J4g0009 RAE ART LG ENA ae ae ein tnnasanerence Ctcoey dan ee AE ARERR LT tegen oN thre ‘Ambassador agreed with Don. wee launched. Don confirmed that he had talked with the “Amba boador who had vouched for Conein. Don stated he was leaving on 29 October to a oe a - Coordinate final plans. Don requested Conein to remain at hoes al _ four hours in advance. Don said nothing would be happening within the to change his planned 31 October departure, the Aubassador would ve, Lodge replied in the affirmative. Don told the Antassador that the US Government should not interfere with or try to stimulate a coup.’ 28 October (continued) Saigon Station's "History of the Vie thame se Generals! coup” Conein. met with General Don for the . last time before the. coup ° beginning 30 October--until further notice. Don repeated that the Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began, but when pressed on his previous commitment to make them available h8 hours in : advance, Don said that. ‘possibly the ptans could oniy be made available next 48 hours and that, if there was a good reason: for the Ambassador : informed in time to make his own decision.
14-00000 SA nln intact nent ee shaw We aes dew 29 October -Trueheert, and David Snith act as a comittee. to direct any coup . @ position to provide technical advice to Harkins and Trueheart as z General felt the US was risking too much based on flimsy evidence... - GTA cabie fror Saige on (SAIG 2040). boule gan lnce whlb ee In an eyes only cable cent via CIA channels, Lodge gives his vievs on the seemingly imminent coup: “In summary, it would apnear that a coup attempt by the generals' group is imminent .-. . and that no positive action by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing Diem end Nhu. ... . .Although there have been no requests. : to date by the generals for material or financial support, we must , 3 a anticipate that cuch request may be forthcoming. so © 6 6 ot Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants: DCI, DDP - Record by DDP & C It was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, Harkins, es e operation. DCI countered with the view that Smith should not be. involved in such a policy-making function, although he would be in os well as carry out their instructions in the operational field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup, we should discourage its launching. The Attorney — , The Del stated his view that even a successful coup would create a - reriod of interregnum and confusion which might only be solved by . @ second or third coup. ms Sas . 8 Mee
NERDY 20 Jet ad, Sorta astm tet te Hap ne a Ze oy 30 October < Should furnish them. ... . . . If we were convinced that the coup “was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. Gen. Harkins has read this and does not. concur." SERET-BS aly CIA cable to Sairon (om 79109), Bundy to Ledge: " . 2. « «+ chances of action with ‘or without our approval nos so stenificant that we should urg sently consider our attitude and contingency plans. ... . . Believe cur attitude. to coup group can still have decisive effect on its:decision. . 2 « « We must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable. oe eee, 1 Conein should express to Don that we do not find presently revealed rn: plans give clear prospect of quick results. ... . »« «.We badly need some corroborative evidence whether Minh and others directly and «| completely involved. .... . highest authority desires it clearly — ; . : unacrstood that after your departure Harkins should. ‘participate. in — sO . io - supervision of ull coup contacts and that in event &@ coup begins, . be he become head of country team. «ee ee ™ CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063) a ee Lodge's reply: "=... . . do not think we have the pover, to . @elay or discourage a coup. Don has made it clear many times that this ie a Vietnamese affair. .... . I believe we should continue our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor - and press for more detailed information. CAS has been analyzing forces for some time and it is.their estimate ‘thatthe generals have — probably fMgured their chances pretty closely. . . 9. . . It does not seem sensible to have the military in charge of a matter which is so profoundly pclitical as a change of government. . . . « e As to requests frcm the generals, they may well have need of fumds at the last moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be passed discreetly, I believe we ‘CIA cable to Saigon (DIR-79407) . e Le a ee ° CAP 63598: a 1 ee + « We GO not accept as a basis for US policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. .....We -. cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that. only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention... .. . . US authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side. . .. .. " ‘he White House repeats its instructions. on ccamand of the country team after Lodge leaves. — . — "Ke
ded tle LE 30 October (continued cus, CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) Cable. fras Lodge (in its entirety): “Thanks for your sagacious dustructica. Will carry cut to test of my ability. went tit 1 November The coup began at 1315 hours, Saigon time, which is equivalent to 0015 hours, Washington time , 1 November. the ‘folloving account - is aravn from several sources: the Saigon Station's history of the . pe coup and various cables. - iC "Ae 135 hours, the Aide de Camp to General Don came to Coneints | house, told him that the coup was in progress, and said that General Don wanted Conein at Joint General Staff (ges) headquarters. The aide also asked Conein to bring with him as much money as Conein :- could readily lay hands upon. ‘he station had stored five million piasters (about $68,000 at the official rate) in a safe in Conein's . house against such a contingency. Conein took three million with Ain. General Don used ‘the money to ‘revard opposition military units ‘who joined the coup group. On 2 November, General Don informed Conein that he needed money to pay the families of persons killed. during the coup. Conein gave General Don an additional 1,750,000 fo Loge piasters. One bundle of 250,000 pilasters was overlooked and was found. _ sm. Hi 2 ea