6 (This form is fo be ured for material extracted i - ~ fr om ClA-—contro! lad docun ate ants, \ . Ss : eo - 60 -' The Inspector General's report corrected the state- ment in the Senate report that the "Central Intelligence Agency had not information indicating that a following investigation was conducted to determine that a follow- ing investigation was conducted to determine the iden- tity of the passenger and had no further information , on the passenger, and no explanation for why a following investigation was not conducted." (The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Perfor- mance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V; Select Com- COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE. mittee to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, p. 30, Senate Report No. 94-755.) The Inspector General Report stated that the Central Intelligence Agency({ conducted THIS ' xvegular surveillance)of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to Headquarters (Tbid., p. ll.) There was one unilateral CIA surveillance team (LaFrRE) that observed Met ARE hal. - . _ (arrivais and departures of Cubana flights) reporting “any unusual recurrences |ana providing copies of flight _-mainfests (Ibid., ps 1D. (one Mexican government had its ae own surveillance team (LITEMPO) at the airport which pro- vided the CIA with photographs of passports and copies of ‘passenger lists of individuals travelling to cuba. ) Classified py derivation: tO1¥Z-/6 120
- 61 - (Ibid., p. 11) In addition, (telephone tap)operations (ormnvox) Against the Cuban Embassy provided transcripts of conversations between the Cubana Airlines office (ana the Mexican Airport Control Office. (Ibid., p. 11.) rhe(arenvoy) transcripts recorded a series of dis- cussions concerning the status of the November 22, 1963 delayed Cubana flight--when it arrived and when it de- parted. The transcripts showed that the flight arrived at the airport at 1620 hours (ALL times used will be Mexico City time to avoid confusion) Mexico City time. (HSCA Staff Review of November 22, 196A s:1envoy trans- cripts) Prior to the arrival of the aircraft, one per- son stated that the aircraft was due at 1630 hours ana "it will go" at 1730, suggesting a quick’ turnaround that would have reduced unloading and loading time, as well as serving of aircraft to a relatively short period. (Ibid.) However, the only key report on the departure of the air- craft was.a statement at 2040 hours that the aircraft had departed for Cuba five minutes earlier, i.e., 2035 hours...(Ibid.) Based on the above ((i1Ewvox)was the only record that existed in the CIA files on the arrival and departure Classified by derivation:
ifnis form is to be used for material extracted \ from Cla—controlled documents.) times of the Cubana flight) (veitner LIFIRE nor. the. Mexican surveillance team reported the arrival or depar- ture flights of the November 22, 1963 Cubana Airlines. flight to Cuba)) then 1.6. concluded that there were major ‘differences between what the Senate Select Committee re- ported about the alleged delayed Cubana flight and the known facts. (Ibid., p. 12) The Cuban flight was on- the ground in Mexico City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes. (Ibid. p. 12) It was not delayed five hours as reported in Book V. (The Investigation of the AssasSination of President John F. Kennedy, Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book v, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations, 4/23/76, D. 30, Senate Intelligence Report No. 94-755) The Cubana flight de- parted at 2035 hours Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of “the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a secret passenger., (Ibid., p. 30) The 2035 departure dif- "fered with the Senate Intelligence Committee Report that the Cubana flight departed at 22000 hours. (Ibid. p. 31) In addition, the I, G. staff concluded that(in view ) of (the surveillance coverage of the Mexican airport [by ) Gorn | the CIA and Mexican governnent) it was doubtful that en . oie ied WiliSSivicayion: Classified by derivation:
ifmis term is tO lis wigee: for material exicaches 2 from ClA---cantrolied documents .) : # ~ 63 - the alleged activity involving the private twin-engined aircraft and passenger would. have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred. (1977 CIA I.G. Report, TAB B, p. 12.) Presumably, the discrepancies pointed out by the ‘Inspector General are meant to explain the fact that the CIA did not take more aggressive investigative steps to ascertain whether there might have been some connection between the delayed flight and the assassina-_ tion of John F. Kennedy. In that regard, the 1977 In- spector General report explains that the Agency had car- . ried the lead as far as it was able by reviewing the (surveillance ite of che (t1PRE and itpnvov operations and asking (ene Mexican surveillance team (LITEMPO)}) about any strange occurrences at the airport on November 22, 1963. (CIA 1977 IG Report, p. 12, Tab B.) However, we the CTA’ Ss lack of access to further information about the . allegedly delayed ¢ Cubana flight and unidentified passen- ger does not explain either the failure of the CIA to take more seriously the suspicions of the source, and most importantly,.to report whatever information it had to the Warren Commission. The Inspector General's attempts
Sau Tor muateric: extracts ~ 64 - to denigrate the value of the information provided on the unidentified alleged Cubana Airlines and unidenti- fied passenger do not diminish the apparent negligence of the agency in seriously pursuing the information as it was.received. The CIA is not to be faulted for the strength of its intelligence gathering, but rather for the judgement which kept that intelligence from the Warren Commission. (The Warren Commission was mandated to pass on the strength of exactly that kind of informa- tion.) Depsite what is now know about the alleged delay of the Cubana Airlines flight and the unidentified pas- senger, the Warren Commission may have wanted to abrigate suspicions which would remain, and satisfy itself that these circumstances did not indicate foreign involvement in the assassination. The CIA contributed to those suspicions by not airing the matter and explaining the circumstances which could shed light on otherwise sini-- “ster appearing events.’ | ‘The Committee has documented instances where the “CIA decided to forego passing information to the Warren
ee used for material extracted form is ta ba isc documents.) t : teeny ClA-—-contre: - 65 - Commission out of a desire to not lay bare extremely sensitive sources and methods of intelligence. The (urEnvov and LIFTREJoperations fall within that category. Classified by ce t r ivation: