157-10014-10152 vO. AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : HW 30955 Dactd: 324235460 JFK Assassination System Date: Identification Form Agency Information SSCIA | 157-10014-10152 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMUHTTEE 07-M-57 Document Information SSCIA DAWSON, RHETT SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR DIEM ASSASSINATION 07/07/1975 14 VIETNAM DIEM, ASSASSINATION MEMORANDUM Declassified 1B; 1C Redact 03/22/2000 CCBOX 437 Page i WH2015
eo JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014~-10152 RECORDS SERIES :; MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMIITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-57 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : DAWSON, RHETT TO : SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR TITLE : DIEM ASSASSINATION DATE : 07/07/75 PAGES : 14 SUBJECTS : VIETNAM DIEM, ASSASSINATION DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET * RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99 OPENING CRITERIA :; COMMENTS : CCBOX 437 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 DBoctd:327423540 Page 2?
TAL ATER { ENCE i ELLIG NI ‘ :T 8 a ED f{ ESTOMA LLY D A S SPECI 5 N NTAI ak CO ILE 7 I [5 at 4 won’) TED) (COMPARTMES 1 extracted, It is not to be or discussed with another person withous to be read only. his file is t in aphrased, rmat.on ic Lt or a requirement, speak to the Control specif pe Lo ar 0D T dd area VY. question, a ave nN a 4 1 o you Yo TT CURE c ) TSSUFD T @ md “s “H ( wy ord — a +2 ny ro) 4 vw an 5 o ; re) U a i fe} oO 7, on ke) Lf} o & > pS a a orn ics ro) Ko) vid
RE2S MEMORANDUM TO : Fritz Schwarz Curt Smothers ‘FROM: Rhett Dawson DATE: July 7, 1975 RE : Diem Assassination TI. Overview A. Summary The assassinations of South Vietnamese President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, on November 2, 1963, concurrent with a Vietnamese generals'coup, represents the most remote, if even that, instance of CIA involvement in the murder of a foreign leader presently being considered by the Committee. Based on all available evidence, Diem's assassination appears to have been a spontaneous and solely Vietnamese~inspired act, guided by anger at Diem for not making available his resignation or presence to coup leaders. The only remaining incident casting doubt on this evidence is the failure of the American Embassy to provide safe conduct for Diem and Nhu out of the country, as originally planned by the generals. (See paragraph II.E.) Nhu's assassination was a part of ‘the plan almost from its inception. B. Conclusions 1. Diem's assassination represents not an incident of an abuse by CIA as mich as it does an account of mistaken national policy. 2. The Kennedy Administration, under intense public pressure from both the New York Times and other dispatches from Saigon, sought to disassociate itself from the repressive Diem regime. 3. A rift between the staff members of State and the National Security Council, on the one hand, and DoD and CIA, on the other, as to. whether Diem and Nhu must be driven from office exacerbated the situation and ill-~served President Kennedy. 4, Although the generals relished the idea of killing Diem's brother, Nhu, it was considered that Diem himself would be allowed to live and either leave the country or, possibly, even retain the presi- dency. No evidence has been adduced that U.S. representatives were aware of the murder of Diem until after it was done. HY 50955 DBocld: 327423540 Page 4
HW 450955 C. Alternatives It appears that the Committee should either: 1. Consider the Diem assassination not as an element of CIA _involvement in the killing of foreign leaders, but as an instance of “U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign country, not unlike Chile, which led to a coup and the leader's not totally unex- pected murder by indigenous military; or 2. Examine McGeorge Bundy and others on the delay in obtaining air evacuation for Diem and Nhu to a country of asylum; or 3. Continue staff investigation further to develop existing evidence as to the killing; or 4, Draft a report based on evidence available at this time. D. Recommendation It is recommended that the Committee examine McGeorge Bundy and others, if necessary, on the delay in air evacuation to asylum. II. History A. ‘The Bombing in Hue | 1. Chronology May 6, 1963 Diem revives regulation banning r public display of any religious , flag —- either Buddhist or Catholic -~ probably due to excessive dis- play of the Vatican flag in DaNang a few days earlier. May 7, 1963 Vui Van Long arrives in Hue and, . r , seeing the city already bedecked with flags for the Buddha's birth- day the next day, tells Buddhist monks that the regulation will not be enforced. Despite Long's rever- sal of the order, Thich Tri Quang, a Buddhist monk, decides to send Docld:324273540 Page 5
HY 0955 monks around to tell people to take down flags as a result of Diem's order. May 8, 1963 , Quang publicly criticizes Diem at Buddhist gathering for flag regula- tion and crowd gathers at a radio station, resulting in grenades be- ing exploded. There is a conflict in the evidence as to who threw the grenades as (a) it was general- ly assumed that Diem's troops caused the 8 deaths, but (b) medical evi- dence found that none of the bodies had metal fragments, implying the grenades were plastic, usually as- sociated with Viet Cong.3 2. Significance Conein stated that this event was the catalyst that brought down the Diem regime." This event, along with the self-immolation by monks and Madame Nhu's (Diem's sister—in—law) incredibly bloodthirsty statements that she would like to furnish some mstard at a bonzes (monks) barbeque,? received unfavorable press and brought pressure on the Kennedy Administra- tion to disassociate itself from that of Diem and apply "direct, relentless and tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States had seldom before attempted with a friendly sovereign government." B. The Abortive August 1963 Coup 1. Chronology July 4, 1963 The initial conscious decision and agreement among the coup principals (Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem) takes place, probably before this date; even though the August coup fails, the intention is never aban- doned.7 | July 1963 A majority of the coup plotters, in- cluding Minh, desire that Diem retire. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu, his wife Madame Nhu, and the warlord brother Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention -—— their deaths are welcomed. Boctlda: 324273540 Page 6
HY 0955 Doctld: 3242734540 August 21, 1963 August 24, 1963 August 25, 1963 Page ? Special Forces, under personal loyalty to Nhu, attack several pagodas in the Saigon area. Reasons for the raid are unclear, but they may be (a) timed when there is no U.S. Ambassador in South Vietnam (Nolting left a few days before and Lodge was on his way)9 and to (b) an effort by the Nhu's to strike back’ at a pagoda which "was more a political command post than a holy place," serving as Quang's headquar- ters. 10 Deptel 243, prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Undersecretary of State Averell Harriman,11 and cleared in Hyannisport by President Kennedy ,12 is dispatched to the newly arrived Am- bassador Lodge. It demands that Diem rid himself of his brothers, .Nhu and Can, and, if he does not do so, Lodge is told that the U.S. will no longer support Diem. Further, he is told to convey to military commanders the assurance that they will receive "direct support in any interim period of. breakdown central government...."13 The Country Team is directed to look at alternative Vietnamese leaders and make plans as "to how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become neces- sary. "1 In a CIA cable, Chief of Station Richard- son reports back the results of a con- ference among Lodge, Deputy Chief of Mission Trueheart, General Harkins (Com mander, MACV), and himself. The group concludes that giving Diem option in Hilsman's cable has no chance of suc-~ ceeding, and accepts Deptel 243 as de~ cision from Washington. 15
