oO | He | ‘ScoRET SENSITIVE ‘ht would be naive, to say the least, to assume that it is possible to conduct one ‘policy in the West and another in the East, to fight with one hand against the arming of West Germany with nuclear weapons, against the spreading of nuclear weapons in the world, and to supply. these weapons to China with the other hand. .... | ''The position of the CPR Government, set forth in the statement of 15 August, can be understood only in the sense that the Chinese leaders do not care how the nuclear weapons Spread among the capitalist countries as long as the CPR leaders get a chance to lay their hands on a nuclear bomb and see what it is like..... ''And the CPR can now.rely on the means of defense which have been developed through the efforts of the Soviet people and which reliably serve the purposes of defending the countries of the socialist commonwealth. "This is why the most reasonable policy for the CPR in the present conditions--if, of course, its desires and potential are to be commensurate=- would be to devote its efforts to the development of the national economy, science, technology, and agriculture, devoting them to raising the | welfare of the Chinese people, to meeting their vital needs. The Chinese people are experiencing many privations, and this is why such a course “OQ in the policy of the Chinese leaders would be more beneficial to the Chinese people, would be more appreciated by them and correctly understood throughout the world. ese. "It cannot be effaced from the memory of the peoples that at the critical moments, when the aggressive quarters put the world on -the brink of war, the Soviet Union without hesitation threw in all its international weight, all its military. might, to stay the hand of the aggressor raised over a smal] or big country. geographical ly distant or close to us. 7 | . SEGRE] © SENSITIVE HW 49061 DBocld:326276313 Page 6
| 7 SusRET SENSITIVE This was the case in the period of. the Suez crisis. this was the case dur ing the events around Syria and Iraq in 1958. This was the case in the period when tension flared up in Taiwan Strait--and the Chinese leaders, the Chinese people, certainly remember it. This was also the case during the crisis in the Caribbean area when the Soviet Union, by its rocket-nuclear might, shielded revolutionary Cuba. Perhaps the Chinese leaders consider that all these were moments of "tranquility." But we can say bluntly that nobody but they are in accord with this. These steps of the Soviet Government were also an expression of genuine proletarian internationalism, not the one on which Peking likes to expound and which is backed by nothing but noisy slogans and paper resolutions. "Nt has everything to administer a devastating rebuff to anyone who would infringe on the security of. the Soviet Union or its friends and allies. But no incantations from Peking will draw the Soviet Union to the road of madness to the road of irresponsible playing with the lives of hundreds of millions of people,"'.... Race The outcry against the nuclear test~ban treaty is widely used in Peking for the propaganda of. a Peking-invented version about a "special! community of. interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin’ America, .... "As if foreseeing the present attempts of the Chinese leaders to erect walls-within the international ‘communist and national liberation . movement, separating it by the token of the color of skin as if foreseeing their striving to separate the liberation struggle of the ~ SECRET SENSITIVE 8 HW 49061 Docld:32626313 Page 9
Mey SECRET cENSITIVE people from the revolutionary movement of the international proletariat, Ve | I. Lenin wrote: "He who takes the standpoint of nationalism, naturally goes as far as to want to surround with a Chinese wall his nationality, his national working class movement, unabashed by the fact that it will be necessary to build separate wells in each city, place, and village, unabashed. by the fact that by his ‘tactics of division and fragmentation he reduces to naught the great ‘call ‘tor, cohesion and unity of proletarians of all nations,. races. 3 and. 1 Languages." seece Conclusion - "The Soviet Government does not abandon hope that the CPR leaders will weigh once more all the consequences of their present policy contradicting the interests of cohesion of the socialist countries and the interests of peace, and would bend efforts for the CPR again to take its place in the rank of states engaged in tireless struggle to prevent thermonuclear war, for peaceful coexistence and for the freedom and. independence of the peoples." seoee ‘The keystone of the Soviet position is the view that the Chinese should. not develop nuclear weapons but rely upon the Soviet “shiela" which defends the Socialist camp. While this theme has undeYlain Soviet statements for some time, this is probably the most unaitibiguous statement the Soviet's have issued. In defending their position, the Soviet Union not only takes the view that the Chinese are ideologically wrong but that they are ignorant of the facts, particularly the facts regarding nuclear weapons. The Soviet lenguage desortbing 4 the negotiation Eastern powers and Western powers for they state "for the first time an international agreement (has ee worked out by three nuclear powers. > SECRETSENSITIVE HW 49061 Docld:32626313 Page 10
SECRET SENSITIVE Although discussed in a low key, this statement is significant in the open Soviet rebuttal of Chinese racist claims "about a 'special' community of interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America.! Finally, probably most important are the Soviet statements implying that the present balance of stragegic power is 7 the Soviet favor. if the Soviet Union is to gain the freedom to serious ly negotiate with the United States, she must, in public, maintain her position both ‘as leader of the international Communist Party and as a nuclear power. Soviet statement of August 20, 1963, indicates that she is clearly trying to do so. Her acceptance of this proposal should make it possible for her to accelerate this trend. HW 49061 DBocld:32626313 Page 11