13-0000 / 0 & esd a) EORET ara Re is highly secret and Our joint center produces great masses of telephone intercepts which are transcribed and reviewed by our small staff in Mexico City. By 9 October, the OSWALD telephone conversa- tion of 1 October had been transcribed and a summary of it cabled to Washington. The name Lee OSWALD meant nothing special to our Mexico City Station, but in their report they did judge nin to be an American male. The cabled report was received in Washington on 9 October and checked in our files, where it was inmediately noted that the Lee OSWALD phoning the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was probably the Lee OSWALD who had ~... defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and returned to the USA in 1962. On 10 October 1963, the day after the report from Mexico City, CIA Headquarters sent out a cabled report about Lee OSWALD's phone call to the Soviet Embassy 3; the report went to the FBI, the Department of State (because OSWALD was a US citizen), and to the Navy Department (because he was a former Marine. ) The cabled report to these agencies highlighted the
13-00000 liklikood that the Lee OSWALD mentioned was probably the former defector. & copy of this same cable was delivered by hand to the Immigration and Naturalization service, with which we have no cable tink. The same day a long cable went out to Mexico City informing our Station of the back- ground of defector Lee OSWALD and asking for more information. Our Station was instructed to pass its information on the phone call to the Mexico City offices of the FBI, the Embassy, the Naval Attache, and the imigre- tion and Naturalization Service. This was done. In its original report of 9 October, Mexico City had said it had a photograph of an apparent American male leaving the Soviet Embassy on 1. October 1963, the day OSWALD phone there. A very sensitive operation in Mexico City provides us with secretly taken photographs of many but not all visitors to the Soviet Embassy there, taken with telephoto lenses. Accordingly, we cabled the Navy Department on 24 October 1963 asking for a photograph of Lee OSWALD from his Marine Corps days so we could compare photos. We had not received this photograph by 22 November 1963, but in any event, it turned out that the man photographed outside the Soviet waren : Pee)
13-0000 sour = © a 3 te men, Embassy was not OSWALD anyway. As chance would have it, none of our several photo obseration points in Mexico City had ever taken an identi- fiable picture of Lee OSWALD. Our Mexico City Station very often produces information like this on US citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Mexico City. Frequently the information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we have even been able to apprehend and return to the USA American military personnel who are attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Headquarters desk requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Plans to pass the derogatory information on a US citizen to other government agencies. Derogatory information on Americans is not treated routinely; in each case the DDP or his Assistant personally scrutinize the information, make sure it is credible, and decide whether and to whom it will be passed. Only in absolute emergencies is the Mexico City Station authorized to pass such information directly to the FBI office in the U.S. Embassy. At this writing (13 December 1963) we do not know what action the FBI
13-00000 Co. geonet | and other agencies may have taken based on our report. We surmise that the FBI may have meade local. checks through Mexican authorities to see if Lee OSWALD was actually in Mexico City on 1 Octeber. Indeed, later in- vestigation has confirmed all the details of his trip, where he stayed, and what he did. To avoid crossing lines with the FBI, our Mexice Station undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now know, OSWALD left Mexico on 3 October and was no longer there when our report was put out. Since this telephone tap operation is [| the Mexicans also had the 1 October intercept on Lee OSWALD, but it apparently slumbered in their filles until the assassination took place. 22 November 1963 When word of the shooting of President Kennedy reached the offices of our operating divisions and staffs on the afternoon of Friday 22 Noven- ber 1963, transistor radios were turned on everywhere to follow the tragedy. When the name of Lee OSWALD was heard, the effect was electric. A phone message from the FBI came at about the same time, naming OSWALD
13-00000 ~~ E23 * rea Pei Basco as the possible assassin and asking for traces. The messaze was passed on at once by the Chief CI, Mr. Angleton, to Mr. Birch O'Neal of his Special Investigations Unit. Mrs. Betty Egeter of this Unit immediately recognized the name of Lee OSWALD and went for his file. At the same time, Mrs. Bustos of the Mexico Desk, who had written our first veport on OSWALD on 10 October recognized the name from radio reports and went after the same file. Mr.. Reichhardt, Mexico Desk Chief, who was home on leave, heard the news and phoned in a reminder that we had semething on OSWALD. While we were preparing a cable to Mexico City asking them for ‘ more information on OSWALD, Mexico City itself heard OSWALD's name on the Voice of America broadcast and cabled to us a reminder of the information the Station had sent in on hin. For the next week, a dozen people in the Agency were continuously engaged in handling incoming messages on the case, writing reports to be cabled out, tracing the names mentioned, and researching files. Within a week, 27 cabled reports had gone out to the White House, the State Depart- ment, and the FBI. Many cables of guidance and inquiry had been sent to
13-00000 ‘oe our overseas stations, and many pieces of information on OSWALD and his wife had been received back. The Mexico City Station researched its telephone taps very thoroughly and came up with several more conversations probably involving OSWALD, but not actually mentioning this name; these connected him also to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Several Mexicans were arrested and questioned about his activities, giving a good picture of what he was really up to. Many conferences were held with the FBI liaison officer who asked us for certain actions and passed us information from the FBI investigation. On the minus side, a host of fabricators, some anonymous, bombarded overseas embassies with spurious tips on the case, most of which we investigated. All of these are soon atecreaitea, but they are still coming in. During this phase of our work, we served primarily in support of the FBI, which was entrusted by the President with the major responsibility for the investigation. The FBI was too busy to supply us with much of its own information, but angwers were given to specific questions we posed to assist our investigation. The Department of State did photograph its entire ae
13-00000 that the wait was sometimes four or five months. The "American" hed shown the Soviets a letter showing he was a member of an organization in favor of Cuba and had claimea that the Cubans could not give him a visa without a Russian visa. Silvia DURAN rejoins that they have the same problem; the “American” is still at the Consulate; they cannot give him a transit visa unless he is assured of a Soviet visa, even though he just wants to go to Cuba to Wait there for his Soviet visa to be granted. He does not know anyone in Cuba. They end the conversation on this note. Silvia DURAN says that she will note this on his “card,” and the Soviet concludes by saying, “Besides he is not known." He excuses himself for the inconvenience he has caused and Silvia DURAN says it is all right. 28 September - Silvia DURAN calls the Soviet Embassy from the Cuban Consulate. She says that she has the American with her agein. The Soviet answering asks her to walt. When another Soviet takes up the phone > Silvia puts the American one The American tries to talk Russian to the Soviet who answers in English. The American aks him to speak Russian. The American says that he had been in the Soviet Embassy and spoken with the
1 3-00000 Consul, and that they had taken his address. The Seviet replies that he knows that. The American then says, somewhat enigmatically: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address because they have it." The Soviet invites him to stop by again and give them the address, and the American agrees to do so. (In this conversation, | the American was speaking hardly recognizable Russian. ) As fax as our records show, OSWALD did not phene the Seviet or Cuban Embassies again until Tuesday 1 October 1963. The intervening days were a Sunday and a Monday. The contents of his later calls seem to show he aid not contact the Soviets on those days. lL October, 10:31 AM ~ A man calls the Soviet Military Attache “in broken Russian and says he had been at their place the previous Saturday (28 September) and talked to their Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were anything NeW. The Soviets ask him to call another phone number and gives him 15-60-55, say~ . ing to ask for a Consul. 1 October 10345 AM ~ (This is the phone call in which OSWALD SeOgel
13-00000 a 4% eons . ae used his true name and which was therefore cabled to Washington on 9 October 1963. ) Lee OSWALD called the Soviet Embassy and announced his own name, saying he had visited them the previous Saturday and spoken with a Consul. They had said they would send a telegram to Washington, and he wanted to know if there were anything new. He did not remember the name of the Consul. ‘The Soviet, who was Embassy guard OBYEDKOV replied: "KOS TIKOY ; he is dark.” OSWALD replied: “Yes, my name is OSWALD." The Soviet excused himself for a minute and then said they hadn't received anything yet. OSWALD asked if they hadn't done anything | and the guard replied they hed sent a request but that nothing had been received as yet.” OSWALD started to say: “And what...", but the Soviet... hung up. 3 October 196 - A man speaking broken Spanish at first and then English phoned the Soviet Military Attache and asked about a visa. The Attache's office referred him to the consulate » giving the number 15-60-55. The caller wrote it down. The attache official shrugged off another
13-00000 question about whether the caller could get a visa, and the conversation ended. (There is no special reason to tie this in with OSWALD, who is now known to have re-entered the US at Laredo the same day.) Since the operation through which we tap the Soviet. Embassy phones in Mexico City is managed | | [|_| the information on Lee OSWALD also came to the attention of President LOPEZ Mateos after 22 November. The next day, 23 November, he called it to the attention of our Chief of Station, who was already working feverishly on the case. Similarly, the Mexicans noticed the involvement of Cuban Consular employee Silvia DURAN, a Mexican national. Our Station suggested that she be arrested and interrogated about OSWALD.. The Mexican authorities had the same idea and she and her husband were arrested on 23 November 1963, in the midst of a party at their home. All the guests were soon released but Silvia and her husband were questioned and released on 25 November 1963. Silvia's husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, an industrial designer, said under police interrogation that wher OSWALD was named as the assassin
