‘[toatoatdt0035] ’ Second thougats on authorizaticns given Lodge in Deptel 243... "General Zarkins‘ meeting with Gezeral Khien ‘Discussion of ways in which we might live with Diem regime .... “Colby's summary of differing positions taken Pe LS TABLE OF CONSENT Mt A) i OO OOOO OI QUE EWWW Be sitions 2 prominent people 4 in late 1963 Ds Toe anti-govermmeat riots begin . 2... 2 2 6 6 © © © @ © oe © © ow Attacks on pagodas; imposition o7 martial law Discussion of. US response. to.pagoda.raids . ... «es «+ » 6 © » Corein meeting sith Céereral Don: CIS guidance on State telegram re- alternative leadership 2... « « Riczara 230n's personal views re alternate leadership Harvicaa informs H2lnus of the substance of Deptel 2430... 2 eo Teptei 243: guidance to Lodge on improving or replacing regime Hilsran cement supplementing Deptel 253... 2.2. 2 © © ee oe we Marguerite Ziggins om Deptel 243 ; Has points out danger posed by Deptel 243; directs CIA support. . Gen. Khanh reauests assurances of U.S. support — : Taltial emtassy meeling to discuss Teptel 241. 2 2 2 ee ee es Lodge presents his credentials to Diem Saigon reports instructions given CIA officers seeing the generals Results of CIA aporoaches to the generals ...+¢.s+¢eeeecs More second thougnts on Deptel 253 Ledge ana Parkins are asked ?sr an interts aprraisal oP prospects. 1 COS believes situation has reached point of no return L Continuing concern over poor orospects for success of coup... . 10 > Taylor cables Harkins re Washington's second thoughts . a “Psylor's cable to Harkins causes Richard dson to change scenario . . 7 Steps to be taken ta get the coup back on the track “ Discussion of where coup planairg went astray” 2. 2. 1 © 1 © 6.8 « « Richardson reports collapse of coup plot in late August ..... Richardson's damage’ assessment report re Preas reports of CIA coup plotting . oo oe we ee eo se Further discussion-of ways of working: iwith Dien regine : Press reports of CIA. support of Col. Tung's Special Forees ... .° David Bell warns of aid cuts . : President centes charge that CIA makes its.own policy ...... Richardson's views on prospects for immediate future Krulak * Mendenhall reports; optimisa vs. pessinisa . .. . es.» Bundy stresses need to unify US government postire Disagreements among cowntry team members ... . ceo eo ew ww, Lodge estimates situation-worsening rapidly; urges sanctions re Discussion of steps, ‘hecessary before. deciding to cut aid... 6. - State tegins to. see no alternative. to working with.Dien. | me _Sheldon's view on Vietran; Ledge stil pursuing coup effort e ee
SS ROI wee 0 a RE it RG ENTS ein FEE DS OU) ag FR LTE NAT MT TO aaa PRE, 2 Tame TBA emt Press reports cf cissensicn in US mission Richarcson's views on need to York with 5 DOP conversation with Deve Smith re rosck Lodge changes pesition; agrees must work. « DCI writes Lodge that Lansdale not aczcepta tse - « DCI oriefing of CIA Suscomaittee of : Metiesara-Taylor report: can withdraw troops Lodse confiras nis cesire that Richardson te replaced Richardson derarts . 2. 6 ee te te ht ee ee we te Discussioa of gsidance tased on Mcilamara-Yaylor. report. . Gen. Mina requests assurances re US position o1 coup attempt... Tave Smith reccmmends we not cppose senerals'aszassization plan MeCore instructs Smith to witnadraw recemmendatica ALUS Seits convires he had deme su... a 72 ~ f Guidance to Lodze; suspension of ADD project. leans ; 30. c President approves policy or no active exeourasezent of coup... » 30, UN factefinding nission on repressioa af Buddhists 30 President comments on Ricrardson transfer; CIA follows guidance. . 32 Modivication oF policy or ro coup encouragement Ambassador's instructions re CIA contacts with generals . 1... DCT briefing of Serate foreign Belatt fons Committwee The generals’ plan for a coup in the wees following Oct 23... .. 33 Budget Bureau officer reports Locge charges against CTA rs 34 Follow-up: meetings betveen Conein acd Cen. Loa; 23 Och 2 wee ee 5 Bundy reservations over handling of contacts with generals 33 Lodge reports CIA pumctilious in carvying out bis instructions . . 35 Coup plotting; US goverment policy; DCI'’s views (36 4 Lodge confirms Conein’s bora fides to.Gen. Don...... . 2. 2 2 oe © « 5 Last Conein/Don meeting teZore the coup vas lavmoze 37 lodge gives his views on current coup plotting (29 Oct) ..... “38 Discussion of chances of success of the planned coup 38 Bundy-to-Lodge cable giving detailed guicance re coup posture .. 39 . Lodge says we bave no vower to delay or discourage a coup . . SF oe The White House rejects Lodge's views . 2. 2. . ee 2 ee wwe ie 39 Lodge thanks Washington for “sagacious instructica™ - ko Coup begins; Conein soes to JGS Has; taxes money with him .... 4O CRITIC reporting on couv identifies Conein by came - : he . The assassination ©. 2 2s 0 ewe ew ete ee ee ee ww ww we ww KB Recap ; . hh “4 aul ye fo Bo tae
This account of CIA and U.S. Coverrzent involverent in ‘the. “Vie tnanese generals’ coup of 1 Novenber 1963 is: ‘drawn: fren docuzentary sources. “fot all of ‘the docunents sumarized or quoteé bear directly on the coup itself. We included some that 7 oe 7 may seen irrelevant, because they illiminate the atmosphere in which U. S. Goverrment policy decisions were reached. ee. é interviewed only three & people in the course of this mo ot inguiry: Williaa Colby, Chief of FE Division at the time {and now) 5 . ; a Joba Richardson, Chief of Station during the coup plotting of August 1963; and David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the tine ‘of the coup/assassination of November 1963.. Each assured us that. he kmew of no CIA assassination schemes against Dien--other than the role played by CIA in maintaining contacts, by direction, with the Vietnamese generals. Many of the documents upon which this report is based are "elassified TOP SECRET. Since the report is being delivered personally and in only one copy; we have chesen not to subject —- - it to the external accountability controls that are entailed in a TOP SECRET classification. On the following page is a list of U.S. Goverment officials whose nazes are menticzed in the report, togetker with the positions
John FP. Kennedy Lyndon B. Jonasoa Meseorge Busy - ‘Dean Rusk . George We Ball d@. Averell Earriman Joseph A. Mendenhall | Frederick BZ. Nolting Benry Cabot Lodge William C. Truehart - Robert McNamara Roswell Gilpatric Maxwell Taylor Victor Keulak 5. Harry De Felt Paul D. Harkins Richard G. Weede John McCone | Gen. Marshall carter Rickard Helms John Richardson avid R. Soith Willian Colby Presiden @ Presicgeat ot oe ee Special & assist National Se Secretary of State Under Secretary of State Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs . Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs UN Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Anbassador (left Saigon 16 August 1963). : Anbassador (arr. Saigcn 23 August 1963) - DCM Secretary of Defense’ Deputy Secretary of Defense. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff? Counterinsurgency, Specialist, acs ‘CHICPAC Coomander, HACY Chief of Staff, MACY Director cf Central Intelligence DICT : Deputy. Director for Plans cIA ‘tater ¢ of ¢ Station until 5 October 1963 “CIA Acting COS after 5 October 1963 ‘Chief, FE PMvision . ..
Pa The sue ressful coup against the Dien regize tn Ssuth Vietnan, wnich resulied - in the  Geatas of #39 Dinh Dies and his. Brosh 127. “Wau - rade oe o tegen on 1 Hovess 7 53 at 1315 hours, Saigon tire = (0015 hours,! Vashington tire). Tais report on CIA and U.S..Govermment involvement in the coup. consists of a chrenological listing of event.., actions,and | deliberations having to do with Vietnam. The report is draw ei ther by quoting selectively Significant overt happenings having bearing on . official actions are included in the chronology. Facts on File, a weekly digest of vorld news, was s used as the source for these historical evegts. Also included are.a few. excerpts from Marguerité 7 Higgins' book Our Vietnam Nightmare* to demonstrate tke extent to thich some once~classified information is now common knowledge... All dates are in 1963. Riots erupted ‘in Hue. _ SNIB _53-2-63: "The Situation in South Vietnan" ram ainemminT Er re "If--as is likely--Dies fails to carry out truly and promptly -  Sarguerite Higgias, Our Vietnam Hishtmare..(New. York: Harper &:Ro ~lL-- pyts
the coumitment he. hus male to the Buddaits, dic cfars will protably flare again aad the chances of a coup or assass ination attenpts ; against him will beccme even better. - . =. .» . We do not think .. . _the Communists: would necessarily profit if he vere overthrow by some “combination of his non-Communist ‘opporents. A non-Communist successor" regise might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but, — given continued support from the US, could ‘provide reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort." SS ‘ , 14 Auzust Current Tntalligence enorandvm OCI No. 2330/63): Premors in South Vie "Coun ee 6 « The coup reports and rumors which have arisen since the Buddhist er isis seem to reflect some serious coup plotting, ; -.put we have no flr evidence of advunced planning by any group toe- . attenpt to overthrow the regime. . .«. « » South Vietnamese troops and police attackea and occupied Buddaist - pagodas. throughout. the.country.....Diem imposed nation-wide. martial..lay.... CIA participants: DCI, DaP, & Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. C/Fe. Record by C/FE. - ‘Mr: Ball recommended that ve continue to provide asylus for the | . two bonzes /Buddhist.monks/ until Lodge arrives and reviews the matter. .. It was agreed that official channels should not te’ made availadle for transmitting press dispatches by Anerican reporters in Saigon. On the 7 matter of possible’ alternate leadership in Vietran, it was vointed out _ that there was no indication that Diem was not in full control.
21 Auzust (contin nued) — “ Current’ Tntellizence “Memoranda (OCT Mo. 2341/63)! "cord in South Vietna — "Additional reports of plotting against the Diem goverment have been received. Waile there is no hard evidence of issicent: + action, the Buddaist issue continues to make the. situatica Gacgerous:". Saigon Station's Chronology of August 1963 Coun Activities At a meeting betveen Conein /an officer of the CIA Saigon Station/ and General Don, the latter asked ‘for US Goverment assurances of support | for moves against the Diem regime. CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 6333+) . - "Ref Dept. telegram in process. Reftel (unten, Has. not yet seen) © states basic line to be taken and directs it be pushed at all levels. Hileman requested Eqs. send companion telegrem to station polating* - -out that this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and who real power is. . Pressing this line can maximize possibliity of obtaining US objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can , Substantially assist in identification of alternate or Suece SOF o » leadership with necessary drive, abilities and ambition, incor. - - porate in our overall conticgency planning end serve as foeus oP, buildup program. Hqs.-will cowment in further datmil after seeing message, if necessary, but Passes & above at. ‘Hilsman' ‘S request ve CIA cable from Ssizon (SAIG 0208) alternate leaderstip: ".... . Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian goverment to replace Diem eéministratian is Chief of Station John Richardson forwards hi's personal views - re oes
f 4-O0000 my . < ‘ usreaglistic. Yne coh: Egems even more in: i Would anpear that ve shall kave ef a View time factcr have not coordinate i * we have exchanged views fully on subd he Ww : 2h August ) Telephone call from Earrizan to DD/P. Record py DD/P. f\ A3 : Mr. Harriman called Mr. Helms just cefore 2000 hours and Wy af » outlined to him the substance of what eventually turmed out to be : ot . Deptel 243 to Saigon. To Helms query, Harriman confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contuined an implicit pull out of American ; : Ok ; Yorces and support if tre Nous! were not ousted. .darrican said that 4 a Ne i Lo: the message had’ been cleared "with Eyannisport," with the Secretary } roa of State, and with Mr. Gilpatric. “ State telegram to Saigon (Dentel 243) : eee tern Wem ape ont The Department informs the Ambassador that the US sovernment : “ : cannot tolerate a situation ia which power lies in Nau's hands. If : x ae Diem is unwilling to rid himself of Nau, then Diem himself may have to : go. The Ambassador is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions against Buddhists must ce redressed; (2) to tell Ley military leaders that the USG cannot’ support a Diem regime that includes the Nhu's and 5 ' that “we will give thea direct support ia any interim period of breakdown ; a central government rechanien;” (3) to make statements in Saigon removing ~h. ° :
14-00000 $F ernie TX a, Bain bal SB bea Gopeey Tory yt ee ag ak Sn ee Li cule’ ~ an possible altermatt in sirens mead . give you catailed instructicns as to how ia proceed, but you will also kuow we will cack on actions you take to achi operation chould “you to the hilt ve our objectives.” Ke 25 August Cable frou Tilsman to Lodge (p DIR 63555} rsonal) seat via CIA channels "State cable sent separately represents agonizing | at higzest levels. Course,outlined is dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US staza is even more dangerous. It won't be easy ror you, but be assured we will tack you all the way.” (Comment: This is a good point at which to break the narrative and insert a serles of excerpts from Marguerite Higgins?’ bock: . i , . : . os ““The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek tragedy, opened with a cable. It was dicpatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24, 1953, a date made more Significant because it was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on summer vweebends or lapses into a sommolent mood as officials desperately see relaxation. - "The tell Tgran contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. embassy in Saigon. < was drawn up ata meeting called by Under-seeret Cary of State Averell Harriman and Roger Hilesan, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs and head or the Vietnem task force. The President's senior advisers were, for = 5 ~~ . - ALAA Ps eee TTT, egy ae - ar ara Pee eee we] Vewited Law Widh AN a em ee ate Tk 2 stg cot art arih weteepaly pie ater om statin oe oem oe (as ‘ bb. t i sees ete ttemenret tee
14-00000 te sagen, 3 Pas TR ed the mest part, cut of tom. CLA Director Join MeCone wes ix tty! - . . the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy of cne war ata time. It envisaged the generals’ maai-zg war on their cwn government, and with ine implicit blessing of the United States. “The substance of the cable was that the U.S. embassy was to wake an effowt to persuade Diem to fire his brother, release the ruddnist rebels, end press censorship, and restore other, cemocratic literties suspended uncer martial law. And if, as the cable anticipated, Diem would not do these things, then the encassy was to contact tre Vietnamese generals and tell thes that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt. « . . the controversial August 2h cable was dispatched fron Washington Saturday evening after being cryptically summarized to President Kennedy at the simmer White Eouse at Hyannis Port. “The acting Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilvatric ... had the cable described to him over the telephone. Mr. Gilpatric says he was frankly surprised that such an important set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not feel that he ought to veto the telesram since... it had the ‘approval of the President.' eryptically, to Richard Eelms, cesuty who also did not feel disposed to veto the President.'” FON AT Oe dion bog eae cedte AS ewe nt tte Poorer me ga pepe bie bata Ame te iat a esteem pecs ie, Saereenieerchermtees sine wer eteo renee neat ta Poms oy mere ee
ae) whe ee however cleared at hizhest levels. believe CIA must Fully accept directives of policy mekzers and seex ways accomplish. Objectives they seek. While have not seen exact text, understand it invites Lodge final judmment...... Yanser in present course of actlon appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately "FYI CIA not consulted re cable {4 identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. Thus suggest a real search Por courses af antian epatvch wef ont tote Om ccurses of action which mignt retain options in our hands at same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we probably unable to affect it.) This bolls down to seeking sare middie ground for at least interim period. .....%7 CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0291) / Chief of Station Richardson reports that General Khanh requested an immediate meeting with Spera /an officer of the CIA Saigon Station/. At the meeting Khanh requested essurances that the U.S. Government would support the Vietmamese army if it should move against the Diem Regime. / CIA Cable from Saigon (SATG 0296) Richardson reports the results of a conference anong Ambassador Lodge, DCM Truehart, Generel cariins, General Weede, and Rickardson. fhe group agreed that giving Diem an option had no chance of success. Taey accepted Deptel 243 for 2k August/ as a basic decision from Settee SEES ASPET POSES, Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions. FP ye om Teme oa ieee Oe iad ° Cideidem a Lice awilbd - i r i
OS ee ga . osm ONT AR ee rae Lge eee a & as g a vay os, ot ails tale) Nairn tant orsgy f Way 4 ar . Gia iaeei i a Or his views on possible Successor hy tide 0-03, Internal ONS Working Paner "On talance, we believe the be St hope for the preservation 97 U3 interests und attainment of ys objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup dtetat by anti-Communist rationalists WLth te sufficient military supoort to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a Group might not prove able to Salvage the situation and, indeed, might . . uote / eventually prove no better than the present regime. Such a deve lorment ™ ° would, however, ezable the US and anti-Communist nationalist clements . iN, to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered oy volitical errors 4 Sa { _ Of past years, months, and weezs. In such a fresh Start, we believe, oa pT ewe” lies the only viable hope for the attainment of US interests and . ( ; objectives in South Vietran." Ambassador Lodge presented his credentials to South Vietnarese uo President Ngo Dinh Dien. ; ? 26 Presidential Meeting on Viet ng nan. CIA particivants: DDCT 2 ppp. Record oy Db2. _ manera Oy VP. The question was raised 2s to whether there had been such a “po Significant change in the Vietnam situation that it really appeared desirable to dimp the Mhu's and possibly Diem himself, -Principal points discussed were: Admiral Felt's concern over the dangers inherent in the current US action in South Vietnam; the fact that Lodge had not seen Diem to discuss the Future rele of the ihu's; i iy re we com
Re ri t prez Btate. SosmerBEE, the meaning of the parase * in Deptel 243; the guest ection taken over the weexend failed. Sesston on August eT with participants to pres key Si persoralitie €3 and 4 contingency plan for ney nenneeeeeeteeeenemnee ie aa ae CIA cable from Saigon (SATS 030%) wR paigon (SATS 0304) Richardson reports thzt the Ambassador decia Secor co official hand should not skow in the operation. would see Khiem and that Spera sould see Khanh. directed to convey the substance of Deptel 243, p "We cannot be of any help duri PTT east eater eas we aatinely their om ection, win or lose." CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0330) ee patgon {SATG 0330) give direct sunport te eilitary co: wnders" & as « estion of Succession; and whet would ke ‘initial action of assuming ppen if the asked For another the | su ccession. ARES aOR -« VERE EEO POET aéa that the American It was egreed that Conein Conein and Spera werep ins this coment: power of Richardson reports the results of the Conein/Svera approaches to the generals. "said he would have te check with Minh.. epee tetera ame ne cine ag aI 2T Angust Presidentiol Meeting on Vietnan. CTA barticiznan C/E. Record by C/Fe. would be successful The President stated that & coun should not be et and asked whether we could turn back at this po In essence, Khanh said he was not yet ready, and Khien “Sennen earner eo nema woe DR ely Bio: _DDOE, DOP, & UG, eltempoted unless it int. Ieee etree enti Ne rep ee ae at |
F-90000 Sten ef j— a as ao : nt i t t t gnent of Lodge 2nd Harri F or the prospects fer victory or defeat of a&coup. A cab wa {yt asking if they still agreed with their concurrences £ o wa a xf ct a he NM ra A t- State telezran to "Examination of Teports to date gives considerad leaves unanswered cuasti - + Proceeding fr outlined in Bestel 2h épprelsal of present eth ail ar favor oreration as Ree | 28 August CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0363) wee EE od Saigon {SAIG 03653) Richardson reports that: "Situation here has resched point of ho return. >... . Unless the generals are neutralized before heizg able to launch their perations, we believe they will act and t: se enrent mindsets mimgngle seme an nth anc that they have good charce to vin... ee . We all tha i ; effort mst succeed and th - ‘Aeeensranenceere % my must be done. . . . » e Presidential Mest ng on Vietnam. CIA participants: PBDCI, orp, 2 he Presicent inewired into the status of E25 plans and was ¢ . ————— ee SE Bors ond was told .. : that these were well worked out. State Departrent parti . a ey AEE : — : i i . . : sae i insisted that Diem and Nhu hed betrayed and double-cressed4 us and we { had no obligations to them and that we cannot win with Dien and Ae. | ' ' \ ‘ 6 ped [o) 4 aT archtop te Ree ee Au . a 4 : sooo ar + . EY a atte Wh
14-09000 ¢ ( a ay: The presicent commented that we had been Winning until August. Nolting expressed nis con 2 that Diem Is the only man who can run South Vietnan in any fashion to permit a continuance of the war effort. He bel jas eved we should make another try to keep Diem. Harriman directly disagreed with hin. The President directed that a telegrem-be prepered to seni to Lodge and Harkins asking their view of the chances of success, expressing concern aver the unfavorable ratio of forces, end inviting ae their suggestious as to how we could increase their possibilities. The President called for another resting later in the dey, ese eeemennil gp I LTTE ET TT EEO NSC Executive Comittee Meeting on Vietnam. CIA participants not identizied. Record by DDS. Dacia nden tenance nanan Matai The President met privately with Rusk, McNamara, Taylor and MeGeorge Bundy. He reported to the rest of the three telegracs were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to Lodge from the President, a general message from the Department to the Ambassador, and a telegram from Taylor to Harkins. elegran from Taylor to Harkins (JCS 33%68-63) "Important White House meeting on subject scheduled for 1200 28 August EDT, your views urgently needed on overall feasibility of operation contemplated. . . . . . FYI State to Seigon 2h3 was crevared without bop or JCS participation.  Auctnorities are now meving second ( ‘5 rahe s re bas) ewe ls prey -« . meee ce oe TTR seat aeaaeime oem orm ae gy Ome TS Wt te Bes OR ee PHO : i i i 7 | os ren Se td
29 fugust Seigon Stetion's chrozolozy of August 1953 coun activities At O74S5 hours, Richardson, Spera and Conein, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact Generals Minh and Khiem at G215 same morning, were shown a iesseze from General Teylor to General Harkins stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at Waite House and commenting that second thoughtawere beginni £ Faced with this information and given strictly linited tine factors, Richardson decided that the meeting with General{s Minh and Khiem shouwlé not be ti a SOP, ne ; d fr ir and Minh, we preceeded to Prusheart's office to make our Teport. The 2 Ambassador came in and Richardson advised him of our meeting with General Weede, of Taylor's casle, and of the decisions which Richardson had made ag @ result cf the Taylor cable. Lodge was angry and C Seger expressed the view that Richardson's decision had destroyed the possibilities af carrying cut a ccup. Richardson expressed a firm dissenting cpinion." WE-HSC Executive Comittee Meeting on Vietnam. CIA | not identified. Record by Dor. wee ¥ The consensus was that Harkins should confirm to the gecterals that 7 the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the : US government. There was agreement that better information was needed oy: ; ‘ “on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether it was :! militarily feasible. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was ; * ‘ drefted for Presidential scproval. &. eet ope Lebar bepemtatpetitep yey: i : t { t i i nanan rteseecmene epee reeere ae cee Repeerienretcengrinesen ange te tee: eetieeen are ntne resumes ieee oere
14-00000 ior eee a CTA particinants: DNCT i Ps% referred to recent cable tr ffic and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing with or what they were Planting. Min MelYamar mara pointed out there Was some question whether the enerals ever Bp = & esperar did have a plan. Bundy said he had re-read the earlier traffic ang noted that they never said they did. Gen. Carter saic he believed that hci aii < the general's coup Was not likely et this Stage and that in another ; : Week we will be approximately where we were before the attack on the Buddhist temples. Bundy Suggested we consider additional contingencles before the group and whether the assumption that Nhu is impossible is well founded. 32 Augist Saigon Station's chronology cf August 1963 coun activities . “General Harkins wag authorized to meet with EKhiem to give ; . . Khtem assurances of USG backing. Khien skowed & reluctance to talk . { and suggested that Harkins meet with Gerersl Minh. Khiem commented ” | that Mich had called off the Plannins ani wes working on other methods : which Khiem would not @escrite. Khien #o-ther Stated that the generals ¥ were not ready as they did not have encughk forces under their control. Harkins decided not to give Khien essur. i exces which he had been authorized to impart. Lodge approved Harkins! Gecision on 31 fugust efter Yorkins rl , { reported. . NATTA, i { t - 13 - ‘ | . a + : = - - 3 Se oid sy Sell ust! { 4 a, 3 ne
Dict Rusk suggested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam ‘Steere actateoen ltt entre =, co] ituation nade us think of 4 coup and what misht be done to improve onditicns in Vietnam, MoNamara Suggested the first requirement wag % reestablishment of commnication between Lodge and Harkins. Rusk directed that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to wheat we might ask the GVM to do. “Site, , ¢ , Calef, FE, who particivated in the meetinzs of late August, r OF see” in a resorandun for Walter =lder provide Ss Xu differing nositic-s iazan "In the discussions Guring the past week, the position of the Department of State, led by Ball, Harriman, and Hilsran, was that the Diem-Nnu government had couble-crossed the US Government because of ; the ettack on the pagodes and that US obligations to the government were no longer valid. further, that a government so discredited could . not conduct successfully the war in Vietnam ard would prove an “ undesirable liability to the US Government elsewhere in Asia. Because of cn these moral, military and political conclusions, the Department recommerded that it must give all support to a group of generals who allegedly were disaffected to the point that a clear indication of US “action was the only ingredient lacking for them to push over a discredited, unpopular and weak Dien government. . , . "The position of the Departzrent of Defense was that while it wed geplored the sensational esnects of the Buddhist situation, it out. . nonetheless felt that an effort should be contimed to deal with Dien _ end try to bring ebout a compromise, and at the same time to Keep in touch with the generals and Support the coup efforts, i? this praved to be the only alternative left. This wes essentially the view of General Harkins and of Ambassdor Uolting. This was considered by the Department of State to be a Poot-dragzzing and weak position. on ta e an ~ Th. : 4} 4 « Ss AP TA tte res oe cae *° a mel ESE aby iid whe EG ho gil” i I ; i | ; ; mel algterternenne mh cae ve when nes caperiiereroey orem sped rere ete awe,
4-90000 < ~- & Ae ae a ger te eB Loe . ron : “¢ f , was § # ‘ome President viewed the Stave Departrent's positioa with consideraple reserve cul was willing to explore the coup ices further. ; i : : He and the Attorney Generel (as well as CIA) were apparently appalled a eat the speed with whieh the State ¢ecisica was reached on Saturday ub AX 4 felt that mere thougat, analysis and of Jk “f nave preceded the instruction to Lodge." oO > re) be we o ? Q | E Bp e 3 OQ = "This particular ¢oup . . « « Generals did not feel Of ready and aid not have murricient balance of forcese «+ + + + ° There is little doubt that GVH evare US role end may have considerable Getaiie 2 es 8 " ot é y 2 September a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523) | a Richardson cabled a damage assessment. the Nhu's are fully ewere that the USG encouraged the generals to coe retenyen mnettnnatetmareeraty ences ae Ee concluded that Diem and enon vert ansarvmmmncsta.mm eevtiamanacenm manahinns ars cae mame esemmmmmeste nee ra a.cumnmnans any § we ALY VAS wetnees canes tee . . attempt a coup and that CTA was the instrumentality of this encourage- a \ N a ment. He judged there was an even possibility that ell major prograzs _ could go forward asin the past. He listed as & major dilema the : : , Station's future relationships with Col. Tung. He noted his dissatis- fection with Tung as a GVH Liaison yenicle through which to conduct FM _— _.- programs, but noted that the GVH hea offered ro alternative. Unless ve were willing to discomtime our WVN, Laos border, and cross-border prograis; : 4 we mist contimue to work with Turns. | e . t | . t - 15 - ; { . . a { aA . uti rye asus { - ee es Ved Le ing : . - “ roe a mete eo ate tl ade Se Fe ene A UR het Ee, Llp REE =o SHORE EL tay ase te ENT ‘ : | i a
~The Times of Vietnam published charges that the CIA wes plotting and financing a coup and was. giving asylum to the chief anti-Diem 4 Buddhist leader.» The story was ‘picked up and widely played by the .., New Yor Daily News,.the Chicago Tribune, Baltirore Sun, and other prominent newspapers. 6 sevtesber pe Ee Oe 7 a ce eel - . . . : oe ' . fo . i ’ Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA varticipants: DD? & C/FEz, Record by DDP & C/fE. Rusk stressed the immediate need for direct contact between Lodge . and Diem. Bundy pointed out the necessity of advising Lodge not to have a real show-down with Dien over Nhu at this forthcoming meeting, es one of Lodge's cables indicated he was headed very mich in this ~ direction. Rusk agreed ta do this. The President agreed with the desirability of. silencing Madame bu but expressed some doubt that -Him's participation’ was as fatal as State seemed to say it 1 WAS. Rusk commented that :the: country ‘team had stated its feeling that ier im mist go, to whi Leh the President replied: that they may have been operating under directives received from here. |
wo . “Wire services and prominést newspapers carried & story that the” | Special : Forces troops who raided the pagodas on 21 fugust were still | being paid secretly ‘by CIA. - This. story was attributed to a highly reliable source in Washington and.gave details of support to Col. ung in the anount of $3 million enmally, and a payment of $250 thousand on 3 September. The story vas datelined in Washingtca and ‘payid Bell warned in a television interview that the US Congress” might cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem governnent changed its policies. (Comment: The U.S. Goverment publicly confirmed on _ 8 October 1963 that aid had already been cut, quietly and over a period of some months. --BLLL Colby, Jocko Richardson, - ‘and Dave Smith each told us that the public amiouncesent of the aid reduction was a "signal" to the generals and that a reduction was planned with ‘that in mind. It say be that the & in aid was Geliberately planned to spur the generals en, but,. ’ 4f so, that intention dic not find its way into the wr tten. record. ‘The nearest thing to it is in the record of a Presidential meeting of 10 September 1953. The Presiden. asked Rufus Faillips, »
actions Phillips would recorzena and | d “cutz 2g aié to. Colonel. Tung: which wouldnbe, viewed by the: ‘Generals wita guch enthusiass ‘and: as an indication of. . & vigorous Anericaa position.” In general, ‘though, aid cuts were discussed in texas‘ of bringing pressure on Diem to sake necded changes in his regime. However planced or however looxed upon by the U.S. administration, ait is clear that the ‘Vietnamese generals considered the official confirmation of aid cuts a3 a clear toxen: of U.S. support of their coup planning. Spera and Conein set with Generals Minh and Khiem on 29 A The following are excerpts from the cabled report of the " meeting (SAIG 0406): ; "If USA now really ready taxe different position, generals want firm evicance to that effect... - Queried as to what ve can do-to show we mean business, “Minh: flatly Stated, stop economic aid to force Nhu. to show his hand.” The suspension of aid did not force Diem and Nau to mend their vay, but it did. create an atmosphere that made it easier for . : ® the generals to assenble ‘the military ‘Support needed for a successful. ‘coup. }-
~ ene sen 10 Sevtember In an taterview by Huntley end Brinkley the charge that CIA makes its own policy. Sauna taaeeeeeeeaeetenteeeeeenneeeemeenenmnennn aaa - CIA cable from:Seigon (SAIG. 0760) "Am inclined to feel gereral officers will seek evolutionary acccemodation with Dien (if he permits them to do so} unless cverall situation clearly ceteriorates, there is preakdown of civil order or governmental macninery, or unless war effort begins to go backward seriously. .« . . . Despite. @amges suffered since § May and 21 August, am inclined to belleve we should be able resume successful prosecution of war in military and civil sections... . . Bo not align myself with the view that UNG showld suspend aid. ..... " sidentisl Meeting CIA varticinents: DCI & C/FE. ‘Record by C/c=. Gen. Krulak reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions vere that the var is going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Viet Cong war will be won if current US military and sociological - programs are continued. Mendenhall, the State representative who " aecampaniea Krulak, expressed the view that there was a complete break- - . “down of the Saigon ‘civilian goverment and the securtty situation in i the provinces had deteriorated. ‘The President asked whether the two . . EI eee TSE gentlezen had visited the same country. Rusk Suggested that the focus be on what happened:in July and August that reversed the optinistic juégzents in May and June. Mr. McCone talzed from a personal telegram be had received from Richardson recommending against any cut in aid.
buh Bath! Bundy st cressed the need to unify ¢ se US Govern resent posture, to Ly aE nr coordinate press guidance, and to control outgoing messages to Saigon. He emphasized the importaace or following the President's Zuldaace on this delicate Vietnam ‘provlea, despite intensely differtag views as to vhat should be done, how, the risks, minioum objectives, and ‘the facts. | * Mermara Stated that his Position was vigorously against throwing out ‘this goverment without seeing an alternative and that none appeared | ’ » McCone commented that the problem was not &6 much the “existence of an Alternative 43 how to put one into Power. Bundy “samart zed the President's position as one in which -ve must -express “our reservations as to ‘the mistakes end misdeeds of Diem but not be in a position where we cannot deal with him further. “UL Septenber CIA cable from Saigon (SAIC. 0797) : rte EV ALG: OF OT} Richardson reported that the country team attempted to agree on : @ Blx-page Summary cable to answer a cable from the Department requesting: views. The tean was unable to azree m the first three pages of
€: summary was too sweeping and too negative, coneludiag definitively ae about the country as a.wnole onan inadequate basis of data. He said: “In ‘some ways we. seem to have reached the point in official American ; community that, if you think ve can win with present government, you are Simply not running in right direction with majority.” State telegram fron Saigon (40. 478) Lé {oe we "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is: (a) that | it is worsening rapidly; (b) that the time has arrived for the US to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the - a existing govermment-and the installation of another; and (c)*that * 7 intensive study should be given by the best brains in the government to all the details, procedures, and varients in commection with the suspension of aid.” McNamara pointed out that Lodge has had littie contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone cemented that he believed that we should move cautiously, that ve should talk seriously to Diem = - and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a -more realistic view.of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also Suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooreration. . : . ae f _ in a departure. The Fresicent asked whether we had carefully studied EEE EES eS SECT EES 003 Say ATED the detailed effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper. vrepared by Hilezan). It was evident that the effects had not been studied.
Peres fe y sit! area The President asked DOD aia CIA to analyze the Hilsman paper. Ee eel ANSARI, also asxed that a “Gelegras “be sent to  Lodze ‘dsking . him to try a , “h reduce the press deataze in Saigon and to establish scre real contact with Diem. Any current plass. for aid negotiations should te stalled, ana the President said he should be well informed of any steps taken in this context--such as the incident involving CrA payszent to 1. Turg last week. . WD September (continued) . ; oo ke HSC Executive Comittee Meeting on Vietnan. CIA participants: DCI & C/Fe.  Recore oy C/7e. Rusk said he believed that we were not likely to ‘achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminate Nhu. ‘At the same tie Annan a-tett tags neonate aS LIS TT . he was not willing to say that Diem should go, as he saw no alternative.. Rusk commented that we should work through Lodge on Diem to take over ' the real leadership and became the real president. Mr. McCone suggested also the desirabitlity of negotiating «ith Nhu. Bundy read off a CIA . sugzestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu. ~ 13 September a, . ; ot -CIA cable frou Saison (SAIG 0890) OT — situation ‘th Viet tnam. “Be ‘included : as part oF his report the substance ~ 22 eAry cyte * SEGRET-EViS OLY SOT ea RN EAE ETS ST NEN BES A ah BORE atm es NO SAP
_» Qharging MAC] with making araroach to SVW wilitary, ‘he -nentioned- Gen. . Don, to attempt stimlate early coup action with a ate US : assurances. J inquired had Ambassador rade such proposal to Washington 15 Septesber "Nef Sheehan writing from Saigon stated that the various elements of the US mission in Vietnam vere so badly divided that Washington bad intervened. He said: "The only civilian official still strongly in favor of going along with the Ngo femily regime is the Chief of _ the Central Intelligence Agency here.” On the same day, Devid Halberstam stated that high US civilian officials in Saigon vere end political situation is deteriorating. Fe said that "the Chief of”. * the Central Intelligence Agency favors all-out support for the ‘Present * Septoa but that alpost- all other members of his staff are ‘exbittered over the raids on the pagodas. They also feel their Chief's close , association with Him, while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence : wey |
| Pickardson ‘replied to Washington's request for his. judgneat on the “Jesmabisty and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was ae thea. in the course of constructing an agreed plan. Ee cabled: “Je must go on trying to win war with curreat administration Yor as long as it persists in power. .. . . . We should not attezpt publicly to achieve osjectives witn. respect. to GV when probability of attaicment is virtually nil. .'. . . . We cannot covertly tinser with or engineer a coup usless general situation Ls reasonably propititious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contacts with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means.’. . . . . Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure Diez, within context of persuading him, to take steps needed. These measures would be more effective if wey are linited — te practical and achievable objectives. . 2... - Memorandua for the Record prevared by DDP "Smith . . . discussed with me... reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson. ... .- - Mike Duna. . . had. we told Conein . . . that Lodge was gcing 'to get rid of Richardson’. « «e's » « Of one octasion Dunn asked Conein, "Do you think that Dave "Smith: can mm the station for a tesporary period while anew Station - Chief is being sent cut here?'" . 19 September _ ot Loage to the President: State telesren fron Saigon (to. Siu) ER ee TA TTA . "Y agree that no gcod opportunity for action to remove present
we S80} ve Personal letter ?ron McCone to: Lodze < "J was told by Dean Rus« that you hed vronosed that Gereral Lansdale . .. replace Richardson as Chief of Station. ..... Iwish to emphasize that the Agency will reorient the Saigon Station ,in asy practical way to meet your desires. Fersonnel, including the Station Coief, can be replaced. . ... . Lansdale would sot be acceptable to the o erly - If the es Soreness then "Trence ner 2a estimate in hand 3 which would lead us to the conclusion that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is “pot however to say that a coup mi ght not cccur even before you receive this letter. 7: soe 23 Sentenber "per briefing of CIA Subcomnittee of House Arzed Services ‘The Director said there aid not appear to be any cohesive military group > capable of ousting the Diem regime, and further that’ there eppeared to be no replacement for. the then current regime that was capable of running the governments - A nev “regime probably would be no better. Consequently, the Agency was urging a cautious, slow , epproach to the problem.
