Al ALT, to IIe pony REGRADED LEGER E SE OF THIS ee Authorily. SALT TES a, feet “ Ta 77 ? ern / py even. HARS, Dale. aaae a bea oni ee FROM We David Slawson pets per Hos Widens, CLA § £ ote Re HW 53294 SUBJECT: Trip to Mexieo oi ty On Wednesdyy, Aprdd 8, 1994 Mr, Moward P, Willens, Mr. William fT, Coleman, Jr., and Mr. W. David Slawson, all-on the ataff of the Commisaion, flew from Washington, D. C. to Mexico City. Mr. Coleman returned on Sunday, April 2 ang Mr. Slawson and Mr. Willens returned on an aicplane leavin: Mexico City at about 3:20, Monday afternoun, April 12. This memorandum will briefly swmuarige this trip plus some of the meetings held in preparation for it. TUESDAY ~ APRIL 7 20120 a.m. to 11:00 a.m, Willens, Coleman and Slawson met with Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas Mann, Mr. Thomaa Ehrlich of the Office of the Legal Adviser for the State Department, and two aides to Kr, Bann in Mr. Mann's office at about 10:20 a.m. Assistant Secretary Mann wns Ambasgeador to Mexico at the time ef the asasssination and perscnally directed the investigatory effort and our relations with the Mexican law enforcement suthorittes immedtately after the new of the Preaident's Geath reached Mexico city. A copy Lote eutemetit ae . . 7 RESRAG See at i| E.O. 11€:2, Sec. § Authority... 4 Name ya) ve by 6 feos: NARS, 39 P25 oh é ‘Declossily oD: Sazon Gey. 21D 7S DoclIda: 32370750 Page 2?
» wo HW 53294 nti 1S representatives of the American Embassy in Mexico City because Castro was the kind of dictator who might have carried out this | : . RECRADED » CONFIDENTIAL . huthority..- mod pe ny mo BARS, rn du BY ..Gocscconetcerephferess of the file oreated by his efforts, consisting of telegrams between Mexico City and the State Department in Washington, had previously been forwarded to the Commission. The purpose of our meeting with Ambassador Mann was first, to inform him _ of our Antent. to go to Mexico and. discuss with him our proposed actions there and second, to raise certain questions with him about his thoughts and actions in Mexico immediately after the assassination. The file turned over to the Commission by Ambassador Mann contains statements of opinion by him that Oswald was probably involved in a ainister fashion, especially by way of taking a bribe, with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City or with some other Castro agency. These suspicions were reinforced by the allegations of a certain "Alvarado" who at the time was . “ee . being interrogated intensively by the Mexican authorities and by 1s he claimed to have seen Lee Harvey Oswald take $6500 in ¢ Stl. § «es . s 7 fee American bills from an individual in the Cuban Embassy. We asked Ambassador Mann what particular evidence aside from the Alvarado assertions he had for these suspicions. He replied that he had none except the general feeling "in his guts" that — ih inne a ik sant aed 4 REGRADED eee wa ee Bw “‘puthority. prides. 1998 ve - a ry. fn. a9... RARE, ses Tb — i | | | SO — Docld: 32370750 Page 3
HW 53294 from it or simply as revenge. his suspicions were strengthened. DocId: 32370750 REGRACED CONFIDENTIAL . Authority. CLG | Ve. 2. een 7s by HM), _ NARS, Date. te Of 26 kind of ruthless action, either through some hope of gaining - The Ambassador added that not even the allegations of Alvarado or other rumors ithtich may have been current in Mexico city to the effect that money had been given to Oswald were really the cause of his suspicions, since the Alvarado allegations were not made until a day or so later, but that the fact that Oswald had visited the Cuban and Russian Embassies in Mexico City shortly before the assassination, which he had learned from his security officers at the Embassy, plus what he believed about Castro's character, seemed sufficient to him to raise the gravest suspicions. Later, he pointed out, when he had a chance to listen to the Dorticos-Armas intercepts, . Ambassador Mann knew of no contacts by Oswald with anyone in Mexioe City other than his visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies and his staying at the Hotel del Comercio. Ambassador Mann said that our intelligence took and was still taking photographs of both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies whenever anyone left or entered their main entrances, at least during the normal visiting hours on Monday through Friday, during the daytime when pictures could be taken without artificial light. | | REGRACED CONFIDENTIAL '~.. Authority CRA Mts. )2f24 /7 Ss ry ARPS 9... nes, ete SP PSP Pb on a ; Page 4
HW 535294 IL —fOP SECRET Aa) 3/25/% — we ew — «es eae eee cee ow The Ambassador eaid that he had been kept informed of the Silvia Duran interrogation through his aides, Clarke Anderson and Winston Scott. He learned of it informally, that is, Anderson and Scott reported orally to him as soon as they received from the Mexican authorities at "@obernaciton" any news about how the interrogation was progressing. In response to our questions, the Ambassador recom- mended that when we got to Mexico City we should work through the representatives of the FBI and the CIA at the American Embassy and, through them, with the Mexican officials they recommended, put that we should do all of this as quietly as possible, without any newspaper publicity. We also asked Ambassador Mann to what extent it was known in Mexico City that the Hotel del Comereio was a headquarters for pro-Castro activities. The Ambassador replied that it was not known generally at all, that this information was current only in intelligence ciroles. Ambassador Mann said that the file from his Embassy which had previously been forwarded to the Commission consti- tuted the entire file which was in existence on this particular subject, with the one exception that it may not have included REGRALED enti aed Sp sine seems er Re a ee odes DoclIda: 32370750 Page 5 ~, ala 1
Ake 3 GGsrilPSTIAL Authaiity, na ts, 1 lafasfon | _ are me Sfasrg | the report from the FBI referred to‘therein, We confirmed | Cran nee HW 53294 that it had not included that report. He said that he was sure that this report sould be obtained from Clarke Anderson in Mexico ‘City, if we thought it was necessary, In response to a similar question about the. "Alvarado" file, he replied that “any additional papers in the possession of American authorities that might be in existence on Alvarado could probably be obtained through the CIA and that we could speak to Mr. Scott about this. He said that he had never seen any papers or formal statements by Silvia Duran; all his information about what she is supposed to have told the Mexican police was received by word of mouth through his aides, Scott and Anderson. Ambassador Mann was then called out to another con- ference, for which he was already a half-hour late. As the meeting was breaking up he asked Mr, Slawson whether, with the benefit of hindsight, the members of the Commission staff felt ‘that his recommendations and actions shortly after the assassination had been justified or whether we thought they were unduly rash. Mr. Slawson replied that although the inves- tigation of the specific allegations of Alvarado had shown that they were in all probability a fabrication, he found nothing in what the Ambassador had done to have been unjustified, in - L- GRADED ora ; i. r Mam: py. 'n9/- TS | Authority... | Yann ar HARS, Bate of } 23 fb oe Docla:32370750 Page 6
