176-10036-10066] JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10066 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ‘ ORIGINATOR : CIA FROM : TO: TITLE : Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion DATE : 2/18/1963 PAGES : 11 “SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION :. ‘ RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion, 2/18/1963. Box 1
ee hk ee ly A De i) SECRET DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES . . 18 February 1963 -It. . Ill. RIVAL FORCES IN LATIN AMERICAN’ SUBVERSION Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. As Mr. Martin aptly put it yesterday, . Castro! s heart is in Peiping - but his stomach is in Moscow. This. Same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected. on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus: Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two mas- ters, but choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion, -A. Castro's views on what..is good for socialism and "revolution in Latin America. are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. 1. Latin American delegates to the East Ger- man Party Congress last month told one of our reliable agents in the Communist party on their return that most ‘Latin. American Communist party representa~ tives ‘strongly supported the position of the USSR regarding the differences between SECRET
SECRET it and China... Both the Cuban and Venezuelan representatives took a "neutral position," that is, they did not support the Soviets. Last summer. a. group of dissident Brazilian Communists who had ‘split off from the regu- lar party went to Cuba to seek Castro's sup- port for their movement. According to one / they got it. Castro advised them to organize guerrilla activities and launch a revolution as quickly as possible. ‘He _ reportedly told the group that powerful revolutionary movements were being built up in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The activities of the splinter-group Com- munists has so rankled the regular party that its leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, a veteran in’the Communist movement in Latin 2. SECRET
| SECRET America, left on 7 February on a trip to Moscow, Prague, and Havana:to build a. - counter-fire against.the dissidents. Ac- cording to reliable covert source | Prestes planned to stop in Prague to arrange with the Chi- nese Communist Ambassador there to send two representatives to Peiping to make a direct complaint about support being given by Com- munist China to the splinter group. Préstes - plans to stop on his way back in Havana to discuss Cuban support for that same splinter : group. While in Moscow he reportedly will discuss the Sino-Soviet ideological differ- ences and assure the Soviets of his party's support. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to. terror and revolution... Else- where in Latin America the Communist parties of- | ficially support more moderate Soviet views but there are serious dissensions among some of the leaders and within the membership. The Cuban mis- sile crisis exacerbated these differences, -3- | SECRET
‘IV. SECRET Qo 1. The Brazilian case is the only clear split so far noted in the major Latin American “parties, but the Paraguayan Communists have just conducted a purge of some 34 members and leaders for deviationist thinking. 2. The Ecuadorean Communist Party has dis~ owned ‘two leaders who have attempted to organize guerrilla bands without party sanc- tion, “one of then, Manuel -Araujo Hidalgo, returned “in early 1962 from a trip to China where he reportedly received some support. 3. Other parties have these problems as well. There are’ many impatient leaders and more ‘followers who want to get on immediately | with revolutionary economic, social and : political reforn, In’ spite of ‘differences: over tactics and timing be~ tween various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Com- munist-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet . "conserva- tive". view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force. SECRET
SECRET Chile represents an inviting opportunity for the 1. Communists to take power legally. The present outlook. is that there is at least an even chance for election of an anti-uUs, Communist coalition government in 1964, | The Communist party, ‘legal in Chile, is a ~ small but ‘influential ‘factor in the organized opposition to President Allesandri's con- servative government. The. Communists effec- tively control the left-wing coalition of Communists, Socialists and National Democrats. Socialist Senator Salvador Allende is this _ coalition's presidential candidate in the '1964 elections. He was defeated by only a narrow margin in the 1958 election. This coalition has increased its popular sup- port since 1958 by advocating. wage increases and social reform projects vetoed by Ales- sandri .on orthodox economic grounds. “Froin the Soviet point of view other Latin Ameri- - can countries also appear to be drifting in the right direction. -5- SECRET
| SECRET -V. Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing, A a : An excellent example of this: was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 1. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level, Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese languages is to be stressed in the institute and through- out the school systen. | A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. | We have been reliably informed that posters have been Placed in some Colombian universi- ties referring to the problems. of the na- tional liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries” as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the ~7~= | SECRET tie y
Vi. SECRET ae near future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribu- tion in Latin America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para ~ el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, ‘unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute expects to enter into close contact with the principal Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963. One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions, These missions are used to further Com- munist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. A. AS can be seen on this map the USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains em- bassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists, of course, have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with -8- SECRET
SECRET Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only deven Latin American countries--Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official ties whatever with any bloc country. | Uruguay offers a good example of how the Commu- nists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor- tance the Communists attach to them. 1. We have found that Communist subversive ac- tivities in Uruguay are not now aimed at pro- moting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retain- ing the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations against Argentina, Para- guay, etc. 2, Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to pre- vent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uru- guayan government itself is anti-Communist, -9.. SECRET
~ SECRET but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan: party itself. | The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo-- some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the blec coun- tries and Cuba at any time. ~10- | SECRET
DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES SECRET; 18 February 1963 CONCLUSIONS I. I should like to conclude with a word of caution. II. oo cere vee et IIttl. ‘Some of the information I have given you is al- ready public knowledge, but I have attempted to include as much pertinent information as TI can without jeopardizing valuable assets and important operations, | | We are working with the Department of State to de- termine how much of the information available to us can be made public through some appropriate channel in order to make plain the Cuban threat to Latin America. In the case of certain informa- tion from clandestine sources, we are attempting to manipulate it to the surface without exposing our agents. We have informéd our stations of the importance this government attaches to exposing Cuban operations. I am sure, however, that you gentlemen can realize the sensitivity of informatiop which comes from penetrations of Communist parties, and the vital importance to the United States of con- tinued protection of these men, -1li- SECRET ce