13-00000 sae _ on swe Prarenomn2 ah 28 A 409+ On octerw ae »kmmoae ee o£ sms ® . . ee ° ey e ey ; . 23 May 1957 . a 7  SUMET: Report oa Plots to Assassiaste Pidel Castro } fhis report was prugured at the request of the Director of Ceatral Intelligence, Ee assigzed the tase to the laspector’ General on 23 March 1467. Ghe report was delivered to the Director, ; persooslly, in installrents, begizning oa 2% April 1967. ‘The : : Director returned this copy to the Yaszector General’ on 22 Mey 1967 by with instructicas that the Inspector General: : : . Ri Retaic it ia persccal, EYES GLY safckeezing . ; ‘ it . Tustroy tte coe burn copy retained tespersrily by the ie Inspector Geceral ' + ° ° i i : Destcoy all notes an€ other course eetertala ariginated ] . ° - by theee participating in the writing of the repose . t e 3 1 ty : fhe one staytack burn copy, all sotes, and all other derived source naterlals vere éestroyed on 23 May 1957. rN Tails ribboa copy is the oaly text of the report pov in existeace, . ' . °° ether fa wnole or in part. Ite text kas been read caly ty: " i . . ° a ° se Richard Eelns, Director of Central Intelligence . i i % . . 7. & Earmas, Inspector Geseral ' : . E. Creer, Iaspecter (sre sf tte autters) i ; 8. D. Breckiaridse, Taspector “(ane ef the eurtors) ‘ _ 5 . * ALL typing of Grafts and of final text vas doze by the authors. 4 , Ped vith the yeport ares a "s Office of Security file used as source materiel mY Meworendims concerning Viliian Sarvey “ e Cartaisa, MONGOGSE pepers . Drev Pearsoa colvms oe a * ania tee - 6 0 :} Ch e ? 6 oe? ® a e “ . ® ro . an . * oe ° See . rae ° . . 8 at * . . o%e ry 7 8 ry . . . sourxp pansies SEEIEG etd Sle HO lin 6 cette gm ea SN TT a . oo ee * 73 ee e owtt gi’ ° TS 6 6 a an a 2 aa Bo, 2 toe ; Gard erin wastalet cae id saa ote con ta cise dentate nian ait ag Gi . eres aA . oy ° i ay ote Me ote ve ac | eye «tether cette ge map ets. ome peta oe 6 jae ee,® le wos. Dos 2 20 18k ath omndds fds on 6's mrcans Aare Patan smelt cet Be TPE Boy oa er: ieteed mre pe re ee, ROE a cep Sei bet oars 08 Loy re Saag ee eee a t
13-00000 oe canes Te 3 Ost 47 gay . . tv oory ry ee re a . ® i 8 : i a, Introductory Section - Miscellaneous Schemes. Prior to August 1950 r ‘ ‘ Ss nt epemnnanen te mgpaprmie se + . oog9 cnammogeam Aerosol Attack oa Radio Station ; ; 3 The Gambling Syndicate Opera tian “ Phase 1 (August 1960 - Hay 1961) ' oe . Phase 2 (Late 1961 - June 1963) ad * § : P| . The Wir etapping Incident Cj . | The Phyllis MoGuixe/Attormey General Phase (Late 1961 - May 1962) . 2c eaten A RPEIERATTRTE 2 | rites ae CEG es oem E The Long Committee Phase (May ~ July 1966) ye ‘i Schenes in Early 1963 ; F bes iS. Project AMIASH --Rojando Cubela, (March 1962 - March 1966) . ; no Pore Fa as : - * puecuscton of » Aseaizetina tion at High-Level Goverment Meetings Do - Special. Group (Augmeated) Meeting of 10 August 1962 .- Special Group Meeting of 30 July 1954 , ° - ° The Ramifications of the Gembling Syn@icate Operation % é + resem on ae stoi cieomamaconnap emamanmer a HEB SDP ME LEST ve f * < f : - A a : i % a & te ta % ? 9° P2SRe AAS whee ar +> - . . sore _ ba baoed - td bo eee be a Sa a wt 2 & nee Bie Se eg St ee wipe a ae my elgg mete Yay Be yt Meee Te Scere ym Tee et
13-00000 toate ile a5 &°. Sa oe fe $= Te \ . “f . rai tay be bt fate es 47 . _ . ole on wd ase ll, | ¢ ’ TABLE OF COWEUTS Page Incroductory Section .Sza reity of documentary evidence . 2 2 2 2 0 eo ee ee eo ceo eo ow L Pelationship of assassization plencing to goverrzent policy 2 Ris of essassinatios whea a govermment is overtarom ... 2.20 & : Resorts to svaecdoche § 4 ; e . Published fatelligense on the possibility of Castro's denise 2... § ee Accurucy of the story Drew Pearsea has 6 3 Miscellac-ous Schemes Prior to August 1960... 26222 eee eee Y | ferosol Attack on Badio Station . . 2 ee ee se ee ee ew ee 10 i i Contaminated Cigars 22 : Depilatory «2. s« eee ees ee eee ese eos eee eve woe LG | : Gambling Syndicate ~ Phase 1. 2 0 e's se eee ee ee eo we wo ow ow A [ ‘ Genesis of the plot . 1. ee eee te ee we eset oo oo Lh ° ‘First contact with Maheu 15 1 O'Connell named as case officer . 1 2-2 ee te we ee ee ew wo BG ats First meeting with Roselit 16 ; Brieficg of Dulles and Cabell hb. 1 eo ee ee ee ee ew eo wo eo eo A « First meeting between Maheu and Glancaza 18 ., baad - Qrue identities of Glancess and Trufficente become known . . . « 19 3 C . Role of frafficante 19 j : eS Early planning on the means of assassination . « «2» «6 = « « « « & . . Gunn‘s involvement with lethal cigars 21 | H a Greichler's preparation of lethal cigars .. 6 26 2 «ee 2 «© ¢ « « al i woe Delivery of the cisars to Gunn 22 | t. Fall Roosevelt learns Of the pisot eo e @ o ee @ © © © © © @€ @ © & © & © 23 5 Te Possible vays of packaging the poison ‘ 23 = NF Yecisicn to package the poison in pill forms . . 2 2 2 0 0 0 « 0 o SH eth ow Juan Orta is identitied as the syndicate's ran in Cuba 25 a _ ° Guan tests the plils on guizrea pigs . 2. 220 0 0 ee ew ee oe oo BF i foe lg. Sequence preceding passing the pills to O'Connell 26 7 e.- oe O'Connell receives the pills and passes them to Roselli... . - 27 co | . uF ns Earvey is briefed on the operation ‘2e Pa - Trafficente receives the pills and gives thes to Orta . . 0 + « o Of ° { & Identification of Orta as - | ps Sme Orta channel collapses cece ce ce ew ee we ee ee ‘ ry . Varona is brought into the operation os 29 7 Edvaré K. Moss eee e es ee eee eee eee eee eco eo 2 | _£ 4 ._ Roselli associates O'Commeil with CIA 3h . B ~ Funds are epproved for pessing to Varoma «. 2 2 2 « 0 « © © 0 @ «© 3h” | an Money and lethal pills are passed to Varona . . . 32 | . & oo Varona’s restaurans coatact in Cuba 2. 2 2 ce eo et te ee ow FO _ , - ° Edwards calls off the operation 33 ti | a elem « i, cote, . Disposition of the pills: ... sec ccc e ee ese se veoeng FL 3 “SS : Ned) - List of those witting of the operation — | | - AH, was LI otacg g a one Ps wee eS
13-00000 net oe Sapien’, fer 3 hen ot ' . “a Gussiing Syndicate - Punse 2.0 ee ee ee eee wee ee ee @ Why Sarvey was brieved am Phase 1. 1 6 ee ee ee ee ee we we GS Earvey put fa charge of tae Executive Aczica Capadility 37 Harvey briefs Helms ca the Executive Acticn Capability... .. . 33 t QIsIN- plenced assassicatios of Liununza : 36 j f * : Approval of Frroject. ITTTE oe ce ee ee we woe eae woe os 2 $ Fy Biscell guts Earvey in charge of the Castro operation ' 39 an Sa Earvey is told ne will head the Cuba task for ee eee © 2 © « 39 Farvey’s first meeting with Edvards on tes Castro operation Germication of QIaIM. 2. 2 ee ee eee ee ee ee eee ee oe oe AL Yarcvey briefs Eelms on the Castro cperacica . BL Citfertircg views Qs. the tusmover to Harvey oe © © © © © @ © @ &@ & @ &L Rarvey's first meetizg vith Boselll in Yew York City 43 Resellé end O'Conne DL. zo tO Miesi. sw eo we ew ee woe we ww kg Earvey leaves for Milam! with lethal pitis hé Roselli is alresdy fia touch with Varorna. . . so « * «© #« s « « o 47 Harvey takes over “a gsizng operatioa® uy . Changes in gangster personzel participating . . « « oe 0 © 0 co 48 ° Maceo enters the operation 4B Earvey supplies weapons and equipment to Veroma . 2 2 2 0 0 0 oo 89 Roselli reports that the pills are in Cuba 50 > -f =) Varona sends a three-man teum 16 Cuba 2 ee eo eo ew we ew eee eee $1 r¢ aa ; Yarona plens to send three militia men to Cuba 51 Harvey and Bésellii agree to temisate the operation | oe eee e 52 Roselit cones to Washingtoa ta meet Harvey 53 List of persons witting of this phase cr the operation 55 eee cect oy Aten MODE O 8 eH The Wiretapping Incident .. cece cesc ese ee eeseec es ime uf (St Pee BO. Glencane asks Makeu to beg Hovan's roca . Likely date of the bugging incident . .. 2 ew 2 eo eo oo wo 0 2 3G Maheu asks Edvard Du Bois to do the job . . _ Du Bols assigns Ballettl and Eerrison to the Job. « « oe oe eo “ Wiretep made instead of microphones plant 59 . Balletti is caught ard poores Makeu for kelm. . «2 eese ses 8 Maheu refers the FSI to CIA . Shef Eédvards meets with an FSI representative . . «se ee © « Efvards intervenes with Sas Papich on Mebeu’s behalf 61 Houston intervenes with the Justice Derartmeat. » « 2 2 «ee ee Houstoa briefs General Carter - Edvards and Houstoa brief the Attorney General. . . 2. 2. 0 0 « + 628 Edvards sends a menorendm record of the meeting to Kennedy 63 Ganbling Syndicate - Poase 2 is already wider way 2 2 6 2 0 « 2 o GF . se _Eelms is briefed on the meeting vith the Attorzey Gezeral &§ “3% ° Edvards varms Mervey to clear vita the DCI. . 2 2 0 ee 2 oe ee &F : 7 = ae Kennedy's request on 4 March 67 for e copy of the briefing meno 65 . | aa Aen eaten 1.08 28 SR «OMEN ORES NE SD om euERENIN Ss PHD fi rr 8 . sects PEs. gh Se ee wa . ow BS8er PEPDY meremceenetet iA LOE IA RELL SEC AE: ' a 9 ane steel Poem > PT ee Beet “pee oom aes al oa i. Cn er a . : oe - : : . a 2 ee we a eR TR ee eo mde ceiigs i” Saat ating fk ye ee Bo ee ote. g Bt EE hatte *, on, iB sl de he aed
13-00000 The siretapoicg Iacidest (sontisued) Calcego Sua-Tizes stery of 15 aug 53 re Glancana & CIA. . . . 2 « GT { Chicago Baily ews story of 9D Auz 63 ve Glancaca & CIA . 8&9 Y Fains sends McCore a copy of the Hennedy brieficg memoranim. . . 69. : ¢ ap Risers nov connect CIA & gangsters in plot to kill Castro 70 * . The Long Committee. 21 ee ww ewe eo ee wwe ee ers ow o Th Former Make eaployee called to testity Ti She Onassis-hiarcaos fignt over cll saivping rights . . . ««e«.- Ji Mateu is hired ty archos esd is sypsorted by CIA . 12 : CIA faterveces ca Rlarshos’ bekult. «2 2 2 6 0 2 os ee © 2 eo 72 ; & Te Long Ceommittes plans to resurrect the Ocassis viretep 72 : *s CIA intervenes with the Leng Comaiccee on Mabeu's behalf. . . . . 73 : ‘ ws Mareu epplics pressure on CIA to avoid publicity 73 mi] : Makeu indicates he may brief his attormey . 2 2 0 0 0 0 eo eo wo Th ! 4 ; Scheres in Early 1963. e eo oe e oa ¢ a e 2 @ e oe eS - - © a ‘e e oe e es oe 73 . Skin Diving Suit. «6 © 6 eo no eo eo ow ewww eewn eo eve a 45 ; 7° i Gift free Donovan to Castro 75 feet TS fhe suit is bought and zage reads. . 0 0 0 eo ee ee ew ow 2 TS t . . {se plan is overtazen dy events 75 { i ‘ $ y . Lést of persoas wht cticze eee % © &® © © © &@ © &O 8B he ew oO we 73 | C m Booby-trapped Sea Shell TT . i j . Books on Moliusca ere bought . 2. 0 0 ee ee ee ee wr eee oo CT { i. - fee plan proves to be iupracticable . TT 4 ‘ Ramee of those wittiscg e ee @ eo oem @ e es e e & cd es a oe & e - oe 7? { ¥ 5 Project AMIASE = Rolando Cubela. eo e@ e@ # © © @ @ @ ®@ @ @ Bw © ee & a 78 i s «dc | meeting with Cubela in Mexico City (Mar 61)...... 78 i 2 5; Gubela‘s role in the Cuban revolutioa . Fa- & ed Cubela reported Gisafzected «620 ees 2 eee eee een eee 79 - a Mexico City meeting inconclusive 79 . ‘ Gi: . *@ubela and Juan Orta vant to extiltrate (Mar 61)... 2... . - 8 | = oo * + Cubela asks for meeting in Paris (aus &.) 81 { z “ tings in Helsinict (aug ea). o- os 83 [’ : 7 Meetings in Steckhols . 1. 2 2 2 0 0 oe ee 0 oe ow ow eee oo f Cabela objects to the word “assassicate™ 65 : 3 Paris reetings (Aug 62); S/s & dezcléuion training... ..... 85 ' ¥ Meetings in Porto Alesre (Sep: 53) . & t ; Paris meetings (Oct 63); Cubela wants assurance fron U.S.Govt . . 87 | & FitcGersla seets with Cutela fs furis (Ges 35) as ( j 99 { : a _ Differing versions of wnat FitrGeralé told Cubela . 1. 2 a c oo « — | : : : . oe eee Fs . : aod oe jap rd ee aa cate ome ee a teiteremye ® Biodome, oaittdeys Peg’. 6”: wee > | = veg thet othe meme DA Ss UT aes Me SEIT
13-00000 3 * a a . $ 27 . a ee rr J . = ge ete gs : ‘ ° = a ie aoe - e e ger ay . we Seb? Be a a & ae” s. Prod ry we a eee fe - 8 ‘ pina pupae 8 venetian eden: Ce. an eee aA) R. RIEED 4 We Rate ao esate saseaeineshiitereruiilata list eedeniat are een ae ee anni ctat is iS 7 Se ie ears ~ Artine gives Cubela silencer and other special gear . . 2 o «6 » 103 Second neane-line between Cutele and gexblisg syndicate operacion 164 Headquarters tersizates all cunlucis with Cutels gress. 2. 2 2 2 10% Cubela and others arrested; plead guilty (Har 66) The charges so eee ee ee ee eee eee tee eee see 100 8 Castro asxs -for leniency 109. Mestinony about the silencer... 0.2 ee eee ee eww 2109 Cubela expecte to be executed 119 Cubela sentenced ta 25 years’ im=prisomest. eceeceeece ea ce LW Ne mention made of Cubcla's pre-Nov 6 dealings with CIA 1 _ Memo to Secretary of State (Rusk), Subject: CIA Involve nent in Cuban Counter-revolutionary Activities — Arrest of Relands CUSELA Secades and Zarnon Tomas GUIM Diaz,dated 7 March 1965 (added after completion of report) [epee eect sec ee cece rece s BR ~coniciepimern + Project AMLASS - Roleado Cubeia (continued) 4 ° Cuba cache approved for Cubela. 2. 2 2 0 ee ee ee ee eo we ow OL a fae Blacks Lear 40 schese 1 discussed 92 t Guana coaverts a ballpoint ven into a hypodermic syringe . - + « « 93 H Saachez gives to Cubels in Paris walle Keomedy fs shos 938 . ! ’ Cubela asks for high-povered rifle with telescopic sight. ... . 93a if Those witting of the Black Leaf 40 eptsote 94 re i Cubela cache put down (vithou: stzlee) (tas Gi). ww ww ee GS Cubela requests a allescer for a FAL rifle _ oT SAS requests TSD to produce FAL silencer on crash basis . 2. « « » OF Second Cubela cache put down (with FAL rivies)(Jumé 64) - | Of Artize meets Cubeis intermilfary. 2. 2 2 2 eo ee ce ee ee eo GG Artice agrees to reet with Cubele persomlty 9 Sanches meets Cukela in Parts (Dec Gi). 2... 0 2 ee ee ee wo oe lOO Explanation of how Artine and Cubela vere. put together 100 Artine and Cubela meet in Kadrid (Dec 6+) - - - - + - + + + + + 2CL “Artize agrees to faruish sileacer ace 12 mo Bmore os emby "s i z a fe yd eet: hee we ee ad Tart hips yee & Sees z SRT Eats ato. ae cae ae han gree * te, se ne» Nate a on we ards Rates Seem ges pa astge pes Seen cap Se neo gni — ta, we, ee are ae . e
13-00000 ak 6 oe an | a ot ' Sey Lee aad cithe eR, 5 * . ge bat eee) me e at aca 25 April 1907 PEMORALICUN ; g Ghis reconstruction of Agency involvement ia Plans ve) , ¥ assassinate Fidel Castro is at best an inperfect history. Because. of the extreze censifivit7 of the operations. being discussed or attexpted, as a catter of principle no official recorés were kept : Ay of planning, of approvals, or of implementation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to to tue main events or were put on paper from memory years aftervard. William Sarvey has retaized skeletal notes of his activities duricg the . t years in question, and they are our best source of dates. Dr. wee cape mages Edvard Gun, of the Office of. Medical. Services, has a record of when he met end when and exryptic references to the subjects discussed. . | of SSR, kes a record of tvo or three dates that ere te dived. Although fragzentary, their records are a help in establishing . Their recollections of dates are particularly hazy, and sqme of thes pertinent. Gunma and | were involved in only the technicel] aspects of operatiozal planning, and their participations vere short— « akambed se . critical tise fre=es. Operational files are useful. in some instances, because they give detes of meetings, the substances of which may be faferzed troa collaterst information. For the most part, though, we have kad to rely oa informatica ; { given to us orally by pecpie whose memories are fogged by time. > teen * : it es, fas, vie wep Ielobee matin «earl we
13-00000 oS eee | iY g i 8 4 4 are no longer eble to kaep the details of cne plan separate freq those ” i é : of esothe.. We interviewed everyone whem ve could identify as Limely ' | : ° . . : a ee ¢ to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of Hr. Dulles and Geseral Cateli. A complete list is attached at Tab A. We did not go on fishing expeditions among the mere possihles. To have done so veuld have risked neking witting a mmober of esploywes vno vere previously * unvitting and, ia our esticate, vould have added. little to the detatis avallapls frees those dizectly involved. There are incorsisteacies 4 enong the various accoumta, but most of thes can be resolved by ‘ : collating the information fienicked by all of the identifiable je my participants in a particular plen and by then checking it against — 3 specific dates’trat can be fixed vith fair certainty. We believe . that this reconstruction of what happened and of the thinking ces eemcgratnrtn ats Hom associated with it is reasounbly sound. If there are significant - inaccuracies in the report, they are most likely to occur in faulty omlering of the sequence of events. Feople still rezember puch of what happened, tat. they can no longer recall. precisely vhen. a 4B So! dh & Sp “a at Petgre® ,, +o . a, r pot “Ke becane clea= very eaxty tn our investigaticn that the vigor H q . , with which schemes vere pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro oo persorally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government's efforts i : to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases f i { t im Agency assassination plemirg, although the transitions fra: one i : | ° “% f 4 *% . . . a . | — . . i ada . : owe 3 . - oe ee cae aire nit hy RCs a a . SF . et me ce ins tgicAai ction cnenseni es Sieve a ETE Sp ROG ES : ae esa pect wth weeps oa oye cen ee TULA eG ee Tee een ee Pa eae ee tetyitens cceecoets jetenteen yy Cee ek a> eee Se rr cn ete : an : oer
13-00000 orphan PytS iy 4 to another are not aivays starsly defined. Sach phase is a reflection of the then prevailicg Goveraneat attitudes tovard the Cubea regine. i a. Prior to August 1960: All of the identifiable schenes: prior to to about August 1960, with one possible exception, vere ained only at discrediting Castro versonally by influencing his behaviour or by altering nis <ppearance. b. August 1950 to April 1951: The plots that were hatched: in late 1960 and early 1951 were aggressively pursued and were viewed by at least seme of the participants as being merely one aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow wae regime a | “4 that culninated in the Bay of Pigs. . . C- . oo ec. April 1961 to lete 1961: A major schene that vas Paes _begua in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and ; remained dormant for several months, as ata most other Agency 7 a - : operational. activity related to’ Cuba. . “ “Ta. inte 1961 to late 1962: ‘That particular scheme was 1...“ meactivated in early 1962 and vas egain pushed vigorously in the’ era of ‘Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense admini— stration pressure on CIA to do scuething about Castro and his crisis of Gctober 1942 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the ar Ure Cs : tes j) Segete A Se “appear nmntiise Ean 4? ot See aes Mew le ee Mata ET eee ot ote 7 grees ert em “ee Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuben nissile i { i { ee eee mate ose rttte cements - ‘eoabea soe
13-00000 ( Y ° aggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived fa : . ‘ April 1962 was firally terninated in early 1953. ‘wo other ! plots vere originated ia 1963, but both vere inpracticable and nothing ever cane of then. . We cennot overemphasize the extent to vhich responsivle Agency officers felt themselves Subject to the peat tration's severe pressures to do some thing about Castro and his regise. The fruitiees and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in that Light. so . Many of those ve interviewed stressed two points that are so ey 4 “ obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe, . - though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of the - . * oe - dominant figure in a goverament, even vhen loyalties are held to hia — ° personally rather. than to the goverment as a body, will not . a : Hecessarily cause the dommfall of the governnent. This joint was . “7 stressed with respect to Castro and Cube in en internal CIA draft aos oe 2 . | Paper of October 1961, vhich was initiated in response to General | to = i - id eee a Py "a wna * Maxvell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The peper took the position that the deuwise of Fidel Castro, fron vhatever cause, would . ~ offer little opportunity for the Liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control. ‘The second point, vhich is more specifically , relevant to our imvestigation, is that bringing about the dovnfall of ’ = * @ government necessarily requires the rewoval of its leaders frou. + APmRDUED cen aC OLAV, ATR. RHINE 2! & Oe ieee “2 Ma cmpeemortag ne Stes este ew ee pedee nw ateteens na tte ey anne eet + lad wee Fee . aad seta" eee ttn hoe Ces re no i re ee ed
13-00000 . 2 oe positions of pover, and there is alvays che ris« that tne sartici- eagee Pieey SsUteta-eLsTte aS fe. ¢ wepite see memes os ure one to.otericokthe-kiliéngs-of ir Dies oof eTrusiblo-by - forses_enconurmged.but-not- controLied-by~tne-Us3 .- Goverment. There is a third point, whies was not directly made by asy of ‘ ‘ those we interviewed, but vhich emerges clearly fraa the interviews : and from review of files. “ime point is that of frequent resort to rynecdoche--the mention of a part when tke whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, ve encounter repeated references to phrases such _ a? 1%) as “disposing of Castro," which may be read ia the narrov, literal AC sense of assassirating him, when it is intended that it be read in . } 5 the broader, figurative sense of dislodging she Castro regime. ° j :. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking veguely of “doing scme- ; | 4 : thing about Castro” vhen it is clear that what they have specifically j sf - e , 6 fin mind is killing hin. In a situation wherein those speaking may not Lave actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said , what they actually feant, they should uot be surprised if their oral ee er ° shorthand is interpreted ditferently than was intended. xX EMSS eS TRS “6 : The suggestioa was made to us that operations aimed at the sa) ° assassination of Castro may have been generated in en atmosphere of : mm ¢ stress in intelligence publications om the possibility of Castro's * | SRE NORA S PORN Ser 4 Wi ' 7 ‘ al soma a wre gS oe Cer se. . oh. a B qeroge 2, e oy 1 oe - bie on . — i : nome 8. _ ya _ <A ‘ ad ae “g *
13-00000 ete Ler ar + ° ‘ as 2 ee bare ey ary éezise Bed on the reordering of the political structure thas wculd foliow. We reviewed intelliseace publications fram 1953 sarcugs A 1966, including National Intelligence Estizates, Special national Intelligence Estizcates, Intelligence Menorexdiz2as, acd Memorandus for the Director. ‘ha HIZ's on “Ihe Situation asd Prospects in Cuba" for 1950, 1953, and 1564 Lave brief yaregrepss ua itzely successor govermments £f Castro were to depart the scene. fe also find similar short references in a SHEZ of March 1960 and in an Intelligence Memorandum of May 1955. In each case the treatment is no more nor jess than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups such 4 “ ae these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the i " } iC; , operators were unduly influenced by the content of intelligence . ' publications. + Pee aa amet en: & ; Drev Pearson's colim of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA a a plan. in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. Pearson elso has information, as yet umublished, to the effect that there vas a ; meeting at the State Department at which essassiration of Castro . TR . Was discussed and that a tear actully landed in Cxta Wath pitts to "be used in an assassination attenpt.. There is basis fm fact for each 2 of those three reparts. . . tet - % . a A CIA officer passed an assassinatica weapon to an \ i - Ageacy Cuban asset at a meeting in Paris on 22 Sovenber 1963. . : g . . -¢" Ghe weapon vas a ballpoint pea rigged as a nypodermic syringe. 3 & B é q & to oo = 6- 7 a rp orera aw ney FG ttn ARN cam EOE. es clear get Hg od aye ad we he eek oer, ee oor oe . "pe Le . 2 5 no Yu oa “ Do le > SOT et PR anere oe er gait mee Qe mm RE meme: Ce dene eet nee ewan es gcd
13-00000 a “e Tne CI4 officer suszzeatet chat the Catan naset lezd the syringe | “ with Biles Leaf 40. She evidence fadicaces that the neeting * was under way at the very moneat President Keanédy was shot. i ° b. Shere vas a aceting of the Srecial Group (Avzzeated) i in Secretary Rusz'a confereace rocm on 10 August 1922 at vhich , Secretary McNazara brouched the subject of liquidation of . Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted ia a Profect MONGOOSE . aan action mesorandim prepared by Ecvard Lansdale. At asothes _ * Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there vas discussion of 2 - a recently-disseminated Clandestine Services inforzation report . . ‘ nok) on a Cuban exile plot to assassinate Castro. CIA had refused i . G ; ~ the extlets request for funds and bad 29 Lnvolvezent in the plot. , é . ce. CIA tvice (first in early 1962 asd again in early 1942) ° i @ supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate centers vorking * fot in. bebalf of CIA on 4 plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1761 7 eS . plot aborted and the pills vere recovered. ‘Those furnished in | Bi cp 0 1 ta, ABTA 2982 vere passed by the gambling symifeste representative . no - * "to a Cuban exile leader in Florida, vho in tum bad then sent to - z. - Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962 the exile leader reported that Bos . . a teen of three nen had been dispatched to Cubs to reeruft for the é - operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the teem would : i make an attempt on Castro's life--perbaps using tre fills. ; ‘ Py * = ° a : . . > >a r Le eee nog, wsgeers venice ee "Pages omen nase pe AeA intel ab aR Na Bi LI Meee REET, * 3 i gE GAN Napeet RLgee a ets BS Trace Sore ee elton ge a teh, eben cere, em 8 Mam 2 oe
13-00000 -_ ie, 7 "4 cow emasnvtnt tet APL BID MoS, a LEU A LAR EMO OMe se mae. r ary Firs ag = rs ; = é ° | Tris report describes these and other eplsodes in details puts thea into verspective; aad reveals, that while the eveats deserited sy a 4 Drew Pearson did occur and are subject to being patched togethe> as though one complete story, the implication of a divect, causative : . relationship amorg them is unfounded. _ os a. fied o 6F e cateparene enema rcemnenrenscaren tins SETI 18 PB EE Ws ae. ARBOR A SPR MS TELE DIOR, 2 EP, 33 ’ va Y “2. . a a ee a . 7 . , @ ¢ a 8 Loe to, tag 8 “3 ' oe g a ‘, ? e . ti a a spree te EET ACA A Ep EA POE
13-00000 3 A OS + 88 sabe mer a Bat. . e¢ . ry foe.. @.3: 3 ° g . © taste 2 4 © Sop etge ., +, : ‘ Sit ease tercenn 4 ene REEPA IK. EK TARR | Gees. pws age ? meee 3 Po otha ue tape L209 5 te ate a kent i ort aS 2 Hee OF Ste ee, mate Sure Sree Ble a . % ‘he ee RE a ee pinnae veo : nd . Pee te Been. . - pan tap b 43a tbe ad : . i Miscellaneous Schezes Prior to August 1950 | March ta August: 1960 . We find evidence of at least three, and perhaps four, tchenes that were wider consideration vell before the gay of Pigs, but ve can fix the time frame only speculatively. -Those who have sone lmowledgs of the episodes guessed at dates renzing from 1959 through 1962. ‘The March-to-August span. ve have fixed may be too narrov, but . it best fits the limited evidence we have. : @.. None of those ve interviewed who was first assigned to ‘the Cuba task force after the Bay of Piss kmowse of any of these echesnes. b. J.D. (Jake) Esterline, who vas head of the Cuba task force in pre-Bay of Pigs days, is probably the most reliable witness on general timizg. Ee my not have been privy to the “precise details of any of the plans, but ke seems at least to | oe have known of all of them." He 4s no longer able to keep the ° Getaiis.of one plan seperate from those of another, but each of the facets he recalls fits sowevhere into one of ‘the Scheses. Hence, © we conclude that all of these schemes vere under consideration + ermamny a cone wat vhile Esterline had direct responsibility for Cuba operations. oe ow  @» Esterline himself fumishes the best clue as to the
13-00000 possible tine span. He tainzs it unlizvely that esy plsnalag of this sort would have progressed to the polat of considerecioa . x of means until after U.S. policy concerning Cuba was decided upon about March 1960. By about the esd of the third quarter of 1950, the total energies of the task force were concentrated on the main-thrust effort, and there would have been no interest in nox time for pursuing sucha vills-o'-the-wisp as these. * We are unable to establish even a tentative sequence anong the schexes; they may, in fact, have been ucder consideration simulteneously. We i find no evidence that any of these scheses was approved at any ; . . t ’ c! -) level higher than division, if that. We think it most Likely that i ean ar no higker-level approvals vere sought, because none of the schemes progressed to the point vhere approval to launch would have been needed. 6 repnen ems -ene exmtmeanann me + jer {SD, renembers discussion of a schese to ° contaminate the air of the redio studio where Castro broadcast his Speeckes with an aerosol spray of a chesical that preéuces reactions siniler to those of lysergic acid (LSD). Nothing came of the idea. [ __]saia he had aiscouraged the schexe, because the chemical could not be relied upoa to te effective. also of ISD, ates «cP och De SEE PERS 2 BRED Ps ORIN Bite AP. O° inte. + LDL OLE : . “e “ os . f ° é ata’ ° e 4 oo... ° Aerosol Attack on Radio Station . | é t C57ere 1 fy) ' 2 © rf & .¥ ° 3 4 ' a A, q vee ae & a ' . ay a) Rt F ae taae 23 3 “ : a : & “4 ‘ y H ef. ar. +4 ‘} .
13-00000 ok ae Oe Ste res, gh er Sit hee SEs wn itg'e: + pb ee Siguget lor ares oe Cems eater, © foe Pemene 99 ag nA 2 ar ars A ages Bey - + Acs SREY ROOT ITURASETNE ITU HEINE ES, CATT at *t vs A e ae id recalls experizentation wiih psychic ecergicers Sut canaot relate it ts Castro asa target. We found so one else vi 3 semembered anything of this plot, vith the possible exception of Jake Esterline who _may kave it confused with other schezes. Contaninated Cigars dake Esterline clairs to have had in his possession in pre-Bay of Pigs days 8 box of = cigars that had becn treated with scue sort of chemical. In our first interview with him, his recollection was that the chemi~zl was intended to produce temporary personality disorientation. The thought was to scmehow contrive to have Castro smoke one before making a speech and then to meke a public spectacle - of himself, Esterline distinctly recalls having had the cigars in Bis serssnal safe eett tbe Ines wah ond end thee they aefinttely vere intended for Castro. He does not renesber how they came into his possession, but he thinks they sust have been prepared by| on a second interview with Bsterline, we mentioned that we had learnea " since firat Speakizg with bis of a schene to cause Castro's beard to fall out. He then said that bis cigars might have been associated with that plan. Esterline finally said that, although it vas" evident that he no longer resembered the intended effect of the cigars, he was positive they vere not letoul. Qae cigars vere never Se
13-00000 . ‘ teen eas “ve «ty used, according to Esterlias, tecause wa/ could cot figure out hoy e { | to deliver thea without danger of blowbacz on the Ayenuy. Ze says he destroyed thea before leaving Wi,* fa June 1951. . Sidsey Gottlieb, of SD, clains to remember distinctly a plot involving cigars. To emphasize the clerity o? his menory, te named the officer, then assigned to WH/CA, who approached him with the scheme. Although there say well have been such a plot, the officer Gottlieb nazed was then assigned in Indfa and has never vorked in ce ae. a . VE “‘Diviston nor hed anything to do with Cuta operations. Gottlieb remembers the scheme as being one that wes talzed ebout frequently but not widely and as being concerned vith killing, not merely with “tate. om 6, influencing behaviour. As fer as Gottlieb knows, this idea never got beyond the talking stage. SD may have gone ahead and prepared - the cigars just in case, but Gottlieb is certain that he did not get the pDD/P*’s (Richard Bissell) personal approval to release them, as would HORM CERCLA, SOESPPE AES SARS FN oe Ue LE AIT ESS. © "tS . have been done if the operation kad gone that far. We are unable to - ; , ; “ discover vhether Esterline and Gottlieb are speaking of a single . 7 of . * eigar episode ‘or of tvo unrelated. schemes. We found no one else with - 3 firm recollections of letnal cigars being considered prior to August 1960. . ; . . € TO RR were g "eet oe ret ose nen aS Se Sadie be abe Se cone “= , i eesuetnen egestas nde mere hor fe i pideiesate Cachet amaerpeeeet oman See a ae mn Aiea ace Sg OE 80 tees
13-00000 . ; ates be ee ; ; . a Py ° € ‘po Mn S Depilatcry , Fa [ ecatts @ scheme involving thellius valts, a chezlcal used by women as a depilatory--the thought teing to destroy Castro’s image as “The Beard” by causing the beard to fall out. The chenical may be administered either orally or by absorption : through the skin. The right dosage causes depliation; too nuch - produces yaralysis.| believes that the idea otiginated in : connection wlth a trip Castro was to have made outside of Cuba. The ; . : icea was to dust thallium powler Into Castro's ahoes when thay were | aey put out at night to be shined. ‘he scheme progressed as far as . : procuring the chemical and testing it on anfmuals. i Ba i f : recollection is that Castro did not make the interded trip, and ° i . the scheme fell. through. renentiers consideration ; : - . _ being given to use of thallium sailte (perhaps against Castro) and . have Something having to do vith boots or shoes.| laces not - a ° . . } remenber with whom he dealt on this plot. We found no one else F : ." Twith fiam knowledge of it. | So i rc &: . . | . ° z wrest a ee a ere eee tt ne pce an’ = . a 8, . . - - ee : mw be tg ae ars -_ we, 3 4 ae al ar o . oe me ee ye Fee | Rte wae aS ES Ara eee sole
13-00000 i a ’ ” ‘# . ctw rcs ee tar ztt a ae ea ee tone a Se eRe ee eee S asdanceteacutcsietercer tories ae Tat! od 4 0, Shwe oe BEN. Oe U te 3 ptoeenne Tree TREES ITE cemretemh Be Preps S20 eh Bede AR & oad TE -much later date--about mid-1962. ee me MEM areas te POOR UB Rl ee RT ee Ganolicg Syndicate The first cericusly-pursved CIA plan to essacsizate Castro had its inception in August 1950. It involved the use of menbers of the crimizal widervorld with contacts inside Cuba. The ‘operation had two phases: the first run fro August 1950 until late Acril or early May 1961, vhen it vas called off following the Bay of Pigs;- the second ran fran Aprtl 1952 until Febriary 1963 and was cerely revival cf the first puase which liad teen inactive since atous May 1961. Gesbling Syndicate - Pease iL August 1 - Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield ,  Eavards, Directar of Security, if Edvards could establish contact with the U.S. enabling syndicate that wes active fm Cuba. The) _ objective clearly was the assassination of Castro although Pavards Claims that there was a studied avoidance of the ters in his conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalis that the idea origizated with J. C. King, thea Chief of Wi Division, although Kirg now recalls having nad only Miaited knovledge of such a plen and at a » 2% — reney ae MT ket! rch sae eh imme he 2m Beem es “ee peg wewens © omcenammen fem amen oe
13-00000 * AAAS ue eee MORNE Vr ORE IAT RONEN OS se Lf tle, gtk pe few gE RT ag ye we : mee cee Tah NL BE Se me og ee EE LL, eraaer peewee @ Edverds consulted 2~vert A. Vaheu, a privece investigates who vt hed done sensitive work for che Agexcy, to see if Msheu had any underworld contacts. Maheu was once a special agent of the Fal. | Ee opened a private office in Washington in 1956. The late Robert Ciumainghem, of the Office of Security (and also a former Special \ Agent. with the Far), imew Vaheu and imew that his business vas having 2 ° @ shaky start financtally. Cunsicghen erranged to subsidize Maheu | to the extent of $500 per nonta. Within six months Maheu was doing . 60 well financielly that he sugge sted that the retainer be discontinued. : Over the years he kas been intizately involved in providing support ' a) for seme of the Agency's more sensitive operations. He has since : C moved his personal headquarters to Les Argeles but retains a Z | Washington office. A more detailed account of Maheu's beckground : eppears in @ separate section of this report. (Comment: Although we see nothing sinister in it, we are struck by the fact tnat so many of the persams whose names appear. ms in this account once worked for the FBI. We have already named aa Cumningkem end Meaheu. later to appear are William | Harvey, Janes O*Connell, and Edward Morgan.) Hsheu acknovledged that he had a contact whe might furnish access to the criminal uéervorid, bas Hahes was most reluctant to allow himself to be involved. in such an assfgnment. He agreed toa . a . CT Furs mtg sé Boe re AL [ I g | | | | | Moe.
13-00000 « A] . adage a 5 fr? a me i eee participate caly afver being presse] oy Elvaras to do co. Maheu identicted Bis contact as one Jchary Roselli, who aived in Las ge Angeles end had the concession for the ice-making sachines on “the , strip” in Las Vegas acd whos Makeu understood to be a menber of the ‘syndicate. Maheu was known to Rosell! 2s a cas vo. kad s mober of large cusiness organizations as clients. Edvards and Maheu agreed that Maheu vould. approach Roselli as the representative of business~ : men with interests in Cuba who saw the elimination of Castro as the essectial] first step ts <he recovery of their invesiments. Maheu . . vas authorized to tell Roselli that his “clients” were willie, to Tee pay $150,000 for Castro's rewoval. é Septexter 1960 ; * Ghet Edvards nezed as bis case officer for the operation 5 , . James P. O'Connell (a forser Special Agent, of the FEL), thea Chief, 4 ne "Operational Support Division, Office of Security. O'Connell and a: TL) Maheu met Roselli {a New York Clty on 1k September 1960 vhere Maheu a e: a : o made the pitch.. Hoselli initially was also reluctant to become : : involved, but finally egreeé to ixtroduce Maheu to “Sam Gola” who ; either kad or could errenge contacts with syndicate elesents in Cuba i. who might-handle the job. Boselli said he nad no interest in being a: - "paid for his particfpation and believed: that “Gold” would feel the +e ¢ se ee ee | ee Ap iad Up T r ane bongs ec tT ET Te aig ornate ten es IT eee te SEE ERG
13-00000 Se hk IEEE Ie: SY é “age ‘s set Dearest cae as rR NPN AT COREE TP CR, REP GP SE Gee * ae sase way. A menorand=s for the recerd prepared by Sheffleli Livaris on 14 May 1962 states: “ilo monies vere ever paid to Rosell! aad Gisscara. Msheu was pafd part of his expense atacy during the periods _ that he was in Miast." (Giancana is “Gold.") O'Connell vas introduced (ia true sane) to Roselli as an employee of Maheu, the explanation being taat O*Concmell woulé handle the case for Maheu, because Meheu vas too busy to work on it full tine himself. No one else in the Office of Security vas made witting of ; . . the operation at this tice. Edwards hizself aid not meet Roselli until the summer of 1942. ' ¢ a . At thie point, about the second talf of September, Shef Zdvards © : al told Bissell that he had a friend, a private investigator, who had | . a contact vho in turn had other contacts through whom syndicate ° elements in Cuta could be reached. These syndicate elements in a ’ es ants atc wegnmger map men: Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter part of September 1960, Edvards, O'Connell, and Bissell were the only wah. ’ e Ve ot “ones in the Agency yho laiew of a plan against Castro involving U.S. ; bay gangster elements. Zdverds states teat Richard Helms was not infersed ; of the plan, because Cuba vas being kendled by Bissell at that tine. : With Bissell present, Edvards briefed the Director (Allea Dulles) end the DDC (General Cabell) on tne existeace of a plan involving . foc} members of the syndicate. She discussion ves clrevaspect; Edvards : i
13-00000 = ode oot, a. dow r - : @ deliberately avolded the use of acy “tad vords.” Tee descriptive ceca 3 used was “an intelligence operatioa.” Edvards is quite sure that the . DCL acd the DDCI clearly understocé ae nature of the operatioa he was aiscussing. Re recalls describing the channel es being "from A to . BtoC." As he then envisioned it, "A" was Meheu, "3B" ves Roselli, ; . aod "C* was the principal in Cuba. “Edwards, recalls that Mr. Dulles nerely nodéed, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly, . : there was no opposition. Edwards states thet, while there was no 7 forzal approval as such, ke felt that he clearly kad tacit approval : > _ ‘to use his cv judguent. Bissell camitted $150,000 for the support - ememeien vemmaet G of the operation. . (Ccument: In the light of this description of the briefics, = a it is appropriate to comjecture as to just what the Directer did os oman can © en approve. Xt is safe to conclude, given the men participating ; and the general. subject of the meeting, that there was Little 11et Lthood of misunderstanding--even though the deteils were t. ; i i . { $ cj i< . @eliterately blurred and the specific intended. result was never a8 - 7 . pr stated in unmistakable language. It is also reasonable to a . conclude that the pofated avoidance of “bad words" exphasized | - " “te the participants the extrene sensitivity of the operatica.}., During the veek of 25 September 1960, O'Connell and Mabeu- wens to — _B- a ‘pontemananinaree moment S07 1 PAN Se: Fa serge ede te Aah i Mert Cnn atten Stree og i,
13-00000 | os fia the Fomtaicbleau Eotel. “Gola” said ke ned ea san, vee ke Lé-ntified only as “Joe,” who would sesve as courier to Cuta end i v : make arxazgenens there. HMeheu pointed out “Gola” to O'Concell . | frou a distance, but O'Connell never net either “Gold” or “Joe.” Ee did, however, learn their true identities. Aa Office of Security penorandim to the DDCI of 2% June 1955 places the tine as “several weeas later.” O'Connell is now uicertein as to whether it was on this first visit to Miami or on a subsequent one that he and Makeu learned. cy - the true identities of the tvo men. Maheu and O'Connell vere staying og ope - at separate hotels. Maheu Phoned O'Connell one Sunday moraing aad . /) . called his attention to-the Parade supplecent in one of that morning's CG: a Miant newspapers. It carried an article on the Cosa Nostra, with . nenwee.ose w - pictures of prominent menbers. The man Maheu and O'Connell knew as "Sam Gold” appeared as Mon Salvatore (Sam) Giencena, a Chicago-based, gangster. “Joe, the courier" (who was never identified to elther Habeu or O'Connell in any other way) turned out te be Santos Trartficante, the Cosa Hostra chieftain in Cuba. _ ; At that tise the gambling casinos were still operating in, Cuta, and Trafficante was maxing regular trips between Miami and Eavasa on syndicate business. (The casinos vere closed and gambling vas canned, effective 7 Janvary 1959. Ca 13 January 1959, Castro annouced that Fe re no de ae EE Ce SE a ke wl the casinos would be persitted to reopen for tourists and foreigzers a: = Seeteg UOPER ERG Fe aE APTS is PTE on : . “ 6 ' anita 00 eambomnen | 19 wanes som 4 oe g a e .
