access to the mes used in Langosch’ s interrogation of ANUG. | (CIA Doc. FOIA 739- 316, 6/19/64, Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur pooley of rocca!s @ounterintelligence Eesearch and Analysis Group took the questions and AMMUG'S responses to the Warren Commission' s office? Ss for Willen's review. Willens saw / Langosch' s May 5 memorandum. The only mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise. relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." . (Ibid.) However, Willens was not shown Langosch's memorands, of May 7 and May 6&6, 1964 which contained “uch more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, | including her possible association with Lee Harvey “Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid.)* The Warren Commission as of June ‘19, 1964, had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead. It had effectively been denied significant * It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5, - 7, 8, Ll and June 19 with attachments, are not) referenced in the Calderon 201 file. (See CIA Computer printout of Calderon 201 file) Their existence was determined by the Committee's. independent review of other agency files. tee gS
background information. This denial may have impeded or prevented the Commission's pursuit of Calderon's powéntial relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. But even if the Warren Commission had learned -of Calderon's background and possible contact with Oswald it still had been denied the one significant piece of information that might haveraised its . interest in Calderon to a more serious level. The Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's conversation of November 22, 1964. The Committee has contacted former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine whether a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren Commission. The response has uniformly been that the Calderon conversation was never made available’ to the Commission nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission.
&, ae HSCA Interview of W. David Slawson, 8/17/78, p.5; Willens response to letter of HSCA Class. Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 132; CF: deposition of Raymond Rocca, p. 156 wherein he states that he is sure the Commission knew of it,) reference to the conversation nor does it indicate that it was ever made known to or provided the Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Comput we rts pene In an effort to _ determine the manner in which the CT. treated the Calderon conversation this Committee posed the following questions to the CIA: | 1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever given access to the transcript of a telephone conversa- tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a female employee of the Cuban Embassy/ “Consulate in Mexico City, identified as Luisa, and an unidentified male speak-~ ing from outside the Cuban Embassy/Con- Sulate? If so, please indicate when this transcript was provided to the Warren Commission or its staff, which CIA official provided it, and which Warren Commission \ members or staff reviewed it. 2..Was the Warren Commission or any member of the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever informed
Classification: Secret (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ~65a- orally or in writing of the substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. (HSCA request letter of August 28, 1978) The CIA responded by memorandum: "Although the (Mexico City) Station considered the conversation of sufficient possible interest to send a copy to headquarters, the latter apparently did nothing with it, for there appears to be no record in the Oswald file of such action as may have been taken. A review of those Warren Commission documents containing information provided by the Agency and still bearing a Secret or Top Secret classification does not reveal whether the conversation was given’ or shown to the Commission." (CIA Doc., Memorandum Regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, p. 1) The available evidence thus supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information nor the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's. significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her comments following the assassination, it may well have given more serious investigative Classification: Secret | Classified by derivation: _C, Berk a “Aa Ga
- 66 - consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald and the Cuban government's possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Two difficult issues remain which are raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible - knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus. The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation ana P : . See p OD) Ciccled portion AS tootnote herein) published its repor. (See above CIA explanation) | As for the Agency's withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64, Swenson Memorandum) The memoranda which provided more extensive examina- tion of her intelligence background were not made si oS . [star | Go sn st)
available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch following his debriefing of AMMUG-1 indicated that AMMUG-1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer ~ believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (CIA Doc.» FOIA 687-295, attach 5, 5/8/64) It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. It would have demonstrated pes st € a : that a*CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, | may have possessed information prior to the assassina- tion regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to the Cuban Intelligence Service , and that Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Regarding Calderon's possible association with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA. 000698
However, there are indications that such contact ‘between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City states in part: -..Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic - exploitation section might be in a posi- tion to follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. (CIA Doc. HMMW- 1935, 9/1/63) -An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief: | of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that: Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to. visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details © not clear (CIA Doc. HMMA 21849, July 31, 1965) At the very least, the above disvatches © evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon and her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.
The Committee has queried David Ronis, the author of the above cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's | “domestic exploitation section." ({(HSCA Class. Staff Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked. principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection of intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi- bility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests co CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. Often he would receive no response to these requests, which normally indicated that no follow-up had either been attempted or successfully conducted. It was Ronis’ recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Atfairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division 009602.
might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's. Sister. Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in. Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated With the CIA. (Ibid.} Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer’ was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Heims, 8/9/78, p. 136; HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148; HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch,: 8/21/78, — Piccolo, Interview of Aeayst 1978 Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the testimony of former CIA employees have revealed :no connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete;the opera
par on April 21, 1964 in most glaring omission being the absencé, “from , £ Onde Or B% “S her 201 filejot * “ cryptic remarks areata ae pn ten eee eeneeentas Y following - the assassination of president Kennedy ee cence tine ans aed Leena npn a eR HO anne Janeen dn uence eee canine et a PE EE. meen Backy roan | cay, AMMUG- 17 - k nferra ee Pratisla te 2, A isn lerming RAL SA SAGO This Committee's investigation of Luisa. Calderon has. revealed that a defector from the Cuban - Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi- ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was ; a assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG~1 (at hereinafter) .* CIA files reveal that A-1l defected from the When he defected, A-1l possessed a number of DGI documents which were subsequently turned aver to the CIA. (CIA Doc. IN 68894, 4/24/64) Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H.- Langosch, went to Ko meet Rely debrief him, . and arrange for A-l's travel into the United States. (Ibid.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch' S xTt is now known that A-1l gia provide signee’ Gant heen ) leads to the CIA regarding Luisa calderonPP t 1s further apparent chat little of this information was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission. Pherefoere, the possibility avists that A-l had rovided other information to the CLA “yelevant co the Warren commission's work wnich. we was not properly reported to the Commission. o08634 C
debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief of Station in (CIA Doc. Dispatch 7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-l was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes. (CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64) se scl att: ee eee et peer eaneneene y June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: There is no. question in my mind that AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, j and agents... (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to Director of Security, 6/23/64) / enn nc nt AAA As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of) 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Tllegal Section B (CIA Doc. IN 68894 4/24/64) whicn was responsible for training agents for. assignmént in Latin America. His specific responsi- bility pertained to handling of 'agent operations | in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Question- naire 6/4/64; CIA poc.[ _|tn 68894 4/24/64) A~l identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli- gence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch described A-l's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:
In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement.was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that ' the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. ( I might say that some of these names -are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64) Thus, A-l was able to provide the CIA soon —_— | after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City. HW Tn set tam pre The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-]. “This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining © ‘to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2) whether, if such leads were provided, these leads 4 and/or other significant information were made . available to the Warren Commission.
The Committee's initial review of the _ Materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files\ However, the Committee did during the course of its review examine a file containing ‘ material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made reference to A-l. Included in this file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by . Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1l provided about the Oswald case. (CIA boc. FOIA 68-290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this file were the A-1 debriefing memoranda of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA #687-295, attach's 3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the Committee requested access to all CIA files concerning referring to A-l. | From review of these materials the Committee has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.
+he. Yarren CommiGs im, Prior to*learning of Oswald's probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter- intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that. the Director consent to an interview before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964, (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren Y commission Report ,A Pz r#4z9) CIA Doc. FOIA 689-298, Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton also wrote: I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the - gensitive Western Hemisphere source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appear- ance unless we have first had some pre-~ liminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implica- tions since it could weil serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this care- fully amd made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.)
Undoubtedly che G@nit to in Angleton's memowas A-1. This conclusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which was quite close in time to A-l's defection. In addition, Rocca's staff prepared prior to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren a"Brief 4 Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various positions adopted bythe CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64) | At Tab E of this brief it states: Within the past week, significant infor- mation has been developed by the CIA re- garding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service . to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban asspect. (Ibid., Tab E) , On May 15, 1964, the day of McConé's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-1. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64), However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-l by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information 900639
was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (Ibid.) The May 15 | communication did . State that the Agency had established contact "with a well-placed invidivual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Intelligencia." - (Ibid.) Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's pro- bable contact with the DGI in’ Mexico City. The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid.,. attachment) As set forth in the section of this report. concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the informa- ‘tion set forth in the Memo.was elicited. Neither the questions nor the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector col- laborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64). 90910"
Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically of Nov. 22 details of her her conversation and “Association with Cuban Intelligence were withheld from the Warren Commission. This information as described above, was derived from However, debriefings of A-l. from the Committee's review of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee -has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that a specific document referenced in the A-1l file is not present in that file. The missing item is of considerable concern to the Committee. It is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case." (CIA Doc Dispatch UFGW-- 5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1] debriefing reports. (Ibid.) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has worked extensively with the Agency files
Classification: seo 4 (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) ~80- system told a Committee staff member that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. IW a CIA memorandum dated September 27, 1978, the CIA has adopted the position that debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964 concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey ; GReP AY nF K Ns Oped s GORplhs, contact Ete. She OE vege poprietirs ekpart a io in Aged, be cmon of the Fae he . ; ne ek premorandim. e Committee has questioned cage on S officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1l1's de- briefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also Interviews of Hildago & Piccolo) He also stated that he does not recall that A-1 provided any other information Classification: _—sfefer sagive OP Fter 8. . fe BIBS ; | Classified by derivation: Cc. Berk
Classification: Se a a £ (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -~80a- *The CIA memorandum states in part as follows: When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's defection and considered the possibility that he might have some knowledge of the Oswald case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions to WH. (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing AMMUG-1.. -WH desk records reflect that AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding this que stionnaire.. ./B/ecause the debriefing. on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive it was dictated directly to a CI intelligence) stenographer on matter, (Counter 5 May 19 64. /Note: several subjects on 4 May 64. was to assign each subject discussed a debriefing number and they were written up in contact report form by the WH case The instructions from CI staff were to handle the Oswald case debriefing very closely and not to keep any copies in officer. WH Divis report number 40, ion/. The "Oswald Case" logged in the WH notebook log as debriefing A-1 was debriefed on The procedure was but the report itself was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly to a CI staff stenographer. be no reason to include the number 40 on the report of this special debriefing for CI staff, report. Oswald's (CIA Doc., Th ere would since it was their only debriefing We are certain it is the debriefing report (#40) because the date is the’ same; it is the only debriefing report on Oswald listed in AMMUG-1 records; the only AMMUG-1 debriefing report in 201 file. and it it (sic) Memorandum for the Record, Regarding AMMUG~-1 Debriefing Report on the Oswald Case, 27 September, 1978, Classification: p. 1) Classified by derivation: Ca) 70. Fe oS ois) ped
Classification: soe i (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) -81- on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as discussed herein. (Ibid.) In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that A-1 provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to locate A-l1. The CIA has also attempted to locate A-l1, whose present relationship with the Agency is ambiguous, but has been Cece pel «. Sor &) to determine his present whereabouts.* The CIA's inability to locate A-1l has been a source of concern to this Committee, particularly in light of his long association with the Agency. remains incomplate with renard te Thus, theCerentels rec chet Gvivw* information A-1 may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. However, with the exception of the Calderon episode and on the basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1l information of investigative significance. A separate question remains, however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-1l was present in the Classification: | Classified by derivation: f
Classification: Setpét (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA——controlled documents.) ~8la- *An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding A-l states in pertinent part: Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved in any CIA operation in Miami or elsewhere. Joseph Norris is the alias of a CIA representative who periodically debriefs (A~1) on personalities and methods of the is no other CIA involvement with | | (CIA Doc. 0807602, CIA 202417, ; Vol. 4, A-l File 201-749651) However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning the Agency status of A-1 states: Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that (A-1) is still an active contact, not receiving any salary, but could be paid if and when used in an operation. No problems here. SPOB will keep his contract in an active folder. (CIA Doc., Handwritten Note, 15 April 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file Classified by derivation: Classification: Seffet 069105
Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to ' show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option. In light of the establishment of A-l's bona fides, . . De , his “proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission. Al Ct. og | ake or theism Aer eed \ | Vata « co kek i Cr aTie The JLASH Operation Boek SH) , . During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assasSination plots... Included in this. report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an 009106
Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 pp- 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). As a result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently | provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. (Ibid. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110). In its examination of the AMLASH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. 80)
The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states “it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (Ibid. ) | The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation ‘prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was : . Ae cont ° tried in*Havana; press reports of Cuban knowledge A _ of AMLASH's ‘association with the CIA weredated from November 1964, approximately one year after President. Kennedy's assassination: (Toid. p. 111). - ‘The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC, Book V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Church Committee concluded: The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commision work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unfiilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH
operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to. the CIA; and — unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH'’s proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's” assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investi-- gated a connection between the AMLASH | operation and President Kennedy's _ , assassination. Although Oswald had been an contact with pro-Castro and anti- Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct | a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p. 5) egies.
In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspeetor General's Report concerning the subject of CIA Sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states: The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassina- tion of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2) The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot. Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state: Tk would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenue of investigation). The CIA, too, could. have considered in specific terms . c what most then saw in general terms-- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point 900410
he to erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of + conscious review. (Ibid. p. 11) J Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392) ¥ In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-27). | A contrasting. view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by JOseph Langosch who in 1963 was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special : Affai Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component: Staff responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, o0o1i?
Classification: . S96 Lb (This form is to be used for material extracted ( from ClA—controlled documents.) -88- ij i JS Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1)~ The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible ; / for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) J Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence oo za for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign | intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3) ¥ It was Langosch's recollection that: ...the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA. (Ibid., p. 4) V Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association he based his conclusion that the AMLASH fe) eration was insecure was available to senior level CIA P Hgeepibatork®) officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (Ibid., p. 4) 4 However, the issue before this Committee is with the CIA and that the information upon which f Classification: sefr£ét o06112 Cc. Berk BARON er = ‘ene ! Fs | Classified by derivation: