13-00000 TOP SECRET in the Dominican Republic, even suggesting that an overt operation against Trujillo be mounted concur- rently with the Cuban operation. The members of the Special Group, however, were unwilling to buy this | particular plan of action; but they did support Mr. Bissell's proposals for some limited covert action operations aimed at the Trujillo regime. James: H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense questioned the feasibility of “expanding the initial beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban Government"; but Mr. Bissell. pointed out that such a project was unrealistic unless "One or all of the following situations develops: (a) overt Support, {(b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive use of air support." 20/ The Group was apparently in agreement that the Agency should make every effort to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections be attempted to overthrow Castro. 21/ In view of the fact that the US would break — diplomatic relations with Cuba. on 3 January 1961, the minutes of. the Special Group meeting of 29 Decem- ber 1960 present an interesting historical problen. In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET meeting with President Eisenhower, on 28 December, the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 De- -cember read as follows: The latter (President Eisenhower] made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of indi- vidual Latin American Governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for US to break relations with Cuba, in concert with Other countries some time before January 20th. 22/ In contrast to the suggestion that the US break realtions with Cuba, prior to the inauguration of Kennedy, General Goodpaster's record of the Merchant- Eisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that: He, [President Eisenhower] thought, however, that [Presidents] Frondizi, Prado, and others should take diplomatic initiative to get Latin American countries to take a position that they would like to remove Castro from power, but, lacking the means to do so, would like the US to take the lead. The President said it was Clear to him that Latin Americans must be brought to see the necessity of action. He was inclined to think that it might be time to recognize the anti-Castro front as the Cuban Government. He added that he would like to see a definite move taken in this matter before January 20th, and said that the State Department should be thinking of some definite action that could be brought about be- fore that time. 23/ “Thinking of some definite action" differs consider- ably from the suggestion that the President thought - 187 - TOP SECRET —
13-00000 TOP SECRET it would be “desirable” to break relations with Cuba prior to 20 January of 1961. At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960, it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group's membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to in- clude Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, and C. Tracy Barnes. 24/ As already has been noted, in his retrospective view of the Bay of Pigs operation Jake Esterline Was quite forceful in his opinion that the Agency's representatives at such high level meetings should have been someone like either himself or Col. Jack Hawkins who were the most knowledgeable about the status of the operation and, indeed, the whole operational plan.* * It is the considered opinion of the author of this history that Esterline had a valid criticism. A re- view of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, indi- cates that one of the most voluminous correspondents was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written  . material is repititious ad nauseam, and that Barnes belabored issues which were common knowledge to the principals in WH/4. Illustrative of this, for example, was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote to Jake Esterline. It began as follows: “It has been a little while since we have had an internal DDP hoe down on your project. In the meantime, a number of important points have been raised." 25/ The memorandum then proceeded to run through all of the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge (footnote continued on following. page) ~ 188 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET On 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the United States Government that it would. have to cut its Embassy staff in Havana ‘to eleven persons. On 3 January 1961, President Eisenhower held a meeting at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation. In addition to the President, and the Secretaries. of State, Defense, and Treasury, the participants “included the members of the Special Group, plus General Goodpaster, Mr. Bissell, Thomas Mann, and Tracy Barnes. Among principal questions, of course, were if and when the United States should break off diplomatic relations with Cuba; and after some initial © hesitation, before the day was over the United States did break relations officially with the Cuban Govern- ment. * | to those who were even marginally involved in planning the .anti-Castro operation and contributed nothing in ‘particular to understanding of any of them. Similarly, Barnes' memorandum for the DCI in prep- aration for. a 3 January policy meeting, rehashed the same information that Barnes had presented to Chief, WH/4, just a few days before. 26/ Barnes appears to have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea. * Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic relations, there was great concern within the Agency that the COS, a communicator, and a PM officer, and ‘possibly a fourth individual be retained as members of the Staff. 21/ - 189 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET The other subject of conversation was whether there now was cause or reason for direct us inter- vention in Cuba, and the decision was that no such action should be taken unless the Cuban Government took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba or damaged official US property (e.g., Guantanamo) . In the course of the discussion about the status of Agency planning for anti-Castro activities, the question was raised about increasing the number of trainees. This was ruled out pending the suitability of training sites to handle additional numbers. Training sites in the US still were denied, in part, again, because of the fear of compromising the US position in the Organization of American States or in the United Nations. | . , The high level White. House meeting also agreed that it would be useful to brief members of the new administration, particularly the Secretary of State, “but “no definite schedule was agreed upon but the concensus [sic] of the meeting was that appropriate briefings should be considered for the near future." 28/ ‘In the few days following the 3 January decision . to break relations with the Castro Government, the ~ 190 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Agency retained control of US communications out of ‘Havana -~ the Ambassador deciding that he preferred to relieve the female Department of State communica- tions officer and retain the services of her male counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic period, the communications officer was instructed to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed, CIA's Director of Communications indicated “there would not be any extreme compromise." In any event, however, the last message from Havana Station -- on 7 January 1961 at 16382 -- stated This last msg from HAVA Station. All files and crypto material destroyed ... on evening 6 Jan [1961] Swiss amb placed “Carta de Proteccion" notices on emb doors minimizing possibility takeover of bldg by GOC.* 29/ : Even as the ‘debate over the breaking of diplomatic relations was taking place within the Eisenhower ad- ministration, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 which provided an ex- cellent summary of the policy decisions which needed - * Authorization for complete shutdown. had been set for 03002 on 7 January 1961. 30/ - 191 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET to be made if strike operations were to be conducted against the Castro government. In the course of his eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need for resolution of the problem that had particularly ‘bothered the Special Group -- that was whether the Kennedy administration was interested in following through on the plans that had been made. Assuming that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow through on the program which had been initiated, Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build up of Castro's military forces the strike operations be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The ques- tion of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning -- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the general question of air operations Hawkins said: It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in ‘the objec-—- tive area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run in to the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Then, by ‘specific recommendations, Hawkins urged the following: l. That the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day. - 192. - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET 2. That any move, to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted. 3. That the operation be abandoned if policy does not. provide for use of adequate tactical air support. | In order to insure the success of both the air strike and the air drop operations which would pro- ' vide the logistical support for. the troops holding the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had in the past, authorization for the use of contract American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air bases in the United states for the launching of logistical flight operations: * 31/ Much the same ground indicated in "Hawkins memo- randum was rehashed in preparing Mr. Barnes and the DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961. * There is no indication that Hawkins ever changed his, attitude about the need for the introduction of . some ‘US pilots into both the strike and logstics air operations, even though . his much quoted cable of 13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high _ praise. for the B-26 pilots. who were about to under- take the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Atr. Operations, Part III, A for discussion of the Hawkins cable in the context of the air operations. - 193 “me . TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Somewhat more. emphasis than Hawkins had given to it. was placed on the political organization and the needs for structuring the exile political group to conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same focus was to be given to the questions regarding air bases, the -size of the invasion force, and the number of trainees who could be accommodated in the camps, and other of the problems that had already been dis- cussed time and time again. 32/ Similarly, in dis- cussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group, much of this same ground continued to be replowed without any positive resolution by the Special Group members. 33/ | | During the course of the frequent sessions of the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower administration, the Director of Central Intelligence also was required to make a presentation before the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record of this meeting stated as follows: | Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba, mentioning the two-pronged program of - 194 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET propaganda including radio and publica~ tions and the paramilitary effort. Again he pointed out that this is an expensive program running to approximately $28 million. Mr. Dulles discussed the radio effort and paramilitary effort in some detail, indicating the numbers of Cubans being trained and the supply efforts and the bases. 34/ Because of the subsequent charges which would be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and others writing on the Bay of Pigs, it is important to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attend- ing this briefing was Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy Director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger and some of the later "experts," was supposed to be in almost total ignorance of any planning for an operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs.* * Other Agency personnel in attendance at this brief- ing were General Cabell, DDCI; Colonel L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support; Richard Helms, Chief of Operations for DDP; Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel, and John Warner, Legislative Counsel. It also should be noted that Mr. William A. Tidwell, Jr. of Amory's office was appointed in January 1961 to be Chief of the Office of Operations in Miami. 35/ Organizationally at this time, the Office of Operations was under the Deputy Director for Intelligence. In view of -the efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans for training in the exile Brigade, it is inconceivable that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence were not fully aware of the plans that were being made to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed at Playa Giron.. - 195 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET On 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got involved in a meeting concerning the planned opera- tions against Castro. On that day the New York Times broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops - in Guatemala. As the ex-President himself wrote: On the morning of January 10 [1961], the New York Times carried an article, with a map, describing the training of anti-Castro: forces in Guatemala ... It told most of the story. I decided that we should say nothing at all about this article. Believing that my successor _ might want some day'to assist the refugee ‘forces to move into*Cuba, I considered that we were limited in what we could say about them. 36/ Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the appearance of the New York Times article is not known, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call on the administration to send a representative up to the Hill on 12 January 1961, in order to provide fur- ther explanation of the fimes article. Of the two candidates being considered to appear before the Senate, Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, or DCI Dulles, it was decided to send Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee. However, President.Eisenhower raised certain questions as to the right of a Committee to ask questions on foreign - 196 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET policy affecting the security of the United States. He [Eisenhower] commented that when this is demanded as a right you .are “sunk," and wondered how much right _.have they got, inasmuch as the Constitu- tion says that it is the responsibility of the Chief Executive. 37/ The culmination of the Special Group discussions, which had taken place with) increasing frequency between ' mid-November 1960 and ‘mid- ~January 1961, was the report of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on 18 January 1961. The conclusions were predictable -- there were decisions that needed to be made, but these could not be made until the new administration became fully aware of the extent of the anti-Castro programs that had been evolving. As Willauer himself said in his final memo: | In the absence of these decisions, or at least most of them, there is a grave . danger that the December 6 plan (updated) may have to be abandoned, -as an effective ‘means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support, and that the only practical course of action for the physical overthrow of Castro, will be either: (1) open U.S. war with Cuba, or (2) a.seven-month overt training by the.U.S. on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force, which will be planned to strike with at least overt U.S. logistical support.* 38/ x * Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December 1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff. -~ 197 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round which the Special Group had been riding for at least two months: was Willauer's closing statement: In our discussions we weighed without coming to a conclusion the advantages of a rapid, effective action by direct war in terms of getting matters over with without a long buildup of world opinion vs. the inevitability of such a build up under any seven month program. 38/ Having reviewed the meetings during the last few weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it is interesting to review the comments of some of those - who were principally involved, as they looked back on that period. One of the most immediate responses was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when ‘he explained the invasion to them. Among other things, Castro claimed: . -That on certain occasions, we have also been in. danger of direct aggression. This danger always has been lurking about us and. at certain times has gathered consider- able support in the minds of ‘leading circles of the United States. One of those moments when this type of direct aggression was _very near was at the end of December [1960] and the beginning of [January 1961], and that is to say, during the last days of the Eisenhower administration. 40/. i - 198 - TOP SECRET
13-00000- TOP SECRET So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his armed forces in. a state of alert for a two week period, _ covering the transitfon from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration. 4AL/ The other. principal protagonist at this time,. remembered it ina somewhat different manner. The former US President wrote of this period in the fol- lowing manner: Covert training of exiles for any pos- j sible future operations against Castro | - was going forward. Units were growing steadily in strength and efficiency ' against the time when actual tactical i planning could. be undertaken. In Decem- ber [1960], I suggested to the State Department that the time might be pro- pitious for organizing a "front" against. Castro among the refugees, with the. United States. recognizing the leader and his associates as the legal govern- ment of Cuba, with the priviso, however, ‘that the exiles themselves would volun- tarily select from their own number an acceptable “head of government." I added that if they could do so at once, I'd like to see recognition accorded i promptly -- if possible, before January So, to the incoming administration, we left units of Cuban refugees busily . training and preparing hopefully for a { return to their native land. Because : they had as yet been unable to find the leader they wanted -~- a national leader to be both anti-Castro and ‘anti~Batista -~- it was impossible to make specific | 7 / ~ 199 -- fo : TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET plans for a military invasion, However, their hatred of Castro, their patriotism, and their readiness to sacrifice for the restoration and freedom in Cuba could not be doubted. 42/ In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's empha- Sis was on the fact. that during his administration all that took place was a training program -- that there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba. This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held on 10 September 1965 when he said: “There was no tactical or operational plan even discussed" when he turned the presidency over to John F. Kennedy . 43/ According to this same interview: The retiring President stressed that there had been no decision as to how the ' Cuban forces would be used, if-at ail. Eisenhower had made no commitments that. might bind the new President in dealing with the Castro problem. In fact, the armed refugee group was still so small and relatively unprepared that it could easily have been disbanded if the incom- ing administration considered its exis- tence unnecessary. - And, more specifically, Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his judgment that the new administration need not rush a decision regarding the Cubans. “At no time did I put before anybody any-: thing’ that could be called a plan (to invade Cuba)," declares the former President. He emphasizes that there was "no mandate, no - 200 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET commitment by me, or by anyone in my admin- istration,“ and he doubts that Kennedy felt “he was frozen to any position by me." 44/ Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, also supported his former boss when queried about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigs activity, stressing that the emphasis during Eisen- hower's administration was on training the Cuban ex- iles and providing them with equipment. Like the former President, Gray, too, said that there was “no military plan". The definition of a military plan, however, seems to have focused on an actual site for the land- ing; and in this sense, Gray certainly was telling the truth because no such choice had been made at the time that’ Eisenhower left office. In his own words, Gray stated: There wasn't any military plan formu- lated by the time the Eisenhower admini- stration went out. Of course, the Presi- dent was fully aware of and conversant with the decision to train and arm indi- viduals. And the concept was one that was sort of changing in the Eisenhower Administration. First we were thinking in terms of the old infiltration of small groups. Then they were thinking of the possibility of landing of people, unit Sized groups. And no decisions had been ' reached at that time. It was only that TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET there was’training. That was clearly authorized, and it was clearly contemplated that there would be or could. be a military action. But it simply was not true that Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't change. As a matter of fact, the planning that was done in his administration was changed. The Bay of Pigs was not the first landing point. That was changed. But none of that, no planning process in the Eisen- hower administration had got to the point of discussing what would be the landing point. 45/ =. What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently ig- nored, as has been pointed out in the preceding dis- cussion, was the major change that was made in the concept in November of 1960. What was to have been an infiltration of numerous small teams of communi- cators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion plan calling for a major enlargement of . the exile Brigade and an air operations plan which would be critical to both the Brigade's landing and its ability to be sustained once ashore in Cuba. What was yet . , 8 undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were the issues which the Special Group had argued through- out the weeks from mid-November into January ~- the - number of treops that should be. or could be trained, } the facilities that would be available for training sites (possibly in third countries or in the United - 202. - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET States), the possible commitment of the United States personnel (as "volunteers" or contracts), and possible overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro.* 46/ ~ \ * Despite the availability of documentary records and autobiographical information about President Eisenhower's role in the anti-Castro program, it is interesting to the ‘historian that the subject of the Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral history interviews conducted with Eisenhower and. various of his senior subordinates who were close to the operation. Included among this group, in addition to. Eisenhower himself, were James H. Douglas, Jr. (DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (USMC), Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Livingston Merchant (State). - 203 - TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET CIA Internal Use Only Access Controlled by CIA History Staff —-TS#795052 | Copy 1 of 2 OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION Votume IIT. Evotution of CIA's Avr1-CastRo POLICIES, 1951-January 1961 (pages 204-388) TOP. SECRET TS#795052 DCI-8 “December 1979 Copy 1 of 2° PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT DO NOT DESTROY
13-00000 ; TOP SECRET Volume IIt Contents (pp. 204-388) Page Part V. _- Direct Action Programs ....... 204 A. Propaganda ee ee ew ew ee we 208 B. Sabotage and other Exercises . . 233 Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role .......... «241 ve * “ * e 2 > Part VII The Question of Assassinations . .. 277 Part VIII Conclusions ............ 290 Appendixes A. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 . 296. B. A Program of Covert Action Against _ . the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 ...... . 300 -C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC: 1) Letter for. Allen Dulles from -Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60 | TS. (DD/P 0-1436) ....... . =. #311 2) Letter for Gordon Gray from. Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60... .. . 313 3) Memorandum for the Special a “Assistant to the President : for National Security Affairs from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60, sub: US Policy toward Cuba ... . 318 TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Page D. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60, sub: Liaision with US Agencies on JMARC Activities . ..... . 332 ‘E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 . . . . 335 F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959...... 337 _G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub: _ What We Are Doing in Cuba ......'. . 344 * ‘Source References Part I Background . . . 2... 2. 2... «© « « « 347 Part II Castro.Must Go . .... +. 6 « . . . 352 Part IItI Changing Concepts .... Le - « 366. Part IV Presidential Resurgence ae _ . 369 Part V Direct Action Programs oe ee ew we) O74 Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . Loe eke os - 382 Part VII Assassination ee ee ee ew eee 386 Part VIII Conclusions ........... . 388 TOP SECRET
13-00000 ' TOP SECRET Part V Direct Action Programs A. Propaganda The desire of WH Division to undertake the propa- : ganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro, antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by more than two months: for on 27 October 1959 in a Memo- -randum to the Director of Central Intelligence, J. Cc. King proposed: That CIA undertake clandestine propa~ ganda. operations targeted at Cuba. These operations would employ primarily: radio broadcasts and other means of propaganda, and at informing the Cuban masses of the truth. 1/ Col. King's memorandum pointed out that repre- sentatives of various of the Cuban opposition groups organized in the United States had requested Agency _ assistance to. set up propaganda operations directed against the. Cuban mainland, and, in addition, he also — indicated that he and the Director of Communications, Gen. McClelland, had his people studying the best, methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts. - 204 - TOP SECRET
13-00000. . TOP SECRET King's initial memorandum. contained no information about potential locations of transmitters, personnel security, inter-Agency coordination or costs. Almost immediately following the memorandum from Col. King to the Director, the subject of propaganda _ directed against the Castro government was introduced to discussions in the Special Group. Following the first such meeting, at which the subject came up seri- ously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide more specifics on such matters as requirements for real estate, recommendations for someone to be in charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment that would be required, and how the broadcasting might be controlled.’ By mid-November, following additional discussions both within the Agency and by the Special Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts origi-_ nate from urider the guidance of Manuel Benitez, and from| | under the Monte Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. ‘The pre- | sumption was that the | operation would be self- sufficient; but that the | | operation. would be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency control. | The estimated costs that were mentioned in TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET suggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be originated from continental United States. How Barnes came by this proposal is not known, for no such activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/ By early February of 1960, however, an equivo- cal agreement apparently had been reached with [| for a memorandum from WH Division indicated that: One pilot [anti-Castro] tape has been made_and has been played, for the benefit of He has agrééd no 6 intGrrérée if We initiate from available transmitters in 4/- Even though thought had been given to the establish- ment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would run the: ahti-Castro ‘broadcasts, haa. made it clear that he would not permit the establishment ‘of special new. transmitting facilities in. his country. on or about 17 March 1960, _the same date that President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its propaganda program which, after outlining. various phases of the activity, stated: ~-~ 207 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET It is planned to concentrate all capa- bilities available to the U.S. Government on the [Cuban] target. In addition, it will be necessary for CIA to create such unilateral, FRD, and third country opera- tions as may be feasible and useful. All ‘facets of psychological operations will be exploited through mass media means, including: radio, television, motion pictures, press.and publications, books, leaflets, posters, handbills, and rumors. The major emphasis will be placed on gray materials. Liaison will be conducted as necessary with other U.S. Government agencies. Black operations will be care- fully coordinated within CIA prior to im- plementation. All direct dealings with members of the FRD willbe under unofficial cover. 5/ ' The outline of the propaganda program made it clear that funding of the propaganda operation was going to be a major problem, and it was also clear that CIA was going to be responsible for a consider- able portion of this. But even as the propaganda program was being formulated, Col. J. C. King was in New York working with Henry Holland to approach a number of American businessmen whose companies had interests in Cuba. Their objective was to raise funds to support the FRD propaganda operations which might be operated through Station WRUL in New York, a sta-: tion that was directed by Mr. Walter Lemon who worked closely with the CIA. Lemon, in fact, was ready to ~ 208 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP. SECRET mount radio program operations almost immediately pending receipt of material and guidance from the Agency.* 6/ a | With reference to King's approach tol | ‘the businessman stated that he would contribute his personal funds to the anti~Castro propaganda effort; and in addition, . he would approach the directors or heads of other companies that were also involved in Cuba -- individ- ‘uals whom he thought were well enough off to make ‘personal contributions. With reference to contribu- tions of this nature: It was decided that personal contri- butions were most advisable because they .. would not require action and approval by Boards of Directors, and therefore could , be most easily concealed... The sum dis-~- cussed was $50,000. 7/ The plan for private funding of WRUL. was in trouble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief + Among. those that Col. King met with on 15 March . 1960, were 5 aanstilone : in the company names and the Agency notified the Com- | missioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions. Ta/ *% _— i includin - 209 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET WH/4 had requested Chief, WHD's permission to obligate JMATE funds for support of the station; but Chief, WHD refused, indicating that private money would be available. In October 1960 a similar proposal. was made and rejected for the same reasons. ‘By. December ~. 1960, however, payment from JMATE funds was authorized because private funds were unavailable. 7b/ | In terms of the broadcast facilities that were to be established under the propaganda program, CIA was to create and control both short and medium wave shipborne radio broadcasting operations, and to investi- gate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmitter capable of black broadcasts into Cuba.* Aside from the broadcast operations, there were a number of ad- ditional programs calling for printing facilities for the production of propaganda materials and secure . “* The airborne medium wave transmitter apparently was ruled out early in the planning stages because it was “a terribly expensive operation." Based on DPD's. estimates, Phillips figured that three flights per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others, Havana, Santiago and Cienfuegos -- over a two month . period would show operating costs in excess of $83,000, plus an additional $0,000 for transmitting equipment on a C-54, and a cost of $250,000 if the C-54 were lost. 7c/ - - 210 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET editorial offices so. that.the propaganda materials could be prepared. 8/ It was shortly after the formulation of the propaganda program that David A. Phillips became Chief of the WH/4 Propaganda Activity. Phillips had done propaganda work for the Agency at the time of the Guatemalan activity, but subsequently retired and had been in private business in Havana. Accord- ing to his own. story, he had intended to stay in private business; but in the course of Castro's rise to power, he was. recontacted by Agency personnel and petsuaded to take on the job of running the Agency's propaganda campaign against Castro.* According to one interviewer: _ In the Guatemalan campaign, Phillips had worked with a handful of completely controlled Latin American propaganda writers, and had been able to‘develop a single credible propaganda line. Now, however, he had to work under Washington | orders, to offer radio broadcasting time to all the major and competing Cuban exile groups. Much of the Phillips’ * For Phillips' own story of his employment and his re-employment by the Agency, see his book The Night Wateh (New York: Atheneum, 1977). = 211 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP. SECRET effort went into overcoming the idea that CIA financed radio programs should become a forum for the varying views of rival exile splinter factions. Phillips was principally in Washington ... [but] there were frequent trips to Miami and New York, and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert broadcasting with Henry Loomis, Director of USIA's Voice of America. 9/ All indications are that Phillips had an excellent staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. * | The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda opera- tion was to be the 50,000 watt radio transmitter located on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called "larger" island being roughly 1 3/4 miles long by 1 1/4 miles wide. US possessions, the Swan Islands are located roughly 100 miles NE of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea. Already located on the island was a Federal Aviation radio ' beacon, and a Department of Commerce weather station. In April 1960, the cover story.which was devised for the * Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and Psychological Section in WH/4, were William Kent, John Isaminger, Phillip A. Toomey, Earnest I.Harrison, Paul Oberst, and Michael J. Maney. 10/ Illustrative of the desire to placate the various exile factions was the proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating basis to present the position of the particular group. FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming on 1 December 1960, and was of the opinion that such programming would “have desired effect on creating semblance [of] united anti Castro opposition." 10a/ - 212 =~ TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET operation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000 watts. and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy was going to purchase scientific signal time from the Gibralter Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary, 'which was nominally the operator of a commercial radio station then being established. The loading of the transmitters, the unloading, the construction of the facilities to house the trans- mitters, and the installation of the transmitters es, was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James Burwell, a logisites officer who was thoroughly in- volved in the JMATE operation, reported that the con- struction activity at Swan Island required the move- ment of 180,000 pounds of equipment from the [| | aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk .and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to “locating the transmitters and constructing the facili- ties for housing the transmitters, a crude landing field also was cleared. The total time involved was approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under $225,000. -~ 213 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 ‘TOP SECRET The first test signals from Swan Island were sent on 17 May 1960, and from that time until the close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the station was one of the two or three principal voices aimed at Castro's government. 11/ Shortly after the initi- ation of the broadcast from Swan, a true tempest in teapot was brewed over the question. of whether or not ‘export licences were going to be required for goods moving from the mainland to Support operations at Swan Island.. Involved in this brouhaha were the Department of Commerce, . the US. Customs Service, and numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff, Commercial Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of Security. Bill Hisemann , WH/4's Chief of Support, had his hands full! Common sense ultimately prevailed and the question of export licences was dropped. 12/ ‘Even before Swan went into operation, there was some question within the government as to whether the CIA or the United States Information Agency should be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts directed at Cuba. Within a few weeks following the - beginning of operations at Swan, this question was resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which - 214 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET . included representatives from the Agency, ‘Mr. Abbot Washburn, the Director of the United States Informa- tion Agency, and various of Mr. Washburn's senior people. The meeting made clear that the Agency was ‘doing medium wave, broadcasting directly into Cuba. ‘Although it was not specified at the meeting in Mundt's office, CIA- also was supporting station WRUL, which had made a direct application on its own initia- tive for funding such broadcasts -- even though the Agency was behind such broadcasting and such. financ- ing. as The Navy, however, got goosey about the cover story which was being ‘presented. Despite a strong effort on the part of senior Agency representatives to convince Rear Admiral S. B. Frankel -- who was designated as the Chief representative of the Office ' of Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste, then Director of ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement in supporting the cover story.* The hassle with the * The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefing for Adm. Frankel was that. the USN was already so heavily involved in the project that it would do them more harm than good to withdraw. Information on this meeting with the Navy and other information pertaining to the development’ of the Swan Island facility is contained in the sources listed under Reference 14/. -215 - TOP SECRET
13-00000. TOP SECRET Navy was successfully resolved when the Agency found that, through its own resources it would be able to ‘provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs, including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty. The problem of security of the island _- particu- larly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs to the island -- was never put to any real test. In fact, what might have been the only serious security incident was most successfully resolved by | | the Security Officer for the island and the Députy Chief of Base. The incident took place in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students landed to assert a claim to sovereignty of the Swan — Islands by the Republic of Honduras, and it was re- ported as follows: A potentially. dangerous situation was averted by the tactful handling of the ' group by | who persuaded them to leave their armament of 13 pistols and three submachine guns aboard their boat and conducted them on a tour of the island. The group leader indicated that he wanted to take a census of the population, and. ‘was furnished with pertinent information, with no divulgence of Agency interest in Radio Swan or its personnel. Upon comple- tion of the census, the group was permitted to raise the Honduran flag, was given lunch ~ 216 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 © TOP SECRET and refreshments, and departed shortly thereafter. The good judgment and dis- cretion of are felt to be directly responsible for avoidance of what could have been a serious incident involving loss of lives, or injury to Agéncy and other island personnel.* 15/ The question of the exact nature of the broad- casts from Swan was the subject of much discussion, both prior to the opening of the station and subse- quent to its first broadcast. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, for example, called Jake Esterline, Chief, Project IMATE to report on conver- sation that he (General Cabell) had with “a person of considerable importance who. was very familiar with Cuba," concerning the nature of the propaganda | which should be aimed at ‘the Cuban population. Cabell Stated that according to this important person, if tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the Cuban population for hours on end, the effect would be “to bore the people horribly with Castro, but would * The island.was manned by 24 people, all but nine of whom were CIA personnel. The nine were unwitting technicians © of the Philco Corporation. - 217 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET also pointedly reveal the. inconsistencies of his statements." Following receipt of this call from the Deputy Director, Esterline passed the word on to: Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps such broadcasts might be used as filler during the intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broad- casts.* 16/ | | . By early August 1960, however, the official policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at % Cuba, was to be “the Revolution Betrayed." This theme was formalized by the Department of State; and at the direction of the Secretary of State, copies of a 105 page document addressed to this theme were pre- sented to members of the National Security Council, to members of the Inter-aAmericah ‘Peace Committee, and to US Embassies in the Latin American countries. * COS Havana forwarded another suggestion for a pos- sible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960 issue of Confidential magazine, which apparently car- ried an article called "An American Mother's Terrifying Story -~ Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter." It was COS Havana's suggestion that wide publicity be given to this article in the Spanish language, pre-~- sumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan. 17/ Available records do not indicate whether this sug- gestion was adopted. ~ 218 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET ‘Instructions were that the Embassies could furnish — copies -of the document to the foreign ministers and to other high officials in their respective countries. Additionally, the NATO Council also received. a copy of this document; and it was the hope ‘of the Depart- ment of State that the document would have some im- pact on the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere countries, which was to be- gin 16 August 1960 in San Jose, Costa Rica. According to one interview of WH/4's propaganda chief, Dave - Phillips, the theme of the Revolution Betrayed Hammered across the idea that Castro had. double-crossed the Cuban people by abandoning the programs and promises — that originally won him support: None of CIA's propaganda, spoken or printed, ever urged the populace to rise up against Castro. This appeal, suicidal before the invasion, would be used when, and if, a Provisional Government obtained a lodge- ment on the island. 18/. According to Phillips's interviewer: Friendly third country diplomats in Havana monitored CIA's principal broad- casts and confirmed that the signals were loud and clear. To verify its audience the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts (ball point pens were a favorite) to any listener who would write to the station. Considering the police controls inside Cuba, listeners' letters were an act of defiance to the regime. There was a -~ 219 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET a flood of letters including, during freak radio propagation periods, re- quests for..ball point pens from New Zealand.* 19/ Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcasts was related to the Director of Central Intelligence by Col. King, Chief, WH Division, who pointed out that WH had a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who, in the form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan, made it clear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud and clear. 21/ | ™% | ' Before the end of the summer of 1960, Swan was on the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for a total of 10 hours a day, in addition to which they also began to utilize programs that had been prepared by the FRD. One. problem which would plague Radio Swan -~ as well as other elements of Project JMARC ~- was the shortage of Spanish language capability. Among * It appears that perhaps baseball cards also were going to be offered as an inducement to get listeners to indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast. - A propaganda note from WH/4 for 9 August 1960, for example, reported: "“M[aney] spoke to| Special Acquisitions. He has contacted a company making baseball cards who claim ‘this most unusual order ever received.' Will get cards, but curious what was wrong with bubble gum." 20/ - 220 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET other evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish language capability immediately available at Radio Swan, were the following: A machine-run of Agency employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient Spanish language to undertake an announcer 's job; inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a Venezue- lan child by a pro-Castro goon, could not be turned to US advantage; and by mid-November 1960 WH Division ‘was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the Department of Defense for a serviceman with native fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer at Radio Swan.* * In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan child, the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan. The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been caused by a counter-revolutionary. (Sources for the foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish . language capability are listed in reference 22/.) ‘The lack of Spanish language capability was felt throughout the project, not only in the propaganda ef- -fort. As late as January 1961, for example, the train- ing facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters for the services for a two week period of an Air Force sergeant who was fluent in Spanish. The training base wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debrief- ing an infiltration team. The request was denied, how- ever, because there was a greater need for the man's services as an instructor at the air training base in Guatemala. 22a/ In another instance, a request from - COB Miami for promotion of a clerical from GS-4 to GS-5 was based on the fact that “her services as a ' translator have been of the greatest importance to the Base since her arrival." 22b/ - 221 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Despite the handicap imposed by the lack of ‘Spanish language capability at the Station, Radio Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activi- ties supported by the Agency? and with Station WRUL, New York, these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts were the most effective means of providing the general Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition. Addi- tionally radio propaganda ~~ via both short and medium wave transmitters -- was to play an important role . immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro forces on Cuban soil. 23/ | Aside from radio broadcasts, other media activi- ties in which WH/4 PP engaged were the hewspaper Avance in Exile and the magazine Bohemia Libre. Both of these “were published in Miami by the exile groups, and at one time Bohemia Libre was reputedly the most widely circulated Spanish language weekly in the world. Al- though barred in Cuba, selected items from both publi- | cations were broadcast by Swan or WRUL. 23a/ One of the strangest of all activities in which WH/4 PP. engaged was a public opinion survey conducted by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime. If WH/4's - 222 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 ‘TOP SECRET planners expected that the survey would show a strong. core of internal opposition to the Castro government, they were to be sadly disappointed. Working with “a competent Cuban research organization" Free's report was based ona series of a thousand interviews with a cross section of the urban population of Cuba “both in’ Havana and in other cities, towns, and villages through- out the island." “Among the findings of the Free survey, the following comments were included in the summary report of mid-August of 1960:": | The great majority of Cubans surveyed felt that both they personally and their “country were very much better off than during the days of Batista. The prevail- tng mood was one of hope and optimism. - Attesting the apparently genuine en- thusiasm of the great majority for the ‘Revolution, the Castro Government and. its program were the replies when the sample was asked about the worst aspects of life in Cuba today. Despite the fact that‘ this question was designed to illicit un- favorable comments, a very sizable major- tty named-as the worst aspects of the present situation items which implied sympathy or support for the present regime. At the top of the list (mentioned by one- third.of all respondents) was regret or - apprehension over the fact that there is opposition to the Revolution and to the Revolutionary regime; [and] that there are misguided counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries. - 223 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - ana TOP SECRET Even in describing the worst aspects of the present situation, only 30% of all respondents mentioned items which could be construed as.criticisms, explicit or implicit, of the Castro regime. Only a few such subjects received significant mention, with each being referred to by only a small minority of total respondents: e.g., the danger of or trend toward Com- munism (7%); criticism of the Revolution's program (7%); economic. difficulties (7%); unemployment (6%); confusion and disorgan- ization (5%). a In view of the overwhelming popularity of the Revolutionary program, it is patently ‘Clear that criticisms of, Castro's program, as such, will fall very Targely on barren, tf not counter-productive ground. The only positive statements that appeared in the Free report, insofar as the objectives of WH/4 were con- cerned, were to the effect that successful - attack on the Castro Government should be made in terms of the inability of the government to meet the projects it had outlined because of “the unwise and unrealistic means it is employing in the execution of its program"; and "the Revolution and its program are being perverted through the insidious influence of the Communists."“* * The information concerning the Free report, is contained in source reference 24/. ~ 224 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET _ It is interésting to record the reaction within the Agency to the Free report: _C/IMARC lamented the fact that the Lioyd Free report evidently has gotten ‘into the hands of the Cuban Government and will probably be used with devastating effect at some point during the meeting {the upcoming OAS Conference scheduled for San Jose, Costa Rica]. He told ADDP/A ‘that he felt the Department of State. would have to be prepared to sacrifice Mr. Free's report on the proverbial “alter of gold." The point was made strongly to ADDP/A that the Free report, in fact, is not at all valid other than for a. limited "sample" of the City of, Habana. ADDP/A agreed, but said he. dia” mot think State. should be made aware of the fact CIA ; actually paid for the report. He further indicated that he was still endeavoring - to find out how the report -- copy of which CIA never received in full -- got out. of control. * 25/ The substance of the Free Report appeared in the New York Times and also in a Peter Edson column which was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers. In passing this information on to the DDP, Chief, WH/4& suggested that “the survey, in the opinion of WH/4 * Chief, WH/4 apparently misread the significance of the Free report: because, as the report points out, ‘the most’ serious opposition was, in fact, in the Havana area, which included the heaviest sampling of opposition sentiment. ~ 225 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Prop, will be used in Cuban propaganda" --. something of an understatement! * 26/ * Logic would seem: to indicate that if WH/4's princi-~ pals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey' s that WH/4/PP might have been tasked to. make a serious study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public to. resist outside interference. In an interview with the author of this history, Dave Phillips’ stated that Enno Hobbing had provided the editorial guidance for WH/4's propaganda efforts; but that to his (Phillips's) knowledge, no study: ever was conducted of the Castro propaganda effort: In retrospect, Phillips indicated that this probably was an oversight. 27/ On the subject of surveys of questionable value during the Bay. of Pigs Operation, mention should be made of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein and Saks to initiate a survey of Cuba's present (May 1960] economic position that will also contain an outline of proposals that would sound [sic] as a platform for a suc- cessor government to the Castro regime. The cost, which will be borne by JMARC, will be about $20,000. This is merely the first phase of the projected comprehensive economic program. Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in the Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and Reports) and the surfeit of government economists fa- miliar with Latin America, WH/4 thought it necessary to negotiate’ an. outside contract for a study such as indicated is truly.incomprehensible! That the Klein and Saks contract was not blocked at the DDP or DCI level is equally: incomprehensible. The company's ‘"Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Govern- ment Platform to Serve the Interests of the People of Cuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of the Hemisphere and the Free World of Which Cuba is a Part" -- which was presented in typescript -- was 15 pages of platitudes about the best of all possible worlds. 28/ | TOP SECRET |
