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, wR eked OF Sei aw neeerttetine oe OY UDO akan alten Et Dhan oe ewe ONE os ‘ a“ NPD. ce ; . : ~ _ Rational com mokratische ParteL Deutschlands (Kational Dercerstic Party of Germany) : Coribined Deutsche Rechtspar tei, Deutsche Reichsparted, t the gpl it off Sozialistiche Reichspartei and: the: Deutsche Parte1. In Aupust 1%4 von Thaden arranged 4 meeting with other r‘phtewingers to promote unification of all nationalist forees. Friedrich Thielen served as both front man and financial backer. A committee of 10 crafted a constitution which. was accepted in Kovember 1964 by representatives of the DRP, DF, GIP ard the DVNP (Deutsche~ | National Volkapartei). The DRP officially disolved in b:eerter 1965 although the . NPD had, ‘n-fact, lone been the nationalist party. At the Z1 larch 1967 meet of the NPD Fxecut've Committee, the more moderate Thielen (forrer Deutsche Partei was ousted from the NPD by the more extreme von Thaden fcreea (CPP).. There was no major rush to leave the NPD,however. Recent reporting hes indicated that those who did leave the IPD,even {nciuding Thielen, ars being invited back into the NPD.
3 g-00000 te i, intestag Slections 1955 (= = NFD's. first Effort 664,187 votes = = 2% (2e- yy ‘March 1968, corzunal Elections, ‘Sehleswice In 10 communities where - oistein, - (XD Hos directive NPD ran candidates, t to particisate, A few-did) ’ aversred 10.5% of vote conrared with 6% in sane. towns in 1965, 3. 19 March 196, Bavarian Coranal Elections 1.6 % of total Bavarian . HED major effort ccncentrated vote tut: ‘ only in Franconia. Middle Franconia = °. Ansbach ~ 5.1% Erlangen - §,3% Mirnberg- 7.3% oo ; Sewhabach-5 6% . . . Upper Franconia Bayreuth - 8.33 .. Coburg = 5.3% J . Kulmbach - 5.3% a ; _ & + 2 village mayors '" “he 27 March 1966 Hamburg Burcersehaft Slection “329 S$ (1.8% in 1%5 no candidates elected 50 0 July 1966 Northrhein<Yestrhalia landtag Election . No NFD candidates elected none entered, 6. 16 Coteber 1966 Hamlin Byelection(Commnal Concil) Be2% (#65= ) 2 seats 8 Séats in Landtag Marbture,viesbaden, Barustadt- and Giessen =ca 10% Fr/M = 6.4% votes= 7.4% 15 Seats in Landtag 7. © November 1986 Eesse Landtaz Slections ; 208 am votes = 7,9%+ ‘7, 29 November 1966 Bavarian Landtar Elections 8. 23 April 19%7 Sheinland-Falatire 4 Seats, 6.9 % of vote $. 23 April 19%7 Schleswip-Holsteia 4 Seats, 5.7 Z of vote 10. 4 June 1967 lower Saxony 10 Seats, 7 X of vote Ll. L October 1%7 Bremen Burrerschaft 8 Seats, 8.8 £ of vote 12....28 Ape 11 1065 Bacen-Muer ttenberg 12 Seaes, 9.8 7 of vote 43. ae Sept 13d Pedecok | Sucks ; 4.304 woke, ae
14-00000 ck Wet ie ae se "Tone 81978 oe - eg ‘ | watt ge FS “Ae bo itler Boom _ by Charles Lam Markmann Heidelberg ‘ Had he iived Adolf Hitler would have been 85 years old on April 20. And it was op this April 20 that the forces responsible for the Guster of Chancellor Willy Brandlt— tor things must be called by their right names ~had almost tnished preparing West Cermany fer her start on the short march back to the past One hears everywhere’ “NM we only had a strong man again.” On the fashionable Nouth Sea resort land of Sylt, Huter’s buthday was celebrated in the best Na- tional Socialist style by several docen Germans, none seotest £5, and all of them arrested oa sina cueulated os displayed Nazi sym- . atang men wore brown shirts and swastika ae oeoaats; the gills frumped themselves up in the ‘dowdy blue skirts and white middy blouses of the Bund deutscher Madein (League of German Girls), the auailiary of the Hitler fugerid, The walls of the room in which they held their party were decorated with pic- tures of Hiller and other National Socialist enblems for which they had scoured Schleswig-Holstein. After they had hstened to records of Hitler’s and oder Nazi leaders’ speeches and of old party march music, they drank a teast te the Fultrer. When they were arrested, one of the young men said the party had been planned merely as Cent puter Gay.” Perhaps oo But for millions of other Germans ‘the re-creation of “the Nazi tune” is serious business’ for some, because they want thore goad old day s Back, and tor a lew becaue they tear the others may very easily get their wish when the Federal Republic ot Germany musi at last put its democracy to the test. ’ The foaris heghtened by the steady and at times spec- tacular nse in whatits called di Hitlerwelle the Udder wave, or Hauler boom which has kept pace with the economic crisis. price ievels and unemployment The number of potiess has double since December ft is as much a Hitler and Itler-assoctated boom as a Nazi boom This is not to say that Nazi thinbing has eye Vo no folluwing ia West Germany —quite the contrary, , as the letiers-to-the-editor columns of newspapers ‘ demonastrair. In Bovaria~Nuinberg (indeed where else), in a PU rh-century Franconian castle, a 25-man “army” of veuths trains regularly, with the sane stect helmets and res that the Welronach? used tom 1939 to 1945. Their leader is a sign-painter named Karl- Crtartts Lau MfParKMANN, critic. ansiifor and journal. ff, is at work ow a book about the two German cepulblecs. Heme Hoftinann, whose poals are simple the destruc: fon cf oomimunisay and big capital the end of paras mentary rule, government by an unelected clits, the annesation of Austna (which, as the Weimar Consti- tution makes clear in Article 61, was also the roal of the Girt German “republic, and the reundication of the Paderal Republic of Germany amd the German: Democratte Repubhiec. . There is a core ofsome E2000 regular roders of the Nana? Zetwatg, which for two decades has been whitewashing the Nazi era, “proving” that the only concentrinon and extermaation camps were those badlt scr tie war by Geran prscaers under Ameri- can onders, for propaganda purposes cthere are even picturesh: promoting a brisk trade in Nar medals, uni- turms weapens and other meniorabtha. as well as books and recordings of Spuuches patty congresses, Nerraneans of military Campaigns (vetanous ones, and encaving ina taly subllo anti-semaism, There is no need tur bratoncy, alter all the Jews were onty the first and moot conspruous of Navi tatyets Teelve or sa milion non-Jews murdered by the Germans died just as painfully —facts tial are aims daily branded as “les” in letters tu new spapers, Occ asie a tly in dea ons:rations, less infrequendy in swwasukadtaubuyys and cemetery vandalism Bat these thing > — the Sytt biathdey party, Hoff. mann’s ormy | (which ouyht to bo tikea scatously = the Nasi party’s strongth rose ta sece member when Hither ioaed iy, the Nadiad Zettang dhe “Canuguant- ans’ whose windows and shops are tilled evclusivaly with Wehelmnine and vspeciailly Natonal socialist a terlt—aie anty syenproms of the Hiller: Ue Vrerest thing is barimore wide read, tar deeper and mere “re spectable “in West Bertin alone there are more whan S00 cars beunsg regictragan plates thar, atter the mondatory “B' ttor Herlind, carry saat letior vinadis as Sn. DA, PY RZ benne the various Comba numizis. hese desivnations tor Srzniscltastutfel (Elite Quandt, Stununidiceiag (Sto Tronps), litle lugeed, Rovrcentracie-lover (Concentration vamp) have net been isstred seutinely, They are issued by request, and Kart Koenig, the Socral Democrat who heads the city’s Economics Departinent, the issuing ouice. explains that ander West German law such re- quess cannot be retused. (Lam not for one moment imuphoing that the hiv should be revised: one does not fiht adeas, or even biute hatreds, with muzzies.) The * ee ener ene enn atte ce
same hinds of plites are visit l¢ in many other parts af Federal Germany. . There are now in. print I teially, thousands of f ‘paper possible. aspect ofsthe - There ate serious; “back titles dealing Witt Third. Reich ‘and ats petsonshitie analytical histones thar sacntne success for integrity; on the other hand two big. exhaustive, expensive big: _Braphies. of ‘Hhuler are selling f mo than wéll:.and pne. “of them. by Joschim €. Festean! ‘ditor uf the arch- reactionary. Franktnete: A! igemieine Zettung, has gone “well past 73. ow copies at-almost $20 apiece — the “publishers have 25.0 more ready and waiting in the warehouse. This book makes much of Hitler's “todernity,” ‘hetle orhas oarbarities: he was necessary to his time. The other, which is much more oveitly an épologia~is by Wemer Maser, who teaches the Hitler era at the University of Munich. ft has sold 30.000 copies. It endeavors to create the impression that, had he not had cettaur proWiems ansing out of misguided medication in 1933, Hiner would have done more good {and Jess harm). ’ in addition there are the big hardcover editions of In England and in the US there has been a revival of interest in the Hitler era paralleling the orie in West Germany At least 12 Fnghsh and Amcncan publish- ers have capstalized on this interest, Here's a $e mpling ot their recent books: Pictures: Sity Hei!, an clustrated historv of Germany trum Bismark to Hitter. by Stefan Lorant (Norton), more than 7) photosraphs and 4 literate text Hitler Clase-np (Macmillan), interesting because -these are Le pictures taken by Hitler's friend Glemrich Hoff- mann, with commentin by confidant and diarist Henry Picker. History: Hiuler’s Rise to Power, The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1223-1933, by Ceottrey Pridhan (ilarper & Row). In-depth answer to the question, what made people support Hitler in the early ‘20s’ Careful and scholarly. Miliary: Hizler’s 'War Ares, The Establishment of the 2 Onter, by Norrmon Rich (Norton) The second volume of a huge, hugely detailed study dealing with Hitlers foreign pohcies Tre Sise and Fall ui the Luft- wate. by David living (Lite, Brown), the Ife of Field Marshall Erhard Mikh who was second in command to Goering and who sun ved to tell much of this to the author The Adwral’s WW? Pack, by Jean Noh (Douwbdle- day! containing authentic first-hand accounts of U-lwat (Grey Wolves) actions, Battle Over the Reich, by Altred Price (Cambritse University Press), won- tains pictures and teat abo atthe bumbiry and sirating of German cities and towas. Part of tre revival be- cause it is Germany seen as destroyed from the air. Hitler's Strateey, ISMO-THI the Bactan Clue, by Maitin van Creveld (Cambridge lunuversity Press), a new view Tue-New Rerysue Hitler's epecches if (four volumes) and Propaganda Min-. aster Paul Foseph | Goebbels’ (two volumes) four new . books about Rudatt Hess; Hitler's deputy who is-now, ‘at. 80, ‘the’ lust prisonerin Spandau, innumerable tadio and.television’ programs dedting with: various aspects “) aindipessanainics of the period, atid, mostlately, a fort- . maghily- Pet iation, Das dnitte Kewhz planvied. 16 cOver- the wttele °N5S-Zeu for popilar. consumption in two years, and then expure. The Ales<especially the Americans — for a long time forbade any mention Whatever of the Hitler period. and Wese Geimany, once it becaine a more or jess undependent state, continucd these bans ter years. Even more than other peoples, Germans have the touching nota thal censorship and repression will effectively eliminate ideas and facts; and, ayannst this, rewher the ieft aor the night has the famtest concept - ot civil Hbwries. Thus itis stil turbidden, even though the German Communist pany has been legalized again, ae: tore a “hiazi’ or “National Socralist’”’ party. Consequeaty the olf SA and Ss men organized the tetally Nati Nanosaaldeniotrnitis he Parter Deutschlands, of Brler’s Interest in the Mediterranean and his rela- trons with tay Rehegion: ihe Geoman Church Straggle und the Holo- cast Wayne University Press), a collection af ersays that gfew out ct che Pitot International schol’ Con- ference mn 1D. Refugees: bse Refuge, by ALJ. Sheeman (Uaoiversity of Calera Press) Aa interesting study ot how Britain chadged her policy abuud refugees trom the Third Reach trem 1933 to 1439 and why. Persons Pirget Heydnich, by Mirastay Ivanov (Afac- millan}. Play-by-play account ot the ass isination of Czech xcupanon bead Reinhard Heydrich and the Nazi revenge that sulimingted in Urdie lhiler. by Juachinn Pest (Harcourt Brace luvanovacnl, the Fnglish teansiatioa by tisha and Clara Winston of the biog manhy inowhich best auachudes that at Hitter had died “fee would hesitate te call han of been Ailed oy 1955 ane of the erestesd of German statesmen.” which may be why rhe bora 15 seven eights over belure we come to the Either oc the oar years Werner Maser's HHitley legend Mieoteese Ronhty (Mapes & Row) Pooimourly detatied with gt imany tacts they ebscure the aan end has werks, Future: To be publ shed by Viking in Aueust, already published im Eoetund pecker & Warburg, [he Lone: hiest Man rr the Wyord, the “inside story of the 30-year impnsoament o: hudolt tess.” inside because the author, Eugene K eird, was farmer commandant of Spandau Firsorn and seems to have won Hess’ confi- dence Despite ids promises it says very little that has not already boon known or surmised. — The Editors
June 8, 1974. a) which, after some initial successes, took cover in the hardly inhospitable Christian Democratic and Chris- tian Socal Unions but has fecenily announced, ats determination. to “purge itself of thie ‘aaint.” In addition in spite ofthe constimtional ban tArticle , 18) on any use of civil liberties ‘to endanger the unde- fined “fr y democratic basic order,” ‘the state ‘of Lower Sakony: one has.34 Active Fascist and Nazi‘ ‘ofganiza-, ’ ons, ‘publishing: houses, and mail-order book dis: inbutors. Noone knows how many membe re, anid. customers they have’ “because they operate fustively, ag the sather stupid law compels Te TS da Aut (Courage). a month ty Magazine addressing Fi frankly “Fascist if not Nazi programy to the young in that state, has a crrculation of 10,000 and is regarded by the Lower Saxon Minister of the Intenor as potentially ur latendly dangerous. * . Eoverywhere there is curiosity about those mysteri- ous 12 years. The teachers who taught then are stil _ teaching, unless superannuated, but very few of them “dare ta teach what they used to teach, or even to talk about “the past.” That is why Dad deifte Rewh wap founded this year: to make money vutof that curiosity. The idea was that of Hans-Peter Dietze, now its man- aging, editor, according to his editor-in-chief, Dr, Christian Zentner, who stakes a pious claun to a de- suc tu-show his young compatriots how the Third Reich came to pass, in order tu prevent its ever hap- pening again. After four issues, De. Zentner is not su sure that his publisher, the big Hamburg house of John fahe Verlag KG, will do much more than break - even, because, he told me, what millions of people are insatably interested in is noi “the abstracions” of nazism and its history but its personalities, and in particular Adolf Hitler, These, he says, are “simple” people who do not read books but who watch felevi- sion and read magazines, and it was they whunt he set out to capture — to clarify the past for them. His magavine is expensive trenvenduus advertising campaign, of dubious taste, resulted in first-issue saley sume 150,000 above the 250,000 copies that the editars and publishers ea- pected. The second issue sold between 336 00 and 340.000 copies, the third something over 250.690 so far, and the fourth - which ts stll on the newsstands — _ more than 200.000. The overwhelming majority of the purchasers and subscribers, Zentner admits, seems to include few of those young peaple he was loukiag tur. the real circulation 4s among the péople old enough to remember, the Nazis who wits furious letters to the editor b-cause he tarnishes their legends. Buth Dietze | and Zentner fold me that the greatest sales of Das dritte Reich are not in cities but out in the country and the small towns, in Bavaria and Franconia especially. One of the reasons for the phenomenal success of 4 television program called “Ein Herz tnd eine Seele” (One Heart and One Soul’) is its enthusiastically en- ~ about $1.50 a copy. A’ men, by name: the Slavs, AG efman erage the prog, ram pass als joyed derogations of the sub. the fews, the Latins. the Levantines Beration ¢ ot” Au in the Faniily “hued: in 1948, that it. had niade a ete mistithe in helping’ Lena’ in yr Es. Chancellor Wally, Brand w as 3 cOnsLint target Because ot his legitimate ‘birth and “his “traitorous” conduct team 1935 ta 1915, whe n he : ‘fougl Woapdinst macizar, ab welt as bis Uselling out’ te “the Reds.” The program re yalarly attracts 60-65 per “cent of the nanonal audience, and unly-an occasional editorial writer or commentator dares lo sve its popes lanty for the danger at is, Its “let-liberal” creator, Wolfgang Menge. claims i to be a satire and so recage nized because people say us protagonist, Aled Tet- éloff, sounds qust he Frand Josef Sfiause, the head of . “the CSU: but then in cach regional election this year more of thea vote tor the Strausses., da mid-March the Bavarian Stat? Radio and Televi- sion broadcast a long interview wath Pfitler’s (and Franklin Raasevett’s) ol hiend, Ermer ute) Hant- starngl, wha is now ST Thoughin the end —theougha rather gruesame practical johe~he felt he had to dee. to the United Stas in D7, and was mateculiy as. Sisted by Roosevet, hus old Tlarward classmate, in gaining entsy dater he became an adviser on pultcy to the Anterican forces’). Hanistacngl spent he whole tune on camera telling what fine fellows Hitha, Gawe- ing. Goebbels, Mimuver and the others really were, when all was sant and done— aad titers of there trades to boet: fine suldicts, pentuses al propaganda, toad so weiter. There Weimar peedecessurs he belitthed anil dismissed as nethings. though he adintted he had never Lnown much about thei aspirations or their acluevernents. Moreaver in spite of having, wath his. wife and sister, hivishly and almost sangle- mindedly supported Phtler fram the days before the 1923 Munchen. Pass. > to bis own abrupt depardire far, the decadent democnicy, ifentstavagt insisted that he had never thought tor a meament Ghat the uniemittinn virulent anti-Semitiog Ob hus frend and beto wold ever amount to anything serigus (sume of iay best friends were 0.0). oe tind has protege would ever have been “stupis enough tu stata war” The real danger ot a Huder cenascence, in the view of Dr. Huge Marx, a scholar who surfered onder the original, hes in the combination of a tomantic nostal- gia and the millennis) German faith in autneritanon rule as the solution te all problems Wermar, attec all, failed primanty, as bon “ illiam B. Shirer and Kar Dietrich Bracher have shown, because no one, includ- ing the Social Demociats who proclaimed it out of desperation when trey could find neither a Hohen- zollem nor anv other voyalty to accept the throne, wanted a repute. Wien the economic crash came after 1929, the midennisl search for the “strong man“ lost its last restrain. 6 a, : 19
14-00000 “Tntelligence Information Report “qa tetesial ee qertg.2¢ inbgrmation eRe np the, Mer ol Betene ef re Un rod Stores witha the meaning ee emage lowe Este lé USC Sore 209 ced ha the tetenaree or oezeletion ef. whuh ja eng 29: an ermutheied paren 18 gretibied” ‘8%, tow, . - oF Re . apes xO FOREIGN: DISSEM ne . - PAGE) OF "1 eages ; ‘CouNTay West Germany ote - Stisuect the National Democratic. Party to Urge: ’ Wuerttenberg Election ‘ Se Intention: ‘of the Executive Conini tte of. Non-participation of the Party in Raden= FELD NO. EGG-1825__ @ mo 6G GI de Gt i} ls The executive committee of the Vest German National Domocratic Party (NPD) wild meet on 18 Mareh with officials of the Baden-Wuerttemborg NPP organization and attempt to persuade the Land organisation not toe contest the 23 April Land eleetion. The executive committce will point out that Uf the NPD does not. run. ‘candidates in this election, the _ chances’ for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to obtain a majority in the Baden-Wuert temberg election will be enhanced. This would enable the CDU to retain its Bundesrat majority : ‘and improve the chances of defeating the Eastern treaties of the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party government, 2, The background'of the executive committee's desire to avoid contesting the Raden-Wuerttemberg clection is its estimate that the NPD would capture only two per cent of the vote this year compared with 9.4 per cent in the last election, a result which the executive committee is most anxious to avoid. ’ 3, Field Dissem: Sent tol oe 8S Gd de Ef S$ EC R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM — Keane} id.evem eqarent INTEL : | Bes -/GAR . : > CRED . wEROrie/3 “7G7R/I, —4 a e LE 1 ; NOT” FOR ATATSON = CAEROT REE ahi POTALS wba Stason aM E 2, Cl 2, FI3, FR 1, EIR _6 - isi Kt
Ba a iSTPIBUTEO ‘[Lig/ae bean [1 E/G/R/BD= 9 ELE / ae ‘FI = IW, CSDO, DO-4. “2 DECE MBER WI. ji IN 77288 : - 2 AERC] . Sa CORTE | ww |p TT Tr an VLGnus ms la oops aie EASED. ON, ‘fa. a coy a3 i 3 S ¥ C RE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEN eo coon & toot oo ha Ee é cyE=] ae G/R haat | 1’ EG ag nm - REQUESTED. Sfave . ARMY THAROUNG INSTRUCTORS OE Fo ones ee aaa asad © { RECOMMEND EXO c. A . ; ‘ B | BASIC DOCUMENT NOT gE { MADE AVAILABLE OCI (TI S | RELAY CABLE ATTACHED [Tj € c \ sHow iw cL w DISSEM ELECTRICALLY CI 10 EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB Cc ° ; T | USI8 PERSONAL ATIN cc rs) E | ZAWAHOO CABLE SENT [7] R NOT FOR UAISON Aj CMERITIO A Libis OORMICES, QS INTERNAL USE ONLY _ Teeoanival ING OFFICERS) “ae | CLASSIFICATION | SECRET L {has Fillet dap FORM 3-89 TR=-2 vse vaevicus commons WELEASING OFFICER levy 7& | (CO KO, i encanta Ws nnn Gab saotne ane AE a NE wii aan (83-40-44-87}
14-0000 . : - & \ : . 4, - 8 ae - SO " @ ROUTINE > - S. ep Intelligence Information Cable "IN 479259 8 oe 5. page 1 oF Spades: SATIN ota ORME fac astener Ks. aamy NAYY AR) Ta/NMCE NIC NSA SHO ONT CRS BAN KAN HAN “TREAS | . a RXNNXNNX - i : irionitg Sy Dele thie. ‘nea! ‘. sts ee misting of we tsbvonags bows, ‘Yetle 1% U.S.C. Se, 7a ond 7v& the ‘NO: FOREIGN ‘DISSE os Lie ES pa . THIS 1S'AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOt FINALLY EVALUATED NTEIGFRNCE cite ToCs. =31¢ 4712543-71 . ‘ Oo . . oisr i DECEMBER 1971 COUNTRY WEST GERMANY: suwsctT SUMMARY OF ADOLF VON THADDEN'S 3 DECEMBER SPEECH TO THE NORTH-= = . di WEST MINING ASSOCIATION my FIELD NO. EGG-2721 ‘4 oT gg. | ; 1. (FIELD COMMENT: ADOLF VON THAD DE N, FORMER : NATIONAL CKAIRMAN OF THE WEST GERMAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PART Y (NPD), HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK TO THE ANNUAL : GENERAL MEETING CF THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION, - SPOKANE, WASEINGTON, ON 3 DECEIDER ON THE TOPIC: A | EUROPEAN'S VIEW OF TES AMERICAN CURRENCY PRODLEM. SEE : + AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL HAMBURG TELEGRAM 767, 10 NOVEYBER 1971. DESPITE VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM HIS NPD POST HE STILL PLANS TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND ~~ Ohtra 2 NO ¥ N DISSE} eo SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEN telcsufe atom? {eisiom eartralet A AENED ORAS Se TCA TIR TELE IOES H MAROON IE RO. Ar RET
14-00000 1OCS-314/12543-71 PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES — * SECRET/xo- FOREIGN ‘DISSEM tolenwificstson - isin eontvoiss - TO PRESENT THE “SPEECH WHICH as: Suhmanrzeo BELOW, ) Be VON, ‘FHADDEN BEGINS BY. TRACING ‘THE HISTORY OF one UNITED STATES" RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY FROM WORLD wah ‘ TO THE’ PRESENT, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION, TO THE 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH. HE GIVES CREDIT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR HELPING. EUROPE BACK ON ITS FEET AFTER WORLD WAR LI THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN. BUT POINTS OUT _ THAT THE NATIONS WHICH WERE HELPED USED THE AID TO BUILD AN EXPORT BASE WHICH NOW IS CONTRIBUTING TO AMERICA'S ' FINANCIAL TROUBLES. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY AND OTHER COUNTRIES BECAME INFECTED WITH AN "EXPORT HYSTERIA" , AFTER THE WAR WHICH HAD SHORT TERM BENEFITS FOR WORLD pw ME ee mew TRADE; BUT WHICH IN THE LONG RUN DAMAGED THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES. 3. THE 15 AUGUST 1971 SPEECH BY PRESIDENT NIXON IS COMPARED WITH ‘THE 24 OCTOBER 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH, AND VON THADDEN SAYS THAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE JUST AS PROFOUND AN EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S NANCY AL SYSTEM AS DID THE CRASH. HE DEPICTS THE SPEECH AND THE RESULTING CONTROLS AS SPELLING THE END OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEN ESTABLISHED AT BRETTON-WOODS, e be Oo OO om on SECRET/no FOREIGN DISSEM felassif tater? fdizrect contrate) - hd an wd ono 9 RO rhe GoD
14-00000 weS-=314-/12543-71 PAGE 3 OF S PAGES - 4. IN uis ANALYSIS. oF. THE ; TYPE CF WORLD ECONOMIC = SYSTEM wate. ‘SHOULD FOLLOW THE CURRENT AMERICAN CONTROLS AND FLOATING OF THE DOLLAR, VON THADDEN DRAWS HEAVILY FROM" THE 23 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE ‘OF FRENCH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU, . HE SAYS THAT THE DOLLAR CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED THE SINGLE WORLD CURRENCY. THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF EUROPE MAKES-.IT NECESSARY THAT A EUROPEAN RESERVE CURRENCY BE ~ AVATLABLE AS A SECOND WORLD CURRENCY. THIS CANNOT BE THE “BRITISH POUND AS MANY PEOPLE AT ONE TIME ‘WOULD HAVE "BELIEVED, . BUT MUST BE'A CURRENCY ACCEPTED BY BOTH FRANCE AND GERMANY AND ADMINISTERED BY A COMMON GERMAN-FRENCH BANK SUPPORTED BY GOLD, ALL EUROPEAN STATES WOULD USE THIS BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS. _. VON THADDEN VIEWS POHPIDOU'S SPEECH AS A SIGNAL TO THE + UNITED STATES THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WILLING To STAY PERMANENTLY UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON, AND AS PROVIDING AN OUTLINE OF THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC ORDER EUROPE SHOULD HAVE IN TEE FUTURE. HE CRITICIZES THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR NOT TAKING A SIMILAR STAND, SAYING THAT WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE STATE TO PUT ECONOMIC ' PRESSURE ON OTHER STATES, THE SITUATION CAN LEAD TO be RS GO oe Gm + B23 G3 ob ch » SECRET/No F FOREIGN DISSEM asa fran ‘dissern Sonisels) . .
14-00000 sae Bi we ww woes) ~324/42543-71 PAGE 4 OFS PAGES ° SECRET so | FOREIGN. DISSEN | oo fa tal oe on NO. OTHER COUNTRY WHICH CAN SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY OF PRESENT DAY WEST GERMANY. HE SAYS THAT THE WEST » SECRET’ NO FOREIGN’ DISSEN _ rehaseAGasiin we ~idusem con POLITICAL: AND MILITARY PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE PROFITABLE “ONLY TO THE ‘conwnists. 5. VON THADDEX SEES TWO ALTERNATIVES IN THE PRESENT. : SITUATION, I.5., EITHER A RETURN TO FIRM PARITY WITH A DEVALUED DOLLAR, OR A CHANGE TO FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES “7 AGREED TO BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND GUARANTEED BY INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES. HE BELIEVES THE DOLLAR MUST BE DEVA LUED’ BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT EXPECT FUROPEANS. TO CONTINUE TO BUY THE DOLLAR AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT ‘LEGALLY FIXED, HE VIEWS FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AS DESIRABLE FOR EUROPE, BLY NOT REALIZABLE AT PRESENT BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM WOULD EXCLUDE THE “THIRD WORLD" , AND THUS WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES. 6. SUMMARIZING, VON THADDEN STRESSES THE NECESSITY ‘FOR THE FREE WORLD TO REMAIN STRONG AND FOR EACH EUROPEAN COUNTRY JQ RETAIN ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DIGNITY TO PREVENT . DOMINATION BY COMMUNIST AND FAR~LEFT FORCES. HE CRITICIZES THCSE WHO SAY THAT AMERICA IS NO LONGER NEEDED i AS! A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE USSR. DECLARING THAT THERE 1S bob ND CP rhe CD felessifociirad (divsers consrets) 3. t
14-00000 1 MO tenella 5 4 3 2 1 e an ., Se - oi EGRET/NO FOREIGN DISSE . eption) . .  fdissem controls ~ IN Si yee woos -314/12543-71 | PAGE 5 OFS PAGES we “GERMAN PEOPLE, THROUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND LEADERS: ‘WHO ARE FRIENDLY TO COMNUNISM, HAVE LOST THEIR NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ARE TOO WEAK TO OPPOSE THE USSR. HE ENDS BY CALLING FOR A CHARACTER RENAISSANCE IN THE FREE WORLD TO MAKE IT STRONG ENOUGH TO COUNTER CONNUNISM. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: _ THE STATEMENT OF VON THADDEN IN SPOKANE MAY 3 ATTRACT PRESS INTEREST DUE TO THE NOTORIETY HE GAINED IN RECENT YEARS AS LEADER OF A GERMAN NATIONALIST PARTY WIDELY DESCRIBED AS NEO-NAZI. IN FACT, ‘THE PARTY. HAS DECLINED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO THE POINT WHERE IT IS THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION, AND VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY DEPRIVES IIM OF ANY POLITICAL PLATFORM IN WEST GERMANY. ) 7. FIELD DISSEN: NONE . e = bo 6S de Gi SECRET’No FOREIGN DISSEM felasndes ioe } fdiisem cantraiga
14-00000 ee ee es s + , . ‘ "te oe, Nk cee ee ee Tntellice ence Inform: ition Rep ort: Fema og GRas es This material comowrs Shore in efectaa Me Natenul Delenie of the United S$ tes in Pee rome ~ * ef the  Espionoge lewqg Phe Th OS TL Rae CFI ord 794, tha. teengmsmen af tesrt lice re) wink bs @ey Cn edn Mes Sacer “ finan ein Ont darn in manne? 19 om wnouther sen parma 1s piee-bted by bre, NO FOREIGN, DISSEM PAGE’) OF 2 PAGES THIS is AN, RSNGHON, REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO, €$-311/01861-7 a SECRET FO PO DATE DISTR. Ag March ‘1971, COUNTRY West Germany en WP TE SUIT _- Intention of Adolf: Yon Thadden | ; ' to Resign As Chairman of the , ‘National Democratic Party - 2 . 4 In early Varch 1971 Adol€ Von Thaddea 2 that he plans to resign as Chairman of the NPD in ‘ ‘thé hear future. Von Thadden has not announced the date 2. Yon Thadden's decision fas been prompted by his : discouragement aver prespeets for the NPD, serious financial : difficulties af the party and by severe internal bickering ; within the NPD Executive Copmittee during the past several. weeks, Von Thadden is basicaliy more modera te than many members of the Executive Committee. Among other disagreeacnts, Yon Thadden has opposed certain aspects of the “Resistance ; Action" - (Aktion Widerstand) in which NPD menbers have : recently stagdd demonstrations which crupted into violence, : Von Thadden was aiso personally humiliated when his sister ‘ and other relatives asked him not to attend the funeral : . Of Von Thadden's brother-in-law, the well-known historian ; . Percy Schramm who died in Goettingen in January 1971, me 8S Gd de OF cto S,E c Fins T. mt FORETGN DISSEM ‘ . : , AM: JME : UR 6, 5 32 fc sam
reET Tee eee ened ob MO es acted tet mo 9G de Petheneanle anes etm Haw SOM, AAD ESE tetpous EGU BUS PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES” . €3-311/01861-71 , t SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 4. Field Dissem: None. 1 SECRET. NO FOREIGN DISSEM om bo 62 & Ga EA gp tte sels Par aL Sh pot ane ae
14-00000 L,lligence Intormation Reggprt Pom uatenel contains lnfasmation ofectiag the Netume! Tedamep ef the United Greet witha the eregn ag wo ~ : «6 a Replenoge dows Hele 18 FSC. See TEP ame A me Boneesigtion ex revelotion of wAluh ta amp Larabarranrer } Bicenar 2 cen seevtheeliod persen: WH erokbited by Sm = » 4 _ NO FORSTON DISSEM. PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES TMS 3 AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT. RMALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE ° ewe menere abet ae ee ee RD, C$ ~311/02895-70 © SE. E. Cc. R § T , oT Lo a REPORT NO. _» Country . West Germany . «OP ea 74 _ 7° SUBJECT "Ana lySis. ‘of the test Germain Nationals - .: ; ns , Democratic Party's Election Chances cee, _ and Cohesiveness | : FIELO NO, OGhWOSS, a { : . . t “. a 1, Adolf von Thad den, NPD chairman, remains firmly ‘in control of the party following the 14-15 February 1970 NPD congress in Werthein. ; ; : i % j | 1 ! r { i H i t a. Skepticism about.the future of the NPD is increasing among party leaders. The NPD is definitely planning to wage vigorous came paigns in all 1970 Land elections, but there appears to be little chance that the party ty will do even as well in these elections as it . did in the 1969 ‘Bundéstag elections, when it failed to obtain five ‘ percent of the total vote, . es ; 3, At.the congress, several vrominent NPD leaders emphasized : the-need for party unity; these apteals were well received: by the oy delegates. There are many unresoived questions and problems, how-. i ever, which will continue to plague the party. For instance, the : wich was adopted in the manifesto issued by the congress, came under strong attack, One group, which = = 3 includes both older and younger members, rejects the concept of the NPD as a conservative party, because they consider. that this term conveys the idea that the party is an out-of-date and reactionary political group. On the-other hand, the proponents of the national-. ‘ conservative concept consider thenselves as upholding “positive | vajues” in- the face of manifestations of disintegration. Von Thadden - ° is the party's unifying force, and one delegate accurately summarized —-: the situation by saying: "Von Thacden, by virtue of the charisma of 4 his speeches, succeeded in bridging the many cracks in the party," “national-conservative” concept, 4. Field Dissem:: Embassy Soan, USBER, . . 1 S ECR § T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM (dinsom controle} {eleesificerioe) OGA-953 CATERROR cr Fee Pereadiag ® EM: CHI, lah | ae’
14-00000 COUNTRY .. West Gerniany \4 ee a Inte! ‘uence Inf ormation Repors vaya Dt nee “ Tale merece eonipng Infor wan Banting the Meteun! Delonte ‘of the United Seater within rhe manalag 7 Bara . ‘ °.% of the damerage dows, Tete 18 USC Sore FOF ont i 4 the fronsmiiion ov revelation of @dich Ia any feted toa ctemety SN WS Ronse we om veewherttied person te prabibited by few et Sevttatiot © SGaSioan oP zs KO FOREIGN DISSE , _. PAGE 1 OrF “PAGES “Ths J5-AN JNFORAAHON, REPORT, pot FINALLY EVALUATED y INTELUIGENCE” SE CR E T Rep ORE NOL: cs-311/08856- 69 DATE bISTR. Nas September 1968S, Y , ema ACOs | SUBJECT West German - Ministry of: laterior '. ,* Evaluation of the Prospects of >. Banting the National Democratic Party . FIELD NO. OGA-913 || ea - Summary: In June 1964, the West German Ministry of the Interior prepared a basic study of the prospects Gf banning the West German National. Democratic Party (NPD) ; The summary of this study given below describes the major ‘charges which the government could. bring against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make against these ‘charges, and the probable political results which would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the NPD, According to the source, this study is still considered the - basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and ig being studied by senior federal government and state (Land) officials, | End of Summary. 1. (Ficld Comment: For several years, West German political and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst Benda, West German Interior Minister, advised Chance llor Kurt Georg Kicsinger that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against the NPD, Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, “and the sub= ject became embroiled in West German politics. Gn 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet decided not to seék 4 court ban of the NPD, at , least until after the September elections, This decision. was prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains and apparently was losing popular support, ) @ mo 80.69 a OA 80 Oo a SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM {aloceifration) {dissem controls} [era [ow [arr [wn [ow Ton Te] ter Fed Diition se foal parogronh OGA-913 CATERROR . et | | IE 2 cr FI 3, DO 1, EUR 8(2 roan Oasoirte preious . ier) EDITORS (aa) TOTALS
annette mt } a here eine ee = AS id oe Ut Tee eee a oy Paige 2 of 4 Pages” SECRE 1x0 FORKIGN DISSEM ,C8-311/08556-69 . 2, Ta: June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared a 50-page study” ‘of the prospects for’ banning the “NPD ‘entitled “Consider ations ‘Regarding a Ban of the Nattonal Democratic Party.” The .study, was well prepared and carcfully written, It ig still “considered the ‘basic Interior Ministry paper on the. NPD and ta _ being - studied by senior officials of both’ the federal ‘and g#tate ° “governments. - “taining a. court decision- against” tthe NPD, but ‘from the content of “the study; It avoids giving: an. opinion on thé prospects of 6b= t-18' clear.that: thé authors’ Believed that the courts would probably reject'a government proposal. to ban the NPD. os {Fela Commenti« Tf ‘the study is istfLh, considered’ current, it ig : “unclear how, 3 , fits with: Benda’ 8 November 1968. statement | that there | “poe ' Coo oe . : . tee oe to. 3. The study stimmarized ‘the case whieh could: be brought against the NPD as follows: . . a. It could be shown that there wags a4 similarity between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers Party, (NSDAP) which has been outlawed. os o be It could be argued that the goals, and parts of the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the prin- “Seiples of a free democratic state, The study concludes that-a sufficiently strong case could be pre=- sented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without a hearing. . 4. The study lists the. following points which the NPD cculd be expected to use in. its defense: - 8. The party. could prove that it has given firm poe trues {tions to its members. not to engage in rowdyism or violencd. 3) b. .It could show that a sizeable number of former NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part of the Se lbstreinigun g (self-cleaning) process. e. It could point out many features of its program which are in. accord with democratic principles. d. It could show that its elected representatives have worked with other parties and have not. disrupted the Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which they participate. : e, It could point out that other political parties have many @x-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not . opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic. f. It would charge that the government's charges were one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date, g. It would claim that not all of Professor Ernst Anrich *s points were included in the party plat- form. “(Field Comment: Anrich is a former university | professor. from Darmstadt whose proposals were apparently more extreme ‘than those ‘incorporated in the ‘party platform. ) h. It could claim that the incréaséd violence (Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD. S BCR E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
14-00000 : p ad om A Gb me i Page 3 of 3 Pagea & , . a . ot ~ . 5-E C RE T/NO FORE, .8 DISSEM c8$-311/08556-69 5. The study states that. it would be very difficult to re- fute these NPD defenses in court, The government would have to - admit’ that since carly 1963--there Nave been very few statenents ; made % ‘by. NPD leaders, ‘or incide ats Gaused by the NPD, which could -be uséd to support the. ROverinment's case. Objective ly, it would have to be admitted that many. incidénts of violencé tn which the a NPD ‘has ‘been involved ‘were {mitiated by opponents of the party. 6. . The atudy -predictg: the following, probable reaults should the governnent. win. its. case. ‘against the: NPD: > The. a Bp would probably. respect the prohibition. it ‘ts: very. “url kelly” that: .the NPD ‘would attempt to” go. under< NPD monber's ‘and “sympathizers. would not “change their “eptntsas because | of. _a -ban, _Many would join. other groups rn 2 NPD and’ rightist sympathizers would begin: a can- paign for the banning of the new German Communist Party (DKP) and other leftist groups. d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign countries, ae 7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a ease against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid evidence (Bewe-taschwier igke iten). In such an event, the following adverse effects would occur: - ' @, The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable publicity. b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some success in. keeping former Nazis out of key positions would be halted... ec. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of the stigma of being associated with a party which could be declared illegal, ‘would join the party or become active supporters. d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members. (Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried because the party's membership has not increased signifi-~ cantly during the past 18 months.) 8. Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER. S ECR E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM —  W & ut
we tee me me ee, PE 8Re + tee aE @ came etiam sie so aR Chiel, oN, ay Ow aL wee pote "enter ¢ of. ‘Station se ee kas anus ges at Teer see cee _ Chief, Furopean I Division ee . . Presse, ne “SCALL/ INTEL: : SASH eo ptm en nage me en nee GROSS MEPERERCE FO actin FRSAIRCD « Brera aces REF: 2GUT-145 69, ‘dated 9 Soplenber 1969 ye , 1, We are very, ‘pleased vith the quality « of the tnforiia=- tion off the, NPD which has-been made’ availab)e through ‘CATERROR, . it. is particularly useful during this pre- ~cleetion period, but we also: apprécinte not having, to wait 6 to 8 weeks for CATIISPER to digest the materi al and pass ‘it on, 2. After looking over the Reference, wo are inclined to stick with the requirements mentioned im DIRECTOR 39264 for. items worthy of intel disSemination,. In this context Bonn State Department Telegram 12253 dated 17 September quotes Foreign Minister Brandt as saying that there has been evidence :that the East Germans, undoubtedly with Sovict approval, had given financial support to von Thaddcen, While we are inelined to think that Brandt's comment may be wishful thinking, “evidence ‘of East German financing for the NPD would be of great intercst and utility. Material not bearing on the requirements” in DIRECTOR 39284 should be forwarded now to Headquarters for review. The NPD, as you know, is a subject of interest beyond its proportions as a political forcé, and we are grateful for the timely opportunity to kecp up with the ins and-outs of it. hesick ce eee ee Harriet G, COCOLLATO Group I - . Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification OISFATCH SYi4USL AND NUAZER _—- 8.0. SEp-ig¢g—— C25 September 1969 >, ; EGES-6522 wae PILE) i ee ELAS LIF ICATION SECRE T ORIGINATING 1st. oo E/G/R orice ~ E/G/IS BAGR sro ___ - E/MEG/Chrono. ee aE ~ C/EUR/R cae Seu elaapedlen - C/E/G/R © RERRALING orriee sv, feet OT erie hls Sreedbure 7 ‘og > o . “ -. ~ o oP 2? Pep te, we oe te CAPR eb ee Ee 1 ares hoo ee aE eS en ao tee ame ae ee ete ND RAEN nce gee etter mner fn ene es
