157-10014-10227 v9.1 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: - TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS :; CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK Assassination System Date: Identification Form Agency Information SSCIA 157-10014-10227 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE 07-M-132 Decument Information SSCIA DAWSON, R. DIEM 06/00/1975 157 CIA COLBY, WILLIAM VIETNAM KENNEDY, JOHN DIEM, ASSASSINATION SUMMARY Declassified 1B;1C Redact 05/05/2000 CC Box 133 HW 450955 Docld: 32423615 Page 1 TTH2015
Date 08/08/95 Page 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION . AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157~-10014-10227 RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M~-132 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : DAWSON, R. TO : TITLE : DIEM DATE : 06/00/75 PAGES : 157 . SUBJECTS : VIETNAM DIEM, ASSASSINATION COLBY, WILLIAM CIA KENNEDY, JOHN DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY . CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99 OPENING CRITERIA : : CC Box 133 COMMENTS {[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 Docld:327473615 Page 2
At Ps atten cates, SLO AEE \ WI 4 Ns 0955 Docld: 32423615" Page 3
AH Gn 2 PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: HicCone Nina eat Coloy Hillsman Kennedy, John F. ‘Tung ce gues ate, artes IMM NCD WicNamarra Diem al ee ‘Lodge Sayer & aE x OCCURRENC™: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants dbeing MeCene and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that cLodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented phat he believed that we should move cautiasly, that we should talk seriously to Diem mand that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic ‘view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach ebe made toNhuito seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real atic with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the inssancs Involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week. 2G Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22 DATE: Dawson 6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: KENNEDY, JOHN F. CATEGORIES: KENNEDY, ROBERT F. 5 Oct 1963 DIEM VA ce em on RERLEA MC CONE, JOHN ; ARAM Fé: PIOOG cceds AH OCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when the telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent Mto Saigon, MC CONE was called over by PRESIDENT KENNEDY and met privately with PRESIDENT S KENNEDY and the Attorney General, ROBERT F, KENNEDY, and took the position that the CIA “should take a hands off position as far as the assassination of DIEM was concerned. MC CONE mj felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reser- g@ Vations concerning DIEM and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we ® could on DIEM to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My pre- “cise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I _ was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if DIEM was removed we would have not one coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and it might. last several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would be SOURCE: STAFF: aire ————" RR, DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, Friday, June 6, 1975, McCone, Vol. 1, 2 of 4 parr: — 29 June 1975 FILE: pp. 62~32 mm eM ERY EP LICE cet ERD GEN SEE cnt EE Sst ie GHD CRD) ahh Ste erm som tee EERE EERD EET GEN “END GEN tE PAS Gat COUEE RE eS med ctr me GED Sa GED EE GED EE RE GEOG ND DD SGD te AY GD ES USS SE eseh steer wesh eeth Sn SEELD Seush ere! ster pte unt enter SEBO itty ROD fctbe sth cE ahr PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: Card 2 of 2 . OCCURRENCE: more stability if DIEM could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him and hope that some group of generals could run the country better." SOURCE: HTT. NATE
[ memeaeenpeaenneeamnaeel a >ALVd NOSMVC ‘H uteuog *G/6T ‘og aume ‘TOSS ‘sBupreay tata vs tA OUNOS G2 *d *SaATJeUIEYTe |yy JO SUO SeM 4eUL ,,"WATC daay pue NHN pue NVO eJeUTUFTS Of SEM SUBAU SAT JeUIaITe ay Jo suo 4eUy AES PTP HNIW TWHNTD autd qeuy WW "NHN HNIC ODN pue weujetA Tedquad ut PaoT dem ayy sem CUM ‘NYO HNIG ODN JO UOTYeUTWTTA ayy aq pTnom ay “suTyyAue op you pmMoo fauy gt —- SEM STUL ‘WIC JO Jou sem UOTJeUTSSEeSsE STU, *UOTJeuTssesse Jo AITTTQTssod ayy DaucTAUSW Pey Jepeat eB 4eUI AUT] SIT au. sem STU “seapT [elauad aaruy peUuTTINO osTe 3H "yej4a,p dnood 9uq yreqys 03 JuSuMLTaACT *S'p 9Uuq quem JOU PTP eH *4e49,p dnoo ayy uy uoTyedpotysed *s*n quem jou pTp ATTenjoe ay ‘ques TyuaNAD 3uy 3eUM, 42 *d ,*Tnyssaoons usaq pey dnoo ayy saqye pte otmou0Da pue AXVYTT TW Of sawod 4T AIaUM Zed ayy UT ATTeOTsTOEds ‘Buyyoeq ueotseuy Jo pamsse aq 04 pejuem Aayun 69e98,p dnoo Pasosuods uedTiauy Ue aq O04 STU4 JUeM 4,UpTp Asuy 4eU4 *4e93,p dnod e aq o4 Suto sem ausauy yeu, “Spey pey Aoyy Jeu au 07 pauTeTdxe HNIW DT ‘auTy 3eUI 4W,, . ‘Suaqrenbpesu s,HNTW Ie Teswpy Aq OS PTP Pue HNIW DIG JoeqUCD 04 Payse sem NTANOO ‘£96T ‘ ~£_ 4090990 UD :FONANHNDDO NHN HNIC OON £96T NVO HNIC OON H7-€ 1aqo4oQ NTYNOO TWHANSD “HNTA > SITHODMLVO >SULVG > SHTLELLNA/SNOSUd GLOT SUN 62 SAT YG aT "09 ‘d Sauogow “GL6T “9 sunr NOSMYd °Y ‘S0UeSTTTSIUL 3aqyTuMl0g yaTEg aqeuag aIOyaq PTSYy Supreay Scan *dOUNOS Hid ‘ . oY 4 y , we No ell} ace i oi ey od CO ,’ queuyreday ayeqg UTM parvaTo useq sey aves -sau stup-ttet riots Aue UO ddUeSTTTAaqUT UT peqsarequT ATTeInqyeu am SJaaamoly] *“Jjo spueu st yoraidde qseq aaat—Taq SATQuenbasuog *o4a Saup@ar yo qroddns aa ‘srayjo ar uoTqtTsod uno jo saqaid uoy ATT See 004 Joop suado z8y7eU sTuy UO UoTI;sod Supe Aq saatTesammo BurZes up sae tt -3q 3M ‘WiTq Jo uot yeuTssesse UOAeT JOU pPTNOM ATuUTe LIE. aM ‘aspaTmouy Tetyzed usas saTaoar qUSTU aM USTUM JO TyearuZ Yons AraAa Butddo4s Joy eTqtsuodsazr Aem ou UT are om SpuRU TAO ay} uO 4nq ‘uot yeUuTSsesse Buyqucddns uo ‘Butacaudde ‘Bupyemmurgs jo uotyrsod auy up eq you -ueo ATUTeIIS80 3q «6*Sdnoals esareujeTA BuPpueqUOD SNOPETeA Jo Aue Jo suoTyoe soy AITTTqTsuodsar ou ZuTAey JO uoT4Tsod 04 BupYyOTAS are SM VEU TBSTO ST YT 4eUd OS SUTT OU ST SUTT 4Saq Teqauas ul “SupTpueu TnyJareo 4soul SUOTSSNOSTP UOTYeUTSSesse SASTTOg,, :adessau BupPMOTToy 2u3 NODIVS SuppnToup “suoyyeooT aos oF *4uUeS ANOO OW “E96T °G 1990900 UO :F5nquuNDDO €96T 900 G |: War WY 50955 Bopid:324736015 Page 6 a WHId < re NHOC —NOO OW *SHIYODaLYS *SaLvd >SHILILNA/SNOSHSd
(EWE eter et merece er Se A RY NET SR CR EP ED CEE E'S SNE EY EY SRE WEY SER ene ne “ATTA GL°9°82 =: ALG UOSMEd :aaWVaS Gt “d **9 qareg S/96T INOdTH “D°I saa uINOS (ST) a’ **TFejep STQeiap~suoo saey Acu pUe STOT Sf) STeEME NAD YEUY AQNOP SeTIIIT ST adayy**'sooroy Jo aouepegq quaTotTyjns aaey jou pTp pue Apesl Teay Jou PIP STVHANAD’ ‘+ peustuty sp dnoo asetnotyzred stuy,, :sdeadde adessali SUTMOTTOS 3u4 “(6610 DIVS) uosTeg wouy eTqeo yIO ‘C96T STE gsngny ue uz - aos * TONAYH NOOO STVUINGD SSAWVNDATA a Wald E961 “sny TE uoT}ze4g UuoTTes - VIO *SdTYOOu.LVO *SaLVd > SULLILNAY/SNOSYUad BY 50955 Bocld:32423615 Page 7
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DEPTEL 256 DATES: CATEGORIES: RICHARDSON TAYLOR LODGE ; 29 Aug. 1963 f DIEM) eye SPERA HARKINS Sy CONEIN TRUEHEART MINH WEED, Gen. Richard G, cane Chief of Staff, MAG anne CARD 1 of 2°! CCURRENCE: On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities as follows: a SO ees "At O745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact GENERALS MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to GENERAL HARKINS stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WHITE HOUSE and com- menting that second thoughts were beginning in Washington. Faced with this information and «= Siven strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting, with GENERALS MINH and KHIEM should not be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH, ahed GISECFZE:PEOOd ¢GsE0c AH "When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't.) STAFREF: - REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12 Dawson DATE: 28.6.75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: CCURRENCE: we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON advised him of our meeting with GENERAL WEEDE, of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which RICHARDSON had made as a result of the TAYLOR cable. LODGE was angry and expressed the view that RICHARDSON's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying, out a coup. RICHARDSON expressed a firm dissenting opinion." (12) SOURCE: : | SEREP: ; ——— PILE +
uosMed :FTyTS 6 "d SO) qaeg ©J96T IMOdH ‘DTT SFDunoOS (6) ws°SSOT JO UTM SuoT{IOe UMO UTeUq ATadT4quy "aqeqs jo demod SuTumsse Jo uoTqoe TeT4TuT Sutamp drtay Aue jo aq qouueo OM, i quauUOD STyy sntd “Cy2 Thidyd JO eoueysqns ayy A@auod 03 pe{oedTP sdomM Weds PUe NISINOO *HNVHW 2988 P[NOM VYHdS Jeu PUP WHIHM 88S PTNOM NIGNOO 9eU3 Peete sem 4T ‘UOT Zeuado dU UT MOUs you prnoys puey TeTOT JO UeoTueuly ayy Jey PSPTOSp YORVSSVENW 2u4 7eUQ squodez NOSCHVHOTY “(nOEO DIVS) uodpes wou eTqeo yIO B UT ‘€96T ‘92 Ysnny UO HONSTHY ND PO be Do Velaelts | ; WITH i D asd UOUTeS UE Je0TJJO yIO ‘NTYNOO : Wwitad = j . Eye ThLdeld qoqeg Aqualy “YodOT a €96T “Sty 92 HNVEDI uYor “NOSCIVHOLY *SHTYODALVO { Sava > SHTLILNA/SNOSUAd SL°9°8@ SFL Sata MOSMed dd VALS 8 “d *D 4aed “LO6T TMOdTY “O'L aunOS i = a ba] Ms 1h to Ag ca od a (8) “W4Id HNIC ODN & JNACTSHYd ASAWVNIGLA HEAOS 04 STeETQUapedo STU paquesaud ASdOT Yodyssvany “€O6T “92 qeriiny Ug ba OOS ET GR ete, pene “Ton, : a eas . —— * FONAYHNI 5 ir ch : i. ' WAI ‘Apyata | ©96T asnenv ge qoge) Adual] “TOCIOT *SHIYODSRLVO *SaLvd ee et tnnnene nen me ces ane HW 450955 >SATLTLNT/SNACuT F
aa ~ERSONS /enT rts. RICHARDSON, John DATES: CATEGORIES: DIEM 25 August 1963 LODGE, Henry Cabot CIA TRUEHAR YD, Willian ote Poa hPL LB » GENERAL, nad no Washingto, RICHARDSON Bives headquarterg REPORT 7 Part ¢ ee ee Page il O955 Bocld: 32473615 HY 45
ae eee AL PERSONS/ENTITIFS: . CATEGORIES: HARRIMAN, Averell KENNEDY, John F. HILSMAN, Roger ° ‘TAYLOR, Maxwell . DIEM v McCONE, John (Mil. ass't to re ae SO , McNAMARA, Robert Pres. ) i fhe py ey tut RUSK, Dean GILPATRIC, Roswell] coarp 1 ee tye nh Heh (ip f OCCURRENCE: ned The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains the following description of the events of August 25, 1963, from a book by MARGUERITE HIGGINS: "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek tramedy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evenine of Aupust 24, 1963, a date made more sipnificant because it was a Saturday. .Washineton usually-empties on summer weekends or lapses into a somolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation. "The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON. It was drawn up at a meeting called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task force. The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CIA DIRECTOR JOHN McCONE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation. (con't) SOURCE: STAFE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 5-6 Dawson a oy FILE: 6. PERSONS/ENTITIES: = | DATES r ~AUEGORTES ; (lusa (cont) { bit hope. - me 7 Na i AL i eSiE bir 4 fh i = (CARD 2 of 4) SPS TAR Re A [beg OCCURRENCE: SECRETARY OF STATE. DEAN RUSK was attending, a baseball mame in New York. PRESIDENT KiSNNEDY was at Hyannis Port. GIENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over and the telegram long on its way. "| the cable proved historic. For the first time it gave the signal to _ tunleash' the Vietnamese military, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which the generals had been talking for so many years. e " the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy of one war at a time. It envisaged the generals! making war on their own government, and with the implicit blessing of the United States. "The substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.) Docld:324273615 Page 12 HW 50955
ee PER RSENS /ENTIRIES: “DATES: ; CATEGORIES: . Yo ele " m be kg i (CARD 3 of ised meh Ae CCURRENCE: 20 persuade DIEM to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and eestore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law. And if, as the cable antici- vated, DIEM would not, do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIETNAMESE GENERALS and tell them that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt. " . the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday 2vening after being cryptically summarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at lyannis Port. "The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC . . . had the cable described © him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC says he was frankly surprised that such an (con't.) PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: Piew foot f OCCURRENCE: important set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not fe ati sught to veto the telegram since . " net tat he . it had the ‘approval of the PRESIDENT, ' "In McCONE's absence, the cable was described . again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS JEPUTY DIRECTOR of the CIA, who also did not feel dis osed to veto s ng! , +he PRESIDENT. '" (5-6) ° Onerning ‘approved by CARD 4 of 4 on nf! hha Nai aii ... nan hee Leh Cty? 4. (yeu ee a AB by BW 50955 Docld: 327473615 Page i3
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN) NHU . DIEM pePrer. 243 24 August 1963 OCCURRENCE: 1 hy = EF ee? iz ns may Tah Be ~ oan) s 7 In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, 'thée*f ame sake! apiedned; "The DEPARTMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation in which power lies in NHU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM himself may have to go. The AMBASSADOR is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions apainst BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that the USG cannot support a DIEM repime that includes the NHU's and that ‘we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central .overnment mechanism;' (3) to make statements in Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids." — "The telegram includes the following statement: 'The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (con't.) SOURCE: OPAFF: Dawson T.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 4-5 DATE: 28.6.75 FILE: PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: OCCURRENCE: (con't from card 1) we might bring about DIEM's replacement if this should become necessary. You will under- Stand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this opera— tion should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to achieve our objectives.'" (4-5) . CARD 2 of 2 Docld:324273615 Page 14 HW 50955
PEKSONS/ENTLLIES 2 DATES: CATEGORIES: Thich Tri Quang Aug. 21, 1963 | Diem. Y/Y Diem , oh CCURRENCE: en ‘bes Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her off xperiences, was more a political command post than a holy place. It was the headquarters “from which the militant f Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political war against the Diem regime. According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two of us. Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconciliate the Buddhists. (Page 181) SOURCE: our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, STAFF: Dawson Harper and Rowe FILE: DATE: July 3, 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIFES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: [GENERAL T TON THAT DINH, MELITARY Vaan GOVERNOR OF SAIGON, COMMANDER 3RD | 21 august 1963 DIEM CORPS | CONEIN rages Bort NGO DINH NHU ____ AMBASSADORP: NOLTING OCCURRENCE: "On the n night oF the olst of August, GENERAL TON THAT DINH, as military gov- ermor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps, has established a curfew. If I recall correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody seen afte: that time would be -—- shot. And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard of NGO DINH H NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon. What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador LODGE was on his way to take over". op. 21 SOURCE: START: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON BW 50955 Docld: 37473615 Page i5
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: “Milting, Ambassador Aug. 21, 1963 Diem —~ Lodge, Ambassador Diem . Thich Tri Quang OCCURRENCE: Higgins claims that "...the raids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam." Higgins goes on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this time was because: "It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many consessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem propaganda explosion, it would be less PeAESE Saree the United States if they took ala e when the new Ambassador was tA fdent of Vietnam. For the same reasons greneieie was taken not | to inform the United States of the pagoda plans. The yeasoning was that Washington could be blamed for something about whic ‘Fynewnothing ." (page 183) SOURCE: ny STAFF: DATE: FILE: PERSONS/ENTITLES: | DATES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN, CIA officer (Saigon) DON, General 8/21/63 DIEM OCCURRENCE: Bal te bik Rew? Ss ty p f a 4K Vi) ae On August 21, 1963, at a meeting between CONEIN’ [An officer of the CIA Saigon station) and General DON, the latter asked for US. government assurances of support -2satearneces-ofsupport for moves against the DIEM regime." (3) — SOURCE; 1967 I.G. Report, Part CL p3. . RD FTLE: ~ DATE: LIMO se BW 50955 Docld: 37473615 Page 16
GENERAL DON AMBASSADOR NOLTING July 1963 CONEIN OCCURRENCE: On July H, 1963, CONEIN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public meeting and the hotel was jemmed packed. CONEIN states that: "It was at that time on the 4th of July that I nad the first indication that something serious was being comtemplated, when. GENERAL DON t: me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning. i ported this fact, and I believe it was around the 8th or 9th of July, that more indi- cations...." po. 20. PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: - | CATEGORIES: ! } SOURCE: STAFF: R. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein DATE: FILE: - 30 June 1975 ERSONS/ENDITIES? ~~ | CDAIRES:: CATEGORIES: EN. DUONG VAN MINH EN. TRAN VAN DON Ad. GEN. LE VAN KIM EN. TRAN THIEN KHTEM,___ _ OCCURRENCE: The tutiol Con Wi “oe C. ceusted below + af o ie - Alempt v. 5G3 é rock bute { he oh bershan Goth-4 . iba chen id Gots “ 1 ore’ o ; vavpeh $ise@ se bun POW), CoS "SOURCE: STAPF: ? iced,” SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, 2" Dawson ‘ ~ : e ran . me y EY?T@. ~ DARE: 6/30/75 WW 50955 Docld:3274233615 Page if
aes PERSONS/ENY DEA Ino 3 | 7/63 —— GEN, MINH NGO DINH WHU aed) Woetd reek, “STAPF? Dawson — Hearings, 5.5.C.1.,; 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page ten. DATE? 6/30/75 PILE: CATEGORIES: In SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the situation in South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared: "if -- as is likely -~ Dien fails to carry oub truly and promptly the conmitment he has made to the Buddhists, disorders will probably flare again and the chanu-s of coup or assassina- tion attempts against him become even better. . . We do not think . the €ommunists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some combination of his non ommunist opponents. A non mmunist successor regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but, given continued support from the U. S., could provide re easonably effec — tive leadership for the government and the war effort." (1-2) SOURCE: 1967 TT.) Renant nant A anln? WW 50955 Docld:327433615 Page 18
PERSONS/ENTITIUS: | DATES: CATEGORIES: peeves bese Zone | DIEM May 6, 1963 DIEM THICH TRI QUANG , OCCURRENCE? — Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic-- having any precedence over the National Vietnamese flag in public places :or in public view. Higgins does not doubt that the Vietnamese government's decision ‘to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti- Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the Nati aliVietnamese flag on view being sometimes tattered and torn and few in number. (9 ‘2 val SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,} STARR: 1965 : Dawson, R. FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN | i164 DIEM <~ MADAME NHU OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be Buddhists. And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in. light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish some mustard at a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. ‘This made people want to identify themselve: against the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas. CONEIN did not know whether or not this became the principal reason for the United States wanting to get rid of the regine. pp. 42-44, SOURCE: STAPF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON PILE: DATE: Tester 7 TAT Docld:32473615 Page 19 HW 50955