13-00000 of President Kennedy, his wife ha@ recognized the name and recalled she had waited on OSWALD when he came to apply for a Cuban transit visa 3 he remembered she had said she dealt with the Seviet Consulate as well to find out whether he had @ Soviet visa. Horacio DURAN recalled his wife had said OSWALD became angry and she had to call out the Cuban Consul, Eusebilo AZCUE, to quiet him. Silvie DURAN teld the same story. She was a leftist sympathizer with @uba and had worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of cultured Relations. She recalled OSWALD well, described hin accurately, related how he had wanted a Cuban visa but ‘could not get one without the assurance of a Soviet visa, and remembered his tiff with the Consul. She admitted she had phoned the Soviet Embassy about hin. The sum total of the statements of Silvia DURAN and her husband was to confirm that OSWALD was in Mexico to get a Cuban visa so he could wait in Cuba for his Soviet visa. The Soviet Consular file passed to the State Department in Washington by the Soviet Embassy confirms a long exchange between first, Mrs. Marina OSWALD, and later her husband, and the Soviet
13-00000 - Consulate in Washington about their requests for permission to return to the Soviet Union. OSWALD was still writing to the Soviets in Washington about this as late as 9 November 1963. Silvia DURAN was arrested again on 27 November and held until 29 November. She told essentially the same story over again. Well-placed sources within the Cuban Embassy in Mexico caty stated that when Silvia DURAN was released from police arrest the first time on 25 November, she was quite pleased with herself. She told her colleagues the same story set out above, adding only that the Mexican police had threatened to extradite her to the United States to confront Lee Harvey OSWALD. The reaction within the Cuban Embassy to the news of President. Kennedy's death was sombre. To date » there is noX credible information in CIA files which would appear te link Lee OSWALD with the Cuban sovernment or the Cuban intelligence service. The whole question of whether Lee OSWALD had any secret connection with the Soviets or Cubans in Mexico cannot yet be answered, but certain parts of the evidence indicate to the contrary. Silvia DURAN and the SECRET
13-00000 found that he handled a Soviet agent who was trained to do sabotage work and that he turned this agent over to another KGB officer who is definitely known to work for the 13th Department. It is generally true in KGB work that sabotage agents are handled only by 13°Department officers. Embassy guard Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV is himself believed to be a KGB man from previous assignments as a bodyguard and sureillent. But unless some direct evidence of Soviet complicity is discovered, it is most likely that OSWALD's dealing with KGB men OBYEDKOV and KOSTIKOY was nothing more than a grim coincidence, a coincidence due in part to the Soviet habit of placing intelligence men in the Embassies in positions where they receive a large portion of the visitors and phone calls. ALL of the five consular officers in the Soviet Embassy are known or suspected intelligence officers. Certainly if OSWALD had been a Soviet agent in training for an assassination assignment or even for sabotage work, the Soviets would have stopped him from making open visits and phone calls to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico after he tried it a couple of times. Our
13-00000 experience in Mexico, studying the Soviet intelligence service at close range, indicates that they do make some mistakes and are sometimes insecure in their methods, but that they do not persist in such glaring errors. Sone insight on the Cuban attitude toward the arrest of Silvia DURAN and the involvement of the Cuban Consulate in the OSWALD case can be gained from two intercepted phone calls made between Cuban President | Osvaldo DORTICOS and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico J oaquin HERNANDEZ Armas on - 26 ‘November 1963, the day after Silvia DURAN was released from her first arrest. At 09:40 AM that morning, President DORTICOS phoned the Ambassador from Havana and asked him several questions about a report which the Ambassador haa sent in on the arrest of Silvia DURAN and the Lee OSWALD =... case. The whole conversation is consistent with the theory that OSWALD merely wanted a visa. The Ambassador did mention the altercation which OSWALD had with Consul AZCUB, and he says that Mexican police bruised Silvia DURAN's arms a little shaking her te impress her with the importance of their questions. They had asked her if she had been intimate with OSWALD and she had denied it. President DORTICOS twice asked Ambassador
13-00000 HERNANDEZ whether the Mexican police hed asked Silvia DURAN questions about “noney, " and the President apparently wanted to know whether the Mexicans thought the Cubans had paid OSWALD money. HERNANDEZ insisted the Mexicans had not offered Silvia DURAN money, and DORTICOS gave us trying to put acrosa his point. President DORTICOS instructed HERNANDEZ to keep on questioning Silvia DURAN and to phone him back. At 7:39 PM that evening Ambassador HERNANDEZ did call President DORTICOS back, saying he had questioned “that person” again and she has nothing new to add. President DORTICOS returns te the issue of whether “g “they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had given money to the manti"that American." But Ambassador. HERNANDEZ persists in misunderstanding DORTICOS, answas in the negative, and says: “Absolutely nothing was given to her." DORTICOS seems to give up, and the conversation dies out after a few more general remarks. We do not know for sure what made President DORTICOS press for informa- @ tion about Cuban money passed to OSWALD, but rumors were current in Mexico and even, we understand, in the USA, that OSWALD had returned from Mexico
13-00000 City with about $5 5,000. Perhaps DORTICOS was trying to learn whether the Mexican police believed that the cubans had financed OSWALD. In any event » the Cuban Government sent the Mexicans a stiff note of protest over the arrest and detention of Silvia DURAN, but the Mexicans rejected the note.