(104-10193-10041 : SUBJECT 4 " Meeting wi eg. ‘Manuel ay” PARTICIPANTS: Ing. Massel Ray _where Lhad taken a room for holding. our mecting. They arrived in ; ‘before we got down to the business of the prospectua. portunity to straas. in a most serious way the need for absolute secrecy. ‘ Concerning our discussions today and any. future discussions or devel- —_ : - as ep ~ Mogg RETURN: | ‘ oi Roma as may 1961 EMORANDUM. FOR THE. RECCRO © Ernesto Betancourt oe BC _ Rogelio Cisneros bo. a Se Pod We Ray.did not return: to. Washinjtoa until early morning ox Friday, 12 May 1961. He called me at.0700 from the. altport. Ha was unable . to fix a definite hour for us.to get-together due to the fact that he was — , -eapocting an appointnent with. a person he did not namé some time — ‘during the: ‘moraing.~ He latar 1éd-& number of times from the Hotel Ambassador ‘to ‘advise me thay. he still had had. nO. word on his ‘appoint-~ wient. As 1145, Mir. Betancourt called to say that he was with Ray and “Eugenio” (Rogelio. Cisneros): and could we get. ‘together. © T eug- gested they drive out ta the Clarendon Hotel Court on Wilson Boulevard, Mr, Betancourt’s car at approximately 1236 noon iime aad we flrat | went to the nearby Hojate. Restaurant on Wilson Boulevard for lunch 2. ’ Durtag lunch we did not discuss the plas but I did take the op- opments which might take ‘place in the future with fespect to our relation- ship. All. agreed vB a the need fer tight security. 3.. ‘After lunch we drove to the Hotel Court and from approximately 2330 until 1730, we discussed the prospectus.. Using Mr. Barnes! out- line B28 general guide, i atressed the importance of being able to present on
oo PIN eae, ‘ -day en SEcagz =2e to the proper people at the earliest possible time a carefully thought- , out pla of action which would set forth clearly the objectives «< what thé project hoped to achieve; a statement of the problem; the etrengtha _ of the Castro.rezgime following the ill-fated invasion; the statua of the ~ande'rg round ad its morale aiid capabdilicias; the extent of internal support for and discontent with the regime, etc., ete. - 4. Lalso spoke of the neod for describing the kind of activities which the Ray organization planned to eagage in and the assets and ‘Capabilities which they have or can acquire to do the job.. The need for explaining the rejationship and coordinatioly of the plan with the Revolue Honary Council was discussed at some length. $2 #uggested that he include in the pian an itemization of the hinds of support which he would expect us to supply immediately ao well as the kind and quantity of eu port which would bs required of us a8 the project developed. 5. lalso suggested thet the plan include their views on how U.S. laisun and coordination could best be worked out; how funda would be funneled: into‘ the project; what commo and other training would be ra- quired; whether U, &. "real estate" would be needed, ote, 7, Ray outlined some of his thoughts regarding his proposed plan of action. According to hia ik contemplates action in three broad flelds: (a) Underground activity -- principally sabotaye -- in the urbao areas, (b) Gradual buildup -- tarsely through clandestine infiltra- * tions of amail bodies of men -- of averrilla forcea in mountaln- ous aad defensible areas, fc) A psycholosical warlars campaign within Cuba and abroad aimed at dlacrediting Castro and at the same time providing the people of Cuba something to fight for, , & dt is Ray's intention to depend almost entirely on maritime opera. tlona for the infiltvation of personne! and materiel into Cubal Ne also rules out of his plan the creation of ancther invasion army but does con< termplate the training of §¥oups of parhap3 up to 156 men in other friendly |
ne trragawrese gm ” Pt ot cS countries of South Arierica ‘ne mentioned Venazusla aba. poo sibility) and: said-he would explore | the possibility: of basing maritime operations in non-U, 5, porta,, er Ray sate ‘soma’ ‘mdans, other than ‘Swan Island, must be found. for reaching: the Cuban’ pepulatiog by radio broadcasts, He spoke of ‘the: possibility. of short wave broadcasts {rom Venesuela and ufilisa- - tloa of & Commercial station in Miami which he “unrlerstands ena be ~ clearly, heard in Cuba, 10, Ray Spoke ‘of the desircability ‘of stimulating the or zanisation of “Pro-True. ‘Cuban Revolutioaary" student eFoups in many countries - of Latin America {he said a ssccessi{ul organization hag bean formed in Puerto Rico) and.of sending qualified representatives to those Latia Anw rican countriea where there is Soviet diplomatic representation to contact student: cand labor groups and leaders in an effort to pregent to them the true picture of the serry etate of students, workers, and intellectuale in Castro's Cuba. il. Ray is also interested in the poasibility of putting out a "News Letter’ under MRP aponeorshiz which would. discuss various aspects of the Cuban.picture and set forth plans for Cuba alter the fall of Castro. He thought such a news letter could goa long way towarda correcting mistaken impressions amony -\nerican” university proféssors ahd in ~ ‘other circlas as to the true nature of the Castro regime, He pointed to. the recent letter from 6) Harvard profeasora which was receatly published inthe N. Y. Times as a “horrible example’ as to haw roige informed even university profasaara are on present day Cuba. 12. When the discuasions got around to the aged for conducting operations at least “under the umbrella“ of the Revolutionary Council, and the need for obtaining Dr, Miro's concurrence before the U, 5S, would.be able to support aay eperasion, it wae obvious that neither Inz. Ray nor Mr, Betancourt holds a hish improssion of the Council, Both fee] that there is a atyong possibility that the closs public “identification of the Council wita the recent Invasion may well have ‘discredited tha Counci! to such an extent that 12 commands no support: Or respect within Cuba. For the sake of argument the; were silling to concede that the | polllical advantages of mmaintainiay tne Council for the purpdes of forcing
ren ci if unity of the various exile groupe may well outweigh its other obvious” shoricomin,.é. However, both: feel, and Mr, Betancourt was quite _@mphatie on this point, that the Council ag a body is not capable of directing clandestine actions against Castro and as a matter of fact dis opposed. to any turther, efforts at overthrowing Castro by sabotage and. other, subversive. actions: since they are completely “sold” on ihe taesis that Cast¥o can only | ‘be removed by direct U. 3. military “-metion and theréfore a Continuation of Cuban underjround activities can ‘only result fa necdless and futile loas of fa, Inthe fact of thie attitude, Ray said he.does not expect: to recelve much encouragement | for his plan from the Council, although he is fairly confident that. Dr. .Miro‘s approval can aventually be obtained, My, Betancourt thought that a workable solution mi,ht be found to their problern if the Council would ayree to concern itoeil exclusively with (a) the current task of unifying. the opposition, and (b) planning for its future agstimption of power as the provisional goverament. Under this arrangement, operations aimed at the duwnfall of Castro could be > entrusted. to those leaders and groups (euch asthe MHP, MRA, and possibly the MDC)-which have both the asseta and the will to do the Job. Bir. Ray thought that it might be feasible to create an operations planning board or command amon, the groups with demonatrated assets and thus avold unnecessary duplication and confusion and make possible overall vlanning. It waa obvious, however, that he wonld prefer to act autoriomeusly in the execution of his program, Mr, Ray was vary critical of Artime and claimed he was in possession of sufficient facts’ to convince him that Artims, ia collusion with ele- menta of the camps, were planning to eliminate tha MRP and its leaders from the picture, when the invasion succecded, Ua'eaid he "kaows " that Artime was being fpancisl}y supported by wealthy ex~Batistlanos” of tha Aijami area, ; 13. Ray hinted at various times that tha MRP may at some polnt find itself laced with the necessity of withdrawing from the Council and - -going it alone, He says that the Council is composed of ";ood mean" but they have no agescta or significant (ollowings and “have nothing to offer. _ the people’ of Cuba" and aithough the proclamation of the Council, as finally drafted, was 8 good one the “progressive” aspects of the proclam- ation were foresd on the Council by the Americans and do not represent the true feelings of the rnajority of the Council members. He ‘said the od i
SEATS . , Cuban people are not likely- to want to risk their lives on the » basis. of promises made by. the present membership of the Council, He feels “that acceptance of the Council! would‘be improved by cadding to ita - -.; thewiberahip. two or three more people whose names ‘would be signl- -fieant-aad mmesuingfal to the Cubaa ‘people. He did not same any spec itte candidates. ‘ : 1M. hte: Ray: let me ‘Fead alsoril4 page report which he had Jest received. from the. MRP. coordinator in-Cuba ‘(Rainol. Gonzales) - - which: painted: a. dreary’ picture of conditions. ia Cuba since the failure | cof the invasboa; wes critical of the: inclusion of Batistianos and “nalnos — ‘ bonites" {nthe invasion force; conveyed the strong feeling that the Subane ‘had been’ betrayed by the Ame ricans; and indicated that while the MRP: ofganization | wad oti) pretty much intact physically, morale ' wae almost completely shattered. ar, Kay *said he would provide me. , 8 ‘sanitized copy (there were some operational and personal details)” ‘of the report. for our information. 15, In view of this report from within Cuba, Mr, Ray said that he will wish to deter submitting his plan for our consideration until he Is able to recalve word from Cuba concerning the capabilitiva, willingness and feasibility of carrying out some of the activities he his in mind, He said it ig useless to submit a program of action if the human elements to carry it out are lacking or completely demoral- ' jaed, He thought he might ba ablé té present Ale prospectus within approximately ten days. He said naturally he will not yive the people inelde any indication that he has been discussing a plan of action with 16 Lurged Kay-to consider submitting at least a preliininary and admittedty tentative prospectus at. thia time based on the assumption ‘that bis masets ave. etill intact and will be willing to ccopwrate in order that it may’ receive early consideration. However, he fuck to his. ., belief that this would not be- “practicable and reiterated tite need for , prior evaluation of the ‘strength and morale of his’ following. 17, Ray asked concerning the detainees at McAlen, Texae, and wondered if they have been released. He was told that as far aa I. know they are still under deteation, He said bir. Goodwin had taken | their names and promised to look into thematter. Mr. Betancourt rer
| SfuneT obo » said ba would chock directiy. with Mr. Goodwin re their status... - 18, 1 invited Mz, Ray” andlor: Mr, Betancourt to call me over the weekend in case ‘either should’ wast to. discues the matter further, ‘Thad the feeling, that Bir, Betancourt’ wae ‘personally. in favor of sub *“mitting 3 narw a: ‘plan. covering’ “short term” needs of their organization amd 18 | may be that euch a: paper will: be submitted after he bas an. ° - opportunity to talk, ‘with Mere fay he private. ers JAN /dia Distribution: | Original & 2 - A/DDP/A tT > AC/WH/4 & circulute l+ Manuel Ray 201 r e has