176-10036-10167 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER |: 176-10036-10167 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : DOS FROM : Ambassador Lodge- TO : Rusk TITLE : DATE : PAGES : 2 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : . DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam,10/29/63-10/31/63, State Cables. Box 2
rrreaear ie ‘SOZTOP: SECRET sey wees " SECTION ONE OF ‘THREE VIA CAS SAIGON 2663 "FROM AMBASSADOR Longe DTG. 3810302 | So ; - TO SECSTATE. wasn’ EYES. ONLY FOR RUSK, “HARRIMAN, BALL, . MILsMaN, HUGHES an OSD EYES: ‘ONLY’ FOR HONANARA, GILPATRIC, TAYLOR, KURLAK, © NR. Whi. | BUNDY a WFO cas HONLULU FOR. ADM FELT. EYES ONLY | REF: “cas WASHINGTON. 73109 1. WE MUST. OF COURSE GET BEST ‘POSSIBLE ESTIMATE OF CHANCE OF . » COUP" s SUCCESS AND THIS ESTIMATE: Must COLOR OUR THINKING, BUT XN D0 NoT\ THINK WE HAVE THE POWER TO” DELAY OR DISCOURAGE A COUP. DON HAS. NADE If CLEAR MANY: TIMES: THAT THIS IS A VIETNAMESE AFFAIR. .. 28 “nes IT 18 THEORETICALLY .POSSIBLE FOR US TO TURN OVER THE INFORMATION = =~ | WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN To’ US IN CONFIDENCE TO DIEW AND THIS WOULD”. UNDOUBTEDLY STOP THE COUP AND:WOULD MAKE’ TRAITORS OUT OF setae PRACTICAL PURPOSES THEREFORE I WOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE VERY LITTLE... INFLUENCE ON WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A-VIETNANESE AFFAIR. IN ADDITION, “THIS WOULD PLAGE THE HEADS OF THE GENERALS, THEIR CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS, oO AND LOWER MILITARY OFFICERS ON THE SPOT, THEREBY SACRIFICING : A SIGNIFICANT. PORTION OF THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP ooo ‘NEEDED. TO CARRY THE waR AGAINST THE vc TO ITS ‘SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. | ; ‘AFTER. OUR: EFFORTS NOT. 70° DISCOURAGE’ A. COUP AND THIS CHANGE. OF HEART, ae a WE WOULD. FORECLOSE, AuY POSSIBILITY OF CHANGE. OF THE GVN FOR THE -BETTERS «°* DIEN/ SHU: HAVE DISPLAYED NO INTENTIONS: TO ‘DATE OF A DESIRE TO CHANGE. THE TRADIT10NAL ‘METHODS OF CONTROL THROUGH POLICE ACTION OR Tae, . | ANY RPT any ACTIONS witICH WOULD PABAUBECE THE POWER POSITION OR SOLIDARI- 2 ae
G career emp | get nea mR me ae capa mE RE ON 8 387 “TF OURTATTENPT™ t0 “THAR THIS”COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL. | YHECH WE pousT, IT Is OUR FIRM ESTIMATE: THAT. YOUNGER OFFICERS, _ "SMALL akOuPS OF MILITARY, WOULD THEN ENGAGE IN AN ABORTIVE’ ACTION 7 CREATING ciaos IDEALLY, SUITED To ve OBJECTIVES. | : a “UHILE WE WILL ATTEMPT A CONBINED ASSESSUE NT IN A FOLLOWING NESSAGE, TIME HAS NOT YET PERMITTED SUBSTANTIVE EXAMINATION OF | THIS MATTER’ WITH GENERAL HARKINS. HY GENERAL VIEW -IS THAT THE U.S. IS TRYING TO. BRING THIS MEDIEVAL: COUNTRY INTO THE 20TH | CENTURY AND THAT WE HAVE MADE COWSIDERABLE PROGRESS “IN MILITARY. * AND ECONOMIC ways BUT. TO GAIN VICTORY WE MUST-ALSO BRING THEM - INTO THE 20TH cENTURY POLITICALLY “AND THAT CAN ONLY BE DONE BY * ‘EITHER. A THOROUGH .GOING CHANGE IN THE BEHAVIOR. OF THE. PRESENT ' GOVERNMENT OR BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT. ‘THE VIET cone ‘PROBLEM IS PARTLY MILITARY. ‘BUT IT IS ALSO PARTLY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL. 7 3. WITH RESPECT TO PAR A 3 ‘REF, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR PRESENT POSITION OF KEEPING HANDS OFF BUT CONTINUE TO MONITOR “AND PRESS FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION. ‘CAS HAS BEEN ANALYZING. - POTENTIAL COUP FORCES FOR SOWE TINE AND IT IS THEIR ETIATE THAT | THE GENERALS HAVE PROBABLY FIGURED: THEIR cHaNcES PRETTY CLOSELY AND PROBABLY ALSO EXPECT THAT ONCE THEY BEGEN. TO MOVE, NOT O#LY PLANNED UNITS, BUT OTHER UNITS WILE JOIN THEM. UE. BEL IEVE THAT VIETNAM" s “BEST GENERALS’ | ARE. INVOLVED IN DIRECTING THIS EFFORT.. IF THEY CaN’ T PULL IT OFF, IT. IS DOUBTFUL OTHER MILITARY LEADERSHIP COULD DO so SUCCESSFULLY. IT Is UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE GENERALS yOULD BE RETICENT _TO REVEAL FULL DETAILS. OF THEIR PLAN FOR FEAR OF LEAKS TO THE. GVNe