JFK Assassination System Date: 7/7/2015 Identification Form , Agency Information AGENCY: SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10014-10131 RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER: = 07-M-37 Document Information ORIGINATOR: SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 03/23/1976 PAGES: 97 . SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY COMMITTEE BUSINESS DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 03/22/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 324 v9.1 l Docld: 32423519 Page 1
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NATIONAL. SECURITY: INFORMATIONS}, Mack The United States Senat 7 Unauthorized Disclosure Subject: to Criminal Sanctions . K2854 Report o of Proceedings, - Hearing held before —-~ Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities FY seséMuesdays: »March 23, 1976 . Washington, D.C. (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over: to the Committee for destruction): WARD & PAUL . 7 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. \ , ‘ ' .- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 544-6000 soota pasa _Page 3 | . | TOP SECRET
WARD/smnl 10 ul 12 13 14 15 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld:32423519 Pdge 4 | TOP SECRET COMMITTEE MEETING Tuesday, March 23, 1976 united States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:50 o'clock a.m. in Room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Walter D. Huddleston presiding. | Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding), Mondale, Hart of Colorado, Mathias and Schweiker. “Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief: Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Rick Inderfurth, William Bader, David Aaron, Elizabeth Culbreath, John Bayly, John ELLIf£, Burt Wides, Joseph diGenova, ‘Bob Kelley, Britt Snider, Charles Lombard, Walter Ricks and Elliot Maxwell. TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
10 11 12 13 14 15 ‘16 1? 18 (19. Al Re 23 24 25 'Docld: 32423519 20 TOP SECRET : PROCEEDINGS “Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, if I might, make one observation about the pomestic Subcommittee. We have completed two or three of the so- ~called major findings of which there will be, I think, .about eight, and we have | completed at least tentatively the recommendations that will be appended to those findings. - Even tliough there may be some further changes, I would like to suggest unless someone has an objection that we be authorized to send that to the printer's so that we can at-least have proofs to work off of. Otherwise I am afraid that if we hold everything until the last moment, it will be several weeks before we can get everything done. And if no one has any objections, I intend to proceed in that way. | Mr. Miller. The findings? Senator Mondale. There are two or three findings that we have largely completed: The recommendations I think are largely although tentatively, maybe the historical. section is ready to go. I don't know, but in any event, understanding that they are stil tentative and subject to change, I would like to send the to the printer, because I think if we don't we are going to have one hell of a glut. Senator Hart of Colorado. Aré these things liable to be | controversial? | | Senator Mondale. I would guess that there may be some TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL age 5
‘TOP SECRET —e_sé changes and divisions of substantial nature in the recommendations. 1 2 |'There may be some other findings, but the. findings are a product 3 lof a bipartisan committee and staff effort and I think pretty 47 unanimously reflect views. | 5 Senator Hart “of Colorado. will running proofs on them in- 6 crease the possibility of leakage? 7 7 Mr. Kirbow. Sir, all of these papers, as Mr. Miller g |jagreed, are going through the security section, the classified 9 Section. | | . 10 Senator Mondale. The record there is pretty good, isn't 11 |) it? 12 Mr. Kirbow. The record is pretty good on our previous 13 || report. | | 14 Senator Mondale. In other words, we can change it any 15 way we want. All that is involved is the expense of changing 16 || what we want to change later, but I think we are far enough 19 ‘along so it is prudent to proceed. | “ta Senator Hart of Colorado. My own feeling is that I would 49 | not want to -- | 20 ‘Mr. Miller. I think you are talking about galleys. 21 ‘Senator Hart of Colorado. A set of the galleys to get out 92 before members have had a chance to see them. | 23 Senator Mondale. I think you are correct in this. I think 24 | your staff had been distributed. 25 Mr. Miller. You are talking about galleys, is that right?’ TOP SECRET “Doclda:32423519 Phge 6 WARD & PAUL
TOP SECRET - ; 1 1 Senator Mondale. Yes, just galleys. Yeah, all designees 2 have had them. | | 3 ‘Senator Huddleston. The designees have gotten your 4 recommendations? | | 5 | Senator Mondale. Are the recommendations out, too? 6 Mr. Schwarz. The recommendations? sure. ? Mr. diGenova. No, no, we haven't had any. 8 Senator Mondale. r am talking about sending to the 9 printer’ s the findings that we have completed of the Subcommitte 10 Mr. Schwarz. The detailed report is the thing we were 11 || talking about. | 12 Senator Mondale. That's the only thing you want.to send? 13 Mr. Schwarz. That's the only ‘thing. | 14 . Senator Mondale. All right, I stand corrected. In other’ 15 words, just the reports. | 16 You don't want to send those findings? 1? Mr. Schwarz. NO, 1 don't think we are going to do that 13 because they are going to, come to the eull Committee next ‘is week or the end of this week. 20 ' Senator Mondale. All right, I stand corrected. You see, 21 || the staff report on such things as King, COINTELPRO -- 22 ' Mr. Schwarz. inforsiants, | 23 Senator Mondale. “Have been completed, right? 24 Mr. Schwarz. About | four of them have gone through a 95 process which includes complete approval by majority and minorit Top SECRET : WARD & PAUL DocId: 32423519 P
