Allende in Retrospect on, “brinkmanship™ that the Chileans exhibited.” Social and political tensions increased—but &> Jongz at economic deterioration was fat reflected in runaway to contain them, | The Turning Point The strains In the system only became unman- agcable in mid-1972, when the lid blew cff the fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures that had been building up for at least a year. As the deficit in government spending rose, particulary | because of its subsidies to the “social area,” its forcign reserves: dropped nearly to zero, and the growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic with Carlos Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance ‘Pinister. The Matus-Millas team sought to “find stability at another fevel,"” ordering a drastic cur- rency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized sector, and permitting limited agricultural price in- creases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of- living index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September, A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase In the cost of living only accelerated the inflation, $0-that by the end of the year the official consumer price Index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1). in September, industrial output began to drop in absolute terms (/.e., not merely in terms of the rate of increase)—-a drop that continued every month ‘| thereafter until the September 1973 coup.” Agri- | cultural production (excluding livestock) also com- menced to decline, and mincral producticn regis- tered precipitous drops, although copper production rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that @ number of new mines came into operation. (On other elements of the worsening economic situation, tee Table 2.) Chile’s economic problems were paralleled in the 49 A secret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the Etate Deparirnent, published in Jack Anderson's Column in Tre Washingtun Post (Wainingien, OC} on Marcm 28, 1972, commented thet “the Calieans nace a great ability 13 rush to Ime brink, emorace eech otner, Bad back OFF." On the gare font see Mauric-> Solace arg Fernande Cepece, Allende'’s Crue: On the Poutcsa of Srnsmensrip, Bogcta, Universidad de tes Aances, 1972. 84 Tne Allende government blamed ine drop in progucton en the Octomer 1972 girtne, But thia ignored ine fact thal Oroduct.on declines began betere October. Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the paticrn of Inflation, the Chilean political system seericd able - Table 1: Monthly Fluctuations in Consumer Prices peidical arena. Several additional ministers were iengeached, including the Minister of Interior, who wey, Charged with abetting the illegal importation of aren from Cuba in March, (The Allende govern- reent claimed that suspect shipmerits from Cuba-— “pulies Cubanos’—were “works of art,” but after the September 1973 coup, the government White fee published an inventory of over 2,000 pounds Gt aris sent from Cuba in 13 crates which customs and fadustrial Output under Allende. Month Consumer Price Index  triiu~trial Oulput * 1973 Oct. 35.6 =-8.0 Now. 35.3 43 Dec. 34.9 =-9.3- 197i Jan, 28.1 AS Feb. 22.8 =73 tAarch 20.1 . 6.3 April . 20.2 1.6 “play 21.0 13.5 June 2b.a 10.7 july 19.1 6.7 Aug. 417.4 10.7 Sept. 15.6 25.5 Oct. 16.5 22.6 Nov. 18.8 22.1 Occ. 22.1 19.5 $972 Jan 248 18.5 Feb. 32.0 11.9 PAarch 34.0 10.2 April 38.1 12.6 fAay 40.0 11.4 June 40.1 2.5 duly 45.9 5.0 Aug. 77.2 3.6 Sept. 114.3 78 Ot 142.9 DF Nov. 249.9 —Bl Dec, 163.4 —O2.1 1973 Jan. 180.3 6.8 Feb. 174.1 os) March 183.3 —28 April 195.5 —11.3 May 233.5 —11.0 dune 283.4 —148 July 323.2 10.7 Aug. 303.6 119 ‘Sept. 286.0 —229 Oct. 528.4 18.0 Now, $28.9 5.4. ¢ Percentage of change from ihe same month of the previous year. SOURCE: institute Nacersi oe Estadisticas (Natonal institute of Sratst.ca), Sartago: Soce‘sd ce fomente Fabtil. (Association tor we Oevenperent cf Manufacturing), Sanhago. &
fee mene ask eompemessee 2 tore or Table 2: Gross domestic product (% change) investment (%2 change) Realbweses and saluries (% change) Exports ($ milion) imparts ($ million) - angen: SOURCE: Demutment of Economics, University of Crile had teen forbidden to Inspect") The Judiciary joined in the conflict, protesting the fadure cf the Ministry of Justice to carry out court orders, while progovernment demonstratars denounced the wie/os de mierda-—"filthy old men—in the Supreme Court. As it became apparent that there was no real ‘| possibility. of resolving their differences, the wo sides turned ta the armed forces as impartial arbi- ters, and the natlonat holidays in mid-September 1972 were marked by rival efforts: ‘of. ihe Congress and the President to ingratiate themselves with the military. The political Involvement of the military was accelerated by the next Step in the Chilean trasecy— the October 1972 strike. Respectively termed the “employers' lockout” and “the national strike” by pro. and anti-Allende forces, it began far from Santiago, in the remote southern. province of Aysen, with a strike by smati truckers. (Referred ta dy: the gavernmant press as the “truck-owners,” the ment. bership of the truckers’ premio—guild—was alnost entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks -{who feared an announced plan to establish a state trucking agency which would have had pricrity access to new trucks and spare parts). Thea strike quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shapheesess, doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, ens: ineers and part of the peasantry. The Christian Demarras and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and the work stospage dragpsd on for over 3 month resulting in an estimated loss of $150-200 milion, In production. Agriculture was particularly hava h because the strike took place in the midst ef the planting season; indeed, there is no doubt that part, -hough not all, of the 25- S-percent drop in the 1973 harvest was the consequence of the strike. Inaustry '* Socrelaris General del Goolerns, Lara Blanco (white Arnal, Sentiago, 1953, pp. 10308. Some Insices of the Chilean ‘Economy, 1 ” gimer grouas. On Ime perastence of worker “economism,” seo James 197072 1970 197 1972 a7 3.3 14 66 242 -85 11.0 30.0 —9.0 1109 1045 - 853 . 1620 g124 1287 5 rE tSPOSReeeenese ete -was fut as adversely affected, since workers at- tempted to keep factories going despite manage- mert's efforts to cease production—and the October strike Saw the emergency of “Industrial Belts” (Cordones) and “Communal Commands,” which seemed to embody the type of spontaneous “popular power that leftist theorists had spoken of as the basis of 4 genuine revolutionary class consclousness to replace the materialistic “economism” that: had characterized Chilean workers until this time.” Whan tHe workers seized closed factories, the plants were usually “intervened” by the government, $0 that an Important result of the October strike was a - considerable expansion of the government-controlled “gector-of industry and trade, The most important outcome of the strike, how- ever, was the direct invalvement of the military in the Allende cabinet. A conditian of the settlement of the strike was that the military take over key cabi- net posts. This resulted most notably In the assign- ment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Com- mander-in-Chief of the Army, General Carics Prats, $0 a {@ assure that the congressional elections scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely and impartially. The involvement of the military ard the prepara- tions for the March elections brought about a lull In the escalation of political conflict in Chile. Inevi- 88 Tne Cordones were mare or less srontaneously organized cominttaes of workers from seized factories Which Ooordinated Produchun and dhavioubun in & given industrial area. The Communal Commaress (Comanacs Comunaies) were organiied by tne Corcanes 1 mot-nze the tocal population In the surrounding aréa. They inched regresenialves of neigh Rood committees (,unles ce besinots, mutners’ groups (centros ge Macresi, price control and DMruGsIwny comMmeitees (jwAlIs JO Assi MVEA y Hrecwos), and Peras, “Cote: Manonahzatian, Socwecorom.s Change and Pooular Parvcipalion,” Stugus st Coniparative inter natona! Oewaiopment {Beverly Hills, Cad), Sering 1973, 90. 24-51. also available in dames Petras, ES, Latin Amence: fram Degensence ip Re volutan, Rew York, Wiley, 1973, Chea. 2. ry
Allende in’ Retrospert 18. Fee 90:8 tr caum Aaa ae Ot oy . - Symptomatic of leltist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Sacre “SSupreme Court as “Protectors of Fascist Sedition.” - _tably, however, it also precuced political divisions within the military itself, a@hich had hitherto been relatively alocf from the grocess.of polarization. It was soon apparent, for ingtance, that General Prats was willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January ‘Admiral ismaet Huerta resigned from the cabinet over plans far the initiaticn cf what he took to be a food-rationing system. it is now also known that the first plans for a possibile coup were made by intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972."* Food distribution became a critical issue as the black market continued to expand, with much of Chile's agricultural production going into itegal channels because of the government's refusal to increase the official prices paid for agricultural pro- duce. The result was, in effect, two separate price systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution system oriented primarily toward the low-income groups and 4 flourishing black market aimed at middie- and upser-income groups. The eapansicn 6 The New Yorn Pores (haw York}, Sept. 27, 1973. atyes are a Ta la ty OO ahd aa nn 7 os a oid | rn "1 ge : oo SS As Go wall poster denounces the country’s =Phote by Juan de Oars for The Mow Yash Times. of the cawars of covernment-appointed Supply and Distinacer, Committees UAVS) to deal with the black-mareet protiem led the opposition to charge polbcai catuactation of food distribution: nonethe- loss, tne gusernment seemed powerless to combat black-rarest operations. ee ensnannsearetrareee Vhe Merch 1974 Elections ee eee i sna | The congressional elections in March did not re. | solve arytrung. Cnile’s right-wing parties had haped that food svoriages and econorni¢ difficulties would PIOGLCE 2 Ael-inirds majority against the govern- cl the Frecaen, but the results, while showing an antigaveenment majority of 56 percent, gave the Alera: regime 44 percent—a larger vote than most ctsérvers had predicicd. The opposition pointed ac inet the vote of the pro-government forces hac séeciined from the 50 percent they had registered a: tne 1971 municipal elections, while | Ment, whuct Mgnt in turn permit the impeachment | the gaverremem compared its 44 percent with the 25 percere nat Allende had received in 1970. In fact, the emy proper basis for comparison was the |
. \ | apprehensive middle-class homeowners "man a walchtower 2 cutside of the wall counters with “We Wilf Win.” aco neighborhood; 4 Socialist slopun on th \ 1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the inftist parties had sulfered a slight floss in vores but | had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain opposi- * Lonists later argued that the Left would have sul- ‘tured much greater losses had it not. Geen for a { eoeermmentassisted electoral fraud invalving some 200,000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented «A support of the argument are unconvincing.” + Whie the government's interpretation af tne elec- j tans as proct that it was expanding iis popular sup- ‘mat at least it had not fost popularity as rapidly as Mewous governments faced with similar economic reverses Despite a wage readjustment in October, teot wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and 1ag- _ f@ontighen continued to consume the wage increase. ® early 1973. However, the combination ef dis- -temingtary distribution of government-orscuced - gree and appeals to Class Consciousness seemed to nnd _ 1 hea crust of the Hwestiganieg Committes of ine CaN < eel ele bee GaPaut, eeprdiuced in tne Lipro Beant, BO. I203d. we ot oR Pom Mtoe 1 1973 Omit the 2149-24 yes OS FIUe OH @ ot Poet EeOR IO JOUNE Lo vole in 197O, Iney TAT SET = eeaiy ihe number of “Haudulent” voters estmsiod 1 Ine _ fort was nat accurate, the election results indicated - atong a security wall built around thelr Santl- =Phete by Sontl Visall) for Photeraporters. ' have stemmed the erosion cf support, at Ieast amerg the masses of the —0F. ‘ Unfortunately for the government's longer-range interests, the deliberate accentuation of ¢la35 consciousness had an opposite effect on the middle class, driving middie-class areas to organize them- selves into “Neighborhood Committees" to defend themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which seemed more likely nov that the safety valve of 2n impending electicn as fo longer present. A gad ernment proposal to limit full wace readjusiments to thosa making fess than three times the minimum wage did nothing 19 reassure the hostile miccie- income groups. ; Before the elections, it had been rumored that there might be ancther attempt in March at an accommedation between the regime and the opposi- tion ferces, possibly under the auspices of ine military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly prevented by the publication, two days after the elections, ct a government decree calling for the initiation in June of a single rational unified school system, which would follow a common curriculum: including compulsory courses in socialism and work ® 55
14-00000 Allende ist eee The ensuing “uproar involved periods in ‘te tof oe sition to the goeernment and mobilized thousands of secondary vchvol students in violent demen:tra- tions in dvaravean Santiago. Stories of fierce argu- ments aver the school proposals among the top military officer, (the military Rad left the cabinet alter the election) filtered into the national press, and a military delegation held a formal mesting with the Educetica Ministry to express thelr -opposi- tion. The cortraecrcy subsiied only when the yov- ermment anrcunced that tne proposal had been postponed, pesvsicg further discussion. Within tre government, the debate continued on whether to “consclidate In order ta advance” (the Communist gnition) or to “advance without com- promise” (tr Socialist stance). One Indication of how the dezzte was resolved was the decision by the governrrect to use a constitutionally-authorized “decree of incictence™ allowing: the cabinet to over- ride the ruirgs of the Controller General of Chile, Hector Hurréces, who had disallowed the requisi- tioning of sarre2 of the factories taken over during the Octcrer 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued with the judictery over the executive's refusal to obey court ercers to return seized properties. On May 26, the Secrerne Court sent a public Iciter to the President cenouncing ... the iifega! attitude of the administration... (lls) open ard continual rebellion against judicial orders... which signifies 3 crisis of the rule of law land] the imminest breakdown ol the juridical struc- ture of the cousitry.”* The stalernate between the executive and the Congress over the constitutional amendment on the “Three Areas cf Property" was compounded when the Constitute Tripunal refused to take jurisdic- tion over the ciscuted question of whether, in the absence cf a g-.ec:scite, the Congress could override the President's mem vetoes by a majority or by a two-thirds vere.” A second constitutional conflict along the same fines developed when the opposition majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment to give farms uncer 40 hectares. {about 100 acres) in size an aceciute guarantee against expropriation 39 Lieve Blancs, o. 215. 80 The fern “Wer wets” revecis the fact that tne Chilean president, uniina hig US courtersayt, Can velo OF Even 1ewrle indiwidual SEC GAS of propoted teers. the Cathee Courch for the first time in formal appo- | . Tenien te coprer m 3s ORES Te ars ie Long ol the asteibulion ‘of lati din the "t formed” sector tothe peasanicy offer as trans tional peried of twa years. (he poverament had once again used @ focphole in the 1967 laa ta povtpane ine defintely the dishabation of tsprepriated land by indiacust title} in 8/29 the official price Indes jucriped 20 percent, indicstog that the enfation wa, mieving into a new hyper Gabonary stare. The ene cficet that the gov- entices had made to hold the ling-its refusal to grant @ full costotdiving ware increa.e to the €1 rs on the praunds that under their eantract they had already reseed partial cost- Gfeliacy increases-—ied to a bridling two-and-a-half maonin ctrize, which inctuded a iners! march on Santize9, mass railcs. and sirnuitancous one-day genera! tirikes for and against the government In mid-June. By that time, Allende was once more rearhy tS resort to military involvernent In the cabinct to rectors social peace. Las Srage—Decline and Fall On sure 29, the last act of the Chilean trapedy began sith an abortive revolt by the Secand Armored Regiment in Santiago. Appiarentiy, ceveral army units hed been in contact with Puleia y Libertad, a right-wog political arcanization, and had planned to seize Frevicent Allende at his residence and to cctuay 29e presidential palace. The revolt was canceled one day before it was to occur, but when one of tee cHicers of the Sccond Armored Regiment was affested and held in the Defense Ministry, the Regiment cecided to tree him and in the process to $6iz6 tf presidential palace as originaily planned. General Prats, the Anay Commander, used the other military writs in Santiago to put down the revolt in a fen Hours—most of which were spent In negotia- tion rali.er than shoaung—but not before President Allonds Hac gone en ihe air to ure “the people” to’ take over aii industries and enterprises as a response to the uorising of “a small group of rebellious mili- tary men.” Tne Central Labor Federation also urged the wérzers to eccupy the factories, and in one day the number cf cempunics taken over by the govern. ment rese from 262 to 526. The “Industrial Belts” that had sprung up at tne time of the October strike Now achieved new importance. The spread of “peo- ple’s power (poder pooular} had been seen by Allenae 23 a deterrent ta a possible future coup, but it created many additional problems for the | ® . 56
14-00000 a i oo on rome Ose Pong etn meee SO EERIE on. as Par eee Sia . A Decrement y a BRP Mean oe ee een yee» 2 aby canmaide cs ttt 4 cot smatitnyaceydieas tee see | Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchlorks march in Santiago in support of the Allende administration during brief nationwide strikes by pro- and anti. | Maraist elements in mid-June I 973. i | kovernment, Production declined Sharply after the | Ukeovers, the ooposition pot fresh fuel for its claim : that the expansion of state control of industry was. - beng carried out through extralepal Channels, and “paler popular” —as expressed in the worker occu- , hbONs—appeared to sonie extent (0 pose a passibie | | Meat of an alternative to the power of the central , &eecrament ‘ Alter the June 29 revolt, Aliende made new effarts. "f) wecure Military involvement in the povernment, ; bul his negotiations with the armed forces were “wMsuccesstul.” Instead, they embarked on a policy of wgorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a | Peasure which had been adopted in October 1972 j . , Mt only sporadically enforced thereafter. This ta | ‘Mihorted any, military or police commanders to. Cay Out arms searches if there was "a presumption _ +f te clandestine existence of illegal firearms." > "Pha tight wing Patri y libertad organization nad farm announced publicly that it was £oing under- Wide World ‘Fhotos * Tee tae ating Scounts uf irose negotiations aapear in éreine + ema, soty BEY, 1973, op. 7-10, “Pam "9 85.198, Ogg Ofc. 8s (Santiago). Oce. @t, 8972. Gy a Bae A Sea Pe ip Rad tome to Sience's Gethin the muda of tna OR Hoe, ard BINCe it Red the sucny sucoot of tne armed 7 ee 88 wee Oo -Piaed 1 GER Ht deans ihe Gpposition of the "Boe et Owh wed tre AHR, 57 - te pee eaten & eo + ie Lehn wie NSF ey ows wins ote er eeed "iT REBT S21 Rae 38 a po epee 9 Se SES OREM SEEPS ‘the Cette Church both concluded independently 1 one tere: Chats, Tie Communists {nitiated a campaign against _ October, the truckers were “in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his Tee UNE Oy ee ee ~ 9+ wordt fet Ae ah on othe aoe aac oy uth tat Bd emanate GlOuEs I an attempt to overthrow the kovernment by fores, and inilitary intcllipence was also aware of the: initiation of arms training by all the govern. Ment Darke, even the centrist Radicals," In the Course of their Crackdown, the military fotind arms caches itt factories in Suntlape and Concepcién, and the kien cf a worker in one such arms raid pro- voked prteets from the leftist parties, _ Al this paint, the Chilean Communist Party and that the erty solution to the impasse in Chile was attempt at an agreement between the Allende so serniment parties and the Christian Demo-- civil war ating. simultaneously with 3 statement by the Chitczn hierarchy calling for a renewal of dia- lopue. Probably in response to these pressures on both sides, two lengthy discussions took place: on July 21 between UP and POC representatives, Both Allende: and the Christlan Nemocrats agreed on the necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law, } but diczzrcemment continued on the constitutional reforninKiende effored to Slen tne arnendment on the “Three Areas of Property" in return for a con. Stitulional araendment specifying that the Congress Could anty Grerride presidential vetoes of constitu. tional amendments by a two-thirds vote. He also Propezec te establishment of Joint committees to work cut further apreements, However, the Christian Demncizts cencunced these proposals as “dilatory” and brake off the nepatiations, A fen days before the dialogue was Initiated, the truckers kegan another strike, which was to fast from Juty 25 until the coup on September 11. As in joined by the other gromics, Coming at a time when the 12-month inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget deficits and subsidies to the nationalized Industries and africulture, had reached 323 percent—-and In a Situation where inventories had not yet been built up from the October strike—the truckers’ action Created much more serious probiems for the govern- ment than the earlier. strike, This new crisis once again raised the question of military participation fellow commanders that It was their patriotic duty to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike. ett er ree PT Allunie's perscnal bodyguard Rad organized courses In arms Taming at tus vacéten rouse vette af Santags. Tne MAPU tegen ers tranng on Oecember 1432, ana tne Rasicats gl3 $0 in July 1973, The armes forces were aware of frugs af east Oy tne ens of dusty. See documents in’ Lore Giance, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-209. PREETI» Ur wee Utes RR REE gE EMI = OF SO ce Ee Sa wie er ee a,
14-00000 Allende in Retrospect Trucks stand idle outside Valparaiso, Chile on Sep- tember 8,.1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing trans. portation strike. = UPE On August 9 Allende swore in what. he called a “national security cabinet,” with General Prats as Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinct posts. Almost coincident with the entrance. of the mil- itary Into the cabinet, the naval establishment be- came involved in a serious conflict with the left wing of the Alicnde coalition. On August 7, the naval intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot to carry cut an enlisted men’s revolt on August 11 in Valparaiso and Concepcién. The announcement accused PS Secretary General Carics Altamirano, MAPU leader Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriques, | head of the MIR, of being the “intellectual authors” of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the con- gressional immunity of the first two, who sat respec- tively In the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Two days before the September coup, Altamirano admitted that he had encouraged navymen to resist their coup-minded (goipista) officers.” ; This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service command from below was combined with maneuvers o 8? tt wan an iedicaton of the continuing press freedom in Cniie that iareosstands in downtuwn Crile af inig time conta ned @ left-wing publication hesanned, “Selaers, Disobey Your Of-cers,” end & magazine of the extreme Right with tne Readines, “The Argnt.of Aspelion,” “Retetlon and ig Goait,” ang “Resistance to ine Tyrant.” by Allende to replace p olticers unsympathe tic to hin. When General Ruiz resigned his ‘cabinet post on August 17 in protest apainit his lack of sufficient power fo settle the strise, Allende compelled him” to add that his, departure from the cabinet “im plicitly” carried with it his retirement as Air Force Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende tactic to remove an officer oppozed fo him, and it) met serious resistance from within the Air Force, provoking a series of actions which ‘ultimately led directly to the September 1.1 coup. On August 20, top Air Force. officers met to ‘decide whether to resist Allende’s action. ‘By evening, Ruiz had persuaded them to accept it on the condition that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer, General Gustavo Leigh, as 4ir Force Commander and | name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so that Allende could not repeat the same maneuver with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking military officers, including. those of sia generals,. gathered in front of General Prats’ houte fo present a letter asking for his resignation. Véhen the demon- tiffion was broken up by police tear gas, it pra- voked such dissension In the armed forces that ‘on the following day General Prats decided to resign both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He was joined by two other generals who, with Prats, had led the military forces that had quelled the tank-regiment revolt in June. . The resignation of what appeared to be the last |- defenders of Allende in the army now meant that ull three services were opposed to the President. it coincided with the adoption on the sane day of 3 “sense of the house” (acuerdo) resolution by the Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and the military ministers, drawing their attention to "the serious breakdown of the constitutional and lepal orcer.” * The resaiution criticized the Allende fovernment for repeatedly bypassing the legislature through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing to promulgate the constitutional reforms voted by the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial orders, encouraging itiegal seizure of property, perse- cuting opposition labor groups, and supporting illegal pararnilitary organizations. In conclusion, it Stated that the listed actions constituted a “serious breakdown of the constitutional and legaf order of the Republic” and urged the military ministers to “put an end to the de facto situations listed abave which violate the Constitution and the law” or be *4Lipeo Blanco, pp. 239-82. et
a. Cuilty of “compromising tie national ane profes. {| put them into Optration, merce the actual seizure of sional character of the armed forces.” control required lithe preperation, . In its original form, the resolution hat declared After the resignations of the third week of August, the Allende government to be illegitimate, but the Allende restructured his cabirict without the top acuerdo had later been softencd in Order to secure military commanders: but still retained representa- the support of the Christian Democrats. Yat its effect | tives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over was still to give a congressional green. lisht to the-|-the Opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as Military, and Allende immediatcly so interpreted it. | Minister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress | Briones, who was known to be interested in another of “promoting a Coup O'ttat by asking tho military | attempt at accommodation with the Christian Demo- forces to” make governmental judgments ‘inde- | crats. The president aito canceled 3 projected trip pendently of the authority and dircetion of the | to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers. President"; he also pointed out that according to The- government and the apposition again staged ‘Tthe Constitution the only: way that the Congress. | rival demonstrations in connection with the third :C0UId decide on the legality of the Presicent’s con. anniversary of the 1970 preside-r.tial elections.. duct of his office was through impeachment by a On the weekend before the coup, the Christian: two-thirds vote.” _ Democrats called al provincial party leaders to a The congressional vote was echocd by several meeting at which a propecel was adopted for the professional associations. The Medical Association | simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the called on their “colleague’ Allende: {o resign—a {| President and for. new. elections to resolve the con- fequest that was echond by the Federation of Pro- fessionals (CUPROCH)-—-and recipnation’ petitions were circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers" Association Issued a declaration vhich—“without attributing a malevolent intention” to the President—asserted an | “iecarnpatibility between the Institutional framework within which he Is Supposed to exercise his office. and the actions which he feels obliped fo carry out in hls program," Arguing that Allende “would appear to be Incapacitated fimpedido) in the exercise of his functions as he understands them,” the statement SugRested that he could be removed from office | Ader Article 43 of the Constitution, which autltor. izes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity.’* ] The Coup ee | Exactly when the decision to carry Out the coup "was made is not yet certain, but it evidently was ‘ feached In the days following Pruts* resignation. j The armed forces had contingency plans for the : control of vital points throughout the country in case : Gf any emergency, and it only required a sipnal to ; "86 Moreurig {laternational Edition) Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. Tne b ; . 198-8 OF tne Crrisnan Bemocrane Party told tne New York Times Se “rather ee nor the armed forers favor anything but & "Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-inChief of the ! Rarer. doRtOR tn Chile's panticat crisis” out empnasited that | Chilean Army and Minister cf Cetense, leaves the j ea ong Gey to avoid a breakdown of tne Constitution w3s ine 5 Bhs MremeRT OF Mlvary men in at least Sk C40Mel Posts, as well ag President Palace on August 15, 1973, alter a “Sy umiernetrelary Bestons and as Reads ef the cnie? govern. conference on the transport crisis. Sone seurties The New York Times, Aug. 2?, 1973, p. 12. : S4) Mercure (international Eaiton}, Aug. 26-Seot. 1, 1973, p. 7. . OPE . ®
Allende in Retrospect gece pepeenenneninniiaan Some oe yO ye wpe Salvador Allende hurries through the corizers of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the: morning of September 1 1, 1973, shorty before taking his own life during the military coup a‘état. flict between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met with the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and caited for the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct cf ofice. Although this step was reportedly cpposed by the Socialists, Briones’ subsequeritly asserted that Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a radio address at noon on the day of the coun.” Meantime, after a stormy session with Aliende on September 7, the military commanders proceated-on Sunday, September 9, to draft the text ci the pronunciamiento issued on September 11. Trey did |_ not secure the agieement of the National Police untll early on the morning of the coup itss’f, and only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniscity had taken over the position of police commanzer.™ On September 10, Navy units set sail from Valparaiso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but that evening they returned tq port ana by early morning of the llth had seized control of that city. Concepcién, the third-ranking city in Cnile and a # information from tne author's personal interviews @an Patricio Aytwin, Jan. hi, 1974, ang Cartos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974. 8 Accounts of precoup military Blivies apoear in Pee Caristhan Science Monctor (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973, Tne wait Street anny (New Yoru), Sept. 25, 1973, Le sfonge (Paris), Des. 13, i372 ang Robert Mosa, “Chile's Coup and After," Encounter (Lona Warch 1974, pp. 72-68. ‘class struggle,” —Phote by The Now York Times, known center of teftist activism, was taken over with- out a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer. ' To justify their action, the military. commanders broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While ad- mitting that the Allende government had initially come to power by legal means, they announced that | ‘it had. “fallen into Hagrant illegitimacy” by violating fundamental rights, by “artificially fomenting the by refusing to implement the de- cisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the Controller-General, by causing a critical decline ia agricultural, commercial and ‘industrial. activity In the country, and by bringing about a state of In- flation and anarchy which “threaten the internal and external security of the country. " The coup leaders concluded: . These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical doctrine... to justify our inkervention to depose a government which is illegitimate. immoral, and um representative of the overwheiming sentiment of the nation,” At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to defend him, Allende broadcast his last message to! i. 38 Lore Bianco, pp. 243-42, 60
