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bw ste ce TOP SECRET DOCUMENT HATERTAL PEVUEWED At CY WE ANQUARTE RS ial  WOUSE SELECE COMMIEPTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, S STAT i MEMBERS TELE /NUMBER./VOLUE : The Examination of the ______ Bona Fides of a KGB Defector JCLUSIVE , DATES: 1 Document - dated February. 1968 TODIAL UNaT/ LOCATION: CI ° . _ . ; 7 G32 T3) a TE Re VUGWED BY. SIGNALL MIE OF. ; pa! REVIEWE NG OFFICIAL ECELV! rvED RE TURN | ony NAM? ) Oa f, Vi rn Clabes Ss CoB ET! LAK gy/ — ee oe an ‘ = . Nn Dee ern tr, a whee Wee TO > * S pay MA aa Saeiieianin ee a a iN Mazo E:, ba Sobshwf
Seams yel TOP SECRET 1. Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968 CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. Nosenko." 2. Please note that the CIA finds this study to be inaccurate in many important details and to contain the results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions. 3. We have deleted certain portions of this study containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto. 4. We request return of this study when it has served your purposes. TOP SECRET
+ oN Py amination of the Bona Fides “of a KGB Defector ~ Yuriy L NOSENKO February 1968 Top Secret 0901267 TS No. 197124 Copy 10
Top Secret CONTENTS Introduction Summary of Case I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS NOSENKO's Statements About Himself Soviet Officials' Statements The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing Positive Intelligence Information Counterintelligence Information Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to NOSENKO's Claimed Service "The KGB Agent in Paris" (sgt. ®EBE'Sounson) "SASHA" (Identity Unknown) "The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty" (Uilliam VASSALL) The KGB Audio Attack on the West German Embassy " ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH) Edward Ellis SMITU Il EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES Notes for the Reader III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPIIY Birth to 1945 t Moscow Tastitute of International Relations (1945-ca. 1950) Naval RU Service (Ca. 1951l-ca. 1953) Summary and Conclusion 6104268 (i) Top Secret Copy 10 PAGE 24 24. 28 30 31 37 41 41 45 “45 48. 58 ‘TS No. 197124
14-00000 Top Secret CONTENTS PAGE VI SEVENTH "DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960) (Cont.). Operational Activities (1955~- ~1958) 113 Entrapment of MALTA) OG ; 114 Recruitment of {BURGI| 06 115 Attempted Recruitment of GEERCKENS) 0g 121 Contact with (Laue ang and|BIRSE\ 06,06 122 Recruitment of (SUNDAR) pb 123 ‘Travel to London (1957 and 1958) 124 Operational Activities_(1958-1960) 127 Recruitment of {HARRIS pe Co 128 Compromise of AFT\ 3 , 129 Recruitment of [DREW oz 130 Recruitment of [LUKIS] 06 "131 Recruitment of {WILBY] 04 . 1310 Recruitment of [TAYLOR] 06. 132 “Recruitment: of [MERTENS] OL 133 Compromise of (BARRETT Hb 134 Compromise of WILLERFORD B& 136 Recruitment o FRIPPEL) () 137 Lee Harvey OSWALD 143 Summary 144 Knowledge of other Seventh Department BO American Tourist Operations 145 Seventh Department Counterintelligence Operations (1955- ~1960) 146 NOSENKO's Information ‘146 Information Furnished KGB by George BLAKE 148 KGB Tourist Study 149 Summary and Conclusion 150 VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960-January 1962) (151 Deputy Chief of Section 151 Transfer to Section 152 Predecessor as Deputy Chief ; 153 Responsibilities ‘ 154 Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief 156 General Supervisory Duties. | 159 CGCL263 (i441) TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 aad
14-00000 Top Secret 84 CONTENTS PAGE AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT (January 1960- -~January 1962) (Cont. ) Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications 236 ' Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy 240 Suspected CIA Officers 241 Unsuspected CIA Officers 244 Personal Handler of Agents 248° Temporary Assignments Abroad 251 Planned Travel to U.S. 251 Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960) 252 Travel to Bulgaria (April-May 1961) 254 Compromise of]LUNT TIOG 256 Promotion and Transfer to Seventh Department (January 1962) 259 Summary and Conclusion 261 SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) 263 Intreductory Comment 7 263 Chief of the American-British Commonwealth ; Section (January 1962-July 1962) 265 - NOSENKO! s Agents 265 Operational Activities 268 Entrapment of JOHNSON] D4 268 Entrapment of |JONES O 272 Recruitment of [BIENSTOCK|O6 | 273 Travel to Geneva (March- June 1962) 275 - Purpose of Trip 275 Investigation of SHAKHOV 276 Security Escort for Delegation 278 Visits to KGB Legal Residency . (279 KGB Officers within Soviet Delegation 279 Association with Other Soviets 280. Supervising Case Officer for BELITSKILY 282 Contact with CIA 286 Operational Activities (continued) 288 Attempted Recruitment of [BRAUNS) 0 288 Summary and Conclusion 290 | 6001270 (v) TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 g
‘Yop Secret. -. CONTENTS VLEET, ‘SEVENTH DEPARTMENT Gantary 1962- ~January: 1964). eS ; (Cont. »- Deputy ‘chiet. of Seventh Department (July 1962- -January 1964) | KGB. ‘Operations. es coe ae “Recruitment of: SVENGHANSEEy OO . Tavestigation. of ISLES INGER “OG [Arrest and Interrogation of’ RoTENY HL aS GRU. Agent (SHUBIN, OG - i Arrest of BARGHOORN eee gence ‘of OSWALD Residence in. USSR - Request» to Return to: USSR: : fo Post-Assassination Review of KGB File “The: CHEREPANOV, Papers” “Contents. . re: -NOSENKO's Travel Document | a Return. to Geneva (January- “February 1964) °- Purpose of Trip = © “i. Visits to KGB Legal Residency | Avadlability for Meetings with: CIA “-) NOSENKO! s Written. Notes — ;  NOSENKO™ Ss) Defection Knowledge. “of Other, Seventh Department es - ‘ Operations operational ‘activities: (July 1962-. Loe Be, _ January - 1964) KGB ‘counterintelligence Operations Among’. an -: -Amerdcan Tourists) “Information ‘Furnished. the KGB by | os ; George BLAKE KGB ‘study of, American Intelligence as “Tourist: Operations “NOSENKO! ‘Ss “Information, yo . po Summary ‘ Summary and conclusion a (vi) PAGE “291 292 - 292 293 295 |: (296 — 298. 303 303. 305 307" 309 314 315 | 316. 317. 318 . . 318. 319 3920-5. 325, “326: 327. 327. 0: 330." 3315. 331 ‘TS No. 197124 “Top Secret Copy
top Secret CONTENTS PAGE IX -OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335 Relationship with General GRIBANOV 335 Communist Party Status . 338 Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342 Awards and Decorations 345 Sourcing 349 Ranks 350 X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT ' 355 XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357 es Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399 437 Index of Personalities v (vii) Top Secret CUCL 2r9 TS No. 197124 Copy 19
Introduction ‘The “judgment” of NOSENKO! s ‘bona | fides’ entailed the. distillation ‘of the’ shuge volume of counterintelligence | information ‘assembled in connection with his case,. including _ the product of ‘his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of . . KGB” operations which he related, the results of file checks_ Of: ‘thousands ‘of individuals: involved, comparison of his’ assertions’ against. ‘collateral | “information. from all: sources. and with. _counterintelligence records on: the KGB and: related , matters... The- examination herein réduces this volume. of material to” “Manageable: proportions,- to essential. elements. of NOSENKO! .§ Claims, in order to permit comparison. of his statements. with Matters:of known fact and to permit. appli- cation: of: ‘reasonable’ judgment... Conclusions are drawn from the examination of each major period. in his: claimed ‘ Be biography.*.:The final . conclusions - represent. the. aggregate. — ee of: conclusions ‘independently drawn from the examination of* each major: period in. his. claimed. i biography. — Fe Be 6064273 TS No. 197124 oS Top Secret = ss copy __10. |
_ Top Secret CONTENTS ©. “IV KGB ENTRY ‘(cae 1953), 61 Date of Entry 62 -Role of General KOBULOW. 64 Eligibility 67 . .. Processing for: Entry | 68 - Initial Service , ve SQ Other Aspects Relevant to KGB service. | oan 72 Summary and. _fonelusion: oe be oe oy, AMERICAN EMBASSY, “SECTION oF AMERICAN. ‘DEPARTMENT. “(eae 1953- ~June 1955) , 75 Operations ‘Against ‘Americad Correspondents | a 75 KGB Files... 77 NOSENKO's ‘Agents 78 “Operations: Against’ USS. ‘Army _ Attache: Personnel “BI Custody of Case Files a 83 NOSENKO's Agents... 7 84 -NOSENKO's Targets.’ x 87 “+ ~ [MICKELSON |. 06. : - 87 - [MEARNS]. O% 88 fxrcnanng] Ob ee 89° FELCHLIN}DG as 90 .[BENSONSO6°. ° 93 “YT STROUD). Db° i as AraC 06, oe OT <{BENSON, MULE and sg ‘Expulsion rr oo — “97 |< WAN LAETHEM)(. 97 Additional Reporting’ aa a CO 99 os Summary and Conclusion e BET eg 99 VT ‘SEVENTE: DEPARTMENT ‘(aune 1955- “January 1960) a 101» ‘Introductory « Comment oe Ce oe. 101 '  NOSENKO's Agents ee os ve . 104— . Soviet Citizen Agents. | “rh. 104 Homosexual Agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV - » + 110° - Summary - So 112. an a “TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy ; aan
-Tep Secret “CONTENTS | Introduction .* Summary of Case *~ I FOUNDATIONS OF, NOS! SENKO" S CLAIMS. Soviet Officials' Statements. -Claimed Service "The. KGB Agent in Paris" . (sgt. REBETSouNSON). “Edward Ellis. SMITH SASHA - (Identity Unknown) fe (The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty" — ce - (William VASSALL) —° . 30 “lo the KGB’ Audio, Attack: on the West German .. a Embassy oo 31 NOSENKO" s- ‘Statements About liimsel£ The, Product of NOSENKO's. Debriefing Positive Intelligence Information | ‘Counterintelligence Information ‘Significant KGB Operations Not — * Directly Related.to NOSENKO' s LM ANDREY" (Dayle w. SMITH) a If “EXAMINATION. OF “NOSENKO! s BONA EIDES: - Notes for. the, ‘Reader III : PRE= KGB curocnarny = ‘Birth. to” 1945. ‘Naval. RU Service. (Ca. 1951-ca. | Summary: and Conclusion a Top Secret 1953) © PAGE. 24. 24.00 | 28 “37 41 Al. a *) t. AS Moscow. Institute of International Relations | (1945-ca. 1950) _ AB 58 GdGL 268 TS No. 197124 Copy 10
a Tep Secret 7 . Summary of Case ~ up The <NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962: in the corridors: “of the Palais des Nations in . Disarmament Conferénce, A Soviet official approached an. ; _ American diplomat with the Suggestion that they get together ~ forca‘talk the following day. The diplomat advised CIA of . _ the appointment, explaining that he thought the approach: so a , ‘ved the Sov - to be’ Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, " @ member of the Soviet. Disarmament Delegation.” ee vil. Later’ meeting with the American diplomat, the Soviet: . “official identified himself ias NOSENKO. and ct ed a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to Genev. “o. security- of the Soviet delegation. He knew that the American “had previously’ served in Moscow and erronedgusly believed that _ ~he was the "American Rezident" in Geneva. NOSENKO stated. “that. he needed approximately 900.Swiss francs-immediately ‘to Gover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on . ei. Liquor and a prostitute’ in Geneva. He offered for this amount "sto se@ll two items of information to American. Intelligence. '.These’ were the identity of a former »/ in Moscow who was ia KGB. agent "dear cip “area, and the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although. -- ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually ¢ontrolled by. the. KGB... “In reply, the American explained that-he was not an intelli-. ~ gence officer, but that.he could place NOSENKO in contact: “with. an appropriate U.S. official in Geneva later that, same | a to ensure the-. | That evening NOSENKO was met by “a CIA officer and « three. hour meeting followed ata CIA safehouse in. Geneva. Describing ' himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the. - American Embassy’ in Moscow ‘and against tourists and other . -travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer - |.0f his financial difficulties and repeated his offér to sell” | 2 coot27: "TS No. 197124 Geneva during the United Nations . offer of cooperation or deféction,.._ American Embassy employee | hers": in the Washington —- . _ Top Secret 7 | Copy 10 _ - ig =
eee te ent te Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO Top Secret C00L 274 TS No. 197124
Top Secret © (Summary of Case) the two items ot information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting Cla, althcugh in the ensuing discussion he aiso expressed dissatisfaction with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO met CIA‘ representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962. With the second meeting on il June, his earlier expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations. His knowledgeability was almost exciusively jimited to the KGB Second Chief Directorate {responsible for counterintelligence and security within che USSR). NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer ina sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations. NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within certain limits to collect information on matters indicated to be of interest to CIA. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his coilaboration be communicated to the American Embassy in Moscow. He promised to notify CIA via an accommodation address when he came to the West again. ; NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964. Since last meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieu- | tenant colonel and had become the Deputy Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States. He cited as reasons his continuing dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime and the fact. that he. probably would have no further opportunities to travel to the West in the foresee~ able future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB opera- tional activity which he had collected in the 18 months — since his last meeting with CIA. + 6001276 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top Secret > (Summary of Case) “Ong February, four days ' seleéted for NOSENKO's: defec ~ received a cable from KGB He “returm to Moscow ‘to. particip foreign tourism to the Sovie before the date tentatively. tion, he reported that he: had ; adquarters ordering his immediate ate in a KGB conference on -:. oO t. Union. -Thar night exfiltration | was driven across the ing was résumed in a The decision was: reached. on 11 February e United States, and in the early... _he’ and his CIA escorts arrived in © » thence to.a safehouse | offices of the U.s. He told both that ‘CIA completed-its’ : initial 18. February, and. on 2 -debriefings of NOSENKO-on. ° 4 February. he was introduced to. he FBI for questioning. At about the ~ a marked change in NOSENKO! - y cooperative during most | 1B. increasingly difficult to get him to |) espond to specific questioning... His free time in. Washington and nearby cities was punctuated. by drinking bouts; crude: CoA ‘behavior, and disputes with his security escort.:. He explained... : -his behavior by saying that he was under. great tension as: oY a result of: his defection, abandonment of his wife. and 's 0 0 - ‘children, and the: disgrace that he had brought to his family: name,.-and-on this: basis CIA accédéd to NOSENKO's demand for ‘a vacation.: On 12 March, NOSENKO left Washington with a. CIA case-officer and two CIA security guards for. a ‘two-week. »,Nisitvto Hawaii. : There his: behavior deterioriated still further. -He drank heavily and. almost constantly: he a. consorted with a> number of Prostitutes; he was loud and crude . in public places; and he spent money extravagantly and “., Conspicuously. . ee ne wo owTS No. 197124. | a hf Copy —_10 - a Top Secret
Top Secret (Summary of Case) During NOSENKO's absence from Washington, consultations were held with the FBI regarding steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. This Agency was concerned that his behavior would attract undesirable atrention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April indicated ic would “not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement, and the Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were advised. On 4 April NOSENKO was driven to a new safehouse in a ‘Washington suburb, and told that this safehouse cthenceforward would be his regular place of residence. Since that time’ NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full~time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media. oo Intensive interrogation of NOSENKO, including a polygraphic examination, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain ‘information which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964. Despite the searching nature of the quéstions and the implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to answer all questions put to him. Because more information pertinent to the question of his bona fides was needed, a new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964. ’ Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was -resumed in a neutral, non~hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964. After further consultations with the FBI, a round of | hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. Between | then and 5 March, NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogation teams, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous assertions. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements. had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions 6001278 - TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
-in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained: hé had . “been basically truthful, and that he had come to. the United. — States solely for the reasons he had originally given. . These interrogations. were suspended on 5..March 1965 eo Fe . Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the. interrogations: of January and February 1965 >. °°.) " concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the — American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB 03: | . Second Chief Directorate, from January, 1960 to January 196220... , Among. the reasons for selecting this particular period were! :. the comparatively large amount of collateral information Date, available against which NOSENKO's statements. could be checked;.” ” - the importancé of the Embassy and its personnel as critical... oS :- KGB Second. Chief Directorate targets; their importance from... the standpoint of ‘American security; and the extent of © 00000. “NOSENKO's claimed knowledge of the activities of the Embassy. . Section, of which he claimed to. have been Deputy Chief. | _ |. In keeping: with a Soviet practice with which NOSENKO was. © . familiar, CIA asked NOSENKO in February.1965. to sign a series.” ~ . of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols", most of 9%. _. Which. concerned, the period of his claimed service: inthe “> '.. American Department.'’.These were written by the CIA interro-:: gators, and they: were designed to, set forth NOSENKO's’ exact: _ Statements and meaning on. various specific subjects.:. The.» vo “protocols were in no Way. presented to NOSENKO ‘as documentary |. - “portions ofa. "confession", but rather as distilled and. final. ~ _ Statements. of what he did and did not know concerning... “. Mes “y particular topics. ~ NOSENKO-was asked to read each page of _\1 @ach protocol: carefully andto sign his name.at the bottom: .: “. to “indicate that he understood and-agreed with its contents; “he was allowed the use. of a dictionary and was permitted. to. ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. — . (Amendments. were entered by the interrogators ‘and were | ‘initialed. by NOSENKO.) | NOSENKO was asked, after reading”: o _@ach page and after completing the entire protocol, whether — “he understood what was written there and whether there were”. any more changes. he wished to make. .;He was then asked to _ Sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood ~ . ‘this report and certify it as’ correct", at the end of the ~~ - _ final page. - With one exception, he -did.so calmly and ‘without - - objections. “In one or two instances he remarked that his Statements were presented in such a manner as to make then TS No. 1971242 : ; - Top Secret ' - . Copy _10 “Orem. -
14-00000 Tep Secret (Summary of Case) “Anything I have Signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I an Signing any paper, This is an officidi document, and I fully understand what I’m doing when 1 Sign it as being absolutely correct." Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August 1965 with the participation of Petr DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, held in Russian, were for the Purpose of using DERYABIN's KGB experience to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's claimed personal ‘During the period 19-25. October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for Seven days on specific aspects of selected tepics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB Operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English. Although the interrogations identified topics and time periods in NOSENKO's accounts which contained the greatest number of contradictions and discrepancies, neither the contradictions nor the discrep- ancies could be resolved, - Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has. encountered among would~be defectors, the question of , NOSENKO's mental Stability was a Matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From his arrival in the. United States in 1964 NOSENKO has been under psychiatric observation. A CIA PSychiatrist and a CIA psychologist, both with extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors, monitored many of NOSENKO's interrogations. In May 1965 the psychologist for three weeks questioned NOSENKO on his life from birth until 1953, when NOSENKO claimed he joined the KGB, in an attempt to identify Psychological factors which might underlie NOSENKO's contradictory and inconsistent accounts. The psychiatrist has continued his periodic observations of NOSENKO to the Present time. The psychiatrist and the Psychologist concluded independently, on the basis of their observations, that NOSENKO was mentally stable. 6001280 | TS No. 197124 a Top Secret Copy —___
Top Secret ‘(Summary of Case) a NOSENKO. has’ not been interrogated. since October. 1966. oo. The: “period since has. been devoted to the examination and. ; -*. ¥eview of the accumulated’ interrogation notes,- transcripts and other materials, and_ in the Preparation of the ‘Present ‘paper. ie a — 7 - oo oe - _ : — oe ; 1S. No: qoriad. _ .. Top Secret Copy 1.0
Top Secret CHAPTER I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS Evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides is comprised of his own statements, the corroborating statements of Soviet officials, and the counterintelligence information he has provided. NOSENKO's Statements About Himself In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad and in the course of the interrogations since, NOSENKO has: made: numerous statements about himself. More than any other, however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial “hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and well-expressed exposition of how he wished CIA to regard him. It is quoted here in its entirety. My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life before the death of my father were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad, and at the beginning of my working life, when I was in the Far East in 1950- 1952. The opportunity. to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of. money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation-in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably TIéfFt its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better. C001 282 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 11
