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14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL erm MERLOT 18 ls eM Ao RAE tH wetted He, 2 ce Advised that NSA "shall act for the Executive Agent in all COMSES matters set forth below" - primarily responsibilities for estab- lishing adequate standards; de Defined COMSEC as “the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny to unauthorized persons information of value which cight be derived from the possession and study of telecamunications, or te mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such a study”; @o Defined telecommunications as “any transuissions, emission or reception of sign, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, visual or other electromagnetic system". NSA preseribes Government-wide standards for the eans of encryption < equipments, codes or other techniques - and only those approved by NSA nay be used for the encryption of classificd information. NSA also develops equipments where required. COMSEC equipments are available today to encrypt sll standard cocmunications methods - telephones veletypewriter, high-speed data, television (black ani white only), even conputer~to-computer transmissions. ‘ However, NSA has no authority to require encryption; the requirement for encryption is left to the agency head under the EQ 10501. Moreover, they are positively prohibited fron monitoring teleconumunicationa to deteraine whether classified information is being revealed unless the agency head concerned approves in advance. To dute, there are no known teleconmunications techniques which would permit unencrypted (clear) information to be transmitted sare fron inter=- ception and fron being read by unauthorized persons. As a result, the 4 U. S&S. COMSEC Board and NSA make the assumption that all unencrypted tele- communications are being monitored and that the information ceing trans- , mitted is compromised. While this is a physical inpossibility, there can be no assurance that any particular transmission is not being intercepted and read. Therefore, NSA will assure no responsibility for the security of coomunications which are not encrypted in an aprroved cryptosysten. The White House Communications Agency (WECA) is responsible for, providing ell telecocsunicaticns for the President und io the White House, except for cormunications to and fron the President's aircraft (Air Force I), which are the responsibility of the Air Force. WHOA is organizationally under the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). ‘ne WECA program has not been reviewed by the Burcau. Kenneth O'Donnell provides policy guidance to the WHCA and has informed the DCA that no information on the size, progran, or budget of the WHCA is to be revealed without his authority. on ? eae Re om ne ake CONFIDENTIAL.
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL . coy - . . . ry ama 8 & tien 3 There is a very close vorking relationship betwen WHCA and SSA on all aspects of COMSEC, including possible “ccipronising emanaticas” as discussed below. However, WICA has an inpossible task in attenpting to provide secure comsunicotions for the President so long as he uses the comercial telephone system. Ualess WUCA can be informed of the specific locations and people to whom the President wishes to talk about sensitive or classified information, there can be _no assurance that the conversations are not ‘eing mccitored. However, if reconi comuunications (teletype are involved, erypto-cquipment can be quickly brought to the locations ‘ where a teletype capability exists. Crypto-cquipments cannot now be installed for secure voice transmissions over the commercial telephone systen. Conpronising Enanations . {The above describes the traditional COMSEC problem where there is little relationship to the “physical security" problen, except insofar as physical security is required for the cryptographic equipceat. In addi- tion and nore ‘closely interrelated with the physical cecurity prodlen is the problem of "“coupromising emanations" or radiation. Eriefly, these are electrical or acoustic signals emanating froa electronic and electro- mechanical equipsents.. If. these. signals cun be intercepted, it is possible to read the information ceing processed by the equipment. To protect against this danger, the U. $. COMSEC Board has approved (with concurrence by all concerned agencies including the Bureau) NSA electrical standards for all electronic or electro-mechenical equipcents computers, typewriters, etce) which process clessificd information. ach agency processing class quifments is Dercnsivie for insuring that their eguiments meet 4 the stendard. ‘ A special subcamittee of the USCSS monitors