TOP SECRET ‘designees for all other comments for It is only those that I would propose sending ; King is Some others like Charlie wants to comment these will still be in | Well, we will do the same on our t wanted to make a comment about when Senator Mondale was ‘talking about sending the récommendatio S, it may not be as relevant, but having worked with the galleys on the assassination report really reviewed them, they are xk with if you are going to be making any changes, ‘and. I just point that out as a cautionary note. The are cumbersome, and it is. just very ‘do any substantive rewriting at all 11, I guess we are not going to do that hese have gone. through an editing your find hand on ‘them, there may be 1 counsel, and tendering to 2 \\incorporation. 5 |[to the printer's, to get that mechanical. thing going. 4 |inot yet at that stage. ) 5 jon NSA, he will have a chance to do that. 6 Senator Mondale. And even that, ? galley form and subject to change. 8 Okay, that is what ri will do then. 9 Senator Huddleston. | 10 |)side. - : Ll Did you want to say Something? ‘eo | os. Culbreath. xes,| 13 | 14 |if it is going to be the fult report, 15 16 | that we did before we had 17 extremely difficult to wo ; | (18 jg ||are hard to read and they 20 ||hard if you are going to: 91 ||with the galleys. 22 Senator Mondale. " We. O93 Mr. Schwarz. Liz, . 2A process, but when you se ‘05 la little more. TOP SECRET WARDO & PAUL ‘Docld: 32423519  PHge 8
10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 pd ‘25 galleys, ‘before us. TOP SECRET | ; Mr. Kirbow. I think. | 1 the point should be mede, Mr. Schwarz, as it was the last time, if there have to be changes | in they have to be. time. So those where there save any time. reset anyway, so you don't save any is going to be any controversy you don{t there is nothing -going where you have Mr. Schwarz. Well, controversy. It is only | eter the process of majority counsel, minority counsel and all] designees have been tendered copies, and King, comments. Senator Huddleston. for example, has not gone because too many people have All right. I think when we adjourned yesterday we had two matters by the Committee. Those believe. all members have One was relatiing to the covert action section which we have new suggestions and new proposals to be made. and considered have been put into written form. I a copy,of it. I would suggest that we delay consideration of that section until at least tomorrow to give time for thought since it is. quite a substantial recommendation. We were on page 55, revision. Mr. Aaron. Yes, we dealing with the structure of the CIA. and Senator Mathias had proposed a were on Section D, starting on page 61, I think apart from. a | aoe . . . Senator. Schweiker's recommendation, which is somewhat independent. TOP SECRET Docld: 32423519 Pdge 9 WARD & PAUL
10 qd. 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 R1 £2 23 24 25 Docld: 32423519 extent to which we wanted ‘advantages and disadvantag of those questions, ‘it wow that we set this aside, be some structural proposals of these others. So I would set those. Senator Schweiker's recomm Senator Huddleston... in that fashion. : Iss I do thi Mr. Kirbow. 62, that the citations be | by the various Senators or I might j | |! in the process of doing ol : Mr. Aaron. - aware, of options and alternative a combination of things th . { well as analytical comment the implications for and a a verify those recommendatiao! I; P SECRET oy la be my suggestion to the Committee cause in. the covert action options are Ithat might significantly affect the to recommend consideration of some aside as a package and consider endation. Inf there is no objection, we will move oo nk there was a request that on page ft) given so that they can be looked at |menbers of the staff so they can ns. lust make a comment on that. We are at, but as I know the Chairman is ‘the Committee did not hold hearings on a broad range — s and what have you, so that the es that are represented here are at one can find in the record as s by the staff as to what might be gainst these particular measures. I think the important point to: be made in terms. of these individual bullets that be state the advaritages and ‘ of course, we would like. t - | gin on page 62 is that they fairly isadvantages, and if they do not, why o do that. bad SECRET WARD & PAUL
10 11 12 13 14 15 ‘16 1? 1a | 19 20 21 | 22 23 24 | 25 Docld: 32423519 ‘ple 11 “TOP SECRET —ss, -Senator Huddleston. . I think ‘that is. true, and while we di not have hearings on any of these" specific questions relating ‘to. ‘these, we did ask a large number of witnesses. Mr. Aaron. .This is, toa large extent, the staff's effort to synthesize what we have learned, and if they are not satisfac or we- should improve them. | Senator Huddleston. All right, with those two matters put on the position for future consideration -- Mr. Aaron. I would ‘recommend we take up Senator Schweikers recommendation which. really applies to a previous section, which is the role of the DCI in the production of intelligence, either place, and simply make for the Committee! s consideration the recommendation that the Directorate of Intelligence be authorized to report directly to the per. ‘Is that a fair statement? Senator Schweiker. Yes, that's right. I have some minor differences, but that is really the ‘main issue as far as I am concerned right now. So I'll pring, that to an issue by just moving that that be in the recommenda- tions and let the Committee dispose of it one way or another. “Senator Huddleston. — ‘Is there any objection to that recommendation? | Hearing none, we will do that. (Pause) Senator Huddleston. .Now, are we ready to go to the Media ‘Top SECRET WARD & PAUL
LO ll 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 »~ RO 24. Docld: 32423519 Page 12 section? Mr. Aaron. Yes. ‘Now, this is a section that we have gone over at some length, and I think that for. the Committee's edification we might ask -~ | | Senator Huddleston. “Are you on page 66? Mr.Aaron. We're on page 66. ' Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, before we proceed in detail on that particular section, it Has come to my attention that we at one point had under: consideration before the Subcommittee strong recommendations from the staff, a section on labor and labor unions and whatnot. This particular copy that I have fails to. show that at this time. Was this determined by the Chairman that that would not be for consideration? | Senator Huddleston. ‘Where aia we wind: up on the labor question? 7 | - Mr. Aaron. It was never in the draft findings and recommendations. Mr. diGenova. Is it in the detailed report, the classified version? Wasn't there a section on that? We quibbled over naming certain individuals. | - Mr. Bader. As you will remember, it was discussed atthe subcommittee level at ane: stage. What I had in the longer report, the domestic impact of foreign clandestine operations, TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL. .
