476-10011-10055) JFK Assassination System Date: 5/5/2016 Identification Form _ AGENCY : Agency Information NARA _ RECORD NUMBER: —176-10011-10055 RECORD SERIES: NSF y . / AGENCY FILENUMBER: | Document Information ORIGINATOR: DOD FROM: LANSDALE, EDWARD TO: SPECIAL GROUP TITLE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED) DATE: 07/25/1962 PAGES: 8 SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret RESTRICTIONS: IC CURRENT STATUS:  Redact DATEOF LASTREVIEW: 05/08/1998 _ OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW COMMENTS: | NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED):7/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-90-48
ore ee, eee oe _ acs Top SECRET ae i “ SENSE : os | os ee ms . 7 4 MEMORANDUM: FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) “ , a From: a Brig. Gen. ‘Lanedale 7 be Subject: “ co, ._ Review of Opération Mongoosé ... | os ‘This is 5 the Operations report : at: the ‘end: of ‘Phase I; “i has os _ - - beeri compiled to assist you in’ reviewing: Operation. Mongoose ‘thus - far. ‘and. in’ n determining. the: best.< course, eof vy S. _action: for ‘the future: in - This’ Opeziations report contains the contribution of: each. yaajor. a i eipanty on jabhectives: on. the planning and Operational ‘activity. sived by. higher authority ‘on. 30 November’ 1961, the v. 's. fier, Becial effort “in order ito Help Cuba overthrow. the: Communist
oo Sere gy reste ’ : 7 6 ~ 7 ee es, wie yen wee airs hae - reach the- goals, in ‘Phase. I: Po torsreer .d. “Undertaking all. other political, ‘economic,. and. covert. - ; " alctions,. “short. of inspiring. a revolt ain. Cuba: "Or: developing. the: need me for 5. S.. armed. intervention. ee. “Be consistent with’ U.. Ss. overt policy, and. remain. ink me position, to. disengage with minimum. logs: in assets and U. S.. prestige. . a. Continue J cs planning. and. essential preliminary: actions-. ; a ae for. a decisive: U. S. , capability: for intervention. ora . ACCOMPLISHMENT - ‘Elements .of. the UL S.., _ government’ were: organized. to reach. ‘the- - - _.goals -set for. Phase I... “My. assessment - ‘of where: we aré: on. each objective is. noted. unde’. -appropriaté ‘sub-headings: bélow. - Jn. general; "this: has ‘been. a. remarkably ‘quiet. ‘operation,. well within. the: “noise! moe mo, aah Nvieibility’* limits. imposed. a | Highe® authority” has. been. kept informed: of. progress. ‘through | “ t the: Special Grou 3 (Augmented)... byt requent. reports. . ‘The: Special ~ Group. has. provided: policy. guidance, | as. Fequired, in: Phase: ‘I: “Phe. Chief of Operations: has’ coordinated: the efforts: of participa cat vos ting. departments and. agencies, . ‘through. meetings of. ‘the: Operational: ~. Representatives: and. ‘by. constant review of. progress... ; The; Ope rational - Representative. of each: major. U.S. participant, in. Operation: Morigoosé™ oe wt are-William. Harvey; (CIA), Robert Hurwitch : (State), Brig. (Gen. Benjamin an , ‘Harris (Defense). and Don: Wilson (USIA) 7 “My Asceasment “Of the organization, planning,. and actions to a Intelligence. CIA had the. main.assignment to. acquire: the _ “hard- intelligence". desired.’ The headquarters: and field: ‘staff, of CIA are now “well organized for. a. major ‘effort for. this. ‘aspect. of. Operation ; Bo a “Mongoose, being: ‘strengthened. by a number of CIA officers experienced - oo | in! “denied: ‘area’. ‘operations. elsewhere. in’ the. world. Planning and - Lo . ‘actions, rate. ‘superior, ina a professional sense of intelligence collection. “CIA established the Caribbean: ‘Adrhis gion. Center at Opa: Locka, ° Florida, and: an inte efrogation. activity” in. Spain. “It. undertook a priority.
