157-10002-10152 OOD eee eee ee ee H = = oo AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORDS SERIES : INTERVIEW SUMMARY AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO : TITLE INTERVIEW WITH SAM DATE SUBJECTS : PAPICH FBI CIA OSWALD, LEE HARVEY CUBA CASTRO DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 256 Folder 4 Date:10/05/93 Page:1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION SSCIA 157-10002-10152 PAPICH : 05/29/75 PAGES : 21 PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT T REFERRED Pp 09/30/93 HY 50955 Doactid: 322761992 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 1
HW 50955 | MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S) ; C) TOTAL pen At | : TTERVIEy AWD MEETING SUMMARY SECRET INTERVIEW WITH: Sam Papich ALL JMEGRAATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT REGARDING: WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. | VATE"TIMETLOCATION: Ma 2 1975; a.m.; Carroll Arms PRESENT: morning: John ELLIFF, Mike Epstein, John Bayly afternoon: John ELLIFF, Burt Wides, John Bayly HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED: FOLLOW UP REQUIRED! ve eres —— ft SOM ET ees : sae BY FBI/JEK cannes ON cle mee HELEASE IN Ey EXECUTIVE SESSION: __YES __jio 185 Mg Ba) SECRET : mimes 57 > i Boclda: 322781993 Page 2?
ae Page / of 4/ 1 —en Rak oe FILE: Papich began with a brief summary of his experi- ence in the FBI. During World War II and there- after he ran certain operations in Latin America. In 1945-47, he ran counterintelligence operations in Brazil against the Communist Party of Brazil and bloc intelligence agents. In 1952 he became FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating and planning, including the development of sources. He also had special assignments overseas for Hoover. Papich presented the following overview of the issues. He has a high respect and regard for the Soviet intelligence service, its efficiency, andg@ effectiveness. He must be shown that their philosophy has changed since 1970. r of the U. S. KGB and GRU is very limited. the U. S. intelligence community_ lieved was good information on, @% This had to be readily revigel Ga @ ' and new operations succeed®& WaYgowing that the premises were false. Papigtt ed "they've taken us to the cleaners in the las® few years". There is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in the United States. The old view was that illegals would aim at middle-class government and business positions. It has been discovered that they take jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment background. There is no knowledge of Soviet objectives. Illegals may do nothing for years so they can be tapped for the future. There may be 100, 500, or 5,000 of them. Some were sent in as They are the Rudolph early as the 20's and 30's. His network was never identified. Abel-type. Therefore, Papich is clearly unhappy with U. S. results in identifying Soviet operations in the United States. Papich stated that he played a controversial "devil's advocate" role between the FBI and the He did not confer with Attorney General CIA. Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell's Papich assumes Helms wanted Mitchell attention. to get a review of the history of FBI-CIA relations. Papich would not have gone to Mitchell without checking with-other FBI officials. it C K FORCE FK TAS % PART CSee hehe ASE IN FULL © IN auf, VED BY FBI EAS “TOTAL DENIAL Cl RELE A REL FOI fs ON Fi @ HY 50955 DBocld:322781992 Page 3
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY page 2. of <</ To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is necessary to §€0 pack to World War II, according to Papich. President Roosevelt got the FBI into the foreign intelligence field in World War II. Overnight the FBL had to generate the capability to move into Latin America against the German espionage operation which included business covers, radio networks, and influence in Latin American governments. The FBI had no precedent or guidance. Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegs conferred with the British in London for assistance. FBI agents went into Latin America first under pusiness covers, then in the embassies, which was thin cover. The legal attaches established official liaison wight’ . leecal authorities. The FBI's role was prime@i counterintelligence but some positive ipo was gathered about the stability of ge FBI agents learned on the job. Mog headquarters was ridiculous until * were reported back. os The OSS ran operations ifn sg as Latin America. Donovataaa Mo ran undercover operations in the United sfmtes. See the book by Donald Downs. OSS had a very close relation- ship with MI 5 and MI 6. The British also ran operations in the United States in 1939-41. No one knows how many- They saw the FBI as neophytes knowing little about the business. The British developed closer relations to oss than to FBI. At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but Hoover received complaints of OSS operations in th United States.—fax-example ; the OSS bugging. IB of Other complaints came from (S (81) Latin America. é tion between Hoover and Donovan is important packground for Hoover's view of the CIA. Donovan would recruit persons regard- 1ess of their packground if he thought they had the capability to penetrate the access: The OSS use of Communists "shook the hell" out of Hoover, as did OSS discussions in Moscow of cooperation. with the NKVD. Hoover would never work with Communists. Hoover saw CIA roots in OSS. Papich stressed that oSS had some great people, extremely capable and dedicated, but OSS nad an element that Hoover would never buy. HW 50955 DBocld: 322761992 Page 4
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 3 of </ In 1943-45, the government began looking toward a worldwide intelligence system. The alternatives were the military, OSS, State, and FBI. FDR allegedly assured Hoover that he would be respon- sible for setting up the post-war system. Papich never saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted this job. The Latin American operation was successful but Hoover never understood or had a feel for the problems. He felt insecure. He never traveled outside the U. S., and only saw things from Washington, D. C. Under President Truman, Hoover did not have a "warm" relationship with the President. When the Central Intelligence group was formed and the 1947 Act drafted, Hoover's attitute was mistrust and lack of confidence in the group creating CIA. were a different type of people, not la oriented. Ivy League students of for did not speak Hoover's language. Papich states it was a "bl¢ Pigs Moover did not get the job. Hoover omfortable" when confronted with worldwidqgi ~ He did not under- stand relationships and opeBations abroad. In the U. S., for instance, if Hoover had a problem with a police chief, he just cut off relations. He couldn't do that with foreign police. A foreign intelligence service cannot operate like a domestic intelligence agency. In 1952, when Papich became FBI-CIA liaison, rela- tionships between the agencies were a mess. Beedle Smith was CIA director. There were many flaps between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psycho- logical warfare, especially regarding the funding of labor groups, student groups, and political parties. At the time of the 1947 Act, these tech- niques of "covert action" were the subject of ‘tremendously heated battles between CIA and State. There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence field. In the field of political and psychological warfare operations, the CIA didn't want stereotyped people. The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional agreements. It would contact a U. S. newsman about a HW 50955 DBocld: 32261992 Page 5 . 19
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page of of </ possible assignment, the newsman would contact the FBI to ask what was going on, this would go to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA director. But Beedle Smith was tough. Communi- cation between the FBI and CIA was almost non- existent by 1952. Papich had no CIA counterpart since the CIA is so compartmented. He had contacts at all levels, exchanging ideas for operations. He would push CIA ideas in the FBI. Flaps would come up. He would stamp them out and say "get on with the job". The FBI was easier to control since it was ceng tralized. Papich's relations with Hoover wog®s go up and down. He frequently asked to gag#iiyn field -- and sometimes Hoover considerg him there. But by the 1950's, most foreign intelligence talent had di the FBI No formal consideration was G bs 4 acement. Tolson to limiting its role to nf probably thought it shouldg pia, expressed a desire to give Wh his intelligence job. Nobody, including Tolson, knew Hoover's reasons for doing what he did. He had his own conversations and contacts in the White House, Congress, and his personal sources. He knew what he was doing and had "a nose and ear for the political climate in Washington". This was true for "risky" operations. Papich believes it would be disastrous to give both foreign and domestic intelligence duties to a CIA. While there would be advantages in coordinating fragmented sources, it is a risk to liberty, like a national police. Papich did not recall any significant plan to improve coordination in 1958 when FBI joined USIB. FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group. The CIA would suggest joint fleld operations but Hoover would rarely buy it. This was like his reluctance to join any operation with any other agencies. He thought the FBI should always have control, a commanding role. For example, Allan F) awith soover. (S) j (Fai Dulles discussed she United Nations HW 50955“ DocId: 32281992 Page 6 bs
Pat INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page S of <7 ln the Bo accents and other countries' agents dm thie. Beeretariat ; * || (S) i e coverage or cei the /, : when ed casi =S. 5 poe Hoover objected to the plan, Dulles dropped it. Another examples Angelton might be disturbed about our lack,o information about KGB operations out Bilcho cabsssy. 1 He would discuss with Papich how to penetrate=tne == KGB. Friction would develop in "the gray area" of posi- tive intelligence. For example, a top foreign — “official came to the United States for medical treatment. The CIA knew he was coming to the U. S. and wanted to know his relationship with Communists and wanted intelligence on the instability in the country. The CIA wants him surveilled to find out his contacts, what he's saying, and a wiretap or bug. The FBI would not do this since he was not Ts an intelligence agent and not within FBI jurisdg@®™™\\ ef (ce . tion. The CIA would be upset. There were sa@f@yehs as \). cases like this, one involving Ki > 13 (clf Over the years, Papich sold Hoover on @y@iaaiTa thes, qn but it was always a gray area. The Ns tion never worked with the EBT oe Kage oordina- per ae C/A In summary, the sources of re wR eeriction were (1) the OSS experience, (2) “p¥g@i®ical and psychological warfare by CIA, and (3) the CIA desire for positive intelligence gathering in the U. S. There was no major issue regarding CIA's desire to develop "#rptends4-in the U.S. Papich recalls no more than three to six instances of disagreement. The FBI never helped the CIA create an organization for deep cover. It never needed FBI help because it moved on its own. The CIA Office of Security advised Papich that they had a relationship with -€he National Student Association. This never gave the FBI a problem. 4 The Katzenbach report would not give the FBI prob- lems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down the drain when contacts through student groups were curtailed. Papich believes that if these contacts SECRE HW 50955 DBocld: 32261992 Page 7 . 8 WES . b
