202-10001-10201 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FIDE NUMBER OR TGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCOMENT TYPE CDASSTPICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS Date 08/04/98 Page <: 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION PORM AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-1L0001-1L0201 FOTA SERIES DOC 202 DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD BRIG. GEN. LANSDALE REVIEW OF OPERATION MONGOOSE 7/25/62 8 MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET 1B, ic RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/30/98 Bracketed portions withheld by the Joint Staff. Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State. a SIXS 13526 JS RE-REVIEW DA’ a ey, CILAY Te RELEASE AS TENA CTE HY. 50955 Docld: 32424932 Page 1
a a! Ce Vajaghed Paha bys OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (— WASHINGTON 25, D.C. : SENSITIVE 25 July 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Subject: Review of Operation Mongoose This is the Operations report at the end of Phase I. It has been compiled to‘assist you in reviewing Operation Mongoose thus far and in determining the best course of U.S. action for the future. ‘pine: . This Operations report contains the contribution of each major participant, on objectives, on the planning and ope rational activity | to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be cove rned by the policy framework. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-2-62) is being submitted separately for consideration in connection with uy ZESs | this report. oe aaa : oe or cece ee P ° as ‘ : : : SSBawm. As Chief of Operations, 1 am indicating in this coverin a 8 & Bese memorandum what I consider to be the most significant aspects of =e ESN our policy and program picture. Fife full report of each major partici- Bee 3) pant is appended, to ensure that you have access to the exact reporting 3 FA 5 < I as submitted. wing SBE | Bs Se S OBJECTIVES & a2 | 225 s As desired by higher authority on 30 Novernber 1961, the U.5. e Yoon SESS cog ¥ & Vv . € & undertook a special effort "in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime." After a review of operational planning and programming con-~- ‘cepts, thé Special Group (Augmented) provided guidelines on 14 March 1962 for Phase I, Operation Mongoose (roughly until the end of July 1962). The main objectives were seen a6: a. The acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Excluded from automatic — regrading: DoD Dir 5200.10 does not apply. _ CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO TOP SECRET \/ume./o5 DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR — RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT OSD. We Ob v ECGONW . _ os ¥ 2evew? [yo PT 4 p04. 068 Td: 32424932 Page 2 MICA SACTUIGNY BF x IVT F HW 509557 EXCLULED FROM GDS
seme TOP SECRET b. Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention. c. Be consistent with U.S. overt policy, and remain in position to disengage with minimum loss in assets and U.S. prestige. d. Continue JCS planning and essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for inte rvention. ACCOMPLISHMENT ° Elements of the U.S. government were organized to reach the | goals set for Phase 1. My assessment of where we are on each | objective is noted under appropriate sub-headings below. In general, | ibaa this has been a rermarkably quiet operation, well within the "noise" oO and "visibility" limits imposed. Higher authority has been kept informed of progress through the Special Group (Augmented), by frequent reports. The Special Group has provided policy guidance, as required, in Phase I, The Chief of Operations has coordinated the efforts of participa- ting departments and agencies, through meetings of the Operational Representatives and by constant review of progress. The Operational ee ted cmt atin ef each, major U.S. participant in Operation. Mongoose | are William Harvey (CIA), Robert Hurwitch (State), ‘Brig. Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USIA). My assessment of the organization, planning, and actions to reach the goals in Phase I: Intelligence, CIA had the main assignment to acquire the "hard-intelligence" desired. The headquarters and field staff of CLA are now well organized for a major effort for this aspect of Operation Mongoose, being strengthened by 4 number of CIA officers experienced in "denied area" operations elsewhere in the world. Planning and actions rate superior, in a professional sense of intelligence collection. ~enter at Opa-Locka,, t undertook a priority | CU stablished the Caribbean Admissing and an interrogatzon activity in Spain. TOP SECRET Doctd: 324274932 Page 3
atin America and Europe. Inside Cuba, the recruitment.and place- ment of third country nationals and initiation of Cuban collection nets, particularly in urban centers, has made Operation Mongoose numeri- largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist owever, the effort in more remote provincial areas of Cuba, : errilla resistance was expected to be spotted, recruited, and organized, was short of the hoped-for goal; this was due to the regime's security precautions and, to some degree, to policy limita- tions on the risks to be assumed. _ Defense contributed the majority of personnel to staff the Caribbean Admission Center, stepped-up SIGINT collection under NSA despite changes and improved sophistication of Cuban communication procedures, and brought into play the available assets of Service intelli- gence organizations, in coordination with CLA. State stepped up its information collection from diplomatic and refugee organization sources. eee Justice (FBI and INS) and USIA provided significant support to the Caribbean Admission Center. Political. State appointed a representative to devote full-time to Operation Mongoose and to develop the required political actions. During Phase I, the Punta del Este conference was a major U.S. political action to isolate Castro and neutralize his influence in the Hemisphere, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. The successful visit of President Kennedy to Mexico was another major U.S, otkitins! sation. with asotential impact upon our special goals, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. Two Operation Mongoose efforts in political action were atternpted in Phase I: to counter Castro-Communist propaganda exploitation of May Day and to sts aisite arouse strong Hemisphere reaction to Cuban military suppression of the hunger demonstration at Cardenas, in June. Ambassadors in Latin America were asked to undertake a special effort, as possible, with the help of their Country Teams; political action results in both instances were mostly negative, due to lack of capability and the local attitude in Latin American countries, tg State is responsible for refugee political policy matters, assisted by CIA in daily liaison. This is an area of major interest to Operation Mongoose, since the Cuban refugees have an open objective of over- throwing the Communist regime in Havana and recapturing their homeland. TOP SECRET BY 50955. Boctd: 32424932 Page 4
