AGENCY : JFK Assassination System Identification Form Agency Information Date: 4/28/201 HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10245 RECORD SERIES: CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION ~ AGENCY FILENUMBER: 63-05-02 Document Information ORIGINATOR: HSCA FROM: BAGLEY, TENNENT TO: Peleased under the John TITLE: Eennedy WSsassination Records Ollection Act of 1992 (44 050 2107 Note!. DATE: 09/15/1978 ase#: NW 53060 Date: PAGES: 169 pe—O5—2017 SUBJECTS : i BAGLEY, TENNENT - CIA, FILES OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD NOSENKO, YURI KGB DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT CLASSIFICATION: — Unclassified RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B 0 CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 36 a v9.1 HW 53080 DocId:32273600 Page 1
25a Avenue Ge 1l'Orée - Bte. 10 1050 S8russels, 3elgium Telerhone: 649-7221 October 11, 1978 “Mr. G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director Select Committee on Assassinations © House of Representatives . Washington, D. C. Dear Mr. Blakey, I have read. the transcript of the testimony of the CIA's representative, Mr. John L. Hart, before your Committee on September 15, 1978. As the former deputy chief of the CIA's Seviet Bloc Division, so prominently and so disparagingly featured in chat testimony, I may be able to help the Committee to judge CIA's. investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union, as reported by Yuri Nosenko. Specifically, I can correct certain misleading impressions left by Mr. Hart. I would call to your attention at least twenty errors, fifteen misleading statements, and ten important omissions in nis test mony, many of chem pertinent to your task and, together, distorting the entire picture. . Having been publicly dishonored by unfounded statements before your Committee, I ask for the courtesy of an opportunity to come before the Committee, publicly if you are to hold more public hearings, to answer not only for myself but also : for the Central Intelligence Agency, which has misrepresented its own performance. | I mention. below a few of the points of error and distortion, leaving many others to be discussed in person with the Committee. My comments refer to .. the line numbers in the draft transcript of Mr. Hart's testimony, and are keyed te the Committee's twofold purpose as vou defined it of evaluating the per oro mance of the Agency and of weighing the eredibili © of Mr. Nosenko. . For clarity I have subdivided these as follows: 1) Effectiveness of CIA's performance: — a) in getting the facts about Oswald from Nesenko, _-b) in investigating these facts. 2) Credibility: a) of Mr. Nosenko's statements about Oswald, b) of Mr. Mosenko as a source. HW 53060 Doclda:32273600 Page 3
-2- After discussing briefly each of these points, I will make, below, a few general comments on the CIA testimony, and will address myself to the matter of Nosenko's treatment. CIA's verformance in qetting the facts frem Nosenko The Committee Staff Report describes accurately the CIA's performance in this particular aspect of its responsibility. Referring to the Agency's ques- tioning of Nosenko on July 3 and July 27, 1964, it ‘Says on page 7 that the CIA's questions “were detailed and specific about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. The questions were chronological and an attempt was made to touch all aspects of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union." Moreover, CIA gave Nosenko a transcript of his own remarks so he could add anything more he knew er correct any errors. (Staff Report; pages 8-9) Mr. Hart's confusing testimony had the effect of changing the Committee's appraisal. Not only givine the Agency a “zero” rating on all aspects of this case, he stated flatly that "There was no effort being made to get at more into Im.ation he might have.” (lines 2848-9) He thus led Mr. Fithian to suggest that the CIA had not even taken "the logical first step" of getting Nosenko's information (3622-8) and led the Chairman to conclude that no investigation of Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko had been made. (4095-8) In this Mr. Hart concurred. (4100) In fact, CIA got from Noesenko all he had to sav. about Oswald. CIA's reports contained no less than these of the FBI, who questioned Nosenko as long as they thought they needed to. Your Committee seems ‘to have been satisfied that in its 21 to 24 hours with Nosenko it, too, had got everything he had to sav. That added only one new fact, about the KGB's voluminous surveillance reports on Oswald, which contradicted Nosenko's earlier reports and, as the Staff Report notes, in turn contradicted another aspect of Nosenko's story: that the KGB didn't watch. @ Oswald enough to learn of his courtship ot Marina. One wonders, therefore, whether Mr. dart would give your Committee a similar "dismal" or “zero” rating. In fact, of course, there was nothing more to be got trom Nosenko. = there had been, CIA would have gone doggedly after it, just as the FBI and your Committee would have. Your Staff Report said that Nosenko "recited" the same story in each of his © MW 53080 Docla:32977¢00° PAGSGLONS With the Committee. The word is apt:
-j- Nosenko had “recited” that story before, to CIA and FBI, each of whom questioned him carefully and systematically about it. It is difficult, then, to accept the new judgment @ that CIA's performance on this aspect deserved a "zero." It could only be a result ef confusion engendered by Mr. Hart. CIA's performance in investicqating Nosenko's reports on Oswald By alleging general prejudice and misunderstanding on the part of CIA personnel handling this case, Mr. Hart confused the Committee on the specific question ef CIA's investigation of Nosenko's inrdérmation. When Mr. Pithian asked specifically whether the CIA had made any attempt to verify Nosenko's iniforma- tion on Oswald's KGB contacts, Mr. Hart replied ves, but then interjected an irrelevant statement about a "climate" of “sick think"! his aim was presumably ‘*o leave the impression that even if another KGS man had confirmed Nosenko's statements on Oswald, these dismal CIA people wouldn't have believed him. (3666) Later Mr. dart backed off even this degree of appro- bation, hinting that maybe, after all, CIA didn't investigate at all: "No such file (showing investi- gation via other defectors) came to my attention." (4177) But Mr. Hart knew very well that no other defectors xnew about Oswald's connections with the XGB. i The truth lies in the Warren Commission repert, cited in lines 4146-9, that CIA just didn't have other sources in the KGB or elsewhere in the USSR in a position to check Nosenko's story. This is not quite the same thing as saying, as the Chairman did, that “we now know that the CIA did not investigate what Nosenko did tell them about Oswald in Russia." (4166) The confusion stems from Mr. Hart's testimony. If CIA's failure to have on tap another soy in she KGB who knew about the Oswald case constitutes "dismal" performance, then that should be so stated.  ] The record’as it stands, at least in the transcript, . Casts an unjustified slur on CIA's performance in this particular aspect of its task. By the way, the coincidence that the CIA had even one KGB source on Oswald in Russia is worth the Committee's notice. Of the many thousands of KGS + ‘ - . - Defectors knowledgeable of internal USSR procecurss | . ontrols were queried by CIA concerning the whole ; HW 93080 pocta: 32273800 _Fsue =F wald in the USSR. and the results were reported.
HW 53080 ~4-~ people throughout the world, CIA had secret relations with only one, and this one turned out to have participated directly in the Oswald case. Not only once, but on two separate occasions: when Oswald came to Russia in 1959 and again after the assassi- mation when the Kremlin leadership caused a defini-. tive review of the whole KGB file on Oswald.- How many KGB men could say as much? CIA was thus unbelievably lucky to be able to contribute to the “Warren Commission at all. (In view of other suspi- ‘cions of Nosenko, the key word in that last sentence is "unbelievably." ) Credibility of Nosenko's statements about Oswald The Committee's Staii Report ably cointed out the contradictions between Nosenko's various state- ments. Mr. Hart admitted, under Mr. Dedd's insistent pressure, that Nosenko's testimony about Oswald was "implausible" and even "incredible." (3431,4353,4396). Be went so far as to recommend that it be disregarded. (3426,.3438, 3467) "However, Mr. Hart exhorted you to believe in the rest of Nosenko's rerorting and to believe in Mr. Nosenko' $s good faith. (2656,3252-78,3348-55) In other. words, he assured you that Nosenko! $ incredible and unusable testimony about Oswald cid not come as a message from the KGB but only from the coniused mind of CIA's advisor. Therefore, Mr. Hart would have you disregard it rather than read it in reverse. To support this recommendation Mr. Hart saic: "ZI cannot offhand remember any statements which he has been proven to have made which were statements of real substance other than the contradictions which have been adduced todav on the Lee Harvev Oswaic matter, which have been proven to be incorzect.” (3253-8) But the Committee only spoke to Nosenko about this one matter. Even so, the Committee detected no less than four or five contradictions. Could this, by extraordinary coincidence, be the only such case? When it confronted Nosenke with his contradictions, the Committee encountered the range of Nosenko's excuses. -and evasions -~ even before the CIA sent Mr. Hart to make these same excuses for Nosenko. Nosenko told che +~ If memory serves, there was a third. occasion, tco. Did not Nosenko happen to be in the room in 1963 when a cable arrived in Moscow concerning Oswald's visa application in Mexico City? Docld: 32273600 Page 6
HW 530860 -5- Committee that he'd been misunderstood, that he didn't understand English, that he'd been under stress, drugged, or hallucinating. He would evade the question, saying you shouldn't ask him what he'd said before, but should ask about the conditions he'd been kept in. Mr. Hart's testimony must then have resounded like an echo in the Committee room. Nosenko even told the Committee staff that he couldn't remember what he had said before. The oddity of this will not have escaped the Committee's notice. It shouldn't matter what he'd said before; he was supposedly talking of thi ngs he'd lived through: the KGB files he'd seen, the officers he'd worked with. If these were real experiences he need only recall them and his reperts would, all by themselves, come out more or less the same way each time (within normal or abnormal limits of memory, and personality quirks, of which we are all almost as aware as Mr. Hart). As the Committee learned, Nosenko's reports did not come out straight, so Nosenko resorted to this bizarre excuse -~ which makes the story appear more learned than experienced Monetheless the CIA asks the Committee to take its word that this is the only time such things haptened, the only such testimony by Nosenko that need be disregarded. But this is particularly difficult: to accept on such an important matter. The Oswald affair, after all, was exciting worlcwide interest, and at the time of the KGB's file review, Nosenko was already a willing secret collaborator of the CIA. One might expect his powers of retention to. work unusually well here. Yet it is precisely on. this matter that CIA tells you that Nosenko was unicuely fuzzy. What the CIA did not tell the Committee, what was hidden behind Mr. Hart's 'offhand" inability to remember other such bad performances by Nosenko-the- man-of-good-faith, was that this vcerformmance was in | no wav unusual. It was simply the way Nosenko reacted whenever he was interrogated in detail on imporgant matters. Not only the contradictions, not only the changes in the story, but the excuses and evasions as well: all were standard Nosenko. This brings us to the next subject. Credibility of Yosenko| as a source This is clearly important to the Committeg which must decide whether Nosenko's contradictory testimony. on Oswald was an aberration, es the CIA pleaded, or Docld: 322 6e8eSsBage; from the KGB.
-6- Here are a few of the errors in the CIA testimony which might aifect your decision: 1) Mr. Hart said, after having reviewed every detail @ of the case for six months with the aid of four assis- tants, "I see no reason to think that he has ever told an untruth, except because he didn't remember it or didn't know or during those times when he was under the influence of alcohol he exaggerated." (3352) Comment: Ten years removed from this case, I can stili remember at least twenty clear cases: of Nosenko's lying about KGB activity and about the career which gave him authority to tell of it, and a dozen examples of his ignorance of matters within his claimed area of responsibility, for which there is no innocent explanation. Never, before this testimony by Mr. Hart, was drinking adduced as an excuse for Nosenko's false reporting. He had no alcohol in his. detention,during which he was questioned, as Mr. Hart reminds us, for 292 days. And not bv the wildest excess of faith or credulity can all of the contradictions and compromising circumstances of the Nosenko case (none of which, edédly enough, did Mr. Hart mention) be attributed to. Nosenko's faulty memory, which Mr. Hart seemed at such pains to establish. 2) Mr. Hart said that the suspicicns of Nosenko arose from the paranoid imaginings and jealousy of a previous defector, whom he calls "X". Mr. Hart told you that Mr, X's views were immediately taken to be the definitive view of Nosenko and from that point on, the treatment of Mr. Nosenko was never, until 1967, devoted to learning what Mr. Nosenko said." (2404-29, 2488-91) Comments: a) It was not X's theories which caused my. initial suspicion of Nosenko in 1962. It was the overlap @ _ of Nosenko's reports (at first glance entirely convincing and important) with those given six _ months earlier by X. Alone, Nosenko looked good (as Mr. Hart said, 2375-9,2397-8); seen alongside X,. whose reporting I had not previousiv seen, “Mosenko looked very odd indeed. The matters which overlapped were serious ones, including a specific lead to penetration of CIA (not a general allega- tion, as Mr. Hart misleadingly suggested on lines 2419-21). There were at least a dozen such points of overlap, of which I can still remember at least . HW 53080 DocId:32273600e Pata Nosenko's information tended to negate or
HW 53080 b) Later, our suspicions of Nosenko were deepened by concrete matters, net paranoid suppositions, and many of these lay outside Nosenko's own story and hence not explicable by his boasting, drinking, or whatnot. ¢) Mr. Hart said that X "was masterminding the examinations in many ways." (2457) In fact X played no role at all in our "examinations" although he submitted a few questions and comments from time to time. The testimony of CIA on this point is inexplicable: its falsity must have been evident in the files Mr. Hart's team serused. ad) It is simply not true that "the tzeatment of Nosenko was not devoted to learning what Mz. Nosenko said." In the Oswald matter alcne the Committee has the record cf careful, systematic questionings in January and July 1964. Similar @are was Gevoted to his other information. The results #ill some of those forty file drawers to which Mr. Hart referred. 3) Mr. Hart stated, "Quantitatively and qualitatively, the information given by Mr. X was much smaller than that given by. Nosenko." (2470) ‘Comments: This breathtaking misstatement hices the fact that Mr. X, paranoid or not, provided in the first months after his defection information which led to the final uncovering of Kim Philby, to the detection of several important senetrations of Western European governments, proof (not allegation) of penetration at the most sensitive lavel of French Intelligence, andi sointers to serious penetrations of tne U. S. Government. Mr. X gave, before Nosenko, the current “organization ari methods of the KGB, and it was Mr. X who first revealed both of the. two KGB operations which Mr. Hart adduced as proof of Nosenko's good faith. (See (4) and (5) below.) To be charitable to Mz. Hart, he admitted to the Committee (2434) that he is "not an expert on Mr..X's case." His testimony, however, sucgests that he has not read the references to X in the Nosenko files. DoclId: 32273600 Page 9
HW 53080 Docld:32273600 Page A8ormation which permitted ¥Y to be caught s 4) Mr. Hart stated, "Mr. Nosenko was responsible for the discovery of a system of microphones within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow which had hitherto been suspected but nobody had enough information on it to actually detect it." (2328-32) Comments: a) Mr. X had given approximate locations of some of the microphones six months earlier. Neither he nor Nosenko knew precise locations, but both knew the mikes were there and both could indicate some specific offices where they cculd be found. The actual tearing out of walls, which Mr. Hart Gescribes, would have been gone, and the micro- phone “system found, without Nosenko's information. b) Contrary to Mr. Hart's statement (2350-3) the KGB would "throw away" already-compremised infor- mation to build up a source. Mr. Hart simply hi from you the fact that this information was already compromised when Nosenko delivered ic. ¢) These microvhones were all in the "old wing" of the Embassy. Nosenko also said, anc carefully explained why, mo microphones were installed in the "new wing." Mr. Edward Jay Epstein, in his book Legend, says that 134 microphones were later found there. I think this can be checked, via the State Department. It would seem to have beer CIA's restonsibility to tell you about this, once they had raised the subject of micropnones to suppert Nosenko's bona fides. 5) Mr. Hart said, "A very high level KGB penetration in a very sensitive position in a Western Eurovean government was, on the basis of Mr. Nosenko's leac, arrested, tried, and convicted of espionage. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away.” (2354-62) Comments: Mr. Hart was presumably referring to a man we can here call "¥", although I do not entirely understand his reticence, for this case is very well. known to the public Mr. Hart has mace. two misstat eme nts here: a) Y's reports to the KGB were known to 4 ana the case had thus been exposed to t six months before Nosenko reported to c t s a wens © The KGB, recognizing this, cut off contact with Y immediately after X's defection. Y'! eventual uncovering was inevitable, even though X had not known his name. Nosenko added one item
HW 53060 -9- b) Therefore, contrary to the CIA testimony, there is a “reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away." The reason -- that Y was already compromised -- was perfectly clear in the files which Mr. Hart's team studied. 6) Mr. Hart told vou that Mr. X had confirmed Nosenko's Claimed positions in the KGB. . (2431) Comment: Mr. X said, on the contrary, that he had personally visited the American-Embassy section of the KGB during the period 1960-61 when Nosenko claimed to have been its deruty chief X knew definitely that Nosenko was not serving ‘there. 7) Mr, Hart said that. DC/SB "had built up a picture which was based on a good deal ct historical researc: about a plot against the West." (4809) Comment: Like point (2) above, this is part of CIA eatfort to belittle the case against Nosenko. My jMicture" of Nosenko's role as a KGB provocateur was based on conerete factors, which as I have said above cannot be explained by Nosenko's vcersonality ilaws or memory. It was not based on “historical research," as Mr. Hart knew very well -- although it is, in fact, supported by a long history of Soviet actions of this sort. , At this point a word may be in erder about Mr. Hart's contemptuous reference to "historical research.” As I mentioned above, Nosenko's information in 1962 everlapvec and det lected leads given shortly before bv X, concerning spies in the U.S. Government. ‘Now, a KGB vaper of this neriod, verhars what Mr. Hart would call a historical document, described the need for disinformation (deception) in KGB counterintelli- gence work. t stated that just catching American spies isn't enough, for the enemy can always start again with new ones. Therefore, said this KGB document, disinformation operations are essential. And among. the purposes of such operations, as I recall the words of the document, the first one mentioned is "to negate and discredit authentic information the enemy has obtained." I believe that Nosenko's mission in 1962 involved just that: covering and protecting KGB sources threatened by X's defection. Does this sound -like a “hor Tendous plot" conjured up by varanoids? It is a straightforward counteressionage cechnique: perfectly. understandable to laymen. But Mr. Hart’ purtese was not enlightenment, But ridicule. DocId: 32273600 Page 11
HW 53060 -10- The last of the four or five purposes the secret KGB document listed (purposes of counterintelligence disinformation operations) was "to penetrate deeper into the enemy service." By taking on Mr. Nosenko as a counselor, the CIA may have helped the KGB achieve this goal, as well as the first one. . What conclusions can be drawn from these and similar errors in the CIA testimony? I would submit that despite these efforts to deride and dismiss the arguments against Nosenko, there is, as Mr. Helms testified, a solid case against Nesenko, of which the implications are very serious. The country is not well served by Mr. Hart's surerficial and offhand dismissal of that case. For i= Nosenko is a KGB plant, as I am convinced he is, there can be no doubt that Nosenko's recited story about Oswald in the USSR is a message from the KGB. That message says, in exaggerated and implausible form, that Oswald had nothing whatever to do with the KGB, mot questioned for his military intelligence, not even screened as a possible CIA plant. Even Mr. Hart finds it incredible and recommends that you disregard it. Sut his reasons are flawed, and can you afford to disregard it? By sending out such a message, the KGB exposes the fact that it has something ko hide. As Mr. Helms told you, that something may be the fact that Oswald was an agent of the KGa. The form and tone of the CIA testimony It is against this grave background that ft will- comment on the general tenor of the CIA testimony. The Committee and the public must have been st ruck dumb by the spectacle of a government asency falling over jtself to cast mud on its own performance of duty. When Mr. Dodd asked Mr. Hart if CIA had "failed in its. responsibility miserably," Mr. Hart replied, in a classic of government acvocacy, "Congressman, ee. I would go further than that." (3188) Mr. Hart's testimony -- one-sided, intemperate, distorted -- was carefully structured to influence rather than inform the Committee. Docld:32273600 Page 12
AW 53030 -ll- Mr. Hart went to special pains to force your. thinking into a certain framework. He began his testimony defensively, citing all the factors which might have caused this defector to bear false witness: stresses, bad memory, drunkenness, the traumas of Gefection (shared, by the way, by all defectors), and even the “unreality of his situation." (2634) And then on to the revelations of mistreatment, which you are to accept as dismissing all evidence against Nosenko. “It is with (these mitigating factors) in: mind that we have to approach everything that happened from 1962"(2498-9), plus of course the sheer bumbling incompetence of Nosenko's handling. On the one hand CIA attacked with venom its own Past performance, and on the other hand adopted an almost beseeching tone in defending a Soviet KG3 person who, by CIA's own admission, had rendered invalid testimony about the assassin of an American president. "You should believe these statements of Mr. Nosenko," Mr. Hart said. (3252) "Anything that ne has said has been said in good faith." (3350) "IT am only asking you to believe that he made> (his statements) in good faith." (3275) "I am hoping that once these misunderstandings are explained, that many of the problems...wnhich the staff has had with the questions and answers from Mr. Nosenkce, and also allegations concerning hin, will be cleared up and go away." (2124-31) Confronted by Mr. Dodd-with the specific contra- dictions which made Nosenko's story unacceptable, Mr. Hart fell back on declarations of faith. (3426 3349) In the heat of his defense of Nosenko and his attack on Nosenko's questioners, Mr. Hart jumbled together the conditions of 1962. (alleged drunkenness) with these of the confinement, leading Mr. Dedd to lay importance on Nosenko's drinking. (3243-4) He got over to Mr. Dodd the idea that hallu Cinations "probably" (3241) influenced Nosenko's performance - under interrogation (by a subtle turn of phrase, lines 2870-73) --- while knowing that hallucinations were never a factor in the question-and-answer sessions. — ting shat the CIA medical officer concluded that Nosennc had feigned his hallucinations (in reriods of isolation) Mr. Hart could not restrain a " knee- jerk defense, “but that was simply one medical officer's opinion." (2864) And finally, by spending his testi- mony on the handling of Mosenko, and the mistreatment, he succeeded in skirting all the facts of the case which are, after all, your. concern. DoclIda: 32273600 Page 153 ;
~12- Mr. Hart's emotional closing message (4883) with its catchy word "abomination," epitomizes his whole testimony. That testimony shows none of the detachment of @ a self-styled "historian" proud of his high standards ef scholarship. (4106) It sounds more like a man pleading a flimsy cause, urgently trying to make a point. He left with the Committee, and the public, a picture of a small group of irresponsible half-wits, carried away by wild fantasies about horrendous plots, failing even to ask questions, much less to check out the answers, while hiding their vile misconduct and tilegal theughts from a Guped leadership. Since these impressions provide the background for Mr. Hart's description of the handling of Nosenko, they may be worth a closer look. He created at least three impressions about the handling of the Nosenko case: lL) That it was the work of an isolated groun of irres- ponsible people Specifically, Mr. Hart repeated that it was a "small group of veople...a very limited group” (2509) handling the case on the basis of a "belie=" held closely by "a very small trusted group." (2518) He gets. over strongly the impression that Mr. Helms was not properly informed. (4619,3996-4019, 4632) Contrary to Mr. Hart's testimony, every step was iscussed with all elements concerned: suggestions were solicited, decisions were worked out in consultation. The leadership did not lose control or confidence. If, indeed, the group concerned with the suspicions of Nosenko remained “very small" it was because if Mosenko was a KGB plant, there was a KGB sty within CIA. This is not the sort of thing one wants to spread widely. 2) That it was the work of incompetents Mr. Hart succeeded. in getting over to the Committee and the cublic an image of gross incompetence on the part of Nosenko's handlers. He led Mr. Dedd, for example, to ask if any of "these characters" are "still kicking around the agency, or have they been fired?" (4282) and to suggest that even if there had been a KGB conspiracy, we would not have been competent to detect it. (4199) HW #53080 Docld:32273600 Page 14
Mr. Hart got over this impression of incompetence in three ways: @ a) By reveating general, intemperately derogatory judgments and labels: He called the handling ot “the entire case" (3189) -- including the competent parts noted above -- "zero", "miserable", "dismal," “counterproductive," and so forth, and hinted that the handlers were prone to wild fancies and illegal conduct. © b) By withholding facts: Certain information Mr. Hart knew and tailed to menticn might have caused the Committee to wonder whether, atter all, there might be more to this than the simplistic picture Mr. Hart drew. For example, ne did not tell Mr. Deda the following about “these characters": (1) That the people managing this complex case were senior officers with perhaps the most experience within the entire Agency in handling Soviet Bloc counterespionage matters. (2) That neither C/S3 nor DC/S8 tended to see shadows where they weren't. In ourtanyv | dealings with Soviet Bloc intelligence officers as defectors or agents-in-place, we had, before Nosenko, never judged anv of them to 5 plants. If anything, I nave been repro for trusting them tco far, as more than one defector will probably be wiliing to te (3) That in our service in positions of responsi- bility before, during, and after this aZfair, our. performance was rated as superior, 4s CIA personnel records will confirm. I< memory serves, even Mr. Hart judged my performance (and probably C/SB's) after this case as > "outstanding." I was decorated for my service. ec) By giving vou talse and misleading information: Here are at least rour examples: @ (1) Mr. Hart told the Committee the outright untruth that the work of C/SB and DC/SB “on this case Rad been discredited and had caused them to te transferred out of Headquarters to foreign assignments." (2529) We can produce witnesses, “if necessary, to prove that this is false. Any "discrediting" came later, Dy Mr. Hart and others. We had asked, long in advance, for our particular assignments and got them when the costs came open in the normal course WW 53080 Doclda:32273600 Page 1@f events, both of us after long headcuarters - .
HW 53080 DocId: 32273600 (2) (3) (4) Mr. Hart introduced a red herring about my Russian-language competence, which so misled Mr. Fithian that he spoke, without rebuttal by Hart,. about an "English speaking person trying to take notes and writing down what this major potential defector was saying and then transcribing them and giving them to the Agency, right down through the interrogation." (3648-52) He led Mr. Dodd, too, to think there were "no verbatim accounts of some of the interrogations but rather notes taken by people who didn't have a very good knowledge of Russian." (3245-7) Hart could have saved a lot of time and confusion by reminding you of the simple truth that a Russian speaker was present at every meeting except the initial contact. In fact, there never was, after that initial contact, any problem of language, Russian or English. I concur with the FBI officer cited in the Committee's Staff Report, pace 37: "There was no question about being misunderstood." Mr. Hart stated falsely that discrepancies in the transcripts were "very important i the history of this case, because (they) gave rise to charges within the Agency that Nosenko was not what he curvorted to be." (2296-2302) I know of no lasting misunder- standings and none at all that imrortantly affected our judgment of Nosenko's bona tices. And why would the transcripts be important after January 1964, when Nosenko himselt was. on hand to be questioned? n By introducing the question in the transcripts Hart nis fe) C e other wavs: i - He attributed them to my Language deficiency when in fact the transcripts were made by a native Russian speaker who had participated in the meetings! How could I know there were errors in the transcripts? ~- He told you that another defector found discrepancies in the transcripts -- but “not mention that it was I who brought tn a@efector into the case, and caused him t review the taves and transer ipts! Mr. 8 falsely hinted that I chose to ignore +t  dGefector's findings. 150 did at ° ar he es Page 16
HW 53060 -15- By way of footnote to this theme, the Committee might be interested to learn that the “very thorough, very conscientious" defector cited by Hart in connec- tion with the transcripts, who is indeed thorough and of high professional integrity and unique expertise on Soviet intelligence matters, reviewed the whole Nosenko case and was convinced that Nosenko was a sent KGB vrovocateur and had not held the sositions in the KGB wnich ne claimed. Mr. Hart seems to nave forgotten to mention this. 3) That the case acainst Nosenko is nothing more than a Daranoid notion: This tneme runs clearly througn Mr. Hart's testimony I have already discussed : certain aspects of ° oo ww @ Mr. Hart incorrectly attributed the whole "misunderstanding" to grandiose fantasies of Mr. xX. In discrediting X he mixes, in the Committee's mind, a theory about the Sino-Soviet split, a "plot" master- minded “by something called the KGB disinicrmation directorate," and the role in this imaginary plot of "penetrations at high levels within inteiligence services" of the West, a plot in the continuing process of “exaggeration and elaboration." (2410-27) Taken one by one in a somewhat caimer trame of reference, these cvoints may merit the Committee's attention. The Disinformation Directorate exists. ivery defector from the KGB, including Nosenko, has conftizmed this, and it has been steadily increased in size and importance within the KGB over the past decades. It offers 3a framework for the centralization and exploita- tion of just such compromised and innocuous inZormation as Nosenko has provided to Western intelligence. It is active and CIA knows it. So why does a CIA spokesman try to present it as part of a paranoid fantasy? Penetration of American Intelligence was suggest by specific leads given by Mr. X%, which were detlecte specific leads given shortly thereafter by Mr. Nosenk Mr. Hart is quite right to say that penetration is pa of the problem. He gives false testimony if he denies these leads and savs that we are dealing only with 2. theory or with general allegations. DoclId: 322773600 Page i7
-16- Mr. Bart implies that all the doubts about Mr. Nosenko. can be dispelled by the factors Mr. Hart cited: bad memory, drunkenness, misunderstanding, @ bad handling, and the rest. In fact, the defense of Mr. Nosenko uses these factors one By one to cover and explain away each of hundreds of specific points ef doubt such as had never arisen in any of the scores of defections of Soviet Bloc intelligence efficers before Nosenko. I have tried repeatedly to build a coherent picture of the entirety of Mr. Nosenko's story, and the circumstances surrounding it, using these excuses. Not only do they fail to explain the most important soints, but they tend to contradict each other. Perhacs Mr. Hart's peoble have never gone through this exercise. Here, in short, is Mr. Hart's message. The. whole case against Nosenko is a theory about a "so-called plot" and is "sheer nonsense." (3920-1) The evidence against Nosenko is "supposed evidence." wt ee The CIA's handling cf Nosenko This leads to the subject of Nosenko'’s treat especially his confinement. For if Mr. Hart suce in dismissing and deriding the case against Nose and all its implications, he robs the detention c= its context and purpose, and truly makes it, as Mr. Dedd put it, "outrageous." (3421) At the risk of repetition I remind you that: 1) There is a carefully documented body of | evidence, not "supposed evidence", against Nosenko, beyond any explanations of bad memory or misunderstandings. It is not juridical proof, but it was taken very seriously by the Agency's orofessional leadership, who were neither fools nor ' paranoids. r _-2) Among the implications underlying the very , real possibility that Nosnko was planted on CIA by the KGB are these two: a) That Lee Harvey Oswald may have been a KGB agent. b) That there was KGB penetration of sensitive elements of the United States Covernment. HW 53060 Docld:32273600 Page 13
-17- Here are certain facts that Mr. Hart has hidden or distorted by the manner of his testimony: 1) Nesenko's treatment for the first two months after his defection was precisely the same as that given any important defector. © 2) During that period Nosenko had ample opportunity. . to0 produce information, or to act in a manner, which might reduce or dissolve doubts about hin. 3) During this pericd Nosenko, unlike genuine defectors, resisted any serious questioning. It was not that he was “drunk around the clock" as Mr. Hart put it; he was usually sober when he deflected questions, changed the subject, and invented excuses not to talk, even about isolated voints of detail. t became clear that if he were to be questioned at all, some discipline nad to be applied. 4) Reasons to suspect Nosenko (not paranoid notions) were growing and the potential implications to American security were becoming clearer. It was our duty to Clarify this matter. Anything less would have been, in truth, the sort of dereliction of cuty of whict Mr. Hart falsely accuses us todaév. Please bear in mind that I find this case (not its handling) just as “abominable” as Mr. Hart does. Tts implications are ugly. It imposed immense and unpleasant tasks upon us, and strains upon the Agency which are al too visible today in vour Committee's hearings has served me ill, professionally and perscnal was there: it would not go away. The burden = and I did my duty. wo a In doing it I was not let down at any time by the Agency leadership. They understcod what had to be cone and why, and they took the necessary decisions to make it possible. . And so Nosenko was detained. -~ If there were reasonable grounds to suspect that he was a KGB plant, his detention was 1) necessary, 2) effective, and 3) a partial success, for it got Mosenko's story and his ignorance pure and unsullied by outside coaching, and this told us much about what } lav behind. ~ If the case against Mosenko was "sheer nonsense," then the detention was not justiti Here is how Mr. Hart described the decision: "The next. step, since the interrogatiéns conducted by the CIA, whic! as I say were cesigned not to ascertain information so much as they were to pin on Nosanko the label of a KGB agent acting to deceive us, since nothing had been proved in the friendly confinement the people running the operation determined that HW 53060 Docld B27 36 GRe cP ase oko would be...a much more spartan confinement... LAF anN aal\
HW 53060 finally, form some believab -~l18~ “This misstates the case. Those early debriefing sessions were not designed to sin any label con Nosenko. (It is true that they did nothing to assuage our doubts and that during the same period we were learning things outside which tended rather to reinforce them.) f£ the results had been more sromising we might have worked gradually around, in the questioning, to the points of doubt, and might thus have avoided any need of confinement. The detention of Nosenko was designed initially to give us an opportunity to confront him with certain contradictions in his storv. This would alert him to our suspicions and if he were still free he might, we thought, either redefect to the Soviet Union or "go sublic," either wav removing our chances to get the data we needed to assess the truth behind his story cof Lee Harvey Oswaid and other serious matters. Our aim was, as Mr. Hart said, to get a confession: either of KGB stonsorship, or of white lise Ai le pattern. The results of this and subsecuemt hostile interrogations surprised us. Nosenko was unable to clarify any single point of doubt. Srought up against his own contradictions and our independent information, he admitted that there could be no innocent explanation (net even forgetfulness) or he would remain silent, of he would come up with a new story, only to change that, too, later. He did confess some lies, but they tended to contradict each other, not offer an innocent explanation for the oddities in his story. In fact, the nestile interrogation reinforced and intensiitied our suspicions. | After this. series of confrontations, we had an opportunity, finally, to do something which would normally have been done first, with any cooperative defector: conduct a systematic debriefing, which he had resisted before his detention. We could, as Mr. Hart put it, "ascertain information." - Mosenko was cooperative. He even wld his cuestioners that they were right to have thus removed him from the temptations of drink and women, and to have forced hia to work seriously. And so began months of systematic questioning under neutral, non-nostile, circumstances. Practical the full range of his knowledge was covered. An ¢ DoclId:32273600 Page 70
HW 53060 is the questioning on the subject of Lee Harvey Oswald in July, 1964, which the Committee's Stati Report called "detailed and specific." As the report states, “an attempt was made to touch all aspects." On each subject Nosenko was given an opportunity, as on the Oswald matter, to review the report and correct or amplify it. He was not drunk, not mistreated, not hallucinating, and there was never the slightest problem of under- standing. (We should not confuse, as did Mr. Hart's testimony, the circumstances of one meeting in 1962 (language problem) with the whole operation, nor the conditions of 1962 (alleged drunkenness) with the conditions of confinement, nor hostile with non-hostile questioning.) Simultaneously we were meticulously checking files and investigating outside, concerning every possible aspect of Nosenko's activities and resorts. The results fill many of those file crawers of .which Mr. Hart spoke. What we learned suggested, uniformity, Nosenko's stories about his career and ders activities in the KGB were not crue. To de these findings, to dismiss them as preconcer is to misrepresent facts clear from the fil t- Q. 2 oO WM RC ns, io ct prs 99’ “bd 40 ct e We found that the KGB operations Nosenko had reported, for example, were already known or had lost any value they had had to the KGB. This is mot true of the reporting of any previous defector. That Mr. Hart, so eager to convince you of Nosenko's good faith, could cite as evidence only cases which had been uncovered by an earlier defector, gives you an idea. Two other KGB spies, an ex-U.S.Army NCO and the well-known case of Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson (the Orly courier-vault penetration), both of which Nosenko truly revealed for the first time, were useless: the NCO had never had access to secr ets nor truly cooperated, Johnson had lost his access to the vault and was being. publicly exposed by a neurotic wife. Such was the pattern, in addition to Nosenko's deflection of at least six srecific leads given earlier by the KGB defector x. ' Fact piled upon fact, creating a conviction on the part of every officer working on this operation that Nosenko was a XGB plant. Each hac his own viewpoint: none was paranoid. DoclId: 322773600 Page ?1
HW 53060 -20- We conducted two more hostile interrogations, always increasing our knowledge, never relieving any suspicions, getting steadily closer to the truth, perhaps. But we got no consession. All of this took time, and Nosenko stayed in confinement. As to the conditions of his detention, Mr. Hart has given many details. They do not seem directly relevant to the Committee's mission, for contrary to Mr. Hart's thesis, they did not materiallv influence Nosenko's revorting one wav “or tne otner, nor the question of Nosenko's dona fides. They cannot truthfully oe. adduced to Gismiss the case against Mosenko. On the contrary these details, in Hart's testimony, tended to confuse the central problem before you: WNosenko's credibility and what lies behind his message to America concerning the KGB's relations with Lee Harvey Oswald. However, if the detention could be dealt with as a separate and distinct topic, I am prepared t answer any questions I can on the subject. oO The original justification for dataining Nosenko had been that he was in the United States under parole and it was the Agency's duty to prevent his harming the security of the United States. This could not last indefinitely. At the end of the efforts described above, we were still witnout the "proof" a confession would provide. We hac only professional, not juridical, evidence. Finally our time ran out and a decision had to be made about what to do about Nosenko. The question of "disvosal" Here the extent of CIA's irrétional involvement with Mosenko becomes blatant. Mr. Hart read (with relish, according to my friends who watched on TV) ' selected items from some penciled jottings in mv handwriting which left with you the impression that I had contemplated or considered (even "suggested" as more than one newspaperman understood him) such measures as liquidation, drugging, or confinement in mental institutions. DoclId: 322773600 Page 22
-2l- I state unequivocally, and will do so under oath, on behalf of myself and anyone I ever Knew in or out of the Central Intelligence Agency, that: © 1) No such measures were ever seriously considered. 2) No such measures were ever studied. (What "loony bin"? How “make him nuts"? What drugs to induce forgetfulness? I Know of none now and never did, nor did I.ever try to find eut if such exist. The whole subject of "liqui- dation" was tabu in the CIA for reasons with which I wholeheartedly acreed then and still do.) 3) No such measures were ever suggested as a course of action, even in intimate personal conversations. 4) No such measures were ever proposed at any level - o£ the Agency. I do not remember making any such notes. However, I can imagine how I might have. Responsible as I was for this “abominable” case, I was called upon to help find the best way to release Nosenko --— without a con- fession but sure that he was an enemy agent. In an effort to find something mneriting serious consideraticn, I suppose that I jotted down, one day, every theoreti- cally conceivable action. Some of them might have been mentioned in one form or anoher by others; I doubt they all sprang from my mind. (I cannot even guess what “soints one through four" might have been, the ones Mr. Hart. declined to read because they wete “unimportant." I guess that means they weren't damning to me.) But the fact that the netes were penciled reveals that they were intended to be transient; the fact that "liquidation" was included reveals that they were theoretical: and their loose, undignified language _ veveals that they were entirely personal, for may fleeting use only. In fact, none of these courses of action could nave been morally acceptable to me, much less conceivable as a practical suggestion to ) - higher. authority. Mr. Hart admitted, or proudly claimed, that he himself discovered these notes in the files. (4270) Although he recognized their purely rersonal nature, that they were not addressed mor.intended fer anv otner person, nor had any practical intent, he chose to bring them to show-ané-tell to the Committee and the American public. Did he feel this a moral duty? Or was it simply part of his evident intent to deride and destrov any opposition to Nosenko? Could he have done it for NW 53080 Docld:322T3BaGORayeOs3 DeTSONal spite? Whatever. tne answer, che
HW 53060 -22- cost seems too hich: he was Giscrediting his own Agency for a matter without substance. I cannot remember any concrete prososal for "@isposal" being made during my tenure. (You under- stand, of course, that "disposal" is merely vsrofess- ional jargon for ending a relationship. )- The course the Agency eventually adonted seems, in retrospect, tne only practical one. I think the Agency did well to rehabilitate Nosenko and, as I thought, put him out to pasture. riowever, I cannot understand why they then emploved nim as an advisor, as a teacher of their staZi trainees in counterintelligence The concrete suspicions of Nosenko have never been “resolved, and because tney are well foundec, they never will "pe cleared up and go away." Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner mav frivolously dismiss them, as they have c e Gone before your Committee, but the still there and it is i ible clandestine cersonnel ¢ Conclusicn Mr. Hart's testimony was a curious serformanc 3. One wonders what could Grive a government agency int the vosition of: - trving to discredit and burv under a pile of izrrelevancies the reasons *o sustect that the Soviet Union sent te America a provecateur to mislead us abcut the assassin of President Kennedy; - pleacing irrationally and misleadingly in fav of a KGB man about whom serious doubts vcersis ~ misrepresenting, invidiously, its own orior a = denigrating publicly the competence and performance of duty of its own officers; ~ éredging up unsubstantial personal notes, lett carelessly in a highly secret file folder, to falsely suggest in sublic the Dlanning bv its own people of the vilest forms of misconduct. DoctId: 32273600 Page 24 As the Congress is conspicuousiy aware, the veil of secrecy can hide irresponsibility and incomretence. But behind that veil the CIA used to maintain unusually high standards of honor and decency anc responsibility, and did a pretty competent job, often in the face of “impossible demands. The decline of these qualities is
~ -23- laid bare by Mr. Hart's testimony -- to the Agency's discredit, to my own dismay, and to the detriment of future recruitment of good men, who will not want to make careers in an environment without integrity. @ The Agency need not have gone so far. Ater all, Nosenko's bona fides had been officially certified. Those who disagreed were judged at its highest level to have “besmirched the Agency's escutcheon." Not only are they out of the way, but “everything possible" is being done to see that no one challenges Nosenko or his ilk, ever again. (4048) The Agency need only have said this much, and no more. That Admiral Turner's versonal emissary went so much further suggests that the Agency may not, after all, be quite so sure of its position. Perhaps it fears that the Committee, wondering about this defector's strange reporting and unconstrainec by CIA's official line, might innocently cry out, | "But the emperor has no clothes on!" This might explain the soray of mud, to cloud your view, The above, I rereat, is Dut a preliminary statement, and is by no means ali I have to say on these subjects. 4 You can reacn me at the address and chone number on the first page. I presume, if I am permitted to appear before your Committee, that my travel expenses will be covered by the Committee. Yours truly, + 4 t . to 8) Q we (1) < : @ , Tennent 3 HW 53060 Docld: 32273600 Page 25
chas : 11-16-78 “We _ . an . A 1 CONTENTS 2 || TESTIMONY OF: —_ PAGE NO. 3 || TENNENT H. BAGLEY, Former Deputy Chief, @ Soviet Bloc Division, Central Intelligence 4 Agency CO 4 10 - 41 12 14 20 21 24 25 TN fate ie ae Tee HW 53060 DBocld: 22773600 Page 26
yrowning > HW 53060 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: EXECUTIVE SESSION ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1978 House of Representatives, - Select Committee on Assassinations, Subcommittee on Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m. in room 2359, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable: Richardson Preyer (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. — Present: Representatives Preyer, Dodd, Fithian, and Thone. 2973600 Page 27
16 17 18 19 20 21 @ 32 23 24 25 Mr. Mr. Preyer. come to order. A quorum being present, the committee will The clerk, Miss Berning, is asked to call the names of those authorized to sit on this committee. Ms. Berning. Dodd; and Mr. Mr. Preyer. At this time the meeting. Mr. Dodd. I Mr. Preyer. favor will answer You, Mr. Chairman; Mrs. Burke; Mr. Thone; Fithian will be substituting for Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. the Chair will entertain a motion to close would so move, Mr. Chairman. You have heard the motion. All those in to the roll call. Ms. Berning. Mr. Preyer. Mr. Preyer. Aye. Ms. Berning. Mr. Thone. (No response.) Ms. Berning. Mrs. Burke. (No response.) Ms. Berning. Mr. Dodd. Mr. Dodd. Aye. Ms. Berning.— Mr. Fithian. Mr. Fithian. Aye. -Ms. Berning. ‘Mr. Preyer. Three ayes, Mr. Chairman. Our witness today is Mr. Tennent H. Bagley. Mr. Bagley served as the deputy. chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of the CIA in 1962, at the time of Mr. Nosenko's first HW 53060 DBocld: 82273600 Page 2786
HW 53060 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 contact with the agency in Geneva, Switzerland, and since that time, has assisted in further interrogations of Mr. Nosenko. I understand you have a prepared statement that you propose to read to the committee and that statement includes a. letter dated October 11, 1978, to Mr. Blakey, the chief counsel of the committee:. Is it correct that you would like that letter to be made a part of the record? Mr. Bagley. If you would, please. Mr. Preyer. But you propose to read the first part of your statement. | Mr. Bagley. Yes, sir. Mr. Preyer. Without objection, the letter dated October 11, 1978, will be made a part of the record. © (Insert:) Docld: #2273600 Page 29 .
HW 53080 13: 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: Mr. Preyer. Mr. Bagley, after you are sworn, you will be recognized. to read your statement. I might suggest, after you are sworn, Mr. Bagley, and before you read your statement, that. you might, for the record, give us your present occupation and your present residence so that we have that basic information. Will you stand at this time and be sworn. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Bagley. I do. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Bagley. I recognize you at this time. TESTIMONY OF TENNENT H. BAGLEY, FORMER DEPUTY ~~” CHIEF, SOVIET BLOC DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr. Bagley. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to make a few introductory remarks to introduce my- Self as the chairman has requested. | I was born in Annapolis, Maryland, 1925; served in World War II for 3 years in the United States Marine Corps; attended Princeton University, University of California, and the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where I received a doctorate gltiboudl of\ science. I served in the CIA from 1950 on and specialized | there in Soviet and satellite operations. I had worked person- ally at one time or another with most of the important opera- tions involving these areas over that generation. 2273600 Page 30
18 19 20 21 23 24 25 HW 53060 DBoctld: In 1962, I became head of the section responsible for counterintelligence against the Soviet intelligence services; and in '65 or '66, I was deputy chief of the Soviet Russia Division. When it was amalgamated with the satellite countries, in "66 -- I believe perhaps '65, I became deputy chief of that amalgamated division. | In '67 I went to Europe as a station chief in Brussels where I retired in 1972 on the Agency early retirement program, entirely, and I repeat entirely, on my own volition. I mention that because these matters of performance and separation of service have been raised in this committee. I also would note for the record that my performance, which I wouldn't otherwise mention, was consistently rated as outstanding, and at the end of it I received an agency decora- tion. Since then I have been a private consultant based in Brussels where. I represent American and European companies who don't have formal representation in Europe, in the field of avionics and chemicals, principally. | Now I proceed to my prepared.statement, Mr. Chairman. 273600 Page 31
HW 53060 12 13 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: I have come before your committee to reply to the testimony of Mr. John L. Hart, who represented the Central Intelligence Agency here on September 15, a testimony which misled you and misused me. As the former deputy chief of the Soviet Bloc Division of . CIA and directly responsible for the case of the KGB defector Yuri Nosenko from 1962 to 1967, I can reply more accurately to your questions and can bring you a better understanding of this matter. For one thing, I won't have to rely as did Mr. Hart on archeological digs into those 40 file drawers of information. Mr. Hart's 6-month expedition obviously failed to understand - what they dug up, and their leader was highly selective in what he chose to. exhibit here. For another, I will not disqualify myself, as he did, from talking about Lee Harvey Oswald, one of the most important aspects of the Nosenko case, nor about the case of the earlier defector here called "X,"’ which is a -eritical factor in understanding Nosenko. CIA's selection of Mr. Hart to study the Nosenko case, and later to present it to you, came to me as a great surprise and - mystery. He seemed to bring few qualifications. to the study of the most sophisticated Soviet counterintelligence operations of 273600 Page 32
HW 53060 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: our generation. As far as I know he never handled a single Soviet intelligence officer, and spent his career, as he told you, remote from Soviet operations, in wars and’ jungles, as he put it. As a result, he was able to tick off 60 years of Soviet deception as a kind of paranoid fantasy, to make contemptuous remarks about "historical research about a plot against the West," and to use the revealing phrase, "I don't happen to be able to share this type of thing -- "' Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt long enough to suggest we turn off ‘Dr. Bagley's microphone. I think we can hear him well enough. Mr. Preyer. The fidelity of that is a little too high. It tends to muffle your voice. You may continue. Mr. Bagley. But "this type of thing" is what the Nosenko case is all about. Mr. Hart did not mention, and perhaps never studied, a number of related cases bearing importantly on the question of Nosenko's credibility. From his testimony you would never guess at the existence of cases apart from but related to the Nosenko case. Mr. Hart apparently did not bother. to talk with many of the best-qualified officers on these cases during his 6 months of research. “When he came to me in 1976 he had not even read the basic papers of the case and instead of talking substance he asked about an irrelevant phrase from an 8-year-old dispatch I had written -- a phrase’ he later brought up with you, “ 273600 Page 33
18 19 20 21 23 24 25 HW 53080 DoctIa: the bit about "devastating consequences," in distorted form and out of context. His testimony here seems not designed to enlighten your committee, but to subject Nosenko's critics -- Mr. Hart's former colleagues -- to vilification and ridicule. He left with the committee a picture of a small group of irresponsible half-wits, carried away by wild fantasies about horrendous plots, failing even to ask questions, neglecting to check on what was said, and all the time hiding their vile misconduct and illegal thoughts from a duped leadership. .Mr. Hart told you a lot about Nosenko's mistreatment but very little about Nosenko's credibility as concerns Lee Harvey Oswald. He called on you to make an act of faith, as the CIA seems to have done, in the good will and truth of a Soviet KGB man who had rendered false and incredible testimony about the assassin of an American President. I quote: 'You should be- lieve these statements of Mr. Nosenko ," Mr. Hart said, "anything he has said has been said in good faith." Then, avoiding the subject of Oswald, he led you into a maze of irrelevant detail about Nosenko's problems and CIA's earlier misunderstanding and mistreatment of this defector. By spattering mud on Nosenko's earlier handling, and particularly on me, Mr. Hart threw up a cloud which threatens to impede your attempts to get at the answer to the true question before you. And I ask you here to focus.on that question, instead:of. the irrelevancies. 273600 Page 34
That question, of course, is how and why a senior KGB defector, directly responsible for important aspects of Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the Soviet Union, could deliver testimony to this committee which even the CIA's representative 5 || called "implausible" and "incredible." Mr. Hart even said that if he were in your position, he would simply disregard what Mr. Nosenko said about Lee Harvey 8 || Oswald. He seems to have done just that, himself. But Mr. 9 || Helms rightly labeled that a copout, and it is not clear to me 10 || how Mr. Hart thought you could or would just pretend that the 11 || question isn't there. 12 Of course, you can't. For today you are in the same posi- 13 tion I was in back in 1964, trying to make sense of Nosenko's 14 || reports. You are investigating and evaluating Nosenko's report- 15 ing’ on Lee Harvey Oswald. I did not think, in my time, that I 16 || could just shrug off Nosenko's bizarre story of Oswald with some 17 irrelevant and half-hearted explanation, as Mr. Hart did here, 18 and slide off into some other subject. 19 Mr. Hart did not explain what he thought you should 20 || believe, or how this "incredible" testimony is compatible with 21 the claim that Nosenko has, by and large, told nothing but the @ 22 || truth since 1962. — 23 He said Nosenko's testimony to you was a unique aberration; 24 || I quote: "I cannot offhand remember any statements which 25 (Nosenko) has been proven to have made which were statements HW 53080 Docld:4?2?73600 Page 35
HW 53060 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 10 of real substance other than the contradictions which have been adduced today on the Lee Harvey Oswald matter, which have been proven to be incorrect." But the committee only spoke to Nosenko about this one matter, and even so, the committee de- tected at least six or seven contradictions from one telling to another. Could this, by coincidence, be the only such case? (I can tell you the answer is no; on the contrary, this was typical Nosenko whenever he was pinned down on details.) While extolling Nosenko's truthfulness, Mr. Hart spent a surprising amount of time giving jyou reasons why Nosenko might have lied or seemed to lie, such as drunken exaggeration, con- fusion, emotional stresses, hallucinations, and the impact of mistreatment. But that wasn't helpful to you, for none of these things had anything to do with Nosenko's story about Oswald. _After all, Nosenko told the CIA and FBI his story about Oswald before any mistreatment, and he told it to your committee after any mistreatment, and no one thought he was drunk at any one of those times. So I will go back to the question here and see if I can help you find an answer. There has ‘to be some way to explain how this direct participant in the events delivered incredible - testimony about them. There must be some explanation for the differences in Nosenko's story at different times he told it, for his excuses and evasions when confronted with these differ- ences, and for his final refusal to talk any more about them 273600 Page 36
10 4 12 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 HW 53080 DoctIa: ll with your committee. As we seek an answer to these questions, I ask you to keep three things in mind: - First, that at the time he reviewed Oswald's file for the KGB, Nosenko was already a willing secret collaborato of the CIA. Therefore, he must have been alert when dealing with this matter of such obvious importance to the United States and to his own country. Second, that Nosenko told us of some of these events only 10 weeks after they happened, so there wasn't time for them to become dim in his memory. | Third, that no one has suggested that Nosenko is mentally unfit. Mr. Hart brought in the Wechsler test and other psychological details merely to show Nosenko's relative strengths and weaknesses, not to prove him a mental bas- ket case. On the contrary, Nosenko claims to have risen fast in the KGB, and he is regarded by his current employers as "an intelligent human being' who "reasons well." I am quoting Mr. Hart, of course, who also called your attention to Nosenko's powers of “logical thought" and his high score in "power of abstract thinking." Aside from the irrelevant details about Nosenko's stresses under mistreatment, and drunkenness , I found two things in Mr. Hart's testimony which might bear on the Oswald story. First and foremost, he spoke about compartmentation, bringing his own 273600 Page 37
