178-10003-10090 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.1 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency information KISS/SCOW 178-10003-10090 CHURCH COM. 7506462 (2) Document Information NSC RECORD MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62 09/06/1962 5 CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS OPERATION MONGOOSE CUBAN EXILES ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES MEMORANDUM Unclassified ic Redact 07/16/1993 Attached to 1781000310069. Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET. 76 HY 50955 Docld:32204525 Page 1
oe DAFT HONGOOSE Minutes - 9/6/62 i. ‘MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD OTS ~ \ oo SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on ae ‘Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962 PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin; Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow 178-10003-10090 178-10004-10264 1. Sabotage Operation General Carter reported that information should be available by Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr. . Bundy requested that’ the White House be informed as soon as the dnformation is obtained. “ 2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 3lst. ~He-noted that some of the: ‘operational. representatives .had questioned Ly dabdse 8 . whether this was responsive to the changed situation engendered by the issuance oF NSAM 181, but said that ‘this plan had been ‘Prepared within tthe framework of the previously- approved guidelines (those of August 16). Mr, Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to. NSAM 181 has ‘been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified -the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that‘the approach -ctaken in the August 31st paper was satisfactory. “3. The following specific comments were then made on Activities Jisted in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not ~given to the paper at this meeting.) a. ~“Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that ‘he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal man tc copy _ UNMARKED —_ Gerald R. Ford Library NN. HY 50955 Docld: 32204525 Page 2
-2- is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method and place of launching, the technical details of the release of “teaflets, etc., etc. b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of arms) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S. objectives toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should be done with: the idea of providing -a-pretext--for further action, ce. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported by State, said that Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of ' the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr. Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount against U.S. radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would. not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare, The Group _ asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared, . d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed at Bloc personnel in Cuba} was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than - just to the latter. | | e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose was changed’ from crippling to harrassing Cuban coumerce. . Photocopy from Gerald R, Ford Library HY 50955 Docld: 32204525 Page 3
£, General Carter pointed out that reference tw support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is tmpractical., The ward was changed to selected. Be ‘Mr. ‘Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken ‘by ‘other ‘Hemisphere governments) would mot ‘be expected overnt ght . | | -ih. General Carter urge tthat,, iim anonectiion vwiitth mumber 22 ' (submarine ‘brosticasts)., General lamsdale should ibe vitven:more latitude . dn working wp other deception possibilities. iir.. Bumnthy Felt, on the - other ‘hand, that particularly because of tthe possibde Cuban counter- - mensurea which fad ibeen outlined iby Mr. Murrow, tthe Group should Look at other jpossibilities in some detail. . 4. General Carter fellt that a ete mination shauilld “be made as tho jhow far the U.S. ds prepared ttm go im economic lhanrassing actions. He emphasized ‘that sabotage operations such as those wniier number 27/ wil mot dm ithemmelwes ibe especially effective im A the Cuban ‘ay economy. - * Bath An onomy (es Tate thin’ alse * | 4, The Group then turned ito a discussion of | [ General Carter emphasized the extreme seneitivity of any such operation and ‘the disastrous results that would flow from some- ithing going wrong, particularily Lf there were obvious attribution to the U.S. ‘He went-on ito say, ihowever,, that it would ibe possible to waxccomp lish this purpose iby methoils more wsubtile tihen tthose indica ted in ithe paper. He mentioned specifically ithe possibility ct | AMET GT TERT S Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HY 50955 Docld: 327204525 Page 4
fs Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must | avoid| ‘they could be completely covered up. , unless 5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiariés which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatior to use such-materials despite many exile claims to the contrary. \ th 6. It: was-suggested.that.the matter.of.attacking and harrassing 6 Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered. 7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against | exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated. 8. it was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked -inta further. 9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much Latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not .be _a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree. , . ° 10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program. Photocopy” from HW 50955 Docld:32204525 Page 5 Gerald R. Ford Library
He mentioned as examples what the’ U.S. response should be in the event of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mounted. . - The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military continger : , ’ plans already prepared, must be pursued. | — ; Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the 4 MONGOOSE framework, Mr. Bundy hat General Lansdale's group, LO particularly the State representative, mate do the initial exploration _ of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible decisiongof this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time available for MONGOOSE operations. Thie matter was left open for further consideration at a meeting next week. 00~Gpa awed - drcfRoupdl dleles - bom _ Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library ee ee pew ene EDT een watt een see WW 50955 Docld:32204525 Page 6