ad “elegtl stoke hebete ee Cater nesthes sHesiiniae HY 50955  Bonld:32424932 Page 5 LOr SECK ET They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of "audibility" and "visibility" apply directly in considering the handling and use of this dynamic refugee potential. As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the understanding that any real political programm must be developed by the Cubans thernselves. : Psychological. Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U, S. government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly; USIA disseminates any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service) and generates "gray" or non-official information (5 million cartoon bookg, and thousands of Spanish books on Cuba disseminated in Latin America) CIA passes inforrnation appropriate for "gray" and covert psychological channels (radio, mailings to Cuba, and dissernination inside Cuba). Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the Cuban people, but short- wave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts — compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S. . competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Guban inter erence »U.S. commercial broadcasts over a fairly wide area of the U.5. (appearing as broadcasts by ave been Ttnitiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to de yibefore their messages are believed and get passed among Cuban ord-of-mouth. Dissemination of leaflets and propaganda inside Cuba by balloon or aircraft has not received policy approval. euban guerrillas inside Cub Econornic, State has the main responsibility for developing economic actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated TOP SECRET
HW 50955  Doold: 32424932 Page 6 ae oe potential inside Cub PW DIL INI the U.S. trade embargo, denial of bunkering facilities, increased port security, and control procedures on transhipment, technical data, and customs inspection. Diplomatic means were used to frustrate Cuban trade negotiations in Israel, Jordan, Iran, Greece, and possibly Japan. Under Resolution VUI adopted at Punta del Este, the OAS has established a special committee to study “the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade with Cuba to other items (than arma," State has prepared a program to be submitted to this OAS cornmittee in the future. The evidence in that Cuba's economy is suffering. Trade with the Communist Bloc and others has kept it limping along, despite scarcity of U.S, goods, the bad drought limiting agrarian crops, increased worker non-cooperation and the regime's bungling of economic control measures, Critical spare parts still arrive in Cuba, including shipments from British and Canadian firms. Chartered shipping from Free World sources still plays a major role in Cuba's trade, and the U.S. has little hope of cutting this life~-line to Castro. a ih ad the main responsibility for assessing resistance } nd to start quietly organizing such resistance as ' feasible. The CIA] has been to set about doing this through introducing | small teams into the Cuban countryside, “over the beach" from boats. | Each tearm is tasked first to stay alive, while getting established in an area. Once able to live in an area, it then stagts a cautious survey of potential recruits for a resistance group. Names of such recruits are sent to CIA for checking, As recruits join, they are trained on the ground ; and then continue the survey. This is slow and dangerous work, Guerrilla, Ci CIA reports that 11 tearms will have been infiltrated by the end of J id that 19 maritime operations have aborted. Of the teams in, the most successful is the one in Pinar del Rio in western Cuba; its success was helped greatly by a maritime re-supply of arms and equipment; the fact that it is a "going concern" and receives help from outside has attracted recruits. Its potential has been estimated at about 250, which is a sizeable guerrilla force. With equally large guerrilla forces in other Cuban provinces, guerrilla warfare could be activated with a good chance of success, if assisted properly. However, the teams in other provinces have not been so successful; our best hope is that we will have viable tearns in all the potential resistance areas by early October. Bad weather, high seas, and increased security patrols will make the infiltration of teams and their re-supply from small boats a hard task. TOP SECRET
ene TOP SECRET abotage has not taken place, on a U.S. -sponsored basis. Planning for’such action by CIA has been thorough, including detailed study of the structures and vulnerabilities of key targets/j Sophisticated actions, such as the contamination of POL has been frustrated by lack of cooperation of nations where POL would be vulnerable to action. |; Commando fo type raids would take maritime means which now have priority"use in support of CIA teams being infiltrated inside to survey and create a guerrilla potential. CIA has reported that there is now some capability inside Cula for sabotage action, that target selection has been under further careful review, and that a proposal is forthcoming to be submitted for policy approvaly Intervention Planning. The JCS were given the responsibility for planning and undertaking essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba. This "Guidelines" objective has been : met, fully. Also, U.S. military readiness for intervention in Cuba has SEE been under continuing review within Defense, being improved wherever feasible. In addition, rumors during June of a possible uprising inside Cuba led to further planning for a contingency where a non-U. S. inspired revolt | might start inside Cuba; inter-agency staffing of U.S. planning for such a Cuban contingency is being completed, under Defense leadership. Assets. Whatever we decide to do in the future depends, to a large degree, onthe assets available to us. Our own U.S. assets in organi- zation, personnel, and equipment are sufficient to liberate Cuba, given the decision to do so. Assets among the Cubans, to liberate themselves, are | ae capable of a greater efféctiveness once 2 firm decisior is made by the U.S. to provide maximum support of Cubans to liberate Cuba, and the Cubans | start being helped towards that goal by the U.S. There are enough able- bodied and properly motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to do the job. : There is wide-spread disaffection in Cuba, with strong indications that economic distress and demoralization of population is causing real concern and strain for the regime's control officials. Firm U.S. intention to help free Cuba is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational aseet for Operation Mongoose. oe At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban people. Rightly or wrongly, the Cubans " have looked and are looking to the U.S. for guidance on what to aspire to and do next. They wonder if we are not merely watching Cuba closely, as 2. 6 TOP SECRET BW 50955 Docld: 32424932 Page 7?