i _ —— ~ 14 - ot - meaningful restrictions on the use of physical ox photo- graphic sugved lances Pap wee faith ae the’ Internal Security Branch‘or its predecessors have | . af . . “~ ~~ ot Le 1 rit from time to time created both a) Spe ial‘inves stigative. a programs and lL) until April 1971, specializ ede xtralegal programs of "neutralization and harassment" called COINTEL~_ PROs. Whe special ‘investigative programs were designed to give headquarters administrative control. over field inves- ; tigations of the "extremist" .and "subversive" arouns and were most. frequently characterized by the development. of a specialized indices. These indices gave headquarters a . a Ma a} . 2 ° : . mechanism by which to intensify investigation on ‘the MOSEL serious of the threats - usually the ieadersnip of a move- ment. As we will see later. ina separ ate Aday carings,, An dN On YESLO Arde pe os nee EB 4 some of. the, incteas were used to. target individuals For t COINTELPRO action and other$ were used as a master List .for detention in times of national emergency. .COINTELPRO grew out of the FBI's frustration over the legal tools which it had-available for use against what it nae ‘ pérceived as the most serious.-internal security threats. Beginning in 1955 with the CPUSA, the Bureau decided that because of interpretation by the courts, such laws as. the | J i | . J | Smith Act could not control the threat of communism in Ameri- can socicty. It therefore began a Gemsec prograik -- CPUSA, COLINTELPRO -- to apply against the CPUSA and its members the Rae seen eaten oh WW 55093 Docld:32989548 Page 66 ’ : :
, . a ; Lo. “the techniques of counter-e@spionage, including "“misinfor- These techniques were first used by the British against the Gernans curing NWLT but were i) mation" and “double cross: ‘perfected by CIA and FBI ‘against tne soviets during the _ Cola War. In CPUSA- COINTELPRO, the Bureau sought . by covert ineans to disrupt the’ party by exploiting factionalism and to discredit the party in’ the eyes o£ the American public. As other threats a Ose, the Bureau applied similar techniauest AVOVAL 3B - : against other,U. -S. citizens which it labelod as "subversive" er eee ox "extremist" ~~ the Klan; leadershtp in the civil rights movement, black"@ilttants and the anti-war movement. as ‘manifested in the "New Left." . ; The major investigative programs included general programs rsd) hse .directed at all internal security ‘threats. Among these were a. series of ‘indices tnitiat ted. in 1935 as part of a program _of identifying individuals who the TIBI perceived as probable ‘threats to the internal security in case of national emergency. ; At various time, Lists of persons who posed such threats were known as the Custodial Detention List, the Security Index, and the Administrative ‘Index. It was anticipated that individ- uals on these indices would. be detained or considered for detention or for more intensive surveillance if such: an emergency were to develop. The detention plan preceded its statutory authority (Title II of the Internal Security’ Act of ” 1950) and survived an ‘explicit order by an Attorney General to $9548 Page 69 : . 4
HW 55093 / “names the PBI nal security. Title, IT ‘detention provi Index terminate the program in 1943. For det selected from the Security Index. sions tion purposes - | e Even since the repeal of the , i. . i. in 1971, the Bureau continues i, a to methteain a list ‘of abou 15 ,0908persons ho were included . af “on the Se curity A list of akout 1,200 persons, “known as the Administrative Index, is based on ‘Persons on that list are described by the Bureau as current threats to - inter- —° While’ statutory authority for the detention program existed, maintained a about the Reserve index. special index, . ae supervised the Security Index, no one outside the FBI knew the Reserve Index, on . ha - individuals who might, be candidates for the Security ‘Index: _and ultimately for detention. hile the Justice Department “Other programs were directed primarily at the CPUSA and "Key Figures., DoclId: 32969546 ity ’ other communist organizations. and their fronts. ‘Leaders ‘of ‘the Party received special investigative attention. “Top Punctionaries ," the highest level leaders ship of the Party, and ‘the second echelon Yeadership, were included’ “ for Too Functionaries, for Key figures. Page TO and semi-annual renor ood Cs in the Security Index and tabled for priority detention. While investigative rep ports on most Security Index ‘subjects ‘were required only annually; quarterly reports were redquired were required Me rere eee tenntttiennttinnerematte marae
. “Christian. Leadership Conference. (1956, and’ against the Socialist Workers Party in 1960. These two programs combined accounteé for the overwhelming majority - scope, directed at individuais and organizations not desig~ hh ft nated by the Bureau as party members or fronts of ‘the party. ‘For example, some of the actions directed at Dr. King and the. SCLC were vart of this progran. / ; ae .were identified they were. inves tigated on an individual basis. HW 55093 L a~ Organizations which the Bureau nad reason to nelieve \ were being infiltrated by CPUSA were investigated ‘under the COMINFIL. program. “The purpose of this investig yation was to detemaine whether: the organization, was unéer the “domination ‘and contxol" of CPUSA. If so, it was Labeled a front by he Bureau and referred to the Attorney General and the Subver- sive Activities Control Board. The investigation of Dr. King was purportedly a COMENFIL inves stigation of. the. Southern COIN TELPRO programs were established ag gainst CPUSA in 4 e of COINTELPRO actions directed against internal security . targets, “- out of - (ns « CPUSA~ -COINTELPRO was broad in- We know of no specialized Ku Klux Klan indices or investi- gative programs. "Action groups" was a term‘applied to violence prone elements within ‘the Klan. As _ these elenents AS far as we have been able to determine, however, no list representing a systematic effort to concentrate investigative resources on cach of these groups was maintained by the Bureau. % . DoclId: 32989346 Page Tf1 . . . XK he fase 2 we” oa =:
mH“ ee Po a 18 - - 7 i ‘ : e « De oo. — @ | Some Klan and other white hate group leaders vere included. - : _in the Rabble Rouser ox Agitator Index (describéd below) ,- | but this vas primarily a list keyed | to black leaders.” | ‘A -COINT 'ELPRO program was eréated agains st the Klan and other white hate groups in 1964. ‘‘This program was one of the most precisely targeted of all COINTELPROs. It was direc- °~ .ted only at the nighest echelon leaders,. and only-. ‘operations were conducted. — - ; oe | 5 oe . Programs directed at blacks: per:se originally were part of the CPUSA or COMIN, IL program. The King/Southern Christian " neadership Conference investigation came under this latter 7 e- heading. Inv April, 1965, however, the | “extromist natters" | ‘as well as “white hate" groups, and the Bureau began to con~ { | i -Manyai-section (122) was revised to. emphasize "black hate" : |  centrate on what it Tabeléd | “Black: Nationalists. As a result of the urban ghetto riots, a special index was sreated .to cover the leadership of the Black Nationalist movement, { *  . This index, first called-the Rabble “Rouser Index and later / | Yenamed the Agitator Index, also ‘included some leaders of white | hate groups. The Rabble Rousér/Agitator Index and a special list called Key Black Extremists wore'established to coordinate | the investigation of black militancy, ar SSive: the—eivil_vi¢ ri sbepbrics MOVEMCTre . . : ; , | In 1567 a Black Nationalist COINTELPRO was established. the extent to which the Agitator/Rabble Rousel Index might have - HW 55093 Docld:32989548 Page 72
wboten = . . : ’ been used for COLNTELPRO targeting is notlclear, although: the list of Key Black Extrembsts-vasidefinitely used for - ‘that purpose.’ 1 Ds Investigation of the New Left movement grew out of Section af 87 investigations of old-line Marxist groups. It intens_fied o oo. . 1 . « in 1968. in the period leading up to the Démocratic Convention vos in Chieco. In January 1968, a special investigative program, the Key Activist program, was established to intensify in- vestigation on the leadership of the New Left’ In May, 1968, a COINYELPRO directed at the Hew Left was ap en eee Tr ee a ete . initiated. Some individuals labeled "Key Activists" were > Pedwnsmmely—selected for COINTILP RO action, but like any in- co Soin gy > 7 oe tous Z . . . . . a dividual on, Bureau listgor indettKey Activists. were mie™ ne (PR saree, oo rie we i ateeernerenaeeneery ean meal ORTH OPP F14 Mall SPURTE COKE LATTER SAITO likely to be subject to COINTELPRO action -because they received ‘closer investigative scrutiny. : | oO, a YW i. ; a | .. .There were Seme consequences for the subjects of FBI _- internal security investigations other than COINTELPROS. _. Prosecution for violation of federal treason or sedition statutes did occur, but has always been rare, GOE3SEpPRe - 1 ope engnp evnaqneha Baten 18 echse fend | Ota teases mpate elect nenn stint tein ened hy renin net Heheadurbmbin wa Srvtigene Niiandraihe Z 9 octet tecsrerrronperatonernesennen eneeeenrere eee oe According to the GAO report, less than 3 percent of intelligence | cases are referred for criminal prosecution and most of these d@u:- | for crimes unrelated to treason or sedition. ; oe fF]. There have been other possible consequences. An individual i on—ai-BBE_indenyox_othesuiee investigated as an "extremist" ° | NW 59093 ‘DocId:32989548 Page 73
L > Bureau provides information on an "> . or “subversive” could be prevented From receiving a federal job or a security clearance. tho FBI acts as tha central. re _ Loe Clearing house for name checks-by federal agencies, ae individual's “subversive” "oe Fe ee eda aensebaneinnmhueianadiananeiesidaics) - or “oxtremisct" activities ‘cach time the Civil Service Com- mMiSSion or Department of Defense sveriuests: 4 check “on an : . . ‘ oy we . } . . ; . ~ applicant for a federal position or security clearance, : ; ; ; A, ae . ~ en emen » . eS . ree — le . ' | i __ . . j | 2 7 . . . e ° | ; . i | | & . | HW-55093 Docld:32989548 ;Page 74+ . Maes _ a x}