HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM shed. If possible, UN or other international ‘forces should be retained in Katanga well into 1964. By that time, it is possible that po- litical leadership will have emerged, the. ANC will have improved its effectiveness, and all elements of the population will be acclimated to the new situation. Also enhancing the need for a foreign military presence in southern Katanga until well into 1964 is the prospect of national elections, which could be ac- companied by serious disorders, Belgium Since the Congo's independence, the Bel- gian Government has restricted its aid con- tribution to servicing the Congo's external - debt. and to technical assistance involving about 1,200 teachers for the Congo and scholarships for Congolese in Belgium, Total Belgian Gov- ernment expenditures for Congo aid were about $53,000,000 in $72,000,000 in 1963. Belgian assistance be- yond this amount apparently is under con- sideration in the wake of the recent 'settle- ment of the contentieux, outstanding financial issues between the Congo and Belgian Gov- ernments that date from independence, The Belgian Government also has agreed to furnish military personnel for retraining the ANC, The importance of ANC retraining is crucial, particularly in view of the eventual withdrawal of UN forces, and should have the highest priority among foreign assistance efforts, _With respect to increased Belgian public responsibility in the Congo, the Belgian Gov- ernment apparently has an ambivalent attitude, compounded by the failure to plan ahead in terms of contingencies. Although the Belgian private stake in the Congo is vast, the Bel- gian Government is reluctant to take steps. ‘to increase its technical and financial as- sistance as long as the United States or other nations are willing to bear the principal burden. In the ‘absence of any other effective lever to obtain an increase in the Belgian aidcontribu- tion, a reduction in the US contribution might serve to heighten Belgian private and official interest in covering the shortfall. A risk in this essentially negative approach is that the Belgians .may react too late to meet Congo- lese needs. If the United States then failed to recover the situation, the way might be opened to renewed Soviet involvement, It is clear that the Belgians, at least for the moment, are being less than frank with the United States about their intentions in the Congo, and the possibility ofa really close Belgian-US aid consortium may > consequently be somewhat limited. The role of Union Miniére in the Katanga secession diverted attention from the sub- Stantial constructive contributions of Bel- 1962 and may reach °- 48 gian private individuals and concerns to emerg- ing stability in other areas of the Congo, All but a few of the major Belgian- financed agri- cultural, industrial, and mining enterprises are in operation, some at levels of produc- tion approaching or above the pre-independ- ence period, Although handicapped by short- ages of spare parts, vehicles, and imported consumer items for sale to workers, the . Belgian enterprises and: their managements have provided surprising economic continuity. In most areas, plantation and plant managers. -and local governments are cooperating closely to increase productivity. Relations between the indigenous population and Belgian man- agements are cordial; outside of .southern Katanga there are few reports of significant Belgo- Congolese animosities, Particularly in the provinces enjoying relatively stable gov- ernments, leaders have stated their desire for additional Belgian investment. Where Bel- gian farmers and small businessmen have failed to resume their enterprises since 1960, provincial leaders especially have said they would welcome renewed Belgian activity. Un- employment stemming from the closing down of some Belgian operations has created serious problems for Congolese political leaders. Nearly 50,000 Belgians .are estimated to be in the Congo. Some observers have ex- pressed the belief that this number would not increase significantly in the future, since most who left in 1960 had either returned or found satisfactory employment in Belgium or else- where. Were conditions more settled, and were special inducements offered, it might be pos- sible to attract more Belgian nationals to the Congo for employment in both the private and public sectors. The United States The pivotal role played in the Congo by the United States has paid off handsomely interms of American prestige, not only in the Congo, but also in the rest of Africa. As long as Con- golese attention centered onthe Katanga seces-~- sion, the US image was positive. However, in the wake of the Katanga victory, the American presence in the Congo is receiving new scru- tiny, through an optic untinted by the rosy aura of the Katanga success. At Leopoldville the US presence is linked very closely with the Adoula government., Radical Congolese sniping at Adoula has de- veloped with considerable effect the theme that Adoula is an American ''stooge,"' Belgian far- left circles recently issued a particularly venomous pamphlet attacking the United States for alleged neo-colonialism in the Congo. Ir- responsible Belgian nationals and interests in the Congo also appear to be actively under- cutting the United States by spreading anti- SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 3276276338 Page 57
HW 49061 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM American rumors. These attacks find an audience among the Congolese elites of the principal urban centers. Thus American "prestige'' is on the firing line for the first time since the demise of Lumumba. At the same time, provincial leaders often ‘equate the American presence with the failure of the Adoula government. Where there have been inadequate central government responses to real or imagined provincial problems, the central government is heaped with blame that often includes an indictment of the United States, In particular, the impressive and use- ful AID truck import program has backfired on the United States. Provincial leaders are aware that over 1,000 trucks were imported under US Government auspices. But they also believe that, with the connivance of the . US: Embassy, the trucks were deliberately denied to the provincial governments. The provincial leaders' misunderstanding of the import program is complete; but more serious is their belief that the United States has conspired with "politicians" at Leopoldville to deny the provinces their due. In the context of possible national elections in 1964, developing anti-American sentiment is ominous. Since the Belgians no longer are scapegoats in any area, except possibly south- ern Katanga, a radical national party—if it emerged in reaction to a moderate national coalition under Adoula—could be expected to build into its platform a plank of demagogic anti-Americanism, Such a backlash could harm an emerging moderate national coalition. The Soviet Bloc Badly burned by its past experience in the Congo, the USSR.has hesitated to make a major new bid for influence. either in Leo- poldville or the provincial capitals. The ab- sence of cohesive political groupings in the Leopoldville parliament—other than the loose coalition of moderate leaders backing the Adoula government, and the generally con- servative Abako and PSA/K parties—has re- duced the field for potential Soviet activity at the center to a lunatic fringe of disaf- fected deputies. At the same time, the weak- ness of the central government, reflected in the polarization of effective political power between Leopoldville and the provincial capi- tals, has raised the ante for the Soviets should they wish to develop influence at the prov- incial level. That the Soviets have concentrated their activity since 1962 in Leopoldville andin the Stanleyville area of ex-Orientale Province, despite the emergence of other strong prov- - incial power centers, is indicative of their current reticence. 49 gian reluctance to provide higher education for Congolese, few were offered an opportunity to imbibe Marxist doctrine at European uni- versity centers, Unlike Africans from former British and French territories, there is no significantly large group of Congolese even aware ofthe Marxist vocabulary. Consequently, such ideological discourse as there is on the East-West confrontation is at a very low fevel, Even the so-called radical nationalist Congolese leaders who accepted Soviet mili- tary assistance in 1960 were ideologically motivated only to the extent that they sought to crush Katanga or to salvage personal power. Most vulnerable at present to Soviet bland- ishments are disaffected national parliamen- tarians and some labor leaders and students. The Soviets at times have bought with the ‘traditional bribes of women, money, and the promise of power a fringe group of deputies such as Anicet Kashamura. However, the profits from this commerce in’ venality have yet to be reaped. Most of the extremist fringe is discredited at Leopoldville and in the constituencies. Among students at Leopoldville, the Roman Catholic auspices of Lovanium University have inhibited much pro-communist activity. Even the radical Congolese students do not generally conceptualize their opposition to the status quo in Marxist terms. Among labor unions, only the Confédéra- tion Générale des Travailleurs Congolais (CGTC) and the Union Nationale des Travail- leurs Congolais (UNTC) have a pro-communist tinge. Their range of activities appears limited. The Congo's massive budgetary deficit and foreign exchange shortage offer new opportuni- ties for Soviet bloc involvement. Even the pro- Western Adoula regime might look with in- terest on Soviet offers of assistance if the financial and monetary crisis worsens. For example, a recent alleged Soviet offer of 5,000 trucks, if true, would be hard for Adoula to refuse, particularly if the offer were made known to provincial leaders, whose transport needs verge on the desperate, The Soviets may be expected to seek to exploit these and other rifts in the Congo's economic fabric. Additional significant opportunities are likely to open for the Soviets in the political pot now beginning to boil in preparation for national elections. in 1964. A moderate na- tional party is envisaged by those around Adoula, whose opponents may be expected to seek to form, in reaction, a national party of a radical stamp. The Soviets might reap a rich harvest from investment in such a radical opposition, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Docld: 3276276336 ‘Page 56 -
APPENDIX TABLES: A. Enumeration of Powers Under Draft Constitution Compared to Loi Fondamentale B. Comparison of Proposed Central- Provincial Power Distribution on Three Key Issues: * ‘UN, Katanga, Coquilhatville Provincial Assembly Presidents' Conference, and Loi Fondamentale Positions. C,. Proposed Partition of Fiscal Domain, UN Draft Constitution D. Profile of New Provinces | E. Typology of Congolese Parties F, Seats Won, by Party, May ]960 Elections G. Glossary of Principal Congolese Political Parties H. Congolese Provincial Governments since 1960 | I. Congolese Central Governments since 1960 (and Secessions) MAPS: | A. Republic of the Congo - Provinces B. Republic of the Congo = Political Stability C. Republic of the Congo - Major Political Parties, May 1960 Elections . D. Republic of the Congo - Provinces and Ethnic Groups HW 49061 Docld:32626336 Page 59
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