(tod-10295-10t64 : t aia “f° SECRET i -- 20 November 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SUBJECT : AMVUIP/1 Meeting, New York City Thuraday, 14 November 1963 . 1. Meeting Time/Place. This meeting was lLatd on by phone from Washington on 13 Koveuber, It took place as’ . scheduled using an office/work—-room in A/i*s Jewelry. factory-— showroom at 31 W. 47th St., New York. 2. Purposes of Meeting. This meeting was scheduled in order to obtain information and identificatione from A/1 revelant to the AMLASH Operation. We were particularly interested in determining AMLASH's present attitude toward the Operation and any details of or names of likely confederates which he may have discussed with A/l after i Ontrich's departure from the scene. We were also interested > in using A/l @s a oheck against the liat of likely AMLASH confederates which had been cowpiled by the MIAPRON group. 3. Finences. The undersigned was prepared to give AMWHIP/1 “sufficient funds to cover his expenses and _ 4 those of AMLASH during the recent three-weck sojourn in ue Europe which A/l made at our request. lowever, A/l refused to accept any remuneration whatsoever, atating that the ‘ money we had given him for his round-trip ticket’ ($950,00) was enough. This, for the record, represents an outlay conservatively of some $1200 to $1500 by A/l from his own pocket on KUBARK behalf, not to mention the lost time from his own business. We believe this gesture should be remembered in future dealings: with A/1. | | ereneernapeiie see ensatewaguraateme-aee 4. General. A/l was feeling poorly as the result of a flu-type cold when we wet. He stated that he would not have come in at all were it not for our scheduled meeting. Nevertheless, he spent willingly several hours with us, going over the points in which we were interested. The meeting terminated at 1530 with no incidents of a security nature noted. > 5. Details of Meeting. Collecting’ information for the AMLASH operation constituted the principal of discussions during this meeting, anc may be found as attachment A to this report. A copy is filed a4iso in the AMLASH 201. SAS/EO, C SECRET chew 1 ‘PEactetee waa sotpastis Guraeseudg acd THO fom FL2T Ee | Gsos Sei suse ‘-oremesramtonp-taseyoeeanes mtn PEPE TEST EICSATET PEDO tt ee hi vantage ine depen sey ee amen item orem mene seme neesevenet eutaese mn wae vutibeet scan ain witcemeivenntes vent cet vane neces t
14-00000 "7. 7tit inte the CASTE cHoM category, and ‘MIRET, though 4 {CHOY H Mia’ friendly with’ LASH, could not. be trusted as his primary cy 2 loyalty was to FIDEL CASTRO. ty Se 0 seam say erepiencoe Cat vst (vol i period which followed. They would never be taken into: the ‘ “, “inher-sanctun", however. When asked about Majors Pedro} oe “stated that \PLANAS) could never be utilized, PORBONET would fier , ‘ ( _ SECRET (a * ATTACHMENT A TO:” AMMHIP MEMO OF MEETING OF 14 NOV 1963 from A/l during the above meeting: The following tnformation and observations wore obtained 1. AMLASH Secretary: Ernestinn ACOSTA Gonzalez (nickname: Mme) calle 25 — $526 Apt & (presumably cur 25th St., No. 526.... Vedado ~ Telephone 303865, - | (Note AMLASH has considerable confidance in his secretary, and has suggested that letters or packages could be sent there on a one or two-shot deal.) 2. In response to the question of whom AMLASH might turn to in order to carry out his plans, AMVHIP mentioned the following persons: lose ACEF Yara, ca. 33 yrs old, who is functionary-. i \in Havana municipal govt. He is ‘of moorigh descent.) Has wide ‘elrele of. acquaintances in Havana, - Major ABEJErNAS Ramon GUIN & Quan ALMETE Be fThe NIEVSS | Of the above, A/1 felt that GUIN, (ACEF, The NIEVES; NARANJO) and AZMEJEINAS\were the most dependable. The degree to whiol Juan ALMETDA could be trusted was questioned by A/I. In addition to the above names which A/l volunteered, he asked about ‘Major DIAZ-ARGUELLES, \Major Tony CASTELS: and Major Faure CHOMON. A/1 stated that he felt ‘DIAZ-ANGUELLES- nd his brother "Tin-Tin” cou}d be used and were trugtworthy; GASTEL and CHOMON', on the other hand, would not be utilized in the initial efforts by AMLASH, but, if his efforts were successful, they could be counted on to support LASH in the 5 @epin NAKANIO MIRET, Qodiles PLANAS', and Gurique BARBONET Gazez, A/1 SECRET otters ital perth aah wa me Se ayo PM oe eR a te a aoe a RE oh me ee Sa NNN RETIREES Re annie te ee ep ena sae stemeanen gue nese : ae Aen i eat » cents ot ome acacngeremne iste “(2 amemermammereaninn pete camden
14-00000 7 ae Pago’ 2 of Attach. .A- atte = a Se Concerning‘Majors William GALVEZ Rodriguez\ . 4 (Victor BORDON Machado, Crescendio PEREZ (Montana?) and (Antonio LUSSON (4020N9} Batlle, A/1 stated that he did a not know these types well and therefore had little to sa regarding them. He did say that he did not cure for \GALVEZ ) personally and that he was a little "psycho"; BOREON was: OK; {PEREZ\ was an older nan, ca. 60 years, who was a nonentity who had his rank because he had guided the group\ into_the hills at the beginning of the fight against Batista: {LUSSON| was probably too loyal to Raul CASTRO to be considered for any initial action. 2 : ; nn ttt er te eer neneniteneeeeed . : he . ! a +S eteetee ae aie sate Hons eneahetnn- -teety tyemn_ 4, _ “hen questioned about the identities of followers DG of Major (ABIES, A/1 stated that it would be better to | po refer to AMLASH, as he (A/1) could only give information thet : é was three yeara old and hence not very accurate. We did not ‘ : press the question, nor suggest names, ag it was evident i that he felt that his answera would Simply not give a true, pO current picture. - &. A/l provided the full nane of a possible lead which he had discey lier with Ontrich: | Nav. (RUIZ) is an agsistan G) rector o Sparte”)for the National Govt APeee-- in Havana. ~< j { | | j G. Im addition to the above information, the undersigned discussed various aspects of the AMLASH case, and in particular, questioned A/l about AMLASH's frane of | mind and future plans which he may have revealed to Afi _ after Ontrich departed the scene. A/} made several pointa,. . which basically boiled down to the fact that AMLASI! was still not pleased with the support he was getting from the | | USG side. The visit with DAINOLD, who acted in the capacity of a representative of high levels of the Govt concerned with the Cuban problem, satisfied AMLASH as far as policyy was concerned , but he was not af all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operational plan as he saw it. A/1l said that AMLASR dwelt constantly on this point. He could not understand why he was denied certain small plecea of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the USG gave much equipment and money to exile groupe for their ineffective excursions againat Cuban coastal targets, According to A/l, AMLASH feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials — | SEGRET Tee meee tt canine abt a EEN AACE reeds ien vO RG ine “$e, Hud oe Flaca as TROON CLUE ee TRON Oss Fee ee
14-00000 Petree anne fae mee rc mt 9 eneepe - SECRET Page 3 of Attach. A from USG technician, he will probably become fed-up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date. A/l atated that AMLASN now has his feet wet vis-a-vis cooperating with USG and has accepted the fact that he will work profitably and securely with it. It is this that we stand to lose with our procrastination, AMLASH also — talked about going to. the French terrorist group, the OAS, in order to get the materials and guidance he needs. It is believed that he was talked out of this idea, after the dangers involved were discussed with AMLASH,. 7. With regard to the radio gear, AMLASH stated that he did not feel that he wanted to take one in with him, particularly in view of the recent arrests in Cuba of agents carrying concealed radios. Tle was not opposed, however, at this time to hevdmg:a radio cached for hin, to be recovered by him later. 8. According.to AMWHIP, 4f there is any interest in having AMLASH Link up with other trusted assets in Cuba, these names would have to be given to him before he returned; otherwise he gould not trust any other means used later inside to get hin to initiate or respond to such contacts. ; } 9. A/l stated that AMLASH talked about getting aid from, or at least discussing his position, with Manolo RAY. However, he stated that he questioned whether this was the best idea, since if RAY came to Paris while he (LASH) was there, people would conclude that there was. something between the two, Another spot wouid be better, thought AMLASH. 10. At the time of A/l's departure, AMLASH said that he would contact "Jack" (Red Stent, Paris staffer) upon his return to Paris. (This he subsequently did on the 15th of November, according to info received ‘from Paris-somewhat belatedly). x . 11. When AMLASH, A/1l, and VENEGAS were together in Rome and Italy, VENEGAS told AMLASI that people were betting that LASH would not return to Cuba. Sone had also questioned his mother on this point. AMLASH reportedly told VENEGAS to cover all the hets he could as he would be a rich man. (It waa at this time, according to A/1, that AMLASH decided that he had better return to Havana
14-00000 | Page 4 of Attach. A. a little sooner than he intetied, in fact almost as soon 86 possible.) 12, AMLASH talked about the two pogsibilitias of re-taking Cuba - either thru favasion by US troops, or hig way. He alse realized, however, that invagion was 7 hot to be considered seriously at this tine. - Also, AMLASH - talked about his ability to tske some men into the hills of Las Villas Province and taking the small towns of i Trinidad and Topes de Collantes, Is said that he and hig : men could last no more than 15 days in the hills as the ' anti-guerrilla fighters now employed by the Regime were | @x-guerillas themselves and knew the way to fight and wimdin the hills. Also the Soviet equipment made tho govt ! ; forces much more formidable than in Batista's time. AMLASIT | apparently was discussing these ideas with the impression | i i that this was the way to set up a provisional rebel govt and thereby invite and gain US support, By the way A/1 tolked, it is fairly certain that AMLASH realized that thie wae not the kind of a Plan which could even remotely be expected to receive USG aid. It ia hoped that he oo does realize that Jiavana must first be taken... or failing =» that, a truely sizable piece af Jand (say, almost an ' entire province) which could be a true rallying point and Staging ground under complece Rebel control, from which ! the rest of the island could be wrested from the Pidelistas | and the Conmunists. { | a 13. In summary, the talks with A/1l led the underaigned to believe that AMLASHE is again entering one of his skeptical woods, one which our actions have Gone little to dispel. Too little and too late....... End of Report