404-1018540177 7 . asad , “ ° , . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains information afecting the National Defense of the United States Within the meaning of the Expionage laws, Tithe 88, USC. Gece. 783 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner aa unsuthoctzed person is prohibited oy taw. S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEN COUNTRY Cuba “REPORT NO. CSCI-316/02294-65 suuect. Political Attatudes and DATE DISTR. 1 June 1965 Aftiliations in the Direccion \ Gereral de Inteligercia (DGI) NO. PAGES 2 : \ TO CIA REFERENCES  @BTURN “Baaegeurs Use Only pate of —«:1964 . + Oe Net Reproduce oe pace.g Washington, D. C, 4 43 pare ACQ, (February 1965) . FIELD REPORT NO. THIS iS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GHADINGS ARE CERNITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT 13 TENTATIVE, source, ~ A former Cuban IS officer who served with the Cuban intelligence - Sérvace until “APPil 1964. 2, although there ‘are many membors of the Direccion General ¢ A _ Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence - DGI) who P appear interested in and favorable. toward :-the Communist "Party, Source knows of only three persons who are actually members: Saul GONZALEZ, alias"Denis"; Manuel VEGA Perez, alias “Marcos Viera", and Felix SUAREZ; alias “Federico Santiesteban". SUAREZ was a sert cf political adviser in the DGI operations departments, but insisted he was not a commissar, but, rather, a person in charge. Although Source and the other officers -would teaSe SUAREZ by calling him “Comisario", SUAREZ greatly “resented the term and actually physically attacked Source for doing so. Every Saturday morning at 8:30, SUAREZ held a political indoctrination meeting which all personnel were supposed to attend. Source was habitually late to these sessions, and althcugh he was given penalties for his obvious disaffection, he never paid any attention to them. The DGI personnel Source knew were perfectly willing to talk politics among themselves but in a rather desultory way; the discussions never went on very long. 2. Apparently during 1962, there had been considerable sentiment for Anibal ESCALANTE and his faction, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP), but in 1964 the PSP group was disrupted and the real loyalty was to Fidel CASTRO rather than to the Party. S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM 5 4 3 : ; 2 4 iterated te meee 1 b____seetosmfewnoe REPCINCLANT CINCSO # {&NS (Note: Field distribution Indicated by “#%.) XP (AMMUG-1) NECLCS | TWP GR. | Taw HCL LA EE) WH a | CSc1-316/02294 _ pea — rwicewave [4 eras — py 1 ae roraus WH/C 8 (1), WE 1 (1), CI 4, RID 1 Toke eo FORM NO. 4 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (2) [| ix-2427 ; LXx-2429
14-00000 S-E-C~R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM ~ 2 - CSCI-316 '02294-65 ESCALANTE, while he remained in Cuba, was apparently the liaison officer between the DGI and the PSP. When ESCALANTE jeft Cuba, the liaison between the DGI and the PSP was taken over by Ramiro VALDES, as a CP member, and he was’ described as a true representative. The DGI operated ‘ Strictly on orders from the Party, conveyed through VALDES. 3. Membership in the Partido Unido Revolucionaria Socialista (PURS) made life easier and entry into the DGI more simple. Between August 1963 and April 1964, all new personnel hired by the DGI came from the Union de Joveres Comunistas (Union of Young Communists ~ UJC), which was PURS-oriented. S~-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM