(tos-for03-t01%a) _ PROCESSING . . ACTION SE TEETSS Pe: teste a cons ACCOM PLISHED : _| Chief, Special Affairs Staff |» a # — — ps ONLY QUALIFIED. at g 8 HEADQUARTERS DESK ne a 4 a GAN JUDGE INDEXING kc ee one ae. fi/ fp La Chief of Station, JMWAVE “AK @) | «cTQperational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK 3 __Project AMTRUNK Operational Review 8 ACTION REQUIRED.. PRIORITY ACTION: .Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK, — .* l. .Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress ‘report on the AMTRUNK team: for the period of 4 through 31 March. . Station views on the operation are summarized below. '2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak- nesses: - . WV) DRED . A. - The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KWBARK and to be workin "with" KUBARK now only because there Was no other alternative it fhey were to accomplish their mission, in other Words, these agents ‘will cooperate with KUBARK only When 1t is to| their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to devélop, control. would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/22.. Would bave no = lesitation “Selling out" the operation to any one of the major re- Tug pa ical p at he felt it advantageous to t ugee po cal groups at any time do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to'collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es- cambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He NSib2Vves bat NSLS, Leceivi adteption because of his ZRM TAL connections, and_ ate to.go. behind KUBARK's back to f . Ar: ig authority..if the gperation ofr KUBARK handling . nd ODACT y of the ‘B progress td his liking. Since A TRUNK/1, accprding to AMCAPE/1,"masterminded" this operatibn in the first place, ift may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS Iwill withhold nothing] from AMTRUNKY1. DATE DISPATCHED ore) at , “3 . sad. ‘ app of PM ~ DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-8381 ' | HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER RETURN To CIA 7 _ * Background Use Only ; ae Do Not Reproduce
14-00000 FORM -f 5-60 140 et ope, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, _ AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on Hees individual will be present. SHAISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER _CQNTINUATION OF - “DISPATCH =” sis Tan | UFGA - 8381 B. This ‘operation has 2 very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by. 6 only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the Gus paps “The latter could prove to be mos t Castro's ‘hands. L Au izusl C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agent: AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not, Satisfactorily resolve the que ‘ding information o “an unknown nature from his KUBARK con- tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 i the Cuban term for a. homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise .to the question whether AMICE/14, with a _ Possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made ' such an ‘approach.to AMTRUNK/3. D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop. E. The Phase “L landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently patrolled by sea. RABEL Thine “Operation, ¢ y of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same 3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Tyree of the ‘four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a number Of Tei y eet Saeed Sone ee the inside whom they ex- pect to be able to .cail on for assistance. Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging Ton to two years, this is frequently. the case in this type of operat on The objective of the operation is worthwhile. 4, Based o 1 the a ,ttached operatia disadvan ages ow ned BPOVE da and the advantages AVE quarters’ decision is to continue with the operation at this time, | operational plars for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated. . END OF MESSAGE | ) PN CLASSIFICATION SE CRE T 53a . USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
14-00000 at ad “2 7 4 a a. ‘Ragoved from Progest “/ 7; ~6- §- a | A e f com SONS /9 t4C/y 6 . @g Classificasd HBO 8-44 . oem 7 Pose: “Phe project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow th 31 March 1963 mo he ‘PROJECT ANTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW oo STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH, aaa earner entre an a nt . The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, ‘and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key.. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N., PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine. methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica- tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included - group discussion and participation in a series of ‘appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two.week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational dis- cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, ‘both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, ‘debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin: out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass -and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under dis- cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for . alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The re- sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted’ as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the _ AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE.
14-00000 Iii, A secondary and subordinate ~ e climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is .exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the. project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial’ phases, which - will.be compartmented from each other. lane One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and e north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which “they infiltrated. ee menace E of. Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise_go into | Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are’ discussed in detail in following para- make initial contacts among certain select high level militar figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de~ ‘veloped. . PHASE I. A. AMTRUNK Personnel 0% ree ras is a (21 )year old Cuban who’ is mature for his years, nh some degree experienced in clandestine opera- tions. He attended CC Catholic Social) finiversity in Havana for _two years, majoring in Social Studies’. Prior to Fidel's takeover. A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasiond great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued gi this work through 1961 and finally atalntellihe n 1962, Although A/2_ does not consider Vie ir WD Januar y, . aad Bi he has been cooperative roughout raining. He.is a pensive individual who displays good - judgenent. His present attitude ‘towards KUBARK appears to be one ‘of “wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is con- scientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission. + of ' o° os ee ra meee . a . + . . . , . 4 ‘ * salt ade eee tae PORTE Se ese POTTS 8 hari | em pene care Re
14-00000 0 : ‘role in this operation: is comparatively mindér and he appears 8 ~ 3 ~ a * Qi] year, old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, ig ure 2nd impulsive On the other hand he is te anor wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista.. In late 1960 he sided with the counter- revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the, ituation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami ih August )1962, While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short Fortunately his Willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, problems in the future TASKS Conduct black infiltration landing at ‘Punta La Jijira Cans 3785 5 I) and establish contact with t farm manager at /3's father's) farm in the see 3885 IIL, Coords 993614 108 2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana, ; a 3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his (father ' s far \and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine “communications. Having completed this he would then be ex- filtrated at Punta Jijira. 4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts. 5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army. 6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes- tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.. a Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 IL).
14-00000 a C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS 1. The tentative date Fon the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira_ is 18 May’ 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to (A73's father's] farm one kilometer from the coast . and from theré A/2 will be provided with transportation to go ', -to’Guanabo or Havana. . 2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after. his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite, 3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels _that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference, 4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his ‘contacts., . . D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA cre EEN CUBA 1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and (i 24 A -two men will work their way to aumfarm owned jointly by/A/3's father and | located kiloneted from the “point of infiltra> contact with sthe manager of the farm named is(35 to 40)¥ears of age, ' is married and ary school education. He has oe of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon oO to make the following contacts in order to obtain . transportation to Guanabo or Havana: who _ lives a“row kilometers away in Sie wns a small farm and a os tcher shop )in the ar nd also owns a truck, He is 08 [37 to 4 years of age, married with six or seven children, He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter- revolutionary activities. fC: _d ¢ ; b. Iz is nanccecaful” in getting truck ne he wil ni act | ho 9 arm next " 66 to @/3's father 'sjtarm. He i 50) ears old, married, ‘ no children, wife's name is He was thef{mayor of > Santa Cruz del Norte}in 195 wns a jeep, Oo roe) MEER A ER ue utes INS ROAR ANGE
14-00000 “Mb sf, Una d SERRE ernseeemsteetnenaenetntes ~ as + em ete ht eg SSFP SPEEA ataseteneneee ee eset emeere meek werent" eee , * MprENOde ENS eS RAAT TE . to be safehoused in Havana. 2. ¢, Another contact of A/3 is | age 21, ‘single, 8th grade education. —ne—proviued t in the form of food and safehousing tq underground workers in the past. Higghome address is (Corojo #1, Cotorro, Joo Havana. He owns (butcher) shop in the Cotorro) section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 ifthe needs The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2. ob. 08. " Be | 25) years of age, born in Havana. A/2 First met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained cor~ respondence with her, She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car. 96, 00 A, ‘be | | age 55) bor in bavana. He is physiciagjwho Lives and practices/medicine) in Havana .0 as helped A/2 in underground activi- ties previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in' . New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months oB( ‘ment and two cars and has previou  A/2 has maiptained correspondence with “ 9) c3) ago. Subject was a member of the. Partido Pueblo Cubano an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of (medicine]ds at the University, of Havana up. until 1961 ~ ‘signed. s also a close griend of o6 a) or egabout (50) born in Cienfuegos, a ormer (senator i554) as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba.| Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party dnd claime KUBARK con- fidante during Castro's takeover. has an apart- dg A/2 in under- ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The 0 husband of this daughter, however, works for (che Guevara] o 06 . age about 35 ,) born in Havana, single. d Subject is an[English teacher who runs a small private toring] school in (Englishy n Havana. She was A/2's glish teacher]and offered support to the underground. lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife. ' BBC RET
14-00000 Ma ae saceeoe he seteanndaacanlaemidetiptindieR NO BE SAT MY a wed | . ane ee °.| age(23-24 J born in Havana, single, ae 4} mo eased. ~She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from sss to 1960] She became @ close gxiend of A/2 during Their student days in- Havana.o’She has no record of underground work. She lives in Gueneee Beach) during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at og Guanabo Beach}in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary 3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected wate. the Castro Regime. . co a OO a. age Gate 30s early 40S) married. Subject hol 6 ran of (Captaimjin the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty.°°He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he,still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claink as been working in a limited fashion against Fi was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups © rimary interest has been trying to or- ganize bl gs within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feel } avery discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organi of the G-2, A/2 claims to be a close friend of nd Gseats him completely. ' A/2 saw and talked t a 0%\1962)prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a reruged! . : al ro) age early (40s ,) served in the . Army)during World War II. Accdrding to A/2, 6% od(u:s . of was made commander of the 6th Military District’) “Following the disappearance of oO S removed from the post and pre- rmy pension as well as royalties perty confiscated by the government. He said Ctarted working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a timehe was the(military os secretary of the MRP and became quite involved i Plotting against Fidel ofA/2 stated that it was rumored at the time that was working for the t he was also a K agent. Eventually na d on a G-2 suspect list, but according : Ss able to evade detection. Subject has good Connections within the Rebel Army and re- -volutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as_a potential operational .- role in spite of. conflicting reports which mention Of aS an opportunist. o {.
14-00000 foe, A/2 may also attempt to contact ‘the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make. contact.” 7 o6 . of | age Gate 30s early 40s ,] married, | ‘fo “member oF the Partido Pueblo Cubano.” He ‘fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as (head of Jo ‘one of the military zones within Havana province, . Eventually phe was given gesser assignments and A/2 thinks he® king Gn INRA) in Oriente Province. He clains [assis ed his underground group . during. 19 y supplying trucks for transporting ; weapons and materials, . E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS oa, Cover | | . A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. ‘Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional ‘items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc, _ The two men will also be outfitted with disguises. 2. Communications Primary communications will be established through an SW | system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited .assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre- arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via . telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency. a F, OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION AT Ct TTS ESSEC APE eran nroe es 1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. .In addition boat patrols are vee * .known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. “Once: infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before heir first contact. However, A/3 is leary of Staying at his 4 ther's farm) for any length of time and he does not want his zt (father}to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the “farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the See am 2ands . This presents the . problem of what to doywith*A/3v On approach is to take A/3 PW VAN RAEN ote ty euniaenepuslantinesoinsay rer od
14-00000 vette _ rebuttal to these remarks is that. ‘the past and when the chips wer own he continued to aid him td Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him, . This, however, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi- ‘ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under- take a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 | -has.a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi- ness competently, Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around his(father's farm]with maritime reception capabilities. z 2. . A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient -numbe:; of supporting assets tg ide for his®csafety while in Havana. However, he has not see fan for over a year. In addition both men are presen yo f the Cuban Army organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports o con- flict with A/2's evaluation o his man. While théré is no evidence to verify that lis pro-regime, there has. been a recent report on him from EO/3 which Claims| is an opportunist who might work for th pbidde ° s . S assisted him i in his underground ren of( ‘pnt still leaves a question mark next to the worth off hich unfortunately can only be resolved by direct. contaeé etween him and A/2. There are other security implications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se- curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip was in thedfing. A/2 has written several other letters not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres- neediest the other hand talked quite freely about hi: ¢ a C -On an Operation that would take them first to Miami and thee to Cuba. Once there they would go to his father farm )a d_ begi o make contacts. A/3 also stated ‘that a man named ould be one of their con- tacts. This loose aed eediouls A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi- date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated . three -days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will gain, his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he presents, — ef
14-00000 pod. Oo “> 1 3. - The above evaluation stresses the operational and security , weeknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re~ cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime ' operations. at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results ‘which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching. in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained. IV. PHASE 11 A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL . nnn 1. AMICE/27, senior member of th oup is a 41 year old DEnGIEN at licen ee Ty hia erese family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself - graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. ‘Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities, In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under- Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground ‘activities. had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. * He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti- vated. He has some experience in: counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to SS res ne amg take offense, Hei frank to state that he has a low opinion. tng Tor the oo ee ea oP ERE osent regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre- sents a difficult handling problem. 2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a ad Taw graduate of the University of Havana, He has been in- _ ‘volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities, © Subject arrived. by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME .He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has’ 1,a very highly developed security consciousness, developed \} from his counter-revolutionary experiences, From January to July 1961 he made four} efiltration/exfiltration ‘trips to and from Cuba knowledge of .the nortif m, and has an excellent . S,area. He is easy to work G-G- Ee OY
14-00000 w with and has evidenced “hittle of the hostilities or anti- - KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27 . . on . oO . : 6(e; -AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a [49 Jyear old. fisherman from the O0[Ca ‘ rdenasjarea who took refuge~in PBPRIME in February 1963, He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will _be used as a maritime guide. — B. TASKS | 1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil _ ‘operations, -- ' 2,.- Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for trans- portation into Havana, ! 3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support. 4, Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-. tration and future infiltrations. — 5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures, , 6... Establish internal and external communications. 7.. Exfiltrate from Phase II. C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, It ig_te ely pDlannec 4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 pril, Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the e KeyS area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they. will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Play i WOES enki hAS.time with these contacts for 3 second in beibobd Otte rtather Dart of May at which time AMICE, » and AMICE/14 will again go in Cinco Leguas and expect to be ‘passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV),
te Sererereray eset bret Ste tit: Se Sar mReTLy cP " _Leguas.on the mainland. Key contacts here ar . [fact related to Tango, above) and Pd OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA fC TE v= ll = o 1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. |This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti- Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used revjously for infils and exfils.,. One is."Tango"' 06.0% - Tango is a brother of =307338)) Git City. of Cardenas. _Contact al o6 Gate ‘whom-A/14 wanted to usé as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere\ The other contact is the owner of the(Salina (salt drying beds)} 4 A/14 has not yet been able to. recall this individual's name © 2, Finca Casualidad, This area is directly south of Cinco or whom have. small farms in the area, a” 3. Town of Marti. ‘Contact here ig"Perige". LNU. Subject is about 50.years old, is employed byLINRA] and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for epesetsons purposes. Q |: owner of the Marino restaurant, Subject Isa close friend of A/14 who assisted im previdusly with transportation for maritime . ‘receptions , ould be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Ow. . ' . oo of Matanzas, A-14 has a friend here naned __é ho also ssigted A/14 in underground activities in 08 ~ wubject is|60/0years old, married, and is_a forma {of public works) in i Subject has a son (Carlos) ow. ‘in New York City dC will be contacted for transpor- tation to Havana. wns a Car. . . 6 . 6. Varadero. "Fifo"| _pims a car and was formerly a . close friend of A/14, ubject was formerly active in the Af undergroundand mi eee by A/14 in the event he could not _usel 01 fér obtaining transportation. aG.& other 0 the communis |but is reported to be anti=communist himselT. 7. Havana " ; . Q a. | | Subject is single and lives _ with “her mother. (Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mis- . 4 tress) andic ouse keeper. Subject is 0b oi {] sister of a (Commandante inthe Navy } ‘| swho, according to ,; Was at one ‘time( chief of naval ob operations «) His present assignment or Iocation is ‘ unknown.
14-00000 di. b. gis a’close friend of A714 ‘an (7: fife {Can be used for operational support, a car, and safe ing. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under but no longer in army. A/14 believes he 1s noW an adminstrator of some type of tndus.try in Havana. and e keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work. dd, | Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing.. Subject has a ore is married, no children, is in his sixties. fed | To be recruited by “A/14 as his prin- ana. Subjec 14 previously worked if togethes in .the underground. sauain in the Sierra re f with Castro and also fought i ~- He resigned from mo . i the army in February, 1959, although he has maintained many a? contacts within the army. Was one time active in t i -° 4 Movim tico Martiano and was a friend off ——, was shot by Castro in Pinar dé io. a Subject came RIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain 7 ‘arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into « Cuba without his absence having been known to the authori- ties. Was responsible for. safehousekeeping for nearly one month when authorities were ‘searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with y letter ‘ about two months ago, a a Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal age Would be used for operational in- telligence and spotting among disaffected ficers,. Would be kept entirely compartmented fron] 06 Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a ro) eu complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27. and A/14, ‘both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist] and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961" ‘to join in an overthrow of.the government. ee SECRET . Co. aft: PO Cne ect t ies ord
14-00000 q 7 g. Target personalities who are Suspected of being .dis-~ 7 - ' y affected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather fo ' ‘information in Havana are as follows: _l. Comandante "Macho" Parra 2, Cdte. Oscar Guerra 3. " Jose Pinares . 4. Capt. FNU Lawton 5. " Manuel: Avila 6. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos 7. " Pedro Miret 8.. Capt. Juan Nuiry 9. Cmdte, Rafael Suarez More 10. Capt, Fernando Fernandez Superville | ll. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos . co 12. Capt. Sandy Olivares oan ; , _ 13, °% Jose Fernandez Alvarez ' These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and SO vse Sees era ee In a majority of cases to indicate the subjects f Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime, .. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14, RI files " were negative on Avila and Lawton, » 3 e) Meg og @ & eed . ) a) hb Tp o § © ct et O oO o.. emf S et a @ QO 9 a oO io) a“ E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS COVER _AND COMMUNICATIONS AMICE/27 and. AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay ‘in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will Plan to train at least two and ‘possible three agents in Havana.in SW, prior to their own \exfiltration. In addition, it is Planned to train A/27 and »A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans ‘will have been laid On with the agents. In the event that a Change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary, '. an OWVL message could be sent to the agents, Any urgent and immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents during their short Stay in Havana would be on a prearranged open code system by commercial telegram. Such a System will be worked out to cover several possible contingencies, In- and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead 1. aie LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 lusive. Although it is e opinion of both ti the training personnel who have been in close contact with ese individuals that both agents are
14-00000 hithly - ‘motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point “will remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that A/27 would veruse a second LCFLUTTER. examination if asked. “Although he says that he did not otis se tee Ls of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in . very general terms with two individuals whom he named at the time of the LCFLUTTER test. One of these * Shall Sl ae errezyMen 2 kG Se Adeb AEABS GODS Z Tie same Gousprernn * - VI, 3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the . past two years. Although it is difficult-to assess how well he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks, ‘lt is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts might be considered really close. .AMICE/14 has been out of direct touch with his operational contacts since July ‘1961, 4 The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent upen having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/'4 as guide. 5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking. Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of . ‘withholding support to the operation. Control however will remain tenuous at best and A/27. will continue to be a dif-~ ficult handling problem. 6. On the. positive side of “the ledger is the calibre of the -agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly ' motivated. Both agents have experience n adestine opera- erece particularly A/14 who has made a “number of previous Clandestine entries and exits and has many operational con- tacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in training. — FUTURE PLANS . . Duringthe week of 1 through 6 April, “the team will receive maritime instruction, During the week 8 through 13 April, they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, dis- guise training, and further operational planning sessions. ‘COMMITMENTS the following principle, which he from ODYOKE was enunciated during his ODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban
14-00000 government which is anti-Communist and which operates on - at democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a ; w' | government of its own choice upon Cuba"... A/27 has made a au “ee ¥ «Ay big point of. ‘discussing this "commitment" . It is apparent oe .that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his Wye yy {1 followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links ane i / Batista and. KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batis- ft aoe / tianos in a post-Castro government. geo” 2. received a plan’ with funds, training 1 ° ibs ah “operational and technical assistance “but would leave | contro 2 operation. entirely in their hands. In other wc tne Lt wah En QDXOKE or KUBARK ‘in an On this i in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition" ' to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful | coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that. these individual: af will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime. ‘This means recognition of an individual's participation in We | the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific . . government formed by the conspirators themselves. fe 3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claimS to have discussed : 4, ‘Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed i several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the com- mitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as commitments. 5. a | been that if. ' while on the f assisted for of time" i PEGGINS acctinea” to state what that time would — : financial assistance would be involved. { 4 a OM ay eines Ie, * 6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between \ | PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no com- . ‘mitment will be made at this time to support any internal lu t group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives Wd -*\-land that this extends specifically to no promise to support vt active sabotage with demolitions. jee. ~ a. BA Sa FM te amr ew i ra Theor is acl ta tS