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page © of X/ voz, SEUREL had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence community could have dealt with the New Left later. The CIA would have had assets to assess the issues. Such questions involved New Left travels overseas and relationships with foreign agents. , The FBI and CIA did discuss..developing a cover , in the U. S. to get intd [Travelers gainea(S) (81) | very little. The immediaté problem was the pro- posal for a joint approach. When Papich was there, it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did set up cover in the U. S., the FBI provided no support. However, if the CIA desired to use a company it would ask for a check of FBI files. es Papich is not aware of any political organi zagy created by the CIA, although it may have be& in the 50's or 60's There was discussig@ tw pe” FBI about creating its own group aimedg§ _f S) (ea | and discussion of whether or not to Le ere know about it. There had to be coniy Sa ean sggee OriOreate Le a Gécision would FBI informant travel overset™® i, limited mainly to CPUSA members. The FBI woWld not tell CIA about informant trips to Moscow or Paris before- hand. The reason was that the CIA would have notified its field agencies that the informant's life should be protected. Instead, the FBI informed the CIA of the results upon the informant 's return. The FBI liaison section was made up of six or seven agents. Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA. Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and the Office of Security. Papich and Creager backed each other up in their respective areas. There were several liaison agents at the Pentagon. The liaison at State was Oren Bartlett. The other ; liaison agents were not so deeply involved in in- elligence operations as was Papich. FBI liaison E NSA was AS” although Papich was also | vy, een. >) involved wit HY 50955 DBocld: 322761992 Page @ : . 46
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page J of X/ Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies, Hoover was "goddamned careful". He was sensitive to any "risks" and thus any request for FBI support had to be established firmly. Hoover never responded "let them do it" within the United States. Hoover did not give other agencies any blessing or approval for question e domestic activities such as the case of thd pirrcia(S) mentioned above. In both the FBI and the CIA, rapeen stimulated interest in covering and recru} the United States, for example The CIA wanted to use its sourd@s™to™r foreign officials in the United States officials went home. These officials,ée spies, therefore, when the CIA asked recruit them, Hoover said no. Thig@t ups and downs, depending on the gis times Papich did convince Hooy recruit a foreign official igp‘\ ral. oover sometimes refused. based his. evaluati the feasibility of the. operation. Neitne| —_Jnor State had their = © capabilities and there“Was no formal discussion of their developing it. Papich stressed that Hoover treated State, CIA, and(~ each Seok There were flaps in the 1950's when the CIA recruited be with the FBI. The x Y to the Attorney Gerf asked for FBIfamige@amsiino more than five or six times. PapichWas-asked by FBI officials whether the CIA ever went to the Attorney General directly : ) Mauthority. Papich says this may have en ut not to his knowledge. Few Attorneys General would have stuck their neck out. It was a possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy, where may p, Was unusually close. Papich says w) mepcould only have happened once or ce since the FBI would have detected it most &) the time. If it was done it would be through CIA HY 50955 DBoctd: 322761992 Page 9
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page & of <7/ ue SECRET Office of Security, although that office had an excellent relationship with FBI. Allan Dulles would not have condoned it since he had great respect for the FBI. Papich believes the same is true of McCone and Helms, Papich also con- cedes the Poss aes of entries by the CIA, t — cater >< : > seneral problem wé United States amog@ Zp ys source in off and on" and >would be needed United States. CIA tried the 50's. FBI involvements some thought a new FBI dg for it. The FBI as const did not have trained personnel or capanyg to develop foreign targets. The CIA had this capability. Papich & proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the United States. CIA would advise FBI of its interest in a target, the purposes of the contact, and any results. If the FBI had no interest in the target, that is, an interest in a KGB contact for example, it would OK the CIA contact. FBI required that CIA furnish it any information relevant to its needs, that is regarding KGB contacts (the New Left was handled separately from the memorandum of under- standing procedures). & Alan Belmont headed the FBI Intelligence Division before Sullivan. A capable administrator, he operated behind the scene, stayed out of politics, had good rapport with agents, and was able to handle Hoover. When Belmont retired, the FBI "lost a rudder". This was a crucial point in FBI history, with Hoover getting old. Belmont stressed to his subordinates the need to develop a strong case for any proposal going to Hoover. Once that case was ready, Belmont would push it hard, but Papich and Belmont did disagree on such matters as counter- intelligence operations against the KGB. HW 50955 DBocla: 32261992 Page i0