AW 535294 | we wanted to become as current as ‘possible on evidence being te pe tee; = Bhasias oa) ca caae Mh. 12) 745 nape nuthority.S We met with the Ambassador at about 9:30 in the morning. Present besides the three of us and the Ambassador were Minister Boonstra, Winston Scott and Clarke Anderson. Mr. Coleman explained in general terms the purpose of our trip. He said that we wanted to learn as much as | possible about what investigations were currently being carried out, with special emphasis on the Hotel del Comereio and on Oswald's northbound journey out of Mexico City, and that we wanted to decide upon and initiate whatever new lines of inves- tigation we felt were called for. In connection with looking into these investigations, we wished to satisfy ourselves that everything reasonably possible was being done and, in addition, produced. Also; we hoped to make contact with one or more Mexican. officials so as to learn directly from them what part. they had played in the assassination investigation and what they had learned that might be of value to us. In particular, we wanted to find out as much as possible about what Mre. Silvia Duran, the olerk at the Cuban Enbassy who dealt frequently with Oswald, knew. Finally, we hoped to make arrangements for, and. REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL Ls gta os Ay. MARS, pate. £2 206 ; avn C3 BI wake | NN os Teh te > oe eft. as hg geet —_ ay Ey " wk Tae, at ee eS eT Saat ee ae Crhatiie ee cat Pa Pi ae ees a ne a ae ee Be eee 1g, aOR Pee Docld:32370750 Page 10
HW 53294 hotest 6a Cua D/P [7 Te 4 x = T ay. Jn. m9 Pew, giyle of? shoe ' and perhaps accomplish, the authentioation of our evidence obtained in Mexico, by the taking of depositions or by invit- ing witnesses to appear before the Commission to testify. Mr. Coleman added that we hoped in all this to be guided by the counsel of the Ambassador and his staff, because we did not want to do anything that would disturb the good relations of the American and Mexican governments. ‘Ambassador Freeman replied that he and his start would “eooperate completely. He said that he saw no objection whatever to our talking directly to Mexicans who had some information to contribute, but he felt that this should be done only in the Bnbassy and only on the clearly stated basis that all appearances and testimony were totally voluntary on the - part of the Mexicans. As to speaking to Mexican officials. the Ambassador again said that this would be fine and he asked only that we work through his staff in setting up appointments, etc. The Ambassador pointed out that the taking of formal depositions in a foreign country could be a very difficult and technical matter. He referred us to the Consulate section of the Embassy for information on how to go about doing this. The Ambassador, Clarke, Boonstra and Anderson felt REGRAGED CONFIGENTIAL . raven DL bt 224) 25° By pe WARS, Date BT how 2. ow FL. Docld:32370750 -Page 11 .
if “a . . : ; . we Chditab ! . a Authoriiy mere Qe. el Ue AA o pin 3]: 5/26 "Embassy and to Mexican officials as what we in fact were, representatives of the Commission. Witten. said that in dealing with Mr. Winston Scott, — the CIA. Chief: for Mexico, we. would. be working with one of the | top foreign ‘operatives ain their entire organization. He said that the CIA would give us complete cooperation. We outlined to Mr. Witten our entire proposed plan _ onee we arrived in Mexico, in general terms, and asked for his comments on how best to achieve our goals. His reply in every instance was that we should deal on the spot with Mr. Scott.. Witten thought that our proposed journey was a very good idea. He repeated what Mr. Helms of the CIA had said a while ago, Bee that there 19. no substitute for the "sase officer” being "on ‘the spot." | | : WEDNESDAY - APRIL 8 8:15 eo Mm, to 7400 p.m ° our plane was scheduled to leave Washington from . Dulles: Airport at 9330 in. the morning and accordingly all three of ua met, at the Washington Air Terminal in the Albert Pick Motel s at about Oras and later arrived at the Mrport 3 at about RECRAGED a pos Saar 2 By wb Dalt nans, date 3/2 LIC. “He H¥90a- pedvarsedva50 Page ts <A
Tee awe HW 535294 7 Lae Authesity. SE4. Qe a me id that our seeing Silvia Duran would be a highly sensitive matter and that it should be discussed fully with the Mexican officials, but they agreed that it did not differ in principle from our seeing other Mexican witnesses, i.e., the Ambassador approved so long as we saw her in the American Embassy, and made clear to her that her appearance was entirely voluntary. There then followed an exchange of views on how best to approach Mexican officials, what Mexican officials would be most valuable for our purposes, and the general substance of our work. At about five minutes to ten the Ambassador had to excuse himself for his first staff meeting, which he had called for 10:00 a.m. | - 10:00 a.m, to 11:00 a.m. Willens, Coleman and Slawson retired to the office ’ that had been assigned to them at the Embassy, room 510, to discuss the conference with the Ambassador and generally to draw up outlines for our coming conference with the FBI, the CIA and Mr. Boonstra, 11:00 a.m. to 1:45 p.m, Mr, Anderson and. Mr. Scott came to room 510 after 2-PeP STE E T hutholly- iPS tT a ls Pahetioad DoclId: 32370750 Page 13
. ; REGRADED Ne Ot, . aan CQG Ch ade on ae] We the start meeting had y tiparoea vs WSs tat we gould confer with Mr, Anderson immediately and meet Mr. Scott later in the aay, at about 3:30. Mr. Anderson was welcome to come with us at our meeting with Mr, Scott, 4f he desired to do 80, and:he said that he would make up his mind on this after he had conferred with us, because he of course had other work to do and would not want to attend the meeting with Scott if it would simply involve him in a repetition of ground he had already vovered. ‘hecoratnely, we met immediately with Clarke Anderson in his offices. He invited Rolfe Larson and a Mr, Trent to take part in the conference. Mr. Trent was also an. - agent of the FBI tenporariiy on aay = Mexico. One of the topies of conversation was Reverend Albert Alexander Osborne, @lso known as John Howard Bowen. Mr. Trent had been the agent primarily engaged in tracking down and talking with Bowen, although Larson too had been somewhat involved. Briefly, the agents described Bowen as an elderly white haired gentleman who was probably engaged in some kind of violation of the law in his fund raising, because it was not clear that he actually used the money he received for religious | ~” REGRADED cen 9! 29 / Zz Authority cr Dheecseelanenncncaeebacers oon 75 nN AN WARS, Date nsfsadoe “tem iiet ay eOTEE gtte Eg - ay SE em ae mitt Peete cael Sipe bo oes rod ag OM Ta Fer, mre Sgr 2 ae peng ait, Se me, a om “Ae Pe Se ana : a ease ats = = fad Sy: we oe “ “ os a ae aad HW 53294 Docld:32370750 Page 14 |
— oe , se , RLGRA if gain. Hi : So , : , , faa cde Cy. ypyog (a $s” . . Dv frag. Le ‘ ft. sfrs ! wanted to push it, the Mexican authorities would deport Osborne qui ckly. The discussion then continued on. to other investiga- 4 tions. Largon gave a detailed summary of recent results of the investigation of Oswald's northbound travel on the Transportes del Norte bus, I will not go into what he said here because it 18 now reflected in an FBI report in the pos- session of the Commission. “We advised him to include as much . ‘detail as possible in the reports which he nent through = et channels in Washington to our Commission because the detail : — which he had told us orally seemed to fit what we knew about Oswald's background and was therefore valuable as confirmatory material in the overall picture, even though it perhaps seemed important to Larson. We then supplied various details about Oswald's background and character which might assist Larson in interrogating witnesses in Mexico. Larson, Trent and Anderson agreed to include all possible detail in their future reports from Mexico, | Largon and Anderson then went into a discussion of the Hotel del Comercio investigation. Here, it appears that the conclusion of the Mexican investigators that no one at the hotel “ABSHALES “ire 12, | hem authority: weg eccisesersoest tl ! 7% angen? “ Wi keh. HANS: BA . id _. <-. sain STEEL, i a se oe ee ee oe hie es Seales a eects fee age a ye St ie WaT to ” Siemens toys Ee a con aa ral Coe OO * CI ea Be tae oe “eet = ee Mateos a PS a heen ee Sea, ae oe aN HW 53294 Docld:32370750 Page 16—
HW 53294 "yt Wty Ay righ a hq 2b hs Lee ret ee Lane JN, De By Eis ze om cn anew —_— me om a remembered Oswald and that the only evidence of his stay there was his name on the register was incorrect. Larson, | after several interrogations, had found that the maid at the hotel did remember Oswald and was able to give some bits of information about him. . For one thing, she, as did other. wit- nesses confirmed that he was always alone when she saw him, Further, she said that he invariably had left the hotel before she cleaned his room at about 9:00 in the morning. Larson had also found out. that the proprietress of the little restaurant next door to the hotel was able to identify Oswald, although | Larson was not completely certain on how mich she really remembered and how much she may have picked up by suggestion from newspaper reporters, — Anyway, she has stated that Oswald frequently ate lunches and dinners at her restaurant, that. he invariably ordered very cheap meals, that he always ate alone, and that he was not able to converse sufficiently in Spanish so that he really knew what he was ordering when he ordered a meal, For example, he often refused soup and dessert, apparently believing that he was thereby saving money, although both items were inoluded in the cost of the full meal. Various other investigations of Oswald and of places where Oswald. may have. been in Hexico > Gtty were also touched upon, «ig sani “tbe REGRADED a Ot 16 ; . , nuthority. Cee OF Nant cee lowe Ae Loe (1)? ala ~ Bala? _.. NABS, Bate ww o/Belts Docld:327370750 Page 17
such as the bull fight arena, the jai alai games, and | the | places where he may have purchased tourist items. For example, Larson and Anderson said that another one of their agents had questioned more than three hundred silver shops in an attempt to locate the place where Oswald may have purchased a siiver bracelet inscribed "Marina." The response had been negative at each shop and subsequent investigation has shown that such bracelets are probably not sold in Mexico at all because they are made in Japan and the duty on importing them 4nto Mexico would make their price non-competitive with local | products. We then asked what was the status of the Gutierrez investigation, Trend and Larson and Anderson all agreed that Gutierrez was sincere and was doing all he could to cooperate with the investigation of what he claims to have seen. In fact, Gutierrez has spend a considerable amount of time trying to get more valuable information and he has never tried to receive any compensation for this work. The weakness in Gutierrer' story, aocording to the FBI representatives, 18 the identification of Oswald. For example, Gutierrez has failed to identify Oswald as the man he saw at the Cuban Embassy receiving money when. shown a picture of. Oswald passing out acthority eRe OT Nee he wars, pate bine ShI af AESRALED Gt pf jos S . wot oe — po, ey ¥ 2 *. 2 - at ee aa ay Roe we apr ee Lye y, aoe Wa i <n Dien mal Fa HW 53294 Bocld:32370750 Page 18
PEMAEED COUEISERTIAL wr PNP ou. PRS, One 2587 Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets: in New Orleans during the summer of 1963, Gutierrez says that he never saw his man in profile, only from the rear and, very fleetingly, from a direct forward view. His best piece of identification is to the automobile he saw "Oswald" and the Cuban enter just outside of the . Embassy. Even here, however, assuming that his description of the automobile is completely accurate, there are probably dozens of such automobiles in and around Mexico City. Renault isa popular make of car in Mexico, and the color described by Gutierrez is a popular color, One automobile answering this | description and frequently seen around the Cuban Embassy has been located, but 1t 18 still registered under the name of the ‘man who owned and sold it several years ago. This situation is apparentiy common in Mexico, “Mexicans often register a car under the name of its former owner in order to avoid paying a sales tax on the transfer, However, investigation is continu- ing to see if the present owner of this particular automobile | can be located. In addition, a constant surveillance of the Cuban Embassy and its vicinity is being kept, to spot this or similar car, and if one is spotted, further investigation will be carried out. -* Slawson then mentioned that we had brought with us - from Washington all the items of pliyetoal evidence which might | REGRAGED CORFICENTIAL puthoriy. 2224, Ub... 1.24.2 4/7 It BY WA adn NARS, Baty Azle eae ner ee eee + ge” HW 53294 DocId: 32370750 Page 19 ..
Lo ; oo . - ; | -. ae ie aapeale> ' a RO PSSEPREDT ph} yale relate to Mexico, © It was agreed that Slawson and Larson would go through these items later, We then {nquired as to our seeing the reports afd current work papers of the FBI in Mexico, Anderson replied that these were open to our exami- nation at any time and that he and his agents would show us whatever we would like to pee. We agreed that we would look at particular reports later, as the occasion warranted. Silvia Duran was then discussed. It appeared that her signed statement had finally been obtained from the Mexican Police. Previously, the existence of such a statement Le. had not been known, We agreed that we would see that later in the day or tomorrow and that it would also be forwarded through channels to the Commission in Washington, We emphasized that we wanted not only a translation of the statement but, if possible, a copy of the statement itself. The FBI representa- tives described Duran as best they could, basically, as a "Mexican pepper pot," a devout communist, and "sexy." (The CIA later showed us some pictures of her, which substantially con- firmed this description.) We discussed what would be the best approaches to our possibly seeing her, Anderson felt that this would be a touchy point but agreed that we should try to do 1t if we could. He thought that the Mexican official that a we should seé about this as well a5 81] other aspects of our EERALED eerie re ath ity CAO ty 19 dof 2 2 1S" i nnd) os 3/2 2/2 nN ‘. \ eke Beet At = ae oe et ae ve oat ae tS . 5 Ne ¥, on ae “aay ee a Da ae ype TIN smd Speman Ta AS nee ey , Serene Ne eS arn wee s see wa Ny eS me eid ae Ma “ie SRLS pF agit as tee aa Led HW 53294 Doclda:32370750 ‘Page 20
. pa 236 1 2=9-P SB O-REP aan am ed / | investigation was Luis Echevarria, Acting Secretary of the Interior. Anderson said that he was well acquainted with . Echevarria and that he got along very well with him, as did Winston Scott. | | | | Willens, Slawson and Coleman each got: the impression from this conference that the FBI in Mexico City had been completely frank and open with us. So far as we can determine every question we asked was answered without an attempt at evasion, and much information volunteered which we had not be asked. Both Larson and Anderson give a@ very good impression | of competence and Anderson's knowledge of the details of the assasbination investigation was especially impressive since his duties are primarily supervisory. The Alvarado investigation was also reviewed, . Clarke Anderson. said that he was present at the Alvarado interrogation which was taken under a polygraph machine. The polygraph operator, who aid not speak Spanish, stood behind Alvarado when he was fastened to the machine and pointed to various questions written in English which he wanted Anderson to ask. Anderson would then ask Alvarado the question in Spanish. In response to our direst question Anderson replied that 1 now that ‘the investigations » were more or less compiete : Be ce 20 | . REGRA J asi ae Ly ct ene Authority... cot R eco a ccnennestapeier eee tT nis ‘a wns, tow dd? Eye 'te, O, a medaele —e., PF, are one creer Cr Fn ep ea Sess ae ast Fiat sede ao NS HW 53294 Docld:32370750 Page ?1
“A 53294, i ison oi Piven al : c _  Autharity.. ek Q Ok, jail 7 | m md een NAPS, wey da He his expert opinion was that. no ‘Foreign eonspiracy: arising’ out of or connected with the territory of Mexico existed in con- nection with the assassination. He said that he felt that if ‘such had existed, although perhaps they would not have solved it by this. time, they at least would have some firm indication that it was in exiatence, which indications were in fact lacking, We asked Anderson how many different allegations of conspiracy haa been received by his office and he replied, B1x. These were? the Gutierrez. allegation, the Alvarado allegation, the Diaz Verson allegation, the. Martino-Ro Ja allegation, the — letter from Victor Cohen, and the ‘allegation coneerning the ‘Stanford University student. Mr, Slawson commented that in his opinion only the first three allegations mentioned even seemed serious and that, after analysis, the only one that still seemed serious vas Gutierrez’. Anderson readily agreed. . Loge 120 am. to 6:00 p.m. ‘After lunch the three of us went to Mr. Scott's office, ‘and were there introduced to his deputy, Mr. Alan White. The conference was begun by Mr. Scott giving us a complete narrative of the CIA's activities in connection with Lee Harvey Oswald, beginning in September 1963 when they first picked up information that Odwald had appeared at. the Russian and Cuban . emg mo "yes TRS SE Fe cad ee SRE tes “DocldT 32370750 “Page 92 fa Pasta 2 t mo tes snot a ee “TET STE STITT nt TRE aoe = oF ae ED ne
EHULAL - Authority... mare Ue, bo? af7 76" 8. ATA J, HAE, BA > J2s./7 ne “oS mbasetes. He. Sot’ stated, at ‘the: ‘beginning of his narrative - that he intended to make 4 complete disclosure of all facts, ~ {neluding the sources of his dnformation, and that he under- . stood that all three of us had been cleared for Top Secret and that. we would not disclose beyond the confines of the | . Commission ‘and its immediate start the information we obtained through him without first clearing it. with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this. Mr. Scott's narrative of. course took a rather long. time to complete, and’ we interripted him at many points with Specific questions. During the course of the narrative we were shown the. actual transcripts, plus the translations, of all the telephone intercepts involved,. and we were. also shown the reels” Sect of photographs. for. all. the, ays: An: question that, had been taken secretly outside the Cuban ‘and Soviet Embassy entrances. Mr. Scott's. narrative alacioséd that the CIA's action immedi-. a . ately after the assassination ‘eonsisted basically of alerting all its confidential sources of information throughout Mexico = oa ‘to Ammediately ehannel all information into their headquarters, i. and of compiling as complete dossiers as possible on Oswald and ad everyone else throughout Mexico who at that time the CIA knew had had. some contact with Oswald. This meant especially 3 Stlvia Durty who: ‘because she, hed. previously been having an ee jeans cturIOEMUL ee ruronty Sor & Pts 1225/2 5 1] iy an. WARS, Dato Yl aa 2 HW 3535294 “Docld: 32370750 Page 23
RESHALES budrivtdndl Authorlty.- Odd be. bh. “gh 4 [26 (75” a 9) NrRe, Erle, WEST Ie apie caftase with, Aachuga, the « former Cuban. Ambassador to Mexico. oe ve ve. and presently: ‘the: Cuban representative at the United Nations, had previously been of substantial interest to the CIA, Eusibio. Azque, Duran' § superior at. the Cuban Embassy , Kostikov, a KGB representative at the Soviet Embassy, and others, and ‘ ne sonveying ¢ this ‘information to Washington... In ‘addition, ‘the CIA a es worked closely with the FBI and with. the Mexican authorities, | especially on the Silvia Duran interrogations. “Finally, : Mr. Scott, along with. Mr. Anderson, was in constant. contact with | Ambassador Mann, to. keep. him as. ‘ourrent as possible on all ~ information coming in and on other developments. Scott pointed out that his headquarters had picked up the name of Lee Harvey Oswald from commercial radio broadcasts 2 fang] had begun. compiling. information. on. him from ite Mexican Le files even ‘before ‘being requested to ado 80 by CIA in Washington. Bae ALL his men were taken eff any other assignment they may have been on and told to concentrate solely on the assassination. ‘All the persons ‘previously mentioned whe might have been in 7 ie contact with Oswald, plus other: people yho in Scott's opinion might possibly be. Anvolveds, were ‘Put under surveillance. This ~ 4neluded, for example, the Guban. Ambassador and all known local Cuban and Russian intelligence agents. Immediately liaison was at up ‘awtth, Mexican offioials.® A mes nger | sent, by. Eohevarria .. nee staat = we ee at aye aor" Ponideses07eo" Page
CISHAS NO On, ECT | a -REGRATEN CONFIDENTIAL © gutusrocnsenoy re | oo putroriy LAG, OF. 4 oF 24/78 RE, LEASE OF THIS DOSUME HT a ras h HAM, bate 2 SLE to the American Embassy at this time ‘@laclosed that Echevarria and President Lopes Mateo had ‘ordered the Mexican border closed for travel both Way8, without having been requested to do 80 by the American Embassy. Scott said thet the border | | closure was 80 thorough that busloads of school children were trapped on both sides, Scott's narrative plus the materials we were shown disclosed immediately how inoorrect our previous information had been on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. _ Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by -Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable aétivities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our infor- mation was we realized that this would be useless, Therefore, instead, we deaided to take as close notes as possible from the original sourde materials, at some later time during our visit. In view of what we had learned about the photographic coverage of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies, we inquired whether photographs, of Onwaa Soman. or ‘going. from. ene or. ‘both a he ee mM TO ree. nee prea ceed — DoclId: 32370750 , Page 25
BOA CPN AL ce 7 . Authority... eth Qt). tl G/ 9&7 eS eS a a Mm Pet fon Me NABS, pete, Maas embassies might be available. scott 1 ‘said ‘they. were not. ‘He explained that photographic « coverage was limited by and large to the daylight weekday hours, because of lack of funds -and because no adequate technical means for taking photographs “at night froma long distance without artificial light, which was of course out of the question under the circumstances, had . been developed. We brought up the question of Gutierrez and received from Scott and White basioally the same information we had previously learned from the FBI, though somewhat attenuated because, &8 Scott and White pointed out, the FBI was carrying the primary responsibility with Gutierrez, We suggested that _ Gutierrez’ story might | be gonfirmed or refuted by photographs ... taken by the CIA, ‘that ‘in particular ‘the automobile. he claimed to have seen might show up on the fringes of some of these. photographs, and we inquired whether an appropriate examina- i tion of the picture reels had been made. White replied that ROD OCS re Tre been made and proved negative. )_ such an examination had not yet been made and that he suspected that it would disclose nothing new, because the photographs covered little more than the entrance itself, However, he promised to make such an examination. (About a day, later Scott reported to, Us that ‘Buch | an examination shad . er WL A Phe Balas Cue ABS, ti a —_—— — em ae coe om om TR game ET a on HW 53294 Docld:32370750 Page 26
REGEAGED CONFIDENTHAY ae £84 oe f 2/25/97 Son Seeeee (| Bankhd.. vs, SIRE 7G an answer’ $0; our’. question, : “White: and. Soogt. gave. " ncis’ 9 professional opinions. that there probably was not a ‘foreten conspiracy connected with Mexico Anvolving the assassination of the President. .They, like Anderson, felt that had there been Buch a _sonspiracy they would at least by ‘this time navé had some ‘tirm indications. of its existence. . We asked Mr, Scott. to pet up a meeting with. Secretary Echevarria for all three of us at the earliest possible time. We wanted beth him and Mr, Anderson there, af possible, both as interpreters and because their previous personal acquaintance © with the Secretary would facilitate our dealings. Scott tele- — phoned Anderson and confirmed this request. we then reentered our discussion of the assasaination | ore" ‘appeared that the CIA —_ Oo general, as 1t related to Mexiioo .: in Washington had not . forwarded certain material developed elsewhere to Beott, even though | these materials might have ‘reasonably related to the Mexican. investigations, ‘For example, the contents of the letter which Oswald wrote to the Russian Embassy after he returned to the United States, describing certain aspects of his trip, had never been disclosed to Scott ‘or his staff, We showed them the contents of this letter at a -, thie. mocking. ce apie ; ocla: :s0S70Is0~ “page
cu HAS NW NO OB eny DECLASs) Doak 7 aor RELEASE oF NAN ' oo ee | a ions C086 A aeafns” a _ Ip — a ZN bry). Yeas. mata 3 3/2s/% “During this general disoussion Mr. Willen was 7 called out to meet with Minister Boonstra in regard to the publicity which had appeared in the local newspapers about our visit. This involved the drafting of a telegram to the State Department. in Washington in regard to this publicity and ~ an estimate as to the reason for at. Also, Willens learned at this time from Boonstra that.the Embassy did not have a copy of the file forwarded to the Commission by Ambassador Mann. Apparently, Ambassador Mann's personal file is the only one now in éxistence aside from ‘the Commission copies of it, all — | eer other copies having been destroyed when the Ambassador left his. i post in Mexico. Boonstra told Willens that he (Boonstra) is the only person other than Scott -and Andergon who was involved with “Ambassador Mann An: the assassination Anvestigations. Mr. wi2iens asked Boonstra to begin ‘thinking about how best we could forward a request to the Mexican officials for a complete _ report on their role in the. assassination investigations. At this time Boonstra's only comment was that such a report should, if possible, be obtained prior to its being reviewed by the Mexican Foreign Office, because such a review might censor out substantial portions for political reasons and in any event ' would involve substantial delay. He suggested that review by the Foreign Office be a condition of publication at a later a sg ——REGRADED GUAFIOENTOR ste —————e z Authority.C QQ Oe yf: 25/95— web MARS, Date I a il Docla: 32370750 Page 275
PESRED COMPIBENTIAL « — . Authority. COL On. yt 2 f?a/ , By .. Raa ae _KARS, we las/ time," but. that: tenet be Permiteed:' to, oid up the. information : at this stage. Back in the CIA offices, ‘guring Willens' absence, Slawson and Coleman discussed the cable traffic from the Soviet "and Cubari Bibassies: both duiing 'thetime éf-Oswald's visite ae there in September-October 1963 and immediately after the assassination. ‘Scott and White said that no increases or unusual variations had been noted at either time. We then dis- cussed briefly. the possibilities that the National Security _ Agency might be able to "preak" the codes for the times when Oswald was in Mexico city, using as a key the fact that Oswald's attempt to obtain a visa was probably communicated to Washington on Friday or Saturday, September 27 or 28. Scott ‘pointed out that all -his-office did with coded materials was to send them back to the National Security Agency in Washington in the form in which 1¢ obtained them, They felt that the code- breaking might be possible, however, and should be tried. _ FRIDAY = APRIL 10 | 9:00 a.m, to 9145 acme Coleman, Willens and Slawson appeared at the FBI offices at 9100 a. M., a8 we had agreed to do the previous  sventne, ‘and ‘there met Rolfe Lareon,”'.Thé pian had been that we : = ‘eine ce ea ae ine eee | Bate, ra sal | ‘L,
Authority. n Rid be. 1s 27 1" PQ. eis, rm ESL | were , Immediately to depart on a tour of the spota which Oswald ~ had visited during his trip to Mexico, but, Larson told us that © he had just been requested not to leave until 9:45, | because by that time we expected some confirmation of the hour when we could meet with Secretary Echevarria. We therefore sat in. Anderson's office. and discussed. with. Larson the relative — locations and other physical aspects of the places we were to see later in the morning. Soon Anderson came in and told us that the appointment with Echevarria was firm for 11:30. The Ambassador had been told about the meeting and again approved it, repeating his. conditions that when we ask Echevarria for permission to speak directly with Mexican citizens that we make clear that we wanted all interviews to be within the American Embassy and to be completely voluntary. We then had a brief discusdion on how we. would, handle: the meeting with | ‘Echevarria. ‘Willens and Slawson paid that we had agreed the previous evening that Bill Coleman would carry the discussion for us and that Coleman would spend the firat few minutes in conveying the gratitude and appreciation of the American Government to the Mexican Government for its assistance to date, _ its satisfaction with the quality of such assistance, eto., and other matters of etiquette and friendship, which we had been told were essential when dealing in a formal manner with rererrenar tmp.cea'ly ; | By omnidh “a Was, naa tse HW 53294 DocId: 32370750 Page 30
pasion 64 Es LE who did not speak Spanish fluently enough to get precise directions. he Hotel del Comeroio, although certainly a cheap hotel and one in which American tourists would ordinarily never stay, has a neat, clean appearance and, according to Larson, 18 in fact clean inside, and stands out from its Surroundings as being definitely more attractive than the other hotels in. the neighborhood, Although one-way streets make it difficult. to drive from the Flecha Roja bus terminal to the Hotel del Comercio except by devious routes, for someone walking, as Oswald was, it would be an easy distance and a natural direction to walk. The hotels near this particular bus terminal are almost all grouped around the same area as the Hotel del Comercio, and it would seem very possible that Oswald could have been directed towards this neighborhood af he inquired of the where- abouts of an inexpensive hotel. Moreover, coming from the | direction of the bus terminal, the Hotel del Comercio would very likely be the first reasonably clean and attractive hotel that one would notice. Some of the other hotels in this neighborhood closer to the terminal than the del Comercio are also attractive, although perhaps not quite. so as the Hotel del Comercio, but Rolfe Larson pointed out that those hotels tend to get filled earlier and therefore Oswald might. have been referred further REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL tune RA OE 1 /R/2.9/ os Peta MR, Bt 3/2.5 7. eC a Se nae ms sane HW 53294 Docld:32370750 ‘Page 32.
“Ee ShERy PUIDENTIAL - sf x yl a j24 7 rer cod bt ‘ wa MAPS, Rete. « B/ashre | down the street. at he Anquired a one of then - for | a room and a 8 on was turned down Larson confirmed what we had been told by both Anderson and Scott. earlier, that hone ef them had any indica~ tion whatever that the Hotel del. Comercio was known ap al nesting place for Cuban revolutionaries or even for Cubans, revolutionary or not. Larson said that he of course had inves~_ tigated this possibility and that his examination of the hotel register for the periods around Oswald's visit there had dis~ closed only one Cuban name. Further investigation showed that this belonged to a Cuban family man who had his family with him and that they were tourists traveling through Mexico. The Cuban and Soviet. Eubassies have no remarkable ‘qharecteristios except that both are surrounded by high adobe walls which make observation of their interiors extremely difficult. The Cuban Consulate, where Oswald did most of his dealings, is a small separate bud iding on the corner of the Cuban complex of buildings, with its exterior walls coterminous with the adobe walls which surround the area, Its front door therefore opens onto the street. Exit and entry into the | Consulate, therefore, forms an exception in that it can easily ' be observed by persons outside, — REGRAGED GodFitwih mnt TE mci IS - de woe cou ee ee OT er WY te POST - : Tes Lat ee irae CO SE EE a eine BO ie ees Sots HW 53294 DBockd: 32370750 Page 33
. 2 ea . . : . : pbk 1S a . i J nina CA wa co | | 1 eeeret tr Inno: arg, Patt — —. eame- —~ a eee oe ; oo After driving around with Larson we returned and. i parked the ear.in front of the ‘Amertoan Embassy and waited just outside the ear for Scott and Anderson to come out, ‘AB we” had agreed beforehand. They came out ‘shortly after 11:00 a.m. and we all got into the car and drove to. the Mexican Ministry of the Interior to meet Senor Echevarria. Oo . a Paneats | 11115 a.m, to 11:45 a.m. | We arrived at Senor Echevarria's office somewhat early but were nevertheless immediately brought in to meet him. Le We were soon joined by his head assistant for this kind of work, Senor Ibanez, Chief of Inspections, Clarke Anderson acted as interpreter, under our instructions that he should feel free to elaborate as to courtesies and details at any time, and Winston, Boots. 2180 _aerenete’ at a few | points. As previously agreed, Mr. Coleman did the talking for the three of us. He. expressed the thanks of the American ‘government, and of the Warren Commission in particular, for the cooperation our nation had received from his agency and from the Hexican government generally, and in general exchanged | pleasantries and courtesies, Coleman also told Echevarria that Chief Justice Warren had gent his personal thanks to Echevarria. a ween tot hae nb. . WARS, Date OLE S/ 76 HW 53294 DoclId:32370750 Page 34
“uh : . Buthority.. C08 OF. abd? Lp ae . T OP $e Se ET M. 5 LRG gts, dele Ba S/26 Coleman asked that the Mexican governement give the Comnission a complete. and as. detailed as possible report on all the investigations 4t had carried on in connection with the assassination and on any other actions, such as closing the © border, 4t had carried through. ‘Echevarria readily agreed to do this, saying that all the basic reports which would go into such an overall report had already been prepared and that he could deliver the overall report on 48 hours notice. He asked, however, that we deliver a formal request for this report to the Mexican foreign office, addressed to his atten- tion, in order that it not be mistakenly sent to some other police or investigatory agency in Mexico. (We had learned | from other sources that there are 26 different police forces operating in the Mexico Federal District alone.) He said that he would telephone the foreign office immediately after our conference to alert them that he was the person responsible for the note and would appreciate ite being forwarded to him for ‘his appropriate action. | We agreed that we would deliver such a note that afternoon if possible, marked to his attention as he had requested, Mr, Coleman went on to tell Echevarria that we were 7 treating all communications from Mexico ‘on this subject as confidential and that we would do the. same for the report he was — REGQADED GGHF IGE cl Buthorlty. SC, | ¢. t 5 Lfea]ag hed ss... WARS, Date, wa Sh. HW 53294 BDocld: 32370750 Page 35
yp re BT a ae | - aa. wpe ;  ERegeeres 7 AD spel 7 going to deliver to us. We ‘would publish only after receiving  glearance from the Mexioan government, which clearance we | Planned to seek at ‘some later point in our investigation. | Eohevarria agreed that this had been his understanding all -along. and that it would also be the understanding upon which he would convey the full eport to UB. 7 Echevarria then discussed briefly the overall . situation and gave his strong opinion that there was no foreign conspiracy involved in the assassination, at least no conspira- oy eonnected with Mexico. . Coleman then brought up the matter of our interview- ing witnesses for documentation purposes and to find out additional information, if possible, in Mexico. To give a specific illustration of what: we had in mind, Mr. Coleman used the manager of the Hotel dei Comercio as an example. | Eohevarria replied basically an the affirmative, but he made two important qualifications.” First, he felt that the inter- | views should not be in the American Embassy, because to hold them there would give the appearance of an official investiga- tion being carried on by the American government on Mexican soil, and this, he felt, would be very disadvantageous politically for the present Mexican government. He pointed out HW 53294 Docld:32370750 Page 36
—RELINGED CiFISENTIAL 2/21 2S Authority. CL Gr, f fa { DOD SeET yA IR Yes Sas ye — = os "ot oe et ae am that. an election for president was scheduled to be he1a in a July, that such elections were held only every six years in Mexico, and that the present time was therefore extremely sensitive politically. “one of the most effective propaganda _- weapons the communists have in Mexico is the alleged American — domination and interference with the Mexican government and any unduly public investigatory activities on our part would lend themselves to this kind of propaganda. Second, Echevarria requested that the interviews with Mexican nationals not be formal but that instead, for example, we ought to arrange to have lunch or coffee, etc,, with the persons with whom we_ wished to speak. Our reply to this, made through Mr, Coleman, was that “swe dd not want any appointments, for lunch or otherwise made at this time because we wanted to leave ‘the entire problem open. we had not in our own minds decided whether and to what extent we wanted to proceed on ‘this basis, Kohevarria agreed that he would take no action until we requested it. There was an dnterruption here while Echevarria. | spoke in Spanish to Ibanez. The three of us took the oppor- tunity to consult quietly in English with one another. Coleman felt. that in.vdqn of Reneyarria’e reluctance to Peres _ eg, RECIADED CONFIDENTIAL or a 2 pay 24 Wey |p 25 fos aa MBS, Date BL Deg PM SN PERO OU AE Fee ee ET FT a ea oy RE Pletal Sa a” SPA a acti Oe HW 53294 Docld:32370750 Page 37
