187-10014-10095 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: 6/29/20) rr I itt HY v9.4 0955 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER: RECORD SERIES : Agency Information SSCIA 157-10014-10095 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-01 Document Information ORIGINATOR: = SSCIA FROM: BARON, FREDERICK TO: SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR. TITLE:  MCGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY DATE: = 07/10/1975 PAGES: 150 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS ; DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA: COMMENTS : Doctld: 32423483 BUNDY, MCGEORGE TRUJILLO CIA CASTRO, FIDEL REPORT Declassified IB; ic Redact 12/02/1999 CCBOX 454 Page i
HY JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM Date 08/06/95 Page 1 eee uatb ED ED HED HEED END ED NES) UGH CEE EEN IED ey HR) AHNED GOREN RED) CRED ut) une. ates EEE FSD SNE GSES SNES GNSS GHEE uA Geb) GES END ES GEESE SEED GEG GEE GED 4S FED GHEE SEHD EES ETD GEE GEEED mm lvem att HNL GNLEE GENE SLED MRED ELD HRLY ENE A ID SE GE SID GEE GH Se Gish ED GES SEED GE GID GIG ND GG SOY SAAD GED GED AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER AGENCY INFORMATION SSCIA 157-10014-10095 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF O7-M-O1 ‘ THE CHURCH ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION SSCIA BARON, FREDERICK SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR. MCGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY 07/10/75 150 BUNDY, MCGEORGE CIA TRUJILLO CASTRO, FIDEL REPORT TOP SECRET REFERRED POSTPONED IN FULL 01/05/99 CCBOX 454 ee ete AS EN SE RISES SES SS SID SSS) TED GIES ESS ESS. SSDS SEG ESRD SESS USS SSS SES GSESD SUES GES SESS) GSES GSD) SSL SASH B6GD HFS ND coe Heer ‘Dts smth SER! aun EDED GENID EDD out Teun sun cute une® cute “nen cEnto ante cme nue) tune cone) cnt cet ‘ene este unen cutee etn enn cate utes suneh conan cnt cette une ute atten cane teen cents cee cam came sates tee 50955 Dovid: 324239483 - ITEM IS. RESTRICTED Page 2
MEMORANDUM TO: Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr. FROM: Frederick Baron ; DATE: July 10, 1975 McGEORGE BUNDY: TRUJILLO SUMMARY McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1961 until 1966. TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30, 1961. During 1961 in the Kennedy Administration much of the primary responsibility for following Dominican Republic affairs was delegated by BUNDY to RICHARD GOODWIN. The following broad issues should be raised in the ques- tioning of Mr. BUNDY in relation to the TRUJILLO assassi- nation: ~ What construction was given by the CIA, State Department, and Special Group during the Kennedy Administration to the January 12, 1961 decision by the Special Group in the waning days of the Eisenhower Administration to approve "limited . Bae supplies of small arms and other material" to Dominican dissidents. Did this authorization carry over? Was it stretched to cover supplies of potential assassination weapons? - Did the reporting to the President and the NSC Tete staff from State and CIA provide adequate notice of the propensities for assassination on the part of Dominican dissident groups with whom the CIA was in contact? (See Rusk memo of 2/15/61, Bissell memo of 2/17/61, and CIA memo of 5/13/61). ! Specifically, did Bissell's memo of February 17, 1961 adequately respond to your request for infor- mation for “higher authority''?
- Did the CIA send a cable to the Dominican station on May 29, 1961 as an authentic state- D ment of a policy to dissociate from political — assassination? Or, was this an attempt to create a written record favorable to the U.S.. which was contrary to previous policy? BUNDY's testimony in relation to the TRUJILLO assassina- tion should involve the following questions (see the Tabs indicated, which are contained in the binder of TRUJILLO materials): Ll. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES - 12 January 1961 (Tab J) Special Group approved the supply of a limited number of small arms and other material: to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. 2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES - 14 February 1961 (Tab A inder Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo." - What precipitated this request? 3. MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM DEAN RUSK - re is February 1961 (Tab Q) — aaron 4. BISSELL MEMORANDUM TO BUNDY: -"“BRIEFING PAPER ON THE _— ‘DOMINICAN REPUBLIC™- 17 February 1961 (Tab R oF 5. CITA MEMORANDUM PREPARED AT REQUEST OF RICHARD GOODWIN: "CIA COVERT ACTIVITIES, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC" -- ol i3 May 1961 (Tab 3C) : 6. MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY FROM CHESTER BOWLES “T TELE tay 1961T (Tab 3-F) 7. CIA CABLE DIRECTOR TO STATION - 29 May 1961 (Tab 3-G) 8. CIA CABLE DIRECTOR TO STATION - 31 May 1961 (Tab 3-I)
o TO: Fritz. Schwarz DATE: July 10, 1975 FROM: Frederick Baron * ; McGEORGE BUNDY Testimony of Richard Bissell on EXECUTIVE ACTION 1. TABS (pp. 48-54°-- 6/9/75) Bissell testified that when he asked HARVEY to create the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY it "could have been BUNDY" (49) or ROSTOW (51). who asked him to do this. Bissell does not recall any specific conversation (51). Bissell and Rostow are "the names of the two people from whom it /the request for such a capability/ is most likely to come from." (53). 2. TAB T (pp. 58-59 -- 6/9/75) Bissell said he assumes that BUNDY and ROSTOW. would have been the bureaucratic channel for such a request (58). 3. TAB U (pp. 80-83 -- 6/9/75) Bissell testified that the “urgings''for an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY could have come at the weekly luncheon meetings with BUNDY, ROSTOW, and. represen- tatives from STATE, CIA, and DEFENSE (81-82). Bissell testified that as he normally operated, he would have replied to ROSTOW in such cases (82). "When I reported to him /ROSTOW/ it would have gone to BUNDY as well." (82)7 4. TAB V (pp. 16-19 -- 6/11/75) IG REPORT, 1967: "On November 15, 1961, HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with Bissell the application of these ZR/RIFLE programs to Cuba. HARVEY says that Bissell instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact with the criminal syndicate, and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO." Bissell testified that he did not recall directing the reactivation of the project but, he said, "I think I did, as part of Mr. HARVEY's responsibility for Project RIFLE, instruct him to take over the contact." (19). Bissell agreed that the purpose of the contact
-2- had been to assassinate CASTRO and said that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it /the contact/ unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation." (19). TAB W (pp. 42-53 -- 6/11/75) Bissell testified: "There is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with ROSTOW and possibly BUNDY." (46). Bissell said he discussed "all aspects of the creation of the capability." (50). Bissell said it was "quite possible" that he discussed CASTRO, TRUJILLO, and LUMUMBA with ROSTOW as examples of assassination targets. (50). ‘When asked a final time, by Senator Baker, whether he recalled discussing the assassination capability with ROSTOW and BUNDY, Bissell replied: "I am not sure about BUNDY, but I think ROSTOW, yes, sir." (52)
HW 0955 TAB A TAB B TAB C TAB D TAB E ‘TAB F TAB G ° INDEX TO EXHIBITS RELATING TO TE 2/14/61 10/5/61 10/6/61 11/30/61 1/19/62 3/5/62 3/5/62 3/16/62 3/13/62 | 3/16/62 4/11/62 8/7/62 ‘Docld: 32423483. Page 6:> — cl Y Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Meeting NSAM No. 100 Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Meeting a Memorandum by JFK /cf. Tab 4, Lansdale Book/ Memorandum from Mc Manus to McCone /cf. Tab 10, Lansdale Book/ Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) /cf£. Tab 21, Lansdale Book, Memorandum by General Taylor fet. Tab 22, Lansdale Book/ Memorandum by General Taylor Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Meeting ‘Memorandum by General Taylor Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) Unsigned memorandum by William K. Harvey 2 oa nea ae
-TAB TAB TAB. ' TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB 8/8/62 8/10/62 8/13/62 8/14/62 8/23/62 8/27/62 10/16/62 10/17/62 1/4/63 1/22/63 4/3/63 4/11/63 4/11/63 Unsigned memorandum from General Lansdale Minutes, Special Group (Augmented) | Meeting Memorandum from General Lansdale /see Tab D, Lansdale Book/ Memorandum from Harvey to DCI Helms /see Tab F, Lansdale Book/ _NSAM No. 181 from Bundy /See Tab 41, Lansdale Book7 Memorandum from Lt. Gen. Carter to Bundy Memorandum from Carter Memorandum from Parrott Memorandum from Bundy to JFK Remarks of JFK to Nise Meeting Memorandum for the Record, titled. "Meeting on Cuba" : Minutes, Special Group Meeting Memorandum to. Bundy from Gordon Chase ° ay wor, reed en nN eB Babee IM HW 50955. DocTd:32423483 " Page, 9.
TAB. TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB TAB 2-A 2-B 2-C 2-D wre, ERE HY 0955. CT cee ae cr po a 2 . Docld: 32493483 Page, 40 —) 4/18/63 4/22/63 4/23/63 4/29/63 5/2/63 5/13/63 5/28/63 6/6/63 6/19/63 7/25/63 . 9/20/63 — 923/63 10/29/63. Minutes, Special Group Meeting Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 2/63 by Bromley. Smith Memorandum from Chase to Bundy Memorandum by Bundy ré 4/30/63 Standing Group Meeting ‘Memorandum from Bundy to Members - of. Standing Group Draft Memorandum from CIA office of National Estimates ; Memorandum from Bundy to Standing Group Members Minutes, Special Group Meeting Memorandum from Parrott to Special Group re "Sabotage Program Cuba" Memorandum from Denney to Crimmins Memorandum from Chase to Bundy Memorandum from Bundy to Special. . Group Memorandum from Bundy to JFK — + mee mene op « . ae cedacahe aut ntiee steaseiimeetnEa
2-E 10/29/63 Check-list for meeting by Bundy 2-F 10/30/63 | Cable, Bundy to Lodge. _2-G 6/10/64 - Memorandum from Helms to McCone 2-1 6/22/64 - Memorandum from Jessup re pre- liminary meeting with Attorney General 6/19/64 2-J 6/22/64 Memorandum for the Record, re . Minutes of the 303 Committee Meeting, 6/18/64 oo, 2-K | 7/31/64 Memorandum for the record re Minutes of 303 Committee _ Meeting, 7/30/64 © 2-L 8/19/64 Memorandum from McCone to Bundy a cece, ann — i rrr) HW5OUSS DocTa: 33423403 © Page We
Chronology and Issues for Testimony. of McGEORGE BUNDY Biographical Background 1953-61 . Faculty of Arts and Science, Harvary University . 1961-63 Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs ' 1963-66 Special Assistant to President Johnson for National Security Affairs 1966- Present President, Ford Foundation _ Chronology of Events ' Summary Outline Re Castro . January 1961 - October 1961 -- Cuba Policy - Inauguration/Bay of Pigs to Mongoose: (NSAM 100 Plan re Removal of Castro) _ November -January 1961 -- Conception and Approval of Mongoose . January - June 1962 -- Mongoose Phase One . June - December 1962 -- Mongoose Phase Two (August 10, 1962 Meeting and possible Discussion of Castro Assassination) . January - November 1963 -- Post-Mongoose Policy (Seeming pattern of discussion and papers on contingency of Castro death) . December 1963 - August 1964 -- Special Group Investigation of Mafia - Cuban Exile Castro Assassination Plot. oa Ps * Page i? Docld: 327423483 HW 50955
23 ORE an i AB ates os dae (McGeorge Bundy) Jan. 9-10, 1961 Jan. 20, 1961 Jan. 27, 1961 t April 17, 1961 May 16, 1961 Oct. 5, 1961 - the nature of the "indicated contingency."" Source NSAM No. 100, Oct. 5, -2- t 6 1. Cuba Policy from Bay of Pigs up to Mongoose Origin Bundy arrives in Washington (Source: Bundy Interview) Bundy Appointment. Kennedy Administration takes office. McGeorge Bundy appointed Assistant to the President for National Security | Affairs. Bundy, Rostow and Bissell lunch at Hay Adams (Source: Bundy Interview Calendar note. . Bay of Pigs. Cuban exiles land at Bay of Pigs. New U.S. Policy on Cuba. President Kennedy approved actions taken by the NSC at a May 5, 1961 meeting to establish U.S. policy toward Cuba. The NSC “agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro and that since the measures agreed below (CIA studies of weaknesses in Castro regime, diplomatic efforts to isolate Castro, improve relations with Cuban exiles, etc.) are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at inter- vals with a view to further action.” Source: Record of Actions by NSC on May 5, 1961.Ctmb 8). , NSAM 100. Bundy issues National Security Action Memorandum No. 100 to the Secretary of State, subject: Contingency Planning for Cuba. The memorandum states in full: "In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba."' There is no eyplanation of. 1961. Crabe). , -Issues and Questions Was "Executive Action'' discussed? Was Bissell instructed re 'Execu- tive Action"? . Was this basic context for later U.S. Policy? Was "indicated contingency" related to "Executive Action"? Did JFK authorize NSAM 100? What was JFK instruction re NSAM 100? See next entries below. ee seer Re HW 50955 Page i353 Docld: 324273483
(McLeorge Bundy) Oct. 5, 1961 Oct. 6, 1961 { Nov. 30, 1961 Jan. 19, 1962 € Taylor Instructions for Castro 'Removal'' Contingence -- JFK interest out to be Revealed. On General Taylor's instructions, Parrott outlines o Mr. Coerr of State a requirement for a "plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban - scene.'' Taylor tells Parrott not to indicate the President's interest in the plan. > Plan for Possible Removal of Castro. The Special Group (Bundy not present) was told by Mr. Parrott "that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba -- the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations." Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961. (See Lansdale, President Kennedy Decision to Begin Mongoose. A memorandum from President Kennedy was sent to Robert Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCone, General Taylor, General Lansdale and Mr. Goodwin, which summarized “the major decisions which have been made in ‘regard to the Cuba Operation.'' The memo stated: '(1) We will use our available assets to go ahead qith the discussed project in order to help Cuba over- | throw the Commmist regime. (2) This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Opera- tions. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and departments of the Government.'' Source: “Memoran- dum, November 30, 1961, (0069-70) .(See Lansdole, Tab 4). Phase One of Mongoose--Intelligence Collection,. January-June 1962 RFK Urges Action. RFK tells Special Group (A) (Bundy not present) that solution of Cuban problem carries ''the top priority in tie U.S. Govern-. ment--all else is secondary--no time, money, effort or manpower 1s to be spared." Source: Memorandum, January 19, 1962, rom McManus to McCone. (See lansdake , Tab te), ‘probably wrote this memo. Issues and Questions Was this the "indicated contingency” in Bundv's NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961? Is this plan the one referred to in Bundy's NSAM 100? Did it relate toa U.S. assassination plan?_ Tal 2), In a staff interview, Bundy recalls he Memo shows JFK approval for Mongoose. : What was JFK relationship with Lansdale and JFK interest in Mongoose? Did RFK emphasis lead to assumption by CIA a Castro assassination plot had tacit authorization of higher authority? Page i4 Docld: 327423483 HW 50955
(McGeorge Bundy) March 5, 1962 March 5, 1962 March 16, 1962 74 - Guidelines Outlined for Mongoose. poses Operation MONGOOSE was to be developed on the following assumptions: (a) in undertaking the overthrow of the target govern- ment /Cuba7 "the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, ‘internal and external, but recognizes that final success will re-. quire decisive use of U.S. military intervention. Source: Memoran- um by General Taylor, March 5, 19 » 00188. CSee lausgate , Tet 22). General Taylor's memorandum pro- Special Group (A) Considers Taylor Guidelines. The Special Group (A) including Mr. Bundy, agreed to examine General Taylor's guidelines. for Mongoose for presentation to higher authority for information. Issues and Questions noses and wuestions If U.S. military intervention ruled out, must assassination be considered as only way to succeed? Establishes Bundy was familiar with Mongoose guidelines. Source: Minutes of Special Group (A) March 5, 1962, 00004, CSee Lansdale , Tab 21). President Receives Progress Briefing. "In the presence of the Special Group (hugmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated 14 March 1962 were cir- culated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a pro- longed consideration of the visibility, General Lansdale and the Special ‘Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines." The memo is footnoted with the following item dated March 22, 1962: "This minute was read to the Special Group. (Augmented) today. The group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or ot erwise, was given igher authority. eé. members of the minute be amended to indicate that the group itselfthad decided to proceed in accordance with the guidelines."' Source: Memorandum , March 16,1962, by General Taylor, 00008. (Ta E), noise level and risks entailed. Why was it necessary to correct this - memorandum? Is there a second level of plausible denial, allowing Special Group to deny a CIA action?» 3 roup asked that the Page i5 Docld: 327423483 HW 50955
Wicucurge punuy) ; 7-3" J April 11, 1962 Bundv Cautions Against Fixed Target Date. LANSDALE gave progress re- port. RUSK and McNAMARA suggested that the current target date for bringing covert operations to a climax should be removed. ‘Mr. BUNDY cautioned that this could lead to an uncontrollabel action internally, which might come to a head at a time which would be ‘embarrassing or inconvenient for the U.S.'' Source: Minutes of Special Group (A), Meeting, April 11, 1962, 00015-17. Ctas F). August 7, 1962 Harvey submits Plan. In response to requests from the Special Group (Augmented), for a paper on "stepped-up Course B" William K. Harvey .- , submits to General Lansdale a ten page plan of covert activities. (Source: Unsigned memo of August 7, 1962 from William K. Harvey) (ta 4). August 8, 1962 Lansdale Transmits Plan to SG (A). Citing the "major difference — rom Phase I of Operation Mongoose" as "removing the restrictions in. the 14 March policy guidelines which keep our actions 'short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area,''’ General Lansdale sends the requested papers (from State, Defense, CIA, and USIA) to the SG(A). ‘The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped-up Course B.'' (Source: Unsigned memo of August 8, 1962 from Gen. Lansdale to SG(A) regarding stepped-up Course B). (See Lausdobe , Tao 38), \ August 18,1962 estion of Assassination of Fidel Castro raised at SG(A) Meeting. At a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Mr. Risk's office, at which, inter alia, Mr. McCone presented "an alternate plan (called... the 'CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale,'' "/t/he question of assassination particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara....It was the obvious con- sensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not_a subjeft which has been made a matter of official record. /Mr. Harvey7 took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.'' (Sources: Memorandum of August 14, 1962, for Deputy Director (Plans) from William K. Harvey, Chief, Task Force W, subject: Operation Mongoose; Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 10 August 1962, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott). (See louscere, Tat 8 Lansdaty Tob rc). at “Neg unde’ ty Issues and Questions Does advantage of having action | controlled counsel for consideration of assassination rather than sabotage? . Why did Special Group (Augmented) request a stepped-up plan? Note Harvey involvement. , (In his affidavit of April 25, 1975, pre- pared for the Rockefeller Commission, ‘McGeorge Bundy states: "I don't have any — ‘recollection of where or how I heard about the poisoning possibility....Now, as to meetings where such things might have been discussed, the only one I have any recollection of -- and it is a refreshed recollection -- I would not have known about it a month ago -- is the one which we discussed yesterday on August 10, 1962 and I do NOT have any recollection of what specifically was said in tha meeting.") . ae a. ar Page 16 Docld: 327423483 HW 50955
| (McGeorge Bundy) | -6- ~ : Issues and Questions Aug. 12, 1962 Lansdale's memo is amended, Four words, ‘Including liquidation of leaders,'' are excised. co os General Lansdale distributes to Harvey (CIA); Hurwitch (State), oa Harris (Defense); and Wilson (USIA) a memorandum subject Alternate ie . Course B. . , et — The original memorandum contains the following language: "Papers required from each of you for me Tuesday meeting: Mr. Harvey Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, including Tiquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception) , and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion '' in other sections of the paper.’ When Harvey receives his copy, he calls Lansdale's office, points out how inadvisable the subsequently deleted language is, and the memorandum is thereupon recalled and the complained-of language deleted by General Lansdale. (Source: Lansdale's Memo- randum of August 13, 1962, to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris and Wilson, Subject: Alternate Course B; Harvey's memorandum of August 14, 1962, supra. (See Louse ote , Tot b, Lansdale Toh F). Aug. 14,1962 © rarvey memorializes Discussion of Assassination of Castro. Harvey writes for Helms, then Deputy Director of Plans, a memoran- dum "for your information.'' The memorandum records how the topic of assassinations "particularly of Fidel Castro," arose and how Harvey thereafter vigorously and quickly objected to Lansdale's having circulated reference to it in his meno of the preceding day, August 13, 1962. CSee Lanrdoge, Tat F) Paragraph 3 reads: 4 "The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, Does Bundy recall this discussion? He was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the - . has said (at his interview with Commit- Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 tee staff on July 8, 1975) that he has Bf - August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in no recollection, refreshed, revived, or So - answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub- independent of any such discussion by ad ject which has been made'a matter of official record. I took McNamara. 4 careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, os and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written ae - comments or study on this point. ~ 48 ; (Sources: Lansdale's memo of Aug. 13, supra; Harvey's memo, Aug 14, supra) Fe Persea ai Page i? Docld: 327423483 HW 50955
