mr ot MW Sa072 ‘ ue yee peor &, <t ph pee ge pe cf poe ble pt ae 4 eon 4 fe pee fh) Gr pete Bt fae be fie el i» w nom oO Wich ck ty ct ‘ " oo ch by so g beg AO ck Wry OM TT th chow g O 2 red ots oO fF. HOO ~ a M wy ur be ck ty NM OQ pean, Pay am Int beg 2 ; WR be dtp « “ange op pry he ck Oa oO co) 3 ry > SM WD O PIT | MO mp Hore O PP 3 QO by fu Heck © S's ck a a ip? he fet Re} sob ch AO MO oO a9 @ ef 3 x arma “mot fu or uy & pe ple + i de wy oO wv cD Fg ph che ood a ~ | cand Or a nO Fee] 2 bot. OL mn} Eto ee pa pe O eB bh 2D O FS By me re bh BOOT Sis, Fea) OF fa) ue 3 0 OH ur C Ye a A jt 7. Wp ocd od cot S$ ck by Yay gs o i ct Cu pu Oo 0 He ety pte MB ed ye OP Pe ah OO tp ra . ited ring assignments .2 service and ti ink source a who rough his pr compan f. of the them. ch ck w is bie & ont RP fo) DP ote bh @ pte fd i Qa ft 3 OD FP te ob QB o oO y employee 3 a i) wk individual whe is not i wolic gatherings in 6b a- + potential witness] eB ay DM cb ck > O rar SCURG > <* POTENTIAL SECURITY rey ny “? fence en inte “4 type of secur on @ confid esent poe ¥ Bureau but merely obtain £ NP TDL er LL SOURGES a) Paer sy ty e Lacard <3 t vA) SS tw and ts 2 9 107A, — B eaten VE ptaining and furnishing current infor-— e matters exclusively for Burean and whose th person should be a member or attend mectings uch as the Communist Party; or be in bversive organization, or espionage ties in the U. S, in behalf of foreign does provide current information reign intelligence data of value on a regular nt o tecome aotive in a subversive organization: activities in the U. S, osely associated therewith, or is in 4 Li4gence data, and is making affir i t or cen ..cts so. that. he can be in a position nish current information to Bureau. > in behalf of foreign ity informant; a person who 3 from, and performing tasks he Bureau under the Bureau's is coopers for both a guidance. a furnishes information available s mples would be: bankers and se duals make no concerted effort and furnish information readily “ who will attend purposes or ive group but nvolved in a subve e Por intelligence hailf of the FBI t INFORMANTS n Laforna should be developed on.all organizations and individuals that are iniz' ..l to the internal security, Hz-rarience has shown that potential infoxrman’* y be obtained through alertn. im the course of normal investi- gative « tivity. live informant ceverage .:ends for the most part upen initiati and resourcefulness of individusl Agents and SACs, For assistance in obta ‘ig potential informants, the following is suggested: 1L, ive tion of , a. oiplainants in security tters b. -eSons interviewed inc ection with security cases Cc. bjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf— “eotion, dis gruntlement, of interest, inactivity, financial haré@~ “hip, or other repudiation of party loyalty d. ‘“reau applicants as.pessible informants @.  -80nal frie nds ané contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau cloyees . £,  .. .pees of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con— Linuous basis 2, Roview of closed security files on individuals 3. Review of reserve index 4. ascertain possibilities of reactivating former con ential inforsants, 5. Deleted 6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA, 7. Consultation with present informants regarding indications ¢. disaffection on the part of Comuunist Party members. They, cf course, Si. td not de . informed as te the nurpese of the inquiry. 8. Review of Piles on communist front organizations ooking for individuals 3 ith only one or two frcits or who attended only i Such individuals freguently are innecent of 3 they have a basis for cultivating the ers, 3 5-13-69 Doold: 32969529 Page 1279
+ 1078 -~C SECTION 107. ECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDI (TAL SOURCES 9, Investigation of @... munist petition signers who are acquainted with Communist Party fux tionaries 10. Be alert to reoei:: any suggestions of plant exeoutives and highly placed personn:. who ar’ reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning members . of subversive orsanizations who might cooperate with the Bureau ox employ~ ees who might te willing to infiltrate @ subversive organization, In the past such contasts have on occasion resulted in the plantts maxing avail~ azhle the servyiecs of an employee who already is an informant of the manage ment, - ii. ersonnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of communist—dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions, 12, With regard to both 10 and 11 above, if possible, ‘the official should _ suggest to the pothntial informant thot he contact the Bureau rather then have an Agent originate the contact. — , 13, After the Bureau has notified the armed forees of a communist in an indus— trial plant having armed forces: contracts, the comaunist froquently recants |" when he is informed of the charges and is fa acing the possibility of dis .missel or transfer to a