875 MW Sa072 3. 9. “ - 87. SECURITY wvasnrcanron® (6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel atroad. If such individual has traveled pehind Iron Curtain, . “also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state (. whether additional investigation is contemplated. File reviews Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent infor- mation showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidate reference cards pertaining to subject in indices. Security informants ; Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed’ in value both for intelligence purposes and as-admissible evidence. Physical surveillances Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, infor- mation of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in Light of existing circumstances and available manpower. a. When information is received that meetings of subversive organiza- tions are to take place, physical surveillances should. be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants. - b. Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities - serve to identify others within movement. c. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau. Photographic surveillances . Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows sub~ jects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations arn. fords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activ- ities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be- properly correlated with other investi- gative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance. . Public sources . ( Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain packgrouna and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state records, public utility records, and school records. Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment). Obtain and index as reference material publications of Subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which bave conducted hearings concerning subversive activities.- ecords of private firms me where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such 2s past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms provided it will not jeopardize investigation. {2.] Chennelizing of information to case files ; . Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be chan= ° nelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances is chan- nelized to individual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information recieved from informants and confidential sources with active investigation. . 26 . . ‘ . . . . wot . . ’ . . * ' ” : . r . ’ ' . ain . . . ‘ a oo * . . . ‘ . . ' . ‘ . ae ta ar endear aes Sed means aru ncn cae ie arian ee aiaétharetieche ok ate aciceaet read sata edits ttattod eieete ene tebeate tee cereal aad etaeet eterna titeete tere tenet teentereeet eee Doold: 32989525 Page 1950 11-15-71 . : ,
‘WW_55072 Comes Mi oeet 2st ooee Moone Fone toe none ee ote oe meee sees 2 wees Boe I <oN SECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS Preparation of channelizing memoranda for other offices. When preparing lengthy channelizing memoranda reporting material of interest to other offices, limit the number of copies prepared for each other such offics to two. Clearly indicate next to the name of the receiving office the number of the pago containing information pertinent to that office and note on cover page that distribution of material for case files is being left to the discretion of the receiving office. If the channelizing memorandum includes names of individuals who merely attend a meeting or * gathoring, and played no important role, the reporting office is to attach to the channelizing memorandum a one-page memorandum - listing the names of all individuals who were merely in attendance and had no important function. The preparation and distribution of additional copies of the ons-page attachment are left to the | dis- cretion of the receiving office.] : Preservation of evidence Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence. a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity. of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as to source and date. b. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recol- lection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadinissible. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsat- isfactory for use in Federal proceedings. . . Doold: 32989529 (Page 1951 ot 262
MW Sa072 ae 10. I. DISSEMINATION OF DATA DEVELOPED In SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS . ‘Policy i. ~ ‘ x SECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ; ' 87H - T (4) Office preparing summary report may include information originally obtained by another office but may not have necessary documentation. If office preparing report has copies of documents obtained by another office -and identity of source, date of activity, date received, and: receiving Agent are known, it is not necessary to obtain file number of original. Pertinent documentation, other than.file number,. should be obtained from auxiliary office. (5) When report includes references to known subversives who have associated with subject, identify source of characterization in cover pages without further documentation. (6) When it is necessary to obtain thumbnail sketch, place in thumbnail sketch file so it will be readily available for future use. Channelizing memoranda ~- destruction of Channelizing memoranda[must]be destroyed following submission of reportsfor following submission of letterhead memoranda (LHM), or © when information is of no value to report or LHM.] Copies of informant's statements designated for 100 classification Piles of informants may be ° destroyed when one year old. (See instructions for destruction of channelizing memoranda in MRR, part II, section 3D, item 8.) on Proper utilization of information received is foremost among Bureau! s responsibilities. Information obtained during investigations should be forwarded to other interested agencies in executive branch unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Delimitations Agreement and Presidential directives provide for dissemination to other agencies which have present or potential interest information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities, and