; Top Secret ve “(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) | “ “Up to 1953,:.over the course of my. entire life--at — - "school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the _family-~it was always pounded. into my head that’ — o Stalin was a great genius, that he was good, keen, 9. > etee; and the thought. never occurred :to mé to Bone, “question his words or his deeds. because everything © oo “that he said, and everything he did, were completely: axiomatic.” The arrests. and trials only involved : “traitors and it was considered and explained that “ithe. betrayor of the people. was: .Yezhow, the head of -. ..the NKVD.- Not even: the"shdadow of ‘doubt fell‘ on. the:  name-of Stalin. - Soon after Stalin's death. in 1953 ° I. read a certain document given me: by my. father... .This was ‘a.secret letter: of the Central Committee of the CPSU on:the ‘case of the doctors;'.it was “not. addressed to. all communists but only to members cand candidate members of the Central Committee... 2 ; » aL. was. deeply shaken by. this letter. which described | Tope _. in ‘detail: how these: ‘people, ‘important. specialists ‘in the. field ‘of: medicine, were brought: to such. a’ es condition that“they condemned ' ‘themselves; that - age ga - they. confessed. to. _things. -which'*had never happened,. to: things. which. they! had never, done. They were. oa _: simply forced to give the evidence which was’ needed. by ‘the: investigators... ‘The secret ‘letters on the. . -eult ‘of Stalin™ and -much~™ that. I heard in the KGB: Jabout the reign of: Stalin,” ‘all. this’ left “its “mark. “and:forcéed me. to: think deeply: about. ‘the. real. truth 0: and: to. look at everything more. critically. 1. nO *. Jonger. had faith. ain-all-‘those™ ideas: which - for years” J Bed, been Pressed into my. head. ae “The. new leaders” “(khrushchev and: Company). used ‘the: Samé .methods. but already: diluted with the water of ~~” democracy, with playing. up-to the people and attempts. “to, convince them that a new era would arise, a new’ ..: ..and. better life, and that now the Party was always. “going to:concern itself with the welfare of the © ‘people. | In fact, it was a. struggle for. power’ and the use of ail means in this ‘struggle, even micro- % -phones. (they listened to the conversations of” oe . Beriya: and his friends; later they listened to the | ~~". eenwersations of Molotov, Malenkov,.Kaganovich,. and ~ others)..’Khrushchev's-endless blabbing about’ : - 0004283 re oe “Ts. No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
1400000 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in the production of butter and milk, when in the stores they were available only infrequently. The endless promises of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is taking place. All this “Similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking place in the country, but already the entire ideology of the Party, its external and internal course. The events in Novocherkassk where 20,000 to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this — popular indignation was suppressed by troops with Many casualties. This also made a deep impression on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood well the real relation of the workers both to the leadership and to the. Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat, what they have and what they can buy with their wages. I heard a great deal from my father about the domestic pdlicies of Khrushchev in regard to the development and the course of construction in industry, about his complete illiteracy in engineering technology and industrial economics, about incorrect decisions in regard to many industries, and this was not only the opinion of -my father, but also of other important leaders in various fields of industry. But no one dared to open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain. decision would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff from Khrushchev that he was profoundly shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought him to his illness and death in August 1956. . The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the 3 GO0L2e4 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy _10_
“Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) - entire “people who | ‘could no longer endure’ a: regime og . imposed on them by: force.- Here it: is necessary: to. emphasize that the life.-of-the people in these. wo -eountries was ‘much better than that of the: people coin the USSR. (1: saw-for. myself: ‘how. people live in. - ' Czechoslovakia,» in Germany, and beyond any doubt =, -.-they live’ ‘better than the entire people « of, these a Soviet. Union) + ies Lo : wo. a - ; a ‘The ‘split. ‘of: ‘the. “international. Communist move~ .ment became for mé.a clear fact:and confirmed: my’ opinion that the. theory” of Communism is a. ‘theory - built. on sand and that it is practiced. according to: ithe needs- of: the leadership.of the Party at..as given. . stage ‘of... “Life and: that :.in reality full material. -- welfare ‘would never be enjoyed by. the Beopte . but. only by the leadership. and the Party. and the... ee! “government. : RS a Working. ‘in ‘the “KGB tT came ‘to: “anderstand- much. ‘and “became conscious’ of: the contradiction: between: the . i van vinternal’, and external course of the USSR. : Such... ae age ~ poco". questions~ as disarmament, the ‘ban. of: atomic weapons, wenmer OS othe: position . of: the USSR. in. the. United: Nations-~-all’” oi / oithese are used . ‘only in the interest of. propaganda. : “cand as a»screen for carrying ‘out of: “the policies. “needed by.the communist. party.” “CL was. myself. ‘)present™ atthe negotiations in Geneva: and . saw. the. : “of: the Soviet. delegation, Deu sets © My” trips. ‘abroad ‘opened my» eyes. wide” -to:-the true ‘reality. ‘With my.-own eyes, I saw how” people live,’ ‘how much: they earn, how. ‘they can dress. and .live-on. their. wages, and I. paid: ‘Special. attention. to ‘the - Ce life of. ordinary people and not..to: that of scientists, — “engineers, ‘ete. And. all- ‘the propaganda. about: ‘the © - -oTenormous armies of unemployed in the. countries‘of.. ‘the West, about the ‘heavy exploitation’ » and che ‘unbelievably. difficult life’ was ‘immediately’. dispelled. .And what I met in. my own, work, how. S which. Soviet citizens get sent where abroad--this finally ‘debunked this propaganda... Many - of my KGB.  acquaintances-- ‘think back. ‘with great. pleasure about ; life abroad. | = o001285 | Ts No. 197124 Top Secret oo | “ - “Copy -
14-00000 1 | os _ Tep Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) I entered the Komsomol completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomol member like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in- 1956 after the death of Stalin and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered pee the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry a into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism q and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the Deputy Chief and then Chief of a section, and then Deputy Chief of a department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedicated to the Party and its course. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the Second Chief Directorate needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to _three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk Second Chief . Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me = — go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaires were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formal- ities had been accomplished. But at the very last . moment the Central Personnel Office of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was necessary because of the health of my daughter 15 6004286 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top . Secret 7 (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) '.(gince 1963 ‘the fliness has. become better) and also. it would: have been advantageous. from the financial. _. point. of view. “From this © time on ‘LT understood that...  Pergonne} would, not Tet me BO. abroad with my family. “Knowing many officers ‘in “the ‘First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate,” I began. to under- stand that being: sent. abroad is. entirely determined, mot by knowledge, experience: in. work and success, =. .. but only by. the absolute ' ‘ccleanliness' of the: : vo person" s autobiography and ‘complete assurance as. toe ‘ his limitless. dedication to the Party and the - os "government, . But - not only being: ‘sent ‘abroad but. the ., assignment _ of, personnel in the First ‘and Second 7 -! Chief Directorates and the entire. KGB depends ons Po, . “the reasons indicated. by me. and. also'.on good relations — swith ‘the leadership: ‘and ‘good ‘connections with workers in. Central ‘Personnel. ; “ i o I lived about: al years ‘with. ‘my wife and: ‘our ‘Life Was not a hell... It is true that there were quarrels | _ . and basically they. ‘boiled ‘down - to the fact-that. shes “took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my.” delays ate work and also.when.I would. be delayed with » ./some of my- friends and ‘acquaintances. after work and - “would. come home. with a few drinks under my belt. Of oo -eourse, LT. loved. cand. love. my children and - only the . fact. ‘that they are takén care’ ‘of “Financially until: ; “they grow up: and: have. received an education to some | extent. consoled me in taking the decision to leave - a, the USSR. What) do I have. in’ mind when I. ‘speak of So - financial - security? | ‘After the death of my arian eras the. family received a large monetary allowance,’ plus 3° “the money that my. mother had saved and valuable © property, ete... My~ mother many times offered to divide all this in. three -parts:. for me, my brother, . -and for her;. but. tT suggested that we mot do this o..) - before her’ death. And, of course, my mother will not. leave my. éhildren. without attention, and my -ghare of the Property and the money will be given to omy children.: |. - Les : ; ss 6001287 — ae enn TS. No. 197124 Top Secret no | Copy —_—
14-00000 Tep Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me? Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my ‘departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from. To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain where and in what circumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that” is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all. and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth. face To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not. immediately, began full to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give. you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I under- stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I ll have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself ‘the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity -and that I started to work towards being sent on a a trip abroad. a sommes | ENS ne 17 0001288 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 _ al
74-0000 " CFOUNDATIONS | OF NOSENKO'S. CLAIMS)" _.0f course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort’. of ‘'baggage', that is, with materials which could.» . be. useful. and necessary for you. In this entire. °°. %~.: “period up to. January’ 1964 1 tried to collect: infor~ -. - ... Mation. which: would be of the maximum value for you.“ . .. My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the” . Seventh Department: in: July 1962 gave mé a greater -°.:) _ opportunity than before. But’ at the same time this: - - assignment almost excludéd the possibility of a trips Le abroad and it. was only with great difficulty ‘that Ivo. . was able to get away for. the ‘trip in January 1964. °° : a It was necessaty to convince my superior CHELNOKOV | :x-; Se . and..then to ask. CHELNOKOV-to convince others.:, Im ee. > this I advanced many reasons:. that I-had.not ‘spent: sos abl the money (in foreign currency); that thes. Sys . .,médicine which I bought for my daughter had proven’ a .. very successful and that-I needed to buy some.more ~ 4’, . medicine to carry. out ‘one more series ‘of treatments;.’:~ that. this trip would not “be 4 long ‘one and that since. ' I was already: the Deputy Chief of the Department. I.- 2°". -would not: be able to-travel abroad any: more and so, |.” . ‘ therefore, this trip.would probably be-my last... Of ~<: “course, all this was.said at..convenient' moments and’ -- outside of. work.. Things: were easier. with the.” » Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad): =: ‘because I. was on good terms ‘with thé KGB officer: |. “who ‘covered Switzerland, besides which when 1. came : back) from Geneva in.1962-1.had brought him a number =.’ . of presents.» -. “The publication in’ 1963 by the. foreign press’ of” - the VASSALL- case. put.me on my guard since in the. ‘: newspaper Times it said outright that. the English 6. 0 - learned about him thanks. to the Americans Who eee es - learned about VASSALL in’the spring of 1962.0 6 “Fortunately, .the leadership of the First’ Chief 6 1° Directorate, as.I. learned from my colleagues, came - _ to the: conclusion that here the Americans had been. °_ _° helped by ‘GOLITSYN.. “But at. the.same time the : . First Chief Directorate was not completely sure of' this. But the publication in the American press of _ | .. Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me'extremely. 9-9 |. | ‘This article in one spot said plainly that as far . , asiis known the. KGB ‘does not have any sources in the a ae 6001289 TSN 197124 7 Top Secret copy
feo a Tes Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply ‘interested’ the KGB. During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass from the Second Department and went, in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and.chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the ‘same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union. 26 July. 1964. Signed: Yu. NOSENKO- ~ 19 COCL 266 TS No. 197124 Tep Secret Copy __10_
Top Secret <. (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S: CLAINS): Sevist Ottiesele” Statenents abese NOSENKO. “The portrait” “of: NOSENKO which. ‘emerges. “from Soviet p's -. officials" statements ‘about: hin since his. defection coin-- ne . cedides markedly. with. NOSENKO's sélf-description.. According ' ‘to, the comments of Soviet ‘officials, principally intelli- - gence officers most . likely to be speaking authoritatively, " “defector: ‘NOSENKO: ‘Was the son of. the deceased Minister, he~ - ys served: over a. decade in the KGB, chis ‘personal shortcomings » Cs WATE overcome through- the patronage of KGB General. GRIBANOV, and ain connection with operations ‘against Americans. he cn ‘occupied . positions: of progressively greater ‘truse- and. - .vesponsibility,. ultimately. becoming. ‘Deputy Chief .of. ‘the oo largest department. in the. key Second (Counterintelligence) ©: » Chief Directorate.’ “According. ‘to. these (sources, his, defection. - wrought sevete™ damage. "for" years: to come" ‘to the KGB Poles “ because’ of his. -knowledge of KGB. operations. against. ‘American “targets, and his. ‘treachery . prompted: the expulsion | and - disgrace of. numerous senior KGB. personnel, ‘the recall. of” tiany: others from ‘abroad, _ the’ virtual. suspension of KGB - ee . operations in. the. United States; and extraordinary | plans” to. ;  B8sassinate. hime co Dae a a a Noe 197124 Jo opus Cs . ae we Top Secret - 7 oe Copy. a 7
14-00000 | Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing A Positive Intelligence information At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted that he was acquainted with Ministers of the Soviet Govern- ment, who were friends of his father, and he heard what was said in their circles. His debriefing and interroga- tions did not bear out his assertion that he was informed of the attitudes and aims of the Soviet leaders. His responses to questions about the viability of the then Soviet Government, for example, were couched in vague and general terms and did not reflect any specific knowledge. From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his entire adult life either as a student or as a state security official, and he stressed that since the early 1950's he had had few interests and "no real contacts" outside of the KGB itself. Questioned on a wide range of topics, including Various aspects of nuclear weaponry, missiles, electronics, communications,. unconventional weapons, military industry, military units and equipment, and research and development, NOSENKO repeatedly said that he had no knowledge of such matters and that his responses reflected only personal opinions. Because of his two assignments to Geneva with the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground testing, Soviet . efforts in the fields of chemical and biological warfare, Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views of the corresponding attitudes and intentions of the United States. Becausé his assignments to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation were for cover purposes only, NOSENKO disclaimed any special knowledge. He explained that he took no part in the substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any connection in the USSR with officials or organizations ‘concerned with arms control or disarmament policies. NOSENKO's failure to provide any useful positive intelligence information was not unique, although previous KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO's claimed access, either on the basis of his family ties or on the basis of his KGB counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union. KGB 21 CUCL 292 | TS No. 197124 Top Secret _ Copy 10 _
Top Sécret | (HOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) officers: who defected earlier. to Western services. ‘provided. no. significant military, economic. or scientific. information. Son: the USSR,. and the political information: provided by ao. ', few. (usually. relating to the personalities and relationships in ‘the ruling: group. of the. Communist Party). was of marginal. - value. wor a fot ~ Gauicerintenisence Information an a ee . ns a me -NOSENKO! s ‘knowledge: of: KGB foreign intelligence. operations Tas: limited; -forshis whole career had been spent in the. -. Second. Chieg - “(Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned.” with: KGB .- operations within the ‘Soviet Union... His. information, cen Second: Chief. Directorate operations, however, was. apparently a e¢ounterintelligence windfall, because . most of” his KGB assignments -involved . operations against American. sc. targets, either visitors: to. the Soviet Union: or members. of the Embassy staff. ‘in: Moscow. - ‘From. this circumstance he me) “represents. himself. ‘as’ an authoritative source on KGB success: ce, and | failure in, recruiting. Americans . ‘in cthe USSR during the ee es: years 1953- “E963 : . : . . ‘NOSENKO. has described” scores of KGB operations ‘mounted, : “against. American: ,Embassy’. -personnel ‘during that ten year °° period... Because of ' lasting - relationships he established with KGB colleagues, NOSENKO kept abreast of KGB ‘operations . against: the. Embassy, even while serving. elsewhere than. in . the Embassy ° Section, .. .NOSENKO has- Stated that ‘he would. : know. ifthe’ facts: were: otherwise, ‘and he. has asserted — unequivocally. that’ no American: ‘stationed permanently « at: the Embassy~ ‘Was: recruited between. ‘the. ‘early .1950's ‘and’ his” defection: ‘tn ‘1964, - NOSENKO. named six members of the Embassy. “staff who! rejected’ KGB recruitment overtures, ‘and ‘all have: confirmed | his: assertions. - He ‘provided -information~ om the. “vulnerability: ‘of a: significant mumber of Embassy personnel; seo dn particular, two. ‘Foreign Service Officers were consequently. ' withdrawn from Moscow... Physical search has confirmed. the: - > ‘information’. he provided. vegarding: the. KGB audio. surveillance’ _ installations: in. the Embassy. a Among’ Americans other than Embassy. personnel whom ‘NOSENKO. described .as KGB’ ‘targets, he provided information. leading | = to the identification‘ of 51 KGB. agents, including seven: Ne “correspondents in Moscow, the Moscow. representative of the ye 74 fAmerican Express _Company}, the former code clerk "ANDREY" eT aye” ‘SMITH, see. pe p. 33), and Sgt. Robert. Lee JOHNSON, “001283 | . ; eens _ TS No. 197124 ne , | Top Secret coe : a - Copy | oe
74-00009 aarares: sgn Be Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Twenty-five of this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after NOSENKO's information was received. In fifteen other instances NOSENKO's information has been corroborated in ‘part by the individuals! admissions of contact with (if not recruitment by) the KGB, or by other sources' reports of their recruitment. Besides these 51, NOSENKO provided leads to four other American KGB agents, including an officer in an American military intelligence organization, none of whom has: yet been identified. Lastly, NOSENKO identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to be American Intelligence agents. From NOSENKO's information 68 non-American KGB agents have been identified. Although investigations are still incomplete, in 39 of these cases the individual's KGB recruitment has been reported by other sources, or the individuals were suspect for,other reasons. Among these i oO 68 individuals were a and_a-fanadian Amhacsador to Moscow, an Austrian and an a fl Director and a.Deputy Secretary of the Foreignil ee «| . Ministry, and a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, Ei. - « “.--gee below). -In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other, KGB foreign agents, yet to be identified. NOS infor- mation about the KGB electronic attack on the Embassy|| in Moscow was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical search. With respect to the KGB itself, NOSENKO named (if not completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens who are or have been affiliated with Soviet intelligence , and security organizations. These included over seven hundred active KGB staff officers, of whom 435 were serving in the Second Chiéf Diréctorate. Of the 165 KGB officers he named as belonging to the First Chief (Foreign Intelli- gence) Directorate, over one hundred had been previously reported to be KGB personnel, as reflected in CIA files. NOSENKO's information permitted updating CIA holdings on previously received reports of the 1959 KGB reorganization, particularly as it affected the Second Chief Directorate, : He described further refinement of responsibilities, the Second Chief Directorate's absorption of previously inde- | , pendent directorates, the creation of new units from elements 23 GOGL294 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy __10_ y/8&
Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS. OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) formerly belonging. to: other. numbered directorates, ‘and. a, a _ individual: officers. prominent. in each. --NOSENKO was not. ABE gS ; productive with respect. to KGB operational methods and. “ i Headquarters: procedures, although he. ‘furnished. numerous. examples, particularly regarding operations mounted against” Embassy: personnel, which Provided - useful insight on these: sFopdes. Se : : “Significant - KGB. Operations Not ‘Directly | Related to SS NOSENKO! s ‘Claimed Service "aq ‘of the KGB: ‘operations which. NOSENKO has. described? are favorable. evidence of his bona fides, but they. break. - down into. two qualitatively ‘different groups. — Operations: which’ NOSENKO related to specific KGB. positions he held at. particular: times are described ‘in the following section in. °°: -.-@onnection with an. examination of his KGB career.. The 206), | remaining: operations are those which NOSENKO said he learned Of. informally, or ‘by accident, or-even’-despite (not because of): the KGB position: che.-held -at. the time. Since these are: ‘not material: to. his. ‘claimed: positions at various ‘times in the° ‘KGB, ‘they. are ‘summarized. an.Annex B. (NOSENKO' s. leads.- to most non- -American KGB. agents. -belong. in this latter. group, . but: for. -Feasons.. of. brevity. they are omitted from this. paper.) kee nt Anon. ‘the: ‘items’ of information: which. NOSENKO. ‘providec “but ‘which do not relate to. specific KGB positions he held... -. at; particular times, there.are several. ‘which merit: special. - note here. | These, _ which are among. the most significant of. 5 “his revelations ,°: are ‘the’ leads to Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,. “ "the KGB agent - in: ‘the: British Admiralty" (William VASSALL) 5. "SASHA". (the KGB. agent. in American Military Intelligence), ~ WANDREY" (Embassy military, code clerk Dayle W. SMITH), 9-0 + . Edward SMITH (CIA officer), and the:.KGB electronic attack | Embassy in Moscow. the KGB Agent . in: Paris" (Sate Robert. Lee JOHNSON) the - first. item “oF information ‘given “by ‘NOSENKO | "upon: meeting CIA. in Geneva in 1964 was a lead toa KGB ._ oe agent.who was:an’ American. serviceman stationed at a sensitive - | . U.S. military: installation.in the Paris.area, The agent had | been the source: of documentary. intelligence which had been ee SN, 197124 Top Secret == Copy oe 4
14-00000 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) . shown to Premier Khrushchev personally. Although still active, the agent had lost access to classified documents. some months earlier, in 1963. NOSENKO characterized the lead as the most important single counterintelligence item . that he acquired during the year and a half he was a CIA collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. NOSENKO's ‘Information Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO first learned of a KGB agent's successful penetra- tion of a classified documents vault at an “important American military installation" in the Paris area. Because the documents included information on strategic targets in France as well as in the Soviet Union, he assumed that it was a "strategic planning installation" The installation had its own airfield and that there were "procedures for bringing Top Secret documents in and for taking them out". There had been six successful entries of. the vault, four in 1962 and two in 1963. On each occasion Special Section technicians travelled TDY to Paris - under diplomatic courier ‘cover to (assist the local KGB case officer in the technical details of the operation. Their function was to advise the case officer concerning the entry’ to the vault and later surreptitiously to unwrap and re~seal the documents. The case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instruc-_ ‘tions to his agent, and the technicians probably never met “the, American. Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation, officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief . Directorate were used. . The. Special Section was comprised ‘of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational- Technical Directorate, and usually it handled surreptitious entries to Western embassies in Moscow. Among these officers were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, $.D. ILYIN, V.V. SINITSYN, V.Z. KARETNIKOV, M.I. PREOBRAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV. | IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took part in this operation, and FOFANOV was later involved. ‘The specialists were not the ones that carried out the operation. It was carried out by the case officers of the Paris Legal Residency. The specialists just opened and then GUGL2S 25 ; TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10 _
(FOUNDATIONS OF -NOSENKO'S cant 7 resealed the packages... LEBEDEV said. that they” also. ‘placed: some radioactive: substance, with the help of the American agent, in, the. lock of the vault. doors; when the ‘substance | was: “. removed, they” could pick the lock. ‘They, did’ the.:same thing ''. fused some. radioactive substance] to the safein the vault.” | Before everything: was. finally ready, ‘the Special Section. . technicians. had to visit. Paris. ‘several ‘times... The’ first. time was the beginning of 1962. The Paris: Residency couldn! to have. launched: the. operation. ‘before: 1962, bécause - ‘they. oc... . “couldn't do it without ‘the’ help. of. Special. Section techni--~ oe g ¢ians and- ‘the latter: did not travel to Paris: in _ 2960 or 1961. “Entry into “the: ‘vault area was’ first. achieved. after. the agent, used. some radioactive. substance: to determine ‘the combination. /The agent: also photographed. ‘the Lock: for ‘KGB. study. Subsequent. entries were always made between two and. five o'clock in the. -morning.’:’, The. agent removed documents .. from tthe vault and. delivered. ‘them to. his ‘KGB: case “officer, _ who in turn passed them. .to Special’ Section technicians.” : The envelopes were: then. opened,’ ‘photographs. ‘were made.,’. ‘the: documents were: repackaged,. and. the envelopes were given. --back to thé case: ‘officer for: return to the-vault. - ‘There= after, the. Paris.Legal. ‘Residency . pouched: the films to: Moscow, and» the’ technicians. themsélves left Paris - until the ‘next: “the KGB officers: were able -to- ‘Complete the: ‘whole operation - auring: the. agent's night duty. .- ‘During ‘this time, they. had: - to pick up’ the ‘materials, drive some place ("maybe the . ~ : . Soviet. Embassy" ) open the: documents, - ‘photograph’ them, close then. again. just. as. they..were, and return them: to the agent. » The KGB cotld not: ‘specify which: documents ‘the. agent. was to “bring ‘outs. “the -‘fact- ‘that all’ the ‘documents had to be. opened. _ shows. , that’ the ere ‘sealed. when : they’. were: received: from fhe agents . De : Ss be ; “Since ‘he. heard’ that almost’: all of: the material obtained was of. interest. to. the: Ministry of ‘Défense, NOSENKO concluded * “that it came fron a. military... installation.: ~The agent couldn't bring’ out a great. deal ‘of material, only what he ‘could hide on his person. - ‘From what. the KGB technicians’ ‘said, NOSENKO thought . the agent. was not alone on “duty. © The| technicians. - said that “the agent explained [to. co-workers] that he is going out for coffee ‘or a sandwich", and that “he is. gone - for. only 5° or. 10 minutes", oo fo cay 7 0001297 SE fee : ce ag NB 197124 Top Secret Copy.
14-00000 ken oe Tep Secret | oe (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) The last time the vault was entered was in the fall of 1963. At about that time the agent, a military man, received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion, he had obtained an extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still: active in January 1964 and was still assigned to the same military post, he had lost access to the classified documents. The information obtained from the agent's vault ‘was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the operation. Before ‘leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the United States in May. When NOSENKO visited the Soviet Embassy in- Paris on 19 January 1964 while -en route to Geneva, FOFANOV was: on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO. ‘chatted with him. FOFANOV said he “was not doing good” and he "would probably be sitting there until May” but -he had hopes “that something might happen". The ‘American: agent: was: getting paid by the KGB and he™ was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of money. NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris Or. ‘if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what. plans the KGB had for hin after he deft Paris. “NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces" at -. separate times from various members of the Second Chief _.. Directorate Special Section who participated in it, ‘principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV in Moscow, and FOFANOV. later in Paris. [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has -also alleged he learned of the case fron IONOV, the Chief. of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV from their visit to his office to discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. GUGL2¢8 27 | ‘Ts. No. 197124 Top Secret : Copy a
‘(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) » NOSENKO's ¢ lead was identified as Army Sérgeant * “Robert Lee JOHNSON; who ‘served in:the period ~ © “2 -1962- -1963 at a ‘military courtier station at Orly” _) Field,’ “Paris. JOHNSON confesséd to KGB “> yeeruitmént of himself.and. his wife, his - ° yecruitnient of Jamés Allen MINTKENBAUGH, and - the latter's. ‘subsequent collaboration with the “KGB. Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH. have vo corroborated JOHNSON’ s statements. — ‘"". NOSENKO ‘is apparently unaware of JOHNSON's: earlier (since 1952). involvement with the KGB co in. Berlin, the United States, and in Orleans, .. France. With respect to the 1962-1963. - surreptitious entires of the courier station... ~svault, however,” JOHNSON ''s admissions coinesde ‘with thé information: provided by. NOSENKO, with. . no Significant. differences. — a, Bsasuat’ (KoB. ) ervptonva, identity. unknown) | . “When NOSENKO™ ‘announced’ “in ‘Gétieva: in 1964 ‘thac he- was. ‘going. to. defect: vhe- ‘was.told that. ‘as aé consequence “additional persons in CLA would te informed of his case. - and he was asked .to° search his recolléction for any i, evidence of: a KGB. penetration of CIA.. NOSENKO. knew of) none in ‘CLA, but. he xecalled: a KGB agent, an American. known. as "SASHA", who was \a. member. of-a U. Se military ~ - intelligence: organization, .- ae De as _NOSENKO' —s “‘Informaéion . “ NOSENKO: Learned: of "SASHA". ‘from M. ‘A. SHALYAPIN; the KGB - officer who, while assigned to:the First Chief Directorate . and working’ in Berlin, recruited the’ agent in 1955- -19576 “"“MSASHA" who had been. recruited by financial inducements, . | — had officer. ‘status 3. he. wore civilian clothes ‘to his meetings. with his KGB handler’and he could have been either'a ~~ . ‘civilian or military’ intelligence officer. "SASHA" returned: to the United States “in the 1960's" or “in 1962". "SASHA" .wWas stationed in the United States at the time of the Cuban. missile crisis but chad. been unable. to provide the KGB any” eo ee _ . 28° . 7 coe GUC1289 TS No. 197124 _ Top Secret. Copy —_
Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) relevant intelligence of any significance. NOSENKO thought that "SASHA" served as a department chief in intelligence when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 - early 1963. NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or October 1962 [after NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and initial contact with CIA] through his friend, Yu. I. GUK.- GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had served in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba. In - /1962 he had: been assigned to the Latin American Department of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer. He retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, . SHALYAPIN obtained: a position with Inturist. Presumably out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk, and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treat-~- mént by the First Chief Directorate which, without hin, ‘would not have had the agent "SASHA" in Germany “at that . time". [1963]. NOSENKO heard such details as he knew: of © : "SASHA" in.the course of several. such talks with SHALYAPIN. | _.. Under-intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO- retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case from SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had discussed the case with SHALYAPIN “at some time". Pressed to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited several officers~~some First Chief Directorate, some Second-who could have told him about it.because they were likely to know of it though none of. them was actually involved in the operation. Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself on this point, saying he did not remember from whom he first learned of "SASHA". sO Comment: "SASHA" has not been identified. GUC1 360 29 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy _ 10
-CROUNDATIONS: OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) a Asked in the. June - 1962: meetings with. CIA if he’ icwas: familiar with ‘the -case of George BLAKE, the former KGB . oo agent. in MI-6, -NOSENKO ‘replied.that he kaew of ‘another, more: - important, KGB, agent. who. was. employed in, the British woe ‘NOSENKO' s. “Information othe: KOB: nas how: (in 1962)" “an “agent. in a “high government position in London ‘who. provides most ° valuable. information, .. “some :from NATO. intelligence. services' conferences. The "agent was recruited in. Moscow: in 1956 or’ 1957. on the basis Lof-a homosexual: compromise. In Moscow he was “a First Secretary" “SOK, "chief. of protocol" of the British. Embassy. ° | After= ‘leaving: Moscow’ he became an “assistant: to the: Minister, 7 OK. “something Like. that". ain ‘the: Admiralty. ("He may be an.) ‘assistant, ,chief of the secretariat, ‘but he's: close to the 0°: Minister. .A11- papers for. the. Minister. go.through him. He's’ not: ‘am -intelligence © officer. ‘He is meeting with the KGB :} “Several. “KER. officers™ ‘received the Order of Lenin. for. including tthe ‘London Rezident “" NOSENKO. ‘learned “of. ‘the: agent' ‘s existence, : but, not. ef his” identity, from his..friend-.and colleague in.the Second “Chief. Directorate,’ VV. A. CHURANOV,,. who had made the recruit- ment: whit ‘chief. of. a section: in the) British. Department. et Comment: GOLITSYN had eatlier provided a lead. ‘to, a’ KGB oo’ "ls agent who:was the source. of Admiralty ‘documents -.~ ‘which GOLITSYN had reviewed in KGB Headquarters... _On--the basis of that lead, British security -authorities on 11 June.1962 passed to CIA a. ~ List. of. twenty suspects, including. VASSALL. “On 17° June CIA gave the British authorities a preliminary report ‘on NOSENKO's.information,;, onthe basis of which the twenty-man list was . reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect. Full a BO cad a a 18 ‘No. 197124 |
14-00000 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) Comment: (Continued) details of NOSENKO! s information were passed to British authorities on 20 August, and on 12 © - September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly confessed. VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two KGB officers, one of whom he identified as CHURANOV. He continued to collaborate with the KGB after returning to London, first in - his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, as clerical officer assistant to. the Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally, - as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval staff. In London he was- met by KGB officer “KOROVIN" who has been identified as London -Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with . the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962. At - the time of his arrest in September he had, , . - preparation for his next meeting on 30 October, < .£ifteen rolls. of: film containing 140 photo-. | Btaphs- of classified Admiralty documents. KGB. Audio Attack on the Jzmbassy -In 1962 and 1964 ‘NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones ‘concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow. Aside from the American Embassy (see p. 25), he_furnished the “greatest. detail on the microphones. in | the) JEmbassy. tw NOSENKO' s Information : The KGB was able to enter “surreptitiously every embassy in Moscow, with the exception of the American and British Embassies. It had been particularly successful with respect to th Embassy. KGB microphones monitored the mbassador as he dictated his reports or held discussions with diplomatic colleagues, including American Ambassador Thompsdii. The microphones were operative during the period rough 1961, and the KGB monitored then- Ambassador ictation of cables, dispatches and Ob : | * ~ Gat 3c2 7 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy _10_ SIG
Leen ee “American: Embassy e Top Secret _ “(FOUNDATIONS’ OF NOSENKO'S. CLAIMS) "conversations as weil. as passages. of a book he was. writing oven ‘the: Soviet. Union. ; a a “NOSENKO. learned. of the KGB “microphones either from - "06 3. BUBNOY, Deputy, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's _» Third (Austria and Germany). Department, or Mikhail SKORIK, --Chief' of. that. Third Department's. First Section. In’ 1960- .1961>-Tatyana -GRISHNYAT. brought from the Operational. '.. Technical Directorate. to’ NOSENKO | in the American Embassy > Section daily monitoring: reports. “from. microphones in the. Américan’ Embassy. On such occasions she had a much larger volume of material addressed ‘to: the Third Department, from ' which NOSENKO concluded that the KGB was even ‘more successful in monitoring. the [Embassy than it was the. | Comment: “NOSENRO" Ss. “4aformat ion’ was, ‘substantially correct. Independent of that. information, however, ; authorities. -learned.in 1963 that their. ) obeehnical security officer-in Moscow had been. !  yeeruited.by’ the KGB. - They. surmised. that the. “> yeeruditment may. have: taken’ place as early as .. 1956.) In. August. 1964 the leader of a téchnical. . search ‘team: was seriously disabled by mustard’ "gas: poisoning,. “presumably at the hands of the | KGB, | In 1965,. finally, ‘another_search team. . completed a. "tear down" of. the “the Ambassador...” In- addition, evidence © ‘was ~ “TOOM. ee _ American - Section until 1960. Top Secret’ = Copy . Embassy;- inthe | course “of which two. separate | _. audio ‘systems with.. 24. microphones were found, ",as well as-27— microphones’ in the residence of. found indicating. ‘that the Embassy had been the | “target. of a sophisticated: electronic attack . against: its” cipher machines. and its ‘acoustic. NOSENKO! 's “assertion. that the KGB microphones — “were: ‘operative in. 1959 and -his sourcing of. his” information to the periodic visits of Tatyana’ “GRISHNYAT to. the ‘American. Section, are contra- .dictory..” NOSENKO claims hé was: not in. the. TS No. 197124 “3 3/8 c 1
14-00000 a Ea Cob boo a Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH) When contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell information about two KGB operations, one of which he knew only under the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY", a KGB agent recruited in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in Washington “near ciphers" NOSENKO's Information-1962 "ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was spotted for the KGB by “QUEBEC” (Roy RHODES). [RHODES served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES. was still in Moscow. when “ANDREY" was recruited by the Second Chief Directorate, although RHODES was not aware of "ANDREY' s" recruitment. The KGB approach to "ANDREY" was based on “women and money" _ “ANDREY" worked satisfactorily ‘in Moscow ‘for the KGB, providing "materials" and information on ciphers. He promised that he would cooperate with the-KGB in future assignments abroad, but: would not work. with them in the United States as he did not want to “sit in the electric chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow. The KGB wanted to pay him more but’ he refused; he said he could not plausibly explain the possession of -too much money. When the KGB offéred him diamonds and other gems for . later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession could arouse the attention of the American. police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United ‘States. The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other -country,. but he did not. Finally, in 1955, the KGB sent V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section ‘of the Second Chief Directorate, and a participant in "ANDREY's" recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to find the agent. KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV", under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. CUCL 304 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —10 33
| _ Top Secret a Eee anton OF NOsENRDs CLAIMS) a * KOVSHUK, with ‘the: help of the KGB Legal Residency in “Washington, learned. “where the agent was living, identified his. automobile,. and contacted him at the end. of 1955 or the. beginning of 1956. :KOVSHUK had looked’ for him.a. long time. — He! found | ‘where. "ANDREY" parked his car, but. “ANDREY". ‘was difficult to get close. to him. At first "ANDREY" was" frightened and refused to. work, ‘but when at the third. contact he was offered. $1, 000; “the agent. -accepted the money 7 7m | { due to his’ gambling, he was again. in financial etraits. From that _point on he worked well with | ‘.the He again. ‘provided. good: information, . information “< considered. important. by the KGB... When KOVSHUK found him,” " ANDREY" was working ‘in. the Pentagon and he was still working: there. in 1962. . Coe ine reference - to. “his modus. operandi. for. eetings with- VANDREY", KOVSHUK, knew. he .was..under. surveillance by the EBDO? His. meetings: ‘always took place in. cars. - KOVSHUK ; would . lose his surveillance the-.day before : the meeting: and ‘travel: ‘outside - of Washington. where he. “would wait by. the. highway; "ANDREY": would drive by. and - stop, KOVSHUK: would sit: with: him ‘inthe: car,” ‘receive: “ANDREY* ‘g! * information, oe) nd: give: him. the. money. i Then. KOVSHUK: ‘would: “pet. out, cand 6 ‘the: American would drive on. Cee otal : ce 2 oO “compromiséd: ‘Rudolé. Ivanovich ABEL ~ {Reino HAYHANEN.,. who- defected® in. ‘Paris. in May’ 1957). ‘also™ provided the’ information leading« ‘tothe jarrest’ of Roy... ‘RHODES, 3 When: RHODES ‘was under: investigation, “ANDREY" Was called ‘as a’ “witness” because’: -he-had worked with: RHODES © in. Moscow. _» "ANDREY""- was’ the’ only ‘such witness called, and he: was called: ‘upon several times: to tell: how RHODES had“behaved vin. Moscow. "ANDREY" could. be: aidentified-as.0. |. the. ‘only person who testified at ‘the. trial. During. enka investigation of RHODES, _"ANDREY"™ “stopped: ‘meeting: ‘KGB officers,. because: he was: afraid. -he-.too.-would be exposed - and» arrested. "ANDREY" may have’ feared that RHODES was. involved -, ini his’. own recruitment,’or he-.may merely. have been: panicky 1; because he knew he. could be accused of. the same thing. as 20004305 36 re a ee TS -No. 197124: Top Secret Copy
14-00000 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the KGB , “having little other choice". KOVSHUK turned “ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know who succeéded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV,. who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961. NOSENKO. did not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted that there | must have been one since. vANDREY™ was still working with .the KGB in 1962. NOSENKO's Information-1964 - . While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different discussions of the case asserted that. "ANDREY" was recruited — in "1948-1949", Nin 1952 or earlier", or “in 1953". "ANDREY" had been ‘recruited by KOVSHUK and N.M. BORODIN. “After returning to the United States, “ANDREY" worked at) — | the Pentagon, “in codes", but by the. time KOVSHUK. recontacted him in: the United States ‘he was néaring the end of his_ enlistment, and he was working. in an Army recruiting office. ‘He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK. rt ‘was not: RHODES* trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation. “ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death.  SANDREY™" did not testify | at the RHODES trial. In Moscow, "ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code machines in the Embassy-worked and may have given the KGB . parts of code machines such as "dises" [sic, meaning rotors]. Aleksandr SELEZNEV, :a deputy department chief in. the - Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in “the “ANDREY" case: ‘NOSENKO first saw him in 1953 during the period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow. SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY". The reason for : SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not E| technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with alll | | 45 | G0C13¢6 tl oe TS No. 197124 — i? | . Top Secret . Copy 10
Top Secret ,rounpAtiong’ oF osnmio's, Cusine) ° _-questions to be asked of " ANDREY". Since SELEZNEV ‘came to ' these) meetings™ ain civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later Saw him in uniform in his visits to the. American Department, ? NOSENKO- speculated: that’ SELEZNEV may “have attended some of os the meetings with "ANDREY". .Although NOSENKO did not know how the KGB exploited hin, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY' s" s-great. importance to the KGB during the. time he worked for. oe them in. Moscow... "Thanks’to his help they were able to read’ your. Staté Department codés...To: date we have never been , able to read your: military codes.:."  "ANDREY" brought no military code material to the KGB, only State Department.- = material... Mainly, he described. the operation of code machines — -and what. daily or other: “periodic. settings ‘were made, = “ANDREY" supplied valuable matéréal from the time that. “othe first’ récontact was madé in the United’ States until he / ‘ceased meeting the KGB because of: the RHODES trial. Again, ; .Safver the trial,-he. was able to. furnish’ good material. This — .Was true both. while KOVSHUK was* handling him and while , “BAGRICHEV. was..the. ‘case. officer... Between June 1962. and _ danuary: 1964, while, -NOSENKO was-in Moscow, he heard, that "something. is. (going | wrong. with this operation®™ “Gowment:. "ANDREY". ‘was. ‘identified: ‘as: “former. U.S. Army Hioue i o° - Sergeant. Dayle W.: SMITH, who served as a-code +o "machine mechanic while, ‘assignéd to the office - “-. of ‘the..U.S. Military - Attache - -in. the Embassy in “" Moscow from April 1952-to April 1954. . / NOSENKO''s. information-has been confirmed as » substantially. correct by admissions of. Roy. . - RHODES and Dayle We ‘SMITH. ‘(("ANDREY") ¢ RHODES. “-anformed. the FBI ins a 1963. interview that. ) ,among. other American. enlisted personnel. of the - Embassy in. Moscow,- he. reported on SMITH ‘to. ~ “the KGB... After denying involvement with the .. . KGB in interviews ‘with the FBI in 1964 and (1965, SMITH admitted. that:he had ‘been approached - by the. KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had “been offered a large sum of cash and géms in exchange: for classified information concerning. Embassy cipher systems, and that he had provided 3606 TS No. 197124 Top Secret _ Copy ——_—. .
14-00000 Top Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) Comment: (Continued) the KGB with a mock code machine rotor. He further acknowledged that he had been recon- tacted by the KGB in the United States in 1957, where he met KGB officers regularly until September 1962. He identified by photo- graph all of the KGB officers described by NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation. NOSENKO “cannot be certain" that he did not know about "ANDREY" while he served in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed to describe specifically the source of his information, he invariably indicated that he learned of the American agent later, informally from KGB colleagues. - m Edward Ellis SMITH -NOSENKO's Information In. the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations against the American Embassy in Moscow, NOSENKO was askéd whether He knew “about SMITH". ‘He answered: "SMITH?.. The red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a.colonel and headed counterintelligence." NOSENKO went on to describe _the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was "RYZHIY", or "REDHEAD"). SMITH had been sleeping with his Russian housemaid, who was an agent planted on him by the KGB. When the KGB was unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs, she was instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed. These were then combined.with photographs of SMITH to produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with the KGB. SMITH came. The KGB was represented at. the meeting. by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer. At this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked for classified information. SMITH agreed to come to further meetings. 37 | C001 368 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy _10
7490000.” a Yop Secret (FOUNDATION OF NOSENKO’S CLAIMS) When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what had happened. She reported that SMITH was in a state of desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance. To increase the pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening letters on each of the succeeding three days. Finally, on the third day, instead of meeting the KGB, SMITH went to Ambassador BOHLEN and reported the blackmail attempt. SMITH was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he was "still in intelligence work". In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played any personal role in the case. He explained that as a junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time, working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in d so important an operation. He said that he had heard about: the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer. (On a later occasion NOSENKO said that his only personal role was being assigned to a phone-watch to receive surveillance reports connected with the: initial KGB approach to SMITH.) ’ GOLITSYN" Ss Information In February 1962 GOLITSYN. reported that in 1957 he had read a two-volume KGB study. which gave examples of successful operations against the Embassy in. Moscow. One case concerned an American, probably single, who was either the Security Officer or the counterintelligence representative in: the Embassy. He had a. dog, and lived in an apartment in the city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid _or cleaning woman was his mistress. The KGB concluded that the American would not. succumb: to ordinary blackmail and consequently the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters. GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied only misinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and misinformation. GOLITSYN said the case study he read was based on a true incident 38 -60043¢ 1369 TS No. 197124 Top Secret | Copy
14-00000 Tep Secret (FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS) which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruit- ment, as was alleged in the study. ‘ Comment: Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy Security Officer (and CIA employee) from July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received four letters from the KGB. The first, received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating photographs of himself and his Russian maid and requested him to come to a personal meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy. When he did not do so, SMITH subsequently had received three threatening letters. In m reporting the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH admitted having been intimate with his Russian maid. SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year later. When interviewed in March 1962 on the _basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH admitted that he had maintained his affair with the Russian maid during most of the time of his Moscow assignment, 20 July 1954 to 8 June 1956, and confirmed that to help her he had in fact passed unclassified information through her to the KGB for many months. NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation. to the period when NOSENKO was in the American Embassy Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's state- ment that he reported the blackmail attempt to the Ambassador in June 1956 is confirmed. If NOSENKO was, as he says, transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have played any role in the KGB approach to SMITH. If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department as he claims. If he played a role in ‘the SMITH case as well as_ in the Seventh Department recruitment of | BURGI) (see p- 115), it remains (% possible that he was neither an officer in the Embassy Section nor Seventh Department and was acting in some other KGB capacity. , 39 | 6001310 oe TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy __ 10 . eR
14-00000 Top Secret CHAPTER II EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES What NOSENKO has said about himself, the information about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently corroborative statements which Soviet officials have made since his defection represent prima facie evidence that NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer. To permit a conclusive judgment that he is a bona fide defector, the information NOSENKO provides about his life and related re persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of important events must be consistent. Allowing for personal vagaries such as lapses of memory and so forth, as weil as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that which is known from independent and reliable sources to the United States Government about Soviet realities and about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes. Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his account of how he functioned in these positions must be substantiated by verisimilar detail. The following portions of this paper, organized in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims. Notes for the Reader In order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following: The examination tests the validity of the presumptive evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence, consistency, and compatibility with fact and plausibility. GUC1341 ; 7 TS. No. 197124 | Top Secret Copy 10
Foep Secret (EXAMINATLON OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES) Notes for the Reader (Continued) NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own assertions and in comparison with collateral information. It is not the function of’ the examination to speculate about possibly. credible alternative explanations for the paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO himself. If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the reader may expect that the item's relevance or significance usually will be developed in the immediately-following text. Otherwise seemingly minor points are included because of their aggregative significance: they will be a matter of comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following each major portion of the examination. Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, rétractions, omissions and the like, are reflected in the text. Where, during his interrogations, it was not possible to pose direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or insight into the interrogators' purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was Provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently .. Was not asked about a particular matter, or that "hé didn't say", or "didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness" and so. forth, the reader properly may assume that the matter was covered extensively. In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts Or retracts earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given | to his final assertion -as opposed to earlier contrary claims. : To assist the reader in following what are sometimes lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative is broken from time to time by a clearly identified editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader's attention to the relevance or Significance of NOSENKO's assertions, or to what conclusion is drawn. 42 G01 3142 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy
Top Secret | Mets for, the Reader’ (Continued) _ a “Ae ‘the, “end: of - each episode © in NOSENKO' s ‘biography -\there appears a conclusion resulting from.the examination - , of NOSENKO's claims with respect to. that period of his. life. The. ‘judgment. of whether NOSENKO is a bona fide .defector is. the: sun, of, these independently drawn conclusions CdCI 319 43 re Ts: No. 193124 Top Secret = Copy.
tep Secret CHAPTER III PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY ‘NOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and. ' his eventual eligibility for KGB service. Below are . ~ >. gummarized pertinent events in his early life, his study at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in repeated interrogations. ~ 7 Birth to 1945 - NOSENKO's Account — NOSENKO was born on.30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the Ukraine. At,the time of. his birth, his father, Ivan ‘Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute. Shortly — -after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September 1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute a and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started 7 ' the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to oo -1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his. father was director ee of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy Ne People’s Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the ae family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed’ the Sixth Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out. _NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for the next two years. In one, he said that on the outbreak of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval ~ School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Lenin~ grad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated to a : 6004345 | ts | TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 19
Yep Secret (PRE-KGB. BIOGRAPHY) Baku), where he finished the Fighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow . Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broxe out he and his mother were. evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku). After just six months in Baku, without completing the’ Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow. °. . Comment: . NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku -and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions. .? NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the ‘Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval . Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he _..yesumed his’ studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO “received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being a hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school. AG GUC1 317 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy —__
NOSENKO ‘completed ‘the tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship- . building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed.” / the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to- ae “the Moscow Institute: of International Relations. that summer... to root ' . “Birth: to. 1945¢ $n mmary and: Conclusion a - NOSENKO- is ‘virtually the sole source of: information on “his early life. — However,.this portion of his claimed . ‘biography: is consistent. with the NOSENKO family's where-~ ‘“abouts as publicized in press ‘accounts at the time of his- 0. father's death in 1956,°and with the existence of the i Sohools, he claims. to have attended. 7 “ pllowing. for. exaggerated: claims of, boyhood heroics : (fighting at; the front, - attending the Frunze Academy, and. . formal inductien in and discharge from the Navy), all of . “which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's. . .. G@laimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO > “and the substance of his claims’ about his life until- ‘A945. _ are accepted § as “trues.” 7 60013 318 re 1 No. 197124 | Top Sec ret oo Copy 10
‘Top Secret - .{PRE~KGB. BIOGRAPHY) “Attendance. at ‘the Moscow Institute. SO of International "Relations. (2945 aca. $329) . ‘In ‘all of his” accounts, NOSENKO has. ‘stated that he ‘entered 7 .; the Institute's Faculty: of International Law and English in.” i SeRtomber 1945. “He completed — his. ‘first year: -in. Spring 1946. pot ‘In ‘1947; (on. “completion. of - his ‘second year at ‘the institute, © ~-NOSENKO ‘clains he received a commission as a. junior lieutenant ~~ .¢ fin the reserves"; he does not recall. in what arm he received. a commission, © other. than, being . ‘sure that it was not -in the Navy. “ . : a “Comment: - Soviet students. ‘completing their ‘second year of ee higher. institutions are commissioned, but in 20.0005) - an- arm (Army, : Navy,» Air Force) - -of Soviet defense 2. ... - forces. At that time they receive their voyennyy » bilet (military booklet) which reflects their >. . ‘assigned, MOS and ‘category. (sostav). CIA interro os gators were unable. ‘to resolve why NOSENKO - “ ss, pleaded ignorance’ on this matter, and concluded ~. dt may relate in’some manner to his’ claims to %:. -0 eo). .. Subsequent commissioned: service in the: Navy. is ee - In 1947, “also, NOSENKO ‘married. the. daughter of. a Soviet t Army Lieutenant General, Augustina K.: TELEGINA "just after". her... >» father had -been arrested: in connection’ with Stalin's campaign: _ against. ‘Marshal Zhukev's associates. . NOSENKO recalls neither: ‘the date of that-.marriage, in what season of the year it: “occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest. ‘[The. ae “significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contra~\ no .,dietory statements about when. and how he obtained his: divorces. i: he See. below. 1 mo . . oo oor c a coos TS No, 197124 Top Secret a Copy —_
‘Fep Secret (PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY) NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute ‘course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated In 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five,years' duration but “Te failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months. Comment: See p.367for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB : upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are materiai to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute. Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953) - NOSENKO claims” that upon completion of his studies at ‘the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully. "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father! s friend, KGB General KOBULOV. 49 | 6001320 TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy 10
y othe’ ‘Significance | Of ‘NOSED 1KO! RUD service is “the. fact. “that: he claims.it launched his: intelligence career and..: :served as. the means. through which he secured appointment tothe KGB after once having been rejected. ..The two or more. -- "years he claimed to ‘ave served in. the RU represent. al - significant _ period of. his’ adult life for which he ‘Should | . have no difficulty accountings Finally, the date of his- -- aetual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is. critical . to. determining the time from: which his claims about KGB Service “can. be. judged. credible. , = “NOSENKO voluntéered extensive. comment on - -his ‘Naval: [RUS ‘service at. his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After. his ‘1964 defection, . iti was ‘the topic on which he made one of his initial: retractions and his: ‘first: admission that he: had \-s,. @arlier made -a. false claim. The. subject of his. ;Naval -RU ., service ‘was | consequently prominent in interrogations. in oe 1964,- 1965 and 1966. -However,.. throughout these interrogations, ‘challenges of his: assertions about. his RU service. prompted — adjustments. in his. claimed date. Of graduation from: the... Institute or- Claimed date’ of entry into the KGB, just as - challenges om those latter: topics. ‘prompted: amended State- ments with respect: to his RU- service. The extent of the ~ still-unreconciled. discrepancies and contradictions. dn NOSENKO's. various:.accounts is best. perceived © in. comparison Of his: statements: made: in 1962, (1964, “1965 and” 1966. Ni SENKO'S ‘Information=1962 _ --NOSENKO | ‘inishea. ‘the. Institute of. ‘International Relations ain “1950. and. immediately reported. for. duty. with the: (RU. {He did not: amplify. how. he’ drew such: an- ‘assignment. Jen In September 1950°he’was. offered | _assignments. in Leningrad, .Moscow,.-and..in’- “the: Far East; and he chose the Far East” “So no one. would think.he. would take advantage of his father's. position". He was. .assigned ‘to..a radio Signals. interception: — unit: in. Sovetskaya” ‘Gavan'. (on the Soviet ‘coast opposite =. Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information . by monitoring the communications of American units operating in. San e | wis tg NO 197124, oO pe Yop Secret : : Copy -
conte on nena ebhdren edi bate VANdAE Ned Aine acta Top Secret (PRE~KGB BIOGRAPHY) Korea. In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed ‘to have “a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone" and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow - for two months. In summer 1952, again eligible for duty, NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military~Diplomatic Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the | curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute from which he was graduated. In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of ‘Primorsk, "the former German city of Pillau". {Baltiysk, a larger city close by Primorsk, is the former German city of Pillau.] . There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained . as stay-behind agents in the event of war. In early 1953, . after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB {KGB] @hairman Beria. KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining _ the KGB. SO oe - NOSENKO's Information-~1964 Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU, -and on the instructions of the Institute's “secret unit", he -..was interviewed by a RU Colonel -KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel Department. After passing the state examination on the . second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in-September 1950, when he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior lieutenant. He also.received orders assigning him to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He ‘left Moscow approximately .1.October 1950, travelling for ten days by train to his unit, which was stationed near Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports Section with duties which included translating American naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle information of American naval forces in the Far East. A -yadio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he was not personally concerned with that unit's activities. 51 6804322 . TS No. 197124 Top Secret Copy _ 10,
Top Secret conan srocrame In spring 1951 ‘NOSENKO. was proinoted to. the rank of .- lieutenant. . At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as: an. ’ "apprentice". in the Agent-~ Intelligence Section near : _Sovetskaya Gavan", an assignment which involved subchaser. delivery and ‘Pickup: of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.” In early. 1952 NOSENKO filed. by mail for divorce from. - TELEGINA in a Moscow. court. In April 1952 he returned to. Moscow on leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters _ _ personnel: ‘officer, Col. KALOSHIN,: and. requested. a transfer .. from the Far East. : ‘During May and June ‘1952 he-was on ‘leave accrued. during His two years' service in the Far. East. Following his) leave, in summer. 1952, NOSENKO was” _ ordered. to proceed. ‘to Rostock but he refused. and took.- " unauthorized leave... (He could not learn. what his. actual. - assignment | was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval” © Intelligence, Points in Germany were being. closed down. )- --He- "subsequently. was. ‘assigned to the Baltic city of. Baltiysk)_ -where he reported for duty with the Intelligence. Staff of. the Fourth .(Baltic) Fleet. He was assigned to ‘a Naval em . Intelligence Point being set. up in Sovetsk. (sic, see Pe 57) 4. a “small town. “in Primorskiy. Kray! near. Baltiysk. - . Comment; Primorskiy-! Kray” isin, ‘the Far East, as” NOSENKO" s- a " interrogators’ pointed. out to him’at the time. -' S _» -NOSENKO.. subsequently. claimed it was his earlier. “0! post; ‘Sovetskaya Gavan',; ‘which. was.in Primorskiy. L - Kray,: a, fact known to him from the way his: -....00.. ' “letters were - addressed.” ‘This: is: also an. (OFKOKe . See below. me . . In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.) Comment: » NOSENKO also: said that ‘after refusing to. go: to = Rostock he himself had received training in. Moscow: and then was sent. to Rostock and Sassnitz,. — GO0E823 TS No. 197124 | Top Secret — Copy