: | @ 6 Airtel to Albany Re: Cost of Responding to Inquiries From. The adoption of this system will eliminate the need to send numerous reports on individual groups or projects each month. Also, the form of data collection will now be uniform. The information obtained will be of value to FBI management for planning and staffing requirements and will be useful for budget justification purposes if it becomes necessary to seek additional personnel to handle-this work. Your cooperation is appreciated. HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 239
» Routing Slip (Copies to Office, 0-7 Rev. 7-T1-75) TO: SAC: TOLEGAT: * fT Albany {_] Houston CoiPklahoma City (—) Albuquerque Indianapolis (-] Omaha (_) Alexandria = Jackson (_] Philadelphia ES Bern (_] Anchorage (_] Jacksonville {_} Phoenix [1] Brasilia (_] Atlanta {_] Kansas City {__] Pittsburgh (_] Buenos Aires (_] Baltimore C_] Knoxville L_} Portland (J Caracas (_J Birmingham [_] Las Vegas {_} Richmond (_] Hong Kong (_} Boston (_] Little Rock (_] Sacramento {_) London (_] Buffalo [_] Los Angeles LC] St.. Louis {_] Madrid Butte {_] Louisville (_] Salt Lake City (] Manila {_] Charlotte [_] Memphis [) San Antonio {_] Mexico City (_] Chicago (_) Miami {_] San Diego (_) Ottawa (_] Cincinnati C_] Milwaukee (_] San Francisco (_} Paris {_] Cleveland C[_} Minneapolis (_] San Juan [_} Rome ; (_] Columbia (_] Mobile {_] Savannah (] Tel Aviv (_] Dallas _] Newark (_] Seattle [_] Tokyo (_] Denver (_] New Haven (_] Springfield (_] Detroit {_} New Orleans (_) Tampa . (_] El Paso (__] New York City [_] Washington Field {_] Honolulu _] Norfolk . CJ Quantico 1/30/76 RE: Date Airtel to all SAC's, 1/14/76, captioned "Cost of Responding to Inquiries From Other Agencies, Congressional Committees and Requests Under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts (FOIPA)" Retention For appropriate () For information —] optional [7] action () Surep, by (() The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ([] conceal all sources, (_] paraphrase contents. (C0 Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA at dated ve Remarks: Effective immediately, an additional activity is being added to those contained on page two of referenced airtel - the time spent preparing | and defending lawsuits where the Bureau and/or its employees are named as defendants or are parties in interest. Insure ti nt on this type activity is includeg pr yvour monthly ~ 2O reports under the capti Civil Suits." | SEARCHED INDEXED \ SERIALIZED QE FILED ot FEB 4.1976 sy HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 2740 ke ae 7 _ _ a oe _ we
SPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 JULY 1973 EDITION GSA FPMR [41 CFR) 101-15.6 4 UNITED STATES G RNMENT . ' - Memorandum TO + ~~ S~AC, ALBANY (66-2877) DATE: 2/4/76 FROM = Sk LESTER L. AMANN SUBJECT: cos? OF RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES FROM OTHER AGENCIES, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND REQUESTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS (FOIPA) RE: Bureau airtel to Albany, 1/14/76. .Referenced airtel pointed out that the FBI is increasingly being called upon to furnish information to Congressional Committees, other agencies, and also to answer requests under Freedom of Information and Privacy _Acts (FOIPA). As a result of this, a monthly report must be submitted setting forth the time spent, both agent and clerical, under each of the different headings (FOIPA, - Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, etc). In order to facilitate the compiling of this monthly report, a separate control file has been established 66-2921. Each supervisory desk should be aware of the necessity of channeling to this control file a break down by agent and clerical hours whenever an inquiry is responded to under any of the Congressional Committees, other agencies (GAO), or FOIPA. (L-sac 1-ASAC 1-Supv. GILBERT 1-Supv. KEEFE — fer: LONERGAN 62-2368 1-66-2921 OL 1-66-2877 on (G2- 2365-4 SEARCBTA oli ho Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan 5010-110 . ee A ee See cee eo meremnne e emnnpeeene me eS 2 eee HW 54955 “Page 241 Docld: 32989494
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 STATEMENT OF CLARENCE M. KELLEY DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS U. S. SENATE WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 26, 1976 MAR 5 1976 FBI-ALBAN i yung; OWnOn &. he, > erica A %e, Pin ais 4, a Pry yt? AW 54955 Docld:32969494 Page 242
HW 54955 I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before this Committee concerning a most important issue -- that of oversight. For some months now, the FBI has undergone a most exhaustive review of its intelligence operations, as have other members of the intelligence community. This review has covered both domestic and foreign intelligence ‘operations of the FBI. And I am hopeful that the results of these extensive reviews will be helpful to the Congress as it considers practical recommendations for legislative oversight. BDocld: 327989494 Page 2743
HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 244 ® @ The FBI has in the past recognized and, indeed, requested a clear delineation of its intelligence responsi-~ bilities and authority to conduct investigations in this extremely sensitive area. We realize that Congress faces a difficult task if it decides to draft oversight legislation that will be of lasting benefit to the American people. Many issues are involved, and most of them are not easily resolved. The primary responsibility for correctness of FBI activities rests in its Director -- a responsibility | I readily assume. I would like to offer for your consideration some of the basic questions I believe must be answered: (1) Should Congressional responsibilities for oversight of the FBI be consolidated? (2) Should Congress become actively involved in the decision-making process of the administration of the FBI? (3) What is the proper degree -- and mode -- of Congressional access to FBI information? (4) What clearance procedures and controls should be established for staff members of a Congressional oversight committee?
