(tos-fota2-t008e PEMCBANDUM PoR THE RECORD SUPINCT: Prelininory Debriefing Resorsy on 1. ‘The substance or this preliminary report covers debr: eld oie Bee from 7 “hrough AD fovenber 1960. 2 tan Both i a. AMPANTIC-7'S operational activities in Cuba froi exrival in Cuba 5 August until his departure 5 Yovember "3940, b. Internal assets develoved in Cuba for future opératiosal ¢» Problems. éneduntered by A+7 while on erating in Cuba. and, vas anti ne to teens cua afternoon P Slane pooled at the % vashington Hotel in antici pation oF feb aporo imately | 1800 ‘hours, A-7 called 12. Belich on ‘th Washington airport to announce his arrival and. eS 8 Gizected ite) where subaaéet ves- subsequently contacte 4 Wh ES SGORe | ° sen Paaeyyy —- com eine, deter ; eye Rovel, Sen : castional outburs support _ his <aly enot ia: nis init eee ‘ov ta
ww ra ad weamdarnet te" fe yen ae oat aa 7 + ~ semle - wens denny a Ae? ateted that on Li cetober ins 1 SGb an up yert riessace ate =e TT mee on de we fase WeiLy Bayt +, 8 ta Jo Taek i ~ co nis Have contect (AMGRESY) informing nim thet his situsticn wes a Lacs wy tet de 1 So f te a Me gt “ 24, ‘~recarious and that he tast get out oF Cube cs soon as possible. fee meget of at f ee whe oe % *, we ne, 2 ee ad ae be cording to A-7 his Ageney contact vas unable to brovide any definite essays hho ¢ e@ from Chita eal he excedltead le htyay GoeSolivewicG “Onn GS LPO LUO Cola Of CHCULUst. ase “GL1Q21 ole abe yo, a at we ~ * a . ale yaya, ae, wo ole te ds 2 west 2 but a Ped a acteipted to lay on unilateral arrangenents to this end with first B oct! : s his operational contact] | end later his tother-in- lew introduced A-7 to al vho orfered to assist him in getting out of Cuba. In the course of the next ten days, A-7's plans to get out of Cuba began to take shape, after. _—s—«s(Pintroduced him td who o ra i inic J vana. On 1 November a negro py the name o , drove to A-7's safehouse end took him to his own nouse located on ‘in Marienao. On the morning of 2 November at 1100 hours exrived at the Negro's house end told A-7 that he planned to Leave for Key West Florida 5 Uovember and would arrange to smuggle A-7— out of Cuba by niding nim in the motor room of his yacht. Arrangements were mace between the principals for A-7 to visit the yacht 4 November to in- spect his proposed hiding place on the yacht. Ih the interim period, A-7 stated that he began to susvect that he may have fallen into a trap and told the legro that he was returning to the U. S. to bring Tony VAROHA back with hia to Cuba. A-7 felt this vas a good simmick to use in the event] planned to turn him over te the G-2. After inspecting his hiding place on the yacht, A-7 told[_ he didn't like the idea of hiding in the motor room and suggested that he syim cut to the boat, where he could be picked.un at sea. ‘Thas night (4 November) A-7 stayed at the hone of | who had a house close to the beach at Santa Heria del ier located about 25 Kilometers from Eavana. Cn 5 Hovember et 0530 hovrs, A-7 besan his long strim in rough, choppy waters and was Dinelly sighted bir } yacht, where he was taken on board the vessel. (A- whe? staves that he vas completely exhausted when he was Diclied up bir the vessel). yoni sd piloted by ed Mey west, Bloride 5 Movember at UES hours.’ Slip avery during the refueling of tI ie yacht before une custdm officials arrived end immediately took off dor ieni. Uvon reaching Miami, A-7 vent directly to nis wife's home Tor a reunion with his fortiiy. In quertr- whe + & aot . oh Tub = oF os quate hy 1 me o~, pune Von Ha gt et tet . 22g iT furcher on gE Gore bo Leave Cuos wivtnouwt ax F : bl ote. ao, 5 rye SA obey, fy oF ee ee fe serious obstacles olac& Mis hath py sue GOGO, A-7 stated thee acd bold hin thet he received official apmrovel for this .
