13-00000 | “te ae rae ge ae pt Te ee ed or * “ee Farsi Seeiion CoOusG iisies co & PUT cuLe lape but se nec to 0G GG 36 450 45 & Fea Us Was GONE Very iairequcntiy. « wept te Bw ae oe etme Dm ee, as ". Tee te ne ee oo Cee VOO ssc taney ee OS a wee e Coe oars TECOVES eS oF : Bee wee wd eat ol 8F eC ee a ee ee en CPE MSC TGC Bon COGVETIUMONS CVEN BN 1G WPT BATES o4SeG OY pe ENS, . ee wee 2 we coe 2 oe 3 Sop we te te an * Oe eWen NOSENHAO as Kz Faseg GOVE Tc POpaGis 4o Ge TORSO G0 GT CVER realisti Ye fg et am sews feelin woe cena ty Me cee map ee SOALSC. 4555 Ge8O UNS Se dt5€ 1G DTESUNE Was ay ConVET sawn Cone Ssemtget apittie wanernerhia Cigenes Pop el gp ey nn ree en ge a GUCLCO Waist PCaSORHGes CaStEUCE Ga ON BCUVE MIC SGLAGnEe Wes 1Ge we e! ia br) ay ret a7) L i compromised to the AGB. The later is a tactor te be con that NOSZENKO Bec to nave Deen aware o: this or this just Secause some- one had a conversaiion in one of the rooms ia which there was an active et ge gas oee ViEWEG The e microphone and NOSENAO has claimed he > microphones in the United Sisaies Embassy. e bee it & apparent that there are a number of imponcerazie cactors to be coasiderec such as wiether the conversation could be sickedc up , by the micropnoze, whether the monitor could recover suiiicient portions Be ay wee oe ¢ - ae 2 & 2 ad ~ es fa ot the conversation to uncersianc the gist of what was bein, even ii he dic, whether he would consicer it of suiiicieni imporiance or interest to incluce in his seport in verbatim or in summazy iorm, In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENXO that he was responsible Peal co for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy, ay goo1s77 Orns as
13-00000 S238 HOt Comsicexved that Gaere is un ecelucte basis for Cuestioning o . . eked Been d CateerTee eur ewes eee be =o cea le Pee = a fNOSANAO thai he was Custodian OF Vie eS BY Security Tle was aa inveniion, The basis lor this concluvion was mot inen acco ua | i i iH current anierviews Ww ich NOSENKSG have fucther inégicatved thai his claim Om this point sn0u.G be accepiec. yy In regaré to (€), the claim of NOSINXO that Le ected in p.zce of KOVSEUK, tne Cariei of Fire: Se a, when KXOVSEUK was absexc, it is consicereG inat this ¢ 2 iS 2CCUDLSLE prOViGing 43s NOT con- a aim erted into a presummion that therefore NOSENKO knew everyiaing that KOVSHUX knew. NOSENKO claims that he was ne: reszonsible ior the civect supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in tne First + ed Section, These officers normally reporied Cirectly to KOVSHUA and would only report to NOSENAO when AOVSHUK was absent, As an example of this, NOSENKO nas shown é lec of detalied knowlecge cf the work against cinlomatic personnel in the United Siaies Embassy. He has sisted he is sure he would have <.owa of anything “important” such as & recruitment or attempted recrzi:ment, but he does m07 claim to have reviewed ali the reports of the various officers of the Fir | 18 | 9004178 ‘w Ame : Le ieee
13-00000 4 SECUIIN, 28 FEC batsGT, OL Loae Led Gl smusVeGuasds GE TLE UNITES eae . Gees aE eS 2% 0960 = 96) ai CV clr abs The previeus criticises wot NOSENAG anew only the mone oy recognize their photographs, ane Glic noe cove sulliclen et ion GC ot oH Sh fea we a r¢) 4CO GCU VALS 43 CONS S LG 1G OS ON UNWaSTanlec oO & iy tt pee 3 ge ef, 3) to Be a J & a8] & n Bee et, criticism, NOSENKO incicates thai in genera: the nanciing oi agenzs t in the Firs: Section was tne responsibliiy of incivicua!.case orlicers. It is aiso apparent that the philosopay in the KGB was to maintain 8 a single hancler-agent reiationship 43 much as possible, and that respon- sibisity for an agent would not be trans had access to a target wio was the ~~ * esponsibilisy of a case oflicer other niiosophy is of particular tnan the hancier o7 ine rent a] zterest in connection with NCSANAD, who even though he was the case oificer respousiblie for ABLOIAN and tozgctzer with KOSOLAPOV anc GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, cic sot have an agent network which he specifically handiec. Mere use of an agent ior resort- ing on or a specific activity against & particular tar
13- 00000 © fr a | i ee ee rier te eyes, me wee ee eee mands hee a Gc uae PC480N TG Drarnsser Pesos neioully TOF the agent and it nme ange tl ‘ont *. Sak mee ~foe see lobe avvwars tue AGG consicers Berees eed? COT wee e eee O9n Sess CS es die ate ne °, wt Re ay oe ae fan of ae wed = pee et a NOSANAG, a5 prevs 2OUS6Y BGC, GS Sets CT ores esponsisility ior work agulmst € Ben'yc: TaAsELs, , ra fr & fy ee te ay ’ rs fe er et i & ci oy) ee ee rst ft 7] oi t ee fe we bi bf > . > £ . re ee er Curis ag 1960 - i961. GUNCEDS 1OF 1 DeELLOG &. Tm inet Ac Caimi Fes aon Slvility for supervision Gf work 2giinst She Service 4cecnes in carly 966, ne was, according to XN ENKO, FESPINSIGIG Tox Supervision oF pee : mnt A the wore of Vadim A. KOSOLAPCOV, Gunnaciy i. CAYAZNOV, Viacimir ‘DEMAIN ane Yevgenty GROMAKGVSALY,. . GAYAZNOV anc XOSOLAP POV worked only against code ¢ and therefore were superviseG soscly by NOS INKO, whereas DIMAIN : ang GROMARKGVSKiY, whe handice indigenous agents in American : ? ctec against coce cleras. & i) a) > fe] e io) @ bes & ry jad ra is] t @ 2 a. pte me oO & quite Clear that the Knowledge ol NOSENAC concerning tne @ it gue code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouca clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his tarzets in 1960 ~ 1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American ernployees ISLAN . at the Uniteé States Embassy Guring this period except for ABIDIAN, codi11e0 ( 20
13-00000 The TOWIng COTA Lclla UTG Concerned With séveral specific ‘€aS@s in which, accos€ing io NOJENNS, cnere was an epovoacn by the wen fae mg ey a Lia e a tata Giyeess Cem ae fas ad a ee ae AGB, interesting Siormsation was Céveloned, or in waich ab lees. @ o we ee er mon OE vem ne”, sem nose we wee ee Veco ae oe Conse Cervad.e AMOUR OF saucilic work Was Carried Gut by NCSEANAS, KOSGLAPOV anc G2 YAZNOYV. The first case, lai.es STOF 177 of the previous summery, Little eccitienal corament is consicercd necessary on this case since there Coca nos appear we be any zcequate reason to ¢uestion the general story of NCSENKO in regard to the KOS ediort against STORSBLAG. It is recognized and meniloned elsewhere that NOSENAS in 1952 exaggerated his personas invoivement in tne case, pariicularly in placing himseil as present with GRISANOV when the r to STORSBERG, NOSENXO has there is no reason to Goust taai an the planning and activities which preceded oe to STORSBERG. An issue was or reviously made over the timing o: the approach to STORSBERG since STORSSERG Gated this as October 1961, NCSENXO has indicated about June 1961, aad information from GOLITSYN, dasec on remarks by KOVSHU& to kim, hac been interpreted as indicating the OO1181 21
13-00000 eso" GE0n . fot woe Hees oy OGE5 @perGach occurreG at sae Nend ou 1gscd. | OSN qrcetegens hans en 5 NOSONEO, Goring current interviews, has mee nena Se en ne Sn a 2ccount Gi ine STOSEIOAG Caot. Ne has siated that ne cauuci precisely coe a 5 ae ieee « Gaede eat oo OTOats tO S.OGAS GANG, GME LGT Ob OCCU r SEG Se.ore 2 ore LUpTGach at ine Moscow airposs io James MEYSOAS (lun. 20, 2962) ‘.UCaUSe OLNETWISE TO ACTON WOULE Lave Deen tken 2gai.-. HL YSEAS, When recenily. reinterviewed, STORSSEAG continced to maimain 2S GESCTIPlsON Gi CO..u6e Ta. EVENTS Makes 30 clear tnat ine Gy pT once. rad t0 have tacen place consi Josepn MORONE, anowner code clerk at the United States omsassy, who wiil be tae subject of further discussion beiow, sas seen interviewed J u oa the basis of statements by STORS y t SEAG that MORONS was present in « American House $n at of the approach, Analysis of the staiements oi MORONE clearly incicates that the events STORSZERG Gescrives could not have taner piace later than the period Feorcary io early May 1961, The pest estimate possible at this time is that tne approacn to STORSBERG occurreé in March - Avril 1951, which is quire compzetible with the approximate cating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the fice of this approximation oz the date oi the approaca to STORSEERG, GO0L1182 wi ee pee we
13-00000 } ~~ Se ee we ee ee ee TOM SOGEGeE CG 2SSUTIE weice dal we « PU ee Sem mE OF * COLI SYN : nas = sa tose See we ae eye TOY - a ee RT A te er a od ann ad cenbtetha Y a Jag GF 2 Vat MY Lian oe oe 2 ow ww ame my me ge ee wm ae we ew, WresnaeteaY COG Cacia am Mustow at the ft ee me onc Gf 1969, récserrecd 10 STORSIAAG, ax Rae NOVSRUA ci tm cme enn pee Dt, cgtee ee te, sa tgem el ne ne wee ee omen 60 &@ COMM EPOTNIS Dine? Ge 20 OSCTEi.GN PAISEY LGN teed GOTMas approach, OF Was premaierely Claiming anticipated success. - 19% 8 Ao ate a weeny! mee twee gum eun © cane wee inn Fad a e3 378 - 4.54 GF he previous sumumaery contal. information rt] len ee er a ee eye ee ag ae etl ne we eee elim ewe lo ee Pee MEVEER eon TEZOIG 6O tai Bec Mi PeeG GelclesGn GScrawGn Gewese wETs Nera Scie AS Gi teis time, it is consicercéa that there are 1a Ciscrevancies Letween. - ty yecord inforrnation anc iniormation Isom > ° mere USINAG wWaics in any wey “ refiect agaizst NOSENKO, KHEYSIAS did not recognize @ ghotogragn = of NOSENHAO as the Soviet who mace i last approach to him at the aire ae port, but this Goes not provice 4 valiie reason to disbelieve the stztement of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to KEYSERS, There are ceriain statements rel set iorta in the previous summary which require specitic comment. (a) Tne statement is made thet no NGG oilicer Cirectly connected with the case coulé regaré KEYSERS as the replacemeat ior STORSBERG. in fact, K2YSERS actually was being trained by STORSSERG as a substitute, not a replacement, evea though his primary assignment GO01183
13-00000 5 soma me oe Ernpassy tnai SIYSEAS eivae oitime, Inany event, wie imoress +07 G2 NOSZINAS wes that STORSBOARG was saving 2 cittlculs ime explaining the parilcular work to FOL YSORS, Tue coservations of . aT AS €5t since HAEYSDARS actually sad a g ig “ Aw i?) ry) * ty ts 4 ee not been a code clerk Dut, as noted, was dein by STORSBERG so that he could acti as & Substiqiie, Uncer tne circ stances, it is consicered quite ic oe KGB would assurce at the time that 2 KEYSERS 1 was to de the eventua. replacement of STORSSIRG. supervisors /Colonel URSAN/ his hornosexual tendencies and he aémitted invoivemenit in three homosexual inciceris, ail at the American House" (raze 179}. gociie4 . ere
13-00000 La ONE et one a amie ee oo ne 8 gee. ae Pn ee eure tos 2. we Ge TAY 2 6G BESET, & TEVecw Gs tie oe mn Bm grommet ee ty eee ene Pe” oe wt Geeaebs TU TIGTaNGUT, Cote a sued aYua, OF GOsGnes wee om 8 ioek 12 Gna sd + aS gape tent i we fate et warieh PECTS Hal AnYSLAS was nor intermce oy nea ees FR a a VURDAN of Dees Ge HOT SUSENLGLY on GLGer - meen epee . ~ Dhl lege ol a wets ee? a MOC tO aC STavate Lhe POSosuiey G2 & PG3a8 GCL oY AG {ce} On page 236 of the sreviews Sucamary, Te ~ me ta ae “no Toe StaAlLeMOnt 23 Mace Hat, “im tic sing. w Cia, el meso 2 opt te eS ee ee me ae a NOGENKAG/ asserieG that ne relied on intormation pro- curec from microphones (KE YSEAS' iallure io réport While the official record shows that KEYSERS ra * Sat el mee Tome - See ge” the detection ictter to Coleone) Gic inceecca report receipt o URBAN in the office of Colonel URBAN, it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before AEYSERS lest the Embassy ior the airpor:. NOSENKO has statea taat ia the absence of information to the contrary izom microphone etal and telephone taps, the KGB had concluceé that KEYSCRS had not reported receipt of the Gefection letter and tnere- - fore had Gecided to approacn KEYSERS atthe airport. In _ view of the short time between KEYSERS report of receipt Gd041185
13-00000 AEB AGS tg apR ro y oage : Lae 2 cP Gi Lue AULICT anc nla Gen vie Se T EAPO 1 OSCOW, ae WG. .* noes wal tae AID had scarica > hee eave been Termarkusie il Lee ee ” Mae Teme ma mm . ras, P0FsatiON im Vive TO Col Gf tae al OSs Go pe . teen Pade tended - t a ul San 88 my on . AG in wwe ALYSOAS maser there . os wee ete 36 COnSiaered COM aCe CPCs Gale Pages 161 - 154 of the Drevieus surimaevy Contain iniormaroa an Megare to Ma Y ZUIUS, whe succeeted James § saving arrived in Moscow in Sestember 1941, GRYAZNOV was the FéaPOnsbie case olficer tor ZUIUS, accovcing to NOCSENKO, Be previous eumiraary states {page +93) taal. ZUIUS, curing 4 rouline cesriefing, confirrned ain Embassy report that in the sumunes of 1962 he nad been intimate with an Austrian woman, “LILLLAN, ' wro Visiled the American House with someone irom the United Aras Resubiic. “MLILLIAN' was interviewed by tne American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienne Further inquiry revealed tnat no Austrian passport nad been issucd to "LILLIAN, and she was later assed ior her passport, "LILLIAN" repiied that she nad Jorgoctten it, then leit, and did not return, Tie previous sunmumary stated that tie above incident had been described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts te entrap Joseph MORONE in 1960, not ZUTUS in 1962, ‘GOCLLEG
13-00000 te Wat AR eens ee , n ~~ 7 ° Sy ace eget te: re wee ae ate, = ary stl we Soe ee Page 292 OF ue previdus sumu.us, velates inforrnation irom A meee om at mye se Ame o.™ rots a4 ; crgecet 7. nett f we tye TEER ee eet ipa NERS Leth Gia a daceohas € WEE 8G ae. Leesan aM Carey «Vou CO Ostaan gem pes age eet A meee eT s wal ne CWO German Women Wad C5G oe of American see lee neegpl ane, ed nse kee hag tata coe ga et Cone ae Ce WCW, Coase Tlaecs Gas Seen G@gGer COVES CE with NOSZENKO, Accorcing io NOSENKO, GAYAZNOV avcanged ior ents 6! the Beriin KGS Resicentura, to visit Moscow West Gerraan anc the oiher as aa Austrian, NOSENKO further identified the "Weer German" azent, UEANNA, ‘as having the cover of a journalist, ame statec he believed "TANNA" Rac yet MORONS at American House, ina recent interview, MORONE coniizmec that in early 194] he had met a West German giri at American House who claimed to bea pOurnaisi. $He starements of MORONE thereiore apoear to substaatiate the report of NOSENXO,~ Concerning tne agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENXO re- vorted that she was cueried about ser passport at American riouse and aS a yesult the NGS returned ner to East Germany without further v1 ef et Z| md ee w ef o wn o git oO ey nu ee z 1 & mt peas 8 ot bt o c mw o @ A oO &. y x c?) "J es e a & we sf ee 7) ¢) bie fh. a i] er has never suggestec any connection with ZUIJUS, 3 or is there reason to assume tnat he could be referring to the experience of ZUIUS since = this took place in the suxamer of 1962, after NOSENKO haé leit the American Embassy Section. 9001187 27 acess
13-00000 at Was the coiclusion oF the previous suramary that NCSINKO 2s ae fw, ee ee gn ofa mee PTT TS “Ce gen eee me Gic aot Raow enough about ZUSUS oF als Gudk round to nave exercised =. seem meeag? fan lee ee Sage se paar, ; cro ~ oo ee Bm em BMY SUPSLVs 40 a tae GEve Tine a ZUIUS. Grenicd that NOSENNG ee nS ne rt. fa ete Sat ibeal Seis = er howe ay Bae eco oS eee Nae = wey oon rege lect tse First Section, Firsi Department, at the enc of 198. ac which tame any p Bupervs A80ry functions of NOSINAG iersminated. ZUIUS, wao an = wae iw * somal - en gee TL wegen ce Cid not arrive in Moscow until Sowtersber 1931, remained in previous information from NOSANKO in reaarc to Paul JENNER. sicaiiy = aq Teporied that when ise AGH learned that Basic » NOSENZXO had resorted that w e ie 2G Paul SENNER, WEO Was Thought to be 2 code clerk, was coming ic Moscow through Telsing, @ plan was made io send Vadim V. KOSOLASOV ae oO Hejsinki to travel on the same train as JENNER to Moscow, «A icmaie et agent of GRYAZNOV was to be nlaced on this train at Vyborg é ater? train entered the USSR. The ie:male agent was to become ecquaimiec with JENNER as a part of a iuture operation against JENNER in Moscew, and KOSOLAPOY was also to become accuainied with JENNER. NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successiul, that both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquainiance of JENNER, 2g. 6001188
13- 00000 ; od BOC that se, NOSENAG, reac the reer: suomited by AOS roeee PON Gs tac ivip isora civisinw to Moscow. dae NNadt, GiteUr Orciving in Megcow, Jeporved Wal le wes BpPPTOACKnEeG Ga He trina trom Mersinsl by ova young Russians, me — - Let wat tte ame gee Te me ee we eee . alG & Bela, PTOGRG.S UIV evs Stucente, "WRG Sstrucs ey & GEV eTseiian. aNNS = ix! According to JENNER, Wey dota sais thet whey Moscow, © About three mosths later JENNER regoricd weang apor SECS azain by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he ned gone on courier business. TEN ao Py a ae 8, ent, SONNOGR & phone Wiusnver, isisting teat ne cul ner, Tad Women blew 28 wpe advised JENNER not to mention the conversation to anyone, NOSINAO has stated that in an effort to ivliow up the initial train acquainiance, the KGB had arrangeeé for the iemaie agett io excounier JENNER at the M Loacow xailroaé station cr airport wnea he went alone to meet couriers, Insofar as is known, JENNER nas never been shown 4 pactozrep of KOSOLAPOV, Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENAO indicate tat 23 appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed asa “ university student. g001189
13-00000 strewn tem ete Semieg ei cee Lace ng eget cep MEME MS MUTE CUTER anes ovale, Ase OO tr 4 ft at t re e & w. et : 6 t& t : rs te a oo ace Cem Step tr ag Ct ee ae > lee gett Fal st se et ee : - -om CUCTes SUT Y as TeEsusas Staten PaweN Narwhs abd Seade STG aded Vacs OG once sb whe TAN ae ee en aCe ee ee) Bee ot on te Bee we brnes FeV ataosthag Wet a atwwte es ha acoeia Wis O% ThE SAME train w sera WAL ee ot ee oe SHatGas, TAsSCS CersaOuasstavds AE5E, SGWEVELS 2 steels CL GE. TG Teae Ses Ga. tle a cian eee “0 cee eee Nm ee me epee GSCGee Fae 3 Dae NER Wee aad OF; Ge COW VOUT Pas ata ge wen 1OR9 cwain Sap, Melee fom Ye we, ome alae ~- te poe 3) Masch 1960 ivain irom Fivienc 03 Miescow, and inat one Viktor ea vy ha KOLOSSSV ta name NOSONASG was identified as an alias u KOSOLAPGY) was on the 2 April i960 train to Moscow. The above obvious Giscrezancy has not been ana cannet Se clasi-~ 2 a vatad Zieé with @vallabse info: mation. ? © t yg QO < [@) t‘ g wo ré) “ wt < ge & & 7 that KCSOLAPOV was not. Neverineliess, the waiversity stucents" who, accorcing io JENNER, struck up a conver- 2 ant wee es Sation with him on the train would apoear clearly to be sari of the Gperationa: effort descrized by NOSINKO, pariiculariy in view of tne 3 Dnereis later approach of this same girl io JENNER at the airport. no reason to Guestion that this girl was the female agext of CRYAZNCOY. in view of the conflict between the train mantles! and siaremenis by oy stucen:" was: whethes GS NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the " this somenow was KOSOLAPCV. or whether it may have been some ther persoa entirely. Gov11S0
13-00000 - ewe Te ae eg Oy he ae od MGs 2CCCBCY Tee LG TEL Mee MhS ATE ANON OVE Set ‘ ca Gass OS ate get fe tee ates: oe ee a ee a ee we ny eVvecesce wuat AOSOLAL OY COule nol have Geen On ine Bure Te eg teat Fue ate ae lS Baste oon wa tease osefleamea Segre Se Serge eh ett ts pega Ree Js eae ate wos BESS 4S GUST UG & SQUSACIOTY Guawe:r .OF Lie 4nulceica Ciscrepency 22 fe% 7S ate! r S  €1é noi travei with JENNER, tiis cocs not es thas NCSENKXO is wrong; iz is evicer.ce thal ne Coes AOt Row somcining ae, 45 the superviser of KOSOLAPOV, snculd nave Known accorcing to HAS OWN Statements. per} o Pages 196 - 192 contain a summery of previous information regard to the J Oni GARLAND case, GARLAND was identifica oy NOSZNKO as & code clerk wiom the XCS was stucying, Get on whom “no Cerogatory information was Gevelovec, NCSENKO provided practicatiy ne Gciaiis in regard to GARLAND ovher tuan to ccentuy nim as a coce clerc. GOLITSYN nas reported on an incident which itis consicezed - relates to the trip of GARLAND from Heisingi to Moscow on 16 Novemoer i 960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsicki KGS Residency received a cable from Moscow acvisizg that an Americana coce clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route te Moscow and that | GOUL191 cary
13-00000 i i 7 oN oy on ou oo eye ~ =, we -s ROSOCLAPOV, Would Se sent to Helsinki o« CTC Wades wal CO & Gere whiecn tne ft SCD Bopee ia Ccoutinuc in Mescow., GOLITSYN walked to AOSULAPSOV net moe ‘i =o AS eG cov AOSOLAPCY a od z: aaGg troete eat AACS - te le a « al mee btn ye ape, Fae Fae pw, % dee tes & sae 2F ae compari erwatee Gs ta oe SlCas Oss tS eTGam LP Gr selsing : ~ *, om Sate ise ewe ee wpe 2 Te wee eat lobar ae ae eee DHE Previous sumrmary also stated GOLITS IN hia cévised that seasingi he inquired of anotner SCO oiicer “fram the Exnbassy Section" (First Section, SCD} about the case on watch he nad Helsed KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, tne ofticer reguscé to Ciscuss tae case and he, GOLITSY A, conciuceé trom this reaction that at must have resulted in a successful recruitment. it has been Getermined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with tre FBI on 20 March 1962, referred io the above "SCD oificer from the Embas sy Section" as (Inu) ZENKIN of the American Desartment, GOLATSYN also siated that the ovicer was in Helsinki uncer the alias £SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unesic to furnish a Arst name and = patronymic for SERGZYEV. GOLITSYN rererred to (imu) ZENAIN és being from the American Department, SCD. It is considered that there is no doubt that the (Inu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name OOL192
13-00000 wee ltt oan weelept em ow LO me yee oe ota Sm me Sy FO pane, wet PUSS eae oF 4 EPS 7 2S OM Garales Gs Laide Sco one Section, aerse ACCES IN _ . ‘omy ey ed TOTNES wm ee peas we Se se ge ae = ment, SCO, aAaccorcing to NCLENAG, one group of tie Second Sectices wa me lens 2 wipe Tee ntts ewe ot. mae wn es "42 GZainst AMETICUR Leuatgence anc us + ZENKIN WaS @ memcer OF inis *y oe A A ek dreads ae Se sm Perse ee tees wate? me ep” pe 2 ee wm ee tg ee group. > NAG has aCvised tha. ZONKIN traveled woroaG a connection f. ef ¢ uw mt id °. be Hy Q if o r on G With activities of tne Second Section, Sur that ce Ka regarding the activities of ZONKIN oa tese trips, NCOSENXO has sur- nisned some iragmentary information which he learned au Fegard to ZENGIN ane when the tuli name of SERGEYEV (ZENAIN) to other win Bis pnoiograpn 26 Gotained, this iragmeniary information irom NCS ANKO Tay prove quite useiul . As regards tae KOSOLA AP OV GARLAND matier anc the ovinion * see *, expressedG oy GOLITSYN based oz the resusal of ZENSCN to discuss the case (GARLAND) that it must have resulted ina successiui recruiimest, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption, Accorcing to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSZNAO on this point, ZENALN was in tne Second Section, not the First Section, in 1960 - 1961. Re was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case 33 GD0LL93
13-00000 wee ew ote 3 & ot ° 2 ge eg TS ee ae abe SS Since ROSOLASPGOYV wis i. olilser of the First Secuen and Ake eo neatly ore wae Fisst Secuien, | tae Work Gains) Gar li NG Was wae reasons. B. Se fag wat mi mame tee FF wale ii Coes BOi aLQear thet ZANAIN would Bec esoariy have Knoveos an oe hela nee ‘os wf e wenden Wipes Teele ST , : Fat det a SP fe Se ew to Moscow train lists Joann GARLANI ind Vikior KRGLOSSOV (alles ao AOSOLAP OV) as passengers, GARLAND; wien interviews Gia 1962 wt . iouiowing the lead crom GOLITSYN, ccnied Raving met any Sovict with the paysical cesc crspison & AOSOLASSYV on the Melsinai-to-Moscow trip, and Geaice ever being approacisec by Soviet Ivteliigence. Later ; * interviews by tne FBlanc a polygrapa interview cid not indicate t that be had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingay bees coniacied by any ioreign intelligence agent. . It is accepted hat AOSOLAPOV went irom Moscow to Heisins: im November 1960, tiat ne talked wits GOLITSYN there, and that ze Was on the same train as GARLAND izorm Heilsina&i to Moscow. it is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip we ni in November 1960. pls to Heis iravel for an SCD cificer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-ievel approval, according to NOSENKG. it does not a : | go01424 ad 34 epee A sa bie fl
13-00000 1 . « as ew ae 6 : . - a * oe . ° : . Waatier that the SE eVEGUas sated TCV otrudef CTEVELCG OS & SATHAsar WLS S105, i vet gel foget eek od ~ Bh mw Tae fe Ts, a ae -% on", me "alta. i ' Cach eFap TUS: SAVE SECIS sa geste O Vs GY SFGVGs, 42C PEG wape WulG tAUS Yaust inevitaaly a. iuriher supporis the assumption tual NOSENAO should nave «rows EDGut ; : the HOSOLAPGV-GARLAND trip. _. The position taken by NOSZENAG on thls point is that he accepia the statement oy ine interviewer that XCSGLAPGYV mace such a trip, . but he says wat ce, NOSZNAO, simply coes not mow anything ascu it. He adds only taat Lad anytiing siguisicant developed im the siucy of GARLAND, ne woulé have deen aware of it, | a NOSENAO,” as supervisor of the group working against coce i . . clerks, should nave knowa of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland :: _ 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a tris tu Cuba eo” from 15 Noveraber 1960 to cirea 17 December 1960, The possiziiiy exists that this could have accounted ior his jack of aowiedge oF the . Moscow on lo Novemoer a B - Oe “ag 6 et ¢ mq i] cP o trip of KOSOLAPOV to Heisin: 1960, However, NOSENKO nas not aitempted to usc his Cuban trip a3 a possible explanation ior not mowing of tae November KOSOLASCV ‘ ripe ee Es ed ve wee me wa eee ate WR eat fo pea As with the JENNER-KCSOLAPOV case, it is not possibd RLAND - te ms this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining te the G KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENXO denies any knowlegze, pe Le ee Ns +
13-00000 ‘this operational activiiy of XKOSGLAPOY is another-apjaxent insiance, “co " agin the SENNER case, of his net Kiowing something hé, by his own tov oo gtatermen¢s, snould have xnown, coe ' Torte se so Webewed in-tie context of ihe tual cucwled;e of NOSENKO ci ; : “+ +-- operations against code clerks, However, neivher the peoblems in che “iso... JENNER case nor those in the GARLAND case, singly ox combined, -i4s Loo fh any way represent conclusive evidence thet NOS =NKO- WAS RG super- : . aa ' -yisor- of XCSGLAPOV-or thaz he wis not ressonsible for the code clerk “vs an + + Operations descrivec Sy NOSENKO, iS Blaicment, Lowever, was not -- ‘gubstantiated in the ‘previous: summary. vei ~ "sss - Dages 193 - 199 of the previous summar; contain ‘an account of we ee KGB activity against code cler«x Joseph MCRONE irom various sources, me “ ineluding NOSENKO, NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962, According to NOSZNKO, the responsidsic case orficer for work i - a te ga MORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that VOZONE ‘-- and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard sy the name of BEGGS, were Warsaw, aryvangements were mace with the a pt on vacation tr pr - planning v.80) 2. YB (the Polish Security Service) for a iemale Polish agent to come to rae “Moscow and travel irom there to Warsaw on the same train as VORONE - and BEGGS... The-intent was for the agent, either on the train or sud~ sure: O°“ sequently in Warsaw,-to meet and compromise MORON © sexually, ‘She “001196 $ é
13-00000 - ae Pt oe oe ett - a re a ee es weet t plaly om Py at eae eee . vr Succesalucy accompiisned this, bul Cuc to ceriain problems in XGB-UB a1i50n TElations, it was NOt pOosivie Jor ine AGS to expioit this clrectiy. The previous summary stated that with respect to the femae 0 UB agent, there was persuasive eviccnce thats ith F NOSENXG nor 1 an i i } KOCSOLAPOV vlayed the voles in che MORONE case deseripcé by NOSENKO. That Summary cited the travel oo NCSENXO to ce ba ene £ KOSOLAPOV to: Binlane at approximately the same time as the MORONG } vip to Warsaw as evicence oi the impossiouiy of NOSENKO ane KOSOLAPOV being invoi.ved personally in this part of the MOONE case, NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met.tne Polish female agent and made the arrangemenis to place Mer on the train to Warsaw. MORONE and BEGGS departed Moscow on 12 November 1950. it is not ~nown when XOSOLAPOV leit Moscow for Heisinki, put he was on ine 16 November 1960 train manifest 2s ceparting Helsinki Jor Moscow. ; . NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 ior Cuba. Tae activities described by NOSENKO are thereiore possibie within tae ‘known time frame. It is clear that NCSENKO in 1942 exaggerated his persosal role in the MORONE case, particularly w when he stated that he, NOSENKXO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states tnat S | Go01197 37 cf
13- 00000 oe} i ROSGLAPOY was tae ony NOD oft ces in contact with the = Posh agent. ms a NOSENAO previoussy siatec that a G3 technician wo was on ihe train train arriveé in Warsaw. Later NOSINNOG saic that instead of talkin * to the technician personally, ne may have reac the report of the technician alter he returned trom Cuba, Tre activities. éeserized by NC. ENXO with regare to this maiier are according.y poasio.e within the Knows tire frame, it is not con sidered that the retzactions, NGOS ENKO Sas mace from ais original statements on this opera ation are Oi suivicient Signiiicance to materially discredit him. Page 198 of the previous Summary conlains the statement that MORONE, when intervieweé, denied having been intimate with Svctiana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employea at the American House. NOSENKO 2e Saw 6 had stated that IVANOVA was iastructed to report everything s or heard concerning MORONS (page 15¢4). Tae suramary, sowever, cited a number of reports that MORONE nad deen intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employec at tae American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unawar of the sexual involvement of MORONE with “IVANOVA's friends," y | oe 6004198 38 tamed 2 enter oe tel.
13-00000 : . NOGANAO, Curing Curves interviews, has indicated awareness {at least some involvement of LVANOVA with MORONE. He has fur- mighed information on 4 Geveloving operation agains: Marine guare with IVANOVA, He ses also stared that the possaivility was considerc of using IVANOVA against MORONE obiain compromis: img photograpas. & This pian was seriousiy affected when it was militiaman/ KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANGVA, her girl friend, MORON and a Marine guard, possibity GARCIA, zad “been “in the city, * then returned to the "Ylati" of one of the Marines where the girls spent the night, This apparently placed the reliability of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section, According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated thai Pictro CECCHI, Italian coo at the Americana Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOY reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalied .ocning specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE, The surrunary also states that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employees to be a close friend of CECCHI and that MORONE had admitted black market money exchanges with CECCHI. During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI furnished " ieces" of information concerning MORONE, but he, NOSENXO, Pp 4 ae : | 6001199
13-00000 . me no black maraci invoavemen: o2 NOL RONS with CZOCH AUEW & + Boy aes : ~ NOSENAO has uis0 iucscuies that che HOD sometivaes suspected, and on occasion actually occame aware thai varicus agents cid not fully report everyting of interesiia tise KGS. The KGS of course as aware that CECOx: Vyer im than bape wee yet WO nu ony ace Was GWare Nat elu. W inVOlvec in weet Sra Ce Saas REL. GeOwWeVer, € nether he reported to the KGB everything he cic and with whom is Open tO Questivg; Viz. , oh ‘The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENAG was unaware that MORONE met some Sovict females in the spring oi. 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Zgyptian-national KGS agent of the Sixth Departmeni who was aiso reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apariment, MORON Cid report oe oe bas tr oe oO ra) e ee a al a A review of oificial vecore having met some Soviet givis at the apariment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone cise nas reported that .e was intimate with any of them. The conciusion of the previous summary in this regard was baged on a misizierpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compzrorise incident took place in tne Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO oa this maiter is con sicered completely accepiabie, 40 G0U1250
13-00000 A iew comments are aporopriate conceraing remarks in the Previous summary on paces .¢9 - 26 concerning five code clerss, Maccice ZWANG, Joan TAYLOZ, Prink Ty «% t band we OT ete OLS SY Soc tet mega Ft a 4°47 DAY, Robert DWELLY anc Joseph GATTEZY, and although it is uci 225 ot =es fe mages, ms! wee - ° Sper ‘iicay stated, the suggestion is &dpyarent that the reporting oi NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NCSENXO was not supervisor Of aii MGR operations against Cocé Clerks, The iollow- ing observations may assist in placing these cases ix their proser perspective: | - {a) Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was icentiiied by NOSENKO.as a code clerk who wes actively ‘worked on™ during 1940 - 1961. The previous summary. suzgested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regard cing “G3 activity - &gainst ZWANG was inecequaie, First, reporting of NOSENKO on ZYWANG contained no reference to the 3 relationsnip of ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case hag identified as 4 AGB agent. Although ZWANG denied sexual relations with nis maid, ae did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment. During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when he 41 7 GoOL2cL ew a Sane
DUT 4180 Can De PlauSibly explained by Jaulty memory on his part or failure on tae past. OF tae maid.to report details Of this relationship to the KGB. news Second, NOSENNO had not reported taat ZWANG wey was invoived in tae currency operations of Pictro CZCCEI, a Ba @ e. b @ b . £ is] & < & (A fact that previous summary im woe — = oy known from AGB agent CECCHi,} bay ever, it appears that the dealings o ZWANG were not directly with CECCHI, but rather tarougn other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvem«ait of ZWANG or, as NOSENKO himseli stated he suspected, ‘CECCHI did not report all Getails of his currency operations to his KGB handjer. fb) John TAYLOR - NOSENKO icentizied TAYLOR as a State Department code clerk and target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was aware of the involvement of TAY LOR with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit TAY LOR “before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might 42 ee gem cme ge et 001202
13-00000 i ‘ i 4 | i { i enGangser the puans for a recrulument anovoacn ta James STORSBSERG, whe hed Quen uucer development ior almost @ year and was considered more vaiuable, yas the explanation given by NOSLN AO was Sabject to Cuestion Py failed to take into account the fact that although STOXSBERG was not approacsed until ater the ceparture cord TAYLOR, the nperation against STORSSERG was underway beiore TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis oi his previous afiair with his maid in Moscow. 3ieG Frank DAY as bas a. & et Hen be - & (ec) Frank DAY - NOSENKO a State Depar wient code clerk who was the farget oz eline KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing “interesting was learned about DAY ané no oper- AJ . ational measures were taken against DAY, The previous summary noted that in Juiy 1961, DAY traveled to the Caucasus with his iriend and jormex overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN, It was also stated that the two were uncer surveillance by five persons G0012E3
we AE at ail times On the ajuove trip, thal they found a “repeisman = eee me we Be ee lee cone sae Ste ae Coal gee that On anoiner occusion an "Liuractive anc avallas.e Soviet Rae Oe gal we toe female" was velleved io nave been wianied in theis train compartment. According to NCSEN HO, suxvelllance anc any other local coverage of any employes ai the United States cmiassy who travels | in the USSR is the respons sibility of the local ba] t fy rs ve $4 @ KGB organization, net the SCD, i: woute appea locai organization was trying to do a thorouga joo on DAY and BROWN, Sut it apparently was nonprocuctive, It coes not seem justiziadie to expect that NOSENAO should have recallee a trip which procuced no resuli (@) Robert DWELLY - NOSENKO hes related in con- siderable detail the etiorts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KCSOLAPOV to involve Robert DWELLY, a4 coée cierx in Moscow irom April 1959 « July 1900, in a homosexus: com- promise operation. According to NOSENXO, a homosexuai agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion DWELLY was a homosexual. GouL2ca 44 Pore bon cao
13-00000 Ps ee — % Zo we weet ee te gam sO oe 2 aS@Te 35 GO Téess0u 1S Cousot the statement of NOSENAO Concessing MOS alums to cctermine wren i i H } ! ! i i ‘ ‘ etme oy auc weere aw Mivael WSS pGlsg ‘inte the city" (Moscow) sat 86 that @ hormosextal cornzromise situation could be arranged, Tanere were no specific Geveiosgmenis irom MA er their efforts, zccording to NOSENAS. . /  DWELLY has catezorically denied being a Romo- sexual; NOSZNKO has not said he was, but omy that the nhomosexuas agent of GRYAZNOV assessed DWELLY as a homosexuai. There Coes noi appear io ¢ to consicer the statements of NCSINKO abour OWELLY ; . aa reflecting adversely on NCSENKO. c= 6: te {e) Josevn GAFFEY - NOSENKO has identified Josepa GAFFEY as 2 code clerk. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO hae siated the KGB hac tried to hire GAFFEY into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DESMAN in the Amezican House. By way of comment, the previous suramary stated that | GAFF EY arrived in Mcscow in September 1961 an that Fred KADERA had reported that GATFEY kad told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Am@PAgPecs fg ted § 8 nm
13-00000 riouse, It was furtaces wolce that GAEBEEY was recasied irom Moscow in Wse Surniecxs of 1902 Gecuuse of Crunkene- ness ang Guris ee bee rs i ry ge View had icuaiiied being in with IVANOVA at tae Ar.érican Nouse and at her acart- ment and taat she aac cizimed pregnancy. As to whether ine abuve inlormation raises a question concerning NOSENXO, the iclowiug cactwcrs should be considered: {1} NOSENKO has stated that during th latter part of December 1961 he was past tixce in the First Department anc pari time in tie . Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962, (2) In addition to the information previously Y Guring inter- mentioned as furnished by GATF @ ft view, GAFFEY also stated tzat he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment, According to GAFFEY, IVANOVA told nim of her pregnancy about 1 May go01206 i 46 maces fens Ne Sa hee Go
13-00000 contained a ceia ontns after G to the Seventh ater of review by NOS) NAO of OTU veporis izon. saicre- ¢ o . =. z paone coverage on the Unired Stazes embassy has previously been es 22% Ge a Nw as ges } oe re +t) ° G ey my ey “ 3 2 iz ¥ f mentioned inthis summa:y. Pa WIE lY eg accoun: of intermation irom NOSE KG om the maiier oi microphones, countermeasures taxen by che Americans in 1964, and Cazmage estimates prepured by ine Americans. The previews conclusica was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or Lis claim that he personally revieweé the KG3 microphone monitoring reports, Comments have been mace in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion, ° A few remaras, itis believed, wiil assist in a fuller understar“i-- oi the micropnone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO a.. 1964, there was 4 single sheet of paper containing on one side hazd- written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro- paones (those which were being monitored) in tie United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previcus summary and neec not be repeated here, The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character- ized in the previous surnmary as singular end it was stated that NOSENAO Crt
13-00000 | ' fl i ae never pladsioly cxpiainee he circumstances waich prompied nis retention of the list until i9a4, when he produced it jor CLA in Geneva. The mlen as qe ge Lee cone gp ea - mt tha athe lee wee _ wsurang Curt OME ae SVaEWS, tad Maer O21 tne auGve 225% Las O¢ED con Ore, TiS €xpaanaiion, Boh of ihe civcumsiznces waich lec to wis acGuiring tne list as well as oi his stili having i: in nas possession < at the time ofa is Gezection, is considered plausible, contrary to the jucgmen: of the previous suremary. + NOSENKO 1 has statec taai t:. 1100 ~ 2961 Viadimir 1, PETROV, Criei of the Second Section, First Department, cesived some “zoints" for use against targets of his section, NOSENKO uses the texm “point" not as meaning just.a micropaone, but as referring te an.OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors ana translators to cover the microphone and translate the “take. we targets of PETROV were primarily Americans anc, therefore, tnere was a transcription-trans 3 problem. According to NOSENKO, most o: the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in tie United States Embassy, The Chief of the First Department, Viacdimir A. XLYPIN, held a meeting attended by XKLYPIN, Chiei of the First Section Viadislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir 1, PE TROV, ang NOSENKO, the purpose of which g001208 48 7 mH pe ars
13-00000 a4 * .8neG tO give tecanical cover © e ee uy 5 e i? is) e oO iy ca er nu bre 4 e¢ he bg Qa (a) er & Pry G s ey - . i) ea is) ie) id age. During the meeting, AGVSHUA aver renily i00% 4 piece OF paper which PETROV hac end wrote on it a Usi cf active microphones in the United States “mbassy and resicences, When tae meeting enced, NOSENKO had this paper anc he icok it back to his ocfice. Contained on the reverse sice of whe paper were t2é following names in Russian: vain, SMITH, Wil, SURTIN, anc Sipe BURTIN. The name A. A, MIXHAYLOV was listed next to the name of 1 LUBE and the name of Y. E, CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name oz SMITH, NOSENXO has expizined that LUBIN, SMITH, Will SURTIN, and Sipe BURTIN v were among ia iargets ot PETROV, anG MIKHAYLOV and CHERNETSEV were oiiicers of the Second Section, NOSENKO stated he mew nothing more about ihe ious non-Sovier e mames except that they were targets of PETROV, NOSENKO stated inet he could not be positive of the cate of the meeting other than that it occurreé while ALY >PIN was Chriel of the First Deparimez:t, (Accorcéing to NOSENKO, KLY PIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as g0012C9
13-00000 i SB oO pele corse aL Bate rary sans oo ‘wld 2 es ge Siwge Tos: . ? . 7 one Pe ae o*, - Czuieli ai tne First Devas ectaSeas fae Cae ca wic-l961,} NCS CaTON OG FegEera ° ‘ nd 2 * a. ae mam et eo vem eye es 3 tS ine (Our HoneSovie. narnes caves 1G Coust al LUGIN is George a8 we oman ae = mee ~ tats oo tm eee, oC ote Sieye Tet z ~nemes dew an; EBT Vesta 08 Bad a Wea a wed Cross ao Be BU Naw aet OTE es corres ram with Sige being ine wire Gi WILAGURTIN, All three are Arnevican Ciiizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. SMITH, az this tirre, has Sill) not Seen icerzizied. in view of the above, it nas Been possibie to Cecuce che Gate oi she meetizg called by ALYPIN as circa June 1961. AccorGing to NOSENAG, the piece of paper Cescribed above “Was piaced by NOSENAO wika oiner noies he Kept Deiween the pages. oZ @ bound voiume waich NOSENXO calls a “workging cozy." This ; (3 Ce) Am 9 according is NOCSZENAO, wis an accountable, registerec norebook © issueG to all oiticers in whica they were supposed to write a1i their notes, Cesireying any other notes. . According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not compietely follow regulations anc the tendency was to frecuently put loose notes in the notebooks so that the notesoos octen actec as a cile rather than being used in the way required by regulations, NOSENAO las stated that when he leit the First Section ne took various notes with him to the Seventa Deparimext; these incluced notes ke had drafted concerning certain First Section activities jor use in brieiing FEDOSZY=IV CouL 210
13-00000 i : i | wae ITY cyte mene ee ea rr When FEDOSSYEV succecdca ALTE ae, 256 BOS at Sad sresarce Jor CTRL tO raieropn sa S 5 : wee lyst im tm ee Come we a tee a Tees a a aoe Doge gen O'e 30 WES GUSL IN TLE ETOUD G. NOLS Ae loud G1Gng wen he went to the Scevents In consideration of the above expianation by NOSENAC, it should of FEDOSEZYEV anc certain notes he... ly Bad also prepared wale in the First Section; @.g., his wolee 13+. | ccture ia the Seventh irectorate in regard to a “mass surve..lauce' om the American Embassy. By inciuding a section (pages 236 - 239} oa ize mowiledge of NOSENKO of the KGB crypitologic attack on Unitec Siates Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to Guestion his informaiion on ihis subject. 4 NOSENKO has asserted that the AGB hac never succeeded in reaGing enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eignth Directoraie (the unit of the KGB respoasible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis} was reacGing some United States Embassy traiZic. While it is open to question to what 3 hth Directorate would be known CoOL2it extent knowledge of successes of the Eig
13-00000 i 1 { t i A i eee tin tage Miwet ot lee wee cone wie pee, to EMYVORE Wi tA FaToe Section of ine Sirs: Be Na SET aLT, Within the . wine eitsiee nyeltns? a NOSENES I tice sh eee SCOPE P.susssly BVAIGGLS to NOSEONNG ia his claimed position, there 4 oJ the excesiion of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO coves not claim io have seen the —cme oe to his claim, NOSENKO ssould have been aware Gai Wiisiam No. MOAZIL - was CIA, but he nas never iden wvidied MCADTLIas CIA. Surely KAOVESNU: anew MORELL was CIA but why NCSENKG is not aware } fORELL Wes CIA is not known. Ic has already been estadlisned, nowever, that NOSENKO, 28 Deputy Chief, was not aware of ali of the activities ci KOVSHUZ As regards some oi the other listed individuals, a-iew remarks are appropriate. (a} NOSENKO has never indicateG any <nowiecge Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARDLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employ ee before going to Moscow, It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was _ "American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not a | go012£2
13-00000 arrive in Moscow until Novew ber 3 beiere NOSENKO .eit the Fire: Section for the Seventh (5) Tae previous sumroary sited that accordin to NOSENAO tae AGS cic not suspect that te ia] ° was a CIA oilicer, yet he was a ClA co . te aya Xla ates thst] . wen = Lo mpecec eee It was also stated that o3 reported the presence Oi iniensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow ivom October 1960 to September 1961, Tre “intensive AGB surveillance" is based on siatements o:| O3 \.n6 may possibiy be raore a refiection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening. NOSZNKO as CLA. William HORBALY was CIA and ideniiiied Dy NOSENKO as suspected of deing a CiA ofdicer or coopiee. iG) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according te NOSENKO, suspectec of being a CLA officer. George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "£31 officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate qui213
13-00000 that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suepicton.: it io not balteved that the liated failures of NOSENKO to identlly CIA officers are of particular significance in establiching tint he was eo? was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many on- kaown facters wulch would need to be considered. Despite our ascump- tions as to what the KGB knows, it (s possible that (a) the KGB did not / know of the CLA alfillation of these people, (b) the taformatton known: te the KGB was not avallable at the First Section, Tiret Deparbmnent, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the Firat Section or to a specific case officer was of ne offictal concern to. NOSENKO and wea not made available to him. “The last of these possibilities ie suggested {un spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in tha Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exeggerate the area of his own haowledgeability hae been seen eleewhere in thie cage. Pages 252 - 258 of the previeus summary contala a report of Gye 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With fegard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of hie travel as Geseribed by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reasou to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made ia a $4 | | Go01214 i} e a ~ | weewkea th i
13-00000 © - ‘ 2 owe « z ad ine previous summary that the travel of NOSENMO to Cuba in i$c6 ® < w er ws is *. 9 he < ph Gi bas a 9: Le] iS te ba fa) e be o at we e ox p ror st 2 et i t ? uF: &, me iva tnat-h ge Gamaged his ch * RY code cleras at the time. To accept che validity of this judgment is to say that nO supervisor an the SCO woulc be perm ritieG tO Make & trip abroad unrelated io his supervisozy functioa, a judgment ios which there is no supporiing evi As résards tne triv.of NOSENKO io Bulgaria in 1961, dor which F-) ‘« : = $ there is no collateral information, t he previous summary conciucea iat hie account of the trip was untrue anc argued that such a trap to Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation _ against STORSSERG was reaching a.climax and his subordinates were “appareniy planning to expiol: KEYSZAS!' newly-ciscovered vulnerability, " it would indicate that the presence of NCSENKO in Moscow was cis- i pensabie, There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO cid sot travel to Duigaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to wry is s account of the purpose of the trip was untrue, As to the STORSBERG case, while it cannot at present be prov that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENZO leit i for Bulgari ed ey it cam be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE, that it nad to have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria. ’ 55 le pap ston Ls ver ments A AMON YER. 6+ Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning a ag Hce Cul %
13-00000 Gi NOSENKO in Moscow a% ine sine this pitch was made, it woulc appear that NOSZENKAO was Comparatively ree io go to Bulgaria because this i ' odie As t@ the KEVSARS case, there is no apparent orobiera since car that the approach to AZYSERS took place aiier NOSZENKO Be sc e er Poe returned izom Bulgaria, and furthermore that the AGB probabiy cic not become aware that XZEYSERS was a homosexual, and thereiore potentially vulnerable, until just before txe pitch was mace, In short, there is no reason to believe that the accourts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, . or that if they are true they necessarily retiect on nis claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations, fe g001216 3 56 i
13-00000 ' | F, NOSENKO's CLAIMS, THAT IN i542 EZ WAS CHIE? ‘ OF THE AMERICAN-BRiITISH COMMONVEALTH SECTION AND WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH
13-00000 4 | at 4 i i F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Devartment, are not credible. (Previous conclusion} The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department thereafter. NOSENKO has. stated that, although he was offered the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. CRIBANOV, Chief, SCD, and although an ordér had been prepared and was in the Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position. According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK, then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was CC01218
13-00000 willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV whe wanted KOVSHUKas a Deputy. | Viadimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the ' position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the. reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN, The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indi- cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best khown to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB. This section actually covers two pcriods in the claimed career gf NOSEN KO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, E - and July 1962 ~ January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart- : ment. Since NOSENKO wae in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de- tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases a gooL213 — — ? we
13-00000 ot re are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS. Apparent conilicits between information from NOSENKO and . ingermation cerived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO, It.is not believed that the . previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief ofthe: ‘ first Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals. A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari- lication, In the WaNace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961] and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary sug- gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend- encies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO, NOSENKO during cure ent sinks gviews
13-00000 has stated that the XGB learnea of the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON “by chance" soon alter his arrival, “SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY, " two homosexual agents of NOSENZO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotei where JOHNSON stayed. They met JOHNSON there and reported -his apparent homosexual tendencies, In regard to the William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO curing current interviews has furnished additional information on the <GB operation against I ONES, including the woman indmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited | as an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case, The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the JONES case are compatibie with his claim to having been Chief oi the First Section, Severth Department, In regara to the Nataiie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case ofiicer but was abie to provide enough _ Specific information concerning the case to bring about a comiession when she was interviewed by the EBL That he did not know all the cetails con- cerning the BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly invoived with the case, In regard to the Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS metin the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that 4 9001224
13-00000 | the Seventh Deparment was not concerned wita ioreigners visiting reiatives in the USSR nor wiita Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, accord= ing to the previous summary, was awate that BRAUNS was a former - Soviet citizen anc ine summary stated that hig plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB iurough his visa application. In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet - expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO, * Cases of “true™ tourists, which were normally the respon- sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the.case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made BRAUNS of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of ra the SCD, However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Depart- ment since BRAUNS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous surmmary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa appli- : cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad... BRAUNS had a * By 1962 there bad been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the a9 Seventh Department. The situation was not the same GORIR9. = o~ a - ry
13-00000 OP et es eee ee tee ee ee relative or relatives in Leningrad, Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number oi items of which the KGB was aware concern- ing his background and occupation irom his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statemezt of purpose in visiting ine USSR. Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary revic ws remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case-and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several syecific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case, Taere is-adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to. give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV, | The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in “what NOSZNKO specifically reported about the BELITSHIY case and infor- mation from the actual CiA record of the case. There are major difier- ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has keen made toward determining whether these apparent differ- ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case, NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in. London in 1960 or 1961 and that the G0014 223 os
13-00000 4 } i el i i i i eet a neasmebes nentmett oa eroe KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary ‘stated that NOSENKAO did not know when the BELITSXi. operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958}, did not know the nature of the British involvement, did n:t know the operational details and contact arrange ments BELITSKIY. had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva. NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British, However, he still has dated the recruit- ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in Loadon and still states that the primary >urpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR; The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to . BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1900; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR. There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis- exepancies between the statements by NOSENXO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO PA 2: bOU1L224 9 “SECRET
13-00000 t the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relation~ ship of BELITSKIY with CIA, There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London | and BELITSKLY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. Asa possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in. 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and ag a result he told the KGB of certain events in Loadon in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA. The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGS actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prioz to 1961; (a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also — ao reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information . received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to 6001225 | 8 SeeneT
13-00000 q “eo : , : : » ty Wiese ato ae George BLAKE, (It seems highly untikely the KGB would : ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which raay have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could : 1 . have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed {rom June 1959 to August 1950 to come under suspicion as having, passed information to Soviet Intelligence. ) (b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, aiter he went | .° to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quic«iy. because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (Ii the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of * the internai mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSAIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail- ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore (001226 fen. Cae
13-00000 meet came tere Bo he UE ee ee ap ee ayes em WOU~6G BOD L2VE $016 Che 2. OW Le BAG ueeaY Gad CORWCS t. wn eek at Tin ag V Pl cee am Sen ne age, 16S Se aor “7 with Amevicen Liteliigence in Coneva 121962, but very we sot Gn wate ete, TE SNE Swe ot smo, we 2 moet . me could Lave to.G toe ACS we Bld seen a pirticulas woman ry Sa Tee ntti eee ce fe " a meee ty eee a or American Intelliisvace auc is wes varsuch this wom: > ce atts - tee me en ~ eee o oe prs rsa. oe fee waGEace Decuria aware SELITSALY: was. is @ ~, eraevican int Geneva. ) Oo Tees ~ sap wearer ey 1. te a Pe : {c) BELITSAIY 2. 2902 La Ge: Within the USSR an indivicual roprésening Cla, However, his agreement: wes. only vader corimia stipulatec coucitiens, the most interesting of wiica was net the incivicual must it te o by g og wt g4 ry) e pte 2) ps th £ B be unwitting oi the true nati BELITSALY with CLA. in adcitios, any messace to BESLITSAIY or any indivicual who met SELITSALY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITONIY with CiA, Nave i te The above conditions are quite expla rs f BELITSAIY had not been under KCB control bemveen 1953 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGS only 2 partial story of & the 194] events.in London. 6001227 10
13-00000 i i As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep~ ancies between information fcom NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reilection.against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not . ; know the true facts of the BELITSAIY case, oe The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA | was an Intourist interpreter recruited. by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY “reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA,"" The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to cIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY," | | There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA, "is a reasonably accurate description of what actualy happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. 7 The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence whik previously in Paris, France, - | | | 6001228 11
13-00000 ae A Me Oe Se ate oe it was determined there was no coilateral information which would indicate that the staternent by SHULGINA hac any factual basis and BELITSKLY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behaif of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been “forcibly recruited by . American Intelligence at a previous date. It was also suggested to /(BELITSXIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and téport the apparent indiscretion of SHULGiNA, ; - Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with ‘the BELITSAIY ease, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. ‘It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of America.. | .tourist agente in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly ’ familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959, The summary noted this -was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart- ‘ment, Although not specificaily stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and tnat NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi- mately 1957, | | 12 Go01229
13-00000 “| A closer examination of the cases cescribed in the previous summary as "CiA American tourist agents,“ reveals there is no con- flict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and tne statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, rirst Depart- ment, As anexample, one of the cascs is tne case of Eaward McGOWAN. NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originaliy a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a leiter ‘ by the indivicuai in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the Firet Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department. Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with L 2 a > 4 and visited the USSR on a teurist visa. Such an individuai would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Depariment, particuiariy since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport, it is,assumed the individual was oi interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department ior such assistance and it is extremely un- likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat, sad . 0001230 13 SLO _—
13-00000 Pages 332 - 333 of the previous surnmary contain the basis for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January | | | 1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depariment from July 1962 to January 1964, ot eon ein cre oe AOE se Hie tt NRA ly MONEE = OREO A Bah BAe An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu~ gion was based on inadequate iniormation is the matter of the written notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964. The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is inadequate, inaccurate, and rnisleading. Prior to current interviews, an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed expiar= ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes. During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed iniorma- tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960 - 1961, - | | GO01231 — . 14 SEERET
13-00000 Primarily the notes os NOSENKO can be categorized as follows: : (a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section end Sixth Section, Seventas Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 19062 - 1963 responsidie for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, wno supervised the Seventh Department, requested a iist of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOSKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENGO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBXOV, but aiso exe panded the request to include ail 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand- written reports from the Chiei or Acting Chief of cach Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors. | Many of the above cases had previously been trans- ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about theiny4232 15 ra pereneryyas i
13-00000 inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BODKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CLA," (b) Notes by NOSENHO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962 ~ 1963 period, Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions, Most of his notes were not detailed but were sulficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection, {c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 ~ 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963, - (4) Drait report ior the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961. © (e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre- pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chieis, including NOSENKO, This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium : of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh 16 6001233 SEGRE
13-00000 Totaxn ett c a mv B bas @9 Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document, The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in % carrying written notes with nim out of the Soviet Union, An examination of this material suggesis taat NOSENKO was using extrerne care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con- siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB aiter his depart- t é ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been des~ troyed by NOSENKO. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva, These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable, The reference to three documents was to: ° (a) The draft report for the briefing of the Coliegium which has been mentioned previously. (b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually . a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of - submitting in handwriting as the others did, 7 6001234
13-00000 (c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent. NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the [ile kept by the Cn-2f which he reviewed and that he kept one. ‘Of interest is the jact that the copy was not a registered document end did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed. 6001235
13-00000 G. NOSENXO HAS NO VALID CLA CERTAINTY THAT we . ? & i ’ é 4 . } ps t I as, a7 7 6001236 : i 1 4
13-00000 G, NOSENKO 27s no valid claim te certainty that the KGB recruited no American Erabassy nersonnel between 1953 and his  sianaa-sannetrsenanannangnnqeaaaninteeantetettntnitesestturewetiiettrenttwrermwrnessssiiiinsiasasSi=yia.aenda Sosa coop ooccsnoraacccsAacorcn dts cor ana pannaa-snnnaasgnneiiasiniysensfannssesasssstinmeendttettternttyeet ved tht Er CnEEEEEOPE cf Er e Gefection in 1964. (Previous conclusion) The conciusion in tuis summary is that NOSENKO is of the oninion that there were no KGB recruitmenis of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 ‘with the exception of "“ANDREY" (Dayle Wailis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD, who actually was 124) :mplevee but did work part of the time in the Embassy. The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any rs way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area. , . The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSEN MULTE be oe, examined and can be cited as follows,