As I have previously testified before a Congressional -Committee and mentioned here today, the decisions in the FBI are mine and I assume full responsibility for them. I think the point merits reiteration.. Some of the mistakes in the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities ‘outside the FBI. We have welcomed Attorney General Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his own words, "as a ‘lightning rod' to deflect improper requests." Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the request, I believed presented the appearance of impropriety. I can assure you, also, that in my administration of the FBI I bring to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including those that arise in my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and candidly so that the Attorney General can discharge his responsibilities with regard to the FBI. There is no question in my mind that the basic structure of the FBI is sound; but it would be a mistake to — W595 5 Dac: 32999494 Page 245
, e * oy think that integrity can be assured only through institutional means. Integrity is a human quality. And the integrity of the FBI therefore is dependent upon the character of the Director of the FBI and every member of the FBI under him. . It will always be so. . I am sure you are aware the Attorney General created a committee of Department and FBI representatives to draft guidelines governing FBI investigations. These quidelines have been discussed with various committees of Congress and although not finalized at this time, they could prove beneficial in the administration of the FBI. I would like to comment briefly on the matter of determining the.degree and method of access to FBI files granted to a committee having oversight responsibility. I believe such determination must carefully consider the questions raised as to the protection of the integrity of such matter aside from privacy considerations. Much of the information received by the Bureau is furnished voluntarily, not only by individuals but by cooperative foreign governments. They do so in return for an express or implied promise of confidentiality. The FBI regards such promises as binding. « HW 54955 Docld: 32989494 Page 246
HW 54955 _ @ The establishment of unlimited access could seriously jeopardize the flow of volunteered information which is the lifeblood of our investigative organization. As the number of persons having access. to highly sensitive materials is increased, the chance of an intentional or inadvertent disclosure also increases. A perfectly well-intentioned person who legitimately comes into possession of sensitive information may well forget, at a later time and in another position, the circumstances under which he acquired the information. Law enforcement in this Nation is largely dependent upon citizen cooperation. Should citizens no longer have any assurance their identities will be protected, the very foundation of cooperation upon which the Bureau is so reliant will be shaken. Our legitimate concern in this area is borne out by the fact courts continue to recognize the special legal status accorded informants in the law enforcement community, in that their true identities are protected. Should the identities of informants be jeopardized by the unnecessary proliferation of information, there will be a severe impact on the ability of the FBI to discharge its mandated responsibilities. DoclId: 32989494 Page 247
‘ g . We are also concerned about the countless public-spirited citizens who come forward voluntarily with information essential for the FBI to function effectively. Other extremely valuable sources of such information are cooperative agencies in this country and abroad. Should the FBI be required to relinquish, over our objections, information of this nature, it is quite likely we would be denied such information in the future. The Select Committees have received unprecedented access to information from the FBI, within agreed limits; ‘but we must ask whether the same degree of access should be allowed, or is essential to, an ongoing oversight committee. The Select Committees came into being in the Watergate atmosphere. Issues were raised that needed to be resolved. Most of them have been resolved with regard to the FBI. I must point out that our diligent cooperation in the endeavors of the Committees stems, in part, from our own commitment to review the actions of the FBI in the past in order to better judge the proper role of the FBI in the future.’, e An excellent example of this commitment is the fact we have reduced the number of our domestic intelligence investigations by 64 percent since July, 1973. Docld: 32989494 Page 246
HW 54955 As of July 31, 1973, we were handling 21,414 such investigations. By October 30, 1975, we had reduced that total to 7,686 pending domestic intelligence cases -- a dechine of 13,728 cases. I think this is solid evidence of our responsiveness even prior to the drafting of proposed guidelines for such investigations. It isn't necessary for a house to fall on us -- much less two houses. So I feel compelled to raise this question: Will the good of the country be better served by continuing an extraordinary degree of direct Congressional access to FBI information, or will it be better served by placing emphasis on requiring the FBI Director to be fully accountable to an oversight committee through sworn testimony? I think the Congress and the FBI can perform their respective tasks with the most advantageous results by the latter means. Now, also, I would strongly suggest that consideration be given to the employment of a permanent, professional staff -- to the extent necessary -- for any proposed oversight committee, with stringent clearance procedures. This would allow the staff members to become thoroughly knowledgeable concerning the FBI's procedures and practices and, thereby, facilitate the work of the committee with proper security. Docld: 32989494 Page 249
