AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE: CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK Assassination System Date: 4/28/201 Identification Form Agency Information HSCA 180-10147-10240 ‘ CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION 63-01-02 Document Information HSCA CIA ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AND LHO IN NEW ORLEANS 03/00/1979 293 Released under the John Kennedy Assassination ecords Collection Act . {44 USC 210% ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES ; -_ Case# : NW S3080 CIA, FILES . OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE NEW ORLEANS FERRIE, DAVID REPORT Unclassified 1A; 1B Redact . 06/04/1998 7 Box 36 HW 53080 DocId:32273595 Page 1
erate Nite oats 4g ? Ney vane Nine tamed, (This form is to be used for material extracted from CiA—controlled documents.) REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Cover Sheet The attached package of paper is the property of the House Select Committee on Assassinations,.and is on loan to CIA under an agreement whereby CIA is not to reproduce or copy the draft or any portion thereof. Notes may be taken on materials in this package, and rough notes may be prepared as a basis for informal and oral exchanges with HSCA representatives. These notes, however, are to be held as though controlled and are. to be destroyed under agreed conditions with HSCA. They are not to be copied or excerpted and are to be held until further instructions are received for eventual disposal. These papers have been numbered for accountability and receipted accordingly. They are to be handled on a secure basis as though ¢ constituting sensitive papers on a need-to-know basis. — a A REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Copy #  < of 7 __ Chass HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 2
[COMMITTEE PRINT] , Prd CreXAo Aeuists gb Cec oniraih so % res ae can ow 9 OS OE ES A A ae ene G Ras Loe Nequer OSwalel in Maer Del dons STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ‘eainations OFFICE nen Snesgrernment Printing Oflice tock 2-OTELIT CLS ot amma: a 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 3 b>
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(1) Two: primary reasons prompted the Committee to investigate anti-Castro activists and organizations. First, the Committee ascertained that as a consequence of the failure and eventual unwillingness of the Kennedy Administration to liberate Cuba from Castro, these persons . , Were , , ; and organizations,_being located primarily in the United States, améhighly militaristic in nature,) possessed the means, motive, and opportunity to assassinate the President. Second, the Committee felt that Lee Harvey _ Oswald's verified association with anti-Castro . Cubon <> » while living in New Orleans during 1963, “together with. his possible contacts with other anti- Ohi vists Goss ibe chy Castro Gimmes, further enhanced the probabitity of the involvement of anti-Castro elements inthe assassination. For these reasons, the Committee thoroughly investigated numerous anti-Castro organizations and operatives and Oswald's activigha while living in New Orleans to determine their connection, if any, to the assassination. (2) The Committee initiated its investigation tb selecting the most active anti-Castro groups and their key leaders from among the more than 100 anti-Castro organizations in existence in November 1963. ‘These groups included Alpha 66, JURE, Commandos L, the Directorio Revolutionario Estudiantial (DRE), the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), which includes the Frente Revolucianario Democratico (FRD), the Junta Gobierno. de - Cuba in Exilo (JGCE), the 30th of November, the “International ‘Penetration Forces (InterPen), Revolutionary Recovery | Movement (MRR) 5 and EIC. by 53060 DoclId:32273595 Page 6
wz = a Dinca lee lnc antl os Their selection ‘evolved. both from the Committee’ s : independent field investigation and the examination of the files and records maintained by the federal and local agencies then monitoring: Cuban exile activity. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Defense. Sematy, eva, (3) These groups can “be described as “action groups. These were the movements most active on both the military and propaganda fronts, the Keates not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted ‘Castro assassination attempts, participated in a. multiplicity of arms dealings and possessed the most. vociferous and aggressive leaders. These were the groups and individuals who received the crux of the Kennedy Administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations following the Cuban missile crisis. These were also the ones who, in the end, were the most . re bitter at President. Kennedy and felt the most betrayed. ae orl: OO STOEL ee sTeecaetid Memes Ps aden ite lia (W) rneveese ; ver = e Committee focused on jwees btn the key members in each group and concentrated. on uncovering links. to Lee Harvey. Oswald. The Committee found evidence of contactgbetween Oswald and ur . ; who wetre i individualsassociated with fememy anti-Castro groups. These persons were JURE member Silvia Odio, Alpha 66 leader Antonio Veciana, CRC designate Frank Bartes, - and DRE member Carlos Bringuier. -Oswald encountered both Bartes and Bringuier in New | Orleans _ during the , on hprenen RET OPED tng HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page 7
Team 3 CoP ~ i Aedde—Pra—Gree Fonzi TM THE ZNGREDiBNS CF AW - @ = ANTI-cASTRO CUBAN CONSPIRACY (Y) vas the John F. Kennedy assassination a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles? There were at tN . least two significant. factors wth. tea the Committee to consider that qa question: equ~@mmmers the Warren Commission’ s decision not, to investigate issue despite the urging of staff counsels involved . , a and in that area of evidence gtagm apparent fact that the anti-Castro Cuban exiles had the means, motivation and opportunity to be involved in the assassination. / maddhilivn (76) Pus hepa, the area of possible Cuban exile involvement was one in which the Warren. Commission was not provided with an adequate investigative background. According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) -which—Leclettrre—theesele (1) "Despite knowledge of Oswald's apparent interest in pro-Castro and anti-Castro activities and top level wy | awareness of certain CIA assassination plots, the we a FBI...made no special investigative effort into, ny z HW 53080 Docld:322973595 Page 11
HW 53060 questions of possible Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination independent of the Oswald investigation. There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or of sources within the Cuban exile community."? — | (/2) Nevertheless, even from the paucity of evidence that was available to them in 1964, two staff attorneys for the Warren Commission speculated that Lee Harvey Oswald, despite his public posture as a Castro sympathizer, was actually an agent of . f anti-Castro exiles. Pressing for further investiga- tion of that possibility, Assistant Counsels William Coleman@ and W. David Slawson wrote a memorandum to Stor ing _ eee ES the Commission Castro involvement in the assassi/fantion on some sort of basis as this: dswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti-Castro Cubans must have realized . that law enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that, therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also learn of them... Second, someone in the anti-Castro or- ganization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence...On these facts, it is pos- sible that some sort of deception was (13) The evidence here could lead to an anti- Docld: 322773595 Page 12
Ss) used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas... The motive of this would, of course, be the expectation that after the Presi- dent was killed Oswald would be ‘caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law enforcement authorities and the public would then.blame the assassina- tion on the Castro government and a call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible... . Gem Se 15 (4) premise *important in considering the possi- bility of anti- -Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy so develop mad assassination g @ historical awareness of the waves of political and emotional impulses which coursed through the Cuban exile communities in Miami, New Orleans and Dallas while Kennedy was President. — EA The Raine of Fidel Coome Ruz The Background: (13) If it can be said to have a beginning, the anti-Castro Cuban exile movement was seeded in the early morning hours of New Year's Day, 1959, when a DC-4 lifted from the fog-shrouded Camp Columbia air- field in Havana.’ Aboard the plane was -Fulgencio who had ween ‘Batista, the military dictator of fon He previa de years” HW 53060 Cuba? Batista was fleeing the country, his regime long beset by forces from within and without, now crumbling under pressure from rebel forces sweeping down from the mountains. When dawn came, the bells Docld: 322773595 Page 13
HW 53060 tolled in Havana and, 600 miles away, Fidel Castro Rua began his triumphal march to the capital.” For seven days Castro and his 26th of July Movement rebels moved down Cuba's Central Highway while thousands - 7 - 6 -Cheered and threw flowers in their path. Castro finally arrived in Havana on January 8th and character- istically gave a speech. Clad in his green fatigue uniform while three white doves, which someone had dramatically released, circled above him, Castro boldly proclaimed: "There is.no longer an enemy!" fe) He was wrong, of course, and knew it. A hard core of Batistianos had fled the country early, many long before their leader, and were already con- cocting counter-revolutionary plots from their refuges in the United States, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere. ° . (7) And it was not very long after Castro took power that a sense of betrayal began to grow among those who had once been his strongest supporters.” As each day went by it-became more apparent that Castro's Revolution was, as one chronicler noted, “leading inexorably toward an institutionalized dictatdérship in which individuals were contemptuously shorn of their rights and dissenters were met with charges of treasonable conduct, counter-revolutionary activity or worse. "10 Then too, there was a large Docld: 32273595 Page 14
NW 53080 number of public executions. - Within two weeks of his reign, Castro shot 150 ex-Batista officials. Within three months, there were at least 506 execu- us 1 tions.: (a The disillusionment for many Cubans deepened when it became obvious that the form of Castro's rule was turning toward Communism and that Castro's _ attitude toward the United States was engendering a hostile relationship. The publishing of Castro's Agrarian Reform Law in May, 1959, was a significant sign. +? It was far more radical than had been ex- pected and was obviously designed to strip both Cuban and American-owned sugar firms of their im- mMensely valuable cane lands. -" -A few weeks later the Chief of Castro's Air Force, Major. Pedro Diaz- Lanz,resigned, charging ".. there was Communist in- fluence in the armed forces and Government." Then, when Castro's own hand-picked President, Manuel Urrutia, announced at a press conference that he rejected the support of the Communists and said "I ' believe that any real Cuban revolutionary should reject it openly," Castro immediately forced him to resign and accused him of actions "bordering on . 1 treason.". (19) And so, after the broken pledges of free Docld: 32273595 Page 15
HW 53060 elections and a free press, the mass trials and executions, the assumption of unlimited power and the bellicose threats against the United States, it slowly began to. dawn on many Cubans that Fidel Castro was not the political savior they had ex- pected. (3o}ithen, on October 19, 1959, there occurred an incident which precipitated the formation of the first organized anti-Castro opposition within Cuba. “Major Huber Matos, one of Castro's highest-ranking officers and considered by most Cubans tc be one of the key heroes of the Revolution, resigned from the Army in protest against the increasing favoritism shown. to known Communists. The next day Matos was arrested, charged with treason, subsequently tried and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Shortly afterwards, Castro himself called a secret meeting of the National Agrarian Reform Institute managers at which he outlined a plan to communize Cuba within three years. There the suspicions of Dr. Manuel Artime, the manager in Oriente Province, were con- firmed. "I realized," Artime later said, "that I was a democratic infiltrator in a Communist govern- ment, 729 Docld:32273595 Page 16
(2) artime returned to Oriente and began or- ganizing students and peasants to fight against Castro and Communism: By early November each pro- vince in Cuba had an element of Artime's new under- ground movement. It was called the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR). “it was the first anti-Castro action group originating from within Castro's own ranks. | | (2a) By the summer of 1960, it had become ob- vious both within and outside of Cuba that the founda- tion for an eventual confrontation between Castro and anti-Castro forces had been laid. The Eisenhower Administration had cancelled the Cuban sugar quota. -” Mikoyan had visited Havana and Raul Castro had gone to Moscow. 73 Ernesto "Che" Guevara had proclaimed publicly that the Revolution was on the road set by Marx, and Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency had said ina speech that Communism had per-_ verted Castro's revolution." zmta By then, ,Castro had seized more than $700 million in U. Ss. property within Cuba.?° | | (23) On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to organize, train, -and equip Cuban . 2 refugees as a guerilla force to overthrow Castro. 6 HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page 17
HW 53060 Soon it became common knowledge within Cuba that a liberation army was being formed and that a political . . . 4 27 structure in exile had been created. As the flight from Cuba increased in size and fervor, the exile community in the United States grew in spirit and confidence. -One historian captured the special characteristics of the new arrivals: They were new types of refugees. Instead of a home, they were seeking temporary asylum. They found it along the sandy beaches and curging coastline of Florida. They arrived by the thousands, in small fishing boats, in planes, chartered or ‘stolen, and crowded into Miami. Along the boulevards, under the palms, and in hotel lobbies, they gathered and plotted their counter-revolution. Miami began to take on the air of a Cuban city. Even its voice was changing. Stores and cafes began advertising in Spanish and English...Everyone talked of home only one hundred miles away. And everyone talked about the great liberation army being formed in, fhe secret camps some- where far away. ; ey By April, 1961, the more than 100,000 Cubans who had fled Castro's Revolution lived in anticipation of its overthrow. They had been buoyed in that hope - by public pronouncements of support from the United States Government. In his State of the Union address, President Kennedy had spoken of "the Communist base Docld: 322773595 Page 18
HW 53080 established 90 miles from the United States," and said that "...Communist domination in this hemi- 29 sphere can never be negotiated." In addition, the Cuban exiles had been organized, directed and almost totally funded by agencies of the U. S. Government, 30 principally the CIA. 2) From an historical perspective, in light of its later radical change, the attitude of the Cuban exiles toward the U. S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs is especially significant. Author Haynes Johnson who, in writing a history of the invasion, collaborated with the top Cuban leaders, including Brigade civilian chief Manuel Artime, described that attitude in detail: From the beginning, the Cuban counter- revolutionists viewed their new American friends with blind trust. Artime was no exception. He, and later virtually all of the Cubans involved, believed so much in the Americans -- or wanted so desper- ately to believe -- that they never ques- - tioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plans. Looking, back on. it, they agree now that their naiveté was partly genuine and partly reluctance to turn down any offer of help in liberat- ing their country. In fact, they had little choice; there was no other place to turn. Some, of course, were driven by other motives: political power and personal ambition were involved. Even Docld: 32273595 Page 19
HW 53060 “v= 210 more important was the traditional Cuban attitude toward America and Americans. To Cubans the United States was more than the colossus of the North, for the two countries were bound closely by attitudes, by history, by geography and by economics. The United States was great and powerful, the master not only of the hemisphere but perhaps of the world, and it was Cuba's friend. One really didn't question such a belief. It was a fact; everyone knew ‘it. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief. 31. (26) This "blind trust" by the Cuban exiles in the U. S. Government prior to the Bay of Pigs was specifically noted by the military commander of the 2506 Brigade, José (Pepe) Pérez San Roman: "Most of the Cubans were there," he said, "because they knew the whole operation was going to be conducted by ‘the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the Americans. So they were going to fight because the United States was backing them. "3 27) The debacle at the Bay of Pigs was not only a military tragedy for the anti-Castro Cuban exiles but also a painful shattering of their confidence in the U. S. Government. The exile leaders claimed that the failure of the invasion was a result of the lack DoclId: 32273595 Page 20
HW 53060 26 V-i1il of promised air support, and for that they directly blamed President Kennedy. >> Particularly galling to them was Kennedy's public declaration to Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the height of the invasion, when the Brigade was being slaughtered in the swamps of Bahia de Cochinos: "...I repeat now that the © United States intends no armed intervention in Cuba.">" . | (28) Even those exile leaders who were willing - to rationalize the extent of Kennedy's responsibility were dissuaded when Kennedy himself admitted the blame. Cuban Revolutionary Council leader Manuel nema ~ Executive, sesson {patente de varona,) in hisAtestimony before the Com- mittee, told of the President gathering the Council members together at the White House when it became clear that the invasion was a disaster. j.vetonalre- called: "We were not charging Mr. Kennedy with any- thing; we just wanted to clarify. We knew that he didn't have any direct knowledge of the problem, and we knew that he was not in ‘charge of the military effects directly. Nevertheless, President Kennedy, to finish the talks, told us he was the one -- the 135 only one responsible. -A few days after that Docld: 32273595 Page 271
HW 53060 v-12 meeting, the White House issued a public statement declaring that President Kennedy assumed "sole re- sponsibility" for the U. S. role in the action against Cuba. (24) The acceptance of responsibility did not cut the bitter disappointment the Cuban exiles felt toward the U. S. Government and President Kennedy. Much later, captured and imprisoned by Castro, Brigade Commander San Roman revealed the depth of his re- action at the failure of the invasion: "I hated the United States," he said, "and I felt that I had been betrayed. Every day it became worse and then-I was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get 37 a rifle and come and fight against the U. Ss." (38) Prominent Cuban attorney Mario Lazo wrote a book caustically titled Dagger in the Heart. °° Tim nara ee Navel ts rene ate “ sanipeettala range eee erm eerness a /"The- Bay of. Pigs defeat was “wholly self- inflicted — a a En rene sm nye ae ctainrem mente na ‘in. Washington," /Lazo wrote! ———— Kennedy told the truth when he. publicly accepted responsibility...The heroism of the beleaguered Cuban Brigade had been rewarddd by betrayal, defeat, death for many of them, long and cruel im- _prisonment for the rest. The Cuban ‘people and the Latin American nations, bound to Cuba by thousands of subtle ties of race and culture, were left with feelings of astonishment and disillusion- ment, and in many cases despair. They Docld: 32273595 Page 22
JAW 53060 vy +13 had always admired the United States as strong, rich, generous -- but where was its sense of honor and the capacity - of its leaders? - _ The mistake of the Cuban fighters. for liberation was that they thought too highly of the United States. They believed to the end that it woyld not let them down. But it did... 3) President Kennedy was well aware of the bitter legacy left him by the Bay of Pigs debacle. It is not now possible to document the changes in Kennedy's personal attitude brought about by the military defeat, but the firming of U. Ss. policy toward Cuba and. the massive. infusion of U. S. aid”Y to clandestine anti-Castro operations in the wake was of the Bay of Pigs que 40 as "the Kennedy vendetta." (32) What can be documented is the pattern of U. S. policy between the period of the Bay of Pigs failure in April, 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in October, 1962. That pattern, replete with both overt and covert maneuvers, had a significant effect on the re-shaping of Cuban exile attitudes and, when it was abruptly reversed, wes have provided the motivation for involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy. DoclId: 32273595 Page 23
vV- 14 (3) m retrospect, the period between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis can be considered the high water mark of anti-Castro activity, almost every manifestation of the U. S. policy providing a reassurance of support of the Cuban exile cause. As a matter of fact, only a few days after the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy delivered a particu- larly hard-line address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the implications of Communism in Cuba. "Cuba must not be abandoned to the Com- munists," he declared, In appealing for support from Latin America, he indicated that the United States would expext more from the nations of the hemisphere ‘with regard to Cuba and asserted that the United States would not allow the doctrine of non-interven- tion to hinder its policy. Said Kennedy, "...our restraint is not inexhaustible," and spoke of Cuba in the context of the "new and deeper struggle."41 (24) When Castro, in a May Day speech, declared Cuba to be a socialist nation, the State Department retorted that Cuba was a full-fledged member of the Communist bloc. (2) Another U. S. response. was the establishment of the Alliance for Progress, after years of relatively HW 53060 Doclda:32273595 Page 24
v-15 little attention to Latin America's economic and social needs. 4? President Kennedy gave the Alliance emocradl All concept a @& seep «4launching in a speech in March, 1961 when he called for vigorous promotion of social and economic development in Latin America through democratic means and, at the same time, pledged substantial financial and political support. 4 (29) While the campaign to broaden its Cuban policy base was being pursued, the United States was ¥# proceeding on another course. In one of the first unilateral efforts to isolate Cuba from its allies, the United States in September, 1961 an- nounced it would stop assistance to any country that assisted Cuba: In December, Kennedy extended the denial of Cuba's sugar quota through the first half of 1962.> (37) Meanwhile, the secret policy aimed at removing Castro through assassination continued as FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover informed Attorney General Robert Kennedy in May that the CIA had used the Mafia in "clandestine efforts" against castro. *° In that month, poison pills to be used in a plot to kill Castro were passed to a Cuban exile in Miami by a Mafia figure. In November, 1961, the CIA initiated Operation HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page 25
HW 53060 “vy - 16 MONGOOSE, designed to enlist 2000 Cuban exiles and ‘dissidents inside Cuba to overthrow Castro. | (23) affdough the bitter aftertaste of the Bay of Pigs invasion lingered in the Cuban exile com- munity, those who remained active in the fight against Castro came to realize that these subsequent actions of the Kennedy Administration were manifesta- tions of its determination to reverse the defeat. d ' What Kennedy hag euphemistically termed "a new and deeper struggle" (supra) became, in actuality, a secret war: . «eethe new President apparently . perceived the defeat as an affront to his pride. Within a matter of weeks he com- mitted the United States to a secret war -against Cuba that eventually required the . services of several thousand men and cost -as much as $100 million a year...Kennedy entrusted its direction to the CIA, which --.-conducted an operation that could be described either as a _ large-scale vendetta or-a small crusade." ee) The fact that the agency of the U. S. Govern- ment the anti-Castro exiles had most dealt with and relied on prior to the Bay of Pigs became, after the invasion failure, the controlling force of the "secret war" was another indication to the Cuban exiles that the Kennedy Administration was, indeed, still Sincere about overthrowing Castro. Within a year of the Bay of Pigs, the CIA curiously and inexplicably began to grow, to branch out, to gather more and more responsibility for the'Cuban problem’. Docld:32273595 Page 276
HW 53060 v-17 The Company was given authority to help monitor Cuba's wireless traffic; to ob- serve its weather; to follow the Castro government's purchases abroad and its currency transactions; to move extra- ordinary numbers of clandestine field operatives in and out of Cuba; to ac- quire a support fleet of ships and air- craft in ordéer:to facilitate these secret agent movements; to advise, train, and help reorganize the police and. security establishments of Latin countries which felt threatened by Castro guerrilla politics; to take a hand in U-2 overflights and sea-air ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) operations aimed at tracing Cuban coastal-defense communications on special devices; to pump...vast sums into political operations theught to be helpful in containing Castro... (45) The nerve center of the United States" “new and deeper struggle" against Castro was estab- lished in the heartland of exile activity, Miami. There, on a secluded, heavily-wooded 1571-acre tract that was part of the University of Miami's South Campus, the CIA set up a front operation, an elec- tronics firm called Zenith Technological Services.> Its code name was JM/WAVE and it soon became the largest CIA installation anywhere in the world outside of its headquarters in Langley, virginia.>° (#) “The JM/WAVE station had, at the height of its activities in 1962, a staff of more than 300 . 53 . Americans, mostly case officers. Each case officer | Docld:32273595 Page 27
Vv - 18 employed from four to ten Cuban "principal agents" who, in turn, would each be responsible for between 54 tn addition, the CIA 10 and 30 regular agents. set up 54 front idvporations ~~ boat shops, real estate firms, detective agencies, travel companies, gun shops -- to provide ostensible employment for the case officers and agents operating outside of JM/WAVE headquarters.-> It also maintained hundreds of pieces of real estate, from small apartments to palatial homes, as "safe houses" in which to hold secret meetings. °° As a result of its JM/WAVE oepration, OWE OF the CIA became amongeudg Florida’ s largest employers. (y It was the JM/WAVE station, threugh Tts-case- officers, which menitered,—more—or tess” controbied, 58 qnd_in-nest cases funded the anti-Castro groups. It was responsible for the great upsurge in anti-. 57 Castro activity and the lifted spirits of the Cuban exiles as American arms and weapons flowed freely through the training camps and guerrilla bases spotted around South Florida.” Anti-Castro raiding parties that left from small secret islands in the Florida Keys were given the "green light" by agents of the JM/WAVE station. °" The result of it all was that there grew in the Cuban exile community a re- newed confidence in the. .U. S. Government's sincerity. and loyalty to its cause. HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 23
v-19 (43 Then came the Cuban missile crisis. The more fervent Cuban exiles were initially elated by the possibility that the crisis might provoke a final showdown with castro. °t For several months prior there was increasing pressure on President ‘Kennedy to take strong measures against the build- up of the Soviet presence in Cuba, which was becoming daily more blatant. Ina report issued at the end of March, 1962 the State Department said that Cuba had received from the Soviet Union $100 million in military aid for the training of Cuban pilots in Czechoslovakia and that the Soviet Union also had provided from 50 to 75 MIG fighters as well as tons of modern weapons for Cuba's ground forces. 62 For-. tifying the Cuban exile's hope for action was ‘the fact that the increasing amounts of Soviet weapons moving into Cuba became the dominant issue in the news in the succeeding months, leading to Congres- sional calls for action and a series of hard-line responses from President Kennedy.” In September, Kennedy declared that the United States would use "whatever means may be necessary" to prevent Cuba from exporting "its aggressive purposes by force or threat of force" against "any part of the Western Hemisphere. "°4 HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 29
HW 53060 V - 20 4) The fervent hope of the Cuban exiles -- that the Cuban.missile crisis would ultimately result in the United States smashing the Castro regime -- was shattered by the manner in which President Kennedy resolved the crisis. Cuba itself was rele- gated to a minor role as tough negotiations took place between the United States and the Soviet Union, specifically through communication between President 65 Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. The crisis ended when President Kennedy announced that all IL-28 bombers were being withdrawn by the Soviets and progress was being made on the withdrawal of offensive missiles and other weapons from Cuba. In return, Kennedy gave the Soviets and the Cubans a "no invasion" pledge.° (45) If Kennedy's actions at the Bay of Pigs first raised doubts in the minds of the Cuban exiles about the President's sincerity and determination to bring about the fall of Castro, his handling of the missile crisis confirmed those doubts. Kennedy's agreement with Khrushchev was termed "a violation" of the pledge he had made three days after the Bay of Pigs invasion that the United States would never 67 abandon. Cuba to Communism. Wrote one prominent exile: "For the friendly Cuban people, allies of the United States, and for hundreds of thousands of Doclda: 32273595 Page 30
V- 21 exiles eager to stake their lives to liberate their native land, it was a soul-shattering blow. "68 | (44) the bitterness of the anti-Castro exiles was exacerbated by the actions the United States Government took to implement the President's "no invasion" pledge. Suddenly there was a crackdown on the very training camps and guerrilla bases which had been originally established and funded by the United States and the exile raids which once had the Government's "green light" were now promptly disavowed and condemned. (4) On March 31, 1963 a group of anti~Castro raiders were arrested by British police at a train- . ing site in the Bahamas. °°? The U. S. State Depart- ment admitted it had given the British the informa- ‘tion about the existence of the camp. /° That same night another exile raiding boat was seized in Miami harbor. 74 On April 3rd, the Soviet Union charged that the United States "encourages and bears full responsibility" for two recent attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban ports by anti-Castro exile commandos.’ The United States responded that it was "taking every step necessary to insure that such attacks are not launched, manned or. equipped from U. S. territory."73 On April 5th, the Coast Guard announced it was throwing more planes, ships HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 31
HW 53080 V- 22 -and men into its effort to police the straits of . . . . 74 Florida against anti-Castro raiders. As a result of the crackdown, Cuban exile sources declared that their movement to rid their homeland of Communism had been dealt “a crippling blow" and that they had lost a vital supply link with anti-Castro fighters inside Cuba. | #') There were numerous other indications of the U. S. crackown on anti-Castro activity: following the missile crisis. The Customs Service raided what had long been a secret training camp in the Florida Keys and arrested the anti-Castro force in training there. /> The FBI seized a major cache of explosives at an anti-Castro camp in Louisiana. /° Just weeks later, the U. S. Coast Guard cooperated with the British Navy: which had captured another group of Cuban exiles in the Bahamas. /” In September, the Federal Aviation Administration issued "strong warnings" to six American civilian pilots who had been flying raids over Cuba. /° Shortly afterwards, the Secret Service arrested a prominent exile leader for conspiring to counterfeit Cuban currency destined for rebel forces inside Cuba.” In October, the Coast Guard seized four exile ships and arrested 22 Docld: 32273595 Page 32
HW 53080 Vv = 23 anti-Castro raiders who claimed they were moving their operations out of the U. S. C44 The feeling of betrayal by the Cuban exiles was given reinforcement by prominent sympathizers outside their community, as well as by Kennedy's political opponents. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, chairman of the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine, asserted: "The Kennedy Administration has committed the final betrayal of Cuban hopes for freedom by its order to block the activities of exiled Cuban freedom fighters to liberate their nation from Communism, "81 Senator Barry Goldwater accused Kennedy of "doing everything in his power" to keep the flag of Cuban exiles "from ever flying over Cuba again. "°? Richard Nixon urged the end of what he called the "quarantine" of Cuban exiles.” 6) OF course, the most strident reactions came from within the anti-Castro community itself. Follow- ing the U. S. Government's notification that it would discontinue its subsidy to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, its president, José Mird Cardona, announced his resignation from the Council in protest: against U. S. policy. 24 The Cuban exile leader accused President Kennedy of "breaking promises and agreempéts" 85 to support. another invasion of Cuba. Cardona Docld: 322773595 Page 33
vV- 24° said the change in American policy reflected the fact that Kennedy had become "the victim of a master play by the Russians."°° (51) The extent of the deterioration of relation- ships between the Cuban exiles and the Kennedy Admin- istration is indicated in the State Department's reply to cdgfpna' s charges. It labeled them "a gross distortion of recent history."°” 2) Against the pattern of United States crack-~ down on Cuban exile activity during this period, however, emerges a counter-grain of incidents which may have some bearing on an examination of the . Kennedy assassination. These incidents involve some very significant Cuban exile raids and anti-Castro operations which took place, despite the crackdown, © between the time of the missile crisis and the assas- sination of the President. In fact, in the midst of the missile crisis, one of the most active Cuban groups, Alpha 66, announced that it made a successful raid on the Cuban port city of Isabela de Sagua, killing about twenty defenders, including Russians. °° On October i5th, the same group sunk a Cuban patrol boat.” On October 31st, the day after the blockade was lifted, it struck again.” Immediately after the crisis ended in November, a spokesman for the HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 34
V- 25 group pledged new raids.?? ™ other anti-Castro (s 3) During this period, ee groupsaremained active. In April, a group calling itself the Cuban Freedom Fighters reported bombing a . . - 92 an oil refinery outside Havana. In May, the Cuban government confirmed that anti~Castro rebels had carried out a "pirate" raid on a militia camp near Havana despite U. S. promises "to take measures to ” 93 Later tha’ month, the anti-»: prevent such attacks." Castro Internal Front of Revolutionary unity reported it had formed a military junt_a in Cuba to serve as "provisional government of Cuba in arms." Shortly afterwards, a group of returning Cuban exile raiders claimed they had blown up a Cuban refinery, sank a gunboat and killed "many" of Castro's soldiers. °* It is not known exactly how many incidents took place during this period, but in April of 1963 one anti- Castro fighter asserted that, by then, the United States Government knew of eleven raids on Cuba since the missile crisis and did nothing.» (S¥ . One analyst, reviewing that period of U. S.- Cuban relations, noted: "The U. S. Government's policy toward the exiles was equivocal and inconsis- 96 tent..." HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 35
HW 53060 V- 26 9s It cannot be determined to what extent, if . any, the military activities of the anti-Castro exile groups were sanctioned or supported by the. ot both ,. Kennedy Administration or by the CIAA Ata press conference in May, 1963, in response to a question as to whether or not the U. S. Was giving aid to exiles, President Kennedy was evasive: "We May well be...well, none that I am familiar.with... I don't think as of today that we are."”” And it is known that by June, 1963, the (CIA was supporting VURE, at least one Cuban exile group, phorieees / under what was termed an "autonymous operations" concept. 7° (6) In retrospect, this much is clear: With or without U. S. Government support and whether or not in blatant defiance of Kennedy Administration policy, there were a number of anti-Castro action groups which were determined to continue -- and, in fact, did continue -- their operations. The resignation of Mirdé Cardona actually split the Cuban Revolution- ary Council down the middle and precipitated a bitter dispute among the exile factions. The more moderate contended that without U. S. support there was little hope of ousting Castro and that the exiles should concentrate their efforts in mounting political Docld: 322773595 Page 36
HW 53060 Vv - 27 e pressure to reverse Washington's shift in policy.?° ‘Other exile groups announced their determination to continue the war against Castro and, if necessary, to violently resist curtailment of their paramilitary activities in the Kennedy Administration, +9 In New Orleans, for instance, Carlos Bringuier, the local leader of the Cuban Student Directorate (DRE) who, coincidentally, would later have a contact with Lee Harvey Oswald; proclaimed, in the wake of the Miro Cardona resignation, that his group "would con- tinue efforts to liberate Cuba despite action by the U. S. to stop raids originating from U. S. soi1."102 (57) I # Fhe seeds of defiance of the Kennedy Administration may have been planted with the exiles even prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. In his history of the invasion, Haynes Johnson revealed that shortly before the invasion, "Frank Bender," the CIA director of the invasion preparations, assembled the exile leaders together at the CIA's Guatemala training camp: It was now early in April and Artime was in the camp as the civilian representative of the Revolutionary Council. Frank called Pepe (San Roman) and (Erneido) | Oliva again. This time he had startling information. There were forces in the administration trying to block the in- vasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would secretly inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe remembers Frank's next Docld:32273595 Page 37
HW 53060 V - 28 words this way: 'If this happens you come here and make some..kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisors, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners.'... Frank then laughed and said: 'In the end we will win.' 19 (58) That, then, is the context in which the “Committee approached the question of whether or not the John F. Kennedy assassiantion was a conspiracy involving anti-Castro Cuban exiles. Also kept in mind was the testimony of the CIA's chief of its Miami JM/WAVE station in 1963, who noted: "...'as- sassination' was part of the ambience of that time., "+94 «4) In this section is detailed the result of the Committee's examination of the most active anti- Castro exile groups and their key leaders. These groups were specifically selected from the more than 100 exile organizations in existence at the time of the Kennedy assassigAtion. °° Their selection was - the result of both independent field investigation by the Committee and the Committee's examination of the files and records maintained by those federal and local agencies monitoring Cuban exile activity at the time. These agencies included local police departments, the FBI, the CIA, the Bureau of Narcotics Docld: 322773595 Page 335
HW 53060 V-- 29 and Dangerous Drugs (now the DEA), the Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Defense. (G0) The groups selected can be termed the "action groups." These were the ones.most active on both the military and propaganda fronts, the ones which not only talked about anti-Castro operations, but actually planned and carried out infiltrations and raids into Cuba, conducted Castro assassination attempts, were involved in a multigtplicity of arms dealings and had the most vociferous and aggressive leaders. These were also the groups and individuals ~who took the brunt of the Kennedy Administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations when it a after the Cuban missile crisis. These were the ones. who, in the end, were most bitter at President Finally Kennedy, the ones who felt the most betrayed. Tam these were the groups and individuals who had the means and motivation to be. involved in the assassina- tion of the President. (6) The Committee, however, found no hard evi- dence that any anti-Castro Cuban group or individual was involved in Kennedy's assassination. Lt Geer Docld:32273595 Page 39
V- 30 that there was some kind of association between Lee Harvey Oswald and individuals connected to at te least two of the groups. HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 40
The Odio Incident (Go) Within the 2 question of a) possibile anti-Castro Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination, the Committee examined one incident which, over the years, has particularly intrigued critics of the Warren Commission's investigation. It has become known as "the Odio incident," the principal person involved being a young Cuban exile named Silvia Odio. (63 Here, in part, is how the Warren Commission detailed the incident and its conclusions in its final Report: S/ The Commission investigated (Mrs. Odio's) statements in connection with its consideration of the testimony of several witnesses suggesting that Oswald may have been eesid i cing din nt, re a seen in the company of unidentified persons of Cuban or se Mexican background. Mrs. Odio was born in. Havana in VY, psi and remained in Cuba until 1960; it appears that Ug ‘both of her parents are political prisoners of the 2s Castro regime. Mrs. Odio is a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE), an anti-Castro organization. She testified that late in September 1963, three men - ~ eame to her apartment in Dallas and asked her to help | them prepare a letter soliciting funds for JURE activities. : She claimed that the men, who exhibited personal familiarity with her imprisoned father, asked her if she were "working j AW 53080 | Docld:32273595 Page 41 to
. ee a 2 =<"Odio were a ee Tore . woe ee os - ose whee dee ce teem ee am ee Vode wh ag spade Be SPE Wane paren Mae og bea er in the underground," and she replied that she was not. She testified that two of the men appeared to be Cubans, although they also had some characteristics that she associated with Mexicans. Those two men did not state their full names, but identified themselves only by their fictitious underground "war, names." Mrs. Odio remembered the name of one of the Cubans as "Leopoldo." The third man, an American, allegedly was introduced to Mrs. Odio as "Leon Oswald,” and she was told that he was very much interested in the Cuban cause. Mrs. Odio said that the men told her that they had just come from New Orleans and that they were then about to leave on a trip. Mrs. Odio testified that the next day Leopoldo called her on the telephone and told her that it was his idea to introduce the American into the underground “because he is great, he is kind of nuts." Leopoldo also said that the American had been in the Marine Corps and was an excellent shot, and that the American said the Cubans "don't have any guts** *because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cubans should have done that, because he was the one that was holding the freedom of Cuba actually." Although Mrs. Odio suggested doubts that the men were in fact members of JURE, she was certain that the American who was introduced to her as Leon Oswald HW 53080 Docld:32273595 Page 4? A, Ww
eS oaig satin ner tee” was Lee Harvey Oswald. Her sister, who was in the apartment at the time of the visit by the three men, and who stated that she saw them briefly in the hallway when answering the door, also believed that the American was Lee Harvey Oswald. By referring to the date on which she moved from her former apartment, October 1, 1963, Mrs. Odio fixed the date of the alleged visit on the Thursday or Friday ye - immediately preceding that date, i.e., September 26 or . ~Y 27. She was positive that the visit occurred prior to October 1. ch | During the course of its investigation, however, the Commission concluded that Oswald could not have been ~~ in Dallas on the evening of either September 26 or 27, 1963. It also developed considerable evidence that he was not in Dallas at any time between the beginning of September , ~ and October 3, 1963.... In spite of the fact that it appeared almost certain that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the time Mrs. Odio thought he was, the Commission requested the FBI to conduct further investigation to determine the validity of Mrs. Odio's testimony. The Commission considered the problems raised by that testimony . as important in view. of the possibility it raised that Oswald may have had companions on his trip to Mexico. The Commission specifically requested the FBI to attempt to locate and identify the two men who Mrs. Odio stated HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page 43
HW 53060 he \ were with the man she thought was Oswald.... \ On September 16, 1964, the FBI located Loran Seba Eugene Hall in Johnsandale, Calif. Hall has been identified as a participant in numerous anti-Castro activities. He told the FBI that in September of 1963 ater naib Sate tee atten posta at ote eee he was in Dallas, soliciting aid in connection with anti-Castro activities. He said he had visited Mrs. oy Odio. He was accompanied by Lawrence Howard, a Mexican- : American from East Los Angeles and one William Seymour from Arizona. He stated that Seymour is similar in appearance to Lee Harvey Oswald; he speaks only a few words of Spanish, as Mrs. Odio had testified one of the men who visited her did. While the FBI had not yet completed its investigation into this matter at the time the report went to press, the Commission has concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was not at Mrs. Odio's Nemec apartment in September of 1963 Gy), The unequivocality of the Warren Commission's conclusions. was. not. supported by the evidence. The Commission had based its definite conclusion on two points: One was the "considerable" evidence that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening Mrs. Odio alleges she saw him; '?) Docld: 322773595 Page 44
5 ~ Odio the.other“was the FBI's report of Loran Eugene Hall's speculation that Odio misidentified his companion, William Seymour, as Lee Harvey Oswala. (3) (70) Although the Warren Commission Report states that Odio "fixed" the date of the alleged Oswald visit on September 26 or September 27, she actually told the FBI that she was not at all positive about the exact date. (4) Shexsai@ it might have been as early as September 25, (9) (7/4) zne Warren Commission asserted that Oswald left New Orleans by bus for Houston, on his way to Mexico, on (6) | September 25. Yet there was no documentary evidence to: substantiatesthat, and neither the bus. driver nor any passenger could recall seeing Oswald on that bus. 7) _in fact, Warren Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin asked the FBI to investigate the possibility that Oswald 7 (8) when a neighbor saw (9) left New Orleans on September 24, him leaving his apartment carrying two suitcases. Rankin pointed out in his letter to J. Edgar Hoover that "Marina Oswald told the Commission that her husband told . her he intended to leave New Orleans the very next day following her departure on September 23, 1963. She has also indicated that he told her an unemployment check would be forwarded to Mrs. Run Paine's address in Irving HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 45
from his post office box in New Orleans.... It also seems impos- \ sible to us that Oswald would have gone all the way back to the Winn-Dixie store at 4303 Magazine Street to cash the unemployment check which he supposedly picked up at the Lafayette Branch of By ¢ the Post Officeg when he could have cashed it at Martin's Restau- NI rant, where he had previously cashed many of his Reily checks and one unemployment check. “That is particularly true if he received Nee sete egg et RR a man A ~ the check on September 25, 1963, as previously thought, and had _ left his apartment with his suitcases the evening before. "10/ (4 b) the FBI never came up with any evidence which resolved the questions raised in Rankin's request. In sum, the Warren Com- mission developed no hard evidence weeee could substantiate the | fact that Oswald was or was not in Dallas during the time. period Odio said she saw him. (Te) Although the Warren Commission stated that the FBI had not yet completed its investigation at the time its report went to press,tl/ jt was only two days after its September 16, 1964, interview of Loran Eugene Hall that the FBI interviewed William Seymour, who denied he ever had any contact with Silvia Odio and chat he had been in Dallas with Hall in September, 1963.12/ The FBI subsequently confirmed the fact that Seymour was working in Florida during September, 1963.13/ 09 ——— HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 46
HW 53060 7 - Odio September 23, 1964, the FBI interviewed Loran Hall's (14) other associate, Lawrence Howard. Howard also denied he had ever contacted Silvia Odio. (19) The FBI then went back and re-interviewed Hall who then said that he had been accompanied on his trip to Dallas not by Seymour but by a Cuban friend he knew as "Wahito" and that he no longer recalled any contact with odio. ‘+9 The FBI determined that "Wahito" was Celio Sergio Castro ‘17? who, when interviewed, said-he had never heard of or met (18) Silvia Odio. On October 1, 1964, the FBI showed Silvia Odio photographs of Loran Hall, William Seymour, (19) She examined Lawrence Howard and Celio Sergio Castro. the photographs and said that none of the individuals were identical to any of the three men who had come to her apartment door in Dallas. ‘°° | (72) In view of the prematurity of the Warren Commission's conclusion based on the impeached Loran Hall allegation and the unresolved question of Oswald's whereabouts at. the time, the Committee considered the Odio incident one of the lingering enigmas in the original assassination investi- gation. Unfortunately, the nature of the incident makes it, from an investigative standpoint, particularly suscept- ible to the erosive effects of time. The canvassing, for instance, of both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in Dallas, New Orleans and Miami in search of descriptive Docld: 322773595 Page 47
8 = Odio | Similarities to the men who visited Odio might have been fruitful at the time; today it would be inappropriate. The construction of a compostie sketch of the individuals when their features were still fresh in Odio's memory might have provided productive evidence 15 years 620; today it would be of questionable value considering the natural adulteration of recall over that period of time. A search for the car eho the men were driving might have been very productive at the time; today it would be useless. The Committee was therefore, handicapped by the limitations of the initial investigation and the paucity of evidence developed. The valid investigative approaches remaining were distressingly limited. Nevertheless, because of the potential significance of the Odio incident ~— to a possible conspiracy in the Kennedy assassination, the Committee decided that, in addition to pursuing any substantive . leads it possibly could, it woulda also attempt to verify the ~ >. record regarding Silvia Odio's credibility and the details of her allegations. . (73) Also of interest to the Committee, of course, were | the initial assertions of Loran Hall that he and two associates, William Seymour and Lawrence Howard, were the ones who had (21) visited Odio in September. All three had been actively involved in anti-Castro activity and were members of a group of. (22) soldiers of fortune called Interpen. The group was arrested at No Name Key, Florida, in December, 1962 as part of the Kennedy ~ (23) That Administration's crackdown on anti-Castro operations. policy, which highly incensed the anti-Castro and right-wing factions, was the result of an agreement Kennedy had made with HW 53060 Docld: 32273595 ' Page 48
9 =~ odio © (24) Khrushchev and Castro. Those factions considered the agreement a "betrayal". '2>) (74) Loran Hall provided. sworn testimony to the Committee at an Executive Session on October 5, 1977. ‘Here ig an” excerpt from that testimony: Q: Did there come a time when the FBI spoke to to you about whether or not you visited Silvia Odio in September, 1963? | | Hall: Yes, there was. | 22 Qt Who spoke to you? Hall: An FBI agent. i a : Q: At that time were you advised why you were lr, being questioned about Silvia Odio? ey | ' Hall: I really don't recall. He stated as I eae recall, he stated something to the effect that were you ever in Dallas, Texas, and I said yes. He said do you ecabecmntes negates nen mt ima know a Mrs. Odio, and I-said I don't recall knowing a Mrs. Odio. I think I knew a Professor Odio, who was a professor at Texas, some univerity in Texas, just outside of Dallas, as I recall. He asked me anyway about the ~“—— maybe a month or two.. ---Q: And you told him you were there with Howard and. Alba? HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 49 apartment building on Magellan, and I said it is possible, I don't know. I said do you have a picture of her and he ‘said no, I do not have. And I said, it is possible I met her but I don't recall. He then asked me who was with me and * ; <I told him I was with Alba and Howard, and then it was like
10 - Odio ‘Hall: Yes... Q: On the first trip? Y Hall: Yes. ...we both read the same FBI report. You know it is directly contradictory to what I am saying. Q: So it is your testimony that at no time did ~ yt - C3 yv i you ever tell an FBI agent that you were in Dallas accompanied. fy oP by Lawrence Howard and William Seymour, is that your testimony? | Hall: That is true. Q: Were you ever directly or indirectly involved | with Silvia Odio in acquiring military equipment for anti- \ castro raids? ——T (26) Hall: No, I was not. f \ 45) committee lnveeeteqertuue interviewed Lawrence Howard Jk i on May 23, 1978. Howard stated he has never met Silvia odio. (27) yCommittee investtyatens also interviewed William Seymour, who acknowledged his relationship with Hall and Howard but did not recall any details ofa trip to Dallas, including meeting any Cubans there, 28) (6) The Committee felt it important early in its in- vestigation to examine in detail the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations as well as their credibility. One of ' the problems faced by the Committee was Odio's negative attitude toward a governmental investigation of the Ken- nedy assassination. Her attitude, she said, was the result ~ (29) of her relationship with the Warren Commission. . She HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page 50
HW 53060 " American Ambassador Phillip Bonsal. ll-- Odio expressed sharp disillusionment with the Warren Commission and said that it was obvious to her that the Commission did not want to believe her story. 32) A Committee in- vestigator noted that her whole demeanor was "one of sharp distrust of the government's motives. She claims she feels she was just used by the Warren Commission for their own ends and she does not want to be put in the same position.” (34) Nevertheless, after contact was established by the Com- mittee aie, Odio's cooperation with the Committee was excellent and she voluntarily submitted to interviews and, subsequently, sworn testimony. @ =that Odio's story remained*consistent with her Warren Commission testimony. There are, however, details concerning Odio, her background and certain points of her story developed by the Committee which should be noted. 78) Silvia Odio was one of ten children of Amador and Sarah Odio who were sent out of Cuba when their parents began taking an active part ina counter-revolu- tionary movement shortly after Castro took power. (24) Amador Odio was among Cuba's wealthy aristocracy, the personal friend of diplomats and ambassadors, including, during the last days of the United States' presence there, (33) Odio was owner of the country's largest trucking business and was once Docld: 32273595 Page 51
12.- Odio described in Time Magazine as the "transport tycoon" of (34) Latin America. Yet, from their youth, both he and his wife were active, front-line fighters against the succession of tyrants who ruled Cuba. During the reign ow'* aA . —_ re of General Gerardo Machado in the '30s, Sarah Odio was yr captured and beaten with a machete until her ribs were - (35) broken. Twice during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the Odios were forced into exile for their / revolutionary activity. !3°) Amador Odio's trucks were the main supply line for the weapons and ammunition which kept Castro's hopes alive in the mountains: Yet when the Odios decided that Castro had "betrayed the revolution," '37) they were among the founding members, with Manolo Ray, of one of the early, most aggressive anti-Castro groups, the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP). (38) (TY) Amador and Sarah Odio were arrested by Castro (39) on October 26, 1961. Their arrest was the result of the capture of MRP national coordinator Reynald Gonzales in hiding on their country estate. (49) @lronically, the Odios had once hosted the wedding of one of Fidel Castro's sisters on the very estate, a large, resort-like retreat (41) in El Cano, outside of Havana. Later, Castro would turn it into a national women's prison and Sarah Odio would spend eight years incarcerated there, while her H¥ 53080 Docld:32273595 Page 52
HW 53060 13.- Odio husband was placed in a cell on Isla de Pinos %(/7? Reynald Gonzales had been wanted in connection with his involvement in the assassination attempt on Castro that had been organized by Antonio Veciana, '43) Czy, Silvia was the oldest of the Odios' ten children. ‘**? She had been sent for her early education to a private girls' school near Philadelphia and later returned to (45) f / Cuba and attended Gian Law School there. é Wi When her parents were arrested, Silvia Odio was 24 years old, living in Puerto Rico with her husband and four young children. (46) The next year her husband, sent to Germany by the chemical firm for which he was working, (44) Destitute and alone, (48) deserted her and the children. she began having emotional problems. By that time, Silvia's younger sisters, Annie and Sarita, were settled oo -. in Dallas. ‘*?? Sarita, a student at the University of Dallas, had become friendly with Mrs. Lucille Connell, the leader of a women's club at a local Episcopal church who had organized a club program to provide financial and social support to the Dallas Cuban Refugee Center. °°”? Connell also happened to be very active in the Mental Health Association of Dallas and, since her son was a psychiatrist, had personally acquired an interest in mental health problems. ‘°!? When Sarita told Connell of her sister Silvia's plight, Connell made arrangements to have Silvia move to Dallas and to also receive psychiatric - Docld: 32273595 Page 53
HW 53060 13 - Odio treatment for her emotional problems at the Southwestern Medical School, '>2? (4) According to Connell, who for a period was Silvia's closest confidante, Silvia's emotional problems, brought on by her suddenly being left alone with four young children, her parents being imprisoned and her life- style abruptly changing from one of wealth to one of deep destitution, were manifested in attacks of total loss of consciousness "when reality got too painful to bear." (93) Connell said she personally witnessed Odio suffer these attacks in her home when she first arrived in Dallas, but with psychiatric treatment their frequency: subsided and they subsequently ended: -- until the Kennedy assassination. '°4) (83) ' Silvia Odio had moved towallas in March of 1963. ">> By September of 1963 she was well-established in the com- munity, had a decent income from a good job, had her emotional problems under control and was doing well: enough (56) to be planning a move into a better apartment. She was scheduled to make that move on October 1, 1963, a Monday. '>7) The week before, she recalled, she had done some packing in preparation for the move and there were boxes scattered across her living room floor which she had to jump over to get to the door. ' Her sister Annie, who was then 17, a cere, had come to the apartment to help her and babysit with her Docld: 322773595 Page 54
HW 53060 14 - Odio (59) children. When the doorbell rang early one evening in that last week of September, it was Annie who went to the door to answer it, (60) foyp . (oY The complex in which Silvia Odio lived at 1084 Magellan Circle in Dallas was a series of garden-type - rental apartments, two-story units with four apartments (61) to each unit. - The two lower units had front doors which faced a common inner vestibule which, in turn, bordered a small, open cement porch elevated a few steps above the ground level, (62) Both the vestibule and porch (63) had overhead lights. Silvia Odio lived in Apartment 64 A of the 1084 unit, a first floor apartment. | ( %a,) Annie Odio provided the Committee with a sworn (65) statement of her independent recollection. She re- membered the evening when three men came to the door of Silvia's apartment in Dallas. ‘°9) (67) One of the men asked to speak to Sarita. He initially spoke English’ but when Annie answered him in Spanish he subsequently also spoke Spanish. (68) Annie told him that Sarita didn't live there. (69) Then, according to Annie's recollection: * "He said something, I don't recall exactlyhat, perhaps. something about her being married, which made me think that they really wanted my sister Silvia. I recall putting — the chain on the door after I told them to wait while / I went to get Silvia. I don't exactly recall but they may have also said something about belonging to JURE, Docld:32273595 Page 55
HW 53060 An Sy me Teh 1S - Odie a ae oN < [ms anti-Castro movement. "20/ (35) Annie also recalled that Silvia was initially reluctant to talk with the strange visitors because she was getting dressed to go out. But she remembers Silvia coming out in her bathrobe to go to the door.Z1/ Annie said that she could only recall what one. of the two Latin men looked like, but it is not a specific recollection, only that he was heavy set, had dark shiny hair combed back and "looked Mexican. "2¢/ _13/ She said "the one in the middle was American.’ (@Se) In testimony to the Committee, independent of her sister's, Silvia Odio algo recalled that it was early evening and that she was 74) She recalled that it was a weekday because she worked that day. 29/ getting dressed to go out when the three men came to the door. She said the men identified themselves as members of JURE, spoke of both its founder, Manola Ray, and her father, who had worked closely with Ray .20/ “Odio said that almost all the conversation she had was with only one of the men, the one who identified himself as "Leopoldo. "L2/ . | (85d) odio was positive in her recollection of the name "Leo- poldo"L8/ but said that the men admitted to her they wer giving her 79/ aliases or “war names. She is less certain of the other Latin's name, but believes it Docld: 32273595 ' Page 56
HW 53060 available more than adequate. 16.- Odio might have been "Angelo" or "angel." (89) She described him, as her sister did, as being Stocky, with black hair (81) and looking"more Mexican than anything else." The ‘ third visitor, the "american," ' was introduced to her as "Leon Oswala, * #83) She said "Leon Oswald" acknowledged the introduction with a very brief reply, perhaps in (84) idiomatic Spanish, but she later concluded that he could not understand Spanish because of his lack of re- action to her Spanish conversation with "Leopoldo." (89) C8) Silvie Odio has been relatively consistent in her testimony to the Warren Commission and ‘to the Committee in her specific descriptions of the three visitors. ‘°°) Her description of "Leopoldo" is especially noteworthy because he has certain very distinct features, including | (87) an unusual hairline that is sharply recessed on the sides. Her description of "Leon Oswald": is, of course, similar to (88) the characteristics of Lee Harvey Oswald. There is absolutely no doubt in her own mind that her visitor was, (89) She points out that she in fact, Lee Harvey Oswald. did have ample opportunity to view him, her conversation with the three men lasting more than twenty minutes, her viewing distance being only about three feet and the light (90) She also recalls, but not very clearly, that “Leopoldo” may have told her that Doclda: 32273595 Page 57
17 .- Odio (91) they had just come from New Orleans. (67) Odio told the Committee, as she did the Warren (92) Commission, that the reason the men came to her was to get her help in soliciting funds in the name of JURE from local businessmen. °° She said: "He (Leopoldo) told me that he would like for me to write them in English, very gy nice letters, and perhaps we could get some funds." '74) a hat is not inconsistent with the vague recollection of pe her sister Annie, who was in the apartment at the time *‘/ the conversation was being conducted through the open y door in the veéstibule. She recalled that the men came — because "they wanted something translated." '99) (88) According to Silvia Odio, her conversation with "Leopoldo" ended without her giving him any commitment to do anything, but he gave her the impression he would (96) -contact her again. The visit ended without "Leon" or "Angelo" having any conversation with her aside from (97). After the men left, (98) a brief greeting word or two. Odio decided to go to the window and watch them. She saw them get into a red car that was parked in the drive- (99) . way in front of the apartment. She said she could not see who was driving the car, but did see "Angelo" on the passenger side of the car, (+99) $4) The cloudiest part of Odio's recollection con- cerns the telephone call she later received from HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page 586 om
hak HW 53060 18 - Odio " iT] (101) : Leopoldo. It could have occurred, she said, the day after the visit or two days after the visit, (102) She (103) thinks it was in the afternoon, but she cannot remember. She thinks it was on a Saturday, when she wasn't working, (104) She is, however, relatively but is not certain. clear in her recollection of the gist of what "Leopoldo" told her when he called her on the telephone and that, too, is consistent with her testimony before the Warren Commis- sion, (105) She said that “Leopoldo” told her that "the _ Gringo" had been a Marine, that he was an expert marksman n (106) She recalled: "He and that he was "kind of loco. said that the Cubans, we did not have any guts because we should have assassinated Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs." (107) (0) On the day that President Kennedy was assassinated, Silvia Odio was coming back from lunch when she heard the news. "As soon as we got back to the office, every- body had their radios on and everybody was listening to it, “sterecebbede* py the time the news came that the President was dead, the president of the company told us that we could go home. I started going back to -- I was very frightened and very upset...I started moving across the warehouse towards the parking lot where we kept our cars...I think next I had passed out. My mind was going around in circles..." (19?) \ . (Fu) During her testimony before the Committee, Odio was asked if, when she heard that Kennedy was assassinated, Docld: 322773595 Page 59
19.- Odio she thought of the three men who had visited her apartment almost two months prior. Her reply: "Oh, very definitely, n (210): | She added: "I had put them out w (111) very definitely. of my mind, but they came back that day. (G2) The next thing she remembered after blacking out was regaining consciousness later in a hospital room, (112) She recalled that her sister Annie had sust walkedzim, ‘t19) She remembered watching the first image of Oswald she saw coming across the television screen in the hospital room: "Annie and I sort of looked at one another and sort of gasped. She said, 'Do you recognize him?' I said yes, and I said, 'Do you recognize him?' She said, 'It is the mr same guy, isn't it?' I said, ‘Yes, But.do not say any- G3) This is an excerpt from the independent sworn statement given to the Committee by Annie Odio: On the day of the assassination of President Kennedy I had gone with my girlfriend, Cherie Matlock, and some other friends to a place where we could see the President's motorcade pass by. I don't remember where it was, only that it was quite a distance from downtown Dallas and Dealey Plaza. After the motorcade passed by we went to a drive-in restaurant | for some hamburgers. When we were coming out of the drive-in we heard that Kennedy was shot. When I first heard that Kennedy. was shot I did not make any connection be- tween the shooting and the men who came to Silvia's door. Later in the afternoon I was by myself in the Matlock home when I first saw Oswald on television. My first thought H¥ 53080 Docld:32273595 Page 60
HW 53060 20.- Odio was, 'My God, I know this guy and I don't know from where! But I'm not going to tell anybody because they're going to think I'm crazy.’ But I kept thinking, ‘Where have I seen this guy?' Then my Sister Sarita called and told me that Silvia had fainted at work and that she was sending her boyfriend Jim, who is now her husband to pick me up and take me to the hospital to see Silvia. Sarita did not tell me then why Silvia had faint- ed. I remember that it was getting dark when Jim picked me up and that we had to drive by Dealey Plaza. I don't remember Jim coming up to the room in the hospital with me when I saw Silvia. I don't re- 'Member anyone else in the room, but it was for their Because they were extremely frightened, concerned a very small room. Silvia was in bed. © The first thing I remember when I walked into the room was that Silvia started crying and crying. I don't remember her saying anything. I think that I told her: ‘You know this guy on TV who shot Presi- dent Kennedy? I think I. know him.' And she said: 'You don't remember where you know him from?' I said: 'No, I cannot re- call, but I know I've seen him before.' And then she told me: 'Do you remember those three guys who came to the house?' -. And that's when I realized I had seen Oswald before. And then when I realized I had seen Oswald before. And then she told me everything, including the fact that one of the men had called back, that she called him 'Leon,' that he said he wanted to be called 'Leon,' and that he said something like the Cubans should kill Kennedy because of what he did with the Bay of Pigs. Silvia also told me a that when she first heard that President Kennedy was shot, she started saying: "Leon did it! Leon did it!' I remember that Silvia was very excited at the hospital and that she kept saying that she knew that Leon was going to do it, (415) if... brothers and sisters and their own safety, worried Docld: 32273595 Page 61
21 - Odio about their mother and father in prison in Cuba and terrifyingly bewildered about the meaning of the three men's visit, Silvia and Annie Odio decided not to reveal (116) the incident. And it was, in fact, only circuit- ously that the FBI came to learn of it. (45) According to Silvia Odio's close friend, Lucille Connell, she received .a call from Silvia's sister Sarita who told her that Silvia had fainted and was in the (117) hospital. Sarita also told her why Silvia had fainted and the fact that Silvia had met Oswald and that (118) he had come to her apartment. Connell cannot recall exactly when Sarita called; she said it was either the day . . (119) of the assassination or the day after. However,~ that Sunday, Connell said, she was speaking on the telephone to a friend of hers, Mrs. Sanford Pick, then working as a receptionist in a Dallas law firm office, when they both saw Ruby shoot Oswald on their television sets, (129) Connell recalled: "And she said to me, 'Oh my goodness, Ruby was in our office last week and had power of attorney drawn for his sister." ‘+2}) ~ (46) Connell said that later that same day she happened ‘to be speaking with another friend, Marcella Insua, the daughter of the head of the Dallas Cuban Relief committee. Connell mentioned to Insua what her other friend had said (122) ~ about Ruby being in her law office. -Insua, Connell said, happened to have a class of American children to HW 53060 Docld: 32273595 Page 62
HW 53060 22 = Odio. 3) ( whom she was teaching Spanish. In that class, she got into a discussion of the Kennedy assassination and mentioned that she knew someone who knew someone who had . . 2 some dealings with Ruby. ‘+ 4). It also happened that there os a son of a local FBI agent in Tnsua’ s class. (229) Thatagg how,..subsequently, the FBI came to contact Connell and learn about the Odio incident. '** 6) (47) The-Committee—decited—tirat factor in judging Odio's credibility is evidence wes indicates that she told someone prior to the Kennedy assassiantion that three men visited her, that one of them was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald," and that she was told that this "Leon" had suggested assassinating President Kennedy. (98) Silvia Odio told the Committee that immediately after the visit of the three men, she wrote to her father in prison in Cuba to ask him if he knew who they were. ‘t27) Amador Odio, who was released from prison in 1969 and is now living in Miami, told Committee investigators that he received Silvia's letter and replied to it, (128) He did not recall when he received the letter, but his reply, dated December 19, 1963, indicates it was very likely in late October or early November, 1963. (129) He wrote: "Tell me who this is who says he is my friend -~- be careful. I do not have any friend who might be here, through Dallas, . 130 so reject his friendship until you give me his name." ‘ 7 Docld: 322773595 Page 63
HW 53060 23 - Odio (49) Silvia Odio told the Committee she recalled, although her recollection is "not very strong," that she also told Lucille Connell prior to the Kennedy assassina- (131) She tion that three men had visited her apartment. said it had to have been before the assassination because she did not see Connell after the assassination as the result of a falling out between them. (132) Prior to that, however, Odio said, she was frequently at Connell's house and she specifically recalled a dinner party, “which may have had something to do with the Mental Health Associa- tion or been given in honor of some doctor 6r psychiatrist," at which, during a conversation in the library, she men- (133) tioned the visit of the three men. She said it would have been very likely that.she told Connell because "she was the type who was a very curious person about the >. details of your life. She always asked a lot of questions about my life and what I was doing. (134) (706) Lucille Connell told the Committee she does not recall Silvia Odio specifically telling her about Oswald (135) at any time, before or after the assassination. She does not recall talking with Odio at a dinner party prior to the assassination, although, she said, she may have, (138) She said her contact with Silvia Odio had not been frequent ‘ within the months prior to the assassination. (137) = (vo1) The one person that Silvia Odio is most positive in her recollection of telling. prior to the assassination Docld: 32273595 Page 64
24 = Odio about the visit of the three men was hér psychiatrist at (138) the time, Dr. Burton C. Einspruch. At the time of the Kennedy assassination, Odio had been seeing Einspruch (139) . usually on a weekly basis (140) for about seven months, and occasionally more frequently. She was suffering 'from what Einspruch described as "a situational life problem. She had a large family, she was semi-impoverished, she was an immigrant, her parents were imprisoned...she | had all the difficulties one might anticipate a displaced person would have." (141) (/02) Both the FBI and the Warren Commission staff U questioned Einspruch after the assassination. (142) The FBI report noted that Einspruch believed Odio "is telling the truth, " (143) The Warren Commission staff report noted that "Dr. Einspruch stated that he had great faith in Miss Odio's story of having met Lee Harvey Oswala." (144) Neither report indicated that Einspruch had been questioned about the specific details of Odio's allegations, whether he had been asked if Odio told him about the visit of the ‘ three men and, if she did, when she aia. (145) (703) In sworn testimony to the Committee, Einspruch reiterated his judgement of Odio as a "truthful" person. ("°° He said he no longer had any files available to document his recollection, but he believes that Odio's visits to HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 65 . |
HW 453080 25 - Odio him had been scheduled at around the time of the assassina- tion, on Wednesdays. ‘147? Sef. (64) Einspruch specifically recalled that Odio had told him, during the normal course of the “format" of the sessions with her in which she related what happened during the previous week, (148) (149) that she had been visited by three men. He recalled that she told him of the (150) visit prior to the assassination. He is definite that she told him that two of the visitors were "Cubans (151) or Latins" and that the third was an "Anglo." He is not sure she mentioned the name "Leon" at his session with her prior to the assassination. ‘1° ) He did remember that when he telephoned Odio on the day of or the day after the assassination,. she did mention "Leon" and she did "in a sort of histrionic way” connect the visit of the three men to the Kennedy assassination and did recognize 7 n (153) ‘Binspruch could not re- one of those men as "Leon. call, however, that Odio told him prior to the assassina- tion that "Leopoldo" had telephoned her and spoke of "Leon" suggesting Kennedy be assassinated. ‘1>4) (Vo) As noted earlier the Committee's ability to investigate the substance of Silvia Odio's allegations was severely restricted not only by the time that has elapsed -sgince they were originally made but also by the lack of - material available in the basic investigative files. Both Docld: 322773595 Page 66
HW 53060 26 - Odio the Warren Commission and the FBI were lax in the pursuit of investigative leads when those leads still held a potential for development. The description provided by Odio of at least one of the Latin visitors, for instance, was detailed enough to justify a thorough canvassing of both the anti-Castro and pro-Castro militant Cuban com- munities in Dallas, New Orleans and Miami for individuals with similar striking characteristics. That, in conjunc- tion with a search for the specifically described:-car the men were seen driving, might have been fruitful. Committee reviews of Warren Commission files and FBI reports reveal no such investigative approach. The focus, instead, was on attempting to determine the possibility of Oswald being in Dallas when Odio reported she saw him. That.’ approach proved inconclusive. (706) Nevertheless, there were | other. points =3aaemsemm: tha - Ribbeoriadte could be examined in attempting to determine the identity of the Silvia Odio visitors. The fact, for instance, that the men claimed to know her father and have knowledge of his activities appeared to be of possible TT} cu ns discovered, investigatory significance. _however, that a front page article in the Dallas News on May 5, 1962, could have provided a source of background a information on Odio's parents. ‘1 5°) The article featured a large photo of Annie and Sarita Odio and detailed the plight of their parents in prison. as well as their back- Doclda: 32273595 Page 67
HW 53060 ‘27 - Odio (1563 grounds. It also could be related to the fact that "Leopoldo" initially asked for Sarita when Annie Odio answered the door, (157) | (40H) Although the Committee considered the possibility that the Odio visitors were being deceptive in claiming an association with the anti-Castro organization JURE, it nevertheless attempted to determine if they were, in fact, members of that group. The Committee conducted extensive interviews with Amador Odio, '98) who was very active with JURE in Cuba prior to his imprisonment, and made an attempt to contact remaining members of the Dallas (159). Although the results of the Commit- chapter of JURE. tee's efforts must be viewed in terms of the lengthy period of time that had elapsed, the Commietee-coubdemind no present recollection of JURE members active in 1963 who used the war names of "Leopoldo" or "Angelo" or fitted Cound be founds the descriptions provided by Silvia odioh't®9) (70a) In addition, the Committee also interviewed the founder and leader of JURE, Manolo Ray, now living in Puerto Rico, (161) Ray said he had been questioned by the FBI about the Odio incident some time after the Kennedy assassination, but he was asked only about Silvia Odio's (162) "They told me that reliability and credibility. she had met Oswald," Ray said. "I don't remember them telling me that the men who came to her said they were Docld: 32273595 Page 665
28 - Odio (163) members of JURE... Ray told the Committee that he knew of no members of JURE traveling through Dallas in 4 September of 1963 in search of money or arms. ‘1° He does not recall anyone by the name of "Leopoldo" or (165) "Angelo" associated with JURE at the time. He said he had no American contacts in Dallas, nor did he receive . . . (166) any major financial support from anyone there. a \ a * * . (724) In addition to these attempts to identify the Odio visitors, the Committee asked Silvia Odio to review some 300 photographs of Cuban activists, both pro-Castro and anti-Castro, and individuals who had or’may have had some association with Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. 167) She could not identify any of the individuals in the photographs as being the two who came to her apartment with "Leon Oswald." oa . (779) Finally, the Committee requested the CIA to stke check on all individuals who used the “war names" of "Leopoldo" and "Angelo" during the period (168) of interest. The CIA comply resulted in the photo-_ graphs of three individuals who might have been in Dallas in September of 1963. (169) The photographs were shown (170) to Silvia Odio with negative results. CONCLUSIONS is essentially credible. From the evidence provided in ‘the sworn testimony of corroborating witnesses, there is no doubt that three men came to her apartment in Dallas HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page 69
HW 53060 29 - Odio prior to the Kennedy assassination and identified them- ax selves as members of an anti-Castro Cuban organization. From a judgament of the credibility of both Silvia and _Annie Odio, it must be concluded that there is a strong probability that one of the men was or appeared to be Lee Harvey Oswald. ee—could seach Mo COunéd pe. (Cath conclusion as to the significance of that visit’s a WErO  Conteleraw tho a= Ehe possibility gs Oswald actually haGere some association with JURE, the anti-Castro group headed by Manolo Ray, and the—pocoilieny that Oswald wanted it to appear that he had that association in order _to implicate the group, politically a left-of-center Cuban organization, in the Kennedy assassination. A Hed tama, (112) t orm m~at-so-eeprd-seach no definite CoubA be Tene iek, conclusion on the specific date of the visit/ The possi- bility that it could have been as early as September 24th, the morning of which Oswald was seen in New Orleans, exists. The visit was more likely on the 25th, 26th, or 27th of September. If it were, then Oswald, judging from ‘evidence developed by both the Warren Commission and this Committee, had to have had access to private transporta- . AMS ee tion, a situation which almost mandates a conspiratorial involvement. Docld:32273595 Page 70
HW 53060 30 ~ Odio meen (/ /3) The—commiete—found bhe scope of its investiga- . WAS tion in the Odio incident) di epemeeee limited as a result of the inadequate investigation performed by the FBI.and the Warren Commission at the time. The lack significance of immediate recognition of the of the Odio incident produced a far from comprehensive investigation at the only time a comprehensive and, rine NPA TERIA TILE REALE YETI SE TAIL I Pre rae CC invesitgation would have been possible. ie a j definitive conclusion regard \ q . <2 a . . eta ey Fy | it reached be fonexa its investigative reports were nee i i . f 3 agp er : . : . é submitted, was erroneous and, in its assumption, appallingly oe J i baseless. Sct tf EEE ET OE TEEN OE sprcpetrnieeesenecareenerre OO” \ eae : \ peo ~ DoclId:32273595 Page T1
a . 4owa/ Ute. , Awan. vVvecrANA BLAnch [L . /it Wf On March 2, 1976, a staff investigator from the SC atted Stoukes CR- PA) officebt Ge. Senator Richard S. Schweiker“ interviewed Antonio veciana Blanch, the founder and former leader of Alpha 66, in his home in Miami.+ At the time, Senator Schweiker was a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and CeChairman of the Subcommittee on the John F. Kennedy Assassination.” The staff investigator told Veciana that he was interested in the relationships between U. S. Government agencies and Cuban exile groups; he did not specifically mention an interest in the Kennedy assassination.” During the course of that interview, Veciana revealed that from about mid-1960 through mid- 1973 he had been directed and advised in his anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities by an American he knew as Maurice Bishop.* Veciana said that Bishop, guided him in planning assassination attempts on Premier Fidel Castro in Havana in 1961 and in Chile in 1971; that Bishop had - directed him to organize Alpha 66 in 1962; and that Bishop, when breaking their relationship in 1973, paid him $253,000 in cash for his services over the years.” . ° ~ ws Parte ayk , Ae oS Veciana Spe revealed,that at one meeting with et Bishop in Dallas-.in late August or September, 1963, he saw ek - with him a young man he later recognized as Lee Harvey 6 . Oswald. de. HW 53060 DBocld:32273595 Page Tf?
HW 53060 ne V first approached wx Waurice Bishop/in Veciana - 2 (vy Veciana told Senator Schweiker's investigator that he had not previously disclosed that information to anyone. (7) The “Sedans Committee, Cook an intense interest in the Veciana allegations. From Senator Schweiker ,it aA . obtained the cokplete files of his officejs investigation;® it The—Commettetee also conducted additional interviews with Veciana and other witnesses who might have had know- ledge of Veciana Ore¥or Bishop. -md“*on April 25 and 26, 1978, Veciana was questioned under oath before the Com- mittee in Executive Session. Th 2% SOA cL wncornd 7% fetes . _ S mike general details of the relationship between Veciana and the See Amer ican he knew omit as Maurice Bishop: Vetranal & We To the best of ds recollection, ® At the time, Veciana was employed in the Banco Financiero, owned by Julio Lobo, the "Sugar King" of Cuba. 1° Veciana himself wasa¢gé well- hore) knownfas president of the professional accountant's a 11 association. 7, Veciana said Bishop introduced himself with a business card which indicated he was with a construction 12 firm headquartered in Belgium. Although Veciana ini- tially assumed he was a new bank customer, Bishop's Docld: 322773595 Page 73
HW 53060 /Veciana - 3 conversation with him soon focused on the Castro Revo- lution. "He also made me aware of his concern regard- ing the Cuban government leaning towards Communism and tried to impress on me the seriousness of the situation," Veciana recalled. (12y Bishop then invited Veciana to lunch and during that and subsequent lunches convinced Veciana to work against the Castro Government. Veciana admittedly did not need much convincing because he himself had concluded only thirty days after the Revolution that Castro was a Communist.+4 ? £ \ first meeting if he worked for the United States Govern- [22) Veciana said he did ask Bishop during their ment. "He told me at the time," Veciana testified, "that he was in no position to let me know for whom he was working or for which agency he was doing this."* Bishop also said he could not tell Veciana whether or not it was Julio Lobo who suggested he contact him. "Supposedly Julio Lobo had very important contacts with the United States Government," Veciana pointed out. +6 Veciana, however, ese later suspected that it might have been another very close friend, Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, ad . . 17 who ~4#t Bishop erto him. Lopez-Fresquet, although then Castro's Minister of Finance, was a covert anti- Whan me Contiats Catelbenet Aauec Aad Castroite, and-had-earttrer=-beerTrecrested by =Sht=sermx | eevee eect dl Docld: 322773595 Page 74
HW 530860 Veciana - 4 as a liaison with the Castro Government. % (\2-3} Once Veciana agreed to work with Bishop on anti-Castro activity, he was put into a "training program. "1? Veciana described this as a "two to three week" program which consisted of nightly lectures. He was the only one in the program, which was conducted by a man he knew only as "Mr. Melton." The lectures were held in an office ina building which Veciana could re- call as being on El Vedado, a commercial thoroughfare. He also remembered the building housed the offices of a mining company "with an American name" and, on the first floor, a branch of the Berlitz School of Languages. -° £124) artnough Veciana said he was given some train- ing in the use of explosives and sabotage techniques, most of the program consisted of lessons in propaganda and psychological warfare. "Bishop told me several times...that psychological warfare could help more than 1 hundreds of soldiers, thousands of soldiers," Veciana testified.?t Veciana sal6 said: "The main purpose was to train me to be an organizer so I was supposed to initiate a type of action and other people would be the ones who would really carry it out."24 a CAs) Following the training, Veciana worked with Bishop on several very effective psychological warfare Docld: 322773595 Page 75
HW 53060 Veciana - 5 ee operations, including a program weeks resulted in the destabilization of the Cuban currency and the creation of public distrust in its value.?? Meanwhile, Veciana also became chief of sabotage for the Movimiento Revo- lucionario del Pueblo (MP), an anti-Castro group headed Mauvel 44 by Maneto Ray. (226) Before the American Embassy in Cuba was closed in January, 1961, Bishop suggested to Veciana that ‘he yo thou. ond contact certain officials tise for help in his anti- Castro activity. Veciana said the names suggested by . Bishop were "Smith," "Sam Kail" and "Joe D'Acosta." — Said Veciana: "Maurice Bishop suggested the names of these individuals because we needed specific weapons to carry out the jobs and he told me that these were the people that could help me,"2> Veciana, however, also said that Bishop asked him not to reveal his name to these people. 26 a 27) Veciana 3 ST egewee: Sete See HB has never assumed that Maurice Bishop was a true name. At one of their early meetings in Havana, Veciana noticed a Belgian passport which Bishop had in his open briefcase. Examining it when SW Bishop(briefly;left the room, Veciana made a quick note of it on a scrap of paper. Veciana kept that scrap of paper and showed it to Senator Schweiker's investigator. Doclda: 32273595 Page 6
HW 53060 Veciana - 6 The name on the paper was "Prigault".?/ (128) A few months after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961, Bishop called Veciana to a meeting. According to Veciana: "At that time Bishop decided that the only thing left to be done was . 2 to have an attempt on Castro's life." 8 Although Veciana himself did not participate in the attempt, he recruited the action men and organized the operation, including renting the apartment from which the shot . 29 7 was to be fired. However the day before the actual HOWeEA4 . . attempt,AVeciana escaped from Cuba by boat with his mother-in-law, in whose name the apartment had been rented, 2° His wife and children had left a few months prior. According to Veciana, it was Bishop who urged him to leave because, he said,€astro's agents were becoming suspicious of Veciana's activities. (24) Shortly after he settled in Miami, Veciana . 32 testified, Bishop again contacted him. Veciana said it would have been easy for anyone to locate him in the 33 The re- close-knit Cuban exile community in Miami. sult of their re-establishing contact eventually led to the founding of Alpha 66 which, according to Veciana, was Bishop's brainchild. "Bishop's main thesis was that Cuba had to be liberated by Cubans," Veciana testifiea.°4 Veciana established himself as the civilian chief and principal fund-raiser for Alpha 66 and recruited the former head of the Second National Front of the Docld: 32273595 Page Tf?
Veciana - 7 Escambre (SNFE), Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, as the military chief.>> Menoyo had a reputation among Cuban exiles of being socialistic and Bishop had some doubts about his loyalty, but Veciana insisted that Menoyo could be trusted. Besides, he said, "if he did not work 136 - Veciana said out right we could get rid of him. that Menoyo was not aware of the existence of Maurice Bishop. (136) Alpha 66 became one of the most active of the anti-Castro exile groups, buying guns and boats, re- cruiting and training commandos and conducting numerous 37 at one point, Veciana proclaimed a raids on Cuba. war chest of $100,000 and announced that all the major exile organizations were backing Alpha 66's efforts. He also publicly\said that all the planning was being done by leaders "I don't even know. "28 (131) According to Veciana, the man behind all of Alpha 66's strategy was Maurice Bishop. Over the 12- year period of their association, Veciana estimates he met with Bishop more than 100 times.>° Veciana, however, claims he had-no way of getting in touch with Bishop and that all the meetings were instigated by Bishop, a procedure Bishop established early in their relationship." ° To set up a meeting, Bishop would call Veciana by tele- phone or, if Veciana was out of town, call a third person whom Veciana trusted, someone who always knew HW 53060 Docld:32273595 Page 73
HW 53060 Veciana - 8 a — 41 Veciana said that this third person never met Bishop but "knew that Bishop and I were partners in this fight because this person shared my anti-Communist feelings."44 6] /.2%% teardown (ist) in-additiern—to contacts with Bishop in Havana and Miami, Veciana also had meetings with him in Dallas, Washington, Las Vegas and Puerto Rico and in Caracas, Lima and La Paz in South America. (133) Veciana specifically recalled some meetings with Bishop because of their special nature. For in- stance, shortly after re-establishing contact with him in Miami, Bishop took Veciana to an office in the Pan American Bank Building in the downtown section of the city.44 Veciana does not recall the exact floor of the building nor if there was any name on the office door. 4? Bishop unlocked the office with a key «Heatana sedds. and in the presence of two men who: were in the office asked him to sign a piece of paper and take part ina "commitment" ceremony. "It was like a pledge of my loyalty, a secret pledge," Veciana | testified. "I thinkthey wanted to impress on me my re- sponsibility and my commitment to the cause."*/ Veciana RV could not identify the two men who were present with Bishop at this ceremony, nor does he re- call’ if he was introduced to them. "They were like spectators," he said. Docld: 322773595 Page 79
HW 53060 ‘relationship with Bishop. Veciana - 9 (134) From August, 1968 until june, 1972, Veciana “+ worked in La Pz, Bolivia. as a banking advisor to Bolivia's Central Bank. His contracts-were financed by the U. S. Agency for International Development, >” and his office was located in the passport division of the American Embassy. Veciana believes that Bishop was instrumental in his getting the AID job, because he himself was surprised that the Agency would Hire a known "terrorist" and anti-Castro activist. The records indicate that Veciana was hired by the Agency even though his application was never signed. (129. While supposedly employed as a banking advisor in Bolivia, Veciana actually did very little such work, but instead was engaged mostly in anti-Castro and anti-. Communist activities with Bishop.-* Among the operations instigated by Bishop at the time was an attempt to assas- Sinate Castro in Chile in 1971.°> (39 According to Veciana, that aborted assassina- tion attempt eventually led to the dissolution of his 36 Although Bishop directed the operation and provided Veciana with intelligence information,” Veciana himself recruited anti-Castro Cuban associates in Caracas to take part in the attempt.>° Without his knowledge, Veciana said, these associates introduced a new element into the plan, a scheme to blame the assassination on certain Russian agents in Docld:322773595 Page 30
HW 53060 Veciana - 10 Caracas.” The associates even produced phony documents and photographs Mirerder to-dothas 6D When Bishop later found out about this unauthorized part of the scheme, he was extremely upset and accused Veciana of being a part of it. ot Although Veciana told Bishop he had no knowledge of it, Bishop apparently did not believe him and eventually suggested that their rela- tionship be terminated. (137) On July 26, 1973, Bishop arranged for Veciana to meet with him in the parking lot of the Flagler Dog Track in Miami. °? When Veciana arrived, Bishop was waiting for him with two younger men in an automobile. °4 At that time Bishop gave Veciana a suitcase which, Veciana later ascertained, contained $253,000 in cash.-> Since, at the beginning of their relationship, Veciana had refused Bishop's offer to pay him for his work with him, the lump sum payment was meant as compensation for his efforts over the years. (338) The Committee's s®aeert interest in the rela- tionship between Antonio Veciana and Maurice Bishop is, of course, predicated on Veciana's contention that he saw Bishop with Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas a few months before the assassination of John F. Kennedy. (13%) Veciana cannot specifically pinpoint the date Docld: 32273595 Page 61.
HW 53060 Veciana - ll of that meeting with Bishop. He believes it was in 67 late August, 1963. Over the years that he knew Bishop, Veciana had at least five meetings with him in Dallas. °® The meeting at which Oswald was present took . place in the lobby of a large office building in the downtown section of the city, perhaps a bank or an insurance building with a blue facade or Lobby. °” When Veciana arrived for the meeting, Bishop was there talk- ing with Oswald. Veciana does not recall whether he was introduced to Oswald by name, but said he did not have any conversation with nim. /° Oswald remained with Bishop and Veciana only for a brief time as they walked towards a nearby coffee shop. Oswald then departed and Bishop and Veciana continued their meeting alone. (140) Veciana testified that he recognized the young man with Bishop as Lee Harvey Oswald after seeing photographs of him following the Kennedy assassination. There is absolutely no doubt in his mind that the man was Oswald, not just someone who resembled him. Veciana pointed out that he had been trained to remember the physical characteristics of people and that if it was not Oswald it was his "exact" double. /3 Cit!) Veciana's next meeting with Bishop was in Miami about two months after the assassination of President Docld: 32273595 _ Page 82
HW 53080 Veciana - 23 with the CIA and was involved in assassination attempts 14 . . on Castro. 0 He said, however, aside from what he read in the American newspapers he has no knowledge of Veciana's association with Maurice Bishop or who . 41 . Maurice Bishop could be.? He said he was never con- tacted by Veciana about Oswalal* seen Veciana since 1959, 143 and, in fact, has not (165) maiz expressed disdain for Veciana, said he con- sidered hima coward and "a person you cannot believe." He said Veciana had personality problems and was under phychiatric care from the time he was 16 years old until he was 21. Ruiz said that "another counter-revolu- tionary," a cousin of Veciana's who is a doctor "in Miami @r Chicago" and whose name is Jose Veciana, could attest to Veciana's psychiatric problems because he had advised the family about them. 14° (166) Committee investigators located Dr. Jose Veciana in Martin, Tennessee, where he is chief of pathology at Volunteer General Hospital. He confirmed ~ that he is a first cousin to Antonio Veciana and that he had known him when he was a child in Havana. 1? Dr. Veciana said he has never known his cousin to have person- ality problems or to have ever been under psychiatric care. He said he himself has never provided Veciana any 148 psychiatric advice nor offered it to his family. He said. he feels that Veciana must be of sound mental con- Docld:32273595 Page 94