404-10103-10132 (telephone _c Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet_and Cuban Embassies (1963) 1. Unilateral Coverage: From the time the Mexico Station was opened {in April. 1947) until the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station{in 1955 \ the Station had . ‘developed a support apparatus. to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multiline phone taps, _ three photographic sites, ‘a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation. Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by{an. _employee: ,of the local < ompany who was , handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped was Vimi ted only by the availability of a listening post | nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc. ) transcribers. Generally, these were Mexican or Mexican- American recruited agents. Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer assisted by technicians on TOY from Headquarters who advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These ‘operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC © "and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Em- bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en- trance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the Leaner are etl - EL BY 008645 CEPOTT CEM |
74-00000 original ly Processed in the Station.-but in early Yi Soviet compound and the ‘LIMITED site was diagonally across a double Taned . street on the southeast corner of ‘that block. - . (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and. operated strictly on an experimental > basis in the. early stages. This base, however, was closed when the Sta- tion received word that the photograph of the. “unidentified man" was - being released by the Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photo- graphic base. It ‘was located in an. upper story of an apartment. building on ‘the - same side of the street! as the LIMITED Site but in the middle of the block. south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet . Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of: a 7 row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. ; This site overlooked the back garden of ‘the Soviet Embassy compound. The » purpose of this operation was to get. good identification photographs of Soviet personnel. The: three photographic sites were managed by a re~ cruited agent who was a Mexican, citizen, the son of an American mother and Mexican father. (deceased). ‘This agent collected the film from the . LIMITED | and LILYRIC sites three times a week. ‘The Fim was then de- . ‘veloped | and printed | into 8 x 10 contact. print strips. LICALLA Film was due to the resig-. nation of. a technician, this Film like: that of LIMITED. and LILYRIC was ~ oe processed on the outside by a recruited agent.
14-00000 Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio From the LIMITED site whenever someone (of. ‘interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for : -{denti fication purposes. The Station also conducted aGund Latera| mail “intercept operation, ~ 2. (Liaidon coverage: Oo {Liaison c coverage) was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican services; at that time. The Mexican Diréction . of Federal Security (DFS), % vith which we conducted liaison was a hip- - pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry - was principal ly occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. i yon siercecalaiede | and corrupt. iA (A Station > (Officer. trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control. In J a an pa a 58, at the- instigation of a Mexican 1 official, a Joint telephone tay tap operation ‘came into existence. “The operation, which became known “as as Pp
14-00000 « i a ry Y — LIENVOY, we was run by a Mexican  officer./ The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by fieerean Army y_ officers. In 1961 , (because Of mismanagement by the Mexican prin=_| (eipats 3 the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening - post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. ‘There was also . an American technician inside the, listening post. 3. Oswald coverage: 3 - - ee oo a en (soint tap ‘operation) asked the ner ican officer at the LTENvoY listening | > post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban. and Satellite Em- jor 1 the. unilateral teTephone taps on these Embassies so oN aaien J &, they would not be ‘discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their > taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected Five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish’ lines, and one, Yugoslav line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later, when ‘a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels: which. contained Russian ~
14-0000 . . . > ‘ or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Mr. ‘Boris Tarasoff did the Russian transla- ‘tions but because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations. usually ran about a A week behind the date of the conversation. As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying him- 7 self as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture: of the . Station started screening all photographs. - However, here ‘again,: there .was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film, did 50 on a night-time basis. | Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete. roll of | Film was used. Later this | was changed and the operator. cleared the camera at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused. Film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours ) and to. photograph all Soviets, their families, all. foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did: occur. but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical dif- . ficulties. ; . Oswald came to the attention of the: listening post operators from a tap of the Soviet Vine. it was picked up and ‘taken to, Mr. Boris ; . SEGRET/SENSHT NE
14-00000 Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English’ since the Chief of Station could read only these two ‘languages and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads , ° . SEGRE] j ScHOWNE
