14-00000 8. Mizones was assigned to Santa Cruz and bas asSigned to La Esperanza, where the latter con of the intelligence training. . As time went by, Mizones' own duties gravitated to becoming basically those of an advisor. - , He ‘said that his case officer was aware of and a —of this : developrient.: Among the things which Mizones and . attempted to accomplish was the preservation of the lives of- captured guerrillas, for the collection of intelligence ‘about the guerrilla's locations, as well as for humanitarian reasons.  Mizones said that he: saved the life of Jose Castillo Chavez, traveling for that purpose to Vallegrande from Santa Cruz, where he spoke briefly to Castillo at the Nuestra Senora de ‘Malta Hospital. At this time Mizones learned of the intent. of Colonel Selich of the Rangers, to have the prisoner executed. _.Mizones prevailed. on Major Saucedo and General La Fuente to take his side. The prisoner was flown to Vallegrande where Mizones covered all medical costs and carried out a two-week ° interrogation. The resulting twenty-page. interrogation report. provided the Bolivians. with a complete concept of the ~guerrilla's strategy, which turned out to be the key to Guevara's capture, according to Mizones. This report was attributed by the Bolivians to be from their own. people. 9. This important. development: was followed. by an encounter in late September between a unit led by a Lt. Galindo’ and the remnants of the guerrillas. . During this action, a Cuban . lieutenant named Miguel; -the Bolivian Coco Peredo; and ai. Bolivian physician named Jose Gutierrez Ardaya were killed. ee Mizones travelled by jeep to Pucara, where. the bodies were © | “located, and through the information he had learned £rom Castillo, he was able to establish that the men were from ~ Guevara's forward element. Upon his return to Santa Cruz, -_ Mizones advised Colonel Zenténo that the 2nd Ranger Battallion | should be immediately deployed, with the remaining two weeks - of their training cancelled. Zenteno accepted this advice-— and the Rangers were moved to Pucara, and the. ‘Headquarters’ o£ the Eighth Division were moved to Vallegrande. Mizones - continueé in-his advisory role, suggesting ‘areas for troop deployment as well as the deployment of the intelligence ‘teams. On the $th of October, contact was established with - Guevara's remai Ss. (At this. time Mizones was in — Vallegrande and in Esperanza.) On the 8th, Major ‘Saucedo reporte we radio that ''the chief" had been - captured. Mizones then flew over the area in a PT-6 carrying with him a PRC-10 radio with which he was able to communicate with the Bolivian forces. He then confirmed that Guevara was - “the chief" who had been captured. He returned to Vallegrande where he told . Col. Zenteno that Guevara had. been wounded and - captured.
14-00000 10. That day Major Selich was sent to Higueras to “interrogate the suerrilla prisoners and assembled the captured documents. Since Colonel Zenteno was- planning to Ely by helicopter to Higueras on the 9th, Mizones asked him on. the evening of the 8th if he could accompany him to interrogate _ Guevara. Zenteno consulted his staff and agreed. (The oe _. helicopter had room only for a pilot and tw - ~ Mizones prepared a 100-word message to the bassengers. in code reporting Guevara's capture and asHing that an Embassy representative be sent to the area to prevail upon the Se -. Bolivians to spare Guevara's life, since he did not. believe | . that he could succeed in doing | so. This message was prepared - for the scheduled 10 a.m. transmission of 9 October, and was not transmitted to the relay point in. Asuncion, Paraguay, — until about 10:30 a.m., after Mizones arrived an Higueras and set up his radio. transmitter an RS-48. il. Zenteno, Mizones and the pilot, Nino de Guzman; set -. out by helicopter from Vallegrande at 7:15 a.m. on the 9th, -and arrived in Higueras at about 7:40 a.m. Mizones accompanied -Zenteno and Major Ayiroa when they visited Guevara in the == = ‘school room.which was. his improvised’ jail. Guevara would not dnswer Zenteno when spoken to.. He was bound, hand and foot, and: had a _leg wound. a . 12. | Mizones and Major Selich ‘then reviewed the captured documents and Mizones obtained permission, from Selich to. _ photograph all the papers, including Guevara's diary, and also. '. Selich's permission to. retain the original accommodation 7 addresses found. _°. 23. While Zenteno ‘and all the other Bolivian officers a (with the exception of a Lieutenant Perez) were outside -of . “the village attending to other military affairs, Mizones - remained-in Higueras as the highest ranking "Bolivian officer". - _In this capacity he answered a call received on the military 'field telephone and answered as Captain ' He was given. the code numbers 500 and 600 as orders. ere to be implemented by command of "higher. authorities". _ He said that the connection was not. clear and he could not recognize the voice but it could have been that of Major Saucedo. In any case, Mizones said that. since it was a line only available - to the military he was confident that it was order re-~ transmitted through military channels. He said that he knew that 500 referred to Guevara, 600 to the word execute and . 700 to the preservation of Guevarra's life. These simple codes had been identified to him previously.
