Seles CoD aL SEALS EL OaIOREC ASSES COOTC tLe AS eee aT COMMENTS ON HSCA REPORTS RECEIVED 26 JANUARY 1979 This new package consists of two drafts, one is a 14 page ' draft concerning a Cuban-American, followed by footnotes. The other is a discussion of whether Oswald had any CIA or other connections; the pagination of this draft was uncertain: and I re-numbered the pages, totalling 108 in all. (U) I. Cuban-American This draft shows the HSCA attempt to sanitize. They have designated LITEMP0/4 to be deleted. They have proposed to delete the word "City" in order to change "Mexico City Station" into a more general “Mexico Station." The Warren Commission report, I think, makes some reference to it so we may have a problem on how to handle it. These references recur on pages 3-5. References to the Monterray Base, also to be deleted, appear on pages 5 and-6. The name of the Subject of the report. Lopez, appears on every page of this section from page 2 on. We should consider whether we object to this. (C) While LITEMPO/4 is indicated for deletion, LIFIRE is not (see pages 2, 3, and 4). Does this make any difference or should we request the same treatment as given LITEMPO? (C) Does the references on page 4 to a. "photograph of Lopez" really compromise anything? There are further references on page 4. More specific references on page 3 are marked for deletion. (C) What is the reference on page 6 to “LAM/FI2" (U). On page 7 there is talk about FBI information on Lopez. While we haven't a direct interest in FBI material, this does relate to the subject which takes us back to the original question of whether we — object giving the name of Lopez. (C) On page 10 CIA's not giving the Warren Commission information on Lopez is described as "egregious." While we think the report that first seemed to give him significance is a very poor report, the HSCA view is that we should have passed it on anyway. We can say.that CIA did what intelligence agencies always do, evaluate the report and not disseminate it if it doesn't have merit, but I don't think that argument would go very far. I am inclined to not take exception to the HSCA description
here. We passed it on to the FBI, and we may request that recognition: oe be given to that fact. (C) oo On page 11, the HSCA draft says that the 1977 Task Force Report “attempted to refute several ‘inaccuracies’ in the Senate report," on. a Lopez. We are entitled to say that rather than refuting the Senate | report, we were pointing out the flaws. in. the information on which the Senate report was based, which raised the question as to its credibility. That might provide us the opportunity, without contesting the other Statements in the HSCA draft, to point out the inaccuracies, and how intelligence agencies must and do evaluate the quality of information received. (C) . mc . The statement on page 11 that the 1977 Task Force report was “apparently the only follow-up...after the Senate report appeared" is. - partly correct. We did report to-the FBI which obviously conducted a . further investigation. The HSCA problem is that it never understood © the responsibilities. between the investigating bodies. (U) The last sentence in the ending of page 12 should be rephrased. . The badly flawed Monterrey report obviously did not jibe with earlier ‘information, which means that the statement by the DCOS to the effect that it did was, on the face of it, incorrect. More than discounting what was said, we are simply pointing out that it did not make sense. (C) At the bottom of page 12 and on over to page 13, it is correct to say that the Task Force report did say that CIA did nothing further about Lopez, although it did debrief a refugee. It had no further capability on its own. It obviously did report to the Bureau, which was responsible for the investigation, which carried it on. Obviously the Bureau did a rather complete job. (C) , The last sentence on page 14 may be "plausible" to the HSCA, but there is no apparent evidence to support that view. CIA's action was based on its correct evaluation of the unreliability of the report. It nevertheless did refer it to the FBI. It is my recollection that the Schweiker report noted that the FBI completed its investigation only after the Warren Commission. We possibly would take’ some exception to this last paragraph on page 14. (U) a II. The Oswald-Agent Question Reference is made on page 2 to "Oswald's alleged association with CIA." I guess anyone can make any kind of allegation and it will be dealt with seriously by the kind of people the Conmittee hires. By phrasing it this way they reveal something of themselves. I suggest that we leave it the way it is without comment. (U)
° PES ma OPE ESAS ra _ The statement is made that the HSCA did an “intensive file review...which included...the CIA's 124 volume Oswald file." As stated, that assertion is false. It is Goldsmith's claim that by looking at the FOIA material, he has reviewed our files; in fact he has not. We should say so. (U) . _ At the bottom of page 4, the draft states "nor was there always - an independent. means of verification that all materials requested by the Agency were, in fact, provided." Having made this gratuitous statement, the Committee is entitled to be told that they did not take the steps necessary to make that statement. There are large quantities of materials assembled for their review that still remain unread. They have been told this enough times to have no misunderstanding; if they leave this statement in their report, it says something about the integrity of their writing. (U) a I do feel inclined to respond to their statement-in the paragraph Starting on page 5. The way they arranged to overcome our "institutional _ obstacles" -- Committee euphenism for security considerations -- was to obligate themselves to observe security. These “institutional obstacles" are a matter of law, and all they had to do to get access was to accept the same responsibility that we observe. This phrasing is a piece of congressional CYA, and we are correct in making an appropriate comment. (U) oe Starting at page 11 the Committee recites what Wilcott said, but _ then doesn't address all of those statements in the discussion that follows. For instance, Wilcott claims that he “himself had unknowingly disbursed payments for Oswald's project." The Committee could point out how difficult that would have been if he was not on the scene until long after Oswald had left. It says something about the witness. (U) It is interesting that the Committee, despite its tendency to state the questions it has about CIA witnesses, suppresses all comment about the dubious quality of Wilcott's testimony. (U) On page 17 the statement about why the Oswald file "was purportedly opened" must be rounded out a little bit. Yes, he did meet the test of being a potential CI threat, so.a file could have been opened on him. The Conmittee also knows, which it points out itself later, that the clerical judgment of the moment was probably the deciding factor. (U) On page 19 it is correct to say that someone could have opened the file on Oswald in 1959, but any comprehensive discussion would make it clear in the same point that it didn't. necessarily. follow that one should do so. (U) .