157-10005-10236 i ° Date:10/04/93 Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM 8B IDENTIFICATION FORM ead mah Naat cb GRE at ARES GUD Lem Sem smeD mcm mh ems EE DMS SO En) anh NE MNES “ION HNP Ene seth meebo un ieee Oe Hef) hel GEL Se SEW 6 Sebh eb od ED ND NS SE SEDGE RG ED EEG dO OD ES ca fo em em et Ee DY met EP oD AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10236 RECORDS SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R445 ORIGINATOR : SSCIA FROM : TO : TITLE : REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/TRANSCRIPT DATE : 07/08/75 PAGES : 257 SUBJECTS : gam TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS m EXHIBITS ATTACHED IN THE FORM OF MEMOS/NEWS ARTICLES DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITS CLASSIFICATION : T RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : BOX 251-5 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 50955 DBocld:32202476 Page 1
TOP SECRET 110 L Mr. Schwarz. ‘These are minutes of the Special Group which. 2 you attended, and it states: "Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 5 || Progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of 4 intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and: 5 / ; | He outlined 6 various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams 7 || had been infiltrated." 8 Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything -- do 9 you recollect Mr. Harvey making that report? 10 General Lansdale. In general terms, yes. 11 Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to the 12 || Passage of pills to persons to accomplish the assassination of. 13 || Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting? WARD & PAUL : 14 General Lansdale. No. AS a matter of fact, we were very 15 proud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had been ig | infiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence. 23 memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress to e4 || Higher Authority? 1? Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams? 18 General Lansdale. Yes. E 19 Mr. Schwarz. Did he Say anything at that Meeting that : 20 you recall about the subject of assassinations? i 2] General Lansdale. Nothing. ; 20 Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62 : 25 Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebook TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBoctd:322702476 Page 2
SENSITIVE | TOP SECRET | Me Program Review by _ SENSITIVE oo Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, Chief of Operations ~ 18 January 1962 DECLASSIFICATION ANO/OR Fk RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT I. OBJECTIVE Ye AS SANITIZED at ) ice -\ The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthraw the Communist \- regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the \ cfUnited States can live in peace. X ie? » ll. CONCEPT OF OPERATION ( L aus Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban (A ‘ people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace. The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to- wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives. The failure of the U.S.-sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support- ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially. y The preparation phase must result ina political action organization in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal , communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this ~ fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.) The climactic moment of revolt will come frorn an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a {racturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movemer! dt Excluded from automatic This do regrading: DOD Dir. Copy N al ly. A §200.10 does not apply y SENSITIVE MW 50955 DocId:32202426 Page (3) c K Dal TOP SECRET WMS wir entreaial ys, bape ° Ar GENERA
HW 450955 Docld: 3220274276 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE H. TV intrusion: Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts . has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and parade demonstrations. : I, Special sabotage support Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship- ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms), CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962,. CIA is introducing@WZubzol#iija corrosive additive, togGuban locomotive el fuel oil throtgh commercial suppliers a (CTR expects to be able to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduc- tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. kph! J. Military actions Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S, help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S, intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor ina people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required. K.- Major: elements of the population pore Status ‘e@:and: CLA are continuing to explore their capabilities 2 epative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cub: on “dynamic elements of the population, particularly operations e Church to reach the women and families, and through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include . enlistment of. the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin-American operational contacts. ~ This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can put it into place. , L. Outlook Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. ' This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals, CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater. effort required. 4 0 Ae _ SENSITIVE K TOP SECRET ma Page
HW 450955 a Docld: 322027426 TOP SECRET: SENSITIVE “V. TARGET SCHEDULE A AGET SCHEDULE A, Intelligence Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA), Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made’ an effective operation for collection and Processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI). ° ' Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area, CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico, etc.) and ona priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all sutf source points, 15 February target date, Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, a nd report on capability by 15 Feb- ruary. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country Sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba, B. Political Task 5; CLA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within, This effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to be. worth at least a million U.S. dollars, -This can be the key to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA. project, - Task 6: CIA to complete plans by ] February for Cover and Decep- tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba, Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on thi sessment of s Ss. wary, CIA to submit Operations schedule for ment within Cuba. This must include localities elected Cubans, their infiltra- and political platform. One section must Fground," assess its true status and plans to use it, Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S, Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local Sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility-towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed, Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's . goals, Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February, Task 10: CLA to submit Operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project! objective of working on dynamic eleme as workers, farmers) is underscored, oo "i LY A ¢ SENSITIVE S political action goals. The nts of the Cuban population (such Due 19 February, 5 a — TOP SECRET Page 45 faye Byte >
( Aw VLUILE | ( Ayre Ve ‘He RECEIVED * JAN 29 1962 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25,0. C. MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL gt a. wy From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sql \- Noting that you will be away from the country rnost of the month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project for which we should provide. Certain proposals should have evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to be made if our Project is to win its goal -- and the bureaucratic machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another. It is my hope that you will make someone specifically o responsible to speak for your determined course and have the NO OBJECTION TO. role of being your "presence" as far as possible, This demands . DEC SIFICATION AND/O a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and £ OF THIS pOCUM oe, reasonably direct access to the President, Perhaps Dick Good- AB SANITIZED 9-q? ' win could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate a\ee (o> q Y suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated men- eb a tioning him. You might be considering General Taylor, but I do St wer j not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine military bureaucrat at heart. As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won, Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U.S. agencies to work hard at it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts _~ haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional pro- gram we are spurring. It may be a special effort which professional labor operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups as an untapped action ~\ potential, It could be a warming-up‘Of the always lively youth element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families Of Lm AS j DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | R JUN 6 1962 RECORDS BRANCH RFF PA per ELCLUDLL- FRO! AUT ET LE PEGRADING: £99 DIR 5209.10 | DUES NOT ALPLY rontains «& pages.. of Za. copies... Sertes_47 o~ an HW 350955 DBocld: 322702476 Page 6
ACTIVITY 1, Sabotage Cuben supply of nickel to Soviets. 2. Sabotage fuel supply. 3. Sabotage communications, 4. Sabotage power supply. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN PURPOSE To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder Cuba's ability to pay for Ploc imports. To cripple transportation, To dramatize and encourage the Spirit of resistance. To increase strain on regime and bring daily business to a standstill by dramatic action all people will note, FY CONSIDERATIONS aR ENG This can be an early sabotage action on the Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based outside Cuba. Destruction of transformers, coolant Pumps and towers seems more feasible than blocking the channel. Effect can be supported later by denial of Spare parts, Effects of CIA program of lubricating oil additive is expected on lo contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer real opportunity for more vigorous program, Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S, broadcasts), Attacks mounted only when Operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave net should be dealt with when there are suf- ficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide with a critical need, in August-September, ee This should be a concerted attack, as feasible in July-August, on power plants at Havana, ° Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara, Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas, It is of a type requiring detailed planning and special equip- ment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba, CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THis DOCUMENT ~ AU AS SANITIZE ysl > ‘ew TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ko) | Ws @o comotive sgimiijaner GSC Much more can be done with fuel 3 rs PROPERTY OF GC 46 Page 7 DoclId: 3220274236 HY 450955
AMET coé6ag 9EPE0GEE - Ploog Q abeg CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED [2 y (4 ¢ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Ko ar, (ew) . ( C * ) ; 1 15 March 1962 {cont} ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS 4, * Caribbean Admission Center, To collect intelligence required for the This operation, in response to early recommendation Opa-Locka, Florida, fully Gperations, to identify and earmark in- as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at activated by 15 March 1962, telligence assets as refugees arrive, utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with and to provide security against Com- anew building completed and occupied, anc witha munist agent operations. staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February - and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. {CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.} 5. * Periodic intelligence esti- To up-date NIE 85.62, se that current As the operations develop, there will be both increased mates, as required by progress estimates can be considered at national intelligence collection and a need for as current an In- of operations, policy levels. , telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. it is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level {than now governing the issuance of NIE's} may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sum- maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose, (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required, } OTHER OPERATIONS Mn, - 6. * Continue negotiating AOS To cripple Cuba's rail transportation, jis required to undertake a successful n contaminating Sabotage of Cuban locomotives, throllgh contaminating ocomotive lubricants, lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking -down, once the contaminant is introduced, 16 = 31 March 1962 30.298 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 7. * Two teams of agents dis- To collect intelligence. One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include patched to Cuba, personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience. ok Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
AMET 92PE0SCE PLOOG eoEeos 6 abeg ACTIVITY Establish 2 additional third- country resident agents in Cuba, co 9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained. 10.* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S, ll. * Develop additional interroga- tion centers in other areas by 31 March 1962, OTHER OPERATIONS None. * Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), _ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ‘16 ~ 31 March 1962 (cont.} PURPOSE To cohect intelligence. To ready agent operations, To exploit the intelligence possi- bilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States. To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations. CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED . a 144 ~ CONSIDERATIONS Possible future use in communications and support. Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and train- ing are for resistance activities, ‘the task of recruit- ment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence -collection purposes only. There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cuhas, !! Farnily, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail- able, (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort. } As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate ptly as feasible. A egotiations with centers, San other interrogation centers as center is being activated in local authorities are being undertaken to act: iv if possible, in! Juan, Puerto are being sur- veyed for possible CenteTs. (CIA responsibility with sup- port by others as necessary.) 5 March 1962, TOP SECRET SENSTTIVR PROPERTY gf THE WHITE HOUSE OFPiGy
HW 450955 — Docld: 32207426 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. ~ SENSIT VE. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale>{_ ° "GANS no 0 ECLASSIFICANGY ot EASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 4 /a4y As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, necding resolution,.are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency. fi, Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose Re \Y Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals ,ofgliroaugis MAuimlonc eg oribir ae eee eel ongcal, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area ; is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees, Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations. aro There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government aining and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert uban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on ‘and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as assessed, and request help, Such requests are starting to surface, as. the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is . EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY SENSITIVE TOP SECRET py dons Ge 7 septs. Series PROPERTY OF ' THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Page 10
HW 450955 + ~ Docld: 322024276 cia NANDOR O”) Ql ) LASSIFICATIO & : PETEASE OF THIS pocunin A\ ys | ~ o4 “ttptave a: BJECTION TO wre - HAS NO.O 3 May 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craig; Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey 1. General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said _the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected. The Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training of such Cubans are being Looked into. ie It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an ass se to the U. S., which might be used in a number of ways. General Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them useful employment after they are trained is an important and a difficult one. tot ayealgere 2. Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress ‘to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelli including the Opa-locka interrogation center and thd __Plandestine interroga- tion center. He outlined various dif freGTETes encountered, and said ' that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets ‘are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely- intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been forecast earlier asa possibility, but it now assumes particular im- jew of Duque's stature.) rvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude Viprograms, The Group asked that a check be made, as ible}. on how effective these operations were, They aiso CODY, | of the scripts used be made available. The Group _ eS worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now being. done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not .Perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time. - Thomas A. Parrott ~ cc: General Lansdale heated falas mm COG PROPERTY Of . THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE wh Dat nae : Be, Pe ao eS figat . (vee Page 11