198-40007-10027 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR: - FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.1 JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/201 Identification Form Agency Information ARMY 198-10007-10027 CALIFANO PAPERS Document Information ARMY JAMES K. PATCHELL MR. CALIFANO REFUGEE HANDLING 02/26/1963 24 CUBAN REFUGEES PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Confidential 1A Redact 04/08/1998 Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 13. Memo from Patchell to Califano re: handling of Cuban refugees. NF K Rovian, Department of the Army EO 13526 Deciassify [I Eye cl Authority, clude Exempt CRelerto__ Review Date /{PUEIS By LIZA OC, Ur, ‘) WW 50355 DBoclad:324274020 Page 1 S
| DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY . WASHINGTON 25, D.C, Me cy STATES ONE February 26, 1963. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALIFANO SUBJECT: Refugee Handling This paper, prepared by HEW, points up the pro lems of - -refugee handling and recommends that only one plane pew e authorized in the event flights are resumed. This. recommendation 1s based upon the ability of HEW to handle that number of refugees through an expanded resettlement program (previously two or three planes per day. were arriving). . There is no direct involvement of the Department of Defense in this program. The major.issues are as follows: | a. . The aitotomy of syphoning off resistance forces versus the normal U, S. assistance to refugees. b. ‘The didotomy of assimilating refugees versus ‘their desire to be ready’ to return toa "new"! Cuba. c. The problem of establishing an additional refugee center to take the burdens off of schools, housing, municipal services, employment, medical and health and community relations in the Miami area (the pros and cons of’the establish-. ment of a second center are outlined in the enclosure: to.the — paper). There are. intelligence and security implications ; in the estab- lishment of a second center which are not fully reflected in the enclosure, I suggest you-take your lead from CIA and Justice on intelligence and security matters (Defense could be involved if we were required to estab- lish a second screening point, however, this is of lesser importance), There is no indication that HEW or Labor have sought. assistance from private institutions other than those presently operating in the Miami “area which include | one Catholic organization, one Protestant organization and one. interdominational organization. | : HW 50955 DoclTd: 3274240270 Page ?
HW 450955 CAUTION: Although it is not our business, suggest that care be exercised in your placing your stamp of approval on any program which restricts the. inflow of refugees as this is against our fundamental principles. Many of the problems are essentially economic and political -and we would do best to be listeners rather than givers. aco K. Patchell .Lit. Colonel USA WEXT ATTACHED IS Previous Action ; Refugees AND Ed. Coss EMUGHT an \T Codd And Sires, (INFo ONLY — GET NTO agw ver SATION ), Doclda: 3274274070 Page 3
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7 February 1963 os ODA(z) - 6295 \ef, Miami Field Office Type of Refugees on Red Cross Flights 1. From 18 Jan - 1 Feb 63 we have had five Red Crose. flights- arriving in Miami from Cuba carrying "US a: tionele.” Presumably official Washington believes that these people are in truth hardship cases, of US nationsis who were prevented from leaving Cuba before this date. In reality the passengers reflect more Cuben nationals than US, and represent to a very large degree Cuban nationals arriving in the US on the coat~taiis of minor children who vere born in the US, The specific figures for the month of January are 276 Cuban nationala and 217 US nationals. There were 196 children, 2, Te Miami Field Office has been covering all Red Cross flights at the airport, and has interviewed all male adults, The results have been extremely poor, based on a large degree on the yery low caliber of the individuals who are coming in. Appended if a@ memorandum prepared by | | concerning the type of refugees whe are arriving, and we think it is completely accurate based on our own observations while covering these flights, 3, While we do not believe that we have any influence over continuance of Red Cross flights, we do feel that we should registe: our Opinion concerning the type of individuals who are being permit~ ted entry into the US under the guise of being US nationais aad hardshic cages, . 4. | mentions a number of mentally deficient. This has been quite true of the passengers on board the Shirley Lykes and the African Pilot, The Biscayne Boulevard Office wifKin the Test week has Interviewed three individuals who had been confined in mental hospitals prior to their departure for the US, I encountered a fourth case on a recent Red Cross flight. Castro is obvicugely getting rid of hie undesirables.
