14-00000 44 September 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Recent Developaents in the Review of the Nosenko Cane 1. On 2 June I was contacted by the DDCI's Spetéil Annistant, George ‘ ‘McManus, and asked to.come ta sic office to discuss Soviet in lelligence chllection as it related tc Prior to this call I aad bediae aware that McManus was making Inquiries Im the SB Division about ay bo2ibLton ana background. In kis office we discussed the SB collection program and tke Ayecial contribution of defectors. No comment was made by either of us regarding aay talk with the DDCI. 2. On 30 June, at my request, I met with the ADDP to express concern at having again been passed over for prosotion. He infor-ted ae beat my proaotion: kad been. approved but that it had not been sade effective because ha ang the DDP vere puzzled that I had gone over their heads to discuss the Hosenky case with the DDCI. He stated that it was not a crime to visit the DDCI, but that bhe DDP chain of command should be followed, and all possible points of appeal For such’ a disagree- ment should be exkausted before taking a matter to the Directap', office. In reply;. I stated that my action was prompted by the knowledge that the 5B Division paper on Hosenko had been sent to the DDCI, that the DDCI was aware test T haa written a dissenting opinion,. and that he had expressed interest in that “pinion. 3+ Tae ADDP stated that ke and the DDP were knowledgaghje of tae Nosenko case, that they had listened to soue of the interrogation tapos, and that they were inclined to accept the Division. position. He advised ne that there were siany facts of whick I was not aware, and that it would be best if I would wonfine ayself to requirezents uatters, leaving counterintelligence. analysis to those persons who were responsible for it. He said that we had treated Hosenko 1, a gentlezanly manner, Which was more than the Soviets would do in a similar ase. . 4. I stated that tke Mosenko case and ost of the Cthes' which the Divisi connected with it were cases with which I had been involved, beat they were all cases of evaluating production in coaparative terms, and that y experience in suc evaluations qualified me to have ~y views heard. He advised 4° that if I would Do try again to discuss the subject. with CSB that ke would nov be. willing to hear me a out. He said that if I still disagreed and wished to discuss lhe subject with : other senior officers, I showld first inform CSB of that: intent, 7 called his attention to the negative attitude of the Division toward intel.|igence opportunities, and the ADDP stated that he and the DDP were entirely aware of inat attitude and were watching it closely. Tsis has since becone apparent to wa, . ce on - d+ After ay return from vacation, on 12 July, ‘CSB caljed me in to for- malize the proazotion and emphasize that he was. solely responsilia for it:;. It was _. toe clear that he had discussed my visit to the-DDCI with the latter end that the DDCI -.~ * had merely confirzed the visit and coamnicated the gist of .reaition to the paper waich tke Division had sent sim on the Nosenko case. HS ve
14-00000 6. On 14 August x, two Division officers wko had been evaluating the Nosenko paper were obliged to write up their critical views and subait then to CSB. He subsequently stated that their criticisms would be useful in tigatening up the paper, and advised tkaex to continue to analyze the paper for this purpose. They continue to find major flaws in the case against Hosenko. CSB informed them that the paper forwarded to the DDCI was only a draft, and that there were bound to be discrepancies and inconsistencies in a paper SO complex and involving so many authors. 7- On 2h August I was called in by CSB/CI and told that I could no longer discuss the Nosenko case with any of the several officers under kis jurisdiction wko were working on the case, and that any of those officers who initiated such discussions with me should be asked if they had kis per- aission to do so. I agreed to honor this arrangeaent but eupaasized that ay only interest in such discussions was to facilitate a thorougk and objective review of the Nosenko case. I then recomended that the two officers be given ay December 1965 paper on the case, and this was subsequently done. 8. Since my determined actions to expedite reopening of the Nosenko case have led the Division and the DDP to disowm my views and to exclude se froa tae review of the case, I see no existing forum for my views within the Clandestine Services. Therefore, in spite of the BBP's advice that I either refrain froa having an opinion, or express it only within tke Division or . the CS, I have a sense of urgency that thé attached views on the disposition of the Nosenko case be considered at the cowaand level of tae Agency waere the ultimate decision smust be made. .
