Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination 
Records Collection Act of 1992 
(44 USC 2107 Note) 
NW 53216 6/17/17
104-10219-10001 ad I Me harder (*#ashington ost*) February 3, 1963 (1) Tre Taste Narver closely follows the cetails concerniny the diss continestion of atomic teste, Yron tis conticts with the ; rdsinistration, he tas not received the inpression tnat the Soviet coueession cuncernin; the inspections on the epot ds considerad aa an exclusive pronagania save and that it hae no Suustantfial value whatsoever, This means actzal progress, The discontiavaticn of the talks in New Yore was unexpected by every vody. for the tine veing, it is believed that the tissin-s, since they have mace a canceseion, wish to {axe ag such advantage as cossible in Goneva, Lawever, tire Hropaganda motives are not tia only aness t ere can be suostantial procress in Gcneva in spite of the fact trat it is easfer to progress whea anly three ceertries are discussing, Provauly, Khreshchev wishes to use the discord of the neeterners and that is why te ie making such FOVES. (2) The Prodien Ustel'SSR ae fo en Ee USER The proolea existing between the United State@ and the Soviet Union will aot be so.ved if “hrushchey decides to take advantace of the conflict de “aulleel. S.A. lt will be bad if be tries to sharpen the conflict by exercizing pressures, Thia wovld sharpen the cold war everywhere, in accition, Khruskchey Shosla realize that the donination of ce Gaulle enn end with vestern rermany coting on top in bestern Eurcpe. Such a thing woild not be in the interest of anyaou7, According to inforzation internally obtaincd, de saulle and the “ussiangs have not yet concluded anything conerctes both parties wish to convey to the other nations the impression that an izprovenent of the retatians detween frence and the Soviet inion is possible, vowever, tris does not scan that France and the Soviet Union have uncertaken concrete povrparlers; at least, that is rot tre case for the time deing, ~ LTH aR
104-10219-10001 It seems that there was nothing substantially new in the conversaiion Vinojraduvede Gaulle, (2) Harder is increasingly worried avout Cuca because there are miny clenents which can couse a aeK crisis, (a) The internal political pressure related to Cuva {mw becoming {nercas:ngly strony and unpleasant for “ennedy, Tre attacks of thage whe affirm that the Administration has again Ririnized the Seviet strenyth in Cu a are vecortiny more and nore corvincing. At the present tine, tho more inoderate cstinations point out that there could v¢ aveut eighteen thousand Soviet troops on Cuva, wild estimations of tie Senate clind up to thirtyefour or thirtyefive thousand men, (3) The question is for how long the Cu:ane can endure the flights of tie sA-erican aircraft over their territory and the shotojrap:ing of their land, The Russdiaas ara training the Crpans in the nanipulnre tise of the antiairerart areacent, The \ossians are provauly dsiny 90 for the virpose of teaching tie Culang ta shoot down the Arncrican aircraft. (c) Such a thing conld huopen after the "ssians leave Cuva and leave everything in Cucvan hancs, (4) Tat ie why the situation is very conlicated. Namely, the United States cunnot bear the presence of the Savieta on Cuba, Sn tle other hand, an arned Coa, withoot the f-ssians, cozld be less resnonsible, Marder does not <now how and whether all these problens will be solved, Harder knows that in tre contacts bctween the Soviet Union und the United St:tes (the neeting “Cennedye 2 huzaietsov, the ~ecting Rusiefoorining which took >lace the cay before yesteriay, the exchin:e of letters. setween chrushchev and Kennedy which is still goin; on) conercto soluticns of these prooiems are not being discussed, (4) De Gaulle's veto was a hard blow to Sreat 3ritain and to the Esropcan Cosson “arxet; it ulso bas deranged Kennecy's plans, And yet, there is no consternation eithcr in the Adnine istration or in the white tiouse, The Administration and the White House do not conceive trat de Gaulle's move is a dlow Bae 522) meee Tekan ra en
104-10219-10001 atc3 Fs TRANSLATION FLOM SERBO-CROATIAN REPORT (A) From the Yugoslav Eabsusy - Washington To the Coordination bypartacnt - Belgrade August 10, 1965 (1) Barrinan did not cose with anything nov concerning Vietnaa. Be vag recoived by President Johnsvn for about 15 minutcs. laumediately thereafter, President J basen had rether long briefings with Congregsovn at which the posittons explained on the ecceeioa of the last press .onference vere repeated. oe (2) All the United Stutea dats end evaluations poiat to the fact that neither Viet cong nor Korth VYietsoa will be resdy for pegotiations before the end of the Bonsoun ge4Gon. e090 (3) According to internal copversetiong With William Bendy, Secretary of stkte Rusk'g Asatstaat for the Far Eaat, and with other tunceionartes ot tae Waite Bouse and of the rate D. partocnt, 1¢ secas that che niciuum required by tho United States for a solution is South Visinam ip a type of "Lava soluttona.” The effects of this solution whould last for at least svc yeata. Tig weans the catahlishaent of a neutralist government in whi-h all the sain torces of the -ountry -~ dneluding the Viet Cong -- would be represented. I[t would be nossible to maintain the :ormations of the Viet Cong as in the case of the Patnet Lao formations. (Gvertcman, blue card index) a aoe Rl
104-10219-10001 Proa the Yugoslav Ratwusy - Sashington To the Coordination Department - Belgrade August 10, 19¢5 The correspondenta of the “Evening Star™ infora today from the United Kationgs that the Untted States Govern- went will snnounce on August ld that it does not issiat on Article 19. Consecuantly, tho problem ts being solved. Allegedly, it will be Announced at the sane time that the soviots have accepted the idea of donations. According to inforgattyun obtataoed by the above- wentioned correspondente, the Unitec States end the Sovtet Uaton have agreed ebout this matter, Tnis would make poasthle the norual sork of the General Asgembly of the United Nationa. (Gvortzmgan, blue card index) on
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104-10219-10001 SUMMARY POM SoKBC-CRGATIAI R=PORT (A) ZL.MENTS FRCi4 TALKS ABCUT PeisevT ACTION CF U. S, A, AND PRISIDENT JCH SON'S PULICY Max Frankel f (1) After two hours of debate and cnly by using heavily hia personal prestige, President Johnson forced his Cebinet to send troops to the Jemiatcan Republic, The Administration 1s far less united edcut the Doatnatcan Republic thsa it fs about Vieraam,. However, sinca this unhappy action has been undertaken: fa the worst possible manner, thers 1s ao choic: but to support | the Presideat. _ RRR (2) Frankel does not consider that the President's actions in the Congo, in Vietaam and in the Dominican Republic ave the result of his thouchtful strateey of the aew “crusada" against cemmuniam. He also considers that these actions are mot tha result of the Presidant's feeling of omnipotence because the President is very careful in avoiding a direct armed confrontation with the Soviet Union. Frankel considers that the ection in th2 Dominican Republic is the product of the following factors: (a) The President is almost completely incapable of understanding the world and the international relations and of wpproaching rationally and systematically the international problens. : : woe ee ee
104-10219-10001 (b) The Presidant {s incapabla of establishing and organizing in tha Vhite House and elsewhere a regular system for deciding about international cuestivas espectslly whea erises and emergencies aro invelved, This ca:rwt ba done because the President is constantly and almost completely confused about the faternational relations. On the basis of this, Frankel is persuaded that the Administration in general does not know what to do as for instance when the Soviet Union, da Gaulle, “estern durope, etc., are Luvolved. (ce) The President's suddan actions and his untletoral support on American power show thet he is fa a panic because ha tears defeat end that he is frustrated ta connection with finternetional developments which he does not undarstand and in front of which he cftea feels powarless, kk (4) It is eaither logical nor exact that tha President hae atarted a general offansive against commntsa,. First of all, he tries tu keep normal relations with the Soviet Untoa. Then, he docs not even think of disturbing the Cuban situation, Furthermore, the relations of the United States and Yugoslavia are normal, Finally, it is a fact that the President's moves have heretofore been only reactions to situations where the United States was faced by unacceptable defeats (Congo, Vietnam, vominican Republic), ‘ctually, he had to defend himself from defcat and did not attempt to win anew territories. If a “crusade” were in question, the President himself would open mew crises on new grounds. kee
104-10219-10001 (5) One of the main reesons related to the President's | bshavior is his fear cnsi aay success cf cocmunism against the United States will jeopardize his interisl political postition. eke (6) As for Vietnam, the ‘dministration is ready to use all the means in order to prevent defeat in South Vietnaa. If the current situation stabilizas, which {fs difficult, the Presideat will act try to widea the military operations, , Tha Vietnamese crisis resains in the stage of controlled escalation, wk One of the esazntilal elescats ta th: calculations of the President and of his ‘dmintstration are the very relfeble evaluctions regarding the wish cf tha soviet Union to avoid participating in military octions in Vietnam or elseavhere, Thus, the mutual avoidence of military confrontation © of the two ‘superpowers’ leaves enough ground for maneuvering. Robart McCloskey Ha defended to the end the offietal and the published reasons of tha United States action {n the Dominican FRepublte. However, it {8 interesting to note that he too emphasized that the Prasident is particularly concernad about the factors related to the internal polictes,
104-10219-10001 Volkov He believes that the dangers related to the United States actions (Vietnam, Cominican kuepublic) should not be overestizeted, This ia his fundamental thesis. Consequently there {s no danger for a confrontatiog of the United States with tha Soviet Union. The (Red) Chinese attack oa tha Soviet Unton which occurred the day before yesterday came only two days after tha heavy ettack contained in the {atroductioa of the book on Khrushchev's deeds. This book is mainly centered on the accusation that the United States and the Soviet Unton “cooperate in a way" regarding Vietnam, This 1s no mere propaganda, The (Fed) Chincsa show that this cooperation worrics them. The Chinese fecl and know that there is tacit toleranca between tha United States and tha Soviet Union an@ that there Esy even be more than thot. /braham Brictberg Editor, "Problems of Comannisa " (USIA) (1) Ha too considers that President Johnson is in a panic beceuss ha wishas to avoid a defeat. That {s vhy he deaperately undertakes actions which are costly and which ere going to cost a lot/the United States, No matter what the contradictton between the President's attitude and his actions may be, ha would be extrenaly glad to develop —_ relatfons with the Soviet Uaton and with castern durope. gre (2) All of the above-listed people (Frankal, Volkov and Brumberg) more or less consider that Kennedy would have undertaken similar steps {n similar situatioas, Kennedy's tactics and explanations would have been different, .
104-10219-10001 ™~ However, Frankel (up to a certain potnt) and Brumberg (completely) consider that Johnson is more conservativa than Kennedy (in spite of the fact thet this is not the case regarding the vitel internal cuestions of the United States). Frankel end Brumberg consider that tha rightist groups and the military circles have somewhat more influence on Johason than they had on Kennedy.
104-10219-10001 . . seen tee nee odredjujucih xnxesnutu asperata Johnsona i njecove situacijes v kee 3 RVOKA OU SADASNIIM AnCL JAVA SAD 1 SELISICL JOINaudaAz Max Jrearkels: 1) Johnson tek ogromnim licnin pritishoa,rosle dvosatne devate,nate- rao \abdinet fa mowntains slanje trupa u 5.Doningo. Acministracija nije oko Voxiuya uorste tako jedinstvena kio cho Vi jetnana; ned jutin, posto nesretna a'cija preduzcta na naigori aoguci nacin i posto se SAD “uvalile” to niko neta izbora nego mora 4a do Fraja podrzava Johnsona,. oe 2) Anericke trupe mnogu ostati u S.lomingu i aesecina. 3) franzeel vorste ne sratra da crcije Joxnsona kaa u Kongu,u Vi jetr: us Doningu rroisticu iz neke njeyove subljene stratezije novog “krotasec pohoda” protiv Komunizma.Isto tako ne radi se ni o o:ecanju sve oil, jer jako Oprezan da se ne zaretlja u dirextnu oruzanu koenfrontaci ju sa ‘ssst-on “mM Siatra da abkcija kad na S.Uoningo proizzsla iz slesecin ' i ! | I 1) skoro totalno otsustvo sposobnosti da se shvati svet, ed juna- rodni odnosi,da se racionaine i sistesatski pridje nedj.problesina. ‘ 2) Nespob-bnest ca se ostvari,cdezbedi u 3eloj kuci i inace | iole sredjeni siste donosenja odluka po-necdj.pitanjina,pogotovo kada res oO krizana i ecerzerncies,Bundy nije us;azio da ovo odezdedi,a i ne a0ze Ba Pretsednitiom koji stalno u skoro totalnoj tonfuziji,sto se tite Med jun: er a ~~ —-- . ‘ Fena ognovu svega udedten da ove Acministrecija “vopste ne s: rodnah ocnesage ras da radi,postupa na reeprena oo5i-u,le Golu,Zh vepste i 3) Nagle akcije Ujonsona,sa oslanjaajex na unilateraiau anericnt silu,porazuju da on u panicnon strahu ed poraza,da frusteiran ned junarods: razvitkoa za koji nena razusevanja a pred kojin ima cesto osecanie nenoci, | rorec toza,cestc iplicisticxi gleda aa mnogo toga kao na “xonuinisticxu z-vernu“,Gdatle i. vazoske fraze o “serifu',"rominiziau", "eisi ji SAD. ' ’ . e ° . . : . 4) Nite t.cicaa ai egzaktno da johnson kreauo u neku opstu ofianzive tots) koma: .,. -. ‘¢vo,on nastoji ta odrzi rorstalne ounuse sa. -sk-om § Leotpeee Ne "a om reayovalo me sedavno ve cm Se 1+ Caja on . { oe
104-10219-10001 injniko i se pouisi) ja da uzrecirava kubenstu situac: ju i cok fasize . mican to Je ustinska stcatezi ja o40 preva <uhij;odnosi sa jJucoslavi jun - Na prenor-aini, Urugo,bez odzira na karacter i inplizacije Johasonevib axcija,cinjenica je Ga si-one Jo sada uvex Sano Keaxcije fa 53 tuaci -— eae ju gde ~ on po sorstevnoj oceni bio pred neprihvatijivin porzizom(xonzo, vi fetres ifetres, : S.Do%izgo).Preia tone cn,za sede,spasava ono sto ina,brani se od fo 2a, Ne zalzira nove teritorije i odlasti.iva je ree oO krstaskon retu on bi ispocetka otvarao nove krize, na novinm terenina, ‘$) Jedan of alavnih razloga Za Junnsonovo ponusanje jeste i njre ovo stazhovanje ¢a Di svaku usteh “noaunizna”™ protiv 9A, Na bilo kon Besitu, bSitno Roxxxti5 oveo u pitande Rjenovu unutarpoliticku pozici ju, t 6) Sto se Vietnasa tice tu ja Adainistracija spreana da upotredi va scetstva i odiuci se na sve da bi spreciia pores u J¥Unolito se ed jutin sadasn ja rate Sitnacija luce stabilizovala,sto tesko da moguce,onda. Johnson’ — ‘ : a : _ : - | : re Di isao ma crosirivanie vojuih dejstava.Vijetnarska kriza je i dal je uo staciju kontrolisane cskalacije, we * 7) Jedan od bitnih elenenata za postupanje Johnsona i _Adrinisty ¢ Jeste staino prisustvo sasvic pouzdanih procena da 558R ne zeti da se urlete uw vojnu atciju u Vijetnamu iti inace,te da uzadamno poha zivenje Vodjenja racuna da ne docdje do vojne konfrontacije uve super-sile OSezsed ju Govol jai sanev-rshi prostore Kobdert BeCloakey: t) vo kraja oranio oficijetnim i obdjavijenin razlozisa akci ju " 5.507 Medjutin,interesantno je da je ion istakao da kcd Johnsona unatarpoli tic as Moaenat skoro preoviad jujuci. i . | Volkov: . \ . { i moe Usnovaoa au teza da ne treda precenjivati opasnosti sadrzane u-arciian ~. SAD,ocnosne u ¥ries oro Vijetnana i S.Vomiaga, jer nena Opasnosti za konf taci jo SA% 3S, Qt an Peslednji,prek jucerasnji kineski napad na SSSR ° . . | Fe en ner en rer ee ee «Saenger rene
104-10219-10001 , | sie teskeg napaca ¥ avocu U KEXE norecny £53: go koga cesio sas0 rar dana pe | yowpletnin ¢ela reuscova,a uw vore je giavna i rezgradjcna optuzba ca SAD i sssn ostvaruiu svesevrsnu ‘ggradn jut oro Visetcaaa i inace = rije sano propaganca. Minezi pokazju va th ovo uzrenirava i da i znaju i osec2ju me postoji bar precutna tolerancija,a “07zcs da izmedju SAD 4 §$S2-a celo vre i visete . . ' vrednik Mpeobte 7 of Consunism' (US TA): Abrsh2ay Brunleargs 1) Takocéjer s7atca da da Jolusen u panéénon strahu aa ne preteoi roraz i zato se gesrecatershi odlueaje na aveije noje kosta us “63 sek kostati SAO, Bez obzira na kontradincij: stava i akcija,on wbedsen Ga m—--® ae fe) fe) pS PN ETS TATOOS i owns een bi Jonacon,da sita cija nirnija, i te kako: razvijao ocnose $a $352-08 i TE. . : 2) Svi sagovornici (Pronkel, Volkov, Sru~bers) vise ranje scatrais cz bi Kenedi,sa Grugacijon tarktikom i objasnjenjina,poduzines siicne 2¢raKe U - ovakvia situccijatae Med jutin, conerle Zrankel,a do kraja Bruwberie : ji snatraju Ga Johnson konzervativnijifiako ne u bitnin pitanjima unutrasajes uredjenia sAU) i da Ko¢ niega vojni kru ovi i desniji deo «rupres “wapitela o uo rey jnaju pesto veci dostup no kod Senetijae * _~ e
104-10219-10001 | i. | an OE SUMPARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN REPORT (B) oe-We notice in the attitude of Andrews nore flexibility than in January. Nanely, now, the State Department does not abandon the program of bilatoral relatious (with Yugoslavia) because of our pwlictes. Now, sone parts of the program are scationed as possible, some parts will be discussed and some parts wait for a rore favorable situation, Ko satrings are attacked, no part of the program iu directly tied to our policies, i Briefly, the attitude is more flexible and the door te ®ll the possibilities is kept open. e990 (4) Kline (?) belonga to the White House, Bundy's efficse; -e isa the direct contact of the White House with the State Pconartment and deals with Yugoslavia, ancng other aia He told as: (a) Kow, thare are no probleas betecen the United States and Yuzoslavia except as to how to develop the concrete | relatiocas within the limits established by the Congress. have (b) President Johason des aot/to solve any particular probles ccanected with Tugoelavia. The President worss on tho improvement of the conditions PL-480 in general. Ue is interested in the question of the spare parte and this is the concrete mnitter which the President is | studying. (c) The President is preparing the project of the trade act East-Yest. This act may contain possibilities of interest to Yugoslavia.
