-~ 17 ~- average it took less than_ 2 @ week for the CIA to transmit BARON ° ° . . . ° * ~ 4 its information to @ Warren Commission, after such in-: = pa en het a 8 formation had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep. ,. ARS tence Zé r Lee oge . . ge Cee on 2 LR Pol protecting 1,3 ye Ofte . es . o LL the CIA's senstived sources and methods, caused “i -seee iat sie? . . f . “le is ae the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty a, _ eltyar* : : in getting 9@@@ information than when the protection of eee met N < vi Cir such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin porate tk eltoe Tt va expressed the opinion that the Agency's» to pro- Jia tect its sensitive sources .and methods did ee: ev C a es which “AEE 4 omm effect wmgm the quality of the information to @iggemeer ene ot vle om ohn the Warren Commission and i , iON ACCeSss. 7 aoe v USCA Clase E ak Reps ot _perei " ; an oes * A ° 4Uh73 on CNA oy 3 B50 ghahkin & 23) [th from Ne TR OAD “Whe. _—— —— mes thhelMor bmi » eh Agency waunmimamigi: unilateral decisions wneurmighisgusbiemenes] o~ . 9OS H accesStsecsA bi HSC AC 4860 Fs A Dye Tok & vy mmm SF materials iegemage qumceeme the Commission. (Scekso dep. s/16/74 tor | > a a ~ £ ‘ i ee lee eae ae me ban, veo4 or nee: u3§ $o° 334 ee ee! , LT RS AL AL arene RDA Heo Vee Wes eo EB ATA SS AS y* 3 perpuihits whe photosurveillance and telephon& surveillance . oun S operations of the CIA's Mexico¥ City Station ~° “sy & hg ; a related consideration ,the™ x es 3 ) Bs ° l 4 cy's reticcace Fo revead
- 18 - wha origin of xeunding™photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man" Each of these concerns will be examined? Gherein. The CIA's concern for revealing the existence -of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was CJ evident from the goeception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first by A to reveal all our technical operations." (seekse aay. p.158) BS iso farther testitigaNfar . 5 We were going to give them intelligence re- yt “ ports which derived from all our sources, in- ‘2 -f .g cluding technical sources, including the tele- “x ~ phone intercept and the information gotten - .» 2 from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly ~ with the information from the telephone inter- *< foo a £ cepts. (Ext~to~Sesteg quoter ati-ef pv) oe Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from examination of the background to the first major CIA IA FoIR Pocur®x # So7- 305 report furnished the Warren Commission garding Lee Harvey , s4ocrrercorm{ i 7 / Oswald's trip to Mexico City. S(Gisee.) Much of the FHROFMA LY, Menten a, Lee tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was “eghoy _ . + es . el ers based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report. A the o1icy limiting Warren Commission know- ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated: Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of tele-
~ 19 — phone taps, in order to protect your contin- uing 6p3 . Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID OTE Fah Dae Pe aad) ee fee ep C/A FoI Doc 1 em 2 Pen 190%, DIR yz &-TS7 The basic policy articulated in the December a et se Spee t¢ cat cone ‘%¢ M6 pf aos 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum o CIA Memorandum br File, 22 Pee sakes fer Fink Oneal) December 10, 1963-2 In that nenetend in’ Birch eal 3 ples Lryestiaak lon Croup? of the CIA Counterintelligence/ Staff wrote that he had tee) been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison mem to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which sup- ported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of Decmeber 9, 1963 Sbeittad no the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones A csleca hpi in Mexico, “‘Papieh-queried-O' Neat whether the FBI could wydce supply the Warren Commission with"source of the telephone taps. (The -FBI-had—knowledge Of CIA's teétephone—surveil- . tef (fF * 8 * . St lance-operations—tn-Mexivo-City;—see-cza-Sqet~3/779/ 5407 , <hue WZ ; . jie  ° O'Neal's memorandum ‘eSB that he discussed this matter oe with Scelso O, WHY anna, preter a discussion with Helms, fi ; 1 §-4-——— 7 _ Swas directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed “to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote: i . y He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the a an) Agency's desire to make available to the Com- ae ee mission at least in this manner-~via the FBI-~ a sensitive information which cou d relate to "ou .F ub i telephone taps (Biosk=@tNeal, Memo for. File, fee uw 20 Dec 63 Subj+—Lee—HarveyOswald ~ ar — 7 0 bg Bich O'n car, le Ciset Pile matinlt J
the--form-of this presentation sah bgeaseeiee ge a . . ° ‘ tect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques. (CIA_Cabie Birs90466,FOIA 426-757; 20 Det 63) weed: - fe we “2 0 + Thy ‘ee WX oN o ee . Iv. nelephond “ta arb HeeG-Sueeedde ance Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren commission, at least during cok Phe Gora $5 pan § 3 AK , the initial stage’ of the CIA's telephonic and photo sur- ‘ The reason for the sensitivity of/ these tele~- phone taps and surveillance was not only be~ cause it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were run- ning in’ conjunction with the Mexican authori-@t tieS|and therefore, if this fad become public knowledge, it would have caused very om feel- _ dings between Mexico and the Stee ace "ee ALCS) .£, chore helms, &/9f25 |,» and that was the reason. casién [PPpar-se Nevertheless, the CIA had provided in ormation to yy} the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveil} nce operations — ot prior to the assassination™ and aging tHe post-assassination wos Sta ff 77/ Zs feufveyt Fu ctht Crema’ , qeoresuernsity ‘—_acinee, 2S yy Lop” of November 28, 1963 the White Ho kh, through information ae ‘made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council? ~ — had Patel _ Director McGeorge Bundy, i Aware that the CIA had tele- pe a | phone taps in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Em- v ,>” \passy/Consulatesand that’ through these taps Oswald's pre- rior to the assassination had been (te Coa. Pow eo I Bee ve cp Becndod igh)
~ 23 ~— unailbrgeesy s$fis—a—source 4: ofconcern to thas Committee. pet is indicative of an” tai Gee hesinnedPebecud inits& aol cudamenntine fpereple Sarl co wonenasssiae Gatameaee Se wf» CHA Galt a ncenctertebl: substance info mation GE provi ides beac TEC OOII 0c (2%, pists eT $$ item the Warren Commission. HES Meuse aekT ‘This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro- ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it, en ! a : i ao gt were 4 — piitaPh Oy Lie Pe 2, LYe et wa are ‘ ‘ ‘ iad ¢ , aL a. Home . 76. lwh Lad os ‘ A GE, 23 me As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA =< en Tk ete, provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that tbo Ps pion, chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit@ during ~“* ‘¢i*? September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum aid ifs em noYmention ~ sations with the Cuban and 1 Sovptll embassy /Consulateshad * ay fel Oe ee ; Oswald’ s various Somer es rows ad been tapped and .subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, \ © Se that the CIA \ that memorandum aod, ndffrention exci had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban faa hs Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at a oe the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban 2720 Ambassador to Mexico which the CIA had also tapped and a ‘transcribed.
‘On February 1, 1964,Helms appeared before the Commission (aéee=above}; and likely discussed the memoran- S14 ref Doc 9G ~ 224,24 Sen 1564, URG7 824) 1964: dum of January 3/ , On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of SSFK E Pee Uo. —— January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that. Ars weitiag | item as Of chequaimminimanenciveniee , the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephoné¢surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and trans- cripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the Feb- ruary 10, 1964 fatter whether Oswald's direct communica- tion with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Peace los the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Com- mission had been informed of the telephong surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry t by Rankin would not have been made. C®8?° .Steh « a Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Com- mission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquar- ters in Langley; Virginia and had been shown various trans~ cripts resulting from the CIA's telephones survel Lrance ; . psec dassr€ pen of Paymord Rocca 2/2 8p operations in Mexico City. (Rocca—dep.:—p-82) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath h precisely the point in time at which the Warren Best) . Commission earned of these operations. Tl Ebias
~ 25 - On February 19, 1964 + me pA ar ps: ogee Sa tot Mk inquiry of February 10. _ The Agency wees did indi- (Fs cate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did wet reveal ‘the source of this information in its response WS Gon rel. to the Commissiornfpr indicate* that de would be revealed “a . by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). y Tbid 1A Fe! hoa “ ° cove Knog [expt ° ot © ; wit! ae, TER puring the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access N to the production material derived from the CIA telephon¢ce surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of . “? aes . these memoranda ten to support 1 the Committee’ s belief —- = ; whee eee ramet ome nt oe fs a 7 Sie a, le that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, ne be and Willeys did not obtain access to CIA telephone surveil- lance materials until April 9, 1964. at eb Goreman, . GE hwson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief. of Station in Mexico City jm provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson _ ffemorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Tig te Moshe C14, 3 HPS r , Prior to Apel a. it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March ‘12,
-~ 26 - 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephon& surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandun® of larga I ~mgem the Warren Commission had learned that" cra eer eens | possessea& transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. Portices~Acmas Theag? conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Durfta' S arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal _ mm ey 2 SlaASOn prognacrarditn. 1 fAer, (2 2, 4464 PPS, /@, ¢s-46 § Police (cite?). es Helms responded to the Com- ote: vy mission's request for access, that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representativeg*™ f>? review @@ this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)\2 Go It shouldbe noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission 1éarned of the Dorticos~Armas intercepts. As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA's telephonic surveillance activities in Mexico City. (cPS8~ one or the other could well have provided the War- ren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Ray~- mond Rogas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep. ) lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.
- 27 - Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964. concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated e eer that the tentative conclusions ce emespastinanioaneyety Oswald! s that he had reacheg were derived from CIA memorandag of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964 CS lerisn yu, rtorh25,5964 and ,in addition a Mexican federal police summary Gmyprof T>° Mexico trip, interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote: A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, @sicd an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accu- rate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. S Tbial These comments indicate that saflson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Salflson had been provided the Duran telephonte intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments conerning the Meiftan police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission,as of March 259 had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. 9 insert pas The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported ; , £67. girJ by reference to his memorandum of9March 27, 1964 L{(Cize> wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald fad visited cba p the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion, WrrAeyu of he  itiginmiemiss based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testi- wis PROTA O FAR dAdo, joears mony before the Mexican police. p Rai Rise inemrcomenneng no
8 elas a et a re aE MOOR SE In ote omen rete abet 5k pod Ate te 6 ERA Pao aca te Cider am indication that he_ hag reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore,® n(Slawsoy had”been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis tedould haves reflected the fact of this reeled by its corroboration or a.pove. criticism of the Mexican police summary report. Herne tpes Westigaite MExico cit¥Aiad not been given ~ a $ Sdawwson restenis, 2 ipts. aWeeSs to the Duran transcri he Commission had been +4" ee ’ forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not.make-.. aw reference to the surveillance operations, and ee SURE by Hee Mevicancteedéral Poli & AGE report: Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance opera- tions to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of Decem- f ber 20, 1964 to its Mexico ) City Station: Qur present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here. (CIA cable, DIR EB goaee, FOIAtH20-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144) mined
Php ON. 8S Reap ANp it ne ROM CMRP LANIER SATB ELAS Ce 2 Rel Pema tanRe I DLari EINER NAT or ahh NT als By AMR NIRS EBT: IH SE AE ARI aa Seer treet IY Mh NRT SOL AAP LON RNA PRED SOG FEEL THE SSE PY LOGY I AIG EO RE SE EE Ie ATE ERR EY Be A PATE AMA RTE DEEL og Noe teehee tn 0 Ae ANE BO c vane ae } % ~ 29 - times. He statedgthat this conclug ian was based upon his é i oy review of Silvgfa Duran's tes’ fleonyto pine Mexican »3oPPae (Slawson megorandum, Marc Pe 7 4 Pcin p. 192) Howezer, Slawson ges not stat gy geonclusiong were alsofdrawn f os ya from review of any “Se the PY fltaction Ex the Mex Zo City statign su: ae Le operafte 3 flvson dose-fndicate, og Loner gral ES NT fw howevar, thawW his Feasoning’ cin COTS regarding, Qswald's ye engateneee visit to. “the Cuban-mibaesy* a access to the CfA ‘Ss peercet ene telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p. m. CS [avs ~ rn. re Sandu, Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated a AGE ; Larterdle tr that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy,‘ re- ev wre SIM ASS yf on questing an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was Fee ee 2. determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on Septem- ber 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate s adh, stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as ead crbid Pp aches P- Rad +becti-c<e— Oswald @% at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, Ce OF. « initively-established Chat Oswald haa visited the. Cuban. Embassy. on. .at. least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dateSand. exact times of his- presence inthe. Cuban. Embassy ame established as the result of the. retephonic surveillance waa this information been made available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These=era: cipts
nee-—tren=mate—avaiitable. The record supports the Committee's finding that as Of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not A ow been given access to the above-referenced series of tele- nol? it y Phonet intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman ow ot ee oo oe and Slawson, they articulatafone question to the CIA and Olt Slarsegh Gleman Sue |: - Qutttions Ral &2A by vhe A rf; Aart Fil memorAprit 2, 1964, GlA—prb97 5) (me-netes?9 Cole manan Lt ke S\awsan Cote: ore 1) What is the information source referred to in 4 ee two me? for information from the Agencys ( EBSaSwado: the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa; . Ze an e $ rr ar uf 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts - et wo . of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts oe Lo the assassination or related subjects; 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed ssy_is discussed Ce bad ¢ A The questt wiretally y pose in the above-referenced A> Y memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA ania ares of September 27, 1963 at 1083 237 a. Piasn awson, memos, “Apri “3 ~ _ 24, 1964, ebiy3223) Vif S lawson —same OUR AT enced ta e source of the information, he had not, been —_ a (ph . oo - = - Lye se a? a ~ ‘
. ° Lol 1S a hee we ae gO Ser  eeee w, rt ee ba ft OY a Z wa |. given access, Latte . 3 rence) Sara iM .v- a “ concerning the assassination (as; ckeartyrro ppd botes Whe Yemmise hun dtm ine Adea v4 Ze coh by . em Lrg < = oe a es dae We # “ ) ejele Sa as OF ce 5 COLL Gaus : ° ~ > caine C y ag - i“ = oa givers Perea SETA ES aS cere ene ete at eS SS ON tfgten number three of the above conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies @& discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. @k the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re- On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated (ay | their concern for receiving-complete access’ to all material® relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They-—wrote:.- fhe most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con- spiracies, etc. took place.
