Date: 02/13/01 Page: 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION Released under the John F. ennedy Assassination Records AGENCY : CIA ollection act of 1992 (44 Use RECORD NUMBER : 104-10534-10082 Pio? Note). Casef#iNW 53216 RECORD SERIES : JFK : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : NOSENKO RECORDS DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : CIA FROM : TO : TITLE : ATTACHMENT B TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:ANATOLE RE NOSENKO, CRUCIAL QUESTIONS. DATE : 04/07/69 PAGES : 45 SUBJECTS : NOSENKO "ANATOLE" co NBR DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : SECRET RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/02/01 OPENING CRITERIA : , COMMENTS : JFK-M-24:F44 2001.02.02.09:27:45:170084: DOCUMENT DATE TAKEN FROM LAST TWO PAGES - CORRECTION AND AMENDMENT. NOT BELIEVED RELEVANT (NBR). [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 53216 DoclId:327404746 Page 1
”~ | Daa ~ a) ATTACHMENT B - 2 . —————— ‘4, _— taF Be Yee PR Fee E ood) ANATOLE Re NOSENKO CRUCIAL QUESTIGNS A. ANATOLE was consulted 31 March and I and 2 April 1969 concerning his recommendations on how to proceed to elicit additional information from NOSENKO. ANATOLE offered specific, topics and questions about which NOSENKO is to be questioned after setting forth items or topics which ANATOLE considers . the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which need explanation or resolution. _ These CRUCIAL QUESTIONS are set forth below with comment or -notations which emerged during our discussions. Be ANATOLE understands that the immediate period of : elicitation from NOSENKO is part of the program to attempt to | resolve the bona fides of NOSENKO. He understands that his participation and contribution is actually the implementation . of the program he originally believed was to be followed -pofore there were any conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides. ae ANATOLE | had been reviewing his file material and the transcripts of his comments in January 1959 (The KY transcripts) so he | was prepared to discuss aspects of the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS as “well as specific elicitation topics. As our contribution to. the discussion with ANATOLE we had prepared 26 papers relating specifically to NOSENKO and I had notes concerning other points or topics to be discussed. Each paper was read by ANATOLE, he fe HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 2?
retained certain of the papers and, as set forth below, he commented about certain of the papers or related matters. After outlining the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS we worked out an elici- tation guide to be followed with NOSENKO as the beginning of _ the program. ‘fhe elicitation guide is detailed separately. C. ANATOLE submits the following as his recommendation “about how to proceed with NOSENKO: 1. Isolate the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS for our guidance -and consideration. (We basically accomplished this 31 March and 1 and 2 April although obviously these may be revised) 2, ‘Devise questions for elicitation. The questioning of NOSENKO is to begin immediately and is to follow the pro- cedures set forth separately. (The initial phase of this:was - accomplished. Additional or revised elicitation topics or | questions will be considered when the results of the first elicitation phase are reviewed with ANATOLE). | 3. <A polygraph examination. (ANATOLE believes another polygraph based on questions he will help frame will be. essential. It is his opinion that it will be possible to make the polygraph meaningful if questions are based on a careful review of the results of the elicitation and specifically on the basis of nis knowleage, ANATOLE believes it should be possible to use the polygraph effectively and to eliminate or explain more adequately the qualifications concerning NOSENKO's veracity HY 53216 Docld:32404748 Page 3
such as "substantially truthful" by pinpointing questions and areas where there remains doubt. ANATOLE agreed there might be a question of when a polygraph examination should be administered since it might be more effective after the confrontation or hostile interrogation of NOSENKO.) 