176-10036-10072 Le # WE (a em rs 2 20. ae we DAD cP CD em ED HF RE Tm AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : DATE : PAGES : SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : 5/19/1961. Box 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM NARA 176-10036-10072 National Security Files Johnson Rostow Meeting of Vietnam Task Force May 15 1961 5/17/1961 - 2 9/10/2000 National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 5/8/1961-
2 thee seperti gates. : Moe de gee! Ps . MEMORANDUM FOR ‘MR.. " ROSTOW a ee eset Ce Cs see sab tees ae VER GION q May 17,1961 EKEMeTeD Phel ws Nieke~ TH 3 SUBJECT: Meeting of . the Viet Nam Task Force on Monday, May. 159) 1961 | After briéfings on the military-and political situation . in Viet Nam and surrounding areas in Southeast Asia, Mr..Cottrell . summarized actions taken over the weekend, referring to a oar ‘series of outgoing and incoming telegrams. These covered the * following matters: , a. The establishment of the Task Force in Washington - and a request .to the Ambassador in Saigon to form a an ‘similar Task Force, there. © . Dd. A message to. Saigon containing ‘the substance of NSC Action Memorandum No. 52 and indicating that these. actions would be reviewed further at an NSC meeting: ‘On | Mey 198 aa A. message - to Saigon summarizing the substance - ‘of . the. Task. Force report for the field. advising. that. the | report itself would ‘be pouched x : 7 aye: 7A message ‘Eo Saigon: indicating. that’ the “ICS was” making the. study called for by paragraph 4 of the Action © mt .Meniorandun (relating to commitment of. U. 5. _ forces) - The Secretary of State had authorized the. dis-. patch or: ‘93 additional MAAG personnel from Clark ‘Air Force Base in ‘the Philippines | to Saigon. I asked whether. the’ status of the Task Force report. iad been Clearly indicated.in sending it to the field. It” de- .. Veloped that the status: had not beén indicated in the messages -. and I was asked to prepare a brief statement of. the points: : that needed to be made . for inclusion: ina subsequent. message. In conneétion with the reference to. "NSC discussion of the | Action Memorandum, Mr..Cottrell asked that agencies: hake known ; at the Wednesday: meeting.of. the. Task Force .any views. they plans - to express on' the. Memorandum. *~. (I subséquently emphasized. to - Mr. Cottrell the fact that this:Memorandum was being. scheduled.” on the agenda: for information and that it’was intended that the Memorandum” should stand.and ‘that there would be no dis-'- cussion of it in the~ NSC unless. an agency. had a serious point. ‘that it wished. to - argue ‘in ‘front’ of the” President. ‘Mrs Cottrell | agreed to make: this point. to ‘Defense’ ‘and at the beginning of Wednesday" s Task Force meeting.)
we Co SEUNE < TG. _° ei . . _" ot . " ; : ; - q | Mr. Cottrell’ referred to the fact that it was. planned to add an additional individual to~the Public Relations: Staff of the Far East: Bureau to “handle. public relations on Viet Nam; that is, to put out information on South Viet Nam and to be ‘available to answer questions. In response to a question, Mr, Cottrell indicated that there would be no connection be- tween this puiblic relations man andthe Task Force. Mr. Cottrell also noted that this Task Force would be running the Viet Nam desk, although | the former Assistant Desk Officer would now be named the Desk Officer and would handle routine matters. ae an ro Mr, Cottrell asked. me whether the planned weekly" - status report’ should not be so timed that it could be - scheduled on a Friday NSC agenda. He also noted that’ a separate status report would be prepared. on covert activities and transmitted to the NSC. I pointed out that there was no. established meeting. time ‘for the NSC and that, therefore, it would be difficult to relate work ‘on the report to NSC” meetings. I indicated that I would check on the matter of scheduling such reports on NSC agendas. (This matter sub- — sequently taken’ up with “you and. with Mr. Bundy ..) . -A ‘question was raised as to: ‘whether: portions. of thie: ‘task. Force report could be downgraded or de- classified. I. pointed out that-we ‘ordinarily proceeded, in handling NSC doctments,. on the principle: that the agency having primary esponsibility should make ‘determination as to: the-classification of a: . particular item in-an' NSC document” ‘and - had - the authority . to: plementation. downgrade or de-classify as necessary” in the. ‘course of: im-: Reference’: was’: : made. to ‘the. fact ‘that a meeting » was he scheduled: in’ the. White,’ House ‘on ‘Thursday (under Mr. Dutton's leadership) ‘to ‘discuss - “the fate of “Project . Hope", . Although this hospital-.ship is supposed to be a private enterprise, ‘the. ‘Government (ICA) has been: picking up the tab for some time. — .It is said to have ‘considerable public. relations value, but , there is. considerable doubt as’ to: whether it makes economic. . a ee ee cc: Mr. Smith sense we At. costs $5,000.a day to operate. the ship. “It:was the consensus of the meeting | that, in -view of. the preparations - that had been made to receive the. ship in Saigon, it would - not be desirable: to cancel the stop in: ‘Saigon, although, . if, necessary, it: could “be kept short. cas : Rdv&t 'H.’ Jonson Mr, Komer