an ne mettionty S85 tad Mere Benes ana, . 2 Septerber - He and the Attorney General (as well as CIA) were apparently erpalled "The President viewed: the ‘State Departnent's ‘position with considerable reserve but was willing to explore the coup idea further. at the speed with which the Statexdecision was reached on Saturday afternoon, 24 August, and felt that more thought, analysis and - preparation should have preceded the instruction. to Ledge." 31 August (contimed) oe t . attempt & coup and that CIA was the instrumentality ef this encoursge- : ‘could go forward as in the paste: “He listed as a major dilemma the - CLA echle from Saigon (SAIG 0495 “This particular coup is finished. . « » .-. Generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces. ... ». « There . ds Little doubt that GVH awure US role and may have considerable detail. e a e @ e CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523) | Richardson cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that Diem and the Nbu's are fully aware that the USG: ‘encouraged the generals to ment. He sudged there was an even possibility” that all major programs Station’ 8 future relationships with Col. Tung. | ‘He noted his dissetis- “fection with Tung as a GVN liaison vehicle through “which to “conduct PM progrars, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we were willing to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we mist contime to work with Tung. i 1 i i i 3
2 Septenber (cont imed) _ The Times cf Vietnam published charges that the CIA Wes plotting 7 7 end ‘financing a. coup and was giving asylum to the. chief anti-Diem ‘Buddhist Leudci's The BwLy Was packed up aud widely played Ly bie “New York Daily ews > the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent nevspapers. .6 Septenber Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. CIA parsicipants: DDP & c/FE. mae Pee ee Record by DDP & C/FE. ¢ Se Rusk stressed the immediate need for direct contact between Lodge. and Diem. Bundy pointed out the necessity of advising Lodge not to have a . real show-down with Diem over Nim at this forthcoming necting, Bs ‘as one of Loage’ 8 cables indicated he was headed very mich in this direction. Rusk agreed to do this. The President agreed with the =- Gesirabllity of silencing Mademe Nhu but expressed some doubt that : Nim's participation was as fatal as State seemed to Bay it Was. Rusk a ‘comented that the’ country team had stated its feeling that Nhu mst ZO, ; Om ; ' to which the President t replied that they may have been operating under te, , airectives received: from here. SREB oy
14-00000 tema men mma baee dbo HDD MRNA Bea ad Soe " S.teptesber oe : | i relisble source in Washington and gave details of support to Col. ‘Tung in the anount of $3 million annually, and a payment of $250 - wight cut back aid to South Vietnam unless the Diem government . Wire services’ and prominent nevspapers carried a . Story that the ; Special Forces troops: ‘who raided the pagodas on a fugust were still Rade mata aaauntter tes MTA rm kw pid mae gene oe CO rT err ee MN Me ode tet OE AG cat a thousand on. 3 Septembere The story was datelined- in Washington and . David Bell. warned in a television interview that the US Congress changed its policies. “+... + (Comment:: The U.S..Government publicly confizmed on " 8 October 1963 that aid had already been cut, quietly and over & period of sone months. Bill Colby, Jocko Richardson, and Dave Smith each told us that the public announcement of a the ata reduction was @ “signal” to the generals and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. Te may be that the cut An. aid was deliberately Planned t to Spur_ the ; generals on, but, “4¢ 60, that intention did not find its way into the written . record. The nearest thing to it is in the record of a Presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked Rufus Phillips,
T4GOBQO.” ' by the Generals with much enthusiasm and as an | indication of a vigorous “American position.” Ia general, “though, aid cuts Vietnamese generals considered the official confimsation of “" ptated, stop economic aid to force Nhu to show his hand." of AID, what specific actions Phillips vould recomend and he I nkkeak suggested “cutting aid to Colonel Tung. wich would ‘be viewed were discussed in terms of bringing pressure on Diem to make needed changes in his regime. However planned or however looked upon by the U.S. administration, it is clear that the aid cuts as a clear token of U.S. support of their coup planning. Spera and Conein met with Generals Minh and Khiem on 29 August. The following are excarpts from the cabled report of the meeting (SAIG 0406): a “oe "If USA now really ready take different positron generals want firm evidence to that effect. . « - » Queried as to what we can do to show ve mean business, Minh flatly fhe suspension of aid did not force Diem and Nhu to mend their ways, but it did create an atmosphere that made it easier for. the generals t to assemble the military Suppor’ needed for a succe seful coup. )