SERIE AGS ORR PRE Sri BS OS at AR IN RC es Pate ae, oe ® Vay fn - . se 2 ‘ srould Subs eaue te Tha rps onnlized 9 his wetuen to. Guba Miami = Tel: : ct hk, Efforts t6 debrief A-7 on his opsrational activities in Cuba were somewhat futile in this initial meeting in view of Ais unsevtl ed. emotional state. His prina vy cOncern appeared to be his Witte and his “ather strained relationship with his in=1a% WS, Who were now residing in Miami. fn this con- nect sion, it showla be pointed out that this emotional state appeared to sten, in part, from his inherent suspicions that his wife (21 years of age and rel- atively attractive) vas being unfaithful to him. All indications are, however, that A-7 has no real basis for these suspicions; other than those conjured w in his own mind. In any case, he requested if it might not be possible to wire- tap His wife's house in Miami, so that hé could have daily tevorts on her activi- ties. While no promises were made, A-7 was assured ve would attempt to look inco this possibility, once we had moré definite information that there vere Some grounds for his suspicions. (Note: Subsequent discussions with Seeurity o2Pice yevealed. that 4a wire-tap of A+7'S house was a major project in itself and inpossible to accomplish at this time without ti eing up considerable persoinel.) A-7 was later told this after we assured him thot his suspicions were groundless wheré his wife. wes concerned. 5« Following this initial meeting with A-7, it vas apparent to both. My. Pékich afd the undérsimed that time tuld be needed to rastore agent's confidence in our capability to support his. efforts in any future projected assiganent in the field. Moreover, Ae7's emotional state, which apbéars to Stem from his vroblems with nis in-laws and his concern about leaving his wife alone, » Hust be fully resolved before attempting to dispatch hin egain. 6. In later debriefing session held from 8 te 15 3 November with 4-7, consi derabi e more dight ‘was ‘thrown on the | nature and SCOD Be of his obéPational f this report, A-7 pes == ‘Series oL mestings ith OA; Triple-A and “DC with 2 view to es tablishning sone de, gree of rapport in the furtherance _- an 5 of his own sersonal ov jectives. % to note that.in = - 1 a ver iod of f accroximately 5 weeks me eb with over Lp tndt~ viduals, who represented various anti-Castro groups operating in the Hevana and Pinar del Rio areas. A=-7 frankly admittved thae ne feed om himself outs too thin in this resdect and that in many cases bh:
y, ain dusts Minséelr. Tndivi some ci degree of rapport and coordination TH this. connection, A-7 eloim turned over & mumber of hi over to ALPANIC-5, prior to his movement to the ESCALBAAY, were he eS subsequently picked ws by C-2. ernal Assets Developed in Cube for future Creraticnal Use: Pind In attempting to sift out Specific assets developed by A-7 during his activities in Havana, Shree of the more srontient dndividuels with whom A-7 was in direct contect should be listed, . "—— in Havana. Ae used (PER ANDES tor planning tae election of snitable LE 3 oth Pinner del Rio and. Oriente provinces, to ats se OF 3 fe ovses in Revatia and use of his garages for s ox nd military equinpnent waich A-7 anticipated would be dispatched to hin. Sad! contacts in Pinar dal Rio % and who was working closely vith A-7 to form a guerrilla group in the Sierra de los Creanos. Was also selected to handle the propaganda for the "Cuba Libre group being organized by A-7 inside Cuba. . (3) | a Cuban national who had served in the U.G. Army and who also fought in the .scambrays against Pavist forees. ROBAYTIA claimed he had A Pores oF 150 men eat his di Speen and ves planning to use them in a guerrilla action against Castro forces in the Pinar del Rio area. Moreover, once vroper materiel support in the form of arms and other military equipment was made availeble to hin by A-7, Ee felt he could marshal over a: thousand men in this area. (2) | a lewyer by profession, tho has unlimited (4) In addition to the ebove assets, A-7 indicated that Ppendered hin considerable assistance In moving sécurely adout evans in the course of his operational contacts. In the case of (Nm % A-7 highly praised his abLlitaes | as A Highly capable Case officer and he feared for his personal sefetys He suggested thet .GRes2 4 should be brought bac to the U.S. for @ rest seriod, before c-2 picked Bim up. “ (5) tel. Who. was troined. th sabotage © techniques in the i U.S. and was later assigied to heT; Was listed by A-7 as zy who could be channeled into nore specific opers ions » ones avail materiel tas forthcoming. sé Flt, however, that he and ATUG-1L [Onducting JoSeSatz os were at considerable odds on’certaia aspects of ANS og Fm cm oe : ra rn oe oe
