{76-1 0036-10184] JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM \ IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY : NARA RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10184 RECORD SERIES : National Security Files AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ORIGINATOR : FROM : TO: TITLE : Phase | DATE : PAGES.: 18 SUBJECTS : DOCUMENT TYPE : CLASSIFICATION : . RESTRICTIONS : - CURRENT STATUS : _ DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 316: Meetings on Vietnam, 9/11/63- 9/12/63. Box 1
a VL. Gt Brand f Coane treat 7 iL - Nte 62 34K “ew ng ines -~EYES ONLY PHASE I, we Purpose The purpose of Phase J is to attempt to persuade Diem and Nhu separately that the Nhus should leave the country for an extended period. The means are continuing the Lodge-Diem conversations; the Nhus from from their immediate supporters; and a carefully- tailored public posture to supplement these efforts. Part A, Phase I, below, describes a possible Lodge approach to Diem. Part B below,describes the actions to be taken to isolate the Nhus from their immediate supporters, including a suggested approach to Nhu himself. Part C,below, describes possible Congressional action to produce pressure on Viet-Nam. Part D,below,describes the US Government public posture in Phase J, including a proposed statement. Part E is concerned with the possible evacuation of dependents as proposed by Ambassador Lodge. CowF Lean ire Cr
TOP SECRET - EVES ONLY Part A, Phase I Lodge's Approach to Diem, Lodge should see Diem and convey the following: ~ The United States Government feels, as the President indicated in his TV interview, that Diem must take drastic - action to recapture the support of his people, repeating the same approach made by Ambassador Lodge in his last meeting,ile., a long vacation for the Nhus, actions to. demonstrate a reversal of the policy of repression, and the broadening of the Government. However, in the meantime, the United States Government is faced with a crisis of confidence in the Vietnamese Government on the part of the American public and more especially the American Congress. In order to preserve the aid program to South Viet-Nam, which the President sincerely desires to do, it has become politically necessary to disassociate ourselves from suoporting those units responsible for the raid on the pagodas. Otherwise, the United States Congress may cut off all aid. Therefore, Ambassador Lodge must reluctantly notify President Diem that assistance to Colonel Tung's programs must be terminated. We will make an attempt to redirect what aid we can on to programs essential to the war effort if this can be worked out. If President Diem can see fit to take the dramatic actions mentioned above promptiy, we feel that we can quickly restore confidence. But we must warn the President that if the Loaf TOP_SECRET- EYES, ONLY situation
TOP: SECRET - EYES ONLY ~ situation, continues. as it has) ‘been | we may have, to. mieke 2" ” “rurther | clits--agein “in’ Order: to: avoid: a total cut: of aid. . If. this ‘becomes . necessary we wall ¢ endeavor’. to make these en . in such é way. as not" to affect the war effort; "e. Ess ‘the let ae water Works; “the” “Saigon « electric power “plant, note. ‘POP! SECRET.
ad. WEES oo cn | - oe . ° TOPSECRET- EYES ONLY . a L Objective So my oe . SE “To separate the Nhus and their immediate supporters (i. (i.e ) | Tung ‘wate. oe ; ‘Hien of the. Police, Minister Ngo Trong Hieu). ee - 7 2. Concept of Operations . “Actions taken should fail short of seriously _ aor damaging the war. effort while at the same time indicating that the U. 8. va ; “not tolerate the Nhus.. The importance ot these actions does not lie in. > paysical damage: done. the. GVN but in i their psychological effect:upon Nou and. ar company, and ‘upon ‘he ‘potential opposition: These actions must demonstzate cos o.. U.S. S. ‘determination not to tolerate the Nhus and their attempts to destroy “American prestige... For every overt Action, ‘there should be corresponding -eovert actions designed to split the Nhu power group and further discredit “thera, | “The entire operation sould be conceived of as a psychological warfare campaign designéa to maintain U. S. Prestige by dissociating ourselves irom. “the: Nous and discrediting them, “3. ‘specific ‘Recommended Actions. Actions should be pinned to, reportedly. “ominous signs that the U. s. will not tolerate thé repressive actions against “ths Buddhists or ‘other, citizens and will not tolerate and Support any persons - : L diréctiy responsible for sucha actions Ge é, ‘the Nous ‘and Tung). A Congressional o or r Senatorial Resolution ‘to this’ purpose’ is - redommended: (see below). “). “Overt - : oS - 8 , Be “a, Requirement for a Sin ed Statement to Accompany v. 8. “Kia 7 Instruet all v. 8. agencies: prompaly to answer ‘routine Fequésts ‘for suppott 0 on a the merits, ‘bat to’ require a signed statement, in substance:
NS ~~ | TOP SECRET.- EYES ONLY" oa "These supplies will not be used in n any way to indicate U. s. .or GVN support of anti-Buddhist or other unjustified 7 repressive actions, or of those persons connected with or. directly: responsible for such actions. Mu. , ne . ~ Comment: No violent reaction from the President is likely if itis. - ae _ explained to him by the Ambassador that these steps a are absolutely necessary a . to prevent all aid from being severed: Selected instances of this fequirement’’ me Should be: leaked to the- press--aleiting them to chiéck- on ‘compliance.: Instances: Y of rejection ot the requirement should be broadly: publicized as: evidence of unwillingness to get on. with the war. This sh ould be very ‘effective in n hastening / consolidation of anti-Nhis opinion. " Permination of CAS Suppor to Vietnamese Speciél Forées oy withdrawing cAs- owned equipment. ‘Announce to Special, Foréces that once forth no adaitional funds will be paid through Tung for any. projects" whatsoever: : - otties 1 projects may be supported by payment directly to project officers, | ~ provided project, is. in mutual best. interest. Any project capable of : serving personal. 2 ambitions: of Now. or: Tang automatically excluded. "Actual harm. done to war effort or. “to Special Forces would be slight but it ‘would be a psychological, blow of : considerable proportions to Tung whose power fests in) the eyes | of the Vietnamese, snot only upon his connections at the Palace but’ upon apparent unliinited v. 8. “Support for him: ee
. . c. No U.S. participation ‘in any new W projects involving, Pung = | . ye ie we Specifically the Hamlet Militia Leader Training Program. “Our. refisal to. oo a7 ‘participate because of Fung should be. announced unequivocally to the Gun; oe we can accompany this by a counterproposal that the oayspe. Directorate be. = a Fs . ‘put in 1 charge 5 since we > consider ita worthy project. a. Cutting Aid to. the Motion Picture: Center : “ Direct Ui 8 = - paid i - personnel at uso Mopix Ceritre and other media activities to refuse to. “handle or. process any material prohibited under 1 above: This. may cause: era Tetctane tue = memitcideng in UFetiurte wre catheter cater Aste Sie Pealatfed nna Ve wafomecn imen 6 mic ee : vu ‘temporary termination of v. 8: participation in: some activities: under: GN : control, and will certainly. evoke inspired. local press attacks. Useful.’ ne ‘gotiuities s should be carried on. n by improvised m means, ‘with full publiety. Hor ‘whit attempts to sinpede the war effort, and U. Ss: continuation of effort; : Pe “Diversion, af Ammunition for Police oak Actual | paysical « effect a but ‘poychological. effect considerable. te Besponse to attacks | in 1 the Times of Viet Nam, The Ambassador “do does. not wish to démean himself by protesting officially, however, “if the U: s." - does not defend itself, this will be interpreted as a sign of, wealiess~-thé. a U St will lose face ana prestige: Suggested counteractions are leaks by, . Embassy officials such as "the ‘Ambassador refuses to: read the rag becainse a of fits notorious reputation 2 ior, “outright iying’, < or, r other comunents indigating : the U vu. ‘s. “considers the newspaper ridiculous. —_ ; = 7 ee _ : oes *unannbuiiced'" visits on ike Viginamese : a “Ge “ambassador makes TOP SECRET = EYES. ONLY.
en ee he re ey BM, po we oy cs TOP SECRET ~ EYES ONLY area re Fo personalities and kev a areas.’ “Visits Ministers, IGS, Genéral I Don, Dinh; ; a Minh, and others, with tne objective of seeking their views ‘and indicating Ms : Americah freedom to tale to whomever’ we please. * Purpise! is to pila” UD ‘American prestige and a. 2 feeling that we are in charge. ‘Must be carefully.” Oo ‘stage-managed to avoid embarrassment, he. “Direct immediate procurement in. cash, and storage urider ma lye. a ov. s. control, of approximately, 3. million: Uz 8. dollars worth: of piastres.: Le ‘4 The purpose is. 9 make immediately available’ ior essential. on- “going counter- 8 “insurgency, programs; “the funds already authorized.. “Possibility, of freeaing, oe ighter.{ v. 8s or "provincial b bank accounts must not. be overlooked. ve 28 ‘Suspension of any CAS projects capable of being used by niin to. ‘busta sp hiss prestige and illustrate that the U.S. is continuing to support cornea! : “him,” CAS. should be brevared: to offer recommendations in this regard. Mas by “set Dinh and Tung against each other by rumors: and. reports to. ; bin tat. Tung. is ‘plotting to’ assassinate him, ete. “set Now against ‘Tran Van Kiem, ‘Mme Nhu! s brother (and thus” : on 7 7 £ increase tension between the Naw’ s). by getting word to Nhu of what Khiem, told. Wormer about: Nhu. “@ : Fabricate a document inking Now with t the DRV, thus s aiscrediting t him with | the Generals,
ee _ TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY | | a Suggested Approach to Now . . _ . _ Although the approach *y Asta and D ‘Orlandi to Nhu was, “unproductive, S ee . la further approach might be made by I ohn Richardson. Tes SO, “the. aprroach: : = shoule emphasize the strong possibility of aid cuts by Congress and our ‘decision to cut or redirect aid to. those units. responsible for the raid ¢ on ‘the: on pagodas along the lines. of Lodge’ s conversation with Diem. “Richardson we “Should then. appeal to: Noi to leave the. country for a. ong wvacation; out oft: " = Ajalty. to the family, love of f country; and té ‘make: e possible. continued US + _ support &t the war effort. TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY"
Fae Reet ¢, Phase T - Congressional Action A resolution expressing the," sense of ‘the Senate" ‘that! aid to: ‘South viet Nam be. terminated vuniess that. ‘reg me reverses: its- policies’ fof. repression. might: be. useful. > ammunition: for. Ambassador Lodge 5. ag it were passed: by. a ‘ ‘ "substantial. margin? < With tacit: “Administration approval, — Se of eva stravesy. ons: ‘the foreign. aid ean such
Batt De ‘Phase 1 | U. S. GOVERNMENT PUBLIC POSTURE IN. PHASE rE » Public. statements or. explanations of U. S. Government actions 3 in! "phase ¢ one. should be. primérily directed toward those. elements of: Vietiamese public opinion vihich our. ‘actions. are attempting’ to. influence. his means that we 'stiould not. make it our: ‘purpose. to inflame: mass’ s:public un: mresty: Although demonstrations, such: as: those spontaneously generated by high’ schoo} students doubitess have an effect even ‘upont fanatiés: effort {ange nelite ne “Moreover, "agitation wiipped up. wt ee ar ae ae "similarly: South: Vietnath, Our: propaganda largeting should he.a as.  confiied
~. a __Tistnaniese relite", n, : “This “elite must. be made aware that our aims" , “and theirs coincide; ‘that we are ‘merely trying. to help them ‘eons * obstacles which stand in the’ way of the achievement of their basic. = goals. ‘They must be made to feel that » we ‘are sharing our confidence. : with: them. concerning ‘he « adtionis we ‘Bre faking in the hope that we we can. . continue to. rely, upon: ‘them. to: provide: leadership: siability: once. we, have: ‘finished our: ‘operation. on: Bxigencies ofthe: American : Scene. may. require us. from ‘time: eto " time. io elaborate « on the basic theme and basic targetting of our public on the whéle, ‘however, we > should be able to rely upon interpretive nalysié inade by a very active and very well- informed x American pres in clarifying the significance of our ‘statements to. othe American public. Ue oe a mow ae “on the whole the Vietnamese elite” has: a very sensitive arapeine which 4 is. alert to the, significance of actions taken in 1 the! political context, “On the while, therefore, _actions may be expected, “to sped ai least as Souily as Words A in ihost instances: mis tact > suggests
“TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY . themselves. without b public explanation: "-Begause of th the Machiavellian cleverness. of the Nhus,, ‘however. “this. course. leaves. open the: pases “ “sibility that ¢ our “actions could be 0 distorted and manipulated as to -hiake t their meaning, confused ¢ even in. the minds of thé "elite! observers. | en! : os | os “Therefore; while still ‘relying primardyup Upon: the actions x athe a th the words to ‘carry ‘the import of our. objectives,’ it is felt” 7 necessary. to: make Limited public statements ‘concerning the: purses of our unieriakings. 7 There follows « a. short L public amourcément which the actions beige directed a against Nhu in n phase one. This’ should lion gfe our 7 opevstion. ‘instead, on the e assumption that: the actions taken
: Comminists.. “The Government « ‘of the united s States is : conbmitied to. helping the: - 7 co people of Viet- Nam, resist and: overcome, the threat to. their. peace, : : ‘security and freedom posed by the subversion and, terror of the. We intend to. stand byt that commitment to the Vietnamese purposes and in mwas sirepagrant¢ tou us: We are > determined to: prevent TOP. SECRET--EYES ONLY
~ prove to be an a important pressure weapon on 1 the GUN. Howerer at is ‘tricky in its handing. On balance, ait seems. wise not to order, a mass’ ‘evacuation, but rather a selective, evacuation ‘of certain dependents.
TOP SBORED ~ EYES “ONLY : $ 7 . oan . . . “The - purpose or “Phase qr ‘remains tne’ same as’ in Phase Test ope m means® are. highly seléctive cuts, and redirection of U: S$. pg a add designed, to avoid as. ‘much: as ‘possible hurting ‘the ware effort: but underlining: our determination to ‘bring? about. By © hanes | “in the. Vietnangse : Government and policies: Det “bodge' approach | to Diem: Lodge should continue nis, =. gone
6). ‘Plaster counterpart therefrom’ constitutes approxi- ~Spdtéay TOR of. ‘the GVN military budget: celia fe a (3). GVN reserves. amount . to. about $170 ‘nillion, tei,  spproxisateay, 10 months. import. cover at 1962 levels.” (4) The. SVN, general supply and stock “position, both | “ econéate: and, military, is. good. 28 Bye 88: ‘yong: as: the: GVN ‘can: effectively: administer’ ts) budget and SO: long | as’ it can allot foreign, exchange’ from: “the paycholoaical. sinpac t nether «han tha in “the: short "pun. haa bee setermination to. ‘suspend. all. U. 8: . the x eo eter commant.t would ve: © profound
We ap SUea 2" SRO SECRET--EVES ONLY | oe oe Publicly announce cancellation ‘of U. s, “ support of “thé Saigon water Works $17. 5. million) and, thé, ‘Saigon eee “‘Bléctrie ‘Power, Plant (gre. 7 million). “(these two projects. are Khown to pe ‘highly valued by Dien, ‘are conspicuous: evidences of long-term U. 8. ‘Suspension of these projects would. have and - vould: have | to, be regarded by: Dien as, evidence. “or: “the * sérioushess, ‘of. u: 8: ‘doubts regarding its long- ‘term. ‘aid: intentions, in’ “sin: Caricellation. of existing, contrdets would ‘be’ costly to- ‘the United. States and’ réneived construe tion would present real airficulties: ‘and ‘added ‘expenses. ‘This, action, might be a. more. _eredipie. res flection (of. U. Ss. “determina tion. éhan verbal: ‘threats sor’ warnings of | possible future. U. s. ‘moves. the ach tio certainties. of. the United States over he wagon of
ee aaah BRRAR CUTTY Lemp emesis tem mm mm se annras Ba { a lishment, counter-insurgenc ~ socials and économic _ develop “strategic hamlets; and ‘the. .°.- ment of the. op On | “GOR-SEGREP--EYES ONLY “re: _.° 3... Publicly ainmouncé continuation of U : po “longoing. programs related to support of the military estab-