13-00000 TOP SECRET WH/4 PP also became involved in the propaganda . activity that was ‘intended to offset the planned visit of Nikita Khrushchev. to Cuba in the summer of 1960. In an Eyes Only memorandum to the: Director of Central Intelligence, Col. J. C. King informed Allen Dulles that it had been learned that Khrushchev had © accepted an invitation from the Government of Cuba to visit that country. Working with Havana Station, a two-pronged program was being developed with the intention of either forcing the cancellation of the trip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban people to Communism. Havana Station was to be responsible | for organizing church opposition to the visit, and _ WH/4 and other elements of WH Division would be re- sponsible for instigating rumors throughout Latin America that an assassination attempt would be made on Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba. . One of the WH/4's contacts suggested that leaf- lets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upside down, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion, and that. these leaflets should be distributed widely through Cuba. 29/ There is no indication that this particular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least ~ 227 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET one instance, the Hammer and Sickle was used to form the ‘'T' in the word fraidor.on a sticker that was being prepared for propaganda use. 30/ In anticipa- ‘tion of the possible visit, 10,000 stickers of an anti-Khrushchev, anti-Soviet nature were forwarded from Headquarters to Havana Station. The legend on one of these was "Cuba, Yes; Russia, No; Khrushchev, No:" and a second item showed a prisoner behind bars formed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words Sin Palabras. -- “Without words ."# 31/ Despite these advanced preparations, no oppor- tunity was presented to utilize the propaganda stickers.** Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendance’ at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, 19-28 September 1960, and even though Castro flew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet, _the Khrushchev visit did not materialize at this time. ee * See following two pages for copies. oe * ‘More’ detailed information on propaganda leaflets and the dissemination of such materials by air drop is given in Volume I of this history, Atr Operations. *#* Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscow at the close of the UN session. On 22 October 1960 in the course of an interview in Moscow with a Cuban journalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visit Cuba and its people as soon as possible. 3la/ - 228 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET If not particularly successful in projects other. than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack of imagination. Among other. projects, it was proposed that the Office of Medical Services' psychiatric study of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader; and the Castro image also would have suffered if a dis- orienting drug could have been placed in Castro's . food. These proposals were similar in intent to others aimed at the Castro "image" as revealed in the Senate select Committee investigation of. CIA plots against the Cuban leader. In light of a rumor that had been picked up to the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting some of their British Sea Fury aircraft with the American flag ~- said planes to be used in a provoca- tion action to discredit the United States -- WH/4 investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in order to forestall any such provocations by the Cubans. . Unfortunately, however, the Agency art shop pointed out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt -to make such fake photos. “With the idea in mind of a - 229 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET propaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's militia (and apparently at the request of Col. Jack -Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM), WH/4/PP gave some thought to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's militia to establish an “elite suicide squad" which would fight on even after the. defeat of the other troops. The gentleman who would later become infamous in connection with the Watergate activity, E. Howard Hunt, and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of sending a white painted “flight of truth" airplane on a trip to several of the Latin American countries, bringing -- ina “Billy Graham type operation" -- the message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution. But this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the planning stage. 32/ None of the foregoing proposals however, were in the same league with the propaganda plan that came to be known as “the Dripping Cuban." The WH/4 Propa- ganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated: P({hillips] dispatched cable on Special Operation to HAVA. (Cuban jumping ship in Bosphorous) . .33/ . In fact, the cable that Dave Phillips had orig- inated was addressed not only to Havana, but also to - 230 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET and to the Forward Operations Base in Miami. Remembering that Dave Phillips himself was something of an actor, as well as a newspaperman, it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its entirety. The cable read as follows: l. FYI: HQS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOW- ING. OPERATION: SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN BOAT HOMEWARD. BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE IN TURKEY. HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT. SENT TO RUSSIA 'FOR IMPRISONMENT. CUBAN SUBJECT WILL ‘CONTACT LOCAL LATIN AMERICAN CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION, THEN RETURN LATIN AMERICA. AFTER BRIEF BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN "ATTEMPT" WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE. FOR THIS REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO "THEY" WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM. 2. FOR HAVA: REQUEST STATION RECRUIT SUBJECT. OBVIOUSLY HE MUST .BE SUPERB ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS NEWSMEN. HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE OF RETAINING THOUSANDS OF "DETAILS" ABOUT HIS ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY. HE MUST BE KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN HE IS “ARRESTED." AN ARTICULATE STUDENT TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SWIMMING ABILITY DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL. .3. SUGGEST THAT IN’ RECRUITMENT, . STATION STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA, BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED. THUS SUB- JECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF SOVIET, CONTROL IN CUBA. STATION ALSO AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING, LATER - 231 - TOP SECRET .
13-00000 TOP SECRET RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PER- MISSION WEEKEND | WITH ALL THE WORKS IN PARIS, ETC. 4, “IN RECRUITMENT, IT SHOULD BE STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON SECURITY. HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST. REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF \ HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGA- TIONS. ). ‘5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS SELECTED. HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME. _ HOPE HE MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH. 6. FOR| t APPRECIATE YOUR ‘CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT COOP- ERATION SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FOR- WARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. 34/ A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above went to Chief, .WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chief of of WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandum read as follows: , . The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helms discussed this cable on 24 August [1960] and concluded that since Fidel Castro.is definitely identifying himself. more and more with the Russians; it is not worth the candle to launch an operation such as that one proposed in subject cable. Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly try to find a body for’ this operation, provid-~ ing we play it very carefully and do not - 232 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET let the body in on what we definitely have in mind; also, that any further cables which go out on this proposed operation are to be signed off by him. Examined in retrospect, it would appear that Mr. Helms had good reason to be nervous about the proposal!* 35/ B. Sabotage and other Exercises** Where WH/4/PP was successful in putting Radio Swan into operation. and in supporting Station WRUL in * This proposal provided another of the very few in- stances where. Mr. Helms' name surfaced in relation to a Bay of Pigs related problem. ** Because so many of the sabotage activities of the Cuban dissidents were uncoordinated, uncontrolled, and did nothing to impede the extension of Castro's control or lessén his support, the author has tried only to , illustrate something of the scope of those sabotage _ operations over which the WH or WH/4 could exercise a degree of control. In responding to the Taylor Com- mittee's request for an assessment of the effectiveness of its sabotage program, the best that WHD could say was: There are numerous acts of sabotage re- ported from all provinces of Cuba. These acts included the burning of cane fields, damaging of power and communication lines and sugar mills, burning of schools and commercial buildings and damaging of petro- leum and sugar refinery [ste]. It is ex- tremely difficult to verify just what sabotage damage were [sic] the result of our team's [ste] activities; however, they have claimed the burning of cane fields, _the firing of commercial stores, [high] tension lines, and the damage to the oil refinery at Santiago de Cuba was the re- sult of a raider operation by one of our (footnote continued on following page). - 233 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET its broadcasts into Cuba, Project IMATE could claim no similarly successful or continuing program of sabotage and disruption. In fact, one of the earliest and most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs against Cuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry -~ was a complete and total bust. Being suggested even before President Eisenhower's authorization of the anti-Castro program, attempts to sabotage and inter- fere with the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineries continued until well into the middle 60's -- with at least one of the sabotage "experts" displaying the same notable lack of success, but excess of foolish- ness, that characterized his. activities during Project — ' external action groups. In addition, we feel that a great deal of the other sabotage were [ste] the results [ste] of the demolitions we supplied to the various teams and other action groups in Cuba with which we were in contact. Approximately 10-15,000 lbs. of the over 100,000 lbs. of material [sic] | placed in the hands of internal assets were demolitions supplies for sabotage action. 35a/ oo The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by Rip Robertson, but his exciting cable about the action greatly overemphasized the damage; and the plant op- erations were quickly restored to normal. At the time, however, the DCI reported it to the Special ‘Group (Chester Bowles, Roswell Gilpatrick, and McGeorge Bundy) as a "successful" operation. 35b/ Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E (p. 335). = 234 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET JMATE. It is a-story worth recording here, because of. the extremely close and continuing relationship between one of the major US. oil companies operating a refinery in Cuba, | and WH Division. As early as 9.Maxch "1960, the minutes of a Special Group meeting reflect conversations that both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the problems being faced by the major petroleum companies operating in Cuba -- SONJ, dexace, and Shell -- and particularly the need for “discreet means of inter- company: consultation" in order to avoid possible anti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of planned para-military operations against Cuba, it was report- ed that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division was approached "by | |. - ‘He (Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared that | Jwit be willing to: cooperate, perhaps even carry the ball. on certain selected [sabotage] targets. pD/P gave authority : to push this contact immediately."* 36/ * Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among. the specific sabotage targets to be considered for at- tack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960, were petroleum targets. 37/ — ~ 235 - TOP SECRET.
13-00000 | TOP SECRET By August of 1960, WH/D had approved a program of “subtle sabotage paying off, without resorting to the more risky and sensational type of sabotage." Unfortunately, however, there was a communications gap between the operations people and the intelli- gence analysts most familiar with the world petroleum industry and a number of demonstrably unworkable -- though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught.* The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked to as an, économic-political target as well as a sabotage target. When the US refineries operating in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet crude oil, WH/4 began to think in terms of disrupting the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis and other independent shipping operators to refuse to carry the Soviet oil. It was predicted that such * The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledge- ability -- both technically and economically -- ona worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch (later the Fuel's Branch) of the Office of Research and Reports (later the Office of Economic Research). Aside from the constant irritation of having to work half in: ‘the dark in response to WH/D or WH/4, ORR/F E&P was constantly having to correct errors, to make apologies, or mend fences with the major US petroleum companies as a result of the lack of coordination be~ tween DDP and DDI components. - 236 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET a plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortage of tanker bottoms in the world market) to transport its own crude to Cuba and. to “provide technicians and make modifications in existing refineries to process their. crude." This, in turn, was | supposed to alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally among Cuba's crude suppliers.* 39/ In addition to petroleum refineries as targets. for sabotage, plans were alsq made to disrupt the Cuban microwave system. unlike the plans: to disrupt the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly — involve properties of the international oil companies ~~ the sabotage program for the. microwave networks, as late as February of 1961, specifically stated that attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net with “hands ‘off RCA‘ and. Dumont systems, which are to remain intact for later consideration.":40/ Also * In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves did dn excellent job of adapting the plants to the ‘use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the refinery commented to this effect after reviewing the all source intelligence materials avail- able on the plant. He was pleased -- at least in one sense --~ to note that training program "has apparently been quite successful! ~ 237 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET - prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C. King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets by resistance forces not controlled by the Agency were far less efficient than such attacks would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 4l/ In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Divi- sion's anti-Castro activity also included extensive plans for the formation of goon squads throughout much. af Latin America in an attempt to counter the pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This goon squad program also was of considerable interest to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Be- _ cause of its areawide nature, the activities of the goon squads were run out of WH/D ‘rather than out of WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit . for were: the following: The disruption inf [Jot about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use of stink bombs set off in the meeting place; in[_ | {ja counter demonstration against some. 200 Castro ‘sympathizers also gathered to. celebrate the 26th of July movement; and in | “A meeting - 238 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET of the Amigos de Cuba was broken up by an . | who sprayed the. two principal speakers, prominent Costa Rican leftists with ‘Who, Me?'."* 42/ Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose to mention in the same context with the goon squads were the ‘of one Latin American country: Who can promote action of any of the National Security Forces. In another country, ans. Agency member integrated. into the serving as an Advisor to the President on matters is in a position to’ recommend police action to the President.** 43/ In what may have been a ploy intended principally to obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations, * “Who, Me?" was an obnoxious scent. ** In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activ- ities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's, it is interesting that the reference to the "Action Squads" described above also included with reference to the Dominican Republic an agent: _ In contact with a group of dissidents capable of violent action, including assas- Sination. This group has killed a number of agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM), Dominican Secret Police. 45/ . 4 - 239 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET rather than in direct action programs against Cuba, representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter- intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire a vessel which .-- for its acquisition, operational | maintenance, crew, including incentive bonus would run roughly $200,000 for a 6-month period ~-- could also be used in deception operations against Castro. In responding to this suggestion from the Special Projects Group, Col. Jack Hawkins quickly put the quietus on this request, noting that it was doubtful that the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radar or commo gear so that they would react to “the false radar presentation, deceptive communications traffic, ‘noise makers, signals, smoke, explosions, etc." Con- sequently Hawkins concluded: In view of the high cost involved, and the other factors mentioned above, .I do not concur in the acquisition of this craft for deception purposes as proposed in the reference. 46/ - 240 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Part VI -:. Mr. Nixon's Role Like so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs story a great deal’ has been said about the role that Richard M. Nixon played in the operation during the course of his Vice Presidency, but woefully little solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either the pros or cons on the subject. Because of the continuing repetition of many of these stories, a careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA records of the operation in order to recover those items pertaining to Nixon's participation directly or inditectiy -- through his aides, assistants, or correspondence ~~ in the Bay of Pigs operation. During the course of his unofficial visit to the United States in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the United States to meet with Mr. Nixon in his official office in the Capitol for’ an informal discussion. Nixon has stated that the meeting was arranged at the request of the Secretary of State Herter, who suggested - 241 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET that. the administration might profit if one of its leaders could gain additional inside information about what made Castro tick. Nixon has said that he had a 3 1/2 hour meeting with Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result of the meeting, he prepared a 4-page secret memorandum ‘and sent copies to Président Eisenhower, Secretary Herter and to Allen Dulles.* 1/ In part at least, Mr. Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro was : 7 made public as early as November 1964 in an article he wrote for the Reader's Digest, and these views were repeated in somewhat more detail in his recent memoirs, RN. The thrust of the meeting was that Nixon was emphasizing the need for Castro to establish a democratic form of government as he (Nixon) understood it, with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the * In his Reader's Digest article of November 1964 Nixon indicated that copies of the memorandum went to the three individuals as noted in the text above, however, in his recent Memoirs, RN, Nixon states that a copy also went to John Foster Dulles. John Foster Dulles was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959, on which date he was succeeded by Christian Herter. At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro, however, Mr. Herter had been acting in Mr. Dulles‘ place. Dulles's death occurred 24 May 1959. - 242 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET type of government he believed in was that which was . expressed most vocally by the people. Nixon's most widely known remark about Castro as a result of that meeting was his statement that: "Castro is incredibly naive about communism, or is under communist discipline." Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with the meeting either, for according to a member of his ‘party when Castro emerged from the meeting he “was angry. He swore and added, ‘This man has spent the whole time scolding me'."* 2 oO Subsequent to his meeting with Castro in April of 1959, Agency records do not reflect any particular interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban activities until the end of January 1960. On 27 Janu- ary, and again on, 23 February, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, briefed Gen. Robert Cushman, Mr. Nixon's Aide, at the Vice President's Office. “Cushman made it.clear that the Vice President was * It was only after making a direct request to Mr. Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained. No copies were found in the files of. CIA, State, or the Eisenhower Library. The copy obtained was from Mr. Nixon's personal files. The memorandum was, in fact, classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET. A copy of the memorandum is attached as Appendix F . 2a/ - 243 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET | interested in supporting anti~Castro groups both within and outside. of Cuba, including goon squads or other | direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro. groups in Cuba. ‘Among the other subjects discussed with General Cushman on 23 February 1960 were propaganda attacks on the Castro government and the possibilities of economic sanctions similar to those which had been suggested by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland, a ; _- whose views on the need for economic sanctions had ‘not only been discussed with Agency representatives, but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's: office. | Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro ef- forts which were of some interest to the Vice-Presi- dent were CIA's relations with the Department of State, . ; which obviously was not one of the Vice President's favorite organizations; but Col. King made it quite clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only after policy approval. 3/ After it was pointed out to Gen. Cushman that the Department of State! s knowl - edgeability about Agency operations was on a strict “need-to-know" basis, even for the Ambassador in Cuba, - 244 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Cushman then showed Col. King some derogatory informa- tion that the FBI had provided the Vice President about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of the Bureau of American Republic Affairs. Col. King's memorandum. provided no details about the nature of this information, but the probability is that both were accussed of being too tolerant of Castro and communists. 4/ During one of these meetings in the early part of 1960, Gen. Cushman- noted that the Vice President had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to consult with, or acquire the services of, Col. Edward Lansdale, a member of Gen. Erskine's Special Operations: Staff in the Department of Defense. Lansdale's activ- ities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, apparently were well known to Nixon. 5/ On 2 March 1960, the Director of Central Intel- ligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing on “What We are Doing in Cuba:" The 7-page briefing ‘paper which had been given to the Director provided information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities, on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda ef- fort which was being supported by Agency financing, - 245 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET and went into details concerning attempts to rally anti-Castro support, not only in the other Latin Ameri-. can nations, but in the Near and Far East and in Africa. Details were given on the preparations being made for resistance activities including the acquisition of training bases in third countries, and both Ydigoras Fuentes, President of Guatemala, and President Luis | Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers of support for this country's anti~Castro activities. ~ Bt, Plans for economic warfare against Castro were also outlined for the Vice President. Delaying de- liveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar indus~ try, tightening credit by oil companies to restrict delivery of the essential petroleum products, and possible restriction in sugar quotas were mentioned as under study. One other. item which was mentioned. in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the fact that the Agency had “a drug, which if placed in Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irra- tional manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results. to him." 6/ It’ should be emphasized that at the date of this briefing (2 March 1960), the United States did not yet. have an official anti-Castro - 246 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET policy -- that would not come until 17 March of 1960. Subsequent to that announced policy, the author has found no other references: to drugs or other types of attack which were being considered upon Castro's person, or the persons of any of the other Cuban leaders, as a part of the Agency's official program. * There is some question as to whether it was the Director of Central Intelligence himself, or whether it was Mr. Bissell, or, perhaps, whether it was Col. King who actually briefed the Vice President on 2 March 1960. A stamp on the copy of the original Memorandum for the Director reads: “Noted by DCI 28 March 1960." This copy was sent to the DCI through the DDP and carries Mr. Bissell's initials. The car- bon of the memorandum does not show this stamp and the presumption is that it was the Director who did a the briefing. A third version of the memorandum is SS & * See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the defini- tion of the Agency's official policy regarding the anti-Castro program, as contrasted to the unofftiecrtal program. The author assumes that regardless of reader's biases regarding the former Vice President, that the fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a briefing will not be construed to.make him a member of a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the Cuban leaders. ~ 247 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET dated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read: For the Director's use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will. con- sider the Cuban covert action program paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing.) This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI did in , fact do the briefing. While the briefer may not be - ; positively identified, there is no question however, ‘that the Vice President did receive a detailed brief- ing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation.* In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr. Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba, the Vice President was also a participant in the 10. March 1960 meeting of the National Security Council when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a danger, that he wanted contingency plans drawn up, and that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all future National Security Council Meetings. Mr. Nixon attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President * See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice 7” President on 2 March 1960. (For Appendix G see p. 344). ~ 248 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET “ gave a formal “go" to the Covert Action Plan of the Agency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group. Mr. Nixon's only reported comments during this meet- ing concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba, the pulling out of private American firms, and the possibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flow of American dollars into Cuba. V/ Perhaps one.of the reasons why Vice President Nixon has been attributed with playing a major role in the Bay of Pigs activity has to do with the re-_ lationship between Nixon's office and Mr. William D. Pawley, former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil and a US businessman with extensive investments in Cuba and interests in various other parts of Latin America. Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Repub- lican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon's cause. Ap- parently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secre-_ tary of State for Latin American affairs -- assuming a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential election ~- Pawley was a widely known conservative. in the spring of 1960, shortly following Presi- dent Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castro program, Pawley's contacts with the Agency (particularly - 249 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET with WHD) and with Nixon's office became increasingly frequent and apparently quite close. On 21 March 1960, four days after formal approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a meeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence which would include the DCI, Col. King, Gen. Cushman, and Walter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United States - Steel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as ‘Mr. Pawley. Of the session with Pawley, Chief, WH/4 wrote:. Details and the agenda were not dis- cussed other than to say the principal emphasis would be on reviewing what work could be done throughout tthe hemisphere and public opinion on the pending .opera- tion against Castro. Mr. Pawley was told that the time had arrived for careful coor- dination of all activities; that permission had been granted for an all-out operation; a government in exile will be formed post. haste; that the acceptable non-Batista . groups will be put into contact. with each other almost immediately; and that Mr. Pawley's contact, Rubio Padilla, will figure prominently in this effort ... It . Was carefully explained to Mr. Pawley that. any action involving exiles now should be most carefully coordinated with Chief, WHD and Chief, Branch'4 to avoid any flaps.* 8/ * Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond CIA until he, Pawley, had the opportunity to give the information directly to Vice President Nixon. - 250 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET The meeting mentioned in the foregoing para- graph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on ‘1 April 1960, and the Agency's representatives briefed, among other things, on the problems being faced by _ the Cubans in exile who. were trying to form a govern- ment. There was considerable discussion as to who should be the nominal leaders of this government in exile, with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr. Rubio Padilla and the Agency's representatives suggesting Dr. Antonio Varona. For the benefit of the Vice President's representative, it was stressed that none of the Latin American countries seemed particularly anxious to provide a. base of operations’ for the government in exile. The group was informed by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Col. King that, in addition to US Government financing, arrange- ments were being made to have private confidential sources -help defray the costs of the Cuban government in exile. Col. King pointed out that over and above a bond issue. | | ' which will be floated in the name of the government in exile with Mr. Pawley's help, that donations are being made by private citizens and corporations. He indicated that confidential arrangements - 251 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP. SECRET © ‘have already been made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to permit individuals Or corporate entities making donations to claim these donations as contributions to the US Government for‘tax purposes. He cautioned that this arrangement was being limited to a very small group. 9/ The question also was raised about the relation- ship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of American States. Mr. Pawley suggested that rather than lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the US Military Mission in the Latin American countries, especially having them pass the word on about the dangers of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were dis- cussed. by the group were the planned propaganda program and “the present pathetic effort on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in Cuba." This meeting demonstrated that from the very _ outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy * Mr. Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and that certain private American citizens were closely involved in the planning. Within a very short time after the April meeting at Pawley's residence, however, - 252,.- - TOP SECRET
13-00000 . TOP SECRET senior Agency personnel -~ notably C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A -- began to question the Agency's rela- tionship with Mr. William Pawley, particularly as. Pawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparently intended to establish a group of. Pawley supported Cubans in exile in opposition to the FRD, the Agency's supported exile group. Barnes's concern was that | if the US continued to support the extremely conserv- ative element represented by Rawley's group, it would be charged that any anti-Castro action under- taken by the US would be “on the basis of protecting economic royalists." | | | What Barnes stressed to Mr. Bissell, the DDP, was the need for the US to decide whether or not it wished to be charged with supporting reactionary movements. in Latin America, not only in Cuba, but in the rest of the Central’ American and Caribbean. \ areas as well. Once having made up its own mind, Barnes suggested that CIA's position be worked out with State “and thereafter take it to Mr. Nixon, giving him at that time, a thorough and complete briefing so that there can be no doubt: in his mind -~ 253 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET as to where we stand, and what we propose to do."* 10/ “When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere Division that he was withdrawing from support of the Agency's anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told col. King that he intended to make his views regarding the FRD known to Vice President Nixon. In addition, Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley's recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and . others, discussed the pros and cons of cutting off the communications channel between Pawley and the Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was pro- | vided by the Agency's communications facility. Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that» the communications channel should be continued because * Mr. Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Group on 19 May 1960,.the DCI categorized the Cubans sup- ported by Pawley as’ “unreconstructed reactionaries.“ 10a/ - 254 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley group. Moreover, the Pawley group had a duplicate channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been _ restricted by denial of the Agency channel. A restric- tion was placed on the transmittal of communications which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba; _ but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable traffic, however, was to ‘be the responsibility of Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline. Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhower administration, the Deputy Director for Plans agreed that the discussion regarding Pawley should ‘be brought to the attention of the Director of Central Intelli- gence and that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bring this matter before both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon. ll/ By the first week of June 1960, however, Jake. Esterline apparently had reached the end of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP, he wrote: It is our firm conviction, based on months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley'‘s views on the Cuban situation are highly ~ 255 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 damaged severely. 12/. TOP SECRET personal and rigid. These views in our opinion are inimical to the best interest of the United States. Mr. Pawley has re- fused to budge from his position and has ~ continued. to seek official endorsement of his views at the high levels of the govern- ment. The flagrant disregard for security reflected in Havana. cable 4820 dated 4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to recommend that all contact with the Rubio- Pawley group be immediately and finally severed. If such action is not taken, no guarantee can be made for the security of the JMARC operation. In point of fact, the information in the foregoing message indicates that security already has been Among other things, the Havana cable which had aroused Chief, WH/4 stated that the following infor- mation was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in US Government now backing Rubio group and no other group. Group has entre to Veep. For a time Pawley was having trouble with an Agency or Agencies who wanted [to] back another junta, but after Pawley offered [to] withdraw completely, he was talked out of doing so, and given assurance his group only would be backed, {and this] resulted resignation person backing other group. 13/ Headquarters prepared a priority cable to be sent to both Havana and to the Forward Operations Base, which had also picked up the disinformation being spread by the anti-FRD group. The text of the -~ 256 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 'Pawley group be the following: TOP SECRET cable read in part as follows: You have been authoritatively advised that US Government is not (repeat not) backing Rubio group.and that it has no intention of ever doing so. It complete fabrication that Pawley was given US Government assurance that only his group would be backed. No resignations of any kind occurred, nor are any foreseen. Mention Veep in such context and on this particular level sheer foolhardiness and can only reflect most adversely on those Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of facts and severest indiscretions. 14/ The cable apparently wag never forwarded to all contacts."* 15/ - 257 - TOP SECRET | either Havana or to Miami, presumably because of Oop- - position from Col. J. C. King who had noted and ini- tialed on his copy of the Memorandum from Jake Ester- line recommending that all contact with the Rubio- “immediately and finally severed" "I do not concur with severing of * As will be noted subsequently, whether it was political expediency or conviction that Pawley could ‘actually do some good, the relationship among Pawley, Chief, WH Division, and Chief, WH/4 continued through- out the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. thing in fact, the relationship between Pawley and Jake Esterline appears to have become mutually sup- portive, particularly as the operation drew to its unsuccessful conclusion. If any-
13-00000 - TOP SECRET On 20 June 1960 at the request of General Cushman, Jake Esterline joined him for lunch, the purpose being to provide the General with sufficient information on the state of the anti-Castro program so that he could bring the Vice President up to date from the time of the Miami meeting that had taken place at William Pawley's house.* Among the points covered were the developments related to the organ- ization of the FRD and the. fact that Mr. William ; ~ 1" Pawley's candidate, Sefior Rubio, had decided not to. join the Frente. According to Esterline's memorandum: Dr. Rubio's failure to join the Frente, however, has not held up progress in form- ing the junta, and/or the other important aspects of the operation. General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarters were to be established in Mexico, and it was on this occasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman to E. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico with the Frente.** * The meeting of 21 March 1960. ** Insofar as.can be determined, this probably was the first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard. the name of E. Howard Hunt. - 258 - | TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Chief, WH/4 also touched on the programs that were being beamed out of Swan Island, on the prepara- tion being made for training paramilitary types, base communications, planned paramilitary activities, the choice of a Third Country's staging area, and that the operation was still scheduled to begin during the month of November 1960. Gen. Cushman noted that the Vice President requested this information in order to prepare for an upcoming NSC meeting at which he would “eS be a senior official. The Vice President's aide also asked if there were any particular problems with re- lation to the operation that Chief, WH/4 wished to - have brought to the attention of the Vice President. Esterline reported that the only problems that had occurred concerned political differences among the exiles, but that for the moment all factions seemed to be quiescent. Chief, WH/4 also indicated to Gen. Cushman “that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC would have adequate support at the eleventh hour."* 16/ On 22 June 1960, General Cabell.-- Acting DCI at the time -~ briefed a special meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban situation. The Vice * Except for Guatemala and Nicaragua, such support — would never be forthcoming. , ~ 259 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET President presided and the meeting was attended by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobiliza- tion, the Acting Attorney General, a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, among others, Messrs. Bissell, King, Esterline, and McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency.* 17/ A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the FRD and its leadership -- their policies, their back- ground, and the internal difficulties and bickering. The propaganda picture also was discussed, with partic- ular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan Island. Gen. Cabell stated that the paramilitary plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would be divided into 25 20-man teams. The teams would go into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident , groups. Cabell emphasized that the implementation of the paramilitary program depended on the existence * Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence -- that component of the Central Intelligence Agency which, according to some of the “authorities" on the Bay of Pigs, was presum- ably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's anti- Castro program. / . - 260 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Of viable dissident forces which “have not emerged in strength." The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create an anti-Castro air force, but his comments about this air force (even at this time) were very much in error. According to General Cabell: Some trained. Cuban fliers are currently available and we hope soon to have access to additional numbers. “Sterile” aircraft for their use have been mothballed by the Department of Defense and earmarked for CIA use. These craft can be made available in a matter of hours. 18/ As reported in an earlier volume of this history, nei- ther the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would be available for missions against Castro's Cuba until late in the fail of 1960.* In the NSC briefing, Cabell also made some inter- esting comments about the resistance that might be encountered in an attempt to oust Castro, emphasizing that intelligence reports had indicated that Cuba | might organize “a ‘foreign legion’ comprised of highly trained regular military personnel, drawn from Com- munist nations, mainly the eastern satellites. Should this eventuality occur it would seriously affect the * See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Air Operations. ~ 261 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET | probable success of any purely clandestine paramili- tary operations." Cabell then introduced a suggestion which would be heard right up to the time that the invasion fleet was ‘being boarded ~~ that “volunteers" be acquired for the anti-Castro forces, such volunteers to be drawn from US Special Forces .* 18a/ | | As the presiding officer at the special National Security Council meeting, Vice President Nixon raised a number of questions with the Department of State representatives concerning support that the Organiza— tion of American States would likely give to this country's anti-Castxo efforts; and he also posed a series of questions concerning the economic pressures that the United States might put.on Cuba. The. ques- ‘tions concerned Sugar, oil, and tariffs in particular; and the Vice President urged that "strong, positive | action [be taken] to avoid becoming labeled "Uncle Sucker." 19/— ‘ * WNo such volunteers were permitted in the case of the ground forces, but in the last two days of the Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted for combat air operations. See Volume I of this “History, Atr Operations. - 262 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET On 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an inter- esting telephone call from. General Cushman, contain- ing two messages from the Vice President. First; Mr. Nixon was interested to know if there were any obsta-. -Cles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis other agencies in support of JMATE; and if there were, the Vice President indicated that he personally would help to resolve such problems. The second request was a bit more sticky. Gen. Cushman said that the Vice President*has commissioned him to. keep Mr. William Pawley happy and, in connection with-this, he has also been instructed to keep Mr. Pawley briefed on how things are moving. General Cushman said he realized that this is much against our desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, but the fact remains that he [Pawley] is .a “big fat political cat" and, as such, the Vice President cannot completely » ignore him. 20/ | Esterline allowed that he understood the General's problem and. suggested that with a few hours advance warning the Agency would provide the Vice President, or the General, with such briefing materials as nec- essary for any given meeting with Mr. Pawley -- after first clearing the paper with the appropriate agency officials and within the security regulations that applied to Mr. Pawley. Esterline indicated in his - 263 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET ‘memorandum that he. immediately informed the Deputy Director for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes, respectively, about the call from General Cushman. * Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice Presi- dent's offer to help CIA with difficulties it might -have with other agencies to heart. In a memorandum from C. Tracy Barnes, concerning a more effective commercial cover for Radio Swan, it appears, from Barnes's response, that Esterline must have suggested that the services of Vice President Nixon be engaged to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the _ FCC over the use of commercial advertising to make * The following interesting comments also appeared in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with General Cushman: This information {regarding Cushman's telephone call] could not be given to Col. King, as he had just departed on a three- day trip.. This memorandum will be avail- able ‘to Col. King, however, upon his re- turn. Wednesday, 6 duly. Contrary to the opinions of ‘many who have. sug- gested that Col. J. C. King was read out of the anti- Castro operation, this memorandum would indicate that, in fact, extreme care was being taken to make sure that J. C. King was read into the act. ~ 264 -— TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Swan appear more legitimate. Barnes, however, took exception and recommended that the US Government should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broad- casts.