3. Decéiitier 1966 oo a wel MEMORANDUM FOR: vee, fee vem ot SUBJECT The Clandestine Effort + Against the “UssR 1. The negative positions taken by the @ivision continue to dominate and negate our efforts ta collect. intelligence on the USSR by clandestine meanas In — addition, I believe that this negative environment has - . done permanent damage to our capabilities against ‘the .. Soviet target, and that this damage. increases with . each day that this envirconent Prevails. ae 2, Following isa sumary. of recent. Qorstomnents _4in the divisions positions and a list of their effects . Be as IT see them. Be  Nosenko is a deception agent, and Soviet decention a operations. revolve around him. _ _ The psychiatrist. has. told the division’ ‘that ae ae Nosenko's desperation to change his situation : oo , may lead to a false confession. Fe I .° The dishonesty and bias in the case , agatost Nosenko are still evident in the current review of his bonafides, according to the officer who . 4g doing most of the writing of that paper. Attachment 4 is an example of this technique. bd. | BOURBON ds a deception agente “t believe that | ‘BOURBON ths bonaf ide. He has just made his seventh identification of auajor . Soviet agent in the U.S. (Boeckenhaupt), who is the fourth such agent who was active, unsuspected, anc in a position to do the U.S.. serious damage, any attempt to develop and disseminate ‘BOUREON' 3 } information is inevitably blocked by the cI . ~./ enphasis, as well as failure to provide the case officer close substantive support. “-4OURBON 413 os providing some significant information whicw As Bee within his access and appears valid. Unwarranted and dishonest ‘Judgments. of! ‘BouReON"S information are made without the knowledge of “_ division officers qualified to make such Judg- ments. See Attachnent Be
fare wivercemenee art ei— msm mata tees anne R MOTTO SCS AE sete en ee - athe officers of the @ivision' 6 GRU Branch. disagree PEP a ; with the division's evaluation of BOURBON, The bow. 7 , _ paper on’ ROURSON's {bonafides is being dictated — “ to them by the division chief. rae ‘Scoren ‘te. a deception agente . . | . “scorcH continues. to provide requirenents and - . ‘dnformation which I believe to be reliable and appropriate to his access. His information is Saii sao that 4 does not permit a firm conclusion » ' ae , - about his. bonafides one way or the other, but . : a _ his cr dnformation is the best basis for. * gudsing, 2 “Qll amportant ‘soviet agents arrested in the u Se ia the past five years or so have been compromiged ee by Nosenko (Johnson, Mintgenbaugh), BOURSON - ORME (Dunlap, Whalen, Thompson, Howell, Drummond, : oO! Roeckenhaupt, and Casaidy), and SCOTCH (buteako Se and others unknown to met. ‘I believe that. - SCOTCH has proven himself in the CI field, “but: ‘the case for him is not as foolprafif as for the othsr two. Even so, his bonafides or lack of . same has no automatic bearing on tesenko and “ @&. Most soviet ‘activities which have been detected around the world are deception operations, called . bs | "disinformation", “screen”, or “diversionary” = operations by the division. . ‘The keystone of this position is the assumption that the GRU academy class of 1963 which was identified for us by Penkovakiy is a "throwaway" _ group runing deception operations. In fact, only 7 of 51 in the class have been identified ia intelligence work. This theory was prepared as a book dispatch three years ago but rot sent out. It is given | in briefings or agency and liaison personnel # . _Analysaés of previous cases, such as the Felfe case, are being written with a bias built in to — . support this _ theory. - 7 a ; oy te - ee a woe wae con . . vee . No valk-ins and few defectors or Liaison agents escape the deception label. * In early January the division begins a course for CT's, and. this. philosophy will probably be .. @ + passed on to them.
weeny aor en "Se Individuals who provide Loformation. which tends . \. , to corroborate the reporting or bonafide@ of the " above agents are also deception agents. Since all RIS defectors and asents. in the future are certain to provide such information, all are Giscredited in advance, This is a particularly crippling position, as our two best positive intelligence sources have been GRU officers.  F The only such defector we have had since Nosenke's Walk-in in 1962 is Olga Farmakovskaya, whom the division judged a deception agent primarily. - ' because she stated her husband attended the GRU - acadeny with Nosenkos - See Attachment oe A number of agents in Satellite intelligence amen services are belng tarred with the pate: © : 3. The effects or the above poaitious. are detrimental - within the Givision and the Agency, and I believe they have damaged our reputation with the FBI, MI-6, and other _ liaison services, . Within the Clandestine Services, these - positions and theories have generated a widespread feeling - of frustration, futility, and impotence. The division “practically preaches the superiority of the KGB over the FBI and CIA, using the above theories as “evidence™, ' 01d standards of information and source evaluation have been abangoned and even reversed, with bad analysis ‘driving good analysis out of existence. The validity _ of Soviet area experience is being denied, The effect is paralysis of our Soviet effort, 4, A number of actions have been taken by the ‘division which have also contributed to the Gecay of the Clandestine Services’ Soviet effort, @. Replacement and downgrading ef senior perscandl, - With Soviet experience, bs. Inereased- dependence on RTS defectors for opera= tional judgments. These defectors are brought into Headquarters and overseas stations and shown Agency documents. Ce. Attempted kidnapping ¢ of the supposed KGB station _ @hief in Tokyo. =~ . ae de Persoanel with experiance, intelidgence, inagi~ . nation, and initiative are bullied, jeered, and shouted into silence, or into division positions which they are required to secept on faith and — without question. | -“3- woN
hears oe atte cas aire emanates all, oF 5. these actions ere primarily injurious to persory dmmedLately 4n the division, but the reduation of their 4ndividual contributions reduces over-all effectiveness, The kidnapping episode discredited the division and the agency, and is a blatant example of the disregard of tha division chief for the views of his staff. The require. ment that division personnel mutely and blindly follow him, abandoning their judgment and self-respect, alicnatag some of the best people in the division, and has been tha’ - direct cause of at least one serious illness and a con= Ce tributing factor to a number of health problems of others, = - fhe motivation of experienced people who still occupy a =i‘ few responsible posts in the division has been seriously eroded by the unhealthy policies summarized above, and ; the related lack of intelligence success, us 6, What t have stated here are ny own aincere. and ne sober views, The concern which I feel for this state of = .. affaire has increased to the point where I am mentally — distressed and physically affected by this catastrophic development in my chosen profession... Even if the present. insidious trend were to be abruptly ended, 1% would take many years to rectify the damage, in the minds of our — own personnel, in operational filles and guidance, and with other agencies and liaison services. I am entirely committed by experience, qualifications, and inclination ; to work on collection against the Soviet target. Now OS ‘ discouraged in this work, I would find it difficult to regenerate this lost enthusiasm in a new assignment, However, if there is no hops of a thorough review of the positions and methods of the division within the next few months, I feel that both my professional and personal welfare will require that T find some other assignment, Te In committing these views to paper, I am aware that the positions and actions which I cite as offensive are also the product of experienced and dedicated Agency enuployees, to whom I impute no dishonorable motives, ‘However, I believe it fair to state that the present. operational philosophy of the division is tatlor-made_ to suit the. KGB; several present and past SR Division officers have made this observation. It appears to ne that the division chief's preoccupation with the KGB and ‘mania for attributing so many of the world's ilis to thom is a product of his own professional frustration, én example of this outlook is given in Attachment D. He ~ appears to hold the KGB responsible for a. tong matory of personal failures: ; .
(a. Be 4. . ‘loss of a Ia Bee compromised through Fellas a Soviet Seeat | in eit a ue -Wr-6 ‘stat? officer was discovered to have been, several bupport agents were found -to be under hos 6 control, and all SR cas -as head of the | 4 he had major responsibility for the raliure t every . such operation which we rane — . . He was publicly disgraced by the "voor-in-thesface” recruitment failure in Vienna. Uy and ‘after he moved t¢ Lt. col; Popey la was transferred m Vienna to Berlin.and was o>. soon compromised. , lose cooperation ‘resulted -in the — r of our agents who were While he was 4 with the the BND CE Section. | working for the Soviets while in Berlin Thm, The Berlin tunnel was discovered ‘and closed, running in Berlin were rolied up CANEY, (1 Sewtan) 2 Shortly after he net [UNACUTE 40 parla, the latter was called home and shot. . —- He was asain publicly disgraced by the kidnapping failure in Tokyo. While sone of these unpleasant events caonot in any way) ‘be blamed on him, it is easy to see how he may have vo acquired a feeling that nothing is bonafide, that nothing | works right, and thati:he must somehow even the score, with _— the KGB as the enemy. I believe that this becomes too ecostly when our intelligence goals and officers are both expended in the process, Leonard MeCoy  DC/SB/RR
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Be 7 "SUBTECE: Resolution of ‘the: Rosenko Problea | . oe he " Hosenko. has now been ‘neld in solitary conf inenent’ and ‘Sncomminicado” L ae for ‘aluost. three years. When we first took this course of action, presumably. ay plan was adopted waich would dispose of the case throug normal Judiciary. pros. cedures and relieve the Agency of a penitmtiary role. - -Althougk the. years. should - _ have strengthened the: case against. Hosenko, the opposite. trend is. apparent, ae ‘more qualified, objective, and. balanced persons: have been. exposed. to the with freedom to express thenselves ,. the case has dteintegrated. : a : “ee ; Walle ‘the, Division’ continues to belabor. its. ‘monstrous paper on the. case,: ‘x ‘suggest that..the. validity’ ofthe case: ‘against ‘Hosenko may: not even be. relevant, to the larger: problem; : which’ ‘is. the need: to divest tke Agency and the U.S.- Governaent ofthe risks. involved in. holding or disposing of. Nosenko«::: -In' other words, the. resolution: of: the- Hosenko : case must: be Just about. ‘the game. whe or-not. everyone agrees: he'd honafide.. mets, ts a i : 3." “te appears. to me. thet. the: risks: Anherent. in: “the ‘ease become: eritical ‘as: ‘goon ag. Nosenko's present status. becozes known to various elezents outside the ‘Intelligence. Community. -I further believe that. these risks. grow with tine,. and: . that-even if tke story: is. not surfaced for many years, the damage will. still. be * serious. Waile the official. assessuent.of these risks.can only be made. by top - : Agency management, those whick .proupted me to,press the Division to undertake ry ; critical review of. the Hosenko case.are represented by the. following: ie : ‘Blesents ‘of ‘Congress who are. not favorably disposed to. the: ‘Agency ; " the Director, or the Executive could use the case politically ji<:° - “ho oo" Lol againet those: entities... Tae greatest risk in this category. probably ae arene begins in early 1968 and runs through national election campaigns. : a be ‘The President could suffer personal eubarrassnent, having: ‘to state be whether he was:  avare of our handling of Nosenko. or authorized - ite. = CO a Trial. ‘at “the « case: in the. press,- at howe and abroad,” probably would © See met develop. in. our favor. Fine points of CI logic often are not cs = appreefeted within: the Intelligence Community, muck: less outside..-2 an (In fact, the aot is. sald to Gisagree with ¢ our iogic in the Toseako case de Tae “Agency. could. be accused. ‘of violating “the Pate of Rights, 7 ” fgnoring os ' - * the rigkts of the individual, ‘usurping judicial prerogatives,. and 2! -:> arbitrary action under special privilege ("governing invisibly")... - ‘Genuine liberals, civil: rightists, and fellow. travelers: would have , aamuni tion’ to use against USe 8 et: Our: ‘treateent’ of ‘Nosenko would ‘be ‘used by ‘the a Soviets to: » aiscourege. _ -, other defectors and agent candidates. ae er 7 f.: Liaisoa ‘services ° are: ‘likely to’ lose ' some confidence’ ‘tn our - coape- B | tence and our. standing in the U.S. Governaent. - (Seniorofficers : vl, (OP the British. Service have, expressed. disagreeaent with: our views | a on a Hosenko.).. ee ae aos ede es &.