Issues and Questions Aug. 23, 1962 Bundy writes National Security Action Memorandum #181 (NSAM #181). What prompted this NSAM? Did NSAM 181 ; - Bundy distributes a memorandum advising that the President result from the August 10 meeting? 7 : Qa Beensee ae h ft ANSON . 7 LA + ] has directed the following action be undertaken: : | . "4, The line of activity projected for Opération MONGOOSE = | Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action: General Taylor): yee. "8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvan- tages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin - crisis. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense).'' (Source: NSAM, No. 181, from McCeorgé Bundy, August 23, 1962) CSee Lausdete, Tet 41). Aug. 27, 1962 CIA Reports to Bundy on Progress in Complying with NSAM #181. Note Harvey responsibility. Marshall S. Carter, Acting DCI, responds to NSAM #181 and informs Mr. Bundy that 'Mr. William K. Harvey, or in his absence, Mr. Bruce , B. Cheever" will be responsible for the line of activity projected for Operation Mongoose (and Plan B plus) as noted in NSAM #181. (Source: Memo of August 27, 1962 from Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Acting Director, DCI, to McGeorge Bundy, Subject: CIA Action in Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181) C8 H), Oct. 17, 1962. Bundy discusses with the President, Gen. Carter's memo for the - Were other unwritten or unrecorded _ Special Group Augmented of October 16, 1962. proposals discussed by Bundy to the After discussion with President Kennedy, selected aspects of . President? ae Gen. Carter's memo, subject, Operation MONGOOSE sabotage proposals, directed to the Special Group Cagnented) on Oct. 16, 1962, are approved. (Sources: Memo of October 16, 1962, from Marshall Carter, Acting DCI to Special Group (Augmented), subject Operation MONGOOSE/Sabotage Proposals; c ' Memorandum of October 17, 1962 from Thomas A. Parrott for the Special Group (Augmented) subject: Memorandum for the Special Grpup- (Augmented) from Gen. Carter, dated 16 October 1962). (yay) Tele | | : ; she Page i165 Docld: 327423483 HW 509550
Bal ESPESPEE-PIOOG cosgag 6 shed (‘icGeorge Bundy) Nag April 11, 1963> » ve -9- 1 - The President summed up the meeting on Cuba by "directing the following: (a) The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future strength should be completed as soon as possible. (b) CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in the field of sabotage during the next six months. (c) A meeting should be held next week to review the proposed sabotage program." Source: Memorandum, April 3, 1963, "Meeting on Cuba," (02842-43). Cat m), President to Consider "Violent Solutions." Gordon Chase writes memorandum to Bundy proposing enticing Castro over to U. S. side. Chase states: "I understand that, in the © near future, the President will be looking at.some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem." Source: Memorandum to Bundy, April 11, 1963, 4-130 (JFK Library file). CTes N). Special Group Requests Destruction of Documents for Security, Reasons. On April 11, 1963, the Special Group (Bundy present) © requested that.comments by the Coordinator of Cuban affairs dated April 11 on three papers being considered at today's meeting be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. /The meeting discussed the “entire question of sabotage” and thus the papers referred to may have dealt with sabotage operations./ { The Special Group engaged in "a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage...the group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken...to determine whether we wished to change the present policy...Mr. McCone expressed “great skepticism about. the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations...unt{$1 an overall policy is made clear and steps to be taken to dssure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro." It was decided that on April 19 a presentation should be made to higher authority and a paper would be prepared out- lining "a proposed broad program for sabotage" examples of specific operations, the scale of activity and how such activity would fit into overall policy. Source: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, April 11, 1963 (02846-47) (Tet 6), | | : Issues and Questions x ‘What is meant by ‘more violent solutions’'? } . . + Why were documents destro} 1 Note unclear policy towar¢ . Cuba. 4 ¥
BT Goéog oz afeg ESPESEEE - PToIog | April 18, 1963 11 23, 1963 aol” April 23, 1963 (McGeorge Bundy) - Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18. The only reference to the | Po we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward a - request, comments on papers for meeting: "Assuming we are not ‘to get rid of him--a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky 4 : , po wee ene ee ee geen ere ge : *% ys - +10 - . an . , Issues and Questions - Bundy Expresses Doubts Re Sabotage. On April 18, 1963, the : : - to } Special Group discussed papers from the Coordinator of Cuban’  §f§ | subject matters of these papers was: "Mr. Fitzgerald pointed i out that the paper of April 17, on a "Maximum Covert Action oa poe Program” consists basically of sabotage and of harassment, |, = . plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be. \ responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. oO | "a presen on Fe rmeemnrnemag ee = tn aR SE tt "Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether . yi potas . we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until “fo | i} 4 Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year anda ee J half."...Mr. Bundy was not sure whether "it would be possible — I , to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's ot papers, without a drastic change in U. S. policy." Source: | Special group minutes dated April 18, 1963 (02848-49). CTs PD. Chase Memorandum to Bundy Re "Short and Sweet" Action on Castro. + Noes such “short ‘and sweet Prior to Standing Group meeting on April 23, Chase at Bundy's , action" refer to assassi-- . nation? -,., Co out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a apt | oe Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way / he Plo approach, or a combination of both.../blockade would, be too long, .. - \ , thus/ "Generally speaking, any nasty actions we contemplate Be should be of the "short and sweet" variety." Source: Chase : a4 . memorandum to Bundy, April 23, 1963, JFK Library file, 4-157. (Tot-R),, » . i - } RFK Proposes Study of U. S. Measures for Contingency of Castro . Does McNamara's hard view. . Death. Discussion of Bundyjpaper titled "A Sketch of the Cuba . reflect JFK policy? | Alternatives," McNamara states the "elimination of the Castro = - a f regime was a requirement” and a U. S. program should arm to 3p ‘create dissidence in Cuba" to allow the U. S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces..."
Tz abeg CG60¢ AH ESPLAPEE - ploog (McGeorge Bundy) ~ ‘ = te April 29, ron May 13, 1963 ARR sree ener meies sem es Se eee oo wee ne ] Reiaeenend ~: - ero : . Sco ~ jl - _ Tssues and Questions Robert Kennedy proposes three studies: (1) "A list of measures Why interest in Castro | we would take following contingencies such as the death of death? - Castro", (2) "A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in 18 months," (3) "A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next 18 months.' (Source: Memroandum, by Bromley Smith, titled "Summary Record of NSC Standing Group meeting, No. 2/63..45" JFK Library file.) C Tet @), Bundy Agenda for Standing Group Meeting. In a memo to Group mem- Why interest in Castro bers, Bundy asks for discussion of, among other subjects, "the death? possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind are: ..e(b) Possible death of Castro.... Source: Bundy Memo, April 29, 1963, 4-30, JFK Library file.(Te-S), Bundy Assigns Study Re Castro Disappearance. Standing Group Noes "disappearance" meeting results in assignment of “examination of the possible refer to Castro death? developments in Cuba if Castro should disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent" for Group discussion on May 14. Other assignments are for possible use of contingencies to achieve "wider political objectives," . economic sabotage, and use of sugar market to harm Cuba. (Source: memorandum, May 2, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group meeting, JFK Library file.) Cree v), Kent Paper on Castro Death Contingency. Sherman Kent's (CIA) Is Kent counseling against draft paper discusses "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. assassination? Actions in the Event of Castro's Death." Under a heading "The U. S. Role" Kent states: "If Castro were to die by other than , natural causes, the U. §. would be widely charged with com- plicity," even though Castro has many enemies. Source: Draft. Memorandum, CIA Officer of National Estimates, May 13, 1963, (JFK Library file) (To 4 ):
(McGeorge Bundy) — -12- | - . . a oo Issues and Questions ; a ‘ May 28, 1963 Bundy Sets Agenda for Discussion of Castro Death Contingency. snetee Bundy informs Standing. Group that at meeting on May 28, "We should discuss a paper on possible U. S. actions in the event of Castro's death," and notes Sherman Kent will be present for this purpose. . , oN, Bundy also notes McCone will distribute "two highly sensitive. 8 ,papers" dealing with "a list of possible actions under consid- ~Yeration at CIA" [not specified/ and Cuban oil supplies. Source: > Memorandum, May 28, 1963, Bundy to Standing Group Members; JFK Library File. (Tot v), COPECHSL Ploeg .-GG600 AY zz ahead Possible Approach to Castro. On June 6, 1963, the Special Group Note interest in talks with discussed "various possibilities of establishing channels of com- Castro while also seeming munication to Castro. All members of the group agree that this interest in contingency of is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro his death. should not be made privy to any U. S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret...it was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual would be discussed with the Special Group, in advance." Source: Minutes of Special Group, June 6, 1963 (Tet-w) —~ TE ae spt ay June 19, 1963 JFK Approves External Sabotage Program. A meeting was held with Did JFK decide against talks is “higher authority’! (Bundy present) at which a program for. "ex- and in favor of harder: sabo- ternal sabotage" for Cuba was approved with the understanding ‘tage approach? that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was , : ; to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: ; 7 (a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facili- ° ties (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest." Source: Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, "Satotage Program Cuba". (a9 x) ewe wee . wim tee
Co60o AW COPESESE Plog ce abeg ed (McGeorge Bundy) _ | - 13 - a Issues and Questions . nears Pa September 20, 1963 Bundy Receives Summary of Paper on Possible Actions--Castro Why is it necessary to ex- hoy uF Suicide Preferable to Assassination. At Bundy's request, Chase | clude assassination if it is om OE summarizes State INR Paper entitled "Cuba: Possible Courses of not being considered? Was . So Action." Chase's summary states: "...The present importance - Dennev asked to consider ~ ae . of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious opera- assassination? we tional target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's . , OTM martyrdom." The INR paper, July 25, 1963, by G. Denney, states: '"Assassina- tion of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro...and drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality." Source: (1) Memorandum, September 20, 1963, G. Chase to Bundy (JFK Library File, 4-119), and (2) Memorandum, July 25, 1963, G. Denney, Jr.. of INR to Mr. Crimmins, Coordinator of Cuba Af- fairs. (Tal, AB , wo ah> l _ June 10, 1964 Helms Memo to DCI on Cuban Exile Plan to Kill Castro. In @ memo 7 to the DCL, Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U. S, would not condone the
Towa Fe cG60¢ AH CSPECHCE -ploog Fe abeg Cad - QicGeorge Bundy) ~- | -M4- a Issues and Questions planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach on March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has of- fered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an un- | a>. identified group which would be willing to assassinate selected ra “\tgban officials for cash. Specifically, the Cameron group is ~ * pnterested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto *Ghe Guevera."" "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy.” Source: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans ie of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110). (Tak 2g) ee “7 June 18, 1964 } _ Bundy Receives Memorandum re Exile-Mafia Assassination Plans for Note Bundy's view below a Special Group (303 Meeting). Peter Jessup, assistant to Mr. that U.S. must prevent such Bundy, wrote a memorandum to Mr. Bundy subject "303. Committee plots. Cuban review." The memo stated the meeting "might serve to give us a clearer picture of what forces are at work today which might serve to embarrass the U. S. A. in the next 120 days." The memo ‘asked: "How close track is the FBI et.al, keeping track of Frank Fiorini and persons of this ilk." The memorandum con- tinued: "We also have these reports of Mafia plans to perform Coup de Main operations for cash. Who is keeping track of this? Does the grapevine among the emigres keep us well-advised of all impending adventures?" A memorandum attached was described as: "Helms memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban headers, 10 June 1964." | June 18, 1964 © Bundy and Special Group (303 Committee) Discuss Report of Cuban | Exile Plan to Kill Castro--Bundy to Inform Robert Kennedy as Law Enforcement Problem. The 303 Committee met to discuss "problems - arising from increased activity on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to as- sassinate Castro and general unrest and instability on the is~- land." ..."A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plot and stated that he be d & erimied oe - | Ep eee eo . t 3 . %
SG60G AM ESFLESE  Ploog Ge abeg ~ (McGeorge Bundy) June 19, 1964 -1S- ; Issues and Questions would like to go into the matter further. Others, including ' Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement." Source: Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, 18 June 1964. CT). Bundy has Jessup Meet with Robert Kennedy re Castro Assassina- What was RFK's action in is, tion Report--Robert Kennedy told failure to prevent can be con- response. August 19, 1964 on ferns or eee “strued as condoning. On June 19, 1964, Peter Jessup met with v “ia yy Attorney General Robert Kennedy re: the decision at the 303 Committee meeting of June 18. "In regard to the memorandum to the DCI concerning alleged underworld connections with Cuban exile groups for the purpose of assassinating key figures in the Castro regime, it was pointed out that these reports, in effect, put the United States government on notice that such plotting was afoot, and failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. The Committee's belief that this was essentially a law enforcement problem was cited. The Attorney General in- dicated that the Department of Justice would look into the mat- ter." Source: Memorandum for the record, June 22, 1964, by Peter Jessup. (Téb2S) Special Group Agrees CIA and FBI to Meet on Exile-Mafia Plot. The 303/Special Group Committee "agreed that Mr. Fitzgerald meet with Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the Attorney General agreed to handle asa — matter of law enforcement." Source: Memorandum for the record | dated July 31, 1964 and Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 30, 1964. (Tab =2K) | Bundy Receives McCone Report on FBI Investigation of Exile~Mafia Did Bundy feel compelled to Pilot. John McCone sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy summarizing take any action? the FBI's investigation of reported plans by Cuban exiles to assassinate government leaders. The memorandum summarized seven reports rendered by the FBI. Three of the seven persons inter- viewed by the FBI stated they had heard of the plan and two of these persons said they had discussed or reported the plan to the CIA., Source: Memorandum from John McCone to McGeorge Bundy, August 19, 1964. (Tah aL) neg Spee an | of Bq — rons
GC6oc AH ESPLAPEE - ploog gz ahead ax) wb. raed 4 + (McGeorge Bundy) ; -16- SEPARATE DOCUMENTS September 23, 1963 Bundy Warns Special Group on Security. Bundy points . out to the Special Group that "unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a Simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the government who have to know a little or much OO, about a U.S.-directed raid against Cuba." (Source: Memo, Sept 23, 1963, ‘Bundy to Special Group. (Tée2¢) Oct 29, 1963 Bundy informs JFK of need for White House information on CIA communications... Bundy asks the President to order that the White House received one copy of all important instructions from State and CIA to the field. Bundy states trouble has arisen from"difference of emphasis" in what we have sent to the field. : (Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, Bundy to JFK.) (Tos 2») Oct 29, 1963 co Bundy on Lodge's movements. Bundy in a checklist discusses consequence for plausible denial for Amb Lodge's movements. : (Source: Memo Oct 29, 1963, title Checklist.)(Te2&) : Oct 30, 1963 . Bundy cables Lodge re Impending Coup. Bundy cables : Lodge that “we cannot accept conslusion that we have no power to delay ora coup." i
‘Memorandum po. To: FAO Schwarz, Smothers From: Robert Kelley SHORT SUMMARY -- CUBA ™ | McGEORGE BUNDY i | McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant for National Security La Affairs to President Kennedy throughout the Kennedy Administration. Bundy chaired the Special Group until Maxwell Taylor took over that j function in mid-1961, and Bundy resumed chairmanship of the Special a Group after Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in late 1962. Bundy and W. W. Rostow met Richard Bissell for lunch on January 27, 1961, although Bundy recalls no discussion of assassi- | nation or Executive Action capability at that meeting. Bundy attended the August 10, 1962 Monsoose meeting where a Castro assassi- nation was reportedly suggested... In October 1961, Bundy issued a National Security Action Memorandum referring to an "indicated contingency" which appears from other documents to have called for a plan in the event of Castro's removal. And in the Spring and Summer of 1963 Bundy and the Special Group considered papers dealing with the contingency of .- Castro's death. Mr. Bundy's examination should encompass the following boty questions and areas: A. In meeting with’ Richard Bissell in January 1961 was an _ Executive Action capability or a Castro assassination plan dis- cussed? HW 50955 Docld:32493483-——Page-27--- © 00 --—-——----
if B. Was NSAM 100 of October 5, 1961 related to a Castro assassination plot or capability? | A C. Was the emphasis placed by President .Kennedy or i Robert Kennedy on the Mongoose Program such that the CIA may have assumed authorization, tacit or otherwise, for a Castro assassination. | D. What accounts for the seeming pattern of interest in the Spring and Summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death? | E. What were the Command and Control procedures for authorization of covert actions in the Kennedy Administration? u EF. Was an assassination of Castro ever considered by the Kennedy Administration in the efforts to deal with the problem of Cuba? LY G. If an assassination was not considered or authorized, what explanation is there for the CIA Castro assassination efforts during the Kennedy Administration? HY. $0955 Docld: 324e5465.. Page .28. 2... “A
MEMORANDUM TO : Files se FROM : Bob Kelley “= - DATE : July 8, 1975 SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH McGEORGE BUNDY SUMMARY On July 8, 1975, Mr. Bundy was interviewed at his office at the Ford Foundation in New York by Frederick Baron, Bob Kelley, and John Bayly of the Select Committee staff. The interview began at approxi- mately 9:00 a.m. and continued virtually without interruption until 1:30 p.m. The interview was conducted in three parts: poems 1. A review by Mr. Bundy of the principal documents in the attached chronology. 2. Mr. Bundy was told of the chronology of events relating to the ie Executive action and ZRIFFLE program, and was asked whether he — had any knowledge or recollection of these matters. : 3. Mr. Bundy reviewed documents relating to the Trujillo matter, and was asked whether he had any knowledge or recollection of that mat- ter. | | In summary, Mr. Bundy said: (1) He did not recall any of the docu- ments listed on the attached chronology relating to Castro, and it was his opinion, based on a reading of those documents at the interview, that they did net reflect any consideration by the White House or Cabinet ose — level people in the Kennedy administration of a Castro assassination plan. ae : sa Tot be vt wee HW 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 29 Se ee
