14-00000 760, suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appré- ciation of or respoct for &n "objective truth." His ree porting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore retemamem . geem distorted. He might recount events according to his mood of the monent. Thus, fo~ example, if real attachzents + ew to family or friends is impossible for a psychopath, there i be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember _ os . his childrens’ birthdays, why io 1962 (or 1965) he appears to have lied=-or been indifferent to the truth--about his older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall whes he first married. In theory this hypothesis can explain any aberration, since it involves the unknowable. In its most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue and contradictory in major ways, that his uccount of his personal and professional life and his rendition of the. information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that he cannot (and/or does not care to) remember or recount how he did the things he did. Most important, it woula dismiss any conclusions based on NOSENKO's testimony siace nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously. This hypo- thesis, however, is ungupportable because of several factors. First, NOSENKO claims. hat he quickly rose to high supervisory respons ¥ counterintelligence organization which is known to require attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB while’ overcoming the black marks in his file: scandal, indiscip- line, negative background factors, and bad Party record. NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was dnattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational activity was carried out unaccompanied. That his rise re= sulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is untene= able, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage (itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not be dispensed upon such a mental case. Mental aberration to the degree which would explain his poor performance under CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his per= formance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for himself. A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psychoe pathic personality 4s that such a person could be induced to recall certain details with the help of discussion, questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded in dredging up any new details or incidents. Even when reminded, he covld not recall, for example, oné of KOSOLAPOV’s TDYs to Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment from the U.S. Arny Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEY in Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN. Another factor ig the impossibility of applying this hypothesis to the totality. of NOSENKO's reporting. If the hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and others are not, and that he therefore remembers the former and forgeta the latter, it is refuted by the inability ‘to. TOP SECRET
14-00008 - aed A, a 761. find a category of information about himself which he con- Gistently remenbored nor any that he consiscently forgot. ff what {S important is his cwn direct experiences, for example, it is odd that he recéfled the operations of others better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents and people invoived in his oun career; he could recount” details of the PEKKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies among tourists, such as McGOWAN, for which he was responsible; he remembered details of the 1955 MALIA case in which he did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the 1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance to him of recruitment operations against U.S, Embassy em- ployees which permitted him to recall sone details of the STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough to help him recall some of the other details which were equally pertinent to nim personally; and it is not selective memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA personne] in Moscow and KCB action against them. If it is said that his parental family is important to him ( hence his memory of his father’s funeral and the names of his uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details about his childhood. If drinking with important people is meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one GRIBANOY evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what season of the year or in what restauradt they took place. Finally, with reference to the “selective menory” hypo- thesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers best and which he told most confidently that the majority of | inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABiDIAN or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among numerous examples. ce. Embellishment The third possibility is that he has simply embellished and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all, admitted many "white lies" and boasts ("painting" himself, as he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often in ways which led him into more contradictions and further admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this hypothesis, he simply invented, on his own, various aspects of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented “his service in the American Department to make himself more interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough from his operations and from his handlers to think he could ‘pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many of the dubious aspects: ‘the story of his career, his lack of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on @ mumber of points: a iain ©
- 762. @The validity of the To Ect such staffi v and Tourist have becn a sibilities (in view of operations reves pame 4 few o (a) NOSENKO not on} double agea details which the CIA case the double agent; te appreache he did cot direct anformation he fficers qyast have Departments as fairly senior ther exarples t agaiast CIA, {rom inside the c orfice eae He gdentifie ad by tne KGB in y part (Dayle SMITH), Sergeant “SHAPIRO; (a) NOSENKO krew ins {oscuws y Kaew the identity vc checwable nenes by sdenzificed themseives +o a several Anerican information he tb n,ould have tu be @ orke : be says he did, of ficer with bro yoGd notes BELISSKIY, put G2 ASC. including the rs 2 as provided. KOR d in beth the Awerican and wuct ed respur@ : of Tourist Department -... y, To huncreds possidle: of a KGB ene operat ions iu w dcipate, including Robert JOHNSON, and ide information © including operatl at the grabasey in ¥ 1 3N CWI NTERS? mailing of 4 ties of john abil POPOY, the honose ete; end fe) sandr CHEREPANOV which wo “He krew certa outside the KGB staff. for enbellishrent.- -The cm nfirnatio BAPGHOORN and cthe® KGB targets as i a! <4 gonfirzed KUSESKO'S unusual ispoi teoe the CB, Intelligence: that he KOS ENKO'S defection was the by Soviet Intelli Vee | reported the reca : a result of the defection, and these offi Soviet Union. A Soviet j indeed returao to the Thus any © as his rank, mbellishment must co which he has @ d. Corbination of Above Another possibili formance was due to a pathologically selecti is intrinsically more ff some obvious weaknes this theory and round © xuality of two d Thus there would not be any great need no ty might b combination ye memory, iplomatic in details of the story uld not have been r S recruited or hich he said *ANDREY™ Henry n Americacs onal activie letter to officers. of Alek- available much rooa eared before ps of otherse He 3pPp a “cnief,” 39& y pepartmeat Chicf in was more important ournalist told neern only amino jready admitted. of bad seno and eabellis jogical a© ses in any t Toss 2ver Suffered oe CP bE ce: EC Te was @ Deput that his defection was a4 severe blow to Soviet than PENKOVSKLY, paris Watch that seaene creates gence .¥ Sie tore eey Bg ep ie 2 LL to Moscow of many nce staffers as cers did r details such e that NOSENXO'S poor per~ FY¥> psycho hnent. While 4 might correct one of the
ccinte vane ag dont semen Daa ee SE C Mare ree Ae ma Remake = pe qmmmtpeneen oe bitin’ Hh sretenatees donee + oe mmo + en 763. individual theories, It cannot explain the counterargusents discussed under corponent parts above. e. Insaaity Subdaiestannande It might ve pustulatec that NOSESY¥O went insano and that thig was the cause not only of his seeningly unmotivated contact with CIA in 1962 but of shortcomings in his story. However, NOSENKO thereafter tandled senior XGB functions well enough to be promoted ard to be persitted abroad in 1964: he has Seta exenined peric.dically by a CIA psyciolo~ gist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has been in contact over considerable periols of time and under versirg degrees of stress with experienced CIA and FRI personnel; he has saine tained his equilibrium under difficult circumstances. Nore of the foregoing results in an indication of {insanity and there are countless other argunents *#hicn would invalidate thas hypothestis. 3. Second Alternative Yt has also been fostulated that NOSENKO is a psycho~ ee path, is what he says ne is, but that for psychological reasons and while under interrogation, he dia rot want to tell] «what he knew. By this line of reasening, NOSENKO has lied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling on the inconasistescices in NOSESKO's statements, the interroe *ator merely caused more inconsistencies or else received the false answers tnat NOSE'KO did not know or did not re~ member the facts. Uncer interrogation, however, NOSENKO recalled and repeated what he had praviousiy gaid in the less inhibiting atscusphere ef the relaxed debricfings prior to 4 Aprii 1964. This alternative explanation thus does aot account for the factual contradictions in NOSENKO'S reporting before the interrogations, such as the errors in dates, in sourcing on the “ANDREY" case, in de- tails about the Pushkin Strect dead drop, etc. It also fails to account for KOSESKD's retracti ons about his rank as lieutenant colonel, in tue face of the KGB TOY travel autho- rization which shows hin to be a Lieutenant colonel, and about the telegraa recallina: hin to SSB Headquarters ia January 1961. € PgR pyre re, ST EE EE I ae ae ik BP ‘Ihc suszestion that NOSENKO Lied to fe, tet eee ineeuntt ar mean aera en EE CE A a, save face Consequently can be disnissed. 4. Third Alterzative The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, in which case his sisreprescntation was done either on his own orf as part of a KGB operation. 1f he is misrepresenting himself on has own, there are (even in theory) only two possibilities: He is rerely exage ’ gerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or he is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, since the Soviets have certified him in many ways; including his - diplonatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet o2ficial protests and Sovict Embassy confrontation in Washingtoa, Soviet pfficials’ renarks in varjous Porat of the world, ead reports er his KGB status and importance. i an .
764, There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrep- resented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This hypothesis could accormodate the argument that the KGB would not dispatch a KGB staff officer as a couble agent against a hostile service because, whether or not the argument is valid, NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIITI.9. above) has not proven his claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has been and is now under KGB control, it woulé appear that he was being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown to Westerners in certain recruitment operations.* This could explain NOSENKO's revelations to.FRIPPEL and others about his family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON case, and NOSENKO'’s arpezrance in the BARGHOORN interrogation. It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and performance under detailed questionirg: Much of what he should have known by personal experience could have been merely memorized as part of his KGB briefing. Nething .n HOSENKO's proauction (see Part VII1.B. above) would preclude his being a KGS-dispatched. agent. That he was 4 KGB-dispactched agent was the conclusion independently arrived at by the CIA specialist who administered a polygraph examination to NCSENKO in April 1964. 4. Pemarks The first alternative above has been rejecteé while the possibility that hOSEkKO on his own misrepresented himself is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO has been manipulated by the GS in an operation directed against American Intelligence. j : by any such “shew® appearances--he did not insist on the truth of his claim to participation 15 the KEYSERS case, which, moreover KEYSERS unreliable witness; anc interview. | =" fits American bepartment service in 1960-1961 was not supported ft. ae could at confirm: PREISFPEUND is an a is not accessible to q force asco lhe we nem . en 1OP SECRET , a «
190000 a nS oo eres a apne ne sone a em 765. - I, Sunsary of Conclusions CLA has considered every major aspect of the SOSENKO case for the purpose of reaching 8 definitive corelusion about the bone fides of this 2ap ahe says he is a KGB officer-derector ZOllabwrating with Aners.can Intelligence. As this point-by-point anelysis has denonstrated, there is no reason to accept any of NOSENKO'S elains to a career as an officer in Soviet intelligence, to authority concerning the range and degree uf EGE operational successes in the UESR {particularly with U.S. offictals and private citizens), to accurate xnowledge regarding rajor security cases in that country, or to cooperation with Arnerican Intel- ligencec. it would be sufficient proof of his mala fides to verify that NOSESKO lied about a single Kepnent OF his cereer in the KGB. He cannot have been truthful in saying that he was the Deputy Chief of tne U.S. Ff: bassy Section. Agzerican Departacut, EGR Secon. Chiel Directurate. in 1960- 3961 and a Deputy Caief in the Tourist Department of the sane directorate fron 1962 until his defection. Nusterous dndicatiaons make it doubtful thet NOSFENKO, a5 he contended, belengea to the naval GRU in 1951-1952, to the U.5, Enbassy Section in 1953-1955, and to the American Tourist Section in 1955-1959. He wos unable To support his alle,ed staff officer status in the EGB, providing incemplete ard inaccue- rate information on his sub-sources and on such topics as Headquarters staff procedurcs while making illogical stata- ments on modus operandi. Neither & supervisor nor, pro@- bably, a case officer, it remains dubious but possible that he wes @ KGB principal agent shose speciality ia the past was coupromising Western honaosexuals. Shatever the capacit in which HOSENXO served, it was not in the KGD ranss, holdi the KGB tities, oF with the KGB honors he has ascrited to himself, and this fact is enough to prove the falsity of his claims to being a genuine defector. There is no question. hosever, that NOSENKG has had the benefit of inside information froa the KCb. He has ¥ he 1+ ene etd ee ee eaid so, other sources have sid 60. the Soviet Government's yeactions to the defection amplécd &S much, anc? has reports contain details which could have cone enly from the RGB. He was 4ntreduced into several operations, the first as early as 1953, in a position appear ing ‘cenior” to knowro KGB staff offices. He has provided data on organization, per sonrel, and methods cospleneot ing ard supplementing that froma others affiliated with the AGB. purposefully misleading about hinself, NOSESKO has also deen deceitiul in discussing che compromises of CHEREPANOY, PENKOVSKIY, and perkeps POPoY, although kere wis reporting ofte: correlates with that frog ‘ several seve : Pe bad a Mm Analysis shows that ==) NOSENKO and others to tue contrary -- CHEREPANOY 288 a KGB provocateur, PEUKOVSEKIY was detected at the Jatest in early 1961 not 1952, and POPOV was probably uncovered earlicr than January 1959 because of @ KCB agent rather than survetl- lance. KOSENKO thus has pot merely misrepresented hinself has practiced deception uncer KGB guidance. Appraisals of KOSENKO's performance under interrogation, his alleged mot tion, and the operational circuastanccs support this view. oe b we & _— but iva- ‘
4-90000 W Top SECRET 7 766, , Furthermore, it ia tho only acceptable oxplanation, amoaog the alternatives, for what has trasspired since contact with CIA began in 1962. CIA's conclusion about the bona fideg of NOSENKO is unequivocal: He is a dispatched agent eontrolled by the KGB. Part IX contains a discussion of the impiications of the forezoir clusion for the Soviet scurces who, Qiks TG RY Pt eee ea eugene have corrcborated the bona TOP SECRET peat Le a engpeeetie 7k wee epee, seeademeegy mie + Lee
14-00000 a rr er oo rr ap nt Ve - * ce ge  SBBBR I Lge Be aa: t . a Sr oD dae, wan ae . sare w Re iy GHERibe PR OE NEP ie -% ye eonclusion that NOSENKO did not serve fa the KCB positions he cleimad contradicts information reported to CIA and the FBI by [ Jenat NOSENKG Rela erator pesitions in the KG3 Second Chief Directorate.** if the con- Clugion cf this study of NCSECKO's bens fides 15 accurate, none ep sources can be correct, ind they mist therefcre be either afsinformed about NOSENY.O oc purposefully misleading. — ot 5 ¥ SY rab could have teen innocently misinformed about zs he defected, 1t is necessary to consider the ways in which the KOS might have create? end supported a legend for a cournterfett KCB officer-cefector like NGSENKO, ‘The FSB might have accorplished this py the following mear.s: - NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to brief him in depth on nune:ous cases and various targets which he would be free to discuss with CiA. The KGB would also have to famaliar:ze nim with KGE staff organi- sational structure and prucedy:es,**" e74 KSB officers prominent in his story le.g., GUn, KCVSEUK, TSYMBAL, . GRIEMIOV) so that he could noc only recesnize their ! protographs but also ler.i reality to his remarks about them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KG3 inscallations and other areas which appeared in his legerd. ee*That these preparations were imperfect, cr at least tnat NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in his pecformance under interrogation. Fe Sen eter DRE Se “yyp secreT a
abs - 768, ri . a! a: te . - a 7 .  w Another phase of the praperations voild have been © WOSTSHD's actual and derunsarradle participation in cpera- “  elocs, geentngly as &@ X58 officer. Preaumably this vould be done so that Westerners (6.92, BARGIOO?N, FRIPPEL, and irs WE. JOBSON) could certify that they hed sean HOSENKO. in tae gome such role.* a Le - The KGB presunably would have restricted the number of its officers aware of suse or all of the operational plan; 1t would nonetheless be faced with the problem of how public knowledge of NCSENKO's defection might affect others in the service. KG3 officers abroad uninformed cf the operational plan micht be indisczeet with foreigners, im meeting Westerr double agencs, oF before micropheres in their homes and offices, aekang such remarks 23 “I. never heard of this man NOSEIKO” or speczlating close to the mark. Trss the KG3 misht ha or the rona fens TAR eg rumors epout his auchearicity (this on the part of the lamited few awire of the facts of tre case), by recalling KG officers tron the pests in the vest (osteasibly be- cause tney were rKrown tO NOSELKO). cy announcing the whole- sale dismissal of those respensibie incauding GRIBALOYV (although in fact they may have roucinely retired cr may hav2 been removed from the main streem of KGB Headcuarters activities). and by making genera. announcenerts within srred cv th fe-tion @gae fee: Sas SECT SE a eee ‘ede 8 Fuccher- mDEG, EIT it 48 COMAIN SOvaet Frac ice t3 mane a bad ex- ample of defectors, such amnmuuncements might be expected to denigrate wOSENKO as a “pad character ‘with venereal disease; an odd Party record, self-inflicted wound, @tC., in his packcround. The KGB might 4450 have taken pains to support MOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence sources, notabiy double agents recocnized by the KGB to be such, told cf the seriousness of the defection. e Ge 39 Faget wen ene ae eee It is within this °°) 7 ee the reperts o: G6 soon sas were unwitting repetit are3 : or whether thear reports constacited purposetul passage of KCB i disinfcrmation. ° ; one miche judge whether BP concerning NOSENKO ion cconeecsnentmat * It is noteworthy that guch participation was limited to Tourist Depertrent operations. NOSENXO did not claim physical partici- pation in any contacts with american imbassy officials during the periods 1953-55 cr 1960-51, except for MULE and STORSBERG (where his clained role was uncheckacle since it involved only holding a door) and KEYZERS (which KEYZERS did not confirm and on wnich NOSENKO did now insist, admitting that he doubted KEYZERS. would remember or recognize han. t : | app seceet
Soh oreo L hatin ‘a : . , + & we _ ° te t a : . .? t- ted . . “8 abig tego ar Se . a a 7696 ' . tof { te - tg . 3 gts #0: q- . ay: : are e1so considered because they : 's ty see extent, although by saying he was @ ipa ca’ civilian, @s% on eee contradicted his claim to KGa eteft "pti officer status. A number of general correlations between the — ie") NOEERKO case and the COSMAEG Craepenalbinon nel maar nee | Luxrees . operations are then reviewed. she final section of Fart IX fe a tte aumary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO © hoo case ond che re by GOLITSIN, GSR Acne atta NCH @ Bate ey: ates = ios S20 overlap BCSES! ‘ cee een anetee er mse eree oo bee opts
14-00000 on c. ., : Be oo TS ns 7 1 sarge. . poo etae . ee —e t . . . a ’ 4 i or rr t pap db Fe. rh rite Tee AR | fa St a Sr bcppag be bat EE tte a eat ae : i rr tt UY Durre . be Pa le ee tien. rn ee . * Heteee of gerwbot wee ypebore bbe Peed gessienm of tne bast oteanest Confer rent an Caaetta. NR CES bn Wa Gm Die last bet SOLhTsyis Qave tl Phd baa tha lore Cagni4 ec the nan. is wath KOSEAKO formation and con- ers who hag met 5 COMMONLS ON Sut. As Me Gane a9e2, abter eAts rit aah tment d and pecuure of the iarge cveriap of NOSLNKO's -oee GUE.TBYN'S, “le UF tne CIA cure off. ae, Genet yesh woth GOLITS aN to Gitar tf. OF wit WSs paler i ak. MOLEISYN wes tudo tase CLA had receive: : peptited certain inferma- 953 an c a peo g@itrerian: an emoayaewa bel er Poe feomoattl ote Phe: POG. Slee GPa PL ste cd tas GOLATOY that ts oe Copaeoetberse i) ee camped “qa, ANC .or4a re anes - dete ibaed, 2 O@fatao LE . Do geet debe ing t.. Gece Caics baw Lyi fitters ot fe Was Shi r : PoDeaeete dhe rerscunel : eeokate dy regwed te ocr dandy CX recur, toe Tob ge port oa ty fone AleksSater : ot ther ag Pj. sti cad aa dapan when tae * : . oy yo tae we Meat. one furtnec Dot EL Re Raa Se EER eg poo tant ny secetafied as Kod hee fet. teal urdansee a Zui rot gpep ND SeLPTOVN 3aad re Lt Qererraly, os eeracecev fOr an usscss- y eet 8 User Nie ristica ee Nel bee f°) nrormation on the 6A 10 Felruscy LU64 Nushihots wepeebtion tie’ the Soviet Dis- cland wa, cablicized, anclud- heani iha3 news he ano.cci- armament Celejation mn GENEeVvt, Await. : ing bas KGB afi.ira von. Wher BOL ately recalled the use jue2 “ducter” feoa Seivcerbone oad linked HOSENZG to lb; ne Uierecpor stuted that ne recsaijJecd MOSENKU as @ member of tue Second Chief ul rectorste working wqu.nst Awcrican e'tizens. Qn Jl FeLiuery dyed GUL! vSyN raised the po. aedioty of bos. artacipstion an ante: r gut Fons of WoShind, und ce this time he was given seme “backgorur.t or the cas. and an rmuication of CIA's reservacions about BROSENNO'S Lons Pies. over the next several mowing GGLITSTN was provides With Mateciar trea tuc 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKG in Seiteerland, and at nis request was supplied with wilh the avallutle bivgraphic data oi NOSENKO to assist nim in analyzing Lie vperaiasn. On 2) duce 1964, GOLITSYN was interviewed in cetaas on the susject of Kusgksro. He confirmea HOSENKO's adentaty as the Lon of the former Miraster of Shap- buildany und said tnat he was a KG etiacerc whe nad worked in the American Depactment and the ‘Tourist beep oatmoenc ot the KGB's Second Chief Directorate. We ves shown o phat ograpa of SOJBEDEO, (not buried in a pheto spread, but sinety) ond dis ohatabhed 26 as a photeyrcuph of the man he hee. fe this ture be gave the information . abou. WoSkENKRY whach 1s summiraged below. SO TOP SECRET
14-00000 The NuseIKO case hes not been discussed with GOLITSMI since the 29 dune 1964 iatervied: thus he has not been questioned further on the circumstances which led to the encounters with WHOSENKLD desercihed by him, nor have the results of subsequent detailed reinterrogstions of HUSENKO - discussed at length in the foregoing seetiona of this paper <- been made available to him for review, analysis, or comment + a Discussion of Infermation*® 2. Resume and Discussion of Inism ~ 1953 emerican Department NUSUKO has said that he entered the KGB in arch 1953** and was first assiqned to the U.S, Embassy Section of the Anerican Department of what js now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He stetad that his duties from hia entry until sometime in 1954, per- haps 3bout June, were to work on files of american correspondents on permanent assignment to “ascod and to meet with the Soviet citizens who were agents or informants reporting on the corres- pondents to the KGB. - GOLITSYN stated that he met NOSENKO in the ¢merican Depart- ‘ment of the Internal Counter intelligence Directorate*** a couple of times in 1953 when he, COLITSYN, wags there on other matters. GOLITSYN had earlier identified his ow job between December 1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the american Sector, Counter- intelligence (Hinth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and re- organized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure she Telationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 693-595, with comments thereon appesring on Pages 647-659, while in this gection are a discussion and an evaluation of what GCLITSYN said about NOSENKU's assignments in the Sacond Chief Directorate (see Pages 343-344). #@ «wrong the various dates civen by NOSENKO for this entry. March 1933 has bean given more often than others and 13 more consistent with the reat of NOSENKO'’s story. . Vy, My, eeemen ta now Aeagtonated the KGB Second Chief pirectoraven Seif éi
be for Vienna in Uctober 1953 GULITSYi ‘was Deputy Chief of the Emicgre Secter, Counterintellicence Vepartmentc, Foreign Int2lligenc? Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate, GOLITSYN has not i. indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these 5; positions which would have necessit3ted his visiting the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although certain activities of cormon interest with the latter would appear - logical, NOSENKO's deseription of his alleged duties with corres- pondents, however, did not encomposs his having official contacts with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligenc? vyepartrent of the Foreign Directorate. according to HOSENKO' =: description of the location of his claimed office in the American Department, and his description of the duties of the co-worzers he said shared it with hin, chance contects there with such 4 representative would have been precluded. Even by NOSENKO's account, then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have been in the course of interdepartmental Liaison between their respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSEIKO's office. GOLITSYN‘'s lack of reporting on KCB operations against American correspondents (ether than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956 er 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business “in the American Department was unrelated to NCSENKO's claimed activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statement on the 1953 encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental. Pleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could have led GULITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO © was a member of the staff within the american Department. fmerican Cepartment/fourist Department -_1955~-1960 HOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Depart- ment to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the ‘ Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section there in 1958. GOLITSYE, however, insisted that NOSEXKO remained in the - American Department until at least 1957, or possibly as late as GOLITSYN added that the KGB would not be aware that he knew.
