‘YOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK: —NOFOR ANNEX TO APPEND. ‘X TO ENCLOSURE A - PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US M (LITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (Note: . The: courses of ac;ion which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither ‘chronologic ily nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point 2 departure for the development ' of a single, integrated, tim:-phased plan. Such a plan would - permit the evaluation of -individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated ac tions designed to lead inexorably . to the objective of adequate Justification for- US military intervention in Cuba). 1. Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate : . provocation as the basis. for ‘US military intervention ain Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 ¢, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban '. reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. our military posture throughout execution of: the plan will allow a rapid: change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies. 2 A. series of well coor inated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give germine a appearance of being done by hostile cuban forces. a. Incidents to estab. ish a credible attack. (not in : chronological order): (1) Start rumors (iiany). | tec sastostine vette, (2) Land friendly “wabans in uniform "over-the-fence" . to stage attack on base. | mo (3) Capture Cuban ‘frlendly) saboteurs inside the base. | . . oo | . (4) Start riots neir the base main gate (friendly - Cubans). | oe _ | Annex to Appendix 7. : to Enclosure A-
TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIR~ NOFORN (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires. (6) Burn aircraft cn air base (sabotage). (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations. . (8) Capture assauli teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantar amo city. (9) Capture militie group which storms the base. (10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -~ napthalene. (11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock -victims (may be lieu of. (10)). . b. United States woulc respond by executing of fensive . operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emp. acements which threaten the base, c. Commence large scale United States military operations. 3. A "Remember the Maine’ incident ‘could be arranged in several forms: a. We could blow up a.US ship in Guantanamo Bay and. "blame Cuba. | b. -We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the cuban waters. .We could arrange to cause such. incident , in the vicinity of Havan:: or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. | The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fair. .y compelling evidence that. the ship was taken.under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or nave seen the fire. The US could. follow up with an air/se. rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" pomaining members of the non-existent _ orew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave: of national indigna :lon. , . . 4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. . . | ° Annex to Appendix 8 . .to Enclosure A
“TOP SECRET SPECIAL HARDLIK™ The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking . haven in the United States. We ‘could sink. a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United states even to the ‘extent of wounding in instar. ces to be’ widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bom s in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents’ and tie release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involve nent: also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an ir responsible government. 5. A "Cuban-based,’ Castrc -supported" filibuster “eould be | simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasior of the Dominican Republic). We know that castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely “against Haiti, Dominican Reg ublic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. ‘These efforts can be magnified and - additional ones contrived fer exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitiv ity of the Dominican Air Force to Antrusions within their national air space. ““Ouban" B-26 or C-46 type aireraft could make cane-burning raids at night. - Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuben" shipments of arms which would . be found,. or intercepted, or the beach.. 6. Use of MIG type airere ft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Haz assment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aireraft by MIG type planes would be useful as ‘complementary actions. An P-86 properly painted wot 1d convince air passengers that they Baw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were. to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modity- ing an aircraft. : However, 1 easonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resourct 8 in about three months. Annex to Appendix 9 oe to. Enclosure A TOP. SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ‘NW 47874 Docla:3 age
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANE T. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft . should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air. and surface craft should be encouraged. 8. It is possible to eres te -an incident which will ‘demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a8 chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to _ Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama cr Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan -route to cross Cuba. “The passengers could be a group of college students off on a TOP a JMR. SEEREI SPECIAL HANDLING. holiday or any grouping: of fersons with a common interest to ‘support chartering a non-sek aduled flight. a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registéred aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. Ata designated ‘time the duplicate would be | substi tuted for the actual elvil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected gassengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drorie. . b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aireraft will be schedule 4 to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendez vous point the passenger - carrying aircraft will descend to. minimum altitude and go directiy ~ into an auxiliary field et Eglin ‘AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return. the aireraft to its original status. The drone aireraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight’ pian. When over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter- _ national distress frequer cy a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by de struction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal, This will allow ICAO radio - Annex to Appendix 10 to Enclosure A