—- 2 om Mr. Bundy Stated further that those documents relating to the contin~ gency in the event of Castro's death and similar language did not re- late to any Castro assassination plan, but rather to studies of what might be the situation in Cuba should Castro die or leave office un- related to any U. S. effort; (2) With respect to the ZRIFFLE program, Bundy stated that he was'astonished" that this could have been going on without_the approval by the Special Group, that he knew of no au-~ thorization for such program, and that he never knew of a case where the Special Group process for authorizing covert actions was by-passed by Allen Dulles or Bissell to reach the President through another route. Mr. Bundy did state that he had a recollection of someone (he does not know whom) informing him of the "Executive action" capability, but it was his understanding that this was only a study of possible assassina- tion methods, and Was not targeted against any particular individual or country. | Set out below is a summary of Mr. Bundy's comments on the three areas outlined above. REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RE CASTRO ON ATTACHED CHRONOLOGY NSAM 100 and related documents re "removal of Castro." Bundy had nee no recollection at all of NSAM 100 and did not know what the words "in- 2 dicated contingency in Cuba" involved When shown the Parrott memorandum for the record, dated October 5, 1961, which states that Woodward was asked by Parrott to prepare a contingency plan on General Tayler's in~ \ structions “against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene" and that General Tayler preferred o that "the President's interest in this matter” not be told to Mr. Woodward, ~KNSAM 100 clearly reflects JFK's desires because Bundy would never write a NSAM without his approval, Bundy said. Ilowever, Bundy emphasized that JFK never asked him to look into or develop a plan for the assassination .of Castro. eh ness HW 50955 Docld:324293483 Page 30
-3- Mr. Bundy still did not recall NSAM 100 or its subject. Similarly, -when shown the Spectal Group meeting minutes of October 6, 1961 where Mr. Parrott told the Group that there was in preparation "a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban . scene," Mr. Bundy's recollection was also not refreshed: Bundy ‘stated that his reading of these documents today makes him think that what was desired was only a plan of what might happen in a post-Castro Cuba, and did not relate to any attempt by the United States to cause Castro's re- moval, Bundy said he does not recall or know of any plan that Woodward or any other agency might have developed as a result of NSAM 100. Bundy suggested that General Taylor would be the best source for information as to why the Presidential interest in this pian should have been con~ cealed from Mr. Woodward. Later in the interview, after reviewing for — Mr. Bundy the chronology relating to the ZRIFFLE program, and pointing out that it was on November 15, 1961 that Bissell is alleged to have instructed Harvey to arrange the assassination of Castro - some forty days after NSAM 100 was issued - Bundy stated there was no relationship between NSAM 100 and the Bissell-Harvey orders of November 15. President's memo, November 30, 1961, launching Mongoose. Bundy had no recollection of this memo, although reading it today he thinks aa he may have written it. Bundy noted that General Tayler ran the Special Mea Group 54/12 meetings from June 1961 through October 1962, and Bundy merely attended to represent the Presidential interest. Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and Special Group approval, © March 5, 1962. Bundy noted that the Mongoose guidelines "recognized - _ * that final success will require decisive U. S. military intervention." 1 ae re a fear 2 Oeste A HY 4S0954
~4- It was suggested to Mr. Bundy that if an invasion was recognized as a requirement, yet was ruled out for political or diplomatic reasons, and it was also recognized that sabotage could not accomplish the over~- throw of the Cuban regime, policy makers might have taken up considera- tion of a Castro assassination. Bundy said that today one could assume that there were ‘two forks'* an. invasion by U. S. forces, or a Castro assassination, but Bundy emphasized that the thinking in the JFK adnin- istration was focussed toward an invasion by U. S. forces. At other points in the interview, Bundy emphasized that JFK policy makers never considered the possibility of assassinating Castro. In positing the "two forks," Bundy did not appear to mean that these two possibilities were considered during the JFK years, but only that one might conceive of the situation today in those terms. JFK briefing on Mongoose March 16, 1962. Bundy explained, although he had no recollection of this document, that this was the type of ef- fort made to create plausible deniability." Thus, though the body of the document states that the Special Group augmented was given “eacit authorization to proceed.’ The footnote corrects that and states no authorization was given by higher authority. Bundy said this reflected an effort to protect the President from disclosure of covert actions and was a usual practice. Bundy said that generally he would speak on a one-to~one basis with President Kennedy and get a‘tlear signal" from him on a covert action proposal. The understanding was that the paper record would not reflect this signal. The President would give a clear signal to the members of the Special Group in informal conferences but rarely at a formal group meeting. Bundy said we wanted the President to hear what we were doing with respect to covert actions, and then we'd continue doing it; but his approval would not be recorded. HW 50955 Docld:32493483 Page 39
-5- In response to a question, Bundy said that there was not another level of plausible deniability between the Special Group and the CIA. In other words, Bundy was asked whether with respect ‘to assassinations, ye a paper record might be created that showed no approval by the Special —e - Group even though they may have given oral authorization for an assassina- ‘tion, so that in later years, the chain of command would not rise above the CIA. Bundy said that there was no such lower level of deniability, "We would be explicit with the CIA either. way on covert action approvals, and such approvals would be reflected in the paper record.” August-October 1962; August 10, 1962, Meeting Mr. Bundy was shown selected documents pertaining to meet- ings of the Special Group Augmented and Operation Mongoose. All were taken from the latter half of 1962 and principally from the months of August, September and October. Although Mr. Bundy was able to identify most of the documents as either his own or as those he received from others he was unable to state that any of them revived his recollection of any discussion or proposal concerning assassinations. More directly, — Mr. Bundy stated that he had no recollection, revived, refreshed, or .- ; 7 independent, of: any talk, proposal or discussion concerning assassina-_ tions during any Special Group Augmented meeting he attended during the months of August, September and October. Moreover, he has no recol- “lection of hearing any reference to assassination made by any one, either seriously or jokingly, during that or any other period (Mr. Bundy con- ' tested that he was at a meeting on October 16, 1962, chaired by the Attorney General at which Operation Mongoose proposals were discussed. Review of pertinent documentation indicates that there were two meet- ings regarding Operation Mongoose on October 16, 1962. Mr. Bundy was apparently in attendance at the first, held in the morning; he was HW 50955 Docld:324293483 Page 33
~6- evidently not in attendance at the second, held in the afternoon in the Attorney General's office for operational representatives. Mr. Helms" memo for files evidently records proceedings at the second meet- ee 1963 Documents re Contingency of Castro's Death Bundy explained that the January 4, 1963, memo from Bundy to the President, although he did not have a clear recollection of writing this memo, reflected the fact that Mongoose was not producing. Bundy | a said "RFK can huff and puff all he wanted to but Castro's house would not come down.'' Bundy pointed out that the whole Cuban environment had been transformed after the missile crisis. Kennedy was in a much stronger political position but there were still Republican critics who wanted continued strong action against Castro. The President recognized that he could not satisfy these critics completely but nevertheless, felt im- pelled to take some measures against Castro to show that he was aware of the problem and trying to do something about it. Bundy showed us an article from the New York Times by James Reston reflecting the President's — opinions to this affect. Gordon Chase Memo to Bundy re''Violent ‘Solutions" . Bundy said that Chase was his personal assistant with the special responsibility for Cuban affairs. (Chase left the White House for the Lindsey administration in New York City and is now at the Harvard Medical School.) Chase did not have the type of position or responsibility on Bundy's staff that would involve him in covert action approvals or in- volvement in anything as serious as assassination discussion. Thus, Chase's references to a "short and sweet'' approach have to do with actions ZF 132423483 Page 340° HW 50955 DocI
HW 50955 like sabotage, harassment or other covert actions far short of assassi- nation. Studies on Contingency of Castro's Death The documents in the period April - September 1963 which discuss con- tingencies after the death of Castro were simply the type of study often | commissioned on developments that might ensue after a foreign leader passes away. They were not prepared in connection with any consideration or dis- cussion of a Castro assassination. “For example the paper by Sherman Kent was "straight estimating" by CIA office of National Estimates. (It should be noted that a Select Committee Staff member who was a very senior ONE Officer believes that the Sherman Kent Paper was by no means a normal estimate. His experience tells him that this was a very closely held paper which would have been prepared by Kent personally at the request of the DCI and not circulated within the ONE board for comments.) In response to a question, Bundy could not recall why there was this seeming interest in the spring and summer of 1963 in the contingency of Castro's death. Bundy said he tried to recall now whether there were reports of a decline in Castro's health or some other event that might have. prompted these | studies. He could not do so. . Documents on Non-Governmental Assassination Plot Bundy commented on the Helms' memo of June 10, 1964: "a disingeneous memorandum given their earlier connection with the Cosa Nostra". However, Bundy said he had no affirmative recollection of these documents at all. He does not deny that he saw them but he simply has no recollection re- freshed or otherwise. Bundy does not recall what RFK's reaction was when he was asked to hav e the Justice Department look into the plot as a matter rey Docld: 32423483 Page 35
of law enforcement, or any other out come with respect to the informa- tion received by the Special Group. vos After reviewing these documents referring to assassinations, Bundy — was asked if there. might have been any connection between these documents | and the developments they reflect and the October 5, 1961, NASM which asked for ‘an indicated contingency, which, from subsequent documents,also seem ‘to deal with "a removal of Castro from the Cuban scene one way or another". the first As he had done when documents were reviewed, Bundy again stated that JFK “never asked me to look into an assassination of Castro." Nor was his re- collection refreshed as to the 1961 documents--he simply does not recall issuing NASM 100 or.any discussion at that time with JFK or anyone else with respect to these documents. : on Executive Action | Bundy recalls that he arrived in Washington around January 9 or 10. He was an old friend of Bissell. Bissetl had been his teacher in college Bee! and he had worked with Bissell in the Marshall Plan and knew him at MIT = as well. His calendar book reflects the fact that he had lunch on January a - 27 at the Hay Adams with Bissell and Rostow. He does not recollect this luncheon nor any discussion with Bissell about executive action capability. He does recall that someone informed him that there was such a capability but that. no individual was targeted and no action would be taken without authorization. Hevthought it was unlikely that his lunch with Bissell re- lated to executive action, but he has no recollection at all of that lunch. He said Bissell and he are frank and candid with each other when they speak and there is no reason to think that Bissell interpreted any conversation with Bundy as authorization to proceed with a Castro assassination plot. ‘AW 50955"
. "No one but the President himself had authority to give such an order in.a valid way." | Vile ' Bundy has no recollection of AMLASH. He does recall the reference — to "poison'' but as something that would be on a larger scale than an in- dividual assassination. For example, if such poison would be used it would affect an entire restaurant and not be administered to a single individual. Bundy had heared of the ball point syringe but does not re- call it in the context of Cuba. Nor does he recall any reference to high powered rifles. Lansdale-REK-JEK Relationship Lansdale did have a direct personal relationship with RFK, but not to JFK. Bundy pointed out, however, that there is a great difference between "RFK beating up on people and saying 'go get poison’." It was in RFK's character to press the bureacracy hard and want to "act agressively" against ne enemies, but out of character to discuss poison or assassination. Any in- bath “Fr Lat structions that Bissell gave Harvey was a far cry from the "gung ho" sugges- tions that Bobby usually made. Mongoose and Assassinations. Bundy said he cannot say there was no connection between the Mongoose three-man teams and any three-man teams for assassinations. He does know that there was no "witting authorization" of three-man assassination teams. He strongly disagrees with any suggestion (by Helms) that thé atmosphere of the Special Group Augmented made it accepta- ble to plot Castro's assassination. | Special Group Approval and Assassination Plots. Bundy has no idea how Sek the reported mafia-CIA plot could have gone on without approval by the Special Group. He is "astonished" if it did so. He said he never knew of
-10- a case where the Special Group approval process was bypassed like men A like Allan Dulles or Bissell or where they took a back route to the a . President around the Special Group. He said he would have to exclude the period before the inauguration on January 20, 1961, because he was not operating in the Special Group at that time. Trujillo . 7 — Bundy had little to do with Dominican affairs. He did recall of : being told of the January 12, 1961, decision to support Dominican dissi- dents and thought this was ''o.k. if the dissidents succeed." He did not believe that support amounted to support for an assassination. Goodwin _ and Ralph Dungan would know about the Dominican Republic and Trujillo. nes ramos ee WW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 38
HW 50 a, a) - 14 February 1961 x MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, \4 February 19601 PRESENT: Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Gen. Cabell, Bissell “3, General — Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and alsoa lst of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue. ; . In the course of the discussion, the following points, among cthers, were made: vA : a. Dominican Republic - Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo. PROPERTY O* yo 0 THE WHITE HOUSE UF. $55 BDocld:32423463 Page 39 ' cee ean am ete
V4, Congo ‘ . tO Mr. Bissell gave more details of the project designed to provide ~~ _ support for pro-Western forces in the Congo, which had been introduced atlast Thursday's meeting. The Group had no objections, V6. Vietnam Agent Drop The proposal for this operation was approved, subject to the stipulation that non-U.S. - preferably Chinese - crews be used. Mr. Bissell said that if all goes well we would plan to come back to the Group for approval for certain "spoiling actions. ' The. members felt that CIA should proceed on the assumption that a comprehensive program would continue, and should therefore take Steps to begin the six-week training cycle for the Vietnamese air " erews, which had been mentioned in the formal proposal. r _ orm ame OE 4 mn oy PROPERTY yr HE WHITE HOUSE Crrict wt soss0” BGGharazazsess Page 40 ~ —_
HY rye i by NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-24250 fev TOP SECRET . RECORD OF ACTIONS oy the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL at its FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING held on May 5, 196). (Approved by the President on May 16, 1361) The President presided at this meeting, The Acting Secretary of the Teeasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below, The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Educa- ticn end Welfare; the Actiag Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Die © rector of Central Intelligence; the Director, U. S. Informaticn Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Depe uty Under Secretary of State; Theodore C, Achilles, Special Assistant ‘to the Secretary of State; Stephen E. Smith, Assistant to Mr. Achilles; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President for Para-Military. Affairs; the Military Aide ro the President; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended the meeting, ACTION | | NUMBER SUBJECT 2420. ‘U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15. for discussion by the Council on May 19, 2421. vu. Ss POLICY TCWARD KOREA ' colt “BA ron Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of MM State for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepace and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 JUL eg, for discussion by the Council on May 19. “NAF ore A Rio5s NSC ACTIONS. NOS. 2420-2425 -le S oe TOP SECRET eee DocId:32423483 “Page 41 0 6 0 0} * copy no, 38 | Me os 7G Be |
‘ROSA ACTION NUMBER aN TOP SECRET SUBJECT 2422, U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (NSC Action No, 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated ._ May 4, 1961) © Bs Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view. to further action, Agreed that the Uniced States should not undertake military fatervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future, Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Stafe. Noted the importance the President attaches to ob« taining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban wilitary capabilities, especiaily the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assis- tance, so that U. S..capabilities for possible intere _ vention may be maintained at an acequate level. Noted the importance the President. attaches to publi- cation in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible polit- ical action to end the current terror. Yoced the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a gavernment-in-exile, sup- port should be given to it insofar as it continues to represeat substantial Cuban sentiment, NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425. -2e : TOP SECRET SH) OAS Boclites2iStet35 ~ Page 43°"
ACTION NUMBER . TOP SECRET SUBJECT 2422, U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) h. as peremen FROM | Bree Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S, armed forces under plans to be developed by the Sec= retary of Defense, ' Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visit= ors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and direcced by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in cerry ing on their former occupations, Refugees pow in Miami - will be encouraged to locate in other areas, Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status, All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizenship, Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of aU. S. em-= bargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battie Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of druggs. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge,the willingness of other Amer- ican states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling sub- _versive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic rela- tions with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of interna- ‘ional communism by all nations of this hemisphere. NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425 ~3-« a TOP SECRET. HW 50955° DocTd:32423483 Page-43 6 a get penn A Merete ttre 7 ~ tae ay ee ee wt ' i
met ACTION _ NUMBER TCP SECRET SUBIFCT 2422, U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) 2423. U.S. POLICY TO YARD THE DOMIN TICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI oe ED) ROM UL ‘ i, a 14h tech 5 Ree HW’. 50955 le Pe Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implemen- tation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social de=- velopment, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of $200-$460 million. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would ex- pand its existing program in Latin America, buec not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro re- gime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U, Se groups. Agreed that U. S, military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Departmene of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin. america with Latin American officers. Agreed that the Secretary of Srate should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effece tive anti-communist action, Agveed that pending appoint of an Assistant Secretery of State for Lacin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of © Richard N, Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President, Agreed that the ‘fesk Force on ‘Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-comuunist in- tervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo be« fore’ we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should te muitilateral. NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425 -4- | TOP SECRET Docid: 32423483 - Page 44-°
