82 g. The Policy Statement In mid-May, as a result of increasing indications that events in the Dominican Republic were Yeaching a climax, | the White House requested situation reports and contingency plans. This exercise was overseen by a member of the National Security Council Staff. A CIA briefing paper prepared for this purpose stated that the three revolvers and the three carbines had been passed to the dissidents for their use in personal defense "attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize Trujillo." The report implied that both the revolvers and the ammunition had been in the consulate with the carbines, and therefore the limitations on the Special Group authorization technically did not apply. The CIA liaison officer at the State Department called to his superiors' attention the fact that weapons had al- ready been passed, and apparently submitted a memorandum outlini AUVdGaT GYOd -u GIVYAS HL WoNd AdODOLOHA the reasons why the United States should not be involved in this activity. Among them were that the United States Government should not lend itself to direct political assassination, that the moral posture of the United States could ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world, that the United States would have encouraged the action, HW 53244 DocId:321058629 Page 36
83 supplied the weapons, effected the delivery, and then turned over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen, and that the United States could not afford a precedent which might convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons. On May 15 a joint CIA-State Department memorandg was sent the President's National Security Adviser informing ning that the plans of the pro-U.S. group were well advanced in the direction of ousting Trujillo "by any means." This memorandum did not call attention to the fact that the United States had supplied weapons to the group. In the midst of these discussions, the Consul General, who had been in Washington for consultation, cabled on "ad @TWUGO AHL WONT Aao return to the Dominican Republic that the dissident group planned to "execute action against Trujillo" that evening. The Department replied that it would consider this timing particularly unfortunate in view of the juxaposition of the AUVdGIT ayod Consul General's return from Washington to the Dominican Republic and the inferences which might be drawn therefrom, This exchange of cables was furnished to the NSC staffer. The state of the covert action program in the Dominican Republic was discussed in the Special Group on May 18, and again on May 25. The Commission has not had access to the minutes. HW 53244 Docld:327105629 Page a7
HW 53244 84 On May 24, the State Department liaison officer provided the Under Secretary with a draft cable, stating that the need to dissociate the United States from obvious inter- vention, and even more so from political assassination, OBOLOHA Overrode the need to secure credit with the Dominican dissident and with Latin America generally. This draft was approved at high levels in the CIA and the State Department, and was vot . TT wee. ' ete ee Os rela Ste ey te ot a 2i.Ns : : St ee . =. foe 2-20 redrafting in the White House, the final version in another hand, stated "We must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S, as a matter of general . policy cannot condone assassination." This version was approved by the President in Paris and cabled to the Dominican Republic. It arrived the day before Trujillo's death on May 30. AAMWdGIT Gaod -Y aTwago AHL WoUT Ad On June 1 the State Department instructed its Consul General, if he could do so "most inconspicuously", to destroy any records concerning contacts with the plotters and any related matters. DoclId:32105829 Page 68
HW 53244 85 2. Summary The investigation disclosed no direct American participation in the assassination. The idea originated with the Dominicans; they acquired some of the weapons on their own; and they did the detailed planning. They were never subject to American supervision or control, On the other hand, CIA and State Department officers in the Dominican Republic were in regular contact with the plotters before the assassination, and they were well aware of the group's lethal intentions. The CIA had told the group of practical problems with several earlier assassination plans; it had offered to train a member of the group in the use of explosives to kill Trujillo. DocId:32105829 Page 69 a QIVYXS FHL WONT AdODOLOHAa AUVdaIT auoa
86 D. Conclusiio President Ford has firmly announced that assassina-— tion is not and should never be a tool of United States policy. The Executive Director of the Commission joins in this statement. It is against the constitutional and moral principles for which this Republic stands for there to be any direct or indirect participation of any agency of the United States Government in any plans involving the assassination of any person in peacetime. a aTWugS AHL WONT AdODOLOHA hy \e) 6 > o S ie HW 53244 DoclId:32105829 Page 90