HW 53060 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 12 experience to show how a person in any organization working on the principle of "need to know" might not be aware of everything going on, even in his own operations. Now, I suppose Mr. Hart intended this as a contribution to Mr. Nosenko's defense; certainly Mr. Nosenko had never mentioned it. The trouble is, it doesn't apply to this story. Nosenko had said repeatedly, to CIA and FBI and recently swore under oath to this committee, that he was right there on the inside of any "compartment." He personally reviewed the application of Oswald to stay in the USSR in 1959 and he personally participated in the recommenda= tion that the KGB should not let Oswald stay in the country and in the decision not to notify the KGB sections which might normally be interested in debriefing a man like Oswald. Nosenko knew that the KGB leadership decided that they "didn't want to be involved" with Oswald -- not to question him at all, not even to screen him as a possible enemy plant. Nosenko personally participated in the refusal of Oswald's visa request from Mexico not long before the assassination of President Kennedy. And after the assas$ination, Nosenko himself was told to review Oswald's KGB file; and did so. He has insisted that if anyone in the KGB ever talked to Oswald, he, Nosenko, would know about it. So "compartmentation" explains nothing. Nosenko's story rests essentially on his personal involvement and authority. The. second and last possible explanation which we can find. in Mr. Hart's testimony is Nosenko's odd memory, which Mr. Hart 273600 Page 386
HW 530380 10 14 “12 20 21 22 23 24 25 DocId: 13 took such pains to establish. After all, Nosenko seems to have changed details of seven or eight aspects of:the story at one time or another. The trouble with this is, it doesn't touch the heart of the story, the truly incredible part, Nosenko didn't forget whether or not the KGB questioned Oswald; he remembers sharply and consistently -- and insists, whatever other changes he makes in his story -- that Oswald was never questioned by the KGB. He knows that and remembers it, for he participated directly in the decision not to. Now that was all Mr. Hart offered. But I think we should try every conceivable explanation. Here are a couple I can think of. Maybe Nosenko was merely boasting, exaggerating, building things up a bit, especially his personal role. Maybe, for example, he only overheard some KGB officers talking, didn't hear it right, and then passed on an incorrect story to us as his experience, to make himself look important in our eyes. Maybe, under this interpretation, he honestly thinks his story is true. Another explanation, going a bit further, might be that he invented the whole story. Perhaps, convinced that the USSR wouldn't get involved in the assassination of an American President (which is what we all tend to think), he invented this story as a contribution to American peace of mind and to international amity. 273600 Page 39
HW 53060 10 1 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 14 Both of these explanations run into trouble. Nosenko, while in detention, had plenty of time and incentive to back off a mere exaggeration, and did, in fact, admit a few minor lies.. But about this story he is adamant. Just recently Mr. Hart tried to get Nosenko to come off it, but even in the current climate of good will and trust, Nosenko refused. And remember, too, that Nosenko volunteered to testify to his incredible tale before the Warren Commission, and he swore to it under oath be- fore your committee. And there are other problems, too. If we begin to play with the idea of fabrication we will have to ask just what parts of the story were invented: did Nosenko also invent the high KGB job which gave him "knowledge" of the Oswald case? Anyway, CIA wouldn't ‘accept this line of speculation. They! insist that Nosenko always talks in good faith, even if his Oswald story isn't believable. They surely wouldn't want you to think they had hired a fabricator as their advisor and teacher. . | 7 And there is yet another obstacle to this line of thought, and not the least important. We must not forget that the Soviet Government itself has confirmed Nosenko's authority to tell the whole story about Oswaid. In Mr. Edward Jay Epstein's book Legend he reports that an attache of the Soviet. embassy in Washington, named Agu, told him that Nosenko is the person who. knows most about Oswald in Russia, even more than the people in 273600 Page 40
HW 53060 19 20. 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 15 Minsk whom Epstein applied vainly to go see. No, I think we can all agree: Mr. Hart, myself, your committee, Mr. Agu, and Mr. Nosenko: Nosenko was neither ex- || aggerating nor inventing nor forgetting nor was he compartmented away from the essential facts of the story. So what is left to explain this incredible testimony? I can think of only two explanations. Maybe Nosenko's story is true, after all. Let's overlook for a moment the fact that everyone (except Mr. Nosenko) believe the contrary, including Mr. Hart and today's CIA, including Mr. Helms, Soviet specialists, and ex-KGB veterans in the West. ‘Let's also overlook the way Nosenko contradicted himself on points of detail from one telling to another. Let's focus only on the essential elements of the story, the ones which remain constant. There are two: first, that the KGB never questioned Oswald, and second, that the KGB never found out that Oswald had information to offer them about interesting U.S. military matters. Here was this young American, Lee Harvey Oswald, just out of the Marine Corps, already inside the USSR and going to great lengths to stay. there and become a citizen. The KGB. never | bothered to talk to hin, not even once, not even to get an idea whether he might be a CIA plant (and although even Nosenko once said, I think, that. the KGB feared he might be). | Can this be true? Could we all be wrong in what we've 273600 Page 41
HW 53060 10 1 12 23 24 25 Doctld: 16 heard about rigid Soviet security precautions and about their strict procedures and disciplines, and about how dangerous it is in the USSR for someone to take a risky decision (like failing to screen an applicant for permanent residence in the USSR) ? Gf course not. Let me give you one small case history which illustrates just how wrong Nosenko's story is. This is an actual event which shows how the real KGB, in the real USSR, reacts to situations like this. It was told by a former KGB man named Kaarlo Tuomi, and can be found on page 286 of John Barron's book, KGB. The story concerns (and from here on I _ quote) "a young Finnish couple who illegally crossed the Soviet border in 1953. The couple walked into a militia station and requested Soviet citizenship, but the KGB jailed them. Continu- ous questioning during the next 11 months indicated only. that the couple believed communist propaganda and sincerely sought to enjoy the life it promised. Nevertheless the KGB consigned them to an exile camp for suspects in Kirov province. Because Tuomi spoke Finnish, the KGB sent him into the camp as a ~ "prisoner" with instructions to become friends with the couple. Hardened as he was to privation, he was still aghast at what he saw in the camp. Whole families subsisted in five-by-eight wooden stalls or cells in communal barracks. Each morning at’ six, trucks. hauled all the men away to peat bogs where they labored until dark. Small children, Tuomi observed, regularly died of ordinary maladies because of inadequate medical care. 273600 Page 42
HW 53060 . 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 17 Worse still, the camp inmates, who had committed no crime, had no idea when, if ever, they might be released. After only 3 days Tuomi persuaded himself that the forlom Finns were con- -cealing nothing, and he signaled the camp administrator to remove him. 'That place is just hell,' he later told Serafin, his KGB supervisor. 'Those people are living like slaves.' 'I -understand,' Serafim said, 'but don't get so excited. There's nothing you or I can do about it.'" That's the end of the quotation. So on the one hand we have a young ex-Marine, Lee Harvey Oswald, from the United States; on the other hand we have a simple Finnish family. Both say they want to live in Russia. The Finns are questioned for 11 months by the KGB, then con- signed indefinitely to a hellish camp for suspects. The Ameri- can is not even talked te once by the KGB. The Finn's experi- ence fits all we know about the true Soviet Union, from Aleksander Solzhenitsyn and so many others, unanimously. Oswald's experience, as Nosenko tells it, cannot have happened. The second main point of Nosenko's story about Oswald was that the KGB did not find out that Oswald had information to offer about interesting military matters. Nosenko specifically told your committee this. To demonstrate its falsity, I need only quote from page 262 of the Warren Commission report, concerning Oswald's interview with the American Consul Snyder in]. Moscow on October 31, 1959, when Oswald declared that he wished 273600 Page 43
HW 53060 12 13 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctlId: 18 to renounce his U.S. citizenship. I quote: 'Oswald also informed Snyder that he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps, intimating that he might know of something of special interest, and that he had informed a Soviet official that he “would give the Soviets any information concerning the Marine Corps and radar operation which he possessed." Nosenko didn't mention this. Apparently he didn't know it. So I think we can safely agree with Mr. Hart that Nosenko's story about Oswald is not credible, not true. Up to this point we've tried five explanations and still haven't found any acceptable one for Nosenko's story, its contradictions, or his evasive manner when confronted with these contradictions. But because you have to find an explanation, just as I had to in 1964, I will propose here the only other explanation I can think of -- one which might explain all the facts before us, including Nosenko's performance before this committee. This sixth explanation is, of course, that Nosenko's story; in its essence, is a message from the Soviet leadership, carried to the United States by a KGB-controlled agent provoca- teur who had already established a clandestine relationship of trust with CIA for other purposes a year earlier. The core of the Soviet message is simple: that the KGB, or Soviet Intelli- gence, had nothing to do with President Kennedy's assassin, nothing at all. 273600 Page 44
AW 53060 10 © 11. 12 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 19 Why they might have sent such a crude message, why they selected this channel to send it, and what truth may lie behind the story given to us, can only be guessed at. If you like, I am prepared to go into such speculation. But even without the answers to these questions, this sixth explanation would make it clear why Nosenko adhered so rigidly to his story. However incredible we might find a message from the Soviet leadership, learned and recited by Nosenko, we would find it difficult to get him to back off it: discipline is discipline, especially in the KGB. | Now, I'm ready to believe that Nosenko may have genuinely forgotten some details of this learned story. I can also accept that, on his own, he may have embroidered on it and got caught when he forgot his own embroidery; this seems to fit the facts we have, including Mr. Hart's description of Mr. Nosenko's memory. This could explain Nosenko's differing descriptions of the KGB file, and his accounts of whether there was or wasn't careful surveillance of Oswald which would detect his relations with Marina, and his change of name of the KGB officer who worked with him on the Oswald case -- that sort of detail. It would also explain why he told your committee repeatedly that he didn't remember what he'd said previously. This wouldn't have mattered if he'd really lived through the experiences he | described; his stories of them at different times should come out straight, all by themselves. When ,- in fact, they didn't, . com 273600 Page 45
HW 53060 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctId: perhaps one could just shrug and forget it. It is not. We got 20 Nosenko resorted to this strange statement, which made his stary appear more memorized than experienced. Now, I recognize that this is an unpleasant and troubling supposition, a hot potato indeed. But please remember that before coming to it, we had dismissed all the other explanations possible. So we cannot simply slide over this as easily as CIA does. It is a serious possibility, not a sick fantasy. .In fact, it is hard to avoid. What is more, Nosenko's story of Oswald is only one of scores of things that Nosenko said which make him appear to be a KGB plant. If the Oswald story were alone, as Mr. Hart said it was, a strange aberration in an otherwise normal performance, the same evasions, contradictions, excuses, whenever we pinned Nosenko down, the way you did on the Oswald story. Those other matters, while not of direct concern to this. committee, included Nosenko's accounts of his career, of his travels, of the way he learned the various items of information he reported, and even accounts of his private life. More important, there were things outside his own reporting and his own performance, which could not be explained away by any part of CIA's litany of excuses for Nosenko (which. so strangely resemble Nosenko's own). All of those irregularities point to the same conclusion: .that Nosenko was sent by the KGB to deceive us. That is, they point to the same conclusion as our sixth possible explanation of Nosenko's 2973600 Page 46
HW 53060 10 11 12. 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 21 story about Oswald. The CIA's manner of dealing with these points of doubt about Nosenko's good faith (at least since 1967) has been to take them one by one, each out of context of the others, and dismiss them with a variety of excuses, or rationalizations: confusion, drunkenness, language problems, denial that he ever. said it, bad memory, exaggeration, boasting, and coincidence -- hundreds and hundreds of coincidences. With any other defector, a small fraction of this number of things would have caused and perpetuated the gravest doubts. For the KGB does send false defectors to the West, and has been doing so for 60 years. And the doubts about this one defector were persuasive to the CIA leadership of an earlier time. Today, a later CIA leadership chooses to dismiss them. If they only pretended to do so, to justify the release and re- habilitation of Nosenko, that would be understandable. But they must really believe in Nosenko, for they are using him in cur- rent counterintelligence work and exposing their clandestine officers to him, and bringing him into their secret premises to help train their counterintelligence personnel. They go much further to demonstrate the depth of their commitment to Nosenko. They vilify their earlier colleagues who disapproved of him. The intensity of Mr. Hart's attack on me, and the fact that it was done in public, must have surprised you, as it did others with whom I've spoken over the past weeks. 273600 Page 47
‘WW 53080 13 14 15 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 22 As Nosenko's principal opponent, I am made out in public as a miserable incompetent and given credit, falsely, for murderous thoughts, illegal designs, torture, and malfeasance. | The CIA had to go far out to invent these charges, which “are not true. Mr. Hart had to bend some facts, invent others, and gloss over a lot more, in order to cover me with mud. In fact, I have detected no less than 30 errors in his testimony, 20 other misleading statements, and 10 major omis- / sions. They seem aimed to destroy the opposition to Nosenko, | and they have the effect of misleading your committee on the | significance of Nosenko's testimony about Oswald. | | ‘I will cite only a few of these points here. Others are to} be found in my letter to this committee dated October 11, 1978, | which I introduce as an annex to my testimony. I can, of course > go into further detail if you wish. But I discuss below some of the points most relevant to your appraisal of Mr. Nosenko's credibility as concerns Lee Harvey Oswald. First, Mr. Hart misled you badly. on the question of. Nosenko's general credibility. It was stunning to hear him say, after reviewing every detail of the case for 6 months with the aid of four assistants, (I quote) "I see no reason" -- here I repeat, "T see no reason" -- "to think: that (Nosenko) has ever told an untruth, except because he didn't remember it or didn't know or during those times when he was under the influence of c alcohol he exaggerated.” Even 10 years away from this case, I 273600 Page 43
HW 53060 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 -BDoctId: 23 can remember at least 20. clear cases of Nosenko's untruths about KGB activity and about the career which gave him authority to tell of it, and a dozen examples of his ignorance of matters within his claimed area of responsibility, for which there is no innocent explanation. Excuse me just a moment and off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Preyer. Back on the record. Mr. Bagley. The "influence of alcohol" cannot be much of a factor, for as Mr. Hart reminds.us, Nosenko was questioned for 292 days while in detention -- when he had no alcohol at all. But Mr. Hart jumbled together the conditions of the 1962 meeting (alleged drunkenness) with those of confinement, leading Congressman Dodd to lay importance on Nosenko's drinking. He even got over to Mr. Dodd, by a subtle turn of phrase, the idea that hallucinations "probably" influenced Nosenko's performance under interrogation. Yet Mr. Hart must have known that hallucinations were never a factor in the question-and-answer sessions. Then, too, Mr. Hart misstated the early roots of our suspicions of Nosenko. Mr. Hart said that they arose from the paranoid imaginings and jealousy of a previous defector, whom he calls "X." “Mr. Hart told you, and I quote, that "Mr. X's views were immediately taken to be the definitive views of Nosenko and from that point on, the treatment of Mr. Nosenko was never, 273600 Page 49
10 11 12 19 20 21 23 | 24. 25 HW 53060. BDoctId: 24 until 1967, devoted to learning what Mr. Nosenko said.'' This is not true, as a document in the files, which I wrote in 1962, will make clear. It was not''X"'stheories which caused my initial suspicion of Nosenko in 1962. It was the overlap of. Nosenko's reports -- at first glance entirely convincing and important -- with those given 6 months earlier by "X."" Alone, Nosenko looked good to me, as Mr. Hart said; seen alongside my nf whose reporting I had not seen before coming to Headquarters after the 1962 meetings with Nosenko, Nosenko looked very odd indeed. The matters which overlapped were serious ones, including a specific lead to penetration of CIA -- not a general allegation, as Mr. Hart misleadingly suggested. There were at least a dozen such points of overlap, of which I can still remember at least eight. Nosenko's information tended to negate or deflect leads from "X."' . | And this brings me to Mr. Hart's efforts to make you think that the suspicions of Nosenko were based on foolish fancies about “horrendous plots." Let me try to restore the balance ‘here. A KGB paper of this period described the need for dis- information (deception) in KGB: counterintelligence work. It stated that just catching American spies isn't enough, for the enemy can always start again with new ones. Therefore, said this KGB document, disinformation operations are essential. - Anc among their purposes was "to negate and discredit authentic in- formation which the enemy has obtained."' There is.some reason 273600 Page 50
HW 53060 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: understandable to laymen. But as I have said, Mr. Hart's which led to the final uncovering of Kim Philby; to the first 273600 Page 51 25 to believe that Nosenko was on just such a mission in 1962: to cover and protect KGB sources threatened by "X'''s defection. Does this sound like a “horrendous plot" conjured up by paranoids? It is known counterespionage technique, perfectly purpose was not enlightenment, but ridicule. To prove Mr. Nosenko's credibility, Mr. Hart made a breathtaking misstatement about the defector "X": 'Quantita- tively and qualitatively," said Mr. Hart, "the information given by Mr. 'X' was much smaller than that given by Nosenko."" Could Mr. Hart really have meant that? Mr. "X," paranoid or not, provided in the first months after his defection information detection of several important penetrations of Western European governments; proof (not general allegations) of penetration at the heart of French intelligence; and pointers to serious penetrations of the United States Government. Before Nosenko "x" uncovered the current organization and. methods of the KGB, and very large numbers of its personnel active in its foreign | operations. | And listen to this: It was Mr. "x" who first revealed bot of the two KGB operations which Mr. Hart adduced as of Nosenko's good faith! _ They concerned microphones in the American Embassy in Moscow ‘and a penetration of one of our NATO allies. As for the microphones, Mr. Hart stated that "Mr. Nosenko