MEMORANDUM TO : Justin F. Gleichauf FROM we SUBJECT; Type of Cuban Refugees Arriving 1. It seems obvious that the Cuban Government is utilizing the Red Cross transportation facilities to foist off on the US great number of undesirables. As has been well documented in reports secured from the arrivals themselves, (and the newspapers), the majority of the passengers on the “African Pilot” and the “Shirley Lykes" had little or ne cennection with the Invasion Prisoners. At the most, the "good" ones could ascribe their departure from Cuba to the fact that they had property the Cuban Government wanted. At the worst, the "bad" ones would appear to be Castro agents, Communists, nationalists, cri- minals and physically disabled. 2. The arrivals on the Red Cross plane of 25 Jan 63 were just about the dregs of Cuban society. The passengers made accusaticns against their fel- iow passengers,.and from the reports secured from individuals, it was apparent that many of them were would be Castristas, neophyte Communists, or genuine Castre agents. 3. The arrivals on the plane of 1 Feb 63 were the worst collection of human beings it has ever been my misfortune to view. There were four or five honest hardship cases of very old persons. There were some who were obviously physical wrecks, there were a number of mentally deficient, and there were some who were obviously seriously il] with disease. In addition te those there were extremely low class people, there were almost illiterate negroes, and there were self admitted Fidelistas, and Na cional-
4, These people are not, in my mind, genuine : refugees. They are (1) cast-offs of the Cuban seciety, (2) arrogant Castro agents, or (3} people oe se devoid of political conviction that they could | owe no allegiance to any country. 5. The wave of indignation experienced by the Immigration and Customs Inspectors is most revealing. These men, veterans of long years of experience in dealing with all types of humanity, have reached the point where they make open statements that "such trash should never be admitted to the US," and before { go on admitting people like thig, I°11 take my re- tirement. 6. Somehow, something should be done to call the attention of Washington to this most sorry state of affaires. This severeign nation should say when people will enter this nation, and should also say who should enter this nation, regardless eof how much the . ; go-gooders howl sbout “humanitarianism.” It is my opinion that until facilities are again set up properly to screen these arrivals at Opa-Locka, no : more refugecs should be allowed to come te the US, 7. The other members of the Miami Field Office Staff are in full ‘accord with these recommendations. eet
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4 a, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. POSITION PAPER IN REGARD TO THE HANDLING. ‘OF. CUBAN REFUGEES If FLIGHTS WERE TO BE RESUMED , Question: WHAT SHOULD THE. UNITED ‘STATES DO. TO HANDLE THE ASSIMILATION, TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT, OF CUBAN REFUGEES ARRIVING AT THE RATE OF 400 TO: 500 A DAY? oe The answer to this question must: be considered from the | standpoint of. . two alternative assumptions: oe (1) Continuation. of: the entry. of ‘the refugees into Miami: with no 4 _, provision - for immediate mandatory Government directed movement. (not resettlement in ‘the. strict sense of the word) to. other | areas; or 7 De ae o (2) . Initial. entry into other areas of the ‘United’ ‘States directly . . from Cuba or. by. Government. directed movenent : ‘from Miami immediately after arrival. Were daily arrivals into Miami to be resumed but at.an increased ‘rate’ of from 400 to 500.a day with no provision for immediate. mandatory Government : directed movement elsewhere, an intolerable situation would develop in. Miami” because social, economic, and health. facilities of. that city, are already: , “overburdened by the (existing Cuban refugee population. During the calendar year 1962. approximately 82, 000: refugees registered _ at the Miami Center and about 35,000. were resettled,. ‘leaving a net gain in the: "refugee population in Miami of 47, 000 persons. There | is an estimated 100,000 - ‘plus Cuban refugees now living in Miami who. are severely taxing: the total Tacinities of the area, Arrivals at the rate of 400 to 500 a day, or 146,000. to 182 500 a year, is a 75% to 120% increase over 1962,° Assuming that we were successful in . : increasing the resettlement figure to 52,000 persons per year, the increase in. ‘the Cuban refugee population in Miami‘ would be between 94,000 and 130, 000 a ue year. Accordingly, if the 400 to 500 daily arrivals were to begin on - March 1, 1965, Miami's refugee population would approach, or be in excess of, my ca 200,000 by March 1, 1964. ‘This would. have an extremely heavy impact upon, the ces total economy of Miami: and would exceed by far.its ability to provide necessary" housing, educational, social, health, and other facilities required by the refugees. ae Examples of problems which would bé ‘created ares a - aes 1. Housing. This would probably be one of the areas of ‘greatest impact. _ Exact statistics are lacking, but what follows sums up prevailing conditions in. Miami. About one-half of the 100,000 refugee population live near the central Miami city region. One-quarter are in other sections of the city and the © ‘remaining one-quarter reside in county regions adjacent. to the city or considerably. me removed from it. Recent surveys indicate that while there are no real slum conditions as yet, there is already considerable over~crowding in refugee ewellings. . ae , ae . oO ee ae nnn = os _ nome nome —, HW 50955 Docld: 32424020 Page 17. e | : 7 . . - ® February 25, 1963 a ane
\ Housing will be further complicated by area re-development and expressway construction already underway in Miami which will eliminate housing currently 3: used by Negroes. An unestimated number of refugees will also be affected, . ; ‘ There is every likelihood- that Negroes will penetrate the fringes of the so-called "Cuban" areas in search of housing and that both elements will become. OE competitors seeking low-cost housing. The result will be to add to existing .. real or imagined economic dislocation of both Negroes and the refugees with the em enn erecta cer ge nee tea nintna act Mies et mpctanls inevitable local public opinion supporting the local Negroes. - ao ene ere anne wen 2+ School facilities. The public schools presently accommodate about ~."/ 18,000 refugee children. ‘The parochial system has about 5,000, The capacity. _ of the latter has been at the overflow level for some time. The public school. system is also at the point where its facilities are being stretched to the Us utmost. Use of portable buildings, double shifting, and "bussing" of refugee’. children to other areas already exist. oO oe a Under the impact of the 1962 net increase in Miami's refugee population’. 7 of 47,000 persons, the public school's refugee child load rose from about 11,000... at the start of 1962 to about 18,000 by the end of the year. If one applies the | 1962 ratio of 150 students for each 1,000 rise in the refugee population to the estimated net increase in the population (were arrivals to reach 400 to 500 per — day), the public school system would have to absorb at least another 14,000 a ob students by March 1, 1964. This would give them a total refugee child school.’ eas ae ere pts vin tes eee beeen jennie! senate 6 registration of at least 32,000 which is far in excess of available or anticipated facilities, mo 7 — 2e__Employment. There are no solid figures for the number of refugees ..- who have full or part-time employment in the Miami aréa, However, with about ©. 100,000 refugees in the area--60,000 of whom are receiving assistance=-it is | reasonable to assume that 15,000 heads. of refugee families have jobs of some kind. Despite the lack of solid data, it is safe to assume that refugee employees have dislodged others, particularly Negroes, from former jobs. A net population increase (as computed previously) of at least 94,000 | refugees would probably add at least another 30,000 potential job seekers in | Miami who would be competing with other refugees and larger numbers of. ar indigenous Negroes and whites. Total unemployment in Miami is already highe= currently estimated at about 12% to 14%, a ne Terr nyt ee ate Sy lpetene te Miami does not have an industrially~based economy. New plants are coming 7 into the area, but they will also attract skilled labor from other parts of the. — nation. There is no foreseeable time when Miami's economy will be able to . absorb its present native and refugee employables, ° ce Ses 4, Municipal services such as police, fire sanitation, etc. No effort. 9 ho is made here to calculate the impact upon these facilities of the already ae oe , existing or hypothetical-refugee population in Miami, But it seems quite et obvious that there will be a heavy impact which would require substantial. ~ a7 expansion of services. Federal financial Support would undoubtedly be sought =. 3 for this purpose. — eo oe Be oe es ee _ nan . ee nent sense mete igen teen _ HY 50955 ‘Docld:32424020 Page 18°
