104-10492-10110 px 29 Mee 67 hans Ro: MOL Car paclinben
74-00000 |: js [soit ARULE7AMISPAWN  ANMOP CusseaTOs PROCESSING ACTION DISPATCH _ 3 EC 7 een A ‘ Chicf, WH, Diviston—————~ fp BOR Lo a ‘Tug inotxinG EQueeiD . fomay GualiHiD DEse ~ Chict of Station, guwave /'e SS Sp>.Pe Plans for ODCA Mid-April Congress___ AgonRiquiNiO -aUARIRCES , “REF: JMWAVE 01805 . ton, fo. 2, . The purpose of this dispatch is to .report the comments of AMMOP-1 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion Democrats Cristiana de America (ODCA). Congress. | AMMOP-1 said - that the precise date of the Congress. is yet to. be set though 4tois still Scheduled for mid-April. He now feels that he will: have a copy of the formal agenda by: the end of December which is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While - ' AMMOP-1] is. nota member of the committee preparing the agenda, ‘he said ‘that he.is being kept generally informed of. developments , and that once the agenda is. prepared he should be in a position — whee tO influence a revision of the agenda in the event that there “are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not satisfactory. He said that the principal person with whom he is in-contact on this matter is Rafael CALDERA and that it will be through CALDERA that he would hope. to make his influence felt.: .AMMOP-1- also said that-he hag been assured by CALDERA that the Cuban ase will be prominent in the agenda. - 2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed of developments on this end. . a Roger E. MARCHBANE. - Distribution: 3 - WH/COG = }¢. Beo~1d cae ft “ oe fake (ROSS REFERENCE TO . . Sarath SYMBOL AND HUMBER , OATE : 7 . QB- 201-767219 _ UFGA-29068 _| 1 December 1967 Classe RATION HOS Aik iruMBEe spear a anaes = cee ne SECRET 19~300-10
14-00000 i; ies ee "ee a, . ot ; : on c -f bt ee é rf a ty raf aap of a ga oS : 5 CU ARRICATICN ote f  BEOCESSING ACHON 70 3 . , as Cis ' Chiefs, All Wl Stations. and Bases | xX |e rengaren es quiet ars, ; — ‘ be foaue gutrae Big ‘ [CAM MRE JE BEG sage ‘ : ‘ = . Chief, sat D ivision ; - : - - P| wCRCOR (psvgsect ; a - - . . Christian Democracy in Latin America | _ . _ [ACTION REQUIRED . ATFLRERCES 7 “ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI. wo The following analysis has been prepared in WH Division and £s transaitted to,-all Wit Division Stations and Basca as a review of the current. status of. Ciristian Democracy in Latin America‘and. _ an updating o£ Neadquarters’ vies on the movement. We believe — “the subject matter merits ¢lose and careful study by all Station operations. and reports officers whose coments are solicited. FYI, this material, in a shorter and sanitized form was published n the 3 Match issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Revicw, — i will thu3*be widely disseminated throughout the intelligence : costiunity. However, the WOCEAR study could net include much of the "Conclusions" section. since it was interpretative and had ‘ye decided to send the full text operational overtones, “Thus we herein in book dispatch form. 1.. The decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that Christian Denosracy misht develop significantly throughout Latin America competing with Communism on ideolozical grounds and offering an- alternative, democratic route ‘to social and economic progress. Christian Démoexacy"s advocacy’ of ‘Third Force” concepts plus . . fcequent manifestations of enti-Yankee syndrome caused some observers to swallow hard, bue there was no denying that these - - eoneepts had’ an emotional appeal. coupled with a cosmicuent to, basic Cozmunism, and presented within an ideolovical framework. stressing the dignity of the husan person, attractiveness to the Latin Aner ‘middle class“elemeats. This dispatch will review the current status of the CD parties and the role of orzanizations -- ODCA, CLASC, Party youth and student wings and European CD groups «= which ‘| cross REFERENCE To — Barston SYMBOL ARO mee on . oo ROOK DISPATCH 5951 7 : 2 ; | This political charisma, oo. social réfora and opposition to - comprised a package of considerable fean, particularly the-student and | seered ? 3 ext. . Fo March 1967) 5006 Foe inn ett eeecnceanan ommmnnnreegeyeanneeaaa ene COORDINATING orerce $yvaoL galt GFEERS waMe Wye Tin eae) OFFICE S1UBOR C /WHD
14-00000 roa two years after th ‘Srei victory, whether thé génerally enthusiastic parties cre genctakly agreed to be of current political significance -.Salvador and Peru. a ¥ - TUASSIF ICA TOM : aes 534 USE PREVIOUS ETON “$E CR ET | Qa AAAS : prawn SU MOOR ASD MuMDe ee NUATIONOFS OL. > i a se Gee ATEN OF |  SEGRET | G08 DISPATCH 5961 eo ee ere eaters tors in the developnent of the Christian Democratic répresent key £ tin ’America. Our major purpose is to, determine, some movesent in L ac in stich Democratic prospects engendered by this ‘assessaent of Curt highly significanc-election was justified. oY CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY 2. Pattics of Current Significance. Christian Democratic in Gnly‘ four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El = a, ‘he. Chileai-Pp¢ fis the only party with the ‘respon- ' sibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 | -. presidential election .was followed by an even more impressive. -, «Showing in the’March 1965 congressional election. However, the “Party's réform program is being implecented with lesa than. deliberate speed, no ‘progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and “indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the lefc wing of the PDC. b. The COPEL Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of cuolicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent _of the clectorate im 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica . “Party (32 percent). COPEL Secretary General Rafael Caldera, — “one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard beaver in his fourth try for the presidency. — ce. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the yotes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. it has little chance of capturing the. presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by. . 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the. likely candidate. ; - a , d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular ' Actica (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Soce would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in compee . tition with the dominant AP and.the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a Listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this arguzent by the very recent split off of a dissident fsetion of the PDC inte a separate party. However, the inelusion of the Peruvian party here {is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD yroup participating in a coalition government and chus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru. - ,
14-00000 : . cay wens ee TEP) DP MBUG AND Ma ORES tae CONTINUATION OF “sega " aD. "DISPATCH J. SECRET | scox DISPATCH 596k 3. ‘Parties of Moderate Potential,’ Applying even the most ., Generous criteria t to the judgement of. potential, there are ‘not more than four CD parties -- in the Dominican Republic, Panawa,; . Brazil.and Guateagla -- that might develop a a3 s moderately. important forces” over the REX. ‘five years: . ao - Be ‘Be "The Dominican PRSC stands as.a prime example of. ot ee DP irresponsibility from the tine Caonabo Javier. took over veg ca _ Patty: ‘leadership in the wake of the Dominican Revolution in of") SAprih.1965,--Ie has-colbaborated with the entire spectrum of Vee fp oo OS Meexist=Lining partics,. and moderation of its extreme” nol 7 f .  iddeancy im the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has yg as es -devéloped a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily ve Sup. or: -£fren"the university Yanks, and 1s buttressed by the strongest . mo “CLAS affiliate (CASC) in the Henispheres . a “be “tie Pansmantan PDC was registered some five years i i azo and. polled only’3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although — ; - . \£ centinues 4 -oiniscule party, it has mada significant “corgentzational strides and its philosophy of. social justice gives it roots lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are largely pérsonalistic or tied to financial interests, “If the Panema CD succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and * attracts militants ‘fraa.-the predominantly negro and mestizo _ population, ie could bécone a force of gome importance. : -.@. While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of ‘the vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three f-sey states of the Center-South (Parana,* Sao Paulo, and Cuanabsra). Like all other pre-Castello Branco political parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner in the. presidential and parlimentary elections of late 1966, ' Expandéd political activity will probably be permitted after the seating ‘of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it is expected that the number of legally recognized political ‘parties will be limited, It appears likely. that the PDC will _ have to merge with another party if it is to compete in the an , lesislative life of the country. If the. PDC joins with a “party that has strength outside the present PDC strongholds, and the PPC message and mystique seta the. tone for such a new political entity, the net result could be expanded importance for Caristian Democracy in Brazil. : : ‘The Guatemalan PDC was..only recently recognized as a lesally constituted party. This nascent group has good ' steensth in the youth and ‘student movement and growth | . potential in the important campesino sector. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene de - Leoa ecpears honest and intclligmt. but he has little organ-. izational flair or charisma. His leadership is being challenged With more by a group of militant "Young Turks” on the left. visorous leadership and the development of middle echelon cadres the party could develop significantly. 4&4. Pa rties of Insienificance,. The remaining nine Christian -Dexseratic persis #» in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay «< show scant premise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argeatins (Salvador Allende, Horacio, Sualdo) and Bolivia CLASSIFICATIONS PAGE PO oe 53a USE PRENOUS FOLTION, SECRET [oc Tennennern 4
74-90000 | rerereceserraverteresryrt eat ERAASIRICA Tithe SECRET | |noox DISPATCH 5962 ° CONTINUATION OF DISPAICH (Remo ‘i Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of bricesnalds to thea handful of parties that réally count. Il =. PARTY YOUTH 5 TINGS © 5. fois Stronath: in ‘Universities. Ahead 2d of P Party’ Stréncth, As - with all political’s ‘Sroups.in-Latin Anerica, the vast majority of cD party milieants are drawn frea the. ranks of student appendages active in. the local ‘universities, In most countries of the hemi-. sphere, C2. voting’ streagth oa the ea: pus is much more significant ‘than the: ‘political - strength of the. parent party. A .few examples. =  dlustrate this point: _ ‘In: Panama, the Party: polled 3.1 peréent “.o£ the vote-in.1964 (and“probably would poll not more than 5 percent: todzy), while Lts University youth got -12.8 percent in the January’ 1966 ‘election, -. ‘The Dowdinican PRSC received 5.4 percent of the vote. ‘in 1962 (aad its preset strength could well be lower ': because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its | «youth wing on the ¢axpus” garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in Jon ty. 1956; In. Venezuela, “COPEL polled 22 percent of the vote in "16533 dts student. wing on the campus of the Central University, -howover,; polled 40.2 ‘percent of the vote in 1966, These comparitive figures suggest sede conclusions which are presented in Paras. 19 and 20 below. 6. Radios lization of Youth Wings. _Sevé¥al Cp leaders, most motebly Frei and Caldora, have expressed considerable concern over the growing. radicalization of party youth wings, That youth groups of every political stripa assume positions to the left of their partics is nothing new, but the situation in several cD groups has: gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line divides the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) from the stance assuned by Marxist youth elements, “In Venezuela, the wing of the- COPET youth headed by Marta Sosa is: so "far-out" it has eared ‘the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly, told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in “the National University is allied with the Communist ' students. -7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great. conecrn of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the "parties further left. Soce observers believe that the CD youth ‘ problem has been exaggerated and that the “hot heads" will mcllow . once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. While this is- partially true, we would take _ issue with this relaxed view. Tha raw. material to be molded is far different than it was ten years ago; since that time the demand for revolutionary (even -convulsive) change has mushroomed -- ard ud me ae ‘asong tha youth the cry has. assumed din proportions. The natural Chae reliowing process. will no. longer produce the same magic, Ss. Rood for Teeinine. Some believe that the only way of sting the CD - youth drift to the left in the foreseeable future lics in massive end intensive youth and political cadre training. Efforts in this direction to date {ac IFEDEC, several national poli tical training institutes, ORMEU and various student training CLASSIFICATION Ss E Gc RQ RP TSE PRCUIGS Cie, A eres
14-00000 ota, AUN AT OT Oe Ae Ny eR 1 Seabee PC Ary aa } SECRET ~ [Beck DBisrAreH 5961 CONTINUATION OF " DISPATCH _ courses) have been discouraging. In-most instances the teacherg | _ share icentical biases with the students with che sesule chat misconccptions ara reinforced and no new horicons ani opened up. Frei énd Caldera have askéd.the Gerzan Institute far International _, Solidarity to inereasa its‘ support .in. the student trsiniss fleld, “but the Germans, while. recognizing the serioua need, have thus far ~ dgehincd: to increase theiy cocsituent, To atcocplish anything . Sigsificant, the Ccmmans belicve a massive projras-cust ba Launched ‘Qwhich would tax their current resources), sad they wonder whether ‘tho.C) youth situation has been permitted to drife too Long to. salvage, — oo 7 Fo III =.TNE IMPACT OF CLASC OV TITS CHRISTIAN DetoceaTie MOvEENT ~ carepesasen meme emo : 9. CLASC Poses Serious Dancer for GD Movement. A KUMONK ..Stucy points out-that “Organized Labor could contribute substantially _ to. the “development of well-organfzed CD political parties in the, -hemisphere, but it also offers the best chance for. CD extrenists tocause harm'to the moverent.” Few would argue that how the CD tovercnt' fares and the image it projects depend in not insignificant mecsure.on. the posture assused and progress achieved by: CLASC.’ - .More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on the worst element comprising it «= and in this resard CLASC is challenged only by the party ‘youth and student wings. As an ~ organized lcbor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the exception of its campesinos ama); its only impact and sole raison _ gtetvs up to this time has beca.as a political action ikstmment with primary appeal to the working classes. It is unlikely that CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow as do parties when they schieve the responsibility of government. 10. CLASC Bas Maintained Posture of Independence, Despite its “Christian'’ label, ‘CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic movement or any rember — party. The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty of most of the same aberrations as the least responsible of the'Ccp parties, it invariably commits its follies independently, (often, in fact, setting sn example that is emulated by the parties). But while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it is also true that CLASC does net discoursge the belief that it is the chosen . labor instrument.of the Christian Democratic movement, although | ‘this label has never been formally bestowed, ‘Tl. Closer Ties Retweon CLASC and CD Movement Appear Likely, It appears likely that a core organic participation of CLASC in CD affairs is in the offing... A Seninar was held in Nortevideo from - 11 - 23 April (sponsored by the Christian Democratie Formation _ Institute -- IFEDEC) for offictals of CLASC who are also officers of Christian Democratic parties, The Seminar, called for the specific purpose of arranging closer coordination between the CD political moveaent and the Christian labor movement, resulted in the signing of the "Carta cée Moatevideo" on 20 April. The Act calls for formal represcatation of ODCA in both tha Christian labor organization snd CD party labor departments. To this end, a Coorcinating Committee was formed -- the Comite Relscionsdor ¥" Coordinsdor De Orennizactonss Laborales ¥ Functonales De Les Partidos Dengsrata Cristianos. The Act appeals to the CO parties 3 CR ASSIF ATEN snracr it FORM ata 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION,
14-00000 ry ‘ Gosraltzea and ; OSA Leadership .hod’ not ‘been obtained in advance.” CLASC identi fieat “-yub off negatively on the CD youth wings. which invariably ‘are further . .heft’ than their parcnt parties .and identify much more closely with , “ tha revolutionary image and myatique CLASC has sowm and propagated. It is perhaps significant that. cLasc.has intensified its efforts - , fhoverent. This. initdativaappeara to have made greatest-progresa. “in Central America. - sO Oo : i - ~Americd-(ODCA). Tha. current officers of ODCA are: - closer attention than we have given it to date 1f it had substantial -sanctions against national groups.. ‘on revolutionary uysticis ' qualify with adjectives ‘from the Latin Acerican parties and organizations against these ¥ mone ray Cerrer® Sxrecyy tin’, ered i - tele . ap i SECRET . PEGG DEVAL 5902 ' CONTINUATION OF | Teeneie Bae Semmes DISPATCH - 4 eee ent wee eb CA cpproval of the-creation-of this Coordinating to request ODC: ; and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen heaispheric labor instruzent, The eventual approval of the ODCA lcadership appears. likely; incedd, de 4a doubtful that the Act would have exerzed froa the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of the ative CLAS Influence on Perty Youth Wings. Closer atioa with the Cy political movencat will likely’ since Jcnuary. to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor: ec: < $We SHE ROLEOF OPC: “13, ODCA Contribintes Little Positive Direction, The Latin American CD partics toxsmed. their.regional organization in Montevideo in 1949 «= the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de os "president . 3 Rafael Caldera, Venezuela Vico President ¢ Hector CORNEIO Chavez, Peru * Vice President t Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala Seerotary General: Tomas REYES Vieuna, Chile ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broad range of key issues (cost forcefully on the American intervention in the Dominican Republic). but :on balance has been less strident in. its criticisa than several of its member partics (notably the Chilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because of - Caldéra's rostraifiiag hand, The Organization would merit much influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply But ODCA amounts to little mora then a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological homogencity and the cement of their union appears to be based more sm (which most parties are careful to like peaceful, democratic and Christian) | end im negative fectors (hostility to the U.3., capitalism and the oligarchics), than on a foundation of Ch doctrine or basic agree~ ment oa just what they want. 14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts in European CD circles to prod ODCA to sect criterla for mexbership and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support eviteria. CYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups ia Latin Amcrica to hold to tha same rigid standards. of political morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should tha Europeans CLAS SF CATION . Use PREWOUS CQhOM, . ; ; enre@hepe of Pg destessuns ~ a es
14-00000 CONTINUATION OF .° | reas ae “Oe ESR GR DISPATCH SECRET -° laos 3 UPSPATCIL 5961 : pes Fe ee ee ee lerate and thus abet the, Lyrespos wwihiiicy of the es because there ara no standords wil. OBCA Cale nocars to ‘¥ecognize | the need fdr < least soma basic idcolozic al comzen ground among ODCA-nexber pirties. But mo signal success has been achieved in this direction to date and we are uot at all sanguine that even modest procress will be made in this revdrd-in tha foreseeable future. Reporting on the €onsress of the, “Werld Christian Democratic Unioa (scDu) held in Lisa in April 1966 indicates clearly thet the Latin Acerican partics | ‘whi -not subait without combat to any effort (whether initiated by the> ‘European fincnctal. backers of the CD novemant or by OSCA)’ that aims at imposing standards and ccatrols that. will inping Se on their conplete freedon of action. ; 8 45. Formation of Central Anerican Regional Grouning. The . Central Ancricea CD parties act in El Salvador in ely 1966 te establish a snaller regional grouping, The Union Renvcrata Cristiana ode: Centrosncrica (UDCCA)s ‘This-action docs not | appear to reflect ‘anyselésent. of pique with ODCA® “(the relations of COPEX and Rafael. Caldera with the Central Ancrican’ partics appear close and cordial) but rather a desire to esteblish a smalicr and more cohesive unit ‘that can better addréss itself to the problems camon to the eres and, to a lesser extént, to the individual CD parties. UDCCA is cozprised of fiva.partics (in Guatedala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Kica and Pensa), with the possibility that a sixth party will be formed in Honduras. "V = EUROPEAN ¢D ROLE AND INFLUENCE 16. The: Furopean Christian Democratic Union CECLU). The European CD -D parties werd first to establish a regional organization, ‘the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (KEI) in 1947, The NEI never played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From the outset the Latin Azericen partles maintained their closest ties with individual leacers of the CD movement in Surope,. particu- arly those involved in financial operations with the sister parties and CLASC in Latin Anerica. The NEI becama progressively. less significant end in recent years was virtually moribund. But in mid-1965 the organization uas revamped and re-christened as the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its newly elected ~ President, Mariano Pucor, Secretary General of tthe Italian PDC, appears intent on making the ECDU a strong organization which will at least match the Socialist International in stature. 17. European J Finansisl Sunort to. the: oD Parties. The two CD organizations waich have coatributed most heavily to the support the Latin American CD partics and related organizations. are the Institute for International Solidarity (11S) and the International Solidsvity Foundation (FIS). Between then they, will. contribute | an estimated $35 60, 000 to $1,000,000 to the CD parties and CLASC in Calendar Year 19 67. [et was recently reported that the COPEI party. of Venezucla vill receive $450,000 for the 1903 election from FIS at the rata of: 3160, 000 per year coumencing in 1965. The IIs, The Institute for International Solidarity, unSil recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the sew Director is = Herkenrath), is an arm of the Konrad Accazucr Foundation the Gernan Christian Democratic Union (Cou). Like its. reetr reine) SECRET ‘ a
14-00000 eo . . & ey wot t i TIMUATION OF oe oe Foc ace ccc eyennae area y na oe e. anne et ee me te “k esart. (cha Teiecsvich Ebert Foundation), x cf Li3's oscrating budyct corcs fron tha vers Goverenent. XS maintaing several. permsteit representatives -- £h Lecia \cari¢a cid: supports several CD activities. directly. a tut.it-also contributes move than £1fty percent of the FIS 7 budget. | ae Tho Fae Gane. Igtemat ional Solidarity Fund was , fownally Grectsi on 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of ginancial. suppors efforts en tha pare of the Europaan CD parties: aad otur Gd-oriented sroupas in Latin America. The “nama was: later changed..to the International Solidarity Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund of CISC aad-other organizations. Tho FIS operates a3an ara '"  @f the ECDU,. with headquarters in Roze, Its most important -~-. leaders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS,-a  Gerzan' ncfieasl and.clese personal friend of Konrad Adcnauer), Maviano Resor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vanistendael _«. . (Seeretary Gorneral of the International Federation of -S. Christian Tracé Unioas #< CISC). of its activities, the Germang and Ytalions have contributed - aleost the entire FIS budget (in 1964, for examplé, Vanistendael contributed only $15,000 froa the CISC International Solidarity , fund). FIS appears to be the exclusive European CD channel for ‘@xcanizations] support to the Latin Accrican CD parties, While he IZS is the rich parmer in the LIS-FIS. tandem and could easily fucd “he Latin Ameri¢en parties directly, the FIS channel is nveferrved by tna Goscans and has two major advantages: First, ginee TIS is a regional solidarity instrument with representation (out vet contributions) froa all the European parties, the resvonsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties ig watered down and cistributed among the European cD'a collectively. Thus a Latin Acerican goverment or party in competition with the local CD's cannot easily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the _ Geeman government. Second, ft 1s casier to obfuscate tha magnitude -. of Eurosean orjanizational support to the Christian Democratic moverene fa Latin Acerica 1£ it is channeled through. a qulti-party organization, The Geraans have limited IIS funding to, less. eontroversicl areas «= support to youth and student formation, political training institutes and CLASC training inatitutes. (See Attachzent, A for a detatled flow chart.) - ; 18, -DLfference ih Function of IIS and FIS. From the start "19, Cd's Coallente Communist Neaination of the University. Yt wea noted in Para, 3 above that almost without exception CD. strenzth in the university greatly exceeds the voting atrength of the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it is a fact that Communist /Christian Democratic strength on the campus is overwnelcinzly doninane throughout the hemisphere. Few would take teste with the conclusion that the vast najority of university youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational — message (tha wore “inspirational” more accurately characterizes the CD moverncont than dses "iccolegical") or an aura of revolutionary mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Denocrats ewe the vote has shifted from one movemcat with a messace to another, “¥e would anpear that the Christian Democrats are the only political eos capable of challenging the Coazaunists' hamisphoric domination bar) of une camnus. i" CLASSI CATION { be 52 SECR ET iT COM NUEe USE PREVIOUS COTION, a
14-00000 sare ee nen cena 0 emai nse = . ee were) ‘CONTINUATION OF i eo oa DISPATCH ( SSCRET. a in 20. C2) Strenuth in University Vo Tadfeatoe of CP Party |» wn omae F t ~ ~~ a & Strontth of Petentint, Frou the foregoing, however, it docs” cD streagch in the university — « _ not follow thac tue growth of -presascs a corresponding incressa in CDiparty strength. While -yoting patterns in the university provide valuable fasights on population (particularly youth) attitudes and aspirations, these pattems are inot4 relicble baroneter of either orsanized party ~ strength or future potential. in“no country of Latin America ‘ 43 the voting strength of the @'s or the Cousunists’ ncarly-as ‘strong ahoag.the population at large as it da on the campus. | Ona. reasen ig: that the university population of Latin Amcrica is. ‘less than:2 perceat of the total population. The CD. carpus leader aliost invaricbly graduates ‘frou student, politica to more dircet: — arty involvecat when he leavs ‘the university +- even Lf the party. has no discernable future. It would appear, however, that the. néusumiversity youth (lacking the pscudo-intcllectual pree tensions andthe sclf-bestowed elite label of the university- traincd) are cuch less inclined to vote and militate for Christian Democracy simply because. it has emotional or inspirational appeal. 21. CP Feilure to Transform Affinity of Lowr Classes Into Votes, The incceduately ccucatcd and tac lower social classes in ‘Latin Ameriéa are inevitably motivated by the pragmatism of the possible; to vote fox a party that has limited potential to achieve national power, sizply becausa it espouses views that hit responsive chords, is a luxury ho believes.ha cannot afford, Better, he thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of the: traditional parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a middle-class mover uc» With fow exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and to a Lesser extent Venezuela} it has scant worker or campesino i appeal.” By end large, Christian Democracy has failed to reach those on the lower rungs of the social ladder, - a 22, Individual Partv Fortmes Appear Unaffected by CD Pro: Many expected, or at least hoped, that the Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of the CD movexent throughout the Nemisphere. This has not happened. ‘here is no evidence that individual CD parties were either ussisted or hindered in. their developzent by the Chilean success story. And yet the view persists that the Chiltan victory was a boon to the movement's potential and progress. During the past year COPEL. leadeyx Rafael Caldera has. broadcast a variation on this theme that They argue that COPEL several Eurepean CD leaders have taken up. : must emerge victorious in the 1$53 election if the CD movement is ‘to maintain its momentum, for sa ideologically based movenent cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually dow, if it has only one significant victory to cite over a period of several years. We would rejeet the view -- based oa election results in Argentina, Coloxsia, Cl Salvedor, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay <= that indivigcal party fortunes will be affected in any significant measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere. Whet sppeavs to energe from these elections 1s rather solid. _ evicence that the national parties will sink or swim on their own devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development of miciie cchelod cadrés, organizational talents, appeal to the “Ncocially éisinkerited," and the pragmatism of local issues and consicerations. International events (with rare exception) count for lictle, and the influence o£ OOCA and the successtul CD parties © .Promress Elscimere. Poeneeennnne nats soe even less. Cx RbSe FCA TOPE SECRET Foun . jace §6530 USE PREVIOUS EONTION, . te | Xx | eacesdmeseet
714-00000! toe . ss 5 - . (ett cere mercer UTES , CONTINUATION OF | eeesaren 1 SSS SST . SECRET ° BOO DISPATCH 5961 DISPATCH | - . 23, Groth Potential Exists, But Mech Less Thos Criginally Antietonted, The Cd movercnt has mace. only modest prosress the past two years, Indications are that the developzent of the movencnt will be uch slower and less extensive than many’ anti= cipsted in the first flush of enthustasu following the Fref victory, for it has many problems to resolve, Chief among these. <operhaps, 18 CD failure to reach the. lower social classes and to cevelop ‘a significant’ worker base, The chances of CLASC. contri~ buting positively to correct this failure apoear recote, Another “major problen-is: the. absence of-an idcological comzonnground, : despite ‘the: lip service patd to the Papal Encyclicals and the a Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate oinimum _ rbéhavioral. standards ‘that these philosophical roots would impose. “This defictency is’ the root ‘cause ‘of two manifestations: First, a ‘propensity to consort with-Comumist and assorted Marxist groups . (e.g, in Colosbia;- Bolivia, ‘tha Dediinican. Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization. of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. ‘The fact, xenains, meverthéless,; that Christian Demoéracy is the most unified  MOn-Cemaunist movement in Latin: America. it cannot be labeled ' democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations - O£ several national parties, ~ a - 24. Need for Felectic Operational Approach to cD's, The . ranks of those wao viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great cnthusiasm. two years azo e= including the European finanefal backers. of thé movenent -« have ‘dwindled considerably, But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the “visceral denigrators") have displayed no:more perception in evaluating CD prospects, The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no “future does not stand the challege of investigation, Neither does the assertion that ‘Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wava of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false, We would Subait that the only valid approach ‘to the cp phenomenon is to assesa the movemeat and make operational judgements on & country-by- “country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no less. The. key question is: .Can the party develop as a positive element’ in national political stability? “If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within ~ ‘the party and to examine the need for operational involvement, |, Station posture toward the CD rovement ‘aust be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case, RUTHERFORD J, LYNER CaaS Git aT ehee SECRET ara aaa §3a USS Piette COTO,
14-00000 we, -. | > CONTINUATION OF. . "DISPATCH CLASES ION SECRET. ae _, Bas Wty | RIC SOG AND RUMULA Distetputiony.: 92: , (1 copy each). - : wi/, wef ty tts ‘RE FORM an "iy ah UST PacmOus EOE | CASRIEATIONS SRGAET 3eanch Chiefs Country Desks EXO as © CKTYCA  CATH/EL. Registry a ] Ge eae TAS uot BCOX DISPATCA. 5961 PAGg NO ii |
74-00000 . ° 1 7 . i ; EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS ig [ ) GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (cou) WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (weoU) ¥ ° KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION F I a > ‘ Political European | Christian Democratic Christian Democratic international Union ‘ , pictnelz Leadership peer Christan Organization Union of . ‘ : acemy — Academy nstitute Democratic of of Young Christian u | . Union Latin America Central Europe Democrats (ECOU) (GDCA) (UCDEC) (UOC) institute 4 for : international Solidarity Internatzonal, Sclidarity . (45) Foundation t OIRECTOR (FIS) Adolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT Johannes Schauft SOME GUDGETARY SUPPORT Support To: Organizational Support To: Political Training Institutes Political Parties Training Institutes of CLASC (Latin American Confederaticn of Christian Trade Unionists) Youth and Student Training 43060 3 OF 8 a a aaa ta CN, eo
° OO secret. No Forcign Disem LO La oy DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE res ne eee ort es Ramm Bun 2+ HOE Sr St WEEKLY SUMMARY Special Report wa. eer ar Christian Democracy in Latin America Rt eae ne prereeren nares 20 eo Secret NQ 1100 i -3 March 1967 No. 0279/67A ;
4a “a ‘4 4 : 1 nto ean tab obama. BE: bee, TROD TORO RE GON Hits oO) Olah iat oe att ee Soho eA de ah GEOL bene ern ae eee ie bp bh tik regan en Le 0 Aer BE Bw Nd i atta ta PADRE Te metre dese lc Foreign Gteven he CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY: IN LATIN AMERICA “The. decisive. victory of Eduardo Frei in the Sep- tember :1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop signifi-. cantly throughout Latin America, compating with Com- munism on ideological grounds and ‘offering an alterna tive, democratic route to gocial and economic progress. ‘No such tren 3d. has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is.to students and middle _ Glass, a relatively small percentage: of the population . ) “dn most Latin American countries, -Its concepts of Te, - basic social reform and the dignity of the human person " \ | tay appeal ‘to the workers, but they still cast their ‘vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance '- of governing. The movement's progress “is likely ‘to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor or- ganizations to compete against the entrenched posi- tions of other political movements, . Current Balance Sheet ._ The Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political: signifi- cance in only four Latin-American countries~-Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador, In only one of -these--Chile-<- is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presi~ dential election was followed by an “even more impressive showing ‘din the March 1965 congressional’ @lection. However, the party's’ _kreform program has run into daif- ficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still con- ‘trolled by the opposition; no ' progress has been made in weaken- ing Marxist domination of the’ urban labor force; and Frei's “moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years. The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one _ in Peru. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strengrh has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a Separate Popular Christian Party. SECRET Page 1 SFECTAL REPORT 3 Mar 67
as “O Country with aciwe chistian Democratic cPaity OC “Country ai woah hiistion Democrat, Pasty ® Oo Country: without Christian, Democratic Party, De weraic ars - ™, sweroRLC v, a BRIT HONOURED ~ Te . + MOOR AE mo, . xy avarem aca, fl ’ : a - 78 - S it 7 se » . 4 garvaoow? TWiCARAGUa . : . . wo 3 - - panama costa fea f- BRAZIL EDUARDO FREI Prosidant of Chile, . . NN BOLIVIA Lotin Amarica’ 's Christian Oemacratic loader. . PARAQUAY RAFAEL CALDERA yy Veneruolan presidential aspirant and : numbor-two Latin American Christian Damocrat » 45820 3-87 Classified material cn-reverse. side of page
- Salvador, No Forelan Oissen. Venezuela's Christian Demo- Crats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear | to. have narrowed -the gap between their 22 percent of the elector-- . ate in’ 1963 ana the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEY Secretary. Géneral Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders. of interna- tional stature, is ‘expected ‘to be the party's Standard: bearer - in his fourth try for the presi-= dency. in favor of a politically expe= dient move to the right, thug filling the vacuum of the center= “xight of the Venezuelan political Spectrum and opening new sources of support. . os In El Salvador, the ppc garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legisla- ' tive election’ and one of its. leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the Mayoralty of San In less than six years the PDC has become the leading Opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presi- dency in-1967, but should be a ‘strong contender by 1972, with \ .Notre Dame ~- educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate, Applying even the most gen- -@rous criteria to the judgment of potential, ‘there are not more than four other cp parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces ‘over the. next Five years, The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), SECRET Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT He has récently come out’. led by Coanabo Javier, has aban=_ donied, atleast for the time being, the irresponsible policies it - - adopted after the April 1963 req volt ahd has moved toward the po- litical center. The party has made “its opposition to the Bala- guer..government clear, but has also indicated that-it intends te Cperate within. bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate. line will in- crease its following and enable. _it to improve on the poor showing it made in. the 1966 elections, The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks. The Panamanian PDC was reg- istered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964, Although it con~ -tinues a minuscule Party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of ‘social justice gives it roots. lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic er tied to financial interests, | The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass~based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest--in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elec~ tions, The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the as- sembly seats in the next election, A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias! party and inherit his mass fol- lowing when he passes from the scene, : : ; The Brazilian ppc polled ‘only four percent of the vote in 3 Mar 67
SECRET Vo Foreign Diseem 1962, but the party had signifi- cant strength in three important south-céntral states. (Parana, : Sad Paulo, and Guanabara).. Like ‘all other Brazilian parties, it ‘was abolished during a political | reorganization under the Castello Branco administration, Most of- its members then affiliated with _ the progovernment_ARENA party | and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant ex- pansion in the number of politi- cal parties--the new Brazilian. constitution sets down stringent. ‘standards that virtually eliminate ‘ the possibility. of a repetition 'Of the former proliferation of parties, but its former members ‘will prob- ‘ably join with. Liké-minded con- gressmen to pursue policies con-~ sistent with Christian Democratic _ ideology. z The Guatemalan PDC was only -xecently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Cathe elic sources in Germany and Bel- gium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current Girection of the party leaves much to bedesired; its leader, Rene de — Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or ° Popular appeal. With more vigo- rous leadership and the develop- ment of.a middle-echelon cadre, © the party might develop Signifi- cantly--particularly if the in- cumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it. The former POC has made no attempt to reconstitute itself, The -remaininy. nine Chris- tian Democratic Parties--in Ar- gentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaregua, Paraguay, and Uruguay-~show scant promise of developing into -forces.| ‘Of national importance over. the next five years. . Geadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale). : Party Youth Wings As with all political groups in Latin America, the vast major- ity of CD party militants. come from. student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, Co: voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent Party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent to~ day), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24,4 percent in January 1967, The Dominican PPSC received 5,4 per-e - cent of the vote in 1962:(and its present strength could. well be ~ lower because of internal divi- sions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the |-vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, ‘however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966, SECRET yo Page - 4 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67
en See SR Several CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile.and Caldera - pressed con- in Venezuela, Nave és ‘siderable concern over the grow- Ang -radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by .CD ‘youth. groups {or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth ele- ‘ments. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth: headed by ‘Marta Sosa is so “far out” it has earned the_sobriquet "the SEGRE Vo Forutgn Blasem . * Astronauts," ./ n parang, tne ; -dominant wiAg of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the Na- tional University, while differ- entiating itself from the Commu- nist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line, us . The great concern of respon~ ‘sible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, Will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once ‘they participate directly in Party life and cope with hard political. reality. Both views ‘can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past. ten years the demand for revolu- tionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed~-and among the youth the cry has assumed much Greater proportions. The Labor Arm: A major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of ita labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Chrig- tian Trade Unionists (CLASC), ; So far, as.an organized force, it has been.a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes, In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has re- flected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic po- litical leaders, In spite of the apparent . differences between CLASC and SECRET Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67
No. Foretagn Diesen the CD movement, a closer and _ more formal.relationship appears. to be in the offing. Last April, ” officials of: CLASC who are also ‘officers of the Christian” Demo-. cratic parties met in: Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the-two groups... To ac- complish this goal, they proposed- that .both the CD party labor de- «- _ partments and CLASC be granted .- “formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organiza- ‘tion of America (ODCA), the re- ’ -gional. grouping formed. in. 1949,... - ne pFOUP. pormee. The plan has not yet been. ‘.implemented, but, eventual ODCA approval appears: likely.. Closer “". CLASC identification with ‘the CD political movement may have an_ adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties-~have “identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first. of the year, - CLASC has intensified its ef- forts to create: its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America. .: . The Role of ODCA In its 17 years of exastence, ODCA has not. evolved beyond a sort.of fraternity held together " more by -negative factors such as hostility to the’US, to capital- -ism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any. effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the Eu- ropean financial backers of the. CD movement.--to impose standards and ‘controls that will impinge on their freedom Of action, : In gencral, ODCA takes a ~ slightly less hostile line on |.” US policies than that of its membér parties. This probably results from-the influence of . its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. » The organization’ 8 two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and ‘Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Victna of-Chile is its secretary general, . Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional ‘| group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was or- - ganized last July. .It now has five member parties, in Guatemaia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, ‘and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras, European Role and Influence Although Latin American Christian Democracy like the Eu- ropean variety, has its roots in _the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European . fascist concept of the corporate state, The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as. the Europeans were moving to the right. Not. until 1947 did the newly _. important and affluent: European SECRET" .Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT. 3 Mar 67
’ , : EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS = -— . GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION acou) ; WORLD CHRISTIAN CEMOCRATIC UNION (wou) ‘ KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION . : ae - Political sone . European —_. Christian Democratic Christian Democratic —_ International Union ‘ fichholz Leadership prudent _ Christian - Organization Union . - of . Academy Academy nstitute "Democratic =~ of ne Young Christian © : . Union _ Latin Amenca Central Europe ; Democrats . - . ; se (ECBUP Lo. AQ OCA (UCDEC) (UOC) | : : institute : wee ae ee : laternational Solidarity International, Solidarity 4 : a HS) Foundation 7 7 OHRECTOR - (FIS) sO vo Mee, - Adolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT zo : : a Lo. Johannes Schauff : SOME BUDGETARY SUPPORT , Support To: Organizational Support To: i Political Training Institutes Politicat Parties Training Institutes of CLASC * . ‘Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists) . 7 , Youth and Stedent Training =” : . -Classshed material on reverse s7Je of page i .) t . ey e4
SECRET. No Foreign Diasem CDs attempt to coordinate inter-_ national CD activity through an organization they: called-the New International Team (NEI). This organization never, achieved any significance because European : influence in- Latin America had -already been undermined by a basic difference in political philosophy and because the Latin American . parties had been maintaining ine dividual relations-with the var- > Yous European groups. These ties were strictly on vague. ‘grounds and for financial ‘reasons. The two heaviest European contributors to. the Latin Ameri- can parties are the Institute for International Solidarity. (11S) and --¢he International Solidarity Foundation (FIS). Between them ‘they will contribute an estimated $800,000 to. $1,000,000 to the American CD parties and CLASC in calendar year 1967. In addition, it was recently xréported that the COPEI party of Venezuela will receive $480,000 for the 1968 election from FIS. The. 11S, under the direction of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm of the West German Christian Democratic Union with the bulk of its budget coming directly from the German government. It maintains several ‘permanent rep~ resentatives in Latin America and supports youth and student ‘groups, political training insti- tutes, and CLASC organizations. The FIS, under the leader- ship of Dr. Johannes Schauff, Operates as an arm of the European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) , successor to the NEI. Since.its idéological. because it. | European COs collectively. ‘ - go \ , creation ‘in 1964, Germans and Italians ‘have contributed almost its entire budget. FIS appears to be the exclusive European channel fer organizational .support to the Latin American parties. It thas assumed this responsibility . is, composed of repre-. sentatives, of all the European’ parties. Thus the responsibility for support to certain contro= versial Latin parties is watered down and distributed among the thermore, a Latin American gov- ernment: or party in’ competition with the local CDs “cannot formally protest its funding activities to the Gernan government. jo - ye Outlook ee The modest progress made by the Christian Democratic mavement in the past two-and a half years suggests that its development will be much slower and less @x-~ tensive than many anticipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory. One major problem is its failure to reach the lower so- cial classes and to develop @ significant worker base. Its strength in the universities and its ability to compete with Communist groups on the campus create unfounded optimism. The "inspirational" approach that attracts the college student has no comcarable appeal among the inadequately educated lower classes. . in Neither does a victory for one party seem likely to have SECRET Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67
14-00000 No. Foreign Oteaem any. major effect onthe fortunes - ‘of another. What’ appears to emerge . from CD gains ‘Or. losses : ‘in recent elections” isirather . -tle, and “solid. evidence that the national , parties*will. Sink or swim on.the basis’ of their own leadership a DISSEM) SECRET — “Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT Loa let ee ATE ee the influence of ODCA 3 Mar 67 abilities, organizational talents, and. approach to-local issues. _ternational events count for lit- In=- and the successful CD parties .for even less, (SECRET NO FOREIGN aie. FRSA ge
7 Fed lye, Micrt "ta 3 Mle Dec wT Qs: IGHACTO VALLADARAG SCORIGUSS 3L Oct. 1906 Miai, Fla. RE: MDC OVS TOaNT IAL 30 SEPT. LOGE New JERsey IGNACIO VALLADARSS RORLCUSS COBLOENTIAL 29 Aug. 1966 Misxi, Flo. RE: MDC SEUSST UCN LUNN TAL
74-90009, REPORT. COVER SHEET” So we | Rebcessna aerion peice _S_E. C. R E£ 7. wey he . BUOCRT NO, sONRCR FMCET ewarnco FOR INDE RING vite | UEC 8473, — ee Aare OF FLPOMF ENOL AERC GE GUIRED a Para atroaten SUP AR ATELY 2 “Henry a 103 No _ 8 August..2966- |. Se pa 2 arene re oerecge . PROIECE ; . Cote : - : ; So jE Pesseurnation &¢ “ASS ESTTRE ET TET vkL. souecd cavey Tee omg men nes aes , 3 OUTS Crssewinat ion r HELO Ot rR 10uT to bON I - nas. a . State a - mo FBI tis ; _— z- | _ ADT ; T&NS [ ta GOFLSD 2 - _ Customs — ; 2- = H Border Patrol ! KUG'] S 1966 Sure pewgurTa, rahe aerate eee \ i TYPIC | SOURCE: AMOT-245.in AMOT reports. as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1888, 6 July, from BARBEITE and Angel HERNANDEZ ; paras. 3 to. 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888; para S' and source comment 5, DbD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy of the decument; para. 3: DD- 1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895, 21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and DD- 1902. 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892;, para. 11, DD-1874% from Ignacio VALLADARES; source comment L: DD~-1874 and DD-1890, 24 July, from Laureano BATISTA. Coe AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25 February 1966, and there 3 no record of contact since that time. . Xi HS. OB: 1 | May. 1935, Havana, Cuba. it: Cuban & ¢ or Status: <Elected_ organization | secty of Natl Executive Committee of MDC. at congress 25-27 Feb 6@. Trip to DR R _on behalt < oF NDC, June 66. ? Group 1: Excluded from . Automatic Downgrading and Deciassification Q- 300-10. azs} bat AP ee eee
14-00000 10th y REN RE NER YY reps ONE wee NT wet eee wae . peae serene ans area va SECRET. ne Page two. of Cover Sheet ms oe | UPG-8873 Name: Aevgdiy Arnaldo. . . mo - : - Sex: wo Co “ ; -_DPoBi. 2. , Cit : . Cuban ; Oce ‘or Status: Emigré in. DR. Termerly Wi Name: hernanvez Rojo, Angel o Nickname S. Bab >» El Bab ' Sex: “Connection with MDC base. “: DPOB: 4 Sept 33, Havana Cuba ol ee a Cit : Cuban Oce or Status: Emigre in Miami. Second: _incommand_ of milita \dept of MDC. Name: ARgarberte \reyre, Placido A. Sex: My DPOB: _19°Nov 3 38, Batabano, Havana Prov, Cuba_ Git : Cuban ‘Name: /fexractos: San Juan, Armando Sax : M Cit : . Cuban , . ; Occ or Status: .Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rice, Oce or Status: --Emiare_ in Miami. _ _Chf_of military. dept ef MDC. ary...
14-00000 law . < Go Now cere Apple 9 Losey cebspie C Fad, tebante, « D Met ‘useily retatte F, Bolamd'y carne’ be iviged [Apphed te uerret i Prullicewntly Pe - FIELD INFORMATION REPORT. os “| “GRADING OF SOURCE. A Completely voi ante 12 tources of seubttul Panesty or toeaity, swgadess of e~ competence Septet bourses we . - - . : Le . APPS AISAL OF CONTIN. 1b Contemed ty offer -ntegerctent 0nd retoble rowrces «2. Probariy tree 3 Posubiy wee. @ Doueey 5, Prepedly fale” 6 Cannot be pas ged, . yw . . . a CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM REPORT NO. | > COUNTRY Cuba/Déminican Republic . } ; bate Lenin alee Binal rs 7 | Suatct G@ Activities: of the MALGy Possibilitpare or xteort 8 August 1966 - ° @F Reactivating. a ‘Ea6e in the’ . So Dominican Republic, Condition-of NO PAGES | % Boats, Possible Alliances With ; | Othér Emigre Organizations REFERENCES DAIL OF 29 May to late July 1966 Se PLACE & , pate acg. United States, Miami SHOOING$ ARE OLRINT 8) kepeagaL or COuNTENT 1% TENTAT VE SEVALCATED nrg var ce Suite fears 1g ft A member of a group of Cuban émigres trained in the techniques. of information collection. This group has provided useful ' Peperts since 1961. SOURCE. “i sernrned to Miami front the 5 mek ce, UVa __ Christiano (MDC, oraz “arnod to Minan{ in late June 1966, fr tv g om ° from the Ch 3 allegedly obtel-: ef of ep EERE T Dledeag ap. : of President Ratam.c. the Domin or uPport for hia ant *° Dominienn document’ in yipgeent* However, eh, petlean kepubl te dine gs ChStPo undertaring- {dk Although pepe it, voted te atpagunn tet dopartaen t of th Me Meena tie qproya] ' Tepresen tatives, Pp atatl ves Of the 1 Chee gd Primarily gee sag PoE Fi Ssied a : + Teo conde Th t. at . ‘ ep ‘ Rowe eo . | -Representact on tn Eat Students? fet uthonap ieeeeed the signin, MR Of Nindg | xi ed (RECE) n3 alliances pirectorate (DHE) Sana f WET Depa wenn a : “S BAVe Yet been formed (DRE) and the Cuban Representataen as mn, oo, &lliances have been made. 2. Laureano Batista Falla, organization secretary of: the National Executive Comulttee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for _ Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned. to. Miami >on 26 Junet. On 29 June he met with other leaders.-of the MDC to inform them of the resulte of his trip?’ ee eer ervey om ore - 2 MED WEE Petes meine eens . : . . ‘ t Fa Batista said that during thexeex discussions held with Genéral Juan Re Sore | erez, Chief of the Air Fores of ths Uominican Réfudic, he had requested Kuizktuxznzp~ eee ree ae pea tteod thoctiadtisix the t Folch esserate with the MOC ‘oy allowging the MDS sa maintain asc Luna located at Estero’ les, r eek town of Pepillo Stug Salcedo (N 19-43 . a ; . 3 ost Raentexkiny inctamzecimhs eo W 71945) 8 tecorsine nani Batic. Po) indicated his wissangness co COOpsamen wmess come corn; j . offered the following assistance, subject to the approval of — President Balaguer, wiom Folch said he will consult: mies E : CONFIDENTIAL ' CONTROLLED DISSEM ‘NO FOREIGN DISSEM Sg erie Mego patane nerg he EET: RECS AMR ED, YBa ca edhe CPL RR Agree ria adi Pom arg ten mS aye He ESE ear me ogee, AT 9 tS ene a eater ee I ne a SICH wre : 6-/ DIA ARMY NAVY ‘AIR NSA --ocR” USIA (.) _I&NS (2) “882% FI 1 =WHC/SI - 1 E/IB/R: | ia 1 WHC/WAVE 1 E a ae RE 3 WHC/CA | ee ya ee 1 CI/OPS/WH 2) WH{___(CINCSO) 1
eeepc eter e tteerenonrncnr as Marea serait: 1c yA “the mecting Batista = CONSTBENT TAL . ' CONTROLLED -DISSEM ‘HO FOREIGN DISSEM <2-) Boo, . : ; UPG -8873 ae The use of five falets fac ing, Santiago de ‘los Caballeros, City for a military base. S$ (Ceo). Boo SO, -b. Authorization for MDC. personnel to move into- and out ‘ ef the Doninican Republic in a clandestine manner. *" Qosinieen Air” of HDC war materigl from Niand aboard - Dominican Air Force planes. aceagsion: Me “9 de los Sontithte rolls, wiobted Base Luna “and on everal o¢ “a fading in Cantlar n wkpxhiwasndt ren i Fe eS the MDC voatth An th danxtads bythe! sent who As the reciple at of B g500, per month web rar nen avearieeter the Dominbean, 5 sublic for the maintens ee als meu ting with Folehy waa du: oe Seenhiie d ranged Batishs . pte , srt tay sen whth the La ‘Sulle College of Cammmey Bates a as enie fe) San ax e fe ots i ad om de at rany ne Gs for RRS RAA LS 3 ho ay eh RATED L 1d by tre M embers wht as i ary ‘ ft 3 e a ct a C ut 38 fo be accede a vc Le aS * me: 4 er reve a) ase rane. te a dP acta om t bee Fe Ruta SAUL S ts cate that he had. < ts aldo Basan, 1 Cubes ; cece ss eam ly DB PED seu made arranges sai, Veh, mats LOMtRe House which is occupied by the MDC memberis who are in charge of Base Luna? — i $8. Batista expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and stYfessed the necessity of acting immediately, including. sendhg ‘MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department, to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans in-ordan’ that the necessary money ean-be obtained. cove Sif! ; venue 6 eR Be MRT OE He Althou th ‘Barbeite acre: plans” “and an estinate, vf the ee he _bastonl ly wauessasesnto sana 2 Satistats advocation of initiating immediate action. ne fe teh fadeds ppposed ee he plang until Balaguer's reaction Is a a oat - fnadvisable to attsnet the implementation t knowns Hornanget® views coincided with those of. Barbe ite, Nsouxiugtassctaxthsvacskianx ce Rt on he digarreement. E The meeting ended without a solution to t! a MAREN CRSLK ENE RRXNNEN AE RRA UE et i. Se cease WAUNGER On Pes oe OO eee tH Oe wo ermnngye omit he ceported that disse par ticularly he tween Armanc es nsion withiax « exists nu kewenxche within the io Sadist. mn cHAx San Juan and & umber to MDG in Puerto Bis : Perez? action with { th we argument that tary matters do not really fall NAGLEXEER ind iv ties Lowe ve r, arbette defen plans and activities. ’ a Rae xX OGHTAR EAE NN RERES KALLE & mili i : within the scope of respons ipllities of tt he mesiden ee a president. : no - 8. The military department of the MPC set forth its views ina ‘document dated 239 May. This document included the following - pointe: a. Discontent is becoming evident because of the ‘lack of | activity which, in turn, results from the lack of funds. The sum rentioned is $10,090.5 © b. No change in United States policy vefardingactlén = _apeinst. Cuba: frow-tha-t-3. is anticipated. A base of operations outside of the United States is considered to be so vitally important that the military department would be willing to operate an illegal base if the resources were. made available. Cl me condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no . i> sea transportation. The beats are described as follows: f CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN PITSSEM  eaenanetettn tt ecenotare, 2 otra ment, em, ed with Batista if rerzuniing ‘the need tor preparation of operational] ear te EA ECS cst ers anne ea ‘Rp teet wsqone Meng nett esd po paver fle ft HPOAON asthe Je Nilegdea na BR. im, ates BE
14-00000 qd) . CONFIDENTIAL . - CONTROLLED PISSEM -, “NO FOREIGN DISSEM =~ a UFG-8473 The /CADELLO I is ‘docked across from Brito! 6 Boat Yard ‘at Stock Island, Flarida.&’ The boat is in need of.. repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the instal- lation of clectronic navigational equipment would be. required to put it in operational condition. Current cocking and routine maintenance costs are not being. paid. Efforts toymake commercial usé of this boat have not. been successful. This boat is considered ideal for ' activities which might be undertaken if there were a base from which to operate, but under the present cir- cumstances the expense which this boat represents ig not justifiable. -It is recommended that consideration be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational base is not’ established within four. months. : “The KYA- oRA? which was donated to the MDC by a neubér of the military department, ia in drydock at Nuta‘s. Boat. Yard in Hiani. There are leaks in the hull. “The LANCHA AZULPis in need of repairs, as well as trailer. Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will ‘proceed as money becomes available. d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives-of “(the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Studentg?. Revolutionary Directorate), and there is an “agreement in “principle” to coordinate future actions. There is no political commitment. 9. In July JorgeMas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representa- a cfion Cubamen el] Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile), ‘proposed that the MDC enter in that some members of MDC wit’ be offered full- time employment’ preparing military plans for the RECE. agreement had been reached. 10, Hernandes, otraterys Font, from pst nti MDG in order to © \ | algo sald that i oceuples. a _* | posirion 3 i 1. In early favors the formation of eipating in the he plans to 4 Fy Fon SY a 1 ath H who feels th at Ramon aume apab @ OL 1 ur 11’ 8 ‘ine lL & f rmu i ny pre sparation “or “plan: 3 “fos on of wh Goes ce position than that a 39 military operations. the military departs -eplace Barbuits in the department. June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez?® jexpressed a desire to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite | agreed to inform Valladares when an operation isfto be carried out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for'Dover, New Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm recoil- \ “~ less rifle, a 50-caliber machine, .gun, and an unstated number of M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff Apartments, apartment 21. CONFIDENTIAL CONTROLLED NISSEM NO FORETCQN DISSEM. a pact with RECE, and indicated As of late July. no format military , would exclude » MPC and gece xgAe whieh Hornunde2 ment of the ich he currently ome y Veparcment ‘orvtne MUU “4n order . maueate from his present. position to an unimportant z| t Se depot meeURi, oc. duaviT pe b TTS Ln en De eer
14-00000 CONFIDENTIAL - CONTROLLED DISSEM =» RO FOREIGN DISSEN ‘ po, . . i a i. — . ; ne UFG-8473 .1. Scurce Comment, At the tise of his departure, Batista told. the executive ‘committee that he was going directly to Caracas, - 4 9 Wenezuela. It was not until after his return that it was ne learned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as he had planned. He later exDlained that whilé he was in -Puerto. Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was I i ! i | Be informed that the latter had “failed in his efforts." oe Field Comment. ‘Presumably he was referring to an interview with President- Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista hac earlier’ said had been arranged by his cousin... (Cf. EGER AIB Bee TM ee ne meee eo ot . Nave been in charge of Dominican sidxzex Armed Forces oat area see | chi C . for an. exi in the Mo ( . x@ ea een tor penn 913/86 oe66, Another source reported tuna in Septeiper 1964"Approximately 30 Cuban exiles were tak ne . at Richmp near Punta Presiderte(N 19-47, -46 rep _ training a ae The aA ard Ww ifs Wa ee bot wes cone Yeimia tbe. veenneeegh | 3 Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was réported to 4%. The location of the house was not given. . 5. Souree Comment: The document, as originally drafted, was modified because Barbeite felt that the’ tone was too strong. - Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to $10,000. 8, reported that the document was being prepared, and that ; . R $75,000 would be requested (Cf. . UFC-8327)) Gree Sefer radi Field Comments, 6. The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat.’ The boat yard referred to : ; is. the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island: which is owned 1 by Mike Brite. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between Key West and Boca Chica. ; - ' | . : Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source ' | 7. The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E.. i _ 8. The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch. H : (Cf. UPG-8322).- Besides the CADELLO I, the,MDC has been reported to own the VICKY I, a blue V-23; the FPUNCHIN CHIA DoS mica (FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO IT. 8. Font is chief of military operations.of.Comandos L, which has an alliance with RECE. (C£.. UFG BPDNesHS se/apeen-Eh), j ” . No . eae beh Pmt on edn fe | ] , | 10. Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which | . he gave to the MDC. He offered to Supply ‘weapons to the | MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs | —— (Brigade 2506), - , : og i I | CONFIDENTIAL an - CONTROLLED DISSEM ae “NO FOREIGN BISSEM
JBL | 27 Oe Pen) Gok noe Cane 7 June be Btrsw
14-00000 ‘ef 80. files which 6re bo loager weet BECRET Chief of Station, JMPAVE a> + 7 Chieg, WUD ne Be, ADMIN/TYPIC Soe, oa Station Files on Cuban Counterrovolutionary and Exile Organizetions REVERENCE: UFGT-=16343, 31 May 1966 i. ¥e aro returning Voluso VII of the MDC file which you sent with tho reference for Headquarters to review as 8 sample of a group ful to the Station. Headquarters appreciates your interest in this aspect of records improvenont considering the until IDENTITY, & KUBAKK employoo who is retiring soon but is now © engeged in writing historical studies, can wiait the Statios to survey those files with others. 2. YOENTITY plans to visit SMWAVE for several days about the end of July to gize up and review certais records for writing & hiatery of theo Station, Therefore, ga would like the 80 background files to be left antact for bie vieit. Afterwards 4 decision will be made on their rotiresent. or other disposition. .. . 3. If space for storing the files is critical se will authorise forwarding them to Headquarters, but will prefer your bolding thes tenporarily to assist with the historical research eited above. Claude F. GOTTFRIED | Attachsent: 7 1. Identity, u/s/c 2, MOC File, b/w Distribution:: . . 3-COS/JNWAVE, w/att. 1 & 2 UFGS-8398 \ ; SBCRET gee \_—- 1-WH/RMO, w/att.} WH/RHO \ 1-WH/C/ESEC, w/att.1 1-wl/C/CA/PP, w/att.t 1-Historical Staff . C/wH/C/CA/PP eee C/WH/C/CA C/HH/C/MO . . 28 ‘ naod for’ retrieval, but would like to defer & decision
SEPANATS COVER ATTACHIUENT 7O UGS-5398 IDENTITY = on Lf abies
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14-00000 we cara “ic Ret. to seagce i sfoy ‘Ose. ee = reagan: 1: ae Que : , ‘ ‘cuassi ito. weSsaGher 7 Cuaseee to hte Ga. toren cones aveee os “paae RO. actioe — . - : apvance COP¥ - - : : . * —_ - tif ee Fal RID COPY O sacven Lod vorees Clever toe 1 Cas ears a wn nn — “ a Fie |e . . ad! . & . A = 4 PS ; Ie hr oe ome K ba LDisole C4 INFO DIA CITE WAVE 2194 re a Op a Lb sratt wt s80 = DYVOUR ANEOP 0 | 7 “ y.0 ANCKIE=1- (IDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA GF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, ¥HO DE LA NAZA HAND CARRIED ROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA, RODRIGUEZ, NIECE. TRAVELED THROUGK SMWAVE AREA. LETTER TO AXCRIE-1 ‘DATED 4 APRIL EF PE'SC SECY OF ESTL: AFFAIRS, WKICH REGUESTED AMCRIB-1 ARRANGE FCS PURCHASE ane SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO FE USED FOR PREC PRESIDE: ITAL ELECT I0i. ACTIVITIES Ih DOMREP.. LETTER WAS ACCCHPANIED WITK © 14ee FOR PUR CHASE - “AND SHLPHERT CCs1Ts tF ‘CARS. aAncs if-1 TELEPHOHED. RCSASIO EVENING bh APRIL TO . . ; 6 4.8 CONFIFE LEtTes at 0 AGREED TG PROVIDE AID IN PROCUR LG CARS. ROSARIO: INFCRICO aver 1-1 ThaT BE CANCIDATE OF PRSC aT PARTY ASSEKELY #XPECTED RECEIVE NONI NAT LON AS PRESICENTIAL Gi 17 APRIL anc STATED rE “OULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS RUSNING NATE. osAR IO ALSO, INDICATED He EXPECTED SOME ‘ELECTORAL suPFe? I FROM UNSPECIFIED NUNEER OF APJ FERBERS. ° “SECTET Z y 5 - hee Ae é ee ee oe
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twotes Cves (v0 Sas IFIED MESSAGE 4 forar copars oe REPRODUCTION FROWIBITES Ceasatly ¥o Fie HO. - 74 SECRET See || PEQSON UmIT ROTEF IEG EL mee 8 H-0E9 70 C4LE BO, vice 010 oer, 10 poanee im] Destroy Osc. a ~ i! FROG J Al LIAIE — a al Belong — paOvamce cory aa MASU fe  F (Crm co COPY | Chie O ass Oed _| me eite VL, IME ye. pat), Eb ff srsf 2 Ms 2, CAKE Mii + _ ““S"E CRE £ 3416542 wm _ i? iis 9$25 DIR INFO| | CITE VAVE 9167 TYPIC AMMOP . REFs WAVE a13o( .- el Rf )* AMCRIB-~J RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS anp WILL DEPART 2245 HouRS 14 APRIL FOR Lima, ‘vegistructen MONITOR ALL EVENTS Fon DESRIEFING ON RETURN. SECRET ORME PaetRip BR Pe FoR a tT TE OAC tJOdKd CAM Tote Yepig > ft CFN? 167 9132 AMCRIB-~} @245 14 LIMA BT SECRET NNAIN
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14-00000 Zz hier, WH aro FROM DISPATCH SUG eer oa gna omy quai besa oe a Chief of Station, | lL . ce © gam rvoce woo . Chief. of Station ouwave . AMMOP/Operational ; a ; oo AMMOP Circular Letter to Identi A Leaders and Organizations : ACTON REGURED REFERENCES AR: FYI REF: WAVE 9754 : ‘lL. -As indicated. in reference, | the ANNO? organization on 15 March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Sidel Castro's 13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations. The. letter, which was signed and composed by ANMOP/1 and which was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested ‘support for Frei's position; and asked the recipients to jcin the struggle Maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism. - 2. The youth wing of the ANMOP group, headed by AMCRIB/i, mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts. ‘based on the 13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters are for- warded under separate. cover, ce 3. According to AMOP/1, his letter was retlayed by’ FUSEE and was the basis | for an article ina Santiago newspaper by Identity C. on . . enesty os bs La rR EE Ee ilip &S. ELMAR |. Attachments: 1 a Seen aD SUNSTRIDER A. Identities = u/se..%4 > 'B. Cys of Ltrs = u/sc_ Distribution: - — “3 = WH/C wi ‘ ~ cos, | /atts — oF £6 er 32 Ra Watts: a cS - Fee e _ a evel, *Please furnish HOS CROSS REFERENCE TO L | SESPRTOH SyMEBOL AND MURAETR | UFGA-25833 : 31 March 66 cassncance eee eetS ALE MUMBER a0 SECRET =) ad. ee. ee. FREER 2 Pot APN topes ne AH, EU eee on cc ee RUE cet ew cae oF
ie 7 oe \ . - SECRET : To wile ‘U/se att $A to UFGA~24893 IDENTITIES: A, Christian Democratic Party Be. Alfredo Lorea C. Jorge Roman SECRET S vo Lo ! ‘ iad “ta Gy 3
Se eee ee ee “ 4 foot Cand . wG 3 « DN dee ed OR oe * a da Marco 15 de 1966. tea ye bee rt rs COO TT AIVETSIUE STATLOAS CE a a ao demécratacristiano: o 7 rt t Z {2 Después de leer una copia literal del discurso pronuncia- stro, en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana, el de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Par~ crata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoble- cados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocucién, mi opinién con relacidn a dicha ofensa. Su (6) uw fe °G en ¢) O FF Peo o Go Ow uy a tor ry Oe fi on 6] o 33 mom g m © $3 © “ G 7 iw ort Digo obligadc, porque el hecho de ser demécratacristiano integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un @ieron a la tarea de realizar una revoluci6n en libertad y mentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al compro- @ las mismas eran ahogadas por la sangre vertida en los pa- s de fusilamientos por hérces como Porfirio Ramirez, Presi- e la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr.Hum orf Marin, Comandante del Sjército Rebelde y autor de la mera Ley de Reforma Agraria; debe servirme de experiencia para mpresar lo que pienso decir a través ce estas lineas. Digo obli- gacdo, porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en milti- ples oportunidades, colaboracién y solidaridad con nuestra lucha, solicitud gue lamentablemente ne ha sido respondida por algunos, abeganco unas veces desconociniento y otras imputdndonos incom- prensisén con el “proceso revolucienario"™ que se est4 llevando a en Cuba, no queremos que en esta cportunidad en que son los chilenos los que necesitan Ge nuestra solidaridad, va- yamos 4 encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se daecida & vesvaldar ptblicamente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo.de Chile en la actitud cfvica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas ex- fe) acas por Castro durante su discurso, entre las cuales trans- ribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he cceido que un Yvepresentante de la burguesfa chilena, que su gobier- s no de la burguesfa. Jamds he creido que Frei vaya Cer ninguna revalucién".... oosteriormente, al referirse a s Sos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del Ge murieron varias personas dijo: “Frei es un reaccio ha demostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de ano ‘irme, sinS un individuo (‘coparde,- que abusa del poder,...... ion fe Me] o, Ua & 4 wo bs ST MH on 3 aH oo & & ° ~ roe —& Oo 23 Os io tt oo “n iy ge tr th nt un gobler ‘ : es eg > fr. . rot ype by bees ee
14-00000 PERS TT fetter poe ‘Ge culpar ala Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmascata. Frei demues- \ tFa al pueblo.de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolucisn es la te. Es decir, no una revolucién sin sangre, sin6é.una polftica de’ “sangre sin -revolucién; sangre sin revolucié6n, esa es la polftica sin revolucién, esa es la politica de la Alianza -para_el Progreso”. de mi mayOr consideracién, quedo suyo OUD s , » es 7 2:00." Lo Frei.ha demostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser un po~ litignverse vulgar gue para justificar su saAguinarioc gesto, trata gue Va c hacer, qué tipo de gobierno és el que va a llevar adelan- Ge Prol,.sangreé.sin revolucién, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre _ Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que Salirle al paso a Castro -y a la camarilla. que desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e¢ © instar y pedir mayor colaboracién con los patriotas gue hoy ofren- “Gan sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la con- rinuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva & cabo en la Isla, sino tambien. ponerle: fin a todos estos incidentes bochorhosos para la historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo publicamente ante el. mundo aun Presidente, a un Partido ya un pueblo que a contrario sensus de lo que 61 esta haciendo en Cuba, sf estA rea- lizando una revolucién en libertad, s{ ha defendido en todo momen. to el sano nacionalismo, s{ se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces las circunstancias lo han requerido a los’ oligarcas Y explotado- res, 7 4 Para terminar, s6lo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de la solidaridad. que une a todos los dem6cratacristianos, exprese pablicamente, su deseo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el ' pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en Cuba, una verdadera revolucién en libertad, asf como su xvespaldo ala uctitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demécrata Cris-~ tiano y el pueblo chileno-en los actuales momentos, Pendiente de su atencién y respuesta y dejands constancia mS Corddalmente, mo Ernesto /Rodriguez Sec. de Relasiores/ Internacionales del MDC Cuba
Se ttn cen nae NTT SEE TOON AN faces eye ce ene JOYERTES SEZICRATA-CRISTIANA OE CUBR, W392 He Ten St. . oe, MEAL, FULL Wa _ . Miami, “Marzo 17. de 1966 i ae Estimaso sompaneros , ; La pe de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol | José Mari{ que. dice:“ver en silencio un -crimen es cometerlo", no ha querido marginarse del da&o que Castro quiere hacerle a la _Revolucién en Libertad, que esta realizando el Presidente Eduar= ‘60 Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demécrata Cristiano de Chile. | Consciente de que es pasible que no te hayan llegado muchas Ge-las informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ata= ques ofblicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, calificAndo al Pre sidente ce “representante de la burguesfa chilena", "reaccionario’ “mimads del imperialismo yanqui yv guardian de sus intereses en Chile’.....etc, Hemos. querido coamunicarte, no s6lo los atagques de Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le han Gaco a castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasados hiciera el ~Diputséoa Demécrata~Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorca y que a con= tinuacian cranscribimos "Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso dig- mo Ge anSlisis. Hace pocos dias atrAs, segtn expresaron diputa- €os qe estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Pre- Agsreg6é que si: el hubiera estado en | Chile, habrfa hecho gue Frei, Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocade la epidermis ‘dela Tri-Continental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera. _ Yo-estuve en Cuba -aflaci6é Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro subid ai poder. En esa ocasién le pregunté al ver a tantos home: csemados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y 61 me contes- t6, con ese modo tan tropicdl: “chico, armas para qué cuando se. tiene al pueblo". — . Sin embargo, ~afiadié Lorca- en los siete atos que Fidel lene 51 pueblo detr4s de 61, anda mas arinado que un militar en zra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los Cota dal manana. . . ;
plete saat: .e thee oC trees emer teens gt tet ts ; * rs ” a - a . eo . e ; i > xacicaics, el Sr. Ihditez, el St. Alessandri, el ‘propio Sr. Frei, han rveccrrido todo el pais sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sucldo Us gue ugilica Castro. - No se votdde decir que Frei sea un cobarde, un ‘mentiroso .” yun éGenota como Fidel Castro afirma - aladi6 Lorca- . En cambio €1 est4 resguardado por metralletas y no puede dormir, ni ge le | conoce comicilio rijo porque los. hijos de lgs’ “muertos en ¢l pare~ -@6n le cescan. Adends ~puntualiz6 Lorca~ vale la pena destacar que. nadie sc ha-ido de Chile. En cambio, es piblico y notecrie gue mais . de 206 590 personas han huido del paraiso fidelista. Y me atrevo. a ‘peng: :x gue si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren ir-— ..8@ Ge Cuda, — Se Guedarfa- ‘8010 con sus barbas y su hermano: RaGl, porque Camilo Cienfuegos ya no est&. Dicen que se cayé de un avién. . ‘Pinalmente, Lorca record6 el caso del que fuera Presiden- te de ics tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorf Marf{n."Es un hombre - -frtegrs, puro y extremadamente justo", decfa Castro de 61. "Estoy segure ce nfinea condenarfa’a quien no mereciera la pena de muere te". S:. ebstante una maflana amaneci6 de mal genio. y el Sr. Sorf Maris be convirtié en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de- los Ee:ados Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro, integers y justo." Estas palabras, expuestas por cl Diputado B.C. Alfredo Lorca, z2flalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro, raticicen una vez mis lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus di- — rigertes, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demécratacris~ tiana ce América y que hoy, con m&s fuerza y moral: que niinca nos permite pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos uné, que ex= pongas pidlicamente tu respaldo a la Revolucién en Libertad que viene se¢alizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demécrata Cristia no de Cnile asf come tu colaboracién: a la lucha que mantiene el puepae s cusano por Gerrocar al castrecomunismo existente en nues~ tra Patria. . . Consciente de que nuestra. solicitud sera escuchada por tf, Y seguros de que nos dards a conocer la atencién que has de Prestazile, guedo a tu entera disposicién am og 4 K&B é fae te fet EF Se ' tee fj wit ee vy a ra oo T seshs Angulo . _ Presidente de la JDC de Cuba
A twogar © ees Oe oo : ZB \ _CLASSHFIED Me cSAGE : TOFSL COP LES 3 CLASSiFyY TO FeRE RQ. | BREF TO PELE NOL : Gy ‘ ' gaat - ~ * . erereeen * ca ~ int rio €] ocr, ve ecavce (J Mh G0 | UES REPRODUCTION PROMIS ITED oesteoy (} sic. i Gate /, a a Paovance Copy — . ES : // nw copy | CJ sssure DDarorres C) verre FILE Va, We a2, caleroe, Caled, Fleilbar, ciloa, abe z Thon : = x, t c¢ 473, Ce Ss SECRET 0422302 / Chan then, Checkin xy DIR INFO| _———=«| CITE WAVE 931 CINGHURST ACTING) of TYPIC AMMNOP REF A DIR 75895 - Wc. 85790 B WAVE g03a(/¥ 51776) 1, AMCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL. 2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN Bo IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-! TRIP TO ATTEND BOTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY. 3, AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 281-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELE=- GATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY. 4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB~-1@ OF REF B SHOULD RE AMNCRIB~1. SE CRE T *Fyopcn CHETAN DEMOCRANIC QCNGEESS Scneound vinta iq MAkCH, 9434 AMCRIB-1 A A 23-26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRI3-1 ui CFN @631 75895 B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB~1 AMMOP C 2401-74999) AMMOP C ANCRIB-13 B AMCRIB=1 inne SECRET BT
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74-90000 ro i a . . GE Pa Tw Re Ne a ae SP Re REPORT cover sueet. | 2 =6 SECRET © I | F pROCESSING ACTION ' 1 Qs) wave " UFG-7960_ wAcKco FER INCERINS ‘. ‘ ! 5 a ‘Henry’ wee “SLOMAN pane CT a “aceoat wT NO INTERING ACQVIRED — bo {0 ._Sylvia Bi. MONESTIBR.-|.___15_ February1966 | _]ors Sara meronrie sur anatey _ Veresers, oprecea ra peostc? - Lt . : : . . . [eS DESSEMINATION — | ! ‘ NG 7 & a ay oe etm em crveterbae Penmaes - ~ : ee er | 7 ata [Fe awe 245. ‘ os [recs orsscmination t ; er! a ; FIELD DESTRIBUE IG — a 1 sapar state - ap FBI Pino I&NS r | -- Customs - pe ; SUPPLEWENTAL DATA ho Jf : | |: SOURCE: ayor-245. in DD-1768, 11 February 1966, Field Comment 2 ; twas received from AMCRIB-10, "orally, on 14 February. ; a ao ‘RID: No Index i ¥ Group 1: Excluded from 3 ' Automatic Downgrading: a -, ; and Declassification ’ . wpe, to { ir { d de “pnpyt _. “1. Bce-so__ | | , : grew ws “SO qa2z0) ‘ yea A467 pervious . i ' ESbvRORs of | I
14-00000 fe -- ° FIELD-INFORMATION’ REPORT... a GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Competely, reviatte, B. .Vautry retianie, ~ Cr Fairty cetera. C Not usually rousnle, £: Not retiatte  . (Applied te sources of doubtful honesty or kxpeily, regardless of rear ceinpstence),  F: Retei-bty cannot be judged  CAephed to ustested @ raccthcientty ATPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3: Contrmad ty other incapenaint ard retiadie sources. 2 Protwdly rue. * d:-Poisibty true. &: Ooert  & Probebly: - telee.,. 61 Cannot de judged, can re ea oo . pe '_ CONFIDENTIAL .. CONTROLLED ‘DISSEH - aE = ppp foe te , a a ; oe oO 2 _ [| counteY Cuba ae —_ "REPORT NO, TS wees in Erect oo " a, . , SUBJECT 6 Christian Desocratic Hovemont CATECF REPORT 15 February 1966 - | ” ¢o@ Hold Coigress in Hiani, , Co || 84 to 27 February 1966 maPaGes —_ 7 REFERENCES bare OF Barly February 1966 . PLACE& . United States, Miami ; DATE ACG. (to 14 Febru LS&S-. : I UNEVALUATED InroRmaTos SrURCE. GRADIDN _ UFG-7960 _ Tees! GR ARR DEPINITINE, QPFMAIGAL OF COMTEMT 1 TENTATIVE. — : oo - , SOURCE: A member of a group of Cuban emigres-trained in the techniques na ‘of information collection. The group has provided useful reports since 1961. 0 . a on The Movimiento Democrata Cristiaso (wwe, Christian Democratic aa Movement ) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 27 February “a 1966, Delegations of Christian Democrats from Venezugla, Peru, “Chile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress, 2. ‘The HDC is preparing to hold elections for positions en the the executive committee. , Field Comments: 1. The Bighth National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami a from 19 to 21 February 1965.__Delegations from Puerto Rico | ‘land Mexico attended. (Cf. “ 2, Another source, who is a member of the MDC, reported that. invitations had been extended to delegations from these countries, but that no replies have been received, except . from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation, ; : ig CONTROLLED DISSEM‘ . _— ae HO DISSEM ABROAD was te mtowatic : : ‘ . RMT BSE . ema eee atte rere tree ameter oat eo.