HW 53080 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 - 24 25 DocId: 26 was responsible for the discovery of a system of microphones within the U.S. Embassy in Moscow which had hitherto been suspected but nobody had enough information on it to actually detect it." But Mr. "'X" had given approximate locations of some of the microphones 6 months earlier. Like Nosenko, he did not know the precise locations, but he knew the mikes were there and could indicate some specific offices where they could be found. The actual tearing out of walls, which Mr. Hart mentioned, would have been done, and the microphone "'system'' found, without Nosenko's information. Contrary to Mr. Hart's statement the KGB would "throw away" already-compromised information to build up a source of theirs. Mr. Hart simply hid from you the fact that | this information was already compromised when Nosenko delivered it. | | Mr. Hart's other proof of Nosenko's credibility was as follows: Mr. Hart said, "A very high level KGB penetration in very sensitive position in a Western European government was, O the basis of Mr. Nosenko's lead, arrested, tried, and convicted of espionage. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away.'' End of quote. Now, Mr. Hart was presumably referring to a man we can here call "Y" although his case is very well known to the public. Did Mr. Hart really not know, or did he choose to hide from you, the fact that "Y'''s reports to the KGB were known to Mr. nym the earlier defector? The KGB, knowing this, cut off contact with 273600 Page 52
HW 53060 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctlId: 27 "Y" immediately after "X'''s defection. "Y'''s uncovering was therefore inevitable, even though "X" had not known "Y''s name. -Nosenko added one item of information which permitted "Y" to be caught sooner; that is all. How, then, could Mr. Hart have said "There is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have given this information away"? The reason, that "Y" was already compromised, was perfectly clear in the files which Mr. Hart's team studied. Mr. Hart also told you that Mr. "X" had confirmed Nosenko's -claimed positions in the KGB. This is not true. Mr. "X" said, on the contrary, that he had personally visited the American Embassy section of the KGB during the 1960-61 period when || Nosenko claims to have been its deputy chief, and knew definite- ly that Nosenko was not serving there. So these are some of the matters affecting Nosenko's general credibility, which may be important to you when you assess the meaning of Nosenko's incredible testimony on Oswald. Now, Mr. Hart also distorted the CIA's performance in get- ting the facts about Oswald from Nosenko. Your committee staff report had it right, before Mr. Hart came forth. Referring to the Agency's questioning of Nosenko on July 3 and 27, 1964, the report says that the CIA's questions "were detailed and speci fie| about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. The questions were chronological and an attempt was made to touch all aspects of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union." Close quote. Moreover, the 273600 Page 53
10 W 12 20 21 x) 24 25 HW 53080 DocId: 28 . CIA gave Nosenko a transcript of his own remarks so he could ad any more he knew, or correct any errors. This is from your staf report, pages 7-9. But then came Mr. Hart with his sweeping denunciations of CIA's "miserable" and "dismal" and "zero" performance, and stating flatly that "There was no effort being made to get at more information (Nosenko) might have." Mr. Hart thus led Congressman Fithian to suggest that the CIA had not even taken “the logical first step" of getting Nosenko's information and led the chairman to conclude that no investigation of Oswald's activities as known to Nosenko had been made. In this Mr. Hart concurred. In truth, of course, there was nothing more to be got from Nosenko, unless it would be later changes of earlier details, as happened when your committee questioned Nosenko. If there had | been more, we would have gone doggedly after it, of course. We | were not the incompetents Mer. Hart made us out to be. Your staff report said that Nosenko "recited" the same story in each of his three sessions with the committee. The word is apt: Nosenko had "recited" that story before, to the CIA and FBI, each of which questioned him systematically about it. So why did Mr. Hart give his own Agency a "zero" on all phases of the handling of Nosenko?- Surely he was seeking to fling mud, not to give serious answers to serious questions. His effect was confusion. 273600 Page 54
HW 53060 12 13 14 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 29 Mr. Hart also suggested to you that CIA just didn't in- vestigate the validity of what Nosenko had said about Oswald. That is equally false. What else, for example, was the purpose of our subjecting Nosenko to hostile interrogation and subject- ing his information to meticulous investigation wherever we could? Those 40 file drawers are full of the results. But of course we were not able to check inside the USSR, as the Warren Commission noted. We didn't have other sources in the KGB who were connected with this Oswald case. But think ho lucky we were to have even one inside source on Oswald inside the KGB. Of the many thousands of KGB men around the world, CI had secret relations with only one, and this one turned out to have participated directly in the Oswald case. Not only once, but on three separate occasions: when Oswald came to Russia in 1959; when he applied for a visa from Mexico to return to Russia; and again after the assassination when the Kremlin leadership caused a definitive review of the whole KGB file on Oswald. How many KGB men could say as much? CIA was thus un- believably lucky to be able to contribute to the Warren Report. In view of other suspicions of Nosenko, the key word in that last sentence is "unbelievably." Gentlemen, I hesitated before replying publicly to Mr . Hart’s false charges, for a number of reasons: - For one thing, I found it hard to imagine myself in the position of defending myself against the CIA before 273600 Page 55
AW 53060 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25° DoctlId: 30 the Congress. My record should have been ample protection against that. Then, too, I'm comfortable in the knowledge that my. honor and integrity, although torn to shreds by the CIA before this committee and the public, remain intact with those who know the truth. And of course, my embarrassment, my public dishonor, count for little compared with the reputation of a_ integrity. To call public attention to the way the CIA misinformed you might cause it embarrassment. I do not want to harm the CIA, which has enough real enemies. For without -the.CIA, who would remain: to oppose the relent- Government agency which must uphold an image of less work of subversion and deception and penetration being directed abroad by the KGB against our country? Who would oppose that arrogant and brutal instrument of repression in the secret, dark places where it works? Finally, it was this thought, of the KGB, which decided me to come before you. Some of the mud the CIA spattered on me might have clouded your view of the KGB's relations with Lee Harvey Oswald, as given to you by Yuri Nosenko of the KGB. The flying mud may have screened important aspects of the case. By wiping. some of it away I thought I might help you to restore what seemed to me a clear presentation of the facts in your 273600 Page 56 : , .
HW 53080 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 31 committee staff report -- written before Mr. Hart's testimony. What I seek is to let the facts carry the day, to wipe them clean again for your inspection. You need not accept either the beseechings of Mr. Hart, or any counterargument from me. But my hope is that you will not let the facts get obscured by emotional distortions, or irrelevancies. Mr. Chairman, my prepared statement continues now with a series of remarks on a series of issues. of interest to the committee,which is the detention of Mr. Nosenko. I have already mentioned to you that I think it irrelevant to your concerns, but since it was a matter of considerable concern to you and of interest to the public, I have prepared a few pages here which I can either read.or use in response to a few questions you may have.. | Mr. Preyer. Let me suggest that you read them. Mr. Bagley. Thank you, sir. The detention of Nosenko has been described in sensation- alist terms by Mr. Hart and, as he clearly intended, has caused some outrage on the part of the committee. I want to deal with it because the committee has been led to consider it, not be- cause it is truly pertinent to your concerns. Mr. Hart and Mr, Nosenko use it, falsely, as an excuse for discrepancies in ‘Nosenko's reporting. But this is a distraction, filling Mr. Hart's testimony in place of discussion of Lee Harvey Oswald. - - Mr. Hart's bias must have been evident to all. He 273600 Page 57
20 21 23 24 25 HW 53080 DoctIa: 32 expressed his personal view that the treatment of Nosenko was "absolutely unacceptable" and he introduced terms like "bank vault"' to imply inhuman treatment. He led Mr. Sawyer to talk of a "torture vault" and "partial starvation" and gave the idea that Nosenko was subjected to unbearable heat, or left shudderin in the wintry cold. He portrayed the conditions in terms. leading committee members to use words like "shocking" and “horrible.'' Yet at the same time Mr. Hart was describing himself as a "historian" bound by known fact. In fact, he mis- led you about almost every aspect of the detention.» Had he in fact bothered to collect facts from all con-. cerned, you would have gotten a quite different and more rational point of view, one which deserved at least some respect if for no other reasons than that it prevailed within Mr. Hart's own organization for 3 years. In fact, one overriding flaw in Mr. Hart's version of these "horrible" matters is that the Agency leadership -- serious and responsible people -- had approved Nosenko's detention and at least the broad outlines of his treatment. Mr. Hart's way around this was to. suggest that Mr. Helms was not aware of what was going on. Mr. Helms has belied that and indeed has called into question some of the impressions conveyed by Mr. Hart to the committee concerning Nosenko's treatment. _I participated in most of the discussions about the detention and I remember the circumstances pretty well. Let me 273600 Page 58
HW 453080" 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctlId: 33 propose to you the explanation I would have given you had I been the Agency's representative. What I. knew may be more valid then what Mr. Hart has selected from Agency records and colored in sensationalist hues. In the first place, let me remind you of the reasons for the detention. Mr. Helms described a few of them, but Mr. Hart did not give you the picture at all. This is important, for if Mr. Hart succeeds in dismissing and deriding the case against . Nosenko and all its implications, he robs the detention of its context and purpose and truly makes it, as Mr. Dodd put it, “outrageous.'' Here is why Nosenko was confined: - First, during the initial period of freedom after his defection, when his handling was identical to that of any normal defector, Nosenko resisted any serious questioning. It was not that he was "drunk around the clock" as Mr. Hart put it; he was usually sober when he deflected questions, changed the subject, and invented excuses not to talk. - Second, his conduct and lack of discipline threatened embarrassment to the Agency during his parole in the United States. Remember, he had not been formally admitted to this country. | _- Third, there was a documented body of evidence, not "supposed evidence" -- that's a quote from Mr. Hart -- beyond any explanations of bad memory or misunderstandings, which made it likely that Nosenko had been sent by the KGB to mislead us. 273600 Page 59
10° 11 12 18 19 20 21 © 22 23 24 25° HW 53060 DBoctId: 34 It was not juridicial proof, but it was taken very seriously by the Agency's professional leadership, who were neither fools nor paranoids. | | - Fourth, the implications underlying this very real “possibility were too serious to ignore. Among them were these two: that Lee Harvey Oswald may have been a KGB agent, and that there was KGB penetration of sensitive elements of the United States Government. - Fifth, if we were to confront Nosenko with the contra- dictions and doubts while he was still free, he would be able to take steps to evade further questioning indefinitely. | - Sixth, there was a special urgency to get at the truth of Nosenko's reports about. Lee Harvey Oswald because of the time limits imposed on the Warren Commission. The legal basis for the detention has been explained to you by Mr. Helms. It had, as we understood clearly at the time, the approval of the Department of Justice and other Government agencies. We did not think we were doing anything illegal, at least not until the time had stretched out beyond reasonable limits, at which time we began to prepare for his release. Nosenko himself didn't seem to consider it "illegal" at the time ; it doubtless seemed a logical intensification of the _ severity of the screening process which he knew he had to go through. He did not complain of violation of any constitutional rights nor ask for a lawyer. An innocent man might have 273600 Page 60
10 11 12. 20 21 23 24 25 HW 53060 Doctd: 35 protested and resisted, but Nosenko was engaged in a contest, and knew that he was failing to convince us -- as indeed he freely admitted (he said he was "Looking bad" even to himself, but had no way to explain the many contradictions, ignorances, and errors). He complained about cold and heat, but not, as far as I remember, about the fact of detention and interrogation. There were two basic requirements for the detention: that it be secure and that Nosenko not be able to communicate with. the outside (with the KGB or with unwitting helpers). There- fore, we needed a separate, isolated. house ina rural or thinly populated area, as far as possible from other houses, with discreet access for the comings and goings which an interroga- tion would require. The Office of Security found a place, but as I remember it was not easy and the rent was high. The actual conditions of detention within the house were not designed to cause him discomfort -- or, for that matter, ‘comfort either. They were to be healthy and clean. He was never touched or threatened and he always knew he wouldn't be; he could always resist a line of questioning by simply clamming up, with a shrug; there was nothing we could do about it. | Nosenko complained about. the heat in summer. . His window was blocked, not to cause him discomfort but to avoid contact with the outside. A top-floor room was chosen in preference to a basement because it would be dry and healthy, while the base- ment would be damp. When it became stuffy; Nosenko rightly | 273600 Page 61
HW 53060 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 36 complained and as I remember, an effort was made to improve the situation; I think a blower was installed to keep the air moving, but perhaps this can be checked in the files. I don't remember any complaint about cold in the winter. If there had been, I cannot imagine why he would not have been given extra blankets, and I do not believe the complaint is justified. His diet was planned always in consultation with a medical doctor. To accuse the Agency of trying to subject him to "partial starvation" is unjust; to imply that Nosenko's handlers wanted to, but a medical doctor "intervened" (as Mr. Hart said) is to distort the facts. The doctor was consulted in advance, at every phase of the detention, and checked Nosenko regularly. I can't remember the time period, but I think it was weekly. It might have been every 2 weeks. The diet was made more or less aus tere depending on the situation at any given phase of the interrogation, but it was always a healthy one.. The time frame has been much distorted here. We did not foresee a long detention -- as ‘both Mr. Helms and Mr. Hart have said. The first step, and perhaps the only one which required detention, was to be the confrontation, the hostile interroga- tion. I do not remember how long we thought it would last; perhaps somewhere between 2 weeks and 2 months. From then on the detention became extended, phase by phase. First, the hostile interrogation. The results surprised . 2273600 Page 62
37 us. Before, we suspected Nosenko might be a plant; afterwards, 211 we had come to think moreover that he might never have been a 3 |} true KGB officer and that he surely had not held certain of the ® 4 || positions in the KGB which he claimed. (This view was rein- 5 forced in later questionings.) | 6 At the conclusion of the hostile interrogation, in which 7 “Nosenko himself admitted that he. "looked bad" even to himself, 8 || Nosenko was entirely willing to submit to a systematic de- 9 || briefing. He said that we had been right to separate him from 10 |} drink and women and make him work seridusly. He did not com- 11 plain then of the conditions of detention. 12 So began the second phase, a systematic questioning of the 13 sort which we would have done with any normal defector under 14 |} conditions of freedom. Nosenko ate quite good food, got books 15 to read, and cooperated without complaint (except when it got the new information derived from his questioning and from out- 19 side investigations in the meantime. It deepened our suspicions, 20 gave us more insight into what might lie behind him, and 21 produced some confessions of minor lies -- which did not remove the doubts, for the new version contradicted other things he 23 || had said. But he did not confess to Soviet control. During 24 this period his diet was made more Spartan, and he was not give reading material. 16 too hot). 17 The third phase was a second hostile interrogation using | 25 HW 53080 DocId:4?273600 Page 63
HW 53060 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 38 Nothing was harmful to Nosenko, however. You have only to listen to his complaints (lack of reading material, and other diversions, being about the worse) to realize that this was not "torture" whatever Nosenko's advantage in making it appear so. After the second hostile interrogation -- I don't remember the date; I believe it was late 1965 -- excuse me, late 1964 -- Nosenko was moved to the second holding area. This we can call the fourth phase. | Much has been made of CIA's constructing a house to hold Wosenko. But the true explanation is far less lurid than Mr. Hart would make it seem. A new safehouse was needed because time erodes the security of any safe area; it was time to move. There was no thought about how much longer the detention had to last; Nosenko was still in the United States on parole to the CIA; we would not, under any circumstances, have certified to the immigration authorities that we considered him a bona fide immigrant. On the contrary, we had a mass of reasons to believe that he was a KGB agent sent to harm the interests of this country. — So what could we do about him? The first thing, in view of the serious implications underlying this suspicion, was to clarify the doubts to the best of our ability. And at that point we still thought there were ways to learn more, enough to justify continuing the effort. | Suitable rural houses near Washington were, of course, hard. to find, expensive to rent, and involved leases for minimum 273600 Page 64
HW 53060 ce) 10 11 12 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 39 period, security hazards, and the threat that breaches of security might make us move again and again. And such holding areas required a large guard force. So the Office of Security considered it not only safer and better for our purposes, but also cheaper, to build a place on Government-owned land, than to leasé a new house, pay the guards, make the alterations, et cetera, for a period we could not control. ‘As to’ the design of that house. Mr. Hart invented the term “bank vault;' which is a catchy phrase but a purposeful misrep- resentation, a misrepresentation of his own Agency's motives. The facts were these. The house was to be separate, but to hold down costs it should be as small as possible. There were certain minimum requirements: an interview room, a room for Nosenko, and a room for the guard or guards. It should require as few guards as possible. It should have an open-air exercise area, but not such as to let him see where he was. And as in the earlier safehouse, he should not be able to communicate with the outside, hence no windows. To prevent tunneling, his room should be of stronger construction. Now, to go from these last two criteria, as Mr. Hart did, and say that "in addition to the vault, which surrounded it,'' is to misstate the truth.. The house was designed by the Office of Security, which was responsible for all the physical aspects of holding Nosenko. At no time did any representative of the Office of Security express 2273600 Page 65 ~
10 11 12° 20 21 23 24, 25 HW 53080 DocIa: 2273600 Page 66 40» any dissatisfaction with the manner of Nosenko's handling, nor disagreement with the suspicions of Nosenko which underlay the detention. | It has been said that Nosenko was kept in "solitary con- finement" and unoccupied, with a special view to influencing him to confess. In fact, there was no alternative to "solitary confinement" (could we have found him a companion) and it was physically impossible to arrange to question him constantly. One day of interrogation requires at least a day and perhaps | more of report writing, and a day or more of investigation, and later sessions take time to prepare. And for almost all the people involved, there were other responsibilities, other tasks; the work went on even outside the Nosenko case. How Mr. Hart could imagine that the Agency leadership (professionals with experience in interrogation) thought Nosenko was under constant questioning is incomprehensible to me. Mr. Hart says we inter- rogated Nosenko for 292 days out of 1277. That makes about 1 day in 4, if you let us off for weekends, and that sounds about right and normal. If I once wrote that the time between. questionings would make Nosenko "ponder," then I was rational- izing inevitable gaps, not planning an unbearable isolation for the man. The detention had positive results. We got, as we never - could have otherwise, the bulk of what Nosenko had to report, pure and free of any outside coaching. We were able to detect
HW 53060 11 12 13 14 23 24 25 DoclId: 41 just how ignorant he was, and in just what areas. We could probe the limits of his knowledge, and they were rigid, even in connection with things he had claimed to have lived through. (Much like his recited story of Lee Harvey Oswald). We were able to apply test questions to refine or test our hypotheses, in the absence of a confession. But, limited by morality and the law, we were not able to get a confession. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, I suppose that we would have done just as well to give him better food, more books, music, a big bed, games, and occasional informal conversations. -But that was not clear at the time. But we could hardly, in good conscience under our responsi- bility under the parole; sponsor him for U.S. immigration. It took a whitewash and pretended belief in his tales to accomplish that. | Now I want to address myself to the question of disposal. Here the extent of CIA's irrational involvement with Nosenko becomes blatant. Mr. Hart read (with relish, according to my: friends who watched on TV) selected items from some ‘penciled jottings in my handwriting which left with you the impression that I had contemplated or considered (even "Sug- gested" as more than one newspaperman understood him) such measures as ‘Liquidation, drugging, or - confinement in mental 4G institutions. I state unequivocally, under oath, that: 273600 Page 67
13 14 15 16 18 19. 20 21 23 24 25 HW 53080 ‘DocId: 42 - First, no such measures were ever seriously considered. - Second, no such measures were ever studied. (What "loony bin"? How "make him nuts"? What drugs to induce forgetfulness? I know of none now and never did, nor did I ever try to find out if such exist. The whole subject of "liquidation" was taboo in the CIA for reasons with which I wholeheartedly agreed then and still do.) - Third, no such measures were ever suggested as a course of action, even in intimate personal conversations. - Fourth, no such Measures were ever proposed at any level of the Agency. Of course, Mr. Helms, when he testified before you, hadn't heard of those penciled notes; neither had anyone else. I do not remember making any such notes. And I have had much time to try to remember. However, I can imagine how I might have. Responsible as I was for this "abominable" case, I was called upon to help find the best way to release Nosenko -- without a confession but sure that he was an enemy agent. In an effort to find something meriting serious consideration, I suppose that I jotted down, one day, every theoretically con- ceivable action. Some of them might have been mentioned in one form or another by others; I doubt they all sprang from my mind. (I cannot even guess what "points 1 through 4"might have been, the ones Mr. Hart declined to read because they were 2973600 Page 68
HW 53060 10 11 12 20 a 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 43 "unimportant." I guess that means they weren't damning to me.) But the fact that the notes were penciled reveals that they were intended to be transient; the fact that “Liquidation" was in- cluded reveals that they were theoretical: and their loose, undignified language reveals that they were entirely personal, for my fleeting use only. In fact, none of these courses of action could have been morally acceptable to me nor conceivable as a practical suggestion to higher authority. Mr. Hart admitted, or proudly claimed, that he himself discovered these notes in the files. - Although he recognized their purely personal nature, that they were not addressed nor intended for any other person, nor had any practical intent, he chose to bring them to show-and-tell to the committee and to the American public. Did he feel this a moral duty? Or was it simply part of his evident intent to deride and destroy any opposition to Nosenko? - Could he have done it for reasons of personal. spite? Whatever the answer, the cost seems too high: he was discrediting his own Agency for a matter without substance. | I cannot remember any concrete proposal for "disposal" being made during my tenure. You understand, of course, that "disposal" is merely professional jargon for ending a relation- ship which began with "acquisition.'' Those are-two words that. go together, being "acquisition" and "disposal." The course the Agency eventually adopted seems, in retrospect, the only 273600 Page 69
HW 53060 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22° 23 24 25 Docld: ab practical one. I think the Agency did well to rehabilitate Nosenko and, as I thought, put him out to pasture. However, I cannot understand-.why they then employed him as an advisor, as a teacher of their staff trainees in counter- intelligence. The concrete suspicions of Nosenko have never been resolved, and because they are well-founded, they never will "be cleared up and go away." Mr. Hart and Admiral Turner may frivolously dismiss them, as they have done before your committee, but the doubts are still there and it is irrespon- sible to expose clandestine personnel to this individual. In conclusion, Mr. Hart's testimony was a curious perfor- — mance. One wonders what could drive a Government agency into the position of: - trying to discredit and bury under a pile of irrelevancies the reasons to suspect that the Soviet Union sent to America a provocateur to - mislead us about the assassin of President Kennedy ; - pleading irrationally and misleadingly in favor of a KGB man about whom serious doubts persist; - misrepresenting, invidiously, its own prior . action; .- denigrating publicly the competence and performance of duty of its own officers; - dredging up unsubstantial personal notes, left 273600 Page 70
HW 53060 10 1 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 45 carelessly in a highly secret file folder, to falsely suggest in public the planning by its own people of the vilest forms of misconduct. As the Congress is conspicuously aware, the veil of secrecy can hide irresponsibility and incompetence. But behind that veil the CIA used to maintain unusually high standards. of honor and decency and responsibility, and did a pretty competent job, often in the face of impossible demands. The decline of these qualities is laid bare by Mr. Hart's testimony -- to the Agency's discredit, to my own dismay, and to the detriment of future recruitment of good men, who will not want to make careers.in an environment without integrity. -The Agency need not have gone so far. After all, Nosenko's bona fides had been officially certified. Those who disagreed were judged at its highest level to have "besmirched the Agency's escutcheon." Not only are they out of the way, but "everything possible" is being done to see that no‘one chal- lenges Nosenko or his. ilk, ever again. The Agency need only have said this much, and no more. - | | . That Admiral Turner's personal emissary went so much further suggests that the Agency may not, after all, be quite so sure of its position. Perhaps it fears that this committee, wondering about this defector's strange reporting and uncon- strained by CIA's official line, might innocently cry out, "But the emperor has no clothes!"" This might explain the spray of 273600 Page 71
18 19 20 21 23 24 25 HW 53080 DoctId: 46 mud, to cloud your view. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. My only regret is that I have not had the opportunity to answer publicly charges that have been made in public. And I should also like to point out in closing that in making this presentation and in.responding to your questions today I may be limited by the fact that the Agency has denied me access to certain documents which I requested be made available. With that in mind, I will be happy to address any questions you may have. Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Bagley. Mr. Fithian, Mr. Klein will be recognized for questioning. Would you prefer to ask questions before Mr. Klein? Mr. Fithian. No. | Mr. Preyer. I recognize Mr. Kiein at this time. Mr. Klein. Mr. Bagley, you referred in your testimony to- the memo that was provided to this committee by Mr. Hart. The actual memo was not provided; a typewritten copy of that account was provided, JFK F-427. I will ask the clerk to show you a copy of that document . | | | | Mc. Chairman, that has already been previously marked into evidence in previous hearings. | | In looking at that document, do you recognize the words as being your own? | Mr. Bagley. No, as I said in my testimony, I can't 273600 Page 72
HW 53060 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctlId: 47 remember any such document. However, I wish to point out that also said it is not at all inconceivable to me that such a document existed, and I did write it. Mr. Klein. Some of the questions I will be directing to you refer to the letter; I believe that is also being put into the record. It is JFK Exhibit 136. You have testified that you were directly responsible for the case of the KGB defector Yuri Nosenko from 1961 to 1962; is that correct? Mr.. Bagley. Yes. Mr. Klein. Was learning what Nosenko knew of Lee Harvey Oswald a major objective of the CIA during those years? Mr. Bagley. This question has arisen in some of the previous questions I have read. There may be some question about the word "major." I would like to say the question of Lee Harvey Oswald was major indeed in our thoughts. We had in our custody the only witness to Oswald's life in the Soviet Union. So it was certainly important. The information which Nosenko gave about Oswald was so circumscribed, so rigid that we took it, we questioned him, as you know, and got to what we thought were the limits of his “knowledge. It was not expanded to anything he really lived through. It was there. We thought we had it. We questioned him in Geneva, I think twice. It is in the record. We talked 2273600 Page 73
ills ls 1:30 HW 53060 10 17 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 48-49 to him here about its The Bureau had him then afterwards In the conditions of detention it was part of the systematic questioning to which I referred in my testimony. It was dealt with seriously. But I don't believe we had much hope of getting any deeper into it. We thought, Mr. Klein, that we had what Nosenko had to say about Oswald. Now whether that's giving it proper importance, it was -- well, of course it was important], but we didn't keep going back day after day for 1,000 days to keep asking him, can you think anything more about it? | The answer is yes, it's important; no, we didn't pound on it incessantly as perhaps a major or important subject might be pounded on. But I say even now, having read excerpts of your talks with him and having seen one or two things change, I would say, perhaps we would have made changes in his story. 273600 Page T4
Mills/gay 11:30 11/16 © HW 53080 1 8 20 21. 22 23 24 25 Docla: 50 Mr. Klein. Was determining whether Nosenko was telling the truth about Oswald, was that a major objective? Mr. Bagley. Yes, it was. Mr. Klein. And did you believe at that time that if Nosenko- was lying about Oswald, thatthat could have immense implications? Mr. Bagley. Yes. But the lying about Oswald was, in this sense, parallel to the lying about several other things, a lot of other things. As you saw, when I took this one case, the case of Lee Harvey Oswald, and took it through our or my thought processes, if you like, I couldn't find any logical or any illogical explanation for why he said what he said about Oswald. So, of course, iW finding out why he was saying it or whether he was telling the truth was of immense importance. As you see, independent of all of the other aspects of Nosenko' s bona fides, we could come to a point of extreme doubt of his bona fides solely on the basis of the Oswald case. Mr. Klein. Now, you quoted from our own report about the detail and specificity of the July 3 and July 27 interro- gations of Nosenko, when he was asked about Oswald in the Soviet Union. | Do you know of any other sessions when Nosenko was ques- tioned specifically in detail. about Oswald and Oswald's ne 273600 Page 75
HW 53060 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 51 ‘about Oswald in the Soviet Union? Mr. Bagley. I don't know. I can't remember. I cannot remember. I do know that in our office we spent -- now, in my office at this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out, as I mentioned in my opening remarks about my career, that during the period from 1962 to about 1965 I was in charge of counterintelligence within the Soviet bloc -- Soviet Russia division. We were the operational element probably most closely involved with the Soviet intelligence aspects of what would come out in the Oswald case, along with the counterintelligence staff, as you know. “We did--because we had sources, defectors and experts at our behest--we did dig. We thought, well, what can we supply, how can we shed some light on this thing. This was on every- body's mind, and it was extremely important to us. -I remember, for example, the passing out of questions to certain defectors who were working with us from the KGB predecessor organization, and their information, their questions, their comments, were brought into us and to the best of my knowledge were made available to the Warren Commission. This is not Nosenko, you remember. This is other sources about Oswald. There were a number of questions which Mr. Epstein got and published in his book as an appendix, through the Freedom DoclId: 42273600 Page 76
HW 53060 10 1 12 17 18 19 20. 21 22 23 24 25 Docla: 52 of Information Act, which came from my section. He calls it 44 questions, but the way it is organized in the book it is a lot more than 44 questions because each one is a group of questions. Now, we passed that to the CIA staff, which was our chanel and liaison to the bureau, and it was passed to the bureau, and there was a big back and forth about whether they would or wouldn't service these questions in their dealings with Nosenko. | They were quite detailed questions, as they had to do with Soviet procedures primarily. Those questions were, I gather, never serviced by the bureau. I can only say in retrospect -- and here my memory fails me slightly -- that by giving them in through channels to be put to Nosenko, somehow we dropped them because I don't believe thaty the conditions of detention, I don't think.those so- called 44 questions were put to Nosenko. When I look back on it, that is something that I would have to answer did we do absolutely .everything, I think it would have been extremely interesting, and I don't quite understand if we didn't why we didn't. Mr. Klein. I lost one point you were making. You said you gave them to the bureau, and the bureau did not ask the questions, bureau meaning -- | Mr. Bagley... The FBI. - 273600 Page Tt?
HW 53060 10 11 12 13 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: Mr. Klein. Didn't the CIA have custody of Nosenko at all times? Mr. Bagley. No. As has been said, custody is not the word here. Responsibility for the questioning of Nosenko on Lee Harvey Oswald was very firmly in the hands of the FBI. Believe me, we were extremely conscious of this, and if my memory is right, I believe we were enjoined at the time not to question him. Certainly there was no doubt that by giving him the body, the man, Nosenko, into the hands of the FBI for as long as they wanted -- I am talking now about conditions of liberty, of course, in this period, immediately after his defection -- that the United States -- the appropriate United States organ- ‘ization for the inquiry into Nosenko's knowledge of Lee Harvey 2 oor clyody Oswald was accomplished. “We had given him, and it was the bureau's job. They did their questioning. You know, I don't know to this day exactly what they asked him. I learned more from your staff report than I had known before. Mr. Klein. Is it your testimony that the agency was constrained from asking Nosenko questions about Oswald's activities in Russia because the FBI had primary jurisdiction | in this? | | / Mr. Bagley. Yes, I think so. 273600 Page 76
HW 53060 12 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctlId: 55 here. I would like to ask a question on this, and if I ask it later it will be as disjointed as can be. If the FBI had responsibility for the questioning of Oswald, which I believe you just said -- Mr. Bagley. Yes. Mr. Fithian. -- how then could you testify earlier, as I believe I understood you to testify, that the questions you asked and the answers you received from Oswald -- from Nosenko about Oswald, I think you said the Oswald case alone disproved Nosenko's bona fides. Mr. Bagley. I didn't say disproved. I said it was a factor in testing of bona fides. I don't think I said dis- proved because the word "prove" is a tricky one in this case. Mr. Fithian. That is not the. burden of my question. The burden of my question is if there was this clear jurisdictional division, are you saying, or aren't you saying that the CIA did or did not question Oswald -- question Nosenko intensely or otherwise about Oswald. | | Mr. Bagley. Oh, yes, I would be glad to review what I said about that. | During the period when we were dealing with Mr. Nosenko- in Geneva, we -- this was an active hot operational matter, there was no question of FBI at all--we were face to face ‘with a man who was in the jargon of the agency, was an agent 273600 Page 60
56 1 in place -- Nosenko before his defection, who was meeting us 2 under clandestine circumstances in Geneva. He was telling us 3 about Lee Harvey Oswald. e | 4 We, of course, took that and got it as straight and as 5 thoroughly as we could under those circumstances. 6 After he defected and came to the United States, it was, 7 through the channels that Mr. Klein is interested in -- it 8 was made clear tha the FBI, as the primary investigative 9 agency on the President's assassination, would manage the 10 further and detailed questioning of Mr. Nosenko in the United 1 States on his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald. | 2 Later, after the detention -- as I mentioned, we tried 13 to get some sort of admissions from Nosenko by the act of 14 hostile interrogation. Those, as far as I remember -- there 1s were no questions involved in there because there were no 16 contradictions about Oswald, and I don't think that was part of 7 our hostile interrogation. 18 But subsequent to the hostile interrogation, as I say, 19 “we were able for the first time because this man had 50 resisted it earlier, we were able to ask him the kinds of — 3 questions we would have asked him had he been free, any normal defector.  ) 22 co | | We got to the questions and back to the questions of Lee 23 . a . Harvey Oswald in the course of that systematic debriefing. That, 24 I think, will explain the dates, Mr. Klein, that are in your » 25 HW 53080 DocId:3~273600 Page 61
HW 53080 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 57 report, which I didn't know, I don't remember. They were the 3rd and 27th of July. Again, I learned from the report or I was reminded by the report that the detention and the hostile interrogation bega in early April. As I remember it, the systematic questioning continued through the summer, and as a part of that questioning not with any expectation that there was more to come, that we would have to contribute about Oswald, but because we wanted to do everything we could to get his full story before the Warren Commission closed its decors, we did ask him about these matters : The result was -- Mr. Fithian. Even though at that time you did not have -- the FBI still had jurisdiction? Mr. Bagley. The question wasn't -- in fact, Mr. Fithian, the question was no longer, ! think -- we didn't feel any constraint during this period of detention. There was nothing preventing us from talking to Nosenko about Oswald. The only thing that may have inhibited us was the conviction that he had no more to say about it. Certainly I think the comparison of what we got in Geneva, and the rather systematic questioning in July, there wasn't any more substance to it. He was making certain statements, and those statements were either true or not true, But, they were certainly very 273600 Page 8?
