vs vs 104-10400-10316 . ee SERRE (SECURITY. FOR CoO mAmiTti 11 March 1977 vy MEMORANDUM FOR| _ ae | Chief, Africa Division sb: Chief, Europe Division Chiet,. Near East Division ’ . LéI, SOVIet/ EAS p ivision FROM | | SUBJECT . : Guidelines for Providing Information to the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Security Services 1. Since members of the S&I Staff will be talking with your Divisions in the near. future, it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as to what may be said concerning relationships with foreign liaison services. In the broad sense, liaison services constitute both a source and a method. 2. We are prepared to discuss the following: a. The identification and responsibili- ties of the liaison services.in a particular area to the extent that we can draw on sources other than information derived through the established liaison relationship, i.e. informatio which will not éndangeéer the source. b. In further describing the liaison services, we can provide information on ‘the. objectives, key personnel, strength, budget E2 IMPDET CL BY 012860 SECRET
13-00000 ! and methods of operations of services, provided that such data will be drawn from open sources | pnd not from details of liaison © “arrangements Wi the services themselves. c. Agency manhours and funds devoted to © liaison with the foreign services. d. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of funds and equipment Provided . ‘to such foreign services. d. We are prepared to provide general comments on the degree of operational coopera- -tion with the Station. If technical support, for example, provides a useful input, we can state that the liaison service provides technical support, using a qualifying adjective to define, such as excellent, limited, etc. 3. We have no objection to the provision of foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with 'such services. Source descriptions should be those used in the disseminated report. 4. We will not make available details on liaison arrangements, information on sources and methods of such services which have been obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources or. other information which would reveal Agency sources and methods or violate the trust on which the official liaison relationship is based. S. The S&I Staff approves close liaison relationships and believes that these relationships are cost effective. o/sa/Do/o| kaw (1542) Distribution Original - C/AF "1 - C/EUR 1 - C/NE 1 - C/SE 2 - SA/DO/O0 “SECRET
13-00000 ! ‘ ' oA ~ SO . Guidelines for Providing Information to Congressional Oversight Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Security Services These guidelines’ take into account the fact that foreign intelligence and security. services, when acting in connection with the Agency's official liaison with them, constitute both a source and a method and thus require the statutory protection accorded any other intelligence source or method. The guidelines also recognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies of the Congress have expressed an interest in such services and in the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency's relationships with them. The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a formula for dealing with these two -. sometimes conflicting objectives. The Agency is prepared to provide, upon specific request, appropriately classified and sanitized information to oversight committees on the following aspects of foreign intelligence and security services: a. the identification of the governments with whose services CIA has liaison arrangements ; | b. Agency man hours and funds devoted to liaison with foreign services;’. c. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of cranny iV R tena eu el
13-00000 | . ee ~ funds and equipment provided to such foreign services; d. Information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budget and methods of operation of such services, provided that such data will be drawn from open sources | | and not from the details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves; e. Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services. 7 . The Agency will not make. available to the oversight conmittees the details of liaison arrangements with foreign. services, information on sources and methods of ., such services obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources, or other information which would reveal Agency sources or methods or violate the trust on which. these official liaison relationships is necessarily based. | In the event of substantial allegations of improper activities conducted by foreign intelligence or security services with which the Agency is presumed to maintain: liaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevant facts which bear on such allegations. Where this would ! involve departure from the above guidelines, the Director will be prepared to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the committee to seck a satisfactory resolution of such problems. . a Rp ! : Cheers l Viva d
13-00000 , 24 July 1975.6" y vo S& CUR \o > a “me teers ee MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD © Mr.. Colby pnd Mr, Knoche met with Chairman Otis Pike at 9/30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Colby left the following material with Pike: 1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats’ Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by olby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached) . Mr. CG 2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment on Foreign Intelligenc ). 3, Three Groudrules papers: --Agreements To Be So of the Select Committees Lace DE. x " «-Secrecy Agreement (Filed in 6D0120) (Attached) oe wht By the DCI With Chairmen se, . =-Guides for Protection of Classified Information QoAnd Documents Furnished i The Select Committee... 4. lL ‘March 1975 1 Letter : from Colby to Senator Church. (Attached) ene ~ \, a | eR IY De aE a ean
13-00000 , s, Ue pcre Checklist for DCI Discussion with HSC 1. . Your intent to be cooperative and forthcoming. _@ Your responsibility to protect S&M. win need HSG understanding of particularly sensitive matters: . --names of agents. and sources. --names of cooperating American organizations and contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality. --material from foreign liaison, ->sensitive intelligence methods. and techniques of collection, 3. will need to work out segurity groundrules, ~-Chairman of USIB Security Committee and cI Director of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements, compartmented clearances, etc, 4, Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness to ‘suspend them to permit testimony by current and ex-ermployees. 5. Will ‘confirm with a letter and an 1 employee bulletin which can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and interviews. oo. FT 4 map * 3 24 July 1975 Glassitied by Exompt from general daclassification schedule of F.0. 11652 exemption schedule SB (1), (2), @) Automaticaiy declassified on Date impossibie ta Determine SECRET
13-00000 : bs . “AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES . Ve ‘It would be desirable if the DCI could secure 2 apréement ; with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in. other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive e matters, shat: ~ fa). ‘Departments and agencies shall have the right” to ‘request that testimony be givepionly in executive session, ‘that in some instances testimony be’ "off-the-record" and - that certain testimony be heard only by members and in ‘some cases s,only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman, eet pw) Witnesses be. afforded an wn opportunity to review ae (> and. ‘comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony. — _ Prior to any papnestion of it. : “te When que stoned about intelligence matters that “ome under the purview of another organization, witnesses. . should be permitted ty state that a response fo the question | Tasw-+ = is not properly within their authority and to respectfully . oo a ; suggest that the appropriate party: be called to testify © on ae such matters. oy . : ; 25 tt would ‘also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement “with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies ee _°. furnishing documents to the committees be-authorized to excise from , those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel — “under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as wellas “os ote those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy. may be . jeopardized by disclosu¥é. Also excised. should be names of sources, operations, specific details of technical devices and systerns main- - tained in compartrmented channels and names of organizations cooperating ona highly ¢ confidential basis. 3. Ins view of their "susceptibility to 5 foreign countermeasures, it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement.with the . Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details
13-00000 , % of the technology of the technical collection programs... It would also be desirable if the Select Committees adopted the use of Compart- mented Control" Systems to’ protect documents on these programs ‘and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-knaw. The xesponsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise | and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area. , L z fee - . a he Further,’ » it would be desirable if the: pcr attempt to - 7 secure an. agreement with the Chairmen, of the Select: Committees s . that they will entertain and consider security principles and guide— ot lines which will be Provided. . oie . - e ~ o . oe ‘ . a a - « . . . @ . . . mm ‘ . e . 1 haere ae . te nd wo oy *~ e o* -_* . ° . * Ca . oo o oo . e oa ~- ~ "8 fe ee . ce - “oe. . . fost. ae - so. " *e oo : -.? ae - . : - . ae - ots . | . weet of, «oat ‘ee ° o ° - 3 et 8 as - : : o -% . . : . = ~ . . . es as ° a . ee "es ae . - pore a _. . » . , . ° a ° on ° . . fre . ied ad * ° . * * a Fe rs e . ‘ 2 _ oe * . ee. - ° . o «., .: : a? ° " alata .?¢ ry * . = £ , e: - : ena's s ? ot o . pte. a * & so ° , - . Tg - ~ 7 . eo 2, aid ° le . : « . ° 7 le ° : : . . = e > o e 1 ° e . ba ° : oe : +o. « : i Bo” : . . t e e oe ° - . ° . e . re . : , . -* o * , . . = ° . 2 bd & . . ® . @ we . a . wo s ° * ‘ya . ry ® . os ad o awe * & eenean-e Peewpoane * ® * 4
13-00000 : ‘s SECRECY AGREEMENT 9-1. | in accepting employment - or assignment with the Select: Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the . Special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor - ° . mation from unauthorized disclosure. 7 . t I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth. ... « °, below.as 2 condition precedent of my employment or assignment with. . . the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United "States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter _ referred to as the Select Committee, ee . = ti is my under standing that i in the course of my employment OF ‘assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the statidards set forth in Executive | Order. 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended, All classified information 50 acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to _ surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee -. ‘or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material. which‘has come into my possession asa - . result of my employment or as signment with the Select Committee, I hereby agree that the burden i is.on “me to determine if inforraation is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified ' information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my "employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative, ae oo
13-00000 _ I hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related © to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to. . the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized " vepresentative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, “>. editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said . material contains any classified information as defined in Executive _ » Order 11652. LIagree that the Chairmah of the Select Committee, _ - President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has the authority to make the final determination. as to whether information . +r ds Classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted. vos “Yhave been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S. C. 793, 794, ' 798 and 952; and 50 U;S.C. 783 (b); and-42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive ~ . Order.11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified infor-— 7 mation, and understand their meaning, a Further, | r agree to: abide bys such rules and procedures as the -. Select Comrnittee shall institute for the protection of classified material. “iv =" ~ Dunderstand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agree- ' ment could subject z me to legal. and/ or. administrative. action. . an ms further agree ‘that, all the conditions and obligations impo sed on yne with respect.to the protection of. ‘classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employ- ment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated. Oo x take the obligations set forth above freely and without any ‘mental reservations or purpose of evasion. tog ee et ° .. Signature e . ; a - Signature oO ; Ee Date . 13 ccararemcertegqie, ra
13-00000 , — s, . GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION _ AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES Clearances (3% 1 le OST LL Personnel Securi . f,. (a) Background Investi ation . ms TE moe vis , It would be desirable for the Select Committees 1 to stipulate. . ; that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material, .« .... testimony or.informatién received or generated by the committees. ~~ . without prior receipt of a security clearance I based ona full field . _ investigation. woe, . et a tet ee 7 ‘ a Pena “ate (b) Secrecy Agreement Ser ele an week It would be desirable for the Select, Committees to: require z a - - signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to the cormmittees! staffs. The agreement should include provisions: 1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a.condition precedent of employment or assignment; SO 2) Recognizing US. Government property rights to clas sified information; 3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence of classified information; th oe de 4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject | the signer to administrative and/ or legal action under appropriate statutes; ee, .7 5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the agreement. -
13-00000 = . 4 Ley ar . . 7 , ° 2. Physical and Document Security. The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure ; that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be -. preserved, These rules should be made known to the individuals. - : and agencies who will be called.upon to present testimony or. foe . materials. Among. these should be vlgs, 0 physical security & and ot document security. ; . et 7) oe -{a) ‘Physical Security _ | oo - = ot : ae os tt would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following rules related to physical security: . -— Le. . aod . oe tae ; a) All classified material will be stored i in. » safes for . safekeeping i in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic ; Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with 7 . the regulations of this.cegistry for classified material.. “ 2), Twenty - -four -hour gua ard protection, supplemented .  ,by anti-intrusion.alarms, should be required on the storage - area. “ . -3) Areas selected for use in closed session should OT oo be guarced against entry by unauthorized persons. AY “The committees should < arrange for the conduct of ” audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of unauthorized use-of transrnitters and/or recording devices. . It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter was ‘located in the Rayburn J House Office Building on 12 Pebruary 1973. a . 5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff - . officer who will secure any misplaced classified material .. or waste. “
13-00000: : 6) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake of conveniente _ except when necessary for the work of the committees.and _ should. not-be, transported” ‘overnight to the office. « ‘ox residence, of personnel of the committees, Coton as oe (b) Document Security oo ' oe eons 2 ; -) Committees should select and identify a single a , location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknow- “ut 5": ledgement of receipt of clas sified materials provided to . eras the committees. So oo en me mare ao ee 2) A sy stem of document control should be establishea ote permit control of glassified documents to provide for accountability. a Pai we " 3) ‘Duplic ation cf documents should be controlled so _ '.as to require a record of the dogument. reproduced, the _ number of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls 2s the original. a . A) Appropriate arrangements should be. made: for. the de struction of classified waste. mas: ° - 5) Transcripts. The committees Should give — consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate _ et . security in the transcription of testimony by committee Set transcribers, The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In some, if not all cases, this might include escort of materials to the place of transcription, the securing of *" earbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed . testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with cominittce rules.
13-00000: . 3. Com aztmented [nformation . : - 6) Early agreement should be reached on the ‘disposition of classified materials such as storage under seal in the National Archives. The question of access should be determined by. the President of the ‘Senate or. the Speaker of the House. ee 7 ‘There i is. some’ ‘extremely. sensitive information in: nthe intelligence ‘community which is dis seminated only to those who have a very strict “need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate.or handle the - ‘material produced by extremely sensitive: foreign: “intelligence collection ‘“programs.. The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulner- . ability to countermeasures which 2 foreign government could easily ’ jastitute. if.details. of the means .of collection becarme known. Thus, ; even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access | . to compartmented information unless they are required to have such '. knowledge in.the performance of their duties. This information is handled in Compartmented Control Systems. It would be desirable if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those * staff personnel with an absolute "need to know” about such systems, - and that documents related to such systems: be handled in a compart-— , 4. Securit Officer CO an ns _— ee mented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any. arrangements. the. Chairmen would desire in this sompartmented area. It would be desirable if the committees appointed a security officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the depart- ments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency’ of interest to identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee. oa
13-00000, ,, 7 “ENTRAC INTELOIGENCE AGEN _e ws SHINGTON, D.C. 20505 2] Honorable F Elmer B. ‘Staats | ot Comptroller Generai of the United States — oe, oo. _ General Accounting Office Se ; - Se 441 G SireeP Po an a I ' Washington, D. Cc. | 20548 co ee! Dear Mr. Siaats: ae! 7 OR My attention has been directea toa wrictbon Mr. ‘Keller, General -. Accounting Office, te the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974, : .. which was > placed i in the Congressional Record. by Senator Proxmire on |.’ tee on a cr re > ebruary 11, 1975.- The-letter deals with the intelligence community and «5.1 ut: >." reviews the General’ ‘Accounting’ Office's: right to: audit and. obtain information.’ ce _. from the Central Intelligence Agency- on a et eee oe ot oe ts Se ee . = nei! 7 wae WN west oe “hae e oo * Ywasmuch as Mr . Keller has treated a a subject basic to this Agency" s . capability to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it would serve .' @usefal purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of : confidential funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the ‘years. ae Mr. Keller notes in his letterthat there are"a fairly substantial number -. of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a certification | — by the head of the department or establishment involved." The need is clear "! in the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital | foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its . direction to the Director of Central Intelligence-to protect intelligence sources _ and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented '. by authorizing certain expenditures "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, - or emergency nature," to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director of Central Intelligence. Such expenditures -would apply, for example, toa secret agent operating abroad in.a hostile climate whose identity must be pro-- . tected not. only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but i “2lso because his freedom>and.on ocgagion his life--weighs 3 in the balance. |. ee cee pee tle oes ra “Other intelligence activities do not have such obvions sécurity require ae “ments, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison * with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of _ both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the mere fact of the relationships, but also its‘sources and methods and sensitive informatior. Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign liaison service, but i in some cases a lessening or even cessation of its cooperation. ayn ie ae ( faye