pe 8 nee ete emer sneite Cran Eine te als hospitals, The dispensary will be working to full or over-capacity even with. population. Out-patient, in-patient facilities at county and private hospitals 5o Medical and health facilities, The primary source of these services for refugees at present is the Miami Center's medical dispensary and cooperating the planned increase in staff and facilities in terms of the present refugee are also severely taxed by the current refugee population level. A 100% increase in the refugee population would add an unsupportable quantitative load to the = Center's dispensary and outside: facilities, Over 1,200 patients are now being treated each week at the Center dispensary and another 3CO to 400 are treated at the hospitals. Do 3 : tee gee te eta 6. Community relations. Difficult to assess--although not: an acute _ problem at this time--it is doubtful that public officials or the general | ce oe ‘renewed refugee influx of the magnitude proposed by. the question, A 100%. mImostly exaggerated situations. We seriously question whether any community a ‘relations program could successfully cope with .the. impact 4 in: 1 Miami of an annual experience over the past two years, an orderly,.. planned resettlement program of - facility would have to provide lodging, mess, medical, protection, -and social. - compute the costs involved, but: they would run into the millions of dollars. : for reasons that are obvious, should be avoided. ' movement within 24 hours of arrival to ‘the location of one or more Centers: population in Miami and Dade County would accept.without serious complaint: ao increase in the refugee population would obviously add to current economic and. a social problems and create increased hostility. toward the Cubans. | te t ‘The HE J Cuban Refugee Center is currently planning an: organized community relations project to assuage the resentment that now exists--based on real but, increase of 100,000 addi tional - Cuban’ refugees. General Observations: If the refugee influx. ‘goes to 400 to. 500 persons’: 24 a day, one of the following: would have to be accomplished to avoid a substantial es increase in the Miami Cuban. vefugee population. . . aa uO Bo "remove: at least 100, 000" ‘yefugees: a year’ from ‘the. Miami area either= * through resettlement or mandatory Government directed movement. Based upon this magnitude is almost impossible of accomplishment. The: implications of. Government. directed movement would ‘require policy decisions at the highest” level of. Government. Be ‘construct: or make use of existing facilities to. serve, as reception | or processing: centers. and to house refugees. in transit. ‘residence. Such aw services as a Minimum. School facilities would also have to be. provided ‘for: ae children, and language training, etc., for: adults... No. effort has been made- tos. Ct aS More importantly, the "refugee camp," a ‘concept, which is: highly. undesirable a Co use of Miami asa transit port of eritry with: Governrient: directed Poa elsewhere in the United. States. de by~ passing. Miami as an initial point. of entry and: establishing. such’ _ points in certain key locations. This would be. the. equivalent of establishing, new refugee centers in a number of localities. It might be easier to by=pass . Miami completely in the first place, than it would be to force movement from ~ oe Miami after entry. | ae ee _ es er ne HW 50955 Docld: 32424020 Page 19
For | a review and analysis of the "considerations involved | in establishing a second Cuban refugee center," see the attached summary of a study made in ‘March 1962. While the figures in that report are no longer valid, the paper. i Conclusions and Recommendations ‘following conclusions and recommendations. . ~~ level. presents a fairly comprehensive review of virtually every factor-~social to 4 fiscal--and lists eleven factors "militating against the establishment of!" ¥ another refugee center, (Incidentally, the additional costs are understated * based on current information, and such costs would be further increased if the’ influx were approximately doubled over that contemplated in the paper.) The study — was concerned with the establishment of a second center in New Orleans. However, the same basic considerations would be valid for other areas. me aoe ew A highly developed resettlement program (either, out of Miami or. out of Miami and one or more-additional Centers) is an essential part of any approach to the handling of additional refugees relating to restoration of flights | mm regardless of the rate of arrival per week os Regardless of what is done to reduce the impact on Miami, Phamed. resettlement remains in our judgment the only long-range, constructive — approach either to handling the present refugee population in Miami or any | new refugee concentration elsewhere, As previously stated, the prospect — of reaching and maintaining an over-all resettlement rate at a 100 1000~a~year..” level within the foreseeable future cannot ‘be expected. : . There are several steps which could be taken to enhance resettlement 93. opportunities. Several of these require. high-level policy