SGiassification:: —— (als rm ig tg be used for material axbasted (8m Cla—sentrelled decuments,) Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's investigation “and the key stations were receiving tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions saying everybody participate in. yo the investigation.“ {Ibid. p. 133.)- It was ‘his. 7 oN (eeoilection, however, that throughout his tenure as’ Ce coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the Mexico’ City Station was the only CIA field station directly a Py \ oan tr Dnt eee Ee Ta tes Footnote * =~ continued from bottom of page 4. I knew that we (at CIA) did not have the basic responsibility for investigating the assassination of the President. If there was a crime commited in the course of this activity, sit) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that it was our responsibility to give the fullest cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr. Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully com » ° operated, and he always fully cooperated with me. (Ibid. p. 52.) a ° oN! ‘ & \_O'Neal_noted that his office (CI/SIG) at the direction of § the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was designated the central point for collection of assassination- : related information made available to the FBI. (Ibid. Pp. 92> ~53. 900613 Elastfiss i Nee 200052)
eee gw 7 «G Gassificctign; _ = ee k is foun is tg be used for maveris! Exceed fom CrA—eentrslled decuments.) involved in investigatory activities related to President _ Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid) | . Cr C4 om y 3B Scelso PANS During the latterhatf~of December, issued a summary report which described Oswald's activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related UG. URE. ES, information then available to the FBI but not provided to CIA until late Dec. 1963. (Ibid. pe. 114-115.) (cra 3 Document Report by John Scelso to c/cr, £8 Dec. 63.)* Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted ‘J. * responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President . SERS Kennedy's assassination to the Counterintelligence Staff. (HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso, Cr 5/16/78, p. 136, 2f. HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 15 wherein Rocca states that a e 6 ’ responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI Staff on January 12, 1964.) Helms testified that this shift in * Approximately two days after President Kennedy's . assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report, oy provided to President Johnson by Helms. This report adopted the position that Oswald probably was a lone assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban intelligence though such ties could not be excluded 7 from con 2. ok oA S<efongggi4 fle fae vation: ners Ch costo. | einen ~ gn ‘
Classification: — is @ be ys for ma ecial extr d { i$ Ai a ig to areria tH extros ea om —<CON ‘ocuments rom vom ON ro ed ocumen 3 responsibility was a logical development because the investigation had begun to take on broader tones. (Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p- 14, see also HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138.) Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond Rocca who testified before the Committee that the shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused in part by the establishment of the Warren oe 7/7¢ (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, vis 12-13.) Rocca added: It was entirely appropriate in the GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would have that (responsibility for the Agency investigation. ) But the minute you had a commission set up outsilde the line obviously had to be the Director, and from the Director to his Chief of Operations overseas, because the spread involved then all of the divisions. Here you had Mr. (Scelso) ae 8 asked to sign off ‘on-.. . . fe ‘ with s (fo.n-. plete FO fovuds the Netherlands, a er! ies i with U.K., Ty and it would: have=-seeme tome. Utteriy administratively simply a hybrid monster. (HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 12.) ? ay + James Angleton supported Rocca's belief that "the spread (of investigative responsibility) involved... MBPs beh t fy sta | Ct yt Senior, |
oy = 4 « Classificatign: —_eseas— 5 form is te be use ia materi! extracted ies : documents —contro ed men rom —<contro mén all of the (CIA) divisions." Angleton testifed to this Committee that the Agency's efforts to gather and coordinate information related to | the assassination underwent a metamorphic transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and Case Officers approached Warren Commission. requirements in a piecemeal fashion. However, Angleton testified the Agency was eventually able to focus its resources to avoid duplication of effort and provide a system for the central referencing of assassination related information as. such information was developed. (HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, pp. 76-77, see also HSCA Classified Sy Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 411/18, p. 23.) Glessification: —__. D0d016 saad easy i
Glassificatign: = — is rm is to be used for ma + Lites (8 orm is to Ai ues Ist asters éatrasted omonOnirove om, Caasontrolled documents. The record reveals that during this second phase 4 of CIA information collection efforts in support of the Warren Commisssion investigation the concentration 5 of Agency resources shifted in, emphasis from exploration ; fe a . of Oswald's activities in Mexico’ ‘City: to “his residency I ge ae wren in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962 and possible association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus. *~ Cseg p tacit ). (Ibid., pp.32-33,44,Executive Session of Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p- 23.) “LA Ses ekiegig, Rocca commented <£ .that during this phase primary interest in support of the a Warren Commission was to follow-up on Soviet leads: on the assumption that a person who spends four years**in the Soviet Union, ‘under his circumstances, had to be of specific interest to Soviet State security and their collateral _ authorities. (HSCA Classified Deposition of “Raymond Rocca, pp. 32-33.) Cseep 1e fe **) Mee 5s Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended to concentrate on concerned the Soviets: Go topP- (Pte conti nuttion of fexT go0c17 |. asilied By Ae —————