JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10215 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files:William H. Brubeck AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : John F. Kennedy document Control Record DATE : PAGES :W/3 _ SUBJECTS : , DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 383: Disarmament, 7/63-10/63. Box 4. HW 49061 Docld:32626317 Page 1
oo, OP eet aoe . ft LETT Bammph Nuk o1- 38% 22-2, You oy ! THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 2030] , Honorable William C. Foster Director. -U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Ssency ‘Department of State oy Washington 25, D. C. ! Dear Bill: I am enclosing copies of JCSM-685-63, 3 septenber 1963, and JCSU-773-63, k October 1963. These two papers P asent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a militarily acceptable U. 5. position on the exchange , of observation posts to reduce the risks of war by surprise attack or miscalculation. I believe that these two pabers provide an excellent / basis for the development of a U. 5. position. - in observation system, such as recomzcnded below, would be advantageous to the United States. While such a > sten could not provide a guarantee against surprise attack, it could, if properly designed, provide a measure of advance warning that would make it more difficult for a State or group of Stetes to initiate a major surprise conventional offensive operction. Such a system could increase confidence, reduce tensions, test Soviet inventions, and begin the proc-ss of opening up the Bloc. , A-suceessful policy on such an obsexviztion system can only emerge from full and open discussion in the Nort. Atlantic Council. These discussions - may ~e difficult but they are essence. il. Successful negotiation of such an esreement with the Soviet Union pe2bably wiil increase existing pressures within the United States end abroad Tor reductions of defense expenditures. In addition, observavion posts located in the U. S. would result in some increase of Soviet knowledge of our response to crisis situations on a world-wide basis. Therefore, such posts would limit our flexibility to some extent. However, on balance it appears that — negotiation of an agreement as outlined herein would be advantageous “tq-the U. S.. . ; . . | fn agreement on observation posts is acceptable within the guidelines out- Nlined betow. However, the preferred position, as outlined in the follow- ing subpevagraphs includes provisions for & reduction of forces in Lurope after implementation of the observation system. The preferred position ineludes: ; (1) Ground observation posts. in the Wersaw Pact area established on the basis of reciprocity in rights and vrivileges and an equitable >alance in numbers. Posts would cover ports, rail centers, motor high- way junctions and air pases and would have adequate surface and air ; . eh, BOD Dik. ao 5 fyi ae ene nes Mets eres Fea Sea -  f
Re, 1 mobility to be able to observe movements on the local transporation : SG complex (see TAB A to Annex A to Aypendix to JCSM-773-63). Details of yok requirements for access to military facilitics, transportation facilities a - and vehicles and for communications will) heve to be developed. Proposed " restrictions on the location of Wersaw Pact posts on NATO territory are as indicated in Annex B to Appendi:: to JCSM-77 3-63. (2) Mobile observation teams assigned on an area basis to observe military activities within that orca (see TAB A to Annex’ A to Appendix , Do to JCSM-773-63.) Again details of reoulrements for access to various - pie facilities and vehicles will have to be developed. There should be ae provisicns for advance notification of major land gee movements oS ; o (brigade/regiment or higher) of forces through: or within areas of po ( ee) of observation posts/teams (sec Appendix to JCSM-773-63, | oe Pp r : ne (3) Aerial surveillance on a 2:-houwr, all-weather basis, with no Dude restriction on sensing equipment, to enccipass at least the area covered De by the observation posts/teams (sce Appendix to JCSM-773-63, p. 5.) Aerial inspection of those portions of ti: USSR bordering Turkey and Iran would be included if the USSR : insis sts on aenlal inspection in those countries. , (4)... Overlapping radar coverege as inéiceted in the Norstad Plan. mo se (5) Reduction of all foreign troops in Europe. to five divisions ° aa “on each side contingent wpon agreement or. and implementation of the preceding a four points. We should develop e U. 5. position on the composition of the | a five NATO divisions. This must be cone vrior to bringing up the subject | Mboe in the North Atlantic Council. We may went the five NATO. divisions to fy be all U. S. or some combination (say, 2 U.S., 1U.K., 1 French, 1 Benelux- © |) i, Canadian) of NATO forces with U. S.. | a Soviet negotiating initiative on the observetion question (or their a response to a U. 5. proposal) would probably take one of the following oo or three general lines of approach: . vty st Be An observation post agreement, perhaps coupled to an advance  nottieation of military movements vrovision and/or other minor measure. -b. A non-aggression pact, perhaps in seturn for some kind of as - observation agreement. ¢. An observation system agreenenst, pe eheps coupled to a with- drawal of weapons of mass destructic:: and/or their delivery vehicles from Germany or Turope. Ye should formulate our position to malice possible negotiations on the: _ basis of either the first or second pos sibility. However, an agreement ao within NATO to withdraw or reducc nuclear weapons and/or their delivery eT vehicles appears impossible at this time. It is also clear that a NATO ae consensus on a non-aggression pact would be very difficult to obtain. re HW 49061 DocId:32626317° Page 3
Without a fundamental change in Gerrit attitudes and a considerable alteration of the views of other Mais “icmbors, we could only discuss a noneoseresston pact as a part of a dro-der Euvopzan setvlement. However, the HAC might be willing to agree to t! ne development of a declaration against aggression, in wonich case, the U. S. could support it in return for an agreement on an observation system. . % is recommended that the U. S. Goveriment vrepare two negotiating rn - proposals: , \ & A complete observation syste. consiseing of the five elements listed above. . : . toot 2 i> \ b. An observation system Cons. suing of vhe sane dements, -.except reduction of forces, a number of which could be separated from the ne- gotiating package as detailed below. CO “~ZElimination of overlapping radar coverese snd serial surveillance from the agreement would not make it wnaccextabdle however, it would eliminate 5 ~ 3 Pp consideration of a reduction of forces since sweveillance capabilities , would be materially reduced. \ Elimination of mobile observation Soe. ., Cusco Lenging radar coverage and - / aerial surveillance would not make 2%. . - imacceptable. It: would eliminate our willingness to = opt co wccuction in forces, and would increase the importance of the “, Exuuber and mobility of the fixed posts and of the other aston ates cerengenents which would optimize safeguards against surprise sitaci. I think that it is necessary for me to emphiccize the problem of gaining a consensus in NATO. There already seoms to be a consensus in the NAC on the five principles enumerated >: | Juan representative that an agrecment on observation posts (1) yx. . romise alliance security, (2) must not alter the East-West mili. cy tol: cc, (3) must not prejudice the reunification of Germany, (4) menu aot o: anything towards recognition ‘of East Germany, and (5) must not = che Lwilin situation more difficult. If we cannot achieve a genuine conten: :. ut subjecting the alliance _ to major stresses and strains, then I chink wet the Committee of Principals ° ~*~ would want to be exceedingly cautious in recommending to the President that wé pursue such an agreement. In view of the foregoing, I recommend that when the proposed position has been formulated and discussed by our ~ representatives, it be the subject of an eerly meeting of the Committee © “Principals. ‘ my Sincerely, 2 Enclosures JCSM-685-63, 3 Sept. 1963 JCSM-773-63, 4 Oct. 1963 t HW 49061 Docld:32626317 Page 4 NL