decision but are of great importance to an acceleration of the resettlement program. These items include, among others: . oO (1) Adjustment of refugee status from ‘that of parole or waiver to. that of alien admitted for permanent residence; _ (2) Control over the type of refugees admitted to the United States; . (3) Screening out of those who should be eliminated for reasons - of mental and physical health with due regard being paid to the” humanitarian aspect. of reunion of families. . However, - even if these steps | were adopted, it is questionable whether’ - the voluntary approach to resettlement could > reach more than a 20s 000-a~year It is our . judgment that the foregoing’ information substantiates. the Conclusions: (1) That the facilities of Miami are'such that it cannot accept a‘. restoration of an influx. of Cuban refugees :of a. magnitude approximating | 400 to 500 a day. Furthermore, were this influx ‘to. be forced upon Miami, public, opinion would react violently against such a moves. , ‘WW 50955 Docld: 32424020 Page 20. . ae pee pee tne con peace emerges te meme ted oe oe
sere rctne see te meant _ desirability of opening a second center subject to substantial question, ~ existing Cuban population or new-arrivals from Miami should receive the . facilities as reception centers should also be subject to the same type of should also be given to the possibility of controling emplanement of passengers... Recommendations: (2) | That there are ‘considerations of service and cost which make the (3) That the question of Government: directed movement of either. the oo. highest possible policy consideration within the Government. The use of scrutiny. (4) ‘That not more than 50, 000 Cuban’ refugees a year. can be reséttled” from the Miami (or other): area through é a ‘voluntary resettlement | prograile mo pettreme sch meats ee eetate tee ete cieeeemimntnams tone ei tear aeeantennmnt ge Based upon the four above listed conclusions, the Department.of Health, Education, and Welfare would strongly urge that the number of new Cuban refugees permitted to enter this country be. restricted to a-number which would not exceed our ability to resettle them'within the various’ communities of this country. - This maximum figure for the foreseeable future appears to be 50,000 a year, or approximately 1,000 a. week. This would represent approximately one flight per: day. This is only about one-third of the number who would enter if 400 to 500. Cuban refugees were admitted a day. Additional consideration can be givem: to:. _— this matter after appropriate exploration is made of alternative courses of action ee such as the use of reception centers and Government directed movement. Consideration ® \\. in Cuba to assure that to the extent possible priority is. given to parents of .. unaccompanied children and to close relatives of Cuban refugees already in the | United States. ; HW 0955: Doctd: 324294020 Page 21
e leone diate nt nterveinsseiis era abn ont panei ye anette ng connate esate ea ht lan ag teenies tera yee! aie angele ale nln tien ent etme Ar mabey Reina int eee Sane ber ein ata es emanates eet gaa one Me HW 450955 there, ‘a sécond Cuban refugee center would be to reduce the migration of addi- “1, The great bulk of Cuban refugees who would otherwise enter the _2,. Services similar to those ‘in Miami be available to Cuban refugees in and if so, the price (financial and otherwise) which would need to be paid, ‘second center for Cuban refugees and of providing the necessary supporting Should drastically reduce the entry of Cubans in Miami, Boat travelers would 3/1/62. - SSA STAFF PAPER = CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING A SECOND CUBAN REFUGEE CENTER IN.NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA |. The establishment of a second Cuban refugée center ‘in New Orleans has ‘been. proposed as one method of relieving the mounting pressure upon the social, economic and health facilities of Miami due to the increasing number of | Cuban refugees who enter the United: States at Miami, Florida, and remain: . ne To be effective, it would be necessary that. Cuban refugees coming to!.the United States be diverted from Miami, Thus, if no substantial number of additional refugees were to arrive in Miami and the voluntary agencies: in. the Miami center would continue their resettlement activities with some success, the pressures on Miami would be lessened, . The optimum effect of tional refugees to Miami to a trickle and to relocate a number of those who were in Miami prior to the establishment of a second center, To achieve .. the above objectives, it is essential that: oo United States at Miami would be directed to New Orleans, Refugees might travel to New Orleans via Miami where INS inspection would take place, or