JFK Assassination System Date. 7/7/2015 - Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY:  SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10155 RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-60 Document Information ORIGINATOR: SSCIA FROM: TO: TITLE : DATE: 07/00/1975 PAGES: 39 SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES GRAY, GORDON SSCSGO, HEARINGS ORGANIZED CRIME LANSDALE, EDWARD G. DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 03/21/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 437 v9.4 1 Docld: 324235435 Page 1
Date : 08/07/95 Page : 1 — JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10155 RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-60 ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS 07/00/75 39 SSCSGO, HEARINGS LANSDALE, EDWARD G. GRAY, GORDON ORGANIZED CRIME ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99- OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : CCBOX 437 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Docld: 324235435 Page 2?
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MEMORANDUM FOR DESTGHEES Assassination Hearings ' Annexed are the following which relate to this week's hearin (This material should be treated with extreme sensitivity.) (1) Schedule of Full Committee Witnesses;* (2) Draft of Summary Chronology end issues/questions concerning General Lansdale (a witness for July 8) ;# (3) The sane for Gordon Gray (a witness for July 9); and (4) Summary Chronology of the actions taken in connection with Castro. The Senators will be receiving similar material for all this week's witnesses. Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr. \ Curtis Smothers * We will be taking, in addition, some proof from middle level personnel related to the Trujillo case. This will be swimarizeéd in writing for the Committee. Copies to William G. Miller avid Aaron “illiaem Bader Docld:32742935543 Page 4
July 7, 1975. HAPECTED SCHEDULE OF MEBTINGS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCER ACTIVITIES FOR THE WEEK OF JULY 7 - 11,-1975 S-ho7 July 8 10:00 a.m. {Roswell GILPATRIC 2:00 p.m. . ( General E. G. LANSDALE S-LOT July 9 10:00 a.m. Walt ROSTOW 2:00 p.m. General Mexwell TAYLOR ' Gordon GRAY $-128 July 10 10:00 a.m, ‘Thomas PARROTT 2:00 p.m Dean RUSK , Richard GOODWIN SLOT July 11 © 8:30 a.m. '“Williem HARVEY 2:00 p.m. Robert MC NAMARA \_ McGeorge BUNDY i This schedule is subject to change on very short notice This is NOT for public announcement Docld: 324235435 Page 5
TO: Fritz O Schwarz and Curt Snothers . FROM: Joseph E. Digenova DATTE: July 6, 1975 SUBJECT: Brig. Gen. Edwatd G. Lansdale Summary Chronology Biographical Background 1941 - U.S. Air Force 1945 1945-1963 Became regular officer in the Air Force (ultimately retired as Major General) Eisenhower Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Administra- ‘(Secretary Thomas Gates) tion { 1960-1961 In Vietnam doing a survey for the Secretary of Defense. 1961 Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations (Secretary Robert McNamara) 1965 Special Assistant to the United States Ambassador to South Vietnam (Lodge) Chronology of Events 1960 November 3 Lansdale present at Special Group meeting when Merchant prompted discussion of "taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara.'' (SG Minutes) Cabell said that kind of program not practical and group decides not to adopt sucha plan. 1961 , , Oct 6 SGA told by Parrott of 2 "other contingency plans in connection with possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene..." (Minutes of SGA). Lansdale memo discusses major sabotage action. Indica- tes that present means NOT likely to cause overthrow of Cuban regime. November 3 QUESTIONS AND ISSUES Yet CIA had already made contact with the Mafia. Was Cabell not informed or was he being dis- ingenuous? Before the Rockefeller Commission Lansdale denies that he was in- volved in sabotage and said that he and JFK and RFK tried to stop sabotage. Clearly not the case. Docld: 32423543 Page 6
November 31 December 1 December 8 1962 . January 18 January 20 January 24 President Kennedy in memo to Special Group summarizes major decisions re Cuba Project and appoints General Lansdale as acting Chief of Operattons. R. Kennedy tells SG that "Higher authority" *i.e., the President) has given priority to Cuba project and Lansdale is to develop long range plan to be reviewed by SG and submitted to higher authority for approval. ‘ Lansdale presents outline of program designed to overthrow Castro regime. Uses Cubans as nucleus. ‘Lansdale sends R. Kennedy a copy of his program review of same day and notes on an attached paper: '‘''My review does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you. I felt that you preferred informing the President privately. Lansdale memo reflecting on 1/19/62 meeting with AG. Reflects L's own view of the severity and the importance of the remarks of the AG re pushing forward vigorously with Cuba Proje-t. "We are in a combat situation -- where we have been given full command." Lansdale memo for Special Group notes it is difficult to control indigenous nationals if the movement develops its own impetus. QUESTIONS AND ISSUES What was the nature of this sensi- tive work? All plans were supposed to go to the SG-2hy not these? Was there a separate secret plan that only Lansdale, the President, and AG and a few others knew of? Was this a manner of avoiding a "reporting" requirement? Did this reflect the pressure that Helms testified to that created what he called a feeling that "anything goes?'' Yet McCone continually complained not enough being done, Why? Was there concern that these nationals if armed would assassi- nate Cuban leaders? Were they concerned that they could unleash something they could not control? Was this dangerous becasue we couldn't control what followed assassination? Docld: 32423543 Page 7
Jan. 24 Lansdale briefs the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Memo for record says ''From the outset, General Lansdale has emphasized paramilitary oeprations in connection with this project." QUESTIONS AND ISSUES These are inconsistent with his caim to Rockefeller Commission that he tried to stop sabotage operations. Docld: 32423543 Page &
January 27 January 30 February 20 March 2 March 5 Lansdale Memo to AG stating need for strong decisions and evidence of his support. Efforts of Agency so far have accomplished goal re Cuba, "and I still feel that we might uncork the touchdown play.independently of the institutional program we are spurring." (emphasis added) Lansdale memo Craig re "Operation Bounty" which establishes system of financial reward comensurate wiht position and stature of victim, for killing or delivering alive known Communists in Cuba. ;Lansdale program review. Proposed plans for September will include “an attack on the cadre of the regime including key leaders. Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police -- G2 officials...CW agents should be fully considered." Lansdale memo to SGA wiht basic plan of action notes "any inference that this plan exists couldplace the President of the United States in a most damaging position." General Taylors guidelines will be reviewed and shown to higher authority, “but in the context of information rather than a request for specific approval." Rusk notes that "once the agents are within the country they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S." Taylor guidelines for Mongoose sent to Lansdale in'draft form. "Are responsible for performance +: through normal command channels to the President." (The word President" is crossed out and "higher authority’ is put in its place.) QUESTIONS AND ISSUES Was this genuine concem for lack of control? Wa what Harvey had done a known example? (poison pills) Was what Harvey did inconsistent with control Is this another example of attempts to isolate the President on the record from the project? Docld: 32423543 Page 93
March 5 March 12 March 13 March 16 April 5 Lansdale memo to Goodwin asking for alternate tracks Rusk sees open to achieve Cuban objectives; plus list of pretexts Rusk sees as desirable in connection with any direct military inter- vention. . Lansdale tells SGA CIA urgently needs policy determination "on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface...there is a need for defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self defense, for training, for purposes shor of open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used by © designated operations officers." Lansdale memo to SGA says many agents infiltrated into Cuba "will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection...however, the CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cubg, they cannot be controlled effectively outside Cuba." Craig reports to SGA that use’of BW/CW to incapacitate Cuban sugar workers "infeasible and it was cancelled." Taylor memo re meeting of SGA with President discussing Taylor's guidelines notes "General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines.''. Footnote says: "...group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise was given by higher authority.'' Footnote added one week later. SGA meeting. McCone impatient. Group consensus is that time has come to reexamine basic philosophy of project with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early overt intervention. oo : QUESTIONS AND ISSUES Is this part of ; "plausible deniability"” What were the guns to be used for? Were the limits" con- cerned with control of what was done with the guns, or with the timing of their deliver (CIA was setting up new contacts with Mafia in late March) Isolating the President once again? Plausible deniability If so why such a clumsy attempt? Docld: 324235435 Page 10
April 10 April 1l April 12 May 3 May 7 Harvey memo to McCone.cites need for less restrictive and less stultifying controls by SGA. Harvey considers Lansdale insistence to be given details improper. At SGA meeting McCone urges speed-up of covert action schedule. "General Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents! . than restricting them to intelligence missions." Three pages marked alternatives I, II, III, with no attribution note: "hence, our covert activities should tbe directed at the...attrition of the leadership of the government, through bribery and related means, and at all other disavowable courses of action detrimental to the local regimes." (00270-00272) Lansdale tells Taylor ‘Under revised plan for Operation Mongoose, proposal for supplying arms and equipment to these (one team in place plus 7 local groups identified) ~ will be submitted to the SG for decision, ad hoc. No proposals have been received." SGA meeting. Harvey reports onhis infiltration teams. Three are in place. Lansdale memo to SGA complains of breakdown of communi- cation with Chief of Operations. He requests that "all plans and actions with operational aspects hereafter be made known to the Chief of Operations...." If this is not done, "we invite the danger of matters falling between the chairs." EG = UESTIONS AND ISSUES ‘toe B Does MceCone's statement show pressure or lack of it? Lans- dale's comments are inconsistent with his Rockefeller testimony. Did Harvey mention the poison pills, and other attempts on the life of Castro? If he did not why would Taylor make a special report to the President on May 7 of Harvey's report? Was this an allusion to recent discovery of unknown Harvey activities? Or was it complaint that Harvey had simply not kept him informed in greater detail? Did it have to do with Harvey at all? Docld: 324235435 Page il