14-00000 t Scottie Wid Merde TOLL aa eae Oe LE ee ek Station that had not yet been shut down by the military. He began: _ a , -This is surely the last time that 1 will be able to spcak “;ifo you... My words are not spoken in bitterness: but disappointment. in the face of these events | can only say to the workers, “I am not going to resign.” At this historic juncture 4 will pay with my life for the loyalty of the people, - Blaming “foreign capital, imperialism, and reaction” for persuading the armed forces to break with their tradition, he said: - come fo you, but it does not matter. You will con- tinue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the feast, you will remember me as an honorable man who was loyal to the revolution,”® ‘ who wished. to do so to leave the building, and— except for his personal secretary-—all the women, ‘Including Allende's pregnant .daughter, feft. The military also offered the President and his family safe conduct out of the country if he would sur- render. Allende rejected the offer. The Alr Force peatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m., Allende decided to discontinue. the resistance, and ihe members who had been with him left the build- ing .in single file, led by the secretary carrying a -white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on a sofa In a reception room on the second floor, put 'wo bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he used was a gift from Fidel Castro." : oO ‘Set eterna Conclusions , ; eee eens Since the coup, comments In the world press i fepresenting widely divergent political postures have | «ted the Chilean case as proof that the hope of j aeheving Marxist socialism through democratic 7 "€ans is a'vain one. Yet most people have failed. to | ote two fundamental errors of the Allende policy, ; either of which was essentially related to the attempt to establish democratic socialism: + {1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his 61 rthe Chilean people over the single ps . Atiende radio History will judge them, ... My voice will no longer. At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which re. 1 USSR, China and Eastern Europe increased only from requisite “the support of the majority of the people." Allende acted as if he had that support; but even at the highest point of his popularity in the April 1971 ciections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his 1 policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at ex- | panding his electoral base, was. more successful In » pitting professional and middle-class groups against at him than in widening his support among workers, an peasants and low-income groups. ; i 2) Mardist economists and policymakers have always placed primary emphasis on Investment and the expansion of the productive capacity of the economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers | emphasized increases In consumption and cornbined this with a headlong rush to take over industry and agriculture—a course far removed from the “two ! steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The conse- { -quences of these-pollcies after their deceptive initial Success were massive government deficits, runaway | ‘| inflation, and a neaf-breakdown of the economy. (The argument that Allende’s economle problems .were the result of a shortage of forelgn credit does not really hold water, since they were caused by policies Initiated before the foreign squeeze ‘and since, In any event, Allende's regime managed to secure enough foreign credits from Latin American, European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase the Chilean foreign debt from $2.6 billion to $3.4 billion in less than three years. Much of the new indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the $9 million to $40 million between 1970 and: 1973.") (no nee ISfnthtr sseteintreeteerUceP 5¢ Transiated from the transcript of Ine tape recording of the speech published In Riczrdo Boizard, £1 Uitimo Ble de Ailenste (the Last Day of Allende}, Santiago, Eautnrial de Pacifica, 3973, pp. 43-45, 0 On Aliende's suicide, see the. meaicai report In £F Mercurie {International Edition), Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, op. 3b arnt 7. Yne Gyawiiness testimony of one of thy President's personal Pry siclans, who entered tha room Immediately therearter, Is publisned in Erciita, Jan. 28, 1976 op. 10-23, Allendte’s widow has esserted that witnesses tok} ner they mad seen Dullet wounds In his chest and stcmach. A supposed account by @ personal bodyguard Circuiated in Meuico and elsewhere describing Ris murder Contains Aumerous factual errors and describes avents which Could not Mace taken lace because of the prysical design of ine ouilding. On this end Mary other myths of Lett and Rignt concerning the overthrow ef Allende, see Paul £. Sigmund, “Allende through ine Mytha,” Worlcwes (New York) April 1974 pp. 16-21. 4 Secretaria, Comité Inte-americano de tg Alianza para el Progreta ‘ (CIAP), £7 Estuerro interno y 143 Necesidades ae Finanamiento Eaterna.para ef Oetarrolio de Crile (Comestic Ettorts and the Needs for Eaternat Financing fcr tne Devewpment of Crile), Wasnington, oc, 1974, p. v-9.
~ Allende inp Retrospect ec Snecite aspects of the Chitean system also Made tha Allende experiment a particularly difficult ane. He was able fo come to power in the first place because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the democratic. system and because the Marxist parties were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many instruments for state control of the economy which had been developed by previous administrations since the -1930's. However, ne: was required to operate within an institutional system which included frequent and staggered elections, proportionat rep- resentation, and a multiparty system which made majority rule very difficult.and often gave veto pow: ers to the-extremes of Right.and Left. The economy had been characterized for nearly a century by 2 chronic tendency to inflation, and successive govern- ments had consistently ignored agriculture in the Interest of securing urban electoral support. The most important systemic constraint of all, of course, was the existence of a professionalized and insti- tutionally-loyal: military which was unresponsive to the Ideological blandishments of the Left.” - The immediate causes of the military intervention are apparent from the preceding account. In the last part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean politics by both sides. and the rest of Chilean society—with the overwhelming majority joining the opposition to Allende. The can- flict. over education in March-April 1973 height: ened that polarization Just at the time the military were’atiempting to extricate themselves from, politi- cal Involvement. Then’ the expansion of arms searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which “104. Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge “T of civil war, Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing military hierarchy by 3 combination of leftist activ- ity among enlisted men and presidential mancuver- ing with promotions and retirements provided the classis scenario for a coup d'état. 33 The Socialists always Geheved that they could convert the fmiltary to thei Outlook. Trig ig gtribingly feveadiqd 1 Sociatist Party gocuments publianed in the Libra Bianco, BO. 424-30. became as polarized as: One can also relate Allenae's dithculties to the inherent contradictions in the Maraist theory to which he appeated.. At the same time that he proclaimed his faith in a democratic, pluratist and libertarian, transition to socialise, many of his Marxist. sup: porters spoke and acted.on the basis of a belief In he inevitability of armed confrontation. With his anewledge, they armed themselves and—-whatl was worse--talked incessantly about revolution, The re- peated Statements of Régis Debray and others that the observance of the rules of “bourgeois” legallty was only a tactic until the balance of forces had improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of the sincerity of Allende’s commitinent to democracy, . When the importation and distribution of arms wa3 combined with efforts to reorganize education along ideological lines, to sUbvert military discipline, and to rearrange the hierarchy of command, It [s not altogether surprising that the military finally took action. , : _ A positive:evaluation of the Allende years would certainly credit him with a sincere effort to ralse the living standards of low-incomo groups and to involve them actively In the determination of thelr own future. It would likewise stress the continucd existence of freedom of expression for all points of view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative assessment would ask whether the low-income groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an eco nemic policy. which after the first half of 1972 pro- duced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agrl- ¢ultural and industrial production, and a reduction in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more critically, one could inquire who has suffered the most in economic and in human terms as a result of the breakdown of the Chilean system—the Marxist politicians, many of whom were able to escape oF go into exile, or the workers, peasants and slurt- dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes in the form of the hardships Imposed by sharply | reduced consumption and the strictures: of dracon- ian military rule.
| a i ‘! " The Chilean Communist sarty, fe Nag eee v nao Ow Le oy : A Wiel se Sanat) Oe Sen SOVIET ANAINST, Lonion 1S Auguct 197b Kremiin’s Hand in cijenda’s Chile by. JAMES THEDERGE Why did Salvador 4! fende’s 4 rout ionuty Bove ernment end in a bloodbath deszite Soviet sup- port and the plaudiis of the werdd’s leht-wing extremists, who saw in Chile a new poth for _ Socialism’ ‘s march ta power? - , domas Theberge, who is.Director of the Letin ‘American Department of the Georgetown Uni- versity Center for Stratsgie ard: internetional Stdiés, shows how Moscow, the “rig brother”, though eager to explicit this opening in Latia Americe to ths full, disagreed with Allende’s headlong methods, and while warning him of the growing. economie chaos denied him enough financial aid. in 1925, Moscow dissatcred rucocio Ravires, a brilliant Peruvian Commun'a: ergeniter, to Chile to implament the “united front” ari “anti- fascist popular frent’ strategy Shar hed replecad. tha uitra-loft strategy of the Cerircern, Since that time tha Chilean Coinnunist sary generally has followed a strategy of braad atiiance and limited ‘alms, although the Cuban revctution ted 10 4 eadicalisation of party strategy. one of tha most foyal cro-Sovivt partiag ja kata “Arnetic. % Gave unqualivies support to ths 1of Czechoslovakia in 196%, Vinita ita fortunes ‘have shifted through tha year: zs 4a result of domestic and international aereicainerts, it une Ustintingly supported tho twist. 27-2 turns of Sovint foreign policy and repeated 3. o2cc"'s tnemes of anti-impariatism and class warizre. The party, at least prior ta the military Inter- vertion of September, 1973. wes the best organ- ised and strongest in Latin #merica. Esowaen 1956 and 1959 it formad on rc2cy alliance for electoral purposes with the Sccicist Party, its more militant Marxist rival on tre Left. But in 1969 the Communists decane erst a much more broadly based ailiance of tsit-sirg forens was necessary fer the transformatca cf ine country Into a socialist state and tney gisved a key role in the founding of tha Pozuier Unity Frane (a coalition of six leftist partite) at the end of that year. After the 1970 electoral victory of tha Popular Unity Front uncer Sstveccr Allande the Communists became tne o:ng’a most inituential force viithin the coalition. If sv? 2 far setar Organised and disciplined pert'cipent than its closest rival, the more idectegicz cy unstable and militant Sacislist Party. The ultimate aim of the party did rct waver throughout the Allande period. Tne Commurits hoped to be -ablo to take advantece of the weak- mass of the democratic ins: ions to install a “dictatorship of the prole:sra:” unter their direstion. Their Sweratary-Generct, Ecuarda Labarca, mada this clear in fs Cz tealia 7 Hores (Santiaco, Gditacini Gavarcty, $972), in which he declarad: “Per ui ties gs am n capital 3 Scrat? Llee invasion © a ‘Istn to Se neisticen necessarily requires that the proletariat be caunverted into the loading class, into the determin’ ing social forea’’, | The Communist strateny, shared by Salvador Aliends and the “moderate” wing of the Socialist Party, was to “e-srthrow" tha bourges!s state “and constitetica, using the legal devica of the plebisciza, '% an interview with. Regis Oedray in 1977 ANands eaid: “As for the bourgeois state at the Present MOUMant, Wa aro Scoking to overcome . To overttvad il (Régis Debray, The CAilsan Revolution, Conversations with Allende, New York, Random House, 1971 p.82). . Mass mabilisation, infiltration of Chilean in- Siiutions aid tactical alliances with tha ceresic, tion were 19 be amplay: ad to generata sufficient pooular suacournt. Congress was to ba reptaced by a “popular assembly” and tha existing legal sysiem ‘by “poguler tribunals.’ President Allende’s pietge to uphold tha “Statuta of Guaraniees (dasignad to cornmit his goverarent to preserve Chile's Gesocretic fraedama and institutions In exckhangey far Congressional SUPLOrt) was simply - Sse oon a@ “tactics! mecetsity’’ to gain power, as he ox- plained fater, : Tne Chilezn Communists and their allies In| Moscow were uneasy about the idsological im- plications of the via Chilend as advocated by Salvador Ailenda (Gebray, p.119). The Com- munist garty pofuced to andorse the via, Chilena a8 a uniguety Chilean path to socialism, which implied taf mt might not nacessarily assume the leading «cle alicr comptata power was gained by _ tha Popular Uney coalition, The Chilcan party supoortad fAgsene’s doctrine of the via pacifica, which accested fice eluctions and popular piural- inn as a short-term tacbical device under Chilean esnditiens but aimed in the long run at installing: a Soviet-sryie Communist dictatorship. The vie cicihea was mot as “pacifis’ as the slogan im- plied: it emoraced all forms of clas 13 conflict and violenca short of armed insurrection and civil wat in the grocess of astablishing the “'dictatar- ship of the preletariat.” . . Misteading image The via Chilena gproctaimed by Allende secon aiter hig efection was widaly muisundarsteed in tna West, The image that was oficially prapa- gited was that of a uniguely Chivean path to a nav toa of fAcexist- humanist socialism, where basic bperties, economic pluralism and frea elactions were respected hy ail, Western liberals ware led to believe that the Allende Government was conestructeg a new Western-Eurosean type at democutie secialism in Chile. This imace cleshect wath the reality of Salvador Allenda’s reetunonary ambstian to use Chiio’s pluraist domocrasy ta dectroy it, Ha seemed to have ahanconed the via Cilena formula during the ist you 6° ig government. Not oniy cid ne rarely 34
erploy it in ius speeches but the importance of progerving “demoed Plurubsm and liberty” wos COnspicuously € Tho government's policy Was very much to Moscow's liking: sewura ef US Invusiments, tha espousil of the goctine of “ideuteqicai plucal- ‘tism” (ralations win all states fcegitdiass nf ideology and internal setitical Character), elcaeer ftolations with the socistst camp, und the foster- Ing of en “anti-ingerislist (anti-US) front in Latin Amarica. Under tha Alisnde regime, foreign policy was reorlented, and the prevrcusly close ties with the Unitod States were rsataced by strong political, Bconomic and scientife ties with the “socialist countries,”” above ail with Cuba anu the USSR. Tho first trip of tha Fereign tinister, Clodomiro | ; p $ Almeyda, outside of Latin America was to the USSR and Enstern Eurepy, in May-June, 1972, President Allende visited Moscow In December, 1972, Strong idsulegical and personal ties linked the Chiloan Commerise party leaders with the Soviet party luadersyip and Salvador Allende with Fidul Castro, | President Allende’s cascription of tha USSR as. Chila’s “hig brother” (hermano mayor) wa3 HO more figure of spazch but reflected the exnoct- ation of hie guvernmen: that the USSR would be- come the most imsertant socialist ally of the evolution and the main ecanomic bulwark of the regime. Moscow did, in fact. becoma the most Important source of socialist camp uconamic aid end credits to the Perulsr Unity government, totalling $620.0 miliica ($756.5 million in short. term bank credit end $263.5 million in prolest ald and supatior creciss) in the 1971-73 pariod®, Tho. USSR autharissg $269.5 million in credits ($98.5 million in shart-resm credit and $162.0 million In ecanamic aia} to the Allende regime, most of which was névar utilised. This was far from tha massive he'p Allends needed, But Mos- Cow was under no illusion that its economic co- Operation would decisively Influence ‘the immediate prospects fice radicat social and economic transformation, although it no doubt helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United States, Soviet influence expanded rapidly as a result of the Chilean Coramur's: party’y loyalty to the USSA and tha expansion of Soviet-Chilean economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and fisheries cooperation mace passitts by the victory of the Communist-Seciatist regima. But Moscow became increasingly alarmed at the deterioration of the ecenomic situation, the violent clashes of the uliva-latt and the ultra-right, and the growing organisation of eoposition tarces, Particularly after tha Paguler Unity goverament failed in the March, 1973, elections to abtain the majority electoral support recuired to transform eee tht a on erence *See Deuds Esterna a> Coz, Tano V, Oepartamante de Crédutos Externos, CORFO, Santiags, 1973, for full de- tails, . the political and econemic structure by peacatul, censtitulional mess, Neveriheioss, Mescow was net willing to pro- wida the massive short-tesn cotinoduy assist: ante {such a3 foodstuffs) or untied coavertols Currency credits -vehich -the fesime needed to finance the import ef food, spare parts. and machinery 10 aiteviota local shortases. Moscovs’s $39.5 million in short-torm bank Credits wag no Goudt helpful but pated into insignificance before she reed to finanes Chile’n imnore requirements, which, for food alona, werd runes atthe rate of stout $709 million a yade when the Allende terms collapsed. Tho Soviet leadership told Chittan Communist and Pooular Univ officials that tha main effort ta Improve the Reanomie situ. ation would have to be trade by the Allerca gave ermment . Moscow repeatadly stressed tha¢ the Popular Unity government! must reverso the’ calamitous declinag in production and product. ivity to have a chance of vHnning aver a majacity Of tho Chileans to thy cause ‘of socialism. Refusing to give Aliendo ‘the hard currency credits he needed to improve his Lworseniag chances for survival, Moscow contented itself with organising eolicarity meatings at home ond adroicd in the hope thet these camenstrations would “reach the ears of the Chilesn pecpic”’ (loscow Radia. 13 August 1973}, Atiends’s loyal aly and “big brother’ was willing to sall Soviet machinery and equipment ta him—that is. exe pand Soviet experts financed by longterm credils - —but denied him the short-term hard currency eredits he desperately needed, & combinatien of circunatances — Moscaw’s astly entanglement in Cuba, economic diificulties et home, shortages of grain and foreign exchange w-ied the USSR to eschew massive short-term aid to Chile and to counsel a policy af salf-help | to the Allenda reqime —~ g theme rencated fre- “Guently by the Chitezn Communist party leader- ship when referring to Soviet assistance. In the final analysis Moscow watched idly while the via Gasiica was destroyed by the disastrous ecanomic policies, the circumvention af tha laws, and the tacit ercouragement of the ulira-late by President Allende and the Popular Unity govern- meant, Moscow pursued a dual strategy in Chile. At the fovel of state-to-state relations it acted cautiously, accated a non-interventianist posture, and encouraged anti-Amsricanitm and independ. ence from the United Statas. Since it realised irat the internal balance of forces did not favour the armed struggle, the Pogular Urity leadership 24s urced to maintain internal unity, relect ihe “provelaiiva and adventurous” overtures of the uitea-init, avoid actions thar migh: provoke 2 civil war or military intervention, edapt a mora rational conomic pclicy, and consolidzie the initia: 3ains of the revolution. At the same tima, Moscow did PSIning to re- Strain direct Cuban invcilvement in the Chilean révolution. Prorected by @ friendly, Starxist- daminated government and its Marxist President, Cuba transporied larce quantities of Sewer and Crocheslovak-sunplied waapang ta tina raciest left . in Cle on the Cutan airiine and merchant ships,
14-00000 te also evtablisned a geeeritty training base and coordinating centre In Crate, The larce intotiig- ency feara in tha Cuban leshassy in Santiaga maintainad Halson vith gig tberation mavament in Argentina, Bolivia, anct Urusuay, Gubd's Soviet. contratied intelligernnd scrvice, Direecién Genera! do Inteligencia (DGI, aia had close ties with the Chilean. ultra-lettizs and other revolutlonary exile grouns, provid: iy them: with training, .2 ann and furics for the arrmeed struggle in Chile and other Latin Arnarican couitrics. a Revolutionaries Teainied: Soviet army persanne! were directly involved In the training of worker revolutionaries for urban guerrilla wartare. This cceired during 1972- 7 at EI Beiloto, near Valparaizo, wherg tha USS had installed a: factary {nr tha manulacture at | prefatricated housing. The fin (KPD} employed | sixteen Hussians, four ef wham were engineers and technicians: the .remaming tasive. wore |... ‘Soviet army: officers. Afte: twelve officers instructed 2 hard-core of specially. selected .worker-revolutioncrias in the use of arms, strect fighting. and urban querrilfa tactics. Tho Russisn-built factary vas Kept undiur constant surveillance by Chile's naval intelligencn. On the morning of 11 September 1972, naval intelliqenes arrested the Russians and thren days’ later ex- polled them from the country”, This clandestine involvement in training querrifias in Chile was an exception to Moscow's official ine of giving full usport tn the lagal and peaceful path to socialize, Yat tha Sovint leader. ship oparates on the princiele that sincy every - avontuality cannot be fores-en it is batter te take advance messuces which might “ecntradict’ the official line than to be sary ister. In Chile there Clearly were some advantages in having some ormed revolutionaries under direct S Soviet control: Moscow viauld-ba able tz retail some measure of influence over the ultra-Iefr particularly impore- ant in the event that this faetio fa] was able to seize power, /ss it turned out, Puctia’s “united front’ tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted by the Chilean military. Soviet industrial Espionage The Soviet Union made every effort to axiract the mazimum advantaze fram i its tachrical assist- ance orscrsmrma,. Wt assigned 46 technicians to the naticralised cooper “eesestey to Rela ¢3ise productivity, all of whem wera engaged in’ in- dus‘rial escionage. Thay were far more interasted in gaining first-hand ansviecse of the advanced US mining equipment anc maeinods of craration than in assisting Chilezn development. Anutés Zauschquovich, eaecunesa vice: president of the cunnzer corascation,.taid me in Dece:ncer 1373 that tha scecialists Gur ing their two-yoar stay eanteouted ncihing to ihe dnsrovement cf mining 13 codwera mainty etcuried in gathering specif'c Lees GF Amavicen equismient, obtaining information cn mining techniques and organisa- tion, and collecting cata en costs and procuct- Ivity.: Moscow was also especially interested In fisheries and fishery-re:ated (oceanographic, hydragraphic and marina biological research) Assistanca ta Chilo. Fismeries aid gave the Russiun’s access to Chifzan parts for ats fshing. eceanod?: shic and a:her vascal r “nm pri ‘end Western Europe by turning to ime Soviot working hours, these” the Chiteans with a Soviet maritima presences Tho growing presenes in Crilgan waters, arcund the Capo and in ¢ub-Antarcts waters provitied a covet for cathering imeHigoncn ang ocvane- graphic data of use to tha Soviet havy. The Soviet Union offered to suonly $300 Jmillion in military equiginent to Alleniie in 15971, tut the military refused tho offer and ceciced ta continue to obtain arms from the United States and othar Wostern suppliers, Tha anti-Communist military wero disturbed by the deepening economic and political violonce under ths ‘Popular Unity government, und were anxicu, not te yearon their military Hes with the United States Union for arms. M-scow hed hoped to evtabtish - gn lenoortant pec cadent for supplying arma to non : Communist countries in Latin Amesica and furthar weaken Washington's alraady strained reisucns | vith the Latin American military, Despite tha cool. ness of oficial US-Chilean relations, tie United States continued to maintain friendiy relations yaith tha Chilean miltary. The Kremlin was very much avara of the veak- ness of the Allende regims, Mot eniy was it 8 minority government (in 1970, 2375 and, ia 4973, 