-~ 33 — Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA. Cx bi A ppi-107 That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the telephonay surveillance ae operations and’ English translations,. og-bhe=vemer- In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances David Slawson wrote: | ",.Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in n Washington. We agreed to this." (Sleweoern=menieg:=dn roow, p. 22} Mr. Scott described to the Gommission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination. immediately ; \ Scott indicated that his staff @#emeumermmeemet began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (BBG ce dS Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents Sed immediately been put under surveillance following the
gt hag "Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown dis- closed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original form Ab yoe, hae rials at some later time during our visit." é Vou ist Sldwson' Ss memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes deal¥exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining w®,respectively? "the pt a7-Ock / ) 1963. sen, Tin tert ets fron that the Agency's Dur and Oswald nversationsSorthep fued Haas cen nda . Vawy fey Ss Sev i rd Coan / ‘SASS Os peu (4 oxic ts qt is “evident from Slawson's recor denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's a comrateley reasoned, ability to draw*conclusionsjregarding Oswald! Ss sojourn in Mexico City, It meant that as ™, of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact “on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise CoArLs * a rd materials eeme available for analysis by the Commission. jane ,
Ve ev2, .~_ 35 7” Coe pata we ye te eet gh ga . i pte ee tear ae eb Fea Sat Naot ae tlt a a aaa . 4, its vam Pye Bane Let Ste Fiheee — a Cte cee thus, the Agency ' ‘S Sarly ‘policy of not providing the Commission with vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of tnvestigation that might have been more seriously considered had this pose material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvements ae LAs B Loe La bn Lt he we ae sae TI - epee i ‘ bal eng pte Pee othe Rote Amt EIN Mexico “city Mystery Man , * rer speed Asprt Odum shorF ex On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald vaereeoiveren itz ‘of a man bearing no allen Commi SStan Kepoct p— THEE photograph had been physical resemblance to her song anes supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files Apoc DPPH~ ISSS, 25fes in an effort to locate information on Oswald. This photograph<p< assassination, dyoLee Harvey oswa eds chara Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico | City and mistakenly linked at that time to | oswaia. CH 47 oO i daxet “GE Kichasatelms 6) ; On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under | fo Bata Cm fe tp — which she was shown the photograp Mrs. Oswald testified that Vwosk she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. ‘ (p. ree
Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote * = . Thomas Kocrramnesines Assstact bbe 5 3 0 (eer , base Nw this photograph “py the . Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin Gaza a he la. 9 _ > — he identity of the individ a> — : . ere - ara Sam aS if that—information- ween available. a ~ Feb 13, 19G4, TRE Poc tt T f * day, ina sepa ate letter, te-BGE—Mecene, ~ - aoe pel fle Cong. akan Animas ty oh “Ze FE y 3 * Rankin wrote Eke ohe Commission <3 Secret « cee | Services tha 4 Or Z - faethe a communications- concerning-the assavsination—to-the-secret a , “ Sservice s requested copies of these 3 a ae materials.‘ reS cane cab Les ethmiomwenmt concern Y secicees th BQ dinner of the individual & argeeeeetcesing) phe MeAice City S tation oS _ hs ee setters’ Py _ ‘Osha het ~aisgcsubsequently_shoy Show! to to Oswald's = iar ROCESS PON AO aa nates aan cad Ve { Sein iin ini pein see mmr cena Ties - :,. | disseminated“to the Secret Service was a November 26 ae cola Doc PIR. ¥S177, 2eWew 14 1464 “., ; dissemination . ‘$ces | thesbeeret=Gervree. That cable concerned the Dord#gmeg-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic a ne surveillance operations in Mexico citfat eae time of the avers fasteg gn Boer les ern s earlier visj TR A "ap cel “Sohn Scelso testified garaing pb see i Ee surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission” ate, of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated::
- 37 - "We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?" Mr. Goldsmith: ...So0 the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission. Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations. | ft Soha o/7% aaa mama :: 150) . _ 7 Fe brtitg aan the Warren ” “ A - wan) RE REALE Lg POP AOL tnd - Commission Looe access to SOULE OF 6 ONLELA hae tte C/rt wo. telep oni¢ s sgpeesniangs» production Ge2dieeised- treme , we, 6h res 1#5 6 wo | larly, Selasale BN em I a e ~tem@mm of the photosurveillance operations, — fw ¥ha Wal Kr Conn UES tan Mtewel , pathy ee e LOE. . . alg . ‘ ® We ons tO Cause concern within the Agency. On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since Novem ler (23, 1964. Rocca then stated: . “Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer cok yah to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by ke wa \ paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 an one poe letter). If they come back on this point he feels od that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than . {pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these ve items are of new substantive interest. We have either ‘passed the material in substapce to the Commission in Soe "7 fesponse to earlier levies ew the items items “a fo warefer to aborted leads, for example, the famous Sex ee _ photographs which are not of Oswald..." C0 Come eo TUS Ae * ae
