Page : 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM | IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION Peleased under the John . Eennedy ‘ WSsassination Records AGENCY : JCS . Ollection Act of 1992 RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10166 RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 167 DOCUMENT INFORMATION (44 USC 2107 Note). ases#: NW 54214 Date: US9-15-2017 . ORIGINATOR ': OSD FROM : TO : TITLE : CLASSIFIED TITLE DATE : 08/08/62 PAGES : 5 SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State. NO JOINT STAFF. OBJECTION FO DECLASSIFICATION ome. WAR 2018 HW 542714 DBocld:32424897 Page 1
(f38 8 AUG 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) Consequences of US Military Intervention dn Cuba (TS) Subject: 1. On 2 August 1962 the chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/Jcs Representative, Operation MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost. (personnel, units and, equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a require- ment for sustained occupation, the level of national mobitli- zation required, and Cuban counteraction." Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts, pes Requirements (personnel, units and equipment) af a. In order ‘to. .selze control of key strategic areas in Cuba within 10- g]adye with minimum casualties to both sides about 261, 000 us ni2itary]personnet would participate ~ in the operation. . @ <= b. -About® 71, 000 Army and 35,000 Marine forces] wii1 be 2; Ss In addition, approxi- o Pe te ap meaven bj 12S 70 oO} engaged on the grouns within Cuba. natery[ 29,000 Army pone span be available as on-call | Fs ‘ at forces, ee Ma jor units /involved in the initial assault include THEN OF Stal Two Army airbornd divisions, an infantry brigade, and Ne Weoar, armored combat ommand; one and one-third Marine divisi wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport Squadrons. J. JA HAS NO OBJECTION TO ‘ECLASSIFICATION AND/OR d. Principal equipment includes: ELEASE OF THIS, DOCUMENT hb (1) Army : Artillery units and armor (inctuaine: about BEB 3 MNE IS 7 scryom 275 tanks’ ) | $4; MO ral EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 2 oN OUG, HW 542714 DBocld: ords’ Sination Rec 02-526) e JFK Assas: f 1992 (PL OvISIO‘S of th ollection Act o re) ae ‘Clase ar inder the Pe eviewed on
HW 54714 (2) Marines (retittery units and armor (including bout 85 tanks), plus some 320 supporting aircratt] (3) Navy Approximately 175=200 ships, including two aircraft carriers with approximately 180 aircraft embarked (4) Air Forge Firvout 490 troop carriers and trans- ports, 312 tactical fighte » and 65 reconnaissance and.refuelling aircraft, | \ 3. Level of National Mobilization Reguired, ‘a Arm - None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs Suits from the actiye reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this missten, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs /Military Government operations. « b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping. i ec. Air Force In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops inthe finizun time, {fourteen Air Force Reserve troop carrier squadrons (0-129)} were originally included in the airlift plan, however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to! repare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day. d. Marines - None. ee Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military sitet gest which would make such \ a precaution desirable in order to~assure US military oo, responsiveness to additional demands. 4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba withih]}10-15 ays. /Subsequent to’ gaining such control of the island there wil? be 4, progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits. | ena =e m= mae , TAR APANRFT Ame ae oe os @ peme seem DoclId: 32742746897 Page 3 ;
HW 542714 TA DoclId: 3242489 & When the assault forces have been committed to the ion operstidn the strategic Army forces in CONUS would be short the supporting forces for the remaining five divi- sions. It is estinave: that the[ aray Airborne two Sivision force foulc be available for other oserations 15-30 days af- ter With: Tadsal from Cuba.\ Substantial Army forces from the on-call ochelon will relieve the assault forces . ana remain on the islans to ‘perform counterguerrilla opera- tions and coniiuct military governnent activities, This force will: be progressively therein as the new Cuben government » increases in effectiveness. b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability (less that deployed with the sixth Fleet) will be engaged fully during the initial phase of the operation. -There may be a requirement for amphi bious lift. for rapi3 redeployment ana counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments within approximately 30-45 days.’ About 40 to 50 per cent of the Pacific amphibious troop lift caba- bility will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of Cuba. } These ships would be available for other operations )in the Pacifie about 15 days after the withdrawat for the Pacific Marines from’ cabal? In addition to the amphibious troop lift Capability the initial Fequirements for sealift will include MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration, Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the initial 10-20 days of the operation. Cc. It is estimated that combat-rekdy status of the Atlantic Command Marine division/wing team will’ be restored within 15 days of withdrawal; combat- -readiness off the 5 Pacific Command Marine expeditionary brigade) vitnin 30 days of withdrawal. dad. For approximately ten days, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed. rn AFAR PS a~ammnenane seem meme cae em 7? Page 4
(28) OASE:{PA) DFOISR ‘QE SECRET CONTRO) 8 AUG 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) Consequences of US Military Intervention Subject: in Cuba (TS) 1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation MONGOOSE, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth "Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost. (personnel, units and: equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a require- ment for sustained occupation, the level of national mobili- zation required, and Cuban counteraction," Pursuant to this request, the requirement. has been divided into its separate parts. t i72, Requirements (personnel, units and equipment) -526) Sination Records” 02. W€ction fo the cument in full Nas no ob iO of this do e JFK Assas “SIONS of th tof 1992 (PL1 Collection Ac ey som, co THEN 0} Stat, * Teclassificati FY, ¢. Major units/involved in the initial assault include: ~ Ne Vepanme G lease a inder the pi eviewed on CIAHASNOOBJECTIONTO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR s+: Principa ho O70 Sa EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY OSs: Z clo yy mod Doc 15) te ( Doc lo} a ee HW 54714 Doclda: 37474797 “Page 7
3. Level of National Mobilisettn Required, a-—Army_- None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs:- . units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Governmient operations. b. Navy - For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in nobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping. c. Air Force & ¢ a, ere originally included in the airlift plan, however Se INCLANT and USAF have been {requested to ‘prepare alternate plans not involving any mobili zation prior to D-day. d., Marines ~ None. e. Further mobilization wopld be required if a concurrent political or military stuatiod geet which would make such a precaution desirable in order to™-assure US military ° responsiveness to additional demands. 4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React - The present basic contingency plan anjyimd pates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba withitd Mays. Subsequent to. gaining such control of the isl wilt be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits. AFARPT- AmwaAe oe sem eaeme caste ao mom mm oe HW 542714 Docld:3242489%" Magt 6
Yas When the assault forces have been committed to the Ton operscidn the strategic Aray forcés in CONUS would be short the suoporting forces for the remaining five divi- perations 15-30 days af- iraval from Cuba.\, Substantial Army forces from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces . and remain on the islans to \perform counterguerrilla opera= tions and conduct military governnent activities. This force will be progressively sithzrawn as the new Cuben government increases in effectiveness. ' b. The Atlantic Fleet amphibious troop lift capability (less that deployed with the sixth Fleet) will be engaged fully during the initial phase of the operation. There may be a requirement for amphibious lift for rapi3 redeployment anda counterguerrilla activity until order has been restored. It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available capability the € : Rial requirements for sealift will include MSTS ships obtained through the: Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the initial 10-20 days of the operatich. Ce It is estimated that conbat-robgy status of the Atlantic Command Marine division/wing team will pe! restored within 15 a days of withdrawal; combat-readiness oF qd. For approximately ite ays, CONUS MATS airlift would be fully committed. HW 54914 Docla:32494807f “page "7° ™™ 7 TET