oo - THE WHITE HOUSE TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE WASHINGTON EYES ONLY > November 10, 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Cuba_ - Miscellaneous ' John Crimmins, Des Fitzgerald, Joe Califano, and I met to talk about miscel- laneous Cuban problems. Here are some of the items which came up. 1. Aranzazu Incident - John Crimmins said that we have completed our "investigation" of the Aranzazu incident and that the Spanish have now asked us to give them our evaluation of the various reports we have furnished to .~ them. John is now working on a paper of talking points he will use with the Spanish (he wants to keep it oral if possible). The general pitch he will - probably want to use will take into account such facts as (a) that we want to _give the Spanish the minimum necessary to keep them from thinking that we are trying to deceive them and (b) that the Spanish, themselves, probably — evaluate Artime as the prime suspect. Specifically, such points as the following might be made to the Spanish: First, while we cannot rule out the possibility that the Cubans sunk the Aranzazu, it is probably more likely that the exiles didit. Second, there are a number of exile groups that have the capability of doing the job. Third, the most likely of the exile groups is - probably Artime. But the fact that Artime's boat was in Curacao would seem to rule him out; and even if this could be explained, we could still not prove. that Artime is the culprit. Fourth, (if pressed) bya process of elimination, the attack would seem to have come from the Dominican Republic (the Spanish already strongly suspect this - see attached cable). In any event, we are sure | it did not come from the U. S. : John Crimmins plans to clear his talking points with the Special Group before he talks to the Spanish. ; So . Special Group Items - Des mentioned that a dissident. group of Army people ‘nets Cuba have contacted Artime's people; reportedly, they have picked ~ Artime because they feel that anyone with his resources must have the. support of the U.S, Government. Des feels that we should let this contact develop and, | in this. connection, he believes that the Special Group should permit the con- — tinuance of our support to Artime for another 60 or 90 days and, if absolutely necessary, allow Artime to make one more attack (more or less controlled by CLA).on Cuba. If we drop Artime precipitously, the dissident group in tani AOA emery Pe onal Oe NE Oi te ets’ o sw . . . RE Nota na esa PagRC RA Is Hn pests o TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - ‘EYES ONLY ‘Doctd:32423484 Page 170 Si (tists nd «BL Johnson Library
‘ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY Mr. Bundy . : -2- November 10, 1964 - | , ; Cuba will assume that Artime is not worth contacting and their willingness to express dissidence may tend to dry up. In all of this discussion, Des emphasized: . that he is no great admirer of Artime and that the above is not an Agency device to keep Artime's group alive. This item will probably come before the Special Group on Thursday. _ , Des also mentioned the possibility of pas sing on to Dorticos, in an unattributable, deniable fashion, the message that, while the U.S. cannot live with Fidel Castro, it might well be able to live with Dorticos. .Des feels that Cuba is in terrible shape, that Dorticos knows it, and that a move like this could conceivably produce a big dividend. At best, it will start Dorticos plotting; at worst, (if Castro finds out) it will help to sow some seeds of dissension and distrust. This item will probably come up at a later Special Group meeting. 3. Erosion of Cuban Economy - Des was very hopeful that Cuba will be in very bad economic shape by the end of 1965. To this end, CIA has arranged to have shipments of faulty additives sent to Cuba; some of this is goingin _ already, and some is on the way. Emphasizing the extreme sensitivity of the operation,’ Des said that the effect on large amounts of Cuban machinery could be brutal. oe The point was made that there was, these days, a general recognition by the European missions in Cuba that the Cuban economic situation is grim and . that, in fact, the isolation policy is not entirely a farce. To some extent, this realization coincided with the timing of the recent Cuban restrictions on credit. 4, British Channel to Castro - John Crimmins said that Patrick Gordon-Walker, - in his meeting with Secretary Rusk, suggested that the British would be pleased to act as'a middle man for a dialogue between the U.S. and Cuba. The Secretary has asked John to look into the desirability of this. The initial feeling of the group was that it was not a good idea. Among other things, if we want to establish a dialogue with Castro, there are better channels than the British. 5. Basic Review of Cuban Policy - The group agreed that, with November 3 behind us, we can usefully do some basic review work on Cuba. To this end, John Crimimins agreed to write a paper which would outline the major problems and the possible options, including accommodation. This will be ready ina few days' time and will be distributed for comment. _We can then decide where to go from there. | “TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY ~ Lyndon B. Johnson Library cat Docld: 32423484 Page 171