14-00000 > Ant T ; S hy gl 14. -.Upon Zenteno's return, Mizones told hin of the message and Zenteno took it as an authentic order and made _ no. effort to have it confirmed. Mizones asked if Guevara's life could be preserved since he had these instructions. Zenteno replied that his own position would be placed in jeopardy if he did not comply. Mizones asked him te make. - ‘the attempt anyway. (Mizones believes that Zenteno had __ _ already resigned himself to the inevitability of Guevara's execution.) . Zentena said that he was in sympathy with Mizones' wish but that it was not in his power to reverse the order. - He told_-Mizones that, he was well aware of the treatment which: , Fidel had meted out to Cubans and told him to execute Guevara . in any manner ‘which he might choose. Zenteno said that he- ‘had’ to leave for Vallegrande at 10:00 a.m. and would send a helicopter back to pick up Guevara's 'body" at 2 p.m., and.  "as-a friend", asked that the body be ready. Mizones reiterated his request. that the order. be appealed and Zenteno agreed to make the attempt, and said he. would advise af he Were. successful. ‘45. - Failing a. ‘ counter- -manding of the order and as the. ‘senior "Bolivian officer" left in Higueras, Mizones said-he. was left with the implementation of. the execution. After Zenteno left, Mizones was able to talk to Guevara, who identified. Mizones either asa Puerto Rican or a Cuban - : working for U.S. intelligence. He said he made this. judgment _ on’ the basis of the questions. asked and on Mizones' accent. | While. Mizones was: with Guevara, shots were fired in adjoining: rooms and Mizones later determined that these involved the © execution of two other prisoners. Recognizing these shots for what they were, nevertheless, Guevara blanched when Mizones confirmed that he too would be executed; although | later. composing himself. . ; - + 16. After Veaving Guevara, “ Mizones ‘told a sergeant. ‘of the order to execute Guevara and entrusted the mission to him. He was told to fire below the head. The oftder was given to ‘the sergeant at 1:00 p.m. and Mizones heard the shots fired ‘at Guevara at 1:20 p.m. At 2:00 p.m., the helicopter returned to Higueras. A Father Shiller perfermed the last rites and Guevara's remains were strapped to one of the helicopter's Skids and Mizones accompanied them to Vallegrande, where they ianded at 2:30 p.m. “Mizones said that he lost himself in the crowd gathered at the airport, but that _ 7 took charge of the remains and was photographed. fizones said that the title of the photograph, which appeared in the press, gave an incorrect identification of| the name Mizones used,
14-00000 , ~ . t an . ° _ « rs a . 1 * . “oy . . . . . sok . ‘ weep ee . welbril  € 8 aap . -6- : . U7. Mizones said he reported the executions to Major Saucedo and the Chief of Operations, 2 Major Gutierrez, ‘and then was taken pack to identify the bodies of the three executed guerrillas. They then dreve to Santa Cruz: with. the . documents, films and equipment and then flew.to La Paz, where Mizones contacted his case officer... He was taken to. a home where he DCOS? and other Americans were priefed by |: ‘him. ‘Everything which he had been able to retain was turned -. _-in:then to be carried by @ special courier, to Washington. : Mizones then. flew back to Santa. Cruz where a. C-15 . by General Porter, CINCSOUTH, was to pick him and. up for a flight to the Canal Zone. This plane arrived With. a flat tire on the 10th or Lith. , The U.S. Mission aircraft, - a C-54, was then flown to Santa Cruz and he and (VilloLbo) _were flown back to La Paz. After overnighting there, another c-130 carried them to Panama where Mizones was asked to relate his story to General Porter. After 2 weeks in Panama, Mizones and —__] were documented as GS-16s so. that they could board a over” ooked military flight to Charlotte, " South Carolina. After their arrival there, they journeyed - to Miami, where Mizones priefed General Cushman. (Mizones believes that in both high-level priefings he mentioned his — own personal role in the execution of Guevara.) - oo ! ° ae :