s fie ‘ , B, % NW 55072 DooiId: 32989529 Page 1369 OSETIA teers UO LVI Ww WVU i) ag wh DEFINITIONS  ) 1. Security inf : Individual a bively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor- { mation on secucit: for intelligence lmatters e exclusively for Burean and whose identity must be pretected. Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in such # position relative to a subversive organization, or: espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U, S. on behalf ef foreign princinal, that he is “able to obtain and does provide current information { of value;for furnish pertinent foreign intelligence data of value on a regular basis. ] . ; 2. Petential security informant Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or eSpionage or intelligence activities in the U. 8S. on -dehalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith,for is in a position to secure pertinent foreign intelligence data, land is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information to Bureau. 3. Double agent . . A specialized type of security informant; a person who is ccoperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both 2 foreign ee service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance, 4, Sial source .dual who on a confidential basis furnishes information available r scugh his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephens company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort en behalr of the Bureau tut merely obtain and furnish information readily. available te them, ‘ SCURCES OF POPENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS 7 Informants eheuld be deveLeped on all organivatic end individuals thet are inimical to the internal security. Experiens: nas shown that 7:tential informants may tbe cbtained through alertness in ths course cf nor:: ” investi- gative aot: 7vizy. Live informant coverage depends for the most par’ spon . initiatiy and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs, For stsistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: 1. Evaluatien of . a. Comzlaine-*s in security matters b. Persons i-’srviewed in connection with security cases . CG. Subjects «. security investigations looking for indications of disaf— fection, ¢ tgruntl ement, loss.of intere: , inactivity, finencial hard- Shiv, or other repudiation oF party loy. ‘Ly . d,° Bureau applicants 28 possible informants . e. Personal “-iends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau | employee- . , £. Sources +! information, confidential sources, and contacts on com tinuous Vasis . . 2. Revi-s of closed security files on individuals 3, Revi.s of reserve index 4. Ascertain vossibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, 5. Deleted . ‘ 6. Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA. 7. Consultation with present informants regarding indice tions of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members, They, cf cc’ ‘se, should not be informed 25 to the purpose of the inquiry. . 8. Review of f iles on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have teen asseciated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a frent, Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating ‘he acquaintance of party members, . °
SECTION 107. (JECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDE, “DAL SOURCES 107A ~ B A, DEFINITIONS 1. Security informant : - Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor- mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected, Such person should te a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or be in . ; such a position relative to a subversive organization, or eSpionage “ activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf cf foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current infor— . . mation of value, an 2. Potential security informant Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or espionage vr intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtein and furnish current information to. . Bureau. 3. Double agent ; A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both «2 foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance. 4. Confidential source . An individual who on a confidential basis furnishes i:7ormation availabie to him through his present position. Examples would ‘+: bankers and [ telephone company employees. These individuals make .. concerted effort en behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish -nformation readily available to them. . oii B. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Informants should be develoved on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that votex:tial informants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal i esti- gative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon ; initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: — 1, Evaluvetion of a. Complainants in security matters b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases c. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf- fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard- . ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty Lot . - - @,. Bureau applicants as possible informants. : . ’ e, Personal friends and contacts of Special‘Agents and other Bureau employees f; Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con tinuous basis » Review of closed security files on individuais Review of reserve index Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, Deleted Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA, e Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. : . ' 8, Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals * , who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended onlv a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innasend of communist propensities, yet they have a basis f2r cultivating the ae acquaintance of party members. . omy “Om OTB Ww YD ° MW 55072 Docld:32989529 Page i370 7 . -
be ( ( B. { XN Ww 55072 SECTION 107 |) sECURTY THPORVANTS AND corti, TAL SOURCES LO7A ~ B DEFINITIONS 1. Sewuraty informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor— mation on security matters exclusively for Bureau and whose i entity must be protectcd., Such person should be a member or attend . etings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party; or 4: in such a position relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal that he is able to obtain and does provide current infor— mation of value. 2. Potential security informant Individual in a position to become active in a subversive organization or eSpionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can become closely associated therewith, and is making affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current informa tion to Bureau. . 3. Doudle agent A snecialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance , 4. Confidential source An individuel who on 2 confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position. Examples would be: bankers and telephone company employees. These individuals make no concerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain ani furnish information readily available to them, SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are irimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential inform nts may be obtained through alertness in the course of normel investi- gative activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs. For assistance in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: . 1. Evaluation of a. Complainants in security matters - bd. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases ce. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of @isaf~ fection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hard- ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty d. Bureau applicants as possible informants e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees ff. Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con- tinuous basis - Review of closed security files on individuals Review of reserve index Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants .° Deleted Review factionalism section of file on Communist Party, USA, Consultation with present informants regarding.indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry. ~ 8. Review of files on communist front organizations Looking for individuals. who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended: only a few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of party members, - 1 Novus wn ° 4-13-65 Docld: 337989529 Page i371 So ; _ . 7 ‘
A, ( B. t {. Nw 55072 N, SECTION 107. sacorre PY INFORMANGS AND CONFID: |, TAL SOURCHS LO7A ~ B DEFINITIONS 1. Security informant Individual actively engaged in obtaining and furnishing current infor- mation on security matters exolusively for Bureau and whose identity must be protected, Such person should be a member or attend meetings of a subversive organization, such as the Communist Party;'or be in such a pos ition relative to a subversive organization, or espionage activities or intelligence activities in the U. 8. on behalf of foreign prinoipal that he is able to obtain and does provide current infor mation of ‘value, 2. Potential seourity informant Individual in a position to become aotive in a subversive organization or espionage or intelligence activities in the U. S. on behalf of foreign principal or can besome closely associated therewith, and is meking affirmative effort through associations or contacts so that he can be in a position actively to obtain and furnish current information ‘to Bureau, Lo . ‘3. Double agent A specialized type of security informant; a person who is cooperating with, receiving assignments from, and performing tasks for both a foreign intelligence service and the Bureau under the Bureau's guidance. 4. Confidential source " An individual who on 2 confidential basis furnishes information available to him through his present position, Examples would be: bankers, telephone company employees, American employees of foreign official establishments, {andJemployees of the United Nations Secretariat, These individuals make no Goncerted effort on behalf of the Bureau but merely obtain and furnish information readily available to them. SOURCES OF POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANTS Informants should be developed on all organizations and individuals that are inimical to the internal security. Experience has shown that potential ingormants may be obtained through alertness in the course of normal investi- getive activity. Live informant coverage depends for the most part upon initiative and resourcefulness of individual Agents and SACs, For assistance “in obtaining potential informants, the following is suggested: 2, Evaluation of a. Complainants in security matters b. Persons interviewed in connection with security cases ce. Subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaf— fection, disgruntiement, Loss of interest, inactivity, financiel hard~ ship, or other repudiation of party loyalty — ; ad. Buresu applicants as possible informants -. ° e. Personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau, employees f, Sources of information, confidential sources, and contacts on con~ tinuous basis 2. Review of closed security files on individuals 3, Review of reserve index aa 4, Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants, 5, [Deleted] 6. Review factionalism section of file- on ‘Communist: Party, USA, . “7, Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be . informed as to the purpose of the inguiry. - 8. Review of files on communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only _@ few meetings of a front, Such individuals frequently are innocent of communist propensities, yet they have a basis for oulvivating the acoquaintanoe of party members. 10-14-64 Doold: 32989523 Page 1372 oo . M apa ES oe lana,