14-00000 gq 7 i i sas by US military personn " h October - . paptnmernnn merece menace neal Kesiaay, Loa! Dt ail ee ct eee wee a eet te FT ee Situation. Their program be was the report in which McNamara recommenced that a established to train Vietnamese so that essential Puncticus performed el could be carried out by Vietramese by the end of 1965. He thought it would then te possible to witadraw the bulx of US personnel. 3 October oo . Personal letter from Lodge to McCone eo 8 @ & * -t agre e with what z understand McNamara has seid to you. ce Richardson as a devoted aad patriaticuAmesi cate © 6 8 oe . iu v4 ee CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 1397) " . . .. . In sum, it is clear that Lodze wants a change in Chief of Station. .... . Departing Saigon 1820 hou $5, etober ee (Comment: Richardson's ceparture vas based on a Leadquarters cs re request that she return to headquarters cn TDY as soon us possi “Upon Richardson's departure, his deputy, David R. Smith, becane Acting Chie? o? Station.” bc rompgts peek amis TIRE Preah By oh eae i Se aT . Coane seme Mr MMC NA lah 4 MERO Meee nee TF Fe eb Pe Rare HOE REPTILE ORI OM EEL ETM TORUS FOUR GTD LINGER: Ere eS aE Or EE REE RAR O NN ANTE sans SITE BERS EE ALONE LM TORE RIR 2-4. eS int NRT Res wl or oral sapecent a sole mnemegemen ee Towne mare erenpte #ypnapatesiveentie 2+ i i i t
rresigential leet! c= Vietnes. tA varticir The meeting was held to discuss matters that became the subject: . of Deptel 534 [Fee later entry of 5 Octoter ct said it was the opinisa of CIA (with the exception:of:Coloy, C/rs) that fiddling with the Commodity Import Program as a political lever would be such ve. lizely to create an economic crisis undermining the var effo than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more cooperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning of the Vietnamese - business communi ty and quickiy engender inflationary measures among the population at large of a more serious nature. It.was the consensus of the meeting that some meaningful © political movements had to be nade, but- exactly what they should be was not. determined. - ‘IA cable fran Saigon (SATG 1445) ote BS yore October), General Minh requested a statenent of the US positioa with respect to a change in the GVE: in the.near fiuture.. He said he did not expect USG support of:a. coup.effort, but did reed USG assurances that the USG would not try. to thwart his plans. He outlined
14-00000 wet be . tye =e * tadhoFe. isd rat ee hia] 22g pe fq fe aca wl Steps . i: = Te oy fr 3 wos 4 oe 4 Pgh san pn tae Fe wean = PF meee, eet, Che change of government: (a) assassination of Neo Dink assy Diem in office; (>) PrN ERT KSAT and (c) direct coup and loyalist military units in Saizon. east } 1 5 October (continued) : mo | if CIA cable from Sai gon (SAIG 1447) x? : Tave Smith, the Acting COS, cabled that he nad discussed this : . : eee Smith reported that he had recommended to Ambassador Lodge that: “de ‘ saree inl 20°C ACTA SAITO SEE TT  TPTSTT SSEELR F Se RI EES STII AT LD Canad | | 7“. . letest Conein/Minh meeting with Antassador Lodge and DCM Truehart. td do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, | & since the otrer two alternatives mean either a dloodcath in Saigon i “4, Regret TAN er SEP TS ene i : or @ protracted struggle which could rip the aray and the country : a ‘menses venene nramnnieniaceesa nett ASE TE IO ET EC |: * asunder." : a ee EAT | bo st (Ccsment;: th's recormendation to Lodge cn assassination drew a prompt response from headquarters. The two entries that follow interrupt the chronology. They are put here to complete ct the story on this sicnificant episode : CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 73551 «. " , . . MeCone directs that * beetatteanen ene? : . to Ambassador [eons rive? sssassinati ‘instructions, as we cannot be in posi course of action and thereby enzazing A he wah re pond tee & ata AD Us inte eR adechet Serer ome # ae
i¥4-00000 eran: a ining OO ied be ita ne vam anes Oo CIA cable fros Saigon (SAIG 1463 of 7 Cetober) "Action taken as directed, In addition, since DCM ‘Prueheart was also present when original recamendation was ‘made, specific withdrawal of recommendatica at McCone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Aetna ssador Lodge cammented that he shares McCone's opinica.
aes tee ce We cast Bo crm deo fy 5 Ostober (continued) - State cable to Saigon (Lentel No. 534): Tae Department cabled guidance to the Ambassador resulting from WSC consideration of the 2 October McNamara-Taylor report. these points were included: (1). Extsting susvension of new comitrents under the AID Commodity Import Program will be maintained. (2) PL 480 (condensed milk) will be handled on a monta-to-month basis but will - not be suspended. GQ) AID Project ‘Loans will be “suspended fer review.” _(%). Ambassador should continue his policy of “cool correctness” toward CVA. te Kouse cable_to Saigon (CAP 63560) _ ", » » President today approved recommendation that no initiative should now be taxen to give any active covert encouragement te @ coup. There should, however, be urgeat covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identi? fy and build contacts with n possible alternative leadership as and when it appears » 2. . .. The UN General Assembly agreed to send a fact-finding mission _ to South Vietnam to investigate charges of goverment oppression of. Buddhists.
74-90000 testinony taken during | its probe.) nee one en Ate, 087 SON itey Eadie mcr eeneaetee (Coment: the fact-finding group left New York 21. October and arrived in Saigon on the 2th. “It first met with Mzo Dinh® Khu and then vi isited the ¥a Lol pagoda, considered the comand post. of the Buddhist protest.movement, where it found only two monks and South Vietnazese secret-policenen. A planned visit to the An Quang pagoda was barred by the Diem goverment. ‘The mission did manage to visit An Quang on 27 October and interviewed Thich Tinh Keit in the presence of a number of - secret police. The 1 November generals’ coup interrupted the ‘pission's work, and it left South Vietoam on 3 November. (The UN General Assembly accepted without vote on 13,- December a decision to discontinue investigation of alleged 7 ‘yepression of Budéhists in South Vietman. Assembly President - Rodriguez said Buddhist oppression by the government -had ~ ceased to be an issue since the ouster ef the Diem government. - (the fact-finding commission had issued. its report on 7 i Decenber. ‘[t arrived at no conclusions but merely detailed a. SEC2T-EYES AL Sage ber ae ety
"I know that the transfer of Mr. Jona Riczerdson, who is a very cedicated public servant, has led to curmises, but I can assure you Platly that the Cia has not carried Out incepenceat activities, but has operated unéer close control of the Director of Central. Intelligence operating under the--sith the cooreration of the National Security Council and under sy instructions." CIA cable to Saigon - Eyes Cnly for Ambassador (DIR 75228) - " . « « « »« While ve do not wish to stitulate coup, we also do not wish to leave impression that US would thwart a change of government or deny econcsic end military assisiance to a new regime if it appearec capable of increesing effectiveness of military - effort, ensuring populer support to win war and improvicg working relations with US." The cable urges that the contact with Minh om press for"detailed information. clearly indicat: ing. that. Minh's plans offer a@ high prospect of success.” ffi (Comment: William Colby is the originator of this cable yer ae and it vas released by @ Cable. Secretariat Duty Officer by i direction of Colby. The text states that these “additional cu a general thoughts” had been discussed with the President and _ REA ET ES SS ET ET Ree TT ae that the cable had been cleared with “higa officials in White ‘House, State, Defense and CIA.")
10 Octocer The Ambassador Lostrict ted CTA not to initiate contact with - Generals Minh or Don, ‘but if the genérals initiate contact, such ne . contacts were authorized: In the course of reet tings with Miah or Don, assurances were to be given as specified in DI T8228 of 9 October. Pek DCE briefing of Senate Foreign Felations Comzittee. DCL briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Camittee. could sey positively would be an improvement over Blem. Therefore it has been our counsel that we must proceed cautiously, otherwi a situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the Communists would cane ont the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines.” 7 We have not seen a successor goverrment in tke wings that fein, 23 October Saigon Station! s mHist of the Vietnamese Cererals' Coup” won At a meeting with Conein requested by General Don, Don said a i the generals had decided totry to s tage 2 coup within a veek ‘following 26 October. Conein, under instructions, passed the substance of DIR 74228 to Don. . Don pronised he vould seek permission of the coup: “committee | to give Conein their political plan for the Ambassador! s eyes only. - oe Sm ere ease aetna EE Rinse Fide BC ReAR NG AP Aatee canine cde SADR a RST ara Bm nts a
25 Osteve Peliouins & meeting SE nenmeth Hansen, Bureau or tre Budzet At Eansens initial meeting with Lodge, Lodge made these charges: (1) CIA was izpreperly dealicg with Imu; (2) CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operations azong the pill tribes; (3) CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddhists and was caught by surprise; (4) Richardson kad a palatial mansion and entertained government officials there; (5) ‘The CIA Station was too Jarce and too visible; (6) CIA acted on its own initiative without coordination and without any control from either the Ambassador or Washington. Bensen. said he later reported to Lodge that he thought Lodge's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything CIA had done tn Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordizated - with and carried out under the directions of the Fadassador, and had been carried cut with both good guegnent and a high quality of perforsance. ; Hansen noted that at the time of his first meeting with Ledze, Lodge had not yet had a full briefing on what the Agency was doing. ‘took place a few days later. SECRETE (e
Conein‘b held —e nee tings with General Don on 24 October.” EE rere Den on 24 Octobre Boa reported he had been in® orzed b, Ceneral Farkins that the U.S military would not thvart any coup plans. Dea said the coup plans were conplete; “thet the necessary military units vere available: and ee a cena that the coup would occur no later than, 2 Haovember. In the second. —— 7 a meeting, Don said the c tee refused to turn over the political | “Plan but authorized Don tg to outline its substance CtA cable to Saigon (DIR 78161) oe Ice rr creer Peperenrneerarreaneg way danger Mhu Pees entra Fuent througa | Conein, °  F ‘ » which he did. , : x cn meetiz a neral Don and Conein who has carried out Sac: nStance explicitly. ~~ 7. {tetera ures aRUNTS . ANTES Presidential Mee ting On Vietnam. CIA particica
The President stated that the purvoce of meeting was to consider: Q) recent ac estons in SV with res spect to coup Plaraisg pry carn a ard qualifications of the ‘Snaividuals: reporting; “and (ey our * polie in Svn,as he wished - to be assured there was uneninity within the poverment prior to the | return.of Ledze for consul tations. .ta2 DCI (ow? stated his vlews in detail. In essence, he held: (1) Don sight ve Jt 2 an bi managed hy Nhu; (2) CIA has no control and therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) Don could have a coup in the maxing and ‘could pull it off; (4) We are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional manner; 5) Successful coup would lead to confusion 9% 7 - because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) Cne coup vould be followed by another and the war might ve lost during period of — ae : political confusion; (7) Civilians capable of running SVN cculd not . 7 be injected into the governzent and exercise effective control; (8) Cannot discuss important political issues with Diem because,of the . policy of “correct, cool attitude:" (9) We either have to work with : Diem and Nbu or ve have to take aggressive steps. to remove then, and’ it is not clear that the succeeding govermment would be mich better. ‘Rage AO Te : : “~* Saigon Station's “History of the Vietnamese Generals’ Coup™ . -. General Don esked Ledge if Conein was speaking for the Anbassador. a es “hides will
Don told the Nmtassador that the The Auoassador agreed vith Done Sn eel 28 October (continued) "nistory of the Viotnamese Generals’ Cop” ' Saigon Sta ation’ s ry th ia Conein met with General Don for the last tize before the coup: + ar Ambassador who “yas launched. Don confirced that he had talked with the Don stated he was leaving on 29 Octoser to had vouched for Conein. coordinate final plans. Bon requested Conein to remain at home Don repeated that the - beginning 30 October--until further notice. c Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began, but wien: pressed on his previous commitment to make then available 48 hours in advance, Don sald that possibly the plans could only be made available four hours in advance. Don said nothing would be happening within the son for the Aubassador “next 48 hours and that, 4f there was a good rea the Ambassador would be to change his planned 31 October devarture, the 4nforned in time to make his own decision.
29 Ozstober ——_—T “CIA cable fros) Saison (sare 2040) ° In an eyes only. cable seat via CLA: channels, Lodge gives his views on the seemingly imminent coup: "In summary, LL woo “appear tnat a coup attempt ty tae gecerals' group is imminent . .. and that mo positive action by tae USG can prevent 2 coun attempt short of informing Dien and Nhu. -.» « » « . Although there heave been no requests to date by the generals for material or financtal support, we nust aaticipate that such request may te fortheeming. ..... L._ Presidential nest sz Mietmam— CIA participants: DCI, DDP . ‘It was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, Harkins, . Trueheart, and David Snith act as a committee to direct any coup operation. DCI’ countered with - tre view that Smith should not be" e involved in such a policy-making function, although he would be in _'. ° & position to provide technical advice to Harkins and frueheart as | well as carry, out their inst tructioas in the operational field. The [President stated that if the forces in Saigen were not clearly in ” favor of the coup, we should discourage its launching..] The Attorne mey . wre ‘General felt the US was risking too much btased on flimsy evidence. _ The DCI stated his view that even a Successiul coup would create a . period of interregou and confusion which might only be solved by Ba second or third coup.
