v9.1 AGENCY : RECORD NUMBER : RECORD SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: PAGES: SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : .DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JFK Assassination System Date: . Identification Form 8/26/201 Agency Information LBJ 177-10001-10475 NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 23 NOV.-27 DEC. 63, BOX | Document Information CIA MCCONE, JOHN Released under the John Kennedy WSssassination Records Ollection Act of 1992 (44 USc 2107 Note}. ase#: NW 53244 Date: H6—-153-2017 12/06/1963 3 NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Unclassified 1A; 1C Redact 04/21/1998 DOC. #14 35 HW 53244 Docld:32283378 Page 1
53 244 | #13 6 December 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963 The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk, McNamara, Rostew, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning the procedures on MLF. Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a group of "young Republicans” opposed the MLF. Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional leaders in smail groups, but to intimate that no government, including the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program. Rusk gave an optimistic report on progrees and etated the most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including the United States. . McNamara atated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the MLF was a ‘must’ or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an independent course in developing theirs own national nuclear weapons resources. Rusk indicated that failure to preceed with the ML¥ might force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force will have a military (7) utility and will permit a reduction in planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost. The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. {| brought up the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I possibly could without endangering sources and methods. ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al. Docld: 322763375 Page 2? snr
HW 535244 The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge Bundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I would prepare for the President some special graphics which would show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba. NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier as te the validity of comparing our aid figures with USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include aid to satellites. His position is that since we include aid te NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece, South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their gatellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined. I do not know whether the figures are available. The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following comments: 1, Lexpect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover underground teste and it was quite possible they would soon make claims for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa- tion on the LASER beam. 2. I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been lecated in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were broadcasting unfavorably against them. . . 3. I noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over Malaysia. i then explained to the President the source of our information that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the assagsination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly. We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon, i stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that 1 felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge. He felt that to do this would have political repersucc Docld: 3227833768 Page 3
\ \ HW 535244 tantamount te a vote of no cenfidence in the military junta, that it would indicate President Johngon's support of Diem rather than the present authorities, Therefore he stated he could act move to remove ‘Lodge but hoped that Ledge would remove himself and become a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too easy), Itold the President that Ledge would destroy de Silva if he opposed hie assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him. The President said he would communicate most emphatically with Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an. appropriate communi- cation. I teld the President this would do no good, that Ledge was absolutely unconscionable in matters of this Kind and he had resorted to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration and thet he never failed to use the newspapera in order to expose an individual er block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David Smith ae Chief of Station, whe is a most competent officer but young and not fully experienced, but this proposal did net meet his request that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the job, The President said he would exercise the full power of his office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a “four-star man” on the job and that is what he wanted. IAM/mem Docld:3227683375 Page 4