- 47 = Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed CIA DS C ; to be 194 Dispatch, HMMA21612¢ Calderon's presence in re BEE HIVE Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City saStion and to the Chief of the CIA's CIR DOC, PSPATCH vy FER loose Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dis-' SSUke, (FOS patch had attached to it a report containg biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The. Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report. On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was ‘sent from the Chie£ of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of tS’ Station in: ‘Mexico: city Wisesten avon “119359 occa aes 3 Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DG? Bl ptcorkteA Con a eta M 5 964. At tha s fo", | was a reported OF oe Sagh he on Ma ay 5, 1 Eth at oy CTMayiicy time, wistaeerson, Chief of Counterintelligence for the y Pepper foci Special Affairs Staff, recerded the results of his de- briefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG¢had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items vERGRIE of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-
- 48 - , ja 81D > Loa § telligence Service officers! ‘Specifically, AMMUG~1 het - beet! asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson, as—recordent-inr-tne’ May—s-memorandum—that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on (ndo,st two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. “CLEIPC bro anryo 5A Swepson thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As.a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch © Go? boot dew oan traffic which recorded er arrival in Me: and departure, pereny Lnove Pree Obs Aor Yofie AVES hE’ oe wy ar. On May 7, 1964, Swemsen recorded additional informa-~ tion he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald' Ss c{A pet Foy GE7- 245, ehtnA.3 7a possible contact with the DGI.” Paragraph 3 of this memoran- dum stated in part: “a. Luisa Calderon, since. she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not per- formed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high. b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence. (ce iD?
- 49 = bag sf » On May 8 Swerrson further disclosed AMMUG's know- ledge of the Oswald case E*Submn araphrased edge o e Oswa case. n paraphrased AMMUG' g peenson,P Pp s knowledge of Calderon as follows: I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI althought she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told Me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency al- though Manuel. Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernan- dez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine- professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald... .[ bia On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson cif doc FeIA 687-299, R octamer ora ncdism , [1 May 156 had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that “the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, dis- ~ cuss the AMMUG/1 sitation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this
~ 50 - takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writ- Lat byA p-= | ing. (1i-Mey—647—Rocca-memo7—FOTA687-295-with/4—attachments) . On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding , AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensi- i ; gs Lei Por Feta 6 F7~ 244 Melos tivity and operational significance. Netached to Helms' 1S Mas (464 ein eS s communication was a Parepnrased accounting of Sweet May 5 memorandum. (HESS emoy—May-ES;-1S SH -POTA- 697TH 294) . In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez tropez Ke set forth. However, that attachment £Skes no reference. what- soever to Luisa Calderon. Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested Ge 6. EEK SS as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to~teek-at the Aangesch’ 3 C1 Doc Foi#t questions used in Swensen's interrogation of aumuc ( (ooeker 739-5. memorfg-eocoa, 19 June 1964 F@Raaa0-2L07. On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and fnalysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Longo k's Willens saw Swemsen's May 5..memorandum. The only mention of aPideron was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in, Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early. “¢ bei Larger KC in 1964.4~ However, Willens was not shown the Swenson memoran- } dum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible