476-10037-10494 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10494 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : CIA FROM : TO: TITLE : Information Report Re: Strategic Hamlets DATE : 2/20/1962 ; PAGES : 5 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 2/62, Box 195. Box 8. r
- oi — Ue 69 pewaraes an TIN, r LSE MATION. REPORT | Tia CRANE : | ee CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Hwee hed cad Th is materlal éonfains - inforatton attecting tho: National . Betonse ‘of the - United States within. the meaning of the Espionage Lows, . Title 10,°U.S.C: Secs.. os 793 end. 794, the: fransmission or revelation of which: In: any. manner te- en: -unouthorized -perion-is prohibited be law. . fd et . . TGASSIRICATION — ~ DISSEMINATION CONTROLS . Pe C-OcNeF-T-D-BOTASL NOFORN /CONTINUED » Oc SOUNTRY ROUTE VIETNAM Oe — Dy rs EREPORT NO, Tos 737500553 UBJECT” STRATEGIC diwanees : a i . | pare piste. 20 FEBRUARY 1962 _ a . oe ae - a | "PRECEDENCE ROUTINE o CVE SATEOR MID-FEBRUARY. 1962 Oe, | IELD NO. FVS~-7075 “IN 30 3 : ; ACE A . VESINAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1962) . : ~ RET AIN OR 0 BESTOW PHA : ‘I Is PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU'S VIEWS ARE AS EXPRESSED, AND THAT LUONG . THIS 1S UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL C OF CONTENT 1s TENTATIVE. | SOURCE - a 7 i... NGO DINE Na, BROTHER AN POLITICAL ‘ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINE ‘DIEM, | ‘STATED ON 1k FEBRUARY 1962 THAT THE STRATEGIC EAMLSTS' ‘PROGRAM WOULD, BE, MORE ” AN ‘A METHOD OF ‘AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR THE POPULATION OF VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE A “BASIC SURAMBOY FOR THE DEVELORMRNT OF VIETUN. “HE STATED THAT A CoyMéout.COMPLAINE “tiv VIBmUM WAS SHE WEAKNESS OF TS CADRES, WHO FAILED TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT'S * REVOLUTIONARY, PROGRAM To REALITY. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS "oniay paRaALY RUE, AS THE OTHER ASPEGT. HAD HOW THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE TO a . fe "OPERATE IN THR COmMEZOH OF INSECURTTY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS: NECESSARY. | © Fon ay cova 8 CATEZE THR SIHCATICN THA TRE CADRE COULD Bi PLACED . INTHE AREA OP HIS. WORK AND, AFFORIED THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES "FoR THE WORK, ‘THE ‘SmRATEGIO HAMLETS" PROGRAM WOULD! PROVIDE BOTH OF THESE. ree . ‘ i CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS . ae | CoO PE-D-RE-ToAch ep NOPORN/CONTINUED CONTROL - eee ee ADDED OA
', CLASSIFICATION -_ DISSEMINATION CONTROLS OO-N-FHT-D-BONAEAIAA-L. __ NOFORN /commemnD CONTROL ” ep THE PROGEUM AS PLANNED, BY. NER HAD THREE MAIN. ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE _ ID. PARTICULARLY APPROPRLATE FOR. yom. oe A. ‘Ir WAS ‘FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, , RESTING | UPON THE BASIC UNIT OF . - VEBINAMESE SOCIETY. “US IT CAPITALIZED D UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THE | | Be THE, SECOND ASFECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZE : _ VIETNAMESE ‘LIFE. NEU STATED THAT IT WAS. LESS: A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARD OF “LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MOLE oF LIVING. HE SAID THAT IF ATTENTION WAS "GIVEN TO INSERTING NEW NOTES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANT’ S EXISTENCE, ir | | WOUED INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN Hts ORIENTATION. NEU COMPARED > ; THR RESULT OF THE ‘INSERTION OF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, BIC., “ENTO 3 “LIFE.OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED communist . ; ‘INFLUENCE. OVER HIS CLASS. AS A RESULT, NHU SAID, MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES Z » WERE LESS INTELLIGENT my ‘THEIR APPROACH, "AS {THEY ADVOCATED MODERNIZATION OF oe “ASIAN LIFE. WITHOUT: REALIZING THAT ‘IT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGAN- Lo Ta AR TONAL. POWER. “Na ‘svateD SHAT A STUDY OF STRPS APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM ALONg oS. fg EINE. SHOULD on ‘MALE’ “AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT ‘TEVOIED To INSERTING THESE NEW. | yous | OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. :. AS, AN EXAMPLE, HE CLIED THE! EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTING | os y BICYCLES WITH MroRcuoTORS, THUS MAKING THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODE a Ft LIFE. HR. STRATEGIC maT, EB REITERATED, “WOULD AFFORD "THE NECESSARY aes = + FROBBOELON J AN zocor Baa RR. BUCH A ‘MODERNIZATION ‘PROGRAM. sone! “ “ weet co eT ae i ELASSIFIEATION — ‘DISSEMINATION CONTROLS C00N-FAI-D-B-H-D-T-M-L. no Ess. ‘HORORL/COMETNUED © CONTROL ar errs
SLASSIFICATION ~— DISSEMINATION CONTIOLS O-OCN-P-T-D-EAUABAT-A+L ~-NOFORN/COMTTIED CONTROL TDCS.-3/502, 5.53 Ce te ‘THIRD ELEMENT, ‘NEU Sarp, WOULD BE DEMOCRATIZATION. - HE perme Ht as THE ‘APPLICATION. OF AW AND ORDER TO RURAL LIFE. HE STATED ‘THAT - ar PRESENT THE PBASAMIS WERE EXPOSED. 70 TLLEGALITY BY THE VIETNAMESE: COMMUNISTS “AND BY. GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (cv) ‘ELEMENTS , BOTH MILITARY ‘AND CIVIL. THIS WAS - IN PART A RESULT OF mE DISPERSION OF’ THE POPULATION AND its INABILITY TO ASSUME: : ITs OWN GOVERNANCE .” AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET, NHU SAID THE | POPULATION SHOUD HE ASSURED EAT THE HAE WOULD HE CUARAMEEED THE PULL ee APPLICATION OF. Lan BY TIS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS’ MOVING Iv TOWARD A SYSTEM OF “DEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE 70 THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, It WOULD HAVE LITILE OR . on " NOREEING 70 Do'WIIH. CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD , “BROUGHT Our IN A RECENT TALK TO Gv: ‘OFFICIALS THAT ONE COULD CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT. IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION. IN THE 7 | COUNTRYSIIE; BUT THAT ‘THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULD . ce DEFINITELY | AFFECT ‘THE DEMOCRATIZATION. OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHED = ‘THE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC. BAMLED WOULD ALSO, ACCORDING 10 NHU, _ AFFORD. | = A: BASIS "FoR ‘THE BUILDING : OF INSTITUTIONS IN VISTNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY, aot Gey, COOPERATIVES, | MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, WOMENS" MOVEMENTS, YOUTH. a fe 3. NEU STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS" CONCEPTS WITH ae GROUP OF GovERIENE OFFICIALS RECENTLY, ‘AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL 2 ‘POINE TO ‘THEM. Gram COMMENT. -FVB- 7034, mDCs- 3/501,110 GAVE AN. “ACCOUNT, FROM | ATARLY RELIAELS SORE, OF NHU'S REMARKS AP THE MEETING. ) HE STATKD THAT BE SMe SRST HIATON CONTROLS . | COeN-P-T-DABAND-TAL CT _ NOFCRH/CONFINUED, CONTROL a
- CLASSIFICATION <= DISSEMINATION CONTROLS  C-0-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L ©. NGFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL - a WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH. DISCONTENT AMONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE . Goverment, waren, HE SAID, STEMMED FROM THE COVERIMENT'S APPROACH TO THE JOB. ; * any LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED ‘A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST 10 His NEXT HIGHER AUS —_ : THORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENIED IF THE ASSISTANGE WAS INADEQUATE. | THE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM 7 : . : THE MINISTRY, AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. ‘THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF THE "PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED “AT INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, HE | — PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE. REQUESTS OF mE AMERICANS AND BE DISCONTENTED WITH THE ‘AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. NHU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS fs INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE ‘UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S -.° "PROBLEMS. HE STATED-TRAT IT WAS NECESSARY [0 DEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE : ~ yneINANSE PEOPLE SO ‘THAT ‘THEY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE ‘AS WAS GIVEN THEM, BUT NOT ATTEMPTING “0 SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE ‘PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THE “STRATEGIC HAMLET WAS THE way TO INTRODUCE (THE PROCESS ‘OF BEGINNING MATURITY “06 THE VIETNAMESE ‘PEOPLE AND THE GOVERMENT. NEU SAID "THAT THE ‘QFRICIALS WERE, 7 MUCH ‘AMUSED AD THE DESCRIPTION oF THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY. IN HIS STATEMENT OF . HOW TO OVERCOME IT. “HE ‘SATD, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO "51 (KREP REPEATING THE LESSON, AS’ OTHERWISE THE OLD HABITS OF IEPENDENCE UPON POWERS ‘ABOVE’ WOULD: RETURN AND THE WHOLE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCONTENT WOULD START — _ : UNSSIFIGATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLS © 0A0nN-P-I-D-E-NRS EAL ne “NOFORN/CONTENURD CONTROL .
CLASTIFIEATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS C-O-N-P-L-D-B-U-T-T-A-L ne HOFORN/CONELIUED CONTROL | toes -3/502,553 o ra MINISTER OF. INTERIOR BUL vAN | BUONO, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION On 13 "FEBRUARY, STATED (THAT NEU. HAD. GIVgN “INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS" | _——FRoKiutt He COMUCEED CER THE FULL ComROL CF ORE YEW THTEYCITSOEREAL, “camatsszon. HE sarD ‘THAT NaU HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT. THE GOVERNMENT DID “Nor WISH A ‘REPETITION OF THE ERRORS: MADE IN THE INETLATION OF THE AGROVILLE = " PROGRAM. NEU EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT | a ‘ID ‘WAS EBING ASKED ‘0 DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, FOR INSTANCE, - thar THE POPULATION BE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY. AND NOT BE _ REQUIRED TO WORK oN DISTANT AREAS. he ALSO STATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS | = ARPAG. PACAP. “ERE INSTRUCTED NOT 10 LAUNCH OFF IN: ALLDIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS ACCORDING TO ‘THEIR OWN IIBAS, BUT 0 FOLLOW "HE PROGRAM AND PAPTERN TO BE | ESTABLISHED, BY THE STRAINGIC HAMLETS’ COMETTES. | a 5. FIBLD DISSIM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID .CINCPAC PACFLD . x _ CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS  GLO-NoP-<T-D-B-N-T-T-A-L = 9° © NOFORN/CONFINUED CONTROL