May 7 June 20 July 11 July 23 July 24 August 8 August 8 Taylor reports to President on Harvey's report to the Special px’ Group pointing out "the very limited progress that has been made." Harvey memo to Lansdale requesting permission from SGA for aerial resupply of infiltrated agents. , Parrott memo to a superior re air resupply operations. . "Exactly what supplies is it intended to provide?...This sort of thing gets us pretty close to the moment of truth." ‘DOD working group tells Lansdale electronic intelligence should improve and provide increases information in areas such as: "plots against prominent figures." Harvey memo to Lansdale outlining CIA participation in phase one.states reason they haven't done more in area of infiltration has been lack of decisiveness by "higher authority" on use of military force. Lansdale memo to SGA states "the major difference from phase one of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines, which kept our actions 'short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area.'" Lansdale memo to SGA concerning Harvey request for authority for major sabotage against industry and public utilities. Lansdale requested this stepped-up plan from Harvey. SUM BESTIONS AND ISSUES What limited projects? Was this an allusion to assassination? Were arms involved in the request? What is the moment of truth? Why such concern for the nature of the supplies? Where does DOD get this idea? What plots are they referring to? Was Harvey frustration put into action by disobeying orders? | Docld: 324235435 Page 12
August 10 August 13 August 14 mW rt We A , August 20 assassination of Castro. Lansdale is present. Harvey memo relating to August 10 meeting states "we will produce an outline for an alternate course B for sub- mission. Papers required from individuals for Tuesday meeting include 'Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, liquidation of leaders)'". McCone calls McNamara after receiving Lansdale memo insis- ting that it be withdrawn because no decision had been made on the subject of liquidation and Lansdale was out of order in asking CIA to consider the matter. McCone testified that McNamara agreed memo should be withdrawn. Harvey memo to McConemting he called Lansdale's office and told Frank Hand of the "stupidity" of including in the Lansdale memo as a topic to be considered "liquidation of leaders.'' CIA would not participate in preparation of such documents pertaining to liquidation and urged that Hand recommend to Lansdale that phrase be excised. Lansdale called back to say that it had been done. Harvey memo to DDP (CIA) notes that matter of assassi- nation brought up in Rusk's office by McNamara. "I took careful note from the comments...and the SGA is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." Taylor memo to SGA received by Lansdale which notes "attached papers were read and approved by higher authority today.'"' Papers were Taylor guidelines for phase two. President told SGA favors more aggressive program. Sabotage was to be employed on selective basis under guidelines. What was the extent of the dis- cussion? Were people told to present plans? Lansdale understood from August 10 meeting that plans were to be prepared. Did everyone else get this impression? Was this the first time McNamara was aware of the Lansdale memo? Had he himself made an effort to have Lansdale withdraw the memo independent of McCone's request? Why was Harvey so concerned? He had carried out full-scale: operation against Castro in April of 1962. Was it simply the fear of having something in writing? Were they expecting unwritten comments or studies on this point? Docld: 324235435 Page 13
August 30 September 6 October 4 October 1l October 26 October 30 November 21 SGA requests CIA to submit list of possible sabotage targets. "The group by reacting to this list could de- fine the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative." At SGA meeting where Lansdale was present Bundy notes re agricultural sabotage that release of chemicals must be avoided unless it could be completely covered up. Lansdale present at SGA meeting when AG questioned whether we were going down the right road or whether "more direct action" is not indicated. AG says President dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field. Lansdale recommends early approval of CIA plans for sabotaging Cuban shipping vessels. Lansdale disavows any responsibility or support for the proposed infiltration of 9 teams into Cuba. "Mr. Harvey's defense of the plan was not conclusive." All teams were to tewithheld. This is the Matahambre copper mine sabotage operation. McCone tells Lansdale President has decided to hold back Operation Mongoose during negotiations on Soviet missile crisis. No more sabotage of any form. Harvey memo says that Lansdale's statement that Operation Mongoose "had had no information on this opeation (Matahambre) since early October was patently false." ‘ony = Gtk , = eee | i 2 ; QUESTIONS AND ISSUES Was this an abdication of control? Was Lansdale kept in the dark about these operations? Numerous Harvey memos have marked as a footnote on them re Matahambre "not in Lansdale's memo."' What does this mean? This was part of an escalating debate over how much Lansdale either knew or did not know about that operation. Was Harvey cover- ing his tracks? Docld: 324235435 Page 14
May May 31 July 3 Lansdale tells Rockefeller Commission he tried to stop sabotage. Admits, however, that there were discussions in the SGA concerning the possibility of plans to assassi- nate foreign leaders. He denies, however, that any such plans were ever actually formukted. Washington Post story says Lansdale "Hinted strongly, but refused to confirm, that the orders to draw up. ‘ plans (that may have included Fidel Castro's assassina- tion) came from the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.'' Lansdale insisted however, that 'neither President Kennedy or any other Kennedy ever gave me any orders to plan the assassination of Castro." In a New York Times story Horrock reports that "yesterday General Lansdale said that in November, 1961, AG Robert F. Kennedy ordered him to prepare a secret contingency plan to depose Mr. Castro. General Lansdale confirmed that Robert Kennedy was acting on behalf of President Kennedy.'' Assassination may have been considered as one of the mans of removing Castro. He never redeived specific orders from JFK or RFK to prepare a plan to assassinate Castro. Washington Star story by O'Leary reports that Lansdale "has named Robert F. Kennedy as the Administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to work out all feasible plans for 'getting rid of' Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.'' The word assassination was never used by anyone Lansdale said, but there was no doubt that the plans envisioned this as one of the means. Lansdale relayed the orders directly to William Harvey. Lansdale gives statement to Select Committee stating that Washington Star story is a distortion of his remarks. "T can say that I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from the Attorney Genral...no order about taking action against Castro personally." a QUESTIONS AND ISSUES Docld: 324235435 Page 15
é GAMBLING SYNDICATE: UNDERWORLD CONTACTS ESTABLISHED Early September, 1960 EDWARDS contacted MAHEU, who agreed to contact the gambling syndicate under the guise of representing international business interests opposed to Castro. In early September, MAHEU met JOHN ROSELLI in Beverly Hills and told him that "high Government sources" desired his assistance. On September 14, O'CONNELL and MAHEU met ROSELLI in New York, and ROSELLI agreed to introduce MAHEU to "SAM GOLD" (SAM GIANCANA) who could arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba. $150,000 was offered for successful completion of the assination. ROSELLI declined to accept payment. GAMBLING . SYNDICATE: DULLES BRIEFED ON OPERATION Mid September, 1960 EDWARDS and BISSELL briefed DCI DULLES and GENERAL CABELL on the gambling syndicate operation. EDWARDS implied that the plan would be put into effect unless DULLES subsequently told him to stop. BISSELL left the meeting certain that DULLES knew the nature of the operation. Comments Docld: 324235435 Page 16
GAMBLING SYNDICATE: GIANCANA JOINS THE OPERATION | - Late September, 1960 During the week of September 24, MAHEU, ROSELLI, and GIANCANA met at the Fontainbleau and Kennilworth hotels in Miama. GIANCANA was to be a “contact man", ee although ROSELLI did not use GIANCANA to locate Cubans employed in the operation. ‘ -GIANCANA told MAHEU that TRAFFICANTE would serve as courrier to Cuba and make arrangements there. O'CONNELL never met GIANCANA or TRAFFICANTE, but recognized them as gangsters from a newspaper article on prominent Cosa Nostra members, and reported this fact to EDWARDS. GAMBLING SYNDICAGE: ROWAN WIRETAP October 1960(?) MAHEU informed O'CONNELL that GIANCANA believed his girlfriend, PHYLLIS MCGUIRE, was having an affair with DAN ROWAN, and that GIANCANA wanted MAHEU to bug ROWAN'S room in Los Vegas. MAHEU warned that if the tap were not installed, GIANCANA would leave Miami, disrupting the operation. O'CONNELL contacted someone at CIA, presumably EDWARDS, and received approval for having MAHEU arrange a tap (EDWARDS denies he was consulted). MAHEU passed the matter to EDWARD DUBOIS, a private investigator, who arranged for ARTHUR J. BALLETTI and J.W. HARRISON to install the tap. pene ee pee ee re ee ee Comments Docld: 324235435 Page i?
oe Comments BALLETTI and HARRISON were arrested after a maid discovered the listening device. BALLETTI called MAHEU, and ROSELLI provided MAHEU with the bail ~ money. MAHEU told EDWARDS that the FBI was in- vestigating his association with ROSELLI and . GIANCANA. EDWARDS told MAHEU that if he was formally Os approached by the FBI, he should refer the FBI to . EDWARDS. i . I EXECUTIVE ACTION: WHITE HOUSE AUTHORIZATION ! January, 1961 During luncheon meetings at the White House in January, BISSELL was requested (probably by BUNDY and ROSTOW) to establish an executive. action capacity. The program was to develop the capability to remove foreign political leaders through the clandestine service. BISSELL assumed the mandate included assassination capability. EXECUTIVE ACTION: PROGRAM ESTABLISHED A Late January, 1961 In late January, BISSELL asked HARVEY to establish an executive action capability. HARVEY understood the mandate to include assassination, but no specific leaders were targeted. HARVEY expressed doubts about the feasibility of assas- sinations to BISSELL and HELMS. The DCI was not advised of the program at this time, and it is uncertain whether he was ever advised. Docld: 324235435 Page 16
Miata On January 26, HARVEY discussed the operation with ARNOLD SILVER. The project was named ZRRIFFLE, and operated under the cover of procuring code decipher materials. Agent QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by SILVER for an operation against Lumumba, was salaried as the principle agent. On January 26, HARVEY discussed assassination techni- ques with SYD GOTTLIEB of the TSD. AMBLING SYNDICATE: ORTA OPERATION January-Fébruary, 1961 GIANCANA suggested the use of poison pills. EDWARDS and O'CONNELL discussed the pills with TREICHLER of TSD, and by February 10, the pills had been tested for their effectiveness. Shortly thereafter they were supplied to O'CONNELL, who gave them to ROSELLI. ROSELLI reported that the pills had been delivered to JUAN ORTA in Cuba. ORTA kept the pills for a few weeks, and then returned them. POISONED CIGARS DELIVERED February 13, 1961 TREICHLER notes reveal poisoned cigars delivered to unidentified person on February 13. ay ts i 8 | Dae eee Comments Docld: 324235435 Page 19
GAMBLING SYNDICATE: VERONA OPERATION a March-April, 1961 Following ORTA's failure, ROSELLI told O'CONNELL that TRAFFICANTE had approached TONY VERONA, head of a Cuban exile movement fronted by the CIA. VERONA claimed to have a contact inside Cuba who worked at a restaurant frequented by Castro. $10,000 in cash and $1,000 in communications equipment were delivered to O'CONNELL to cover operational expenses. MAHEU; ROSELLI, TRAFFICANTE, and VERONA met at the Fontainbleau Hotel in Miami, and MAHEU delivered the cash and capsules to VERONA. When the operation failed to materialize, VERONA returned the cash. AMLASH: INITIAL CONTACT March 9, 1961 JACK STEWART, of the Mexico City station of the CIA, met with AMLASH-1, a major in the Cuban army who was disaffected with Castro, in Mexico City on March 9. AMLASH-1 requested arms for use in operations against Castro. AMLASH: REQUEST -FOR AID IN DEFECTING March 28, 1961 AMLASH-1 decided to defect and requested aid from STEWART. No assistance was given because of report that Cuban police aware of AMLASH-1's defection plans. | ee ne | oa Fag! Comments Docld: 324235435 Page 270
EARLY APRIL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT | a Early April, 1961 During early April, 1961, CIA cables reveal that an unidentified Cuban working with the agency volun- teered to assassinate Castro, but was unable to enter Cuba. : , BAY OF PIGS: APRIL 16-19, 1961 GAMBLING SYNDICATE: OPERATION TERMINATED Late April, 1961 Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, EDWARDS sent word to ROSELLI through O'CONNELL that the Syndicate operation was terminated, and that even if someone succeeded in assassinating Castro, there would be no payoff. The pills were retrieved. MCCONE BRIEFING RE: ASSASSINATIONS September, 1961 Between his nomination and confirmation, MCCONE was briefed about the Cuban operations. He was apparently not told about any assassination plans, either past or ongoing, nor about Executive Action or the Gambling Syndicate operation. Hien Comments Docld: 324235435 Page 271
Comments MCCONE BECOMES DCI October, 1961 | : ke TASK FORCE W: INCEPTION October, 1961 In October, SAM HALPERN of the Caribbean Division attended a meeting with BISSELL and GHOSE ZOGBEY, Branch Chief. BISSELL stated that he had been repri- manded by RFK and JFK for not "getting rid of" the Castro regime. He ordered HALPERN and ZOGBEY to plan an operation to get rid of Castro, placing no limita- tion on the means. Shortly after the meeting, HALPERN was introduced to . GENERAL LANSDALE. HALPERN looked to LANSDALE for guidance and reported to him. EXECUTIVE ACTION: DECISION TO APPLY PROGRAM TO CASTRO ee eee een November 15, 1961 On November 15, HARVEY and BISSELL discussed apply- ing the ZRRIFLE capability against Castro. BISSELL also instructed HARVEY to take over EDWARDS' gambling syndicate operation. TASK FORCE W: HARVEY TAKES COMMAND January, 1962 HARVEY was put in charge of Task Force W in January, 1962. Docld: 324235435 Page 22
GAMBLING SYNDICATE: EDWARDS-HARVEY BRIEFING February 1962 Edwards briefed HARVEY on the gambling syndicate opera- tion in February. Details for his taking over the operation were worked out during the following month. HELMS BECOMES DDP AND BRIEFED BY BISSELL February, 1962 ' . HELMS replaced BISSELL as DDP in February. BISSELL, either himself or through HARVEY, briefed HELMS on the gambling syndicate assassination plot, telling him it had been deactivated. EXECUTIVE ACTION: AUTHORIZATION BY HELMS February 19, 1962 On February 19, HELMS issued a memorandum authorizing HARVEY to retain QJWIN and other agents he felt neces- sary for ZRRIFLE; accounting for funds was to be by general category by HARVEY's certification. Comments Docld: 324235435 Page 23
oe Ny mora Comments WIRETAP INCIDENT: FBI-CIA DISCUSSIONS February-April, 1962 Sometime after BALLETTI's arrest, MAHEU informed the Td FBI that the ROWAN wiretap involved an intelligence operation directed against Cuba. On February 7, EDWARDS told PAPICH that the CIA would object to the use of CIA personnel or information in prosecutions, and that the introduction of evidence concerning the CIA operation would be "embarrassing to the Government." On March 23, HOOVER sent a letter to MCCONE through EDWARDS characterizing the ROWAN wiretap as involving "intelligence information" and asking if the CIA ob- jected to prosecution of BALLETTI and MAHEU. EDWARDS forwarded the letter to HOUSTON, requesting him to in- form Assistant Attorney General MILLER that the ROWAN | wiretap was related to intelligence operations against Cuba. On April 16, HOUSTON requested MILLER to under- take no prosecutions for the ROWAN wiretap. HOUSTON then briefed DDCI CARTER, who said that MCCONE might be briefed in ''due time’. There is no indication © that CARTER was told about the assassination opera- tion or that MCCONE was briefed by any of the parties. GAMBLING SYNDICATE: HARVEY MEETS ROSELLI Early April, 1962 HARVEY requested EDWARDS to put him in touch with ROSELLI. ‘In early April, O'CONNELL introduced HARVEY to ROSELLI in Miami. HARVEY told ROSELLI to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with MAHEU or GIANCANA. HARVEY briefed HELMS on the result of this meeting, and thereafter kept HELMS informed of the status of the operation. Docld: 324235435 Page 24
GAMBLING SYNDICATE: MEETING IN NEW YORK April 8-9, 1962 HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSELLI met in New York on April 8-9. It is uncertain whether MAHEAU was pre- sent. . GAMBLING SYNDICATE: WASHINGTON MEETING April 14, 1962 HARVEY, O'CONNELL, and ROSELLI met in Washington on April 14. ROSELLI was apprehensive about HARVEY and asked O'CONNELL to stay with operation. GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO ROSELLI April 19-21, 1962 TREICHLER delivered four pills to O'CONNELL on April 18. HARVEY arrived in Miami with the pills on April 21. GAMBLING SYNDICATE: DELIVERY OF PILLS TO VERONA April 21, 1962 ROSELLI reestablished contact with VERONA, who claimed to have an asset in Cuba who could deposit the pills in Castro's food. ROSELLI told HARVEY that the asset in- tended to use the pills to assassinate Castro, Che Guevarra, and Raul Castro. HARVEY approved of the targets and gave ROSELLI the pills, who passed them on to his asset (Cuban no. 1). ROSELLI's assistant was an Italian-speaking Cuban named MACEO. Comments re) Il Docld: 324235435 Page 25
WIRETAP INCIDENT: REK BRIEFING Kore May 7-14, 1962 At RFK's request, on May 7, 1962, EDWARDS and HOUSTON briefed RFK on the first phase of gambling syndicate assasSination plot. EDWARDS claims he did not know the operation was continuing; HOUSTON claims EDWARDS told him the operation had terminated. RFK was told that the operation had been terminated, and RFK stated that no operations involving gangsters should be under- taken without first notifying him. EDWARDS did not notify HARVEY of this order. RFK briefed HOOVER on May 10, criticizing the use of underworld figures and stating that it would be difficult to prosecute MAHEU or GIANCANA on any charges. On May 14, EDWARDS and HARVEY met with HELMS and advised against telling MCCONE of the assassination plot. HELMS | agreed not to brief MCCONE. On May 14, EDWARDS wrote a memorandum for the file stating that HARVEY had informed him that he was dropping all plans to use ROSELLI in the future. According to HARVEY, both he and EDWARDS knew that the ROSELLI operation was continuing. On May 14, EDWARDS wrote a memorandum for the record, a copy of which was sent to RFK, summarizing the May 7 briefing of RFK. Comments Docld: 324235435 Page 27
GAMBLING SYNDICATE: 3 MAN TEAM SENT TO CUBA June, 1962 ROSELLI informed HARVEY in June that a three-man team had been dispatched to Cuba, evidently to either kill Castro themselves or to recruit others to do the job. GAMBLING SYNDICATE: O'CONNELL CUT OUT. June, 1962 $ . O'CONNELL left for an assignment to Japan in June, 1962. His participation in the Gambling Syndicate Operation ended at least by this time, and possibly in May. AMLASH: RECRUITMENT AS ASSET July-September, 1962 Meetings were held with AMLASH-1 in early August in Helsinki, in which AMLASH-1 expressed a desire to carry out operations to undermine the Castro regime, includ- ing the assassination of Castro. During the weeks of August 14-23, AMLASH-1 was met by agents in Paris and given S/W training. GAMBLING SYNDICATE: SECOND THREE-MAN TEAM SENT September 7-11, 1962 HARVEY met ROSELLI in Miami on September 7 and ll. ROSELLI reported that the pills were still in Cuba, and that VERONA was preparing to send in another three- man team assigned to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Comments 14 Docld: 324235435 Page 265
HARVEY did not notify MCCONE because he doubted that the plot would succeed. GAMBLING SYNDICATE: ROSELLI PLACED IN SAFE HOUSE. October, 1962 ROSELLI claims that the CIA put him in a "safe house" in Washington, D. C. during the Cuban missile crisis. TASK FORCB W: FITZGERALD TAKES COMMAND January, 1963 FITZGERALD replaced HARVEY as commander of Task Force W in January, 1963, under intense pressure from either RFK or JFK to "get rid of'' Castro. The Task Force for the first time considered methods of assassinating Castro. The Special Group was told of none of these plans. TASK FORCE W: EXPLODING SEASHELL January, 1963(?) FITZGERALD asked HALPERN to investigate the possibility of rigging an exotic seashell to explode and placing it in an area where Castro went skin diving. The plan was dropped as impractical. Comments 15 Docld: 324235435 Page 29
Comments TASK FORCE W: CONTAMINATED DIVING SUIT ee ' - January, 1963 : | A plan was devised to have JAMES DONOVAN, who was 7 | negotiating for the release of Bay of Pigs pri- ; soners with Castro, to present Castro with a diving suit dusted with a fungus that would produce a dis- ‘ A. . abiling skin disease and contaminated with a tubercle vs bacilli. The plan was abandoned because DONOVAN had already given Castro a diving suit. ‘ GAMBLING SYNDICATE: COLLAPSE OF OPERATION January 6-16, 1963 HARVEY met with ROSELLI and MACEO in Miami several times during the first half of January. The second three-man oe team did not embark for Cuba. ROSELLI told HARVEY that : nothing was happening and that it was doubtful that any- thing would happen in the future. GAMBLING SYNDICATE: TERMINATION OF OPERATION February 11-15, 1963 HARVEY left word for MACEO in Miami that the assassi- nation program had ended. On February 15, HARVEY met with ROSELLI in Los Angeles, where they agreed to call off the assassination plot. ROSELLI did not notify the assets that the plot had been terminated, but simply refrained from further dealing with them in any way. Docld: 324235435 Page 30
Comments PERSONAL MEETING BETWEEN HARVEY AND ROSELLI ae June, 1963 In Mid-June, HARVEY, after notifying HELMS, had a personal meeting with ROSELLI in Washington, D.C. prior to HARVEY's trip to Rome. eee RR ee HELMS BRIEFS MCCONE ON GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION August 16, 1963 ‘ On August 16, MCCONE asked HELMS about relations between the Mafia and the CIA after learning of imminent newspaper articles on the topic. HELMS sent MCCONE a copy of EDWARDS' May 14, 1962 memo- randum describing only the first phase of the operation. The cover memorandum stated "I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment.'' MCCONE did not recall hearing of the operation previously, and was told by HELMS that it "has long since been put to bed." Articles stating that GIANCANA had been used by the CIA in an intelligence operation against Cuba appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times on August 16, and the Chicago Daily News on August 20. Docld: 324235435 Page 31
