157-10011-10060 Date:09/30/93 Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10060 RECORDS ‘SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCIA . FROM: . TO: TITLE .: TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING DATE : 09/11/75 PAGES : 71 SUBJECTS :. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING: WITNESS, HELMS, RICHARD EXHIBIT: MEMO FOR THE RECORD RE CUBAN OPERATIONS CABLES EXHIBIT: MEMO FOR RECORD RE SILENCER FOR FAL AUTO RIFLE rR] REBELLON, JOSE [R] DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : T RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW. : 09/29/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : SSCI Box 247, Foider 4 smu comm ua mcs aS re) SO me crm cums tt em cmt ttt RG AD) ne cnn net cnet ne io SU SHES EH RD SS EE GS cmt GN lm EEE ED EEE Om) GED OND ED CD UE Oth eth unt ean mh HHO ent fom ek GOS ahh AE I amet sts Gm [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HY 50955 DBocld: 322038276 Page 1
gsh 31 Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 Ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 B85 Bocld:: 31 TOP SECRET really know all of this. in detail. 1 oo. Mr. Kelley. Do you know who (RSEiis was? Mr. Helms. He was a Cuban exile leader, is the best definition to give to tie Mr. Kelley. I am told by a member of our staff who reviewed these documents in their unsanitized forms that BREW Sea IeEiMB ard that L-l was AMLASH, and that the case officers whom they have questioned about these documents ~~ f Mr. Helms. Wasn ' t7aRRuEyalso a member of the Cuban Brigade? En L-l was AMLASH in the period '64-'65, and the case officers who were involved in. these cocumeNnts have testified, they say, that Desmond Fitzgerald knew all about what they were doing, that he was informed that they were trying to put AMLASH in touch with our teammate in order to effect AMLASH's goal of assassinating Castro, and that the case was a very big one, at least in their view of what the DDP Directorate was doing at the time. Mr. Helms. Who said Fitzgerald knew all of these things? Mr. Kelley. The case officers that they were working for Fitzgerald. Now my question is did you know what Fitzgerald was doing? Did Fitzgerald report to you what he and his case ~ officers were doing with respect to AMLASH., TOP SECRET 203628 Page 2
ash 33 33 TOP SECRET 2 : 1 this case,.-I think, two of them out in Europe some place, s z handling an asset -- and just how often you put your finger é 5 into the pie, if at all, other than getting yourself routinely 5 a 4 briefed by one of your trusted -- Mr. Helms. It would be the latter. Pitzgerald would be 6 the man who would report to me and tell me what was going on. ? Get what authorizations he needed for me, bring me whatever 8 papers had to be signed in order to carry on his work. Obviousl 9 minutes of 303° Committee meetings would come to me with 10 regard to participating, whether I did or didn't. ii In other words, I would keep in the policy line there. 1£ || But the actual operational.‘detdils, -day: to day; woukd . .)~ 1s be handled by Fitzgerald and his people in these various (3) 14 stations, Miami,[ | and so forth. They would come into WARD & PAUL oo — 15) him in Washington. 16 What telegrams going back and forth I would see.or would i” not see, I would not have every Single telegram there to 18 find out, but this was generally, he reported to me. [I didn't 2 19 go down and: talk to individual case officers about these. Q £0 Mr. Kirbow. One other question. 3 el Mr. Helms. Except on rare:ddcasions. $ ee Mr. Kirbow. Sure. 4 Fa a3 After Desmond Fitzgerald returned from his trip to meet 5 . g 24 with AMLASH, hoding himself forth, apparently properly to be . - 3 £5 a representative of the United States government, do you recall TOP SECRET HW 50955 DBDocld: 32203326 Page 3
HW 450955 Ca perry co aa IRKy SECRET 0312402 3 MAY 64. IN 74774 REF: DIR 16696 Oe 1. AGENT ASSESSMENT SUBJECT PARA TWO REF IS HE INTELLIGENT CLEVER COURAGEOUS PICTURESQUE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS CONFIDENCE OF AGENT-1 AND SUBSTANTIAL KNOWLEDGE LATTER'S ANTI REGIME PLANS INCLUDING DETAILS OF prsposat. | THOUGH EARLIER NOT INCLINED SHARE AGENT-1 ENTHUSIASM AGENT NOW ENTIRELY CONVINCED BY RECENT TALKS WITH SUBJECT THAT HE WELL MOTIVATED VERY USEFUL COLLABORATOR FOR AGENT-1 PARTICULARLY IN CUBA AND IS NOT PLAYING DOUBLE GAME. IN MAKING HIS ASSESSMENT AGENT OBVIOUSLY ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO FACT AGENT-1 GAVE SUBJECT THE CLOSELY HELD "M" ACCOMMCDATION e ADDRESS. e e- 2. SUBJECT DOES NOT PLAN STAY EUROPE BUT IN KEEPING RECENT ADVICE BY CHE GUEVARA NOW EXPECTS GO BACK CUBA IN THREE OR FOUR MONTHS. MEANWHILE HIS LODGING BEING PAID BY CARRILLO WHO DURING UPCOMING TRIP CUBA WILL SEE WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE. SUBJECT DOES NOT WANT BE ASSIGNED EMBASSY PARIS AS WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN AT LEAST YEAR AND HALF BEFORE RETURN CUBA. SUBJECT HAS HAD IDEA GO SPAIN IN INTERIM BUT AGENT HAS SOUGHT APPARENTLY SUCCESSFULLY DISCOURAGE HIM, | 3. SUBJECT TOLD AGENT HE REPORTED TO CARRILLO A RECENT . at BY MIGUEL ROCHE IN PARIS ON BEHALF OF AMERICANS. BY SO “& DOENG sho ROMes HE INCREASED STANDING WITH CARRILLO. IN RE Docld:32703828 Page 4