104-10219-10001 Ho is evaluating whether something could be done \ with AID for “the comaunist countries." He believes that the current legal texts and the reguiations of the Export Isport Bank allow something in thig regard. If Yugoslavia has wishes, it could receive credits and loans for various purposes. (d) As for the spare parts, it .is calculated that &S0% of our needs : are covored through the usual coomercial channels. Now, it is looked for means for the remaining 20%, without changing the legal situation. — (o) The Btate Cepartment has not yet sont to the White House any draft for Johnson's reply to Tito. It ceems that this! hua beea unnccesnarily dalayed because Joknson's principle is to reply the following dsy. Eling ig cortain that the State Departnent has not yet. sent the drait, because bo would bave ceen it. Nanely, he sogg | everything which is specifically forwarded to Jonnsoa,. There are countries and personalities about which and about vhom Jcinson hag to be informed even if matters of more | routine are involved. Se wishes to mive his perscaal instructions regarding these countries and persounlitiesa. Johnson wishes to | know what is going on especially in the following countries: tho USSR, Inconosia, Prence, Crest Britain, Yusvslavia, India, the United Arab Republic, etc. When Eline read Tito's cable addressed to Johnson, he immediately aaid that the cable is good, that it has substance and that it is very good because the last paragraph rentions 1 pergonal meetings as useful; in their own evaluation, the passage before the last clearly explains what Yugoslavia expects and what it criticizes; however, this criticism is constructive and has no cheap polemic tmaplications. ah et Dad ea
104-10219-10001 aww _ — (1) Regarding the vieits, he personally does not 69¢ the | i possibility that Johnson may visit Yugoslavia in 1965 because the President is already engaged with visits to Latin America and Vestern Burope. He cannot undertake three important visits in one year. _ Kline does not believe that Johnson could visit either the Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe in 1965, unless somo completely unexpected events take place. The President's visit to Europe could encompass Great Britain, France, Westorn Germany and Italy. He would not go to Holland and to Sweden. Yugoslavian could not be included in Johnson's itinerary because of obvious political probless,. Johnsen would not tie his visit to Yugeslavia to his viaits to the Eastern Europecn countries because he does not wish to equalize these countries. Perhaps, his trip to Yugoslavia could be tied to visits to Greece, to Turkey, to the Hear East, etc. As for Humphrey's visits, the Prosident will docide whether, whore and when these visits should be made, Rothing in this regard bas heen decided as yet. (g) Kline knows with absolute certainty that Elbrick bas not asked to meot Johnson; that is, the request fron the State Department has not becn forwarded to the White House. Kline directly works on these matters. The procedure which is followed in such cases is that Rusk makes the request and indicates the specific subject about which the Aspsssador wishes totilk in order that Johnson may be prepared. S8usk has not addressed such a roquest. Elbrick could have asked for the meeting with the President in the State Department and‘ the Intter may have concluded taoat, in this mozent, he has nothing special to talk with Johnson. ese Kline did not raise any questions regarding the writing of our press, regarding our policies, etc. Last year, he did so in A rather sharp manner. ME
104-10219-10001 Kline talxed very calmly and constructively, Be almost joked when he said that there ts no nood to get upset about anything. | "If Sukarno wishes to get out of the United Nations, let him go; 1f Masger asks us to drink the wator of the Red Sea, we will drink it." That is the way in whic h Kline spoke. This tine, Kline was lens polemic than in the past, He trented our relations as a normal matter vitbout raleing particular problems. t a/ Micunovie
104-10219-10001 aimed at ‘he destrection of the alliance, , Nobody yet knows what do Zaulle will do. Tho United States Govermnent has not any aliernutive elaborated in cetrils, However, tie Sovernnent intends to esntinue ail ites activities *ground" ce Caulles; ite covernaent will avoid motionless ‘rasce (eic) while making the necessary adaptations requested by tho new elenents of the situati-a. This will Lact until there occurs a iavoravstle chaije. This may mean a continuous pressare and the prep ration of future positicns (sic). a Yranstator's Notes Te oriqinal text is tuo much J abvreviated and unclear, Salb ee : oa
104-10219-10001 | . — oe tere emener wees i : i : ! i , F§ 7 i t i 3 : : 1 4 Dea Vinosredov-3e Gol nije bilo neces substincifaine nov See ‘ 1) Prati cetelino razvej oho testova. Iz svodih tensakata u Agsini strociji, nije stetro af utiszs a: rrosiveno cledarie ra sovjetsku heace- siin(oho insretcife na lien ~esta)keo na isk!) dicivo Propagindna ‘ta8tikn, a bez ikoive cterijrine s.drzire. Ts znsciio cteriinten nin recall zretics Presovera uo iY bilo nesecohiveance 22 sverz. sadn se veruie da tsa, rosto . | - teinili bercesidu zele dn fe ste vise tanitalicirain u ecnevi ,picracandna, ité, 2.13 iv to rije istijucivi cild. More .aci do ooterijsinez uanretta 2) Do nekoy nitretta u resavanju crobl: c izcaddu sce S3SK nice weci 4eci ako se “Aruscey orilentise na bosiscenie euvoba ws sel} 5000. dle di lose ako bi isso na procud! javanje troz pritisek: to ce z-ostriti hla ecto ratovilu situeci ju np svi: frontevi-a. Sez: tom. ,trodac oi de hvats Ca se dov:innciin De Sola ioze euctili Tri .2tot Zanadne Nenackeiu ZE, sto nije u nicile: interesu. prea ononce ste Co soa intecc resonate, izredju De Soln i Rusa nije ies ¢oslo ni co tickyih hontretnih roz-2 <2 2catranja; Ly $< Ss° s . back ° 20322 1 eruga strona za sada zele dau oc: Qdrugih naih-vi prea crszind i oCrosi bude pristtni kao seszenest. Mediutin, to ne znaci dz seio bito Cer toniiepsignon Gozoveraiu, Derr re ze sada. % leda dz ni a cszseveryu 3) Marc ra sve vise brirne .W9n3 TCst0ji vise ele enata Raji za -v- vre—e 0su da a a Prt soviershkeo arand. peoszeuni cssore 0 Oko Il.oco coviets™ Civigi proscenni : Secata itu co 33.670-35.C00. mets
104-10219-10001 2 ee ee eRe ern oe se ee ee me ON le WO OP . ewes . ~ne att, - gavo to voze da Suce staini pritisat i | 1 2 b) Pitanje je dolle “ert Xubsnei da podnose onericeto raclicnje, sninane .usi uvezbavaji Auberen ao rshoveniu anti-svionstih o-uzdina. Verovatno d¢ Ga bi jecnoz cena Nubenei eborili cvionr, ¢) To bi se Cesilo pre hea Ansa rredaju sve uo mile cubanaca, "a oni odu sa cube. i d) Zato je situacisia veoua kocriibevens: SAU ne .ogu da roduose takvo sovietsho prisvstvo ne Nubi, a, ¢ Gruse strane, ALDa Norugana, bez 215%, “eze Diti neeccoverniia. Ram ongxzexiexchandxzhinexebekenarzigizirxgrizocx: NON EAAZSEX ANON GM 2EZ REVEUZLINZNARALTLANELIN AW VuZu7Vesehkenegzana dive gr zr2xstandizi2ieng et Marder ne zna kato ce se i da Ji sve ore rezitisznx sano da: kontoktina S332-SAU(Senodi-‘ug jecov, «retiucer Rusi=Jrbriniin! ~ eo. « - ? povre na iziena pisana Nruscov-Nenedi,toja i - alge trode) FEXM me razco- Vera o kontretnin nacininza kako da se :ve ove resi. . n : 4) Iako je De Gol ranio tezsk uderac svojia veton obo V3 i BIC i porenetio Kenedijeve planove, u Acainistrsciji i 3.0 ne visdca neta konsternecija, niti pretstava da se radi o fincas ienteinon ruceniu Savez2.Nixo jos ne zna sta ce ca cini De Sol. $v Vizda nea teku t detalino rezradiienu alternativa; ali je Orisjentisana ra nzstavljanje svih th vo tae th abtivnosti “oko De Solna, «aobilczeci mepe :itnu Froneusin, do doljih vienenay sa nmeznic sdartiranje: ncvor ciecent:: Situaci je.vec kvsri -. 2.2. ee eee ee me ee ee am ee ee te ee eee Tt ge oe hae ee
104-10219-10001 FEANSLATION 7 it § 7 se CHATTY SEES ee See ne Bh A ELS Max rrankel ("Kew York Tincs”) Peoruary 12, 1563 (1) RELATIONS GETWELN UNIG.u STATES AND ALLIES Kennedy Incw vout the "Sevbolt™ and avout the Stute Verartnent note adiresscd to Canada, ite anpreved. Sow, it is alleged that Nennedy cic not kaow in order to kecp formally sare the position of the chief of the country. i (a) De Gaulle Tee offfedal attitude of sennedy toward ce Gaulle ig outlined in (ic editorial of the *astingten vost" weieh eritiejzed Mocnillan whe wished te ereute an allii:nce of smeat eritain and the {ve aiaineat de Savile; actually, this attitsce is nerely & retlection of tie lack oF possibility of the United States to chance anything for the ti-c velnay the United Si-tes Also expects that changes will take pince in france, If de Gaulle were vounser, if he had behing Bia a completely united France and if sorething could be fore, the United States would not Le %s0 beacvulent and sn calm" ag it now isg things wovld be different and the situation would be similar to tie one which now exists uctween the Suviet cnicn and (ked) China vecouse.¢ Gaulle's policies are in certain aspects fuatenentally different fro: the attituge and the plans of the United States, (3) Canada The rain and real reasons for the conflict Diefendater- United Statcs 4s the qzestion of nuclear armanent and of the personal intolcranco of ielenoaker who wishes to exploit the anti-Ascrican line, Questions like the attitude of Canada ir Seneva, its trace with Cuba, etc., are not a matter for conflict and would not perturb the relaticns of the United States and Canada, 'In fact, sreat zritain, Norway and other countries have nany policies Similar to those of Canadagy namely, their trade with Cuba is of
104-10219-10001 a greater valime than the trade which Canada has with C1sa Great Uritain delivers ulanes to (cu) Crinz, cte. In nadttton, the Canadian diziomatic nission in Cua is of inealeulabdly creat value to the United states; Jt is one of Anericn's RELATIONS shiwiex Die UNI Tea STATES avi Tie SevilecT UNYON (Frankel'ts Confidential Talks in the State Dep:rtment and in the Rrite louse) ; (1) sertin Tie United States and the Soviet Union are not discussing jicrlin at all. aA small nuvber of hivzh Functionarics ef the State Henarinent and of the write lwuse tcld the eresident that Shrvebchev's speech in cast Berlin furnishes the occasion for the renewal of talks. Uowever, venredy refsescd to talk (-rankel belicves that tris is not quad), The subject of tie internal discussions in the St-te repartment mostly centcred about tre question of the presence md of tre flag of the United Nations in “est Zcrlin, Tre State Deoartrent considers that If tre auestica of a modus vivend{i cancs to life, the presence af elomente of the United Nations has ta 2e@ serely svsbolics such world ce, for instance, a yearly report of tre American Comcsadant in cerlin submitted to the United Natfonss the United hations would ast have tke riqhnt to cecide about the strength of the soluiers stationcd in West Jerlin, about the transfer of the soldicrs, soout their armament, ete, Tire vonsander would cot heve to ask for the proliminary authorization of the United \ations for anything woich ig of a vital nature. (six illenivle handwritten words) Thus, the situation remains the sane for the tine seing. The Auttinistration considerc. since the very beginning that the dbuiiding of the wall between East and west Jerlin has eliminated a areat number of Khrushchev's proslens, Consequently, this was one of the reasons for which the Administration did not undertake asy neasarcs against this situations tis attitude considerably hampered the poeition of the Administration within the United States at the tine of the construction of the Serlin wall, Shrusnchev recognized this aspect of the existence of the wall (sic) only sow, that is, after ene year and one half of threat8, . movenents of tanxs, aircraft, cte.(sic), The fact that Khrushchev recognized this aspect only after the withdrawal from Cuba makes the Administration suspicious agout Khrushchev's
104-10219-10001 intentions and tactics. (' ranstotor's Sote: The Llsst two sentences of this parayrash are not clear at all in the original text.) (2) The jects The prospect fer resulating tie cuesticn of the tests is. very bau at tre present time, So technical citferecces are invelved (s{x tactwritten iLleqiole warts). In fact, if elrbt insnections on <-¢ spot arc cnuugh ror the Caited States in order to conire! adequately this aatter, five or trree of then world also be slecuate. 5 the otbor tand, if the (.ssiang are not ofraid of esnionace for three inspections, there 16 no reason to be afraid o: “ive or ci :ht inspections. Actualiy, matters of political lack of preperation and political iripossiszility are to vlanre, igh fenctionarics of the United States Aininistraticn congider that tre Vugssians are not willing to discontinue the testis and really do not wigh to discontinue then, iho reason for such a fussian attituce is explained in this munv-er (several unintel]liyiole handwritten words): 4€ the Fussians are vehind in nuclear armanecnat and in rockets as iit was velicved that the United States was behind a cxynte of ycoars ago, then it fs clear that the “ssfans do nei wish the discontinuaiion of the tosis, Suspicions of Sussian tactics sej2n when the Sussians asked that the corvesponderce Yernedye:trustchevy be pubivished; {here was not enssgh reason for svch a renest. tie crsnicions becane firmor wren the “useiangs discontinued the nouroarlers at tre moment wren the United States asved trat the modes of inspection be cise:ased in a more detailed manner, (According to frankel's inside infermation, the cnited States was ready to accept five inspecti-ns.) lowever, the 2ussians insisted, as tiev always ‘id, that the United States has to accept first the principle of tiree insocetivas and the modes of inspection Would bec discussed tcerearter. (2) Accordin; to information that Frankel has gotten from the State Ccpartszent, to Soviet Anvassadors in yarious Western capitals congtantly allude rather directly t*at the mited States and tne Soviet Union are continuously enjajed in important talks related to Serlin, that the two Cassiries are in suostantial asreenent, cic, This is not tr:e at all. The Adninistration and tne newspaperacn do not clearly see whether
104-10219-10001 these allusions of the Soviet Ambassadors are aimed at cresting suspicisns among the scstern countries or wheti er they wisk to justify the Sovict policies concerni:7 3erlin in front of the Soviet connunist partacrs; nanely, the Soviet policies cancerning Berlin tend to avoid tensions, Finally, the Soviet alluaions could also be aimed at showing to the nonaligned nations that the Soviets are "constructive." (4) General Strte of felations The Administration and the Shite Nouse consider that we are rot either faced or in the co:rse of nejotiations and that we are not in the process of achieving anyt:ind. The most significant result of the recest events is the fact that it is vecoring nore and more clenr that the United States and the Sovict Unica co not velieve that ft is worth resorting to war for the gol:tion of any prodlem which divides tre two countries, This fuct first became apparent during the Sorean war, At the present tine, there is no interrspticn of the cold war if we mean oy interruotien a rapprochment or a real lessening of tension between the United States and the Sovict Union. In Kurope, there has been no cold war. in a military gense for a rather long period of tine, Narely, there were no threats ard military preparations, In JAY (sic, we may mention only Victnua, De Gaulle considers that there is no longer war threat in Western Furope, Othersise, he world not have adopted his current policics, Furthermore and ainilarly, if Pekin y were not aware of the fact that the United States is not supporting CIIANS Kai-shek's aspirations toward the Peoole's Hepudlie of China and enavling hin to become aqaressive, China could sot have embarked on its conflict with the Soviet inion, Tt is certain that if the threat of war tad not disappeared, Jupiter wovld not be witrdrawn from Italy and fron Greece, Actually, fron tre mlitary point of view the withe draval of Jupiter does not change anything because the Polaris is even rore danserous and efficient than the Jupiter, That 1s the reasoa why the ‘ussians are already changing the direction
104-10219-10001 of their main oropaganda blows from land buses to oases for supply of submarines, I would be difficslt to conceive the or to threaten with the reduction of the United States treops in vestern Europe. (sic) llocvever, here, the waraing up of the cotiwar is expected in Latin America within the next decade and a similar warning up will very prov.oly also taxe place in Africa,
104-10219-10001 : oe: = - wt PUMKELOE£)-13.12.1653 . ° / 4) eaksi sage syveatee Koneai zr2o i ne Sbavbeit i za izjavu sDo kinzdi i ocetric. ” . sadn se tvrdi ce nige asac, va bi se for :eino ocuvils neozicila sefa Ov7aVC6 _ a SE a a ” Q) De SUL3"Stev Mencdida rrese De Jolu,uvednik U.Posta tt tone se Neltinne Mabcilan sto zeli da stwceri sever Vievetawica rrotiv De 7oha, Sno izraz ne -o¢ci SAD da soda bils sta iziene, tno’ scekivandn ca dod fe co rronene u Frincusioj. D2 je De Sol nlaaji, adn iza sete ina Potrhuno ujedinicnu @rancusku, J da bile ovako "welikocusne" i ‘trirnet situscije ketva sada,reci:o, izies UoNnetin aspeltiva Fencacentaino su b) ELNADA: Osneva i stvarna cacrzina sutoba Difenb-ker-oio 4 Ditenju nallearnos nzorszania i liencj netrreliivesti Difensctera, rosi zeli eco ersrloztise Zerazito cnti-snecic!: linijs. Tatye titania iso Stav Xconaie u Zenevi,trzovine sa x1d01 i slenis: uonste preciet ovo: sukoba,niti bi onetiia SA.D-cancca odnosestonse:0, 73,Servestias! sl. iiajs nneze stavove zaiecnicke sa Xanadon, ~noso vise tesuin sa kudos, ¥3 sa Kinon(avioni) i sl.se: toga, tenadsta Citloictska sisiis u 'lavani od mescenjive infor ativne koristi za SAD; to in dels od Najvred ijin kancla, _os™ . .. Lone bee een ca gtaee ; - 1 . Ree ee ee we ----
104-10219-10001 Oe Ao a eee ea see roe = we ex One cy. elet) ae PVs Se “a gk ae wa. ke ve ou I we Pad Sen QR we ee UN u Zen i eT . . AS eC t IS “ Wot Tec Seen in (Oyo eae OE Ao eal ao ee Crave Ul mn neko hieivantiost=z-obcveze-te- She weetes jays: SERRE OSTA SE 8a nahi tno-trez Spree thine — ee, 2 = roel : oternivela de “Pen nie zida iz~+dia 2. : fig iy ; _ _ ' ne éeo rrodl: Paget osiaios i” a werlime 2a Urssceva bio: ilo . ore mee por nge 4 tla Mista rrotiv toga, st> - svojev-e:eno costa tx trimocs stetizc niered coziciil eater = . ° . _ . ™ ° ~ . tS viedo Kedjutin, "ruscev bel: pees Priznao. tad asreht re'stoleniz "Zits te . Y ; sto dotie i- eas, gecinu iro dara zastrasivanija,rotretanis eéaksve, - Onehmn jy avons; itd, Sto Herrizrz0 oved as-ekt tek rosle revieces _ Sa Xube,to unosi izxe pocozre.®@ ked id-in miereve nz-ere 2 Us un er id is] hae e ae aU) $3 taktibu.. kostr. abi. Dile<cev.lics i 5 3 Oe een em abe ‘ ome re
104-10219-10001 oo . 3) Preia infer acijena ee ert tain 2 1 an | f i MENEE ae SICH TS fnsrete say onss Fete eGek-sa ni-za-siuen? 5 iii 2. Mavs mad uty wih, i ns Rees one aice Ca kisi oe 5 Bore OSs. awe yn: rti feciste ci cele.Sats ' ® le te +S WF wiekg eng Ma AEF min, Hrei—JassQ rznsto: ako tvsi sida tetite zacsstali ou nuitearnes me2ruzan ju i reketana Io sto se pre dveetri ccciw vislilo ca zrestale 518,0ra Se tes:o noze Pretposiaviti da bi Nusi isif rs abusty u.eSucnic u- istrenost rushe tartike roccle kad wisi tm a di Ga se rrenishka ‘lene Nruscov oko tes ova objavi,izko bez Covolino mA OF. 7po lotove verrcce- ne Kac Ausi preninuli rrerovore i to once kida SAv tr-d le er se Getali-ije utvrde nodaliteti insre’cija,tez obzira ne Sroj.CEr< nel ry) 3 + ip) 4 “$ ° N ary La Oo oy v bile streanme na 5 inereteida ajeMedgutin, ausi : insvexcije cocisnje,na oré= da se vide savuliteti, : ae : eran 2 apecnia prestonicana stalno cine desta dir entre aluai je na te 4 Se iznedju SAD i $352 voze celo vrene Sicrz2jqi razrovori oko 3erlina, da doslo do usaglesavania i sl, sto worste me stoji,Adninistrecigi i noviserican nie jasro dz Li to cin@ zbdo5 uresenja sunnji aed ju ° 2 . . . 2 . Zapadcne, ili tice pred ke-anistic ia partnéria OPREVC aN ga SVO 31 “u neZaostravanja oro Berlina,ili n- -$toja je da se prikzs konstrubtivnin pred neanzazovaning 4) Orste stanite ocnosa: Sin se ne azlaz Nd- i to rreovh djejea ocena u Aninista dG ji,3i - ni pred, ni u, neson Eree2s= stvarnoz rrezo- , varania,jos manje postizanj- nekdh re zultstescsronan trea ltat psstednjin _ dogatiaga jeu tore sto $2 s¥e jiesnife, ios ci kKoreiskos rata, vidi aa -@i SAD ni SSSR =e isle ¢a ijecno pitanje site Njina Gee rata.to fo - - osnova sc¢asnie Situaci®# .21i 7i ne-ano Soca reki prekid,ili od-cirtnje ° HAG Seas Caer =e rer ne wee
104-10219-10001 sone he een 1) ae ye eee 6 nee ae rane ee eee eee eieeie ven ce ort wo a 2g = a“ . Jaindnoz cata,chy se cog tin rodrazu eva OStvarivenie ili pridlizevar je Nerozy stvarnos ¢eterte ole 3sideUstvari, hlidnes rata wu voiro: s:iisis (pcetnia rrivrica) us Evrori vee desta vreieia i Betas 4 GAU sano u Vijetnasu. inda Ge Solu rie Di bilo Jasno da morc vise voine pretn je N 1> ze) ) tt. 33 ° Cae ue rt 16) ed -_. QO ba] nM Q o Pte mi can isao n:. svod: szessr i rolitixujsia be na of pate 3 ) a fe bo . O. ” — oh) vai o- 2 La vee ° - ° n SIU n1®Y 5 $no Ga SAD re re -Tzeovaju Canze-.) .j-Sehkove asper2cije orena te KIMI, mith. au Ororucugu acsresiju, ni Kim re di M0315 ici na ovedey sutob 92 S55R-0%. Svatako, Ca noma to2 oONira ne bi »9z1l0 Goci,;oritiehd, co povlacenia Jupitera iz Iralije i Sewing fay. 3 ar iste pe caniaL aac: A . . a SECRE,2n80 S@ WONG Nista ne ienjaYcolcris rol ernjce jos orisni® i efikssnije, pa 2:si vec v“endadn peoveec glavnez nroparencnoz utara Sa baza ma zeclji ry Daze za snabdevan je pec--ornic@ .Iste tako bi Se testo i reznislizlo ili pretilo redvciranie: crop SAD trupa ou 22, Ali,ovde ocekuju rasrlacsivanie nladnez tata u Latinskod Americi oa narednoj deladi,e vrlo we rovatno iu africi, ~ . 6 . “= . ror ee “ é ~ - , "F = =~ - ete ‘ ea aster ~ = as Pte WEES ° —_— ¢ . cone:
104-10219-10001 - - - et 3 TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN From tae Yugoslav t.nbassy - Washington To tne Coordinatios Division - Belgrade January 28, 1964 (1) Rusk, Bucdy, and XicNamara are remaining with Joarson. There is no danger for Jonnson to taku some impulsive dangerous stcp because ae does cct nae one move in tae fleld of forelgn policies without asking for the acvice of the above-mexrtioned three people. ’ The source considers that the fact that Bundy remaing Is important for the relations af tha United States and Yugoslavia because Lundy Ig a friend : of Yugoslavia. He nas great undcretanding for tne interest of the United tates ‘ in malataining good relations with Yugoslavia. see (3) Johnson'a policies toward Cuba will be tough. de will try as much as he e2n to isolate Cuba and to make things difficult for Castro. However, Jonnéon absolutely will not cadertaice a military action; he ts aware of the fact that that is not feasible and that it cannot politically help him. Be has a tough attitede toward Panama and he will oct yleld under pressure because it would leave the impreasion of weakness. 339 i: (3) Johnson will look for arrangements with the Soviet Union. His attitude is not to insist on matters on which no agreement ls possible (Berlina, Laos). | (Kilduff from B. K.)
104-10219-10001 A, Gorey ae “56Y, ae  Poanu & ero ce ROG a “ en gen oreecrise nels Bon ye aghowest t AQWeeL. Tevet owiatia Le weXue Pee octwowe SAD - Gegrerye ite Ramole, jur on pergjadiy pug ordarge, welituy iat da anny SiiD « pol Pe ara A zi ele Oa tolir3Q noc js Qa) IMAL. 2. do fnsonors fo tela prea. Nba! te jl Bereta, ear lronc hebes geet mck cla, fo oer, Sa Keats acteatigin, mt * 2 aL Asa I Aad, {Vag abe, old ing teang, Goro ola, <e Jorn ee, oe a 6 lgere <8 tes WaAe poo tbisis weer Cote, Vad’ cla paps : coe Bort Many moe ey er ae jresestig 3 fre a “ ire pote Gite eeLint ond ako drrete aL: ea, SSSR. Ranh . 4, ‘ OP OMA EAE - rtm, Lave ). aannoajet Tae ——— __ | esimenmemenne t . e Ktoluff az BK, ee ne MLE TINIE coh TAD NRRaeRAtm ae ee MAt A eter tans nn meinen cower Nees
104-10219-10001 ITEX #1 FRANSLATION FLOM SERPC-CROATIAN From the Yugoslav Eabassy - Vashingtoa fo the Coordination Division - Belgrace February 13, ised The State Department is preparing for the dis- cussions with Home. According to thesac preparations, the State Departsent will not insist on the internal problems of the Vest. Actually, the State Departecot maintains the basic conceptions of Kennedy but accepts the present-cay atalesate os a reality. Until Erhardt's visit to Faris, tnere was gome hope. After this tsit, the State Department considers that 4t is not possible to do away with the stalezate in the foresoeablse future. In thie connection, it also is considered in the ftate Departreat that the possibilitics of Mune are linited because of the forthcoming elections; this too ia accepted as a reality. It is particularly considered that Lupe eannot give the obligation concerning the participation in the sultilateral forces. oe9 fhe problems of the Conzon Hzrket and the question of the forthcoming negotiations concerning the tariffs will ba discussed. Rowever, only the acute probless will be diaecussed. Ko spectacular solutions ere anticipated. The State Departzent also does not expect that the existing a@ifferences will be ironed out. The importance of Home's visit ia considered to be the establishwent of closer personal contacts which allow the personal explanations of the various positions.
104-10219-10001 Tao Americanswill insist on: = the trade probleas with Cuba aad - the questions concerning the credita granted to the countries of the Eastern Bloc. Toe Americans expect that the British will eak for definite support against Sukarno, if fighting resunes ia Bornes. As fer as Cyprus its concerned, the British are pore favorably disposed toward the Greek attitude related to the preliminary guarantee of intogrity. fhe Americans, on the other hand, consider that there is a certain degrea of logic an the Turkish attitude. he Americans believe that tho negotiations cannot be be fore hand considered as doomed to fail. ose The conversations concerning the German plan vill be of an informative nature, Up to now, the plan invelved was discussed at two meetings of the Committee of Ambassadors. Gn the occasion of the first mseting, Eoapstoin spoke sbout Bis vaslc ideas. At the socond eseting, the Anbagsadors expreased their opinicas. The plan contains some ideos froa the so-called Eden's plan. It also contains Kennedy's proposals pertaining to the creation of the mixed compissions svea about matters which are not connected with trace. fhe plan ia based on the principle of unity bet it dees net inaict on common elections. ‘ According to the Anorican evaluation, the plas : does not contzin anything nev and, in its current forse, it dose net open any prospects. (Bob, on the besis of his conversations vith the Vestera Ambessadora and Harton on the basis of his coaversatioas with Tyles)
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104-10219-10001 ™~ ute rma) SUIMQUARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN CD From the Yugoslav Eabessy - Washington To the Coordination Divigica - Belgrade February 17, 1964 Speaking about the conversations Bore-Jobnson, Rusk told a limited nusber of nevspaperson: The conversations consisted of nere work, There wag Qlmost exaggeration in this regard, About thirty probless wero discussed, Hany very iuportant things were arreed upon and much work was finighed. Dangerous attuations were discussed, Fzuceptias the questions of comxurist trade, including Cuba jn thoge matters, Home aud Jokuson vere Batisiied, There ig coxplete mutual trust ond tha gosls to be achieved are the B25, _ The cooperation concerning Cyprus is close. Tho counterpropasitions of Hakarios are greatly aifforcat from the festern propositiors. Bome and Jobnason vorked on the basis of reports which were submitted each hour, Ball is with thea in order to discusa matters aed net for the. purncse of rendering decisions, The most important thing ig to stop the fighting. Oo Bask was asked how the United States sllowed to be iavolved in the Cyprus problea. Sr alee
104-10219-10001 Rusk replied “the United States considered that the Proposed revision of the Constitution sboula be elffocted by the Guarantors; thus, it was proposed that the Unttad Siates piay the role of ‘junlor partnor,'* Rusk was asked whether the United States can participate along with the troops of the Commonwealth, He answered: wo ore not members of the Commonvealth but we will stick to our offer; we cid not tovite ourselves and will pot exclude ourgelveg," Be was asked about the United Rations. He replied: “somebody wishes to use the United Mationa for the purposa of cutting ecrosa the treaties; the mont taportanst thing ia to etop the fight; a mediation vill te indigpensable." S86 Rusk woe osked about aisarmamnt, He ansvered: “we have analysod the Bovist moves and we heve goon where the Sovicts are sharpiy opposed, whore they Bre eligitly tudifferent and where they have given their counter- propositions; it 1s anticipated that Butler's visit to Caneva will give new incentive to the negotiations," 380 Rusk was asked about Cuba: He replied: “the differences concerning tha policies tevard Cuba have been establighed; we have explained our attitude in ¢etails and vhy we consider that the temisphere is threatened; the traces between Great Britain and Cuba will prebebly increase this year; the exes will happen with the Soviet Union; however, with the Soviet Union, even Great Britain has problems because the Soviet Union iz not ready to pay 6.5% as interest,"* Rusk waa seked whether the British attitude in trade refiects the differences conceraing the conceptions of the cold war.
104-10219-10001 He replied:. “Bo; the differences involved exist ainee 1949; thers are no nev British evaluations concerning ita relation with the communist Bloc; we «sre in agrecsent regarding the relations toward the cusmunist Bloc.” ose Rusk was asked bow aany concessions had to be made to Groat Britain for the purpose of achioving unanimity regarding Southzastern Asia, Ho replied: “the United States has supported Malayeta in the past and Great Britain has also supported the United Btates in Vietnaa; the well-known British expert on everrilla warfare, Thomson, is in Vietcam with big whole experience which he acquired in dalaysia.” see Ruol'was asked whether France was discussed, Re replied: “very little; ve only etecuered whether the recogaition of (Red) China is the reward for its rgoting policies and we aeked ourselvos whether the recognition will etrengthea these policies.” 268 As far as the neutrality of Southeastern Acts ig concerned, Pusk exid that “there is no difference betveen Creat Britkin and the United States especially if neutrality means that the Best has to get out.” In tho cand, Rusk was asked bow went the talks between Johnsen and Hoe. Be repiiad: very well because one is a farmer from fexan and the othor a farmer from Scotland. “> a
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104-10219-10001 ch nes Oe mes ee eee ee biboag he: d. Du ee ae From the Yugoslav Eabarsy = Washingtsn Zo tha Ccordinatioa Biviston - Lelcrace March 17, 1964 (1) Tho enthus{esa for vork hag considerably drelined $n the Stato Peopartnent bceause it has becozs cioar Laat Johuson reais very 1ittlo of tho Stato Lopertucnt material. On a cotnle of occasions, Jolincon has retursed ts Pundy 59>9 analyses of the State Lopartzeat and bags eshed Pandy vhy ho fvtdo tkez to hia, telling hia that he neroly ceeds the siwiizaring, When Kennedy w2s Fresidzent, the Strte Ienartnert hea tho Zeeling that the current doportiut matéors wero ectuad); propcred for the President, This gavo particular incentive to tho functionaries of tho State Dopartueat. ees (2) Tho prevailing opinion in ths State Departnant and elsevhcre is that Ruck bes not "filied tha vecuuna" du foveigy Ppolicics loft by Eennody and by Johnson's lack of experienc, . Up to now, tho intoraal epeculations rentioa Purdy end @ven Bore often Uclanera as funk's successors, ; fT, Yanna is lately rantioned as the post Liksly sucecensor, ho matter what his attitude mcy be, Coviously,. NManup has not the espacitics required for the position of United States Secrotary of State, soe (3) Rostov, vith choa Johnson has repeatcdly been in contcct, das also bean partly elininatad, . Bostow no longer bas the direct contsct with the Fregident and tas ren arouse Johnsen, 8o had euch contacts curtice the Kennedy Adainistration, na ~-¥- -*%- anal
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104-10219-10001 ee - 29) TRANSLATION FROW SATRO-CRONTTEN (06, cr Urbs ‘. Dole e wt a . ' : s : 2 ie? “, byte tos F hoviaey poten ' re cas eee Wb lg CALE 2) ‘ Son werws: * a> x eg wy e vee - a ' et ae ee 4 “Fe ne: Sia tae "e 3, 8 ge MSP SSA titty tion Fron tho Yugoslav Yrbassy - Vaobingtoa To the Coordination Division = Palgracc 6. 0t.:. oe f. re Stel ats a Tp ew te March 17, 1954 qi) Johnson will probably rot be able to freeze tho question of Cuba until tho election: Maither will ho cncceeod in pushing it back to a losa promircat piaco. Tho Republicans will do nll they can for the purpose of dofeatizng hin with the Cuban question, Cvba will rexain an acute question as long as Castro is in pover, oso (2) In connoction with Cuda, the ovents gay covelop in the following manner. Tho United States intelliccnco services allegedly. have tho inforsation that tho Russians could arnournce rithin a couple of months that they ure withdrawing ail their troons frog Cuba, The Russians would take advartage of the incidests of tre tro United States plancs downed over Eastern Gernany and of the new A-11 plane to juatizy leaving tho “surface to air" aissiles in Cuba, Up to nov, Russian crevs nantpulated the rockets Anvolved, When the Russians leavo, the Cubans cculd cows sono ' of the U-2 plares which are continuovsly reconnoitering over Cuba, The United States considers that this recoanaissance ani tho photozraphing of the Cuban territory actually is part of - the practical and tacit FEensedy-[hrustchav agrecacat eincs thers | - dg no > direct inspection of that territory. — a wes te etree nen ee eee eee eee t , . ese nn ame ' F ° x ¢ Bete or er ee : wre te eee
104-10219-10001 bates eeetie oe ¢ bee fost - (3) If tho Nucsians co withdraw froa Cada, the United Gtates will insist that 4¢ has tho right to the U-2 flichts, Otkerwise, the Uaited Stetes carsot Ltov whethor soo Russians bave remained in Cuba, what tbey aro coing and, ehother they cro installing larser rockets, otc. That ie why, in caso of ths usa of "surface to air" missiles by tho Cubdaus against the Acorican planes, a eriticrl gituation may occur, Pw S8 ° In tho ueanvallo, it may be n has recently Lecone vory cautious. ot Looa thet Castro hivsol? fe pee ee
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104-10219-10001 ~, wei © 7 SURBARY FROM BRRBO-CROATIAN LL lS ¥ron the Yugoslav Embassy ~ Washington To the Coordination Division - Belgrade March 21, 1964 The Stato Department and the CIA have unconfirmed information that Tito may moet Khrushchev in April, . This mecting does not worry either the Btate Departmont ‘or the CIA, Ths report of Vigzhovie at the VI Pleniss of the Centrel Committca of the Comsunists! Leacue of Yupceslavia waa particularly noticed. Tito’s recent statezents vere eleo noticed; they indicate that Tito hes decided that ¥Yugoslavin should fully @evelop its ow policies. Thus, it is evaluated that Tito is Gevelerins his oa @ecisive attiteds and if Khrusiichev wants his cooperation, it must be tased ea tha acceptance of Tito's conditions and methods, 8/ "Volkoy"
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104-10219-10001 rr Ay mee Ht more hah J wy nm week’ PROT STUN CTALTIAN a ee ee Lote teeth ee Ob B the. be ch ewbts Cuwet i diese me Slbdket. week Be 5 te eee Frea the Tucsoslay Inbansy = Yashinztoa To the Coordination Departscat = Dolgride 6S A : ak bts wl desl otetes “April 24, — Oy SL hese (2) Tne crisis related to Caba is teconiny clorner. The - Ecpublicars wish to cale it aa irnortant elcctov.i Lesue. Fa oe 12g. ery i ec rs ee Sop. fe (2) Accor ciuz to : tho Cersressferal circles, the Republi-e cans are asiiny that cho Covicts withccay not cnly tscir tres oa bat nies snoir rockets frog C ica. Tresiccnt dennson hes to srparate the Cutan exisins fica tho question of tho United Staics velations with tha Covict Unioa; his wholo electoral canpaign is baccd on lessening of tension and peaco. Ses (3) Tho Adninistration has notified the Russians that 4ocrican plaacs will continua to fly over Cuba besauge there fs no inspcstion of the Cuban bases. Furthernora, the United States has stressed thet it vill consiter aay savoting of an Ancrican plane os a nost serious matter. eee (4) fhe situation of the Adainistration is unpleasant: (a) bocause it docs rot wish any milftary co:mlications in connection with Cuba in general ace sarticularly not before tho olecsticna;: (>) it cannot stop the U-2 71ichts in screral and farticularly not before the elections: the fornal justification for the U-2 fliszhts is the possibility that bis reckets could asain be sent by tze Soviets to Cuba; in fact, tia Ue? flights are a pressure agairst Cuba watch ruins Castro's prestiga. es cee ec ere ee ee be
104-10219-10001 (5) Ceetro hinself has nade his ovn poaition nore difficelt by publicly ceclarivg that ho wild not tolcrato the U-2 fli-ats. ~ 3 * For the tite teins, 1t conzot be ecen how the probica, which is bocouiny core and voru tc259, cin bo colved becazca the attitule of both partics is 52 cuirp. Thais 19 a danzeroig matter. .: - ww ee? i. | & st ; ae - It do vost protablo that tho Unitcd States is tryin? to fnoresa tho Coviet Union in order that the nuusians nicht in turn iroress Castro about tho scriousness of tio eltuation. — ‘ ohie i rs ae 4 foeh Mp beng ge He oY V7 . ae eae me ate pe ee aS gee he te ee OG SEE
104-10219-10001 K. UrLey 1964 cnorjuoroele lo rie ebgia aL SOP ade phate, Ae 7 Orernge cane ola <2 fever’ - mode. voz sone 20 0Ge wcla ofvre U-2 avien Hage Anca. malities, tutu, Qo aerate Mote, a At gti emia ~ Ag Repudrichareaea he Seta, woliseeg A, ar Sf. 1, we an of Tarte avotiater Re fa cla ail perrwadens case EO Sictan Ate 2) Praca, Ao ait en gover ahurtkerke . enne de VT ae garde, Antisera Potricna, ola Rkadhtiarg ocl Vente, ola nr Crfeomen powhun Aa Kite a eontiawnernt ty rede, : At wearer okey. a <2 OVO ME ahi fre. prvrnen, Rape AZ Freel eu - Aeaanapeargin RAMAN OVALY RA ; Maro AKCTR. ~ ages AM eben aug. debe Kels cle meen <. ORIG ecladg nie Prey . , HOLE ko" we wolneeing SHD- SSSK, See whe, robe Retrorcetn acticacin, oot wolnrrg SAD - SSSR Garmae ole, pats: ee ee Lata rakwilar ote Kea be ae Pe elo Wg io 3) roan sje a | Sa NA BET. tek tate feo ste eh ek Reg NS Ueto " al
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104-10219-10001 wa &7 TRANSLATION FROM SERBO-CROATIAN ” ‘ June 16, 1954 Ke Today the American E:bassy from Bonn has urgently reported as very confidential inforiation to the State Department that the articla oy ELEGANT from Bonn (Nask~ ingtcn Post, issue for Jue 16) was directly insoired in the Bonn Ministry of Forcign Affairs, ELEGANT, with whoa they spoke at the E:bassy, has show that data con- : cerning the unfavorable aspscts of the JOUNSON-EXILARD mecting were received fron hich officials whe accompanied ; ERHAXD, It still isn't definitely explained whether thoy ; had EXTARD's direct consent for leaking things to ELEGANT, put initial ioforsation indicates that ERLARD must have OWN 2) Insofar as ELEGANT's own report is concerned, 38, Well as his story of disagreement ani difficulty in talks, they are correct, especially because-- a) JOHNSG rejected any diplomatic initiative of Western powers regarding unification of Germany with the explanation that it would be pointless, huveless, and would merely ascravate relations, thwart the gradual realization of a detente between East and tiest, U.S. and USSR, and rake more difficult U. S. positions in Euroge. b) JOHNSON, in spite of ERHARD's request, insisted on U. S. readiness and determination to achieve partial results and agreenents with the USSR in Europe and otherwise, regardless of whether these are tied condi- tionally or otherwise with parallel steps toward unifi- cation of Gerrany as West Germany is planning then. tne es en ome 0s ae emer re eg eee : c) In the context of reYecting all of FERHARD's :) concrete proposals for a new initiative re unification ; Sas (declaration, note to USSR, proposal for a permanent conference, etc.) concerning unification, this was unequivocally rade plain to ERHiRD that in a practical sense between the USSR and the U. S. there exists sone kind of tacit asreement that the present division of Gerrans can be raiatained indefinitely. (In the State _ Department and the White Zouse there is ever greater.- - understaading for AHXUSHCEZV's essential interest: | Lt: NS Ste io
104-10219-10001 wee Ce er -~ ' not to allow Germany in any way, even potentially, in the life of several generations, for any danger to threaten the USSR and Eastern Europe, d) Because of that, ERtUURD insisted, on his fart, on Gerrany's frecdon of determination of West Gercany to " participatés or not to participate in, to support or not to support certain arragenents bwteen the U. S, and USSR, East and West, in accordance with his estimate whether they hold back or advance the cause of unifiration. In ‘ accordance with this key issue the cor-unique included positions of both sides because there was no compronise. 6) The atmosphere at the neeting was the coldest so far in any meetings of an Ancrican president with a German chancellor, 4)This element is in the process of ever deeper differences and ever more frequent clashes of U. S, and West Germany on certain basic issues of European policy as well as in East-West relations. Sich development, which will progress, will push ERILARD more ard more into Da GAULLE's arns, 5) Because of the sensitive situation regarding this the State Department (TYLER, RUSK's assistant) has stopped the circulation of the ERHARD-JO:INSON meeting's minutes so that only the top USIA echelons may see Zthem though not the Germanrpress attache. ° . [HeGOWAN]. Jyne 19, 1964 1) Even tho at the beginning it was somewhat disturb ed the American Enbassy in Belgrade arrived at the con- Clusion that in the TITO-XHRUSHCHEY meeting there occurred no essential changes of Yugoslavia'’s position. - 2) T,is after careful perteal of comuniqués, TITO's appearance at the airport upon return fron Leningrad, and even after devoting certain attention to the fact that TITO spent less tine in Leningrad than it was announced he would remain (two days) [sic]. 3) The latest analysis and conclusions of the Enbassy : aero from BINDER's alarming report in the New York Tynes t) June 12, in which BDWDER writes, on the basis of a communique; that TITO mde a fundamental and sudstantial a oes =
104-10219-10001 wee ee ee | meen pine eee . ‘ . . ee ee eer « 2 . concession by consenting to a conference of Com.unist Par- tics and the “monolithic unity of the novenent under USSR leadership as well as by conpletely adopting KHRUSECHEV's platforn., The Ensassy as well as the analysis section at the State Departnent at once showed that BINDER has incor- rectly quoted the version of the conmunique ("monolithic unity"), while the Serbo-Croatian version reads "unity and monolithism", which is sonecthing wholly different, 4) The Entassy litewise concluded that the meeting passed off "as could be expected, minus any new incidents and changes, whereby TITO expounded to KILtUSHCHEV his view- point and vice versa, that there exists a high cecree of understanding ard agreerent, but both substantially rain- taincd their positions in spite of their intentions", With this also the State Department agreed. §) Meanwhile, detailed analyses of the Leningrad com- munique in the State Department show one rassaae 2s sounding that Yugoslavia is asscciating itself with criticien of Rorania which in this cese would very muca surprise thon. Likewise there are differences in, the Slovene and Serbo- Croatian versions of the cormunique,. 6) The S,ate Departnent judges that Yugoslavia could “eventually take part in a conference of the CP's, especially if a conference would be held outside of Moscow to preclude any geographic seal of the CP-SU leadership and the rost direct pressure to follow the USSR line. This would in every way be a significant modification of present positions. (MCGOWAN and POLYANSKY, USSR Desk at S,ate Departmont)
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104-10219-10001 { ahs » t : - os. aed.brc t TRANE LATION FROM SERLO-CROATIAN. LEM RUA LLAN From the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington To the State Secretariat of Foreign Affaire « Belgrade Noven.ber 13, 1964 (1). The moves made by the Soviet leaders up to now do not allow to see their concrete position in the international relations. For the time being, they are obviously trying, with caution, to patch up the conflict with the Chinese and that is alniost their main concern, It seems th2t calm with the Chincge fs neccessary to the Sovict leaders. for the purpose of alleviating their burden and of giving therm the pussibillty i to take the initiative regarding other questinas. oss (2) The analysts of the State Department are paying great attention to the manner in witich the new Soviet leaders are treatiag Stalin. Since the replacement of Khrushchev, "the cult of the person” is often being attacked, including tne past “cult of the person." However, Stalin is not mentioned by name. The analysts in question carefully follow the can:paign which glorifies Sorge. Now, it is less mentioned than in the past that Stalin aid not take into consideration Sorge's information. ose (3) The-absence of a great, centralized, general Party campaign concerning the further program of development, etc., shows that no such program has been established heretofore and that the leaders have not yet coordinated their positicas.
104-10219-10001 (4) According to information recelved from Western Europe, it seems that Brezhnev did not affirm himself as a definite and adequate chief. The delegations of the Western European communist parties returned from Moscow with the impression that Brezhnev 1s rather colorless. The delegations are not in pressed with Brezhnev’s leader- ahip. se6 (5) All the information from Lastern curope agrees that, up to now, the result is u:erely the strengthening of the inacpendcace tenucncics, within the frame of the funcamental discipline of the Bloc. However, the iniormation {rom :astern :urope canact yet be evalu- aed as to whether and in which manncr the Changes which occurred in Moscow will affect the personal positions of the Eastern European leaders. The representatives of the United States have nowhere, except in Poland, felt a cooling, a spacing uf contacts with the officials or a decrease of interest in the development of relations with the United States. een (6) The reports from Belgrade indicate that the Yugoslav leaders remain worried. - It is evaluated that the position of Yugoslavia has, at least for the time being, become weaker because the influence of Yugosiavia on Khrushchev was a strong Yuzoslav position, (SV-5 and Matusek, Officer in Charge of Lastern Earope and of Yugoslavia in the Department for the Analysis of Information) -2- en we tee
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104-10219-10001 TRANSLATION FROd SERBO-CROATIAR Harder (1) Johnson bas made the r/zht step. Naturally, in his motivation, there ia a great deal of endeavor to present the United States in a favorable light and achieve a success in propaganda and in prestige. However, his whole action is not merely limited to that. es6 (2) Tho United Statos evaluated that it cannot start the negotiations while it was fxced by a cexplete deteat and by a situation which was catustrephically dctertorating. Thus, the United States had to improve its situation and to acquire a "position" which would enable it to act. Conssquently, the United States resorted to tho intensification of ita military action and to the bombings. Now, the United States belisves that it has acquired the “position” in question. Kore or less everybody its by now aware of the fact that the United States bas not been militarily defested in Vietnam. Thus, the United Statea has evaluated that it can take the initiative contained in Johnson's speech. ese (3) The United States waited for a suitable moment to take the initiative. The appeal of the seventeen net ions was considered as a suitable moment to start the diplomatic action. Soe (4) It is not excluded that the United States may discontinue the bombings for a few days. : However, it would bo altogether unrealistic to expect that Johnson could have announced the discontinuation of the bombings and politically survived in this country. See
104-10219-10001 ®, ne ne ee es (5) How, all is concentrated on the reply from Hanot. Yor instance, if Hanoi declares that it is interested in negotiating but cannot do it under tho bombing, it would be a Aialagua. Then, the United States could gay: “all right, hovever, if you are goiug to set conditions, you too have to do this or that." Or the Laited States could agree to stop the bombings for a couple of cays in order to soo what North Vietnam will do. Xn the meanwhile, soundings may be made through diplomatic channels, etc. MEISE ee
104-10219-10001 SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN Frankel (1) President Johnson and hie Administration consider that the bombing of North Vietnam is equivalent to the military act{vitles of the Vietcong and to the infiltration of the men and of the armament from North Vietnam. No matter what people may thirk about it, President Johnson cannot stop the bombings as a preliminary condition for the negotiations. eee (2) The toterpretation that President Johnson has accepted the proposal contained in the Appeal as a matisr of tactics ts erroneous. He did not accept the Appeal becnuse he belleved (that the other side will reject it and that he would thus eppear 28 more constructive. eas (3) Preeident Johnson has done a great deal and has exposed himself by accepting the Appeal. Senator Dirksen, who has an enormous influence, has already attacked the President for yielding, for being scared, etc. The American newspapermen in Washington have been discussing the whole day whether Hanoi will interpret the President's acceptance as an act of weakness. ose (4) It is not reasonable to expect the President to make new steps while the other side ts doing absolutely nothing. . As long as North Vietnam asks that the United States troops be withdrawn from South Vietnam, Presiden Johnson cannot do anything. 8 =_ oss 1 an RE ER eee a enn eee See
104-10219-10001 re ee rem ee aes gee ee ee, eee ie ee cee we cee (5) Since the end of the Belyrade Conference of March 15, only one single new element wes brought lato the situation by the United States, namely, the gases; the use of gases waa discontlaued. Otherwise, the bombings began on March 2. The Appeal has asked for “uncondition:l negotiations” alter the bombings. (€) According to his information, when the Appeal was being prepared, the Adiminietration had the intention of gently rejecting it. However, the colder reasoning prevailed and the Appeal wes used to con. plete the military operations with diplomatic political moves thus furnishing the occasion to the other side lo reply comehow. However, the other sice still belleves that it can Inflict a military defeat. oo¢ (7) According to the information obtained in the State Desartinent, the Yugoslav representatives in the United Nations hnva already asxed that the bombings be siopped. Such a request is completely unrealistic and it 1s not constructive {a the least. It is not objective to ask continuously {rom tne President to make concessions while the other side shows no will to do anything.
104-10219-10001 toon TRANSLATION FRON SERBO-CROATIAN Leacacoa (1) He spoke to me in the sase sanneor ns he did two months ego, After the military escalation undertaken in order to prevent the erosion of ths Apcrican situation end for the purrose of convincing Korth Vietnam that it cannot have s military victory, Precidont Johnso2 opened the door to the political diplomatic possibilities. Sto (2) Thus, the first phase was the disruption of the American position, Tha second phase is tho Aucrican nilitary eccalation as a reply to the offensive of Vietcong and of Korth Viotran, In about aix to eight wceks (aince both sides know that a militery selution in pot possible}, political diplomatic actions will be uwncerteken. Ysuere will be discugsiocas for the ,ursose of obtaining the positicns as favcrable as peseible for the negotiations, fhe negotietiong will take placo after the “usual prestige rites" which precede each armistice, All shall ue done in order to maho/ippear that "I did not give up first.”
104-10219-10001 -infj}tracifi Lindi i ocuzia iz ‘kod __slabostis Marder: : 1) Johnson ucinio stvarni step; naravno da wu notivaciji ina i<obar deo nastojania da se SAD Ppretstave u boljet svetlu,postigns propagandno-prestizni poen, ali se citava akcijz re svodi sato na x to. 7 ; Zz) Posto su SAD ocenile da re socu na pregovore sve dot rred totainin porazon,sa situacijon toja svaki sat znacila sve katastre- falniju sroziju,te da roraju da izravnaiju srix gitvcei ju bar co te sere da i one inaju jednu “polugsy jecna “pozicirs' sa koje xogu ca Gjestvuju - islivna jacanje voine“akcije i bombarfevanje. Posto sada Zakljucuju da tu “bazu","rolugu" itaju,da xxterixatszy vise manje svima jasno da neva jetnostétrnog Vojnoz roraza SAUL Vijetnamy,onda ocenili ca sadecnii trenutak pocodan za inicisetivu Sazrzanwu u Johnscnovon povoru,. § 3) Cekali na rogodns priliku za ovo i apel 17 zesalje,Z arrila, ocenjep kao takav dobar povodes ¢a se “zakac3" Ciplcsaetska axci ja. 4) Nije menoguce da SAD privreneno,za pur nekolixo dana . obustave bombardovanje.Ali bi bilo totalno nerealno ocekivati da bi fa to Johnsom mogao da javno iziavi i da ovds politicki prezivi, S) Sve se sada koncetrise na ofceovor Hanoja.Ako bi Hanoj,recinc, rekao da zainteresovan za razsovore,a da ne noze dok se bonbarduje, ona di tu vec bio Jijatlog;tade Di SAD rexietu redu',aii i vi morzie, 2ko fostavijate uslove,da ucinize ovo ili ono, 1li,dtobro,obystavjeno Za par dana,da vidino sta cete vi preko diplomatskih kanala se vrse sondirania i si, Frankel; - 1.Cvest je prilaz Adninistrac je i fotnsona da je bombardovanje Bx Severnog Viljetnanza ekvivalercno a vojnim akcijazz Vijetkones i fv l3e2 obzira sta seo tene misli, kaca Johnson i vilada krenuli ra bomDeadovanie ne nog" obustavli2ti ka? “preduslov za pregovore", as ad ° 2 ?ogresno bi bilo Protumaciti da Johnson prikvatio predice Arela sano kao trik ili taktixu ili sxe zato sto i se ocenjivalo da ce za druga strana odbaciti,na onda 3.Ko god bilo sta razume o politicko3 situaciji u SAI(Konsres, vojei krugovi,mnogi rateborni savernici Jcohnsona),itd, zra d2 se jucerasajin istupcos znatno izlezio.Ipak on prvi,a re drupa strana, pokrenuo "eskalaci ju diplomatije’. Yee za je Dir tsen, koji ovde ina ogronan uticaj,zgrabio za gusy ¢2 popusta,da avn@rickih nevinara ue vs $a 2a>rinutoscu da lice singtom x Ss Citav san diskurrje da i Hanoj prisiti istup Johnsona kao 2kt 4. Nerazumno je ocekivati da “rapnog koraka,i denasr iez “w+. ge etrangne g2-- womnson s0ze nosle Jocerasa jeg eevrra ma Adel ca cini nove koraze 342 ne ven: govoriti i1i ciniti: u medjuvresenu, SAD ispadaju Fonstruktivnije prat svetoz Se uplasio i sl. Yec € 2 | ee CEN mes meee ec me sista, nego neta apsolutns aikKakve - - «en Mpinnigg 8
104-10219-10001 ONO eee em ee meee ++ me. tees . 2 ee on Sn ereyer ee, ween “us i - - indikeciie 22 Zainteresovana za txiproceyciptonatskuakei ji, sY bITa srag Sada ca kaze da Zainteresoven 272 Pregovore,ra neka kaze éta ih cneta i sl, Ali, dok Manoj kaze ca neta pregovora cok SAD ne izadiz iz Vijetnana . Jobepon ne soze niste,. 5) Od zevrsetka Beorradshke konferencije 15 marta sano je jedan NOV elesenat bio unesen p Situacijy od strane SAD3 gasovi,d to je rery Olustavi jeao, Inace, boabgndovanie Dez obzir2 na retalijacij: je Otpocelo vec 2 ary marta. Prema tone Apel ja NEE i rosle 'ega trazio,kao Oper3tivni Stav,precovore bez -preduslova, 6) Ina necetke da prva reeakciie na Apel,éek jos nije bio ‘Precen,ovee = Adninistcrag Ji Dila da ga se glatko Ohi je.Medjutin, Prevladale hizdnije razwislisnie da Aaa] Cate rrilixu da se vo jno deistvo korpierentira POM ickoediptohstskis, 4 nadi da ce Grupa Strana na ner: nacin Oc goveriti - wholiko se i dalje ne Zancsi isejon da moze da nanase Vojni peraz, 79 Prev Ra zasedan ed SAU,od oe 0 isfornacijana y SU, pretavnici Jugoslaviie u UN(NGajark) ‘tu KROniteta za definiciy 2nreside danas jutro vec traridi onepona da ide Calie,ca obustari boa tezcovanje § to law e .ODjavi,To je totalno neralno j nekonstruktivano:to Je neobjektivng baranse i nereatno Stalno teranje samo Say i Je ustupke,dok Griga strana ne forazuie nikakvy &? Leacacos: hsnena da cine Voli& ni za sta, 1,.Kao sto i f0vorio prije dva mjeseca(sto hilo tz Za Oko osaa ele) ja, posli ie izv wyjne es\alacije voini da di se har Zonekle sprecito ercdiranje anericke sir —ubedio da ne "2e da ostvari Vojnu pobjed POliticko-diclozatskin Bazgucnostina, CNO.op.m.C. I.) 2 Geistava sap uacije i sv u- Johnson ctvorio vrata JePrva fara Je,znaci,dile FeOpadanie arericke faza je bila as ericka vojna eckalacija,kao o+ Viletkonga j SV. Meze se reci da wand sada u*polu-finaly Laviesnoz Otvaran ia, Sada Cey jJetno 6-38 nedielia, obe Strani nastedati.znaive;g da VOINO resenie ne "OguCe,Ca rofu sano cDe da tzgude,siti ji vo jne i POLiticko-dinionzarske akcije i nadmetania,w Aastojan ju da se estvari Povol iniia Pozicija,sts maksinalnija,z2 Frecovere, Do Prego. : ; vora ce doci kata se obevi “"uohiea jen Prestizai ritual. svakoz Primirija i S¢danja za stol: da S@ to tako izvede kako ne bi izglecato da “ro ja‘ Strana prva Popustila, POZiCi jesdrugs govor na ofanzivu | . ' to. . ; ie woe . - ss ~ . . ; { . ' oe i SoWR hr NeR SENET ‘
104-10219-10001 att Jyh SUMMARY FROM tL KEO-CKOATIAN REPORT (A) From the Yugoslav i nbassy - Washington To the Courdination Di partment - belgrade June 11, 1965 CABLE beea . (i) Up to now the State Gcpartment bas not.lara:ea about the visits of President Tito to Czechoslovakia and to Lastern Germany, The D particent continues to be consicerably irritated in { connection ~vith the propoeala for united action in Vietnam and in the Dominican. Ktepablic agains! the United otates, A greatcr uttention fs pai to Tito's trip to the Soviet Union especialy because thie visit follows the heaviest Yugoslav direct attacks on the United States, Jo this connection the White House and the State Departn.ent are somewhat emotionally upset becausc the United ‘tates Situation ip Vietnam and in the Don.inican Kepublic is not §00d, The Kegional Section ana the Section for Analyses of the State Department consider that the relatively cold reception of Tito in Czechoslovakia will not build a position of strength for Tito’s visit to the Soviet Union. Ona the other hand, Tito'’s cxceptional reception in Lastern Berlin has impressed everybouy, inclucing the American observers, and it will probably be an assct (or Tito. cotere Cah PNAS 5
104-10219-10001 (2) In connection with the Sino-Soviet conilict, there is great interest in Tito’s visit to the Sovict Union, fince the incident with the Chincse students around the United States Embassy, the Sovicts have not directly attacked the Chinese in thelr press. However, the press has published Fashidov's conflict with Peng (7) on the occasion of the celebration of the 14th aontversary of the Con.n:unist Party in jakarta, Now, the press has published Tito’s visit. Perhaps, the fovicts consider that a complete silence is act suitable because they loge too much ground in the international comniunist moven ent, Wolter) — len Youle gn pL (£. Ford said that the first day of Tito's visit to Lastern Germany was bearable" frou: the polnt of view of the Etate Departnient. )
104-10219-10001 SUMMARY PROM SERBO-CROATIAN UAT AR REPORT (B) CABLE From tho Yugoslav Esbassy = Washington To the Coordination Lepartment - Belgrade June ll, 1965 (1) Because of the tense aituation related to ‘Vietnam and the the Rouinican Republic, the Anerican diplomats have much leas opportunity of maintaining ugoful contacts in Eastera Furope, The value of the Anerican information from Esstorn Europe hag considerably ceclined. This is particularly true for the information emanating fro@ Poland. The game holds true for the situation ia Washington regarding the American contacts viin Eastern European and with Soviet diplomats; the exception is the contact Thomson- Dobryain which is stiil souewhat saintained. See : (2) That is why, the offorts of the CIA, of = the Bureau for Analyses of the State Department and of / other organizationa are intensified. These organizations i are trying to loarn the situation froa publighed uztertal, 1 from eventn and aiedisr satiers, Particular effurts are made to learn the situation of the relations between tbe countries of Eastern Kurope and tie Soviet Union. A score of things is not clear in this connection as for instance: ~ the meetings of the ainisters of foreign affairs, ~ Kadar's visit to Moscow, - the newg recsarding the forthcoming visit of Gonulka to Hoscow, - Tito's visit, etc. eee weahitterte sone
104-10219-10001 (3) The situation in Sofia is not clear. [It ia kpown that the Putsch was defeated. Kevertheless, it soems that tho situation is difficult because when Zhivkov recetved Suslov he publicly gaid thst Suslov had come for the purpose of “settling for us the situationmd tho relations.” : It waa noticed that Suslov was acconpanied by several Soviet experta on Romanta. Soe ; (4) The analyees show differences in the position of varfoug Soviet leaders. Suglov's speech in Sofia vas expectally interesting if coapzred to the speeches of the other Soviet leaders. Hamely, Erezhnev said that"all necessary aid should be given to Vietnan." On the other hand, Suslov said that "the burden of aruasent in considerably ielt by the Soviet people.® It was noticed that, on the occagton of the parade o! Hay 9 in Koacow, Brezhnev had great pains to : persunde Mslinoveki to take the siand near hin and Kosygin. There ig the tepression that the Soviet leaders : Sre discussing the essential questions (Vietnam) under : considerable pressure. ; The "Heveveek" editor in charge of foreign policies was in Moscow where he spoke with Zhukov, Cicetkina (gice a wourn) and other editors of “Pravda” and of "Izvestia." Only Cicetkina, who belonzs to the old NKVD personnel, defined Khruschev‘s discngagement froa Victaas a8 “anti-socialistic." All the edttora were silent when the assertion that Ahrushchev was wore realistic and less harn~ ful for the USSR-0.8.A. relations vere eade,. ose (5) There are not yet enough indications shoving the new pro-Stalin course is affirming iteelf in the Soviet Union. The invitation to Tito to visit Hoscow does not agree vith the affiruation of the new pro-Stalin course. =~ BD w« teh de Abts kes
104-10219-10001 Some analysta of the State Departaent even notice that the KEVD is mentioned more often and that it has greater recognition. Tho NXVD was constantly attacked under Khrushchev; consequently, the young people refrained from joining 1t; perhaps, the recognittiuna of the KEVD ia due to the difficulties of recruiting new and young personnel. TM Names aoe ee ee emer ne ere me
104-10219-10001 _ Cp Pome fe YES rz ie V) brocenjuduei ciste sa stanovists enerichih interesa i odraza rin amer3ckoe Juposlovenshe odmene do sda u SD nije bite neko “alarma'™ oko dosadesn jeg roka poseta Perit uw Usk i IN, Nastavija se znatna iritacija cadi poziva na ujedinjenu akeiju vretiv SAD uu Viietname § OR,ali se konstatnie da Se, po fornulaci java antianericki stavovi ne zaostravaju i da rostoji izvesno ni jansiranje. Neacingxmy Mnono vec y paznia se roklania Putuou S5Sk; dopusta Se mapnenost slabe reahci je u . Sane SAD nA Tstuyapopotove zatoe ato dn ave rosete Cola Wrekolibo nelel ja easle cdivektngh naste7i NW napata na salou JuUvosteovenskim is javama ll tom pep beste we AKG vovehw SU situsedi ja x i dalje donekle emocionalna, i sve se teze peima Jer situaci ja SAD 6 u Vi jetnamu i DR nije dobr'a. _ Relativao hiatpiji rrijer iu Pray i Csr nopste,procen jujuou regionalnom olélenju i aceleniu za aralize SD,nece biti “pozicdi ja® snape' uo odnosn na pecetu Mo.kvi,a ni inace, Med pitim,vanredan socek no bstecnom Nerlinu impresio- | Hirao svih,pa i amecicke posmatrace,i verovatno dabro dotasi ‘Tite eee ree meee ee ne ee me em ye ee eee = ga ni
104-10219-10001 Kao i do sata, konacne ocene ce Cekati caversetak posete Moskvi pde ce sve yaviniti cd taga hako se Lito tile postavio. : 2) Sa sires aspekta, majveca paznia se poklania sovietskom pozivu Titu u kontekstu nosovietskim javnaimn izjavana to stampa nije bite direktnih napada na Kinu. Rusti nisu sami objavili direktno izvorne vesti o tome da Kinesi spxenavakz omtali dotur F naoruzinja u Vijetnan, vec to "procureli™ zapadnoj stampi,bez ikakvog objavl jivanja ‘ S52? ; ue sovjetshoj.ovakav stav soyateamu seYisplstio kdd AA zemal ja,posebno uo kampan jd oko prisustva AA konterenci ji. . Ow “Med jutim Ohjavi jiven je uo sov jetskol stampi sukoba RaSideva sa Venjjom na proslavi , Dewert . 14 pocdisnjice KPI ow énctomezeji, i sada objuvijgivanje nosete itea,sto an Kineze usd “ervena kepa", andacara jn daVmozda procen juju da im kopletno cutanje i neodgovaranje ne odgovara jer previse pube u medjunarodnom kompokretu,pde Ainezi sticu poene, posebno xxd na pitanju Vi jetnama, “ (Volter. Inace, i ma nivou ceferenta u Udelenju za Nemacku nam gowrili da prvi dan. CE ford posete IN-u,aa njihovog stanovista,”podnos] Sivo" protekao)) 1 + wees er ee « 2 Ea FS ee ee er. cr nov jetsko-kineskops sukebas ob incidenta sa kineskim studertima oka amercicke ambasade - wees ewe ee er ew . Ss ae ie CQ PRN Ok eee
104-10219-10001 Ke L) Raci zaostravanja atmosfera oko Vijetnama' s DR americki diplomati un . IE imaju mnogo man je prilike da odrzavaiu korisne kontaktejvrednost americkih | rfornacija iz LE po svim lini jama znatno opala za posledn ja dva meseca,a ‘WMasingtonu,sem donekle Tomson-lobrinjin, | ajvise iz Poljske.Ista situacija i u Kontnktima sa IB i SSSR pretstavnicima 2) Zbog toga udvostrucen napor u CIA,Birou za analize SD,po institutima da e€ 37 Objavijenid materi jala,dogad jaja i sl. pokusa nazirati kretan ja,posehno u odnogima IB zeml je-Sssk gue nis stvari nejasno(sastanci VP ministara inostra nih poslova,poseta Kadara Muskvi,vesti o nniskori joj poseti Gomulke u Moskvit, poseta Hita,itded ; 3) Nije jisno kakva situacija u Sofiji,sem da puc pogcazen; medjutimn,izpleda da sitnacija teska jer Zivkov docekujuci Suslova javno govario da S.dolazt ¢ aovietskin_specijalista za umunijus 0 “da nam sredi situaciju i odnose't,Zapazili Saou pratng$i Suslova bilo n{zy~ 4) Analize zapazaju razlike 1 stavovima pojedinih sov.e tskih rukevodilaca. vorcima ce ene amen ee: Govor Suslova u Sefiji bio posebno interesantan,kad se uporedi sa Ro A ow oe vate 1+ woe meen. . . _— imme em ote oA toe
104-10219-10001 oa Croverio ¢ ™~ ostalih, Dok Ur genjev Rayluceyecyn posledniin izjavara o svakoj potrebnoj pomocd Vijetnamusdotle Suslov da teret naoruzanja znatno pada na tleca sov jetskog naroda. Posmatraci primetidi da prilikom vojne parade u Moskvi 9 ac ja,Wreznjev jedva napovorio Malinovskos ¢3 stane aa tribinu pored nieso i Aosigina. Ima se utisak da seu rukovocda ts SSSRea diskutuje pod znatnim pritiskom(Vi jetnam) o bitnin pitanjina,tako da se to mora Odrazavati iu njihovim istupima.spol jno politicki urednik "Njuzvila ® bie ww Moskvi: i 1 de Goverio sa dukovim,Cicetkinom i drugim urednicima uo traved, laveatijama, itd. Sem Cjcetkine, koja stari hadar Ne«Vb,i koja dezanpazcan leuscova iz Vijetonma navzvala : . ‘se hed jalisticxim", svi sutnjom presli preko tvrdnje da stav truscova bio renlsticoniji - iomanje stetan za adnose SSSH=SAD. 5) Nena Jos dovoljno indikacija da seu SSsReu reafirmica reki novi pro-staljinist ie cki kurs.toziv Titu se ne bi mopgao sa ovim uskladiti. Pojedini analiticari u speak dopustaju monnenost da ge NKVD vine pominje da mu se ada veca prianania zbhog tone -— a sto ponte stalnog naradanja na njih,pod liruscovon,dosto do advracanja mliadjih kadrova,pa nozda doslo i do problema dovolijnog rerutovan dae , _ oE $ (Volter.) . _ * ‘ Nee, peer eee bo we terme em ewer ae ee Fn ee et eee eee cemmmpan © ore ee ee «Oe A ae eoreneecemnnee tin emmere 8 remote meme T ah » me a ee 8 ee ee ewe
104-10219-10001 TRANSLATION FRCM SERBO-CROATIAN gepornr (A) °° 7 _ os wee cw me ee ae From the Yugoslav Emtiassy - ashing ton - Fo the Coordination Departacnt - Belgrade August 16, 1965 oe ‘1) . Harriaan did not come eith anythiag nov concerning Viotnan. ; Be was received by Prestdent Johnaon fer about. 15 minutes. lumediately thereafter, President Johnson bad rather long briefings with Congressuen at which the posittoas ezplaines on the occasion of the last press conference were repented. eo te pa (2) All the United States data and evaluations poiat to the fact thet neither Viet Cong nor Eorta Vietnaa will be ready for negotiations before the cud of the HOUGOOD SEASON. . eee (3) According te internal conversatioas with Willian Bsady, Secretary af Stste Rusk'gs Asgaisteant for the Fur EBaat, and with other functionaries of the White Houme and of the Stale Nepartsoné, 1b geese Chet the ~ ginisua reqaired by the United States for a solution ib | Soath Vietnas is a type of "Loog Boluttes.” The ‘effects of this golutica ghould last for at least sume yenta. This means the estahliahsent of a neutralist government io which all the weln torces of the country -~ ducluding the Viet Cong -- woulg be represented. It - would be poemible to maintain the.terwationg of the | Viet Cong as im the case of the Patnet Lao formstions. (Gvortensa, blue card index) cor oy La ANN ane TR VEAL atte gee ate a wacta uot au 'S Fi3
104-10219-10001 Re ar ae WN me ne wom BE ew Froa the Yugoslav Eabassy ~- Washington . To the Coordination Departacnt - Belgrade August 10, 19¢5 The correspondents of the “Evening Star™ infora today from the United Nations that the United States Goverr- | ment vill announce on August 1d that it does not insist en Article 19. Consequently, the probles ig being solved. Allegodly, it wh1l be announced at the sene time that the sovicets have accepted the idea of donations. According to inforeation obtained by the above- mentioned correspondents, the United States and the Sovtet Vaion bave agreed about this matter. sO , This vould make possible the narual work of the General Assembly of the United Nations. (Gvortzman, blue card tndex)
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104-10219-10001 : veo, tte Be a SUMMARY PROM SERBO-CROATIAN - REPORT (A) se Ld ; ELiMENTS FROM TALKS ABOUT PRESENT ACTION a, ot Be thee ye ‘p Youge . * OF U. S. A. AND PRESIDINT JCHNSON’S POLICY , Max Frankel oe (1) A€ter two hours of debate and only by using heavily hia personal prestige, President Johnson forced his Cebinet to send troops to the Jomiatcan Republic, The Administration is far less united about the Dominican . | Republic than {t fis about Vietnam. | However, since this unhappy action has been undertaken ot. i: fa tha worst possible manner, there is ao choice but to support oe | the President. a mo i . ae | ; { (2) Frankel does not consider that the President's pee wee t ections in the Congo, in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic 20.002... are the resuit of his thoughtful strategy of the new “crusada' ; against ecmmuiniam, He also considers that thesa actions are not the result of the President's feeling of omnipotence ‘-.- beeause the President is very careful ia avoiding a direct " 3 oe "armed confrontation with the Soviet Uaton, © ee smn an 8 maceaemane ow oe Of a Dial Frankel considers that the action in the Dominican _ a Republic is the product of the following factors: (a) The President is almost completely incapable of understanding the world and the international relations and of - ®pproaching rationally and systematically the internattonal a problems. , eee = “= ae are ee
104-10219-10001 (b) The President {s incapable of establishing and a oe organizing in the White House and elsewhere a regular system - €or deciding about international questions aspectally when _. crises and emergencies are involved, This cannot ba done because the President is constantly and almost completely confused about the international relations, On the basis of this, Frankel is persuaded that the Administration in general does not know what to do as for fnstance when the Soviet Union, de Gaulle, Western oa ta etc., are Auvolved. (ce) The President's sudden actions and his unilateral support on '' . American power show that he is in a panic because he fears defeat and that he is frustrated in connection with international developments which he does not understand end in front of which he often feels powerless. kaw (4) It is naither logical nor exact that the. President hae started a general offensive against commnisa. First of all, he tries to keep normal relations with oo the Soviet Unioa, Then, he does not even think of disturbing the Cuban situation. Fuxthetaore, the relations of tha United States and Fagoalavia are normzal,. Finally, ie is a fact that the President's moves . . have heretofore been only reactions to situations where the ~ is» , . United States was faced by unacceptable defeats (Congo, (alas uu... Whetmam, Dominican Republic), Actually, he had to defend oor 7". Admpel€ from defeat and did oot attempt to win new territories. { : a8 Tf a “erusade" were in question, the President tinaste would open new crises oa new grounds, “et t # SOW ash teeth Gad a Rare ato tipee el be ante ee = TON ent oo AR enti Gale 0 akg te gt) eh patente sae UROL SARE Raia ee
104-10219-10001 ° _ (3) One of the main reasons related to the President's : -- on. waa. behavior 1s his feer that any success of communism against oo 5 the United States will jeopardize his interasl political position. Rew (6) As for Vietnam, the Administration {s ready to use all the means in order to prevent defest in South Vietnas. _ f-the current situation stabilizes, which fs _ difficult, the President will not try to widen the mflitary operatioas. , The Vietnamese crisis remains in the stage of controlled escalation. waw One of the essential elements in the calculations of the President and of hia Administration are the very reliable evaluations regarding the wish of the Soviet Unton oo a to avoid participating {n military actions in Vietnam or So ‘ elsavhere,. . re . Thus, the mutual avoidance of military confrontation of the two ‘superpowers’ leaves enough ground for maneuvering. Robart McCloskey He defended to the end the offiectal and the “+ published reasons of the United States action in the Dominican -. PRepublie. oe, _ Bayeed . However, it is interesting to note that he too i emphasized that the Prasident is particularly concernad ! _ . bout the factors related to the internal polictas, pe. TT ermine rata bammis Comet ena tite NM