y 30 Cotober sv GIA cable to Saigon (DIR 79209) «np wenw ginustontnnraendon mE YO LOS Sete” 2 oo « » Chances of action with or.without :°°- ee : our epproval now so significant that we should urgently consider our ot oe attituce and centingency plans. ... . . Believe our attitude to : ; ; coup group can still have decisive effect on its decision. ; .... We must have assurance balance of forces: clearly fnvorable. .. .'. fe ; Conein should express to Don that we go not Pind presently: revealed Plans.give clear prospect of quick results. .... . We badly need . seme corroborative evidence whether Minh and others directly and ~.* completely involved. . ... . highest authority a Saudade aay understcod that after your departure lerkins should participate in. super‘ision of all coup contacts and that in event a coup begins, Rr he become head of country team. .... . emcee err ee ~ ~_ “CIA cable from Saigoa (SAIG 20637 «+ » « . G9 not think dela, coup. Lon tas made it clear many tires that’ this is a Vietz jeaim. » . « . . LT believe we should continue our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor ; _and press for more detailed inforsation. CAS has been analyzing , forces for same time and it is their estimate that the generals have ~. hoe _ probably figured their chances pretty closely. .... . It does tnt eRe ete sin renee not seem sensible to have the military in charze of a matter which ; ‘ is so profoundly political as a change of goverment. .... « ; ; As t sts from the generals, +5 dads par eee’ A . ; . e@ extent that tc can be passed discree jie “ mee DOUL PUEBISD 1027 teeta » Le we were convinced that the coup 7. was going to fail, we vould of course do everything. we could to stop it. Gen. Harkins has read this and dces not concur." Doe, a CIA table to Saigon (DIR-79407) Lo. CO , f CAP 63598: ".... . We do not accept as-a-basis for US policy ~ that we have no power to deley or discourage ea coup. ..... We i? " cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. .... . US euthorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from etther side. . .... " The Waite House repeats its instructions on command of the country team after Lodge leaves. oad oe f fe ‘ as as ap Pan ‘at Ute," Cs ee PI3 Ere! BS a i egal i A ea Dei een asain tno oe
x "mans for your sazacious Pony ability. TAAL gh ft The coup began at 1 315 2 hours, Saigen time, which is equivalent--- to oois hours, Washington time, 1 Noventer. The following Account, a , E- *8 draw from several sources: the Saigon Station's history of the (7 coup and various cables... | At 1315 hours, the Aide de Camp to General Don cane to Conéin's house, told hin: that the coun was in progress, and said that General . Don wanted Conein at Joint General Stare (JGS) headquarters. aide also asked Conein to bring Conein ‘took three million with him. General Don used the money to reward opposi tion military units | , who joined the coup group. \"¢ _ Oa 2 November, General Don infornea: Conein that he needed money to pay the families of persons killed | “ during the coup. Conein gave General Don an additional 1,750,000 Plasters. One bundle of 250,000 piasters was overlooked and was found :
14-00000 "mn SOP oe Ce: treme y yytcee Guu. oe ae -. le “oN Lf ox ° a) ehh later in Conein's safe, & very sensitive ratter. Pave Saith reported by cable on 25 Noventer Penner nee econo . . 1963 that the disbursement had not yet teen discussed with the Ambassador. The files do not show whether ' She Ambassador was ever told. in a State cable fron Sai igon of 2h April 1954, Lodge reports a meeting he had that day wi General Minh. It reads in part: "He then said: 'I want to ask you a question about a money © matter. Did Conein ever give General Don money for the } November 1 ‘ coup?! . "I suid: "Definitely not. Had he done such a ting, a would certainly have imown it.'” yf? We asked Dave Smith about this, and he said he thought that + Ambassador had eventually been told that the money had been passed. fT yee We can neither confirm nor refute from the record. ' ‘Thus, Conein went to JGS headquarters and remained at the command post throughout the struggle. Before leaving his home, Conein alerted the station by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, - Conein was told by Cereral Den that Don kad tried musuccessfully to reach Conein earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that Conein'’s telephone was out of oréer. Conein was told that he was to keep a telephone lire open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA ‘ officer on the scene and in intisate contact with the coup principals, - = hi. ° ’ map eeu! barge bedgian mes *
BI tbs port almost minute-by-minute ‘progress of The fact that Conein was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles. ‘on 2h October, headquarters had cabled the station: ~" "In future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you should slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR : a BRENT. © AS a eonsequ sence, ‘the first, cabled = revorts from the station came ‘in as regular, CIA cables ana were 2 put onto the CRITIC network here at headquarters. The Pirct cable wes received at headquarters oat onT hours, Washington tine, and yas filed | on the CRITIC network: at. 0159. At 0256 ‘hours, | ‘following receipe of ihe Sixth non-CRITIC cable, ‘headquarters instructed the station to put the coup reporting . | on the ‘CRITIC network at the station. Sometine during the day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters cabled a warning to the station against including _ the names ‘of CIA personnel in its CRITIC cables. Conein is identified . = Se ty rame » and as being at Jcs headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,” seven of hich vere put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at headquarters. ne 1030 hours 2 November (in Saigon) the Saigon radio announced | that both Dien and Nou had comitted suicide bY taking poison. “Later in the day General Minh said that Dies and Nau escaped from Gla Long EEE Ae TS emer ea wee eee ie ote aN ati oT A
74-90000 Pelace shortly after O700 hours on 2 Yovenber cy a tunnel unknown . © the generals. “They left the: tunnel: ta the dock ares: and vent te. @ Cataclic church in Cacloa where they took poison. ‘they were diecovered at the church at 1030 hours. | We do not have a truly reliable account of the circumstances x , of their deaths, but they certainly were not by Suicide. : - hecording to one of Conein's reports, Diem called General Dan at 0650 hours 2 Hovenber and offered to surrender unconditionally. General Minh immediately ordered all telephones removed from rooms in their 308 comand post’area. This cut off all communication with the. outside * except for radios under Minh's control. - : Oa 16 Hovember 1963 a field-grade officer of the JGS,who was deeply involved in the coup and whose reliability the station could . not judge (nor did it name him), gave a. station officer two photographs —~ of the bodies of Diem and Nhu, which he claimed he had taken at the a request of General Kin. The photographs show that the deaths were , very bloody. - ‘The source gave the following account of the ‘aeaths: . The officer was present when the Military Revolutionary Committee debated the ultimate disposition of the ‘brothers, accompanied the force that apprehended then, and witnessed. ‘the events immediately after their deaths. He was not present in | the M-113 armored personnel carcier at the tine: of the deaths. A lengthy argent took place on the night of 1-2 November- as to the ultimate disposition of Diem and Nhu, with most of the generals favoring their execution. ‘The ultimate decision was
to. kill thes. “Rh Captain Tauag was desigrated & as executioner, Fon the morning of 2 Nov enver, the Committee received a ph one call frea a casual inforzant telling were Diem and Rou could be found. A force. fis dispatched to apprehend — then. {This appears to conflict with Cozein's report that the phones had been pulled out.J° Shortly after 10:00. a.m., Dies and Nhu entered the. personnel carrier with Captain Nhung. Upon arrival at the JGS headquarter S, Dies and Thu vere dead. Nhu had been stabbed 21 ties in the back with a carbine taycnet aod shot five times. Diem kad. been szot twice in the chest. Noung leaped from tre M-113 with the bayonet in hand and proudly displayed it to all observers. His ams vere soaked with blood. {from the protos, it loozs as if Diem and. had their hasds tiad behind their backs : ohn To recap: a. CIA was not in favor of the decision to. abandon : the . ‘Diem regime, but faithfully carried out instructious. b. CIA officers Conein and Spera were the contacts with the. . coup generals, but only as approved and under instructions. 7 ¢. A CIA officer, Conein, » was at the > generals! comand ‘post throughout the fighting. da. Coneth furnished General Don about $65,000 to buy off “opposition military wits while the coup was in progress. e. CTA had no hand in the assassinations and had na foreknowledge of then.