TOP SECRET NUMBER SUBJECT 2424. U.S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA we ‘ pie Agveed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what — . ‘can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall 7 a communist take-over in that country. 2425. U.S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASTA | a. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit ” and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeest Asia. = b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are considering inclusion of U. &. troops in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments during or. after the forthcoming l4-nation Geneva Conference, ¢. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending recommendations to the President promptly on U. S. training troops in Viet Nam. F 2 “ (oreecmareceones WL 8S, : 3 a | NSC ACTIONS NOS, 2420-2425 -=5- | TOP SECRET mye . wel oy get « ” . - “ bog eh Sade te HH 10955 Docld:32423483 Page 45 — 7"
~ _. _ ; ener mee ear OS RA EE EEE BSS EER RF Op EL ~~ . Are Oo WASHINGTON P Y . October 5, 196L’ NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM. NO, 100 EEE EEN UM ING 100 TO: The Secretary of State SUBJECT: Contingency Planning for Cuba In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba. . McGeorge Bundy cct The Secretary of Defense Director of Central Intelligence Mr. Richard Goodwin cc? Mrs. uincoln Mr. Bundy's Files ° Mr. Bromley Smith “Ter FQ Gebeey C-O-P-¥ phe NTR ES GS Oetcd Glan td ia he HW 50955 BDocld: 3274273483 Page 46 ~
eee . HAtVEy #28 13 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group (Augmented) Meeting on ‘Project Mongoose, 13 March 1962 PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey 1. The Group (with one exception) agreed to accept the - changes in paragraph 2 of General Taylor's Guidelines, which were proposed by the DCI under date of 12 March 1962 and by DOD/JCS under date of 13 March. Mr. Bundy expressed doubts about accepting some of this language. . In explaining the additional actions which would be contemplated under the new CIA language, Mr. Harvey cited the need to give training on survival, weapons and physical training and to promise resupply to infiltrated agents. It was agreed that under the Guidelines as revised, CIA would still continue to bring specific proposals for approval tothe special Group, which involve policy considerations. 2. General Lansdale's paper of 13 March, entitled "Insti- tutional Planning Operation Mongoose," was then discussed. The sections headed Phase I, for CIA, State and Defense, were approved. The sections headed Phase II were deferred. 3. The paper from General Lansdale to the Special Group dated 12 March 1962, entitled "Policy Question Operation Mongoose," was then considered and the following decisions made: a. Use of U.S. Military Installations. CIA was asked to survey the possibility of acquiring privately-owned sites for the proposed training. They also undertook to reexamine the feasibility of using facilities at Isolation. b.. Arming of Cuban Guerrillas: The proposal to authorize arms and equipment to "deserving Cuban guerrillas" under the circumstances stated was approved. It was specified that any major operations of this kind would be subject to specific approval by the Special Group, and that periodic progress reports would be ‘made to the Group.. (This decision did not deal with the actual means of supply, which is covered in ¢ below.) PROPERTY OF HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 47 ee a THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
he 4 Co Use of U.S. Military Personnel and Equipment. The a Group agreed that it would have to accept the proposition that re- supply operations will probably require U.S. military personnel “ ‘and equipment to include aircraft and seacraft. This point will ‘be included in the Guidelines. General Lansdale will arrange with the Air Force to obtain an analysis of the risks which would be involved in air supply operations over Cuba; this should be ready by next’ week, In the meantime preparations should be begun for the selection of personnel and aircraft for necessary preliminaries, such a "sheep-dipping."' The Air Force will be asked to come up within two weeks with an estimate of their capability to provide one or two aircraft for use in initial operations. In connection with small boat operations, the Secre- tary of Defense undertook to provide anything that was available within the Defense establishment for which a requirement might be established. It was pointed out there are no PT boats available and that foreign vessels will have to be acquired. CIA will present a specific request for equipment other than PT boats, within the next few days. 4. Mr. McNamara then raised the possibility that a decision may be made which will make it impossible to use U.S. personnel. He urged that planning, therefore, proceed on two tracks, assuming that such personnel can be used in the initial phase but will not be permitted later on. The Group felt that the Guidelines should re- flect that, in the covert phase of this operation, U.S. personnel, bases and equipment would be available but that the situation that > would exist in the face of a prohibition against such use must also be studied immediately. 4. At the Attorney General's suggestion, General Lansdale undertook to examine the possibility of sabotage or other means of destroying the- Soviet boats which have been or will be delivered to Cuba. . 6. The proposed underwater reconnaissance of the beach east of Havana was approved, after the statement by General Lemnitzer that amphibious planning cannot proceed without this and that the risk is virtually non-existent. 7. It was agreed that the Group should give a. status report to higher authority this week, to include discussion of general principles and guidelines. Thomas A. Parrott No distribution Un re . PROPERTY vu: . THE WHITE HOUSE OF FICE HY S0955 Bocld: 3242735483 Page 46 — at
16 March 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD Subject: Discussion of Operation MONGOOSE , with the Presi dent 18Cussion After a Prolonged Consideration of the Visibility NOlse level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and Suidelines, M,D.T, members Was given by higher authority The S of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided £O proceed in accordance with the Guidelines, e Ye. yl Tab bes Ge! je 49 §0955 Dacld:32493483 Pag HY :
re HARVEY 4 3 1l April 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 11 April 1962 ’ PRESENT: General Taylor and Mr. Bundy; Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Martin; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and General Lansdale; Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey Colonel Davies and Mr. Duval, of CIA, were also present. 1. General Lansdale gave a progress report. 2. Mr. McCone stated that there is little evidence from photo reconnaissance of any significant increase in military support - facilities, over those tnat existed during the Batista regime. He therefore questioned whether current astimates of the sizeof the Cuban military forces may not be somewhat exaggerated. In this connection, attention was called.to the sizeable list of bloc materiel which has been provided to Cuba. Mr. McNamara asked about evidences of underground in- stallations, pointing out that should these exist in any significant numbers it would have a bearing on probable Cuban intentions and also on the difficulties of armed invasion of the island. He added that © in any case, the difficulties can be expected to increase in the next one to five years. a Mr. Harvey. reported on the interrogation of recent exfiltrees, with emphasis on their statements that some resistance elements exist in seven areas, ’ Answering Mr. Rusk's question, General Lemnitzer said that the U.S. has the capability of blockading Cuba completely. He added that the chiefs consider Cuba a threat to the U.S. and the Hemisphere now and in the future. ~~ a The following requests emerged from this discussion: a. Defense and CIA analysts should jointly consider all available evidence, particularly photographic; bearing on supporting military facilities, including any underground ones. PROPERTY OF . THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HY 50955 Docld: 327423483 Page 50 ~ , ; ’
b, A study should be made of the time and resources * required to put a complete blockade into effect. Ce CIA should compile the numbers of individuals who are now traveling into Cuba from other countries in the Hemisphere, d. Defense/JCS should examine the possibility of establishing “patrol posts" in the Caribbean, manned by personnel from one or several countries; particular attention should be given to the possibility of such an establishment, to be purely U.S., in Haiti, so as to guard against any invasion attempt of that country from Cuba, 3. Mr. McCone said that the current schedule of covert actions can be met, but. he suggested that perhaps it should be speeded up even though this would entail increased dangers of attribution to the U.S. He added that the present restrictions on attribution present difficulties with respect to training agents and to supply missions. Mr. MecCone also questioned whether complete success within the current covert framework would lead to the desired result. Mr. Rusk urged that efforts be continued to explore the possibilities of defection or subversion of key individuals-in the Castro regime, and that efforts be made to induct Cuban exiles into the U.S. armed forces... (Mr. McNamara agreed that. the latter could and should be done.) yet In answer to the Secretary of State's question as to the adequacy of existing policy approvals, General Lansdale said it would be useful to have approval to go further with infiltrated agents than Vv restricting them to intelligence missions. It was agreed that, within the framework of present understandings, the numbers of personnel to be infiltrated could be stepped up. In this connection, it was noted . however that it will be difficult if not impossible to maintain motiva- tion and morale indefinitely, without at least the implied promise of eventual action by the U.S, 4. The Secretary of State said that, at this time, he can see no way in which an organized invasion of Cuba could be justified; on the other hand, this should not be taken as an excuse to cease activity against the Castro regime. lle, supported by the Secretary of Defense, took the position that the U.S, should "play for the breaks," and should take necessary steps so as to get into a position which would afford the U.S, a maximum number of choices of action. In this connection, he and Mr. McNamara suggested that the current target PROPERTY Ut ‘ , SE OFFICE HW 50955 Docld:32493483 Page 51 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFI
r= © Fg D aI ae ea b= 7 August 1962 LUAAOD COVERT ACTIVITIES “ William K. Harvey, CLA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states: I. SITUATION: A. The purpose of this plan is to outline. the action which would _be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action ''b'' in General Lansdale's memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962. B. The intelligence estimate for the periad of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62. mele Tot, fe C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are eb gee tha % yore ty { ' made: ( ake hie 1. Conclusion #D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.) — ee i. vlan aan | 7 i |J— 2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force. 3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open resistance and through fortuituous circum- stances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated ona ‘time table" basis. II. MISSION: "Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment" oO oe ext bay Go ok ws TOP SECRET SENSITIVE THE WHITE Hyboe UFFICL HY. 50955 Docld:324934683 Page 52 —~
Ill. TASKS: A. Political: ‘1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop, active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the ‘overthrow of Castro. e weer TGA 2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, —_— leaders, and political groups.. 3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban _—— political groups as appropriate. 4. Develop contacts in the ''power centers" of the Cuban. government as a possible means of splitting the regime. ee ne ate 5. Induce the population to engage in militant mass action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and ee vel ‘ —) (7 “\. sabotage. ; _—— B. Economic: . 1. ‘Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution. 2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. i No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical © facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics. 3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes. L— 4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread ,___ minor acts of sabotage. ' Cc. Resistance: .. 6 | revolt in the general population. WW 50955 Docld: 32429483 Page 53 ~ 2 1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and TOP s SECRET propery af SENSITIVE —_ a “¢ THE WHITE HOSS arriee
fog. | 3, ae ' feasible amounts a in potential r Posts, 7. Dd, Psycholo gical: 1. People to 2. . Recruit, train, cells in the major Cache arms, run raids against selecte telephone centrals, If feasible and authorized, Strengthen, ma resist Castro Discredit th TOP SECRET and supply small clandestine resistance cities and in other selected areas of Cuba. ammunition, and Other Supplies in maximum » in areag accessible to the resistance cells and esistance areas. g0vernment by hit ang cal G-2 offices, militia ments of the Cuban’ d targets such as lo etc. initiate an internal uprising. intain, and exploit the will of the Cuban -C Ommunism. e Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, . and elsewhere, E. l. Particular emphasis on a. b. dg. Populati e. ‘power Provide the ma Intelligence: ximum intelli the following: gence coverage of Cuba with Capabilities and intentions of the Castro gevernment,-~ Activities of Cuban G-2,. Soviet activities in Cuba, -* State of resistance including the tone and temper of the on. . a, , Militia morale. ress and strain among the ment, Locug of power and/or st centers" in the Cuban govern ore} aur S ty be fe . SENSITIVE Pr & PROPERLY or YE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE cy . i \ “HW S0955 Daocld: 327423483 Page 54° —
om TOP SECRI ES IV. IMP LEMENTATION: To undertake the above listed tasks, and carry out the following program sion of the current program, particu CIA would be required to develop (which constitutes a substantial expan- larly in fields other than intelligence). A. Intelligence (FI): The curr and expanded. No additional policy approv ing types of a 1. spotting /recruiting/training of lega in Cuba or in maintenance critical as polic 2. spotting /recruiting/ training of third c ent build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified als are needed. The follow - ctions will be maximized: lly established Cubans Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and — of reliable, secure coramunications will become more e state controls increase. ountry nationals _ resident in Cuba. . ; potential acc problem. ) population. propaganda essential: \ "od ST operation, ‘approval to HY 30955 Docld:324273483 Page 55 3, Spotting/recruiting /train 4, Expansion of communications intell in the G-2, police, B. Psycholo gical Warfare The program must primarily con in "high noise 1. The establishme located in Southern Florida or other ing of legal travelers who have _. ess to significant information. igence, particularly and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA (CA): centrate on and reach the Cuban It will have to provide aggressive and provocative as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage level types of propaganda operations calling for work dad other forms of militant mass slow-downs, sabotage, an 4 stoppages, . - action and widespread overt resistance is required. . The following psychological warfare activities are considered nt of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba appropriate area. When this is in the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy establish this is required. ‘Top SECRET SENSITIVE  pRoPERTY OF OSL THE WaTe ROUSE orFl —_ \ is ck
ye | TOP SECRET 2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching ” operations. 1 1 ” rue . oe 3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet ye dropping operations using U. S. and other contract crews. |. pe cul , 4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required. 5. Continuation and expansion of the "Voice of Cuba" submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy. - 6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers. 7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba. Cc. Paramilitary: To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited.’ - &xperience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining "black teams'' in the target country for an.indefinite period, nor has any q method yet been devised by which infiitrated ''black teams" can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the ‘ PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide 'the spark of hope.'' Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents. ' . To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential: 1. Commando/Raider Teams - Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral ‘caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, andhitand run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen | these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either \ i) ' TOP SECRE er SENSITIVE kt . | PRORLEIY: We pone ra ae ' . & UN ns THE WHHITE HiGUSE OF FINE “< Pada aed HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 56
HY 0955 Docld: 324273483 Page 57 as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated - that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that ot could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable period. They should have a minimum of four-months training , for ‘which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non- -Cuban “contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel. 2. Urban Resistance Cells - Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small "legal'' compartmented g P resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the "legal'' residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting, casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any major uprising). A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising. a It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals. 3. Rural Resistance Cells - Three to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small "legal" compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until — 7 called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that. Va twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of. the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors. 4. Guerrilla - Five to cight man teams equipped with W/T a oo . pp ‘communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, (Ve 6 TOP SECRET oa ~ PROPERTY OF: THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE a “ Ls ae PRL 3
HY 0955 t EE - TOP SECRET recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) “Whit and run’ guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psy- chological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four -months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time. f. 4 5. Cuban Exile Forces - The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the & Ve al maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements 7 should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or proups to permit the formation of a ''Cuban Freedom Fighi' under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the ''Cuban Freedom Fighter! groups. Additional Policy approval | is required. ee a Oo. Infiltration/Exfiltration - The increased Cuban cefensive ‘capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including: - a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability. b. Submarines and other naval craft. c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and . aircraft. . _Additional policy approval is required. ; TOP SECRET SENSITIVE | - apapeRt: 38 Ae TEee io 5s ed Docld:32423483 Page 58 7
. round Support: Three including all instruction an Separate training facilities d Support, . a. Site a ~ ©°mmando/raidey training Provide. a four “month training Course on a repetitive - basis for *PPToximately 100 men. . b, Site B . -Specia] Forces type training asad ; . : - Provide four ~month Course on a repetitive basis, Fifty men per course, Co C. Sitec . Special] Forces type ‘raining Provide four-m na repetitive basis ; Fift e =e . 2 Naval Support: Estimate . & to ten nd of 1963 the requirement By the e ntially higher. b, Submarine Tadio broadcasts - "Voice of Free Cuba" C. Naval Surface Craft SUDport may be Fequired at a later date but Cannot be Predicted noy d, Installation CIA SUPply base atorin PFOximity to Boca Chica Naval Air Station, €. Use of Guantanamo Nav including Infilt COnnaissance, uban agents ang SUSPects 3 Air Support: a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in }; ‘Supplement U.S, contract STeWS,. provide crews and aircraft TOP SecRer SENSIT] VE PROPERTY of page 59" : 13242735483 Pag DocId:32 HW 50955 DB.
for aerial re~supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially _estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by _ January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could sub- stantially increase. b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements. 4. Personnel: Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to ‘provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support. , -B. From USIA and Federal Communications Commission: Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter. VI. POLICY APPROVALS REQUIRED: The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program: , A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare’ operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance. B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by Radio Free Cuba. . Cc. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching. D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping. EB. ' Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeted against Cuban indus try and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, trans-~ portation, and communications. Fe Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration. G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated. — ; TOP SECRET | PROPERTY OF eric SENSITIVE THE WHITE HOUSE OFF | Que me . RP Oy HW 50955 Docld:32473483 Page 60 ~~
HW 450955 TOP SECRET H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities. I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re- supply /infiltration/exfiltra- tion missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews. | J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men Foren I eet purposes. from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of ''Cuban Freedom Fighters. " : K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational ‘VIL. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA: A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Opera- tion Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600. B. Estimated Budget: L Bocld: 32423483 ' Fiscal Year 1963 - $40,000, 000 Fiscal Year 1964 - $60,000, 000 (exclusive of reirnburse- Page 61 ment for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis.) io - ‘ “ a ‘ } z oy SENSITIVE: | PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF FICE
on . IU? debit CB SERSTTHY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C. -OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy ‘SUBJECT - : CIA Action in Response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181 1. In response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 181, the following CIA officers are designated as the respon- sible officers for items in which action is assigned to CIA. Item 2. _ Mr. Seymour R. Bolten Item 4. | Mr. William K. Harvey or in his absence, Mr. Bruce B. Cheever Item 5. Mr. Ray Cline 2. Lhave directed the following actions to be initiated: A. The CIA/Cuban Task Force will follow up with Pentagon representatives to determine the Department of Defense attitude or action on the Secretary of State's suggestion made at — the 23 August meeting regarding the removal of restrictions on mounting operations out of - the Guantanamo Base. B. | The Board of National Estimates will establish "a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and types of Communist Bloc oo personnel entering Cuba, quantity and types OB a of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and TR all construction, particularily missile sites. oS) TEAL (U? SECRET - . ngs ate , ? TS 173282 Copy 1 ae ey tae . . teh ew aye HW 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 62 SQ rr ene ar ini . tga lait! . ware. a or ee . . : : St caanenin ons nachhainds Uate iti melt x antnanertans aie neei-aiatiaenen ake ay : . ‘ oe . - $ 4
wae Be . HW 50955 DocId: 324293483 Page 63_ TOP SECRET “SENSITIVE The Board of National Estimates will prepare an assessment of the physical and psychological dangers to the United States and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba. CIA will institute . immediately a daily publication on Cuban developments to include current intelli-- gence reporting, substantiating evidence, estima- tive assessments, and coverage of domestic and foreign press. This publication will be distributed ‘to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Secretary McNamara, Mr, Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, Secretary Rusk, General Taylor, and the Attorney General. _CIA will arrange intelligence collection overflights. of Cuba as frequently as the situation demands. The CIA/Cuban Task Force is now working on a plan of operations which will be supplementary to the course of action already approved by the . Special Group (Augmented). _ This plan of opera- tions will approximate the line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE in Plan B Plus. en ans, Cede Marshall S. Carter. Lt. General, USA Acting Director 10? , SECRET | eo : : toatl SASTVE = ies
os a - Gry ae ._—_™~ - % ; : ‘ fa id y o Yroretalia oF ae ; oy Se ap ol Centra lateltfens Deh. an poroglbie toe Sehd Sn bp Ben oo, fa tne A Cole feornen acnidnst . . & i. wom By 7 = - pect eZ Es. feqhe » Fas sitoas . a 4 . a CEPR! to a. re -Luabees od fe Vet ik | Hacera,. - ore tT wre foe ers Oo ah uh iv |. PROPERTY OF | | - _ oo ' THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE | ne | re Hi O95 A, Docld: 32423483 Page 64 :
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HY 0955 Docld: 32423483 Page 66 . SENSITIVE Operation MONGOOSE 17 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) SUBJECT: Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from General Carter, dated 16 October 1962 3 As agreed at yesterday's meeting, Mr. Bundy discussed the above-mentioned memorandum with higher authority today. The decisions are as follows: 1. Paragraph d. of the subject memorandum is dis- approved. This disapproval extends to any activity intended to | capitalize on even the notional existence of materiel of the kind described. 2. Paragraph b. is approved with the addition of the words "Bloc or Cuban" inserted before "shipping and port facilities."t 3. Paragraph h. is approved with the addition of "Bloc" _ before the words "oil tanker." 4. All other proposals are approved as listed. Thomas A. Parrott. Copies: 1 - Mr. Bundy . 5 - Mr. Kennedy 2.- Mr. Johnson .- 6 = General Taylor _ falos- 3 - Mr. Gilpatrict kitrongs yi le3- le (7 = Chief of Operations — Cy dieting o lle — 4 . .--Mr. McCone - 6 PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFice
on ne i dan ii | THE WHITE HOUSE 14 . wer i, may, WASHINGTON / January 4, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR “THE PRESIDENT Subject: Further organization of the Government for dealing with Cuba On your oral instructions conveyed by General Clifton, Ihave met | with an interdepartmental group to try to work out an improved arrangement for our handling of Cuban policy and action in 1963, The time is ripe for such a reorganization, because we seem to be wind- ing up the negotiations in New York, the prisoners are out, and there is well nigh universal agreement that Mongoose,is ata dead end. The . people with whom I have been working are: Vance, Yarmolinsky and General Wheeler as delegates for McNamara and Gilpatric; Nick Katzenbach as a delegate of Bobby; Pat Carter from CIA; and Alexis Johnson and Ed Martin from State Department, The following paragraphs represent my personal sense of what we. - have worked out together, and while there may be some small dif- ferences of point of view or need for revision, Ithink they are ripe -. _for your consideration. mS , 1, The first guiding principle is that final policy responsibility should remain with you, working with the Executive Committee when necessary. There is no point pretending that-major Cuban policy decisions can be made anywhere else than in the White House, and your own executive role, supplernented by the Executive Committee when there are major policy issues or interdepartmental difficulties, | is indispensable. | 2. The more complicated matter is where to put day-to-day coordinat- ing responsibility.’ After considerable discus sion, the unanimous consensus is that we should locate this responsibility in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, working as a deputy to Ed Martin in the State Department and acting as chairman of an interdepartmental group on Cuba. The.Coordinator would be responsible to Dean Rusk and - Ed'Martin for departmental business, and, under thet guidance, to HY 4S0954 Docld: 32423483 Page 67
you and the Executive Committee for. interdepartmental coordination. Nothing. in his authority would supplant the responsibility of other operating departments for management of their own assigned tasks,. or their right to be consulted beforé their resources are committed; but it would be clear that you and the Executive Committee were looking to the Coordinator and his interdepartmental committee for effective execution of your policy decisions. In ordinary circum-~ stances, the necessary coordination will be carried out. effectively by good will and good sense on all sides. When there is an honest difference that cannot be resolved it will, of course, have to come upstairs one way or another. . The key to this administrative organization is, of course, the indi- vidual appointed as coordinator, The recommendation of the State ‘Department is that Sterling Cottrell should be given this job. He has been doing a very solid and constructive job as head of the Vietnamese Task Force, and he is due for reassignment to Latin American Affairs, which turn out to be his preferred professional field, beth by ex-._ perience and by interest. He has the necessary professional seniority. in the Department, and high interdepartmental acceptance. He has worked well with the White House staff,. If this arrangement should be approved, the Cuban desk of the Depart- ment would be absorbed in a new, higher level Office of Cuban -Affairs under Cottrell, with Bob Hurwitch as his deputy. Hurwitch has done a very able job within the Department, but he is a little junior for a major job of interdepartmental coordination. At the same time, Cottrell would be expected to find and appoint a deputy co- ordinator, to be based in Miami, to handle day-to-day relations with Cuban refugees and with interested agencies of Government on the spot. Bill Orrick has been asked to expedite effective interdepart- mental administrative support, as necessary, for both the Coordinator’ ‘and the Miami office. 3. Ifa Coordinator for Cuban Affairs is established, then we think the Mongoose office should be disbanded and responsibility for covert operations. should be a part of the work of the Coordinator and his : associates from other departments, reporting on covert activities to the Special Group (5412) in the normal way. The Special Group HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 63 ~
~3.- would in turn be guided by broader policy as established by you through ~ the Executive Committee, The covert aspects of our Cuban enterprise are not the most important ones, at present, and they need to be handled in the wider context of an open Cuban policy, centered ina. visible office of Cuban Affairs, Sucha change would liberate General Lansdale for many other tasks in which his services are uniquely valuable, 4, The problem of organization is of coursé less than half the battle: what we really need is to sort out our policies toward Cuba. There are a number of loose ends, large and small, of which the following are samples: a. The shipping orders and the broader question of economic pressure on Cuba are still unsettled, , Executive Orders have been prepared along the lines of your press conference state-. ment, but they are being held up, as I think Dean Rusk has explained to you, pending discussion with OAS and other Allies, The State Department will take any public rap for this delay. b. The organization and handling of refugees needs restudy. We.need a much more open and continuous communication with refugee leaders, and we need clarification of the opportunities to be offered to Cuban volunteers, whether or not they are veterans of the brigade. If we can manage it, we need to geta stronger process of , representation of free Cubans, c. We should intensify our investigation of ways and means _of communicating with possibly dissident members of the Castro regime, perhaps including even Fidel himself. _ Donovan, for ex- ample, has an invitation to be Castro's. guest at the beach of. Veradero, . and there is work to be done also in our relations with men like Manolo Ray. -d, The role of intelligence officers needs to be redefined, The very large commitment of the CIA to Mongoose activities should be reexamined, and probably substantially reduced, and the role of CIA as an apparent spokesman and agent of the United States Govern- ment in Cuban affairs should probably be reduced still further -- —_ HW 50955 Docld:32473463 Page 69
HY although this in no sense reflects on the Agency, which has been trying to do what it was told to do. e. The political, psychological, and personal aspects of the effort to isolate Castro's Cuba should be pursued intensively in the OAS, We do not want Cuba to be a hemispheric training © ground for Communists, and we have not exhausted our weapons here, f. We need to keep up a continuous “and high-level barrage ‘of public statements explicitly defending our rights of surveillance. You said on television that the camera will be our best inspector _and this position should be energetically sustained. §0955 DBactd: g. The question of Pan American flights should be re- viewed. My own view, which Ed Martin shares, is that it is probably to our advantage to have such flights, and that Juan Trippe should not be allowed to get away with poor-mouthing on the cost to Pan American. Over the long run this franchise is of the highest im- portance to Pan American, and nothing I have heard about their marginal losses is very impressive. 5. It would help to have your general reaction to these matters by . Monday. If you approve, we could put the organization into effect at once and have a preliminary discussion of the substantive issues by Cottrell's people with the Executive Committee before the end of next week. hes. McG. B. — 324954683 Page 70 -~-4- , oo Ly
" —_ i - nk THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON SECRET Remarks of President Kennedy to the National Security Council Meeting of January 22, 1963 | , ‘The President began his discussion of national security problems by calling attention to the worldwide responsibilities of the United States. While we fully recognize our responsibilities, other states are not carrying their fair share of the burden, * Cuba The major lesson of the Cuban crisis, the President said, was the . paramount importance of timing. Both sides, the United States and the USSR, need sufficient time to consider alternative courses of action. Our objective was and is to protect our national interests . while trying to avoid a nuclear exchange which, if it happened, would be a defeat for both sides. In handling crises, it is important that the Russians have cnough time to debate their action. If they are forced to react in an hour or two, they may react ina spasm and resort to nuclear war. We, too, looking back on the quarantine vs. air strike decision, took several days to discuss and understand the ‘advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives, The reason for building up NATO conventional forces is to gain greater control over the timing of a showdown in Europe provoked by the Russians. The President pointed out that we must always be in a position to threaten Cuba as a possible riposte to Russian pressure against us in Berlin. We must always be ready to move immediately against -Cuba in the event we decide such action would be a more effective xesponse to a Soviet initiative than a nuclear response. We can use Cuba to limit Soviet actions in the way the Russians use Berlin _ to limit our actions. Western Europe Turning to Europe, the President recalled that de Gaulle's current policy is no different than that he has been advocating since 1958 when he first proposed to President Eisenhower a U.S. - U.K. - France directorate giving France, in ‘effect, a veto on our use of nuclear weapons. The suggestion was turned down because it would have broken up NATO, This Administration agrees it was a correct HW 50955 DBocld: 32423433 Page fin
HW 509455. Doclda: 324273483 Page 72 SECRET ~-2- . —_ , Ke A decision. .The turndown of de Gaulle's proposal was not, however, the reason why he is bchaving as he nowis. Even if we had given France nuclear weapons, de Gaulle would have tried to restore France toa predominant position in Europe. For years, in speeches and in his memoirs, ‘de Gaulle has expressed his view that France must be a ‘dominant power speaking to the USSR and the West as an equal, dependent on no one, . - In analyzing de Gaulle! Ss pr esent actions, the President said de Gaulle did not question our support of Europe. The proof that he does not fear we would desert him is the deployment of only a small number of French troops opposite the Russians in Germany. He relies on our power to protect him while he launches his policies based solely on the self-interest of France. Having been turned down by the U.S. and U.K. on the directorate, de Gaulle, turned to Germany. This helps to keep Germany from looking to the Russians. It does threaten NATO which de Gaulle strongly opposes. | . As to the Common Market, the President said that if Great Britain joined, Europe would be strengthened and stabilized. We favor the U.K. joining even though it will cost the U.S, considerable trade. If France keeps Britain out, this will be a setback for us but a more severe setback for the U.K. Our interest, the President continued, is to strengthen the NATO multilateral force concept, even though de Gaulle is opposed, because a multilateral force will increase our influence in Europe and provide. a way to guide NATO and keep it strong. We have to live with de Gaulle. One way to respond is to strengthen NATO and push for a multilateral — nuclear force which will weaken de Gaulle's control of the Six. We should not be overly distressed because the problems caused by de Gaulle are not crucial in the sense that our problems in Latin . America are. U.S. Trade Negotiations The President then summarized the guidelines for forthcoming trade negotiations, In-+the present situation, we must be very carcful to protect U.S, interests. Our balance of payments problem is serious, it is not now under control, and it must be righted at the latest by the end of 1964. If we do not do so, there will be pressure against the dollar and Congress will be demanding reductions in our foreign programs. SECRET aed
make the sub-continent of Asia strong. Even under present -against us. SECRET ~3- _ Me One effort we must make, the President continued, is to seck to prevent European states from taking actions which make our balance of payments problem worse. For example, we maintain large forces -in Germany. We must firmly oppose West Germany if it increases y y OPP y its agricultural production to our detriment. We have not yet reached the point of wheat against troops but we cannot continue to pay for the military protection of Europe while the NATO states are not pay- ing their fair share and living off the "fat of the land."' We have been very generous to Europe and it is now time for us to look out for our- selves, knowing full well that the Europeans will not do anything for us . simply because we have in the past helped them. No longer dependent on the U.S. for economic assistance, the European states are less subject to our influence, If the French and other European powers acquire a nuclear capability they would be in-a position to be entirely independent and we might be on the outside looking in. We must exploit our military and political position to ensure that our economic interests. are protected. Attitude Toward Neutrals. De . Referring to criticism by those who say we are treating neutrals as: favorably as allies, the President said he did not believe such criti- cism was sound but we shouldn't be over-confident ourselves, For example, the Pakistanis oppose our giving military assistance to . the Indians. Despite the fact that the Pakistanis are our allies, , 4 we must recognize the importance of India. If the Indians joined the Chinese, we would have no free South Asia. Our aim is to Denese Sanne re Indian leadership, we can work with India just as we must use our ally Pakistan to achieve our aim of keeping the sub-continent out of © the Communist camp. We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutrals to join the Communist bloc. ‘Therefore, we must: keep our ties to Nasser and other neutralists even if we do not like many things. they do because, if we lose them, the balance of power could swing: Assistance to Foreign Countries The President said he wanted to make clear that we are giving aid to foreign countries in order to increase the security of the United | States -- not primarily for humanitarian reasons. AID programs _ should be tested against the contribution they make toward improving SECRET t HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 737
HW 450955 SECRET ~ 4 or. our national security. Recalling that the military could always get ‘Congress to appropriate funds for military assistance, the Presi-~ dent asked that Defense Department officials help sell Congress on economic assistance. Some Congressmen will try to cut the heart out of the AID program. Should they succeed, we would be in real danger. A major effort is required to prevent this, We must make every effort to keep countries out of the Communist bloc.’ Oncea country is in, we know from experience that it is very difficult to get it out, ‘We cannot risk the possibility of four or five countries suddenly turning Communist just because we did not give them economic and military aid. An outside group is now reviewing the existing AID program for the purpose of ensuring that our assistance to foreign countries will best serve our own national interest. s Domestic Issues In introducing his remarks on domestic issues, the President empha~ sized the major effort which has been made to hold down the budget. - deficit now estimated at about $12 billion. The current budget shows increases only for defense, space and the fixed charge of interest.on _the national debt, Our cconomic growth rate over the past ten years, he continued, has been too slow, particularly in view of the great increase in our population, , We must avoid another recession which would endanger our gold. position and have a bad psychological effect on the American people% In. comparison with the Russians who are making a major effort to improve their domestic economy, we must not give the impression. of just drifting lest other states draw the conclusion that we cannot deal with our domestic economic problems. An unbalanced budget as such is not worrisome cspecially when we realize that our present deficit is a reflection of the hot and cold war we have bcen fighting during the past fifteen years. The new | tax bill is very important in this respect because if it is passed by the Congress we. will be in much better shape. It is unnecessary to point out that all these matters, AID, defense, economic growth and the tax program are all related. If we become SECRET DoclTd: 32423483 Page 74...
HW 450955 Docla: 327493483 Page 75 7 SECRET | 5 - | “Su weaker economically, our influence abroad will be reduced. I£ this happens, the entire Free World position weakens. Itis basic to our national security to have a strong domestic economy. Defense Problem s . Recalling recent decisions limiting or halting certain military pro-~ grams, c.g. the B-70, Skybolt, and Nike~Zeus, the President said we are going forward with large defense and space programs. If the necessity develops, we will do even more, but there is a Limit to how much we can do, ™ One of our big tasks is to persuade our colleagues in Europe to in- crease their defense forces. If we are to keep six divisions in: Europe, the European states must do more. Why should we have in Europe supplies adequate to fight for ninety days when the European forces around our troops have only enough supplies to fight for two or three days? Our forces in Europe are further for~ ward than the troops of de Gaulle. who, nstead of committing his divisions to NATO, is banking on us to defend him by maintaining’ our present military position in Europe. While recognizing the 7 military interests of the Free World, we should consider very hard the narrower interests of the United States. Test Ban Negotiations The President reviewed the background of the current negotiations ‘with the USSR on a test ban treaty. Our primary purpose in trying to get a treaty with Russia is to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese Communists, We will have a difficult time protecting the free areas of Asia if the Chinese get nuclear weapons, A test ban including only the USSR, the British, and the U.S. would not be very meaningful except in regard to the Chinese problem which the Russians are believed to be as concerned | ‘ about as'we are. If we get a treaty we think we can live with, all of © us must support it in order to overcome Congressional opposition which undoubtedly will develop. - Concluding his remarks,: the President thanked the assembled officers for their cooperation, commented on the harmonious relations which exist among the Departments. and Agencies, and expressed the hope — that during the coming year we could build on the solid foundation ' which now exists. SECRET
RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL 3 April 1963 eo . MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD a ; SUBJECT: Meeting on Cuba pyre artes PRESENT: The President, the Attorney General, Secretary Vance, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Martin, Mr. Hurwitch, c ; fist Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Calefano © ” 1. The President asked Mr. FitzGerald whether the exile raids accomplish anything worthwhile. The latter replied that he thought they do not accomplish anything except perhaps to bolster morale : of the exiles; on the other hand the effect on people still in Cuba i can be counterproductive to some degree. The President said that i he does not object to these raids if they really strike worthwhile targets ‘rather than the "froth" which their acts to date have a bles represented. He/added that he had no objection to raids from the a sea unless they were directed at Soviet ships. He also said we , > cannot condone the holding of press conferences by the exiles after ne such raids. uo 2. Mr. FitzGerald gave a summary of the results of agent oo ; t operations to date. He noted that failures in black operations have . : been due to weather, lack of reception, hostile activities in the area, and mechanical failures; only three failures have been due to refusal of the agents to continue. He emphasized the fact that the Cubans are very good at counterinsurgency--that is putting down resistance groups-~but not very good at sophisticated counterintelligence operations. He noted that there has been no particular trouble in recruiting agents, but that it is not always possible to match the qualifications and experience of these operatives with desired targets. Mr. FitzGerald added that the classic Communist "block system" is - particularly effective in uncovering illegal residents. 3. The President: asked whether sabotage operations are now underway. Mrs. Bundy pointed out that they are not, because the Special Group had decided=-based to a considerable extent on the difficulties. encountered in mounting the mine operation--that such activity is not worth the effort expanded on it, in relation to the results that could be obtained in the intelligence field. The latter has: been considered to have priority and to be more practicable. Mr. Martin added that it had also been felt that sabotage by itself was not particularly productive and that it should be done primarily in conjunction with other activities.
