¢ JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10211 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record DATE : , PAGES :W2 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : ‘DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4. HW 49061 DocId:32626315 Page 1
HW 49061 EXEMETED MK 46.3164 Soe - L i 7 | SECRET 4 SECRET = geneiti Fei wo TSS Possible U.S. Strategy Toward France French Approach A review of DeGaul le! s press conference statements following the test ‘ban provides some indication of possible French reaction and also opportus- nities for U.S. policy. First, DeGaulle objected to the test ban treaty ~ because it did not limit the further manufacturex of delivery vehicles. "It is a fact that they both have the means to annihilate the universe and it is a fact that there is no question of their renouncing such means,'' "In these circumstances, then, since the world situation has not changed in the slightest with respect to this threat, it is perfectly natural that a country like France, which is beginning to obtain the means of freeing itself to some degree from this permanent terror, should employ them, the more so since there is nothing to prevent the two rivals, after their tests have been terminated, from continuing to manufacture more and more numerous and more and more powerful projectiles and providing themselves with launch- ing vehicles, rockets, planes, submarines, and satellites perfected to an ever-increasing degree,'"' Second, France proposed a conference of the nuclear powers to pose "'yractical'' measures covering nuclear delivery vehicles. "However, in any case and at all odds, France would be prepared when that vain pretense is ended == | am speaking of the Geneva Conference -- to propose to the three other atomic powers certain effective and practical disarmament measures concerning, in parti- cular, air and maritime space vehicles for launching nuclear missiles. What occurred in Moscow merely confirms France's .intention, and it intends, before the end of this year, to invite all the States concerned to study this essential problem together with France before it may become. insoluble in its turn." If the U.S, Government chooses to support proposal freezing nuclear free levels, we could increase the possibility of French participation, (1) By offering to supply the French with a smal] but limited number ao . 44 . -— SEGRET —SENSITWE SECRET Docld: 327676315 Page 2?
4) SECRET SENSITIVE of nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads, contingent upon their -parti- cipation in this treaty and the test ban. (2) If private discussions with the Soviet Union indicated a likeli- hood that an agreement could be negotiated, we should attempt to arrange to hold the meetings in Paris, under DeGaulle's sponsorship, and refer to any treaty as ''The Treaty of Paris''. In private we must make clear our terms to the British and DeGaulle so that the USSR cannot use such negotiations to further divide the Alliance. If accepted by the Soviet Union, this proposal would either deeply divide us from France, or once again establish a common French and U.S. nuclear policy. * EGRET SENSITIVE HW 49061 DBocld:326276315 Page 3