N ‘ a3\ ’ 09 Rey. 16-79) @ . @ "7 ha DATE: _ 5/13/93 CLASSIFICATION: _— UNCLAS FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI (soa-to-1036360 yf) % ota sy Pow Mia Mattee SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON °POW/MIA AFFAIRS WI-0- 52. 00-1 236l . | MUSHTAQ ED DIWAN; POW/MIA FRAUD MATTERS, and 10/8/92, captioned as above. File number 66-2170 has been changed into 62A-HQ-1036360. Enclosed for. the Houston Field Office (HO) are the original files: 185A-121 and 265-MM-50339. HO files were reviewed by the Civil Discovery Review Unit (CDRU), Legal Counsel Division (LCD), for documents responsive to the above-captioned Congressional Request. CDRU determined that the files contained no relevant material. Any questions regarding this matter should be directed : to. Paralegal Specialist JAMES B. STROUD, CDRU, LCD, on extension 3595. - Enclosure af , NW 54997 Docld:32989520 Page 2 _
0-9 (Rev. 8-16-79) ® “ * Y TRANSMIT VIA: _ ALRTEL CLASSIFICATION: _ UNCLAS DATE: _ 5/13/93 FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI (62A-HQ-1036360) TO: SAC, HOUSTON (62A=HQ-1036360) SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS ReHOairtels to Director, FBI dated 9/22/92, captioned - MUSHTAQ AHMED DIWAN; POW/MIA FRAUD MATTERS, and 10/8/92, captioned as above. File number 66-2170 has been changed into 62A~-HQ-1036360. Enclosed for the Houston Field Office (HO) are the original files: 185A-121 and 265-MM-50339. HO files were reviewed by the Civil Discovery Review Unit (CDRU), Legal Counsel Division (LCD), for documents responsive to the above-captioned Congressional Request. CDRU determined that the files contained no relevant material. ; Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to Paralegal Specialist JAMES B. STROUD, CDRU, LCD, on extension 3595. ‘Enclosure (y2-24.8 L~ || ‘ ’ NW 54937- Deold:32989520 Page 3 -- ; : _- - - _ - -
‘outing Slip (Coples ro OFF arose) ge ‘ (J Honolulu (_] Norfolk C) Quai ie December 5, 1975 ‘REr TESTIMONY OF assisay TO Oath DIRECTOR 7, ny2 sea fi AMS E j ECR COMMET TE oy TC: SAC: - t : 7G LEGAT: C7] Albany {—j, Houston CC] Oklahoma City ‘ {~] Albuquerque [_] Indianapolis CL) Omaha 4 CO Bem (] Alexandria =[[j Jackson (7) Philadel} phia (—] Bonn (7) Anchorage ([) Jacksonville {_] Phoenix (_] Brasilia ([} Atlanta (_] Kansas City (] Pittsburgh (—} Buenos Aires . (€] Baltimore © [7] Knoxville (_) Portland (—) Caracas : (-] Binningham [_] Los-Vegas C_] Richmond - (_] Hong Kong i (_] Boston (_} Little Rock ([] Sacramento. f—) London ! C_} Buffalo (_] Los Angeles (_] St. Lovis CC] Madrid { C_] Butle (__] Louisville {C] Salt_Lake City. f=)-Manila ' {J} Charlotte Memphis (_} San Antonio {_] Mexico City ; (J Chicago Cj Miami (-] San Diego [_] Ottawa : (} Cincinnati (_] Milwaukee {_} San Francisco (I Paris Cj Cleveland C_) Minneapolis [_) San Juan [_] Rome [= Columbia {—] Mobile [=] Savannah [1 Tel Aviv | f_]} Dallas ((] Newark (_] Seattle [_] Tokyo (_} Denver _ .{-) New Haven | Springfield | (} Detroit (C) New Orleans (_j Tampa i (_) El Paso [_] New York City (C) Washington Field | ico | | . For appropriate (C) For information C7) optional g() action (<) Surep, by (C] The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, (7) conceal all ~ sources, 7} paraphrase | contents. (_) Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA — dated I ¥ Remarks: Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony. f Attached for your information an N asSistance, is the complete transcript Of above-referenced eee een ~ AYVL —% Panehiy Goaws ZcaigaN uy SEARS HED. SEXED Ene. Mf ~ DEC3 4975 Bufile foi—nuusiud Urfile . ‘“ " HW 54957 voor Soasne0 Pag Yat Sle pechgntreminees wx nw son ces ewe remem
Cie United States Senate ~ ” coat Oe ania ee ae ee BR A ae oP Lhe we ; . - | “Report of Proceedings Hearing held before “A Mleck Committes to Study Governmental Operations | With Respect to Intelligence Activities INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION } mesday , December 2, 1975 : Washington, D.C. WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. }. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 544-6000 ~ MW 54597 Doeld: 32889520 Page 5
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Nw 34957 security and foreign counterintelligence ‘investigations; Mr. ‘|| investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., Assistant to Section DoclTd: 32989520 Page 6 Senator Tower... The next witnesses to appear before the Committee are JEK Act 6 Th) , Assistant to the Director- Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all investigative operations; Mr.. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal John A. Mintz, Assistant Diréctor, Legal Counsel Division; Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations; Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive Chief, Supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigaln-, Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelicy, Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, Gener-.: Inveetiie gative Division. Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.
smn‘ 16 ty Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 > WARO & PAUL 14 15. 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 oe 24 410 First Strect, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothin but the truth, ‘so help you God? the principal witness, and we will call on others as questionin might require, and I would direct each of you when you do the members of the Committee to return from the floor. percent of your intelligence infoxmation. 1 the criteria for the selection ci informants? 9 - eo~-.:. 1901 . Do you’ solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give Mr. Adams. TI do. Mr. Wannall. I do. . sO Lk Mr. Mintz. I do. Mr. Deegan. I do. Mr. Schackelford. I do. Mr. Newman. I do. | Mr. Grigalus. I do. Mr. Kelley. I do. Senator Tower. It is intended that.Mr. Wannall will be I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow (A brief recess was taken.) Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order. Mr. Wannall, according to.data, informants provide ‘83 Now, will you provide the Committee with some information HW 34997 Doold: 32989520 Page 7 ‘
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 1 12 _ 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 oe 18 “19 20 al 202 23 410 First Strect, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 24 25 HW $4953) .boekd+ 329895 20-—Page 6 then? ® ‘ PESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT: DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION - ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS ,. ASSISTANT 0 THE DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION) ; youn A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L. SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR., = ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT CHIEF;, AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF, " CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION _Mr. Wannall. .Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you ' have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting Office. Senator Tower. That is GAO. Mr. Wannall. Based on.a sampling of about 93 cases. Senator Tower. Would that appear to be a fairly accurate figure. . Mr. Wannall. I have not seen any survey which the FBI itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that we do get the principal portion of our information from live sources. Senator Tower. It would be a rélatively, high percent.: Mr. Wannall. I would say yes. And your quest” Le wo z criteria?