104-10219-10001 Volkov He believes that tha dangera related to tha United States actions (Vietnam, Dominican Republic) should not be overéstimated. This ia his fundamental thesis. Consequently thera is no danger for a confrontation of the United States with the Soviet Union, The (Red) Chinese attack on tha Soviet Union which occurred the day before yesterday came only two days after the heavy attack contained in the introduction of the book on Khrushchev's deeds. This book is mainly centered on the eccusation that the United States and the Soviet Union “cooperate in a way" regarding Vietnam, This is no mere propaganda, ; The (Red) Chinese show that this cooperation worries them, The Chinese feel and know that there is tacit tolerance between the United States and the Soviet Union an‘ that there may even bo more than thet. eo fbraham Brumberg Editor, "Problems of Communism " (USIA) — (1) He teo considers thst President Johnson is - ee - ina pantie beceuse he wishes to avoid a defeat. That is vhy ~~ he desperately undertakes actions which are costly and which _ 8re going to cost a lot/the United States. cs ok . . No matter what tha contradiction between the “oi "©. President's attitude and his actions may be, he would be , | extremely glad to develop ©:: relations with the Soviet Unton and with Eastern urope. ; ; ers (2) All of the above-listed people (Frankel, Volkov and Brumberg) more or leas consider that Kennedy would. have underteken sinilar steps in similar situations, Kannedy® g tactics and explanations would have been different. . 8 Tee Cet eine Sd ont eid pe feo es
104-10219-10001 7 7 - . However, Frankel (up to a certain point) and Brumberg . (completely) consider that Johnson is more conservative than 4 ‘ Kennedy (in spite of the fact that this is not the case regarding fo. | the vital daternal questions of the United States). Frankel rn © i and Brumberg consider that the rightist groups and the military : circles have somewhat. more influence on Johnson than they _ : ‘had on Kennedy. - veneer ee 4 tibigteanpincieeieaes see aee RR Re ATE PERE relent Sepa ne cca con, y By DUTY, segs Ualgedemasietobn San en Mh et ne oo
104-10219-10001 + AUT RNR ERI ROETEY A. * wv bee VORA O SADASNJIM AKCLJAYA SAD 1 SCLITICL JOUNsuNA: Max _#rarkels fao xadinet na morwntains slanje trupa u 5.Doningo, Acdministracija nije 1) Johnson tek oxronmnim licnin pzitiston,rosle dvosatne debate,nate- '. Oko Voninyga uorste tako jedinstyena kao cko Viljetnama; sed jiutin, posto resretna a'cija preduzcta na saigori aovuci nacin i posto se SAD "uvalile to niko nena izbora nego mora da do raja podrzava Johnsona. a 2) Anericke trupe mogu ostati u S.Vomingu i mesecina. 3) Frankel uorste ne szatra da cheije Jonnsona kao-u Kongu,u Vi jetres u_oeDominzgu proisticu iz neke njegove smisljene strategije novog “hrstasie pohoda" protiv Komunizma.Isto tako ne radi se ni-o Osecanju svenoci, jer 32kO Oprezan da se ne zapetija u dirextnu oruzanu konfrontacijn s2 sssk-or “nm ssatra da abkcija kao na S.Woningo proizesla iz sledecin odred ju jucih xuxsnuty aspekata Johnsona i njecove situacije: 1) skoxro totalno otsustvo sposobnosti da se shvati svet, med juna- rodni odnosi, da se racjonaine i sistenatski pridje nedj.eproblesina. 1 Oe 2) Nesrpobrbnost da se ostvari, cvezbedi u Beloj: kuci i inace iole sredjeni siste. donosenja odluka po- med jepitanjima, pogotove kada rec © krizana i ecergencies.Bundy nije us:zio da ovo obdezbedi,a i ne 10ze Ba Pretsednikon koji stalno u skoro totalnoj konfuziji,sto se tice ed june ada da radi,postupa na pr.prema sosieu,De Golu,Zih venste i cc (Fena Oshovu sVega udedien da oVa Administracija uopste ne zh rodnih odncsa Bae onng BT 2) Nagle akcije v vjonsona,sa oslanjaajea na unilateralnu anericn. silu, porazu ju da onu panicnon ‘Strahu od poraza,da frustciran med junarocn: . tazvitkon za koji nena. razurevanja a pred kojin ima cesto osecanie nemoci, rored toza,cestc iplicisticki fleda aa "n0go toga kao na . "eonunistioxu z-vern",Gdatle .i- 1aroske fraze 0 “serifu", "kominizau", "x isi ji 3AB", ie 2ENO ni egzaxtno da Johnson krenno u. _neku ons tu eiarie ys, “eve eon nastoji : Sa odrzi roraatne. ‘ounuse Sa ae i - Se “Teaja | f
104-10219-10001 = oo BS e<injgniko i ne pouisija da uzre-irava kuvanstu situaci ju i Gok astro - * “ “Tiican to je sustinska stratezi ja sA0 presa utd ;odnosi sa jucoslavi jor - ma Prenor-alni, Drugo,bez obzira na karaxter i inplixacije Johnsonevih _ On po sopstevnoj oceni bio pred neprihvatijivin poruzom(xonzgo, Viletnas, axcija,cinjenica je da su-one Jo sada uvex sano Keaxcije na situaci ju gde qt t ‘Se Dozizgo). Preuia tome con,za sede, spasava ono sto ima,brani se od Forzza, ne zauzima nove » terirorije i odla sti. a Je rece 0° krstaskoa retu on bi : a i con : ; Jepocetka otvs.rao nove xrizc, na novim terenina. S) Jedan of slavnin razboga 2a Junnsonovo ponasanje jeste i njrzovo 7 - Ovenide da Si svaku usreh “Roaunizna"t protiv 33, na bilo kon mesiu oo stnz . Sitno KoxAxatis .oveo u pitanje Rjezovu unutarpol3ticku pozici ju, 6) Sto se Vietnara tice tu jo Administracija sprenna da upotrebdi sva_ 2% “$retstva i odiued se na sve ga bi sprecila poraz u J¥Uiolio se sed jutin Sadasnja Patesituacija luce stabilizovala,sto tesro da moguce,onda Johnson” a re Di isao na prosirivanie vojnih dejstava.Vijetnaaska kriza je i dalje i u staciju kontrolisane eskalacije. 7) Jedan od bitnih elemenata za postupanje Johnsona i Adninistn ciie ot  Jeste stalno prisustvo sasvic pougdanih nrocena da SssR ne zeli da se urlete u vojnu atciju u Vijetranu i4i inace,te da uzajamno poka zivanje - vod jenja racuna da ne dod je do vojne konfrontacije sive super-sile obezned ju ; ‘ Govol jaz: manevarshi prostore Robert HcCloskey: Low $2) vo kraja oranio oficijetnim i objavijenin razlozica akei ju u 5. Dorin . Medjutia, interesantno je da je i on istakao da ked Johnsona unutarpolit ticki ““monenat skoro preovladjujucie Volkov: 7 o - ‘ Usnovna vu teza da ne treba Precenjivati opasnosti sadrzane u-arciiaa u Fries oro Vijetnana i $.Vominga, jer nena Opasnosti za konf taci jo SA% 357 Oten aa Poslean ji,prek jucerasnji kineski napad Na SSSR Boa SUS A tke oh edad we in eed nessun, Ty oeed see mens ne St rn Sonera x ne meen PRS Sabian Se ae aes ee Me as
104-10219-10001 -— on me e 8 pet gs : i i \ or 0° - ' ¢o koga Cosio saso Par dana posle teskog napaca ¥ uvocu U KUXS narecnu en: Foaplietnin dels reuscova,a wu kore je giavna i rezgradjena optuzba cz >AD i sssh ostvarusu evotevrsnu “"saradn ju’ oko Viietnama i inace - nije sano | - Kinezi pokazvju va ih ovo venemirava i da i znaju 3 oseca ju propaganca. pestoji bar precutna tolerancija,a 70z¢i temellineettat ga izmedju SAD i SSSR-a celo vreve i vise. sberz.uredinik “Probte ts of Communism" (USTA)s Abrehasa 5ru 1) Tako¢jer snatra da da Jolbnsen u pandénon strahu ca ne pretrpi Dn reoraz i 2ato se gesreratershi odiucaje na ateije roje kostau a woje ce 7. ek kostati SAD.3ez obzira na kontradikciju stava i akeija,on ubecien Ga po. DE Johason,da sits cija mircnija, i te.kako razvijao oGnose sa $35#-0n i ’ 2) svi sagovornici(Prankel, Volkov, Brusberé) vise ranje statrzju dz bi " ¥enedi,sa Grugaci jon taktikom i objasnjenjima,poduzinzo siicne serake u 7 ovakvia situccijanae Med jutim, ceneklie Frankel,a do kraja Krunbetz, snatraju oa Johnson konzervativnijifiako ne u bitnin pitanjima unutrasnjes “t. yredjenga AD) i, da koe njega vojni krugovi i desniji deo Krupnog kapit:la “.', daaju pesto veci dostup no kod “enedi ja. MAE Sth SER Se tenes re byte
104-10219-10001 ™ oe Ts gon FOE SUMMARY FRO SERBO-CROATIAN REPORT (B) +..We notice in the attitude of Andrews more flexibility than in January. Namely, now, the State Department does not abandon the program of bilatoral relations (vith Yugoslavia) because of our policies. Now, some parts of the program are eentioned as possiblo, some parts will be discussed and soze0 parts wait Zor a more favorable situation, No strings are attacked, no . part of the. program its directly tied to our policies. Briefly, the attitude is more flexible and tho dcor to &ll the possibilities is kept open. soo (4) Eline (7) belongs to the Fhite Zouse, Bundy's effice; ve ie the direct contact of the White House with the State Oopartment and deala with Yugoslavian, sasong otkor things. He told nus: , . (a) How, there are no probless hetveen the United ; States and Yugoslavia except as to how to develop the concrete relations within the limits established by the oo have rete (b) President Johnson does not/to golive any particular ‘probles cennected with Yugoslavia. ; The President works on tho improvezent of the conditions PL-480 in general. He is interested in the question ef the opare parts and this is the concrete matter which the Presideat is , studying. . . : ee (c) The President is preparing the projest ef tho Co gra a anty “es trade act Ract-Yeat. This act may contain possibilities of - ee intorest to Yugoslavia, ; og . . eee Woe fa Dena le gh een Re Wee bgp eee de tyst aed alte ONS Bokewaryastny SEL eat SSDP MURR IES oe Bat Spe ant eo op A ets chery mdse attend 6 oats ee oe, LM Rte SRR ae, OA EEE
104-10219-10001 . Ho is evaluating whether something could be done ; 4 with AID for "the communist countries." Be believes that the wt current legal texts and the regulations of the Export Inport oS Bank allow something in this regard. at i Tf Yugeslavia has wishes, it could receive credits and leans for various purposes. (d) As for the spare parts, it -is calculated that 60% of our needs -  .: } are covered through the usual coumercial channols. How, it is looked for means for the remaining 20%, without changing the lege situation, : i (e) The State Dovartment has not yet sent to the White ! House any draft for Johnson's reply to Tito. It seens that this i has becn unnecessarily dolayed because Johnson's principle is ; te reply the following day. oe i . Eline ig cortain that the State Department has not yot a a i Gent the draft, because ho would have seen 4t. Hamely, he a : - everything which is specifically forwarded to Johnson. There are countries and personalitiscs about which and about whem Jchnzon has to be inforned even if matters of nere : routise are involved. He wishes to Rive his personal instructions ’ ‘ regarding these countries end personalities. Johnson wishes to se knew what is going on especially in the following countries: . = the USSR, So nee ae nes o = Xndonosia, : ~ i » France, . “ » ay eT we". wee Be .© Greet Britain, a | ag Ce ee, ee - Yugeslavia, oe, a et eee Lie ST Loe! Edita. : aRERe OE Pet F - the United Arab Republic, otc. When Kline read Tito's cable addressed to Johnson, he _ immediately anid that the cable ig good, that it has substance and that it is very good because the last paragraph nentions . personal meetings as useful; in their own evaluation, tke passage ! ‘ before the last clearly Gzplains what Yugoslavia 6xpects and what . it criticizes; however, this criticisn is constructive and has ne cheap polemic implications. . nthe Wosk cd 2 a 3 t- 4 : i . kom. ™ 7 rar TTS rte pila Wee ae ect ariel ERR LN OME AP EO em oeteeRe mS Mua Pps patel mm tal YaLc nee oe - ad ae ~ Bs : ; - , ‘ " i * 2 , ros é can) o * PhS URT AAT at Fipnanmamt bis aed e Rie a AR ENS  te Fa DMT ezga at Dike, teaamt te Mh cele meter ahaa uaa Ses er en ne ARAN ‘ _— spe aye nee Ahi a Raceetin Pep SisT itn at on breathe’ Wit beedung ce |
104-10219-10001 (f) Regarding the visita, he personally does not so the possibility that Johnson may visit Yugoslavia in 1965 because the Prezident is already engaged with visits to Latin America and Western Eurepe. He cannot undertake three important visits in one year. : ; Kiino. does not believe that Johnson could visit either the Soviet Union or the countries of Eastern Europe in 1965, unless some completely unexpected events take placo. , The President's visit to Burope could encompass Great Britain, France, Western Germany and Italy. He would not go to - Holland and to Sweden. Yugoslavia could not be included in { Jobnson’s itinerary because of obvious political problens. Johnson vould not tie his visit to Yugoslavia to hia visits to the Eastern European countries because he does not wish to equalize these countries. Perhaps, his trip to Yugoslavie could be tied to visita to Greeco, to Turkey, to the Hear East, etc. As for Humphrey's visits, -the President will decide whether, where and when these. visits should be viade. ‘Bothing in this regard bans beon decided as yet. (g) Kline knows with absolute cortainty that Blbrick has not asked to mect Johnson; that is, the request from the State Department has not been forwarded to the White House. te Nene sete mete me Le ee ee” OY \ : Kline directly works on these matters. The procedure which is folloved in such cases is that Rusk makes the request and indicates the specific subject about which the Agsbassador wishes totalk in order that Johnson may be prepared. Suck has not addresaed such a request. ‘ - H 1 i i td 1 i i { i ' Elbrick could have asked for the meeting with the _ President in the State Department and*the latter may have concluded that, in this mozent, he has nothing special to talk with Johnson. ; oe { | { | i \ t | t . Soe Eline did not raise any questions regarding the writing of our press, regarding our policies, etc. Last year, he did so in a rather sharp MARBCr. | pre nse epee a eee perenne tte neem Hen ee wos ba EO alte EARS aie SPN ey a sesissebpee ang i SB AREA R RARE Aah SUS RS tas Crp ie geeederegt gba oi in eauaeioed Sag aliens a't
104-10219-10001 a pete eodenestzaay ate 17 So Spaa Eline talzed very calaly and constructively, ye Ge almost joked when he said that , there ta no need to get upset about anything, ; rem on ae, "X? Sukarno wishes to let hie go; 12 Haesor asks ug get out of the United Nations, 7 8 will drink it," to drink the water ef the Rea Bea, That is the Way in which Elise spoke, This tine, Eline was loss polemic than in the past, Ee trented our relations as a formal matter without raising particular problems, . S/ HBicunevie
104-10219-10001 . _ ; : Poslana : Sacer MA 7 ; “ Bro}: 3 god. ‘ Primljena .—..—-_._.-.. -...... ¥ | “| \. . [kao normalan,bex iznenadjesia, sn uolicederaves tretiranjea odnosa preun pojedie on # oon? mim oblastimas ; oo af ; ft . ' .! (© Mi Zapazamo u ovakvon postev? jer ty Andrewsa razliku od kruceg etava vont se i ; imao u januaru.Sada ne prouseziiaxd da Sb napusta program bilateralnih odnosa | oe 7 a p radi wase politike i si *nego se delovs prograusa poninju kao oktuelai,recavall : : 4 7 . toa se na neki wacgin, za neke se ceka odluke , a SD ih zagovara,za nake treda i me me i : | vigets da li mpnaw povol jna situacija da se radi-na ajima tokom 1965 - ave *: ‘4 - F bez direktnog uslovl Javan ja,oduosno povezivan ja sa nasgom politikom.Ovo sedan is 3 ~. vox . fleksibilai ji stav,bez fornulisas ja direb?nih pneposradnils ated ja,aii uz a : " >). 7 ; oa ostavi janje otvorenia svih mogucnosti. > s - : 4. U Ganasnjem razgovoru K1aja(B. kuca,u Ban éd Jevon aparatu, Girektaa veza’ LS 4 : Bx i So po pitanju Jugoslavije,izmedju ostalog) nas govorio aledece: 7 G. ze : i ene | 1) ieted ya SAD i Jugoslavije sada nema nekih problitsas sea kako ravi Jats : , 4 Konkretne odnose u granédama koje postavlja Koagres wt ieee a of tute C- " ‘e % TL kw rhabordy ctuben lawn, : ule dine (Cane aot VO wats a iT oe hve © ‘ " a
At 104-10219-10001 ; abe a b)Pred Pretsednikom Johnsonom se ne nalaze neki problemi | koje treba resavatd a . ; bd vezi Jugoslavije zasebno i Posteo Te tetain aemdl, wa pobol jaavan ju uslova za PL~480 ae ; uopste,xx celo vreme bio zainteresovus: a5 reway aan je pitanja rerervaih delova,4 to fe 7 korkr etne stvari oko Jugoslavije kojina se bavio, = ©) Pretsednik priprema mace cakons 6 trgovind Istok-Zapad,kredi tina i sl. koji sm moze nitrunzy-t sadrzavati mogucnosti koje 42 a Jugoslavi ju interesantne.Procenjuc ‘se Ga li da se ponovo nesto redi ga AID za “konunisticke zemlje", Nije sasvim sigurar / ali je ubed jen da sadasn ji zakonski peee cori i dnterni pravilnicd Brin baanke omogucava jy obez beg ovoj,ako se to jako reli, da Jugosilavi Jil tage kredite 2 zajmove u caine avrhe, ne nuzno Sano garantovanje kredita za po jed ine nuzicke projekte.a i ovde ina Fraznih mogucnos ti, kako se vidi iz rumunske transakci je, (AOR Meee tO ae iene atten ote ete es G) Sto se rezeavnih delova tice. izeacunali su devaon nasih pofreba moze Zacovol jiti di Zadovol java obicnin Roaertl Jatin putem,a sada se sadi na tone da sq! bez menjanja pravne situacije nadje nacin 4 za preostalih 208, mew gate dee women ca, jos, a 7 @) SD ymmmtin 21 je poslao Beloj kucd nikakav nacet aug Johnsonovog odgovora pee » cee ree Ae Fe enuitie de ieee geen Rhewigheumengy: OR eas Seah Suth vain, M0 Ay thes ans 3 ri ? i ce nes i a tet Ree ORS ee
104-10219-10001 yen a ae te Betacam gene ed \ an rn ea ‘ sq : e : wi. os! a r \ 5 ., , 3 ! | ' ‘ A ‘ te . o we, . aN . . i i . a t . tq ; e . ty . x 11 Poslana .-. Broj: Primijena.—. .o.._. 1964 pod, ”, ‘a fe Titu;tu se se izgleda bespotrebno zategilo, jer je peinedp Johnsona da odgovori gare ot ' ! Len bi 4 odanh sledecag dana,kao sto bilo ucinjemo sa avin ostalin, Klajn siguran da! SD jos nije od’stavio odgovor, jer bi ga on video. Odgovor Titu bi mu prosao: kroz ruke jer to tako sa svim onina koji Craze specifican uvid Johnsona. ee SNe? seca tue Ina zemal ja i licnosti o cijia potezima, telegramima Johasognu, Pa makar bili’ Pe ee najrutinskiji, ili o otsustvu istih,mora ju automatakd da ga licno obaveste i i dobi ju njegovu izricitu direktivu zea postupak.To spadaju one zemi je ze ae koje Johnsonu narocito stalo da ma sta se HXRxX sa njima desava.To su,pored ” ostalih, SSSR, Indonez ija, Prancuska, VB, Jugos lavd ja, indi ja,UAR a al. Kad procitao telegram Tits Jolnsoau, Klajn odmah rekao da dobre i. aadeza Jaa, fo he tte tres er da veoma dobr> sto posledn ji parazraf pomin je licne susrete kao korisne Jer. to i njihova vcena,da Pretposledn ji pasus sadrzajas, jasno hostav ja ono a a ce et tebe, ee ao ta bee Bae free ye . cf Gues ‘ ere \ sto Jugoslavija enatnaantebine 1 SAD,81i konstruktivno, bez| poledickog tonae f) Sto se poseta tice, ta on licno ne vidi mogucnosti za posetu Jugoslavi f- tokom 1965, jer Johanson se vec obsvezas prema La 4 éapadnoj Bvropi,a ne ROZe ‘ . Aerio ae 4. RiP TAP
104-10219-10001 . . ye OO RE 12 7 ; u jednoj goding tri vazna putovanjJa da c ini.Ou isto tako ne smatra,sem ako ne ': bude koupletnog iznenad jen ja i neocekivanih Obrta, da bi Johsnon 1965 putovao U posetu Zapadao} Evropi, koja bi 28 Be bi Isao u Holand’ ju , * oe ' Jugoslavi ja, iz ociglednih politickih problema, J bilo.u Moskvu,bilo u IB zemlje, erecimo,obuhvatila, | VB, Franusku, ZN, Italiju oSvedsku,ne bi ge mogla ukl jucitd ohnson isto tako ne bi SPpajao posetu.. Jugoslavi ji S& posetom IE zemljama, jer nece da Ja izjednacu je Sa njima.Mozda my 4 wu okviru neke posete Grdckoj, Turskoj, Bligkom Zatoku 4 al, Ste se Hamfriga tice, tu re , q Pretsednik treba da odluci da 1i,kads,gde i sla © tome jos nema nista, “ he ; crete ti iter of VD serge beer ee vege : &) Ons sasvim sigurno zna de Elbrick nije mites tr 216 aestanak 6a Johnsono takav zahtey postavi Rask,oa ‘Baznakom © cenu ambasador specifieno Zeli da razgovara, kako bi se Johnson priprenio aoe oF Takvog zahteva nije tilo.Druga je stvar ako Blbrick. takav re w SD 4 zahtev interno Postavi Jao hoses konstruktivno,mirno, skoro Wo sali govorecd da se he treba = URINE BAS tan dt eS water es SEE eee .f ~ IRE ear A fia AIMS Nt cee 8 Settee : ve page hag
104-10219-10001 ry Poalana rene aoe jena. g j Sa i : be : { é Cc ' f : bo t us a) pot : 4 . ros ! ys ty a . 3 3 } 4 i Dal { i] a an A { = t : i i - : > id ° “ o : -m Loe : t ° , B a e FA ae soiree Peres ; ee a ee Fe i ako nag Naser upucuje da pijen neka ide} ide is UN, kacno zeli da "ako Su vedu iz Crvenog mora, u redu piceano Je!" Ovog pita se postavio man je polemicki,vise tretirajuci nase odnose kso norwalne,bez posebnih probl ena 1 } mn ini en ee mete ee sngovornici c SD.) erties tees wee Not 8
104-10219-10001 teeta enema eee Retna SSemeticemenctasns one wenn se ~ _ - - gat al SUMMARY FROM SERSO-CROATIAN REPORT (B) i ewer en mw ‘May 6 (7), 1965 “SOME OF THE BORE IMPORTANT REACTIONS TO PRESIDERT JOHNSON'S ACTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (a) The Press “New York Times” - In the beginning, the paper was puch sore cautious than when the Vietnamese crisis started. ~ Now, it sharply attacks the intervention and its motives. “Washington Post" - It does net support the action in the Dowinican Republic as strongly as it does tho intervention in Viet Nan. "Christian Science Monitor” = After some initial hesitation, it supports the action. eo8 (>) The Commentators Lippman =~ Actually supports President Johnson. ese vee 2 sole (c) The Congress , The opposition is emaller than sgainst the totervention “tn Viet Ram. Horse sharply criticizes. Fulbright and Church “gupport. Hansfield, McGovern and Gruening sre silent. RHR ‘. +. (a) Hovements and Organizations . 4. Heretofore, there were no protests. There is no fear that a wider conflict say be involved in the Dominican Republic; such a threat exists in Viet Nan. : : wy mewn avmmes se cto oe aoa soe a ate tate tee “ i ‘s 2 a
104-10219-10001 a a i , ONERE ATOMASE MOMENTE Tz vos, WASNJE REAXCIJE UNUTAR SAD KA Jul SUNUVU - oa f io } AKCIJY U S.LCHINSUS i: Njujory Taims je u pocetku ‘anogo opreznije no oko’ Vijetnana, aid : i. "danas do kraja ostro i frontalno osudzo intervenci ju i i notivaci ju.Clanci a _ Restona i Sulzbercera Pretstavl jaju ustvari zanerke ili tritira " Johnsonovo j . “ doktrini®, jako Reston,sa svojin hladnoratovskih po2zicije,dopista ~ogucnost i da akeija i doktrina neizbezna, S on ; Vasington Post ne daje onzke evrstu rodrsku cko S.Doninga kao oko i + te . Stanpa daje Focrsku jakim pSanjen o “komun tistickoa" eleventu By Se _, etiasas ings dogacjejina.Ali dosta prenosi i nepade na SAD u -svetu i. UN, Kriscen sSajens Monitor poste pocetnih suanji i rezerve sada daje wee ens “Monitor podrsku,ali na lind ji velikog dela sta p2 Koji sade daje poerstu akei ji Sey? “aduini steacd je da se OAS privoli da da SVO ju Aegitic naciju akei ji SAD, kao 3 Me re re eae " Jedineg necina da se SAD izvuky iz vrlo teskepoliticko-diplonatske ' gituaci je, a Care a, b) Konentatori: Lipman, iako i on . vidd nedoslednosti i problematicnost Polozaja i _ dosadasn je notivaci je akcije,ustvari daie podrsku johnsononu na liniji a = XN sustinskog antironunima i svoje Stare velikosilaske koncers ijec poveti interesnih sferas 2 ee c) Kongres: ees Javna i poznata cpozici ja nanja no oko Vi jetttans. Do Sada seno Morse , i et j restoko kritikovao, Pulbra jt na putu i podrzao.Cherch. Podrz20.2a Ma sfielda, novi --Grueainga,MeGoverna se ne zna sizgleca da cute. Johneon izvrsio aktivan ae Pritisa Srazes jem i dobijan jen dodatnih kredita. Re et ee RE OS LON TTS FACT A SOU IIE ett aticrnst es mee ay pokretisorranizaci 23 “De Sada nena rroglasa ,protesta,piketa ‘i ‘sl. eo 1OkO Vijetassa.’itanse je da li ce ovo porritd Vijet mam ili ce se , pokret protesta west x Ojacati -Stisuluson arcije u Ss, Doningu, Uako se otvorenije i cinicnije u stanpi,itd konentarise de “SAD- ivolovane,da iskrcavan je narinaca pretstavija 49 vek,i sl. en #3 Bag Be oe -- eres -¥ ae tet ge we eeceies - 2 ge ee eS or ac int get ore i mete, SHES. She ole 7 ~ Fo na tate ee
104-10219-10001 — i | I, : : ne ; Prosireno ~° utisak je, bar za. $ada,da je,bez obzira Na nazivanje akei je pravin So inenoa,opozici Ja’ akeiji manje. jaka, izrazena i dircktna Lego akci3 ji u Vijetnanu. Sagovornici nan sevorili da to zbog toga sto sesanje u LA poslove poznato i trécicionalno,sto jake psihoza antikonunizna jos jaca kad rec o "obalara SAD", sto se ina iskustvo Sa Kubon,te sto ocigiad ono nema Straha da dilo sta ay SeDoningu nosi u sebi bilo kakvu opasnost sineg konfliktayza razliku od Vijetnana, ‘Uv ton snislu srelativno, Adninistracija u laksen polozaju u sprovod jen ju i prianato akcije z3 koju opste Foznato da prijavijae (Cesta uporedjenja sa sovjetskom -_akei jon u Mad jarskoj), © we . | . » SOS ote eee Fis arene Setanta ated eee aT pat eee el —_ aol on aes ich para, Tea to ee tag I w- FAR Potable wie a. weet oye Bet d ds teat, politi S
104-10219-10001 a os a 7 . cy : : SA SK/ I 4 ’ ae aes | “ SUMMARY Froy SER ORCROATIAY eR errata tag te tt foo ITEM £1 CONVERSATION BEIWSEN BOWEN C, PANCOAST, USLA OFFICIAL LN CHARGE APT Sth. See i OY YUGUSLAV ACFALHS, AND CVLIETO Jus, PRESS ATCACHE AP THE } sam YUGISLAY EMBASSY os Tho Cuban Crisig ea 1) U ‘Tho United States Action has to result in the | ‘ dismantling of the bases in Cuba, Pancoast personally and on the basis of hig understanding of the situation docs not . i believe that the exclusive condition for the lifting of the Po i blockade ig the complete dismantlins of the bases: in addition, . = : ie docs not believe that the complete disheniling should take q placa imediately. The discontinustion of the sending of i rockets to Cuba, the stopoiag of the further construction of é the bases, some international inapection etc., could solve | ; the first phase of the crisis; hovever, the Solution of tho ' §eCcond phase shogld not be too long delayed. ; ¥ é : It seens that the Brazilian proposal concerning the arizatioa® of Latia Anerica and Africa has attracted te Fdenucl i ry st attention as a kind of solution.. the gr 8 a 2). | 2 pete, so - oF ae “oi ae wi oy, eS _ i ot The reaction of President Tito was soderate and calny : ce conscquently, there aro no objections in this connection. it ae is true that he nade reproaches to the United States by saying uo fin that the United hations could have beon Hore thoroughly used}: ; hae oy many people ere of this saria opinion in this country} however, he did not call for a fiont acainst "agoressiva inperialism,4 It can be seen tat Presicent Tito has thorousily mastered the art of nost colely expressing his thoughts concerning the oe Situation and of constructively Saying what, in his opinion, _—e should be done, secre mee Sanus ahtedes ea tee HANGeh tg Bren Lop aT lee o SSy DA gg oie Santo enamine gaa ERS SRE et ee ee ee ee
104-10219-10001 n It is n pity that the press has not published _ re Prosidont Zito's statement because it would have shown to the -Assrican public the true attitode of nonaligned Yugoslavia, a constructive and independont sociilist country, - : {Panconst's remark that the statcront was not published } in tho press ia correct. Pancoast did not know that on the very ’ day of the statomont, it was broadcasted on radio and on television, ) i The Clause sf the Nost fuvored Nation i) i The USIA too (sic) expects to receive end has asied for the atatanent of tho President concerning the clause of the most favored nation, The USLA considers that it 1a in an extremely difficult position in front of the Yugeslay public opinion. Tae USIA is afraid that our peblic opinion may interpret tze discontinuation of the clause of the most favored Looe - nation as a puaishnont inflicted by the United States on the ‘ Yugoslav pesapvio, ; ‘ : There are no arsunants for Propaganda in Yugoslavia; thore are not evon arguscnts for a yvood defense. That is why the USIA ang the Embassy have bean told that thay havo to emphasize as nuch as posxible that aid will Still be civen, that the President has bozn authorizod to continues aiding the Cormunist countries and the countries which are in trade ' Felations with Cuba, ‘es : 2 BD): ; . Tse whole situation which has developed in connection “as.e with Cuba ean deteriorate oven more and become Worse because of the anticomunist attitude of the Congress. “a8 fowever, the Administration will try to re-establish _ the clause of the most favored nation. So
104-10219-10001 we —_ ee a y . z ove = Panscast,referent aa Jugeslavifu USIA --Jobus- 2) Accija SAD mora de ira ca regeltat derontirarnjJe taza ne Xubi, Licro,iz ° "" gvega ste rozune u situact 4, no misli de isljsecivi uslov za susnenzijs blykade o) Be koaplatn: denontiranje bace,niti do togs nera deci sasvis, daa. oinah.rourdane i ‘ devoljno Csezbe tiene steoiftanjs dotutsyia rexeta,calie Lepradsje bazayuz nein a es inepekeiju { prisustvd kod taza \iedjunarodnih posnatraca} ine setrtoen isl. voglo \ ‘bi Sith resenje za orfvu fazu, s tin sto fe cruga ne Di suvise cMlozliz. Pe avenu, _* . trssislki pr-Dlog o demikisarizaciji LA i Afrixe orivlact nafvecu pazajs keo forma favedjenias ° 2) Reskelja Pretsednixa Tita umerera,hladncsryma,ne mogu joj sta zaveriti. i Tacno da napravis vrigevere SAD-u(mogle ce vise istoristiti W,sa cine sed - - mogt u ovoj zenlji slasu),ali nema poziva na berbu protiv "agrasivneg inperijoll- «! gna".Vidi se da je do kraja usao u to 2a na nojhiadnisi nacin izrazi ono ste ‘4 fa ‘ ' t a ° 7 oO nisli o situeciji i konstruxtivno izlozi eno 3%0 pe njegovon rislien 2 da pretetavlia potrabnu svcijufsteta sto stampa nije cals peblicitet toJ isjavi, er bi to javnesti u SAD povazalo stvamul etav i lik dugsslaevije kae neangazovane a r g rv 3 ‘konetrektivne,nezaviene sccijalisticke zenlje.(Pancosstztazae Naved Panceasta isjava nije dobila publicitat u stanst tacangaije mu bile noznato da fs er ae SAPO a  - na dan izjavs ista 4akt+e na TV 1 radiu « New Yerku Thee ceteris) 3 8 1) I USIA je ocekivala i tracils izia7a Pretssdinita 9 Eei.?. Zaklgucili | . 7 on i. ‘ga da su krajnje tesken potozaju orad jugeslovenskon jammoscusbeje se aan ea . TY Wags tees ad tee - javnest ne shvati da SAD kie-javaju jug.narod sevlacenjem Xwi.Pe Nanaju : Reel ye alters nata ga prapagandni nastup u Jugoslaviji,cak al za debra cefarzivu.zate ihn porucili USIS-2 1 Andasadi ta sto j2 mzguce vise isticu da ca serse ici, ae wo Ste . : . Pretsednix dere ovlestenj: <a nastavija peats cemunisticnin temljama, bes | enin enlisca xofe trsuju $2 futons re “. ° Q) Citava nsstala sityacisa exe Kuoe noze ia jea { ‘ue amtikomurizaz 2 Kengresu.Nedjutia, Aciaistracija ce
104-10219-10001 and the withdrawal of the Russians with less loss of prestige, 3) AW. ITEYN #3 , October 25 CONVERSATIOR BETWEEN TUOMAS BRINELOW, COUNSELOR OF Tits BRITISH EMBASSY, AND CY LJETO JOS, PRESS ATIACI AT TRE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY 1) Great britain pointa out that by installing basos in Cuba the Soviet Union intended to channe the balance of powers it was a blow to the United Statos and a provocation at the fame times the Soviet Union crroncously belioved thet the United States was not ready to fight. fhe United States was compelicd to react. If the Sovio®? Unton had succeeded, tho situation would have been worse, Tho attitude of Kennedy and of the United States Government was that the Sovict Union has to be definitely Stopped and that tho Russians must be compelled to withdrai. These are tha actual. facts: all the moral and logalistic debates cannot Change thea and aro anachronisms, 2) . Great britain knows that Kennedy has solected the moans, that is, the blockade, which allows ihe groatest length of tise for diplomatic discussions, Kennody has purposcdily ' selected the blockade because he wanted to give tine, This is the second vital fact that Groat britain is taking into considere- ation in €vaiuating the situation, Any other action would iave had tougher Ronentary and lasting consequonces and would have unavoidably led to physical confrontation, that is, to the bombing of the Cuban bases and to the killing of Russians or to invasion. On thg other hand, a blockade allows tho postponenent of the conflict . The third vital fact is that the United Statos has first and immediately raised the question in the United Nations, seach YUN Bee RAMAN FR ls oak: ANE AYER as ean
104-10219-10001 an The fact that the Security Council of the United Nations was sk faced by a fait accompli ia not of a vital nature; the main thins was that the machinery of the United Nations was put in motion, that there was. possibility for pourparlers, that there ‘ Was tia and ala there wz room for “efiective diplomacy.® i. this. means that there was an additional element, i: nasely *the dimonsion of the situation" (sic) and not only a ‘ barc physical confrontation of tuo powers in a vacuum (sic). Brinelow personally forasecs these diplomatic developasnts: Security Council, veto, General Assombly with ° long discussions becausc it is. too large, thus, possibly. oo sumedt mecting of two, of threo, etc. stiowevor, he izmediately: | ; said that a Kennedy-karushchey moeting weuld be very difficult after all that happened, In his predictions, Srinelow is guided by the evaluation that the Soviet Union docs not wish a showdown in Cubse In case of a coaflict of ships, the United States : willbe extremely "touch." 5) It can be said that the United States Government is 1 clearly aware of the fact that the Russians cannot be compelled : - to &bandon completely tie Cuban bases if mero formal. declarations ’ concerning prestine and face-saving ara made. , The Americans have to make some concessions which 4 must have sone material sicnificance. However, the news a oo published in the press anid related to the reciprocal dismonthing ri s+. - @& United Statos bases de not necessarily reflect the opinion oa of the United States Sonceraing the concessions involved.
104-10219-10000 re og ho: ; Brinelov,s avetau: VB anbacain Jobu's we 1) VB PoLazi od tega ds S335, tazon sa RIDh » iso na imem. ravnoteze snaca, dzazev SAD, nanosenje udera Sabu, volszect 1 of Pogresne teze da SAD nesprecne da se bere, Sid” Torale reagovetigch SS5R vests dosle bi do jos teze Situacise. Sf Raspalozente fenedija,vlate 3.3 tokvo cz f2li na edluess zays tav7ijanjs, Stinda  - ae fe Rusi nateraty 2a ce svas Povusue Te se mater rifelra Cinjenica gituactje, 4 eve moralno~l=r2listicke rasprave J2 ne nanizin 4 yee aneronizare 2) Britasij! t2 voznato da de Xenedi isabray sretstys smacin skeije(blok2da) koja dase nasvise vrenena Za efextivan Cinloratiju. Kanedt ge i izabrao ovej * put upravo za te da 2 to l2vesno vreresZe je Griga bitna cinjentea «oju 73 1 xx . Uzina u oroeesnt eituactj:, 3) Treea ditna cinjenica deste da su s10 otvahyprve predale stvar UW; alge ta qa Sitne sto je Postavljanjen bloxats 23 ztavljen cored cotev cin.Genevn> je da UN rssinerija pokranuta, da se pregevara, dobé fz u vrevem, sto sve cajs prostora zz "efextiyny diploratije™. Posto Ji estan, znaci,jes jedzan elensnat, : dinenzija situacije, a ne sazo eeola fiziccxa 2 kenfrontacija eve sile u Vaktamte ' nh) On 2 cn? preavidja ovakay sek situscige na planu 2iplonatife: SB,veto, GS koja preglonzana pa dugo raspravlja,pa zate,eventualno, Sumit, dvosics, entreaties in ee .trojice £ sl. Ee utim, otrah raglacava da bi susret Kenedi-in:scer ncsle cycea : r) ges i Say 5) Hore se reci da Tladi Sid Jesna da se Rusi ne w9ga naterat® na tetalne . i odrosno u Ovaives Situaciji,bio veona tezats tent arenms semte eozranj tise forszine, tekieratt povlacenje teza sa Kube,sano us forzaln Cearanje sreStisa Rreg forcsine, fekisratia , nett $42 wae Ma dqe vne iene did mora oci do nekth koncesiss koje i cateritaim sesto Traces ade | tis, vestl u novinaca 0 UtIvratmer dementirestu nexih SaD baza bt] etshavate Tame . iseje. Ancrike 3 tense ; ; Sraka 2raza skefla dL irala teze nomestaine £ tizgersene o-eledig, br statovle Oren a moe a: li dr ‘neairewn £ fszieka konfrentactju: invarifa it vente redovaage x Eghe{rez2) te - Snaeiic pucende najubtjante Aisae A oko Eloteis nercce 82lazan}e a szsreta slakxttons > ’ ni é: , i Prenena,povlactnt $e Ruse sa nanje subitka Prestiza i el. E: ayeus. bigs in Hani aad i luadita-unedlasvqadiiysnes Fea ee TEP RR LEIA RATE ERA ARE GE ba
104-10219-10001 Me - At. 2 inten, /  YTEM 2 - October 25° CONVERSATICN BETHEEN EDVARD Re RiTTIE, COUNSELLOZ of THE CANADIAN EMGASSY, ASD CY’ IJETO JOU, PRESS ATTACLS AT THE - . ; ' YUGOSLAV aHBASSY ; 1) Rattie emphasizos the same things which wore omphasized in tho British bmbassy. iio says that the United States has chosen the lcast danccrous measures, that is, the blockade. He also says that the Canadian Covernnent was oncourased by the fact that the United Staics has resorted ta the inited Nations and that the last paracraph of the. American resolution proposes pourparlers with fussia, 2) ; lio onphagizes, just as it was onphasized in the - atidud 2 oe ~ British Embassy, that it is iateresting and important as a re precedent that tne United Statos for the first tine asked ae ' the United Nations for action in tho tostern iNenisphere. 3) Ye has the inpression, like the people in the british Embassy, that the United States CGovornmeat has not yot decided ‘what measures to undertake in connectioa with the dismantiing of the bases; nancly, it has not yet decided whcther to sharpen: the blockade, whether to resort to Lonbving, whothcr to invade ce eens nm ae aie MM fT URS onto Cog i q Cuba, atc. aig iat - TE gy ana ee ee me en Sn oat . oe Tio impression at the Canadian bmbassy is that the oo, es blockade can bo lifted, at least temporarily, and that it will en oy not be strictly tied te the dismantling of the bases (Translator's Son ag oe ‘a Notes This passace is unclear in the original. : oe Por the time being, creat attention 1s devoted to 7 the Brazilian proposal concerning the *denuclearization" of 74 tN ctr tte te a Hh a Thee oe oe ded : ce : ends ecieim grants tina mvleamaees ces mating Smut haSsesntenk 9h MAb eee Cage + te I A FA Mn ahah nC eet men!
104-10219-10001 » ee Tek onscreen Eatin America; this "denuclearization® could be a qood solution, oe : In addition, from the formal point of view, the dismantling of ‘ a & Cuban baso is requestod and not the cismantling of a Soviet me The Canadian trbassy also has not the impression (Translator's Note: It is probably implied that a sinilar impression prevails in tie eritish tmbassy) that U Thant's : ot Proposal will succecd. . — ae EN ase All actually depends upon the “behavior of the Russian ships. <A physical confrontation Should not be excluded, Any Russian act against Nest Berlin will certainly lead to war, The United States is absolutely determined in this regard, oniy a kind of linited blockade of iest Berlin, t and its limitod charactor should be lincdiately announced, - oo. could bo @ atep which would not automatically and insiane “ot bt taneously put in motion the armed forces and would nat ; inzediateiy cause an armed conflict. ‘tho situation of Berlin is such that no lizited war can be fougit there, thet is, a ; war with conventional weapons. Any shooting around Berlin would mean war, E 6) (sic) According to the first reactions of the State Depart~ } ment, the United States will not accept u Thant's proposal, i This docs not moan that the proposal should not have been made >, or that new proposals should not be subiitted. According to the information at the disposal of the Canadian Gmbassy, the United States Govornnent has not yet adopted a decision concerning its action toward Cuba, if diplomacy does not succeed and if the problem of the dismantling of the bases is not solved in due tine, n : i i~ Be 1 pin nme tectrenain Panne EASA ede"  Laietitm teILNW atte N To ieality awcvate “oetin eee ce e 2. . ee ae F sehig hPa’ s Sythe Seg Eee he ot mt OL, oh eae AO ED RUG oat. : PyAtaltition Nhe ay hd ate MAG OEE "TY TARA Naina sei Be gran aus aA ee 0 Promergue A EEG AES FREER, NS alle sgteAap sales FO Reba ea yee an NS ey ean deaths Te SG ~ . Ps : ay
104-10219-10001 It is true that Kennedy hag sald that the blockade could be a mere beginning; however, for the time boing, it kas _ At becn decided whether it will be followed by bombings invasion. The british belicve that it is possible that Gromyto did mot Know how far the aruing of Cuba with rockets had advanced. The British cannot discuss the question why Kennedcy did not speak about the rockets to Cromyko3; Lippman reproves Kennedy , EE tice for not having spoken about this matter; bowever, Lippmann's . _ reproyal that ciplomacy is discarded is not correct bceause the United States hag. offered the possibility for diplionatic discussions. . lite . a ‘ * AERTS Bite gabe rae eke eT eae Mascon ww. gebsie a BER waka ages icd nde WUE MAA ed geen
104-10219-10001 ee i t a . i” ‘ — 25. ¥.62 Tha 8 Savtnix “sratske anbasaie Rettinder: 1) Kae fu Antavadi V5 istics Ja cid duatrele najranie opzemi seru-blokein £ daje elicr® razlose, Iste teko aze ja Xanalera vlada ankuracirana tine ste 1 Avo i . . . Chie Ma UN L sus u rezoluciit kega SAD oredlr2ileju novlednfen nesusz,stosi m4 i trazenje prezgcwora aa Austra. pe Sw ear : Po qe 2 i ‘ 2) Kan i ¥B Anbasadt psiviec! ja iavecesanine,£ Kao nresedan vemna,rt> Sad orvi xe : put ar ake 2 taf istve Win Seordnej Herisferi. ‘ : : 3) Kas iu vs B anbnaadty tenose utisak Ja Visds SAD jos nide caredila precizan H 7 _kura aketje ex): 2@rontiranja baca,te da nena Jes odluke 24 inractjughorourdovinja, ; a | ‘strozu bleksiu i el. | 1 8 : . e ; w+. Mb) Ngihov uttenk da ce es neca olvejiti blekada,bar orivrecaty susgensija,ed : we ' . , ’ obsvijenog ulanjanja ocza,xao mokeimumme 21 Eada poklinfaju pazaj > trse2itlaxeu , 5 a i predlogu denixiearizacije LA; to bi mogso biti iobar inlas.Pored ¢stalog, forralna, radi se 0 ukianjaju lubesske base,a ne sovjetskee ; : { 1 5) ML oni necaju utizax da bi nogne uspsti U Tantov predloge : i | . - : H . : - z } q a ozs g
104-10219-10001 ee _ 6) TI dalse ive: tavis! ed ponesanfa rusiih pradovae Fiatetza xonfrentact 4; po ae Nije Leetjuccra. Svaka. ekefge na dapshi Berlin eiserne znaek ret. ctD i apsalutne reseno.dsdino=leteertetertinjse tecra orrante-na dLovada 2B el ss ai “s | 7 ogvanicenost bi etueh blle 1 tshdartsana, sone bitl keraz ke c§i se bi micns stave 3 Be 3 imah’ pokret eruzane enace,odnceno izagvae althoy sukobe Taace, tatcra Je situretia oko Berlinz,ta ne sre biti ogranicencs rate, xonv.orucien, Svalt pi: eand cko Berlina di zracto eektlaciju 2 rate: : . G) Prena povia reset (jana iz 59, SAD rece sritatt td U Tantoy predlezeToa ne | ’ P ry o mack de ya nije trebdil> nepraviti,ilt da ne treba ci-ith reves - we ? 7) Presa njthevin infornacijaca Vlada SAD 4 sada nifa denijela ofluia: | i © tome: kakvu ce sxciju veditd prema dubl avo se na utp) sa efertivnen 2iplenatin I | i a J jJetjako ne 4nJje u odgovaraduces vrerenu do resanja pitanja uvlanjanjs basae | ws ms Tacne je da Je Mened: goverio de dloxeta meze DLL samo pocetak,ali nena jes odluke o tem 32 ce =u sleditd bonbdsqdovan Je, 41L invastjee 8) BRitanct dooustaja mogucnos® da Groniza nije znae Zot se na Rubi zosilo sa rakstataete mnogu ga ulaze u to katvi su razlosi Kenecdija ste mu nif) to Teka, . & sta Lipran pregovara.Frigo-vror Limpnana da Je > Holerat tiga Suspendowana nije of " tacan, Jer Je ‘SAD bas dala roguensstt za tee oo ee cee . Sudara tredova GAD EL bite dake Ptoughl ree Bs Poa Bee Pie
104-10219-10001 a | : a ae ee oe ! > 3 f 4 TRANSLATION FROM SERSO@CHEOATIAN ‘ ae Conversation of January (7?) 21, 1969. Dr, Karl Keysen, the Assistant of Mesregor ilundy, Special ey wo Adviser of Kennedy for questions of national security and foreign policies ema (1) The White House and tho State Departrent were somewhat exictecd about Presideat Tito's trin to the Soviet Union. Up to now, they have come to the conclusicn that Yugoslavia is now nearer to the Soviet Union that it was five years ago} in this rapprochement, the Sovict Union has changed its attitude more than Yugoslavia. (2) It was explained to Ncysen that Khrushchev and the Soviet Union are more willing now to uccept Yugoslavia ag | an independent and honaligned nation. In this connecti:n, Keysen has not expressed any disagreement and has not made any r Comments, . i- Keysen’s attitude remained the sane when it wae bo Cxplained to hin that President Tito wag favorably f:pressed } by the development of the Soviet foreign policy and activities ee ae 7 = in generals President Tito was favorably impressed by Khrushchev's : rolo in the solution of the Cubdanc risis, dy our (Yugoslav) interest in establishing better relations with the Sevict Union, by Xhrushchev's influence on the eveats of great significance which aro taking pluco in that part of the world, etc. f | | oe __ (3) Ne (Keysen) was astounded to hear that the — relations botwocn the United States and Yugoslavia ure in a j b very difficult, shaso and that they perhaps are at their lowest oe cee “77 point since 1949, Ne said that his is not his opinion and es ' ' evaluation, _ He did not say anything when he was told that the mye relations in question are, for the time being, in a state of Oo ee wae _ Constant deterioration, , en ining esata ga mein ara ot Rie AF ?
104-10219-10001 = a, Err Hie completely understands the siqnififeance. that we attach to the clause of the most favored naticn, ue agrees 7 4 that this has become the main problem of the relations between x the United States and Yugoslavia, ie repeated ttat the (United States) Administrattun has done everything for the purpose of avoiding the passing of the anendnent; however, he said that an important Trade Act was involved, fie affirmed that the Adminis- tration is detcrmined to ask the Congress for the rectification of this situation, : ony (4) He wis particularly interested in hearing about OE , the accumulation of negative events caused by Americans which SR Fae have been occurring in the relations between the United States a and Yugoslaviag nancly: (a) after the visit of Dulles, not a single one of { the most prominent menbers of the United States Government has visited Yugoslavia; Nixon, Eisenhower and Johngon were very careful in avoiding its . (b) they (the Americans) never arranged the visit « ie of President Tito to the United States; (c) they (the Americans) allowed ants-Yeqoslav eniqrant : demonstrations to take place in New York when President Tito was there; this did not happen to President Tito when he visited othor heatern countries (London, buris), althouch Yugoslav a amet emigrants also live in theso countries; (d) the (American) reaction to the Belgrade Conference and the hard and rude memorandum which wag addressed to the Yu:osiavs in this connection; ouf (Yugoslav) reply was strong but constructive; t (e) the discontinuation of the clause of the most . favored nation is, in addition to other things, also an insult _ _ because Yugoslavia is treated like a second-class country; te this discontinuation coincided with the unsatisfactory. attitude _ of the Common Harket and this has all the more affected Yugoslavia _which increasingly needs markets for Yugoslav goods; ; {4 (f) the attack on our (Yugoslav) mission in Western pe Be Germany and the murder of Popovic have not provoked any reproval : ef this act and any support of Yugoslavia, rey A : rst So rin H '¢ 5 ae 2 eG 5 we RE TS ete ee ate Seren Sata tates ie BETTY a an A Us, Nal EN ORE He oc SS REAR Nile SPA ples Ee sat vation Te Dak: Ne Ue Guanes Gat fae ft larg 2 pid rin ae elie ey tet en. Ail een 1 tye agg, abet hep oe nS wf qeerce seg ysis 1a A PAS engage O lacingtn® * PUES AWE RS itr ON TE en Ra eet try asi se ake
104-10219-10001 Te ones enamen ae gee i - i t \ is is Keygen said that it was particularly ngefal for bia to hear all these things, No matter how the si¢cation reaily is. . and no matter what the United States will or will act do, he has becone aware that this in fact is an accumulation of unsatis- — _ factory occurrences, ; ‘ “ He comuented on them and categorized them. tle said - that is is clezr to bim that they wore sostly due to their (American) wrong moves in the field of “personal reintions,? Keysen added that Tito is considered in the hite louse as being a very courageous and independent leader, As for the 8elqrade Conference, Seyson said that ihe Americans can understand the motives of our attitude at the Conference involved and he hopes that we (the Yugostavs) can uncerstand treir motives for such a.recction; he dia not wish to elaborate for the time being whethcr it was wise to send ug ; *such a memorandum," ; ; , The clause of the most favored nation is quite clear, They (the Awricans) can understand that it vas particularly hard because of the difficultics with the European Conmon Market, However, he added that the American policics are ained at . opening the ‘uropean Common Market and at avoiding discrimination as much as possible, In the end, Keyson spoke about the attack in Sono. fie said that the Americans have nothing to do with it, They (the Anericans) transmitted to idenaver an official and confidential remark stressing that it is very unfortunate that such & thing could have happened , ae (3) In connection with the clause of the nest fevered nation, Koysen again emphasized the strength of the public opinion, the fact that the Aduinistration cannot issve orders, etc, os . ; an ; ‘J pointed out that the Administration {4s not anite helplessly confronted by a monolithic anticommunist wall; I _ eninded him of Khrushchew's visit to the United States, of the change of attitude concerning itunqary in the United Natiors, of the aid granted to the communist nations, etc. I recalled that, as a matter of rule, the Administration had got the things which it most wanted,
104-10219-10001 ‘of the authority and of the power in the Congress should be ce as important legislative proposal. Soviet Union, the statements that we have conmon aims with the ce ‘United States," that is, the present-day social systen of the West, Kennedy never said such a thing about the USS&, They with connunisn. Keysen replied that the distribution of the forces, taken into considcration, etc, he also added that the clause of the sost favored nation ig by no means the first problem of Kennedy. If for instance he had the chofce betwean the passing of the tax law and of the classe of the most favored nation, he would chose the tax law which is by far his aost Nowever, Kennedy will anyway ask for the re-establishment of the clause of the most favored nation; the outlook ig now considerably more favorable than it was last ycar. The United States has by no means "stricicen out" Yugoslavia and its relations with Yugoslavia. I pointed out that some of the things which do not seem to be of paramount importance in a qiven moment can be of capital importance in the following monent when various 1 implications and consequences of various questions are taken y into consideration. I particularly emphasized my profcund worry concerning the development of the relations if the clause of the wsost favored nation is not re-established, The present- day sitvation prevents useful initiatives from both sides. I indirectly said that the solution of the question of the clause - of the sost favored nation is awaited and that sone things oo — gtand behind this solution. a tit (6) hile talking about the attitude and the conceptions of kennan, keysen particularly stressed that "Kennan's outlock is dark and pessimistic because he considers that his job in 3elograde is tough." Keysen spoke about this matter In bag & manner that clearly showed that he considers that ennan's ee re attitude is infiuenced by personal considerations. vem coatecnss wieadd aan oo dleresh Sao In the end, Keysen said that: our support of the USSR (the victory of socialism), the declarations that we agree with the Sovicts regarding the most important questions, etc., cause a particularly negative reaction in the United States . oe, because Khrushchev has stated that his aim is "to bury the a a (the Asericans) consider that communism is a problem of the communist countries, These countries can occupy themselves we toes, f,8¢2 9 te cea htan ha bade MUM APR AEE ES bed Oe a ARG ata eet ate ie pemag fone teeta te Stee 2 Wana lal PACT ee nl Bik Sanit ff mae nnn taney tom att
104-10219-10001 7 : . Kennedy has especially emphasized his attitude in : 7 * gi i " bie "State of the Union* message, - od : , The United States has nothing against any lines of : : Yugoslav foreign policy as long ag these lincs are suited to _ the Yugoslav interests. Suspicions are i roused only when sone i Of these lines follow the intcorests which are not Yugoslav. a rs a ate foe fe 7 (8) Finally, be said that Sundy has approxinatély : _ the same opinion about all these things, , j { Pe . ; ate ; po . a usgecs mee eee ape apes ers re sees me neer yp yyere me tener
104-10219-10001 = =~" na os beat rupee ete Ga pee tr cagare ee eeee © omnes een ne at oe ee pee ee At eS NE rumen cena He IN Stagg nk RE r te cemNAmNR STDS ta » eae : . oo, . —. Razgover 21.4. 163) 7 : , Dr.tarl Kevs myzecenir “eSrevor BUY Yea psrec.savetnika Kencei a t act ritanis sine bezbednesti i spol ine rolitikes : a tne etree cee renee seg cemented Et 1) Bilo je(u BK,SD) izvesnog uzbud jenJja oko puta Pretsednika Tita u SSSR3 do sada su dosli do zakljucua da sro  blizi SsSR=u no sto sro -bili pre 5 godina,s tim da SSSR onaj koji vise nenjao svoj stay, a ne Jugoslavijae 2) Keysen, bez nekih posebvnih konentera i bez nekog neslasanja saslusao . dzlaa nje o tome da Hei SSS2 sada vise spresni da nas prize kao nezavis Rey Deangozovane,o povol jnin utiscina bPretsednika o daijea kretanju sovjetske spoljne politike 3 ckeije uopste,o peiznan ju H-u za ulogu u resavanju kubanske krize,o nasea interesu da obezbedjuje:o sto tolje odnose sa SSSR-01,5vVOje prisustvo i uticaj u vogadjajina of ogronne vaznosti io ji se desava ju u tor delu sveta, itd, itd. 3) Sa iznrenad jenjen i prizeddoa da to nije bila i njegova procena pris io ‘konstataciju da odnosi SAD~-Jugoslavija u vrlo teskoj situaciji, ma tacci ' koja nozd2 najniza posle 1449,.Nije imao privedbu na konstataci ju da se, za sada, stalno poforsavaju.ekazume potpuno « acaj koji pridajezo KNP, silaze se ca to postalo centralno pitanje odnosa.Ponavl ja da Adainistracija pokusala sve da ne dodje Go anand-ana,ali se radilo o krupnoa vente - EXpeActue Ivrdi da Adnministracija resena da trazi od Kongresa isprav] jan jes 4) Sa posednin intenesovanjes Ppratio navod jenje prisera rakuaulaci ji negativnin stvari wu nasia Senos ing, 3¢ njihove strane? adposle, Dullesa~ fooetes “Bijedan o! najistanuti jin clanova Vlade SAD u Jugcs slavi jf;Nikson,Ajzeahauer i Djonson. je pazljive obisli;.b) Nikad nisu obezbedili ostvarenje posete * - ."* pretsednika Tita SaD-u; c)dopus tili anti- jus.enigrantske dex ons traci je kad Tito dio u N.Y.,sto cm se nije desitlo un drugia zapadnis zenljara, ede “3e tatod jer ina(Lorgon, Pariz)3 “) reakcija na Seog rads <3 ronferenci ju i twrd 2 grub mesorarduy koji nan uputili,a ai oO: goverili evrsto ali - bons fruktivao; e) KNP, koja pored-svezga i uvreda, jer znaci tretran kao aA ne ad teeter beens eteatine ene ec ely Rayaentinenare Se apt Aa ea 2 eet Cg SRT bey oS ad spe sateen a, a gr teen ee erated Sete any) Sh ota cre he Da rnliting 2
104-10219-10001 -.— t ' i t i : 4 ; seas 3 7 é neke drugorazredne zenlje,a to koincidiralo sa nepovol jnin o¢rzavanjen nenayannastz teskoce Administraci je koja ne moze da nared juje,itd. wznxa “- Kada mu izneseno da nam niz prirera('Hruscev u SAD,proena stava ° Maz jars- 'w donenu spol jre. politike, Aédnizistracija nije bespomccno suocena sa “Rekia monolitnia antikoaunistickin zidon,i darxgimcom postizale sto ae jako htela, K.erekao ca treba imati u vidu raspered snaga,viasti, sile ‘-. Kongresu i $l Takodjer,ca KNP nije prvi. probles za. Kenedi ja; ako bi, ‘gecino, oslo do cilene ca li progurati Zakon o porea ma,koji ww daleko “-\ pa jvazniji legislativni predlog, ili XN?,uslovl jeno, josno je da bi se oo 7 . ® : Za jednicrog Trzista,pa utoliko teze pada sto nam sve potrebnija trzista za nzsu robu; f) Kapad na nasuy nisiju u ZN,ubistvo Popovicay bez javne podrske nana, edness osude atta. , K. rekao da nu 1 pose ebno korisro da ovo Cuje; bez obzira kato stvari _ 5 ewists stajale, i sta SAD ursdile ili ne,vici da ovo bila akumulaci ja | nepovol jnib mornenata. Katecrorisuc be bate h i konentarisuci ihn posebno’rekzo 3 da mu jasno da se dobrin deloa radilo o slabin njihovin potezina u _ . Binaxx donenu "Licnih o:nosa" (personal relations),ali dodaje da Tito kod njib, u BK,"ziva ugled veona hrabrog BZ, samostalnog lideras sto se Beogra:tske konferercije tice oni nosu da razuieju mse ‘rezloge za Pred, Hy | stavove na n.0j, nih jihove razlove za onakvu reakci ju, "ne ulazeci™ seda u to da 1ij je bilo parietno upucivati Naz onakav inemorandun", KNP je jasna stvar; shvataju da nai posebno tesko palo radi teskoca sa ERC, ali treba dodati da citava njibova politika da EEC ucine otvorenin, nang sa sto man je distraninacije.Na kraju,napad u Bonu: oni nevaju nitta sa tinj;zvanicno i poverljivo su Adenauerovoj vladi preneli svoju prinedbu da je veona nesretno sto se tako nesto soglo dogovitie 5) Ke,t vezi KNP, ronovo ‘naglasava snagu antikomunistickog appa jay 3 : + cet wit : \ieer ee Tee Fg, koj u UN,odrzavanje ponoci "kcnunisticxin zeal jana" )govori da,posebno Joos \ po pravilu (ees SeteNAOS a my Geek mae wore = oie may eyes = Saye erry ge 8 sBalscweus gy Hides 2 = ¢ 8 swear tex wo samen es uy i teeta apd eat oh t Mee tO DT te aes | URAC mat eet bee oto atin tteete yoaesh
104-10219-10001 ae oe Cp or i meres ! wis { ; . Or tee ADT St ann kaze da nasi stavovi podrske SSSR-u , izjavljivanja da inano zajecnicke ‘istovremeno Iruscov govori da nu je cilj dashrani SAD",o/:nosno danasnji “gmatraju komunizam pitanjemproblernom konunistickih zenaljajneka se one “ Dave konuniznom. Ovakav stav je Kenedi posebno istaxao u svojoj "Porcei 4a stan ju Nacije''. SAD nenaju nista protiv ni jednog Juzoslovenskog stava u spol jnoj politici,sve dotle dok ti stavovi su na lini e -£ brigor za isenESe koji nisu Jtgosiovensks ee ee eee opredelio za Zekon o porezina-kao vazni ji. ee Hed jutin, trazice svakaro wrecanje KP A depends su sada costa SAD acinn Maelie we Mulacde\dagea rte wige, bol ji no prosl- godine. a ek se. cline Primetio san ca ono sto ne zigleda “najvamije" u jednor trenutiu, moze da bude i te kako kapitalno vazno u sledecem,rosebdno obziroa na implikacije i posledice raznih pitanja.Posebno san neglasio ciuboku gabrinutost za razvoj cdnosa ako Se ne vrati KNPssacaisnje stanje one::ogucava korisne inicijative hxia i jecine i cGruge strane; irdirektzo sam rekao ca se ceka KN? ida neke stvari stoje radi togae 6) U razpovoru ° steyn, pogiedinn Wena Kenarocito naglasio da “"Xenan mozda gleda xxexise crno i pesinisticki zato sto suatra svoj. posao u Beogradu teskim'’. K. o ovome fovorio na takav nacin da bilo jasno da nx smatra da Kenanov stav licno obojen. y 7) Kysen na kraju, xzxmunyagnexyxypxvzyn soxyaynigextipiperaekyy ciljeve sa SSSR-on(pobeda soci jalizma),da se slazeno u najvaznijia pitanjina,itd,izazivaju posebno negativnu_reakciju u SAD zato sto drustveni poredak Zapada. To Kenedi nikaca nije rekao za SsSR3 oni i jugoslovers:ih interesa; suanje pocinju ondaahoda b& neki stavovi bili opredel jeni 43) a fro ner ¢ Co ‘ & Bal oo wht Ett io a
104-10219-10001 ¢ To the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (selgrade) The State Department believes that for the time being the most important thing is to have contacts between Yugoslavia und Western Germany which would not be mere protests, sutual hecusations, etc. The United States is working on thie matter but it is rather skeptical. It suececded last year, However, it seems that the whole matter is now postponed because a new explosion has como. — : The United States has similar difficulties with the relations between Greece end Bulgaria. The United States haa just succeeded in persuading the creeks to negotiate with the. Bulgsrians in order to normalize their relations and stabilize the whole region when Papandreu fell and the spy procass took place in Sofia. Thus, there are no reaults for the tine being. The Greeke had even agreed about a dato Concerning the start of the negotiations with the Bulgarians.  € (Andrews of the State Department to Jod.) s/ Micunovie (Handwritten notes) Do not send. a/V.He 1/15/64 J A Cetera antes tae ari Lattin ALi rece sath me SEAL: atu RN tee Rein FANN the Ka Ban! OSs netat? etme Th deme a Peta Z TRANSLATION FROM SERBUSCROATIAR © ee
104-10219-10001 { we a ot t ! 4} 1 ‘ H j | . i ‘ o 4 z . ‘ . ‘ ‘ ° Sines a Uo - ne seuneyeees on tee - cija jedina sadrzina ne bi bili protesti, uzajanna optuzivanja i sl.Na to SAD rade,iako sa dosta skepse, jer SVO jim uticdgem koe obe strane to uspelo prosle podine,ali se izgleda problen samo odlozio, jer opet doslo do eksplozi jeeSlicnin | “t teskoca inaju sa odnosima orcka-Bugarska. Taman su bili nagovorili Gerke da idu na pregovore sa Bugarima da bi se nornalizovali odnosi, i time daljje doprinelo stabivigae! i, elunvag polruc ja, kad doslo do pada Papandreua, spijiunskog procesa. u Sofiji,pa za sada ostalo bez rezultata.Grei se vec bili slozili i sa datumom otpocinjanga Preyovora sa Yugarima, co. - : Ls mo, , CAncrews,SU Job) | | Md cuno v ic F x 7 . : be mate oe . ., : F 1 AAS Tet AP eet Se A TAYE yeas etal £ 7
104-10219-10001 SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CKOATIAN = Fron the Yugoslav Embassy - Washington | To the Coordination Division - Belgrade | | Be _ Maxeh 3,. 1964 ar (1) Ths dskoneinatdon of nflitery aid to Yugoslavia _ is actually a rather ‘symbolic patter. It ic true that the Preaident does not usually ! cancel such a decision within e& period of a couple of months, : Hovaver, as far as ‘p. knows, the Yugoslav Goverment has not either here or in Belgrade officially asked the , . .. United States for e explanations about the practical meaning a : ; of Presidant Johngon’s decision regarding the spare parts. ; ro “f ' The Yugoslav Govermmant has not asked whether the deciston means that the UnitedStates Goverment Ins no possibilities or whether it does not wish to furnish the parts involved. Consequently, the ‘mertcans probably do not. know : |. whether Tgp olavia still needs the spare parts, : “ eg econ > y meme ESE en As fer as wa. are concerned, we eartainly have the a _ famine right to criticize the decision es negative and arbitrary. i a ne ; "However, the necessity of rendering this actually Ble ~ eens a... Symbolic decision ia the result of the American evelustion. no nm nee _-"" ""- 9f the United States political realities and of the need . i -- i. €0 apply the rether clearly expressed wishes of the Congress. ~ .. , Johbason has evaluated that he should have acted the way. he did, 3 = : G He 2. veg tee ks ewe is — Ps Par ore - Se Belg pees CARA ad Monga a ee eH ey ie m stay aetna added iggy anes ade paca + sts eb hnsaiy tetyta a AC EAS onda saa ga Fe mA Rear eg ese yN ins, Tung soayeiiss Sabai a eR ee Re eae ea ROR Beane omne y SEe A LMR EMER AMI ig GBs, ibn
104-10219-10001 Yugoslavia too has its political realities, Ag! Yugoslavia too does sumetines things vhich are criticized by re the United states, | a i ; However, all this does not necessarily mean that ; tha relations between the United States and Yugoslavia ara Mot good, These relations wore stabilized after the re- - establichment of tha clause of tha most favored nation and ~ : they ean be further developed. . —_ win (2) The selection of flbrick, one of the most eminent and moet able Anorican fnbatsadors, is the direct result of Johnson's and of Pusk's care for the ralations with Yugoslavia, This salecticn reflects the importance which . 4o attributed to the relations involved, Actually, this selection reflects tha importance which 4s attributed to Yugoslevia in genoral, (The sending of Zlbrick after seven months is merely - due to the bureaucratic procedures and to the difficulties which folloved tho asgeseinetion cf ‘Remedy »-e/Translator's coe) This paregraph has been stricken cut ia the original wie : Johnson's telegram addressed to Tito reflects tha i e lina of policy of the United States which {s explained above, -~- dn Buck's speech, the passage treating Yugoslavia reveals that ha much cares to show the’ Anceriean public what are his polictes toward Yugoslavia. before Baxing his speech, Rusk had ; ..'~ old Johngon about its main elements and Johnson had issediately. a endorsed then. . a “ie . "Johnson {is persuaded and so are the men in the white i House «- such as bundy -- that tha relations with Yugoslavia Loe, ere good and that there are no particular problens, ‘ ay k : see por se vie atnaeay th so TAT Oy Ray
104-10219-10001 — Ets « In the relations with almost each country, there mete og é are teday good and bad things. For instance the activities =? i of cortain organizations and individuals against the Consulate ; in Chicago are a bad thing. However, we must be per auaded that the United States, the State Department and the White House are peying the most serious attention to this state of sffairs, They do all thoy can for the purposes of fulfilling the oblissttons of the United States and in exdsr to protect us from attacks, The fact that they cannot always echfleve results in this regard is due to the neslitics of the United States. Kennody himeslf said on one occasion that a division has to fight in order that ons American citizen may register at an ‘mericen university. This is a deficiency of the ~ United States but it is a reality that the dase teens ere fighting. : Actually, the situation in Chicago is an Luolated | ona and it chowld not influence the relations between the ~ two countries, For instance, if Johnson were esked now about the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, ha would reply that they ere good. These relations are not listed Smee ame gees aed . 88 & problem on the s erowled agenda of the President. a _ Ia Johnson would also say that he is contimuing tha puro Kennedy (translator's Notes This last word has been stricken cs Sooo 1 OWS and in tts place it is marked) policies which were 0 Be Pie Ae . bepetofore applied toward Yugoslevia. hark ae arya fe mae ee (3) ‘The Yugoslavs should be very satisfled if they anslyze Johnson’ s voting related to Yugoslavia during the whole tine that he was in the Senate. i DS tad ade a ea ae ao errr ead ae a ee ee cee el 1 ar cer aera teen paneer er natal 20 RR te ei ton embers ted, NE et BERT gare age eo necting gatas CURE P Rha chan op ri pn ty EIR TI nT ae nee) sag jpg at \scaeprd hg oma eve we
104-10219-10001 oa a | 7 | . | ; - ; ‘etna tar ee pet SA A AST AS Rey Dire end a ma et EAM ES Relat iets Stele died ys. Recently, Goldwater attacked Johnson! s votings in the Senate as being more leftist than those of the liberal | : * % * Ir _ Be said that from his conversations with Johnson, © from the meetings cf the NatiomlSecurity Council, frou the - evaluations of Bundy, from the Raterial vhich he reads ani from the analysts cf Johnson's votings, he mey gay that Johnson has definite conceptions of the world, of the foreign policy thilosophy, of the rele of the United States, of the possibilities cf the United States, of peaca, of war, ete. These conceptions are similer te those of — Kennedy in many of their vital elements. Johnzon, lika Kennedy, considers thet thea world must be varied and that, in that senso, the world must be "coexistent," an Loe Johnson doea not vant to change regimes in the soviet Union, in Eastern aurope, etc., by force, — mo . The thing that Johnson would like most and for which he most feals is peace: he wishes to discard war. That is why he energetically favors disarmament, He wishes to continue tks policies inaugurated by the Test Ban Agreement, -~--- -- Ag fay aa Johngon is concerned, he would like to take off the agenda _. tha world exiees of Leos ant Victnan, However, he does not wish to withdraw and to be dafeated . ; only because (Red) China and North Vietnam have chosen to nn cL fight a sucrrélla war. vente oasis sea wimg aomm gs eee een ema a so Tike Kennedy, Johnson is for the United Nations, cot sha 8 Like Kennedy, he does not wish to sea tha United States poo tt kT ge burdened vith new responsibilities in the United Nations ria against. fts will, Pa rd EASA PRET a A brckae frien age aaah tee «Be ighen m ~ oy : :
104-10219-10001 F : - = rnin met Loramie eevee oe iol Bieteernertrtlentisltiece anmmermmmnes eesti d r pea i Consequently, the basic foreign political conceptions i of Johnson do naver vitally differ from thosa of Xenrady, : His style and his methods are different. . = Johnson ts a little less wordly minded or fashtonable -than Kennedy. He fsa little more accentuated as a nationalist than Kennedy but this is more a matter of form than of subetance. In this connection, he asks more from the othera. . Hovever, this is a nuance and not the essence, t * & - III _ Here are some moves of the United States: . + Cyprus - The United States folleved Great Britain. neg et | The solution within the NATO did not succead,. Tims, thore was a change of attitude, Zanzibar - First, it was characterized as communist, Then, £¢ was recognized when their representative was thrown out. ° Gia - the first evaluation ws that the fishing boats were part of a large Cuban offensive ia connection i with Panama, Then, the whole matter was reduced to the size of i , & Mere technical police ineidant. ; _ 2 oe The fmpression of confusten in the work ef tha Poe eee .: Administration and in the work of the President in the ; foreign policies is created, Than, the Americans dofend their errors. a - - OS (a) The world and the United States ere yoo". | Dolls 8 a fast and strange series of crises during the last 5 I : : ‘ Swen TLS = - 2 ~ a a o ° . erg Sets Fede nm Sepevceaee ‘ wip eunqone tary RTS fe ol pS bias Feo gt hee Le ee eee Tew Se Rees eet SiR I rae ogfige drititgen gmoney aaeanl hil inca eGeRO Mee Baer aed neon ino NAO STO INL tah Beak el SNES MURS RSE ie 8 athe bt Poke CLES NT ORR AE 7 rane
104-10219-10001 NEBy wel te dae (b) Johnson fs in no hurry to render decisions and ". be, Up to a certain point, leaves the events to develop. He ao Me does it because he wishes to learn the things first, to yet A thoroughly acquainted with them and then to make dceetstons , _ entailing permanent obligetions or to formulate vital positions, de “Kennedy, too, needed threa years to arrive at his , > speech et the American University. Johnson wishes to be the undentable and untque ° chief in general including the foreign policies, Jshnson still does not wish to tackle the details and he will do that when he gets acquainted with the mastters as his subordinates are acquainted... , Naturelly, during this phase, the subordinates are more independent, they decida becausa they have to | ; (e) Consequently, such and similar situations and the American resctLonsz do not convay the impression that Johnesa is directing tha foreign policies. : Taking a look at the spectfic situations, wa see: ~ Cyprus = The only wish of the Uatted States ta to ; ayoid the crisis and the war batween two ellias, Greece and - ‘Turkey. The Americans believe that the fastest and the : surest way was through the NATO, This did not succeed. However, the United States is neithor in principle ner - otherwise opposed to the solution through the United Nations — 4€ {t can be done. - . 7 i a ~ Zanzibar - The Americans followed the British __ Fa Bens ye 5 °° and this Limited the freedom of their maneuvers, Huvever,. lial Rial : . the United States has no direct interest in Zanzibar but Cat as Great Svitein has; thus, it is logical that the British should me have taken the initiative. ; | vm Pttalel sda m sour by a, ARH aE tb ae ete pein Ee eet TEESE RSE ARE COE SIRS id Pe aE ES S
104-10219-10001 bers fei a @ Guba - In the first moment, the Americans thought that something significant was undertaken, As sommeo they became aware thet it was not the case, they irmediately acted in AERUREANCE., . rs re * Iv I pointed out that one can receive the impression that the United States is becoming increasingly conservative. because! —_ it tries to solve the Cyprus ee out of the United Nations, it (Rusk) expressed reserve toverd the General Secretariat of tha United Nations a few weeks AEs it emleayors to keep the status quo in the field of the relations of tixe developed and of the undeardoveloped countries (the Conference for Development and Trade) } it more and sore directly links its help to foreign aid; ete. , Em I said that {n the past, the United States had moe cis sense renee os been @ redical, anticolontal and progressive force inthe .. ._. 2 ee B, replied that the United states is by mo means Poo beeming increasingly conzervative. The contrary is true. a a ‘Re said that. a few years ego, the Test Ban wos ~ i - imeenceivable and so were the present-day relations with the ee Soviet Union, He added that the eoffca agreement is. extremely. significant and that it establishes a most significant preeedent in the economic relations. This agreement was concluded two years ago but it could have been concluded ten pon years ago. cece ; side ip pm vam g sop ee . St Me rte ce cee eee sors ee ee FATA MVREIE A eaten UR ADE ot Hem RTE A Sunae panes aa top elegant ar anne es AEB ea fee ceed anderen “ie ae me pee card a o aceatee mes iE
104-10219-10001 - Five cr six years ago, it was felt in the United States that ‘the postwar period and the time when the United States we “an imperial power was a thing of the past, He said — that now the United States is stronger than ever before; perhaps, it was the strongest power in the pest but it had less possibility for influence. New forces exist in the world today and they ere ' strong, That is why the United States is more cautious in epanding its resources and that is why its goals ere nere limited. The United States is more realistic than in the . past end Lt understands that its allies are act going to do what it (the United states) considers to be good and progressive. Now, the United States asks for less and intervenes less, For instance, the United States did not publicly eriticize the armed french intervention in Gabon because it would inmedistaly bo interpreted that the United States is taking over the responsibility ror peace and for welfare in Gabon; this is not the wish of tha United States and it cannot do that. In addition, de Ceulle does vhat ha wishes, Consequently, it is no longer realistic to characterize the actions of Great Sritain, France or Western Germany as . “United States activities, activities of the vestern Allfance, activities of the alifes of the United States" ete, 20 On the other hand, the United States does not tha policies of Laos and of Vietnam as "Soviet," beeause it knows that the sf{tuation between tha Soviet Union : and Chins has greatly changed, ALL this does not mean that the United States is Prien @ gradually more regressive attitude. The contrary § : shears inate nota Sees 23, Hatha tar tipi sonhige ani apiof Hite tte eed epuben niga febaay Pati cae habe yh Saad Ha 2X ASHES ee eid aie rate nwa? Sees
104-10219-10001 ‘Stes, a ete eee en We EARS oe ranean 7 oN song eet i LoS TAO ee Yc ENN Ne cae RO gi Han, MET a a a ae ee a : Beck é Bpeseae-Sieate oS tp are 8, AOE Sore peg aint shane eth iaeg dines ENTIRE aa EE AS at eaat dpa Se cat : (#e are forwarding this cable throush the K line becausa Brubeck {is Bundy*s agsistent in the SatfLonel] . Security Council. rubeck is particularly responsible for Africa and for international economy, His conversation with Job was previously arranged, ~ We are sending this detailed cable because it represents Brubeck's arguments on the serious remarks which we made to him and because he spoke rather openly. - oo (The direct evaluation of his remarks and his sources will be separately treated, / Translators Mote: This paragraph has been stricken in the original text./) In spite of the fact that Brubeck tried to show the “tates policies {n the mort constructive light, &t must be said that he did not heeltate to recognize the émerican errors, (Ie also &3 important to note that Bruback foels - the need to speak in this manner in general and particularly : with us. /Translator’s Note; This peregreph has been _ | Steiekes: from the original text./) ; SRE ee Re rena a 27 eB ter ioe i " N ‘ oc a ge eet tae daemon ttn,
104-10219-10001 am | Te sod 1). Ukidanije vo jne no: Ned Jucoslavi ji je, materijalno, Vis SC sinbolicna stvax. Ek Cver|. oS Cert beeseias ttn da,politick iy Pretsednik obicno ne rondntavn zn wesecedva talvis . | edluku wstae i for:ain€ vraca sit: mca juona prethodno stanie. Medjutim, koliko et By: zna pJusoslovenska vinda nije ni ovde ni u Beogmdu(tor ‘alnodzvanicno pitaba Av da a t Lf a daju objasujenje sta odluka Johnsona prakticno znaci u por ledu rezervnil delova, da. [: of, e li to unaci da viada SAD neva mogucnosti ili odbija da obezhedjuje dalje potrebne nabav \ a (Rey iegeup erat tae es tova,arierickoj strani verovatno nije poznmato da li i kakev 7 mE, dy 3 a ee : 2 "5 . ¥ , , 5 20 renervne delove. . svakalo uo pravu dasa svocg stanovista kritikuje.ovw ner kao nesativian,arbitrarnn,kao sto to cine i viade drugih zevalja.Med jutim, nuzda denose ae ° nia ove, ‘aterijainoVsinboliene, odluke,rezuttat anericke procene a erick ih politictin sf Aa! -realnosti i- ‘onora sto Administraci ja mora da raajna dosta jasan nalog Konpresa; Jolin . oliticke. a ay Bat bi son, ,ocenio do, ovako mOra2o i trebao da postupi. I Jugoslavija ima svoje p centre ee _ - espe pe me te we elee ee ae ee Fe ec pepe ee enn Sentence enema ee crommancamummrs remy mam ee 2 ri rt erin ate
104-10219-10001 ; it t i ' . i on Hi i ! t aa ‘ t { . SAD, SD, 3K pridajn svu potrebdnu ozbiljnost ovome wee pene tys te realnosti kadi ho jih neki put cini atv ‘koje SAD kritikuju - ali ni jedno ni cMico ne mor da znaci ca odnosi SAleJenis" dobri,poste odbrane KNP atabilizovand i da se ne mnogu rawijati. 2)Izbor Elbricka, ka. jecinoy od njihovih najsposobnijih i ajuclednijih ambasadora ’ direktan renultat Jolnsonove i Ruskove brire za odnose sa Jei odraz aznncaja koji se tim odnosina pridaje,oduosno zurcaja koji se pridaje mestnu Jugoslavije uopste.€sirmn je T Jolis nonov telegran Titu tekodjer na ovoj Liniji.Puskov hover, pasns o Jucgo-laviji,poka ry . ° 3, . ° -4° z je do koje mere im kala da SAD javnost shvata politiknu prema Jugoslaviji, Vverenje je -sJohnsonona i Ljedi WoURCSundy da an odnost an of sire dobri- 4 dn ‘nena seci i Johnson se odah slozio mesavina bol jih i ei ja ft pojecdin:ca »i cine sve sto moguce da odgovore oe a ati ne Bee ee ey tee ne top yepemeetee apy ees ' ‘ : . : , H . ” ts ' om wo : we th 7 3 . . \ e aS t , ‘ a 3 ae 4. ot : - a, te e: . } ‘ * eee ‘ 3 By . “4 . ’ a q ta - . ‘x - : . . . . : 1 ‘ ‘ é c by * _ ° ™ my : peoceiny = OE wpa Wane MR pe ee giey: ay \. Late edad
104-10219-10001 a jami> obavezana SAD n “Poza zastite ol nasilja.sto ne mogu uvek sve da pontipny t Ly. rezdltat je ivealnos ti aw SAD. San Nenedi jednom rekao da trebalo da jedya avericka | fy et ‘ YO divizija udje u borbu da bi se jedan anqzicli tad janin upisao na ameri& i univerzi teté. lager ddan ustuo 4 Ovo goste nedostatak i aay a SANAL i realnost Protiv koje se bore.Med jutim Cikane ” Je dzolovana stvar kojn ndyaeme da utice na odnose dve zemlje. d a Kac bi s:.ia neko -—pitao Johnsona kalvi alnosi SAD-J. on bi odgovorio da dobri, Oud a ho 2to2 ‘ teeter Ni Niecsovan Prenasomilanon dnevnom redu kao neki Problem, 'Takod jer: | } . e bi rekao da nastaviia sa scape politikow prema J. 3 : 3) Jugosloveni bi trebalo da budu vena zadovoljni kad analizitraju plasania Johnsona | ‘ ‘. | |. Za Sve'Vreid dok bio u Senatu po svim pitanjina koja doticala JUZOS Lavi ju. GHereeembem Ae 7 nacdavnecoldveter napao Jehnsona da njerova Siasanja tokom godina u Senatu cak levija od liberala I[omfri ja.) o - SS , _ te pe, Iz svojih razrovora sa Johnsonom,sa sastanaka Nac donalnog Saveta hezbednosti,4iz occ. - poe na Bundysa,materijala koje cita,te-: mind za Johnsonovih glasanja,Bekaze da sa sigurnoso:.” Ps PT . ees eer Demet emai et
104-10219-10001 gees ovo shve .tanje sveta, poli ts ela Filove filny in ded if i a cng’ tt jevoAtd. as of ee spoil jno- ia bee moze da kaze da Aounson _ o wlozi ae i moguc os tina, mir i: ratu,itd pemmpaamtet OY 13 4 ots aaezdvereuece elevente: I on, kao i Kenedi, shvata da svet mora biti caznovestan. a ‘s a ion a ae ro go u tom aist koen7 jstentann: ni on ne zeli da silom menia rez ve S5SRe, TE t ale. - Se JB. oO Na Janarnd hi oneca jgnotiv Johnsona,zads tak koji jako oseca i stvar ko ju bi najvis se | rn I PE eeted PO Pretsodnik zeleo ia oatvari) jer te obezbed jen, ie i anapeed jen se: rl. ' nied ri ae : = Daiptrere ay vo “ $ ,e te mira,wklan) janie opasnosts rata. Zato prs 20 napredak =" yazoruzan Wyza penci ji. jaine s ' NOE, zac nastavbjanie onora sta zapoceto Test Vaktom.Sto sé Johnsona tice, on bi. a re | zelco da sine i Laos foywitatean sa dnevnom rea svetskih keiza - ald nije za to da - | 4 a { se povuce, tips poraz si&Ao zato sto su Kina 2 severni Vijetnan ‘dzabrali da vode fen : ritshi ratekao 4 Kenedi i on je an UP pals ni Kenedi nije bio za to da S& vecina u,GS i donos Vodluke “gmo SAD Ko je ziace tovarenic novih odgovornosti na 5A pad " a | Urine Le, o- -novns. cpoljnope] tticka koncepcija SE Johnsona sevic razLikiie od en que » u yanalosae : xacophelie , | kenediiovesMiegov stil i naci nVarugacd ji, Johnson jean Se SxMpE feneos 1 - gnQViace aizeazen nacionalizam 2 na toj liniji vise zahteva od drugih. i : . N ‘ ’ : ' ae . * . “J t 2 : x ‘ u , he it ' ; ! # oe ' ok f. “ ‘ a . 4, 2 ps Set one
104-10219-10001 wemestrenetenep nae Ned ” fi oe 4 fo, Ako takve s Lituacd je kum i potezi SAD kao:Kipar ms “ae VB, iene ori jentaci Ja Ra: * "s resavanic u okviru NA‘TO,pa Prodsana’ stava); Zanzkbar(prvo pa propglasili kouini sticking . A ' : zatim aa “prignali onda kada i+ izbacili rretstavnika); Kuba(prva ocena da ribarski. carci deo velike Kastrove ofanzive u vezi Paname,zatim svodjenie citave stvari na : tehnicko-policijski incident) - stvara ju p Ize Mer ecu ©) utisak konfud je wv radi eu. ; —. Aduinisteacije,Peetsednika nu spoljnim odnosi:a, onda t WWdigenon le tri momenta prvcustveno relevantna: : \ FY . . @ i a) I svet’i SAD u rosledni} par meseci. zaista prolage—ti kroz jednu trzu seriju i endnu kombinaci ju ‘kriza srednieg i manjed dometa; b) Johnson se ne zuri sa odtukama,donekle pusta da dogadjoji teku, jer zeld * = 5 ga prvo upozna stvari,da zaista vlada materijom,pa da predje na takve, odluke i kornake ¥ '. Koji znacili prenzimanje trajnih obaveza,formulisanje bitnih stavova.(I Kenedi ju , wf : ; . r] ts : trebalo tri.godine da dodje do fovera A -erickon univerzi tetu). Johnson, koji we, hoe j a seen tise yyy henge eae Se ae oy a mere at matt tee rate lire tenet + ste em eee
104-10219-10001 : ST mee eerie were bergen ON eae pen cea ne rae ae oe i ’ ! 2 7 ¢ . —_ ae) Uf ~ ” 4 . e s a Soa.) nesumnjivi i-jedini sef u rukovedienju i¥Spol jni: odnosima,nece da nrelazd , jos | ° uvek,no detal jno rukoved Jen.e dok ne zna stvari Isao i. rind reek jens » Dok ta fnza tralc, festa ay, fae osecaju Se, nieravnoa,veca nazavisnost i odluke druging, oj Ve sot Site ns ur sala ponenute i druge situacije 3 aner tele reake3 je ne dajuVosnova Fe—nk— tz ae, . spoljne _ viet soa Exetaninanel devaneonerernist! 5 E “Nee je i o specifienin karakteristika: ‘a. svake od ovih situacija: ° i 7 : rinac: Jedina briga sAD di se duzbegne keiza,rat dz ved Ju dé naveznikny sUreke 4 a J! . Terske.? inilo iz se najbrze*i najibolje kroz NATU.Ni je’ uspelo. abe niu rrind pu . 7 ni inace protiv resavania, dko—eatvrr SIV RTOZ ON brsnr UM, ober ortinelaug. 7 : : - _ 7 Zanzibar: Ovde sledili Mritance, sto in svakake ogranicilo Shona ranevea.ALL : : : i “SAD roma iu na Zanzibaru neporredne interese, vB ima,pa zato logicno nastupili. “" 7 a i . , Kuba: jednostavno im uo prvom momentu izgledalo da ree ° neces. vecemsci" 8c : - , uverili da nije,édaan postupili preva toe. . ma I “ ' * Bea yo \ ‘ : - in . se aa * sae sing eviiehenimmcianeng segs vemisn - , at if : = * Fa : g : . ' ve \ 1 ‘ fits , » cf z ; 7 2 ‘ fr aa wat x . aa so ‘ fa Fi ie ae ; ‘ . af ve : “ 1 8 ' Sing . my 5 . t - ts ae , ‘ . . Be - hae, ‘ 7 3 a . ‘ . ' c ' . aft 4 a . : + t » ‘ ‘ a . 4 ‘fe . : ‘ , t % mee omen anew ed — - woe ae ts Pie ae , 4 2 i ataieniaiwe earn ae ce ane sagan maps SSIS meee a : wg : * : . Pid 2 , : 7 Ww. “ ! i wiyaney : é
aay 104-10219-10001 oe GE ee Bhd tet ated Log Ble ’ i Ye 1 Na primedbu da: Se zbog. nastojamia de se Kipar tretira van UN, rezervi prema GS UN ! " u Raskovo'n savor& od pre nekoliko nedelja,zalapan, ju za status kvo 1 oblasti odnosa a | razvijenih i nerazvijenih(Konferencija za razvoj i trpovinu),sve direkt ijeg ve zivanja 7 AG i i of, posioci SAD kao diftektnog orndja spoljne politike,i ssl.moze stvoriti utasak da SAD s ¥ z} sve kongervativnija sila, za razliku od nekadon jes radikalndi je ontikoind jalnopg tava ; , } unluot ” : ‘ | i prorr sivnosti presa UN,i sl. = Berekao da SAUWne hostaju sve ‘konzervativnije vec . { . 4 nanrotiv.Pre nekoliko godina bio nemopue Test Pakt i sadasnji ocmosi sa SSSI. Sporn | zimio kafai,koji vaurerdtno znaca. jna ptvar 4 kapitulan presedan wu skoro najvaznijoj =o: — - os : ee red tou ellie ta Medidpinie ine uaging j i oblastigkoji zakljucen preagodinugaye bio takqdjer nerogue pre dgset i <1. f le . ERA hea) hege Poh) we wig towya. « SAD Hf ree .  . ? . Sita ta Droces tage Vec 5-6 fodina, suevise—chyrtagu fia prolazi posleratna an cpoha kadaVbile “iunerdjaina sila", cija zelja, bar u sopskevno" savezu, bila cesto :: ‘ stvarnost.Sada SAD,za sebe, jace no ikada pre, modda najjaca sila sxmkz, ali Sa manjim %. t mogumosti a uticaja, jer a med juvreienu nastupile NOVe Bensaere—sHN ia, Lsie jnke © a i, ve i sile.Zato SAUD suzdrzijivije vu trosenju svojih | Sretstava, san Je nastoJje, jer nerenino, ./ F : f F i . ® 1 \ . ~ 4A . eo a . ‘ . v , . ‘ “r a ‘ ‘ F ‘ ‘ im . f 7 iki Tie a wy neal wae
104-10219-10001 — da nieni saveznici rade onako kako se njoi cini da dobro i ‘Trontesivno, postavd fe jn man je zahteva i sanje. se uplicn.(Nisn 7 uzeld ‘pevni kriticki stay prea francusko} - oruzano}. interve cigi u Gabonu, jer bi odsah bilo shvaceno da SAD onda preuziva ju. C 2kun Cro Ne GoX 2 OK s mn 7 odgovornost Za red i blagostanje Gabona a one to ne zele ine WORN, ) oder ie, vise _ - nije realino postupke VG,Prancuske, ZN i si. kvalifikovati kao postupke "SAD/'zapadnog, saveraysaveznika SAD. i ‘sl, kao sto ni. SAD ne identi Fikes ju, kinesku politikn u Laosu i the eg ee Vi Jotname gn suv jetskom, jer znajnu da se sieanetjianboko jheenitine Sve ovo ne znaci da u vaznin pitanjiMa, problewiua ‘sadaspice SAD zauziv‘aju sve renresivnije stavove, vecVnaprotive C saliemo Linijom Ke. jer Breubeck,zacenik Uendvea u Nacionalnom savetu bezbednosti, 0 u aparatu ‘Hele kuce. Brubeck posebno edgeveran za Afriku i wedj.privre dudMrazgovorn Bs ee ‘t a aa Ne 3 Gust Joba sa niin se dogovoriliYs 01 jemo op:ieno jer pret:tavija razrad jenu fet RE in argunentact ju na ozbil jne bad ‘edbe koje cu: niligt jer Rrubeck bio dosta otvoren, , bez obzira na to sto naata evan ppikaze n ‘ihovu core eet u St ies svetlisOdernancade | ito precmommerar-poreehnen tr torriniy fesebne pee a oate) ; we cme ete pevenere © neem ie ete tare LUE rece mene mate ae me aE AT ST i meee eevee: fe ace tam en ementne ore nate a ieee ee tf te erm commen «sag at: ne esi iE, Ade Soptoiniie slatiigsa aia dat
104-10219-10001 . art. 7 ~ay ie SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN REPORT (A) ok KF Of & CONCERNING THE CONVERSATION OF JOB WITH ANDREWS (LUICH - JANUARY 8, 1963) . (1) Andrews asked with a cortain implicit dissatisfaction why the Yugoslav press has not commented on President Johnson's State of the Union Message (except the comments of Radojicic and Hilic). He said that, from the point of view of the direct Yugeslav interests, the Hessage is satisfactory. Bo added that ho doos not see how the pert of the Hessago related to the foreign policies could represent a problem for the Yugoslav newspapermon. Ho believes that Yugcalavia is waiting to see the reaction of the Soviet Union and of the other ' eecialist countries in order to write. . I replied that the Message was made only four days . ne ago and that we have net yet received tho newspapers published ; . , &t that tine, ao Andrews said that the United States Embassy would have informed if there had been editorials concerning the Be . : Verne, ve ot os Nea I told him that they (the Americans) know: that we ASSUES Our attitudes independently and that he Shovid leave to ws the evaluation of such an important document. tx our practice a period of fotr:or five days and even a longer period Of time is not unusual. Sse peer mapsgere te cae cee Boe Re (2) In accordance with the instructions of our Enbassy, Be, I mentioned that the Ambassador is back from tho Bight Congresa .- - - and that, naturally, the policies of Yugoslavia regarding the : United States reaain the sane. ee , pee : Yor the timo being, it does not ssem that the Yugeslav- State Secretary of Foreign Affairs will visit the United States. i Consequently, the Yugoslav Ambassador will probably ask to visit . oa the State Department which is quite normal and-patcir i 7 did after returning from Yugoslavia. Nene veneer eents BE Sa ae een em Nee taretneweminney sem ne ce ee Seber Mel oy a ee sit tig Region lee tee se AOE avid g Ce : cast 5 F : ante sear ren sage Ql PB NEM pve & oe mine ER NR AN PO MAL IIP AEST ECT cles nbengel ehanngpe oe eBET PET PEAT RAL EG O98 NS ee eto Mee inte 5 :
104-10219-10001 Bee: . 5 ATL EN Hee WM Bet ee BLAME sap eet aye om epeia ea ft EE ee game eT : se oot a ’ ae * : ’ . coms nye, mca tes ee BNET GARE HET Serie bp ety Ae Rayer aba be . B Branca TEEPE TODA ME Tea te RLS ehsiony am dinero agen NaT Cg weet ; . Credits and the Yuseslay enterpris treatment than any other country . the-President are favorably inclined in th - Bnything for the purpose of developing the The passage of the Neasage which treats the developzent oo of trade indfleated that, from the political point of view, ths ; ground for our 1965 pregram is nore satisfactory, see (3) Androws pointed out that the situation related to trade is now somewhat different because; ; (a) Andrews told Valker (aftor hig conversation with Job) about the sending of a. delegation to Yugeslavie, ‘Walker expressed the Opinion that Aadrevs should not have talked in that manner because soxe people and the Congress will not be willing to change the Foreign Ald Act, (b) I asked whether Walker has actual ly opposed the proposal related to the Bending of tke delegation. Andrevs replied ta the arfirnative, that Yugoslavia has the possibility credit of twenty years and the credi years, However, he added of receiving the vheat On aA & of the Poles is merely five He. aid that as far as the credita of the Export f port Bank aro concerned, the Bank is ex porsred to grant private fee temauiggennt 2 Be eS cap work on this natter. bie (c) He said that they are preparing the action to ask . the Congress to authorize then to grant the clause of the most . Zavored ngtion to the countries of Eastern Europe (4d) He said that Yugoslavin enjoys a far better | of Eastern Europe. These oF Rs countrics are asking for the Sane treatment; the Cougress and - 7S Sin Seronnainat iy are sieaae is regard, ees - . . (4) & sata that it scens that, aftor the Sta Vuion Heszago, the Congress wili- not United States and Yugoslavia, I added that, in fact, the cam only arrange for ths development of the othor Eastern European countries, Andrews eaid that recently some difficulties have appeared. He stressed that it does aot make sense for the
104-10219-10001 : State Department to submit propesale to the Whito House aad ask . for the action of the Congress regarding Yugeslavia. ie e=phasiced i ; that even sone people in the State Department itself do rot share 3 ‘ tke sane opinion end that he cannot szy. more about this gatter and 7 : “explain away everything.” 7. Pos Stl aie RR gtr nev ROL ang ayy ante.
ee < Pa noo, pone ‘ SUMMARY FROM SERBO-CROATIAN (5) I remarked that nothing has changed on the Yugoslav side, Andreve said that he will tell me/few things since T am insisting: : (a) The last Yugoslav action in tha Congo hes created great concern. Tito declared in Cairo that Yugoslavia may - “possibly send armament to the insurgents, The Leopoldville Government does not directly attack Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia did not act in this manner : “ey even with Tirana and Peking despite the fact that Albania we and China are directly attacking the Yugoslav national interests. The Yugeslav action in the Congo was particularly tough for Elbrick, 2 a ws In this instance, the Yugoslav rigid attitude has Fe collided with the /merican ettituda which has become rigtd by now. | (b) The Yugoslav press continues tts anti-/merican >... Campaign and propaganda by stressing that all the world . (;.  @wils are caused by American imperialism or by some American reactionary circles, a ep ta & Tha Yugoslavs do not take into consideration that, on pete. '.. for instance, in Asia, the United States confronts the . ...., Chinese imperialism which would suffocate, if it could, ’ also Yugoslavia. 7 This is gradually angering Washington. (c) The Russians are not criticized at All. Sue criticism would be a help in the Congress as an indication of SAT RR BS phat et NS EW eg ee Eh Up ter ite gag! SL andl, went bn becteite: meter olen, Sag STE ees! PONE ANG ag Aten tee 8 oh ston eh chal SARE oe Ee tle tie