14-00000 Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963) 1. Unilateral Coverage: From the time the Mexico Station was opened jin April 1947 \until - the arrival of Mr. Win Scott as Chief of Station in 1955, ithe Station had - developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) ‘consisted of multiline - phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team and a mail intercept operation. Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were. placed by fan employee of the local 5 (telephone company who was} handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped was limited only by the availability of a listening post nearby and the availability of langauge (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech, etc.) transcribers. Generally. these were Mexican or Mexican American recruited agents. Three photographic sites were handled. by a Station case officer assisted by technicians on TDY from Headquarters who advised the Station on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. These operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK (namely: LIMITED, LILYRIC © _ and LICALLA). ‘LIMITED was a fixed site directly opposite the Soviet Em- bassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and a pedestrian en- trance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the E2, IMPDET CPOTTRENGTNE
14-00000 | originally processed in the Station’ but in early @S9, _ processed on the outside by a recruited agent. Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across a double laned street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base and operated: strictly on an experimental basis. in the early stages. This base, ‘however, was. closed when the Sta- tion received word that the photograph of the “unidentified man* was being. released by the’ Warren Commission. LILYRIC was an alternate photo~ — graphic base. It was ‘located in an upper Story of an apartment building 7 on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but jn the middle of | ‘the block south. It had a planted view of the front gate of the Soviet | . Embassy. LICALLA, the third photographic site, was located in one of a | Saati row of four houses on the south side. of ‘the Soviet Embassy compound. This site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The te . purpose of this operation was to get good. identification photographs of a” Soviet personnel. The three photographic sites were managed by a re- cruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother a _and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from. the LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then de- a veloped and printed into 8 x 10 contact print strips. LICALLA film was due to the resig- -_ nation of a ‘technician, this film Vike that. of LIMITED and LILYRIC was ~ SECRET/ SENSITIVE
14-00000 Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for identification purposes. The Station also conducted a unilateral mail intercept operation, LIBIGHT, which was handled by an American case officer. A recruited Mexican agent, who had a semiofficial status, obtained selected letters from a subagent employed by the Mexican postal system. 2. Liaison Coverage: Liaison coverage was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican services at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS), with which we conducted liaison, was a hip- pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of t “te Te: . Receetel , and corrupt. A Station foreigners. Their agents were +s officer trained a number of them in name tracing and travel control. In 1958, at the instigation of a Mexican official, a joint telephone tap operation came into existence. The operation, which became known as
14-00000 LIENVOY, was run by a Mexican officer. The listening post had 30 lines connected at one time. The transcription room was staffed by Mexican _Army officers. In 1961, because of mismanagement by the Mexican prin- cipals, the Station chief, himself, became the project case officer. A Station officer assisted him in the daily supervision of the listening post, and in picking up the transcripts and the tapes. There was also an American technician inside the listening post. 3. Oswald Coverage: In mid-1962, the Mexican officer in charge of LIENVOY (the L joint tap operation) asked the American officer at the LIENVOY listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Em- ‘bassies in anticipation of possible coverage. The Station immediately disconnected all of the unilateral telephone taps on these Embassies SO that they would not be discovered when the Mexicans hooked up their taps. The Mexicans soon thereafter connected five Cuban lines, five Soviet lines, three Czech lines, two Polish lines, and one Yugoslav line. At the listening post, a live monitor made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station. Later, when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian
74-90000 “* & ~ SECRET / SENSITIVE or a language other than Spanish or’ English were taken to another location 7 - for translation and typing. Mr. Boris. Tarasoff did the Russian transla- tions but: because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of ‘the conversation. | ‘As soon as the Station earned that an “Anerican identifying him- a self as Lee Oswald Phoned the Soviet Embassy, Miss Ann Goodpasture of the " Station started screening all photographs. ‘However, here again, there “owas. a backlog because the photographs were ‘picked up three times a week — but. those picked up were usually for dates, a few days before since the ites technician who was Processing the Film, did so on. ‘a night- time basis. | Further, photographs were not made initiatly until: a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera . at the end of each day regardless of amount of: unused. film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire. work day (office hours ) and to a photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, ‘and cars with. foreign license Plates. Human error did occur but ‘generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse ¢ camera which frequently developed mechanical dif- Ficuities. . Oswald came to the attention of the © listening post: operators — " ' from ‘a tap of the Soviet line... It was picked up and taken to Mr. Boris SECRETSENSTNE.
14-00000 ‘Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. - There was some delay because Station personnel waited to compare the 7 photographs with the typed transcript. All. transcripts were made in. ' either Spanish or English since the Chief of Station could read only a - these two languages and because he personaly screened the transcripts for operational leads. What re: