included two majo-s (ane of which AM-HIP later reported -wags a ailitia commander ia the center part of the islani), two captaing, and several “others whom AMLASH sai he could trust, but whom he would not name. AMLASH said he had hac plane to blew up an cil refinery, as he felt that , the continuing exietence of a eenblence of norcal -funet:oning {n Cuba depended upon a cohtinuing supply of petrolex, suppl tes of which, as we kmow, are at a-eritical stage today, He also wanted to plan. the execution °? of Carlos Rodriguez and the Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Pidel, ‘by “exeeut ion if necessary. Ee feels that if Fidel is eliminated, it would ' be meoti éasier to effect a tave<over, (4e listened ‘for the most part, bat at this point tried to explain to AMLASH that men like 2odrt.uez could easily te replaced by Moseow, and that the killine of the Covi at Ambassador, would _ have only the triefest effect on the Soviet oontrol of tuba.) AMLA UH was not too interested in listenin: at this oo'’nt, an’ continued ty cain: that if he could achieve all these actions, plus othere, in cne master stroke, & take-over, durin: the ensuing confusion, would te much facitlttated, He did not fesl that haul or Che would te atle to rally the people ‘nm aufficiunt time to prevent opposition foress fran forming. Hig ar-vumenta and plans had oan, flavs, tut AM/HIP could not help adnirine (to himself) AGS @ professed desire for vigorous and, he pefully, effective aeons, deo :aned: to alter the situation {n no uncertain terca. chile we were making no eammittmente or plang, we sotnted cut to AMLALN that achemes ite he anvigioned certainiy had the'r clase, hut that a lot ef coersinatton, planning, inforaatt en. gollest'oan, ate,, ware meceseary prerequinitea to enoure the value end gugress of meh plans, 4&4 4 eat. he @-rea’é oth tha, tut we ween’? f29 aur@ Suat Rew meiah of th’ a areuneat AMLAM wae will on-, er welt te wihita., tp ‘te.  saeummprmmemenmataceeneaeaee ad
AMLASH made it clear during the diseessions that he. war completely arainst Pidel‘s use of Soviet help fron the first, but he had never env faloned, that even if 't were uses, ‘gust how ineffective [t vealir woul? be ‘tovards _ Boleing Cates problems. He still feele stronziy, he. sat d, about the : spitght of the lover classts”in Cuba, and in any future Cuba, he would st822 “Ansfet on a new deal for then, AMLAG! sald that althoush he had not besa effective. in helpisig the formation of a benefictal new. Sovernzent ia Gubay he was now prepared to work towards that end. This tina, he said, he. ~ (MMMRtGG t8-AetE wake tovardé the future, both for his.om interests’ and for ‘Cuba's. The last tine, he sstd that he thoucht only as far ag the elimination of. Batista, and had not ziven consideration to plenn'ne for a government he ; favored after the fishting was orer.. “"e felt that AMLASH seant thet he was as ‘mich concerned atout his (AXLACH’s) voe‘t’on in the covernnent and personal gte:e in a new cuba, gs he was about anvthin; else, Jt ts our ‘mpresston that AGACH feels that he id not -et hts share of the epotls or power from the Cestro recine, tn proportion to his contr itution aceinst Batista, AMLASWH is a caml‘este¢ persenalit.. It is diffteult to fairly duize, at thie time, AMLALH's decries of concern for a truly revoluttonizsed Cube for the people's henefit, we his concer to see a new sovergment fn Cute in which he gats just recornition. hie does not necessarily gean that AMASH wants Aikh political off:ce, hut he dosa want credit for his efforts and the resuitant power and prestige aaons his countrymen. in addition te hte & concern for the manner in wate. the vorlets are urtns Cube for their own “estore in Latin ine: tea, oA ‘a worried atout the ertent tw writen ~aotes ‘pe usin: ‘ne jevlet Cochntque vf eanturing the einte of Wie porte rennts an! the mang preparanis effe:'@ asa net Ure wsagees,
cee, eden camenompesis oo enntin een Beet tea me & He feels certa'n that in a cougle of years, the young people Will te coiplstaly irrevocably won over ‘te Castro, and. that the misze3 will begia to- believe ‘the intense anti-Aneriean, antl = Sest preparanda to which thay” ‘are subsected. dust ae ereat ag are ASLAH's fearc about the Castro: 6 ue tnain: of , young ninds, 4s his concern th t the Tok wll beg’n to consi for’ a status quo for Cuba, and in the event of ‘any intenze and eucééseful anti-rezime . ‘activity, such ae he. plans, and: wbich. “Looks: as tf. tt aight, depose the rezins, ‘ “PBPRIE wilh withdraw its support frée such efforte in the face of’ seriour . thrsats fron ‘the Soviets. “Although ALAS did not say it in ‘go ‘many words, 4% was apparent froma the discussione that AMLASH would prefer: ‘to be able to free Cuba without any outside support (and by inference, obligations), tut | he fg a realist enough to concece that any efforts to overthrow Castro must have the support of PEPAIMY. He fa, therefore, willing to enter into A scussions wi th a representative (es) of PUPYIN2 towards this. end. AMCACH agre-4 to meet in Paris for the ourzese of further detriefings and te rive any inforeatton in any field which he has. He {6 also most willing to discuss any plans which may lead to an evarthrow of the oraeent government, AMLASH sta*¢e! many tines, howerar, “ur’ne the course of the meetinzs, that he vaa only interested 'n fnvelvine hirgelf tna plan of simmificant action, and which waa truly des?-ne! ta achieve rapicly hie desire to help Tuta, (He tol4 aAMAHIP later ;ftar wa hav left the meatinea, Wat he vag afsea:4 that FRPIIMY would cory gue to pursue its presant course, that of prov: din’ money an: t teas, tut ne ATTICS!) aMA Mi wae ales mort adazant s*out not tecaming trvalved many wa © Un the “ulen @efuree etreles and or cantsati.ea in amt .. He gate Unet he feele there ae at.li the ease people whe Left Cute, i.a., willing ta walt fre the shanre ta return am? again pureve the’. eiy teterwet , that cf massing aria, He aleo gat-* ole ese cobras 0 ade wes Ba Mae 20! camN ate mamenine densithe MMR R Re Loi dem os
he felt that the Cubans there were complutely penetrated tr castro informants, and that for thea to mow of htp cooperation w th pre De, would be the caxe as tell'nz Castro, and thus his future would enc grainst the wall we ° assured bin that maxims security would te practiced, .as far ag these people were concerned. Ee also does not.wish to trust.or se intolved with» any. contract subans. Only the PSPRIMEKS does he.wigh to -deal., (Along this Line, AMGHIP stated that Ds did not think it advisable to reveal uny of thase. ; on Sepigptiations to AMCONTSRT/L, whom AMI AIP has known for many years and is en oT quite trtendly, but whon he coes not fesl can keep - -B secret of this natare.) This meeting terminated at 0030 on 2 August. fhe three participants _ took a taxi together ‘pack to town. AMSHIP and AYLASH stepped off at & leeal . night club, Teater Grillen, while ve cont ‘nued on te our hotel. He incidents of a security nature were observed, and it was felt that the meet'ng wes held withou$ tha knowled74 or observation of the oppes ‘tion. bk. Meating of 7 Ausest 1947.  e met with AMAIIP in his hotel room (No. Lh” at the Yaaruna) at 1700 hours on 7 Aurust. @ discusse? the events and talxa of the 9: eceding even'ng for sare ?'me. at aporoximetely 1200, AMLASH arrived, sreetad ue affatl,, ant Jone! ue for a drink. AMLATH used this meeting to re- atate h’e posit’ on concerning his desire fo participation ‘mn a really rai fiesnt action a-ainet tno vaztio ray Fa. Having decijed +7 this tine that further A’ scussicne an! denrtefins a cf AMLAGH shoul? tate plece wi th a Lpantehaapoak!e: ef, wa outlined the - tga to meet for puch a purpose in Peria, ANA de did pot Live the idea ot too mam pele being aware of his eomaration with PROM, tut ace@et Unat 2t woul! be best im arcer to Oo allio himself to exprecs hie (fess ant plana rettar, an’ to te ate to grav ide us vith Ale infeswation tn the speateat pasa (tle Catt ve ee