13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT E, 1975 - 1992 Foreword The review of counterintelligence literature, 1975 - 1992, which follows is not meant to include every book published concerning espionage and/or counterintelligence from the period 1975 until 1992. The object of this study is to focus on a relatively small selection of books that were influential because of the views they expressed and (, the# reasonable degree of historical acourace ) Me Tvety concentrate on the major counterintelligence issues of the | period and age highlighteacBy the views of James Angleton and Anatole Golitsyn, which from ‘al 1962 were a compelling force in Western counterintelligence services. \\ The scope of the study is largely limited to books about the American, British, and Canadian intelligence and security services although it in some instances touches on countries of Western Europe such as France, West Germany, Norway, etc. 7 y4 ow Recent books such as Corson and Trento's Widows are.exemded \: because they are not reputable by even the generally low é standards of pioele counterintelligence writing. Other works, Jy ce anil Lon’ or | David Wise's The NG such as /Ron Kessler\s e y_ Sta Spy Who Got away | BVO emeteadied because some parts of their stories are factualhky doubtful and better surveys of these complicated and sensitive events reside in the CIA records. SNA (¥ on the other hand, no studies exist on Angleton's efforts in Lac C/A PELE. retirement to spread this propaganda’via such writers as a | “Ee Epstein. Nor has [therd/been any analysis)done of how many secrets of the British services became public knowledge, 7 fe " a | | wv dy W\ , oo \ , ranging from the Blunt case to the secret inquiry into Sir BN 3 . iS Roger Hollis as putative Soviet spy. (As, there are VQ ey vey : on yi. va buetirm “SN instTUctivé lése€ns “in these events, a review of what exists in the public domain and how it got there fish be helpful to 2 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT deodbin, aA
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT counterintelligence managers of the future who wish to avoid some of the errors of the past. GEN INTEREST (°) ¢ © ta “977 ~- Orchids for Mother by Aaron Latham. A novel about Angleton. NOT RECOMMENDED. (1978 - Honorable Men by William Colby. Chapter on Angleton's dismissal is RECOMMENDED. 1978 ~- Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald by Edward Jay Epstein. NOT RECOMMENDED; A SUMMARY appears in this study. A979 - e e e c $3 ichard Helms and the , CIA by Thomas Powers. NOT RECOMMENDED as portions that deal with counterintelligence are inaccurate. [/'1978 - i 2 of Treason: Five Who Spied for Russia by Andrew Boyle. A SUMMARY appears in this study. j V/ 1980 ~ Wilderness of Mirrors by David Martin. A classic strongly RECOMMENDED; a SUMMARY appears in this study. . 1980 ~- The Spike by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. A novel about Angleton. NOT RECOMMENDED. L 1981 ~ Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back by Henry Hurt. | Despite many errors it is RECOMMENDED. A SUMMARY appears in this study. 1981 - Their Trade is Treachery by Chapman Pincher. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. 3 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 \. 1982 x 1982 sf 3984 ae / 1986 NN A987 f y 1988 1988 1988 v 1988 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT - yr Services red: ames Leslie Bennett and the RCMP Security Service by John Sawatsky. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. ~ A.Matter of Trust: MI-5, 1945-72 by Nigel West. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. ~ New Lies for Old by Anatole Golitsyn. RECOMMENDED only to learn what Golitsyn thought; no SUMMARY appears in this study. - The FBI/KGB War: A Special Agent's Story by Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shachtman. STRONGLY RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. - Spycatcher: the Candid Biography of a Senior Intelligence Officer by Peter Wright with Paul Greengrass. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. ~ The Spycatcher Trial by Malcolm Turnbull. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. The Spycatcher Affair by Chapman Pincher. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. - : e sible War Between the KGB and the CIA by Edward Jay Epstein. NOT RECOMMENDED but a SUMMARY appears in this study. - to irds: oviet Post-War Defectors by Gordon Brook-Shepherd. STRONGLY RECOMMENDED, and a SUMMARY appears in this study. 4 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 Hases = # 1989 - Vi1991 - CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT e] : the et Ss i =5 by Nigel West. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. Widows: Four American Spies, the Wives They Left pen £2 x g Intelligence by Corson and Trento. Definitely NOT RECOMMENDED and NOT SUMMARIZED in this study. H ames Jesus Angleton: e CIA! Master Spy Hunter by Tom Mangold. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. VV 1992 - Molehunt: The Secret Search for Traitors That Shattered the CIA by David Wise. RECOMMENDED and a SUMMARY appears in this study. 5 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 ‘CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT introduction The year 1974 was a watershed in literature about the CIA. eid to that time had been few books critical of the Agency and they had been by outsiders, usually professional journalists such as Wise and Ross. Most books had been GAtebt neutral or even positive, especially those written by former Agency officials such as Allen Dulles and Lyman Kirkpatrick. But in 1974 a disgruntled former Agency employee, Philip Agee, published his highly critical book, Inside the Company: CIA Diary. He was followed by others in quick succession: J. B. Smith, John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti (with J. D. Marks), and R. W. McGehee--placing highly confidential information in the public co lak teed Men gO made their disclosures about subjectsV/of which they had special knowledge gr inferBat, but the cumulative effect was to breach the walls of confidentiality @ich haa protected Agency operations and personnel. Although the net effect was damaging, especially in the case of Agee where his efforts were directed at revealing the identities of officers serving abroad under cover, this general scatter shot approach, while distressing, did not reveal information about the most sensitive operations, namely, those directed against the main target--the Soviet Union and its intelligence organs. In the mid-seventies this changed with the publication of a series of magazine articles authored mainly by Edward J. Epstein, a New York writer, which culminated with the publication of his book in 1978 called Legend. The articles, but especially the book, publicized for the first time a series: of clashes within the Agency both the cI Staff and the Soviet Division} concerning the bona fides of a defector from the KGB named Yuriy Nosenko. Epstein's articles and his book contained so much detailed information 6 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 "yp ‘CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT about sensitive operations by the CIA and the FBI that it was generally agreed Epstein had a willing and knowledgeable source, either a serving officer (which was thought doubtful) or a retired person 6f4@ sufficiently senior Sositieow that he had wide knowledge of operations against the Sovi | target both overseas and in the "U.S." Although vane! son onward Epstein admitted, on occasion he spoke with yas Angleton, the retired former Chief of the cI staff) he never admitted Angleton was his source. In fact, Epstein, wisely perhaps, never sourced his articles nor his book, leaving the reader in the dark as to how he came upon such rare nuggets of sensitive information. Then in 1988, with Angleton dead, Epstein in a new book called Deception admitted that from 1977 onward he had obtained large amounts of highly classified information from Angleton, N.S. Miler, Tennent H. Bagley and others who shared Angleton's beliefs. be When Angleton was dismissed by \D CI William Colby in late 1974, he had no thought of what he would do in his retirement. For the itowing six months he spent part of his time at Langley, assisting the new CI Staff by introducing them to such persons as his defector friend, Anatole Golitsyn. After a few months it became clear to Angleton that he really had been dismissed and his future with CIA was finished. The whole matter was a terrible blow; he became embittered and at first withdrew into alcohol. But quite soon people began to seek him out and he began to formulate some ideas about the future. As he got more attention from media people, he began to cultivate a method of playing them off one against another, planting an idea here and there amongst them. He changed his luncheon venue from a local restaurant to the more politically congenial atmosphere of the Army-Navy Club. one~idéa~ Angleton developed sae togevelgp a counterattack @y the Agency and, in particular, the new CI Staff by which he would prove thd wre their new approach arid indict them 7 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT for negligence of duty. This task was given to his loyal aide, N.S. Miler. Miler took on the job but found he was ye his own researcher as well as secretary. Foreseeing a dim future of virtual servitude, he took his family and withdrew to remote New Mexico. Angleton's activities in this period, while not neglecting the idea of KGB penetration, focused more immediately on his strong belief in the threat from the KGB of deception and disinformation. To support this thesis he continually raised the issue of Nosenko. Lea idea Lub “that caught fire amongst some of his supporters and led to a sort of cottage industry in which many academics and think tank specialists propagated the theory. Oddly, however, Angleton's allies in Great Britain took a different line. There they concentrated on KGB penetration largely because events threw up some exceptional examples, such as Sir Anthony Blunt. Because of the so-called Cambridge "Ring of Five," public attention was more easily caught by the idea of moles in Her Majesty's government. This eventually led to much embarrassment for the Thatcher government, culminating in the "Spycatcher" trial in Australia in 1986. 8 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT e ¢ ¢ j ene Aer Not.icng after his long suffering but devoted aide, "Scotty" Miler, decamped to New Mexico, a young writer interested in CIA contacted Angleton. Aaron Latham holds a doctorate in literature from Princeton and in 1975 was editor of New York magazine. He was attracted to Angleton because of the latter's association with Ezra Pound and other American poets. A two-hour initial call to Angleton resulted in luncheon and visits to Angleton's home and orchid sheaf. Latham wanted to write about the CIA and Claims he took the fiction route on the advice of Victor Marchetti. Whatever the case, the result was a novel called Orchids for Mother published in 1977. The novel is heavily loaded with atrocious sex, but the main theme is about an old ex-CIA officer fired by the Director over differences in policy. The dismissed CIA man (Angleton) decides he must rid the Agency of this DCI, obviously meant to be Colby, which he accomplishes by hiring an assassin to kill him (the old veteran) and then adroitly places the blame on the Director, thus assuring the latter will be accused of murdering his antagonist. The novel portrays Mother (the curious name Latham gives Angleton, which he lifted from a book by Miles Copeland) as a genius wasted by his dismissal from service to suit the ambition of a grey bureaucrat whose security as well as common sense is much in doubt. It is a singularly vicious work. It did not sell well. Mrs. Angleton called the book "garbage" and claimed her husband never read it. In the summer of 1977 Angleton developed a new forum for his ideas when he and like-minded associates organized the Security and Intelligence Fund (SIF) which was intended to defend the US security and intelligence organizations and incidentally raise money for the defense of two FBI officers then under indictment by the Carter administration. In this 9 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT endeavor, Angleton was on surer ground. For starters, he had the support of the large number of FBI retirees as well as many from CIA. This was the period when the Pike and Church committees in the Congress were in full cry and a number of ex-intelligence people who believed Congress had gone too far were rallying a defense. (David Phillips was also starting the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.) The drive by Angleton was very successful; over $600,000 was raised and six months after its founding SIF was reported to have more than 17,000 members. Angleton was made chairman with his friends in senior positions. But lyeour soon after, the US Attorney General decided not to pursue the prosecution of the FBI men and the reason for SIF nore or less evaporated. Keoenthe eee) eton converted it into a forum by which he spread information about what he saw as various forms of Soviet deception and it continued into the next decade until, after Angelton's death and the coming of glasnost, it withered away. The publication of Legend in 1978 provided enormous stimulus to the deception idea by suggesting the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko, had been sent by the KGB to provide a cover story for Oswald. Epstein had made a small reputation with an earlier book on the Warren Commission called Inquest, which was generally well received because it pointed out some obvious inadequacies in the Warren Commission report. In Legend, Epstein wrote what in effect were two books: one focused on Oswald's Marine career in. Japan, his time in Russia and then his return to Amerida; while the second portrayed Nosenko as playing a key rolein a major KGB deception operation intended to provide cover for Oswald (and the Soviet government) as well as to negate the effects of Golitsyn's revelations. As so much classified information could only have come from a person or persons with intimate knowledge of the Nosenko case, blame for the leakage naturally focused on Angleton and his 10 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT supporters. It came as no surprise when ten years later (and after Angleton's death) Epstein admitted his sources to have been Angleton, Bagley, Miler, and other supporters. Despite some negative reviews such as George Lardner's in The Washington Post, which denounced the book as "essentially dishonest," the book sold well and was very important in spreading Angleton's ideas of a super KGB manipulating American society and politics via its | sophisticated deception apparatus. The theme of Legend is extended in a novel which appeared in 1980 called The Spike by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. De Borchgrave, soon to be editor of the new Washington Times and Moss, then editor of "The Blue Economist," were close friends and admirers of Angleton, whose conspiracy theories largely jibed with their own. Moss had been spreading bogus Angleton propaganda in his sheet for some time, an example being his claim Golitsyn had provided the lead to Philby. This caught the eye of then DCI Turner, who inquired of the CI Staff. The latter replied from solid knowledge that Golitsyn could only be credited for an assist on Vassal and none on Philby or Blunt. The low quality and general crudeness of theme in The Spike exceeds that even of the Latham novel. Briefly, it told the story of a young liberal taken in by leftists who came to realize his error thanks to timely guidance received from an elderly former CIA counterintelligence officer who had been fired by a Director obviously acting on the Kremlin's directions. Moscow's secret designs are revealed by a KGB high level defector whose escape is managed by MI-6 because the CIA is so penetrated it could not be trusted with the mission. The KGB defector then uncovers the Soviet agents in the White House, CIA and elsewhere and the wise old counterintelligence chief, obviously meant to be il CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Angleton, saves America. Although hard to believe, the book was an alternate Book-of-the-Month Club selection. However, \1980/was not entirely a year of wine and roses for the Angletonians | fldk He as eat Wiiderness of Mirrors appeared, authored by David Martin. Now considered a classic of intelligence literature, Martin spent over two years interviewing CIA retirees, including Angleton himself who at first favored Martin with many secrets but later cut him off when he learned Martin was consorting with some CIA people who were critical of the ex-CI Staff chief. one of these was Clare E. Petty who had worked on Angleton's staff and had concluded he was either a giant fraud or a KGB agent. Martin originally intended to publicize this view via an article in Newsweek, but it was dropped when Angleton threatened legal action. However, Martin did publish his book that exposed Golitsyn as a not important defector who made more trouble than he was worth, suggested Nosenko was genuine and punched many holes in the Angleton myth. It provided) a lengthy and denunciatory review by Epstein in The New York Times as well as a long public statement by Angelton claiming Martin had robbed him of his phrase "wilderness of mirrors" when in fact Angleton had himself lifted it from a poem by T.S. Eliot. owever, event were weakening Epstein's faith in his master. In 1981 Mrs. Thatcher was forced by the publication of a book called Their Trade is Treachery to admit that Sir Roger Hollis, the former Director General of MI~-5, had been investigated after allegations were received he was a Soviet agent. Mrs. Thatcher stoutly asserted that a high-level investigation of these charges found them false. Some months later, Epstein managed to obtain an interview with the defector, Michel Goleniewski, who had become convinced he was the last of the Romanovs, but otherwise remained quite a sensible person. In the interview Epstein asked if 12 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT yo the defector thought Hollis was a KGB mole, an idea much } : supported by Angleton. The defector replied negatively, at then listed precisely all the Soviet agents MI-5 had yy apprehended due to the information he had provided. "If thas es! 3S KGB had had a mole at the head of MI-5, you can be sure ass oy 4 io a these men would somehow have escaped," he commented dryly. SS A further confusion of the issues occurred in 1979-80 period with the publication of a series of articles written by one Joe Trento, then a reporter for a daily in Wilmington, Delaware. Trento, probably from Petty, learned Cleveland Cram was writing a history of the Angleton years in counterintelligence and from that slight fact launched a number of charges against Angleton including some which included largely erroneous information about the Nosenko and Loginov cases. As Cram had several times interviewed Angleton in connection with the history, Cram contacted him to assure him the leak to Trento had come from others. Angleton's response to the Trento articles was to attack Admiral Turner. The Trento articles continued for some time and were an embarrassment to the Agency, but they did not affect the writing of the history. At any rate, Cram's interviews of Angleton by this time were at an end mostly because it had become increasingly evident Angleton's judgment and veracity could no longer be relied upon. The next book of consequence to appear, which was associated with Angleton, was Henry Hurt's Shadrin in 1981. Hurt had worked on Legend as an assistant to Epstein. During this stint Hurt became aware of the Shadrin case and began interviewing Mrs. Ewe Shadrin and her lawyer, Richard Copaken. Hurt quickly sensed a rich story and the Reader's Digest agreed to provide financial support for the project, which began as a magazine article but quickly grew into a book. The chief editor at this time for "Reader's Digest" was Fulton Oursler, a man of strong right-wing views and 13 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT much influenced by the Angleton-Epstein theories, which he saw could be promoted by the Shadrin story while at the same time condemning the new CI Staff for what he believed were serious errors in their handling of the case. The inability ‘of the US authorities to provide an answer to the mystery of Shadrin's disappearance had also provoked wide criticism. The story not only revived the old Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy but made it current by telling the story of the appearance of a mysterious KGB man named "Igor" (codenamed Kitty Hawk by the FBI). There is little doubt Wig that Angleton contributed information to Hurt but so did a number of FBI people who broke their oaths, talking more than their share. [In sun, much classified information was put in the public domain that could not but have endangered the safety of the Soviet named "Igor," assuming he was genuine, a matter on which again Agency people divided, Angleton believing he was not, while others thought his valuable information assured his bona fides. The Hurt book, an interesting story, was however, essentially a propaganda piece intended to benefit Mrs. Shadrin, but its shrill attack on the Agency, the FBI, and the new CI Staff was not helpful and the book's many inaccuracies distorted an already confused situation. A number of other ai appeared during the early 1980's such as William cold sees Honorable Men in which he explains why he dismissed Angleton, Tom Powers' The Man Who Kept the Secrets, which highly praised Angleton (a position from which Powers has retreated), and a book by a Canadian, John Sawatsky, on the Bennett case in Canada. The latter, called For Services Rendered appeared in 1982. Bennett, a long-time civilian employee of the RCMP Security Service, was falsely impugned by Clare Petty, a major conspiracy theorist, on Angleton's staff. It immediately ignited an investigation, which could have been stopped by Angleton, 14 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 ‘CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT but instead he en it impetus by suggesting the Mounties consult Golitsyn. That sealed Bennett's doom and brought his dismissal from the service although no substantial evidence existed against him and he passed his polygraph tests. The case tore the Mounties apart and furthermore gave ammunition to those who arguédlPhe Security Service should be removed from the RCMP. Within a few years Canada had a civilian security service. Sawatsky's book drew considerable attention in Canada but little in America. In 1988, one year after Angleton's death, Epstein produced his book called Deception. In the years between Legend and Deception Epstein had become something of a specialist on the subject of Soviet disinformation and deception. These twin subjects, along with "active measures" (to which they are related), “ket occupied a number of scholars and writers during the 1980s. In this they were assisted by the testimony of several Soviet defectors, including the indefatigable Golitsyn who added his own volume to the field called New Lies for Old, whose turgid prose had to be endlessly rewritten before it was rendered readable. Epstein's book Deception, like its predecessor, is really in two parts. The second part in which he describes various deceptions practiced throvigh the centuries can be ignored as it says nothing new. / If/ is the first 105 pages that are of interest, wherein he repeats the old theories about Nosenko, and then in the section "Acknowledgments" names all his sources for the years past: Angleton, Bagley, Miler, Sullivan, etc. He also indicates in this part that his informants understood clearly, they were providing him with classified information. at/is an astonishing set of revelations. (xy is difficult to avoid the feeling that this book is Epstein's last hurrah, at least in the world of intelligence. He senses with glasnost the days of the 15 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT TE ment ay
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT as, conspiracists are numbered. ee time to take the money and run. In 1991 an English writer, Tom Mangold, published his biography of Angleton called Cold Warrior to which he devoted three years of intensive work and $300,000 of Simon and Schuster's money. Mangold has carefully sourced his book, the research is impressive and Mavsaay impeccable, and the writing is good if a bit overwrought at times. But it is far more a history of the CI Staff for the last ten years under Angleton's command than it is a story about the man himself. As history it is largely accurate and fair although the absence of a chapter on Israeli liaison (chopped out by the editor) is unfortunate. The book was the occasion of considerable commentary because Mangold stated he had interviewed 208 CIA retirees, until it was then noted 'that John Ranelagh, another English author, in his book on the CIA had interviewed over 350 CIA retirees. Mangold's conclusions that counterintelligence suffered badly at Angleton's hands at the very time in the Cold War when the Agency needed common sense and honesty most is well made and backed by numerous examples. Finally, it should be noted that a second book about Angleton and the old CI Staff followed only ten months after Cold Warrior. This book called Molehunt by the veteran intelligence writer, David Wise, is also a well-researched and smooth-reading volume concentrating largely on the hunt for “Sasha, " a Soviet agent Golitsyn claimed had played a major role providing the Russians valuable information. It was mainly from this search for the supposed mole within CIA that a very few CIA officers had their careers damaged. Because his sources did not possess complete knowledge of the "Sasha" story, e has presented a partially distorted story. The coopicen juory of the "Sasha" case resides in the cic sroniveb xp /Gorai Sidney Ross at Langley; for 16 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 van CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT various reasons, it remains a highly restricted issue. Despite this minor misconception, for which the author cannot be blamed, the Wise book is otherwise factually correct and is another cautionary tale management should bear in mind. : 2 a Oswald by Edward Jay Epstein; The Reader's Digest Press/McGraw-Hill Book Company (New York, N.¥.), 1978--382 pages Epstein is a git bright and able writer who took his MA at Cornell and his doctorate in government at Harvard (1972). He had made a name for himself with his book Truth, done as his master's thesis at Cornell. As one of the first serious works to expose the shortcomings of the Commission, it sold well and made Epstein momentarily well known. Epstein became aware of the Nosenko case through the Reader's Digest, from which he became acquainted with James Angleton. Their association flourished and Angleton became Epstein's major source on Nosenko and the issues surrounding him. Eventually The Reader's Digest sponsored Epstein's research to the tune of $500,000. The book was a best seller, projecting Epstein into the forefront of those who were popular exponents of the ideas of Angleton. Following the publication of Legend, Epstein wrote numerous articles for New York magazine, Commentary, and other publications, mostly--though not always-~supportive of the Angleton theories. Legend is in fact two books: the first is about Nosenko and the Angleton belief that he was part of a KGB deception operation while the second is about Oswald's service in the Marine Corps in Japan where it is suggested he acquired information about the U-2 flights flown from the airfield on which he was stationed as well as his later 17 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT sojourn in the Soviet Union. In brief, Epstein accepted Angleton's conclusion that "Nosenko was a Soviet intelligence agent dispatched by the KGB expressly for the purpose of delivering disinformation to the CIA, FBI and Warren Commission." In this scheme of things, Oswald, the supposed lone assassin of President Kennedy,.likely was working for the KGB; Nosenko said this was not true, but, therefore, by the logic in Legend--it is. Oswald the ex- Marine who defected to the USSR in 1959 and returned three years later, had been living a "legend," a false biography concected for him by the KGB. Amongst these two stories is a central theme, carefully stated but always present, which is that the highest level of the intelligence community, and certainly the CIA, is penetrated by a "mole" working for the KGB. Although by 1978 this "mole" had not been found, the best proof that he existed rested in the assertion of Nosenko that he knew of no penetration, which contradicted statements made to the contrary by a "Mr. Stone," who proves to be Anatole Golitsyn. Epstein thus promoted the Angleton twin beliefs of deception and penetration by the KGB which was enshrined in his concept which came to be derisively called "The Monster Plot."/ For CIA officers who wish to a 4 uplvith a learn the full story of the Nosenko case, it is recommended be a i bh ~ LY they read the Fieldhouse/Snowdon study on Nosenko ‘Lt commissioned by then DCI Casey in 1981. — ee In his source notes, Epstein is quite frank in stating that his work is based on interviews with Nosenko and retired CIA officers. He then lists a number including Gordon Stewart, Admiral Turner, Richard Helms, James Angleton and members of his CI Staff, William Sullivan and Sam Papich of the FBI, and others connected with the Golitsyn and Nosenko cases. Although Epstein is careful to camouflage his sources by never quoting them verbatim or strestait( 8 fy) eteet that a number of CIA officers had provided ai immense amount of classified information to 18 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Epstein. This was leakage about hitherto most sensitive Soviet cases on a scale the CIA had not before experienced. However, because Epstein so cleverly refrained from pin point sourcing, © was /impossible to say exactly which CIA and/or FBI officers had leaked what. In 1989 the mystery was resolved with the publication of a second book by Epstein called Deception which dealt with the contentious | old cases, including Nosenko and Golitsyn again. But now | with his major source, Angleton, dead, Epstein revealed in detail who his informants had been. This will be reviewed in detail in the summary on Deception. Although the presentation of these hitherto highly classified cases shocked most observers, within a year the entire Nosenko case was to be revealed to the public in detail via the U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations. Legend sold better than might have been expected, and the conspiracy buffs found it a welcome addition to the growing literature on the Kennedy assassination. Many, however, found the book confusing and its claims extravagant and unsupported by factual evidence. One of the chief critics was George Lardner of The Washington Post who wrote, "What Epstein has written...is a fascinating, important, and essentially dishonest book. Fascinating because it offers new information about Oswald, about the KGB, and about the CIA. Dishonest because it pretends to be objective, because it is saddled with demonstrative errors and inexcusable omissions, because it assumes the KGB always knows what it is doing while the CIA does not. It is paranoid. It is naive." / However, there is no question but that Legend set the tone for the debate which was to ensue in the media about the Nosenko affair. It gave the Angleton and Bagley forces an advantage by putting their argument adroitly if dishonestly before the public. t wa not until David po ee i9 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 ‘CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Martin responded with Wilderness of Mirrors that any opposing view was to be presented in a coherent fashion. Wilderness of Mirrors by David C. Martin; Harper and Row (New York, N.Y¥.), 1980-228 pages | The best written and most informed book about CIA operations against the Soviet target in the 1950's and 1960's with a penetrating and critical analysis of two of the most prominent CIA officers involved, William K. Harvey and James Angleton. Based upon countless interviews with retired CIA officers, material acquired under FOIA, and from open sources, including evidence derived from the House Committee Hearings on Assassination, Martin crowds into 228 pages an exciting and generally accurate story. Martin began his research with Angleton as his main source in theLate 1970 , but then transferred his interest to Harvey/ /However, s he progressed, Martin became convinced that W. e Harvey was an important figure, it was Angleton around whom major controversy swirled; furthermore, behave was substantial evidenée that he had done severe damage to CIA (especially to counterintelligence) and that his forced resignation by CIA Director William-colby had been a necessary and long overdue action./ There was )the additional problem for Martin that Harvey was dead ana his wife refused to grant interviews nor would she give Martin access to his official or private papers. Also, Harvey's career had ended in 1967 and only a few years later he left Washington for. good: ~ Angi} ton, on the other hand, had remained in full throttle until December 1974 when Colby abruptly ‘ended his career, ut even after that Angleton continued a guerrilla action against the Agency, the new CI Staff, his old antagonist, Colby, and launched a minor propaganda campaign which he fueled with calculated leakage playing one journalist off against another. One of those to 20 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT whom he leaked in the early days was Martin until Angleton discovered Martin was listening to other ex-Agency people who did not swallow all of Angleton's theories, whereupon he abruptly cut Martin off. Thus the last half of the book is largely devoted to Golitsyn and the subsequent controversy ever Nosenko as well as such side diversions as the mole hunt, KGB disinformation and other staples of Angleton's diverse activities. Martin did not name his sources nor did he footnote the book, provide a bibliography or other academic paraphernalia. In his forward he explained the purpose and scope of the book and then was careful to note that one of his principal sources was Angleton, "who was a marvelous education in the ways of the CIA. Over time, he explained to me its organization, its personnel, its modus operandi, and its internal rivalries." It was from Angleton, Martin continues, that he first heard some of the more colorful stories about Bill Harvey. On the other hand, when Martin called Harvey, the latter always hung up. Of course, after Angleton heard that Martin was in touch with Clare Edward Petty, who when working for Angleton had become suspicious of his motives and began to speculate perhaps Angelton was the mole they were searching for, Angleton refused to continue this cooperation. Certainly Petty was one of the generous contributors of information to Martin about Angleton and the mole hunt, the Golitsyn-Nosenko controversy, and many other subjects covered in the book. Aside from Angleton, Martin identifies few other ex-CIA sources although he admits they were legion. The book was lar well received by the reviewers mainly becausé“it te pons written intelligence yarn which is also chock ZuIl of mostly accurate factual material. It sold out quickly and went into a paperback edition by Ballantine. Even that edition has long since sold out and 21 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT the book is now a collector's item. Most readers found it a good story, but many found it especially interesting because it focused on the enigmatic Angleton who by 1980 had become a notorious figure thanks to Epstein's best-seller Legend, which had lavished attention on Angleton as a counterintelligence genius whe had /bden/ wrongly Gismissed at the height of the Cold War, an act many hinted was close to treasonable. Martin's book took a Wbkik aitferent tack, revealing Angleton as“self-centered, ambitious, and wy paranoid character with little regard for his Agency colleagues or for simple common sense. That view prompted the lone critic of the book, Epstein, to write a long reveiw for the New York Times Book Review filled with vituperative comments, loose charges and character assassination. Angleton himself entered the fray with a three page public ‘statement denouncing Martin and accusing him of having stolen his phrase Wilderness of Mirrors, which Angleton had actually lifted from a poem by T.S. Eliot without _ attribution. Martin had heard Angleton use it ad nauseam in the midnight sessions and as he could discern no copyright he appropriated the term as a compelling title for his book. The book remains a classic on Angleton and the period. 22 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 “@GONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Ss H o Never Came Back by Henry Hurt; The Reader's Digest Press/McGraw Hill (New York, N.¥.), 1981-- 301 pages Henry Hurt was a free lance writer and researcher for Reader's Digest when he met Edward J. Epstein. He assisted Epstein on the research for Legend and was heavily influenced by Epstein's ideas on recent intelligence matters, which the latter had absorbed from Angleton. In 1979 Hurt met Ewe Shadrin, the wife of the Soviet naval defector who disappeared in Vienna in December) 1979 while on a mission for the FBI and CIA. Soon after, Hutt met Ewe's aggressive young lawyer, Richard Copaken>~ and from this association a plan developed for Hurt to write an article for Reader's Digest about Ewe's missing husband. The article rapidly grew into a book for Re ader- s Digest under the direction of Fulton Oursler, a risht-wi}g editor with a i strong enthusiasm for Angleton. Copaken immediately took Hurt in hand and introduced him to a number of key persons associated with the Shadrin case, including several FBI officers while Epstein introduced Hurt to Angleton. The latter seems to have been responsible for facilitating a surprise visit by Hurt to Golitsyn at his hideaway in upstate New York, an event which shook Golitsy nd also necessitated for security reasons soon moving te edyeotar from that place to a new location in Hie Southland. “in 1981 Shadrin's mysterious dis pearance. oni his ill-fated visit to Vienna remained unsolved. Copaken and Mrs. Shadrin were increasingly frustrated and confused by seeming US Government indifference to their case, although in fact the agencies concerned were doing all possible to extract any iota of information from the Soviets while the latter remained largely uncommunicative. In 1985 a Soviet defector, Vitali 23 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Yurchenko, had come over to the CIA, albeit briefly, and in his debriefing provided the answer: Shadrin had been killed accidentally by the KGB during his meeting with them in Vienna. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov was born in 1922 in the USSR and chose the Soviet Navy for a career. He proved an exceptional officer, a man of high intellect, great charm and wide interests. With advanced training in nuclear missiles, he was at age 27 the youngest destroyer captain in the Red Navy; he was obviously destined for top command. In 1959 his ship was stationed in Gdynia, Poland, supporting a training program for Indonesian naval officers. There Artamonov met and fell in_love-with- Gora, a young dental graduate fro “wealthy Polish ftanily. Marriage seemed impossible ‘given Ewe's parent's antipathy for all Soviets and the Red Navy's own restrictions, so he proposed defection, she accepted, and in a daring and dangerous Roti Geb , an escape they crossed the Baltic to Sweden in a commandeerea~ / naval launch. He was brought to America under CIA auspices, and, being fully cooperative, he proved a veritable gold mine to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Under the new identity of Shadrin, Nick and Ewe made remarkable progress. He took an MA and a PhD in engineering; she opened a successful dental practice. They made many new friends, mostly drawn from high-ranking intelligence officials. But then problems developed. As his debriefing drew to a close, he should by any measure have been continued as a naval analyst or consultant to ONI, but because of his background a general security clearance was refused. He was finally assigned to a unit of former defectors serving as translators in the new Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The job and the people who worked with him were below his level; Shadrin was understandably distressed but he stayed the course. 24 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 ‘CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT This situation was radically altered in 1966 with the arrival in Washington of a KGB officer named in the book as Igor (code named Kitty Hawk by FBI and CIA). The full story of Igor and Shadrin's association with the operation which ensued is tola in one or more Agency studies which, although several were written in ignorance of the final developments in the case, are more factually accurate and detailed than Hurt's account, which is gueh degraded by the fact he Had ‘to build his case wholly on word-of-mouth accounts. However, / Hurt must be credited with, thanks to considerable™pressiire applied by "Reader's Digest" at high levels, having collected considerable information; he also had help from Copaken's own aggressive investigation. Finally, it appears that several FBI officers confided more to Ewe Shadrin and her lawyer than they should have. The Angleton/Epstein role emerges in the portion dealing with Igor's background and his bona fides. Throughout the book, Hurt flays the Agency and FBI for having allowed Shadrin to proceed with his hazardous mission in a city where the KGB could control the situation, but (s/ {s jaigticult to perceive what other course could have been taken if the operation were to remain viable. It was an admitted gamble, it had been done successfully before, Shadrin was willing to proceed, and so the die was cast. But then Hurt introduces the issue of Igor's credibility. Should the operation have been undertaken yn oe a were so many questions about Igor? Hurt Sitescene“fact Igor's credentials rested to some degree on two defectors whom Hurt regards as false, Fedora (the KGB agent who had worked for the FBI) and Nosenko. The fact that by 1981 the Agency had long accepted Nosenko as bona fide is swept aside as irrelevant. Instead Hurt cites Epstein's Legend as his source for questioning Nosenko's authenticity, but Hurt also 25 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT cites an FBI study done in 1980 which he claims concluded ds Readers of Shadrin should bear in mind Hurt was acting / throughout for Ewe Shadrin by attempting to generate maximum FEDORA was a false defector. publicity for her case and thus improve her leverage with officialdom. Thus ,throughout the book the issue of Igor's security is totally disregarded. If Igor were genuine, which Hurt doubts by following the judgment of Epstein (in turn based on Angelton's views), then obviously his security should have been paramount. Logically, he should never have been mentioned at all. Hurt apparently never understood or refused to believe Igor had been a valuable source of counterintelligence information, one of his leads having led r “7 to the apprehension of a long term KGB spy who had done we eS enormous damage to American interests. Many other cases had derived from Igor's information and were being played out. ou White it is true that) Igor| had bee mentioned in: ‘american press articles|as early as 1978, the source of Wiith leakage has not been identified, the cases derived from Igor were still being developed and, more importantZy, if Igor were genuine, all the Hurt publicity was likely to put his life at serious risk. Hurt's book propelled the Shadrin case and the mysterious Igor into the public knowledge in a major way. What action the Soviets took, if any, subsequently towards Igor is unknown to this writer, but if Igor suffered ween or\death at the hands of the KGB, then Hurt and h erstwhile Ares f a (inv Nie 4 Hurt also mid} exaggerates what he terms Agency ~ lies bear a heavy responsibility. incompetence and bungling in the Shadrin case, assigning guilt to Colby, Kalaris and McCoy, roughly in that order. He cites lack of surveillance in Vienna and the failure to notify Washington immediately when Shadrin's absence was discovered. Much of the blame he puts on the uncommunicative Cynthia Hausmann. She is accused of being 26 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 “CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT distant /and insensitive to Ewe Shadrin when Nick was found to be/nissing. Although Hausmann was not a very outgoi rie person under the best of circumstances, she was a os ste wae « wy | competent and conscientious officer. 7 tee ae wnat 4a surveillance was of doubtful utility in this case and an immediate cable to Washington would have been of little help. Under the circumstances, Hausmann's cautious and restrained conduct seems laudable. Hurt's outrage on these points is both naive and absurd. The Hurt book reflects throughout the influence of Angleton, but it plays a secondary role. But this seriously flaws the book, which is rcome by events except for our ignorance of the disposition) f Igor. This persists but perhaps in the new dispensation we may one day receive the answer. H e es Bennett and the RCMP. Security Service by John Sawatsky; Doubleday and Company (New York and Toronto), 1982--239 pages Sawatsky's book might well have been titled James , because that is what cautionary tale and should be read y every senior officer dealing with security and counterintelligence. Sawatsky's book is also one of the best on the Angleton era, although it deals with but one slice of it. Although Golitsyn plays a role in the book, Sawatsky does not otherwise touch upon the major controversies that plagued the counterintelligence scene at the time. Sawatsky did interview some CIA retired officers, but the bulk of his evidence was collected from RCMP personnel who were actually involved in the io; aa case. BS tocus“¥e entirely on the Canadian scene aha there-are—— few distractions from the central story, Wbidbligs! a vivid and truthful account of the destruction of an excellent 27 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 ‘reads like security service files, except that itis / ne “CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT civilian officer of the RCMP Security Servite. Thefe.are~ lso several accounts in the official |CcIc files, “which may be consulted to verify Sawatsky's story. Sawatsky, My a Canadian journalist, dip cut his teeth on intelligence and security affairs with an earlier book called Men In The Shadows, a general account of the RCMP Security Service. Shortly after the publication of Sawatsky's book, a novel appeared by a Canadian named Ian Adams. This was a thinly disguised story of the alleged role of Leslie James Bennett as a Soviet spy. Bennett, who had been a senior civilian official in the RCMP for many years, all in counterintelligence work against the Soviets, had been forced out of the service in 1972 supposedly on health grounds. After a brief period in South Africa, Bennett settled in Australia. When the Adams book appeared, he struck back at its innuendo with a libel suit. In the ensuing trial, much about the previously highly secret Bennett case became public knowledge. Armed with these—. details, Sawatsky went after the rest of the story. yam) a LS probably safe proposition that Bennett told Sawatsky side of the story and provided the names of friends who could fill in additional detail as well as color. It also seems likely that as Sawatsky pursued his investigation those who believed Bennett guilty were ready to tell their story while those who preferred to believe him innocent, were equally ready to strike back with more argument. This kind or argument and counterargument, stimulating each side to blurt out more that it had originally intended, is perfect for the investigative journalist. Sawatsky had a field day. Former RCMP personnel obviously talked freely and in great detail. The result is an astonishing book that we - livelier and better written. Keene 28 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Readers of the Martin, Pincher, and other books about counterintelligence in this period will find a‘common thread running through them and Sawatsky's book. It - / » pe sah éntenhsely -heitd-by A small group of Western wo ; Jali counterintelligence officers in the 1960s and 1970s’ that their services were penetrated by the Soviets. The penetration was thought to explain why things had gone wrong, to show cause for many otherwise inexplicable anomalies, and to account for the failures of their services in the struggle against Soviet Bloc intelligence. These fears came somewhat later to the Mounties than to the British, who had contracted a very severe case of mole fever during the late 1960s. But when the Mounties got the disease, they got it the worst of all. When people wondered why cases had collapsed, spies slipped away without trace, or double agents who had gone to Moscow were never heard from again, the almost overwhelming judgment was that it must have been the work of a mole. On pages 265-266, Sawatsky tells how suspicion fell on Bennett because Clare E. Petty, one of Angleton's counterintelligence officers, told some stories out of school. They constituted the kind of airy theorizing in which Petty specialized, what might be termed extreme speculation unsupported by any fact, but it was enough to set off a conflagration. When Angleton learned of Petty's indiscretion, he was furious, but he did not then go to the Mounties and advise caution. Instead, when he saw how rapidly the case was developing, he poured kerosene-on the fire by suggesting the RCMP consult Golitsyn/“ Tt was to be Golitsyn's last big case, and he took full advantage of it. Although only a year earlier he had visited Ottawa and stayed at the Bennett home discussing cases for hours, an event which Bennett thought led to their becoming close friends, the defector now declared Bennett to be a KGB mole. 29 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT This was all that was needed and the RCMP hurtled off to disaster. Bennett was an outsider (i.e., a civilian employee, a rarity in the RCMP); he had been in the counterintelligence branch for two decades; he had had access to everything; and he was not the most popular of men. Bennett, a Welshman who entered the RCMP in the early 1950s, had raised several generations of commissioned and noncommissioned Mounties, trying to instill in them the kind of discipline, perseverance, objectivity, and dedication that counterintelligence work requires. In the course of his career it is safe to say he made some enemies. A dry, dyspeptic man with a fierce dedication to his work, he was . ‘49 sown to arrive regularly at the office at seven in the Sy morning and not leave until seven at night; this addiction te \s _to duty was later to be cited against him. He had a biting By tongue. He could be acidly critical of young, raw recruits yl from the Canadian prairies who came to him with nothing more than a high school education and whom he was trying to hammer into an effective counterintelligence service. [In the long run, although he was widely respected (and nowhere more than with the foreign services with whom the RCMP had liaison), many of those who passed through B Branch (the counterintelligence section of the security service) hated him. It was’ a likely, if unspoken, factor in the accusations against hin. The story of the investigation, the confrontation, the interrogation, and the ultimate decision that Bennett had to leave is well tolal| Sawatsky despite its enormous complexities. “a terrible, wrenching hour for the distinguished irector General (its first) of the security service, John K. Starnes, when he finally had to decide Bennett must go. Bennett, never in good health, was put out of the RCMP on a medical discharge. Starnes himself left 30 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT the security service not long after and within a few years the whole organization was closed down, to be replaced in due course by a civilian service. ooo - ¢ whe destruction of James vennett ana the uitinate” demise of the RCMP Security Service are svence (60 ynagte Angleton must be held at least partially responsible>y Angleton had been a malign influence upon the service for many years, an example of which is the Olga Farmakovskaya case detailed in the Canadian Section of the CI Staff History and also covered in Mangold's Cold Warrior. On pages 257-258, Sawatsky gives an example of Angleton gulling the Canadians with a fanciful story he had also used on the British. Angleton in the greatest secrecy told the RCMP of a mysterious source he had behind the Iron Curtain which reported only sporadically but whose product was of the highest quality. Angleton went on to indicate that, with a reference to the cultivation of orchids, he was slowly and patiently developing this source which provided evidence of Soviet disruption and disinformation but also positive intelligence as well. The source served up only partial information and tended to refer to ancient Soviet history. It could not be interrogated and its product came out to the West erratically. Although good, this source had not yet penetrated to the inner circle of Soviet power, but Angleton had high hopes. This fanciful source (the writer heard this himself with a small group of RCMP officers at La Nicoise at midnight and was appalled) existed, of course, only as a figment of Angleton's imagination, but over long alcoholic meals Angleton would bit by bit unveil the story of his mole in Moscow. The Mounties were sworn to deepest secrecy, but they should have checked with their British friends, as Angleton had used this ploy on them at an earlier stage. When Maurice Oldfield became Chief of MI-6 in 1973 and Michael Hanley Director General of MI-5 in 1972, they turned a deaf ear to such palpable nonsense. (Angleton had hinted 31 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT at querying the source regarding Harold Wilson's alleged Soviet connections, but the source never responded.) The new management was determined not to be victimized further. Only after the Bennett and other disasters did the Canadians and British compare notes, thus discovering they had been gulled separately over the years. After Bennett's libel case against Adams brought this scandal into public view, the Canadian Government made its own inquiry and in 1980 the Solicitor General of Canada, Mr. Francis Fox, told the House of Commons Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs that "there was no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Bennett was anything but a loyal Canadian citizen" although there was no mention of any financial compensation for his obvious loss of income plus his personal humiliation. The incubus of Angleton still seemed to hover over the case. Bennett lives in exile in Australia surviving on a miserable medical pension.| Nothing seems to be able to shake Canadian Government resolve to forget as completely as possible the Bennett case. 4 eS 32 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT DECEPTION: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA by Edward J. Epstein; Simon and Schuster (New York, N.Y.), 1989--335 pages onic that Edward J. Epstein should have pub his book called Deception in mid-1989 just as the Soviet Union was undergoing massive changes, which would by autumn 1991 result in its total demise. So also has its major intelligence arm, the KGB, vanished, which according , responsible for many mind-boggling feats of deception. *) we cil to Epstein and his principal source, James Angleton, was little heralded result of these events has been the disappearance almost overnight of what once was a burgeoning cottage industry employing hundreds of academics and self- appointed experts around in the country in universities and think tanks devoted to the study of Soviet deception, Gisinformation, active measures and subversion. This ‘ already antique field of academic endeavor now has, like it ‘ Epstein's book, the smell of attic dust. ho This book, rather like its predecessor Legend, is really two books; the first book in 105 pages explains Angleton's theories developed largely from the defector, Anatole Golitsyn. The second part--the remainder of the book--is devoted to various forms of deception. As this subject has been better covered in other voree(8 9 of no concern here except to note that one chapter is devéted to the Soviet defector, Vitali Yurchenko, designated by Epstein as an obvious KGB provocation similar to Nosenko. Epstein concludes the book with a long chapter on glasnost, which he dismisses as simply another massive KGB deception. The most arresting information imparted in Deception is Epstein's confession regarding his sources for both Legend and this book. With Angleton now dead, Epstein apparently 33 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRALT feels free to admit the former chief of CIA counterintelligence was his major source since 1976 when they first met. Te-was Angleton who pasped Epstein on to his assistants, Miler and Rocca, providing introductions to William Hood lore FBI officers William Sullivan and Sam Papich. Angleton sent Epstein to Europe to see Stephen de Mowbray, the former MI-6 officer and a devoted disciple of Golitsyn, in England and to Tennent ("Pete") Bagley in Belgium. That the latter understood he was passing on classified information is revealed by Epstein's amusing description of the clandestine circumstances under which they met. All down the years, Angleton remained a constant and prolific source for Epstein; the latter showed his appreciation by taking Angleton with him to Israel when he went there in 1982 to de research @a his book about the diamond trade (later published as The Rise and Fall of Diamonds). Although it was obvious to most astute observers that Angleton was leaking classified information to Epstein and others, nothing was done to caution him. On the other hand, when it. pie a oe eis an? material to the press, he was sent an official warning ~ aoe thy pl uw was agreed Clare E. Petty had been leaking classified letter by CIA. Thus,in retirement, as when he was a CIA i Uw won ( official, Angleton enjoyed a protected and special status. ie fi oe ah Le In Part One Epstein recites again, as in Legend, the Angleton belief in the KGB program of deception and penetration, which over the years he had absorbed from the \ defector Golitsyn and had then embellished further with Uf special embroidery of his own. These theories came to be pe described by Angleton's critics as "The Monster Plot." As Epstein never seems to have grasped the real meaning of how the theory was supposed to have operated, the reader is advised to read the appropriate section in the CI Staff official history or the special chapter in the CI Staff study done by Fieldhouse on the Nosenko case. 34 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 ‘CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT One of Golitsyn's major clains, made almost immediately after his defection, was that another defector would soon be sent by the KGB, as Angleton invariably put it, to "mutilate" Golitsyn's leads (which in another oddity of terminology, Angleton always called “serials"). In 1964 Nosenko defected to the CIA. Angleton, who by now had complete control of Golitsyn, instantly viewed Nosenko as the predicted plant thereby ensuring that Golitsyn would maintain his primacy as the CI Staff's resident expert. When Nosenko did not confess to his role as a false defector, he was incarcerated for three years under severe conditions. Epstein blames this action entirely on Soviet Division management, while portraying the powerful Angelton as agonizing helplessly on the sidelines. This rendition is not only wrong, but patently absurd. Angleton knew all the legal inquiries concerning such action, was kept informed of the construction of the prison quarters, and never once raised an objection. If he had, as Epstein claims, genuinely opposed Nosenko's imprisonment, one word from him to Helms would have been sufficient to stop the program instantly. The foregoing is but one of many errors of fact and/or misinterpretation in this book. Like Legend it is propaganda for Angleton and is essentially dishonest. The errors are too many to document here, but one more example will give the flavor of this work. This error tends to confirm what an exasperated senior FBI officer wrote to Director J. Edgar Hoover: "Golitsyn is not above fabricating to support his theories." On page 85, Epstein cites Golitsyn's assertion that, to support the KGB deception program, it was necessary to divide Soviet intelligence into an outer and an inner KGB. Epstein then explains what Golitsyn allegedly reported about this, but nothing remotely resembling this can be found in any of 35 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT Golitsyn's debriefings. It seems likely this fiction was developed by Golitsyn after his visit to England, when there is much evidence he began to embroider and fabricate. The idea of the two KGBs has never been reported by any other Soviet source or defector, including the most senior defector of modern times, Oleg Gordievsky. Thus it is suggested this statement should be treated with great reserve. It also suggests that Epstein, who makes considerable pretensions to scholarship, should have been more conscientious in checking such stories with more responsible sources before labeling them as fact. In summary, this is one of many bad books that appeared during the period after Angleton's dismissal which were inspired by him and mostly have no factual basis. Just as Angleton gulled the British and Canadians with fake stories about an alleged highly secret source of his in Moscow who on occasion produced startling, if mostly historic, _information, so for over fifteen years Angleton and his / cohorts gulled the public via such writers as Epstein with boo like Legend and Deception. It is difficult to believe that a writer as obviously intelligent as Epstein could . a wr NV believe the stuff he wrote. An interview with Epstein in the magazine Vanity Fair in May 1989 suggests Epstein is having second thoughts about Angleton and even about his pet defector, Golitsyn. In the interview, Epstein admits Angleton's views were shaped by Golitsyn-~-but how reliable was he? "Possibly Golitsyn was a liar," admits Epstein, "but Golitsyn is very interesting because he is a museum of Angleton's mind. What I believe happened is that Golitsyn listened to stories Angleton told him and then repeated them to British intelligence and vice versa." This suggests that the great confidence writers like Epstein put in Golitsyn is being eroded (witness the article William Safire wrote in The New York Times after his 36 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT
13-00000 ‘CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT visit with Golitsyn). And as a result, has Epstein's confidence in Angleton's veracity been equally eroded? It appears this may be the case as Epstein concluded the interview noted above with the remark: "Actually, I don't know whether to believe Angleton at all!" 37 CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN NOCONTRACT