157-10014-10136 i ; JFK Assassination System Date: WH2015 Identification Form Agency Information “4 AGENCY:  SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10136 | RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER: 07-M-42 Document Information ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DRAFT ASSASSINATION REPORT 7 DATE: 10/16/1975 PAGES: 360 SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORT DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT ; CLASSIFICATION : Declassified hh RESTRICTIONS: 1B;1C " CURRENT STATUS: = Redact | DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/21/2000 a) OPENING CRITERIA : f I t CCBOX 349 | COMMENTS : v9.1 HY 50955 Docld: 324235274 Page i :
HW 50955 AGENCY - RECORD NUMBER RECORDS “SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER ‘Date Page JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY. INFORMATION 1 ' t SSCIA 157-10014-10136 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE 07-M-42 08/07/95 ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE ; PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION i SSCIA DRAFT ASSASSINATION REPORT 10/16/75 360° SSCSGO, REPORT REPORT TOP SECRET REFERRED | POSTPONED IN FULL | 01/05/99 CCBOX 349 DoclTd: 324295274 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 2
. Tinks a a ~ . ~ 2 Boag FAY October" 167-1975. | | | f ‘STNATION REPORT po Taper Frorogue 7 he _ TAB Bi Introduction and Summary - TAB C: “Covert Action as Vehicle fs Foreign Policy Implementation uy ‘TAB OD: Cuba | | Al | 1. Introduction’ ' — 2. At What Level. Were the Castro Plots Authorized or | _...Known About: Within the CIA - | ar 3. The. Question. of Authorization Outside the Central”: - ‘Intelligence: Agency | ‘in the Eisenhower Administration, t 4. The Question: of Authyrization During the Kennedy | | i an Administration, Pre-Bay of Pigs : 5, The Question of Authérization During the Kennedy | - Administration, Post, Bay of Pigs | 7. The Question of autHorization in the Johnson. Administratior ib : TAB E: Congo. | -TAB F: Executive Action Capability on TAB G: | Dominican Republic | ee TAB. H: Chile i TAB I: South Vietnam it TAB. J: Findings and Conclusions'. TAB K: Recommendations TAB L: Epilogue - i WW 50955 Docld:32423524— Page 3 7
HW 50955 Tab Tab “Tab Tab Tab - Tab. Tab Tab Tab Tab SELECT COMMITTEE - A te PROLOGUE A: B:. Part Cr Part D: Part E: Part F: Part G: Part H: Part I: Part J: Part Docld: 324239524 I: Introduction and Summary II: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign’ Polic III/Cuba ‘' III/Dominican Republic u LII/Chile : i III/Congo 4 IIT/South Vietnam ~ a IV: Findings and Conelusions ana V: Recommendations , , fi ‘y Lo ; Mi ic i i. I t Page 4 i i i: September I, 1975 SSASSINATION REPORT... ' Implementation -
HY Agreed to by Subcommittee October 8, 1975 PROLOGUE The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in in the context of United States policy and actions designed ‘to counter the threat of spreading Communism. | Following the end of World War II, many nations in eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under Communist influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was accompanied by the rapid disintegration of the Western colonial empires. The Second World War no sooner ended than a new. struggle ‘began... The Communi st threat, emanating. from what was then called the "Sino-Soviet bloc," produced a;policy of containment intended ‘4 to prevent further encroachment by | Communism into the "free world, ” United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for *. the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military bases throughout the world. . Our, concern over the expansion of an aggressive Communist monolith led the United States to fight. two major wars in Asia. In addition, it’ was considered necessary to + “wage a relentless cold war against |Communist expansion wherever it appeared in the "back alleys of.the world." This called for a full range of clandestine activities in response to the operations f 1 of Communist clandestine services. The fear of expanding Communism was particularly acute when Fidel Castro emerged as the leader!of Cuba in the late 1950's. i His takeover was seen as the first! significant penetration by the Communists into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. leaders, including 0955 DocId:32423524 Page 5 {
t BO we fame most Members of Congress, called fbr vigorous action to stem the Communist infection in this hemisphere. These policies rested on: . a | widespread popular support and encouragement. Throughout this period, the U!S. felt impelled to respond to threats which were, or seemed to be, skirmishes. in a global. Cold War against Communism, Castro's Ciba raised the spectre of a Soviet outpost at America’s doorstep. Events: in the Dominican Republic appeared to offer more such opportunities for the Russians and their allies.’ The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic center of the African continent,:a and the prospect of Communist pene- tration ‘there was viewed asa threat to American interests in emerging Africa, : Americans are well aware (Of the powerful reactions set off ly the va in the. United States in the 1960' s|by the domino theory. in Indochina. And, even: the election in 1970 of 1a Marxist. president ‘in Chile ‘was seen by some as a threat similar to. that of Castro's takeover in Cuba. i . The Committee ‘regards the unfo rtunate events dealt with in this Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but ao not justified, by the pressure of events at the time. The’ Committee believes that it is: “still in the sigtional interest of the United States ‘to do what it can to help nations resist Communist domination, qt He but it is. clear that this | cannot’ justify in the future the kind of ‘abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved _ HW 450955 that steps must be taken to prevent ‘them from. happening again. | 4 1 Docld: 32423524 Page 6 |
| Agreed to b Drafting Subcommittee on August oT, 1975* I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY This interim report covers allegations of United States involve- ment in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. Of equal i sicnificance in this report are certain other cases where foreign political . q leaders in fact were killed, where the United States was in some manner ; killing, but where it would be incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been t involved in activity leading up to the to encourage assassination. . |. The evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in several assassination plots. The Committee believes that the use of assassi- nation as a tool of foreign policy is incompatible with American principles, international order, and morality. It;should be rejected. Our inquiry. also revealed serious problems with respect to United States involvement in coups directed against foreign governments. Some of these problems are addressed here on the basis of our investigation to date; others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into a - covert action has been completed. We stress the interin nature,of this report. In the course of ae. palit tae ‘the Committee's continuing work, other! alleged assassination plots may surface, and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may come to light. Uowever, it is the Committee's; view that the cases covered herein have been developed in sufficient.detail to clarify the issues which are at the heart of the Committee's mandate to recommend legislative and other reforms relating to the vital matters discussed below. ee * The Vice Chairman reserved ‘as to jthe first sentence in the discussion / . of the similarities and differences among the plots. (See p. HY 50955 DBoctd: 324293524 Page 7
HW 450955 In depth treatment of the assassination question has lengthened the Committee's schedule but has of the hard issues it must face in thel nevertheless, to complete, by February 1 . : greatly increased the Committee's awareness Months ahead. The Conmittee intends, i 1976, its main job of undertaking the First comprehensive review of the intellisence community. JAY The > Committee! Under Senate Resolution 21, s Mandate | ! + the Committee was instructed to in- estigate the full range of governtiental intelligence activities and the xtent, if any, ethical”. to which such activities were In addition to that very broad general mandate, “illesal, improper or un- | - the Committee : so ob a ; ; . was required by the Senate to investigate, study and make recommendations concerning various specific matters, ‘nation issue. Al thoush “reported assassination plots, the. Com a variety of reasons, to complete Branch turned dent, the Dxecutive the Commission had done, along .with m.. tions. ote gate the following: the extent and. necessity of © . abroad"; its] over, to ‘the Select other docutients relating to several of which relate to the assassi- the Rockefeller Commission conducted an inquiry into | ih * 7 miission a t eclared it was unable, for inquiry. At the direction.cf£ the Presi- Committee the work to assassina- For exaaple, S. Res: 21 requires the Committee to study and investi-’ 4 . covert intelligence activities “Cthe] nature and e tent’ of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities” . . on, \ ° . . "the need. for improved, Strengthened, or consolidated oversisht of United States intelligence the need for new lesis lation. { Docld: 324234524 I s" activities by the Congress”, and
D5. Comittee Decision To Make This Report Public ; > —F This report raises important questions of national policy. We ; oar ; Fal . ‘believe that the public is entitled to/ know wnat certain instrumentalities hogy ota : . & . wy, SOE their Government have done. Further, our recommendations can only be Pa ire : ieee r ~/judged in light of the factual record.) Therefore, this interim report Because of our faith in the democratic system, and the paranount importance of strengthening the institutions of this country, the Committee ‘ “t - ay ade oo Ry believes the truth about the assassination allegations should be told. electorate. Truth underlies both te Democracy depends upon a well-informed Qo justice and freedom. ms i “ he facts disclosed herein should be soon (Tin We reject any contention that. 1 i . . kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United States. Despite oo the possible injury to our national reputation, the Comittee believes. that foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection, respect the United States more ‘for keeping faith with its democraticjideal than they will condemn us for - ‘the misconduct itself. ; 7 t ~The fact that portions of the Story have already been publicly dis- closed only accentuates the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and mis- leading partial disclosures are neither fair to the individuals involved, nor a responsible way to lay the. groundwork for informed public policy ~ judpetwents. al | it . eels Investigation Cc. “The Sco e of the. Committ _ eat cece he oe - The investigation of the assassination issue has been an unpleasant i i ae a ! duty, but one that the Select Committ e-had to meet. The Committee ha tie ‘ . a a compiled a massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway. HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 9
ea ¢ ie "3 fa ag ¢?) w le) rh a The hearins record includes sone - Af i i 13 witnesses*during _ hearing days as. ell as numerous staff interviews. worn testimony from _ The documents which the Committee obtained ineluded raw Files from the i agencies and departuents, from the Unite House, and from the Presidential libraries of the Administrations of former Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy f Kennedy and Johnson.** We obtained evidence of two general types: first, evidence which related to the overall setting of events, the national policy of . di A ; the time, and descriptions of normal operating’ procedures including ot , if channels of comaand and control; and ‘second, evidence relating to specific 4 Be 1 4 ‘ A Senate Comaittee is not a ‘court. It looks” to the past, not to events. determine guilt: or innocence, but in order to wake recommendations for the if future. Therefore, where we found the) evidence to be ambiguous--as we did 4 ; j on sone issues-~we have set out both Sides, in order that the evidence may speak for itself. not ? oa. , . Gespite the number of witnesses and documents examined by the te Committee, there were the following shortcomings in the evidence available to us: ae, | I jl | * The names of the witnesses are|set forth in Appendix A. wk The Committee served both general and specific document requests upon the Executive Branch and the Administration represented to the Committee that it did not know of any additional relevant documents, excent, of course, for the possibility that the "Nixon papers" (which the Committee.is attempting to obtain): may: contain material televant to the allegations relating to Chile. HY 50955 Docld: 3242754574 Page 10
HW 450955 Many of the events under consideration occurred as long as fifteen years ago. With one exception, they occurred during the administrations of Presidents now dead. Other high officials, whose testimony might have additional light upon the thorny issues of authorization and control, are also dead. Moreover, with the passage of time, the memories of those still alive have dinmed. The Committee often faced the difficult task of dis- tinguishing refreshed recollection from speculation. In. many instances, witnesses were unable to testify from in- | - dependent recollection and had to rely on documents con- temporaneous with the jevents to refresh their recollections. t : og ° : 7 . While informed speculation is of some assistance, it can | -f it only be assigned limited weight in judging specific events. Assassination is. |not a subject on which one would ip | expect many records or documents to be made or retained. 4 In fact, there were more relevant contemporaneous documents : - then we had expected, land the CIA in 1967 made internal study of the Castro, Trujillo and Diem assassination allega- a. tions. That study ¢ was quite useful, particularly in suggesting leads for uncovering the story of the actual assassination activity. Unfortunately, some material ® Those studies were made. at .the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms to provide him with information to respond to questions put to him by President Johnson. The President's questions, as to Castro, were provoked by a Drew Pearson newspaper column of March [6], 1967, which had alleged CIA attempts on the life of Castro using the Mafia. . _ a Docld: 32423524 The President asked Helms at thé same time to provide information about Trujillo and Diem. ' Page iL
0955 Docld:32423524 Page 12 relating to.that investigation was destroyed upon’ its -completion.* os A final deficiency in the evide ace stems from the doctrine that CEA covert operations should be concealed _ from the world and performed in such a way that if they were discovered, the role of the United States could be plausibly denied. As an extension of this doctrine of “plausible deniabiticy! communications between the As sency and high Administration: officials were often convoluted and imprecise.** ~ The evidence contains sharp. conflicts ,. sone of which relate to basic facts. Dut the most important conflicts relate not so much to basic facts as to diff ering perceptions and! opinions based upon relatively undis- puted facts. With respect to both kinds of conflicts, the Committee has attempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it. may speak for itself. In the findings and conclusions section, we suzgest resolutions of some of the conflicts. “Remembering that the Committee’ ‘gs main job is to find lessons forthe future, there are .also occasions’ where we point out that resolving conflicts in the evidence may be less important than making certain that ‘the system which oroduced the asbisuities is corrected. * This Was done pursuant to the instructions of GIA Director Richard _ Helms (Helms Ex. ; 6/13/75 tr. ). In fairness.to Director Helms it should be added, however , that he was responsible for requesting the preparation of the I.G. Reports and for preserving then. *® For a full discussion of this doct¥ine see pages. vat ry 408.
-T- D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions 1. ‘The Questions Presented The Committee sought to answer four broad questions: ASSASSINATION PLOTS. Did U.S. officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots designed to assassinate foreign leaders? INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER KILLINGS. Did U.S. officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly con- tributed to the killing of-'foreign leaders? AUTHORIZATION . Whére there was involvement by U.S. officials in assassination ‘plote or other killings, were such activities ordered and if do, at what levels of our Government? COMAMIGADTON AND CONDROL.. Even Lf not authorized, J were the assassination activities perceived to.be within the scope of agency authority, and was adequate control exercised over its activities. 2, Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the. Plots The Seven Allegations. The Committee investigated alleged i U.S. involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries.* They were: . Country , Individual Involved** Cuba Fidel Castro Congo (Zaire) . , Patrice Lumumba ’ ae * Insert Footnote on Sukarno and Duvalier. ‘ae "| ¥*® Insert re Raul and Che and Ngo Dinh Nhu. HY 50955 DBocld:324273574 Page 13
HY 0955 Country - , + °“Tndividual Involved Dominican Republic . Rafael Trujillo Chile General .Rene Schneider South Vietnam ‘Ngo Dinh Diem In summary, the evidence with respect to each allegation disclosed the following.* Fidel. Castro (Cuba). United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro beginning in 1960. American underworld figures were used in these plots as well as Cubans hostile to the Castro resime. .One of the later . tae plots, which lasted until 1965, involved a Cuban. dissident who was provided encouragement and material support by the United States. Patrice Lumumba _(Congo/Zaire). In the Tall of 1959, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward saining access to Lumumba. | Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumunba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does hot appear from, the evidence that the United ‘States was involved in the actual killing. Rafael Trujilto (Dominican Republic). Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May ‘31, 1961. ‘Gonmencing in 1960 and continuing ito the time of the assassination, the UL: Government generally supported | these dissidents and some Governaent personnel were ‘aware that (they intended, . to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by ‘ American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There was conflicting evidence whether the weapons were xnowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any were present: at the scene. } i j i 7t * See Section III for a detailed treatment of the evidence. Docld: 324934574 Page 14
ice- Chairman “rer reserved :clude con- ant of Com- fy Name Ceneral Rene Schucider (Chile). On Ietober Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted while resisting a kidnap attempt oo . three days earlier. Schneider, as Commander in Chief of the Arriy and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle to efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from a assuming the office of Pres ident i of Chile. The United States ‘Government supported ,and sought: to instigate, a military coup to block Allende. U. 8- officials supplied financial: aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed . Allende. ‘There was conflicting evidehea on whether the United States had previously severed relations with the! groupethat kidnapped and killed | Schneider and on whether any of the equipment supplied was actually used in the kidnapping. , I | Yeo Dinh ! Dien e Gouth A, Vietnaii) . Diem and his. brother, “Nhu, were Bo killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Cenearals' coup. Although the United States “Government supported the coup, there was no evidence that Awerican officials favored the assassination. Thdeed, it appeared that the assassination of Dien was not part of the Generals! pre- couD alanaing but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the \ coup and with which ‘there was no American connection.” In addition to these five cases the Comnittee received evidence that ranking government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within thé CIA of a’y generalized capability to ass sagsinate. Sinilarities and Differences Among the Plots. The.plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small. and an none of which possessed great political or military strength. . Apart from sphere that similarity, there were significant differences among. the plots. The stern Pemi- HW 450955 Docld: 32423524 Page 15 : : . ° : i following, distinctions are pertinent:’.
(1) Whether United States officials initiates the plot or a ~, were responding to requests of local dissidents for aid. (2) “Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a . 1 - foreign leader,or whether the leader's death was:a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the covern-- ment. Lo . i The Castro case is an example of a plot conceived by United States officials to kill a foreign leader. The Lumumba plot falls into the sane. |: category. | In the case of Trujillo, althoughthe U . 5S. Government certainly i . : opposed his resime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States: officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose ain clearly was to. assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them this country was in- plica ted, whether the specific weaponty actually supplied was meant to kill 7 _ Trujillo or vas only intended as a syybol of U.S. support for the dissidents. & ¥ The Schneider case is’ different from that of both Castro and Tru- i jillo. The United States Government go ought a coup and provided, support to local dissidents, knowing they. believed that General Schneider was an obstacle . i to their plans. However, even though | Pe ‘support Liicluded deadly weapons, 4 it appears that the intention of both ithe dissidents and the Uni ed States so I. officials was to abduct, not to kill, General Schneider. Similarly, in the Diem case, United States officials did want a change in Covernnent, but there is néd°evidence that the United States sought the death of Dien hilinsel£. 3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority . een * or seen ce Eee at ee RE a tc en ee mete = a, : a and. Control. ' . . . od To put the inquiry into assaSsination allegations. in context, two HW 50955 Docld:32493524 Page 16
HY 0955 Docld: 324293524 Page it points must be made clear. First, that the United States Government opposed the various leaders “In question, ‘U.S. officials _at the highest levels objected to the’ Castro and Trujillo resizes, believed the accession of Allende to power in. Chile would be ha raful to American in- terests, and thought of Lumumba as a danzerous force in the heart of Africa. fo Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in tne context of other, more massive activities directed aga iast the regimes in question. For example, the plots directed against Fi Fidel Castro pers sonally, “éannot be under- stood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive, assaults upon his regime, such as the B Ba: Ly of Pig 3s invasiog in 1961 and Operation Nonzoose in 1962. - . a Yowever, the issue of Goveritnental authorization of assassinetion i a 4 £ independent jmportance. There is a significant difference between a coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and te . other forms of intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore, ‘ he Committee endeavored to explore as fully as possible the question o} Se ee 1 2f BY \ . . i ar were authorized, and if so, from how and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, anc it so; woat level the authorization came. ; F He discovered a murky picture... ‘It is not clear whether this tis ‘il due to the systen of. deniability and the consequent state of the evidence which even after our longs investigation remains conflicting and inconclusive, , he | $915 4 “1 Sys teh > aut! i- or whether there were in. fact. serious shortcomings in the system of authori _zation so that activities guch as assassinations could have been undertaken by ; : 3 7 : a eet pl e aearaas ' Sar. an agency of the United States Government without express authority a % Lippman meat
HY 0955 consideration. Docld: 324235234 Based upon the record of our, investigation, the Committee's single most important finding is that the ‘system was such that assassina- tion activity could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States oe Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the highest level. Along with that paramount conclusion, the Committee makes four other major findings.* The first relates to the lack of direct evidence of authori- zation of the assassination plots by Presidents or other persons above the Governmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain officials may have, nonetheless, perceived tNat, according to their judgment and experiénce, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third criticizes. agency officials for failing on several occasions to reveal their plans and activities to superior authorities, or. for failing to.do so with i i sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials for, on occasion, giving vague and indirect instructions to subordinates, and +s 4! ' , weet for not making sufficiently clear that!assassination should be excluded from There is admittedly a tension ni within the four findings. The first . -. abo. ; a and third points tend to suggest a lack of authority while the second and ANY. fourth points explain why agency officials could nonetheless have perecived : : ; : he . so: : : that. their actions were proper. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are sone conflicts over facts, it is more important that there may often have been two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds and ex- perience of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinquighed * The Committee's findings are elaborated in Section ', infra. "
from those who were not. Words of urzency which to the former tray have meant killins, te the latter may have meant nothing of the sort. Vhile we are critical of is mindful of the inherent problems compar tnentation, circumlocution, andijj This sytem creates the risk of confus clarity and sober judgment are most n extensive review of the evidence rela ce r { tain individual actions, the Committee a system which relies upon secrecy, TES the avoidance of clear responsibility. ple on and rashness in the very areas where ip) cessarv. Hence, before turning to an 4 uy, to the cases, we briefly deal with ‘ va the general subject of covert action during the relevant period. i Mee HW 50955 Docld:32493524 Page 19 i oe
Agreed to by Drafting Subcommittee ba August 28, 1975 Il. COVERT ACTION AS VEHICLE FOR " FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION Simply stated, covert action may be defined as activity which sup- 5 . H . “ss ports the sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives but is concealed [I The National Security Act of 1947 Ute under circumstances permitting that n ‘lon to plausibly deny its actions. idid not specifically include { ! | Hy er, it granted to the National authority for covert operations. aT i =< s Security Council, then created as an strument of the President, the ws { authority to direct the CIA to "perforin such other functions and duties — ational security as the National ty Security Council may from time to timedirect." Thereafter, at its i first meeting in December 1947, the wet onat Security Council issued ye i I operations. From 1955 to.1970, the bdllhe authority for these operations | 1 Communism,"** directing the CIA ~~ f related to intelligence affecting the ie a top secret directive granting the CIA ithe authority to conduct covert was National Security Council 5412/2.* This directive framed the purposes, 'of covert operations entirely to counter, reduce and discredit "Inter national Communism" throughout the world in a manner consistent with U. Sililforeign and military policies. A It alse directed the CIA to undertake cavert operations to achieve this - end, and defined covert operations as any covert activities related to i! % Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations is National Security Decision Memorandum 40, whilch superceded NSC 5412/2 on Feb- ruary 17, 1970. ip tt i ee i 2 ** By contrast, NSAM 40 of 1970 described covert actions as those secret ‘activities designed to further: official U. S. programs and policies abroad. It made no reference: ‘to communism, we, ae a SE, BUT og a a Seas ae oe. aon HW 50955 Docld:j2d23524° Page 20
propaganda, economic warfare, political) action netuing sabotage, demolition and assistance to resistancél movements) and all activities : \ : H : compatible with the directive (emphasis; supplied). In 1962, the CIA's General Counsel rendered the.opinion that the Agency’s activities are . _ "not inhibited by any limitations othe! than those broadly set forth i i { in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62) . | 2. POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL MECHANTSM ne _ ; : The evidence dealt with in Part ILI is concerned with what actually — happened as far.as obtaining, or not obtaining, authorization for the ac-_ tivities under review by the Committee: With respect to what was meant ‘ ~ to happen in regard to covert action gdnerally, the CIA's General Counsel ; on stated in 1962: CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Oc- casionally suggestions for acti'on will come from out- side sources but, to depend entirely on such require- ments would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibili- * ties. Also, the average person, both in government and outside, is thinking along normal lines and to develop clandestine cold war activities; properly, persons know- ing both the capabilities and limitations of clandestine action must be studying and devising how such actions can be undertaken effectively. With respect to policy approval, the General Counsel went on to say: zi Both in developing ideas or plans—for action-it is.in- cumbent upon the Agency to obtain necessary policy ap- proval, and for this purpose these matters should be. explored with proper officials|in other departments and agencies, particularly in the Departments of State and Defense, so the determination can be made as to whether any one proposal should! go to the Special Group or higher for policy determination. ~~ soda The General Counsel's 1962 memorandum made it clear that the CIA a : Lx considered itself responsible for developing proposals and plans to ch qi HW 350955 DBocld:3274235524 Page 21
HW 50955 i implement the specific objectives of NS ever, the memorandum stated that even i for action, it was incumbent upon the A other executive departments and agencie ‘ policy approval" (emphasis added). The of course, was whether such approval wal sary" Beginning in 1955, the responsibi action operations rested in the Special + 4 H nat committee of the National Security Coune Assistant for National Security Affairs i telligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defé State for Political Affairs. Today ta mittee, and its membership now includes In addition, during 1962 an of Staffs. established to oversee covert operations as the Special Group (Augmented) and wa Special Group, the Attorney General and) ‘ t B A officials thought it was I [ to obtain express approval for i il | pastiSeg= afr ‘ n the development of ideas or plans i , gency not only to coordinate with Ss, but also to r i “obtain necessary " issue which’ faced the Committee, ,» in fact, sought and obtained "neces ese activities. | ity for authorizing CIA covert joroup, a sub-Cabinet level sub- il conposed of the President's the Director of Central In- ense: and the Under Secretary of S group is known.as the 40 Com- ‘the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs i other subcommittee of the NSC was S relating to Cuba. It was known S composed of the members of the 4 certain other high officials. The overriding purpose of the special Group and its successors | | 4 has been to exercise control over cover Group was charged with. the cenomeii | of any proposed activity, whether or n how likely it would be to succeed, and ° be "proper" and in the American intere usually was responsible for determinilig| dential consideration, as well as keeping him DoclTd: 324235274 Page 22 i | t iL j | operations abroad. The Special ty of considering the objectives { - it would accomplish these aims. n general whether or not it would. - The Special Group Chairman which projects required “Presi- i sate abreast of progress or changes.
HY TE 0955 mental authorization and review. The foregoing should not be taken always have been clear and tidy, nor lowed. 1955 the Special Group procedures were Prior to 1955, formal procedures barely existed at all. to imply that the. procedures: hat they have always been fol- \ In made more formal. Neverthe-. less, the procedures that were followed during the period of 1959-63 oy - were. characterized by an internal CIA memorandum as “somewhat ‘cloudy and thus can probably be described as having been based on value judg- ments by the DCI." (Memorandum for the I ‘Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Co- ordination of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967) In addition to the Ve i t ecutive. ert action could not preempt Presidentia oo ' mandate foreign policy. Similarly, it be represented as the "desire" "somewhat cloudy The Committee recognizes that 7 "nature of the formal pro- . fe _cedures themselves, there are other options afailable to any Chief Ex- an agency charter to plan cov-~ 1 authority to develop and lis equally clear that what may ¢ of a President is often communicated by intermediary officials whose perceptions ay or may not accurately ! Yreflect the true Presidential purpose. I can be disregarded from above or below! f example, a President. instructed CIA fe) Special Group or other. departments. I officials decided not to bring matters’ Group. it should also.be noted that | ' = to activities labeled "covert action’ considered in. this report were treated j | Obviously, formal procedures mee Stns ll — 5 In at least one case, for’ icials not to consult with the ‘at..least one other case, Agency re the attention of the Special ua of the above procedures apply | ‘whereas some of the activities as "counter-intelligence" actions. Such actions are not normally subject| to 40 Committee-type interdepart- Docld: 324235274 Page 23 i
The Concept of "'Plausible Deniabliiti ty" | Non-attribution for U. S. covert covert operations was the i original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of plausible i, denial. Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates. that this con- oe eee cept, designed to protect the U. S. andj its operatives from the conse- or Eh quences of disclosures, has been significantly expanded to: (1) mask not only Presidential decisions but i ose of his senior staffers; (2) . “7 a support less than complete advice to on — ch persons regarding these op- erations. The quest for "plausible denial’. j ii shafed the processes of the U. S. Government for approving and eva uating covert actions. The 40 r ‘as “circuit breakers" for a ee ration of covert action at sev- \ i if a Committee and its predecessors can sled President, placing the locus of consid od eral removes from the Oval office. On consequence of the doctrine of plausible denial is an incomplete dodimentary record. { Pal i The quest for "plausible denial"! has also led to the use of cer-~ ! tain techniques, including euphemism and circumlocution. These tech- pre £ niques have had as their purpose the lobjective of allowing the Presi- dent and other senior.officials to adhy| knowledge of an operation should - no : vet it be disclosed. In addition, the use ‘of indirect reference to inform . a President could be reversed-~a President could communicate his desire uw . 1 ved: to see a highly sensitive operation undertaken in a similar indirect, i 1 i. circumlocutious manner. Whether, at times circumlocution had the affect Boa ; a of failing to let Presidents or other officials accurately understand be" what was being said, was a question faced by the Committee. i wat ae . HWY 50955 Docld:3274235524 Page ?4 iF i
"Plausible deniability" raises a Committee has had to confront. of plausible denial has affected the ig other issues which the . g interpretations of the practice tent to which sensitive matters were raised or considered. The evidenc f very serious problems of assessing and -trol-can arise out of plausible denia e discussed below revealed that ‘ . 42 . insuring accountability and con- Page 25 HW 50955 Docld: 3242394524
HY “ee 0955 Docld: 324233524 B. Cuba . Mik MuUpUol C75 171) We have divided the facts with respect to Cuba into three ; ; ee broad sections: 7 ATT The first discusses the pists against Fidel Castro's life without attempting to ,confront the ques The second deals with the the successive Directors of Central Tint i McCone, authorized or knew about the i organizationally divided the evidence} proof relating to other high administr ct ° i oO 8 lox 0) K ct bp @ cr ct om @ oO - bad oO Q ct Oo ky (o) a) C2 i$) jen ct + =P administrative policy-making councils) afi Intelligence Agency.) in The third section covers the 1 not other high officials--including the Hf or knew about the plots. This section to whether or not the CIA officials ate them to .be consistent with the gener administrations even if they had no ML = = @: 4H 8 >= =F i ———O- ty lt io of authorization. dence concerning whether or not elligence, Allen Dulles and John rious plots. (Although we have elating to the DCI's from the Sal tion officials, it is important rail Intelligence is the principal @ matters, a member of major $ well as head of the Central evidence concerning whether or various Presidents--authorized also considers the evidence relating QO were involvea with the plots believed policy objectives of the various rsonal knowledge as to whether the plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority. Page 26 t ta ad
NZ HW 50955 advance beyond the stage of pl Docld: 32423524 1. The Assassination We have found concre plots involving the CIA to ass to 1965. Although some of the involving the use of underworl gressed to the point of sendin dispatching teams to commit th furnishing weapons and other 4 dissident. The assassination om | =. Quz=F SE OEST 200 = Ss my ' Plots Themselves e, evidence of at least eight ! t f \ ) t ssinate Fidel Castro from 1960 assassination plots did not Fn . 1 te nning and preparation, one plot mere U2 laced. Another plot involved t | figures reportedly twice pro- ‘poison pills to Cuba and Sassination devices to a Cuban ad proposals ran -the gamut from high-powered rifles to poison Hills, poison pens, deadly 1 . bacterial powders, and other devices which would strain the imagination. The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963--the very day pen to a Cuban for use against t an emissary from President Ken : i that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas--when a CIA official in Paris offered a poison ‘Castro while at the same time ia was meeting with Castro to explore the possibility of impr ved relations. The following narra assassination plots against C Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. of the level and degree of aut considered in the sections tha -Page 27 i{| f 1 The question orization of the plots is t : ae
HY 0955 Docld: 324233524 ae le | ‘ ‘ oi i Bite — (a) Plots: Barly 196 Oo - “lh (1) Plots £6 Destroy ‘Castro's Public Image Efforts agai assassination attempts. Ve , t From March) adh fl ap nst Castro did not begin with hrough August 1960, during the | | t : last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered c i ue plans to undermine Castro's cha | | speeches. According to the Tee official in the Technical Servic: ismatic appeal by sabotaging his ector General's Report, an es Division (TSD) recalled dis- cussing a scheme to spray Castrd's brdéadeasting studio with a chemical which produced effects scheme because the chemical was: ‘Il TSD. impregnated a box of cigars aie mine Similar to LSD, but rejected the not reliable. During this period, with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping, to induce Castro to smoke one mae of the cigars before delivering | also reported a plan to destroy : Jl dusting his shoes with thalliun would cause his beard to fall out. tered during a trip outside of. C Castro would leave his shoes out fp to be shined. TSD procured the: a speech. The Inspector General (Castro's image as "The Beard" by lsalts, a strong depilatory that The chemical was to be adminis-— uba, “in which it was anticipated side the door of his hotel room chemical and tested it on animals, iy a but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his (I.G., pp. 10-13.) in . ~2 i trip. HI ft (2) Proposal to Sabotage Flight The first ‘proposed action against the life of. a Cuban leader sponsored by the aware took place in July 1960. c ‘ i CIA of which the Committee is | On July 18, 1960, a Cuban airline Bet i Page 28 7
HW 50955 stations along the route were Docla: 324273524 Page 29 Lt pilot who had volunteered to a iM 0 ist the CIA in gathering intelli- ' .gence informed his case officer in Havana that he. would probably be chosen to fly to Prague on| pity 21 to return Raul Castro to iiOn July 20 the pilot confirmed that Cuba (Memo to I.G., 1/17/75). he would definitely fly the plane. CIA Headquarters and field ‘requested to inform the Havana Station of any intelligence needs that] the pilot might fulfill. The case officer testified that he and he pilot contemplated only acquiring cdi information about Raul Castro, and that assas- sination was not considered.*}’ The cable from the Hatrana Station was received at Head- quarters on the night of guly 2 The duty officer, who was summoned I: 4 DDP Richard Bissell, and J.C. Ki ng, Chief of the Western Hemisphere - to Headquarters from his homey jontectea Tracy Barnes, Deputy to | Division.** Following their ipetructions, he sent a cable to the Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at Sy HQs." The cable inquired whether the pilot was sufficiently motivated to risk “arranging ah laccident during return trip" and : ‘ : ye it * A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs supports this account. f **-The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King because he would not otherwise ‘have signed the cable "oy direction, J.S. King". (Duty Officer, p. 16) He also would "very definitely" have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barnes was the man to whom we went . ‘| 5 for. our authority and for work connected with the Cuban Project).' (Duty Officer, pp. 4, 25) Since King at that time was giving oily ' ‘nominal attention" to Cuban affairs, the officer concluded [that a proposal of the > Brevety of an assassination could only. have j"[cone from Mr. Barnes" (Duty Officer, . 2h) mn B i, an 4 i ,
HW 50955 Bocld: advised that the. station coun determine willingness - to. cooper - of Ten thousand dollars was author art discretion contact. subject to ate and his suggestions on details" af rized as payment "after successful completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the nat possibility that the pilot was| case officer, this cable repres ; i conventional activities we'd pebn asked to handle". interview, 8/4/75, p.-2)* st] The case officer cont proposal while accompanying hil to thé airport for the flight. ease officer avoided the word), i a double agent. According to the ented "quite a departure from the (Case Officer acted the pilot and told him of the The 4 Lesassinate” » but made it clear that ui the CIA contemplated an Maceident to neutralize this leader's (Raul's) influence". assured that his sons, would be “event of his death, the pilot tered to take a limited to possibilities that Havana to Director, 7/22/T0) | i Immediately after _ officer was told that a cable y i At s q * The duty officer remenbére ing facts for precisely that re [cable], and I say this because (Duty, Officer, p. 14) The case the cable, he i £ N we (case Officer interview, p..2) cermerave ‘had. just arrived stating: "swallowed hard": |, ‘After being I. given a college education in the "calculated risk", might pass as accidental.** (Cable, Wh 1 urning to the station the case i "Do not i d d the cable and some of the surround- ason: "[T]t was an unusual type of I can remember it 15 years later." officer recalled that when he saw (Case Officer interview, p. 3) ** The cable from Havana to'Headquarters stated that the pilot was willing to risk: "A. Engine burnout on takeoff to delay or harrass trip: B. Vague possibility water ditching, approximately se three hours out from Cuba.' 324273524 Page 30 - |
HW 450955 : it -infra at . te Docld: 32423524 Page 31 a pursue ref. Would like .to drop matter." (Cable, Director to Havana, 7/22/60; Memo to I. Cs, 1/17/75)* It was, of course, too late .to "drop the matter" since the plane had already departed. When the Cuban pilot returned, he told the case officer that he j i ’ -had not had an opportunity to’ arrange an accident. (3) Poison Cilgars yt A notation! in the records of the Chief, t Operations Div., Office of Medical Services indicates that on anaes fh i 4 August 16, 1960, he was given. a ‘box. of Castro's favorite cigars with instructions to treat tem with @ lethal poison (r. G., Dp. 21). The cigars were contamiziatea with a botulinum toxin so ¥ a potent that a person would aie after putting | one in his mouth (I.G., p. 22). The Chief reygibea that the cigars were ready on Te October 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to ne an unidentified person on rene 13, 1961 (I.G., p. 22). The rae! caene Eee i record does not disclose whet il ran attempt was made. to pass the ih cigars to Castro. HH (b) Use of underworld! Pigures-—Phase I -(1) The initial Plan~ <a | In August 1860, the CIA ‘took steps to enlist the aid of embers of the criminal underworld with gambling if . . ran *“Phis cable was signed vy thecy Barnes (Duty Officer, p. 28) The duty officer recalled seeing this cable, and testified that he had heard that Allen Dulles had countermanded the cable authorizing the possible assassination attempt against Raul Castro. (Duty Officer, pp. 29-30) The reagons for Dulles’ action are discussed
HW 450955 Docld: 3242734524 Page 32 oo syndicate contacts .to assassinate Castro. The earliest evidence { ii of the operation is a conversation. between Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) Richard Bissell and \Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Chief of the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell asked him to locate someone who could jassassinate Castro (Edwards , pp. 2-3). Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to fina dna believed that Edwards.raised " I someone to assassinate Castro; the idea of contacting member ie i a gambling syndicate operating { 1-73). Edwards assigned the mission HE to James P. O'Connell, Chief of fhe Operational Support Division w i of the CIA's Office of Security| f in Cuba* (Bissell, 6/9, Dp. 7: explaining that he and Bissell = ech Serer i iminate" or “assassinate” Castro were looking for someone to Why (O'Connell, pp. 8, 95-96). |f ; ay ‘ ‘ Edwards and ore Maheu to recruit someone "tough] enough" to handle the job (O'Connell, p. 8). Maheu was. ni ex~FBI agent who had entered into @ career as a private investig ie in 1954. . Robert Cunningham, ts who was employed in the CIA's for the CIA to use “Maheu in * Although Castro. closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign tourists in late February 1999. and remained open until late Septeinber 1961. ;
several sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to have an Agency person or a government person get caught"* (O'Connell, p. 158).. Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA of $500, which was terminated after his practice became more lucrative (O'Connell, pp. 13- us it. G., p- 15). O'Connell had served as Maheu's case officer nce the Agency first began using s iy a h ; i { i ' 4 | i e Maheu's services, and by my y had become close personal Sometime in “ August or early September 1960, it 1 friends (Maheu, p. 6). ' bm t O'Connell approached Maheu abou tt the proposed operation (O'Connell, p. 93; Maheu, 7/29, p. 6). As Maheu recalls the conversation, . hd O'Connell asked him to contact dibhn Roselli, an underworld figure i with possible gambling contacts) in Las Vegas, to determine if he perated with the CIA in attempting contract with the Saudi Arabian n Onassis virtually complete control over shipping of oil from Saudij[Arabia. Although he was employed by Onassis’ competitor, Niarchos, Maheu worked closely with the CIA. He testified that he contracted for a listening device to be placed on Onassis' room in New! York. after first. consulting with the Agency, and that he provided , the impetus for the termination of the contract by publicizing its terms in a newspaper in Rome that he said he purchased with CIA Pong (Maheu, 1/30/75, pp. hes. ) ® During 1954-1955, Maheu to undermine Aristotle Onassi O'Connell testified that, Maheu, at the CIA's request had also. previously arranged for the production of a fiim in Hollywood depicting a foreign leader with!’ a woman in the’ Soviet Union. The CIA planned to circulate the film, representing it to have been pro- duced, but not released (O'Connell, pp. 159, 162-163). Maheu testi- fied that he had located an actor resembling the leader and had arranged for the production of the film (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 39-42). HY 50955 DBocld: 324293574 Page 33
HY arial 0955 : Af p. 8; O'Connell, pp. 15-26). aia would participate " of Castro* (Mahéu, 7/29, p. 8). Maheu had known Roselli since the late 1950's (Maheu, 7/29, eal pp. 58-60). Although Maheu oth ths not to have been aware of the ie . extent of Roselli's underworld) connections and activities, he 4 : . vil recalled that che "it was certainly evident’ to me that he was able to accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of attention" (Maheu, 7/29, p. 60). O'Connell’ had previously 1 met Hogans at Maheu's home (anew, 7/29, It Pp. 8). O'Connell and Maheu oar claimed that the other had raised the idea of using Roselli, and) Nahe Said O'Connell was aware that Roselli had contacts with the: ‘gambling syndicate (Maheu, 1/29, ‘ i ‘“Maheu was at first reluctant to become involved ‘| i in the operation because it mite interfere with his relationship ai with his new client, Howard Hughes. He finally agreed because: he j I felt that he owed the Agency a Gonmitment (Oo! Connell, pp. 12-13, i 103). O'Connell recalled that, Maheu was to approach Roselli - using a cover story that he represented business firms suffering 4 heavy financial losses caused. Py) Castro's actions** (O'Connell, p. 16). O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money , jolt a - “yi anita . * Maheu testified that he was. told that the plan to assassinate Castro was one phase of a larger. project to invade Cuba (Maheu, pp- 7, 13, 47). fe fof #e Roselli testified that the | ' story was developed later and used as a mutual "cover" by O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli in dealing with Cubans recruited for the project (Roselli, pp. 16-17). Docld:32423524 Page 34 ho
HW 50955 Bocld: 10 ‘probably $150, 000,.. for Castros assassination* (O'Connell, pp. 16, 111; Memorandum, Osborn.to Der, - 6/24/66). (2) ‘Contact With The Syndicate In carly Heptenber 1960, Maheu met Roselli at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills, told him that "high govern- es Ib . . . . ment officials" needed his cooperation in getting rid of Castro, i i and asked him to help reeurit Cubans to do the job (Roselli,.p. 8). Maheu recalled that Roselli wasliat first reluctant to participate i TE in the project and insisted. on" “ineeting with a representative of ie it el 10-11; Roselli, p. 9). A meeting with O'Connell. was arranged in New York City at the Plaza Hotel the government (Maheu, 7/29, p during the week of September 1h, 1960 (Roselli, pp. 10-11; I.G., if p. 16). O'Connell testified thet he was introduced to Roselli as a business associate of Naheu, and that Maheu told Roselli that he represented international business interests which were pooling money to Pay for the assassination of Castro (O'Connell, p. 26). Roselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that [ O'Connell was with the CIA** (Rose, pp. ll, » 85). “ * The I.G. Report places the |amount at $150,000; O'Connell thought it might have been $100/000 (O'Connell, p. 16), Roselli recalled $250,000: (Roselli, p.j 25) and Edwards confirmed the $150, 000. figure (Edwards, p. 9), _ Maheu could recall no "price tag" for Castro's assassination :(Maheu, p. 34). %* The weight of the testimony indicates that Roselli realized the CIA was behind the assassination attempt at an early stage. eh if 324735274 Page 35
aay i anes tg fe RS eS JY eal ’ k Oe eae: ‘ t t was aipanged that Roselli would go to il Florida and recruit Cubans for the operation (Roselli, pp. ll-12). Edwards informed Bissell that epntact had been made with the gambling syndicate (Bissell, 6), pp. 20-21; I.G., p. iT). During the. week of September 24, 1960, O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli,met in Miami to.work out the details of the operation (0'Connell, pp. 25-26; Roselli, p. 12; _ I.G.,.p. 18). Roselli used the. cover name of "John Rawlston" and represented himself to the | ‘Cuban contacts as an agent of tl "some business interests of Wall Street. that had. . nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I was getting financial assistance from. them" (Roselli, pp. 9, 17). 4 Maheu handled the details of setting up ! i the ‘operation and keeping O'Connell informed of developments. ai After they had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly prior to October 18,* Roselli! i prroaucea Maheu to two indivi- 7 p ai | i Maheu substantially confirmed) his account (Maheu, p. 111). O'Connell recalled that about! three weeks after the New York meeting, Roselli told him, "Ii am not. kidding, I know who you work for." (O'Connell, p. 261) * Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gold" (Giancana) after November , 1960, when. he was staying at the Fountainbleu Hotel (Maheu, p. 17). -Other evidence indicates that the meet-_ ing took place earlier. . When: they first went to Miami, Maheu and Roselli stayed at the Kennillworth Hotel (Maheu, pp. 15-16); FBI records reveal that Maheu, and Roselli (alias J. A. Rollins) were registered at the Kennilworth from October 11-30 (File R-505, FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved in the operation during the October period at the Kennilworth pecause (1) the wiretap of Rowan" s apartment, discussed infra, was made on October 30°; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent. a memorandum to Bissell stating. that Giancana. Had been. telling several people that he was 4 involved in an assassination atvenpt against Castro (see infra, p. HY 50955 Docld: 324235274 Page 36
HW 450955 BDoclda: 3242735274 Page 37 duals on whom he. intended to serve as a "vack-up man" (Rosé ae OSS (Maheu, p. 17); and "Joe", whom 12 ely: "Sam Gold", who would i! aa p. 15),. or "Key" man a Joona said would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arraigenents there (1I.G., p. 19). 4 t O'Connell, who was using the namie "Jim Olds", met "Sam" and "Joe" only briefly (O'Connell,' pp. 26-29). O'Connell testiffed that he learned the true. identities of his associates one morning when Maheu called and i i 4 asked him to examine the "Parade" supplement to the Miami t Times .* An article on the Attorz ney General's ten-most-wanted criminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Mom Salvatore Giancana, ‘ i a Chicago-based gangster ,** and the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cub I.G., p. 19). O'Connell reporte (O'Connell, pp. 31, 33) but aia qt f "Joe" was Santos Trafficante, at (O'Connell, pp. 28-30); d his discovery to Edwards an reported this fact to his super a O'Connell testified that this - in ids iy ? a Ie it * not know whether Edwards ors (O'Connell, pp. 32, 41). cident occurred after ‘we ‘were in this thing up to our ears", a “month or so after i * A search of ‘supplements to hu Miami papers during this ERS | 6 described by O'Connell. period did not reveal ‘the articl Bi ¥* Sam Giancana was ‘murdered ih his home on dune 20, 1975. / Trafficante made regular tr. gambling syndicate business (1: 'G at ips between Miami and Cuba on » pp. 19-20). i i at \ { O 4 | of . I fl i an
HW 450955 BDocld: 32425524 Page 36 My . ; a? th tullen. b 13 Giancana had been brought into: the operation, but prior to Ory ia] giving the poison pills to Roselli (O'Connell, pp. 30, 4h). ot Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job to locate someone in Castro's -eltourage who could accomplish the assassination (Maheu, Dp. 19), and that he met almost daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time (Maheu, p. 18). Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key H role" (Maheu, p. 34), Roselli claimed that none of the Cubans eventually used in the operation, were acquired through Giancana's contacts (Roselli, pfs). (3) Rowan Wiretap Incident . In late octdber 1960, Maheu arranged for rte a Florida investigator, Edward: DuBois , to place an electronic "bug" in comedian Dan Rowan's room in Las Vegas (Maheu, p. 36). DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balvetti, flew to Las Vegas and installed a tap on Rowan's phone, (Maheu , p. 38). O'Connell in j characterized the ensuing events as a "Keystone comedy act" (O'Connell, De 68). On October 3, 1960, Balletti, believing i hg that Rowan would be out for ths) [Afternoon, left the wiretap is equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and He 1 notified the local sheriff, wilo|arvestea Balletti and brought i ! cos ' * According to O'Connell and! Roselli, DuBois had been requested to place a legal electronic bug against the wall from an adjacent apartment. Ballletti instead installed an electronic tap on the phone (0'Gonnell, pp. 67- 685 Maheu, pp. 36-37). a oo “
14 him to the jail. Balletti called Naheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this thing up to his ear" (O'Connell, “pp. n- 72; File R-505, FBI memorandum). Balletti's bail was paid by Rosella (Roselli, p. 52). os (i) Evidence concenitis CTIA involvement in the Tap. The ray Commit tee received conflicting diitence on whether the agency was consulted 1 prior to the installation of bhe! tap." O'Connell testified that he had called Edwards and cleared the placement of an electronic "bug" in Rowan's apartment prior to the installation of the tap (O'Connell, pp. 67-71). Maheu recalled that! fs hadeinitially asked O'Connell if 1 ee the CIA would handle the job, andlithat O'Connell had told him that "he would call Mr. dlls and see if they would have the — i capability of scot ce this, . . . and that subsequently ; ‘he informed me that re i te do it, but approved paying for it if we hired an independent oe Edwards had said that they would not epeaenersend private detective to plit it on." (Maheu, 7/29, p. 37). On the other hand, Edwards , in a May 14, 1962 memorandum for the mr Attorney General (discussed at leheth, infra, pe ), stated that "At the time of the ihbident.néither. the Agency nor. +x the undersigned knew [pf the proposed technical installation." Regardless of whether the CIA initially authorized the tap, it is apparent ‘that the CIA paid for the tap. : [DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu had paid him a retainer of $1,000. (Bile R-505, p. 14). O'Connell confirmed that CIA "indirectly" paid for! the tap because "we paid Maheu a certain amount of money s and he just paid it out of what we were giving him." "Q: But it was understood, ‘or you understood, that out of the money the CIA made available: 'to Maheu, Dubois would be paid for the tap? A: Yes. . i oe #® ws Q@: And Colonel Edwards. 4+; knew somebody was bein employed i in order to accomplish! a tap? ad a A: That is right." (O'Connell, p. 69.) > “ A memorandum by J.. Edgar Hoover: states that the Attorney General said he had been told by Edwards that the NCIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu in making the installation" (Memo Hoover, 4/10/62). tf | HY 50955 BDocld: 3242935524 Page 39 i t
HW 50955 Bocld: 15 bin The Inspector General's Report aceepted Edwards' assertion that "the Agency was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after the fact", but offered no further evidence. to support that contention (1.G., p. 67). t The Committee also réceived conflicting evidence concerning ~whether the tap had been placed’ to keep Giancana in Miami or to check on security leaks. O'Connell tbsfirtea that during the early stages of negotiations with the gambling weteare Maheu informed O'Connell that a girl friend of Gianeana was S, an affair with Rowan. Giancana wanted” Maheu to bug Rowan's room; otherwise, Giancana threatened to fly to Las i fi Vegas himself. Maheu was concerned that Giancana's departure would Ht disrupt the negotiations, and secured O'Connell's permission to arrange Ls i for a bug to ensure Giancana's..continued presence and cooperation. a ud (O'Connell, pp. 68-67.) Maheu kilfstantially confirmed this account (Maheu, pp. 25-30). ok MH nf There is some evidence’ suggesting that the CIA itself may have i ‘4 instituted the tap to determine’ ‘whether Giancana was leaking information Wo about his involvement in an assassination attempt against Castro. Bissell was informed that Giancana had been talking about Giancana's I involvement in an. assassination plot’. { without. indicating the CIA was uo hen yt * when Roselli talked with Giancana after the wiretap had been discovered, Gianecana "laughed. ... I remenber his expression, smoking a cigar, he almost swallowed it laughing about it" (Roselli, p. 52). Roselli claims that he was “perturbed! ‘because "Tt was blowing everything, blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to keep quiet" (Roselli, p. 22). ‘Roselli said that he told Giancana that the CIA was involved in the operation "in order to have hii keep his mouth shut" (Rosell, p. 27). ih 324735274 Page 40
, i ee uit involved) by an October 18, 1960 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, which ’ i “ stated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported: "(D)uring recent conversations with several friends, Gianeana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done. away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated “ , that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. . . Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further ~ described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's." (File R-505, memo from Hoover to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/19/60.) Roselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for the tap on different occasions: first that Gjancana was concerned about a i _ possible affair between Rowan and his girl friend; and, second, that he had arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girl — H friend about the assassinationjplot, and whether she was spreading the story (Roselli, pp. 47-48). Maheu gave the second explanation to the ' FBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the tap (File -R-505, FBI Summary), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum to the | Attorney General: . Nvgheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that (Giancana's girl friend) might know of the proposed operation and might. pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friend of (Giancana's girl friend)". (Memorandum, Edwards to Kemedy, 5/14/62.) (ii) “Consequences of the tap. Edwards told Maheu that if he was "approached by the FBI, he. could refer them to me to be briefed that-he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba" (Memo, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62). FBI records indicate that on April 18, HY 50955 Docld: 324235274 ‘Page ai
HW 450955 | SUR Wl 1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA, and suggested that Sheffield Edwards be.contacted (File R-505, Memo, 4/20/61). Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it might reveal sensitive information relating to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion* (R-505, ‘Summary of FBI file). Ina memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbett J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney General that the "national interest" would preclude any prosecutions based upon the tap. Following a briefing of ' the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to prosecute.** : t 7 i * Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are described fully infra at pp. ¥% Maheu subsequently drew on his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee investigating invasions of privacy in 1966. According to the Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the Committee intended to call him, “he applied pressure on the Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might expose his past sensitive work for the CIA" (I.G., p. 74). Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, met with Maheu and his attorney, Fdward P. Morgan, and informed Senator Long that Maheu had been involved in CIA operations (Houston, pp. 58-60). As a result, the Long Committee did not call Maheu to testify. , Docld: 324273524 Page 42
HW 50955 mit (4) Poison Pills Are Prepared and Delivered’ to Cuba The Inspector General's Report described conversations among Bissell, Rawards , and Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning the most effective method of poisoning Castro (1.G., pp. 23- 24). There is some evidence that Giancana or Roselli originated if ; the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro's drink to give the "asset" a chance to escape (1.G., p. 25). O'Connell recalled Roselli's request for something "nice and clean, with- out getting into any kind of out and out ambushing", preferably a poison that would disappear ‘without a trace (O'Connell, p. 116). The Inspector General's Report cited O'Connell as stating that the Agency had first considered a "ganeland-style killing" in which Castro would. be gunned down. Glancana reportedly opposed the idea because it would be difficult to recruit someone for such a dangerous operation, arid suggested instead the use of poison. (1I.G., p. 25) : "—s-Rawards réjected the first batch of pills prepared by TSD because they. would not dissolve in water. A second batch, containing botulinum toxin, "did the job expected of them" when tested on monkeys. (I.G., pp. 25-26; O'Connell, p. 43) O'Connell received the pills from TSD, probably in | February 1961, with reassurances that they were lethal ,* and * Records of the TSD still ‘extant in 1967 indicate that the pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to O'Connell sometime thereafter. Boclad: 3274735274 Page 43
HW 450955 19 then gave them to Roselli _(0*Connell, p. 43). In late February or March 1961, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered in Cuba to an official close to Castro who may have received kickbacks from the gambling interests (I.G., p. 23). The official kept the pills for a few weeks, then returned them. Roselli and O'Connell ascribed! his failure to a case of 4 "cold feet" (Roselli, p. oly: éConnell, p. Wu). “The Inspector i General noted that he had rost! ints position in the Prime Minister's office, and thus acess to*Castro,: before he received the pills (I.G., p. 28). (5) A Seconda Delivery Is Attempted Following ‘this first failure, Roselli told O'Connell that Trafficante believed Tony Varona, a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement, might be able to accom- plish the assassination (I.G., p. 29).* Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona y Lorado headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a Cuban exile group supported by the CIA. The Inspector Gene¥al's Report suggests that Varone: may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in * O'Connell testified that he met Varona only once, and that after the meeting Varona told Roselli: "Look, I don't know [sic] like the CIA and you can't tell me that this guy isn't a CIA man". O'Connell recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or what, os but he suspected that I wasn't what I was ‘represented to. be." (O'Connell, p.- 22. .) Na A BDocld: 3242735274 Page 44
Sere? HW 50955 20 Cuba after the overthrow of Castro (I.G., p. 29). The Report speculated that Varona was interested in the assassination ' scheme as a means of financing the purchase of arms and communications equipment (I.G., p. 31). Varona claimed to have a contact inside a restaurant frequented by castro (Roselli, p- 21). As a prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and $1,000 worth - of communications equipment (L.G., pp. 31-32; O'Connell, p. 23). O'Connell recalls that Colonel Jd. C. King, head of the Western i Hemisphere Division, gave him .$50,0007in Bissell's office to pay Varona if he successfully ‘assassinated Castro (O'Connell, ! pp. 17-21). O'Connell stated ‘that Bissell also authorized him to give Varona the clectronies ieguspment that he requested (O'Connell, pp. 20-2h). a | Bissell testified that he did not doubt that some cash was given to O'Connell, ana that he was aware that the poison pills had been prepared. He did not recall the meeting, and considered it unlikely that O'Connell. would have been “given the imoney in his office (Bissell, 6/11, p. 40). The Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an interview with the person who signed the voucher for the funds, placed the amount at $10,000 (I.G., pp. 31-32), If the Inspector General's conclusions were correct, the funds which Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment a» Docld:324273574 Page 45
HW 50955 el 1 ae to Varona, and not the $150,000 that was to be paid to Varona 7 after. Castro's death. The record does clearly reflect, however, that communications equipment:was delivered to Varona* and that he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, probably in the amount of $10,000 (1.G:, p. 32). The money and pills were delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante, and Varona at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Roselli recalled, Maheu b "opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of money on his lap... . and also came up with the capsules and he explained how they were going to be used. As far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling soups and things like that, but they could be used in water or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Roselli, “p. 21). ¥* Varona had: no better success than Orta. According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards believed , the scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting the restau- rant where the "asset" was employed. Maheu suggested an * O'Connell testified that a man from the communications office delivered the communications equipment that Varona had requested to Miami (O'Connell,:p. 20). Maheu recalled deliver- ing an automobile which he had been told contained communica-— tions..equipment to an empty lot (Maheu, p. 52). ¥* Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred, and did not recall being present at a meeting at which the pills were passed (Maheu, pp. 40-1). Maheu did recall that O'Connell showed him the pills in an envelope and told him that the pills « would be given to a Cuban (Maheu, p. 4o). Docla: 32423524 Page 46
‘ ee? HW 50955 Boclda: 324273524 Page 47 eln. alternative reason. He recalled being informed that after the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had to be received before in fact! they were administered" (Maheu, i é p. 42). -He testified that he iwas informed by O'Connell some- time after the operation that'|the Cubans had an opportunity to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra or Raul Castro, but that the [jg stenal" never came (Maheu, 1 ane pp. 43-44, 60-61}. He did not -know who was responsible for giving the signal (Maheu, p. 4h-b5), Varona subsequently Hi - returned the cash and the pills, (O'Connell, -pp. 19-20; CIA Justice file R-153, Memorandum. Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66). The date’ of the Varona operation is unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in March- April 1961, prior-to the Bay of, Pigs (I.G., p. 29). Bissell “Tt testified that the effort against Castro was called off after the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/11 : p. 52) and Maheu testified that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of Pigs (Maheu, D- 50). O'Connell, however, was certain that it . a , . occurred during early 1962 (O'Connell, pp. 47-48). id (c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II (1) Change in Leadership The Inspector General's Report 8 divides the gambling syndicate operation into Phase I, termina-
22 PPS ETS MY) PT EST en re AAROE rh ting with the Bay of Pigs, and ‘Phase IT, beginning with: William Harvey's involvement in late 1961. The distinction between a clearly demarcated Phase I and Phase II may be an artificial one, as there is considerable evidence that the operation was continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period | . Ved; immediately following the Bay’'jof Pigs.* id 14 In‘ early 1961, Harvey** was assigned the it responsibility for establishing a general capability within the CIA for disabling foresen indore including assassination as a "last resort" (Bissell, 6/9. p. 73; Harvey, 6/25, pp. sho 35). a t de . . hh oO * Harvey said that he took ‘over a "going operation” from Edwards (1.G., p. 42; Harvey, 6/25, p. 67) and emphasized that: "I would like to make as clear as I can that there was no phase 1, phase 2 in this. This is an ongoing matter which I injected into ..!'. . (Harvey, 6/25, p. 90). Continuity was provided by retaining O'Connell as the case officer for the project well into May 1962. During interviews for the Inspector General's Report , O'Connell recelled that there was "something going on' " between. the Bay of Pigs and Harvey's assumption of control x (1. G., p. 43). When testifying before the Committee, 0! Connell! firmly. recalled several trips to Miami in the Fall of 1961, ana "right up to the time I turned it over to Harvey I was’ in and out of Miami" (O'Connell, pp. 89-90). ; ** Harvey had a. long background in clandestine activities. He had conceived and carried out the Berlin tunnel operation (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9), and served as Chief of the division, which was responsible for the.. ‘surreptitious acquisition of .code information (Harvey, 6/25, Pp. 8- ~9). | HW 350955 Docld:3242355274 Page 46
i “eee! HW 50955 Bocld: 23 The capability was called aa included under the cryptonym bUyeoeue, It and the evidence relating to (i) its connectio: ie the "White House" and (ii) whether or not it involved acid ton as well as "capability" is i i ' — HI ; Harvey's. notes reflect that Bissell asked ¢ fi him to take over the gambling" syndicate operation from Edwards i { and discussed the “application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba" on November 16, 1961 (1.G., p. 39). Bissell confirmed that the conversation took place and accepted fhe November date as accurate (Bissell, 7/17, pp- 12-13). He also testified that the operation ore tot ; : eer . . "was not reactivated, inidther words, no instructions - went out to Roselli or to others .. . to renew’the- attempt, until after I had’ left the Agency" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 53). Harvey agreed that his conversation with Bissell was limited to exploring the feasibility of using the gambling syridicate against Castro (Harvey, T/ll, p: 60). ~~ Richard Helms replaced Bissell as DDP in February 1962. As such,’ he was Harvey's superior. Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of the gambling 32473574 Page 49
PN TE us ‘pea syndicate operation at all stages* (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 65-66; al mt oa log ‘ T/ll, p. ha; I.G., p. 41). (2) The Operation is Reactivated _ In early April 1962, Harvey, who testi- fied that. he was acting on "explicit orders” from Helms (Harvey, T/ll, p. 18), requested Bawarde! to put him in touch with Roselli (CIA Justice File R- 153; viva memorandum , 5/14/62). O'Connell . first introduced Harvey to Roselli in Miami, where Harvey told Roselli to maintain his cuban ieontacts, but not to deal with Maheu or Giancana (O'Connell, p. 50; ; Roselli, pp. 27-30), whom he had decided were “untrustworthy” “" "surplus" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65). O'Connell recalled that Roselli! did not initially trust Harvey, q 4 { , oe *When interviewed for the ‘Inspector General's Report, Harvey j stated that he briefed Helms on}his first meeting with Roselli, , and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the Castro operation" (I.G., p. 1) Helms! recollection was less certain. Helms did recall that he was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Roselli in April 1962. He remembered that! he "reluctantly" had approved the operation, but that he had no confidence that it would succeed (Helms, 7/17, p- 23). . When asked.if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida, Helms testified: vy "I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recall necessarily approving them; but since Harvey alleges to have them and says that hé 'took them to Miami, I must have, I must have authorized them in some fashion.” (Helms, 6/13, p. 44). -Helms confirmed that.Harvey was "reporting quite regularly what was going on. Whether he reported everything. or not, I do not know." It was Helms' expectation that Harvey would have reported to him a matter such as the pills. (Helms , 6/13, p. 105). However, Helms also _ testified: - ; { - "You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currently a - ; informed. Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today , I don't remember it, as I have said. But I do not recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life"(Helms, 7/18, p. 32). HW 50955 Boclays2423524 Page 50 ; i
HW 50955 DocTd:324273574 Page 51 although they subsequently developed a close friendship. (O'Connell, p. 52). Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli met for ‘a second time in New York on April 8-9, 1962 (1.G., p. 43). A Fy notation made during this time in the files of the Technical Ser- vices Division indicates that folir poison pills were given to O'Connell on April 18, 1962 (1I.G., pp. 46-17). The pills were passed to Harvey, who arrivea in Miami on April 21, and found Roselli already in touch with Varona (I.G., p- 47). He gave the pills to Roselli, explaining that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything" (Roselli, Pp. 31). Roselli testified that he told Harvey that the Cubans intended to use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul Castro. According to Roselli's testimony, Harvey approved of the targets, stating "everything is 411 right, what they want to do" ‘ diy 4 (Roselli, p. 34). In Varona rbquested arms and equipment as a guid pro quo for carrying out the assassination operation (O'Connell, pp. 53-54). Harvey, with the help ofthe CIA's Miami station (JMWAVE) , procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios, and boat radar costing about $5,000 (1.G., p- hg). Harvey and the chief of the JMWAVE station rented a U-Haul truck under an asstitied name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot (Harvey, 6/25, p. 63). The keys were given to Roselli, who watched the delivery from across the street with O'Connell (O'Connell, pp. 92-93). ‘ oon : fae |
HW 450955 BDocld: 3242735274 Page 52 ' 26 The truckload of equipment was finally picked up by either Varona or Roselli's agent, Maceo (.G., pp. 49=50; Roselli, p. 4o). Harvey testified that the arms "sould" have been for use in the ; assassination attempt, but that they were not given to Varona solely for that purpose (Harvey, T/1l, p. 9). Roselli kept Harvey informed of the ‘operation's progress. Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the pills and guns had arrived in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 64; Roselli, pp. 34, 42-43). On June 21, he told Harvey that Varona had dis- patched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's Report described the team's mission as. "vague" and conjectured that: the team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the poison pills if the opportunity arose (I.G.,-p. 51). Harvey met Roselli in. Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Varona was reported to be preparing to send in another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were still "safe" in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, D. 103; I.G., p. 51). | _ Harvey testified that by this time he had grave doubts about whether] the operation would ever take place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 104). Varona's second team never left for Cuba, claiming that "conditions" in Cuba were!not right (1I.G., p. 51-52). During early January 1963, Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray Varona's expenses (I.G., p. 52). if
i Ly il Se Upeaua dl a i i Harvey terminated the sera in mia-february 1963. At a meeting with Roselli in Los! | Anigeles, it was agreed that Roselli would taper off his communications with Varona (1.G., pp. (32 53). Roselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans. _. However, he never informed then that the offer of $150, 900 for Castro's assassination had been withdrawn® (Roselli, p. 45). i ' The:lagency personnel who dealt with “b> . Roselli attributed his motivation to patriotism** and testified that he was not paid for his services. According to O'Connell, Roselli , - “paid his way, he paid his, own hotel fees, he paid his own travel.... And he, never took a nickel, he said, no, as long as it is for the government of the United States, this is ‘thle least I can 1 do, because I owe it a lot.” (0"Consie12 p. 27). : } \ Edwards agreed that Roselli was "never paid a » cent (Edwards, p- 16), and Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing at all, not even for expenses, and that Mr. Roselli was given a pittance that did not even begin to cover his expenses (Maheu, 7/29, p. 68). It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Roselli's pede i ve - ~ c, ae * "Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they understood from you to ‘come from Wall Street was still. outstanding? oh "A: I don't know if they still think so ... I didn't see them after that to tell! them that" (Roselli, p. 45). " ** Roselli claims that he was motivated by “honor and dedi- cation" (Roselli, p- 59). In 1943, Roselli had been convicted of extorting money from motion picture producers to insure studios against. labor strikes,“ and during the period of his contacts with the CIA, Roselli was ‘ deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas No ; _ (File R-505, Summary of FBI: ‘Doeuments). It is possible that he believed’ cooperating with thél'government in the assassination operation might serve him well ‘in the future. ‘ eye F| HW 350955 DBocld:3242355274 Page 53
HW 450955 28 fh ky hotel bill during his stay in Mim in October 1960.* The CIA's involvement with Roselli caused the Agency some a if prosecutions for fraudulent gambling ifficulty during Roselli's subsequent 4 : ‘activities and living in the country Wi under an assumed name.** vt i (4) Plans ‘uh frariy 1963 Two rips to assassinate Castro were ex- plored by Task Force W, the section concerned with covert Cuban : nak 1 on operations, in early 1963. Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased),- Chief : of the Task Force, asked Samuel Halpern to determine whether an exotic seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro ‘commonly went skin diving (Halpern ,} p. 28). The idea was explored by the Technical Division and. discarded as| impractical (Helms, 6/13, p. 135; I.G., p-77) - A second plan (who was negotiating with Castro for al a * FBI reports reveal that Roselli! Ss! lexpenses | at the Kennilworth Hotel, where he was registered from October 11 - 30, 1960 under the name. of J.A. Rollins, were paid by Maheu (File R7505, FBI file summary, p.10). Maheu's expenses were reimbursed by the CIA: pe aft ; ** In May 1966, the FBI. threatened id theport Roselli for living in the United. States under an assumed name unless! ‘nel | cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia. (Roselli, whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and allegedly brought illegally into the United States while still a child.) Roselli contacted Edwards, who informed the FBI that Roselli wanted to “keep square with the Bureau," but was: -afraid that gangsters might kill. him for “talking" (CIA Justice File R-153),!Nemorandum, Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66). After Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency, ‘to represent him (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum for Record by Osborn, 12/11/67). Harvey contacted the Agenicy and suggested that it prevent the prosecution (Osborn Memorandum, supra)! Roselli was subsequently convicted of violating United States interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA approached the Immigration and Naturaliaation Service, Department of Justice, to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli! S past operational activity with CIA "that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought. (CIA to I Select Committee, 7/21/75). It was: agreed that CIA would be kept informed of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently being litigated in the courts. Bocld: 32742735274 Page 54
HW 50955 SPUN “29 a i: a ido BF taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit*® (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39). The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or do Fitzgerald conceived of the [plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely Hy that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed his negotiations by the middie; of January 1963. Helms characterized wa the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms. 6/13, p. 135). TSD bougit a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura t foot). and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states that the plan was abandoned bedause Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). “Helms testified a that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135). (e) AMLASH i. (1) origin of the Project a In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico City CIA station met with a hldnay-ptacea Cuban official to determine if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G., “p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-~1, had been a [i = . mea gid. *Donovan was not aware of! the plan. ae Docla: 32423524 Page 55 a
WW 50955 DoclTd: 32423524 Page 56 30 Heath 1 Ral involved with an anti-Batistl faction that only grudgingly accepted Castro's rule (Case officer 2) ip. 9, 39).* The meeting was incon- ‘i i clusive, put lead to subsequerlt meetings at which AM/LASH-1 agreed to cooperate with the CIA. W AM/LASH-1, was viewed as an important "asset" Be ees inside Cuba. As a pigh-ranbing military leader who enjoyed the confidence of Fidel Castro, ns could keep the CIA informed of the internal workings of the régime ‘(case Officer 2, pp. 23, 40). It was also believed that he met play a part in fomenting a coup within Cuba (Case Officer 2h Bi 43) Fe | From che first contact with AM/LASH-1, until’ the latter part of 1963, it, was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba. His inttiad requests to the CIA and FBI for he aid in defecting were rebuffed (I.G., pp. 80, 82-83). When Case Officer 1 joined the AM/LASH-1" operation in June 1967, his assign- . * The Committee has taken the testimoy of the two case officers involved in the AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH-1 through September 1963; Case Officer 2 continued until mid~1965 (Case Officer 2, p- ). ‘The Committee has agreed not to divulge their names as they are still'in active service with the Agency. *¥*® AM/LASH-1 was the major "asset" in the AM/LASH operation. During this period the CIA also sponsored a separate operation to "“pnenetrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections or an attempt to produce: information from dissidents, or | _perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then present government in Cuba" (Case Officer 1, pp. 18, 22). . The case officers for AM/LASH were also involved in this second related program. sot
HW 450955 Docld:324273524 Page 57 yids ge epee 31 : ; a cf mA Bd ment was to "stay in place ia t At a meeting in August 1962)in a foreign capital, AM/LASH-1 stated report. to.us" (case Officer 1, p. 38). that he would remain in cuba ah | | meeting). The subject of as y de if he "could do something really signifi- cant for the creation of a w Cuba", and expressed a desire to plan iA [: the execution of Fidel. Cast pease Officer 1 Contact Report, August 1 - | S . vt apeinating C Castro was again discussed 962, between AM/LASH1 and his case at a meeting on August 10, officer. The case officer gontact report states that assassination was raised in discussing noi/pASH-L's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH-1 j was visibly\upset. "It vas{ingt, the att that he objected to, but re aap hte ue a merely the choice of the wora|sea to describe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable." (Case Officer|1 iContact Report, August 7-10, meetings). ic | The cate|feticers vt who testified before the Com- | | a ' mittee said that AM/LASH-1 } was | “not directly requested to assassinate Af Castro. The record clearly/reveals, however , that the agency per- es il ‘ sonnel dealin gwith AM/LASH! 1.were aware of his desire to take such boo action. A cable to headquarters reporting an August 1§, 1963 meet- i ing with AM/LASH-1 stated: | ‘"Have no intention give AMLASH-1 physical elim- ination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative. ue ®* Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH-1 discussed "eliminating' Castro, although he attributed such) remarks to AMLASH-1's "mercurial" nature, and stated that no specific|:plans for assassinations were ever discussed (Case Officer 1, pp. 39-41;'62). The case officer who took over the’ AMLASH project in September: 1963 recalled being briefed by Case Officer 1 on AMLASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first step in a coup. (Case Officer @ Pp. 28). The second AMLASH case officer described the context in which AMLASH-1 generally raised the topic. of" {qssassination: "You also must recognize ; "that AMLASH was a rather tempera- mental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and whereas he may have said: ‘something like this in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk about organizing a regular military coup in the next breath." (Case Officer 2, p.29) rT . by
HY 0955 Docld: 324273574 Page 52 =e Ve again raised the possibilit * defecting, but indicated that he : ahs 7 would be willing to continu drking against the Castro regime if At a m ¥ f e : 4 he received firm assurances of American support (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49). According to Case ‘Officer 2, AMLASH-1 asked for military supplies, a device} with which to protect himself if his plots against Castro were dhecqvered, and a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy (cast Officer 2, pp. 48-h9). Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), who was then Chief, SAS * agreed ts meet AMLASH-1 and give him the assur- ances he sought. The rospel od General's Report states that Fitz- gerald | consulted with the Ps Helms , who agreed that Fitzgerald should hold himself out as : personal representative of Attorney General Kennedy (1I.G., p. 8g) a Helms leatiriea that he did not recall the con- i versation, and speculated that the Attorney General might not have yh been consulted because : "this was so central fo ‘the whole theme of what we had . been trying to do . . ||. (find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and [have a group to replace Castro). This is obviously what! we had been pushing, what every- body had been. pushing {for us to try to do, and. it is that context that I would have made some remark like this. (Helms , 6/13, p. aT) 4 * SAS (Special Affairs Start) was the name given to Task Force W in early-1963 when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as head of the covert Cuban operations. The AMLASH Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald. ** The contact plan for the jproposea meeting stated: "Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who Itrairelled to (fcreign capital) for spe- cific purpose meeting /AMLASH-1 and giving him assurances of” full support with a change of the present government in Cuba. 4 Wo rr {
33 Helms recalled that he told\ Fitzgerald to i . "so ahead and say that!) from the standpoint of political ae support, the United States government will be behind you if “you are successful. ‘This ‘had nothing to do with killings. . This’ had only to do with. the political action part of it". (Helms, 6/13, p. 131. Nr Fitzgerald met AM/LASH-1 on October 29, 1963, . i : in a foreign capital, and rae that the United States would in! sal support a coup against Castio# }(Case Officer 2, p. 60). When { l Hed - later interviewed for the ee General's Report, Fitzgerald i ‘recalled that AM/LASH-1 regllatdaay requested an assassination A weapon, particularly a nnelbdvore rifle with telescopic sights that could be used to kill caltro from a distance" (1.6., p. 90). Fitzgerald stated that he tah would have "no part of an Rinieas on Castro's life" (I. G., p- 90). Met Case Officer 2 recalled that. i ! ae /AM/LASH-1 that the United States {/LASH=1 ‘raised the prospect of assassinating Castro, but dialnot propose an explicit plan (Case ey : SH-1, was, however, “convinced that Officer 2, pp. 62, 85). i: i ° Castro had to: ‘be removed ae i i I * Case Officer 2 did not recall whether Robert Kennedy's name was used (Case Officer 2, p. 60). i, ower. before a coup could be under- hey cea . : es woe i Boner ate as HY 50955 DBocld: 32423574 Page 59
HW 50955 Docld: Officer 2, dated November 1 g2425524 34 bi p. 61). a taken in Cuba” (Case ortiedh 2 AMLASH 1, also requested high-powered rifles and grenades (Case Officer aap: 77). A memorandum by Case 3, 4963, states: Zs "C/SAS (Fitzgerald) dtigroved telling AMLASH-1 he would be given a cache. inside}Cuba. Cache could, if. he requested it, include! .) . high powered rifles with scopes .. a ho : tel AMLASH-1 was told on HovenBer! 22, 1963, that the cache would be dropped in Cuba (Case orriey (2) Thel!Poison Pen.Device On ror 22, 1963, Case Officer 2 met with ‘loffered him a ball-point pen rigged | suggested that Blackleaf 40 would be an effective poison to use ‘in the device. (Case Officer 2, p. 110) ' The needle was designed to- ‘bel S0 fine that the victim would not notice its insertion (case btficer 2, p. 103). The Taspector General's Report states that Case Officer 2, when he was) interviewed in 1967, stated that AMLASH-1 had ‘requested the Agency to. |. i bib "devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause, him to lose his own life in the try.' (1.G., vp, 92) | a The Report concluded that: "although none of the} ‘participants so stated, it may be inferred that they were! seeking a means of assassination of a sort that AMLASH-1 might reasonably have been ex- pected + to have devised himself. " (I.G., p-. 92) Page 60
"h be . y } } i if 7 Mh : wen why jsf Halpern , Fitzgerald's assistant, told the Committee that the pen was intended to show "bona fides" and "The orders were to do something to get rid of Castro. . and we thought this other method might work whereas: a rifle ~~ wouldn't." (Halpern, p! 26) Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured ‘to take care of a vebinlet, trom him that he have some device for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him, whatever the case mayer (Helms, 6/13, p. 113) w, . (t)his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11, p. 133)* ° On November 22, 2963, Fitzgerald and the case officer met with AMLASH-lL in a Evropean capital and offered him the poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf-0, a deadly poison which is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, p. 112) The Inspect- or General's Report noted that ho . "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro." (I.G., p. 9) “* In his testimony before the.Committee, Case Officer 2 offered a con- flicting story. He said that the purpose of the pen was "to provide AMLASH with a device which would serve him to “protect” Himself in case he Was-confronted with and charged with being involved in|a military coup against Castro." (Case Officer 2, p. 107) According to the case officer, AMLASH-1 had requested an "esoteric device which could easily be concealed and which he could use in self-defense (Case Officer 2, po. 98-99).| The device was not intended for offensive use against any person, but was rather . ~» "a kind of psychological erutch . . .to help him think that we were interested in his own Protection, his own security” ' (Case Officer 2, pp. 104-105 This version is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, some of which were written by the AMLASH case officer, which establish that AMLASH-1 intended to kill Castro, and that the CIA knew his desire and endeavored to supply the means. - that he needed. 4, i . : Co. | HWY 350955 Docld:327423524 Page 61
HY 0955 cer 2, pp. 110-111). - Bocld: 3242735274 Page 62 i 36 The case officer later recalled that AMLASH-1 did not "think much of the device,” and complained that CIA could surely "come up with something more sophisticated than that” (I.G., p-. 93a). The case officer recalled offering the pen to AMLASH-1, but could not remember whether AMLASH-1 threw it away then or took it with him (case Officer 2, pp. 105, 110). He did recall that AMLASH-1 said he ould not. take the pen back to Cuba, but did not know what AMLASH- in fact did with the pen (Case Offi- An entry in the CIA files on AMLASH dated March 29, 1965, states: "although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AMLASH-1 on November 22, 1963, that CIA would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight , silencer, all the money he wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with AMLASH-1 changed’ and it was decided that we could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and would not aid AMLASH-1 in this attempt. . . AMLASH-1 was not informed of (this de- cision) until. he was seen by the case officer in Noven- ber, 1964. "
37 (3) Providing AMLASH-1 with Arms CTA cables indicate that one cache of arms for AMLASH-1 was delivered inCuba in March 1964 and another in June. An entry in the AMLASH |file for May 5, 1964, states that the case officer requested the Technical Services Division to pro- duce, on a "crash basis,” a silencer which would fit an FAL rifle. The contact report of a meeting between the case officer and a confidant of AMLASH states that AMLASH was subsequently informed that it was not feasible to make a silencer-—for an FAL. Toward the latter part of 1964, AMLASH-1 became more insistent on the: act that the assassination of the Cuban leadership was a necessary initial step ina successful coup. (case Officer 2, pp. 129-133), In a memorandum dated December 10, ne 1964, the case officer wrote} | "AMLASH-1 was told and: fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree ‘in the 'first step' of: his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where B-1 could fit in: ‘nicely in giving any support he - would request. " vt - . 1 Poeun in the AMLASH file establish that in - early 1965, the CIA put AMLASH in contact with B-1, the leader of an id anti-Castro group. As the case officer explained to the Inspector General: “1 7 | HY 50955 DBocld:324273574 Page 63
HW 450955 B-1 states that B-1, in his " . . . what had happened was that SAS had conttived to put B-1 and AMLASH jbGgether in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had been engin- eered by CIA. The thought was that B-l needed a man inside and AMLASH wantled a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, B-1' fright get its man inside Cuba and AMLASH might get nis silenced weapon -- from B-1." (I1.G., p. 101) if tH I: A report ; of a meeting between a case officer and tt initial contacts with AMLASH-1, discussed ie mie plans for assassinating Castro. AMLASH-1 suggested that guerrilla raids against Cuba should be! istepped up one month before the i Sm \ i "attempt on Fidel Castro" to, Mprepare the public and raise the morale and resistance spirit of the: people.' B-l reported that AMLASH-1 believed that the only sowutin to the problems in Cuba would " be in 4 ity "to get rid of Fidel Gastro. He is able either to shoot him with a silencer of'iplace a bomb in some place where Fidel will be. He might use, for example, a small bomb that he can carry and] place, or with his group attack, the residence where Fidel lives ... . B-l is going to provide AMLASH-1 with] escape routes and places where B-1 is able to pick him up He will memorize these points and escape routes. . UW next, B-l is to provide AMLASH-1 either a silencer for a FAL or, a rifle with a silencer.* ron) | | - an} 4 a & A CIA document dated danuary 3, 3, “1965, - states that B-l told a case officer that he and ee had reached an agreement on the following points: "1. B-l is to provide jAM/LASH-1 with a silencer for the FAL; if this is impossible, B-l1 is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several — bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment idévice which he would be able to carry and place next to [Fidel Castro. "0, Bel is to provide lAM/LASH- 1 with escape routes controlled | by B-1 and not by | the Americans. The lack of confidence built up by the Bay; of Pigs Looms large: "3. B-l is to prepare one of the western provinces, either Doocld: 32423524 Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandes- tine underground schanisn. This would be a fall back position and a sat] area where men and weapons are avail-~ able to the group:./ 1 P if Page 64 : |
HW 450955 "small, highly concentrated 39 ead 4 1965, stated Hisilencer and that AMLASH-1 had syplosives. On February 11, 1965 the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH—1 would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one? secretary" (I.G., p. 103). \) ! FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l's A jsubsequent cable reported that K, - "Bl had three packages | of special items made up by his technical i i . My people and delivered to AMLASH—1 in Madrid" (I.G., p. 103 in Jun e 11965, CI* terminated all contact with ‘tt AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities il were widely known (I.G., pp {iiloh105). WS , "6, Docld: 32423524 iy i : f fy Vy if i B-1l is .to.be in Cubul one week before the elimination B-1's location. B-1l is to arrange of Fidel, but no het including AM/LASH-1 will know 4 ve for recongition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and - a junta is formed. though Raul Castro ‘This junta will be established even and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in’ control of the part of the country. This. is the reason to establish some that the junta can ‘AM/LASH- 1 requested that B-1 be able control over one of the provinces so be formed in that location. One month to the day, before the neutralization of Fidel, B-l will increase ithe number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to|raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cubal.! {in all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be AM/LASH-L' S war name. Page 65 ny | , 1 "| f ay i ii i
HW 50955 Boclda: 3274735274 Page 66 Approved by’ Dratting Subcommiteee 9/5/75 — i if te ai H a ale ate dp. le de 2. At What Level bbe the Castro Plots Authorized or vf Known About Within the central. Intelligence Agency? © (a) The sueselil hg resented.. As we have seen, first Richard Bissell and then’ Richard Helms, each as Deputy Director of Plans (DDP), were aware of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. The evidence set forth herein relses to whether their superiors in the Agency, in particular sith Dulles and John McCone, authorized or were aware of the assassination plots. Dulles served as DH petox of Central Intelligence (DCT) from. 1953 to November 1961. MeCone served as DCI from November (1961 ne to 1965.* The Committee took considerable testimony on whether Dul- u fie i les and MeCone (or their Deputy DCLI's, General Cabell and General Carter, respectively) knew about or authorized the plots against Fidel Castro's life, I In summary, the evidence is as follows: (i) Dulled! Bissell and Edwards both hE ob é : expressed the belief that pulltes (and. his Deputy, General Cabell) fon Hs [i authorized the initial phase of the assassination plot involving - underworld figures. They acknowledged, however, that ‘Dulles (and his Deputy) were not told abate: the plot until after the under - al he: li; ‘world ‘figures had been contacted. The words said to have been used to brief them--"an intelligence operation"™--do not convey on * Bissell served as DDP from January 1, 1959, to February..17, 1962. (President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissell because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 6-8). ) Helms, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell in February 1962 as DDP. He was'appointed DDCI in April 1965, and DCL in June 1966. a
| | 2 iy 4 ‘ ee : ved assassination, although: Bissell th saning must have been understood. if yhich can be said both to suggest their. face that the plot invo 02g aaa and Edwards insist. the real me : . ih There is some other evidence Eee ig ow and to suggest that they did not : (ii) MeCone 7 that Dulles and Cabell did kn =O* know. (See Section. (b) below! McCone testified that he did not know about or authorize the plots. Helms and Bissell both stated that McCone was “not told by “them of the earlier assassination ef- Hi * forts when McCone assumed tndlfbosition of DCI in November 1961. The 1.G. Report states that Harvey received Helms' approval not to brief McCone when the actuiil efforts were resumed in 1962. Harvey testified this accorded with his recollection. Thereafter, al \ Helms and Harvey did not tell McCone about assassination activity on several occasions. Helms |did not recall any agreement not to brief McConé, but did not call into question the position taken by Harvey or the I.G. Report on this matter. Helms did say that Mc- | Cone never told him not to assassinate Castro, but added that he was not claiming that he toldiMeCone about the plots. (These mat- ters, as well as the various |Feasons put forward by Harvey and Helms for not briefing MeCon¢, are set forth in Section (c) below.) (b) Did Allen| Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial Plots Against Castro? Both/Allen Dulles and his Deputy (DDCT), * This testimony relates to the "airplane" incident in July 1960 and what the I.G. Report reférred to as the initial phase of the assassination effort involving the underworld. - With-respect* to- .the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I. G. Report concluded they could "find no evidence |that any of the schemes were approved at any level higher than division, if that". (1.G., p. 10.) HWY 350955 Docld:327423524 Page 67
General Cabell, are deceased. 1 _ “i i ‘ H a I Since we were unable to take any testimony from either, the Colinittee' s investigation centered around the documents availabl alive who served under Dulles " e' and the testimony of those still Bana Cabell.* '*The Inspector General ques preparing his Report in 1967. HY 50955 DBocld: 324293524 Page 63 an stioned neither. Dulles nor ee Cabell in
HW 450955 -sending of, Docld: 32423524 (i) Dulles' Janus 1969 Statement _t< to the Special Group Suggesting Contingency Plans for the Overthrow of the Casto Government, but Rul ingifout "Elimination" of Castro. January: 13, 1960, . the first Special Group disc) tnrow Castro, was not contemplated by the (1/13/60). ing, According to. first "noted the possibility, will not be able to tolerate gested that covert contingent of the. Castro government might “to the State Department repr was very important so as to to take over," Dulles "emphasized that we do elimination of Castro, to enable responsible fe) foothold." (ii) Dulles ' “Allebéa. Recission of the July 1960 emphasized thal) BE i. Dulles, ii) ussion of a covert ie in what was apparently program to over- = ‘a quick elimination of Castro" {Sase, a £ CIA (minutes of Special Group meet- t" ithe minutes of the meeting, Dulles i ‘that over the long run the U.S. hh ai ‘ithe Castro regime in Cuba, and sug- cy planning to sccomplish the fall nt be in order. Then, in response esentative' Ss comment that “timing permit a solidly based opposition hy i not: have in mind a quick but rather actions designed pposition leaders to get a Ye aE Airplane ‘Assassination. Plan Upon Learning of It. As discussed in gr in July, 1960, Tracy Barnes, in July, 1960, a! ~2 p tr ds . pater detail above (see p. ), Bissell" s assistant, approved the “cable to the Havana station stating i r that "possible removal of top) three leaders (was) receiving serious consideration, * and a plan to kill Raul Castro. shortly after it had been a Page 69 " ‘ phe fpstructions were given to carry out That plan was, however , “abandoned | i a coved. eee tae
HW 50955 Docld:324735294 Page 70 a ft ' . i The Executive Offic court action project, who hadl sent the he had "heard" had indicated that (Duty Officer, p. 29).* The; had no personal knowledge o£; or even if Dulles had been t fa i testified that "assassination had not b covert action project in action in this incident? policy against the use orf Officer, p. yee ra The countermanding cable} - "Operational Immediate," was, of the previous night. The .L saw the cable and’ was told that, best of my knowledge; my Director [Dulles], not t [Bissell] “nad directed that assassination was. not 9) (Duty Officer, p. 29). The officer stated that ne Bissell about the count ermandii cable and in all likelihood hi action in discussions the Chief of the Cuba project. ( ** The officer testified: | .7twe were schooled | {used assassination] we, understood this as a bas i "Question: So was it yo cable, and in view of you general practice with re you had been schooled tolat it was not done, ination was not part of} knew?" iz Hy: td: i that Dulles hel countermanded Barnes' Officer added, had counte -- had same morning with his superior, a w that although other countries. i br to the Cnief of the Cuba cables testified that he plan and d i Vassassination was not to be considered." however, that he the reason for calling off the plan, hie one who called it off, he further een part of the Cuba 1960 and that Dulles' conformed with CIA assassination. " (Duty i i i t bo the Havana station, which was sent the morning after the cable pRticer who sent that cable testified: to the jmemory is that the He Deputy Director xrmanded the cable and indicated that be considered." . ‘did not talk to either Dulles or ing cable, but that he did see the eard of the reason for Dulles' re- the Duty Officer, pp. 30-32). and I-had always. "(Duty Officer, do not, ic rule. p 14). ur understanding after this ur knowledge of the Agency spect to assassination in which that assass- as far as you nae ad aie ania the Cuba Project, \
t “eax” HW 50955 BDoclda: 324273524 Page Fi { "Officer: That's verve! { wok ke | "Question: And would it] your recollections conceé as what Mr. Dulles’ atti on your general training said ... [and] that afte were told fortified) that Dulles had nullifie jbe accuaate to say that srning what you now view ti tudes were ... are based ‘about what had always been this incident, what you that previous belief [in] dat least this particular cable?" EL, "Officer: Correct.” ‘| “Question: Do you have or as a result of your i that would indicate to t Mr. Dulles did have assai to speak?" "Officer: anything in your recollection nformed opinion or experience he contrary; that is, that ssination in his arsenal, so -_ ‘I have no basis for any such speculation." (Duty Officer, pp. 31, |). ae !
HW 450955 (iii) Dulles priefis in September 1960. | 1. Bissell | i on Use of Underworld Figures Ah Edwards Said Dulles Was Told About An "Intelligence e operacilh | With No "Bad Words" Used, But. “That Dulles Cand his Deputy) Und: Understood That to Mean a Bissell recalled that "in the latter part of Assassination. 1 September" there was "'a meeting briefed Mr, Dulles and General \Cabell" . } i i Bissell testified that "Colone i circumlocutious terms the plan) Sas, syndicate representatives" (Big that Edwards had said: "that contact had been made with [the underworld], for their use, a plan had been prepared ssell, 6/9, Pp. in which Col. Edwards and I (Bissell, 6/9, p. 20). Edwards outlined in somewhat jrhat he had discussed with 22). He stated that and I think he either said in as many words or strongly inferred that the plan would be put inte or subsequent ey he was told by Mr. not be". (Bissell, 6/9, P. The. CIA's 1967 I.G. with Edwards and Bissell, said) | as follows: . th "The discussion was circumspect. avoided the use of any "bad words' "an intelligence operation’ term used was Report, effect unless at that time Dulles that it. should 22.).% based upon interviews ‘Dulles and Cabell were briefed Edwards deliberately The ,descriptive Edwards is quite sure that the DCI land the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the. operation he was discussing. He * Bissell ‘testified that hel was’ relying on the dating provided in the Inspector General' s Report, but that his state- ments concerning what was said| at the meeting were of his personal knowledge (Bissell, f t ee SN AO at DoclTd: 324235274 Page 72 4a 6/9, pp. 20-22).
HY ' Smee 0955 I recalls describing the the as being ‘from A to B to c'. As he then envisioned it, A was Maheu, B was Roselli, and C was the pkincipal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles here ly nodded, presumably in understanding and approval... Certainly there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no formal approval as such, ‘He felt that he ore had tacit approval to use hisl, rown judgement.’ (I.G. pp. 17-18.) ‘ Bissell testified that the destription sounded “highly plausible” wa (Bissell Tr. 6/9/75 at 24.) Edwards said it was "accurate" (Edwards Tr. at 11). In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwards described briefing Dulles, the question arises as to whether Dulles in fact would have understood that the operation involved assassination. The Inspector |General, in attempting to "con- jecture as to just what the Director did - approve” decided Bissell testified _ that Ne He Bocld: "It is safe to conclude, piven the men participating and the general subject of the meeting, that there was. little likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details were deliberately blurred and the specific intended - result was never stated to unmistakable language. It is "Bissell.: . . . it's relly a guess on my: part that also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of 'bad words' emphasized to.the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation.” (I.G., p.18 __). - "I can only ‘say that I atl quite sure I came away from that meeting--and there was , I think, subsequent | occasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles and myself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the nature of the operation. ' al , ek s "Q.: .What were the subsequent conversations you had with Mr. Dulles in which/you concluded that he knew that this was an assassination effort? ic oo ‘|! i tle 32423524 Page 73 oe
rae” HW 50955 4 hi an i a mi such conversations occurred, . . I do believe they did occur is that during the; éhtire autumn I suppose I must have spoken to Mr. Dulles|ipractically daily about some aspect of the whole Cuban|joperation and I am virtually certain that he would in'one or another of those con- versations and probably. thore than once have asked if there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards’ operation. He also may have been in direct contact with “ Edwards at that time." (Gissell Tr. 6/9/75, pp. 24-26) When asked by the Chairman why, in this context, pérsons within the. Agency talked "in riddles to one another" “Bissell replied that: re I think there was.4 reluctance to spread even on an oral record some aspects of this operation. ao -_- "Chairman: Did the reluctance spring from the fact that it simply grated against your conscience to have to speak more explicitly? | "Bissell: I don't chink de grated against my conscience. I think it may have been. a feeling that the Director * [Dulles] preferred the usé of the sort of language that is described in the ‘1T.G. Report.’ Bissell, in a subsequent appearance before the Committee, again addressed thé [issue of whether he and Edwards had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an assassination operation: "I thought I-made clear that it-was my impression--and I believe the impression incidentally that I thought was confirmed in the [1I.G: Report]--that in discussing this with Dulles and Cabell . . . the objective of the operation was made unmistakably clear to them. The terms ‘an intelligence operation’, I think someone said, was.that not a cover designation? But we would not under any circumstances have told Allen Dulles that this was an intélligence collection operation. If I said that - on Monday, I must have given a wrong impression. (Bissell Tr. 6/11, p. 24. ) On the other hand, ‘Sot Breckenridge, the only author of the Inspector ceneral s Report still with the CIA, Hon testified that in his. opinion;a “pointed avoidance of ‘bad “tH bed if i t i { DoclTd: 32423524 Page 7f4
HW 50955 | 4 f Bocla: 32742735274 Page 75 , i : ' words"! “intelligence i. r operation” would have been ond Estood as an assassination attempt, and that "it was open, to question how clearly this was stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not Mr. Dulles under- . | stood" (Colby/Breckenridge, 5/  —?. yd Sheffield Edwards was: iquite infirm when examined by the Committeé and has since died.* Edwards testified before the Committee as follows: ". . . ([T)jhis possible prefect was approved by Allen B. Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General Cabell, _the Deputy Director. They are: both dead. "The Chairman: How do you, know, Colonel, that the project had been approved ‘by these two gentlemen? "Edwards : I personally briefed Allen Dulles . . . and Cabell." (Edwards, 5/30/75) pp. 5-6) © In his interview with . t the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards testified (Edwards interview, p. 5): an "Q.: Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did you have any contact with/on the top echelon?. | "A.: Very important. The) plan was approved by Allen W. Dulles and General ane * As the investigation procteded, members of the Committee requested that Edwards be recalled. Edwards passed away before this could be accomplished. As a result of Edwards' infirmity and subsequent death) the Committee was unable to - examine him effectively concerning his conflicting prior statements, concerning ‘Dulles | _ knowledge of the plots. 4 Fi : oo ‘ |
HW 450955 Docld: 324273524 Page 76 i fi  ooplp ead yp James. O'Connell, who] was the case officer for the i AG operation involving underwor1di. igures, testified that when nt ny died a: ae -he and Edwards discussed the matter in 1975, prior to giving evidence to the Rockefeller Coliniss ion, he was sure that Edwards had told him Dulles had! approved the plot (o' Connell i Tr. 5/30, pp. 58-59). He added! ‘that he was "reasonably sure" i. or "knew" in the "back of my mind” that either Edwards or Bissell had also told him of mye knowledge when the plot was underway in 1960-62 (0' Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 33-34; 36; i 60) .* 4 \ i ech A review of Dulles 'ca alendar for August through -~ December 1960 showed no meetitty Hh | ia involving Dulles, Cabell, Bissell and Edwards.** Of course, such a meeting could have Ii I nn | occurred without having been ¥ to Dulles, He Was Not Briefed 2.- Whatever Was Saild| yy Until After ‘Contact With the Ur derworld Figures. Had Been Made. : ' Bi i‘ Bissell and the Inspector General's Report (which i EAE * In June 1966, Howard J. ‘Osborn, “Edwards' successor as Director of Security, wrote a'lthemorandum for Helms on Maheu stating that "the DCI was briéfed and gave his approval". When questioned about this memorandum , Osborn stated that he had no firsthand knowledge of; ithe briefing, and that he had most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or O'Connell. ** The calendar also reflects’ no meetings ‘during that period between Dulles, Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles and Edwards. fib. oe
- 5 J - i + 1 mele relied on Edwards) placed the briefing of Dulles in "the latter . , a . part of September 1960". Bissell did not have: a clear independent recollection of. the dates involved, but recalled that discussions concerning the possible use of syndicate riembers against Castro began "in the Autumn of 1960". * He recalled initial discussions among himself, Edwards, and Colonel J C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, which he’ said occurred before Dulles and | Cabell were approached about, asSassinating Castro. According 7 -~ "those conversations, the'subject matter was a capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided - upon. ‘| - ; "It is, therefore, accurate to say that my best recollection. of those conversations (with Edwards and King) is that they addressed themselves to the existence or non-existence of the ‘capability and to the possibility of developing a capability|. They: were not conclusive or decisive conversations . #/i. nor would they have revealed a prior decision to implement such a pian by anybody.' (Bissell, 6/9, p. 19.) | to Bissell, aa th * MQ: When did you first: become. _aware of any plan or effort to assassinate Mr iJjGastro? "Bissell: Well, I became.,aware of planning a contingency basis for such an operatipn. | My recollection is August ; aa 1h j "Bissell: '60, correct ae . but without reading [the I.G. Report], I would have remembered initial conversations early in the autumn of 1960. " (Bissell Tr. 6/9, pp. 17- 18.) | a "Q.: August of 1960? HWY 350955 Docld:327423524 Page 7? Sod
HW 50955 briefing of "senior officials" been offered. about the use of underworld figlres to assassinate Castro, Boclda: 324273524 Page 76 O'Connell contacted! Roselli in early September 1960. During the week. of September 255 O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli Bet met with Giancana and Traffic as follows concerning the sequel ole ; "Q.: Well, before we come! to the meeting [with Dullesl, you had been informed, prior to that, had you not, that contact had been made with] the Mafia? Ze in Miami. Bissell testified cen = ce of those events: "Mr. Bissell. I had. | why "Q.: Now were you informed that the Mafia had been given the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate. Castro? "Bissell: Not that early'l| to my “best recollection. I cannot date that at alljwell. I would suppose that it "was within the next two on three weeks." (Bissell, o/9, pp. 20-21.) mie On the other hand, Roselli's testimony suggests that Maheu had indicated prior to the “acter fpare of September" 1960 that a large sum of money would be pailg for Castro's death (Roselli, | Pp. 17), and Edwards’ May 14, 1962 memorandum indicated the | stook place after the money had nit asi It is clear, then, ‘the even if Dulles was informed aA sub- ordinate agency officials had. “Sheviously decided to take steps i toward arranging for the Kailas of Castro, including discussing . cai! it with organized crime leadérs ae
(iv) Questions Rais ed i |by Edwards’ Communications to the Justice Department in: L oT and 1962. As fully described ‘s slibe ‘pp. ._, the FBI discovered in the late 1960's that Maheu. wl been involved in an illegal | wiretap in Las Vegas. In April 1961, Maheu told the FBI that the tap had been placed in conection with a CIA operation, and suggested that the FBI contact jPdwards to verify this fact. An FBI report. of a Maly 3, 1961 interview with Edwards A | (in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as it relating to "clandestine efforts, against the Castro Government” with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given ? to the Attorney General) stated) eat "Col. Edwards advised that jonly Mr. Bissell (Director of in CIA were aware of the Plans, CIA) and two others,| Giancana-Maheu activity in'|/behalf of CIA's program and Allen Dulles was com letely unaware of Edwards’ contact with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of|Gen. Taylor and the Attorney | General in connection with;their inquiries into CIA ‘relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworild against Castro. (FBI memo- randum entitled "Arthur, James Balletti et al.",May 22, 1961, p. 2.) (Emphasis ayged) i eee : j i a if! HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 79 wt
Bissell said he was’ ‘certain, however, that the-~- statement regarding Dulles’ kndtiledge about the operation was Ah - i 4 . recollection that Allen Dulles ‘was unaware of: these contacts, i wrong, and testified that ne just flatly contrary to my ale as I have testified several rime (Bissell, 6/11, p. 27).* When asked to af on why Edwards would have told the FBI that Dulles was wapere of Edwards’ contact with Maheu, Bissell replied: it "TI can only surmise chat. tb believed he could secure the cooperation of the Justice Department that he required without in any Waly involving his superior, ' Mr. Dulles, and simply di@ this in a protective fashion." (Bissell, 7/179), p. 20). 7, 1962, Edwards and CIA's A year later, on Ma 3 General Counsel met with Attor éy| General Robert Kennedy. (That ely) below at P- .). Edwards' memorandum of the meeting indica meeting, is discussed extensiv ed that ‘he had said that after. Roselli and Giancana had be offered $150,000, ‘Edwards -had “then briefed the proper senior officials of [the] AL mie | ofp “ zi Now, it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware: of these contacts, as I have testified several times. Also, I ‘submit it is quite im- plausible that I would have briefed Gen. Taylor . and the Attorney General--and. incidentally, I have-no recollection of briefing those two gentle men except as members of: the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of |which Allen Dulles. him- ‘self was a member--it is quite implausible that I would have briefed themiion a matter which had been going on for some months, and some which .- “ the Director, Mr. Dulles Himself, had never been informed." i WW 50955 Bocla: 3274273524 Page 30
* ee” HYW 50955 Agency” (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally approved."* It further states |that "knowledge" of the project lik had been "kept to a total of Six persons." ** | ¢ on Dulles had left thel Agency between the time of Edwards’ two statements. BI (v) Remarks Made t6 ‘the Special Group by General Cabell in November 1960. : Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware of the Castro plots (Bissell Tr. 6/9,.p. 22; Edwards Tr. 5/30/75, pp. 5-6). ate Pay On the same day as writing that memorandum for the Attorney General, Edwards wrote another memorandum for his own files indicating that after putting Harvey in contact with Roselli in early April, he had: “cautioned him (Harvey]| that I felt that any future projects of this nature| Should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." (5/14/62, Memorandum for the Record. } This memorandum, which contained other information which Harvey and Edwards had agreed to include to "falsify" the record, is discussed infra; p. . i ae r ww The 1967 Inspector General"’s Report surmised that thirteen people knew of the plot, including Dulles, based upon Bissell's and Edwards’ account of the Dulles briefing. (See discussion, supra. at .) *kk The Inspector General's Report stated: "With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Dulles) and the DDCI (Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. . . Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing."' (IG Report, P. 17.) O'Connell testified that, prior to O'Connell's testifying before the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told O'Connell that Cabell had been aware of and authorized the project. Doclda: 32423574 Page @1
Hy 50955 The testimony indicates that the meeting between Dulles, Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime "in the autumn" 7 of 1960, probably around September. The minutes of a meeting of the Special Group, the high- Level governmental body for consider- ing covert action, on November 3, 1960, reflect the following. remarks: 4 "Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban'Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous. in conception and execu- tion, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly: ‘because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.’ (11/3/60 Special Group Minutes, P. 3). Exactly what the. ‘term “direct positive action" meant to the speaker or those listening is uncertain, Neither was able to offer any interpretive help to. the Committee. However, other | participants at this meeting have testified that the reference could mean or include assassination.” whe ray NQ: Do you read. . . direct, positive action. as meaning killing (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro and Che Guevara)?" "A: I would read it that way, yes." (Lansdale Tr. 7/8/7357 p. 103.) "Q: . ; -would you agree that the words ‘direct positive action' appear to question whether there's been any planning in connection with assassinating (the Castros and Guevara)?" ih . . “ "A: I think the phrase ‘positive action’ could include assassinations, but. . . I'm not sure what was in Mr. Merchant's mind."’ (Gray Tr. 7/9/75, p. G.) Docla: 3242735274 Page 6&2
j Ay : Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meeting. After reatting the reference to “direct li positive action,” Bissell said|) i find it difficult to understand" (Bissell Tr. 7/17 ip . 18). He was then asked aw 1 . . | ‘y ' ‘tf al "Q: Do you, in light: of, the November 3 minutes) remain firm that Cabell was | knowledgeable (of the assassination ie "A: It casts some doubt. on that in my mind." When asked if it cast "some sigaificant doubt in light of (Cabell‘'s) character" Bissell answered "ves" (Bissell, 1/17, pp. 22-23). of HY 50955 Docld:32423574 Page 83
(c) Did John MeConel Know of or Authorize Assassina- - tion Plots During His Tenure -as | DCL toi The CIA considered several assassination plots against Castro during McCone’ ij Lenure as Director. Harvey initiated his contact with Roselli in April 1962, and the. operation involving underworld figures continued into early 1963. In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated diving suit. AM/LASH was offered a poison: pen device in November 1963, and caches of aris were delivered to Cuba for nis use in the following year.) (i) MeCone testified That He Did Not Authorize or Know About the Castro Plots land That He Would Have Dis- i approved the Plots Had He Been Asked McCone testified that he was not aware of | the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those plots. * (MeCone , 6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissell, Helms, or anyone else iwhen he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 6-7, 17), and that if he had ever been asked ;about the plots, he would have disapproved. (McCone, 6/6/75, .p. 47) McCone testified: ; j ; ; A im “ * McCone testified that he. first learned of the Roselli operation in August, 1963, long after pe had. been terminated. See discussion, Pp. HY 50955 Bocld: 32423935274 Page 64
HW 50955 I had no knowledge'of any authorized plan or planning that might’ ‘lead to a request for authorization. Of ourse, during those days it was almost common'! for one person or another to say, we ought. to dispose of Castro - [b]ut at no time did anyone come to me, or. come to other authorities to my knowledge, with a plan for the actual undertaking of an assassination. | ( ‘ te whe + ity 4 rie ra woyl ri a! ’ Senator Hart of Colorado: . . . Did you ever discuss the subject of assassinations with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles? . ry McCone: No, I did not. ~ . (ii) Helms , Bissell, land Other Subordinate Agency Employees Testified That They pila Not Ask McCone to Approve the Plots or Know If He Had_ Knowledge Of Them. | Richard Bissell was DDP under MeCone for three months, from November 1961. until February, 1962. Richard Helms assumed : 4 -¥.: Your testimony is that. you never discussed > assassinations with } Mr. McCone? i A.: .That is correct.’ Q.: . .{D}]id you ‘tel McCone anything about that conversation with Mr. Harvey in which you at least told him (Harvey) to take ““ over the relationship with the criminal syndicate? A.: I don't remember so doing. Docld: 32473574 PBPage 685
Helms testified that he did not recall ever having dis- cussed the assassination plotsllivith MeCone while the plots were continuing.* When asked HHheches McCone was aware of the \ assassination plots against Castro, Helms testified: No, it isn't my impression that I told him, at least I don't have any impression, unfor- tunately. . . . Mr. McCone is an honorable man. He has done his own testifying, and all I can say is that I do not know specifically whether he was aware or not. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 90,. LO1-102) i mi Helms further testified: . ae Q.: I believe Mr. -Mé'Cone testified that he never heard of any of these attempts when he was Director. Would, you have any reason to disagree with his testimony? Helms: Sir, I have always liked McCone and I don't want to get,,into an altercation with him. He had access: to. Harvey and everybody else just the way I had and he had regular access to the Attorney General. wk ke & *& * ~ ‘Q.: If you were a member of this Committee wouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was un- ‘aware of the assassination attempts while “they were underway? ii aa Helms: I don't know how to answer that, Senator Mondale. - He; was involved in this up to his scuppers just the way everybody else *Helms testified that he first told McCone about the plot using underworld figures in August 1963, See discussion supra at p. ; oman + HY 50955 Decld: 32423524 Page 86 -
44h was that was in it, ‘hha I just don't know. I have no reason to ampugn his integrity. On the cther hand, T fdon | t understand -how it was he didn't hear, about some of these things that he claims’ that he didn’t. (Helms , 7/13/75, pp. 32-33) x *« * * ve I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McCone was not informed and when I was told that there was evidence that he wasn't informed, I was trying to scratch my head as to why I didn't tell him at the time and my surmises are the best I can come up with. I am really surprised I did not discuss it with him at ‘the time. My relations with him were good, and so my surmises are just the best I am able to do in 1975 over an episode that took place that many years ago. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 990) Several other Agency offidials who were aware of the | assassination plots testified that they had not told McCone of the plots. William Harvey testified that he never spoke with McCone about the operation involving underworld figures or ‘assassination and that, to. the best of his knowledge, McCone had not been told about the project. (Harvey, 6/25/75, Sheffield Edwards, when asked whether he had informed McCone about the plot, replied! | | Edwards : No, I did not infor Mr. McCone. is “Q.: Was there a reason for why you did not inform Mr. McCone? HY 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 87 '
i Edwards: Well, I did not want to drag Mr. McCone into this thing that in my opinion had petered out, and I did not want to involve him. " (Edwards, p. 18) James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the opera- tion under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards had told him during a discussion about the plots in 1965 that Edwards had not briefed McCone on the operation. . As a matter of fact, {I don't think he ever knew about it. From later conversations with Colonel Edwards, not recently, we talked about it, and he said that jhe was convinced that Mr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't on his watch, so to speak, and he didn't want to get him involved. {Q" Connell, pp. 37, 39) ‘George McManus, Helms’ sptcial Assistant for Cuba during ' 4 } the relevant period.,. vestified|thac he was not told about the assassination activities, and gave his opinion that if MeCone had been asked to approve an assassination, he “would have reacted violently immediately"? ¥e ‘1 ! *McManus advanced two reasong for this opinion: CL) “MeCone had a great love for the President: of ‘the United States and he sort of looked at him as an older son or a:brother, a very protective sense he had about the President, President Kernedy, and McCone would have immediately said Jesus, this is a no win ball game. (2) ~Secondly, as an individual, he would have found it morally reprehensible. (McManus, p. 33) (Continued) HY 50955 Docld: 32423524 Page 68
Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that he had not known of the underworld operation until August 1963, and that in his opinion iMeCone did not learn of the operation prior to that time. i | (Elder, p. 15) (iii) ‘Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About rr We | McCone assumed the position of DCI in Novem- the Assassination Plots ber 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked Harvey to assume operational controleover the Castro plot in- volving underworld figures.** Richard Helms replaced Bissell i in February of 1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on ny (Continued) ee McManus also testified: ' IT always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the Director fully informed of any activity that he thought was sensitive. . . . Under most cir- cumstances, and indeed under all circumstances you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone, with the exception of a situation in which -Helms had been told by higher authority not to tell him. (McManus: ;\pp. 32-34). *In August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards’ May 14, 1962, memorandum to the. Attorney General. See discussion infra at p. With respect to the Cuban, assassination matters, where — Colby's kivowledge was only second-hand, Colby said: "Mr. McCone did-not know of it." (Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101) 2, **See earlier discussion supra. HW 50955 Docld:32423524 Page 89
HW 50955. the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was Harvey's immediate superior and the person to whom he reported about the Castro plot activities. ih Harvey seprifies that in the spring of 1962, when he was - preparing to, contact Roselli, he briefed Helms on the assassination plot. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65) Harvey said: I briefed Helms’ ‘generally. on the take- over of Roselli, on ‘the doybts about the operation, on the possible . . . future of it, and to the extent, it had then been possible, the assessment of Roselli and the cutting out of various individuall's .* if ‘ Harvey testified that when he briefed Helms on the assassina- ‘tion plot operation, they decided that it would not be appro- priate at that point to brief John McCone. There was a fairly abetted discussion be- tween myself and Helms as to whether or not the Director should at that time be briefed concerning this. For a variety of reasons H we = MH *Harvey testified that when He took over the Roselli opera-~ tion, he had “cut out" both Maheu and Giancana. because regard: less of what I may have thought.of their trustworthiness, . they were surplus" to the operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, P. 65). Becld: 32423574 Page 960
HW 450955 which were tossed back and forth, we agreed that it was not necessary or advisable to brief him at that time. 7 I then said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you decide in the future that he should be ‘briefed, I would like to know about it in advance to which, to my best recollection, he agreed. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 66) 4 Harvey then offered the following explanation for why he and -Helms had decided not to discuss ‘the matter with McCone at that time: There were several reasons-for this. One, this operation at that stage had not been assessed. It was obviously questionable on several grounds. It obviously involved know- ledge by too many people. We were not, even sure at that point. it had any remote possibility or rather any real possibility for success. It had arisen with full authority insofar as either of us knew long before I knew anything about it, and before the then-Director became Director of the Agency. I saw no reason at that time to charge him with knowledge of this, at least until we reach- ed the point where it appeared it might come to fruitation or had had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem we faced, including the possible problem .77 and it was a very, or-it appeared to be, and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this government being blackmailed either by Cubans for political purposes or by ‘figures in organized crime for their own self- Docld: 32423524 protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 67-68) al. whe whe al whe we ras * * Ww Page 91
HW 450955 I am definitely not! effort to hide or ¢ the Director. Ther cussion as to wheth Sary or appropriate of this particular! form to. the then-Di 6/25/75, p. 69) Harvey stated that he di that the assassination activi by the Director" had he been saying that. there was any conceal any information from e'‘was not. This was a’ dis-— er. or not it was even neces- at this point to take details operation in an unassessed _ rector at that time. (Harvey, d not have any reason to believe ties would have been "disapproved advised of the project (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69) and stated that he hdd thought the plots "were completely authorized at ever beyond the Agency". (Harvey, “MecCone had not been given an! Harvey replied: ry appropriate level within and MALTS, p. 66) When asked why opportunity to consider the plot, One of the things that I don't know from my own. . . knowle in exactly what ter dge . . . is who was briefed ms at the time of the so- called Las Vegas flop that involved attempts to place a technical s Rowan's hotel room. Docld: 3242735274 Page 92 urveillance . . . in Dan . (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 46) fee
HY 0955 Harvey was queried on whether the reasons he had given for not briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he should [have been] briefed forthwith". Harvey eplied: . The . Well, Senator Huddleston, it will be quite easy in looking at /it now to say, well, I can see your argument. , ; i All I can say ‘to you in answer is at that time I didn't feel.that it was necessary or advisable. I did not make this decision except in consultation, and had I been disagreed with, that would have ‘been it. And I am not off- loading this on Richard Helms or attempting to at all. It isn't all that ‘easy for me to go back this many years and sort of recast all of © the reasoning and be sure I am accurate. And . I don't also want to evade it by saying, well, it. seemed like a good idea at the time. But actually it did. | In other words, this was not something that either Helms or’ myself felt that at that stage there was any point in attempting to brief the Director)on it until, at least, we ' had a somewhat better’ handle on it. t . i | * a i a eS | ‘And I; might also alld, if I may, .. . but as far as either one of us knew at that point he might, have been or| should have been briefed, -if you want it that way,-by-either Allen Dulles . or Richard Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 67-71). 1967 Report prepared by the Inspector General for | | Helms states that Harvey said: "When he briefed Helms on Roselli, Director." Docld: 324293574 Page 93 he obtained Helms' approval not to brief the (I.G., p. 41) |
HW S0955 Helms testified that he but that he had no reason to did not recall this conversation, doubt the accuracy of Harvey's testimony and the Inspector General ' s Report. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 32, 106) Helms, when asked about’ oy i Harvey" s testimony that he and Harvey had agreed not to brigf McCone, stated "I frankly don't recall having agreed to this! hat My recollection is that I had very grave _myself, well this is) Helms also stated: Boclda: 3242735274 Page 94 H doubts about the wisdom of this. . . . And as I recall it, we had, so fewrassets inside Cuba at that time that I was willing to try almost anything. But the} thing did not loom large in my mind at that time. I was enormously busy with a lot of other things, taking over a new job [as DDP]. Mr. /MéCone was realtively new in the Agency and I guess I must have thought to : going to look peculiar to him and I doubt vety|much this is going to go anyplace, but if it ldoes, then that is time enough to bring him | into ‘the picture. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 33) i: ele 4 li dg: pe 4 4 It was a Mafia comheétion and Mr. McCone was relatively new to the organization and this was, you know, not a very; “Savory effort. (Helms, 6/13/7535" p. 92) | , 4 Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having been convinced that any attempt: was ireally made on Castro's life. I am having a very| difficult time justifying before this Committee, because there is some- “thing in here that] doesn’ t. come together, even forme, I am sorry] to say. Because if this was all that clear, as| everybody seems to think it a oe
HW 50955 On May 7, was, rant in Cuba and Castro was about to die, ie . ~ that there werelthose pills in that restau- I ; IT cer- tainly would have talked to McCone about it. And this never was but it never was, T/LTITS, p. 34) 1962, Edwards no at that time. I am sorry to say, pthat clear, (Helms, a 'and the CIA's General Counsel, pod mall Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy ¢ on the operation involving onde figures, terminated. * describing it as " ' 3 a ui Harvey told the Inspector: General that: Harvey testified that what h Helms testified that he did | remarked: thing. on 14 May he ing with the Attor by Edwards. Harve briefing Mr. McCon states that Helms p. 65) _ Any briefing of the with the Attorney should come from C the Gener Houston, DDP unless we are ‘p. 99) It seems. odd to me General had been b seem very logical to brief the Direc (Helms, 6 /| | ptiefed Helms on the meet- ney General, as told to him’ y,,too, advised against e and General Carter and concurred in this. (1.G., 7 i i e had probably told Helms was that: Director on the discussion General concerning this olonel Edwards and Larry al. Counsel, and not from the asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75, i; not recall this conversation and | duly because, if the Attorney riefed on something it would ithat it would be very important tor at that time on the same 13/75, p. 107) “if f — . ‘ *The briefing is exhaustively described s supra at p. According to the Inspec Roselli had a farewell dinne ment to Rome. in June 1963. and Sam Papich, Bocld: 324273524 the FBI liai eo General's Report, Harvey and” x before Harvey went on an assign- |The meeting was observed by the FBI, ison with the CIA, notified Harvey Page 95
HY 0955 Harvey supplied popsen pills and weapons to Roselli | and his Cuban associates during) a trip to Miami in: April, -1962.%* : : ih At a Special Group meeting on} April 26, General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent i, if activities" (Memo, McCone, 4/26/62). On April 26, Harvey was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request ; . . LP “af . . and McCone's wish to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to discuss the’ Task Force Activities." . (Memoran- dum, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62) . Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported ~ status of the active and potential vay to the Special Group on “the sources inside Cuba. " ot ( Q.: “Did you report on tne passage of the pills to Roselli? Harvey: No, I did not . 5 | Q.: Which you had just||accomplished in Miami. . .for - the purpose of assassinat ing Fidel Castro. | te Harvey: No. Q.: And did you report ‘that to Mr. McCone when he asked -you to tell him what. you had done in Miami? Harvey: No, I did not. Hi (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 16-17.) . Moe that Hoover would be informed. | “Harvey asked Papich to call him ‘if he felt that Hoover would \inform the Director about the incident. "Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of the incident and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief McCone unless a-call from Hoover was expected. (1.G. p. 34.) 7 Oy | * Harvey described the trip to|Miami as . , ” "one of a number of periddic trips for the purpose of reviewing in toto. . . the actual and potential operations at the Miami base. . .. and this covered the whole gamut from personnel administration, operational support in the way of small craft (and) soon..." (Harvey, 7/11, PP. ' 15-16). . , it Bocld: 324234524 Page 96 | !
HY 0955 Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special Group about the operation at that time because: "T did not consider eitheri, A, that this should be in any sense in this amorphous stage, surfaced to the Special Group, nor, as I have attempted to explain before that it should be briefed to John McCone at that point in the state that it was in with as little as we knew about it, and with all of the at- tendant background which at that point, and I was not personal- ly cognizant of all of this, had been going on for approximate- dy, as. recall, two to two- -and-a-half years.'' (Harvey, 7/11, Pp - mt , ; . Harvey attended ‘an August 10, 1962 meeting of the ‘Special Group Augmented.* He testified that a person [Robert McNamara] at that meeting suggested that the Special Group "consider the elimination or assassination of Fidel” (Harvey , 7/11; p. 30). Harvey then testified that on the day following this Special Group meeting (Harvey, 6/25, P- 71): 4 . p a) ‘in connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the question again came up and, 1 expressed some opinion as to _the inappropriateness of this having been raised in this © form and at that forum” [Special Group meeting], at which point Mr. McCone stated. in substance that he agreed and also that he had felt ‘so strongly that he had, I believe, the preceding afternoon. or, evening, personally called the ‘gentleman who made the. proposal or. suggestion and had stated similar views. as to the inappropriateness and that he [Me- Cone] said in addition . ~ . Lf 1 got myself involved in some- thing like this, [I might end up getting myself ex-communicated." . WI 1 , 4 _Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion about the actual assassination operation involving Roselli. He said ~2 (Harvey, 6/25, p. 73): ih *This meeting and the raising of the suggestion of assassina- . tion is discussed in depth in part _, infra. rhe Docld: 324273524 Page 37 '
HW 50955 it fe red , (733- i "T would like to recast the time that this took place. This was August of '62. This was ‘at the start of the so-called Missile Crisis. " "A tentative decision had been made at that point that the only sensible thing to do with [the Roselli operation] was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be done . . . I am sure thatil had discussed with Roselli, at least on a tentative basis, -by August, the probable neces- sity of terminating this’. . . . According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was” reported to be still in Cuba'‘at this time. (1.G., pp. 51-52) Harvey testified that the Report was referring to the pills — (Harvey, 6/25, ‘P- (105), fe -~ I In relation to the August! 10 meeting, Helms was asked whether 4 he believed McCone would: have stopped an assassination attempt if Ai i he had known. that one was underway. Helms stated: *Harvey said: Bocld: 324735274 Page 36 Mr. Helms: 'The reason I ‘say I don't know... is that elsewhere Mr. McCone states that he went to see Mr. Mc- Namara in connection with; this August 1962. affair and told Mr. McNamara that he’ wouldn' t have anything to do with- this, that. I have no recollection that I don't believe he ever said anything to me about his not wanting to have any- thing to do with it. ; t _Q.: "And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You . are his Deputy for Plans? Mr. Helms: "Tl saw him almost daily. Q.: "And is it your belief that if he had made any such statement to Mr. McNamara that he would have come to you and told you about it atjsome point? Mr. Helms: "I just don! ‘t | know why he didn't but I don't re- call-any such statement.| As I said, and I would like to repeat it, Mr. MeCone had given me my job, he had promoted me, I felt close to him,/I felt loyal to him, and I would not have violated an instruction he gave me if IT could have possibly helped it. "T may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving an actual order to terminate this as soon as possible, (Harvey, 6/25, p. 74). H
HW 450955 Docld: 32423524 O.: Mr. Helms: Walter Elder, however, "But in any event, indicate that he was oppos 34 it "Not to me." who served .as McCone's Executive Assistant, 4 is your judgment that he did not ed to assassinations? . testified, that he had persona} ly told Helms of McCone's opposition to assassination after the August 10 meeting.* An August 16, 1963, that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana. Helms for a report about the article. (iv) The August 1963 [Briefing of McCone Chicago Sun Times article claimed de ale McCone asked McCone testified that when Helms came to see him, he brought the following memorandum: my on subject, General in Attached is the only | copy in the Agency of a memorandum the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney May of 1962. Ii was ‘vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since, I was informed that it had been iu written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the’ Attorney General in May of last year. m9. and, I spoke with Colonel in the absence of Mr nel Edwards' assistance a “*Elder told the Committee: "T told Mr. Helms that Mr} lindwards on the telephone last evening, | Bannerman on leave, I was with Colo- ble to locate this copy. As far as I McCone had expressed his feeling , that assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved. Furthermore 4) 2 conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be unthinkable to record in writing any consid- eration of assassination because it left the impression that the subject had received serious consideration by governmental policy makers, derstand’. strength of Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension McCone's feelings after this conversation. that-Mr. about Mr. Affidavit.) **The 8/16/63 The point is McCone's Chicago Sun Times article states that " believed that Giancana never did any spying Department sources for the CIA, but pretended to go along with the Agency which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, ‘I un- that I made Mr. Helms aware of the Opposition to assassination. I know (Elder "Justice "in the f hopes that” the Justice Department 's drive to put him behind bars tt i might be slowed - or at least affected - by his ruse of coopera- tion with another government agency. Page 99 it
HY 50955 am aware, Agency relationships with » serve your purpose. | "3. I assume you are awar; discussed in the attachmen Central Intelligence, re: this is the only, Sam Giancana, i i} it ~ H written information available on ubject. I hope that this will - HL is if | e of the nature of the operation t. " (Memorandum to Director of 8/16/63.)* iE from Helms, That memorandum attached theiMay 14, 1962, memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy from Sheffield | tion as having been terminated j infra, p. .) discussion, ‘Neither McCone nor Helms at the meeting. Walter Elder, sistant, recalled: "Mr. [McCone] who read it and particular comment other than to say, uy ae Bi i 4 happen during my tenure. qt Helms came in with’ [the memorandum]. = ; [Edwards which described the opera- before McCone became DCI. (See ere able to remember what was said ‘who was then McCone's Executive As- He handed it to handed it back without any ‘Well, this did not — abe PAS 9 Ay ee ok x, 2 ray we ” i "Was anything, else said? (Elder, pp. 16-17, 57-59.) Q A "No, he had very Little to say about it. Q.: "Did Mr. Helms then leave? A Mr, Hels left. , Elder testified that he had concluded that the operation in- volved assassination from reading the two memoranda that were given 8/13, p. 60)! Elder "further concluded that ([Mc- ‘to McCone (Elder, Cone] was perfectly aware of what “Mr. Helms was trying to say to 1 *When asked whether this entry in the memorandum suggested that he had previously been aware of the operation, -McCone testified that iy "Helms had orally informed him volved assassination (McCone, p. Bocld: 324273574 Page 100 yon that day in August" that it in- 9).
|= 36- him" (Elder, p. 60). Elder further testified: Q.: “Other than that conversation that you just described between yourself and Mr. McCone, did he have anything else to say about that memorandum? Mr. Elder: "No." .Q.: "T-take it then he did not tell either you or Mr. Helms that we absolutely could not have this activity going on in the future? Mr. Elder: "No." The Inspector General's Report conclaided that: "This is the earliest date on which we have evidence of Mr. McCone'’s being aware of any aspect of the scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the. gambling syndicate.'' (I1.G., p. 70). : HY 50955 DBocld: 32423524 Page 101
9/1/75 . Based on “ Subcommittee : Meeting, ; 8/29/75 TABLE OF CONTENTS age The question of Authorization Outside the Central Intelligence Agency In the Eisenhower Administration---~<---~~---=-- seman nnn nnn nnn nnn nnn 1 ly Summary-~~~---=-------- === anne anne oe 2. Richard Bissell's Testimony ----- ------------------------ ~--------- 4 (a) Lack of Personal knowledge--==--=-----——-- wate een meeenneea 4 (b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles-----------------—- errr eee eee 4 3. White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed- senate 7 (a) ‘Gordon Gray~-s—---—nn nnn nnn . ec — 7 (b) Andrew Goodpaster-~-----~----=--- Sana TETERERTEaaaateaaeateeete ae 8 (c) Thomas a | 9 3 (4) John Eisenhower —~-~~~~==~—-- panne sr a 10 4. Documentary Evidence-~~----~~ ~-=-== a ween ll (a) The Inspector General's Report red were enn nnn it : + : (b) The Contemporaneous Documents- a wanna -n- eo == ---- === + “12 HY 50955 DBocld:324235574 Page i102
HY 50955 /r/75 raft Based on Subcommittee Meeting, 8/29/75 (bp) The Question of Authorization Outside The Central Intelli- gence Agency In The Bisenhower Admirlistration. lL 1. Summary | As discussed in the preceding section, the evidence as to whether Allen Dulles, CIA Director during the Eisenhower Administration, was informed of the Castro assassination operation is not clear. Even assuming that Dulles was so informed, authorization outside the CIA for a Castro assassination could, according to the testimony, only have come from President Eisenhower, from someone speaking for him, or from the Special Group.* At issue, therefore, is whether President | Eisenhower, his close aides, or the Special Group authorized or had knowledge of the Castro assassination plots. In addition to Bissell, we took considerable testimony from President Eisenhower's principal staff assistants, Gordon Gray (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and President Eisenhower's “representative. on the Special Group); General Andrew Goodpaster (Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower with particular responsibility for * With respect to then Vice President Nixon, Bissell testified--and he was supported by the principal White House assistants and the documents~- that Nixon was not significantly involved in Cuban matters generally at the critical times. There is no evidence suggesting his knowledge of the Vastro assassination effort during the period under review, significant parts of which occurred during the Presidential campaign. (Bissell 3 Pp. ; Gray, 7/9, \D. 39) Therefore, we concluded that, despite the indications in Nixon's book My Six Crises (p. ) that he was involved in Cuban matters. generally--and Howard Hunt's characterization of him as the [action officer] for the Bay of Pigs, there was insufficient reason to examine Mr. Nixon on Cuba looked ! tat alone. We came -to a contrary conclusion on Chile and Bocld: 3242735274 Page 103 . ~
HW 50955 national security operational matters); John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff Secretary and the President's son) and from Thomas Parrott (Secretary to the Special Group and special assistant to Allen Dulles). In summary, the evidence was: | (4) Bissell testified that he did not inform the Special Group or President Eisenhower of the Castro’ assassination operation, and he had no personal knowledge that Allen Dulles informed either President Eisenhower or the Special Group. However, Bissell expressed the belief that Allen Dulles would have advised President Eisenhower (but not the Special Group) in a Neircumlocutious" or "oblique" way. Bissell based this "pure personal opinion" on his understanding of Dulles' practice. with respect to other particularly sensitive covert operations. But Bissell testified that Dulles. never told him that he had so advised President Eisenhower regarding the Castro assassination operation, even though Dulles had told Bissell when he had employed this "cireumlocutious" approach to the President on certain other occasions. (ii) Gordon Gray testified that the Special Group never approved a Castro assassination, and that President Eisenhower had charged the Special Group with the responsibility of authorizing all important covert operations. A review ‘of the records of Special Group meetings shows that a query concerning a plan to take "direct positive action" against Castro at a Special Group meeting caused Allen Dulles’ Deputy, General Cabell, to advise that such action was beyond the CIA's capability. Gray, Goodpaster and John Eisenhower all affirmed (i) that they did not believe President Eisenhower would have. considered such a matter in a private BDocld: 324735274 Page i104
HY 0955 meeting with Dulles, or indeed that President Eisenhower would have approved a Castro assassination in any event, and (ii) that he would not have dis-_ cussed such a matter without telling ithem. They conclude, therefore, as a matter of opinion, that President Eisenhower was never told, and testify, as a matter of fact, that they never heard anything about any assassination at any time. (iii) In addition to the I.G. Report (which found that the CIA could not say that any assassination activity carried on during this period was responsive to Administration pressure), the documentary evidence showed that the subject of Castro's removal was discussed at two meetings of the National Security Council and the Special Group. in March 1960. The minutes of these meetings indicated that: the discussions were in the context of a general con- . sideration of the proposal to train a Cuban exile force for an invasion of Cuba.and an assessment that Castro's overthrow might result in a Communist takeover. Gray and Aamiral Burke testified that the discussion of Castro's removal at these meetings did not refer to assassination, but rather: to the problem of creating an anti-Castro exile force strong enough to insure a non- Communist successor to. the Castro regime. In any event, no action was shown to have stemmed from those meetings. An additional Spécial Group document | showed that when a question regarding planning for "direct positive action" against Cuban leaders was raised at a meeting in the Fall of 1960 (shortly after Phase I-of the CIA/underworld assassination operation was initiated), the Deputy Director of the CIA told the Special Group that such action was . beyond the CIA's capability. Docld: 324293524 Page 105
ana, f 2. Richard Bissell's Testimony (a) Lack of Personal Knowledge. Bissell testified that he knew nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the Castro assassination effort. (Bissell, 6/9, p. 30).. Indeed, Bisséll met frequently with the Special Group in the Fall of 1960 for the purpose of discussing Cuban operations, but never informed the Special Group that there was a plot underway involving use 6f underworld figures to assassinate Castro, (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 25-26); nor did Bissell inform President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon or any other person outside the CIA (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 26-29). Bissell testified that his reason for not doing so was that as Deputy Director of Plans, he reported to the Director and under Agency procedures relied upon the Director to inform the appropriate persons outside tha Agency. Thus, the question of President Eisenhower's knowledge réste on whether Allen Dulles personally informed him of the Castro plot. (b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles. Based upon his belief that Dulles had been briefed about the operation involving underworld figures and understood that it involved assassination, Bissell assumed that Allen Dulles would have sought authorization above the CIA level. As Bissell testified: "T went on the assumption that, in a matter of this sensitivity, the Director would handle higher level clearances. By clearance I mean authorization."* (Bissell, 6/9, p. 26.) #/ <2 eterna eterna *Bissell reiterated this view on his second day of testimony: moo, I .felt that the responsibility for obtaining necessary authorization should remain with the Director." (Bissell, 6/11, p. 4) Ma, ~ HW 350955 DBocld:324235274 Page 106
Bisseil further stated that although he believed that Dulles probably" talked with President Eisenhower: "the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance and there were much more important matters to talk about with the President." (Bissell, 7/17, p. 25.) Bissell said he was "guessing" that Dulles informed Eisenhower. (Bissell 7/17, pp. 38-39.) He said, however, that he based his assumption on his knowledge of "eommand relationship, of Allen, Dulles as an individual, and of his [Dulles'] mode of operations". (Bissell, 6/11, D- 6.) As " Bissell explained, his guess that Dulles informed President Eisenhower “is not based on hard evidence" but is "pure personal opinion”. (Bissell, sie" oo 6/9, p. 61.) Nevertheless, he believed it to be so, and that the Presi- dent thereupon gave his authorization "perhaps only tacitly”. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained, - "My guess is that indeed whoever informed him, that is Dulles ‘directly or Dulles through a staff member, would have had the same desire. . . to shield the President and to shield him in the sense of intimating or making clear_that something of the sort was going forward, but giving the President as little in- formation about it as possible, and the purpose of it would have been to give the President an opportunity,-if he so elected, to cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to continue but without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement of the detailed specific plan." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61) =~2 HW 50955 Docld: 32473524 Page 107
Bissell said circumlocution would have been used "to protect the President" in accord with the concept of "plausible deniability".* | As noted above, Bissell testified he had no personal knowledge that Dulles informed .President Eisenhower of the Castro plot. On other specific occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Dulles had told Bissell he had used the "circumlocutious" approach with President Eisenhower. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 10.) But with respect to the Castro ‘assassination attempt, Dulles did not so. inform Bissell. (Bissell, 6/11, >. 11.) As Bissell testified: "IT still want to be quite clear, I do not have a recollection of the Director telling me that on this specific operation he had made such an approach and received assent, approval, tacit or otherwise. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 11.) ‘As to whether Dulles knew of the plots and informed Eisenhower, we have discussed above the fact that in January 1960 Dulles had told the Special Group that the CIA "did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro." (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, January 13, 1960, p._). And.in July 1960 an instruction by Bissell's deputy to attempt to kill Raul Castro, which also stated that “possible removal of top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at headquarters” had been countermanded. The CIA officer who drafted this instruction testified that he had heard at the time that. it was Dulles who countermanded this instruction and in doing so had "indicated “that assassination was not to be considered." (Hinkle, p. 29). HY 50955 «2 * Bissell explained the "Dlausible deniability" practice as follows: “Any covert operations, but especially covert operations . . . that if successful, would have very visible consequences, it was of course an objective to carry out in such a way that they could be plausibly disclaimed by the U.S. Government . " (Bissell, 6/11; p. 5.) Bissell apparently assumed that a corollary to that doctrine required the use of "oblique", "circumlocutious" language. Boclda: 324293524 Page 106
(iii) White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed. 1. Gordon Gray. Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration on January 20, 1961. (Gray, p. 4.) In this capacity, Gray served as the President's representative on the Special Group. (Gray, p. 4.) President Eisenhower specifically instructed Gray that all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty of another _ country must be deliberated by the Special Group. (Gray, p. 6.) Gray testified that during the period July 1958 .to January 20,.1961, the Special Group never approved an action to assassinate Castro (Gray, p. 6) and no such suggestion was made by Bissell. (Gray, p. 37.) | Gray testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would have "approached President Eisenhower without informing Gray. Gray stated: "I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with such a proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it from Mr. Dulles. (Gray, p. 35. “ * Gray pointed out “that I was not with President Eisenhower twenty- four hours a-day. It was a few minutes every day, practically every day." (Gray; p. 35.) According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone with President Eisenhower on one occasion in the Fall of 1960. That meeting lasted ten minutes on November 25, 1960. The record of the previous portion of the meeting attended by Gray indicates. only that, in addition to discussion of operations in another country, "there was also some discussion of Cuba" (Memorandum, November 28, 1960, by Gordon Gray, of Meeting with the President, November 25, 1960 at 10:40 A.M.). We feel compelled to state that the fact of this brief meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any, significance or relevance. Boclda: 324293524 Page i105