13-00000', ‘Even overt activities | ave » their own ‘security pr oblems.” “thus, 1 many U. Ss. , citizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence , Le units S only « on condition that their cooperation in this respect. be absolutely protected - . This need for the Special protection of intelligence sources and methods has been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative | branches of our Government. Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General ° ' Of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of: the Budget,” addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it provided "for the granting of much wider authority than I’ would ordinarily recommend for Government agencies, generally,. the purposes sought to be . obtained in the establishment of the Central. Intelligence. Agency are believed to: . bé of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures pro- , posed therein." He went on to:say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters ... is apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided | i-:.2 1dn section, 102(d).C3) of Public Law: 253, that the Director ‘of Gentral Intelligence Fras = ‘shalk- be ‘Yesponsible. for. protecting intelligence sources and methods from. ~ as ST s¢ unauthorized, disclosure.” - Under these conditions; he Stated,” aT do-riot feel called, pen to object to the proposals advanced. we Ae. Sigh Ty .. : ee oe Fe ee — ed Loatecs s ete er Pa Pane 1 Sa bas, a mel ve er “it has been arid it remains. ‘the policy of CIA to o rely upon vouchered funds wherever possible. (Vouchered furids are those which can be accounted for and - '- audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies. , + and with standard Government regylations and procedures.) Currently more . 4... than half of the Agency's appropriafions are disbursed as vouchered funds. "..--.. The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his. “March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for “objects © of a confidential, Seaoreanary - oy emergency nature." . . , From the beginning ‘of CIA. records for ait'vouchered fund expenditures _ | were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of | the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and - collection. vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures , were made'legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made. Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of _ | 6 confidential ,. extraordinary, ¢ or r emergency nature, i.e., intelligence sources. 2. and see ae “. El = oar. ee foo ge a a sth a aE i cae seodietenetee ‘audit. approach, a and raised with the CIA Subcommittee ‘of the” ‘House Armed Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agen ’ activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to : Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10 (now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that "any broadening of our audit activities should not include an evaluation (of the intelligence activities of the Agency." Pare:
13-00000: CoM - Mr.’Allen Dulles, th <5 Director of Central Intelligence agreed tha that GAO should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comp troller dated October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have. to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for a which. by law the Director’ s certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher. oe :  . &The results of the trial. period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1961 '. were made.dkmown to the CIA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 1961 from the . Comptroller General in which he said the GAO planned to discontinue the audit _ of CIA activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit | _ of the overt activities of CIA." Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively _ review and evaluate activities of the Support Component because the confidential and overt activities of this component. are integrpted to. such an extent that we cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits." He further stated "we have been. ’: given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt pierce cee ote M* s “7 +: '-" activities of the Intelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion; will : nobis * +.“ be productive ‘of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the - ot . - extent to which needed overt information is available for collection or’ determine ~., *:." the need for the intelligence inforniation selected for collation and use in the prom” “ - duction of intelligence reports.". In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing . the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive audit approach”. and the Director's story responsibility and authority to protect i intelligence | ‘sources: and methods. ; oo ; whe: wo eee “fT ~ Both the Director and Chaifman Vinson, of the House Committee « on a Armed Services, ‘requested that the Compfroller General continue to audit Agency affairs ' on a limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated © ‘his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, tHe Comptrole: _ .General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary | ’ for our GAO audit staff to have nearly completé access to CIA activities;"and = ' that even to _perform reasonably comprehensivé reviews would require "complete - access to the administrative activities ... that.are performed in support of both sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA. " Lon. a, Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General ¢ on a July 18, “1962, stating that, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency - a _7:* ave necessary, I believe, for. the proper protection of its intelligence activities -.-5 : ¢, 7.and shéuld be maintained.” ‘The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of): “=..--" the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued audit was ‘not a worthwhile “+e ~ | . effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities 3 in the Central L Intelligence Agency. “In summary, I believe that several. points are , deserving of emphasis i in assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to > this ; Paoe 6
13-00000 (a) CIA coope:..,. d fully i in all respects in exten. de administrative support and in granting security clearances | ae _ and access to information related to vouchered fund activities... ot _- (b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committee - ' ip the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature | ahd status of the activity. (c) ‘This Agency. ‘encouraged ( GAO to conduct and to. continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational | ' and statutory requirements imposed upon. this Agency. i - (da). The decision to discontinue. the pudit activities. oe was made solely by.GAO and was approved? by the Chairman i . of the House Armed i Services Committees. Se Ss . rr iad re . tga . a * w : "Orig = Addressee. Se “7 OGC ee Te oe 2- Compt oe oo rete a }-os. SR 1 =OLC Subject (GAO).,.w/bagic; , ee ou “1s " OL Proxmire file’ « ee. Sogn Se x7 2: WEY eg (13 Jun 75) a 7
13-00000 | *y, cn Sn ene See SR a te a DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE) ; ; “WASHINGTON, bG 20505 ° . The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman Select. Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives . 4 : Washington, De. c. 20515. AL Dear Mr. Chairman: me In our. conversation on. 1 Friday you asked ‘for: the statutory | oO basis for the compartmentation principle. I wish first to "ort. respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner: in which your ... a staff can receive access to the sensitive material protected . by special com artmentation S stems. a a ae ; So, . The current basis: for the U.S. ‘Government security eb ks *-. Classification system is Executive Order 11652, promulgated ..” | - ...,0n 8 March 1972. Historically, foreign. intelligence. has i. been treated as. one category of classified’ national. security vy, information. . There are numerous. statutory recognitions of :. the importance of national security information, e.g., the — -" ... Freedom of Information Act... Consequently, much foreign. os - intelligence is classified CONPIDENTIAL, SECRFT or TOP. _ .» SECRET according to. specifications set forth in-the Order. '. Nottall foreign intelligence, however, is classified national security information under. the provisions of the Executive . Order (e.g., an American:source providing foreign information “or assistance). Also, the potential risks attendant with the compromise of a foreign intelligence. source or method ‘differ substantially from the risks attendant with much classified defense information. . Section 102 (d) (3) of thé National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides: "That the Director of Central Intel-— “ligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In reccgnition of this responsibility, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972) instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to, . ",..-develop and review security standards and practices-as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of . intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.”
13-00000 °, *: Since the. National Security Act ‘aia not provide for” an authority _ corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area, . — the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence . Board are responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination - | and security of intelligence material."’ The Director of Central Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has promulgated a-number of. directives, regulations . and security: manuals..:related to the protection of foreign . - . intelligence and foreign: intelligence sources and methods, a and applicable to. the overall U.S. . Anfelligence community. wh, The fundamental. ‘security: principle involved. in the pro- , : “tection of foreign intelligence and. of its sources .and. methods. . as a- strict application of "need to know" --a principle - _ veferred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A). This © =- _ applies the simple mathematical premise that the fewer the | ~ number of individuals: made- privy to a secret, the less Likely that it will be disclosed.:. The security principle of - “compartmentation" involving. special access and information ‘dissemination controls. is designed to ensure that only those individuals whose 'need'to know" has been specifically _ -approved by some higher authority, who have been specially | ‘indoctrinated, and who. undertake ‘special commitments to | : ‘protect. it are ‘provided acéess to a particularly’ sensitive te EL category of foreign intelligence sources and. methods... - a mots Compartmentation assists in “the: application of the "need- to-. know” principle by ensuring that individuals are. provided. , access to only that information clearly essential to the », , Performance. of their duties.” Lo Compartmentation was” undoubtedly a major contributing "factor involved in. the nation's secret development. of the . atomic. bomb during World War II, and the principle is still . -. implicit in security procedures related to ERDA’s "RESTRICTED © DATA" as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the © . £ield of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, compartmentation | _.was practiced throughout the development and operation of the - U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign oe intelligence categories of activities using formalized com- . partmentation procedures today involves the matter of ae ' foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e., ot ‘communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 798 recognizes the special character of this material by providing specifically for prosecution for the oo unauthorized disclosure. of information concerning any “oo communications. activities of the United States” without the TE
13-00000 ‘ , é . ! a a aa ee necessity to show intent ‘to harm the United | States. The | reason for. the application of strict compartmentation pro- cedures to communications intelligence and other foreign intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which of. its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift — remedial action, and the. source can be forever lost. Oo On Friday afternoon, copies of the secrecy oath’ used ry . by the executive branch.with respect to three compartmented - ‘access. control systems were made availiable to you along with. ©. ‘the. revised forms. developed for and executed by certain members. of the’ staff of the:Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence. a ‘ Activities.:I. would: hope that the enclosed agreement. modified " “for the. House: Select: Committee, combining all “three. J compartments into. one document ,. would meet. your, particular . concerns. ae “For your ‘information, in addition ‘to ‘the Senate Select - Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with : ‘compartmented access, the following House and. Senate committees - have.: obtained compartmented - ‘access. for their staffs, which was: granted after. the normal briefings and | signing | of the . _secrecy Oatii:. . met a, a : oe lee | pumed services Committee | or : “Appropriations Committee _. os Sten “Aeronautical and Space Sciences: Committee “May 1 reiterate’ ‘the ‘points ‘I miade on a Friday: oo ae No. material. is being withheld from menbers of _ the Committee. . os oe a ; :, be We are prepared to and aia brief the ‘Stake of the a Committee on noncompartnfented matters, based upon your .- ‘ certification of their security clearance and the fact . that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement ‘with you, a copy of which you provided. c. -The compartmentation procedures of the —- - 8 -_ Intelligence Community have been established pursuant. to statute and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain = ‘access to this compartmented material would be to _. accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified - in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties in access to such compartmented material throughout the -
13-00000 ", = *: 2 eee Be. ee - — cepts he . . . a . . %. ° : a * . : ” a . aie ‘ ne ni . . - : ‘ sos oo ee a ony Lo _ Intelligence Community. It is clear that” the -. obligations assumed here would run between the staff _ member and the Committee and in no way would provide | “ any control. or influence over them by me or any " "element of the, Intelligence Community . Cee Fe ‘a. tt would undoubtedly be. feasible to develsp 2 oF, _ “another procedure to ensure special protection of the os “... sensitive matters currently included in the compart: ot ' Mented systems, but this would involve review and oe a TE «. discussions with various interested parties which St .” would undoubtedly take. some ‘time and delay your Ce »; Anvestigations - , Bo be, re oo E hope: you: will agree that this: is the simplest and... easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can. f proceed ¥ with the substance. of your investigations. a Sincerely,
13-00000 : Distribution: 1-DCI ‘1-DDCI 1-I1G 1-OLC “4-E.H. Knocke: 1-SC/DCI
13-00000 ° , » So r ‘have been “informed ‘that pursuant to law (Sections 792, .° 793, 794, 795, 797 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I. ~ am not: to discuss: ‘with or disclose to.any person any information . Yelating directly: or ‘indirectly to the below identified compart- ' mented Programs,’ unless such person is currently authorized to. 2c: discuss or receive such informa*ion ,or material. of the particular i } | category involved... I:.am.aware that: the responsibility of. -ascertaining that=such an authorization for another. person is ests. with me. - . wou valid and current, oy ‘acknowledge. that it is my. ‘responsibility - to | inform | myself of. the: contents’ of the above mentioned sections. of © Title: 18, U.S. :Code,.'as. they pertain to performance of my duties: I. am aware further that if a change in my status renders: it no longer necessary for me to receive compartmented intelligence, my name will be removed from the jist of _ Persons authorized to., Feceive: such | material. a : ea ‘News 3 media ‘reports concerning any of ‘these comparteented materials does not relieve me of my: obligation under the oath iBiened below. - mo oe, oo oa ‘I acknowledge thet. r have been briefed. on the ‘folioving 28 compar’ meated systems « or Programs: s _ a fil) Pe: hae . : . : "OY. . a OATH OF SECRECY : tT do solemnly swear “that I will not . discuss with or Do. disclose to any person, regardless of his official position .  ~._ or status, any information: relating directly or indirectly to Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom, or the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until I . have ascertained that such person has been authorized to discuss , CONFIDENTIAL -B-2 IMPDET CL BY-
13-00000 « », alc ae a a ff Bp etme 2 0 Qs) CONFIDENTIAL _ .. a i and handle this material, and that his authorization has not Pe been revoked, except. in the performance of my official duties. on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and in accordance with: the requirements set forth in the tTules’ of such Committee. a | ar = 2 SORRADENTAL nr eee
13-00000 » NTIOWAL Unaut herioed. i SC5055 Criminal Sone nct meee ee oe 7 Dear Mr, Field; ne : MUNI. CE “RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY . . - Se | WASHINGTON,D.C, 20505 HS¢ MAT. FUAN. Review Staff: 752563 20 August 1975 Mr. A. Searle Field taff Director: Select Committee on Intelligence. Room 232 Cannon House Office Building Washington D,C. 20515 Ase SECUR eiTy” » Dor o/s appre’ eRe oe nee . ee aster alae .: Around the end of July, Mr. Roeder, obviously impressed “by your admonitions about the need for security, asked ifI =. a could work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified documents, Our Office of Security put this together, and while I think Mr, Roeder had in mind something more applicable to an individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to you for whatever use you care to make of it, so "-Ineidentally, we have not yet carried out the: physical survey '. of your quarters which you requested on 29 July, I have been ~. in touch with Ms. Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct "one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recom- mendations for your consideration when that i is done. a Cae ‘ ‘Sincerely. Assistant to the Director Attachment: a/s ce: D/OS - a ONTO, PAL HFOSMATON He 8 sebiect to Classified by : amet trom seas Sehotuls eF £.0. 18 Cans 82 YY
13-00000 + to aha + PRUFIOENTIAL 14 AUG 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff “ATTENTION | : | VIA . 2 Acting Deputy Director for Administration SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligeace - . Protection of Classified Materials REFERENCE == Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec frof | subject: Request for Security AIS In accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a “package” to be used by the House Select. Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys- ical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific rec- ommendations must he deferred. In this connection, we plan to have o£ the Physical Security Division {extension 3494) meet with appropriate represent- atives of the Committee for the specific purpose of con- . ducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field,. Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, ' requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the re- sults of this survey and its recommendations, the attached - general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Com- mittee's classified material. Robert W, Gambino Director of Security Distribution: . ES. IMPDET Orig & 2 - Adse_. CL BY 056966 1 - ADD/A OS $ 12 065 CONFIDENTIAL
t ~ ONDE AL _ GENERAL SUGGESTIONS _ FOR THE ROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL 1. Designate a Committee member as the Security Officer responsible for the overall control handling and protection of the classified material. 2. Establish and maintain a register of all . Committee personnel who are authorized to — review classified material and insure that no unauthorized personnel will have access to . the material. 3. Establish a central document control system whereby all classified documents are properly logged upon receipt and annotated as to. disposition. 4. Designate a Document Control Clerk who will be specifically responsible for the logging and control of all classified material. Appropriate records should be established to reflect that all classified material is properly logged in and out, by date and tine, - to authorized nembers of the Committee 3. In the event material is designated as being: of a codeword or compartmented nature, special physical security features as enunciated by the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and later adopted as policy should be adhered to. (Specifics regarding these requirements will be provided in the course of the pending survey.) - 6. All guards assigned to the physical security control over the Committea's storage area should be U. S. citizens and possess appro- priate security clearances. 7. If feasible, a reading room should be es- tablished within the designated storage area CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 ee Le 1d. Li. | 13. 14. CONFIDENTIAL for the Committee's classified material, and all research and review activities of the material should be restricted to this area. In those instances where the Committees meets in Executive session, every effort should be made to insure that the site being used has been subjected to a technical security inspec- tion to negate the possibility of unauthorized transmitting or recording devices. This area of concern could pese serious security deficien- cies in the event the same area would be used initially in public session and then closed for the Executive session without such an inspection being made.. Adequats safeguards should be utilized in the transmission of classified material under the cognizance of the Committee from one area to — another, ™ Reproduction of any portion of ‘the Committee's _ Classified material should be prohibited without the express approval of the Staff Director. In this instance, notes, extracts, summaries, etc., made from classified material | must also be provided the same degree of . protection as that provided to the source material. Aceess controls to the storage and reten- tion area should be established to insurs that only authorized personnel are allowed entrance. Storage of all classified material should be within the designated area as opposed to any areas or outside offices. Security protection should be provided to all Committee transcripts during the tran- scription process as well as during the periods while they are in transit. A security check procedure should ba estab- lished to inspect the areas where the Com- mittee meets at the termination of each . session to insure that no classified material 2 CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 . 15. CONFIDENTIAL or notes, etc., are inadvertently left un- secured. (Attached are examples of Security Check Sheets.) _Arrangements should ba made to insure that there are adequate facilities for the destruction of classified waste material. In this instance, such waste material should be provided protection until its final - destruction. 16. 17. 18. 19. Only approved classified material destruc- tion methods should be utilized. (Details regarding this can be obtained in the course of the pending survey.) oo All Committee personnel granted access to classified material by the Staff Director should be briefed on their obligations end | responsibilities regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such material. Specific physical security recommendations applicable te the proposed storage area for the Committee's classified material, consistent with sound security principles, must be deferred until the completion of the survey. This would also include recommendations relative to the type of storage containers which the Committee proposes to use. Pending the completion of a security survey at the new storage site, it is suggested that the protective measures currently in effect at the temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon ' Building, not be changed. CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 * at « . om, 27 ‘ « = ad A ATTACHMENT - sy - re ‘vito
13-00000 ', * ’ « SECURITY CHECK SHexT SECLuiTY CHECK SHEET _|T0>: Office of Security. | ITHRU: Component Security Officer | TSO LOCK : ROTATE DIAL FQUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION TO CHECK | SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON i ®HERRING-HALL°-MARVIN® SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT H (on new type, ralse fateh) ANO PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD. : j ‘VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH an WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD. . . . | ALARM SWITSHES: TURN TO "NIGHT® POSITION CERTIFICATION "| | CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM, MON THIS) MONT HIS) ° O[ orenepay | ciosev ay | CHECKED BY | GUARD CHECK OPENED BY CLOSED BY | CHECKED BY | GUARD CHECK | THNITIALS| TIME INITIALS! TIME [INITIALS] TIME [INiTiALs, TIME |. | Thinitiacs)| Time [INITIALS] TIME [INITIALS] TIME [INITIALS] TIME FROM: | ~ —_ ew | TOLOCK ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION TO CHECK SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL ORAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON *HERRING*HALL*MARVIN® SAFES TURN DRAWER HANOLE TO RIGHT (on new type, ralse latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD. , VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH WHILE PULLING OOOR OUTWARD. . : ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO "NIGHT® POSITION CERTIFICATION i CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT | HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM, ECE R# Cl Didi » aS" 108 ocasoLeTe PREVIOUS EDITIONS
13-00000 , 7 ° rT Area Security Check Sheet Items to be Checked Checker Desks (Including Drawers) Tables (Including Drawers) Chairs Floor Window Ledges Typewriters Stenotype Machines Reproduction Equipment Trash Receptacles - Charts, Exhibits, CF : ‘Chalkboards AIIM Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc. (Check to insure that imprints of classified notes not present)
13-00000° | Ho i 4 UNCLASSIFIED ' only eQNFIDENTIAL 5 con wri = SECRET to ] ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials EXTENSION a4 te WELZ 3 Ao hol Director of Security _ 6777 boar 14 AUG 1975 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whem INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED | FORWARDE! om 610 “ie” C] secret CRCRUNEUUATOR |) INTERNAL Ty uNcLassiFieD
13-00000 t CONRDENTAL 14 AUG 197§ MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff ATTENTION — VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration SUBJECT. . : House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials REFERENCE . : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold Baer subject: Request for Security In accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys- ical security survey of the area which will be used to. store the Committee's classified material, specific rec- ommendations_must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to hav Jot the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate represent- -atives of the Committee for the specific purpose of con- ducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the . Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the re- sults. of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Com- mittee's classified material. ~ Robert W. Gambino Director of Security Atts. Distribution: . E3 IMPDET Orig § 2 - Adse . CL BY 056966 1 - ADD/A OS 5 12 065 CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000° 0s SECRET apc) Batre "THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 9 SEGA STase WASHINGTON, D. €.° 20505 DCI/IC 75-2620 2 September 1975 Intelligence Community Staff MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence Attached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House - ‘Select Committee on Intelligence. Attachme nt =~ This Document May Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment 793 chasstpizp sy __ 3207 EXEMET F 208F GENERAL BECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE CEE. 0. 12357, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: § SEL, (2), (33 or (4) (circle one of more) AU OSIATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Date Imip»ssible to Determine (unless jiapossible, insert date of event) SECRET
- s SECRET UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE SECOM-D-105 2 September 1975. MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence On 29 August 1975, Mr, Robert Gambino, Director of Security/CLA; |Deputy Chief, Physical ‘Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented -information.” Attached is a memorandum outlining the security (0th ote arrangements. ” Donald E. Moore Chairman Attachment - This Document May Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment cLassizigo By _ 320723 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE CF E. 0. 11552, EXESIPTION CATEGORY: § SECU, &), (3) or (4) (circle one or more) AUTOWATICALLY DECLASSIFICD ON Date Impossible to Determine
13-00000 “rear of the space with orie entrance to the secure room, ‘This room ‘ 2 September 1975 House Select Committee on Intelligence 1. The House Select Committee staff is now located in its permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building. Ms. Jacqueline Hess is the Security Officer, telephone number 225-9696. 2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member of the Capitol Police is stationed at a guard desk inside the door and admits only authorized individuals. Visitors must sign in with the guard, who calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees. ‘Interview rooms-are located in the staff area but separated from the _ work area. During non-work hours two guards are on duty in the space, 3. All classified material is kept in a secure area atthe. | is to be locked at all times when specified.employees are not on duty in the room. At the present time, Ms. Hess is the only one who will be able to open the secure area and unless circumstances ‘change this arrangement will continue. 4. All classified material is kept in this secure area, and stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks. At present, Ms. Hess is the only person who possesses the combination to these, Safes. a m 5. Reading of classified documents is to be in a reading area, consisting of several tables, in the secure area. A staff employee desiring access to a classified document must make a request for it, Ms. Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes.taken from classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the documents must respect the original classification and receive corresponding security. Copying of classified documents is to be strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located in staff space, and copies are to receive the same security protection as the original. ’ ° cLassizten sy __ 356793 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE GF £, Q. 11582, EXEMPTION CATEGORY § SBCi, Re an (3) ae (4) (civele one of more) AU. CMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Cualess impos viule, in: insert dale of ave Vint) ete eee EERE EAE CEE EEF PE a ma
13-00000 i i SECREI - 6. The entire space has been swept and plans call for additional periodic sweeping. There is a motion detector in the secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building. Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol Police was immediate. Two doors which normally serve as access’ to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed on these doors. ; , 7. Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Hess: advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security and this will be continually stressed. Also they have tried to instill strong security consciousness among all the staff. Mr. Field indicated that at present it is not expected the staff will total more than 35, SECRET
House Armed Services Subcommittee on ; Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy” The Subcommittee on Intelligence and. Military Application of Nuclear Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The new Sub-" committee has picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and is expanding its staff accordingly. Representative Melvin Price's Chairmanship is due to his long years of membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There will be an ever- increasing involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of nuclear energy and -we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required foreign intelligence, * Members of the Subcommittee are as follows: Melvin Price (D., I11.), Chairman . Charles H. Wilson (D., Calif.) Jack Brinkley (D., Ga.) Dan Daniel (D., Va.) | G. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.) - Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.) _ ; Bob Carr (D., Mich.) — , Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.) Samuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.) Bob Wilson (R., Calif.) William L. Dickinson (R., Ala.) Marjorie S. Holt (R., Md.) Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R., Va.) Staff of the Subcommittee are as follows: John Ford, Staff Director “William H. Hogan, Counsel © Adam J. Klein, Professional Mr. Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced Mr. Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired. Mr.-Hogan is Counsel of the Subcommittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency matters. Adam Klein is a specialist in atomic energy matters.
