| 180-10147-10166 Met roe aoe weet ta” ’ t i ‘ i L lan? we ~ ; ee : Fy _\ 2 Classification: . ‘e _ it J lL. (This form is to be used for material extracted pom 6 gt) from ClA—controlled documents.) plas 4S ee ete ee In 1964, the CIA advised the Warren Commission that the Agency! never had a relationship of any kind with Lee. Harvey Oswald. Testifying before the Commission, John ‘A. McCone, who was then Director of Central Intelligence, indicated that Oswald "was not an agent, employee, or - informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or = solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him directly or in any other manner...Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency." / McCone's testimony was ~ corroborated by Richard M. Helms, then the Agency's N ‘Deputy Director for Plans and therefore the person directly responsible for clandestine operations. _/ Once these assurances had been received, _/ the record reflects no CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO G9 my DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR ops gs LEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT Classification: 7 Ree IN ED . . —{~ Classified by derivation: /2197- 1016 > ee ke | ea Se LESS SE, “NU 6, f e (Siete ET : ae werAce a
Ch Classification! {This form is to be used for material extracted . from ClA—controlled documents.) RETESET . £urther efforts by the Warren Commission to investigate “Wieden this matter. ~ The Committee sought | to ‘resolve the issue of Oswald's o> Sheed > alleged /association with the ‘cra by ‘conducting an inguiry SSR, aa that went sevona’ the: tvési@ad level’ ci Geathtng “aéstenseea’ o 4 _ from two of the Agency's most senior officials. Instead, | ¢ a more analytical investigative approach was utilized. | { ; a ee — f we’ _. First, an effort was made to identify circumstances either | j in Oswald's life or in the manner in which his case was Neve se ETHIE, handled by the CIA which were potentially suggestive of an : intelligence association of.some kind. Then, an intensive . j j file review was undertaken which included both the CIA's wt 144-volume Oswald file and hundreds of others from the CIA, 4 as well as the FBI, State Department, and the Department of Strrereert aes, Defense. / Based upon these file reviews, a series of Classification: EPP 8 cen, ec oo i Classified by derivation: LF EF LT -
"Reteeraae «sot ati ges OO Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted ‘from CiA*+controlled documents.) — interviews, depositions, and executive session hearings were conducted with both Agency and non-Agency witnesses. The contacts with present and former CIA personnel covered a broad range of individuals, including staff and division chiefs, clandestine ‘ase offices, area desk officer's, research analysts, secretaries, and ‘clerical assistants. In total, more than 125 persons, including at least 50 "present and former CIA employees, were questioned regarding this issue. The results of this investigation confirmed the Warren Commission testimony given by Messrs. McCone and Helms. There was no indication in Oswald's CIA file suggestive in any way that he had ever had any contact with the Agency. Moreover, the Agency employees who would have been in a position to know if Oswald had been associated with the CIA u asaiky denied that he had been an agent Carrion: o~ Lo ss =< —" | Classified by derivation: LE LF | a
wine teem “aa eat mentite ety, "Nd tine a's . Nao oe set ame ates SE LF LF aad KE att oh wa oF Classification: a — © (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClIA<ontrolled documents.) or connected with the CIA in any other capacity. / he Finally, taken in their entirety, the items of circumstantial ‘evidence that the Committee had selected for investigation | as possibly indicative of an intelligence association did . hot support ‘the allegation that Oswald had-an.intelligence __ agency relationship ‘of some -kind.. This finding, however, must be qualified because the same institutional characteristics, in terms of the Agency's extreme compartmentalization and the complexity of its ‘ enormous filing system, that are designed to preclude penetration by foreign. powers have the simultaneous effect of making Congressional inquiry very difficult: For example, CIA personnel testified to the Committee that a review of Agency files will not always indicate whether an individual was affiliated with the Agency in any respect. Nor was there always an independent means of verifying that all Classification: oo +( o | Classified by derivation: PRONE.
i ns : 7 Ci Clesifiction: 4 a | i ¢ A (This form. is to be used for material extracted r from ClA=conitfolled documents.) b | 7 materials requested from the Agency were, in fact, provided KC Accordingly, any finding which.is essentially negative in | f nature, such as that Lee Harvey Oswald was neither associated with the CIA in any way nor ever even. in contact with that _ 7 + dnstitution,.canngt be rendered in absolute. terms. <2. To the extent possible, however, the Committee's — ; investigation was designed te overcome the Agency's aa | t 4 "institutional obstacles that potentially impede effective | ap ee [Oo ee a of Fe external scrutiny of, thé CIA.. fhe vast majority of CIA. yo ? files made available to the Committee were reviewed in / f | unsanitized form. freee files were evaluated both for their substantive content and for any potential procedural oO 4 j . irregularities suggestive of possible tampering. After - | t + . . noe . ra review, the files were used as the basis for examination 1 ° and cross~examination of present and former Agency Classification: we \ , Classified by derivation: Ae
= ete mages oe 1) ear temadtene hele oy ooo “qa emer otros ( ) Classification: __ “(This form is to be used for material extracted ‘from ClIA—controlled documents.) employees. Because of the number of Agency personnel who were queried, it is highly probable that any significant inconsistencies between the files and the witnesses’ responses would have been established. Classification: Classified by derivation: Sree eH, POPET HAIN AY yo. ERR, San veneer, aN neo Aewmae NA mart,
Ch Classification: = _ ancaee ; O t if i q at i 3 (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA=—controlled documents.) ' SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 1. CIA Personnel in_the Soviet Russia Division - In addition to obtaining testimony from former directors John H. McCone and Richard M. Helms, the /coninittse interviewed individuals who were chiefs of the’ CIA's soviet Russia division during 1959-1963.* These individuals categorically denied that Oswald had. ever "been associated in any capacity with the CIA. To investigate this matter further, the persons who had been chiefs and/or deputy chiefs during 1959-62 of the | three units within the Soviet Russia division which were Nyhan Batiste ty responsible respectively for clandestine activities, . ot *The chief(s) of the Soviet Russia division from August 1962 ‘to September 1963 was not interviewed by the Committee. Classification: Classified by derivation: . Ae LP LE
Stee (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) , Na American legal travelers, and research in support of clandestine activities.* The heads of the clandestine PPI PLE MH, activity section stated] during this period the CIA had | i ‘3 an i . . o very few operatives in the Soviet Union and that Oswald . = fuss | . 2 | Was. not. one of then. Moreover, ‘they: Stated that: because of 7 . a ml Ma osm te surname : . q his. obvious instability, Oswald would never have met the Ne ows mentees te RTT, Agency's standards for use in the field.**. Phe heads of the *For the unit that was responsible for American legal travelers, only the years. 1959-61 were covered. However ,. since every American legal traveler who was involved in this program was recruited before his trip to the Soviet Union, the relevant year for Lee Harvey Oswald was 1959 because that is when he departed Leroy epee United States. wenn Claes “| ‘One officer’ acknewtedgyes the remote possibility that an af . individual could be run by someone as part of a "vest pocket” 4 ' operation without other Agency officials knowing about ite dust en this possibility, as it applies to Oswald, was negated by the deputy chie --Of.the Soviet Russia —~ clandestine activities sectiony! commented that in 1963 he was involved in a review of every. Piandestine operation ever run | SBOE ere, New + 0 am veterly PTO Be BA, ‘ ere uy 1 « din the Soviet Union, and that Oswald was not involved in ; _\. any of. these cases. oo mo, es a
4 a ee, |. Classification: —___ _ © y | (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA=-controlled documents.) Soviet Russia division's Agerican—hegal Traveter—pregeatipes: Sought coopal>~ ot, “ig art by — i ae the Soviet Union as a means of obtaining information and sdentitying _ possible subjects for recruitment, informed the Committee “that they met with éach person i - i ‘and that Oswald was not one of them. | These Agency officials ,- . ne _. oe - a eee Aenenen a . . e also ‘advised the Committee that only "clean-cut" college “2 jy | graduates were used in this Progra, and that Oswald did Ee “e -\ not meet this criteria. © Finally, ‘the Agency officers in . ) e& \ oni | charge of the Soviet Russia division's research section in support of clandestine activities indicated that, had : .. sla ste 88 Oswald been. contacted by the Agency, their section would ; \ - probably have been informed, but that this, in fact, never { - occurred. Sek | -. Classification: & a AS PME A, SHE, SAP ta,
“ * semete sibee "\ ean ante Wasetes es cotalin Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<énitrolled documents.) lay @ 2. CIA Personnel | | The Committee investigated the allegation of former CIA employee [who testified in executive ‘session that shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy he was advised by fellow employees at the CIA's om ( nae Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent who had received financial disbursements under an assigned cryptonym. |] [pxplained that he had been employed by the CIA as a finance officer from 1957 until his resignation from the Agency in 1966. In this capacity, he served 4s a fiscal account assistant on the support staff ( } exon June of 1960 to June 1964. [| _sdavised that in addition to his regular responsibilities, he had served security duty on his off~hours in order to supplement his income. This additional job put him in contact with Classification: esr ny © sapere oe some AP CTY ETI, SERIE Sevres HeRN. SIP hn,