14-00000 see ee TOP SECEET Ce OSENAU'S true position in the american Depsctuent in 1957 or 1958. GOLITSM dia net indscete how he acquired his knowledge on thig aor why the KGB subsequently would have Deen unable to determine thet ne had. If nis access to this information was in- decd that remote (a3 GULITSTI's assignment in 1957 and 1958 would indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that it could likee ,, wise be sonewhat garbled. COLITSYN was unable to explain the [ fact thut NOSENKO's physical presence in exclusively Tourist Department esses hud been ,ositively established through photo { fdentifications made by several of the individuals ‘{nvolved, who met NOSEWKO aa early as 1956. From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to have becn in the Teurist Department) GOLITSYU was enrolled in the KCB Higher School. He was detached from the school, in the period January-tiarcn 1959, in order to gether material for his thesia. At that time GOLITS “i spent just under two months in the Tourist Department,*® but GOLITSYN’s work did not involve hia in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He has reported having “occasionally” met NOSENKO in 19592: althcuch he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems probable that it woulc have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked NOSENKO in 1959 where he w2s working and NOSENKO told him the Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters must have been brief, superficial, and not work-related, hence insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function with the Tourlet Department. a *in describing hig own and others’ responsibilities in the Tcurist Department, NOSEYKO has made no reference to this unit having @ formal or cequiar relationship with tne KGB school or to students from the school having been detached to the department. TOP SECRET
14-00000 qv . : . TW Sse | . a _ » Be a is oan a informazegicon wes ee ovidlanl a to COLTS iad igs ° ; as : The detuiled interrogations of KOSKY cou: ay ernina his claims . : : to KGB positions between 1953 and 1964, did not take ples unt any months after GULITSY made his jeobennt Be “and they err based ‘ upon all collatersl] information knownyirélating to each phase. None- : of the results of these interrogations was mad? available to GOLITS(N, so he wags not aware of the countless prints on which NOSEXKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged tenure in theas-~Geportments. ° 3. Comments on GCOLITSYN Several factors influence the evaluation of COLITSYN's states ments on NOSENKOs ; - First, as stated in Part VIII.I., it is concluded that NOSENKO aid not serve in the KG3 positions he claimed. GOLITSY!I's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as NOSENKO's claims abcut service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. hore~- ever, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB “letter-writer® (actually NOSENKO) was under KGa control in submitting infor- | mation to american Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an officer in the imerican Department (until 1957 or 1958, “shereas HOSAIKG said he was reassigned from the Gepartment in 1955) and in the Tourist Separtment subsequently. - Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's defection, Gespite many previous opportunities to do Bo (e.gee in discussions of GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV) ard despite GOLITSYN’s proven excellence of memory. for names and tasks of KGB personnel. CULITSYN gave little detail on the circum- stances of his encounters with NOSENKO, and. he hag not been questioned further sbout them. Nevertheless, a3 indicated in | the foregoing yemarks on the circumstances in which the two : men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would | Ube Bis no have been brief, infrequent, casual, extra-official, ‘and: dp seb tat - “herts i cetieletee we der tt saat tee see 6str st -aememetiorat xle aa
BUR Wee wesese ‘he Folle owing discussion considers os COLTTSiN* 3. information. about Nusdukyu in conjunc: tion with NOSAKO's dental atout haviny | jo been in contect with GLITSYi.* vossible axpth metions for i GOLITSYN'’s having referred to their encounters but having mis- . identified NUSENKU's positions in the KGB are: First, GOLITSYil could have erred: second, GOLITSYN cculd have lied for personal reasons; and third, COLITSM could have lied st the diraction of the KGB because he (like NOSEWKO) is under 4:G3 control. To examine each of these points separutelys ~ GOLITSYN could have erred. Apart free tue dentist by RUSEXKO, who is an unreliable source, there i3 no evidence to refute COLITSY's statement that he and NCS2IKO met in the @émerdcan vepartment in 1953 and in the Tourist Otpartment in 1958 or 1959. (The conclusion i-““art VIII.I. about NOSENKO's bona fides do not rule out the possibility that -— he was physically present on occasion on the pramises of tha two departments in these years, although not in the capicities that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, could have been such that GOLITSY erred in assuming - because NOSENKO was seen on or near the premises of the two departments, and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYU in 1958 cr 1959 that he was in the Tourist Department - that NOSENKO was therefore an officer of these specific elements of the #253 Second Chief Directorate. Thus, if GOLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he mistakenly identified NOSENKO ag being a menber of the staffs ° of the ¢merican and Tourist Departments at these times. - GOLITSYN could have lied for personal rea3ons. He may have believed that to say he met HOSENKO or to say he knew ® There ia insufficient information available to reach a conclusion ; about, Or *ven speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSY's defection occurred in Janvary 1962, as contrasted with the fsct * that it took place on 15 December 1961. ' ! : .
+h ety" tip, eee tet tee esi Liku's positicns An the Kuy would aid suthenkicity to hia aarlier evalu. tion of the NUSENKO Anformation of 1962, to his. contradictions of NUSLIKU'S stutaments concerning service in tho U. 3e Bnbassy Seetion én] the operations of thet section, und to his contention thot the KGB would try to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) information by spreading purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports on the same subject matter. In summary, COLITSZ's intention in lying about NOS=ix0 could simcly have heen te add greater eredibility to his expressecé opinion that ‘Wsc:hO was 4 ROD provocateur. ~ CULITSYY could have lied ut the direction of the KGB, an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness and not because Cla has any reason to Telieve GOLITSMI is under KG3 control. This evplenation would mean that COLITSYN, although offering partial. confirmation for NOSm:KO's claims, @irectly attacked the bona Ficns of another KGB-dispatched agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. acting under KG3 instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine HOSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSCNKO said he was providing reliable and comprehensive information about KGB operations against #merican officials and tourists” in the USSR. At the sume time, NOSENKO wis not giving an account of their relationship that waa consistent with COLITSYN's, by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting che earlier reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union, and NOSERKO was seexing to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that experienced by GOLITSYN. according to this hyrothesis, two sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance - deliberately gave conflicting stories of their relationship, and each tricd to undermine the bona fides of the other, GOLITSYN explictly and HOSENKO by implication. This explanation is so illov‘cal, as well as so detrimental to tha KGB, that it must be rejected from seriou3 consideration.
Ate Soe ee age a SY) ‘Re che choice thus secms to lia betwaer the first two “explanations i for GULITS&N' misidantif ication of NVSGENKO, one un understand. ible error of assumption dravn from their fea chances ancounters, ‘the i other a misguided uttempt thet had no ginister goals. In either cause, GOLITSYN's testimony does not eentribute to 4 determination of the status of NOSENKG within the KCB as of the yeors prior to 1960. . | There are two explanutions for NOSBIKO's denial about havino met COLITSY. One explunation is that they were never in personal . . the KGB was aware of this fact, and ~ unprepared Cor ~ the KGB briefed NOSENKO contact, GULITSYN's statements to the contrary seeordingly. If in this particular instance NOSEMKO told the truth and (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional or adiffercnt conclusion can be draen apout the bona fides of NOSENKO and his claims of service in the KGB. The second explenstion is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take plece in 1353 and again in 1958 or 1959, but becuusa of their easgual and fleeting nature, NOSENKO (unlike COLITSYN) has not remembered theme ate lee ee seen tn wee ot oe tee, ve * OP SECRET
eat. 2. Regune of _intorimarson* es ome Aecording to CabLlesvk, he personally mez GWOSENKG two or three Cine oat ees, whale vissetaned ti: US. Embaisy inecion of the Awenican fa gertuett, a component of the interne! :ecucaty directorate, ond «gain in 1958 and 1948. On the other hand, - NOSENUKO «as unable to identafy COLITSYN's photocraph ard he denied ever havirg seer ham GOLITS 2 saad chat GUK, CHURANOV. ond KASHCURYEY were treacnds of NOSEMKO as well as of GoLirsyN. (NOS. E:MKO clained ro nm: a. friendly terms with each of tlw we: three KG of faeerss tee wchmuwledeed. howoewes, that hig wequaintance , with OUR had bess merery cauual urtil NOCENKO's three-month ‘DY tO Coneva an P9un whicu mnie them the pest of fraends.) From j 1982 20 1957 af POLAR CULITSYN said GOSEHKO was @ cane officer : to the Vo. Babes tig fee tron, them Chena recd toy thes: Varese at : Departwcat . where be eas a Seno cae OFF eee vee 19D 2010 PSYN { Stuted unepaavecably chat BUGERR was net wo Deputy Chenel of, the i U.S, kingsssy Section of urherwise serving in that Section or an . the Anceican Lepartment. as of the time he (GOLITSYN) Jonsulted with various o:ficers there in Apeal-—June 1960 and January 1961.*%° GOLITSYi spoke cnern with of facers wivrn HOSENKO ciaims as close cOlleacies ane dudsng KOWCHUR and CHYAZIGY, and would doukcless have krown iff hOSEUKG wee@ supervising of otherwise involved in code clerk operanions. In summary COLITSYN cog cobar ited some oF NOSEL.K3 s alleswed @.signzent an tie KOK Second Chi-:f Directorate mut not all of them while SCSEUKO contradicted GOLIT GY by saying that the two men iad never moet 3. Comments on Gels PSV From Decemier 1952 untalk Apral 1953 GOLITSY’ was “Chief of the American Dbes* Counterintelblicernve Depactment. Foreign Directorate, EG Cehen 436) and for most of tbe period from January ¢o March 1999 mu was on TOY ceawining assigtnents to the Second Chief tasre tar ate In the facse gub at least -OLITSYN presumsoly would have had regular ceatings with the U S. Embassy Section, and periap:. also in the second he would have been in ' eontant with the fourast Lepartmenr, in which NOSENKO claimed to have bezven then serving Despite this and de:gprte has proven exerllenes: of marry fur the: tous and tasks of Kn personnel, GOLDPPSYN never mentioned NUSENKO an debrictings éuring the years 1962 and 1963. nor commented on his name on the two occasions when it was shown to him. although he had numerous Opportunitics to mencion ham in connection with the mames of CHURAIOCV, PAGPCHEYEV, ang GUK. 2 oo a me meme ee ” The relataor.hip between the reporting by GOLETSYN and NOSENFO on specific operations 18 shown on Pecqen 994 -595, with cammonts tiereun appearing on Pages 647-659 whale an the section which follows below are a discussi07% and an evaluatoon of what GOLITSYN said anout NOSERKO'’s assignments in the Second Chief Directorate,.<5 desceibel on Payes 343-344, eaten mer t+ cetetafinstag =~ epee stated an Past VELIL.L., howewrr. tf 28S not ceedibte that NOSENKG served in the: U.S. Embassy Section in 1953. 5% ofr te 1960-1%.2 . : { | \ : roo emma Egy oe a tr “og tree? ho “aeee 7 ‘a er Stee MTT EN TYLER TS - ~
pte) - v 7 ~, ag hea ahh ey pe = PAS 4. @ a are ae os “eg ” a, Fe Ege % oN Ad od eg tie bs og as Gi pce , ee 343 ee a ae ¥ S dew re f = a.¢.8 Cas [gue | ey. a yey “- ee zh 4 sara oF Oe & Ade 9 bow a me a 4 23 Bare tet a ee Es ve AS roe a ay é oe ath neg ne ws Lode. 9 n st % u ae ¢ ae arn ee bs wie ig’: % boy & Fr S-° & ry iM 4 ys. 2% Shee s ee ik ‘ + > a S fe LA Fig 4 at F ‘ rie oD MA a a Be ER og ed tet, ; an Sh eke. euerly eee ee ag we ee a es : fi : ‘° . wee <a dip. ot Se oS ‘ on . bese _ yt Se ea wee a Pe MR Se Bak Ar On Sas eS og at Pat va) are Ae ee 2 r , “os th ue oy ake °. a. we ak gm “wat 2 W e , v 3} Fae Seth ee ae as ame on e abe 2 eg wP hes had a rn oe 8 edie nee pie oer cea em ee ee ate TOP ScoRET
Lage Seunet ve ian There would appear to b: ro reason why NOSEIKO, af ne had ever met SWLNIGYN, should soc have zaid ra to &ericen Intelit- yenes: Representativer.® Tu heave dor: 2:0 would have gqaven NOSFZ KO concrete siipport for bas claus of Kult scuff service, which he knew to be in quvstjon. 3. the contrary. however, NOSERKO consis- tently denied asy contact end ronufacturcd a demonseraply false story to explain his own wksence during COLITS NI s admitted visit to the section in which }:0S2-n0 claims to have served in January 1961. (Sen Page 183, seconse feotnote.) On the othe: hand, COL: T£YnN's claim must le weasured against the bsckcround ond circumstances of his statements. In the ab- sence of any comuents about oF identitication of BCSENKO by GCLIT- SYN proog to the public announcement Of Lis defection from the KGN, and in view of the snout Of informarion mace available to him trom NOCH maAteriais prior to hes making any statements about his alleged acquairtence with him, GOLITST s “identifica- tion" of NOSENKO as @ KGE staff officer known to him personally cennot be considered as rpoitencous OF uncentaminated' information. The weight of anéependenc evicence againsr LCSENKG's alleged service in those positicre which GOLITSIN corroLorated, combined with the conflict ketween GOLITSYN s and MOSENKO's testimony about their personal acyuaeintencesnip, maxes it impossirle to accept GOLITSYN's verification of NOSENKO's Claimed KGB status during any stage of the latter's career. *it is not likely that he weuld forcet it. Direct relationship with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and im- portant to remecining KGH officers? even if temporarily forgotten, post-defection reminiscences would almost certainly bring buck memories of such recert ar? direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates. WwW SECRET. ' . { | ne er Acme amen et ee ad
14-00000 SELES retire Sheet + emettants annette + eo. svav rn ewe + mee mengg meee ys te = 2. WOSFNKO'S Background and Careor Information Peported P NOSENKO was affiliated with the KG" for approxl= mateiy 16 vears, since about 1947, and wuz an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His tather, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and alse Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukrainc. Seuree Date of Information j “15 February 1964 (Re- ported to/the Ft on 12 February 1964) i f The photograph which appeared in U.S. news= papers 1s not that of EOSENKO, ** ask ea Ue werked wath NOSENKO for several years in FoB Head puarters; he d@seribed NOSLENKO as a person wid Lixes to be fashionably dressed at whl 10 February 1964 (Re- ported to the FRI on 2 Feprcary 1964) i times and os fond.of women, by natura ie tricndly -: individual amt generally well-liked by lis foie 3 low workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second role | Chicf Lirecturate. i t ebruary luo4 (Fe- wmryred quite certain ae? —| Coepie hut NOSENKO ha: the rani fe=ve ported to the FRI on }2 February (964) 29 February ic64 (Re- 4! sorted to tre ERT on re. 29 Fobrusry 1964) ae ed oh é@ om ‘ me ye Rita beste vapmct las dome SE. TBE te. cna Pe Pe 1p MOY Gm, ABE cw ope, og Brae yd I bd te, is BET ALSO Oy oP Pe. tae wok Ct
, ee teetlaaenwn so winmneidee ne cee eee nea soem es ee an ire << _ wert ‘ F , prety bd Se. ae ay ¢ Ne, eid ‘od ’ ; TOP SEC’ bed parlig ae $B gts Lede oo ee ~ me
(Reported go tye FBI on 20 Febru. (Reported ~Jeon 22 Febr (Paporteu the Fils 1925) —, or | 1964) co the FBI ary 1964) .o CIA by iw rebruary the ectection might.be a "trick by the KGB, ne Woy replied that from his own knowledge of ga + Gs ga toa TERT sf “Bf Bet teal ees) a. d EERE Be ees asked Lapde hes yeewhether he felt BOSLNKO actually defected whether he felt is matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's cefection vas not 4 “trick® by the KGR. NOSENHO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Amoricans. It is assumed by the KGB that. he ig. familiar with the number and location af microphones in Fa ca the U.S. Embassy. 3 Bs Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was beputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working ina the Seyonth (Surveillanea) Directorate in Moscowg an three separate occasions participates in conferences between “important psop a" of the Second Chief Directorate and the. Seventn Direce torata, NOSENKO was present at all of thesa.? Although NOSGENKO was @ Ceputy Chief he hel d oniy the rank of captain in the KGB, ted. attributed this (the disparity Detween jo» and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOYVY exerted on tha behalf of NOSENKO, Lee Pe ae
14-00000 DATE Sk) 4 LOST/MISSING MATERIAL THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE. DOCUMENT NO. DATED: OR PAGE(S). V7 FROM: CIA JOB NO. pox no. Reel ¥& 2 FOLDER NO.
14-00000 > cna tee ee ee UREN 1964 (foe ported topgha FART on 964) nn sme Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO J ; ga would have a great deal of important informa- tu tion which he could impart to intelligence agencies of cther countrics. Cartainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American «and British nationale. The bulk of MOSEKKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelli- gence operations of the KGB in Moscow and alao YG personalitaen working in Meadquarters. NOSTIK: wan aise unduultedily familiar wath all KG%s persomealities in Seneva® and certainly knew 19 Fe portod 32 iebrucr e som? EGM personasitics 3A ether countries. [f— tri: eee Ses MOSENKO had been 10 is the Seana Chaef Li:owteratoe for about 14 years be and wes weypieboted with wimost all of the ¢m- ad ployees of this siirectorate, He was award of cs the gtructiuze of the -GR and Knows many persone jong nel oof the Pirst Chief Dircctorate. - Pee . iG 1. @ a ee «. ‘obs gt oa ake ae lop “ 7 2 fb re wpaase ee a Be on mes Be My a oh 4 ze Re my EE es ee ra) ai wert dae ier) he P. “piste hen tg eds 5K: A ; Pol, hay , LUSLERU, as Deputy to the Chie. af the ourist Department, had in nis possession a telephone ¢cirectory which Lasted the names of some 10,000 KGB eme ployecs in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deput oe of Depgrtmentsafad these phone books.** meee Pe anon, Ws wits xpressed the opinion that"N ‘ emma s, Ne *, a, ne, otal OTE acer Biss *%. ; A nee bee A. ot Baty Gee ooh eS "eS og pee or Coed
14-00000 779. (Reporttd to ghe FBI on } n 19€4) ids much mure valuable to/the FBI and CIA than. was Oleg PENKOVSKLY becatiso of tha fuct that he knowa go much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGB end is familiar with so manyiindividuals in the KGB gi? both in Moscow and abroad. MEINE acuta A CUR at er that PENKOVSKIY was able;to furnish amorican and British Intelligencejwith a lot of informa- tion concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledqdeable in auntelligence and counlerintelligence opera tions of the KGih.” NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies =#.5 of the KGB directoralces dnd departments at KGB — Headqusrtvrs in Moscow. '¥n KS3 Headquarters tJ ther: are four separate dining cooms for pere ES sonnel who work there; oe such dining room is pd reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. os Because of this fact, NO$ENKO has a vast know- SS the KGB. * a Few f o"NUSENKO voluntecred for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten occasionally in the “chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier. an
st (Repor EN, to the FBI on *There seems nanimous opinion among the iz, : ¢ 27 March - metthat NOSENKO... could do — ‘the KGB a tre amount of harm.” NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate / ; would have been entitle rd to have one personnel directory of approximatiely 30 pages setting forth the identities cf all of the supervisory . officials in KGB Headqiwiarters. NOSENKO would aleo have had a 200- “ene directory listing by name and telephone numer all the rank-and- file employees working: nae O° The Opinion d by some & (GB “chiefs” Um m that 1£ 80s KO were merely a seve two diredtories available to Ameracan Intelligence, ithe KGB would be gaverely damaged for the present and for several years to come, * te rnp SECRET 20 May 1 (Ro- ported to on 21 May The KGB was lucky that [the Americans found only - 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 midrophones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. @ Daseels quite sure that NOSENKC was respouctPec for furnishing anformation to the Amecicung which resulted in the micropiones being found. It was his opinion that NCSENKO knew only the gen- eral location of the 4(| microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones. 10? § vit Report by the 1l June l * See above} NOSENKO did not mention these directories,
14-00000 (negoctad Wy ene A The qeneral consensus among ,kCU employoes Ga on 22 June l {gs that in the future the KGB will i s toealing Bharply the effects of NOSENKO's es- cape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is con- sidered to ‘be vastly more important than either ‘ GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appearn to be based on several factoru: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Mencow and withihis help agents wore developed among theue Rnericans. Second, it 1s assumed by KGB personne| that because cf his closeness to the U.S. fmbassy in the post, NOSENKG would also be famitiar with the number of microphones which hed bien anetalled ain the Embassy by the KGB and/the locations of shese microphones. ‘Tnirc,,as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKOG w uld normally save nad access to a telephone jirectory listing atl personnel in all directorates of the KG in Moscow. Another fuctor, whieh ie a formidable one ia the minds of other kon employees, be that NOSENKO travelled ina rather influential circle of friends in Moscow wha gy ox, high in the Soviet Government. i oa these comments cited as rcusons for KOSEMKO . being an “important catch"! for American Tntel< _° Liyence, but amy CP ge eats no one in the KGB really knows exactly hpw much information NOSENYO had concerning the) KGB. a. . ee fd Land oc [ae] duel (Fe) Que ca joe Ste 4 fUb veer’ The amount of damaga caused by NOSENNO's de- fection is “unpredictable.|' NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate worke ing abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGE Neadquarters by virbue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB dppartments. (Reported Yo A by the F3I 8 Fobruary 1 )
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7 786. ena eS JPR Ne (paported co FS6 on 9 May L943 tow : pak eae ae + ca ee : ua ae oes ‘ne hi oe “ie nue NA ists ay Tha SR pitas carne is nave boea epatablashod by the CPSU for the yuspozres: (a; to determine why KGL em- ployees such as DeKYARIN, GOLITSYN, and BNOSENKO defected whale serving abroad; and (b) to attempt to climninate “weak KGB employees and improve the efficicney of the KGR. wenn pati oe ao na fork io ae . oo AM investigating commiss2on of the CPSU Central Committe: checking inte the circumstances sur@ -roundsnq BOSEMNKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion trom the KGB of 15 Second Chief Lirectorate employees. These in- cluse GRIPANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, likes an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken sinde the primary re~ sponsibility tor the defectian was placed on . GRIBANOV. Tt was realized that, in addition to ‘ being Chief of the Secon; cf, Directorate at a ge Sa A a ha a ph ai Sa aor z : Aalvesivad : tain TEs Tnmmennans eronnachtbenbrscsan Tevame © ‘eam ey eee ala » htt
14-00000 787. the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was 4 port@ sonal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.® it was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware ; of NOY lans to defect, BRR here. | se pT BET” REET Oe ERI, Lede SNR Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK Of the 11 other fone Chief Direce torate Ciiployees expelled, pome were found to have been personal friends hf NOSENKO and some of them were found to have sonfaded to NOSENKO details of onegesiony., 4 val h they were working. a “Gb otficer stataoncd in fashangton, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating come mission had determined that) Guk, a mutual frienc of NOSENKO and GOLUBFV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV faooe had been assigned to the Wakhington Legal Resi@- td, @ency. GOLUPEV had himsels worked with NOSENKO Coa ™ ‘in KGB Headquarters sometimp in the past, but be subsequently NOSENKO and GOLULEV were given dif} ferent assignments within tlic KGB and thereafter es did not associate with one jnother ain the course — of their daily activities. . See Pages 327-150 an which NCSENKO'S Gescriprion of his relationship wath GRIBANOV is discussed. Lf gowt al 1QPUs DP Saal bdras t, ars SE ghee a's | . #8@ NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name anil photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer, who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first met GOLUSEV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Forcign Ministry personne! in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV in KGB Headquarters in 1963. At that time COLUBEV was assigned@ to the New York Direction of the Counter- intelligence vcgactment of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this Department as tong as he had known. him. ev oof
14-00000 hee to htme 8 (OP 8 ome (Reposted to by fie FRI on 29 Jarnua 35) (oeported PMLA DY the PRY on 9 Fel mae ary 1965) ve It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chicf Directorate and sent to GRPBANOV. This summary contained con- siderable “compromising information” concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have renoved him froin connideration for this trip. GRiusNOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANMOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's dericiencins because of GRIBANOV'S long-time triaagndship with NOSENKO's father.* «pt Belt Baar ein gn GRIBAXNOV nas been dismissed from the ¥GB, @xX- pelled from the CPsu, and is presently living on a gmatl pension. Wis dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defceetion,** in addition, not less than 50 other people were dise- massed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chic? of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of | his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK. | ed B22 ars Cred Beaded or? fee i) j= * NOSEHRS said that his father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted. fe a GRIBANOV was reportcdly in operatic as late autumn of 1764, At that ti nal contact wath a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently ine he turned his contact over to another KGB officer. pane a8 Os Velnee SRA Em ont aad PURE retnvten ay satoe Fe or gE «no coe tren atm Ai Be me BP
14-00000 Kuss TOP § Early Fung ee (Re- ported to CIMby the FRI on 29 gunosyus) Major General BANNTKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIRANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his carcer,.® “GRIBANDV i.3 working in a small city outside Moscow 25 the chief of security at an import= ant military plant ond is new a “nothing.* after the detection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted ar wdbtensave investigation to determine which employees knew him and the natuce of their rela- ‘lenship. During this TAPABRIN was questioned Ve osai:t he knew NOSESKO, but only cusually and mnty Fecause of datistd contacts within the KGB. She arvew ce hoabica Guetuvmined, nowever, that mBABELN and GHIBANO were iriends socially and that TARALKIN attenéed several parties at which MOQSENKO wan presepk. Garis invited by NOSENKO were uakO there aff deseribed one such party. Thereatter, TAIGHRIN was affarded a hear- apg amd was accused on willfully concealing wital anfurmation. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all. pension rights.*** tated : [aoe NOsENnu seid that it was oe: ravouho authorised his 1964 trip to Geneva, durang which he defected, and are] that to the best of his krowledse, GRIBANOY Cid not know that he (NUSENEO) was making this trip. Never~- cso thalecs, NOSENKO said tint me ticuat chat GRIBANOY maght be fired brow the KG3 a8 a result of his defection i becauge"he was ccsponsivic foc bashing me ahead." NOSENKO said that BANNTKOV would not be punished because = he had done nothing other thaa suppart him as a candidate fur the 2964 Geneva assignment (sea Pages 333-334). MNOSENKO reported that TARAEATH was Chief of the British Nepartinent from 1958 to 1963, at which time he be- came Deputy Chief or "Service Ne. 2," the reorg nized Counterintelligenes Department of the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO gaid he saw GRIBANOV tute Came souL1ally during has KGB careur; on each occasion TARABRIN was presant. NOSENKO reported that he provided gisia fer CRIDANOV and VARAGKIN at paurtias ia 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961. He could not revall any catails of the lve? party fe.g., who the girls were, where they went, what they did, etc.). He was, howuver, Anica te deseribe the L9o3 party, whien took place in October or Novomber, in con= pre — ry : , 7 Ra sagt BM A ON a in ce siderable cctail tsi age cee Pye vane as ear Sa TENS Bees Sa!