HW 509455 in Russia. The CIA had\ INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page F of £7 vas SECRET Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents, in the 50's the CIA's general attitude was not to investigate or surveil Americans overseas. FBI- CIA communications rarely involved U. S. citizen targets unless they clearly involved a KGB agent. In the 1960's, Papich recalls two early incidents of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas. One was the Republic of New Africa, a black group with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals (note by Elliff -- the individual was Robert _ Williams?). The second was Stokely Carmichael, who traveled around the world. The FBI asked the CIA for coverage of Carmichael's contacts overseas but there were no results since the‘CIA had no capability. In retrospect, Papich thinks his importance was exaggerated. Papich does not recall any case or interest of the CIA regarding Dr. King. The FBI levied no requests on the CIA regarding Dr. King. Papich recall ges the FBI thought a black Communist Party mer . contacts with King. The assumption wag : CPUSA was supported and financed by This influenced the FBI's vie ee. There was no way the CIA Ug Ws. the CIA had no penetra Cy O8 one “Communist Party alge HUSA On the CPUSA links to the Soviet Union. 7%) But little or no effort abroad into developing information on this. It was not a CIA priority. CIA was satisfied with FBI coverage of the Communist Party. If the KGB was using it for espionage or influence, the FBI would uncover it. The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA activities. Regarding CPUSA, FBI determined that there was Soviet financial support into the 1960's The FBI attitude as early as the 50's was that the CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA links to the Soviet Union. There were no leads for the CIA to explore in France, Czechoslovakia, etc. If a Communist Party member went to Rome or London, then FBI would ask CIA coverage, but the CIA gave it low priority and produced little. This led to . FBI dissatisfaction with CIA, so FBI went through its legal attaches, who would contact foreign security services. Normally, the CIA was informed but sometimes the CIA was not notified if the FBI called it "an internal security" matter. Papich Boclda: 322681999 Page il 2
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page £2 of oo c= SECRET stresses that this is a problem. What is the dif- ference between "internal security" and "counter- intelligence" and “positive intelligence"? FBI would use these distinctions as an excuse not to notify CIA. Regarding the legal attaches, Papich was in Rio de Janerio after World War II. The FBI had moved out when the CIA moved in, but Hoover wanted to have someone there anyway. Papich stayed a year but wanted out since he disliked doing only liaison work with local police and CIA. The legal attaches were never operations and dealt with foreign security pail major exception wag@Wecheicou ens acquiescence, the FBI was Opera ional. ‘age was through sources going back ae and may still exist. SG A There were six or severilegal attache offices from the 1950's until Papich left in 1970. Papich feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should be closely coordinated with the CIA so that their assets and sources do not duplicate the CIA. A FBI man abroad can be useful to the intelligence counnaee, 4 ree his liaison with local police. heecounterintelligence field of a R ar Boula ‘be by the CIA. Coverage oS) (Fat) Member should be joint FBI-CIA. There never has been such coordination. The legal attache should be involved in operations through his liaison contacts. Papich e following example: the CIA and S | ny’ pave good liaison for counterintel- ye Spec” igence coverage. If a joint overage(¢ target is coming to the U. egal . fe) prepare ( (1A) n the U.S. ; attache should be involved for the transfer of coveragé Papich sees the implications of this for the ¢ to have a single counterintelligence agency. There would be advantages of centralization, communication, and security. Be HW 50955 Docld:322781992 Page i2 CEORE ON