TRUEHEART, WILLIAM June 1963 MECKLIN, JOHN (Dir. USIA) NOLTING, AMBASSADOR PERSONS /ENTITIES: DATES : | CATEGORIES: H 4 ; ? | OCCURRENCE: Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue was to "urge Diem to repair all Buddhist grievances forthwith, to accept responsibilit for the May 8 killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting Hue himself to do so.'' (Ambassador Nolting was on a Meditterranean vaction at the time.) . "According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from Washington, 'direct,relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government...' In despair Trueheart in June resorted to a formal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures (police effort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), t e, United States would be forced to disassociate itself publicly from such actions, -asind @ did two months later. The warning was a momentous step. It amounted-sto? ck roftrvtial command from i 3 ‘aula wey nek STAFFER: SOURCE ; -- Dawson, R. Row, 1965 | pate: July 2, 1975 27%, FILE: - | CATEGORIES: PERSONS/ENTITIES: | | DATES: OCCURRENCE: (continuation) the United States. Public disassociation could have disasterous results, encouraging the Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regimes foreign critics... perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup'' (100) SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, AN Docld:324273615 Page 20 HW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: | CONEIN "Summer 1963" } DIEM we NHU, NGO DINH MADAME, NHU CAN, NGO DINH OCCURRENCE: coNEIN stated that the attacks in May in Hue followed up by on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of the seen Ses by making them become a political entity which they had never been before. CONEIN state that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAIB and JNSPAU, as well as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power of the ever ment at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME NHU, the chief o : the womens' solidarity movement. DIEM was felt to be out of touch with reality and tt fe - ting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp. 44-45 iy SOURCE: STAFF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein DATE: ” R. DAWSON | ae July 1, 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN DIEM ee "middle May OCCURRENCE: CoNEIN said that the DIEM could not understand their doing so. chance to get out of it and get out of it very gracefully within the 8th of May incident in HUE by meeting the demands of paying off the families of those people who were killed when the military attacked the pagodas in Hue If this woul . d have been done, I think that we would have been much better off This was i the political situation....", pp, 41-W2 * fuming point of government started the Buddhist antagonism but He gave his personal opinion as that "they had a the first two weeks after SOURCE: ~ TAFF;: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein mT Tom. R. DAWSON BW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 21
PERSOHUS/ENEIVIES : DATINS : CATEGORIES: DIEM wY/ DIEM | May 8, 1963 MAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp.?) OCCURRENCE | "Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation of the Hue affairs. For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical conmission led by Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a man of integrity by the Americans.)'' The commission also included the Surgeon General of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance. After extensive interrogation of witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of the deaths on May 8. ay "At the time, nonetheless, Diem' 5 regime claimed that plastic bob uSed the deaths was widely ridiculed. The = ~ 7. te - . @ incidence. The American con- pthe government's Giiprts to place ete ae SF Sv “ye soar Dawson, R. July 2, 1975 iis to sul had been out 6 of town bu he ten al hal ee So ae on OD POSE “« a Our Viet Nam Nightnare, “Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965 DATE: FILE: PERSONS/ENTITIES : pares: — | CATEGORIES * | May 8, 1963 ° DIEM VA a . art Nguyen, Van Bang later at the trial of Major'Dang Sy said that "While we were inside, two loud explosions ‘suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the sounds of broken glass, gunshots, and-exploding hand grenades."' In the confusion Major Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air. Unfortunately this was the prearranged signal authorizing his troops to use grenades to disperse the crowds. At least 15 of these grenades were throw and the explosions caused at least 8 dead at the radio station. (95) This statement though, appears to be in conflict with later medical evidence coming from the Interior Minister which ‘found that none of the bodies of the dead had metal THICH TRE QUANG NGUTEN VAN BANG (Province Chief) | MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV. CHIEF) OCCURRENCE: splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla." (95-96) SOURCE: —— STAPF : Qur Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, ; Dawson, R. 1965 PILES: DATE: July 2, 1975 Docld:324273615 Page 22 HW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES ; | DATES: — 4 CATEGORIES: aaa renner : ee j ea | ores | THICH TRI QUANG ' | May 8, 1963 NGUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief) - MAJOR DANG SY (Asst. Province Chief) OCCURRENCE: According to Higgins on May 8, 1963 on the, ddhist birthday Thich Tri Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags. About 8 pm Thich Tri Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then made the demand upon the director of the station to play. He was refused. Thich Tri Quang proceeded to encourage an already active angry crowd which in the middle of this oration began to shout and press forward. The director of the station called up Nguyen Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would fighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd. Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94) STARE: SOURCE Our Viet Nam Niehtnare, Higgins, Harper and Row, F 1965 Dawson, R. FIL | DATE: July 2, 1975 PERSONS/ENTIVIEFS: DATES: CATEGORIES: Diem “a Trich Tri Quang Diem OCCURRENCE: "No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam. If there had been, assuredly the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world. Complaints of alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quant and his accomplices in a campaign of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented no more than the early activity of determined propagandists. Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and techniques of governing." ANTI AIT ee WW 50955 Docld:327473615 Page 23
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: bien ¥ Colby feo, Vinh Can 10/65 Conein ha OCCURRENCE: Colby explained that a couple of weeks before the assassination the thought of assassination was not aimed at Oiem but at Sha and Caan, Dien's two brotuers who were considered the evil influence of the sovernnent. The idea of removing Mhu from Vietnam was one that was discussed in great sletail ind a great deal of pressure was put on Diem to send his brother out of the country." “At one point I made a sugrestion that perhaps T could con- vince him of the desirability of Leaving the country for the benefit of iis own, of the country itself, That IT could £0 over and argue him into Gt) Phat 7 think is the separable thing From the actual decis sion to shoot Dien. Po think the decision to shoot Diem was a conscience decision taken bv the enerads: hich came as a very new development durine the coup, but let's face Con r 1 oyyr ahaa ah ie ined f+ I rae a government, Paces 55-34 hearines, SSCL, June 20, 1975, Colby PERSONS/ENTITIES: : | CATEGORIES: 11/2/63 Dien ~~ | my, Heo Dinh mein nh OCCURRENCE: mein stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassina- on was there a discussion of the hilling of Dien. Further, there had never ‘en any discussion at any time ahout Diem himself being killed by anyhbod:. | fact, the generals and many people wanted Diem to be around but they could it stand Nhu and Madame Nhu, Diem's wife. Page 64-66, SOURCE: ; STAFF: ~~" Hlearings, SSC » Conein, June 20, 1975 Dawson 32423615 Page 24 Bocld BW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: COLBY, WILLIAM . MINH, GENERAL , 1 November 1963} DIEM / Niw OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "Apparently the decision by several of the generals, the ones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent an officer, a small armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in the other vart of town. He and his brother were put in an armored personnel carrier with an officer, a young Vietnamese who was an aide to GENERAL MINH, head of the coup group, and they went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier arrived back at head- quarters, the two were dead and had been shot several times. That officer, incidentally, and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently/when this junta of generals was chao about two months later. Somebody took that. occasion to shoot him." pp. “19. Se SOURCE: ee STARE? RR. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 16-19 DATE: PILE: pedal 29 June 1975 PERSONS/ENTIRIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: DIEM | May 7, 1963 | pre wa THICH TRI QUANG aay i OCCURRENCE: The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached’Hue on May 7, 1963. Since the city was already bedecked with flags the Vietnamese Minister-of Interior, Vui Van Long, arriving in Hue on‘the same date as the circular arrived ts to the Bud- dhist leaders and explained thatthe flag regulation would not b6enforced. '"The leaders of the monks were very pleased," said Minister Long. ''They,4 ned*to me and told me that I had given complete satisfaction to their desiresa€ \Q ang was present during this exchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the ayrangement not to enforce the regulation. Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief could - reverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, according to Higgins was that Kuang sent aifew monks around to tell the people to haul down the flags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministers actions. "The monks weré told to tell the population that this was being done as a SOUNCE: PESelT of Diem wis rete ts bar Hee —“badethist Weg "O-$ res) SEER, “Our Viet Num Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,;  ——*ODawson, R. 1965 | PILE: : ;DATE: July 2, 1975 BW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 25
PERSONS/ENTITIES: , DATES: CATEGORIES: McCone = Diem DIEM ~~ Kahn H 7 OCCURRENCE: In responce to, a question as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate Mr. Diem and“ *© had sent a telegram jn conjunetio ‘that suggestion, McCone testified that he did not think it was Mr. Diem, OME CESCLEPER that "there was a prog 2sal, one of a number of proposals, in connection with the diffigult political situation that = existed in South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination . Nhu and General Kanh.... when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down" (4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations. 4e were really at war there. My opposition was more on the basi s of considered judgement that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final an alysis solve any problem.", (5). SOURCE: TARE ¢ MeCone, June 6, 1975 Gordon Rhea DATES 6727/75 BW 50955 Docld: 32423615 Page 26
PERSONS/ENTEIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: LANSDALE ALAN DULLES Mar 16, 1960 | MONGOOSE . SPECIAL GROUP DIEM CCURRENCE: On March 16, 1960 at the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans to use the base radio at Guentameo Bay to expand the stations listening audience. VIETNAM Mr. DULLES Referred to the worsening security situation in South Vietnam... and commented that this appears to be_a situation where S. F. training might be in order. DULLES asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. LANSDALE to visit the area to assess the situation on the spot." DULLES also discussed briefly "the possibility of assisting the South Aiietnam government to mount guerrila operationsin the north." SOURCE: HUE p., STAFF: OO Bay fhm FEE tn Minutes of Special Group Negping, Maren 16, 1960. KELLEY TER. | aro DATE: FILE: 2 4 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: PEROONS/ENTITIES DATES: L CATEGORIES: Lansdale May 12, 1960 Diem Dulles Special Group Hare Irwin OCCURRENCE: On May 12, 1960, the $ from President Diem "that he assumed tha pecial Group discussed the subject of the invitation for General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam. Mr. t the way in which Diem would like to use Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U. S., could no doubt be made. On to carry out whatever i Sy Hare said General » but that some adjustments Mr. Dulles said that "Lansdale could be counted nstructions he had in a manner least calculated to upset Diem." “Eas Abe Ch, . 4 ha HY Ey cw My wie fey oy Ee eg SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group mee STAFF: Bob Kelley FILE: DATE: June 29, 1975 WW 5094545 Docld: 32423615 Page 28
» ORSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: “STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM J NGO DINH NHU 1962 ' DIEM i MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-~GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, COLBY, HARKINS WESTMORELAND, GENERAL . OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "In 1062 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTER © THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM to be responsible for liaison between CIA and th, MINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. The idea for this program was that of NHU, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security withi: hamlets and villages in order ‘35 ‘the people could deny access of food and taxes to the VIET CONG. In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspic of the MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and including small sections." p. 17. CONEIN. "This was done with the permission of GENERAL HARKINS an it was known to GENERAL WESTMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18. SOURCE: STARE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein «< R. DAWSON FILE: DATE: 30 June 1975 IK - PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: Maxwell Taylor Special Group Aug - 27 Sept 62 MOONGOOSE Diem] OCCURRENCE: - a Taylor states that the Special Group and the Sencial Group Augmented considered a proposal by -IA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic REpublic of Vietnam. This had een prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Nefense. raylor added that the Special Group aéked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. (t was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support of this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of attle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. | SOURCE * Maxwell Tay lor. $< Sept 27, 1962." ¢ —— PGW BTLE: names G/IQLTG BW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 29
CAITTEGOKIIS: DIEM vA PERSONS/ENETTIRG: | DATES: CONEIN February 1962 | | CCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. ‘This was not the first indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was th: political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un- able, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the military structure. ‘This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17. SOURCE: “STAFF: Hearings, SSCL, June 20, 1975, Conein i R. DAWSON i DATE: FILE: 30 June 1975 WW 50955 Docld:327433615 Page 30
PERSONS/ENPIPIFS : DATES | CATEEGORIE ‘ | | CONETIN Febru ary 1963 DIEM J OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. ‘This was not the first indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was th: political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un- able, at this time, to determine this fact. ‘There was an isolated dissidence within the military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17. SOURCE: Hearines, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein | R. DAWSON at FILE: 30 June 1975 WW 50955 BDocld:324273615 Page 31
PERSONS/ENTIPVIES: | DATES: | J “ues DLE oo 1963 ; DIEM : . } { OCCURRENCE: "Most manifestations of political oppostion,' wrote Henderson, “were vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elections were far from free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime bore the the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's people with the forms and substance of democracy, but...Diem had still to prove that his professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165) ..¢ SOURCE: STAFF: Row, 1965 Dawson, R. FILE: ee PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: NGO DINH CAN 1963 | DIEM / MINISTER OF INTERIOR COoNnein: . | CATEGORIES: en nc nn eee ~ OCCURRENCE: - a=" CONRIN stated that: "On May 7, 1963,..... "The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself ¢ his entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam. While in Hue, it was on my aircraft that I. assigned to me for that day --: while in Hue, they had a very large meeting of different military authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on. They had met w the President's brother, NGO DINH CAN who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some decisions were made, of wnich I was not aware of (sic). We returned quite late the night the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR told me it. would be impossi I wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Budda. I wanted to see burt boats wit’ the candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there wa. an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists: At that time, the Buddhists as an ent." was not a political force and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Budd came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening 7” AN R. DAWSON < bel Be Re Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein:../ Docld: 324273615 Page 33 HW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: LODGE, weary CABOT 1963 DEIM ~ | | CONEIN | | OCCURRENCE: ...-l worked for Ambassador LODGE. I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I re- ceived my instructions from Ambassador LODGE. They were cable instructions, he had a very good habit of not reading something. He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained to you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know wh: was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instruc: tions, do you understand them? Yes, sir; allright, we'll carry them out." p. 23 SOURCE: STAFF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON PILE: DATE: 20 June 1975 » PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN 1963 | DIEM .— cotin tafe Al Mat: OCCURRENCE: "I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25 SOURCE: | STAFF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON FILE: DATE: ine 20 FQ7G Docld:324273615 Page 34 HW 50955
PEHSONS/ENTULIES : Dawson National Security Council - State Dent DATES: | CATEGORIES: 1963 OCCURRENCE : Colby stated that the policy of the chain of command wanted a determination whether it be by the Security Council or by other authority is made to carry out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council to the ambassador. "The ambassador is the President's representative and has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an important question like this (the Diem coup) would be passed to the ambassador tohandle. "Now, the other. avencies in town would be informed of the policy directive that we macht have additional communication as to the details as to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through directive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and in- mediately under the control of the ambassador." Page 35. ar IQ « SOURCES Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby Dawson ' PILE: pear T/V/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: Special Forces 1965 Diem J Colby ' OCCURRENCE: Colby stated that "the Special Forces first arrived in Vietname working for CTA in this country prosram of developing villaszes for their own defense. "hen it sot to be as JT remember 750 of them the question arose as to whether they should be transferred out of CIA into military control, and this was done during L963; military took over responsibility for that program and 1 . ae gn Yaura 22096 [will have some more words to say about that at another time." Pare 26-29, SOURCE: STAFF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20,1975, Colby Nawson TYATT « 32423615 Page 35 Bocld HW 50955
