178-10004-10087 eee REE cnn nenstattnnennnnnnnnnt REM v9.1 HiT AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : * RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : 50955 Docld: 32112749 Page 12 JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information WILDEROTTE 178-10004-10087 ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS (3) Document Information CIA CARL, OFFICE OF THE DD/S&T BUCHEN, PHILIP [Restricted] 07/16/1975 17 CIA ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS REPORT Secret Consulted Withhold 08/06/1993 Transmittal memo and 15-page report. } 7 ay Date: 8/27/20)
. df 10 July 1975 Bs ; DATE: Office of the DD/S2T SUBJECT: Attached Report 178-10004-10087 . REMARKS: Phil: Attached is the interim report on the problem you and I have discussed recently. I stress the term interim Since we have received - new information from Defense as recently as yesterday and have not exhausted our own Search for information within CIA, Recognizing your concern that the investigation be conducted with the Participation of some that we were unable to find a satisfactory solution -- let me briefly outline the approach I followed. I stressed objectivity and tried to assure that no persons who were potentially a party to the activities in question had any Opportunity to destroy information or materia] which might be related, My Associate Deputy Director, Dr. Sayre Stevens, i ti ith technical an MD with an outstanding FeSearch background but hired by Photocopy from Gereid R. Ford Library — awe pPisat IMet WARS Aptop as yatege g notes ee MALTS SBOE ES pape LE ety ins SREST PTA Betty ot tin 93 98 Bia aint: PERS | by KI 9 Jed grace Wa sees HW 50955 Docld:3271127749 Page 2?
CIA only a couple of years ago and could not possibly have had any prior knowledge or involvement. Additionally, I used personne] from my own staff to assure that compilation of inventory, etc. was done in presence of people representing me, who again could have had no prior involvement. As I noted earlier, we are continuing our investigation internally as well as jointly with DOD. We will keep you informed. Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Litwary HY 50955 Docld:37112749 Page 3
HW 30955 Doctld: 32112749 Page a  oinmena @ ATA eee AE EEL. tke SENSITIVE SPACEY SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF MKNAOMI Project Discovery. The initial identification of the relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible questionable activity requiring further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated with the project in response to. the repetitive appeals of the DCI that all past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the attention of Agency management. -As a result of the information provided by him and by two other officers identified as having some awareness of the project, it became clear that further investigation of the matter was in order. Concern about these assertions was heightened because the A/DDS&T had noted. in a recent review of the 1963 IG Survey of the Technical Services Division (TSD) that approximately $90,000 in that current fiscal year was spent at |Fort Detrick "for the maintenance of a BW capability". This statement appeared sO important that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to questions about the activity, the cognizant officer in TSD -- now the Office of - Technical Service (OTS) -- reported that a small effort had been carried on at Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of incapacitants and BW/CW oe uel E2 IMP DET . Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library im PRL: sy
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library detection and did not carry the serious implications of the IG's report. It had in any event been terminated some years ago. The A/DDS&T was satisfied with this response. When new and more disturbing information about the nature of the Fort Detrick activity emerged, however, the words of the IG Survey tended to give it credibility. Thus, late in April 1975 a search was begun for any records or other information available on the project. Difficulties were immediately encountered because the project cryptonym could not be identified. The search for records of fund transfers to Fort Detrick did ultimately produce information in that regard, however, and checks by the Office of Security on one of the individuals - {dentified as having been involved in Fort Detrick activities did provide the MKNAOMI cryptonym. This enabled OTS to recall the proper files from Records Center; two MKNAOMI files were retrieved. Some additional information was also. produced from the Office of Logistics files. This collection of material largely confirmed the nature of the project as reported by the informants and identified 4 a number of people involved in the activity. Additional cause for concern _ resulted from the association of several of these people with specific. assassinatic plans as revealed in the IG's report on that activity. A major concern after the discovery of the records involved the disposition of a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible Agency use. It was not known whether or not these materials had been destroyed along with the Army's BW stockpiles in response to Presidential Directives of November 1969 and February 1970. An unsigned memo raising the question of the disposition of Agency materials maintained by Fort Detrick posed the option of having it stored ina commercial laboratory. It was the impression of those in OTS who were familiar with the project that the material had in fact been destroyed but no records confirming it could be found. In an attempt to find such confirmation, laboratory storage facilities in OTS were searched and in the vi) HW 50955 Docld:327112749 Page 5
course of that search about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 6 mg of cobra venom ~~ but none of the other materials -- were discovered. . Subsequent to the decision in late April that a full investigation of the Ft. Detrick project was needed, all information uncovered was passed to the OCI, to Staff members of the Rockefeller Commission and to the White House staff handling Intelligence Community investigation matters. In June, Senator Church was informed by Rod Hills of the White House that a sensitive activity was under investigation. sources of Information. | This summary report on the activity is based upon an investigation utilizing: (1) the files and documents uncovered as a result of the initial search which are limited and contain only a smal] number of Agency-originated documents; (2) -the material found in OTS storage which includes the shellfish toxin and several. pieces of delivery hardware; (3) interviews voluntarily given by current Agency employees who had some knowledge of the project and by a number of retired employees indicated by the records as having been more deeply involved at stages of particular interest. (Included in the latter category are Tom Karamessines, Cornelius Roosevelt, Ray.Treichler, | (4). intormation contained in the iG‘s Report on assassination pianning and [5) information developed by a DOD investigation initiated as a result of conversa- tions with the White House about the matter; this information was only recently received and has not been widely incorporated in this report, however. Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick. The Agency association with Fort Detrick involved the Special Operations Division (SOD) of that facility. This Division was apparently responsible for 3 or Oey from * Gerald R. Ford Library HY 50955 Docld:371127749 Page 6
ef developing special applications for BW agents and toxins. The principal customer 7” ee H, Ea = of its activities appears to have been the U.S. Army Special Forces. Its concern was beth with the development of suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for special use in paramilitary situations. These applications clearly included One-on-one situations in which clandestine delivery was a concern. Both standard BW agents and biologically derived toxins were investigated by the Division. Discussions with former Fort Detrick employees indicates that SOD was first established as a distinct, highly secure activity within Fort Detrick in about 1948, though no records. going back that far have been found. The Division was abolished in 1970 or 1971 as the Fort Detrick operation was terminated. CIA Relationships with SOD. The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May 1952 through a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer for the performance | of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick: The animus for establishing this relationship seems to have been a belief in OTS that the special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biological materials of all sorts provided the Agency with expertise and capabilities which were appropriate to its function and not otherwise available... Discussions indicate that the perception of the requirement for such capabilities was tied to- | earlier: OSS experience, Initial funding was at the $200,000 a year level which grew to a high point in FY 1958 of $390,000 and then dwindled to $75,000 a year: in the late 1960's. Though there appear to be some gaps in available funding records, total Agency funding in the period from FY 1953 through FY 1970 is ate Photocopy Geraid R. Ford Library HY 50955 Docld:327112749 Page 7
SECRET estimated to have been somewhat more than $3 million. These funds were apparently used to generally augment the level of effort undertaken by SOD. Agency requirements for specific R&D were not levied in any programmatic way, but rather the Agency identified particular work being done by SOD as part of its program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then levied requirements for the customizing of such developments for Agency use. Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined. Thus a project approval memo of 1967 identifies the four functional categories of project activity: | a. Maintenance of a stockpile of incapacitating and lethal © agents in readiness for operational use; b. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated balance of biological and chemical] disseminating systems for operational readiness; d. Provide technical support and consultation on request to meet ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive BW/CH. In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use. 5 : Ph whe? Gerald R. Ford Library HY 50955 Docld:327112749 Page 6
Project Management within CIA. From its outset the project was characterized by a compartmentation that was extreme even by CIA standards. Only two or three Agency officers at any given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. This work was managed first within the Biology Branch and later in the Chemistry Branch of TSB. Because of the sensitivity of the activity, queries by operations officers as to the availability of materials and delivery systems of the type being developed at Fort Detrick were automatically turned away by TSD unless initial approval for contact had been given by the Deputy Director for Plans. Even when this was the case, the Chief of TSD often referred the operations :officer directly to one of the cleared officers dealing with Fort Detrick and was never informed as to the nature of the discussions. ~ This method of procedure has been confirmed both through interviews and by the IG report on assassination planning. No written records were kept. . Though some CIA-originated documents have been found in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation of activities took place. No records on such things as material control, receipt, delivery, destruction, etc. can be found. No documents relating to any possible operational use of the material have been found. The files as they exist are quite different from those normally maintained in the course of a typical CIA R&D project. As noted above, funding to the project was provided simply on the basis of augmenting the level of effort established by Army funding. There appears to have been no relation of funding to specific tasking, nor can any strict accounting of funds on the basis of effort expended in the Agency's behalf be found. Project officers with whom discussions were held stated thac the funding was simply provided to maintain the availability to the Agency of the capabilities 6 SRE Photocopy Stine i fram Geraid R. Ford Library HY 50955 Docld: 37117749 Page 3
| GEOLET of SOD. Finally, there is little evidence of much specific program definition on the part of the Agency. Though occasional specific requests for material or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed Operational problem can be found, the Agency with one or two exceptions through the years appears to have ridden on a program generated internally by SOD largely on the basis of Special Forces requirements. There are one or two exceptions which will be discussed below. Activities of Peculiar CIA Interest. Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an overriding interest in incapacitants, particularly in later years, available records make it clear that CIA interests included maintaining a stockpile of ~vr rv eoucuaacascaennnnnnnnroinannrrnetenmenenenn lethal materials and delivery systems. / ee sn enrnnennennnn nena Primary Agency interest seemed’to relate to the development of dissemination equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept on the shelf. A number of such dissemination ‘devices appear to be peculiarly suited for the type of clandesti use one might associate with Agency operations. Some of these were included among hardvare stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsenal subsequent to the closure of SOD: attache cases rigged to disseminate an agent into the air, a cigarette 7 Photocopy from. Gerald R. Ford Library HY 50955 Docld: 327112729 Page 10
case rigged to disseminate an agent when lighted, a fountain pen dart launcher, “an engine head bolt designed to release an agent when heated, a fluorescent light starter to activate the light and then release an agent, etc. Available records do not indicate whether or not all these were developed specifically for the CIA, though. the DOD investigation has identified the head bolt device as falling into such a category. The easy association of this equipment with specific Agency requirements because of its nature is apt to be misleading, however. At a meeting in June 1952, at the very outset of the Agency's associa- tion with SOD when CIA representatives stated they as yet had no specific re- quirements, a list of SOD priorities for work on dissemination devices was provided. This dissemination list included such things as cigarettes, chewing gum, cigarette lighters, wrist watches, fountain pens, rings, etc. Presumably work on these devices was already underway in response: to Army Special Forces requirements. Nevertheless, the Agency clearly showed an interest in such devices and levied requirements for the special preparation of some. 8 ae i Photocopy from eraid R. Ford Library HW 50955 Docld: 327112749 Page 11
shelifish Toxin. By the late 1960's, a stockpile of some 15 to 20 different BN agents and toxins was maintained on a regular basis by SOD for possible Agency use. The supply included such agents as food poisons, infectious viruses, lethal botulinum toxin, paralytic shellfish toxin, snake (krait) venon, Microsporeum gypseum which Produces severe skin disease, etc. Varying amounts of these materials ranging from 100 grams to 100 milligrams were maintained. As noted above, with the Presidential Order requiring the destruction of Army BW and toxin stockpiles, the question was raised as to the disposition of Agency materials. Though specific accounting for each agent on the list is not on hand, DOD indicates that, with the likely exception of. the shellfish toxin, all of these materials were in fact destroyed by SOD personnel. The shellfish. toxin -- along with 8 milligrams of cobra venom -- was found by David Boston, currently Chief of the Chemistry Branch, in Vault B10. in the basement of South Building which houses OTS. This vault is a lightly used laboratory area and historically associated with the Biology and Chemistry "Branches of OTS. It has been regularly used for the storage of dangerous materials of various types. In past years, the combination to the vault had been available | only to the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Chemistry Branch and their secretary. More recently, the combination had been given to other members of the Chemistry _ Branch as well. With the discovery of the material on 20 May, however, the combination was changed and is now available only to the Chief of the Chemistry Branch, his secretary, and OTS security officers. On 13 June the vault was put under 24-hour guard. | 10 Photocopy from Stind Fae aad se ERR | Gereid R. Ford Ubrary HW 50955 Docld: 321127749 Page 13
The freezer in which the toxin was found is located under one of the. work benches in the laboratory. The Fort Detrick material was the only thing in the freezer and was in two one-gallon cans along with several smaller con- tainers. There were no labels on the gallon cans, but on top of each was a folded piece of paper with pertinent information about the contents. This information provided the types and amounts of material and the date on which it was put into storage. The shellfish toxin was, according to this information, put into the freezer in February 1970, and the cobra venom, in February 1961. The shellfish toxin was packaged in several different forms including two individual doses in tablet form. | The discovery of the material was a result of repeated attempts by Boston to determine what disposition had been made af Agency BY materials held by Fort Detrick. In making one more check on this, he called | la former Chief of the Chemistry Branch, who retired in September 1972, and asked him if- he knew what the disposition had been. stated that he thought that perhaps some of the shellfish toxin might not have been destroyed and was in storage in OTS. In following up on this lead, Boston found the material in the freezer. Though hard to understand, such material could in fact be stored for so long without anyone being aware of it. The laboratory is no longer used for the type of work for which it was originally built and had become a disordered storage facility. There have been no requirements for use of the freezer in the inter- ° vening years and_it is indeed possible that no. occasion arose to. investigate the contents of the freezer. There have been. no reported functioning difficulties with the freezer during this entire period. 11 Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library HY $0955 Docld:3271127749 Page i4
After finding the shellfish toxin in the vault, a complete inventory was taken. A large number of dangerous chemicals or drugs of various types were found. These materials relate to a number of past programs of TSD, including the drug project, the development of harassment materials for crowd control or meeting disruption, crop contamination programs, etc. Small amounts of several other lethal preparations were found. Two of these are known to have been obtained by the Agency for testing at Fort Detrick. Nothing is known about three. others. Also found were a number of L-Pills issued to agents, and formerly to U-2 pilots, for suicide purposes in the event of capture. | Boston contended that he had no recollection of the shellfish toxin having been obtained from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. On 30 June, dis- cussions were held with) in an interview at which Boston was also presen Gordon stated that the toxin had in fact been called back from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory on the basis of his own decision which resulted from - conversations with Boston. It was their belief that the cost and difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to have it destroyed. Apparently no one, including the Chief of TSD, was told of this decision or the fact that the material had been delivered by Fort Detrick. As [| recalled, this took place prior to his being told by the Chief of TSO to inform Fort Detrick that destruction of the material on the inventory list should take place. Boston who was present during this discussion took.no issue with [| _Jaccount. Neither could recall precisely how the material was delivered to OTS, but the DOD investigation indicates that it was delivered to Boston by someone from Fort Detrick. 12 Photocopy from Geraid R. Ford Library tate: HY 530955 Docld: 3271127749 Page 15
was certain that the shellfish toxin in storage in OTS is the same toxin as that listed on the inventory. There is, however, a discrepancy between the amount in storage as calculated from the labels and the amount shown on the inventory. Since the material in storage is in several different forms and complete reliance is placed upon labeling, however, no real discrepancy may actually exist. Discussions with Karamessines have established that he and Helms were aware of the disposition question and that a clear decision had been made that the Agency stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, im accordance with Presidential Directives, the CIA should get completely out of the BY business. The explanation given by as to how the shellfish toxin came to be in Agency storage is fully consistent with other available information. He Stated that the material was always handled with extreme care. Undoubtedly it was simply transferred from one freezer to another and in his view was continually -under adequate control. He is certain that nothing was done with it subsequent to its delivery and prior to his departure from the Agency in 1972. Boston has given assurance that it was untouched subsequent to that. After the discovery of the material, OTS was told to investigate ways in which they could safely dispose of it with full documentation. Edgewood Arsenal. was contacted and arrangements were made to deliver the material to Edgewood for disposal on 11 June 1975. The disposal was to be witnessed by a representative from the IG's office. On the day prior to the scheduled delivery, these arrange- ments were cancelled, however, because the DD/S&T wished to consider further ways of insuring that the destruction of the material could not be later 13. SENET = Gerald R. Ford Library HY $0955 Docld:3271127749 Page 16
SEGHET misinterpreted. Upon informing Edgewood Arsenal of this decision, Boston was told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemical material for the CIA, it would not do so in the case of biological materials since that was not con- Sistent with the mission of the arsenal. No further efforts toward the disposal of the material have taken place, and it remains under guard in the OTS vault. Operational Uses of MKNAOMI Material. There is no record associating the project with actual operations. Dis- cussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers with darts loaded with dog incapacitant may have been delivered for use in - S.E. Asia. They also indicate that some of the material or crop;spoilants may have been employed. While no direct connections to assassination planning have - been found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents being _investigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes for incapacitating . : : / or assassinating Castro. | SEGhET Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Litrary HW 50955 Docld: 321127749 Page it
None of the interviews. undertaken in the course of this investigation provide information about specific. support to operations which may have involved assassination. Roosevelt, who.was Chief of TSD from 1960-1962, believed that discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know few of the details and was skeptical as to. the seriousness of such discussions. Treichler, Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received requests for such support or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible with information he earlier provided to the IG's office during: its investigation of assassination attempts. ‘Treichler may constitute a connection. between the MKNAOMI project and the assassination plots involving Castro. ‘He was the officer responsible for MKNAOMI during this period. The records show his giving direction in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those mentioned in the assassination schemes. Finally, the IG’s report indicates that he delivered such material to other elements of the Agency. Beyond the Castro” schemes, no suggestion can be found that-any of these materials or devices was ever considered for use for lethal purposes. Photocopy from SEERET Gerald R. Ford Library HW 50955 Docld:321127749 Page 16