HW 35355 at ~ JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION ' ‘Beleased under the John Kennedy AGENCY : CIA Assassination Records RECORD NUMBER : 104-10302-10008 ; RECORD SERIES : JFK AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CIA-DI-FILES DOCUMENT INFORMATION Wi-27?-2017 Oollection Act of 1992 AGENCY ORIGINATOR : CIA FROM : TO : TITLE : OCI WEEKLY REVIEW DATE : 11/22/1963 PAGES : 36 SUBJECTS : OCI REVIEW DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : 1B CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED IN PART PUBLIC - RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/98 COMMENTS : JFK-M-02 : F2 : 1998.09.22.14:32:20:780120 : ARRB REQUEST .UOUCIA-9. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 104-10302-10008 DocId: 32401316 Page 1
22 November 1963 SC No. 00619/63 Copy No. 384 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SERIES "BL" a copy paTe_°” W* “3. co, Ts COPY MAT OT BEFORTHER REPRODUCED ae CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ». 4 7 > = 4 . z bos -- | » + ‘> 4 * > a > ~ <= THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL NO FOREIGN DiSsEM ‘ + G@OUP [’ Exelided from automatic 7 4 | oo 7 me ” 5/349 wipe mene HW 55355 DBocld:32401316 Page 2?
HW 355355 DocId: 32401316 This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen omly by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS. No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI- GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. DISSEMINATION CONTROLS This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7, the document must be handled within the framework of the limitation so imposed. Page 3
HW 355355 FOPSECRETDPEAR CONTENTS (Information as of 1200 EST, 21 November 1963) CUBA Page CUBA'S NEW COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE LAW 1 This law, explained in a broadcast by Raul Castro on 12 November, will be an important instrument of control over the population and a means of "re-edu- cating" those still unadjusted to the Castro regime. TRAINING OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL 2 Raul Castro also stated in his broadcast that some 7,000 Cubans had volunteered to train in special weapons and that "antiaircraft missile troops" had completed their first phase of instruction. DEPARTURES OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM CUBA , 2 Some 1,700 Soviets--most of them probably military --may have sailed for the USSR since 9 November. GUERRILLA AND ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN CUBA The anti-Castro guerrillas in Cuba have not been able to develop the cohesion and drive that char- acterized the Castro revolutionary groups before Batista's fall. The Castro regime, moreover, has created a large special force to hunt down insur- gents, and has enacted stringent laws designed to discourage the population from supporting them. (Pub- lished separately as Special Report SC No. 00619/63C) THE COMMUNIST WORLD THE BARGHOORN CASE 3 Moscow's handling of this affair suggests an ini- tial miscalculation of the repercussions in the US, followed by efforts to minimize the damage to Soviet- American relations. USSR REJECTS ALLIED STATEMENT ON BERLIN ACCESS 4 *“"Moscow's rejection of the Allied’ statement on har- monized access procedures maintains the deadlock on the question of "control" and is another tacti- “4, cal maneuver to draw the West into formal talks. 4 PEIPING RENEWS ATTACK ON. MOSCOW 4 ‘“* The Chinese’ apparently regard Khrushchev's latest request for a cessation of polemics as a sign of weakness and as a good time to press the attack. | 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page i TOP SECRET DINAR— DoclId: 327401316 Page 4
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page INDICATIONS OF ECONOMIC REAPPRAISAL IN THE USSR ; 6 =. Scheduling of a central committee plenum early next” ‘. month indicates that the 1964-65 economic plan now is ready for presentation after a delay apparently occasioned by a reappraisal of the economy in Light... of the poor agricultural ‘situation. ge vith ts as RUMANIA OPENS DOORS FOR COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA 7 * A visit to Belgrade this week by Rumania's Gheor-~ ghiu-Dej. will complete the process of re-establish- ing contacts at a high level between Yugoslavia and — . all the members of the Soviet, .bloc.. Ce we SATELLITES UNDERMINE GDR'S POSITION ON BERLIN 8 “ Clauses in Rumanian and Hungarian trade pacts with’ Bonn acknowledging their applicability to West Ber- lin and giving semidiplomatic status to West German . trade’ missions undercut basic East German positions. COMMUN IST CHINA' S_ LEGISLATURE CONVENES IN SECRET - 9 *°The National People’s Congress, which uséd to be a major annual forum for public boasting, was also ‘held behind closed doors last year. Lee PEIPING SEEKS LARGER FOOTHOLD IN LATIN AMERICA 10 * Lacking “diplo omatic™ “recognition in any Latin Amer- — ican country except Cuba, Peiping must depend on its news offices and unofficial commercial missions to support political and subversive efforts. AS IA-AFRICA SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS . li “<The governing junta'’s party is running scared, but, even if it falls short of a majority, should be able. to dominate the government. PROBLEMS MOUNT FOR ‘NEW SOUTH VIETNAMESE ‘REGIME 12 ~~ Some military officers are showing signs of. person- - al political ambitions, and internal disagreements are already apparent on such matters as the role of . the prospective advisory "council of sages." a CAMBODIA RENOUNCES AMERICAN AID 13 *Sihanouk's action follows weeks of charges that the US supports dissident Cambodian broadcasts from Thailand and South Vietnam. 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page ii -FOP-SECREF-DEINAR HW 55355 Docld: 32401316 Page 5
= oe aad ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page TENUOUS "CEASE-FIRE" IN LAOS. 7 14 “©The Communist faction may be seeking a temporary detente to gain time for broader military ventures, ° or to undermine the neutralist-rightist alliance j by minor concessions to the neutralist faction. ARMY TAKES OVER IN IRAQ.. . . an 15 * The new regime retains some Baathist coloration. While Iraqi~Syrian union now seems a dead issue, Syria's Baathist leaders may expect to reach some accommodation with Baghdad... «00 es AFRICANS DEAL WITH ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN DISPUTE 16 ® While the conciliation commission selected by the ~ Organization of African Unity pursues its delib- erations, Morocco and Algeria will quietly improve their military positions. NEW SCMALI-ETHIOPIAN TENSIONS oo , 17 *% Fighting in Ethiopia's Somali-inhabited Ogaden re- ~ gion has sharply increased, and the Somali Republic will probably seek international support for its territorial claims there. EUROPE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CABINET IN ITALY 18 “Disagreements over the prospective government pro- gram are retarding the negotiations for a center- left coaltion. ; & THE ITALIAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK * Industrial output is at a record high, but infla- tionary pressures and balance-of~payments deficits persist. Businessmen now are apprehensive about concessions to Socialist viewpoints in a center- left government. The Socialists, however, say they will support, for the present at least, con- servative financial policies designed to prolong the economic boom. (Published separately as Spe- 4 cial Report SC No. 00619/63A) i THE ERHARD GOVERNMENT IN WEST GERMANY ~The new chancellor has made few changes in the cab- inet or policy inherited from Adenauer, but he dis- plays a flexibility which is likely to be particu- larly evident in his approach to East-West relations. Eager to promote US-German harmony, Erhard will visit ‘ Washington from 24 to 27 November. (Published sep- ae arately as Special Report SC No. 00619/63B) he a 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page iii TOP-SECRET DINAR HW 55355 Docld:32401316 Page 6
EUROPE (continued) Page MANSHOLT PLAN FOR SETTLING ‘EEC GRAIN CONTROVERSY _.. 19 * EEC Commissioner Mansholt's proposals for unify- ing Common Market grain prices appear to offer some hope for solution of the Community's Ss most ~, vexing problem. . i a PR CHANGING BRITISH LABOR PARTY. DEFENSE POLICY 20 > Apprehensive ‘about ‘upholding its policy in an 7 election campaign or as the government party, Labor is modifying its heretofore flat opposition to the MLF and an "independent" British nuclear deterrent. AREA NOTE 21 On the British Communist Party. WESTERN HEMISPHERE AREA NOTE 21 On Canada ARGENTINA ANNULS OIL CONTRACTS _ 22 The foreign companies nevertheléss continue to op- — erate pending court determination of their financial position vis-a-vis the government and negotiation . of new contracts... * THE OIL CONTROVERSY IN PERU 23 “ President Belaunde appears to be adopting a more conciliatory position on the controversy over taxes to be paid by the US-owned International Petroleum Company. oe VENEZUELAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ON 1 DECEMBER 24 Communist-inspired violence aimed at disrupting the election continues, and there remains a tacit threat of intervention by military leaders if they find the winning candidate unacceptable. 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page iv —FOP-SECREFT-DENAR- HW 55355 Docld:32401316 Page 7
HW 355355 Cuba CUBA'S NEW COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE LAW Cuba's draft law on compul- sory military service, explained in detail by Raul Castro ina nationwide broadcast on 12 No- vember, has far-reaching social and political ramifications. It is to be an important new instrument of control over the population and a means of "re- educating" Cubans who have not yet become adjusted to living and working in a "socialist" country. When Fidel Castro first announced last July that such a law would be forthcoming, it was “““in the context of a bitter at- tack on the remnants of the Cuban middle class. He said the law would make Cuba a nation "more and more of workers and less and less of parasites” and ensure that the "sons of today's parasites do not become tomorrow's potential lumpen" (his word for recalcitrants and dissidents, whatever their class origin.) In a talk to representatives of Cuba's central labor organi- zation on 15 November, Raul Castro indicated that politically unreliable Cubans will be im- pressed into labor battalions rather than inducted into regular military units. He expressed confidence that many "lumpen" so impressed will be rehabil- itated. Raul Castro declared that the law will not be officially promulgated for another two or three weeks. In the interin, the "people" are to discuss and "approve" it in meetings of their "mass organizations." The draft law makes all Cuban males between the ages of 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW 17 and 45 liable to three years of active military service. Women between 17 and 35 who volunteer will be accepted for two-year terms. The law states that an individual may fulfill his obligations either by serv- ing full time for three years or, at the discretion of the state, as a member of the re- serves. Students and others whose civilian duties are judged to be of sufficient importance may be assigned to the reserves, but will nevertheless be re- quired to take military train- ing during certain periods of the year. , . The pay for draftees on active duty is to be a token “allowance” of only seven pesos per month--as compared with the 60 to 80 pesos that the lowest ranking Cuban soldiers now receive. Castro justified this by indicating that all the draftee's personal needs, as well as those of any de- pendents he might have, would be taken care of by the state. All eligible Cubans are to register during the month of December. Castro estimated that some 1.5 million Cuban males will participate in the initial registration. His calculations indicate that approximately: 28,000 are to be called to active service each year. Thus, after the program has been in effect for three years, there will be about 84,000 men on active duty under this program. (CONFIDENTIAL) Page 1 —FOP-SECREF-DENAR DocId: 32401316 Page 6
HW 355355 oon Cuba TRAINING OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL In his 12 November speech, Raul Castro stated that some 7,000 Cuban students had joined the armed forces when Fidel Cas- tro asked for volunteers to train in the handling of special weapons. He added that he had recently attended the graduation of Cuban students completing the first phase of instruction for "antiaircraft missile . troops." Cuban surface-to-air mis- sile (SAM) trainees recently DEPARTURES OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM CUBA Five Soviet passenger ships have arrived in Cuba and de- parted for home since 9 Novem- ber. Four of these arrived di- rectly from the USSR while the fifth came from Brazil. The number and type of per- sonnel arriving is unknown. Each ship normally carries 340 pas- sengers., 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW completed the four-month classroom phase of SAM instruc- tion at San Julian airfield and are scheduled to begin field training at SAM sites this month. The 7,000 Cuban stu- dents said to be enrolled in "special weapons™ courses probably include the SAM trainees as well as those training in radar, cruise mis- sile, Snapper antitank rocket, and possibly FROG tactical rocket operations. UPK-Act_ 6 (1) (B) one vessel was to carry a full complement on the voyage to Cuba. Available evidence indi- cates that about 1,000 Soviets --most of them probably mili- tary--left Cuba for the USSR aboard three of these ships, and suggests that another 700 departed on the remaining two vessels. Page 2 FOP-SEECRET DINAR DoclId: 327401316 Page 9
HW 355355 THE BARGHOORN CASE The release of Professor Barghoorn on 16 November, two days after President Kennedy's public condemnation of Soviet behavior, apparently reflected a decision by the Soviet leaders to disengage as quickly as pos-— sible from this episode and to try to minimize the damage to Soviet-US relations. Ambassador Kohler believes the Soviet authorities failed to anticipate the US reaction to Barghoorn's arrest and that they were bewildered and genuinely alarmed by the volume and in- tensity of US protests and ac— tions. Moscow's terse announce— ment of Barghoorn's release stated that in view of the “concern of high -US officials," the So- viet Government had decided "merely to expel him from the Soviet Union" rather than bring him to trial on espionage charges. - Gromyko informed Kohler privately that this decision was the result of Khrushchev's personal inter- vention and requested that this be brought to the attention of President Kennedy. Soviet propaganda has played down the incident, deplored the "hue and cry" raised in the US, and expressed the pious hope that Washington "will correctly evalu— ate the good will of the Soviet Government" in releasing Barghoar. 22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW ~ The Communist World In Ambassador Kohler's view, this episode does not reflect a deliberate decision to worsen relations with the US or to jettison the peaceful co- existence policy and move closer to Chinese Communist positions. Although the ambassador acknowl- edges that Soviet authorities regard an occasional espionage case as a useful device for warn- img thhe Soviet people against ummomitored contacts with West- erners, he feels the primary motiwe in the Barghoorn affair was the desire to secure a hos- tage for I. A. Ivanov, an em- ployee of the Soviet "Amtorg" -trade organization in New York who was arrested on 29 October. Gromyko told Kohler on 16 No- vember that the USSR expects that the US Government "will take the necessary measures" to release Ivanov. Moscow's apparent desire to awoid further damaging pub- Lic exchanges over this case was evident in Gromyko's "con- fidemtial" warning to Kohler that if any US official pub- Licly attempts to justify Barg- fhoorm‘'s behavior, thus casting doubt on the legitimacy of So- wiet actions, the USSR "will reserve the right to publish materials of the investiga- tion, including the deposition ef FP. Barghoorn himself."" (SE- CRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Page 3 —FOP-SECRETDISAR DoclId: 327401316 Page 10
IVINALVW GYOM AGOO aOVd AO ASHYAGY NO ‘SECRET ALLIED VERSUS HARMONIZED ALLIED PROCEDURES ADVANCE NOTIFICATION 1, Advance notification will be given for convoys of eight or more vehicles. 2. Prior notification will be given orally not later than 15 minutes before arrival of convoy at Soviet checkpoint. Allies also agreed that this provision would not alter existing self-imposed restraints on sending convoys containing six of seven vehicles, DISMOUNTING 1. Drivers, co-drivers, and crew members do not dismount for heodcount. 2. Passengers in buses, whether the buses are traveling singly or as part of a convoy, will not dismount. 3. Passengers In other single vehicles will not dismount, except that those in vehicles carrying 10 or more passengers will be prepared to dismount. 4. Passengers in any convoy with more than 30 passengers (not counting bus passengers) will be prepared to dismount. 5. Passengers In convoys with 30 passengers or less (not count- ing bus passengers) will not dismount, except that those In Individual vehicles carrying 10 of more passengers, within the convoy; will be prepared to dismount, 6. Dismounting for headcount (If requested by o Soviet check~ point officer) will be carried out under the following conditions: a) Dismounting will be executed on order of the Allied convoy commander and not of a Soviet officer. b) Allied convoy commander will determine where the troops should form for headcount, taking Into account considerations of the danger of excessive public displays, c) In event troops dismounted for headcount are photo- graphed or exposed to propaganda broadcasts, distribution of propoganda pamphlets, or other forms of propaganda, or are otherwise harassed, they will promptly remount. d) Headcount In no case will exceed 15 minutes in duration. Otherwise troops wil! remount, e) Dismounting will not be performed In Inclement weather (extreme cold, rain, snow, etc.) INSPECTION 4. On vehicles carrying passengers, tallgates the tops of which are over slx feet from the ground will be lowered at Soviet request. No tailgates six feet or lower will be lowered. 2. Only convoy commander's identity card will be presented to the Soviets together with freight documents, TEXT OF SUMMARY OF ALLIED PROCEDURES TRANSMITTED TO SOVIETS ON 29 OCTOBER 1963 + Not mentioned « Not mentioned . (See 4 below.) 2. Possengen In buses, whether the buses are traveling singly or os part of a convoy, will not dismount, 3. Not mentioned 4, In any convoy with more than 30 passengers (i.e., exclusive of drivers, assistant drivers, and, in the case of specialized vehicles, other crew members), the possengers will be prepared to dismount for headcount. 5. Convoys with 30 passengers or less will not dismount for headcount, except that individual vehicles with 10 of more passengers, In the convoy, will be prepared to do so. 6, Dismounting for headcount will be carried out under the following condi tions: a) Dismount will be executed on order of the Allied convoy commender . b) The Allied convoy commander will determine where the troops thould form for headcount. c) In the event troops dismounted for headcount are photo- graphed or exposed to propaganda broadcasts, distribution of propaganda pamphlets, or other forms of propaganda, or are otherwise harassed, they will promptly remount. d) Headcount will be performed expeditiously. Otherwise the troops will remount. @) Dismounting will not be performed in inclement weather. 1, On vehicles carrying passengers, the Allied convoy commonder will be prepored to lower tallgates the tops of which are over six feet from the ground. No toilgates six feet or lower will be lowered. 2. Not mentioned SOVIET PROCEDURES AS COMMUNICATED TO THE ALLIES ON 16 NOVEMBER 1963 1. Advance notice must be given In accordance with established practice. Convoys of less than five vehicles ore processed through without advance notice. 2. Not mentioned 1. Drivers are not counted In determining whether a convoy shovid dismount. 2. Troops traveling In buses ore checked without a lineup. 3. Troops traveling in single vehicles are checked without a lineup. 4. Allied troops traveling In convoys dismount ond line up for verifi- cation. Two men may be left with each vehicle os guords. 5. Verification of personnel is allowed in the vehicles If the sum total doas not exceed on average of two or three men per vehicle, not including drivers. 6. Not mentioned > a) Not mentioned b) Not mentioned c) Not mentioned d) Not mentioned @) A check of personnel will be mode in the vehicles in cose of bod weather, I.e., snow or rain, with the permission of the Soviet commander, as is the present practice. 1. Verification can be made with tallgates down or with tollgates up If @ count Is then possible. 2. Allled convoys are processed by presenting established documents. ange 2 Page i1 DoclId: 32401316 HW 355355
HW 355355 Docld: 327401316 2 OP -SREREE HT USSR REJECTS ALLIED STATEMENT ON BERLIN ACCESS Hoscow's rejection of the Al- 8 lied statement on harmonized pro- “ cedures on the Berlin autobahn maintains the deadlock on the ques- tion of "control" over procedures and is another tactical maneuver to draw the West into a formal dis- cussion of the whole question of access to Berlin. The USSR's reply of 16 Novem- ber dismissed the Allied statement as representing merely "internal instructions” and again emphasized its own claim to control the pas- sage of persons and goods of Al- lied forces through Soviet check- points. The Soviet response, delivered to representatives of the Allied military liaison missions, reit- erated earlier remarks of Foreign Minister Gromyko in insisting that a 29 June 1945 meeting of Allied commanders in chief "exactly es- tablished" that Soviet authorities “take care of protection, control and traffic regulation" for access ‘routes used by the Allied military forces. The ambiguous presentation of Soviet procedures by the chief of the Soviet military liaison mission deliberately preserved wide lati- PEIPING RENEWS ATTACK ON MOSCOW The Chinese Communist lead- ers apparently regard Khrushchev's 25 October request for a cessation of polemics as an expression of So- viet weakness. They certainly view it, not as genuine, but as a tactical move aimed at gaining a needed respite. The Chinese have no intention of giving Khrushchev this respite. Moscow's recent effort to ar- range a stage-managed international 22 Sov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW The Communist World tude for Soviet checkpoint command- . ers in processing Allied convoys. In a further attempt to dem- onstrate Moscow's firmness on this issue, Gromyko told the Danish for- eign minister that the USSR would not give in on the question of auto- bahn procedures. He also told the UK ambassador on 14 November that the 1945 agreement "could not be changed one iota." A series of incidents in the Berlin air corridors between 14 and 16 November apparently were not staged to pose the threat of more serious and drastic harassment of the Allied access routes. Flares sighted by civil air pilots in the air corridors on 14 November were probably related to a Soviet mili- tary field exercise in the area. The sporadic shining of high- powered searchlights on US civil aircraft on all three days may have been the work of local East Ger- man border troops acting without authority from higher military headquarters. The US representa- tive at the Berlin Air Safety Cen- ter protested this action, and there have been no further inci- dents reported since 16 November. (SECRET KIMBO NO FOREIGN DISSEM) Communist meeting to condemn the Chinese was apparently resisted by other Communist parties. The Chi- nese probably believe that this was a significant setback to Khrushchev's attempts to isolate them. They therefore feel, as they did when he called for a cessation of polen- ics last February, that this is a good time to press the attack. This emerges clearly from a. 19 November combined Red Flag ~- Page 4 ~_ TOP -SECREF-DPAAR Page 12
HW 355355 * People's Daily article--the fifth In Peiping’s current series of attacks on the positions outlined in the Soviet Union's 14 July open letter. A long commentary on the "questions of war and peace," the article advanced no new ideas of this oft-debated issue but concentrated on heavy personal abuse of Khrushchev. Just before the Soviet October Revolution celebrations on 7 No- vember, when the Chinese were un- certain whether they would be faced with an extreme challenge from the USSR, their war of words with Moscow had taken on a more ambiguous tone. The fourth com- mentary’; published on 21 October, did not attack Khrushchev with the customary vigor. The flavor of the current article, however, is contained in the comment that the US im- perialists have not become "beautiful angels in spite of Khrushchev's bible-reading and psalm-singing; they have not turned into compassionate Bud- dhas in spite of Khrushchev's prayers and incense~-burning." The Barghoorn affair gives the Chinese a ready-made example. of how the Soviet leadership has abandoned principle and knuckled under to US pressure while gain- ing nothing in return. Peiping has lost no time interpreting it this way. Although there has been no-editorial comment as yet, selective reporting in the Chi- nese press makes the point clearly. Using Western news stories, Pei- ‘22 Nov 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW _ The Communist World ping details the forms of pres- sure the US applied to gain Barg- hoorn's release and then depicts Khrushchev's personal interven- tion as a hasty and complete sur- render. The Chinese realize that Khrushchev's requests for a tempering of the dispute are welcome among other Communist parties which find the constant cross fire difficult to escape. To counter this, Peiping has periodically cited the number of anti-Chinese articles which continue to appear in the So- viet press. In preparation for - their renewed assault, the-Chi- - nese on 15 November printed a hasty and "incomplete" count which showed that more than 80 articles with anti-Chinese com- mentary had appeared in the So- viet press in one two-week period following Khrushchev's 25 Octo- ber request for a pause, Moscow, unless stung to a quick response by the fury of the Chinese attack on Khrushchev, will probably maintain its self-imposed ban on its polemics while it seeks a way to convince other Communist parties to join in the isolation of Peiping. The Soviets now have begun to hint that, instead of an international gathering, another bilateral meeting might be held. Moscow probably believes that the almost inevitable failure of bi- lateral talks would show that its constant attempts to be reason- able produce no change in Chinese behavior, (CONFIDENTIAL) Page 5 "TOP SECRET DINAR- DoclId: 327401316 Page 13
HW 355355 mages De DoclId: 32401316 TOP SECRET DINAR INDICATIONS OF ECONOMIC REAPPRAISAL pret ed Regep eee cage Ps yage part TE BE OT EG z The scheduling of a Soviet central committee plenum on the chemical industry for 9 December indicates that the 1964-65 economic plan now is ready for presentation. Completion of the plan was delayed apparently to reappraise the econ- omy in light of the unusually poor 1963 harvest and the extraordinary purchases of Western grain. from the press dis- cussion, the plan is predicated on the rules set out by Khrushchev last summer--greater concentration Judging of investment to speed construction, a sharp boost in chemical output to support agriculture and indus- try, and stepped-up investment in irrigation. While Khrushchev con- tinues to tell some Westerners that the program will involve cutbacks” in military expenditures, he has told others that both agricultural and military needs can be met si- multaneously.. There are many signs in the press that Soviet in- dustry is already being redirected to support the new program. Khrushchev recently told visiting US businessmen that the crash fertilizer program would rapidly boost agricultural output. His statement that farm output depends neither on the capitalist nor the socialist system but on investment is in sharp contrast with the organizational manipula- tions which characterized his approach to the farm program for several years. His boast that the new program will enable the USSR to match US agricultural productivity overlooks production and allocational problems inherent in the undertaking and ignores serious soil and climatic handi- caps. 22 Nov 63° CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW The Communist World IN THE USSR So tee cnet ot ae mere ee Apparently there is concern in some Soviet. circles that these problems are being underrated. On 17 November, Pravda published a letter from several prominent scientists who cautioned that agriculture does not have enough storage facilities and machinery to utilize additional fertilizer, that the country now is wasting virtually half the fertilizer al- ready being produced, and that some of the plans put forth by the Ministry of Agriculture are unrealistic. The scientists sug- gest that some of the increased investment for new fertilizer capacity be used for more urgent farming needs. The regime's pur-.. pose in permitting this letter to appear was perhaps to underscore the need to effect a wide range of resource shifts in favor of agriculture, but also to indicate that certain elements in the pro- gram are still open for debate. 1964-65 planning was recent events--particularly the unexpected requirement to spend a large. of gold for Western grain. | Soviet planners are considering steps to speed up the expansion of gold production, but that the increases envisaged would be rel- atively modest and would do little to ease the balance-of-payments problems. The 1964 increase under discussion for the chief gold-pro- ducing region apparently amounts to one or two tons (worth $1 to $2.25 million)--only about one percent of total Soviet output. Plans in other gold-producing. areas are not known. (TOP SECRET DINAR) Page 6 TOP SECRET DINAR Page 14
“ Rumania's Gheorghiu-Dej is visiting Yugoslavia... — He was preceded in Yugoslavia .-. and Hungary's Kadar by Khrushchev in August ....- "in September. 631119 3 CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE HW 55355 DBocld:32401316 Page 15