fo tae ‘ wi JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM D Date : 06/25/98 Page : 1 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER.: AGENCY INFORMATION NSC 145-10001-10184 Released under the John . Eennedy Wes5assaination Records oOllection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). ase#: NW 54214 Date: -----------~-.---—- ~~~ ~~~ ----------------------~----------- WO 1LO-2017-_-_________J__-_ ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS DOCUMENT INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 03/21/62 12 MINUTES OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT 1C RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 02/10/98 EXEMPT PER E.0, 13526 SEC 3.3(b) SOXS _ DATE EXEMPTED: MAR GROUP JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 3/202C Z2¢377 OKAY 70 ROLE 1S ROATEO inv 54214 DoclId: 32977069 Page 1
21 March 1962 RANDUM FOR RECORD: _ Pollowing are the minutes of the Caribbean Survey @: 14 in the Rational Operations Room 2B 913, 21 March 1 ollowing was the attendance at the meetin dein Goodin : | oe. Lansdale's request, Mr. Harvey opened the meeting by pivine a general operationsl status report. He discussed teams, etc., in some detail, indicating thatthe missionf of the teams was intelligence collection, controls and the development of latent resistant areas. “fhe quality ef the Ope Locka Interrogation | Center - reports have been good. 150 are coming in per week on an average of possible intelligence re _ Very ee of high level ‘polit sont —e has been a: p : tion. tenrelis sabotage 1s dscreasiog in owt. ey ggeretions) problems of putting in agents are getting tamginer oxi tougher. The controls by the Commmists in Cuba are getting tighter and tighter and will slow dam the operation. Agents must have _ documents, to get documents you must register, when you register “the Blee informer checks on you periodically. ‘This makes it tough to get ration cards. Some few Cuban agents have t : ter. Mr. Kennedy asked how abi backlog of refugees - some 75,000 people coming in cka in the Miami area prior to beginning of this operati : How about @ program to as oited. Mr. Harvey indica ‘ date they have been una C in certain special case ; that they have a plan ft get the personnel availab “Bxcuupee mom GOS 977069 Page 2
Mr. Kennedy brought up the possibility of using Immigration — haem: wavectelty the broader — types who can Comat ttee oe recommended an ‘additional screening anne for Cubans, possibly in the New Orleans area. Mr. Kennedy asked CIA what the vote would be ~ Cuba s otween | the Castro — the Gen Craig was asked to rep t discussed CIA support _—. that a the the sneeria period to de prepared ata moment's notice to inter- vene in Cuba to prevent a ‘Bungarian type operation or te exploit any possible sagalens oat = eee —, = results ef the | Cuban oauerttios wae : eneene. ee ee ¥ Verce's general con- : elusions were read to the o— wide. the —— that operations ‘latter phases, inasmuch ise ani before the Cu i se operandi, etc., and y yently, they might produ t on-balance, any : es of success. 977069 Page a
be enplayed, Garittcan Survey Group ceo aate, et extent US —_—* forces a will ‘be employed within the territorial question of priority ef Mongoose: tt was eustasised to the Attorney — General that to date we had not had particular trouble in this 4 : into trouble areas, par- in regard : , that to. date, this had sei handled : ree Sexy gece enannes, for example, Gen | ‘Decker who hed a little trouble in shi ered in getting stockpiles, t by making decisions » priority and that tim in a Guban operation?, or we id Cuba take priori wtih neces take priority? Mr. Gilpatric indicated he would like to try to solve this wroblen at Defense level without referring it to anyone higher. He asked that he be kept Anformed of this situation as it. develops into a real proble ares. Have Col Knight keep ne inforaed on this situation so t' at “ could let Z Nr. Gilpatric know Sy vay of the (CS when the ¢ime comes that. we should do so
i am craig then covered the organisation, staffi operandi ef the Snvibeesn Surveg-Proup Working Group of BOD of JCS and finally entovg, inten vet tans ag first important misaien undertaken by the group was _ the niltary's stake and | Communist regine in cu Defense will support $ phase of operation of : personnel and bases, es e peint that the ntntery believe: that the continued existe Castro Commmnist meime is Ancompatible with the mini security requirements of the Us and makes a point that the nil tary could intervene in Cuba without serious offense to national or world public opinion under we fo ing three conditions: a Firat = if we moved in response to a homend fardan: re to restore ord2:. Second - {f «2 arnounced instant to going in that we were awoving in te r2stere order and would hold free elections and we will with@raw from Cuba as soo! the new covernment advised that trey hed the raped t ntatn law and order without : | we 54214. ae ee Page 5
assistance from the OAS nation. Third - If the opere tion ucted as quickly as possible and with suffi : that the Commnist bloc ‘or bases in Cuba. It would great) nerability and our defense cost as f developed or shifted to met this the Soviets had an option on which : at any time in this regard. They can a a scencd base in Cuba at their wil: : facts squarely now anf Sotermine as Griz as | possible whether : Caba of Communi.sn hy eoicrt ore Cubans within — purposes S fee ae an early decision as eo vhether we tf coheed ar the covert. reas fail. for the foreseeable future the elisinetinn of the commnist regi, since to remove the base might well trigger World War III. . to. ‘the group that the views I expre r in regard to the nec Na under which w we could go in without causing too much world consternation and condemnation, and to held by the Soviet Russia consernins vases in Cuba, ented pditical judgments ond were with _ Yr, Gilpatric max indicated he too ¢ ed this to be NW 54214 DocId:3297
1 judgment. I indicated that this wa: judgment, there was no doubt about it bi id involve the Defense and JCS respons s NSAM No. 55 published last June, the the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he consi JOint Chiefs of Staff felt obligated to so ‘advise the President. — ‘when I made this statement Mr, Kennedy indicated to the effect _ that this was correct, that it was the responsibility of the JCS to make Same of this nature. . Goodwin did not pursue the matter further at this time. « Geodwin then queried me in regard te the reactions capabilities ef the US forees inner comtri of latin Ameriea, that if euch : o @ requirement oc 1 te ve the general t =o group sise unit. Mr. oripetrte then prepeted to aay at this tine ‘thet it was the intent ef Defense : Mr. Goodwin then was requested to - a , briefing on the State - gituation in regard te the Caribbean Survey croup. He began by | so far we have been unable to get any at this was being done. Mr. Kennedy ¢ lesely on this mijeet asking why he cou hen we knew this to be a fact. Mr. possible was béing done to turn up t ccess. Mr, Kennedy then queried h were working on this for State. Mr. t was questionable whe ther Castro xs such action nt he used to take them but that he is tendency HW 54214 DocId:3
: temporarily poe in the low key that CIA too hed trouble turning up positive evidence Since it had been unable to do so to date. My. Goodwin added that many allegations had been made against Casséto but no proof of Cuban aggression had been proven dic 1d be a distinet asset splitting ‘the u rahip in Cuba. Raul Castro, good possibility. We need @ way to get next to this man. Mr. Goodwin then said that there were overtones threughout the US that _ the US was planning an invasion of Cuba, that this was detrimental to our relationships world-wide. Mr. Gilpetrie and Mr. Kennedy indieated that no matter what was being done, there woul > this effect and such overtones would be voiced about . Goodwin ind teates that one ef the items on tomorrow's agenda for the Special Group would be discussion of tractors fer prisoners in Cube. Mr. Helms brought ed the fact that noabers pieture before ae « ‘project was laid on. | . Goodwin indicated that the Fiat Automotive Company had indicated to Castro that they would provide him with the tractors _ needed. for $18,000,000, no down payment, ten years to pay. So far Castro had not accepted . is offer. Mr, Gilpatrig who lef his time, indicated that 77069 Page 8
_faylor would also be out o ‘He indicated I should deal with Mr, MeNamara if anything came up in the meantime requiring DOD Secretary's guidance. However, he said I was free to bring up anything tomorrow morning, 22 Mareh, that sould: like for him to handle before he left. I indicated there =z = several Sahiakaw ee <— of business which I would like to. get his a and ture before he left and arranged that I at 10004, 22. March, in his office. He indicated to have the risk paper ready to be referred to the Special Group on 22 Mareh. I indicated this could be done since Jes had ‘already approved it and it was ready for his signature and reference to deing the fact that < idee is the fact thet ee University. ais is being yreyagentteod, Ane ther prejeat is the defester situation, which. ‘USIA is pushing through television coverage. ir. Bran adbed that US will : figged ond criticised ne matter whet she does in this area in ” ea, but we should get going with a coun tion te counter such eriticion, ‘the US seems to have 0 built- resistance in Latin America. People just naturally do not. like the US, as far as their verbal reaction to our actions. They eonsider the vs an aggresser verbally. It is proper to criticize the US in this area. However, & eounter-force can help. Most Latin Americans realize that the US mst do sone thing about cuba. but their first reaction eless, will be if we do anything about, Cuba to criticize th this 1s the manner of the beast. ne 54214 Docld: 32977069 Page 3
Gen Lansdale indicated that we should exploit ~ emotional possibilities of the 6000 Guban ehildren mentioned by USIA. —-*Follewing ents made by Mr. Robert Kennedy: The worl ‘tnvelved in the last 2 months has helped us to develop ‘hse problem we are up against in Cuba. We now fairly well understand the avepa we must take in the future, some of these steps we de not like but nevertheless, they are inevitable. It is not conceivable at this time to eall for invasion of US forces in Guba, however, this sumer, fall and next year my change all this. In this first phase, we must find out the situation in Guba and mybe “take steps beyond that. Welmow mere now and we are keeping our. _ Selves infermed . We knew what we can do, we know what is required. it is mot like She situation was last April with regard te oF properedness. The President and his chief edvisers: eonsider this the highest priority project in the Goverment. A serious 8itua- ¢ien has been existing in Cuba for several years ang it will get mor ~nerafa. “The President is most anzious we be able to do something ghost GHB 18, @enee it. Gen Lansdale's leadership in this project has poshed fervard. ‘few are mnking progress, doing good work. - dhere is s possidility that tee Meriia endl Beath East situation would have sn impact on develommente in Guba. We amét be ready to exploit any shange that ecours for us. All ef this work and effort is essential and the President keeps an appraisal en it _gimost on a daily basis. The President is prepared to do whatever nas to be done, we must use our imagination. Mr. Kennedy expressed | complete satisfaction with the Group working on the project now with Gen Craig, Mr. Harvey and Mr. Helms. He did not mention anyone else representing other departaents. We need push more effort, imagination. He feels the Group is up with ‘the Task he urged for us to go on and he indicated he would be watching us closely on a daily basis to see how we are doing and tohelp vo iy needed, NW S4214 DPocld: 32977069 Page 10
' | bottom VSC ube copy. TM. BAT _ WW 54214 DocId:3
Ics } Gdr Witehell told me thetcrA people } haa been 39 . Key West %o eentast Adm MeEl rey, soumanding there, requesting 8 and air suppert, ete. Kay West sent exelusive message to ‘THCLANE ~ copy te Adm Griffin im CWO effics, Both addressees eplied that Key West should de nothing witil 1¢ hears from this mi. Gar Mitehell was requested te leek into this matter. We ust the CIA in channels, they had agreed te have the matters ike this appreved here befere going te the Meld with their squest. Mr. Cheever, CIA, called we agreed to diveuss matters invelving wntreversies with each ether before either Department - Defense * GIA = would lodge complaints er table then at the Special group Informed him of the facet shat we had been burned on ' te avoid it in the future by he and I @iseuss- '°" bad made @ complaint er eritician “ertainly the best AW 54214 DocTd: 32977069... Page 12
pepers he had inherited when he teok over the job upon his arPival here. These papers were obviously of the type with a shet gun blast for equipment personnel, etc., submitted by CIA at the initial eonferenese in early January. HW..54214 DociId:32977069 Page 13 poco in esas en