an AMLASH: MEETING WITH FITZGERALD oe RS October, 1963 AMLASH-1 insisted on meeting with a senior United States official for assurances of American support. FITZGERALD and HELMS agreed that FITZGERALD should meet AMLASH in Paris and hold himself out as a per- sonal representative of RFK. HELMS decided that it was unnecessary to seek approval from RFK because he believed the operation was consistent with RFK's general policies toward Cuba. FITZGERALD met CUBELA on October 29, and promised to aid any anti-communist groups which could neutralize Castro. CUBELA requested a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights. FITZGERALD told CUBELA that the United States would not take part in an assas- sination scheme. AMLASH: DECISION TO PROVIDE RIFLES a ee November 19, 1963 A memorandum for the record by SANCHEZ dated November 19 states: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD) approved telling CUBELA he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include... high powered rifles with scopes... ." Comments 18 Docld: 324235435 Page 32
AMLASH: PREPARATION OF POISON PEN November 20, 1963 HALPERN requested GUNN to prepare a pen rigged with a syringe for injecting a deadly poison, Blackleaf 40. HALPERN believed that AMLASH could use the pen against Castro more effectively than a rifle. The SGA was not told about the operation. AMLASH: TRANSFER OF POISON PEN: November 22, 1963 FITZGERALD met with AMLASH in Paris on November 22, gave him the poison pen, and recommended that Black- leaf 40 would be an effective poison. AMLASH-1 was disappointed, and requested that weapons be deposited at a friend's farm in Cuba. AMLASH: ARMS DELIVERY March-June 1964 A cache of arms was delivered to Cuba for AMLASH on March 17-21; in the week of June’9, another cache con- taining two FAL automatic rifles was landed in Cuba. Comments 19 Docld: 324235435 Page 353
AMLASH: ARTIME CONTACT December, 1964 SANCHEZ met AMLASH-1 in Paris on December 6-7 and indicated that the United States could not provide assistance for his assassination attempt. It was contrived to put AMLASH-1 in contact with ARTIME in the hope that ARTIME would provide AMLASH-1 with a silenced weapon. On December 30, ARTIME met AMLASH in Madrid, and ARTIME agreed to furnish a silencer. ' AMLASH: WEAPON DELIVERY February 11, 1965 On February 11, the Madrid station cabled: "On 10 or 11 of February CUBELA is to receive one pistol with silencer and one Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from ARTIME's secretary. Both weapons come from U.S. and now in Madrid." A cable on February 12 reported that "ARTIME had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to CUBELA in Madrid." . AMLASH: TERMINATION June, 1965 CIA terminated all contacts with the AMLASH group because it felt that too many people knew about the AMLASH opera- tion. Comments 20 Docld: 324235435 Page 34
Comments AMLASH ARRESTED March 1, 1966 CUBELA was arrested on March 1, 1966 and tried for planning the assassination of Castro. we MEMO FROM HELMS TO RUSK REGARDING AMLASH March 7, 1966 In regponse to Havana Presna Latina news release of March 5, 1966, recounting AMLASH-1's arrest and trial, HELMS wrote RUSK on March 7 that the CIA had been in contact with AMLASH-1 from 1961-1965, but that the CIA was not involved in a plot with AMLASH-1 to assassinate Castro, and that it never encouraged AMLASH-1 to attempt such an act. LONG COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION May-June, 1966 The Committee headed by Senator LONG investigating invasions of privacy intended to call MAHEU. The Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice informed the CIA, and the CIA's General Counsel arranged to have MAHEU excused from testifying. Docld: 32423543 Page 35
ROSELLI CONTACTS EDWARDS mo Week of May 12, 1966 fad On May 12, ROSELLI flew to Washington, D. C. and met with EDWARDS. ROSELLI told EDWARDS that he had been approached by FBI agents who revealed that they knew . he was in the country under an assumed name by slipping a picture of him in his youth under his door. ROSELLI indicated that he was afraid other gangsters might take action against him if he talked to the FBI. EDWARDS believed ROSELLI wanted EDWARDS to inform the FBI of ‘ROSELLI's concerns. CIA INFORMS FBI OF ROSELLI DEVELOPMENTS May 12-18, 1966 EDWARDS advised HOWARD OSBORN, CIA Director of Security, of his May 12 meeting with ROSELLI. OSBORN informed SAM PAPICH, FBI liaison with the CIA, of the meeting, and on May 18 briefed HELMS. HELMS instructed OSBORN to work closely with the FBI and to instruct him if evidence of a ''quid pro quo" developed. OSBORN admitted to the FBI that "ROSELLI has CIA in an unusually vulnerable position and that he would have no qualms about embarras- sing CIA if it served his own interests." ROSELLI CONTACTS EDWARDS Late May, 1966 ROSELLI phoned EDWARDS and explained that the FBI was trying to blackmail him. ROSELLI contends that he did not request any assistance from HARVEY. Comments 22 Docld: 324235435 Page 36
On October 22 and 27, ROSELLI requested HARVEY to serve as his attorney, asking "why the agency could not do as much for him as it did for BOB MAHEU" in connection with the Long Committee. (HARVEY was no longer employed by the CIA). On December 8, HARVEY reported that '"ROSELLI will maintain his trust unless he is convicted and the threat of deportation arises." ‘COLBY MEMO ON ASSASSINATION August, 1969 In August, COLBY issued a memorandum to all Deputy Directors stating that "the CIA will not engage in assassinations or induce, assist or project to others that assassination be em- ployed." La Comments 24. Docld: 324235435 Page 36
i | CASTRO ASSASSINATION PLANS EARLY PLANS TO HARASS CASTRO March-July, 1960 Discussion of plans to sabotage Castro's speeches by contaminating air of radio studio with a substance resembling LSD and by impregnating Castro's cigars with a chemical to produce temporary disorientation. Plan to cause Castro's beard to fall out by placing thallium salts in his shoes progresses as far as testing the chemical on animals. GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION INITIATED August, 1960 In August, 1960, DDP BISSELL requested SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, Chief of the Office of Security, to establish contacts with gambling syndicate that was active in Cuba for the purpose of exploring capacity for assas- sinating Castro. EDWARDS told the case officer for the operation, JAMES O'CONNELL, to contact ROBERT A. MAHEU, a private investigator with syndicate con- nections. EDWARDS and BISSELL discussed various forms of poisoning with CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief of TSD. POISON CIGARS August 16, 1960 EDWARD GUNN, Office of Medical Services, receives Cigars with orders to contaminate them with lethal material. The cigars are contaminated with Botulinum Toxin by RAY TREICHLER, TSD. poo pourc ee feces Comments Docld: 324235435 Page 39
ore ; July 6, 1975 GORDON GRAY Chronolo and Issués Biogravohical Background Issues and Questions 1942-1947 «U.S. Army (Pvt. to Captain) 1949-50 Department of Army (ultimately Secretary of the Army) 1950-51 Speciel Assistant to President TRUMAN 1951 Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological Strategy’ . Board, which involved close contact with» in- telligence community 951-55 President, University of North Carolina 1955 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) 1958 Directcr, Office of Defense Mobilization 1958-61 SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER) FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC) 1961-75 Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence “Advisory Board) appointed by JFK Chronolegy of Events 1959 : ‘ “November 4 Special Group discusses Allen Dulles’ “Cuba . Gray represents President EISENHOWER at : Prope wanda Project” for use of radio trans- Special Group meetings. mitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project) would meet with high level approval" provided - it was acceptable to the President of Mexico. (SG Minutes) ; Docld: 324235435 Page 40
eh re 1960 February 17 March 9 April 28 June 30 July 1 July 21 August 12 Chronology Special Group approves evaluation of agents for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed this matter with his essociate (Eisenhower) and reported two tactical objections. (SG Minutes) CRAY tells Special Group that any covert action like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken only after overall consideration of "whether and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO." (SG Minutes) "GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on. what happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO can be kept out of the Dominican Republic.’ Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military inter- vention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes) GRAY said "the opinion had been expressed to him' that DILLON shculd be "Chief of Staff" for all Cuba activities. (SG Minutes) GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the Castro government." (SG Minutes) ~ Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI recommending delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic sccpes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The memo said: "approval for delivery of these arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM. GRAY said “his associates" would favor the development of sabotage operations in CUBA. (SG Minutes) BISSELL outlines million dollar budget for Cuban operations which was to be laid before ‘higher authorities" for decision. (SG Minutes) Issues and Questions Did such consideration involve. plotting? % Did US support TRUJILLO's opponents out ofa desire to keep CASTRO out of the Dominican Republic? General atmosphere of vehement opposition to CASTRO. Was the Special Group aware of this action? Was the President aware of the plan? Purpose of weapons? "Associate" is the euphemism for Eisen hower. , Does sabotage imply the further step of assassination? ™ assassination - Docld: 324235435 Page 41
1960 Angust 16 August 25 August (approx ) November 3 Me ViLY LUBY -3- Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison for use against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21) After tne Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for ver straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this ... It wag finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule cut ‘consideration’ of any rticular kind of activity which might con- tribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA, SG Minutes; emphasis added BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p.14) During brief discussion of CONGO developments, "GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added) GRAY, DOUGLAS, and MERCHANT take the view that events in Cuba, "have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective." GRAY suggested "using the CIA- backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt intervention." -"MERCHANT asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct | positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVAR He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and prebably brainless ... [1/t would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General CABELL coneluded this operation was highly dangerous’ and "beyond capabilities." (SG Minutes) UESOLAVILD ao5oueco alu Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or DCI Dulles aware of this? ‘Is this a circumlocutious order for assass- ination from the President? An indicationthar at the least, assassination was within the range of acceptable means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"? - Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES aware of this? Was it authorized by anyone outside the DDP? Against LUMUMBA personally? Was a simultaneous assassination of the three Cuban leaders ever planned or initiated? Note that prior to this CIA had already made the contract with the MAFIA to kill CASTRO. (i) Was Deputy DCI CABELL excluded from knowledge? (ii) Or was he misleading the Special Group? Docld: 3274235435 Page 42