SECRET reductions would be wilikely. The interrelationship of political eetilenent and arms control agresments is mon cee readily apperent in thig area than a any oth it is particularly important to continue to explore fully with our NATO allies | and the USSR all combinations or political and arms control agreements which could reduce the dangers of confrontation in Eurcpe. The achtevem ent of a non Zero Sum settlement, however, in this area is move difficult to foresse than In any other astect of US-USSR relations. This means that the break- . tarough in the European eres way quite likely require a longer vedting period | than in any other aspect. ‘Tt is the long ter reorientation of political relationships -- €.8., closer integration in Western Europe and closer — een Oper tion within the fslantic Communi ty ; greater dis-affiliation wit thin the Commioist satellites; ete. << which offers the best hope for e zero sun settlement which the USSR would accept. That is, it will require a certain “sense of the inevitability of the development of such political trends in Europe to penetrate to the Soviet leadership before there will be a willingness to accept & European settlement also acceptable to the West. Conversely, for the US to proceeé too rapidly with arms control negotiations could have a disintegrative effect within the Atlantic community and this in turn could - lead the USSR to exploit arms control negotiations primarily for their disruptive effect rather than for stabilization and detente. 5. Reflections The arms control considerations that have been summarized in this entire. discussion may be considered to. ‘be "reduction -- control" at the strategic end of, the forces spectrum, with primarily "deployment -- use" controls of one kind or another at the middle and lower ends of the spectrum «- all ha. SECRET HW 49061 Docld:32626321 Page 42
SECRET pending the time when political tensions have been resolved enourh to make Sut in a larger perspective the very fact of being able to nezotiate and egrse on the rather eleborate errengements covered in this paper (on oa) the strategic "reduction" ley. vel, and/or the tactical nuclear conventional ? Ly} force “deployment »~ use” level) would izply ‘the achlevenent of @ stage where political problems were in Pact being resolved, as registered by the arms control agreements, Whether great power rivalry is yet quite this \ tt usceptible to amsiicration and sublimation -. even though the inmoulse Ky or common interest (non z zéro sum settlements) is certainly increasing in the | “kind of world we live in «- renains moot. This paper attempts to raise the issues, decision on which is necessary for the conduct of those negotiations required to determine whether that oe - 3 rivalry ¢ can be circumvented. Nothing ; in this peper should give great : | optimism. But the problems delineated should not be a cause for undue ro essimism or abatement of our efforts. The 17 years of apparently meaningless propaganda exchanges in the arms control field finally gave birth to tvo arms control agreements. The fact that these agreenents came about at a time when political detente. suited the needs of the Soviet leadership stould not obscure the fact that a great body of common language and dogma, in the arms control field made it possible for relatively quick agreement when the political circumstances were eppropriate. A future struggle to Sueceed Khrushchev could well result in the seizure of arms control issues by one of the aspiring lievtenants as a tool for the winning of possible support | necessary to achieve power. Or increasing problems in. the allocation of economic. HW 49061 Docld:326276321 Page 43
.. cece cee cespee i we we ME <i jee SECRET resources of with the Cainese Communist could drive the Soviet leadersht toward the i ‘puch veckeges : etaile i ) Ward the eeceptance of such packeges, The detailed, painstaking, years - long spelling out of the details of a mutually acceptable fizst ment with the USSR, to which this document attezpts to make a contri buticn, 5 showld comtinua. 43 SECRET HW 49061 DBocld:3262763271 Page 44