457-10011-10125 . ; Date:10/07/93 re Page:1 | | JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM a : IDENTIFICATION FORM . AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : SSCIA / RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10125 RECORDS SERIES : AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : SSCI a - FROM : TO : TITLE : | TRANSCRIPT: AMLASH CASE OFFICER DATE : 07/29/75 PAGES : 147 SUBJECTS : AMLASH CASE OFFICER (WITNESS TESTIFIED UNDER AN ALIAS) [R] S DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT . CLASSIFICATION : T sae RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : SSCI Box 230, Folder 5 Slee ladda lee a Kanade eed ee er ee ee ne ee eee [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED HW 450955 Docld: 32203893 Page i
WARD & PAUL Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 il le 13 14 15 16 17 18 ig 20° 21 Re 23 24 20 TOP SECRET affairs? AMLASH Case Officer. Correct. Mr. Baron. Were you an employee of the CIA during that time on another assignment? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I was. Mr. Baron. I would like to ask you some questions about a series of events that occurred in 1961, simply to find out whether you have any recollection of any of the names of people involved or the activities involved that you may have garnered either from personal contact with these people or from subsequent review of the files involved: First of all, in 1961, we have a record from the IG Report of a meeting between| who was a CIA officer at that time and a Cuban who we have agreed to refer to as AMLASH for the purposes of this session today. Our understanding is that a meeting was arranged by  Casiles Tepeddnoreho was known as AMWHIP, who served as an intermediary between AMLASH and[ ana that the meeting took place in Mexico City to discuss the possibility that AMLASH might cooperate either with CIA -- strike that -- to discuss AMLASH's views on the Cuban situation generally. Do you have any recollection from any source of initial contacts between{ iad AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. Only the general recollection that he was contacted about the time that you said hea was, but no DoctTd: 32203393 Page 2? | TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20: el Ra 295 24 20 Bocld:3 TOP SECRET details on that. Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge from any source about the source of the initiative for these first contacts between AMLASH and the CIA? AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't. Mr. Baron. You are not aware of the CIA having taken the initiative in this instance as opposed to AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, no. I don't know who took the initiative. Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss these meetings with| « personally? AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't. Mr. Baron. Have you ever met| || AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I have. Mr. Baron. Did you meet| Buring the period between 1963 and 1965 when you were involved with Cuban ey AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I can recollect. Mr. Baron. Do you recall in what connection you dealt . with ) AMLASH Case Officer. As a colleague in the Agency, but not specifically on this operation. Mr. Baron. Have you ever met Gamiles RAVEIIRG g, who was known as agent AMWHIP? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I have. Mr. Baron. And did you work Sree ite. Hepediiaa’ so099 aye + TOP SECRET specificall
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 aw) a 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 18 19 el 22 23 24 ©) Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 295 20 - TOP SECRET On the AMLASH Project during the time of your involvement in the AMLASH Project? | AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, because he was used before to serve as the contact and the interpreter, and I didn't need an interpreter to work with AMLASH, so although I knew him and I knew of him, he was not involved directly with - me in my contacts with AMLASH. imo? Mr. Baron. Did you meet directly with @acieg Heped AMLASH Case Officer. I know him, yes, or I knew him. Mr. Baron. Although he wasn't serving as an interpreter during the course of this operation, was he serving as an intermediary between yourself and AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. He was in contact with AMLASH. He was a very close friend of AMLASH. He had served as an intermediary, but during the time I was in contact, he did not serve as the intermediary. In other words, I contacted him directly. I contactdd AMLASH directly. HCNENOS Bop | the period of your involvement with AMLASH? Mr. Baron. And what role did lay during AMLASH Case Officer. As a friend of AMLASH. He knew what AMLASH was proposing. Mr. Baron. And would sometimes discuss AMLASH's proposals with you in AMLASH's absence? AMLASH Case Officer. I camnot recall any specific term or any spacific subject that we would have discussed, but I HW 50955 Docld: 32203893 Page 4 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET 19 Mr. Rhea. Did William Harvey ever speak to you of the use of gambling syndicate contacts in Cuba for any operation Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 to o whatsoever? 4 AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't. 5 Mr. Baron. -Did you ever hear, during the period of 6 "60 to "66 of any mention of the use of poison pills against i ” 9 Fidel Castro? 8 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't. 9 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear about the development of 10 poison pills at the CIA? 11 AMLASH Case Officer. No. 4 12 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of the. cryptonym {aig @& 13 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. 14 Mr. Baron. What did that cryptonym signify? 15 AMLASH Case Officer. That was the recruitment of sources 16 as I recall it. It was a project for the recruitment of 17 intelligence sources inside Cuba, primary military sources, as 18 || I recall the cryptonym. 19 | Mr. Baron. Was that the cryptonym from the asset 20+ Spotting project that you were working on with William Harvey? 21 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't remember if it was at the 22 | time that William Harvey was there or afterwards, I don't 23 || recall the time period, but it was the overall operation for 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 | the recruitment of sources inside Cuba. 25 Mr. Baron. Did you continue working on this asset spottin HW 50955 DBocld: 322703593 Page 5 TOP SECRET ;
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, 5.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 Crt o> 10 Ll le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° al 22 295 24 29 TOP SECRET 20 and recruitment project even after you began working on AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did. Mr. Baron. And at some point that project came to be AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but I don't remember exactly when that cryptonym was given to the project. Mr. Baron. Was removal of key military leaders around Castro ever a part of SiABRONC EF AMLASH Case Officer. To the best of my recollection, no. Mr. Baron. Who was the man in charge of Project#MHayr© AMLASH Case Officer. I was, at a time. Mr. Baron. You would have been called Project Director or case officer? AMLASH Case Officer. I was the case officer, yes. Mr. Baron. Were any of the assets for the guHAnronp also assets for Project AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. They were not conceived that way, ' but one or two of them crossed. Mr. Baron. To your knowledge, were any of the assets in igwho were not assets for Project AMLASH ever involved jist in any kind of program of direct personal action against Castro? AMLASH Case Officer. No, they were not. Mr. Baron. When you reported on Project; to whom secre 03893 Page 6 TOP SECR ET CA
Phone {Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° el 22 25 24 25 TOP SECRET 21 did you report? AMLASH Case Officer. To FitzGerald. Mr. Baron. After FitzGerald took over from William Harvey? AMLASH Case Officer. Right. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of FitzGerald's reporting to anyone above him AMLASH Case Officer. I assume that he did, but I did not accompany him to any of the meetings. Mr. Baron. Would you assume that he reported to Richard Bissell on -- I'm sorry. Would you assume that he reported to Richard Helms on Project {miner AMLASH Case Officer. That would be the chain of command, the chain of reporting, but I am not aware of what he reported to Helms or anybody. Mr. Baron. And do you have any direct knowledge of any reporting FitzGerald may have done on GisARRONBto the Special Group? AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't. Mr. Baron. Okay. Do you have any recollection of a trip that Agent AMLASH took to Helsinki in June of 1962? AMLASH Case Officer. No details. I knew he had made that trip. Mr. Baron. But you were never involved during that period of time with Project AMLASH? DoclTd: 322703393 Page 7 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 Ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° al 22 25 24 25 TOP SECRET 22 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I was not. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection as to the results of that trip? | AMLASH Case Officer. No specific, no. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of contact between the CIA and the FBI with respect to Project AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't. Mr. Baron. Were you ‘ever made aware of a report that the FBI forwarded to the CIA about a meeting held between icanlocpucoetiemand the FBI? . AMLASH Case Officer. No, I wasn't. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection at all of dissatisfaction expressed by Los Carrs about the lack of vigor with which the CIA was approaching the defection of AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. This was part of the record, of the AMLASH record, but I had nothing to do with that, and I was not involved in the operation at that time. Mr. Baron. When you took over Project AMLASH, was it a concern of yours to demonstrate to Agent AMLASH that the CIA would be vigorous in supporting his actions? AMLASH Case Officer. The primary objective, when I took over the contact with AMLASH was to keep him in place and convince him to return to Cuba and not to permit him to defect and stay away from the island. Bocld: 32203393 Page 6 TOP SECDET
TOP SECRET 24 1 or the state of affairs in the barracks? Can you be specific Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 £ | there? . ) AMLASH Case Officer. Well, we were looking for the 4 information at the highest levels. 5 Mr. Kelley. Your source of information from the highest 6 levels. ‘You Mean you wanted to know what the sentiment was in 7 the highest lavels? 8 AMLASH Case Officer. That is right, and to develop 9 information on’ then. we2 had to develop sources in those 10 Circles, ® 11 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of a contact 12 report that Bwrote about a meeting on WARD & PAUL 13 August lst of 1962 that he held with AMLASH in Helsinki? 14 AMLASH Case Officer. I know that such a contact report 15 was in the file, but I was not associated with the Operation 16 in '62. 1? Mr. Baron. Let me show you this, it is a copy of an 18 excerpt from that report, as it appears in the IG Report of g 19 1967, and ask you if that refreshes your recollection in any : 20: way? i 21 And for the record, let us mark this AMLASH Exhibit 1. : 202 . (The document referred to : 23 was marked AMLASH Exhibit i 24 No. 1 for identification. 25 TOP SECRET HY 50955 DBocld: 322703893 Page 9
WARD &@ PAUL Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10° Ll 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° 21 22 23 24 29 TOP SECRET 25 Mr. Baron. Have you had a chance to read it through? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.- Mr. Baron. Having looked at this document, do you have any further recollection of ever seaing this document, or a discussing the meeting directly with AMLASH Case Officer. I probably discussed the meeting with| | I don't recall discussing these specific items. I do recall that there was a contact report in the files. Whether this was the specific one that I recall seeing in the files, I could not attest to, but certainly it was a practice to write contact reports. Mr. Baron. Who was " AMLASH Case Officer. He was the case officer who, with Mr. Baron. So he had the same position that you did in connection with Project AMLASH and was your predecessor? AMLASH Case Officer. He was my predecessor, as far as the contact was concerned, yas. | Mr. Baron. Was there anyone else who was a predecessor to you in any other sense? AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I recall. Mr. Rhea. Before you took over Project AMLASH, what office did{ work out of? Was he under the DDP? . AMLASH Case Officer. No, he was under SAS. Bocld: 3232703393 Page 10 TOP SECRET
Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 av) KH 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 Al £2 295 24 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 20° TOP SECRET 26 Mr. Rhea. He was under SAS. Mr. Baron. Which. was? AMLASH Case Officer. Under FitzGerald. Mr. Baron. Which was under FitzGerald who in turn was under the DDP Helms, is that correct? AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct. ” Mr. Baron. After you took over from did he continue to be involved in Project AMLASH in any way? AMLASH Case Officer. No, not after the first meeting. Mr. Baron. He moved on to a different assignment then? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.. | Mr. Baron. Directing your attention back to this contact, or this excerpt from a contact report, I realize that you don't have a direct recollection of seeing this contact report except for glancing at it in the files, but do you recall ever discussing with| ; [the excerpt in the fourth paragraph here where it says "He" -- referring to AMLASH -- "also wanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodriquez (a topranking Castro subordinate) and the Soviet Ambassador, and also to eliminate Fidel, by execution if necessary." And then it continues, in the next paragraph, "While we were making no commitments or plans, wa pointed out to AMLASH that schemes like he envisionéd certainly took place, but that a lot of coordination, plans, information collection, et cetera were necessary prerequisites to insure the value and WW 50955 Bocla: 32203093 Page il TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° £1 22 25 24 29 TOP SECRET 27 success of such plans." Did you ever discuss this kind of desire to eliminate Fidel Castro and others on the part of AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, no. Not in conjunction with this report, this contact report that is shown. Pa Mr. Baron. Did you have general briefing sessions with trhen you took over from him as case officer on the project? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. . Mr. Baron. Was it in the course of his briefing sessions that you generally discussed the subject that is referred to here, the subject of AMLASH's desire to eliminate Castro by execution if necessary? ‘ AMLASH Case Officer. If this was mentioned, it was a very small portion of the discussion about AMLASH. My primary interest at that time in my discussions with| Rs to find out who specifically -- (Whereupon, Senator Morgan entered the hearing room.) Mr. Baron. Let's go off the record a minute. (Discussion off the record.) Senator Morgan. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you have given today will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? AMLASH Case Officer. I do. Doclda: 32303593 Page 12 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET 28 1 Mr. Baron. You understand -- is it true that, now that 2 you are under oath, that you are willing to state that the Phone (Area 202) $44-6000 iS) testimony you have given here this afternoon was the truth as 4 far as you know it? 5 | AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. 6 Mr. Baron. And you understand that your rights are still 7 intact that we discussed before? You have the right to counsel, 8 if you wish, the right to stop at any point and ask for 9 counsel, and the right to remain silent as we have already 10 discussed, and these rights are still intact? 11 (Discussion off the record.) 12 Mr. Baron. Now we were just discussing general briefing 13 sessions that you may have had with | bwhen 14 you took over for him as case officer for the AMLASH operation WARD & PAUL 15 and you say that you do not have a specific recollection of 16 1U telling you that AMLASH was intent on eliminating 1? Castro by execution if necessary, is that correct? 18 AMLASH Case Officer. That is correct. 19 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that you generally discussed 20:| AMLASH's desire to get rid of Castro with [during 21 your briefing sessions? 202 AMLASH Case Officer. In general this was mentioned, becaus 23 this was seen by AMLASH at that time as one of the means of 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20003 24 reversing the government in Cuba. 25 Mr. Baron. Presumably, if@ijanlnas was aware, as he BY S0955 Docld: 323203893 Page i3 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PALE 410 First Street, S.E.. Wasnington, O.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 195 16 17 18 19 20° el £2 29 24 £0 TOP SECRET 29 indicates in this report of the strength of AMLASH's desire to get rid of Castro by execution if necessary, he would have conveyed that to you in some way, isn't that correct? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but you also must recognize that AMLASH was a rather temperamental man whose temperament was of a mercurical nature and whereas he may have said something like this in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk about organizing a regular military coup in the next breath. Mr. Baron. At the time that you took ovar Project AMLASH, did| [teeta you that a specific means of overthrowing Castro had been chosen? AMLASH Case Officer. No. Mr. Baron. Then in this document when he says that "We were making no commitments or plans" and then it goes on to say that he wanted to make sure that AMLASH understood that “coordination, planning, information, collection, et cetera, were necessary prerequisites to insure the value and success of such plans" what plans would he have been referring to there? AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. It was true that there was certainly no plans that I know of which would refer to the elimination of Rodriquez, Fidel or the Soviet Ambassador general plans for the coup, for a military coup, maybe this was what he was talking about. I wouldn't know, I don't know what he was -~ I wasn’t there at the time and I don't know specifically what he was talking about. DocId:3 soos Page 14 TOP SECRET
WARD & PAUL Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 11 le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° el £2 29 24 £0 ‘particular because AMLASH objected to the use of that word? TOP SECRET 30 Mr. Baron. Let's move on, then, to a few days later in August of 1962; between the l0th and the lith of August of 1962, ofand AMLASH apparently met in Copenhagen for further meetings. Do you have any recollectidn of being informed by sd those meetings? AMLASH Case Officer. No, just on the general subject that they had met, but not on any specifics. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of learning from any source that during the meetings in Copenhagen, assassination was discussed’ between| [ana AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. As a plan? Mr. Baron. Discussed in any sense. AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I mean, it may have been, but I don't know if it was specificially discussed by him. But I do not recollect that ler anybody told me that in Copenhagen assassination was discussed. Mr. Kelley. Did| lever Say to you that you should not use the word assassinate with AMLASH. for any. reason in AMLASH Cage Officer. Yes. I recall stating that AMLASH did not like to talk specifically about assassina- tion. Mr. Baron. Did you recall any time in your association with AMLASH when he became upset when that word might arise in conversation? Docld: 34203893 Page 15 TOP SECR ET
WARD &@ PAUL Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 J Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° 21 22 £9 24 29 TOP SECRET 31 AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that he specifically used that word. He would use such words as "neutralization," but not specifically "assassination." Mr. Baron. And when he would use a word like neutraliza- tion, he would be referring to assassination, is that a fair assumption? AMLASH Case Officer. Well, yes and no. We were talking about the removal from power of Castro, which could mean assassination, but could also Mean just physically remove him without killing him. | e Mr. Baron. Let me show you for a moment an excerpt from a contact report written byf about his meetings on August l0th and llth, 1962. He refers in this excerpt for the record to the fact that they were "discussing various aspects of AMLASH's future role in Cuba." And he says, “wae used the term assassinate, which was most objectionable to AMLASH and he became visibly upset." And then he goes on to say, "It was not the act he objected to but merely the choice of the word used to describe it. Eliminate was acceptable." Does that fit with your understanding of the way AMLASH related to the concept of assassination and the use of the word assassination? AMLASH Case Officer. Generally speaking yes, because we never -- I certainly never raised the subject of assassination TOP SECRET DoclTd: 32203893 Page 16
TOP SECRET 33 1 Mr. Baron. Does this description by{ ifort the 2 fact that AMLASH would not -object to the act of assassination Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000 3 but rather to the word, fit with your understanding of 4 | AMLASH'’s character? That he would have no particular objection 5 to contemplating assassination? 6 AMLASH Case Officer. That is difficult for me to say 7 || because as I say, we never discussed this subject in that 9 Mr. Baron. Did he ever use the term eliminate Castro 10 to you.to the best of your recollection? 11 AMLASH Case Officer. I recall the word neutralize more 12 than eliminate. WARD & PAUL 13 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that they would have meant 14 | the same thing? 15 AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, vaguely, I guess. It would 16 probably mean the same thing. 