JFK Assassination System Date: 6/24/20] Identification Form Peleased under the John Kennedy Agency information AGENCY : ARMY WSsassination Records RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10135 ollection het of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS ase#:NWU 54214 Date: AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ee eet Document Information ORIGINATOR: ARMY FROM: CYRUS R. VANCE TO: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TITLE: PROVISION OF SUITABLE RADAR EQUIPMENT FOR TEMPORARY INSTALLATION AT THE BREAKWATER ENTRANCE TO THE PORT OF COLON, PANAMA DATE: 00/00/0000 PAGES: 23 SUBJECTS : ; ~ POLICY AND PLANNING - CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : RESTRICTIONS : CURRENT STATUS : DATE OF LAST REVIEW : OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : v9.1 HW 542714 DBocld: 3242741276 Top Secret 1C Redact 07/24/1998 Califano Papers, Box 4, Folder |. Memo from Vance to CJCS re: Radar Installation; Report entitled "Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of Use of Force)." Department of the Army EO 13526 SA Declassify — Exclude — Exempt Authority, C Refer To__. oP = Review pated /(¢/ LOLS By Ko Page 1
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. IN REPLY REFER TO: SUBJEGT: Provision of Suitable Radar Equipment for Temporary oe Installation at the Breakwater Entrance to the Port of Colon » Panama The recel if f reports of possible contraband. ‘shi pfnents to Venezuela- Colombia origina ftidy g from the Panama Free Zone wefe discussed atthe Standing: Group/l eeth ng of the National Security: Coufcil on December 13, .1963,. Asa r¢@sult. of th nese} jreports and as part of ah intensified effort to confirm and , ‘liminaté shh j traffic, I pe fque st that.mmediate action be. taken to insf ll a. silitable } kadar: capg ifs lity at/the. ha, rbor entrance to Colon, é is ‘that CENCLANT has appropriate thi gb att poser It .is:desired that this equip- 5 ce rating ger sonnél be situated in such a manner ¢ at day and ‘night overak e.ig“provided of shipping, entering and leaving the é Breakwater north of Powt of Colon. Present plans contem- plate that this requirement may extehkd for a period of up to 120 days. Appropriate coordination betwee CINCLANT and USCINGSO .should be accomplished by: the Joint Staff\, WSCINCSO is authorized to . coordinate this matter with the Governor oMthe-Panama:Canal Zone and CAS Panama. In view of the urgency of’this matter the equipment and operators should be in place not later than December 22,. 1963. - Major General Krulak, who participated as your repreSentative at the Decem- ber 13, 1963 meeting.of the NSC Standing:Group,..4s .familiar’with this. - requirement. . Cyrus R. Vance ‘Secretary of the Army OF 4 pyrER VALS N ed LASSIP LE °D “AprER 12 YEARS Oo DOD DIR 5200-10 HW 542714 DBocld:324241276 Page 2?
UNILATERAL ACTION A CIA View CIA will propose authority be granted to conduct CIA or s. : : ee autonomous air strikes. Comment Advantages outweigh disadvantages provided. "plausible denial" can be assured. CIA (US) personnel would risk this ‘denial factor, | HW 542914 Docld: 3274274178 Page 3
Cy a > > vy ve * . . “ae + : wou Lt : . _ _ \ \ s7 “ _— Hw 54214 DoclId: 324241276 Page 4
To a a a ao | | Ris ¢ went cons BS w sists of 10 ip So TE matic we " seme Wop; Series AB " posstaiE FURTHER UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL ” ACTIONS TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON CUBA (SHORT OF USE OF -EORGE) ry 3 Unilateral i economic inotallations by autonomous Cuban exile . oo oup(s) o exatin from bases outside the United. |. oR PEBRRB to fet / Capability to be provided to ‘autonomous: “group(s) by CIA on "plausible denial" basis. Authorization for. such ‘operations: ‘has ‘been ‘requested. dn’ ‘past. but ~ not granted.) L. Advantages _ coe a. Possible substantial direct economic effects” eee e ,Indirect economic effects (maintenance of etree . military alert with consequent partial fying MP | of labor force) © = Positive effects on morale of -anti-Castro:ele = ‘mente a and waverers within Cubs | _ Clear demonstration to Castro of determination ee of opposition 2. Disadvantages HW 542714 Docld:324241276 Page 5
ao, ‘ . . ° ‘ . ‘ ¢ empente eam e er emery . : . i - Re , o 4 ”~ . a a * 5 1 Me a 44 A ~ ~ , ny oy sligd °F UNILATERAL ACTION B CIA View CIA will recommend complete relaxation of present policy _ banning all independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against targets:in Cuba from US and urge the British to do likewise for Bahama territory. Comment State course of action is preferable. Only selected reliable C) exile groups should be utilized for this purpose. The British would likely recoil from CIA proposal. Exile air attacks should not be authorized, : . . : Po ee neem er A ee teat = - adele HW 542714 Docld:324241276 Page 6 SE SS TT
: Marked rabsing of noise level... ‘sabotage and infiltration activities. - _Cnvolves discreet neutralization of obstacles to. Hw aa214 DoclId: 324241276 Page 7
UNILATERAL ACTION C CIA View CIA will concur in this course of action, Comment This course of action should only be. undertaken if a US policy decision to.do away with Castro. by all means Short of invasion is forthcoming. Otherwise it constitutes a costly and marginally effective course of action. HW 54714 Docld: 3274274178 Page 6
to CIA eperations -. * Positive effects 0 on ‘Cuban exile morale “elements i” and Wwaverers within Cuba vets acquiescence Auite'e “evic ent eotinerning U.S.-based exile x raids - Uncertainty of control over choice SDA ¢ Military Feints (Movement of U.S.- air and surface units over and in international waters near Cuba fn manner designed to keep Cuban military foxee in state of alert and  Moertatnty To be effective, movements, would shave Docld: 3274274178 Page 9
co ns | | UNILATERAL ACTION D See | CIA View : | CIA will concur for both intelligence and psychological effect. | Comment. . C) Flights can and should be resumed particularly if reports of stepped up Soviet Arms deliveries continue. In addition consideration. should be given to initiating night photography missions in areas. of suspected military activity. HW 542714 DBocld:324241276 Page 10
sarreetaril io - Paychological harassment of Castro and other et, ia ! e “anager Sse escalation : tially psychological exercise - Possible negative effects | on morale of anti- of military personnel ‘Occasional, selected low-level "reconnaissance" ° overflights by U.S, aircraft yy Wiehe pare would be designed to reduce to a pa214 DoclId: 324241276 Page i1 :
a a ee UNILATERAL ACTION EF CIA. View CIA will support this action and seek additional US sanctions against Canada, the UK, Spain’and Japan, Comment NASM 220 provides that a ship that engages in the Cuban trade. on or after January 1, 1963 is proscribed from carrying US government cargoes, This ship can be removed only if the owner contracts. to. remove it and all other ships owned. by his firm from the Cuban-trade. The State course of action is a . fairly significant step which should increase pressure on Cuba, The State paper appears to underplay somewhat.the effects of this action, HW 54214 Docld: 3274274178 Page 12
‘tould represent a continuation, sharpening and ety intensification of programs already in effect. a. Heightened appearance of forward movement “ se because of Congressional and press sensitivity ito shipping question - ’ Disadvantages ; a 4 Relatively. small practical returns “= Political costs with maritime nations . : . a Possible legal difficulties involved in some. unilateral measures -.. Measures of a bilateral nature, outside and within | Hw 4214 DoclId: 324241276 ; Wherever possible, the OAS reso-= quest the cooperation of other Page 15
BILATERAL ACTION B ‘CIA View As noted previously CIA will favor strong.US sanctions against free world nations involved in the Cuban trade especially Canada, the UK, Japan and Spain, Comment Additional US denial efforts are required, we. a Hw 4214 Docld: 3274274178 Page 16
HW 54214 fi u 4 ee, bilateral. relations, Economic Denial is This. program involves overt | and covert, - legal - and extrarlegal, diplomatic and private, efforts to DoclId: 324241276 dene Cuba access to free-world markets and sources u “increases Cubba leverage on free-world sugar “cone 7 cS sumers. In addition, there is a general (but varying) Page i7
BILATERAL ACTION B jaaeterineeninensaaeaiashessiasveniineiaiatnaiaata one CIA View As noted previously CIA will favor strong US sanctions against free world nations involved.in the Cuban trade especially Canada, the UK, Japan and Spain. Comment Additional US denial efforts are required, Ts ne et a Se SS Se oo HW 94214 Docld: 32424128 Page 18
“dlatingutshed from governments. ° Progress has been made in our economic. dental _ Program, and effective operations ‘have been carried’ HW 54214 Docld: 3242741236 Page 19 -
! C Oo —_ BILATERAL ACTION C ‘CIA View Unknown. , Comment Concur (See Tab » Section I) BILATERAL ACTION D CIA View Unknown Comment The US-USSR Civil Air Agreement will seri ‘ously erode our efforts to establish barriers against air service to Cuba. The US should risk offending. those countries: which fail to respond to current US efforts to.restrict air services to Cuba. Ly - cant fae So nes a es Hw 4214 DoclId: 324241276 Page 20 Pn ma Sy oe
An additional immediately available step would be. the conclusion of an agreement involving the anend- ment of NSAM 220 with the British shipowner, - to guarantee the withdrawal, by. early 1963. of all bts. “ohips in return for the progressive removal from ‘the. baacklist of his vessels as they get out of “the trade. This agreement should have beneficial ‘effects on other tiporeant ‘ship owners. ‘Foreign Aid Authorization act could increase our | ns diplomatic: pressures. on) ‘the maritime nations, air services (Eree-world « and Coumunist) to and from Cuba should be strengthened ° by the provisions. of the . ~ new Foreign Aid Authorization act, ae, “again, we “ere prepared to accept the. costs to other: interests in the. offending countries. On the other ‘hand, HW 542714 Docld:324241276 Page 21 .
HW 54714 SS BILATERAL ACTION CG CIA View Unknown, Comment | Concur (See Tab , Section I) BILATERAL ACTION D Unknown , Comment The US-USSR Civil Air Agreement:will. seriously erode our efforts to establish barriers against air service to Cuba. The US should risk offending those countries which fail to respond to current US efforts to restrict air services to Cuba. ee a nt Se a — _ 4 Docld: 32742741278 Page 22?
Aidoks Sf Bie teat ty tea pas TARE OS Ee ET ae RTP NTE US-USSR civil air agreement could have erosive ~ effects on the always precarious - Anti-Subversive Program Essentially, the “ Lines of the anti-subversive program have been laid. assistance, Sali Hw j42i4 Docld: 3274274178 Page 23
HW 54714 | p ~ | Le we a ~, | co , Bilateral Action E CIA View ‘CIA would favor early recognition of the Dominican and Honduran governments to assist in holding - the Latin American line against Castro, CIA. would favor bilateral arrangements with Latin American governments for joint measures to detect and.to prevent arms smuggling and subversive activity by land, sea, or air, Venezuela should be given first priority. Comment DOD should favor the CIA view above. Balanced corrective action in the key target-areas of Venezuela and ©) Columbia will. require. improved. military communications and an increased US military presence (MTTS). aemarrnrmammeed ar cr eae Re i a secs et seems oo ae Docld: 3274274178 Page 24
HW 54714 BILATERAL ACTION E ; CLA View _ CIA would favor early recognition. of the Dominican and Honduran governments to assist in holding the Latin American line against. Castro. CIA would favor bilateral arrangements with Latin American governments for joint measures to detect and to prevent arms smuggling and. subversive activity by land, sea, or air, Venezuela should be given first priority. Comment DOD should favor. the CIA view above. Balanced corrective action in the key target areas. of Venezuela.and Columbia will require improved military communications and an increaséd US military presence (MTTS), Docld: 324274178 Page 25