~_™ 9 canueary 15 MSMORANOUM OF CONVERSATICN . SUBIECT -2 Meeting with Dr. Nsxeel "“anolo” BaF Ll. Prior to departing fron Washington on ] canzery 1961, 1 was instructed by Tracy Barnes to contact Dr. EAT in Miami, = was instructed to assure RAY: - 3 . : re A, Thet "we" perscnally hold him An BSgh veperd ant that while "we" are not backing - any individual ox group in the political sense. we So-hzve syrpathr with his program and his ains. : B, That "we" are prepared to render } hie whietever neterial assistance he neads and can feasitiy use. That wetle the mechanism of the Frente would Saye to be cael for the delivery of such materials, since nocdher mechaniom for this purpose presently exists. this did not mean that De, RAY need. be beholden to the Frente. C, That wa understood ho is planing 3 return to Orta. We feel that this would be a wise macve, end consequently urge him to do so. in shis connection wo are prepared to offer him a commmmicetor and ciner similar assistance so that he can maintain contest with his people. 2, I had plenned to sea NAY on bis return from fuerte Ries <a the afternocn of 3 January 1961, but the _im-inency of a treak of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba eomme lied me to return to Havana on the morning of 3 <acuery 1°61. - Consequently, my meeting with RAY was pogtpomed until last avening when an appointment was nede through WIESTMGER +o meet with him at the latter's apartment. 3, Our mesting lasted approximately three hous - roughly fran 7 to 10 p.m. We covered a wide range of subjects, the highlights of wien T shall try to cover in succeeding paragratha. (ute. “Ed tr
Se “weeks or. -explolted if thesa dissident elenents could have som ‘believe is. how he put ’ had previously presen _ insisted that:the .job ‘be done. “RAY also sa‘d that "one o - RAY -commentad that: whl many deople who. still view:hid as a-popular leader’ lp.his people. “Fuck more 1h the propaganda line: In-this connection. he said that thé KRP hopes within. the next three oto acquire brosicasting facilities in Costa Rica, perhaps dequire a ship.from which propaganda could Venezuela, arid “be disseminated, — ATTITUDS TOSARD-THS FRENTE, RAY fool's that the Frente kas little to offer. the people of Cuba for «ke future, For example, he said, there is great discontent in the Cuban Rebel Army which could be : é : @ assurance ths’ they were laying down. their lives for's worthwhile cause. RAY ; dods not feel :that ‘the action. ard composition of the FAD inspires. such confidence, He did not ‘Rention any nares specifically among “the FRD: which would represent: a "return to .the.past™ ‘but he did say that one of the Execttive Menbers. (head of a dapartzent, I ‘ it) had: been a big time contractor during — BATISTA's regime and that when RAY took over the Ministry of Publie dorks under: President URRUTIA, he learned. that this same contractor : ted.a bill and collected 300,000 pesos for a public ‘works project which was never undertaken, man: jailed, RAY. said:that ‘he és Minister of ‘Public Works nerely © ; “He commented that he (RAY) would. néw probably “have to pay-for this." I presume he meant that this particular person will eventually seek some tyve of parsonal. revear. f the five” members of the.FRD confided to ‘there is little he’can do about it besacse ey him that-he 1s not. happy. but g@ usual eriticiama of the TS - "he ig there.” -RAY repeated gona of th "high living,” petty politics, "everyboiy receiving a salary,” ani che "obvious fact” that the U.S, Governzent is picking up ‘the tab, Tris he said was fine with the }RF tacause it waa causing tisillusione - Cubans within ond without Cuba to turn to the “RP asthe only hore, He was quite frank in steting that while ke is willing to “cooperste* with the Frente, he did not want the YRP to become identified is tte - Cuban mind with the Frente; and thus itself bee-te discredited thragh "association, ® Bo ; yn, nt -now ‘sae CASTR™ for iat he is..a eynteal dictates. |. da@checessary Ke-aaid ‘to. presont CASTRU to ‘the ‘people in'e truer 1isht. oe Inatead of havisg the |
‘He’ “said ve “aia + ot insist. or particularly ey a that the. arms ba. - on ‘identified with’ "RP*:-stickers, so-therefore he could not ‘see sny ; Justificétion’ for” insisting that the. ‘artis bear the “FRO “Label.” 2 an “gaid that his grcup has done all. the orérational plannine” for the drop, eourlers have gone - -back ‘and.’ forth Batween Havana and ‘the Sscanbrays, ‘Raps have been. drawn up, DZ 's have beer arranged, end now he is told that the equirment weich he had been told was being supp ied... ‘te his sroup must bear the Label of the rival "F2D." It is obvious that while we say that: we: Look. uron: the Frente as: a non- political . grouping of: ‘warious’ osposition: Rroups, RAY looks uron the Frente as ~ “the poTitieal” organization” “ot ‘Tony Vs ‘RCRA: and - Y ‘personal ly do not _ /fe)] sanguine’,that any: amount of ‘explanation: will change. his a as ‘thinking: dncthis regard. ‘Here, and elsewhere during our conversat ton, I. noted a.certain acount of ‘dntranstgeace and lac’ of tolerance on “the part of RAY which does not bode well for the future, unless he. can be made to real ise that his wroup and following are. not ‘the sole ‘repository of. virtue. honesty, competence and «06d intentions, . RAY is an idealist, He ‘dreans. of a iexocratic ‘Guba; free.of corruption, ‘riiled by cen who. are selflessly dedicated to the promotion of the ‘general walfare. . When I said to RAY that Tony YARCNA and ether leaders of the. FR? would gay that they too stand for these th ings. he again ‘sulled and sald: . "The curious thing ig that thoy do not come- out ‘and say unequivocally, that they stand. for, these things. _ ‘Instead they say wo abe Cutans - we are not Znglishren, we are nok Amaricans, we are not Germans - ve ara Cubans." What they mean to say, he went.on., is that gaifishnass,. sone corruption. et cetera, is part ‘of thé Cuban uake us “and” ‘that this being the case-it is unre realistic and impractical to think that Cusans can aspires to a jdenocracy based on integrity and fiscal honesty such as we have in athe United States, or England, or other more advanced dexoerneies of Western Europe, He feels that. the paorle of Cuba yearn for such a dexocracy- and they do not. ses the chance of fiifiliment in the compositicn of the Frente. Therefore I he wishes to exboly in the ERP those men whose
¢4-00000 ~b« rerutationg sra clean - he lept referring to Felipe Pasoa, ag an exampie - and thus hold out to the Cubans tn Cuba a hops of better ; days to come = and to provite then a cause for which to Cight. ° Without a will to fight on the part of tha peorle of Cuba, he sald, . ; . ASTRO wil never be overthrow, Thea will to fight does not exist ; on the scale that is needed to achieve success. Thre Frente is completely incapable of rroviding the inspiration frem which such a will can stem, Consequentaly. it is ur to the MRP te tngrire the confidence of the pcople by brinving torather thoss persons and elexents whom the people trust and who are not fidentifled with the corrupt , rast. The people of Ciba, he said, cannot stand another disappointment, Their hopes must not be raised again, omly to auffer another betrayal. oO ; : * re a .- ERCVISTONAL GOVERNMENT. I brourht ur tha subject of a provisional government, a government in exile, but prefaced my remarks by saying that I was only oxpressing my personal views. I said: "Don't you feel that the problem of whose sticker goes on the air drops, and who gets credit: for this or that. would be regolved if an Assembly of. Opposition Groups were to meat and to democratically elect a rroviatonal government, composed ef honest, competent men of uninreachable record, which would represent all tha divorss opposition groups and which would raise the. hopes and provide the will to fight to the Cubans in Cuba who are uncertain and confused with respect to the future?” He said he wag opposed to a coalition covaracant nade up of representatives of various political parties -ag-a previstona}.povernment bacausa Fa was sure such & government would not be able to provide the united, honest, non-partisan type of leadership which will be required following the fall of CasrRu, He would prefer a government of “integration rather then a povernment of "coalition," By that he said he meant that the best qualified men would be asked to serve their country in an apolitical capacity. That these man would be measured by their experience, conpetence, reputation, ete., and little or no concarn should be given as to their political arfillaticns. A government composed of such men would aiickly win tha respect of the Cuben porulation; these men could get on with the job of reecnstructing the country, completely subordinating cartisan political considerations, since such man would not be politically ambitious, Moreover. a government composed of such outstanding sen would win the ecnfidence of foreign countries which would be mera disrosed to erant loang. which will be an urgent necessity from the very start, So far as the rovernzent itself is concerned, 1t wenld be apolitical. The various political oarties ani their leaders would be free to prerara for the coming electiona - whether they be in 6, 12 or 18 months. at which tima the Cuban neople ; : free elections could decida whic po'itien!l narty it wanted to in covern the country. T_asked RAY who would select thess men. And at what juncture of tha struggle against CASTRO would a provisional rovernmant arpear, He was iittle fussy - probably intentionally - on this point, He clearly indicated that some work hai already bean accomplished on the matter outa Ry one .
point. = ho Bey. ‘no “have : 4t was-a ‘Tittle - ‘promature for hin, ‘te, 9. di se of the. Constitution. which guarantee individual iibertias,’ p ‘inflation and a serious dislocation of the eccnomy, | ‘written along the American lines, 3° this mattor ‘at ‘greater length. . CONSTITL triton oF 99) Oo. 4 gaia. to AY. 2 ay. undoes’ and ‘you do. ‘not want - ve to retain tho ‘Constitution of 1940." ‘Ha ant? ted: at this.° He said — this question has- been. rut to hih bofore. Gften bell izerently, Hovever, he said, each bite: ‘that ha. hag axplainad wry he féels that the Constitution must-be rewritten he ‘Kas ented up convincing the rerson in qucation that cortain features of the Constitution of 1940 aro either unvorkable, und2-ocratic or obsolete, He aaid- ‘faw.of the people who gat worked © 3 over the Constitution heave, aver: read. the Constitution and there as not know what. they are” taling about. He said the Constitution ig not like the Arorican Constitution , ‘which sets out. its. rrecepts. in general | terna ‘and covers basic questions. ‘of government. Tre Cuban constitution jaa long, ranbling document that often. poes into minute details of miles and rerulations which have no “place: in. the..basic law of tha land. First. he sald. he wanted to make it absoltitely clear that ‘he "loves" those provisions. rivate ‘However, there ‘are other warts of tha Conatitution wich are impracticabia. With resrect, to Agrarian Reform, -he pointed ‘out, the Constitution requires _ immediate payment in: éash..: He said in no country of ‘the world has ‘an. agrarian | crogras bean carried ‘out with inzed fate cash paytients. “Not only does -the- government: ‘not: have the money to carry cut suck: a-vrogram, but {f 1% if4: 4t would Fesult in The electoral laws, *e gaid, area very. complex .. and those re: cating to apportionment cf the Ccngress can sniy result in: ‘corruption. . l retarked? "Yop mean they are written in sucha way that they invite corruption? he said: "More than that, they fores corrustion.* He said‘under the a: present, sat-up one has to either be a nlilioneire or ‘be ‘able to borrow , : property. ete, 200,000 pesos (and thus: accent. cormitmenta) in order to be elected to . He gaid‘he would like to see this part of the: Constitution Also, he said the laws relating to the raising.of revenues are archale, Ne said that ‘n order ito acjuirs noney for a given program. a specific tax must be applied designed to. . ; ; - - a ecngress,
14-00000 + 10, “gr " would? be. ‘satisfacto’ aly conclidied: in "two weeka or 803" cothrough, Raul CHIBAS.: p.plan’- to: return ‘gure ‘that: he had nailed ‘down and? support: He ‘said: he’ wae: Hopeful. ‘that the ? Fpol {tical " os <naidérationa : =  Yhich. he: ind teated. (without “elerification) :- were going quite sat lafactorily = =. “WEESINGER. -askedt... "Do you ‘mean ‘after 20-January?" “Rat amfiled ‘but made’ no reply. He said: that Ke had hoped that-he had aattled the matter of the” logistical | -gupport when-ha- talked: to. Mr. -B-last, but it now appears that itis not settled and that ‘they’ way haveto return to Cuba without thie — ‘support. He said he was. leaving for New York on 9 January and would eas remain there. until ‘Saturday, ° AS! January. He said he could be reached . -Itold hin ‘that I thought-he should return, aa on 8s. he. could ,; and. ‘that. we were: prepared to-assiat him in‘ every way _poasible, <ineluiing, providing him with - 2 comrunicator. He said- we had - already trained ia comiunicator for: his group ‘who had been infiltrated “into Oba and. ne wondered Where that man was ct the cregent time < - whether in ilavana or the hills. Neither I.nor. WIESINGER could enliphten _ hin on this point, except to say that he was ‘aafoely in Cuba. ; During the entire. intervs few. swith one exception, - ‘RAY. waa nis usual. quiet, soft: spoken self... However, ha did: show emotion when he asked he - if T thought somacna>vas. try ing to gabotaze his efforts to supply the -yesistance groups in Cuba. For examrle, he first brought up. and it was Tost obvious that it ia a matter of. graat concern to him. the matter of ths plans, maps, -ate., for the MRP action against. the Igle of Pines; . Ho said a carefully coord inated plen hai been laid on, That ‘BAR RIN. discussed it with -* v irey.” That BARQUIN asked "Jimmy" if the map. and other pacers could be det Y4vered in-Cuba within 4S “ours. © _"J innyt assured ‘BAR QUIN that they could and BAR)! ‘TH: handed ‘them over, RAY said that BARWIN erred in doing this as ‘they. hal there own facilities for transmitting the papers. The papera never: arrived at their destination. nor have” they aver been heard from again, As a consequence, @ plan of great depertance had to be abaviened, and aa irreplaceab!o opportunity lost, Ha vas extremely agitated when he talked of this matter and although WIESING:2 and I attanmnted to assure him that ke was 7ot. being sabotaged and thet there wera no "comuniets" trying to frustrate hig: activities, he nonethe! es3 is...
ie people in the Sscaxbrays, “Vo you, th! for. some reason or other and cniitions are pleced et the: xeiple of Fis beief that he Fas not reeot Lead to. believe he will receive. . : i GAGANIZATION, We discussed. briefly the MHP intel: 2. |. anized under WIZSINGSR' s guidance. - We gointed out. that as had‘ bsen made. due to the fact that BARIUIN = RAY's. ©. ho:.job =. had ‘go tany other responsibil ities that he--- fg matter his undivided attention, PAT lenghed (25 and aaid t ‘BAR UIN has bean: given: no other resvonaibilities, bub. = that he. hag sought ‘out other responsibilities oa his om which are” time taking. ‘He promised to think about this and was agreeaclé to: — os assigning a “shirt sleeve” typa of qoerator to work with WIZSINGZR “a, von -the-nuts and bolts. The name “of Nicolas “S\DUZA was sugrestod. - by. the undersigned (in prior consultation with WIZ3t!G7A) ag a person... of. considerable intelligence ani drive and endowed with a willingness to carry out orders. Nicolas. wo is a brother of one of RAY's | closest men, ‘Ignacio VENDOZA, was acceptable to RAY end he asked WIESINGER if he “gould ascertain Nicolas’. present whereabouts 50 .. "., ‘that -he could. propositioned on the subject. ee te at tt was cordial throughout: a 12, The tieeting. broke. up after ten o!.cluck. ~ ard I feel. cleared the air e little altiough it settled ro matters. of consequence. 1: told RAY I was going to Washington on Monday and, after ‘eonsultations, might wish to see h'm agein. He said he vould | welcome ‘another get-together end that I could reach his through. ~ CHIBAS ‘during ‘the .current week, 3 3 N 2