* 21/ It was also in July 1960 that Vice President Nixon's office, principally through the person of General Cushman, first indicated an interest in the activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. Garcia was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive back- 58, % ing both within the Cuban community in Miami and ‘among dissidents inside Cuba. At one point he claimed that he could raise a force of 2,000 men in the Miami area and 10 ,.000 men inside of Cuba -~- if he were given | proper financial support for training and equipping these men. Garcia's name first came before the Agency in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a Cuban exile who was an Agency contact. During this * Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr. Nixon or whether a determination was made concerning the increased use of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in doubt. But Barnes's suggestion of official. USG par- ticipation in Swan was rejected. A note from Ester- line on the official routing slip from Barnes for- ‘warding this memorandum read: “I believe Mr. Bissell reversed this position?" To this query King noted “Yes“ on the. buck slip. - 265 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET initial meeting Garcia claimed that he had large stores of military equipment in Spain, that he had additional promises of assistance from General Franco, and that he had contacts in the White House who had given him the “go ahead" for an invasion of Cuba! Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI, to General Cabell, and apparently to the Office of Vice President Nixon. In any event, on 9 July 1960 Jake Esterline met with Mr. Marshall Diggs, a Washington | lawyer and Garcia's sponsor, where he was told of Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro. Ina follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July, Mr. Phillip Toomey, WH/4/Prop met with Garcia, Cameron Pulley, and two reputed underwater demolitions ex- perts. Garcia went into his act about how his force could overthrow the Castro Government, assuming that he could get some financial assistance for training and equipping the troops. Mr. Pulley proceeded to tell Mr. Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a program that was being promoted by former Senator Owen Brewster for the entire Caribbean area -- appar- ently a program designed to eliminate all the bad guys. Following another meeting on 13 July and after ~ 266 -. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET listening to Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as Communists -- as well as being unimpressed by his credentials -~- on 15 July 1960, Marshall Diggs was informed that the Agency had no interest in support- ing Mr. Garcia. On 20 July 1960, Chief, JMATE met with General Cushman to tell him that a full study had been made of the representatives of ‘Seflor Garcia; and as a result, the DCI probably would get in touch with Mr. Diggs and/or Senator Brewster and explain to them “the wisdom of their desi'sting from pushing Garcia as an outstanding Cuban military leader." The subject dragged on, however; and at one point Mr. Pulley, who with Mr. Diggs and ex-Senator Brewster, was a strong supporter of Mr. Nixon, indi- cated that the administration's policies with regard to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in’ the upcoming election. Moreover Pulley also is reported to have. indicated that a congressional investigation of the anti-Castro plan was possible. The Director of Cen- tral Intelligence was advised on 26 September that because of Garcia's threats to expose everything he > had learned about possible Agency involvement in the anti-Castro effort, including the Cuban exile TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET organization in the United States, that the time had come for Diggs and Pulley to be asked “to forego their efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga." This recommendation was approved by General c. P. Cabell on 13 October 1960.* 22/ _.Insofar as the available records show, the con- tacts between Vice President Nixon's office, and the * More nonsense from Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga would surface again in the summer of 1961 following Castro's offer to free the Bay of Pigs” ‘prisoners in return for US tractors when Garcia bounced up with another pro- posal for the planned escape of the prisoners -- pro- viding, of course, that he be given a bundle of bucks. In fact, the hand of Garcia reached from beyond the grave to touch on the BOP operation. On 2 August 1976, almost a year after Garcia's death, the Washing- ton Star carried a.UPI dispatch saying that Rep. Thomas N. Downing (D., Va.) had affidavits claiming that: In return for: support of the invasion [of Cuba] from Mario G. Kohly, a popular right-wing leader who was exiled from Cuba, then Vice President ‘Nixon agreed in October 1960.to order the CIA to arrest the leftist leaders and turn them over to-Kohly for “elimination" after Premier Fidel Castro was thrown out of office. _ The affidavits reportedly came from a former CIA con- tract agent and Mario G. Kohly, Jr., son of the would-be invasion leader. These materials were supposed.to have some bearing on House of Representatives's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy; but there is no indication that they. were given any credence. 23/ - 268 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Central Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia case -~- for all practical purposes ended by August 1960.* The only other significant involvement between the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency, prior to the change of administration on 20 January 1961, concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates for President and Vice President of the United States, prior to the 1960 election. -On 23 July 1960, follow- ing the Democratic convention, Allen Dulles briefed Sen.. John Kennedy, and on 28 July Senator Lyndon ‘Johnson. In his memorandum to President Eisenhower, who had directed that Dulles give these briefings, the DCI reported that in the two hour period for each briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet Union, developments in the Berlin situation, in the * Whether this reflects the concentration of the Vice President's activities on the upcoming November elec- tion, whether the principal contacts came to be main- tained between Col. J. C. King and Nixon's office -- with the consequent reference memoranda being included in J. C. King's files, which have disappeared from the sight of God and man -- or whether, in fact, this is an accurate reflection of the limited contacts, the author cannot confirm. His inclination is to believe that the contacts probably were as limited as described: above. , : 7 TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Congo, and in Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on 19 September 1960, and again the briefing touched _ on relations with the Soviet Union and on the trouble spots in the world, including Cuba. The White House was informed of this briefing prior to the event; and subsequent to the briefing of Kennedy, Mr. Dulles reported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of the White House Staff and also to Brigadier Genéral Andrew Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President. 24/ i The exact nature of the briefings that Dulles gave to Kennedy on, Cuba is of particular historical importance in terms of the election of 1960. In the last of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixon and Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, in the course of condemning the Castro regime and suggesting that the United States take stronger action against Castro, made the statement that: We must attempt to strengthen the non- Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far, these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our Government. 25/ Based on his knowledge and interest in supporting the anti-Castro program that had been authorized by - 270 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET President Eisenhower in March 1960, Nixon was put in a Catch-22 situation; for as he said: President Eisenhower had instructed Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, to brief the Democratic candidate on all opera- tions, including Top Secret operations. I knew that Kennedy had already received two briefings from Dulles. I immediately had a member of my staff call the White House on the security line to ask if these briefings covered Cuba. A member of the White House Staff indicated they had. (Several months after the election, Allen Dulles was to state that his brief- ing of Kennedy ‘had included Cuba but not: the training program fo®,Cuban exiles.) At the time of the debate, however, and after checking with the White House, I had to proceed with the assumption that Kennedy had been briefed on the secret program. I was faced with the heads~he-wins, tails-I-lose proposition. If in the Tv . debate I were to reveal the existence of the training program and point out that I had been one of its strongest advocates, I would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's position. But if I did so, the project would be doomed, and also the lives of the brave men,. both inside and outside of Cuba, who were receiving training and assistance. I had only one choice: to protect the security of the program, I had to oppose Kennedy on his position of advocating that the United States openly aid anti-Castro forces inside and outside Cuba. 26/ It is interesting to observe that Nixon became more philosophical about the impact of the final TV -~ 271 ~- TOP SECRET
13-00000 © TOP SECRET debate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 elec- tion as time passed. In 1964 he would write “Most observers agree that our positions on the Cuban issue could well have been the decisive factor [fin ‘the outcome of the election]." But in his recent memoirs he expressed doubt that any single factor in such a close election could really have changed the outcome. * 27/ | Following the TV debate-yin which Kennedy had raised the issue of assistance for Cuba, Nixon quickly lashed back at Kennedy. The result of the introduc- tion of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the * In an interesting conversation with Fawn M. Brodie who is writing a Nixon biography, the author of this history, in response to Brodie's concern about the fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public, emphasized that plausible deniability was of real con- cern at the time of the TV debate. He also emphasized the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by Nixon. The author also suggested to Mrs. Brodie that it seemed equally valid-.to infer that perhaps Kennedy had been leaked detailed information about the anti- Castro program and that he used this device to put Nixon in a corner during the TV debate. Arthur Schles- _inger, of course, claimed that the Kennedy comments “were no more than a rhetorical flourish. Neither Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army in Guatemala." 28/ ~ 272 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 ° TOP SECRET election campaign, struck sensitive nerves within the Agency; and on 26 October 1960, General Cabell met with Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, indicating that the discussion and debate about Cuban issues were touching on areas which, in the end, might be damaging to the nation's interest. On 27 October at the Special Group meeting, Mr. Gray reported that he had talked to "certain Nixon people in the White House" in an attempt to enlist their support to bring such dis- cussions to an end. 29/ . - It was not until-18 November 1960 that Presi- dent-elect John F. Kennedy was fully briefed by Direc-. tor of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, on the extent of the anti-Castro activities being planned by the United States Government. 30/ Mr. Nixon's misconception of the extent of the briefing that Kennedy had received in the pre-election period was not finally clarified however, until 20 March 1962 when Allen Dulles addressed a memorandum to John A. McCone, his successor as Director of Central Intelli- gence, stating as follows: (~ 273 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 - TOP SECRET I have read the portions of Mr. Nixon's book with regard to the intel- ligence briefings which he understood Senator Kennedy had been given by me with respect to Cuba during the campaign. I have also seen the White House state- ment issued today on this subject. There has been here, I believe, an honest misunderstanding. This was probably due to the nature of the mes- Sage Mr. Nixon writes he received as to these briefings. The Cuban situation was, of course, dealt with in the briefings I gave to Senator: Kennedy. The last briefing I gave him was over a month before the debate.,in which the issue arose. My briefings were intelligence brief- ings on the world situation. They did not cover our own Government's plans or programs for action -~ overt or covert. 31/ As previously noted, however, by 1964, if not earlier, Mr. Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an error in assuming that Kennedy. had received a more detailed briefing than in fact he truly had. By way of concluding this. segment on Richard . Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity, it _ should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination was Nixon “the architect of the Bay of Pigs."* 32/ * A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden, an old CIA man, in a TV documentary on the CIA made by the. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. ; - 274 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 . TOP SECRET It is equally clear that Mr. Nixon, principally through his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., was fully read into the plans that were being developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for the ouster of Fidel Castro. This interest was especially strong in the period from the winter of 1960 through the late summer of 1960. It also_ should be apparent to the reader that while some of the Vice President's interést ~— particularly in his insistence on placating William Pawley, especially in giving undue attention to Pawley'‘s concerns that the Agency~sponsored Cuban~exile organization was being taken over by the pro-Com- munist groups -- was politically motivated, his basic concern was the fear of the establishment of a communist government in the Western Hemis- phere. Certainly his constant interest and offers to provide help for the Agency in its relations to other branches of the US Government fall into the latter, rather than the former, category. The 4 unanswerable question, of course, is whether Cuban Communism would play such a large role in international | - 275 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET affairs in 1979; particularly in the third world countries, if Richard Nixon had been elected Presi- dent in 1960.* | A * Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon would have had the US play was the comment that he reportedly made to William Pawley several weeks be- fore the 1960 election, when Nixon indicated that he favored breaking relations. with Cuba -- at that time | -~- recognizing a Government-in-exile, and then assist~ ing that Government in its efforts to oust Castro. 33/ —- 276 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Part VII The Question of Assassinations In his testimony before the Senate Select Com- mittee to Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence Activities, Richard M. Bissell, formerly CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, testified fully and completely to the role that he, Sheffield Edwards, and William Harvey played in negotiations with Robert Maheu and Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro. In. addition to the individuals just named, it also appears. highly probable that Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (and possibly both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy) was aware that Castro. was an assassination target. Unfortunately the Senate Com-. mittee Report -and the media. coverage of the investi- gation of the Central Intelligence Agency's partici-— pation in assassination plots made it appear that the Mafia involvement was a fundamental part of the Agency's response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authori- zation for CIA to be principally responsible for the ouster of Fidel Castro. In fact, the activities of - 277 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Messrs. Bissell, Edwards, and Harvey, with Maheu and the Mafia remained strictly compartmented and isolated from the officially authorized Project JMARC ~- the Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs operation. Bissell himself stated: I don't remember. I have no recollec- tion that [there was] any specific other plot against Castro during this period when the Bay of Pigs operation was in preparation. I do remember my own feel- ing that the Mafia plot had a very modest chance for success, and that it was not something to be depended*.on in any way. I don't remember others. 1/_. Bissell also told the author of this history that: Shef [Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director, Office of Security] would occasionally let me know what was going on [vis-a-vis the Mafia]. In effect, he and his immediate subordinate were case officers for that activity; and I don't think anybody else {was] involved. I think probably Tracy [Barnes] may have known about it, but I don't think anybody else involved with the Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about it, whatever. My recollection is that it never went to the Special Group, and that is the view of [McGeorge] Bundy.* 2/ * Interestingly enough, at the same time that Col. Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro, CIA's Deputy Director for Support, Col. L. K. White, noted: . Shef Edwards and I met with General Cabell and Jack Earman [on 22 March 1961] to point out to them that we were not (footnote continued on following page) -~ 278 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Jacob D. Esterline, who was Chief, WH/4, the component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically created to run the anti-Castro project, disclaimed either responsibility or knowledgeability about the Mafia connection.* 4/ Richard D. Drain, who -became Chief of Operations for WH/4 was more voluble on the subject of the assassination attempts which were re- ported by the Senate Select Committee. In an inter- view which touched, among other things on the planned assasSination of Castro by the Mafia-types Drain com- mented: furnishing. the Director the personal protection which. we should be furnish- ing in these critical times, particu- larly with regard to the dangers inherent in the Cuban situation. General Cabell agreed to talk with the Director about this, and to try to obtain his approval to increase Mr. Tighe's force to six people. 3/ © * Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief, WH/4 he refused. to grant Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, a. blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types. It was subsequent to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found out about this, and Esterline told the author of this history that he expressed his strong opposition to the fund- ing of such activities to J. C. King. 5/ - 279 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET I've been giving you lessons here about [how] a COPS should know a little about everything ... Well, I promise you, until it came out in 1975, this allegation, at least, that Shef Edwards and Mr. Maheu were working with the Mafia to assassinate Castro, concurrent. with the Bay of Pigs Operation, that is the first time I ever heard about it. Ever! ... My thought, when I saw this, was Jesus Christ, I must have been a little over-compartmented, because we had spent a considerable amount of nervous energy figuring out how are we going to get a shot at the old son-of-a- bitch concurrent with the landing. If anybody with whom I participated in planning for that ... something that we never had figured out hew to do, because so many of our agents went down just prior to the invasion. If anybody that was in- volved in that ever spoke a word about any other exercise going on to get Castro, I never heard it; and my initial reaction when all this came out, during this last year was... well ... why did they give me the idiot treatment? Then it occurred to me that maybe there was very good reason for me not to know. You don‘t need to know ... compartmentation ... even from COPS is not unheard of ... Well, mind you, I am not saying what I've just said in any kind of pique; and I certainly don't want to leave you -- or this tape recorder -- with the impression that had I known about this, I would have been opposed... I must say, I don't think I would have enjoyed the instrument very much ~- whereas we put out an awful lot of bullshit to the Cubans about the res- toration of democracy and all that. Those Cubans, that were working with us were not, I submit, working for the re-establishment of the Mafia as a controlling factor in Havana. I had a helluva lot rather, in ~ 280 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET contemplating the assassination of Castro, contemplated in the way that we were con- templating it -- that is, can we get a ‘Rip Robertson close to him? Can we get a really hairy Cuban -- I. mean a gutsy Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one thing in mind? We surveyed all of our agent material to see who could take a shot at him, but the assassination of that charismatic guy, coincidental .with the invasion, would have been a highly desirable thing. Whether the instrument to be picked should have included the. Mafia, I think I might have questioned at the time. It was part of my job ... to ask, "Now wait a minute ... What are we doing here? ... If this comes out ... what will we look like?™.Not only to our- selves, which is important, but’ to the Cubans." 6/ In light of Drain's comments about the desira- bility of having the good guys in the white hats elim- inate Castro, rather than the Mafia guys in the black hats, a specific attempt was made to see what the official records revealed about such plans. Although ay far from satisfactory or complete, there is evidence f to indicate that the white-hatted guys would have had no objection “~~ aS reported by Mr. Drain -- if a suc- cessful assassination attempt could have been made. Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for - Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking - 281 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP. SECRET "direct positive action" against the Castro brothers and Che Guevara, WH/4 . records reveal interest, and possibly Limited, direct participation, in a number of such activities. * ~ ‘For the: ‘most part, however, the various pieces of evidence that seemed ' to implicate WH/4 in assas- sination plots against Castro or other of the Cuban leaders proved to be cold trails. The peripatetic Howard Hunt claimed, even prior to the Senate inves- tigations, that after a visit to Havana’ in the spring of 1960, he prepared a report recommending among other things that the Agency should: Assassinate Castro before or coincident with the invasion (a task. for Cuban patri- ots) ... Barnes and Bissell read my report --- and said it would weigh in the. final planning ... So far as I have been able to determine no coherent plan was ever developed within CIA to assassinate AY * As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Cabell. pointed out to Mr. Merchant that such action was highly dangerous both in conception and execution, and, further, he indicated that it was beyond the Agency‘s capability. 7/ The Senate Select Committee chased its tail at some length over the interpretation of the ‘term “direct positive. action," as used by Merchant. Only someone (even a Senator) who consist- ently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a ; problem understanding the meaning to ‘be anything other ‘than assassination. ~ 282 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Castro, but it was the heart's desire of many exile groups.* 8/ In another instance, it appeared possible that an agent named{ fg a Cuban exile, might have been in training to make an assassination attempt because it was reported that he was taken to the | firing range. where he was checked out in the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi- hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol, single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer; carbine with folding stock; and a 7.65mm British Welrod with silencer. He is to be also checked out this week in the use of a sporting rifle with telescopic lens attach- ment. co, It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration into Havana, | had two principal sabotage missions -- one against the Esso’; refinery and the other aimed at the Havana Electric Company. 9/ In mid-July 1960, theré reportedly was an internal | - Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither WH/4.nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago A de Cuba reported: | * Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status of his recommendation he was told that it was “in the hands of a special group.“ Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery (Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any .such report. ~ 283 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET On 15 July 1960, the Cuban Government un- covered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit to Mina del Frio, an army camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains, between Bayamo and Manza- nillo in Oriente Province. Three captains ‘and approximately 100 soldiers had been ar- rested and more arrests are expected. 10/ In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain, Jake Esterline the Chief of Project IMATE was also very emphatic in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban lead- ers was a part of the JMATE Program. In response to a question of whether various of the special arms that were being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for use against the Cuban leadership, Esterline responded: No, I think it [silenced weapons in par- ticular] is for hit and run operations, where they could do their maximum damage and get out without necessarily alerting people ... I know of no -~ within JMARC as I knew it -- I know of no attempt, no plans that were made to assassinate. As a matter of fact, the constant battle with Cubans during those years was to tell them that we weren't going to get involved in any assassination, that if there was going to be an overthrow, it was going to be, obviously, a bloody op- eration; but no Cubans were going to be sent in there, to “make an assassination attempt." It was. going to be a ground-roots revolution.* 11/ Some contradictory evidence, however, indicates that WH/4, if not principally responsible, was certainly * It is known that at least one assassination plot against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men using US rifle-grenades -- was proposed by anti-Castro Cubans to COS Havana, but the COS gave the originator of the plan “no encouragement whatsoever." ila/ os 284 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET aware of some sort of planned assassination activity. One of the principals of WH/4 recorded that on 24 Feb- ruary 1961 he: Asked Ed [Stanulis], Dave P{hillips], | {Ed] Hinkle, [Bob] Moore, and Jake [Ester- line] why not proceed with Operation “AMHINT to set up a program of assassina- tion. 12/ Although the author of that remark was Chief of - Operations for Project JMATE, he was unaware, as re- ported earlier in this chapter, of the Mafia connection; ay but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that the invasion might lead to the death of Castro.* In response to a specific question about the AMHINT pro- gram, all he could say was: | I said that I was not failing to give some attention to the business of assas- sination. Now, here on the 24th of Feb-— ruary, when I asked Ed, Dave Phillips, Hinkle, Moore, and Jake “why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination,“ either none of those bastards knew anything about Sheffield Edwards and Maheu in the Mafia... or some of them did, and didn't see fit to say “Drain, take your AMHINT and stuff _ it. We've got this thing pretty well * See pp. 279-281. ~ 285 -_ TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET ‘covered." What I would love now [is] to see an outline of AMHINT.* 13/ _A few days after the reference to the AMHINT assas~- sination program, WH/4 Propaganda Notes contained the following statement: “TI [saminger] phoned following line to Wilkinson from Swan: ... attempted assassination of Guevara"; and Chief .Operations WH/4 made a cryptic note: "CI and D watch Gueverra [ste] assassination attempt." 15/ When asked about the possibility that WH/4 was directly in- volved in an attempt to assassinate Che Guevara, the former Chief of Operations for the prdject wrote: | My only memory of this is that we did not plan a Che assassination, but must have gotten intelligence that an attempt on him had been tried, planned, discovered or speculated If one can assume that the statement "CI and D watch Gueverra [sic] assassination attempt" translates as “Counter- Intelligence and Division D watch Guevara assassination * The author of this history has unsuccessfully tried to track down this particular project. AMHINT was related to the work of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE), an anti~Castro organization inside Cuba. The only evidence that has been found which might have been related to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request of 14 January 1961 for “Silenciadores Rifles de marilla telescopica." (A request for rifles with silencers and telescopic sights.) This might have had to do with a DRE plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather than a plan to kill Castro. When the FOB in Miami heard: about the plan against the Soviet official they “immedi-' ately sent ... {word] to AMHINT-1 forbidding planned ‘atentado‘ [assassination].“ 14/ \ ~ 286 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET attempt" then the comment from Chief of Operations appears eminently sensible, for Counter-Intelligence and Division D (which was responsible for intercept traffic) would be the two most Likely sources to pick up information should an attempt be made on Guevara' s life -~- particularly since such an item probably would not be reported overtly in the Cuban press or radio: 7 | One ‘final item which was surfaced during the course of research concerning the possibility that WH/4 had > actually included an assassination program as part of its operational planning concerns a carbon copy identified only as "Must Go List." The single sheet of unknown prov- enance lists and identifies in the following order eleven individuals: | . | | Che Guevara - Minister of Industries Raul Castro Ruz - Chief of Cuban Armed Forces, and wife, Vilma Espin de Castro Blas Roca - International Communist leader and Secretary General of Communist Party Ramiro Valdez Menendez ~- Minister of . Interior (G-2) : Carlos Olivares ~- Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Raphael Rodriguez - Communist leader, editor of newspaper HOY Lazaro Pena - Communist leader - labor movement Abelardo Colome. - Deputy in G-2 Captain Rogelio Acevedo - Chief of Militia Anibal Escalante - Communist leader Armendo Hart Davalos - Minister of Education, and wife, Haydee Santamaria de Hart Pencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a note: "List forwarded E. L. by C/WH/4 in Nov [1960]."* When * A copy of the list follows p. 287. The list should read Armando, rather. than gprmendo, Hart. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET asked if he could identify the "Must Go List" the former Chief of WH/4 stated: ~ Weil, I know all these people ... Some of them I know personally, like Armando Hart ... I entertained Hart in my home a number of times ... the miserable bastard. I have never seen that list in my life, but this is the whole top gang at that _time. Now many of them were later elimi- nated from the power structure by Castro, and by Raul Castro ... They got rid of Olivares, and Roca was pushed aside ... Armando Hart was also half nuts at this point, and he still is. I guess he is still fairly prominent,,but he is not really in the power structure. Abelardo Colome -- I don't even know who he is. I wish to help you, but I don't know. 17/ The former Chief of Operations for WH/4, in re- sponse to the question of whether the "Must Go List" meant anything to him, replied as follows: No! Huh! “List forwarded E. L. by Chief WH/4" ... Eddie Lansdale ... E. L. would be Eddie Lansdale. Chief, WH/4 was Jacob D. Esterline. In November, I was. there ... No “Big Daddy.“ Well, whether this "Must Go“ is in terms of the assassination, or in terms ... fof] nobody, none of these people must be allowed to have a role in the new govern- ment. I guess “Must Go" came to pass eventually in the case of number one on . this list, Che Guevara. Raul ... I myself, contemplating the future government, thought it might be interesting to try to keep Raul in, with Fidel out. Capture what magic there was in the name of Castro, but do it with that little homosexual, instead of with Fidel, the real man. I - 288 - TOP SECRET —
13-00000 TOP SECRET don't even know the rest of these guys -- Hart, Escalante, etc. 18/ By way of summarizing, it would appear that CIA's official anti-Castro program as reflected in Project JMATE did not include assassination as an integral part of its operational planning, but would not have been averse to eliminating Castro or other of the. Cuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded. Based on records, however, WH/4's principals were in no way privy to, or participants in, the Mafia assas~ ination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs. - 289 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET Part VIII . _ Conclusions This volume has traced the history of the CIA's official anti-Castro prograni from its inception in 1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration in January of 1961. It emphasized that in the initial period when Castro's revolution was taking place, the Agency, reflecting the policies of the US Government, was caught betwixt and between -- to move with Castro or to move against Castro. Shortly following his take- over, it became clear that Castro had little or no in- - tention -- nor apparently concern ~- for establishing cordial relations with the "Colossus of the North.". Instead, he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies for military, technical, and economic assistance. Te - became clear that a new philosophy was being intro-. duced into the Caribbean basin and that this philosophy was directly contrary to the interests of the United States Government and to the governments of many of the Latin American nations, whether democratically governed or governed by dictatorships of the right. - 290 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET As Castro's threats became more ‘serious, and as increasing pressures were put on legitimate eco- nomic interests of the United States in Cuba, pressures within the United States Government led to a decision that Castro must go. . With great concern about the impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the United States Government would have on the United - Nations and. on the Organization of American States, it was decided that a covert plan of action would be — adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960. It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary programs which would be implemented in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was )to be the principal action agent for the bulk of the program. Once the official US position was announced, CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy. A separate Task Force within the Western Hemisphere Division was established under the leadership of Jacob ‘D: Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief, | Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called for a propaganda program to be’ run out of a radio -~ 291 -. TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City. Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castro - publications launched in the area of Miami. Para- military programs initially called for the training of cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructors who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and . training for the numerous dissident elements that reportedly were ready to move against Castro. Unfortunately, however, 'as the summer of 1960 drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro's military strength and training programs were sharply .- improving .and that the initial plan to infiltrate small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was feasible. Consequently, the concept changed to one > of a landing in force, the acquisition of a defensible base in Cuba from which a Provisional Government might call for assistance from the United States Government if the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient support: to force the overthrow of Castro. This volume emphasized that following his decision in March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro pro- gram, President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the = 292 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET question of developments of the anti-Castro program until late in the fall, following the election of 1960 and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that time Mr. Eisen- hower reinjected himself into. the program and stimulated action to the point where some of CIA's planners hoped that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was already underway -~ paramilitary operations might be ‘initiated. _ Apparently this was feared by Castro, too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs we he said: When our country was in danger of direct aggression and mobilized itself, it waited for the [Kennedy] presidential inauguration thinking that this man {Kennedy] would do something different, because all in all, we didn't understand why a man who assumed the administration of the United States would want to bear the guilt of someone else's mistakes.* 1/ This was not to be, however, for aside from considerable emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only limited support for sabotage activities prior to the * Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that --in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon and General-C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell proposing air and naval protection for the invasion and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the beachhead. 2/ ~ 293 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP SECRET end of Eisenhower's administration. There was con- siderable concern over the necessary formalities of diplomacy in order that the United States not be in- volved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS for its anti-Castro program. Because it has been so widely publicized that ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the prin- cipals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation, this volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon played into the proper context. It was the role of an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch, and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's role be construed to have had a major impact on the development of operational planning by the Central Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort. . Similarly, because of the sensationalism which surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, including Fidel Castro and the implications that the Mafia plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay. of Pigs Operation, thorough examination of the evidence was undertaken to determine if this allegation was sup- ‘portable. It was not. The Mafia operation was run - 294 - TOP SECRET
13-00000 TOP. SECRET aside from, apart from, and independent of the formal anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At most, four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and pos- sibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu. In terms of Project JMATE itself, the few bits of information which indicate the possibility of as- sassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also fail to demonstrate any responsibility for their ini- tiation on the part of WH/4. If anything, the evidence would indicate. that WH/4's position was one of watchful waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara. _ The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons might be involved in. such an attempt ‘cannot be ruled out. 3/ Obviously it would be foolish to contend that those principally responsible for developing CIA's - anti-Castro program would have objected to the assas- Sination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of © the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency..: = 295 - TOP SECRET a
13-00000 . Appendix A Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from J. C. King, ll Dec 59
13-00000 { — one er . ery SENA . , . 8 Arps ds C] uncassipisp = | iy" NAL — OF conripentia,. ) secngz SO Oo min oo Po . &UUTING AND RECORD SHEET OFFICER'S INITIALS COMMENTS (Number each camment ta shaw from when to whom. raw @ fine across column ‘after each comment.) “| cane Oi nah, ORE, GAR at abil etteon 4, | | tt } §, | | : ale | ' l ° | 7 . . i . Tenetrtenetetete ante athanacinhatie! + a at veemante debedneny dah afb oh aLinihaees = shasb © hatin “oho | PuadaticiatattTg Gy SADE tanith sthcnatcetinty Sse" + tes | eet NCCE, AyD 5 O tee teste enlatte + 6 to an SiPattato4, east emnnatatny ates Rat 2 eth ety ctty eaetEDO abn Set oS le dest rcenenest etacrumeiias aston EER Peseta trea tdi ae ee Ls | | ee | ed 6 Pair . . oa H wt coe ae at us 3E taney? mT opp en, 8 oar . + ITePMal F] uNeLassi#!55 . mi USE GHEY: j : : Tomrtens sen Ne MT ESET Caw RE (ER Oe ate
13-00000 on. = Li Becemoer LOS? she, TEMORANLOM #OR: Director of Central Intelligence via: Ceyxty Director (Plans) SUBJECT: Cuben Problems. — i. “Estimate of the Situation. _& Gletatorship of the gar Left ls mew estabdlisnad. Xs is not only unfriendly to the Gatved Stztea in oral eriticisa, but has taser acticn against Aserican properties, both : indussrish and agricultural, which, if peruitted to stead, will encurage siaiiac actions azainst U. Ss. holdings in a ober Eatin Anecican emumtrias. b. Wado and taust expect a 4 sajor increase im the scale and effectiveness of Cuban ald and partic tpation in revolutionary oo actiors agains: other countries of Latin uerics now ort endly to the United Stateg. Xn addition to Thaose Ti Baye aiceady beaa tergets ~- Nicaragua, Panema, The Domisican & Regublte ¢ wnd Baivi, eeert invelligence indicates 2 direct interest by Cestre in .. Colombia and Peru. Betarcourt's position in Vesemele would be gravely weakened by Caatro successes, end ic is believed cxly a guastion of time before an alliance would be established between the poverful Corwunist Party of Yenemtela and the Castros. | H ce Papid naticnalizetion of the danks, industry 2 and commerce is rep portedly contemplated. If this occurs, the smais group in control will have 2t its disposition several hmmdred million dollars from ‘the sale of the sugar crop early in 1960. Part of these 2ends may be used to furtser their revolutiorery opjectives against other sombsie = Ee + of the Car ibbean and Sout th America. d. Castro nas lost the suwpvert of the uover class acd most of airy tee 9% tue middle class, We prebably still has a sufficient following fron the iasuas to maintain control uatil Turther Joresds can be mada in his pomilar support enli the uppos aivion on nose effectively unified. &. Prooasenda action Go reduce his follovinz, walle easential, in 63212 will probably rot be eewyh to dislodze him. #i stranglerold on Cuba will be broxsea only oy violent £. to is av perso onal opinion tnet if Castro is sucesssiul in consciidating his position and remaining ia power for two more? years, . —3am7
13-00000 ius ting denage may occ positioa or leaders Min in Latin Americus. piadieetatltnshY Nahin Te overthroy of Castro within ore year 2 and his = junta friendly to the United States which wiil cail Zor a oe nionths afsér ussuaption of office. 3e Reccomanded Action: @- Ciandestine radio attacks from Cariopean Uiberal group, working closely with us and using C brea adcasting. be nerasioa overaticas again be mounted from witain Cuba Ce She cacouragenent of pro-J.S. oovosition Estista and Mesferrer supporters, 5D 23s tablis! ‘by area within Cuba. This would have the Zollo st Castro's &V « 4 “spiscement br a @lections six ecuntri = cnoan met * sors, eteluding oe. - hed 3 fate & contreLisd aing 2avantages: (1) I woud cermit the establismueat of a redio stetion, hee long wave, waicn would reaca all o: ‘Since it would be on Cuban soil, & (2) A controlled area would de a rally the growing opoositicn to Castro in the same tus @cations in Cuba. prebians of. joint opera- tions with other covustries werid be eliminated. ing point Por menner that the 25th of Suly movement. in the hills of Oriente became the rally: int of ueny wao turned against Batista. ag es (3) rs would be a mesns of testing the Progeaouted 2 e plsce (4) The reportedly isege f constitutional Cuben Armay would have (5) A sigeable merril curtail Castro's p Jans "Pon r other countries. foe Abas | - a.  F ‘horough consideration Be Sven bo tne 2 to Nice Castr Hone of thos2 clase to Tid 298 elimi nation to? Fidel. te 2: $0°6, SULTAnZCN Aad AaNrs oz the opposition, and separating the men from the boys. eisencts of the to £0. la inoyerent within Cuba would evoletionary action against 3 “t he ia aret, ete we 1, has nis brother Raut
or his comceenton Che Guevarra, hay 13-00000 of i FA a a ‘ 49 6) 8) fi oe 85 a 4h pel Be & ad < bo 6 any > a wt any 4 £ age om one a ore 4 “sty a ons oe uo nwo St ort ~ 2 yet a Pt \ a _ ’ bang , Paral ’ ef ay 2) a PF LP ie wa * I 2, Pomme “Aly ies - a sere nT , = a “2 we - kek or a ‘4 a c -S00e f, ends Ky) ra] . oe ao : be Gt i a Be ay 44 ¢ ¢ 4 > fe we J &) tel 9} 6 § @ a Fy) 3 rey 7 & nae, ‘. hy ty} & de 4 a } 5 te = es} fa ba) » bag wy e) 2 Q 3] wi fs 5 ee % qt ae aS 3 haa eR gook a at Ae a Ay ‘ rr’ etl o td O Q 299
13-00000 Appendix B “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime 16. Mar 60
13-00000 * “he. t. ” ee = . oe oh “. er cane é mo - _— - — ee . re oy EES A nly This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960, ei fs seneee me ana AS AE GO OE NIN Mh GEAR EERE RNG alte ee
13-00000 16 March 1960. A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME 1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring. about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such amanner as to avoid any appearanée of U.S. intervention. | Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct . action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative, ~~ Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond controi of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U. S. to act in a crisis. Z. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action: a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing 7 and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared | as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shase of a council or junta, through the merger of three accentable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogar ‘Restore the S48 Weak 301 ; a» antaseneteeneungrsneenenseatepeenaetnepteeteensennsegenneantasetele ie ttt nth et £2 CARERS, # SAAD fA CETERA TERS 7S AED a EN,
13-00000 Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A) b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means ‘for mass communication to the Cuban people so thata powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. ‘The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supple- mented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by AY ' ‘private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B) c. Work is already in. progress in the création of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be respon- sive to the orders and directions of tne "exile! opposition, Such a. network must have effective communication and be selectively manned, to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization caa probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard Tare. ay 302 -
13-00000 . - af “ —“"/ : nr / ‘the Island. Initially’a cadre of leaders will be recruited after care- ful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. Ina second intelligence, to arrange for ‘the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, ‘to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals | and groups as directed. | d. Preparations. have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. | so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. “In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and fox infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a.small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country. 3. Leadershio: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the 303 xt rem 48 ts th oh A nner SARN bf eens EEPROM 6 EDD Pe A Ee nee enemy SRE Stee
13-00000 uN SER opoosition. Accordingly, every effort will be made.to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro’ should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. . As the possibility of an overthrow of ; Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S, support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken. 4, Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council wili, of course, be explained as activities of that entity {insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to nave direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to _ support the opposition, $100, 000 has already been pledged from U.S. SOUrCES. At an appropriate time 2 bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2, 006, 000. 5. Budget: Itis anticipated that approximately $4,460,000 of CLA funds wiil be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not acme a wat ng ce een ane We es (ae NN ON SO RRO oe Aco Hated Mint etn saree ot maw wt
13-00000 i J reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from. now, the estimated requirements for FY -1960 funds is $900, 000 with the balance of $3,500, 000 required in FY-1961. | The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, ; . of course, ‘be greatly altered by nolicy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C) 6. Recommendations: That the Central InteHigence Agency be authorized { to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.
13-00000 : AA ) ——— THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION l. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These © all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to accepiance, i.e. -they are for the revolution as originally conceived --many being former 26th of July members --and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. | They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. - These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of “Restore the Revolution". | 2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably prematureé to have a fixed platform for the Council | but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. ‘Two of the CIA. group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities: a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject ‘to strong Sino-Soviet influence. ; | b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is-no hope of this as long as Castro throttles : ( the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.
13-00000. . EVES BALY c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put ‘into effect. d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated. e. Sino -Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated. A. special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.
13-00000 - ~ | ms Tab B oS - PROPAGANDA i - |. Jd, Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. . Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have - been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). jand [| ‘have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from pnd ee: CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material, 2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U. S. -controlled station, This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these wel be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience ang as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Guba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility right be installed on a U.S, base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be 4 made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida. heh kway Siam Cepntl 308. Ae em CEE Gee A OTD LO BNE NEED Sa +
13-00000. eo “S a -~ EYES SHLY “ SEGRET 3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. Avance, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has Hl Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario deja Marina, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have.to close soon. Arrangements have already been inade to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba ‘clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on 2 regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered. | * A, Inside Cuba, a ClA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba. 5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.