13-00000 out that Cutecs would Se carred. She cabicet on 17 feorusry 1959 authorized reopening the casinos for the tourist trede. Time segazine * for 2 March 1959 emnounced that the casizcs tad been reopened the- previous week. The New York Mines issue of 30 Septenber 1961 enrounced that the last of the casinos sill mmring‘hed been closed.) Trafficente was to wake the arrangements vith cne of kis centacts inside Cuba on one of his trips to Havana. - Fa and Barly inter 1950 Very early in the operation, well before the first contact vith + ieee Roselli, the machinery for reedying the means of assassination vas & ‘o set ia motion. The sequence of events is not clear, but it is | apparent that a mmber of methods were consicered. Preparaticn of some materials vent ahead without express approval. (Comment: It should be noted that TSD maintains a stock of equipment and materials for operatiosal use. When queries are BG Ayeemce Coa 5 2490 im cna Gale cio a Ome oe + att. . : e Bes i Y “ ’ "2° 3". wade of TSD technicians about materials or devices that are not stock items, it is not wusval for th: technicians to go * ahead vith the preperation of the weterfials or devicés aziinst the event that there {fs e formal reqzest for then. Because of * this, uniue significance should not be attached to edvance -- preparations for this operatica. I< should also be noted thas se . » : > eed $e OAD AEADPDUPD 1S GRAYED ASG OUBEA atm Gh COTA SLANTED ED Gb TT IPA ETAT AGI SS See ISI AAEGR ASSO ERS SEDI vee SS eon eT ED og oy . : . ‘ ' = sous a es roan) . : ey Se ee ee seen og Bae! 2 ONL me SO os Pe BS se “~ we, Gee: . odes ve att dagen yg to oh ot mp Ot. . + ae ieee Pa Pee ey eee
13-00000 ene apa ve Teg ieente e it was not unusual at the tice in questioa for the Chief of sp oe Cornelius Roosevelt, then Chief of TSD, has the clear impression Nab to be by-passed in operations involving his people. While ; ‘ f that all requests were levied through his, instances vere cited in the course of this inquiry where such was not the case. ‘The “ practices and procedures in existence at the time may account, ; . at least in pars, for the differing recollectioas of what did and . _ what did not hapren and for the differing Cegrees of significance tye OS given developzents in the =inds of the partistrants.) roe bats Dr. Edvard Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has @ notation tkat on 16 August 1960 he received a box of UO - Cuban cigars to be treated vith a lethal saterial. He understood then -. . © to be Fidel's favorite brand, and ke thinks they were given to him by Shef Edvards. Edvards does not recall the incident. Gunn has @ — : notation that he contacteaf of TSD, on 6 September 1960. [eestor experimenting with some cigars and then treating , . . - ‘a full box. He cannot nov recall whether he vas initially given two ~ 2 pe : * boxes, experimenting with one and then treating the other; or whether . : ' he bought a box for exverizentation, after which he treated the box " supplied hia by Gunn. Ee does ‘not, in fact, remeber Gunn as the ‘Supplier of any cigars. Ya is positive, though, that he ata contaninate « a full box of fifty cigars with botulinu toxin, ¢ a virulent ‘poison that - QL. D ¢ oe vat Si ewatemeewans e-GrnaOT REN: NK OA BR 1S oT Be aR PePRewoRe. 1 WE abe ka Stee etd “ mame re . “tow. ~ we eink wee etcetera» tee rg em ae pater dae ee” .
13-00000 ed ra! gee geo oy yt . t 7 . : tbe bee § de eid a xe produces a fatal filiness some hours after it is ingested. distinectsy resenbers the .flaps-and-seals joo he hsd to do on the box 5 : othr: aad co each of the wrapped cigars, both to get at the cigars and to erase evidence of tampering. We kept cne of the experizental cigars and still has it. He retested it duriag our inguiry and found that ‘the toxin still retained 94% of its original effectiveness. The cigars were so heavily contaminated that merely putting one in the mouth would do the job; the! tntendea victim would not actually have to smoke it. / Gunn's sotes show that he reported the cigars as beirg ready / for delivery og 7 October 1960. | notes do not show actual delivery until 13 February 1961. ‘They do not indicate to vhon Fos CePA 4 I RR Te ERG 2 he, ° _ delivery vas made. Gunn states that he took the cigars, at some wuspecified tive, and kept them im his personal safe. He rewenbers . Cm destroying thez within a month of Shef Edwards retirement in June 4963. . awa (Coument::" Others recall. the cigar schese, but only asan i EK - . . ‘4@ea that vas ‘considered end then discarded. Roosevelt, Chief ~ a : of TSD at the time, and O'Commell, the case officer, recall the = * cigar scheme, but feel. that it was never considered seriously. To Gum who gave it a good deal of tie but did not participate im the broader operetional discussions, the cigare loom as isportant.) . a 1550. - ee tay, ‘ - " cc = . . . .
13-00000 ( 20° 2), : dwards recalls appreacking Roosevelt afte> Bissell hed already ad . é spokes ta to Roosevelt om the subject; Roosevelt recalls speaking to ed jr oe # Edwards after Bissell discussed it wita zévaras. - Bissell does not e .°? recall specific conversations with either of them onthe techaical aspects of the problen, but he believes that he must have "closed the . : , Loop” by talks with both Edvwerds and Roosevelt. | Roosevelt recalls * his first meeting vith Ed. wards as being ia S@wards' office. Edvards E 7 - renenbers asking to be introduced to a chemist. He is sure that he a é Oe did not name the target to Roosevelt, but Roosevelt says be knew it Bx was Castro. Roosevelt believes that he would have put Edwards tn t c- touch with] then chief of TSD's Crentcal Division, but . é . . 2. a no " recollection of such work at that tine. Ld : = a recalls other cperations at other tices, but not this one. Roosevelt bs "|. @f& sey that, if he turned it over 4 —_}L_Jous have Re ‘ ‘ eae * Roosevelt remembers that four, possible. Spproaches were considered: . (i) sone thing highly toxic, such as shelliish poisoa to be adzinistered :, with a pin (which Roosevelt said was vhat vas supplied to Gary Powers); - @). bacterial material in Meuia. fom} (3) ‘Yactertal treatment of a = cigarette or cigar; and (4) a handkerchief treated with bacteria. ae we oe : AA eS The decision, hd the best of his recollection, was that bacteria in ps eue fora was s the best means. Bissell recalls the sane decision, | L} Sepp ee ln Sethe ede ae ee ee ke e . ns ; a 4 : . eae BS peed LE Peas z0 BB: n08 pital tget s pece en ln Fe + Este Ss 9 a ERE Jha eaoe ae rw | iter. ceva A ok ot aS PUN Sie PA . : eee
13-00000 8 ? ° ‘¢° : iw. i £ a tan 8 8 iets asidce fe « é ey yoo - ¢ $  *. tying i+ to a recollection that Castro frequently crack tea, coffee, i ° or boufllon, for which a Liquid poisen would be particulerly vell "30 . : sulted. i Janvary - February 1961 : Despite the decision that,a poison in liquid fora vould be most fb : desirable, what vas actually prepared and delivered was a solid in 7 ‘ the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets. [ q ; . i renembers meeting with Edwards and O'Connell in Edvaris® office to _ : sy : discuss the requirement. The specifications were that the poison te . : , | co steble, soluble, saze to hendle, undetectable, not immediately acting, " . F and vith a firmly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to | meeting all of those requirements, and it msy be put up in efther | , liquid or solid for. | _|states that the pill. form was } io . Chosen because of ease and safety of handling. ie. : ic (Comment: ‘The gangsters may have bad soze influence on the ee a * choice of a hans of assassination. O'Connell says that inhis ~~ . i nit i 2 mo, very early discussions vith the gangsters (or, rore precisely, ; A . Wsheu's discussions vith them) consideration was given to possible : i } : ' ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency-had first Lets em eee e £ thougr.t in tems of a typical, ganglend-style killing in whick a 4 | Castro would be gunced down. Giancase was flatly opyosed to the Ss 4 a. & 7 att
13-00000 we a i rer. we me mm SOR we ete my Seep aorme . prem mete mm SRM ECS oe 28 pba, tribe edble ¢ sw Le ev) beet fi i ie a uce of firearms. He caida that nO one eculd be recruited to do the Job, Lecause th- chance of survival and escape vould be . * negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante (“Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that rid oe wae gatmee + would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gaagsters ; 4 + i ‘ e é t 3 e named their men inside as Juan Orta who was then Office Calef ra “e and Direcczor Gereral of the Office of the Prine Minister (Castro). dete prmemes 8 arte The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to eon ¢ ) receive kickbacks from the gaubling interests, had since lost a ee that. cource of income, and needed the coney.) When Edvards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even _ disintegrate, let alone dissolve. [tone them back and made up a new batch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards , abe pace nee! - at that point vanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. Je 3 . called on Dr. Guna to make an independent test of then. Edwards gave Guan money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. Gunn has a record. of a conversation vichl on & February 1951. It may have related-~to the ‘tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that . Guma tested the pills om the guinea pigs and found them ineffective. ar. _L. ae om, 4 am, LB oe, meurintes “i wry a oe : SMPTE TERT Tt ot a? ae wre, fag ried ay? sean ede Rad etns e. satus into FEE “em gia Gigs Dea tal af
13-00000 ne apy AP tr i} t { 1 teed fadad Sa) Ts anne “—e 7 ee te | states that tests of botulin oa guimee pigs ere not valid, because guisea pigs huve e bigh resistance to this particular toxin. | $ [___ |btmsene tested the pills on monkeys end found they did the joo expected of then. We cannot reconstruct with certainty the sequence of eveats between readying the pills and putting them into tue hands of Roselli. : & ry > 1 ry Py Edvards has the iopressicn that he kad a favorable report frea Dr. Guna on the guinea pig test. Gumn probably reported only that the ote Wee + ik: a pilis vere effective, and Eéwards assumed the report vas tased on the * fe results of tests on guirea pigs. Dr. Cunn hes a clear recollection, Pen rs ) without a date, of being preseat at a meeting in which Bvosevelt rr oe Bs, 2+ wo meen me -emtme- dexcastrated a’ pencil designed as a concealzent device for delivering the pills. Roosevelt also recalis such a meeting, also without a date. Gunns’ notes record that his last action on the operation came om 10 February 1961 when be put Gottlieb in touch with Edwards. 7 mtn tet Fame teeTs Gottlieb has no recollection of being involved, ean impression that is - supported by Bissell vho states that Gottlieb’s assignments vere of a " different nature. O'Connell, who eventually received the pills, recalls that he dealt vith ee Jnas no record of delivering pills at this tine, but he dces not oriinarily keep detailed ne oe epee pecminen ced faye PBA AAO RAL AE MERARR 2 ote LEED Bead PIES «Ce amoulse SBRaBS.. “if Gaede . . . ‘s *y . 1, ecords of such things. ; mo, fe : |. 3 8 ay f é * 18 Qtiete Cupenaere evembaqanient ere a .* a re ee ed 7 a . ‘ :
13-00000 ca gee tema seme ome . EPL RkEF CTA Ia any evens, G'Coxrell did receive the pills, and he belleves z there were six of then. He recalls giving three to Roselli. Presusebly 7 the other three vere used in testing for solubilis ty and effectiveness. ; : The éates on whica O'Ccnceil recelved the pills and subsequently ; . : passed thes to Roselli cancot be establiched. It would have beea ‘ 7 ° sometine after Gusn's nozation of 10 Februnry 1561. . : | Guan also has a record of. being approached about the undertaking | ie -. by Willian K. Harvey (former special agent of the FEI) in Febrvary wtd ‘ : . . in comnection vith a censitive project Tarvey was working on for a a . * Bissell. According to Gunn‘s notes, he briefed Harvey on the cperatiea, ' ( } °° and Harvey instructed afa to discuss techniques, but not targets, _ @ with Cottlteb. Guna‘s notation on this point is not in accord with O'Connell. ‘that the pilis had been delivered to Orta in Cuba. Orta é r i . the recollectiosof azy of the others involved. We are unable to . 3 : ° clarify itz the note cay have been in another context. O'Connell ; Le states that J. C. King was also briefed at this tine, although King G ist “J: | denies learning of the operation until much later. ; Jot as ne Co . “ . ‘ é ee q Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante. Roselli reported to soe is unilerstood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before 5 rn ae . : : __ . 7 ES ser Ci returning them. According to the gangsters, Orta got ‘cold feet. a page e ‘ deals ch mate TEN TRAIT © . eee ks eo: a t x ¢ tee eee gee Tet Me gt See ee Lae ag ae te ee een ee 18 gsm ahe * vanes agin tnee renee inne deni ons tins er ces arin oe™ nae am woh tp ohare BMA Og “3 e. ont wt : é semnet aden eat TS ser ted Sear child ee aa ee ae . 4 ete Sete a OD
13-00000 . . : ° (Coment: Crte lost nis position ia the Prize Minister's Office ou 26 Jenzary 1961, wile planning for the operation was é oc Bee ee g. oo still going on in Miami and im Washings<n. He took refuge in : “TE . : - the Venezuelan Enkassy oa 11 April 1961 and became the responsi- od ; bility of the Mexican Exbassy when Veremela broke relations i 3 - with Cuba in Hoverter 141. Castro refused to give hin a safe 7 4 . conduct pass until October 1964 when he vas allowed to leave for ‘| - 2 Mexico City- Ee arrived is Miami in early February 1565. : 4 . (Xt appears that Edvards and O'Connell did not tmow at the . a time of Orta's fall from favor. They have made no reference + i _ tg dtenasertbing Orta's failure to cold feet. It would ceem, OO | though, “that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his . eccess to Castro. They described hin as a san vho hed once bad @ position that alloved his a rake-off on gambling profits, a position that he kad since lost. The only job with which we cen hab as PEs oo anT & we ae eemnnnene : : . associate Orta that might have alloved hin a rake-off vas the ° - / i the gangsters kad 2 man in Cuba with easy a@ecess to Castro, what , they actually bad was a man cisgruntled et having lost access.) _ “| - The previously-mentioned 24 June 1966 su=cary of the operation : . prepared by the Office of Security states that when Orta asked out . SAAR Bh NAP FAN. MARTA MRE TiN IIE oe ‘at + ates 7 ete : - . yy i “ notte = Tees “es “es - a7 et: : * tn " e . eet iB hima, Getto ated ep . . wo . os . bSsica?. Dh sortie ty Btata int satiate i . pension ewe 3 teense “erate Sry spd cb. nie ae dPmann + pat atm te pial Gee x2. ond «rom AR Fas DE ROO a AROS ATE Se anh 0%, Aa IE srr ae? de emane tema R's oes + ine es ta ite a mgt SP ag ON Mie EA TS . - Set ee em ooo : ~~ OR te vee ome £. .
13-00000 PE Tol as ek a £ the assiganent he cuzgested asotner caniicate vno wade several : atterats wiliheut success. Neitser Zivards nor O'Csanell sere the = 4 - , : identity of Orta’s replecsenent nor any adiiticczal details of the . rt reported further attenpts. : Marea - April 1961 i Following the collapse of the Orta channel, Roselli told i O'Conmell that Trafficante Imew of a man high up ia the.Cubsn exile _ movenent vho night do the job. He identified hin as Tony Varona : |. . (pz. Manvel. Antonio de YARCNA y Loredo). Varona was the head of the 7 | ¢ 3 Democratic Revolutionary Front, a group supported by the Ageacy as . part of the lerger Cuban operation. O'Connell understood that Varora ° [ ; was dissatisfied with the nature and the extent of this support and i - that JMHAVZ suspected that Varona was not keeping his bargain vith the | i Agency. _ . ° ‘ , j (Comment: Reports from the FBI suggest how Trafficante mney. i. See ote have Imown of Varoua. On 21 December 1960 the Bureau formried i - A - * te the Agency @ memorandum reporticg that efforts vere being a wade by U.S. xacketeers to finecce enti-Castro activities in an hopes of securing the gambdling, prostitution, and dope monopolies thse «= («w”~=<‘<i«é‘és A Cite im. the eet Castro was overthrom. A later repors of J Bt) Jemery 1961 associates Varoza vith those schenes. Yarona = 23 - . - e. % Case be § tos ga ce . 5 . a ee wes » aan a ‘ * ‘ a LS abe Fy wwtbafe an oa casthgnaseae fy cite Letts fh oe Mae eager eee oe ete “eer wise appease ata: egqthae tine -w Beers Pa en ae Oe ae ee LETTS WE eae
13-00000 een. . ry + eae ad ae ee . e . . . ‘ . 4A IRA REPRE AREAL LSE DP ahem GE ae ERERER sperteon a . — . . ’ ve . £ . art eats 5 ateht ie. 8 so - aolggret vet tyre? 912 eigen ee wy, ot ae SR HTT See > ors we aa Ee es ae Werete + & oF - 7 oo. sw EE ae ete coe Le ve + ph Roe nee OF Jee had hired Edvard K. Moss, a Wash‘agton public relations counselor, asa fund raiser and public relations adviser. : The Bureeu report alleged that Hoss* pistress was one Julfa 4 Cellici, wnose brothers represented two of the fargest gzsbling casinos in Cuta. ihe Cellint brothers vere belleved to be in touch with Varona throug Moss and were reparted to have offered. Varona large sums of money for his operations against Castro, with the understanding that they vould receive privileged treatment "in the Cubs of the future." Attempts to verity these ‘yeports vere unsuccessful. (There is a record of CIA interest in Moss, but there is no indication that the Ageacy head any involvement with his in connection with Cuba. He was granted Covert Security Clearances in March 1959 for use by, [Division in his (ttea) rele as consultant to the eel again in Novesber "13962 for use by CA Staff under Project ZRMAJOR, @ program for the exploitation of poli thos constltants. in early 1965 Mose i “ became of interest. to “the House Foreign Afssirs ‘Const tee because of his record of having represented various foreign goverccents. — A meaorandum prepared by CA Staff in March 1965 states that the records 49 not show any use meade of Moss by either| Piviston i or by CA Stazf. The CSA of 7 Hovexber 1962 specifies that she ° eft e: Meow em a vedo. penton nk peeves ot se Bee
13-00000 t& wane : approval beeame invalid £2 Moss vere sot used within six ‘ months of the este of the approval.) 7 Trefficente apprcacked Varoza and told bin that he hed clfeats : who wanted to do avay with Castro and that they would pay big mozey . for the job. Varcaa is rerorted to have peen very receptive » Since : iv would mean that he would be able to buy his ovm ships, eras, aad eccmaunicatioas equipaent. | ie - . (Comment: By this tice Roselli had beceme certain that O'Connell was aa Agency eaployee, u0% a subordinate of Mazeu. + 6 ; Be told o'Conne®} that he was sure that O'Connell vas “a C ~ goveranent man - CIA” but that O'Connell should not coafira _this to him. Roselli said that as a loyal Averican he vould | -! do vhatever he could and vould never divulge the operatioa.) i = i Roselli vas to deliver mosey to Varona for expenses. O'Connell : i I Pee ofa s ebtenmetert tae tee yes cen) PUD Be rte eree nee ad em cone grag tarmamem, © 5m am feTthe * . . . . . e * oo, ; nov recalls the amount as $50,000. Edwards, who was avay at the tine, ; x - s,s recalls it as $25,000. Since Edwards was absent, O*Connell had to ¢ e ae a oF + get approval from EAvarés* deputy, Rotert Bannerman, who uatil thea | : had been unvitting of the operation. O'Connell told Bancersan that | the operation vas knowa to and approved by Edvards. Bennerzan authorized passing the money acd now recalls the azount as being on the order of 4 _ $20,000 to $25,000. An Office cf Security menorandwm to the DUCI, : ®% _ ee a TS cere teers 4 ee ems ts. . ca epee Woe sehen aint! bratineds oes ttheenp ies Prt 8 ccwrah Sangin = . a : ate _spoulavisemn Sipe tee je OER BS ee eet Fe ee 8 ES at ee ERLE By ERT ee eee ce eae
13-00000 : ‘ = ; Gated 24+ June 1965, sets the acount as $10,i00 is ceah and $1,000 ; . worth of comunicatisas eqitgsen:. Jaze Esverlize, who signed the i . vouchers for the funds, recalls the anounts as being those stated oN ; im the Office of Security menora=Acm. . (Comment: As a sldelignt, Esterlice sxys that, when he : 2 learned of the intended use of Verona, steps vere taken to , : cancel the plan. Varonus was one of the five key figures in the ‘ Revolutionary Frout end vas heavily involved in support of the 3 appreaching Eay of Pigs operation. If staps were in fact taken a to end Varona's participation in the syndicate plan, they vere ; 4 y ineffective. It is clear that he continued as an integral part : 4 3 je of the syndicate schene.) When the money vas ready, O'Connell took the Pills fron his safe o~ * and delivered them and the noney to Roselli. Bosellf£ gave the pills ans and the money ‘to Varom, whoa Roselli dealt with under psevdonyz. 7 Tittle is known of the delivery chamels beyond Varona- Yaron was > PERG oO eRBTA -c. CRA OLS SrUReENeNy een Soa be a on'h* Y 2 > . . ‘ ’ a ae ms D ee f, 4 ’ ed 2 rtp PRA EO TD APTI : G ~ : believed to have alt asset fastde Cuba in a position to slip e pill : -. 9 Castro. Edvards recalls sarething about a contact who worked in @ restaurant frequented by Castro and vho vas to receive the pills esd pus then into Castro's food or drink. Edwerds believes that the ve wW¥ schene failed because Castro ceased to visit thas particular restaurant. : : e3 ‘ BSE: St eee er *  Recencone : id noe 7 . nom em oF ©, cats gM grins nao eto of ec mage ee, srmgeaeie) Sapte ser = ond. we nan tant tae eae ee TE
13-00000 ; TIERED bce nnen, geen OMA UETR STE Ei MON ene oe ot wie ee te Sawing ae em, { é . April - May 1964 | — : . e : toate ae Saad oe Soon after the Esy cf Pigs, Zaévarts sent vord to Rogellt - ‘ through O'Connell that the operation wes off--even if souething “ happered there would ‘te no payorf. Usvards is sure there was a .* : complete standdow after that; the operation was dead and rémained so t ; i a: wath) Avril 1952. He clear! y relates the origins o? the operation to 3 ; the upcoming Bay of Pigs invasioa, acd i<s termization to the Eay t of Pigs failure. O'Connell agrees that the operation was called off i-. . _ after the Bay of Pigs but that the tersiration was not firm an¢é fizal. , 4 i- aN He believes that there was scnething going on betveen April 1961 aad_ , : i a C. “s April 1962, but ke cannot now recall vias. He agrees with BLL | - Harvey that when the operation was revived f= April 1962, Harvey took 7 _ over a "going operation.” . , . . s , - - (Compent: As Aistinguished frou Edvards and O'Connell, t : both Bissell and Esterline place the termination date of the | 4 foo. ", -. . assassination operation as being about six months before the - oc. 4 ty xe @ oe ° Bay of Pigs. Esterline gives as bis reason for so believing the : [ _ fact that the decision bad been made to go abead vith a massive, a : i . . . major operation instead of an iné!viduelly-tergeted one such as ; this. Whatever the intention in this respect, if the decision to : aren 2B : terminate was actually rade, the decision was not coomumicated i . i a e ‘ . welt te | ~ bs, vt ( ye - 33 - : . ae aged ° ° aa ~“ 7 a . . a ee “werent "male can oo Be «8a a erteatne: LE pigpucn memset asia dist as sntaantea mimo inenar sotait
13-00000 ae cae, AMR he SPATE . % yy ’ : effectively. It is clear that this pleo to assassinate Castro continued in train until coretine after the Bay of Pigs.) : O'Connell believes that he cust have recovered the pills, but s “he has n0 specific recollection of having done so. He thinks that a4 : instead of returning them to TD ke probably would have éestroyed a i then, most Likely by flushieg then dom a toilet.[_____|has no { i. ‘xecord of the pills having been refurned to him, but he says he is | : quite sure taat they vere. : ; In a memorandum of 14 May 1962 Shefficld Edwards stated that | 7 . knovledge of this particular operation was Limited to six persons. i eo, En the course of this investigation, ve have identified the folloving . i cor persons who kiew in late 1960 or early 1961 of this specific plan : | . | to assassinate Castro: ; i - 1. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence — ; | - - 2. . General C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence . ae 3. Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans _ _ ; pe &. Sheffield Eévards, Director of Security _ |  G fon. : 5. "Janes Q'come, Office of Security, the case officer . re eee a “ 6. J.D. Esterline, Catef, Wa/t — - —_ be %- Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD - . 8. | Chemical. Divisioa, TSD 9. Edward Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Medical, Services i { ‘ Sounwee: emnatrET pe wanes Th wes Coes e . ams sae / 7 o pet oe ots Benet ont or tht a ae : i ~-L Sere: see. aoe ees > — 4
13-00000 . 2 i H , ; $ ¢ i 10. Willies Harvey, Chief, F1/D 1. a . ; ll. Sidsey Gottlies, Special Assistant to the DD/P (CGottlied's Sore ~ dmg “+ i fame vas encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he . an oe: i denfes mowing of the operation in 1560-61.) . *! i 12, Rovert Bannerman, Deputy Director of Security ‘ 13. J.C. King, Chief, Wa Division (He too denies knoving of | to ‘ the operation at the tine.) ; ti i She followirg persons outside the goverrment are known to be ii witting of the operation and either know or strongly suspect the \" Ageacy'’s connection vith it: . H | oa 1. Robert Maheu, a private investigator - 3 i , iG I 2. John Roselli, the Agency's principal contact’ with the : ge=blicg syndicate - 1 . 3. Sam Giancana, an important figure in the syndicate i a k, Santos Trafficante, the courier and men inside Cuba | a . : . { { . a These additional people were avare of the operation, but their : Bee. , . , ° : pe kmovledge of CIA's connection with 1t can only be speculated: . oe, Lok td b 1. Juen Orta, the man origirally selected to poison Castro . . i . 2. - Antonfo Varona, a Cuban exile leader . a . | 3. ‘re son-in-law of Varona, who is know to have been involved z with him closely during this time. (The Varona 201°file makes : ( no reference to Varona having a-son-in-lew, but he identified rn | this close associate as such.) . ae ee ee .
13-00000 - 8 Mele Pat ot) Seow. wn woo wae Ae eee g Satie aE Np Aged ay Se. ot Ss ate ee ee ee Su ok roe: ey 2 The Agency's General Counsel, Llavrence Houston, end Attorne Gersral Rotert Kenzedy learned the full detalls of the operatioa ina co aped | ‘ May 2962. We do not know the particulars of the report Drev Pearson now bas, but 1% may include cany of the deteils of this operation. : rr it does, then the circle of those nos kncvledgeable vould be ; : 1. Edvard P. Horgas, Meaheu's Vasairgton attomey . 2. Columist Drev Pearson and probably his yartuer, oe , - ge Jack Anderson : é. : 3. Chief Justice Yarl Verren Bo} | , widened to include: re ff “ ) hk. James Rowley, chief of the Secret Service een -§ Pat Coyne, Pxecutive Secretary of the PFIAB 6 Attorney General Remsey Clark ° %. Yarlous menbers of the FBI S s AIS MG REY TS BR Let: Bowe aetn t any 2 a 8 6 et Te wae Ha eS
13-00000 i : OTASEY FPA meng q - tbise Sam Csisis i “sy « ; ‘Genblicg Synitcate - Passe 2 Willies Harvey, Chief of FI/D, was triefed in February 1951 (oy authority of Richard Bissell) on prase ore of the gnabling 4 we ORD t ' & oon % 2 at 4. a by. #4 syndicate operation. That briefing wes in connection with a sensitive ° ; Operation that Bissell rad assigned to Earvey. Earvey describes it thus: Early in the Kearedy administration, Bissell called him in to i ° discuss what Earvey refers to as an Executive Action Capability; 1.e., @ generel stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required. .. i Harvey's notes quote Bissell as sayixs, Wee White House has twice i ‘ ~ urged me to create such a capability. * Bissell recalis discussirg : . { C./° the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. He 3 7 mentioned the Edvards/gambling syndicate operation against Castro ° ; in that context, but he now thinks that the operation was over by . 7 ; then and thet reference to it vas in terms of a past operation as 8 ‘ PS case in point. rt was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be | b. briefed by Eaverds. Harvey's fixing of the date as February vas s only. ° “ | pes on "after review of events both preceding the briefing ani folloving it. 1 | cae FA a He says nov that it might have been/eerly as late Jamary er as Inte i i as Varch 1961. . . ~ | oO After some discussion of the problens involved {2 developing an | . Executive Action Capability, Bissell placed Harvey in charge of the | ied 4 effort. Harvey seys that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects - SiGe create LRTI a BRS clear, $ Hy ta : =A, ot i net eee e 2. ae na a ans “m *3 eptemme, Pa * eae = Fee Saens eAtin! 2 a oop stg Bon? Le ae *. tea SS She
13-00000 & * , fd of? the problem vita und with Sianey Gotciied. Since : [___]vae already cut ic, Earvey used rin i= deve velepizg the 5: Executive Acticn Capebility, although never with respect to Castro. { We did not question Gottlieb on his knovledzge of the program for : creating an Executive Action Capebility, but Earvey's mention of bin ot in this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gum that Harvey gi ‘ . 5 i i _ instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlied without associating ii the discussion with the Castro operation. Harvey states that after the decision vas made to go ahead vith the creating of an Executive Action Capabilicy, and vhile he was 5 still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helms Laan 4 8 - fully on the general, concept but without mention of the then ongoing e, Plan toe assassinate Castro. The Executive Action program cane to be know as ZRRIFIE. Its principal asset vas en agent, GI4IN, who hed teen recruited earlier ‘ so agee meanachettamtinn a enna by for use in a special operation in the Congo-(em- 7 fo or urs o. west “¢ tace 4, ° (O'Donnell. made a survey of the scene, decided he vanted no part in ° an assassination attempt, and asked to be released--which BisseLL ° : She, i ‘granted.) ‘The project name, @AUIFLE, + anpeers in the files in . .. . Hay 1961, although the first recorded approval is dsted 19 Februxy =; | | IC — | | i 1962. The new DD/P (Selus) on that date authorized Farvey, dy oe senate, eee Hates 7 erence ee ane BBY is
13-00000 + hs ‘po a7 te + hee ° ae glee, SOLER TY EAS CNR MEG LEE ETT I | PAINE Otte OA on cee. oA Hy r+ ome mpencradduy, to handle the project on a special basis. Accounting for _ expenditures was to be by gezeral category and cau Barvey’s certifi- cation. The initial approval vas for $15,700, consisting of $7,200 . for QUIN's annval selary and $7,500 for operaticeal expenses. ' Project ZRRIELE was covered as an Fi/D operation (ostensibly to develop a capability for entering saves ani for kidnapping couriers). Xt continued on a course separate froa the Edvards/gaubling syndicate operation. against Castro until 15 November 1961. Eervey has a note that on that dave he éiscussed with Bissell. the application of the ZRRIPLE programs to Cuba. Earwey says that Bissell instructed him to take over Edvards' contact with the criminal syndicate and thereafter t rim the operation against Castro. Harvey adds that, as &@ completely unrelated development, shortiy after this discussion with Bissell. he - was told by Helms that he vas to be placed in charge of the Agency's ' Zate 1961 ~ Early 1962 Harvey recalls that he wes very busy with a mmber of things in the period that followed the discussion with Bissell that led to his taking over Edvards* Castro operation. He was turning over his responsibilities in Fi/D. Ee was working with NSA on the Martin/ Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and a . ° -39-— ii cette COMER a i a ee ° eer wre! re ~ : Saati ers Pad 2% net meese . ° tat 7 weet Sos . cmon eStore! Seed thy =. 9 gw ih igne: Se ee ee fen 9 wre aoe > pt shape: ae 8 bess Pye ae Sse ett eS See RR of = STORE GT Te BL A eB. pa Tene BPMLS PRY ER el ie otk oon ee es ti red ~ - tom
13-00000 24, J Oem necnpemmmtareenbpebereaentinay Mts A imevmatonn ota ‘ “ ot , . . ® re ae ements ate oe ~ ae pee me te em oem , 4 was engaged ia daily seetlags concerning ices. he attended a statisn 4 esleZs' conference in Paraca in late Jaavary ani early rebruary. : Se . February - March 1952 Harvey recalls a first meetizg with Edwards in ‘February 1962 . oa the subject of the Castro operssion. ite also recalls working ; out the details of the takeover duriag March. ; . (Coment: After Earvey took over the Castro operation > 7 yan 4¢ as one aspect of @PRIFLE; however, he personally handled. / the Castro operation and did sot use any of tre assets being ; developed in ZRRIFIE. He says that he scon came to think of the ¢ , Castro operation and RRIFIZ as being syaonymous. The over-all : Executive Action program cane to be treated in his mind as being | synonymous vith QIWIN, the agent working on the over-all progras. He says that vhen be wrote of ZARIFLE/GIWIN the reference vas to Pe ee Executive Action Capability; vhen he used the cryptonym ZRRIFIE | Mt, alone, he vas referring te Castro. He. said that his correspondence . BTID Ge RP. ovate PenRTraA IO 1G Bbw CUTSIAEA. Soa | Pe . 8 8 . . * oo. * at Bye vould disclose this distinction. We reviewed the. correspondence and found it for the most part unreve (After Harvey left Task Force W and vas winding up ‘his ° . headquarters responsibilities {n preparation for assignment to Rome, he wrote a mezorandus to the Chief, FI Staff, dated 27 Jume-. -~ ko = - ern as urs ti 4 Saws an b buted ln <oor! napiestgn ae oe ogo” Sao dor . - enw ee nm gs estate eee? 2 CaP diiankat aioe meekA tiated siento? oes Seana #2 i . : ge eg a . oa ° eget 7 “ . oe . bd . : . ; £ - i wees wet ee a nae ee ee Precise eat TRTARE TS Son agi ths ta awh A NE 8.5 MARS gE os AEH, GOON ESAT NR oe
13-00000 . { “to. i] woe { a , 1953, stating that the origiral justificatiua for exploying f- ; QSyE¥ no longer existed ‘end raising the q:estioa of QUAIN's | . ii .  temfnation. The records (CLEA-197%, 2% April 195%) shov that bat i ; coal QIWIS was terminated by the Lurembourg Station on 21 April Gk 196k. There is no indication in the fiie that the Executive Action Capability of ZaaIc1z/Giwil we ever used.) i B April 1962 : a's Edwards recalls Harvey contacting him in April and asking te be . ic. “put in touch with Boselli. Edvanis says that he verified Eelas‘ l h. om, . “ : Cc } approval and then meade the arrangements. Earvey states that he briefed 4 . Felms before his first meeting with Rosell{, explainixg its purpose, ‘ ; nn and that he also reported to Eelus the results of his meeting vith a - : i ie . Roselli. Harvey states that thereafter be regularly briefed Helus ' 2 ° . i on the status of the Castro operation. | . f ‘ (Comment: Edvarés statement thet he “verified Helms‘ ; vege approval” is the earliest iniication ve bave that Mr. Helms had . oa been made witting of the guxbling syndicate operation against . { te 7 Castro. Harvey added that, when he briefed Helus on Roselli, ( : i he obtained Helns' approval not to brief the Director.) ~ Edvards, Harvey, and O*Comell have differing recollections-of the specifics of the turnover frea Elvards/O'Consell to Harvey. Not ee ene fore rete. cuitiehintonedinems satiety vents: “reciente redhat tise
13-00000, , wer oe * gege.. eer ete . . + ae va swe a ce a mene ry all of tee @ifferences can be recolvad--n9% evea dy follow-up interviews in which “ke information furnisked by each wus checked with each of the other tvo. There is no disagreement on tre fact es a of the turnover nor on when it tcck place. The recollections vary decidedly, though, on the status of the operation at the tine of its transfer +o Earvey and on just hov clean the break. was between phase ° one under Edwards and phase two under Harveys @: ahem Sm PEEPSiyerEID, © os. 208 foe ; a. Edwards believes that the operation was called off completely after the day of Pigs and that there was no further Sen gmap ene 8 a operatiosal activity in connection with 1% until Harvey met seb pene. C 4 Rosellt and reactivated the operation in April 1952. O'Connell ° introduced Harvey to Roselli, and Edvards kad nothing further te . do with the cperation--with the exception of a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in connection with the Phyllis ' - McGuire wiretapping incideat. (‘the wiretapping incident ts 4 . -. described in a separate section of this report.) Eévards* records show that on ue May 1962 Harvey called Edvards “and indicated that he was droppizg any plans for the use of . aT Roselli for the future." oo — - - : e ose b. Earvey's recollection of the turnover tends to support Edvards' simmasy, but he claims that he took over “a going 0 CRAG ReGen APO ep ahi EOP aD 1 wPaee Snares enpeNGEMETERE HE ENER 14 - M4 eeuE: . a a % ee 4 operaticn.” Scue support for this claim is found in kis description eR ete beg tt OI ate ee le a ST UENO =. come SP Gna e Fa i Rar Sree tit eA REN Steger, rei its eg
13-00000 Be a Ue sOng y . TO geme Ce wee ee OE om vee, ee te Cwm ecee res rycn 239 FF, ° . * bs, - ° of just row Lt was planced to get the polesa into Cast trots food by employing someone with access to a restaurant frequeated by Castro™.. The meckanics vere identical with those described by er eT Edvards and as reported in our earlier accowit of phase one of the operation. e. O'Connell's account of his own role in the operation im the early weeks following Harvey's supposed. tazxeover mikes it evident that there was not a clean break between the Office of oP Nem. a a 6 BRI gee EAD ea Security's sespousibility and that of Harvey. Further, O'Connell mow believes that there must have been "semething going on” betveen April 1961 (after the Bay of Pigs) and April 1962, but ‘he clains to be unable to remember any of the yarticulars. oe» eres tba There.are other disagreements among the three on facts. They are reviewed here, not because they alter the essential fact of the turnover or of Harvey's sole responsibility for the operation after a certain point in time, but because they suggest that persons who . were supposedly unwitting of events efter the turmoever were in fact “witting, because they were not effectively cut off at the instant of tumover. cent - Barvey's notes show that he and O'Comell went to New York City to meet Roselli on the 8th and 9th of April.1952. O'Connell recalls it as being carly im April and that the introduction was meade on a - age
13-00000 cog peer mele mesieaacrsetn hE suanitoniertgerstii inet: a tare Coa a a a ont oe *, “rence we ets . eo. : TT a Mn a beer oe Rie cl ee EEE TTR TCT ss Hy ‘ e " . op * . . . * ny Pt GLE Oe Oy as, 9 me ETM Oth teat e emmy. . . Ls cenmn es atee a Sunday, which vorl4’ maze it ite 6th. Harvey rays that only he esd O'Cosrell net via Posell’; C*Connell says that Maheu vas also present at the seeting. Hock are positive or the eccuracy of their recollections, and each gives reasons for his contidence in his clarity of recall. Tse siguificance, for purposes of this inquiry, is whether Maheu Gid or dia sot know that the opereaticn continued under Harvey. a. Harvey is certain that he would have remembered it if Maheu were present. He and Maheu were in tse same FRE training class at Quantico in 1940. Ze does not remember having seen . Maheu since he, Harvey, ceme with the Agency in 19%7, although he , acknovledges that he may have seen him once or tyice socially. - He is sure he hes not seen Maheu since 1952 when Harvey vas assigned to Berlin. : F : be O'Connell, who set up the meeting, is just as positive wend S ae Maheu was there. Es describes a series of events that : wget Vy |, Peassure his of the accuracy of hig memory. The four of then ° oa Te traveled separately to Hew York. ‘They met at the Savoy Plaza ‘Hotel (Savoy Hilton?) where all four stayed. After discussions, Maheu suggested dinner at the Elk Room, a fashionable restauzent in @ nearby hotel. O'Comell says that Makeu picked up the tab. feey finished dinner about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. Roselli, wanted to ~ & . tae eee ot . eof re cc LS te ree Se kate eh te ie om ie ol Sega Ley Se a Sytem on) en Cag os ‘ at teadiners ©
13-00000 i * g i a buy tae group a nigaceap, met since 1t wes Sunday aich« asarly ‘ all of the ters vere closed. They valced around the nelfgnbor- ee a 1 - , hood locking for an open bar and firally vound up at the ~s Copecabena. ‘hey vere refuted admittexce to the bar because of | ‘ a rule restricting adziasioa to couples, co they cat ata table ~ : ; where they could vateh the floor shew. Roselli found bisself : - facing a table at “rizgside” at which Phyllis McGuire was sitting ; is — vith Dorothy Kilgallen and Liberace for the opening night of — singer Rosemary Clooney. To avoid Payllis Mefuire's ceeing him, ; a Roselli got his companions to change their seating arrangenent C. >. . 60 that his beck was turced to Miss McGuire. Mabeu was an : 7 integral part of allthis. (Roselli's reacon for not vaating . F . Phyllis McGuire to cee him vith his companions will becone : evident frou her role in the viretapping incident, vhich {s ‘ : . Gescribed in a separate section of this report.) aad _ The tvo aitfering recollections camot be reconciled. As a point of Eis" interest, Rivards stated that vien he briefed Harvey on the operation ; ; ° "Off from Earvey'’s takeover of the operation. - 4 The next significant point of differeace has to do vith viat --  : - happened after the Nev York meeting. O'Comell told uz that ke and . i — Roselli left New York for Miami the next day (presumably 10 April) , t. AS - &5 - : Tura gy Zet8 442 Pa ers - oe, eet - foe Teor s  enlee ae Bs
13-00000 = - wa - . a a nem w. 35 oo t i ' toe 74 : ry t and remained there until Harvey arrived. Earvey, on the other bacd, . recalls a meeting with O'Connell aad Roselli ia Washington on Lb April. . O'Connell, at first, did not recall the Washington meeting, but, ° vhen given Eervey's.chronology, he seid ke eid recall returning to 7a Wastington to reet Eervey for scme perpose but that the details are q . . . ‘ t vague in his oind. Harvey at first thought that the 1s April neetizg i ‘in Washington was O'Connell's last contact with Roselli during this second phase of the ganbling syndicate operation. O'Connell told us thet Roselli was apprehensive over the new arrangement (and of Earvey personally) and asked, O'Connell to resain on for a time, which O'Connell } HF me, commen © *s ® agreed to do. When told that O'Connellwas sure that he had continued vO \ on in the operation for sone two or three weeks after Harvey's take- over, Harvey agreed that this was correct. O'Connell's carryover vas. for purposes of continufty., We cannct be sure of the date O'Conrell. was finally elininated trom the operation. Ee vas in Miemi with . ‘ Rosells and Harvey perhaps as late as 27 April. His role in the _ operation had definitely ended by June 1962 when he was assigned PCS oe e * oe to Obinave. . ° Harvey recalls leaving Washington for Miemt by automobile on 19 April. He thought that he took delivery of the pills froa Dr. Gann before leaving. Gunn has no record of any such deliveryat that time; ee ee en eet eer nee : ; a his last record concerning pills is dated February 1961. [t~—SY (Mo 7 ~ 46 -
13-00000 oe Ses meen eg wa we CAMO OF Pew Ye Une wey ols TE $ e a. ° : does have a cotetion of delivering four pills (cze capsule and tiree teblets) to "J.C." on 18 April 1962. [seas *his as being Jia O'Connell. When told of this, Harvey agreed that it vas probably correct. O'Connell elso feels that he must have been in Washington for the pill delivery. ; . Hasvey says that he arrived in Miami oa 21 April 1962 and found % Roselli already in touch with Tony Verona, the Cuban exile leader vbo eS ee + i eres et ene on AB NEE _ bad participated in phase one. It ts at this point that the final is , difference in recollections occurs. Harvey described the manner in . which the lethal material. was to be introtuced inte Castro's food, mT involving an asset of Varona’s who had access to someone in ae se i ene Aw restaurant frequented by Castro. We told Harvey that Edvards had « described precisely the same plan. When ve asked Harvey hov Edvards could have mown of the mechanics if there had been no activity in the ees eee rae eae ome operation for a year, and if Harvey was etarting again trem scratch, ot, Harvey replied that he tock over a going operation--one that vas [7 allready “in train”. Bivands denies that this is so. O'Comell says a “that Harvey is the one vho is right. The operation vas going on when , Harvey took 1¢ over, although O*Commell does not remember when VYarona was reactivated or wheat had been done with him fn the meantine.. O - - - ss ° : —— _ 3 € i i { { i 8 i i i which sav Harvey replacing Edvards/O'Connel!, there also were changes z é { i | i { 3 | | ° Alleng vith the change in Agency leadership of the operation, ee :
13-00000 et - : "e - oo meses . if ia the orisimal cast of hocdiws pizyers. Earvey svecified that ; Gtencaca was no% to be orought fn on <se re: stivatioa of the operetica, é “ : endl he believes thet Boselli hosored the request. Roselli once tee oe wé weposted to Earvey that Glancaca had esced if anything was going on, and’ when Boselli said that notzing was cappering, Glancara said, "Yoo bed." Additicmlly, Santos Tracsticente (“Jce, the courter® froma i : the earlier phase) vas no longer involved. With the closing of the last casino in Havaca in Septenter 1901, Trafficante presumably no | i i longer bad. access. Roselli now tad a san imowm to Farvey as Maceo, ; wno also used the rames Garcla-Gcsez acd Godoy. | e oN (Comment: Earvey is unable further to identify Maceo; be i : _ describes ‘him as "a Cuban who spoke Italian.” One of VYaroza's . | associates in the Cuban exile commity vas named Antonio MACZO ; ' Meckle, but it seens wlikely thet he vas the Maceo of this . : ; i 7 operation. He was prouizert erozgh ia the extle commmity to a pres -— ; have been known to Harvey. Yurther, it seems clear that Maceo . ae ee vas “Roselli's man." This secord phase appears to lack the ; ; ; ; ae *  overshelaing, high-level gangster flavor that characterized the 4 a first phase. Roselli remained es a prominent figure in the ° a | Operation, but working directly vith the Cutan exile coummity 1 and directly on behalf of CIA... Roselli was essential to the . second prase as a contact with Varoms, who presumably still Sh PALBEAIE. LS 9 a's SRAIROERD 1 EG Os BAIT EAS, ‘ “ ‘ e one 8B eenelinee on oe | " a LJ eras ea PATE TE OE, BOOS RE ME Efe RR erates None erien Phe nar ree ase TF “ ope
13-00000 : Fj eae Gh a Be, belfteved ke was teiaz Supported oy U.S. cusisesmes vith ficec’:ias. sctezes {= Cuca. Roselli ceeced Giancens end Trafficente in the first phese as a means of estabif{shing contacts inside Cuba. Ee did not need them im the second phase, because he bad Yarona. Fowever, it would be nafve to essume that Eoselli{ did not take the precaution of informing higter-ups is che syndicate teat he wees ote wag working in « territory considered to be the private demain . ef someone else in the syndicate.) ‘ When the pills vere given to Varoma through Roselli, Varona . “y requested arms and ecuimment needed for the support of his end of the ‘ operation. Roselli passed the request to Earvey. Earvey, vith the 10m as SHO f a +a 4 help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JKHAVE Statica, procured { explosives, detonators, tventy .30 caliber rifles, tventy .45 caliber | hand guns, two readies, ani one boat radar. Earvey says that the. i “shopping list™ included saze items that could be obtained only from f. — ‘the U.S. Goverment. Harvey oultted those Liters, because Roselli, = - oe rth ‘ posing as a rercesehtetive of private business interests, would not i have hed access to suck equipment. ‘he cost of the ams and equignent, é . about $5,000, vas T/A'd to headquarters. : i . - Earvey end Shackley rented a U-Haul truck unter en assumed rane, i - 7 teaded At with the aras and equizzeat, ant parsed {¢ in the parking lot ; . of a drive~in restaurant. The keys vere then given to Roselli for ome ob A hang. Sniftameten: « Peres “omer “amnicinn se Be gonint Ai tntiag lO yt RDN et ie es sie bP ae ee EM i ee a Pee i { | .
13-00000 . S Pe. eens * ia a wnm> ae te oe ee ater ag ae Le tee . owes Gelivery eicher to Maceo, to Verona, or to Varoca’s son-in-ley. ; Evidestly Earvey ond Roseili rad not yet coze to crust each otker. if s Pertaps fearing a double-cross, each cet about independently to n° ; ageh : nat < assure himself that the equipsent reached the proper hands. After , i! paretcg the truck, Harvey and Shackley kept the parking lot. under ° .- Surveillance until the pass vas completed. Posel2!, accompanied by ; . : O'Connell, did the ‘same. tleither pair knew thst the other wes ‘ watching. Eventually the truck was picked up end driven away. It 20: A perenne oe wm sedeeneot was returned later, empty, and with the keys unéer tke seat as : prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey says / : . ’ i that Snackley never knew to whos delivery was made ror for vhat ¥) CU purpose. Shac¥ley was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation fron vhich he was othervise excluded. May 1962 Same fim. tehamn, otis cambmTe ar8 ele ene , Baxvey end Roselli, arranged « system of telephone communication . . . _y which Harvey vas | kept posted: on any develoments. Harvey, using & ae. hours, Los Angeles time. . Rosell. could phone Eesvey at Harvey's home | im the evening. Roselli reported that the pilis vere in Cuba ‘and at : foe “pay phone, could call Rosell at the Friars Chi in Los Angeles at 1500 7 the restaurant reportedly used regulerly by Castro. i | SR Srnercttreaeewm tee enestteean setasenes eet APC SE ARITA ITOTEY® SUA 8 Sth Bib OPAL IE NEY «Oh eysc att * Menthe ob Sa elles oy OH * . . e ' : . 7 ‘ . ‘ og oo . t “ Bea ees So sn Se ee eS whee. ay fF Samet oe ata agd “Sentai! aibee ary “es wert sey “b. necn Cte 2 th ye Sees te aca * Sheree o edit Micha have 05's Agile cn Nain he 4 AB y erento eet Sot eA NED “esuaees sae ig emead grate sere Seer aes see esr a eT aS a ah
13-00000 + eee ao pelt: co a eesucetege ~ mee — ¢ Moe Ses ee a £ CS tes bon 8 due & be’ a ( : Jse 1902 : . Reselal reported to Zarvey om 21 duce that Vareaa had diagetched. | 7 a@ team of three nen to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is | , pretty vague. Earvey saié that they appeared to have no specific H plen for killing Castro. They vere to recruit others who night be | : . . as an used {r such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill castro presented a 5 1 : itself, they or the persons they recruited were to wake the attempt-— +t $ : : ; | perhaps using the pilis. Earvey never learned their names or anything ‘ 4 : : ‘ elee about then. Froe the sequence of the reports, it would sees that : i 7 the pilis were sent is. ahead of the three-man tees, but this is not now i % é ; iC —_ ascertatrable. , . ! ° Peon wt rae LR ENA OP EIEARIATES GT to ASR SEIS Oy BO a ERER Re sefosd SERDP OED B cata e seat args a RPE 4 " September 1962 ; ‘was reported as then ready to send in another team of three mea. They body guard. During this period the “medicine” vas reported as still Harvey sav Roselli in Miami on 7 and on 1L Septexber. Varora es were Supposedly | militia pen whose assiguzent was to penetrate Castro's aw cee oe im place and the three men of the first team safe. ber 1962 ~ Jemary 1963 Although Harvey received several reports that the nilitia sen vere polsed to taxe off, presumably froma scnevnere in the Florida keys, - em Sei, G00 ancalpiantie Se Ne ee ee sind Ibias aca g are ee ‘ sea: ee Sea Oe, gree af, oe Oe pres race OR RT eee poate EE erga * : FE OS png Ree te Te ni ag om a Oe hee EE eee eee ne ete ls
13-00000 comem estate co cred, ste. + pts ae ° van . ° y = they did not actually leave. First, “conditions incide" were given ac the reason for delay; then tae Ceototer micsile crisis threw plans awcy. Harvey was in Vial between 22 Decester end 6 ‘January. He saw’ both Roselli enc Maceo several times duricz that period. He made a payment of $2,700 to Psoselli for passing +o Varoza for the expenses of” the three nilitis men. Harvey and Roselli had telephone discussicrs of the operation betveen 11 and 15 Jenvary. Earvey says that Roselli wasn’t kidding himself. Ee agreed with Harvey tnat nothing vas happening and that there vas not much chance that anything vould | happen in the future. As far as Earvey kcovs, che three militia men never did leave for Cuta. Ee xnows nothing of what pay have happened to the three reported to have been sent to Cuba. Februsry 1 : Harvey was in Miam! 11-1% February.” Ee had no contacts with any of the principals, but he left word for Maceo that there vas nothing new and that 1t now looked as if it were all over. (Just how Harvey “left this vord for Maceo is not clear.) Harvey left Mieni om 15 February to meet with Roselli in Los - Angeles. They agreed at the Los Angeles meeting that the operation . would be closed off, but that it would te unwise to attempt a preciyitate break between Roselli ard Varoma. Roselli agreed that he vould continue  GRe cae etm pwenaneepainreneovunece IDRS heii enie Dn trGN Ti we. ONES pect Mme eRREAA te! Aamo abanctpe ‘ , . . . ame se ma Tee pie a ne spies : - x or She Ike. ee . . wee af oon a ae ae
13-00000 ee ee LAR at eB om oe tam 8 See * samme, a Se sy to ese Verona, gredvally reducing the frequency of contact uatil ere WES Bore. 26 Gs & April = May 196 Farvey cays that he received tvo telephone calls fren Roselli during this period. Harvey decided that it would be best to have ose © last meeting vith Roselli before he left for his assiguzent in Rone. 2 etal a Ae 68 Bey Soe He stetes that he reported this decision to Mr. Helms who gave his +o Gee approval. —,; June 1963 6 Gram 2 e Foon HEE Be meaner we: f 4 e oF : ¢ 6 \ a Reselli came to Washington to meet vith Harvey sometime about the middle of Jume. Harvey met him at Dilles airport. Harvey remembers Pre art there vould be no delay at the airport evaiting baggage. Harvey had by . then closed his ova home in preparation for leaving the country and mR was living in the hquse of a neighbor vho vas out of tom. Roselli “stayed vith Harvey as 8 houseguest $n in the neighbor's hone. That “evening Roselli, Harvey, and firs. Eervey went out for dinner. _While dining, Harvey received e phone call trea Sam Papich who wanted to incw 4¢ Harvey knew the identity of his aimner guest. Harvey said thet he did. 4 | having suggested to Roselli that he bring caly carry-on luggage so . | | : & t g 5A PNR E 80 RETORTED AERA UN OY fateretebr poe eee ere. CORA Ned reBeNe “om. 6 oy a
13-00000 cee * alt volver ten genen ne . . % subsequentiy developed that the FBI nad Hozellt ender isveasive Gurvelliance at the tine, exd Harvey speculates whet he was piczed uy as he left the alxport parking lot end «ms ideatiMed through his auto wend pe license number. Earvey net Pepich for breakiust the next morning and explained that he wes terminating an operational essociation with Roselli. Papich reninded Earvey of the Far rule requiring FRI personnel i to repors any known contacts betveen former FBI employees and crinizal . 3 @lenents. Papich said that te would have to report to J. Edgar Hoover wre 4 that Harvey had been seen with Roselli. Harvey said he understood Papich's situation and did sot object to such a report being rade. . Harvey said that he asked Papich to inform hin in advance if it appeared “ - that Hoover might call Mz. MsCone--Harvey's point being that he felt . that MeCone should be briered before receiving a call from Hoover. Papich agreed to do so. Harvey said that ke then told Mr. Eelus of : 4 “peg! Ratgt io wine Mt white os, 5 oo the incident and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief MeCone wiless a call froa Eoover was to be expected. ren “oe : Tats vas Harvey's isst Suce~to-face meeting with Roselli, . _ : as Lad cate althoug he has heard fros hiit since then. Te later links betveen - . Harvey and Roselli are described in @ separate section of this report. The list of persons witting of the second phase of the operation @ivfers fron those who mew of the first Phase. Those we have identified rs: axes: ee et en ea LL aed ar se Re a rift mate re
13-00000 On O naten® EPs wee ESI UR AERROTE - ERERS GRD GONNA PO Bt ea ws Riedie be nn - ene 8 oe cama eee ae t . ro é i : 1. Rickerd zeles, Deputy Director for Plass * i . 2. Willies Harvey, Calef, 2 ask Force @ § 3. .Jemes O'Connell, Office of Security (He knows that Hervey” : took over the operation and delivered pilisc, arms, and . ' equipment im April 1962. He does not lmow of developrents after May 1962.) 4k, field Edwards, Director of Se ‘curity (He knows of the fact er the turnover to Earvey, but states ke knovs nothing of ; developments thereaSter.) ; : 5. J. C. King, cater, VE Division (fe scated in our interview with him that he knew that Harvey vas having meetings with: A mesbers of the gambling syndicate in 1962.) t : 6. Bruce Cheever, Harvey's deputy in 1962 (Cheever knows that an Harvey was meeting with gangsters in Beno (sic) in the vinter ; “y of 1962.) & al 7. Ted Ghackley, Chief, IMWAVE (He assisted Harvey ia the . delivery of arns and equipzent to Varcza in April 19%: De but presumably did not mow the identities of the recipients 3 . nor the purpose for vhich the material vas to be used.) : a 8. <TSD participation vas linited j te Surat é the pills to OfCounell on 18 April 1962.) _ ae - g. ‘Antonfo Varona, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably vas "ae ; not avare of goverment sponsorship.) Log 10. Varona’s son-in-law (fe too was presumably vas not aware of . a | the government's role.) a ; “gee 12. Maceo, Roselli's "nan" (Maceo probably imew there vas a. goverment comection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.) We can only conjecture as te who else may Lave knovn at least that ” the operation was continuing and perhaps sone of the details. Sau Sete i 18) ee
13-00000 Oo) Glancace was supposedly cut ous of che second passe, but we cannot . : be sure that Rosell{ did not keep him {uformed. ‘The sase way be said t i ‘of Sentos Trafficante. Harvey is sure that Maheu vas not involved in 07" ne Farvey's introduction to Roselli, but O'Connell is equally positive thet Meaheu partleipated. The story that Drew Pearson ‘told the President, and vaich 1s ‘mov ia other Goverssent circles, sounds suspiciously like this cecond phase of the operation. Iz that is so, s , ” then it iis likely that the operation has leaked~-perhaps throvgh : i es these channels: re ) Roselli to Haheu | | ; e" ° Makeu to Bdverd P. Morgan, Faheu's Washington lavyer " ; : Morgan to Drew Pearson . i Pearson to Chief Justice Warren and to the President i _— Warren to Hovley, chief of the Secret Service’ . Bore oF hen FAI to Attorney General Clark . ; ®6 8 . . . et we ly 8 eee ae : : ae “8 abate a tote & rs ! . . , We have a more detatled treatment im a separate section of this report . of the channels through which the story may have rassed. 0 wep EDRs ere ees cae RRNA Tee a BEY es 6 . . ‘ ‘ ‘ . ot ee ee er Ne Coa ee Sf sees ase “parla nbiunyiesertees retin sen
13-00000 : | ‘Bitrate seas Tre diretasolaz Incsideat , : : late 1961 - Early 1962 . a , “ ¢ 3 Well after the Pre-3ay of Pigs phase of the gaubling syndicate operation to assassinate Castro, and caly indirectly related to it, @ development in the ‘private life of Sem Giancana led to an inciéent that made the Fal avare of the Agency's relationship with the syndicate ; and required the briefing of the Attorney General on the details | of the assassination pias. . moat Phyllis McGuire, of the singing McGuire sisters, was and is : openly known to be Giancena's mistress. Giancara suspected her of having an afteir with Pan Rovan, of the Rowan end Martin conedy team. Both Rovan and Miss McGuire vere then entertaining ‘im Las Vegas, and Giancana asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan’s room. Maheu did not vant te do the job and declined on the grounds that he vesn‘'t equlpped fer that sort of work, Giancena made a cleim for a return fevor: he had worked on tne Castro assassination operation for Maheu, and * J '“Vaheu was indebted to hin. Giancana said that 42 Mabeu wouldn't” take on the job, he, Glancara, vould go to Las Vegas and do it : me hinself. Makeu agreed to arrange to have the room bugged. ° (Comment: The exact date of this is uncertain. An August 1953 item on Glancaza in the chicago ‘Sun-Tines refers to the ° incident, without mention of wiretapping, and sets the year as ERAT ABD 0 tr eI ROUENED PT poten ia hat rb tae cogtm aime aneamonane, ; ohted s<eGnameee Lr a4 a t t ‘ * i. . at . a . . ° cf 7 . yee * : Age OF AR Be 0 «chit ore atte coats ‘tee ene eon ete TA TC A NT TEAC SNA Se 6 Ne és > weer c det et ee cot te + Secon et een ne vate i is: ew peared Shaiya setae. genes i: na ee mee et be ae ee Ber gO he SERB Se ate MOET we MN ath ct cen teens a ee ee
13-00000 : ne ° 3 phee @ eo ee on anon adage: ee ° . ci eeme .. 2 ‘ a f ’ ¥e aa 4 Le Bu at . ay of: t t : F 1941. Tosre is nothing in Ageazy files thas pinpoints the date, i ‘ and the memories of these ve Snverviewcd who mow of the incideat os i 5 - F e + 0f “sjeter wie} . are hazy. Eévards and O'Comell did no« leam of the incident ; until after it bad happened. Zévards can place it only as being 4 after the Pay of Pigs. O'Conmmell at first thought that it was ° fa early 1962. When shown the newspaper account, O’Concsell said : that if the nevs story was correc:, 1t would have had to nave been : very late in 1961. An Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI, ; $ of 24 June 1966, states that it vee "at the height of the project negotirtions.” his is confusing, rather then clarifying, because 2008 ee ‘ C ) _ the operation vas supposedly at dead standstill in late 1961 oe | 7 and very early 1962. Clearly the incident occurred before 7 : of February 1962, because it vas on that date that the Director of Security told the FEE that CIA vould object to prosecutian. 7 | . Presumably the FBI's case vas already complete by then.) cles Mchew arranged to have Giancana's request handled by Etvard Le ; tebe pe Bois, a private “tivestigator in Mie=i. Du Bots assigued ‘vo men 8 - to the job: Arthur J. Ealletti and J. W. Harrison. — . (Comment: The September 1966 classified telephone directory. for the Greater Miemi. Area lists Edvard L. Du Bois under "Detective Agencies." There is an advertizenent on the page for “Arthur J. Balletti Investigations” waich lists as one of aH i 1 e ‘ BURY READ Eni eo tentB CNR ree CRRA TATTAS 8 AIOE a AOE ELLIE PRE. AA ETA Pt 0m EE Wwe a we + 8 . . »* : e ‘ . a ‘ ° cy wees « t ob. < ace? on date ae es ee ee ee ae 2a : one! age wien Se ee orien eos age eeg ee pers eas tees Mrost att ae wei mel oe se 7 py phi anes wae core OE | iT. oreee BEAT ty. be! mye Sey AN Beg ES Oo Tee Rapes Ng Ps
13-00000 gaaga 8 é +. EEG TA OLS OR a sos UG tgs Sea ap Etats PPR RENTON, CAP Es Ne RPA «Rng He MP ne A PERM oF ORES oo Te OIA . a ge ame Oe pada | aaceee lis specialties the obtainirg of photographic and electronic evidence.) O'Connell rcalls that, instead of planting a nicrophoze ia Rowan's ° roor, the Lovestigator tapped the telephone, vhich would not have revealed, the sort of intimacies that Glancana expected to discover. When Rowan left the rocs to doa shov, Balletti also le?t his roca to see the act, leaving his equigseat out ia full sight and rmaing. It was found by a maid, and the local sheriff's office was called. Balletti was arrested. Barrison was not picked up. Agency personne] have no further information about Harrison. The FBE identified him only as being “supplied by Makeu.” . _  -Balletti first tried to telephone Du Bois for help but could not reach him. He then called Maheu, in the presence of the sheriff's officers. O'Connell says that Maheu was able to fix the matter with — local Las Vegas authorities, perhaps vith help from Roselli. . However, ‘Ballet's call to Maheu caused the case to reach the FEI. The Bureau decided to press for prosecutica under the wireteppizg statute. “When Maheu was approached by the FEE, he referred them to the cra” Director of Security, Sheffield Eavards. (Comment: Edvards: states that he had told Maheu, who had . to work closely with the thugs, thet if ke got into a bind with: the FEI, he could tell the Bureau that he was vorking on an id tehreeneeccer | ~ aide ve Bate oe . originate ae ‘enema mob oe eee oFER AERO sey +e * 4 oe wae emIOTBS + are oer dovengepen go ap combetetemttttre ee e am : rT
13-00000 " inteliigerze operation being Landed oy Zivarts. vakeu, , accoriing to Edvards, told the Bureau that he had not personally . done the wiretappizs, but that it grew out of an operation he vas * working on with Edwards. Maheu presuzably did not mention the 4 ultimate objective of the “intelligence operation” involving the gesbling syndicate. The Bureeu, in a nencrand:m from J. Sdgar : ; - Hoover to the Der, dated 23 March 1962, stated that: “Mekeu claimed . that he ordered coverege of Rowan in tebalf of CIA's efforts to obtain intelligence information in Cuba through the hoodlug @lement, Including San Giancara, which bed interests there. Maheu ~ said he was put in contact with Glancana in conzec-lon with these H Ce intelligence activities throvgh John Roselli, a Los Angeles” vo { | . hoodlum. Maheu authorized wiring of Rovan's room end discussed , . this matter vith Johan Boselli.") | ae "ne 23 March meorsndus from the Bureau takes the fomofa a Taye oa : letter of confirmation of a 7 February meeting between an unnamed * _ eae 4 ye B we representative of the FEE and Skef Edwards. The penorandun- quotes ° i " gawarts as having made the following points: Makeu vas iavolved in a . . sensitive operation with the Agency; the Agency would object to aay | ~- . . * prosecution that would necessitate use of CIA personnel or information; — Re a, ff & an « ° fy | t a ‘ a s ix ate ite ‘ ) 4 € pucwmcnonees oy wh fs i LA atthe soe a enttndinsce: t 24 8 SEi A era eRaLREI MRRP REN tie. oth MEO NRE PTET ed (AERO RUE FEY OVO 4 MaRS UR po ETIN ahem om we RRR Taatraieaial - - . 1 . owe. : _ en te ele Bowe oe ‘e.g aes boo one et pees ee ee 1 mee Fr Ler Same are ene
13-00000 + Rene HOPERER EES TS Ae * : asd introdustten of evicence ccacernicg CIA cperaticas woule enbarrass ; ds the Goverasent. Tois {3 also esseatially as stated to us by Etvards s jm revieving the incident during the course of this investigation. aoe. The 23 March memorandus stated that the Criminal Division of the ; Department of Justice requested that CIA advise specifically if it . , . objected to initiation of criminal prosecutioa egaiast Ealletti, Maheu, acd Harrison. On 28 or 29 March, Edvards met with the Bureau : \ liaison officer, Sam Papich, and told hin thet any prosecutica vould endazger sensitive sources and methods used ia a duly authorized | ! | | eomeee project ard vould not be in the national interest. Papich accepted C Edvards' oral statement as the reply sequested and raid that ke would an report to proger authorities in the Bureau. Edwards made a record of the meeting im a memorandum of & April. 1942. a ew cxmanigmggruemnpn out «80s a+ Edwards informed us during our inquiry that at the time of the bugging incident and tke flap that ensued those (Dulles and Bissell) who had given the initial epprovel of the plan to assassinate Cestro - through the gambling syndicate vere gone. As no one else in authority (including Mr. Hens) had been cut in on the operation, Edwards dealt- with Pepich without reference to anyone else in the Agency. Tes Pd an April 195 os | oS . ; in early April Papich informed Eivards that Serbert J. Miller, te eo F * - : 4 aresrt Tse Eee] TF - ° ." ; . > ehh RINE IE G9 Shey UNG ALA OOY. 5°40 REINA Ake TONS, + salty B 0 ete FBC AUAOS DH VOSA" SOMO wopfatoth eo sete Saree gi a ener " . . ,
13-00000 eres < me- 2 eo OP Penge ep & ie au Sater See? os saga, q i ) “te oe ee . Oop aa eo we & pe | te loge Assistant Attorney Generel in charge of the Crimisai Division of the Lepartzent of Justice, wanted to discuss the case. Edwards then brought in Lawrence Houston, Gereral Counsel, and asked Houstoa to call oa Miller ard tell bis < that the bugging <ucifert in Las Vegas 44s related to an intelligescse operation and i the Agency did not ° ‘think it wise at that time to surface its cozzectio: with Posellt. Houston met with Miller on 16 April and. told his of the Agency's involvement, without revealing aay details of the assassination ‘operation. Houston’s memoresdim of the reeting, dated 26 April, quotes Miller as saying that he foresaw 10 eajor difficulty in stopping prosecution, but that he aight sention the probles to the Attomey General. Houston's memoranda notes that Miller reised a question about the possibility of our involvement in this particular case, the Las Vegas wiretap, standing in the way of prosecution of other actions, particularly against Giancana. - Houston's 26 April. mexoramiua states that on 20 April there was a” second meeting with Justice—with Miller's first assistant, Mr. Foley. At that meeting Houston told Yoley’that the Agency's request not to : ee : L prosecute was linkted te this specific bugging incicent, was based’ on ; % -. ° 7 security grounds, end thet security considerations would not be a bar €- z to prosecution on other matters. As it was possible that the Attorney -§ . General might be told about this and might then call the DCI, Houston te B tet own ecewn, 8 2 a Tate: ee ae nom erases separa oct er es om ete vanities ~* ae a ne ee ee rr lige lagi tm ah totem ian bo pe ee ee ee PP ere, Seer ee Sis An tet eet | aPrags een ee ‘ eo rs ‘ 9 gO, BEE 0 eontlgptccmtoc eo 2 i i
13-00000 pe “eee, ote Saarew Tir musa og gas (oo be eA iaceen. ad i ee briefed the DDCI, General Carter, who said be underscood the situation» end in due tine aignt Grief cha Divestor, Ur. HeCone. It is not mova whether General Cerzer 2id or did not brie? Me. MeCone. There is no : indication that General Carter was further briefed oa the full, detafis of the assassication pis: against Castro. ne See May 1962 soto Meth te ge mens ERED 2+ The Attorney General obviously was told of CIA’s operational involvement vith gangster elements, because ke requested a briefing on the details. On 7 May 1962 ShefMNeld Edvards acd Lawrence Houston » met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy ara, as Edwards puts it, wee cr" . “briefed bin ell the May." Houston says that after the briefing I Kennedy "thought about the problem quite seriously." The Attorney General said that he could see tne probles end that he could not pro against those involved fn the wiretapping case. Ee spoke quite on nnenane gmosmemedblse : r firnly, saying in effect, “I trust that if you ever try to do busizess © - with orgenized crime again--vith gangsters--you vill let the Attorney “General kmow before you do it.*'| Houston quotes Eévards as replying that this vas a reasonable request. Edvards says that, apong the Points covered was that of Eoselli‘s motivation. The Attorney Generel had. GAR PR PTR RA ME DR e IN ORIEL eo SM, TIE AS RECHT Ura Poe ‘ 2 thought that Roselli was doing the job (the atteapt at assassination: of Castro) for money. Exwards corrected that ispression; he was not. - pen ates ons Suter ‘waren sacks? eh eaen ste sonegrerigtinonn metranateereiacorein e. toe Pe RB Sep eee = ES ce EEE oh eeD 6 38 e- wale TBE ee ag tne eine wma ee Fs + fame wane
13-00000 wag” ca oo, BP? ees 0 7 Houston recalls that during the meeting with the Attorney Ceseral the letter esked for a memoranda record of the meeting, x Zdvarés believes chat the request was wade later and by telephone. a. A . A renorandis vas prepared and vas signed by Edvards. Both E4vards end - : ° Houston recall kheving hed a hand in writing it. A trensofctal buck- ; slip fran Houston to Rensaly notes that the request vas made on , : ‘os Ll May, vbich suggests that Edvarda is correct in his belle? that the ; request vas sade by telephone after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney = ° General. ‘The menorandus is Gated IW tay 102. Tt vag tyned im tua g a . copies only, with the original beicg sent to Attorney Genersl Kennedy tO!) and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It vas | | a typed by Edvands* secretary, Sareh Hall. It does not state the : ; 2 : “purpose of the operation on vbich Kennedy vas briefed, but it does | 4 make £t clear that the operation was against Castro awl ite true i a purpose may be inferred frax the menorandm. i 7 - ‘Edwards states that the briefing of the Attorney Generel and | BY : L the forvarding of 8 penorandum of recom vas carried cut without 2 ret | ae - “netefing the Director (Jon McCone), the DDCE (General Carter), or the : -j z / mp/P (Richard Helus). He felt that, since they had not been privy to got “the operation vhen it vas wder say, they should be protected fro ; | : involvenent in it after the fact. As noted previously, Houston hed woe ® / : ° briefed the DDCI on the fact that there was @ matter involving the ac LY ~ 63 - i 4 oo me wl ep, eg 8D ee opt Repke one Baws a4 ots, ond an h. eee en arnt cbtien Vettes be viens aad speed petnmer Saini Sakaied on ape a ae he MT ta Mag ae “ aati a 7 Pe et tea or acer ee aa .. el Dos ‘ we ee a eo title pte Wee ap pte te peak lege, ee nt ed aed gia tee ON fpr tek .
13-00000 « vr Sel ee, ae aos we met . ae ln oe weemee anew : soe comes . 2 Paty rey Pen ca + wee + Departcent of Justice, but Houston Lad nos gi ven the DOI the specisies. Ee feels 1% would Gave teen normal ‘or Bin to Lave driefed tue DCI- . i in view of t the Attormey General's interest, but ke also feels quite - Redhat woe stre eaat/auta have remembered doing it acd he dces not. He , 4 suggested that Edvards' éeliberate avoidance of such briefings may ) kave led his ‘also toe avoid meking ary briefings. Se recalls no disagreements with Edvards oa this point and concludes that he gust 2G etna the in + ag cate have accepted Edvards’ decision not to brief. a oS Houston ani Edwards briefed Robert Kennedy on a CIA operation () . entracincg gengster elements, which presumably was terminated following SAE pes 984 the Bay os’ Pigs fiasco. Kennedy stated his view, reportedly quite : strongly, that.the Attorney General should be told in advance of any. . I, future CIA intentions to vork vith or through U.S. gangster elexents. _ _. From seports of the briefing, it is reasonable to assume that Kennedy an a believed he bad such a commitzent fron Agency representatives. In fact, hovever, at the tine of the 7 May 1962 briefing of the Attorney General on “Geb Ling Syndicate ~ Phase One,".Phase Two under pe 7 Ft oe er" + ee ’ - Willies Harvey was already well under vay. Earvey had been introduced to Roselli on § April and Veroza or his men had received the lethal " Ay. t. ! t j i i . - pllls, the arns, and related support equirment in late April.” The Attomey General was not toid that the gaubling syndicate operation bad already been reactivated, nor, a3 far as ve know, was ke ever told - - . Fe Oe ee. ~ . o Gb « oe . eo: wet . we ee: ay oy eee : = Cran RO MEAT LIP OPS OOS PSS * 1 RNEY SY age F- oA Th CPN Anetdee de +o - ‘ @ i . 4& 4: rad a en ry em terns 4 : . « ° : — a -” eae o hatoag) a3 — gion nen EES TE REPT eo Beare aergera a eas eR ae OS Oe a ne en
13-00000 a eee oo Speteme soe . . . aa “t ae a en ree kn “ys gine 8 eS ee “t ‘*s 4% . 3 . . ' 5 i iata nena cai sanqpengenemremaun ewatgnmncranen: tatatta ete Ree. tT ee ee .. 4 . . . ; e ‘ . . . . . .* . . vhat purpose (althougs 5 , retrospect, he probably acted properly in briefing the Attorney General * in advance of any future CIA use of gangsters. woo ye Hope qr an eadimed ¢ . ttdivcs  ‘ebid etd that CIA hed a continuing involvecent with U.s. casgster eleseats. When the Atcorney General wes triefec oa 7 Says Edvards knew that Hervey had been introduced to Rosell!. Ze must also have mown that his subordicate, Janes O'Connell, vas in Miami and roughly for wards 20eS not mov recall this). The gexbling syndicate cperation kad been taken focm hia, and, in ‘ | | on only that aspect of the operation for which he hed been resporsible and of which he aad direct, persoral xrnevledge. Harvey states that on 14 May he briefed Mr. Helms on the meeting neni see) with the Attorney Geners1, as told to him by Edvards. Harvey, too, ee aa . advised against briefieg Mr. McCane anil Cereral Carter and states ° that Helms concurred in this. Oa that same date, 1h May, Edvards prepared @ menorandim for the record stating that on that day Earvey hed told his that any plans for future use of Roselli were dropped. ' PRS Bete PIATRA ERODE eae - fe F < ° eo e . Eévards? menorandis ‘states that be “cautioned bis: (Harvey) that r ate tees". am rogeh, Ee mote acc wee Ee! Pe ee tee i (Bavards) felt that ’ “any future projects of this nature should have » the many “tackt approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." Edvards cos - i ’ J i informed us that he has no specific recollection of having told Harvey of Kemedy's warning that the Attorney Gereral should be told oo 8 SS 3 deste * AF, 7% md ° ie os ee. om oe eee gee . eee te ee cee pet sete pe - . te 4 ' BN oa FE ge PL Rk TEL ose RN has SS Fin a a a Re ite * wpa Ct Wa ees Meet eR TE Lee ese Le rast Fetal eo a si ts - conf ™ ee: store eee att aa of a eie _ yrange art wreyetienne ss sacred Sgt eel ; re srennea: na Y ae aortas: ae ae Sa 8 4 Ae B s/n Ning ate T+ ay ont te, peated a Roel setae wee pea 2 eT aNiictg wide ne fete ait dor ciphin Ou Nw Leng eee es ea le ae am = - wee * ~
13-00000 “Peo at one Pak a ne ee tome . oe eee . re ee oe or ee ee ey * . Patera Par eee eC BOL | i gashesteniped 7 elt preeerwesiiane- . “, _ fomerdi ah ate wed “downs b Although the Attorney General on 7 May 1952 vas givea a full and frask account of the Ageacy's relations vith Maheu, Rozellt, and Giescana in the Castro operation, including the viretappiag finp, it appears that the F3I was not given anything like the sane detail. The Bureau gulte properly was not told ebout the assassication operation, and Lt seems thet it also was not told how the private & * lite of Glancana came to involve the Agency in the Las Vegas wire~ eae tapping incident. Edwards states that to have briefed the Bureau on he assassination operation vould have put it im an impossible bind, Since both Roselli and Gfancana were high on the Bursau*s "list." The briefing of Attorney General Kennedy was absolutely restricted to hin, aad we can only speculate that the confidence was observed. ° (Comment: Senator Rotert Kennedy's secretary, who was his secretary when be was Attorney General, phoned the Director's office on 4&4 March 1967 and asked for a copy of the ‘Senne eet it ir nies Eévands' memorandum on the 7 May 1962 meeting with Kennedy vhen ; he was Attorney General, at which time he was briefed on the . ami ee ee Castro assassination operation. Kennedy kmev of the Drew Pearson nt ne naeng encores ’ article of T March 1957 and wanted to check kis recollection of LE Ee apy ems - vhat he had been told by Edwards and Houston on 7 May 1962. ‘The aA nese . Attorney General's copy of the memorandum for the record of that ; . eee i! briefing is in the archives of the Attorney General's office. ie | | Mr.. Helms subsequently had lunch with Senator Kenedy. Ee tooka beh GssRtresmomees am ancundinrmonanay sane ina ASTER E GR TTR rat BBs SORE Pe BE i GRIT OME! LF BE re . i) ee ent, . g a mo EB . . reo an a en ‘ : 2 é ‘ Cet eeenrmeeniecieeeteeei needa ‘ a , enw escaes tone 1s dhe co ewe emtcratieesee saveeaetnatedtentveme © eed 5 hehe Se Bice aiering SP bee aoe: Patan to Swap. sghatpuer lg oi oan sys as sinetet fer hs Rem Sint Hey, oo Tae Stefeclivgem ted oo Ep ney 3 ee aa eR SY no 2
13-00000 Pos, ror Yetetomy 2 tenese. 2 ie waver nege oe ave . ny copy of the mezorandus with hin and alloved Aennedy to read it. Ee dia not leave a copy vith Meacedy.) . tr the information given the Bureau {a as limited as the records | 7 and our faformation indicate, then the Bureau has not been inforned, i . ; as the Attorney General was, that the Agency was 7: est unwitting and _ | then a reluctant accessory after the fact. It would be surprising, ° ‘ though, if the Bureau does not nov know the whole story of the Tas | ; Vegas bugging incident. Whether the Bureau may now think that CIA was | less than candid about the bugging incident (ae distinguished fraa the ; - sensitive assassination operation) is a question for speculation. " Bureau. In fact, some indication of the extent of the Bureau's “ What is available to the press is undoubtedly available to the ‘ : ‘Imovledge is found in a feature story in the Chicago Sun: Sun-Tizes ot { 16 August 1963, with a Washington date line, under the banner lead: an a The article cites "Justice Department sources’ as expressing the belief . : ’ ‘that Giancena never dia any spying at all for the CIA. He merely: a os pretended to go along with the CIA: ™ i "in the hope that the Justice Department's drive to put hin pet behind bars might be slowed - or at least affected ~ by his ruse of co-operation with enother goverazent ageacy.” *- Gale aheaeharnieer insta: MIRRORS WOR hgh Neste det BB canes be & ARN Gone coma antEREe des em aRENT MD TEN gag + sOTONAS P . +8 : a (6) The story places the period of the relationship fren 1959 to: eth eo eet. a sree . anon wets ae ce! : eee peat es a oot ee! . ‘ wwe Tt et ey wi gta “eepty abe tos roan i de a ATR ETS Deeg antn F pad everett tte t +, emt ene eae mbites ee tr echsacsiertine ies itinig eds i SE Rage a eT SET eg aN FFE Sr beast we ee an eS eR LE mie am ee Rema at TR Em a cert af ern caabt mm 0 ere ame ate al Sam Lag a oem cae es es See nt Stn at So nA Habe Fable
13-00000 fone, ( F) é 6 i a Poy eT eG . 2 “8 rs ore * af a Toe te oon Teele a ee ee et re ee aan oF ty cod ene = oo te ote a ~ mene ee . ate “ ae \ rae bac) eae . . " . .@ Gh led sane & fae ae wovcad se . e . | . ae ‘2 nee ad "sone tize in 1960, long tefore the edborcive revel cide 4av, sion at the Bay of Pigs in April, 2961." - EF =e newspazer then gives the folloviag version of the bugging incident; ©” 0° “* *# + “e “An ecually bizarre episode months later gave the ; Justice Department its first clue to Glancana‘s negotiations with the CIA. . "Te figures in this incident were a eale night- club entertainer and Giancaca‘'s girl friend, Payliis McGuire, one of the singing McGuire sisters. ers "At the tine, in Giencena's opinion, the entertainer was Overly attentive to Miss NcGrire. "At Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961, sheriff's police seized a prowler in the entertainer‘s hotel suite. Por hours, the intruder refused to identify himself or say he vas rifling the entertainer's rooms. me tamteapeaws Dan. + “Persistent questioning by sheriff's deputies, “8s according to federal authorities, led to an , . aéuission by the prowler that he was on the ” payroll of a private detective agency in Florida. incident from the operator of the detective agency. At first, the operutor refused to discuss the matter. Winslily, however, he told investigators te get in touch with the CIA. . : aot. “Florida authorities sought an explanation of the ; , a [ <2 moon lowe .¢ “he inquiry then shifted freu Florida to Washington . and revealed Glancara‘'s negotiations with CIA, it was disclosed. g $ t an 78 “Governzent sources reported Thursday that the ° private investigator's mission in the Las Vegas suite of the entertainer wes another riddle of the _ . Gilencena caper with the CIA. Neither CYA nor the - Florida detective Agency ever has offered an ' explanation of what the investigator was doing in ° .the Hotel sulte, the sources said.” ot ~ 68 « att ce Bete gone lee om eee me Bt tm te me . be ary ree, cia? nghar ed ’ “ tae - eT ea ee a re sme eae 9 : POC EEE +" sapped aaah SM Wain om We tg eye fog : : . a wage Meee meh ee ke ee te ee ta St eT ne ata te ee ae Eg Lee me Ei ie te me eRe Oe tek Ligaen idle arin ood Re bettas wank P eee.
13-00000 ae oes ro er 2 foe Sead On Of fot, troy Phh aye: @ ta 10 10 4 RED On: < CRE Pe outiey ow e Poe % . . * ae e . “ote f° ; . SiS TARAS ERENT, Cam ARR eRe ID? pa PUTER Oe Can Re MELEE . ? & . . _ “ rn ame ee . ce wee haw! em Loe é nearrt Eee £83} Four days later, cn 20 August 1953, the nicago Lally News reported further cn tre subject under the following neadline: ° : Tr? SAUTH ABOVE CCSA NOSTRA CEY=? AnD THE CIA® fhe story cited an incident im which Glancara literally bumped into an Fal agent vno was tailing him. Giancansa was reported to have said, “Why don't you fellcvs leave se alone? I'm one of you!” CGiancara is represented in the revspaper accaumt as having been approached by-< but not az having made any arrangenents with--CIA. ‘he story also mentions the Lac Veens incident, but in terms of someone, possibly - CYA, ransacking a roas occupled by one of Glencana’s henchmen vho , had Just returned fre Cubs. og te Oz 16 August 1963 the DD/P (Helms) sent a memorandum to the DCI (McCone) forvarding a copy of the 14 May 1962 memorandus for the “record sent to Attorney Ceneral Kennedy following the 7 May 1962 Sect aay se briefing of Keosedy on the gambling eynéicate operation ~- phase one. oom ty? o : : oo The coincidence of cates strongly suggeats that the Director's as oes interest resulted frou the Chicago newspaper story of 16 August, ” yn ‘his trensaltte] penorandiss to the DCr, Mr. Helms urote that: "=... ives vaguely avare of the existence of such @ memorendus /tre memorandim for the record of the 7 May- 1962 briefirg of Rovert Kennedy Since I was informed that it hed been vritten as a result cf a brieficg given by Colosel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year. « « © © « XY assume you ere aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment.” a. peri, Sir Tees large as wnt 2 ua h Os oie hehe Ct we: eo Sea «ue .. ne . . - . - . . etn 4g ote. aot gn beg em ee ee mk ee eee lee cade re ewer mee ee celts tees 4 ea em eerape 6 * bem ie Ve “4 i i i i ti t ‘ Z i 4. ‘- . 4 : 2 ¢ 7 sonnel ind eros, at ” : e . on te oe ate act oer we oy! vat coeneegiens °.
13-00000 = ; eo & e aM @ * Sead 5 FFE are we one we, cae tity aOgee waite a. Se we we me wee sone <n : ” Tpis is the earliest date cn which we have evidense of Er. MsCone's . 7 5 bea. being avare of any aspect of the scheze to assassinate Castro ‘using — . sbi emerge Bh . benders of the ganbling syndicate. . ei Drew Peerson hag access to these newsrarer stories, and they ; ere available to any nunber of sources who sigst vish to collect - i ‘ suche information. The rumors of CIA's alliance vith gurgsters are ; not new; vhat is new is that the rotors now comnect CIA and the : gangsters in a plot to assassinate Castro. It say be assumed that . . the Attorney General (Ciark) “novs that the rors of tze relation- eens bey © 6 ship, as suena, are true because of the recoris of the FBI on the Las re Vegas wiretapping incident. As of this writing, he does not . , " necessarily ‘mow more-~subject to vhat he may have learned as a result of the FEE interview of Edvard P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington whee attorney. A clue as to hew much tae Attorney General may know is . i 8 0 6 cam oe easton en natn a : : aon found in his statement that Maheu {s the closest thing to a link -. ° ' ot i - 70 - aot oe. =i uf  peate Pgs Gs wad bade sabtewd tl ae “cant. . Cd Pein Rant exrontnow eorentenonms on, Pom ee wee SEA LOR Tree ee eg 08'S Peta HET gt. wy, oe OD 7 ow ws, is ee Li me ee} ia . . . > . “eb et le OD BE Te 2 tee et o's. . - er : we eo Ll eee te =f : = ot ~-§ cpt ph B tyrants sr weet: & Cao, slimmer t * gO cere te Bérnetes assy ar rer: fet aie PR a gee Ne . se pares ve eee ge Qe ES pene dee ce cm a arta Te eee ae a eee TT ET
f ‘ « ( : May = July 1935 ‘ . . The Long Coxaittee The Agency’s previous intervent‘ozs ca Kaheu's bekalf are ° revieved here, because of the increasingly isportans role of Maheu 1 : & 5 in the scensrio. The last of these interventions occurred during 7 ; the period May ~ June 1966. At that tine e Sesete Comsittee beaded i “ i z ; by Senator Long of Missouri was investigating invasious of privacy ' ” end planned to call Makeu to testify. We learned indirectly of the 7 } — Committee's intention to call his. A san wno ‘vas employed by Maheu i in 1954-55 was inforsed that he vould be called to testify about his on we ae peat: eo. wre : é 7 Perera oth ins 9 beg . activities during that period. He vas an employee of AID in 1966. The Internal Security Division of the Depurtnent of Justice learned that he was to be called as a witness and informed CIA's Gezeral. . : aoa” . Counsel. * Byrne 18 tONGe "Em. cao Semagrens etre age ' 0 me 9 eon Mamet toes In the 1994-55 tice pertod Mahou vas hixed by the Greek sniping . . Hagnate, Niarchos, bo kelp in a financfal tussle Kiarchos was having | aoe gu an, Ogee? $8 ae eee . siete Oo; . i rr) ; . With another Greek skippirg Migure, Cumsslsy who hed nanaged te : negotiate a pact with King Seud uder which Onassis would control 90% of all Saudi Arabian ofl shipsents. British, American, and German shipping interests opposed Ocassis’ near monopoly, and the US and UK governments supported Biarenss in his Mant to ave the agreement see bees to ae! a a at mo we. Sata ceeds begpeni ety oe, -, Agama sree ela oat aT ate ART OE de Sirk aR we at etal gat ey tee a reeator wenn aiine ae roe daee ng re irre | O00000-E1L
13-00000 tye 3A oF Mp Tig ams eattacte gn GEAR ° . ® on whey? * A) fp . . ' 1 UGE ASP OORT GIG LOVERS 1 AP HEPER Gere, + with Vice Presidect Rixon. Meheu's operations vere financed by ° Se Ne wee wee a ee we ri * 43 j.2° Fee we eeed wi ed odes of cancelled. Mahe is believed ta have worked at tov levels in dath the British end Anerisan governments, reportedly aveting at least once Niarenos, but CIA became ituvolwed fn supporting then oy request of the Department of State. Agency ccamunications ard pouch facilities " were made available to Maheu, acd he was given help in developing a black propagec4’s campaign ageinst Ceassis. Iifarchos, vith Maheu's help, won his scrap with Onassis. - <A variety of litigation arose from the contest. In one levy suit for libel before the New Yor Supreme Court in early 1956 (Onassis vs. Catapodis), Miarchos was examined by attorneys for Catapodis. Vhen questions vere’asked about certain affidavits in issue (which hed been passed through the CIA pouch systes), Miarchos, as a wittess, vas advised by his attorneys not to testify on the grounds of Goverment privilege. CIA inevitably becaze involved, he Genezal Counsel prepared a statement for the U.S. District Attorney in Hew York (to te retained by the O0/c office there) stating the Agency's interest. As a consequence, Cra vas identitied as being a party to the Riaschos/— Gnassis squabble. Although that was in 1956, the Agency's inter- ventioa is presuzably still atmatter of record. Tre Long Committee planned to resurrect the old Cnassis/Nfarchos fight, because it bad involved an inwasion of privacy. Apparensly ee Se ee ean ee Bey 1B ae tant tele Sa Sees oases ate TF ee eT ee Le ea ie fe Fong: GED ee acest bien: aes weston? a gti natn chignencbae tint emi 3 ones ~ om me Beit + atone, 4 , Sid bypttien eae ‘e tome a CU ERIN SoA RAHA & semciempemntianeh teh Ootan St TEganeare. ee ww mee ces tearident + ‘
13-00000 @ a n +e " eo - f . . “4 wo ee ass OG aoa a 4 (' i . ? one of the things Mateu did vas to hire sczecc to mm a techatcel tums? ' gurvefllance on Onassis‘ offices, and this tecacte know. Hakeu's pore recent involvement in the Las Vegas wiretapping incident also oe seened certain to receive extensive ettentioa by the Long Committee. The Long Comalttee presumably vould have been interesced only fn: Maheu's connection with the wiretappings thet grew out of the Cnassis/ Niarchos affair and the gaubling syncicate operation agsizst Castro. a fhe Agency decided that it would not be in its interest to allow oo Maheu to testify on the bugging incidents because of the risk that his testimony sould not be confined Just two wiretapping. further, i ‘a - Makeu has been used over the years in a rumter of sensitive CIA a operations. There was a risk that a generel icquiry might open up other sensitive issues. 4& number of neetings were held vith Edvard P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington attorney, and vith a close legal. associate of Serator Loag, a St. Louis attorney named Korris Shenker. Finally, in direct meetings with Senator Long, our General Counsel was able to have Maheu excuced fros testifying before the long = -. While negotiations - were under way to have Maheu excused from - which might jeopardize bis business with very suportent clients. He was especially worried cover his Howard Hughes account. He arplied pressure om. wt eae maa ee site aay: y 2 ¢ { , a | i | f 3 ia , ‘testifying, Meheu became quite alarmed over the risk of adverse publicity, i ed Frew eae Bele ek ae ee ee ee OC ne ee ee et on OE OT eS Sweet eM OT 2 ne eee , tee cece
13-00000 es @ a - SPA, 6 . ROME OP ES atee semen sa et a oat waeer es er reee sts z & = . 2 ‘ . eek ¢ * ‘. . ° ; . { \ : a a me: i ¢ . é wat. ~- . ord : te a 7 2 : z : of on the Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting chat publicity efshs HP pe expese his past sensitive work for CIA. Meheu's teckgruucd exd past assuctutions with CIA ere the subject of aaother section of this report. ° James O'Coonell states that at one polnt in the negotiations with : . the Long Commitcvee Meheu indicated treat he might trief his at: eRe yy a 4 ' Edvard P. Morgan, fully about his past activities so that Morgan would ort: te be able te decide how best to represent hin. Whether he did or not, and, £f so, whe he told him, is not mown. We have a discussion of + Cae Gen mie ae the possible isplications of this in a later secticn of this report. i C: . a. Maheuw pay very well have told Morgea tse details of @ . the plan to assassinate Castro using members of the ganbling . syndicate, and : | - b. Maheu has now, on three separate occasions, seem CIA . ; intervene in official proceedings--once for Hiarchos and twice H , for Maheu. ; ae mo. : ; . wf Co 7 oe : . so . wae “ why at “ q . . i 4 é a ce pte e eee RN yg gered pear tne Om emt get LT ey tegen RTT Ay te ceraben emia we ata ee Eben foam my we oS
13-00000 eames ee a eee a as no times - a ere ae? ¢ getty # . * CORREO Te of Moet Hy Gt ¥ & te , Schemes in Tarly 2953 Ski:. Diving Sust « OBR? oF At about the tise of the Donovan-Castrco negotiations for the release of the Hay of Pigs prisoners a. plag was éevised to have Donovan present @ contaminated skin déiving sult to castro as a gifs. Castro was know to be a skin diving enthusfast. Se cannot put a precise date cn this scheme. Desmond FitzGerald told us of it as if i | it had originated after ke took over the Cuba task force in January 1663. Samuel Balpern said that 1+ began under Wiiifem Harvey and that he, Ealperz, briefed FitzGerald oa 4%. Earvey states positively C that he never heard of it. " . * ++ enn etna fo = ° According to Sidney Gottlieb, this echeme progressed to the * point of actually buying a diving suit and readying it for delivery. . The technique involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus t that vould produce a disabling and chronic skin disease (Madura foot) and contaminating the breathing apperatus with tubercle bacilli. Ce vmmhot om 2 . Gottlieb does not remember what came of the scheme or what happened "  t@ the scuba suit. Sam Halpern, vio was in on the scheme, at first said the plan was dropped because it was cbvicusly impracticable. Be later recalled that the plan was ebandoned % because it was overtaken a, cececihys qutmnmesmeseshoete euasin pamneret Re rn ee my 4 bay : . . . a e . . 6 ef . by events: Donovan had elresdy given Castro a skin diving suit on his ° own initiative. The scheme ray have been mentioned to Mike Miskovsky, ° . . >) + who vorted with Donova, but FitzGerald has no recollectioa that itwas. 9° FP 5a? ¢ - 15 - . . . . . . . . se Boy . & 7 4 eet ae . woos aoa : » : . . oS ere. ate “aoe ron te gh oye te tice hae oe eet . a oe ae hos = to vigninetiggn aera oe = rap ohare iene Beyreowen gre” eam, awe Tamers ye Seo eet rete en Hiner wenntin aha tb Se a peta ob PR ees z oe PTR eee 8 eet SSIs on Sees Tes Bat on een Rae eng ee MR me be pation nye Clee oe eg TL sete “ote we ee -
13-00000 %° ee é . & oe Do gene % ® . . a 2°: 89 oie ree we oes wee gee hae ae cee tee one wee coe wee ek ge * Br ME Sy ® as tad we 8 . Halpern says that he mentioned the plan to Gaorge Ke¥anus, then cae & special assistant to tre DD/P (ifeims). McManus later told Ealpern PSperes 8 ee that he had mentioned the scheme to Mr. Helms. ‘Those who vere involved | x. ¢ bag oe we in the plot or vho vere identified to us by the participants as being : tting are the followizg: . . . i Rickard Helns { 4 ‘ . Fi i i William Harvey (denies any knovledge) i Cesnond FitzGerald Sanvel Halpern George McManus | G . 4g Bhdney Gottlieb — | 7 20 ps tae eateimamatm octet Lom opp, SAN. btm a0 dante af é ® e fe ' ‘ ’ * @ . ' ' ? d 4 é ‘ ee Te ee ey Tee * een Td “@ . . Ce + e - Oe ed — ou. ° ; = . ~ Tene . . f Het 2. a e RK ° = - toe wipe . 2. * * 4 +e ened Coe . ae ote Th gta roe Y . Te ee pena galing Repeats heads Al att mt PEN. wate See fen, itt Albom te vaote's | aces ares Nea dee se ce RN he ol pews t Aes oY een a , ee - wet gle ee ee eto e, ee AE 2 eae eam ee hte ee mada oy ame +
13-00000 aye PAD Eee ® e 3 s- » aaa demneeNrORn ty § « etna AM An Goats oe ¢ OF A * ‘ . ros SF we of @ tae & fet oe Sh Elmo EQUATES CF LurcahATiol Files were furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, che Geserai Counsel, the Lezistacive Counsel, tre Czief of WE Division, en2 dy Col. J. C. Hing, former Chlef of WH Division. Bicgraphic files and intelligence pudlications were furnished by the Director of Central Reference. }f vas not nade wittirg of the reason for our interest im thea, end those who asseabdled thez for him were not told for whom they were intended. We celled cack four officers tor fatervievs: Richard Bissell,. Sbeffield Edvards frou retizesent, Willies Earvey froo sick leave, ana Nestor Suaczez fren his post ini(eracas,| Gtzervise, our intercievs were conficed to offlcers assigned the headquarters installaticn. We opened each interview Sy referring to the Drew Tearsoa colimm of 7 March 1907, citing thes as the reason for our interest in learaics of plots to assassinate Castro. We told those iaverviewed that we were on a fact-finding mission on tekalf of the Glrector, ard thas this was not the usual sort of Insrector General investigation. We asxed each to raze any others vho were lizely to have kmovledge of such plots. ‘“«e cautioned each not to discuss the sub{ect of the interview with anyone else--even others whea we sisht interviov. This is a cooplete list of those interviewed: Desmond Fitréerald Senuel Halpern Bruce.Cheever, |] so J. C. King Alfonse Rodriguez J. D0. Esterlize Edvard Guna Eovard Osborn . Jazes O*Consell Stdney Gottlieb . . Sheffield Edvards Lavrence Houston | e [! Joan Harner 4 . Restor Sanckez Williem Harvey Corzelius Roosevelt Ober Rickard Bissell Ft oem epmenen aan GENE OEE ae +e ° 6 | te Ly ° 0 @ emma anim tne tem oe ve a 6 ep 9 a
13-00000 nS Lr a g. i" ‘ oo Pas © AA. tod * 886, Beoby-tra sped Sea Sheil ' : Sexe tine nm 1953, date uncertain but p: waably early in the wad ; : . year, Desmond FitzGerald, then Catel, S&S, ori inated a sche exe tor Oe ans . doing avay with Castro by reaas of an explosives-rigged sea shell. o The idea was to take an unusually spectacular sea ‘shell -that sould , i me be certaia to catch Castro's eye, load it with an explosive triggered | - ‘ to blow vhea the shell vas Lifted, ana susmerge it in an area vkere | : Castro oftea went skin diving. i Des bougat two books on Caribbean Mollusca. The scheme vas soon ‘ as "found to be impracticable. None of the shells that might conceivably 4 rt aa be found fn the Caribbean area was both spectacular exough to be sure . 7 | of attracting attention and large enough to hold the needed volume ‘of explosive. The widget submarine that would Lave had to be used in emplacement of the shell has tco short un operating range for such - | 4&8 Operation. a care geen eneninetea FiteGeralé states that he, Sam Halpern, and Bruce Cheever had ; several sessions at which they explor:d this possibility, but that no- : , + ge TE "| one else was ever brought in on the talks. Halpern believes that he . t : had conversations with TSD on ‘feasibility and using a hypothetical ; { . - ° . case. He does not rezenbder with whoa he may have spoxen. We are unable to identify any others who knew of the scheme at the time it was beirg considered. 4 7 epg ewes Sure ame be Be 8 . ant . .e — e ay we BS Se ee aed ‘ oot, the oo eoheneel <n o agtet .,
13-00000 ra on ‘ Arete ese ye tas £ te tetenae d ote 2 sen ° : - 3 ’ , ( e ect hALASE - Polunte Cutele : 9 March 1561 ® . ; an officer then assigned to the Mexico City Station, set in Mexico City with Rolando Cubela to sound out Cubela . on his views on the Cuban situation. Cubsela rad been atteading the | i : leftist-sponsored Letin Aserican Conference'on national Sovereignty, i Erancipation and Peace held in Mexico City froa.5 to 8 March. : Cubela vas nonceemittal. The meeting was arranged by Carlos 7 . epedino (AMMHIP-1), a long-tire friend of Cubela. Cubela mew : ae casually frou Havana where las once assigned and where ; g 4 iC. . @ sinilar meeting had once teen set up but had fallen through. . , (Comment: Rolando CUZELA Secades was the second-ranking z. leader of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) 13 de Marso, which y : was an elite group of left!st. student activists founded in 1956 to organize violence to overthrow the Batista regice. Cubela . : was believed to have been one of the participants in the ; - coed : iH - ; - ° assassination in 1956 of Lt. Col. Antonio BLAvco Rico, then : * - : ° : 4 the head of Patista‘s military intelligence service. The DR i : , . meabers considered thenselves quite apart from tne Fidel{sta 26th of July Movement, despite the fact that they had reluctantly - signed a unity pact. In the final days of the revolution the DR . took the Presidential Palace, which they refused to surrender . an 2, . Pe eee ee * “BRP RRA NAD 8 tk i PE a HE PRAGP Oren A Fetes: ‘ ware na . foe . . . fo ee ao tyes . . Lage Lipton gem e Ogata pos tamer UME oer hte:- i ae eld tn ee Aree ene oa naan : re ar a aa ALE oan crm male ced me me Fart Fr eee :
13-00000 . te Che Guevara but eventuaily (ena relestantly) turned cver to Fidel Castro. Cubela vas a major in the Cuban army, the bighest . Cuban nilitery rank. . é , (A CS Information Report with a date of information of - ° - March 1959 reported that: “Priors to his appointment to the post of Cubas Military Attacks to Spain and his subsequent ; departure for Madrid on 27 March 1959, Rolando Cubela frankly expressed to Prize Minister Mécl Castro hie dissatisfaction mo . over the present situation in Cuba. Cubeia .. . privately $a * told intizates that he was co disgusted vith Castro that if he, ; te C Cubela, did not get cat of the country scon, he would xill - , ' : a . (Although the March 1961 zeeting betweenf ana Cubela ; . ; in Mexico City was inconslusive, it led to other meetings out of | ‘ which grew Project AMIASH. Cubela (AMLASH-1) repeatedly insisted | 5 that the essential first step in overthroving the regize was the | ’ elinination of Castro himself, which Cubela claimed he vas pad ea : on 20)" prepaxed to accomplish. He repeatedly requested that ve furnish ana . s ¢ him the special equipment or raterial needed to do the job. Those Bo { immediately concerned with the rucning of the operation now ‘ : recall it as one in which the Agency was interested primarily in ; keeping Cubela active in the MUAPRON progrem directed against «age “eee! Siege Fe Sy Sree © F ReChrreitenee t emeaeredh EPR aen 8 RBHEN HEAT PS SNE ak 4 ye : 5 as tet spe 8 Nes mp aerell 3 . ; Seles tera pee ect Ne lle 6 AEN GR ENT ESE TAR EE He ME ender’
13-00000 — C . Cuben military leaders, ville resiszing siz pleas for techaical : . assistance in an assass’ iation attexpt. The volzainous project t ‘ files and the infornation furnished us by ilestor Sanchez, ; Cubela‘s case officer, ao not vholiy support those recollectioss. The Agency offered both direct and fodirect support for Cubela's , plottings.) ‘ : 28 March 1961 ' i f . An asset of the Miami Station reported tzat Rolando Cubela asd a _- Juan Orta vanted to defect and needed help in escaping. (Juan Orta ic i was the gangsters’ “man inside Cuba" vith access to Castro in the ; i 7 { 7 _ lethal pill operation we have called Gaxbling Syndicate - Paase Oce.) | { Headquarters expressed, interest in exfiltrating Orta and Cubela. - | t The exfiltration attempt vas called ofas a result of a report that | od. i the Cutan police vere evare of Cubels's desire to defect and of hfs : , | i departure plans. | ‘ Ee . Satan TORS: oe (Comment :. This is one of three naze-Links ve found in the a _ nd ; oe AMLASH file between Rolando Cubvela and perscns involved in the | . : : , eanbling syndicate episodes. Tze other tvo links are ever nore’ -_ : i . . nebulous than this. If Cubele was in fact one of the gangsters’ to ‘ assets inside Cuta, that fact wes unkcowm to either the CIA ‘ | , . officers running the gangster episodes or to those handling Cubela.) | , : Be ser Re Ue Pete BT nate sels BE ott Lett, Fm eal fils Nanay Bone thine a ge etn a ee en oe 4p ate hm kN elt EN rw el met ee hee owe PM em eae
13-00000 . Uk August 1961 x . ° . . : oe § furlos Tepedino reported that Rolando Cubele wes planning 3 so ; te attend the French Hational Student Unton Culturel restival : later im the month. Cubela sent a cessage to Tepedino saying that F he vanted to talk vitha “friend of[ st in Paris if possible. 1 oe The nessage presumably was passed through Cubela‘s girl friend, i ; an airline stewartess. The Paris Station was given approval to : ‘ ; : : appreach Cubela, but there is no indfvation fn the file that he £ was actually contacted. , i ; . , 1§ June 1! i i¢- cae . a”. The SMMAVE Station cabled that a station asset (amconcent-1) was told by Lucia ECHEVARRIA Bianci that Cubela had left Cuba for Helsink?! on 10 Jume 1962. He was traveling om a Czech airline, by vay of Prague, to Helsinkt vbere he planned to attend the World Siw]. Youth Festival. Ancia's mother and father had. arrived in Mieurt } ‘on 9 June and ted ‘been seen off at the ajport by Cubela vhen they left Cuba. Lucia's nother told Lucia that Cubela wanted to defect a wy + 8 mau mutes wo! |teeren end to enter the U.S. Cubela said that on hts return from Eelsinkt he vould pass through Paris where he hoped to meet his old frierd, . 4 ay a ony 6) G 1 4 ie b t 4 é te % SP PBMC ED By ERLE IOLEOR LS CELDT TETRA, 5 PLES THER". FRY OST A DEAT ee ee eee res 2 ee ee ee iattek cotta etgfbarge Meer Sitacie weet Seneh! eee rd eis ~ ag fo ama OT" Ot. a WM eR in, Bina Zoe ge 8 a EPO TP Re a, le BEAR Bagh owe es Fs. ote, ae ba La Peo an ete TEE Eee Je is wee 9 Ne ngealtt wee eek tS i ste eC atone WR gemma othe os were dates | mn
13-00000 . a a Fn ee ee ent e rant Grease 7° {ne FEY forwarted to CIA a report of a meeting «ith an Far - i {afornant fin Miawi on 11 Juze. ‘Ths inforsant sported that Cubela was attending the Youth Festival in Helsinki in July-Avgust 1962 and wanted to defect. Ina detailed transsittal mexorandim, the Fal identified its informant as Carlos Tepedino, weoa the zat anew to | be a long-time contact of CIA. Tepedino offered his services to the t “FBI to assist in the defection of Cutela. Be told the Bureau of -[_____] meeting vith Cutela in Mexico City in March 1961. The : | J 1 Bureau stated in its memorandi to us thet it had told Zepedine + @rpowees- a0 C oe that his offer ‘voula be forvarded to the proper U.S. agency. ‘The . Bureau also stated that it was informing ite Paris representative Onstoe ary om 6 i) ® to refer fepedino to CIA if Tepedins should contact the Paris Legal Attache. - ; “. ee ed Fi The JMAAVE Station reported the substance of a telephone  - of conversation between Tepedino and a station officer, which was arranged ty AMCONCERT-1. ‘lepedino identified the origizal source 0 PSs 1 seem come mee ou! fay wos of his inforzation on Cutela‘'s desire to defect. as being the Echavarrias, ‘ ome ‘ . i AACR OD TTTROTTTETS ED SERN ARTEL ARTS AER nos . ° “f ° . . _° ae : . : # . . 6 : . Ty froa whos the JMAJAVE Station had received its report. Tepedino said be had- approached the Fa in Miexi because of dissatisfaction with the | =); 8 patentee - Oo. cempicdaene ure lintanna Bans sig whl pig vob wait nap transl eds OU E E, R Slat EES He Paco ees A on te AoC, et Ci Set oR GGL OEE ASO Moe pease wg OR re BRT AEE olen FE hey eas ony opm eee Te REET. oS AM oe OP an ROS MT Ty MY om alate MGC ogames camry tinaae tint ge TIE ee te ot ern Len Rhee rweD ames 6 Benes beg ce te Reet ee oe ate ae ai lke ere eG ee
13-00000 £ : QE VIS TTT mete ts ‘ “ : ° “ae tm tet Bo wo S we 6 eet tS bam 3 : way CIA kad tacdled Cutela's “plansed defection” fa Paris in August. § 1961. Tepedino agreed to reet vith a CIA officer and contact < arrengements were made. 13 and 1h July 1962 . -¢ : i | | frou headquarters, met vith Tepedino. in | Sew York City on 13 end 14 July 1962. Tepedino agreed to meet | jax Helsinki, and to travel anywhere else necessary, to aid ’. 4m an attempt to defect Cubela. Tepedinc, who is a successful, Ca 2 . . Cuban exile jeveller in Kev York City, refused an offer to pay his . ¢ qcumomeyieme) ones commpy seus oe hotel expenses. He was not offered a ecalary or bonus. ; . July - 6 August 1 ° oO 1 me _ Sepedino arrived in Helsinki on 30 July. Jwas already p : there. Cubela vas. found, and the first of a series of meetings vith C . full expenses. He did accept reimbursement for airline tickets and 4 ‘ 4° or, oir’ a Wee | i lage him vas hela on 1 August. the original objective of defecting cubela rs: was quickly changed to one of recruiting him in place. These are oo | t excerpts fron leontact report of the frst meeting witha ee’. ; . ri ‘ a os ay Cubela: RPE Gad SONI BCR Rae RaAImEE (Ns see eoah Gh ABO OOERD Ry Me HONEA aaa, 7-3 Be” oo. . . % . . 4 a? ae He sald he was considering not going back to Cuba, but after talking to Tepedino, he felt thet if he could do seething 7. oe ot really significant for the creation of a nev Cuta, bores . 7 ae ae eet he vas interested in returning to carry on the fight there. aa Ste Nedilemae Fo inset sch nttrattae tee ater Agee guceng infos te et sgt Par Bs alle Ta, on len at mine 0 on let Sly BL go ang Oe Ons ne Eee Be OL me ee ee
13-00000 frm: os < . ° on aft gt ahi efor “ee a eo oe - "e ob vee 4 “ae co Ore oD AEE TD = 2g a D . * i . 88 tet GO Bees He caid he vas nov interested ia ris sing his life for any szall undertaking, but that if he could be given @ really large part *9 play, ke would use hinself aad several others in Cuba vhen be could rely upoa. Ee caid he had plans to blow up an oil refinery, as te felt that the continuing existence of a semblance of normal functioning in ft Cuba depended upon a continuing supply of petroleum, supplies of” + which, as ve know, are at a critical staye today. . He also wanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriguez (a top- 8 : ranking Castro subordinate) aad the Soviet Aubassador, and also . to eliminate Fidel, by execution if necessary. wee 8 a While we vere maxing no comlttments or plans, ve pointed out to . . Cubela thet schemes like he envisioned certainly had their place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, infisrmatioa-collection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure the value and success of such plans. Cubela stated many tines during the course of this and subsequent meetings ‘that he vas only interested {a involving hinself in a . plan of significant action, and waich was truly designed to bd achieve rapidly his desire to help Cuba. . ecm ageatiys ant - 9 August 1962 : ° Because of the ‘security hazard in too frequent meetings in ee ee ee ae Helsinkt ,vhere Cubela was surrounded by his associates in the Cuban . on Mi AE delegation, it was "agreed that further meetings vould be held in - aon 4 ae _ Stockholm and in Copenhagen. Cubela ‘agreed to meet with a Spanfsh- @ 0 eam weruos gee ge - Bigtatee vey speaking case officer in Paris later in the month. Nothing significent came out of the meetings in Stockhols, 7 - 9 August, except Cubela's | ' Yevelation that he had told four of his Cuban associates of his meetings \ : _e - in Eelcinki with fepedino. * e . . « o * “Tae - eae tee of a a ah .- \e one = : os Wiheewiled bec ial wwadee aT Sey oe: Senne eee ie ee pes ee Ser ae oe ete ES OO | Si a aoe liad
13-00000 wl . 7 st ee oe “ee 2 oe, tome tetera tee ns Letty OB 1G - 11 Auesss 1942 Tepedineg, and Cubein cet in Copestagesn for further . meetings. | _____ferote in his contect report: i . ™ . « » at one tine vhen ve always vrote of hinsel¢ as ‘ve'7 were discussing the vzects of Cubela‘’s futere : role in Cuba, we used the term ‘assassinate.’ ‘Te use of this tern, we later learned from Tepedino and fraz Cubela himself, was most objectionable to the letter, and ke was visibly upset. ° Yt was not the act he obfected co, but rather serely “the ckolce of the word used to describe it. ‘Elininate vas ecceptable.*" = (Comment: It 1s varth noting here that Tepedino, a Cuban jeveller in Hew York, ves present at a series of meetings at ae La: Or canes aqme th eeprom weNEtEEDY + which the assassination of Castro was discussed betveen Cubela r i . antf | whom Tepedino knew to be a CIA officer.) ik = 23 August 1962 : (. Cubela, Tepedino, soa Yow in Paris und vere joined rn by ja Spanish-speaking case officer froa Madrid. H Cubela vas given S/W training and was issued appropriate Sft supplies. He was taken to the south of France on 20 August for e dexolition denonstration. | |pianned to polygraph Cubcla and asked for a polygraph operator to be sent to Paris. Cubela indignaatiy . - efusea ta be polygirspbed. bled on 17 August: “Rave no intention give Cubela physical elinization nission ' as requirement but recogzize this sovething be esuld or . might try to carry out on his ovm initiative.” Headquarters replied by cable on 18 August: i - Of pe - ; |e 3 om oy oy © cccscane scram +. womendballnv "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given Cusela.” | 2D August 1952 ' Cubela left Prague by air for Havens. - 85 - tS Eiea H - U_wseta abe Ua - mee = gee ci pri . ae : et ood Pare ter owing ‘, B Laan See a setey we ae | Ricca 5 al ergy Oe Raptr etesie afk ene rome ie =" eee serene s po ie Se PE Bema Ee mee WP ce lee) acbetE args be ae Com thera mee Reet = oetinas , Seater A eres P+ GP Satie” ef ad aot y 7 ba! Tn ee er ne aie Sue ot one eee, al . a 5 ate . A te a ” =
13-00000 (S280 CORR RATETUPRARIEEA GOED THERE wotondt doi ance RAE Bree. caths mney oem meinNENAD an Bake Oho RaspKeTRET ‘ , . . . ‘ . ‘ 2 me oO er Tes 6 hace oa Sod ‘e . a te , eo. at's ” either loyal to Fidel or vere so afraid of biz thet they vere ‘5 - 3 Sentenver 1963 Cubela attended the Collegiace Cases in Porto Alegre, Brazil, asa representative of the Cuban goverrment. Ee was get there by [ibn fepedino. Also particiretizng was Nestor Senchez, a Sparish-speaking case officer rca headquarters, who thereafter acted & es case officer for Cutela. i Cubela claimed that he had written tuo S/a messages. (Only ene had been received.) He ‘said he was reluctant to use S/d because he feared the efficiency of the Cuben postal censorship. t Cubela discussed a group of Cuben military officers know to oe _ : him, and possible weys of approaching then. ‘he probles vas, he explained, that although many of thes were anti-Commmist, they vere , | ° reluctant to discuss any conspiracies for fear they might be ] § | provocations. Cubela said that he thought highly of Rason GUIN Diaz . : - , we i 3 a = 2.4. 17. (AMESUNK~10) who vas hiding Miguel DIAZ Isalgue (AMECE-Ik). Dies sf ea "had been sent to Cuba by CIA to recruit Guin in place, and had done so. Cubela said he planned to use Guin but was concerned about Guin's “nervous condition” and the fact that ke érazk heavily. Cubela vas told to assist Guin in Guin'’s intelligence assignnents, but not to help Guin lesve Cuba--as Cubela proposed. a2 Fee Bt ae TRE er ote ee BO pete A aateett tnt pean! Py abso 60 EMR all bad eed lente seed Soe terete ost dean 65 ai, gh aah Ty ate a eat ae OS Oe sae hey war mitts ae otter man tae 8 go Srimein o Reatariaeee FA,
13-00000 00a ane ae 2 eam aang Aaptoonetang? A 4 . ° - ib Septesbder 1653 Froa Porto <0 Alegre, Cubela flew “to Peris, arriving oa ik Sepencer. He was there ostensibly to attend the Alliance Fiaceaise, out actually “f to take an extended vacation--of vhich he planned to infors Fidel es Se after the fact... ct wewe oO Ge a be CBR O, 0. ene © chtor ose 16 Sestesber 1957 ° Cubela (in Paris) wrote to Tepedino (in Eew York): “I don't intend to see (be intervieved by) your friend again,” vhich you . vs i should tell them, “so they don't make the trip. I vant to get avay °  ‘fros politics completely . 2... ® , 3 Gctober 1963 C ; s Nestor Sanchez arrived in Paris for meetings with Cubela. (‘the ~" record does not reveal why Sanchez went to Paris in the face of Cutela’s . . + stated wish not to see him. The letter way have been written during ° @ spell of temporary depression. Station officers were already in “-+° .  egatact with Cubele when Sanchez arrived.) Also participating in the . . ee ey somomytnatamatropean 90 fo meetings were John (Red) Stent and Rickard Long. At the time of these ee aon BAENGR P+ DINO Ge Vestenn GIB. ad . . eo e” . . . ; ’. st fe ® ¥ a 4 a ‘meetings it vas ai gpavered that the French were unilaterally keeping 7 be 4 | Cubela under surveillance. CIA informed the French that our contacts i with Cubela vere for the purpose of defecting hin. . : 11 October 1963 . . Sanchez cabled that Cubela was insistent upon meeting vith a wen, 4 senfor U.S.. official, preferably Robert F. Kennedy, for assurances bd + ee sg wg ht “co aS pares Bee ath Sete end cape See he Slee ee Agha OF mole OR eee OE aN ealbom tee dot MERE eS CeO Son ee tte, PU Ue Oat o abs Mle wir. ema mas I tin omni wrote dey. 24 I io os oS MATE TS
13-00000 & Boot se Ae meek mn a bal on, s, Mi ereuneteaneven esis RAED, a us ORD ee ERE aPC LBBB ods Rn ote epene NEGO RSR CY a Oe oe . . : ; . cat ge tee Shrek Regen Ueno pgs Stes ote Nee We 2 ote te a ened oman be FF etegteen: % wy, i of U.S. moral suppers for any ectivity Cubela under took im Cuda. Sencnez said that the ansver Cutela secely rea signet te crucial to CIA's relationsaip with Cubela. Sanchez recommended tha that “hishest and profound considers tt ou be given as feeling drawn by all who in contact Cubela is that he deterzined attenpt op against Castro with or without U.S. support.* 13 October 1963 The Paris Station cabled: “Sanches ETA LOUD 13 Oct. Pending change after 12 Oct meet Sanches plans return Hqs after LOO stop in order discuss details operation before entering final round discussions with AMLASH." 17 Getober 1 ; . . Red Stent cabled the results of a meeting with Cubela and fepedino. Cubela, in a private conversation with Stent, reiterated bis desire to speak with a high-level U.S. Government official. " Stent . raid that basically Cubela wanted assurances that the U.S. Goverment. * vl would eupport him if .bis enterprise were successful. ; ~ " tie 7 29 October 1963 ee " Desmond FitzGerald, then Chief, SAS, who vas going te Parts on. ‘other business, arranged to meet with Cubela to give hiss the assurances CT Se ee ag Ts = - pn i ato) aa a eeieteeeiries cae HES LOND: AENERLT ERY PYRO gO oT BSH so . ~ we . . wt mee Comme emme we ese south Bose * 2 : oa 2) Peete vey eo ee 3, € Ye ot os 4 aS 4 on GRRE EREER EERE RS Ee i + apedutabal ‘ee as omemenbe oe f a t i i. “4 mee fe
13-00000 2 + peed ry he sougat. The contact plan for the neeting, e copy of Which f:. im the § AMIASH file, has tnis to say on cover: a ee FitzGerald will represent self as perscesal. representative of Robert F. Kensedy who traveled Taris for specific purpose meeting Cubela ant giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present poverzcert in Cuba. According to FitsGerald, he discussed the planced meeting with the po/? (Selns) wao decided it was rot necessary to ceek approval from Robert Kennedy for FitzGerald to speak in his rane. The meeting, was held in Red Stent'’s house in Paris on 23 October 1953. FitzGerald used se alies Jemes Clark. Westor gtenen ws eam antes tect chee ae “. Sanchez acted as interpreter. Red Stent was not present during the ont. meeting. Sanchez on 13 November 1953 wrote a memorandun for the - * record of the meeting. It reads, in part: prepared to render all oecesseary assistance to any anti-ccomunist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban jJeadership and assures sufSicient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it {s prepared to give. It was. :-. . .. ., e@gphasived that the above support.will be forthcowing only efter W dediwee ey oa or a real coup has been effected and the group involved is {n a position Vg sat De, ° to request U.S. (probably uder OAS auspices) recogaiticn and . a , support. It was made clear that the U.S. was not prepared to ob. i 7 _ , @ommit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as such am <= - a 1 0 uprising can be excinguished in a matter of hours if the preseat . : goverment is still in control in Havara. As vor the post—coup - perioé, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be . . turned tack but will support the necessary ecososic and - og cee ad political refores vhich will benefit the mass of the Cuban oR vars os | 8 FiteGerald informed.Cubela that the United States is | . ‘qamareneretaminntsraramearinnny ian et ORM) veRemNRG. OP obama: oe meersge" & Sofie act ete ere ae 2. fo seat tee fae GONE Mt of Riaatiede a SuPer ae Ade fatag Pesala genet en EW od tk ncmnlh gate de ee vege ow wes dee biota Cae Te oe So
13-00000 s bs Es oa “ ene pw TEE me . shee . “ . ; ze t = et er ° . oe g 0 84 we 4 £ ee N , Lew mescad  ctewed UWiema : a i of. 3 : Ss) 7¢ a " . 4 2 @ i (Comment: Those invo:ved now recall the purpose of the coe a weeting as being something quite different fea: thet egvearing” 7 — aks in writtea records prepared at about the tine of tke xeeting. “S assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-povered tae rifle with telescopic sights or some otter veapon that could 0 eek AR ee MRE Pe tea g i t H ] : FitzGerald recalis that Cubela spose repeatedly of the need for an | , { 4 foo". . | + be used to KELL Castro from a distance. FitzGerald vanted no | . _ - “part of such a achere and told Sandaz to tell Cubela thet the | Py ae oo. . U.S. sinpiy does not do such things. when be vas told this, { § as _, © Cubele ‘said he wanted confirmation fron a senior U.S. official, . 7 che r + ee eanyestete enamine #4 ont @ . nota nesber of CTA. #itzGerald says that whea he met vith awe ma 2 tee a 2) Cubela in Parts he told Cubela that the U.S. Goverment vould oe : ee have ‘no part of an at ttenpt: on Castro!s life. Sex Ealpern, + vho Ff wre i | : oh a not t present at 7 t Aton meeting with Cubed but “: ae - f " baentieel vith that of ‘Fitecerala. ve fe ee s ogee r oh eGae ese ge OM. Rete, ae ee 2 ora ook: ee oiaay Be. that as.it.may, “the written “record ‘tells & sanewhat differen’ ns eo “2, ’ 2 *e oe Caine athg. tet mean eo PS 283, wt, ae i Cran wd De! ‘story. | Tn Seiiéez" nenorindin of tie reeting vith Cubela he wro vere cae a orere nwa af ese . “as. wwe “* Wothizg of an operatiorel] nature was discussed at the FitzGerald meeting. After the meeting Cubela stated that he was satisfied with the policy iiscussion-bus now desired _ know what techaical SuEpor® we could Provide hin. e . tae oa - . . . wt : Serer) : - oe. et. “~¢ . . Boe See. : we ete. 3 - ao wee, eh ree aco te - 90 - G08 Riera 300-3 ee bret Satltys bh Dsttat CRAUO TORDER LT re. Votre 8 wiwEe. Ot 3 a ’ a o ° . . . pote . . a gee omy ae e- * - oo, oo. Jamas ol biatd 268 dim SB _— - : - Pe er eee : ee . : « fT taste ete + grad 7 a arr eee : eer" . . = . ° cipher me ee le oe . . i . wg ed 2 he te = 2 Sen Sede 8 Ss sudhas A 9 ovine aaers sei a0" et een a “7? ~ ewe * peas — ~ ar ” iotatirny ono earn er nt ae om eae = ers Pera tf pcre st) REESE et cet Menges en e- heng eared PRE ROR er nt em OD RL ae eA ee rote Sade ee ra toe Oe es Reta tet tee eto oh et te ee Beed  o Sofa oe
13-00000 uy Puattoeg, oh . er wo be scams ¥ wee eae 4 satregare swept G90 14 Movenber 1952 é  - [___Pet with Tepedtzo fa New York City oi Us Hovenber, 6. peg nies : ki [contact report reveels Cubela's reaction (as teld to EE. Tepedine) ta his neeting with Piteserala. ; | . The visit with FitzGerald, vino acted in tse capacity of a representative of high levels of the Goverzmment concerned vith the Cuban problem satisfied Cubela as far as policy vas * yr. Concerned, but he was not at all hapoy with the fact that ke still. . - Was mot given the tecmuical assisterce for the operational plan 7" "as he saw it. Tepedino said that Cubela dvelt constantly on 2 ge vere rus this point. He could not understand why be was dented certain 7 oar 33, *. emall. pieces of equigent vhich praztsed a firal solutioa to itt . i the probles, while, on the other hand, the U.S. Goverment — . “.¢ “ wh * gave much equiscent and money ta exile groups for their os - ‘dmeffective excursices against Cuban ccastel targets. ; i ; ae _ According to Tepedino, Cubela feels strongly oa this point, me | a _ ae j and if he does not get advice and materials frou a U.S. ot i ~e “2°. Goverment techaictan, he will probably became fed-up . ee ‘sgain, and we WiLL lose vhatever progress ve have made to date. e i ess _ofsas { oars ’ aE pear approved telltes Cubela. he ‘would be given a cache . . ' 2 Sense . 8 tbEB. a3f "te - arn a fete ca’ 7. *: oi a 4 ve" me ae oa ee 3 tate 3 ; weg ee Mee i power “rifles ne ete aan Gfsas 2 reqiisted wacitten ‘Beports « ou ; esrtiet ; WEG. fo. bs ; loa. “88, ok eo oe an 2 “2 t ECR. ‘PY gGASH operation be Rept to a mintace.” re ne | a 20 Novenber “1963 of Fy OO a Le oto: | : : e ¥ 3 pone 8 . : = Pa ear et seuey ponte, arte pne,s dip ag® Gate nia te te” sees” citese th yo ot, act AEE Mong tc Tipe hate tone GEM AS at BBO tay Foe tyre tes Bde toe a Wine Fe ee Tot Se
13-00000 hi. ca the Pearsoa story. : i 7 (: de Pearson, Anderson, and Greensmm (in Las Vegas) are oo. oe AES: nevspapermen with a nevsvorthy story. Pesrsoa kas already - . + E published much of it. - @. Maheu oes have good reason for ast wanving the story |. afred further. Unfavorable publicity =ight cause him to lose { his lucrative client, Howard. Hughes. There might be some value . to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion. . , re 4 What do other components of Covernpent know about this operation? . . Cc 7 e , ° . Forner Attorney General Robert Kennedy vas fully briefed by - \ Houston and Edvards on 7 May 1962. A menoranfim confirming the ne : I I. oral briefing vas forwarded to Kemmedy o2 1% May 1962. . he memomandies | ne -. + + does not use the word “assassinate,” but there is little roan for i ; oo nisinterpretation of of what vas meant. Premmshly the original « ‘of that ~ pe ttdiced — be noted that the briefing of Kemedy vas restricted to Phase One cf | ‘of the operation, which had ended about @ year earlier.. Fhase Two was already under way at the time of the briefing, but Kennedy wa not told of it. ’ As far as ve know, the FBI hes not been told the sensitive - Pe eagt whee PQS EaS seeee ee ye PSE aif