MEMCRANDUM POR RECORD: Follewing are the minutes of the Caribbean Survey Croup held in the National Operations Room 23 $13, 21 March 1¢52, Following was the attendance at the meeting: re Attorney General Mr, Hand Mr. Gilpatric Gen Lansdale Mr, Helns Gen Craig Mr, Harvey Col Patchell Mr. Goodwin Mr. Ryan. At Gen Lansdale's request, Mr, Harvey opened the neeting by ‘ ‘ giving a general operational status report. Ee discussed tears, ete., in some detail, indicating thatthe uissions of the teans was intelligence collection, controls and the development of , - latent resistant areas, The quality of the Opa Locka Interrogatic : ess Center - reports have been good. 150 are coming in per week on eee an average of possible intelligence reports. Very little of high ged level political intelligence has been available. . However, tremen- “** Soha dous amounts of counter-intelligence is being received. Informa- ‘ 8S Fa - tion on 300 Cuban agents per week, for example. Nothing so far Bees. uncovered in the intelligence area changes the basic conclusions Beeen made originally by Cla; at the outset of this task. However, esse s for the most part, conclusions havc been firmed by further inform eae. E tion. Generally sabotage is decreasing in Cuba. Te operationa? ree e problems of putting in agents are getting tougher and tougher. The controls by the Communists in Cuba are getting tighter and tighter and will slow down the operation. Agents must have . documents, to get documents you must register, when you register the Bloc informer checks on you periodically. Tnis maxes it touch to get ration cards, Some few Cudan afents have been comin in through the OpaLocka Center, Mr. Kennedy asked how abut the backlog of refugees - sore 75,000 peopie coming in through Cpa vearewoen 3 Lov -* “Se Eneke in the Miami area prior to beginning of this operations intelligence center there. How about @ program to aSsure tha * 7 -40R JIE (©) . these 75,000 sources are exploited. Mr. Harvey indicated CIA had a plan to cot this dona,to date they have been unable to hit . & A NO OBJECTION TO . . 8 bic part of the backlog, but in certain special cases have been LASSIFICATION ANDIOR ce ttinc information fren them, that they have a plan for this RELEASE OF THIS D nb ectting , y plan f ete SRE aRS JuLnNen at AS . AQ and will handle 46 when they cet the personnel available. . Rd EET! ; eS0- NICO oO om } EXCLUDED FD. SOS ‘ L- HW 54214 Docld:32424904 Page 2 APF Voc a aq
Mr, Kennedy treecht up the possibility of using Inuicration Department people, especially the broader patrol types who can speak Spanish. Mr. Gilpatric indicated that Senator Uart's Conuittee has recommended an additioni.: semsening center for Cubans, possibly in the New Orleans area. “rp, Kennedy asked CIA what the votecwsiild be in Cubs as between the Castro and the anti-Castro are the chances Qf, communist recinez i Gen Craig Wis asked to report on DOD participation. He Cirst discussed CIA support in general, that during the first phase of the operation, DOD's primary role sould be to support State-CiA and UST... in the intellisence gathering phase and in the interim period to be prepared at a moment's notice to inter- vene in Cuba to prevent a Eungarian typ? cpers or to exploit clusions wereMed to the Gaupwiu> the indication that operatio: initially would possibly be much more successfur vit. those in _ the latter phases, inasmuch as they would be accomplished with surprise and before the Cubans head en opportunity to figure the modus operandi, etc., and build up @ muard against it. Subd- sequently, they might produce more effective counter-actions but that on-balance, &%% ally speaking, such operations had a good — chance of success ¢ my re fact that Gen LeMay end the Joint Chiefs consider this type or operation to involve more of 2 risk than atfect for Cuban infiltrees would have oe the Avon Park Training Fr _. entailed was enphasiced Ait fe sanitizing of 2 aireratt and sneep 4 wrens eens ; 7 “) dipping of 2 aircraft crews by the Air Ferce was discussed. Tre assistance by the Navy to CIA tn small beat omeration and in 7 general raritim assistance waa dietusged, Avon Park, suitadle navy commander for amall boats, the teach Jumper testinc, PT i i 1 boats, were dtscussed ag specific profec ts was pbrourht cut j that the followince policy matters amonn ¢ HW 54214 Docld:3274274904 Page 3
