(tos-10%60-t00t ASS IFIED when blonk_TOF YER RET when attached. to Top Secret Docume vhen filled in form is ‘detacheo’ from controlled document. = ewe wee: Jutomoricaly ¢ downgraded or declassi- a ° CONTROL AND COVER SHEET. FGR TOP SECRE’ I DOCUMENT CIA CONTROL NO > 2 TS/8082F ama Onn 0 orm. witt ve placed on ‘and “attached ‘to: eae! Top. Secret. document. ‘peceived yg 8] o within the, CIA and awl. remain attached .to. the document. until such tem as: it’ Access to Top-.Se er. 18. d to, Top Seer: “Control perso 2 Top Secret Control ‘soho receive and/oi é e ustody in the lejt-ha' in’ the right-hand olum
14-00000 OP SeeRu'l COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Washington, DC 20500 Nelson A. Rockefeller, David W. Belin, Chairman . Executive Director John T. Connor : C. Douglas Dillon Erwin N. Griswold Lane Kirkland Lyman L. Lemnitzer Ronald Reagan Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. MLMORAWDUM TO FLbLis From: James 565. Weidner Subject: Interview with Raymond G. Rocca, February 14, 1975, 2 p.m, A, BACKGROUND Rocca is originally from San Francisco, and ne still maintains a home there. te was graduated from the University of California in 1938 with an Ak and in 1939 with an MA in international relations. his thesis related to the facist problem in the Meditarranean area. In April, 1942, he joined the Researca and wYevelopment Section of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. With the collapse of Italy in Septenwer, 1943, Rocca joined. the OUsS K2 group (which was independent although coordinate with the counterintelligence OSS unit). Until carly July, 1944, when he went to Rome, Angleton assumea command of the X2 unit in 1944. Rocca eventually became Anyleton's executive aide there. Angleton left Rome in wovember, 1947. Rocca remained, under student cover. the was not under "official cover." ; Rocca returned to the United States and Stayed a year in CIA headquarters. ne attended the wational War Colleye in 1954-55. Rocca then joined Angleton in the recently created Counterintelligence (CI) Staff of tne CIA. (the Staff was set up in vecember, 1954 or early 1955. Prior to that time, the counter- intelligence operation nad been submerged in foreign intelligence. At this point, it was broken out to be TS PE OS27 WOP SpCRetl! Wiley H/ 2260/4
14-00000 VOR SuURe an independent unit.) Rocca was assigned to be the chief of the Research anu Analysis (2 and A) component of the CI Staff. ite remained in that capacity until 1969 when he became Angleton's ueputy. ue resigned/retired from the CIA on vecember 31, 1974. B. OBJECTIVES OF COUNTLRINY coulGuaCch a no eT NS de he wne overall opjective of the Staff was to form a uoctrinal vasis for Ul. because CI nad not been a separate unit theretofore, it was necessary to specify precisely what its purpose and operational objectives would be. ‘these ovjectives were: (1) penetration of other agencies; tnat is, identification of other agents and achievement of placing otaer ayents therein; (2) developing uouble ayents; (3) handling uefectors, principally those coming out of other services; (4) development of types of controls; that is, intercepting and deciphering of communications (Tne mail intercept program would have fallen witnin this objective.); and (5) accomplisnment of research. ‘this involved building files, analyzing relevant information, and creatiny uescriptive papers. €. ObJeCTIVLS OF ReSLARCh AND ANALYSIS A. Research and Analysis Inventoried initially, the status of counterintelligence work being done by various of the CIA Stations. This was necessary in order to determine the scope of such activity tnaen in existence. iventually, approximately 133 people were engaged in full-time CIA work overseas. B. Creation of Section 56 of the wational intelligence Survey inais was commenced in 1950 and “finished” in 1955 insofar as tne Survey related to CI. YVhe report, however, is still being updated. ‘This involved collection of information from various branches of tne CIA's clan- destine activities anu editing the information. VORP SpCRiy 7S 7S CS 2/7 OLCC4 W /
14-00000 TOP SeCRee C. Providing Support to Casework Lxamples of tnis support were the arrest of Sobel in the 1950's (R and A maue a inan available to work on this case.) anu the Reino iaynanen defection leading to the conviction of Abel. D. ‘training R and A uoes part of tie counterintelliyence training. Rocca gave me a detailed outline of the organization of the Cl vivision. A- schematic of tuat organization is annexed nereto. ‘the organization retained its structure until August, 1973, wnen its Operations were reduced substantially. (According to Rocca, approximately 100 of the CI personnel were shifteu to other areas.) &. Mailing Intercept Proyram Rocca knew nothing of the program at all until 1960 when R anu A conmenced receiving through COMIn? channels moderate amounts (no more tian one or two pieces a month) of descriptions or photographs. he could not recall the particulars of any of these matters. He assumed that tne entire project had been directed and properly approved. ‘Ihe project was hanuled, insofar as CI was involved, by the Special investigations group. it was nighly compartmented. When Rocca became Angleton's deputy in 1969, he learneu more concerning the existence of the project. whe understood tnat it was a special project prouucing niyh-yrade information on the main adversary. Rocca saiu that he would Classify the project as a "Strategic significance" because it yielded information on individuals communicating witn people working for the KGB, ile could not recall specific details. Particularly important, in his opinion, was the fact tnat the adversary did not know tnat the project existed, Rocca was not responsible on a day~to-day basis for the project even after he became ueputy. ‘That responsibility was given to Fred tubbara, Angleton's bLxecutive Director, whom I believe had been appointed at approximately tne same time as Rocca. Monthly reports from the project would come to Rocca at which time he revicwed them briefly and passed tacm on to Angleton. TS GOS27 TOP SLCRet OLE Cs pw)
‘ve TOP spicRet ~ A= Rocca says tnat he hau no particular discussions concerning the project with eitner Angleton or hubbard which he can recall. In 1971 or 1972, however, Rocca nau to “defend” the project to aarancssines. This was a part of what constituted, in essence, an annual review by the Weputy Virector of all significant projects in which CI was involved. ‘The task fell to Rocca because Angleton was then on vacation. liubbard and others involved directly in the project prepared a pro forma justification for Rocca to present to hKaYramesSines. ‘This was based on the production of the project, as well as tne high security surrounding it. In July, 1973, after nubbard had left, Rocca and the JCI had determined to abanuon the mail intercept project. Rocca was assigned to wind uown the Operation. At that point, there were three or four CI people in heauquarters involved in the project.* ‘he project was located in tne COMI area on the seventh floor. Because COMINT needed the space, Rocca developed a new vault for it on_the second floor with tie remainder of el, Mrs. was reassigned to: Operations, and the two translators were assigned to R and A. ‘The product of the project still remains in the vault area on the second floor. Rocca hau no knowledge of the specifics of the Operation in New York. ‘this was because that aspect of the project was handled by the Office of Security. In essence, the Special Investiyations group of CI was a “customer” of the Office of Security. In addition, CI analyzed the materials and distributed them to the appropriate recipients. Angleton determined who would receive the materials. Rocca knew nothing of the Wew Orleans Operation anu almost nothing about tne San Francisco Operation. wis only connection with the latter was when people from, ae believes, tie Far iast operational unit inquired of him avout the wew York Operation. because Rocca knew little of the Operation, he referred them to Security. 7S PE0S27 OLC C4 an VORP SeCRiee
14-00000 TOP SECRL?T -~ 5 - FPF, vissidvent Uperation Rocca knew nothing of tnis operation at tie time it was establisned in 1967 except that he recalls” having seen tine memorandum which Specified tnat informa~ tion relating te foreign contacts of uissidents in this country would be ovtained and analyzed. whe recalls that in about 1966-67 Over who had been under Rocca in R and A was assigned to Operations. ‘inere he became the Referent for the vomestic Operations vivision which nad been created in 1964. At that point, Ober left the CI area On the second floor and established his own operation somewhere else in. the building. ; Wnen Rocca became Angleton's ueputy, tne project had already been established and was fundeu through tne regular staff budget. Rocca never saw any of the substance of the project. uis only connection with it was signing authorizations for expenses upon Ober's request. Ober did not explain what the expenses were for. ‘this was typical where, as here, the operation was fully compartmented. Althouyn Rocca was generally in charge of staff briefings on projects, ne did not brief on this project. ‘tne briefing was done by Ober of any personnel who naa the need to know. Ober dealt uirectly with xaramessines or helms on this project. ne uid not deal through Rocca, nor, so far as Rocca knows, uid he deal tnrough Angleton, Rocca said that this project was Simply not within his duties as a deputy, anda that he did not exceed the scope of his assignment as a deputy. G. Police uiaisons As far as Rocca knows, CI ias not had any contact with any local police to the extent that such contacts or liaisons would have occurred: this would have been done by the Office of Security. 7S 7FOA7 OLCCGH/ ZOP SECRetT
14-00000 TOP Sueur ~ § = hh. Surveillance, breaking and untering, ‘laps, utc. Rocca was not aware of any such activity by CI in the United States. I. Present Cl Activities within the United States ES Within the vnited states Rocca said that ne was aware of only four areas in which CI presently operates in the United States. 1. cI handles four Soviet or Bloc defectors in the United States. For example, CI has a man on tne bast Coase who is a retired annuitant acting as a local handler of a defector. 2. CI has various consultants on projects doing work in the United States. ‘these are people actually working under a contract with CIA. For example, a woman is currently working part time on a book relating to the use of disinformation. ‘The contract relating to preparation of this book calls only for its publication abroad, and a foreign publishing nouse has agreed to the publication. 3. CI nas twenty former agents who previously worked abroad, now acting under military cover in the United States analyzing the Sovict press for relevant intelligence information. 4. I has several people who May not be CIA personnel reporting on their contacts with Soviets. both in the United States and abroad, these People may also report on their contacts with people abroad who, in turn, have contacts with the Soviets. J. Miscella:eous Comments nnn tS ORME NES Rocca said that he believed that the informant referred to in the Hersh article of becember 29, 1974, was a fraud. we thinks tnat the informant must have been a person frauaulently posiny as a former CIA agent because the information contained in the article is, according to Rocca, not only incorrect but does not even make sense in the context of the CIA. Rocca could not elaborate on exactly what he meant but strongly suggestea that we talk to Bill hood, wao was formerly Chief of vomestic Operations YOR SLCRLT TS7FOSA7 PLC C4 A /
14-00000 TOP SicrRe - 7 - in New York before joining the CIA in Wasnington. (It seemed apparent to me that Rocca must nave Spoken to hood and did not want to incorrectly interpret what Hood had told me.) BaSed on the above discussion, Rocca said that he felt it was important tnat a Federal law be enacted which makes it a crime for a CIA employee or former employee to reveal classifiod information which he learns in the course of his activities. Rocca saia tnat it was ironic that such laws existeu for other agencies but not for tne CIA. Rocca also referred to the tiersh article of January 10, 1975, relating to the possible destruction of CIA files. Rocca said that contrary to the implication in the article that files might be uestroyed, he personally wrote a memorandum stating that no files should be destroyed under any circumstances given the existence of the present investigations. Rocca will provide a copy of that memorandum, TOP SEecRet Ol ily wx
14-00000 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Leaving CIA - Raymond G. Rocca's Story 1. The immediate background of Mr. Rocca's departure from CIA was a brief discussion between Mr. Angleton and Mr. Colby late in the afternoon of 20 December 1974. The gist of the discussion was related to Mr. Rocca by ‘Mr. Angleton at around 1800 hours when Mr. Rocca was summoned to Mr. Angleton's office. Mr. Angleton said Mr. Colby, after referring to a forthcoming article by Mr. Hersh, which, however, had not exercised a determining influence in his decision, had asked Mr. Angleton to leave his position as chief and take the advantages of retirement. In response to Mr. Angleton's question about a successor, the DCI said he had not given any thought to that, but had named three individuals, presently overseas, as examples off the top of his head. Mr. Angleton, as Mr. Rocca understood it from Lllach wwe Fol Ia TS WHAISAZ OLE H/
14-00000 him, asked the DCI whether the leadership possibilities were extendable to Mr. Rocca or Mr. Miler and was told, "that was negotiable." It was stipulated that further discussion should take place with the DDO, Mr. Nelson, and only Mr. Rocca would be informed at that stage. 2. On Saturday, the 2lst, Mr. Angleton telephoned Mr. Rocca and expressed the view--with which Mr. Rocca agreed~~that he should ask Mr. Nelson to enlarge the range of discussion by including Mr. Miler. 3. Mr. Hersh's piece, falsely accusing CIA of running a massive domestic surveillance operation, appeared on 22 December. 4. At.1000, Monday, 23 December, Mr. Miler and Mr. Rocca were asked to accompany Mr. Angleton to a meeting in Mr. Nelson's office. Mr. Nelson's deputy, Mr. Blee, was present. The discussion took place under considerable time pressure because as the meeting went on, it became clear that a Special DDO Staff Meeting had been called for 1100, at which, presumably, the results of the discussion underway would be announced. Among other details there was an extensive discussion between Mr. Angleton and 2 ” G8 T8372 OS27 OLCLs wy
14-00000 Mr. Nelson on two points: a. By Mr. Angleton. That it would be a mistake to retire him at that stage because it would be universally interpreted as an admission of the New York Times story. Also Mr. Angleton reviewed the items of upcoming business that had already been programmed in sensitive CI matters for January and February. b. By Mr. Nelson. The absolute necessity to take _ action necessary to assure the integrity of the investi- gations which were to be foreseen. Mr. Angleton's removal as chief / cr CI was assumed in this discussion, presumably by derivaticn from the Friday talk with the Director. Mr. Angleton reviewed the merits of having the succession in the staff passed to Mr. Rocca and/or to Mr. Miler. 5. At a certain point Mr. Nelson asked what did Mr. Rocca and Mr. Miler want to do. (It will be recognized that there was, under the circumstances, no chance for consultations, and, actually, no possibility of considered thought.) Mr. Nelson did not offer either of these men the succession to Mr. Angleton, neither did he ask Mr. Rocca (or Mr. Miler) to leave the Agency. He did request that CMake 77 / Foe FS WITAP? OLC Coy Ht /
14-00000 oft they stay on in their positions for a transition period. 6. Mr. Rocca, in the absence of any indication of interest by Mr. Nelson in him as Successor, stated he was not desireous of remaining on in any task Other than counterintelligence. He would be willing to stay on for the transition--under a contract, which Mr. Nelson had stated would be possible-~for whatever time was necessary, and therefore he too would retire by 31 December, bearing in mind the advantage of the joint cost-of-living increases of 31 December and 30 June 1974, 7. To sum up, Mr. Rocca would not have retired on 31 December 1974 had he been offered the command succession. (That, as he understood it, would have been Mr. Angleton's wish.) He was not made the offer. As he saw it, under the circumstances, there was really no other option to retire- ment in the interest of the CI function or in his own ced G. Rocca interest. 27 February 1975 Langley, Virginia ‘ FOS 7K 052-7 OLC Ce py
14-00000 ( € TOP SECRET COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Washington, DC 20500 | RAYMOND G. ROCCA | (Former Deputy Chief, Counterintelligence Staff) Background Mr. Rocca joined the Counterintelligence (CI) Staff of the CIA in 1955, having previously served in Italy as a member of the X2 Unit of the OSS. The chief of his unit in the OSS had been Mr. Angleton. Upon joining the CI Staff, Rocca became a Member of its research and analysis component. He remained in that capacity until 1969, when he became Deputy Chief of the CI Staff, under Mr. Angleton. Mail Intercept Program Rocca knew nothing of the program at all until 1960 when R and A commenced receiving through COMINT bh channcis mederatc amounts (no-more than onc sr tes | pieces a month) of descriptions or photographs. The program was highly compartmented. When Rocca became Angleton's Deputy in 1969, he learned more concerning the existence of the project. He understood that it was a special project producing high-grade information on the main adversary. - The project was handled, insofar as CI was involved, by the Special Investigations group. Rocca was not responsible on a day-to-day basis for the project even after he became Deputy. That responsibility was given to Fred Hubbard, Angleton's Executive Director. Monthly reports from the project would come to Rocca at which time he reviewed them briefly and passed them on to Angleton. QM ach Bea TOP SECRET Fy TS TKOSR A OLE Copy 22a0!1G
14-00000 TOP SECRET - 2- In 1971 or 1972, however, Rocca had to “defend" the project to Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans. This was a part of what con- stituted, in essence, an annual review by the Deputy Director of all significant projects in which CI was involved. The task fell to Rocca because Angleton was then on vacation. Hubbard and others involved directly in the project prepared a pro forma justifi- cation for Rocca to present to Karamessines. ‘Rocca has no specific knowledge of the part of the operation which occurred in the New York City Post Office. This was because that aspect of the project was handled by the Office of Security. In essence, CI was a "customer" of the Office of Security. In addition, CI analyzed the materials and distributed them to the appropriate recipients. Angleton determined who would receive the materials. In July, 1973, Rocca was assigned to wind down the operation, after the DCI had determined to terminate it. Pocea moved the physical location of the project within headquarters and arranged to have the three or four people involved in the project re~- assigned. The work product of the project remains at headquarters. Dissident Operation Rocca knew nothing of this operation at the time it was established, except that he recalls having seen the memorandum which specified that information relating to foreign contacts of dissi- dents in this country would be obtained and analyzed. He also knew that in 1967, Ober, who had been under Rocca in Research and Analysis (R and A) was assigned to Operations, where he became the Referent for the Domestic Operations Division. At that point, Ober left the CI area and established his own operation somewhere else in the headquarters building. OlECa A,
14-00000 ey TOP SECRET - 3- When Rocca became Angleton's Deputy in 1969, the project had already been established. It was funded through the regular staff budget. Rocca's only connection with the project, even then, was Signing authorizations for expenses which Ober requested. Ober did not explain what the expenses ‘were for. Ober dealt directly with Karamessines or Helms on this project. Ober did not deal .through Rocca nor, so far as Rocca knows, did he deal through Angleton. Police Liaisons FG ce biaisons As far as Rocca knows, CI has not had. any contact with any local police. To the extent that such contacts or liaisons may have occurred, he believes it would have been done by the Office of Security. Surveillance, Breaking and Entering, Taps, Etc. Tee om mm fmm hk ee Oe . activit TT ANNAN Oe ee dae wae Ge any Suc actavi. YY ary CI in the United States. Present Counterintelligence Activities within the United States Rocca is aware of only four areas in which CI presently operates in the United States: l. CI handles Soviet or Bloc defectors in the United States. 2. CI has various consultants doing work in the United States. 3. CI has former agents (who previously worked abroad) in the United States analyzing the Soviet press for relevant intelligence information. 4. CI has several people in the nature of agents reporting on their contacts with Soviets both in the United States and abroad. CH eh e- HD. PLC Cg #/
14-00000 THOMAS : mis Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL | 410 First Streat, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 295 1 TOP SECRET 872 CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. MR. BELIN: I am going to turn the questioning over to Jim Weidner. CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Is there an opening statement?) TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND G. ROCCA MR. ROCCA: I have prepared a small curriculum vitae. It behooves a native San Franciscan to circulate it to his constituents. There may he some extra copies. I will pick them up. MR. BELIN: Do you have anything you want to state first before your interrogation? MR. ROCCA: No sir. I have a statement there, an ‘aide memoire, which goes to the implications of what is going on for counterintelligence. The only statement that I had in addition is that my preoccupation in this discussion grows out of the conviction, based on operational facts, that hostile espionage, political action, and counterintelligence -- in other words, uncontested expansion of Soviet intelligence presence, successful recruitments, penetrations, and disin- formation by the Soviets and the Bloc services of intelligence and security and other conspiratorial organs ~~ will increase Qilack mse LA 3 FO TS MUSA TOP SECRET bee gat) during the period of detente. “= i |
14-00000 410 First Streat, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & FAUL 10 “i. 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 2 TOP SECRET a7 fhe hard fact that KGB presence under Soviet official cover has continued to increase throughout the world, parti- cularly in areas of direct concern to us like Western Europe, | Latin America, ‘and Africa, makes it a matter of urgency for | CIA to devote a larger part of its energy to the CI problem. | The same thing has happened in the U.S.; the remedy, through | the appropriate Federal agency or agencies, will have to be the same. | | The fact that the KGB/Bloc services, including Cubang, have continued in the past two years to undertake developmenta ‘relations and have made pitches to and significant contacts with American officials overseas at an undiminished rate, that work out to one or more per week, is the complementary opera- tional. element that underlines the urgency for an effective counterintelligence response abroad and domestically. Overhead photography and sophisticated but remotely Operating equipment will not, and never will, tell us who the Soviet, Bloc, and Cuban spies are. This inimical activity originates abroad and is no respector of our organizational, jurisdictional, or territorial distinctions. As we are pre~ sently oryanized in the United States, no one Federal agency can hope to deal successfully with the growing threat alond. This integrated, determined adversary can only be dealt with by coordinated, innovative and aqqressive defense through counterintelligence and counterespionage operations which bring GA Cae bh ane te 73 | TOP SECRET 7e ISB ISa> Ole (8, ARS
14-00000 ad ° r ° os) G Qo ‘¢ 8 2 ce] £ 5 = ul vi 3 S M4 = a ~ we = ix ° ~" ¢ Phone (Area 202) 44-6000 WARD & PAUL LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 874 ; TOP SECRET invested with the problem. | | | together the operational capabilities of all Federal agencies | I have been a member now for 30 or more years of | one of the components invested with this job and my career has ended by retirement. I contemplate the future in the Statement, | as well as the past and I want to say that as far as I know, the component I have heen a member of CI staff, has engaged or | participated in no way in the domestic activities specified by Hirsh in the New York Times, that is, in the Breakins, physical audio surveillances and the other massive elements of | | surveillance that he has charged. With respect to the mail intercept program, I have talked in detail with Mr. Weidner and I am prepared to discuss that as well as anything else you have in mind. MR, WEIDNER: Perhaps we should back up just a hit t the time that you returned to the United States and joined the CIA staff here. You have given us a biography that brings us up to that point. | What position did you take in 1955 when you returned? MR. ROCCA: I became Chief of the Research and group later on. It numbered at no time more than 35 or 36 “people and it was concerned in the main with the topics that I have outlined in my biography. It represented an attempt to bring to bear brain power on the problem, research, hard CtechrsX- FEF TOP SECRET 78 7S G05 7 DLC 0.4, HE / Analysis Division, it eas called at that moment. It became a
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 - 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 235 24 25 LS TOP SECRET 87 research brain power on the problem of the identification, neutralization and manipulation of Soviet agents and their principals. MR. WEIDNER: At that time was the counterintelli- gence funcwion of the CIA just being established in a formal | sense? | HMR. ROCCA: The question turns in a formal sense there had been counterintelligence in OSS,it had been indepen- dent under General Donovan, it had heen headed by Jimmy Murphy, it had its own cadre, it had its own ciphers, it was an . autonomous part of OSS function, it was submerged as a functio to foreign intelligence during the SSU and following periods. In other words, it became a subordinate part of what we call foreign intelligence activities until late "54, early '55, when it was finally broken out asa coordinate activity at the staff level. MR. WEIDNER: Was one of your early functions to determine precisely what counterintelligence activities had been going on up to that point that were not particularly coordinated? MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. One of our first jobs was to study first of all how many people were doing counterintelligent full time within our organization. We found the number to be extremely small. AS a matter of fact, they are still extremel Tol S 7§ O27 TOP SECRET Ore ey H/ small and growing smaller.
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 Ll 12. 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 25 ° TOP SECRET 876 Fulltime counterintelligence at the non staff level, people overseas and in headquarters divisional and branch conponents. MR. WEIDNER: Did Research and Analysis have any Srp mtteecemm antennas te a ‘ameter teehee tt ke aye & nag operational activities at all? MR. ROCCA: At that time it undertook no operational activities except in direct dealings on an ad hoc basis with people Like defectors who had something to contribute directly | to the research impact. | MR. WEIDNER: What sort of dealings did you have with them? | | MR. ROCCA: As you know, by law we have the responsi bility for resettlement of defectors and any number of Soviet defectors, any number of incidents these people remained in contact with us continuously and are handled as continuing sources of information, in some instances compensated, in othe instances not. MR. WEIDNER: Would the FBI have Played a part in this? MR. ROCCA: FBI might or might not have played a part. They have always participated in the continuing debrief- ing of defectors. For example, we have a number, the staff still operates a number of these, I would say half a dozen of those. The FBI sees on a continuing basis at least two of them. They Whlichrme CHS
14-00000 Phone (Ares 202) $44-6000 - WARO & PAUL 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 él 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET | 977 continue to show photographs of incoming people, that is, incoming Soviets, to try to pick up in these human sources who have memories about that service people that they are still in the Service and are coming into the country. So we are in touch with the FBI. MR. WEIDNER: This is activity within the United States? MR. ROCCA: This is activity within the United States with respect to defectors. MR. WEIDNER: We will return to other activities in amore general sense. But you mentioned the mail intercept program, | | When was the first time you became aware that such a program was in existence?- MR. ROCCA: I became aware of the actual .content of the program and of its existence in a formal sense on the 4th of April 1960. MR. WEIDNER: How is that? MR. ROCCA: This fact is registered and I was able to confirm by simply looking. At that point I was cleared for the reception of material... MR. WEIDNER: When you say it is registered, the registration is the fact of your clearance? MR. ROCCA: There is a card which indicates the name of every individual who knows or knew. TOP SECRET UC ktchimin’ PAR FoTS BosaZ OlC Ca #, ete ee rere | | | | | | |
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 25 24 Bo 7 TOP SECRET a 878 MR. WEIDNER: Excuse me. What did you learn Gf the program at that point? MR. ROCCA: Nothing of its mechanics. My assumption was that this was an authorized directed program and I simply attempted to read and utilize the material, if that were possible. MR. WEIDNER: You Say you assumed that it was a directed and authorized program. Did anybody ever tell you how it had been authorized and/or directed? MR. ROCCA: No, I got that knowledge later on and specifically in the more recent events. MR. WEIDNER: You mean in preparing for these hearings? | MR. ROCCA: In preparing for these hearings and read ing the background of the actual discussions. MR. WEIDNER: Up to that point you had no knowledge of that subject? MR. ROCCA: Of -that subject, yes. MR. WEIDNER: What sort of materials? CHAIRMAN .ROCKEFELLER: Could he give us the dates at which in his exploration he found the program was authorized | and by whom and so forth, if you have that? MR. ROCCA: Early this year in reading a paper prepared on the program, and its background, it was specified TOP SECRET 7o 73 Uasar — OP fe Py 7
14-00000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 26003 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ll l2 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 o 879 TOP SECRET in the paper that the program had been originated in the early *S0's, and that it had been cleared by a succession of Post- masters General and others, including an ex Attorney General, as I recall. There was a specific reference to Mr. Allen Dulles having gone to the Postmaster-General, it is my best recollection, I think you have that in your attachment, and to my knowledge is really effective based on that attachment. MR. WEIDNER: The attachment you are speaking of is the attachment Mr. Angleton submitted? MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: The reason I raised the ques-: tion was up to his testimony, I thought it was '53, he said this program was initiated back in °49, I think. Was it '52? Excuse me? MR. ROCCA: Tt may have had a lapse. CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: In a previous Administration. MR. ROCCA: He may have had a lapse. MR. WEIDNER: What is your understanding? MR. ROCCA: My understanding is it was ‘55. MR. BELIN: '52 or '53, CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: ‘53 officially by the higher- ups it had been recommended and undertaken within the Agency prior to that. | MR. ROCCA: This is quite without my knowledge. CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I couldn't even guess, CM thme, 0 Jo 3 TOP SECRET 70 4S PF 932 Alo N. a) A err nr tee ep se hn een si tsi ane on a ere SS EY eer free
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL $10 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 880 ° TOP SECRET MR. WEIDNER: What sort of material? MR. ROCCA: My understanding is that the origin of it went back to the component, that actually in the clandestine services or equivalent at the time actually had the function of working against the Soviet Union. That was the SP Division. MR. GRISWOLD: Could you speak yp. You are talking to us, not to the people down there. | | | MR. ROCCA: I am sorry. ‘ MR. GRISWOLD: Thank you. MR. WEIDNER: When you started receiving these materials you were still in R&A; is that correct? mr. ROCCA: Yes sir. MR. WEIDNER: What sort of a flow in terms of number of materials would you -receive? MR. ROCCA: Tt was a very small flow of material and none of it sticks in my mind at this time as outstanding in importance to what we were doing in R&A. I have better recollection for later pieces of information that concerned, that is, for information in the '60's when we became very much interested in the problem of disinformation ~-- dez informatzia that is what the Soviets call strategic deception. This information went, some of the coverage concerned one of our specific targets who was an individual named Victor Louie and on him we had as I recall from this material very good coverage. GM ih mir Dd HZ 7°78 FCS27 TOP SECRET g6c oy ft /
14-00000 WARD &@ PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.Cc. 20003 Prone (Area 202) 544-6600 10 Li 12 13 44 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 . TOP SECRET 861 MR. WEIDNER: Could you determine from the materials ‘you received whether these were letters to or from the United States? MR. ROCCA: No sir, MR. WEIDNER: Just the substances of the information?! MR. ROCCA: These things came in, they were mostly from the USSR, not the other way. MR. WEIDNER: You became Mr. Angleton's Deputy in 1969, is that correct? MR. ROCCA: Yes. First of July I judge was the date. MR. WEIDNER: Did you gain any further information concerning the mail intercept program at that point? MR. ROCCA: Not at that point. At that point in the staff's development I became Deputy, leaving the position as Chief of Research and Analysis, where my Deputy succeeded in my Place. I took with me a good number of jobs that I had ’ already begun on the research side and there was created an executive officer and it was through him that the direct oversight was continued in the project. Now, what had happene is, more than what I had stated to you the other day, in becoming Deputy, I did not succeed to the job which the previous deputies had, and there had been two, Mr. Horton, and Mr. Hunt, had had which was simultaneously acting as Deputy to Mr. Angleton's staff and Chief of Operations. I did not succeed as Chief of Operations. Mr. Miler became Chief of | AT hone, 2 70 SS P¥OSAZ OLCCHe#Y/ TOP SECRET | i i !
