Beene ek Ta Sane Meee, nese Seeder ete RN ONO aA eiadie ht see we ree mentee oleae (od-0102-10224) fis. en eee foe, a ‘ 4 ' - + et ee mere ota eee sae aeadenhinmtomnnthnited tensa a edbas cy eee Tarte eemenette « otea ameted baal tans «wether tices «opm man tmetie ati Uh onli tench he 5 atid abe mettiee asc ats? uns ws tusachasomvated's tows « eo - od ete 4 + - SECRET - SENSITIVE r Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey Dated 27 November 1962 This is not a controlled item wits 2S not a controlled item RETUR? TO oN Background Use ony TEI CS Do Not rept Tone + SNES an ig + G3
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14-00000 + eentameite! Seabeme ss * in Bellin lial tai epee anther wo | Western He'isphere, the United States dees pot Angend te [ etme SECRET - ssusitive | aq November 1962 Note: Discussed 27 Ucyecher 1862 by DD/T with Cl ud approved gener: i! im principle by FCT, Fully concurred to ; by DD/P. ' MEMORARDOM. FOR: Director of Central Intelligence . THROUGH: - * Deputy Director (Plena) SUBJECT: - Operstious) Pien for Cont Linu ing Operettons S4gainst Cubs tz. Action: This memorandum is for your information ‘and pursuant to your request. Reccumendatione for action rre contained ia Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memerrons! ' iw to col ineate an operational pina for the action whick we believe should be taken by CIA pgsinst Cubs fur the predictohte future, In summary the plan provides for ccatinuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort egeinst Cuba and fcr the reorientstion of the current effort into » long tern denied area type of operation of the highest priority. I, ASSUMPTIONS: ‘As “The United States Government wlll g lve public assurances that, provided no nuclesr or offeusive weapors °° present or re-introduced into Cuba, end provided Cubs dcer not take actéon to threaten the peace ond security of the DOG rs A scurcn os MCs er PAPER iO. invade Cuba ny guppert sn invasion of Cuba.
14-00000 i | aa These assurances will preclude any ‘meaningful CIA action ‘on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cubr, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal con- ditions’ in Cuba, ‘such a revolt if provoked would be totally a destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at +e emp & few diye, unless ‘eupported. by & major, United States - MaLaitery? ‘oomal tuent “Tia naghtiou,” the 1 non~invasion assurances | . 88 & practical matter will. preclude invading Cuba on the pretext ‘of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanano. a CIA operations Anvolving a high noise level and. " distiset ‘@lenent. of -attributability, particularly paramilitary, " guerrilly,. and coniaando type operations will. be unacceptable as a matter of ‘policy. | De The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for . ithe indefinite future, with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of erushing ‘ unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive wespons from Cube ary serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no herd indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over . Cuba bas been substantially weakenod. | | , Be . The United States ‘assurances of no invasion and no - gupport of: an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving tc Castro and his regime a certain degree of gsnctuary. This will
a e ‘Ss ' : o 4 | a) severely demege the sorale and motivation of anti-regine Cubsne both insiide sad. outside of Cuba, - Which will make it ineressing iy " ditticult for us to. recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communi st regine, ie. Despite. the above. factons,, Higher Authority probably - wilt goutiaue heavy. proamure, on: the! CLA for a naxioun effort ‘against ‘cuba ‘end may even, contAnue to contend that the ultinete. objective ia the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This. As an unrealistic objective, however, except.on o very long-term basis 88 thie United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling an the. inmediste future to commit troops to Support sich, an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Capen exiles probably will not "express, the shove factors to them in the context or with the bluntness: atated here, , mS In view of these factors, the so-called “Track Tro", . course of action, 1.@., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regine will, although unrealistic, become increzs ing ly . attractive et various levels in the United States Government. H. ds a matter of policy, political pressures and economic preneures short. of blockade, faids, and | aggressive ‘sabotage: against Guba will be continued. ,
NL 9 Ea Ob aS a se ele wenn 8 Mamma a oe oetlat A baitae a teal 4 note eae? I. Fone view of the above assumptions prramilitary, commant& aud sabotage. operations, except ia rare selective instonces will serve little purpose; also they wilt be counter-proeuct ive since, it. undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli. gence nore difgioult and should. only be undertnken in those very ' few instances. where an unusually high return can be demonstreted, Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cube, it would eppear clear that Higher Authertty wall insist on 8 continued, . even intensified, fatelligence coverage of Cuba. J, “in view of the policy factors, an iacresased use of factlities,. ‘veal estate and ‘basing outside the United States, 7 particularly in: ‘Latin Amerie, will be both necessary snd desirable. . (Ke “Adequate aerial reconnaisssnce of Cuba will continue. it; opsecrives: Based on the above sssumptions, the following objectiven appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against ‘Cuba; A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cubs from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World. , "B. ” To. the maxinum extent possible, discredit the Castro- commnist. reg ine in Cuba and in the Yestern Eewisphere and the Fest of the world.
on: Cc. Matntein through clandestine TAGES y short of commands and guerrilla ‘type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regine and economy not only _ for the Purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on 7 Blo. regources used . to support Cuba. : D. Maintain. meximua possible intelligence: and counter - “intettigence: coverage of Cubs, “including particular emphasis Ls. Capabilities and inteations of the government. Seer wg ' Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security. organs. a 3. Soviet’ and Bloc activities: in Cuba. ss &,)« State of potential resistance, including the i sorale and tenper of the ‘populace. | 8. " walitia and military order of battle end equip- nent. . 6 The loci of power and of possible stresses and straing in the power centers in the Cuban goverumont, ' 7%. Belationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World ‘end uncommitted nations. 8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cubsn econony . oe :
. f + + whe” re . t fee og Fe Ses . : r " R. Toko maziaum action to induce a split in the Cuben regime tnd maintain the capability of capitalizing iumediatel# through clandestine means. to the extent possible on any ; significsnt uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regina, or strains and stresses aiong Cuban leadership or in Cubro/ “alae, relationships, 3: oe OPERATIONAL PLAN: _ Espionage and Inte1ligence Collection « Ald feraible . ‘effort “shout be undertsken to continue end intensify intelii- gence. collection concerning Cuba. The status of. our intell1li- gence collection and related operational activity at the ' present time and its development during the past six months -is delinested , in detail in Attachment A, which wes preprred tr serve as the basis for. the: iG's report on this particulsr ; matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. "You will. note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous “ gub-beadings the intelligence coverage which has been developed.by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operationel action it is proposed to take to continue ond, as possible, increase !n- telligence coverage of Cuba. 1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As y-u know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air . travel t ‘the heavy’ flow of Cuban refugees baa dwindled “almost to nothing. in view of this and in connection oan
with the contingency plenning for supporting any persibls military action in Cube, the Opa-Locks Interrogation =~ | Center as such was dismantled, ' although. the personnel of the ‘Center have been retzined intact. In order to | Fevastablish, the flow of intelligence from refugees, . it is. “Proposed . that. Pan duerican Airways and ELH be " saduce’’ to reinstitute their regular: flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done a6 soon a3 - possible after the settlement of the current negotinrttens and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa~-Locka vefugee interrogation center will be re-established | erie same pérsonnel. | . Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be ‘made to continue to ezploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, F re-establish communica-  ¢iens: with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cube, So an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the atringency of future " Guban security snd control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast. 3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re- cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated gnd strengthened and every effort . | WALL be made to jncreaae this coverage, both through the, development of additional resident sgents in Cuba og ‘
14-00000 po — ae and | through, the a development of additional legal travellers. | . 4, | ee = We will continue to press the [wn are assisting us in the effort against Guba. for additional coverage, including the oe ie ate ate oot: - recruiting of agents within. theiz own areas for joint Sp rhe . dtepateh, to Gabe. The [most effectively co-~ | operating at this point: in this connection are. the | waned ae re see Direct “ ‘approaches to several of these (_Jeither by you | personally or in your name, as you prefer, sre being separately recommended. Personal representaticn . by you to thd ___finderlined stove would be useful. re © addition, we will (Fe-survey all other oF . with which we are in. contact and reiterate to those : ‘appearing to, have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maxioum coverage of this problem. we 2 | In connection with the[~]probien generally, we wilt endeavor to induce. all of the to make greater use of their["_"Jassets, ‘botn inside and . outagide cf Cuba. Particular attention will be given to - possible utilization of the eine axe. _ + in Be ritine erations: In addition to increasing ae eztorta to get at semen agents end other aaritine assets through | | we will continue our undlatera2 third country efforts to reeruit sezmen anc 7 Bag
14-00000 st —s . ' a ~\ ote ‘ . | j prrticularly Cuban seamen, to increane the twenty ’ officers and. crew nuevas Eo eha St aboard Six Cuban vessels we sre a now running. as controlled agents. 6. Penetration of Cuban Instellations Abropd;: At | the: present time we are running 12 Cuben diplomats stationed outside Cubs as controlled agents and have vishie © operations ained: at. an additional 20 Cuban diplomats. We propose te continue sud intensity the current progten — of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben officin! represeutztive abroad to whom we can gain access snd - concerning whom we have sny reason to believe a amt one |. guseeptibility to approach exists. These additions1 . penetrations will be attenpted both through]| | operations and where appropriate in conjunction with 3 oo ce %.- Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban officiel installations . i a : __ No aajor expansion of this coverage is presently in contemplated, but we will continue to survey eddition:t targets of. opportunity and wherever possible insts1l coverage in those cases where the additional intelil- “gence trom this type of source over and above whst we are now receiving would appear ‘to make such Lustalirticn ‘ worthwhile. _ oGe 3 a
EN ON A IY ts EO Ae Net oe S Yn vette meet nabs 3 ER SES LES Re BONO Rtn went Baas > . %,. Sommunicetions Intelligence: Vo will continu: our present CIA Close Support coversge from the KOLA (0 station (ne the sane level end will continue to pross NSA for sdditional coverage of Cuban comaunicr- ‘tions. As the current situation "ucermelizes" it shel be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even Auerease their, seaborne intercept coverage of. Cuban commmnigations, - 9. Communist Party Operations: <A complete survey bas been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration ean te directed egainst Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent. against Cuban ‘targets, “this will be done, except in those cases whers such action would result in unacceptablgprejudice te “the operations in the srea where the agent is now based. It ig believed that the. most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there sre 65 penetrations of verious communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 27 wi 1)! be directed against these targets unless in any case there. ore overriding reasons .to_ the. contrary, The Swemaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually axanined to see ag they can be diverted to Cuban torgets,
YS FeO ety tne ah Gee SON Oe le Rate dct ttetaRaS a Be TE PY Ga BP! LO. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two siccessful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) Which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, end reinforced but pointed ‘prémarily at continued intelligence collection and rt | the recruituent’ for intelligence collection purposes of other. Cubans, who already are ‘legelly Fesident in Cubs in the sreas where the tenms are operating (Pinar el Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most careful ly selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional . agents. and teams will be. tnuftiltrated black into Cuba in an effort ‘te duplicate the performances of the COBRA and AMTORRID teansg and particularly to. recruit and, 22 _ possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba. : | 11. Exfiltration: As feasible, sgents end potentisl vecruita now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for - twaining, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated inte Cube, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal trave! channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever . feasible through our black inf iltration-exfiltretion facilities, primarily our maritine assets,
8, Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences’ of stress or strain within the regine and between the regime and other ‘ antiona,’ particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will bs’ continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity os famhtons) fashions) ‘This’ ts ‘pastcally. 2 Jong: tera effort. A great deal ” ot work, already has. gone into this and the current . status ef this program and the proposed further expldtstion of the nunercus’ leads wo ‘have developed is being. made, in the ditereats of brevity in this somorandum, the subject of \g separate ‘compilation. The effectiveness of sssets aimed rt actually splitting the regine, 1.@., @ pairce revolt, will of -—- eotirse. depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United states Goyernasut to support them and it is entirely possibile . | that any” ‘gach effort might fail unless supported . with militery forces which on ‘the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear ‘unlikely. c. Sabotage: On the basia of the esoumpticas get cut above, . commendo type sabotage, ginor sabotage, and other acta of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose end should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptabia risk, to do sa jor damage to the Cuban econony. it is proposed ' to. continue searching for. such ‘Limited opportunities, but. no active or wide scale program is contempizted.. ~12- | . * . ed y of . nt es ees OMe Hae ple Bae
2D, Parant}ita Coamando and Guerrilla rationts: Given the ; assumptions tn Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be. undertaken, However, we | Prepese ‘to Raintain ian being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking. such operations in order to .” fully exploit any. ‘substantial change in internal Cuban con. ditions or ‘any substantial revolt or uprising which might occny, E, Economic Warfore: tt is proposed to continue end - intensify the program already undertaken to deny through ‘clandestine aud covert means critical materials to the Cuben "economy. This consists primarily of denizl operations, possibly sone preciusive buying and inducing frimdly U.S. and alived firas and governments to prevent the shipmenta of atrategic | materials, to Cuba. aot Py Counterintelligence: — The current counterintelligence os and counterespionage progran éghinst the Cuban Ged end _ related services will be continued end as possible intensified. This ‘program has developed Substantially and it should be possible within the. coming months to increase its effect ivenen considerably in countering not enly Cuban but Bloc intelli- ' gence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychologies} Warfare: ‘om Ta tails tiene the following tasks wall be continued and where oot appropriate intensified: ‘ a. Assist and support State in any. fassible acticn.
TENN ee esas EL of the Costro~conmunist regine. 2, ‘Assist State in the developnent of post~-Censtrn "- Coheepts, leaders, and political Sroups. x Stimlate, Support. seh ,Suide covertly the "propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and, other Cuban political Groups rad individuals, ra . §ppropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside 1 Cuba. o.oo te Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the . Cuban people: to resist Castro-comunian, making maximo use of the downgrading of Castro and hig regime during ‘the Hissile crisis. Se. Discredit and ridicule Castro end his regine an Cuba, in the Heulgsphere and elsewhere, with. eauphosis on the thene the uissile crisis denoustrsted con~ .Clusively that Castro is nothing but a ere pawn of Soviet imperialian, . 6, Continue "Radio Auericas" ond other CIA- Sponsored Cuban exile. radio brosdeasts «a appropriate. 7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operations! capability has been established and policy authority is | Sranted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.  Contime the infiltration of propaganda materin | into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and courlers, ‘with special emphasis on selective black cperations. ~lAn
ee ee ae H, Exploitation o of Exilo Groups: We Wild continue the claidestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence ve collecting, paychological warfare and other appreved missicns.. : As fesathle, we will act to wount 26 mich of this effort cx possible from: areas outside the continental United States, rnd particularly from Latin Aneriaa. Ag Higher Authority decides - OB a “Track Two" concept. or on. any, ‘pimilor concept which eontemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generslly directed - action. operations of Cuban groups against Cubs, it is believed that efforts ahduld be made to transfer aB wguch ds possible Of the. esponsibility. for this non-clandestine, non-intelligencs | type operation inté the political field, which is the province .. (O£ the Department of State. In this connection, ‘it ig believed iit would he advisable to press for the creation within the | Departuent of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs te | nena + the overt governonent relationships with | Cubsn exile | Groups. : IV, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES: Maxi cum iuplementation of the above plan which provides for the moat intensive feasible collection of intelligenc:, ; the implementationof releted progrems as outlined, and the nuintenence of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunit: ‘as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes an internal Cuban conditions will,. it is believed, permit and uske advisable the following: . | | al Se
14-00000 ; - —— | _ A, A gradual but substantial reduction im the expenditures | and pergonnel of Task Force We . B, Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W . within: the Clandestine Service, possibly ase major component of. of the WH Division under different direction. | C.. The abolition of the operational Hongoose mechanism, ‘Ds The. removal of the past ‘frauework: which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) cf even minor operational deteils and decision by committee on . points which it, is believed ore completely within the purvler of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision. i. Ve ‘RECOMMENDED: ACTION: ee A. Your concurrence in the above general operations} plan ool recomended. B. -It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the @ Special. Group (Augmented) and secure its coneurrence. Cc. It is recommended that you secure from the Specin) Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Fran Anerican Airways and KLM to. resume their flights between Alan! ond Hsvana at the appropriate time. p. It is recommended that if eny “Track Two" conceyt is proposed, you endesvor to tranafer to the Department “£ State all pessible ‘overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled -16—
14-00000 ‘ | tt is Feconmended that. the’ Mongoose operations) . necliaaien be abolished, a ee it you concur in this soncent, Specific recommendation. oo | . VEY en , _ Cates, Tagk Force Ww vy . ‘ * . eo “ : ” . ' on > . « a ~ & . . . . ° . . a aes > . . ° ry "e . 4 “4 * é ‘ e : Co » . rT ad cg ‘ lo io is ae