TOP SECRET _ plan. to. collect. information on the. target from third. country areas in = =| .Latin America and Europe. Inside Cuba, the. recruitment and place- : ‘ment of third country nationals and initiation of Cuban. collection. nets; bos particularly in urban centers, has. made Operation Mongoose numeri- -- cally the. largest U.S.. intelligence agent effort.inside a-Communist state. However, the effort in. more remote. provincial areas of Cuba, | where guerrilla resistance was expected to.be.spotted,. récruited, ‘and organized, was short. of the. hoped-for goal; this was due to. the . regime's security precautions. and, to some degree, to policy: limita-. ' tions on. the risks to be assumed. 5 Defense contributed the majority of pérsonnel to staff the _ Caribbean Admission Center, stepped- “up SIGINT. collection under: NSA.” despite changes and improved. sophistication of. Cuban communication : procedures, and brought’ into play. the available. assets of Service intelli- - gence organizations, in coordination. with. CIA. -State stepped up its _ 7 . information. collection from. diplomatic. and. refugee ‘organization. sources. _ Justice (FBI and INS). and USIA provided: significant support to the : 7 , Caribbean Admission. Center. i Political, State. appointed a. representative. “to devote full- time to ‘Operation: Mongoose’ and. to. develop the required political actions. ; - During: ‘Phase. I,- the’ Punta, del Este conference was. a. major. U.S. political’ action. to. isolate Castro. and. neutralize: his. influence in. the. Hemisphere. “but. ‘was: not developed within.. the -context..of Operation: ‘Mongoose. | The - - fouccessful visit of- President Kennedy: to Mexico was: another major. ‘U. Ss. ~ “political. action, with a potential impact. upon-our- special goals, but. was. “not ‘developed. within the: ‘context of Operation. Mongoose. Two Operation. sMongoose efforts ‘in. political. action. were attempted in Phasel:- " counter. Castro- ‘Gommunist. propaganda. exploitation. of May. Day and to’ _. arouse. strong’ Hemisphere: reactién. to:Cuban. military, suppression. of the hunger: demonstration at Cardenas, . in June. _Ambas sadors in.Latin- ‘America . weré asked to, undertake. a special. effort,..as: possible, with. the help. of their. . Country. Teams; political. action results.in: ‘both. instances were, mostly. negative, due. to. lack. of | capability and the: local. attitude: in. Latin. American countries. a - * State is: responsible. for: refugee political, policy: matters, assisted. a _ bye CIA: in.daily. liaison. “This. is an area of major-interest to- Operation. , coe Mongoose, since the: ‘Cuban refugees, have. an ‘open., objective of over~- oe throwing. the Communist regime in. Havana ‘and. recapturing.1 their. homelaiid,
mee meee ene ae ep ee ee pine : ‘ee = - TOP SEGRET They are given. open: U. S; assistance to: ‘remain: in. ‘this country, yet _are participating in- “Covert. actions it’a limited way. Only:a fractional opening has been made to. release. the. ‘frustrated energy of ‘these. refugees | vin freeing their homeland. and :in. creating a:favorable political climate in -Latin.Ame rica for the liberation. of Cuba.. : Policy limitations of:"audibility" and."visibility" apply directly. in. considering, the handling | and. use of this . ‘dyniarnic refugee potential. : As a working. document for-U, Ss: operational guidance, State . developed a definition. of.a. political. program: for afree Cuba, with. the. - , understanding. that. any, réal.- ‘political program. ‘must be ‘developed. by the 7 Cubans. ‘themselves. |. Paychological:: “Psychological. activities for. Operation: Mongoose . make, use of existing assignments. of responsibilities. within. the U. S. Psychological. Operations: ‘Group. which meets..weekly;: USIA. dissérninates government: State,. having the policy’ role,. -chairs..an. inter- -agency. Cuba _ \ any. U.S. government. information. (VOA and ‘Press. Service). and. generates. oe J ligray'-o or non-official information. (5.