assigned a cryptonym and that Wilcott himself had Classification: ty (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) [ho other employees of the [ who would come by the office and engage in informal conversations regarding politics and their work. told the Committee that on the day after President Kennedy's assassination, he was informed by a CIA case officer that Lee Harvey Oswald was a CIA agent. [| further testified that he was told that Oswald had been unknowingly disbursed payments for Oswald's project using (Pe en ep ee ee aetna Scns einstein Yona nae gman that cryptonym. Although | was unable to identify the specific case officers who had initially informed him of - Oswald's Agency relationship, he named several employees of the | with whom he believed he had subsequently _ discussed the allegations. advised the Committee that after learning Classification: | | A - lla | Classified by derivation: sep ryre ere pores wt ee SEN TARS SATB PPAR NTT
es 2 BER 7, a a a ae aa a oe a Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted ; from ClA—controlled documents.) ; : , of the alleged Oswald connection to the CIA, he had never > rechecked the disbursement records for 3 evidence of the Oswald project. He explained that this was f _ because at that time he viewed the information as mere shop : | talk and gave it little:credence, Neither did he report “ b v “the allegations to any formal investigative bodies following the assassination as he considered the information to be hearsay. Sem, | In an attempt to: investigate | allegations x concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's relationship with the CIA, the . en deaemttlysh, N Committee interviewed. several present and former CIA employees who were selected on the basis of the position each had held with the CIA during the years 1954-1964. Among those persons interviewed were individuals whose responsibilities |e . Od during this period, including the chief and deputy chies (os } covered a broad spectrum of areas within ened Ned etnatrostate QUE, Classification: —_ — . L Classified by derivation: 2d eis
Neneasteee * aena ely 55 amnatrtn atts, he Looe etonn, ra eat ent tate, wre 6 nee ter Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA——controlled documents.) as well as officers in finance, registry, the Soviet Branch and counterintelligence. _/ The Committee's investigation During | none any documents Harvey Oswald known to anyone until the time of publication of Warren refuted Wilcott's allegation. the course of their employment in enel | . of these individuals interviewed had ever seen or heard any information indicating that Lee was a CIA agent. / This allegation was not SUP ree Commission critical literature and the Garrison investigation in the late 1960's. / ‘Some of the individuals, including the chief of counterintelligence within the Soviet Russia Branch that Lee Harvey Oswald had been recruited by the KGB SOAR VET Re AERTS OS BEB, expressed the belief that it was possible eye ROR, during his military tour of duty in Japan as the CIA's ids Peper, had identified a KGB program aimed at recruiting Classification: | \ Qe ae | : Classified by derivation:
Metene cenene: ‘ . : \ etnsete ablated Sy etree it sail ner chip Abadene Classification: - } (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClAS—<énirolled documents.) ULS. military personnel in Tokyo during the period that Oswald was stationed there. An intelligence analyst whom LOI SEF LF naa specifically named as having been involved, following the assassination, in a conversation regarding the Oswald-CIA agent allegation told the Committee that he was not in the at that time. A review of this individual's Office of Personnel file confirmed that, in (B fact, he had been transferred from the/| to the , oo United States in 1962. i The chief of the| Deron 1961-1965 stated that, had Oswald been used by the Agency within their jurisdiction, they certainly would have known about it. Similarly, almost all those persons interviewed who worked | AR in the Soviet Russia branch indicated that they would have known if Lee Harvey Oswald had, in fact, Classification: +4 “ /4 “~ | Classified by derivation: SEF SEF 53S EYED. NET to, SOP UERE ON, seryreerrcs WIT eT REA, SUE PS “GVA EP “Err pp SEI ST ET PET Ye, ~
Neaiteann “ Lr Seer Classification: § ‘ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) been recruited as a CIA agent when he was in Japan. _/ These persons expressed the opinion that had Oswald been recruited without their knowledge, it would have been a rare exception contrary to the working policy and guidelines of the 3. Lee Harvey Oswald's CIA File The CIA has long acknowledged that, prior to the President's assassination, it had a personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald. This file, which in Agency terminology is referred to as a 201 file, was opened on December 9, 1960. The Agency has explained to the Committee that 201 files are opened when a person is considered to be of potential intelligence or counterintelligence significance. The opening of such a file is designed to serve the purpose of cous Viel t3-~ Chet Ve bringing ati tetmeiey CIA Mp information pertaining to that Classification: —_ / 1 ~ Classified by derivation: SUFI OT Te, oy RUT OR, RE per gene, SPOR en aol iN ROTATE, AU,
BD AOR Oren atte atte sot te \ eaten . - connote any actual relationship or contact. with the CIA. GO | Classifietign: ws iat | | es Or (This form is to be used for material extratted — from ClA—controlled documents.) Loi . — . individual into one * centralized Gecords syste elonging to the Deputy Directorate for Operations, that component ' o£ the Agency responsible for clandestine activities. The existence of a. 201 file does not necessarily For example,- the Oswald file \ A ot wh cleaay 2 because he was considered to be a potential counterintelligence “ threat. Oswald's -file contained absolutely no indication that he had ever had any relationship with the CIA. Nevertheless, because the Committee was aware o£ at least one instance (in an unrelated case) where an Agency officer had apparently seme contemplated the use of faked files. with forged documents, _/ special attention was given to procedural: questions that were occasioned by this file review. Classification: “~w PY AIT
Seoace etched ewe Para 5. . eee a (This form is to be.used for material extracted from ClA-—controlled documents.) a) Why was Oswald's 201 file opened on December 9, 1960, more than a year after his attempt to defect to the Soviet Union? A confidential State Department telegram dated October 31, 1959,which was sent from Moscow to the CIA, - reported that Lee Harvey Oswald, a recently discharged marine, had appeared at the United States Moscow embassy to renounce his Americah citizenship and "has offered Soviets any information he has acquired as /an/ enlisted radar operator." _/ At least three other communications of a confidential nature which gave more detail on the Oswald case were apparently* sent to the CIA during the same *Two of these documents, Warren Commission Exhibits 917 and “ 918, contained routing notations indicating that they had been sent to the CIA, but the documents themselves were never found in Oswald's file. Classification: Classified by derivation: se enn ore eevee
A ‘was not opened until December 9, 1960. = oe CO Classification: a eee al (This form is ‘to be used for material extracted . y from ClA—controlled documents.) 7 approximate time period. __/ Agency officials questioned by the Committee have testified that. the substance of the October 31, 1959 cable was sufficiently important to warrant. the opening of a 201 file. In fact, however, Oswald's file the cra was requested by the Committee to indicate where documents pertaining to Oswald had been disseminated internally and stored prior to the opening of his 201 file. In response, the Agency advised the Committee that because document dissemination revords of low national security significance are retained for only a five-year period, they are no longer in existence for the years 1959-1963. _/ Consequently, the Agency was unable to explain either when these documents had been received or by which component. Classification: | | Oo — FF - Classified by derivation: ETE an, SORE R HE, PCO TEE, WL APP ETO ERD, Sep Pale eee, ETO TERE, tom ermeretn cant, Se rte erate
Ty ey Classification; { y oo | (This form is to be used for material extracted a from ClA—controlled documents.) 4 An Agency memorandum, dated September 18, 1975, “indicates that Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960 by virtue of the receipt of five documents: two from the FBI, two from the State Department, and one from the Navy « _S _: @his reasoning, however, isinconsistent with the presence in Oswald's file of four State Department documents dated in (1959 and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. It is, of course, possible that the September 18, 1975 memorandum is referring - to State Department documents that were received by the DDO cuit Neti. in October and. November of 1960 and that the earlier State Department communications had been received by the CIA's com, ne Office of Security but not the BBO. In the absence of a ” Nehamnaten nam dissemination records, however, the issue cannot be \ | resolved on this basis. 2? The September 18, 1975 memorandum also states that : Classification: - a. __ a Zz, — Classified by derivation: . Aes
Ne genten te met, cee - ee igo m ef. \his "‘defection' to the USSR on 10/31/59 and renewed interest: | - used to start a file on Oswald does not resolve this issue om the "source document" that initiated the action makes reference . Classification: —-_ fe (This form is to be used for material extracted . from ClA—controlled documents.) \ a SE CN, pm ttt et 9! Oswald's file was opened on December 9, 1960las a result of i a ij i / oe reentry into the United States." / {there is no indication, jenn, __ however, that Oswald expressed, any ‘intention of. returning. to any United States government saetstes 1 atta ‘aa-Febrery - Of 1961. Finally, reference to the original form that was because the appropriate slot which would normally indicate yt to an Agency component rather than to a dated document. The Committee. was able to determine the basis for the | opening of Oswald's file on December 9, 1960 by interviewing and then deposing the Agency employee who was directly — responsible for initiating the opening action. This individual Classification: . | Classified by derivation: bahia LN PREP HA,
.- 4 | involved. fo C\ Classification: - (This form is to be. used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) - xplained that the CIA had received a request from the State Department for information concerning American defectors. After compiling the requested information, she responded to the inquiry and then opened a 201 file on each defector this“Sstatement was corroborated by review of State Departméntjwiich indicated that such a request, in fact, had " been made of the CIA on October 25, 1960. Attached to the State Depart ment letter was a List of known. defectors; Lee Harvey Oswald's name was on that 1st. _/. -the CIA. - responded to this request on November 21, 1960 by providing the requested information and adding two names to the State Department's original list. Significantly, the Committee reviewed the files of eleven individuals on the original State Department list Classification: ___-}. \= | — Beet Classified by derivation: SIEM RTT, OT (Sy >
9 taba aden eee cabins + "Nba eintcctnlatin F CY Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) and determined that the files for each of the five (including Oswald) who did not have Agency (201) files prior to the ‘receipt of the State Department inquiry were opened in | December 1960. In each case, the slot for “source document” ‘made reférence to the same Agéncy component rather than tos. ‘a dated document. Even sO, this analysis only explains why a file on. Oswald was finally opened; standing alone it does not explain: the leeningiy tong delay) in the opening of the file. To determine whether such a delayed opening was necessarily unusual, the Committee reviewed the files of 13 of the 14 soy persons on the CIA's November 21, 1960 response to the State Department and of 16 other defectors (from an original list. of 380) who were American born, had defected during the years 1958-1963, and who had returned to the United States Classification: apt are eg, ceemeer sous ste tt
f 4 “ a , bog Cs Classification: _ (This form is to be used for. material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) . ° during that same time period. Of 29 files that were reviewed, cad - @ight individuals had been the subject of 201 files prior to the time of their defection. In only four of the remaining twenty-one cases were 201 files opened at the time of Netanidin Nts ; defection. ‘The files on the 17 other. defectors were opened from four. months: to several years after the time of defection. p- At the very least, this file review. indicated that : _. during 1958-63 the opening of a file years after a defection ; 7 me 7 ae ee ie a was not ‘at all uncommon. In many cases the opening was Ne ethinn te triggered by some event, independent of the defection, which . i drew attention to the individual involved. b) Why was Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file opened under ; ae the name Lee Henry Oswald?. , . — —— ‘Lee Harvey Oswaldts 201 file was mistakenly opened ; . ae ; under the name Lee Henry Oswald. No Agency witness was able Classification: Classified by derivation: Sra ert,
foe me oe ee oO ‘Classification: -€- J “(this form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents, a J specifically to explain how this mistake was made, All Agency personnel, however, including the person who initiated the file opening, testified that this must have been occasioned innocently by bureaucratic error. Moreover, the Committee _Feceived substantial testimony to ‘the effect that. this error would not have preventéd Oswald's name from being elicited from the CIA's filinc system during a routine name trace done Adven i . under the name Lee Henry Oswald. | . - ee . ° c) What do the letters!."AG," which are written in the space for "Other Identification" on Oswald's ‘201 t. opening form, connote? t. ee _ The form used to initiate the opening of a 201 file Y for Lee Harvey Oswald containsthe designation AG ina box ; marked "Other Identification." Because this term was considered s to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of , 4 rhs oo Oswald's alleged Agency relationship, the CTA\was asked to use —— Classification: : ea _ | Classified by derivation:
defectors to the East or the SINO/SOVIET Bloc including _<Cuba," and that anyone so described could. have the OI . . defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. . Cy Classification: % (This form is to’ be used Hor material extracted j ? from ClA—controlled documents.) explain its meaning. The Agency's response indicated that "AG" is the OI ("Other Identification") codé meaning “actual or potential code "AG." This codé was reportedly added to Oswald's | opening form because of the. comment on the form that he had _-An Agency official who was {DdO records expert and for many years had been involved in the CIA's investigative efforts concerning. the John F. Kennedy assassination, gave the Committee a somewhat. different explanation of the circumstances surrounding the term "AG" and its placement on Oswald's opening form. This individual testified that "AG" was an example of a code used to aid in preparing computer listings of ata ae ee groupings or intelligence affiliations: Classification: é i } g - . | Classified by derivation:
eren epee eres "Nudiaeme eens “erborctine @arune’ Neda endanas s oe -" Classification: ~ _ (This form is to be used for materiol extracted from CIA—<ontrolled documeénts:). He explained that these codes always utilized two létters and that in this case, the First letter "A" must have represented Communism, while the second letter would represent some category within the Communist structure, “His recollection was that atthe time of the. “assassination the “AG" code was not yet in existence because © there were no provisions then. in effect within the Agency for _the indexing of American defectors. He recalled that it was only during the life of the Warrén Commission that the CIA realized that its records system lacked provisions for indexing an individual such as s Oswald... _Consequently, the CIA then revised XC nee eos to include authorization for indexing American defectors and established a code for its computer system to be used for the category of "American defectors." Although this individual did not know when the Classification: a ’ | Classified by derivation: SET, G7) aN
ets toe trees on, _ | 4 Classification: ee ‘2 ? (This form is to. be used for material extracted from CIA-+contiolled documents. ~ notation "AG" was added to Oswald's opening sheet, he presumed 5 : i - | | | ; . 4 that it would have to have been following the addition of a the American defector code, thus placing the time somewhere 7 _in the middle of the Warren Commission's investigation. - He | op OSS} éxplained ‘that ‘it was a. ficult to determine whenany.of the . , notations on the opening sheet were made, since it was standard procedure to update the forms whenever.necessary so that they. | 7 were as reflective as possible of the available information. Finally, this individual testified that the regulations ; regarding the use of this occupation. and intelligence code specifically prohibited indicating that a particular person was either an employee of the Agency or someone who was used - : . oO - - 2 \ by the Agency. _/ This prohibition was designed to prevent . , j anyone from being able to produce any kind of categorical listing of CIA employees, contacts, or connections: a, Seg | . Classification: a 7 i Lu ¥ Classified by derivation:
: te d. age ge: “" Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted - from CIA=controlled documents:) d) Why does the opening form for Lee Harvey Oswald's _ ; 201 file indicate that the file was to be restricted? ; The form that was used to initiate the opening. of Lee i: ; é Harvey Oswald's 201 file contains a notation indicating that h “the file was to be "restricted." This indication was’ considered potentially significant because of the CIA's practice of restricting agents’ files to persons on a "need ; _ to know" basis. Further investigation, however, revealed that restricting . access to a file was not necessarily indicative of any relation- ship with the CIA. The individual who actually placed the restriction on Oswald's file testified that this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of any developments that might have occurred with regard to the file. This purpose was achieved ® because any person seeking access to the file first had to a Classi: ication: ie ' Classified by derivation: OTT, “UI “ETT, SHORTER SWEET, EET,
4 “etn cate Weta: oy vsetiohels, “Nt mena Sa OQ) Classification; (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClIA=controlled documents.). . notify the restricting officer; at that time the restricting officer could be apprised of any developments possibly necessitating access to the file by someone else. This testimony was confirmed by a CIA records expert oo Whe further testified. that, had’ the file beén pérmanently cvdtlsed as well as vestrictea, the possibility of a relationship with the CIA would have been greater. There was no indication on Oswald's form that it had been placed on permanent change. Finally, the Committee reviewed the files of four other - defectors which had been opened at the same time and by the - same Person as Oswald's, and determined that each of their files had similarly been restricted. Each of these other individuals had been on the list of defectors that had been | exchanged by the CIA and State Department. None of the files | pertaining to these other defectors had any evidence suggestive Classification: - _ eZ ~—" Classified by derivation: Rperyymags ser og TRUER, ROOT, HH OD, Reeoe EAT Det ae ems,
08 nan semana np Prrre*s eens Me co hime se eet of Counterintelligence, Research and Analysis, dated» ~ -£xrom Oswald's 201 file.- According to the memorandum, this While the memorandum mentioned that such a machine listing was - attached, no such attachment was found. in the 201 file at the time of the Committee’ s review. \\ pears the classification "SECRET EYES ONLY," and is one of the Nae | oh Classification: ee “(This form is - to be used for material extracted . i from ClA—controlled documents.) , a, b of a possible intelligence agency association. i e) Were 37 documents missing from Lee Harvey Oswald's f 201 file? _ In the course of reviewing Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, _ i ve ed an unsigned memorandum to the Chief 20 February 1964, which stated that 37 documents were missing [ ~~ SEP ARIE, statement was based upon a comparison of a machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in the 201 file and | those documents actually physically available in the file. é i 3 ROT I, The memorandum itself oN te mere: Classification: eyes é ey F — noe Ne Po: foe “ Es . cary ~~ s,
} ecoumption a 1 eteteier te « eee . “ te Niciesarmenes 2 (Cy Classification: — (This. form is to be used for material extracted > : from ClA—controlled documents.) - Ae documents that had been fully withheld from release-under the \ 3 Freedom of Information review.\ | . oO : oe ; J ~ . : on \ . ; 7 . eran esponse~to—a-Committee inquiry7 “the CIA advised > that because Oswald's file was sO active during the course of __.the Warren’ ‘Commission. investigation, ‘up-to-date machine listings were produced periodically. On this basis, the Agency. stated that "it must be assumed that. whoever was responsible for maintaining the Oswald file brought thie file up-to-date by ‘locating the 37 documents and placing them in the file." Because this response was incomplete, the author of this memorandum was deposed. He testified that once a sae - document had been registered into a 201 file by the Agency's computer system, physical placement of the document in the file was not always necessary. On this basis, he explained that the items listed in the memorandum were not missing but Classification: Classified by derivation: ne ee . . a . . ‘ 4 . . ; a *\ ; \ | . i ELE ET, TR, RTOS, SPP,
‘a C} Classificdtion: | 2. : 3 3 BY : H H (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) rather had either been routinely placed in a separate file “because of their sensitivity or were being held by other - individuals who needed them for analytical purposes. He 4 | "further stated that in the course of his custodianship of Oswald's file, he had requested perhaps as many as 100 _ computer listings: on the contents of the. Oswald file: While -there had been many instances in which one or more documents had been. charged out ‘to someone, he stated that he had never discovered that any documents were actually missing. ; | According to his testimony, the 37 documents, in fact, were available, but simply were not located in the file at that time. f) Was there any evidence that the CIA had for some 3 | - reason maintained a dual citing system regarding : Lee Harvey Oswald? Although the Committee was aware from its outset of the possibility that a dual filing system -- using one Classification: ss Classified by derivation: TERRI TTR, RENTHY SYR, wep, | ERLE ATT th, sepren
C) Classification: - (This form is to be bsed for material extracted ‘i from ClA—controlled documents.) y ? - ; _ f ostensibly innocuous file and one which contained the actual p . t operational detail indicative of an Agency relationship with { 4 the CIA -- could be utilized to disguise the existence of an 7 actual relationship between an individual and the CIA, this 5 ‘awareness heightened into.a concern with the discovery of. certain files which indicated that at least two Agency , . officers had contemplated the use of fake files and forged ; - -* @ocuments to protect the purpose of the ZR Rifle project. EIA | IE, -£rom being disclosed. The ZR Rifle project was an executive 2 action (i.e., assassination) program which bore no relation to the Oswald case. Richard Helms testified that the assassinations aspect of this project was never implemented and, in fact, N. Nee wets, Se, { ] . was discontinued as soon as it was brought to his attention, / € \ : SO [ but the implications of this discovery in terms of the , _-/potentiality for a faked Oswald file were troubling. 4 \ a o¢- ° , ¢ ws —— Classification: _ ; | Classified by derivation:
. _4 : i i Classification: (This form is to. be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.): . , SER HHO mh, In the Oswald case, there were two items which received scrutiny because they were potentially indicative of a dual Sanit . REVEO NPT T i filing system. The first involved a photograph of him that had been taken in Minsk in 1961 and the second concerned a } =  eopy.of a-letter: that had: been written to him by his mother { during his stay in the Soviet Union. At the time of President Kennedy's assassination, both of these items were in a the CIA's possession but neither was in Oswald's 201 file. . | {- The photograph of Oswald taken in Minsk shows him posing with several other people. . According to the CIA, the picture was found after the-assassination as a result of . r E ' a search of the Agency's graphics files for materials potentially . relevant to Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union. / The ; Agency advised that this photograph, as well as several others not related to Oswald, were routinely obtained in Classification: A oe rap a, . 5 J : Classified by derivation:
ag Nuit Ne Nata tase sigos te oto Neste (This form is ‘to be used for material extracted from ClA=controlled docunieiits.) 1962 from some tourists by the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division, a component that frequently sought information on a nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad in ‘Communist countries. | Connittes Interviews with the tourists’ in question oe confirmed that the photograph, along with 159 other photographic slides, had. been made routinely available to the Agency's Domestic Contacts Division. Neither tourist had . heard of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination or even knew which photographs had been of interest to the Agency. Cra records. indicate that only five of the 160 slides initially made available were retained. _/) Connittes interviews with the two CIA employees who had handled the slides for the Domestic Contacts Division established that Oswald had not been identifies at the time that these Classification: a aneqe ey 26 D $ 7 Classified by derivation: 0 TELE were vam,  wIMwePATA, * econ atere aI
D "Nase ann ee Neerae eh dott os “Classification: ‘(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—conitrolled documents.) “ photographic materials had been. made available. / One of these employeés stated that the Oswald picture had been retained because it depicted a Soviet intourist guide; the ‘other employee indicated that the picture had-been kept because it ‘showed.a crane in the background.._/ The employee who worked at CIA headquarters confirmed that the photograph of Oswald had not been discovered until a post- assassination Search of the Minsk graphics file for materials pertaining to Oswald. Accordingly, this photograph is not evidence that the CIA maintained a duat filing system with respect to Oswald. The picture apparently was Kept in a separate file only until 1964 when Oswald was actually identified to be one of its subjects. . The Committee's investigation of a letter concerning Classification: | erty | he
ecosssreae es a . Loft cave ee eee eeede an G Ne ance alate ohee, fs beatae enn nls prone ered so mente atee As rete eee. Classification: a (This form is to be used for material extracted | from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald that was in the Agency's possession similarly did not ‘result in any evidence of a dual filing -system. | This letter, dated July 6, 1961, had been sent to Marguerite Oswald to her > ' son, but was intercepted as a result of a CIA mail intercept program. {f This program, known as HT-Lingual, attempted to intercept letters being sent between the United States and Russia in an effort to obtain both positive intelligence and counterintelligence information. __/ Typically, intercepted . letters and/or their envelopes would be photographed and then — returned to the mails. -In response to a Committee inguiry, the CIA explained that because of the project's extreme sensitivity, all ‘materials generated as a result of mail intercepts were stored in a separate projedrs file which was maintained by the counterintelligence staff. . / Consequently, such items were | Classification: a 7 as oS i Classified by derivation: ES AF LET ES aT ABET AB ST} seen then ecco resp te trate ao “Aeterna et, 2 oh a, deere orate th teemaceaes romeo? oa, Se lanhoumean
8 wee oa . ‘ : a “head ctwer on tet %s Na mae ates ere reny to Oswald** resulted in the discovery of reproductions of four | 7% ; - e. 2 ~ ES \! Classification: . = (This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA controlled documents.) not placed in 201 files. This ‘explanation was confirmed by — the testimony of a senior officer from the counterintelligence staff who had jurisdiction over the HT-Lingual project files.* /- g) Was there any evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald had ever participated in a CIA counterintelligence staff project? - The Committee's review of HT-Lingual files pertaining index cards, two pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald and two - *Since Oswald was the subject. in approximately 50 communications during his stay in the Soviet Union, the Committee also questioned why the Agency~ostensibly had just one letter in its possession directly related to Lee Harvey Oswald. In essence, this may be explained by the fact that HT-Lingual only operated four days a week and even then only on a aE ATTEN, RAPT TEE TERT Bete, + sampling basis.  / a , i **Al though the Agency had only one letter in its possession directly related to Oswald, after the assassination the HT-Lingual files were combed for additional materials potentially, related to him. Approximately 50 pieces of correspondence were f discovered. None of these were ultimately judged to be of any b Significance. These materials, however, were stored in a separate Oswald HT-Lingual- file. Classified by derivation: =. Classification: 2% OE
qj nc (This form is to be used for material extracted ve from ClA—controlled documents.) UL Classification: motes 9 . ewer . pertaining to Marina Oswald, which were dated after-the assassination of President Kennedy. The pages containing the | = reproductions of these cards are stamped "Secret Eyes Only." J , The first card regarding Lee Harvey Oswald is dated | 9 November 1959 and states that Oswald is a recent defector ¢ Ws ‘the USSR and a former Marine. It also. bears the notation a a “"CL/Project/RE" and some handwritten notations. “Ghe second eet card on Oswald places him in Minsk, USSR. It contains = Non wcnahbaid om». « ee background information on him and states that he "reportedly ——== | expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions." This card is dated 7 August 1961 and also bears eee the notation "WATCH LIST." These cards, particularly the a j reference to "CI/Project/RE," raised the question of whether — 1 Lee Harvey Oswald was, in fact, involved in some sort of CI = ° project. < canst ee The .Committee..guestioned former employees of the CIA* wht “28% - | Classification: _ : ” Ges 39 | Classified by derivation: oy .
Nan cies : “Se weoser amie *- Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) may have had some knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual ngs, program in general and these cards in particular. Some of these employees recognized the cards as relating to the HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identify the meaning of:-the notation, "CI/Project/RE. " However, one person testified that the "CI Project" was “simply.a name of convenience which was used to describe. the HT-Lingual project"; another person testified that "CI Project" was the name of the component which ran the HT-Lingual project. The latter explained that "RE" represented 3 the initials of a person wha_had been a translator of foreign language documents and that the initials had probably been Placed there so that someone could come back to the translator if a question arose concerning one of the documents. §/ Another employee testified that the "Watch-List" notation on- Classification: a) "1 Classified by derivation: SSO, Ago rT, nacenste, ener, sa, TY << EF Sry ay Say se. ERE 2 ABN
: Nee niente : . . Ny elapse toe tommy “Rem tee ee ee a EY = dR a ener” Po FS a a sd Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) may have had some knowledge pertaining to the HT-Lingual program in general and these cards in particular. Some of these employees recognized the cards as relating to the HT-Lingual project, but were unable to identity the meaning” of- the notation, "C1/Project/RE." However, one person testified that the "cI Project" was "simply a name of convenience which was’ used to describe. the HT-Lingual project"; another person testified that "CI Project" was the name of the component which ran the HT-Lingual project. The ‘latter explained that "RE" represented the initials of a person who. had been a translator of foreign ‘ language documents and that the initials had probably been placed there so that someone could come back to the translator - if a question arose concerning one of the documents. // Another employee testified that the “Watch-List" notation on - ~ Classification: ay ot Classified by derivation: . : BAAR BEET tH NETTIE,
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted i from CiA—controlled documents.) b i‘ . { the second card referred to a list of persons who had f. wt . 3 been identified as being of particular interest in the Agency é with respect to the mail intercept progran. ce 4 . The Committee requested the CIA to provide an ) | | QB. explanation. for the.terms "CI/Project/RE," and. "Watch List," | a and for the significance of the handwritten notations appearing Rm Oe my on the index cards. In addition, the Committee requested a description of criteria utilized in compiling a “watch list." | to In regard to the meaning of the notation "CI/Project/RE,"_ freee oe espe ay rane, the CIA explained that there existed an office within the _Counterintelligence staff that was known as ."CI/Project," a cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the. wate carne ie office's functions. In fact, this office was responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by the HT-Lingual project. The response further explains that "RE" represents Classification:
O oO Classification: ; ] x xz S By bal &g Q a a ‘ : : (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) the initials of a former employee who is presently retired Junaex In responding to a request for the criteria used in Oe Ne compiling a “Watch List," the CIA referred to-a section of { 2 - the Report to- the President b « the. Commission on CIA Activities “Within-the United States, which states: Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest (one should also add counterintelligence : interest) were specified in Watch Lists provided a } to the mail project by the Counterintelligence Staff, cia _ by other CIA components, and by the FBI. The total number of names on the Watch List varied, from time | _ . to time, but on the average, the list included approximately 300 names, including about 100 furnished | j ' by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of United States citizens. Thus, the full meaning of the notation is that on 5 ‘ bream temetinne . 9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the “Watch List" co for the HT-Lingual project for the reason stated on the card -- ; that Oswald was a recent defector to the USSR and a former Marine. Classification: __ ae ae _ a AS 3 Classified by derivation:
bebe BSE Stoo: tetas tox \ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) Classification: The response goes on to state that the handwritten number, #7-305, which also appears on the first card, is a reference £9 the communication from the CI stafé to the Office of Security expressing the former's interest in seeing any mail to or from Oswald in the Soviet Union. Finally, the other handwritten notation, "N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59," signifies that a name trace run through the central records register indicates that there was no record for Lee Oswald as per that date. ‘The Agency's explanation of the meaning of the second card is that on 7 August 196 Mrs. Egerter ‘requested that Oswald's name be placed on the atch List". because of Oswald's expressed desire to return to the U.S. as stated on the card. The handwritten notation indicates, in this instance, eo Bree | REEF E Re ET, aay SO. STENT, ‘that Oswald's name was deleted from the “Watch List" on 28 May 1962. Classification: 1 f . Classified by derivation: LES LE OE EE EE |
ody ~ Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) - . ; J In reference to the two cards on Marina Oswald, the | tprronus mt en, “J Agency stated that her name was first placed on the "Watch | j List" on 26 November 1963 because she was the wife of Lee ° Harvey Oswald. . The second card served the purpose of adding | | { Oo - ; CO ; j the name Marina Oswald Porter to the "Watch List" on f { 29 June 1965 after she remarried. Both names were deleted. | from the list as of 26 May 1972. | ee 4 Thus, the statements of former CIA employees were eo { “corroborated by the Agency's response regarding the ‘explanation “emer amen es «to - f of the index cardsin the CIA's HT-Lingual files pertaining to i Oswald. The explanations attested to the fact that the . references on the cards Were not demonstrative of an Agency . i. . to, a ee ae f JON relationship with Oswald, but instead were examples of notations 4 . a . 4 ; routinely utilized in connection with the HT-Lingual project.: : : ae: | Classifi ication: treet wicca 4 a ; a Classified by derivation:
Neh on eects be She mete tee ~. os saab ow he By “Ca ine hala om NG teens am rare Nene mation aos Boab © Classification: _ | . (This form is to be used for material extracted , from ClA—controlled documents.) 4. Did the CIA ever debrief Lee Harvey Oswald? The CIA has denied ever having had any contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, and its records are consistent with this position. Because the Agency has a issue, the Committee's init nonclandestine basis from Americans traveling abroad, the absence of any record indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald, a returning defector who: had worked ina Minsk radio factory, had not been debriefed has been considered by Warren Commission critics to be either inherently noncredible (i.e., the record has been destroyed) “or indicative that Oswald had been’ contacted through other than routine Domestic Contact Division channels. After reviewing the Agency's records pertaining to this oS Classification: Classified by derivation: jal point of inquiry was to interview | BG Maik
a oA a7: a a a a i stan mmnad de LSRSID. Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) TT the former chief of an Agency component responsible for research Ni ewatndeai ein + — related to clandestine operations within the Soviet Union who : had written a November 25, 1963 memorandum which indicated that, upon Oswald's return from: the Soviet Union,*' this officer — “i "had considered “the laying of interviews fon him/ through. | { 4 I or other suitable channels." This individual indicated that Oswald was considered suspect § sass | because the Soviets had appeared to have been very solicitous of him. For this reason, a nonclandestine contact, either by sm cue 8 Atty the or other "suitable channels" such as. the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service, of A *The memorandum indicates that the possibility of an Oswald od contact was discussed during the summer of 1960, but the author -.:. ; . indicated that the conversation actually took place during . | the summer of 1962, shortly before his transfer to a new { assignment. During the summer .of 1960, the author was not a bo on an active assignment. "ea eed oo te 80 ‘ | | Classification:
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extrected from ClA—<controlled documents.) i i 4 t was considered. The officer stated, however, that to” his knowledge, no contact with Oswald was ever made; moreover, if a debriefing had occurred; the officer stated that he would Nanos cnkion have been informed. - Finally, -he stated that Oswald was oe considered a potential lead, but only of marginal importance, | | ' and therefore the absence of a debriefing was not at all “ unusual: ‘ee - | The Committee interviewed five other Agency employees who were in a position to have discussed Oswald in 1962 with the author of this memorandum, including the person who replaced the author of the ‘itemorandum as chief of the research x i ‘section, but none of them could recall any such conversation. AY x Ve eet atts \ . aie —Classification: \ w. a ue : Classified by derivation:
: Ed ge ° \ Ba \ Classification: © 4 {This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) "\teenetnwe a to result in any evidence suggesting that Oswald had been - . "Sinn pam tite contacted’ at any time by the CIA. The author of the November 25, 1963 memorandum also — Soren twey informed the Committee that the CIA maintained a large 1 . a , A. volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which : Oswald worked. This information was stored in the Office of Research and Reporting. _/ Another former CIA employee, who ; ' had worked in the Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet. | { branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962, advised the. Committee that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence i regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In Fact, this individual | ad i a ; claims that during the summer of 1962 he ceytewed a. contact . “4 report from representatives ‘of ‘the ‘CIA! s 7 | - who had interviewed a- former Marine who had worked at the Minsk 7 Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR... This defector, oe : . Classification: as , |. Classified by derivation:
Nement as ce ee “an atetiee de’ ty dats el Bee — hebsitieaee Loney” . AMT og Cee re al MEE ‘ Spree” Spray { 3 €3 _ Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA-—controlled documents.) ta, whom the employee believes nay have been Oswald, had...been Living with his family in Minsk. | the employee advised the Committee that the contact report was filed ina volume ‘concerning the’ Minsk Radio Plant which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch, then a component of the Office of Central Reference. _ Accordingly, -the Committee requested that the CIA provide both the above- described contact report and the volume of. materials ‘concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. A review by the Committee | of the documents in the volumes on the Minsk Radio Plant, however, revealed that no such contact report existed in that file. The CIA has stated to the Committee that between 1958 and 1963 it had no procedure for the systematic debriefing of overseas travelers, including returning defectors. Instead, Classification: Reeaw sae wee oe, fees ean taut,
« decedent. “e ih aottenrs dea "mat eee. ome Re ch © Classification: _—_ © (This form is to be used for material extracted - from ClA—controlled documents.) the Agency relied upon the FBI both to make such contacts and “report any significant results. To investigate this question further, the Committee reviewed the files of 22 individuals (selected from an original list of 380 possible Soviet defectors) who were born in America and appeared to have returned to the United States between 1958 and 1963.* Of these 22 individuals, only four were interviewed at any time by the CIA. These four instances tended to involve particular intelligence or counterintelligence. ~ needs, but this was not always the case. Based upon this file-review, it appears that, in fact, an the CIA did not contact returning defectors in 1962 as a matter ° *An effort was also made to review only the files of American-— born individuals who had defected during these years. Not all of the 22 individuals, however, met this criteria. — Classification: J -, Classified by derivation:
g _4 a eS an Nees adenine mas + "Naat ett ro! be Nee doses ae sent Classification: (This form.is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) of standard operating procedure. For this ‘reason, the absence of any Agency contact’ with Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union cannot be considered in any way unusual, particularly since the FBI did fulfill its jurisdictional obligation to conduct such interviews. 5. The Justice Department's Failure to Prosecute Lee Harvey Oswald’ for Offering to Give Intelligence Information to “the Soviet Union | When Lee Harvey Oswald appeared at the United States Embassy in Moscow on October 31, 1959 for the purpose of renouncing his American citizenship, he allegedly offered to . x give the Soviets information that he had acquired as ao a Marine Corps radar operator. -_/ “The Committee sought” to determine why the Justice Department did not prosecute . Oswald for his offer to divulge this kind of information.” Classification: _ ; 4 Classified by derivation: __ eps Dem seams Memeny anes
+ eoiniOtcl ARET See” ay” Sisco aay" ericpste” Suaeear - Sa ae ~ Do, ? # Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) A review of Oswald's “correspondence with the American o embassy in Moscow indicates that on February 13, 1961 the A ' embassy received a letter from him in which he expressed a "desire to return to the-United States if...some agreement be _ . _ i f/could be reached/ concerning the dropping of any legal { _  proGeedings against /him7."_/ On February 28, 1961, the . j embassy sought guidance from the State Department concerning (4 Oswald's potential liability to . criminal prosecution.  / | r a ' The State Department, however, responded on April 13, 1961 that it was "not ina position to advise Mr. Oswald whether upon his i : _ desired return to the United States he may be amenable. to , f prosecution for any possible offenses committed in. violation EERIE | of the laws of the United States..." J -- On May 10, 1961, Oswald wrote the embassy demanding a "full guarantee" against ‘the possibility of prosecution. _/ = Classification: Z | © “Classified by derivation: 22
Neonat meses ’ . on Seen ye ed ene Se ete shea « : ) a | Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) He visited with embassy consul Richard Snyder on July 16, 1961, and denied that he had ever given any. information to the Soviets. _/ Snyder advised Oswald on an informal basis that, while no assurances could be given, the embassy did not perceive any basis for prosecuting Oswald for an offense involving any severe. punishment. _/ There is no record that the State Department ever _ gave Oswald any assurances that he would not be prosecuted. ‘' Upon his return to the United States, Oswald was interviewed twice by the FBI. On each occasion, he denied ever giving any information to the Soviet Union. _/ In a response to a Committee request, the Department of Justice indicated that prosecution of Oswald was never considered because his file contains no evidence that he had ever revealed or offered to reveal national defense information _. Classification: Classified by derivation: tl ce nen seme oo some
i i i 3 Fi a 3 . ' . ERE CREME at 2 et TORE IS OG ATTY ER Be Thae EMAAR PBK BA tnaem ne: Ne nenuates one New wet alineson ee es sO Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA——<ontrolled documents.) . a” to the Soviet union. _/- In a subsequent response,- the Department acknowledged the existence of some evidence that Oswald had offered information to the Soviet Union, but stated that there were, nevertheless, serious obstacles toa possible prosecution: It (Department file) does contain a copy of an FBI memorandum, dated July 3, 1961, which is recorded as having been received in the Justice Department's Internal Security | Division on December 10, 1963, which states 7 that the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence contained a copy of a Department of State telegram, dated October 31, 1959, at Moscow. The telegram, which is summarized in the FBI report, quoted.Oswald as having offered the Soviets any information he had . acquired as a radar operator. The FBI report. did not indicate that the information to which Oswald had access as a radar operator was classified. Oswald returned to the United States on | June 13, 1962. He was interviewed by the FBI on June 26, 1962, at Fort Worth, Texas, at which time he denied furnishing any information to the Soviets concerning his Marine Corps experiences. He stated that he never gave the Soviets any information: © =" which would be used to the detriment of the ‘United States.. In sum, therefore, the only “evidence” that Oswald ever offered to furnish ‘information to the Soviets is his own reported statement to’ an official at the oy Classification: A) i Classified by derivation: — Pater at—n tenet ly, eee toes * Ooh . eRe Tse OPO ‘| ae | 1
Nae tte dikes oe . tena h a samen Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) _ U.S. embassy in Moscow. That statement, .of course, was contradicted by his denial. . to the FBI, ‘upon. his return to the United States, that he had ever made such an offer. In the prosecution of a criminal case, the Government cannot establish a prima facie case solely on a defendant's unsupported confession. The Government must introduce substantial independent evidence which would -tend to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant's statement. See, Opper v. United States, 348 U.S..84 (1954). Accordingly, in the absence of any information that Oswald had offered to reveal classified information to the Soviets, and lacking corroboration of his | statement that he had proferred information of any kind to the Russians, we did not consider his | prosecution for violation of the espionage statutes, 18 U.S.C. 88 793, 793. Based upon this analysis, there is no evidence that Oswald received favorable treatment from either the State Department or the Justice Department regarding the possibility eg, of a criminal prosecution. 6. Oswald's Contacts with Americans in the Soviet Union 30, a) Priscilla Johnson McMillan Priscilla Johnson McMillan, author. of Marina and Lee, became a subject of the Committee's inquiry because she was Classification: |, Clossified by. derivation: ___ BSG Tah Co © egageecton,
"Naim om oe tee noe nee ‘ . as, hed ante O Classification: RS {This form is to be used for material extracted’ from ClA—controlled documents.). eat one of two American correspondents who had obtained an interview ae, with Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay -in Moscow .in 1959. The. . Committee sought to investigate the allegation that Ms. McMillan's interview with Oswald had been arranged by the CIA. - John McVickar, a consul at the American embassy, testified that he had Oswald's case with Ms. McMillan, and ‘that he thought “she “might help us in communicating with him and help him in dealing with. what appeared to be a very strong personal problem if she were able to talk with him.” _/ McVickar stated, however, that he had never worked in any” capacity for the CIA, nor did he believe that Ms. McMillan had any such affiliation. The Committee's review of Mr. + McVickar's State Department and CIA files confirmed that he had never been associated with the CIA. ; i Classified by derivation: rove We omen en,
Ree ithe meee "arenes oat ave + nt cnt, \ an Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) According to Ms. McMillan's testimony about the events ot surrounding her interview with Lee Harvey Oswald, in November 1959 she had just returned from a visit to the United States where she covered the Camp David summit between President - Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev. On November 16, 1959, she went to the American embassy to pick up her mail for the first time since her return to the Soviet Union. The mail pickup facility was in a foyer near the consular office. Consular - Officer John A. McVickar came out of this office and welcomed McMillan back to the Soviet Union. They exchanged a few words, and as she was leaving, McVickar commented that at her hotel was an American who was trying to defect to the Soviet Union. McVickar stated that the American would not speak to “any of us," but might speak to McMillan because she. was a woman. She recalls that as she was leaving, McVickar Classification: ‘Classified by derivation: ORR RTE A, REPO aR Sere | swreerrenan, RI RMT TTN, RTP t Rete, AEE Um se ow
Ndtcinal, dhs da oh, ay £0 ceebeyteteo be, wae kig "Nhat linda 4 eee eer et oem wa eee coer mecca ee? re nee on, ee ee ne ee =" Classification: Ne (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) told her to remember that shé was an American. McMillan oroceedea to her hotel, found out the American's room number, knocked on his door, and asked him | for an interview. The American, Lee Harvey Oswald, did not - ask her into the room, but he did agree to talk to her in her room later that night. No American government official. arranged the actual interview with Oswald. She met with Oswald just once. ‘She believes. that MeVickar called her on November 17, the day after her interview with Oswald, and asked her to supper. That evening at supper they discussed her interview with Oswald. McVickar indicated a general concern about Oswald and felt that “the attitude of another American. consular official might have ' pushed Oswald further in’ the direction of defection. MeVickar indicated a personal feeling that it would be a sad thing for ‘Oswald to defect in view. of his age, but he did not indicate . Classification: _ Sete amen aemee » Se ree ee ete ee an ee rte ene ee oF om ao moat
° ope « 1 Classification: 7 (This form is to be used for material ‘extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) - that this was, the U.S. Govertiment's position. (p.18) . Ms. Millan also testified that. she had never worked. for | _ the CIA, nor was she connected with any other federal government agency at the time of her -interview with Lee ‘Harvey Oswald. 3 According to an affidavit that Ms. McMillan filed with the ; Committee, her only employment with the federal government was as a 30-day temporary translator for the Joint Press Reading fo ones Service, n organization that was operated by the AmeriGan;- \ ’ British, and Canadian embassies in Moscow. i “Seen Sto, Finally, Ms. "McMillan “testified that because of: her : background in rosian states, she applied for a position with | . 6 the CIA in 1952 as an intelligence analyst. The application erecta en ner Sa oe” ae geombermeptn neces Sone oe ‘, was withdrawn Voce the CIA completed its security check on ai m denied a her & security clearance, “She acknowledged being debriefed by an Agency employee in 1962 after returning "Classification: a ert, Sarre: th, ete orn, 7 Se, WET EM, RATER, », Seer,
“hen og ad aad, “ei etn & Sdee emeten: we nfo z { Hq | oko Aiogkey” eae ht SI re ee a et ae Ser Classification:, {This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—conirolled documents.) from her thrid trip to the Soviet Union, but explained that this Ne, contact was in some way related to the confiscation of her “notes by Soviet officials.* The Committee's review of CIA files pertaining to Ms. McMillan corroborated her testimony. ‘There was - no indication in the file suggesting that she had ever worked for *In November 1962, I hada conversation ith a man who either Don himself as_aC.1.A, _employes} ana” gavé his name“ads Ss) ei er Donald Jameson or James MacDonald. ¢-T" agreed to~see hin in. part because thé-confiscation-of my papers and notes had utterly altered my situation -~- I now had no hope of returning to the U.S.S.R. and was free for the first time to write what '.I knew. I was preparing a series of articles for The Reporter. ‘which would contain the same information about whic ° Gartiesdp had expressed a desire to talk to me. Finallyy during e Atter part of my 1962 trip to the U.S.S.R., I had been under heavy surveillance and the K.G.B. knéw what Soviet citi- . -zens I had seen. Many of those I had talked to for the Reporter articles were Russian "liberals" (anti-Stalin and pro- ~Khrushchev) .; What reprisals might befall those whom I had interviewed I did not know, but since my notes were now part of the K.G.B. _. files, I felt that it might help them if the C.I-A. knew. that ‘which the K.G.B. already knew. My meeting with - Jameson which occurred at the Brattle Inn, Cambridge, was a of my usual effort to avoid contact with the C.I.A., and the subject matter was confined to my impressions of the Soviet ° literary ‘and cultural climate. Classification: a : Classified by derivation: Ry Peter ven, agree ne tere, a, SET Pe, WEP Rem y|, f : ¥ ¢ ah ATA Ss spay,
hee meando = piveeevnenerer’ oa NX . “hn te Nenestmm ovens “thee « Sameer ae ¢ Classification: ss CD (This form: is to be used for material extracted from ClA——controlled documents.) the CIA. In fact, there was;some evidence suggesting that the - Agency was reluctant even to debrief her after her trips to the Soviet Union. An interview with’ the former Agency official ry - : ~ Tes gousso! @ Ser pee bang Ceo ply & Peet of Wty ey. who had been }deputy | chief and then-chief of the American Ye al 7 tp Me ofl | . 4 Giavetersprogran during the years— 1958 to 1961 confirmed that) een Ms. McMillan had not been used by the CIA inthat—pregram. There was information in Ms. McMillan's £ile indicating» that on occasion during the years 1962-65 she had provided cultural and literary type information to the CIA. None of this information, however, was suggestive in any way of a clandestine relationship. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Ms. McMillan ever worked for the CIA or received the Agency's assistance in obtaining an interview with Lee Harvey ... :%: Classification: Classified by derivation: serge rire,
a mabe Nees e Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Oswald.* a b) Richard E. Snyder Richard E. Snyder was the consular official in the United States Moscow embassy who handled the Oswald case. It was Snyder with whom Oswald met in 1959 when Oswald sought to renounce his American citizenship. Two years later, when Oswald initiated his inquiries about ‘returning to the United States, Snyder again became involved in the case. Warren Commission critics have alleged that Snyder was associated in some way with the CIA during his service in the Moscow embassy. : - In his Committee depositon, Richard snyder acknowledged that for an eleven-month period during 1949-50 he worked for *Nor is there any basis, based upon Ms. McMillan' Ss testimony, CIA files, and an affidavit provided by McMillan's publisher, Harper and Row, to support the allegation that the CIA financed the book Marina and Lee. "Classification: 4 yo a Classified. iby derivation:
“ete sae tame ee + ee ae ananalommeats« teat ates bes a Se dates eat eae we - i 4 eis Classification: _ {This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) the CIA while he was on the waiting list for a foreign service te. appointment with the State Department. Snyder testified, however, that, since resigning from the CIA tn March of 1950, he has had no contact with. the CIA other than a letter written in 1970 or 1971 inquiring about employment on a “contractual basis.* The Committee reviewed Snyder's files at the State Department, Defense pepartment, ana the CIA. Both the State Department and Defense Department are consistent with his testimony. Snyder's CIA file revealed that at one .time prior to 1974 it had been xed flagged and maintained on a segregated basis. The file contained a routing indicator which stated that. the file had been red flagged because of a -*Snyder also denied contact with any other intelligence service while active as a foreign service officer. | Classification: { \ Classified by derivation: _ bal ial AY REP PR AB, . Ry, $b TE
eee OEP EP LIN TOTT ST Fy 4 3 é é t ? erecta “Sealy ote cae ote to explain the reference to "cover" because according to its — - *Responding to a newspaper allegation that Oswald had m Classification: (This form is to . used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) "DCI statement and a matter of cover" concerning Snyder. In response to a Committee inquiry, the CIA indicated that the DCI statement presumably refers to comments which ‘former DCI Richard Helms had made in 1964 concerning the © Oswald case when Helms had been Deputy Director for Plans.* The CIA also stated that Snyder's file had been flagged at the request of DDO/CI to ensure that all inquiries concerning Snyder would be referred to that office. The Agency was’ unable records Snyder had never been assigned any cover while employed. Further, the Agency stated that "/t here is ‘no record in Mr. Snyder's Official Personnel File that he ever worked, directly t with CIA representatives in Moscow, Richard Helms wrote a memorandum to the Warren Commission on March 18, 1964 in which he stated the “desire to state for the record that the allegation carried in this press‘ report is utterly unfounded as far as the CIA is concerned." , oO Classification: 6 | _ —_ - ft ; | . Classified by derivation: RPP ERG, Rae beer SHED, . RE VR. per, sees RTP EA, . SEPT eereeey, PRES mn
naan seed dbs OF © Classification: (This form is to. be uged for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) or indirectly, in any capacity for the CIA. after his resignation on 26 September 1950." The Committee does not regard this explanation as satisfactory, especially since Snyder's 201 file indicates that for approximately one year during 1956-1957 he was used by an Agency case officer {sa spotter FE Harvard | University ecause . eee emer aggre Ae es mime em tg = ene eer of his access to ctl SSE ne might be going to the Soviet Union, nor was the Agency actually able to’ explain specifically why someone considered it necessary to red flag the Snyder file. The remainder of the Snyder file, however, is entirely ' consistent with his testimony before the Committee concerning | the absence of Agency contacts. .In addition, the CIA personnel officer who handled Snyder's case in 1950 confirmed that. Snyder had, in fact, terminated his employment with the Sf 9 Classification: (5 i Ke |. Classified by derivation: cement eaneeeceete ote Fe spe aman, ate sa es tet,
. 3 nig : oe for gnc ay . étage seeeeey | Classification: \ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) t Wey CIA at that time. _ Moreover, he added that Snyder didcrot-gos | . Lo og Nn bo wy ake .. plored. mk to the State Department undexany—kind—of t.  / 4 This -position was confirmed by a former State Department 1° . , ; ' official who was aware of ‘procedures for State. Department i aaa br CIA employees. In addition, this individual stated : i that at no time from 1959 to 1963 did the CIA use. the State. | _ Department's overseas consular positions as cover for CIA oe intelligence officers. : (Insertion to follow ~- Analysis) c) Dr. Alexis H. Davison f oN Dr. Alexis H. Davison was the U.S. Embassy physician in SUT SI ET. Moscow from May 1961 to Ney 1263 In May 1963 he was welled oO from the Soviet Union, in connection with the Penkovsky spy SERA to PT en ented aa ER S ne oe Lt . ee Se wine ee a <Tnt : leas. te = eee nae STS A et ere A a er case. After, ‘tha. saree of President Kennedy, it was é a SN | Wiassi anion: —_—— So 7s aa a BO oo : : - Coot. a o 6 7 Classified by derivation:
betes woe” Pye om a isi ae” owes we” , SOR aRy tos : : rs ieee” seas coll o.,. ~éceapbanapr : Ae oe ‘ 2 : : Classification: (This form is to be used for moterial extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) _ discovered that the name of br, Davisonts mother, Mes. Hal Davison, and her ‘Atlanta address were in Oswald's address book under the heading "mother of U.S. Embassy doctor." In addition, it was also determined that the flight which Oswald, his wife and child took fron New York to Dallas on June 14, 1962 had stopped in. Atlanta. For this reason, it has been alleged that Dr. Davison was Oswald's intelligence contact. in Moscow. In a Committee interview, Dr. Alexis Davison stated that he had been a physician in the U.S. Air Force and was stationed in Moscow as the U.S. Embassy physician from May 1961 to May 1963. In this capacity, it was his auty to perforn physical examinations on all Soviet immigrants to ‘the United States. “He recalls that most of these immigrants were elderly, but he remembers two young women, one who was a mathematics Classification: G \ : ' Classified by derivation: SOT, SENT, SETI RECT arte
Nase Fa ae os othe C | Classification: ©, (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ean teacher from the south of Russia and one who was married to an American. The latter was very frightened by the prospect of going to the United States. She stated that she was going to: Texas with her husband. Davison said that if she and her . husband traveled through Atlanta on their way to Texas, his mother, a native-born Russian, would be happy to see her. He gave his mother's name and address in Atlanta to the woman's husband, who was "scruffy looking." This was not an unusual thing to do, since his family had always been very hospitable . to Russians who visited Atlanta. In retrospect, he assumes that he gave his mother's name and address to either Lee to ete coc Marina Oswald, but he is uncertain in this regard. _f After the assassination.of President Kennedy, Davison | was interviewed first by a Secret Service agent and later by - an FBI agent in connection with the entry of his mother's Classification: _ lassified by. derivation: FF rer SUTTTO, RH PPT, saperty os oereg!
Ci Classification: a -. EPEAT ORET ER, (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) , 4 . . ee OP PRT, name and address in Oswald's.address book, | The FBI agent { wok ' oS f ra . also interviewed Davison's mother, Mrs. Hal: (Natalia 4 ; ‘Alekseevna) Davison. Davison indicated that the Secret Service and the FBI were the only government agencies to — i _ interview him about his contact with the Oswalds. _ / — ' . “Davison admitted his involvement in the Penkovsky spy \ . : case. Specifically, he stated that in connection with his : assignment as U.S. Embassy physician in Moscow, he had received | Some superficial intelligence training. This training mainly | | involved lectures on Soviet life and instructions on remembering - 4 i and reporting Soviet names and military activities. During his i i tour of duty in Moscow, Davison was asked by an Embassy - ~ -\ f -employee, whose name he no longer remembers, to observe a 7 | certain lamp post on his daily route between his apartment and the Embassy and to be alert for a signal by telephone; Classification: _[ 4
oe ee ecaeeineesy ene TT Abeer ad spare ~ ATT : ted Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) Davison agreed. (accoraing to his instructions, if he ever s a black chalk mark\on the lamp post or if he ever received a telephone call\in which the caller blew ing the receiver three times, he wks to notify a person ‘whose name he no — / longer venenbers) He was told nothing else ‘about this f : f Operation. Davison performed his’ role in this operation for | ‘. . approximately one year. ‘He, participated in no other operations o * \ vA : \ ; : during his tour of duty ih Moscow, but he did perform some desk work for the Air’ Attache. 0} just one occasion, toward the end of this year, he observed ens mark on the lamp post . \. and his wife received the telephone signal. As instructed, } f . he reported these happenings. “Shortly thekeafter, the. Soviets reported that they had broken the Penkovsky spying operation: oy \, ’ The Sovaess declared Davison persona non grata\ just after he left Moscow bec is tour of duty had ended. He does not “Cid ication: Classified by d derivation: : ’ bic SECT, tA, ST, SESPATFA, ET Coy.
. "Nila co abtasit oaks + Neda but bre d by \" Classification: a ‘(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) swe lt a) a recall any in eiTigence debrietings on 1 the _Pébkavskgy—————. Davison denied participating. in. any other intelligence activity related work during Wis employment in Moscow, and a, le . 3 a provided the Committee with an affidavit to this effect. a ~ . va . “ . The former deputy éhief of the CIA" s Soviet Russia clandestine . re activities séction during 1960-62 confirmed Davison's position, .- ’ . ra - os a . a 2 @ - e Pan ae . and characterized his involvement in“the Penkovsky case as a Le ae ae ae oe “ woke snot deal. “In addition? a review of Davison's CIA and “ Department Of Defense files was also entirely consistent with his Committee testimony. rccowainetn, Thee tc no basis for concluding that Dr. Davison was Lee Harvey Oswald's intelligence contact in Moscow. (Classification: a [Z i Classified by derivation: BFE RET, | | 4 | SRO TT, TTL A
BOS | Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) : ~~ 7. George deMohrenschildt George deMohrenschildt was a prominent member of Dallas! | White Russian" community who befriended Lee Harvey Oswald. This friendship has engendered considerable speculation J because of the contrast between the backgrounds of the two men. DeMohrenschildt was described as sophisticated ‘and well educated, - one who moved easily in the social and professional circles Bs el of oilmen and the so-called “White Russian” community, many ‘ of-whom were avowed right-wingers. Oswald's "lowly" background - aia not include much education or influence, and he was,in fact, shunned by the very same Dallas Russian community which N embraced deMohrenschildt. DeMohrenschildt committed suicide ... t in 1977 shortly after having been contacted for an interview —. by a Committee investigator. In his Warren Commission testimony, deMohrenschildt Ciassification: ; 7 z | ' Classified by derivation: Sta Sr. SEES,
\ 3 QF Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Hy a , o “stated that he believed he had discussed Lee Harvey Oswald with J. Walton Moore, whom deMohrenschildt described as "a Government man.-~ either FBI or Central Intelligence."  / - DeMohrenschildt said Moore had interviewed him when he returned from Yugoslavia and that he was known as the head of the FBI in Dallas. _/ DeMohrenschildt said that he had ‘ asked Moore and Ft. Worth attorney Max Clark about Oswald. to reassure himself that it was "safe" for the deMohrenschildts to assist Oswald, _/ and was:told by one.of these. persons that "the guy seems to be OK." / This admitted association with J. Walton Moore, a known employee of the CIA's yar Domestic Contacts Division; gave rise/to the question « of ° whether deMohrenschildt had contacted Lee Harvey Oswald ‘on behalf of the CIA. Class fication:. : : 7. 4 - Classified by derivation; DN Soa ry