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL. 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 TOP SECRET 882 Operations. So an executive officer was added, Mr. Hubbard of the project though I remained on the distribution for materials as they came in on a routine monthly basis indicating i at this time, and he took over the chore of direct oversight ‘ t { i | i what had been covered in cryptic language, and I was in general: aware of the project on that level until it was terminated, and: that was in 73, I judge. MR. WEIDNER: Did there come a time when you had a discussion with Mr. Karamessinas, who was the Deputy Director ! of Plans, concerning the project? | MR. ROCCA: I did. At one time during this period - MR. WEIDNER: What period is that? MR. ROCCA: 1971 is my best recollection. During Mr. Angleton's absence, inasmuch as it was my function as Deputy sameeren to act in his. absence, there was some kind of a question that had arisen that required the presentation of an indication of the results as they had accumulated in the recent past, for him, and to the best of my recollection Mr. Hubbard and I went together to present these elements of proudction and security review. They were interested in how secure was the project and so forth. And I presented these materials to Mr. Karamessinas in written form, as I recall. MR. WEIDNER: Was it Mr. Karamessinas' general mode of operation to have annual or periodic reviews of Projects within his directorate? ihn t-F'3 75 DF oes TOP SECRET ss von vA
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2l 22 23 24 25 “all projects so I cannot say that that was what motivated this, 02 TOP SECRET 883 MR. ROCCA: This is standard order of procedure for but certainly I can, I recall this episode. in the fall of, as I have it, in "71. MR. WEIDNER: During that particular conference or ' at any other time that you can recall was there any question Yaised as to the propriety, the legal propriety of the project? MR. ROCCA: No, not to my knowledge. Not to my : knowledge or recollection. | MR. WEIDNER: And you never had any particular dis- cussion with anyone concerning the approval or legality of the project? MR. ROCCA: I did not, sir, ever. MR. WEIDNER: _ Now, what was counterintelligence's relationship tothe mail intercept program? I think the Commission has already been told that the operation actually occurred in New York City? MR. ROCCA: That is correct. The operation origi- nated outside of CI. CI took it over as a customer and dissemination point in 1955 or whenever. That was our relatiori- ship to it. The actual work was done by another component outside of the seat of Government. MR. WEIDNER: You say the actual work, the actual work of collection? MR. ROCCA: The actual, whatever went into the > TOP SECRET Jo 7S WS 27 Airin Lf
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 416 First Street, $.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 WARD & PAUL 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 13 mechanics analysis, gence? | | TOP SECRET 834 of the handling of the material. MR. WEIDNER: But the processing of it, that is the was done in headquarters in Washington? MR. ROCCA: That is correct, sir. MR. WEIDNER: And that was done by counterintelli-~ mented small unit of Russian language specialists who were set i MR. ROCCA: That was done by a very highly compart- | | | | i up in a comintarea,a vaulted area, under every possible safe-~- guard, and they treated this material in accordance with their skills, that is they translated or summarized or otherwise prepared it. MR. WEIDNER: Was that vaulted area in the part of the building where CI is. located or was it in a separate area? MR. ROCCA: It was in a separate area for most of th time that the project existed, as far as I know. They may have started in 1955-56 in that area, in that timeframe, on the same floor, but very quickly thereafter moved to the 7th floor into comint area where a vaulted area had been prepared, MR, WEIDNER: Was there any particular reason for th move, that you can recall? MR. ROCCA: I could only justify it on the basis of the security and the handling of the material... It was handled | as comint also. MR. WEIDNER: Did you participate in the decision to GLIA mr 250 FES TOP SECRET LT 7S PPS a7 MLCCe zey
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 44-6006 WARD &@ PAUL 410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 14 TOP SECRET 885 discontinue the program, and I helieve the testimony has been of '73? MR. MR. MR. MR. wR. MR. MR. that it was decided to discontinue it in approximately July | ‘ROCCA: I did not, -sir. WEIDNER: Did you learn of that decision? ROCCA: I learned of it. WEIDNER: Who told you? ROCCA: Mr. Angleton. | WEIDNER: Did he tell you why? ROCCA: The indication that he gave me was that Mr. Schlesinger had agreed to go to the President to get a top executive decision with respect to the contuance or discontinuance of the program, that this issue had been raised in a discussion between him, Dr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby, before that; that Dr. Schlesinger had agreed to take that ¢ . action, Mr. Colby, or someone was to talk with Cotter, or someone, whoever it was. MR. MR, WEIDNER: Who was Cotter? ROCCA: As I understand it, he is the individual on the Post Office side who was actually handling it, the Post Office interest, and he refused to permit the time necessary for Dr. Schlesinger to go to the President. The thing therefore ended sumarily at his choice. MR. MR, WEIDNER: At Mr. Cotter's choice? ROCCA: Yes sir. I am giving you the name in GMC 2 J #2 TOP SECRET Td 7S FeOSA7 aAirn th. ‘
14-00000 Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 been out of it by that time. i TOP SECRET 6 complete good faith. It may not be correct, he may well have MR. WEIDNER: Were you told whether the impetus to terminate the project had come from within the CIA or from without? | MR. ROCCA: No; I was not. I jusged that there had | been some difference with respect to the project inside as well as out but I only know that by hearsay. | MR. WEIDNER: What difference? | MR. ROCCA: That the decision as to whether or not i should be continued or terminated. MR. WEIDNER: Did you play any part in the termina- tion of the project, that is, once the decision was made to terminate it? | MR. ROCCA: Yes, these decisions coincided with the decisions made by Pr. Schlesinger to compress personnel in the Agency and as a consequence the first large hemorrage of per~ sonnel took place on the retirements that took place on 30 June 1973, and among them was the Executive Office. MR. WEIDNER: And the Executive Officer is Mr. Angleton? MR. ROCCA: Yes; Mr. Hubbard. The job of winding this down and taking care of the details became mine and I did it. MR. WEIDNER: What did you do? TOP SECRET 70 7S PLOSAP Aiw- th , LL f
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 1O 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 295 24 25 16 TOP SECRET 807 MR. ROCCA: Through our administrative officer and the people. still engaged in the project, we, and under the pressure of the need of our comint people for additional space on the top floor, and they wanted,:in other words, to usefully employ the space we occupied, we secured new vault space of Similar level of security, securely transferred all of the material to the new vault space where it remains together with its indices and appurtenances. MR. ROCCA: The new vault space is within the CI counterintelligence area? MR. ROCCA: The new vault space is on the same floor | | but physically dislocated from CI. It is, however, an approve security office vault which meets, inother words, all of the minimum standards. ‘We created it, it had to be built. MR. WEIDNER: The personnel were reassigned, then? MR. ROCCA: The personnel were reassigned to other tasks. | | MR. WEIDNER: If the Commission wanted to look at the records of this project to determine the substance of it, are those records still in existence and intact? ' MR. ROCCA: They are totally intact. MR. WEIDNER: In this vault, newly created vault? MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. And I am sure the Commission would be welcome to examine them, both the vault and the Material, in its present status. TOP SECRET 70 7S FEOSD D> QO ff fos. th 4
14-00000 Phane (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 "7 TOP SECRET ao8 MR. WEIDNER: Let me turn to a different subject. MR..BELIN:; Before you leave that subject, there may be a question of two some of the Commission might want to ask. You have discussed this entire area with Mr. Angleton recently in interviews with members of the staff; is that correct? MR. ROCCA: Well, I read the attachment. MR. BELIN: That Mr. Angleton prepared? MR. ROCCA: Yes. MR. BELIN: Or was prepared that Mr. Angleton presented? MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. MR. BELIN: Is there anything in the attachment with which you disagree? MR. ROCCA: No sir. tt seems to me like a perfectly complete narrative, descriptive account, as far as I know. COMMISSIONER REAGAN: This chart that you gave us here, we have some difficulty identifying them. How do we estimate the increase in the number of agents, foreign agents they have? MR. ROCCA: These are official personnel assigned. here, sir, you see, and within the official personnel that the assigned here on 16th Street. There is an institution known as the Resident Toura which comprises those that work for State Department and for GRU, Soviet military intelligence, Let toh (ES TOP secret “4 A05* Fb TS APOS27 OL LO VG. LL soesemmneattendehtestatenemmeemetaterne eee
14-00000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 LO ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 . 19 20 al 22 23 24 25 +8 TOP SECRET geo so these charts reflect the growth of Soviet official presence throughout the world and in the United States, delineates in another line, a solid bar, what wé know among them to be security and military intelligence operatives, and then it draws another line, which is an estimate, and it is a minimal estimate, the 40 percent line, which we have come upon as the result of the research that I have been doing for years, as the minimal. And as you see we are falling behind in our identifications both here and abroad, and very seriously abroad. MR. CONNOR: May I ask a question on this subject. Based on your experience, was the substance of the material that was obtained from these written communications back and forth of value to the counterintelligence group? MR. ROCCA: I consider it sir, mind you, I am talkin now completely as an individual who was not privy to the begin ning of it and did not get into it until 1960, and therefore, to a large extent impressionable. It seems to me that for the ‘50's and '60's this what may be called a source of strategic importance for counterintelligence. AS to the extent that the Soviets did not know it we had it. It was capable of bearing indications that would have given us identifications not only legals but of illegals and of other interests that the Soviets had that we could get in no other way and that I could only compare it to the overhead photography which functioned at the Vea TOP SECRET Ts TS 2¢0F 27 Al C Qs, LL fF | eet me te mre tte ecrttenes nee ttepeatnstt enema “apne ate
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, O.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 el aod 25 24 20 1s TOP SECRET 890 same time and gave us another type or for a good part of that time of strategic information. This taken together with the six or seven defectors that ame out in the '50's, who gave us living examples and | identifications, and the three penetrations that we had going | in the ‘50's of the Soviets, they were Popov, and Penkovsky, ark GoyeneveS3Ki, three people working inside those surfaces over a | period of time from '53 to '61. We had the foundation of a | Strategy response to the Soviet threat and all you have to do is to read the '60's and you read the results because at no time in the history of Soviet intelligence and counter- intelligence have they been hit so hard as in the decade of the "60's. We got Blake in '61. We got Philby in '63. We got Pak, these are two UK fellows, Vassil, another UK one, in *64. Pak in France in ‘64. Felfe, the Chief of German Counterintelligence, West German, about the same time, There 4 are a number of NATO cases that grew out, all of them, of this combination of what I call strategic CI weaponry. Defectors, penetrations and unfortunately all of these penetrations were compromised, Penkovsky was tried and shot, Popov was tried and shot. Only one got away, and that is Goyenevsky. So I would say that this was an extraordinary resourde particularly in view of the way it was handled for counter- intelligence. I can't go beyond that because, as I say, I don't know where every distribution went to the Bureau, how TOP SECRET sy 78 2k 482? A} f Cer. LS
14-00000 Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003 LO 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 al 22 23 24 25 | 20 TOP SECRET - 892 | Many went, how many reports went with the Bureau, you have that data and can gauge it for yourself. To me it waS part and | parcel of an advantage which was extraordinary and it hurts | me to talk about it now. MR. GRISWOLD: What was the relation of this to the defectors. I haven't found that connection. ! MR. ROCCA: Well, a defector will talk about collec- | tion by true name and in some instances in this project, in. | this material, we found that individual writing to people heres) and so by that kind of correlation of identification of names, | the project makes its contribution to an. ongoing ‘lead which began with a defector. So that the idea of backing up operations with research involves using all of these tools against the target. That is a specific example that I can recall offhand. COMMISSIONER CORBIN: You have given an example of United States? MR. ROCCA: As I say, the stuff I saw came from the USSR. I can't make anything out of the other at all because I was not that close to it. COMMISSIONER BELIN: Basically the defectors were of prime importance? MR. ROCCA: Absolutely gilt edge.. COMMISSIONER BELIN: And the technical observations ChlAcbomin? Ze TOP SECRET) = 5 mail coming from USSR. What about mail originating in the
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) $44-G000 WARD & PAUL 416 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 11 12 13 14 15 16— L? 18 19 20 él 22 25 24 25 “FOP SECRET 892 through the U-2 and satellites? MR. ROCCA: This is another thing. COMMISSIONER BELIN: And both of those were far more Substantial than the mail intercept program; isn't that true? MR. ROCCA: I can't argue the merit really in that, | with that fineness of degree of detail because they were laid | to different -- | COMMISSIONER BELIN: To follow through the question | Mr. Corbin asked, was there anything that you can specifically | remember that was gleaned from intercepting the mail of an | American citizen going to the Soviet Union? MR. ROCCA: I have not that capability, not because it doesn't exist, in fact I think there are some specific examples cited in the report... COMMISSIONER BELIN: In Mr. Angleton's report? _ MR. ROCCA: Yes. But maybe other witnesses could Clarify that. | COMMISSIONER LEMINITZER: “You don't know whether it went to the FBI? MR. ROCCA: I am sure’ the reports were shared with the FBI. I am Sure they were. Sir, what I don't know is in response to Mr. Belin‘'s question, how important it was, whethe they made any cases,that kind of thing. COMMISSIONER BELIN: Mr. Weidner. MR. WEIDNER: I would like to turn to the operation Gh mt LPR TOP SECRET 7U TSARASOF |
14-00000 Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL. 4106 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 200023 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 “2 TOP SECRET 893 concerning dissidents or information relating to foreign news Or contacts with American dissidents. I believe the project was established sometime in 1967. The record will show that. - non ee eacerae ean merece aaNet cm eet At that point you were sitll in R&A; is that correct? MR. ROCCA: That is right. i MR. WEIDNER: Were you aware that this particular project was being established? | MR. ROCCA: I was aware of it when it was announced | in the regulation. It was not discussed with me before it was announced, before the action was taken. I was not privy to that kind of thing as Chief of Research and Analysis though the very man chosen had spent sometime in Research and Analysi working specifically on machine records and techniques which was a matter of grave concern to him, and interest. He was specifically interested in developing and perfecting the techniques of ADP control over data. I recall him, Mr. Ober, a fine officer, who spent sometime in R&A before he went down to OPS, from whence he went into this unit. COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Excuse me. What do you mean when it was announced? MR. ROCCA: I would say there was an actual announce ment by Karamessinas which said as of such and such a date a unit has been created under the headship -- COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD. This was an internal announce- CM lp Moma, TF 2 TOP SECRET v4 Papo
14-00000 — TOP SECRET B94 Tem omer man, verte atm ate ener tte te ie A ehimantte meets es g 1 ment? 3 s 2 MR. ROCCA: Within the DDP. g 5 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: ‘Not a public announcement? ® : 4 MR. ROCCA: No. 5 COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Do you know about when that 6 was? 7 MR. ROCCA: I would guess it was '57, sometime in 8 "S7. 9 , COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: You mean '67? 10 MR. ROCCA: ‘67, I am sorry. Ll | COMMISSIONER GRISWOLD: Thank you. ; 12 | MR. WEIDNER: Mr. Ober was transferred out of R&A 2 ‘ 13 at about that time, or was it before then? : 14 MR. ROCCA: Before then. Because he did a 15 transitional tour. I had nothing permanent for him to do in 16 R&A besides this work that he was doing. We have our own 17 machine, I had my own machine records, so he went to OPS as 18 referent, as we call it, as the OPS Supervisor for the Domesti 19 Operations Division. S ; 20 MR. WEIDNER: Was this program a part of the ‘ 21 Domestic Operations Division, do you know? i 20 MR. ROCCA: No, I don't think so. : 23 MR. WEIDNER: Well, then, did he leave Domestic ‘ 24 Operations, the referent desk? E 25 MR. ROCCA: As the referent he was in CI and in the Mla Dama ce 73 TOP SECRET Jo 78 70527 eemacarratirnttettnes: artnet ni met ates sistnminn oo
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 44-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, Q.C. 20003 10 1l 12 13 14 15_ 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET : 895 part of CI known as CI operations which had a number of referents for each of the major counterintelligence jobs that was being done overseas or in the United States as in this instance it turned out. MR. WEIDNER: What I am driving at, whether this project was a part of the Domestic Operations.Division or whether this was a separate project, the dissident project. Do you know? MR. ROCCA: It was a separate project as far as I know. MR. WEIDNER: When you became: Mr. Angleton's Deputy in '69, did you gain any greater knowledge about this project? MR. ROCCA: I gained no greater knowledge because it was absolutely compartmented and sat in another part of the building. What I gained was the opportunity of administra- tively seeing budget and travel accounts pertaining to Mr. Ober's activity and his people's activity within the United States. MR. WEIDNER: Did he specify to any degree what those activities were? MR. ROCCA: I was never told what those activities _ were. In fact, I am sure I would not have been even had I asked because these were known as compartmented activities. MR. WEIDNER: Did Mr. Ober deal through you as Mr. Angleton's Deputy? UlichnT 0 > Ta 78 JE OS2 TOP SECRET piece win”
14-00000 Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Streat, §.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 TOP SECRET 896 MR. ROCCA: Never dealt through me to Mr. Angleton. MR. WEIDNER: Other than for the expense request? MR. ROCCA: Other than these. MR. WEIDNER: It seems to me that the mail program ~~ MR. ROCCA: He dealt with Mr. Karamessinas and Mr. Helms on these matters. I would say that he was with us for rations and quarters. This would be something that General Leminitzer recognizes. MR. WEIDNER: There seems to be a certain parallel between the mail program and what I will call the dissident program, that is, both seemed to have a chain of command, if. you want to call it that, somewhat out of the ordinary. Is that a fair statement? MR. ROCCA: Yes, - I think that is probably a fair statement and in both instances I think the differences pertai to the sensitivity of the. activity. MR. WEIDNER: You never had any discussion with any- one concerning the propriety of the dissident program? . MR. ROCCA: No, I would never have thought of it as being improper. The National Security Act in its provisions with respect to limitations on our powers does not proscribe that we live in another country in doing our operations and My assumption had always been, and I have not .seen any evidenc to the contrary, that Mr. Ober's activity, the activity of this unit, at all times looked to fruits abroad, which is C}Mlach ms 3 TOP SECRET oe Jo TS 7#RdAS>
14-00000 Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD &@ PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a1 22 ae) 24 25 Ev 837 precisely where we were Suppoesed to operate, MR. WEIDNER: ‘You say that is your assumption. Do you have any specific facts on which you would base that? MR. ROCCA: I don't know Mr. Ober's operations. He had them because, as I say, I know the budgetary line-up of the period and, therefore, I am sure you can get them from him They were never explained to me under this need to know principle. One operation that I know is his, and maybe you already know about it, is the penetration of Agee in Paris. MR. WEIDNER: Perhaps you can tell us about that. MR. ROCCA: Agee is a defector, an American intelli- gence defector, as far as I am concerned, the only one we have had, and he has just written a book that is going to be a massive blow to the security and identity of our operations in Latin America. It comes out in England. He was an individual recruited in the late °50's, he operated in Latin America in the '60's, and left us under what he himself called very friendly circumstances in 1968 in Mexico City after his personal affairs had become completely mucked up as a conse- quence of the collapse of his marriage, One of the final things he did was to write the Director -~ this is again hearsay, I have not seen the letter, but I believe my sources are good on it -- a letter in which he said no hard feelings, I will always be your principal Ala hrs Ll #F TOP SECRET Fo 7S VMSAT | a i [ i i
14-00000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 . Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 ae 23 24 25 TOP SECRET a9 backer, and so forth. This is 1968. By 1971 we knew that he had made two trips to Cuba. The origins of his ideological conversion, whatever they might be, in Mexico City, after he left us, presumably, he went to the University of Mexico, he had, as I say, marital problems, another woman, whom he has Since left. I can't judge. But when he became by his action a threat we only had to point out what the nature of that _ threat was and to assess it. It is, I am told, that the individual who succeeded in placing an agent within the zone o confidence in Paris was Mr. Ober and this was one of his operations, perfectly legitimate operations, as far as I am concerned, because while it involved an American, I think, maybe not maybe, it was in Latin American, but whatever, it took place outside of this country and it presented us with extremely useful information on assess the potential damage and has come to pass. MR. WEIDNER: You say special operations? As far as MR. ROCCA: operations and it should figure MR. WEIDNER: I think operations? MR. ROCCA: Who did I MR. WEIDNER: Agee's,. TOP SECRET the basis of which we could intention of Agee, all of whic this was a part of Ober's I know this is one of Agee's as one of the big cases. you mean one of Ober's say? fp tHechme A3 TS FBS 2D / Al 0 the +4:
TOP SECRET 899 MR. ROCCA: Ober. I am sorry. Now, that is one I | i { i : } —— | “ 2 do know about by the unconventional route of just listening | Ci] Q N ‘ Z 3 but I can't cite any of the others at all. | \ Ps 2 A MR. WEIDNER: Let me turn to another subject, or | 5 perhaps if anyone else has any questions on this one before I | t do? 6 i 9 COMMISSIONER BELIN: I think we had better move: 8 forward because we have one more witness. i 9 MR. WEIDNER: Let me touch briefly on two other | 10 subject matters which have come to light, at least in publicity, Ll and that is the liaison with local police forces and/or this | 12 use of surveillance, breaking and entering, and the like, | ad < within the United States. é 13 | . e 1 Are you aware of any such activities by counter- | intelligence? 15 MR. ROCCA: No. And as far as police are concerned, 16 we have no relations with, we have never had any relations 1? with local police. . 18 MR. WEIDNER: What about surveillance and the like? ” 19 o 8 MR. ROCCA: As far as I know the staff has never 3 20 ‘ done any surveillance of any kind. It has no capability to do g 21 is é it or experts to do it, and we have a TO officer that was as F 22 ud high as 202 and it is now down to 78, and each I think can be 2 ao E if necessary summoned and questioned on the point. No breakins|, ~ ¥ 24 woe £ . 3 no surveillances, involving audio or physical activity, no e ° OM a borwt FZ | TOP SECRET 39 jsorane
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6900 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 “10 Li l2 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 él £2 25 24 25 TOP SECRET 900 no contact with police in the mail operation that I have told | you about or otherwise. MR. WEIDNER: What about ‘wiretaps? MR. ROCCA: No wiretaps. - MR. WEIDNER: Are you aware now of any activity? MR. ROCCA: We were interested in other people's capabilities of wiretapping us. As I told you, we had a specialized component that: studied Soviet capabilities of tapping our communications and we reported to the community regularly on this. MR. WEIDNER: ARe you presently aware of any CI counterintelligence activities within the United States? MR. ROCCA: At present CI activity in the United States outside of our headquarters building involves contacts with the Washington area and in one major city, Eastern Seaboard city, with defectors, Soviet defectors, and we have contacts in this area with about; | I am in personal contact with some of these people at least on a weekly basis. | I have an officer in touch with them nearly on a daily basis. The exception outside of the Seat of Government in this major city is handled by anothr officer, former staffer, who is now a hired annuitant. So these are defector contacts that we have. These are highly specialized relations dealing with the main enemy as I have described him and I consider them entirel within our legal brief. So we have a| defectors tha TOP SECRET 7S 760827) | Poe ev fe.
14-00000 WARD &@ PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, B.C. 20003 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 2) 24 25 TOP SECRET 901 we are in direct touch with and to whom we move and from whom we move, each on a regular basis. Second, we have three consultants. These are private individuals who are experts in international communisn, or on dissinformation, and there again the contact is direct. We don’t buy all of their time, we buy some of it, and those MR. WEIDNER: What sort of work. Can you give me an example? MR. ROCCA: One of the topics, one of the consultant are, in other words, consultants. . , | is on tap for dissinformation. I think we have contact with the person who is probably the world's best authority on this topic and we simply pay for a part of his time. MR. GRAY: Would these be university professors and similar people? | | MR. ROCCA: They could have been formerly. This person is not. COMMISSIONER BELIN: By dissinformation you mean intentionally misleading misinformation released by the Soviets? MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. COMMISSIONER BELIN: Or some other? MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. For example, before the Yom Kippur War telling us through various cables they were tired o the Arabs and the Arabs couldn't shoot straight and this and JOP SECRET 7273 OS 27 Ade SY... hb
14-00000 WARD &@ PAUL 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 ill 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20. 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET 902 | that and the other, that is dissinformation. No question it | would have been good to have recognized it then instead of now. MR. WEIDNER: These consultants are U.S. citizens under contract with the CIA; is that correct? MR. ROCCA: Yes. MR. WEIDNER: Do you have any other activities within the United States in which counterintelligence is involved? if i | MR. ROCCA: We have a group of former agents. | | These are people who work for us abroad that we keep under appropriate cover here in Washington, official cover, working on overt Soviet publication, that is things in the Russian language, that they read and from which they extract informatids dealing with Soviet intelligence and security matters. These | people have cover status. in official buildings, they don't figure as CIA. We pay them salaries and we interact with them I think that is the entire extent of it. MR. WEIDNER: Do you have any people through whom you maintain contact with other Soviets here in the United States or abroad? MR. ROCCA: Thes might be uncompensated contacts who would really figure in the area of agents or double agents, either active or under development, and there are such. Again perfectly legitimate developmental activity. | COMMISSIONER BELIN: There has been a lot of comment about possible wiretapping by CIA people. Could you tell us wt HS TOP SECRET 7517 |
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 1O li 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 25 24 25 . TOP SECRET what the Russians are doing in this country? Summarize what a they might be doing insofar as wiretapping or eavesdropping | on phone conversations? | MR. ROCCA: The Russians' sophistication in this area, Mr. Belin, if you are interested in it, to the extent that you seem to be, should be gained from someone who has expert knowledge, and I think you ought to lay the question on for NSA or someone, but it is phenominal. Their ability to cover communications, including microwave, is astounding, ad I am a layman in this, therefore, I am giving you what I have been told in the course of briefings designed to keep me from using even Our own phone, a 351 number, even the 351 number. They have the degree of sophistication of coming in and discriminating, if you use a microwave , on that kind of a code. So this is an extraordinary thing. It is going on right here in your back yard. MR. WEIDNER: If they want to they could get every conversation coming out of Capitol Hil, or most conversations? MR. ROCCA: That is too much. I haven't the expertise to say that but I think if you are interested in it get the experts. (Off the record discussion) COMMISSIONER BELIN: Mr, Rocca, Mr. Corbin has one o two questions. CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I want to ask a question. TS /§ 6527 TOP SECRET) 39, Zh 45
14-00000 Phone (Area 202} §44-6000 WARD & PAUL 4106 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 295 24 25 - One of them is it is directly related, I believe, to a 12 TOP SECRET 504 And that. is, what in your opinion caused the downward curve of identification of agents starting in 1968? MR. ROCCA: This is on the domestic chart? CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Domestic. Then it has picked up again but you show a lag there. MR. ROCCA: That is right. This is the Bureau Tet mane Semi SESE tan me ee 2 seh Qt pte ee tenets at etter 2 record. It is directly related, sir, I believe to, there are a number of explanations or points bearing on an explanstion. percent decline in Bureau manpower expenditure, which I am not tenet anette ptpemeet sere: hoc cps vente leewmememnetrnen showing and which I am just giving you. CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Is that true on a worldwide basis, too? MR. ROCCA: — On a -worldwide scale we have simply gone off line in our counterintelligence work. I think Mr. Angleton said so in his statement that we are looking for other things, we are not analyzing resident tourists, and our gap is getting resident toura. That word means resident toura That is the word that means the organized intelligence and security component within each Soviet Embassy or Consulate, It has its own capabilities, its won ciphers and its own operations. We used to study those and we knew them everywhere in the world back in the good old days, but along with manpowey, and we have heen cut well into the bone, not just to the bone. TOP SECRET Fo TSU 2D
14-00000 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Strest, S.E., Washington, ©.C. 20003 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET 905 We have I think to face up On our side to the fact that our priorities have been shifted and now I think with these revelations we are dead in the water. COMMISSIONER BELIN: When you said Bureau do you mean FBI.or CIA? | | MR. ROCCA: This is the domestic figures. | COMMISSIONER BELIN: You used the phrase Bureau with | regard to curtailed 12 percent. MR. ROCCA: That is the Bureau. COMMISSIONER BELIN: That is the FBI? i MR. ROCCA: Yes sir. COMMISSIONER CONNOR: In Washington parlance FBI is called the Bureau and CIA is called the Agency. MR. ROCCA: That is right. COMMISSIONER BELIN: I would like to have the court reporter make these charts a part of your interrogation together with your statement, so we will give you two copies of the charts so they will be in the transcript. (The above referred to charts follow) CllaAhmoy TOS T § PEOS2%7 6.ctA/ TOP SECRET
14-00000 BIOGRAPHY - Raymond George Rocca, born 22 February 1917 in San Francisco, which is family home. Sherman Grammar School, Galileo High School ('34). University of California, Berkeley, AB ~ ‘38 in Political Science. Phi Betta Kappa. MA - ‘39, Highest Honors in International Relations. Worked for Doctorate 1939 - April 30, 1942, successfully completed orals. (Unclassified) Joined Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Washington, D. C., 3 May 1942 as Italian broadcast analyst. (Unclassified) Joined OSS Counterintelligence component, April 1944. Arrived Rome, Italy, July 1944. Remained in Italy in service of OSS and its successor agencies, the Strategic Services Unit and CIA, under military and as of end 1947, under non-official cover, until 1953. Temporary duty assignments abroad: 1955, 1956, 1959, 1964, 1967, 1969, 1971, and 1973. (Secret) National War College, class of 1954-55. (Unclassified) Joined DDP/CI Staff, July 1955 as Chief of its Research and Analysis Group. Functions: production and editing of finished CI studies, case studies, briefings, defector debriefings, accumulation of CI doctrine, and research, stimulation, and participation in CI training. Deputy Chief, CI Staff (as of July 1973 renamed CI/OPS), July 1969 - 31 December 1974. Principal functional concerns: a. General staff administration oversight and bureaucratic detail. b. Responsibility for specific Soviet and Bloc defector development.. c. Soviet Deception and Disinformation. d. Development of liaison relations with selected Western intelligence and security services on case study and analyses. (Secret) abhlick es ono ciassiriseo py O55431) EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION yrs any SCHEDULE GF E. 0. 11052, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: S23 “S VESA/ § stn), ©. (3) or (4) (circle age or more) 0 L@ é fe / AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 7 date impossible to determine (usless impossible, insect date or eveat)
14-00000 ‘SECRET Aide-memoire for the Commission on ee ENE Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States CtA Activities Within the United States My preoccupation in this discussion grows out of the conviction, based on operational facts, that hostile espionage, political action, and counterintelligence--in other words, uncontested expansion of Soviet intelligence presence, successful recruitments, penetrations, and disinformation by the Soviets and the Bloc services of intelligence and security and other conspiratorial organs-~ will increase during the period of detente. The hard fact that KGB presence under Soviet official cover has continued to increase throughout the world, particularly in areas of direct concern to us like Western Europe, Latin America, and Africa, makes it a matter of urgency for CIA to devote a larger part of its energy to that CI problem. The same thing has happened in the U.S.; the remedy, through the appropriate Federal agency or agencies, will have to be the same. . CC fg AIS & BTS ROS 2 OLCCY &/ CLASSIFIED BY 055431 SECRET a EXEM?T FROM GENERAL. DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. 0. 11552, EXEMPTION CATECORY: § S81), ©. (3) or (4) (civele one of mere) AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON date impossible to determine . (uales impossible, insert date or event)
14-00000 SECRET The fact that the KGB/Bloc services, including Cubans, have continued in the past two years to undertake develop- mental relations and have made pitches to and significant contacts with American officials overseas at an undiminished rate, that work out to one or more per week, is the complementary Operational element that underlines the urgency for an effective counterintelligence response. abroad and domestically. Overhead photography and sophisticated but remotely operating equipment will NOT, and never will, tell us who the Soviet, Bloc, and Cuban spies are. This inimical activity Originates abroad and is no respector of our organizational, jurisdictional, or territorial distinctions. As we are presently organized in the United States, no one Federal agency can hope to deal successfully with the growing threat alone. This: integrated, determined adversary can only be dealt with by coordinated, innovative, and aggressive defense through counterintelligence and counterespionage operations - which bring together the operational capabilities of all Federal agencies invested with the problem. my hrm Rocca Washington, D. C. ; 17 February 1975 TS Lf O57 2 CEPDET
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