7 Mr. Baron. And that they could be fairly interepreted 18 in this context as a euphemism that AMLASH might use, because : 19 | he was uncomfortable with the word assassination? : 20: AMLASH Case Officer. It could be. I mean, I could not : 21 state specifically whether he was using it because he ws i 20 uncomfortable with the word assassination, or be ause he was : 23 uncomfortable ‘with the act itself. This is difficult for 2S: o4 | me to clarify for you. ° 25 Mr. Baron. All right. HW 50955 seoace 03593 Page i? TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 1l 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° el 22 230 24 £0 TOP SECRET 34 Did you evar learn of a meeting later in August between have any recollection of being told about such a meeting? AMLASH, #ggepedumon AMLASH Case Officer. Only in general terms. Mr. Baron. Did you know AMLASH Case Officer. Not at that time. ” Mr. Baron. Did you come to know Iduring the course of your association with Project AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. No. Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the. fact that, AMLASH was given any kind of special training in France during 1962? AMLASH Case Officer. Only a vague recollection from the file. Mr. Baron. And what is your recollection? AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if it was training or if it was a demonstration in explosives, but no more than that. Mr. Baron. Why would he be given this kind of training? AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. Mr. Baron. Wouldn't this kind of training be for the purpose of operations that he might perform inside Cuba? AMLASH Case Officer. I do not specifically know if there were any plans for such operations. If such -- Mr. Baron. I'm not asking right now if there were plans or not, but simply what .the purpose of the training would have Boclda: 32703693 Page 16 = TOP SECRET :
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 ~ dl 12 13 14 15 16 Ll? 18 19 20: 21 ze 23 24 20 TOP SECRET 35 been? AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. Mr. Baron. To create the capability to perform such operations. Is that a fair way to put it? AMLASH Case Officer. It would appear that that's what it would be, but I don't know that those were the plans. Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any S/W training that was given to AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. Only from having heard that he was given S/W training. . Mr. Baron. And is that secret writing training? AMLASH Case Officer. Secrat writing. In order for him to be able to communicate off-island, if he returned. Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of a cable that bent to CIA Headquarters on August 17 which indicated that AMLASH might try to carry out an assassination attempt on his own initiative? AMLASH Case Officer. I do not have any recollection at that time. Reading the file afterwards, I know a cable was sent. Specifically what it said, I do not recall. Mr. Baron. But you do remember that a cable was sent to the effect that AMLASH might try a physical elimination mission against Castro on his own? AMLASH Case Officer. No, I do not specifically remember Docld: 322033893 Page 19 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET g 36 3 1 that. © ) Mr. Baron. What do you recollect about the cable? i 3 AMLASH Case Officer. The one of the fact that he had been 4 given the explosives training, or the demonstration in explosives, 5 || but specifically that it mentioned assassination, I do not 6 recall. 9 Mr. Baron. Let me draw your attention now to a document g || We will mark AMLASH 3, which is a one sentence excerpt from a 9 cable fron{” sé ho was a case officer of the CIA, 10 to CIA Headquarters, cabled on August 17, 1962. 11 . (The document referred ad z to was marked AMLASH g 6 . e ¢ c iz |. Exhibit No. 3 for 3 14 identification. ) 15 16 17 18 3 & 19 u 20° g 5 21 | 3 M 22 | 23 z @: z4 25 HW 50955 Docld: 32203893 Page 20 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET 37 1 Mr. Baron. After reading this cable, do you ever remember 2 seeing that before? . 5 AMLASH Case Officer. Noa. 4 Mr. Baron. Were you aver briefed by Por anyone 5 | else on the fact that the CIA was aware that AMLASH could or Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 6 might try to carry out on his own initiative a physical ? alimination mission against Castro? 8 AMLASH Case Officer. It was mentioned to me, but only in 9 the most general terms, not in any specific plan that he had to 10 do it. . ll Mr. Baron. And what kind of general terms would it have 12 been that he would do it? 13 AMLASH Case Officer. Primarily, as I recall, in the terms WARD & PAUL 14 of his -- the fact that he did not like to use the term assass- 15 ination. 16 Again, getting back to what I mentioned before in the 17 terms of elimination or neutralization of the leadership, but 18 || not specifically of an assassination, a specific assassination 19 || attempt against Castro. It was in those general terms that I 20°] recall it, not in specific terms. 21 Mr. Baron. In looking at this cable, however, would you 202 agree that the physical elimination mission that is referred 23 to there where it says "Have no intention give AMLASH physical 24 elimination mission" is probably an assassination attempt | 25 against Castro? In other words ,|| fis saying I have no HW 50955 Docld:32203893 Page 21 TOP SECRET 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003 HW 450955 10 11 le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° 21 22 235 24 29 were many people around Castro, and this was the high military TOP SECRET 41 yourself and AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. fvent down there to introduce me to AMLASH. Mr. Baron. Do you remember if Gamigeitieomitincmwas also present? AMLASH Case Officer. fowalso went on that trip, yes. Mr. Baron. And what was the purpose of that trip? | AMLASH Case Officer. To introduce AMLASH to me as a Spanish-speaking case officer. Mr. Baron. Do you recall any specific discussions you had with AMLASH about the role he might Play inside Cuba? AMLASH Case Officer. During the first meeting, as I recall, we primarily discussed the situation in Cuba, the internal situation vis-a-vis Castro personalities who were unhappy for one reason or another with the Castro regime. Mr. Baron. In general, what was AMLASH's assessment at that time of the strength of the Castro regime? AMLASH Case Officer. As I recall, it was strong. There officers who were unhappy with the Communist: orientation of the regime, but many of these officers were still, as he reported at that time, were either still loyal to Castro or were afraid of the consequences if their disloyalty was found out. Mr. Baron. And AMLASH himself was willing to participate Docld: 34203893 Page 22 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ay) bH 10 ll Ga) <2a 12 14 14 WARD & P 15 16 17 18 19 el 22 23 24 410 Fisst Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 20 HW 50955 Docld:3 he was also a friend and in contact with AMTRUNK] 20° TOP SECRET 44 everything that ws being done, as far as I understood it, was to foment a military coup. That was the objective. Mr. Kelley. And where did you understand this from? Who gave direction and shape to the program in which you were wokring? AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I worked for FitzGerald. 1 worked for Desmond FitzGerald. Mr. Baron. Who was at that time Chief of Task Force W? AMLASH Case Officer. He was the Chief of the Task Force. Mr. Baron. Or Chief of SAS? AMLASH Case Officer. Or SAS. Mr. Baron. Do you recall telling AMLASH to assist a man who was known as AMTRUNK in his intelligence assignments within Cuba? AMLASH Case Officer. I didn't specifically ask him to assist muro Because he was one of the ones of the assets we had unilaterally recruited inside Cuba. In my discussions with AMLASH, I found out for the first time that N Mr. Baron. And do you recall the mission that AMTRUNK: had at that time? AMLASH Case Officer. It was very early in the operation. It was a matter of establishing communications with him at that time. Again, he was going to be used to develop the intelli- gence that we were trying to develop. 03693 Page 23 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 Li le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° el g2 23 24 £9 pocta:3 203593 Page 24 TOP SECRET TOP SECRET 45 Mr. Baron. Was AMTRUNKG a military officer, high military officer in the Cuban Army? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he was. Mr. Baron. And he was in some sort of regular contact with you as case officer for this project? AMLASH Case Officer. Only through a courier who had been infiltrated to the island at that time. Mr. Baron. In early September of 1963, do you recall AMLASH expressing any kind of dissatisfaction with the willing- ness of the CIA to help him out? Do you recall any thought that he might not want to see you again shortly after that meeting in Brazil? AMLASH Case Officer. Only in a letter or message that I recall that was received by {i@pediingy and he had expressed his feeling at that time that the way it was interpreted that he decided to defect. In other words, he wasn't interested in carrying on any further conversations about the possibilty of returning to Cuba. Mr. Baron. Did you meet with him, or did he defect thereafter? AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't. Mr. Baron. And did you meet with him shortly thereafter in the beginning of October in Paris? | AMLASH Case Officer... Yes, I did. Mr. Baron. Had he changed his mind about defecting at that
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PauL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 ll 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20: Al R22 25 24 25 “Bocld: 3 TOP SECRET 46 Point? AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically, but he was willing to, again, discuss the possibility of returning. Mr. Baron. Had anything specific happened to antagonize him in Brazil so that he would not want to see you again? AMLASH Case Officer. No. Mr. Baron. Was he asking for any particular kind of support at that point, other than help: in defecting? AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't specifically make any requests of me, except if he did return to Cuba that he would expect our support and assurances of our support. Mr. Baron. And did he make this clear to you in Paris in early October? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he did. Mr. Baron. Did you known t AMLASH Case Officer. He was in Paris at that time. Mr. Baron. And he was working for the CIA in Paris at the time? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. te SEER, Mr. Baron. And do you recall that| |kas also working for the CIA at that time in Paris? AMLASH Case Officer. In Paris, yes. Mr. Baron. Do you recall that they participated in the meetings with AMLASH in early October in Paris? AMLASH Case Officer. They did not participate in my 03093 Page 25 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET 47 1 meetings with AMLASH. They met AMLASH to pass him a message telling him that I was. coming and that I would be there to o talk to him. Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 4 Mr. Baron. Do you recall learning in very early October 5 | that the| 6 AMLASH Case Officer. Vaguely. I vaguely recall being 7 told by the people in Paris that this was the case. I did not & || detect at any time I was in contact with him || 2 fl | | 7 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't. Mr. Baron.| WARD & PAUL a en a EF a AMLASH Case Officer. Later on I was aware of it. At that 1? time, I wasn't. 18 Mr. Baron. Later on in October, around the llth of 19 October in '63, do you recall any particular kind of request 20'| that AMLASH was asking you to make to people back in Headquarters 21 at the CIA? 22 AMLASH CAse Officer. Yes. 235 Again, he had not decided himself as to whether he would 24 defect or return to Cuba. If he decided to return to Cuba, he 410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003 25 || wanted several things. First of all, he wanted the assurances HW 350955 DBocld: 32203693 Page 26 TOP SECRET
Prnone (Area 2062) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL HY 0955 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003) - 10 11 le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° al 22 23 24 29 Docld:322703893 Page 27 TOP SECRET 59 AMLASH Case Officer. No, I didn't. Mr. Bayly. Did you think there was any subterfuge or funny business going on? AMLASH Case Officer. No. Mr. Baron. Do you Yemember then a meeting that took Place subsequently in Paris with AMLASH and FitzGerald and yourself present? : AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. Mr. Baron. And to the best of your recollection, would October 29, 1963 be the date of that meeting? AMLASH Case Officer. It was late October, yes. Mr. Baron. Did you serve as the interpreter at that meeting? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. Mr. Baron. And did FitzGerald use an alias? AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. Mr. Baron. Do you remember his alias? AMLASH Case Officer. James Clark, I believe it was. Mr. Baron. And was; bresent at that meeting? AMLASH Case Officer. No. Mr. Baron. What do you remember about the discussion at that meeting? AMLASH CAse Officer. It was a discussion in which FitzGerald assured AMLASH, gave him the assurances that he was looking for, that the United States' government was prepared TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20° el 22 235 24 £9 TOP SECRET 71 Senator Morgan. As I recall, most of them were shot. AMLASH Case Officer. No, the whole group was reduced. In fact, two of them were let go. He and amTRUNIE Pere given twenty-five years, I may be wrong. Senator Morgan. Well, they were, but I'm talking about other than this group of people who were involved with AMLASH. What I am really asking is, do you think there is any possibility that Castro knew what was going on all of the time? AMLASH Case Officer. That is a very good question, but I have nothing that I could say definitively that he did. It was something that we were always checking, that we were very sensitive to, that we had a double agent, shall we say, on our hands, and we did not have any indication at the time I was involved with the operation that he had been run into us by Castro. Senator Morgan. Does it strike you as somewhat unusual that during all of this time while you were talking about a military coup, you were providing guns and hidden hypodermic needles and et cetera that nothing ever came of it? This is the thing that disturbs me, or makes me wonder, is, you know, I don't think there is any question but what if they had really been concerned’ they could have brought about the execution of - AMLASH Case Officer. Well, Senator, the thing is, your reference to the hypodermic thing, it was shown to him, it wasn't given to him, he never took that in with him. Docld: 332033593 Page 26 Th. Dp GCEfD cT
Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 HW 509455 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 1? 18 19 20° el Re 25 24 25 TOP SECRET 86 AMLASH Case Officer. He did not specifically state this, but this could be one type, yes. Mr. Baron. Let me ask you first whether you remember a contact report written by bfter, Fret with fin New York in mid-November, 1963, in which explains what AMLASH's reaction was to this whole meeting. Do you remember such a contact report? AMLASH Case Officer. I don't remember the contact report. I remember there was some kind of word back that AMLASH was generally, again, pleased with the meeting that he had had, but I don't remember the details as to what else. The policy assurance had been given to him and he was satisfied with that. He now wanted to discuss the specific support that he thought he needed, both to initiate a coup and to protect himself. So these were the issues that were still being discussed at that time. Mr. Baron. All right. Let's move then to whatever thinking you and FitzGerald and anyone else at CIA did about the kind of support to be provided, what kind of discussions did you have following this meeting with FitzGerald or anyone else in the Cuban Task Force about the kind of support to be provided at this point? AMLASH Case Officer. Wall, he requested the high-powered rifles with the scopes and these were the center of the discussion, because ~~ well, as to whether these would be, a Bocld: 322703893 Page 29 Tr. B eEfD ey
WARD & PAUL Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 co 410 First Street, S.£., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 10 ll le 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 el Ae 25 24 25 50955 DBocld: 20° TOP SECRET 93 ask you, I would just like for you to take a look at a document that will be called Exhibit No. 8. This is excerpted in the IG Report, and it is a contact report written by| ] F that reports a meeting he had with in New York City in which (Se tEeWexplained AMLASH's reaction to the meeting with FitzGerald. (The document referred to was marked AMLASH Exhibit No. 8 for identification.) | 503003 paye 40 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6600 i) 10 Ll le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1”? 