LO 11 l2 ° 214 15 16 17 18 19 end 1 20 21 . 22 25 24 295 Docld: 32423519 Page 13 aaeey TOP Steweh io. etc., was a short section on labor which I said to the Subcommit tee at the time was based largly on byproduct’ materials that came from the overall Katzenbach study, that is, what part of the labor problem emerged from that larger study of educational institutions and voluntary organizations and the like. I. took some of that material and brought it to the attention of the Committee, but I thought this was the labor issue, and ‘said at the same time that the staff and me, in this case, had not pursued that or explored it in any depth enough to come to any real conclusions about it. In fact, you will, remember the section itself which is in here did not make recommendations. In fact, its findings were quite tentative, and that is the way. it was left at that time.) I have never had a -- Senator Huddleston. Do we make reference in here to the labor connections? Mr. Aaron. Just on the first page. There is a statement, talking about the scope of domestic activity, it notes that ther has in the past been collaboration with the American Trade — Union Federation. Mr. Bader. one of the things, Senator, that I was going to say in my remarks here, there has been no such collaboration since 1974 when the abor-CIA relationships. did in fact come to ‘an end, with the exception of some personal relationships, really, or institutional -- personal relationships, I should. TOP SECRET - WARD & PAUL
10 ll le 15 16 1? 18 | 19 20 -e1 22. 20 24 29 Docld: 324293519 | | TOP SECRET ar say, that were only effected through the internetional organiza- tions of labor overseas. | | | Mr. Kirbow. Thank you, sir. Senator Huddleston. I think we might, as we get through this particular section, we might reconsider whether or not the two references there to the collaboration with the trade union, is sufficient, or whether we ought to add a paragraph perhaps a little more descriptive to what the evidence indicates actually occurred. Mr. Bader. We can certainly come back to that, Senator, as we go. The references here, the brief references to labor, were really references to the full spectrum of ICTA activities in the 'pre-'67 period. _ Senator Huddleston. Would the backup paper available’on this subject have any information on that? | | Mr. Bader. yes, the backup paper has about 14 to 16 pages” on CIA-labor relationships. © Senator Huddleston. Describing what happened in the case? Mr. Bader. . One of the problems that emerges at that time, that that section is the one section where the name of the prominent American was mentioned, and nowhere else in the~ paper are namas given, and the Cammittee felt, I think, felt it was the sense of the meeting that whatever we did with the labor side, -the singling out of one or two individuals was TOP SECRET ge 14 . ' WARD & PAUL
TOP SECRET ae probably not wise, and certainly was inconsistent with the. 2 |lpattern of the overall paper. put it certainly is something ‘3 |iwe can return to as we go, through here. | 4 Senator Huddleston, I think that would be appropriate. 5 Senator Mathias, we were talking about the labor involvemen 6. encountered, and it is not mentioned very prominently in the 7 findings -and recommendations. I think we should consider whethe 8 or not we might need a paragraph on that after looking at this 9 overall section. _— LO Mr. Aaron. I might suggest that we proceed here now by 11: |}having Bill give us a little or give the Committee a little back 12 ground on what isa very complicated issue in which we have 13 some choices between principal and cost on the one hand and - 14 clear benefit on the other, and. which has a long history 15 of concern on the part of the American public and the government 16 at large. . | | 17 Senator Huddleston. All right. -18 Mr. Bader? | 19 Mr. Bader. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 20° Mr. Chairman, it has been the question of the independence | / 97 land integrity of American educational institutions has been | 9° lon the American agenda for some time. I would point out 23 || to the Committee which is| ‘referenced certainly in the paper, 24 that since 1967 that the issue was very much in Eront of the 25. American public. _ The headlines here in the Washington Post of TOP SECRET Docld: 32423519 A ge 15 WARD & PAUL
| | _ TOP SECRET 13 7 16 February 1967, President Johnson Acts to: Pretect American Academic Community, Hill Seeks CIA Probe, and at the time, Presi 5 |ldent Johnson in the wake of the revelations that the CIA had been using the National Student Association and also a wide range of American philanthropic organizations, moved to establis os 6 the Katzenbach Committee, and the President said at the time, 7 |ithe President believed strongly that the integrity and inde- ‘& pendence of the educational community must be preserved. 9 Out of the Katzenbach Committee came a series of restrictio 10 and guidelines which the Agency has very faithfully followed, in tl lithe period since '67.. I would only make two remarks about this.. 12 In the first category, I think it is certainly fair to say on 13 the basis of reviewing the. contemporary literature at the. time, 14 ||post-"67, that the American public in general thought the proble 215 of the independence and the integrity of the American academic 16 | community was over as a result of the Katzenbach guidelines. 1? Let me read something from the Katzenbach guidelines on 18 the restrictions of operational use, because central. to what 19 we are doing here is proposing further restrictions on operational. - 20 use of individuals, and after '67, this operational use was 22 restricted in certain categories, and one category was total | RR prohibition. And let me read the variety of individuals that £35 | were totally prohibited, because we are now in the recommendatio s © 24 that are before the Full Committee talking about further 25 | prohibitions, so there is a consistency in this matter, and I TO? SECRET : WARD & PAUL Docld: 32423519 Page 16
16° 17 18 19 20 21 22 + 23 24 29 Docld: 32423519 thse 17 TOP SECRET 44 wanted to point out a few of ‘them to you. “Operational use, under their instruction, is prohibited for members and trainees of ACTION, Fulbright Grantees, official ox employees of the rnternational Association for Cultural Freedom -- this is the old Congress of Cultural Freedom -- officials, employees or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, and employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies. As a result-of the '67 guidelines, the Central Intelligence Agency shifted its attention both to what. it called offshore institutional use and very heavily to the use of individuals in american institutions which were not prohibited under these guidelines. ‘Let me review. the variety of individuals that DDO can use under the present guidelines. I will just take four or five of the list here: publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media, and I will go on to say that now that prohibition has been established in that category for accredited U.S; journalists -- individuals engaged in public relations activities, foreign delegates or employes of the United Nations assigned to. the U.S., staff members or officials of the. Red cross: Society, officials of the Vatican. state, U.S. Government funded professors, lecturers, students and grantees. I am talking here about those who are on the ‘list where operational use is permitted: members of educationa TO? SECRET WARD & PAUL
aw « wo ww sa oe 8 15 or private or voluntary organizations, officials or employees of the African-American Institute, and volunteers to America. ‘!These, under the present Jaidelines of the Central Intelligence. Agency are in the permissible operational use category. We go on to say that there have been further restrictions since ‘67. I have already’ mentioned that’ in 1974 labor, for all practical purposes, was put on the prohibited list, and we now have the 1976 prohibitions on Media, and I would just read one section from the Media prohibitions. "CIA recognizes the special status afforded these institu- . tions under our Constitution,. and in order to avoid any appearance of improper use . by the Agency, the Der went on to. say effective immediately, CIA will not enter any paid or contractual relation ship with any full time or part time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station." “these are the two basic issues the Committee has in front 18 of us, that is, the operational use of American academics and 19 the operational use of U.S. journalists and those in the 20 edia organizations. : 21 Now, r turn the Committee's attention to page 69 ,which | 22 jis ‘the central page as far' as the scope of the use of American’ 23 academics are concerned, and make a few remarks about that. 24 The figures are not in dispute with the Central Intelligenc gency. The Agency is now using approximately 300 American | TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL 25 Docld: 32423519 Page 15
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 el 22, 23 24 £9 |ithat they are being used f TOP SECRET —sis academics for operational purposes such as recrviting foreign Students on University campuses and writing books or propaganda. Beyond these 286 there are an additional 41 academics that are used in an unwitting fashion, that is, they do not know. or operational purposes such as puttin notices on university bulletin boards, assisting in arranging student interviews. We have said that we have testimony as to > how this unwitting relationship works, or what will happen, .ad they have given a case here when the Agency came .to testify, ‘to the fact, is that the Agency would come aboard the campus, under. cover, under the guise of a.commercial firm.. That commer- i cial firm would want translators. or someone in the economic business of one sort or another. The unwitting academic would either arrange the interview or post a notice to the fact that this commercial firm is on the campus. --Then the foreign student, he would then respond to that particular add or invitation and then the: Agency would proceed ‘to recruit them, if they. wanted them, and I will read from the text here from an Agency ‘representative. — : 1 ; "We have what we refer to as commercial recruitment, where werrecruit them under the guise of a commercial firm, and the man's mission is to meet the provision of economic intelligence on his own country. once he returns." Question: "But he thinks he is working for a private firm and not the CIA. "cr Docld:32423519 Page 19 WARD & PAUL
TOP SECRET 3 1, 2 |\process: leading to total recruitment of the individual." 5 CIA: "We hope that is not to be the case, in the case of f e 4 |iguy that is too tough, to'go all the way to the point where you | . can stop and still have a,;relationship is.this commercial I 1 CIA: "Or a group"of:iAvestors.. But that'.is a step:in the fina | recruitment "" Question: "You mean! you put them in. an interim step: before he knows he is in the Central Intelligence Ageny? _ CIA: "Yes, that is correct. That is one form of this recruitment done generally through the unwitting basis. The other, the witting Americn academics are, let me say that at some of the institutions -- there is one other individua 13 ||lwho knows that an American. academic is in this. process, in 82: 14 jlof the 134 American colleges, there is one individual aware, At 215 the remaining 52, at- least one university official is aware 16 of the operational use made of academics on his campus. _ rm sor 4 that is reversed. 80 institutions, no one other than the 18 individual is aware of the CIA link. At the remaining 52, 19 llat least one university official is aware of the operational use 20 made of academics on his campus . | 2] So in effect that is, where we have it with relation: to f i 22 |Ithe American academics, and perhaps we might discuss that first, _ . i ; 23 |Mr. Chairman. The question is whether the recommendations that 24 jwe have -- and I will turn you to the recommendations section 25 for American academics on page 77, give a range of options for ToP SECRET , ; , _ WARD & PAUL _ Docld: 324235519 Page 20
| TOP SECRET kg the Committee to consider, ranging from a Committee to study the i 4 2 jluse of American academics, and recommends the CIA continue to 5 {use American academics for such purposes, and it moves it sort . , Bo - 4 lof gradually to a spectrum of possible reactions of the Committed. 6 that: there be: no- unwitting relationships, that: the individual ” himself know that: the CIA is using him for operational purposes, 3 and the: responsible official on © the ‘campus be the University . 9 president. | LO r refer to, the Committee recommends that the CIA amend uu its internal directives td include: a requirement that. -- this is 12 ||the one I am referring to |-- that both the individual academic i | 5. |A central one is that one option is the Committee might propose 14 of the clandestine relationship. 15 _ And we go on, the Committee recommends that the CIA : 1é amend its internal directives to include a prohibition against 1 the CIA entering into a paid relationship with American academicg$. 18 We move right through the spectrum into total prohibition. Total prohibition, of course, is not inconsistent with what the Ly 'and the president. of the university or college be knowledgeable 19 99 |CIA has done in the past with prohibitions in certain categories 91 |The issues obviously are the ones that David has raised and g2 ||the Subcommittee has discussed: is this tradeoff between 23 operational use which the Agency puts a very high premium on, ga ||to the Committee, saying that they think that this source of 55 |recruitment is vital to their operations, and on the other to a TOP SECRET Docld: 32423519 Page 21 WARD & PAUL
14 15 16 17 “18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 32423519 Page 22 TOP SECRET | “49 [ concern that has been expressed in the paper and at the Sub- committee level, as to what this would mean in terms of presiden Johnson's original problem, the integrity and independence of the American academic conimunity and the image that they convey, |. both to their students and to the world as to the integrity of those institutions and ee indiviauals within them. I might say one last! thing on the operational use. The Agency as I have said has made this into a growth-stop, to use their term. Since 1971-72 they have’ made a major effort. The FRD, the Foreign Resources Division, is devoting most of its resources it is bringing some of its very best agents from abroad to work in the United States. Of the ten field stations it has in the United States, eight are devoted solely to recruitment of students on various campuses. Mr. Kirbow. Foreign students. ‘Mr. Bader. Foreign. students on American campuses, and they attach, as I sayy enormous importance to this. Of their overall recruitments, a very high percentage of them from the Agency's view come from this source in the United States, and they would be most dismayed if this source were denied them. On the other hand, it should be said that the Agency has” never done, heretofore, has not done an evaluation of the usefulness of these foreign students. They began one for the _ years '73 and '74, but that evaluation has not been completed. So.we, the staff, is faced with a difficult situation which TO? SECRET " WARD & PAUL
10 lil 12 lo 16 17 18 19 20. 21 Re 23 24 25 Docld: 32423519 20 valuable, they are ‘retained, they provide good intelligence, { but they have not done an ‘internal evaluation that either is available at the Agency or finished | at the agency, or obviously llavailable to the Committee to that effect. With that htroduction, then, Mr. Chairman -- Senator Huddleston. iso the Committee will know, the Subcommittee presents a number of options here because of the inability, really, to come down with a firm position on. the matter of academics. . : | Joe, did you have : “something? Mr. diGenova. I just. wanted to say something, Senator, that Bill referred to the jhigh percentage of recruitments. I | the Agency says and has written that these are enormously think for the Senators who were not at the Subcommittee, because | | of their Domestic work, it should. be clear that on page 69, the bottom of page 69, the beginning paragraph, it indicates that more’ than one half oL the CIA’ s case officers are assigned to ! this task in the United States; over 60 pércent of the CIA agent recruitments within ‘the U.S. last year were foreign students, and the next point is equally as important, perhaps more so, that those recruitments in the United States represent 10 percent of: the worldwide recruitment: of high targets, such as the U.S.S.R., People's Republic of China, Eastern Europe cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam. | ' Mr. Aaron. I would make one point. additionally. We do not| TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
| TOP SECRET | J t i know whether those hard targets in fact represent the Soviet | ol 2 |lUnion and China, or whether they really are what is known as the soft-hard target which is Eastern. Europe. i) 4 Mr. diGenova. Why does it Say that? h |: Mr. Aaron. Because the category includes Eastern Hurope 6 as well as the Soviet Union and China. We do not know what the 7 breakout is. | 3 Mr. diGenova. Well,! I don't understand what the point is. 9 Is that bad? 10 “what does it mean? | 11 We are using the word "hard target." We say the USSR, 12 |PRC, East Europe. should we not be saying that in the findings? i Mr. Aaron. But -what we don't know yet is what the breakout | 14 is. We don't know the fact were there any Soviets at all. We 15 just don't know that fact. That, of course, is important. Le. | - Senator Mondale. Mx. Chairman, Mr. Chairman? 17 _ Senator Huddleston. |. There is a further problem that was 1g brought up in background information. I think a further problem ‘19 |the Committee is going to have in regard to this section is 90 |ithat the Agency intent will want to strike out a great deal of 21 this information, both in the background paper and. from our 20 findings and recommendations, too. We may find some difficulty 23 in providing enough information to support what we recommend. 04 Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman, you sat through these: 25 hearings. Do you have any recommendations as to which options TOP SECRET Docld: 32423519 Pdge 24 WARD & PAUL
| ; ||make the most sense? 2° Sénator Huddleston. i Well, as I say, our. Subcommittee. had 3 a little difficulty with this because of the problem of balance 4 | and what not. It seems tb be a repugnant practice, using 5 academics in this country, of recruiting young college students 6 who come to this country to participate in CIA activity. Balanct 9 ing that,<which sounds very undesizable, against which the ; 8: Agency claims is the productivity of such action and the need 9 for it, so because of that we couldn't come to a firm recommen- 10 dation, unfortunately. LLM Senator Mathias. You postponed it until this moment. _ 12 Senator Huddleston. | That's right. 13 - Senator Mondale. I ‘just wondered if you had a personal i { | 14 conclusion. isi. | Senator Huddleston. My personal conclusion goes to this 16 Paragraph Boon page 77, that while we recognize the problems 19 with it relating to integrity or whatever, we are not prepared 18 to totally forbid it at this time. 19 Senator Mondale. Could we add to the recommendations 20 that the follow-on permanent committee flag this problem for | 21 special review and further action? 22 Mr. Miller . Because there is one thing» that has become 23 evident. We really don' t know what the value of these ‘recruit. 24 ments are. There is only the assertion that they are useful, "95 ||but we have seen no evidence of the yield. TOP SECRET Oo WARD & PAUL Docld: 32423519 Page 25
i TQ Steuer 1 23: i . ; 1 Mr. Kirbow. And in all fairness, I must indicate we don't: e |lsee anything to the contrary. We have ‘no evidence before the S ||Committee that they are not useful sources. They are devoting 4 lla major part of their resources to this, and it just, I ‘think, 5 denies belief, almost, that they would be..doing this sort of 6 |\ithing if they didn't figure it was of some value. _ 7 Mr. Inderfurth. I think the Domestic Subcommittee talked 8 |Ito that issue in the FBI. intelligence program. They devoted a 9 lot of energy to it, but the GAO which did a study « of it, said. 10 that it wasn’ te productive. a | Mr. Kirbow. Well, excuse me. I am coming in from Mr. Mille 's 12 |}point that said this wasn't productive. 13 Mr. Inderfurth. Well, just the argument that it doesn't 14 || seem productive isn't necessarily true. 15 | Mr. Miller. Well, my problem, Charlie, is picking up 16 Senator Mondale's rossentjon to send it to the oversight 17 ||committee is very valuable on the basis that we don't know 18 whether there is any yield in fact of value. 19 ‘Senator Schweiker. I would like to ask a question. for 20 || clarification. © 7 ° 21 The foreign students that they recruit, are they ultimately 22 a witting or unwitting? In other words, when they finally end 23 |lup, you say they use subterfuge to go to campus and talk to 24 | the student. Now, when he goes back and becomes operational, 25 || does he still think he is working for some cover company, or TOP SECRET | Docld: 32423519 Page 26 ; _ WARD & PAUL
TOP SECRET a 1 llaoes he really know he is working for the CIA? 2 Mr. Bader. It depends, Senator. ‘There are various stages -S jiwith the various individuals. A typical case would be one that 4 II have described, reading from the record, is an individual that 5 jis recruited under a commercial guise, and for a certain amount 6 of time he stays under that commercial cover,’ and he does not_ ? realize that he is working for the Central Intelligence Agency, 8 |land then he is assessed during that period, and if they feel 9 that he will become a reliable agent, a good agent, a hard 10 agent, someone that they can use effectively, then they let — st him in. | | 12 Senator Schweiker. “When he becomes & hard agent, then, 13 jis he witting? | 14 Mr. Bader. Then he is witting. ‘That's what I'm telling 15 you. | | 16 Senator Schweiker. ‘That's the difference between a soft. 17 and a hard agent. 18 Mr. Bader. They would keep an agent. in a proprietary, “19 commercial intelligence, in the commercial sense of the word, 20 intelligence, a firm, for X number of years, and he would never ‘21 || know that it has a CIA relationship. (22 Mr. Maxwell. there would be a difference probably in 23 || tasking. | 24 Mr. Bader. There would be a difference in tasking. tt is 25 || clear from the record, Senator, that if it is soft, the TOP SECRET ge 27 WARD & PAUL Docld: 32423519 P
10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 | Docld: 32423519 plac 25 li | TOP SECRET — 25 individual would be doing. normally what he does today, and the CIA would derive some usefulness or some use from that take. .(When he goes through the second category, he is tasked. He is asked to do things. It is at that point that he goes from soft to hard, where he is then told to please collect intelligence on such and such. Senator Huddleston. Senator Mathias?» Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I have a proxy here from Senator Goldwater, and I thought: maybe we ought to put his views on the record. He says,"I am opposed to any prohibition on recruitment of foreign students and. academics within the United States. Moreover, I believe that any American should have the individual right to cooperate with the CIA and FBI as he chooses. I fully respect the right of organizations to take positions on the degree to which they as organizations will cooperate with the CIA and FBI. Finally, Ir. don't believe there should be any discussion in the public release of the report of the numbers of academic institutions and teachers and administrative personnel who may have cooperate with the CIA. Quite apart from the security problems, the problems which it might cause to the universities." Senator Schweiker. The point I want to try to make is: that maybe one grourid of compromise, Mr..Chairman, is to require what I am calling informed consent. tam not so sure that this maybe isn't the middle ground. It disturbs me greatly to hear TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL ~
10 Lil 12 14 LS 16 18 19 20 ~ R11 Re 24 25 Docld:32423519 P ge 29 TOP SECRET .: that people are duped into working for the CIA. I heard one case about a guy where ~~ I don't know whether he was duped, but he ended up getting killed in his own country. But I am not sure he even knew who'-he w@aisi working for’ 6r!who-killed ‘him, an I think that is a pretty serious indictment. But what I am working for is whether we should require informed consent on the basis that they have got to level at all stages who the hell they are working for, and then leave it up: to the student to decide. To mislead the students about who they are working for I think is really questionable. That's all I have. : Senator Huddleston. - Senator Hart? Senator Hart of Colorado. This is not an easy area, but it is a classic example of what I think you would call the do-other syndrome, that we have got to do what the other side does, and I doubt that there is anybody in this room that . wouldn't be repelled by American students studying in Moscow being approached by KGB to come back and spy on their own country or, for that Matter, any other government that would do that. I would assume that all Americans would find that repugnant, yet we find ourselves saying that in the days where we have got-- to do the saine thing. So I do think it is a | thing that we ought ‘to examine our fundamental principles and not just talk about what is expedient and what is easy for the - TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
TOP SECRET 27 Agency and what is helpful to them. There are some things” more 1 | 2 important to this country; and what it stands for than. what is 3S: ijleasy for the CIA or wat fe convenient for the CIA. 4 In any case, I think the sentence that is contained, the 5 |ilast sentence in Option where it Says “alert the institutions 7 oe ae country" s ae is 8 Society's problems, it ss not tarvara'e problem or the Universit 9 lot California's problen: ; it is our-_problem.... “and.L.do.net . 16 think that _ by tossing the ball back to, some university President 11 we are fulfilling our function here. | | 12 oy think we ought to have it out and resolve it. We are 13 || the policy making body of, this government, of this country, and 14 to say it is the problem be the academic community is foolish. 7 15 | The governing principle should not be whether it is best for . H 16 || the CIA or whether it is what the CIA wants. It is what is best . r : 17 || for this country and what! is in fundamental keeping with what. “18 we stand for. . 19 The CIA will always find a way to get its job done, and 20 it doesn't need to violate the Constitution or people's rights 21 to do their job. oo 22 Senator Mondale. Well, one of the problems with this is 23 ||-it doesn't violate anybody" s rights. | | (24° Senator Schweiker. elt, I am not sure, Gary, if you are 25 witting about it, that anybody ' s rights are being violated. Top SECRET Docld:32423519 WARD & PAUL
