in combatting Cuban subversive activity, the following measures Should be pursued by the United States in that body, at times and under circumstances which give regard to the need to “aes exgeunegiges mich ci and give recognition to the fact that progess will probably be slow. - (1) Pursue adaption by the OAS of a resolution calling upon all member states to sever diplomatic | yy | relations with Cuba, thus impeding the travel of y. sgubversives to Cuba by legal means, and at the same © Yan creating serious obstacles to other related Cuban subversive activities. | (2) Propose a recommendation by the OAS to. member . governments of a program of steps, on both the national and international levels, to control travel - by their nationals to Cuba, utilizing the proposals in the report by the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS).as well as the specific recommen- dations set forth herein. SECRET 20 HW 350955 DBoclda: 32423826 Page 24
HY 0955 _ SECRET © «> (3) Once the initial comprehensive program in (2) above is recommended, utilize the appropriate OAS bodies to follow up on implementation through such means as multilateral exchange of information, meeting of experts, and utilization by individual countries of the services of the Special Consultative Committee on Security. / (4) Propose adoption by the OAS of a resolution, 6 binding upon all member states, to terminate air and — maritime carrier traffic with Cuba. (5) Recommend action by the OAS to establish a public information program focussing on the threat to the hemisphere posed by Cuban subversive training activities. SECRET el Bocld: 32425826 Page 25
HW 50955 SECRET . == te Ve Actions Concerning Illegal Travel As the actions outlined in the preceding sections become effective, one of the results will be to force the hitherto legitimate travel into clandestine channels « It) may, therefore, be expected that measures to impede illegal movement will acquire steadily increasing importance. The steps proposed herein are listed, as in the preceding section, in terms of immediate impact projects which promise early and visible results, and longer range projects which while of great importance, cannot be ex- pected to mature as rapidly. | ae Immediate Impact Actions. (1) Intelligence Actions (a) Increase greatly our penetration and other intelligence efforts to identify persons engaging in illegal travel to Cuba, and determine routes and methods employed, Report selécted information, consistent with the requirement for protecting our ‘own intelligence program, to host government. (b) Utilize US intelligence capabilities to determine the nature and extent of clandestine aircraft and small boat traffic between Cuba and other countries in the Caribbean area, with special SECRET 22 Doclda: 3242736276 Page 26
SECRET a ey attention to Mexico,. Honduras, Jamaica, Haiti and / ppber -tne Dominican Republic, Use evidence obtained to ye" ¥ persuade governments coneerned to institute sure veillance and other contre@l measures. (2) Surveillance and Reporting Actions / (a) Continue current US sea and air surveil~. lance of the Caribbean area contiguous to Cubas An an? (bo) Continue, the Improvement, at high priority, of US communications in Latin America, in order to improve alerting, reporting and control capabilities. _(c) Establish intelligence centers at: Caribbean | Command fna Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters _| for rapid processing and dissemination to countries  goncerned via the American Ambassadors 5 of intel~ ligence on subversive movements , A) USE Y Count Lets Cn bhewn Sesunabe bs tong ES ho Stee my jor Ma NA bern Peta (1) Surveillance Actions (a) Establish a coordinated Caribbean surveil- lance system involving? - i..Continued close-in surveillance of Cuba py US forces, 2% A US military alerting systems by which intelligence of subversive movement will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors ! SECRET 23 HW 50955 Docld: 32423626 Page 27
to countries concerned through intelligence yt vi, centers at Caribhéan Command fra Caribbean sen ve ‘Frontier Headquarters > | Urtuflig 1 onesie Be A unilateral surveillance and inter- eeption effort by each country in its own. territorial waters. Ae US assistance in final interception in territorial waters, upon request by the country concerned, | (2) US Military Assistance Actions | (a) Review Military Assistance objectives and planning guidance to provide selected countries, especially in the Caribbean, and Central American area, with small patrol craft, training and logistical support, including fuel for operations | if required, to enable these countries to establish an effective patrol of their own coasts, | (b) Provide US Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard training assistance, as required, to develop or improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military personnel, This may take the form of a. | Canal Zone raining activity, employment of mobile training teams, or a combination of both. SECRET —— ey HW 50955 Doclda: 324238026 Page 26
SECRET : . . 4 a “ . ao ey ~ (c) Urge the accelerated improvement of inter- nal security forces and police forces in Latin American countries and the intensification of . patrol and intelligence activities aimed at pre- venting clandestine ‘departures and apprehending returned trainees. Provide equipment, training and advice as required, & SECRET 25 HW 50955 Docld:324273826 Page 29