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY Mr: Bundy Oo -3-— November 10, 1964 Des Fitzgerald said we should consider the re-institution, in the near future, of the "unilateral'' CLA-directed covert program which had scored a number of hits last year. The group agreed, however, that a decision on this should probably wait until some of the basic review work on Cuba had been completed. Gl. “Gordon Chase pocta:32420404 Page 172 7 Ss a Lyndon B. Johnson Library a
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ; 12 November 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Policy Toward Cuba In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that he forward the Army study entitled, Square Dance" to the Inter- ; departmental Coordinating Commitiee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the JCS. In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on ''Square Dance,'! I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater’than that required to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on "just! international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could under- take such operations without having our role discovered and resulting in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if ''Square Dance'! were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid and control would be increased. As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I understand he-did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend, “however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration of ‘Square Dance" at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals, we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment. | SO IK pte, R, Ko, BOWMAN TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE Ee | bony Lyndon B. Jonson Library Docld: 324273454 Page 173
TOP Sl SRET INFORMATIC COVER SHEET copy xo. COmTROL MUMMERS GEFICE OF THE SELRETARY OF SEFENSE TOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEET The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauther « . t ized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, cus- | tody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations. . i This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) iden- oe te ae etre teen ’ tified hy number above. Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shal]. sign and fill in the information required Detnw. aT - REMARas WAM NRECE ITED RELEASED (Indicate portions and all of documents reed) ae "194 PHEY;OCS EDITIONS CF THIS FORM ARE TASOLETE. (When attachments are removed, this to++ ¢. une tasei fied) c TOP SECRET INFORMATION 625993 ae 1 COVER SHEET “1 ] Copy. Lyndon B. Johnson Library 3 Docld: 324273454 Page i174 an coe . cou
‘ SD SRR Re TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE . a COPY NO, __ 2 SCS 2304 /eku-1 | _-:DISTRIBUTION G 39. October 1964. Pages 2 - 8, incl. REPORT BY ‘THE J-5 SQUARE DANCE (U)- Reference: JCS 2304/e44 bs yx meet i. 1, At the ng on 6 November 1964, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recor- a mendations in paragraph 42 of tnis report. iders are request ved 2. This Decision replaces page 2. to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised | nite pages 3 and 5, inc corporating the amendments, and to dastng the Superseded pazes in accordance with security regulations | . . 3. ‘The meinorendum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A; B, and Cc; was forwarded as JCSM-942-6L, » dated'9 November 1964, to the Secretary of Defense, 4, Int chat ‘the. ‘Commandant: Aad expressed direct concern of ‘she Marine “Corps in tnis matter, the provisions of Title 10, _ US Cede. ia (c) ua -pplied ‘and were followed. DISTRIBUTION: Gen. Wheeler tesa) Gen. Burchinal (D gS). Gen. Johnson (CSA) _ en, Manhart (VD yohe Adm. McDonald (CNO) Adm, Davis (DD/IS) Gen. LeMay (CSAB) fo Adm, Mustin J- 3) Gen. Greene (CHC LCL Gen, pocta: 32423484. Page 175
: | HOP SECRET ; os TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE SQUARE DANCE (U) THE PROBLEM 1. Po respond to a memorandum* bythe Cnier of Stafr, US Army, tc consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President that the United States Fr won ad covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Start in responding**5 to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, 6 stated that the President would be advised of. any new and: | 7 promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure & upon ‘the Cuban regime. wo 3. On 1 September 1954, the Chief of: Staff, US Army, sent 1c a memorandum® , to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: forwarding. a Li study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime 12 by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry. ~The Chief / 13 of Staff, US arny, mecommenced chat tae Joint Start accomplish 14 ine verage ancy coord saaction on the study pr oposals; and chat 15 “the Joint Ch niefs of Staff approve the study and forward it 16 "by memorandum to the President, informing him that the Joint 17 Chiefs of Staff support the conclusions and recommendations . 18 7 of. the study and cons Lder that the outline program therein 19 “provides. an adequate framework for the development of detailed 20 supporting programs and plans for participating agencies. ; el Ss on. 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered 22 the ‘recomendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and acreed 22 to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation ou of a report. ~ . 7 (2s) x Enclosure to JCS 2304/2 3. —_ | Cony” DOT ae . Lyndon B. Johnson Library MOP SECRET - SENSITIVE | eS =. - ; ane ; ae ie Si oa > TPP Docld: 32423464 Page 176 ; . v i : 7 : - rag.