“Cuba where military action is t his oun ‘resurn. c. Problens Encot unter ed by Some of the more significant preblens. encountered by A+7 Curing the course of his operations in Havena sre as follows: (1) Security: In this connection, A-7 stated that despite the disguise given him, he had to be constantly on the alert from the danger of being picked wp by G-2 or Castro police during the course of his numerous operational contacts. He Sited several exaimples where he believed he was under sur- veillance by the opposition and subsequently succeeded in allud- ing this surveillence. He complained that his disguise, (hair- piece and mustache) rapidly deteriorated in the Havana climate - and as a cénseqtencé he was forced to abandon “this disguise towar the latter part of his stay in Havana. Similarly, he was forced tO change his quarters continually, by moving from one safehouse to enother as a security precaution, since he felt that it was generally known in Cuban circles that he was obérating in the Hevana area, and tnat he was vrobably already under the sur- veillance of Castro security forées. (2) Materiel Supoort: In the course of these debriefing sessions, one of A-7's chief complaints vas ast despite uis urgent messages sent through his cut-out EERE=2) to the Station that arms and other militery equipment vend sorely needed by! his groups in Havana and Pinar del. Rio, no ection vas taken to itiplément his réduests. As @ result, A-7 felt he vas losing face with his followers and this was one of the primary factors for returning to the States to discuss +h spect wth Headquarters 3% 2 As? stated. thet witaout the Soeeeee OF 7 WE C 23 ald be in direct communication with us, he is fully convinced. that any subsequent retutn to Css in an operational cabacity vould be ineffectual. lence, this would. be one of the conditions laid on, us.thet when he 2 &. W/P osaretor vould be assigned to hin persona: Ve rst Evi biarek=tst foe ae SAF Predicated on the assum ively near future, deta x feel 1 that iis most Sigel leant comtrinusso stey where he appears t : sth he dessit te 4heie aifferences: ain non these goerations snould pe  esaduc ee horeover, should the BYabaurct complex. decide to move into other wre : saxe place, A=7 vould spoear co Se - Joe 2 cr Ss
Lee an BOuLng o over the operat ions in this area against Castro in oy cass, @ de¢ision has beén reached that A-7 should not be a3 ne ed, Aue operator who can be relied on to worl: close nside the country. 8. Case Officer Comments: Despite A-T's tendencies to overate on @ granciose scale, his disappo Ointhient in the lack of simpost raceived on nis initial mission %0 Cuba; ang ais disple ay of emotional. dnstabilixy v at vanes for us in Cuba. His motivation appears to stem 7 from his ‘personal anbitions to make his mark on this counter-revolution against Castro, where hé can | assure himself of 4 briminent position in the future government to be formed in. Cuba after the overthrow of the Castro regime. A-7 has imagination and. the will to suécéed. His weakness is his inability to hide his personal ambitions from others who may work with him end who may have altogether adif- ferent motivations and sénse of values. Hence, it is believed that A-7 WLLL encounter problems dn handling. pedile recruited or assigned to him in the course of his activities inside the country. AMPUG-l. can be sited as a@ good example, chere. a “clash of personalities has apparently alreedy taken places In view of this y AxT wi have to be dealt with firmly end must te convinced | that the success or failure of his projected mission vill depend dis inside the corntr; 7 again. ‘similarly, A-7 must resolve his “personal, ‘problen dealing with his wife and in-laws, which has had an adverse ef fect on hin personally since his return, and may affect his operations inside Cuba. ‘The next several weeks will, therefore, need be devoted to re-establish A-7's conPidence in our ability to support his efforts in Cuba, once ké is sent. back, and working out his family problems to obviate any adverse psycholo- gical effect which may be detrimental to his operations i Cuba.