Oe 2 x 4 5 6 q 3: 9 “10 11 a 2 1 e 12 an Saree *) t 13 > 14 15 16. 17 18 8 19 2 20 é 21 = 4 22 & °° R3 eS -R4 ¢t 25 MW 54937 Doold: Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection of informants? Mr. Wwannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In_ our cases relating to extremist matters, surely id order to get an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged ina criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set of criteria. If you're talking about our internal security matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require | . that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field office indices, checks with other informants who are operating in the same area, and in various established sources such as local police departments. Following this, if it- appears that the person is the type who. has. credibility, .can.-be depended upon to be reliable, we would interview the individual in order to make a determination |. as to whether or not he will be willing to assist: the FBI in discharging its cesponsibilities. in. that. field. Following that, assuming that the. answer is positive, we would conduct a rather in depth. investigation for. the. purpose of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability. Senator. Tower. “vow. does. the. Bureau. distinguish between the. use of informants. for law enforcement as opposed to . intelligence. collection? Is the guidance different, 6x is: it the same, or what? 25639520 Page 3 » er ene oe te Ma ae et RN RNY ee 2 Om ar Sem en Bev tat Ps nae - ene ms + 5
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 le ‘13 LWARD & PAUL 18 19 20 22 23 A 24 > 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 WW 54997 Docld: 32989520 Page i0 21 Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address the use of informants on criminal matters Since he is over the operational division on that. Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fac that a criminal. informant in a law enforcement function, you are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be just for purposes of pure intelligence. The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to, through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be used independently of the testimony of the informant so that he can continue operating as a criminal informant. Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to function as provocateurs? » Mr. Adams. No, sir, they "re not. We have strict regula- tions against -using “informants: as provocateurs. This gets into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage |, in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don' occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to ‘avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can ren coer ey L peer Ree EOE Pe SR SD
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 WARO & PAUL 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 L9 20 al 22 23 24 25 Ss @ - Se tO | 1905 engage in criminal activity, and ‘the courts have held that, especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that - the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that ah informant Himself can’engagé in criminal activity, but because there is lacking this ‘criminal intent to violate a law, we stay away from. ‘that. Our regulations fall short of tha . If we have a situation where we felt that an informant ‘thas to become involved in some activity in order to protect or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United ~ States Attornéy or to the Attorney General to try to make sure .we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our informants. Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that , they are informing on, do you not? Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs, which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably “one of the best’ examples of a situation where’ the'law'was- in effect at the time. We heard the term States Rights used much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law enforcement. We must have local law enforcement, to use the troops only as a last resort. And then you have a situation like this where you do try - HW 54997 Doold:32989520 Page ii
smn *21 “Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Hw 54997 LO 11 . Le. 13] 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ‘be 23 24 25 BDoclds2989520 Page 12 some areas participating in Klan violence. see what action.was taken with that information, as he pointed -Marshals who do havé authority similar to-local law enforcement | ~ trated as anyone else was, “and when we got information. from Someone: like Mr. Rowe, good information, reliable information, and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility. to to preserve the respective roles in law enforcerient. You have historical problems: with the “Klan coming along. We had situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost _ powerless to act. We-had local Yaw enforcement officers in The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those, he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't - out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was reported to the police departments in every instance. We also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead memoranda .to the Department of Justice the problem, and hére, here. we were, the FBI, ina position where we had no- authority in the absence of instruction from. the Department of Justice, to make an arrest. Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in: a situation where the Department called in United States officials. ’ So, historically, in those-days, we were just as frus-
7 Phone (Arca 202) 544-6000 ~_ ies) 10 Li 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 25 @ oo @ 1907 do something about it, it was not always acted upon, as he indicated. © . . Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was adequate. evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act? oy oS | _ Mr. Adams. The Departmental rules at that. time, and still require Departmental approval where you have: a conspiracy. Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. . you can have a mob scene, and:you can have blacks and whites belting each other, but unless you can show that those that initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have}. no violation. Congress recognized this, and-it wasn't until 1968 that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights statute, which added punitive measures against an individual. that didn't have to be a conspiracy. But this was a problem that the whole country was grappling with: the President of the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from a meitorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General. The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing violence, and in neutralizing the Klan -- and that was one. of the reasons. . “senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con- tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam HW 34997 Doold: 32869520 Page 13
L sun 23 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il 12 WARD & PAUL 14 15— 16 17 18 19 20 eal 22 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 29 investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation @ —_ @ _ 1908 Veterans Against the War? Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the intent to halter political expression? Mr. Adams..We had information on the Vietnam Veterans Against the War that indicated that there were -subversive groups involved. They were going to North Vietnam and meeting. with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the International Communist Party. We feel that we-had a very valid basis to direct our attention to the VVAW. It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made, and what it gimally boiled down to was a situation where it split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and: they closed. those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow the national organization. But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we and subservience to the national office. Senator Tower. Mr. Hart? Senator Hart of Michigan. But in the process of chasing after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of informatio that clearly has no relationship to any Federal :criminal MW 54937 Doold’32889520 Page i4
wo Ot Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 > oa out ey cowl 10 12 13 WARO & PAUL 14 45 |. “16 20 21 22 : 23 ae mo 410 First Street, S.E., Washington,-D.C. 20003 25 NW 54997 Docld:32989520 Page 15 ‘stuff off. by siimply tébling ‘the agent, or your informant? qa 19. “we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because 24 -@ a me eo | - “1908 statute. Mr. Adams. TI agree, Senator. “Senator Hart of Michigan. Why. don't you try to shut that Me. Adams; Here is thé .problem that ‘you, have with that. When you're looking’ at an organization, do you report only the violent statements made by the group or do you also show that you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have some of these church -groups that were mentioned, and others, that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the statutes, You have to report the, good, the favorable along with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. “We wind up with information in our files. We are. accused of being vacuum cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner.’ If you want to know the real purpose of an organization, do you only report the violent statements made and the fact that it is by.a small minority, or do you also-show the broad base of the organizatio and what it really is? And within that is where we have to have the guidelines we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in our files. . Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process, - you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people who are, who .have been engaged in basic First Amendment
a oad Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO, 11 12 WARD & PAUL 14 15. 16 17 “19 20 "21 “_ x 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 > smn (25° ‘see. where any harm is served -by having that’ in our files. ' later.a name check. is. asked. on Reverend Smith and. all. your . | @ 380 exercises, and this is what hangs some of us up. Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, eithe asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter- viewed concerning some friend’ who is applying for a job. | . Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the FBI? Now,. sonieone can say, as reported at our last session, that this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our files ‘has an.onerous impression, a chilling effect. I agree. It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because of considering: a man for the Supreme Court of the United States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't “Senator Hart.of Michigan. But if.I am. Reverend. Smith and. the. vacuum. cleaner. picked up the fact. that..I. was. helping the véterans,. Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years file shows. is that he was. associated. two. years ago. with a group that was sufficient enough, held sufficient. doubtful. patriotism to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on them -- Mx. Adams. This is a problem. MW 54937 Doold: 32989520 Page 16
al HW 54997 Docld:32989520 Page i7- ‘ n E Ld 5. N OV Pnone (Arca 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 "as the Congressional input are.going to address themselves to. ‘ upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back conceivably may result in violonce or disruption o we Senator Hart of Michigan. This is what should require us to rethink this whole business. Mr. Adams. Absolutely. And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range of groups which the Bureau can .and has had informant penetratio and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition — of when an extremist or security investigation -may be under- taken refers to groups whose activity either involves ¥iolation of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then informants may be used. Another guideline says that domestic intelligence investigations now must -be predicated on criminal violations. The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation relevant to a potential violation. Even now,.-with an improved, again in a world of possible violations or activities which may result in illegal acts. Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of ‘the right to démonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition, rh town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result
° o ° 2 ‘ a: ~T wm ~ a ° a g o S < = ° c 2 LO ll 12 WARD & PAUL 13 16 1? 20 al Re 25 24 “410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 NW 34957 Dool 19. the meeting. Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because they may. result | an: violence; disruption? Mr. Adams. No, sir. Senator Hart of Michigan. Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every ‘aspect of ‘the peace movement? Mr. Adams. No, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we: ::}. monitor demonstrations wheré we have an indication that the demonstration itself is sponsored -by a group that we have an investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in, or where members of one of these groups are participating where’ there is a potential that they might change the peaceful nature of the demonstration. But. this is our closest question of trying to draw guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the. First Amendment rights of people, yet at. the same time being aware of groups’ such as we have had in greater numbers in the. past than we’ do ‘at the present time, But we have had periods where the démonstrations have been rather severe, and ‘the courts have said that the FBI has ‘a right, and indeed a duty,. to keep itself informed with réspect to the possible commission of crime, It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention. And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut 232989520 Page i6
+ oh € n EI So nN Loe] owt t Fi . G1 Phone (Area 202) 844-6000 , end 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 HW 34997 DBoold: that's: wheré' I: think itiost, of jour disagreements -fald- 7 Vir ~. “@ —_ _ @ . _ > {1923 case. Our problem is where we have a demonstration and wé have to make a, judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us. to-monitor thé activities, and - * . 7 2989590 Page 15 . ii
“ . NMARRIS :GSH ~ Sen. Sel. CIA 12/275 Tape 6 on . { = ot! ' Phone (Area 202) 54 ray) 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 "20 el 22 23 n 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 MW 54997 Doold: 32989520 . Page 20 remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential Senator Hart of Michigan. Let's assume that the rule for opening an investigation ona group is narrowly drawn. ‘The Bureau manual states ‘that ‘informants investigating a subversive organization should not only réport on what that group is doing but should look at and report on activities in which ~ the group is participating. There is- a Section :37B3 dealing with reporting. on connections with other groups. That section says that the’ field office shall -"determire and report on any, significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups." ‘Any significant connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups. Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of 1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the installation of thé anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us sources reported on the plan's participants and activities of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM, particularly in open public debate in’a high school auditorium, | which included speakers from the Defense Department for the ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM, The informants reported on the planning for the meeting, the distribution of materials to churches and schools, participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on t::: [7 ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat’:. on
. fe] Lo] L=) 9 3 ‘ . (“2 1 plans for a subsequent town meeting in Washington with -the ° . " N - 2 ll names of local political leaders who would attend. F 5 Now the information, the informant information came -as- a. part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive,‘gcoup - 5 |) participating in that goalition. Yet the information dealt 6 || with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the 7-)/ plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminat qd -°" _8 to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to. the 9 White Ilouse. 10 How do we get into all of. that? 11 Mr. Adams. Well ~~ 12 Senator Hart of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it, 13 || would you do it again? » WARD & PAUL 14 , Mr. Adams. Well, not in 1975, compared to what -1969 ‘ £6 || was. The problem we had at the time was where we had: an 16 informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was ‘17 || going to take place and it was going to bethe Daily World, 18 || which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments 19 || about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took eo lla quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May .28, 21 1969 and closed. June 5 saying there.was no problem with this 22 |) organization. 23 Now the problem we get into is if we take ‘a quick lock a?’ “ 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 24 |} and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have 25 stayed in too Long. When you're dealing with security 7¢ 18 Jip MW 54997 Doold:39989590 Page 21
ma se ‘ Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 "|, °° ~ Q n a kad Me an . . -  & ae x * aa ~ and they supported him with. total resources, of the Soviet, ~ . Union, false identification, all. the 3 money he needs ; communi- Ne “cations ‘networks, satellite assistance, and everything, ‘and ° you're working with a paucity of information. The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic Security. You don't have a lot of black and white situations. _So someone reports something to you which you feel; you take a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and ‘I think that! s 10 || what they aid. he li Senator Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let | | . soviet espionage where they: ean ‘UE one” person in this country 12 | .me bring you up to date, closer.to current, a current place 13 WARD & PAUL on the calendar. 14 This, one is the fall of last year, 1975. President 15 |} Fora announced His new program with respect to amnesty, as 16 | he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there . ‘17 || were several national conferences involving all the groups 18.|| and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty. Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is not against -~ while unconditional amnésty is not yet the law,. we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either. ~wreeee Mr. Adams, That's right. Senator Hart of Michigan. “Som@ of the sponsors were ae ee 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 umbrella organizations involving about 50° diverse emonps rund | the country. FBI informants provided .advance istics whic oi ow Soe 7 : . . « | ral ' . a) . . = = » 132989520 Page 22 #~— . , ; ! MW 54937 Dool
gsh 4 Lo] Qa Lo] ° z ( \ 1 N 8 2 < o 5! 3 é 10 il 12 “13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 al 22 Ro ‘ae 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 Nw 549387 Dooclc 19. 20. plans for the meeting and-apparently attended and reported on the ‘conference. The Bureau's own reports described the participants as having. representéd diverse’ perspectives -on -- the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of.men killed in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues, delegates from student organizations, and aides of .House and _ Senate inembers, drafting legislation on amnesty. - The informant apparently was attending in his role as a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive and it described the topics of the workshop. Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted that in view of the location of the conference ata theological seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its, coverage ._ to informant reports. | Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last fall. - And this isa conference of people who have the point of view that I share, that the soaner we have unconditional amnesty, the better for the soul of the country. Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner. approach on ‘a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad. informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups in that setting having contact with other groups, all and everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the Pa2989520 Page 23
gsh 5 1 Bureau files. 2 Is this what we want? - Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ° Mx. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this. 4 [le is particular knowledgeable as to this operation. 5 Mr. Wannall.. Sénator Hart, that was a case that was 6 opened on November 14.and closed November 20, and the informatign ? which caused us to be interested in it were really.two particular 8 items. One was that’ a member of the steering committee there "9 was a three man steering committee, and oné of those members 10 || of the national confexence was in fact a national officer 11 || of the vvAW in whom we ‘had suggested before we did. have a 12 legitimate investigative interest.: WARD & PAUL 13 Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I would almost say so whht 14 at that point. 15 1 Mr, Wannall. The second report we had was. that the 16 VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the - 17 conférence to take it over, And the third report we had -- 18 Senatox Hart of Michigan. And incidentally, all of the 19 information that your Buffalo informant had given you with . 20 respect to the goals and aims o£ the VVAW gave you a list of 21 goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected : 22 || objectives. There wasn't a single item out of that VVAW that 23 jeopardizes the .security of this country at all. i 2 24° Mr. Wannall. Well, of-course, we did not rely entirely ! + 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 on the Buffalo informant, but even ‘there we did. recej::. Mw b4997 Doold: 32909520 Page 24
gsh 6 me} é 3 3 t 5 6 q 8 9 10 11 J po) é 12 arene [a] fe 13 é. 14 15 16 1? 18 3 19 J fe) ¢ 20 e- gt = é 22 i 23 (Eng zg 25 ) ® 1919 from that informant information which I considered to be - Significant. The Buffalo chapter’ of the VVAW was the regional office . covering New York and northern New Jersey. It was one of the five most active VVAW chapters’ in the country and at a national conference, or at the regional conference, this informant reported information back to us that an attendee at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance. There -was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the VVAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuals in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in agreement with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the _ interest of the revolutionary union. So all of the information that we had on the VAN did not come from that source but even that particular source did give us information which we considered to be of some significance in our appraisal’ of the need for continuing the investigation of that particular chapter of the VVAW. Senator Nart of Michigan. But does it give you the right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even if it is a conference that might be taken’over by the VVAW when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we seck to achieve unconditional’ amnesty? What threat? HW 34997 Doold: 32989520 Fage 25
gsh 7 » Phone (Arca 202) 544-6000 a) “10 11 12° es WARD & PAUL 14. | 15 16 17 18 19 "20. 21 BB 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 " R5 NW 34957 Dool ee. °- ” - x 00d Mx. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VVAW influence on a particular mesting, if you ever happened to be holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was. Senator Hart of Michigan. What if it was a meeting to “Seek to maké more effective the food stamp system in this country? an . . a MEI Wantiall. Well, -of course’ ‘there’ had been some organizations. oo os tO woe Senator Hart of Michigan. Would the sane logic follow? Mr. Wannall. I think that if we found that if the Communist Paxty USA was going to take over the meeting: and use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic . in doing: that. You have a whole’ scope here “ahd it's a matter . of where you,do and where you don't,’ and ‘hopefully, as we've said before, we will have some guidance, not only £rom this committee but from the guidelines that are being developed. But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and not gathering everything there was about it. : In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us, and that was the person who had, who was not developed for this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other matters for some period of time. And as soon as we got the report of the outerra cio bbe mecting and the fact that in the period of some x=): Qun, 1 232989520 Page 26 . ee SE ON . a . "6 8 nN oa . ‘ me re ces cee ee a ee oem
8 TI oe oe, Sacra 2 TA neo TE 2 TY STS SEC TTT AS » wc uF ia Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 s WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Nw 34937 c Docld: 32989520 Page 27 © @ we discontinued any further interest, Senator Hart of Michigan. Well,: my time has expired but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we. really want to Gontrol the dangers to our society of using informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have . to restrict, sharply domestic intelligence investigations, And that gets us into what I would. like to raise ‘with you when my turn comes, around again, and that's: the use. of warrants, obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before’a full-fledged informant can be directed ‘by the Bureau against a group or individuals. I know you have objections to. that and I would like, to review that’ with you. | Senator Mondale, pursue that question. Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about. an. obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn loose a full- fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources whe Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the Committee. The Bureau argues that such a Warrant requirement | might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their " government. Now that's a cénéern for First Amendmént rights that ought to . heaxten all the civil libertarians,
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Streat, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Hw 54997 10 11 12 “13 14 15. |} 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Doeld: e . , - r a 1922 But why would that vary, why would a warrant sequirement raise a serious constitutional question? Mr. Adams. Well, ‘for one thing it's the practicability of it or “the” inpacticability lof é getting a warrant .which: ordinarily involves probable’ cause “to: ‘show that a crime has been or is about to be committed. In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activitie such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have discussed before, where they say publicly we're not. to engage ‘in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United States, Well; now; you can't show probableé cause if: they're about | to do it because they're telling you they're nok. going to do it and you know they're not going to do it at this particular moment. It's just: the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particulak organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization: and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations. S2569520 Page 26
“We don't have probable ‘cause’ fox “him’.to target against ‘ that organization, ‘but: yet we should be able to receive informa : Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 tion’ coin’ him that he as. ‘a’ Communist Party member, even 3 though in an informant status, is going to that orgatiization’ | and don't worry. about it. Wetre making no: headway ‘on it.’ ‘It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants, the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not | violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. They have recognized the necessity ‘that the government has to have ; individuals who will assist them in carrying out their | governmental duties. Senator Hart of Michigan. I'm not sure ‘I've heard anything WARD. & PAUL yet in response to the constitutional question, the very practical question that you addressed. Quickly, you. are right that the court has said that the use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutiona rights of the subject under investigation. But Congress can prescribe some safeguards, some xules and some standards, just as we have with respect to your use 6£ ‘electronic ‘surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants. that's quite different from saying that the warrant procedure itself would be unconstitutional. But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show a probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a“warrant, 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 therefore you oppose the prdéposal to require you. to get a _NW_54507 Dootd: 32969520 Page 29
ww gsh Il a od ' Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 on PP, Oo! wo a 10 Ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL End Tape 6 +4 Begin Tape? 16 17 18 - 19 20 al 22 23 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 NW 34957 Doold: 32959520 Page 30 rs warrant. Tt seems to beg ‘the question. Assuming that you ‘sdy that, since. we use informants and investigate groups which may only engage in lawful activities but which might engage. in activities that can result in: violence or illegal acts, and you-can't use the warrant, but Congress could say that the-use of informants is subject to such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity, including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss the anti-ballisti¢ missilé system, and we don't want you to use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or unless you present your requést to a magistrate. in the same. fashion as you‘are required to do with respect to, in most cases, to wiretap. oo This is an option available to Congzess. Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker, Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much . Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential security informant and a security informant? | Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator: Schweiker, ‘that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on him before talking with him. and then we do a further in-depth background check. A potential security informant is someone who is under consideration before he is approved by’ headquarters for use as’ an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 ) . 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 | * | HW 34957 DoocldyS2989520 Page 31 -On some occasions that person will have been developed to a but it has not gotten to‘the point yet where we have satisfied _in not intervening in the Rowe situation when violence was rd) CO  ] . “1925 point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are engaged .in checking upon. his reliability. a In some instances he may be paid for information furnishe ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does, the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an approved FBI informant. Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of. being an informant, I guess. . Mr. Wannall.. It is a preliminary step, one ofthe | ° preliminary steps. | Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in :the Rowe testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when violence was known? I know we asked you several times but I'm still having trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was known. | Mc. Wannall. Senator Schyeiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to that. If you have no objection, I'll ask him to answer that. Senator Schweiker. All, right. Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the
gsh 13. @ a . 1926 problem today. we, are an investigative agency. We do “not have police powers like the United States marshalls do. About 1795, I guess, or. ‘sme period like that, maxshalls have tf Phone (Area 202) 544-6000" had- the authority, that almost, pordéts: on what: a: sheriftnhas. We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintair the role of an investigative agency. We were to report: on ‘ activities to furnish the information to the ‘local police, | who had an obligation to, act. We furnished it to the Departiien of Justice. | In those areas where the local police did not act, it, Tt Nene e mane eee wea we outer ye katy ear met cmrtrentrantions See eae heanent til wey settee Snttneredainan innate ssnetatinwn oon om . . * Hi WARD & PAUL resulted finally in the Attorney General ‘sending 500 United States marshalls down .to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to march in protest of their civil rights. : meee me nat thetic mer fete eee os This. was..an. extraordinary measure because it came ata time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was _a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country. |, “This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies in itself at the time either because many of them did act upon the information that was furnished to them, But we have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we would not have had evidence that there was 2 -conspiracy available. We can do. absolutely nothing in that regard. In bittle Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and L WL 5aoo7 Dex 132989520 Page 32 7
gsh 14 ° ° 3 o 2 ¢ So . nw ° ~ . q : So N a o 2 <4 ~ e Cc E WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003 | NW 54997 ‘Lo il 12 13 14 is | 16 “17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25. Boold: : - ‘ next. ‘to. th ‘Amy; “the’ United States marshalls should make them, not ‘the. FBI, even though. we developed the violations. | and ever the. years, 28" you. know;-,at, the time, there were marly quéstions Yaised.” ‘why doesn't thé PeI:stop this?: ‘why ‘aom't’”- you ‘do something about ite. Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and .of course we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area._ Senator Schweiker. “What would be wrong, just following up your point there, Mr. -Adams, with setting up a program.., since it's obvious ‘to ‘me that a lot of informers are going to: * have pre-knowledge of. violence of using U.S. marshalls on some kind of a long-range basis t0. prevent violence? . Mr. Adams. We do, We have them in Boston in connection. with the busing incident. We aré investigating the violations | under the ‘Civil: Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston, they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this is the approach, that the Federal government finally recognized was the solution to the problem where you had to have added Federal import. Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a. pretty advanced confrontation, shouldn't we have some ,7ere a coordinated prograr that when you go up-the ladder of covt:and in the FBI, that on. an immediate'and fairly contemporzry basis, that kind of 989520 Page 33 : a ’
gst is | @ | ry 1928 a help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it rae) gets to a Boston state? Pnono (Area 202) 544-6000 ‘ Ot I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not . ‘-4 W saying it isnit.. But. it seams.to me..we. need’-a,.better remedy _ 5 | than. we have. 6 Mr. Adams. Welt, fortunately., we're, at-a time .wheré ~ 7 || conditions have subsided in the country, evén from the '60s 8 | and the '70s and periods -- or '50s and (6082+ We.report to the | 9 Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the - 10 country as we learn of them so that the Department will be 11 || aware of them, The planning for ‘Boston, for instance, took & PAUL 12 || place a year in advance with state officials, city officials, 13 |} the Department of Justice and the. FBI sitting.down together WARD 14 |] saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston? 15.- I think we!ve learned: a lot from the days back in the 16 |} early ‘60s. But the government had no mechanics which protecte 17 || people’ at that time. 18 Senator Schweiker. I'd like to go, if I may, to the 19 || Robert: Hardy case. I know he- is nota witness but he 20 || was a witness before the House, But since this affects my 21 || state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was 22 the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized 23 || a raid on the Camden draft hoard. An! according to Mr. Hardy's . oy . 24 ||} testimony before our Committee, he sz. that in advance of the 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 || raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact Nw 54997 DooclId: 32969520 Page 34 . . _¢
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000. WARO & PAUL oa o °o °o Nn u. a ry ° 2 a £ £ “ Lcd 3 w “4 2 o e s 5 “ ~ “ = in i=) cal < Nw 34957 10 11 12 “13 ny 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctId: "1929- that they had all the information they needed to clamp down on the: conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time, and yet no arrests were madé._ | Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true? Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It: was not a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your question. There was, in fact, a representative of the Department of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously as that case progressed as to what point the. arrest should be made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort... | So I. think that Mr. Ilardy's statement to the effect that there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true. Senator Schweiker. That responsibility rests with wlio under your procedures? . Mr, Wannall. We investigate decisions on making: arrests, when they should be made, and decisions with régard to prosecutions are made either.by the United States attorneys or by Federals in the Department. Me. Adams, At this time that particular case did have a departmental attorney on the scene ‘#:ause there are questions: £ conspiracy. Conspiracy‘is a tough violation to prove and | sometimes a question of do youchave the added value of catching 2989520 Page 35
a ee ee NE ES RE RE a NN uw ‘17 iQ “ ne > Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 Oo on PP oF MD HB ~2 LO 11 12 WARD .& PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 410 First Strect, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 13° - during, the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you someone in the commission of the crime as further proof, rather than relying on. one informant and some circumstantial evidence to prove the violation. Senator Schweiker. Well,.in this case, though, they even had a dry run. - They could have arrested them on the ary run, That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to me. “They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on the dry run. I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry run. Who was this Department of Justice official who made that decision? Mr. Adams. Guy ‘Goodwin was the Department official. Senator Schweiker. Next I'd like to ask back in 1965, put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another infiltrating the’ Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated membership. . I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates. That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan at that point was an informant paid by the government. And I believe the figure goes on 0 indicate that 70 percent of the new members of the Kia:. that year were FBI informants. : NW 34937 Doold: 32959520 Page 36 ‘
cos rate meee eran mv marniennicrnnr tment matthew ML, gh amnkw vemeee * of . ono ot ° i=] o 9 ‘ < sz ore] ~ N o <N 6 o & © c é on , oO 10 <1 WARD & PAUL 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 "23 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25. a 12 Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people . ‘to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that’ ‘you shouldn't. have informants. in the Klan- and know what's going on..for, violence, but it seems: to me that this is the - tail. wagging the ‘dog. oo | FOr example, today we supposedly have only, i594. “total informants, for. both- domestic” informants and, 1a potenian informant he and ‘hat here” we had 2, 000° just in the Klan alone. Mx. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all ‘racial matters, informants at that. particular time, and I think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual. number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was aroun 6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the: testiinony . Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a group called the Action Group. ‘This was the group that you remember from Mx. Rowe's testimony, that he was left. af- ter the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard “all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information, but he never knew what was going on because each one had an action group that went out and considered themselves in the, missionary field. Theirs was the violence. In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct as many informants as you possibly can against it, Bear in ‘Mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress an NW 34957 Doold: 32989520 Page 37 me orem ee oo
gsh 19 ; e 1932 o 8 . 8 ; OY 3 . everyone’ is concerned about the murder of the civil rights i XS . . s 2 ; . : < workers, the Linio Kent sase, the Viola Liuzzo case, the ec 3 . . , . . . ~ . “oe é bombings of the church in Birmingham. We were faced with one 4 oe ee i _tremendous problem at that time. 5 . Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that. 6 ; . . Mr. Adams. Our only approach was through informants ? and through-the use of informants we solved these cases, the | 8 ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have o never solved. They are extremely difficult, © 10 These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and 3 it as we told the President, that we had moved informants like - > . < ; . a. 3 12 Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the < 18 head .man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us 14 of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and 15 yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever 16 unless we can creaté enough disruption that these members will 17 | realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers, 18 even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are 19 in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was 20 | the case, that I would be caught. And that's what we did and 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 21 ll that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure . "22 Il ana just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of Cy 25 | their members ultimately weré Klan members and they didn't 24 dare engage in these acts of violence because they knew they 25 couldn't control the conspiracy any longer. ’ Nw 54957 Docld:3 S89520 |_Page 36
gsh 20 “400 Pnone (Area 202) 544. wo LO ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24. 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Hw 54997", I 1933 Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have one quick question.. Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500 informers for black ghetto situations? Mr, Adams. I'm not sure if that's thé year. We did ‘have one year where we had a number like that which probably had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities were being: burned, betroit, Washington, areas like this.- We, were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is” violence going to break out, what next? They weren't informants like an individual penetrating an organization. They were listening posts in the community that would help tell us that we have a group here that's gettin ' ready to start another fire-fight-or something. Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more Senators remaining for questioning. If we can try to get everything in‘in the first round, we will not have a second round and I think we can -finish around 1:00, and we can. go on and terminate the proceedings. However, Tf anyone feels that they have another question that they want to return to, we can come back here by. 2:00. Senator Mondale? ’ Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the facis. 2£.grime, inyestigating, it may be the best professional x " a « Ee Te ey" rT wr
ed Se ee ae teen eee se = o 5 - sere > —- . WARD & PAUL w gsh 21 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 Hw 54997 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 il 12 13 14 15) “be L7 18 19 20 21 ‘22 23 24 25 Doold: . % 1934 ; organization of its kind-in the world. And when the FBI acts in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped ho shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of the crucial public confidence in an éssential: law enforcement agency of this country. In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI in 1924, In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation, strayed from its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and protector of political ideas. “And through the interference of. civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and: Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department get involved in political ideas. And yet here we are again looking at a record where with Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with -- we even had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-define ’ impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas. It seems to be the basis of the-strategy that people can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the PSGS520 Page 40
"  gsh 22 “ 1 Oo 8 g 2 | ka é oO 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 af 2 « & 12 m~ : & 13 ES 14 15 16 1? 18 2 g 19 x a} ¢ 20 é 21 = ui 22 i 3 aa 2 24 25 “ox dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly iy Nw 54997 -Docld: 32989520 Page 41 : a @ : @ ; 1935. . . , \ tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive at odds with the philosophy of American government. I started in politics years ago and the first thing we had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out. of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help from the FBI or the CIA. We just rammed then out of the meetin on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't ’ good union leaders when .we didn't want anything to do with them And _ yet, we see time and time again that we're going .to protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's dangerous, that we've going to protect véterans from whatever it is, and we're going -to protect the Council of Churches from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that precisely what is expected of the FR? is known by you, by the public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask you? | Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like , to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we follsed that policy for abou ee . ten years until the President of the .ited States said that: we should investigate the Nazi Party.
I. OQ, z 1 I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party. | ‘a 2 tL feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in i 3 “the fact that in World War Il, as contrasted with World War I, 4 there wasn't ‘one single incident of' foreign directed sabotage 5 || which took place in the United States. — | 6 Senator Mondale. And under the criminal’ law you could | | 7 || have investigated these issues of sabotage. 8 Isn't sabotage a crime? - 9 Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime, "10 _ Senator Mondale. Could you have investigated that? ll Mr. Adams. After it happened. fo 2 12: Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get’ involved 8 . : 13 || in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of° 3 14 || crimes that could have been comnitted. It's very interesting. w 15 -In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to | 16 continue what you're now doing and as. I understand it, you PO A RT ES SS cS Ra =P PU pa . 17 || still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam 1g || Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of 19 || Churches, and this can still go on. This can still.go on under 20 || your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to 21 || Justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitics ‘29° in terms of criminal matters. 23 || Mr. Adams. The law does :not say we have to wait. until 24 || we have been murdered before we can -- 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 _ 25 Senator Mondale; Absolutely, but that's the field of Hw 54997 Doold: #2989520 Page 42
gsh 24 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 2) WARD & PAUL 14 _ 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 ‘22 235 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 54997 DocId S2989520 Page 43 wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority @ Co @ . “1937. law again. you're. trying to defend apples with oranges. That.'s the law. You can do that. , | Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which of the 20,000 Bund embers might have been a saboteur. You don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can direct an intelligence operation against the German-American Bund , the same thing we did after Congress said -- . ‘Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that? Why did you object to ‘going to court for authority for that - Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for probable cause to investigate an organization. There were activities which did take place, like one time they outlined. the Communist Party -- . Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under court authority you can investigate where there is probable cause ox reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest. Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than, just making these decisions on your own? Mr. Adams. We have expressed ccmplete concurrence in that. We feel that we're going to ge stheat to death in the — next 100 years, you're damned if you ‘o, and damned if you don't Lf wa don't have a delineation of our responsibility
. gsh 25 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Nw 34937 10 ll 12 13 14 16 17 18° 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Doold: in this area. But I won't agree with you, Senator, that we “have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States. I agree with you that we have made some mistakes. Mr. Kelley has set a pattern of being as forthright as any LGirector of the FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because of the necessity that we’ mist concentrate on these areas of abuse. We must not lose sight of the overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I still feel that this is the freest country in the world. I've travelled much, as I'm sure you havé, and I know we have made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they - are’ -by the fact that there are 20,.000 murders a year in the i United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night ’ i and feel safe, ‘Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an argument then, Mr. .Adams, for’ strengthening our powers to go after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or continuing a policy which we now see undermines ‘the public confidence you need to do your “job. Mr, Adams. Absolutely. ‘The mistakes we have made are what have brought on this embarrassment to us. | I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some 29659520 Page 44
. gsh ‘26 © BS @ 1 mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But 2 at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes f Phone (Area 202) 544-6009 5 out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity - 4 of zercing in on abuses. | 5 . I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think 6 the ‘accoinplishments ‘in the Klan was the finest hour of the 7 || FBI and yet, I'm.sure in dealing with the Klan that we made End Tape 7 8 some mistakes. But I just don't. agree with bungling. LO ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 410 First Streot, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 | BW 54997 Doold:s2989520 Page 45
SHARRIS/smnl. © oo © 1940 t. 8 3 8 ao 3 1 Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but " 8 . . F 2 I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble : 3 || over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we 4 need to have new legal standards. 5 Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that. 6 Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston. ” Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 8 Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at- some 9 length seems to have been an * inclination. on the part of 10 the Bureau to establish. a notion about an individual or a group 11 which | seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge. In ad . z 12-|| the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was : E 13 being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi- z 14 || gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating tha 15 || this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out 16 to intensify the investigation. There never seemed to be a 7 willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts. 18 Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar 3 19 to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, tha J . Q 20 every piece of information that she. supplied to the Bureau g { z 21 || seemed to indicate that the Bureau was, not correct in its FS . wi 22 assumption that this organization planned to commit violence, YW f E 23 or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist e , es & o4 || that this investigation go on, and th.s information was used ¢ ° ; . . 25 against the individuals. HW 34997 DoolpP: 32889520 Page 46
8 o 9 = > Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted tha ( ‘ °° » . N g its first assumptions were wrong and they have changed their : . FA | course? Mr. Adams; .We have admitted that. We have also shown from one of the cases that Sénator Hart brought up, that after five days’ we closed the case. We were told something by-an individual that theré was a concern of an adverse influence in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King situation there was no testimony to the. effect that we just dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and "on, ad infinitum, The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This WARD. & PAUL wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that < « there. was. a basis to- continue ‘the investigation up to a point. | What I testified to was that we were improper in discredittir Dr. King, but it's just like -- Senator Huddleston. The -Committee has before it memorand written by high officials of the Bureau indicating: that the information they were receiving from the field, from these surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition was. Mr. Adams. That. memorandum was rot on Dr. King. That - oe was on another individual that I thi. somehow got mixed up’ 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 in the discussion, one.where the isguc was can we make people -NW 54997. .DooTd:32989520 Page 47 a é
Phono (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 > HW 54997 LO il 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19° 20 el 22 23 24 25 Doct Ley ae ‘prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to investigate them. But the young lady. appearing this morning making the comment that she never knew of anything she told us that she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and agreed to cooperate with: the FBI in providing information regard- ‘ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most concerned about efforts.by the Revolutionary Union to take over the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this.. I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW- WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped the investigation. They don't agree with these principles laid down. by the -- Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that information against members who certainly had not been involved _in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job or whatever? Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to prevent crime, and you can't wait unt:} something happens. . The ae . Attorney General has clearly spoken i- that area, and even our statutory jurisdiction provides that we don't -~ 132989520 Page 45 e
