AGENCY INFORMATION - AGENCY: FBI ' RECORD NUMBER:  124-10185-10098 RECORD SERIES: HO ‘ AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116395-386 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR: FBI FROM: SULLIVAN, W. C. TO: DELOACH, C.D. TITLE: DATE: 03/07/1970 — PAGES: 15 . SUBJECT: CC, CIA ACT, CP, LHO, TRA, WIRETAPPING, CASTRO, ACT DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT ORIGINAL” - Secret NEW . CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFICATION: REVIEW DATE: 10/30/1998 | UPDATE DATE: — 02/12/2001 STATUS _ Redact ~ RESTRICTIONS: JFK Act 6 (1)(B) JFK Act 6 (1)(C) COMMENTS: INC 3 MEMO, LIST, 329 OF 344 PAGES NAR HY 50953 DBoctd: 327176432 Page 1
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| a HY _Pi9s-64024)] ©) a oe Do, Cs on of CIA. ¥This information was given to the Legal Attache b possible hostage situation in his native country. The Bureau was following this potential defection and pursuant to estab- lished procedures was keeping interested agencies apprised of developments. On September 15, 1958, we received information indicating that another Government agency was conducting an investigation of the subject. It was later established that CIA was the other agency. (Refi Bureau file (S) 39. CIA ACTIVITIES IN ) S) The Legal Attache, Tokyo, reported b letter dated mber 225 1958,/that | was a paid, ighly regarded, and very sensitive source G2 Head in Japan. According to CIA did not want this. information to be known to other agencies, particularly the FBI. The Director's notation was, "Some more of CIA double dealing’ H." (Letter from Legat, Tokyo, dated September 22, 1958, "Investigations in Hong Kong and Manila, Philippines") 40. ALLEGED CIA INCOMPETENCE - During the period October 20-25, 1958, Bureau representatives attended a seminar at Orlando, Florida, which ©, ns was given by the U.S. Air Force. Among the activities was a ° lecture given by Subsequent to aS te) briefing, General Millard Young of. the Air Force confided to © Bureau representatives and expressed his displeasure with the | ' briefing given by[ He was particularly critical of ) a _ireluctance to rnish certain information, using the S) @xcuse that the matter was of a "Top Secret" nature. General Young stated that the position taken by was only "@) . excuse for incompetence on the part of . This item is being cited in the event we desire to ‘use the foregoing as evidence to support a position that we were 50957 obliged to be circumspect in dealing with CIA. (Memorandum October 28, 1958, Roach to Belmont, "Joint Strategic Planning Seminar, Orlando Air Force Base, Orlando, Florida, October 20-25, 1958") - 4i., CIA COVERAGE IN CUBA_PRIOR TO OVERTEROW OF BATISTA GOVERNMENT The overthrow of the Batista Government on January 1, - 1959, and the subsequent assumption of power by Castro raised questions concerning the efficiency and competence of U.S. intel= . “« ligence. ‘Allen Dulles indicated that future secaepee® would sen i BDoclda: 327176432 Page 4
' . by show that many more people were involved in the Castro organi- ” gation than the U.S. Government had realized, Information 7 coming to-our attention suggested the possibility that both State and CIA had failed to assess developments in Cuba properly. The foregoing is cited in the event that we found reason to question the competency of [578 in Cuba.] This could 6) be useful if we wanted to justify th existence of a Legal - — Attache office in Havana. One could also comment that poor “coverage in Cuba had an indirect and adverse effect on our operations in the United States. | By letter =) 25, 1959, we voiced our objections to CIA for giving guidance to an individual with whom we had been maintaining contact for, the purpose of developing him as a double agent. The individual involved was a well-known_expert in the field of : (9) medicallr applied to/space flying. was } Also a contract agent of CIA and d-occasion to handle Sensitive matters for that Agency.jK InjApril, (1959, [was preparing GS) al to make a trip to Moscow. C brieféd him on matters as they oe applied to his trip. The Agency also interviewed him concerning aa his relationship with the subject in Washington, D. C., and, furthermore, gave him guidance concerning the relationship. We objected to CIA giving any guidance to oncernin S) is contacts with the subject without fir ng with us. Bureau file S) 43, ALLEGED BELITTLING OF COMMUNISM BY ALLEN DULLES a In July, 1959, Allen Dulles of CIA spoke at the .National Strategy Seminar of the National War College. One N, of the professors handling the Seminar was eritical of Dulles. ~ i AN He claimed that Dulles had belittled the importance of the acs. communist problem.) :; a en a: The above is being cited in the event we desire to ‘utilize ‘the information in justifying a position that it was ~*, mecessary to be circumspect with CIA. (Memorandum W. C. Sullivan ' ; to Belmont, August 14, 1969, "National Strategy Seminar, National _; War College, July, 1959") Nt chandelier nn 44, “PRUE" MAGAZINE ARTICLE — SEPTEMBER, 1959 7 3 3 . In September, 1959, "True" magazine carried an article captioned "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock,” which included information of a derogatory nature concerning the Director and the Bureau. The article precipitated a crisis eee rn nen vere ae oe en eronge - = : : ULES CR ECR EO gs OR A DO OT eee Ee eee HY 50953 DBoctd: 327176432 Page 5
| 6 an! ; ; ‘ i ~ _. On February 7, 1962, LOEORET  ceciena Edwards, Director of Security, CIA, informed the Liaison Agent that CIA was preparing a report containing extremely sensitive information. He stated that this information came: from a sensitive source and he was not certain as to how it should be handled. As a result of a discussion with Edwards on ‘February 26, 1962, it was ascertained that CIA had maintained a technical surveillance on ver an extended period. Edwards explained that he ha “beén reluctant to identify this -gource at an earlier date because he feared that prosecution could have been jeopardized and, furthermore, he did not want his Agency embarrassed in the event the Bureau objected to CIA maintaining a capability such as technical surveillances. It was made emphatically.clear to Edwards that it was absolutely necessary that we be provided with all the details and, further- more, that CIA, at the outset, should have apprised us of the existence of the coverage. The Director made the notation, IZ only wish we would eventually realize CIA can never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion, but on specific instances of all too many in number.’ Yet, there jexists wistful belief that the ‘leopard has changed his spots,' H." (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan February aie, 1962, ("Unknown Subject; KGB Ageht KRoowh 2S 'Sasha!'') © 56. | KS) "In February, 1962, the Liaison Agent was requested: to discuss with CIA a case which, in our opinion, clearly _ - $ndicated CIA had failed to keep us appropriately informed of developments. The Bureau's original interest was initiated — _ in Miami as a result of a discussion with CIA personnel in that - city. Attempts to get CIA replies via correspondence were. eos . negative, On February 13, 1962, the Liaison Agent discussed. - the matter with CIA and received a reply which did not adequately _ . gatisfy the Bureau's request. (Memorandum Donahoe to Sullivan, : February 27, 1962, and Brennan to Sullivan, March 2, 1962; Bureau | file (2) | | | 7 ~ 87, [CIA WIRE TAPPING IN TEE UNITED STATES ,. <)) oe - | 7 ° na, . Le i oo Sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, CIA had a | become involved in a weird plan designed to bring about the ~ Ss assassination of Fidel Castro. One of the principal ingredients | of this plan was to. be the utilization of U.S. hoodlums, CIA ..;:, -; established contact with Robert Maheu, former Bureau Agent, who served as. the intermediary in dealings with the notorious a hoodlum, Sam Giancana. (<\ re Oo } , : . aS cenrenicrenpeemecone mt HY 50953 DBoctd: 327176432 Page 6
oy = | The entire operation fell apart when we developed information indicating that Maheu was behind a wire tapping operation in Nevada, Potentially, there were elements for possible violation of unauthorized publication or use of communications, However, prosecution was out of the question because of the tainted involvement of CIA. (Arthur James Balletti, ‘unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications" and memo- randum from the Director to Mr. Tolson, dated May 10, 1962) 58. L iS) an | In October, 1962, we lodged a protest with CIA '. because the Agency initiated operation of Cuban agents in the Miami area and in so doing violated Bureau jurisdiction, Arrangements were subsequently effected where the source in the-matter was turned over to the Bureau for handling Meno~ randum Brennan to Sullivan, October 29, 1962, ‘On April 23. 1963. CIA requested that the Bureau establish coverage on a visiting Panamanian] national. ye SS -{mmediately instituted investigation and then determined that CIA actually had been instrumental in supporting the subject's trip to the United States, CIA had been endeavoring to recruit the subject... On April 29, 1963, a strong. protest was lodged with General Carter, Deputy Director of CIA, (Hemorandum Brennan to Sullivan, April 26, 1963, [ I(S) 60, ALLEGED ATTACK ON BUREAU BY JOHN McCONE ‘ . We received information in December, 1963, indicating | that John McCone, Director of CIA, allegedly was attacking the . Bureau in what would appear to be a vicious and underhanded , ‘Manner, McCone allegedly informed Congressman Jerry Ford and .- - Drew Pearson that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City .. oo ao indicating that Lee Harvey Cswald had received $6,500 to a assassinate President Kennedy. The story attributed to McCone on ‘appeared to be related ‘to information which had come from one Gilberto Alvarado, a Nicaraguan national, Interrogation of ms Alvarado, including a polygraph, disclosed that he had fabricated his story. This had been made known to CIA and to McCone, There- fore, if McCone had made the above statements to Ford and Pearson, | it would appear that it would have been an obvious attempt to ridicule the Bureau, The Liaison Agent contacted McCone on December 23, 1963, McCone vehemently denied the allegations. Lo | (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, December 23, 1963, “Relations —— With | CIA") -, - a , HY 50953 DBoctd: 327176432 Page 7