" RETYPED FROM INDISTINCT ORIGINAL -~-2- In answer. to the President's question, a number of people said that acts of sabotage might have some beneficial results from the U. S. point. of view, both from the standpoint of the intrinsic economic damage that might be done, and also for the psychological - effect of making it evident that internal resistance to Castro exists. (In the latter connection, Mr. FitzGerald made the point that recent : exfiltrees have said that there is now no organized resistance inside oo Cuba.) 4. In answer to the Attorney General's question, Mr. Fitzgerald . i. said that immediate plans are primarily based on obtaining fuller 7 intelligence coverage of the island, with emphasis on filling in Sa ‘existing geographic gaps. He said that perhaps the most important question in this context is whether time is on our side or on Castro's, and added that the Board of National Estimates is currently investi- gating this question. Mr. FitzGerald added that in his opinion there is no chance of a successful civilian uprising against Castro because of the strength of Castro's security measures, but that we are hopeful of accomplishing penetrations of the military establishment; on the other hand, it is doubtful whether any such contacts would be willing to communicate among themselves, for fear of provocation. 5. The Attorney General asked whether it might not be useful to | consider commando-type raids by groups of from 100 to 500 men. Mr. © ; FitzGerald pointed out that if such groups could be landed it would : probably be impossible for them to survive for any length of time. : Mr. Bundy added that under these circumstances we would then have to face the problem of whether the U. S. would actually back up these men. The Attorney General urged, in any case, that CIA survey all possibilities | _ for aggressive action in Cuba over the next six months, assuming that the Agency could be given a free rein to proceed. ' 6. The President summed up the meeting by directing the following: a. The intelligence estimate on Castro's probable future oo ber strength should be completed as soon as possible. at b. CIA should examine exactly what might be accomplished in the field of sabotage during the next six months. c. A meeting should be held next week to ‘review the pro- posed sabotage progran.. (Signed) Thomas A. Parrott Thomas A. Parrott Distribution - . ae CIA - 2 cys | ae State - lcy. Defense - lcy
TT ee meme ct + tenon tm dhe tate a ee ca Cs err ee te Bee cas g owes pure she wp ‘UY April 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meecing of the Specig 1 Group, 11 April 1963 PRESENT:. Mr. Bundy, Mr, Johnson, Mr. McCone 4 Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley > were present for Items ] ~ 3, Mr. FitzGerald WAS present for Item 4. . oo Powe 4. Cuban Operations — ee a . . Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the Paper of 9 April, Siving. ; So * & Summary of the recent results in cha agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next monch, The Group . Approved chis Projection.’ In Tesponse CoO a question about the status . of Manolo Ray's people, Mr, FitzGerald said thac CIA was in Couch wich him from time fo time, and chac any plan he has to offer for activicy . Co against Cuba will de sympathetically Tec@ived, bur that he has noc to —— date coe up with any such Proposal, . The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dared ll. April, 2 - onthe three papers being considered at today's meeting were noced, ‘ : The Group requested thar these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for Security reasons, With specific reference to tho cenmoant thar a - proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the Carget dace of the 20th or 2lsct of April, Mr, FitzGerald POinced oue thar this date : had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known, Re said thar of course no activity of this Kind would be allowed to -interfere with those: nevotiations at this stage, There then ensucd a lengchy discussion of the entire question of * Sabotage, The Group agreed that che papers before it CO requests which had been levied on CTA to come up with general. and: “specifle Propusals., On the other hand, all wembers of the Croup , recounized thac a Searching examination muse he undertaken in the lighe Were responsive nye ee PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOLES OreiCk oe 9800 HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 78
HY Particularly in view of the recently- of all percinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed thar in order co provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc, With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile ¢ it was agreed that this sort of activicy poses a real dilemma. enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficuls to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S, of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling, the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in che operations. Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage onrerations, to include training, until an over-all policy igs made clear on steps to be taken to assure the re- moval of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also com- mented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and thé fact thac they trould ‘undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second pointe, but fele char chese particular Cubans are perhaps more ‘effective than the usual run, “It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a pre- sentation should be made to higher authority at which cime all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be preoared, for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity. which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fic into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the prepuration of this paper. — , QT od ree gtk 4, groups, is thus placed in.the position ouclining::a proposed broad program 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 79
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY April. 1], 1963. ~ . ore MEMORANDUM For: Mr. Bundy | Ney SUBJECT: Cuba --'Polic a olicy | to hurt Castro by varying degrees of Overt and covert nastiness, We have not yet looked seriously at the other Side of the coin -- quietly — enticing Castro Over to us, - a - 2. Ifthe sweet approach turned out to be feasible and, in turn, successful, the benefits would be Substantial, In the Short run, we would Probably be able to neutralize at least 2 of our Main worries about Castro .- the reintroduction of offensive missiles and Cuban .8ubversion, [ny the long runs, we would be able to work on eliminating. 3. While the Practical obstacles to this sort of @PProach may be immense, they may not be insuperable, Two such Obstacles are oe i are under control, that the Russian Presence in Cuba is reduced and that Castro is much More a nationalist than | a Communist, the selling job necessary fora careful, (b) Castro's Reluctance to be Enticed ~~ This may be an cCasier nut to Crack now than it Once would have been, Castro may have received, from Our point of view, some very valuable — education Over the past couple years, Hopefully, he has learned that the Russians are not as tough and reliable ag he thought they were and that we are a lot tougher and nastier than he thought we were; also hopefully, he is Scared,. ' i i TOP SECR ET - EYES ONLY a EVES ONLY 4 ' 3483 Page 8o-— ~ Docld: 3242341 Hi -30455 -- |
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY Our present nasty policy is probably a necessary prelude to a sweet approach. The more we can (1) scare Castro and (2) demonstrate to him that the Bloc is either unwilling or unable to fill his security and ' economic requirements, the more amenable Castro probably will be to a new approach. In this regard, perhaps the worst thing we can do is to let our nasty policy ease off without a particular objective in | sight. 4 TLunderstand that, in-the near future, the President will be looking | at some more violent solutions to the Cuban problem, It might be interesting if, at roughly the same time, he could have a look ata feasibility study on a policy turn-around. is still premature ? HW 50955*.Docld:327473453 Page a1-- Do you think this timing for such a study is right? Or do you think it Gordon Chase ee we rae owen sg ee
"18 April 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963. PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johngon, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone The Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item 1. l. Cuban Operations , ; Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the -meetiny tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, che proposed sabotaye actions for April will be cancelled and two caching operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The Group approved this. , ir, FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative decision on balloons, he was proposing Co dismantle the capability, which is expensive to keep in being. fe said chat if it were desired to start che program up at any time after dismantling, it would take about three months. -A number of members of the Group felt that in a ‘real crisis balloons could be of considerable valuc. Accordingly. it was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with che idea that if a situation sliould arise’ in which balloons would be use- ful, launching could be accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying - too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting on. his opposition to che earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an inte,rated program. The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Co-. ordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16th, L7ch, and 18th. It was noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully. . In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted che Office of National Estimates of CLA to review the papers, in light of their estimative content. It was thus agreed that the papers should be staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr. Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper which would be prefaced by che culdelincs currently contained in the Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various types, and then recommendations. Sn eT Heater arts oe PROPERTY OF — THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE HW 50955 Docld:32493483 Page @2
HW 450955 Mr. Bundy and Me. MeCone expressed some doubts as co whecher we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer piccure of what che over-all policy toward Cuba is’ likely co be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of ‘these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date, and he fele-thac we muse decide whether we are willing to accept this. He added that he did not feel that such a deve lopment would necessarily be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level activicies prevailing now. He was not sure whether » or to what extent, it would be pessible ty embark on the activicies proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this connection, Mr. Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not generate a high noise level, , Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program' consists basically of sabotage and harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. Hie mentioned some of the difficulties thac would flow from Supporting one group and not others. Mr. McCone said thac if such groups become ; ‘ active, ic will be obvious that they have U.S. support beeause it is well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr. Bundy agreed cthac, despite che face chat some Central American governs ments minht be used as cutouts, the U.S. would be blamed for their , activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on such a course, They felt additionally that we must be sure that such. a program would contribute to over-all policy ‘objectives. Me. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that time is running in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald ‘said that some of these accivities are de signed ta slow down or possible stop the trend of events in his favor. | NS Te was. noted that the propyram for shipping sabotage,’ which has already been. approved, is in process of ‘possible implementation. fc was. agreed that this process should not be interrupted: . -~ ont ar ee Poet ne Seren os Mee PROPERTY OF ae THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE: Docld:32423483 Page &3 ess 4
i TOP SECRET Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Mecting No, 2/63, April 23, 1963, 5:00 PM -- Cuba The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled "A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives." , . Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would . produce a major change in Cuba, He expressed his firm view that Castro's position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a require- ment and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creat- ing such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.5, to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retalia- tion by the USSR on the West. Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro's position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from. now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could - provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban - economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve. Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the © ‘Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of | existing policy on the Castro regime, He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling. the Cuban economy, leading to | shortages, lack of spare parts, and even. sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was’no way to finance © Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds; had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut lowe from the USSR and not yet aided by the U.S, Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not TOP SECRET Docld: 324293483 Page g4
TOP SECRET -2- stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be. induced to give up his revolution. , The Attorney General proposed three studies: a. A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2. b. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months. OO c, A program to cause as much. trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months. Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression, He urged that our policy toward Cuba always. be kept in this ‘perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major im- portance to us. USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we necd promptly a state- ment of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba. ' Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba © we could live with if it wereno longer run by Castro or tied to. Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the guestion remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba, There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist ‘Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. - There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba. TOP SECRET HW 50955 Docta?32423483 Page 65 oo *
TOP SECRET -_ ~ 3,- Mr, Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows: r ae Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing. b. Agree on military responses. which we should make to con- tingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane, . c. .Develop a program to get rid of Castro. : . Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba. e. ’ A program to induce Soviet withdrawal, f. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow. ge A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba. Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a’regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro, 2 Bromley Smith HW 50955 Doold:32473483 Page 86
a ee THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TOP SECRET EYES ONLY -« . © . April 23, 1963 MEMORANDUM. FOR MR, BUNDY | SUBJECT: Cuba -- Policy I refer to your request that I look over the papers for the Standing Group . tL meeting and give you my comments. . 1, The covering memorandum is very stimulating, hits the gut issues and should provoke some much-needed thought and discussion on Cuba policy. - ‘Re ''Possible New Initiatives" on page 3 -- The implication oy of the bie ee courses of action is that only Course a is likely to gain our , pe ~ maximum objectives. While this is probably true, I'm not sure we can i — rule out all possibilities quite yet. For example, Course c could con- ceivably lead to the attainment of all possible U.S. objectives, ‘including the eventual overthrow of Castro. I think the first order of business is to figure out exactly what we want U.S. -Cuba relations to look like in X number of years, Assuming it we are not out for Castro's scalp for the sake of his scalp, is there a , Castro we can live with happily? If not, what is the best way. of getting - ome rid of him -- a tough, nasty approach, a sweet and sneaky approach, or - a combination of both (e.g. a two-stage plan)? If, on the other hand, there is a Castro we can live with, what are our terms of accommoda- tion? Are we more likely to get these terms by a tough or a sweet approach? 3, Re POL Blockade on page 3 -- Even assuming it would not . escalate into a shooting war, a POL blockade may not be a realistic pressuring device. It is my understanding that we would have to block- ade for three to six months before Castro would really hurt. This means. we would be under terrific world (and probably domestic) pressure for an ai awfully long time (e.g. newspapers depicting dying babies because the . power was cut off at the-hospital), Generally speaking, any nasty actions _ we contemplate should be of the ''short and sweet" variety. a - rm TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -- HW 50955 .Docld:32423483 Page 87 - et et gat eee
Ah tha ells indte caeelh e ‘tian arr Bethe an tones 4 Dee Docld:32493483 Page 88 TOP SECRET _ 2 - EYES ONLY 4. The Standing Group may also wish to focus hard on some of the policy approaches which we are now using and which we may want to continue using in the future, For example, is economic isolation of Cuba from the Free World likely to make Castro submit to our will? Or is a rupture in the Bloc/Cuba tie more promising? Is it possible to use both approaches at the same time? Or are we more likely to break the Bloc/Cuba tie if we back off from our policy of isolating Cuba economically from the Free World? . a a Gordon Chase TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY © —— WS t°
THE WHITE HOUSE ( i WASHINGTON . We oe TOP SECRET EYES ONLY | | - . ‘ April 29, 1963 4 AGENDA FOR MEETING OF THE STANDING GROUP ° an — TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 10:30 AM I have not been able to make special assignments to individual members of the group in this first week, but I have had helpful dis- cussions with several members, and I know that other members have had conversations with each other. What I hope we can do - tomorrow is to fill out the outline which follows of major areas of interest, and to:make preliminary decisions as to ways and mcans of petting forward with the necessary spade work. free 1. The possible use of contingencies £ for t the achievement: of wider political objectives. ~Tilustrations which come to mind here are: a. Interference with overflights. Bf (o) Possible death of Castros c. The occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary. - Coburn rs Cubes . : ? { dj Attr ibutable interference by Castro in other countries. | nw VSse Yoh Pam La, Co Reintroduction of offensive weapons. 2. Pr programs. which h might be initiated by the United States Government ' * ce rer 5 manren an ea with both ‘immoedia te ‘and long-run objectives. Examples s which come to mind are? 7 a f ho . a, Greater pr essure against the Soviet presence, perhaps by _ additional OAS resolutions and then naval action to inter rupt all military traffic to Cuba. : NN treg a 4» / ¢ “= oe [ the Expanded economic action, possibly including encourage- d ane | mont of cooperative sabotage on a much larger scale than | : Pon anything attempted up until now, Within this category additional ty possible gambits are of great interest to higher authority and it 4 it hoped that some may be offered, “ SENSE IVE - TOP SECRET EYES ONLY | ae a &. or na od to Qrrets raf, geben, Me Ge for pened HW 50955 Docld:@2423483 Page 892
b SENSITIVE -2- \ EYES ONLY TOP SECRET | | Moe ; (3. ‘The possible defection of Castro. This isa wholly separate a) -\ kind of undertaking and there seemed to be considerable agreement ' last week that it was not very promising, but it has been properly pointed out that it could be pursucd on a separate track while some or all-of the things proposed above were going on. . “t, Oe gener al agreement last week that this also is a matter of high importance and that it could be pursued independently of decisions in other categories. ee IN . 4. An information program for post- Castro Cuba, There was’ — g’ 4 - Documents which members may want to look at before the mecting aay are attached: Tab A: Draft intelligence estirnate of the situation in Cuba a year from now. Tab B: The first outline of an OAS Resolution about the Soviet . military presence. This item is of considerable present interest to higher authority. It is recognized that the dict here is relatively thin, but I think we can usefully spend one more mceting making sure that we have the elements of the problem in proper shape. before we go into more detailed work, } | McGeorge Bundy SENSITIVE - TOP SECRET EYES ONLY meee ee we ccc uesame owen emis Gk _ cout bowen oo. ' ware) eo . Ge . a —_ oe . ne ge tl zee HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 90
4 SESE MOTE SAE OE ae ore: eRe em; Pad. HW 50955 .. “ot ¥ a de trae . - we tee a ee tg Joe -. Sota, . rh re ee oe ote IR a alott,e ie ee al : cee re , teerey re - ¥ Ma 25 1963. De . fee nt oan : . * ‘ *. Mei -" oe , te ve & e siete y Wo gee $b Mle ab Go WS lea Tey ati te gan da 7 te, Whee: "he moDtiehe 1 ae ft gt . . . . ct ne Q “ettity ! . . a Sates > 3 ‘ Se Oe ae 2 TFs ARr ss MORANDUM FOR aw Per abnnry MEMBERS OF THE STANDING GROUP The following accignmento have been made ea a result of the discus sion in the Standing Group on Tuesdays April 50ths, l. There will be an examination of the possible developments tn Cuba if Castro were to. disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent ond will be available for dise- cussion at the mecting of the Standing Group on May 14th. 7 2. There will be an analysis of the possible use of contingencies. for the achievement of wider political objectives. This analysis will. be conducted under the dizection of Mr. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Paul — Nitze, and its first results will be available for discussion at they meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th. This first zenalysis will . provide: a. A detailed examination of possible action in the event: of interference with surveillance; and b. a more general assessment: of possibla use of other contingencies in Cuba or {n the waters around Cuba. 3, The Central Intelligence Agency will prepara a general paper on the possible forms of effective Interference with the economic life of Cuba by sabotage or other means. In particular, CIA wilh report on the ofl problem in relation to Cuba, itis hoped that a first report on this study may be available next week for distribution. 4, The Department of State will examine the possible use of the sugar market as a means of complicating the life of the Castro regime. It {s hoped that this study will be available next week. TOP SECRET EYES ONLY + SENSITIVE Docld: 32423483 Page 91
+4 / . 1 nt + ry . a oe _. 5. The principal tople of discugsion for the mecting of the Standing Group on May 7th will be the development ofa. 3. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba, and tho initial: lead tn the discussion will be taken by Mr. Wilson for USIA,. - Appropriate papers will be circulated before noon on Monday, me tt : roar’ De ape os oe arene. ~ ~ : aft oe ‘ 3 T an aed ag ‘ Sar % Re’ . ¥ A a ~ . é ‘ ae ran giver BR a O ear, ne _,, MeGeorge Bundy roo. vt Ve Le eg we ier : 5 * an > ty 73 a? eb bee ao ale ’ "ae * * pos - ~ ~ as . . . te a aoe ‘ “ ” aa boo * *, ah 3 ar < ‘ ~ 8 - : se ae - ne ed we & % vee EDT Se a’ voehee ~! . - * ’ . “ “7 »~ *. Tae : 2 ane “ oe rs » - C4 a - * . z so Ps “ 4 “ om \ oe “ . « * : . : < Soe tye get . eft mor a “ s te as . <¢ rots we . ‘ ~ 6 : . : TOP SECRET EYES ONLY ~ SENSITIVE WW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 92 ‘ a “wa bates on tet oad Stn italia, ait hee baba ek Oe 6 abeta ee le ane Lagat a cea ee Ree ad at tly a a noes Lek mah ed sates Cat cake Oe é oH
HY 450955 a Oe ' CONTROILED DISSEM / f LA a vs TS #185620 ~ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Sy CFFICE OF NATIONAY, ESTIMATES cess 13 May 1663 Ne DRAFT MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Tevelopments in Cuba and Possible US Actions in the Event of Castro's Death* ) SUMMARY . We believe the odds are that upon Castro's death his brother Raul .or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing _ and help, take over control. However, there 1s @ good chance that @ power struggle would. cnsue, and.a lesser chance that such a struggle would spread, either into a many-sided conflict or with ay the Moscow-oriented Communists Iincd up on one side ‘and those who “are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In any case * Tnis memorandum is a general analysis of the situation and prospects for US action after Castro's death. We have not sousht ,to work out in detail Latin American, Western European, or other 2, ed third party reactions in the vartous contingencies adverted to in our exanination of the problem. In paragraph 13 we consider very "generally the problem of Soviet reactions. ; GROUP 1 _— Excluded froin automatic downgrading and declassification.~ - (T-O-P . S-E-C-R-E-T CONTROLLED DISGEM ar cr prod men pe we ete Pia t . Page 93 7 7 we ge a se wee
WW 0955 Docld: 324273483 Page 94 _. T-O-P  S-E-C-R-E-T pol CONTROLLEH DISSEM [. : 7) Bee! ‘the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to |. Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly — influence the outcome. Anti-Hoscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US © 7 military intervention. | - — } . te I ty i. im tf. i. vee ' T-0-P  §-E-C-R-E-T } CONTROLLED DISSEM m. oo OO Cea
T-O-P G-E-C-R-B-T CONPROLLED DISSEM . : ; 8 (I. CUBA WELECUR CASTRO I Factors jin the Situation 1. he course of events in Cuba efter Castro's death would depend upon a wide ronge of varisbles ond unknowns, which are . unlikely to be made manifest until after the event. Yet we can noke sone edvance essessment of the Jmportance of certain factors. a Tae Leaviership. Castro's personal predaitinance hes overshadoyved the rest of the Leadership. The two mest proninent end powerful political leaders under Fidel ere his brother Raul and Che Guevara. Baul 4s Deputy Premier and the . designated successor. ‘urthernore he is Minister of the Armed Forees ond Commander in Chief. He has by far the ‘best chance of taking over efter his brother's death, but he has a cold end . unattractive personality with Listle of Fidel's appeal to the public. On the other hand, Che Guevera is ao more colorful figure, ation of ability and drive, and therefore a likely contender for power. Tf these trio were to cooperate, together with President Doiticos they would have a good chance of consolidating control. Among the old line Conrunists the position ond attitude of Carlos Rafael. Rodriquez would be the most important, since he enjoys ~2- rey P0-P G-2-C-R-E-T CONPROLLED DISSEM HW 509557 Doéld:32493483 Page 95 —
HW S09545---Dop Dd: 3242354683 Page 96 -- te - T-O-P S-H-C-R-E- 7 PVE elo se | CONLROLL; D DISSE some respect anoug the Fldelistas and has authority among the Moscow-ortented Comnunists,. (© au we rT amy aapenaroanraenene atti aanabnennennatnniestettetettt eet mererr ttt De Differences within the Regime. The top leadership of the regime seems to live in more harmony than after the Escalante affair in the spring of 1962 or after the October 1962 crisis. However, we believe that there Is still a basic cleavage between the Fidelistas and the Moscow-orientcd Comsunists and that it might widen in situations of stress. ce The Azwy end Security Forces. The anned f orces and security services have been molded i sto instrunants highly responsive to Fidel himself. ‘After his departure, both the army and the security forces are Likely to beccne more important and more active in politics. Their allegiance in a power strugzle . would depend to a rajor extent on the ecireunstences then current. We have little trustworthy, information on the mejority of the. . individual military comzanders, but we do know that popular leaders have been moved from post to post, presumably to prevent -. their attaining too great power. A sizeable minority of the top \ military commanders are persuesively reported to be opposed to the present close ties with the USSR; the y have heen restrained so far by their personal loyalty to Fidel and by the regi! Ss ~3- T-O-P ‘-E-C-R-K-T CONTROLLED DISSEM — (> cron te te ee ae rem ee ne
T-O-P S-F-C-R-E-T PEN CONTROLLED DISSIM + Posy infcrmant systen. few commanders would probably lend themselves readily to support of another Moscow-orlented leader; most have demonstrated no political loyalty ‘except: to Castro. Thus we would expect dissension within the arned forces in the event of a struggle for power. The loyalty of. the commanders rather than the attitude of the troenps would probably govern the behavior of the military forces in such a strugele. ds The Cuban Public. The enthusiasm of a suostantial portion of the population for the changes wrought by the Castro ‘revolution, the departure or imprisonment of many potential - 3a - T-O-P  S-E-C-R-E-T _ CONTROLLED DISSEM vo ” HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 97. oe
HW 450955 T-~9-P  5S-f- C-R-E-T an ~  COWTROLIED DE E- m R- SSEM leaders of opposition, the gererol possivity of the remainder of ' the vomulati ton, the ywenkzess cf the resistence, and the strength |. of the security orgenitntions all ergue against the likelihood of & pooular uprising after Castro's death. e. The § Soviet Role. Castro's death would deprive. the Soviets of the only Communist leader with Chevisma in Latin America and at the seme time relieve them of the difficulties of doing | business with a spiney independent character. Cestro's successor might be far easier for the Soviets to deal with, but is sure to lack Castro's wide emotional appeal. Upen Castro's death the Sovicts would move rapidly to the support of Raul Castro or what- ever other friendly contender for power scemed likely to win cut. They would be able to offer significant help to their chosen instrument, and such support might be decisive in any struggle for power among the top leadership. f. the US Role. If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the US would be widely charged with complicity, even though. it is widely xinown that Castro has many ¢aenies. US inter- vention would bé anticipated by: many supporters and by many opponents of the regime. In this state of affairs, not only the nature but also. the tining of US actions would have great Laportance, and US oy “T-0-P  §-E-C-R-E-T COUPROLLED DISSEM od Docld: 32423483 Page 98 wees ee ee see eee ee =.