travel directly to New Orleans, New Orleans, If a stop~over in Miami was not made, the necessary services would include INS inspection and Federal center registration, In any case, it would be necessary to provide financial assistance, health care, education, resettlement, and employment for individuals - and families and care and protection ‘of unaccompanied children, . In weighing the feasibility of a second refugee center, consideration should. : be given to whether a second center would achieve the desired objectives | Important to this consideration are the current situation in Miami, the flow of Cuban refugees to the United States, the cost of establishing a services in New Orleans, and the effect any such move would have on Federal. State relations and National Policy with respect to the refugees, A. Factors in Favor of Establishing a Second Cuban Refugee Center in New Orleans, Louisiana 1, A second refugee center located in any part of the United States continue to arrive in Miami and undoubtedly. some refugees entering. at New | Orléans would find their way to Miami, - But the overall effect in relieving the social, economic, and health pressures upon Miami. should be significant, © DocId: 32424020 Page 22 0 0
ee ’- anne peer te etnian tein et pacers nacgsngtn methane mtb ns tn Meme mete neers ttn at benim nie stntidbanie semanas mahanhng mt eh Meike me drertsbne ote inka id eta inne tnd am nerta shee Ral fit min pt hamigmniniene OREO ON cSt HEN anennacet Rint minora tnd enfin cine acetetne* nimne Ain nfasieaih garam neta ween ar HW 50955 ‘life than in Miami and less attraction to remain in New Orleans, - absorb without serious consequences. for: its permanent residents and. Cuban »  eould not absorb many. more | than. the approximately 100, 000 Cuban refugees” . @lready in Miami, ; we can either stop existing direct flights from Havana to Miami or. coerce. - Miami, The only apparent means’ ‘of reversing the process of natural selection: _, flights would be filled, “would be creating a local problem, The community would not be asking for: ‘would be soliciting cooperation of: State and local authorities to act as ‘the - than in Miami, It is also assumed that Louisiana and: New. Orleans would . resultant additional costs, = .2 = 2, The absence of a- large, wéll-established Cuban: community. in New. pg Orleans might facilitate resettlement, ‘There would be much less informal help to Cuban refugees in finding housing, jobs, and adjusting to American 3, There is a limit. to the number. of tefugees ‘Miami. ean | . continue to. refugees, It is not possible to determine. accurately what. this absorption. point might be, but it would seem that a: eity with a population of 980, 000 Be Factors Militating ‘Against the Establishment of a | Refugee gee ‘Genter. in New Orleans 1. Getting ‘the refugees to go Eo. New Orleans instead of Miami, Unless” the choice of New Orleans, the Port of natural. selection will. continue to ‘be: would be to use our influence so that the only direct. flights available from |... Cuba would be to New Orleange With no ‘other choice, - ‘Presumably the: New Orleans. 2, . In setting up another center in » Nor’ Ovieeao, the. Federal Government help because of problems created by natural inemi gration, As such, DHEW: agent of the Federal government. in. providing certain services or in making ‘their facilities available to Cuban refugees, This was the converse of eh ' situation. in. Florida, Hence, there is no assurance that State and local ' authorities would cooperate ‘willingly with the Federal government, or. that - they would be willing to absorb certain costs, such as the Florida State Department of Public Welfare and Dade County. school system have done. a 3, A second refugee center in New Orleans would add to program costs, For example, to provide a level of assistance’ payments to Cuban refugees in: i New Orleans commensurate with the public assistance programs would require’ © a monthly average payment of $85.85 per case whereas the Florida Department .. cs of Public Welfare estimated assistance payments for March 1962, at about $72,55 per month, This alone would. require an additional 4 million ‘plus: dollars, In addition, salary and office costs are higher in New Orleans so expect to be reimbursed the full cost of educating children of Cuban. refugees, and that it would be necessary to accord similar consideration to Florida, 3: ' In addition, the very fact of a second center would involve an increase. in en such items of expense as overhead, rental of IBM equipment, as well as cone. siderable communications, record-keeping, and coordination problems, with 4s A second center may increase total resettlement and job placements but not necessarily in direct proportion to the staff engaged in resettlement or job finding, Actually, two centers might be competing for. approximately - —— the same potential number of resettlementa and jobs. _ aes a ene pe ger DocId: 32424020 Page 23°. 0
my ve an 4 3, The additional resettlements expected from a second refugee center... might be realized by merely increasing the present resettlement staff in io the Miami center, Increasing the resettlement staff in Miami would consti= -. ' tute a relatively small part of the additional cost of operating a second ‘ refugee center, . a ae eat le aie aD 6. Cuban refugees in New Orleans would need more help from agencies in a locating housing and in-using community services because the smaller Cuban community in New Orleans could not provide the help furnished refugees by — the large and well established Cuban community of Miami, Stated in the - positive, the Miami Cuban community provides invaluable help to Cuban refugees in adjusting to a new culture and in attaining self-support, . Because of a’ : lack of a large Cuban community in New Orleans it is ‘also contemplated that a: higher proportion of registrants at the Center would apply for. financial ; assistance than is the case in Miami. } 7. It would be difficult to justify the separation of families and to! es pee - prevent refugees with telatives or. friends in Miami from gravitating there, 2 ane | 8. ‘Coordinating work of two centers would be complicated, time-consuming DoE and expensive, and would probably require a sizeable. administrative organizations...” 9, If the second center does not succeed ain resettling ‘refugees quickly,. oe it is possible that the result might be’ another Miami, so that instead of 22) | _ solving one serious problem the Department may be. confronted with two serious. problems, , . a 10, ‘It would be. difficult to. arrange: air ‘transportation from Havana. to. New Orleans, No airline is flying that. route presently and the. cost of. transportation to New Orleans would probably be double the cost to Miami,’ Since fares are now payable only in Cuban pesos which must be spent in Cuba, it would probably be- necessary For the Federal | government - to. subsidize the: operation. ° Meee Oa vate matte eat hte uted ete ectiee erakeimoten nahin ets Hamden ne mutates Reiland i ew alate Natta AATAR ein atthlli BSR Re tayete os cena satine: sete © ati ll, There are ‘approximate ly 1; 500 ‘cuban. ‘refugees now ; living in the. New 4 Orleans area who, it. is estimated, “would ‘file for financial assistance,’ ge. Under present policies’ only persons | residing in the Miami area are stetore|i for such assistance, me po io eee & Cc, Pros and ‘Cons of ‘stop-over in Mant En-Route to New Orleans” Bo Pros: | a an 1. The ‘advantage of a. stop-over in Miami | is that: the: facilities sect . _ for inspection by INS. and registration by the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami: could be used to perform these functions for Cuban ‘refugees entering the United | States at New Orleans, Louisiana, ‘without | ‘any additional cost,. This would avoid. . the necessity of duplicate facilities in. New Orleans to perform like functions with the attendant problems of recruiting and training staff and finding . suitable office. space, and securing. additional | appropriations. aerate + emenengrine te tewtinbetinecgaend ta Sin nolan ern a i A tenant ann an ean a noha eign ne HW 50955 Docld:32424020 Page 24 9 0 0 ee
oe 2, It would not be necessary to arrange for direct flights to New. _ Orleans and charter arrangements from Miami to New Orleans are readily — accomplished, Sons: To arrange a stop~over in Miami for screening and registration. would entail the operation of a congregate housing and feeding program in order to carry out these functions efficiently and to prevent refugees: from entering Miami,. The organization and operation of a congregate housing - and feeding program would necessitate housing facilities, staff, equipment etc,, all of which would have to be provided by the Federal government, _ . Furthermore, there is no way to forcibly ship anyone to New Orleans after this process even if it were considered possible on policy grounds, There )).. 0° will be a natural desire to join relatives and friends in Miami, Certainly: this would complicate the work of the Department of Health, Education, and °° Welfare in administering the Cuban refugee program. “Though additional, costs would be entailed to screen and register refugees in New Orleans, ‘these. 7 costs would be partially offset by the savings resulting from reducing the volume of this work in Miami, : ! 0 Hey gig meena meer yep tee rte a my emercininatiens Seates abckemen Nec Wapntnamenisenasty tat te etter dremel nate marten ie Seabee we ennai eae lieth ninth kh ae Shenton ete ee no HW 50955 Dockd:32424020 Page 25 9° °° so )