“owe wouNP..SEGRET SPECIAL HAND TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN” NOFORN stations in the Western Remisphere to tell the US what has happened to the airoraft instead of the US trying to. "sell" the ineident. , , 9. It is possible to ereete an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MiGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft ‘over international waters ir an unprovoked attack. . a. Approximately 4 or 5.F-101 aircraft will be dispatched ‘in trail from Homestead (FB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission WA1l be to reverse course and simulate fakir ‘aircraft for an air defer se exercise in southern Florida. - These aircraft would coné uct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crevs would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles. off the Ciban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ar munition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the. Cuban MIGs. - b. On one such flight a pre-briefed pilot ‘would fly tail-end Charley at cons: derable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Islind this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MItis and was going down. No other calls would: be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low al ;itude and land at-a secure pase, ‘an Eglin ‘quxiliary. The alceraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored aid given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed she mission under.an alias, would resume his ‘proper identi sy “and ‘return to his normal place of business. The pilot ind aircraft would ‘then have disappeared. e.. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a 6 ibmarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately © 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew... Search shipe and aireraft could be dispatched - and parts ef aircraft fcund, . Annex to Appendix il _to Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECI HANDLIK> NOFA _ENCL SURE B FACTS BEARIN} ON THE PROBLEM i. The Joint Chiefs. of Stiff have previously. stated" ‘that US unilateral military intervention in cuba ean be "undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile “acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon’ which to base overt intervention. 2.. The need for positive 1etion in the event that current "covert efforts to foster an internal cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of ‘Staff -on 7. March 1962, as follows: Nn ee determination shat a credible internal revolt. is impossible of astainment during the next “Qe 10 months. will require 1 decision by the United States to’ develop a Cuban "provo sation" as justification for positive US military action." | 36 It is understood that che Department of State also is - preparing. suggested courses >of action to > develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba. -* JCS 1969/7303 ** JCS 1969/313 2 "| Bnelosure B - vv wo. SEGRET- SPECIAL HAND
THE JOINT «-HIEFS OF STAFF WASHIK STON 25, D.C, SMo243-62 1 March 1962 gta na MEMORANDUM “C2 THE COMMA DANT OF THE MARINE CORPS’ Subject: ‘cedure 3 to be Followed in Handling = Geltral Ychelligence Avency, State Departmcr . 21d US Infomation Agency Requests fom Doo Suporte in Connection nw vith the letivities cf the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG) (5) The Department of [:fense has been requested to be prepared to ascist the Contral Intelligence Agency, the Department of State ind the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followe i by the Services in handling - such requests for support. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: FP. J, BLOUIN: RAdm, USN Secretary . Enclosure: . | DS Subj as above EXCLUDED FROM G' EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RECRADING: DIN DIR 5200.10 DOSS NOT APPLY’ SG TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING ap mor NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 173
SPECLAL HANDEN-d HOPE THE JOINT ( HIEFS OF STAFF WASHIN 5TON 25, £.C. - ‘ oo SMe242252 _ MEHMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE Subject: Procedure: to be Followed in Handling Central Iitelligence Agency, ctate Departmen; and US Information Agency’ ’ Requeste ‘or DOD Support in vonnection with the .ctivities of the Caribbean ™ | Survey Group (CSG) (3) ~ a The Department of D:fense has been requested to be prepared to assist the C:ntral Intelligence Agency, the Department of State ind the US Information Agency in activities connected ith the operations of the Garibbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the - procedures to be followel by the Services in handling such requests for support. | For the Joint Chiefs of Staffs Cpe F. J. BLOUIN: ; RAdm, USN Secretary Emelosurer , ops : Subj as above EXCLUDED FROM s EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; COD DIR 5200.10. DOES UOT APPLY TOP SECRET SPEC AL HANDLING Nord aoe ad ‘NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 174
apAE MAE Gg GP Gah AR bIAIB aed dla Gea ° THE JOINT cHIEFS OF STAFF _WASHIE GTYON 25. 0.c, . SH~241-62 co _ 1 Karen 1962 ". MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERA'TIONS Subject: Prosedures to be Followed. in. Handling Central Intellisence Agency, State Departmert aril US Information Agency ara Sat Requests fox NOU Support in Connection a with the Activities of the Carlobeca ™.- Survey Group (C3G) (S) fhe Department of Iafense has been requested to be prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departnent of State and the US Information Agency in activities connected with the operations ef the Caribbean Survey Group. Tre enclosure sets forth the procedures to be followed by “the Services in handling 7 such requests for supnrort. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 4 F. Jd. BLOUIN RAdm, USN Secretary ° Enclosure: Subj as above EXCLUDED FROM GDS | saeeieeeemeeeesee ee EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: BOD DIP .S200.10 DOES NOT APPLY NW 47874 Docld:32276301 Page 175
SECiE SPECLIL HANDLIbG HOFORR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHIPE STON 25, O.c, Shie240-62 _ - 1 Harch 1692 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY Procedure 3 to ‘be Followed in Handling . Central Iitellizence Agency, state . Departmen; and US Information Agency Requests ‘or DOD Support in Connection with the ietivities of the Caribbean “Survey Group (C3@) (S) Subject: _ . The Department of D:fense has been requested to be prepared ‘to assist. the Cintral Intelligence Agency, the Tepartment of State and che US Information Agency in activities connected wit: the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure sets forth the orocedures to be followe 1 by the Services in handling such requests for SUPPOr 3. . ; , . For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: F, J, BLOUIN RAdm, USN - Secretary Enclospre: . [ai e Subj as above EXCLUDED FROM GDS ania} EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIZ 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY \ TOP SECRET SPEC AL HANDLING NOFORN. on e. a aad NW 47674 Doold:32276301 Page 176
Toe seer NOFORN —_ SPECIAL HANDLING : ; : Be 1 March 1962 DUN FOR TEE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT . . | Bub ject: Procedures for DOD Support of the erations: . | a | C14, the State Department, and t The Joint chiefs of Staff and Mr. Gilpatric have approved the attached paper, which is forvarded for your information. WILLIAN H. CRAIG Brig General, USA DOD/ICS Representative Caribbean Survey Group EXCLUDED FROM GOS TOP SecRer NOFORN SPECIAL. HANDLING NW 47874 Docld: 32276301 Page 177