HW 50955 T-O0-P S-£-C-R-8-7 Ved CGITROLLED DISSEM | silence or inaction would also have far-reaching consequences. These will be dealt. with in more deteil tn the following paragrephs. Stages of the Cuban Renstion to Castro's Death men kT tt ea tet AMEE ACT ES CN ttt 8 a re kare MERON CR HtNne AOR ipnnn ee cre ety 4, Ig the US did not intervene immediately, Raul Castro or one of the top echelon of Castro's follovers vould probebly be cbie to consolidate a working regime acceptoble to the Soviets. However, — we believe thet there vould be a substantial, though less then even Chance, of a struggle for power among the top. leaders. Such a struggle for pover might be res olived by the anergence of a single leader, but there is a chance that the conflict would wysimately take on the choractcristics of a civil war. Qe Initial Period of Solidarity. We believe that the nest probable developuent after Castro's death would be a rallying of a regime around the designated successor, Raul Castro. The cnpositdon would toke hesrt, ‘but would wait For a move from the US end the Letdn fmericen opponents of the Castro regine before committing itself to more than token efforts. After on initial period of consolidation and solidarity the new leaders might go on to shove ww tacir position ne csteblich tholy persanont cuthoritiy end control. On the other hand, “is ds equally likely thet a = 5 =. T-O-P ©-8-C-R-E.T . - CONEROLLED DISSEM , a lo ” Docld:32423483-——Page 99 — - - pelle eee Ree a |
— T-O“P  S-N-C-R-E-T peda 3 COMPROLEED DISSEM a ~‘. fo. YO struggle for paw will. develop. Duving thia early phase we: \“ SE believe that pressure from the US woulda he more likely to increase the solidarity of the regime than pranote a power strvggle. be Shrangle for Power. If sone Individusl or grows - decided to contest Raul’s lewlership, the arbeane would devend upon a nunder of factors, the most important of which would probably | be whether Reul had gained or wiicnated the loyalty of the amsed forces. 25 is possibis thet, as in the USSR, the struggle for power could be confined to the induir civeles ond that a single | figure would eventually gain control. In Cuba, however, such a ae ¥ : . s ; F. t, | coed struggle would be likely to break into the open, throwing up several ambitious contenders for place and power. e. Widened Conflict. It is also possible that a = . ‘ . t . ” struggle for pover would not end after the strongest of the in- oo Pee, dividual lepders had asserted himself but that alliances vould be formed and liaes be drawn between the Fidelistas on the one hand and the Moscow-oriented Communists on the other. Such a split could extend into the Anny and security forces and develop into something like a civil war. Perhaps even more likely than a two sided civil war would-be a conflict in which many groups , ~6- I~ T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-~! , CCUTROLLED DISSEM SN sy as . bce eee . mo HW 50955 DocId:32423483 Page 100 ee . —
HY 50955 T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T CONTROLLED DISS EM enorect, alt striving for dontnance, fowaing alliances and breaking off into nev splinter groups and Factions. In such a aituation the aazegenee of a non-Commmist Fidelista group, Claiming to be the rightful heirs of the original revaqlution, would be a possibility, but unlikely without us support. d. Ultimate Resolution. Whatever the outcome of en upheavel Like that described. dbove, certoin elonents: in the pr esent - situation seem certain to survive. : The soctal ond econenie changes brought about by. Castro's revolution are unlikely to be reversed, wnether or not Castro's ultimate successor be a Covmunist. Cuba is likely to be a socialist state and probably to require for soe time en authoritarian government. Whoever the Jieeder of Cuba is, he will probably be eritically dependent upon the support of armed Torces. II, US COURSES OF ACTION De Ho 2 Special US Ind tiatives. ‘The posture of the US dn the drmedtate aftermath of Castro's death will be of: critical uportanee. if? the us took no position and no action after Castro's death the new regine would move rapidly to consol. idate | “Te T-O-P §-E-C-R-H-T aay OLA COMULROLL"D DISSEM DocId: 32423483 Page 101 osseasnnansoensete pos | I i | ff . t ‘pec as aed
-COMIROLLED DISSEM f a a core its hold and the likelihnoed of en anti-Communist force energing for a would be greatly reduced. If such an anti-Cotwmnist group did \. hook . ae . ecnerge without the encouragaent or jatervention of the US its | position night be Less vulnerable to charges of being the. ercature of the US. We think it much more Likely, however, that ony enti-Cammnist group that emerged in Cuba would uecd and might openly seek esourances and help from the US. The most likely cirewstences for such en ospeul would be those in which . a nationalist grcup was openly in conflict with a Communist | directed end supported group. The emergence of en offeckive anti-Conumuist force in Cuba widd depend prj3marily on Cubon initiative ond wovld prchably require the defection of iuportaat elenents of ‘che. existing regine. With proper tining, however, US encovragemcnt might stimulate such a | | development. Once the internal political forees in Cuba heave pro- duced a split between the nationalists and. the Moscow-oriented Communists US initlotives would be of utmost dmportance. At the right mouent they night produce a merging of nationalists within the regime ond those in opposition. This seems to us the combine- tion most likely to upset the forces seeking a Communist ‘succession. 8. [T-0-P S-8-C-R-5-T CONTROLLED DISSEM HY 50955 Docld: 32423483 Page i107? | Corr pte tent en eT ye i eee gone tree ce nee
' HY 4S0954 i ft T-C~P CONTROLLED DISSEM 5-K-C-R-E-T If US offers are to have en appeal to such a conlition they must neke clear the willingness of the US to ccoperate with former nembers and supporters of the Castro regime whose aim is to achieve Cuba! s independence of the Soviets and the Communist Bloc. , it will also be necessary for the US to make a convincing assertion of Its reediness to accept most of the social and economic changes instituted by the Castro regime. importance. which a public ennouncenent of US willingness Te problem of timing will, of course, be one of preat it sees Likely that. there would be a period during nationalist group would be disadvantageous. to suppert oC A too rapid announce. | ment might serve to consolidate resistance to these people; a too long delay could cause than to despair. Meanwhile, it would be a] essential to trans sait on offer of support clandestinely to the right people at the eerliest possible manent. the relative timing of One pr oblem will be a US amouncement end of activities designed to preposition forces in. onbietpation of rultilling promises. It will be extraacly difficult to move any US forces without publicity by the US press, but such prepositioning as can be carried out inconspicucusly probably ougat to toke place as soon as a general course of action has been decided upon. Doctd: 32423483 Page i103 » J = T-O-P CONTROLLED S-"-C-R-E-T DLSSEM” re rt A public statement of. PPA V4 en’ epee ee pret net ie °
HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 1043 7 ‘ COUTROLIZD DISSEM q cto | ce ' oo , [ov ene US intentions should probably be made before nilitery preparations |); directed toward Cuba became widely known. NOE ae 8. Once a nationelist group had emerged and entered into conflict with the Moscow-orLlented Communists, the assistance which it would require from the US vould depend Largely on clreumstances. It might be that arms and ermunition delivered rapidly and in such | a way as to ensure its victory would be the only aid colled for. | It 13 possiole that such a group would ask for US air support and perhaps for US ground forces as well in the early stages of conflict; sooner or later it vould alnost certainly require such support. In (a later stage if a US supported notionalist group had won dcminance, the US would face a new set of problems. Almost any such group wourd be likely to insist that no political or social changes made under Castro be reversed excevt at its own initiative. Compensation for expropriated US property might be agreed to, but not at a realistic figure. The US would alnost certainly be obliged to ‘undertake an aid program at least the rough equal of the present — Soviet program. ~~ 9. Action Throngh a Government in Exile. . It 1s highly unlikely that any Cuban exile group could effectively influence the course of events in Cuba after Castro's death, with or without -US support. Furthermore, the associetion of exiles with US T-0-P  S-E- womm se cee oe nt
-T-O0-P S-h.C-R-E-T Pa . CONPROLLED DISSEM POP initiatives would probably reduce their chances of success. it ds possible that certain groups in Cuba. would prefer to deal with the US through a Cuban government in exile, but we think it unlikely. . 10. Quaxentine and Rlockate, If in consonance with varlous policy prcenouncements the US were to quarantine Soviet attempts to reinforce its military and technical personnel in Cuba and to introduce additional armanents, the US-oriented revolutionaries would probably be enspirited. If on the other hand the US declared a blockade the reactions in Cuba ‘would be mixed: our friends would be greatly heai-tened to realize that the US had indicated its willingness to bring down the Comauntst regime in Cuba, even at ‘the. risk of war with the Soviet Unton. The regime vould be apprehensive. ‘Unless the blockade were swiftly challenged by the Soviets and the focus | of the confrontation drastically shifted, the chances of the fall of the successor Cuban regime would rise. li. Invasion. If the US declared its readiness to support . the Cuban nationalists and true heirs of the Castro revolution “and. if: such a group emerged, the chances are at least even that it would requtre the 4ntervention of US forces before it could Lue . T-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T ’ CONTROLLED DISSEM — HW 50955 Docld:32493483 Page 105 sey geen ca mee eg
HW 23 T-9-P S-H-C-R-E-T CCNTROLLED DISSEM -” eer mee ne gain contr “ol of the island. of the various guises under which invasion might be undertaken the least palatable and probably the least effective would be.that of a Cuban exile force. An undisguised US invasion would cause political problens inside and outside Cuba, but we do not believe that they would be unacceptable to the Cy exiti-Communist | movement. Much would depend, of course, on the authenticity of the Cuban movement. (eee coe tee ee neg meen enereueagera ace an nme 5 etait 12. Joins Action by Hemisphere States. Joint OAS action would be unlikely to have any great appeal to Cubans, even the Cuban nationalists. However, steps to bring the OAS in some way or another into any action contemplated by the US might help avoid many diplomatic problems in Latin fmerica and elsewhere. 13.- Soviet Reaction. Castro's departure from the scene © would not lessen the Scviet concern to preserve the Communist base in Cuba. They would certainly try to influence the ‘situation, Particularly if a power struggle developed. For a time: they. ould. operate behind the scenes and publicly would - not have to: GO. beyond reaffirmation of their vague: commitments 40955 Dac to protect | a Communist Cuba. Once the. struggle reacned open ‘ROP s Oe DLS Td:39493483 Page 106 serene arr a gy! Fa ete meer ge ere + pone eee nnaneS a - oe tt te ee gee ‘| . ce wane te ae > Dasa eertemie tit stm ae worm oS rs woot
UCNPROLLED DISSEM Cot conflict, or if the US took strong action against the new regime, .the USSR would have no choice. Taey would have to aecide how far to go in support of a Communist faction. — What they would do outside Cuba is beyond the scope of this paper, but within Cuba we believe the Soviets would be cautious about engeging in open conflict. HY 50955 -~13- P-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T | CONTROLLED DISSEM . Doclda: 324233483 Page se? ares. AGT. ag ee a a we remem pe
nl CNET oor at . a ad fal 19 June 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP SUBJECT: Sabotage Program, Cuba A meeting was held this morning with higher authority, on the ‘above subject. Present were Mr. McNamara and General McKee; Mr. Harriman; Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald; and Mr. Bundy. Mr. Harriman said that the Standing Group. had approved the proposed external sabotage program for Cuba and that the Secretary of State had approved it in general terms, although not in detail. He said it was State's understanding that the Special Group would review the program regularly but tnat all concerned had agreed that’ once operations had begun, they should continue for a reasonable length of time and not be subject to periodic stop-and-go orders. X A period of perhaps eighteen months was mentioned. Mr. FitzGerald then gave the outlines of the proposed program. It will be directed at four major seginents of the Cuban economy: _ (a) electric power; (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (c) railroad and highway transportation; and (d) production and manufacturing. (He pointed out that many targets in the last category could be put out of operation by successful sabotage. of power facilities.) The first operation is planned for mid-July. Raids will be conducted from outside Cuba, using Cuban agents under CIA control. Missions will be staged from a U.S. key. The point was raised that if any agents are captured they can reveal their point of departure, and the question was asked whether a British key could not be used instead. Mr. FitzGerald responded that this would not help’ the situation because in any case the agents would be in a position to tell a full story about U.S. involvement. A question was asked as to whether the Cubans could retaliate in kind. The answer was that they would certainly have this capa~- bility but that they have not retaliated to date, in spite of a number of publicized exile raids. 7 a ; ‘ Mr. Bundy pointed out that these operations will raise the noise level considerably, in the same manner as the Alpha 66 raids did. (A comment was made that this is certainly true, and that ic i 4 . fa: “— ete | | cvES GALY PROPERTY OF (S97 | a . THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE H¥ 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 108
will increase our domestic political problems, because the in- creased publicity will inevitably lead to complaints that che U.S. course of action is inadequate.) Mr. Bundy added that the proposed sabotage program interlocks with two other efforts along the same lines. One of these involves an autonomous operation which will be based in Central America and which will not be operative until October or November, and the other consists of continuing efforts to develop ‘internal resistance elements which could carry out sabotage. The purpose of all of this is to nourish a spirit of resistance and dis-~- affection which could lead to significant defections and other by- products of unrest. Mr. McCone said that the military forces are a particularly important target in this connection. Mr. McCone also emphasized the fact that no single act of sabotage, as proposed in this program, can be expected to have a very significant effect on the Cuban economy, but what we are trying for is the cumulative effect of a continuing series of operations. The program was approved, with the understanding that operations would not begin until mid-July. t 6 Bah id Thomas A. Parrott Distribution. Mr. Johnson Mr. Gilpatric Mr. McCone ~ a mk ‘ vn ests ae | | 7 PROPERTY OF HW 50955 Docld:32493483 Page 109 - , THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
fy “0055 a | ee Ate let / rats ehicat ye § n me af aN 6 | yey SECRET Me Ce on testa eas DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH _ July 25, 1963 - MEMORANDUM , TO : CCA = Mr. Crimmins _ FROM : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. b td.) : SUBJECT: Cuba: Possible Courses of Action This paper, prepared solely by a meniber of the INR Special Studies Group who, among others from INR, has represented INR on the Cuba Coordinating Committee, presents a concept and offers some possible courses of action towards Cuba. It is submitted for your , possible interest. Summary and Recowmendations Rationale of Proposals Revolutionary Nationalism Versus Communism ‘A. Exiles Stimulate Nationalist Altcrnative B. Revolutionary Objectives -C. Revolutionary Program D. Exile Radio Activities | .Digcrediting Castro in Latin America Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule Psychological Guidelines GROUP I Exeluded from automatic downgrading and declassification SECRET | 7 se DotId: 32423483 Page 110
HY “AOA Docld: 32423483 Page lit : me ~ SECREL : Cle yey fe f Summary and Recommendations US policy seeks to achieve an independent, democratic,and socially progressive Cuba and to erase the commmist presence in Cuba which con- stitutes a foreign imposition on the Cuban people and a threat to hemi- spheric security. The problem discussed in this paper-is how to gain these objectives without resort to invasion or attributable acts of violence and violations of international law. To this end the paper offers specific proposals and guidelines for: 1) discrediting Fidel - Castro and his communist regime in Latin America, 2) destroying his image in Cuba, and 3) creating the necessary preconditions for nation- alist upheaval inside Cuba within two years. Public expression of US policy should parallel the uscful distinc-~ tion made during the missile crisis when action was directed not against Castro but against the communist military threat emanating from Cuba. It should now be aimed publicly not at getting rid of Castro -- since ‘this only increases his popularity with the nationalistic Cuban people -- but at removing the threat posed by the communist presence in Cuba. The public position should be: Castro is not a threat to us, but a mere puppet who has violated Cuban liberty, dignity and well- being; the couwmaunist presence in Cuba, however, constitutes a totali- ‘tarian and subversive force in this hemisphere and therefore remains unacceptable. Tn short, we suggest that the US government publicly disengage from Castro while continuing indirect action against him in order to overthrow his communist regime. Accordingly, the following action is recommended: a. Indirectly guide nationalist revolutionary ‘oxile groups with reputations that remain untarnished (through non- identification with Batista, the Brigade,or US intcrests) in an effort to overthrow the Castro regime from within, under the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement.’ We propose that reputable exile leaders such as Manolo Rey Ernesto Betancourtand Javier Pazos: 1) be informed by Romulo Betancourt that the US expects them to assume the main leadership role in this endeavor without involving the US; 2) be offered for their consideration the strategy, Revolutionary Objectives and Revolutionary Program set forth herein; 3) be encouraged to initiate a several-month campaign of radio harassment as a prelude to fomenting orzanized sabotage, subversion and guerrilla warfare against the Castro regime; and 4) announce their Revolutionary Program on July 26, 1963, seemingly, if not actually from the: Cuban mainland. SECRET wee
HW "50955 Docld: 32423483 | Page 112 ‘The theeting t this aftemoon, will be devoted, toa number. of. ‘special problems ‘on ‘Cuba, but, I hope. we may have: a few minutes at the end to take a reading on the’ ‘gene. ral position. as it ‘appears. “We should briefly’ discuss a paper. on possible Us_Se “ys For, this part. of the’. . ; “yo | There 2 are ti wo highly ‘sensitive CIA papers “Which © Mee MeCone has requested that we hold for ‘distribution at the | “meeting. : “They deal with a list of possible ‘actions under cons, ‘sideration at CLA an t the, ‘end to ‘make a brief. oral ‘comment on the “YT propose, a esults “of our ‘discus sions. ‘thus far, 38 | I understand them... My, ‘own “preliminary. conclusions’ are ‘not! ‘optimistic,. b excuse for avoiding. the issue. oan DETERIORAT TING BLECTRO STATIC | id with: the specific, problem of Cuba! 8 ot supplies Be a sine mrt IAN hegnte newb 3S Lede pee dd ot evens rere a eee att Ba deeded oh Ce Bak OF Pr neenye Sey oan res i)