TOP SECRET. Ce 1 Senator Hart of Colorado. ‘Well, it is not that easy. You 2 ||have got people coming over here to stuay, you ‘have got 5 relatives that want to come in to this country. I mean, there 4 |}are all kinds of subtle forms of blackmail that can be used. a7 It is just not an easy question of walking. up to a foreign stude t 6 ||and saying, when you get back home do you want to send us some ? information. 8 _ You pointed out one oase that people, they get killed. for 9 doing this. We are talking about people that may want to become 10 | citizens. They feel that this is a tradeoff they can make 11 to get in here. They may need the money. Who knows?‘+:: 12 Mr. Wides. There is a constant problem, by the: way, 13 that I know of working in Senator Hart's office, of foreign 14 |} students who are here .--\it has been a-legislative matter on -15 || the Hill -- who do not plan to go back and: forth to Africa ‘16 every summary and come on the assumption that they can get work,| 17 ||and then there are restrictions. on their working, and it is not 18 ||clear whether they can stay here or will have to go back, and 19 |}so in some ways it is like the person on immigrant status -20 || trying to get citizenship, in terms of having sources of pressur 21 from the Government on them. 22 i Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I only have one other. thing to 23 contribute because it was discussed principally by Senator 24 Schweiker, but I think this witting or unwitting thing may be 25 jja key somewhere along the line. TOP SECRET Doold:32423519 Plage 31 WARD & PAUL
10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 | 18 “19 20 21 22 23 24 25 TOP SECRET as , Mr. Bader, isn't it clear that even with the academic or the approach to the foreign student by the undercover man posing as a representative of a corporation, that that student to be recruited at all has to be witting of the fact that he or she is working ‘for a U.S. firm or some.firm, and it is usuall against the best interests of his own country or his own firm when he goes back to his home. He is made witting of that at the outset, is he not?. Mr. Bader. No, sir. . Mr. Kirbow. “What is he made witting of that gives him any control over him reporting information that is of any value? Mr. Bader. It is. not done that way. Let me give you a specific example of a commercial intelligence firm or a commercial reporting firm out of Dallas Texas is one that I know of. Mr. Kirbow. Yes. ‘Mr. Bader. The individual is recruited, asked and given a job. He said, we would like you to go to Paris and write ‘articles and reports for us on the petroleum industry. That ‘is what the individual does. He is never tasked. s _ Mr. Kirbow. This would be a French student. Mr. Bader. This would be a French student. He would. never be tasked until such time as he moves from the first to. the second category. | Mr. Kirbow. During that period he is not doing any harm TOP SECRET Docld: 32423519 Page 32 . , WARD & PAUL
a Gl end 2 ? co Ke] 10 ll 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20 el 22 R35 24 25 Docld: 32423519 Page 353 TOP SECRET. 30 to his country or anything. | He is just reporting on a regular, commercial, overt type information. Mr. Bader. Well, I put it to you that an individual who is unwittingly working for a CIA proprietary could certainly be perceived from his country's point of view as doing harm to that country : Since he is, you see, he is. not in effect -- he is in actuality working for a foreign government. Me. Kirbow. But the first time they ask him to ask anythin of detriment to his country, like a state secret, he is made witting that he is working for the CIA. I think that was basically the point. Mr. Bader. Basically the same, but in the first instance he is. in fact working for a foreign power. | Mr. Kirbow. He is siorking for a foreign power, and he knows it. . | | | Mr. diGenova. Now, that is not my reading of the record, Burt. My reading of the record -- and this supports what you are saying, you are just getting it the wrong way -- he is reporting information back. He may not know he is reporting it to the CIA. He does know that he is certainly not reporting it to his own Ministry of Information. Mr. Kirbow's point is that even though he may not know he is reporting to. _ the CIA, he does know that he is not providing positive economic intelligence to his own government but to some other outside force. If it is found out that it is a CIA proprietary, either TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
10 11 12 1S 14 15 16 1? -18° 19 20 21 22 24 25 Docld: 32423519 Page 55 ‘back to the contractual relationship between the foreign meaningful contractual relationships in this country. this thing. I am sure there are many other foreign.news mr SECRET | 52 contractual relationship between CIA and foreign or United a States journalists accredited to foreign media. organizations which have a substantial relationship to U.S. media organization i.e., if. ‘the CIA employed someone in Reuters, it is not a. U.S. media organization, and obviously there could then be the problem ‘that Senator Schweiker raised and the fact is not that it is a foreign media organization. It is the foreign media organization which has substantial contractual relation- ship to U.S. media organizations: ‘a number of U.S. media organizations “subscribe to the Reuters service. Is there a way that you could prevent the contractual relationship with foreign or U.S. individuals .who are employed by foreign media organizations that have a substantial tie to U.S. media organizations? _ ¥ Senator Schweiker. it seems to me that unless you cover that end, “you are still Paying taxpayers' money to throw propaganda back into the [united States, and I think you get news service and this country, and I don't know why we should not include organizations, foreign news organizations that have Now, I am not picking out Reuters per se, but I think that is the kind of thing that is completely a loophole as I read services that have deals with AP or UP on an. exchange. basis TOP SECRET WARO & PAUL