e . | @ . 1943 smn 4 8 ; 8 7 3 . ‘ou = 1 . Senator Huddleston. _ Well, of course we've had considerabl 3 2 evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent 5 5 crimé, when you had information that it was going to occur. , 4 But I'm,sure there are instances’ where you have. 5 Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he 6 reported to us. “9 Senator Huddleston. To a police department which you 8 knew was an accomplice to the crime. . 9 Mr. Adams. Not necessarily. 10 Senator Huddleston, Your informant had told you that, | 11 hadn't he? J | cr é 12 Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have | - : 13 " other informants, and we have other information. | 14 Senator Huddleston. Yes, but you were aware that he 15 | had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in | 16 order ‘to -- | 17 Mr. adams. Yes. He furnished many other instances also. 18 Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole 19 lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were 20 || already part of it. Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so tha when the Department, agreeing that we had no further. juris- 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform certain law enforcement functions. . NW 34957 DocldyS29o9520 Page 495
p, in 3 5 re) Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Hw 54957 Doold: 32989520 Page 50 ad 1944 e | eo : Senator Huddleston. Now, the Committee. has received documents which indicated that in one situation the. FBI assiste an informant who had been established in a white hate group to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid his expenses in setting up this rival organization. Now, does, this not put the Bureau in a position of being responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might have undertaken? o Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a specific group. ; - 4 This is. Joe Deegan. Mr. Deegan. Senatcr, it's my understanding that the informant we're talking about decided to break off from the group he was with. He was with the Macon Klan group of’: the United Klans of America, and he decided. to break off. This was in compliance with our regulations. “His breaking off, we did not pay him to set up the organization. He did it on his own. . We paid him for the information he furnished us concerning the operation. We did not sponsor the organiza- tion. Senator Huddleston. Concerning the new organization that he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that organization? e Mr. Deegan.. He continued to advis: us of that organizatio
eneyen) = == al 1 7 vo ae Oe ee ee ET FR le rRNA Ae © ee REP SN: - smn. 6 ~, ) yo _? Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 » WARD & PAUL ~~ ™ 410 First Strect, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 >) Ne 54957 LO il 12 13 14 15— 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 25 Doold: and other organizations. He would advise us of planned activities. Senator Huddleston. The: new organization, that he forméd, did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one? Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, ‘and it did not last that long. . Senator Huddleston. “There's also evidence of an FBI informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of - | responsibility within the Party with. the knowledge of his ‘FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing them in how to use those weapons., Presumably this was in the © knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became “- came in contact with the group. that was contracting for murder, and he partici- pated in-this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with | " the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably: ait in the knowledge of the FBI. i How does this square with your enforcement and crime prevention responsibilities. Mr. Deegan.. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particula case. - It: does not square with our policy in all respects, and I would have to look at that particular case you're talking about to give you an answer. “ Senator Huddleston. X don't nave the documentation on tha particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of . oi @S89520 Page 51
smn 7 e 1 || control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind | o 2 || of an. organization and to, what extent an effort is ‘made to < . . ; 3 prevent these infdrmants. from engaging in the kind of thing 4 || that you are suppoSedly trying to prevent. 5 Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who becam . 6 ||, active in ah action group, and we told him to get-out or , | 7 | we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the 8 information he had furnished in the past. 9 We have had cases, Senator, where we have had -- 10 Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participate uw in violent activities. 2 12 Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent ° a E 13 || activities. ES = ? 14 Senator Huddleston. That's what he said.. ; 15 Mr. Adams. I know that's what he. said. But. that's what 16 lawsuits are.all about, is that there. are. two sides to the “17 issue, and our agents. handling. this have. advised. us, and I 18 believe have advised. your. staff, that at no time did they 19 advise him to engage. in violence. 20 Senator.Huddleston. Just to.do what was. necessary to 21 get the information, I believe maybe might have been his 22 instructions. 23 Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement 24 to him’along that line, and'‘we -have informants ,- we have 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 25 informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law LNW 64997 BoolIqg: 32989520 Page 52
e | eo 1947 smn 8 i 3 ‘ ? , ; an 1 and we have immediately converted their status from an informan Bs 2 to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I < . . 3 3 |] ‘can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for: 4 || -violating the laws, once it -came’ to our attention, and even 5 to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence 6 in-this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told 7 me that they found one case where their agent had been working 8 24 hours a day, and he was a little late in aiisseminating the 9 information to the police department. No violence.occurred,, | 10 || but it showed ug in a file review, and he was censured for 11 || his delay in properly: notifying local authorities. ai 12 So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow 13 || reasonable safeguards.in order to carry it out, including periodic ° 14 || review of all informant. files. . ; : is | Senator Huddleston. Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is . -16 substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the 47 agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you 18 happen to be with someone and they decide to.do something, that g “49 . he couldn't be an angel. These were the words of the agent,. : 20 and be a good informant.. .He wouldn't take the lead; but the 8 . - 21 implication is that he would have to go along and would have AS to be involved if he was going. to maintain his credibility. 22 237 Mr. Adams.. There's no question but that an informant at 410 First Streot, S.€ 24 times. will have to be present. during demonstrations, riots, fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was % 25 “WW 54997 Dool 32989520 Page 53 . foo &
Se re ee a TT MY WARD & PAUL Prone (Ares 202) sasons wo LO il 12 13 14 15 | 16 17 “18 “19 20 21 22. “23 "24 » 410 2, Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 | _25 MW 34937 Dool 1329689520 Page 54 @ a @ 1948 to the effect that -- and i was sitting in the back of the room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were beat with chains, and I-didn't hear whether he said he beat someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing taking an active part in criminal actions. Senator Huddleston. He was close enough to get his "throat cut.. How does the gathering ‘of information -- Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that we probably should recess a few minutes. Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should we convene this afternoon? Senator Huddleston. I'm finished. I just had one more _ question. Senator Tower. Go ahead. Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of information about an individual's personal life,.social, sex life and -becoming involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention. Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mx. . Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge ‘concerning it, and I can's: see’where it would FE be.of any value whatsoever. Senator Huddleston. You aren't a.ure of any case where