i Doc ID: 6606906 Date: 10/05/98 PaGE:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY.: NSA RECORD NUMBER : 144-10001-10179 RECORDS SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : NSA FROH : YEATES, LAO TITLE : 8 NOVEMBER MTG W/MR. BLAKEY DATE : 11/10/78 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : MR. CHRISTENSEN’S KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B CURRENT STATUS : X DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98 OPENING CRITERIA : ORIGINATING AGENCY'S DETERMINATION REQUIRED COMMENTS ; Released on 11-02-2017 under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2017 Note) [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Doc ID: 6606906 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: 8 November Meeting with Mr. Blakey 1. On 8 November, Ed Sapp visited Mr. Robert G. Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, to receive questions concerning a former Air Force enlisted man's allegation that he had intercepted information linking an assassination plot against President Kennedy with a figure in organized crime. Mr. Blakey had been referred to NSA (GC, Dan Silver) by Ms. Judy Miller, Special Assistant to John Kester, OSD. 2. Mr. Blakey indicated that David F.: Christensen had communicated with a friend of his named Sgt Michael B. Stevensen at "Corry" Field, FLorida. Mr. Christensen has been committed to a mental institution due, he asserts, to pressures arising from an incident occurring in 1963. 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D) b (iii) 3. At that time, Christensen was in the Air Force-assigned to Kirknewton, Scotland. Sometime before November; 1963, in his work as an interceptor of communications, he intercepted the communications referred in paragraph 1. Mr. Blakey stated that he did not know who the crime figure is. Christensen's supervisor, Sgt Praeter (actually "Prater") refused to send this traffic to NSA and this, he alleges, eventually caused him to have a mental breakdown. 4, Mr. Blakey stated that NSA had already acknowledged the existence of such a facility during this period, but he didn't indicate to whom such a statement had been made. 5. Mr. Blakey posed the following questions for NSA: (a) What is NSA's capability for retrieving communications from this time and place? (b) How quickly can we make this retrieval? (His Committee completes its work in December. If NSA can easily provide the answers to a number of questions, he will do some preliminary investigation before formally requesting the information, but if we indicate that much time will be required, he will task us now.) (c) What additional information does NSA need from Mr. Blakey to speed the retrieval process? (d) Is the data still available for retrieval? Released on 11-02-2017 under the John F. Kennedy Assassination ae : Records Collection Act of mn ASE - : Al ORS as UC eS \ 1992 (44 USC 2017 Note) m MEY Usb aunaes HU bath ¥ \ <2.
Doc ID: 6606906 (e) Was Christensen really employed by the Air Force, working for Praeter (Prater), and actually doing this kind of work at that location during that period? 6. He asked for the responses, or at least, a status of what can be provided and how soon, by Monday, 13 November. 44USC2107(5)(g)(2)(D) (iii) 7. On 7 September, the General Counsel sent a .copy of, David Christensen's letter to the FBI (GC/335/78),.along with a.-letter from AF Security Service (to which Sgt-Stevensen had sent the letter). In the General Counsel's letter-he noted that Security Service was intercepting communications’ at Kirknewton in 1963 and that links between were monitored. 8. On 9 November, Ed and I met with Dan Silver and decided Dan should respond initially to Mr. Blakey's questions by phone. After coordinating with EXEC/DDO, Ed asked G9 to provide input for a response. 9, Harold Parrish (5649) of G809 conducted an initial review of the availability of data from USA-SS covering the first eleven months of 1963. From a computer file listing maintained by N3, 20 boxes of data were identified. Cross-checking assures that this is all and the contents column helped eliminate 17 of the boxes. The remaining three wil be manually reviewed on 13 November. If they, in fact, do contain traffic:-there will be some 2000 sheets per box. 10. I notified Dem, i Mr. Blakey with the news, odo nonin aneaie Y at i Ha AG MATT (on hun, , ¢ EUGENE F. YEATES Chief Legislative Affairs VASP GARD RAR ETE AANDLOE Vin UUW! WliuwicLd Ul
Doc IQ  §606906 a e ; - | : | @ MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN JOHN G. KESTER, _ SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE : AND G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS Ce edlaneatineeienndionn Iam Reenter te Te - 4d. This Memorandum of Understanding shall govern:the pro- tection of classified information of the Department of Defense Leyte ~o (fiend ef, tide .xelating to the investigation of the House “cposean tes on Assassinations (Committee) into the allegations of involvement by the Government of Cuba: in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. For such purpose, the Department of Defense will make _ available for an interview by a desig- . nated member of the Committee Staff at a time of mutual conven- ience but not later than 22 November 1978. 2. The interview will be conducted in secure spaces which are authorized for the discussion of classified signals intelli- gence information, 3. The interview will be limited in Scope to the substan- . tive content of the allegations of - Informa- - tion which deals with intelligence sources and methods will not be used in responding to questions. Ay The Committee agrees, for itself and on behalf of the person designated by the Committee to conduct the interview, not _ to disclose any classified information which is revealed in the
aid course of the interview without the prior written concurrence of the Department of Defense. A representative of the Depart- ment will attend the briefing and advise the Committee represen- tative as to information that is classified. | | 5. The Committee's designee who conducts the interview may -make a recording or transcript of the interview and written notes of the responses of . to the Committee's ques- tions. The Committee agrees that any such notes may be inspected by the Department's representative prior to removal from the. interview room, and any classified information which is contained inthe notes shall be deleted prior to their removal. If any classified information is contained in the notes, the original version shall be maintained in the Office of the Special Assistant © to the Secretary of Defense, and the Committee may have access to those notes as needed, . Any recording or transcript of the inter- view will be left in the possession of the Department of Defense for a review to determine its classification. Ifthe transcript or recording contains classified information, at will remain in the Department! s possession, and the’ Conitittee may have access to it as needed. 6.0 Nothing in the Committee's undertaking affects the Committee! s right to invoke in the future any subpoena power - available to it to secure and disclose the information related to 'S allegations provided, “however, that the Committee will not disclose the information until any related litigation has been concluded by judicial action that permits disclosure. 2
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