157-10014-10002 JFK Assassination System Date: 1/7/2015 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY > SSCIA RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10002, RECORD SERIES: HEARINGS AGENCY FILENUMBER:  01-H-10 Document Information ORIGINATOR: SSCSGO FROM: KARAMESSINES, THOMAS TO: TITLE: DATE: 04/14/1976 . PAGES: 69 , ‘ , SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES CIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE KARAMESSINES, THOMAS DURAN, SYLVIA DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION : — Unclassified RESTRICTIONS: 1A CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 05/13/1998 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 1 v9.1 HY 50955 Docld: 3242733590 Page 1
HW 50955 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Date Page 07/31/95 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION -ssesee ssciA 157-10014-10002 HEARINGS 01-H-10 ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCSGO KARAMESSINES, THOMAS 04/14/76 69 KARAMESSINES, THOMAS FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE CIA ANGLETON, JAMES COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OSWALD, LEE, POST~RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO DURAN, SYLVIA TRANSCRIPT TOP SECRET REFERRED POSTPONED IN FULL 06/26/97 Box 1 Docld: 32423390 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 2
Report of -Proceedings Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental eh Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Wednesday, April 14, 1976 Washington, D.C (Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction) WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, 8. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003 (202) 644-6000
Yea a ARAN SUN, ‘Pestimony of: Thomas Karamessines WARD &@ PAUL ~ cs 2 6 o> g ie) € g r £ & 5 a 3 a a a z “ 2 ¢ TOP SECRET
—- ba) ~ Cc. on 6. c on) oO ih WARD & PAUL S10 Fest Street, 5.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, BD. C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 o'clock pem., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Richard &. Schweiker, presiding. Present: Senator Schweiker. (presiding) . Also Present: James Johnston, Paul Wallach and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members. \ TOP SECRET
Prone (Aree 202} ’ pinta a 3 < a € o & « Ed 410 First Street, §.£., Wathington, O.C. 20003 “ Sor TESTIMONY: OF. THOMAS -RARAMESSINES , Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record you full name and address? | Mr. Karamessines. Thomas Karamessines, 6726xKennedy Lane, Falls Church, Virginia. Mr. Johnston. And you have previously testified before the Committee, and have been furnished a copy of the rules, and are aware of your right to counsel with regard to the Committee, is that correct? - Mr. Karamessines. Yes. Mr. Johnston. Let the record show that Senator Schweiker will be here presently. But it is my understanding, Mr. Karamessines, that it ig agreeable to go ahead without the Senator present? Mr. Karamessines. Yes. Mr. Johnson. Would you state for the record your posi- tion with the Agency in the fall of 19637 Mr. Karamessines. I was Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. | Mr. Johnson. And the Director for Plans was Mr. Helms, .i8 that correct? Mr. Karamessines. Correct. Mr. Johnston. And would you describe briefly -- Mr. Karamessines. I should correct that. The Deputy Director for Plans, that is the title, Deputy Director for TOP SECRET
Se nee 36 7 ’ / WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 | 20 210 22 23 24 25 f Mr. Johnston.. your rile as Assistant to Mr. Helms? Mr. Karamessines. - It was generally to keep abreast of our operational projects, to review the daily cabl e and other va traffic €or referral to Mr. Helms, and matters of particular interest. to him, to assist him by looking after managerial problems relating to the general administration of the Directorate of Plans, and to act in his place when he was away. Mr. Johnston. for Plans? Mr. Karamessines. Mr. Johnstcn. Were there any other Assistant Directors That is correct. Mr. Karamessines. No. Mr. Johnston. Officer? Mr. Karamessines. In the Deputy Directorate for Plans? And did Mr. Helms have an Executive recall who they were at that time. Mr. Johnston. from theirs? Mr. Karamessines. Yes, he had one or two. But I don't And would you distinguish your function Yes. The Executive Officer would have had no command or line responsibility, whereas I did. Mr. Johnston. Let me go to the period before the assassination of President Kennedy. TOP SECRET 'Phat is correct. Would you state briefly ’
Z 3 « _& 6 t+] & € Ed 410 Fiest Street. S.E., Wastington, 0.C. 20003 ¥ “/And ‘to-refresh your memory, Lee Harry Oswaid visited Mexico City in- Septenber and early October of 1963, and CIA surveillance there picked up the fact of his visit to the Soviet Embassy. And I want to show you Director Message Number 74830 of 10 October 1963. Principally I am interested in the. fact that on the third page of that you are the authenticating Officer. And I will give you a chance to perruse the message. Mr. Karamessines. Actually I am the releasing officer. Mr. Johnston. You are the releasing officer? Mr. Karamessine. That is right. I don't know who some of the other people here are, because their names are not listed. The only name that has been left on here is my name as releasing officer, right? Mr. Johnston. Right. Then the originating unit is what on that message? Mr. Karamessine. WH=-3, Mexico. Mr. Johnston. What you your capacity be as reviewing officer of that message? Mr. Karamessines. To make sure that it wasn't violating - any particular policies of ours, particularly since it was dealing with a man who at least had been American, and might still be an american. And we were taking an interest in this fellow even though he wasn't an American. And normally we wouldn't do that, unless there was good reason -- as there TOP SECRET
P 2 « & & a & < B 416 First Street, S.€., Washington, D.C. 20003, Re LUNI ab VANS A a Ws . obviously was in this case, because he had been. a Marine, and had defected, officially defected to the Soviet Union, accord- ing to this measage in 1959. Mr. Johnston. We are operating with a.zerqx copy of the message. But is that a copy of your signature on the third page? . . Mr. Karamessines. Yes. Mr. Johnston. And with that is it fair to establish that you at least read the message and knew of the activity on the date you read the message? Mr. Karamessines. I read the message. And it concerns a Marine defector to the Soviet Union who apparently, accord~ ing to the incoming message to which this was a response, was trying to get in touch with some Soviets or Cubans in Mexico. That would be the extent of my interest in it at the time. And I would have ascertained that this certainly was a legitimate interest of the CIA in an Ameriéan, as an exception to the general rule. Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any operational interest that the CIA had in Oswald? Mr. Karamessines. ‘No, never at any time to my knowledge. ! Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that in the fall of 1963 the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee? Mr. Karamessines. I didn't know that. Mr. Johnston. Were you later aware of TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL 410 Fiest Street, S.E., Wasnington, B.C. 20003 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Mr. Karamessines. \ @ séen. allegations of that. I don't know whether that is true or not. Mr. Johnston. But you had no involvement in any contemplated action or operation? i. Mr. Karamessines. No, absolutely not. Mr. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable of the CIA, progarm | operations directed ggainst Cuba? 7 Mr. Karamessines. Generally, in very general terms, yes.| Mr. Johnston. And those were run by whom at the time in the fall of 1963? . , Mr. Karamessines. They had had the Bay of Pigs, the | previous year, right? Mr. Johnston. No, 1961, April and May of 1961. Mr. Karamessines. That is right, 1961. I don't know whether the Cuban activity has been -- my recollection doesn't permit me to say with assurance that the Cuban activity had been transferred back, had been transferred to the WH Division, or if it continued to function as a special staff of some kind, I don't recall. But it was one or the other. Mr. Johnston. Was Mr. Fitzgerald the Head of the Cuban Division? Mr. Karamessines. He was at one time, yes, before he became DP at one time, he was in charge, yes. Mr. Johnston. And did he have a unit called the Special Affairs Staff charged with Cuban operations? TOP SECRET yom
WARD & PAUL 410 Forst Steeet, $.€.. Wastungtan, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Raramessines.” ‘Yes, he did at. ‘one ‘point. . Mr. Johnston. who had in the fall of 1963 counterintelli responsibility for Cuban matters? Mr. Karamessines. General Cuban:-matters? Mr. Johnston. Yes. Mr. Karamessines. Counterintelligence, Seaponsdbility, in a case like that, would have been an integral part of the special Staff, with the assistance and the contribution and fae i the general. staff supervision of our Counterintelligence Staff, | | the senior Counterintelligence Staff. Mr. Johnston. And that would have been — Mr. Karamessines. Mr. Angleton's Office. Mr. Johnston. Mr. Angleton's Office. Was the Special Affairs Counterintelligence separate from the general Counterintelligence Staff? Mr. Karamessines. I would have been. How much of it they had, I don't know. Mr. Johnston. Who coordinated the Special Affairs Staff counterintelligence withe Counterintelligence Division? Mr. Karamessines. They just coordinated directly, I would imagine. I don't think we had an additional officer appointed to the former coordination function. They would have been required -- normally that would be the SOP -- to coordinate their actions with the senior Counterintelligence Staff. TOP SECRET
WARD & PAWL 19 20 21 22 410 First Street, 5.E., Watnington, O.C. 20003 23 24 " Johnston. Was it SOP for SAS ‘to inform the ‘Mr. Counterintelligence Staff of all -- Mx. Karamessines. I don't know that. I was not very close to the whole Cuban activity. It was an activity that had been given birth while I was abroad. And it had its disaster in late 1961. And I was brought back in 1962 as a DDP in March. And my guess would be that it was a conscious decision not to involve me too closely in the remnants of the other _ activity. , ! Mr. Johnston. Moving to the assassination of President Kenney and the day of the assassination, how was the matter : and the problem and.the investigation if any, of the assassina- tion handled immediately upon receiving word? Was there any task force created to handle the matter? Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall the creation of any task force. But I do remember that because the Counterintelli- gence Staft was responsible in any case for conducting our ; jiaison with the other American intelligence security agencies, especially the FBI, the Secret Service, that the Counterin- telligence Staff was designated, to my best recollection now, as the focal point for the receipt of requests for information from these other agencies, and for responding to those requests for information. And as a result of that, as far as I can now recall, all communications going out to Secret Service or FBI in response to requests for information were TOP SECRET seals eeaantannan daar maaan eure
410 Forst Street, S.£., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 WARD & PAUL le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ae 25 directly by that Stare, « or if the content warranted, they were brought up the line for review and signature by Mr. Helms or myself in his absence. Mr. Johnston. bk you refer to Counterintelligence Staff you are battering to Mr. Angleton's operation? Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I am. Mr. Johnston. What about the Cuban Counterintelligence Staff, how were they staffed in the investigation? Mr. Karamessines. You mean SAS? Mr. Johnston. | Yes. Mr. Karamessine. Which we mentioned earlier? N ss Mr. Johnston. Yes. Mr. Karamessines. I don't know if they were still in being at that time. But if they were -- I don't know the answer to your question, but my assunption would be that anything they had to contribute would have been funneled into the Counterintelligence Staff. ~ Mr. Johnston. Did you ever specifically -- do you recall asking them to make a contribution yourself? Mr. Karamessines. [? Mr. Johnston. Yes. , Mr. Karamessines. No, I do not. Mr. Johnston. Do you recall any correspondence TOP SECRET OF any And again, just. 80 that we Are clear, when! + pe anaes orgies TT rere oaepne pty ean RATE =,
WARD & PAUL 410 First Sireet, $.£., Wasningtan, D.C. 20003 Phone (Area 202) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 29 Mr. there may have been instructions from Mr. Helms, for example, to Mr. Fitzgerald. But I don't recall seeing any such information? Karamessines. No, I do not. instructions. Mr. sea correspondence in which Mr. Helms directed Mr. Angleton : to perform those functions for the Counterintelligence Staff? Mr. Karamessines. No. But Mr. Angleton certainly was i performing them, and he wouldn't have stepped in to take over the activity iff Mr. Helms hadn't made it slain that that was Johnston. Did you ever participate in meetings or i the way he wanted it handled. Mr. Mr. Chief. of the Western Hem.sphere Division. Mr. Mr. Mr. Johnston. Karamessines. Johnston. Who was Mr. J. C. King in this era? For the Deputy Directorate for Plans? Karamessines. Right. Johnston. was Jack Whitney? Mr. of the DDP. And to the best of your recollection, who | There may have been, He was at this time, I believe, the pmapernsvemagiog she hagiguab acaehpan Ag se Karamessines. Well, I know Jack Whitten as an Officer particular point, I don't remember. Mr. Johnston. Was he at that time involved with SAS? Mr. Karamessines. I don't know. Mr. Johnston. Was Mr. King? TOP SECRET But what capacity he was serving in at that omg ermrereieen wring AS \
2 > € & é a & € B - B16 Feest Steeet, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 9 10 11 been generally aware of SAS’s activities, since they ‘were ‘takin place within his geographical area, as 8 special staff. Me. Johnston. bid he have operational control of SAS? Mr. Karamessines. I- don' t believe BO. Mr. Johnston. And operational control af-¢ SAS. was -o- Mr. Karamessines. re would have been in the nads of the Director of SAS, Mr. Fitzgerald, who would have been responsible té Mr. Helms. Mr. Johnston. Directly to Mr. Helms? Mr. Karamessines. Yes. Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald respond through you to | Mr. Helms? Mr. Karamessines. Not to these matters. Mr. Johnston. We have touched before -- Mr. Wallach. Is there a reason why he didn't respond on those matters? Mr. Karamessines. I had explained before you came in, I think, that I came back here in March of 1962, after the collapse of the Cuban thing, and the changes that had taken place, and the place was in a bit of a turmoil. And my instructions were to look after the day to day business. Mr. Johnston. Off the record a minute. (Off the record discussion.) Mr. Johnston. Back on the record. , TOP SECRET
De 9 9 WARD & FAL 76490 410 Fiest Street, $.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | 19 20 24 29 that just get us into trouble, some of these ridiculous things | view of the ‘turmoil that had ‘been ‘taking place in ‘the Agency » and specifically in the DDP, that we needed more than ever to get back to norm@l operating, in other words, to bring people down off the chandgiiers..We had a change of guard, Mr. Bissell had been removed, and Mr. Dulles had been removed, - ‘and Mr. Helms had been brought in as Deputy Director for Plans. And the idea there was that we were going to get back to basic, classic intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and we were going to be done with some of these high flown ventures that had been happening prior to that time. When I came*back. my charge from Helms was, look, you : see the general running of the DDP, the day to day, normal | functioning. We have got Fitzgerald “= I think it was Fitzgerald -~ and he will be worrying about Cuban things. | He was a senior officer, don't forget. When Mr. Helms went up to the Deputy Director of the Agency, Mr. Fitzgerald | was selected to be the DDP, not I, even though I had been the Deputy to Mr. Helms. Senator Schweiker. (Now presiding) When was that that that happened? Mr. Karamessines. 1965; So that my job was to get matters back to the kind of procedures, controls and phase by phase, and step by step TOP SECRET ~ecmarermeteanatgt, Snerigmignl that ee
WARD &@ PAUL 10 Foest Street, $.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 10 li 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ai 22 24 29 functioned, I..thought ;- ry well all through the fifties, when I was serving for the most part back in Headquarters most of the time at all. - In 1959 when Mr. Bissell took over he changed a lot of things. And controle became very loosey goosey. And I think the Agency and the @landestine Service suffered quite a bit from that short but for me devastating interval in the history of it. f But what Helms tried to do was get this thing back on track. And I was supposed to help him do this. That is why he brought me back, when my tour of duty was nearly up. Senator Schweiker. You were excluded from the chain of ' command? Mr. Karamessines. It was simply made clear that this was a Special Staff whose only job would be this, and I didn't have to be all that concerned about it. That didn't mean that I couldn't know what was happening there if I wanted to know. But I had my hands absolutely full with things that I had to deal with myself. And here was a very senior fellow with a staff of his own dealing with just this special thins, which was-an outgrowth and a result, or whatever you want to call it, of the Cuban operations, which I knew nothing about. Senator Schweiker. And how did the White House coordination or liaison go with that Special Affairs Section? TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL 1é 3 f g 19 3g a € 20 g A 21 A 4 4 RR : a 23 é 4 24: e 25 _Mr. Karamessines. Not through me. va soa . Senator Schweiker. I understand that, 1 Mr. Karamessines. It would be through Fitzgerald ani Helms. who would have handled that! in the Senator Schwelker. White House? Mr. Karamessines. I don't know.. I have heard Bobby Kennedy. But I wasn't there. Mr. Johnston. Let me continue with the Special Affa.- Staff. Did they also have responsibility for the Cuban c::: groups and the operations of Cuban exiles? Mr. Karamessines. Yes, they did, that was all part o«: their ball of wax. “Senator Schweiker, Like Alpha 66, would that have we uy (¢3) 5 under them? Mr. Karamessines., Anything relating to operations directly or indigectly suppored by the CIA against the Castro. Government, landing agents, small boat infiltrations, screening fellows down in Miami, working with the Immigra:: and Nationalization, FBI, very closely. All of this was Sas with the help of the Counterintelligence Staff as required. Mr. Wallach. On the other side of the coin, what abou: the question of Cuba‘’s operations vis-a-vis the US? Was thax also out of SAS? TOP SECRET A geanenqenmen reenter peeing tin ym eee = 4 ced Sb
WARD & PAUL” 410 First Street, 5.€., Washington, O.C. 26003 10 il 12 13 18 19 | 20 21 22 the. Cuban Intelligence eeptcer ‘And we “knew that. the DCI was very active: particularly “tn canada, in sending fellows ae down into the states’ as agents through Canada. and’ ever go ‘eften SAS, through. ite: activities in Miami would plex up reflections: of: DGI- activities. and: report these of course ink Counterintelligence ‘and the FBI. Mr. Johnston. Let's go back to the investigation of the assassination. Do you recall the incident with Sylvia Dura, who was the Méxican employed by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico city? : - Mr. Karamessines. From the Cuban Consulate? Mr. Johnston. The Cuban Consolate, that is correct. Do you recall that you received information that Sy le Dura was going to be arrested by Mexican authorities? Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I have a recollection of that. I don't recall the circumstances, but that rings a bell, if that is what yo.u mean. And she was going to be arrested and questioned, is that right? Mr. Johnston. That is correct. TOP SECRET | # fh RS a 4 8 ag
a 2 « a a a & « 3 preo3 410 First Street. S.£.. Wasnington, 0... Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 Mr. .Karamessines. correctly, is that right? Mr. Johnston. That is less clear, as to your account. Mr. Karamessines. I see. . Mr. Johnston. My question is, first of all, were you ever told or do you know whether Sylvia Dura was a contact for the Agency? Mr. Karamessines. No, and I don't believe she was ever -- I have no knowledge and do not believe she was ever a con-~ tact for the Agency, for the CIA. Senator Schweiker. Let's ask the same question of Alvarado. Mr. Karamessines. He was that nut that you mentioned earlier that came in.and gave them a tall story which turned out to be false. Senator Schweiker. Was he ever an informer or source of information? ’ Mr. Karamessines. The answer is no as far as anything I ever heard from anybody. Mr. Johnston. Do you recall ordering Mr. Whitten to call off the arrest of Sylvia Dura, proposed arrest of Sylvia Dura? Mr. Karamessines. Do I recall ordering Mr. Whitney to call it off? Mr. Johnston. Yes. TOP SECRET
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 2 3 « a € fe) © ¢ 2 D.C. anon3 Veas S.E., 410 Ferst Street, Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall that. Are you Sure I ordered him to call off the arrest? Maybe somebody ‘else did. I don't recall any such thing. I don't recall i anybody ordering it. Mr. Johnston. Let me show you, then, a cable which apparently was sent out after -- by way of background, prior to this cable going out, Mexico City had cabled and said, Mexican policé havavalready arrested Dura, 80 we can't call off her arrest. Mr. Karamessines. I see. Mr. Johnston. And then this cable followed, Director of 20 November 1963. Mr. Karanessines. Yes. Mr. Johnston. Who originated that cable? Mr. Karamessines. ‘The Origin of this cable -- it looks like it came from the Mexican Branch of the WH Division. I notice that the CI Staff is on distribution. Senator Schweiker. Who was Head of the Mexican Branch? Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall at this point. Senator Schweiker. Wasn't David Phillips working down at the time? Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall. You can get that,” . f Iam sure, very easily from the Agency. I certainly can't recall who was in charge of the Mexican Branch at that time. Senator Schweiker. On the structure of operations the TOP SECRET
way that you were structured then, would the ‘Head of the Mexico City Branch have reported to whom under your procedures? { Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 Mr. Karamessines. To the Director of the Western Hemisphere Division, the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, who as J. C. King. Mr. Johnston. And he would have reported to whom? Mr. Karamessines. And he would have reported to Mr. Helms, or in his absence, to me. . Mr. Johnston. In other words, it would go to Mr. Helms unless you were acting in this capacity? Mr. Karamessines. That 4s right) he was the DDP at that \ J 3 < & a o x « 3 Mr. Johnston. Now, if operations were going on out of Mexico City against Castro, would they have fallen under the Special Affairs Section, or would they have gone up the chain of command we have just described, or would it depend? Mr. Karamessines. It could have happened either way. . Besse rape! : yee eo In other words, they cauld have been handled by the Special Q008 2 Affairs Section in close coordination with the WH Division, because it happened to be not in the States here but over in the WH Division. _ Wastinatan, ©.0. Mr. Johnston. In Director 84916 which you just lockes we at, it is a flash message which is of the highes priority, is that correct? BLO Beret teat, Mr. Karamessines. Yes, in terms of the emergency of the TOP SECRET
roscoe ee Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 ) > < a € ° a < 3 0003 S.E., Wasninaion, D.C. 2 TiO First Street, messages getting there, correct. Mr. Johnston. And it says, arrest of Sylvia Dura is an extremely serious matter which could prejudice -- using the code word which I think means United States? Mr. Karamessines. That is right. Mr. Johnston. -- freedom of action on entire question of -- another cade word which means Cuban -- | Mr. Karamessines. Right. Mr. Johnston. responsibility. Why was the arrest of Sylvia Dura such an extremely serious matter that it could prejudice the US freedom of action on the question of Cuban responsibility? Mr. Karamessines. The only thing I can surmise here -- and this is now out of context, and 15 years later, or whenever it is -- that while she was still there, and we had the lines on the phone, and sle was in here job -- and maybe we had informants, I don't know, I don't recall -- the idea was there, maybe we would learn some more about Cuban responsibility, possible Cuban responsibility, since this guy had been talking to the Consulate. Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss this matter with Mr. Helms? Mr. Karamessines. I haven't the faintest recollection. I couldn't possibly answer a question like that. Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss it with Mr. Whitten or TOP SECRET
Prone (Area 202) 544-6000 ‘ 4 > 4 a é ° x < z D.C. 20003 . Washington, SEO First Steeet, S.£ Mr. King? Mr. Karamessines. I couldn't possibly answer a question like that. That would have been one of hundreds of cables I would have seen that one day, any given day. Mr. Johnston. Let me just put to you, though, my review has not necessarily been comprehensive, but this appears to be v the only flash message sent out in the course of these events Mr. Karamessines. I would be surprised if you didn't find others, number one. And number two, even though it is a flash message, and I read it, I couldn't possibly recall with whom I might have discussed it at the time, who brought it to me for signature, and whether it was sent, just sent in, or i handed to me by my secretary, I don't recall the circumstances... But it is a very natural and very proper and quite under- standable operational message, given the great interest that we had in what this woman might be able to tip us off to if we could continue listening secretly to here conversations with others. She might call Aunt Tillie living in. Guadalajara and say, Aunt Tillie, I am going to take it on the lam here, ‘because I think we have been caought trying to skp the bill, or whatever. Now, here are the Mexicans going to arrest her. And this kind of cut the ground out from under our feet at that point. And what the message is saying in effect is, let's try to keep TOP SECRET FE Beare em entre ee ee
eh eec tens this as quiet as possible and see what we can salvage from it. We are also hopeful that we could get to talk to her or | Phune (Area 202) 544-6000 _ interrogate her or question her ourselves, or arrange for the FBI or Secret: Service to do it. Mr. Johnston. And they also put to you that this é message indicates the existence of a question at CIA of Cuban responsibility? Mr. Karamessines. There was a question at that point after the President was killed of anybody's responsibilities, starting with the Russians, because Oswald had been a defector to the Russians, and then going right away to the Cuban, because_ they were palsy walsy and even in touch with the Cub Consulate in Mexico. J 3 € a a Q < 3 These were natural suspicions at the time and we would have been derelict not to have had them. What we didn't have ~ was the kind of evidence that would have proved one or the other. q ~Mr. Johnston. And to explore the question of Cuban responsibility, who should ‘have been directed to investigate mare that? Mr. Karamessines. It was under investigation constantly. Ve aytaeegtones, That is what was being done. This message:is an indication Street. te. of that. WH was doing it, and CI Staff was interested in pursuing it. ALO Poest Mr. Johnston. But didn't it occur to you that SAS TOP SECRET
] > < a & a & « z 410 Fest Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20603 Mr.’ Karamessine from the way we worked. ; Mr. Johnston. You do. know, that .the CI ‘Staff’was. involved par Mr. Karamessines. . Yes. — Mr. Johnston. And you do know the Western Hemisphere Division was involved? Mr. Karamessines. Right. Mr. Johnston. But you only assume htat SAS was involved? Mr. Karamessines. ‘That is right. SAS's business was | an offensive role, responsibility, to send agents -- their counterintelligence intelligence was a. very limited thing , r 5 Do, designed to protect their own activities against penetration, whereas this had much wider scope. This was talking: about ’ . some fellow who had been a Marine, and had deserted and gone to the Soviet Union, all of these things. And then when he shows up in Mexico he is not within SAS's perameter, he is within WH's perameter. Mr. Johnston. Did you ever ask Mr. Helms whether SAS had gotten involved in the investigation? Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall asking such a question. Mr. Johnston. Off the record a second. ‘TOP SECRET
Z 3 C4 a s fe] = < 3 410 First Street, S.€., Washington, O.C. 20003 is Director. 84855,,23 November.1963.. And:the other one is Director 4837; 23:November. And. you.are the” releasing. officer, as oes ENN Loa ca “Schweiker: Senator. me,show:you two more 2 messages. One - Mr. Johnston.. Let ‘ for the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division on both of them. Mr. Karamessines. He probably wasn't available at- the time and they brought it into me. Yes. Mr. Johnston. And is it a fair statement that: those two | messages together ask Mexico City Station for all information on Alferiev or Kostikov -~ Mr. Karamessines. One is Alferiev, as I read it here, and the other one asks information on one Kostikov, both of whom apparently were either identified or suspected Russian intelligence officers. Mr. Johnston. Now, when you sent these two messages out, when you signed on as releasing officer, would you have expected to receive back everything Mexico City Station had on those two? Mr. Karamessines. Not I, the Division would that sent the message. Mr. Johnston. But that was what was being called for by the two mesages? Mr. Karamessines. Well, whatever the messages ask for, TOP SECRET
Mr. Johnstons ‘The message on Kostikov says: require the following infornation about: Kostikov, the names * 5 ttt x tacts not already reporte and background, his con ; y _— Headquarters." . a - Be pe ; | - And the message.on Alferiev. said: vpequest reported in coverage Alferiev as with Kostixov." Now, is it correct: that Mexico city should have interpreted this to give you everything they had not already reported on these two individuals? Mr. Karamessines. Not already reported, yes. Mr. dgohnston. AS an experienced Intelligence Officer and| as Assistant DDP, what would you’ have expected the Counter~ a Fe) < & é o « « E4 intelligence Staff to do with those contacts, with the reports coming back from Mexico City? Mr. Karamessines. With the information? Mr. Johnston. Yes. Mr. Karamessines.- It depends on what the information Mr. Johnston. The message reporting pack on this gave all contacts, known contacts that these individuals had in Mexico City. And what is the next step in your process? Mr. Karamessines. you check these names out to see 410 Forst Street, 5.6., Wasningion, D.c. 70003 whether your files give any evidence of suspicios activity. And if they don't, if they simply don't indicate any suspicious
a 2 < Co 6 o C3 < 3 410 First Steeet, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 carry on from-there and investigate. further: - ‘dndividual, .is.it routine. standard operating procedure to suspicious activity, then, you would follow.: from there," and you would pass this information on to other interested parties within the Agency or within: the Government, and you would + : by Mr. Johnston< “phat, is “the -point i am'getting to. If it.reports.back that: Alferiev. has contacts with a named check the CI file. on that: named. individual? Mr. Karamessines. Yes, unless the desk officer that receives it happens to know who that fellow is and doesn't to check. And that happens quite frequently. Mr. Johnston. And do you know anything about the responses on these two meassages? Mr. Karamessines. No, I don't recall the messages going out, and I certainly don't recall any responses. . i Mr. Johnston. Your response earlier on why we might have warned about the arrest of Sylvia Dura in terms of damaging { i i i our tap, the telephone surveillance -- Mr. Karamessines. I didn't suggest, sir, that we might be damaging our tap. What I was suggesting was that by arresting her they were taking her out of her office, her. | living quarters, and putting her under arrest. And. this would reduce and eliminate indeed our chances of hearing her further. | Mr. Johnston. I understand that. What I don't reconcile TOP SECRET acest ra a? Rica be
a > < & 6 a « < z 410 Eevst Stewet, $.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 PB sagt DT ae pst arrest of Sylvia:Dura.is an extremely serious,matter which could prejudice all freedom of action on. the entire question of Cuban responsibility." -It doesn't say. specifically the thing that. I. would sharte with. you as:.thelogical.thing: to be BARES MEM YOU BS) Boe rogical:. thing: i! concerned about, it’ seems more’ concerned ‘aboiit ‘whether we have to come to. some conclusion. we may not want to come to relating to Cuban responsibility. And. I. am puzzled by that for two reasons. Number. one, -it doesn't express the things.that, you would logically say, which is what you aid, and number two, | why are we more worried about our freedom of action as opposed | to finding out what happened? Mr. Karamessines. I can answer that very quickly, I believe. I see what you are driving at now. I can easily see a situation in which we wouldn't want the Mixican Government or any other government to know what Sylvia Dura may have to say about Oswald or the President's assassination, assuming she had anything to do, we wouldn't want anybody else to know until we had had a chance to focus on it ourselves and decide what our Government, what position our Government was going to take about it. Let me put the case this way, if I may. Let us assume that Sylvia Dura is hauled in by the Mexicans, and she says, ‘fellows, it is very simple. I know, because she was hired -- because this Mexican, ex-Marine, was actually hired by the TOP SECRET
(Soviet Gover “Service: to kill’ President ‘Kennedy. “Little Mexican counterintelligence police guy, a I have got the scoop of the century. And “he calls his: newspaper “guys in, and he says, this is the information; is reading: Soviets and Cubans planned assassination of President Kennedy. © | Now, you are sitting downtown in the White Hquse:or in the State Department, and you are wondering, where do we go next, declar war on the Soviets and the Cubans? Where do we -go? You would prefer to be ina situation where, if this woman had had a -- and.I use. the term had had, because to my a > < ry é fe} & « 2 recollection she didn't have much light to throw on.it, or any light really -~ if she had that kind of dynamite information we would have been in a much better: position, our Government, or President, and the State Department would have been in a much better position had we had a chance to focus on whatever information she had to give us. Now, here she would be giving it first to somebody else, assuming she had it, which she did 410 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 not. Mr. Johnston.. Did conversations like that actually take place. at CIA on November 22nd and 23rd? Mr. Karamessines. There were all kinds of conversations about this thing taking place, certainly. TOP SECRET ive vee pes
2 > < & a fs] & « 53 410 First Street, 5.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 a eas aes Mr. xaramessines. All I can tell you is that they must have, but if you were to ask me to recall apspecific, one, I Mr. Johnston. Iiam net asking you ‘to‘recalla specific ‘one, but whether you participated in conversations at CIA with other officials of the Agency to the effect that you have just talked about, that if the word gets out that there is Cuban or Soviet involvement in this; we need to know that first indpendently, we want to know it first independently, it would give our Government that much head start in deciding what the heck it wanted to do about it. Were there any conversations ~~ and again in a general -~ that looked at US courses of action in the event responsibility was established? Me. Karamessines. I recall no such conversations. Mr. Johnston. In the event that Soviet responsibility --1 Mr. Karamessines. I recall no such conversations, and not a party to them, to the best of my recollection. Mr. Johnston. But there was great concern that your investigation might turn up foreign involvement? Mr. Karamessines. There was no great concern that it might turn up. We weren't afraid of it. If it came.it would come. What we were hoping to do, though,. as a service to the TOP SECRET
a “a efore any foreigners had it, to get it exclusively, so that our Government could focus on what i€ any action it felt it would wish to take in the situation. As it turned out; .we never had that kind of information. a ‘ it was a moot question. Mr. Johnston.” Let-me ‘ask you two specific areag.:: my question will. be whether. they came to your: attention. you aware that the CIA received information that on. the afternoon of the assassination an unidentified passenger landed at the airport in Mexico City on a two engine aircraft, boarded a Cuban aircraft bound for Havana, bypassed customs and rode in I the cockpit of the Cuban aircraft that afternoon? a 3 < a a ie) « < z Mr. Karamessines. Was I aware of that? Mr. Johnston. Yes. Mr. Karamessines. No, at least I have no recollection of it. Somebody might have mentioned it at the time in passing. What was the significance of it? Mr. Johnston. I just wondered whether you would attribute any significance to it. Mr. Karamessines. No, none at all. The DGI had quite a lot of freedom of movement, freedom of action in Mexico in those days. Senator Schweiker. When was this, the day of the 410 Firtt Street, $.£., Washington, B.C. 20003 assassination? cet eda a0 i abe ED
2 3 < a e i)  @ < z 410 First Street, S.E., Wasningion, 0.C. 20003 the day:of the assassination? - » Mrs Karamessines;' No, not particularly. Senator Schieiker You'don't think! that there’ gome special orders that: went out to DGI as towhere. they. wee and what they were doing on the day. of the President's assassina- tion? Mr. Karamessines. First of all, I never heard of. this report. Let's start to that. And secondly, I didn't under- stand you to say that it was a DGI officer that got on the airplane, you said somebody got on the airplane and sat next to the Cuban pilot and took off, without going through customs. | Mr. Johnston. I am sorry, I did not.tell you that they held up the Cuban aircraft. . Mr. Karamessines. You see the difference now? You know the story. He gives me a couple of tidbits and then you get excited because I am not excited, see? Senator Schweiker. The Cuban aircraft was held up for 1700 hours to 2200 hours awaiting this passenger. That was the information the CIA received. And the passenger arrived on a twir cngine aircraft, bypassed customes, and went into the Cuban airlines craft and rode in the cockpit. So he was basically unidentified arriving under those circumstances. TOP SE
2 3 < Cd é fe) « < = 410 First Street, 5.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 "Karamessines./: No, that name doesn't ‘ring Johnaton. ; And went .to Mexico city, and. on, November 27th went to Havana as the only passenger on a Cuban airline flight to Havana. Mr. Karamessines. No, that name doesn't ringca bell with me. Mr. Johnston. -And that never came to your attention? Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall that. That doesn't mean it never came to my attention. ‘But what I am talling you is that I don't remember having been apprized of that particular bit of information. It may well have been brought to my attention. And we.might have done a lot about it at the | time, and we might have reached conclusions‘on it. .I just don't remember. Mr. Johnston. If that was handled by SAS would you have , been involved in it, the Lopez matter especially? Mr. Karamessines. Well, I might have been, if Mr. Helms | didn't happen to be there and they needed to report it to somebody, yes, Itmight have been. But I don't recall being involved in it.
Mr. Karamessines. . None.. Mr. Johnston. And as Mr. Helms’ Assistant. you had not Pa . bee informed? oo Mee Karamessines Mr. Johnston. Have you read the Senate: Select Committee report on Assassinations? oe Mr. Karamessines. No, I have not. Mr. Johnston. According to the information the Senate ii received, in August of 1963 Mr. Helms told Mr. McCone about le certain CIA’ plots against Castro. Were you at that meeting? 2 2 < & 4 i) “e < z 13 . Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not. 14 Mr. Johnston. Do you know of that briefing or that 15 report to Mr. McCone? 16 Mr. Karamessines. No sir, I did not. 17 Mr. Johnston. When did you first learn that the CIA had plots to assassinate Fidel Castro? Mr. Karamessines. You will find this surprising, but it is true. At about the time that a fellow named Bill Harvey retired and went out to work as a lawyer in the Midwest, or shortly thereafter, he gave an interview which was published in one of the columns. And he then mentioned the names of Roselli and some other guy. 410 First Street, $.€., Washington, D.C, 20003 Senator Schweiker. Giancana? TOP SECRET.
d 3 < a é S = « 3 410 Fiest Street, $.E., Wasmington, 0.C. 20093 ne Goeth fee sean d 7 OF some , web oy Lip ‘that it, what are.you t about around there who.weré knowledgeable and-had-lived through this a a wot 4 period ~~ and I was.then not’ in:'the’states, -I was-overseas ~~ told me that they had tried to’ do ‘something -- at the White House request, incidentally -- they had tried to do something, but it hadn't worked, and that was it. Senator Schweiker. Had you heard any talk about what role Bobby Kennedy did or didn't have in that situation? Mr. Karamessines,. Yes. What I was told -~ and this was absolutely hearsay “~~ was that Bobby Kennedy was -the one that was pushing for this, and that he was reflecting his brother's desires. Senator Schweiker. Did he use a desk over at CIA Headquarters during this period? Mr. Karamessines. Not to my knowledge -- I think I would have known if he had, but not to my knowledge. Remember, I was not in the building, I was overseas from 1959 to March 1962. So what was happening in that period I just don't know. He might have had a desk. But I never heard that. And I co didn't know of it.
WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 “I have. see at + oy be » whether’ I have ‘seen, it in’ Congressional reports or in the newspapers or in the office. , Mr. Johnston. In the fall of 1963 when you were serving as Mr. Helms’ Assistant did you ever see any documents with the erypt AMLASH on them, any reports involving AMLASH? Mr. Karamessines. I am sorry, but I simply cannot answer that question. I don't know. I may have, or I may not have. But there were thousands of crypts, and I couldn't possibly remember. And what AMLASH means right now I haven't the vaguest notion. Senator Schweiker. The answer you gave a moment ago was as to the time frame when you learned about the assassination attempts relating to a column by Bill Harvey, the Army. Mr. Karamessines. Yes. Mr. Johnston. What year was that? Mr. Karamessines. That, must have been around -- my best recollection would have been about 1964, somewhere in there, Late 1963, 1964, or maybe even 1965. Senator Schweiker... It wouldn't have been the Jack Anderson 1967 story, would it? > TOP SECRET yale . syReged Any | | |
F] 2 < a 6 o & < 3 410 Farst Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 Ry + ecifically mentione Sere a Mr. Karamessines ch, ¥ = ae aes a things I am very grateful about. Senator Schweiker. In retrospect it was best not. to havel : . known? Mr. Karamessines... I asked a fellow that used to work for me named Sam Halpern. And he chuckled and he said, look, you weren't around when it was.all happening, you were overseas. But I was these when Bissell came back from talking with Bobby Kennedy. And-he said it was a messy business. And he said, when you came back and you were made a:.DP everybody agreed that we wouldn't tell you about these things, because, he said, you are the kind of fellow that would have either left or raised holy hell about it. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware, then, of the meetings that were taking place in the fall of 1963 between CIA case o-~ficers and the high level Cuban whose code name was AMLASH, whereby he was proposing the overthrow of Castro, and solicit- ing US support for him? Senator Schweiker. I would like to qualify that a littie TOP SECRET a fe
“ Castro parently both elements were involved. Mr. Karamessines. ‘Senator Schweiker. et remember. Mr. Johnston. - Let me mention his name:off. the record. . yee Senator Schweiker. Let's go off the record a moment. {Off the record discussion.) Mr. Johnston. Back on the record. Mr. Karamessines. I had heard about him, but I wasn't WARD & PAUL running him. He was being run by the Cuban Task Force. - Senator Schweiker. That would have been. Special Affairs Section that you were talking about? Mr. Karamessines. Right. Mr. Johnston. .Were you aware that meetings were taking place in the fall of 1963? Mr. Karamessines. I would have assumed at the time that we ere in touch with somebody like that, yes. Senator Schweiker. In other words, they were going along regularly as a matter of policy? Mr. Karamessines. Yes. And I knew that we were trying 410 First Street, $.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 to put agents into Cuba, drop men by air, put them in by boat, \ | i |
. 4 Ne eet ga ou ea this was for’ intellig there was any possible hope’ f irring and. reagitatl ive sa flown to meet with ‘AMLASH, and, toassure him that, + overthrow of Castro which he, AMLASH , “included «in: the’ assassination of Castro, had full us support ,- were you aware that Fitzgerald had done that? - . Mr. Karamessines. Not at all. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that on November 22nd the case officer offered AMLASH a poison pen or some kind of - poison device? a 2 < a 6 a & < 3 Mr. Karamessines. No. I have heard of that in connec- tion with publications in the papers subsequent to the :..° inquiries of the Senate. But I did not know of anything like that, I was not kept posted on anything like that. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a Cuban policy review { to within CIA in early December 1963?- Mr. Karamessines. We had Cuban policy reviews from time 3 to time in the Agency. The one that I am most aware of is / . the one in which I urged that we get the Forty Committee to allow-us to wrap up this Cuban program, because the budget couldn't take it, and we weren't accomplishing a thing but a 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003 waste of time and effort. And-I ordered written and sanctioned
ad 2 € a a a i € 3 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 ‘of the expenses, ‘but.we were 4 ected, ta that we could get rid ‘of some | yt ¥ ‘about the middle of 519608 pDP in 1967. But I: don't have any spe policy review in Decenber 1963. Mr. Johnston. And you don't associate -- you had no knowledge of a Cuban policy review that you would associate with the Kennedy assassination? ; Mr. Karamessines. No, no recollection -- I don’t want to say no knowledge, because you could produce something that shows that I knew about such a thing. I just don't recall any such. Mr. Johnston. You were. aware of the JM Wave Station that existed? Mr. Karamessines. In Florida, absolutely. I visited once on a brief trip to Miami. Mr. Johnston. And did you know of Oswald's possible connections with the Cuban groups, that he was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba? Mr. Karamessines. No, I didn't know about that until after the assassination had taken plsce and the newspapers printed up a lot of stuff about Oswald and the Fair Play
i i. ue 2 ei y a ae Rea aN aes aye eats SUNN Bs matt that we had on oswald ESL arne Prone (Area 20: Mr. Johnston... Did. you “ever recall: any, orders being, given to the Wave Stat sopgces, to assist the investigati Karamessines. Karamessines. “go assist, in’ the investigation of it? Mre Johnston. Yes. Ss Mr. Karamessines. It wouldn't surprise me that such orders were given. But I don't recall it. It would have been | appropriate to have asked them some questions about it if they 2 3 < & a a & < F could be responsive. There may have been questions about the local Cuban community with which Oswald might have been in touch, in view of this fair business. Senator Schweiker. If they did in fact do that which flow of command would that have come from probably? Mir. Karamessines. That would come up on the Special Affairs Staff’ Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of a relationship between the CIA and US customs agents in Florida in 1963? Mr. Karmessines. 1 knew that the CIA had working relationships with Immigration and Nationalization customs, 410 Fest Street, S.E.. wastungton, D.C. 20003 ‘ the FBI, and I don't know who all eise, in Florida, in TOP.
pir irae jy mgt tp BD ot a 2 < & a [s] « < 3 410 Fiest Street, $.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 agents were detailed to CIA operational use? Mr. Karamessines. No, Senator Schweiker. Or that~ they were ‘using customs cover for the CIA agents? ‘ Mr. Karamessines. That would not: surprise me; I.didn't know it at the time, but if somebody told me that, we were using customs covers for some of our agents with customs permission, that would not have surprised me. But I don't recall knowing it at the time. We were using various covers. Senator Schweiker. I asked you about David Phillips. Did he work under your operations in any form when you were -- Mr. Karamessines. When I was DDP David Phillips was in charge of our Child operation. And he was in charge of the Chili Task Force in the DDP. Senator Schweiker. Were there any other operations besides Chile that he worked for under you? Mr. Karamessines. Well, he served in Latin America in a | } i variety of poses, and he served in the Latin American Division i i here in HNeqdquarters, the Western Hemisphere Division. But we never worked together closely. Senator Schweiker. Were tbere any Cuban responsibilities that he had that you are aware of? TOP SECRE
af 2 € a 3 fe] x « z 410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 ag inks aoe sine Mr. Johnsto Ee? else the decision to mak Commission would’ have been _Perfectly: natura | Mr. Johnston. And you have ‘talked about: But why was it? a oo oe Mr. Karamessines. The reason that it would have been the natural thing to do was because this Matter, the assassination of the President, concerned primarily the FBI, the Secret.Service and other agencies having a plain undisputed unambiguous domestic security responsibility, and the Secret Service of course; having the explicit responsibility for the protection of the President. And we were organized in the DDP so as to concentrate or focus our liaison activities with the agencies I have just mentioned in the cr Staff. So that seems a very natural place in which to vest this reponsibility. Mr. Johnston. But that left a hole from the CIA stand- point because of the SAS counterintelligence being separate from the CI Staff? Mr. Karamessines. Not necessarily. Because the CI Staff, as a senior staff, had responsibilities which transcende
2 2 < * a fe} cy < s 430 Fiest Street, $.€., Washingtan, O.C. 20003 =e oe SION aes a : 4 weiker, SAS have’ been the’more 1 logical connecting point, .because of ‘the dealings with b Cy TEE nr a ups, in view: of Oswald's.” for, Cuba’ Committee; on any of this would, have stopped dead after the first name or two. It was the cr staff that had the counterintelligence files which would support the extensive investigation which was conducted. SAS could never have done it because it didn't have the files with which to do it. It wasn't its responsi- bility. Senator Schweiker. But Jim Angleton comes in and tells us just about the same story that you are telling us, which was the compartmentation they had, and the Cuban activities per se really weren't under his province, they were over at SAS? Mr. Karamessines. Cuban activities, that is correct. In other words, the Cuban activities means the conduct of operations again Cuba largely, that is what it means. And these operations were being conducted out of SAS largely, to a smaller extent the WH Division, but largely: SAS. Angleton was right. Senator Schweiker. But it almost looks as if whoever
2 3 < a 4 a « < 2 410 Forst Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 that.’ > i ve and I don't agree with that. wou d=thesmost intimate knowledge of the very thing here: that‘ wa flash as a top secret message: "Arrest of sylvia Dura’is: extremely serious matter which could’ prejudice freedom of. action on entire question of Cuban responsibility." ° Who would know that but SAS, and why not plug SAS into it? Mr. Karamessines. But that didn't come from the CI Staff, it came from the Western Hemispher Division. Senator Schweiker. I understand. But here is the top. priority at that point in that particular connection. My only point was that since it was top priority message that the best way to give the Warren Commission the knowledge it needed to pursue in whatever way it might lead would have been to have a pipeline to SAS. But from what we can find out no such pipeline existed to the Warren’ Commission from SAS, in fact if anything, there was a closed door between the SAS and the Warren Commission. And Angleton keeps coming up with -- and I believe him -- the same kind of answers you are giving, well, I didn't know, and we didn't communicate, and you will have to talk to them. So that the one legical and TOP SECR eb at
2 2 < & & a ig € 3 410 First Street, S.E., Wasrengton, B.C. 20003 oo sO ur SN ve Ae ay Ste Te Commission. Mr. Karamessines.- The SAS, if thqt is what you are focusing on, SAS's charter, if that is what you mean, I: don't know when they were put inte. business. as SAS. :For'a.long time it was known as the Cuban Task Force W, that is ite: vAnd ‘later they were called SAS. I don't. know when they were created, or when they became one or the other. But I do know this, that their responsibility was the conduct of what you might call offensive operations against Cuba, intelligence and action operations against Cuba. And that was their charter. The President was assassinated by a fellow who has some contact with the Fair Play Committee in Miami, and he is in touch with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico, and he is a former nN Marine. I don't see how that would tie in with SAS at all, in the absence of some indication that there was a tieup. But I don't see the connection at all. And therefore I don't see why one would get concerned about SAS not having been paraded up to appear before the Warren Commission. And I will tell you this. My clear recollection is that there wasn't anything that we could provide the Warren Commission as far as we were concerned that we didn't provide, anything we were asked for, everything we could put in. Senator Schweiker. Knowledge of the assassination attempts against Castro? TOP SECRET
Ren oy a: i bag rah red at. would :have fe } vehanged matters, any,'re Senator Schweiker. Well, hypothetically it was certainly one of the most logical motivation factors to have pursued as an investigative unit.) oo: : — are cone j | Mr. Karamessines. “I suppose. . But in, any case, any information the Warren Commission asked for, or any of the othe} agencies asked for they got, and I think the. record will show ‘ 1 4 that they got in spades. - I took the Warren Commission down to the Registry of our building and explained to the Chief Justice t and to several members of the Commission how it was that we were able to report as promptly as we reported on Oswald being a 2 « a & fo] & < = in touch with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico whenever it was, September or October. And he couldn't understand how we could have gotten that report out so quickly. And I showed him how dt is done automatically with the machines, and so forth. Senator Schweiker. One of the Senators asked Director Helms when he was before the Committee why he didn't provide the Warren Commission with information-about the assassination attempts against Castro. And he said he wasn't asked. I don't quite reconcile that with what you are just telling me, althoudh I know you can only speak for yourself, obviously. But it just strikes me as peculiar that a key question like that was a matter of being asked. So that is why I think there is a 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 gap with the SAS Section here. If they are the ones that are TOP SECRET |
2 2 « & C] f] & < & 410 Forst Street, $.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 that allegedly had ‘some. tie with the pro-Castro Cubans: .better source of information than SAS? In fact-theyare the Conly ‘source.’ Angleton, said he ‘andthe FBI had, very little. knowledge was SAS and they never plugged into the Warren Commission. That is the problem that is’a pecular thing. Mr. Johnston. You were not aware of that problem at the time? Mr. Karamessines. I still don't consider it as a problem. But I was not aware of it at the time as a problem or otherwise. Any information that SAS might have had was not locked off somewhere in another building with no allowed access or anythicng like this. It was there, Angleton, I, the Director, anybody, you know, could check names <= and names were checked against their files continually. And this guy's name, the information on Fair Play for Cuba and all that business that we had, I will bet you money came from SAS's files very likely. You see what I mean? This was accessible. The only question you are raising is, why didn't somebody go to the Warren Commission -- and that somebody should have been SAS == and tell the Warren Commission, you know, we tried to kill Castrol a couple of years ago or last year, or whatever it was. Isn't that what you are asking? I can't answer that TOP SECRET rr é 2, fot f
Pi] 3 € & 4 o & « 3 430 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 “these: plots in - Senator Se Sosy a and y aid co 2 ot and not volunteering information: Mr. Katamessines. . I can't ‘answer that” I can assure you that SAS was not being kept locked up in the back room somewhere, their files were not being sequestered from the Warren Commission or anything like that, if you think you are making a point. Senator Schweiker. I see your point. . Mr. Johnston. How do you!:know their files weren't being sequestered? Mr. Karamessines. Well, I know whetnever we needed to get a run on any Cuban name or whatever, it would have been e run through:their files, our Central Registrar, WH Division, a check -=- in other words, there would be a three or four way check. And I remember one of the complaints at the time from several of the people was, well, you have got to check this from three or four different points to make sure you have covered all the bases. Mr. Johnston. Are you aware that at least one of their files had a notation on it, do not remove from that office?
2 2 < & 4 Q [4 < z 410 Fivst Street, $.€., Washington, O.C, 20003 9 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ‘because there’ are 1 saya, please don't. take them. That is not, significant to me atall. Senator Schweiker. “hat. is a routine procedure, you say? Mr. Karamessines. qt is not a routine decision. .B t to-ume it doesn’t have; any special significance. | Mr. Johnston. Ware you aware of the 1967 IG report on assassinations at the time it was. being prepared? Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not. Mr. Johnston. Were you talked to by the Inspector General? Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not, to my recollection. - Mr. Johnston. Were you informed about Mr. Helms meeting with the President on the report? Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not. Mr. Johnston. Do you know that there was such a meeting? Mr. Karamessines. No, I did not. You are talking about a meeting between Mr. Helms and the president in 1967 dealing with assassinations? Mr. Johnston. Yes. , MY. Karamessgines. The answer is no. ' i \ t i
ae Spe LEO ba 2 3 < & 6 a £ € z 410 First Street, S.E., Wasningtan, O.C. 20003 ‘was the DDP. Mr. Johnston. And§ Mr. Karamessines. Tr became the DDP: Senator Schweiker. Who was the top Assistant, to. Fitzgerald, who would have been right under Pitageraid? Mr. Karamessines. When he was ppp? Se Senator Schweiker. No, when he was in charge of the special action. Mr. Karamessines. The Cuban thing? Senator Schwelker. Yes. Mr. Karamessines. I can't remember. YOu can get it easily enough, but I just can't remember. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware in March and April of 1967 that the Inspector General's Office was conducting an investigation of assassinations? Mr. Karamessines. No,’ I was not. Mr. Johnston. And that they were talking to Mr. Fitzgerald, who was your boss? Mr. Karamessines. No, I was not. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of any information the FBI was receiving in 1967 regarding CIA assassination plots? TOP SE ais abate
Mr. Johnsto tions altogether? Mr. Karamessines Mr. Johnston Mr. Karamessines:. Senator Schweiker. they really compartmentalized that operation. - ee . Mr. Johnston. Let me just once again recap: Were you knowledgeable of the course of the CIA investigation of the Kennedy assassination? You have indicated throughout your testimony today that:'you were kept abreast of those. WARD & FAUL Mr. Karamessines. I was kept abreast of the activities that were taking place to support the investigation being conducted by the FBI and the Secret Servicn of the Kennedy Assassination. We were not conducting a separate, special investigation of the Kennedy assassination. But we were tryin i | | | g to get as much information as possible from our overseas posts that might throw any light whatever on who Oswald was and why he killed the President, and who put him up to it if somebody put it up to dt. And I was fully familiar with the fact that we were knocking ourselves out trying to get to the bottom of those questions.” 410 Forst Street, $.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 Senator Schweiker. In your recollection again, who
2 3 < a 6 i} & < 3 316 Feest Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.c. 20003 within: CIA? Mr. Karamessines. The Counterintelligence Staff,:I" believe. Everything was ~~ I don’t, want to use the word ‘focus =~: i 1, re that!Sas:: Senator Schweiker. You are saying: plugged into them to the extent -- Mr. Karamessines. . If they had anything at all to contribute, number one. And number two, the cr Staff was the senior staff and could have at any time have gone to SAS and said, we want this and that and that, check your files and give us this or that. They were the senior staff. Mr. Johnston. Were you aware in 1963 -- Mr. Karamessines. Let me say°one other thing. Mr. Angleton very properly would say, SAS had its own thing, and I didn't have much dealing with SAS. He didn't. He is sittin up here somewhere. But Mr. Angleton doesn't always know what the eight or one guys under him or doing, SAS and all these others. But then thing float up to him. And he gets a report, let's say, on Oswald, or somebody. It doesn't say, we have got this from SAS'S files. He just sees a report, it came from the files. So I can't fault Angleton for feeling as he does. Senator Schweiker. I am not faulting him. Mr. Karamessines. But. I do think that it is wrong TOP SECRET rate BTN ek
ed > « & i] o © @ 3 410 First Street, 5.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Yee tely’: business. Because it is And you do know what the Western Hemisphere Division did. But you have testified that you don’t know what SAS did. . Mr. Karanessines.. I did’ not gay that I didn't know what they did. What I did say was that I was eertain that SAS would have contributed from their files, or from agent contact in Miami, to the effort that was being made. And this would ba true of any other of the operating divisions. We might have had a reflection of some activity in Timbuktu, or in some South American or African division. Mr. Johnston. You have previously testifed that you did not know about the meeting between Mr. Fitzgerald and AMLASH. Mr. Karamessines. I did not. Mr. Johnston. And you said you did not know that on November 22nd a CIA case officer met again with AMLASH and \ showed him a poison weapon to use? Mr. Karamessines. I did not, no knowledge whatsoever. Mr. Johnston. Bo you know whether there was any investigation made connected with any relationship between
% os es Z 73 € * & CI m:) & < 3 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 Sh ¥ tse oO ee EEE ee Mr. Johnston. ‘: Do you know of any, AMLASH may have been a provocation agent?” °.. -Karamessines.: Noy: ‘note’ VI hav Sy Be z ! , ° o ty of anything likecthatt! Mr. Johnston. ° Would :it be a relevant inquiry?. Mr. Karamessines. Well, I don't know. “I didn't. all that much about AMLASH. I would have to know a 16 about AMLASH and the details of that operation to be able to respond to that question. Senator Schweiker. Going back to the structure of understanding your functional definition of flow of lines of authority, JMWAVE, -would-that have been under you, or SAS, or how would JMWAVE have tied. into this functional breakdown? Mr. Karamessines. JMWAVE was the Miami extension of activity against Cuba headquartered in our Headquarters, which took place -~ in the Cuban invasion, you know, they had a station down there, I don't know whether they called it JMWAVE at that time or gave it some other name. But there was a group down in Miami, in that area, two or three groups, probably, when they mounted the Cuban invasion in the Bay of Pigs in 1961. And there continued to be an installation, one or more installations like that, in that area down ther at one point it was called JMWAVE, and at another point it may tS
racy es ae eens ee . Senat that. you are: saying?. ou are sayen ine ‘Senator. Schwe Mabe Wed tly the that have been e that the Special Affairs Staff, was that in’ operation? Mr, Karamessines. Yes. . Senator Schweiker. So that would have been true. So the overwhelming bulk: would have come through SAS except: for om] 3 € a8 € Q « < s. coordination and some things that might have been done jointly with a concurrent knowledge kind of thing? Mr. Karamessines. You mean from JMWAVE you are talking about? Senator Schweiker. Right. The man in the picture at Mexico City, can you shed any light on who that man in the picture was? i Mr. Karamessines. That was really a problem at the time. M I don't think we ever determined, did we? Genator Schweiker. Nobody seems to know. Mr. Karamessines. And then there was a lot of fuss about a picture being provided by the Bureau -~ that was a big 410 Ferat Street, $.E., Washington, O.¢. 20003
e is no problem.on that. Mr.'-Karamessines, couldn't have ascertained w : uy .was af lly. Mr. Karamessines.’ revisn't all that: unusual, rea Senator Schweiker. But you have a listening device inside you certainly cogia-have figured out.. Mr. Karamessines. I know, but that didn't hear everything that went on everywhere. 2 > < & 6 a & « Eg Senator Behweiker. But you could have pretty well figured somehow what there was that day just in business transactions? , Mr. Karamessines. Not necessarily... Let's say it was a local agency of some kind, and he had instructions, and his instructions were, you go in and the receptionist will recognize you, you just walk right by her orshim-and walk down the hall and go in Room 407. We don't happen to have a listening device in 407, and he comes and goes and all we do is get a picture of him. We don't know who he is. Sometimes we can find out who he is by working with the locals. They will help us. Other times if he makes repeated visits, then 410 Fest Street, $.€., Washington, O.C. 20003 you have got a chance to surveil him as he leaves and see where
“Mr. Johns as 3"to.don a BAe ‘any you are aware of? i Mr. Karamessines. If I say..t don't: recall any; . fees S eye. not wish my answer to suggest that "there weren't simply means that I do not recall any. It is likely that there were, but I don't remember them. Mr. Johnston. Any time did you receive an order from c Mr. Helms or anyone else above you not to investigate a4 certain 2 3 < & é (] « < 3 area or a certain question? Mr. Karamessines. Never. Mr. Johnston. That is all. Senator Schweiker. That is all I have. Me. Johnston. He has never taken an oath. Senator Schweiker. We will do the first thing last. We appreciate your cooperation. And just for formality's: sake we would like to swear you in. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have given is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 Mr. Karamessines. I do.
t K bah Bee 2 > « & 4 6 « « $ 410 Forest Street, $.E., Washington, O.c. 70003 “put on 4 ¥ thing. Mr. Karameasines:' Okay. Mr. Madigan. a ¢ want to ask you'a few questions, Mr. Karamessines, about a couple of areas that are involved’ tangentially with the AMLASH situation, in that they take place in the sane time period, the first of which is with regard to Howard Hunt. And as you may know, the Agency had been trying to determina for sometime what Hunt's assignment was in Spain in 1965, And that is the first area that I want to ask you about. And my first queastion would be, do you yourself know what Hunt was doing when he was assigned to Spain? Mr. Karamessines. Yes. Mr. Madigan. As background I might recall for you that he was as you know a4 staff employee up until June of 1965, when he was assiqned on a4 contract basis over to Spain, until November of 1966, & 14 month period. And .you were Assistant pop, I think at the time. TOP SECRET aera ane ie 3 ne aaa
-) 3 :€ a a a. © € F 7 ALO First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 anticipat + kind. of -b ‘language and: who ‘co et along with people, ‘reasonably, pass himself off as a’ retired former Service office could write,: write and a period in time when Hunt's services weren't being, let's say, eagerly sought in other parts of the Directorate. And this seemed good solution. And he was sent to Spain for just that purpose. Mr. Madigan. And what was the purpose, to do what? Mr. Karamessines. The purpose was to establish himself, to fit into the community, and hold himself available for operational tasks as they might be given him to do at some point in time. Mr. Madigan. Who did he report to? Mr. Karamessines.’ He would report back to the offices Madigan. Did he report to someone in particular? Karamessines. Yes, he reported to the DDP and to me Madigan. The DDP, then, would be Mr. Helms? ep analogy BN oe
WARD & PAUL 410 Fiest Street, S.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 - ~2 ro) Oo roy wo nw Q np a nm nm wo wl ww] & Mr. vcnieelee During that, perted ot a 1 don’ *t know. I just don''t récall. I know others of. our people” did. But whether he aia or not I don't recall. Mr. Madigan. Were you aware that they were close friends at the time? Mc. Karamessines. If didn't know the Cubans all that well. I do know: that Hunt was very active in the invasion of the Bay of Pigs thing in 1961. And I gather ARTIME was active in that also. So he would have known ARTIME very well, and he would have known a group of several othecs very wéll. Mr. Madigan. What 43 your information or knowledge about Hunt's being in effect blocked for a position over there at f prior provlems in Montevideo? Does that ring a bell with you, that time by Weodward, who was then the Ambassador, because of | i or had you not heard of that? Mr. Karamessines. Tf recall something like that, but I don't remember the circumstances and details of it. I can't throw any Light on ite Mr. Madigan. Did he file any written reports with your i TOP SECRET
novels while he was over ‘He wrote’a couple of..them, which were § fay i checked by us at Headquarters before they were sent to the publishers. Mr. Madigan. Was that part of the reason he was sent over there?- Mr. Karamessines. Yes, that.was part of the reason he was over there. As I indicated earlier, he had a job of Nw setting. up out in the boondocks ~~ he would act as a retired Government Service fellow. who was supplementing his income by conducting an active:business: which we could prove to the “Spanish authorities if called upon to do so with a publishing firm, that he was writing novels, books. And he did indeed do that. And he wrote several books. I don't know how many he wrote while he was in Spain. He may have written one or two. , Mr. Madigan. I think three. Is that a normal practice with regard to.the Agency? Mr. Karamessines. No, it is not, because we don't have TOP SECRET WARO & FAUEL .~
Re fae ie t the profits:or whatever. from his enterprise cy, whereas in this case Hunt receive fete ewe oe . . Is there some particular reason for that? . Mr. Karamessines. No, I. don't recall what the arrange- ments were. But I think the understandingwas that if there were any royalties of any significance we would talk about how they should be split up. Mr. Madigan. The documents also indicate that he had done some writing for Allen Dulles, and that this was sort of a promise that had been made that he would be allowed to go abroad and write books. Mr. Karamessines. I am not familiar with that. Mr. Madigan. You never heard of that? Mr. Karamessines. No, I am not familiar with that.. Mr. Madigan. Was his assignment over there in the general course -- did everyone or the key people know about it, or was it some special assignment that only yourself and a few people knew? TOP SECRET WARD &@ PAUL Aw ae
ere iu reasons ’ Mr. Madigan. Did he do any work with the Mr. Karamessines. No. , We tried to keep hin away, from Mr. Madigan. WHat about the opposition, the underground? Mr. Karamessines. No, he was not instructed to go out and seek contacts, he was instructed to hole himself ready to serve as a servicing depot, a safe house, an intermediary, if we wanted him to be an intermediary, or if a station spotted certain situations in which it could not act but had to have somebody outside who could act, so that it wouldn't rub off on the station, he would be available.for that kind of task. Mr. Madigan. The over there at the | time indicates that Hunt never did any operational assignementa for him. Mr. Karamessines. That is correct. . Mr. Madigan. So these theoretical items that you listed such as providing safe house, and so on, he never did any of those? Mr. Karamessines, No sir. The occasion didn't arise where he was calied upon to do it. But he was put in place TOP SECRET WARD & FAUL
: %, that contain, the opinion that, as you L RAY Iniow, aa ‘there to write spy novels to increase the inage of the Agency. tie. Karamessines. Well, that would come from. individual who hadn't directly heard from Fitzgerald. I did. At the time of Fitzgerald's encumbacy he had studies made, and they were available at the Agency, and this was very far sighted of him. Several of us felt that we ought to do this and studied matters on the suggestion of situations and what we dd would be confronted with as a Government and as an about eight or 10 or 12, areas. And [ was practically at the top of the list. He felt pretty strongly about it, and he felt this would be one move where we would begin positioning ourselves for the eventuality. Mr. Madigan. What was the reason, then, that he was movad out of there after a year? Mr..Karamessines. I think he wanted to come home, he got tired of it and wanted to come home, if I recall TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
-) Mr. Madigan : " ask’ you, some quest matter. And that, is a fellow by the nane of Jack: a av ou were at the ‘Agency of |an gs ‘that. tl Had: We / Mr. Karamessines. None whatever. - in the White House? — Mr. Madigan. In the Motion Pictures? Mr. Karamessines. None whatever. Mr. Madigan. Do you know of any involvement between the Agency and Valenti concerning the assassination of President Kennedy? Mr. Karamessines. None whatever, no information, no knowledge “=m N . Mee Madigan. No meetings? Mr. Karamessines. No. What are they? I am curious. 18 Mr. Madigan. “hese are just a bunch of random questions 19 Ihave. I am trying to complete our record here. 20 In 1971 and 1972 periods do you have any dealings with 21 Cuban exile activities in Costa Rica in the DDP? 22 Mr. Karamessines. Tf don't recall any. But we may have 23 had. You don't mean personally, do you, you mean the DDP? 24 Mr. Madigan. Do you have any knowledge of any generally? Mr. Karamessines. I don't recall any myself. TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
Veta ; learning of we tor in Floriea to we thE aia you have any involvenent ‘youveelf;. or’ to your knowledge dia anyone in the DDP have any involvement. with thia®: ‘fellow that I mentioned earlier, Manuel Artime? Mr. Karamessines. I never knew the man, never met him, so I didn't have any involvement with him. And I can't tell you now who in the DDP actually worked with him or handled him or saw him or dealt with him. You mentioned earlier that Hunt did, and I am quite sure that he did. I wouldn't be surprised if Fitzgerald didn't know him pretty well, because Fitzgerald had been intimate with Cuban activities. And there would be a number of other DDP officers dating back from the time of the Bay of Pigs situation and before who would have been ware of Artime or might have worked with him or handled him. But I never did. Mr. Madigan. Did you ever know -= Mr. Karamessines. I wasn't in the States during that period, remember that, I was overseas. TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL
Bs ws No, Iam talking ‘now about “the Bay of Pigs period, when Artime and all the rest. of. these quys came out of the woodwork, and that is how they came-on. blitzkrieg. I wasn't one of the fellows available’to be in touch with Artime, 7 ‘period? Mr. Karamessines. Yes, I was in Headquarters then, yes. Mr. Madigan. Have you any knowledge whatsoever about ’ an effort to try to promote the Agency's image by having some of these novels Hunt wrote made into motion pictures and television shows? Mr. Karamessines. There was a lot of thought going to trying to push some of these CIA novels of Hunt's. But nothing ever came of it as far as I know. I believe Mr. Helms or somebody up the line decided against it. Mr. Madigan. And you didn't have any personal dealings with him? ; | Mr. Karamessines. No sir, I did not. You mean did I deal with the motion picture people? Mr. Madigan. Or the TV people? Mr. Karamessines. No sir, I did not. Mr. Madigan. What time frame do you place recollection hearing about this? TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL ae oy
ft certainly-never went - How about '72, that late? ‘ I.don’t. : T£'something:h fe a vs ae that put into moving pictures once in awhile that the Director or.somethi g would say; the Bureau does it, the Defense Depaztment does te, and maybe we ought to crank up a program or something like that. And Hunt used to think that this would be a good idea. And whether he was in touch with some. people or not I just don't remember now. He may well have been. Mr. Madigan. How do you know that Hunt thought it was a good idea? Did he talk to you about it? Mr. Karamessines. Sure, absolutely. Mr. Madigan. That is all. Mr. Johnston. That is all. thank you. (Whereupon, the interview was concluded at 4:25 p.m.) TOP SECRET WARD & PAUL Soom Me ae,