195-40005-10023 v9.1 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : _ AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : HW 50955 DBocld: 32423706 JFK Assassination System .. Date: 6/16/201 Identification Form Agency Information OSD 195-10005-10023 MCNAMARA PAPERS Document Information OSD BENJAMIN T. HARRIS ‘CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, MONGOOSE END OF PHASE I 07/23/1962 12 CONTINGENCY PLANS - CUBA OPERATION MONGOOSE - END OF PHASE I PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Top Secret ic Redact 09/14/1998 McNamara Papers, Box 86 (42), Mongoose. Memo from Harris to Chief of Operations re: accomplishments of Operation Mongoose Phase I, estimate of potential for intelligence collection and military operations, etc. Page i
HW 50955 Docld:32423706 Page 2 TOP SECRET c. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other countries. d. Voice Radio Broadcasts from a Submarine. DOD made\a submarine available to CIA fox_the conduct of voice radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIAL} e. Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the CIA. . _ £. Utilization of AVON-PARK, Florida, by CIA as.a Base for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the feasibility of using certain facilities at AVON-PARK for the training of Cuban 1 refugees in guerrilla warfare. g- Oil Drum Mines. DOD transferred 40 oil drum mines to CIA. , h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer. to duty with.CIA to be in charge of small boat operations at Miami, Florida. i.. Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. In order to insure.a decisive US military capability for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANT's regular contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are being made to reduce the reaction time required for imple - mentation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US forces. j- Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Inter - vention in Cuba. CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piece- meal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk in- herent in such an operation CINCLANT is.seeking means for reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment. k. Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has heen developed for the purpose of covering the prepositioning of forces allocated to the contingency plans for overt military intervention in Cuba. 2 TOP SECRET
aah HW 50955  Docld:32423706 Page 3 TOP SECRET also includes means designed to provoke Cuban reaction and of thus actasa triggering device for US intervention. 1. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision, to suppress. and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execu- tion of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal revolt. - , ‘m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been develop - ed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours after decision. n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a ' provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared. : o. DOD's Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the ~ Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished without leading to general war and without serious offense to public opinion. p. [Bwe/Gw=Gapabi itiesmasApaperswaseprepareédsistine tie things :that,cansberdonié%a gains tiCubasin BW CWtiela, | q. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba. r. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba. s. Manufacture of Soviet Aircraft. A survey was made con- cerning the US capability for the covert production of facsimiles of Soviet aircraft. t. Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the require- ments of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols, electronic collection and special operations were implemented. Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political 3 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET nd economic interest were provided to the Caribbean Admission foonter, Opa Locka, Florida. All information obtained from these ff Sources was processed through the Intelligence Community's channels. The flow of information concerning Cuba has been greatly improved as a result of these efforts. However, gaps ‘still exist, particularly in details of military order of battle. Increased efforts are being made to fill these gaps. cre an u. Utilization of(US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for Joint Navy/CIA Intellfgence Operations. DOD inve stigated the possibility of using Guantanamofas a base of operations for the collection of national level intelligence, in light of the present policy limitations and possible policy changes in the future. v. Establishment of Patrol Posts" in the Caribbean. In response to a request from the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, DOD examined the possibility of establishing ‘patrol posts" in the Caribbean. ; w. Psychological O erations: A survey was conducted in an attempt to increase|Naval Base Guantanamo's role in psychological operations.) As a result special OSD funds were made available for Special baseball sportscasts {over the base radio station} 3. Operational Estimate of the Potential for Intelligence Collection. a. Reconnaissance ~ a summary of the Cuban reconnaissance operation is given below: Completed Vehicle Code Word Frequency “WV -2Q . Melrose 13 A3D-2P/2Q ' Fitbolt . 4 USS Moale Operation 19 Mar - 12 Apr 62 . RB 47 1 May 62 Submarine /UDU 5 - 6 May 62 Continuing F3D-2Q Call Money 6 ~ ll per month AD-5Q Sleepwalker 2 per month C -130 Quick Fox 10 per month A3D-2P 6 - 8 per month Navy DD daily Navy P-2V twice daily | 4 TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423706 Page 4
TOP SECRET e. Summary - Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off con- siderably in recent weeks. Changes in unit Organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organi- zation itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with Specific targets, this situation will probably continue. 4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba - # . Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the 7 U.S. could: a. With 18 days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne- amphibious assault which it is anticipated would gain control ofikey military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba: within 10 days and result in minimum: US and Cuban casualties. b. Should the situation demand, ‘a piecemeal commitment of US forces could be made with reaction times approximately as follows: 2 Airborne Divisions - 5 days (para-drop units only) 4 Marine BLTS - ° 7- 8 days | Following Forces ~ - 15.- 18 days | { (This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk, ) c. In conjunction with either of the actions described in a and b, above, cover and deception plans have been developed which, if executed, would result in prepositioning of forces-assigned to the invasion of Cuba and could thereby result in an over-all reaction time of approximately 12 days for a coordinated assault. d. Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in Cuba within 6, 12 or 24 hours; the time dependent upon aircraft availability and desired intensity of attack. e. Air-sea blockade can be initiated. within 24 hours with effective- ness increasing toa complete blockade within approximately 48 hours. 5. Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Guba: a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it. 7 . ‘TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docld:32423706 Page 5