indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the . ‘telephonic surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts ‘from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1 of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. “Manifestly, had ‘the Warren Commission - been informed of the telephonic surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made... - | ~ Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recoilection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico city. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make rss esr
this material available to Commission representa- tives and was not able to state under oath’ precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibid.). On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the: Consulate. However, the Agency neither revealed the source of this information in its response to the Commission nor indicated that this source would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). (Ibid.) — Warren Commission Knowledge of CIA telephonic Surveillance “During the period of March - April 1964, a David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission know- ledge of and access to the production material . derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations. in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, and
and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephonic surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, who provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to “Mexico City) - Prior to April 9, it appears doubtful. that the Commission had been given even partial access. to the referenced material. “Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren © Commission had at least become aware that the CIA aia maintain telephonic surveillance of the Cuban ‘embassy /Consulate. (Slewson memoranduni, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives) . Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that. the Warren | Commission had learned that the CIA possessed tran- scripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. The Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren
Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, 45-46) Helms responded to the Commission's request for, access, stating that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission's representatives to review this material. (Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6) Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. ‘In that memo Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip, were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, (Slawson Memorandum of March > 25, 1964, p. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary of interrogations”éonducted shortly. after the assassinationfwith certain Cuban Embassy _ et a employees. / Slawson wrote: A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is there- fore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police. (Ibid.)
These comments indicate that Slawson placed qualified reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephonic intercept tran- scripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided -little substantive information > pertaining to Silvia Duran. -As Slawson reveals, the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveil- lance operations, and a summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police, Thus, the Agency, had. been successful for over three months in not exposing che. surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station: Our present plan in passing information - to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mn mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here. (CIA Doc. FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964, CIA p. 2144, DIR 90466)
The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (cD 692) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. (Ibid, p. 2) This. conclusion, noe te, was based upon an analysis of Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. ‘This memorandum bears no indication that he had . reviewed any of the Duran transcripts.. Furthermore, had Slawson been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated | into his analysis and accordingly noted for this PUFPOSE. His analysis would have reflected the fact of his review either by its ‘corroboration or | criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report. — Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic’ surveillance production would have clarified some ambig uities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. (Slawson Memorandurn — of April 21, 1964, Subj: Intercepts from Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico, p. 2) pwe 7-27,
Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA analysts | to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. | Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, subsequently identified by CIA analysts as Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy. (Ibid. p. 4) Had this’ information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. | | The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced — series of telephonic intercepts. In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they posed one question to the CIA and made two.requestsfor. information from the Agency. (Slawgon - Coleman Memorandum of April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador Mann File) Coleman and Slawson wrote: ‘1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that
Oswald intended to settle down.in Odessa; | 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts refer to the assassination or related subjects; 3) We would especially like to see the . intercept in which the allegation that: money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed (Ibid. ) | The question initially posed by (Item I)’ in’ the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephonic intercept of September 27, 1963 vat 10:37 a.m. (Slawson Memorandum of April 21, “1964, p. 1) Obviously, if Slewson found it necessary to request the source of the information, he had | not as yet been provided access to the original material by the CIA. Item Number Two of the above listing tends to show that the Commission had not been giving access to the intercept concerning the assassination.
Item number three of the above listing reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Armas — conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts at @ March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference with CIA on March 12, 1964) | | | On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place. ..-in order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or
possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investi- gatory agencies there have done. This. means reading their reports, after _trans- lation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves. (Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, April 13, 1964, Subj: Additional lines of Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove Worthwhile, p. il.) | | Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire — for a thorough investigation had been thwarted by the CIA's concern lest its sources and metnods, however relevant to the Commission's investigation, be exposed. Considering the-gravity and signi- ficance of the Warren Commission's investigation | the Agency's witholding of material from the Commission staff was clearly improper.