e e As we seek to define the proper degree of oversight, or review, of FBI operations, we must consider the administrative burdens such oversight involves. I should point out that in responding to requests of the two Select Committees, the FBI at its headquarters alone expended 3,976 days of Agent personnel and 1,964 days of clerical personnel from April through December, 1975 -- manpower diverted from investigative duties. In dollars and cents that represents a cost of approximately $640,500. Additionally, the cost of conducting background investigations of committee staff members had reached about $393,699 through last month. Now these figures do not take into account personnel utilized in responding to requests of other committees of Congress, which have substantially increased during the past year. Many of the requests we receive from Congress are duplicative in nature. Though we diligently try to respond fully and accurately in each and every instance, it is a time-consuming and costly chore. And I feel strongly that the interests of the American people would be best served by Congress consolidating its oversight functions. | “whe manpower of the FBI is limited. With the increased burden placed on the Bureau by Congressional Committee HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 250
requests, and Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act requests, we have reached the point where the Bureau's ability to perform its normal investigative functions has been impaired. So I would urge you to consider these matters in your deliberations concerning oversight legislation. I assure you we will continue to cooperate to the best of our ability. And I can further assure you that under a Director held fully accountable and reporting at intervals to an oversight committee, the FBI can perform effectively . and honorably. Thank you. HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 251
@ Testimony beforegghe Committee on Government Opera’ ns, 1-26-76 QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR RIBICOFF QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: Mr. Kelley, Do you believe that there should be a Congressional Oversight Committee handling intelligence matters? I believe in oversight, Senator. I do not know whether you mean one which is separated from the criminal activities performed by the FBI or not. If it be fragmented, I do not , believe that such should be done. I subscribe to an oversight of both the intelligence activ- _ ities in the domestic and foreign security and the criminal. I do not think it is anyone's intention in the oversight committee to take care of the day- to-day problems that the criminal oversight has domestically, but in the counterintelli- gence field, do you believe that there should be such an oversight committee? I do believe that it is necessary that we do have oversight. Mr. Colby testified last week that, in his opinion, after reporting to eight committees, he feels that the sooner such an oversight committee is created, the better off the intelligence community would be. Do you believe with Mr. Colby? I do. In your statement on page 3--I quote you-~-you state that "Some of the mistakes in the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside the FBI." Could you please tell us what mistakes and which higher authorities you are referring to? I am referring to the requests, the orders that have come to us from members of the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, and these stem from the installation of some of our electronic surveillances and from programs that we have followed which have been with the authority of, and approval of, those in this area. There are not--I do not have a complete outline of them, but we do have instances where the FBI did not initiate these. The orders came from outside our organization and from, of course, The White House on some occasions. HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 252
QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR, MR. MR. _ AW 54955 Docld: 32989494 Page 253 KELLEY: QUESTION: KELLEY: QUESTION: KELLEY : Do you believe that such requests have been improper under the authority of the FBI? I do not think by any means that they come under the purview of the FBI. What should a director of the FBI do if he receives an order from the President, or the Attorney General or someone in the White House staff that you believe contrary to what your responsibilities and authorities are? What should a Director do under those circumstances? First, I think that he should deliberate and talk with the Attorney General, if it be one not coming from the Attorney General and get his determination. If it be one where there is some doubt, he should get it in writing. If it be one that he does not under any consideration nor as a result of deliberation wherein an effort is made to convince him, but he himself does not feel that it is advisable then he should withdraw, he should resign. And as I was once told by Senator Byrd during confirmation, it is hoped that in such an instance that he would come to the oversight committee of the Congress and consult with them about what should be done under these circumstances. Of course, that is a matter which the Director himself has to arrive at, and I am already committed to, and still subscribe to, the proposition that I am not going to give way just because it comes from higher authority. If the President of the United States makes a request of you that you believe to be improper, and of course, he is your boss, you would feel honor-bound under those circum- stances to resign as Director of the FBI? If it came to the final crunch, yes. Do you believe that an FBI Director should have a definite term in office? I have been asked this before. I am not uncom- fortable under the present system where my term of office is from day to day. I do not believe that there should be any greater tenure than that. Insofar as a limitation on how long he can be Director, I feel that nine or ten years is sufficient. I do subscribe to that.
QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: You say also on page 3 that when Mr. Levi became Attorney General, he instructed you to report to him any requests or practices which, in your judgment, were improper or presented the appearance of impropriety. Have you made such reports to Mr. Levi? Yes, sir. Are they confidential, or could you describe generally the nature and frequency of such improper requests? Most of them have been in the area of Cointel Programs which we have discovered ourselves in some of our file reviews. I can remember another where we determined that there were certain mail openings which we did not know about until we accidentally discovered them. It was not a failure to inform us, but they thought that this was an ongoing program that had been given official approval. There was no thought that it was something that should be hidden. We did discover them in the top echelon of the FBI and, therefore, the thought is they were new to us--they were also new to Levi and we informed him about them. In your testimony you stated that the Bureau has reduced a number of pending domestic intelli- gence investigations from 21,414 in 1973 to 7,686 by October 30, 1975. How do you explain this? Were there too many investigations being conducted two years prior? Senator, when I first came in, I talked with the man in charge of our Intelligence Division. That is the one where we handle the security matters, and it was our opinion, together, that there were too many investigations being conducted in the security field. I asked him to review the bases on which we conduct our investigations. Obviously it became apparent that some of our fields of attention could be under close scrutiny. I felt some undue extensions of our investigatory capabilities and this was a contin- uing process, and the reduction was not something that was immediate, but extended from, I would say, the latter part of '73 when we got ourselves lined up, right through to October, as it says in my statement, of '75. We looked over why _ AW 54955) Docld: 32989494 Page 254
MR. CHAIRMAN: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: are ® doing certain things, an: might well be, as is many times true in investigative Circles, that you might get a little too concerned about something that on close scrutiny may not have been quite as alarming.as it first seems. This is not at all unusual. It is, however, unusual that it comes from within and yes, as a result of the realignment of our goals--realignment of our procedures--our basis for investigating matters, we did bring about this reduction. Thank you. Senator Percy? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Mr. Kelley for his demonstrated desire and willingness to work with members of Congress and to help us fulfill our responsibilities. Former Attorney General Katzenbach testified last week that he often did not know what the FBI was doing. What is your own working relationship with the present Attorney General? Do you keep him informed of all the major activities that the FBI is undertaking? Does he participate in deciding whether or not you undertake major undertakings? Senator, we certainly keep him informed of any major program. I would say that perhaps we may, On occasion, over-inform him. We may tell him about things that are antici- patory as far as problems are concerned. We try to keep him fully informed. For example, if there happens to be something we learn about that May cause press inquiries of him, we inform him of that. Many times they are made. I just point this out inasmuch as we are trying valiantly to keep him informed. When do you anticipate new guidelines for the FBI being finalized? I cannot give you this response. It has been several months in preparation. I know that it has now been thrown back into the hopper for re-evaluation. I cannot tell you--perhaps Mr. Levi can give you better information in that regard. HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 255
QUESTION: As a follow-up on that first question, to be certain that I complete the record on it, can you think now in retrospect in anything in your term of office as Director of the FBI that you really should have advised the Attorney General of that you maybe subsequently did, but did not at the time? MR. KELLEY: I cannot think of anything, Senator. QUESTION: I asked that, because Dean Rusk said that he subsequently has now learned of certain things undertaken in foreign countries by, say, the CIA that he thought at the time he knew everything going on, he now learns he did not know, and I wanted to complete that record. You talk about unlimited access to your files being dangerous, and I do not think anyone contem~ plates that whatsoever, but I do not think either that you should be left in the position where just your word is the only thing that an Oversight Committee has. What do you think is proper in this respect with respect to reference to files? MR. KELLEY: I think that there should be a working arrange- ment between our people and whatever group might have oversight, and there is a strong requirement that there not be presentation of material which would first compromise a source of information, whether that be a citizen, a government, or an informant. The confiden- tiality of the work done by the FBI is an extremely important thing. Names are not just all that reveal the identity. It may be that certain circumstances, when revealed, may pinpoint what might be the source of information. There might be also too great a proliferation of information about some activity of the FBI. . For example, we have, of course, warrantless , wiretaps. We feel that there should be confidentiality of that. These have been authorized through the approval of the President through the Attorney General's delegated authority in this regard. I would say generally that if there be a reasonable basis whereby we can explain that it should be maintained confidential that it be so maintained. On the other hand, we should extend ourselves in the spirit of HW 54955 DBocld:329899494 Page 256
QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: HW 54955 Docld: 32989494 Page 257 cooperation to inform and to report on measures, and if they want a review that we extend ourselves to let them make such review. You have been able to reduce your domestic intelligence investigations by 64 percent since July, 1973. Can you tell us how you have done that? By a review that we started in mid-1973 looking over the bases for our investigatory needs and our intelligence operations, and generally to take an inventory and say which should we continue, which should we now perhaps give additional emphasis, and we culled out, in other words, those which we did not feel were strictly productive insofar as meeting our commitments. Did you find that you eliminated some of those, Mr. Kelley, because they were illegal, in retrospect, as you look back and decided that the FBI should not, as a law enforcement agency, should not engage in illegal practices in investigations? You know, when you speak of illegality, we have great difficulty. Sometimes, in the context of the time, you may open matters which later are determined to be perhaps possible civil rights investigations, invasions of privacy, or other background objections. I do not know of any which, I would say, were actually illegal. I just do not recall any that would meet that classification. Were some eliminated because they may have been borderline, and in retrospect in numerality, you decided not to go ahead? I would say that that is a possibility. In a strict classification or interpretation they may be termed an invasion of privacy or rights or something of that type. Were most of them eliminated because you felt they were not productive, and to use a phrase, they were not really cost-effective, for the amount of energy and effort put into them? They would not have paid off?
MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: I would say that those would re®, great and major reasons. With the workload declining 64 percent, has there been any decline at all in manpower? Have you shifted manpower to other Division-- -.-person power, excuse me; man or womanpower-—- have you shifted it to other divisions? There has been some shifting; much of our so-called overload of manpower or investigative attention by this Division has been picked up by the terroristic activities investigations. Of course, we have had a great rise in that: ° doubled each year. And, strangely enough, during 1975, it even increased more than that. We had more terrorist-type of bombings in 1975 than we had in 1974. You mentioned the burden that has been placed on the FBI by the Congress. I presume that there is not any question that the CIA could rightfully maintain that a tremendous burden has placed on it by the Congress now. I think, in retrospect and in fairness, a part of the burden is unfair, unwarranted, and not cost-effective. But a large part of the burden is placed simply because we have recognized that we failed the American people in the past, and no one has more clearly admitted this than the Majority leader of the Senate, Senator Mansfield, in his opening statements before the committee. So that we have to rectify that. We may overkill, in a sense. I hope we will not. I hope that we will go a prudent, moderate path and not overreact to the situation. But a large part of that burden is because we simply did not perform the function in the past and the American people know it, they are holding us accountable for that. I wonder if you could for the record, however, just give us a sense of your own personal burden, which worries me, both about the Director of the CIA and the Director of the FBI. How much of your personal time, since you have assumed office, do you think you have devoted to preparing for, giving testimony before Congressional Committees, and then following up on the testimony that has been given, or looking at the testimony being given by others? HW 54955 DBocld:32999494 Page 253
. . MR. KELLEY: SENATOR: MR. CHAIRMAN: SENATOR: I mf say that about 25 sorce® of my time is consumed in going over testimony, reviewing material, acquainting myself with the progress of the various committee activities, in pre- paring myself for testimony, and in testifying; and I think that the others in the top echelon of the Bureau who are involved in this type of thing may have even more than this devoted in their time. It has increased my work day considerably, and I find myself many times reading until the wee hours of the morning. I am not complaining about it. I assumed this. Much more time is devoted to doing my job now than ever before, again, about 25 percent of that time is in this area. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Are we going for one more round of questions? If there are more questions. I have just a few left. I would like an answer to how much time you think is appro- priate for you to spend on this activity, I will wait until we come back. QUESTIONS NOW FROM SENATOR BROCK QUESTION: MR. HW 54955 KELLEY : Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you clarify for me something you said earlier. With regard to the oversight function, I thought that you said that the oversight should include all FBI activities. If that is the case, you might be in some disagreement, with those that say we should separate the oversight of the domestic operations, primarily FBI, from the international oversight function which would more relate to CIA. 75 percent to 80 percent of our time is on criminal activities. There is, on the other hand, a great interrelationship between our security people and our criminal investigations. We may have a case where we need additional people in a security matter. We will call on some people in the criminal activity section. It is true, on the other hand, we will have a big bank robbery or some big fugitive case. We may call on security people and have them do it. We have difficulty in setting aside Docld: 32989494 Page 259
that portion of our budget which’ goes solely to the so-called intelligence activities. In the area of intelligence, we have quite a bit of work in the intelligence field in the criminal work. We would suggest that it not be fragmented, and would hope that we could present all of our difficulties to one committee. I realize that there is the thought that this thrust should be just toward security matters foreign and domestic. We have problems other than this. I can see where it would be very helpful to us to have an overall oversight which would take care of both of our branches QUESTION: The reason I asked the question, there has been at least some indication among members of the Senate, that they would like--at least some members would like--to separate the intelligence from the criminal aspect, and give the oversight committee which this committee might create, jurisdiction over all intelligence, counterintelligence, domestically and international intelligence but to leave to the Judicial Committee, the principal oversight responsibility for the FBI. I gather that you would not find that a very happy end product? MR. KELLEY: We report to the Appropriations Committee, and they outline our programs. Under this possibility we would be reporting to an Intelligence Committee, we would be reporting to the Senate Judiciary Committee on general oversight. Right away we have three within the Senate. QUESTION: If we did give this committee full and complete jurisdiction, would you also suggest that they have jurisdiction in terms of appropriations as well? In other words, you would limit the oversight to one committee. It would have both authorization oversight and appropriation authority. MR. KELLEY: Senator, I am not really prepared to give you an opinion on that. I would say that probably this should be reserved to the Attorney General. Personally, of course, it would probably give us a closer definition of oversight and might be that such a committee certainly could become best acquainted with our work in ongoing programs, but I do not know that I can answer well that particular question. HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 2760
. QUESTION: MR. HW 54955 KELLEY : I an Qe sure that we can cithe® As a matter of fact, there are some of us that feel that rather than trying to define this thing too precisely, we should create an oversight committee and assign to them the responsibility of a study of the extent of the jurisdictional question. That may be the best thing that we can achieve at the moment if we are going to get any response. Let me ask you one or two more questions, again in this same area, I am reluctant to limit the right of an Over- sight Committee in terms of access. I think that is almost something that we can do by experience, as we have with the Joint Committee . on Atomic Energy. There the experience has proven to be good, and I think, healthy for both sides, Executive and Legislative. I am distressed by the leak of information that is ongoing now. I think it is extremely dangerous yet I find it difficult to find a way in which we would limit an oversight committee which may need some access in order to reach this definition of responsibility. I do not know how we would do what you are suggesting, essentially depends upon the Director and his testimony before the Committee. Under our recommendations, we conclude that there should be investigations and clearances granted to members of staff, that their numbers, as well as others for the Committee, should be as limited as possible. We feel that matters that might compromise our sources of information are those that are most important. I think, Senator, that probably we could start off in such a rela- tionship being a little extended insofar as our own desires, we can be a little more open, and see how it works. I would hope that it would be sort of an open-end type of thing so that we can get some history of experiences. I do not want to foreclose the right of review in this regard. I think, as a citizen, I am compelled to say that there should be a better flow of infor- mation than has been true in the past. I am willing to at least explore such a possibility. - 10- Docld: 32989494 Page 2761
QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. CHAIRMAN: WEICKER: HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 262 That is really what I am reaching for, and I appreciate it. We are treating this as if it is going to be de novo every six months. It is not. You are going to create an expertise in this Committee and its staff a knowledge of the general problem area, and I think these matters will begin to settle up as it gains maturity and experience. I am reluctant to eliminate it now because I think we may create an adversary relationship which I do not think is helpful, where, as an alternative, if we kept it fairly open, I think a development of that experience would lead to a good relationship, as we have done with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy earlier. There are misunderstandings about why we think things are confidential. Take for example, a small thing, a release of our telephone directory. It is not generally understood that, by virtue of the release of the telephone directory, you therefore list the identity of our Agents. They are listed in the telephone book. There- after, they get a lot of crank calls. I never did release my address, and as soon as it was listed--and it was listed of course in the Congressional Record--I am not complaining about this--I started receiving crank mail at my home and some of it was on post cards, some of it my wife read, it was not the best thing. People do not realize that we try to protect it for reasons that we could possibly explain in an atmosphere of cooperation with such a committee, and I would look forward to that opportunity. We have not communicated properly, possibly. If it is determined this is too far fetched, all right, we will drop it. We are willing to discuss it. Thank you. My time has expired. I think what I am saying is that there is a clear distinction between a one-shot investigatory committee which is trying to get short-term information and a continuing over- sight committee with a developed relationship on a maturing basis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Weicker, while it is your turn, since Senator Percy has used up his time, he has requested a few more minutes, if you would yield to him. I yield. -jll-
QUESTIONS NOW FROM SENATOR PERCY QUESTION : MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 263 Regretfully, I have a witness upstairs in the Foreign Relations Committee. I was anxious to follow up, Mr. Kelley, what proportion of your time do you think is appropriate and proper that you should devote to Congressional oversight? In other words, we have the same objective to reduce the burden on your Department because of the duplicative activities of the proliferated committees. What proportion do you think is appropriate for you to spend? I have never really considered it, but I would say that during my ordinary, everyday operations, I should keep this in mind and should review each program with the thought prepared to discuss it with an oversight committee, maybe 5 percent, just a ballpark figure. That is a goal I am not sure we will ever achieve but certainly if we can cut if in half, it will help, because your principal duty obviously is to administer a very able department and agency. The thought has been orbited--I threw it out originally--to just try to cut in half in area of intelligence because of the tremen- dous amount of knowledge a person has to gain to properly authorize in authorizing legislation, .and yet the law--and we are not specialists in this field; we are dealing with specialists in the law enforcement field--to cut it in half to see if possibly we can consider in this one oversight committee, giving that committee both authorization and appropriations authority so the service would only have to go before one committee in the Senate and one in the House and have his job done with and thoroughly inform, say, a group of nine Senators that would rotate in that position. Would that, in your judgement, be of material assistance and help if we could work it out internally? If we could, Senator, in one committee, I feel this would be advantageous. I have long proposed that the Attorney General be taken out of politics and not be permitted by procedure or precedent, just as the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, has not participated in politics as such. The Attorney General has -12-
been a politically oriented office, many times being the campaign manager. Do you feel that the Director of the FBI is not a political position and it should never be permitted--do you think it would be a good idea for the Attorney General not to engage in party politics while he is holding that office? MR. KELLEY: I have never had experience with it since I have come here, in any dealings with me or with the Bureau by the three Attorneys General under whom I have worked. There has been no indication of political influence. QUESTION: Do you suggest consolidation of Congressional oversight of the FBI. Should that be done by the same committee overseeing agencies dealing with foreign intelligence in your judgment? MR. KELLEY: In my judgment, all of the operations of the FBI would advantageously be joined in one committee. QUESTION: One committee? MR. KELLEY: Yes, sir. QUESTION: Could you explain in layman's term the difference between foreign and domestic intelligence in criminal cases as managed administratively by | the FBI? And I ask that with the understanding that criminal activities involving foreign powers are not necessarily handled in the FBI's foreign intelligence division. For example, if another country were to finance terrorist acts within the United States, the entire case might be handled in the Criminal Division. Therefore, it would help us in our understanding if you could differentiate between what activities are handled by each of those bureaus. If you would like to do that for the record, to make it more complete, I would certainly accept that. MR. KELLEY: I would prefer to prepare this in a response to you ; and will do so. QUESTION: Mr. Kelley, finally, FBI activities seem to be at the heart of one of the gray areas of oversight. I think we are in general agreement that Congress should create a committee that would oversee the CIA and NSA. What aspects of the FBI that should be looked at by this committee is another matter. What are your views on this? MR. KELLEY: Could I also give you that response--may I respond to that in writing also? ~ 13 - NW 34955) Docld: 32999494 Page 264
bal “ + SENATOR: Yes, @. certainly may. I chink @hat that winds up. I would simply like to say having known Attorney General Levi for a quarter of a century as a trustee at the University of Chicago, I . think the tone and attitude that he is establishing, the relationship that he has established with you and which has been a cause of great concern between the FBI Directors of the past have not been fully satisfactory and fully cooperative. I think that relationship that has been estab- lished has been an outstanding accomplishment, and I think your testimony to that effect here is very important indeed, and I certainly - commend both you and Attorney General Levi, because a great deal has been accomplished already. MR. CHAIRMAN: Senator Weicker? SENATOR: | Thank you, Mr. Chairman. QUESTIONS NOW FROM SENATOR WEICKER QUESTION: I notice in your statement you make mention of the fact that since 1975, or April through December, 1975, a great amount of time, effort, and money was expended on responding to Congressional inquiries, et cetera. I think we both might also allude to the fact that that | is directly attributable to the fact that there was no Congressional inquiry for many years before that, and what in effect you have seen is an extreme reaction to an extreme situation. As a matter of fact, as I understand it, and prior to the impeach- ment inquiry neither the House nor the Senate Judiciary Committees held any hearings on FBI oversight. Is that correct, to your knowledge? MR. KELLEY: I do not recall this, Senator. QUESTION: I believe that was before your time, but that is the record. MR. KELLEY: I am thinking only during the time that I have been here. I do not recall just when we first reported to the Oversight Committee. It was during the time that Mr. Saxbe was Attorney General. We appeared three times. Prior to that I do not know. - 14 - i oan 3 . HW 54955 BDocld: 327989494 Page 2765
“ QUESTION: I think it is important to coint Wat that I am sure the American people are just as appalled about your being overburdened with Congressional inquiries as they are with no Congressional inquiries. But that is the record. There is nothing in between. I think that is important to point out as we try to devise some system, some apparatus, to bring balance to all this. We need the FBI. As. I said the other day, we need a CIA. There is no reason why a choice has to be made between 0 and 100 percent insofar as it is using up your time, the CIA or any of our law enforcement agencies. My concern, believe me, Director, is not that you are going to be overburdened with oversight.. As I have indicated, unless this Congress acts very shortly, the whole thing is going to be forgotten and we are going to go back to zero again. That is a far greater danger in my book than your being overburdened. I would suggest to you, it is very strange to say, that I would hope that you, along with Mr. Colby and others in the law enforcement community, would fight very hard to see this oversight legislation implemented, because on that depends the survival of your agency, on that depends a restoration of confidence as far as the American people are concerned in the law enforcement and intelligence agencies. I fear the bureaucratic footdragging is going to go on around here two years, five years from now. We will be right back at square A, except the next time that any other abuses get uncovered, that is going to be the end of your agency. There is going to be no way of coming back in the room to construct something that makes sense. That is my concern. MR. KELLEY: I went on record during my confirmation sponsoring oversight, and I still feel that it is a very viable and proper precedure. I have no objection to it whatsoever, and I welcome it. QUESTION: I notice you say you favor a new oversight committee. Is it your feeling that the present oversight mechanisms are not adequate? MR. KELLEY: I hope I have not indicated that I am critical of the present oversight. I hope that we can have a centralized oversight whereby our intelligence and our criminal investigatory responsibilities are best included in this one. Under the projected possibilities, the Bureau would be fragmented, we would have an oversight of the security of the national counterintelligence field and -15- HW 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 266
QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: QUESTION: MR. KELLEY: the @ nat field maintained ©... present oversight system. I would hope that it would be together. We do report to the Appropriations Committee and we do report to the Judiciary Committee on Oversight. If it were fragmented further, we would have three oversight committees. Do you feel that the present system of oversight as embodied in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees should be supplanted by a new Oversight Committee, or are you satisfied with the present system? I would reserve the final determination to consultation as I would want to do, of course, with Mr. Levi to get together and do this. I would say, primarily, our goal is to have it centered not in any particular committee. I think that is the responsibility of Congress, actually. What we want to do is not fragment it, not proliferate it, but to have it so that we can have one group to which we can go for considera- tion of our problems and outline our procedures. I can appreciate, Mr. Director, that you still have to work with the Senate and House Judiciary Committees and obviously we don't want to ruffle any feathers. We want to plot a future course. We are not trying to find out how we can live with the past. The difficulty is, as I perceive it, not that the mechanism was not there for oversight--it was there. The problem was that it was a secondary function of the particular committee, in this case the Judiciary Committee, something down the line. Do you feel that your agency and its activities are of sufficient importance that that should be a full-time job, rather than a secondary job, for a Congressional committee? I responded to a question asked by Senator Percy about how much time I thought I might be devoting to the oversight requirement. I thought about 5 percent. That is just a ballpark figure. I do not think that that would necessarily mean that one committee would be set aside for just that type of deliberation. I think that if it were to include all of our activities, criminal as well as security, that it might take a little more, but still, I do not think that things come up that frequently where it would be a real heavy task for any committee. - 16 - HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 267
> © * QUESTION: You understand what we are conte tating here would be a committee whose intention would be directed toward the FBI, the CIA, the law enforcement intelligence community? It would not just be the FBI; it would also be the CIA. What I am saying, I think what others are trying to get across is, is this sufficiently important to this Nation, to its life and to its Constitution, that that is a full-time job and not a secondary job for some other Committee, be it the FBI which is a secondary function of Judiciary, or the CIA, which is a secondary function of Armed Services. This is a primary function. At least, I do not find it a primary function of law enforcement intelligence. That is why my question to you, whether you are satisfied with the present system, which obviously has not worked in the past, with a warning could work, or whether we are best just having one committee that would work with these law enforcement intelligence agencies and start from scratch and once again try to rebuild confidence. It really does not make any difference what you think or what I think or what Senator Ribicoff thinks or our colleagues here think. The fact is that the American people have lost their confidence. That is the group we have to reach. Whether I am satisfied that you are a fine man with great integrity and a fine Director, it does not mean anything, and your opinion of me, that is not important. What the American people think is what is very important. That is what is jeopardizing your Agency now and, indeed, the Congress. MR. KELLEY: I would construe anything which is developed by Congress as something which we would certainly try to work under. We will not complain. You will not have any beefs from us. I told Senator Brock that I would certainly work as best we can with the system that is devised. I repeat that to you, too. I am not going to argue about it. I would like to work with you just as closely as we can. QUESTION: I appreciate it. I am not trying to lay all of this at your doorstep. I think Senators Brock and Ribicoff were talking earlier, we were talking earlier, I was talking earlier with Senator Brock, we are going to try to pry these things loose -17- HW 54955 Docld:329689494 Page 266
. in LD congress. They are the ®. that do not want any change. That is why I am trying to get all the help we can publicly. Please understand what I think all of us here are saying. We are not against your agency. We want to see it survive, but it cannot survive unless the American people feel that they have a handle on this policy. Thank you. MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Senator Nunn? SENATOR: I have no questions. CHAIRMAN : Senator Brock, do you have any more questions? SENATOR: No. CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. It may very will be, as we proceed to mark up this legislation, that we may have occasion to talk to you and your staff. I would hope that you would be available to us in the future. MR. KELLEY: We will be available. | WW 54955 Docld:32969494 Page 269 npr
” a9 Mey. 214-74) é ° . FBI Transmit in Vig Atel (Type in plaintext or code) (Precedence) 2-20-76 TO: SAC, Albany (Date) F : Director, FBI BUREAUWIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM, 76-7 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS U. S. SENATE, JANUARY 26, 1976 Enclosed for your information is one copy of the statement I delivered before the Committee on Government Operations of the U. S. Senate on January 26, 1976, as well as a transcript of the question-and-answer. session that followed. The latter can be used in answering inquiries from newsmen and others but should not be fur- nished to any outsider. The enclosed material may be of assistance to you in responding to inquiries you may receive from the public or the press. (Do not type BEYOND THIS MARGIN.) (This line for LEFT MARGIN.) Enclosures (2) 1 - All Field Offices - Enclosures (2) 1 - Each Legat - Enclosures (2) (Do not type below this Tine.) | (2-2a30¥_23 iy . pe . Nj SEARCHE INDEXED \ — \y GY SERIALIZED Een Poe | MAR 5 1976 FBI-ALRAMY bas 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 270