BUNDY, MC GEORGE , TAYLOR, MAXWELL | BALL, GEORGE WORRESTAL, MICHAEL - HILLSMAN, ROGER; AMBASSADOR NOLITING MC CONE, JOHN, MC NAMARA, ROBERT CATEGORIES: — SER Ea oo i GECURFEWOE® COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conference room or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, MESSRS. BUNDY, BALL, FORRESTAL, HILLSMAN, MC CONE, MC NAMARA GILPATRIC, TAYLOR. p. 70 COLBY also stated that generally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to be with the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the Attorney General would have been there. pp. 70-71, The chairman of the meetings downstairs which | President never attended would have been Mr. BUNDY. pp. 71-72 Mr. HARRIMAN would come so: times, COLBY recalled, and Vice President JOHNSON would always attend the ones upstairs in the Cabinet room, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. Te Anbassador NOLTING. when he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam took a very active role opposing action: against President DIEM to the extent that he was invited to participate. And his advice w not accepted. p. 73 SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby FILE: STAFF: R. DAWSON DATE: 1 July 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: DIEM a Summer and Fall 1963 CONEIN OCCURRENCE: "There were (sic) not one coup plan. There were several. The problem that wa: facing the people that were making assessments of this was which one had the most likely chance of succeeding? We were at the point of no return. There was no chance of going back. because there was going to be a coup. ‘The best thing to do was to monitor and keep the U.S. government advised of who the principal players were, what their intentions were then and in the future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this time, it was getting down to the critical element. In October, the generals had to have assurances that I was speakin; for the Ambassador. Several attempts were made to get these assurances, and it was practi- cally impossible because of the security around the generals, who were already suspect..." pe ane Geb ab | ie Be) a ng 1 BW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 36
PERSONS/SENTIVPIES: DATES: Diem Summer 1963 ATEGORIES: Diem oe ae OCCURRENCE: "....Diem was not conforming to Western standards of democracy. And this was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assump- tion that Occidental style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems. It was an assumption with which Ngo Dinh Diem disagreed on both practical and philosophical grounds." ~ SOURCE: STAPF: ————~_ "Our Vietnam Nightmare", Marguerite Higgins, —— Dawson Harper & Row, 1965, p. 165 FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES? CATEGORIES: Thich Tri Quang Summer, 1963 | Diem a McNamara Diem OCCURRENCE:  Caprd=i== Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for concilia- tion was based on the assumption. that Thich Tri Quang's grievances concerning flags and such were what motivated his Budist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich Tri Quang wanted was a pretext to see. His objective was not a solution, but nonethe- less than Diem's head. , “Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personnally shown immediate public concern for the victims of the Hue tragedy. He then instantly order generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never publicized. Perhaps he was too ', So inwardly assured of his innocence was Diem that he did not of going through the Cree of proving it. mer, certainly (Gontinued-or-Card2) paw pleased Madero Ave. be base Twe lu sucA straiiyy Wold scarcely & et Thies i “Guaws fi SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, ¥& ¥ Harper and Rowe DATE: July 3, 1975 mrrnm. BW 50955 Docld: 324273615 Page 37
PERSONS/ENTILISES : GEN. HUYUH DANISS 3 CA LIGUN Lis SOURCE: FILE: GEN. DO CAO TRI GEN. NGUYEN KHANH GEN. TON THAT DINH GEN, DON Hearings, §$.S.C.1I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page ten. ~~ OCCURRENCE : DATES + 7/63 STAFF: DATE: Dawson 6/30/75 gy SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exh page LO. \ ibit one, STAFI: DATE: Dawson 6/20/75 32433615 Page 34 WW 50955 DBoaciId
PERSONS /# DATES : | CATEGORERS 7/63 DIEM a OCCURRENCE + CONTINUED ON ANOTHER CARD: Da. CS “SOURCE: , OT ; a ~~ | STAPF: a ~——-—="_ Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson _ page ten. DATE: 6/30/75 FILE: - Pi RSONS SEN LT TLRS: : CATEGORIES: OCCURRENCE: POMP Tn Oe CONTINUED FROM FIRST CARD: SOURCE TAPF: Hearings, S.S.C.1I.,° 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAR: Dawson page il. “PLLE: | DATE: 6/30/75 324273615 Page 39 HW 50955 Doclid
yi! = “Hearings, S.9.C.2., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ~ “Dawson Page li. DATE: 6/30/75 FILE: CATEGO ORIES: ERSONS/EN NEITIES ¢ a] een) 2 SEeecesy bp yy che woe, "SOURCE: Hearings, STSVClIT, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit’ one, “STAPF S “= page 10-11. Dawson FILE: DATE: 6/30/7 324233615 Page 40 WW 50955 DBoaciId
PEoUNS/ENT LW LESS | DATES: ! CATEGORIES: NGO DINH NHU . CONEIN July 11, 1963 ' DIEM ~~ OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together for staff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he knew of some coup planning going on the generals. This scared the generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DINE NHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks." p. 20-21. SOURCE: STAVE? R. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein PILE DATE: 30 June 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIFS: DATES; CATEGORIES: Krulik, Major General Victor H. Kennedy, John F Mendenhall, Joseph, State National Security Council | Diem f slo OCCURRENCE: Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour of the country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against the Viet Cong. Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on the effect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "Have you two fellows been in the same country?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reac- tion to Vietnam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by go-- ing to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and bat- talion headquarters. But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, i.e., Hue in Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that affine ha knew during that time, and it was the slightly Effett, volital soc ery ea w ee haven of Viet Nam's chronically critical and bickering intellectua] Gen eb 5) STAFF: Dawson SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Harper and Rowe DATE BW 50955 Docld: 324273615 Page 41
PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: | | | CATEGORIES: NHU, NGO DINH 1 DIEM a CONEIN August 1963 ro OCCURRENCE: The coup ...."aborted, because, one, they did not have necessary forces. I'm talking about the coup plotters, did not have ‘the necessary forces to combat those loyal to the DIEM government, namely elements of the Marines, elements of the Rangers, presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the best armed troops available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have acoup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality NGO DINH NE’ who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare." pp. 22-23 SOURCE: STAFF: R, DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein DATE: 20 June 1975 FILE: PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES | TS COLBY | August 1963 9: DIEM co > = es tA OCCURRENCE: ~ COLBY stated that: As part or the pressure On the goverment In the Augus period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnarese military and wit: Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assisi ance to the SPECIAL FORCES. We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the military who were involved in that, but CIA is an easy thing to turn off, turn on and off. The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off. In a simple way, I think ¢t: has had a certain influence in what they did. I lmow it resulted in the transfer of sever: units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them." p. 78-79 STAPF: R. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, Jue 20, 1975, Colby WW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 42
WrouNos NE ba bd DALES? | CATEGOK Lins: gous ENE LA Li | , 7 | wMADAME NHU | ; SCONZIN August 1963_ | DIEM | on ’ | =] er CCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the =bonzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME, NHU mthat were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the popul: tion.” p. 21 £F ahed CL9LEPELE SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein i R. DAWSON BIDE: . . | DATE: 31 June 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: COMMODITY 8) Sy TTS, ore cymes, cote IMPORT PROGRAM August 1963 DE fc ipa COLBY, WILLIAM » ce ek! f OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the United States sought to put pressure on President DIEM and the goverment, particularly to remove NG DINH NHU from the country, to bring about cer- tain changes of policy in August of 1963 that was thought necessary to improve the perfor- mance of the government of South Vietnam. Among these were the suspension of Public Law 480 aid the suspension of the commodity import. program. And also through various contacts with dissident generals, the United States was requested whether it would stand aside if the generals ran their own coup, and they were given the response in general terms that, "Yes, we would stand aside, and yes, we would continue the aid program if a successor gOV— ernment took over and looked reasonably able to carry on the war. This can only be read as a green light to the generals. This message was passed through a CIA officer, but his cre- ditentials were checked by the generals receiving this kind of a message, with the Ambassador and with the Chief of the Military Aid group in Saigon so_ that there was no question SOURCE: about what U.S. policy was, nor that the CL! office was speaking for the Ambassador with his knowledge FILe; Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 10-11 R. DAWSON DATE: 29 June 1975
# PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: DIEM CATEGORIES: tn _ ‘® COLBY, WILLIAM . August 1963 DIEM / & NOLTING ~ LODGE, denry Cabot a CCURRENCE: 5 SERENE COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors 7 from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided N Buddists pagadas and essentially sought to surpress the Buddihist dissidence. COLBY stated N that DIEM went out and supressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying. it in his mind a and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that w country was faced with. COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect DIEM's image here in the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within the educa- ted class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself. FF afea Spies (2 SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 8-9 R. DAWSON FILE: : DATE: 29 June 1975 DIEM | | Aug. 7, 1963 ; BEM NOLTING, AMBASSADOR ° RICHARDSON, JOHN OCCURRENCE: Higgins asked Diem ‘in an interview on August 7, 1963 whether Diem thought the United States was plotting against him. Diem replied: ''I do not think Ambassador Nolting is plotting against me. I do not think Richardson /of the CIA/ is plotting against me. I know there are American officials who are preparing the way in the event the decision is taken to try and get rid of me. I cannot forsee the future. And I cannot believe that America would turn against an ally under attack, engaged in a struggle | for its very existence. But some people are crazy--and the world is crazy. Still, Miss Higgins, I hope that your government will take a realistic look at these young generals plotting to take my place. How much maturity or political understanding do they have--of their own country, let alone the world?" (169) SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and * Dawson, R.
CATEGORIES: PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: Dts, LODGE, AMBASSADOR / | Aug. 7, 1963 | | Cad. i Z ee nee OCCURRE WCE: ie During an interview by Higgins with DIEM on August 7, 1963 "'...Diem sent an aide for document, which‘I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent con- versation with an American official." pIpOod ccsed¢ AH "Your ambassador, '' Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my posture of the liberal image to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists and the political opposition...1 cannot seem to convinvce the embassy that this is Viet Nam--not the United States of America. We have had good reason to ban street demonstra- tions in the middle of a war, and the reason is that the Viet Cong gnéiev rywhere.. .what would happen if the Viet Cong should infiltrate the demonstratienihe Saigon, toss a bomb, kills dozens of persons, including some American pre GY Wha ‘would ‘liberal GF aheqd CL9eePree opinion' say of me then? Would they believe my goveramien “when: said that the Viet Cong were responsible for the killings because only ths Communists could profit from SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Wiggins, 1 STAFF: 1965 Dawson, R. riils DATE: July 2, 1975 PERSONS/ENTICIES : DATES : CATEGORIES: CARD TWO | | Cad. 2 f/2- such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the Viet Cong...but-whom did the Americans blame? They blamed me--the President of Viet Nam- - and the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable nextefime? This is not child's play; I am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when I 4 O&protect the people of this country--including the Americans--by good police work Keeping control in (continuation) SOURCE: [ STAPR: “ Qur Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, Dawson, R. 1965 : PILE: | (DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES fiiiting, Amb. DATES: CATEGORIES: Affair, Saigon Embassy] oa ee an = ad Ga. m Hilsaan, Roger, Assistant Secretary of St te] > wa [frueheart, William] /Mechlin, Director, YSIA 3[ielez ted SS Ybet han 2 Card Cok 2 CARD 1 OCCURRENCE: Higgins points out that on August 14, 1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America © broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was “beginning to affect the war effort." Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who was at that time in conference with Trueheart and Mechlin. Milting told Higgins that "OQur report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though, of course, it could if riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting front-line troups.” "We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued, " of the rumor that Bud~ dhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what Hilsman based this statement on. But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA.” Mechlin eugested to Milting that perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's commengniigy yiHklenan was, after all, Milting's boss.'' Higgins, returning to Nenetgraondyganiehtreatter, called Hilsman (Continued on Card 2) AAG ad # SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, Harper and Rowe OF hed CL9bePee DATE:. July 3, 1975 i a set cee es mee cee amt ch ER res eee teem Ste tne, ten enn, ih nee Se AERA SRG GAD GEG HED GD) SEES EEE nD EDD GUE: SON GHENT GEEED HUT GOAN ONY unm enen weney sunn GELL GEL Gu ME TD HEH GAEND GAS GED GEE GE ED EE FILE: PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: to find out what was the basis for his broadcast. Hilsman conceded that in fact he had based his account upon the reports in the New York Times and other press dispatches out » of Saigon. (page x@& 124-125). TOP SEvs SOURCE: oar FILE: | DATE:
= PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: ai rms S Diem 14 August 1963 c ; a OCCURRENCE: i. wy In the @urrent Intelligence Mbmorandum (OCI 2339/63): "Coup Rumors in ii south Viet " ", | is ou ietnam” the following quotation appeared: . . the coup reports i 4 and rumors which have aris en since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect S some serious coup plotting? Awe have no firm evidence of advanced planning —_ by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime . . ." (2). a plowed La} be aad PERSONS/ENTI’ TIES: DATES: DIEM 8/21/63 Ball, Undersecretary of State Helms, Richard Colby, Wm. OCCURRENCE: My mings ad a re On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied: Buddhist pagodas throughout. the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial - law. At apresidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control." (2) SOURCE: 1967 I.G. Report, Part C RD PILE: DATE: Cage
PERSONS/ENTITIES: IES: DIEM On 21 August 1963 >» the current 3 . "Coup Rumors 4 : intelligence memor. — ting against the bran Vietnam" stated that Nadditioner (ocr 2341/63): | ce of inmincse went have been received, White te oF plot~ Situation dange: nent action, the Buddhist issu +€ there is no serous. (3) € continues to make the SOURCE; 1967 I.G. Re . STAFF: . port, P. =2tt FILE: > Fart Cp. 3 ‘seeeateemrtsene DATE; %D mn ne 6/28/75 Cage PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: 21 August 1963 | W DIEM CONEIN DINH NGO DINH NHU, .GENERAL DON CCURRENCE: "During the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16 September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of the DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both President DIEM and counsellor NHU that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himsel! NHU's reaction was to order him to Dalat for a rest." During this period of time, DINH realized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. The generals would recognize this fact and GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and that, above all, should have been thanked by DIEM and NHU for saving the government. pp. 12-13 SOURCE: - STAFF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975 , Exhibit 1, Conein R. DAWSON TATT Pa lame.
PERSONS/ENTITIES: Diem DATES: J SRERGORTES |: August 21, 196 Diem f OCCURRENCE: ‘tgaed—b Higgins characterizes the raids auxXakmi on the XaLoi and& on August 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy toward Viet Nam. She states that this crystalizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration that Diem had to be opposed. " raised stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an Oriental Ian Fleming. Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks "stormed" into shortly after midnight. A ; of bells, a  blood-curdling scream shattered the spirits serenity. One eye witness professed to see two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy. “When the United Nations in Viet Nam investigated the rumors in ck - iomaey 3 Hon SOURCE: Our Viataaa Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins Harper and Rowe The investigators pollad at Venghh whe had been FILE! proweud dura, the etue Haw Xe Loy and elseolare. (80-#, © mmm ants een ce comm GED cee cee gm em Tem SE END Gu Fem DED EEE EE EDGY OY EGET SEE GOD St uh a HS SND GD a EE GED IE SEED GET GNSS QUEL ES EY ME ons ES SEED SNE eblh Geet shies nen: sane ans: neh nen. GntOh ROD See SetOE ne: Stn ERE. tine Bt shtty er Seth oer nen uth St ee He = 6F ahed GL9ESFEETPTIO0G CG60c AH STAFF: Dawson DATE: July 2, 1975 ” PERSONS/ENTI TIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: 8/21/63 DIEM Ball, Undersecretary of State v Helms, Richard eI a Ay Colby, Wm. el ie aa? i . OCCURRENCE: ia: : ey FG On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial law. At apresidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control." (2) SOURCE: : 1967 I.G. Report, Part C | RD TOs FILE: Cage 6/28/75
*PIGOG Co60h AH GTOLSPAE og afeag PERSONS/ENTIVIES: ] DAVIES : CATEGOKIES: 21 AUG. thru OCCURRENCE: a Dee. TA TOT e SOURCE? Hearings, $.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STARE  pawson page le. PILE: , DATES 6/30/75 i MRSS JIN Lod GENERAL DINH seisp ey CANE OO! DIEM (7 TAS LES: | el AUG. thr 16 SEPT. '6 “OCCURRENCE : wtf wha tos capa oye sun Citi. 3 meron ORD as o Roos aot yey OME mot andes adhe Ribeh Cw Han Hearings, S.$.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page la. : DATE: 6/30/75 .
PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: aN HILLSMAN , Roger (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) 8/22/63 CCURRENCE: abe fated Bs ha Ay ba VP a H pS OST EPA EE oo On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334), the followdng |, | message appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Has. not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushed at all levels. Hilfsman requested Has. send companion telegram to station pointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and who real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtain- ing US@, objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can substantially assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary drive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingency |. planning and serve as focus of build-up program. Hgs. will comment eed Liew STAFF: RD 6/28/75 TS hed GTIESPLEPLICd c6605 AH SOURCE: 1967 I.G. Report, Part C FILE: DATE: —— Cage — PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: HILLSMAN, Roger (Assistant Secretary of State for Far 8/22/63 Diem Eastern Affairs ) CIA OCCURRENCE: CALD 72 +f 2. CARD #2 further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above at Hilvsman's request." (3) a SOURCE: sum 1967 I.G. Report, part 0, po DATE: RD FILE: Cage
Lobe p sve wk ube « DALES : CATEGORIES: RICHARDSON, John (CIA station 8/22/63 Diem” chief in Saigon) . Saigon Embassy re F wT & a Be \ Bb Gat DIEM atie } tra | | On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0208) Chief of _Station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate leadership: ". . . Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic. The solution seems even more improbable than ever before. Would appear that we should have either DIEM or military junta.. . . Wlew time factor have not coordinated ton es es with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject mat~ er. - : ZG shed CLOCZTETEPEOOG—ccenc wy SOURCE: STAFF: 1967 I.G. Report, part c, pp 3 FILE: : PRO DATE: Sacccceemen= COE een 8/28/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: ee . a - . TLLSMAN, ROGER Ono ae 22 or 23 August | DIEM @ ‘LODGE, HENRY CABOT CONEIN 1963 OCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August. When he arrived he found that Saigon was + armed camp. "During tnis period of these attacks ion the pagodas, there had been many con- tacts made by a lot of people to anybody wno would listen to them reese abou Gone sone u j i xisti i ked with different gene ing t doing away with the existing regime, I nad talked wi 5 . the one in August —- [ don't recall if it was the .23rd or 24th, we received a cable which later been mown as the famous ROGER HILLSMAN cable which practically gave us the go-ahead chat this type of thing could not continue." pp. 2l-2e SOURCE: STAPF: . r \ Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON DATE + a
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: CONEIN 23 August 1963 | DIEM OCCURRENE: "There was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occasic: i 1 3 ith colonels and junior officers. Ar: ith them, other people had also. We had met wi We antloipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August. p. ee. €G ahed GI9ESFEEPIOQ0d GGHOoc AH SOURCE: | STARE: j . DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein } R. DAWS FILE: 30 June 1975 CATEGORIES: Diem PEKSONS/ENTIVIES: ae UNO SENT LL LES HARRIMAN, W. Averrel (Undersecretarf of State for Political Affairs) HELMS (Deputy Director for Plans, RUSK, Dean (Secretary of State) PATR Raswe Ren DATES; 8/24/63 TA) Def: MAP Shp of Defense) eo SL, a i, i On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS at 26607 4 kaa Wy hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HFLMS the Substance of what eventually turned out to be Deptel 242 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to HELMS' query, "HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained an implicit pullout of American forces and Support if the Nhus' were not ousted. HARRIMAN said the message had been cleared 'with Hyannisport}: ,) with the Secretary of State and with Mr. GILPATRICK.!!(4) ’ SOURCE: 1967 I.G. Report, part Cpl RD PILE: DATE Cage 6/28/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: HILSMAN, Roper (Ass't. Sec.State for Far Fastern Aff -- FE) LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN) DATES: | CATEGORIES: DIEM ye 25 Aupust 1963 | CCURRENCE: On August 25, 1963, in a cable from HILSMAN to LODGE (personal), sent via CIA channels (DIR 63854), there appeared the following message: "State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way." (5) FG abed GLOESZFEEPIO0d GGé0c AH SOURCE? IG. REPORT 1967, p. 5 otaeEY Dawson Paez C FILE: DATE: 28.6.75 PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: | CATEGORIES: CIA 25 Aug. 1963 | “ LODGE, Henry Cabot ; DIEM sd OCCURRENCE: G uo Chi peg ay Letdaca bY In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following message appeared: "FYI CIA not consulted re cable being sent separately, which however cleared at highest levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact. text, understand it invites LODGE final judgment. . . . Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. ‘Thus suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we probably unable to affect it.) ‘This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least interim period... ." (7) SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 19607, p. 7 STAFF: Dawson
BERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: ‘(GHARDSON, Saigon Chief of Station 25 August 1963 DIEM INH, General (SVN) 2M BRA , CIA officer in Saigon : : Noae S . Ty : a CCURRENCE: a er eee Birr . 1ua CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appe bo ars on August 25, 1963: hc * 5 7 ° 5 , CNERSA ted an immediate meeting, with NEF OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH reques | Bu (an officer of the CIA Saigon Station}. At the meeting, KHANH requested assurances that 16 U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the DIEM RIMES." (7) Lines Ln] an an : AER: 3 SOURCE: I.q. REPORT 1967, p. 7 STAFF: Dawson fr C. FILE: DATE: 28.6.75 - oo ae PLRSONS/ENTIVLES : pares: | CATEGORIES: rt ppt nn | hp nanan en CIA 26 August 1963 | DIEM dn August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Starr Memorandum, No. 60-63 Internal ONE Vorking Paper, CIA Distribution Only," the following statement appears: ‘On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment of US objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Communist rationalists with sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a proup nitht not prove able to Salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better shan the present repiime. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist jationalist elements to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of vast years, months, and weeks. In such a fresh start, we believe, lies the only viable hope “or the attainment of US interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)
Es o PERSONS/ENTITIES: g DATES: CATEGORIES: GIELMS, Richard LODGE, Henry Cabot DIEM 1/ CARTER, Gen. Marshall KENNEDY, John F. | 26 August 1963 NU CIA TEM DEPTEL 243 MELT, ADM. Harry D. (CINCPAC) ke »=©6 OCCURRENCE: Hite Mn August 26, 1963, HELMS' record of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other SIA participant was GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER, DDCI. 1] mthe question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam situation that 1t really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DITM himself. Prin- %ipal points discussed were: ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current WS action in South Vietnam; the fact that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role of the NHU's; the meaning of the phrase 'give direct support to military commanders! in DEPTEL 243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend failed. The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August 27 with participants to present biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9) SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 8-9 STAFF: Dawson DATE? — 28.6.75 FILE: cp ENTE ; oe CONEIN > MINH ; i RDSON reports the result 0330), nr | \ nr Said he was not yet S of the CONEIN/s ° eet od wh bag 1) vet ready, and KHIEM sata no &pproaches to th © we © generals, oul d have to check with MINH In canons
SS: CATEGORIES: : PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | = wa S KENNEDY, John F. HARKINS (MAC/V) oy hue. 1964 & HeLMS (DD/P) CIA AUE. | COLBY, William DEPTEL 243 CARTE : LODGE, Henry Cabot oN.) | 6hd we 5 less i 2 ecessful. and "The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted Da asked ene the jctement s mi hether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT as oot J ee OE asked iene HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or setae ok O 10) grafted acking if they still agreed with their concurrences to DEPTEL 243. £G aheq CL9fePee - ploog STAFF: Dawson SOURCE: .G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 9-10 DATE: 28.6.75 FILE: Sram me nen ee YATES: | CATEGORIES: oo DALES CATEGORIES DEPLEL 243 DEPTEL 256 a7 A yo KENNEDY, John FP. (Mp. 1963 | DIEM LODGE, Henry Cabot HARKINS, John (Commander, MAC/V) OCCURRENCE: In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 256) > On August 27, 1963, the following Message appeared: "Examination of reports to date gives considerable ho Proceeding from the concept outlined in DEPTET, 243 as appraisal of present prospects. . . , Highest authorit of developing Situation, presently favor operation as currently planned by generals. We wish to give you all possible support in best available course but not to insist on any decision that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." (10) pe but leaves unanswered questions. . modified, now desire your prompt interim y asks whether you and HARKINS, in light -I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10 FILE:
DATES: LINN OUNS/ WE LE LISS ¢ EN. DINE ef ! GOUNSELLER NHU CATEGORIES: OCCURRENCE: aG aheq CLI9fePeE  ploog ‘5. Conedt bit one STARE Y Dawson . AON " DK fy Conadq Mxhibi one cian ~ SOURCH Sy aring 8.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhi > SOURCE? Hearings, S.S.C, oo pages le-13. DATE: 6/30/75 ems wes we ss papper SL ONSJENT ID LES 5 ‘ICHARDSON, John DATES: 28 Aug. 1963 CATEGORIES: ) ASLEGORTIES DIEM ~~ COCURRENCE: 1 August 28, 1963, RICHARDSON reports in situation here has reached i x als are neutralized before sing able to launch Cheir Operations, we believe they will act and ance to win. ...We all understand that th done on our must’ suéceeg and part must be done... ." (10) I.G. REPORT 1967, Part Cy, p. 10 STAPF: Dawson DATE: as
B  PERSONS/ENTIVIES: a lcd ied DATES: CATEGORIES: oNSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTER : BIELMS, Richard 29 Aug. 1963 DIEM ~ SHARKINS SKENNEDY, John FP, _ Pui [ & OCCURRENCE: aN id rat a NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCTL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam on August 29, 1963, with a record taken by DD/P HELMS, shows that mH OTe consensus was that HARKINS should confirm to the generals that the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented t he views of the US government. There was agreement that getter information was needed on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether it was. militarily feasible. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for @RESTDENTIAL approval." (12) (Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12) > Pp. 12 STAFF: Dawson DATE?  28.6.75 SE meee ee ey ey en as nn pc PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: i CATEGORIES: | <ENNEDY, JOHN F. BUNDY, McGeorge RUSK Dean NSC Exec. Com. 28 Aug. 1963 ; McNAMARA , Robert LODGE, Henry Cabop . R (oi hor i TAYLOR, Maxwell HARKINS, John ! He, ithe LY fi ' CCURRENCE? a Vet RY Sti boo NALS fa % j ' McGEORGE 2 j ith RUSK, McNAMARA, TAYLOR, and . 6 the PRESIDENT met privately wi ; » Me . eonOnGe | Coe te weporbed to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE re eithnt aoe eenural nessare e bei sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from ve ee S ns ae) r from the DEPARIMENT to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARK . " 4 " EXECUTIVE This is reflected in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the eh nae tirled.) cee | SOMME TEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not iden . AFF: Dawson SOURCE: 1.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. ll STAPE S DATE: 28.6.75 FILE:
BISON, Lyndon B. McNAMARA 30 Aug. 1963 [ DIEM IMS BUNDY , CARTER @OLBY Rf a =. 8 OCCURRENCE: UE mivitaw yh yin CB August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTTAL, meeting on Vietnam, with HELMS, CARTER, agd COLBY participating. The record is provided by C/FE COLBY which shows that: Bal ie "BUSK referred to recent cable traffic and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing wath or what they were planning. MeNAMARA pointed out that there was some question whether tHe generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY Said he had re-read the earlier traffie and noted swat they never said they did. GEN. CARTER Said he believed that the general's coup was not lbkely at this Stage and that in another week we will be approximately where we were before ‘Re attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY sugested we consider additional contingencies fore the GROUP and whether the assumption that NUU is impossible is well founded." (13) SOURCE: _1.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13 STAFF? Dawson FILE: DATE? 28,6.75° PERSONS/ENTITIES: JOHNSON, Lyndon B. HARKINS DATES: CATEGORIES: 31 Aug. 1963 DIEM COLBY CARTER en wees RUSK HELMS a ee Fi I McoNAMARA pa! LODGE OCCURRENCE: | ; At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects that: "RUSK suggested we: look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us vai er a cou and what might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. McNAMARA PRINS. RUSK dineoten quirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE and HARKINS . Ree 7 ree soN that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we might as to do." (14) DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS.also participated. ) SOURCE: STAFF? Dawson I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 14
DATES: | 31 Aug. 1963 | DIEM Y% # PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: ABRKINS HEM ; Akh \ Perey MOCCURRENCE: Sao Re i ea hi . ‘e ve Fie . a . a es m,August 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities, the Oflowing report appears: ha IBNERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to give KHIEM assurances of USG backinr. HREM showed a reluctance to talk and surepgested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH.  KHIEM owmented that MINH had called off the planning and was working, on other methods which KHTEM Qld not describe. KHIEM further stated that the generals were not ready as they did not have Wurh forces under their control. ‘HARKINS decided not to ive KHIEM assurances which he had 2fn authorized to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS! decision on 31 August after HARKINS re- orted." (13) SOURCE: 1G . REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13 STAFF: Dawson FILE: DATE: 28.6.75 PERSONS/ENTITIFS: DATES: CATEGORIES: Pall 1963 2 Dien State Department HeCone Defense Department OCCURRENCE: Colby stated that the "...in this situation we were haviny almost daily mectings with senior officials in the CIA, State Department, Defense Ne- partment and so forth, in the basement of the White House and there was no question that this was national policy and hammered out. ...at these meetings, these were the mectings at which Mr. McCone and I arsued very strongly that we should not move against the Diem sovernnent we should continue”to work with it." Page 36
& PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: 3 CONEIN Fall 1963 | DIEM ee a Ls &® OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: “there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who .@ were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. The best way I ® can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one genera! " would talk, wall. out of the room to go to the "john", two would tell you, don't trust that m one, and finally the one who had out-waited the other two, there would be one left, and he would say, don't trust those two. p. 31 A a9 abe gq SOURCE: | Snare Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein | R. DAWSON pr 4 FILE: DATE: July 1, 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: CATEGORIES: COLBY | | Fall 1963 | LODGE, HENRY CABOT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ote Ati DEPARTMS! OCCURRENCE: conBy stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the proposition that the war coul: not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in - his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, this which was the public oressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and the United States, and think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SBCURITY COUN’ and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT." p. 61 | i ~ SOURCE: STARE; — R. DAWSON
G6oc AH PERSONS /ENTITIFS: DATES: | CATEGORIES: Lr rrr - tA COLBY ae . a (a i> ; o Generet HAekw Fall 1963 pie B.LODGE , H.C « BNSC a Ba he te WOCCURRENCE: Mp, COLBY“that: 'The Defense Department was almost totally in a position thi Mthe wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well, that this (DIEM's continuance in office) is an urban problem, urban political problem whic: pshould not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and General HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth". p. 62 a . “3 SOURCE: R. Dawson Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby DATE: 1 July 1975 FILE: PERSONG/ENTITIFS: DATES: CATEGORIES: NHU ; Fall 1963. . } DIEM 4 LODGE, #.¢- COLBY OCCURRENCE: OOLBY stated in response to a question as to whether there was any serious attempt to persuade DIEM to leave office voluntarily that: '"Tnere had certainly been dis- cussions to have NHU leave Vietnam at various times". But, "there was almost no direct contact between our ambassador LODGE and President DIEM, very little contact." P. 66
2° ERSONS/EI NTITIES: i DATES: - | CATEGORIES: wa COLBY . | 3 Fall 1963 | DIEM a in - . ~ NSC 2-2 tATE DEE ARTE ND BOCCURRE ENCE: COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by "the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT was "None of distasi “for President DIEM." p. 61 o ai ot LA La | at iy th mH ee SOURCE: —_ | ~ | STAPF? R. DAWSON Hearings, SSCL, June 20. 1975, Colby { PILE: | 1 July 1975 CORB BY NESTIDENT KENNEDY ; GENERAL KRULAK a. MR. MENDELHAY OCCURRENCE? COLBY stated that: "The most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has been described publicly a number of times, was that at one time, particularly with the frustrating period the President (Kennedy) Paced with these two strong positions, he sent two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara anda Mr. Mendelhay, wno had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about five days to make an assessment on the spot and they came back to the camera room, and one sat on one end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had b:-. to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 30 military chiefs and all that sort of thir and the war business (was) going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then Fall 1963 = iS ce \ _ Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless be- cause there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the genera: feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, looked at them and ~ SOURC vE? Sandy Ad fou Tass Cet ye th (he sane county ¢ Hrd dle STARE: f Hearings» gs CI, June 1 _ GAsuer ts they did, S une 20, 1975, Coiby They toked at tose diblocut R. DAWSON TPT he me ot a : tae TNNAMT o
zi PISMSONS/ENT LL BS? DATES : | CATEGORIES: ‘Boh, Tonthat 9/65 | “Vien be . Wa, Neo Dinh ] a OCCURRENCE: PI ‘@ncin stated that Diem and Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double went. Diem or Nhu had planned to have a Bravo I and a Bravo TT that Dien Nba would have their own coun and ee down to Vonetau as if they were Scapins and there would immediately be a counter-coup to bring Yiem--all Wstieated by Nhu back to power by popular acclamation. So on November J @ lop.m. in the afternoon when troons were moving it was assumed by Diem @d Nhu that this was part of Diem's nlan to have a counter-coup. Pase 60-65. SOURCE: . a, A ET « . ilearinys, SSC, STARR: Dawson Conein, June 20, 1975 1 G PILE: DATE: 7/1/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: CONEIN DATES: | CATEGORIES: DIEM September 1963 HUAN, Commanding Officer, Military a DON promised DINH that he would personnaly speak to the President on DINH's behalf and that he would ask that DINH be granted the Ministry of Interior, while he, DON, would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. DINH believed that DON had his personal interest at heart and DON did in fact make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his fovernment, but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for DIEM or NHU to accept. Deadlines were given. DINH was informed that the President would give hil the ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and DINH had not received what he tho- ught was his proper recognition, GENERAL DON and other officers including HUAN continued to lend sympathy to DINH.while DINH was still waiting for his ministerial post. p. 13 SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein Tima 2 PaTE
i PERSONS/ENTITIES DATES: CATEGORIES: oo | ® GENERAL MINH | a ita September 1963 | DIEM / ~ LODGE, tlean’ CABOT © DON, GENERAL re CONE IN NCE: " = the month of September, there was still more talk of coups, and at thi ee nth of September’, T had been told by Ambassador LODGE that I was ee iohaenes planning only....That I was to convey any messages. I had conveyed aS eM and BIG ane on two occasions ae HTEM on one occasion. I had met with ewe ey ethoe military on another occas On several oecasions, I had met with GENERAL DON an leaders." Db. 33 GTOLSPEE = 99 abeg STARR: SOURCE: vo i R. DA Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein ? Pipe: | DATE? 59 June 1975 PERSONS/ENT LT LES : paves: | CATEGORIES: RICHARDSON, John ate VATEGURTEO DIEM t DIEM NHU 2 Sept. 1963 OTA COL. TUNG OCCURRENCE: on September 2, 1963, 8 7°" BE ce In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523),/the I.G. REPORT provides the following summary: "RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIFM and the NHU's are fully aware that the USG encouraged the GENERALS to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of this encouragement. He Judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could fo forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a GVN liaison vehicle through which to conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we. were willing to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with TUNG . (NOTE: PM programs = paramilitary programs) "The Times of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting and financing a cou: and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIEM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widely olaved by the New York Daily Hews , the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent SOURCE: newspapers . STAFF: Dawson om ramen oa A Ser
B PiSONS/ENTLL LES : DATES: CAILEGORLES: KRNNEDY, John F. DIEM Y HELMS NHU _ 6 Sept. 1963 | DIEM C@LBY BUNDY " MADAME NHU 4 a ne a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS And COLBY provide the fol- drew ee uA eee ggoming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction. TSK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing, MADAME NHU but éxpressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK commented that the COUNIRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16) I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16 STAFF: SOURCE: Dawson FILE: DATE: 98 gs
Bi LWXSUNS/ENLIL LES : DATES: CATEGORIES: EWNEDY, John F. DIEM Y BEMS NHU _ 6 Sept. 1963 | DIEM GEBY BUNDY USK * MADAME, NHU ANE ‘ fi SNP ES myo RENCE: a ee tha PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS Snd COLBY provide the fol- Owing summary: i) a) HSK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out he necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth- qning meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction. (BK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing, MADAME NHU but Xpressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. Gymented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT eplied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16) I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16 a * « - a DATE: 28.6.75 Special Forces CIA payments CIA 8 Sept. 1963 7 Tong, Col. — w BEM Spe ~~ OCCURRENCE: On 8 Septenber 1963 wire services in prominent newspapers carried a story that the Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on the 21 August were still being “paid secretly by CIA. This story was: attributed tO a highly reliable source in Washington and gave details of support to Col. Tung in the amount of $3 ,000 ,000 amually, and of payment of $250,000 on 3 September. ‘The cory was datelined in Washington and in Manila. David Bell warned in a television interview that the U.S. Congress might cut pack aid to Vietnam unless the Diam government changed o> its policy. TY NO “SOURCE: STAFF: fe 5 1967 (CIA - il Dawson IG Report 1967 (CIA) , p. 17 DATE:
BT STIEZEZE!PIOO Goéog 69 3heg ! w-PERSONS/ENTITIES: ber late. — Gomack, Victor Gen. ,| Mendenhall,Jos. A. Counterinsurgency Specialist UN Adviso Joint Chiefs of Staff__ Bureau F DATES: , CATEGORIES: 10 Sept. 1963 Eastern DIEM Rusk, Dean Sec. of State | ffairs MeCone, John CGE Kennedy 4. ———~ - OCCURRENCE: Richardson ,John . At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the following recer by Colby is provided of the meeting of September 10, 1963. General Gndetah reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions were that the war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won if current U.S. military and socological programs are continued. Mendenhall, the State representative who accompanied Gzelagk, expressed the view that there was complete breakdown of the Siagon civilian government in the security situations in the provinces had deteriorated. ‘The President asked where the two gentlemen had been insame country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August that reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June. Mr. McCone talked froma . zainst_any cut in ald. _ personal telegram which he had received Richardson reconmen SOURCE: STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19 Dawson FILE: DATE: 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: Diem Richardson, Chief of Station CIA Siagon DIEM 10 Sept 1963 ——SCCURRENCE: ~ ~ On 10 September 1963 in a cable from the CIA station in Siagon (SATGO760) to Washington, the following quotation appears: "Am inclined to feel general officers will seek evolutionary accomodation with Diem, (if he permits them to do so) unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, there. : , is breakdown of civil - order or of governmental machinery,or unless war effort begins to Ro backward seriously (despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21 August am inclined to believe we should be able to resume successful prosecution of war in military and civil sections) do not align myself with the view that USG should suspend aid ". SOURCE? — : OT mon IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19 . Dawson
Kennedy , John If. President CIA | 10 Sept. 1963 DIEM OccURRENCE On 10 September 1963, in an interview by Huntle rinkley. i 7 Ger v na ey and Br aside 3 the charge that the CIA makes its own polley. y Brinkley, the President: denied Of Shed GLGeSPEEPLOCG Geé0c AH SOURCE: a Pees . STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19 PtLE ’ DATE: Dawson ee 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTIVTES : | DRAPES: CAPEGORLES :. Bandy , Colby McCone pie MeNemarra 10 Sept. 1963hy2. ts OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council oxecubive inceting on Vietnan, with". Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the following record: Bundy = stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, to coordinate press guidance and to eontrol outgoing messages to Saigon.~ He emphasized the {portance of following the President's guidance on this Gelicate problem, in spite of intensly differing views of what should be done and how, the risk, minkmum objectives, and facts. McNamarra stated that his position was virouously against throwing out this government without seeing an alterygative and that none appeared to exist. Mr. McCone commented that the problem was not so much the existance of an alternative as to how to put one into power. Bundy summarized the President's position as one in which we must express our reservations as to mistakes and misdeeds of Diem but not be a position where we can not deal with him further <- SOURCE? - | STAPF: an Dawson
Z PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: Richar dson, John eede, General CIA Station Siagon ll Sept 1963 _ DIEM . 5 ee H OCCURRENCE? “ty a September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGO797) Richardson tyeported that the country team attempted to agree ona six page summary cable to answer '\ cable fron the department requesting views. ‘The team was unable to agree even on the Nirst three pages of the summary. Weedzand Richardson dissented on the basis of the Brat summary was too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country Sn an inadequate basis of data. He said: "in some ways we seem to have reached the point in the official American community, where if you think we can win with the present @overninent , you are simply not running in the right direction with the majority." tad fat SOURCE: STAFFS IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 20 Dawson FILE: 7 DATE? 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: McCone ‘Lodge Colby Nhu ; Rusk 11 Sept 1963 DIEM Bundy OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 mee meeting o of the National SEcurity Council | Executive Souni thee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with McCone also being present for the CIA) tne following appears: "Rusk said he believed that we were not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminte Nhu, At the same time he was not willing to say that Diem whould go, he saw no alternative. Rusk comnented ~ that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real leadership’ and become the real President. McCone suggested also the desirability of negotiating with Diem. Bundy read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu.
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: dge, Ambassador Henry Cabot , 11 Sept 1963 SS6gs AH DIEM Taog IK OCCURRENCE: 7 un a state telegram from Saigon (SAIGH78) Lodge provided the following reflection on he situation: "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that ¥t is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U. S. to use what effective Sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing goverment and the installation if another; and (c) that intensive study should be given by the best brains of the government to all the details, procedures and variants in conncection with suspension @f aid." La] | ha SOURCE: STAPF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. el Dawson FILE: DATE: 6/27/75 MeCone ina Coloy liidisman _ Kemedy, John F. Tung oh. _ DIEM poy tts MeNamarra Diem 11 Sept 63 ° ror Lodge : OCCURRENCE? tH a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being MeCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNemarra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCene conmented that he believed that we should, move ‘cautiosly, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Jodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach . be made toNKuito seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we i had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid.(as proposed in a paper prepared — by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsiran paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the prestducno MS pould be WELL intonned oT ary steps taken “ir this con extpRESuch-as-the-———— fnetanna anvatvine CTA pavment to Col Tung last week. me ’
UOSMEY, da VLS *Zup.1euyes aousSTTTeaquy peseuep ATareass sey ‘Kressaoou aTTUM NUN U4TM UOTIePFoosse esoTo JeTyo Iau Teej osTe Aeuy, ‘sepoZed auy uz spTer.ayq daao padaqqzque ore Jyeqs sty jo S.ISquicul JyjO TTe@ AsouyTe yeu} yng aupZar quesarzd ayy doy qroddns qno [Te s4oAes Kousdy goussT[Tequr Terquag ayy jo jafyo ayy yeuy pezeqs weysdeqTeH *€96T dequeqdes SGT UO zane ti hs : TONAWHNDOO 77 ward : ; €96T *3deg ST Toa ‘uyor ‘euogoyl pyaeq ‘ueysaeqTey : SATHOSaLVO : SHLVG : SHTLIGNS/SNOSUad SSLye -alld NOSMVd ze °d *(¥IO) L96T todey DI >AAVLS >FOuUNOS an td a] a’ Ayparougne s,azpoy # UTUIEA SEM STYUQ PTOF Sem pue UOysuUTYsSe 04 Tesodoid e yons epeu Jopessequy pey palpnouy & [T ‘saouemsse *S'n agetidoidde yyyM uoyz {oe dnoo kTreo ayerrurrys 04 y4duaqye 04 SUOg in "ua pouotquau ay ‘ATeYTT FW AS OF YORordde oyy Sup yeu YQTA ADA BuyB7zeyo BuTwapyTsuosd x ST dJopessequy ou, i4reyanzy\hod UAT uoTSssnosTp eB JO BouRASsqns oy qaodat sty & jo yred se paepnpouy ey ‘“WeUgeTA UT UOTIENATS SBYyy JO SMoTA STY poyiodar uosTeg peyTsyTaA # OUM UeUTTTeUg UOYTUTASuNY (O6QODTVS) £96T Tequeydeg ET uo uodpeg wory aetqeo yIO eB uy T ce _ _ THONAHUNQOO a =] Terauag Suog * qoqeg Aqua ‘eZpoT ip NOd SWETTLIM 6 yreyenzy, uo\sutyuny “UeUTTeUs > SAT LIGNA/SNOSUAd WG €g6t 3deg ET > SHLHODALVO >SULVvd HW 5095
BT Gt Waiberstian, David. wecCone, John, DCI 15 Sept. 1963 a gon Station DLEM wD ee ee Oe ee ee a co ee poi : . pep ee? ' te OCCURRENCE: pe , On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence Reoency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their mhief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence Fathering. a] Kin SOURCE: OO STAPF? ee IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 23 DATE: Dawson FILE: . | 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: Richardson, John Diem DATES: CATEGORIES: 16 Sept 1963, DIEM OCCURRENCE: a In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGO922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's requestfor his Judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long — as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with . respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure ! Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be i more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)" TARE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 Nawson
COé6ag¢ AH CT9LEPaE - ploaog Gf aheg PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: — Richardson, John Moy Diem 16 Sept 1963 DIEM ~~ OCCURRENCE: - __ In a CIA cable from Saigon (SATGO922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's requestfor his judgnent on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated ineasures designed to pressure’ Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These. measures would be more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives. )" SOURCE: STAFF; IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 FILE: pate; C/T STE PERSONS/ENTITIES: smith, David R. DATES: CATEGORIES: CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963 ae Richardson, John Lodge Sept 17, 1963 DIEM Dunn, Mike oo nen) A nea OCCURRENCE: Hoek SALAH In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17! 1963 fie Leporied mith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr John Richard (Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson! (On on sn occasion Dunn asked Conein, .'do_you think that, Dave. Smith can run the ‘stations f a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?! " i SOURCE: STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 Dawson PILE: | DATE 6/27/75 * . 4 . ee wy 4 a
BT GTSEEPEE proeg coé6ar of abeg PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: smith, David R. CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963 Sept 17, 1963 DIEM Richardson, John Lodge Dunn, Mike Salgon Station ; ; ; ~ OCCURRENCE: Pp ee ee In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September-17;. 1963, he “reported "Smith (discuss with me) reports that lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson (Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one occasion Dunn asked Conein, ‘do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?! " '- SOURCE: a STAPF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 Dawson FILE: : DATES 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean McCone, John : Lodge, Henry Cabot Richardson, John OCCURRENCE: DATES: CATEGORIES: Sept 19, 1963 In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed thet Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your , desires. Personnel, including the ‘station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would - not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter..... " SOURCE: i TAF: : IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25 | Dawson i DTT tf . !
SG60G AM CTSESPSE Ploeg Li abea PERSOUS/IENE TT LES: DAIRES: . CATEGORIES: Todee, Viemery Cabot Kennedy, John F. Sept. 19, 1963 On September 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (544) Lodge stated to the President that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the present government in the immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as an interim measure pending such eventuality. Frankly, I see no opportunity at all for substantative changes. " SOURCE: STAFF: ns Dawson PILE IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24-25 DATE: athe | 6/25/15 CATEGORIES: PERSONS/ENDITIES : DATES: Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean MeCone, John Saigon STation Sept 19, 1963 Lodge, Henry Cabot Richardson, John OCCURRENCE: In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced . We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead ‘us to conelude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter..... " IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25 | Dawson STAFF: ' i i
COé6ag¢ AH CT9LEPaE - ploaog af aed - PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: UWEBKGUR LED ¢ MceCone CTIA Subcommittee on House Armed Services . Sept. 23, 196 OCCURRENCE: OT oe On September 23, 1963, the hicCone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services. He told them that the agency Was urging a slow cautious approach to the problem of “ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regime that was capable of running the government. : | STAPF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25 Dawson DATE: 6/25/75 SOURCE: FILE®: PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: NHU a TO DINH October 1963 DIEM Vw COLONEL TUNC CONEIN CCURRENCE: DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to rres DIEM. He became the actual key to the success of the coup. His facile, and at times brilliant mind, was used to the general's advantage in that GENERAL DINH convinced President DIEM that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket orders to be a counter-coup force. ~DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his principal airborne com- panies on a bootless operation outside of Saigon on 29 and 30 October, so that these troops would not be present on 1 November. DINH is the Minister of Security in the provisional government. p. 13 SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein i mere. DATE:
PERSONS/ENTITIFS: DATES: CATEGORIES: DIEM — CG60¢ AH CONEIN October 1963 OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying orders from his air bassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who were planning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caught with their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economic and military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his objective the en- couragement or the promotion of the coup, nor’did he ever discuss the possibility of dis- couraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest or remained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway. pp. 38-41 GT9LSPEE - Plog 6L ahead STAFF: SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R, DAWSON DATE: FILE: — July 1, 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: DINH . MINH Early October DIEM a DON 1963 COLONEL CO, Dinh's Deputy OCCURRENCE? Voon the ministerial post for DINH did not materialize by early October, the coup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime. It is evident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL MINH dur- ing the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had compromised him sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH if he showed any sign of compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a day including CO, his deputy. p. 13
AH PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: DIEM / Gc60g CONEIN COLBY, WILLIAM October, 1963 OCCURRENCE: CoLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONEIN) received a call on October 30 (1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the de- cision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home at one point, etc." of shed GCToOlePeg : pros Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 11-le ————" —R. DAWSON FILE: ——=* 99 June 1975
AH Gco60c ploog | Ta pra CTOEZESE cad - PERSONS/ENTITIES: Conein Gen. Don . Gen. Duong Van Minh Gen. Ton That Dinh Ngo Dinh Nhu OCCURRENCE: SLO ae bk Sec, PERSONS/ENTITIES: OCCURRENCE: SATEGORIES: DIEM CARD STAPF s DATE: Dawson 6/30/75 CONTINUED ON NEXT
Es PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: a AMBASSADOR LODGE 10/3/63 | DU =] | * CONDI 10/3/63 ! DIEM a GEN. DUONG VAN MINH | Ls 2 a | = oul ha ia hal fal ci berg berg =| fu it] bn] =e) ha SOURCE: | STAFF: Dawson ; ~ -Hearings, $.8.C.I.,° 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, Pb | ———— FILE DATE: 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENTITIFS: CATEGORIES: McNamarra Lodge McCone DIEM Y Richardson smith OCCURRENCE: a sas Ne yom rel Sa On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what . IT understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 ina CIA cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the’ following report appeared:"....it is clear that Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". Ina comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-~ quarters requsst that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station." SOURCE: : STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26 parr: Dowson
Coé6ag¢o AH 5 3 e3) / OCCURRENCE: On 5 October 1963 in ° : a states cable t instruction that € to Saigon (DEPTEL CPN. the Ambassador should continue his volley on it tt CT9LEPaE - ploog stated as a fourth cool correctness "toward é co abheg SOURCE; orc ner IG Report 1967 (cia Pp. 30 MeNanacva Lodge MeCone Oct 3 - 4,1963 DIEM Richardson Cp pe oe Stith a ph poh G8 ea! OCCURRENCE : . po Neds ee a On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what L understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:"....it is clear that Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". Ina corment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head- quarters requsst that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station." SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26 DATE: STAFF: Dawson
BT GTRESPEE-PTOOG cosgag Fa aheg PERSONS/ENTIPIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: LODGE ne Dept. of State MCHAMARRA 5 Oct 1963 DIEM ‘TAYLOR . Py PIR y “OCCUR Clot On 5 “October oe in a states cable to Saigon (ORPTELS 3H) it was stated as a fourth instruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness"toward GPN. SOURCE: : STAPF IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30 DATE: FILE: oo eet een ee tee cere tte eth tones nh nh manly hh oe eh oe Me AED GND nnd an et DO ak nh ae Pa Ae th Aha Ns NEE een an Seat ea Sent Hy eth punk ath pnt ng Sah Se eR A FU bed AR WA Rn! ene fete oo tae aie wnt one me He ee PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: KENNEDY, JOHN F. a LODGE, HENRY CABOT DIEM WHITEHOUSE October 5, 196 OCCURRENCE: In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears: .Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as it appears...." SOURCE: STAFF? IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30° . Dawson
CG60¢ AH as) fu =] ' oo an PERSONS/ENT fg ee KENNEDY , JOHN F. ITIES: 0000 0g | ee LODGE, OS In OCCURRENCE in Presdie ee aigon (CAP63560) eee ent today a 0) of 5 0 any active Pproved recommendation ct 1963, the following Message appears ener, IG R Sport 1967 (CIA) p, 30 — StF PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: Kennedy, John F. Colby, William Conmodity Tisport Program Oct. 5, 1963 McCone DIEM OCCURRENCE: a —_ On 5 October there was a Presidential meeting on Vietnam. ‘The only CIA participant was MeCone. He provided the following record. The meeting was held to discuss matters that became the subject of DEPTEL 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.) DCI said it was the opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Fareast Division, that fiddling with the commodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create an economic crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more cocperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at large of a more serious nature. Tt was the concensus of the meeting that some meaningful political movements had to be made but exactly what they should be was not determined. Dawton TH Rannart 1067 (CTA) n. 27
Go60c AH GTOLSPEE - Plog og shed SHUT, DAVID - . “CONAN , Oct 5, 1963 DTTEM LODGE MINH Tn a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGIYN7) of 5 October 1963, DAVE SMITH, the Acting Chief of Station cabled that he had discussed this latest CONE-IN/MINH ata nae iene LODGE and DCK\WRUEHART., SMITH reported that he had recommended HO iba Seater HOD that: “we do not set ourselves errovacably against the assassignatton ple 4 Secs oe the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or protracted strugs. which can rip the Army and the country asunder. * om, ———SouRcE: j —— STAFF: _ _ Dawson IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.28 DATE: FILE: 6/27/75 Ke Hc SY NN Se ce "eee ms KD ts emt One nh SEED ER) ste sone sty erp ext coe em ( PERSONS/ENTITIES: Nhu, Ngo Dinh Conein DATES: CATEGORIES: CAn, Ngo Dinh Lodge Oct 5, 1963 DIEM ” y Diem wy eo En yoy pa aN = ree ; Minh, General hw iris) Sonos . OCCURRENCE: Gen CST ne On October 5, 1963 in a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIGI445) it was stated that the meeting with Conein (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future. He said he did not expect U.S.G. gupport of a coup effort but did need USG assurances that USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the change of government: (a) assassinationof Ngo Din Nhu and Ngo Dinh €ir Aheeping President Diem in office; (b) encirclement of Saigon by various military units; and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist military units. SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27-28 Dawson PILE:
= PERSONS/ENTITIES: @ODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. wie pape ‘KENNEDY, ROBERT F.., Via b va ji }IEM, MC CONE, JOHN: ees [=] ROCCURRENCE: vc CONE recalled a meeting with — President KENNEDY and Attorney General "ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about October 5 or 6, 1963. The Attorney General was M'rather non-committal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said, ohn, are you sure you are right? And I said, I think I am and he said I'm rather surprised a@ the position you took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it..."(T) This dis- eussion had nothing to do with assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go @r use our influences not to. Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of ms- gages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways. CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called -- CABOT LODGE was called by DIEM's Office and DIEM said, you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do it. Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy... SOURCE: STAPF: Hearings, SSCI, June 6, 1975, McCone, pp. 63-64 R. DAWSON PILE: DATE: 29 June 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: CATEGORIES: KAHN iN. LODGE, TRUHART, WM. a SNH KARR , 5-7 Oct. 1963 NGO DINH KAHN SMITH, DAVID COLBY, WILLIAM, MC CONE, JOHN ; — OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified as to the events surrounding the cable from Saigon of 5 Octo ber 1963 which reads as follows: "We do not set ourselves irrevocably agaanst the assass ination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath wees gon or a tracted struggle which could rip the army and ene counery epearene ane ene oe © Oe ara NE as follows: 6 October 1963 which COLBY wrote for MC co direc Sonat ee ec j tion plan under MC CO Ss ; recommendation to Ambassador concerning assassina A Unde? i erereby endangering, our in a position to actively condone such course ol ac cannot gpons ibility therefore COLBY explained eet this second message pe Ofion of DIEM s inati COLBY state a ellminate assassination as an alternative. an N pepiy was sent. on becober 7 sothers NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to continue. u Soe algun in response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was taken as directed, mean Hd ing that the Anbassador had been so informed to withdraw the recommendation. SOURCE: TARE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 12-17 _ R. DAWSON FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975
CG60¢ AH GT9LEPAE - Plog og shed PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: MCCONE ~ j a LODGE SMITH Oct 6, 1963 DIEM “OCCURRENCE: In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR7366lof 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs that you withdraw recommendations from Ambassador (concerning assassignation plan) under MCCONE instructions as we can not be inposition actively condoning such course of action and thereby’. engaging our responsibility therefore." SOURCE: STARR IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28 Dawson FILE: DATE: eb LAU PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: 'VRUEHART , LODGE MCCONE . SMITH Oct 7, 1963 DIEM ~ OCCURRENCE: In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Saigon, the station in Saigon responded (SAIG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DOAN TRUEHART was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal recommendation at MCCONE's instruction was also conveyed to TRUEHART. Ambassador LODGE commented that he shares MCCONE'S opinion." SOURCE: STAPP: _ IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 29 Dawson — FILE: DATE: 6/21/75
z PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: ° on ee a pe latertanehee cliente & BUNDY COLBY Jf od @ JOHNSON vo[3/ 63 DIEM | ' KILPATRICK . SPECIAL GROUP = MCCONE ; OCCURRENCE: *, On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there % was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.S. was maintaining % a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to the fact ‘ ® that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans. Mr. MCCONE also referred A ™ to "theorientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that"for m Americans to resume top level contacts at this time would appear to represent & a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running ® counter to his policy." The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of ® station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined. ) SOURCE: 3 Ti Abba | Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct.17, 1963" - Kelley FILE: DATE: ee a ~ 6/28/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: - CA'PEGORTES: a Tung, Col. Smith, David Oct 8, 1963 Phillips, Rusus, AID Acting Chief of Station DIEM Colby, William Sisevonu after 10/5/63 _ Richardson, John "Jocko"Aid to Diem Regime On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflects in a conment that the U.S. government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had alraady been cut quitely and over a period of some months. Bill Colby, Jock Anderson and Dave Smith told us that the public announcement of the aid reduction was a signal to the general and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals on, but if so, that antention did not find its way into the record. ‘The nearest thing to it is in the record of a presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips receminended and he suggested "cutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much enthusiasm as an indication of virgouous of American position. " "In general, aid cuts were discussed in terms of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in his-xereintass Hevever planned; -orhevever-Leokedipen—b . the US aa ats it. is. clear Cee GR vietnamese considered the official confirmation of aleoht kis a clear token of their support of coup planning. . DTT. IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 17-18 ATT Dawson
06 abeg CLOEZEZE  PLOOd CGé60c BH 7 PERSONS/ENTITIES : inna + + | | 6/27/75 REMEDY, JOHN F, DATES: a HARDSON, JOHN — ATEGORIES: . Oct. 9, 1963 ure you flat] operating S operated unde y that th my instructions. i © coope e ration of t is a very dedicated p he National Se DIEM | NT kno ub] w that CIA has not *¢ servant, has led to meet carried out mtrol of the Director of Centred saent curity Council and unde PERSONS/ENTITIES: LODGE, HENRY CABOT COLBY, WILLIAM KENNEDY, JOHN F. OCCURRENCE: CATEGORIES: Oct 9, 1963 prem “ “ALAR (QPP AARAE © see r { vor oo In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228) which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollow to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leav a change of government or deny economic or mil it appeared capable of increasing effectivenes support to win war and improving working relat ing appears:"... while we do not wish e theimpression that U.S. would thwart itary assistance to a new regime and if s of military effort, insuring popular fonships with U.S." The cable urges that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense." SOURCE: STAFF: Nawenn
COé6ag¢ AH GT9LEPEE - Plog T6 abeq PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: INNEDY, JOHN F. RICHARDSON, JOHN Oct. 9, 1963 DIEM OCCURRENCE: Ne On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has nov carried out independent activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under iny instructions.” SOURCE: . STAFF: . : IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 Dawson FILE: DATE: 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES; DATES: CATEGORIES: LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. ~~ wT MINH, GENERAL Oct 10, 1963 DIEM DON, GENERAL COSt 9, 196D COLBY, WILLIAM OCCURRENCE: In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assibtance to a new Yea» if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort. - SOURCE: , STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33 DAWSON
Z6 8HCa CLOLZPZE:PTOOad ccseoc AA LODGE, HENRY CAROL a ne COLBY, WIRLIAM Oct 9, 1963 DIEM KENNEDY, JOHN I. poh g ‘ booty In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Aybassador (DIR7/228) which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theilmoression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges , that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense." STAFF SOURCE: ee IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 Dawson FILE: | < DATE: =" 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: LODGE, tH!ENRY CABOT KENNEDY , JOHN F, — Oct 10, 1963 DIEM MINH, GIENISRAL DON, GIENERAL COLBY, WILLIAM OCCURRENCE: In a 10 October 1963 gntry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " while we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...." Oct. 9,1963 [STARR DAWSON SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33
E Piyrduiiosy Lawes ta tees oe ret AMBASSADOR LODGE GcEN. MINH GEN. DON S 4, CCURRENCE: ms qu ha hee ha cu =i fk an ‘i fu Li La] 4p a] STAFF: Dawson SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I.,; 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, ro po. © cn = OID, { DATE: 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: JODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. ———— ee TINH, GENERAL 7 @ct_10, 963 DIEM ~~ JON, GENERAL Oct. 951963 SOLBY, WILLIAM , OCCURRENCE: In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...." — SOURCE: ) STAFF; IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33 . DAWSON
PERSONS/ENTITIES: Senate Foreign Relations Committee MCCONE DATES: COé6ag¢ AH Oct 10,1963 CCURRENCE: A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we c would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our c cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor me the sidelines." iploo0d CTOESPEE Fo 35eq SOURCE: IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33 FILE: CATEGORIES: DIEM L~* it was noted that ould say positively ounsel to proceed result in something rely by sitting on STAPF: Dawson DATE "6/27/75 DATES: PERSONS/ENTITIES: senate Foreign Relations Comnittee _MCCONE Oct 10,1963 “OCCURRENCE: A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nwe have not seen a successor government in the wings t ‘would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it eautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the sidelines." SOURCE: IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33 FILE: wr . CATEGORIES: it was noted that hat we could say positively has been our counsel to proceed which might result in something the victor merely by sitting on STAFF: Dawson en ae =" 6/27/15
$8608 AH ; CATEGORIES : SCONETN GENERAL, DON PDIR/ 1228 Oct 23,1963 A LODGE, HENRY CAROL - be ~ OCCURRENCE: 7 . TU ee In a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it was noted that a meeting with CONIEIN requested by General DON, DON said the Generals had decided to try to ‘stage a coup within a week follcwing 26 October. CONE IN gunder instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would scek ®permission of the coup conmittee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's weyes only. SOURCE: - STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 33 DATE. Dawson FILE: — —— 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: Lt. Col. PHAM NGOC THAO oct. 2h, 163 | DIEM OCCURRENCE: * Dawson RTT + DATE >
AH cn PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: e GONE IN DIEM a AMBASSADOR LODGE TRON 4 eI = a OCCURRIENCE: ifn re) w nH fool on 9g abeg SOURCE: earings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One , STAFF? pawson Paae &, ~ . DATE: 6 30 75 FILE: / / PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: INEIN Sateen etl ‘NERAL DON R74228 IDGE, HENRY CABOT a 7 OCCURRENCE: “4 oo ces a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon | stations, "Hi story” of ‘the Vietnamese Generals up", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the nerals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week follcwing 26 October. CONEIN der instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek rmission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's es only. t SOURCE: T STAPF:
ES PERSONS/ENTIT Lis: WALES: UM LLU Ud Ld 1 20N Oct. 23, 163 | DIEM Goonein in OCCURRENCE: ploog GToCSFEl 1 £6 afea SOURCE: Hearings, 5.0.C PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: ON Oct. 23, '63 | DIEM ~ . /ONEIN . HUAN CCURRENCE : Dawson PILE: DATE: 6/30/75
: PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: i] nnn rs ee SEN. MINH 10/18/63 DIEM e~ DON . EN. HARKINS pra g tl | vad bes OCCURRENCE: N tad a) ft CH La = | fal) lo fa] LF] oo SOURCE: ; ; STAFF: ———~ Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One « ————__ Dawson Parnes fs, DATE: - FILE: ——~ 6/30/75 sy ee ~ CATEGORIES: SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAPF? dawson pages 13-14. PYLE: npzme. ©/30/75
z PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: *Conein Oct. 1’, 763 | DIEM oe @Huan “Gen. Harkins whimbassador Lodge o pra GTOLEPEE 66 sbeg SOURCE: Hearings, 5.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, Page So be, FILE: janes 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: LAM NGOC HUAN . AMBASSADOR LODGE CATEGORIES: DIEM — OCCURRENCE: SOURCE: ; . Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One., Peg 5, mor ror
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: % | in CONEIN @ MC NAMARA 12 October 1963! DIEM & NGU YEN QUANG © - PHAM NGOC 'THAO ci OCCURRENCE? When CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p. ", oO, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, l.e. 2 i NGU YEN’ and THAO. But did not explain the reference to MC NAMARA. p. 29 m3 =i foo GA a=) fu is Ln] fon Lee =) SOURCE: STAPF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON FILE: : DATE: — ——" July 1, 1975 ee ee a ht tn Hw en 2S: CATEGORIES: ERSONS/ENTITIES DATES: . DIEM J AMBASSADOR LODGE SECRETARY MACNAMARA OCCURRENCE: , — STANF: SOURCE? “uearings, $.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, | “—~——" Dawson
Es eee one my - a PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: Amy 2 CONEIN 3 CATEGORIES: DON i=] =) aq =| er wy OCCURRENCE: . a TT ha ol =) a a ial Mo eT Ahh fu itd & 2 = =) j=h CON'T ON NEXT CARD 4a SOURCE: — hearings, S.S.C.I., Jun Exhibit One. OA wa PILE: | ae PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: OCCURRENCE: | Pacers roe eo: C NUATION OF LAST CARD: Ch. 7a CONARHON NEXT SOURCE:
>PIOGG Go60c'’ AH GT9LEPaE 201 abeg Bo kad tae J a ow a4 PL dds e ee Reet eer CCURRENCE: CONTINUATION OF LAST TWO CARDS: PPO 2 Ps er © oh SE oe abbow fox 2a Ge rolpexr. SOURCE: FILE: WE haa bed oo
DON 10/24 /63 & ONEIN SOEN, HARKINS © eS 8 & i at) Rat be Ral tal oy fesk Lm] Le fi itd Ly] ft | so al SOURCE: Hearings, 4 >| STAFF: PeHoQes 4~ hy one Dawson a wh we mee - # FILE: DATE: 6/30/75 Lt me pete a on ee ee ae cre cram sme eo RE ea ED tov Gm nd Gu SOE SREY Gene Mente Sur On ttm fem sD fms fem ED SEY GS AEP WED AUDY GED Raw seen) eh eee ty mS dir ccd mgs com Gua me mpm cD & °-ERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: JODGE, HENRY CABOT JARKINS October 24, 1963' DIEM ~~ 3UNDY, MC GEORGE GENERAL DON ZONE IN JCCURRENCE: In a cable marked "eyes only" to LODGE and HARKINS from BUNDY dated October 24, CONEIN characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.S. government and DIEM. The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. NHU attempting entrapment DON's approaches to CONEIN. Feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKIN: zan stand back from any non-essential involvement. It seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN." p. 33 OURCE: STAPF : learings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
5 FISMSUNS/ENELU LIES ¢ DATES: CATEGORIES: = BUNDY CONEIN — Lo JOHNSON Oct. 24, 1963 DIEM @KILPATRICK SPECIAL GROUP — MCCONE Lr 6 CCURRENCE: aOn October 24, 1963 Mr. MCCONE had a special group meeting "expressed his fear that wthe top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved ein conversations between General DON and COEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN wusefuliness and involve Ambassador LODGE and General HARKINS in operation difficult Eto deny." The Special Group authorized a message to LODGE and to HARKINS emphasizing a secure system of contacts with Genral DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment mot DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONEIN meetings. The group agreed to firm up policy thinking re Vietnam before LODGE returns to Washington and hear Mr. LODGE's views on what courses of action should be taken. FOL SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct. 24, 19634 [!! FILE: aM PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ODGE 3UNDY Oct. 24, 1963 JON, GENERAL fos SONEIN OCCURRENCE: ma UIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY:it was noted that: "CAS has x2@en punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each weting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance xplicitly..." SOURCE: : STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 DAWSON FILE: DATE: 6/27/75
GOT ehegq GIOLePREEPIOed Ge6ac AH PeRSONS/ZENTIPLES: DATES: LODGE 7 oo HARKINS . BUNDY Oct 24, 1963 CONEIN boo, NHU ; [i i t re | phi btes mane ar | cat ad In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon Tor LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's approaches to CONIKIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over iwetings between DON and CONEIN." SOURCE: STAFF: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 ‘DATE: DAWSON 6/27/75 ee eee mi ares ae ee ee eee ee eS a OH A YG ONLOAD I EID A i SU Nw SN a Gm RY SE GE" eee CED Crm GOES eutp ct say ret ny wr sie ca Gene cums Set cae SEED SE Ene uy Ga sony PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: | BRENT 24 Oct 1963 DIEM CONEIN - CRITIC JGSs Levene" The IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION: ‘in future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you. should ‘slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.' As a consequence, the firse cabled reports from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here at headquarters." STAFF: R. DAWSON DATE: SOURCE: CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42 movrrm .
z PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: aHANSEN, “BUREAU OP BUDGET ~ oo SEXECULIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA Oct 24, 1963 DIEM oLODGE oy ECHARDSON 5 . is ~ OCCURRENCE: _ - oT ~~ On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and 8 KENNISTH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at . Nhis initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive & Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing “with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the we LLL tribes; 8. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was @ caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government ® officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or “Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE Chat he thought LODGE's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried cut under the directions of the Ambassadar. nd_had_been carried out with good judgment and wit h a_high quality of peter QURCERANSIN noted that at the time of his first meeting with®figi, LODGE hadnot yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. ‘This took place a few days later. (This appears to be a record by the CIA of a source which it had in @ apres of the Budget for fin He! Sut what Lodges Ehinking Sis at this tim.) BAN F PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ; CATEGORIES: DON, GENERAL HARKINS, GENERAL _ CONEIN, Oct. 24, 1963 DIEM OCCURRENCE? ae In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON reported he had been informed be Geli rel HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON to outline its substance, which he did. SOURCE: : STAFF: : IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35 Dawson PILE: - . DATE: A/97/76
= 2 PERSONS/ENTITIFS: ira) a a é * Ee ° — DATES: CATEGORIES: HARKINS © BUNDY : 8 CONEIN Oct 24, 1963 DIEM“ - : oe . ; CO PP MOR PON oe - rc OCCURRENCE: 2 AP et 2 In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, £ INDY the following. B scupe eppears: eth S, from BUNDY the following me SS AEE : ...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's pproaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back aw from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to main meetings between DON and CONEIN." sve vain close control over 5 fad SOURCE: ars IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. TLE: p. 35 DATE: DAWSON oe ’ 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGET — ST EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA Oct 24, 1963 DIEM . , LODGE . ar a a RICHARDSON SRR | OCCURRENCE: On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at . his initial meeting with LODGE. ‘The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive i. Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing e with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the hill tribes; 8. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was | caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its i own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the | ambassadar.._and had been carried out with good judgment ot. me quality of performans his first meeting with BOwuE, LODGE hadnot vet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. This took pldce a few days later. - awe We coh ah 4+ had in e Rirean of the Budget !
80T 26egq CLOLePEE PIOOG Gaéoc BH PERSONS/ENTITIES: DON, GENERAL HARKINS, GENERAL CONEIN, CCURRENCE: In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "Hi DATES: Oct. 24, 1963 CATEGORIES: story of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON reported he had been informed hy Geheral HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized. DON any coup plans. to outline its substance, which he did. SOURCE: FILE: PERSONS/ENTITIES: LODGE BUNDY DON, GENERAL CONEIN In a @IA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY:it was noted that: "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. OCCURRENCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35 DATES: Oct. 24, 1963 The second meeting STAFF: Dawson DATE: 6/27/75 CATEGORIES: I have personally approved each meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly..." SOURCE; IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 oTAFF: DAWSON i
El PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: _ EMCCONE NHU y SKENNEDY, JOHN F. DIEM - “LODGE eDIEM oe a 5 ie OCCURRENCE: Ry ge Sa ET ] “In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from NCIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose Nof the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to Scoup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in “Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government _ wrior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail. Bin sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and "therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making rand could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional ‘manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war-might be lost during ornftuasto ay {wines -Deuph-yte e be injected-imto the government and exere S G-AOG we eithey have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggres and it“isnot clear that the succeeding government would be much be IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: MCCONE NHU KENNEDY, JOHN F. Oct.25, 1963 DIEM LODGE DIEM — OCCURRENCE: In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose . of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect o coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our po cy Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the governimen prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in ner Tn sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not contro an . therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in ; naling and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-pro esstona ‘x manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would prov ce we leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the warsmnight e los uring pertodagy peEtival confusion; (7}-civitians capadie-of nnn or eres "3 coud not —— be injected into the government and exercise effective contro 5 nine eee. (9) important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool{ correc a Tuas 5 Naan we eithar >Aave to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggres 1G ,SEeDS o ren e
PERSONS/ENTITIES: Geoc AW “DON, GENERAL LODGE,” AMBASSADOR eCONEIN “2B éPee OCCURRENCE: Oct. 28, 1963 DIEM“ dhe October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generats woup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for ther Ambassador. DGE replied in the affirmative. ' DON told the Ambas dof uhati the U.S. government ashould not interfer with or try to stimulate a cour ‘The! Ambassador agreed with DON. sh f= =] SOURCE: STAFF: ——— . DAWSON IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37 DATE: FILE: 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: DON, GENERAL . 28 October 1963] DIEM t+" LODGE, HENRY CABOT CONELN "in the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey _ to LODGE that they were ready to have a coup and that CONEIN was to stay home and await fur. ther orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE ,. who was preparing to retum home on the 3lst of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON that LODGE not change his_plans as it mi going on. p. 48, SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein FILE: ght be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was STAFF: R. DAWSON NATE:
+ RSONS/EN NTITTES: DATES: , CATEGORIES: STILWELL, GENERAL RICHARD : LA SPONEIN Latter part ony DIEM GENERAL DON . October 1963 “OCCURRENCE : In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated, the people in Washington figured chat CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the U.S. government in case he was found out to have been set up. ‘Therefore, the people in Wash- Gington made made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive militar: S OpGE ona should take over from him. When Washington then sent a message to Anbassador DGE and recommended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN's, GENERAL SOTTLWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't wan! panybody else. pp. 31-32 SOURCE: STAFF: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON DATE: FILE: July 1, 1975 PERSOHS/ENTITTLES : DATES: CATEGORIES: JON, GENERAL “ODGF 1, AMEASSADOR SONISIN Oct. 28, 1963 : DOM OCCURRENCE: : an — a he October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals soup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for jhe; Ambassador. DGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador - Chat: the uU! is) government should not: interfer with or try to stimulate a coup .! im The’ Ambassador P agreed with DON. ae “ IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37 name. PAWSON
z et ce VALINOS CATEGORIES: N, GENERAL GONEIN Oct 28, 1963 DIEM WODGE, HENRY CABOT _ oA 2 OCCURRENCE: ~ 7 be rn fh an October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnames Generals Goup" it is noted that: CONEIN inet with Genral DON for the last time before the GUD was launched. DON confirmed he had talked with the Ambassador who had vouched for CONEIN. DON stated that he was leaving on 29 October to coordinate final wians. DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until 30 October -- until further notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have the plans before the coup Ueean, ,but when pressed on his previous commitment ‘to make them available, 48 hours Bn advance, DON said that possiblythe hours would only be made available 4 hours in advance. DON said that nothing would be happening within the next 48 hours and that, if there was a good reason for the ambassador to change his planned 31 October departure, the Ambassador would be informed in time to make his own decision. SOURCE: STAFF: PILE: ; DATE Stee ee $/2U05.
, CAQEGPEL. BT Goéog pled ETT afeg e “ ‘PERSONS/ENTITIES : CONSIN GEN. DO CAO TRI GEN. NGUYEN KHANH GEN. DON AMBAS. LODGE OCCURRLwwi. CON'T ON NEXT een an ee CARD eet ere CCURRENCE: CON 'D FROM LAS? CARD CATEGORIES: ia us aoe ed
““O60G AH proaeg FIE a60g. -€19EZPZE: —— DATES: OCCURRENCE: eae naar pares omen CONT. FROM LAST CARD rer nernett Roe AE CE — " enema ne ee ce weer mee mene ena ao et cm ee ine em Dk HEED gE or ee te es SE eT Te Se ve om Freienerhvand aes CATEGORIES: STAFF: DATE: ——e eee ie tee ee IE ae PTT EES IELTS TB STMELEAS NEY A
BT Gt —) be PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ; CATEGORIES: Finh , i “ Bhans, CAPT Conein 11/2/63 Lm shu, feo Dinh 1, Col OCCURRENCE: ha wo . Bam was returning with Diem and Nhu and an aide of Diem to the headquarters Th an arnored personnel carrier when flinh in a separate column in radio com- winications with Lam's celunn Found out that Diem and Nhu had been taken. goncein states that tinh with his aide, crossed the celumn, halted it and miune stepped into the armored car and upon orders from Hinh ‘hens billed Bhom. The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff Headanarters and later on in the afternoon they were Jater removed from the Ceneral Staff Neadanarters to Clinique St. Pant. SOURCE: Bearings, &SC Conein, June 20, 1975 STARR: Dawson DATE: 7/1/75 FILE: PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: LODGE, HENRY CABOT 1 November 1963} DIEM WH OONEIN OCCURRENCE: Oy or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1953) there were communications between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was trans~ piring. OONEIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the genera did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They d not want any American participation within the coup. p. 50 SOURCE: PP en ak on rae COMT Tear WN TAIT Dan ee oe Dn : —— ™ ron rena
BT Cn nH . 2400 hours RAN THIEN KHIEM Nov. 1, ‘62 DIEM a NH RAN VAN DON ed eee ee ee eee Oey ie UL URRENCE : 7 Ga rs =i) i ook CH Ls Bi ie La?) = - oh ~ SOURCE: . } STARE: we Hearings, S.S.C. de, 6/20/75, Conein, ae Dawson Exhibit One 5 page Pl, DATE: FILE: — 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENYTITIES: DATES Si CATE EGOR] RIES S: Nov. 1, '6 pIEM UU 2400 howe a : OCCURRENCE _ ¢ Theeg Byes hal neyo Neoe Sho else hae ppt m Located. v SOURCE: - : ) j - STAPF? pay on oeree=' Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, a SON, Exhibit One, page 21. ; | mere: 6/30/75
BT cCoéog pled GT9LEPaE LIT abea 11/1/63 2140 hours orm LiL DUND/ EASE LE Lis 3 DALIES 3 | CATEGORIES: NHU “OCCURRENCIE SOURCE: a STARRY llearings, 5.S.C.1I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 19. BILE: _ | DAE: Dawson PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: CATEGORIES: 11/1/63 2400 hours DIEM ~~ SOURCE” TT SER EE ~ Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Dawson Exhibit One, page 21, FILE: TV AMT «
CATEGORTES : MINH 11/1/63 AMBASSADOR LODGE 1925 hours 4, aa fod s Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, SaaS 3 page 16, CO DATE: 5 js 4 hte, PERSONS/ENLITIES : . DATES: 11/1/63 2140 hours DIEM a OCCURRENCE: BOMB EO Vo Crryed ohenedus p) tha ms Cb UOTE Lian weed STAPF: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Dawson Exhibit One, Page 19. SOURCE: Docla: 32423615 Page 1156 HY S0955
uds Meg Hiyze ‘auo 4tatuxy Surauc) *G6L/02/9 **L°o' g's Ssdutaeay ele Vi P1OUNOS DONALD OO EN GL/og/9 i auvd | “oT aded UOSMEQ a fauo ytatuxy ‘uteueg ¢)/oz/9 “*T*o's*s ‘sdutaivay _ alelVS >sOHM NOS TONED N90 vo oO WALT OHE OODN NIXON Quaptsezg ah Page 119 324273615 HW 50955 Docla
PERSONS/ENTIVIES : DATES } : CATES OI 11/1/63 DUONG VAN MINH - TRAN VAN MINH . TRAN THIEN KHIEM Sait ‘ i L, : Dawson en cone vee ~ coins te ee ae ue ene ee ee cosonvene vouvctetee vin weve mnie vein wit a SO DUP.CeE) Hearings, $.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit lJ 21 & PILE: page 16. DATE: 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: , . DATES: 11/1/63 1545 hours GEN. NGUYEN KHANH OCCURRENCE: RCE: " ; _ STAPF: pay SOURCE? earings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one "Pawson - page 16. pare; 6/30/75 32423615 Page 120 HY 50955 Docid
COL. ALIS: Nov. 1, '63 1330 hours CAYEGORTIES: “OCCUR INCE? SOURCE: oo i — Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one page lh. : RIL PERS SONS/FI VP TD TES : Le QUANG TUNG SENT DATE: Dawson 6/30/79 11/1/63 1400 hours “OCCURRENCE: ~ SOURCES Hearings, S.S.C.1 page Lk. FILE: 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, wa “SITAR ET DATE: Diem 6/30/75 HW 50955 Docld:324293615 Page i121
PVA a a « DaurunuUinsy WIN LL iin t DALES & CATEGORIES: | . i . COLBY Noverber 1, 1963 DIEM a LODGE, H.C. “OCTTREENCE. WHEN DIEM CAIIed LODGE directly preceding HS Coats COLT staves tna te eSsaes that he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "....said that he was going to require his officers to have filled their oaths of loyalty to tne constitution, th Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position President." p. 67 SRC STAFF: SOURCE: EET SST STAPE: R. DAWSON . r li Hearn SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby | DATE: 1 July 1975 A Re SRE SE GY wee et Ato aE GED wey eee FERS GERD Gah Re tee GN EID UD ae, PERSONS/ENTITIES: aa se SSS LE SY SG we me Se eID A Sn HRY HE GD A Nh ew ey cams ee ¢ DATES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN 4 DON, GENERAL 1 Nov 1963 DIEM STATION (sa\con) JGS headquarters OCCURRENCE: On November 1, 1963,:."CONEIN went to JGS headquarters and remained ab the command post throughout the Struggle. Before leaving his home, CONEIN alerted the STATION by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, CONEIN was told by GENERAL DON that DON had tried unsuccessfully to reach CONEIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that CONEIN's telephone was out of order. CONEIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate con- of the coup." tact with the coup principals,the STATION was able to report almost minute-—by-minute progres: SOURCE: CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 41-42 FILE: R. DAWSON DATE: 29 June 1975 HW 50955 Docld: 32423615 Page 122
PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN COLBY, WILLIAM 1 November D ~ 3 NR tan B= AAS [Sa eet iM 196 mM ms CRAY outs 963 pe a fe Ae Bee MIHN, GENERAL us FPR g ATE RY vee he we ade Sh Be tg fete COLBY states that "When CONEIN was told by the generals, GENERAL MINH, that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted. that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance to look at the bodies but turned it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assass- ination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between Presi- dent DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to vecelve that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city. SOURCE: KLIN was not in attendance, STAFF: R. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19. : FILE: DATE! 29 June 1975 | PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN gat BIN TOP ay CRITIC 1 Nov 1963 BO Bat | ia i JGS headquarters ee A i STATION Ly boom ek oat OCCURRENCE: Ty. ————~==—<—=<< The IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles", and bolsters that notoriety by the following statement: ‘"The first cable (on the coup) was received at headquarters at 0117 hours, .(November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159. At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the STATION. Sometime during the day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in its CRITIC cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages, seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at headquarters." SOURCE: STAPF; CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42 R. DAWSON , DATE: FILE: 29 June 1975 Docld:32423615 Page 123 HY 450955
VALS! CATEGORIES: CONEIN l November 1963 DIEM RRENC . When the generals took ie i left only the embassy Lines aren over the PIT which controlled the communications, they Ihe telephone terminals had been tak coup and instead of leavin ZIN! i i "i ad been discorvens: saa & CONEIN's telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected SOURCE; Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein PILE: R. DAWSON DATE: July 1, 1975 ee PERSONS/ENTITIES: ; DATES: CATEGORIES: 1 November 1963; DIEM / } COLBY, WILLIAM Nhu OCCURRENC!: conBy stated that "The CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of Pres- ident DIEM and Mr. NHU. ‘The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in ihe United States goverment and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern. In retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encoura; ing and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the DIEM regime, and that the record is very clear that the United States through itsoverall policy was in support of that overthr: and, of course, I think it is fair to say that in launching a violent overthrow of a re- @ime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders we. killed in the process." pp. 19-20 | 4 ih ef SOURCE: STARE: R. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, po. 19~20 rar rr TRAMTMD « SO Thaasn TAT HY 50955 Docld: 32423615 Page 124
ERSOMS/ENTTP TES: pes PERSONS JEN ETP TES DATES: CATEGORIES: GENERAL DINE DIEM el AUG. thru 16 SEPT. '63 yh EAA og eervions curlog 4 Him fo tha 223 SOURCES | : STAPF? Dawson Hearings, 8 S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, age 12. PEs 30/7 eTLE page 12 DATE? 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: CONEIN 1 November 1993 DIEM OCCURRENCE: CoNEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take place at a certain time in order to alert American personnel who might be living around the area to watch out or stay under cover, because they» would find 105's in the center of the city. There were no American casualities during this coup. The Vietnamese suffered about 100 dead. p. 51-52 STAFF: OURCE: SOURC R. DAWSON Docla: 32423615 Page i125 HY S0955
Vritisuiis/ibn ely bes: CATEGORIES : DIEM SOURCE: . ye | USPRARE YT _ — ~~ Hearings, S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, {| ~~~" pawson page ll. DATE: , PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES? CAIESORTES GEN. DINH- 31 August. '63 { COUNSELLER NHU ~~ OCCURRENCE: Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself. a SOURCH: Hearings , S.S.C.1., 6/20/75 5 Conein, Exhibit one, DTABP? Dawson - pages le-13. PILE: : DATES 6/30/75 Page 176 1324273615 Bocld HY 450955
GEN. MINH CON'T. ON NEXT CARD Oo maTeT nee! DIEM ae “ SOURCE: pages ll-le. Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ¥ SOM RT te ee tee ore eee te en see nt a ta ete tS DATE: 6/30/75 SOURCE? p| 12, LAST CARD CONTINUED PILE: DATES: ~~ STAPF: DATE: * "Dawson 6/30/75 Page i237 2324275615 Bocld HY 450955
PERSOUS/ENTIP TES : DATES: COL. KHANGY” oo a CATEGORIES: ere aR OS) ean a LOL OMe CONT ON NEX? CARD Yas Pacer SOURCE: Hearings, 8.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page le. PILE: | ~~ «6/30/75 . PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: OCCURRENCE: _ — CONPFENUATION FROM LAST CARD HSN ROM LAST CARD EWOCOiS, Axess Page 12, con't, Page 12% 132495615 Boctld HW 50955
PERSOUS/ENE LP TES : PORTERS: DINH © . DON OCCURRENCE t . “| STAPF: Dawson a=" Hearings, $.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, TT SOURCE: page 13. DATE: 6/30/75 Page 129 1324235615 Bocld HY S0955
PEN OUD / isi h LL bid . i embod) GCALIOUUNR LILS 3 Hearings, 5.5.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, OTAPP? pawson pages 13-14. os 6/30/75 SOURCE: PILE: . | , DATE: PERSONS/ENTIPIES: — - DATES : CATEGORIES: NGO DINH NHU | 11/1/63 DIEM GEN. DON GEN, DINH SOURCE: Heart ; re earings, §.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, | ~7-~ Dawson page 13. PTLE: . . nate. 6/20/75 324273615 Page i130 HW 509545 DociId
GEN. DON CONEIN AMBASSADOR LODGE “CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD "GORTHS + sCCURRENCE : ‘STAPF: SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson PA aS PILE: ee me me aren ore teen ee as ct nde me ty ml Fb ME EEE ah ee tare ee ly ne be Fe t PERSONS/ENTITIUES: DATENS: CATEGORIES: OCCU TRRENCH: CONT FROM LAST CARD = co cee jiak to owder @ crasatiee bohyvren © we — STAREG 2324235615 Page 131 50955 Docld HW
PpToGed Goé60og AH GTS3EGE&E EET abheg “Uy OPT earn tte SVI WOW NOTLVANTINOD LOND BIN DOO PARTON A SPRITE an AE A RARE PME IY retraite tere ae ee = GL/OE/9 aL¥C uosmeq ‘auc 4tatuxg Sutoucg *¢),/o2/9 PEOPLES Sp dered! hadi “C7 eSed ‘*T*o°Ss’s *sButszesy Soh NHN SUT LEN / SNOSH ad Nod * nap HNIC CON