. RAL . e GPrromas POR HO. 10 J s016=006 . MAP 1963 EOITIOH | O54,GEM, 886. WO. 97 Pee ' : ars . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OLAE i Memorandum | TO :Mr, C.D, DeLoach | pate: 3/7/70 ne | OIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO FROM -W. C. Sullivan _ DECLASSECATION AND/OR, | on a - RELEASE CF CiA INFORMATION - oe . - IN THIS DOCUMENT,,AS saniiz7 SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GMB 5-31-44 (5p¢ mAL Jeer) ' _- AGENCY (CIA) } ae bee (BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBE] @x) ‘ Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that (Y Ge operated informants’ in Cuba during the period we had a Legat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there, It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA, Papich also refers to a memorandun WHME€& to WANE , 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem Of whether a 4-tercept operation between the and the CPC]should be G) turned over f6 o.9 _ complete coverage, We~of course, ‘had no coverage fof (Bureau had not advised other "agencies of this”“source Sinc® we did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau igo The entire operation was later turned over to CIA, ; CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a _ letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants NWAME noted that CIA was not overly cooperative and that, : in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time W4me met with the CIA representative in Havana who . , - admitted he was not getting any informationfGoncerning the cPcI (&) and had no plans for any aggressive action in that field, or this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own noverage IG We instructed. sane: to ascertain from the Havana CIA representative information available to him concerning matters of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue through informant sources -to obtain needed information regarding securit matters which cottld not be supplied by CIA, Subsequently, our relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to-be sound. 6-9. gY RECOMMENDED ACTION: Classified by 40.7 7a YECL aaa a —— , Doclassify on: app” (Fre) in light\ of the facts set forth, “NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Di SECRET Subject to Criminal Sanctions ; None. We do not believe, f that CIA will make an issue of this HY 50953 DBoctd: 327176432 Page 6
ao mo. OPTIONAL FORM NO 10. , 5010-106 MAY 1962 EOITION ran GSA,GEN. REG.ZNO. 27 t - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum — 1 - Mr. DeLoach 1 - Mr. Sullivan TO ‘Mr. C. D. DeLoach DATE: = 3/7/70 | 1 = Liaison . SECRET 1 - Mr. Flemister FROM :W,. C. Sullivan es | "GIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO” - SUBJECT RELATIONSHIPS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE | G AGENCY (CIA) _ pe FORI@ATION n i & BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUB TM TRUE fee TAS SANir!z | & . AN THi JodMcnt oa Gras Sfulacs Ge mae foea.-chP- 360) : Item number eleven in the material submitted to the Director by SA Sam Papich in his memorandum 3/5/70 states that ic operated informants in Cuba during the period we had a égat Office in Havana and did not coordinate our operations with CIA or advise it we had sources there, It was noted that after Castro came on the scene, approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA, Papich also refers to a memorandum Donahoe to Mr, Belmont, 2/5/60, regarding the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC) which dealt with the problem of whether a Havana sourcelfused in an intercept operation between the and the ¢C hould be turned over complete coverage. We, “of course, . had no coverage [fof és ureau had not advised other. agencies of this’ source sinc® we"did not want Castro to uncover any operational activities which might embarrass the Bureau. (RO The entire operation was later turned over to CIA. CIA began its operations in Havana in 4/47 and in a letter to the Bureau, 4/28/53, [regarding Havana informants the Legat noted that CIA was no overly cooperative and that, in fact, it was not developing pertinent information. At that time Legat met with the CIA representative in Havana who admitted he was not getting any information(concerning the -¢ cl@e and had no plans for any aggresSive action in that field. {For this reason it was necessary for us to develop our own coverage, SL @ We instructed the Legat to ascertain from the Havana CIA & representative information available to him concerning tters sa of interest to the Bureau; however, he was to continue through | -m @ dinformant sources obtain needed information regardi security 2° matters which cou not be supplied by CIA, Subsequently, our De 6 relations with CIA improved to the point of being described as Se 8 excellent in 1958. We think our overall position to-be sound, 38 @ . . . ™ € €& RECOMMENDED ACTION: palsenadtateshtinnniahanestaiclatadataatatahl . . None. We do not believe, in lig of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter, oy 2 . : aes bye F : A a Ed ha ‘4 a - HCF : bsf/mst \h L eo : e a HY 50953 DBoctd: 327176432 Page 9