HW 450955 August 26, 1963 Lodge presents credentials to Diem, 16 ; CIA agents Conein and Spera are told to tell the generals the substance of Deptel 243, but that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of as- suming power of state."17 August 28, 1963 © Maxwell Taylor; in a cable, elicits Harkins! views on feasibility of opera- tion as Washington is having second thoughts. Taylor claims that Deptel 243 was prepared "without DoD or JCS participation. ''18 August 29, 1963 Conein and Spera meet with generals, who want firm evidence of U.S. support, and Minh flatly states that in order to do this, U.S. should stop economic aid to Diem (which was done in September) .19 August 31,. 1963 In a CIA cable from Saigon, Washington . is told, "(t)his particular coup is . Pinished....generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of _ forces....There is little doubt that GVN aware U.S. role and may have con- siderable detail-..."20 2. Significance This. period bears examination because it, and principally Deptel 243, sets the tone for later relations between the Country Team and the generals. Minh, disbelieving at first that the U.S. is really supporting him, grows in confidence, despite the U.S. military's continu- ing support of Diem.@l In the next period, Minh finds that of the 15 or sO coups22 being planned, Lodge, through Conein, endorses his.23 Nhu promises to get out_of Saigon, but by this time no one trusts another's word and Nm stays.24 . C. The November Coup September 13, 1963 Lodge complains bitterly that having ~ to meet with Diem "is an extremely -time consuming procedure" and asks | that he not have to do so unless he Via a Docld: 32423540 Page @
October 24, 1963 October 28, 1963 ‘November 1, 1963 1315 hours 1340 hours 1345 hours 1650 hours. 1715 hours 1845 hours 1856 hours 1915 hours HY 50955 DBoctd: 327423540 Page 9 Conein meets with Don, a coup leader, and informs him that the U.S. does not "go for this knocking off."32 Conein meets with Don for last time before coup is launched and is told that he will receive four hours' no- - tice. Don wants firm departure time from Vietnam for Lodge's Gemporary return to Washington. 33 Saigon Embassy still does not have coup force plans. Instead of getting four hours' notice, Embassy receives four minutes' warning of start of coup.35 An aide to Don tells Conein to go to Joint General Staff (JGS) headquarters and bring with him all the money he can lay his hands on. Conein takes 3 million piastre Station had stored 5 million piastres ($68, 000).3 The generals are unable to contact palace by phone, but propose Diem resign - immediately, guaranteeing safe departure to him and Nhu. Otherwise, palace will be attacked at 1530 hours. 37 Palace surrounded. 38 - Minh tells Nhu that if he and Diem do not resign within 5 minutes, the palace will be bombed. 39 Minh telephones Diem, but Diem hangs up on him. Minh orders the palace to be bombed. 40 Troops: are moving in on, the palace.41 Diem refuses again to capitulate. 42 Minh gives Diem another chance to sur- render; if he refuses, he will be blasted "off face of the earth. "43
HW 450955 2140 hours _ One air assault on Presidential Guard barracks launched before nightfall. No others launched before nightfall as Minh waits to Five Diem one more chance to resign. 4 November 2, 1963 an 0650 hours Diem calls Don with offer to surrender unconditionally. 45 The generals proceed to palace to pick up Diem and Nhu and escort them to JGS. They will request preference as to destination and seek approval of the country designated. 46 - 0800 hours Escort at palace, but neither Diem nor Nhu appear. 47 - ‘How Diem and Nhu leave the palace and are subsequently located is a question open to dispute. Conein speculates that they escaped through a third, unknown tunnel48 and go to a Catholic Church in Choion. Being familiar ‘faces, an informant identifies them and calls JGS.49 “Another less specula— tive and more detailed account, by a-CIA source, states that Diem and Nhu left the palace the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and went to the Church at 0800 hours, November 2, 1963. Ten minutes later, they were picked up by the Army and forced into an Army vehicle, in which they were locked.59 Higgins reports this account to some extent, but states that Diem called Khiem, a coup leader, and offered to resign, disclosing their whereabouts in Cholon. Then, she states, Minh called a meeting, ‘excluding Khiem, and a convoy was organized. Diem and Nhu are forced into a vehicle, left to themselves by Colonel Lam, who seeks their safe conduct. When Lam, at the end of the convoy, arrives at JGS, he finds Diem has been shot in the back of the head, and Nhu stabbed in the chest and shot numerous times in the back. Both had their hands tied behind their backs.51 Minh tells Conein that Diem and Nhu committed suicide, but Conein doubts that a Catholic would take his life in a church.22 Minh, according to Higgins, later states that his aide, Captain Nhung, had gotten into the vehicle with Diem and Nhu and, having been provoked into an argument, shoots them both.53 There is little support for this story by Minh in that pictures revealed a bloody death and their hands tied.54 In any event, Nhung is assumed to be the | executioner,25 but only one account blames Minh for giving the order, al- though it might be expected that an aide to a general would be so acting. 56 Docld: 324273540 Page 10
HW 450955 1030 hours The bodies of Diem and Nhu are at JGS, . but Conein declines to view them for fear of the damage a leak of his having done so could do to U.S. interests.57 D. The Five Million Piastres The decision for the CIA to pass along funds to the coup leaders may have been a point of discussion in early October 1963.58 Lodge men- tions that a request for money may be forthcoming and that it should be anticipated.59 This is interesting as all other available evidence20 sub- mits that this decision was of such relative insignificance that it could be made by the Station without consultation with Lodge. : Conein received the money on October 24, 1963, and put it into a safe in his house. The money was given to Don for two purposes: (1) to procure rice and bread for troops diverted from supplies; and (2) to pay death benefits to those killed during the coup (Conein claims there is no insurance in Vietnam and that this was a customary practice) .61 . The only observation that this question poses is the laxity of payment by the CIA of a sizeable amount of the money. , E. The Twenty-four Hour Airplane Delay The only remaining question in the conduct of the U.S. Government .during the November 1 coup is whether Lodge's unwillingness or inability to obtain safe conduct for Diem and Nhu indicates some involvement in or knowledge of the assassination of the two that is not apparent on the face of available records. On October 30, 1963, Lodge notifies Washington that they should anticipate a request by key personalities for evacuation. Lodge suggests Saipan as a depository for the asylees as its absence of press and com munications would allow policy makers time to make further disposition. Lodge recognizes that a request for asylum in the Saigon Embassy is not unlikely also and hopes that the new government will help him resolve this. Conein was the go-between for securing an airplane for Diem and Nhu. He was first asked by Minh and Don, after Minh's phone conversation with Diem shortly after 6 o'clock in the morning, November 2, 1963. Conein called Smith at the Embassy and was told in an unusually orderly and re- sponsive fashion that Diem would be taken to the first country that of- fered asylum and that they did not want to land in a country other than the one which was granting asylum. Docld: 324273540 Page il
HW 450955 At some point, Conein was also advised that the C-130, which was the only airplane available in Vietnam, could not fly far enough to land in New Delhi, Karachi, or Tehran, and that 24 hours would be needed to get a KC-135 from Guam. Conein then passed all this informa- tion on to Don.®3 The reasons given for the 24 hour delay was that the pilots in Guam would have to be briefed on their route and that the airport would have to be opened. 6 This whole incident casts a pall over American involvement in the assassinations of Diem and Nhu. Evidence presently available is unsatisfactory to explain away what is considered to be the last linger- ing doubt of U.S. having any hand in the killings. For this reason, it_is recommended that the Committee examine McGeorge Bundy on the is- _ Sue_and consider whether further investigation is warranted. DoclTd: 32423540 Page 12
ebay OU ee le Sn seca ~li- FOOTNOTES 1. Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (Harper and Row, 1965), p. 91 (hereinafter cited as Higgins). 2. Higgins, pp. 91-92. 3. Higgins, pp. 95-96. 4, Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, June 20, 1975 (hereinafter cited as | Hearings, with person and date), at pp. yoy, Conein. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 43. Higgins, p. 100. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, p. 10. . Ibid. oO co =] N Ww Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. al. 10. Higgins, p. 181. Ll. Deptel 243, received from White House (WH), July 3, 1975. 12. Higgins, p. 196. . | 13. Deptel 243, received from WH, July 3, 1975. Having used the quoted phrase, Hilsman later (Deptel 249) queries Lodge as to its meaning. 14. Ibid. 15. CIA I.G. Report (hereinafter cited as -I.G.), Part C, 1967, pp. 7-8. 16. Ibid., p. 8. 17. Ibid., p. 9. 18. Ibid. > p. ll. Higgins, however, claims that Roswell Gilpatric, Act- ing, Secretary of Defense, was telephoned and gave his assent. Higgins, 19. Ibid., p. 18. 20. Ibid., p. 15. HW 350955 DBocld:327423540 Page 13