related matters. Bureau requirements -Because 211 conceivable situations cannot be anticipated, data below pertains to representative situations which occur frequently. Basic rule is that security information must be furnished promptly to inter- ested agencies in executive branch, Term “interested agency" must be interpreted in light of reason and common sense. Bring any unusual ‘Situations to Bureau's attention promptly for consideration, Considerations affecting national defense in Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico necessitate broadest possible construction to requirements for dissemination to intelligence services in those areas. See Manual of Rules and Regulations, part II, section 5, pertaining to Bureau's overall responsibilities, policies, and exceptions in dissemination. a. Members of armed forces Delimitations Agreement between FBI and armed forces intelligence agencies (see section 102B, volumes IV, of this manuel) requires each agency to exchange freely and directly with other subscribing agencies all information of mutual interest. <Any information developed concerning members of military services must be referred immediately to appropriate military branch having primary respon- sibility, even though allegations have not been fully resolved or verified. Specifically point out in such instances that infor- mation has not been verified. When it is determined security subject is member of armed services, discontinue investigation immediately, advise Bureau, and disseminate pertinent reports locally to appropriate intelligence agency. Dissemination regarding military personnel is not confined to subjects of security investi- gations but extends to any subversive data developed against member of armed services during FBI investigations. If member of armed forces has been in contact with security subject or any individual or group with security implications, immediately advise appropriate local intelligence service, even though security aspects of contact have not been resolved. Point out in such instances that infor- mation is unverified and transmit any additional developments am- mediately. Docld:32989529 Page 1952 31 11-15-71 234- ee wer IE et Rh neat neat mane pate mean ond Snes RAE es Ree EN EY Ok WOON pees SIRT ATEE ASRS T NER CA ar _ER MEDS FON Punetnal SORmATET mareny Gamma neneryretnmadn yer i j tne ots Jon pees mt anne tartan nets eth ot he ers wae Pe ee eeed nck ca erie cae ean ee eae eet aan et ee) severe emopememes TIE AT
87TI su 87. SECURITY INVES rrcns tov Determine during security investigations whether subjects have any close relatives in armed forces. Promptly call such associations : to attention of appropriate military intelligence services, together ( i with pertinent data, including reports, on subjects involved. Eval- KOO uation of these associations lies entirely within province of mili- tary intelligence services, but Bureau must disseminate: this infor- mation immediately upon receipt. Advise Bureau by letter concerning any subversive contacts or information ceveloped concerning military personnel, including statement as to local dissemination and enclosing 7 LHli setting out subversive data, b. Aliens and naturalized citizens Purnish information concerning aliens and naturalized ‘citizens which [ . might have bearing on their deportation or[denaturalizationjto Immi-~ gration and Naturalization Service (INS). If in doubt, disseminate. co. Employces of or persons having regular access to key facilities or employees of plants having contracts with military services |. - - See instructions in this section concerning individuals employed in : . or having access to key facilities. a. Employees of public utilities (including state and municipal facilities) which are not on key'facilities list or otherwise in item c, above, and facilities which are or may become engaged in manufacture of materials vital to national defense Disseminate locally to Army and other intelligence services if their interest is apparent, e. ‘Individuals on inactive duty who are members ‘of: or hold commissions in reserve branches or National Guard Disseminate locally to appropriate military intelligence services ££. Seamen and subjects employed in maritime industry, including long-- shoremen and water-front employees Disseminate locally to Coast Guard and, when circumstances dictate, to other interested intelligence agencies, including NISO. &. Employees of Federal Government within purview of Executive Order 10450 No dissemination of reports in security of Government employees -cases-may be made in field. If, however, subject is employed in key ( facility, furnish copies of reports bearing dual character, "Security Jk of Government Employees; Security Matter - C," to appropriate intel- ligence agencies of armed services. Instructions regarding dis- semination to Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, Ohio, appear in this section of this manual under individuals employed in or having access to key facilities - dissemination. Instructions regarding all phases of FBI responsibil-~ ities under Executive Order 10450 are in section 19, volume II, of _.. this manual. h. Individuals who own property or reside in immediate vicinity of installetion or other premises under cognizance of branch of armed “servicés Disseminate locally to intelligence service of military branch in- volved. i. Airmen issued certificates by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) FAA issues certificates to airmen, defined as persons in command or [ . acting as[pilot,]mechanic, or member of crew in navigation of air- . creft while under way; individuals directly in charge of inspection, 7 maintenance, overhauling, or repair of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances; and any individual serving in capacity of aircraft dispatcher or air-traffic control tower operator. Furnish to Bureau subversive data concerning such persons by report or LHM. In cover communication, recommend such data be furnished to FAA, Dissemination will be made only at Bureau. For additional instructions regarding dissemination to FAA, see Manual of Rules and Regulations, . part II, section 5. . , Peat NW 35072 Doold: 329895259 Page 1953 _ 12-14~70 . .
» 87. SECURITY cuvesorcaezon@® 87E (c) When all logical leads have been exhausted in case of ( missing important functionary, consider requesting Bureau authority to circularize all field offices with subject's photograph and background information, ad. Individuals traveling abroad (Also see section 105G, volume IV, of this manual.) . ‘ Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that subject in one of following categories intends to travel abroad or has already departed this country for foreign travel: subject of Af current security investigation, subject in priorities I and ITI of security index, past security subjects who may be in underground capacity, or subject concerning whom there is current information indicating need for foreign coverage. (1) Immediately advise Bureau by LHM available details concerning om travel, including places and dates of departure and intended return, destination and itinerary, purpose of trip, name under which passport was issued, number of passport, and issuing . office, if known. Include full description of subject and all. ‘aliases (in case of Chinese and Korean subjects, include Chinese telegraphic code or Korean telegraphic code numbers). Also include concise resume of available subversive data regarding ‘subject. Do not delay advising Bureau of actual or intended travel while developing details of travel as time is of essence. (2) Set out lead for WFO to check records of Passport Office, Depart- . ment of State; but do not limit efforts to develop pertinent information to such check. . (3) Information concerning subject's proposed travel abroad, including informetion concerning subversive activities, is furnished Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and legal attaches. If travel is in area covered by legal attache, forward sufficient copies of LHM to enable dissemination of three copies to each legal attaches involved. For each of these we rewert hem we ge eel ag eG ee ‘ : . . aeeneeye Empey eer ee ennai wwe De ertitt ayn Aromat ieee taverns 55 ee eee heal uecemkekicod 7 legal attaches, forward one photograph of subject, if available. ( If stops are to be placed with security services abroad, cover i N. letter should so indicate. Set forth requests for investigation abroad on separate numbered page, captioned "Leads," at end of LH. . Request should not refer to legal attache or request investigation : by particular agency abroad. : (4) Subsequent report in individual case should contain details i - yregsrding subject's travel. In nonsecurity index cases where : LHMs are submitted, communication transmitting data regarding “ travel should indicate whether investigation is being initiated and, if not, why. ‘ (5) Set forth below are steps to be taken when information is received that one of following is forming tour group for foreign travel: ‘ organization of investigative interest to Bureau or subject in one of categories described in first paragraph under item d above. (a) Advise appropriate offices, under caption of tour group or . organization, identities of individuals participating. in tour, and furnish Bureau LHMs for State Department, CTA, and appropriate legal attaches. Include all readily available information pertaining to tour, such as itinerary, pertinent dates, names and addresses of participants, and thumbnail sketch of organization or individual sponsoring tour. ~ (vo) Offices should immediately identify participants and submit LHMs on those in one of categories described in first para- graph under item d above. Refer to LHM previously prepared under caption of tour group or organization. Submit letter to Bureau under caption of tour group or organization listing individuals within territory participating in tour on whom there is no subversive information. 1 pgetrepsee preteen 3 My 8m ' | eye ererenpereeerrenrstmensnncnenrninaerere seen re ( 25 5-13-71 | _ Nw 55072 Dooid: 32989529 Page 1954
87E 5. 6. 10. f SECTLON 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (6) Advise Bureau promptly by LHM of subject's return from travel abroad. If such individual has traveled behind Iron Curtain, also furnish Bureau recommendations as to interview and state whether additional investigation is contemplated. File reviews . me Check office indices and review files thoroughly for pertinent infor-~ mation showing background and subversive activity. Include information in initial report. After each check and review of files has been made, consolidats reference cards pertaining to subject in indices. Security informants Information developed through security informants is unsurpassed, in value both for intelligence purposes and as admissible evidence. Physical survesillances . Physical surveillances should be used when, in opinion of SAC, infor- mation of sufficient value might be obtained to justify their use in light of existing circumstances and available manpower, ae When information is received that meetings of subversive organiza~ tions are to take