4. A hostile/confrontation interrogation phase at ._ which time NOSENKO would be faced with the errors, incon-~ sistencies, falsehoods, etc. in his story and advised that his mission failed. This phase of the approach to NOSENKO would only be undertaken upon conclusion of the elicitation phase or if or when NOSENKO's attitude changes during the elicitation phase. The confrontation would be undertaken only when full research on every aspect of each CRUCIAL QUESTION has been completed and specific questions are framed with ANATOLE on the basis of NOSENKO's information or — answers and all collateral information. In this connection ANATOLE expects continuing research on each crucial question so that each can be examined on the basis of a summary of all information about the question, the details of what NOSENKO - has said and related or collateral information. such as photographs or documents, etc. The hostile interrogation phase ANATOLE anticipates will be undertaken only after full consid- eration of all possible problems. For example ANATOLE stresses he will need to review the Bagley letter of November 1966 to — HOSENKO since this will be a key element in considering how to '. proceed with the confrontation as well as to attempt to determine HW 53216 ————— ve a oo. 4 4 Doclda:32404746 Page 4
° tT t what influence that letter has had on NOSENKO during the 67-68 intervicws. D. It was necessary to emphasize to ANATOLE the fact that at this time it is not possible for mie to assure him that everything NOSENKO has said on any topic has been racovered or is retrievable even for the interview period of 1967-1963 (and 65). Hoting the papers we had prepared ANATOLE had to be told there was no assurance that everything NOSENKO has said was included or considered when attempting to extract or summarize his statements about a person or event. Specif- ically it was noted that with a fow exceptions no topic or item is fully covered during one or two interviews. Even though ANATGLE recognized the problem based on his review of the transcripts of the 1967-68 interviews it was necessary to emphasize the fact that the validity of any given question we had framed might be challenged, reversed or modified as the process of indexing: the transcripts continued, ANATOLE was | told that as of 31 March 1969 we had been able to index and oxtract the transcripts and memoranda of the 1967-68 interviews. only through N-188 of approxinately 260 H-memoranda. ANATOLE also was told it is not pessible to be certain that all previous information from NOSENKO can be accurately and fully recovered. Egor this reason it is difficult if not impossible to isolate what he might have said in 1964 and/or 1965 and compare that os HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 5
HW 53216 DoclId:32404748 Page 6 ~SEGRET @ @ -5- statement with what he said in 1968, ANATOLE also acknowledged - noting the pessible significance of the interview techniques as these have varied over the years, Contrast in the technique and the approach to NOSENKO whero, for exanple, he is provided information or asked only to confira a leading question has tended to dilute if not obscure what NOSENKO actually has had to say about rany sudjects; at this stage it may be virtually impossible to distinguish NOSENKO’s original infor- nation fron subsequent statements modified as a result of. ‘questioning. ‘This problem is an important consideration because the approach to the elicitation phase was developed with this in mind. Essentially it was agreed with ANATOLE that despite previous statements oF information from NOSENKO the elicitation phase would be managed to attempt to obtain | from NOSENKO everything he has to offer or say about each ’ CRUCIAL QUESTION at this time without reference to any previous statement. (It is ANATOLE's opinion that if NOSENKO provides a full statement without prompting that further questioning can bo meaningful after analysis of his statement ds spite the possibility N NOSENKO has modified or revised his information as he has learned or apparently learned what he thinks is wanted or he should say. ANATOLE believes the fundamental problem remains and that despite NOSENKO’Ss twists and turns it will be possible to sort through the various. stories to focus on the reason for NOSENKO's dispatch and determine the
on oe be key items of diversion. E. In reply to ANATOLE's question he was told that the FBI continued to interview NOSENKO usually with Mr. Solie present but that I did not know in advance anything about the topics of any interviews. I told ANATOLE it was my opinion that once elicitation from NOSENKO began on the basis of his _ recommendations that other interviews would stop. Keo recognized and agreed that there might be a tactical and/or psychological problem with NOSENKO by shifting the interview ‘technique to elicitation rather than consultation and a response to’ questioning. ANATOLE could not emphasize too " strongly the need to let NOSENKO.respond fully with minimal prodding or stimulation and without refreshing his memory. ANATOLE was told it was my understanding the elicitation - ‘phase would be conducted by Mr, Solie without FBI partici-- pation although I did tell ANATOLE that the elicitation trans- cript results would undoubtedly be given to the FBI just as have the results of all the 1967-69 interviews. F, ANATOLE expects and recommends that the period of elicitation will be followed by the period of interrogation . or confrontation to be conducted by a tean of threo persons - The security expert, Mr. Solic; a counterintelligence specialist who knows related cases and CI problems, and a Soviet specialist. HW 53216 Docld:32404746 Page 7
ANATOLE says this team approach will be necessary to implement a fast moving interrogation, based on the script he will help uevise, which will not permit NOSENKO time to reflect or think about his answers. The tactic will be to insist on immediate and full answers and ANATOLE insists that once the new elicitation phase begins NOSENKO not be permitted to write any answers: He is not to be given any written assign- ments: every response and reply is to be oral and transcribed . and NOSENKO must be encouraged and permitted to respond fully: he is not to be asked to confirm or deny any statement nor is “he to be assisted in replying to any question with suggestions or reminders. G. ANATOLE recognizes the problem of information from FBI sources and the release of this information to hin. He respects the FBI need to protect its sources and understands the FBI attitude even though he quite obviously disagrees. He believes that our failure to make relevant information available to him is shortsighted and lessens both his effectiveness and. our ability to decipher the NOSENKO puzzle faster. ANATOLE recalls that at the time NOSENKO defected in 1964 and there was discussion with the FBI about the SASHA lead and related matters he asked for FBI file and source information pertinent to the problems, ANATOLE continues to believe there probably HW 53216 DoclId: 32404746 Page 6
@ -8- ® is a serious question about the possible significance of NOSENKO to panetration of the FBI and the bona fides of FBI ‘sources in terms of misinformation (disinformation) in relation to both NOSENKO and other information. He is of the opinion that a FBI source(s} probably came to the FBI after his defection and perhaps after NOSENKO's contact if not dispatch in 1964. He suggests the possibility there may be a false arrest and show trial of a FBI source in order to further bolster NOSENKO'’s story. Although it has. not been possible to discuss this aspect of the NOSENKO story with ANATOLE it seems clear that if we are to gain full measure from ANATOLE. it will be necessary for the FBI to approve or conduct a briefing of ANATOLE appropriate to puting a perspective on the FBI sources so he can assess what they have said about NOSENKO and GOLITZYN. | 8 H.° The following are the CRUCIAL QUESTIONS which are to ‘form the basis for elicitation from NOSENKO. They are set forth in the order discussed. | . 7 . 1, Misinformation in the Second Chief Directorate (sco) (This is an ammediate topic for elicitation as set forth- separately) 2, Leadership of the KGB | 3. Leadership ef the First Chief Directorate CFCD} 4, Leadership of the SCD . 5. SHELEPIN's 1959 Report (This topic will be discussed HW 53216 DoclId:32404746 Page 9
HW 53216 copy.) nore thoroughly with ANATOLE before the question is raised with NOSENKO again. ANATOLE was emphatic in stating that it had been a mistake to raise the subject of the KGB policy and 1959 veorganization with NOSENKO. He read the paper with attachments but deferred comment except to note that NOSENKO had said very little of significance. It was at this time - that ANATOLE first notod it was a mistake to permit NOSENKO to write memoranda, ANATOLE obviously considers this aspect . of the NOSENKO case most important and a topic which requires . iis study particularly in view of the fact he now has extracts | from the GOLENIEWSKI letters which relate to the 1959 KGB reorganization and disinformation, ANATOLE also did not recall . the book so it will be necessary to make certain he has a : . 6, Penetration of the American. Embassy Moscow (ANATOLE considers this a most important topic which requires additional study and elicitation later after research will permit us to assess NOSENKO's statements rapidly. ANATOLE | reiterates his concern that it is exactly and specifically in this area that NOSENKO's reassurance of no KGB successes. is most likely diversion. ANATOLE expressed his concern that in January he may have commented too extensively and theoret- ically about this problem. le now wants to re-examine this problem and refocus everyone back more precisely to NOSENKO and his story) DoclId:32404748 Page 10