104-10335-10014 J64-/0 33 5-/0014 . \y Assassination Records Review Board 600 E Street NW + 2nd Floor » Washington, DC 20530 (202] 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457 January 28, 1997 Mr. John Pereira Director Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Re: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) : Dear John: - Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994), the Review Board has the authority. to “direct.a - Government office to . . . investigate the facts surrounding, additional information [and] records ....” Section 70)(1)(C)Gi). Pursuant to this authority, the Review Board is seeking to resolve in a complete and comprehensive manner certain questions related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that CIA may have held prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Accordingly, we request that CIA provide complete and . comprehensive answers to the questions identified below. On May 12, 1992, Director Robert M. Gates testified to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding CIA’s records on Oswald prior to the assassination. - Mr. Gates testified that “[p]rior to President Kennedy’s assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages..... “ (The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1972: Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (emphasis added) (copy enclosed). It is the Review Board’s current understanding, however, that at the time of the assassination, CIA held at least three separate files (including soft files) on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 file (201-289248), an HTLINGUAL file, and an Office of Boarp Memacers: John R. Tunheim, Chair + Henry F. Graff - Kermit l. Hall + William L. Joyce « Aana K. Nelson Executive Director: David G. Marwell
13-00000 Mr. John Pereira. January 28, 1997 Page 2 Security file.’ We have identified references to one or more other possible Oswald files including possible soft files designated as follows: CI/SI, CI/SIG, CI/LSN, and CS/LSN. 1. Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy. 2. Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination. 3. For the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please identify which records (and the total number that) were in the file at the time of the assassination. 4. To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the - jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files. For each question, please explain the basis for the answer and the sources (records or persons) whom you consulted to answer the question. To the extent that you are not able to answer a question completely, please so indicate and provide the best reasonable answer. If, during the course of your research, you learn that any record relating to a pre-assassination file or record has been destroyed, please provide us with all available information related to the destruction of the records or files. ‘ These queries should be interpreted in their broadest reasonable sense. To the extent that you question whether certain responses may be within the scope of our request, please let us know and we can advise you whether we would wish to include it. We anticipate that the responses to these questions will be referenced in CIA’s Final Compliance Statement. ‘One Office of Security file on Oswald (or relating to Oswald) may have been numbered 351-164. In addition, Margaret Stevens may have held an Office of Security “MS-” file on Oswald.
we fe Mr. John Pereira January 28, 1997 Page 3 We request that you make this information available to us by February 24, 1997. If this does not provide you with sufficient time, please let us know, in writing, by what date you believe you will be able to answer the questions fully. _ Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely, David G. Marwell Executive Director ” Enclosure
13-00000 Sor lee |. THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT _OF 1992 HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON S.J. RES, 282 TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF dk ORD RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOLIN F RENN? MAY 12, lua Printed for the use of the Committer on Ghoverttientas Attar. WS. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE cs 5 ae WASHINGTON : 1992 For sale by the US. Government Printing Orfiee Supenmieadent of Documents, Congressional Sales Ole, W. ISBN 0-16-039035~4 ashingtoay [Co Mace?
13-00000 - 50 denied, you say postponed. I am curious as to how long the post- ponement will be, Will it be until the national security or privacy are no longer threatened? Do we want to require a mandatory review every two years? _Going along, some of the language is fairly broad. We had the exchange here a few moments ago about an intelligence agent. Then there is another section that gives us an exception—‘‘an in- telligence method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expect- ed to be utilized.” ‘The one that troubles me most, although I know there is a reason for it, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open, is “, .. an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that person is identified in the material or not.” I am concerned about that being used as a ground for requesting postponement of disclo- sure. So I think, consistent with all that you have said here, I hope that you will give us the benefit of your second look at that Section 6.6f this proposed Act. _ Chairman Guenn. Thank you. _ Senator Cohen? = ’ Senator Conen. No further questions. a . Chairman Guenn. Good. Thank-you very much. We may have ad- ditional questions. It-has been along session this morning here, and we have additional questions from other members or questions after we review. We would appreciate an early reply so it.could be included in the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate. -Mr. Stoxes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Specrer. Thank you very much. . .Chairman GLenn. The next panel is the Honorable. Robert Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the: Honorable William Sessions, Director of the FBI. Gentlemen, you have been very patient here this: morning. I know we had told you you woul ‘be on by about 10:00 here. ‘We are about an hour late on that, or a little over. We appreciate your forbearance ‘this morning. We look forward to your testimony this morning.. ~ Mr. Gates, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it very much. ” . TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR, .. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC! Mr. Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr: Chairman, I am here 3 today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, the ‘ Assassination Materials Disclosure, Act of 1992, and to describe the nature of the documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency g. that relate to the assassination of John F.. Kennedy. Senator Sasser. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Director could || pull the mike just a little bit closer? Thank you. Mr. Gates. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter. ° Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution, that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of ol President Kenned ] ent | y. We hope that i ivi ists hier op at opening up and j - iste, ‘hi forians ind, most importantly, the public access Dare is P to resolve questions that. still linger over 28 . years i y after the assassination. Further, | believe that maximum dis- he murder of Preside nt Kenned , &ven before the introduction of this io; t : . ing, aged for eater public access te CIA d, soon I historic’ nee en anh v0 ergs ago, I announced the establishment of many histede race that will be responsible for declassif ing $ Hon oP ea uments as possible, consistent with ‘protec, os intel igence sources and methods. warn the protec: unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency’s . In addition ‘to the i A have directed the bs systematic review of 30- ear-old doc ligence to ats ihe bi tory staff in the Center bor the Study of Intel qeorical importance, vindludiog focusing on particular events of uments for the wstoFical Review Group will then examine (eee - Because of high fates -of declassifying the records, © the doc. legislation or other arene, ‘he JFK papers, I am not waiting fo longin to CIA. The Historical Room ty ee essitving documents be- t group of these records, including all CLA document lee with oui f€ assassination, h : i fonal ‘Ar pmumimal deletions and is being transfersed ‘othe ‘Ne 8: We carry out our donee Program to declass inati pun ntly aur, goal will be to release as Tan; ody assassinat ret, } reem ntly appro ee a new CIA declassification guideline for oun in favor of declassification T tier ically directs a presurmption ing im mache oss . ve we can @ in making these documents available to the public ward ean instru istori i cted the Historical Review Group to take this. attitude to cart. In this spirit, the Age Poor cy today. wi ; ‘ : these new guidelines for historical review anak’, asset atable these documents for de : : i eclassification, it is j in som ; n, it is im assecet 2 context, The CIA’s collection of docmmennt 10 Place them 250,00 to Boajvod renter’, Kennedy ‘consists of appr to the copi igi ; material. This ; ples. and originals of information Provided to the Warren Com
13-00000 we 52 Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalo- gued, and is highly disorganized, all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most. sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clip- ings. P These records include documents that CIA had in’ its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the - House Select Committee on Assassinations. Prior to President Kennedy’s assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages, some of which originated with the FBI, the State Department, the Navy, and néwspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated -within CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see firsthand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and we are providing them to the Na- tional Archives. oe The records in this file dealt with Oswald’s defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald, some 38,000 pages, most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963. The Committee:has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI and about 20 percent originated | from the State Department or elsewhere. . Our staff is still going through the-material compiled at the re- quest of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of poper ‘records and one box that contains 78 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that. within the 68 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 per- cent originated with a variety of other U.S::Government agencies, private organizations, arid foreign and American press. : Although our documents do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA docu- ments that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now un- erway. t a re A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indica- tions of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide vari- ety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning ‘Cuba and Castro, Oswald’s defection to the Soviet Union, and Os- wald’s subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The also include a large number of name traces requested by the s 53 of the House Select Commi | | rial weit’ mumittee on Assassinations, gal ing to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exiles mate Haney’ ber of : tion of man unauthorized disclosure, nations, and documents by the House Select Comm: the sequestra- cies other than CIA Owever, we have alread : . to coordi : y taken steps to li : classe With other agencies, and to begin the process ah the House of Re necessary, in the absence of legislation T will. de lease the resul te of the xe for a resolution permitting CIA tome documents, eclassification effort on the sequestered While I expect a ] under our progr aon aves amount of the materia] can be declassified cannot be released to (pasume that there will be information that : é public for i i Privacy concerns or th a wariety of reasons, includi ods. Let me take- € exposure of intelligence ’ ng ods € take a moment to give an example of this tyre of mee Duri investivati sassinatt nae investigation by the House Select Committe requested of a wi erstand that security and personne] file een rts, or perfo er of CIA employees. These files contai D fit. credit checks on individual CLA’ office ee A mmeaical evaluations, and ues TS. i q ion of who killed President Kennedy, those’ and oe n se, the viduals in keeping the inf ghs the clear privacy interest of the indi- ar privacy concerns exist wi atory information on particular individuals wie containing derog- mation in order to. ke redactions and summarize the isfy tion Is released, while still nt the maximum am arize the infor. © privacy of an individual, tectin 4 President : -BY- i an t one vide readeureoe a pepeTs; to enhance public coniene relevant . reer . as not h in : guishe to the assass sination, I would apo “ eres digten inguished former juri of Government, perhaps including have redacted or k jurists, to examine whatever d ts we "t public report orp lgssified. They would then issue an unclaste > Gitort: required to declassify : an anation of President Kennedy fhe documents relating to the portant program and J unting. However, it is 0 an Ps ae aie = &am committed to making j ' I 1 to. g it work. By ; ny sienishing resources within i i mmuni y T have ‘allocated 1 full-time positions to expan “the
13-00000 54 history staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical inter- t. est. I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to getting these papers declassified and released, and to open what re- mains classified to outside non-governmental review. It is against this background that in response to the Committee’s request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only intelligence community concerns. I will defer to the Depart- ment of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint reso- ution, le ; ; First, vesting in an outside body. the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods... Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no pro- vision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff. Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release.of CIA in- formation contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents origi- nated by these entities can be released directly by the executive di- rector of the assassination materials review board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the executive direc- tor to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of ma- terial at one time. oe an Fifth, and finally, Section 6 of the joint resolution, which. out- lines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release. of. documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work product information. Whil e such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK as- sassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed. These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its con- trol. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism estab- lished by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material. Mr. Chairman, let me close with a comment on why I am person- ally committed to getting these documents out. Like all Americans old enough to remember that terrible day in 1963, and as several members of the Committee have alluded to, I also remember where I was and what I was doing. 55 I was a college student at William and Mary, and I can r ber how the word spread-like wild fire between ‘classes of that 1 hor. rible event. I made my way to Washington that weekend and stood at sre, wabreection of Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues, or hours to w. i , wil never forget zo ; atch the President's funeral cortege. | entered public service less than three years later i President Kennedy's inaugural call, a call I rf many in heeding eration heard. He said then, “Now, the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, not as a call to attle, though in battle we are, but as a call to bear the burden of a ong twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, pa- “ent in tribulation, a struggle against the common enemies of man—tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.” ‘Mr, Chairman, the only thing more horrifying to me than the as- sassination itself is the insidious, perverse notion that elements of the American Government, that my own ‘gency, had some part in it. I am determined personally to make public or to expose to disin- terested eyes every relevant scrap of i , ion, i : : r paper in CIA’s possession, the hope of helping to dispel this corrosive suspicion. With or with- out legislation, I intend to proceed. I believe I owe that to his Preparep Statement or Mr. Gates Mr. Chairman I am here today at your r i i . » 2 am 3 our request to provide my views on S. J. Res. ae route «{ssnssination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992,” and to describe the Kennedy socumentas held by the CIA that. relate to the assassination of John F. maior . ry much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important Let me begin by stating that I am in com lete agreement with th | the joint resolution-—that efforts should be made to declassify and make nec sassination of John F. Kennedy, We hope that openi iving j i a ; ° . pening up and giving Journalists, historia and, most unportantly, the public access to governmental fics will help believe that maximum disclosure wil sc oke Teche assassination. Further, | do with the murder of John F Reneeaes it the theory that CIA had anything to 60 belore introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized th public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two wont for erpner josef Cy establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for feclasel ng 28 many historical documents as possible consistent with the protec- ks me ence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review fp rOUP, in @ Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassi- former Sone ents 30 R bare s old or older, and nation intelligence estimates on the r years old or older. In additi i review of 80-year-old documents, I"have directed the History Staff in the Center for dl he Stu 0 Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of ical hee iny otance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Histor- the remy Pp en examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying _ Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting f islati Fy tps ¥ ] other agencies to start declass g documents belonging to CIA. The Historical pew roup, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents relat. it 1 pasessination of John F. Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first gro po b ese records, includin all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to assags: * assified with quite minimal d i i transferred to the National Archives for release to the public, Than ie ieee ge, @ small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to
13-00000 a6 begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and | anticipate that many of these will be released shortly. As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as ible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA eclassification guideline for ovr Historical Review Program which specifically. di- rects a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collec- tion of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consista of ap- proximately 250,000-800,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accu- mulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not in- dexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized—all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive in- telligence sources to the most mundane news clippings. These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassina- tion, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of fhe assassination investigations. | should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point. Ag you can see, prior to Preqident Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file-on Lee Harvey Oswald ¢ consisted of 38 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and _ newspaper clippings. Only 11 decuments originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have de- claasified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Os- wald’s defection to the Soviet Union In 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it.was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the reat of the material:-on Oswald—some 33,000 pages—most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22,1968. ; ‘ i. You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or depart- ments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material com- piled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on tions, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent of the. documents originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agen- cies, private organizations, and foreign and American press. - Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we none- - theless have a substantial collection of documents that will require considerable effort to review, and ag I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassifica- tion is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some in- dications of what they contain, Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald’s defec- tion to the Soviet Union, and Oswald’s subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans, They also include a large.number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committees on inations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities. . The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unau- thorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Com- mittee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agen- cies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencigs and to begin the process of declassification. If neces- 7 a sary, I will ask the House for a resoluti itti the qoclassification effort on the se uestered documenta’ 'o release the results of ‘4 Gxpect @ large amount of the material can be decl if ani | assume that there stil] will be information that cannot be released to The poe fe i" a variety of erengons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelli- material. During the investigation b the "House leet Conamples of this type of tions, ] understand that security and 5 rsonnel fil Pere Rommittee on Assassins. ency employees. These files contain fitness reports, (periormenen & aluchongy medical evaluations and credit checks on indi idual Ci Pothecrs Atay eiuations). vant to the question of who killed President | Ken. ed: ye these ea aipeuthough irrele- uments ultimately nicted up inthe ce ennedy, these and other personal doc- 1 € sequestered collection of doc . . Heve that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information Suter oe / isclose such information to the publi i make redactions and summarize the information in order tovensuive thet en wl agent or the Privacy of an individual. 8 sapere. to peed by the Con ess and signed by the Presi i the Fie apers, | to areanee public confidence and provide Teaser TS TA hae held ba : van @ assassination, I wil i mente nguished redacted or be side of Government to examine vponee, pene publi report on then hed ep a ified. They would then issue an unclassified pene olort required to declassify the documents related inati Porensont Kennedy _Aiill be daunting. However, it is an important progr am and | aco argo i making 3 work. Even in a time of diminishi within, the Hisligence Community, I have allocation of 15 full-time positions to pan ry and to > form ihe Historical Review Group that will review ‘ rical interest. donieve, these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers ormmente oe re eased, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-gov- tea’ roquest, I cite our technical vesce ee pcan response to this Commit e joint resolution to achieve this same result. 4 inte 10 address only weanes ey ; 0 achiev . nd to address only Intelli ommunity concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any adie - problems posed by the joint resolution, First, vesting in an outside bod the determinati 1 out rmination as to whether CIA i related to the assaseina tion can‘ b .Teleased to the public ig inconsistent with tae ry: spo: ty to protect. intelligence sources and methods Second, I ; joi i nity + am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring Rea Board ances oF gocure document handling by the Assassination Materials ; » 4 am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide i : aed t] the A one to object to the release @ of CIA information contained in sockmnents cd | ‘ W ission. Under the joint resoluti - ments qabinated by "hese entities can be $ released directly by t ne Exooutive Dinca bad ster Exocutive Branch acca ard without any review by the President urth, the joint resolution provision for a 80-da i i re . ’ y¥ period for mrevide se Peane cisions by the Executive Director to. release information an ae volume of materia ame fc fimeeningtu review of what could prove to be a large » and tinally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outli ie er ai al Public Zelease of ¢.focument, makes no provision for poster : CUL . May con ecutive privilege or deliberati attorney-client, or attorney work product inf oo ile such privileges oul be waive ent ¢ public reer Pr juct information, ® such privileges could factual informatienns and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to rectly related to the JFK assasginati th be available under the joint resolution in the rare might be needed °° : : case they might b . ese are the technical problems that I believe can’ be folved and that will, in fai i i Kemicin the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President
13-00000 I 58 i the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even nowt Been, Was dociaanitication the relevant documents under its control. Furth ners we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of-this material. Chairman GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Gates. Mr. Sessions. TIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM 8. SESSIONS, DIRECTOR, “PEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY _ DAVID G. LEITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE .. Sessions. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of. the Comite I have a complete statement which I will file, and there are some diagrams which I will also make available for the record, and a photograph of the files themselves. will Chairman GLENN. ithout objection, your entire statement included in the recerd.. . are Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear before you to testify about FBI investigative records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I applaud this process and your efforts. It is fundamental that Government exist to mee the needs of its citizens. An examination of these issues is directly related to satisfying the intense interest and concern of our citizens about the circumstances surrounding that tragic event some eR yorn ti i i J favor the outset, I would like to state emphatically that I. manonun disclosure, consistent with the law and the legitimate need to protect certain small but highly sensitive categories of in- formation. I can assure you that the FBI will work cooperativel: y through the Department of Justice with both the Senate ‘and t. e ‘House to develop a comprehensive approach to these importan issues. . ‘ As you know, the Government has conducted a number of re- views “Of the assassination. The Warren Commission, the House As sassinations Committee, and the Church Committee all conducte reviews that I believe can be best categorized as exhaustive. t is my understanding that the FBI provided massive amounts of infor: mation to those entities to help ensure that they accomplishe their missions. Once again, we desire to be as helpful as we are able. ; a h ‘Immediately following the shooting of President Kennedy, the FBI began a massive investigation. An intense effort was made. Re- lated investigations were conducted and much information was ex- changed, as Director Gates has noted, between the various agen- cies. As is the case with. all major investigations, thousands of. ages of documents were created to record the results of these ef- for facilitate the investigations. ; Many A Uteent kinds of information were recorded in the FBI files. The results of thousands of interviews of witnesses, other in- dividuals with possible helpful knowledge, and contacts with confi- dential informants were..memo ed. Communications between the FBI headquarters and our field offices, and vice versa, were in- ‘cluded, as were communications between the FBI and other agen- cies. Forensic reports were recorded. In all, FBI files relating to the 59 assassination contained over 499,000 pages of documents, with a few more pages added every time the FBI follows up on a new alle- gation or a new issue arises. After Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, the FBI began receiving requests for information relating to the as- sassination. By 1978, four years later, over 200,000 ages of materi- al had been processed and made available to the public through the FBI’s public reading room. Many authors, journalists, historians, and others have visited and revisited these materials, which remain available today as a valuable source of historic information. I would like to briefly describe to the Committee a@ breakdown of FBI records relating in some way to the assassination. The FBI has four core files that relate directly to the investigation of the assas- sination. Our cooperation with the Warren Commission and the in- vestigation of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby—those are the four core files. There are approximately 499,000 pages in these files, 268,000 of which are duplicate pages that were cross-filed, third agency records, and some FBI records that have not been processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Approximately 228,000 pages, or 94 percent of the records we have processed, have already been released to the public. In addi- tion, the FBI has several other much smaller files as a result of other directly related investigations, such as the investigation of Marina Oswald, and these files comprise approximately 22,000 pages, 13,000 of which are duplicate, third agency, or unprocessed pages. Fifty-eight percent of these Pages processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act have been released to the public. Of the pages available in the FBI reading room on the main floor at FBI headquarters, approximately 189,000 pages, or 94 percent, are available in their gntirety. The remaining 12,000 pages in the reading room reflect some degree of redaction. The information that has not been disclosed or that has been redacted to some degree falls within the exemptions that are enumerated in the Freedom of Information Act and the protections of the Privacy Act. This includes information that, one, is classified on the basis of national security; two, would disclose the identities of individuals who specifically requested confidentiality; three, would disclose the identities of confidential informants or sources; four, is highly per- sonal information about individuals; or, five, originated with other Government agencies and those agencies specifically requested that the information not be released based upon exemptions applicable to those particular agencies. While I strongly favor maximum disclosure under the law, there are certain types of information that are particularly critical to successful law enforcement investigations and national security; for example, information that is properly and appropriately classified, information that would identify confidential sources, and informa- tion that would disclose sensitive investigative techniques or the types of information the disclosure of which could negatively impact upon our ability to fulfill our mission. Information in FBI files that has not been disclosed publicly falls largely within these descriptions of information. n any case, I believe it is extremel healthy for the country to have these issues aired and to be resolved. The public interest dic-
13-00000 ' 7 FOR-OFFICIAL USE Ont (CLA Be, oD Fe TL Pp ROAPO- CR oo, aa CRY 97-062 ee . 2 31 January 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham DO Focal Point for JFK Board Lee Strickland DA Focal Point for JFK Board FROM: ‘John F. Pereira. Chief, Historical Review Group SUBJECT: | Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board 1. Attached is “Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)”, which was received from the Assassination Records Review Board on. 29 January i997. The request is for additional details " related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that may have existed in the Office of Security and in the DO. 2. Please advise how you would like us to respond to this request. We are asked to make the information available to the Board by 24 February 1997. Attachment
13-00000 ‘ : SECRET : . a. 27 February 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence FROM: Chief, Information Management Branch Office of Personnel Security SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board REFERENCE : CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997 1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. , 2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell’s letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994. Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy. Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, Regraded Confidential cL BY: (96056367 When Separated From CL Reason: 1.5(c) Secret Attachment DECL ON: X11 DRV FROM: COV 1-82 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET & A and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Karvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS. (U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald’s name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. -(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from || lof the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files. Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination. Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as: #0077826 Opened approximately July 1952 #0090079 Opened approximately February 1953 #0093466 Opened approximately July 1953 #0119144 Opened approximately May 1955 2 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET (U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming, and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, { China) and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with.the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations. (U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of. Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are: a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled “U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15” b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American “defectors” from May 1959 to October 1960 c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated ‘1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961 f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic. SECRET
13-00000 (U) SECRET The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows: a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959 The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled “Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship” Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959 Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959 Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959 The Washington Pest press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled “Rebuffed’ Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled “U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15” Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960 Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961 Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter 5 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963 , x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963 y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald). Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files. Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel.to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald. (U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre- assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information. 7 SECRET
13-00000 SECRET (U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency’s organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security. of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre- assassination time period. | made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Office retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on 3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-~assassination time frame. ene Attachment 8 SECRET
13-00000 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD — on “8 ‘april: 1994, ‘the complete set of. SRPOINTER and _ - HTLINGUAL security support files and. indexes held by the - Office of Security were destroyed in accordance with. the: ‘guidelines set forth in the approved: Records Control | Schedules 31-76 and (31-83 and by the office of: General - . Counsel .
P.2/6 OGC-94-51066 6 April 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR: _ i? Information Review Team Office of Security VIA: . Robert J. Eatinger Assistant General Counsel //. Litigation Division vo FROM: OO a mt Officer Office of General Counsel SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction 1. This responds to your memo of 9 February 1994 requesting confirmation that the security support fllea of the HTLINGUAL project are not the subject of a current litigation, investigation, or other inquiry that would preclude their destruction pursuant to normal guidelines for ‘records of this type. A review of OGC files located no currently active casea involving the HTLINGUAL project. Therefore, OGC pores no objection to destruction of the files if authorized by your approved records disposition schedule. - a 2. For your information. I have attached a copy of a March 1990 memorandum in which OGC provided quidance to the DO regarding destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL project files. According to that memorandum, files pertaining to HTLINGUAL may be destroyed only if: (1) they meet the — -'. Gyiteria for destruction on the applicable NARA approved records disposition schedule; (2) are not responsive to a FOIA or Privacy Act request currently being processed by the -of£fice concerned; and (3) do not. document the initiation, dimplementation, and termination of the projects, or 'conatitute files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency ig required to maintain. As the attachment indicates, NARA's requirement that the SSCI concur in any proposed destruction has already been met. Cl BY 171358); DECL OADR DRV FM SEC 13-87. SECRET OPO te nh Ae a IE SRSA OEP OSE te eens anes wn we rancenman
13-00000 mm ee ee ; P.d/b SECRET | SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction 3. TI apologize for the delay in responding to your request. Please let me know if I may be of further assistance. ee Attachment: . As Stated 2 SECRET
13-00000 : a Se ee rae SECRET om -., SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction " DCI/OGC/REG eka /76195) (6 Apr 94) Distribution: Original - Addressee _ dd - OGC Registry ae SECRET FoUNe Meer uaa,
13-00000 P.5/6 7 C~90-50611 Meech 1990 | | ‘MEMORANDUM FOR: C/OIT/ATME ” FROM: yr ivision, OGC SUBJECT: Destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Project Files . REFERENCE: Request for Authorization to Retain or - Destroy Questionable Records: 141C‘s for MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Projects, from IMS/MPG/IRMB, dated 18 December 1989 l. The referenced request seeks concurrence for the destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL files in accordance with routine records destruction schedules approved by the National Archivist. Subject to the qualifications set forth below, the propoged destruction can proceed without legal objection. 2. On several occasions over the past 12 years, DO/IMS has proposed that the Agency identify and destroy MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL records in accerdance with routine records destruction schedules. The major reason not to do so has been the existence of litigation that has necessitated retention of those records. With the settlement of the National Lawyers‘ Guild litigation, a major obstacle to routine records destruction appears to have been eliminated. 3. That case alone, however, does not govern the records retention or_destruction of MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files. In addition, destruction may proceed only in accordance with the records disposition authorization provided by the Archivist on 17 March 1978. (Job Nos. NC1-263-77-18 and NC1-263-78-1). The approval given by the Archivist is subject to essentially the following conditions: (1) files and documents that are the objects of FOIA end Privacy Act requests, or those involved in any other litigation, are not to be destroyed; (2) files that document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, and other files on U.&. persons of foreign. | intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain, are not to be destroyed; (3) no disposal will occur prior to review and concurrence of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. . 4. In reviewing the materials you have provided, I have . been able to conclude that then SSCI Chairman, Birch Bayh, in ' several separate letters dated 6 April 1978, informed the DCT that the Committee had no objection ta the implementation of the records disposal lists approved by the Archivist. In my
13-00000 Ny . op - .Ageordingly, with the exception of the case of . _f@lating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files that necessitate the ' to Leo fT. Hurwitz, therefore, should be retained. In addition, Peck v. CTA) . Should be cetained. I am not aware of any other matters that . ‘relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL that should not be destroyed. requirements of the Records Disposal List. Finally, of course, . from the FBI's investigation relating to the National Lawyers’ agreement. This means that, to the extent MHCHAOS records are r.ore i oH OR teotne, «ane Tapes” cio tatt 68 tat Y bead el WE Gd U8 1 view, therefore, condition number (3) has heen satisfied. , there appear to be'no ongoing court cases retention of those materials. All HTLINGUAL materials relating any records pertaining to Dr. Sidney M. Peck ( would require retention of the files at the present time, but you should contact the Agency's FOIA Coordinator to determine if there are any outstanding FOIA or Privacy Act requests If so, materials should be retained in accordance with the information that the Agency must maintain that is of foreign intelligence value also should not be destroyed. . 4. YI would also point ‘out that the terms of the National Lawyers Guild settlement require that all agencies of the Federal Government, including the CIA, shall not use, release or disclose, within or outside the Government, certain information relating to the National Lawyers Guild and its subunits. Accordingly, if there is CIA information derived. Guild, Agency records, files or indices must be appropriately marked so ag te permit implementation.of the settlement . not isolated but are contained in other Agency files, some means o£ ensuring that the information is not disseminated must @ mace. 5. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. © ; oh. cc: C/ALD/OGC wees
13-00000 9 February 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR: OGC/Litigation S7EV& CT-N FROM: Review Team SUBJECT: - Files Scheduled For Destruction 1: On. 7 February 1994, this office was given direction by Mr. Archibald, Legal Advisor for the Office of Security, to deal directly. with your office in reference to the attached. ., 2.. If .you have any. questions about the attached, please feel free to call’on (440615) Your prompt assistance in this Matter is. greatly appreciated. 3. Thank you. for your. coordination ‘and cooperation in. assisting. the Records Control. Schedule Analysts;| | (0615) and _|40616) | aeCEEnnaic Information Review Team
13-00000 _ MEMORANDUM FOR: {ty "9 December i993 ULLTICeE UL securtty, Legal Advisor FROM: | | SS niormation Review Team SUBJECT: HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files of DO/IMS, on (47411) in reference to the H curity Support Files/SR POINTER Files. I asked if his office had any problems with our office destroying tnéseé files as they were within our guidelines for destruction. He | responded by saying that they had retired their files in ool and ave to look into it further. On 8 December 1993, alled to say that his office, DO/IMS, had no probie -with is-destroying our support files to their HT. LINGUAL project as — On 7 December 1993, this office coordinated with|__—/P Ee . they destroyed their files in the late 1980's The few files they retired in 1991 were on the Administrative and Policy issues of.HT LINGUAL. 2. Since the DO no longer has a need for the information in these files (list is attached) and has essentially approved ‘their destruction, we have supplied to you copies of our own Security Records Control Schedule which verifies that these files meet destruction criteria. As you can see though, by the comment on the SR POINTER Files, we need to be sure there is no litigation open before we destroy. 3. In light of paragraph 2, our office now awaits OGC approval. Your coordination with OGC in this effort is greatly appreciated. Please note, destruction of these files include the SR POINTER name index which is currently utilized by this office for the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) - cases... Destruction of this index will aid in decreasing unnecessary review and research on part of FOIA and PA. - 4.  .Thank yo of any assistance_to ow please call either lon (40268), fo & gees) or n 06157 5. ee Information Review Team Distribution:__. ' Original - cc ; ~- cL BY 2039256 DECL OADR DRV FM SEC 13-87 SECRET RY Me ah ae am REY Se ae BREE EMU OER AER RT TL ITETTD COC ONRINNN tt tng Gtr mint ene ree Pen a a IO OO IN AE ILEAAS ETT EDISTO DIST CINTA P OD NPT TT ATT EIT EPI II TET a EP TET CLT ONE
13-00000 FILS EMENT PICK BESPOVET ON rataut Trane, ACS 3/-63 ved by External EMPORARY . Destroy when 6 months old. g Files.  Keports,. Duplicate EMPORARY. Destroy 5 years after by Security Duty - utoff. Cut off at end of each Rd als who contact the alendar year, hold in current files ederal Register, area for 2 years, transfer to AARC for TA=5l, NotL€: stems of | Records, 3 years, then destroy. ear iy rts, guard post — TEMPORARY . Destroy when superseded obsolete, or no longer needed. equests for telephone TEMPORARY « Destroy 3 years after . cutoff. Cut of f when backstop. arrangement is terminated, hold in eurrent files area for 3 years, then destroy. dorrespondence and reports on TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after Bities in connection with ° cutoff. Cut off at termination of project, hold in current files area for 1 year, transfer to AARC for 2 years, then destroy... CLASSIS ECATION tat) SECRET a a / 35
13-00000 KCS e fb SCHRDULE NEW . i j , 1. has earap ; - 3/~ AS fiw Ons tree FILES LDENTIF ICATION VOLUME DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS , Record copies of reports pertaining to ‘Temporary. Hold in current file the SRPOINTER:Project.. (Discontinued). . area until litigation concluded then destroy. #-
13-00000 Security Support Files. for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files Mail Intercept Program 99358 PROJECT CHAPERON OS-PROJECT POINTER ae PROJECT SETTER SFN 159144 ne PROJECT SETTER - SRINDIAN SFN 507356 . PROJECT SRINDIAN ~SR POINTER/REDSKIN SR POINTER PROJECT SR POINTER PROJECT SR POINTER Cuban Watch List SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL Material Duplicated from CI Staff. . Report JAN 29 75 Draft Memorandum on Background -of SR POINTER Prepared 23DEC74 OS Personnel Directly and Indirectly Involved with SR POINTER . WESTPOINTER SFN 583870 PROJECT WESTPOINTER SSD Mail Cover U.S. Post.Office Liaison File with no name related to Mail os SR POINTER INDEX -~ VOL SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL nr VOL SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL , VOL Record of BANJOES Received VOL PROJECT HT LINGUAL Clearance #90079 29NOV56~-29NOV63 VOL SR POINTER General Admin and Policy April 63 VOL Original SR POINTER Documents VOL Documents Reviewed by OGC VOL SR POINTER SFN 119144 “Informan ANJO. VOL PROJECT SR POINTER Admin 11JUNS2-S5FEB58 #77826 VOL 10 HT LINGUAL Statistics SFN 119144: VOL 11 SR POINTER GENERAL SFN 93466 VOL 12 PROJECT Outline and Cronology #77826 VOL 13 Record of BANJOES Received (VOL 6) VOL 14 SR POINTER Statistics JAN68-MAR70 VOL 15 SR POINTER VOL 16 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 18JAN62- 29MAR63 : ; . VOL 17 SR POINTER 13MAR70 #90079 VOL 18 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Ploicy 27JUL54- ' LODECE1 | - VOL 19 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 1FEB56-2SEP58 Memos to CI Staff VOL 20 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 9SEP58-15AUG60 Memos to CI Staff wWOWH WD
13-00000 Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files: '~ “VOL 21 PROJECT HT LINGUAL Staff VOL 22 PROJECT HT LINGUAL Staff VOL 23 PROJECT SR POINTER BANJO File 2JUL53-27DEC5? | VOL 24 PROJECT SR POINTER BANJO File 8JAN58-22DEC58 VOL 25 PROJECT SR POINTER - BANJO File 7JAN59-22DEC60 — VOL 26 PROJECT SR POINTER BANJO File 3JAN61-27DEC61 VOL 27 PROJECT SR POINTER BANJO File 23JAN63-2MAR64 VOL 28 PROJECT HT LINGUAL _ VOL 29 PROJECT. HT LINGUAL VOL 30 PROJECT HT LINGUAL ‘VOL 31 FANFOLD Coding Syst VOL 32 Watch List JAN66 - VOL 33 #90079 DC Survey VOL 34 #94866 Radio Moscow VOL 35 SEN 77826 PROJECT S Relations With 490079 26AUG60-6JUN62 Memos to ‘CI #90079 25gUN62-25MAR64 Memos to CI Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special. Informant BANJO SEN 119144 Special Informant: BANJO SFN 119144 Special Informant BANJO SEN 119144 Special SFN 119144 BANJO 25MAR64-23DEC64 SFN 119144 BANJO 4JAN66-29MAR67 SFN 119144 BANJO 30MAR67 em #90079 R POINTER Post Office Department; VOL 36 PROJECT DAYLIGHT SEN 243550 VOL 37 Review of HT LINGUAL Project Outline 10AUG59 - VOL 38 POINTER
13-00000 “FORTIN Baoraatten 7 HE LINGUAL- ADO. project. . Opening U, Sy. “@itizen' ‘3 mail going © Dobos other ‘countries (mostly Soviet. Union): & mail. ‘incoming. “ .. °) €xrom: other countries: (1950's). Most mail was opened. in NYS ae ., Actual opefiing & monitoring. of mail assigned. to. Qs. with into. “turned : over: to. the: POs. . mo woe Be R: ‘POINTER 08 3 name, for. ar ‘LINGUAL: pe Sete mail an _ San. a Fransico’ (also. known vas MK BAKO Actual’ tetters, (copies) ) intercepted. _  BROUJEC? SETTERS, Mail opened, in New Orleans, targeting South’ America.) ° 8 ; Ce oo “Project was. exposed in Rockefeliar Commission report. Project. names - release with - SEK | Anfo, * mo
13-00000 oof 7 CONFIDENTIAL or 06 December 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR: y . Services Team Leader FROM: __|/ Services Tean | - SUBJECT: : Transfer of POINTER and related files REFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993 from (Léonard” Kaplan) (C/IRT) fl (OGC) a Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, fro >(OGC) to 1. On 30 November 1993, Investigations and Services Branch -(I&SB) received a copy of an Office of General Counsel (0OGC) memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, wherein advised that it would be prudent for IéSB t below list of files to. the Information Review Team (IRT). 2.. In accordance with this memorandum, I&SB (3804) | (Stafford) transferred the below list of files, on 06 December 1993, to P(C/IRT) via (G20. Stafford) . ds = 3. Therefore, as of 06 December 1993, I&SB considers itself absolved of the responsibility as custodian of the files. Conversely, as of 06 December, IRT assumes the responsibility as custodian of the files. FILES TRANSFERRED FROM OS/I&SB TO OS/IRT: 1. HT LINGUAL (BANJO) ......ccecececcccsnccsece 0119144 2. WESTPOINTER eee eco reve eeeessesseseee O583870 3. SR POINTER wwuaesecnvees No case number visible 4. (PILE 22.2... 2 eee. No case number visible 5. ( PROJECT INDIAN ........-2-00ee00- No case: number visible Continued on next page) vs . WARNING NOTICE CL BY 07011407 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES DECL OADR OR METHODS INVOLVED DERV FRM COV 1- 82 CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 : @ on a ae CONFIDENTIAL (Continued) . HT LINGUAL ..scccvcccsccccccvccccscccccesses e V090079 ° SR POINTER/OS PERSONNEL ......No case number visible 8. HT LINGUAL .cccseccsccccces oe cececes oor ceeee - 0080079 9. PROJECT HT LINGUAL wee cece ces eseeec cece es 0090079 10. HT LINGUAL ...... econ eeeceneees co eeeeesecsese 00930079 11. SR POINTER ...-cscc2ce0 “pe cccccccces secs eseces 0077826 12. SR POINTER -....2.cccccc0 eevescecees ceeccesece 0093466 13. SR POINTER (BANJO) ......20e>2 eee eee ee eeeneee - -0119144 14. SR POINTER (BANJO) .....cccccccccsceccessceees0lLl9I144 15. WATCH LIST coccccocsseccses NO Case number visible 16. HT LINGUAL 2... cc ccc ccc eves ccccccsnccancecece 0119144 17. DC SURVEY ..cccaccccccccccccceccccccevcesse 0090079 18. PROJECT DAYLIGHT ....ccevcccccssccseccsccece - -0243550 19. SR POINTER (CUBAN WATCHLIST) .No case number visible 20. HT LINGUAL (BANJO) .....2-ce0. eee eee ncecne .«-+0119144 21. HT LINGUAL ..........2.......NO case number visible 22. SR POINTER (BANJO) eee rere nreevecccrevce «eee 20119144 23. RADIO AMATEURS IN USSR ...... No case number visible 24. FANFOLD CODING SYSTEM....... cnens ceeeccccsee 0090079 25. SR POINTER (MAPS) ...... 7eee--NO case number visible 26. RADIO MOSCOW ....cccccccccccccsene eoeecee 22. - 0094866 27.. PROJECT CHAPERON .....ccccecce eee een eeesaesene 0099358 28. SR POINTER ..... cee ene nee ccnee No case number visible 29. MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM........ No case number visible 30. SR POINTER seeeeccees coe ewevceseceocesesceeee 0090079 31. PROJECT OUTLINE CHRONO/SR POINTER .........0. 0077826 32. | = fn ww ee cence cc ec ccccscseces ee22-0156003 33. LIAISON | ecceeeee NO Case number visible 34. SSD MAIL COVER .....ccccccece -No case number visible 35. PROJECT SETTER ....cccccccccsccccceseces eee e 0159144 36. SR POINTER/REDSKIN ....-.cececce No case number visible 37. SR POINTER .....cccccccsccece -No case number visible 38. OS PROJECT POINTER ...........No case number visible 39. RECORD OF BANJOES ........... -No case number visible 40. SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL ........No case number visible 41. SR POINTER ....... secscce --...NoO case number visible 42. HT LINGUAL ......ccccccecccvcns No case number visible 43. SR POINTER ....cce. ee eee eee reer evevves a eee eee 0030079 44. ORIGINAL SR POINTER .......... No case number visible 45. SR POINTER/BANJO ....... eae cece eww wate enccce 0119144 46. SR POINTER/BANJO ........ eee eee so ees ee seeeeee 0119144 47. SR POINTER/BANJO ........ eee eee tees ea es eseeee 0119144 48. HT LINGUAL ...... tes ecesseesece weecenseseee 20119144 49. SR POINTER .....c.ccccccccccce No case number visible (Continued) CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 50. 52. D4. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. a CONFIDENTIAL PROJECT HT LINGUAL ......cccccccccccccccccees PROJECT SR POINTER ...cccscecscscccscesssecsseses SR POINTER eee e meee reer eee rer seeseeresseces SR POINTER ....... eee eecece eeeee cece ee eeeeees SR POINTER .....eeeeeeee +«ee.-NO Case number BANJO ..occccescscceccerceeeeeNO Case number weve ccc ece No case number sae eeees »~No case. number STOLEN AGENCY GREDENTIAL......No case number SR POINTER occ ee ne aee co eenwecone wee ec ececcece CONFIDENTIAL visible visible visible visible visible 0090079
UNCLASSIFIED [J INTERNAL [x] conrmenruat. — [[_] secrer a "ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET a SUBJECT: | Sia @o starron REMOVAL | OF SRPOINTER. PILES FROM [8804 STAFFORD 10 e oO C/IRT __ | | COMMENTS. {Humber each comment to show from whom to whom. : _ Draw a tne acroes column alter sesh comment) : ; . 4 hes toe afd at te SR rosie. “glee Gna & ph ywp 4 ATL Wie At hs, 3 nek pus 40 03 tht ® cont Ce Bes samt, 20 He Foi Ay) eo te Aika rh yk ne dis protien Jy tee G5. ben ea sebane y Aone ws ¥] words tas. ane to Mow 7”. Cobh mt ore Ande te be 14.Please call when signed. Thank you. FORM 610 USE PREVIOUS NEED INTERNAL . UNCLASSIFIED me mesos [] Sacer [x] co meat, [_] PATIRNAL to |
13-00000 | a a | Mg. CONFIDENTIAL 23 November 1993 Een ese) to (620 | Stafford /(IRT) . mo MEMORANDUM FOR: aa os: Legal Advisor oe 6N20 Stafford eh SO _ ” “GRY6E, Information Review Team Office. of Security . . _ SUBJECT: oe a Removal of SRPOINTER Files eon (3504) | 1. Per a telephonic. conversation with | Joe the OS/Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB), this memo. ~* will formally request.a transfer/relocation of the noted ~ SREOINTER files to 08/Information Review Team (IRT) . 2, -IgSB° is currently holding the SRPOINTER . files: as ; formerly an I&SB Security Officer, served as. Tne Us Yerer s for his historical perspectives of the files. as since retired and it has. been_ informally agreed that IRT will serve as the focal point | holder of the files. 3. A formal ‘transfer will serve to alleviate IéSB‘'s role as an "intermediary" in the occasional to frequent use of the SRPOINTER files for IRT's formal responses to Freedom | ‘of Information and Privacy Act. requests. Additionally, as -IRT serves as.the focal point for other public and Agency | requests, at-is necessary to reference these. files. 4, Your concurrence is ‘required per C/I&SB -instructions ‘for a formal move of the SRPOINTER | files from | Gs08 Stafford /to ( G20 0 Stafford: a Gk we A . Concurrence: Tl... - “WARNING NOTICE CL By 21291129 7 INTELLIGENCE SOURCES - . . DECL OADR “OR METHODS INVOLVED = | DERV FRM COV 1-82 CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000 ro ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL |. USE ONLY "ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT (Optional Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board FROM J. Barry Harrelson: NO. ; taf CSI 97-210 Historical Review Group/CSI DATE (2E20 IPB 9 May 1997 TO (Officer designation, + and building) COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a fine across column after each comment.) Fs Va 1. John Pereira, C/HRG (2E20 IPB / fft NS Ss I (1812 Stafford / 5. J. Barry Harrelson CSIHRG._ (2E20 IPB) o ~ ad Smal S ra U a FORM 619 (EF) USE ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL 4-92 EDITIONS USE ONLY
13-00000 to ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY CSI 97-210 9 May 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Branch Office of Personnel Security VIA: Chief, Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence FROM: J. Barry Harrelson Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board REFERENCE: A. Memo for C/IMB, dtd 27 Feb. 97, . Same Subject B. Memo for DA/DO IROs (CSI 97-062), dtd 31 Jan 97 The following actions need to be taken to complete the Agency's response to the JFK Board's Request. for Additional n tion and Records A-1 ald Pre-Assassination iles) : * a. Response to Request: CIA has to provide an official response that will become a part of the public record. The response should be a releasable version of your memorandum of 27 February 1997; according to the classification markings, most of the text is unclassified. I recommend that you send me an annotated copy indicating what can be released. I will prepare the response and coordinate it with you. Also please review the attachments to the memorandum for possible release. The JFK Board may consider documentation of the destruction of potentially relevant files as assassination records. HRG will handle any additional coordination (OGC, DO, etc.) required. b. ansfe f Oswald's ile (#0351164): The original Office of Security subject file on Oswald currently held by the Office of Personnel Security should be transferred to the Historical Review Group. The file will be incorporated into the Agency’s JFK Assassination Collection and reviewed for release under the JFK Act of 1992. Most documents in this file will probably be duplicates of documents in the HSCA sequestered matexial held by HRG, however, under the JFK law all “Oswald” file? ate considered assassination records. The ARRB staff has asked for access to the file when practical. ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 o . ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board ~eCcr Defectors File (#0341008): The ARRB staff has requested acceSs*to the parts of the Defector File that contain the Oswald documents, items a-f, listed in your 27 February memorandum. (We were unable to locate documents “e” and *f* in the HSCA sequestered collection.) Assassination- and Oswald~-related documents in this file will most likely be declared assassination records. HRG will handle any third Agency coordination required. Please let me know when it will be possible to give the ARRB staff access to the files. The access is considered for back- ground purposes only, and any notes taken will be reviewed by your staff and HRG. If a file is considered sensitive, access can be restricted to one ARRB staff member and monitored by your staff. The review can take place either at your office or in HRG. If you any questions, please give me a call, secure 31825. ‘vy a ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 * ‘ ADMINISTRATIVE ‘- INTERNAL USE ONLY SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board DC#/€SI/HRG/JBHarrelson:bas/x31806) (9 May 97) g:hrg/req#160S.doc Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 C/IP&CRD 1 , OGC 1 - 1 - B. Harrelson 1 - HRG File a Re 3 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000 5 June 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Review of OS Records on LHO and Defectors - FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC 1. Over the course of three half days, 29 May, 2 and 4 June, 1997 ARRB Staff member Michelle Combs reviewed the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald and a multi- volume file collection entitled “Defectors.” These were made available by in OS offices in Stafford Building? 2. At the request of OS, the undersigned was present during the review. Mrs. Combs took notes of items of interest an tickies on a number of documents. She advised hat she (Mrs. Combs) would write a memorandum o ad done and pass it to Mr. Gunn. Further, she advised that Mr. Gunn might want review the files personally. 3. stated she would keep these files segregated within her office for quick retrieval if we wanted to see them again. , Breneman
13-00000 \ J Bo +4 f 27 October 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD PROM: | | ief£, Information Management Branch Office of Personnel Security SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY. AIN: 0351164 1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center fdr the Study o£ intelligence (HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre- assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was. generated by the John F. Kennedy. Soara’s--desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this réview were forwarded to the WkG/CSI on 27 february 1997. Ze During the Informa-ion Management Branch’ s (IMB)research in response to ne above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files yas not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. a search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintainey failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing'yolume. The séarch failed to find Volume V. 3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was Thade to locate Volume V oF to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V Was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status. 4. Duxing the complete réyview of the Oswald files no ‘time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other yolumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering errer resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.
13-00000 ‘ . -,. ‘ Central Intelligence Agency 24 December 1997 Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board —. . Cee yey 600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor) «=.::. J: «.: .... oe WADN AY Washington, D.C. 20530 Pee oT) : Dear Dr. Gunn: kong Re: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File) This is a partial response to the ARRB‘s referént request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending. 1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel - Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a.general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files. 2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office’s file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the “missing” volume V may never have existed. 3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors. 4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines. If you have any questions about this response, please advise. Sincerely, J. Barry Harrelson
13-00000 22 December 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 1. Pursuant to ARRB “Resquet No. CIA-16,the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre- assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994. Question 1: Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy. Response: At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information ‘on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled “Defectors File” (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and ~ the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS. 2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826. (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.
13-00000 . Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the. opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination. Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as: #0077826 Opened approximately July 1952 #0090079 Opened approximately February 1953 #0093466 Opened approximately July 1953 #0119144 Opened approximately May 1955 3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations. 4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are: a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled “U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15" b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 @ctober 1960 with attached list of American “defectors” from May 1959 to October 1960 c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
13-00000 d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961 f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red: China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic. 5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful. 6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one~half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical , index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name. 7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the’ United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows: * a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959 b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled “Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship”
13-00000 Leaves Soviet ‘Home’” s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962. 8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent. volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President. Kennedy. t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald , u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswaid) v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald) w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963 x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963 y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald). Question 4: To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files. Response: It is believed that OS holdings on ,.Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to RusSia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of
13-00000 documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald. 9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre- assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information. 10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or. prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the ae counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security. 11. A representataive of the Office of Personnel Security /Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.
13-00000 *, 16 September 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk. Executive Director, ARRB FROM: J. Barry Harrelson JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM SUBJECT: CIA-16, Oswald Pre-Assassination Files 1. This is further to my letter of 24 December 1997 in response to referent request. 2. That letter, was a partial response which provided the Office of Personnel Security’s information. The Directorate of Operations’ (DO) response was still pending. The DO response was provided on 2 September 1998 and it is attached. 3. Please note that both responses are contained in the Agency's Compliance Declaration dated 2 September 1998 at Attachment V(2). 4. This completes the Agency’s action on CIA-16. If you have any questions about this matter, please advise. Sincerely, Encl. A/S
13-00000 DO Response to Board Request CIA ~- 16 Oswald Pre-Assassination Files The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The | document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201. Prior. td establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201. . Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of matérial which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL itents related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination. &