476-10036-10346 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA . RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10346 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: William H. Brubeck AGENCY FILE NUMBER : , ORIGINATOR : NUFK FROM : ) TO: TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record DATE : 12/13/1963 PAGES : 7) SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : . RESTRICTIONS : - CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : | . COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 382: Congo 12/62. Box 3.
ER NLL-03- Th9; Yor Ce a eomber 13, 2 — MEAORARDIM OR THE PRESIDEH? iene Sheen ‘We ase sooking te prevent en inereasa in ‘Commmi.st influsaco in the Congo, to reintegrate the Brenga, and to strengthen end mainteia - a moderate governzent. in Leopoldville that can in fact run tho | “country. Without rotnvigeration, our present policy cannot achieve - these ends. ; | tnable, « with a hostile Parliament around his neck, to take stops . 7 . necessary for reconciliation and reintegration. ; i Conmmist bles presence ‘Qn Leopoldvi lie is now a ‘atetines possibility, But how nets inttative the Sovists take will bo directly related to ‘thoip assossmant of coup ‘whl to act an Central ‘Afetea. qholr disadvantages, io crying to operate in Central Africa : -. S8e 80 great that they wd not move unless ae eppsears. we are dise . ‘me 8 United Betions, with Linkted financial: resources and : probably | carly withdrawls of Indien troops, cannot remain in the Congo smoh longer bg. en effective foree. . ‘Bosauso: United States end UN poltey/ter all practical purposes, boon indietinguishable, the Orgenisetion’s failure in the Congo — would be a major failure ‘of this Administration's policy and weald — seriously undermine the poscekeeping : ‘sole of the United Hatiens. a ; he Beod Bood — se
Ree een tne «meme oS one : os J Situation this Weck | fhe basic assumption of our present Congo policy ds that ea) » could got Katanga reintegrated into ‘tke Gengo and an effactive moderate goverm=snt established and functioning in Leepoldville, » - by persuasion and diplomacy ‘backed up by threats of economies aetien. This assumption has turned out to be WPERE it ds uPong, because “Thsombe end his supporters are clearly not going to reintegrate mios | they have: so aiid. ‘nothing we have dens eonvinees Takeake thas, im the ‘last’ analysis, ho ‘wll be forced to it. . It ‘ds alse wrong becawse we axe not pullding an effestive Contra “Government in. Leopoldville. A lergely irresponsible Parliamint and | @ flabby administration at not good enougs as a poll tical Sremeworks Adeula: ‘is the best leader on the. horizon, but we should be holping : - to develop other political leadership. _ f - Agter met. intermational ccaversation, Foreign Hinister Spank has sent ) private emissary to Tshombe to got him to accept a@ change — fn the imsthed by which UMEK maims ite payments. Ths decisien te make Cha payzents to the Contral Government instead of to shonbo atiewld ‘have been takon without trying to "clear 2". with @shenbo, but Spaak elected to consult Pehembe, fire Wo do not yet know on what - . 7 Gorns | Pohombo wil accept Spaakt! proposal. We do know fren os - experience that if 2¢ requires any aetion on bis part to. carry. ous ‘the detail, ‘that action wh not: be taleoa.
