1/202-10001-10213 AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NOMBER ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITIES DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASST FICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS HY. 50955 Docld: 3274274944 Date : 08/04/98 Page : 1 JPR ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION JCS 202-10001-10213 FOTA SERIES DOC 214 DOCUMENT INFORMATION OSD MONGOOSE SCHEDULE 05/17/62 L2 MONGOOSE MEMORANDUM TOP SECRET 1B, 1c RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 07/30/38 Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State. NOOINTS STA OBJECTION DECLASSIFICATION [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Page 1
2 cc 3 oh 2 Se eesy 8 =o . 23P 8 Roa a 2 BS, z o Ar oO = BERS eR ne ote = @v- Su“ 5 th . 9 OS ee = IH Ve : _ - Pome ep oe 2=GwE OO 9 gs CMS pon pS Aorrvactar > oprere re Bu y, “[ OPERATION MONGOOSE [Ponte me 23445 <2 17 May 1962 ") | PRIORITY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE «, wi -- % 21 MAY - 30 JUNE 1962 Coe as 8. TASK PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS POLITICAL 1. Obtain sore special and signifi- To produce material for psycho- cant action within the OAS Members of OAS need to be inspired logical impact on Cuba. to push some special action through. organization against the Castro-~ Current events offer a number of Communist regime. opportunities for exploitation through (STATE) such OAS bodies as the Commission 4-- on Human Rights, the Peace Committee, the Council of Jurists, and the Children's institute, as well as the Special Con- sultative Committee on Security. / zZ. Activate key public leaders in To produce material for peyche - Under the Ambassador's initiative, Latin America to make timely logical impact on Cuba. each Country Tear by now has the awe oenesinn and strong staternents about the means to generate more open and | OASD(PA) DEOTSR Castro-Communist threat to the : active commitment of Latin American TOP SGCRET Cop Hemisphere, the failures of the political, intellectual, labor, youth, Copy No regime towards Guban workers, religious, and military leaders. One Case No. students, farmers, and freedorn. significant action in each Latin American iT.S. No. (STATE) [Docomeant No. Z country, for hard impact on Cuba, is a Minimum need, EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC __ The Department of State releases this document This document contains REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it Copy No. 2 of DOES NOT APPLY under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection of 1992,(RL'1¢2-526) Portionys) Postponed UnderO:( C~ ) bere fo pages. (2 copies. Series  ./ (ore) OAS. HW. 50955. Donld:32474944 Page 2?
| | POLITICAL - continued 3. -oesusnen sata enaemangasananenvEneTenne \ : PURPOSE To produce material for major psychological impact on Cuba, undermining the power and prestige of the hierarchy of the Castro regime. PAGE -2- CONSIDERATIONS Docld: 327494944 Page 3 HW 30955 :
TASK POLITICAL ~ continued 4. Develop a suggested platform of Cuban political~economic objectives for possible adoption by Cubans in freeing their country. (STATE) Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA) boa. SPECIAL vee inestaseneoni mbit hep mis ote mon we a man nd PURPOSE For the guidance of Operation Mongoese personnel, particularly in the selection and readying of agents to ensure that they are committed te acceptable political beliefs before introduction into Guba. These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have pur- poseful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support the project. PAGE -3- CONSIDERATIONS There are a number of statements of Cuban political objectives, including draits by State and CIA. What is needed now, and promptly, is a single working document for the guidance of U.S. operational staffe. CIA and State both have had roles with the CRC and others. Cuban leaders also make contact at a number of high offices of the U.S. government. For the good of the U.S., the Cuban refugees, and our project, there must be coordinated manage - ment. The Director, Central Intelligence, should have this responsibility, particularly with leaders of the stature of Dr. Jose Miro Gardona. BY 50955. Docld: 32474944 Page 4
TASK PSYCHOLOGICAL 6. Steer psychological -propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Guba operations. (STATE) 7. Make streng, repetitive theme on radio broadcasts to Cuba of the overwhelming disapproval throughout the Western Hemisphere of the Castro-Communist regime, along with sympathy for the captive Gubans. (USLA) PURPOSE To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special paychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and ‘to inform the public. To undermine Castro's psycho- legical basis of control over the Cuban people and the lower echelons ol the regime's bureaucracy, PAGE -4- CONSIDERATIONS This has been a normal State-chaired working group. It needs to be sharply geared to the project's operations, including consideration of declassifying material for operational use. Defense should be added to the membership. It is possible that USIA should assurne leadership. This is to make full use of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere. HY 50955: Docld: 32474944. Page 5
TASK. PSYCHOLOGICAL ~ continued 8. Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors, as dramatic witness against the Castro-~Communist regime. (USIA) Ready the "Voice of Cuba" for radio broadcast. {CLA} , pope i te , eli ka ee PURPOSE To undermine Castro's psycho -~ logical basis of control and to build the tone for anti-Castro actions in the Western Hemis - phere. To provide a ready capability for giving a voice" to encourage resistance elements inside Cuba and to undermine the morale of the Castro regime. PAGE ~-5- CONSIDERATIONS Note the inclusion of defectors in this tagak; it ie still a CIA task to produce the defectors. Also, this task includes exploitation of Dr. Miro Cardona's intensely moving staternent at the end of the Armstrong Circle Theater drama, “Anatomy of Betrayal." Initially, this would be for brief news broadcaste of local events inside Cuba, simulating a.location in Cuba, but actuallyffegated off-shora.]A plan of how best to do this, with the proposed program format, is needed to obtain policy decision. Page 6 HW 50955 Docld: 324274944
ple? TASE PSYCHOLOGICAL ~ continued [16.3 Ready a propaganda acti for | balloon delivery. (cay Ie z Ll. Deliver copies of Time magazine, with Blas Roca cover story, into Cuba. (CIA) “reteeen on | : | i lt St est PURPOSE To provide a ready capability for low-risk propaganda dis - semination inside Cuba. To make the truth available to the Cuban people about the Communist regime. PAGE -6- CONSIDERATIONS A plan of how best to do this, including | types of propaganda content (with thought given for delivery of symbolic gilts, such as scarce foods or medicines, i | as well as leafleta}, is required for de- | | cision. It ie noted that USLA has a brief a | \ | recording of Castro's broadcasts, sharply contrasting his promises when he took power with what he said when he admitted his Communist affiliation; these could be put on cheap plastic discs and into leaflets. \ ' : ' : | This is seen as amuggling in copies, i for passing from hand-to-handif” The i smuggling could be done by A (| i J) co) 3 | | | : : | Docld: 324274944 Page 7 HW 50955
TASK PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued Fad ot Le eh da : 12.) Intensify psychological effort at Guantanamo. (DEFENSE) 13. Create musical and visual symbols tO express anti-regime sentiments. (USIA) . rr errr ee | accent tn tae tty PURPOSE To make fullest possible use of the existing Cuban labor population on the base. Toe provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime. PAGE «7. CONSIDERATIONS tern ed STD Activities include Sports broadcasts, in Spanish, over the base radio station on ball games, news broadcasts using regular wire service news, and making Spanish-language periodicals and litera - ture available for reading on base. USIA has a number of selected titles, published in Mexico and Rio, for stocking base libraries. Also, USIA has a number of VOA “backgrounders" and refugee inter - Views on tape which could be used for radio broadcasts to Cuban employees on the base, ee | New words to a favorite s0ng, a2 new tune, @ visual symbol for wall “painting, a hand symbol ag easy to do as 'V for Victory," are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call on CIA for assistance, since some thought has been given to this already. enema eet nmges ni WY S0955. BDocld:32424944 Page 6
TASKS PSYCHOLOGICAL - continued 14. Select a sabotage operation. (CLA) INTELLIGENCE 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. {CLA} eee ee oe sid ee > : Steines harass fom Sn ts PURPOSE To make a psychological impact upon the regime and public, which symbolizes popular resis -~ tance to the regime and which causes talk encouraging to resis - tance. To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is ade- quate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. PAGE -B~- CONSIDERATIONS GIA should select a feasible sabotage operation, a "showy" one apainst the regime, but not against the people, and present a specific proposal for approval. - Feasibility depends on CIA's judgment, both operationally and for depth of intelligence required. The sche WY. 50955 BDocld:324234944 Page 3
TASES INTELLIGENCE - continued 16| : i i fs md ee ee sone EHUD | (CIA) | Intensify use of | collection for specific psycho - ' legical information which can be exploited in propaganda. Intensify the exploitation of the intelligence potential which exists on the base at Guantanamo. (DEFENSE) Reeoneed ee in, PURPOSE To provide material for opera - tions putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage. To take the fullest possible advan- tage of this open U.S. “listening post” on Cuban soil. PAGE -9- CONSIDERATIONS Really current "inside'news tips can do moat to undermine the regime's morale and interest the Cuban public. Classifi- cation may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a priority. ONI can call upon CIA for assistance. A communication link te Miarni would per - mit use of extensive CIA background infor - mation available there and leads for further/ | exploitation, not only for positive intelli- gence, but also for counter -intelligence. A number of further steps are possible. 7 ag eae UBeNs an ites seen ourinohndBnso —— “, WY 50955. Docld: 32474944. Page 10
TASKS INTELLIGENCE -~ continued 18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA) MILITARY 19. Develop a real dual-purpose capability of intelligence teams in building up the agent pool for infiltration. (CIA) ] ye © SPEGH.L Har liide an a PURPOSE To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent tearns ingside Cuba when needed. To assure that skille needed for guerrilla operations are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made. PAGE -10- CONSIDERATIONS Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it AL. is still desired that CLA mount such ed operations with Cubanfor Latin American] ~ personnel, an acceptable means must bé found promptly. CIA, with Defense agsis- tance, as @ priority will review feasible means of mounting theae operations, and recommend the most practical method for a policy decision. While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training prograrn to anti- cipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be trained for possible intro - duction in September, it is known that at least 3 months “lead tirne’ is required for minimum selection and training. That means now. It is possible that Defense can be of far more help than called upon atpresent. Also, it is possible that further policy guidance might be required. HW AO955 Docld:32474944 Page 11
TASKS MILITARY - continued 20. Induct Gubans into the U.5. Armed Forces for training. (DEFENSE) ECONOMIC 21. Tighten effect of sanctions by increased effort to enlist further participation by NATO nations, Mexico, Japan, and others. (STATE) PURPOSE To fulfill Cuban exile leadership desires and to build up a potential reserve for possible future mili- tary action ingide Cuba. To further restrict Cuba's economy. To worsen Cuba's economic situation. SPEGIAR Gu. aa | taste te it gah tte PAGE ~-1l- CONSIDERATIONS For instance, gangster elements should olier a possible means to accomplish this task, particularly in Cuban cities. This could be a test mission for alleged resistance cells, without undue risk to “nolee level." HY 50955. DocId: 324274944 Page 12