Agency Information \ JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: 5/5/2016 AGENCY: NARA RECORD NUMBER: _ 176-10010-10019 RECORD SERIES: SORENSEN AGENCY FILENUMBER: 4 Document Information ORIGINATOR: DOS FROM: ; TO: KENNEDY, JOHN F. TITLE: FUTURE POLICY TOWARD CUBA DATE: 12/03/1962 PAGES: 3 SUBJECTS : . ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : — Top Secret : RESTRICTIONS:  1C , , CURRENT STATUS: = Withhold DATE OF LAST REVIEW: —08/18/1993 © OPENING CRITERIA : UPON AGENCY REVIEW ‘ COMMENTS : SORENSEN PAPERS:CLASSIFIED SUBJECT FILES 1961-1964:Cuba, Subjects, General and Historical Information, 1026/62-11/1/62:Box 49 a _—<—$—$$ v9.1 10 HW 49061 Docld:322705533 Page 1 .
7033 oe ER Cr an MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT? Futur re Policy toward Cuda 2Se ™ oO 7 - _ . Res Policy Zi oO oe al 2S Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains ann ~ oe a pen Bae the overthrow of the Castro regime and its replacement by oy om . . yoo one sharing the aims of the Free World, Our immediate —S 3 objectives are to weaken the regime; frustrate its- - subversive intentions; further reduce its influence in the Hemisphere; and increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime (cr split the regime off from the oO + Bloc). A policy of containing, undermining, discrediting isolating the Castro regine through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic economic; psychological and otnaer pressures il achieve these immediate objectives and ‘could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective. ~ This annex will Courses of Action be circulated ~ to ExCom members at the meeting called undertaken: to discuss the memo. The following overt* courses of action should be 1. OAS action: condemning the Castro regime for its duplicity; extending the trade embargo to all items except => * } ‘ e for the program of covert actions, please see Annex A. HW 49061 Docld:322705533 Page 2?
Ni 36 Appli sation @ the four-point shipping restrictions POP SECREY | except feosstuffs, medicines and medical supplies; further limiting air and sea commnicat ions between the Hemisphere and Cuba; authorizing eir and other surveillance} and. ronotion of subversive . J. 2, Establishment of Caribbean security e arrangements © thr ain isterial level meetings of the Caribbean hnrough big 0] J we e) on C3 Pes o uy) ie) 7 q) a a G3 © tS ct {2 is Sa cD Qu iy a 4 . countries for the purpoces of reaching agreement on: increasing the intensity of surveillance of coastal and international - | waters; inoreased surveillance and control of land boundaries 3 increased control over subversive activities within national = boundaries 3 Systematic exchange of intelligence information; ; \ A\ and, developmeat of procedures for coordination of military - re Cuba. to which shipment of COCO List (strategic) items is 4, Inelusion by NATO of Cuba on the list of countries ee 7, Dissuasion of Free World industrial nations from el / |shipping crucial spere parts and equipment to Cuba, not lon the COCOM list. \ Ge Persuasion of non-Blos nations to limit their —. Y airlines service to Cuba and to withhold transit rights oo a to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. HW 49061 DBocld:32205533 Page 3
7, . Persuasion of Latin American nations to imit ane.) | NY the travel of. their ndtionals to Cuba and to intensify \ Tx.z, (measures to prevent agents and groups of international ~~ , . “ef . SN communism from carrying on their subversive activities. hy ' 8, Persuasion of appropriate OAS organs to study \ “\ f urgently the transfer of funds to the other American he Republics for subversive pruposes, the plen of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for nan ) training in subversive techriiques; and to make recommendations . \ to the member states regarding counter-measures. ~ 9. Maintenance of currently enhanced VOA medium wave , {facilities beamed to Cuba and adoption by VOA of a more aggressive line toward Cuba. | 10. Facilitation of Cuban exiles’ entry into the United States Armed Forces for training, and formation of reserve units thereafter. Tining yO We should surface our program of {soleting and weakening -Cuba when it becomes clear that. our discussions on Cuba with theSoviets are unlikely to be fruitful. Actions w th respect to Cuba which may contribute substantially to creating a situaticn calling for Unitea Sseates military. action should be withhelé until the Sovicst combat units have been vemoved from Cubs or efforts tc persuade the USSE to remove them heve failed. HW 49061 DBocld:32205533 Page 4