bean Survey Creup preject boundsries of Cuba, to what extent ever-flichts of Cuta,for parooses of leaflet drops, resupply and diversion, to what extent will Guantanaino be usedags a base for acents, like black flights 5 troiled ard other ‘ . - " « and finally, «hat is the prierity of cperation Noncoose as cou pared to other pro f.ctc and operations such as Scuth Vietnan and Berlin at the current time. In the letter connection, that is, the question of priority cf Mongoces, it was emphasized to tre Atterne - “8 ; General that to date «e had not had particular trouble fn this grea but that inevitanly ve would run into trouble areas, pare ticularly in resard to legistics matters, that to date. this had been handled threugh the ecrmeand channels, for example, Gen Decker who had a little treuble in thts area in cetting stockpile: wed haw* and supplies and equipment, logistic lift for the Army onc oo luse it by making decisions through command chernels without desisnath: a priority and that the Sixty to date the preparation and plannin had been going forward smoothly, but that the time would com: when the decisisn would be made as to which would set tne priorit for exa:nple, would gocd, equipmant, ete, earmarked for Vietnan an Berlin and nove to stosipiiing areas far those seuld they 92 used . or would in a. Cuvan operation?, or would Cuba take priority xftn cthers take priority? Mr. Cilpatric indicated he would like to try tr Solve this problex at Defanss level without referring it to anyene hinher. Ne asked that he be kart inforr 2 of this wy situation as 4% dzvelsors inte a reti protlen area. Have Col - ¥ HW 542714 DBocld:324274904 Page 4
HW 542714 DocId: 324274904 Page 5 INCLANT VAS CURRentiy enzaced tn rovmil chanrels and vertous that at eny particular time 4 would be vossible to crient the ¥ time ladder besinning et di minus 12 days and soins up tod so : military. situaticn with the political situation in termsof wnetner or not the profect «as getting hot. Tnais would permit us to have CINCIAMD if it did not involve tinoins cff the operatic , to go to a @ minus 10 condition, for example, that somewhere alon: the spectrum in the ladder, there would be epoint at which you could not go further toarés preparation without tipping off your hand or taizs unacceptable risk, that wa would discover this point and have this x4... cf planning chart pvrevered for use ‘in the future. In the czantime, Defense was bending all efforts to be ready on the shortest possihle notice effect? operand’ of the Usribbean Survey Greup Vorking Group of DOD cf JCS and finally meting indivinfed that the first important mission urndertaxen by the crovp wes to develop un* NCD/ICS position as to the wiltary's stake end proposed role in the oustinz of the Communist regire in Cuba. Basically, the policy reflected trat in: - Defense will cuppert State-CIA, {f necescary, oo the rreparatery plise of operation cf Nengoose in terms ef supply. transportation, personnes and bases, establishes the pont that the niktary belley that the continued existence of the Caetro Communist rerine is Incoupativie with the mintrum seevrity requirements of the US and makes a point that the miZtary could intervene ‘n Cuba without Serious offens2 to national or world wwIda mubiic tne following three conditiona: First - ifowe moved in resvonse to a humanitari to restore order. e as ro é Second - if w2oannouneed ftratant to croeine ‘tn that we were . tae tm ee- ~s be ~ . - mei om 2 ristsre emirr aod cranid hold free electiona and we ea FO Bune Sd . - wlll wit Seen Cuba 25 sen 26 the raw coavernnont advised 4 Sa ee oe 29 alt ve s & ween te a ue eA 1a oy hoi othe ctnetiltty te ritrtats law and ovder wit:our cok pas a Cr a ; a ad i Te