PpToGed Goé60og AH GT9ECEAE EET aheg SL/ U/L *ALVG eT LOSMEG AQTOD §SZ6T f6¢ oune *TDO8s ‘ssutaroy * AelVLS *HOHNOS "US-Gp SoSey .,,7ALQUNOD oY) GUTAVOT UT adULTSTSse ynodu DUTYPOWOS COT PUdU pep o8poy Lopussvquy foaerpoy | fosuodsor ayy +dnoo Oy. FO uoousopyL A OUP UT SUM STUY] "UOTRLNRTS STYI Juoge Bury oedos pooyssrapun om osnedsq aueu Aq (Aq TOD) OW puv oLepsuvy [RLoOUdH YLMsuod “sg “fy Oy AVY. pawn oj] ‘uMOp STUZ Jnd 03 [LTJUOSSO ZT poadTToOq ay YvyI puv ‘sterouey sty Lq uty PSULLGY opeu Surog sum yLOJJO uvrss+,, topqnoa. Sutavy svn OY 2VYR pres wor’ "dnOd 99 JO UOOUTOTJU OY2 uo OSpoy oF wat Wouy OpeMW TTvo tv szUNODddA WO TAA UU LSOLOP V Sem otauz AdOD oy. OAVY JOU pTp oy YUNOUIER WwYR poquas Aqpog > TONTHYN OOO AQT 9.) aupOY CO/T/TT vam UOUULOZIV OPepsuvy > SE LYOORLVO *SaLvd > SUT LT TMT SOMO OMSL Mh a re,
PERSONS/ENTITIFS: HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON, “DATES: CATEGORIES: 30 Oct. 1963 | DIEM”. OCCURRENCE: On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063): "........ do not think we have the power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has made it clear many times that this is a Vietnamese affair...... I believe we should continue our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has been anaylzing forces for some time and it is their estimate that the generals have probably figured their chances pretty closely....... It does not seem sensible to have the military in charge of matter which is so profoundly political as a change of govern- ment....As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be passed discreetly, I believe we should furnish them....If we were convinced that the coup was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. HARKINS has read “SOURCE: taIs und des nd START R. Dawson CIA IG Report 1967, p. 39 DATE: PILE: ———" 29 June 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: RP CENTETTES: CATEGORIES: FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC Commander CONEIN DIEMt— OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on or about October 31, 1963, FELT came to Vietnam i landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning. p. 48 , ws SOURCE: | Hearings ,“SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein START: ~———" — R,DAWSON FILE: DATE: Taster 49 VATE Docld:32423615 Page 134 HY 450955
PERSONS/ENTITIES: LODGE BUNDY DATES: CATEGORIES: DIEM / 30 Oct 1963 OCCURRENCE? On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the following eable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred: "Thanks for your sagacious instruction. Will earry out to best of my ability." SOURCE: STAFF: R. DAWSON CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 40 FILE: nate: 29 June 1975 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DG PCr tn Sem ee HON wees AImeh cie He ENN cee fear EEE OED GEE GED GEE SOD CONN SU GUD cD oT & DATES: CATEGORIES: | iS fa wb fi 30 Oct 1963 BUNDY (7?) OCCURRENCE: On October 30, 19603, ina cable to Saigon e following quotation appeared: "....We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage coup....We cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention....U.S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side.... " ( the IG Report here states without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House re- peats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves." The inference can probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, it was undoubtedly emanating from the White House. ) R. DAWSON CIA IG Report, 1967 p. 39 FILE: . DATE: 29 June 1975 HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page i135
CAREGORTES: PERSONS/ENTIPIES: DATES: CALE SMITH, DAVID MOCONE HARKINS, CENKRAL "HELMS Oct. 29, 1963, , TRUBHARD, WILLIAM  COLBY : KENNEDY, ROBERT KNNEDY, JOUN F, OCCURRENCE: © Tn a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TTRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that 8MITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. ‘The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup. SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38 DATE: Dawson FILE: 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES HARKINS , DON cope MINH KENNEDY, JOHN F. woes, of DIEM LODGE Oct 30, 1963+; “4 5 i: 5 BUNDY a be OCCURRENCE: _ " i Tn a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of OCT 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that .chan@es of action with or without our approval now so sighificant that we should ongently consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to coup group can still have decisive effect on itsdecision. ... We must have assurance balance of forees clearly favorable...CONEIN should express to DON that we do not find presently reveal plans to give clear prospect of quick results...we badly need some corroborative: evidence of men or others directly involved....highest authority desires it clearly understood that after your departure HARKINS should participate in all coup contacts supervision and the event coup begins he become head of country team. IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 39 Dawson Docld:32423615 Page 136 HH 50955
LODGE, AMBASSADOR —— DIEM NHU CATEGORIES : Oct. 29, 1963 OCCURRENCE? preg [ ; if itd molto bey ma CODGE wives eet wsakG20h0) of 29 October, sent’ through eyes only channels of oA, SE give on the seemingly inminent coup: "In surma i | ee eee abtempt by the ganerals group is inminent...and that no positiveaction by eve no vouuests to fare attempt short of informing DIEM and } Althoughthere y 2 equests to -e by the generals for rateri cial « inticipate that such requests may be fortheoning or Mnanedal Supports We must IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38 STAFF: PILE: Dawson DATE: 6/27/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: LODGE, AMBASSADOR DIEM NHU DIEM / OCCURRENCE: BR SOF ro ae In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent“through eyes -only* channels of: CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup: "Tn summary , it would appear that a coup attempt by the ganerals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU.. .Althoughthere have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..." SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38 Dawson PTI. HW 50955 Docld: 32423615 Page 137
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES: GEN. DON 10/28/63 AMBASSADOR LODGE CONEIN OCCURRENCE: ry 2 UO er ois be ry ; STAFF: SOURCE: Hearings, $.S.C.1I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Dawson = TA TH we, ? nee va DATE: FILE: .* — 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENTITIEFS: CATEGORIES: SMITH, DAVID MCCONE HARKINS, GENERAL HELMS TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY KENNEDY, ROBERT KENNEDY, JOHN F. OCCURRENCE + . In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS. and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The OCI stated his view that even a suecessful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup. SOURCE: STAFF; Docla: 32423615 Page 136 HY S0955
6ET AHP CISEEPEEPIOOd coéoc AH fon i he ct (7) _C) O om ne | 4 nm oD 4 Fe rst Eg ater & ey x : | : “i a ‘ 1 it one, QQ id i) oi iw a . = 2 By p> 8 5 { 1) << ! a o | in EX : ih ! 169] -_ ) 4 w : — 1 fy \ XO t Oo ; 1 ° 3 I tH I i | FRE o + Ss | a eS a “ \ S | onl a is) ie nye , tt ia { } oral SB wv ! » fl g i me io mS { feag 1 i Pa ; iO > ey \ pee | ny | es | 4 3| sat brs ony A oy =] ot iO (Se & | | I 1 o eal FP 10] cel | of 1 t ay 1 1 2? a | H i | 82 : : = 225 eas Kat a
“PERSONS/ENTITIES: CONEIN GEM, DUONG VAN MINH GEN, TRAN VAN DON DATES: CATEGORIES: Nov. 1, 196 CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD Renta tiene FL TE an ne ea ee SOURCE: Dawson FILE: pate: 6/30/75 CCURRENCE: LRP EME rene ge ytines CONT. PRO M LAST CARD eR ee A genres ins nina STAFF: FILE: | Dave: 32473615 Page 140 Bocld HY 50955
PERSONS/ENDLTTES : | pares 11/2/63 JLCE PRESIDENT THO | 0310 hours DIEM CATRGORTRS ; OCCURRENCE ee . ys > “Dood . t COL Tha prbeena at 1 eng Pr a vate Es bace ES Oder Qeivay MBytes “SOURCE: oo oo ~ — Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Page 22, FILE: LL, DATE? 6/30/75 STARR i Dawson Docld:32423615 Page 141 HY 450955
A hekeUiWs NY LY iss : er taranaantontor ema S DATES: 2 November 1963 MINH NHUNG BRENCE? CONBIN stated that around 6:30 or 6:4 te MINH for the first time. DIEM asked MINH for full not guarantee full honors, if and during the time that another. DIEM stated that he would order the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls that this took place at about 7:50, Noverber 2, 1963. CONEIN stated as follows: "At this - Stage, there were four armored cars and 113's an escort of military police proceeded inmme- . Giately from the joint’ general staff headquarters toward GAI LONG PALACE. BIG MINH with his aide, CAPTAIN NHUNG got into a sedan and with MIS Corps, went out the back road from the general staff headquarters towar d the back of the golf course and took a different road from the armored cars that went down Cong Le." p, 52-53 SOURCE: R. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein PILE: DATE: July 1, 1975 PERSONS/ENDI'P EES : DALES : CATEGORIES: MINH 11/2/63 , 2420 hours DIEM Odzd(?) SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, STAPF? Dawson Exhibit One, page 23. DoclTd:32423615 Page 142 HY 450955
FERSONS/ENTILUVIES : DATES: CATEGORIES: Yon, General Conein 11/2/63 Dien OCCURRENCE: Conein stated at the time they were mony on the capitulation of Dien, in the press. Pace 74, £oing. to bring the press in for Don said"get the hell out we are the cere- bringing SOURCE: Dawson j FILE: | pave: 7/1/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: LAM, DUONG NGOC DATES: Wook tsb Wooen Ler >, / Yer 7 — onl OS Sey OCCURRENCE + XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted, took off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted, and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan. DIFM and NHi were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the column LAM, who was a little fat guy who wore a mustache and used to command the civil guard and not the individual who jater became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical pro- tection. p. 59-60 SOURCE: STAFF: Rp. DAWSON Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein Docld:32423615 Page 143 HY 450955
PERKSONS/ENTIVIES: . DATES: CATEGORIES: Conein - Lodge sic. 11/2/65 i Dien a OCCURRENCE; J J a Conch stattt™ he kept contact with the junta "until the day that the u. S. ofEiclally recosnized the South Vietnamese gvovernnent. There were several countrics that recornized, and T was acting as the liaison officer for the aubassador to the junta during this: period Cor approximately ten days or two weeks, SOURCE: co san : ye - PIT « Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1875 STAPR: FILE: p. G1 DATE: 7/1/75 DATES: CATEGORIES: PERSONS/ENTITIES: Tuan Conein 11/2/63 Dien Nhu l ~~ OCCURRENCE * * Colby stated that another officer who had. worked with Conein was executed about that same time as Diem and “hu were. Tuan apparently had been head of the Special Forces and had worked very Closely with Diem and Nhu and Conein and » Page 27-26. was executed by the Generals -that mornings SOURCE: ; STAPF: ; Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby mm Dawson i FILE: - DATE: 7/1/75 Page 144 232425615 Bocld HY 450955
CATEGORIES: Dion» fink thi, Neo Binh : CONC TL | , OCCURRENCE: Tonein explained that although it was baffling as to why Diem left the palace to eo to the church in Cholon, and although he did not know exactly how they ‘at out the general assumption was that there were secret tunnels. in the palace shich was the former Governor General's Palace called Gailong Palace. The tunnel took thea under and tiroush the palace and the half block to City Hall. Depa aed aee O3-64, PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: 11/2/63 | | STARE : SOURCE: HNeariness, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975 Dawson FILE: DATE: 7/1/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES: Sane, Major ‘tinh . Diem ee Phen, Neoc Conein ufo [¢ > MLCT. Ree Tau Miu OCCURRENCE: Bane was in the armored column and returned about an hour after Minh had left. Conein asked Bang (whom Conein had met in Hanoi in 1949 what his orders were, _. Bang stated the orders soing through the palace was that we were not to fare unless we were fired upon and that they had not been found at that tine. The expectation was and everyhody assumed, that Minh and Nhu were at the palace, Dawson SS (leary SSCOV, Goria, SPO A SM 32425615 Page 145 HW 509455 Dacia
PERSONS/ENTTIT IES: GUN L ON MEX CARD DATES: CATEGORIES: a 11/2/63 DIEM ne ; Ey 0310 hours fds 7. Vawo Chany CLG 4 _ LIST OF OFFICERS Volonehoe? Loin Von PARTICIPATING IN. Wy, WhRoL of Mitbhecavy Oeouraty Saevias Co Chuan. Jed vcs < THe COUP: = we CON’T on NEXT CARD Bal Bana Nb Division Giese Noroe } Sly kd SOURCE: Le . 2 eee ree wid! Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Cone | STAPF: Dawson Exhibit One, page 22, PILE: 6/30/75 PERSONS/' ENP ITT ¢ DATISS : CATEGORIES . 7 DIEM NGUYEN CAO KY OCCURR ENCE: iS ie LAST CARD Cont? ° fe. Coleneds: he OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP: Hearings, $.S.C.1I., 6/20/75, Conein, STARR: SOURCE? Boclda: 324273615 Page 146 HW 50955
ae Be OCCURRENCE : LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP: CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD: . LOL DATE: BW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 147
cgaspin pee opens PERSONS /ENTLPTES | OPES: 11/2/63 1330 hours NHU Rhames vo (tp Ge saavt 2: ri. 7 » by Was lM tho ~ SOURCE ; 7 STAPH: . we Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Dawson Pages 24 = 25, DATE: PILE: ° 6/30/75 PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: DIEM DON, GENERAL . MINH, GENERAL 2 Nov 1963 DIEM * CONEIN JGS headquarters OCCURRENCE: "According to one of CONEIN's reports, DIEM called GENERAL DON at 0650 hours 2 November and offered to surrender unconditionally. GENERAL MINH inmediately ordered all telephones removed from rooms in their JGS command post area. with the outside except for radios under MINH's control. This cut off all conmmunicatio: DoclTd:32423615 Page 146 HY 450955
CAREGORITES: ™ ad iene Nov. 2, '63 1130 hours NHU oCCURRENCE : ~ SOURCES . STARE: ~—---=" Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, a Dawson Exhibit one, page 24. DATE: PILE: - 6/30/75 PERSONS/IENTIPTE oss DATES: CATEGOR IRTES: 11/2/63 = 1330 hours DIEM SOURCE: STAPF: “Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson ye'25, . rns; Page '*? PDAPE: py Page 149 232423615 Boclda HH 50955
PREASONS/ENTIT IIS ¢ DAMES : 11/2/63 AMBASSADOR LODGE 1000 hours CATEGORIES DIEM a yoasmmdts Loudya cleared an Se bo the Chancery. SOURCE: oe ee oe ae Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 24, Riles SIRARE Dawson DATE: 6/30/75 PERSONS 5/E. NTT TIES DATES: GEN. MAI HUU XUAN 11/2/63 1130 hours NHU CATEGORIES: a OCCURRENCE 3 Yana Musa. led or ALA ga Boye Dh x Che Go wana pe OF 3 elie, death at =" Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 24. DATE? 6/30/75 SPARE] Dawson” HY 50955 Docld: 32423615 Page 150
PERSONS/ENTIPIES: DATES: CATEGORIES: J. 11/2/63 NHU ; 1000 hours DIEM OCCURRENCE: POUNCE’ Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein SEATE? Dawson Exhibit One, page 24, FILE: | pare: — 6/30/75 ae er ee last eee —. oe ee — acannon ey ane PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES : CATEGORIES: 11/2/63 NHU | 1000 hours a “OCCURRENCE: CH J rh STALL LL \ ~ aowdbss Wilk SOURCE: Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein SPAFE? Dawson Exhibit One, page 24’, PILE: sare. 6/30/75 Boclda: 324273615 Page i151 HY S0955
11/2/63 0420 hours Vice President THO SOURCE ee ten e  SIRABR IE —_ ~—-—=="" Hearings, 5.5.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, a Dawson Exhibit One, page 23. DATE: 6/30/75 POR GOS JEG Tp pps - DNptarce PE HOON S ZEAE LP TES: | ATES “ CATEGORIES : 11/2/63 1000 hours DIEM t-—— ~ SOURCE YT ql woe Ton) _ Paes earings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, ™ 1 Port Nawean Boclda: 324273615 Page i152 HY S0955
~ OCCURRENCE: PERSONS/ENTITIES: . DATES: _ CATEGORIES: es A bene VEEN } f KEANE : Jan. 1964 : DIEM (~~ MAJOR DANG SY | At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime the coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh' 5, Bro deaths had been .caused-by American-supplied grenades <A Be use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the convictignxby3thésmilitary court was that the 8 deaths were caused by these concussion grenades “\Higgans argues in her book that this conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessmerg Of the MKIII grenade which found that at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have suffi- cient force to decapitate or mutilate persons, let alone bring down the ceilings, doors, and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station. (95-96) Higgins also states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter one way or another. The trial was clearly rigged from the start." (96-97) SOURCE: STAPP: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, | Dawson, R. 1965 PILE: | DATE: July 2, 1975 Bocld: 324273615 Page i545 HW 50955
LLiwoUNOSUNE LE LES DATES: CATEGORIES: Thich Tri Quang Spring, 1965 Diem, - McNamara Diem CCURRENCE: Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that: "Thich Tri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps the greatest mistake we made was_when we gave Thich Tri Quang at the U. S. Embassy." (from September through November 1963) Page 103 gon SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, STAFF: Dawson Harper and Rowe | FILE: DATE: July 3, 1975 Boclda: 3274273615 Page 156 HY 450955
ae VALILO: CATEGORIES: Colby, Wn. BE, hearson, D. dem | Breckinridge 3 ( 67 IX-C+2-5 . Castro OCCURRENCE; Breckinridge actually put togeth response to a March 1967 Drew P was involved with criminal synd ner the I.G. Reports and he did so in carson column to the effect that the agency icates to assassinate Castro. As a result of discussions caused by the Pearson column, staff members in the I.G.'s office were directed to put together reports on CIA involvement in the assassination of Castro, Trujillo, and Diem (50). SOURCE: SSCL; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75 FILE: Cage eats eee HY 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 157
PERSONS/ENTITIES: IG REPORT CONEIN SPERA DON, GENERAL DIEM CATEGORIES: DIEM, “ 31 May 1967 OCCURRENCE: ty concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations: ‘To recap: (a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the DIEM regime, but faithfully carried _ out instructions. (2) CIA officers CONEIN and SPERA were the contacts with the coup gener— als, but only as approved and under instructions. (c) A CIA officer, CONEIN, was at the generals' command post throughout the fighting. (d) CONEIN furnished GENERAL DON about $65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress. {(e) CIA had no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them." ~ SOURCE: a R. DAWSON CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44 DATE: FILE: = 29 June 1975 BW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 1456
Pinos. LE Liss: | DATES: ' Wo fF COLBY | “ oo COLBY stated in response to the difficulty f6r the United States once it has sougnt to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of tho. foreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various tir the degree: to which he is going to do one thing or the other. The U.S. cannot control it. The U. S. cai assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, vernaps influence him, but the control, that is....when you are dealing with essentially another soverign, why t: are limits to your degree of authority over them." p. 76 OCCURRENCE: SOURCE: STAT: Hearings, SSCL, June 20, 1975, Colby me R. DAWSON FILE DATE: 1 July 1975 Docld:324273615 Page 159 BW 50955