HW 53060 10 | 12 14 15 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 58 limited. I think we could list the number of facts he gave us about the Oswald case, and they would not be a very long list. They have to do with how he heard abou it and what he heard about Oswald's attempt at suicide, about Oswald's psychological asséssment they did or did not do in the KGB, or in a Soviet hospital, on Oswald. These facts lined up have not changed and they have not increased by subsequent questionings. And I think by the time we were talking about, while Nosenko was in detention and we could have asked him as many questions as we wanted to, I think our feeling was | that we had his story. And I think subsequent events have | borne that out. The only thing I regret, as I say, is that those forty- four questions which we Had passed to the FBI, I don't think “we should have felt any inhibition about asking Nosekno those at that time. I don't think anybody should have any “inhibitions about asking Mr. Nosenko those questions today. So I hope that answers your question. Mr. Fithian. I was just unclear -- Mr. Bagley. While he was in detention, we didn't feel strongly constrained. There was not much thought -- the Bureau was always -- the FBI was always aware that if they wanted to talk to Mr. Nosenko again, that they could have him at any time they wanted. There was no question of keeping him away from the FBI. With the FBI's knowledge © 273600 Page 83
HW 53060 18 19 20 21 22. 23 24 25 DoctId: 59 of this case, the FBI's interest in this case, he was always there. If they wanted to come to the CIA and say, “Look, you are custodians of Mr. Nosekno. We would like to talk to him," they would have talked to him again. Mr. Fithian. The reason I raised the question was I inferred from your response to Mr. Klein you somehow felt ruled out jurisdictionally, because that was the FBI's province. Mr. Bagley. I would say prior to the detention, yes. Mr. Fithian. Only for one time frame. Mr. Bagley. Yes. I think from the time of his defection, or the time of his arrival in the United States until the detention. And as I say, the detention was designed to do a hostile interrogation, not to question him systematically. In fact, the hostile interrogation was a confused and confusing operation which didn't succeed, but it was strictly focused on contradictions in his story. And as I state, there were few enough, if any, contradictions visible within his story of Oswald that there was nothing there we could hook onto and use with any impact. Mr. Fithian. Thank you. | Mr. Klein. Is it your testimony that whether it be. very early or later on that the CIA did make every effort -to get all the information from Mr. Nosenko that. it could get and to find the truth -- all the information from Nosenko 273600 Page 64
11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 . 20 21 o 23 24 25 HW 53080 DoctId: 60 about Oswald that it could get, and to determine whether ‘that information was true or not? Mr. Bagley. There are two questions, I think. I separated them in my letter. The question did we get all the information. And then you said -- Mr. Klein. You attempted to get all the information from Nosenko about Oswald. You can take that one first. Mr. Bagley. Okay. It would be very easy, and I would in good conscience say yes. But over these past weeks I have had a lot of time to think about it, what did we know, what could we have done. And the only thing that sticks in my mind right now that would have been perhaps useful for the record was to ask him those questions which our experts, knowing internal Soviet procedures, had dredged up about -- which were not all to do with Oswald, and they had nothing to do with - his knowledge of Oswald. They had to do with Oswald's own story, which has to do with his meeting with Marina, his permission to marry Marina, his exit of Marina from the Soviet Union, all of these things that have to do with Soviet internal procedures, where we consider ourselves particularly well informed, because we had access to some former KGB people who knew these procedures. - By the way, they have said, they said at that time -- well, their reaction to the story was quite violent. I under-. stand that you have talked to some defectors on this subject. 273600 Page 65
HW 53060 18 19 20 21. 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 61 But the reaction of the KGB men to the Oswald and Marina story, and most particularly to Nosenko's story about the failure to talk to him, and the ease with which he married this lady and so forth, they believed that this is not possible as given. Strongly they believe that. | Mr. Klein. I think my question sort of got lost. But is it your testimony that at some point the CIA did try to get all the information that they could from Nosenko that he knew about Oswald? Mr. Bagley. About Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald, yes. Mr. Klein. And at some point did the CIA try to do its best, do whatever was possible to determine whether the information Nosenko gave about Oswald was true? Mr. Bagley. I would say our efforts in this respect would be on two planes. One is to check out the facts, and those facts, as I think Mr. Helms told you here, can only be found within the files of the KGB. And secondly, to find out whether Nosenko as such is telling a true story. In. other words, is his story -- is all of his story true, and therefore is’ his story of Oswald potentially true. And in that latter respect, I would say we made a heroic but umsuccess ful effort. I say unsuccessful, because we didn't prove it.. As I told you today -- I hope I got over to you the fact that I am convinced that the story cannot be true. But that was the result of a long and strenuous effort. 273600 Page 6
HW 53060 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 62 So my answer to your second question is yes, indeed. Mr. Klein. It is also your testimony that prior to the hostile interrogations, the CIA did not concentrate on the Oswald question because the FBI had primary responsibility for that issue, even though it dealt with Oswald's activities in Russia. Mr. Bagley. Correct. Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time I read into the record page 7 from a document received from the FBI which is responses to questions that this committee posed to the FBI. I cannot put the entire document into evidence because portions of it are secret. But the portion I propose to read is unclassified. The question posed to the FBI by this committee was "Did either the FBI or the CIA have primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald. If neither had primary responsibility, was there any division of responsibility?" | The answer, and I am quoting: "The FBI had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswals that pertained to his, Oswald's, activities in the United States, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA had primary responsibility for investigating Nosenko's statements about Oswald's activities abroad." Mr. Bagley. I find that absolutely incomprehensible, 273600 Page aT
HW 53060 10 11 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 63 because Nosenko could not conceivably have known anything about Oswald's activities in the United States. The FBI would have had nothing to talk to him about. Mr. Klein. In effect, what this document would seem to say is that for everything that Nosenko knew about Lee Harvey Oswald, the CIA had primary responsibility of finding it out and investigating it. Mr. Bagley. Absolutely, that is what that document says to me, yes. Because it couldn't possibly have been the agreement between the FBI and CIA at that time because, as I say, there is no use talking to a Moscow-based internal security officer of the KGB about a man, a former Marine of the United States, who came to the United States -- who had lived in the United States before he came to Russia, came back to the United States after he lived in Russia, and at some point along the way killed the President of the United States. How in the world would this man have had anything to say on the subject? In fact,he would have shrugged and said, ''No, I don't know. anything about it." Mr. Klein. So we draw the conclusion from this that the CIA was of the opinion that the FBI. had responsibility in this area and at the same time the FBI was of the opinion that the CIA had the primary responsibility in this area? Mr. Bagley. Certainly not. The FBI talked to this man for days. They could have terminated their so-called 273600 Page 66
HW 53060 12 13 14 19 20 21: 22 23 24 25 DoctlId: 64 responsibility in five minutes had they thought that we were responsible, the CIA was responsible for talking to him about everything to do with Oswald in Russia. Mr. Klein. Well, you are disputing that statement, is that right? Mr. Bagley. Oh, yes. And I have a feeling that there is some misunderstanding there. I can't believe that anybody said that seriously. I have no memory of any such thing being said at the time because -- perhaps they meant, you know -- it couldn't mean that they felt that the FBI had -- no, they were talking about Oswald, not about Nosenko. No, I cannot understand it. Mr. Klein. So, you dispute that. Mr. Bagley. Oh, of course. Mr. Klein. Well -- Mr. Bagley. But I suspect it is a misunderstanding, rather than a misstatement. Mr. Klein. You testified earlier that you did not recall any other sessions where Nosenko was asked detailed specific questions about Oswald in Russia, other than the July 3 and July 27 statements, which were mentioned in our report, is that correct? - Mr. Bagley. That is correct. One reason I think perhaps you have the whole picture is that there were pretty careful records kept. In response to your questions to the agency, 273600 Page 49
HW 53080 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 65 or -- I am sure you had got all of the pertinent files, and had there been anything else, it would have been clearly indicated. | Mr. Klein. I should state for the record we have read those files, and we know of no others. Do you have any recollection of how long these two session were in time? Mr. Bagley. You mean the July session? Mr. Klein. July 3 and July 27. Mr. Bagley. No. I take it that information came from a document. Did it give any indication of the time? Because -- Mr. Klein. I should state for the record the sessions are on tape. Mr. Bagley. Well, then, there must be a way to know. Mr. Klein. How many hours, as an experienced security | officer, considering what you have told us was of importance to this question of Oswald -- how many hours do you think that the agency should have devoted to questioning Nosenko about Oswald? Mr. Bagley. I would give you a practical answer to that question. . When you are faced with a man who is telling you a Limited number of facts, which have a very clear limit, you can ask him the questions, and you can write down the answers, and you can ask: him the same questions or related questions all day long. 273600 Page 90
HW 53080 12 13 14 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 66 But I think that we felt that we had touched his limits, and we didn't just feel it, we experienced it, and that had we talked more and more and more we wouldn't have gotten anywhere. Therefore, I cannot guess how many hours one should spend asking the same questions. I would add, by way of comment to your question, that had he lived through the experience as he said, we could have talke with him for days. Because you have a situation where a case officer named Rostrusin, or Krupnov, if this man walks up, and they talk about it, and then they go out and have a drink, or they live through these experiences, that Oswald had been in a hotel, and that there was this Soviet Intourist woman who was in touch with him, what exactly what is her relationships with both KGB and what did she think about this guy, and did you talk to her and when -- these are things which would go on and on and on had there been a genuine contact. But the one thing I have noticed is that your complete information about Oswald and ourselves or the FBI's runs to a few pages, never more. You can't expand it. You reached the limit. Therefore, my answer to your question is I can't guess how long you can spend on this man, but I don't think it is any longer than we did spend. Mr. Klein. Is it your testimony that five or six hours would be adequate for this issue? Mr. Bagley. I am sorry. That is a very difficult question 273600 Page 91
12 13 14 20 21 @ 22 23 24 25 HW 53060 DBoctId: 67 to answer. Mr. Klein. I should state for the record that the committe has heard the tapes of these two sessions and they lasted, combined, approximately five or six hours. That is where the figure comes from. Mr. Bagley. I don't know. You are talking about a matter of hours -- was it six hours or 12 hours or even 30 hours. Perhaps there could have been more. Mr. Klein. Now, are you familiar with the person who questioned Oswald on July 3 or July 27? Mr. Bagley. No, I can't remember who it was. _I£ you tell me his name , I am sure I would remember. But -- it was presumably a member of my division, or my section, I would say -- at that time the counterintelligence section of the Soviet division. Mr. Klein. My only hesitation is -- Mr. Bagley. It doesn't matter. Mr. Klein. -- is the security aspect. Mr. Bagley. -Unless you want to ask me about some document. Excuse me for my question. Mr. Klein. What I do want to ask you is do you think if you have Nosenko, as he is speaking about Oswald, and you said it was an important issue, that the person who questioned Nosenko about Oswald should be somebody who is experienced in “KGB -- questioning KGB defectors. 273600 Page 92
HW 53060 10 11 12 13 14 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 68 Mr. Bagley. I don't know. ‘You have people available for questioning, and their manner of questioning is more or less detailed, and more or less competent, depending on their training, and depending on their personal inclinations or capacities. Everybody has to get his experience somewhere. I think many officers I have known have done brilliant and complete interrogations without any prior experience. No, I don't think it is necessarily relevant to be systematic about this. There was an implication in one of the reports I read that this man had not carefully studied the matter of Oswald before asking the questions of Nosenko. I think probably more could have been done there. Mr. Klein. When you say that everyone has to get their experience somewhere, do you think that this situation would have been a proper place to give somebody experience in questioning a KGB defector, talking about Lee Harvey Oswald? Mr. Bagley. Yes, I think it would -- in other words, it is not grotesque, it is not unheard of to have a competent . person -- I am sure that the man who was sent -- as I say, I don't remember who it was -- I am sure he was not an incompe- tent. When we are talking about questioning anybody about - anything, we are talking about a personal capability, personal professional competence, rather than experience, let's say, 273600 Page 93
12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 HW 53060 DBoctId: 70 Nosenko been very familiar with all aspects of Oswald, and experienced in KGB, and spent more than five or six hours questioning Nosenko about Oswald, and perhaps the CIA would have come up with more relevant information in determining whether Nosenko was telling the truth about Oswald? Mr. Bagley. No. Mr. Klein. You state in your report that the chairman of this committee, due to Mr. Hart's confusing testimony -- Mr. Fithian. Mr. Klein, are you departing that particular line of questioning now? Mr. Klein. I am going to come back to it. But you certainly can ask a question now. | . Mr. Fithian. I have had the feeling, subjective, today that perhaps, hearing your testimony and what else we have found out, that it would be fair to characterize your major interest in Nosenko as not being Oswald -- either because you touched the limits of his knowledge, information, or for what- ever reason--and that it would be fair to say that your real interest in Nosenko, as an individual, was the potential penetration of American government, potential penetration of - your own agency, determining whether he was sent here to mislead your agency, sent here to undermine Mr. X, whatever. - In other words, the intelligence operations that he might be able to lead you to were of a great deal more interest to you than Oswald. Isn't thatfair to say? 273600 Page 95
10 11 12 20 21 Y ) 22 23 24 25 HW 53060 DBoctId: 71 Mr. Bagley. No, no, it isn't, Mr. Fithian. I would like to correct some of the impressions given in this field by Mr. Hart, among others. During the period of Nosenko's clandestine meetings with us before his defection, and during the period of his questioning under conditions of freedom in the United States, he was treated -- and his information was gone at -- precisely as would any other defector. The most important information he had to offer was got at, priorities were established, he was questioned on every- thing he knew including Oswald. During the period of confinement, he was also questioned on Oswald. Now, if the case as a whole seems to bear this counter- intelligence flavor, I would like to say that is probably determined by the fact that Mr. Nosenko was an internal security officer of the KGB. He was questioned early on, both in Geneva and here, on his knowledge of anything to do with Soviet politics, Soviet personalities, on the economic or internal relationships with the leadership, any type of policy information that he could give from his knowledge, as a KGB officer. | These are things which some KGB officers have had know- ledge of. In other words, we don't write them off. They are not nearly as valuable as sources of intelligence are; for example, officers of the Soviet army or the Soviet military 273600 Page 96
HW 53060 . 10 11 12 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 72 intelligence. But nonetheless, they are not necessarily zerom@g, — especially having to do with political information. I would say we made every effort to get what this man had on other things, that we were not just slanting our questions in order to determine whether he was a plant. However, during that questioning we continually found reason to suspect that he was a plant, but that was not our purpose as it has been stated to this committee. Our purpose was to get what he knew. He didn't know much. That is a fact. That isn't our preconception, as Mr. Hart -- Mr. Fithian. You mean he didn't know much about any area? Mr. Bagley. No, sir. Well, what do you mean by any area? Mr. Fithian. The areas you questioned him on. Mr. Bagley. The areas I mentioned, on Soviet politics, economics and so on, he knew effectively nothing. He had nothing that was of any intelligence value. Mr. Fithian. Well, I had some other questions, but that would kind of lead us far astray. Mr. Klein. I don't Have a whole lot more. You stated in your letter that the chairman of. the committee, due to the confusing testimony of Mer. Hart, was led to state that no investigation of Oswald's activities 273600 Page 97
HW 53060 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 73 as known to Nosenko have been made. Mr. Bagley. Yes. Mr. Klein. And that that was incorrect? Mr. Bagley. Oh, yes. Mr. Klein. Would you tell us specifically what the CIA did to investigate what Nosenko said about Oswald in Russia? Mr. Bagley. The context of that statement, by the way, as is put in my letter, has to do with the getting -- it is in the paragraph of that letter which talks about getting the information from, even though we are talking about investi- gation. This is as I read the transcript. It may not be correct. It may have meant indeed the investigation of the information which had been gotten. Mr. Klein. Right. Distinguishing taking a statement from investigation, using investigation in that way, would you. tell us what specifically wad done to investigate this case. Mr. Bagley. Yes, with pleasure. First of all, the best way to investigate it is to check parallel sources of information. In this case, the only parallel source of information which could tell us, confirm or deny whether Lee Harvey Oswald had or had not been questioned by the KGB, or had or had not had any relations with the KGB, or some of the other things Nosenko said, could only come ‘from the KGB, or Intourist, or from some of the personalities 273600 Page 98
12 13 16 17 18 20 21 © 22 23 24 25 HW 53080 DoctId: 14 74 in contact with Nosenko in Russia. We had no such sources. Secondly, we would probably go into -- I am not sure what the technical term here is -- we would consult experts. We would take Nosenko's information and see whether it made sense in terms of the knowledge, our knowledge of the Soviet Union. That would not be a reference merely to files. That would be the questioning of all available sources on this subject. That is the point I made, that we did go back to every one of our @éfectors, not only on Nosenko's story, but on Oswald's story, directly. That would be about all -- except finally the attempt to determine how valid that information was in terms of the man's total credibility, which means investigation under interro- gation. Mr. Klein. Now, consulting of experts -- you told us that although you spoke to some defectors, that they never — used the questions, is that right? Mr. Bagley. No, no, no. They made reports. They made comments and reports about internal Soviet procedures which bore on the Oswald story. Oh, yes, they did that. They made reports. | Mr. Klein. So, since, as you say, you could not go to the KGB, the only investigation that the CIA did in this matter was to consult other defectors about procedures in the KGB? 273600 Page 939
HW 53060 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 75 Mr. Bagley. Other defectors, other knowledge available to the American intelligence community. Mr. Klein. Well, what specifically? Mr. Bagley. Excuse me? Mr. Klein. I say other than defectors, who else did you specifically talk to, to investigate. Mr. Bagley.” Talk to? Oh, let me think. Talk to. May I ask you to be very precise in your question as to what aspects of the story you might be talking about? Is it Nosenko's story of Oswald? Because if it is, it has to do with the procedures of admission to the Soviet Union, the series of events that oecurred to Oswald in the Soviet Union, the ‘suicide, and things of that sort. Mr. Klein. And you are saying that you investigated this--| these statements by Nosenko how, by speaking to-- Mr. Bagley. Well, who would know about, let's say, | procedures for the admission of people into the Soviet Union. Who would know about -- the main source, the most valued source we have ever had on things from this very closed society, where these regulations and these procedures are in no sense open to the public, the best: source we have had, of course, is defectors and that is over a large number of years-- many years. | The result has been we have accumulated this information, and have turned out general reports and kept them up-to-date 273600 Page 100
