(404-10196-10029 | be held-on-22 and:23 February 1971. Mae ORANDUM FOR: ‘Tre ottachad aresentation was given by for CL/SPG, - : a. . ; oot . - . > COUNTHRINTELLIGENCE OPERATIO ONS ‘alnon be given-at an OSI Intelligence Collection Setuidar-to et Yesterday and today. you have hetd discussions on. the. intelligence collection process, “targetting,: and exploitation, In: this hour’ tong. diss - euselon of counterintelligeace, Iam going: to continue ‘that process. { any going to talk about intelligence collection, the procese of. targetting, : and the process of exploitation. However, in contrast to the: other speakers in the seminar, Tam. going to discuss you as a target. vor most of us serving inthe Directorate of Science and Tech- nology or the Directorate of Intelligence, ‘security ona daily basis consists of showing your badge ta the man at the door and making sure, that ‘your safe is closed at night. During the day we associate with our colleagues who wear badges to testify to the fact they have been cleared. Outsiders who come into view also wear badges indicating that they too have been cleared. Thus wrapped in thie cloak provided us by security, few of us give much thought to the fact that a major power with endless funda considers the United States and in particular the Central Intellie gence Agency to be the "main enemy, the primary adversary, the prime target."' There ig documentary proof of this. Ican go on to 68.7 t fechaca’ Gir psteemts, GQURETALRT RRB O0S135S S23 nN a:
“SEGRET say that in this age of technology where, in my view, the United States has’no equal, -the. Directorate of Science and-Technology and ite offices | euch as the Office of Selentitte Intelligence rate pretty high on the — 1 ‘Priority list of targets. Ie hag'td -- - look at “the publicity e+ and Took ” , at. the’ fact that as so many of you know, the Soviet technological gap 2 “ta aormetning the Soviets are trying to eloae fast. Interestingly oN 7 . were c pait of gsoeraphic area ‘divisions. About 1956/87, these isolated. ; ‘ectentific units, we re " eongolida { the department was upgraded’ ‘into a ‘fall fledged, directorate, As far : - . > as overseas ‘¥epieaentation is. “concerned; the USSR: Wag “at siote ‘tn IAEA. Twenty pereent of these ave occiipied by KGB S&T case officers. O.K:, 0 yéu' never heard of any Russians snooping around OSI . and bédides security is there with badges and locked safes, etc. ,-80° we are’ protected from’attack, Don't you believe it. Let us for a moment pretend that we are KGB or GRU operations officers.and that we wish to penetrate OSI. How do we go about it? Do we send one of our nice Soviet lade to call? Do we use a case officer from one of the Eastern European eateliites'? Just for an idea of the magnitude of SECRET a: ‘into ‘an. Sut departinent and in. 1963, - ro vs
14-00000 | a SECRET the known resources available tous as KGB officers, consider that | in 1969 there were more than 21, 009 Soviet citizens resident in some 97 néa<Cofmmunist countries. Of these almost aix thousard were , - official Soviets and aixty percent or 3,.560°of these official Soviets ; | were intelligence officers. Putting this in local terms, there dre’ 100 ; Soviets officially listed as é diplomats at the Eesbstay here in Washing ; toa. it would be more ‘than prudent ‘to assume that at least 60 of these ' “es se - ‘people a a¥e'Soviet intelligence afticers. in. addition ‘to: ‘thts formidable - . array ‘to. which. ‘Ehave. duet ailuded, the: seven Eastern, European Cominas, im . 7“ nist ‘eouatries: have among: ‘theta: nineteen different Antelligeace services: Aading to the Washington contingent from diese services: brings. our” 7 number up: ‘to. about 100, Bloc intelligence olficers. - Abs bat you. gay the. FBI watches them, Do they? Consider the statistics. Assuming’ | we ; | j | | eee ine, en remanent note ane me petites Sania eer ipeenaeeen erwin orewenntang satt neue arte ae peg . we ee we et a eaves pr meee temps et te oo. “a3 man aurveltiance team, which is far too few for a good surveillance operation, 24°hour per day. coverage of these people would on the basis ‘of 3 eight hour ekilfts require 900 people in the street seven days per week, W ith these e figures, you, are talking about some 20% of the rey entire FEI staff of agents just to handle thie emall piece of the Pro . “blem. Neverihetess, if all we had to worry about were these 100 Bloc agente in Washington, wé could rest easy. At the morment for example, ‘the FBI is terribly concerned about the proposed new Soviet SECRET y
SECRET ‘Consulate in San Francioco which will turn louse the KGL of the coast. No, the chances are that the fellow we need to worry sbsut Is - 2k a nice frleadly American or hie Ualeoh counterpart who is in the Sa puildlag and whe: is wearing a badge. dn other worda, a-perietration oe “agent. . w ith ‘the use. of thet teri; let me digress lor: a moinent and There are several waya to look at .countériritelligence. One - - | thing that itis not ie dnother name fer security, ‘even though there or "are e security factore involved. "Within CIA, “we uy to defend or ‘protect a Ss bee, ‘ Pros i | | 2 Soot ry to lay out for youswhet-counteriatelligenée is all. about. ee | ie three things:. our people, ¢ our inétallattons, and our ‘activities. - | tecting people and things {a the primary job of the: Office of Security. : } Wathin-the Clandestine Service the third item, protecting our activities, | - ‘tea Joint responsibility between’ the various area divisions and the - Counterintelligence Staff. Traditionally ‘Speaking, there haa not been. | ee te _&, function similar toa Counterintelligence Staff in DDS&T because 7 * traditionally they were not engaging in operational activities w hich had to be protected. This, ag you are aware, is no longer true. Sorne ; of ue who have been exposed to both sides of the house are somewhat SECRET
14-00000 ‘Staft bas: USIB responsibility for sosate intelligence avrsad, , doctrine, setting’ up channets for ahartag Clinformation, ‘e! ete. not mean that we act-as policeman, for the community. SECRET uneasy that such hiphly eeasitive scientific and technical information and operations are not better protected than they are, liowever, this fa, for my part, » Peressy opinioa, 4 Vader the terms of NSCID No. 5, the CIA and da tura the CI. This ‘ means, 2 that ch staff is to provise the lead dn developing « a ceatral register of péesple of counte rintelligence interest, de veloping ‘counterintelligence’ -y _R does’ Fach agency. ‘is. responriote for. polteinig its own house, and frankly some ova ‘better o job than others. However, there’ fa direct overtapping ie the jet age between SiAts reoponsibitities and the internal seeustiy Peeponsibilities ofthe FRI, There is nd cléar line of demarcation between ULS, Agencies. — All wark together, . ae Payee Soy ae, seme aera rn en, ae an activity, Cl work can 1 be considered tea be | two matching halfa; security | and counterespioaage. Security conaists ot € stablishing - passive er statle defeuses against ali hostile and concealed attempte . to interfer with our intelligence fanctions regardless at who tries to interfer and protecting our geerets, Counterespicnage on the other hand requires the identification af a specific adveraary, .a knowledge SECRET ht re et
. dnteigence service. SECRET x sfwhat epeciffie ope rationa he ts carrying out and the countering or neutralizing of hia operations by penetrating or manipulating them so that their thrust Js turned back upon the aggressor. «! - Finally, and-thia to mé is the real guts of Clas I know it, a defensive service, sucheda a Coupteriitelligence Staff, cannot oimply ‘git. and- build defensive barrie: ra. ‘Tt must ‘accept a ‘esponstollty. _ beyonit the requirements of aécurity i€ we read security to mean Proc ‘tection agalinet clandestine or, covert attacks on our people, inotatlstions, anid adtivitics. uf this 4s all, we Beek: to do, any. y sophisticated tateltigeace service such’ ae the HGR oF GRU, til be. too etrong for us; and we wil flad ourdelves unequal to the taeke ‘Coed counterinteltigence « rust be. aggressive, - a inaat deara all it can about our “enemies, leara thete secrets and be privy to their councils. In other’ words, the one trane ‘ scending ‘objective of counterintelligenée is the penetration of the enemy “A Soviet défector ia of rnuch less value tha a "clandestine penetration: of the. Soviets service becauae with a defector, the Soviets know precisely what le Knew and thus how badly they are hurt, With a penetration, you have the only mean of really knowing’ whether you yoursélf are penetrated. Insofar as the organisation and activities of a counterintelligence SECRET ang
74-00000 5 etaff abe concerned, {ta structure asd fusctiens are to-a large eatent ’ ‘ determined dy the activities of its chief adveraary aud by national vbs 1 . ‘ . . S “ ; - jeciives. Is our case thie would of course be the KGO and GRU. : Basically apéaking, inoat CI Staffs bxeak dowa into an operations group” - “eee and a research and rnalysis SFOS | ita the usual administrative sups eG port including a very strong technical: wait.” The operations gréup carries cn such activities: as surveillance and gounteraurveiMances penetraticas, provocations, double ‘agent cpetstions; techsical operations aan “ “and counterte chanical operations, counteriateltigence interrogaticns, and Po . . ‘ ee -debriefiags, the handling of walkeins aad defectors ana joint operations re with vartos forelgn Maison services aad operational security reviews. 4 of will be . glad to. define and/or expand a) the, meaning of. any of these.i ag le an ote ° you desire. Are there any questions $ 7 Se : = a > te A cl operations group with worliewide responsibilities is usually . ' brokea- down into geographic’ areae wits an operations branch: for each Re area, A: < typleal operations branch: wo! ould have a counteresplonage. wait, . a countersubveraion unlit, a counlérpropazsac 2a unit, and’an operational security. unit, ot . . ot a _ While the operations group and branches are worrying about the day-to-day problems involved in the haatling of operations of the type
14-00000 _ Stace all intelligence organizations handle certain situations. in, certain. SECRET we have just Jescribed, the 2% A unitis analyzing all of the data obe tained, devising doctrine and guidance and putting out reporta about developments and trends as well as specific stidlea re my enemy in much the same manner ag you write a 8 Toport in OSI, with ve course the big’ difference that Ci reporta are intended pritriarily for’ cr audiences and policy Purposes ao that- the’ clagulation is much lea than ‘ts the ‘cage . for an Os! or EMSAC produét., The. R & A ualt looks” at the activities — of'an individual KGD officer as tactical reporting. Activity of the Soviet. Eimbasey as a-whole tp considered to be opeFational reporting while operations of the 268 in toto are agsessed a as strategic reporting. - 4 xt 1 4 ways i and each has ‘its hallmarke which reflect: among other things the society whieh a repreaents; long-term analyels by the R & A unit is . crucial to establish the standard opé rating procedures for recogni: ing Soviet operations for what they are and-then countering them: - Now, back to you as a target. Naturally the EGB would lke to achieve that ultimate succegs' © a penetration of CIA. Having an ageat inthe enemy intelligence service ia a particularly rewarding pastime because people in intelligence services know so much about what is going on in their own country that is classified. Many of you, for instance, SECRET
14-00000 . geo T i kriow a yreat deal about highly classified projects in the Pentagoa which have dittle or nothing to du with our fateligence eoglitction or analysis. If you are working the Soviet AM problem yuu get to know a great ‘ deal about our own ABM, - / 7 “ : oe . a . Many peoplé. work long hard hours to try to insure thatthe KGB docs ‘not succeed in getting ‘a. atatf employee on thelr payroll. ‘ Over the’ past tive years attempts. by foreign intelligence: officers,” piincipally Soviet, to recruit U. Se Government employees: have been ; reportad ‘ab: the rate of about ‘wo a day.” Diriag: this period there were- the’ employee te ‘the point that, he coutd come right-o out t and tials .¢ the ‘peeruitmeat pitch. Moat af those targeted were State Pepartmént , employees, with the. Agency and the Department of Defense tied for second, This at least shows that the KGB fa trying. But perhaps the So - most significant thing to think about is this. If this many cases were - oo reported, how about the recrultmient attempta that were not. ae Mfy purpose fa reviewing the above is not to make you start . . - - _ more. thas i 000 incldenta in which’ the foreigner foie he had developed f ; looking crosseyed at your colleagues, but merely to suggest that you — ‘ _ give the matter some thought from time to time. . 9 SECRET
14-00000 a a SECKE| i ; Let's sagume that we have been auccese(ul in keeping any KOR ‘ so agents off the payroll, VWihat da’ they do next? Who els@ comes into the Cla Headyuartern building > t found out recently, to my great surprise, ‘that there are 100, ( 900 visitors to this ) building in a year" stime. But - let's get epceltic, let!s talc about. O8R. 0, - ow, “Between August- 1970 and carly this month, ‘Osl bad 293 visitors. of this number, the bulky or 454, were from other Governnient _agencieo, o 138 were 2 contractors cleared’ by CLA, ‘white the remaining 201 were. private individuals who etther. hold no ) clearances, at au or ‘hota some Unfortunately, GIA is ‘rather unique in. a spending the. stots, money , and manboure in clearing people. As you Knows we have our own clears ---- “ance eystem and do-not, rely-on the checko of others for our employees or , ‘ our contractors, With other agenciés, and particularly with the Departs . ment of Defense, with employees and contractors in the millions the kind i 1 | ¢ { | i ; ; | | 7 ifad-of-clearance from another Government ageicy. - - E i | 4 f ! 1 i | j ‘ of investigative checks we perform in CIA would Fun to the thousands of | ‘people and the billlons of dollars, and in all likelihood the whole defense ae -effort would grind to a screeching halt if they did. Too often then an individual with a top secret clearance from another agency ig simply an individual whose name, when checked ~ . i 10 - = SECRET
14-00000 ~~ SECRET against the ‘ists of the various securkty agencica (National Agency Gheck), failed to disclose any soecalled derrogatory information. I can tell you off the record that there are a: number of individuals who worked abroad On classified Projecta for foteign governments for ‘several years who then returned to this country and promptly were granted top éecret clearaices dy.- U.S. agencies without a word aésked.. ¥ ith this the | ‘ase ir follows that.sonie at these people may well be viorking for someone , besidea ‘Uncle Sam. “along that line, I can also gay off the record that there were amdng those 793 OSI visitors in the last six months ‘people who were in fact Working for someone besides Uncle Sam. Agata; the foregotiig ts not calculated:to make you into a suspl- cious security officer type at'all. Hopefully it will get you away from the state of mind where this « sort of thing never occurs to you. In conclusion t I have some specific du Suggestions to make which are not Big, ° deal but which, ig. impiemented, can be of help to us all. If you are dealing with people outside the Agency, or inside for that matter, there is ao need to tell them everything you know about everything just because they are cleared. If they come to tall about apples, stick to apples. Don't give them a gratis tour of the orchard. u SECRET whee ee ae eee eee
14-00000 2 : SECRET if one of your contractors or a former colleague in industry ceally tries ta pump you about things that are none of his concern, ghut him off. if her persista, tell someone... While he is probably trying te get more business from us for hia fiem, thete may be miore to it than ' that. ~ toux just for the-Hell of its ® ' game or peat with an accent that he is 100" 3 CR. The ideal KGB agent is the Ww. A, Ss. P. with 8 Yale degree and | a: a pedigree ‘that sets him into, the. Sons. of the American, R evolution. “Even af your Buy is just great, be may have a boss or colleague back at the ranch who is not go great. This is something to be kept particularly in mind when dealing with ; foreigh Matson people: Re ‘particularly wary of the Haison type --— _vemember Fuchs, Vaseal, Philby, and dossards- becuse your friend v was cleared for top secret. w don't automatically assume he atillis. Cheek. in the interim. Are there any questions? 1 ¥4 SECRET 8 Sag GRRREITE tra ANCE NTR TORE Eee PAPEETE EM 1 ERE PIA TTT I I PTE ER. TOR, RP AEE ATT SP OAT eS Don't) assume that’ just because ‘the “guy Goes not have & | Russias { i | an ry a 7 if CIA Headquarters, seeine a slaniorous place to your | former aon —- , eotleagues and neighbors, ‘leave it that way? deat give “them: a glee’ é | He may have been fired 4 And finally, juzt hateis six raonths ago, wn gsc EEE et AP TSS SORE are ON tr ESAT SHAT fee