4354 cf the olectorata supported the Popular a Unity coalition) but the armed forces 222 Cowart ful novional potica were strengly ani-Comm: srist, Since the “democratic forces’ saceed full oziitical and economic power, Moscow favoured a Gradual take-over by the Commence and.  avoidanen of civil wae or military confrosiation itra-right et all costs. Acth the ultea-iefr and & ecponents of Allenda wera attacked reguiarly in, the Soviat prass, But the Mevernent of the Heve- jutionary Left (MIR), an ultra-left group that pur- syed tha armed path and hosed to culest the opposition forces in a violent confroniston, was singled out for particularly scathing criticism, Te was charged with “revolutionary advenicrisay”’, sontributing to political instability and harming the prespects of survival of the Poaular Unity goverment. a From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised that the oprosition to tha Allenda governinenl wag growing and widespread. ft was only the shrewd and dilatary personality of Allenda——cailied in maintaining a balance between the citruptive forces within his own governmant—tiat hazid to- cether the disintegrating fabric of society, Thera was Soviet criticism of the irratidnal economic management, declining agricul.ural aad industrial production, accelerating — inflation, and. the vrorsening balance of paymien’s. . Soviet obsarvers acvised a slower tapeu-over of she economy, nationalising the large fiers first but leaving the smaller and mediunvsized ‘firms a2ione for the tima deing. In the last months befars {4a miliary coup they save tse handwritag on the wall and urged a censobdatisn of tna cocscmic gzins already achieved, collaSaration with the eopesition political parties fespecicily the Christian Democtats), and avoicance of armed confiict. . “ anc heterotic pttt *Eredts (Santvago}, 10-16 October 1973, inte ain ads with tha Chiluan aulitacy high ¢ are”  aufhor’s anand, Cece
14-00000 Collapse of Socialist ‘fdodel” The Sovier POlcy wvis-devis Chile erghasiond Cooseraton in the political fete, the foreiey of on anteUS front with Chile, Peru ang Cita, and Gapansion of trada and aid reusions vehile ga. Vrain from palemics and interfaring in Chile's Internal affairs tmatily through its inllueses over the Ciitean Communist Piety). Tho Chitean Com. munisis vere glven moral and, material support for widening the besa of support af the regime, but it trade no difference to tha final gutcorng, The weaeness of the Allende reqime, its (atetul internal contradictions, official conaiverce in the artning and violence. uf tha ultra-left, the Véeimar. typo inflation and food shortages, the growing political polarisatica and violence, and thy fate. fui elenation ef the armed forres were ths de- Cisive Conditions that triggtred the coup d‘érat that fed to Aliende’s downtall and replacement by & military junta on 11 Supternber, 1973. Moscow was deeply disturbed but not especl: ally surprised. TASS acmitted on 20 Septembar 1973 thet the “Chilean seperiaicg wae bitter and drarnatic,”” and Fidel Castra daclared that he vas *‘vOry uoSet by events in Chile’ (the news miitary junta hed immadiaiely broken off ralations with Havana). Moscow -severod diplomatic relations | with Santiago aad withdrew its amtassacter and embassy 3:2 decacsa of allaned persecution of Sevier sMiciaig hy tha junta, Alter less then a wese in gow: Chila's new military government began to teal the full blast of Sovint displeasura and frustration, axpenssud in a well-orchestratad 802 gusteined propaganda campaign aimed at . Igolatins and disczuditing the regimo, Tre Sovier media sccussd tha junta of “per- BoCuIIN-; leit-wingers with Unparalicled cruelty” (Moseaw Aadio, 18 Saptamber 1973;. There Were resorts in Pravda on 26 September trae “the siresis ef Sentisge ware flowing with bisce4” and the rad:o sacke of “tens of thousands of Chilean democrazs” Killed, Salvador Allende was alierne alively sezarted ta have been “murdered in cold WASHILRGTON Post 28 August 1974 Argentine Ne cenager was “the Perohist workers’ answer ta the enemies of our class.” A two-month gloxdown at the Renault plat climaxed Monday with ouster of left blood” er ta have dicd a hure’s death, resisting the e-dels to the very end. Allendes’s residenen was allesed to have been “wined of the face af the earth.” The junta was shooting at wamen and chiidren in an attest to intimidate tha people. Or. 23 Octever TASS indignantly blamed tho CIA, Chitecn “resection” and “American monopolies” fer organising tha military coup. And according toa Mescew broadest even Leanid Brezhnev, not known for his devotion to Wastern demae- facy, expressed horror at the ““monstreus, com. _ pletely .cpen vidiation of a country’s constitution, tho unceremonious flouting of tha democratle | traditions of an entire nation,” The overthrow of the Allende government waa @ bitter but not entirely uneapected setback for Moscow's unhed frente tictica In Latin America, énd had adverse repsrcussions fer Marxist Parties alsewhara in the West, Communists and Socialists in France and italy who had earlior - pointed to Cnila as a modal af the peacotul trang- itlon to socialism moved to disengage thamsalvas from the Allende disusie:, Instead of leading to socialism, united front tccticg in Chilo ushored , “Ina period of unparalleled political violence, snt\mous suifering for .Chile’s workers and middia class, and the worst economic crists in its history. . Soviet designs for Chile to serve as the van guard of tha anti-US front in Latin Arnerica ended in a completa fiasco and left a deen impression wee on the non-Carmnunist poitical partius and the armed forces in the region, I* reminded thera of the Grave risks of entering into an alliance with totalitarian parties. Dasnite protestations ta the contrary, Marxist governments éra driven In- exdranly to violate pledges to uphold tha con- Stitution, to destroy the private soctor af the economy, and ullimately to install a tutalitarian dictatorship. : eer thr ep reerDnetenn-te Authoritative stataments of tha Chilean Comraunise Party's position under the Alfance fegime can be found in Labarea’s Comeian 27 Herss and Luis Corvalan’a, Caming de Victors, (Santisga, 1971). NEW YORK TIMES . 28. August 1974 . Murdered BUENOS = AIRES—Cun. | Men kilied the Iehor rota. tions manazer of a French owned auto plant in Cor. doba yesterday, and Post. dent Mana Estela Peron spoke ut szainst tne recent “cowardly and mercenary assassinations” In Arsen. tina. The extreme leferst Peron ist Armed Forces elvimedt Perpansi?ility for the . a°h of IRA Renault offieay Ri éarda Goya, 35, gavin it - Ades fst leaders of the auto un- fon. Warkera nattied police Jat night on the streets of Cordoba. * | , Mrs.. Peron, In her first speech from the palace bal. eony that hee late pusband, President Juan D. Perun of- fen used as a rostrum, eeclared: “Many people d:ink that because I am a wacnan | cannot rule... but with this fracsile appearence § have committed apyecd.” Mer ie: mincution of the salitiral 3 caine in a raik eare lier with, provincial cover: hols. supporiess on numerous occa-| HEARS ho. PERON “te: event wae marred hy the! Gosernmen's moudte2 prope femme with fefiwing industrial Only a Few Thomsand Attend workers in Coneha, 130 miles . . northwest of the cama. : Her First Public Rally Early this morning, awidentic, ~ ———_ ified Cerrerists cur dows the JJebor relastons manager of thas Ry JONATHAN KANDELL Reneut, a tcadine cop manue Soamat te Tne Xoo Youre Timeg facturer- in Cordoba. as he! BUENOS AIRES. Qa 27-—.drove to tne main plant that, Only a few than sand tesds ua. has heen in the comer ef a hit-, iomists vatheared today ue hear ter workers’ Stat, Presdent Inch Martnes co The kuilinn ef the Arsemine: Rerén, in der ust puhin fahy executive, Ricantn Gava, 45° since she took affiee, spear in years ald, followed 4! S Isat: the Riders Mara ge “Move, nignt Perieray Gert w austen; Where ber tue hosed) Get werners and pee Teeeenneeg fiat a net, ernest ccieannntnegeesteennts MARRIES sce + soe,