ona *[to4-t0215-10002 Sat OFFICIAL: DISPATCH | Via: ATR _ | DISPATCH t Mos mou. ZIG _ ae = Ay Security Inforenaticl es CLASSIFICATION To + Ghief of Station, San Joop 9 «-- OATEF FROM: Gatae, UH : SUBJECT: centnar. Opera tional SPECIFIC: CE curtty Review of Current Operations « Project RUMABOID REF: Field Regulation Bo. 50-20, 1 duly 1952 le Your attention is invited to the Frovistofs regulation which require periodic revievs of eurre tS us might romult in a Headquarters Gxisting condttiens. You are therefore ms af paragrash 16 of the referenced regulation, ° oe 4e Project EUMAKOID is courised of four agents: HUMANOID (U. S. eitisen yer of Station Chief, Raabe iat ous MAND oo, 7 ie Tue abiectivms of project HRAIID, as est forth in the approved Fro, outline, are as owes i i i €S Copy | . J L i v4 stc Qe ¢ : . COORDINATING OFFICER ‘ : CLASSIFICATION Sow voae 207e® i 3
1-00000 $ , t H i % t 3 # 4 \ 7 CECRET ~ wo Zw (a) Cutout services (HMAHOID), (b) Penetration of (HUMANOID-I11)}, ‘(s) (HUMANOID I and HUMANOID IT), (a4) Penetration of (e) Information emanating froa university and intellectual (f) Parallel penetration | | (g) Additional sources of information on political movements, 6. The current method (s) of = between EUMANOID end HUMANOID.I1I 4g not clear te Headquarters. TRKE4-1084 irdicated that HUMANOID planned to close his photo shop thus eliminating the letter drop and safe house that had been used previously for contacts between these agents TRSAW1215 pointed out that "contact between cut-out (HUMAHOID) and agent (HUMANOID-III) is the weakest security link in the project at this tine.® Te between HUMANOID and ] agents a reasonsbiy secure, dowever, it is no That the Directar _ of the| is witting of the operation. Hig permission to intercept & 6 ‘as obtained by HUMANOID who indicated. to the ®the Anericans® were interested in communi st and The Director himself originally selected the HG EUMANOID.II) who vare assigned to the task of ception of the operation coverage has grad cover | of interest rather than merely ccumimist |The station presumes that this expamied coverage has done vi ~ the knowledge of the Direetor. en : The alacrity (apparently) with which the Director acceded to HIMAWOID¢ g request, and the assumption that the Director de not aware of the expanded Coverage, suggests possible security hazards which should be considered by the field station. Of importense 4a the possibility t the iga shared operation. It is publicly known that auth 6s senetimes confiscate soumnist officials, pare tiowlarly the Director of the mi gh BUMANOTD with in order nature of our intelligence interests, identify higher elements in the net, control the operation, ete. SECRET wxapsaiae? PO gt He te cermin cece ota, PERE weenie ee ferme ae oe = ce Oe 6 ae ene fe pacar ep te sae oe cormorants owes i i ; } i t ; i i i +
FH-00000 PRA ATT NE 9 SMR SEAT OE BBY RR TEST PR cig SET 2 peony tee Was co | | ' Chef of Detectives and reportedly a follower rf . i Security Infermation AL OBIE. You ps J Yeo cab bad b ae ee | It is recomended thet this aspect of the operation be camented : Upon by the station with a view to stre the risks involved in terms of value da that blograrhic information be furnished Kendquarters in | orcer that we may initiate a hane check on the Director, The station should } also indicate the desirability of initiating security clearance action. This i would a specially important if ; cy other, statian operations. 8. A study of past Operational data sugreats the possibility that too mich dependence ig being placed on the Frincipal agent HOID, At the present te Peete a8 cut-out for two neta and i penetration of the s FPecent re project en. 4 Visaged ixplesertation of other objectives which may require the reerultment of additional agents and the creation of edditiom] nets. If EUAIDIDtg : cut-out finctions vere to be extended to puch additional nets, thsre is the possibility that compromise of this ons key individual vould seopardize virtually cur operations in the area, . It is recamented that thia matter be considered by the station if . and vhen any additional nets are crea e Consideration should be riven to the recrultaent of additional cut-outs in 3 9. In March 1952 a technical surveillanbe Was conducted on an individual of interest. Two agents HUANOID and HOMAMIST were utilized in the moni toring phase of the operation, When local authorities detected the operation, » HUMANIST Was apprehended interrogated, and ultinately Tevesled the idents ty of the Chief of Station (since replaced). After a thorough review of available evidence, k ters conowrred with u inion that HUMANOID probably had not been identified by the rmaente . However. it ie noted that the investigation by the GF Ese aoe bom poceePartletpatton in the investi tion may or may not be elenifi uses of his adherense to in any event it is recomenied eee in the surveili On be thoroughly reviewed if , Fears are fulfilled in the national elections ‘It is also recamended that constant efforts be made to confirma the belief that RIMABOID was uot contaminated, 10. A review of BUMAROID's past and Fresent contacts vith Peveale that he hes had clandestine intelligence relations with EGHANIST (paragraph 9, above), HUGGER, HUMAROID1, HUMANOID.II, and HUMABUID IIT, Both HUMANIST and HUCCER have been termimted, and there fs no evidence to indicate the cLlremstances attending their termination have ‘ the security of HCMANOID, Honstheless, it activities are known to @ widening circle of indigenous agents. Connection 4¢ must also be remembered that HUMANOID's services "tho Americans* are knoun to the Director o be | ; _ ( graph 7 above). Moreover, in July 195] 985 reported the fact thet HUMAHOID's wife, a Costa Rican, vas wit
® , t tek emt iemoees gpm +g ” Security Information Poteaed | whe It is recarmended that the ebove information be evaluated by the field station when the independent field survey of project HUMANOID ig : wmlertaken. Pertinent coments should be made regarding the significance ; i of this information from a security viewpoint. ‘ ll. In summery, it is recamended that HUMANOID exercise extrems caution PO im ali of his intelligence activities. Although there 1s no Clearly defined ; security problem involved, paragraphs 9 and 10, above, suggest areas of possible danger. . to 12, The attached diagram illustrates our present understanding of the . i HOMANOID operation. Comments on the diagram as well as the text of the above review will be appreciated. ¥ | 1 Attachnent kK . 3 | J. C, KING i Ful bw By 19 September 1952 i 5 a : be >, £07 | pot Ml 4 ite £0 eo | 038 Me SECRET sis 7% i. ™ 7 | “ect 1G88 6 SE oe oie ate Be EN eB ee ee we an Sr es © ee atilan - oe