HY 0955 Gray further testified that his relationship with President Eisenhower was such that President Eisenhower “would discuss with me any~ thing that came to his attention independently of me." (Gray, p. 7.) And Gray testified that President Eisenhower never discussed with him the subject: of a Castro assassination or of the use of the underworld figures and Cubans in such an effort. (Gray, p. 7.) 2. Andrew Goodpaster.. Goodpaster served as President Eisenhower's Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer during the last two years of the Eisenhower Administration. (Goodpaster , Pp. 3.) In addition to responsi- bility for the President's schedule and the supervision of the White -House staff, Goodpaster was responsible for handling with the President "all | matters of day to day. operations" in the foreign affairs and national security field, including the activities of the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) Goodpaster testified that he had a. "very close personal relationship" with President Eisenhower and ~ saw the President “essentially every day when [President Eisenhower] was in Washington (Goodpaster, p. 4). Along with Gordon Gray, Goodpaster served as the channel, between the CIA and the President. Goodpaster was the particular channel for "operations in which [President Eisenhower ] | “might take a personal part". (Goodpaster, p. h.) - Goodpaster testified that he never heard any mention of assas- ination efforts. (Goodpaster , p. 5.) He said that President Eisenhower “never told him about any assassination effort and that it was his belief, under White House procedures and by virtue of his close relationship with President Eisenhower, that if an assassination plan or operation had ever ’ been raised with the President, he would have learned of it. (Goodpaster, _p. 5.) Qe a AL ee plete | Boclda: 324293574 Page 110
Beyond this General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell's assumption of a "circumlocutious" personal conversation between Dulles and the President "completely unlikely”... _ "That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He had made it very clear to us how he wanted to handle matters of this kind, and we had set up procedures to see that they were then handled that way." (Goodpaster, pp. 6-7) According to Goodpaster, after the collapse of the Paris Summit Conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Khruschev as a result of the U-2 incident in the Spring of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration - reviewed its procedures for approval of CIA 6perations and tightened them. General Goodpaster testified that this review was carried out "with the aim in mind of being sure we had full: and explicit uncer- standing of any proposals that came to us and we knew from [President Eisenhower] that in doing that we were responsive to a desire on his part." (Goodpaster, p. 7.) Secondly, according to Goodpaster, the relationship between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles was quite different from that between the President and John Foster Dulles. He said John Foster Dulles "was a confidant of the President while Allen Dulles was not. (Goodpaster, -p. 8.) 3. Thomas Parrott. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, served as Secretary of the Special Group from 1957 through the end of. the Eisenhower Administration (and thereafter until October 1963). (Parrott, p. 4.) Parrott stated that, by virtue of this assignment, he functioned as Allen Dulles’ assistant in connection with the Special Group, knew Dulles well, and gained an understanding of Dulles’ method of expression and his HY 4S0954 Docld: 32423524 Page i111 .-
HY 50955 10 practice for dealing with the President. (Parrott, pp. 13-14:)* Parrott testified that early in 1959, President, Eisenhower directed the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve, or reject all significant covert action operations (Parrott, p. 4.) Parrott testified it would have been "highly unlikely” for President Eisenhower to have instructed the CIA. to carry out a covert operation without informing the Special Group. Parrott testified: "ss evidenced in his .. . revitalization . .. of this Committee [the Special Group], [President Eisenhower was] highly conscious of the necessity to be protective . .. in this field, and I just eannot conceive that [President Eisenhower | would have gone off and mounted some kind of covert operation on his own. This certainly would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's staff method of doing business .. . "** (Parrott, p. 7.) 4. John Eisenhower. John Eisenhower , President Eisenhower's son, served in Goodpaster's office as Assistant Steff Secretary from mid- 1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. (Eisenhower, pp. 5, 9) He testified that his father had confided secret matters in him "to a very large extent”. (Eisenhower, p. 3.) For example, he said that after the — Potsdam Conference in July 1945, then Gen. Eisenhower told him that the United States had developed the atomic bomb at a time when this was highly * Parrott testified: _"T saw him [Allen Dulles] several times a week for hours at a time. IT had known him somewhat before . . . but I got to know him very well indeed during these four years.” (Parrott, p. 13.) oz Parrott further testified that Allen Dulles followed a practice of . insisting upon specific orders rather than "tacit approval” and he also found Bissell's assumptions regarding a. eircumlocutious conversation between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles “hard to believe! (Parrott, p. 1h.) ai Bocld: 3242735274 Page 112
a secret information. (Eisenhower, p. 3.) And he said that as early as 1956, President Eisenhower told him of the secret U-2 flights. (Eisenhower, p. h.) | a ” John Eisenhower testified, as a matter of fact, that President Eisenhower never told him of any CIA activity involving an assassination plan or attempt with respect to Castro. ‘(Bisenhower, p. 5.) Based on “his father's practice in other matters, it was his opinion that President Eisenhower would have told him if the President had known of any such activity. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) He further testified that President Eisenhower did not deal with important subjects ina circumlocutious manner. (Eisenhower, p. 8.) John Eisenhower further testified that it was his father's pelief that no leader was indispensable, and thus assassination was not an alternative a in the conduct of foreign policy. (Eisenhower, p. 14.) (iv) "The Documents 4. The Inspector General's Report The document latest in date which pears upon the issue of © authorization for Phase I of the Castro assassination efforts is the 1967 - Inspector General's Report. In the concluding section of the Report to Director Helms, the authors advanced several possible Agency responses to Drew Pearson's public charges regarding CIAAinderworld links.* One of the ® On March 3, 1967, Drew Pearson stated in his newspaper column that there was a U.S. "plot" to assassinate Castro, and that "one version claims that underworld figures actually were recruited to carry out the plot." (Pearson, Washington Merry Go-Round, March 3, 1967) HY 50955 DBocld:32423574 Page i113
12 ae a Be A ly A 3 questions they asked was whether the Agency could say it was acting pur- d suant to Government policy -- or as they put the question: "Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer given was: "Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the - attempt commencing in April 1962) was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase.” (I.G., p. 132). In addition to the I.G. Report, we examined the records of the National Security Council and the Special Group, as well as other relevant White House files bearing on the question of authorization for the period from Castro's rise to power to the end of the Eisenhower -Administration. As we discuss below, three documents were found which contained references arguably related to the subject. of assassination. e. The Contemporaneous Documents ~ In March 1960, the National Security Council and the Special Group focused on Cuban policy. President ‘Eisenhower had just returned from a foreign trip in which - "Latin American Presidents had-counseled further forbearance “by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization ‘of American States would finally see the potential danger in Cuba and take concerted action." (Gray, Ex. 2,.Memorandum of - ' March 10, 1960 NSC Meeting, p. 8). Castro was characterized as hostile, but his Communist ties were apparently then unclear. Indeed, it may have been the prevailing opinion, at that time, that Castro was not actually a Communist.* For it was stated in the minutes of the March 10, 1960 NSC. meeting: "there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's dis- Q appearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray, Ex. 2, p. 7). a a * Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "Marxist-Lenist" on December 2, 1961. (David Larson, Cuba Crisis of 1962, p. 304). HY 50955 DBocld: 32423574 Page 114
13 % tee - Wek a AHL _ 4 Out of these March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group - came the general covert action plan against Cuba.* Against this background of general discussions of Cuba, we con- sidered certain remarks appearing in the records of a March 10, 1960 National Security Council meeting and a March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting. The record of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President Eisenhower was present) states that Admiral Arleigh burke, in commenting on Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba covert action plan was in. preparation, "suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around Gastro were even worse than Castro." (Gray Ex. 2, Pp. 9). And, according to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on March 14, 1960 (which President Eisenhower did not attend) "there was @ general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2). | Admiral Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961, stated in an affidavit** that although he. did not have a specific recollec- tion of the March 10, 1960 meeting of the National Security Council, he had a clear recollection of the discussions of Cuba policy that took place in the spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated that the reference to the suggestion by him at the March 10, 1960 meeting "clearly refers to the x2 * As Gray testified, this plan covered four areas: sabotage, economic sanc- tions, propaganda, and training of a Cuban exile force for a possible invasion. Gray stated that this plan had nothing to do with assassination. (Gray, 7/9/75, p- 17). tit eee . . . ae HY 50955 He Admiral Burke was unable to testif y in pers . because he was in the hospital. person before the vonmittee Bocld: 324273534 Page 115
HY 50955 14 general covert action plan reported by Allen Dulles at that meeting and to the general consideration given at that time in the U. S. Government to identify Cuban groups with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castro regime." (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated: - "In this connection, it was my view that the U.S. must support those Cuban groups who would have a sufficient power base among the Cuban people, not merely to overthrow Castro, but to be able to cope with and dismantle his organization as well. It was my firm belief at the time that many. people in Castro's. organization were Communist and that Castro was probably a Communist. I therefore advocated that any effort to support groups so as to achieve Castro's overthrow must focus, not merely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime, but on the very strong organization that had been the key to Castro's rise to power, and was the basis for hig power." (Burke affidavit, p. 1-2).* , ; Burke stated further: "The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting or at any other meeting or discussion that I attended or in which I participated. It is my firm conviction based on five years of close association with President Eisenhower during my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that President Eisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion, or have permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would he have ever authorized, condoned, or permitted an assassination attempt." (Burke affidavit, p. 2). Gray testified that the discussion-at the March 10 and March 14,- | 1960 meetings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro government, rather than ‘to assassinate Castro himself.- He said that Admiral Burke's recorded comment at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting was part of a lengthy and general discussion of the problem of Cuba. At the outset of that discussion, it was Under Secretary . . of State Douglas Dillon who pointed out that "the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 73 Gray, p- 11). Ana . Bocld: 32423524 Page 116
. | HGNH eDELWwhae Bo} Admiral Burke's reference to a "package deal” for the removal of Cuban - leaders was in direct response to a comment by Allen Dulles recorded in the minutes that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked 8 on. (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9; Gray pp. 13-14). Gray said he believed that Mr. Dulles "was certainly referring to" the Eisenhower Administration's plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than a targeted attempt on Castro's life.*/ (Gray pp. 14, 45). Gray testified that viewing Admiral Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that "Admiral */ A CIA memorandum of an internal CIA meeting (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960), shows that the first meeting of the CIA task force established to plan the training of a Cuban exile force was held on March 9, 1960, the day before the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting. (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960). At that March 9, 1960, CIA meeting, the CIA task force discussed "an operation directed at the overthrow of the Castro regime" and described that operation as one: in which a Cuban exile force would be trained for "6-7 months." In the discussion of this operation, it was noted that a principal problem was the weakness of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided into many parts," but it was hoped that during the long training period the “opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed a Bovernment= in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached." According to the memorandum of the meeting, chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division J. C. King, had stated, “unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could - be eliminated in onepackage ~ which is highly unlikely - - this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force." (Id., p. 1). HW 50955 Doocld: 323493524 Page 117
Burke ... was expressing his opinion that if you have any plan /for the overthrow of Castro/ it ought to take’ these factors into consideration, that you might end up with a Communist government." (Gray, p- 45). | ‘With respect to the March 14, 1960 ‘Special Group meeting, Admiral Burke stated that the "general discussion" referred to in the record of that meeting 'tlearly did not involve a discussion of assassination of Cuban leaders, but to the possible effects should only those leaders be overthrown by a group not powerful enough to also master the organization those leaders had established -in Cuba." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) Burke stated further: "Thus, it was consistent with my views then that I should have been recorded in the record of the March 14 meeting as warning in this discussion that the Communists might move into control even if these three top leaders should be overthrown. As stated above, I strongly believed that a strong, organized.group must be in the forefront of any effort to overthrow the Castro government." (Burke affidavit, p. 2). In any event, when a question "whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara" was subsequently asked. at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Cabell, according to the record of that meeting, pointed out "that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities." (Gray Ex. 1, p. 3). “a e * The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger they might move into control." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2) / HY 50955 DBocld:32423574 Page 119
HY 50955 The reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and can be subject to a number of different interpretations, including a u question suggesting exploration of assassination.* However, it is clear that at most a question was being asked. Moreover, assuming that "direct positive action" meant killing, it is significant that Shortly after assassi- nation plots were begun, the CIA Deputy Director told the Special Group that such action was "beyond our capabilities." = — = “- ae enceerntsecenreth _ a . * Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action" and General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum. Gray testified that the phrase "direct pasitive action” could be taken to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 7/9, p. 9). Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based on the context of weekly Special Group meetings and discussion in the Fall of 1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba; General Cabell was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to carry out this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, pp. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the phrase "direct positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did not . employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the President. (Parrott, pp. 19-21). We discuss in greater detail’at pp. , > and other ambiguous phrases in minutes and memoranda drafted by Parrott. a Bissell testified that he found it "difficult to understana" that General Cabell would have told-the Special Group that-it was beyond the CIA's capa-— bilities to take "direct positive action" (if that referred to assassination) in light of Bissell's assumption that General Cabell was informed of the CIA/ underworld assassination effort. (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 15-18). Mr. Merchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of his physician. a2 Boclad: 324273574 Page 119
!} CO TABLE OF CONTENTS c. ‘THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION _ Gi) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS --------------------------- a. BISSELL WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED RESIDENT KENNED T THE SINATION 0. TION HAD WAS BEING - b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE OFFIC © Of SINATION ee Se OD Gy GED GD GED Geet HT SH ST RY ED cet) ee CD GE GRD OAD SFE CUD GED Gad mH AED ED enh ee ante MARU tet mh EE SEED GED GEE Gh EOD GTO GU GID GY GD. EGS ED UD GR) GER ate wit) c. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF , AND INION THAT P Se etee Ath Sete SREP GRD RED GES GOED SED GUE GE SED SEE GR eh AD cn SY MND ESHER MeO EN HERD AEE OAD ES ED GED ts GD KENNED d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS 0 ADMINISTRATION 0) (i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-EIECT ---i--------------- (ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION (iii) “TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY ------------..-- (iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL --~------------- e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND 6 cat em a a ey nt Oe ew Ee ee ube tn en HY 50955 DBocld: 32423524 Page 120
HW 50955 ; , (DRAFTING SUBCOMMITTEE) TOP SECRET -- FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE ONLY 8/29/75 c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided herein into two broad sections. The first primarily relates to the assassination operation | involving. underworld figures and occurring prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. The second. section deals with the Post-Bay of Pigs period, including the Roselli operation in the spring of .1962, Operation Mongoose, the laboratory schemes in early 1963, and the AM/LASH plot in the fall of 1963. (i) PRE-BAY. OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS The pattern of testimony for this period was essentially the same as for the Eisenhower Administration. Bissell, once again, said he assumed and believed that Dulles had met with President Kennedy and informed him, in a circumlocutious fashion, that the operation had been planned and was being attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) did not inform the President about the assassination efforts or any of the other non-CIA persons with whom he was working on covert’ Cuban operations. The Kennedy Administration officials all testified that they did not know about or authorize the plots. Furthermore, they said they did not believe the President did or would authorize. an assassination plot. There were for this period no significant contemporaneous documents. a. BISSELL, WAS OF THE OPINION THAT, DULLES. HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KENNEDY. i AS BEIN When John F. Kennedy became President in January, 1961, Richard Bissell was still Deputy Director for Plans and the principal agency official respon- - sible for the ongoing efforts against the Castro regime, including both the Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination plots. Bissell is the only sur-_ BDoclda: 3274273574 Page i171
HY 50955 Page 2 viving CIA policy maker with first hand knowledge of high-level decision- making in the early phases of the Castro assassination efforts. . Bissell testified that he believed Allen Dulles had informed the President (although Dulles did not so inform him) and that accordingly the plots had been approved by the highest authority. Bissell was questioned about how he felt the. Pres-~_ ident would have been made aware of the plots: "Senator Baker: ...You have no reason to think that he [Dulles] didn't or he did [brief President Kennedy]. . But the question I put was whether or not in the ordinary course of the operations of the CIA as you know it under their traditions, their rules and regulations, their policies as you knew them what in your opinion -- [w]as the President, President-elect briefed or was he in the light of all these circumstances? Bissell: I believe at some stage the President ’ and the President-elect both were advised that such an operation had been planned and was being attempted. Senator Baker: By whom?. | Bissell: I would guess through some channel by Allen Dulles. The Chairman: But you're guessing, aren't you?’ A 2 -Mr. Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that . I cannot recollect the giving of such briefing at ‘the meeting with the President-elect in November or in any meeting with President Eisenhower."' (6/9/75, pp. 38- 39). - Bissell's testimony varied with respect to the force with which he stated his belief that the President had been informed. Once he referred to it as "a pure personal opinion’ - (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-1); on another occasion he testified as follows: Bocld: 32423524 ‘Page 1232