(404-10107-10030 . vo . > y at RAL i t, 3 * % 23 August 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence VIA: ; Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM: John H. Waller Inspector General SUBJECT: The Defectors Nosenko and Golitsyn 1. Action Requested: Approve providing the SSCI with additional material on above subject per Paragraph 4 below. 2. Background: This report concerns the extent of information on the defectors, Yuriy Nosenko and Anatoly Golitsyn, which the Agency has made known to the Rockefeller Commission and to the - Senate Church Committee and its oversight successor, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. . NOSENKO:. The record shows that the material listed in Attachment A regarding Nosenko was passed to the Rockefeller Commission in February 1975. This material held by the Rockefeller Commission was subsequently made available to the Church Committee for its investigation. Additional material gatnered by the Rockefeller Commissicn on Hosenko throtigh inter- views with former employees, etc. may also have been made avail- able to the Church Committee but we have no record of it. The Reckefelter Commission's brief menticn of the Hosenko incar- ceration in its final report is attached as Attachment B. The matertal concerning fosanko which was provided the Rockefeller Commission included datails of his background in the KGB, his recruitment in 1962 and his role as an agent in place, his defection in 1954, the nature of his involuntary con- Finement by tha Agency during the pericd 1964-67 and the author- ity on which the confinement was based. Tne Rockefeller Commis- Sion was also provided a 15-page summary, perhaps better termed an apologia, prepared by the DDO's Ssviet Russia Division and RETURN TO CIA E2 IMPDET Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce CL BY 055636
14-00000 rata ean beg th, Cl Staff in 1967. This paper sets forth the doubts. concern- ing Nosenko's bona fides, the inconsistencies in his aabrief- ings, his increasingly uncooperative attitude, and the indi- cations of deception during his initial polygraph examina- tions. It describes how the determination was made that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent with a deception mission, and how Nosenko was then incarcerated to preclude any con- ceivable means of communication with the KGB. It was then believed that intensive interrogation, coupled with a Spartan- like existence in solitary confinement, would eventually break Nosenko and bring about a confession as to his true status and KGB mission. Nosenko withstood the arduous regimen and was subsequently vindicated. Other material furnished the Rockefeller Commission on Nosenko included a rather short summary prepared by the Of- . fice of Security which touched on Nosenko's ultimate vindica- tion, rehabilitation and current status as a Paid Consultant. There is no indication that Soviet defector Golitsyn's original ‘stimulus to the Nosenko controversy was ever surfaced to either the Rockefeller Commission or the Senate Select Committee. Golitsyn has inspired and supported the Ci Staff suspicion that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent. A study of the Nosenko case (which takes issue with the earlier suspicions toward and- treatment of Nosenko) prepared by retired annuitant John Hart in early 1977 called "The Monster Plot" has not been shown to the Senate Select Comnittee on Intelligence and, of course, was not finished in time to have been made available to the eariier Church Committee. It should be noted that there is a Memorandum for the ’ Record prepared by CIA's Legislative Counsel, John H. Maury, on 5 August 1969 entitled "Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case” (see Attachment C). This indicates that - Congressional oversight committees or oversight committee staf- - fers, at least, were privy to CIA concerns regarding Nosenko's bona Fides as long ago aS 1969. This memorandum includes re- ference to CIA's incarceration of Nosenko, justifying it to per- mit “prolonged briefing", with the concern he might be targeted for “executive action" if the Soviets should discover his wnere- abouts. Nosenko's own attitude since his abuse by CIA seems to have been philosophical and forgiving. He has lodged no complaints.. Nasenko continues to be fully cooperative and
14-00000 . ; | . . i ; . sy . ” ; C stated his feelings to the Office of Security in 1975 to the effect that he desires no publicity; it would ptace him in personal danger and it would certainly discourage any Soviet. official from defecting for years ta come. GOLITSYN: Information provided the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee on Anatoly .Golitsyn, who defected in 1961, has been minimal. -According to Agency re- cords, it was limited to recounting tne documentation require- ments, including passports in alias, for change of identity procedures for Golitsyn and his family on three: occasions. His. thesis that Soviet defectors could not be trusted and his role in working with the CI Staff on an exercise to identify possible Soviet penetrations of CIA are. not believed to have been known to the Rockefeller Commission; the Church Committee or the present Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Neither John Hart's report on Nosenko, nor Bronson Tweedy's report on Golitsyn, which analyze these situations, written after the Church Committee investigations, have been shown to the- Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). i ‘It should also be noted that a staff member of the current Senate oversight committee (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence), Mr. Jean Malot*Evans, was a DDO, CI Staff careerist until his retirement in June 1974. It is our under- standing that he is, therefore, personally conversant with much of the background and develooments in the Nosenko and Gqlitsyn _ cases, although we do not know how much he has recorded for the SSCI’s benefit. EDUARD OUN: The Rockefeller Commission report, on page 170, mentioned a case where a defector was physically abused, though not seriously injured, by an Agency employes. It added that the employee was subsequently discharged by the DCI. This case pertains to the Estonia ard QOun, who defected in 1955..-The employee was also of Estonian origin. was returned to Headquarters to. face After lengthy and acrimonious Suitability proceedings , vas discharged from CIA in 1961 3. Recent Actions: At your request, I briefed the Staff Director of the SSCI, Mr. William Miller, on 25 August 1977 in broad outline, and described the incident of Nosenko' Ss incarceration by CIA from 1964-1967, which he was, of course, already familiar with. I also briefed him in general terms -- without naming svecific _ officers -~ how tha careers of certain CIA officers had been
14-00000 Poo 4 + L cn harmed by unsubstantiated suspicions that they were Soviet KGB agents, based on the theories and reasoning of defector Golitsya. This situation had not been previously known by Miller or the SSCI (although the SSCI's CI Staff expert, Evans, as noted abeve, had previously worked on the DDO's CI Staff under James Angleton and thus may have had some familiarity with this episode in the Agency's history). I also told Mr. Miller that newsman David Martin seems to be digging into the Nosenko and Golitsyn cases and is trying to interview various former CIA employees. I "explained that it is possible, therefore, that there may be public surfacing of some or all of the story. 1 offered more ; complete briefings to: the SSCI, should it so desire. 4, Recommendation: I recommend that we be prepared to offer Mr. Miller additional briefings of the Nosenko case and the Golitsyn case, should he request more detail. od oa “deni i’ Wailer Attachments - 3 : a Attachment A te : Attachment B Attachment C . s/ Stansfield Turvé? 7 APPROVED: is] 31 AUG 1977 Director of Central Intelligence DISAPPROVED: Director of Central Intelligence ‘DATE:
14-00000 Attachm ent A: Titles of documents sent to the Rockefeller Commission and to the Department of Justice 1. Memorandurn for: The Inspector General . _ 1967 Subject : The Nosenko Case- Attachment : Summary of 1967 Document which outlines the Nosenko Case. (This 15-page report presents the SR. Division and CI Staff position that Nosenko was a dispatched KGB agent and discusses Nosenko's involuntary confinement by the Agency for approximately three years. ) 2. Memorandum to Dept. of Justice from OGC listing nine ~. 30 Jan 1975 documents requested by the DJ and attached. {1} Nosenko's request for political asylum dated 4 Feb 1964. (2) Nosenko's Secrecy Agreement dated 21 April 1989. (3) Nosenko's contract with CIA as Independent Contractor or Consultant, dated 21 April 1969 ($16,500 per annum). (4) Nosenko's contract with CIA dated 1 March 1970 ($18,500 per annum). (5) Receipt for advance of back salary, April 1964-Harch 1969, dated 25 Oct. 1972 ($35,006). ?: (6) Receipt for full payment of back salary, April 1964-March 1969, dated 16 Nov. 72 ($52,052 in addition to prior - payment of $35,000). (7) Wosenko's Acknowledgement and Release to CIA, dated 12 July 1973. (S) M/R of 13 July 1973 concerning 12 July 73 acknowledgment and release. Nosenko's revised contract dated-9 May 1974 ($23,750 per annurt) .
14-00000 € 3. M/R from John M. Maury, Subject: Briefing of Key 5 Aug 1969 Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko Case, (This briefing paper, for the Senate and House Appropriations and Armad Services Committees, reflected the DDO's continued concern re Nosenka's bona fides. Copy attached as Tab C.) 4. Office of Security memoranda re confinement 10 July 1964 instructions for Nosenko, 5. Memorandum for USI8B from DDCI Marshall Carter 12 Feb 1964 advising of Nosenko's defection. 6.. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from DDO li Feb 1954 advising of tosenko's defection. 7. Hemoranda from the Office of Security to . 18 July 1989, [&NS re Nosenko's alien status. . © 24 duly 1969 8. Memorandum from DCI to I&aNS recommending -9 Oct 1969 permanent residency status. for Nosenko. 9. Asst, Atty General Memo to DCI concurring 20 Oct 1969 in permanent residency status. 10. OGC memo to D/OS advising that CIA has 3 Apr 1964 responsibility for Nosenko. . C/SR Div. M/R re discussion with Deputy : 2 Apr 1954 Attorney General on basis for Nosenko detention. 12. Office of Security summary on highlights — CA 3 Feb 1975 of Nosenko case. , . 13. The Executive Registry indicates this additional - information was passed to the Rockefeller Commission: a. Selected short summaries prepared by O0&C - 14 Apr 1975 -: for the DDCI. b. D/OS memo to L&NS advising of Nosenko’s 11 Feb 1964 imainent arrival in the USA. c. OGC-memos to D/OS re Parole Status of 3 Apr 1964 Defectors.
14-00000 GU imemo to D/OS entitled Nosenko 14 Feb 1969 Options (Rehabilitation program). Memorandum to David W. Belin from DDCI 22 Jan 1975 responding to specific questions about Nosenko's period of confinement and about nature of Agency support for Golitsyn. Memorandum to David W. Belin from DDCI 24 Feb 1975 listing identities for previous material. IDENs only were used,
won c( mt, 170 ( Meeoaaiendalion (2s) ‘She CIA should strictly adhere to estublished lesal proceedures severning access to federal incone tax information. Recommendation (25) CIA investigative records Sheuld show that the investigation was duly authorized, and hy whom, and should ciearly set forth ihe factual basis for undertaking the inveslivation and the results ef the investivation, C. Handling of Defeciors liivertigation of defectors is the responsibility of the CLA under a National Security Council InteHigence. Directive, assigning this daty fo the Aveney us a “service of common concern” to the intelligence connmuaty asa whole. ae : Within the CTA, the OMice of Security is charged with providing proper security for the handling of persons who have defected to the United States from other nations. A careful procedure has Deen devel- oped for such handling. Generally a defeetor can be processed iia few months’ time. Tz one iistanuce, however, 2 defector was involuntarily confined to a CLA in- slallation for approximately three years. For much of this lime, the defector was held in solitary confinement under extremely spartan live ing conditions, The defector was a pparently not physically abused. The justification given by the CYA. for the Jengihy confinement arose out of a substantial concern regarding the defector’s bona fides. When the issue was finally resolved, the defector was given total freedom and became « United States citizen. Tie confinement of ihe defector was approved by the Director of Central Jivelligence on the writtey advice of the General Counsel. The ! EBL the Attorney General, the United States Intelligence Board, and 3 selected Members of Congress were all aware to some extent of the | continued confinement, : ; aan ° ee” Tn one other case, a defector was physically abnsed, although not. seriously injured. The Director of Central Tnicligence discharged the emplovec Involved. \ TMA AS URNA Bet ras mistetcomerater tne gee, OO We am tm ne arta, Conclusions Such tastduent of individuals hy an ageney of the United States is unlawful. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Tspecter General mist be alert to prevent repetitions,
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14-00000 - . et 8 ° ° 4 : - ~~ - . ° a) t gaan . ° OSU Poomees 5 een ees es ' ~ - 2 - DRASTTIIMM ~ 19 June 1909 ‘SUBJECT: Brieiing of Key Congressional Contacts on tha Iden 1 Casa Soe tes The following aragra lus are proposed as guidance for briefing ke: a . 3 Key congressional contacts on the history and status of the iden 1 ‘ease, They ara based primarily on material provided b by SB Division, and have been cleared by 58, CI Staff and the Office of Securit It is proposed tnat ‘the Chairmen and/or senior staff ofiicers of each of tha Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the Mines indicated. TR, . e a wT >. od, This ‘casa goes back sometime into history and you may recall ..,é a . es . ce . we Jhaying ‘heard of it sevaral years ago, From time tc time it has received .., & . 7 . . - . . . : a . . . "+ press play, both when it first broke in early 1954 and occasionally since, tiicer of the Comynittee for a Stas Orice Stats Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Ministe a . . e @ building in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzeriane, in 1964, He was then brought to the United States woere oe has since deen in the custody of the Agency uncergoing extensive deorleiings ~*~ by oisicars of the Agency and the Wl. . Se é ‘ ’ ° . . & . - @
14-00000 nas been sharad with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and Cat ee UT corey pe By fe & *.. cla 4 ne ihe | ‘ . rn ns auhee od wine 7 . t, - ina wet. ow eee me ee me em . 2. tden f Weed peen a nGe vlillcer for witrcmimataly it: ek at tne time of ais Cefection. Iden 1 has proviced a larze quantity of 2 ‘counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intellizence. tp Fore example, one of his reports played a paxt in the negation of a ma afor hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, “his information ° ee r . ° foreign Eaiaon services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Iden 1 identified many hundreds of. Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of use ia i information on the organization of tha KGB, its operational doctrine and ‘its techniques and methods. - ° . meee . 6 and undisciplined son of a foxymer ranking Minister of the Soviet Govern nent abe Jo ..4 In debriefing him it becam apparent that Iden 1, the privileged a . + 2. “Was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own * importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his lize history, when weighed against other inforrnation already in our possession, raised soma douots concerning hia veracity. To permit extensive and prolong ec debvieling, arrangements were made to accommodate Iden 1 under hignly secure o conditions, Thesa arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases atleast, by the additional need to provide Iden 1 with continuinz personal Ten n wrens pYoOtection sinca thare was tha distinct possioility that, as a KGB oificar,
nee “OA wee ge Te Tee . oo ° . : . ~ = . - te . Po ne ee eed - . wba pty, $ . SP + piay : ° ~ : ‘, Pe mb ewe 8 ° rife y ot cha a fae cen fae Meee shy bi meth 22 at wate pt tin WS GES sees GN  Ehacutive action! if the Soviets should discover ; . a : oe ae te t. Wess? 1 * . : £ - : Spode oe igh s He are : naeeaag eons thie tote, da tefl 5 nt his whereabouts: Wit the Passage Gs time, this latter iactert is ecnmnsidasac to ba sufficiently diminished to justify a phased noymalization of Iden l's em sane _ situation--this Gespit te the fact that some points remain unresolved concernin: his bona fides. nn oan - Se _ 8 5. The Agency, with the assistance of the F i . . x lool: into these questionable aspects of the case, whila rermaining ale oe xt eo Si, is continuing ta. the possibility of hostile interest. | However, during ng the £ull period of his . stay in the United States Iden 1 has cooperated with -with the other_ai and welfare, and our ° 2 current efiorts are being directed toward his gracual adjustment to a normal, - independent status. As a step in this direction, he is no ; » he now Living inhisown ~~ private apaztment, subject to some protective surveillence. De . . - * . - - 6 This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal 7 . & ‘problems of readjustment exverienced 7 oy many Cefectors as well as the By Zack thai Iden 1 ‘is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own Security, We are on at ; ul that Fry ope Iden] is se naiole « enougn to realize that un cue publicity caused by any rasa act on his mart could lead to uns) sat trhajs evan daneaee ~- ne &Csi0N ON Nis Dare couid lead to unpleasant, PETAADS even Ganvervaus S$ CONSe@qCuencs., particularly tor himself. We therefore beliave it aDDTopriate to take this