place, physical surveillances should be considered to corroborate such information and identify participants. be Surveillances of individuals in leadership or underground capacities serve to identify others within movement. ec. Success of surveillances depends upon resourcefulness of Agents who must at all times exercise sound judgment and discretion. Be alert to observe activity of subject and countersurveillances which may be used to identify Agents and embarrass Bureau. Photographic surveillances Photographic evidence of meetings between individuals or which shows sub- jects entering or leaving meeting places of subversive organizations af- -fords convincing and admissible evidence to establish subversive activ- ities. Prior Bureau authority is needed for photographic surveillances of meetings and they must be properly correlated with other investi- gative techniques to obtain maximum evidence. Conceal equipment to avoid detection by subjects or other individuals in proximity of surveillance. Public sources . Make use of all logical public sources of information. Obtain background and lineage data from birth records and local bureaus of vital statistics, credit agencies, state racords, public utility records, and school records. [Credit check of individual should be limited to obtaining identifying information only (name, address, former address, employment, former employment).] Obtain and index as reference material publications of subversive organizations and records of state and Federal committees which have conducted hearings concerning subversive activities. , Records of private firms Where pertinent information is available in records of private firms, such as past or present employers, insurance companies, and merchants, contact such firms vrovided it will not jeopardize investigation. Channelizing of information to case files Membership or activity in subversive organizations should be channelized to main case files of individuals involved. Mimeographed form FD-306 may be used provided it is limited to reporting attendance at meetings. When information from informants or surveillances ia channelized to indi-~ vidual case files, it must be documented. Coordinate information received from informants and confidential sources with active investigation. Preservation of evidence . Bear in mind necessity of obtaining admissible evidence. a. Identify, preserve, and maintain continuity of evidence obtained for possible admission in Federal proceedings. Identify specifically as * to source and date. db. Notes or statements from informants necessary to refresh their recol- lection if called to testify must be in sufficient detail to serve this purpose and contain no material which would make their use inadvisable or inadmissible. c. Informant's original notes or statements are not to be blocked, stamped, serialized, or mutilated in any way which would render them unsat- isfactory for use in Federal proceedings. NW 35072 Doocld: 32939529 Page 1955 26 18 SLE WER ES PRON MOTO Re werte Cre Eye merry et FY emenE ere rE ORT Ree if THOS EET ENC ETON pm NRE Ee et PE MOR ACTOR TREE Ft hs <nah ibmsaasdineedaieancaanhan hints kcmcccerennaeemel Am eraemnesnmeenst At Seng Rg nee Nseeperth oa ren se rmR APN ema weg eT Teens Yona foe
a ttn, ‘ NW 35072 4 - 87. SECURITY cavssorcanrol . 87E ad. Above also applies to Agent's notes taken during surveillances or concerning evidence otherwise obtained. 11. Interviews with subjects of security investigations @e Policy No security investigation of an individual is to be closed unless subject is included in security index or consideration given to interview. Bureau will not authorize cancellation of security index card for inactivity until subject has been interviewed or Bureau advised why interview is inadvisable. be. Purpose , 1) When investigation is inconclusive, to determine subject's sympathies and whether he continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrines (2) fo develop information concerning activities of subject and his associates in subversive movement (3) fo develop informants e¢. SAC authority Without Bureau authority SAC may: (1) Authorize interviews with individuals who have not been subjects of security investigations and available information does not _ warrant opening case , (2) Authorize interviews’ of subjects of security cases who have previously been interviewed with Bureau authority, provided no change has taken place in subject's status and interviews are conducted under same conditions as previously authorized (3) Authorize interviews of subjects of closed security cases in- cluding persons who were on security index but were removed (4) Authorize interviews of rank-and-file black extremists except as noted in section 122, volume IV, of this manual ad. Procedures for interviews under SAC authority (1) If there is closed file, reopen it. If none, open case in 134 category to resolve whether subject is identical with information in files and determine his current employment and residence, (2) Case Agent will prepare memorandum requesting SAC authority to conduct interview of subject to determine his attitude towards cooperation with FBI. (3) During first contact Agent should identify himself, outline Bureau's responsibilities in security field, and request subject's assistance. If individual has been member of basic revolutionary organization and appears cooperative, he may be questioned about his own activities. However, this interview is for sole purpose - of determining whether subject might be cooperative. (4). If cooperative, advise Bureau and conduct background investigation under section 107, volume IV, of this manual. If uncooperative, prepare brief memorandum for file and close case. Letter to Bursau not necessary. ‘ @, Prior Bureau authority Prior Bureau authority required for (1) Subjects of active currant investigation where no prior Bureau authority has been obtained (2) Closed cases on current security index subjects where no prior. ; interview has bean conducted (3) Subjects of investigations requested by Bureau, both open and closed, such as applicant and loyalty cases (4) Individuals when circumstances indicate delicate situation and greater than usual risk involved, such as labor leaders and individuals in educational, mass media, religious, or publish- ing fields. Bureau authority needed even though there were prior interviews. 5 Security subjects who have publicly disclosed previous contacts 6 Subjects of section A reserve index cards In above cases, no report need be submitted when requesting Bureau authority to interview subject. Doclda: 32989525 Page 1956 27 . ‘ WAwLA 71 ' 4 i i Fa & pneanoings Creqibenet € btpmsstyra den tat) 2 pee vives ne pitere renee -¥ ome oe tan we ou OE MASE Ween “yee Ae ate
871 (2) (2) (2) Troon Bes Banos Sao anne Stoneen, 0 conan Bt oetet Yoon, 0 soot dose ee © es Bans eS noes ee Beet Bees does 0 hoe Ses Bees Be dt ree meet toe Dn 9 oe Be cones sore aes Yee Bea Bt anes Bonet ees ee oes Bes Een Bone cen 1 oem Eaten 9 on 0 cone Samet Dees Fac beet Eee hon Ven Yes 9 ann Laon, Kama Ean Ramen. ae Cee) NW 35072 Dooid: 32989525 f£. Letter requesting Bureau authority for interview si Qou 87. SHCURITY INVESTIGATI &@ In absence of special circumstances, include following state- ment in first paragraph of letter. (2.) Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to inter- views of security subjects. If subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during initial inter- ‘view to direct his activities and complete background in- vestigation required by section 107C of Manual of In- structions will be conducted and Bureau will be requested to authorize recontact with subject as PSI. (bv) Form FD-336 contains above statement and may be used. Statement in no way precludes interviewing Agents from obtaining all subversive information subject is willing to furnish or other data which will assist in determining his potential as informant. ({c) If available, letter must contain following information: I. Residence address, occupation, employment, race, date and place of birth, citizenship, and status of health TI. Marital status. If married, occupation, employment, and race of Spouse. TIT. Length of time subject was member of or affiliated with subversive organization and positions held. When in- vestigation is based on circumstances other than mem- bership or affiliation with subversive organizations, briefly set forth facts. TV. If married, state if spouse is or has been member of or affiliated with subversive groups, positions held, and period of such membership or affiliation. V. ‘Membership or affiliation of any other close relatives in subversive groups VI. Information regarding defection, expulsion, inactivity, and present sympathies of subject and, if married, of Spouse VII. What is expected to be gained by interview (a) In each letter, pertinent information, if available, regarding ° seven items listed must be set out under appropriate number but headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any item, so indicate after number. Letters must be personally approved by SAC. One copy of letter should only be first page of letter. When unnecessary to issue specific instructions, Bureau will approve request by stamping this page and returning by routing slip. . When authorized, interview must be conducted within 45 days. If not possible, advise Bureau and indicate subject will be contacted within 45 days. If interview has not been conducted at end of second period, request new authority. Include any new informa- tion bearing upon advisability of interview. g. Preparation for and conduct of interview Preparation must be thorough and interview conducted so that Agents will not be compromised, Bureau will not be embarrassed, and informants will not be exposed. GPUSA has planned traps for Agents attempting interviews with members by installing recording machines in members' homes or endeavoring to have interview observed by concealed third party. ; Interviews should be conducted by two Agents. Agent experienced in security investigations who is knowledgeable regarding de- velopment of informants should conduct interrogation, Actual - approach need not be made by both Agents; one Agent may observe from secure distance. (Two Agents should be physically present during interview or contact with known or suspected Nation of Islam members in all cases.) Background of subject and circum- stances will determine how approach should be handled. 28 : Page 1957 8-13-70 oe ; ert Tipe be wremqstmmiccranads Paee Pry NAL OTE HRT ereny cqtnerr amet T Yb IN AER SA Creare hen tent Thete a cite eh es ceemobarnrientertien ls yy te. MOVE eT ER OP ERAN TR BO A ATR TD RT AYE SEEN ETER HE OEM Pot erm Towne nat ate. mene Cone mee,
7 * HW S5072 Docld: 32989525 Page 1556 8-13-70 ss Aes wna Oe 0 sas Dee oe 2 noes 0 0 A ae Deo DD De Da Dn Oe me ct Bc Ds oe ee doe Oo Ba Ba Bae We Uso Bes Kee nee Dee ne Kose Kf ne Lee Lone fae Danes Cas Kaen toms Rama han Eames ee ee C 87. SECURITY rwvesrrcar . 87B i. Finances Special efforts must be made to locate and monitor bank accounts of organizations. Emphasis must be placed on determining if funds are being furnished organizations from foreign sources and if there is any rapport between the organizations and organizations in foreign . countries. gj. Support given to or received from CPUSA or other communist group Develop evidence showing support, financial or otherwise, given by organization to CPUSA or other communist group or received by organi- zation from CPUSA or other communist group. _k. Implementation of CPUSA line or that of other communist group Usually shown through comparison of programs and literature of organi- gation with those of CPUSA or other communist group during any partic— ular period. : 1. Accuracy of identifications Use extreme care to assure statements relating to affiliations or membership in subversive organizations are accurate in all respects, Show exact basis, plus corroboration wherever possible, for {dentifi- cation of suspected organizations or individuals with information of a possible subversive nature. Never refer to a person as @ "known communist" unless he is publicly known as such. m. Specific requirements for CPUSA investigations Follow previously established reporting format. New York is respon- Bible, in addition to reporting activities of New York District, for investigating and reporting separately on national committee meetings, national training schools, and other important national meetings. _n. Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other Marxist-Leninist or frotskyite groups All offices submit semiannual reports and carry as pending inactive, except New York whose report on SWP activities on national basis should be designated pending. New York also submit report on local SWP ac- ‘tivities. Indicate in cover pages whether all persons identified in report as members of SWP or as members of other Marxist-Leninist or Trotskyite groups who reside within area covered by reporting office | are listed in security index, or are informants or sources. fist any exception by name and show status of investigation and state whether name has been furnished Bureau for indexing. Data concerning above topics can usually be secured through following sources: confidential informants, incorporation records, bank records, literature and publications of organization, newspapers, public meetings and rallies, confidential investigative techniques, various public records, panel sources, confidential sources and other sources of informa- tion, interviews with past or present CPUSA members, review of field office files, pretext interviews, surveillances, Agents attending mass meetings, etc. , Dissemination of information to Secret Service regarding plots against President On 2-3-65, an "Agreement Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service Concerning Presidential Protection" was signed and became effective. This agreement is set out in its entirety in section 102, volume IV, of this manual. Agreement provides that FBI, in its investigations of organizations whose activities are inimical to welfare of U. S., will be alert to and promptly notify Secret Service of any information indicating plot against person of the President. It is responsibility of Secret Service to initiate necessary action to neutralize such plot. a. Be alert during investigation of organization for information in- dicating plot against person of President. Upon receipt, immediately furnish complete details to nearest office of Secret Service and appropriate local law enforcement agencies and advise Bureau by teletype, or telephone if facts warrant, of information furnished and fact it has been so disseminated. Attempt immediately to verify information, but do not attempt evaluation of information. 15 sos . | eer eee | A POE TNR REPO AONNEE TIS IS OR T Oe Pe catered Pea eR seeMbcodtia OLE Meee 7. coarse. err.