this program and provides guidance and assistance to the concerned agencies. As might be expected, . new Orfensive techniques are constently being discovered which require additional defensive precautions. It is in this field that the line between communications ececurity and physical security get fussy. Physical Security The term “physical security" has traditionally been ussociuted with safes, + guards, ana fences. However, with the advent of sophisticated eizctronic eavesdropping tecaniguas, most agencies have expanded tne physical security role tv provide protection against. unauthorized access to classified or eensitive information either by people or by devices. “2” crewing awareness of the threat posed by clandestine listening cev.. . cue NSC, in Decerber 1955, established a Srecial Cocziviee oa Techaical Surveillance ee ae ae qu ty Soh ocean a n ’ : ot 2
CONFIDENTIAL “y +4 pivigacares. This Committse, conmoced OF retevsentotives oF State, i vee . D : om we - See ee em ee, . + ence (S53 and each Sorviee), CEA, Fal end NGA, was casrged vith, s GLsas a» Stuty and review of the Gocestic und foreim threct to tae “ssouviuy of classifies delens: infornution” presented by the “installation und operution of clendestine technical surveillance devices” in Ue S. peered Goverment Zecilities or quarters. be Establishing uad ccordinatinz policies with respect to counteriag bah eet et wed Thareate The Committes meets ct leest ronthly and cubrits annual reports to the No cn its act send findinzce Ther: is a close relationship tetveen this ecasalttee and the ULSie committee oa compronising emunatioas - in wuct, there are a-nuster of incivicucals who sit on kota. i Each ancnucy 7 le for carrying out its own technical surveillance Hinstions wits Gtevar conn Golicy gaidelians are established by the ne counitie cquipceat to be uced, cte.). 4 m diccovercd in the U. 5. altheush over 100 w cain U. &. fccilitics overseas batween Is9 and 1yl9. An cdditioasal 420 wore ciseovered in friendly foreign overceus Tucilities between 1955 ané 1950. any “ind have tee o wet ava Gealins vita two Oe a osm % od se ee . - . “ oA ge. ort ~ wvotlans which an craecties : : ; stave agencies wicutiosus and physical favice:). oa ste @& clear éecsismnine of stucy oF Dovanse ao secutive Auent of Covermcrent fe releoo. his vecnencisilivy chrousgn Tee kh ae? e dn thea ®icl. of = ae os ae ae ae, mooscaslyilicty to the fee em an a2 ~ sof Fewer te ~ rer S12 CG 2wUS matterse opmize secinieal sais pie 2 ey : “ i fe E - ta a . tt pete tar Pa < es yornry = af SoSve tt OQ OlLcCUlvs Tor EMPEOSee Af al ~ ae ae «7 oF iu, ginal ro passed Matters colo Capawetaet ee Secretaries GF Stave ane . 3 Tehecenunicatioas wna President SO TecCusena Ge DrGsec5 clessivied invorwat 2G insure 2.2% no information aay be weteven CeGlue ata 2nlormo eae
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL ae ar oe ewe tome aa 6k Omar i available to unauthorized porsors throu~) meorprentsing emanat ons. * For a thorouth evalima.ton, it ray bo Ruswssary, if tha White House desires, &o request NSA to monitor White House communications on a sazpling basis and advise the White House of the results. On the ratter of clandustine listening devices, the NSO Special Comittee on Techaical Survelilance Countermeasures should be charged with assessing the adequacy of tha Secret Service procedures, equip mont ‘and level of technical skill, and recommanding any changes necessary te attain the highest practicable level of porforsance. we believa the Secret Service has the rosponsibility for protecting tha Presidential estabiishrent against clandestine devices since thoy support the Burvau on request. Thay are not members of tha committee and, so far as we can datermina, they co not receive comaittaa reports nor do thay contributa information to the committee. As a continuing matter, they should be made a menver of the comaittoe. Racom- ented action: i. That Mr. Bunly issue a. NSAM. providing that the Secratary of vefense, as Executive Aza. for all « communications cccari ity matters, will direct NSA to conduct a survey and make a report on tho adaquacy of presont somnunications security measures in affect at the white ousea, including non-crypto cennunications. é. That Mr. Bunly arrange through the ese Sre cial ¢ Cormittea on feshnical Surveillance Countarmeasures to sucura a coview and report on maasures in effect a the white Housa to maintain surveillance and protoc- tion against clandestine listening devices. 3. That both sapgorta ba reviewed by the Presicent's Committee on the warren Rerort, augrentod by Er. Non vaig and General O'Sonnell (OcH), for advice and recormendation to the President. pa oben eee seme Niet £ 3 i CONFIDENTIAL