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4@ b. The Conpromise of PENYOVSS4ILY (i) Introduetion . gee and NUSENKO agree on only ene aspect of the PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VI1I.B.6.b.): They both attribute the initial nemspromise to KGB surveillance. Al- though dager vee report screes with NOSENKO that the KGR learned of American participation in the operation only after PENKOVSKiY was arrested, Gi subseauent reports contradict this by tying the compronise directly to survoil- lance of U.S. Embass+ personnel visiting the Pushkin Street dead drop sitc. steg@imiee story of the events stemming from the corpromise of the cvad drop site is at odds both with other reporting[_ | (ii) Discussion after the EGB terminated tne pe oe or eee that the KGB had been aware of FPENXOVSALY's involvement with Aneri- cans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about two and one half months prior to the arrests. This state- ment is inaccurate concerning JACOB, vio vas a last-minute substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 kovember 1962 and who never before had personally par- ticipated in the operation. @3@eR#QS@ statements otherwise Ee agree with NCSENKO's subseavent report and the “official report" regarding KG3 ignorance of the role of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSAIY cose. oe : sport on the case, however, is contra- dictory tu his first repcert and to the othe: sources: He said in Geezer 1965S that surveillance of U.S. Embassy tar- gets detected a visit to the Pushkin Sircet site by an American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon he was arrested and confessed. CI: however, has no evieg dence besides the statements b:@ methat PENKOVSKIY ever a went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA personnel. In {ee reported at greater length about the roie of Pusnkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin Street not once but twice: surveillance had observed Lim on both eccasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed “him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who em entered the building reported that the Amncrican appeared to be tving his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself, Semcontinucd, the ract that it was the second visit to the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion, and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit 1V camera to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was ob- served checking it (see preceding paragraph): an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the dead drop and procecding to his office where he secreted the TAP SECRET
14-00000 TOP SECnE! 2a. material if 2 concealszent areca ip his dezk; th i continued in serveilicsne of the deal drur site, > d PESKOVSKEY leond the c-2¢ crap, and ceased an Anerice ow 2 efroated adings and could offer no defers: Tais repert su the cal ndicaticn tnat the EGU lad ruvveilled the two vinits iv the Posrei: Street site made Ly U.S, Exbassy of- Ff ficers; whale See SB report stated thet one Aserigan visited the site teice, in face tea difsvcrent anericars “acited the site@ onee cach, MAHGNLY on 2) Jaccary igé) and SBIDIAS of 3O Lecenber Pel. (JACOB) vho came te unboed it. PENPovSriy ws ~~ O&O 3 & om wa * > ta (iv) Remar The Pushtin Street dead drop was never used fcr communi- -eation to PENKOVSHIY. and in fact was loaded only once, when the KGP cit so and activated it on 2 Novenbcr 1962, thereby apprehending JACOB, Uorcover, the first visit to Pushkin Strect, in January 1961, predated any personal contact bet. ween PENKOVSALY a Vestern Intelligence, either Americaa or British. Thus, @si@eise report on Ancricans visiting there is only partially os curate. and the use of taese “surveilled” visits 25 an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY i is ungupportable. in reporting incetrectiy or this matter, uo oe gE couls have errec merely tecause Ais sub-seurces (one - mnamed, the othe: aproreniiy cespite the conflict in | tion in a.s presence. reperting stout his position) repeated erroneous infcrmma- SEEGERS ceovorsscless is the only scarce > reveal that the ¥GE wGt aw3r- Ri:nkin Strece dead dron as early as 2l January her MISONCY want t. ine 32% Sale therea= ¢ fore has ce cm the bona fi NOSEN: y showing o KG2 awarere ei:te il reati Leror “DLGTaA's wiel here, end ev: PENKOVSHIY nal centact with Western inctellice:ce servi JOIAN visit, NOSEVKO saic, wnicn first arous tne site at Pushnin Strc3t. TO? S2nci
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| rr 609. de Introguét ior. ; . \ While in general terms corroboratin. NOSENKO's claims to service in both the GRU and the KGB, | which are incompatible with the statenente by KOSENKT on his intelligence career. houch rot 3s prolific a reporter on NOSENKO as gitar spagsP ip SUED pidtek ere ie t.es had several topics in common with NOSENKO: PUPG!, PEXKOVSKIY, CHEREPANCV, SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and the contacts ketween the GRU officer BOLSHAKOV and Attorney Ganeral Fobert KEWWFDY 1n/196?__sien compared with NOSENKO's information, the reports on the case of FOPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV ere interlocking: FOPOV was compromised after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958 and in consequence of KGP surveillance. ~ CHEREPANGV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's compromise. Hay concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that so Intellig NOSENKO have indicated thet this compromise resulted from “GB surveillance of PENKCVSKLY's British contacts in Moscow, @ review of the topics conmon to these two sources. 2. Statements on NOSENKO When discussing NOSENKO for the first time, CERES said on pcre eee thet they were not rersonally acquainted, but that ‘various persons" in Moscow (whom he did rdét identify) had spoken to him about NOSENKO, The statements by Waieiese@ and NOSENKO on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation: NOSENKO AS a young man, NOSENKO attended NOSENKO gaid his entire ser- the GRU‘s Military-Diplomatic vice in the GRU, in the years Acadeny (MDA) and then was in 1950-1953, consisted of duty ‘ the GRU Information Department -- in the Naval GRU, first in mp a in all, perhaps a year of service the Far East’ and then in the .——. ~ in the GRU.* Baltic.** , * Xntil the late 1950's, the course at tne MDA, the strategic “*aintellicence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more recently, the course has been of three years‘ duration. **During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was separate from the rest of the GRU, , | — | | TOP SEE
er ar oe chat NHCSENKO had provided. | lee cored eee me ye sci 810. | NOSENKO A “very undisciplined person“ NCSENKO's statements abcut him- while in the GRU and “not very self during the 1950-1953 period good,” NOSENKO was to have been appear to acree with the evalu- discharged from the GRU. ation, but he has said nothing about facing discharce by the . Navel Geu, NOSENKO's father, “a very in- His transter from the Naval Gau fivuentiai person in the Ministry to the #G3 jn 1953, NOS=INKO of Shipbuilding,” was able to said, wrs at the initiative of get NOSENKO transferred to the KG" General KOBUL.Y, e® friend KGB. of hie father: the elder NOSENKO was Minister of Shnipbutiding. NOSEXKO was “an important boss" Recording to NOSENKO, his most in the KG3 (directorzte or recent KG3 title rrior to de- department unknown). fecting was Deputy Chief, Teucist Department, KGS Second Chief Direcrorate. see stated that NCCUENKO cave ‘vurv, very good information" to Cheeta States, having hed “great access" tc KGB information which included “all means of KGP cover raze of people in Moscow, =icrophone systems in the embassies, etc. tne J.5. Embassy, eg ha OY SP -ontinued, had found micrephones on the basis of informatior 36 Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting Be The CHEREPANOV Case (i) Summary One of the two ways in which te has corroborated NOSENKO the KGB; CHEREPANOV cave some” papers to the U.S. Embassy in Hoscow, which returned them to che Soviet Miniscry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).: the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced them by analysis to CHFREPANOV: meanwhile, GIcREFANOV had tried to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkisn border and executed. In every major respect, therefore Gig eh agrees with NOSEUKO's version of tne case. When asked whether the CHEREPANOV incident might have been “a trick" by the KGS to emrarrass the U.S. Embassy, Gos¥gey replied that it was definitely not. The second way in which e@BEggr has certified that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source is indirect. CHEREPANOV documents, Qage@mep had indicatee that KGB: surv:_llance of a U.S, Embassy officer crougnt about the compromise of POFOV. (ii) Remarks As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the CHEREPANOV incident was & KGB provocation against the U.5. Embassy. but it is conceivable that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made yor sie
[ee SEAS ert Ha 14-00000 ‘es SAGES vensecgmrennenenmnene ass os vee TOP SEE" 8ll. b. The Coupromise of PEMKOVSKLY m dates on the compromise of PE'KOVSFIY are at vari- ance ith HNCSERKO's er.d they diszgree on wrecher the ¥GD knew American Intelligence to be involved in this operation befcre JACOB of CIA was apprenended at the Pushkin Street deed drop on 2 November 1962. Seth so'rces stated, however, that curveillance led to the detection of PEXKOVSKIY, although again they diffur on the person with whom PEVrOVS&Kiy was firet seen by tho KGB: eR eaid this individual was the Britian businecsnan WYIRlE, while NOS- ENKO said it was the Excglisnwoman Pers. CHISHCL¥. According tu@gEeiey PENKOVSKIY had been working openly with WYNNE, exploaning wnat he was trying to zvelop WYNNE, and the KGB learned cf their meetings through surveil lence.* WYNNE cet PENKOVEMIY in Moscow du “ring Aprit- Wav 1961, May-June 1961, August 1961, ana June-July 1962. GPAs repert that PLiKOVSKIY came under tuspic‘on in May 196 therefore is not consistent with his statevent about KGB surveil- lance of the WYSNE-PONKCVSKIY meetings, nor does this report co- ancice with the evidence trom WYNNE himself that the KC3 was sufficiently suspicicus of their meetings to record a converse- ticr they had had «aig mp 1951 (one year ecarlier than in the version). NOlfiun9 dated the PENKOVSKIY compromise at a month or two after he was first seen, but at the time not iden- tified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in hovember or December 1961. Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participa. tion of American intelli sce in the FESKOVSKIY (Operation p until American in a lavatory. f uP CIA reccrds show that it was Of 27 Au :gust S62. Lose ee: that the KSB “invented” the incidert at Fushnxin Street on 2 Hove ember 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to catch the American unlcading the dead drop. ** PEXKOVSKIY was not personal y_ercwn to o hin, Gaeeim stated. an * The sane statement was made by NOSEIKO and in the official KGB document on PEXNKOVSKIY's compromise. t*This is obviously true, although the cate cf PENKOVSKIY's arres* may have keen more than a month Lefore, Tor SECRET
14-00000 TOR SECT Ce The Corpromise of POPOV (4) Introduction Of all the sources available to American roe orev eee is the best placed to report on the CORPEORISS of FOPOV: ro ee BS ag oth aie - iy gee fe iF : ees Ry ale A cr. that provided by NOSENKO and CHEREF BNOV, as well. a3 chat in the 16 September 1959 message fren. POFOV to CIA (kclieved to have keen dictated by the KGB). These four sources have indicated that the ccmpromise resulted from KG3 surveillance of a U.S. Fobessy official following the recall of 1 PCPOV in November 1958, CEE bovever, has not precisely dated the inciderc (dated by inrerence ry the cthers at 2) Ganuary 1959), has asscciated it with an Aw2rican Intelligence dead drop for POPOV (whereas the othicrs have said it was CIA's mailing ef a letter to POPOV), and has nor ning) tne CIA Seficer involved ((George WINTERS)? The evidence £ romeeggonee BP ike thac from NOSEN“O, GHEREPAICV, and the PCFCY message, conflicts with that from CeLITSYN whose state. ments on the compromise of POPOV ere suppor tec by analysis of events in 21957 and 1358 on which FOPOV reported (s Pages 663-665), (ii) Cetails ae : ad rade a “very serious mistake" by using an i accommodation acdress Supplied by Anerican Intelligence to receive , mail from a girlfriend in Aucstria.** “In sere f=shion" this came “ to the attention of the Austrian police, Qi hie ne it was Getermined that she had been sending mail fo a Soviet offi- eer in Berlin: The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and eventually POE was conironted ky the chief of his GRU component in Berlin.*** CRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled SNOT ye Of providi ng in- ae sub-source for this remark , 2x 2 > and since then GR an resolved the discrepancy Detween this version ana the other Y one treated at length here. ** CIA did not supply POPOV with en acconmodation address, but _ he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK. went to the Austrian police on 25 Auqust 1958 with i Soviet Intelligence officer. POPOV's superior confronted him ; on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEK and received from him an i admission to having had some correspondence with her concern- i ing his search for cperational leads: the superior told POPOV that the Soviets believed “she wag working for someone” and that “possibly she is the cause” of the Berlin unit’s opera- tional difficulties. PCPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 Nov- enber 1958 ostersibly for a weex's TDY to discuss the case of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He did not return to Berlin. F co comeemntcpenepeetn ince wets GS cumin tn TOP SEGEET tresses. i intormation that included the identification of POPOV as a een
anes 9 . TO? SECRET 813. to Moscow to explain the cituation, und when he wag unable to do so, the facts were turned over to the KG3 for full-scale investiga- OTL NY SEE SMEAR SRA IEE Ce gor tt not been for POPOV'S correspondence with an Austrian women, “they would never have eaught hin," and that POPOV was “arrested because of a connection with a gicl;" also, SIP TE at the cnc of 1939, POPOV was recelled to Moscow “for something” gs SSRN T gree yh Oke While the foregoing KGB investigation wes in progresses d routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Emoassy official in Moscow, This person was observed renting a boat in Gorkiy Park, going to the vicinity of a new bridge near the Moscow Stadium, and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding arec. Its suspicions aroused, the KG3 covered this area and observed POPOV unloading a dead drop. He was arrested, doubled, and | "operated" against American Intelligence for a year ard one-half.* Eventually, the KG3 put in motion a plan to attempt to compromise the American official who was meeting POPOV. The KGS photograpned a meetinc in a Moscow resraurant, then arrested the official and showed him pictures of his neeting with POPCY and of FOPOV UNn- leading the dead Grop at the oridge. After the Aherican refused to work fer the KGB, he was released and declared persona hon grata,** AB aecaay RG aoe we CLA quest ioneeE ERB on POPOV 's compra se. He said at tars Lime that he hid heard POBOV was apprehended through a dead dryp. PGPOV “apparently was under suspicion there in Berlin, and when tacy (presumably the GRU) recalled him to Moscow, they wondered wno his future contacts would be, and they were told the following: ‘KGB workers place American i:nbassy employees vider surveillance.' They observed an American at the staircesc... and they found a dead-drep under the staircase. So they established coverage of the dead drop and ob- served POPOV come and unload the drop. They made a report, and after this PO®0V was under surveillance... Then he was called in and told thus-and-so. ney showed him photographs. They told him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts. He agreed to it..."*** = w i * Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE was arrested the following October, he could not have been doubled against CIA for more than eleven months. #* Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LANGELLE of the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959. ##*as previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey the possi- bilities for dead drops to be used in other operations, One GE these was bocated-in—Lenin- willis,-an_area of Moscow _not far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was mctituaced beneash a staircese; ae oF te Se PSG YSIS C5 et DES LANGELLY visited tre area ur tne dea rop site cn <« EY 28 May 1958, but the dead drop was loaded - {on 7 June 1958) rather than by LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV document, discussed on Pages 563- 564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operation- al activities in Moscow, that this dead drop was for use with an agent named NEPNIKOV; in fact, it was not intended for the REPNIKOV case. a
14-00000 TOP Seu! feos ra ead 4+ aT ee “ eS Ae ay gee (iv) Remarks os: my precisely what he had been told, but 1 SEMETERD «<1 Leer sey mite informed him. There is, however, no evident reason why would have done this. Another explanation might be that misunderstood nis sub-source, of in relaying the infor-atis in to wy cS the detaals. his would mean that’ Adie aS less thea fully attentive to dutails ea a personal acgeaintince who had gained notoriety, details wnich he was told at a time when he was in a position conparghle to PEON ds in ie domes with None of these explanations seems entirely satisfactory, and the answer may lie elsewhere. ST ee. *However, in another Vers or OIG seid that as soon as the illegals reported their compromise in January 1956, POPOV, irmediately fell under suspicion. The conflict between @4 Statements hes not been resolved. a ae 2 meen agence + Gen Sommaineenpetnette +
ea pee gg RN Ht an mannan NA RES A A, RARER ARENA RRR 14-00000 @ 9 al5. gd.  suupin, LEsINGER, and ROLSHAKCY In threes instenccEaRgmpss NOSHNXO confirmed reports made by fe 2 EP the iictatfication of SHUEIN as a GRU agent, the Soviets' suspicions that SLZSINGER was in cor.tact with the FBI, and che status of BCLSHAKOV as a GRU officer. * , SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated witn two GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1949's, but indepen- gee icatio of his havi ] ng more recently been an a2 ae ek: Pee Boh 2m (5 HE sSaeted ROE Ye See POLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of CE and KCSERKO, has not been named as & GRU of F:ceer by any other . eource, nor has he Leen observed in re itangs with GRU acents, Bath : GP and NCSSNUNO spoxe of ROLSHAN C'S heving inet attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962, NOSHIKO added that, in inictating the contact, the Attorney General kiuew HOLSHATOV to be 4 “military intelligence officer," but tris repote has rot been corroborated,** 4,  Cosments on «Seah A confirmation that SOSZUKO is = cenuine KGS officer- defector 15 comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion _ that ppage KO as dispatched by the S55 woula not necessarily bring pg eR Lora fides into gucstion: much would depend upon bar Oe ee ee Sources, aS yet unidentified. “tira ar.d NOSENKO a of POPOV, a man @emwe ayy r% eee have authenticated iva 23 : validity of a CHERE- PANOV document which concerned the FurOV compromise and which was prepared by toe EGU for transmittal to american Intelligeance. in addition, and NCSENKO ‘suppor® ome another about the PENKOV- SKIY conmprerise, about the contact hetween BOLSHAKOV oe & ar a CShiuieea and Robert KENNEDY, and about SiUSIN and Gave - Self Aniocme:ion of BOLSHAKOV and. SHUNIN is unique; on SLESINGER it is ccerrororated by actions taken by the KCB, as reported sy SLESINGER; on POPOV, PENKCVSKIY, and CHEREPANIOV it is confirmed i by KGS controlled sources. wistiy Swpperting on the compromise é s yor and both With the exception of his details on POPOV ,gMELERESAR report- ing on NOSENKO and on common topics <3n be explained, individually, : by misinformation Ge Mreceived and innocently passed elong. These items taken together, however, in the light GME TEP state- : ments on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict witn GL lt reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that qo is contrelled by the KGB. Be a | tad *#I€ Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to Te 4 GRU officer, the question remains ag to how NOSEIKO was aware of the fact, _- &* ood] tom | ee CO ae | ame) a | i | 4
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821. F. met bae eegteer Ge tf ey 1. Introduction Cen counter inte! licence production has Leen ex- tremely limited. For the most pert sie haz provided only super- ficial reports, generally only ir response to questioning and frequently citing her cwn lack of access to information of value. professed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of, Gertain situations on which NOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably false isitherefors ncreworthy in the context of her total perfcrm- ance. | reporting on NCSENKO, despite vaqueness ané contradictions, has the net effect of supporting his bona fices and affirming the importance of the information he nas re- rted. accounts of the 4 = a mes reports on the compromise ct PENKOVSKIY, while differing markedly from NOSENKO’s in basis, scope, and detail, confirmed almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. 77] confessed pirticipation as an egent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, despite repeated claims to xnow_rotining of im- portance concerning its operations, has placed in NOSEKO's milieu, and the KGb officers who figured in [reporting are, {with two exceptions) 2. NOSENKO's Fackground and Career Phas claimed no first-hand or authoritative knowle@Ge of NCSENKO, reporting at various times that[  |had heard gossip, had heard about him from KGB friend SVIRIN (who[__] believed only "knew about" NOSE:KO, i.e. did not know him personally), or had heard about him from “scemeone froa the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN, "| has reported frag- ments on NOSENKO's background: his father's fositicn, his mother's ethnic background, and NOSENKO's ron-KG2 status. initially said that NOSENKO's father was a general, later said was mot rd sure of that, and stiil later amended her description to “general or minister," edding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching an accurate statement only efter several conversations about hin. consistent statement that NOSENKO‘'s mother was Jewish and involved in black market activities has not keen elsewhere reported, and statement that NOSENKO was a civilian, rather thar. a KGB officer, contradicts his own account and that of other sources who have confirmed his KGa status. | sourcing of limited information on NOSENKO to| |KGE frien SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by NOSEWKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American ad Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and oefcre that of the Third Department of the Directorate of the KGS Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.) bo ; Tor SECRET
14-00000 eatewestaraengttaene taster tee Gaeta ct GES DSR RARMEAERG Hin Ge SAETDEDES + otc ms me pn meh we Bee unee doe @A7 paretle to that of NISENRU ard - to 1959 WS ceel - Lo OB go a 822. 3. NOSENKO's Knowlecze ~ Damage to the K33 one . . 1a8 mentioned SCSELKO's a:sclosures to the Americans concerning the micropro.es in tne U.S, Emuassy - only reference to inforzation he micnt have provided - on each eccasion when discussed NOSERKO, jattributed to : SVIRIN the remark ir. October i19€6 that UOSETKO had done consider- able harm to the Scviet Unicn by revealing this information, thus (and specifically only in this cor.text) uncerscoring the importence of NCSENKO's information. (NOSENKO himself has characterized this information es the most important he has provided.) The context in which discussed HOSFIKO has been the gereral one of oe defectors frcm the Soviet Union: | ___ hersttedly emphasized that the Soviets attexpt to ccnvince a Sseviet citizens that “anybody wno defects will find nis crave ov tne Tard of KGE as mers fa RR ce « epee ' i * rr rag Py r pe a eee fa with reference to hOSENKO, d@ SVIRIN as civinag Said thar NCSSIKO,. too, would one Gay be exterminated, thus ciearly implying shat NOSENKG was a genuine defectcr. 4. Parallels with SCSEKU's heporting a. The CHEREPANOV Czse account cf CHEREPA'OV's cisarfection, treason, arrest, and execution «i tirrs ir General c.tline and in emphasis that of SOSENKO. g¥v aes : ease through esoral friesdship with CHEREPANSV ang Ts wives Ee yf cescriced in fact, as the only friend of CGiEr.FrANOV who renaines FaTtrrul “enough after CHEREPAN 7's gownf2all to call on CHEREPANOV's widod, whose address This Girect knowledge is com knew. introduced account of the CHEREFANSYV case, as in discussions of NCSENKO, Ly references to the determination ard effectiveness cf the KGB in apprehending and executing those wno were “running away";| cffered GiZFEPANCY as an example'of a Soviet traitor who had ceen caught and executed. account ct the details, however, differs snarply froa that of NOSENKO (and others).[ _]identification of CHEPEPANOY as a classmate[_ | | Jat the GkU's Military Diplomatic Academy (MOA) from 1956 _ who have reported on CHERE- PANOV, ‘For the period during whic k said CHEREPIOV attended the MOA, NOSSNKO has made no specif.c statements con- cerning CHEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some un- specified date after CHEREPANOV's return from Belgrade (elsewhere reported as mid-1956) and before early 1960 CHEREPANOV had been assigned to the U.S, Enbassy Section. Amnerican Cepartment, KGS Second Chief Directcrate., | Pclsc stated, however. that after his craduation rrom tne MUA in 1959, CHEREPANOV “finally” obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, sug- gesting that he had no intervening assignment. Where NOSERAO has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV’s having collected KGB docunerts during his acsignment to the U.SJ Frbassy Section for later trarsuitcal to the Americars, has described his increasing bitterness from the datS"or ATS €vvéring the MDA in 195¢. [ _] was not sure that he had been a KGB officer; negther mentioned ror did account allow for his assign- ment to the U.S. Emkassy Section in 1960-1961 (as stated by 4 meme
TO? SECRET 823. by NCSENKO); [_____—s[described the documents which he turned over to the Avericens as maving come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. stated, therefore, rather than demenstrated, the point that tTese were guch imporcant documents, impocvrant enough that...he was shot.” gioercing fceron@ account of the CGUEREPANOV affairs sourced] | inforration dittererely ard added firs=-hand s waich she hac previously disclaimed having. said that "In teo days this man was arreste?...in two nonths he was snot." Tnis is also at variance with NCSiMZl'© acntoure of a KGB investiga- tion of up to 20 cr 25 days, follewed ry the Kar offiser’s visit | to CELREFANOV on & December 1963, GiZSEP?OV's Ciight, ard a seven- cay search for rim before his arrest. De The Compromise cf PENKOVSKTY Clesely conforming in this riserce ta NOSSNKO's account cf PEMIKCVSE“IY's compromise, laced the date of initial suspicion of PENKOYVSKIY at about Ccrocer or November 1961. statements of the casis for this cuspicien, however, differ com-— pletely from the reacens advanced by NOSESKO (and other sources). Ce Reports or KGS Fersonnel | a or named reiatively few KC83 officers who have figured in career as_a KGB acer: cr about whom eculd re- Port any sucstance. o¢| | KcB handlers: -- - : nr - KGB hendler while was employed —_ in Moscow wasl — - e 27, 6 e S 8 ePeerara i i Kelationship with him was not related te earlier santurist work, however, but connection with a foreign corres- pondent, which was KOSTYRYA's respensibility after his re- turn to Moscow. a
a 9 a en B24. Of the four other KGB officers cn whom a : reported in any cepth, three were previously ident and only Ly NOSEXKOG: “by NOSENKO Le ES i | ! ‘ i } t i - In connection with SVIRIN, Sere recounted an incidence in which a KUB officer cescriped in dceroga- tory terms, Valercin MUZEYUIK, hid narrowly escaped disnissal as a result of a a@runken brawl with a militianan. MUZEYNIA hed not only survived, however, tut continued to bear a higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and sub- ; crdinate, SVIRIN. NOSENKO said MUZEYNIA was an officer of i the Directorate cf the KGB Secend Chief Directorate. - Vadim isiRYUKOV was identified by fi ENPRI eras KSB officer under HNovesti cover assicned to Sore on the inrerviesw in Aacure + 136¢ of eee ue Ee NOSENKO hac pr eviouslv given Snformation con Lcerning BIR LUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief Dircetcrate, targetted against foreign correspondents. te ae epee Met on A erate en 5. Remarks There is confusion in @ mee Ss sub-scurcing for information on NOSENKO and incomsistency | lthat. on one hard, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of microphones in the U.S. Scbassy. These facts indicate that if was brigcec ry the KCB to report to American Intelligence on NOS= ENKO pas es Mas inadcauately prepared. Otherwise, however, Paar ag Fersonelly supported the bona fides of NOSENKC - by offering « carect conrirmation of the bona “fides 5 Of CHEREPANOW, by corrocorating NOSENKC's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Director- ate personalities. terme ane neeremntt wet meee rE wetgememenpmen eae RTTE ENS. Camere Pm career - The circumstances of her claimed. relationship with the KGB contradict KGB practice as known frea other sources. a8 PmgmaseneReEtE eee 5 ene Sie EE OEFORRIES SOS Memb yee Tne et ae vw dheme TOP SECRET
Bos, ecnatlte «me ne : 825. . t imay have peer a KG. orgenized pre- ‘ : i Rude to the defection of Pevetee bee. 1s also® suggested by i the fact that the one operational sultace her husband 15 : “4 known to have had there was 4 Western douple agent, and \ | able to provide idcatifying data on thi - Nearly all of GRRRYERIRISgys identifications of « Soviet Intelligence persurelities were previously known. i ' - She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation for defectirg, of her relationship «ith her husband, and of her associations with KGB personnel. - Against the background of the claimed difficulties in which she “os husband found themselves, it sews une likely that & wie peyy Wold have reen permitted to leave the USSR. “a . the West and an her husband's situsticn and behavior since the defection. cine enmenee A bo TOP SECRET
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TOP Sevizi , 4 r ort yorte late ‘ i . 1 wt $ wie : : ey grey : Lith rye ne LP bse te ‘hath & mee eore ween re oES . t H t aot ais > a. wr ee ite? gel. webs 2 oe ltt ae le Marl ab. Ur.laes ee £ t rf 4 PI a6 Gury... vahbats of Sebstatet Poa Ss. ne Cut Rrotwat ion Of Sf. cma tepabtestae co: oe the ts particularly es biarnce tele ces tte Flos aves isc bite docs mr staan on the fanizeataech and eee wet ne THe Oke Ol bec rate weet Une qee ate mute eae he SS ele a. che th var.y 95d “nis in- rioataee. Wik aieteett et ry Div l ttateecing his debe t- sion at ena of 29 tL. je Loo ue el fed orvamina- tarncal. er ote ot ri : a7 6 sntatacd a Si zene ele t Of ante : ‘ : pie ‘ tae. cio peoovsdea ben ir Dee tee a one Ma he * A Polasr (6 stat: oitioes: crainei ry ce f+ TULEMLYWSXY was a also @ FSP agen. lta. Ce SS TOP SECIS?
14-00000 Other LeTimisues CF wWAACN VETIOLS Scurees anotner include tne foriowing: oe ‘ : Peel tance Gus iOTen. Uses KGs Surveaa dence bates tora'e ancbude: special paint i save confioned onn sy tee nvisible to tne naked ev: ov visiple tareugn «fe Ot & Special Ge¢icEe It 139 Used GM TOM SUN ion with herb eprecs wsord cipcuas televigien at Lricacs. tenne.s ©te A crnilar Lecrnig? wes Gescribed by Wiel ekwsei 20 ay tCR. LOWE ULE £ PELbes ta GOgs ino Farvens Lierce provided many ue cable On taas tes tee HGS also can Le comeeuled In tue idpls .uwere GF TEenUs. conversations cetween foreign Capen DOV papers nave ces- & cu” NOL © mM. pnImes and ; toes Ss LA CAG “otek cf whe RG Sueverela vce Direc voreare wEOLee Be fet nae develored a ci ete p eeadled puget ham Gat vei les sO shaped tnat they cen Lat am tne stave haeul oad. Cf @® man = 34at. They Thus concealed. tity ac used in Moseow oy tne Ro: to listen to (©. particulacly at tne Kotrel Merrope. and ime nmetea batienal Su.u miniaturized Gevices mave 32120 BC. SEREL ant{cr S,1a to. F : creypronym as ON-RRSIPA, eo HOSEN! by @ Soviet pcsing as an American @ecepite G@ ty SOLMDEWE TD. COLITSYN : ee ac i ere CHISERANOV pepers. "S“P4uOY papers Gave tne KGB : Weoee ported tne KCB reennique of wit. nirg a, ose batetele a for tie U S. Rnbassy in Moscow to a KiB ingtar.at en ownere Lney ate intercepied Where tne buik of MOSEIKO s reporting on KGR occrations was € nas concerbed witn tnos: of the Secoaid Caves Gireitorave. tn ica) a ee a orrer c.f © 8 Tamea mere. : Ae eee : Cee em. Ovo e lr | NAVE net hLat nO ofl kha@k SOunlerintcdargenc 0D UNelr statements on tre compremise of given Getails on ties in éddition c- oa e 48ctivie CIA assets Witnin the USSR ta topic of reporlsing Dy eee > 1@ CHERE- PAN OY eS Wa ——— The infturmar on fren 2, _—— ary zed peiow wee ‘ se CPOE: nas jar ADLE Lo provil Cnhie€é Dire-rorate activity. He reported the G's discov r ery of an American employea at tne Sokolniki Exnibirion in Moscow if ® The existence and d teasipility of su.m a ruostance has nm verified. TOP SEE" e ot been
14-00000 — TOP SEGRE? 232. clandestine conmcuct with gi’ wdentitie.: Soviet female. (This contact 18 rot identifies at the Exhibition in 1959.) He spoke Of The Kal sg 4 webew Gg: ot af American Intelir- gence Geaddrop urcaer é& torch an the area of the Ageciculcural Exhibition. He sa:¢ that the KCS contrclied a.t U S&S. agent con- tacts in Moscow, including on! wits an old sat in his 60's (ics- EMKG reported cn 44 ingividuel who may re daria) with this agent). wis! 2 39 A cleipcd to paw. celfilled functions which, SCSEAaAG end os hers have Ges rioed as ste dird procedure an ons against Téreigners and Soviers iniage tna Soviet Union. S mca she «as a Secord Chict Dirercrate agent t » ‘epeleie Mierassy, in Mess yo gnd Jace ne we a? tis \ G € iS 7 by hs + an eR OT the dgefecctians of i the genuine sources Noana © tenet reek [RE that emerican : Intelligence kegen to 16. 21,€ voOlsuinol ard s:iteally currcocrative informeticn fron others on the aceretuiss of tne XOR Second Thiet and Surve:llance Directorates. The cae ing of thas, anfcrmasian therefore arpeers to be sicnificent in atdition co the overlap of specific details Tre fat enn oie aany Of these sources, even includiny Gey i Mer. eed EL orcond Chiel oirec- torate informatics ome raired Koo decision to em~- phasize cr sacriiice at. ‘6 revicusly r 1 ee emacs nasemeearem mee ste wees TOP SECRET =; . oe a oat + etree eee eee, nae aor orempmtatinirttperneteteenennnene 6 ns
~ us TOP SECRET 833 Oo a ARE OTR oe ARERR AED CA EY ome atten Sam a ER GEN AO Ow we ake bake al ee a im ishee TOP $ ae A AREER ty mentee cree yRHeee te Ne ESET STEPS . * ra”
sersitive source(s) TOP SEcaET ee aoe Ti . a om romaine mreeNneD tare seppegatzerenrpate: etemtneansdiymnwetrenae + > " od . reer ;
14-00000 si 83°. H. Evaluation The conclusion tha: BOSEREO 15 on @ KOE wi3si:on could carry damaging implications to: tne ources wno have Supported nis bones tides, Unless trtir ctatenents or, NOSENKG can be convincin:zily «explained @f innotent repetition of misinfor- mation spread by tre Pas within tne Sevier secviess. tnese sources mignt be conciuced ta nave been celiberately misleading eitner as Promotors cl tnfir own personal interests or @S parties to 4a KGB co.spiracy. Regarding GOLITSYN. tne opinion of CIA-1s tnat he purpose- fully gave false suppore for NOSPNKO in an attempt co make his Opinions more @utnoritative. This it nar a satisfactory explana- cion for the remarks on NOLENKO by ps dpe p Eee el ae 5 however, trere seem to 08 no perscnai i Te eee ceo ener” @ The possibility chic QQeReees : are uncer KSE control was tested curther an the concexe ef sne NCSENKO opera- ticr cy reviewing caralieis in there reporting and his. and c:neral cOrrelacions tnat near fron one case to anotner., At the same time, tne NOSENKO- P22 eee cORrecticns were soe for compar- Stive purposes. Wis found tnat would eliminate oe : fron consideracion eas possibly being TALS €xemination against the conclusion tnat NOSENKC is under KSPggontrol, oe oH eae TOP SE! - ce eee snes Manny he eememer aim menue enewnenrsremerrapeetaimoe | ae tee oe :