fw SECRET COPY CANNOT BE XEROX ’ 4 Cire SECRE T 0312202 3 MAY 64 IN 74775 REF: DIR 16696 1. MSG WHICH SUBJECT PARA TWO REF HAD FROM AGENT-1 WAS THAT [ uarrer WANTS SILENCER: FOR THE “BELGIAN FAL SUBMACHINEGUN SOONEST. | THIS TO BE DELIVERED TO M FOR J. AGENT NOT ABLE GET BETTER DESCRIPTION WEAPON BUT SAYS IT IS THE NATO WEAPON WHICH MILITIA CUBA CARRY. 2. SUBJECT PARA TWO REF LED BY AGENT THINK LATTER WILL TRY GET SILENCER TO CUBA VIA RELATIVES ITALY. [ACTUALLY CIA WOULD [nave TO DELIVER. din IGNORANCE HQS KNOWLEDGE DETAILS CIA OFFICER ASKED TO WHAT ADDRESS ITEM COULD BE DELIVERED IF DESIRED DO SO. e AGENT GAVE IDENS A AND B ON AUPN, "NICK" HAS BACKGROUND. 2. . 3. JOSE ALBERTO IBARRA MARTIN HAS NOT COME TO PARIS AND PROBABLY WILL NOT ACC SUBJECT PARA TWO REF. BASIC REASON IS HE TURNED DOWN REQUEST BY FAURE HE WORK FOR DSE IN INTERNATIONAL FIELD WHILE ABROAD. DID SO BECAUSE HE BASICALLY FRIEND OF FAURE AND DID NOT WANT BETRAY HIM. fecut 4. NO INFO ON SUBJECTS PARA THREE REF. , THINKS MAY LEARN ABOUT THEM GENEVA WHERE GOES 3 MAY. ADDITIONAL RESPONSE TO REF FOLLOWS SEPARATELY . SECRET ae ge) rey cD waded ae | manard] HW 50955 DBocld:32203026 Page 5
HW 450955 yy, SLY , = CLE ewer z SECRE T SECRET 0417362 a Lad oF La/ TBP EY. 1. MEDICAL .L DOCTOR (SOURCE) SPANISH CITIZEN WHO WENT CUBA LATE OCTOBER 1963 AS FOREIGN TECHNICIAN, RETURNED PARI 15 APRIL, DISILLUSIONED WITH CONDITIONS AND TREATMENT CUBA. SUBJECT IS FAMILY FRIEND AGENT-9. | | 2. WHILE WORKING IN HOSPITAL IN SANTIAGO DE CUBA SUBJ SAN AGENT-1 TOLD SUBJ HE WANTS LEAVE CUBA WITH MOTHER AND SON AND OBTAIN SCHOLARSHIP IN FRANCE. SOURCE STATES DEPRESSED AND HAS MANY ENEMIES IN CUBAN GOVT. | 3. . SOURCE STATES THAT, SHORTLY "BEFORE LEAVING CUBA, CUBAN DOCTORS AT HOWPITAL TOLD HIM "SOMETHING BIG" GOING TO HAPPEN CUBA WITHIN "NEXT FEW WEEKS" AND ADVISED SOURCE TO LEAVE ASAP. ACCORD- ING SOURCE DOCTORS IMPLYING THIS "SOMETHING" WILL BE ATTEMPT OVERTHRGA CASTRO REGIME AND DOCTORS ANTICIPATING THIS WITH PLEASURE. SOURCE STATES AGENT-1 LIFE IN DANGER AND HE-WILL BE KILLED IF OVERTHROW ATTEMPT FAILS. | 4, RELATED ABOVE IS ANOTHER AGENT'S STATEMENT TO SECOND AGENT THAT AGENT ONE THREE OR FOUR WEEKS AGO WAS PLANNING ASSASSINATION | ATTEMPT. IMPLICATION WAS IT DELAYED FOR REASONS WHICH AGENT-1 APPEARED NOT TO HAVE LEARNED. i | | | 5. NO. INDEX. SECRET - AUG Za stS CIA Docld: 322036828 Page 6
” ea, cence ee e  EE e, SECRET $ ; . ay FROM: . AZ Yrs Pee Gy To: prioritr[ | INFO: | CITE DIR 73048 . REF: Woe (IN 47894) 1. AT MEETING 22 DEC GH = cONFIRMED «=04-/ PLANS TRAVEL MADR WITH PRIMARY REASON HIS MADR TRIP IS TALK WITH TOE = CONVERSATIONS WITH B-/ REPS MADR. ALTHOUGH FROM PERSONAL SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, SINCE HE RETURNING 20@4, &£-/ ~ DISINCLINED MEET PERSONALLY WITH @-i , HE INTERESTED DETERMINING FROM WHAT CAN BE GAINED TO ADVANCE STRUGGLE AGAINST CAsveo BY JOINING FORCES WITH B-) AND HIS GROUP. . WAS INFORMED BY @v4@ AT MEETING IN PARI EARLY DEC 64 THAT .US& CANNOT RENDER ANY KIND OF SUPPORT AND WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY IN HIS PLAN NEUTRALIZE GAstéo- . d-/ ~ CLAIMS TO UNDERSTAND .U-9.G. POSITION BUT SINCE HE SEES NO OTHER SOLUTION TO @UGAV PROBLEM HE PLANS CONTINUE HIS OWN EFFORTS AND ATTEMPT IGNITE INTERNAL COUP AGAINST CAS7@o REGIME. SINCE  L-f AWARE HE CANNOT GET SUPPORT FROM U-So, HE MAY TRY &-/~ . WHILE HOS WOULD LIKE SEE. 4-s AND S-/ - GET TOGETHER, IT IS NOT DESIRED 14 . BE INTERMEDIARY. WE CAN ONLY ENCOURAGE INDIRECTLY AND PERMIT THEM REACH OWN DECISIONS... £-/ WAS TOLD U+5-G.HAS NO | HY 50955 DBoctd: 32203826 Page 7
SECRET . « PAGE 2 CONTROL OVER... B-/ SINCE HE OPERATES FROM OUTSIDE ..U. 5. TERRITORY BUT IT FACT @-s ~ MOST ACTIVE LEADER WORKING FOR LIBERATION HIS COUNTRY. a - 3. WHILE PROBABLY SUSPECTED, NEITHER &-/ | NOR S-# KNOW THAT @/4 IN UNILATERAL CONTACT WITH OTHER.  @y# DOES NOT PLAN REVEAL THIS FACT OR CONFIRM IT IF THEY MEET AND REVEAL CASE AM OTROS, TO EACH OTHER. ALTHOUGH 4cewr HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN PAST, PLEASE REMIND HIM HE SHOULD NOT REVEAL HIS KNOWLEDGE £-/ CONTACT WITH Cl4 TO ANYONE. O Mea 4. IF a-f TAKES INITIATIVE CONTACT AGevT WHILE IN MADRID, SUGGEST CONTACT BE PERMITTED SINCE THEY PERSONAL FRIENOS.®* OT WEL HQS INTERESTED RECEIVING ANYTHING L~f/ 1 MAY TELL AGENT « 4-4 DID NOT ASK FOR @/A CONTACT IN MADRID AND NONE REQUIRED. L-t MAY ASK FOR DCO ON PERSONAL BASIS BUT CONTACT UNNECESSARY. END OF MESSAGE C/WE oy | | DC/WH/SA HW 50955 DBoclda: 32203826 Page 6
\ tearat e et fo } cory /A7 nusacy CLASSIFIED BE MESSAGE crear yi . ee em ee € “5 SECRET eC hRrourt ron FeAUIGaiTEo +y ge tare ANnvANce COPY WM tesuee ACT foery _ pel wip Lbetl 2! ee 4 N866SE R 4 OCT. Le “QR — REQUESTED URGENT MIE WLIN Cask OF FLGE SAID MET WITH fe Sev ses” 2 OCI WHICH TIME Soeee a ; : REVEALED SOME DETAILS ite PLAN UF ACTION AIMED AL OVERENROW. Caszee GOVT. FOLL Gist Sw7¢ce RoiAKno: PRESENT MISSION IS ake CUNTACTS AMONG. MILITARY LEADERS CUTS 1Di e) Soe€CE) GOING PARLs 9 OCT UNDER MEET WiTHd CREW Awe PEL Ges whe 15 CogA r Aer FLAS bAnc CCHIEF AvoT TO B-1) AL Guat) HUTEL. Witt wim. 4. [as ALSU INVULVEUL BUT UNKNOWN IF HE GOING Paklo.  Sewece Anu y ‘Z WILL Re TUR NAKID GROUP AWAITING UNIDENTIFIED HiG#t IL UFR ILER LEAVE CogA URDER TRAVEL PAKIS FOX “SUA LT MEETING" With = G-s, WHICH HUPERULLY TO OCCUR BY MID-NOVEMBER. PUNPOSE WOULD BE COORDINATE ACTION, INCLUDING ASSASSINATION CASTLO FOLLOWED BY MIL coup TO TAKE PLACE. SOVRTIME DEC 64. CSTATION CONMENT: PRESUME MIL LEADER  <-/ », Nihil : << os HAS AGREED ACCEPL ASSASSIN ROLE, Soccce: HIMSELF PLANNING aL ACK ENTRY Cven 10 MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGLI MENDES. ADDED THAT ALOVE MIL OFF ICEN Mayr NU Uk ABLE RETURN c| _ 2 Seexee SAID HE ACTING) UNDER yA INGIRUCTIONS. SAID RECI Cel. <3) FROM AUS Rd 1975 CIA APPROVED Ft can en ee ~_ GIA HisTeRce: HW 50955 Docld: 32203828 Page 9