DIRECTORATE OF ‘PLANS ———- SECRET _ COUNTRY . West Germany x‘ ay sa ances remankne 8 FE a ye wee 2h oy Intelligence Information Report fo Jae he moaning Ce ey ' FX.6 ematerna! comta ca re taeeret fim ing he Natere! Getonse af Se Uo ted Sota: we H nO Sn of Ne bigarsce coat, Tle 13. $C. bers 26D ond 784, me woraminar of rece’ etiam Of wash oh Gay it epeekcnarc ae | POrRE? 18 CA yeanthotited patron 08 prbhib isd bp tow, PAGE 1 OF2 PAGES NO SsEy THIS: iS "AN InFORMATION REPORT, NOT Fy Wane TSALUATED INTELLIGENCE SSPORT NO. cs 7311/08430-6 69 re OaTE DISTR. § 22 September ver 1993 - -$UBSECT: AcQ Miscellanéous information’ on ‘the National Democratic Party Feo NO, EGG-1444, “@ 2°6 ww & w . 2. that Knipphals, prior to joining the NPD, participated in Easter Marches and received unfavorable publicity. Further= 1, According to a ranking official of the Kiel ‘district of the National Democratic Party (XPD), Karl-Heing Knipphaiés, the chairman of the Kiel district of the NPD, and Adolf v ° n Thaddeon, the national chairman of the NPD, are personal enemies. {Source Comment: In January 1969 Knipphals was elected to be his party district's candidate for the West German Parliament. Knipphals, a Kiel lawyer, is in his early 50's. He was severely wounded during World War II and has only. one arm.) Von Thadden is aware of, and unhappy about, the fact voily Thadden is. concerned about Knipphals' strong and ruthless political ambitions, He has referred to Knipphals "second Hitler”, and he welcomes and encourages the fact that there is strong. opposition to Knipphals even within the Kiel district of the party. Von Thadden, for the above reasons, would very much like to see Xnipphals remain on the district lével and is anxtous to keep him out of the West German Parliament. : . “48 3. The same official. who made the remarks about von Thadden and Knipphals. also stated that many wealthy industrial- ists contribute funds to. the NPD anonymously, because they do not wish their association or sympathy with the party to become known, $0 ‘ a4 4. The chairman of another NPD district in. Schleswig- 353 Holstein stated that, in view of the fact that each new 22 ti S-E~C-R=-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM ih Bom contral iy EGG-1444 CAINFER TiS) ALLE ASING tb MES Shee a ‘Aany CH browned
14-00000 PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES ~ "  ¢$-311/08430-69 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM “, . fae Session of the West German Parliament is - opened by its: oldest ‘tember, the NPD will insure that the oldest. member of the next . fol) Pa ¥iament will be an: NPD man. (Head uarters. Comment: ‘The yo > possibility’, that” an NPD ‘Deputy mipht open the Bundestag has Syst ce Bangedy | been considered’ by the cDU. Sée CS-311708164- 69%) a “_.. §) Field Dissem: None I. _ y SECR ET NO FOREIGN DISSEM od bb ES Be in | : a ee
aot kate ea SS 2 = \ catelligence Information i. port Ths omsmerin comtnes intermotion eB.chag the National Satara” of te? Carved Stores withia the gaomang of the tancimage lose Tite 18 UEC. Ler YY ond 294, the Immumuen of revelation of wiech ia ang ergnned 2 <> emarhented porton ‘it prokb ted By low, THIS 1S AN INFGAMATION READE, "NOT FINALY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE Acq s 0 - eee ante "Rate Osta, =\@ July. 1965 > CONFIDENTIAL West Germany ; . a | German Govérnuent Evidénce against es Py the National Democratic Party (NPD) . \U Kt __ “RDN. EGN=4107 5 4 3 2 1 e e oe ee 77-paxe German-language report, describing the National Democratic. Party (NPD) and presenting documentary and ‘testimonial evidence of possibly unconstitutional aspects of the NPD, has been deposited in the files of the CIA Docu- ment and Pictorial Services Division, from which copies may be obtained upon. request. The report is the shorter of two versions prepared by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz). This Shorter version is ‘said to. be complete in substance and is the version which was made available to West German Cabinet members in preparation for Cabinet discussion of whether the NPD should be.baaned. The longer, two-volume version has not been obtained. + 2. Appraisal of the legal validity of the evidence against the NPD was omitted from the report at the order of the Minister of the Interior, who reserved to himself an.- assessment of the NPD's “legality. Also, pages 9 to l3--a section entitled Chief Features of the Ideology (Grundzuege der Ideologie)--was omitted from the report at the request of the Ninister of the Interior. (Headquarters Comment: The evidence in the report appears to to be overt and Tess than conclusive. The West German Cabinet decided in the spring ” of 1969 not to request a ban of the NPD; substantial doubt existed as to whether there were sufficient grounds to obtain ~ ‘a legal ban of ‘the NPD, The omissions from the text, referred ‘to in this paragraph,.may reflect realization by the Interior Ministry of the weakness of the case against the NPD, } 4, Field Dissemination: | (limited). ‘ Distribution of Attachment: CRS /ADD CONFIDENTIAL | oO) FOREIGN DISSEM (cloas:rqrnen} TOTALS CAWHISPER EGN-~4107 IE 2, CI 2, FI 3,D0 1, “EUR 9(2) REPORT NO. CS LT-3 13/01123+69
‘country ' West Berlin/West Germany, = pon ; susi€c? Status: ‘Report oa Proglens, Activities om on aca. em ee om, oe inselligence Information Report . . : intormetion oflecting the Hattonel Defense of the United States within the’ meanieg ° — Famers! ean ee Use. fore, PF3 ond PRA the trunsminsion of rovekitios of which In ony Larcapergenares gusanee (@ em encutherized person le probibited by kw. Letncratentid No FOREIGN DISSEM . ae pace) OF 4 PAGES een 9 eee eo ete ae Sennen EG CaN LEE or Let - ate ae a sneer ReportNo. CS -311/06109 -69, “LBSECRET —_ oo _DATE DISTR: ocr July 1969, “and Plans of the West Berlin National \ot “: Democratic Party * an FieLo.no. EGB-24,611_ : Hy of the plan for dissolution, ‘he remains active.behind the scenes. Since carly April, Fy & 3 2 q @ Summary: The Berlin NPD has been plagued by a split between the Berlin City leadership, which is loyal to the Party's national leaders, and the “Loyalists! headed by the Berlin district leaders, who opposed the dissolution of the Berlin NPD. ordered by National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden in October - 19683 - Court action led to the thwarting In ah effort to keep the Berlin Party alive, in mid-March von Thadden ordered a cessation of open Party ac= Subse- tivities until after the Septembcr parliamentary elections. quently, von Thadden arranged a. postponement of a scheduled Berlin Party convention until October, because of the possibility of a ban on the Berlin NPD by. the Allies and the threat of trouble from the militant left. At the end of March, Berlin City NPD Chief Rudolf Kendzia resigned in an effort to” promote party unity in Berlin, but the Berlin NPD leadership has followed von Thadden's guidelines. The influence - of the Loyalists has been greatly reduced, and in accordance with von Thadden's instructions party activities have been circumspect. . Both the Berlin and the National leadership are hoping that the NPD will cbtain 25 to 35 Bundestag seats in September, which, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to right-wing voters in Berlin and enhance NPD chances during .the 1971 Berlin communal elections. Berlin is planning to send volunteer workers to campaign for the NPD in West Germany, especially -in North. Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD strong- hold, ‘End of BeMeREr, ot 1, (Field Comment; In October 1968, the West Berlin NPD had approximately 480 dues-paying members, According. to a senior party official, more than 100 members have officially dropped their fe a oo BD fe. wo a te s: E c R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEN ¢ foot [eee er [se Te (har Fuld Diviosioa wa Boal parsgror Ce TNs 0 PEGS Ica ren fap [_}24,611 EG eae — os Cavanx EG RPT] TTT CAVANISH Ses Ps coDaDirating | REE Aste /JL Peg EUR 9, CA 3 CI 4, FI 3, DOL,
floor after ome AS te Be Ui CS-311 ‘06103269 dropping out quietly. In March the paid-up membership and others are Incmbership was about J00,)} 2. Following the abortive attempt dy the National Democratic Party (NPD) leadership to ferce the Berlin NPD to dissolve itself for tactical reasoas in October 1968, routine party activity resumed al~ most immediately. [te was characterized by a split between the leader= ship. Of ‘the Berlin City (Landesverband) party unit and that of “dis- trict (Kre isverband) party units, The former are ectierally loyal to National Party:Chairman Adolf von Thadden and the national leadership in Hanover and the ir ‘broader tactical concepts; while the latter, ree= ferred to us the “Loyalists” (Satzungpstreuc), defend the létver of the Berlin NPD ‘statutes, The Loyalists initially objected primarily to the mechod of the attempted: dissolution, but the friction with the “@ity Executive ‘Committee (Landesvorstand) headed by’ Rudolf Kendzia “tog.-, ded “to total. mutual. ‘mistrust, ‘disloyal statements to the press, ‘and ae efforts. to get. each, other “expelled from “the - party: by & party court (Schiedskertent) .” rr . v a "3, At a general membership feet tng dn Berliaes iix.}5.-March. A969, von’ Thaddéri attempted to achieve. & truce within the party and ordered -that- there be -no- “political organizational activity" until after the “September ‘1969 parliamentary elections, At this meeting von Thadden ‘approved the scheduling. of a ‘Berlin party convention (L andesparteitag) ‘ for 26 ‘April 1969, at which a new and hopefully more stable city Executive Committee was to be elected, . ; 4. The 15 March. meeting provided an indication that the Berlin NPD may well stick together under. von Thadden's guidance until 1971, in spite of the friction between city and district leadership, Al-* though the eight’ “spokesmen ‘for the local leadership, who took the Kéndzia'ts situation report and von Thadden's tcynote : speech, approved the action of the Berlin NPD districts in opposing : the self-dissolution of the local party, and no one contradicted them, nil but Jl-of the 140 members present then voted for a resolution con demning District Chiefs Johann Ratzek (Schceneberg) and Philipp Goelles (Wilmersdorf), leaders of the Loyalists, for anti-party ac- tivity. This vote amounted to a vote of confidence in the tactics of the Berlin City. leadership, and aécording to members present was due solely to von Thadden's presence and influence, In the view of these members , a meeting without the attendance of representatives of the Hanover headquarters would have led.to a no-confidence vote ‘in the Kendzia leadership. During the meeting, von Thadden also rejected Kendzia's "Berlin Program," which called for a softer line on East Germany and on German reunification. 5.. At the 15 March session, left-wing, anti-NPD protestors **-assaulted a number of NPD members and forced the NPD twice to change its meeting site, This leftist action and the obvious fact that the militant left has a penetration of the Berlin NPD have had a seri- ously dampening effect on the NPD's willingness to meet in the open, The party is now tentatively planning to hold future meetings on a rented excursion boat whose location would not be announced until the time of the meeting. 6. The Berlin NPD has made strenuous efforts to determine which left-wing organizations made up the task force which tried to disrupt the 15 March meeting. The Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) claimed the honor, but the NPD investigation showed definitely that all but a handful of the protestors were an organized group dispatched by the Spandau branch of the West Berlin Socialist Unity. Party (SEW) whose actions are part of a long~range program of harassment by the East Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED). 7, -Because of the subsequent possible threats of prohibition by the Allies (signalled by a letter from Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz to the Allies asking that the NPD in Berlin be banned) and of further counter-demonstrations by the militant left, on 27 March -von Thaddéen wrote a letter to the Berlin City leadership asking that SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Scxad : Net 4
: ‘ i H i oo FS Ud bdo WH - Keridzia’ resigned. on 23 March, id “tinct danger ‘that “this could occur, , October, "Mensel, Berlin NPD. S EC R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 3 of 4 PAGES cS- 311/06103 - 69 the Berlin party convention be postponed until October 1969, the ‘normal expiration. date of the term of the present city Executive att The letter, which — was read-.at several ‘district meetings, also stipulated that the city and district organizations weré t6 restrict themselves to rout ine monthly meetings with no- ‘speeches and no invited guests until next October, oye ‘8. In’ o ‘tactical | move to proncte \party unity, Party hier ” In response to von Thadden's letter, strte t ‘pH unit leadership, which otherwise remiined ? » -Walter Seézen, a member of ‘the nae i leaderanip. Was: “present, ; the -pos tponément motion would fail; there was 6. dis- At the 10 April meeting, the - district leaders grumbled’ “but approved the postponement until 11 October. : 9. On Kendzia'gs resignation, Guenther Mensel, a member of the Executive Committee, was selectéd as, Acting Pz. ty Chief and Speaker of the Party- “Council until-a new Executive Committee is elected in an attorney, was hesitant about nccepting the’ “yok because of its” ‘possible effect on his practice, and did not commit himself until the 10 April executive meeting, Mensel's age (62) and stability were the main reasons for his selection, The only other replacement considered was Guenter Kleinert, also on the Executive Committee, whom Kendzia did not trust. Mensel's duties are to con~ tiga: in. Apri “gist of calling and chairing pro-forma monthly Executive Committee meetings and.of presiding at the party congress next October, 10. Kendzia considers his resignation a temporary tactical re-~ treat caused by disagreements with the NPD national and Berlin dis~ trict leaders, by von Thadden's public rejection of his "Berlin Program," loss of business because of unfavorable publicity, and a hit-and-run car necident involving a bicyclist on 27 March, Kendzia promised Mensel to remain active behind the scenes and set up a _yacant office in his place of business as party headquarters, with desks for himself and Executive Committee members Frank Schwerdt, Joachim Rebuschat and Hans Werner Andreas, the de facto heads of the ll. Kendzia and a majority of the NPD leaders hope elections will bring some 25 to 35 NPD members into the Bundestag. will make the party more acceptable to potential This, they feel, The. ‘situation was ticklish because the ‘Berlin NPD statutes: “provide that if. full membership meetings | in " four of the 12-districts-had.-Voted for holding of the party conven= - a a seasion- of the- Berlin Par, Council - Ghandesausschuss) — that the fall right-wing voters in Berlin and thus enable the NPD to make a showing in che 1971 Berlin communal elections, (Source Comment: The Berlin ' NPD's major problem in Berlin is to keep Its membership intact and its machinery functioning until 1971, -Whether Kendzia will hold to his promise to direct the Berlin NPD from behind the scenes indefi~ nitely, and whether he will emerge as leader ‘in 1971, are open ques- tions, because Kendzia has shown an interest in the current program and” policies of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and particularly in its “General-Contract" concept, which fits in with his "Berlin Program." A close friend of Kendzia’s, (fnu) Nerchert, resigned from the NPD. to protest..its participation in the presidential election in Berlin 6n 5 March and has already made overtures to the FDP.) 4 12..- Since Keadzia? s resignation and the 10 April executive meet=- ing, Hanover leadership. Rebuschat and Andreas).have attended annual election meetings in all 12 party:districts, Through their influence, pro-von Thadden or neutral District Executive Committees have been elected in each case.s§ . The district officers who led the opposition to the self-dissolution S ECR E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM the Berlin City Executive ‘Committee (under Kendzia's behind-the~ scénes tutelage) has kept the Berlin NPD functioning and loyal to the - Executive Committee members (especially Schwerdt, 3 2 t
wat ence ammeter ewe tegen a! smnemenes pets miaceaee 5 8 3 2 a ‘th S EC R 5 T/NO FOREIGN DISSEN Page 4 of 4 PAGES ; CS-211/06103-69 of the Berlin NPD last fall nave been effectively expelled of neu< tralized, As of. early May, Loyalist influence had been greatly re- duced, Although there is now no Significant internal oppos ition ‘group, there was a-.call pending for formation of an informal “group representing both the city organization and the ‘districts to propose organizational changes. Routine monthly district: mee thigs with "guests" from West Germany, whenever possible, are to be continued, under the watchful eye of the .pro-tem Executive | Committee, until — next. “October. when the party convention of the: Berlin NPD will elect a new: leadership. . 13; Schuetz" attenpts ‘bo have ‘the NPD banned in Berlin have not been taken: ‘seriously; Local party activists are preparing to- Lsupport ‘the NPD election campaign in West Germany by sending volun- téecr workers. vA letter appealing for such ‘he Ip states that the de= 2 “eisive’ ‘electoral campaign which will determine whether or not. the ~.NBD. gets into the Bundéstag will be- waged in ‘North Rhine-Westphalia, _ Atr: fare and Living: expense subsidies are being offered to volun- - teers who are to distribute Veaflets; put up posters and ring door=- | ' bellg.. (Field Comment: The °NPD made tnroads in North Rhine= ‘Westphalia “during the economic recession of 1965-66, and the NPD a “mational leadership is count ing heavily on salvaging their foothold in the ‘Bie Vefeld-Ruhr area. e) : , ; “14. The main ‘NPD weapons in’ the national election campaign are to be pamphlets. describing the party's election platform, One is- to be distributed beiween 1 and 15 June; a follow-up pamphlet, be~ tween 15 and 30 August; and a third pamphlet on the eve of the elec<- tion. Each will be printed in 15,000,000 copies. Distribution will be handled by two firms--Velbringer Company and Erdmann Company, : 15. Ruediger Kratiss, head of the NPD's student organization, the National University League (Nationater Hochschulbund - NHB), - has moved from Berlin to Bonn to assume the post of chairman of the . Bonn City NPD Executive Committee. Von Thadden plans to.use the tactic of moving reliable leaders into critical areas after the i. elections, For example, he plans to move a Bavarian NPD officer to : Berlin and assume the chairmanship of the Berlin NPD, In an attempt to obtain legal recognition for the NHB in Berlin, (fnu) von Hindy, a Hungarian law student and gocd friend of Krauss, is to be ap- pointed Krauss’ successor, -16, Field Dissem: USBER, DCSI/USCOB (Also sent . SECR E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM wo RP GD & tt
14-00000 NO FOREIGN O18SRM To ge 5 -SRcaREeTr | en = vies Geut Germany _ re et ' June 1968 ECT West German Winistry of Interior. TT Evaluption of the Prospects of * Hanning the Nstional Domocratic . Party : es [ ME.) OGA-B18 ~ Sunzury:. In June 1968, the Yest German Nintatry of tho Interior prepared a bagic atudy of the prospects of banning the Best Geraan Nacional Deaocratic Party (NPD). The sumnury of this study given below describes the major charges which the government could bring againgt the NPD, the defeuses the NPD could be expected Co make agsinet these charges, and the probable politicr] cesults which would follew beth a guecesziul and en unsuccessful cage againat the NPL, According to the source, thia atudy ia still coneldered the hagic Intertor Ministry evaluation of the case agaiast the N?2D rzud 4a being atudied by senior federal government and state (and) officinis, End of Suumary.. . t. CPield Coament: For several yeara, West German political ‘and governuent ledders have debated seeking @ congtitutional court ban on the NPD. Gu (13 Nevesber 1984, Ernst Benda, Yeast Geran Interior Mintater, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg Eilegstuager that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a sult againet the NPD. Kleasinger, howéver, cpposed bringing a suit, and the sub- ject becase cmbrotled in Best Gerwao politica. On 23 April 1969, the Federal Cabinet dectded aot to geck & court ban of the NPD, at lesat until after the September electiona. This deciaton wag prompted by evidence thet the NPD was waking no mesbership gains and: apparently was loging populer support.) t t ‘ 8 RC RE T/NO YORBIGN DISS¥M SVR oe
S ECR Tt. Ko Fo N DRESSES Page 2. 2. Yu dune 1968, tne Reet Geratin Inter tor: dinivery, prepared n 50-pege study of Che prospec ty Lor d.agemaag the APD eativled "Cons ideratious Regarding @ Yan of the Navaghal Dvavoratic Party." The study. was well prepered acd ecrefylly written, “Itiis: still cansideved the bagyle Interior ‘Miniatry paper on the Wed aud is”. being ptudied by sentor of fichals of. :both che Cudéral sad space. governments. It avoids | xiving:. an oplatoa on: the prospects ‘of ob< taining a court deciston Agdinst the NPD, buc {row the conteat of the study, && is’ clevr that the authors’ believed’ ¢ chat ithe “CONF tS’ ~ would probably reject A xoverracat proposal to dau: che. ‘NPD.. ; “¢Bield. comment: - Yio the study ig still ‘cous ide red’: current, “it ts ‘-unciesr hes how it it fits with. Benda "a November 1960 statenent.. that there . @ag suificrent evidence tc ebtaia @ ban ugatust ene RED. There 72: Have been other reports, hawever, that ihe evidénce wis vot as . *-@lear-cut as Benda would. have had the Chance Llor’ selieve. See, for example, SGN-3394,) 3. The study yumearized ibe case which could be brought agaiast the NPV aa follows! . a. Yt could be shown thac there was a siullarity between the NPD and the National Sccialiat Gerann Workers Party (NSDAP) which has twen out lawed.- i b. Ft could be sryuad tuat the xools, and parte af the parcy plactorm, of tke NPO are cnotrary to the pria- Ciples of a free democratic etare. The study concludes Chat a sufficiently strony cane could be pre~- sented te prevent the case being turowa out by*the courts without a hearing. 4. The study lists the. following potaia which the NPD could be expected to use in its detense: &, The pacty could prove that ic bas given firm (netruc~ fiyuy ty Ste meisbecg sus to enue du mesea van or gieleave, b. It could show thet a sizeable ausber of rormer NSOAP meabers have been forced out of the party as part of the Selbstreinigunag (seli-cieaning}) process. ce. At eould potat our many feacures of ita progrea which are in accord with democratic pracciples. ad. ft could show tnat its elected regrosentatives have worked wath other parties and have wot disrupted the Lendtage (atate dicts) and other elected bodies in which they participate, @. Ut could goint out that other political parties have manv ex-Nazis sad ex~communists as mubers and could claim chat che majority of the 28,006 NPD aimbera are not opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic. $. It would charge that the government’s charyes vere one-gided, unfairly preseuted, and out of date, we It would claim that not all of Professor (fav) Anrvich * a points were iucluded tn tne party plat- form. (Pisld Comment: Aprich is uppareatly a rightist whose proposals | Were more extrese than chose incorporated in the party pilatfors.) i. Yt could claim thac the increased violinee (Verrohuny) of the policical climate in West Germany is the faalt of the New Left end not of the NPD, S FPR FE PUNA PARETGN MmISSRE
S ECR E T/HO FOREIGN DISSEM Page 3 $. The study vtates tbhac ic would be very disficult.to re- fuce these yep defcases tu court. The governscnt would have fo adwale that Sings. eerly 1968 there have been very few stateaents mide by NPD leaders, oF incidents caused by the NPD, which could be-used to SUGDIE, Lhe goveromcat’ Bw CASO. . ‘Objcetively, tf would - have to. be admitted: that many incideats of violence in which the | , NPD haa been tovoived. were initiated: by opponc nis of ube party. ; 6. ‘Phe etudy’ predicts” the following probabie results should the” goverume ut vie 469, ‘Cane against he NPD: me, ete ns _ Phe. NPD would’ probably reppeet the prohibicioa, it is very, Wolikely that. the NPD would atteapt co go uader- éround 26 the {legal Comiunise Perty of Geraony CKPD). did. : “bo NPB mewibers and ayapathizere would ont chenage their opinions because of a ban, Many sould goka, other groups or parties and continus to work for their politics] beliefs. c. NPD aad rightist sympathizers vould beyin a Case paiga for the banning of Che new Cerman Coomunist Party: (DEP) ard other leftist groups. ad. A ban of tue HPD would be wel received in foreigs countrics. ?, The study conelodey thac Lf tbe goveragent shoula lose a ease ayainet the HPS, bt would be the result of the Lack at valid evidence (Reweigsschwiorigkciten}). Eu such aa eveat, the followiag adverse affects vouls occur: - : . a. The NPD would receive a new impetus aad valuable publicity. b. The pulley of Selbstreinigung which has had some a Pe ano success ip Keeping forner Nuzie cut of key positteas vould be hnited. ec. Many widdle-class persons who synpathize wilh the nr, but who bave refrained from open support becruse of the utigoa of being assocldted wich 2 party which could be declared illegal, would goin the party or become active supporters. a. The party wountd undoubtedly attract more seabers, {(Ficitd Comment: The NPL leaderstip ia kuoen to be worried heosuse the party’s aeabership nas wot increased sigaifi- crotly during the pase 16 months.) 8. Field Dissem: Sabassy Donn, USBRER. SECRE T/NO FaRsiGy BISSsy
) errrir ee Secret , 20 : Lo "+ No Foreign Disses DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY s) UMMARY Special Report West Germany's. National Democrats and the Grand Coalition Secret Ne 9 I 9
14-00000 SECRET ant WEST-GERMANY'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATS AND THE GRAND COALITION * Gernaay's far- right National Democrati¢ Party” : (NPD) ‘showed another increase in strength in recent ; elections ia Baden-Wuerttemberg, while the Social oo Democrats “({SPD). lost heavily. This‘ outcome in a ; , of traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears to stem in part from the dissat isfaction of many oo ’ Socialists and trade unionists in the SPD with ’ , " ‘ their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian ‘Democrats (CDU). Another factor was the discontent . \ ’ of farmers.and refugees with the policies of the | Grand Coalition in Bonn. Concern over student dis~ H _ orders contributed to the NPD gains, but this was . | . not as-decisive as some have supposed... Despite - : these gains, the NPD is unlikely to achieve a : growth comparable to that of the Nazi Party in the | early 1930s. : . The outcome in Baden-Wuerttemberg confirmed ; the belief of many Socialists that their cocvera- : ; tion with the CDU at both the national and state : level is preving to be unprofitable for the party. : As a result, they have alreacy decided at the state : level not to renew cabinet cocperation with the i CBU in Baden-Wuerttemberg, thus making prospects ‘ for the Bonn coalition appear less favorable. Nevertheless, SPD leaders in Bonn remain committed _to the. Grand Coalition and serious instability at, 7 the federal ievel seems unlikely. Over the long run the outcome of this latest election may have te certain implications nationally, including the . : possibility that Bonn leaders may be encouraged 4: . to take a more nationalist line. The NPD's Success more than in the last Baden- : . Waerttemberg state election in : The West German state elec- iss, but 15 percent less than tions in Bacen-Wuerttesberg on in the 1965 federal election. 28 April breught the far-right . ; National Democratic Party (NPD) Christian Democratic Union of, 9,8 percent of the vote, the (C>Z) strength fell slightly to : most impressive total it has yet 44.3 percent (1964: 46.2 per- : ; attained in any state. about 71 cent), while the Social Demo- : percent of the voters turned cratic Party (SPD) achieved a out, approximately three percent vote of only 29.1 percent (1964: SECRET Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
SECRET PARTIES INS ~BADEN- WUERTTEMBERG 90436 3 68 . . - 37.3 percent). The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), made a slight gain, winning 14.4 percent of the vote (1964: 13.1 percent). Against the background of last October's Bremen elections, in which the National Democratic Party won what was then a record percentage of 8.9, the Baden- Wuerttemberg results brought re- newed cries of alarm over the dangers of neo-Nazism in the Fed- eral Repubiic. More important, the results also raised doubts as to the future of a coalition government by the Ghristian Dem- ocrats and Social Democrats, not only in Baden-Wuerttemberg but at the federal government level as well, Baden-Wuerttemberg: A Test Case Baden and Wuerttemberg tra- ditionally have been strongholds of liberal, nonsocialist democ- racy in Germany. In the early 1930s, the Nazi vote in this area was almost always appreci- { 2 ably lower than elsewhere in Germany. The hotbeds of Nazism lay in other regions, for ex- ample in Franconia, East Prugsia, t " and. Schleswig-Holstein. “The economic and social pic- ture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would lead to expectations of stability there. The proportion ‘of the population. now employed in in- dustry -is higher than in any other state. The economy of the state was virtually untouched by the recent West German recession, during which unemployment never exceeded one percent. Per. cap- ita income is. above average. Protestants and Catholics are almost evenly balanced in pop- ulation, while the proportion of protestants in the Federal Re- public is slightly higher. A few observers correctly forecast the outcome, but the general expectation was that the vote for the National Democratic Party would be lower than in Bremen. The two major West Ger-~ man polling organizations had predicted in March that the NPD would receive five percent of the vote, Federal-level politicians had campaigned actively in the state. Charmcellor Kurt Kiesinger, a popular native son, made a three-day speaking tour, in which he sharply attacked “arrogant, thoughtless, and dangerous na- tionalism.” He stressed this theme in the Hohenlohe area, where the NPD later received its highest vote in the state. Willy Brandt also appeared to speak for the Social Democrats. SECRET Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
-SECRET — NPD Representation inv West German States SAAR POT 3 38 6.9% (4 seats} 2} April ‘of iN 5.8%.(4 erate) 23 April °97 LOWER. SANONY NORTH REBAR. WPS EPHALIA 7.9% (3 senes) 6 Now ‘06 RIENELAND. DALATINATE BADEN- WUERTTEMBERG SECRET Page 3° SPECIAL REPORT 7% (10 nents) 4 June ‘s7 > BAMARIA 31 May 68 '
14-00000 The participation by na~.. - tional figures reflected a feel- ing in-Bonn that this state elec- tion, the last before the 1969 federal. election, might influence national politics. The dnalogy to the. federal scene was pointed ‘up by the existence in Baden-, Wuerttemberg of a coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, similar to that in- Bonn. Reaction to, Student Riots Ia looking for explanations “of the NPD gains, German observ= ers have emphasized the public reaction against the Easter stu- dent rioting, and dissatisfaction with the federal grand coalition. Conservatives. lean to the former explanation, while students and trade unionists stress the latter. The NPD did not receive less than, .. 6 percent in any. electoral dis- trict. This suggests that the . «sentiment expressed by the vote. is widespread, and may extend throughout the FRG. Reaction to student rioting probably contributed something, but this aspect seems to have been exaggerated as a factor in NPD gains. In Heidelberg, the NPD vote rose to 11.9 percent, but in three other university towns, the party's vote fell. below the state average of 9.8 percent. In industrial Esslingen, where there had been two stu- dent riots, the NPD only attained 9 percent. Some voters may have been influenced by student dem- enstrations to transfer their votes from the SPD to the CDU, whose spokesmen have generally ad- vocated a stern treatment of rioters. | | i “at the same’ time, ‘the -“néw. left" cértainly failed to win” popular support. The Democratic Left, supported by radical stu- dents, won only 2. 3 percent in the state as a whole, while mak- ing better showings in certain university and industrial local- ities.. While the Democratic Left's state-wide average was bet- ter’ than the far left had at~- tained in recent elections under other names, it fell below the last, low figure gained by the Communists before they became illegal: 3.2 percent. Hostility to the Grand Coalition? There is dissatisfaction with the coalition within the- cbuU, and it can be. assumed that some of the party's right wing voted for the National Democrats. ‘| The Socialists, however, suffered | the greater loss, Left-of-center ‘Socialists often complain that the party has compromised its principles and lost public favor. There is an undercurrent of feel- ing in these quarters that the party has endangered German democ- racy .by abandoning its long- time position of opposition and entering into collaboration with the CbU. Although the SPD has pro- vided much of the impetus to the grand coalition's economic and foreign policies, and although the coalition in Baden-Wuerttem- berg has generally functioned well, dissatisfaction undoubtedly exists among idealistic members 1 of the left and among tradition- ! ally class-conscious union. mem- bers. Middle class voters of this persuasion probably turned SECRET Page 4 “SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
‘ \ i i i } BOREAS et ad .to the Free Democratié Party, -which has assumed the role’ of ‘respectable oppésition. -TRe- connection between ‘this: left-" * liberal eriticism and the NPD gains on. 28 April ‘is not- ~-imme-_ diately apparent. we te Some commentators including . 'gome Socialists j~ “conclude. that: many ‘SPD voters defected to the ‘NPD. The respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung fudged some ot the election data to support its argument that workers had gone over to the NPD, but.a more careful analysis has shown that the NPD did indeed win above~av- erage support.in some working~ class neighborhoods. Many. old Socialists and trade unionists, such as Willi Bleicher, the powerful boss of the metalworkers in this state, are cool to the coalition and . hostile to intellectuals, and some of them are repelled by an-- archic student leftisn. most workers are unlikely under gonditions of full employment ‘to. east what they would consider a neo-Nazi vote; certainly Bleicher would never favor such action. SPD electoral losses would seem te be due less to defection to the NPD than to the failure of lower-level SPD functionaries, avathetic, or evenhostile toward the coalition, to get out’ the vete, and to the failure of many trade union and normally SPD voters to go to the polls. In traditionally socialist Mannheim, only 58 percent of those entitled to vote turned out. SPD percentages dropped 14 per- cent in one district and 13 per- Even 30, — | -eént in another. Thé percentage’ -of NPD. strength rose to 12.1, 10.9,. and 11.2 in the three city districts, but working class- votes would not be needed to pro- vide these percentages, espe= ‘cially in the face of -a low SPD tUfnout. These. votes probably came mainly from the CDU, the FOP, of from those who had not voted before. NPD Activity Pays Off The NPD organization worked hard during the campaign, con- ducting more meetings than all the other parties put together. The party has overcome its former inexperience and disunity,. and is developing into a well-oiled political machine. The organ- ization fields speakers and pro-~- vides canned speeches and prop- aganda materials to local groups. The NPD's heritage is not purely Nazi. It encompasses more re- spectable antecedents, such as the Deutschnationaler (German Nationalists) and other conser~ vative elements. In the inter- ests of avoiding a government ban, the National Democratic Party shuns blatantly Nazi appeals and tactics. Adolf von Thadden, the na~ tional leader of the NPD, is a smooth personality from a Junker family who denies charges that he was an active Nazi. He seems to model himself more on De Gaulle than on Hitler. The Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the party, Wilhelm Gutmann, is a former Nazi. During “the good old days," he was Buergermeister of Tiengen on the Swiss border, ‘where he .sponsored anti-Semitic SECRET Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
activities in (1938. | He refused to permit the raising: of white flags when the Allied forces ar- rived in 1945. - Despite his past, he won 15,000 votes in Karlsruhe, In one. commune in the’ northern endof the state, the NPD gained ~~ anh absolute majority with 55 per- cent of thé vote; this was. the; home of an NPD candidate named. Valentin’ Goetz, who had been :>; voted out ‘as Buergermeister . two years before. — . The NPD won its greatest relative successes in three northern districts: Oehringen (14.8 percent), Crailsheim (14.5 percent), and Tauberbischofsheim (14.3 percent). The first two of these districts are largely prot- estant; the latter is predomi- nantly Catholic. This northern area, and especially its Hohen~ lohe section, is ‘filled with dis- satisfied small farmers, who. now face Common Market. competition ADOLF VON THADDEN SECRET SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68 Page 6 and who have recently suffered the’ loss of a-state subsidy ‘on milk. Rural dissatisfaction pro- vides opportunities for the NPD, but this is not va promising base _ for a mass movement, particularly sifice the farm population in. the ‘Federal Republic has dropped in the last ten years from 20 per- cent to ll percent. Another im- portant voting factor in this. | northern area is the relatively high proportion of refugees, who were probably aroused by recent Statements by Willy Brandt about the Oder-Neisse line and by -the failure of the COU to* react more forcefully against Brandt. As was the case in the early 1930s, overwhelmingly Catholic areas, where the Church influences its members politi- cally, had the lowest right ex- tremist vote. One overwhelm- ingly Protestant district, FPreudenstadt, also produced a WILHELM GUTMANN 1
AEST Patt a ee a low. NPD vote. A postelection .. poll of 1967 voters’ in Bremen _ showed. that, ‘Unlike. the | Hitler’ " movement, ‘the National: Democrats — do not yet attract many women and youth. More than two ‘thirds ~. Of the voters ‘for the. party, | Were males, and the strongest. _ participation was in the 45 to .60 age bracket. For Gains and Losses The FDP profited from its position in the opposition. Ralf Dahrendorf, a séciologist from the University of. Konstanz with an international reputation, has recently entered the party and has assumed a leading role, in- luencing the FDP in a loftward direction and attracting left- liberal support. In the Stuttgart district where he was a candidate, the party vote rose by 6 percent. On the other hand, the new pat- tern is not acceptable to many old members of this tradition~ ally business-oriented party, who looking askance at Dahrendorf’s readiness to debate and discuss with Rudi Dutschke and other rad- ical students. ‘Two of the three districts with heaviest NPD gains also showed heavy FDP losses, as aid some other former FDP areas of strength. . : Perspectives on the Vote The over-all picture appears te be that while both the Chris- tian Democrats and the Free Demo~ erats lost to the NPD, they gained at the expense of the Socialists. The Socialists suffered from ‘ apathy and incurred some loss to both the NPD and Demecratic Left. The NPD probably garnered some margin -in March. SECRET new and’ uncommitted votes, It is fortunate for the ‘SPD jJeaders dn Bonn-that the annual party congress came before- the Baden- Wierttemberg election. It is hardly likely that the congress would now defeat a motion with- holding. endorsement of the coall- tion, as it did by a four-vote Assuming the SPD remains faithful to the . Bonn coalition now, the prospects are for further erosion of its Strength and for greater diffi- culties within its ranks. Meanwhile, the NPD probably will continue to grow in in- fluence. ‘It now is probably stronger in some other areas than in Baden-Wuerttemberg. A change from proportional rep- resentation to single-member.—. .. constituencies, which might have o Tauber JManaheim bischulsheim Baden- .. Wuerttemberg — Heitelbors Ocheingen Heilbroan. . 5 . Cralishein eRarksrabe ‘ Plorsheint gSTUTTGART ® Enlingen Freudenstadt Tuchingen e . Ulm oFrevburg Tiengen Constanz , . 90671 $-68 SECRET Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
,, hot seem to be warranted. early 1930s, Germany seived: to block - “NPD growth, has .. now ‘become even’ “less acceptable than "be fore’ to the SPp, which, would have 16st three-fifths of its Baden-Wuerttenberg. seats under. this. Syste A ban of: the. NPD appears” — unlikely unless" the party com- ~ mits some flagrant violation of _accépted rules. A Bonn prass of- | fice spokesman has stated that ithe government will seek a po~ ‘litical debate with the NPD, and ‘not aban. On present form, the NPD may get 40 seats in the 1969 Bundestag elections. An attempt to set a higher minimum per- centage of votes (present mini- ". mum: five percent) for Bundestag. ropresentation would arouse. - violent FPD opposition, and does not seem to be under serious con- Sideration at the moment. It would violate German traditton, and might produce a reaction in favor of the NPN, enabling it to overstep even the new margin. Although. the growth of the NPD is disturbing, alarm does In the suffered from depression and high unem- ployment, and had bitter memoriés of a recent inflation which wiped out savings. Powerful elements in the government and society/ including President von Hinden~ berg, the army, the courts, and heavy industry, were highly re- actionary and either cool er hos~ tile to republican democracy~~as were the professors and students. Racism was rampant and more or less respectable, and unwilling- ness to accept defeat in World War I provided endless opportu- ry “manifestations. velopment. -nities for defiagoguery. All thesé conditions are: now vir- tually absent. The defeat in 1945, and subsequent disclosures, work to discredit. any real Nazi. Moreover, the fact that .no other state will elect a-new assembly before the 1969 federal elections may help to prevent a real bandwagon de= = - It must be emphasized that the NPD is still a small party, if no longer a mere splin- ter group. The Coalition Problem German observers tend to be more worried about the effect of the NPD showing on foreign opin- ion than about the increase in NPD strength itself, and their greatest concerh is over the pros- pects for the grand coalition, resulting from the SPD losses. A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD conven- tion voted on 18 May against con- tinuing the coalition in Stuttgart, and the old state SPD leaders Yesigned. This would seem to make the prospects for the Bonn coalition less favorable. At the same time, the FDP appears not to be in a mood to return to a coalition in either Bonn or Stuttgart. Dahrendorf has suggested that there might be a CDU minority government in the State, State CDU leaders may, however, prefer to call new elec- tions if a coalition cannot Be formed. In this evént, they would appeal for an absolute ma- jority from the voters. If they got it and if the NPD vote de- clined, this would be encouraging, but new elections might also have a less favorable outcome. SECRET Page 8 SPECIAL REPORT _ 31 -May 68
seta Th oe ASP tc ke will arise in- Born. With this . kind of ‘a breakdown of .the vote, ' the -FDP ‘and the. SPD together can- ~ not form ‘a majofity, and ‘a -re- fusal Gn the part of both of them to join the’ cbU means that the ‘latter cannot organize a ma-— jority government either--unless: the CDU invites NPD 'collabora-. tion, which it. is far from ready to do. _ A collapse of the grand ‘coalition in Bonn either before -Oor after 1969 and a return by: the SPD to opposition positions would signify more than a passing cabinet crisis. In the past, parties ‘tended to harden into intransigence, committed to par- ticular ideological and material interests, and undblé to reach pragmatic compromises with each other. In recent years, West German politicidns have tried ‘to break with this ‘tradition and to work oa the consensus prin-. ciple. A failure of these ef~ _ forts would have serious - ‘impli< . cations. I£--as does not Seem. likely at present--the three major parties were unable to form a majority government, this might lead to severe instability and the discrediting of par- liamencary government. Bonn and Weimar Many misleading analogies have been drawn between the Bonn and Weimar republics. One Weimar precedent may help, however, to : Lf the, 1969 ‘{éderal election: .. follows thé pattern: of the 28-: . ‘April -€lettion,. the ‘same ‘problems " SECRET. explain why some observers view - the coalition problem seriously. In March 1930, another grand coalition with SPD participation collapsed over ‘the ‘question of cuts in unemployment insurance, leading to ‘the formation of a conservative majority government under Heinrich Bruening. Bruening was later replaced by the reac- °’ tionary Franz von Papen, who in turn was followed first by a wire-. pulling general, Kurt von Schlei-~- cher, and then by Adolf Hitler. The worst aspect of the SPD with- drawal was that it made the par- liament ineffective and power- less, Once minority government was embarked on, supported by presi- dential prerogatives, there was no effective test for legitimacy ‘except the will of Hindenburg by then susceptible and old. The Nazis ultimately came to power, not by a majority vote, but through the paralysis and impotence of the constitutional system and through intrigues in the presidential palace on the part of those, espe- Cially Papen and Schleicher, who _ thought they could “use" Nazi mass support. In contrast to the 30s, the presidential powers now are far weaker,* and aside from all the other factors inhibiting a recurrence, the Weimar precedent itself must influence SPD leaders in Bonn. They are completely committed personally to the pres~ ent coalition. A decision to go into opposition is unlikely under Brandt and Wehner. *The absence of executive emergency powers is not of course without dangers. In a bitter parliamentary deadlock, an illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extrugovernmental elements, might be the only way out. So SECRET Page 9 _ SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
14-00000 SECREF a “another possibility might be @ ‘left-wing’ withdrawal .from the SPD, although the leadership for a dissident. faction has yet te" emerge. This_might provide ‘a healthy outlet “for ‘Criticism of the system withoot? a turn to - minority rule. Unlike the early 1930s, virtually all West Ger- man politicians now would do their best to maintain a functioning : constitutional system. Real. ~ dangers will probably not arise unless, as in the late Weimar period, the government finds it- self confronted with economic or political problems which seem to defy compromise settlement or yational solution: Immediate Prospects Assuming that the Bonn co- alition lasts until the 1969 elections, its leading members may still modify their policies somewhat in the light of the Baden-Wuerttemberg experience. The adverse vote of the refugees in the recent election could act as a brake on the policy of de- tente with Czechoslovakia and Poland, although there is neo sign of this as yet. Chancellor Kie- singer has attributed NPD gains partly to “years of agitation - against our own history and against healthy self-confidence," which suggests that he may try to sound a more nationalistic note. To the extent to which. the results continue to be attributed to studént activities, this will “Strengthen the demand for firm=- ness. Even before the election, Brandt sent a telegram to SPD state headquarters, advising that Speakers should react “completely hard" against student demonstra- tions. Although the antistudent re- action does not seem to have been as important a factor as some have ‘believed it to be, constant vio- lence and provocation on the part of the students, accompanied by constant press attention, could lead to severe official or unof- ficial counteraction. This. in turn, could bring more serious Student violence, verhaps with the support of other elements. Some matters of student con- cern have appeal for others. Thus students and many trade unionists oppose emergency laws, and this question is again being agitated. Because of the Nazi experience, there is widespread aversion among left-of-center elements to the use of force in the name of “or- der," however great the provoca- tion. But also because of the Nazi experience, a really large increase in NPD votes does not seem likely in the 1969 election, or in an earlier new election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL) SECRET Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT . 31 May 68
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14-00000 wah wards nanargce SO Secret co! Ne Fereign Dissem rer’ bine ee cuntyah Caeeginnateey emt dey INTELLIGENCE The National Democratic Party in West Germany Special Report | WEEKLY REVIEW . , , Secret Po ' Ne 310 ‘ : Ty, ; : \9 June 19877
14-00000 Ae NES Rae ean site SO URS nr eer) Tee ADs ae an te THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY: IN WEST GERNANY . The poor ‘showing of the ultranatilonalistic. National Democratic Party (NPD): in recent elections in several Wést German states clearly disproves the party's claim of providing an acceptable alternative to the policies and programs of the country's maior parties. The NPD's failure to, maintain the momentum suggested by the successes scored in two state - elections last fall.is directly attributable both to its own well-publicized interhal dissension and to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and Secialists deriving from the image of vigor and decisiveness imparted by their “grand coalition® under Chancellor Kiesinger. Barring some serious reversal in the fortunes of the Kiesinger government-- which is unlikely--it is doubtful that the NPD will be any more successful than other fringe groups have been in seeking to rally latent right-radical senti- ment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political ferce. Election Setbacks The NPD has claimed wide attention both in Germany and abroad and led many observers to conclude that it was a force to be reckoned with, “Within two and a half years of its founding in November 1964, the party elected representatives to the legislatures in five of West Germany's ten states (11 counting West Berliny. In elections this April the party was expected to obtain close to 10 percent of the vote in Rhineland-Palatinate and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig- Holstein but actually won only four seats in each parliament with 6.9 and 5.8 percent of the 1 4 base bastion" of Lower Saxony, the NPD's performance was simi~ larly unimpressive-<-7 rercent of the. vote and 10 Lanétag seats.. Emphasis by party leaders on their success in gaining rep= resentation in all the states where the party has comreted during the past year has not masked their disappointment that the NPD's momentum of growth has leveled off. The party's failure to make a good showing in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony~~areas considered particu- Jarly susceptible to nationalist appeals--is especially damaging, and raises fundamental goubt about the party's future pros- vote respectively. In the 4 June -pects. election in the party's “home SECRET Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67 £
a ee oy SECRET. - a“ NPD Representation in West German States a 5.8% (4 seoes) SCHEELS WIG. . FREMEN x - LOWER © f "SAXONY MOVIE RHINE 8 “ WESTPHALIA ‘ : : 7.9% (8 seata) 6.9% (4 seats) REUINEL ANDY Be ” SAAR - BADEN. 74% (45 seats} : WUERTTEMBERG ~ > BAVARIA 86840 6 AF : SECRET
14-00000 SECRET Origins: and Early Successes elections in Bavaria and Schleswig= , ; - oe . Holstein in March 1966, however, . tt : “Pérmed from ‘the remnants of.. the NPD showed that it could com- Laer coe, thé defunct German Reich - ‘Party mand pockets of strength. In the en, (DRP)--6ne of a numberof ultra- | Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and _ oa . nationalistic. splinter groups | Bayreuth, it received between 7 . (oo ha thom, _, which | have dotted the political uo a : landscape of postwar Germany=~ the, . . ve NPD. quickly established a polit-" mo, . ical apparatus capable of func- Tae . . tioning throvghout the country. : . The new party soon distinguished elected representatives to the lo- cal governing councils. These gains were facilitated by concen- trating the party's efforts in selected areas such as the Protes- tant centers of Middle and Upper ‘Franconia in heavily Catholic Bavaria. itself by its relative success in attracting the support of other ultranationalistic-elements and a : variety of political: malcontents. 2 Earlier-attemrts by other groups The first clear demonstra- a . ” to unite’ disparate nationalists tion that the NPD could attract 7 invariably had foundered on -per- more than the ultrarationalist N . gonadal rivalries and tactical.dis~ vote came two weeks later in "" agreements. Some were. no more Hamburg, where the party nearly than platforms for self~expres- doubled its vote as compared with sion by leaders: advocating a the Bundestag election the year particular set of extremist no- before. Although the NPD failed tions. Even the most successful, to elect any deputies, the Chris- , the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), tian Democrats and the Socialists 7 which at its high water mark were concerned about its ability obtained 11 percent of the vote | tO secure even 3.9 percent of in the. Lower Saxeny Landtag elec- the vote. The threat to the tra- : tions in 1951, was unable to | ditional third party, the conserva- i establish effective working rela- tive Free Democrats (FDP) became : tions with rival rightist groups apparent. The FDP fell a third before it was outlawed by the below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of West German supreme court in its 12 seats in the Hamburg city 1952. - _council. Profiting from a decline ‘in the economy which was already under way and the increasing pub- lic disenchantment with the lead- ership of then Chancellor Erhard in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both | its organizational effort and its public relations campaign, | ; During its first year, the : NPD encountered many of the prob- . lems experienced by its predeces- sors. ‘The party was unable to put on an effective campaign for the September 1965 national elections : and obtained only 2 percent of : the votes--short of the 5-percent ' minimum required for representa- 2 tion in the Bundestag. In local The stage was then set for the party's breakthrough in the Hesse and Bavaria state elections t ot SECRET Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
14-00000 bro. a last fallin which it won 7.9 and 7.4-percont of ‘the vote and elected 8 and 1S debduties respec: tively. “En: Bavaria the NPD emerged -as the only small party. in the Landtag, ‘gausing the -FDP to lose its ‘representation in the . legislatdrd for the -first, time in ’ tts history. © By usderlining the — weakness of ‘the FCP, the election outcome contributed to the forma- tion of the grand ccalition gov- ernment in Bonn by the Christian Democrata and the Socialists. For the major parties, the NPD's successes had disturbing implications, In contrast to its yarious predecessors, the NPD appeared cunpable of mobilizing urban as well as ruzal support and of altering the general trend long evident in most West German elections toward a two-party system. In Hesse, the combined yote of the Christian Democrats and Socialists was a lower per- ‘centage of the total vote than in the pravicus election four years earlier. Still more significantly, however, Hesse and Bavaria pro- vided further evidence cf the PD's ability to attract “pro- test" votes from various dis- affected lower-middie-class ele- ments including small businessmen and farmers unhappy with their lot in. present-day Germany. Basic Characteristi es and Sources of Surrert 3 2 oO In spite of its Girect lineage from the old German Reich Party, the NPD has tried to dispel the impression among om the general public that it is the spiritual heir of Hitler's Na- | tional Socialists. The party has sought acceptance as a. legitinate ‘political party and insists. that it intends to function within the established democratic order. Party spokesmen maintain that it. differs 1rom the established par~ tiés primarily in its allegedly superior devotion to the national interast, which they accuse the governing parties in Bonn of having failed to protect. (The NPD says it offers the voter a genuine choice between bankrupt policies of the major parties and a@ return to national morality. As mach as some NPD support- ers might wish to play down the party's Nazi associations, how~ ever, it has been clearly estab- lished that the leadership con- sists of a nucleus of former Nazis.who nave been active in neo-Nazi parties throughout the postwar years. According to police reports, some 2,000 of the estimated 25,000 members of the NPD belonged to the Nazi party before 1933. This ratio is roughly eight times that for the public as a whole. The party has lost libel suits in which it has chal- lenged charges of neo-Nazism. The German Interior Ministry notes the parallels in political eutlook and philosophy between the NPD and the Nazis, and main- tains that the party's activities “approach” unconstitutionality. In the words of one former party member, the NPD is made up of people "who have forgotten nothing and learned nothing" from Germany's past. SECRET Page ¢@ SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
er ae Beate ei Paleo nents 8a Ce ee re me me ae Pe poets 2 Tam ene TA oe sate _law that would make it more dif- . Bundestag representation. so ; SEGRET The Bonn government is gen- erally reluctant, however, to ban the NPD, believing that it would be imprudent .to drive the ultra- rightists underground... if the NPD were to ‘score impressive new. successes in future elections, thewever, the resulting concern in the major parties might’ prompt a reconsideration of this policy. Interior Minister Luecke favors banning the party as socn as .enough evidence can be obtained to assure successful court action. It is also possible that new '-- NPD gains would motivate the : established parties to make pro= posed changes in the electoral ficult for the NPD to obtain Although the NPD pregram is strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian Kational Socialism, the vcarty's electoral supporters in Hesse and Bavaria also include persons tions or any particular suscepti- bility to Nazism per se. It has managed to attract impulsive youngsters, as well as political malcontents of all ages. . Its membership includes individuals from a broad range of occupations. The NPD's special appeal among the lower-middle-class, and par~- ticularly among the small business- men and farmers is reinforced by the economic squeeze these groups are experiencing as a result of gcvernment economy measures. In Hesse and Bavaria, the party did especially well in areas noted for traditional German nationalism and in areas which are predomi- nantly Protestant. Many NPD ad- herents are expellees from the territories lost at. the end of World War IT. . The makeup of the formal NPD membership is not radically different in age or occupation group from a. cross section of the - general public. However, there are certain characteristics of NPD supporters which set them apart from supporters of the three major-parties. The NPD tends to attract a somewhat larger number of older persons as well as young adults, and the number of lower middle class members, including pensioners, is dis- proportionately large. Formal membership among students, how~- ever, is very small and only 350 of a total of 244,000 university students are on the party rolls.. There is no evidence that the KPD receives significant financial support from German industrialists. It is, however, able to operate in the black. The sound state of its finances is in part a result of its prac- tice of charging admission to its rallies. This serves the double function of making the rank and file feel that they have a stake in the party and of making it necessary for its opponents to pay for the right to heckle. The party also derives considerable sums from membership dues, sub- scriptions to party publications, and donations from members and sympathizers. SECRET Page § SPECIAL REPORT § Jun 67
SECREDP oe Party leader Von Thadden at Second NPD Congress at Karlsruhe, June 1966 NPD audience: a charactaristic crass section OS827 4467 Cita i iSECRET e
14-00000 SECRET Rumors of clandestine fi- nancial support from thé. Commu- ~ “nists or from sympathizers among Nazi emigrants. to: Latin America : chave mot been gonfirmed. | , gon Despite. NPD claims: of vide= ‘spread sympathy in. the West German carmed forces, there is no evidence ‘of this.’ German security offi- . cials estimate that no more than 2 percent of armed forces members are card-carrying NPD-members. ‘Since .the NPD is -a legal political organization, military leaders are constrained from openly in- fluencing members of the armed forces to oppose it. Many Germans are probably reluctant openly to admit their support for an organization like the NPD. It is significant, how- ever, that only 6 percent of respondents to a national opinion poll in January 1967 indicated a preference for the NPD. Leadership Problems .- The most notable single handicap confronting the NPD is the weakness of its leadership. None of its leaders possesses any great talent or stature. Cer~ tainly no individual with Hitler's demagogic genius has yet ap- peared. ‘The absence of strong leadership in what has been called a "fuehrer-oriented party" has left it divided and weakened by factionalism. This was clearly demonstrated in March 1967 wher ‘then party chairman Fritz Thielen and Deputy Chairman Adolf von Thadden engaged in a public feud which further damaged the party's reputation. An outgrowth of long- standing personal antagonism, the dispute was triggered by Thielen's resistaace to Von Thadden's at- tempted take-over as party chair~- man in Lower Saxony. Thielen claimed that Von Thadden's elec- tion to the state chairmanship had been illegal and would hurt the party's reputation. The par=- ty’s federal executive, however, turned the tables on Thielen and not only voted to reinstate Von - Thadden but also to drop Thielen from the national chairmanship and expel him from the party. Thielen clung to the helm under a temporary court order until finally throwing in the sponge in early May with an announcement of his formation of a new, rival part,, the Na- tional Peoples Party (NVP). More of an archconservative than a neo-Nazi, Thielen was never more than a figurehead. Real au- thority and leadership--as well as ideological guidance--was provided by Von Thadden. Von Thadden is. a 45-year-old native of Pomerania, a member of a prominent and aris- tocratic Prussian family, a number of whose members were prominent in the anti-Nazi resistance. Al- though Von Thadden applied for Nazi party membership he appar- ently was never formally admitted. An ardent nationalist, Von Thadden aspires to become a German De Gaulle rather than a re-creator of the German Reich. Other leaders of some promi- nence include Otto Hess, party propaganda chief, and Waldemar Schuetz, editor of the NPD's SECRET Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
““~ S 7) SECRET / . ; official weekly, ‘Deutsche Nachrichten. Both were active Nazis. Thielen'’s departure- clears the way for Von Thadden formally to take over leadership of the _NPD, It is doubtful that Thiclen has the personal force or follow-. ing to organize a party with significant strength. The impact ef the new party on the NPD will probably be small since the bulk of the NPD membership appears to prefer the leadership and ideology of tha Von Thadden group. On the other hand, the strengthening of extremist tendencies within the NPD signaled by the triumph of Von Thadden may hurt the party's interests in the long run. ha result is also likely to assist those actively seeking a formal government crackdown on the party. Program In addition to its leadership difficulties, another failing of the NPD -is its inability as yet to offer a clear, positive pregram relevant to existing problems. Xenophobic and opportunistic, the NPD feeds upon nostalyia for an Older German nationalism, discon- tent with the existing social or- der, and Germany's international Standing and frustration over the fact that reunification remains as distant a prospect as ever. {ts stated objectives are ill de- fined, when not deliberately am- biguous, and are sometimes incon- sistent. Its electoral approach is generally: negative and destruc- tively critical rather than af- firmative. Its principal targets include ‘foreign intérests and cul- ‘ture which undermine old values _ ' and “de-Germanize the fatherland.” It attacks the renunciation by those in power’of what the NPD regards as justified German ob- jectives. It deplores what it’ considers the miseducation and corruption of youth, “crime in the streets,” foreign aid, and the. competition of foreign workers... The NPD demands an end to German dependence on the US and calls for the revival of German national consciousness. [ft ate tempts to draw a parallel between West German ~ US relations and those between the East German regime and the USSR. In order to free Germany From foreign domina- tion, NPD spokesmen maintain, American "occupation" forces must go, although not before the with- drawal of Russian troops, which the NED would have occur simultane- : ously with that of US troops, Germany must again become master of its éwn fate, party leaders in- sist, and the “Lie” of war guilt and war crimes trials must be ended and a new German general staff created. A key demand is that the reunification of Germany cannot be limited to uniting West and East Germany but must include the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse border now held by Poland. Al- though it does not advocate the use of force to achieve this ob- jective, the party holds out hope that recovery will be possible by a Machiavellian deal of some sert. NPD spokesmen at present renounce a national nuclear capability for Germany. SECRET Page 8 SFECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
Pa -, cee are te oF eene Gee amen VOU Dy ee cab ew ate eaten nig 6 meee eat nt we RE eo avian std ae gee 09 The’ party puts forth slogans "proclaiming "Germany for the Ger- mans" and "Europe for the Euro- peans.” | Indeed, ‘the NPD favors a united Europe somewhat along the lines advocated by De Gaulle. Europe, it holds, should be com- pletely independent of the US, and possess its own nuclear deter- rent. It should be built on a Franco-German alliance that smaller European countries sooner or later would have to join. The NPD would welcome the decay of NATO as sig- naling the end of sterile policies which do not serve Germany's real interests. In seeking to gain the broad- est popular acceptance, the party avolds affirming the more extrema aspects of Nazi ideology. There: is, for example, no obvious anti- Semitiam in the party program - and Jews technically could become party members. The private atti- tudes of the leadership, however, are said to resemble traditional ‘Nazi anti-Semitism closely. The NPD makes vague references, more= ‘over, to the importance of "blood ties," rejects evidence relating to the Nazi extermination policy, makes derogatory references to the Jews in the party press, and denounces aid to Israel. In recent campaigning in Lower Saxony, NPD spokesmen shifted tactics somewhat by no lenger stressing issues obviously associated with the Nazi period such as war guilt and reparations.- Instead, they sought to exploit current grievances including the economic recession, unemploy- ment, lack of progress on reuni- SECRET a t fication, and, what they called the unreliability of NATO. Future Prospects The NPD's failure to main- tain the momentum of last fali‘’s successes in this year's state elections in Schleswig-Holstein,- Rhineland- ~Palatinate, and Lower Saxony is a serious blow to the party's hopes. The squabble among the leadership apparently reinforced the feeling among un~ committed elements that casting a pretest vote for the NPD was not worthwhile under present cir- cumstances. The widespread dis-~ content among farmers over goyv- ernment economy measures did not result in a significant shift of votes to the NPD. Moreover, there has been a strony resur- gence of general ‘confidence in the Bonn government. Although the NPD benefited last fall from the popular dissatisfaction with the Erhard government, the grand coalition headed by COU Chancellor Kiesinger has displayed vigor and decisiveness which has been re-~- warded at the polls. Even if the NPD were to fol- low its forerunners intn oblivion it-would not mark the end of right-~ ist extremism. A portion of the German electorate will remain re- ceptive to this kind of appeal. In the absence of, a party such as the NPD, right-wing voters tend to give their support to one of the insignificant splinter par- ties, or to one of the more con- servative established parties, such as the EDP, . when they vote at all, SECRET , Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
it is possible--although in- creasingly- unlikely--that. the NPD could turn out ‘€o. resemble other parties of a national~conserva- -tive stamp.. Despite the radical views of some of thoir members such groups have. ‘managed. to. Op-- erate without. subversive” tmani- ..- festations. ‘The ‘German Party (OP), for example, which had been rep- resented in several North German ‘state legislatures and in the Bundestag conducted itself_in a. responsible fashion. .- The NPD at present draws a good deal of this traditional right-wing vote from the old Refu- gee Purty, the DP, and small con- servative regional parties such as the Bavarian Party. The total extremist vote, ‘however, has in- creased very little since the establishment of the NPD. Es- timates of the extent of hard-core - ultranationalist sentiment in Germany vary between 5 and 15 per- cent of the electorate. Under present conditions this does not constitute a threat to German dem- ocratic institutions and is not SECRET greater than the degree of exe tremist sentiment in-other West- ern. European countries. Outlook ‘Assuming. the NPD’ survives | the current period of internal . strife, its potential for further growth beyond its present f- to 8-percent range appears to be limited under conditions now pre- vailing in West Germany. The NPD is still capable of Capitalizing on circumstances which might pre- sent themselves as a result of a protracted economic recession or major political blunders which would discredit the present gov- ernment leadership. The outcome of recent state elections, how- ever, tends to confirm that the overwhelming majority of German voters continues to prefer the moderate -albett-increasingly ~~ independent and nationalist, pol- icies of the major parties and the government, and rejects the radical alternatives advocated by the NPD. (SECRET) SECRET Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67 bere ae
I — a REPORT NO. CS DB-312/ 00003-67 aS oy BPRS, nein uae SIE us CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Sear Tye Trio material contains, Information Slfecting the Rational Defense af the United Mates within the megaing of the Faplonaze Laws, Title 1a Vs Seen 793 oad a6, the trensmin we of tevelatioes of which [A any manner to aa uneuthoriued person ts prohibited ‘by fow. SECRE T NO FORZIGN DISSEM «West, Germany . . ‘BEY ‘Progran : ‘to ‘Monitor and Counter DATE DISTR. 3 JAN W967 the Activities of the National , Democratic Party - NO. PAGES 3 ‘ —_ REFERENCES — FIELD REPORT NO. THiS 18 UNEVALUATLO '\6O9Mkt.o% SOURCT CRADINGS ARC DIF(MNVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT S Peatagive, ” | | t = FD me (Summary: The West German Federal Office for the Protection - of the Constitution (BfV) and its regional affiliates ’ (LfV) have undertaken a program to moniter and counter .the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD). Included in this program are efforts to penetrate the NPD at all its levels, to monitor its membership end finances, . and to counter its influence. ) Roporte For a number of ‘yours, the BfV has been engaged in penetrating and monitoring the activities of right radical — organizations, Since the establishment of the NPD in. 1964,the BfV has made a concerted effort to penetrate it at both the national and regional levels. This effort has resulted in the recruitment of about 60 sources with access _to the NPD organizations at_all levels. In several cases the BDfV or LfV have been able ‘to recruit loéal NPD county chairmen and in six Lacnder have access to the minutes and files of the Land organizatlons. The BfV has also penetrated the.national headquarters of the NPD in Hannover.’ Through its penetration. of the national organization, the BV has been able to oUtain and photograph the entire mem= bership rolls, which currently contain about 20,000 names. The national list has been augmented by additional member- ship applications obtained via penotrations of the 1. i ‘Land organizations. The BfV is currently in the process of tracing all of these membership applications against the master Nazi Party membership files at the American ‘ SECRET . Leteted tre ptm NO FOREIGN DISSEM /Continued/ semer ating ond “TLLEZG/INT | | i Para: y E E ¥ Ae gh "ZE"2, CI 2, FI 4, EUR 9, DO/H 1. c = FO Gb De GH |
14-00000 She bor COALPGCLLED DLSSEM - , / -Page 2 CSUB-212./00003-67 controlled. Berlin Pocumant. onter. Althoujth this tracing Aetivity nas not boon completed and-is hnridicapped by Lack of personnel at the Berlin Document Cenicr, the BLV estimetes its current file on the APD is far more accurate than the files at. the NPD headquarters. Because of its accrss to the Berlin’ Document: Center; the BLV will. éventually.. have a better estimate of the number of NPD members who are” former Nazi Party méembars than does, the NPD. itseif. tte ll, | Thee Biv ‘ts also making a concerted ‘effort to obtain ‘docu- Sot wo -, metitary evidence on tie NPD's sources of income. The recruite + ment ‘efforts ‘to do thig are. directed. at spotting and recruite dng: clerical ‘help who ‘work:in NPD offices and have access to filés. ‘ Information. dn! ‘the’ ‘BIV!'s possession to date, which. includes considerable’ documentary. evidence regarding finances, indicates that the party is not receiving any ae substantial financial sésistance from abroad. The primcipal - on sources of funds are as ‘follows: , Jae . The morithly DM 3.7 membership dues. For ‘the “20, 600 members, this dmounts’ to DM 60,000 per month or DM. 720,000 a year. b, ,Subseription fees for publications. ie “@, Single donations from financially well-to-do members and supporters. ° . d. Admission fees for political rallies. The BV vs has registered, since May 1966 when the NPD began its : campaign in Bavaria, a total of more than 2900 polit- : ical rallies in Bavaria. Although at times more than a Ss - ‘one. third. of. those attending. -such - wallies vere. : - estimated to be opposed to the NPD, everyone attending i the rally paid an admission fee. The BLV¥ estimates that the NPN has heen able through the above sources i of income to collect from DM 3,000,000 to DM 4,000,000. i : The LFV are watching this funding quite closely, particularly for evidence of financing from Communial countries. Thus far they have been unable to sub- stantiaté the existence of any such support. Although thero is.no firm evidence of actual financial support of the NPD from Communist sources, the BLV is aware : of an interost'-on the part of the Eastern intellizgeace : services to penetrate the NPD and monitor its activities, & At the instigation of Federal Minister of ({nterior Luecke, the B£V has undertaken to establish a confidential ell~party . committec consisting of mempers of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Christian ‘ DPemocratic Union (CDU)Y and the Trade Union Movement (DGB) to counter the NPD in Rheinland-Pfalz prior to the upcoming elections in spring’ 1v67. All of the parties have agreed to participate and this activity is moving ahead. Recently ata two-duy conference chaired by. the BIV in’a village on the Mosel River, it was decided not only to counteract NPD. propaganda during the election campaign, but also to undertake orientation lectures for all officials in the. Rheinland-Pfalz and other local governments who have shown NPD leanings. These courses will be launched as soon as the campaign gets underway. A similar propaganda and ofientation activity-is also being planned for the elections ‘dn Schleswig-Holstein. in 1967, 6, The BfV has persuaded the DGB to set up an action group 5 aimed at organizing the Labor movement into countering the 5 . ; . 4 4 ' : ° . 3 1 ? SECRET 2 { : : NO FOREIGN DiSSEM . 1 ho CONTROLLED DISSEM /Continued/
f ' 1 2 tent oo say SSCRET oe NO FOREIGN DISSES CONTROLLED DISSEM Page 3 . CSNB-312/00003-67 influence of the NPD. The BfV is assisting the DGB in. working out methods for the infiltration of workers into NPD organizations - to report and counteract their influence . within factories and workers councils. . The BV has also established contact ‘with the German Industrial Institute in Cologne, which .is.'sponsored by the German equivalent of the USS. National- ‘AsSociation of Manufacturers, The BV used as an argument with’ the industrialists the fact that. _ inéreasing. influence of the NPD in Gernan industry would have. a, negative effect pon foreign trade.” The BEV: undertook a-survey ‘of the election resiilts at ‘the village and county level -in. Land Hesse. This survey showed _— - that the NPD had substantial success in’ areas containing '. German hilitary. -installations. It was further determined : ‘that -the ° ‘NPD’ had cénSiderable appeal anang non=conmissioned . professional soldiers who feel. they have failed to find acceptance in the postwar-German society. This negative attitude has been less among Bundeswehr officers and draftees than among, non-commissioned officers, who fee] thenselves under- . spaid and ‘lacking in social acceptance. The BLV has contacted .the sécurity organizations of the Bundeswehr to under- take a‘program of orientation to counter the influence of _ the NPD within the Bundeswehr. Headquarters Comment: CS-311/16288-66 from a different source reported that the President of the West German Association of Military Reservists had stated that a large percentage of older reserve officers and non- commissioned officers had voted for the NPD in the Land | Hesse election. . SECRET ' NO FOREIGN DISSEM : CONTROLLED DISSE oo fp Gd be i +e Bede
Stellenbe esets antenna ta eS Eo 48 Ung des (Stand: 1.10.1966) © Parteivorsitzender: AER neers GUTMAWN THIELEN | “-wohnhatts Beruf: FPriedfich (Frit exe ts Sundesparteivorstandes der NPD z) ged. 25-9.16 in Breseny dremen-ocnonevecs, Srauteichen 1 Betonfabrikant . Frihere Organisationszuzensri ’ Grundungsmitglied der ci, Mitglied der Bremer Biurgerschaften, 1957 Mitglied und spiter uandesvorsitzender der L. Stelivertreter: 1 Wilhel ’“Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen. NSDAP: nicht titglied geb. 9.6.1900 in Basel, wonnhafts: nar srihe, Kaiserallee 30 ‘Beruf: Angestellter 1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Baden-w wirttemberg der NPD Friihere Or "Gesamtdeutse ehen., und Entnazifizierungsg peschadigter" (BIE). NSDAP: 1.3.1932 1933 Biirgermeister in Piengen von THADDEN Beruf: Chefredakteur Prihere ~Srganisationszu 1950 Mitel. u. Funktionair der "Deutschen Reichspartei"(DRP), ranisationssi,; he Parte." SS Pf Bae Funktionir des "Bundesverbandes: ehem.Internierter- Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff, wohnhartt: Benthe, Larchenweg 6 cehnarigKkeit ager "Deutsenon secant Mitglied’ des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion "Nationale Rechte", é_pactei" (DRP}, 1955-1959 Mitglied des niedersichaischen Landtages. NSDAP; "109.1939 Ww INTER Franz Florian, geb. 23.3.1923 in Amberg, wobnhatt: tegernsee, sahnhofstr. 11 Beruf; Metzgermeister u. Fachredakteur 1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD Friihere Or anisationsau ehoriexeit: CSU-Mitglaied u. Mitglied Ger s,andesleitung -GDP-Mitglied u. Mitglied des Vorstandes des Landesaus- schusses und dea Kreisverbandea NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
: iia PAE A - _ = we Se err sersres UTERO merece: “ me 14-00000 7 Te pe enna gma gcwteaecae sgt RET own ie t ® z t III. Prassdiun: BROUWER, Otto. Theodor, ged. 31.5, 1906 in Paris, . wonuhars: Bremen-Vegesacs, Senses él, ae . Beruf: .Raufnmann . . Vorsitzende r des _handeswes andes Bremen der NPD. a telied der Bremer Burgézschatt NSD NSDAP: 1.8. 1951 HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.19¢8 in “Rossdorf, . a t: Bissendorf, weidendamn, Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann, DP Frinere Orvat.cationssucencrickeit: A : Natglied u. cundtionar aer "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DEP), ws ae ; NSDAP: 1.8.1930 a : Kreisleiter, Gauinsvekteur, Gauredner, oR 1938 Referent-im 3erichts- und R echtsamt der - a obersten SA-Fiihruns, SA-Obersturmbannfihrer. ANKER Dr. ‘Kar 1, geb. 22.9/1913 in Theesen, : ee Bieleteid, Padertorner Weg 24 a : Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Novar By ee . Vorsitgender deg Landesvervandes Nordrhein-Westf.d.NPD Fruhere Organisationszugehtrigkeit: keine NADAP: 1.5.1933 AT Laden Ck ate SCHUTZ, Valdemar, geb. 9.22.1913 in Dausenau, ; wonnnalt: Gottingen, Feiix-Klein-str. 4 : ' Reruf: Schriftleiter u. Verlagsinhaber keits: Friunere Orwanisationszuseniri¢ iPetitgiied una runktiona NSDAP: 1.11.1936, . 19°9 Bintritt in die HJ, : : 1O%4 Adjutant des ¢au-Pressechefs, : 19357 Kreiswart u. Gaureferent "Kraft durch Freude" (KeF), 1 : 1958-1959 Junker cer Ordensburg Vogelsang, ' ° anschlieSend Beaurtragter der NSDAP ig Gau Hessen, SS-Hauptsturmfiihres der Waffen-SS ' SCHWEIMER, Horst-Giinther, geb. 11.2.1913 in Essen, wonnnalt: hanburg-Crob-Fioztbek, Hochrad 7, Beruf: Keedereibesitzer : Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hamburg der NeD i ee Orgarisationszugehdrigkeit: keine . NSDAP: 1.4.1932 , ‘ . SS-Hauptsturmfihrer und Adjutant ! Legationsrat im Auswirtigen Amt .
SF tana EL erro menge ao ae Ree YORU PEN Me ererrecene ene sere Y . Rt : wo I RES EY a emer ie mare) ‘ IV. a) ADS, Uta, gan. 2Ll iP oan gerlin, wananarhs Fao tna BUCKLE. Os 1 Berar: Wise. Posten tage ‘ er oreome Gremaveata care tenes s<2i%2 Aa tals eb Aer oe Se5 we Ger. G.P und der NE-Freunde. HADAY: nicnt Me “gaied i F | WITRELMANS, 34.07, seb. 21.3..909 in ingen/Kra.Gifnorn WOMTALGS fe bsatecttey GVACKRAnns sr. 4 Berul: Kechtsanea.s una Notas : Frokhere O2e%r. Mityiaed aer ve) und Miteg.ied Gea dtages - ea NOGAGS nacht Parte v~varstarnds: « GePS ti} , ee eam te ms geb. 7.10.07 in Hargarten/Lothéringen enzianstr. 7 Anmerk pee he race rd, aAhrons BU ANOS wonnnmalrt: Peunere Crivany: Dap-Mitgeaed unc NuDAP: nacht Mitglied PONG eke sts runxt.onar ged. 20.11.1940 in Lohnhorst, MAUL, Peter wohtinalty: uannover, Auf dem Larchenberge 15, Beruf; otudent vanisationszu kelne vehoricceits Fruhere Or NODAL? nicht Matglied MAL nOUN, bo, ceb. 26.9,1908 in Kaufbeuren, ’ wohiinalts iTobalt bingen, Bahnhorstr. 45 Berulfs aaufwann FPrukere Organicationszugehdrixnceits “Mitglied und runktionar NSDAP: 1.8.1930 1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch FPreude" “(KaP) 1936 Leiter der Gauschulungeburg Gau Schwaben 1937 Reichsychulungsleiter 4m Amt fulr Technik,Munchen. geb. 8.11.1911 in Coesfeld, NZ gu SALM Karl ARR PES Yireitucheid u.Diisseld., Kahlenbergweg 7 Beruf: Kaufmann/Oberst a.D. Frihere Organivationsguschorigxeit: keine NODAPs nacht Mitglied ps woop: pe oted aA’ 4 e of Sens yg
Se PES ett ake Tne ia Sc aan ee Sesser Pe TEE IAT RET RE SE ELIE, EP OOD MBE I TS yx . fe + " ° ? FE PST PPR NTT PORN sat NRE NIAC ad Te i hl dhe mai : oT las ia * = ss ee iar, bd). s Big ft se Bevhere Orronicati ones “NSDAP: 1.9.1938 “Yorsitzender des LV Rheinlan Fd : eS : Pitta: geb.. 18.2-2917 in Prettin, wena’: baneoure, an der fecht 1 : ‘Beruf: Hausfrau “ehorigkeit: * peur,ecnen Kinderschutg~- ~ eS Sranaeran una weateriu aes _bundes" Oldenburg DRY-Mitglied una Funktionar . ooo >i.2,1606 in Saarbrucken, Enaircher Weg 23 . Vere. cnerangseay Snann : Vorsitzendesr aes Lansesverbandes aariand der NPD rruhere OrranieAtionsZ arigrert: nicht bekannt NSDAP: 1,.6.1935 vars, Adolf, Eevee ASLO cane waft: vaurerackels LP wren b pritg, ged. 26.10.1914 in Osthofon, “MA f, 3 Wont: Ostnofen, “anger Str. 20 Heruf: winzer/weinnindier d-Pfalz der NPD Fruhere Oreanz catronszucensrigkelt: ar-Mitgiled una rubs $20nar NODAP: 1.3.1933 SS-Sturmbannfunrer 26,5.1899 in Solingen, FARBISIDER, Heinrich, eb. 2 Oberer Hausberg 4 wohnhart: Totnenburg/Fulda, Beruf: Kaufmann tus Landesverbandes Hes sagucehorigkeit: ; =Hetronaen-Volkspartei" (DNVP) d des hessischen Land tages, Yor upte@nder sen der NPD frubere Orvans. cAtior L914 fitglieda ger rpyeutsc 1946 FDP=Mitzlied und Mitglie 1949 Mitglied des Bundestages, artei"™ (DP) u. Mitglied 1955 Ubertratt our “Deutschen P der Fraktion der DP i= Deutschen Bundestag. NMGDAPs 12.10.1951 Austritt erfol gte in Hovember 1932 KUHNE, Dr. jur. Lothar, ged- 2.1.1908 in Steinbach/Thir., ere wonnnalt: Hannover, im Moore 12, Beruf: Kechtsanwalt, Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Niedersachsen der NPD yruhere Orranisation: Ter-Mitgiied u. ste NSDAP: 12.12.1931 19 é Reichssichernei*shauptant ; . 19 i tlichen Prifungskoun)e- ‘erent in der *Partelan sion" 4am Stab des Stelivertreterse des 1937 Buro des Botschafters von Ribbentrop, sg-Unteroturmafubrer se aed hrera, earanety
02 os Ce ee - : oo coat) Aane ANE Se CE ER me Rm TRS RE ey Sion maaan spe . co . % K a FE EIR RR One Sra CHORE A, cetera . of, so? . . . ss - . oy Bee eg Bet yee eb e BRE. vo ay ms ae my a i = . , ig = Seg . . Lot e > ™ . & ~ e ~~ wt . 33 CFG i mai ey & ~~» LO BEN Rarictrnat, weds G68.1927 an Nazslau/Schl., wohnhalt: ccllicswi-, nolonnenweg 31, Beruf: Backer und Jugendpfleger — -. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Schleswig-Holatein der NPD ‘Friihere Orsanisationszurgehdripkeit: JOKPobtgaced uhda sundctionar, DRP-Hitglied und Funktionar auf Kreisebene. NSDAP: nicht Mitglied y i Y } ; ; V. Amter im Prisidium: ! ee a . " Orgaunisationsabteilung: Adolf v. THADDEN (a.Stellvertreter) Finangabterlung: Otto Theodor BROUWSR (s.Prdsidium) Rechtsabtei lung: Propaganda- u.Schuiungsabteiiung: Otto HESS (s.Prasidium) Presseabteilung: Waldemar SCHUTZ (s. Prisidium) Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Prdsidiun) Frits WINKELMANN (s.Prisidium) te mentee te aah wate Heferat 3.0.V.: F . : VI. Referenten in Parteivorstand: i AuGenpolitix: i '. yon THADDEN, Adolf (ss. Stelivertreter) i innenpolitik: HERRMANNDORIPER ‘ ‘ wonnnart: Muncnen, Beruf: Senatsrat 3 geschiftsfiihrenden VYorstandes des Landes= ges s Bayern der NPD, nde Benno, ged. 20.3.3916 in Altotting, Heckenstaller Str. 178, Mitglied verbande Vorsatgender des Bezirksverbandes Oberbayern der NPD. i ; ; : Friihere Organisationszugehirigseit: nicht bekannt NSDAP: 1.1.1938 . ———"_ HJ-Mitglied seit 1933 "| Agrarpolitik: » | RUDOLPH, Heinz, geb. 7.6.1922 in Elberberg, .-° Wohnhate: alein-Ilde 5, ‘ Do bof: Burgermeister, Dipl.Laniwirt, Hauptmann d.R. . ! Keferent fiir Agrarfragen im LY Niedersachsen der NPD, hs Redner aut Landesebene im LV Niedersachsen der NPD, 1. Vorsitzsender 1m Kreisverband Hildesheim der NPD. — ‘ veMitglie NSDAP: 1.9.1940
14-00000 Ne aa ameeett ee 8 pee ee ie Dee oe aan Wirtschafts Verkehtupolitik:: Jugend{ragen:. ; t Finans- ung Steuerpolitiks PAGBENDER, Heinrich (s. Parteivorstand) SCHWEIMER; Horst-Giinther (S. Prasidium) LOWER, karl-Ernst (s. Parteivorstand) bozinipulitixs KNUP SEH, Kurt, geb. 7.6.1915 in Rippien, wonnnaiss Neuenhuus, Jahnstr. 2, Beruf: ElLektromonteur - Geschaftafiinrer und Kassenleiter im Kreiaverband’ Grafschalrt Bentheim der NPD . Fruhere Orfanisationssuyenori Heebitgised und runktlonar NSDAP: 1.59.1950 ckeits Frauen- und Familienfrragen: WINKELVOSS, Gertraud (s. Parteivorstand) Kulturpolitik: DEMNYE, Dr. Dietrich, geb. 19.4.1924 in Duisburg, WormnuLt: JuLseurs~meiderich, Haferacker 13 Berul;. Overgtudienrat ‘ 2. stellv. Vorsitsenuer im LV Nordrhein-Weatf. d.NPD Lundesredner des LV Wordrhein-Westfralen der NPD - Wrunere Organ.sationssugendriskeit: nicht bekannt WovARs nient Matglied Vertricbenenlraren: GULMANN, Wilhelm (s. Stellvertreter) Arbeitskreis Bundeswehr: ' NI?@SCHe, Dieter, ged. 4.7.1934 in Zattau, ‘wohnhalt: Oldenburg, (2.2%. Putlos) Beruf: Hauptmann der Bundeswehr NPD-Stadtrat im Stadtparlament Oldenburg Fruhere OrranisationszugehGrigkeit: AROH@ Hitgiied . ‘NSDAP: nicht Mitglied Oe we ee wete Semetoap Saga Mage beige. oe wate fy grew de oe ae SOe Aah te ante neat etteds Satine eden on te Pee i
. VII. Sonat wee Tata sa ie BENTO core tee Funktionen ix Parteivorstand ; Leiter der Abteilung Kasse% ao . Foe, ‘SCHUTZ, Waldemar (a. Priisidium) . : : Leiter der evigionsabteiltng in der Finanzabta lung: |  SGHIMMEROWK, Dr. Heins, geb. 22:1.1911 in Chemnits, Wonnnalrt? tiunnover, kaimundstr. 1 so BerulL: Vergicherungs-kaulmann “- Yriikere Oorcnnigaticnssugendrigkeits witvemstglieu una runktionur- DirP-Mitglaeu und Funktionar HODAPs: 1.6.1950 ; SS-Oberoturnbannfuhrer- bungegsveuchartaruhrers ; HWAKZ, Martin, geb. 16.9.142 in Oels/Schles. aonnnait; pore~bngen, Charlottenstr. 14 Berufstauptmann a.Bw. a.D. a Yriinere Organisationszugehdrigkeit: keine ; THe mate ace pl oma taeee teeta ae nase MGDAPs 1.5.1952 * name ‘ _ : . " ; . ; F } ins hy i * ro ie ' en é FE gg te. to gn sage a ry ws aes ae ot yo i" oe Sa Bly pe bart ats Mar g2e 2
~ oo rere ae epee ree Ie way vee rams aa . yr neare eee rete npe e ae ‘ b hci a hr ep ~ . 3 : : ee i SLY TREE TPE Ah ee 4 , a Geceliscniuster vVerlayes . , SHeutsend pacurichten® . Guoll. . / . DCHUTZ, vilaeu.c, feb. J.10.19715 in Dausenau, . 7° Wonnnart; Gottinzen, Felix-alein-str. 4 . oof Berul': scénriftieiter und Verlagsinnaber ; . Frinere Orvanisutionsscupenorigkeits DAP - Matysieu und rundktionur io. * NSvaPs 1.11.1956, : , ly24 bintritt in die itd, 2 19.4 #Ugutunt des Gau- ~Presseéchefs, a (F957 RPeiswart una Gaureferent "Kraft durch . 3 . : Freuae" (UBF), . ees 7 1998 - 14,4 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang, 2 . -$ 0 angcenlieuena beuurtragter der NODAP in Gau Hessen, ate Jo-Hauptybucumiunrer aes Walfen-s. j von TMLUUEN, auoll, ed. Tet. 1921 in Trieglaft, : lc cA tie Seka to WOohnnmalt: penmtne , ~ archenweg 6 : Beruf: Unelredaxteur a : Hedhere OQreunisaticnuguvehndrirkoits g . ; 949 Matelaea der Heo tehen Hecnts-rartei" (DRP), a so fiatglied aes yveutuchen Bundestages in der Fraktion a ; "dationale xecnte", = i. 1950 nitwaied unu funktiondr der "Deutschen Reichs- 5 a partei" (DuP), : FS . F 1455 ~ 19549 Mitglied:aes niedersachsischen Tandtages. : ne d a oi) NsbaP: 1.9.1939 E ( HESS, Otto, geo. 14.12.1903 in xossaortr, q : wonnnult: #isbendorf’, weiaendamm, : F ‘ Berut: Oberrevierungsrat a.v. (Jurist), Kaufmann, . y : / Frihere Orgunisitionsszupehdrigxesitey 3 ; ' Mitgl. uy Funktaonar der “Deutscnen Heichspartei"® (DRE) NSDAP: 1.06.19256 Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner, i 1998 teferent im jerichts- und Rechtsamt der a . : obersten: sa~fuhrung, Sa-OQberaturmbanniuhrer. Malet - vOwn, sail, web. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren, Wonhnalt? “roburtingen, Bahnhofstr. 45 geruf; Kaufgiann ; : : rruhere Orgvanisationszurendripgkeit: DaP = hitglied una funktionar , NSUDAP: 1.8.1450 : ; 1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdP) 1926 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben . TY 97 Heicugacnulungsleiter in Amt fiir Technik, Munchen
co ree wees bed pres tt Be oon in a aes ea BELL Wake Oka . ° ‘ 4 . Veu.daed Loe mo are : neferstsleiter. der Yaupstreunandstelle Ost, Berlin RHE RB ESO, re, Heins, geo. 22.17.1991 in Che rmni ts, woe bcos BELGE alorer, wats YorslenusunsSaéaalcain , mm kb ka ANS > 2 aera tie oe Mitiiieu una Pt Too. load oo-Qoers surabannfunre Sear, O03 Vona-sernhard, geo. 10.29.1903 eo Tiase en Wen china, bas) Protzig/Pounern. Bot: wohnnalts: wuppertal- Voawins tel, Am Osterholz 55 AS a veri s luaversatatactre: TeSGUr S.WV. ur cuit, wehrer an einer Privatschule Frere Orenisutions vaso oe maigaaecu una or ter der xgJay (Gau Ostpreugen) (len-vdisleliter, nouniru.rer. . r Prelessor der stuatswissenschaften adtertus-Universitat in Konigsberg. ii. salter, yeb. o.10.1908 in Breslau, ~ it wooeawitena, armoldstr. 24 we or rere eres saery : . er . ~ Sar os wk sh bead UNG suns saonar » Goer atrptitlonscsugenoricseite: ea ags y.4.1932 ee ges. 22.10.1950 in Greifswald, Tuart-Baa vannstatt,sPreuergasse 45 5 _ sf o
Dy ii tuly din Hamburg, kampffallee 162 PESTZEN, Walter, get wonnhaits. bremen, Kuleu . .Hepuly Kaufmann — ! ~- °  prutiere Ofanisitionssugehorigkeit: "oal0 0. > BaP OS Mitglied und Funktionar ~ * ,  - . DRP - Natglied wid Funktionar ae sO nF "" 0 7 NODAP: 1.4,.°19$0 . ‘ I , ged. 25.9.1916 in Bremen, eck, Hrauteichen 19 ‘ ; THIELE, Friedricn WORUNMELIG? Breen we hone Beruf: beton~-favrikant * Branere Orcimiua tren’ auy GYunduncgbitgs.ed der Ulu, . rechnaften, ‘ skeite cenor ° bs Mitglied uer prewer: burgers _ i 1957 Mitglied und sputer Lindesvorsitzender der i ' * “Deutuchen Partei" (bP) in Bremen . i NGDAP: nient Mitglied Sreciur, go. 31.%.1906 in Paris, BROUWER, Otte c rd WOnhNalt: Bleuen~VeyeOuck, Gerhurd-xohlfa-Str. 61 Beruf: xaufsann tionszuyenGcrigkeit: * Birgerschaften. 12 Frunere Oceanis ‘yeutscne cartel Mitgiled der Dreger USoAPs 1.4.17951 ~ ® - . NAME niente se ree aig ; ’ pe gftd Be vai e aed Pr Fe ay we eS 4q.- . we hee yee Bee yy ee re $ [1m ele: ae PLS rs ee PORES fee ets Ube! Brag tet Fae ceo, kg Rm Ct ee re ey ore : ¢ . Be . ' Woe aw NS a way in FE . . a nee ma nee SOK Ee RIED Miteortamm ttt PR ED ‘TSEEAE Mec oe saree vem aie TIRE SID HD:
14-00000 Germany frou Ritler BOD). 4683. 1963 The menace of the miracle: ; London, necator 1962: 27 Tp. “DIL.  DD259- ,ATRS - . ee ARTZ, RELAU?, ‘Germany ina nutehéll., 2a ed., rev. and enl. Bonn, ‘Presa and Inforsdtion Office of the Federal Governzent 6 Adenauer. NOT ate: ave ‘L6p. DD43.A8 1960 DEC. of Genfany, 1960. ~ BEROTSON,, JOHN ROBERT. Nasi var eins; the plans for the “thousand year Reich. Rock Island, Ill., Augustana College ' Library, 1962;- 155p. — (angustans Library publications, 0-30): npe56. 5-BST DIC. Germany, & a ‘companion to Gertian studies. - -BITHELL, SEO, ed. . 5th ed., rev. and enl. London, Methuen, 1955. 5798p. open BG 1955 DIC; 0DD61.B6 1955 CIA. an BOSSENBROOK, WILLIAM JORN. ‘The German mind. Detroit, Yayne State University Press, 1961. h69p. DOT6. BET? «DIL. BRANT, STEFAR, pseud.: East German rising. “London, ‘Themes and Hudson, 1955. 202p. BD21. 4. BUA DIL; DD261.4.B3B5 CIA. BULLOCK, ALAN LOUIS CHARLES. Hitler; a study in tyranny. Rev. ed. New York, Harper, 1960. 776p. DD2%7.85B85 DIC; DD2KT.HSBSS 1960 CLA. _— Decision in Germany. Garden City, CLAY, LUCIUS DU BIGNON. ‘H. Y., Doubleday, 1950. S522p. DD257.C55 DIC; pb257.c6 . CIA. ‘ COLLIER, DAVID S., and KURT GLASER., eds. _ Berlin and the future of Eastern Burope, Chicago, Pegnery, 1963. @5lp. (Foundation for Foreign Affaira series, no.7) DEAS. 5» c&é «DIL; DOh3.C7 «= CIA. FOR OFFICIAL USE ORLY
14-00000 a mee a oN Conair, - “Janes “BRYANT. _ Germany. and ‘treedan; a perdoual: Abpfatéal. - : Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. L17Tp.; (the - ' -Godkin, lectures: a Harvard: A Univers ty, 1938) ‘BO259«2- 66% ‘ CE,-BENEDETTO. -“- “Geriiany- and’ Birepe, 8  pirttiad diescasion. “Hew. Yo él, ‘Randa House, 19556 B3p. _ BDT6.C74 DIL. DAVIDEON, ROGENE. * the: ‘aeath’ exif iife of- ‘Qérmeny; ein account” ; ve of the ‘American’ ‘occupation... “London, J. ‘Cape, 1959s badpe . “D257 -D33 aed * DD257+D33E5 CIA. 5 ana aa . ‘Ditio, wibwids “Garniany ana world politica in the ‘twentieth’ ecentiiry. Hew w ork, ‘Rnopf, 1959. ‘Dalp. pp232.D413— éDIL; . ~ Bd232.D5 _. DICKINSON, ROBERT. ent. . “ Germany; & general and regional so geography. 2d ed. London, Methuen; New York, Dutton, 1961. Be cm ..DDA3-D5 DIC} D435 1961 CIA. "DLC haa 1953 ed. caly. va _-TLI, MARSHALL, . Germany; a modern history. Ann Arbor, University - of Michigan Presa, 1961. h6Tp- pp89.D5 DIC; 9 DD89.D5 «CIA. DONNER, JOERN. | Report from Berlin. Bloouiington, Indiana University Press, 1961. 2864p. Dp881.D633 DLC; pp881.b62 CIA. , ‘Praaalation fron the Swedish. DORNEERG, rou. Schizophrenic Germany. New York, Macmilian, 1961. 3020. DD259. 2.D6 DIC; DDd259.2.D6 CIA. H ALLEN WELSH. Germany's underground. New York, Macmillan, 1957. 2067p. Dn256.D9 Dic; ¥1838.p8 CIA. A simple, clear account of the opposition to Hitler during the war. EPSTEIN, FRITZ THEODOR, Germany and the United States: basic- patterns of conflict and understanding. Lawrence, Kansas, 1959. 204-31hp. £183.8.G355 DIL. "Reprinted from Iseues and Conflicts, University of Kansas Prese, 3T4p. 1959." 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
74-90000 . i ee s 2 ‘ - i FOR OnFICEAL USE onLE a BAND, ume." ; " prooperity- -thirenigh Gonpeti toa. ae Yorks "Preeger, 1958 260p. -BC286. 5° E7313 . “DIL. me RICK, ERICH: ke ‘history of the Weimar Republic.  Conbridge, - os) Baivad sity Press, 1962-. DD237.5913: DIC. a FLeNeey;, Asiph ? Maden Crermia Mistery (i9ex GERALD. . Germany’ between two vorlds ide. Hew York, Bareourt, - “Brace,” 1961s. -, 2996p. -- DD259.".F78 “CIAL : ae GERMANY (FEDERAL: REPUBLIC). CONSTITUTION, 1961. he basic law of : oo os the Federal Republic of Germany; amendments as of 31 December. to oe soe Wns ev York, German Information Center, 1961. 62p. bo _ “ countess, WALTER,  Mietory, ‘of ‘the German géneral ‘staff, 1657-1985 + 7 ae New York, Prager, 1953. 508p.  DD101.G614 1953° ECs’ a _  BD101.661 195385 , CIA. . , ° gee, Ge LAY. Te shan The Feanding « of the Federal. Reps bea of (ror maa. (14sx) . GOTTLIEB, “MANUEL. The German peace settlement and the Berlin crisis. New York, Paine-Whitman Publishere, 1960. 275p. DD257-G68 | DIL; ‘BD257 -68 CIA. co. GT. -BRIT. ‘FOREIGN orice. Selected documenta on Germany and the quéstion of Berlin, 1944-1961. London, HMSO, 1961. 4603p. (Its Germany, 1961, no.2. Gt. Brit. Parliament. Papers by command, cmnd. 1552) DD257.4.075 1961. “DIC. GROSSER, ALFRED. The colossus again; Western Germany from defeat . _to.rearmameiit. Hew York, Praeger, 1955. 2h9p. DD257.G7#13 DiC; DD25T.GTES CIA. HEIDENEEIMER, ARNOLD J. The governments of Germany. New York, Crowell, 1961. 22hp. JW3971.A59B% DIC; JN3971.A58H4% CIA. ° - HELLER, DEANE, and DAVID HELLER. The Berlin Wall. New York, Walker, 1962, 2h2p. DD881.H39 DLC; DDS81.Hb2 CIA. EERTZ, FRIEDRICH OTTO. Development of the German public mind; @ social history of German political sentiments, aspirations, and ideas. London, Allen & Unwin, 1957. 52h4p. DDLI2.HuA DIC. L— REYDECERR, J08 JULIUS, and JOHANNES LEES. The Nuremberg trial; a history of Hazi Germany. | New York, World Pub. Co., 1942. 3908p. -K1836.1.G386145 “CIA. “3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
14-00000 awe a ae en orraetit OSE ONLY. Se - d Vacs, RICHARD: : Deadcieey in Weatern: Germany. ‘London, New ° York; Oxford Gniverssty: Preae, 1951s. cael Bve59- 4. HS DIGS. -Bb259. JKeHO”. -CLAG. . Lo Sy - HOR ‘WILREUL, the sééret front; the story oF. Basi political. SBS ees Rew ee. uae 195b. 327. “dz. PES - 2 ‘ . x : arunslaticd trea the deman. ; a "~ HOEBORG, ‘ ‘EAJO.  -A-history of modem Gommany. “ew 1 York, Ae ‘Knope, 1959= = DDLT5-H62 DIL. Volt the Reformation. : HOLBROOK, SABRA. —. Capital without & , country: fhe challenge of Berlin. New York, Coward-HeCann, 1961. ; | - HORSE, ALISTAR. “Return to power; a report on the new Germany. ” Hew York, Praeger, (1956. ki5p. DD259.4.H65 1956 DLL; pd259.4.88 1956 CIA. HUEREHER, THEODORE. The schools of West Germany; a study of German elementary and secondary ‘schools. Hey York, Hew York University Presa, 1962. 18lp. - LA721.82.88 DIC; - LAT2l. 82.88 CIA. INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND AUMANISTIC STUDIES. The Thira Reich; a shidy published under the auspices of the International Council fox Failosophy and Bumauiatic Studies - and with the assistance of UNESCO. New York, Praeger, 1955. 910p. DD256.5. 158 19536 DIC; pp256.5.I5 cIA. JARMAN, THOMAS LECKIE. The rise and fall of Bazi Germany. New York, Rew York University Press, 1956. 3688p. D256.5.03 1956 “DIC; DD256.5.53 CIAe . JOHNSON, UWE. Speculations about Jakob. New York, Grove, 1962. ; A novel reflecting life during the last decades in Germany. KITZIBGER, UWE W. German electoral politics, a study of the 1957 campaign. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960. 365p. JH3971.A95K5 DLC; JHS971.A956 1957.K7 CIA. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
14-00000 ‘POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY *, °° 0 ls *. NOCHAN, IXONEL; “ . the striggle for Gerisany, "1914-1945. puiabire, ar ee cre University Frees; Chicago, Aldine | Pub- Co. , 1963. 150p. > on - a, rain, HA ‘The ‘wind’ ‘of Germany’ ‘the. education of a aation. i: : - Hew Tethy Scribner, 1960... 3T0p. _ DDT6-KS9 DIL; ‘DOTE-K59 CIA. a HG, (150 'L . | The German 1déa of freedom; history of a “"-. political tradition. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. 540pe DDLL2. 582 DIC. . LAQUEUR,, WALTER-ZE'SV. ~ Young Germany; a history of the German . Do youth movesient. London, Routledge & Paul, 1962. 253p. ae 19.13 DIES -BRI99- Q513 CIA. ec LIDDELL, HART, BASIL HENRY. ‘The German generals talk, Nev York, 5 Morrow, lok, 308. DIST.I5 19Ka DIC; DYST15 CEA. 3 LOEWENSTEIN, Prince HUBERTUS, aad ‘YOLKMAR VOR ZUEHILSDORFY. and the defense of the West. New York, Praeger, 1962. 383p. UAG46.3.IBE5S CIA. yo, ..4 LOWER, ROBERT HARRY. © Toward understanding Germany. Chicago, . University of Chicago Press, 1954. 396p. HWu45.168 DLO; , “HNALS.LG CIA. - rd J ‘A MCINNIS, “EDGAR, RICHARD HISCOCKS, and ROBER? SPENCER. The shaping of postvar Germany. London, Dent, 1960. 195p. DD257.M35 19Ga DIC; DD257.N35 1960 CIA. e _ MCCLELLAN, GRANT S., ed. The two Germanies. New York, Wilson, 1959. 18hp. (the Reference shelf, v-31, 0.1) DD257.M27 = DLE. DD25T »M2 CIA. MANDER, JOHN. Berlin, hostage for the Weet. Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1962. 12hp. (A Penguin special, 8209) 0D881.M27 “DIC; =DDGSL.M2 = CIA. MARVELL, ROGER, and HEINRICH FRAENKEL. Goering. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1962.. Mk2p. DO2NT7.G67M3_ DLC; «= DN2KT.G67M2 CIAL MEINECKS, FRIEDRICH. Tne German catastrophe; reflections an? recollections. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2950. l2lp. DD256.5.Mk2 DLC; ppesé. 5.MbES CIA. frenslation from the German. b) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
14-00000 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY cea Aaaey facts and figueee “Prnkfirt aM, Ae WM Netane=, ig ol :  NI3p. "20259. 172 DIC; - DD259.M372 «CIA oo Lae aac ‘som. Co-t = Our stake ia Germany. Washingtoa, Washington ee . - MEAL, FRED WARHER, | War and peace aad Germany. Hew York, We We Horton, 1962. 166ps DD257.25.N38 DIC; = DD2ST.BS.NG CIA MESSELRODE, FRANZ VON. Germany's other half; 6 journalist's appraisal of East Geimany. London, Hew York, Abelari-Schuman, — | 3963. -2OTp. " DD26LNAS DIC; bD261.2.Ws' CIA. PASSANT, ERNEST JAMES. Short history of Germany 1815-1945. ¢ London, Hew York, Cambridge University Press; 1959. 2955p. DD232.P35 DLC; _ B83 pp2j2.P2 CIA. , PIRNEY, ‘RDWARD Kee ~ Federalisa, bureaucracy and party politics ‘in Western Cex 1 Hill, University of North Carolina Press, many. Chape 1963. 268p. <JN3971.ATTPS DIC. i FIESOR, KOPPEL SHUB. Modern Germany, ite history and civilization. New York, Macmillan, 1954. 637p- DD203.P5 1g DLCs DD203.P5 1954 CIA. aos A useful survey, particularly of the intellectual background. PLISCHKE, EIMER. Contemporary government of Germany. Soston, Koughton Mifflin, 1961, 2hdp. _ SHBGTLeASPSS DIC; ONSOTLASPT  CIAs POLLOCK, JAMES KERR, and others. Germany in power an4 eclipse; the background of German development. New York, Yan Hostrand, 1952. 66lp. DDo9.P64 DIC; DDS9.P6 CIA. POUNDS, HORMAN JOBN GREVILLE. Divided Germany and Berlin. Princeton, N. J., Ven Nostrand, 1962, 1208p. DN257.25.P6 DIL; DD257.25-P7 CIAe PRITTIE, Hon. TERENCE CORNELIUS FARMER. Germany divided. Boston, Little, Brown, 1960. 380p. DD257.P72 1961 C3 DD257.PT CIA. DIC bag English ed. FOR OFFICIAL USE ORLY
atte, ‘4 ° ° FOR OFFICIAL USE. OHLY "aim, Kony FRANK. Gerhanyt "2600 yeara Rave od. New York, ; ; Fs pagar Pub. 60% 1961. ave: DBO. R36 1961 . DIG; . oe : < patoo, CHARLES 3 3.,: ed. Pérlin-<pivot 0 of Geruan destiny. Chapel “HLLL;. University of Horth Carolina Press, 1960. 233p. / . BDBEL.BI553~ (DiC; _DD881. R62 | ClAe ” pomireis, HARB; ‘The Gérmsin opposition to o Bitlery an appraisal. ' @a rev.‘ed. Chicago, Regne » 1962. 166p. (Foundation for foreign affairs series, n0.6).. DD256.3.R6 1962 DIC; _¥2838.R84 1962 ' IAs. < SHIRER, WILLIAM LAWRENCE.’ - ‘The rise and fall of the Tint Retehs a history of Nazi Germany. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960. " 1245p. —DD256.5.848 . DIL; DD256. 5-855 CIA This dis iasued aleo a8 a paperback ed. ne surTs, BRUCE LANNES &. The governance of Berlin. New York, Cainegte - Endowment for International Peace, 1959. 171-230p. (International conciliation, no.525) JX1907.A8 no.525 DIC. . CUYDER, Toure LEO. Basic history of modern Germany. Princeton, N. Je». Van Nostrand, 1957. 1192p. DD175.858 DIC; DD175.858 CIA. . SPEIER, HARS. German rearmement and atomic war; the views of . German military and political jeaders. Evanston, I1Li., Row, Peterson," 1957+ 272p- UAT1O.856 DIC; UAT1O.S7 CIA. SPEIER, HANG, . and W. PHILLIPS DAVISOH, eds. Weat German leadership and foreigs 3 policy. Evanston, Tll., Row, Peterson, 1957. 323p. pp259.4.86 DIC3 DD259.457 CIA. STAHL, WALTER, ed. fhe politics of postwar Germany. New York, Preeger for Atlantic-Bruecke, 1963. 4&0p. DpD259.4.88 DIC; DD259. 4.871 CIA. STERH, FRITZ RICHARD. Cultural despair and the politics of discontent; a study of the rise of the “Germanic” ideology. , Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961. 367p. DD76.872 1961 DIL. T FOR OFFICIAL USE OSLY m8 ame
14-00000 "sre, WOLFGANG P;"" Tae structure cf the East Germai econcny, "Cambridge, _ Harvard: University Presa, 1960. Mop cored “part al “ALA JORN PERCIVALE. ~ The course of. German histexy; @ survey of the éevelopitat of Germany since 1815. Hew York, coward-weCann, - 230p. BD203- 3 1946 pic. ; QUEENS, LETS EARENS. the new Gemany aid the old Nazis. Yew York, _ Bandon House, ‘1961. 2686p. 1ne59.2.T% DIC; = Dn2ss.2.23 CIA. , CHARLES WHEELER. The unquiet Germans. Hew York, Earper, 19ST.  275p.°  DD257- B5 ~° «DIC. - VERMEIL, EDMOZD. --. Germany im the twentieth century; a political and cultural history of the Weimar Republic aud the Bird Reich. Hew York, Praeger, 1956. 2608p. D232.V413 1956 Dios DD232.V5E5 CIA. VIERECK, PETER ROBERT EDWIN, © Metapalitica, the roots of the Hast minds New-York, Capricorn Books, 1961. 364p.. (A Capricorn book, CAPS5)  DD253. V5 1961 DIL. . 7. WHEELER-BENNETT, JOGN WHEELER.. The nemesis of power. loaion, Hew York, Hacmillan, 1953. 8259p. DD2k0.W5 Dicz isw.w56 Revised ed. 1963 / WORLRARE, RAYMOND A., and WERNER KRUSCH. | The land and pocple Germany. Fhiladelphia, Lippincott, 1997. 1160p. DDLT.w of are. ‘FOR OFFICIAL USE OSLY