476-10038-10036 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10038-10036 RECORD SERIES : The Personal Papers of Gordon Chase -AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ‘ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : Memorandum for the President DATE : 12/15/1963 PAGES :.42@ 23 - SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Gordon Chase, Box 1: Chronological file 8/63-12/63, Box'1. Box 8.
eA SEER Re eer te STOP SECRET - SENSITIVE he RAPT a 7 a a —— on 12/15/63 (Ce- An “MEMORANDUM. FOR THE PR ESIDENT a - - SUBJECT: fips Meeting on Cuba -- December 19, 1963 At 11:00 A. M. on Thursday, you will be meeting primarily with State, Defense, CIA, to discuss further possible measures we can take against Castro, which stop short of invasion and blockade. The following is an attempt to describe the Cuban problem asa whole -- where we have been since January, 1963; where we are now; and where we seem to be headed. | The paper ends with a brief description of a number of further possible . measures we can take against Cuba. State, Defense, and CIA, which, by ‘and large, have reserved theiz positions on these measures, will be prepared to discuss them with you in detail at the meeting. — La I, Current U.S. Policy - ° . _ The bare minimum objective of our policy is a Cuba which poses no threat to its neighbors and which is not a Soviet satellite. In moving towards a this objective we have rejected the options of unprovoked U. S. military inter- | - vention in Cuba and of aneffective, total blockade around Cuba o primarily . because they would risk another US/USSR confrontation. ‘Instead, we are engaged ina variety of unilateral, bilateral, and: multilateral measures, both defensive and offensive, which stop short of these drastic measures. ' JI, Review of U.S. Measures Against Cuba Since January, 1963. On January 9, 1963, the White House set up an interdepartmental task 7 ve force, headed by State, to coordinate all matters pertaining to Cuba.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE /. With the establishment of the Cuban Coordinating Committee, our post- | missile crisis measures against Cuba began. ‘These measures have been’ essentially either defensive or offensive in nature. : AL Defensive Measures Our defensive measures have primarily aimed at three targets: wll te (1) Cuba, the Military Threat -- We have been intent on ensuring that Cuba does not become again an “offensive weapons" ‘(e. ge missilés) threat to the U.S. or Latin America. To this end we have conducted: intensive air and sea surveillance around and over Cuba and have collected intelligence from within. Cuba. So far as we know, we have’ been entirely successful in this effort and Cuba is not now an "offensive wéapons't threat to either the U.S. or to Latin .America.. a But even without "offensive weapons" Cuba remains a powerful military ‘establishment in Latin Ame rica. To discourage pos sible Cuban military attacks | against ite neighbors, we have put ourselves clearly on record that a ea any such Cuban moves asd will have extremely dire consequences for Cuba. | ; oo (2) Soviet Troops We have been intent, for domestic political, as weil 7 as national security reasons on effecting the removal of all Soviet military person- nel from Cuba. To this end we have made it eminently clear to the Soviets on numerous occasions that we cannot tolerate the permanent assignment. of Soviet military personnel to Cuba. As a result of Soviet self-interest and our pressures, there are now 4,000 to 7, 000 Soviet military personnel (mostly advisers and | technicians) remaining in Cuba, representing a drop of about 65% to 75% from the peak reached in the autumn of 1962; a net outflow appears to be continuing. How- ever, the issue remains a delicate one. At any moment the } Russians: could
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE arbitrarily decide to send more troops into Cuba. Also, the fact that volatile Cubans will probably control the i disturbing. | , a 7 \ surface-to-air missile sites by mid-1964 is f& '
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -3- (3) Subversion -~ We have been intent on impeding and if possible stopping Cuban based and supported subversion in the Hemisphere. To this end we have made a special effort, bilaterally and in multilateral forums, to direct Latin American attention to, and to assist (materially where appropriate) Latin American efforts in the problem of controlling inte rnal insurgency and in controlling the subversive movement of people, funds, arms, and propaganda between Latin Are rica and Cuba. | On the otie hand we have had some success -~ there is now an increased awareness in , Latin America of the extent and nature of the threat along with an increased capability and will in Latin America to do something about the problem, . _One measure of our success is Venezuelan readiness, in contrast to ‘ previous reluctance, to make an international issue out of the e-memmsehe discovery] Another small measure of this success is that primarily through the use of travel control by Latin American governments, there has been a 50% drop over the past year in the number of Latin Americans traveling to 7 mY v Cuba. On the other hand, with Castro, still exceedingly intent on producing "another Cuba'' in the Hemisphere, and with many Latin American gover ments still unwilling or unable to cope effectively with subversive efforts, . } much remains to be done. In this regard proper exploitation of the recent discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela might take us a long way towards getting wholehearted Latin American. cooperation in the fight against subversion. Such cooperation is a vital key to success in this field, _ : Senet pate net a pe * een eae alan: 5 be rae aa a ae a eS Cal oe
ray sr primarily. because implementation depends on the cooperation of others _ away from the heat of October, 1962, in fact, this has not happened. i: ’ fields, while making further progress in others. About a year ago, only 5 f . Fescak. TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE | B. Offensive Measures _ Offensively, our ultimate minimum target is t to remove the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere. We hope to achieve this by concentrating mainly on three intermediate targete -- intensifying Cuba's already- serious economic difficulties; increasing the cost and unpleasantness to the Soviets ' of maintaining Cuba; and stimulating direct and indirect internal resistance - to the regime. Our chief weapons for achieving these offensive targets are two -- isolation measures and covert measures (which also have an impact. ; on our defensive targets, particularly Cuban subversion). (1) Isolation Measures =~ The most outstanding characteristic of our ; isolation measures is that they have been exceedingly difficult to implement and not merely on U.S. will alone. Nevertheless, while one could have 7 reasonably expected our isolation policy to break up as the world moved. Instead, while far from necforming Glo nty over the past year, . | our isolation policy generally has held the ground already made in some i OAS countries maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba; the number not only remains the same now, but anticipated OAS reaction to the discovery - bow -. of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela gives some reason to hope for further N ruptures. The low level of Free World trade with Cuba reached in 1962 has generally been maintained in 1963. Air isolation of Cuba has been fairly successful; a dramatic demonstration of this is the fact that many Latin