pres al} ci a 957 Authority. ch levees Qh. (3.29 q/ By -- DA Daye te, hate. Sdesfe 7 formal mestinge even with uniaportant witnesses such as, the hotel Glerk, that the. ‘proposal we chad for dealing with Stivia. Duran ought to ve handled very otrcunspectiy. He proposed to | do this by shifting the conversation back to the ‘overall report, stressing that in the writing of this ‘report we felt that: Duran's interrogation was of. ‘the highest: Amportance, ‘and then hopefully shifting the conversation onto the subject of how we pe could deal directly with Duran. “Willens and Slawson agreed with | this approach, . “Coleman then again spoke to Echevarria, referring back to the overall report and describing our feeling of importance as to Silvia Duran, étc., as outlined in the previous paragraph, Echevarria replied by emphatically agreeing that Duran's testimony was of the greatest importance and promising. to go. into as much detail and documentation as possible in connection. with her evidence in his final report. He commented “that it was upon. the information his men had obtained from her that he had relied most heavily in concluding. that no con~ ‘spiracy had been hatched during Oswald's visits to Mexico, At about this. point, Echevarria abruptly took steps. to end the meeting. He said that he had an. appointment to have lunch with — : ‘Queen Juliana, who was then in ‘the midst of an official visit | (RESTAGED CONFIDENTIAL — aaa ES Beal 2s : Ds, a MURS, Dale ZBL 7E cae aE EE RR _ | ' HW 53294. DocId:32370750 Page 38. °°
“puthoulty, oars in ae ds po to Mexico, and that he of course had to be on time. Coleman used the opportunity to say jokingly that we would like to have lunch with Siivia Duran while Echevarria was with the Queen. Echevarria replied in the same vein that we would not have as much fun as we thought because Duran was not a good- leoking Cuban but only a Mexican. With this rather inconc)usive result on Duran, the meeting ended, As we were leaving and walking down the stairs to the entrance of the building Senor Ibanez came up. behind and asked Clarke Anderson to stay a minute and speak with hin, which Anderson did. The rest of us proceeded to our oar in the parking lot outside to await Anderson. . Anderson later told us that Ibanez had held him back to say that he /Tbhanez7 was completely at our disposal for | making any arrangements. for lunch or otherwise with Mexican nationals. Clarke Anderson told Ibanez that we appreciated this but that in some instances we might find 4t rather too informal at a luncheon to transact the kind of business we hoped to do with some of the witnesses, Ibanez replied that in that case he would be happy to set up appointments at his office in the Ministry of the Interior building. Anderson questioned whether this was in line with the ‘kind of non-official atmosphere that Echevarria hoped to: oreate, henge: repiied that perhaps 4t REGRADED GaNFIGENTIAL ; Authority. fe Ret Lf ce: s WW 53294%. Docld:32370750 Page: 39/ :
‘ ys Oo . . CTOMADED CENTIRCETIAL . was not. However, the Poseipality ¢ of using Ibanez' office was not foreclosed. " We then. drove directly back to the Embassy, arriving there about noon. "22100 noon to 1:30 p.m. The three of us plus Seott and Anderson went to Minister Boonstra’ 8 office as Boon as we arrived at the American Embassy. We reviewed with Boonstra_ what had occurred with Echevarria. We decided that we would submit the note to the Mexican government that afternoon, if possible, although every- one recognized the difficulty of delivering the note to the proper Mexican officials which was created by the visit of Queen Juliana, Boonstra pointed out that not only was there an official lunoh, at which Echevarria was now in attendance, but that a state: dinner was planned for that evening. Boonstra requested that we draft the aubstance of the note immediately and that it then be given to him for shaping into final form. We then discussed with Boonstra the problem of Silvia Duran. We pointed out that our only interest in wit- nesses other than Duran was to get their formal testimony for . authentication purposes. We aid not feel that there was any- thing we could learn from interrogating them that Mr. Larson and other BI r agent hed not “alrea y? 39 ee PEGRADED et | Basle "5 ruthorly. ree A HS. ashe! Liie ! a y/ earned, This was not HW 53294 Docld:32370750 Page 40
Pius cst CUNT ietiial . L /?.: -o pepeccaes PH cusp . true. of Duran, ‘however, because, she had been interviewed only by the Mexican poltoe and. we considered that. interview | inadequate. (I should point out that we do not consider it totally inadequate, however. It is only on details such as Oswald's physical appearance, side comments or remarks he may have made, etc., that we would like to interrogate Mrs. Duran further. On the essential point of whether or not his contacts with the Embassy consisted of anything other than an attempt to travel to Cuba, Silvia Duran's knowledge has probably been exhausted.) We discussed with Boonstra the best approach to try to speak to Duran. Boonstra frankly stated that at this point it was his opinion that we would not be able to get through to her. He felt that the Mexicans were too politically sensitive to risk having her picked up a third time under arrest and that she, being @ communist and especi- ally because her husband was a very militant communist and a very bitter person in general, would not agree to any kind of voluntary appearance, Nevertheless, he {Soonstra7 would raise no objection to our attempt to arrange a meeting with her. We therefore agreed that Scott or Anderson would recontact Ibanez and if necessary Echevarria as well to try to arrange a meeting with Silvia Duran. It was pointed out that even Shough the meeting would have to | be vintoraal” as stated by ——s pees CGAFIGENTIAL en uthority <7 Q2aky, ead. / 24 Mato a 58/7 HW 53294 Docld:32370750 “Page 41
Fy e - . . , ; oe, : veo blk bh OE. were __ Echevarria, ~ possibly. for dunch» we. gould arrange that the. a luncheon would be in a private place ‘and that its location would not be disclosed to Mrs. Duran prior to her arrival there, She could be picked -up in an Embassy car and driven to some other part of the city. Also, if necessary, the room and/or our persons could be fitted with recording pparatus 80 that no notes would be necessary and so that proof of what was discussed could be obtained and kept for an indefinite period thereafter, Boonstra suggested that we consider the use of a a oe "eutout" for Duran, By this he meant that she could be taken ~ — to the United States on some unofficial journey, for example, to give her story to an American magazine, and while in the United, States. she ould then. Bppear before the Commission. We ‘@isoussed the pros and. cons of a@ cutout and decided that it was worth considering, and that we would bring it up at the highest levels of the Commission after we returned to the United States. The conference with Boonstra lasted only about one- half hour. All of us except Boonstra then retired to room 510, the office which had been assigned to Slawson, Willens and Coleman at the Embassy, and there drafted the note to be sent | REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL - puto ahd ay AZ L24/9 Waa. Males, mh vam Shes / Pe HW 53294 DocId:32370750 Page 42
‘bege : eM. HW 53294 _ to the Comission or to representatives of the Commission. - Commission, the “sutout” approach, etc., would be deferred | pending receipt of the outcome of Anderson's conversation with | he, Dy bath, RAL huthisity CLQ. CH oy, lzf? 7s” no PVA 8 BYES he ‘te the Mexican government asking for its official report on the assassination, As poon as the note was drawn up it was delivered back to Boonstra's office and we continued cur vonference. This conference consisted of amuch fuller die- oussion of the alternatives of getting Duran to testify either The detatls, difficulties and possible variations of a "cutout" were gone into by Scott. We also informed Scott and Andersen in detail of the kind of payments which Duran could legitimately expect if she were to journey to Washington, that is, the usual witness fees, her hotel and meal expenses, the hotel and meal expenses for her husband, although he would not get witnese fees, and of course the travel expenses for both of them. This conference ended when we desided it was time to break for lunch. It waa agreed that Andersen would contact Ibanex to try to work out an immediate follow-up on Duran in Mexico City. while we were there, but that any other approaches to Duran, © for example, a request to her that she go to Washington or elsewhere in the United States for an appearance before the Ibanez, REGRADED CONFIDENTIAL — nan gl Anon XQ. man, Date, Page 43 Docld: 32370750
HW 53294 | documents for us to read, | Mexico. DocId: 32370750 |, wate need GoAFIDENTIAL _— Autherfty. ChE, Mn re as [3 Oy, Jn “> WA Bait, 4 2340 a.m. to 3230 pee ey se: After lunch we met in the office of Clarke Anderson. Mr. Anderson was not there, since he was back seeing Ibanez, but we were accompanied by Mr. Larson. Mr, The. first was Silvia Duran! 8 signed Larson had two “statement, accompanied by. a ‘translation, and the second was a group of reports on the exit of Oswald from Mexico by Transportes del Norte bus. We also used the occasion to discuss with Larson the best procedures for authenticating the evidence gathered in Since the conditions set up by Echevarria were not amenable to our getting direct authentication from the Mexican witnesses involved, we proposed that the FBI agents who had . heard the testimony or received the. pertinent items of doou- mentary or physical evidence from the Mexicans would them- eelves be asked to give testimony before a representative of the Commission and, by reference to the source of their materials, indirectly authenticate it. We explained in some detail how this would work and asked Larson to conduct his procedures 80 as to make later authentication as firm and as easy as possible, and to convey this message to all other FBI agents in the area who were working on the assassination. ‘Coleman, eepectally, “empnantedate tarsen “the desirability of te BEsaiGED itictanah BY Patt 9... Nas wi ashe ane Res a eae ee mo Sard = PE we SS. é oS ~ WA. Page 44. Authority. A.A Oty cyane t oan Se Te vem SA Se ana a me ae, Pat ‘ my. caiaeeaetT te cae eral to ae
accurately identifying documentary material, ‘by number. or other code, ‘and advised Aim ‘to see that the number of hands through which a document was passed was kept to a minimum and | that each document was kept. in the custody of a reliable person at all times, Larson gave the impression of readily “understanding all this and he of course agreed to our sugges- Z ie - 3330 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. By pre-arrangement we met at 3:30 with Winston Scott. With him again was his assistant, Alan White. The occasion for this meeting was to give us the opportunity to go through all the intercepts carefully and to use them as a basis for reconstructing Oswald's activities insofar as they touched . upon the Cuban and Soviet Babassies.. This, we did, and we then “y showed white and Scott the result of our work, for their comment. They agreed in every respect with ouk conclusions. . I will not go “into great detail here because these conclusions L will of course. be incorporated in our narrative report on | boo Oswald's activities in Mexico, but in outline the conclusions | | were as follows: On: Friday, September OT: Ny ‘Time | | 7 ae ge 19100 BoM. . iu .Flecha Roja bus arrives in ,Mexioo, City - oe REGRADED GOAFIDEATIAL aA . — puthorty he Ber (2/29) 0s P-0=P-— SE 0B T PrP MBS, On, 3/28/76
pean GOgpinet 3f2epo puttislly-. ooh: te ed , be fh m9 tie, Dale 32.6 Je Time 10137 a.m. Oswald te1ephoned the ‘Russian. o, Babassy, to get "visas to . Odessa. Sometime later = Oswald visits Cuban Consulate. Some time later Oswald visits Russian still . Consulate. ~"S5 gome time later. “Oswald visits the Cuban . 7" s* gtill, which ° ~ Consulate and during this visit BS includes the period Silvia Duran calls the Russian wo _ 4:05 to 4:26 in the Consulate and soon thereafter afternoon the Russian Consulate telephones . - her back. "Saturday, , September 2Bt. a : “Morning "Oswald visits the Russian | em . _ Consulate | Some time. includ- Oswald visits the Cuban ing 11:51 a.m. - Consulate and during this visit _ Silvia Duran. phoned the Russian Consulate, ” Oswald probably again visited " gome time later the ‘Russian Consulate , 10:31 a.m,” ~ Oswald telephones the Russian . _ Embassy and is told to call . . ' the Russian Consulate instead. 31130 a.m.  . Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate. He is hung up on. ay We then discussed the Dorticos-Armas intercepts and on W _29ked. Hr. Boott, for his examined them. An. BOme.. detail... se REDRADED OAFIDEXTAL -, Buthorfty: C04 Dex, safecl efa5 67 ives MARS, Date Yaseae