ome, ADMISTEATIE INTER USE ONLY : PROBLEMS A. House Subcommittee on | Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Former Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to him for support in any problems developing with other committees and other members of the House not on the Subcommittee. Based on the reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have approached him in this Congress for assistance, it is quite evident that he is not the dominant personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will not stick his neck out to defend the Agency. Nor does it appear that the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems. A few ‘weeks ago former Chairman Nedzi suggested that we resolve a problem involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker O'Neill. This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to House leadership to resolve problems. Mr. Nedzi also suggested that we contact someone in the White House on a problem. We.may be faced with needed White House Support on a problem before we approach the leader- ship- ; ; B. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control : 3 The extent of Chairman Lester L. Wolff's oversight of -the Agency in its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problen. As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr. Wolff intends to extend the Agency's activities to where there is maximum effective collection of foreign intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and conviction without regard to the Agency's statutory prohibitions, The only solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the Select Committee as to what the Agency's role should be. ADE HISTRATIVE INTERNAL pe aie tpl , he} rr jon ] Be x =e
“ ___DMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS Flouse of Representatives — ‘ DEMoc RATS fe eee JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts ‘WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky ‘DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania TOM STEED, Oklahoma GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Mlinoia JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia ‘NEAL SMITH, Iowa , ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut JOSEPH P. ADDABEO, New York JOHN J. McFALL, California EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois FRANE E. EVANS, Colorado DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California LOUIS STOKES, Ohiec GUNN McKAY, Utah TOM BEVILL, Alabama BILL CHAPPELL, Florida BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas EDWARD I. KOCH, New York (95th Congress, Ist Session) GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman To pab lecans in Sens ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois SILVIO 0. CONTE, Massachusetts JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota JACK EDWARDS, Alabama ROBERT C. McEWEN, New York JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania c. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida JACK F. KEMP, New York WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado RALPH S. REGULA, Ohio CLAIR W. BURGENER, California GEORGE M. O’BRIEN, Illinois VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska Keita F. MAINLAND Clerk and Staff Director YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania BOB TRAXLER, Michigan . ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts MAX BAUCUS, Montana CHARLES WILSON, Texas LINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana NORMAN D. DICKS, ‘Washington AGRICULTURE & RELATED AGENCIES , DEFENSE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOREIGN OPERATIONS HUD—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES INTERIOR LABOR—-HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE LEGISLATIVE. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PUBLIC WORKS ' STATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE & JUDICIARY TRANSPORTATION TREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE— GENERAL GOVERNMENT Subcommittees Whitten, Evans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Sikes, Natcher Andrews, Robinson, Myers Mahon, Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, MeFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell, urlison Edwards, Robinson, Kemp ' Natcher, Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjamin Burgener, Kemp . Long, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yates, Burke, Roybal, Stokes Young, Conte, Smith Boland, Traxler, Baucus, Stokes, Bevill, Boggs, Burlison, Alexander Coughlin, McDade, Young Yates, McKay, Long, Evans, Murtha, Duncan, Dicks, Whitten McDade, Regula, Armstrong Flood, Natcher, Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stokes, Early Michel, Conte, 0 "Brien Shipley, Benjamin, Giaimo, McFall, Murtha, Traxler Armstrong, Coughlin, Cederberg McKay, Sikes, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell McEwen, Regula Bevill, Boland, Whitten, Slack, Boggs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell Myers, Burgener, Smith Slack, Smith, Flynt, Alexander, Burke, Early Cederberg, Andrews, Miller McFall, Steed, Koch, Duncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evans Conte, Edwards, oO’ Brien Steed, Addabbo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Flynt Miller, McEwen NOTE: Mr. Mahon, as Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Cederberg, as Ranking Minority Member, are ex officio members of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members. aPo 86-238-b January £6, 1977.
13-00000 | $ House Appropriations Committee team: | Room 2D 0117. Telephones: 5848, 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) &d0/ ag. “Leonard M. (Bucky) WALTERS, Badge: blue House Committée Clearances: SI, TK,’ BYECOM G. Charles @. (Chuck) HAYNES Badge: green no~escort Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM Eugene B. MILHEL " Badge: ue HoGse Comittee Clearanges: I, TK, /BYECOM George C. BAIRD (Carter) Badge: blue House Committee Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM Leon F. (Frank) SCHWARTZ Badge: blue House Committee . dohn | LayTen Supervisory officials of HAC Surveys §& Investigations Staff (not to be stationed at Hqs bldg, but may visit from time to time): Cornelius: R. (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief -Badge: green no-escort Marion S. RAMEY, Deputy Chief Badge: blue House Committee OX 7-9371 James Brian HYLAND Badge: mene blue House Committee
13-00000 - 2 August 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations Committee Survey Group 1. “An initial session was held on 30 July 1976 of about one and a half hours with six persons from the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, to-discuss the purpose of their survey of the Directorate of Operations and to propose some arrangements to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents. The following attended: Mr. Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson, Chief of Surveys and Investigations Staff Mr. Marion Ramey, Deputv Mr. Leonard (Bucky) Walters, who will head the team inspecting the Directorate of Operations Mr. Charles (Chuck) Haynes, team member Mr. Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former Agency employee) Mr. George C. Baird, team member Attending for the Agency were: Mr. Theodore Shackley, who chaired the meeting Mr. Robert Gambino Lyle Miller 2. The meeting followed reasonably well the attached agenda, which was made available to all at the beginning of the meeting. The following paragraphs summarize the important points covered. 3. Scope: Mr. Shackley asked the group to define its mission, noting some of the topics mentioned in recent conversations with Mr. Snodgrass suggested particular interests whereas the Committee's report on the FY 77 budget
13-00000. ° % had suggested a different orientation. Mr. Anderson, characterizing the enterprise as a survey rather than an investigation, stated that his instructions were from the Chairman of the Committee: -they called for a detailed review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety. Mr. Walters would mention certain particular interests, noted below, but that did not set limits to the ultimate scope of the survey. Mr. Walters then took over: “a. He expects to do a complete review, from the managerial and substantive standpoint, of the Directorate. His initial interests indicated an auditor's approach to these questions - how budgets are compiled, examination of accounting procedures for regular and. special funds, cost systems and the like. b. He went on, however, to the management aspects which they would also pursue to determine the results of the Directorate's operations - the value of intelligence produced versus the costs involved in procuring it, and areas of possible overlap in collection with the military and with NSA. c. Specific areas which would be explored, given, as examples, included contingency reserves, the "special retirement fund" (presumably referring to MHMUTUAL), the procedures for reimbursin and support, propriétariées OW CYréaté i justification, value and effectiveness), safe- houses and. "CA cadres. Mr. Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr. Shackley's request for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient _detail so that we could take the managerial steps necessary to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our managers and senior operations officers who would be involved in current operations as well as overlapping inquiries from other groups concurrently overseeing the Directorate. Mr. Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies which the Directorate might have which would aid the team in its work. P"Ly - i re 2 4 kt Fy
13-00000 - Pa a t 4. Duration: The team's first objective will be to render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977, in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in. considering the Agency's FY 1978 budget. The team wishes to start work immediately and will consist of either six or seven members who will occupy space in Headquarters building and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought out, however, that the team would also interview users of our intelligence and other collectors. There was ambiguity in the projection of the total length of the survey; I interpreted Mr. Anderson's remarks to indicate that he expected the team to be with us for most of calendar year 1977. 5. Security: Mr. Anderson explained the arrangement by which the Committee limits access by even the members of the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be reviewed in a specified area and they are stored, in very limited numbers, in the tower of the Capitol in the special facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of - Congress. Mr. Gambino explained the arrangements for badges, certification of clearances, and provided for the team's consideration a copy of the "non-disclosure agreement" which we would like members to sign. There was considerable discussion, and some objection, to the issuance of blue -badges which will provide access to virtually all parts of the building but which must be turned in and picked up at the entrance each day. This arrangement was reluctantly ‘accepted but it was made clear at lunch and in later § discussion with the team and with Mr. Anderson they are unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience and physical access to the building. 6. Access: Of more concern was the Agency position that the SA/D6/70 would serve as a control point for the team's further access to individuals and documents in the Directorate. The requirement was explained in terms of the need to record, against later requirements such as in fact now in progress stemming from another investigation, the names, subject matter and general content of matters discussed by Agency officers with team members. The requirement to "monitor" was explained as an effort to keep this type of record, rather than to impose a third party from the office of SA/DO/O on all interviews; the latter was clearly considered by the team to be an unreasonable intrusion. It was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with 1 Seman aes ae em IT her aN oe eS TRAST LEAN ne oR Rint ete ais ET Seth aia Ta REECE Lees eens nee com
13-00000. : \ system outlined in -the attached agenda, and that we would reconsider procedures later if they seemed clearly to be unwieldy. . We anticipated, however, that once the team splits into smaller groups as is planned, and pursues particular areas of inquiry, it will be possible to evolve a workable system which meets the objectives of both parties. 7. Other: There appears to be no difficulty in protecting identities of sources, providing documents in sanitized form, maintaining notes only in this building and at the appropriate security level and introducing some officers under cover in alias where necessary; all these points were noted and none was objected to. Space and other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible to provide adequate space adjacent to the SA/DQ/0O offices. Mr. Anderson began by noting the outstanding cooperation on the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which relatively free access to personnel and files had been afforded his team), and ended by stating that the coming survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses and that therefore he believed that such access could have very beneficial results for the Agency. It was agreed to begin the survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976. Mr. Walters with several team members will, however, set up shop on 2 efcan to review such general briefing papers a can make available to them at that time. : SA/DO/0 j:53 (7368/1398) Distribution: (all w/att) Orig € 1 - DDO ee 1 - ADDO - OLC (Mr. Miller) - D/SEC _(Mr. Gambino) - COMPT SSA/D - SA/DDCI - SA/DO/O fe ed ed bed ed i E2 IMPDET CL BY 012860
13-00000 | 3 ard SECRET AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH 2 HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF 30 JULY 1976 ) dmesg Request Stateneyt “from Committee representatives of scope, duratiow and proposed procedure to be followed by Committee investigators. Discussion of arrangements for investigation: 1. Facilities: DDO will provide office space, telephones and secure storage facilities for investigators. Parking spaces and cafeteria priveleges will also be provided. 2. Security: a. Badges allowing unescorted access to Headquarters building will be issued, to be picked up and left with receptionist. Agreement to be signed when badge issued, per current procedures governing all Congressional staffs. . b. Clearances through necessary level to be obtained prior to commencement of briefings or interviews, level to be determined on’ basis of first meeting. 3. Access: a. Orientation briefings on Directorate and its subdivisions to be offered. b. Access re personnel and documents within gency -O be controlled by office of . SA/DO/O. SE RCE PROTOS TeT will maintain record * of SEE interviews and of documents provided. c. Documents to be provided upon specific request for study within building. They will be sanitized. to protect sources qnd methods using guidelines previo usly — established for HSC and SSC vheberenee fen ee aie eek
13-00000 SA/DO/O to monitor all interviews. _ ne ee LCE Tt Documents to be examined by the investigation team within Headquarters building. If copies of documents are : desired, investigators will request them from SA/DO/O who will see that they are provided promptly appropriate classified and sanitized form. If required by the Committee (outside Headquarters building), same procedure will be followed but will be subject to review by SA/DO/O. en ee ON Formal questions are to be put in | writing in order to provide proper and full context so that most complete and pertinent answers can be provided. Discussion of note-taking and reports: (1) Maintenance of proper security and classification (2) Notes to retain same level of security Classitication as documents or interviews on which they based.
13-00000 1 = - ADMIy" “STRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONI- ™, This ‘notice expires 31 January 1978 | DON 5-218 DDO NOTICE GENERAL | NO. 5-218 4 August 1976 SURVEY BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF 1. GENERAL Menbers of the staff of the House Appropriations Com- mittee began an extensive examination of the Directo- rate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976. They expect that it will take approximately 17 months to complete this study. They state their activities are necessary to better understand the appropriations process. They emphasize that their objective is not to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activi- ties. The staff menbers' activities will be coordi- nated through SA/DO/O. The following paragraphs attempt to anticipate the procedures necessary to exercise orderly control over the staff's activities. . These procedures may be subject to modification as future experience may dictate. 2. LOCATION Members of this Congressional staff have been issued blue badges bearing the words "House Committee" which permit unescorted access to all non-specially controlled areas of the building, including the main cafeteria. The staff will be provided suitable private office space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the SA/DO/O, which will be relocated in Room 2 D 0109 as of 6 August 1976. It is expected that they will initi- ally have a greater interest in interviews than they do in documents. Since they will have adequate office space, interviews should be conducted within their ‘premises. 7 3. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS a. The staff is expected to make any requests for. documentation to the SA/DO/O. Individual officers ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL, USE. ONLY . tee
13-00000 hee ’ ° ADMIN* “TRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY ms woo, DON 5-218 DDO NOTICE - | GENERAL NO. 5-218 . k August 1976 who receive requests from staff members for docu- ments should ask that the request be put to the SA/DO/O. All documents provided to the SA/DO/0 for transmittal to the staff will be logged in by the SA/DO/O and logged back to the component after the staff has completed its study. The SA/DO/O will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retain a copy of the document concerned. All documents will be properly sanitized to protect sources and methods. The staff has indicated that it does not anticipate any need for such detail and accepts the principle of sanitization. Any questions concerning the degree of sanitization should be referred to the SA/DO/O. Ground rules for sanitization are similar to those applied during the activities of the Select Committees. General guidelines will be provided separately. On receipt of a document back from the SA/DO/0 the recipient should indicate the date received, and that it had been made available to the staff. The document should be retained by the recipient in the form in which it was provided to the staff for possible further reference; the record copy of the document should also reflect the fact that a sanitized copy was provided to the staff. Any further copies of documents requested by the staff will be made only by the office of the SA/DO/O. hk. INTERVIEWS Ge A representative from the office of the SA/DO/0 _will not necessarily be present during interviews. All interviews should be requested by the staff through the SA/DO/O. The SA/DO/O will maintain @ record of the date of interview; the name of the person interviewed, and by whom; the alias if one is used; and the subjects discussed. A form will be provided to the interviewee to record 2 ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY rn ne - ern en rrareruistenennp nent reryrter netfee at ou 4
13-00000 i ADMIP"STRATIVE-INTERNAL WSE ON}. DON 5~218 DDO NOTICE . GENERAL NO. 5-218 . . . 4 August 1976 the essential facts. He should retain one copy for possible future reference and one copy should be forwarded to the SA/DO/0. b. It is recognized that the badge access and the length of the stay in the building by the staff members may lead to wmscheduled contacts. If such contacts are connected with the official duties of the staff, then appropriate comments should be forwarded to SA/DO/O on the form cited above. Officers showld be careful not to allow conversations to drift to areas of interest not covered by official interviews. If this does take place, however, we shall rely on the officer concerned to inform the SA/DO/O of these develop- ments. 5. SECURITY _ The Blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that” staff members should be treated as visitors in the presence of persons not connected with their official duties. Persons introduced under alias should be careful that the alias is protected if a chance meeting takes place in the presence of other col- leagues. In this connection, persons interviewed should be careful not to expose associates who have not been interviewed. William W. Wells Deputy Director for Operations eg | ASDDIE!S | 18 das 1 3 ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 27 August 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions ‘and Staffs . FROM : | | SUBJECT : Guidance for Interviews with House Appropriations Committee Staff REFERENCE -= : DON 5-218, 4 August 1976 i $i 1. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations Staff team from. the House Appropriations Committee. The subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting. I have explained to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e (personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a- separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management Group. You should touch on the other topics suggested in the memorandum mentioned above. 2. General guidelines are contained in reference notice. The following may be helpful, however, in preparing your briefing. Our general intention is to be as forth- . coming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any information which would lead to the identification of a specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person or group with which the.Agency has a relationship of confidence, or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign services can in most cases be acknowledged, but details of the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared operations should not be disclosed. 3. In the briefing contemplated. on management policies and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of providing further information later. The staff has already had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and CONFIDENTIAL ES a
13-00000 A Peg — UUNFIDERTIAL we personnel strengths broken down by component,.and a listing by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS. They have been given a briefing on the current organization of the Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff elements will shortly be reorganized. They have a listing of all overseas stations and bases. If you have further questions on material already provided to the Committee, please check with this office. 4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place in room 2 D 0117; if possible, a member of my staff will be present. We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum ' for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form" as a general guide. Space is somewhat limited, but you should bring any. supporting personnel you desire to have participate in your briefing. The Surveys and Investigations team is — aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover status; please’ advise this office if any persons intend to use an alias during these briefing sessions. 5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of these briefings. att E2 IMPDET CONFIDENTIAL CL BY 012860
13-00000 August 18, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR FROM ai M. Walters, Staff Member House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff Request arrangement for comprehensive briefings with appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and Leon F. Schwartz. , , 1. Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre Provide in this briefing data relating to the organization, utilization and cost data for this activity for the periods FY 74, 75, 76 and projected data for FY 77 and FY 78. Organizational data should include manning and equipment levels for the aforementioned periods. 2. Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected by such a change. If additional expenditures in either dollars or manpower. positions are involved, justification should accompany the presentation. Explain in detail how the Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of 100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations Bill. 3. The Special Projects Group Explain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel from the Near East Division and providing it with special status by placing it directly under DDO. Additional manpower and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed. 4. Coordination Within the Intelligence Community Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the various task groups established (both within CIA and community-
13-00000 sand Division, riefin y each) 1 1 ut snot: ‘Limited to: _ on wide) which have been specifically established to deal with the collection vs. analysis problem. Impacts and changes brought about or anticipated within DO as a result of these groups' actions should be covered. 5. Management. Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff -.a. Overview of role of staff or division b. Decision-making processes and how coordinated in DO, CIA and intelligence community c. Organizational structure d. Program development, and execution from initiation to budgeting to implementation, including development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk officers and division or staff directors. e. Personnel policies and practices including recruitment, training promotion, position classification, establishment of station complements and rotational policies. f. Management and accounting controls to assure compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are properly used, expended and receipted for. While the order of arranging the presentations is not critical, it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be presented earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week of August 30. Please coordinate with either Mr. Raird or myself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary material used in the presentations could be provided to the attendees during each briefing session. omar tae] Se rte cela a
13-00000 ouwent [fue tJ | _[concurrence |__| iwrormarion [| [signature "SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA’ 7 ‘Wror AND BOTTOM. =, UNCLASSIFIED | | CONFIDENTIAL | | SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP [action DISPATCH ||| RECOMMENDATION - | RETURN Fon yr nfo T hau clinrhe! pitped torimuy Lis A/POONW prorclin wrth. Me SNODERASS mm MBO, Chay Lh Ahad an o pege form Ge | (Brn tolimst a Lis. Corvirndlen, om thts FOLO HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | BATE | WALneR 10 Spf [_[_unerassirres | conrimentiai [| secre] Fone x0. 237 Use previous editions J DIRECT REPLY | | PREPARE REPLY . be 17 PO/6 %- 3259 7 26 Pedy 1976,
13-00000 \l in attermpting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the sCommittee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time ‘Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley, he continued wi is toward roviding him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany ‘on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he perceived them in the time frame February to May J976. With thatas a backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective. docu- ments. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and | flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO man- ower allocation proced . Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructia nist tactic. His point being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information fo the Committee members. Attermpts were made by Mr. Shackley to show how men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley re- iterated the DDO position that access to Management by Obiective docu: ments by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whale question of sources l hods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an examination of the Management by Objective documents. it was hoped that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could.be discovered which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only conclude that Mr. Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort of a. | formula.erauation which will enable him to test our manpower alccaiee // Sy Shei. ‘We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go SECRET
13-00000 SECRET -7- into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower Such as : AED what targets are ina country, what are the preat power interests in a particular country, what is the operational environment in the country i.€., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a ‘particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass, but he is looking for something else which has less variables in it when, in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropria- tions Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is complete OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try - to obtain n of what specific whe manpo issues that trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this conted has been asked to try to determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations within the DDO might give Mr. SET FEET the insight into manpower allo- cations that he is currently seeking. ) 9. Comment. in net assessment terms one would have to conclude that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate product. For this the A gency gets high marks. On the other hand, the Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents, leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put another way, there appears to be no prospect for. establishing the type of dialogue with Mr. Snod i i6fi i ests of both parties. e are i i in an adversary relationshi nth him, although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that a SECRET a RE REG mm eee oe a nn ce
ag Mr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with ERA : some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think _ appropriate? Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with ashi . the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that, -and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have their contents described to the Conmittee by anyone who is not intimately familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert action operations and with the entire management system used by the Operations Directorate. There are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern revolves around. ‘the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry “you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management. system ' is effective is that particl tion is strict] Limited to. those immediately concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the: in ad “fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written — ' with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership. There will be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of - ‘problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. ° inevitably, the net effect | a ad _ will be" to reduce the usefulness of the system. | Another difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging per- . Se eee LE Seer eEE CE EEE TO TEED formance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss recruitments in terms“of numbers, the specific access of agents to information, recruit- We a a an ment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this. sensitive material on iin . Sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily | of disconnected bits and pieces or of ‘unenlightening generalizations. And I have a third problem with this request. The reports. themselves are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal TT TS a a OT a oD management. It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate ————— its effectiveness. ‘Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the. Agency * who nat . ' has that intimate knowledge should be present if and when you want to . consider the reports.