Eiassifieation: Secret This form is tg be used for movenial extracted om €lA—centrelled documents) “ye ig -§l- on Oswald's contact with the DGI. except for that. set forth in the. Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as discussed herein. (Ibid.) In * eee effort to ad thé’ substance of infoymation that A-1 prpvided Yo" the crn’ ing Oswald, the Cc fri eves Kas attempted ocate A~lé The CEA has” Loco attempted to! 7 Vocate wi firose glasen farationhs with the Agency is uous/ but has been urfable! gency g ser pei sae) to determine his present whepéabouts 4 a The CIA's - f va e $ 7 inability to Aocate A~-1l has been # sourse of concern to’ this /Committee, particularly in light of his long association with the Agency. remauns (acempett | aft rtnasra te Ane mat * xnform Abit -1 ty T peg , may have supplied the CIA about’ Oswald. Hewerer, ith Lt [ir o the exception of the Calderon episode and on the "8 « ‘ , basis of the CIA's written reocrd, it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1l ~ information of investigative significance. A separate question remains, however. The j Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-l was present in the 8A? ——w a 90910 | ees 5 Ra, omer k 2UC Riles On
tag Classification: secrete _ This form is tg be used for matssial extracted ofA €lA—<eniretied ESEUMENS) -~8la~ *An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding A-1l states in pertinent part: Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved fo in any CIA. operation in Miami or elsewhere. % a (soseph-norris) Ks the alias of a CIA a representativeLwho periodically debriefs (A-1) on personalities and methods of the DGI.. There is no other CIA involvement with ye ® cl€ Rodriguez. (CIA Doc. O8646027-CEA 202417, fe B a WVolwuw4;"A-1L File 202-349652)~ However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning the Agency status of A-1 states: Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that (A~1) [is still an active contact} not receiving any salary, but could“be paid if and when used in an operation. No problems here. (SPOB will keep his contract in an active folder.] (CIA Doc., Handwritten Note, | 15 i 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file Hh ica. fy N88 eam a Peal av Glassification: | 000105 care ivation: he ett JGGQ . | Glessified ty derivation: Berk ©
Classification: SECREL (This form is to be used for material extracted WashingtortronDCA—eardelledhdocumenter controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l1's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-l as it ‘concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option. ‘In light of the establishment of A-l's hona fides, . | , his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission. , Pi we The AMLASH Operation (+e be incorporate 10%? cr cbiis gy A eX Fock ox) During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General ‘issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an SECRET, Prt Classification: Classified by derivation: 009106 a a a a Y YA, YUP, é y NEAR, ah. 5, + xe a a
- §3 - Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonyn AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). Asa result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political. alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency. Subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral whe and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. (Ibid. pp. 104-106} During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. . In its examination of the the 1967 IGR concluded that the direct and indirect support for S ow Classification: (Ibid.. pp. AMLASH operation FR e 107-110). CIA had offered both AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. rii og Mee i& L Bis Classified by derivation: 009107 a re a a a a ee SRR. GHeth. NEA, 8 NUE,
(This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meéting with a Cuban agent [and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (Ibid. ) The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy .~-The 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was ~~ ; act : tried in® Havana® “press reports of Cuban knowledge / of AMLASH's association with the CIA were dated from November 1964, approximately one year after President Kennedy's assassination. (Inid. p. 111). The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC, Book.V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) The Church Commitee o ‘ concluded: The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commision work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unilke those earlier plots, the AMLASH Classification: Situs [ 0108 Classified by derivation: ‘alah, SS a a a ae “oR “Gh. Ey Neda. “Sh,
co Classification: SECRET (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could Clearly be traced to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's | assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of | the AMLASH operation. No one investi- gated a connection between the AMLASH operation and President Kennedy's "-assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti- Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct Fe a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p. 5).- Classification: “GEM. 000109 Classified by derivation: ‘Sih “ER WE “ER “WH “aati | “Niele.
Classification: SECRET (This form is to be used: for material extracted from ClA—<ontrolled documents.) Nabe om Poe (ke ~~ In 1977, the CIA issued a clcohd-taspactor weeneral's Report concerning ‘the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in Rte large part, was intended as a> ‘Febuttal of the Church Committee! s findings. The 1977 GR states: The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) . characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassina- tion of JFK in order to support the SSC . View that it should have been reported - ot weer Tk fy to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR D- 2) The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot. Nevertheless, the 1977 ICR ‘aid. state: — aa, to re orce the Beans sion) rts hadAt takep Ca broader view  » ¢ f. Q ik av e of A i i i The“CIA, o, cowld. j i yspeci fie terms* on térms~-~ x LLi of Soviet or G@uban involvément jpn the Assassination because of the ‘temsions of the time. It is not ‘enough’ to be able to point rood I Bis wes Oe Tue Classification: 990410 Classified by derivation:  GGAM, NURIA. NOR, = NURSE, “SHAD, NEE.
The Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) to erroneous; crit] 25s mage today. The Agency boul hay talyen brodder initiatives then as Well/ That; ¢ CIA employees At thé time felt#-as : LEME they obvzZously did4-that the yactivities co thejharetn Gointation. ng relevance oa to the/Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (Ibid. p. LY) oe Trae « the Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not. believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391,392) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of “SR, Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-27). A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 fe > , ; was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Specialy, _— Affai Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component Sta Sf responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence “UHR. Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, NGI. : Classified by derivation PBAA be
(ais form ig tg be used for moteriol extrasted Om Cra—centrelled decuments) ~8g~ Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1) The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsib for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp..3, 8, 7 Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligenc for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). It was Langosch's recollection that: ...the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the \ CIA. (Ibid., p. 4) Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior lev seep 35 officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (Ibid., However, the issue before this Committee is Elgssification: — S34 le 9) e MS » ¢ agp p. 4) G00i12 MUUGg GL | fied. by deriyoti . | |  Cassliess yy, Geiales;, —C-——Berk SU, @ a he nye ty,
Grassificatign; Secret __ rom CrA—conttalled sgcumente} e *In response to Langosch's. sworn statements, this Committee has received from the CIA an affidavit executed by Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who "served as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald: during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff...and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." (CIA Doc., Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, executed Oct. 5, 1978, p. 1) Mr. Pollock specifically contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an assassination operation. In pertinent part, Pollock - drew the following conclusions: “Geek “WGA. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objective of organizing P a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the : Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an “assassiantion operation.” Mr. FitzGerald : stated within my hearing on several occasions z his awareness that coup d'etat often involves 4 loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2) He also stated: Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an "assassiantion operation"; the . case officer did not; I,~as Executive Officer, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with a Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other #* , . branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro. The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. /Ibid., par. 4, po. 2/), (TIbid., par. 6, p. 3) ~ | . Classifieds by, desivotiens, —c—Bexk
Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted from ClA—controlled documents.) SN could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better chance of getting to the heart of it. It might have only revealed that we are involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that would ‘have at least come out. (HSCA Class._ Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91) The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to the Warren Commission, the Commission might have been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture that has surrounded the AMLASH operation during the past decade. As history now. records, the AMLASH operation remains a footnote to the turbulent relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States. “Ges EHR sy, we & Se NEEM, “Se. PHOPLLS