nee ond BECENE H wg ae Pad jw ES £ Co ota HW 450955 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE AUS 23, rg Docld: 32203328 SECRET AND Asst toa RECEIVED ORDERS FROM IN_ OSES paGe_2_ Cin MEL WITH HIM IN PARIS, file Uv NOT MAURID, DUE PUBLICITY GIVEN MRR FOLLUSING SIERRA AN At CALY li-G diet. REFUSED “FOR L WHICH : FROM "G' THIS REGARD. c be ~Wouttf€ HAS ASKED GERVE AS HIS LOCAL CONTACT, xO APPROVAL GIVEN, seuee€ STHES MRR REP SPAIN) BECOME WIITING wen REP rae MEETING WITH 5°¢4CE TODAY AND 4e ~ov2cEe TOLD fe INSIDE @osA “WANT NG PaRI 6 ABOVE ACTION AS MEANS PHECLUDE FUTURE. 5. STATION Has NOE CONTACT b AERC AUS CU se GPO UREL FOR LOAN TO PAY AIR FARES TO PAIS ACK FUNDS.” Sete FINALLY GCT titi? LU He Div NUT wALE rNWITkUE TOUS (Onibi ANY ASPECIS AbUVL PLA. WILL PROVIDE SLAT1O0n PULL hrPURT 3 OU -ONF IDeNTI ALLY PHA AOST NIL LLALERS YALU THEY SUPPORT ILG e ad 9 Pocycenn @ MELT £7 2kPT SINC cL. ATTEMPTING REACH HIM PRIOR 5 ocr GRAPH WHICH HE PROMISED PROVID GROUP 'S PLaNs. 6. STATION UNABLE EVALUATE DISCREETLY MONITOR THESE ACIIV SECRET ¥ PISSEM PER... er "FROM. ¢ aA a re ie ae a | | fy t SECRET | ee Cf TRIP, OvSTENSI BLY U_TAIN NIS pauTO- tb, AND TRY ELICIT INFO HIS THAYLL wu ANY ABOVE INFO, HOWEVER WILL ATTENPT ITTES. Cot SLET Page 10
(270 - Goi wor 22H) SECRET FROM: | ; PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY 8 OCT 64 IN 89419 1. CO MET WITH Sdecee 5 OCT. SAID GOING PARIS SAME DAY 2000 ~ HOURS ON AIR FRANCE FLT WITH FRIEND HE REFUSED IDENTIFY, SAYING "I'M NOT WORKING FOR YOU YET RPT YET.” PROMISED PROVIDE FULL DETAILS HIS TRIP ON RETURN MADR 9/10 OCT. DID SAY HE WOULD CONTACT lie THERE. | | 2. SPOKE IN VAGUE TERMS RE "BIG PLAN" AIMED AT DISCREDITING CUSAN OFFICIALS IN EUROPE, INCLUDING POSSIBILITY BREAK IN RELATIONS SPAIN/ Cod4 LATER SAID MIGHT NEED OUR HELP OBTAIN 4 VISA FOR SELF. IN REPLY TO QUERY WHETHER HIS PROPOSED TRAVEL CONNECTED ANY WAY WITH "CIS MISSION," SAID HIS OBJECTIVE TO KILL CASTEO AND OVERTHROW HIS GOVT. | 3. SAID PLANS MEET PARIS WITH PERSON WHO "ARRANGED" SIERRA ARANZAZU ATTACK BY PAYING OFF RADIO OPERATOR TO SEND POSITION TO ATTACKING CRAFT. SAID R/O HAS TOLD WHOLE STORY TO SPANISH POLICE. _ 4, ACCORDING SUBJ, (FNU) MORALES OF ¢us4s/ EMB PARI WORKING FOR Aino Men Séevice. JOKINGLY COMMENTED MANY @Cugds+v4 OFFICIALS COLLABORATING WITH HOST GOVT SERVICES IN MOST COUNTRIES AND CasTée WOULD PAY HIGH PRICE SECRET RE’) FROM “SO 69 1975 GIA tate oe. ® HW S09S—-Bortdrs220ge28: Page AL 9 ree meter
rrr 95 ens ee IN 89419 PAGE 2 FOR SUCH INFO, HOWEVER SUBJ "HOT INTERESTED." 5. mez) «6 RECD TELEGRAM 5 OCT FROM TWO CIS AGENTS ABROAD SHIP CIENFUEGOS IN BILBAO. MSG CONTAINED GREETING FOR Sevcee GP HE IDENTIFIED THEM AS: ALBERTO ORIA (AKA: JIMMY WINDOW) AND “MONGO FAMILIA." SAID ORIA ON OSTENSIBLE SIX MONTHS LEAVE FROM UNIV POST. BELIEVES THEY PLANNING OPERATE SPAIN AND FRANCE. SSEUON WILL RECONTACT SUBJ ON RETURN MADR. PLS ASSIGN CRYPT FOR SUBJ. S ECR ET pre ROW 2 Ig7g rane CIA SECRET e : % HW 50955 DBocld: 32203828 Page i2
SECRET 1a COPY: COULD NOT XEROX 10 December 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Officer SUBJECT: Last Meet with L-1 and Case Officer Jeeps according to his wife who spoke to him by telephone 10 December, hopes to return Tuesday, 15 December. L-1 will debrief him as soon as he returns on the situation in Havana, and as agreed, pass all information he collects through you. L-1 has no phone but will.contact you through@UBeR) You can call him at the residence at telephone number. EWE Sreturned from Madrid on 9 December with the information from (REPT carding the meeting with B-1. L-1 may meet with B-1 later but is not prepared to meet with him until after he talks with gi and finds out the details of the arrangements. L-1 is also concerned over his own security and that of the people inside Cuba whom he would be committing once he ties in with B-l. [ 3. Our official line to take with regard to B-1 is that he is operating from outside the United States, is doing what he can for his country, and is highly thought of. Although we would like to see B-1 and L- 1 get together, we do not want to be the brokers in the union. All we can do is encourage it indirect and permit them to make their own. decisions. . 1s in tull agreement with L-1 line of thinking regarding solution in Cuba and is the reason he would like to join forces. B-1 does not know and we do E plan to tell him that we are in direct contact with L- 1 nor does L-1 know and we do not desire he know that we are in' direct contact with B-l. 4. L-1 was told and fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree in the "first step" of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This _is where B-1 could fit in nicely in TR ae tel Ahearn pees oe nti ee ete ne giving any support he would request. nev rm emt ee Naat Bena atin echt penne? He RAEI 1978 SECRET ce HW 50955 Bocla: 32203828 Page i3
HY 0955 ,  SEpr Ey a re ! QA-/ of] Meeting in West Palm Eeach, Florida, 3 Jan 1965 sJECT: Ceacond Meeting Between -\ and L-{. in Madrid on °O December 1964 lh OHI returned to Madrid on 30 December 1964, Ba arrived at 1500 hours and by 1600 hours was in his second “ metting with Lomd, The meeting lasted until 2200 hours and took place in an apartment on the top floor of thehighest commercial building in Madrid. The apartment was rented the 1p = and e They rented the apart- ment and spent the night, one rea ‘ined in the anartwent until the conference took place, at arrived with cTHee vis oe : "In the apartment when od ieryaroy were [1 and . —-l was saying his hellos to. yy) and Lda stise PERSCAS Looked around the apartment for any "eoncealed ta recorders, He used the pretext of looking for something that the Spanish security service may have planted in the apartment. but was also checking on his brothers. EPefore leaving fis 3S) ordered three bottles of cider and four cans of beer, This. was delivered and everybody except L =) and © A —% left the aprtment., Tansy promised to call at 2000 hours to find out Ba 3 bo ivan .When they snould come and pick them up. 2. Tney started the conversation discussing mutual acquaintances and friends in Cuba. . i--"] Coes not think much of the DRS boys, especially Salvat, who is in Hiami at this time, but he does respect Alberto Muller who is in prison. He stated that Unller is havingtroubles in the Isle of Pines but he is cemonstrating his determination to resist any kind of indoctrination which is forced upon hin. fy -1l had a long list of government personalities which he had hidden in his coat. When he extracted the list from its hiding place, L. -l started to laugh. L. ~l asked whether 5 -j was also going to ask him about all these different oeapie because the Americang had also presented him with a long list‘ asking about the same people. He said the Americans always ask him about these people and also about the new arms that Fidel may have in Cuba, 3. L. -l mentioned that the first thing that may  ,\ interest _@®-1l pofore they started to talk about any ~ \\ personalities was that all the SAM sites were in Cuban hands | \ and not in Sevist hands, He also mentioned there were tyo ' groups with whom he was in contact besides his own group of the Directorio Revolucionario, one led by Cmdte. Efigenio “Dearie from the 26th of July group and a second group — ‘ | bee ee . Bocld: 32703828 Page i4
~2- also from the 26th of July. The latter is opposed to the | regime, but a prerequisite to joining in the coup is the . G€limination of Castro. The following officers are iembers of this grouo: Cmdtes. Sergio del Valle, Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army; Antonio Lusson y Eatlie; Guillermo Garcia Frias, Commander of the Western Army; and Victor Bordon Machado, Chief of Artillery, Western Arny. L.~l was not too lauditory concerning this group. He feels they want to reap thé fruit after the big job has been performed. On theother hand, regarding Ameijeiras, he claims that he has the courage and determination to proceed with what has to be done under any and all circumstances, — 5. (> --1 asked the following question of oC aq; If Fidel Castro should be eliminated, what officers would: ‘join a group which would oppose the Communist Party, aul Castro, Che Guevara and company. L_—{ mentioned Sergio del Valle. tI Claims that he has already talked to del Valle but the condition placed by him is the death of Fidel Castro or he is unwilling to participate in any kind of coup. According to .. |---| he has already spoken with del Valle, lusson, Guillermo Garcia Frias, and Victor Bordon Machado. All Of these people are in the same position as del Yalle; they are not willing to participate in anything until Fidel Castro is eliminated. In > | opinion, the following would also join the anti-Communist forces once Fidel Castre is sliminatea: uan Almeida Eosque, Celarming@ Castilla Has and Fsdro Miret. Another man who may also join them is “31 Gallego" Yernandez, but he has no trooos with him. The troops are very much opposed to him because he was a member of Batista's old army. He was then made a comandante in the new rebel arny. L-—| . feels that Cmdte. Wanuel Caspedes Fernandez, the deputy commander of the Nastern Army dn Oriente, will probably join an anti- Communist group. “Ll is not certain of Cespedes but does know his brother is anti-Communist. -L=-| has not yet — spoxen with or talxed with Cadte, Cscar Fernandez Mel who is the deputy commander in the Western Arny. L-\ is rela- tively sure fernandez will join them since Fernandez is against Castro since Fidel is living with Fernandez's wife, L-| is also certain that the members of the old army and the old navy will also join them although he has not had direct contact with these people. ie is sure of this because Fidel at svery opportunity warns Ramiro Valdes to check these people out and keep a careful waten on them, This group consists of Cmdte. Juan Ignayrra iatarran, Chief of the Eastern Naval Bistrict in FRanes, who | claims is a homosexual; Capt. Juan Valdez Reyes, member of PURS; Capt. Juan Valez Carrion, Naval Base Commander, Cienfuegos;. and Capt. Bonacio Porrata Nieves, Commanding Cfficer 2 gE SECRET . HY 50955 DBocld: 322038278 Page 15
HY 0955 \ ra claimed he didn't know the rest of the list FEmumeygn SESRET southern Sector of Eastern Naval District, Fidel has no confidence in these people and has placed below them people of confidence to watch over then, i_-{ dis not certain, but feels that Juan Almeida Eosque will probably join forces Vwith the anti-Castro, anti-Communist proup, aliso Cndte. Raul Seméegz Tomassevicn, Cahier Onerations of Central saroy. L- | had with hin, 6, Another man with whom ._..1-! 4s also in contact is Cmdte. Jose Ramon Sachado Yentura, the ‘iinister co Publie Health, Machado and Cadte. Raul Vallejo Crtiz are in the midst of a dispute since Vallejo is desirous of getting HMachado's ninistry. L~-t gave  (G-| the details and the exact locations where Fidel spends every Saturday and Sunday and specifically every Sunday at Varacero, ey | will take maps with him the next time he travels to Burope to see L~ | so he can pinpoint on the maps the exact locations where Fidel stays, Py— | is noping that tith these details he can prepare an operation against that point. Yaure Chomon Mediavilla, Minister of Transport, is 100 percent 1 Communist, (FNU) Garcia is also very close to Chomon and they ‘~ are both completely enchanted with Viarxism and Marxist theories, q. After discussing the different personalities, ___@-| and L--\ started talking about other matters, | ' informed ®-\ \ that the first Cuban exile leader with whoa RE ‘es DErrer FRONT he had talked was oe L-i escided to make this contact because he felt it necessary to ceveloo a concrete plan they could proceed to work on. le ~\ claims he was convinced that @-1 actually has something because of the way Fidel talks against him and is opposed to him even in private conversations. L—| Claims that the commando raids raise the morale and spirit of resistance of the people in Cuba. L-—t had one piece of advice for f-t , that is, &-| must concentrate his commando attacks on two targets. He was very insistent to forget military targsts but | to concentrate on economic targets, specifically sucar and FOL,’ Ne said these two items are in short supply and it infuriates. Fidel every time he looses one drop of o1i1 or ons pound of sugar. The other piece of advice _—| had for OQ | was that the frequency of the attacks should be stepsed up. He felt there was too much time between operations. In order to heat up the target, L<-\ also sugzvested that one month before the attempt on Fidel Castro as many targets as possible should y be hit in order to prepare the public and raise the morale and resistance spirit of the people, {_-| told A— | that the militiamen or the army will do nothing once Fidel is dead. They will sit back and wait to see what the Cuban public will do. If the Cuban public takes to the street, they will do nothing to SECRET Aub tw 978 BDocld: 3227038278 Page 16
~4— GLUHL 8. On this chord they started to reach a series of agreements, ({-/ at this point stated, "Now let's see n wnat I have, I have what I €old you, ny group trom. the—OR, : ‘ which I have again reactivated, and also the contacts with \ thasa other cocole that I have mentioned to you. I have also \ been in contact with the Americans since before tha Lay of Pigs. = have been out just about every year and every year Y have had contact with the Americans." He again repeated the facet that he had requested a silencer for the FAL from ths Americans which they had not been able to provide. Ne said, 4 "The Americans tried to zive me a radio to take to Cuba." \ Le 4 was against taking the risks of operating a radio \ in Cuba. (—| said, “The other things the Americans want 4 ne to do is to organize a coup, to organize a group of officers, battalions and regiments in order to carry out a coup against ridel. But what the Americans fail to realize is that they are not faced with another regular Latin American government in Cuba. _So long as Fidel Castro is around, this is impossible, When people from Washington come to talk With “He, they talk with a police mentality, not with a political mentality, recognizing the sitation in Cuba." He said “W_ comes to talk to him from Washington. He fails to believe now whether /” is even from Washington since he has asked him for a silencer and he won’t even give: him a silencer. \ | { 9, L-} claims the only thing that he is capable ‘| of doing is trying to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able 4 either to shoot him with a silencer or place a bomb in some | place where idel will be, de might use, for example, a small jj bomb that he can carry and place, or with his group attack, ” the residence where Fidel lives when he goes to Varadero, “| | These are the only things he can do, After that he has to pray and hope he isn’t caught. Te also stated he doos not want to become a martyr and does not want to exchange his Life for Didel’s. He confirma he is not a hero, he wants to \ live and gee what bappens after Fidel. He says he is not opposed to risking his life providing he has some assurance or some possibility of getting out and also of assuring himself that he will accomplish his mission. He claims that ~ once he eliminates Fidel, the comandantes that he hag men=- tioned before will join him. At this particular time, it is necessary for Q-\ to appear on the scene because this will convinces everybody that the Americans ara also backing the coup, He also clains that if he is unsuccessful in hig attsmpt against Pidel, it is tho same comandantes who will slit his throat in order to keep him from taliing. L-{ claims this is the reason he needs Ae|. If the attempt fails, he will have a place to go. If it is successful, Reve will also have @B-\ t to guarantee U. S. support. mere gos aes Te face cat (iF Wy 2 ¥ ? ee AGC 29 1975 GIA CS Gree BEGET a4 HY 50955 DBocld: 32203826 Page i?
HY 0955 _,. SECRET 10. L—-\. in discussing the political set up after Fidel, claims he is not opposed to is—| beinz president of the junta, provided there is an equal bumber of represen~ tatives on the junta from the internal group. Those from —-\'S group should be selected from the prisoners in ‘Cuba. For example, if there are six people on the junta. three vould be from i-1's and Ameijeiras's groups and j4—-) plus two of his group from inside Cuba. Ll. L.-| asked thrat the other members of the junta be revolutionary members who are presently in jail on tne Isle of Pines, that they not be old Latistianos or from the exile community. i_—! claims it has to be the former revolu- tionaries who have tow served time on the Isle of Pines in order to help cleanse the ones who have collaborated with the regime all this tine. L.-J feels they will need the 4nfluence the boys in prison can bring to bear on the masses, {ne other point that L- | insisted upon was that in the first three montha after a coup the Cuban exiles not be per- |; mitted to return to Cuba. The only ones who would be permitted to return, in a non-political and strictly technical fashion, | would be the doctors and the engineers, and only to work, not | to engage in politics. | 12, L~! asked, "Pirst, what do I need?” The first - thing he claims he needs is a means of escape. L-—{ said he needed escape routes provided by (A -4| not those belonging to the Americans, “If you fail me, then L-aw will kAl1l you and he is unable to kill the Americans." © & =| is going to provide _ with escape routes and —— piasea where B- | 4s able to pick him up. Ue will memorize these points and escape routes, He will not take anything back in writing. 13. .-—l also asked that % -\ do everything possible to organize one of the western provinces, either Pinar del Rio or Havana, where they could have a fall back position or where, once Fidel is eliminated,  \.-\ can go in order to take refuge during the period of chaos which may - follow. 14, ‘Next, BA-l 1s to provide | -\ either a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer, S| told [.-—|{ he did not know since he was not a technician, if it is possible to make a silencer for the FAL, . L-—\ stated.that the Americans also told him it was technically impossible because it would reduce the effective range of the FAL, but he wasn’t sure this was the case. If | can give L— \ a silencer, he will personally take the silencer back with him. If it is a régle with a silencer then iA-\ Will pug p cache for. L—-{ in Cuba. come SECRET BDocld: 3227038278 Page 18
__ SECRET 15, The other thing |{-| requested of A-\ was a bomb inside a suitcase, a cake, a lamp or any concealed bomb that he could place at Fidel’s side without being stopped nnd searched before retting there. de said, "Con't send me nny radios, don't expect me to operate any radios inside Cuba." 16, GM -\ offered ,-\ contacts inside Cuba. L_— thought about it and then stated ke would accept these contacts, but be would establish the contact after having _ ehecked them out; he did not want the contacts coming to hin or knowing who he was. 6 —\ agreed and stated this was perfectly satisfactory. 17. \--\ also would like to know the exact location of the cache before he returns so he can memorize this infor- mation. After the cache is in place, Look asked >| to write him a letter in French mailed in Paris, purporting to be from a French girl friend whom he had met there, talking about their love affairs in Paris. He will know when he receives this letter the cache is in place and he will go pick it up. L—| requested several letters be written to him in case one of the letters should get lost, Another thing he requested was that the cache be placed in a location where he could go with relative ease without causing suspicion, ©--\ was unable to remember but _-| did mention that the Anericans had either given him a cache or nad pro- mised him a cache. However, it was placed in such 2 location that it was impossible for him to go recover it. 13. L—l also requested that once Fidel was eliminated and the new government formed, they would have the recognition of at least five Latin American governments. ts had already offered this ana {—| approved of it. . 1, L—- | also requested that after every commando attack the propaganda reaching Cuba would state that ais attack vas made possible because of the intelligence received from the chief of the underground inside Cuba. Thanks to . L -P- who is the leader of the undergrcund this attack was “! 3 made possible. i.—|( . hopes that after Fidel Castro is cw oliminated, he will be able to disclese that he was ' “P* He also authorized & -.] to disclose that if something happens to L-| during this period, ~ 4-| is authorized to disclose that <P" was in fact t-te 2 agreed to this because he is aware of the complex which L-{ has because of the time he has spent inside doing nothing, going along with the Castro regime. ai Sa ot 1978 | | SEORER 4 4 : 4 HWY 350955 DBocld:32203828 Page 19
SEGRET 20, L.-| also requested that ®%—1{ ° be in Cuba one week before the climination of Fidel. (S--\ agreed to this provided no one, including L-\ xnow where he was hiding. At the time the elimination of Fidel takes place, L-| insists that. ®-|. must be in Cuba, L -\ . according to — Py —| has two complexes. One is from the fact that he has been with Fidel and the present regime for such a long time and no one realizes that, although he has been in contact with the Americans, he is unable to publicize the - fact that he has been workin? against Fidel for over three years. The second complex, and a very personal fear, is the fact that he may be_loft hanging by himself. He lacks confidence in overs body outside Cuba, The other considera~- tion that L-| raised with b-| “was, uponhis return to Paris, ne would type an original and one copy of the agree- ments. When they meet the next time, both fo wl and L-\ would sign both copies, -| would keep one - of the copies of the agreement, and the second copy would be placed in a safe deposit box to which t--\ would give the combination to a trusted person whom he did not identify, if yf betrayed 4i.-—\ or did not live up to the sere nent, hia confidant could publish the agreement, B-| would have the same privilege if L- i does not live up. to his part of the agreement. fy —| consicers the request ridiculous since no purpose can possibly be served by publishing such a document, but realizes this is also a part of L—-iss complex and will give L— | the feeling of some control over > -\ and his part of the agreement. c-/O WH/SA &-1 vee. File: internal Op HW 350955 DBocld:32203828 Page 20
-| cA Meeting in Vest Palm Beach, Florida, 3 Jan 1965 /7 ne SUBJECT:  Points-of Agreement Reached Between a -| 4 and el Le 7 . Following . are the: points on which. an agreement was reached: I. & —| is to. provide. “y- 7 with a silencer for the FAL; if-this is impossible, Qo .is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer. plus seyeral-bombs concegzled sither in a suitcese, g-lamp.- | or some other concealment device which he would be able to :. carry: and place. next to Fidel. Castro;. ttt roa “2. oy - “4s. to: provide: L | moe escape nibs controlled by. O-j .and not by: the Americans. _The lack of confidence: brilt.wp:by the Bay of Pigs looms. large... '-: LPR ARs zt a ae wr ta eee Dp 3. nD 5 is to prepare one of the western provinces, either Pinar ‘del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandestine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back position and a safe area where men and. “weapons are: available to the group. 4, S| is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination. of Fidel, but noone, including aor will know. D—[> location, 5. Q~) is to arrange for recognition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed, This junta will be established even though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of the part of the country. This is the reason i.—-| requested that Py 4 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be forned in that location. 6. One month to the day before the naatralization of Fidel, 6-} will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the soirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by op —| he must relata that the raid was possible thanks to the information receivyod from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by “P* This will be L.-j's3 war name. ‘a HY 50955 DBocld: 3227038276 Page 21
eive 7. S-| will im several “contacts insicdo € Cuba but will not disclose Lem dos identity to the contacts, therefore leaving the initiative for contact with Lim—{ « These contacts Ll will use itn case he hag to send an urgent message to ¢-—| outside Cuba. He will utilize the Clandestine nseudonym “pe in these messages. This will also serve as boua fideg and identification, 8. All theses points will be committed to writing, a copy of which will be Riven to | and a copy of which will be deposited in a safo deposit box in a bank to which ° | Will give the combination to a trusted friend, In case o-\ betrays any part of the agreement, his confidant will be authorize. to Publish this agreement. The same would pertain to | if \L- betrays any part of tho agreement. ‘This {n goneral was the essence of the meeting. (‘b ~\ Plans to return to Paris the end of January before i-\'S yeturn to Havana, At that time they will formalize their previous arreements and O-| will give L | what he has requested, CYoa WH/ SA/ File: Internal Op HW 50955 Bocla: 32203828 Page 22
HW 450955 (0 tno (] NO INDEX 16/FEB/1965 (J FILE IN CS FILE NO. a é MES te cn amd tae! SAGE FORM . Boy 4 ue =F oo . . " Ev rhe So ae ce cr ce 2 fe Se ee Se eat te SE ences ee eee rome cee ree ey spews sere we . DIRECTOR a ope fly ca aie Pde, ve, Free | INFO, : a ae GITE OR 855 02 SQUEST FOR MEETING AND } {NEY APPROVED, FYI, PEEL ED AS "LIVING" EXPENSES AND Nor ‘CONNECTED WITH REQUEST a FOR 10 ,000 DOLLARS FOR OPS, WHICH, AS PARI “AWARE, WAS REFUSED, ALSO INTERESTING NOTE TO CONSIDER: Is FACT THIS REQUEST APPARENTLY REPRESENTS SWALLOWING OF PRIDE BY .£-f AND ALSO PERHAPS TEST BY HIM WHETHER 10,000 DOLLAR TURN DOWN WAS ACTUALLY FOR OPS CONSIDERATIONS As EXPLAINED TO HIM AT TIME, OR WHETHER IT INDICATION | C/A” DOUBTING HIS NTEGRITY AND ABILITY SERVE AS USEFUL ALLY. ; 2. REQUEST Gam orem DentEr IN DEPTH FOR REMAINDER UNANSWERED L-/ RQMS, OF WHICH COPY LEFT PARI BY 7 C/o ALSO MOST INTERESTED FOLL: ALL DETAILS CUBAN AMBASSADORS RECENT MEETING MADRID; REASONS FOR CHE'S TRIP TO CHINA AND PURPOSE HIS FORTHCOMING FAST AFRICAN TRIP; ALL DETAILS OF CLOSELY-HELD MEETING LATIN AMERICA CP'S IN HAVANA LAST WEEK NOV 64, _PARTICULARLY WHAT WAS OUTCOME DECISIONS REACHE POINTS OF CONTENTION, AND HOW MUCH DID IT CONTRIBUTE 0 RESOLUTION CUBA'S. » PREDIGANENS) yis-a-vzs SOVIET-CHICOM SPLI?; IS CARILLO GOING ALGIERS SOON TOSMEET CHE AND IF 59, WHY? APPR ia COORDIMATING onicrasaan Hee a é RELEABING OFFICER Bocld: 3227036828 Page 23
wee tm fe is rn “MESSAGE FORM _ Ox § ECRE TY _. () No inoex - 0 FILE IN CS FILE NO. ' OM: DIRECTOR _ | ceis - PAGE to a : a on ; Bs succes? NONEY. ‘PAID, AFTER DEBRIEF. — :END_ or “MESSAGE a Oe, lee _ CABLE SEC: _ PLS GIVE ONE, cory TaIS. CABLE AND REPLY TO CATE, - foe ret 8 Lt oe *. 2 - se - . oe : are oo S.lF : a . ‘ = 2 . bee on = . & « Lp a : > core = ore - . - . . « . a o a ; “whsa/eon — . WH/sa/. , | w/e “AUG = 5 Se Sa Boe A opis/oG | ne : ey AC /VID of ; b ‘ & COORDIMATING Totten e bag cee ee ee t Lee eles 1 Gaur ; AUTHENTICATING mecasine orrices - Bee E Cc R E a tga tae ena _ «OFricka HY 50955 DBocld: 3227038276 Page 24
HW 50955 SECRET u “18 March 1965 WEVORANDUM: : : a ; SUBJECT! Proposal to Fxploit. .4-/ and ee Jose Rebellos in Aw Operation Oo _ It is proposed that at the next meating with ®) we pass a message as follows: — . "A big comandants or capitan who uced _to be a leader of the university students opened a numbered (secret) acccunt in Switzerland through,Colombian Suarez (ay -guccessor). He was traveling in Burope at _ that time, roughly Deceuber. 1964-January 1965. --The deposit was in the anount of $10,000." _The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to both . L-é _ and Jose Rabellons: both Ara’ past presicertsce so. of the FEY (Federation cf University Students), one is 2 comandinte and the other a captain, ard both were traveling ~. oh 2. Subject proposal has taken the fo into consideration. 7 . - in Eurcpe in December 1964-January 1965. llowing information an - L-[- a a a) re Dt a... The-recerdr~ The file shews that since . April 1959 and repeatedly since then) <-/ not done so. He also was reportedly on the has throatened to eliminate CASTRO, bit has) verge several times of defecting but never dic. There are numerous reperts of varying credibility eee ns Eas poer-and is Cagire agent. His character isp such that he has been described _. dn a report aa ‘a probable thief, a possible. = _: Ygap of Rarcorics, a—heaosexial_or_a_triendof _. homosexuals,” but also "an exceedingly brave Qan.” Various reports indicate that he is a =. heavy drinker and a party lover.” Thus a person | iret ¥aLts could resonably be believed - to/H@ involved in irregular financial transactions. FOR : - Boclda: 32270362738 Page 25
If L-/” ‘is a Castro agent and ee castro should be aware of _.4-/ 's relation Pree ' ship with Gs Castro might conclude th , iy eg a L-j received the money fros C/A itt pb ae” banked it without. reporting it, and was in ee ae ee os ‘fact working with C/A {C28Ero. pues os (At the recent meetings L-{/ gee v ~ asked us for $10,000. We did rot’ ‘give him fae tats sum, thought a Ee seve hin $7,000.) Lc! Coord \ . ‘ - kg o's... Yf for: any reason the regime should We | re do away with- £-/ | his alleged sympathizers > , im AKA in the Armed Forces might feel they must react. f | . at once to save their own skins." Given the. /7 Ae’, HW 450955 SECRET ~2 = ee ew b. - Favorable factors (fron” " OPS standpoint): In the sguumer of 1962 L-f a in a Eurcpean bank "for a rainy day." In March 1961. e-l showed great sensitivity cn the subject of bank accounts BP S500 in Helsinki to be deposited in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that “he might shoot any o2ficial so invoived. ' ¢. ‘Conclusion: While it-cannot ho. discounted that, pare “may be. Castro _ - £ROEt,—tt-aay bo that be has been sinccre “da Bis dealings with C/A Resolution of coubts throurh an Poly GRAPH interview has been impossible since  L-f bit the ceiling when the matter, was first nenti oned. ova. Presumably . OAs interest in” a hey is to see him carry out his mission to eliminate CAS7KO The above proposal . “may actually stimulate the desired action. “If i -{ is questioned by tha regime in. connection with this charge, and should the -investigation involve a certain amount of harassment and unpleasantnesa, he night well reach the conclusion that the time to take - matters into his own hands (which he has threatened to do for several years). has at. (| last arrived. Co. a tense political situation in Cuba today, this is not out of the question and certainly thi » proposal could split the regime | more. Docld: 322036828 Page 26 1) o . Le > we ie ey ty a ger 59? do ko 3 8 - = cen? pepo YUE os
HW 450955 ‘ Ww ' Co Pri co song re Ce | . Jose Rebellon oe _ SO ' Ion ie fated foteka Rebe is cn-centreversial gosd target for inelusioa in this OPS play for ‘the » following reasons: a. Be is close to Castro, ag well as to L-j/ . and has a Communist background, ve b, He is familiar with the $80,000 account cpened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador . Carrillo in the fall of 1964... Rebellon hag “been authorized by Castro to Gray on that - fund for purchases related to Castro's pet ‘projects. Castro might think that Rebellon had raided Castro’ s own official fund. Srarn “As with Ley any action by the _ “\**" ‘pegime against Rebellon might widen splits in te “Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness , and tensions in interpersonal relati caships that we desire. st oe Docld: 32203828 Page 27 é : . Pe te - . 5 - ' 4 Jet ~ . vy ~ Ce rs « ° Oa ; cael - be ~ an ae. - ; - an - - = ~ ‘ ‘ ! . ' s . a eee a a) < a “8 ope aw, » : : Oe oe eR we Po reh WR  aed a i ae a ne ° ; So . ; . : x. ~ Pa 2 . 2 eh ; . aw wl mo _ " oh * + , = : A ITY . te! se . . * - @
oe Beane v2 23 waren 1945 HSNORANOUM FOR THE RECORD i 70: C/Pt | . PO We Yee ‘oot nd . Aa Vie tt™ « ta , . Subject: L_-/ On aon a Reference: DIR 96056- H~/:s TRAINTG aND. L=] Sow awe pal “Mae Se OT In view of the fact that it was a policy of, Ane @- 1 062) conpaax aan not to disseminate any of the information, inclusive of th L-!. connection, 4° outside of the (2-! office and that of the C/wa, it may. ve possible that «-t- your office has not seen the attached Mexorandum of conversations between ees /.-!/ | and G-{ ~. In it, £.-t explains and cites the military y connections he nas, their conditions for nelping nin, their positions, et cetera, Tnis may be of interest to your office. In addition, £-/ . has made it clear that he has no materiel needs, “~ other than the “10,000 which he requested (Waich was not made available), a The money was ne edad to keen zertain peonls in certain positions, if necessary; Sos ft ye _brives under some ci irounstances; for Sis ésea ,-tP-possibie, eb cetera, ~~ When (+p ramsey to hives hire money \ save him 37,00, Lat | hinself is trying separately to raise #3, 005 (C we ves am anna semerectettietaeeciis FYI: Although e/5r7-> and C/o assured £—f on 22 Novemoer 19453 that @/A would give him everything he needed ‘(telesconi Sight, silencer, all the money he wanted) the situation changed when . 2/O and ! a/S/-S left the meeting to discover tat President Kennedy had bceen assassinated, Because of this fact, plans with 4&~/ changed and it was decided tnat we could have nod part in the assassimmtion of a sovernment leader (includinz Castro) and would not aid | in this attemrt. Tnis included the following: We would not furnish the silencer, nor ecope, nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not Lift a finger to help L-f escape from Cuva should he assassinate Castro, oan pesos) inside Cuba. w £-/ was not informed of the information in the preceding paragrann ute until he was seen by: @/o in November 1944. 2.74 understood tris, However, we attempted to have the same ends accomplisiied for L-/ via f-| . (9-]} furnished him with the silencerviich, he carried in on 23 February 1045, has made some plans Torvis-esespe ir A-/ has tie opportunity, __ and told him he could count on his nelp, L--f made A g/ pub this in Ib kite ~ LO clear his own part in it -- Sut since then appears to mve decided _ that he neither likes AI nor trusts nim, Ue refused. to accept the 10, coo from him since he had just recently met him and , in a aad, not emtnrt ‘Lo be obligate d to hin, pes “igs a, Is a7 HW 350955 DBDocld:32203826 Page 23 .