457-10014-10219 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.1 HW 50955 DBocld: 324273607 JFK Assassination System : Date: Identification Form Agency Information SSCIA 157-10014-10219 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE 07-M-124 Document Information SSCIA WALLACH, PAUL SCHWARZ, FRITZ 07/22/1975 15 OPERATION MONGOOSE MCMANUS, GEORGE SUMMARY Unclassified 1B; 1C Redact 05/3 1/2000 CC Box 254 Page 1 V/7/2015
Date Page 08/08/95 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM - AGENCY INFORMATION , AGENCY : .SSCIA { RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10219 ; RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS. OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE AGENCY FILE NUMBER :; DOCUMENT INFORMATION . ORIGINATOR SSCIA FROM : WALLACH, PAUL TO : SCHWARZ, FRITZ TITLE : DATE : 07/22/75 PAGES : 13 SUBJECTS : MCMANUS, GEORGE OPERATION MONGOOSE DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED - CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99 OPENING CRITERIA : ‘ COMMENTS : CC Box 254 \ . [R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBocla: 32423607 Page 2
HW 450955 Bay MEMORANDUM an Oy a/ . TO : Fritz Schwarz : FROM: Paul Wallach DATE: July 22, 1975 RE : Staff Interview of George McManus (Monday, July 21, 1975) As we discussed last week, I asked George McManus to come down for an interview Monday evening. The interview lasted approxi- mately three hours; the substance of that interview -- as reconstructed from both Joe DiGenova's and my own notes — is reflected in the at- tached memorandum. MeManus should make a brief appearance before the Committee. He worked closely with both Helms and Harvey, and his testimony will allow a different perspective on the Mongoose operations and the as-— sassination issues. McManus will also testify as to his perceptions of Robert Kennedy, and Messrs: Helms, Lansdale, McCone, and Harvey. More spe- cifically, McManus may show us that Helms was not as "on top" of the . Cuban operations as he would have had us believe on June 13 -- a posi- tion from which he attempted to back away during his most recent Com mittee appearance. ec: William Miller Curtis Smothers Docld:32423607 Page 4
Hiv 50955 Historical Data: ae tericali vata McManus retired in May 1970 after some 20 Plus years of covert/clandestine agency service. In the early 1950s he headed up the CIA's He was subsequently appointed[| | Station Chief and later Director of the Cover Staff. In mid-December 1961, Helms asked McManus to apply his | ____ expertise to the Agency's Cuban Defector Inter- rogation Center. MéManus headed for Florida on Christmas Day and spent the following week at the Opa Locha Center. He reported directly to Helms on his findings, conclu- sions, and suggestions in a memorandum dated January 3, 1962.* McManus recalls that the "center" was then inopera- tive; he called for an immediate operational restructuring. McManus stressed the importance of the positive intelligence that the Center could, and indeed eventually did provide at the time of the Missle Crisis. It was not until early January 1962 that Helms formally brought McManus "on board" as his assistant for "Cuban activities. The initial weeks were dedicated to ensuring that the revitalized Center got off the ground; subsequent - *This afternoon 1 requested a copy of McManus’ January 3 memorandum. /f Docld: 32423607 Page 5
the January 19 meeting Was McManus' first Cuban OPerations "briefingn, McManus recalled that Genera]. However, McManus --who Was at that time was just Page 7 955 Docld: 32423607 HW 45095:
‘Words, (With the ©xception of discussion relating to Opa Locha Center--se¢ typed memo, at Paragraph 3). McManus a$sumed that RFK was Speaking foy the President, McManus "never got anything off the ground aS fast as he did the Cuban Refugee Center", However, at no time did from the Attorney General, According to McManus, Helms met regularly with the PResident and "much less Often With the Attorney Genera] ."" McManus neither Was present nor discussed e 6 AD955 Daocld: 327473607 Paq Hy
WW 50955 Docld: 32423607 McManus on being Helms! assistant for Cuban Operations: . As Helms! 4aSSistant for Cuban activities, McManus was in daily Contact with both Helms and Harvey, Moreover, he Soon after the January 19 meeting, Harvey was brought in 4S Director of the Cuban Task Force, McManus understood that part of his job was to keep track of Harvey who was "quite an independent fellow", and not "extremely forthcom- ing with information", McManus explained that Helms Shared his feeling that "we had to Set off our asses and get moyv- ing on Cuba", However, Helms as ppp had "lots of Other impor- tant concerns," he Summarized intelligence information and the Operational Work of Task Force yw. Apparently, the Operational S€ction Was prepared by Harvey and Simply reviewed by McManus Prior to transmittal to Helms, Helms in turn reviewed the draft report. The final version was eventually disseminateg to seven rectpients, including"inter alia, McCone, Lansdale, Defense, and the White House," Although McManus was Helms! “Cuban fyes and ears" he disclaims any knowledge of discussions, Plans or attempts relating to the © S28Sination/elimination/liquidation of Fidel Castro, Although we did not Show McManus Specific Page 9
documentation of assassination attempts (for the reasons discussed last week), we informed McManus generally as to the nature of the plans and attempts, their time sequence, and the cast of characters. McManus admitted that he was Surprised that these were just now being called to his at- tention. He told us that assassination was "a completely different ball game". Indeed he stated that assassination was in his opinion senseless; '"viz., our leaders would have been sitting ducks", HW 30935 DBocld: 3274236007 Page 10 SA
HW 450955 McManus on General Lansdale: McManus described Lansdale as "Kook", "wild-man", and as "just plain crazy". He told us that Lansdale was Similarly viewed by most others at the Agency. Unfortunately, Lansdale was "sponsored by the Kennedys" and "as good soldiers the CIA had to cooperate." McManus vividly recounted Lansdale forays into the sabotage arena. He presented his initial laundry list of Cuban action pro- posals early in 1962, of course, he expected immediate CIA action on his requests. In McManus! words, the CIA was "re- quired to assist Lansdale in these "unrealistic", "half-baked," and "half-ass"' schemes. McManus added that With every new dawn a Lansdale courrier bearing yet another "half-baked scheme" would arrive at Task Force W's door. McManus succinctly painted a picture of the Agency's -- and more specifically, McCone's, Helms', Harvey's and McManus' -- resentment of Lansdale. Lansdale -- with the CIA "as his troops and horses" -- was ready to do battle, albeit indi- rectly, with the Castro regime. McManus stressed that "Lansdale's projects simply gave the impression of movement. Although the frenzy of activity gave a whirlwind impression, it was without substance. McManus noted some higher ups regarded Lansdale as a mystic, viz, "they must have believed that despite Lansdale's insane ideas, he had some sort of power to accomplish results or they wouldn't have kept him." Neither Helms nor McManus had daily contact with Lansdale. Docld: 32423607 Page ii
As mentioned above, Harvey, Dt, and not 12 50955 Docld:32423607 Page HW
about the Past year's Cuban Operations, McManus replied that — he would Tather put it in Writing, The November 5, 1962 memorandum is his "thinkpiece." Helms never discussed the Memorandum with McManus, However, McManus deduces .. from light -- i.e., as the means to limit Castro's advances in Pressed views, I would think that we Will want to review this memorandum with McManus tomorrow, 14 50955 DocTd:32423607 Page HY
HW 450955 McManus on not being informed of assassination attempts while Admiral Rayburn's. executive assictante ees ee Ss executive assistant As noted previously, McManus disclaims any knowledge whatever of assassination plans or attempts. He rejects the notion of "plausible deniability" at the operational level; i.e., where the Operatives would not inform the SCI or DDP. In adamantly rejecting the existence of any such unwritten law in the intelligence community, he stressed that DCI must be fully informed as to all ongoing Agency operations. Indeed, McManus told us that McCone, Rayburn, and Helms were all "inquisitive"! men. McManus believes that McCone would have been "morally Outraged" if informed of assassination attempts. However, the "accuracy" of McManus! Statement may be questioned as he also stated that "Helms would have been opposed to assa- ssinations." When I explained that Helms was aware of such attempts, he could not provide a Satisfactory response. Docld: 324273607 Page 15