HY 0955 el. This is the inference drawn from a cable (Saigon Embassy, Number 577) from Lodge to State, on September 22, 1963, noting that the Country Team is not speaking with one voice and requesting guidance in light of imminent visit of Taylor and Maxwell to Diem. Also, paragraph 4, Lodge cable from Saigon CIA, number 2023, October 29, 1963, reporting on Conein meeting with Minh, who complains that “other Americans should quit talk- ing to Colonels and Majors (Vietnamese) about coup action...." An in- teresting sidelight to this entire study is the division within the U.S. Government, with State and certain National Security Council staff main- taining a "Diem-must-go" attitude, wnile DoD and CIA believe that the issue is in the countryside, not in Saigon and Hue. Cf., for example, Hearings, Colby, June 20, 1975, p. 65. 22. CIA Saigon (Lodge) cable, number 2114, to. Secretary of State and others, dated October 31, 1963. 23. CIA Saigon (Lodge) cable, number 2023, to Secretary of State and others, dated October 29, 1963. 24, Saigon Embassy (Lodge) cable, number 403, to Secretary of State, dated September 2, 1963. 25. Saigon Embassy (Ledge) cable, number 505, to Secretary of State, dated September 13, 1963. Cf., also I.G., pp. 21-22, where McCone com plains that Lodge has had little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. 26. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 25. But Minh stated that Diem is to be kept in office. Other two alternatives envision (a) encircle- ment of Saigon by various military units and (b) direct confrontation between a ery units involved in the coup and loyalist units. I.G., pp. 27-28. 27. I.G., p. 28. 28. Hearings, McCone, June 6, 1975, p. 60. (Colby drafted this for McCone. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 35.) 29. Ibid., p. 62. 30. I.G., p. 28. 31. %I.G., p. 29. 32. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 37. It should be pointed out that Colby stated at the Hearings, June 20, 1975, at p. 58, that Conein was not aware of McCone's instructions at his next meeting with Minh Docld:324293540 Page 14
HW 450955 (not Don —- Conein was confused as to who he instructed) and therefore did not pass on decision to him. Conein could not explain why he had not included his discussion with Don in an otherwise exhaustive after- action report. Hearings, June 20, 1975, pp. 37-38. 33. I.G., p. 37. a -34. CIA Saigon cable (Lodge) to State, number 2129, dated November 1, 1963. 35. MACV Cable (Harkins) to JCS, number 8512, dated November 1, 1963. 36. I.G., p. 40. 37. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1 (hereinafter simply Exhibit), p. 15. 38. Exhibit, p. 14. | 39. Ibid., p. 17. 40. Ibid. Wi. Ibid., p. 18. 42, Ibid. 43, Ibid. - ul, Tbid., pp. 19-20. 45. Ibid., p. 23. 46. Ibid. 47, Ibid. 48. TIbid., p. 25. | ‘4g, Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, pp. 58-59. ‘This story is bolstered by a summary of speculative stories contained in a Saigon Embassy cable (Lodge), number 888, to State, dated November 2, 1963, at p. 3. 50. Saigon Embassy cable (Lodge), number 888, to State, at p. l. 51. Higgins, pp. 216-219. 52. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 56. 53. Higgins, p. 219,.... Docld: 32423540. Page 15
HW 450955 54. 53. 56. Df. 58. 59. I.G., p. 43. I.G., p. 43. Higgins, p. 219. . Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 58. Hearings, Colby, June 20, 1979, p. 22, Saigon Station Cable (Lodge) , number 2040, to State, dated October 29, 1963, and mumber 2063, dated October 30, 1963. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64, I.G., p. 41, and Hearings, Colby, June 20, 1975, p. 23. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 72. Saigon Station Cable (Lodge), number 2063, dated October 30, 1963. Hearings, Conein, June 20, 1975, p. 54. Ibid., pp. 76~78. Docld: 324273540 Page 16