104-10308-10081 22August 1963 MEETING WITH AMBIDDY-1, 13-17 August 1963 SUBJECT: AMWORLD--Showdown Meeting Between AMBIDDY-1 and ERACERB-1, Week of 29 July 1963 Synopsis The following is AMBIDDY-1's description of a showdown with ERACERB-1. There were no witnesses present and, needless.to emphasize, A-1 put the best possible face upon his performance in this crucial meeting. Its tenor, we are inclined to accept as probably true. On the other hand, it would be premature to conclude that ERACERB-1] has in fact abandoned his grandiloquent invasion plans. He may have merely shelved them until such time as he determines that A-1 is so deeply committed in Nicaragua that he has no choice but support ERACERB-I's strategy. Also, the problems posed by other, competing exile organizations may not actually have been resolved to A-l's ultimate satisfaction. A-1l's forthcoming (ETD o/a 21 Aug 1963) visit to Nicaragua may give a clearer reflection of what he has in effect been able to accomplish. 1. The last meeting between oe and ERACERB-1 took place in the home of the latter. Present were AMBIDDY-1, ERACERB-1 and Capt. Perez. The latter part of the meeting was between them alone. 2. ERACERB-1 gave AMBIDDY-1 the maps and the aerial photo- graphs of Puerto Nuevo. Capt. Perez was then asked to leave. 3. ERACERB-1 stated that he had been called by ERLOOP-1 from Miami to tell him that Tony Varona and Prio desired totalk with ERACERB-1. He would receive them in order to set their minds at rest and tomake sure that they bother nliether Nicaragua nor AMBIDDY-1. The latter availed himself of this opportunity to tell ERACERB-1 the following?
13-00000 ~-2- 4, "I know that you have talked to a great number of people in Miami. Many of these people claim that you have promised them help. I want to clarify something. The group of individuals that help me financially are not willing to give one solitary cent to people who are not with my group. In other words if there is going to be aid for many groups you can rest assured that I will have to leave Nicaragua and go to another country, and assuredly you will have support of these other groups yourself. Our plans are going to be carried out by myself and the boys who are with me. One of the reasons why we left PBPRIME was because we refused to execute , plans which had not been drawn up by us. If my bosy suspect that these plang will not be directed by them and myself, they will refuse to come to Nicaragua. Besides, if you reach political understandings with some of the old politicians, those commitments will bind you but will not bind us, Under no circum- stances will we obey political directives from discredited politicians. The | only door that opened to us and through which we could invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs was Nicaragua. For this reason 1am very indebtedto you. It | has demonstrated to me that what they say about a‘ dictatorship‘in Nicaragua : is false. But other Latin American countries do not know what I know about Nicaragua. If Ially myself with these old politicians, the Latin American people will know that this is an imposition. I don't wish to gain the reputa- tion of being an individual who has had things imposed lupon him. Also, I am/willing to permit other Latin Americans to say that you, in order to help Cuba, imposed your will upon us, And that is what people will say if I unite with those old politicians. These politicians, when they are out of hearing, say that Nicaragua has a dictatorship. They are now, hypocritically, coming to you and asking that there be a coordination of all these groups. Afterward they will say that ERACERB-~l was able to impose this coordina- tion upon AMBIDDY-1. Those old polite are not interested in their prestige, but lam interested in mine. A*d I am interested in your prestige. Ihave received letters from the undergound in Cuba saying they thought you are a bad man, ‘A-1 admitted that these letters are notional.) They thought so until they heard that you were helping me. Since they know me they assume that ERACERB-1 must be a democrat. I have a reputation of being a revolutionary and a democrat. I want to help to disprove the ill repute of your being a dicator. If Il unite with those old politicians, I will lose my reputation and you will lose yours. I want to help you because | realize that the bad reputation which you have acquired is a result of Communist intrigue. Ata time when other Latin American countries are very silent about communism, you are willing to take strong action. In order to help you I will have to overthrow Fidel Castro, And in order to overthrow Fidel Castro I have to be able to call on the help of the Cuban people. In order to rely on the help of the Cuban people I must try to pre- serve the reputation I enjoy with them. In order to do so, I cannot afford
13-00000 ~3- to ally myself with this gang of crooks. Only in this way will I be able one day. to stand on Cuban soil and say that it was ERACERB-1, the defender of democracy, who enabled me to liberate Cuba. It is then when all like minded Latin American governments will join in fighting communism. And the indisputable leader will be yourself. Ican learn a great deal from you in the field of international politics, strategy, tactics. As far as the feelings of the Cuban people are concerned, this is something I understand. '"' 5. ERQCERB~1 told AMBIDDY-1 that he had let him talk without Saying anything because he wanted to know how he felt. Now, A-1 could | be completely convinced that all, absolutely all, that ERACERB-1 had done | was designed to set up AMBIDDY-1 as indisputable leader of the resistance | ("the Cuban question"), ERACERB-1 would never fail A-1. While it is perhaps true that ERACERB-1 had taken some bad steps, this was only to help A-1. Under no circumstances did he want A-1 to share the prestige with someone else. He wanted A-1 to always speak frankly with him becaus it was not true that he does notunderstand the Cubans. Some of the things that he has believed were in error. A-1 shouldn't worry about that. Whatever doubts A-l had, ERACERB-1 would clear up immediately. He was completely in accordance with whatever A-1] had said. He knew that many calumnies had been spread about him. He knew that perhaps the only individual who could clear him among the Americas was A-l. He understood that Carlos Prio did ntt have the prestige to say that. ERACERB-1 was not a dictator. Besides, Prio says many things today and others tomorrow. Prio was one of the men who had launched an invasion against Nicaragua in the days of ERACERB-Il's father and he would never forget it. He understood that many men [: had listened to him never .-P_- -. declared themselves to him in public, buj talked badly of the Nicaraguan government once outside of Nicaragua. ‘Phat the only one who had never rejected Nicaragua in any way and declared himself a friend of ERACERB-1 was A-1 who should rest assured that all of ERACERB-1's activilics were for the purpose of helping A-~l., 6. After this discourse, A-1 told him that AMWORLD-2 had called to say that ERLOOP-1 had created a mess in Miami, drawing up lists of candidates, recurits and other things. A-1 told ERACERB-1 that it was his impression that ERLOOP was recruiting on his own. This plan, A-1 pointed out, will not work because his camps were going to be small camps. ERACERB-1 could imagine 10 thousand Cubans who want to fight. Where will we keep them? Who will take care of 10 thousand Cubans? Who is gang to give the money to take care of these 10 thousand Cubans. The money given to A-1 is not to maintain 10 thousand Cubans but to create small nuclei of Cubans who are going to work effectively: This/ will o nothing am obstruct the progress of A~l's work and would be fatal for his plans.
13-00000 ~4.- Besides, it would jeopardize the security of his project. 7. ERACERB-1, in answering, accepted full blame for ERLOOP-1's activities, having told him, thinking of a subsequent invasion, to recruit Cubans willing to participate in it. ERACERB-1 promised to order ERLOOP-] the following day when he was expected hime, to suspend permanently all recruitng. A-1 is sure of this because Capt. Perez told him that ERACERB-1 in fact told ERLOOP-1 to stop recruiting. 8. A-1 took the opportunity of ERACERB-1's mention of an invasion to make the following observations: Had ERACERB-1 considered that if there is an invasion of Cuba, the liberators of Cuba will be the PBPRIMERS, not he: Conversely, he should understand that by engaging in this type of war (i.e., unconventional) which can be won, prestige re- garding the liberation of Cuba will belong to A-1 since it was ERACERB-1 who granted the bases for this type of war. "You don't understand that we with our spirit and with our youth, and with our guerrilla groups, we can destroy Castro and make Cuba the first nation which ffeed itself from communism. This impact upon the international scene would be lost if there is an invasion from outside. This would be another warlike act, nota liberation of the country itself." 9. ERACERB-1 conceded that there was going to be many obstacles for an invasion. But he was going to see if some type of guarantee could be obtained so that A-] would not be abandoned. A-1 rejoined that it would be necessary to work and accomplish the end result without a guarantee. "Our problem is that we have always askgd for guarantees and that they have failed us. Let us work with full conten) in our own resources. Anything else would be foolingpurselves, AlthougMithey give us guarantees, they don't keep them, You are very intelligence and you understand international poltics. In the international field there are not guarantees,'!' ERACERB-1 _ conceded that perhaps A-1 was right. They parted with a warm embrace. we - "yf fo Lyk “pet Ce feet Henry D, Hecksher Distribution: ; 1 - COS, Managua 1 - COS, JMWAVE 1- Policy 1 {nic 1 - ERACERB-1 201