Volunteers could be vrocessed tarough "Sheepdip" (sani- d tized and proper arrangements made in event of capture 2 or death). Sanitized USAF erews to man the four unmanned 3 CIA aircraft cam be provided in about 10 days. 4h (4) CIA can support approximately four sorties per 5 day with 2-4 B-26s based at Pakhli., Additional sorties 6 will require augmentation of the CIA task foree with ri operational planning, intelligence, maintenance, armament 8 and ordnance personnel, 9 4. Helicopter 0 Operations: Addit ional helicopter support is LO fundamental to the success of the vroposéd operation. cP a. A total of 20 H-34 helicopters are required to provide L2 airlift and pickup in the forward areas which lack landing LS fields for fixed-wing aircraft, a4 b. At prese ent, CAT has four engaged in operations, An LS additional sixteen can be furnished by the Department of 16 Defense within a week, Suitable aireraft are not available L? on the commercial market. Ostensibly they will be owned 18 anc operated by CAT, LQ c¢. CAT has four qualified pilots flying these H-34s and 20 is experiencing great difficulty in locating more as they 21 are in short supply cutside the armed services, The Depart- ne ment of Defense can supply sixteen additional pllots within 23 about 10 days. They will be processed through "Sheepdip" ah. and ostensibly be employed by CAT, ee) d. Their present hourly vate of up to 100 hours of 26 flying per month is exceptional, It is difficult to eae estimate the sorties avallable because their mission times 28 vary so drastically. 29 Docld: 324275007. .Page.19 |
onan ene TOP SECRET é. Maintenance personnel are in short supply, and it will i be necessary to move a military maintenance unLt in to main~ tain the 20 airerart. CHP BO has a site near Nong Khai, Thailand, in mind for a maintenance base. Bangkok is too far away, and -the airfield at Vientiane too vulnerable to rebel action. A Marine maintenance unit can be moved into thailand from PACOM in 2-3 days. Personnel would comprise ee) Operations and Maintenance personnel and 75 base support. 9+ Airlift Operations: 2 a. Using Vientiane, there is a requirement for sixteen 1Q- operational C46 equivalents plus 4 C130's during the peak 1 phase of the attack. An estimated ten C46's daily are Le required prior to the troop drop and thirteen C46's daily 13 after the troop drop. 14 b. CAT can supply 4 C130 crews, and the Defense Depart- 15 ment can supply the aircraft. 16 c. CAT has eleven C46's and four CH7's assigned to South- 17 east Asian operations. It can make available one more Cl:7.. 18 and three DC4's which are presently used on other commit- 19 ments. The FAL has seven C47's. 20 d. CAT has adequate personnel to operate their aircraft, © 21 and the FAL can count on using five C47's with FAL pilots. ae e. It is urgent to shorten the turn-around time of the 23 Clu6 and CH7 aircraft being used to supply the FAL. This ah can be most effectively accomplished by airlifting supplies. 25 by USAF aircraft directly into Vientiane. If this is not 26 permitted and the present Shuttle between Bangkck and dl Vientiane is continued, there will not be sufficient 23 operational C46 equivalents available during the most 29 crucial phases of the battle. 30 ae © ay cA ed C2 ent by Wi is sa wes maori DoclId: 32425007... Page. 20
EAD SRO aE cea TOP SECRET 6. Artillery Support. During the final assault phase on Plaine des Jarres it is anticipated FAL will need up to four 105 mn artillery batteries in addition to present capabilities. Because of the time frame involved, these units with equipment Will be obtained from Thai volunteer forces. 7. Augmentation of PEO and JUSMAAG Personnel. In order to provide Chief, PEO, and Chief, JUSMAAG, increased advisory, logistical, interpreter, and technical assistance, necessary personnel augmentation will be furnished on a priority basis. Personnel requisitions for this augmentation will be forwarded by these organizations as soon as requirements are determined. TOP. SECRET 6 Docld: 32425007 ..Page 21 oe (OOO CN 10 il
CRET ASSESSMENT OF RISKS i. It must be recognized that the plenned operation will present the opposition with a decision as to ite response, 2. We consider 1t most likely that the enemy will seek sof spots, particularly in southern Laos, to create counter- pressure. If the planned PDJ operation is successful, it should be possible for the FAL to meet this threat, 3. SNIE 58-€1, dated 21 February 1961, provides an estimate of Communist Bloc response to the use of "volunteer" combat aircraft by the PAL in Laos. This estimate is: "The commitnent of 'wolunteer! combat airerart: to 2 es yo toms eRGEORON AMA NN 53 SN aN _AtcouHiNe een RONONRNEMANone Bround support operations in Lao The Bloc would probably seék to increase PL AAA capabilities, possibly covertly & ‘a OD tee introducing DRV-AAA unites, oviet threats would be. made gainst the (Theil, Vietnamese, or other} bases supporting the air operations. The chances are about even that ‘volunteer! Communist ground attack aircraft would be committed in Laos. However, the chances of such commit- ment would rise sharply if the non-Communist aircraft had attacked and destroyed Soviet airlift aircraft. We belteve it less likely that Communist air strikes would be atteinpt against the supporting non-Communist air bases," It is considered possible to meet this threat without further escalation on our part. 4, Should this not. be possible, overt US air support from outside Laos may be necessary, 5. We consider Lt important to leave the enemy uncertain as to our reaction should the other side then further escalate, 6. The reported recent arguments between the Soviets and the CHICOMs indicate that the Soviets are sensitive to the dangers of escalation. Failure on cur part to present them TOP SECRET Docld: 32425007 | Page 22 ad
with this risk would tend to support the GHTCOM position ‘that aeeressive Communist action presents less risk to the Ray Communist side than the more careful operations implied by the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" program s 7. An essential complement to the military actions proposed is the requirement for concomitant political action to insure Cu that our limited military objectives are Clearly understood by the Communist Bloc. On this basis &, the advantages to be gained far outweigh the risks involved. TOP SECRET 2 Docld: 32425007 Page 23