18 19 20 21 @ 22 23 24 25 HW 53060 DBoctId: Those would be consulted. In other words, written reports background information. Surely we checked that. Mr. Klein. So in general you checked the reports that had been accumulated over the years, but not specifically written for this case. Mr. Bagley. And then questioned people specifically about this case, those sources we had. 76 on what certain Soviet procedures are. Mr. Klein. Who did you question, without saying a name -- if you questioned defectors, how many? Mr. Bagley. Defectors. Mr. Klein. How many did you question? Mr. Bagley. Certainly a minimum of three, and as many perhaps as, I would guess -- my memory really isn't sure because I wasn't as closely aware of some of these otker things -- I would imagine that we sou-ght or got reports from more than those three, the three that I know of. How many more, I don't remember. Mr. Klein. And were their records and files of what these -- all the people that you questioned, are-those records all made, of what they said when asked specifically to comment on this case? Mr. Bagley. I don't know that, Mr. Klein. I don't. know. Mr. Klein. And other than the number of defectors, at least three, anybody else that you questioned, or did you do 273600 Page 101
HW 53060 12 13 14 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 77 anything else to investigate what Nosenko said about Oswald? Mr. Bagley. The word investigation is bothering me a little. I don't know what you mean. If you mean to look into it, to verify it by whatever information we had about Russia, what other sources are avaialble? You have overt information, and you have information which has come from covert sources. | Mr. Klein. What I am saying is -- 1 am not stating at this time that there are other possibilities. I am just asking what -- is that the extent of what you did to investigate it? Mr. Bagley. We are talkingabout Nosenko's story, which is Oswald in Russia. Mr. Klein. Yes. Mr. Bagley. What you do to investigate that in the United States is go down to the neighborhood and you go talk to people. But we had no such access to people inside the Soviet Union. THere was a tremendous limit to our ability to investigate this information. | Therefore, if these outsiders, talking about procedures, or what would or wouldn't be done normally, sounds like a . somewhat inadequate means of investigation, it was the only one at our disposal. Mr. Klein. As I say, your statement is that there was investigation. I am just trying to ascertain -- Mr. Bagley: I mentioned investigation on those three 273600 Page 102
HW 53060 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 78 grounds, the third of those grounds being the attempt by interrogation to get at the veracity of Nosenko in general, and Nosenko as a source on Oswald. Mr. Klein. And we have already discussed the extent of the questioning of Nosenko on the Oswald matter. That was those two sessions. Mr. Bagley. The questioning of Nosenko on the Oswald matter was limited to these two sessions, I believe, because you have told me so -- plus the session is in Geneva. details with Nosenko about Oswald? Mr. Bagley. The words "in detail" are hard to say because the conditions of a clandestine meeting are never satisfactory. You cannot sit down and be systematic because you don't have that much time. There are other things we ‘talked about. Mr. Klein. Did you ever question Marina Oswald about what - happened in Russia when she was with Oswald, and compare that to what Nosenko was giving you? Mr. Bagley. To my knowledge the CIA had no access whatsoever to Marina Oswald, and I have no knowledge of any CIA contact with her at any. time. Mr. Klein: Did you ever ask the FBI to question her specifically about the issues you were interested in? Mr. Klein. Do you recollect in Geneva that you spoke in | . Mr. Bagley. Yes. | Docld: 32273600 Page 103
HW 53060 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 79 Mr. Klein. Is there a written request for that? Mr. Bagley. I would suspect so, yes. Mr. Klein. And did you get any answer back? Mr. Bagley. No. Mr. Klein. The FBI -- Mr. Bagley. No, I don't believe that we would have asked them to ask her something to tell us because this would have been a violation of what the FBI considered its charter in this case. Mr. Klein. So you didn't ask them. Mr. Bagley. We would give them questions to ask her. We would reuqest them or suggest to them that they ask Marina certain questions. That, yes, but not with the idea of reporting back to us because we wouldn't have any right to do that. Mr. Klein.. You wouldn't have any right to have the FBI give you their reports on Marina Oswald? Mr. Bagley. Oh, yes, we would have a right to ask them to give the reports. But we didn't say why don't you ask this. This is essentially why we are doing it. We gave them a request for information and said will you go ask these questions. That is the history of the famous 44 questions I spoke about a moment ago. | Mr. Klein. Weren't you interested in the answers to 273600 Page 104
10 11 12 18 19 20 at Y ) 22 23 24 25 HW 53060 DBoctId: 80 compare it to what Nosenko was telling you? Mr. Bagley. Yes, indeed. But -- the answers to -- Mr. Klein. That Marina gave the FBI, to compare it to what Nosenko told you what happened? Mr. Bagley. We would have been very happy to have answers from Marina, and asked these questions. But we could not operate through the FBI to do this. I think this is a thing: that has come up in previous testimony. I think we were constrained, that the bureau felt very strongly it was their responsibility. Mr. Klein. Did you ever make any attempt to study files you had on other people who had defected, Americans who had defected to the Soviet Union, and check what happened to them, and compare them to Oswald's? Mr. Bagley. Oh, yes, and the people whowere doing that -- by the way, I want to stress here that the agency component primarily responsible -- I told you about our wholehearted effort and tremendous interest in this. But the agency component handling the agency's requirements on Lee Harvey Oswald were in fact the counterintelligence staff. They indeed did look into the experience of other defectors... Mr. Klein. Were their reports made on this? Mr. Bagley. I don't know. Mr. Klein. I should say for the record, Mr. Chairman, that our committee has seen these files, but has never seen 273600 Page 105
HW 53060 10 11 12 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 81 any reports indicating that any kind of study was made to compare these people to Oswald. Were the results of these studies put in the final report that you people -- that the Soviet Russia division published in I believe February of 1977? Mr. Bagley. No. The Soviet Russia -- may I speak about that report? The report, the so-called final Soviet Russia division report has also been misrepresented here. What was being done in the so-called thousand page report, or whatever one chooses to call it, was to make sense out of an incredible mass of material. It had gotten to the point, there were so many inter- related cases, so much detail connected with Nosenko, that somebody new coming into the case could probably no longer master it. What I sought to do was to get each and every aspect of the case written up, what Nosenko had said, what investigations had been made of it, perhaps even comments on it, or further things to be done on it. That I don't remember -- the exact format. But I do know the first two things were there, what Nosenko had said and. what our investigation, independent knowledge showed. This was put together with the idea of being a reference of easy access, not as a final report. Now, exactly what was finally said in it when it got into its eventual form, the so-called 400 page report, I don't 273600 Page 106
em fls HW 53060 10 - 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctlId: 82 know because I wasn't there, and I had certainly not originally intended that compilation had to be a final report. It has certainly been treated as such, and has been described as such here. Perhaps there were passages in it which had the kind of conclusions which I saw quoted -- Nosenko was not this, and was not that, and was trying to deceive, and things of that sort. Perhaps they appeared even in that thousand page report. But frankly, that wasn't its original intent, and I don't remember their being in there. Mr. Klein. Do you specifically remember a report where there was a study of all American defectors to the Soviet Union and a comparison? | | Mr. Bagley. No, but I can assure you that the person to ask on that would be the counterintelligence steff. That was their responsibility. Mr. Klein. You don't recall a report? : Mr. Bagley. No. Mr. Klein.. Do you recall any kind of effort to get hold of documents, letters, diary written by Oswald, and compare that to what Nosenko was telling you about Oswald? Mr. Bagley. No, no. 273600 Page 107
19 20 21 ® 22 23 24 25 83 Mr. Klein. When I asked you earlier about whether if you thought that a more experienced person questioned Nosenko, somebody who knew more about Oswald did the questioning, and whether there were longer sessions, whether that might have helped to get more information and get to the truth in this matter, you said that you didn't think it would help. And in your letter to us, you told us that you felt the Agency did an adequate job, and you compared what the Agency learned about Nosenko and what this committee learned and said that since we and the FBI didn't’ learn any more than the CIA, that that shows that the Agency did a good job. Mr. Bagley. Did an adequate job. I didn't say dida good job. Mr. Klein. An adequate job. Mr. Bagley. Yes. Mr. Klein. Did the FBI have the same access to Nosenko that the CIA had? Mr. Bagley. Yes. As I remember, I think he was delivered to them. I think they probably questioned him -- I am not | a hundred percent sure of this, but I seem to remember that they questioned him on their own premises. In other words, I think he was out of our custody in the period he was being talked £0 by the FBI. It is conceivable that I am wrong and that the FBI people came to the house in which Nosenko was living and talked to him there. But I have some --. HW 53080 DoclIa:39273600 Page 1086
HW 53060 20 21 22 23 24, 25° DoclId: 84 Mr. Klein. I believe the record will reflect that was the case. Mr. Bagley. I'm sorry. I didn't remember. Mr. Klein. Do you recall the FBI having any access to Nosenko after April 4, 1964? Mr. Bagley. No. Nor do I remember their asking for such access. Mr. Klein. So they only were able to question Nosekno for approximately two months in 1964, is that right? Mr. Bagley. Correct. Mr. Klein. And you stated in your letter that they questioned him -- Mr. Bagley. Wait a minute. Excuse me. You said were able to interrogate him only during two months? Mr. Klein. They had two months -- Mr. Bagley. You used the words "were able". They were able to talk to him more if they asked for it. I said that earlier today. Mr. Klein. Well, you are saying they could have spoken to him after April 4, 1964. Mr. Bagley. Of course. We would never have denied them access to him. Mr. Klein. And your testimony is that they had questioned him all they wanted, and that is why they didn't question him any more after April 4, 1964. 273600 Page 109
85 3 1 Mr. Bagley. Yes. It is certainly my understanding. 2 Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, again. I would like to read 3 || from the report given to us by the FBL, from page 5. This . 4 || particular section was read into the record at our earlier 5 || hearings. I would like to read it again. 6 "The FBI had no direct access to Nosenko from April 3, 1964 7 until April 3 of 1969, and therefore was not in a position to 8 make an objective assessment of his bona fides nor of the ver- 9 acity of information furniehed by him. Thus information 10 provided by him in early 1964 was accepted at face value and "| qualified in terms of the source and the conditions under which 12 it was; received." 13 Does that indicate to you that the FBI felt that they ° 14 | could have interviewed him any time they wanted after April 4, 15 || 19647 ‘6 | Mr. Bagley. Yes. The phrase in there was they had, as 17 Ll understood it -- they had no access to him during that 18 period. They didn't suggest, I think, by that phraseology that 19 they were denied it. I know of no case in which the FBI 20. asked for access to Nosenko or that anything was said to 21 the Bureau that suggested to them that they could not have r) 22 access to him during his period of detention. 23 Mr. Klein. And you also'compared the findings of the 24 CLA with the findings of this committee. Do you think the 25 fact that this committee spoke to Nosenko fourteen years later HW 53060 DBocld:4P273600 Page 110
HW 53080 10 11 12 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId: 86 might have put the committee at a disadvantage versus the position the CIA was in in 1964? Mr. Bagley. Normally I would say of course. In this case, I see no sign of it. Mr. Klein. You don't think that the committee had any disadvantage -- Mr.Bagley. No. I say I don't see any sign of it in the result. On the contrary, I think you got everything and perhaps a bit more. As to whether the four years. make a disadvantage in this case or not, I would say normally of course it would. Everybody's memory fades, especially of - experienced events. Mr. Klein. Do you think that the absence of the investigative and intelligence resources that the CIA had available in 1964, the absence of that for this committee might have also made it more difficult for this committee to conduct its investigation? Mr. Bagley. The absence of what -- excuse me? Mr. Klein. The investigative and intelligence resources that the CIA has available, and had available in 1964, that that might have -- Mr. Bagley. As I pointed out to you, there were no investigative resources that you would consider serious ones inside the Soviet Union. | Mr. Klein. You don't think that the. CIA had any 273600 Page 111
5 3 HW 53080 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ‘24 25 87 advantage over this committee as far as sources available to them? “Mr. Bagley. I don't know what your limitations were, Mr. Klein. I would think that the type of sources that I have described would have been made available to your committee had you asked them. In other words , defectors, available background information on the Soviet Union and so forth. I don't think that -- well, I don't know what other assets you are talking about or what other capabilities. Mr. Klein. You state in your letter that the committee came up with only one fact. Mr. Bagley. Well, I was talking there about the -- Mr. Klein. Surveillance. Mr. Bagley. The surveillance. Mr. Klein. You are aware that the committee came up with numerous inconsistencies in Nosenko's statements? Mr. Bagley. I certainly am. And I found them extremely well presented. Mr. Klein. In the time that the CIA had to question Nosenko, can you specifically tell us any inconsistencies or untruths that the CIA pinned him to? Mr. Bagley. In the details of the case? Mr. Klein. Yes. Mr. Bagley. | The answer is probably no. I don't -- and the answer is certainly no, I do not remember any. Doclda: 3492773600 Page 112
6 s HW 53080 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoctId: 88 But as to whether there were or not, I don't remember. Mr. Klein. In the files that I have read I can state that I have not found any. And my question to you is if the Agency did an adequate job, then how is it that fourteen years later this committee found inconsistencies, when the Agency never found any at the time? Mr. Bagley. Well, some of those were changes in the stor in the interim, aren't they? Mr. Klein. That is correct. But they came about from questioning, from checking prior statements, questioning a number of times about the facts, twenty-five, thirty hours. Mr. Bagley. Yes, prior statements. Mr. Klein: My question basically is did the Agency put the time and resources into this so that if there were inconsistencies that could have been found in 1964 they would | have been found. Mr. Bagley. I am not sure that these inconsistencies did exist at that time. And certainly I am not sure that a questioning of him at that time would have produced these inconsistencies. I have no way of knowing that. Mr. Klein. I am not necessarily referring to these particular inconsistencies. What I am suggesting is that “if inconsistencies develop in questioning of somebody now, would it be a fair statement that adequate questioning in 1964, although maybe not developing these same inconsistencies, p273600 Page 113
HW 53060 8 10 12 20 21 22 23 24 25 DoclId 39 would hae probably developed other inconsistencies which could have been investigated and could have been the basis for even further questioning. Mr. Bagley. I think that is unknowable. I don't know. Mr. Fithian. On that point, if I may add, Mr. Klein -- your own professional judgment is that Nosenko is lying about his knowledge of Oswald in Russia, or that he is intentionally misrepresanting what he knows to be factual about the KGB treatment of Oswald. Mr. Bagley. Yes. Mr. Fithian. I mean those are the only two possibilities. Mr. Bagley. Yes, sir. Mr. Fithian. And that was your conclusion at that time. Mr. Bagley. The conclusion -- | Mr. Fithian. Let me just ask you. You never would have put your stamp of approval on Nosenko's bona fides, is that correct? Mr. Bagley. No one would put a stamp of approval on somebody's bona fides except as the result of a careful and considerable period of investigation; that is any defector. | Mr. Fithian. I understand that. Mr. Bagley. And in his case it is suggested and has been suggested to this committee that conclusions were drawn prior to his 2. first of all prior to his reappearance in 1964, in other words, after the 1962 meetings, and 273600 Page 114
HW 53060 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 90-4) subsequently during that period, before he was incarcerated, if that is the word. The fact is that at all times in our > discussion, regardless of what might -- well, let me start again. That at all times we left the door open to him, for him to prove his bona fides. The key period in this, in my opinion, was in that period of freedom, after his defection, where he was treated like anyone else, and we tried to go down and talk to him and so forth. And there were points or questions in our minds which we tried to approach with him during that period. I would say that we went to the meetings in 1964 with a doubt in the back of our minds. But in no way planning to handle the meetings in a different way than would have been. Quite a lot was made by Mr. Hart about the duplicity with which we talked about the settlement arrangements that would be made with Mr. Nosenko when he came to the United States. This has been the subject of some controversy since. My memory tells me that we were not and could not have been authorized to exercise duplicity as such. We were offering him the type of settlement which we would have offered to that man had he: established his bona fides. It was not duplicity as such. Now, if you say at the same time that fellow who is promising these things is also the author of this paper over here which says that we don't trust him, or that there are some Doclda: 34273600 Page 115
Brg fils 12:30 HW 53060 20 21 22 23 — 24 25 Docla: 92 odd things here which suggest he was a KGB plant, I would say absolutely yes. But is that duplicity? Because the door was always open for the establishment of his bona fides. And as for the first hostile interrogation, when we confronted him with these contradictions, I would say to you that we probably suspected that he would not be able to clear up these things. But we didn't do it. And there might conceivably have been some innocent explanation of both contradictions in his own story or oddities, all the things that Mr. Hart or others have mentioned, that there was some -- he was perhaps a pathological liar or that he was boasting or he had a very strange memory, a whole lot of things could have come up. But what we had done in the meantime is to do a lot of investigation on the side, not only about Oswald, and that we presented this outside information to him, asked him questions about it, and found that he was inexplicably unable to answer the questions. 273600 Page 116
12:30 browning fls mills HW 53080 20 21 22 23 24 25 Docld: 93 At what point has one concluded that this man -- in other. words, dismissed him as a source? I don't think we ever did. I don't think we talked to him about Oswald until much later, during the period we are talking about here. I don't think any less effort was made than would have been. made with a serious defector. There were certainly more troubles in getting . details from him than from other defectors, but I think our posture, face-to-face to him, probably was not much different than it would have been had we not had the suspicions in the background. It's the word "conclusions" that bothers me. It's the conclusion what he might have said had we not had these preconceptions, as Mr..Hart put it. Mr. Fithian. I was trying to get at a followup to Mr. Klein's questions. Mainly inconsistencies occurred because stories didn't match and so on, but I was trying to ascertain whether or not in your judgment, since you did not believe him, you had reason at that time either because of inconsistencies fe) lies or whatever you judged them to be, to disbelieve his rendition of the Oswald story in Russia. Mr. Bagley. To the degree we had a suspicion of him at all, the answer is. yes; we had that much reason to disbelieve. what he said about Oswald in Russia. Plus the fact the story h was telling about Oswald in Russia was absolutely unaccepéable to us alone as a story, for all the reasons we have already — discussed. It was an incredible story and Mr. Hart and others 273600 Page 117
20 21 ® #2 23 24 25 HW 53080 DoctId: 110 claims to have made a brilliant career as an English-speaking case officer, an operations officer, a man who gets out in the field, a tough guy, as he used to call himself. He told of certain things he had done. We checked them out. It goes without saying we were fairly meticulous about that. We found only two operations in which he physically appeared at all prior to 1962, that we could confirm. In other words, we were getting from him the statement of where he was, and then we were going back to what we knew about those operations, or else going out and interviewing the people involved. One was as a member of a team of about three, three people in the compromise of an American tourist on homo- sexual grounds in 1956. The other was as a junior officer, a companion of an identified officer, senior officer, of the Tourist Department of the KGB in meeting with an agent of theirs whom the bureau had interviewed. That agent's testimony -- I will say he was an American -- this American's testimony showed that Nosenko appeared exclusively as a junior member of the team. He had never appeared alone. The other man, who was an identified officer of the section, of the tourist directed section, did all the question- _ ing and all the control of the meetings as testified by the agent. 273600 Page 134