HY 0955 snort QEORET. - 3- b. Reverse the present David-Goliath relationship with | Cuba by having a smaller and militarily helpless Central American state, with a highly respected leader, engage Castro in a propaganda struggle in order to distract Castro and provoke him into threatening and unwise countermoves. If successful this will serve several purposes: 1) make an ordinary bully out of a heroically posturing Castro, cause him to lose self-esteem, and possibly involve. him in a chain reaction of mistakes, 2) increase Latin American concern over Cuban. subver sion | and promote OAS cooperation in defense of a small nation (the US should be the last to interfere overtly), 3) pro- vide the US. with an excuse to take further action against Cuba, should such escalation become desirable, and 4) present Cuba-obsessed American public opinion with a new outlook on a Castro cut down to smaller dimensions. ce. Coincidental with this baiting of Castro, and with- out attribution to the US, mount a catnpaign to destroy Castro's image through ridicule. US strategy should be directed toward achidving the eventual down- fall of the Castro/Communist regime as a result of internal stresses and in response to forces largely,if not wholly, unattributable to the US. Without fanfare and through the employment Of overtly legal measures, and '. without displaying undue concern about Cuban diplomatic relations and marginal trade with such countries as Uruguay and Chile, the US should continue to seek the economic and political isolation of Cuba from the | free world. The Cuban regime contains the seeds of its own destruction. believe that progress in promoting its destruction can be made in such a way as to increase US prestige in Latin America and give immediate | impetus to the Alliance for Progress program. Rationale of Proposals We The strategy proposed here is intended to supplement present measures against Cuba, and to offer operational and psychological guidelines, at the same time that it dovetails with recent policy on exile groups. It secks to place the Cuban problem in perspective, subordinating it to more vital natidfal and hemispheric issues. If this strategy is based on realistic assumptions and accurate analysis, it will serve as a public relations guide for the emotionally charged Cuban problem both in the ‘DBoold:32423483 Page 113.- SECRET yobs 4-0 wea a, ita, PE
a SECRET ye - i -- \o US and abroad. Although we cannot assume that the Castro regime can be toppled by the proposed measures within twenty-four months, these proposals involve no US militarily commitment or financial cost, and we recommend that they be implemented without delay. The fact that the nationalist symbol personified by Castro is now essential to communist success places the vulnerability of the Castro/ Communist regime in one person and makes him the logical operational target. However, the indoctrination of Cuban youth is proceeding apace, and the loyalty of this group is being strengthened by the regime's assignment of responsible roles to relatively young cadres. Furthermore, as communist indoctrination and totalitarian organizational techniques become more effective, the cormunist apparatus will be able to function perhaps even more efficiently without Castro. His syinbolic value in Latin America, however, would continue to be a-commnist asset. Although Castro is an unreliable ally who is actually neither puppet nor neutralist, the Soviet Union is committed to supplying massive aid to him. Given the scope of this investment, there is smll chance . of negotiating the comminist presence (foreign and local) out of Cuba. Activist Cubans inside the island, who are capable of fomenting an up- -heaval, view as the alternative to Communism not a democratic state but either a repetition of Batista or an American occupation. Con- sequently, many Cubans actually prefer Castro to foresceable governments. They should be afforded a Cuban nationalist alternative. Moreover, &@ purely Cuban solution to the Cuban problem has a great advantage -- it avoids direct confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. If the Castro/Communist experiment will appear to have failed not on its own merits but as a result of obvious or inadequately disguised US intervention, or as a consequence of the fraudulent invocation (in Latin American cyes) of a unilateral and lopsided Monroe Doctrine, the validity of Castro's revolutionary course might remain unquestioned. This Castro/Communist experiment constitutes a genuine social revolution, albeit a perverted one. If it is interrupted by the force of the world's foremost "imperialist" and "capitalist" power in the absence of major provocation, such action will discredit the. US and tend to validate the uncompleted experiment. Further Castro-type revolutions will then be stimulated rather than discouraged, since it will appear to many that social revolution (peaceful or otherwise) --'and not just communism -- has been outlawed by the US in this area. It is not the winning of this kind of battle btt the manner in which it is won that will determine the success or failure of US policy in the hemisphere. SECRET HY 50955 Docld: 32423433 Page. 114.
HW 50955 a, DocId: 32427483 Nk coy: Assassination of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyr- dom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro, destroy his self- esteem, sabotage his revolution, force him to conclude that his situation - is hopeless and, as in the case of his political idol Eduardo Chibas, in 1951, drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality. While suicide is not expected, it is reasonable to anticipate that sus- tained harassment and denigration of Castro plus frustration of communist plans within Cuba will provoke turmoil and set the stage for. the regime' s collapse. The targets of pressure, influence,and support in Cuba - are the military, urban labor (in particular pre-Castro trade union members), student, bureaucratic, and other groups that are’ susceptible to disen- chantment with Castro. Castro and not a imjor target. ‘The Cuban masses are at least passively loyal to Action: against Cuban and bloc ships even within the Cuban three mile limit should be avoided, inorder to deny the Soviet Union an excuse for claiming attack in international waters, which would allow them to use this issue to obscure Castro's. reversalé by con-. fusing Cuban and world opinion. The greatest weapon against Communist subversion and recurrent dis- order in Latin America would be convincing cvidence that the Alliance for Progress is in forward motion and that the internal social reforms upon which it is dependent are being carried out. US strategy must recognize that such reforms are initiated in response to political pressure, which can only be applied by an articulate electorate, literate and instructed in democratic practices. ' Perhaps the greatest stumbling block to effec- tive implementation of the Alliance program is the Latin American feeling that it is essentially a negative anti-Cuba policy. Unless the Alliance for Progress is dissociated from our anti-Castro/Communist programs and policy, Castro can successfully exploit this association to destroy the . hopes of Cuban and other Latin American idealists. US pressure tacties to obtain collective OAS measures against Castro's “regime often result in creating resentment against the US and sympathy for Cuba. Legal victories of tactical value, unsupported by Latin American public opinion, or supported by disreputable and transient regimes, should not obscure continuing problems which may become a source of later political defeats. Other OAS members should continue to be encouraged to accept more responsibility for the Cuban problem, even to the extent of putting forth solutions we may not favor. - SECRET Page FIs” mo iq WRT wey wee 2 4 , or vad e- | iad ee
nv SO955 Dota: 32423483 SECRET oe a or nieve ne ‘} Possible OAS attempts, promoted by such countries as Mexico and Brazil, to reach an understanding with Castro can always be used to publicize conditions within Cuba by posing such terms as: holding of elections (a nudge to Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti, and Guatemala), re- leasing political prisoners, university autonomy, reintegration of exiles, and Cuban cooperation against foreign subversion. Revolutionary Nationalism versus Communism , Revolutionary ee oe A. Exiles Stimlate Nationalist Altemative Reputable exile groups such as are led by Manolo Ray, enbody a— nationalist alternative to a Castro/Communist dominated Cuba, but they mist appear to operate without US support from Latin American bases. Only by appealing to Cuban nationalism and by supporting the original aims of the Cuban revolution can the exiles stimulate and promote action which will retain the passivity of the masses, dampen the enthusiasm of Cuban youth, gain the support of urban labor, weaken the Joyalty of cadre elements -- who in vast majority are not now Commnists -- and turn them against the cornmunist regime. At a carefully determined appropriate Gime, Soviet installations on the Cuban mainland should be attacked by exile and local guerrillas on 4 large scale. Severe reprisals against these Cuban action elements might provide a lever for creating antagonism between the Sovicts and the Cuban people. If properly exploited and publicized by. non-US media, & quiet rage could accumulate in the minds of at least some of the 300 , 000 Cubans under arms. Since the US will appear dissociated from this ac~- tivity and unable to control it, it will be justified in publicly ignoring any Soviet or Castro complaints. Although there would be some risk of escalation, we should be prepared to meet it in order to permit Cuban patriots to evict the Communis's from Cuba. No public encouragement should be given the Cuban exiles beyond the universally accepted acknowledgement that patriots have the right to. fight for the independence and freedom of their own countries. Repu- table exile elements should obtain their moral and material support from such countries as Venezuela and Costa Rica. Direct US assistance should be avoided or channeled through the governments of. the above-mentioned countries. Excessive US or even foreign assistance or involvement will beeeme known and thus tend to sap Cuban nationalist initiative, lessen revolutionary motivation and appeal, and allow Castro convincingly to blame the US. - SECRET oO Page 116-~. - ae
SECRET a vs Although exiles can be instrumental in establishing the precondi- ; tions of successful revolt, the main effort mst come from within Cuba. Do With proper guidance (from Batancourt, Orlich or Americans they trust) co reputable exiles can present an appealing program, create a mystique _ — and a provisional leadership symbol in imprisoned revolutionary hero , Major Huber Matos, and initiate the psychological and operational pro- gram to discredit Castro and provoke internal revolt. — . The uprisings in Poland and East Germany and the successful revolt in Hungary were crushed by the use or threat of use of massive military ot force: large Soviet armies were stationed on their territories. In con- trast, the absence of an occupation army. permitted Yugoslavia to exert its independence. For the same reason, and also because of geographical — scparation, little Albania not only maintains its independence from yout , also brazenly thumbs its nose at, Moscow. And, with a few hundred men Castro overthrew a regime whose ‘forces were equipped and trained by the US. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that if the well-aimed Cubans should decide to revolt, the small number of Soviet troops there | would almost certainly act wisely by remaining in their barracks. Except .for specific actions, outside inducements and pressures for exile political unity only internationlize and thus neutralize théir | most choesive element -- nationalism. For example, an exile government would only be discredited as a US puppet and have no appeal within Cuba. at this time. Similarly, whenever an exile group. is closely identified with the US or its interests, Castro is able to rally Cuban nationalism to his support. Center and left-of-center groups nced not be alienated, but it is only the revolutionary exiles who can convey nationalist con- ; viction to potential upheavalists in Cuba ; this nationalist focus is a a t tactical commnications device. . Some exile action groups are cooperating among themselves. In - exchange for supplies and by demonstrating more effective leadership, the more reputable ones could perform a coordinating function. for action purposes these units should add to their own emblems that of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement." The latter might infuriate Castro and confuse his supporters. Formal political unity is largely irrelevant and should not be pressed. Mutuality of interest and proven trust remain the most effective _ means of influenceng exile goups toward cooperative action. Any attempt Gg by a foreign power to. control, exile activities will carrupt and dis- , credit them or reveal that their integrity can be purchased. In Castro's own words: "Revolutions are carried out on a basis of morality." SECRET Hv 50955 DocTd: 32423483 Page ii?
SECRET | 7 a fo - 8 . As a reputable exile, Castro trained with his men in Mexico and solicited funds in New York City. After he landed in Cuba and commenced Organized guerrilla activity, he expressed this view of the function of non-combatant exiles; ; Exiles should cooperate in the struggle, but it is absurd for them to try tell us from abroad what . peak ve should. take, what sugar field we should burn, what sabotage we should perform, Or at what moment and. in what circumstances and form we should unloose the General strike. In addition to being absurd, it is ridiculous. Help us from abroad by collecting money. , . mong the exiles and the Cuban emigrants, by cam- | paigning for the cause of Cuba in the press and in } public opinion. Denounce the crimes we are suffering ‘here, but do not pretend to direct from Miami the a | revolution that ig being waged in all of the cities j and country places of the island through fighting, agitating, sabotaging and striking 4nd thousands of other forms of revolutionary action, which have | been the war strategy of the 26th of July Movement, ad Although Castro fought very few battles in the Sierra Maestra, he - was able to broadcast fairly regularly to the Cuban people (reportedly by tapes via Radio Caracas), His kind treatment of the local peasantry, : and their consequent passive adherence to. his cause, plus the relative indifference of the Cuban military forces sent against him (mostly in- terested in plunder) were special circumstances which no guerrilla unit can hope to duplicate within the present totalitarian security arrange- — ment.. While guerrilla activity in Cuba now usually has tragic results, — ce this action perhaps cannot and probably should not be discouraged. How- , [, ever, such action units require guidance and coordination oftheir losses 1 are to be reduced and their effectiveness increased. This need could be. i filled by revolutionary exile radio, which should promote not revolt, I. but relatively less risky sabotage (spiking highways accommodating — Soviet trucks) and passive resistance. Discouraging revolt at this time would give this radio an aura of wisdom and authority and also suggest its certainty about the coming revolt and its timing: "Do not revolt - nowe", has an ominous ring. - _ . a . , | . | SECRET . oe Co So | HW 50955 Docld:32423483 Page 114.
SECRET (ore Wey a ne -9- PURE B. Revolutinnary Objectives .Only by drawing to themselves the very powerful force of Cuban nationalism can the reputable exiles undermine the present Cuban regime . and provoke a revolt or palace revolution against Castro. Towards this end they must be able tos , 1) 2) 3) 5) 6 7) ‘HW 50955 . Doclia: 32423433 convince the Cuban people that they are against. any ‘foreign interference, US or Soviet; convince the Cuban people that they are engaged in an internal struggle, indifferent to whether or not this is part of a global Cold War; convey certainty of ultimate victory and demonstrate Willingness to sacrifice; identify themselves with the original aims of the Cuban revolution, the Constitution of 1940 as amended in the light of history since 1958, and the ideas of Marti; separate patriots from ambitious politicos, reduce dis-~- sension among reputable exiles, encourage internal Leadership for an uprising and discourage future caudillos like Castro, by publicly excluding them- selves from public office for two years after liberation; announce the objectives of the revolution from the Cuban mainland, make clear that a’detailed program will not be imposed but must be worked Qu& with the democratic participation of the Cuban people, have it understood that no one person, nor any exile group can claim the Yight to speak for all the Cuban people; — establish Free University of Havana facilities ina Central American Republic to train exile students, excluding partisan politics (as guests of a friendly '* country) and political undesirables, partly as a lure to defect Cuban youth through a superior educational -program, with Radio Education to be beamed at Cuba; SECRET Page 1i9-
SECRET Oy - 10 - 8) make the Cuban hero Major Huber Matos an effective revolutionary symbol and provisional leader. , iy . (the mys tique of an unseen man leading a revolu- © i tion from a dungeon cell); initiate a student sponsored "Save the Rosenbergs"-type campaign (complete with riots and demonstrations), not in the US but in Latin America, to "Free Matos 5" a — and free the estimated forty to seventy-five -_ thousand political: prisoners in Cuba (about . en whom there has been astonishingly little concern) oo and collect money to assist their families; oe vo. 9) halt haphazard raids and attacks which might harm . innocent people (allowing Castro to speak of — dead women and children), concentrate on key military (particularly : ‘foreign), industrial and communications installations, avoiding blood- shed if possible; gain the cooperdtion of other i exiles and insurgents by offering arms and equip- : ment- in return for coordination and cooperation; ° m C. Revolutionary Program The following are sugpestions for a public program which the exiles should announce on the Cuban mainland through radio and leaflets under the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement" and with Matos ‘their provisional leader. The. feasibility and the details of this pvorram would of course have to be determined by the reputable exiles themselves; 4 whatever are its contents, its primary purpose is to appeal to the people within Cuba. The principles to be enunciated would include: — 1) Political freedom, civil liberties, rule of law and ' , respect for individual privacy; and social justice 7 along: the lines of the 1940 Constitution. Inmple- mentation of the original aims of the 26th of July Movement. . All political, social and economic pro- rams: to be voted on freely by all the Cuban people. 2) Exile leaders exclude themselves from accepting political office (a Castro tactic). All office-holders will be elected and for specific periods of time. No more Caudillos like Batista or Castroe The OAS will be asked to help provisional leaders to administer until national and local elections are held twelve months after liberation+ SECRET. HW 50955 Docldj32423483 Page| 126- ’ cee a - fe |.