476-10036-10182 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10182 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : DOS FROM : TO: TITLE : Vietnam Status Report DATE : 7/1/1962 PAGES : 17 SUBJECTS: - DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 4/4/63-7/11/63. Box
NUN O eI eT eee “Copy, OFZacopies © ‘FINAL REPORT = TASK FORCE VIETNAM daly 1, 1962 & Presidential Program (Initiated May 23, 1962) 1. Seek to increase GVN confidence in US by Vice-Presidential visit. Achieved. 26 tion. Continues: Our attempts contime >» but Diem's popular support has decreased. The January h, 1962, GVN-US Joint Communique spelled out a program: ‘aimed at providing every Vietnamese with a atake in thd outcome of the war. The communique ré- sulted from negotiations which began with Vice President Johnson's visit and the Staley Mission. Negotiations aimed at producing action which will increase popular support continue. between Diem and Noltang specifically : importance of developing democratic institutions. The GVYN has taken a number of actions following from. and related to this understanding which are calculated te increase popular support. These include the estab- lishment of Provincial Councils, a National Economic Council, a Constitutional Court, a national flood no lief organization (which included oppositionists), ' continuing purge of officiels charged with various abuses, an organization within the Presidency charged with the responsibility for collecting and acting on popular complaints, the continued toleration of at least a minimum of opposition activity (example: the opposition candidates in the 1961 Presidential elections are at large and have organized a Democratic Bloc; ane other oppositionist group has been permitted to set up the Front for National Unity which has publicly demanded a forum and legal status for opposition groups). - A wore vigorous civilian civic action program has. been set in motion, combining the personnel of the. former . SECRET
SECRET Qe former Youth, Information and Civic Action Ministries. U. S. officials have influenced this program through constant colitact and assistance to the information program and ‘to the civic action aspects of counterine surgency plans. gin negotiations looking towarB.bilateral arrangement with VN. Suspended: The Décenber u Memorandum of Understandin > Plus our onegoing joint programs constitu equate bilateral "arrangement" for realizing our objectives in VN. A ‘bilateral treaty would probably bring us into conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Accords, commit us irrevocably, and Diem has shown little interest in such a treaty since General Taylor's visit, and the increased fmeri¢an assistance which resulted. . Continues:. Vietnamese-Cambodian relations continue to be bad. In spite of ‘many US efforts to bring the two parties: to- gether, little progress has been registered. VN's stand- ing in world opinion -has probably improved as a result. of clearer international understanding of the nature of the ‘hostilitiea there. In contacts with other governments, the U. S. has consistently sought to present the facts of the Viet~- Nam situation. In December 1961, the US published the evidence linking the DRV with the VC and documenting DRV aggression against SVN in our report “A Threat to the Peace”, At our suggestion, President Diem on , 1962, sent a letter to all heads of Govern- ment and Chiefs of State outlining the facts of the _ DRV attack on his country. * The June 2 ICC Report: charging the DRV with a deliberate campaign aimed at . ‘the violent overthrow of ‘the GVN has been used by our diplomatic Missions to focus world attention on the. DRV attack, 5. Strengthen SECRET .
SECRET @3e - Se Strengthen border control arrangements with Cambodia. Continues: “68 Cooperate with GVN in 5 other governments ° Continues: Suspended: In spite of repeated efforts by the US, joint VNe Cambodian control has not been effected and incidents are frequent. This continuing friction and the absence of effective joint border controls has helped the VC. ng effective use of assistance from The British have sent a special advisory mission ta Viet- Nam under R. G. KE. Thompson. Im cooperation with the Thompson Mission, the US and the GYN have worked out the Delta Plan. The Australians have agree to send a mili- tary training mission which will be integrated into MAAG activities. The Koreans have sent a military survey mission, the Thais are being approached to send observers. We intend to approach New Zealand. Malaya has trained several hundred Vietnamese in counter-guerrilla opera- tions. The US is currently seeking to coordinate economic assistance to Viet-Nam by means of a special’ coordination group of donor nations. We are urging other countries t4 increase their assistance to VN, particularly in the form of commodity imports formerly financed by the US aid program, Over the past few years economic aid from countries other than the US has amounted to more than $108 million, including both grants and loans. Donor countries include Japan, France, Germany, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Gamada, China, and The Philippines. — ' Accomplished by the Taylor Mission. The present level of U.S. assistance, i.e. training and logistic support plus some limited operational forces, appears to be the most effective "mix" at this tims. 8, Sssess SECRET
{ if ed SECRET whe 8 Assess political implications of increasing GVN forces from 170,000 to 200,000. Achieved: The current strength level is over 197,000. 9. Request recommendations from Nolting to accomplish actions 1 and 2. | "1.103. Install, radar to obtain warning of Communist Loverflights. for intelli- Sichteved: Temporary installations were set up and operational ait - Danang in Oetober 1961. Permanent installations are under construction with a target date of. early Sprang 1963. prove e Achieved. 12. Inerease MAAG as necessary for 20, 000-man ‘ARYN increase. Achieved. Consider case for increase ARVN strength 170,000. Achieved: Current ARVN strength is 197,000. Target for the end of Fiscal Year 2964 3 is 225,000. Us. Provide MAP support for Civil Guard Force 68,000. Achieved. . 15. Expand SECRET
15. Expand MAAG responsibilities ‘to. include support and advice to Selfe Defense Corps .. achieved. 16. ‘Provide MAP support for Vietnamese Junk Force, including training of junk crews. ; Continues: See Action 5h. 17. Aocelerated Special Forces Training. Continues: Eleven Special Forces teams are engaged in training pro= grams in Viet=-Nam. 18, Collaborate with GVN dn usé of military, health, welfare and public works specialists for activities in villages. Continues:. With U.S. assistance, ARVN's Civic Action Program has improved steadily. However, this program still requires a great deal of effort to realize its full potential. 19, Stu ointly with GWN border control techniques. Continues: The use of defoliants, dogs, portable radar, invisible chemical markings and other devices and techniques are undergoing study and tests at the combat develop= ment test center in VN. See also Action 65. ' 90, Consider establishment in SEA of testing facilities for new technic eB against Conmunist aggression. ' Achieved: Combat test development centers have been established and are in operation in VN and Thailand. 2l. Full SECRET
LL. | SECRET 21. Full examination of size and composition forces required in case of commitmen VN Continuss: Contingency planning is under continual review. - 2 peseeiee to VN economic and fiscal experts to work out Achieved: The Staley Mission completed its work in June of 1961. Its plan was adopted as the Joint Action Plan (SEE Actions 3 through hh below). 23. Ck (AID) is authorized to undertake rural development - action programs. : Continues: The January i, 1962 Joint Commmnique outlined these programs. USOM/Saigon has mounted an impact crop protection Pa sotroyine rat destruction and. eradication of rice:destroying insects, which “wilt - directly benefit.5 70,000 families. A program’ for — Montagnard rel4 2.4 d.. resettlement is under ways. The International luntary Service under. contract to AID has been. expanded to 69 people. “ Civic action in connection with the two clear- and hold operations; >,plus the country-wide strategic hamlet program, - “is” being planned and supported jointly. This” bivic action effort includes agri- cultural credit: and‘extension, schools, and rural. medical programs “from “village dispensaries to ~~ provincial surgical facilities. 2h; 0 Undertake long g-range | economte develo] ment 2 Program a8 a means Continues: The GVN_ has ‘Announced - a ‘formal 5-year piaa. “the on-going U.Se. "AID: ‘program has contributed:and will continue, to. contribute. BL ‘cantly. to. the : long= . range : deve lopment of the. economic. infrastructure; > Anelucing. both n sgricultural Sevelopnent and . ce FG ndustrlali gation
to SECRET | “ ay Po industrialization. U.S. aid continues to make important contributions to education, medicine, and other social services. 25. Assess economic implications of an ARN force increase of. chieved. ' Continues: USIS has ‘worked closely with the cw to develop its information program. Accomplishments include the establishment of a radio net serving: the entire nation, production and distribution of films, and the development of rural newspapers. We are cur= rently negotiating for the establishment of joint branch USIS-VIS posts throughout the country. 2]. Country Team reeepeennation with Wy should compile_docuninted throughout the worid. Continues: The.US publication “A Threat to the Peace" and Under Secretary Ballis speech on Viet-Nan, pub= lished by the Department in June, brought the evidence of Communist aggression to the attention of an international audience. USIS in Saigon works with the Vietnamese authorities on a con=- tinuing basis to collect and ecress-file such information for use in media throughout the world, 28. In coordination with CIA and GWN, USIS will publicize unfavorable conditions in NW. Continues: Information which can be declassified is not plenti- ful, but USIS continues to cross-file stories on _ unfavorable conditions whenever available. 29. Development SECRET
296 Suspended: Security conditions make this type of project diffi-— cult. A US-financed center near My Tho is in operation, however, with IVS personnel (who have been fired on by the VC). Ten pilot agricultural stations are conducting tests and demonstration work in crop and livestock development. 30. Exploit ¢_rehabtiitetion of Te prisoners and broadcast their Stories to Commmist areas. Continues: The GYN does not have a well-defined rehabilita- tion program for VC prisoners. (See Action 68). It has been reluctant to make prisoners available for interviews. Interviews with refugees from Communist NVN have been made and. broadcast, howe Sverre. Cancelled: The fair was called off. 32. Covert action to be carried forward coordinated at appropriate levels. ' Continues, 336 President reserves jude ent _on levels of funding proposed, _. No Task Force. “action re ured. B. Joint Action Program (Staley Report) 34. Provide equipment and assistance in training for en increase in To increase effectiveness of increase, armed forces from 170,000 to 200,000. . | mutually SECRET
( _ SECRET Jeo matually agreed geographically phased plea, understanding on traihing and use of 30,000 additional men, and regulation of rate of increase for most effi- cient absorption should be accomplished, Contimes: The force level now stands at 197,000. We haves encountered difficulties in setting up and imple- menting a geographically phased plan. The Delta plan meets this requirement, but we are not sure that it will be completely implemented, — Achieved: Force levels now stand at 197, 000. The ultimate target is 225,000 by the end of FY 6h. On the Self-Defense Corps and the Civil Guard see Action 55. Continues : ‘The commodity. import target: for FY 62 was set at “$135 million. The Vietnamese economy has been able to absorb only $110 million. Other external resources, i.€. equipment for economic and mili- tary projects, have been provided as needed. 37. VN should be strongly urged to undertake generation of plasters by the means spelled out ‘in Joint Action “Continues: The GUN instituted fiscal reforms, including what amounted to a devaluation, in January 1962. These reforms are a direct result of U.S. urgings. Internal tax receipts have increased over 1961. Piaster revenue remains inadequate, however, to. cover counterinsurgency needs. The GVN has been unwilling to use deficit financing to meet this shortfall and has requegted & cash grant from US. The problem is under negotiation. 38. Strongly
: StCRET _ a ne @10- 38, Strongly urge GVN_ undertake tax reform and adopt and realistic rate of exchange. Continues; Although the January 1962 fiscal reforms represent considerable progress, the GYN still has a mltiple exchange rate which is set too high. Tax collec- tions should also be improved. Continues: GVN has abided by the agreed criteria for imports in spite of shortfalls in the commodity import program. The January reforms raised the effective pilaster rate but at the appropriate time it should be raised further. Continues: The GVN has recently announced a five-year plan, but this plan is more.im the nature of a catalogue of projects than an integrated economic plan. Man- power planning is still very haphazard. .One step forward: doctors are subject to the draft and medical talent will presumably be allocated to the most urgent needs. Continues: Our joint effort has markedly improved Vietnamese morale, SECRET
Cc, ' SECRET ae f alle . morale. Diem has been understandably concerned that the extent of U.S. assistance may make the GVN appear to be the creuture of the U.S. 43. E Parallel committees should be given maximum delegation of authority. Suspended: Parallel committees have been discarded in favor of direct: contact and negotiation beteen the. action pedple on. both sides at each level. Contimess | TR/W provided the White House with regular Status Reports, the NSC has provided an observer on TF/VN, and the Director of the Task Force appears bi-weekly at meetings of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency). Actions under NSAM 10), hS. preparations for against SVN. Achieved: "A Threat to the Peace” was published in December 1961. s_paper on DRV aggression 46, Achieved: The ICC report of June 2, 1962 confirms the U.S. position, i.e. the hostilities in VN are caused, directed, planned and led by the IRV. ; Suspended: After studying matter several times it was con- cluded that in present circumstances presentation to UN would result in more complications than gains. 48. Introduce SECRET
SECRET L8. Achieved. See Action 53. | " Sagpanidad Due to possible effects on Lao negotiations. Achieved: Gereral Taylor went to Viet-Nam in October 1961. 51. | aor reat agrees Continues. D. &ctions under NSAM 111 52. Provide increased airlift to GUN forces. | Continues: The Be S.-provided airlift has sharply increased | ARVN mobility and reduced reaction time. Perhaps more than other factors, it has enabled the GUN tn to take the offensive and upset the VC timetable. con There are now 80 U.S.-manned helicopters, 20 other | 4 (U-1A), and 21 C-123's im Viet-Nam. In addition, | 32 C-123's based at Clark are available for . operations in Viet-Nam. . Continue g. Operation Farngate (including 8 1-28'8, ‘four C-h7's ee ‘and four Be26's) now provides instruction in and . . execution SECRET
( SECRET o13- execution of ailr-ground support. Results have been good, with evidence that many VC attacks and bases have been disrupted by air action. Equipment and personnel have also been provided for air reconnais- sance and photography and for special intelligence. Continues: A joint Junk Patrol has been organized with the Vietnamese Navy and elements of the Seventh Fleet to cut infiltration from North Viet-Nam, Construce tion is underway to develop a Junk Force of 28 Divisions (20 junks per Division). Four Junk Divi- sions are now operational. Three Junk Force traine ing centers are operating, and recruitment of Vietnamese fishermen is satisfactory. The U. S. has provided the GVN with 713 craft in all. These include 693 boats for inland water- way patrol and to increase ARVN mobility in the delta, 9 harbor support and logistics type vessels, and 11 vessels with off-shore and major river capa- bility. _ARWN of static 55. Train and equip 00 and SNC with objective relieving missions. —_ _ Ce . Continues: Training of the Civil Guard by MAAG began January 1961 at a single training center. At MAAG's urging, the training was speeded up by establishing four other centers and reducing the training period from 2h to 12 weeks. By mid-June, 128 companies were trained, 51 were in training at the centers, and 21 addi tional were in training on-the-spot under MAAG contact training teams, The target for FY 62 is 372 trained companies. By the end of FY 64, total strength will be 90,000. Current strength, trained and untrained, is 75,000. FY 63 strength is set for 78,950 and FY él, 80,000. 566 Provide personnel and equipment to improve intelligence system from provincial level upward. SECRET
Continues: 19) U.S. military intelligence personnel are in Viet-Nam working at all levelg to improve the GVN intelligence capability, CIA has regional intelli- gence advisors in place’ and works closely with the Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) at the national level. CIO has assumed unified national intelligence responsibilities, and with U.S. advice, is reorganizing itself. . 576 Provide new terms reference ganization and additional personnel Continues: A military assistance command under General Harkins was , . @stablished in February 1962 to direct our increased operational and training activities in Viet-Nam. U.S. military personnel in Viet-Nam have been increased to 9,069 to carry out our increased responsibilities. 58. Provide increased economic aid for flood relief and to sy counterinsurgency program. Continues: Emergency food relief assistance from the U.S. included medicaments and PL 80 foodstuffs. Major items in our increased economic aid in support of counterin- surgency to date include: funds and equipment for. two clear-and-hold operations now in progress (Hai Yen and Binh Minh or Sunrise), funds and equipmsnt for Montagnard refugee relief and resettlement; the estab- lishment of a special stockpile of supplies and equip- ment for fast servicing of rural counterinsurgency programs (particularly the strategic hamlet program); funds and equipment for 25 new surgical suites (which will treat battle caualties) to be set up in provin- cial hospitals; new strategic road construction and repair of bridges and roads sabotaged by the VC; and the rapid development of commmnications systems, in particular a broadcasting net and the village radio program which now has installed 670 of a projected 2500 two-way radios. flood relief, e GVN to request international or multilateral assistance for Suspended: Assistance was received from Malaya and Australia. 60. Provide SECRET
o15~ ‘60. Provide administrators and advisors for the GYN as agreed by ¢ two government Ss Continues: The. GVN has not- yet formally requested advisers. MAAG advisors are,operating im all provinces, 61. Provide personnel for Joint provincial survey 3 ‘Continues: Three joint provincial surveys were completed by a formal joint US-GVN team. Joint intelligence sur- veys of all provinces were made by CIA. Formal joint surveys have been abandoned, since it is found that the information can best be obtained by continuing _ local contacts. All agencies continue to collect _ the required information in cooperation with the GVN. 62. SYN. action to. place nation on war footings including measures to tap Continues: See Action 2, In addition to the measures noted under Action 2, the GVN has reactivated its National Internal Security Council, which Diem promised he would use as a war cabinet, created an Inter-Ministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee under Ngo dinh Nhu, provided military training for civil servants and women, and in Central Viet-Nam organized a promising political-military irreg- ular force to operate in the hamlets. Little or no genuine effort has been made to get the support of . opposition cliques or to realize the potential of the religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. A great deal of effort has gone into programs designed to give the rwral population a stake in the war, The war will be won or lost in the provinces, 636 Vitalization of ap riate > governmental wartime agencies. Continues: An acute shortage of skilled administrators plus the teme- permental reluctance of Diem to delegate authority (a reluctance understandably reinforced by the real dangers of subversion or another coup attempt) have made progress on this action slow. The National Internal Security Council has apparently met only . Five SECRET
el6e . five times since its inception in January and the Strategic Hamlet Committee is little more than an extension of Nhu. Progress has been registered in cutting red tape and increasing efficiency. Best results will probably be achieved by ad hoc arrange- ments and continued steady but patient pressure from the U.S. rather than by insistance on dramatic struce tural changes in the OWN. ble Continues: Considerable progress registered on this item. With U.S. assistance, ARVN has cut its reaction . time and markedly improved its mobility. A Field Command, a Joint US~GYN Operations Center, a Joint General Staff and a Tactical Air Command, have been organized and are operating. U.S. advisors have been accepted and are operating effectively with all units, with the Provice Chiefs, and in the intelligence organizations. The GVN has in- creased pay and benefits for the Civil Guard and the lower ranks of ARVN. The weakest link in the GWN military is still ite citizen defense forces, the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, but as noted in Action 55, this problem is being rapidly. ‘solved, E; December  Diem-Nolting Memorandum of Agreement. 7 be added from the Diem-Nolting agreement. 65. Border Ranger Force. Contimes: Ten cohmpanies of ARVN Rangers and li companies of Montagnard Rangers were made available for the Border: Ranger Force on March 20. However, the old MAAG border control plan has not beem implemented because high ARVN officers feel it is unrealistic, - Plans and concepts for border control are under study by both RVNAF and their U.S. advisors, The forces presently engaged in border control total about 7,000 in 88 posts. 66. Develop SECRET
co oe ae “eh J= 66. Continues: Increased activity by ¢ Civic Action cadre plus frequent trips to rural areas by the President, National Assembly Deputies, and Cabinet Ministers have helped. The President has been unwilling to undertake regular "fireside chats." The basic problem is a change in attitude by District. and Provincial officials, This is well understood at the top, but changing atti- tudes is slow work. ‘67.6 Continues: No non-Commnist prisoners of note have been brought — to trial. The principal civilian leaders of the November 1960 coup are still being held without trial in spite of reports that Diem intends to re- lease then. Continues: The GYN has developed a nationwide plan approved a by Thuan and General Ty, but it has not yet been coordinated with all Ministries. Surrender leaf- lets and rewards have been used locally in a number of areas with varying success. Although it seems to have great promise, the GVN has not yet really given this tactic a trial. SECRET —