HW 49061 . ethnic groups. DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM a serious issue while the present Kibali- Ituri provincial leader, John Foster Manzikala, stays in power. : 3) The Lunda and Tshokwe téibal zones Of southwest. Katanga, There are large Lunda and Tshokwe populations in both Angola and Rho- desia. The Lunda are most numerous in Rhodesia, andthe Tshokwe in Angola, In this area latent seceéssionism. is complicated by | the traditional hostility between these There is food for thought ‘in the name of the Tshokwe party in the Congo, Association des Tshokwe du Congo, de l'Angola, et de la Rhodésie (ATCAR). was actively seeking the incorporation of the Tshokwe-inhabited Dilol6 Buckle’ into the. Congo, 1l- Negotiations were reported between. the Conakat territorial administrator in Dilolo and his Portuguese counterpart in July-August 1960, with a view to repatriation of 50, 000_ Tshokwe. to Angola. The potential for trouble, though now diffuse, could become concrete, depending on political developrnents in the three countries involved. Fragmentation The phenomenon of fragmentation’ is much more -recent than the: impulse to secessionism,: although it derives from comimon roots. Fragmentation, a lesser. variant of secession, has entailed withdrawal:-to establish a semi--. autonomous entity, while not renouncing par-" ticipation in’ the state. No movement for a new province -goes back further than 1959 in the Congo, and these initiatives were really only given a decisive fillip by the tensions of the 1960 electoral campaign andthe immediate pre- independence period. Two factors made inescapable the formation. of new provinces: 1) The emergence of three de facto new provinces in the immediate wake of independ- ence: Korigo ‘Central, South Kasai, and North Katanga. The’ first was a result of the strong desire of fhe Bakongo for their own political entity; the second ensued from the calvary of the Kasai Baluba and the forced regrouping of some 250,000 refugees in:the narrow confines of the Baluba ethnic ‘homeland; and the third was a riposte to the unilateral. Conakat act of secession, 2) The general breakdown of authority, which gave autonomist movements the opportunity to establish their claims at a time when central authority “was ._powerless to resist and incapable of exercising leadership. With Pandora's box opened by the’ three initial de facto new provinces, further frag- mentation occurred. For example, in former 11. This small piece of land was traded by the Belgians to the Portu- _.guese in 1926 in return for land near Matadi to permit railroad construction. two - In 1960 ATCAR. Leopoldville Province, once the Bas-Congo withdrawal was a certainty, both Lac Leopold - IIl:andKwango demanded separation from Kwilu,. “When Cuvette Centrale pulled out’of’ Equateur 14 Province, the Ngbwaka-Ngbangi tribes of Ubangi ‘refused: to remain linked ‘with: the Ngombe of Moyen Congo, By eatly 1961: the candidate provinces had:been fairly’ well de- lineated. Their claims to legitimacy were consolidated by the principle, adopted at the Tananarive and Coquilhatville Conferences in March and April-May 1961, of admitting ‘''de facto or de jure'! leaders to sit at the con- ference table, Sixteen of the present 2I prov-- inces were represented at the Coquilhatville Conference. By the time legitimate, constitu- tional government was restoredin Leopoldville’ in August - 1961, ‘there was no ‘turning back the ; clock, With the exception ' of the: first three new’ provinces, the fragmentation movement did not reflect: any popular groundswell.’ The paternity of the provinces lay usually with "out" groups whose aspirations were frustrated within the framework of the old provinces.. The elite from“a given region had little difficulty in’ invoking ethnic- regionalist argu- ments to rally popular support to” form a new province. - Legal Basis of the New Provinces Parliament writhed in eight ‘months of elephantine labors to givé birth to a judicial. monstrosity, the law of April 27, 1962, which established criteria for the new provinces. The Lumumbist bloc; then still a relatively coherent group, fought hard against the law, The problem of defining criteria and pro- cedures was complex. The ethnic factor was generally advanced as the guide to partition, but it was immediately subject to debate, The Bakongo group was clearly identifiable, and its will to constitute itself into a separate political entity was manifest. However, where the Mongo community, for example, begins and ends is a subject of eridless dispute among anthropologists, with significant variations between the Mongophiles and Mongophobes. Further, in many areas, such as Kwilu and: Kasai, precolonial migration patterns produced a population mosaic of infinite intricacy, which’ all the techniques of" gerrymander could not unscramble.’ Three prerequisites for provincial Status were finally adopted: . 1) A population minimum 1 of 700,000; 2) Economic "viability"; 3) A petition submitted by two- thirds ot the provincial and national deputies from the putative provincial area, - There was, however, an escape clause which rendered the minimum population cri- terion meaningless; a population of less than SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM — Page 23
aw HW 49061 . President DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO’FOREIGN DISSEM 700,000 was acceptable ''si les impératifs politiques et sociales l'exigent.” Any group could concoct "imperative reasons'" for ignor- ing the population minimum. Economic viability was indefinable and hence inapplicable. Thus the only real criterion was a petition from two- thirds of the deputies from the region, ; Characteristics of the New Provinces ‘Table D in ‘the appendix to this report ‘provides summary profiles of the character- istics of the new provinces. Map D, also in -the appendix, ‘shows the provinces and ethnic groups. | Although’ ethnic factors were important in the establishment of the’ new provinces, it- is not really adequate to describe them as “tribal provinces," as Table D-clearly shows. Only seven can be considered really ethnically -homogeneous, and four more ‘have one group which tends to predominate. Again, the ambi- guity of the concept of ethnic homogeneity must be stréssed, For example, though one might argue that North Katanga was ‘a Baluba province since ‘most of the peoples inhabiting the zone belong at least peripherally to the ‘Luba culture cluster, a subjective sense of '"Lubahood'! is shared by only a portion of them. The province, therefore, cannot engender loyalty” by ‘explicitly stressing a Baluba character. Some provinces classifiable as ethnically homogeneous have experienced some of the most serious tribal disorders-in recent months. For example, Kwango is essentially a Bayaka tribal province, ‘but grave disturbances have been created by the dissidence of a Bayaka sub-group, the Bapelende. Even more costly has been the strife in Sankuru, where, viewed externally, only Batetela are visible. However, there are two kinds of Batetela: those who experienced acculturative contacts with the Zanzibar Arab traders at the end of the nineteenth century, and-those who did not. The former, enlisted as marauding warrior bands by the Arabs, were shrewd enough to pick a winner and joined the Belgians in their war against the Arabs, As a reward, they were given land and posted in strong points throughout the Sankuru region, where they subjugated their brethren. Provincial Diamasumbu -reopened the issue recently by an appeal to the "downtrodden" to rise against their Narabisé!! oppressors, led by Abbé Athanase Ndjadi, The’ result was tribal war, involving a large number of deaths and the destruction of a sizeable part of the capital city of Lodja.- 15 ' Unité Kasaienne, _overlap, ‘cite. only the more Only seven of the new provinces seek to invoke ‘ethnic loyalty as a fundamental ethos. YQ At the other extreme are Haut Congo, Kivu Central, and’ Katanga Oriental, which became provinces after being deserted by neighboring areas and will ‘have a difficult time developing a sense of common purpose. Another hypothesis occasionally advanced to explain the new provinces is-‘that they are one-party provinces, It is true that in 15 of the 21 there isa single dominant party. A major qualification: to this is that in four of the new provinces (Haut Congo, Uélé; Kibali- Ituri, and Sankuru) MNC/L is the single party. Here one could argue that, rather than the ‘parties shaping the provinces, the provinces have consecrated the disintegration of a once ‘potent and supra-ethnic party. In Uélé, for ‘example, MNC/L is virtually excluded from the government. : In four of the other ''one- -party provinces," the parties were poorly organized and had only a fleeting existence (Kwango, Moyen Congo, and Lomami). In six, the parties were an expression of a strong sense ‘of ethnic identity (Kongo‘Central, Sud-Kasai, Kasai Central, Lomami). Kwango, Moyen Congo, and ‘Ethnic and political party criteria however, and it is difficult even in analytical terms to disentangle them. Pre-existing administrative divisions helped to shape the new provinces, In only one’case (Lomami) has a new province beenestablished which straddles the old provincial boundaries, Although provincial’ boundaries ‘underwent major revision in 1933, they had remained stable since that time, whereas districts and territories had been constantly in flux.NIntra- provincial migration was not encouraged; the provincial capital served as the primary pole of attraction for the young, the educated, and the ambitious. The former district boundaries in. 17 cases have served as guideposts for establishing the new provinces, although in most cases with some adjustments. It may be suggested that the former administrative ‘units. serve as starting points for the frag- ‘mentation process, If there were strong ethnic or political. reasons ‘to redraw the lines, this was done, Otherwise, inertia favored retention ‘of the familiar frame of reference. Although in some _ instances colonial provincial boundaries coincided with. ethnic frontiers, in many others they did not. To important, the Mongo people were divided among five provinces 12. Kongo Central, Bakongo tribe; Kwango, Bayaka tribe; Cuvette Centrale, Mongo tribe; Moyen Congo, ‘‘Bangala’’-Ngombe tribe; Lomami, . Basongye tribe; Sud-Kasai, Baluba tribe; and Kasai Central, Lulua tribe. 13, The administrative hierarchy is structured -as follows (in descend- ing order): province, district, territory, sector (circonsription indigéne), village. ‘ SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 24
HW 49061 ) with varied success, _ units DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DiSSEM (all but Katanga). The closely related Batetela and Bakusu were split between Kivu and Kasai. The Bapende were divided between Kasai and Leopoldville. ‘The Basongye were split between Kasai, Kivu, and Katanga; only they have suceeded in regrouping in a new province {Lomami). - Traditional structures are to some degree significant in 11 provinces. In Kwango; the Kiamfu; a local tribal leader, is clearly the dominant political force. His 40 sons provide him with ample manpower to infiltrate key administrative positions, and the weakness of modern development in the region leaves him little competition. In Uélé, 4 of the 11 min- isters, beginning with President Mambaya, belong to the Azande ruling clan, the Avungara, The provincial government relies heavily on — the strong authority of the Azande chiefs. One of them; the Minister of Agriculture, has no fewer than 16 relatives in the Uéle Assembly. In Kasai Central; 3 of 11 ministers are members of the family of the scheming and ambitious self-appointed Lulua paramount chief, Sylvestre Mangole Kalamba. Provincial President Francois Lwakabwanga was form- erly Kalamba's personal secretary. And in Kivu Central; the key obstacle tothe formation of a government was the complex set of hostilities deriving from the traditional hos- tility between the two ruling houses of the Bashi (the Kabare and Ngweshi clans), com- pounded by a dispute over the selection of the Kabare Mwami (King). Provincial Administration The new provinces have begun operation The official installation of the new institutions started in September 1962. Four (Ué1é, Kongo Central, Kwilu, and Cuvette Centrale) can be considered function- ing very well. Ubangi, Kibali-Ituri, Nord- Katanga, Sud-Kasai, and Lomami have rea- sonably operative governments. The most unstable are Sud Congo (Lualaba), Lac Leo- pold II, Kivu Central, Kasai. Central, Haut Congo, Katanga Oriental, and Sankuru Maniema, Unité Kasaienne, and Kwango function very poorly. - Possibilities for Further Fragmentation Two critical problems remain for the new provinces; the festering issue of territories disputed between two or more provinces is entirely unsolved, and several of the present show signs of further fragmentation (see map). The problem of the territories was to be settled by referendum. However, no referendum has ‘been organized to date, and none is.scheduled in the near future. In one instance, Goma and Ruthshuru territories (disputed by Kivu Central and Nord-Kivu), 16 Parliament tried. to settle the “dispute by : awarding the territories to Kivu Central, How- ever, this procedure has caused more prob- lems than it solved, | The disputed territories are administered directly by the central government, There have been numerous complaints about the perpetuation of this interregnum. On the other hand, since these are, by and large, marginal zones with diverse populations; the referenda are likely to be bitterly fought, Especially when the issue is attachmient to an ethriic province, the fears of small groups that they would be accorded subordinate status are unfortunately justified. It may well be- that the best solution for some of the more hopelessly divided transitional zones woiild be indefinite prolongation of the present central administration. Some way might be found to formalize the arrangement, so that the wounds of civil strife may heal. In some instances, provinces have simply dispatched their police forces to conquer disputed areas. This has happened in Bolobo, now occupied by Maindombe police after a sharp engagement with Moyen Congo. forces, and in the Kasongo area, now in the hands of Lomami, to the great indignation of Maniema. The dimensions of the problem cari be seen by the length of the list of disputed areas: Zones Legaliy Subject to Referendum Former Province Regions contested Provinces claiming territory ——_—_——_—— ieee ec eee Eee Leopoldville Kimvula sector Kongo Central-Kwango , . (Popokabaka . . territory) | : Equateur Banzyville Ubangi-Muyen Congo Ortentale Watsa Udid-~Kibali-Iturd Faradje ué1d--Kibald -Ituri Kivu Goma, Kivu Central--Nord-Kivu Rutahuru Kivu Central--Nord-Kivu , Shabunda Kivu Central-Mainema Kivu Central-Mainema--Nord . Katanga Katanga Basongye regions Lomami-~-Nord-Katanga of Kongolo, Kabdalo, Kabongo Kasai Musunba group (Kasei Diatrict) Didaya Mwene-Ditu | Lusambo town Tshishilu sector | (Dibaya territory) Other areas subject to dispute: . Unité Kasaienne-Sankuru Unite! Kasaienne-Kasai Central: Kasai Central--Sud-Kasai-- Nord-Katanga Lomami--Sankuru Kasai Central-Unite’ Kasaienne Kango Central -Leopoldville Leopoldville Leopoldville subur- ban zone Federal District parts of Kutu, . Kwilu-Lac Leopold II Panningville ter- . yee ritories Bolobo Tac Leopold II-Moyen Congo Equateur — parts of Bongandanga, Moyen Congo-Cuvette Centrale Basankusu terri- tories : Katanga Baudoinville Nord-Katanga--Katanga Oriental Lubudi, Mitwaba Nord-Katanga--Kdtanga territories Oriental Kasai Dimbelenge Lomami-Kasai Central parts of Mveka , territories Unite Kasaienne-Kasal Central SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 25
ar. HW 49061 DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM The following provinces appear far from Stable in their present form and may well break up, or perhaps regroup with another province:. . 1) Maindombe: Nearly half the provincial councilors, led by Jacques Massa, are in "exile' in Leopoldville. The split is primarily regional, with the opposition dominating Mushie, Kutu, and Inongo, while provincial President Victor Koumorico's bloc is strongest in the east and south, in Kiri and Oshwe territories, 2) Moyen Congo: The Budja-inhabited ter- ritory of Bumba is thoroughly hostile to the capital of Lisala. Bumba has demanded a new province. A more remote possibility might be a Budja union with Haut-Congo. 3) Uélé: The Babua tribe in Aketi and Buta territories are unrepresented inthe provincial government, A secession plot might be mounted | by such Babua leaders as Christophe Gbenye or Egide Bocheley- Davidson, who are certain to be frozen out if new elections are organized under the aegis of the present Uélé government, 4) Kibali-Ituri: There is some disposition to rally to Uélé. The incumbent president, Manzikala, is strongly opposed to this, and it is unlikely to happen as long as he retains leadership. 5) Nord-Kivu: This province is lacking any town which could serve as a capital, unless it obtains Goma. There is some hope in Bukavu that Nord-Kivu will eventually agree to re- unification. 6) Kivu Central: The Warega areas in the south are still by no means committed to this province. 7) Mainema: The present government is a highly uneasy coalition of the two dominant ethnic groups, Bakusu and Warega. Presi- dent Kisanga is a Murega, and Vice Presi- dent Bulakimuri a Mukusu. A break-up of this province, with the Bakusu areas joining Sankuru, and the Warega portions uniting with the Warega of Kivu Central to form a new province, is a distinct possibility. 8) Nord-Katanga: In early 1963, immedi- ately after the end of the Katanga secession, there was some sentiment for a reunification of the old Katanga province. Balubakat leaders in lLeopoldville, especially Jason Sendwe, tended to support this. However, important elements in Nord-Katanga vigorously oppose the move, and the splitting of South Katanga into two provinces would seem to complicate future. reunification efforts. 9) Unité Kasaienne: This. province includes a diverse collection of ethnic groups united only by their common hostility to both Baluba and Lulua. The government is weak and cor- rupt, but does not appear to face any im- mediate challenges. 10) Kwango: Although there is ethnic homo- geneity and a strong. traditional system, this. 17 region is the poorest of the Congo. It is almost without economic resources, Some observers feel that the province may collapse eventually because of its poverty. The pious hope is occasionally expressed that the new provinces experiment is already shown to be such a catastrophe that a move- ment toward reconstitution of the old entities will shortly emerge. It is also suggested that this might. be encouraged by grouping certain common services in the old provincial cap- itals, This hope appears, on reflection, for- lorn. There is absolutely no sentiment in any of the provinces for reunification, with the exceptions noted above. Such wishful think- ing especially is encountered in the old prov- incial capitals, which have seen their horizons abruptly narrowed. Nostalgia for the good old days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was found in Vienna, not Budapest. The old prov- incial services have already been dismantled to the extent physically possible, In such fields as communications, where dependence on the old capitals continues, a major objective of the new provinces is to terminate the existing arrangements at the earliest possible moment. A Mixed Blessing? The cost of creating new provinces has been considerable, The procedures and records of the colonial administration have been rendered largely worthless. About 150 new ministers and their parasitic entourages of friends and relatives in the ministerial cab- inets'' are lined up at the pay window each month. There is obviously no increased out- put to justify this outrageous charge upon the treasury. Yet it appears that there are important reasons to welcome the change, which now seems irreversible, Before it transpired, five of the six old provinces had ceased functioning, The Bakongo refused to sit with the rest in Leopoldville. The Mongo were determined not to cooperate further with the Ngombe in Equateur. Kivu was at an impasse. Katanga and Kasai had split apart with hos- tilities costing thousands of lives and the relocation of several hundred thousand per- sons. Therefore, the alternative of retaining the old provinces was not really open, We would endorse the conclusions of a Lovanium University delegation of economists and political scientists which toured most of the new provinces early in 1963, They cite as common advantages of the new provinces: 1) a provincial assembly more representa- tive of public opinion; 2) frequently, a government of technicians which is better aware of the situation in the province; 3) a regional pride to defend; 4) a more limited area; SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 26
HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM 5) imperfect, yet better, ethnic cohesion, It is worth stressing that in many areas the new institutions function quite well indeed, with virtually no European technical assist- ance. Very real benefits in acquisition of 18 political and administrative skills areacc ruing in these regions, A great contribution could be made to the Congo in providing technical assistance to those provinces which have clearly passed the "takeoff'! point, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 3276276338 Page 2?7
HW 49061 DoclId: 326276336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM V. THE BUREAUCRACY The colonial state is the prototype of a bureaucratic system, And Belgian adminis- tration was perhaps the most thoroughly bu- reaucratic of all colonial systems. The bu- reaucracy was almost untrammeled in its exercise of power by any consultative or semi-representative bodies, either in the colony or in the metropole. In short, there were no politics other thanadministration, With system and purpose, the colonial bu- reaucracy penetrated and organized Congolese society. It created an elite in its own image, whose access to the modern world was through the subaltern ranks of the administration. In a profound way, it established the values, the standards of judgment, and the style of the Congo's leadership. . ; In any political system, the technical capac- ity to transmit and execute a decision is a determinant of the efficacy of government. For these reasons, we examine the nature of the Congolese civil service, African Exclusion from the Colonial Civil Service The Belgian colonial service differed from its British and French counterparts in the absolute exclusion of Congolese from all the top echelons, until the adoption January 13, 1959, of a statut unique. Until then there were two official barriers to Congolese: 1) Entry into the civil service was limited to citizens of Belgium (and Luxemburg), Congolese were held by most judicial hair- splitters to be 'subjects,'' but not citizens," 2) After World War II a university degree was a prerequisite, Since the first Congolese to hold a degree was Thomas Kanza, who graduated from Louvain in 1956 (and still was not admitted to the civilservice), the exclusion was complete, A specialauxiliary civil service was organized to staff the clerical ranks; this was entirely African, Friction with the Africans first developed at the bottom grade of the European service, which included non-university personnel. Be- ginning in 1953 a certain number of Congolese would have qualified for this rank, but the administration held that a complete reform of the civil service was "under study,'' and continued to deny access to Africans, Entry on equal terms to the civil service was of crucial importance to the Congolese elite. Through 1958 it was probably their greatest single grievance, Significantly, it was not until after the Leopoldville riots of 1959 that the statut unique made its appearance, 19 “service, The Statut Unique The provisions of the statut_unique are the root cause of the present outrageous salary scales for the civil service, The familiar colonial conundrum was posed: to attract able European talent, relatively high - pay scales were necessary, But African opinion vehemently rejected any salary differential between European and African performing the same work. An initial effort was made to write in an 'expatriation bonus" for European civil servants, but this foundered on the problem of the few Europeans recruited in the Congo itself, who considered themselves permanent residents of the Congo and thus would not have qualified for the bonus, At this time, Belgian policy postulated a Eurafrican future for the Congo, It was assumed that for a long period—even after independence--Bel- gians would play an important role both in administrative and representative bodies at all echelons, Accordingly, even this limited number of Europeans were an important.con- cern for the colonial policy-maker, ‘ The final solution, embodied in the statut unique, involved simply pasting together the two civil service structures. There were seven ranks. The top three were to remain virtually exclusively European for the im- mediate future; the fourth category would be the point of fusion between the two systems; and the bottom three were the African grades, The high European pay scales were to be applied to the few Africans who entered at the top. The traditional low scale’ would continue to apply at the bottom, as illustrated by the following table: COMPOSITION OF CIVIL SERVICE AND PAY SCALE, 1960 Rank European African Pay scale (annual) "(Belgian Congo francs) 1 106 0 Over 440,000 2 1,004 1 325,000-440,000 3 3,532 2 225,000-325,000 4 5,159 800 90,000-225,000 5 . 73,250-90,000 6 0 11,000 45,000-73,250 7 Less than 45,000 The Effects of Independence The months immediately before independ- ence Saw grave tensions within the civil On the African side, there was radical discontent among the clerks over the SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 275
HW 49061 DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM decolonization formula agreed upon at the Brussels Round Table. This, in sum, pro- vided for a completely Africanized political direction for the country, while the adminis- . tration was toremainalmost entirely European at the top levels. A "revolt of the clerks" was brewing, and had the ANC not first mutinied; a serious breakdown would have been likely within the administration, Insecurity grew apace on the European side, There were demonstrations and strike threats, which Belgium tried to allay inMarch 1960 by.a-law guaranteeing integration into the metropolitan service for any agent unable to continue his career in Africa. In the panic days of July 1960 the Belgian Ambassador announced a blanket extension of these pro- visions to all Belgian civil servants except those. in Katanga. terror, ensured the massive departure of nearly all the European functionaries, Africa's most .radical decolonization plan was thus ‘compounded by revolutionary Africanization of the civil service. Initially the result was administrative chaos, In the territories the general tendency was for the senior clerk to fill the shoes of the departing Belgian, provided he was not ethni- cally or politically incompatible, But in the central and provincial ministries the dis- organization was massive. The Lumumba gov- ernment never really functioned. There was a large-scale influx of persons into the civil service on the basis of ethnic and political criteria, : It is difficult not to underestimate the enormous pressures placed upon the newly installed ministers. Each of them was con- fronted with a virtual army of political and éthnic clients camped on his doorstep, who expected, a concrete reward for their support. The minister was unprotected by any estab- lished, operative administrative regulations to escape these claims. Neither law nor party existed at that time to provide a dis- cipline permitting rational solutions. Violence and intimidation were in the air, and it took a rare, brave minister to avoid substantial concessions--even in’ those cases where he understood that these were wrong. It was not until the installation of the College of Com- missioners in September 1960 that administra- tive disorder began tocome under control. In legal terms, the new promotions were initially on the basis of "encommissionment" rather than formal ''nomination,'' This was to avoid giving an. employee permanent rank above the civil service grade he previously held, pending a complete overhaul of the regu- lations, The spectacular promotions therefore did not immediately yield financial benefits, It was not until the enactment of Ordinance 33 of April 21, 1961, that concessions were made - to confirm the material advantages expected This, in the context of_ 20 . the _of expenditures, by the civil servants, Under international pressures even this was not immediately applied. Moreover, the central government was “sparing in the number of permanent nomi- nations made to the top two grades. Inflation of the Civil Service Pay Scale. ’ A new civil service law was finally promul- gated in July 1963, The distorted salary scale has ‘been definitively corrected by aligning the bottom with the top. The upper levels received emoluments higher than those -paid to Belgian functionaries before independence, and injustices within the public pay scale were reduced by giving enormous boosts at lower ranks. In mid-1962 there were approximately 15,000 functionaries ''sous statut'' (not including Katanga). In addition there were: 2,000 "political personnel" (par- lementarians, ministerial cabinets), approx- imately 45,000 teachers, about 35,000 soldiers, 10,000 police, and the mass of workers em- ployed by the government in various menial . capacities (100,000-300,000), All government salaries in the last analysis have been scaled .upon the excessively high civil service salaries, The resultisa situation where public receipts cover perhaps one-third and salaries. account for nearly 90 per cent of all government expendi- tures, Unfortunately this exorbitant privilege lies with those who have significant power within the political system--politicans, functionaries, teachers, soldiers, and police- men. An austerity program in this context is not a matter of imposing sacrifice upon the society as a whole; the ruling group - must penalize itself. Disaffection of the University Graduates Another major area of difficulty in the structure of the civil service is the failure to provide adequate opportunities for absorbing the new generation of university graduates shortly to emerge in relatively large numbers, Under the new statute, access to the top category and the upper half of the second rank is open only to those’ who had received an efficiency rating of ''very good' for three successive years prior to 1960, This was un- mistakably directed against the university graduates, who were thus disqualified entirely. An older group, which had no higher edu- cational facilities in its youth and which cites long experience, albeit in subaltern posts, and the wisdom of age, conflicts with the younger generation emerging from the universities of Europe and Africa, This tension js found in most new African states, and the Congo's problem differs only in degree. The workings of history and Belgian policy have made the contrast between generations par- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 29
HW 49061 Docld: 32676338 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM ticularly sharp, Only Minister of Justice Justin Bomboko and Foreign Minister Auguste Mabita-Kalanda, among the present top leader- _ship, hold university degrees, The flavor of the mutualantagonisms between the clerks and students is captured in the two statements briefly quoted below; the former from. an Abako journal, and the latter from a Manifeste des universitaires congolaises (written by Mabita-Kalanda) publishedin 1961: Even in the Abako, we have no knowl- edge of a single university student who has accepted to serve even as ‘secretary | for the movement, They belittle our work and consider us as primitive.... We have done everything ourselves, and therefore, we must not be forgotten.... We have won our independence with our little bit of French, we will govern the country with this same little bit of French.... We have learned by experience, which the university students are incapable of doing. Consequently, we intend to occupy all the positions and we will make good use of our experience, It has often been said that the Congo lacks trained persons, Yet we see none- theless that the Congolese university graduates are kept away from political responsibilities, If one or the other has been given some responsibility, it was in most cases by a politician from his tribe, in function ofa short-sighted policy, It has often been said: university grad- uates are theoreticians, they have no experience, One thing, however, is clear, and that is that in.the matter of experi- ence, at least concerning the problem of the modern world, no Congolese has very much in the political, administrative, or military field. The experience of the majority of the present leaders is limited to having been clerks, soldiers, or teachers. We don't know any Congolese who has had a long experience in the art of commanding, of conceiving or of super- vising a task of great scope. The university graduates obviously tend to overrate their own immediate value to the society. James Coleman has perceptively ob- served the "uncritical equating of education with special rights and legitimacy!’ by the African elite, which views Western education as a grace-giving process. ''Politics,'' he adds, "have been permeated with the pre- sumably incontestable assumption that the educated have a divine right to rule."14 ~ But the present utilization of university graduates makes neither administrative nor - political sense, The relatively modest post 14. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, Politics of the Develop- ing Areas, 1960, pp. 282-283. a1 _entered the civil service. It is of assistant bureau chief is not satisfactory to the graduate; only a handful have in fact ironic that nearly all members _ of the Congo's oversized ambassadorial corps are university grad- uates, hardly a rational employment of an extremely scarce resource./5There is a sharp sense of grievance on the part of the growing group of university graduates, which: can become dangerous for the existing order. The Organization and Effectiveness of the Civil Service The civil service may be examined at two levels: 1) central and provincial. ministries, and 2) the territorial service. The central and provincial ministries. To begin with positive aspects, the Congolese civil service is much better than generally believed. Not that its performance any absolute sense, Most readers, however, are likely to presume chaotic incompetence. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that the general level of administrative ability in the Congo is not sharply below the African norm, This is faint but necessary praise, Moreover, the caliber of members of the central administration in the Congo stands out in relation to other elements governmental process, They are far superior .to members of political parties or repre- sentative assemblies, Although the top civil servants are exercising functions far beyond those for which they were trained, they gen- erally have behind them long years of service in the Belgian administration. Many have reasonable norms of bureaucratic rectitude and discipline, and know what constitute reasonable criteria of satisfactory performance, if they do not always have the capacity to achieve it. A modern bureaucracy provides to a transitional society invaluable experience in the exercise of responsibility in a setting where rational (in a Western sense) standards of behavior exist, It is precisely these norms of conduct which are lacking in the Congo's political sector. There are, of course, many shortcomings of the civil service. The most significant are examined below: | 1) The exigencies of ministeriai inflation have created serious duplication and juris- dictional conflict, especially at the central level, The workings of Parliament are such that apparently no government can win a vote of confidence without having a cabinet numbering, at a minimum, .20 ministers. Under the colonial administration there were 15, For example, Mario Cardoso in Washington, Theodore Idzumbuir at the UN, Thomas Kanza in. London, Andre Mandi'in Rome, Paul Mushiete in Paris, and Joseph Mbeka at the Common Market are all among the small group of university graduates. SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 30 is outstanding in’ in the. s
HW 49061 ' change), DoclId: 32626336 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM 11 major departments, These have been broken into a maximum of 25 ministries, Atthe present time, there are 20. In the field of economic affairs a continuing jurisdictional dispute is waged among the. overlapping Ministers of a) Finance, b) NationalEconomy,andc) Plan- ning and Industrial Development. There is, in addition, a Vice Premier for Economic Co- ordination, an important organ attached to the Prime Minister's office, In the field of social policy, a Vice Premier operates alongside Ministers’ of a) Labor and Social Welfare, b) Social Affairs, and c) Youth and Sport. Overlapping is less serious at the provincial level, where the Loi Fondamentale restricts the number of ministers to 10. 2) The Congo has imported the harmful continental practice of "political cabinets" for ministers, Provincial and central gov- “ernment ministers are entitled to a personal cabinet of 13 persons. These cabinets are supposed to offer ''political'' advice, as op- posed to the administrative recommendations emanating from the civil service. The auth- orized annual salary total for one ministerial cabinet (there are approximately 250 minis- ters in the Congo, each of whom could have his own cabinet) is 2,705,600 Congo francs (about US$43,000 at the official rate of ex- The Congo would no doubt profit’ if this hungry horde of camp followers simply drew salaries and never came to the office. As there are no legal minimum requirements for employment in this capacity, the quality of most is particularly low, and their nuisance value to the regular civil service high, 3) Related to (2) is the fact that relations - between the ministers and the civil service are often poor, Venerable functionaries have inherited the "apolitical: mores of the colonial ‘administration and tend to resent the "upstart" politician who was catapulted via the 1960 elections to a command position, 4) Even the most highly educated ministers tend to pad the civil service rosters of their ministries with ethnic followers, A striking example is the Foreign Ministry, which from the outset has been headed by a university graduate. Former Foreign Minister Bomboko, whatever his political merits, systematically created for himself a solidly Mongo tribal ambiance for his working environment, We were told by a young Muluba subaltern, freshly installed at the ministry under the new min- ister, Mabita-Kalanda, that fellow Baluba tribesmen have descended like locusts, while the unhappy Mongo are out on the streets, "Clest comme ga dans la démocratie," he observed with a philosophic chuckle. 5) Good will and long clerical experience are not enough in the more highly technical functions, Air traffic control is a case in point, Visitors travelling by air would do well to arrive via Brazzaville should the UN with- 22 draw. its personnel from the Leopoldville air- port control towers in the near future. The whole area of public finance is another example. Foreign technicians are indispensable inthese departments, The whole judicial structure similarly cannot operate without a minimum number of trained magistrates, 6) Areas of administration involving large sums of private or public money are particu- larly prone to corrupting influences. The im- port licensing system, for example, is vulner- able, Anything which touches the diamondtrade from near or far is likewise susceptible. 7) The inability of the Congolese Government to assure regular payment toits functionaries, especially at provincial and local levels, is an open the Congo as elsewhere, those with adminis- trative power usually can find a way to assure themselves of what they feel to be their due-- and corruption has a narcotic effect. 8) Finally, central and provincial adminis- trations often lack the technical means of effectively communicating instructions and information to subordinates in the field, The territorial service, The territorial service differs importantly from the central administration, These local echelons are in much more intimate contact with the popula- tion, especially in the rural areas, Because he is face-to-face with the people, the ter- ritorial administrator, unlike most other civil servants, is under close scrutiny. Possibilities for corruption are accordingly fewer. The territory, averaging roughly 7,000 square miles and 100,000 inhabitants, was the lowest echelon of European administration in the colonial period, Below approximately 125 territories lay approximately 1,000 circon- scriptions indigénes (native authorities) headed by traditional (or appointed) Congolese chiefs, Thus the territory was and remains a crucial administrative level, Many of the major deci- sions affecting the lives of the mass of the population are taken or, at least, implemented at this level, In our view, based on observation of a large number of these local seats of gov- ernment, the administrative performance in the territories is superior to that at provincial and central levels, The territorial seat today is usually a small, dusty town of perhaps 5,000 inhabitants, lacking the amenities found in Leopoldville or Elisabethville, In a real sense, the local administrators share the life of the population at large, even if they do occupy the large, pleasant houses left behind by their European predecessors, In the immediate wake of independence a tendency appeared in several parts of the country toward political appointments to ter- ritorial administrative posts, Well-organized parties such as MNC/L, PSA, and Abako recognized thé critical importance of the SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 31 invitation to corrupt behavior, In Fal