13-00000 (a) During March i953-late May 1955 NOSENKO Was a case officer in the First Section, First Departrnent, SCD. NOSENKAO does not claim that he would kave known the detaiis concerning any recruitments (other than “ANDEEY") in this period, out states if there aad been he would have heard “someting, " (bo) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details, (c} During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depariment, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by tae KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of th4)Q1233 case or cases, There is merit to this contention by 2
13-00000 he f NOSENKO since the Chief oi Section was Vladislav KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart- ment since 1933, actually worxing in the First Section except ior the periods of tirme that he was in the United States to reactivate "“ANDREY" in 1957-1958 anda period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department. . . (a) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department, However, he continued te maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1953 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department, According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would nave furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any euccessful recruitments of Unitec States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the Herbert HOWARD case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not uatil 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually 9001239 3 pec ween cen ry ee ne nee eee a ee ant etn cnn men Seema le eee wean OF ee ee
13-00000 tn RH OTE IO: Rt A pt nat NL ep 21 eA MOYO AO 2 RT Hee Atay Ar Tete Sin Nee RAE ME a AAs arrange teva ib eet i RT YD TOR te +o EN Phen a8 ca ba EY tpt DET tr I AP ST A + tp PEL OU AMR tle sit learned of the name when the First Section, Firat Departinent, needed the services of the Seventh Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in 2 certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of HOWARD. In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO thet "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD were the only successful KGB recruitmente during 1953 - December 1963. It should be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of NOSENKO. However, tn view of the cited actual basis for the opinion eat of NOSENKO, acceptance. of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an honest opinion should not be converted into 2 statement that it is absolvts proof that ancther recruitment could not have occurred, NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since OSENKO wae only in the Firat Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961 his opinion that he wovld have heard “something” about a recruitment in 1954 = 1959 or 1962 - 1963 @annot be accepted as infallible. j | Go01240 |
13-00000 SC eh Agee: ap OEE TE DAES NII oO PEAR LS CLT IEE ROLE EL ALONE PIE LCN CREE IT! IE ALT T ECT IOI BILE: BOI AEN AEE ET SRRIY SO Tt YEU SERIE SREP HCC HCH BE ot tera. ~ Secret a a VV. £XNNEM Ae eeeealenatebatant aF “Sey REINER AE YER TERIOR AEN are pce th seem ee E ae OP LT AT HEE NGA LOR OUR ENE MT EUR AB Sos
13-00000 ] eo ne ek oem The previous summary contained an Annex "A" an "BY" covering pages 316 - 435, Limited comments concerning nA," Statements of Soviet OfNciais About NOSENKO, and Annex "3B," Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached, there is an Annex "C"'to this summary whica is entitleé, "The Cherepanov Papers," Ailachments: Annex A Annex B Annex C + cat oe we * : In addition, QoU1242
13-00000 ANNEN B - SUMMARIZES OF CASES NOT EXANMINGD IN TANT , | a (6001243
13-00000 ) CAAA SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT Er.) hooaha wae ces ey ~N2D IN ZN ewe 2GG 2% Pe artery a sa aa spent Fen tay eee am oe” ~ ALCS 399 - 439 Gi the PT CVAOUS SULLLNGTY Con. SUNS 2 eO UMLOS TAG ASOT on the cases of 49 Ameicane Who, according NOSENZO, were of KGB intevest, were approached by the KGS, o: were actually recruited by tne AGG, It was stated teat tn. & tie &o fas we did not clearly relate to the apecizic KGS positions held at particular times by NOSENKO cad thus could not be usedully employed in examining bis claimed KGB service. Tse sourcing of these cases has beex exprored sen? in detail curing tse curvent interviews Wita NOSENAO, anc itis now ' possible to establish a certain relationsiip between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSZENKO in the KGB, It is the conciusion of this summary that any group o: 49 casae, as well as all other cases concerning waich NOSENKO nas furnisaed suf a ey a £,54 :A ~ = . £ one 2 at information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of tae information, but to determine how NOSENAG claimed to have learned of cne case and waether his statements con- cerning each idextitied case ave supported by collateral information, These iactors are important in assessing the overall validity of iafor~ mation from NOSENKO as well as being supporting eviadhde2ctt: s claimed positions in the KGB. pear]
13-00000 , — ot ~ wa ene ge Pele lee eee Gk te fete. ~ “eee m= 90 asl ne. TO COMMENT Bpeciicaily on cack Gf the 49 cases would require ° wae Lun me leea gl ‘eae 7 Te avery lengthy paper, Curscat interviews nave cevelonec erfes apt £2 Taney - er onen in wer a a acditionai injorvmailon igom NOSENAO is app cases, Of even more sigaiiicance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information ina rv 3 tast@an = oo NEO mm of ana 4, % mt te nS a The indicated inability of NOSENKO to commisciely source asl 49 of the cases is not consicexved significant, particulasly since his having c a’ > wee eT fat 2, Ve lyme wae ei ee = Oe ewan WE bab CseaINEG 2OSs.+.GN8 knowledge of all the cases ia Guite ¢] in the KGB, in addition, criticism of NCSZNAO ior not veing able to ae source all of his information would be unvcasonable since it makes no allowance for norraal lapses of memory ox failure to recali some-~- « aed So Fans fang wet Ol ae oe aot eo a. fe as oot thing Whack Was snSignisscant at ine time it Gccurre p Without citing in detail any of the 47 cases, the ways in whica NOSENKO iearned of a number of the cases ava considered important since there is a direct relationship to claimed positions in the AGS urs 60 ~ Janua 64, speciiicaliy the position of Desuty CrieZ, during 1960 - January 1964, speciiical position of Deputy C First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1962; Chief, First Section, Seventa Deparimeni, January - July 1962; anc as Deputy Chief, Seven. Department, July 1962 = January 1964, Cextain examples of the avove are as follows: 6001245 aoe acme anne ie nearer es wire Ee, se anemone apenas gape i ante ere em
13-00000 see ee mate DO BR TE Crea ange eS BL Lene IB oat RIVE ph rhctng secur RCN SET mdf cA PaPS ile abet Ye Att ae ep am ape A S ‘ : a) NOSENKXO learned Gi a wucnuer of the Seventh Depariment cases which nad occurred in 1960 - G62, as aye C o vy. 4 % oy % io] be 3 8: o oe Oo @: Ss Lay Ge hu & be & o weil as several 1955 - 195 o 2 oat en: . re en mete OS tL ae wel pe ore tne Crliei or Acting Care: ol ihe First Section, Second Section aud Sixth Section in i903. These noies were ore area atthe request gi NOSENAG wie as a Depuiy Chiel, S oo these three sections; and ine re Ret ¢ te & et < 2) n Ps o e iv & b e ue $ 3] t ” f pansion of the origina po ot ef a is cr wh re bey + o 3 tw Oo tw wy oO = u & ae) oy ~ * ¢) i bee CG ey & e ue © bey ie G oe) te) “ cs] ts e 5 of the SCD, for information on recruitm Department, NOSENKO brought with him in 1904 the noies preparea by the Cniei or Acting Curler of the First Section, Second Section and Sinis Section ane his knowledge of many oi the cases which had occurred prior to 1942, paruculer 1960 ~ 1961, was limizec to information contained in the notes. From these noies, NOSENKAO nad prepared his re- 2 port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were nét applica to the request, (b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 ~ 1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, from Gernadiy 1. GRYAZNOV who succeeced NOSENKO as Deputy Chier, , 6001246 - ee me &
13-00000 3 Se ee ee oye fe tye, wee oe erg 2ATSt se pariaient, Wis snes raa$non Was ryt First Section, iurnisued to NOSENAO primarily because of Lis iviencsiiz with GRYAZNOV anc not as we result of mutusl operations. wee ant Bowever, NOSENSAG icuscned of Ceviais uo. Ge Cases or ree fyapwetotagh npptieinesst eaenite we ws tame ee was furnished accitiona: cetails as a result ola eGGQuUEse serene cee OEP i a nee irom the Sevenia Depusunoal te tne Pisst Section, Sires Departmen:, for assistance oF vice versa, fr i ~- = £ x#% = a: eo . 2S eh. Oo .. a a H Certain of the 49 cases tisted were cases of the Seventn Desire ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was ia tae Sevens Department. Certain of the cases were cases in Walch the Firet Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1966 Knowledge of NGSZENKO concerning these Ovo groups Of C4SE3 GOES not materially support his claimeé positions in the First Ocparoment and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Sevenitn Department prior to 1950 and in 1962 = 1963, anc Gis claimed os, re assignment to tae First Depariment in 1900 - 1961. 4 es nea os we r ch we ee ee ce ce ee ee ee coe cam enemas EE, ce It is difiicui: to specizicaliy comment conceraing tucse 49 cases since they do not iall into one or two specilic categories. Inatead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First 4 Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approxi- mately five and one-half years. It should be noted, BOBBUPED akpt the
13-00000 expianation of NOSENXO concerning uls Knowsecge of cae 49 cases 26 both plausible and cormpatioie with Lis claimed positions in the : - a: oo ee een 7. ote are emcee "Gy, fatet Deparunent anc Seventa Deparunent curing 1900 ~ January i964. aie. re 6901248
13-00000 4, 4 [OV PAPERS ANNEM C - THE CHERI Fe ' ness | | g001249 SECRET [Exgeste®
13-00000 a oe me peo woe Tim CHEREPANOV PAPE Pages 309 ~ 316 of tse previous sum.aary contain a cescrinion oi the Cherepanov Papers, and how Alexsancér Nikolayevick C CHEASPANGV passed a pacxage of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in carly November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respec: to tre CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that ne was Deputy Criei, Sevenin Department, . in late 1963. The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSZNKO cannot be ignored anc must be given specific consic- ‘eration, li CHEREPANOV was under KGS controi wien he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information, " the bona fides of N NOSENKO are subject to very serious question, | | NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, ; ; according to NOSENKO, an oicficer in the F First Section, First Depaztment, : mere 6001250
13-00000 2 tty ee ma ot Mippae omen ce te nn 3 : Guring 1960 - mid-1961 when ke was forced into retirement foom the KGS, During the above period of time, NOSENAO ciaims w Lave been Deputy Chief, First Suction, ilisough ae Coes nos claim to have x ac @ Girect supervisory responsiblity over CHEREPANSV excest be aay a ithe absence of tae Caici of Section, Viadisia ete v ROVSEUA, ACSSNKO @1l60 Ciaimis co have pariicipatcd in the bunt jor CHEREPANCY in December 1963, Considexvation has previously been given to the Cieory chat tee ~ - 2 Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans oy the KGS tarou &. CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO, This cacory seems to have little credibility since che papers coutein mo intormation which would even support tne clairn of NCSENKO that be was in the First Section, First Depaviment, 1960 - 1961. The papers aiso contain no incormation waich would indicate there was even a Deputy Criel od the First Section curing 1958,- 1980. Statements by NOSE NXKO are ernpoatic ¢ that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers waich it iater cevelopec he had taken from ihe First Section prior to his retirement because he was Gisgruntled with nis treatment by tse KGB, and that the action by GHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KG3. There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is . G901 251
13-00000 nk ARR H Ra RNNE MMM te b * tere ees wean Te OU Ae Ee ee eee re somepapermemenrcmsas? . o Gg ry wr pee wa be 6 o i) i+] wi ae) ee 1 pte o. of iy uw § me ay c hte 4 a] 6 . ph oO ] a. ce) ee ef “ e 4 bi e ft’ fi oe qh is] 3 % e iv u Depariment, ee om oe — 5 During curvens inierviews, ire CHIALPANGY case lus seen covered in Cetail wits NOSENKO, The Cherepanov Pagers, waick «3 were originally shown to NOSEIWAC ix 1964 alier Lis celecition, have priox to 1964, his statements in regard to the vavious candwritings, types of notes, and draii memoranda leave no doust that NOSENXO was very jamiiar wits personne. in the First Section, Firs: Devavi~ ment, 4G With First Department procedures. . Certain additional research has been conducted in regarc to the papers and 4 Getailed analysis will be prepared ata later date. it should de noted tnat a considerabie amount of persocal judgmex: cas , & een necessary in maxing an assessment of tae Chevresanov Paper b ssary in making ssessment Cueresanov Papers since there are no exemplars wits waich to compare any of the material. However, based on information ceveloped thus far, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was uncer KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive infer oae' =. k
13-00000 or taat the papers were olner thin the coliection of material vy a Gisgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or cecumulaccd ine removal of which woula ony Lave constituted a rainimial visk to. tT TTD wast CHEREPANGYV. ™ wiley ae yas Th eee Thea Fae cemaplnpegeed oo oe ewe dee 2h CHmre GHCTENGNOV £O7CSS Gave OCA CEVIGWEE to Cetermmine : Sm ey foe ie tig Quetta nage Ae pee ein : Vg mcatigey lie Tee ii theve is any information which could oe cuncicered "Ceceutive bere mation" either by Cirect siatement ox implication. Two possisic arcas Lave been noted ane civen iull consicerauon, These arcas ir ty 4 if Sa (a) There is no specilic information that there were any recruiiments by the KGB of Americana per- sonnel in the United States Drasvassy Guvin nor is these any informaiion suggesting the KGB hac an cuxing that period of time, (bp Poise 5. POPOV, a GAU ofiicer who aad been an extremely valuable CLA source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January pene 939 as a resuit of 4 letier mailing Gy George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTEAS was a CIA employee under L 3272 assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained by the KGB aiter mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS. G001253
13-00000 wee wey eel ~ 4 * a rn cs ~ te my Sea se “as, in regard to (4), i.e papers ave only a rather minute pa be De GO. ee no, coe mgt fas ee aed So gtt my gia yet 5 8Gs the total papers prev. ped in the First Section curing 1956 - 1960. * to 8, : 24.2 “Sg $6 these “agers Wwhies cleaetle ov jeciveetio The iata of aNY Aloe Gaon an mMmcse Papers WHICE Gavecily Or anasre ces * fol mce wma Meet tem RITE pone an ow a ne Sam met im min la eee ANnGiCatEsS that tue 8G rikae a recruitment of an American in the 7 . sae tem Ene nee pep yee are te te ST ean to, as yes net sin "Oss Emoassy or had an Arnervican source in the Embassy Curing the 1956 - Z wm aceing) Se ne nome ts ee on mw Dee te fa man mae tee et 1900 porioG is only a whales 26Y Conse vauon. It is not conclusive prog: trata recruiiment Was not mace or that an damevica % Souree Gig not exist, The paners Co not coiialn @ positive sitave.nent on either matter. In regara to (>), the quite speciiic information in the papers that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by tue KGB as 4 result of AGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., wao maiied a letter to . POPOV in January 1959, this information shoulda be considered as possio.y information of a Ceceptive natuze unless an adequ os & a " iw pal Ay) 4 & et bee € +s] rs can be made ior its presence in the papers, POPOV was recalled to be Moscow irom East Germany ia November 1958 ostensibly fox TOY, The circumstances uncer which he was recalied and coliaterai inior~- mation have given adequate grounds for a belief taat by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligeace or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence. | ‘aap it may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United Siates Intelligence, more specitaaly 25 yee 5 Apes ae ye on
13-00000 CtA, had a source in the GRU would have come ivom an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, noi tue SCD, It can also be presumed that & GSOUXCYE OF Avent Of the PCD ia aw position to Aivnisa a lead toa : penetration of the GRU by Weatern Intelligence woulda ba carecully protected even witais tiie KGS. The vossibiitiy of course Gxists vhat “ Boe " - om , oat 3 a oa seca a lead izom George BLAKE, an SCD agent, resultec in tio ci osure Of POPOV to the KGB, but itis noz esc cadished wh tit did nov is there any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not Save another agent or agents who furzished information to the AG3 pertinent to cevelop- ment of the case against POPOV. The primary question, however, as zegardés the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information os _ from an FCD source or agent whica led to suspicion of POPOV or inzos marion pie rt fy sGentidication of POPOV, this would be incorpatizie w in the papers and coulé only lead to tie conclusion thai the pasers contain > “deceptive iniormation, " . The conclusion in regard io the above is that the act the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he. mailed the letter to POPOV in Januazy 1959 is not iacorpatiole with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained infor- . mation from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in “el regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV. GNOL255 a perme ANE aa. 2 C fe
13-00000 _that the KGB had received inforrmition leading to sus if information was received irom an important FCD agens suck as George BLAKE of through another vatuavte £02) agent Welch ied to KGB suspicion of PO.’OYV yvries to his return to Moscow in November 1958, itis highly unliine.y suca incorration would receive wide Gistribution within the KGu, cituer in the TOD or thea SCD. & 4S a250 possible tne Limited groux within the KCB who would bé aware _ Le) from a valuable agent would d¢ very interesteG in attvinutiag the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPGYV by WINTERS. ‘The possizility sLouic be éonsicered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV iheve was only a dees suspicion of POPOV but that the icter compieiely souidizied tae case against POPOV. Consideration has been given to the possidisity Gat CL EAIPANGV was under KGB control when be passed the papers to the Aricerican y tourist and that it was done by the KGB with tae hope of invoiving SIA in a KGB -control'cea operation withia the USSR. In that event, tae papers passed by CHEREPANOV would mos: likely be genuine since this would have been the initial siep in waat tae KGS noped would become a successful operation. . ' The above theory has beex rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it. These factors inciuce the fact that GO0L256 7
13-00000 4 i . ary, : ’ » 4 i : \ Be et oat wee OF Tee OT AM Laie Pa we TS Was Et iGhsl cae lee Years Ge, ‘ i Wee. tig foe tan mm es ee re err en wp oe yee . NeesaCes WOM BGaCale fe aaah ae oe Godse TO CUSLONE 2CC@S55 anc tiere . ; as me Lo Glggtagn SUM T De wm Foe eee ag Dee Maree momen at i Was TG aC ees a bah ase footwes Was LG FESIRG ina otewmre Contact. an] my i ‘ + é aa t - i . ‘ : 0001257 con tena ce ANE on pe nemtN OF OAR Nn cfm ne Nhe hee oem me socquarat ry
13-00000 Hl H eed . iim Z . ‘ INDEX ABIDIAN, Jokn - IV, £, 5, 7-15,19, 20, 52 _ MANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) ~ 1V,G,1-4 ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - Il, A,2 ARTEMOY, Vladinir Lvovich - 1V, F,6,12,13 ‘BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - 1V,E,3,4 _BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV,F,2 BARRETT, Robert - UL, F, 14,15 BEGGS, Frank - IV, E, 36,37 BEL: TSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12 BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - 1V,B,2,3,5=7 BIENSTOCK, Natalie - IV, F,3,4 BIRSE, Arthur - 1V,D,1,2 “BLAKE, George - IV,D,9; IV, F,9: V,C,6,7 BODKOV, Filip Denisovich - IV, F, 15,16; V,B,3 BOHLEN, Ambassador ~ LI, F,16 BOWDEN, Lewis - IV,E, 53,54 BRAUNS, Horst - IV, F, 3-6 BROWN, G. Stanley - IV,E, 43 . gGov12s8
13-00000 ete ae wee tan a ee POL Be ect BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F,4 BURGI, Richard - IV,D,1 BURTIN, Sipe - IV, E, 49, 50 : BURTIN, Will - IV,E, 49, 50 CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40, 42 CHELNOKOV, Viadimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F,2,16 CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - Il, H,4; V, C,1~4, 6-8 CHERNETSEV, Y. E. - IV,E, 49 | CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - il, B, 4 DAY, Frank - IV, F, 41, 42 DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, £, 20,45 DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich ~ IV,B, 5,6 DOUGLAS, William ©. - IV,D,3 DREW, George - IV,D,1 DWELLY, Robert - IV; E, 41,44, 45.” FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V,A,1 FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV,E, 8,9 FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV, E, 49-51; IV, F,1 FISK, Norman - IV,D,5 FRIPPEL, Arsene - IV, D,2 0601259 GAFFEY, Joseph - IV, E, 41, 45, 46
13-00000 . GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich - ULB, at ae tected A btn 8 GARBLER, Paul - IV,E,52 GARCIA, Anthony A. - IV, E,39 ‘GARLAND, John - Ul, F,17; iV. 5, 31, 33-36 GINSBURG, Michael - 1V,D,5,6 3,4; Ii, ‘ IV,38,5,6; IV, V,A,1 E,9-11; IU, F, 5-13, 15-19; L,9,10; IV,E, 21,23, 31-34; GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - HI, F. 3,4; IV,6; 1V,6; IV,E,4,5,21; IV.F.1,2 "GRIGORIY" - UILF,13; IV,5D,3,6; 1V.F,4 GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - 01,5,4; IV,E,20 GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - 1,B,4; Il, F,8-13,15; IV, E,5,12, 19-21, 26-28, 30,43-45; 1V.G,3; V,B, 3,4 GUK, Yuriy I. - I0,B,4 HAMILTON, Victor Norris - 2, E,9 (aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri) "HANNA" ~ IV, E, 27 HARRIS, Gisella - IV,D,1,7,8 HORBALY, William - IV, E,53 HOWARD, Herbert - I,E,8; 10,F,20; I1V,G,1,3,4 IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38, 39,45, 46 JENNER, Paul - IV, E, 28-31, 35-36 JOHNSON, Robert Lee - Il, £,8; UI,G,5_ JOHNSON, Wallace Everett - IV, F, 3,4 JONES, William Carroll - IV, F,3,4 gv01 260 ive B
13-00000 78 hy emtoren we ; dum A 6 @ ben & KADERA, Fred - IV, E, 45 ‘ ma 7G - ca KANTOR, Marvin - 1V,D,5,6 KARLOV, fnu - 1V,D,5 KASHPEROV, Mikhail - I,H,4 KEMMER, Myra - IV,E,9 ‘ KEYSERS, James -IV,E, 22-26, 55, 56 KLY PIN, Vladimir Aiekseyevich - IV,E,5, 48-51 | OO . . KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) -IV,B, 1-4,7 KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30,34 (Alias used by KOSOLAPOV) KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - 10,B,4; DI, F,8,16,17; IV. E,5,19-21, 28-32, . 34-39, 42-44 KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1 KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - 1,3B,4; I1,F,5,11,12; 1V,E,3,4, 6, 12, 18,21, 23,49,52,53; IV,F,1,2; 1V,G,3; V,C,2 | KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV, E, 12 | KRUGLOV, Sergey Nixiforovich - 1V,B,5 : LANE, Alien - IV,D,12 LANGELLE, Russell - 01,F,3; IV,E,8 "LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26 LUBIN, George - W.E, 49,50 LUNT, Horace IL F.3 MAHONEY, Eugene - IV,E,53 | - g001264 MALIA, Martin - IV,D,2 4 SLlary AE pb PAD as Sy Noone
13-00000 "MARK, David ~ III, C, 4 MATLAW, Ralph - 1V,D,5 MERTENS, Gerard ~ IV,D,2 . MIXHAYLOV, A. A, - IV,E, 49 _ MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - II/E, 8; UL, G,5 . MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 52 | : ‘MORONE, Joseph < IV, E, 22, 27,36, 37,39, 40, 55 MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV, C,4 oo "MC GOWAN, Edward - IV, F,13 PECHTER, Bernard - iv, D, 5,6 PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich - 1V,E,13 PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - Ii, B, 4; IV, E, 48, 49 POPOV, Petr S. -IV,E,7, 10; ¥,C/4-7  PREISFREUND, Johan - DL, F,5.2,12 PRESSMAN, Patrick - IV,D,5,7°-~ "RAKETA" - IV,C, 5 RASTVOROV, Yuriy - IV,B, 5,6 . RHODES, Roy - II, F, 4 RUFE, Jobn - IV,D,5,6 SCHWARZENBACH, Collette - I, F,10 9001262
13-00000 / é 7: $ * SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV,=, 32,33 (Very poasibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENXIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGZYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.) . SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry - LU,F,6_ SHATTAUER, Sofia - 1V,D,5,7 - SHAZLY, Sarwat el -IV,E, 40. | SHELEPIN, Alekvandr Nikolayevich - Il, F,13 “SHMELEV" - UI, F, 13; IV,D, 3,6; IV, F, 4 SHUBIN, Jobn - 1V,D, SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV, F,l, 12 SMITH, Dayle Wallis - LU, F, 4,26; IV,G,} SMITH, Edward Ellis - 10, 7,4 SMITH, John Discee - I, 5,9; IV, E, 49, 50 STALIN - IV,B,5 STEVENS, Edmund - I, F, 4,6 STORSBERG, James - ii, F,3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55, 56 TARASKA, William - IV,D, 5,6 TAYLOR, David - IV,D,2 TAYLOR, John ~ IV, E, 42, 43 UMANETS, Ella ~ IV, E, 38 6001262 SC otk een
13-00000 | | | semi ee ee ee cee ssn AS bande tue fb URBAN, (Colonel) - IV, E, 24,25 VASSALL, William - Ill, E, 9; Ul, G, 5; IV,D,9 WASHENHO, Steve - IV, E, 53 WILBY, William Stanley - iv,D,Z WINTERS, George Payre, Jr. - IV,E, 53; V,C,4-7 ZENKIN, PNU - IV, E, 32-34 . (Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.) : ZUIUS, Matthew - IV, E, 26-28 ZWANG, Maurice - IV, E, 46-42 7 | Gu01 264-