DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.41 HW 53080 Docld: 322372935 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information HSCA | 180-10145-10148 CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION 50-61-01 Document Information HSCA 00/00/0000 27 ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES SSCI CIA, METHODOLOGY CIA, FILES REPORT Unclassified 1A Redact 08/25/1995 Box 27 Page 1 Date: 4/18/201 Released under the John Kennedy WSs5asgsination Records ollection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#: NW S3080 Date: He—-O5-2017
2 . yg * CIA Operations Against Cuba The SSC Final Report speaks of operations against Cuba and the castro regime, and contends that they should have been reported in detail to the Warren Commission as part of the subject matter that it consciously took into consideration. A case can be made for specific considerations of these various activities by the Warren Commission, at least as part of the unique background of the times; it might have provided it additional investigative leads. However, to advance the general thought is not to discard the usual tests of evidence that must still control how the findings are treated. It should be noted that at the time of the Warren Commission inquiry there was no secret about the tensions between the Kennedy Administration and the Castro regime. Book V of the SSC Final Report refers briefly to some of the more dramatic events, such as the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 and the Missile Crisis in October 1962 (see pages 2, 3, 10 and 11). In fact, the totality of American policy and practice must have appeared threatening to the Castro regime, and most certainly must have been considered by it as pro- vocative. Additional U. S. policies and programs that could have been Viewed negatively by Castro were the breaking of diplomatic relations, 53060 Docld:32272935 Page 4 To eg teen. eg a ee ae ee Sante A978 vi mee cre renee or aes F % mA NI IEY Ye? EN Seren Rea gee HSK ig aes ype TEU ae ote ake at a ane NaNO Se a ere MigRiainete tines Soe erin eee,
eae e eee” tet: ty TART P ON TET aT cadet ait oe a tera Lab Regios Spite eben — S sconomic and political sanctions, paramilitary operations (which re- € ceived recurring publicity in the press), as well as a variety of covert operations that were not known publicly. On 18 November 1963 President Kennedy -- four days before his death -- delivered a major policy address in Miami, accusing Castro of having betrayed the Cuban pT LSTA Ne EL HT PENT REET IS ROA BA 1 AUER RE AB revolution; at the time the press, reportedly onthe basis of what "ahite House sources" said about it, viewed it as a call for the Cuban people to overthrow the Castro regime. The United States provided a haven and base for Cuban exiles, who ee pre gag ARTI OMRON UBM 8 ep taRE A conducted their independent operations against the Castro government. “Sore of these exiles had the support of CIA, as well as from other ‘ alements of the U.S. Government, and still others had support from private sources. With or without official U.S. support these exiles “spoke in forceful Latin terms about what they hoped to do. The Cuban “intelligence services had agents in the exile community in America and it is likely that what they reported back to Havana assigned to -CIA responsibility for many of the activities under consideration, ‘whether CIA was involved or not. We do not know the extent to which the Warren Commission took what might be characterized as "judicial notice" of the tensions between the two governments and their leaders; it certainly was in the public domain. “That consideration was given the possibility of 2 a Hi 53080 Docld:32272935 Page pUnic)
SERN EN SR OB RA RR NAR R BRIESAAR ramsey ro eh ase Dg AYR REAL gee aT NNER NTIS RTE = I SE LONE CPOE MPH ty SSE Cuban or Soviet involvement in the assassination is no secret, clearly reflecting a recognition of the question at the time. That a request was not made by the Warren Commission, nor volunteered by the intel- Tigence agencies, for extensive review of all Cuban operations is being faulted today. Yet, in the light of understandings at that time, it could well have appeared to members of the Warren Commission and its staff as not directly relevant, in fact, to the specific issue of the murder of the President. In the absence of evidence to the contrary a case could still be made for that view, although the evolution of public perceptions probably would not accept it without reservation. The SSC Final Report has fixed on the Cuban operations of the intelligence agencies--primarily those of CIA--for special attention in considering the question. Implicitly it accepts the theory that there could well have been conspiracy in the murder of President Kennedy, and that Castro could have been behind it, having been pro- voked by depredations against Cuba or plotting against his own life. However, in advancing its thesis, the SSC Report cautioned that it had "seen no evidence that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban govern- ment plotted President Kennedy's assassination in retaliation for U.S. operations against Cuba." 53060 Docld: 32272935 Page 6.
BACKGROUND In April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) published their Final Report (Bodk V) which in essence faulted the CIA for its errors of ommission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's on-going plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's rationale \ is detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings, but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position. "Senior CIA officials also should have realized that _ their agency was not utilizing its full capability to: investi- gate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, par- ticularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation with- out telling them of these vital facts. Those officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CIA had no evidence of a foreign conspiracy." (p. 7, Book V) Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect" that Book V occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a com- prehensive report in 1977 designed, to answer, at least within the Agency, the critical questions posited in the SSC Final Report. However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow response to the Warren Commission's quest for all possible relevant information. ("Relevancy" is, of course, the "buyword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.) On page 10 of the Agency's conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges ° that: "While one can understand today why the Warren Com- mission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of in- vestigation, it would have served to re-inforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the nots, assassination (JFK) because of tensions of, the time. oar ....The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." (p. 10, 1977 Report) HW. 53080 Docld: 32272935 Page f
HW 53060 Page Two It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA with regard to the significance to the work of the Warren Commission of the CIA's Castro assassination\attanpts! and to resolve the parties controversy as to the operations’ importance. Instead, this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all the facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in the CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-1963. Certain influences and conclusions will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivation of the syndicate participants in the operations. INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CIA PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards* (1967 IG Report, p. : Interim Report, p. 74) Edwards assigned the specific tasks of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Opera- tional Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Maheu, who had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive covert operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel. , Although Maheu and O'Connell differ-as to who initially brought up John Roselli's name for consideration, there was a meeting between Maheu and Roselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant ‘in Los Angeles in early September 1960. (Interim Report, p. 75) oo Comment: Maheu seems the logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In the * _ Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp. 74-75, Interim Report. Docld: 32272935 Page 6
”" Page Three Office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the Mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that: "Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a Raigh ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice making machines on the Strip# Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was, in fact, a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.") (Comment : Confirmation of the earliest Maheu-Roselli _ contact is gound in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an ' alleged telephone call in 1959 from Maheu to Roselli.) (See Roselli Write- up) (Comment: Maheu and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1960, including Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.) oe Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to _ discuss further details. (Interim Report, p. 76; Office of | Pe Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 November 1970) Al- - Oe though the Inspector General's Report placed the meeting at the Plaza Hilton on 14 September 1960, Roselli recalled that the discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960. (Comment: Tony de Varona admits going to New York City at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Roselli at this time or (¥éStimony of de Varona) that his visit had an assassination motivation. Ac cording to a 19 November 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, "Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd.") (Comment: The timing of the introduction of both Giancana ('Gold') and Trafficante ('Joe') is important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassina- tion plots. According to the 1967 IG Report, the entrance of Giancana took place "during the week of 25 September 1960"... (1967 IG Report, p. 18)) In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p. 76, does not fix a date certain for Giancana's initial appearance but (al- though it was "certainly prior to October 18." (p. 76)) be- cause of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IG September date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the initiation in November 1960. As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned that Giancana had been introduced to Maheu "prior to October | \ | HW 53060 DBoclda:32272935 Page 9
HW 53060 Page Four 18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960; and (2) DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo, dated 18 October 1960, which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro". (FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 from Hoover to Bissell, Interim Report, p. 79) (Comment: Each of the dual reasons listed in the Interim Report on p. 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately below.) (Comment: Although the 1967. IG Report. stated that "Maheu pointed out 'Gold' to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either 'Gold' or 'Joe'",; the Interim Report disputes this observation by. apparently quoting from O'Connell's — Senate testimony and stating that "the Support Chief, who was using the name 'Jim Olds'," said he had met 'Sam' and ~'Joe', once, and then only briefly. (O.C. 5(30)75, pp. 26- 29; Interim Report, p. 77)) (Comment: Conflicts appear also on several relatively minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in New “York City and Miami. For instance: 1. Did Roselli know from the beginning that the operation was CIA? a. O'Connell stated that Maheu told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Maheu told him that O'Connell was CIA (Interim Report, p. 76). Also, foot- note 1 on page 76 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about three weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Giancana, that "I am not kidding. I know who you work for." The importance of Roselli's recognition of CIA initiation is that it is doubtful if Giancana and . Trafficante could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed mocye fully below. a 2. Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some business interests of Wall Street that had... nickel interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli; 6/24/ 75, pp. 9, 17) _ Cf£. Jack Anderson column of January 19, 1971, which stated that "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy?....None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CTA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge agsinst Castro for his seizure of oil holdings." Docld: 32272935 Page i10 Weems St a
Page Five In Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli and William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of Phase I, it is another example of serious discrepancies which exist between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli. a 3. The alleged "surprise discovery" by Maheu and O'Connell as. to the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, although it is possible that the Senate Committee staff overlooked the specific Miami news- paper Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included pictures of Giancana and Trafficante, thus graphically showing Maheu and O'Connell the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Parade magazine for the months of October and November. Tt . would appear that O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the - introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were de- livered to Roselli, et. al, until approximately March 1961. Whatever, the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Parade article. (Interim Report, p.- 77, fn. 1) ~, The principals in Phase I of the operation also dis~ agree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Golda" and "Joe" in the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation. "Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a 'key' role, (Maheu, 7.2.975, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination", Roselli downplayed Giancana's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli, 6/24/75, p. 15) (Whether Roselli received a "message" from Giancana's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open to question.) Roselli's Senate characterization of Giancana's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged recountment of Giancana's due to his "knowledge of the Cuban crowd" which the 19 November 1970 memo recorded. | Trafficante(s) involvement. in Phase T is even more jumbled by the available evidence. The 1967 IG Report and Senate Interim Report state that "'Gold' identified 'Joe' to -Maheu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangments there". (IG Report, p. 19; Interim Report, p. 77) To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 IG Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business". HW 53060 DBocld:32272935 Page 11
HW 53060 Page Six - (Comment: This factually unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official govern- ment records of other agencies. As an example, State Depart- ment files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport in Cuba on October = , 1959, and received that document in Havana on February ° , 1960. (See Trafficante file, State Department) No records available to the Committee from INS, State Department, or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during this period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante recalled that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release from prison. (Testimony, pp. 4-53, Oct. , 1977) His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the red by mid-1960, and law enforce- ment reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.) : By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Trafficante's role had diminished to a point even below Gian- cana's. He had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "trans-— lator" and was needed only to facilitate conversation between Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual _ assassination. Interestingly, Trafficante and Roselli's 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the facts as they were being reported in , 1963 by the principals. (Comment: The Senate testimony of Trafficante and Roselli needs to be outlined with a view to contrasting the "courier vs. interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross-examine either man on this discrepancy nor did the Interim Report "hint" at the problem. ) Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the methad to be . employed to accomplish the foal. The Agency took the simplistic, _Straight-forward approach of shooting Castro, but this plan was rejected by Giancana. In a comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that would be put into Castro's food and drink...Trafficante - (Joe, the courier) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surrepticiously poison Castro. The gang- sters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister, | Castro. The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to received kickbacks from the gambling interests but had since lost that source of income and needed the money. (I.G. Report, p. 25) Docld: 32272935 Page 12?