Sonrestricted vosition in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that 7 ane person advise the Pireau of his past activities, Be alert to take advantage of such, coopes:.tion when offered, 14, Review of Communist Pa arty vegistration records to ascertain what indiy id- nals merely registered bub rever became active ' 15... Use of a reliabi., third psx is to make the contact with a possible inform "cant when direst contact by + Agent is ina visable. — Request Bureau to furnish the services of an °. \avidus'l. who jf availchle for such a contact, - 16, Of’ stals and employees of °.:eign establi-’ments’in the U. 8S, 17. Ex’ «sees of the United Nat icas Secretarias . ; ; 18, Co. . sts (business, social, or otherwise) of “foreign officials stationed in - Uv. Ss. 19, Ind’ ‘duals who ?.sause of background, employment, or social status are position of stelligence interest to a fofeign principal and” who . undertake in 1r2lligence assignments under the guidance of the Burcaa, (See deseo program, section, LOSK 26h, volume IV, of this | manual. ) c+ SMPRRVLEYS WOTH AND DEVRLOE Pe iy oF BACKGROUND on INDIVIDUALS BRING ‘WSLIDERED FOR Ti OR PURPOSES . “lan a decision is ma to consider a particular individual: for : “ormant ‘:heposes, background investiga tion must be conducted. Extensive . .ground Luvestigation should not be conducted, however; until the indivi «. has _ been interviewed and.it has bes determined he is willing -i> assii* the Bureau. Obtain prior Bureau au herity to interview whenov ws the etrictions imposed in section 87D, item ob, (7), volume TIT, and section 1652, item 6b, (9), volume IV, “rela tivo. to interviews apply. Background investigation should consist of the-following: . Check of field office files for derogatory information - Disereet canvass of l-¢ical informants to ascertain if the individual is known to them . Inquiries of discreet rature to obtain information concerning the individ- vid's personal history (date and place of birth, ctc. ), patriotion, health, reliability, stability, integrity, goneral reputation, Svesent ond pass <mployments, and business connections. Background investigation must -definitely establish that the individual can be utilised without am . . : danger of Fueere embarrassment due to instability or unreliability. Securing ba cund information from the individual is not surtic Lheeebs his vack@roung must be established by the investigation, includince Iisereet * yairies among persons who are personally acquainted with him. 4. G. rk of local credit and arrest records. Obtain necessary data for t Nie w [ fr complotion of anf FD- 165 Iform which should be transmitted to the Identi- { fication Division to obtain any record he may ha uvefland to place a stop [ against his fingerprints if they are on file.] 5S. Aased services record should be reviewed if the individual is a vetrran. - 6. Check draft stetus or status in the armed forces reserve, 7. Domestic status and if any marital difficulties all dotails should. be obtainsd. . y a 2-13~68 NW 55072 Doold: 32989525 Page 1250
tn D. My 35072 9. 10. APPROVAL, INDCCTRINATION, DEVELOPMENT, AID CONTROL OF POTENTIAL SECURTTY epar sy Attar PC CU TANTS vIS 1. [2.3 Doeld: 329699529 Page 1261 . ‘ TY TNPORMANTS AND CONFTN IAL SOURCES 107G - D 2 Lo ro] AJ ra) a foe J Perscous heing coimmdersa for use in ésploneage and “Toreign nationality caces many times oresunt soecial problems which Limit ox govern the scope . of the initial investigation. iSee instructions re contact ceases and } dececo program, section LOSE, 6% and 6h, volume IV, -* this manual.) However, where practical the above items should be “s3red. j Lez2s to obtain background data inust be handled by sailiary offices within 30 days. . . Invectigation as outlined above must be completed prior to any request to guide, diroct, or designate an individual as a potential security informant. Wien background information .bbained as deseribed under subsection C, ' transmil results to Bureau i. the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request .uthority to designate individual as a Bureau approved potential security informant and to proceed with his development. Do not submit on a UACB basis. Include a physical description. After designation 25 a Bureau-approved potential security informant, the following matters showld be made clear +o Haims: - , 2. His assistance is strictly voluntary and he is +o understand that there is no coercion or intimidation involved, b. He is not and cannot.consider himself 2 Bureau employee, or "nndercover Agent" of the FBI. Inu this regard, the seriousness of violating the impersonation statutes must be impressed upon him, : ¢. His cooperaticn must be strictly c«:.fidential at all times and if he . should feel he cannot maintain ti. sonfidence, he should so advise, There should be no doubt left in -.2 mind of the informant that Wis relationship must remain on a con.iniential basis and if he viclates the - confidence he will be of no value and by so doing the Bureau's investiga— , tive activity may be jeopardized. If he Has a special problem- which weu require revealing his assistance to his wife or other persinent indiv-.2 this should be ascertained and an appropriate recommendation mads to : . Bureau. The special circumstances will be taken into consideration b, -.:e Buréau and you will be advised accordingly. ad. If the potential informant is connected in any mwenner with a labor unica, me id Ley a inform him that the Bureau is not interested in employer~en..loyee relationships as'such and is only concerned with obtaining “nformation on the infiltration of labor unions by subversive elemen: e. If the potential informant is a studer’, teacher, or has . similar relations with a school, college, or w.ivrersity, in the int wial interview and subsequent handling, be sure to follow current instruciions con— cerning investigations on the Campuses of colleges and universities, Do not interview female potentials in their «s 2 homes’ or apartments unless necessary and all such interviews in their re.idences should de conducted by two 4gents after specific approval of the superior in the field office responsible for development of informants. ‘his instruction is not applicable where active investigation has established that the povential informant is of good character, there is no indication of . affiliation with subversive groups,,and there will be no embarrassment? ~ to the Burean. : ‘ . ; ct -Hxcept in espionage and foreign nationality matters where contacé is | ° ‘- maintained -on a periodic basis dependont on the circumstances of the 7 — Case, potential infurmants should be contacted personally at Least once every two weeks in the same manner as informants. ~ ae Advise Bureau of progress being made at Least every[six]months. Letters concerning potential informants who are not being paid on Bureau authorization should be submitted on a UACB basis, should contain . : informative summary of information furnished during past[six]Jmonths, ana must include certifications regarding potential -inforinant's stability , and reliability and his indoctrination against disslosure » Ghese letters should follow the form indicated under section 107N, 3b, but should omit item (5) concerning payments and reword item {1) to omit reference to any poyment racommendation. . ERAN Rte an babded ELAN E RMR tyne 9 tee ne 9-13~68 . ' APA MLNYE, Da as,
1070 + B sscmtoy 107. fae CURLTY INFORMANTS AND CONFID “TAT: SOURCES @ @ ds of WWntacts with potential informant so that the cases will f (6.7 Fast recor not becoma { {7,] During aon ‘2, if i% develovs individual - dows not discontinue efforts. { [8, / During initial stages of development a: 2n occasion active informants may vaise 2 personal question concerning their own position if it - becomes knuwn publicly that they are affiliated with a subversive organi 28 Thon. In the event a potontial informant or informant inquires as to what can be done for him in such a case, «2 may be told that “ his cooperation is a matter of record in the F ° and if some question arises concerning his loyalty we will consider «king the facts of his cvcperation with the FR. known to his employer + to the responsible inilivideais. It should be pointed out that this action may make it impossible for him to continue on behalf of the FBI and the service . which he is performing for his country may be terminated. Before . . taking steps to advise anyone of a potential informant's or infozmant's cooperation, prior Bureau authority must be obtained. > [ [9.j] From the first interview with a potential informant through his develop- - ment and until he is discontinued, extreme caution should be used at all times to be certain he is not a plant. . [ [LO.] When potential informant begins to furnish current information and Otherwise qualifies for designation as informant, assign permanent symbol number and edvise Bureau. This communicati-* must be personally initialcd by SAC or ASAC acting in his absence; ir .-idual's background must also be thoroughly reviewed at this time, keee? ug in mind possibility of using informant as a witness. If individual has any weaknesses, set forth safeguards beiag followed to insure security and to prevent embarrassment to Bureau. - E. BUREAU POLICY ; . 1. Development of military perscanel Do not develon informants among military personnel on military reserva— tions, establishments, etc., unless specifically approved by the Bureau. 2. ‘Contacts by designated Agents Contacts with an informant or potential informant should only be meade by. the Agent or bzents specifically designated to contact him. _ 3. Divulging information to informant No information should be divulged to a2 potential informant or an fnformant concerning any of the Bureau's investigative activity other than that which is essential to his proper operation. - oe 9-13-68 MW 35072 Dooeld: 32809529 Page 1262 ‘