oho | Ageioa,: end probably irreparable damage to the UN as a. paacolmopor) — fe nd ag tha 2 matter over to the Africans. ho : Africans ‘6 cannot handle it, and this would open the Congo to eventual Commmist talsover; a Secession. Loopolaviiie cannot be ‘Donght 2 se , long aa it has ‘tho «. “ alterne tive of Sovist aids end oN | ‘ the umifior of the Congo. Wo eo “RO , prospect that Pehombe could: win enough support throughout, the Congo te fualte this & realistic possibility. . * Waat fa ureng with the » ploture is ‘the absence of a U.S _ | dooicton es to what we would do, in. the final analysie, to prevent. obsos, Large-scale massacres, and/or a major Soviet presence called is by pedieal suecessors to Adoula, “If wo continus %o pursue precant policies, they. wade result in hardening the - ‘Eehoinbs decessicn, further weakening the position: of Adowla (because of his’ inability to. solve the Katanga problem, the ano (big nodernestyle politicad issue ds. Congo pelitics). 2? vo /Aotei dows. this road, we may avantually have to tse. United States; and porkhapa other wostern forces ¢o- clean up a very meosy state of effeiras “gf wo are clear nov that ta the wltinate aso vo vould use our ota: power fa Central Africa, ‘thon anything short of that that whLL “ provent ‘a breakdom in the Congo is prafenble to waiting too long end. then having to go in with too mush. a
Yo thors fore recommend that the United ‘States Goveranent tako it as @ a mejor ebjective to develop @ modern and moderate Central Government im the Congo, te got Ketenga rointegrated inte the. ‘Gongo and te prevent a Soviet presences in the Congo. We recomend inmsdiiate steps both to move vepidly toward those objestives end - to demonstzte that wo ‘have in fact taken this decision end aro "prepared to: bacle 4s with the fall weight of United States POW? o: 4 Demosracy eannet blurs. unless at HOES ite ££ wo. moan 4b, and de Lt is elear to all concerned that ve HDan it, we ¢an use the peasibility of ow faller interventien ater’ to accomplish our purposes with. less - intervention HOW. = We: recommnd cree hinds of stops. to HOVE shoe, on tho assumption that wo really meen ats (a) fee OF forces in tho Gonge should | be butt up to the point where it would clearly be ridiculous for ‘Fohonbs's Ketengen forces to challenge them. _(b) Camvinse Adoula to prorogue the Parlismat, . - to govern with a backing of a proowsstorn group heeded by _. Hebatu; and to ostablish mome effective adainistration with — “WH, U8. and Belgian sscistenco. | . te) Comtinus te purawe vigorously the most feasible ” elomuts of the Thent Plen,. notably ‘the. division of revenues | (withemt farther consultation with @shorbe » 42 necessary) the Sentral Goveramant's amesty» the military otandetili a Berth Rabangts and en attempt te-foree an agreed | | - division my
obo ' @ivision of powers and the beginnings. of military integration : between the Central Government. and the. Katanga. . In these cireumstances, we recomend three major steps: Le At the prosent ‘time, our. assessment is that, with: the new - ‘Indonesian battalion. (one of them supposedly. a paratrooper battalion). ‘and the relatively ‘good security ai tuation, din the rest of ‘the country, the .UN has enough ground forces to handle: any challenge from. m Rateinganese ‘gendarmerie af. it 1a not challenged, ‘ftom ‘the airs _ The problem 1s, therefore, te ‘hake: ‘sure that no present _ or conceivable Katanga air’ papabd lity: haa a. ‘chance to operate against the Un forces. ‘this. means three things? . ae Le  Shanging ‘the present: ‘Piles of engugement of UNOC | Air Force” - “to permit the destruction in the. . | air or on ‘the ground of Ratangese air force planes with combat | capability, af any of these planes. engages in a hostile act. This would “involve due justification and public warning fore such action was undertaken, fshombs would be told that, if any. o of his planes 4s positively identified as engaging in hostile | action in Nerth Katanga or South Katanga, UNOC would consider itself justified not only in attacking the plane in queation, but 1A. attacking and destroying on the ground, after due warning so as to limit civilian casualtios, all Xatangan air force - planes with combat capability, =~ _ foe . Te, 2, ‘povlowing
| "SERED , F “ebae  g ne Be Poliowing through on: ali ‘ef ‘the present arrangements to beof up the UM ‘air forces in. Jthie area with Swedish, . Italian, .. Iranien, | and, Ethoplan equipment, and, | personnels “ge vould be 4a departure from the: original Hamarek jold policy . for the United Wations-to accept an American, unit as a part of the regular BNOC Force, which has been made up of contributions from - countries who are not permanent members of the Security Council. Moreover, it raises’ the question of the. command relationship of the US unit to ‘UHOC. Under existing State-J¢s arrangements the USAF _transport airoraft flying in support. of uNOC, the CINCEUR representative an Loopolavilie retains. operational control, The Indian, Ethiopian and Swedish: air units: are, of course, under direct UNOC command. The: -Sy¢ woula find: it easier to. accept a US unit 4¢ its command relation- | ship with’ ‘NOC ‘es "ttie same as. the air contingents of other nations: Prom the. political standpoint, we believe. this would be in the U3. Anterest,. ‘but ‘the evs of the Secretary of. Defense and the SCs should be sought on this point. re So | - Our willingness. SECRET .
eT. ‘mi gsden of (a) pre yeocting our (pat ispoijt planes waigh ars operating 4h the toydrter | fe the Congo“en behalf’ of the te) y doting ‘up fhe UN Forces; ena (e) g ‘ining and ¢ have le pi ce an adeGuat {national Hie foree for al eral Government Cz gets “Congo. G, . Our willingness. so do this would. be very well raceived by a ‘great majority ef the UN manbers, end. especially by mambors of ‘the . Gengo Advisory Comittee. Go the Secretary General, at would symbolize end demonstrate in a practical way our earnest: resolve to see Shis - thing through and avoid a major féllure by the OW ia its largest 3 poacolssping attempt. | _ Needless to. ssy, the: presence of U.S. forces o or even the . clear Imowledge that 0.8. forces Wore available for this purpose o would be a significant pressure on Zshoubs and his asaéoiates. | Tehonbe could interpret this eeieion in-no other wey than as preg? that ony. ‘rosdatanée on his part to ‘the WW, oF any attempt to destroy Rurepean fadlities in Katanga, would bo. met by a ‘devastating counter’ blow. ; cee ‘Wo are ouggesting a butlantp of U. 8. . malitery 2 forces under iy > of . tO Foo integrate the Katenga, ‘The idea is not & that the United States oP the vn ‘would teks a military initiative to destroy Gohembe’s a govermiont. But the UM,. vith U.S. backing, would bs placed in a ‘position whore the alternative of military resistance was no longer open to Tebembo, and politica negotiation Joading tovard . _ reoenet tation
28s . receaodliation and teintegratien, weuld be the ealy ratienal . choices. left to him. “ao stops roquired to strengthen the Contra Goveramsat ave sot forth in PAB C.. . in general, Wailo Adoule is not an aoa) ehofco, wo believe . he ia the best. individual evailable to hold the roing of goverment — _* $f Leopoldville and, even with Erlianent dismissed, bo would enjoy the Virtus of having talon office legitimately. he question ; of maintaining a “goup" group dn power would iuvoelve tha. iA te _ a certain extent. For obvious reasens, ve would prefer to keep the) attire operation as overt as possible, and the fact that Kasavubs | Gam legally prorague Parliament for thirty days faetlitates this. mn ohds comecticn, wo would expect Adoula to establish a mero effective executive branch. while wo havo considered giving. ' “gadaédene) assktance, to the GOC in establishing its om air capability, | thle! equivensnt would, for the tins boing; be redundant in view "| “0@ tho strengthentg of the Oi alr farce. This, too, would ; seduce she ‘necd Sor as to expand our covert operations wth the | oe constant risk of OxPOSUES © ee | the dotailea 4 agente | of ¢ stops required 4s. ‘avedlable ss Antood, | , As all tes familiar, But in a new atmosphore produced bya new 7 “ Aonmneteation ¢ thet | wo mean AG, BOmS of ths steps. required could oo
taken: immsdiatety. . Adovia. could order the stendstiil with minima aistioulty | if assured of this ‘more fortheoning u3/0E support. Moreover, - although the UMEK. is- now negotiating the subject with Pehambe , when 4% is faced with. us determination to end secession, this might stimulate them to turn over imme diate ly their taxes and foreign | exchangs to the Monetary Council with or without Tabombe"s agreement. Working out the agreed dyision of power between the . Central Government - aud the Katenga and avrangomente for military integration would be @ more complex task We think this could best be. achieved by having v Thant personally fly to ths Congo avid ‘negotiate « final setblement with Adoule and ‘Pehombe on these questions. eee a coat fe eee ee cae : Both aides would ‘be: given to understand that we would tolerate no, nonsense in. firming up specific arrangements based upen the: ‘negotiations that have already been ‘held. ao, ‘z0 ;UNP8tsco/Butun- 20 sHCleve land smtb