202-10001-10221 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER Date Page JPR ASSASSINATION SYS'TEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-L0001-10221 FOTA SERIES DOC 222 08/04/98 aL ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT: STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS NW S0955.. BocTd:327427495> Page 1 DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING 03/13/62 16 MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET 1B, 1¢ RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/30/98 Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State. NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION FICATION
TOP SECRET a. SENSITIVE 13 March 1962 | s\ - . CMLL AALV?, MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) From: Brig, Gen, Lansdale Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose concuta inClA tmiented), decument Planning tranemitted to you by my memorandum of 16 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security. Se . 6 Attachments visions of the JFK Assassinalion - Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526) sipones release of portion(s) of it Distribution: % OA trprdl “hytiak” on 2S Portions) Postponed Under © (/ CB) J i? z e 4 z *) e S a The Department of State releasas this in part and po: Reviewed on af Sof 73 under the pro O 3 < Te: i ~ General Taylor a - The Attorney General 3 “ Secretary Rusk/ Deputy Under Sec retary Johnson 4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric 5 ~ General Lemnitaer (through General Craig) 6/7 « Mr. MeCone (through Mr. Helma/Mr. Harvey) i & 7 Mr, Murrow/Mr. Wilson 9/10 ~ Chief of Operations 63) NO OBJECTION TO De “ BECLASSIFICATION AND/OR ' oisa(oroisey_3 7 rs /O/ RELEASE OF THIS PaCUMENT, Gublh Pe. 55 | AS SANITIZED AS JUNE 7 & . , mn Ls | 6 (1) (A)(C) Excluded from automatic | avecie™’ regrading: DOOD Directive Document containg pages. i ash. “oO Ege 5200.10 does not apply. Copy No. . of 10 copies. Series A, 2% Je N) SENSITIVE TOP SECRET NW 50955 Docld: 324274952 Page 2
PHASE 1 (CLA) i. 15 March 1962 ACTIVITY , PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 1. * Dispatch one intelligence Collect and report intelligence on anti- There is a risk that this action will disclose this U. 5, agent operation to key area regime attitudes, on potential resist- intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel selected by CIA, ance, and on vulnerabilities and are being intensively trained. This first team hase 2 atrengthe of Gormrmunist security agents. An area in which resistance has been reported i aystem. hag been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, ' | make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. : i Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack i “4 of intelligence. First reports from firet team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third tearns, dispatched in March, are ex- j pected to start in April. i Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained \ for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,  j with the thought that they will be in place inside Cubs i and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are i decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the i agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlied | effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort: : will be made to atternpt such control. H ' i 2. intelligence To collect inteHigence. These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant. ET tee mags en 9 ra CL. oi ARAN ey ae siall officers in place in Havana. 3,| __ ]intet- To collect intelligence. ligence officera, readied to travel in Cuba for temporary ‘ periods, *e, "Sint * Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962, Se ae ee a OE ek elk del eek eee Eee i HY 509545 soca apassons Page 3
ACTIVITY 4. * Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fally activated by 15 March 1962. 5. * Periodic intelligence eeti- madtes, ae required by progress of operations. ie JER OPERATIONS: Lo 1% March 1962 {cont} PURPOSE To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark in- telligence aeseta as refugees arrive, and to provide security againet Corn - muniat agent operations. To up-date NIE 85-62, ao that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels. etalf of 43 at work. CONSIDERATIONS This operation, in response to early recommendation as easzential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost apeed to become fully active by 15 March, with anew building completed and occupied, anc with a Operations cormmenced 15 February and, ag of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CLA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.) As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an In- telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. lt ie likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sur - maries on Cuba and ie planning a bi-monthly or weekly report gurmming up intelligence for thie purpose. reaponsibility, with support of others as required. } (CLA & a e INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS 7. * Two teame of agents die- patched to Cuba. * iteme marked by asteriak were appreved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 16 - 31 March 1962 To collect intelligence. * TH SECRET Ce RCTS One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both tearma includ personnel whe have had resistance training and some past experience. reh 1962 ee eee ee ee 2 ey AE ag ih oe irisinecsern itn tea le Page 4 os re nH =H mM =H a Lan] c=] late o a ra im oy oo BS.
~ ACTIVITY Establish 2 additionall_| agents in By March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained. 2 10.* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban “coloniee" in U.S. ll, *® Develop additional inte rroga ~ tion centere in other areas by 31 March 1962, OTHER OPERATIONS None. se erratic PURPOSE Te collect intelligence. To ready agent operations. “To exploit the intelligence possi- bilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.5. citizens) now in the United States. To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levela than now seem possible in the continental U.&., to spot additional intelligence aesete and to provide security against Comrmuniat agent ope rations. * Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), PEE, Py LOTT PO TE TS ee ET EM A ee ee GP CONSIDERATIONS | Possible future use in cornmmunications and support. Effectiveness and numbera are dependent upon purpose of recruiiment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. Uf the rec ruitrnent and train- ing are for resistance activities, the task of recruit- ment and training will be much leas difficult than if they are limited to intelligence -colleclion purposes only. There are “colonies” in Waghingion, D.C., and other U.S. cities which are “little Cubas,** Family, Church, and business inlerests provoke unusual,personal ties inside Cuba for sorne of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail- able. (FBI support and coordination ie basic in thig elfort.)} Ae Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CLA will other interrogation centers as promptly as feaaib center ig being activated in Spain) Negotiations local authorities are being underlaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas. San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, e being eur~ veyed for possible centers. (CIA r igibility with eup- port by others as necessary.) § March 1962. Docld:32474959 Page 5 HW. 509455
ACTIVITY PUB POSE CONSIDERATIONS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS nnn tl athena atta l2.* Two teams of agents dis - To collect intelligence, Number of agents undetermined as yet. itched to Cuba. 3 agents, tem ~ Te collect intelligence. arily travelling legally, in mi Da. i. OTHER OPERATIONS None. . 16 ~ 30 April 1962 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS i4, * Two teams of agente dig - To collect intelligence. Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum patched to Cuba. glances, 156 ¥ To collect intelligence. Possible use for communications and support | ' j gent in Havana. OTHER OPERATIONS None, i ~ 15 May 1962 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS i6. * Two teams of agente dia- Te collect intelligence. Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circum- patched to Guba, stances. Ls . ai 17{ 3 legal resident agentes in To collect intelligence. | ‘| Cuba. a o . wu “ Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), § March 1962. ey a nw al 3 ie % ae Mi e fi a = a i HW..50955
we sae eee RA | oy 19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba, OTHER OPERATIONS oon eget EASY ' None, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, tnt! OPERATIONS, 20. * Four teama of agents dig. patched to Cubs, 21, One possible Singleton agent Operation, lale of Pines, 224) Four additional resident agents |Jinside Cuba, SS 23. Five "legal travel" agenta inside Cuba, 24. By 31 May, selection of 5G additional agents and Srain 35 additional agents, items marked by aateriek were approved by Special Group (Augmented), PURPOSE To collect intelligence, \. a CONSIDERATIONS To collect intelligence, “Legal travel" means Persons a re in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods. 16 - 3 May 1962 ® Te collect intelligence. Teams of 2 to § agents each, Slancea, CIA will be allempt of Cuba as it can, depending on circum. ing to cover as much Te collect inte Ligence. Difficult To collect intelligence. CIA will be atlempting to cover a 8 much of Cuba as it can, The main factor of determining location of reaident agents ig to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable, Te collect intelligence, To ready agent operations, 5 March 1962 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE si AR Rig tities ea + ee 4 i HW 50955 Docld:324294959 Page 7
Au 2 fe vied y AOR (Cont) ~ ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS OTHER OPERATIONS — ryune iT July 1962 INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ota tet OBE UPERA TIONS 26. * 16 to 15 teame of agents dis - ‘To collect intelligence. “patched to Cuba. Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions, 27, Reinforce and resupply agente To reinforce and resupply, as Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent and teame previously placed or possible. upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of activated inside Cuba. methods to be used (that ia, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery). 28. By Jl July, select 100 additional pe agents and train 70 additional “a agente, To ready agent operations, & : £54, * Collection of paychological To provide documentary and photo - material, graphic evidence of the tyranny of 4 the Communist regime, This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Weat- ern Hemisphere. 30, * Survey airfields, military installationa, and communica tion centera, To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime, This is conceived of as ground surveya, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents. 31.) * By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime, To provide current inte lligence on the This requires attempta to place trained agents inside actions and intentions of the regime, government organizations, or to defect officiale “in place," t speci REINS: - ae Mems marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), § March 1962 ‘ I aga tet Hey in nk ah Ste me ian Sk age A "ereeacenasonepesno Herne a ° ' . a ee ee ene teats tm ee i at Docld:329424952 Page 6 HW. 50955
eases i ie ACTIVITY OTHER OPERATIONS monet tan ais None. 32, * Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the popula ~ .. tion ingide Cuba, To provide the Special Group (ILC 541 augmented) with a hard estimate of the - Guban situation, % PURPOSE End of July 1962 CONSIDERATIONS Hema marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group [Augmented), § March 1962 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 5494952 PAge 9
OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE Hi (State) ACTIVITY 1. Make political decision to intervene with U.S. mili- tary forces in Guba. 2. .U.5. officials and news releases on policy decision. 4, Latin American leaders, government and public, in support. PURPOSE To overtly engage the U.S, prestige in eup~ port of a Cuban revolt to an extent that would require the U.5. io become involved in assur~ ing the ullimate victory of a Cuban revolution, thie involvernent must include the commitment of U.S, military forces as necessary te achieve such wictory. Indicate policy and commit prestige of U.5. government to appropriate support of the Cuban people ve. Communist dictatorship. Commit national prestige and power of Latin political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, military leaders to cause of Cuban people againet Cornmunist regime. For local public impact, international support. and morale of resistance within Cuba. en pg hig IN a, ris ch 8 HR eat tm CONE seit yg, RRB MR ag To BP LOI. ra EI ee This political decision will require considera - tion of the legal and moral factors, assessed jn the perspective of world opinion and U. 5. security interests. Top officials of Executive and Legislative branches to make timely statements. Thie should encourage similar altitude by leaders of other nations and help spirit of Cubans. Development of sympathy leading to favorable opinion about outside support for Cuban people is @ goal, fy public staternents will be aximum publicity at country of  / countries and into Cuba by 4 of State action by ClAand | Timely an encourage origin, oth CIA aasete, USIA is involv * Ritssrretetttittseae ses «nee i tO a Docld: 32474952 Page 10 HW 50955
OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE U1 (CIA) ACTIVITY i, Support U, 8, military actions in Cuba, PURPOSE Te provide intelligence, guerrilla action, and Guban political-peychological support of U.S. military ope rations. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS censors a CIA capabilities must be continuouely assessed and considered in the development of military planning, Executive responsibility for direct. ing the use of covert assets muat be clearly understood as resting in the U.S, military commander of the U.S, intervention, as in agreed-upon wartime operationa, ee = 2 Bite Btitb ts Mptt on "he DocTd: 3234274952 Page 12 BW 450955
OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE 1 (USLA) ACTIVITY i, increase news empha sia on Cuban revolt and inter. vention from the outside 'o help the Cuban move - ment, a es es ee PURPOSE To neutralize Spposition te U.S, policy and, if possible, Bain support for U.S, policy in the Weatern Hemisphere, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS ‘eerste ne Optimum exploitation o f news material avail. able to CIA and Defens @ i8 €4sential, epee ace er a, gam cose “es 8 sone ti soon latte saa tiaiah Be HW 50955 Docld: 324274959 Page 13
Ad debt shad PAILS, PHASE | (State) ACTIVITY Political and econemic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize ite influence in the Western Hemiephe re. March - July 1962 PURPOSE Activities in consonance with U.S. policy established alter the April 1961 failure in Cubs. CONSIDERATIONS These activities will have some negative impact onthe Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemis - phere. They are noted here, for the aake of com~ pleteness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programa and projects. PRE oe ig RARER os Ra 5 teeta estan te ei te Hits en Piast 2 8 i en 99494959 Page 14 Bocld HH 50955
OPERATION MONGOOSE PHASE 1 (Defense) AC CTYLTY Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence cove r- age of Cuba ae required. Develop the means of the Inter - American Defense Board to pro- wide gubetantive intelligence on Cuban activities. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence opesglions into Cuba, The Joint Chiefs of Staff will con- tinue the planning and essential preliminary actions to asaure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention, March July 1962 PURPOSE To develop increased “hard” intelligence. To add te the U.8. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for securily, To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan. To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba, TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS Use of caya near Cuba entail unacceptable security riske when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.) Sensitivity of using thie multi-national organiza - tion clearly restricta potential use by USA. Visi - bility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here. The intelligence plan requirea support by U.S. military manpower and equipment. The U.S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take ellective counter measures is reduced to a minimum, | BW 50955 Docld: 324274952 Page 15
JPERA TION MONGOOSE PHASE 1 (USIA} ACTIVITY Propaganda programe to isolate Caatro regime and neutralise its influence in the Western Hemis - phere. March - July 1962 PURPOSE Activities in consonance with U, 5, policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba, CONSIDERATIONS tne eatin a These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere, There will be some new material for use ag the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continua + tion of that already in effect, Docld: 32424952 Page 16 955