(This form is to be used for material extracted § from ClA—controlled documents.) to erroneous,;criticisms. made tod Ye n brodéder That/ ; CIA employees ra the time felt“-as Ri they obvyousl¥ did“-thdt the Activities about: which / Athey -knew/had n ng relevance to the / Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (thid. p. iy Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of eens President. Kennedy' Ss Geath. . Ctrockefei ler Commis ion, ra ( testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392) MS creernegc nyo Serre econ tenn ett: iA aan t a In addition, Mr. Helms testified betore-this——————~ Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed ag 773 eco ennemttttteti tne, to be..an-assassination plot Exec. Sess. Test. of aa ree “Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26- -27) . yy NESTE en tnt AP Pt nA NEE ead Lay ect “Sa A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph Langesch who in 1963 was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Specialy __ Affai The Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component Sta ft responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence earn en eA ent na et seme eh renee i rn pe a Services (HSCA” Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, apna err St REET I I RN Ming aN T ote pce aan ees Asc aay Sa. Classification:
Ghassificatisn: a (Ts farm ig te be used for material extracted fom Cha—eontrelled documents.) ~8g8— Sept. 14, 1378, go> me Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible i for. the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for 4 safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban oo s = naeccrtent LAT Pascoe me janes entire netiatinad tera tet Min ee ee etre att (of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). It was _— th ante a Langosch's recollection that: Intelligence Services, (HSCA Classified Nessa ««ethe AMLASH operation prior to the f assassination of President Kennedy was i characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination 4 - operation—initiated and sponsored by the CIA. Gbiae, pe Py “Sa. Ca Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH “ge 37 operation was insecure was available to senior lev L cn 3 officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. aces p- 4) However, the issue before this Committee is ne Classified, by, decinatc ation: »—CBRerk
Ctassificatign; ——seeeee_— ‘(ihis form is te be wed for material extras tem Cesena See sha seuments,) ~88a- *In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee has received from the CIA an affidavit executed by Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who "served as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff...and discugsed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed, °/,{GIA Doc? Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, executed G@cits, sRe- p.- 1) Mr. Pollock specifically contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an assassination operation. In pertinent part, Pollock drew the following conclusions: 4 To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objective of organizing a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it: as an "assassiantion operation." Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2) He also stated: . { Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an "assassiantion operation"; the case officer did not; I,”as Executive Officer, never é discussed any aspect of the AMLASH ‘operation with ; Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other i branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a & hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) | > The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. /Tbid., par. 4, p. 2/), (Ibid., par. 6, p. 3) an s AA NCAT PASTUAGLEINTO) 909113 By GeV, —Se—Bexrk
Classification: : not simply Wadena 8 Roe sig" spall extocted an from CIA—-contr led documents: assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission. In the case of the AMLASH operation this. determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objectives. | Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that such informa- tion, if made available to the Warren Commission, might have stimulated the Commission's investiga- tive concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin commented before this Committee: ---when I read..cthe Church Committee's report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any more or polish it off. I don't think that “s36xT Classification: CRET _ Classified by derivation: i:
_ 90 - Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better chance of getting to the heart of it. It might have Only revealed that we are involved in it and who approved it and all - BD that. But I think that wo . _whave~-at—least--eome_out.__((HSCA Class> ST of J. Lee Rankin, BATT TE B- 91) meet Dae that had the AMLASH operation ‘been disclosed to the Warren Commission, the Commission might have been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture that has s" urrounded the AMLASH operation during the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH operation remains a footnote to the turbulent | Yelations between Castro's Cuba and the United States. “tie “EG = “Si. Classification: Ciassified by derivation: