by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassina- tion was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the inves- tigation wére not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of Government, who were charged with investigating the assassina- tion. ($8C, Beek, PC) ‘This Committee has sought to examine in greater detail the general findings of the SSC. The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, oc withheld information relevant to the assassina- tion of president Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, whether the misinforming or withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission was the seecormes
result of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employees. The Committee has sought to examine the . issue detailed above in both an objective and disciplined manner. In order to accomplish this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977 - Report by the CIA's Inspector General (hereinafter 77 IGR). This ‘Report was highly critical of the ssc findings and asserted that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of Limited effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission in its work. The 77 IGR was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the ssc findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies ‘and submitted special analyses and reports." (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E.) In order to demonstrate further the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77 IGR contained a comprehensive listing of CIA generated material made available
to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassina- tion of President Kennedy. In this respect, the Committee agrees with the 77 IGR wherein it is stated that "This compiliation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to. consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to, the extent that it reveals something of © ‘the results of that effort." (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab EB) | | a In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of CLA generated material referenced above, the Committee has paralled its review to the ‘structure given to these material by. the 77 IGR. In this xegard the 77 IGR detail four inter- related compilations of Kennedy assassination material. These four compilations are: 1) Agency dissemination of information to the Intelligence Community (Formal and Informal Disseminations) 2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission
3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al regarding rumors and allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination 4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the Warren Commission on Rumors and Allegations Relating to the President's Assassination (77 IGR, Introduction. to Tab E.) | These compilations were reviewed by a staff member of the Committee who focused upon those CIA materials which the 77 IGR documented as having made available in written form to the Warren Commission. | | _ During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the review of the Agency's compilations discussed in this report. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive
issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising an approximate total of ninety volumes of material have been examined and analyzed by a staff member of this Committee in preparation of this report. . The findings set forth herein are subject to modification due to the following considera- tions. During the course of .the past fifteen | years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's. sophisticated document retrieval system, certain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. Whether these documents merely have been filed incorrectly or destroyed, gaps in the written record still do exist. Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of
relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee, certain files requested’ by the Committee for review have either not been made available to the Committee or have been made available to the Committee in a sanitized fashion. Therefore, to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial of access and/or santization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the | best evidence available to the Committee thoough this may not be all relevant evidence to which the Agency has access. | One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance of these discussions, briefings, and ‘meetings may not always be reflected by the written. - record made the subject of this study. “wherefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session: hearings with
key Warren Commission staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an . effort to resolve questions that are not addressed by the written record. The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject for discussion herein. aa - x CA Vest 50 2 S fe Ge { a A Ton sant seution =e Org: of€ In . “ es Aared) fe II. Warren Commission Relationship With CTA Regarding ‘Information Made Available By CIA To Warren Conmission EZ opinioas ok Watlan Com ni §SIen and Ch Re presectakive > “@ Dei ra, DAERCE mH Mish On cia Gel etionqniP . The “Committee has contacted both representatives of BRAMALL TRY Acollewi ng SUsQ seks. AL Nee A By Follow FLAS ot Liscassions ; a aT ~ Gh orgunizeckios of weRe ci Als PAZESTH gs aN \) et x resent meEANES 8 eee SN heey ‘ b) ha Looking CURIOS AS of NH WATE ~fearki RS me, ~ ve Nt Sey EN eA TAL POOR Orne sss AO. So wot ok am eN . & peptsCA to ae NEAT PATA SdE RAT Camct nok wi tn “ . Roe Ke DI IER Comm Ni 88s 3 SS Se PURS wid reettrod square Looby AEE RNS SSO 5 Cts GOrnce™ APD Whe WA FIN > ~ ~ . ue deny by AE PARES Eigekios QA! Conk’ hmerh 4 S| wa substanct acd Takers at xkormmchio-n 2 * , : (t+< by VA ar len Lo onmist ic’ im had Ve. COMA ts ot vo « : fe . St, sah wt Wake & Mo AR oa RES: 4K > Ce ann itt > wry rh ig ; eae ~! cree a x TUR 4d COND 2€ MavtmnBs oa, 1103, , Paes
the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who.played significant roles in providing CIA generated information to the Warren Commission. The. general consensus of these representatives is that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the, Commission's investi- gation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18.) (See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, * p. 24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission, who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David S lawson on matters which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives - with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. (See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman, 8/2/78.) Mr. Slawson expressed a Similar opinion regarding ‘the Agency's cooperation and cuality of work. (Bxecutive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17, see also JFK exh, 23.) J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Com- mission, testified that the warren Commission and its staff were assure ed) that the ‘Agency would cooperate in the Commission work. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/7/78, p. 4.) sea ve 8 John Melony ,8(17/78 PF ) John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during wesc peorget
the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA’s work vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5.) Mr. McCone was responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Warren ggomission. (Ibid. pp. 5-6.) In this regard Mr. McCone ' testified that: The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I person- ally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my . ‘office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him--giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satis- fied. (Ibid. p. 9.). oop al . (eva nck cr aig cf hg Bib Seite Mors ; ; cals Wereto SSrOom ara ." : = Ctats key representa~ C. DakESP OO PEI BES Mr. Raymond Rocca, tives) to the Warren Commission during its investigation, ake characterized the Agency's role as one of full sup- port to the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA,xeeatTed under oath that Richard Helms had given the following directive: All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CIA staff and R and A and marked - for us. He issued very, very strictly worded indications--they were verbal in so far as I know--that we were to leave no stone unturned. (HSCA Class. Depo, of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, }
Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees.» (Ibid. p. 24.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." {(Ibid., p. 26.) A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation,was directly responsible for the / CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Ibid., p. 23.) He testified‘to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, .p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its infor- mation to the Warren Commission. He stated: An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Com- mission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and ‘pieces or as individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we ‘could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.) However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily
on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under oath he supported this proposition: ‘Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to speci- fic requests by the Warren Commission? Mr. Helms: That is correct. I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which some- thing different might have occured, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and-the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them. 7 As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not. (Ibid., p. 34.) Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant infcrmation to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as follows: Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission com- | municate with the President and get a different arrangement. because we might not ask the right
questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p. 4) Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29) H GeqQuast men th cx sponse Policy Effect of CIA *Infermation- Supply -Policy on Warren afore ak ion ced evant te Commission knowledge of and access to CEA supported © Wallin Commisdion Lan qnie Operations. J The unfortunate consequences of not asking the CIA the right questions | were graphically illustrated by the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti- ~Castro assassination plots [ssc Book V) see also (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, SSC, 11/20/75]- . Paradoxically, even if the Warren ad Commission had requested information on ‘such plots, the C/A'S pers nk o& ce mtee® U2 CER THe Ura l2~ Commnisscon wourtd nethawel heen able tro camino As Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had | no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investi- gation of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p- 50.)
Had Rocca,as the CIA's working level representative to the Warren Commission,been requested by the Commission to research and report on any and all CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's efforts would have produced no substantive informa- tion. (Ibid., p. 49) | The record also reflects that the CIA desk officer who was initially given the responsibility - by Mr. Helms to investigate for the CIA Lee Harvey Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investi- gation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 73, 111-112) Mr. Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots. the following action would have. been taken: "we would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have ‘had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban sources \ queried about it." (Ibid., p. 166) As the record reflects, these plots were known by few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding
i i : 3 eS nomen pray ett aba Renn NNN A Pat SAL ape Se eganp d n ARPES NOPE MAS EUS B98 Mae Ma these plots reveals that the Agency compromised its promise to supply all relevant information to the Warren Commission. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the acute laxity of the Agency's compromise: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms: Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti- Castro assassination plots. I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations. If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not.in a position to ask you — about it. -Is that not true? = Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Com- mission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission. Did you ever discuss with the Director - whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?
Mr. Helms: IT did not, as far as I recall. (HSCA Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31.) Mr. McCone testifed that he first became aware “of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA | Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, -p. 13) _ | When asked whether the CIA desired to withold. informa- tion from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti- Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he gave the following response: "T cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they with- held the information from me. (Ibid., p- 16) os ‘ Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels Rankin, Slawson and Spector were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the a ed
Warren Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test. of Arlen Spector 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec. ‘Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, LL/15/77, p. 71 where he states that possible witholding of information by CIA about Agency attempts to assassinate Castro did not significantly affect Warren Commission investigation) From the CIA's perspective, Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi- fied. He stated that: " a completely different _ procedural approach probably would and should have been taken." (HscA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca - 7/17/78, p.- 45) | John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President , Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms’ . non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:
Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots? Mr. Scelso: ' No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which © he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78) Introductory Section/Agency Concern for the Sanctity of Sensitive Sources and Methods The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information was dependent upon 1) the availability. of information; and 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request and 3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back: "and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others. For example, some might involve
BN 3 x i : : : g 3 x checking a file which was in Washington.. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country. Obviously, one takes longer to per- form than the other. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 25) At times the CIA!s concern for protecting its sensitive sources and methods caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting relevant information than when. the protec- tion of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods did effect the quality of the information to which the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78, p- 23) As a result of the CIA's concern, in some instances the Agency made the unilaterial decision to limit access to CIA materials by the Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 158): The Committee has identified two areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These are:
N Put wan abet Lie, Cah ae ere SAE ee dats Dili che alate cnet rain Date 1) Witholding information from the Warren Commission — pertaining to the photo- surveillance and telephonic surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station 2) As a related consideration, the Agency's reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph now referred to as that of the “Mexico City Mystery Man" Bach of these concerns will be examined herein. The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." {Ibid., p. 158) But Scelso did testify that: We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts. Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by axamination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Se Tm on ee ert et aS ak ye £
Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA DOC. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the information provided to the Warren .Commission in this.report. was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report. The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articu- lated: as early as December 20, 1963, at which . time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: _ Our present plan in passing information ‘to the Warren.Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to. protect your continuing ops. Will rely ‘instead on statements of Silvia Duran. and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA Doc. FOIA. #420-757,° 12/20/63, Dir 90466) , The basic policy articulated in the December - me oe 20, 1963 cable is also set forth{as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBIC ina a acetne een D ARN Neer it = tetany emianmn eta Af ORE Eres PN AAI UL OT OT OO AE yy Aenean, ekeeer eer CIA memorandum of December ] 10, 1963.3 (CIA Memorandum Bm CANE joe pene Be te tan tt = AG ON A eee ne eee | included in with Soft for File, file materials) In that memorandum, of the CIA Counterinteliigence/Special Investigations Group Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam
weedeat Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI. was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of: December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided| with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico and asked him whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of the telephone taps. | ___|memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion | with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission.
* He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI sensitive informa- tion which could relate to telephone taps. (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by | included in Soft File materials) *. - The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 ina formalized fashion. When Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already: called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, - that we have information (as deter- mined from Agency sources) coinciding -with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing ‘on his activities while in that area. - (CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64, CIA # CSCI-3/779/510. | , - Mr. Helms’ further-indicated that the CIA might _ be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information. In this way the CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. The policies articulated were: senegerrae
The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency — sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. (CIA Doc. FOIA #398-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) This cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being with- held from the Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission which would be ina form protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques (Ibid. ) (See also Angleton beposition. .)o | (Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.) 1) Your Bureau not disseminate information re- ceived from this Agency without prior concur-_ rence 2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments (sic) or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau througn other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible future interest of the Commission and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (Ibid.)
z y My R se Iv. Telephone Taps Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during. the initial stage of the Commission's work, of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City. The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only becyase it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authorities and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52) The CIA's unwillingness to-inform the Warren Commission in the early stages of its investigation of the above-described surveillance operations is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of information the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the Warren Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/6/78, p.- 158) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in
its investigation with all the facts before it. As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - (CIA Doc. FOTA #509-803 1/31/64) October 3, 1963” That memorandum did not mention. that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and. by the Agency's Mexico City Station subsequently transcribed”? Furthermore, that memo- ‘randum did not mention that the CIA had tapped» and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia buran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos “and Cuban Ambassador. to Mexico: Armas which the CIA- had also tapped and transcribed. | On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the. Commission and likely discussed the-memorandum of January 31, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOLIA 2498-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. (JFK Doc. No. 3872 ) A review of Rankin's letter