13-00000_ FINANCIAL ANNEX I. Political Action oo | -. BY-1960 : FY-1961 Support of Opposition Elements ; and other Group Activities 150, 000 800, 000 Il. Propaganda Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of trans- mitters). | ae 400,000 700, 090 Press and Publications - oe 100, 000 500, 000 “il, Paramilitary In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training 200, 000 1, 300, 000° IV. Intelligence Collection 50,000 — 200,000 Totals | * 900, 000 3, 500, 000 x *These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not e occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action rrogram should be accelerated, additional funds will be required. Eire £VZ22 8 OEPRET lta we assed
13-00000 Appendix C-1 _CNO Correspondence with Department of State and nsc:*. 1) Letter for Allen. Dulles from Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60
13-00000 SUBJECT: (Optional) bBo Lgvet me, USE( LY ROUTING AMD a - UNCLASSIFIED ~~ i Foe ee rT. Wey ow ke avy gw s nao CHVIET AL A ‘Ltr fram DD/P TO: (Officer desiqnation, roam number, and OFFICERS INitaars ——— C/WH Division ¢ Hy 4 | “4 | Ae fF Vee": Ogis ty ‘ 4. i ; OE Ai hall Bie hc lg en es s. ¢ a i. 4 ° < = 6. a “4 £ f. - i ; : : Rime ee etl. * wh : i z . ¢ ‘ i ' : : i % Lette : : : F i t i) = ee 311 ~e- come} mame ee ~ mga CTT 9yIeT : SMA Lisp cas: arene ar ie { - ate retebe! “* mo a.$2 nets i la Niacen Leo COMMENTS (Number each commant to show fram whom to whan, Draw ao Lina acta columa after each comment.) STR nema oe e ae mee me St te Ne seen» l. Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the aiternoon of 17 March and tha latter handed to me. Ido not delieve it requires a reoly Dut pass it to yau for any walua it may have. RMSBjr. HAE mee Nee A OO aE AN cate REET ANAL Rane PRY tt enn ota RE ene NEARED Aen SER MRS : aNd foosaurbactrrger tea au foo ts tweet Petes ls
13-00000 ZEA a 17 March 1960 PERSONAL - TOP SECRET Dear Allien: Enclosed is a memorandum my staff pre- pared containing some suggestions which might be ‘useful to you in your work. Naturally, Ido not agree with quite all the comments contained in tne memorandum, but I know-that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desir eto make sure no opportunity is left uncovered. Warm resards. Sincerely, ARLEIGH BURKE The ‘Honorable Allen Dulles Director of Central Intelligence Enclosure ‘312 CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS - stems in! she anszec aang nos carer a.m aneeetrnscreriteiie ese one senna tesa) GORSEPAIA SAEED. MOSSE SEES SPS ene Eerste see eneeneeenenes et
13-00000 Appendix C-2 CNO Correspondence with Department of State and NSC: 2) Letter for Gordon Gray from Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 td fo WwW
13-00000 a, te tlimey eae - CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS pee ee eee enn avai hyiss) , BR Wasyenh n SOP SHLCRET iS March 1950 Dea» Gordon: pe Eneloseé is a cony of a momorancum on U.S. action in Cuba which may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours, ARLEIGH BURKE The Honorabie Gordon Gray Special Assistant. to.the President for National Security Affairs The White House Enclosure ee ne Ty andl TOP’ ‘SECRET’ * 314
13-00000 . ‘ . -, fee oti ww. ors . . - = Ve Lt o : ALO 12 1350 02 on Fon een IONS Sad tlm 6 Se FS Rabon & ee uU. 5. action in Cube (5 1, ‘the recomucndctiess comiained in ihe mper on "U.S. Actions in Cuba" were Entended orisinally to provide t roc outline for a carefully laic out proyrs:, for causim, the Castro reyine to be replaced by a friencly -ove criment. me vate 3 vould Yo. ically control and cotrdinate alla pects 25 "oy Tt was intercedé that ane nrovide the guidance as-to the specific actions required of the other cerart.ents of the vovernnoat The ‘paper was not interpreted in this manner ; f those OO received it and the se arch apmears now to be for specific actions wnicr can be uscd .to accoupli Sh the end des ired, > 2. Te toll owing are offered as possible soecific actions whicn can be taxen in surport of our position on Cuba - You might desire to have 00 inject these itexs into ihe NSC nceting, 16 “arch. a. Tach ~ Chairman, Or he Chief of the U.S. _Delzation, attempt to have / @ Celevstion other than U.S. introduce 4 moti on for the board to consider the f gap in henispheric cefense resulting from the Cuban situation or for the Board to recommend that the O85 study the inZlluence of. Xommunisn in Cuba,. bt, Cor ssercial ~ Oil companies are. not being paid by Cuba. State could request Lhe oil companies to point ont to the zo overnnents who produce the oil the effects. an their cconomies of the loss of the Cuban market 2 ec. Schocle and var Colle,es ~'The Services could include in courses for foreign officers the cfrect on hemisphere defense of the establishnent of a Souzmmist dictatorship in Cuba, da, Gommercial - Do iatin Asericans hold stock in the expropriated properties in Cuba? If so, State could request the comcanies concerned to include in ‘their dividend maliings, information pointing out the effect on the companies' _rearninzgs and. the’ stockholders! dividends of expropriation of property without coupensation and, for the oil copa nies, non-payment for oil celivered, e, State ,in conjunction with CIA, publish a weekly or bi-weekly letter co.cunenting “tne actions of the Custro Covernment for the previous pericd. Incliced would be: *. + (1) Violations of human rizhts, (2) Konmmnist. trends and actions, - (3) Dictatorial and uncenocratic actions. 315 Pani Pont heanies Pave 1 of 3 cosies TOP SECKET
13-00000 ce Bs tea wn {Lj ak Givlountic posts, (2) danny, Tavy an. Air Foree for turther distributioa to units or officers in nentact with Latin sccericans. Castro rerisc. for the JS. nosition. sveoricans as to the sommumist agoects, the formal commitment of the Castro regime on taking power ubals internatiscnal com.itments, LL, ALL Services -— Prenare and distribute speech material suitable for inclusien fn various iypes of addresses, Maite erial snoul¢ cover: (2) xozcunistie aspects of present Cuban Government. . (2) throat of Nomzunism in Cunha to hemispheric defer nS. (3) fhe dictatorial. aspects of the Cuban reine. Lo ° (4) the Cubar: regize's aetions mG against the basic husan rights. — 4 (5) the strategic impor? ance of the Guantanamo Kaval base. (6) The logic of the firmness of the treaties by which we hold m0 Cc _ Distribute this material to the Services and to their Leazues and associaticns for raxinun we in oublic ssecches. Le GhGB - have Gersral Skaer, as Thirector of the Staff, IADB, ingect into the monthly intelligence brieLings | at the IAGB information on the latest Soviet Bloc actions and the propress of International Komwsunisz in Cuba. h. State, in conjunction with CIA and the Service intelligence arencies hold sseciar briefings once cach month on the general situstion in Cuba wit Special exphasis on the Kozunistic aspects for the following: fficials of the OAS and Une “ rsonnel of the Stati of the IAB. (3) Offices U.5. persennel in Vashington having cuties involving fe » sod i~ ha} All Services provice spscial briefings on a one-tine tasis along the line of n, a50ve ier officers and enlisted personel of units proceeding to Caribbein or South Acerican ports. » Nevy enccavor to have a gocd resorter or author orcpare a story con~ fs. oo taining the Newy's vioxs on Cuantanazo for publication in a national magazine with wide circulation in Latin Averica, ore STAuyaT 316 , . i
13-00000 . - wee ot . ceases ai Sty Lewd . werciantis ofi:er in his lett tor of\arch 10 onolete brielic, of State Vayartnent. activitics uation in aa effort to prod State to move raster. all individuals and, -row os of U.S. Nati Yomcunist threat in Cuba for further dissomination to ee ee | 317 Pare 3 of 3 pages ROD Suryen
13-00000 ASSISTANT SECRETARY CF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25,0. C, “HAR 16 1960 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM POR THE SPECTAL fSSISTAUS TO THE PRESIDEN POR NATIONAL SSCURITY Ar?aIRS SUBJECT: _ . ‘U.S. Policy toward Cuba Esclosed 1s en exchanzo of letters on the above “gubject betveen Admiral Burks and Uncsr Sceratary Merchant, both . of whom have authorized that I malts tha corvespondence available to you for whatever help it may be in connection with the dis- cussion of this subject at tho Council nesting this coming : Thursday. . me) assistant Secretary 2 Encis 8 318
13-00000 SECRET Dear Arlefche XY vas mosh Intercoted In your psrocnal letter of Februcry 25, 1940, es Cede end tha Caribdsen altamtica, {a thich 1 noted a nerked dsores of st{allarity fn the suggestions of the Davy end of cur poople hess concerning the eacd to reverse ths tread Im Cxeda cad the esthods waich ora best. calculated to echicve this result. AS you ore écubtlaso avare from the briefing whic oh Dick Retotton red I qwe ths Joint Chicfs ef Steff on Jenucry 9 1%E9,. esct of tis eources of action suggasted In the essorendem hocdsd *Rotemndations for U. S. Actions In Cuba,* wich you" ‘trancaitted with your letter, wore initiated gems tics ago ond ere constently being {ntensiffled. To gocepitelate, cor ova thinking on ths Cuben situation ag It relates to Communica cxd cor om oecerity interests bso beca eg follower ’ The couicva edjectiva of Intermaticnral Cecaun{es-— - in the” lexedfate Tsturc--[o the consoldation of a radicel, tati-Amoricen Revolution fricadly to the USSR In Cra ord the  wtillention of Cuda as a bese to pronote slnilny revolutfiomory eoveronts fn ths Caribbcan. The ninfmea Speective of of the Cosxnists, if they are umable to ucalew osugoing, is te acko the United Stctes pay as high price co pessibie for tht elimination of the undesirable features of tha Cvhon Revolutios. In particular, the Commmists stend to gain by ~ proveking us into armed Intervention, or othervise tsk ing interventicalst actions {nm violation of cur comite=te ia il a esensr which could be ands to appres as if tho Usited States reacted ths coxa way £9 the Soviote did in Huxgary ond other satellites. a b. Unless Adairal Arlei¢h Burin, Chlef of Havel Operaticcs, Departecat of tha Havy. SECRET
13-00000 Sch ET ~2- >. Unless ve were indexinitely to occupy Cuba ollitorily, ths only colutsca to ths Cubsun problea fs necessarily the ‘ecosgents of a Cudoa leaderohlp willing to end copcbla of govcsatiag ths countsy along Macs esseptable to the Crban scopic end along Linco cansistent with bosic U.S. policy with reapcot to Lotin Anerica. ‘This will tcks tics, Oa the eas haet, &t fo dovstgul thot oxy Cuden Govormcat raich re- exited {cos U.S. cored o¢ other overt intesvertica could leag oxvrvive cur withdratal. Oa the others, despite cor am lonp=atendisg edagivings goricrniag Cantso, it lo ea inoscep= Coie fact that ha emace inte gover with over=tcleing cuppest sot ely fn Cuda tet elscciora in the heaicphsm, inoluding . fa thio Cuntsy. Although tht ovppovt hos lonely evoporated fa the Uvited Statec--cnd, to u lesser extent, in reapoasible ofraics 4s the othee Latin Acoriecsn Republ ios—Cestso end, somtjeulttly, his sofoma poogrea ctfil eajay very Co idszable aoe, fa bin comftey. Ceobong, oven thooe dlaflicaicacd with fre ‘€e5tco, Rave yet to find on alternative leotercalp tich thay Belfcwo would estuslly corcy out the cefora cxcures tala Glico opinion ot41l dcmis. Opposition clencto tasated Mth colscheeation with the Extlata rogins ore ctéll political cmedoptoble end covid net esteblich a ctable government. Grcoktioa gzouys that might be atecytebla to Cuban are begientns to orgenice cove effectively bat, ce beat, it will Be months bafera thay ore coady for vigecosm cation. Ge Tho priexcy ebjecstive of U. 3. polley cheuld be tac ecoolesetioa of the erectica af on effetivo, potrietic asyvo= exat Sifendly to the United Ststco within Cha asd cmng Goa exiles to counter Cubsio aurrent tscnd. The Ligot tesk fs to cogura, irpefes os wo ors ehle to d co, o Glicate fa Wafea vetpenoible end friextiy Cubess would (ici 1¢ worth taile to egpose Cestsw policies talch help the Cenaabts xa vexfoseiss good U.S.-Octan celetiens. Ca ths poolitive aids, we choid ocd are tekzing estiona orl ecking otetencrts thich tesaid caccugngs cuch eleconts to expeics esre offectively end to expect cc support ond @Olicdosctica fn thsfe offerte  acMevs political end econaais progiess fos Ccha by tekiing — a iffercat road Shan the svcd Cotdea semizaio. At the | $5 bricfiina, ve gave on (eilontitcs af tes covert cottvities crfomcy tormrds this end, cs voll 55 on findiccttion ef ths extemfve exiitelibuted effert waich kas boca midency for ove? a ycar to identify end expese to pebita eninioa Ea ths nogttive oifc, cug polfeics ose cot by ths principio thes expcotttca to Coatootn pollsics fa Gta will
13-00000 SECRET ~ -3- {nereose fairly scoidly Uf {8 fa clear to Cebens that Cestco hésself ig regponsible for political ond ccocenie datoriczo~ tien ef the country. Kowever, the consolsdatgoa of tho: enzooition will be sloved dora ff Cestre cm omaescda ly woppiry ths fleg of patrictisn aul antic=alica chow Line gelf tan Seether coavinting the Ceban people thot tho Uaited Stctc3 Eas aggserofivs écaigns oa tha Cetin natien c9 a thols td that the United Sts8e09 ratasr then Cootcofs polisica is teoecasible fer Cebata cifficultics, Ye moe, thordfere, - execoios the greatest ease tant uc do ast emcococctily tccasfoon ths developing dissatisfeation of tas Cchon poopie with Ceotco into a fight betwee: the Unitcd Statics end Gta, ‘fo 29 Gslfresypcsting Crden cxild thea afford to cesport wa goainet Ais cya ecuctsy. ad. hilo wa bailewa Cast {ntenAncriem ostica throuch fho 023 andfar coms cacaceio cation by the United Stotcs fa ecofenss of ito rigkto acy pany cn icportant vole at the Tepes tina, wo aust ast let these posaibilizics coce x3 © lose sigh? ef the critical fret that mo solutica will be .pcaotsle wxtdl em cltermetave lesdewanip is rexty to move bn. 2% ths copblsrtics of colicctive o7 unlicteral pecocurco Mould Delsey the Cootre Geveexmont doom before ca cescpteble loufopchip fo gvacdy to tee over, ts porcdohiiiziac ess efvil - wor ef oO tc ce by even moss Cocmmmistia elomezta. Bithor would beicg ws oleser to comod Intervention. Tau, ubdie wo ezs goings chec4 fn the process of Influcnsirgy the chhos Ancrge ema Regesilcs to see the Coomalst and ether acpoots of the Coon situction a2 we co ext preparing the ground for pnocibic. ister=Accotlom censidecetion of the Cohen preblen, ws Setend to centrol the tiatag of cay euch moting tmofer o9 pocD>le. % coinside with tae daveleccsst of on ektcrnctiva lemiote Galp. It ta cles the Intention of ths Ptniniotect fea to sroyoss to ths Cengrees thes ths Preslemt be given hecroe ticeasy cathority to elter sygar quotes In ths enifecal fiatesest end ws kev develesed ond aca prising Ista affect (& ection plen to ehtaln the release of ths THhitsd Stet fron eeetasa other ecexcale comiteonta weseb feorle ew & ikity to tak actton in the excacaie ficld tam this coctd eutrSute to cafegerdiag or intercat cr te the extn af exatétiens fevsschls to 0 les¢orcnip ecpssed to Costs !9 potietes, | ; 321,
13-00000 ~ cnn? Reetrermeas co an, a UStd scessst te all Chess eaticss, a ect icpoutant cles £5 23. Flies Is neeing sor Extraa bo sealices Mhot Cs dctecticresicn of Ghee mlitiset cad ocencaia 130 86 Cus ts Costrola exccteco, ansluting his Conzecticas wits Interantionsl Cocamficx. Tics fs acotcd for 2 alternc Rive lendasoh’e to ecosgs end to coomiss cffeotively for estica. siz 43 alca reeéod ferthes to ouckes Latin Accticen cpinica te ths Gags ef Gia oktaxtica ai fot Lotta Amaicon Gevermmamto te eco essen rose to the point of view that the Cor: citeation 45 a entter of commen comesta, not Joos o U.S.-Costse quocgel. Us urs wading all  aveilable gesilitics to ack: this t&ez co ciost os pesible, BA or exeerionses fa other d4¥ficult situctfozs fa the Neca East end Cexteal Snetica indleate that fomwdiate semdts cre not ty be expacted, Kitt tise, we atta gofag to have, wo belleve, to axereise restraint from tecking actions whlah, while gaficsating cur arm great sense ef Conssea GG wyenay, would esteally retard the process ef Ghazge vhica ve oil I chevlé point ext also thet, tille ection in the O25 et tha right tinez my be éasircbls ca eae mcons of crouraging tn alterantive Cubza icadueshin, wa would probly heve-to contend vith Sevicts In the Uakted Bckiens. It {9 clrost certain thot the Croan: will try te | eniicipate or counter exy U. 3. egpreach to the O38 by paing dircatly toa tha United Eatiors, Furthecuore, ectunl *erforcenent netien® hy tho GS would peeaobly be brought up before the Caited Haticae under Beticle 53 of the G Charter even Lf ve argued that any sction taken by ths G'S constituted ealy *recommndatiens" to governnmts. Thie feinferoes our view that ection In the O45——uhick con be taken unter faa Caster by coavoking a aseting ef Fortign Hiaistare, ss vell 03 exfier the Rio Treaty end the Carcess Renolutica—chould prfserfly be vicved a9 2 msmns of oteengthening Cuben copesitien te Castzols polloies at the right seoest sathsr then a9 6 coos of quarnatinirg Cxta end wafting te see what bepoens. It would ot present bs some taat difffeult to bring a case against. Cuba under the Corceacs Reoolin thea sface the latest Spsefol National Intelligence Retiantc——which .w3 huve asksd te be seviewsd=-dses not find the Coban Geverancat to be Cammmistdoninated nt present. Ef our ow Pstdeate does not yst chotactinte the ease, {t usuld be défvioult im a sheet tir: ts portunde icss wall-inSornsd govetemonts that “the politics’ geotite. ticac? ef Ceba age under Intematioml Conemaiet catool Gra lest fea, A3 you ete sxare, cor Basie asticact policy (oon S607 Good irtesvestion as a loot reoszt to bs ch is ene pote vhea all else fatlo. Wo vould be mcg scluc EN, to omhe er csneus in Oto recommendation to the Preotdest until Goss Mt been gestensble ohanss fcr all other colitders to 3 tected, 322
13-00000 ee EIT seer St Teonk you again for och nding | ce a copy of your comerenéen. Ao you hisy, the Te is “keaping ths Cuse ca problen mbes constent ocrutixy, he wEAg dlocssoed (& in coms datall at its Jomary 1h eecting cad mata tifls coraing. At the {fest of tas eoctings, the Scuretary of State sevitved the solicy toverd Cute wideh hed been appsoved by ths Preaidest, © end tha coacensua of this soonligto aceting tao that thSa polfcy fs” ccoontisity correct. Yc enticlpats th-2, at future aeotsag3 of the EXC, tisre will be further dfacussions coacernizg Cuba to determing tistios _ thece shedd bs o rodifiectioa of policy tevard thet country. ia vicw ef the fect that tedcyla ESC aseting fndfeated cantiavad egrcecont ca ths validity cf the policy discussed in Josucry, it wuld appear toceesaesy Co develop nor policy documsatotion ct this ties, capoofob ly ‘cs the preposais is your Eavy exeocendia eloacly paralisl policics vRick era alseady wnisroay. Should you, er your colleegess om ths Jofat Chfteya, acsirc.oa Luster pelefing cn our cetiens and cperational plana to carzy CA ths policy, z eheuid da ROS: shia gizd te esrosge it. Sincerdly, Livingstes 7. Restnest Under Seorstacy for Poiitical Affairs
13-00000 26 FEB 1969 ScGREE Bie Do PluSOUA oe: hesy Livyies Fras) beconing ancreasinwly censerncad over cetericrating con- tt citions in tke Garit wbeane % aa cepecielly concerned over tre present situstion in te By in wheee security the Nevy ie directly interested oy reason of tis island's stretevic location with respect te the son agorcaches tne southern Giited States end the sanama Caan], and becouse of tie locetion there of the Cua: tereno Havel ivse.e Cubs ay sors to be in the process of Catling uncer the contnation of inbermaticnal Ce:nunisne Should this tren continwe wicheeked and a os: amumist Cacinetcd or “fron governsent® become £ roclity, 2 direst threat te the sceurity of tho United Stztcs voulé be presentcde Addiqicanliy, & communist controlled state in Guba world serve is & dese of operaticns for the further spread of co-snnis Sic influence in the Vestern end Sphere having as its aim the iscletion of the United States from Latin freriene ‘3 4 “ 3 > af 2ecause of ny concern, I <2 tcking the liberty ¢ ef sending you the attached paper a9 indicative of carvent Navy thintcing in this maltor, ~ naucly that positive uction to reverse ‘the present tread should be initistcd ito the emi that the concunist threat is clini~- nated and a ctavle, iricndly govern=ent establisied in Cubae Action teken new in tha case of Cuba will also facilitate and proe - vide a fomsdstion for eny. similar actions which may be necessary to prevent the spread of comunisn in Latin America and to staoilize other vress where unrest is Sppearing. e I am also sending a ‘copy of this letter and the enclosure to eack Irwine ; sincerely, Enclosures Paper on U.S. Acticn in Cvo2 Copy tos = Ke de Be Irwin IZ, (0s0/ IS) w/exclosure 324
13-00000 x lL, he Castro Uevese:nt in Cuba is a vehicic ty which internation aicwors to be i cinki., a fosthold in the ucstern foaispuere. it tle pre osont 33 3) ~ ° 3 2 1} 8k Bp. 3) ) Anaad evuwiinws, if vill soon be too late for tie United States to stexn i, tic Sovict incursion isto this hersephore this Situation, in n its many (4 ra.ificctions, presouts an imseaizte thres to the security of tho United Liates arog t3 that of ova irypertan netsh b0= = Soerth and South aserica, ghee pT Ee £ ot ws te 2. what action can be taken to preveat the cctablichzent of a comsmist © Olt siste in Cuba and to restore a stable, friencly ,overnzcnt? dion nanan 9. ‘She UL 8, tag nrrver renconeed the Yorrec Ibctrine., This was reeffirced by Secretary of Stato Dulles in his address to the Kation on July 12, 1954, Ga Intornabba:al Coununiscxc fn Custezale, In thet address, “ir. Dulles Statcd: vers in ternatiors1 cowzsumism has tcen probing here ané tiere for restin:; places in the Auerficas, It finally chose . Guatennia 2s a spot which it coxld turn into an official bese rsion which would extend to other Axeri can Republics "Tiiis intrusion of Soviet cespotism was, of course, a direct - challene to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most funda mental of our foreiin policies, its United States is bound by treaties which commit it to seek settle- seat of henisphorie-disputes by veaceful means » bu’ which also provice for action in the event of aggression cither from outside the hemisphere or within. Article 5 of the Inter-Anerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, aunea@ at ido. de Janciro, 1947, requires each contracting party to send to the Security Council of the UN conplete information "concerning the activities uncertaken ... for the purpose of maintaining Inter-American peace and security." Article 6 of this treaty states: "If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the J he Lente oT political inécoendence of any Averican State Sho. 2e Poe oR 0 Deena : ¢ wo aftectec by an ayression which is not an srsed att -by any other fact or sitvation that wight endanger the paace or Acrica, the ergun of Consultation. shali meet in ediat Pace iL a Sere 325
13-00000 Pewter dk ee DEG KCasSures which snoale be taken for the for the mainteiance of th.c¢ peace a: security order to arroc on . coun Cefoense a 2 t's Contincnt fac Lcclaration adopted by the Tenth Inter-Acericen Conference at 5, Voucsucla, ci. 1954, States: "net ths coviratioa or control of the political institutions of aw 4.cricaa State oy the international comsunist movenent, oxtendirs to this hecisprere the political SsySste= of an extra=- moe continental rover, woule constitute a threat to the sovereciznty ang po litice1 independance of tire Azsrieca State GS, endangering the peace of Avorisa, and woule call for th tang of consultation to oonsicer tae Sdoption or appropricte actio accoréancs with ry i LCE Oss Sst oi July ‘iovesent euccecded in Gisplaciny Batista on 1 dan 1959. Since - tat time the Czstro rezice has followed increasingly tre classic stratory for establishing a comiunist stzt « she communist time table is delincet ed in Anerican ciibassy Navana Licpatcnh «0, 05 Gated 29 Vecesber 759, ‘the rathiecs ron ‘ination £ the opposition, assuaptiion of Gictatorial HONSTI, Gucpensioan of clectious, “the: "Ente Averica™ cacpaicn, the stucicd breaixioc of fhe ‘coonosy and confiscation of proverty, the initiation of relations ani trade with the Soviet imion, the forbidding of anti-communist activity anc ‘the brealdown an reconstitution of the 4recd Services and police cre ali typices? corcaniist mareuvors, 7) the masority of the Cuba are rot yet coniitted to the acceptance of communism nor are they aware of the trond of the Revolution in this Girection. the lener classes, horever, continue to sive full support to Castro and the Revolution. , It has mot yet been proved that Castro hiuself is a cosmumist, However, sore of his srincipal dcouties as well as other leacers are belicved to te comsunis tS» Ta eny case, individuals susce ptible to comzinist influence are ccupyiry xe y positions in the ,overnment as s¢ll as in all iswportant organ- salions anc trece unions. Two develogarnis are noticeable. Communists are beir:, sppointed openly and are being elected (in trade unions) to key positions, cidcécn communists in ihe 26th of ed Hoverent are taking positions in ssenain, “opposition to the copes comuunists. AL present the Cuban 4ried forces are. disorganized ad apnarently capable only of guerrilla warfare, Intellizence resorts indicate that the Sovict Eloc nay be suorlying technicians to essi aining the new forces a sist in ‘r 3 Supplying erso to the new sovernnent. ther © ts +7) rs present indication thei tre fall ef the Castro Governcent is imminent. if it should fall, hoxever, tie covernment vould most probably euerge 26 a communist  overnsent because ot FREELY 374
13-00000 on oSitieon lenders hava. bean eib.ingted and there appear to te no leaccrs of Stature renadaln. grou whom anti-Cas trofenti-Conuuist - wosles coulé rally. OaQaLS oii oF us assassinated, soy action wile: would prosaaly womamdiice the safety of Aucricans in Cura, Finally, in the ane moscipilit, of Cirest sousort for Cuba by the Seavict hse, even to ihe = ns wat wicre., weic eee 7 ad & t z Fescks noe 3 2- ae ee eee ve & Cova ee et of an opon wmtual sceurity epreccent, caunot te Y “Sle, ess Att 7 S$ athe 4. Torce basic cormrses of action are oncn to the U.S. As Multi liter al ection throws tre US. B. Uellaterdl svert Action wy the u. S. i/ C. Covert Unilateral fection by the Se SMe Lon, sutsidiary cetiow, euch as econucte pressure and wore] succ which will eccist in acnicvviny the objective should also be take: in. aGcition The 22 chincry exists in the declerstion ana aprescants of ‘the usS for the U.S. to request convocation of the Organ of Conseliction of the Ghee With s sulsequent investigation of the jovermment in Cuba, anc, if aporoval of the manber states is obtainec, intervention to prevent a Cozminist take~over. . (a) fcvan BSS ongomance wi ith our national policy and oes @ (a) m woule be in our treaty cozcitcents ure 'y et '? x (b) It, woule strenvthen the GAS and world reassure the Free torld and the latin Axerican States of U.S. willingnos S to iive up to commitments. (2) bisadvancaces: LES AS VANTIN ES oo — (a) Uncertainty of support for OAS act ion by oh ner Latin American ‘tates, (b) Delay in 04S action could result in a Cowzuaist controlled front coverntent being a “fait accompli" in Cuba, {c) Could result in the entire probles endizg in the Security Page 3 ang : a
13-00000 Coweii of the Ub where the vovict unioa has’ a voto. tie U.S. has tie eapebi lity to cceize Cuba by direct military action, anc aficr a corolication perisd, cause the establishxcat of a SaaS : . Im 7 at bore Tricenely, mone COmswnist ,OVeEmmacnt . ton, {a) It would be in consonance vith the Honroe Toctrine, “whieh is still Sasic -. 5. policy with respect to the Acstern Lemisphere, and vould solve tre sroblen, (b) It would serve notice to the “orld that the 0. 8. will Vlisheent of a comamist or communist "front" rezic -. (c) It would re-omphacisce to the world thet the U.S. will not hesitate to act wien ite seesrity is atest (d). I& woule dispel any illusions by the world at large tat the U.S. is waillin; anu unable to act no cutter what the provocation. It would also protably stop the “baiting of tne 0.5." in which soxe sinor powers throuchout the vorld indulse, (2) Uisacventa ‘es: (a) It would violate our 045 comzitacnis to seek settlezent by peaceful means. , (b) It vould lead to charges of azgression against the U.S., both in the CAS and in the United catlions,with the resulting possivility - e937 os et Bn Seok gy Fy e Of OF and C45 astion a:aiust ine 3. 5. (c) It would prove tizt the U.S. is not willing to abide by its treaties if G. S. intorests dictate othervise, oo (a) It conki isvlate tho U.S. from the otner Anerican States. (ec) Tt would violste the principle of non~intervention. Ha) war @ ze 3 sist rebel groups covertly to overthrow the recent sever: sst2ablisa a friencly govermant. Cancurreatly, t at sasures to alert cl) fricndly nations and the be YU. S. Goverment to ihe danger of the threat
13-00000 a + 2S be ee Sr ou . Spon | % “= Py as ¢ fn onler to dicevedit Guha ann bring world opinion io tre Side of ine U5, 7.e fF 48 we ee Eye ® o. rout ny om (aj; J. 3. .2nid not be charged with aguression, (z) Fi earrisd out cuccessi fs ully, Free Verlé acd Latin averican opinion woul. Le faverevle tv tuo 4. S. (2) Yissévanta, es: . {a} Shere iz ms certainty of success, ; (u) She effort cigst well come too late. In considcrie: and concariny the ateve courses of action, the basic assurstion whet tho undted Stetes cannot and mut mot pomsit within the western vomispier: the establisicert of aay coverment cominated by th Tatecaatioual Consarvicsteis parsacunt., ine orefere, if other courses of action fail, the u. >. nest, Svea at she face of adcverse world opiaion, -taks wniletoral cetion to prevent goch am occurrence. . Until the sitwetion reaches the stage where direct eniletecral action by the U.S, is tre only <sansc icit, it apccars tut a combination of te 2086 parts of courtes of ecticn A arc C which heave a fair chence of succes Should be followed in srder to utilize the prixs advaniase given uncer rh, i.e., the cooreration anc (ocd will of the other Anerican States. re) Nee ra ry .7 0) a SP gu YB peng - cages — - — 4 t:0 Isllowin, conelusions are reached: A _& ie} o fo « Tse establisiment of a.com mounist goverazert , or a "front™ goverment following cowmmist preceptc, ia Cuba would te a direct tireat to the ceurlty of the 3, 3. anc would aadanger heaicpheric security. b The U, S, should initiate positive action to elininate the threat before a coimomdist or “froa." crmacat in Cuba is a “fait accompli." C. Althon hn the revolution stili has ihe support of the Basses 3 the resultin. ove ricecit ia Cuba is following the path of internationa conmunicn, : . they < are not yet avare of the tread tuvard conmunisn, Castro has the persons 2 @. accorican > holéin s are boing ca:tiscated. - «avericaa lives muy te ow ela, mw - apt 2 gf a a a ie sae, ; 7 encanyered if stable, responsible goverancatl is not ensured, . : 2 22 : ’ = @, fh ~onros soctrine is siili basic Uv. S. policy with respect to the western enisphere.
13-00000 opt es td OS bbe b oguest action . «wy , . oy wees 2 crc a 2, Srwocecurc exisis water tre Iccluretion of barace ee a says - caged on 2%. oo ar. : by Lig a. ulwinst @ Comaunist tureat © “es extent of infiltration of % a 7 ae . 8, Se THe u. S. Showld proceed to Cocuent t cowtusicic inin key resitions in Cuba and the extont of extra-“estern wwioviers commuuist support of the zresent Cuoaa regire. we the V, 3. Should initiste a camaizn to asprise all UW. S. ageacies, the 2, S. public, and the other American States of the threat in order to goin Support Tor any foture action thot ssy be taken, tam *t ta need 2 oe ee Aat <4e i, The J, 3. shewld covertly snpnort the Cubana cpcesition, a. tne 0. 5., after having peatoed the reanired support, should reso t dic ezse before the U5 in order that joint action by the uembers of tie vic say O: tasgn to @lininete the concunist threat acu establish a friendly, stable Tovermcent in Cuna, kK. The Gd. S., as a lest resort, showic take unilateral allitary act‘on to elisirate the tt treat, " * i / 6 To accurvlish the above, the followin, plen cf action is recomvendeds a. imnediately aocurent the cozmurist tize table ‘and the commmnist take-over in Cuba, b. Use all rosources and cegia te veke the U.S. and the other Azerican States axare of the threat, The following sho uid be utilized to accomplish (1) Intellierse briefings of: , 3 (a) U. S. Sovernment officials, Ab) Newspaper represent atives and editors. {c) U.S. businessmen operating abroad and goinc abroad. (2) The IND nombers ane Latin imerican Ciplozatic persomel (ec) The Catholic Church (possibly tarougn the Apostolic Delegate), (f) Church groups operating in Letin Aserica. (¢) Latin. werican officials visiting the U, S. and y. S. | ot lade ene prs “és Pare 6 . & 330 -
13-00000 9 f (2) eriemtection ef racio Sreadeasts aud movs regorts, dota covern= an slete vey es Srivate, f Sod +E hE iy aye 2 ae (3) She vi, SG. Infer.stion Sarvice. {47,411 country teres. . 2 e . es c, Covertly sucjport the Cuhan opsositiva, Sclact ane? grooa trusted VuTeas a5 arorosriate to EST - rosponstble pests in a friendly covorazent, tad * : od Pom we : oine Pay eens, 2 UT oe; eee ¢ *, 2 . @, 22 prepurcd io one feree to Safspuard and evacuate ad a, Ustionale should the situation detertorate to the point whers they a enudanyored, Ge wu@u Sunsort ius been caled, recuist, in conjunction with uther ~ n . $° vs * : i he Org.n of Cousultction of the ac ander the Tord of the eels arat ton i t : = 3 we a pa ra ° e- tees a or é . mencers of the 25, ecnvecntion of t! o (1) See 488 action to cali on Cuba to niece herself uwler O45 eusoiees “in or¢er to sreserw the reveliution for the reaple aud orevent cozcuuaist iake-over,® az arce in the event the ebove th cod at ware oS aw é eh . : {2) Geex GAG cetion-to ictervene by i 23 forsed to accozplish the aleve, keep (8) fn ubetever réor te force the tatin hverkcan 4 ae o , ~ ee dk teed : ue. 3. particinetion to 2 nists 4 an ~ = = & ge States to assuze their ressonsibiiitics to the Hemisphere and to counter accusations of U.S, iuperialicn. oe. in the event time docs not permit coxzplction of tas above, or as a last resort, be prepared to tele unilateral military action to establish a Non-commanist governuent in Cuba, — Pathol ect"
13-00000 Appendix D Memorandum. for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60