SECRET ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected ova 3 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assis- tant to the President on National Security Affairs, NcGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the befense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On $ Rebru- ary 1904, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB meabers on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that .-.- Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was 7 agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community. | . a - The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions ‘about Nosenko'’s bona tides by the then Director, rr. Mecone, on 11 February 1964. Nr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary af the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964, Generals Carroll and Fitch of PIA were also subsequent ly informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides. s i 8 SECRET
SEGEET The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other: senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction: that such a move might have on other potential defectors. | The Director of Security, Stute Department, was informed | of the bona fides problem at an. early date. We have worked Closely with this office since then on the problem of eval- uating the eignificance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department. Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was, ees a XGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain. FZI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating | and investigating him from the moment of his defection, The FEI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the F231 and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major 9 oa SEGHET —_—
14-00000 SEGHET aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meetsaz with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenzo's case on 1 April 1964, the FRI interposed no objec- tions to our proposal to restrict Nosenko‘s mavements.and . commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI for- - mally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your’ Pa 2 interrcyations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion’ in this case, we do recognize it is possi=lie that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or apent pro- vocateur.” The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our res- ervations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion «agi sougss from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and p#role agreement, and as to. how we. should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this COunerY. Efforts to Keep the XGR fron Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenao's True Status . From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on # KGB mission it was obvious that iff ne were 10 “. SECRET
14-00000 SEGALT to have the time to analyse anil resolve this case, and to. plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential that we attempt te keep the KGB fron learning of our awareness of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed know ledge of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and the implications thereof, was restricted tu a very few people in the Agency and the. intelligence community. Nonetheless, we did advise key policy echelons. and principals in the intel- . Ligence community, even though this carried the inevitable risk of leakage. Sovict Inspired Inquirics In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets were making a serious effort to find out what happened to Nesenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist, Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and matcrials for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain compensation from Nosenko for: damages caused by his abandon- ment of her and her children. In responding to this approach we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself, ‘il SECRET
SECRET to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to repre- sent blatant and crucl manipulation of his family by the KGB - and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way. . Nosenko's Status To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions ~ of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney Gencral under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the FTI on 10 February 1955, which states: 7 “After parole of such aliens, the Central Intel- ligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal. "°° °* security needs of the United States during con- ‘tinuance of their parole stra‘tus." . In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United 12 SECRET
14-00000 SECRET States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko ata location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was , 7 necessary to keep him incommunicado ata location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within: it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no com- plaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial. Disposal From the time that Nosenko was brought to this cou a a we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation ’. as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda | drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what 13 , ele. SECKET
SEGRET this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country. USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous. - :. occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, wlthough we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defec- tors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United. ame States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nos enko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, apain playing their part, might have refused to accept Noscnko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship. Third Country: Although we believed’ it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country, 14 ‘SECRET
SECRET there is certainly no country in the free world on which we ould conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first inform- ing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department | of State would veto such a piece ‘of intergovernmental duplic- ity on the basis of the political risks involved. 15 5 Seecet
Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO NOSENKO is a Sovict intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the u.c., and after 4 short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions . | — for a period of approximately three years. Commencing dnmoct? 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed terval freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. -{tizen in 1974. fle 15 presently under contract to the Agenw Ys providing consultative services and information on sub,iects germane to his background. NOSENKO was confined yvhen as a result of his debricfing substantive questions were ry ised concerning his bona fides, und his general behavior raised: further concern about his cmotional health and generai safet,”° NOSENKO'S dcobricfing and confinement were ended when it wes concluded that he was pot a threat to national security. Tee advice of tin . Justice Department was obtained at the tine OL uae con fin ment, and the FRI participated in his subsequent debrae ing: NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated wits. the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement. The strict conditions of NOSENKO'S confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to ma his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his coenfine- ment and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document... that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers fADD/O and D/OS) that such was the casc, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors. whose bona fides were in doubt. Avan: oe ke clear to him that
14-00000 Din ideiie | sats pe 075 MEMORANDUM FCR: General Counegel the Office of Security concerning the awaree Attached ts a report from ness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FRI, and I&Nf), We have. been advieed by AND/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S,, but that he could not be ensured of immediate ina sense, we are told, he elected to atay under liberty if he elected to stay: the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on thie latter point, other than as shown In the attachment. vs t ' SUBJECT : Novenke S, BD, Breckinridge Attachment: a/s cyan be om
of the vest, IF was REMNST Strona {, Yurdy Ivanovich Nos enko, request the Covernuent ot the United States of Aucrica ty prant ne political asyltwi in the United States of Ancrica. This decision has been taken by ne as the r¢sult of considerfag this cuestion over tho course of several yours without any pressure oa the pire of anyone whosocver. in the truth of the Suciabist systci. L absohutely do not beiisve curking in the &Gé and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet cithzen about the daternal situation, the «adod of the people and the policies of the Scviet Governacnt, I bocane convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will bo truth and real Creedosa as ony as Party. Travelling aware of the existence of a The events in Hun,ary and East Berlin and tie split of the Cosmunist sovenent are for ac vivid exasples and confdragae oe oe. tion of tho correctness of ay own decision ty break forever with the Soviet unton, the country is soverned by the Connunist on official trips abroad to the couatries able correctly to understand aad becone a real and actusl free world. loweant to assure the Covornnent of the United States of Anerica that [ will ecvete all ay strength and knovledse te the Cevernient and people United states of Acurica. 4 FPebraury 1964 thee om {s/ Yuriy Ivanovic: c of th ROSQNQ
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16 ‘ICY jazo Received this date from an Authorized Government Repre- sentative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on. the following banks:. ~ ‘Riggs National Bank . $15,000. 00 _ Union Trust Company 15, 000, 00 American Security & Trust 15, 000. 00 he National Bank of Washington 7,052. 00 The above aniount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00 advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back salary covéring the period April 1964 to March 1969, /s/ IDEN 1 NS /s/ IDEN 5 Ae, aye Witness: Date: Neves, be SE, 6972,
10 2 Oe ot te coe UNGTED Le ENCES €) CPENMENT Mhemorandum bate: 13 July 1973 Files \ 1 IDEN 2 IDEN 1 1, On 12-July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and Release which way prepared by the General Counsel was Signed by the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the undersigned, ‘Chere were no problems iavolved in obtaining the signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he would sigan such « document if he would receive the $15, 000, 00 which Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 . before his defection. . ; 2, Subject understood that the attached did not affect the existing contecactual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations in that contract were valid and continuing. 3. Alsey attached is a copy of the $13,000. 00 Cashier's Check givea to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed sum of $15,000, 00, the Subject having previously received $2, 000. 0G which was a part of the agreed sum. . *faf/ IDEN 2---- Big U.S. Savings Bands Regecberly on the Pazrall Sasinay Plan
14-00000 “OR NOW LEDCEMENT AND RELEASE | WHEREAS, IDENT . & former citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repablics and an employee of the Committee for State Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Govern- ment and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and, WHEREAS, IDEN 1 ‘Was promised certain sums of money for his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been paid to him: and, | WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agtacy; NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND and 00/100 Dollars (S15, 000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, IDEN I . for himself and for his heirs, executors, admini- Strators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United States Government and the Central fntelligence Agency and all of its employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Govern- iment and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document, 12 July 1973, WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL: } / _ /s/ IDEN 1 ; 4SEAL) “IDEN 1 WITNESS; On Behalf of the United States Government Ptaad /s/ IDEN 2 oe 2 A Re Gentes 2 6 ae re ee me alee oe 8 LOS 0 oe owe 8 a.
pO memes mg DL . ww) . Beta A ele NE IR a es TO A incelt w H NT oe e- nee IDEN 1 Dear IDEN 1 . | Reference is made to your contract with the United Stutes Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective | March LOT. . Effective | March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first ° : : - 7 . . sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows: “You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency | at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars it ($23, 750) per year, " ae " All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect. , i . Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below. ne oe CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ‘ BY /s/ IDEN 3 Ce : Spegfal Contracting Officer i; “ " ¢@ . . ACCEPTED: # / y fayy i /s/ IDEN 1 kayo (277 i George Martin Rosnek " “Date | WITNESS: Ta etc aetna terete PE Agere pee i Date : APPROVED: /a/ IDEN 4 ; SP OT Ww ° 7 . Date’ E2ZIMPDET . CL by: 063837. oan . . z - : ane ae s AT ao Sees me AD ato ooo oo, Mame meme: on + es noe cee nee BO ements
14-00000 DESECTORS TAB TILE DATE 1 Memo for Mr. Garrisen fren s, D. Preckinridee, Suijes 30 dan 75 Tnformation on Petention ef Pefector 2 Memo for [Gu from Jerrold E. Brown, Subig Bequest for Information (reg Repert that DCT fired an exployee for abusing a defector) 18 Jun TS MFR from Walter Elder, Suble Rockefeller Cure igetion Contact (re: Report that PCL fired an employee for abusing a defector) i 23 Jun 75° Memo for-IG from ¢, W. Xare. Sub: Alleced Thleval Activities (Unidenti Cled Suifect -. Alleved Aiune of Defector) . a 27 Jun 75 3 Routing Slip to 8, Breckinridge frem FL Puen 22 Jan 7% Att: Memorandum of Agreement Pelween the Attorney General : of the United States and the Central Intell! .e Agency for the Fntry of Aliens of Interest te the Certral Tntellipence Agency under Specifie Circumstances 10 Feb 55 - H “emo for Inspector General from Jerrold S.2rewn, datod 18 June 1975 18 June 1975, Subjects Request for Infomation (ro- DCI firing an empleyee for abysinz a defector) _ ey
14-00000 : ; iy Lita Review Staff: 75/880 SECRET: . . yn Faye 1§ June 1925. MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General SUBJECT > Request For Information The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) Says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a de- fector., Can you uncover the details on this in- cident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? ‘(John Waller says the DDO has no knowledve of “any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. Ne suggests checking Office of SecurityJ) my - B Town ec: Pde John Waller