eEpP Sid RET TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE . 5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented with a briefing on the study and discussed. some of the issues of the proposed actions.  — . 7 7 30° DISCUSSION 6. For discussion, see Appendix A, ; 4 | | CONCLUSIONS 7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the 5 ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a 6 _ government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. _ 7 8. The proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar 8 industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and g merits consideration by other appropriate governmental ‘lo agencies as another option, in concert with’ other actions, 11 for causing the collapse of the Castro regime. ~ 12 9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are - 13 possible political consequences which could result from _ . 14 . | proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed. 15 (10. The: Inte rdepartmental Coordinating Committee for 16 | Guban Affairs ‘isthe proper agency to accomplish the inter- a agency coordination. — - | , . 7 18. 11. “The study. should be forwarded to, the Secretary of | 19 Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating 20 | Comittee for Cuban ALL airs for comment and recommendation — el preliminary to ‘submission to the President by the Joint a 220 Chiefs of Start ao oe) re 23 RECOMMENDATIONS 12. It is recommended that: . 24 7 a. The memorandum in che Enclosure, together with its 25 | oe “Appendices A, B, and , waich reflects the above conclu- 26 ‘sions. be rorwerded to ‘the, Seoretary: of Dexense., Re Lyndon CB. Johnson library, a TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE oe . oh SCS 230K/2kk-2 -Docld: 32425484 Page iT? : oe
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the: commanders of 1 unified or specified commands. | . _ - a. ~ ¢@. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned | 3 to NATO activities. : : | on d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US 5 : 6 Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee. Action Officer: Captain J. 0, Sherman, USN J- 5, Extension 78926 ° é “ oe wie, a =o ~ eater are oF ms “he _ oe a ore Copy”. . I | Lyndon 8 Johnson Library | Soe ee ee TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE ee eA JOS 2304/2NH-p ee BY ne a Seo a . Docld:32423484 Page 178 ~~ ee eo, Pe v2 ie Sb CR oe
. o woN om “AA AY AD GU IQ a AS “iy Oh? 7) 1B, ! CIR IE TT TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE ENCLOSURE “ 7 | DRAFT ae MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Subject: Cuban Actions (U) 1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in respond- 1 ing to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, 2 stated that the President would be advised of any new and | 2 oe ‘promising courses of action which could possibly bring . 4 pressure upon the Castro regime. 5. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a 6 study which examines world sugar economics and the vulner- T abilities ofr Cuba.’ S sugar industry. The study proposes an 8 outline program which would undermine Castro's economy, ie} deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political 10 instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's 11. sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the 12 world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a 12 three~ to Six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent. : 14 reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by 45 introducing aerially from off- shore, a sugar cane plant 16 | eee persette, Bunga. - Subsequently, che economic ana political | | i7 | . _ disturba aces’ caused oy this attack could be exac serbated and . 1 ‘exploited by such measur es as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease 19 among. draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, 20° mining canefields, burning cane, ana directing other acts | el of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and 22 transportation systems. —_ , 23 ‘GROUP. L .- sew sone oa —— : - oe EXCLUDED, AUTOMATIC re ~ — poo. ees prc ICATION® oo f TOP SECRET --. SENSITIVE es . as (ICS -2308/2u4-1 a GN 8 Enclosure 0 BDocld: 32423404 Page 179 : . , y
at APE NS fi fi? 4s PO? SECRET TOP. SECRET - SENSITIVE: Ht 3.. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the - ultimate US objective toward Cuba siust be to esuablis sh a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. The concept. of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert means would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime. hiefs of QQ 4. Although the Joint pessible political consequences from proof of the US involve- CA) cr sed) Fy ry V3 p) O : (a) R te qt ta (oy) ct ny (D \O co oN OV ient in such a program, they believe that proposais related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, 10 the stabilization of the free market, and the covert intro- 11) duction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration. 12 Other forms of attack Sroposed in the study.mignt be taken . 13 subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political . 14 turbulence. & Additional dise cussion is provided in Appendix A 15 hereto. 16 5. It is recommended that the attached draft memorandum 17. (Appendix B) and study (Appendix C) be forwarded to the 18 Interdepar tmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban ‘Arfal es 19 for appropriate interagency coordination and ‘comment as a 20 n of further recommendation by the 21 | \22 f a Caay _ Lyndon B ‘Johnson Libra “a ee ee + TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 7 OS i Enclosure’ a JCS 2304/24 -1. . ce : i (Revised by Decision + 9. Novexber igs) ~ . od fon sy om Ey . , cet . wt Chr WW iS @ yoo iy 1 * oe FOP SD RY CCN, Ea a+ - a : om . . . Ne Docld: 32423484 Page 130 : a ot . . 7 . ot
or. o~ TOP SECRET APPENDICES A, B, AND C (6 pages) re Copy “TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE “Lyndon Be “Johnson Library” ere JCS 2304/244-1 ae _ 6 . f “Appendicés Ay +B, and. co oe | Lo 7 oe | anh ara. wy ) Te. a we Xs Wa Le Docld: 32423484 Page 181 ‘ Rs os
ee on eis oo my Teh rs PF \ a) H aa > HANG iy K mo Sy APPENDIX A CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK | COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGSR INDUSTRY 1. The ultimate success of the proposed program would depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices. qt would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual production of sugar if a Subsequent rise in the orice of sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of convertible currency as it nad before the program was undertaken, The arguments and rationale in favor of the economic proposals in the,study appear to have validity. However, world economics is a most complex subject and involves many variable factors, The important points on economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate agencies in the government having responsibility for such matters, 2. Assuming that success of the actions of the outline program can’ be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or that if it did fall, a government friendly to tne United States would be installed. Russia has too much at stake, politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime for economic reasons alone, Success of the proposed acticns a would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro Government and would be an additional means of exerting X pressure against that government. Copy Lyndon. 8 johnson Library | we se) WD TOP SECRET —- SENSITIVE ‘ Docld: 324273454 Page 162 Ae) I+ pm F Oo OO ON DWH fF WW Ke
DocId: 32423484 Page 183 Peat lyy aT} ess Tet ON Bt : 1 5 of Sis ; vad red il Hoe es dV Wa So ada van es TOP SECRET - SENS H TIVE 3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by the study. The approval for implementation of such a concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the event of discovery. There is also an obvious political risk associated with this. proposal. Should any credible evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political loss to the United States would be great. Quite apart from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence of the United States in international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States would be impaired seriously. 4, Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the President apprised of the capabilities of the military establishment. The subject study presents measures which should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after coordination with appropriate government agencies it would represent another option for positive actions against the Castro regime. | 5. NSA 213% dated 8 January 1963, established a comnittee to coordinate the management of all aspects of US policy toward Cuba, The President looks to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for the effective coordination of the execution of policy decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. The subject study should be referred to this committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to reporting to the President... | . Copy * Enclosure to JCS 2304/i¥ndon B. Johnson Library | tr _ TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 2 ’ Appendix fo . 5 Ow Fw 10
Doeld: 3242354504 Page 164 _ . ne mt, ~~ + a On - m2 a Ps re ee a - =, A are an * 6, The Joint Chiefs of Starr have a responsibiiavy to <yI KR i od : > wrt yA Pawan 4. provide military advics to the Cs ucoager.in Chief and the - Fad ~~ ral -~, TT 4. — ? s - ~ » 7 Secretary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that a matter sucm as the prcpcsals under consideration, bo sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation that the stucy be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for coordination and comment as a bezig Por considerstion of further reconmendat sions: by via: ~ 2 aa WA Le a) Je QO coint Chiefs of Stefi | “Gon Lyndon B. toh ason Library wo on ana wn Ff WwW ND yee
iq Gare “OT NS rea oe SECRET - SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM TOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN APPAIRS Subject: Cuban Actions (U) 1, On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed “1 the President that they would continue to review the problem 2 of putting additional pressures on Castro and that the 3° President would be advised if any new and promising courses 4 - _ of action were uncovered, 5 2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on 6 the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attack- 7 “ing the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world 3 sugar market and tne vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry, 9 nd proposes a phased inter ragency program which would 10 a. Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by il approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1966 12 production level, 13 b. Expand US influence in tne world sugar market 14 by assignment cf guotas and other actions to insulate 15 the free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses. 16 3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in 17 the study are within existing or attainable military capa- ‘18 bilities, Several actions are provosed, Key among these 19 is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite ' 20 against sugar cane. it appears feasible to introduce ek gradually Bunga into Cuba ana maintain a basis for plausibly 22 disavowing US involvement, 23 G20UP 1 | _ SxCLUDE! 2 cn aunnEntC DOWNGRA DING oda ts a TR yar ce to ta Dockd: 32423484_ Page 165 ‘ yo rr
TOP SECRET SENSI TVs C 4, Mindful of the risks attending such actions, une Joint 1 Chie?s of Stoft have reviewed the oroposals of the ctucy and 2 SO belleve that they offer an option for exerting new pressures 3 against Castro They believe that proposals releted to the A expansion of US influence over che world sugar market, the +45 stabilization of the free marixet, and the covert in troduction 6. of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration, Cther forms 7 of sttvack proposed in the s to 5. the study is forwarde the concept and actions the study be coordinst mental departments end review end coordinetion, it comments be made available the Joint Chiefs of Staff. tudy might be taken subsequentl exploit resulting economic proposed in ed by your commit OD y nd political turbulence, d herewith witha ov) ct a requ thst a0) nC) the outline program of tee with other govern- Upon completion of your is further réquested that your 14 to the Secretary of Defense 2nd 15 TOP SECRET. - SENSTTIVE L : yadon 8B. Johnson rary . . ae) Rie oeaC Lol B ye - oe te vet Lutes ar (Revised cy Decision “Novewven 1G4) VTS Nay Po yea iy OO Fy Docld: 32423484 Page 166.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE APPENDIX C Army Report on SQUARE DANCE (U) (See Attachment to JCS 2304/244, beginning on page 6 of the white attachment) \ 7 : OO Copy. Lyndon. B. Johnson Library TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 6 7 - Appendix ¢ | pT CS yt Nt SR Am mT Docld: 324273454. Page 167. . See — OO Mout PM tae a :
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE; “cove 3 NO. 5S November 1964 is | DISTRIBUTION G NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES to. the - “HOLDERS OF JCS 230H/2un- 1 A Report by the J-5 i on 7 FIRST CORRIGENDUM a = At the ‘request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page T> and destroy the ‘superseded page in accordance with security regulations. _R. C. FORBES J. E. MANSFIELD Joint Secretariat — -- UNCLASSIFEED- Without Attachment .. | “SECRET - "SENSITIVE oo - eet D t Coorig to JCS: 2304/2u4-1 Re 7 OP > SE ECRET | Docla+32423484 Paye 188 ee -
THE WHITE HOUSE TOs SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTON EYES ONLY November 12, 1964 "MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba 1. Irefer to your interest in hearing more about the Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment of contaminating elements to Cuba and’which is aimed at bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of ' Cuban machinery. , . 2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted ‘for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5 would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald is now conducting. Ihave not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting. (As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted and were the ‘sole attendee from the NSC staff. }) While.I do not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached - - memo,’ they indicate that Item,5 was. approved. My own strong recollection of the fallouiewse from the meeting was , that Items 1 through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious “| . prablems concerned Items 6 and7. . | a 3. Iassume that you still want to hear a status report on the - Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I _ will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup. 7, ‘think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop, if indeed we do want.to stopit. In any event, you will be able to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives his status ‘report. ae | GO | %. Gordon Chase - | ~ AL . >. a Cie, af OK Ing 7 Lm use A TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY stmee rissa er oe a ORT “es encase iota ae a oi Copy” DocTd:32423484 ‘Page 189 — Fundan RB. Inhnson, Viheary