> wits (iis form is te be used for metarial extcastad 8 a. pet from ClA—<entrelled documents.) *The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee Counsel sheds, further light on the dt€ficuitéies—encountered by—~the~Agency,“related—to-its investigation of possible Cuban involvement in the assassination: Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was _the Soviet connection. Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view. Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-. Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President? _ Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side. The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic) within -- it was an-enigma at the time. They were just - | getting started. This was -area. This was WEN Cyc, lean De Seeetls area of proficiency. } So the defectors had only © em begun to come out and they came out rater, the Cuban defectors. ie So, I can't -- I really an e-say—th a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time. The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of ‘the Rockefeller thing. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection. investigated? . Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate. & ayy 900018 Classified by derivation: _ Classified by derivation: - Gisssifisatisn:
ae wy =~ aw ay ay Ay a ae ~ 9b - I Elassification: . This form is to be used for matasial sateested m ElA=centreted decuments)) Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the Agency provide -=~ Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly didn't do it. Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me? Mr. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R&A. Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not -- Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all. This was something left to the people who were concerned specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation. Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information | pertinent to the assassination was to go through your office, correct? Mr. Rocca. Yes. “Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent to the assassination went through your office, I take (it) you or. Mr. Helms would decide what information would be relevant for the Warren Commission to see. Is that correct? Mr. Rocea. Well 7 fo & Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew? Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes. € \ Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the 3 position, it would seem, to know what information was being generated in the field that was going to the < Warren Commission. & Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (did). - Glassificatisn: Yar trotele) ee 053 . ; i Classified by derivation: : . _ Classified d by derivation: ee bea nu) & e pas ee WES
~ 9c = Glassificatien: ; (his form is te be used for motenial extents €iA=—<onirelled documents.) Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans. Fd ‘ , ° Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record. \”" \ (Discussion off the record. _ Mr. Goldsmith. Let's continue. of Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the great press manifestation was that Cuban. exiles who were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this. This was the great concern. Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. -y There are different -- VG ging eb ty othe i o F f weed, Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to(WH}, do you have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in this kind of thing. There was extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised to try to clarify that side. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility of an assassination plot by Castro against the President was adequately investigated? (Pause) Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hind- Sight, I could say probably not. But at the time it seems to me that they gave due attention to it -- within the information that I had at my disposal. é OS oer ; ‘ q **Tn fact, EHO spent 2 years, 8 months in the Soviet Union > COctober 1959 - June 1962). ea. 099920 ro i Classified by derivation: . Je a3. Classified by derivation: _ Piha = yA
om fre y . é 8 : i k o3 - 10a --, = SE  Glassification:: This form is te Be used for meaverial sctraate! on ElA—centrelled decuments) ya Oswafid. .. (Angleton, p. 86), e~stated~-for-the-record oad with garg—ko-theWarren-Commission's~investigation” ..i./ j (withthe-CIA's~ support) 6f possible Cuban’ involvement J lonley 4 in the-assassination?™ . < y * jae keg iM (2) I personally believe that the United a if States intelligence services did not (AB dey ey | have the capabilities to ever come to an adjudication (of the Cuban aspect). y 7 I don't think.the-capabilities were-thergs | . : va To oe He ee tA Ng a I HSCK Classified beposition of James Angleton; ere cnn cnt ett ete eared ZTO TR SNM a aa. : f 000622 GL0G-4) \ Classified py derivation:
~~ ay =7 my a ll =- Elassification:. This form is te be sed for material axtercted . f om GlA—cenirsied decumeants,) Caq\ . As noted above, the CI Staff assumed responsibility in late December 1963 =- early January 1964 for the coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond Rocca, (Chief of ‘Research and i Analysis. for cr ‘Staff, was designated ..., 8 Commission. Angtetron, t0/S/A7S, vb. 77.) Rocca's Research and Analysis component was concerned with: unt-of~contact with § the Warnenswec- oon (42) “analytical intelligence, analytical XQ brainpower, which meant all source, all overt source comprehension; a study of cases that had ceased to occupy opera- tional significance, that is, closed cases, to maintain the ongoing record of overall quality and quantity of counterintelligence on QO being performed by the entire DDP operational" /GSca Classified Deposition of 2. for etan ys, (HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocéa, \ 9/17/78" see also HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.) related pases (x) Mr. Rocca “testified ‘that “assassination-— information generated by CIA components was directed to his staff (as designated point of contact with the Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day to day Sa. ae oo <=.
Geter : ad pn 8 | ie ee, es {gt et terial extracted a <3 roue documen $4 oan oman, . 524 _™ Pita, ae “oe ae eres: o page Hse Cher deps. te. occa afr work (€eid., pp. 16-17.) This information was then pr al cetronee eR LINBIEET NE pee reviewéd by Rocca or his assistants who na cindes [t » Expé at research and search man for the U.S. Intelligence - CA ty EAp med Community and its resources/}, and irLiar—Beeley who had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a: umber _ Ro) ee aed years prior to the assassinatig®) (bia. p. 17. . i sings stb riz ae During the course of the Warren Commission investi- hat et gation, Headey A aa oe ntcspe ue fey worked with those hed “et «. Oo CIA sivistons pecdasing substantive information, .. set en Yelated to the assassination (ibid. ay é (4x Mr. Rocca wa Speer Ke even though | & CI/R&A. was the Agency's point of reference with regard to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the ; CI staff in general displaced the direct relations of Mr. Helms or any other concerned | Agency official with | 7 the Warren Commission, 4tbid.; Rocca testified that neither cr Staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet a seeycey 4 Division (represented by Dettideitumphy, Chief of the 000624 wee. | Clann By satan toni: ———
~~ sy ay a” «ay ay 7 - 13 - Classification: , This form is te be used far Gl exteasted m GlA=<centrelled documents.) SR division and his assistant, its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/R&A displace John Scelso-in his contact with the Warren Commission. Rocca y€ estifieds that in some instances iA cade. wd J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly to Helms with requests,.and in other instances David Slawson, a Commission Staff counsel LC Aganty try hspee | . with ToirHe?PtT of Rocca's staff. 43 | The record reveals that on certain issues of particular sensitivity Rocca was not permitted to act as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission. He testified that "compartmentalization was observed | notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level 3 i ‘point of contact. (aScaA Classified Deposition of Raymond canis sneer rdtat arene mpniecw * Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct Superior during the course of the Warren Commission investigation, he did not participate on a regular ‘basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive Gal kif os information to. the Warren Commission nor did he deal mai ge roe on a direct basis with Warren Commission represen 0% o) * tives. (excepting Allen Dulles on an unoffici asis; opie gs agent Hs€a~Ctasstfted Deposition of Raymond Rocca 78/17/78) _ pod oi? > —-—-p._1]=18p H&éGA~Ghasedcied Deposition of James Angleton, °° 10/5/78, 3, P- 782) However, Angleton testified to this _ot --€ommittee that he did attempt to keep apprised of aa developments as the investigation progressed through Snr consultation with Rocca. (HS€A-—Classtfted—pepositierr of Jam (a2 bid, p81) EGET HESHIOR: yf a tan § 4 ?. Clositieg by derivation: ar ue E23 assified By derivations a mssmsmesnmes _ N a
This form is te be vsed for metstial eateested em €lA=centreted GOGURENE) 3 C Rocca, 4/17/78, p-. 18) Scca cited by way of example the case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca testified that he did not attend any of the Ag ancy . discussions. - Pertaining to Nosenka's S case f —_ Rather, (as i it affected the Warren n Commission investi= ~~, (gation esponsibility for the Nosenko casdwae ae Ag cact Enphuses | . \ ; ree SR Division, in Cay) Rocca described the CI staff mail intercept program, assigned to addition to Richard Helms HY INGUAL, as a second example of an Agency matter ‘about which he had no knowledge nor input. ne SEACH TS Upp’ (Ibid., pp. 19-20, “Rather, Jamies ‘Angleton and handled. the. disposition of this: particular ZO RI AS pen try rant ig HCL material (HSCA Classified Deposition of J. Scelso, ~, 5/16/78, p. 113, wherein Scelso states that CI Staff \ ( i including was: reposi PLINGUAL intercepts; | buck See WSCA Clase Dep. 7/20 (7% irene |UCUdl gg herein] Steses Tht didnot ae ae i Warren Commi 38 len had know aK = the ATLIVGO f vo. Presramn becams?® ee As Not es et AY be pros Ay ha Warten Commi shion with moakerials 2ert tran . he, MT AIVSUAL progam. Sa Ree SI ey ot oe IBS. ?
Classification: wes This f9rm is 19 Be eed Agr material satcasted 8mm lA—eenireted aseumantsy =| . (vy) In summary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally decentralized information reporting function best dO characterized the organization of this second phase ef the Agency's investigati efforts to assis NER Chass ep at Al, Mh aeiad. 7) WS the Warren Commission (Epotd., p. 10; HSCA Classified eee j “Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 75, 80. . j eon ene ep vn ENN? See also CIA Doc. Rocca Memo for Record, ol April 1975, / “Subject: Conversation with David W. Belin, April l, | e) Ask io, , wherein it is stated. that Helms remained senior official in charge of the overall investigation, with CI staff acting as a coordinator and repository “ of information collected.) 908027 Giassificatisn: —— 20.0829 4 ere alias sci,
Crassificatien: —— is for o be used materi +e &S ™ 8 ig to areriag Sstrasds od om —con ed do ce rom —eeiirolled documents: The yer Come 198 SOTA Cloning Ret tanes A, Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA Representatives Regarding Warren Commission-CIA Relationship Ce The Committee has contacted both representatives of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA~ generated information to the Warren Commission.. The general consensus of these representatives is that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the (SREB APPT ed aca eines 5 person soonest PEt investigati " “(HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 1/17/78, p. 18) (See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, el 8/9/78, ppy 24, William Coleman, a senior staff counsel nee for thé Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters ; i which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as vi ead highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent..—-5” or (See HSCA staff interview of William Colemag, ~ \ 8/2/78! Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality ip tg ae og aor 4 SEY: 999023 Hh | aalied By iat Berk
aT PT y A = 7 a onl - — Gassifi ication: secede Si ica ion: (This form is to be used for material extracted aN Cpae_torlftoltéy Bsenighesneterie extracted from ClA—controlled documents -~10—- we ra > Par ee Session Testimony of W. “David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17;see also JFK Exhibit 23.) Ci J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the OS Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured by the CIA that the Agency would cooperate in the 6 EOS sanctitalty of crated Tce aie gates Gd WRC work, A ASca ‘Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/7/78, p.4; HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 9) John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard \ by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and. 7. of John comprehensive (HSCA Class. Depo. EER TE ae eal McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5) | . McCone was responsible for ensuring wR ste yatlo Red ef Neg S | . i fat all relevant matters were oo | 90823. ‘Chessifiication: so“ | 2aCc0: “13 — | | “Classified by derivations hall ee 'C. Berk
ay ay ay ar ay ~ co a ron Classification: se oH form is to be used for material extracted Athis dorm_is teoikey BSeiiehrs|orerie extracted rom ClA—contralled document ~l0a- w| bo conveyed by the the Warren Commission. (Ibid., pp. 56) In this regard, Mr. McCone at: (4 The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the | vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him 75 giving if his staff everything tha ( 0) he was quite satisfied. (Ibid., ‘ps 9) + - zo #2 3 policy cOanotte | gist the SRE aa rer Radio fase Bp eric eee 2 SacrenComm isting Y bpeh all matradg i 613 -b8hsn seit S “peliéf That’ Pag Pa Relevane'>** ~J f- Materials Be Made Promptly Available By CIA To Warren Commission C> Mr. Raymond Rocca, - Tic aA aT NIL mpiosenter of cin pales aye rune ae . od, Ag the Warren Commission . investigation, characterized the Agency's role as one /of full support to the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and~ “> Ce arene tetera emt 1 ore rs a neptintrnare mana 40 yp 889630 | Cletitied by derivation: — Sa BSEs
Classification: Classification: - (This form is to be used for material extracted fridvs Chtrm—dorteohhed deelrientaiaterial extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ~10b- _ oO wo “UU Staft. of the Cias stated under oath that Richard Helms had given the following directive: an ang. A, Csr) . (ali ‘material bearing ia—anse wey hat could be of assistance to the | Warren Commission should be seen by cif staff and R em@ A and marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded laste ot ctu’ indbeetbons ~~ they were verbal in so 1% far as I.know ~- that we were to leave no ---"~ if ~"gtone aie ———————— CS ‘(HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, Lf27/78 p. 24) _ We “GR. “WE “SR “GR aepest G aCf 8529 7 ee ie | Classified by derivation: C. Berk , ne ee ]
elF 3 i Mr. ROCE Fs AAR: Fbae uke Bi tndiERWwladaa@ed Mr. Helms* | 5 from ClA— —controlled fetter 2 ers were follow to the letter by all CIA employees. -Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: as to turn over and to develop any information be of assistance bearing on the assassination that co to the Warren Commission." . [sv] A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation,was directly responsible for the f ~ CIA's estigation of President Kennedy's assassination andthe Tighmenk of obvi vig a ris tha Warren Gorn miss 1a, (Ibid., p. 23.\) He testified to the Committee that the Made every effort to be as responsive as possible enna em emneaedinrents 7", wns Warren’ Commission requests«¢ (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard. Helms, 8/9/78, 29: . Helms added further testimony aa an ON a regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor- mation to the Warren Commission. He stated: An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com- mission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as jual items...Each individual item thae“tame along we” a8 care of as best we Cog) . However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily ; TP * gg an3e ; | Classified by derivation: Classification:
, a y 4 MT & Classification: on the basis offhigHarnndinie hei used fos unaterial extadedsts. under from ClA—controlled documents.) Oath he supported this proposition: Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that _ the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to speci- fic requests by the Warren Commission? © Mr. Helms: That is correct. I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallAble. There may have been times or circumstances under which some- thing different might have occured, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be-responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When. they asked for something we gave it to . them. a ” As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether wée-valunteered it or not, S wi (Ibid., p. ; [r) - Mr. Helms" orf characterization of fulfilling Warren iesicn requests on a cash is rat Commission requests on a caseAbasis rather than uniformly ‘volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the. Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as follows: . . (<8) Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission com- municate with the President and get a different arrangeeqar ificanone st not ask the right Classified by derictt SEE.
«Ses sification: fara t pon “ . assitication: | (This form is to be used for material extracted «dis dpxm—isnivoiey UUnkahemeterial extracted from ClA—controiled documents. -13- questions and then we would not have the _s information and that would be absurd,- eUHSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin. 8/17/78, p. 4) x4) Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA ; “ were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the of assassination investigation." ] (Exec. Sess. Test. W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, 29) p. B anne ee omen agama tt neta +o pki “S ed et ote TO. SE poet ms Pi ne OAL FL ELY _—_ Neh TEN A ES 1 ON o um: >) . oo (6 §o unfortunate consequence: OF etre nae celianee 07 | fhecin 2 provide ‘bra Carn mi Selon we PR Gehl relia vaANT CIA rn ker? a | jocfe fic wre fh : “4 the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro Ls assassination plots//(SSC Book V) see also (A}fegec Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report,. SSC, 11/20/75)/- Parntoxteatiy;—ev if e wee wees Se ae es ars Pa = Pheilatl a ; cs i fied eatias acagras i s San wot he record rev ead s+ et hee prots, gine al point of contact with the, Watre é ' pon a ces ete " 1w) we = Commission we . f 000084 red O52 Se | sty dt C2 BOE aN a or ir ya ST LT a mT ee
a Te WF eT Elassification: (This form is to be used for material extracted fds Conm—iontiPolted ugelrientmpterial extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ~l3a- “50 requestéar reals, +e had"ho™ wn ? _Fidel Waar: Class.” Depo. of nas  Roe€a, 7/17/78, § Set p BE \ f SEGHES J 20.0502 | Clailied by devotion: CBOE C. Berk
(This form is to be used for material extracted fram ClA—-controlled documents.) Had Rocge, as @ CIA's working level representative “ ne tothe Ww tren Commi ssioti, been reifiiested by the ving report onan ind_att ae x CIA-diti-castfo » assassinatién_ Etations Rocca's oe “eee te Pe Kinglevet ef xs would_have produ no sttbstantive informa- Avon. (2bid., p. soe ‘(ol The record Tih reveals that the CIA desk | officer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr. Helms to investigate . So Lee Harvey Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investi- eee 3” (asc Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/75 ry Set j Hae(93 REE Bara Ve te WIL ASH apr oct ra eed Mr. Scelso testified that had he (pp. Gh assassination plots the following action would have been taken: ” f We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operative Y security had to see if he had (sic) been ea a double-agent, informing Castro about » J4 our poison pen things, and so on. I “would have had all o $ queried about it."¢ (er) "we would have gone at that hot and heavy. “(Ibid., p. 1667" (43) As the record reflects, these plots were known g W Poca cot rtyed b We was netin apesity oy to ang oer gues Hons re lubed to 1A a. nakise pints agacaet Caste bur Prat Prese ratte pe ans wed Ay prias wile ware rote rain } . © EBA h AN “Wa asd Ant Kad gad tian muti iat ake: ra Lt y orZh Classification: S} <2) Waret’ Se Gakee - 4 us OZ see, also HSét=@beeenGdiad Deposition o vanes ‘Angletorfs 7 6YTR, oe -P\ pp.fo77t erein Angleton states Prat rcdid ns ey a SHOTS nN : OPS Ne m2 RS FAd9 1 nee F Hider C wet ° wat | Pare rhe es arf ere fan TK ~ “oe few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding. $
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) these plots reveals that the Agency compromised +hepalray ot yts Pivectec its=promise to supply all relevant information to  bsee-sroctempntrt Sonn fice teanenin ) the Warren Commission. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the ‘extent «of the Agency's compromise: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the ~ Warren Commission's work; and, in light of: that, ‘the Committee - would like toa be informed as to why the Warren Commission was- not told by you of the anti- Castro assassination plots. Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren. Commission about our operations. Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not , . know of the operation, it certainly . was not ina position to ask you about it. Is that not true? - Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Com- \ Mission or to Congressional Committees. or to anyplace else without the Lf Director's permission. iad Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director y whether the Warren Commission ; Oo should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination lots? jee a Classification: Classified by derivation: Haabs7
(This form is to be used for material extracted - lo 0 from ClA—controlled documents.) . . Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall. {HSCA Exec. Sess. TéStT Ut rd Be ag ) 8/7078: pp. 30-314, emphasis/ Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots he directed oe f that. the. Agency cease all such activities. A ar ah aac @lass. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p.- 13) When asked whether the ClA desired to withold informa- tion from the. Warren Commission about the Agency anti- Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he gave the following response: "I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never .3 been satisfied as to why they with: best cia Paina niens caebeenaiinnaal Ibid., i 6 ) : i ee NIAAA A ne 4 ; Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the - Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels © Rankin, Slawson and Spector were in agreement that ; such information should have been reported to the — Classification: | Classified by dei OBG38
<7 AT LF LT LT ae Classification: — SE (This form is fois. Depc Oe Fictede Rankin ae from ClA—con rp eet J ; Warren Commission. (Exec. Sens. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test. of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec. Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p- 71. c where he states that nossible witholding of - ~ Ss, fo. information by CIA about Agency attempts to -assassinate Castro did not significantly affect . NN _Warren Commission- investigation) ener ee ot sateen ae een er ee Te ee ern etre rear RE Rg Sia ren Brom_the-GiAts-perepective, Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots his efforts to explore the -possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi- . fied. He stated that: " -acompletely different 4 a . a _ ée procedural approach probably. ‘would and should aa been.. taken.” SSCA ¢ Class. Depo. of Raymond ‘R cca vas Prom a U17/78, p- 45). femmes a ~ John Scelsby ‘the-above-cited ‘CIA desk “offiger. ~~ ; — N fo ran the CIA's initial “investigation of President / Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility / 3 \—_was_given to the CIAt s counterintelligence staff, a Onan pe - offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission: Classification: . gong29 | Classified by derivation:
(This form is to be used for material. extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) - -Mr. Goldsmith: DO you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the’ assassination plots? ‘Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service.) (HSCA Clas$= “Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78 IT. Bb. a “=~ Agernic concern/ ‘for the geneeity” of Sensitive Sources and Methods - Factors Affecting | CIA Resporise to Warren Commission Requests The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information was dependent upon 1) the availability of information; _ . 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request and 3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. on the first two points, Mr. un Helms testified that when cIa(had been) able to \ satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back: “and some of these inquiries obviously os longer than others... For example, some Saal Classification: | 086649 | Classified by derivation: # : z “a
ne Ro Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to _ See if we could locate somebody in some overseas country. vg Obviously, one takes longer to per- = form than the other. /T&xec. Sess. Tees a (‘Of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. b demain wat fnt-e--confeeet ‘or protécting its Ces and at€thods caused ‘the ® Warden not at issue. 20K OCC Ed OA, J. ‘Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that yéhe Agency’ s effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods pact ctae (Ge .v . @f£ectadthe quality of the information to which 72 wrt the Warren Commission and its ‘staff. ‘were given — : § <4 (as ‘ a’ access. _ . HSCA ‘Class. ‘Depo, of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78, WP 22) As a resul It of “he-GEAlsconeern, in ‘ some instances the Agency Re herent ne daegageager et qererarers Limi Ptccess pt: f Ma tian ernie cones ten rey viet EE (isea_class. EPO. of John ‘Scelso, 5/16/78, p. sty nr cc hp es meoumynatnss The Committee has identified twoXareas of concern in which the Agency's. Gesive—to brouect! Ges Oo 7 CO nl li iced tad rrK. : sensitive sources: and methods” iapeteek the Woven ‘Commission's investigation. These are: : Classification: 900041 : Classified by derivation: re aed
Classification: “SECRET (This form is to be used for material extracted ; eken obs Din ti Hatley <——— from ClA—controlled documents.) or (fovtee es) Witholding infiexmaiion from the Warron Commission ~ . pertaining to ) pre operattens of the CIA's HexicomertyStation 2) Osta related considerate tion, the Agency" s pele retieence to reveal the origin of ihe photograph dee oN Yor Aor ted ran wheel hak mcsisten | fo) <4 ww © nitiak Conuaen fer Resealy ney Sen Bat FE Sour tee Ink’ Meth ods The CIA's concern for revealing the existence Soura. rad rtctiots a of sensitive technical operations / “as outlined abovep was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that “we were not authorized ae ae Sees i vel Bt first to_rewe al all our Gechnicad operations." (Ibid., p. 158) / But Scelso did testify that: were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including seehrrieed sources, including the telephone..intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia 7S Duran, for example, which, corresponded _ almost exactly | with the” ‘informati on from ; rt {Vbid de oF Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA ; report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Classification: 000042 Classified by derivation:
aT a a LT a 2 a AT ae Classification: (This. form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) _ [ong CE Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to ——— a boc. -POIA 4509- -803,, “1731/64 Wemorandum ‘for J. Lee BAnKin’ from Richard Helms) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this. report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report. ‘The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission - knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu- lated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information ye ' to the Warren Commission is to eliminate [seer aa £3) mention ofptebepttire-taps, in order to act . “protect your continuing-eps. Will rely ‘instead on statements of Silvia Duran oo, and on contents of SRR heap prsular ficken WF ole ... Which Soviets gave ae oce BOT ~ 3 oe Red0-BS 74427207637 “‘Dir™ 90466) a“ res ache The a HaStC~pokicy~artieurated in the December 20, 1963 cableAis also set forth? in a CIA memorandum _ ~ of December 1. oe it specifically concerned 7 ‘the CIA's relations with the FBI, | CIR Memorandu 12/20/63, included in with Soft In that memorandum, a eolozee] . a he ‘ S a “for, File, “f } awn of. the CIA. Counter intelligence Special Investigations Group Ses wrote that he had. been advised by Sam oe lassi ication: _. : clossifed by derivation: Q 0 tf G 3
SECREL Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted Papich, FBiorh iA sennitalled HecutBats.) that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported» or complimented the FBI's five volume report of ‘December 9, 1963 that had been: submitted to the Cid em ahnpee | Warren Commission. Papich provided with this report which indicated that some United 7 SAN Co oP se eed States Agency was tepping—tetepiiones in-Mexico and asked him whether the FBI could supply the pel Operadt ven Warren Commission with the source of the -teiephone a tapsy-{— “Sremoeéndum shows that he discussed . this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare | CIA material to be. passed to the Warren m commission. [srw cy Bas 5 phages | ? is ag 1 pac, ee hed Foyt LLBean Bi ie tha AP A e ¢ J PSs bee ee CME seterd, UF: a, 4 i a oagg44 Classification: i wa] ‘e) re) Bei | 1 j | Classified by derivation:
eCrZel ue Classification: oO - (This form is to be used for material extracted ;-——~ from ClA—controlled documents.) He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available Le Pe to. the Commission at least in this yoo a manner--via the FBI~sensitive informa-. ec’ tion _which. could.relate to“tetep sie . AGIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, By“. if included. in. Soft File materials)* FA hs TE The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 ina formalized fashion.” when Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already: called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information [{as deter-. mined from Agency sources)| coinciding with thé dateiwhen Oswald was in Mexico ‘City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. ‘ See aoe : CIA Fai Moi nase fe 474-19 | “Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which ‘would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which ‘Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information. [In \ this way the CIA could check the possibility of oo revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. The policies articulated were: bus lai. i“ re € go Classification: —$__________ 090545 — Classified by derivation:
(This form is to be used for material extracted ‘ 4 from ClA—controlled documents.) Item number three on the above listing ant ¢ seed et al ve TAN A LA Penn POP AG trae: reveals” that The dneeccens rte orticos-Armas conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the. passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the ra foresee The Commission thet i n-for een had specifically ¥eequéste VERS port feos~ammas— eee ersHoN twanserrpts at & March 1, 1964 meeting between . Commission | _representatives_and.Agency representatives. _yol : -S$iawson: memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: conference \ with CIA on March 12, 1964) ) : ee ; On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City. trip: The most. probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a-‘conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no™bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place. ...In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that Ry ae NER. might have uncovered other motivations or Classification: ’ Classified by derivation: :
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Luisa Calderon Approximately five hours after President | Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee in Mexico city named "Luisa" received a telephone 2 cali -from An. unidentified-man-—speaking-Spanish. (S “ < Ps a (CIA boc. FO : 5, 11/27 63, ‘173-615, attachment This call had been in ‘CityStation,as subsequently reported to CIA headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversa- tion as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consu~ During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard» _ (of the assassination) the latest news. Luisa replied in a- joking tone: _ Yes, of course, I. knew almost before Kennedy." (Ibid.) . ; CIA's Paraphrasing the tebephone—-intercept—eranscript, it states that the caller told Luisa . the person ; F; . A a ’ Be pee ee . - a x Ciassification: Classified by dg QQ "2  _ “aE. | NERA. x Ed