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page “1 of When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence service for coverage of an FBI target, it asks for any information rather than specifying the data. This is because foreign services may be penetrated by the KGB. Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft in France or the "17 wiretaps". through the roof. Hoover these investigations sg would be a top officié For example, under PQ Sgt Kennedy the FBI did identify a top source Of leaks, gave the informa- tion to Kennedy, and nothing was done. The secu- rity committee was created to deal with leaks. Rach agency would handle its own, although the President could still order the FBI to enter the ease. % cs ot haere would be done. Papich did not recall anything about Anna Chennault, but he did recall that during the Korean War there was a request of a top American citizen regarding those negotiations. Papich says he talked them out of it. Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens, Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage of New Left travel abroad about 1967. He does not recall an FBI interest as early as 1965, at the time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on antiwar protests. Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request to CIA nor did he know when Ober's unit was set up. He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his unit but he did know of its existence after it was established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular group leaders. The Bureau wanted to know if there was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders. These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not know CIA project codewords). There wag_no CIA o- of, a, to cover antiwar contacts Mo uw) (F8!) . he CIA's attitude toward this new issue\™, a Similar to the old assumptions about the CPUSA. HY 50955 DBocld:322761992 Page 13 ; rt
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page /Z of x/ "3 mod RPh The accepted view at CIA was that it was impor- tant to determine if there was foreign support or sabotage training. After 1967, FBI-CIA contacts on this topic developed rapidly. There were few really valuable CIA results nor was much obtained through the FBI, the legal attaches, or informants going abroad. ; Papich referred to the climate of press commentary, assassinations, allegations of sabotage plans, and bombings. There was "a potential for panic within the intelligence community" since no one had the coverage they thought tney needed. Travel of U.S. antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed impor- tant, although sometimes after inquiry the individuals were found not to be important. Therefore, time was spent on targets who should not have been targets but this was a new task. Hoover did not understand the issue. He thought New Left CPUSA links were most important. Papich never thought the CPUSA responsible for development of the New Left or SDS. CPUSA did try to use the New Left. Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled \ CPUSA day to day. Some of his assumptions had been proved wrong. In World War [I days, yes, the Soviets used CPUSA for recruitment. In the late 40's and 50's, the Soviets changed their policy, no longer using CPUSA for this purpose. Hoover was never convinced of tnis cnange. Papich recognized the possibility that there might be a reversal of Soviet policy regarding CPUSA but Papich's top concern has always been AGB penetra- tion of CIA, FBI, NSA, etc., as well as the question of how good the double agents are. Regarding the theory of KGB aims)for using U.S. dissidents, the main problem was lack of knowledge. In the 40's and 50's, the FBI was confident of its knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to influence U. S. politics, but in the Late 50's the Bureau's coverage of new sroups was tremendously weak. The FBI recognized this. The CIA stressed it also for three reasons: (1) tne increase in FBI requests for CIA information, (¢; the White House requests, and (3) CIA officials own concern about inadequate coverage. The conciusion was that intelligence regarding people wro went abroad was inadequate. , HW 50955 Docld:32261992 Page 14
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY | Page (Pot </ exe SEGRET Papich had no personal involvement with White House requests. There was discussion both in the FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage and development of sources. For example, does CIA have anybody who can have an entree into SDS? The Katzenbach report had limited the CIA to foreign sources or to U. S. students recruited abroad. Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this, but also with Angleton and Tom Karamenses (DDP). Papich believes anything Ober said and did reflected CIA policy from the top. The operation grew like Topsy. CIA compartmented it ve j Pr tightly and Ober was very security conscj the FBI, W. C. Sullivan was concerned ggg by the assassinations, riots, and bgth& put on the pressure to find out He pressed Papich to pressurg acted alone. No one H@B’NinswWered the question of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union. Did he get any guidance? Why did they permit him to leave? Papich had frequent discussions with Dulles and the CIA regarding the Warren Commission although he thinks the formal FBI liaison was Jim Malloy. The question as to whether Oswald was a U. S. intelligence asset never arose. Critics at the time said the FBI should have surveilled Oswald. Papich recalls discussions of a plan to have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such plan was ever implemented to his knowledge. It was not worth the risk. He does not know whether the CIA did it. He stresses that the FBI was not likely to use "nuts", Regarding the Riha incident, Papich says this was not the reason for his retirement. Instead, there were problems with Hoover on operations and policy: decisions. Papich was HS) an aggressive stand LR (FB). a on coverage o | Soviets oI (S one's proposal on expanded FBI cover- meiPapich stated that others in the G) ( ) (FRA MceCone to press for more coverage. McCone was aggressive. Papich pusned it too. This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis. some SECRET HW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 15
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page Lf ot _&/ | @ “SECRET Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues but proposals for major new operations went to PFTAB for support. Clifford was chairman. Papich doesn't know what Hoover said to Clifford, but the answer on the proposal was negative. The proposal involved more extensive and sophisticated elec- tronic surveillance. This was at the time of dis- covery of microphones in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, as well as an increase in the numbers KGB attempts to recruit U. S. citizens 4 does not think COINTELPRO was deve longals alternative to this. e> . Hoover's rejection of McCongs® " re influence CIA attitudes toward thegif®EgeurlaA saw the FBI as not being "a clandestine ge ircy". CIA's view was that FBI had to reject CIA“proposals as illegal. When Papich lectured to CIA recruits he attempted to orient CIA to the FBI's limits. On the other hand, FBI did not understand CIA functions abroad. Returning to the Riha incident, Papich stressed that he clashed with Hoover every year and that their relationship had declined steadily after 1966. By fall of '69, he saw his value as nil. In December '69, he decided to retire the follow- ing. spring. In February 1970, while winding up his normal business, the Riha incident arose. Professor Riha disappeared from the university. There was faculty and press interest in Boulder, Colorado, and a Congressional inquiry came to FBI. But FBI opened no case or-investigation. In March of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado came to a CIA man in domestic contact service in Boulder to inquire about the disappearance. The CIA man called two friends in the Denver FBI office. FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and dis- covered that marital problems had led to the dis- appearance. CIA man told the university president what he learned from "reliable government sources". The president told the press. The local district attorney called the president and asked his source. The president went back to his CIA source. The CIA source then promptly contacted the CIA officer in Denver, who contacted the Denver FBI SAC. The CIA officer suggested that he and the SAC go to the va district attorney to say that the original source Los was local police, but the SAC rejected the idea and (4A. HY 50955 DBocld: 32261992 Page 16 6
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page (Sof <7 SEGRET FILE: wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent who gave the information. The CIA officer refused and there was a bitter clash. (Things like this had happened in the past. FBI field agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always told them to get on with the job.) The SAC sent a teletype to Hoover. Hoover said to Papich, go to Helms and get the identity of the FBI sourge. Helms called in the CIA man, who refused toget identify him. Helms sent Hoover a lettagmé this and said he was "taking the nege@ trative action". Hoover noted ongt® continue liaison with CIA". a | Papich then wrote a long “Pesignation to Hoover instead of his §¥ aYprief resignation note. He strongly appt ceo Hoover to reconsider and keep communications oBen. He also raised serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions. Hoover was not happy. Papich says there had been dozens of incidents like this before. He did not confer with anyone in the FBI about his letter. W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring things up. (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI it's OK with him for the Committee to get the letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover. The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.) Regarding the 1966 cutbacks, Papich thinks it started with the Long Committee hearings on the Internal Revenue Service. After the Kennedy Administration, and especially under Attorney General Clark, there were cutbacks i 1B (1) W. C. Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at USIB meetings. Papich would discuss FBI-CIA problems witb willivan. Papich stressed the need . [8 CG ) —____»¥—____— . WW 50955 Docld: 32281992 Page i? ; . pee
HY 50955 Boclda: 3227681992 Page i168 INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY = Page /@ of 7 Regarding the CIA and Sbcal police, the only thing Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA's relation- ship with New York City police. The purpose was not operations, but protection of CIA New York facilities. He was also aware of relationships between Washington, D. C., and suburban police for protection of CIA facilities and personnel. He ) ‘knew that some CIA employees joined questionable groups and that the CIA was concerned about its personnel associating with radicals and protesters. The CIA Office of Security informed the FBI in 1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in protest groups. The information provided to the FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap". Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA sources. He is not aware of any CIA activity re- garding Women's Strike for Peace, nor was he aware of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations. CIA should have relied on FBI. Bill Creager was succeeded as liaison with Office of Security by Fred Cassidy. They provided memo- randa to the FBI Intelligence Division on all trans- actions with CIA. Creager kept Papich advised, especially of the potential for flaps and for successful operations. Papich believes Office of Security was restricted both in number of personnel and by CIA rules. It could claim a need to protect its own facilities and personnel but it didn't have significant capability. If it did, it would have been detected by the FBI. Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965, Papich recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President and the National Security Council. Johnson may have asked the FBI for help. An FBI agent from the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and possibly from Mexico City, were sent to the Dominican Republic. This was done with CIA approval and the joint effort was successful. There were no flaps. The FBI agent had sources all over Central America going back to World War II. Other FBI activities in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI's role in Havana before Castro, Jamaica, Miami, and San Juan. In all these areas the FBI's capability was based
on personal relationships going back to World War II. In the late 1960's, the FBI went into El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste of FBI manpower. Regarding Cubans in Miami, there were many flaps with CIA. For example, CIA would attempt to recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba, the exile would ask the FBI about it, and Hoover would get mad. The FBI would not be informed about CIA cover companies screening exiles. The FBI investi- gated one cover company until it discovered the CIA cover. CIA tried to recruit FBI sources with- out checking out FBI. Papich is sure CIA "must have" used agents to cover local Miami Cubans. But FBI had excellent coverage and would protest when CIA took an interest in somebody FBI was investigating. There would be general protests to CIA to stay out of counterintelligence. Some problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent in charge. There was minimum FBI contact with CEA operations. Some names involved here are (< c PaReaa cheese eceased; Bill Harvey; and a (S) \A itzgerald. , Regarding CIA counterintelligence against Cubans in New York, Papich said the policy was no counterintelligence by CIA. He has no recollection of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal activities, but Papich admits he would have learned only if there was a flap. Regarding CIA Domestic Operations Division, Papich formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relation- ships. The problem, as noted earlier, was CIA aya) atthe zens foreign officials in the U. 5 (SA CS) emeatet. Hoover finally, reluctantly, S) >, reed to the 1966 understanding. Papich warned CIA that if there were continuing flaps, Hoover would withdraw his agreement and "it would be my ie butt". There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where Domestic Operations Division attempted to recruit and failed to advise FBI. If CIA was interested in a Soviet bloc intelligence service recruitment, FBI said no. If either Domestic Operations Division or the counterintelligence staff was interested in ‘any Soviet in the U. S., they touched base with FBI. But they felt that if FBI had allowed them to recruit they could have succeeded. HW 50955 Docld:32261992 Page 19 . /
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page /§ of </ Regarding postal intercept, CIA came “up “with the proposition, said they had entree, and desired it for positive intelligence. CIA dial work, The focus was air mail to and Prom lca S) (Fav) gave FBI the products where FBI nad "stops" on | persons of interest and also where other informa- tion might be of interest to FBI. It provided some leads to intelligence agents. Papich recalls . a brief mail intercept. e early 1950's on the West Coast regarding itt was stopped atter(S) (FBI) a@ new postmaster arrive Papich stated that the New York operation was of greater benefit to the ge CIA for itive intelligence hn CEB] gas (S S) Xow s meetings with CIA and —— AEA pearesso( Fal) pecmmnpereeerfus, not much worthwhile ‘a OMENTtin the Miami area {Tana CS CS) Ga) itor ine The. BI would get leads for mit OE 8) Cra) As etr récalls no other areag [fn the ro av, we Regarding CIA Domestic Contact Service, FBI would get positive intelligence reports, for example, on an alien coming to the United States. The FBI was interested in his training in Russia as a possible source regarding Soviet intelligence activities. The CIA Domestic Contact Service would provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups. They got the information from faculty and students regard- ing future riots. The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities were set by the intelligence community, for. example, gather whatever they can about missiles. . The FBI would not task DCS. If DCS went into opera- tions, FBI itself was upset. But DCS had good officers who would note potential for counter- intelligence use. There was no increase in DCS traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969. The creation of DCS in 1947 worried Hoover, who feared an internal security role. It was set up by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact between FBI and the DCS at the fieid level. The procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview HW 50955 Docld: 32281992 Page 20
HW 450955 an alien, a form was submitted by FBI.” “¢ttnen Docld: 32231992 es i got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation. Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluates the potential for a double agent or the possibility of recruitment. FBI usually goes to the agency and tells them the situation to prevent access to sensitive information. Also, the agency can give FBI assistance. The CIA Office of Security is "paranoid" on this subject. It is very concerned if there is a report on a CIA employee assoclating with bloc nationals. Before telling the FBI, it would do as much as it could on its own so there would be something to discuss. In one case the CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was a spy, predicated on its analysts’ conclusions from a photograph. FBI refused to move on the basis of this alone. There were other cases where FBI and CIA had different evaluations of evidence. It depended on what CIA gave FBI. CIA was "jumpier" than FBI. . If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own employees, it never checked with FBI. The same was true for physical surveillance of its own employees. If the FBI had known, it would have raised hell, but it never came to FBI attention and there was no policy discussion of the subject. If the CIA wanted to do something with its own assets with Attorney General or White House approval, it would not check with FBI. But it would coordinate with FBI if it saw a risk that FBI would discover. Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen. Papich adds his view that every newsman assigned to Moscow is useful to the KGB. A newman who may have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a target in the U. S. Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity "tainting" a criminal case. CIA would make sources available for criminal prosecutions. Page 21 . —
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Pagea’o of ~</ Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls proposals for developing cover in the U. 8S. for going overseas. Ober advised Papich of the develop- ment of sources in the U. S. to cover overseas targets. Papich would write a memo on the situa- tion and provide any relevant FBI information. He also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA if they travel overseas. Papich stresses that FBI sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working through CIA but never got very far. Papich gives the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and reported back through CIA. Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather information on policy guidance, funding, and train- ing of U. S. dissidents overseas. There was a large volume of communication covering names like Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups. FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investiga- tion regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must recognize the evidentiary rules. If there were prosecutions (very few), it was never necessary to disclose CIA data. CIA sources were not in a position to testify. Papich does not recall ask- ing CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might have originated with electronic surveillance over- seas. Any If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief. Papich would insist on identification of the sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI did get access to sources, sometimes working through a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI. Papich recalls di Ss "notional" £4, i hep; groups targeted atl he presran(S) | (F81) was not implemente erore ne Te n 1970. It could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence Division but they would have come to Papich if CIA was needed. Papich discussed with Far East Division in CIA. Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer. to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the entire intelligence community, including the White ° a HW 350955 DBocld:327261992 Page 22 . oa
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page g/ of 2/ sel O A ) B Gav). Vance where TSD provided documents to FBI and ) he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of CIA alias documentation or other document forging. If this had been done, it would have had to go through Papich. Papich knew nothing about Vesco. On Ober memgs to FBI, Papich recalls a code b designatidg  —  CC‘(C§ Whe purpose was so (SS) ) rt) that when TMPormatier came toack to CIA from FBI it could be sent directly to Ober. The counter- intelligence staff had an office to log communica- tions. The determination as to what FBI informa- tion would go to Ober was first based on Ober's request for specifics.and second based on FBI criteria which considered whether there would be any possible CIA results. FBI would alert Ober regarding an individual and ask for any informa- tion generally about his overseas activity. QW) Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and enter- ing operations in the 1960's Regarding CIA security research staff, Papich recalled that it concentrated on developing counter- intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton- type" operation, doing research on penetration of the CIA. It also analyzed and evaluated the exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might have been Communists or have had World War II Communist contacts. For example, in Germany until the mid-50's, CIA was vulnerable to recruitment by Communist intelligence. CIA brought in brilliant minds who might still have strong identification © i with their home countries in eastern and middle Europe. Finally, Papich and Creager felt that "the guts of liaison" was with DDP on counterintelligence, not on their internal security problems. With Office of Security there was a small number of investiga- tions overlapping FBI. HY 50955 DBocld:322781992 Page 23 , $