-million. cartoon. books. and. thousands - "Of. Spanish. books. on: Guba. disseminated in Latin Ame rica); GIA. passes. , . information. appropriate for-"': 'gray"' and covert. psychological. channels (radio, mailings: to- Cuba, and dissemination. inside ‘Cuba). aoF “Conditions. and. events. in Cuba have provided ‘many éffective. themes, * . which have ‘been: promptly. and sharply: exploited. by. available. méans.in-the . - Western. Hemisphere. . ‘However, the ‘U.S. still. lacks. the ‘capability, ‘of . --effettively- getting - information. to the ‘imajority- ‘of the: Cuban people. - Our or short-wave broadcasts, are. highly: regarded: by. the Cuban people,. but short>: - wave receiver ‘sets ‘are: limited inside ‘Cuba. - Our medium :wave. broadcasts a compete against stronger. Cuban. signals;. it-was felt that greater U.S. competition in. medium-wave: broadcasts could lead to Cuban. interference ; of U.S.. commercial. ‘broadcasts over a:fairly wide area. of. the U.S. " Clandestine. broadcaata. from: a ‘submarine. (appearing as. broadcasts: by - . . ~Guban guerrillas. inside. Guba), have. ‘béen initiated; they. are in, ‘their: infancy, “land ‘havea long. way. to.devéelop. before. their. messages are believed and ° get passed. among. ‘Cubans: by, word- of - mouth: - -.Dissemination. of leaflets a and propaganda. inside. Guba, by balloon: Or: ‘aircraft has. not received. policy ws «approval. “3 ; fo, eee Bl enamic. State has. the main. responsibility’: for. developing economic | actions. State. has. chaired an. inter ragency y working, group, which generated -
ce the U. S.. trade. embargo, denial’ of. bunke ring: facilities, increased port security, and control procedures: oni. transhipment, . technical. data, and. . Customs dnspection. . -Diplomatic.meéans weré:used to. frustrate. Cuban . trade: négotiations in-Israel, Jordan,: Tran,: Greece, and. possibly ‘Japan. a Under Resolution. VIII vadopted | ‘at-Punta del. ‘Este,. the- OAS. has. established. a. special committee to. study. "the feasibility: and. desirability. of extending , . «the ‘suspension of. trade ‘with Cuba to. other.items. (than arma,’ !. State has Prepared a Program to: be. submitted fo. this. OAS: ‘committee’ ‘in. the. future. ae _ TOP SECRET | ol, “The. evidence: iB: ‘that: Cuba's s ‘economy: is. ‘suffering. - “Trade. with the - = . Communist ‘Bloc and. others ‘has. ‘kept it! limping ; along, despite scarcity . of :U.S8. goods, - the: bad ‘drought limiting. ‘agrarian. crops,.. increased. worker ‘non- -coopération. and. ‘the 'régime's: ‘bungling. of’écOnormic:control measures. | . - : Critical. spare, parts ‘till arrive. in: Guba,» ‘including, shipments. from. British - and: ‘Canadian. firms, Chartered. shipping. from Frée World sources. still . Do _.. plays. a. major ‘role in "Guba' 's. trade, and, a thé: U. ‘S.. “has. little. hope. of cutting | = a ae life-line’ to Castro. . DO _Gaerrilla.”” CIA had thezmain. responsibility: for assessing résistance oy poténtial inside: ‘Cuba: and £6: start quietly-. ‘organizing. such. ¥esistarice as. rae — feasible. The: CIA. plan has: -been. to set:about, doing, this, through introducing _ ae small. téams. ‘into the Guban’ -countrysidé, : Nower: the. beach": from. boats. ~ = Each, team. is: ‘tasked: first to. stay’ alive,: while: getting. established in. an. area. .., Once: able to ‘live in an. aréa,. it.then: ‘Btapts .a-cautious. survey, of: ‘potential - “ ; -“Fecruite for a. resistance group. Names: -of-such. recruits are sent ‘to. CIA: aan . for, checking... ‘As. recruits join,. ‘they are: trained. ‘on. the ground by. the. team,” _ ve and. then. continue the: survey... . This. is. slow. and. dangerous work. CIA Feports. that. i teams. will: have beén. infiltrated by: the ‘énd, of suly and: that. ‘19 maritime operations. have. aborted. Of. the: teams, in,: ‘the most ‘successful. is. the one:in’Pinar: ‘del Rio. in western. Cuba; - *: ite. success. was: “helpéd: greatly by: a maritime re- “supply: of arms and ; equipment; the. fact: ‘that. it.is. a: "going - concern". and: receives, help from Lo outside. has. ‘attracted. recruits. .Its. potential has been.éstimated at about _ -- |250,° which ‘is.a. sizeable guerrilla force. . : With: equally: large guerrilla an - forces’ in:other Cuban, provinces, Bue rrilla. warfare. ‘ould’ be activated -. _ '| witha: gded: chance of . ‘success, if. aésisted properly: : | However, . the teams | 2 in. other. provinces. ‘have not béen SO. successful; our best. hope. is that we © ae will: have viable: téams in all. ‘the potential. resistance areas, by: early. October. ot Bad weather, high. séas,, and: ineredsed: ‘security: ‘patrols will make: the infiltration of teams” ‘and. ‘their. re- supply: from. small. boats a: shard. task, ~ eh. aS & .
&: €, a a oT orskenar. in! Sabotage ‘has. not taken: place): -on.a. U. Ss. -sponsoréd ‘basis. . ; LO Planning. for. ‘such. action by. GIA. has. been. thorough; including detailed : “,. .. study of the. structures. ‘and. ‘vulnérabilities. of: key targets. . Sophisticated ~ a actions ,. such. asthe contamination. ot POL, has. ‘been frustrated by. lack. of . cooperation. of nations. where’ POL would be: vulnerable. ‘to action.. ‘Commando i type ‘raids. would take. maritime m i. which now. have. priority use in . ; _ support of CIA teams being. infiltra’ id inside. to survey. and. create a. guerrilla potential. « :CIA has. ‘reported: ‘that. there -is-now: some. capability” inside: Cuba - _Vfor sabotage action, . that target: seléction: has. been. ‘under ‘further. careful ~ “review, -and. that a. proposal. i is forthcoming. to. >be submitted for’ ‘policy approval. Intervention: Planning.. “The. St cS. were. given. ‘the. résponsibility for planning and undertaking. essential preliminary: actions for.'a.decisive U.S. ° capability: for: intervention: in:Cuba. . This Guidelines" objective: has been. ~ met, fully. Algo, U. s.. milita vo readiness: for intervention. in.Cuba has “: been: under: continuing reyiew: ‘within. ‘Defense,. being improved. wherever oa feasible. . In: addition,~ rumors. ‘during, June ofa possible uprising | inside Cuba Lo “Led to: ‘further: planning for: a, contingency-where: a non-U. Se: ‘inspired revolt . ‘might start. ‘inside Cuba;. intér-agency. staffing. of UsS. :planning® ‘for. such al _-Cyban contingency i is: “being. completed, under Defense: leadership. a oS : a Beers to. ‘the will: ae the: ee che people.” “Rightly or wrongly, : the. ‘Cubans ° me have: Gked and. are’ ‘ooking t ito. the. Us Se for’ guidance on. what to aspire to
” os PORBRORET eo ay matter of our own. security, undertaking some economic! : proscription, . a and: isolating the Castro/Communist gang from contaminating the Hemis-"< _ ae phere.. - Along with recognition of our. humanitarian sympathies, this seems ..°: Sa to. be the fear among Cuban refugees, although fey. are still hopeful. “4 v 2 ag Cubans become. convinced that the U, S. is not going to. do more o 2 ~ than. watch and talk, I- believe they will make other plans for the future:. . The bulk of Cuban. refugees inthe U. S. are most likely to start getting s, serious ‘about. settling down: for life in the U.S., dulling their desire.to | ee Feturn: ‘home ‘with pe ‘réonal risk involved. The ‘bulk of disaffected people fon 7 inside Cuba will lose. hope and incentive: ‘for futile protests against. the regime. ~ 7 and. start accepting. their status. as captives .of-the.Commurists. ‘Some Guban ao oO ‘activists will not. accept the'loss of their homeland so easily and may. seek: _ release from, frustration. by. liberation operations outside. U.S. ‘territory. o _ 7 and ‘control. ‘The recent wildcat. Cuban scheme to bomb. Habana from, Central. - i _ America is an example. oe mS ca - Our. probes. ot ‘the guerrilla poténtial inside Cuba have béen hampe réa. oy by. similaz. morale factors. ' Cubans sent.to risk their lives on missions: e oS . _ indide. ‘Cuba. feel very. much alone, except for their.communications ‘link* : “Back: tothe U. S. They .are unable to’recruit. freedom. fighters, agutecsively” wo aby” the time-proven. method ‘of starting an.active resistance and thus attracting :  Tecruite:” ‘U.S. | guidelines to keep this short.of a revolt. have made the: inten-- tion, behind the ope ration suspect to local: Cubans. : The evidence ‘of some | me arn intent) AB: seen in the- recent maritime’ 're- supply. of the tearn ‘in. Pinar, del Rio, e . a Awe were: to: exploit the evident guerrilla potential. in this province; it “appears - (oe that we would. have to furnish. supplies ‘by ‘air and. ‘probably: open-the' U.S. - to strong, charges. of furnishing such Support: to Cuban resistance elements. ae y é 7 m “Therefore; we ‘have. been unable. to surface: the. Cuban resistance ae Co potential. to a point. ‘where we can méasure. it. realistically. | ‘The only. way oe “this, can.berdone,, atcurately,° is when resistance. actually. Hasa rallying. “point. of f¥eedom fighters -who appear. to the Cuban people. td have some — os a it chance. of Winning, and’ that means at least an implication’ that the U.S.sis.-e/ at in siipport.. Word- of- -mouth information: that. such. a freedom movement: is:, LS ae afoot, could causé. the. majority of the Cuban ‘people-to ‘choose sides... Tt nd would’ ‘be: the first real opportunity’ for: them to do .so.since ‘Castro and the: De .Communists. came, to. “power... _The) re. was: ‘little opportunity for’ the Cuban ay ‘today.’ Af the. Cuban’ people are to- feel they have. a real opportunity, . they. we must: have’ ‘something. which, they can Join with, some belief. in. its success, od i. = -_ _ 7 - | ; “TOP SECRET x
a, oo re ‘Attachmenta’ ~ SNES es. e: Only"! é0 ies. to:. _ - Sracial Group. (Augmented) PROJECTION ai hee 1). a a “As, a help towards ‘the maidag of.a. Re Sy ‘decision. ona future course “of action, the. ‘Ope rational, Representatives. developed. working. statements <; of four possibilities; at my. re quest. they” have-commented.on.the. positive - ‘and negative factors: ‘worth. considéring ' foreach possible course, and it. is ‘suggested that’ these. thoughtful. statements are worth. reading. in full. The: ‘working statements: of the shoiees. open to. the U.S. are as. follows: as Cancel operations plaiis, treat Tuba, as a Bloc: nation; protect Hemisphere from: it,-or- be _Exert ‘all possible diplématic,.¢ économic, ‘Beychological,. and: - S other pressures “to. overthrow: the Castro“Communist. regime. without _ we overt, temployment of u. S. military, « OF. “Commit U. B. to. help. Cubans. overthrow ‘the Castio- Communist a - ee ‘ régime, with a: step-by-~ ‘step: phasing: to-ensure. success, including : ‘the: use. an of. U. S.. ~military, force if Fequited at the. end; or Dts ‘: ‘d. “Use, a , provocation and overthrow the. Gastro: ‘Communist - SL “hee by. U. Se inilitary: force. = “RECOMMENDATION. Te is ‘recommiénded: that this review.of. ‘Phase. 1 be considered by, 7 . he's Special Group’ as. providing the. operational basis. for guidelines: and: . objectives. for Phasé Il. ‘ It is a’matter of urgency; ‘that thesé be: arrived - _.at-by, the. Special Group, to. 0 permit developing specific plans and. schedules. - for, Phase I. Sats oe ae omer = ak v + pach rien we . AG. ee General. Taylor. ee et ae 4a “Nex, John MeGone.’ ‘oy a a rs ‘Mr: ‘Alexis Johnson: . Se “BL Mrs: “Robert: ‘Kerinedy, a ae Be Mr: Roswell. Gilpatric: ae “6. "General. Lemnitzer a perational Rep resentatives CES . oa i 2. “Mr. William Harvey (Gia) "9!" “General. Harris (Defense) | 8. - Mr. Robert Hurwitch p (State) , 10.: Mr.- Don: Wilson. (USIA) | ne 11. : Chief of- Operations. 8 ; TOP. SECRET.