way that my knowledge of a scheme or idea of using poison probably relates to the year 1962." | | Bundy further stated: "T am absolutely certain that I never knew of or believed that there was any authorization to go ahead with an effort to liquidate Castro, or any other Cuban leader," With reference to his testimony concerning an executive action capability, Bundy said that ''I recall the words 'exec- utive action capability' more clearly today than I did yesterday...but Ido not have any recollection as to what I knew about that or who requested it or how much was done under it, Idon't recall having any particular continuing interest in or information about that particular activity'’ which was ''something like" a''plan to have some kind of ua dIwadS FHL WoT AdODOLOHA stand-by capability for action against individuals." (8) Documents of the National Security Council On April 17, 1975, the Executive Director wrote AUYWdGIT ayor to the National Security Council requesting immediate access to all files and documents relating to the operations affecting Cuba and the Dominican R epublic during the period 1960-1964 and in particular asked for access to the records of the National Security Council, the Special Group and the Special Group augmented, The request of the However, on May 9, the Executive Director was denied on May 9, 1975. National Security Council (NSC) purported to deliver to the Executive Directo HW 53244 Docld: 32203996 Page 37
all National Security Council documents in its possession which per- tained to the question of possible assassination attempts on the life of Castro or Trujillo. One of these documents was an excerpt from a paper on "United States Policy Toward Cuba''dated May 4, 1961 and prepared for discussion by the National Security Council at its meeting on May 5, 1961. are as follows: HW 53244 DBocld:32203996 Page 36 Paragraphs No. 79 and No. 80 from this excerpt 79. Castro. A political vulnerability of the regime lies in the person of Castro himself. It is not clear whether the regime could continue to operate for long without him. There is no question that the bureaucracy operates relatively freely, and probably makes many decisions without con- sulting Castro. However, it is equally certain that the Castro personality and his appeal to the Cuban people is an important element in maintaining popular support for the regime. If Castro were removed from the scene the regime might collapse for lack of this central rallying point. On the other . hand, the bureaucracy may now be so firmly entrenched that it could function independently--although admittedly without the degree of popular support now enjoyed. Further, by using Castro as a martyr it might be possible to generate at least 4 temporary support for his successor. 80. A further possibility attendant upon the death of Castro would be the attitude of the PSP. The party would like to assume a moreopen and dominant role inthe Cuban Government. Castro's death might ‘force or encourage the party into a precipitate move to seize power. If this happened it would probably have an adverse reaction of Latin American opinion, though principally at the government level. AMWddIT GuOd -u GIWuUaDS AHL WOUT AdODOLOHA
HW 535244 Subsequently the Executive Director renewed his request orally and also in writing on May 22. On May 30, the National Security Council stated that it had completed a review of all records of the predecessor groups of the Forty Committee and trans- mitted some additional. documents, although still denying overall access. Included in the copies of the documents transferred on May 30, 1975 were the. following: (a.) Copy of the November 3, 1960 "Minutes of Special Group Meeting" attended by Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, General Cabell and General Lansdale. The last paragraph stated: "Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the He Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. conceded that it Gen. Cabell point highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous acti suggestion is beyond our capabilities." DoclId: 322703996 Page 39 — . ; : i would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. ed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and on, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's avdart quod “ad GIWaaS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA <
HW 535244 (b) The remaining documents all related to 1964 and will be discussed in the concluding part of the section of the Statement of Facts. pertaining to possible assassination plans directed against Premier Castro. je. ‘June 13, 1961 Taylor Report According to a June 13, 1961 paper, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed President-elect Kennedy in November 1960 at Palm Beach about the Bay of Pigs planning. The Taylor paper was prepared pursuant to an April 22, 1961 directive’by the President | to Taylor, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arley Burke and Allen Dulles for an overall analysis and study of governmental practices for military, paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity with special attention "to the lessons that can be learned from recent events in Cuba." There is nothing in the June 13, 1961 Taylor report which specifically discusses assassination. However, during the time the study was being under - taken the aforementioned May 22, 1961, FBI memorandum was prepared and. sent to Attorney General Kennedy. k. Relationship of Phase I Plan with Bay of Pigs Sheffield Edwards, himself, thought that these plans were developed in connection with the Bay of Pigs, and it was Bissell DoclId: 322703996 Page 40 AUWddIT GuOd -Y AIWYAD AHL WoUT AdOOOLOHd
who was in charge of the overall coordination of the Bay of Pigs operation. Bissell denies that these plans were part of the Bay of Pigs planning. He testified that he was "quite clear" that the plans. for attempted assassination of Fidel Castro were not developed as a part of the Bay of Pigs operation.» l. | Knowledge of Phase I Plans Inside Cuba Bissell stated that he did not think the actual attempt was ever made, although it is physically possible that the poison pills did reach Cuba. He also said that although he did not remember having any evidence that Castro knew of these attempts, "it is perfectly possible that, with some time lag, Castro would have come on some evidence of this operation."! ‘ Bissell also testified that to the extent individuals in the Cuban exile community in Miami may have been involved, "our belief was that Castro was extremely well informed on what was going on, !! m. Termination of Phase I Plan After the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, according to Sheffield Edwards "the pian, as I recall, petered out.'' Edwards said that he did not become involved with any other person, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, to try to get the pills to Cuba. HW 535244 DoclId: 32203996 Page 41 “ad GIwWaaS AHL WOUT AdODOLOHG | “KUWdaLlT auog
HW 53244 ‘n. Other Plans During,Phase I While the Phase I plans were underway, the Agency received confirmaton from contacts in Cuba concerning possible assassination attempts inside Cuba against Castro. Most of these contacts took place in the first part of 1961 immediately preceding the Bay of Pigs landing. In particular, there were several cables received referring to a possible assassination attempt against Fidel. Castro on April 9, 1961, during a public appearance at the Sports Palace in Havana. There were also messages received from dis- sident Cubans inside Cuba in the first few months after the Bay of Pigs invasion. In some of these messages there were references to trying to kill Castro. None of these possible assassination attempts from dissidents inside Cuba appear to have been coordinated with the Phase I plans, DoclId: 32203996 Page 42 AUVdGIT Guod “aU GIVYAD AHL NOW KdODOLOHA.,
HW 535244 39 3. 1962-63 and the Phase II Plans. a. Possible authorization - the Testimony of Richard Bissell . ‘In late 1961 or early 1962, Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, recalled asking a new case officer "to take over a part of our reviving effort against Castro and the Castro Administration...I probably urged him to look into this plan...which had been the subject of active attention nearly a year before. I have no recollection of authorizing him to revive it, except to look at it as a plan, or to proceed with any action along those lines." Richard Bissell resigned from the Agency in February, 1962. His successor as Deputy Director for Plans was Richard Helms. b. The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer The Phase II case officer in a signed recorded interview said that he had a conversation with Richard Bissell, which he believed took place in the latter part of 1961 or early 1962, in which Bissell told him in substance that someone in the White House had raised the question whether or not the Agency should develop what, was called an "executive action capability," which was a capability of assassination or Docld: 32203996 Page 43 AUVdaIT Guod *y aIwugo AHL WNoYT AdODOLOHA
40 liquidation of leaders of foreign countries. The case officer said that Bissell briefed him that an operation against Castro "had been mounted". and "that it had been. handled through Sheffield Edwards." | The case officer said he was then briefed ‘by Edwards on the operation that’ had been previously | “conducted. This testimony was corroborated by Colonel Edwards. . Both Edwards and the case officer stated that Edwards did not have any further contact with any > subsequent phase after Phase I. Colonel Edwards put the Phase . II case officer in contact with the case officer who had been involved with Phase I for a briefing. The Phase II case officer then took over this entire operation for the Agency. The Phase II case officer stated in his recorded interview that after he was briefed by the previous case officer and discussed the matter. with Sheffield Edwards, AUVddIT Guod "YU GIwagS AHL WOU KdODOLOHA . he then discussed the matter with Richard Helms. The Phase II case officer took over the direct contact with the Mafia personnel which to the best of his recollection occurred "about early April 1962." | (3) ‘The Phase II Plans The Phase II plans involved two possibilities of assassination: rifle fire and the use of poison pills. HW 532744 DBocld:322703996 Page 44
ee - Al Delivery of funds for the acquisition. of rifles and handguns plus some medicinal drugs and anti-biotics took place in the summer of 1962. According to the case officer, it-was somewhat less than $5,000. The money was delivered to the Mafia.contact, and the case officer received a report from the Mafia contact that the Cuban contact had called to report that the arms and poison pills had gotten into Cuba. | The case officer stated that he felt he ‘was dealing with a very volatile situation that "in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs failure" was the kind of an operation. that the Government, the Agency or anybody else could not afford to have surface. ",..It was quite obvious that there was an explosion potential here--an explosion not in the technical sense--a flap potential, if you will, but it took some time to find out just what could be done and how it could be done, to try to sanitize the possible reper- cussions of this." He claimed that very shortly after | taking over the operation he reached a tentative conclusion that the plans had little chance of success and he decided to "wind down" the plans gradually. The winding down was completed in the Spring of 1963 and in June, 1963, the case officer went abroad to another position wholly unconnected with A the Cuban operation. HW 535244 Docld:32203996 Page 45 “ad GIWYaIS AHL WOT AdODOLOHA AUVdadIT quod
HW 535244 42 When asked why the operation did not meet with success, the case officer said "I don't know if I have any valid opinion why. . There are a great many things that could have happened. It wasn't tried, it was choked off, it was penetrated from the start--at least on the Cuban end--that is the end in Cuba. When I say I have no personal | knowledge of this, I am aware that Castro has claimed there. were a number of attempts on his life. I am aware that he has blamed those on the U.S. in general and the CIA in particular. But I have no personal knowledge of facts which would prove that there was ever actually, if you will, a shot fired or any poison administered, or any other attempt | other than in the inchoate. stage." The case officer also stated that "given the capabilities of Castro's security apparat and the general seive-Like character of the community in exile and the number of people who knew at least something about this particular incident oer operation, before I had any connection with it, or later as a result of things that occurred before I had any connection with it, I think and thought at the time that it was conceivable that it had been penetrated. I cannot honestly state that I had at that time any firm reason to believe that Castro was aware of this operation." Docld: 322703996 Page 46 AMWdGIT ayod "a GIWYAD FHL WOU AdOOOLOHA
HW 535244 44 with the Agency, and since the decision had been made at that time that this should be sanitized, tied off and terminated as soon as practically feasible, I saw no reason why the new DCI should be briefed on it, and I strongly recommended that he not be." The case officer said that to the best of his knowledge McCone at no. time in 1962 knew of the fact that Phase Ir of the operations were underway. John McCone testified that he first learned ‘about Phase II when he was first interviewed by the Executive Director of the CIA Commission in April, 1975, and McCone further stated that the only knowledge he had of Phase I was knowledge he received on August 16, 1963 upon receipt of a memorandum from Richard Helms together with a copy of the | May 14, 1962"Memorandum for the Record" delivered to Attorney General Kennedy. e. The Testimony of Richard Helms re Phase II Helms was asked whether he remembered any discussions with the case officer concerning the furnishing of either arms or poison pills to Cuban exiles to have them Helms replied try and carry out ‘any assassination plans. "I don't have any question that we tried to line them in Cuba, to bring down this government or to kill anybody they Docld: 32203996 Page 46 AUVdGIT Guodr -y aiwags HHL WOWd AdODOLOHA.
HW 53244 ‘coming forward. 45 could lay their hands on." But he did not recall that "a specific project was approved which was designed for a man to go to point B and actually shoot or poison or do something to Castro." : Helms testified before the Commission that "he was not aware of the CIA ever having assassinated any Foreign leader. I certainly never authorized the execution of any such operation while I was Director or Deputy Director and. _when I was Deputy Director for Plans I don't remember it I certainly never recommended such’ an action to the then Director." Helms said ‘that although he had no recollection of any discussion with the case officer not to tell the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, in 1962 about the existence of plans, "I have no reason to cavil" that this was the fact. £. The August 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special _ Group (Augmented) . The Special Group (Augmented) was a.group of senior people in the Administration who were involved in overall planning with operations directed against Cuba. Included in AUWdaIT GuOd “ay GIwuaS AHL WOUd AdODOLOHA that group wére the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara; the Attorney General of the United States, Robert Kennedy; the Assistant to the President for National Security, McGeorge Bundy; General Maxwell Taylor; and General Lyman Lemnitzer (who is a member of the Commission), along with sever:1 others. The coordinating DoclId: 32203996 Page 49
HW 535244 46 officer of the Special Group (Augmented) was Brigadier General Edward Lansdale. (Robert Kennedy was not present at the August 10, 1962, meeting.) (1) The Interrogation of the Phase II Case Officer The Phase II case officer said that he was at a meeting of the "Special Group: (Augmented) in the State Department in August 1962, when someone brought up the possibility of "liquidation" of Castro. John McCone was at that meeting and, according to the case officer, John McCone "got rather red in the face" and.made a remark which "was a clear effort to stop any such proposals, suggestion or any discussion thereof at that meeting within that forum immediately." | On August 14, 1962, the Phase II case officer prepared a memorandum for the Deputy Director of Plans, who was Richard Helms, in which he attached a copy of an August 13, 1962 memorandum prepared by General Lansdale. The CIA case officer's memorandum to Helms said: l. Action.. None. This memorandum is for your information. 2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four.. words were "including liquidation of leaders." DoclId: 322703996 Page 50 AUWdaIT Guod -y atwago HHL WOUT AdODOLOHA
47 3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group .(Augmented) in Secretary . Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point. ‘ 4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in ‘his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining . to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those dissemi~ nated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so." The attached Lansdale memorandum under date of August 13, 1962 had excised from it a phrase. The blank space was the approximate size of the phrase, "including liquidation of leaders." (2) Interrogation of Robert M. McNamara According to Robert M. McNamara in a recorded interview, he had no recollection of being present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. "I'm not suggesting I wasn't, but I have no recollection:.of it. I do seem to recall that there was such a group; I doubt very much if I was a member of it." He said that he "might have heen a participant" at one or more | HW 53244 DBocld:32203996 Page 51 AYWdGIT GuOd *Y AIWuaS AHL WOU AdODOLOHG
HW 53244 48 meetings. When asked whether or not he heard anyone discuss the possibility of assassinating Castro or any other foreign leader, McNamara replied: "No. I should interject here another point I made earlier, as I have no notes--I did not take.notes of any meetings I attended with rare exceptions, _and I have no other basis for refreshing my memory and my .™memory of those years is very bad. I'm not saying this to in any way qualify what I'm saying except that it is a fact - that my memory is poor in relation to the period." | McNamara stated that "I am almost certain that were an assassination contemplated, which seems to me... extremely unlikely, if it were contemplated or any action been taken to move in that direction, it would have had to receive the approval of not just Mr. Bundy but other officials at that same level, including my deputy, I think, and my deputy never would have approved anything like that without discussing it with me." Secretary McNamara said that he "couldn't imagine anything relating to a CIA operation that was-known to the President and was not known to Mr. Bundy. I can imagine something with respect to CIA known to Mr. Bundy, not known to the President either because they were not that important or conceivably because it was thought desirable to protect the President from certain knowledge...I can't imagine Mr. Bundy himself supporting assassination. I can't Docld: 32203996 — Page 52 AUWddIT GuOd *Y GIWUaD AHL WONT AdODO.LOHA
HW 53244 49 imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader, without mentioning it to the President, even though to do so would by that action involve the President. I say I can't imagine him supporting assassination of a foreign leader without the President's knowledge because it is the President who would pay if that action were undertaken and it ever. became known. Mr. Bundy recognized, more than the rest of us, the ‘importance of protecting the presidency as well. as the particular president, and particularly protecting his ability to govern." (3) The Testimony of John McCone © John McCone testified that he was present at the August 10, 1962 meeting. He said that he objected to the discussion of liquidation of leadership as a | possibility of consideration and he later talked with Secretary McNamara and expressed the same view, and he said Secretary McNamara agreed. John McCone testified that at the time of the August 10, 1962 meeting he did not know of the existence of the Phase I plans nor did he know that at the very time the meeting was taking place, Phase II was underway. (4) The Affidavit of General Lemnitzer Lyman Lemnitzer, a member of the CIA Commission, was also present on the August 10, 1962, meeting. In an affidavit he declared that he has no recollection of the question of liquidation of Castro or other Cuban leaders being discussed. DoclId: 322703996 Page 53 AUWdaGIT GuOd *-u AIWYaS AHL WOMd KdOODOLOHA
HW 535244 50 (5) The Testimony of General Lansdale. General Lansdale had no specific recollection of the August 10, 1962, meeting although he said that "it is quite possible” that he might have attended that meeting. General Lansdale said that the possibility of assassination may have been discussed at that meeting. | He also had no specific recollection of his memorandum dated August 13, 1962, and the words whited out. When asked whether or not those words might have been "including liquidation of leaders” Lansdale replied "T doubt it. I just don't recall anything at all on liquidation of | leaders." However, he also said that it was possible that the excised phrase from his memorandum was "including liquidation of leaders," but he stated that this was merely a matter of considering.a possibility, one of several alternatives. (6) Additional Testimony of General Lansdale According to Lansdale, during 1960 he was Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. He said he had no knowledge of any discussion of possible plans for the assassination of any foreign leaders. | In 1961 Lansdale was appointed by Secretary McNamara as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special ' Operations. ’ DoclId: 322703996 Page 54 ua aTwaaS FHL WOUd AdODOLOHA KaWdadIT auog
HW 535244 51 (a) Discussions with and Written Proposals to President Kennedy Kenned Lansdale said that he had.a discussion. with President Kennedy. "I do not recall exactly on that. He asked me if I would think about the situation in Cuba and if I could come up with any suggestions or recommendations from such a study. It-was a rather vague assignment by him, but it was to be done for him personally." Lansdale "suggested. an intermediary" to whom he would report ‘and Lansdale said the President "appointed his brother, who was the Attorney General." According to Lansdale, he made an initial series of recommendations in late 1961 or.early 1962, in writing, addressed to the President, "to see if there was a possibility of using Cuban refugees to help them get their political thinking together to see if there would be any feasibility of a revolution in Cuba." He says he thinks he gave the written report to the Attorney General for delivery to the President and that he later saw the paper "in the files of the President...he received it and. he had possession of it." (b) Cuban Exile Groups During the first part of 1962 there were | discussions about Cuban exiles possibly going back inside Cuba to harass the regime. Lansdale stated that the possibility of, these exile groups trying to assassinate Castro "might well have been mentioned." However, he said that "T don't recall a DoclId: 32203996 Page 55 “AMVdaTT quod °ad dIwygo FHL Woud AdODO.LOHA
HW 535244 to submit papers, it was an authorization for submitting papers 52 Single instance of any serious action being undertaken" on any plan for assassination. . He went on to say that whatever discussions took place concerning assassination related to possibilities rather than actualities. (c) Requests for "possibility" Plans - but no - Authorization to Carry Out Lansdale said that if there were directions DOLOHa and not an authorization for necessarily carrying out the action. Lansdale admitted that "there might well have been" a request for the CIA to come up with, as a possibility, a plan for liquidation of leadership. If that request was made, he said it could have been one of his requests and that he "quite probably — would have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense" and "possibly the Attorney General with whom I was in contact." AUVdaIT Quod -Y aIwugo AHL WOUT Ado Lansdale said that at no time during 1960, 1961, 1962 or 1963 did he have any knowledge of the existence of any plans for the assassination of any Cuban leader or any other leader. Lansdale testified that he never heard any discussion of "executive action capability." DoclId: 32203996 Page 56
53 g. Interrogation of General Taylor General Maxwell Taylor said that he was not aware of the existence of any plans to assassinate Castro. He said he did not have any discussions with the President concerning the possibility or the existence of the plans to assassinate Castro. However, "“...in the case of Bob Kennedy and Allen Dulles, we talked about so many things at the time of the Bay of Pigs as we sat around the table I couldn't say--that the desirability of the disappearance of Castro or what would happen if he were assassinated in Cuba--that was not raised, I don't recall." He said he didn't recall any conversations about assassination with McGeorge Bundy or Walt Rostow. "I couldn't say that discussion in the abstract 'wouldn't it be a nice thing if someone bumped Castro off! that could well have been said, but I just don't recall it.” Taylor said that he never knew of any authorizatio for the CIA to undertake any assassination. He also said he Kuvaart GuOd *Y GIVYXD FHL WOdd AdODOLOHA had no knowledge of the phrase "executive action capability" or any proposal for the CIA to. develop a general standby capability to assassinate foreign leaders. | | General Taylor, who was at the August 10, 1962, meeting, said he had no recollection of any assassination. plan being discussed, although he said that it might have been. HW 532744 DBocld:32203996 Page 57
HW 53244 54 h. Testimony of Richard Helms Re Unseating Castro Government and Possible Plans (1). White House Pressure Richard Helms, now Ambassador to Iran, testified that "there was a flat-out effont ordered by the White House, the President, Bobby Kennedy who was after all his man, his right hand in these matters, to unseat the Castro government, to do everything possible to get rid of ‘it by whatever device could be found and that was the reason for mounting this large operation in Miami to work on this very problem. And the Bay of Pigs was a part of this effort and after the Bay of Pigs failed, there was even a greater push to try to get rid of this Communist influence 90 miles from the United States shores. | ‘In response to a question concerning "Who might have been the driving forces from the White House in efforts to do something about Castro" Helms responded, "Well, the principal driving force was the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. There isn't any question about this. Involved in this was a group of individuals who were sort.of hired and pulled together by Kennedy: and Rusk and McNamara and McGeorge Bundy and all those people to get on with this job and as I DoclId: 322703996 Page 56 AUVddIT GUOX *Y GIWYID AHL WONT AdODO.LOHA
HW 535244 55 sit here and start to hink about this, Califano was one of them. It seems to me Lansdale, who had been successful in this kind of operation out in the Far East was brought in for a while." (2). Possible Assassination Plans - Ambassador Helms testified that he did not recall "any plans that were approved or that were viable specifically directed at eliminating Castro, but that there were conversations about it, I haven't the slightest doubt." "The business about the assassination of Castro, I have read about this in the papers. I have heard about it from associates. It has been kicked around whether this was a viable proposition. or not. I have no doubt it was written into various plans as one of many options but I don"t recall any successful effort that was made in this direction and since Castro is alive and apparently well in Havana, the extent to which this was serious I have never ascertained." Ambassador Helms said he did not "recall ever having heard anything about poison pills or any of that." He did recall that "at some’ juncture" a.decision was reached "that it would be advisable to brief Robert Kennedy as the Attorney General " about "various things that the Agency had © had to do" with certain Mafia members. He did recall that DoclId: 322703996 Page 59 AUWdaIT quod *Y GIWua AHL Wout XdODOLOHA
HW 535244 56 the Phase II case officer had taken over the plans but he did not "recall any special basis being used to try to get them to do an assassination." i. The August 16, 1963 Memorandum to John McCone about Phase I According to John McCone, the first time he learned about the existence of any assassination plans was on August 16, 1963, when he was given a copy of the May 14, 1962 "Memorandum for the Record" prepared for Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The particular events underlying the disclosure to Director John McCone appear to have started on the evening of August 15, .1963. “Stanley J. Grogan, an assistant to the Director in charge of press relations, received a telephone call at his house from a man who said he was Sandy Smith, a reporter for the Chicago Sun-Times. According to a memorandum ‘for the record prepared on August 16, 1963 by Grogan, Sandy Smith "said he was working on a story as a follow-up to the revelations by Joe Valachi, who is under. close guard at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, who had named a man Giancana as the head gangster in Chicago. The man in Chicago recently went to court to have the FBI cease surveillance of him and his house and lost the decision. DoclId: 322703996 Page 60 AUWdadIT Guod *yY GIway. FHL woud KdODOLOHA
57 He said the Chicagoan reportedly at one time was used by CIA to find out what was going on in Cuba, but provided no information of value. Smith said he stated this to the Department of Justice and they would neither confirm or deny." | | | | | | On August 16, 1963, the front page of the Chicago Sun-Times contained a story by Sandy smith with a headline "CIA Sought Giancana Help for cuba Spying." The story started with the following paragraphs: "A fantastic | tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang | boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was “revealed Thursday to The Sun- “Times. "It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government official said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort | to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel castro regime came into power in 1959. "What the CIA accomplished--if any thing--by AMVdagIT quod negotiating with the 53-year old Chicago rackets chief is one of. many unexplained mysteries of the matter." Richard Helms gave John McCone on August 16 a memorandum (dated August 16) under the subject "Sam Giancana" which stated: "Attached is the only copy in HW 53244 Doclda:32203996 Page 61 a dIWadS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA °
58 the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year." Richard Helms, when interrogated by the Commission staff, testified he did not have any recollection of the specific events. However, when he was shown his memorandum of August 16, 1963, addressed to John McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, he remembered that he had delivered that memorandum to Mr. McCone. Helms did not recall whether or not he had seen the May 14, 1962 memorandum for the record sent to the Attorney General before the date he sent it to John McCone on August 16, 1963. HW 532744 DBocld:32203996 Page 62 ad aTwuago AHL Nous KdODOLOHG. kuwdalt ayoq
59 4, Miscellaneous 1963 Schemes - According to the 1967 Inspector General investiga- tion report, during 1963 several miscellaneous schemes were | developed inside the Agency for possible use against Fidel Castro. Helms testified he was vaguely aware of some of these schemes, which he called "hairbrained." There was no showing that any of the schemes extended beyond the discussion stage. One. of these schemes involved discussions inside the CIA about trying to have General Donovan, who was negotiating with Fidel Castro for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, give to Fidel Castro a contaminated skindiving suit. It was known that Fidel Castro liked to skindive. The CIA plan was to dust the inside of the suit with a fungus producing madera foot, a disabling and chronic skin disease, and also contaminating the suit with tuberculosis bacilli in the breathing apparatus. There is'no evidence that General Donovan: knew of any such schemes AUWdaTT quod "ad GIWYaS FHL woug AdODOLOHG developed inside the Agency. “The scheme was dropped because Donovan on his own volition gave Fidel Castro an uncontaminated ' skindiving suit as a gesture of friendship. HW 53244 Docld:32203996 Page 63
HW 535244 60 x During this period of time there were also discussions about preparing a booby-trap spectacular seashell which would be submerged in an area where Castro often skindived. The seashell would be loaded with explosives to blow apart when “the shell was lifted. After investigation it was determined that there was no shell in the Caribbean area large enough to hold a sufficient amount of explosive which was spectacular enough to attract the attention of Castro. Also, a midget . submarine which was anticipated to be used for the emplacement of the seashell did not have a long enough operating range. 5. The Phase III Plan - 1963 - 1965 | In 1963 a CIA employee who was fluent in Spanish was assigned on temporary duty with the Special Operations . Group on Cuba. The employee is hereafter referred to as the Phase III case officer. The task assigned to him "...was to collect intelligence and to try to organize a group of military officers inside Cuba who were opposed to the Cuban regime-the Castro regime." ‘In the latter part of 1963 while on a trip. abroad,. he met a Cuban with whom CIA personnel had been in contact since 1961. At this first 1963 meeting the Phase III case officer said there was no discussion about any possible assassination of any Cuban leader. DoclId: 322703996 Page 64 AUVdadIT GuOd “A GIWYIO AHL HOU KdODOLOHG :
HW 535244 61 Originally, the Cuban contact had been a Castro supporter and had been a member of one of the groups— that overthrew Batista. However, "he became disenchanted with Castro" shortly after Castro took over because of "the harsh police state policies that were being carried out." | At a subsequent 1963 meéting, which took place in Europe, the Phase III case officer said that the primary discussion concerned "getting into more detail on the organization of a group inside Cuba which coulda be used in an internal coup against the Castro government. | "The subject of assassination was. never raised by me. It was never discussed in that context. In discussing the coup and how a coup would be carried out, this particular. contact did raise the possibility and in his mind the very real possibility that there would be bloodshed, and: that somebody would be killed, Their, or his, opinion was that. to even get the internal revolt, a coup, underway that the leadership--the top leadership--would have to be neutralized. ‘Specific assassination of any of the people, it was not discussed in those particular terms." According to the Phase III case officer, the Cuban contact held a relatively high position in the Cuban government. The Cuban "requested a meeting...a high Docld: 322703996 Page 65 UY GIWYID AHL WONT AGODOLOHa AUVdGIT auod
HW 535244 62 level policy maker in Washington, specifically mentioning Robert Kennedy as one of the people with whom he would ‘like to talk, to get some assurance that Washington. was serious about proceeding with this type of an operation. The Cuban also said "that they would need some - help in-arms probably-in getting started, in kicking off the coup." The Cuban mentioned high powered rifles and scopes and said "they felt that they could capture | sufficient arms to carry on once they started." Subsequently, a senior CIA officer travelled to Europe to meet the Cuban and "assured him...that the U.S. Government was serious about this operation..." and "that the U.S. Government was prepared to support the coup and that when they launched the coup as soon as they established themselves in any reasonable manner inside Cuba that the t U.S. Government would support them." The next meeting took place on November 22, 1963 in Europe. The Cuban contact had requested "some type of esoteric gadget with which he would be able to defend himself" if there were a confrontation directly with Castro. - "He had in mind some sort of a pellet pen or anything that was not a hand weapon that he could carry with him into any conference with Castro. DoclId: 322703996 Page 66 a QIWadS AHL WOYA AdOOOLOHA KaWaGIT auoa
HW 535244 63. Although the Agency did not develop such a device, it did develop a ballpoint pen which had a hypodermic needle inside that when you pushed the lever, the needle came out and poison could be injected into someone. The Phase III case officer showed the pen to the Cuban contact on November 22, 1963. The Cuban contact | declined the gadget "because of the close proximity with which he would have to get to a person Lf anything developed in the form of a confrontation with him." Instead, the Cuban asked for weapons, and the case officer told the Cuban "that a cache of weapons would be put down for him in Cuba." One or two caches of weapons, including high- powered rifles with scopes, were subsequently placed down , in Cuba. In addition, according to the Phase III case officer, he delivered money to help the Cuban contact with his living expenses, while in Europe. "It was around $1,000 at one time, no more than that." . ‘The Phase III case officer broke off contact _ with the Cuban in the latter part. of 1964 and was reassigned to another task in early 1965. The Cuban contact then was turned over to a Cuban exile group. ‘Docld: 32203996 Page 67 AUWdadIT GuOd *-Y GIWUYID AHL WONT AdODOLOHA
HW 535244 64 According to the 1967 CIA Inspector General investigation report, CIA support was withdrawn from the Cuban in 1965 because too many people knew about him and his plan. In March 1966 a Cuban leader was arrested and confessed to receiving rifles with telescopic sites from the CIA to be used for the assassination of Castro, according to a "Prensa Latina" news release. The man said he received $100,000 toward this plan. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State > after this news story appeared, the CIA said that the contact was recruited to collect intelligence of military activities © and objectives in Cuba. The Agency said: "There is no truth to the allegations that the CIA paid $100,000 or any other sizeable sum of money" as claimed in the Cuban newspapers following the confession of the contact. The Agency also said "the Agency was not involved" with either of the two men arrested by Cuban authorities "in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro as claimed in the Prensa Latina news release, nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act..." The-memorandum to Secretary Rusk was signed by Richard Helms and was dated March 6, 1966. Docld: 322703996 Page 63 AUVdaIT GYOd °Y GIWuaS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA
65 6. Miscellaneous 1964 Schemes Involving Cuban Exile Community - On June 10, 1964, Richard Helms, Deputy Director for Plans, sent to John McCone, DCI, a memorandum on the subject "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders." _ The opening paragraph of the report declared: "The following report was compiled from information obtained by Agency officers from persons who were parties to the actions described. Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, c ondone the planned actions. ‘Presumably the sources of the report, ‘in submitting this. information, were motivated in part by the belief that by disclosing the information they would obtain immunity against legal action should they succeed in implementing the plan." The report then detailed several different reports pertaining to the development of ",..a plan, that was stil] in the émbryonic stage, to assassinate Fidel Castro". Some of the plans involved advances of funds with the major payment to be made upon the consummation of an assassination, The funds were to come from either wealthy ‘Cubans or "Cosa Nostra'' elements. The May 30, 1975 letter from the National Security Council to the Executive Director had several documents attached which HW 532744 DBocld:322703996 Page 69 AWVdadIT GuOd “UY GIwagO AHL WOU AdOOOLOHd
HW 535244 66 pertained to the possibility of assassination of Castro by Cuban exiles or the Mafia. These papers included the following: a. A June 18, 1964 memorandum prepared for McGeorge Bundy under the subject "303 Committee Cuban Review.'' The portion of the memorandum delivered opened with the following sentence: "tt seems to me that this meeting might serve to give us a _ clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the USA in the next 120 days. " | The memorandum referred to ''other groups of adventurers and freebooters who have an unknown capability for trouble.... "We also have these reports of MAFIA plans to perform coup de main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well advised of all impending adventures? !! Attached was the June 10, 1964 copy of the Helms memorandum AUVdaIT quod *y atTwaa9o AHL WOdd AdODOLOHA to the Director of Central Intelligence, b. A‘''Memorandum for the Record" dated June 22, 1964 under the subject Preliminary Meeting with Attorney General, 19 June 1964" with the "R eference: Minutes of Meeting of 303 Committee of 18 June 1964 on ‘Overall Subject of Cuba'' was signed by Peter Jessup. The portion of the memorandum disclosed to the Executive Director included the following final paragraph: DoctId: 32203996 Page TO