1964 On April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. (Slawson Memorandum, April 22, 1964, Subj: Trip to Mexico City, p. 1) Prior to their departure, they met with Thomas Mann, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid.). Ambassador Mann told the Warren Commission representa- tives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates {Ibid., p. 3) ‘Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were inet by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA (Ibid. pp. 9-10) That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made_ \ available to the group actual transcripts of the CIA's telephonic surveillance operations accompanied with English translations of the transcripts. In addition,
he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances, David Slawson wrote: "’,.Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtain- ed through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. |. We agreed to this." (Ibid.) Mr. Scott described to the Commission repre- sentatives the CIA's course of action immediately . following the assassination, indicating that his ‘staff immediately began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (Ibid.) Scott revealed that all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents: Had “qurckly _ been put under surveillance following the assassination. Slawson concluded : "Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how © incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet | and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the
distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit." (Ibid, p..24)* ee A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source “materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. ‘These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conver~ sations for the period Sept. 27 - Oct. 1, 1963. | “(Slawson Memorandum, April 21, 1964 Subj: Intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City. ee See: NTS AR RETA A BIOON OE SIMD EN BEETLES ote Nn OE BAM Po OE GERI ct AM OE AE EY Yin eae DOH ET AS TN an Al a a ee It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's ability to draw accurately reasoned conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City. It meant that as of April 10, 1964,
VI. nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace “the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise materials could have been made available for analysis by the Commission. (tpid.) Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation — and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation O.g., Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously considered had ‘this material been: expeditiously provided. | Mexico City Mystery Man. on November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odum. showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son (Warren
a % os Tay Comunission Report p. 364) This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives: had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald? (cra Doc. DDP4-1555, 3/25/64, Warren Commission Doc. 67yethis photograph which was one in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. pence terest 1! Prior to the assassination, ; had been linked by Peete ee, Beene neta mn ne the Mexico City Station to Lee Harvey Oswald. (Ibid.) . Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. (Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms 8/7/54, vol. XI, pp. 469-473) On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren’ Commission and recounted the cir- cumstances under which she was shown the photograph. (Warren Commission Report Vol I 153) Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack ‘Ruby. (Ibid., Vol. 1)
Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP requesting both the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph and an explanation of the circumstances by which this photograph was obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872) on that same day, in a separate letter, Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials - that ‘the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963 to the Secret Service but not to the Warren Commission. Rankin requested copies of these. materials which included three CIA cables. The cables concerned the photograph subsequently shown. by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual originally identified by the Mexico City Station as Lee Harvey Oswald. (Letter of J; Lee Rankin. Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872) Among the materials disseminated by the CIA to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination. (CIA Doc DIR 85177, 11/26/64) That cable concerned
the Dorticos-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. As a result the CIA was reluctant to make the material disseminated to the Secret Service available to the Warren Commission for in SO doing the Agency would have necessarily exposed its telephonic surveillance operationsto the Commission. — John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission recounting the origion of the photograph in question. Scelso stated: "We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?" Mr. Goldsmith: ....SO the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was: not relevant, to the Warren Commission. cae : Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations. . (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso 5/16/78, \ p- 150) In summary the records shows that - By February 12, 1964 the Warren Commission had inadvertantly requested access to telephonic surveillance production, a cause for concern within the
due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods. Similarly the disclosure of the photosurveillance operations | | -to the Warren Commission had also begun to cause concern within the Agency. on March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an _internal memorandum to Richard Helms that “we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since “November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated: "Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the ; above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone requesting JFK Doc.3982) If they come back on . this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over: to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to--the Commission in response to earlier levies or the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs age ta ong Pe SEAN RB aa peel 2 which are not of Oswald...°# (CIA Doc. FOTA W/ £579-250,. 3/5/6489 Ws ass Hse Classifier Deposs tive ot Dam S Analeten 19/5/78, P. access “to Oe NEO a CIA reports PEAS OM Lar net opfous Ai Ye Aarne os Corner is provided th SION ISR Gcee So te CEA Save it aree mately Secret Ser = AAS Atte +e dow. Bacncy’s Conetln L8G vice after pr pht okjars ae eS GOR CCE ct Bods aottbaacA § ) Nov. 22, - 1963,
On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding ‘the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK Doc. # 3872, Slawson | Memorandum, March 12, 1964) The record indicates that. the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrases are complete." (Letter of J. Lee | Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JFK Doc. No. 3872) » Rankin further indicated that the same | procedure was to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,
1963 which had not as yet been furnished because it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (Ibid.,. par. 3) Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (FOIA # 622-258) by two separate communications. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CDN631, 3/24/64, CIA Doc., pppP4’-1555, 3/24/64, CD 674 hereinafter) CD 631 provided the Commission with a icopy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (and to the Secret Service on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence | at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had from the Navy ‘ requestéd two, copies» of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico city. Furthermore, the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that it had determined chat the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 dia not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Agency explained that it had checked the photograp: against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963, CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately followi
tne assassination, and cn Wovember 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station reyarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and _ Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Parapnreses o£ these cables, not revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency wrote that the subject of the photo referenced in these cables was not Oswald. It was further 4 stated that: "In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the original copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as well as the photos of the unidenti-~ fied man." (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555 CD634,24 March 1964) On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum. for the record: "The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24, 196 (Commission Document No. 631) in which it: set-forth ‘the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested." (Memorandum of William-Coleman, March 24, 1964) Coleman went on to state; "As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the
assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inguiry."(Ibid.) The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headguarters in Langley, Virginia. | Sterns’ memorandum of his visit reveals that : he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. - Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The file also contained: "Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station: relating to the photograph of the unidenti- fied individual mistakenly believed to-be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23,: 1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA."  (Memoranduia of Samuel Stern, March 27, 1964) —_ Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Woe ton ced
Warren Commission on.March 24, 1964. He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. In addition, Stern examined the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background infor- mation on Oswald." (Ibid.) Stern recorded that these messages were paraphrased accurately as set forth in the CIA's January ‘31 memo. to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's | Mexico City trip. — | 7 | | Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald -related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "there is ; no item listed on the printout which the, Warren Com. mission nas not been given either in full text or paraphrased." _(Thid.) | Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.
Vit. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission Relationship It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence and one of the seven members of the Warren Commission, did not report erucial information to the Warren Commission. Specifically, the Senate Select Committee concluded: "With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission. knew of CIA assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency. - (SCC, Book.V,-pp. 67-68) However, the SSC did not explore further the “relationship and allegiances of Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former Director of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by. the CIA related to Mr. Dulles’ service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which suggests that pol oF mong ett on nF EAR one Shane ses Dulles® provided information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission activities and investigative policies,
This memorandum which was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, concerned the controversial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964 ‘prepared for DDP Helms concerned Murphy's discussions with Allan Dulles about Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. In relevant part Murphy wrote: "Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report. " (CIA Doc. Memorandum of David Murphy of July 8, - 1964, Subj: Discussion with Dulles re. Nosenko, p. 3) ® Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. | Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language "which would allude to the existence
of other, unverified information on the Cswald case." (Ibid.) This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko information. | Murphy continued: | "Tt was agreed an effort would be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know pre- cisely in what context the Warren Commission intended to make use of the Nosenko informa- tion. This, Mr. Dulles will have to deter- mine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as © soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin. (Ibid., p. 2) Whether by design or as an. unintended result, the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the Warren Commission, at the very least contemplated compromising his position with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information about the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko. ease. (Add short section giving Helms and Angleton's views)
VIII. Luisa Calderon Approximately five hours after President — Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (CIA Doc. FOIA“MEXI 7105, 11/27/63, 173-615, attachment) This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City’ Station as. the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (Ibid.) The Mexico City Station,as subsequently reported to CIA. headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversa- tion as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consu- ‘late. (Ibid.) During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard (of the assassination) the latest news Luisa replied ina joking - tone: "Vas, of course, IT knew almost before Kennedy." (Ibid. ) CIA's Paraphrasing the telephone intercept transcript, it states that the caller toid Luisa the person
apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she also knew this. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a "gringo." The unidenti- fied caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassina- tion and that she’had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against -intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say;. the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened... who knows Luisa responded: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (Ske laughs.) (Ibid, p. 2) Raymond Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rocke~ feller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments: © geetaqarr ge
we NY avin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto WAY /i fy fouggestion of foreknowledge. This is the an . UW? only item in the intercept coverage of i . the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina- tion that contains the suggestion of fore- knowledge or expectation. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for DC/OPS, 5/23/75, p-. 15) Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic AYE joomments do not merit serious attention. Her words vy ‘ may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassina- ‘< @® tion but may equally be interpreted without such a ‘Sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee | has determined that Luisa Calderon's case. ae ‘morite | serious attention in the months following the assas- Sination. In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the State Department (CIA Doc. DIR 85573 11/27/63): In that cable Mann stated: ...Washington should urgently consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: ‘ Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers Luisa Calderon “is a secretary in Cuban Consulate here. {Ibid.) * Reaachimm Yee issuer we pobsctkhar Catagroa's comments co 1 Reed once rin tere cher +o Indic oke possible Sore kn eusledyt 4a Cir pes titan 1S os te (lows! Purins <7 Row k efeller Commi Ss IBA In guilds ? Cohdetonty conversetion Was idkenttitiel as a mae ~ sible were ek infotmeakian § ron \AA A Culeen ark Boviet Apeleprene intercepts _ : oe —— s ero SO Ce EA vod Cote oc. pletCever j
This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: “Info from Amb Mann for Sec Rusk re: _. persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy. fann went on to state in urgent > “terms: "They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican govern- ment could use them as witnesses." (Ibid.) According to CIA files, Calderon mace reserva- tions to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on. December 11, 1963, less than four weeks after the assassination. (CIA Doc. CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/63) - Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal - police. However, .Silvia Duran, a friend and associate. of Calderon's and the one person believed to have. had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and guéstioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions. (CIA Doc. DIR 84950, 11/23/63, CIA Doc. DIR 85471, 11/27/63) ran a + \> Wee, LAO, rer See § (ye * WW Oe Comm PI “ro (Eat of She Othe CT at L Cck ate Oo She, Mek epton il be rte Alvarada Der art! & ole Ton Neh gs Calderas Wag BMae A stick fe Cukdin Fob assy when OSudets Sort me Meee a on Ga ha A CP, foo, rh phe. CES ACRE . rae etna. mice vp se “pres ee Connade ; Pcin Dees DPPY-ATAL, ITane Ied Attagore | ced
sgh During her’} v@pinterrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with ‘Calderon. ot ob the COMET IG Pa There is no indication in thi@ report “for the = questioning*Duran about Calderon. (CIA Doc. DDP4-0940, 2/21/64) The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964 more than two months after Calderon had returned 7 to Cuba. (Tbhid.) Information was _ reported to the CIA during May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The defector, * AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence operations. (CTA Doc., Memorandum of Joseph Langosch to Chief, Office of Security, 6/23/64) caldron's ties to Cuban intelligence were reportea to the Warren Commission on June 18, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #739-319 \ 6/19/64) However, the Committee has determined | from its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's of Novemless 22 < pert in guste ot pas a~ conversation‘*to the Warren Commission. Consequently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that x. A C/A memerandiim, es CES POnse® FO an sca request letier wt fusust Av, (G73, > tries tA Pact: Concerning Calheren’s conve Alan 3 KX . . 4d A Hheweh phe CMetics City) Station censidered the COVES or OR gE BUEETC(ERK possible ry bert +o Send ow Copy +> headquarkeer Sy TNR tarxter ue
Calderon had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission .by the CIA. The Agency's oversignt in this regard may have forclosed the Commission from actively pursuing a lead of great significance. Calderon's..201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc. Dispatch HMMA21612, no date given) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (Zor Cuban - operations). (CIA Doc. Dispatch JFCA-10095, 7/15/63) That dispatch had attached to it a report containing piographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached: report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The
notation indicated that a report was pending on No such report is present Calderon. (Ibid., p. 3 of attachment) ‘The -_ in Calderon's 201 File. | _Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report. | | Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first recorded by the CIA on May 5, 1964. (ctA poc.4Blind Memorandum of Harold Swensony FOIA 68-290 5/5/64) At that time, Joseph Langosch, Chief of counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of. the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. - The memorandum stated that ANMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey. - Oswald or his activities but was able to provide | items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban Intelligence Service officers. (Ibid.) Specifically, -AMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Langosch "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion
General De Intelligencia (DGI) , specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." (Ibid.) Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. AS a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure for Cuba within one month after the assassination. (Ibid. ) | | On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (CIA Doc FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 5/7/64) Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part: ft a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI-even though she has not performed any services. Her home.is in the Vedado section where the rents are high. b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport.". Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the devartment named in the previous sentence. (Ibid.)
On May 8 Langosch further disclosed AMMUG's . knowledge of the Oswald case. (Ibid, attach. 5). Langosch paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows: . I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned - about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do. any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time ‘she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something Similar. . As you know, the pronunciation -of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name “mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. _-It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, ‘the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine professional relationship . - between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) ' that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald... ({Ibid.)
aL gE, CRE a AT sa Rate NMG EA ATG IAN EC MALIN Gh PRE ana obama wi KARAS SR ALA SEPERATION AA EO Oh ae ater ent On May ll, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG (CIA Doc. FOIA 687-295, 5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum) Rocca proposed that “the DDP in person or via a designee, per ferably the former, discuss the AMMUG-1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest | ‘convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not ‘ 4 desirable to put anything in writing. (Ibid. p. 2) On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA Doc. FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached to Helms' communication ‘was a paraphrased accounting of Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth. However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon. Howard Willens of the Warren Commission ‘requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,
access to the questions used in Langosch's interrogation of amu. (CIA Doc. FOIA 739-316, 6/19/64, Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca!s Gounterintelligence fesearch and Analysis Group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to. the Warren Commission's office's for Willen's review. Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only Mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise _ xelationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in:-Mexico from -which she returned to Cuba early in 1964."  (Ibid.) However, Willens was not shown . Langosch's memoranda», of May 7 and May &, 1964 which contained “much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible association with Léee Harvey -Oswald and/or American intelligence. (tbia.)* The Warren Commission as of June 19, 1964, had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead. It had effectively been denied significant * It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5, 7, 8, ll and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced in the Calderon 201 file. (See CIA Computer printout of Calderon 201 file) Their existence was determined by the Committee's independent review of other agency files. 0) > Poe
background information. This denial may have impeded or prevented the Commission's pursuit of Calderon's popential relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. But even if the Warren Commission had .itearned of Calderon's background and possible contact with _ Oswald it still had been denied the one significant piece of information that might haveraised its ae interest in Calderon to a more serious level. The_ Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's conversation of November 22, 1964. The Committee has contacted former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine whether a transcript of the Calderon conversation was | ever shown to the Warren Commission. The response» \ | . “has uniformly been that the Calderon conversation was never made available to the Commission nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission.
HSCA Interview of W. David Slawson, 8/17/78, p.5; Willens response to letter of HSCA Class. Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 132; CF deposition of Raymond Rocca, p. 156 wherein he states that he is sure the Commission knew of it,) In addition, the Calderon. 201 file bears no reference to the conversation nor does it indicate that it was ever made known to Or provided the Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Computer print-out of Calderon 201 file) In an effort to. - determine the manner in which the CI? treated the Calderon conversation this Committee posed the following questions to. the CIA: l. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever given access to the transcript of a telephone conversa- tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a female employee of the Cuban Embassy/ Consulate in Mexico City, identified as Luisa, and an unidentified male speak- ing from outstde the Cuban Embassy/Con- sulate? If so, please indicate when this transcript was provided to the Warren . CommiSSion or its staff, which CIA official provided it, and which Warren Commission members or staff reviewed it. 2. Was the Warren Commission or any member of the Warren Commission or any Warren Commission staff member ever informed
~ 650- orally or in writing of the substance - @£ the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. Ci SCA epee? fete, # Pri) ast lav, “ey ze) << ley a memorandum cevt Septerbarst.1978, “he CIA responded: Sun quote ® ps7 The available evidence thus supports the > “= conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the informationn6ér the opportunity by which it could: evaluate Luisa Calderon's signi- ficance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission-been expedi- | | tiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her commen taay Following the assassination, it \ may well have given more serious investigative consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald “el and the Cuban government's possible involvement in
a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Two difficult issues remain which are raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus. The first question can be explained in benign “terms. It-is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not - “recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and published its report. (See above CIA explanation) AS for the Agency's withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the | record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64, Swenson Memorandum) The memoranda which provided more extensive. examina- tion of her intelligence background were not: made
available for the Commission's review. significantly, the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch following his debriefing of AMMUG-1l indicated that AMMUG-1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (CIA Doc. FOIA 687-295, attach 5, 5/8/64) It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren “Commission either because there was no basis in | fact for the allegation or because the allegation was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. Tt would have demonstrated that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban ‘Embassy, may have possessed information prior. to the assassina- tion “regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to ‘the Cuban Intelligence Service . and that Services - possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. Regarding Calderon's possible association with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA.
However, there are indications that such contact between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City states in part: ...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic - exploitation section might’ be in a posi- tion to.follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. (CIA Doc.  HMMW- 1935, 9/1/63) An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that: Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear (CIA Doc. HMMA 21849, July 31, 1965) At the very least, the above dispatches evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon \ and her family. Whether this interest took | the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file. sent dee
The Committee has queried David Ronis, the author of the above cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section.” (HSCA Class. Staff Interview of David Ronis,. 8/31/78) Ronis was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible for recruitment -and handling of agents for collection of intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsi- bility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normelly would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. Often he would receive no response to these requests, which normally indicated that no follow-up had elther been attempted or successfully conducted. It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff: He also stated c WO that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division pene toe aay
might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sister. . Ronis told the Committee that he had no. recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for . the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection. that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (Ibid.) various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 136; HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148; HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78, Piccolo, Interview of —_) . Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no “connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete:zthe
rae most glaring omission being the - absence; from one eee a Caldecen , her 201 File.fof “ cryptic remarks OA er gare neo . atti tiariataeetetnceteneiannmnanateed ae following the assassination of President Kennedy. 3 ee ne See oe AMMUG-1 This Committee’ s investigation of puisa Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi- ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts with ‘the DGI in Mexico city. This defector was: assigned the CIA cryptonym ANMUG- L ({A-1 hereinafter). * CIA files reveal that A-1 defected from the DGI on April | 21, 1964 in When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of pel documents which were subsequently turned over to the CIA. (CIA Doc. IN 53894, 4/24/64) Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H. Langosch, went to to meet A-l, debrief him, and arrange for A-1's travel into the United States. (Ipid.) On May 1, 1964, 92 reels of Langosch's a *Tt is now _xnown that A-1 did provide significant leads to the CIA regarding Tuisa Calderon. It is further apparent that Little of this information was made available by the CIA to. the Warren Commission. Therefore, tne possibility exists that A-l had provided otner information to the CIA : relevant to the Warren Commission's work which was not properly reported to the Commission. oy ( 4
debriefing of A-1l were forwarded to the Chief of Station in (CIA Doc. Dispatch| _| 7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-1l was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes. (CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64) _By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency. He stated: There is no question in my mind that -AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector. or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban-intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to Director of Security, 6/23/64) As an officer of the DGI, A-1l from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's ‘Illegal Section B (CIA Doc. EN 68894 4/24/64) which was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsi- bility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Question- naire 6/4/64; CIA Doc. In 68894 4/24/64) A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelli- gence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch described A-1l's knowledge of DGI operations in ~ Mexico as follows:
‘In Mexico City, he knows who the "intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he “was until the 16th of April at.which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is -Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. ( I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing of A-1l, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64) ‘Thus, A-l was able to provide the CIA soon after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in | Mexico City. The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-l. ‘This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1l had provided any valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2) © whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information were made available to the Warren Commission.