- . Date : 06/25/98 Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM eae eleased ameer -the- John } - AGENCY INFORMATION . Kennedy Wesassination Records AGENCY : NSC ollection Act of i992 RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10166 (44 USc 2107 Note). RECORDS SERIES : ase#:NWU 54214 Date: AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 150 © HoO-10-2017 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : NSC FROM : THOMAS A. PARROTT TO : . TITLE : MEMORANDUM DATE : 09/06/62 PAGES : 5 ; SUBJECTS : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON OPERATION MONGOOSE DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/25/98 OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION HW 542714 DBocld:32977062 Page 1
HW 542714 are fr Ma, Bondy qlee DBAPT MONGOOSE Minutes - 9/6/62 TAP /mm MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD ee, SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE , 6 September 1962 PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin; Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow 1. Sabotage Operation General Carter reported that information should be available by © Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr. _ Bundy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the information is obtained. 2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st. He noted that some of the operational representatives had questioned whether this was responsive to the changed situation elgsudssed by the issuance of NSAM 181, but said that this plan had been prepared within the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16). Mr. Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to. NSAM 181 has been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that the approach taken in the August 3lst paper was satisfactory. 3. The following specific comments were then made on Activities listed in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not given to the paper at this meeting.) a. Mr. Martin said that number 20Q@amissrsyy was tricky and that he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal DocId: 32977062 Page 2?
-2- is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that details should be presented to the Group, to include he convene Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ee Ce In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported by State, said that Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr. Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount against U.S. radio stations, and gaid that he felt on balance it would not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared. d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 a e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce, HW 54214 Docld:32977062.-Page 3
HW..542714 Docld: 32977062 Page 4 f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight. h. General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22 General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter~ measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail. i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban &
HW..54214 Docld:32977062 Page 5 oo . A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which 5. could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary. 7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated. 8. It was suggested that the possibilities of «% WBbe looked into further. 9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree. 10, Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.