18 19 el 22 235 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003 24 25 WW 50355 DBocld:: 20° TOP SECRET 94 Mr. Rhea. I wanted Particularly to draw your attention to the sentence halfway through the paragraph which ‘says that he, meaning AMLASH, could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, parenthetically, that refers to the Cuban problem and Castro's control of the island, while, on the other hand, the U.S. government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. The first question I have about that particular document is do recall which small pieces of might be referred to in this contact report, which is admittedly secondhand, this report from @lepeaunom Boo you have any idea what small pieces of equipment might be referred to? AMLASH Case Officer. No, not specifically, except to believe that this would be the small piece of esoteric type of equipment that he would need to defend himself because this is what had been denied him, so I am only saying this from what. I know at that time. He would be unhappy with the technical support, because on 14 November, he had not been told that he would get a cache or that he would be given any kind or shown any kind of small equipment, esoteric equipment, that he though he needed. Mr. Rhea. All right. This leads us into the main event I would like to talk wit 203333 Page Fi TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 — 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 17 . 18 19 el 22 £9 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 24 £9 HW 50955 DoclIa: 20° TOP SECRET . 95 you about, and that is the decision by people within the CIA. to manufacture a pen that would be rigged with a hypodermic needle which could eject a poison into someone. We have had various testimony on what this event means, and I would like to get your impression of it. To work into it in an orderly fashion, first, when do you | first recall any discussions about producing a poison pen or any discussions of that type, to give to AMLASH? AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, I don't recall when this matter was raised. It certainly just have taken place after the 29 October meeting. Mr. Rhea. Would you date it before the November 14th meeting? AMLASH Case Officer. No, because in fact he didn't know that -~- nobody knew that this was even -~ I didn't know that this was a possibility until two or three days before the 22 November meeting. Mr. Baron. Let's go off the record. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Baron. For the record, there was no meeting on the 14th of November, that was simply the date on which fh in New York City to discuss reportedly met with foeeunh AMLASH's reaction to the Paris meeting on October the 29th. Mr. Rhea. Were you involved in the decision to produce this poison pen? 203393 Page 32 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 fav) t 10 ll 12 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 a7 18 19 el 22 235 24 4106 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 25 HW 50955 bBocld: 20° TOP SECRET 123 part referring to you? AMLASH Case Officer. No, .:jJust the part referring to me. Mr. Schwarz. With respect to the part that refers to you, I take it you have got no knowledge about Mr. MecCone's awareness of any of that material? AMLASH Case Officer. No. Mr. Schwarz. All right. AMLASH Case Officer. And to the best of my recollection, there's nothing in My part of the IG Report. Mr. Schwarz. No, there is not. You are correct. Mr. Rhea. I would like to ask you about some cables and references in the IG Report, even though you've testified you were not personally aware of any of these weapons drops, I would like for you to help us clear up some terms. (Discussion off the record.) Mr. Rhea. Are you familiar with the term AMTRUNK? AMLASH Case Officer. It was -- I recall the term AMTRUNK which was one of the cryptonyms used for the group of, a certain group of military officers or agents inside Cuba. JI can specifically recall the one of them that we talked about before was anmeone{ What it meant, I don't know. Mr. Rhea. Would the AMTRUNK operation be comparable to the AMLASH Operation but simply involve different characters? Would that be a fair way to characterize it. AMLASH Case officer. Yes, that would be a fair way to 22033893 Page 33 TOP SECRET
Phone (Area 202} 544-6000 WARD & PAUL 410 Figst Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003 HW 50955 10 ll le 13 M4 15 16 1? 18 19 20° el ge 23 24 29 TOP SECRET 125 AMLASH Case Officer. As I stated before, I don't speci- fically remember that he requested FAL's. What I vaguely. Yemember is at some time he made mention that he owned an FAL, that he had an FAL in his home in Cuba. Mr. Rhea. Would you have any reason to doubt, aside from faulty memory would you have any reason to doubt that he did request FAL's be included in the drop? AMLASH Case Officer. He could have. Mr. Rhea. You have no recollection at all? AMLASH Case Officer. No. . ia you ‘familiar with the name | Mr. Rhea. Are: LASH Case Officer. I vaguely recall that he was one of the’ people that was involved with AMLASH. Mr. Rhea. Do you recall his role? AMLASH Case Officer. No, because when I was in the operation he was not active in any way except that AMLASH had mentioned -him as one of the people he could use. Mr. Rhea. Are you familiar with a request by AMLASH for Silencers for FAL rifles? AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically that he made this request of me. Mr. Rhea. Do you recall discussing silencers with him? for any: purpose? AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I can recollect. Docld:32P03893 Page 34 TOD GEC D ET
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 ra) 10 11 le 13 WARD & PAUL, 14 15 16 1? 18 | 19 el £2 25 24 =| First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003 £0 TOP SECRET 128 you have anything there? Mr. Rhea. I do. » I want to show you a few things in there. Again, I want to get your Opindeén on some summaries in the IG Report. I will hana you Exhibit No. 9, which appears on Page 100 » of the Inspector General's Report which is an excerpt of a memorandum allegedly prepared by you and left withl| On December 10, 1964, 20° (The document referred to was marked AMLASH Exhibit No. 9 for identification.) TOP SECRET HW 50955 DBocld: 322703693 Page 35
—™, ap Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 10 il le 13 WARD & PAUL 14 15 16 1? 18 19 Al 22 235 24 410 First Street, §.€., Washington, 0.C. 20003 295 WW 50955 Doclad: 32709093 Page 36 20° SOP*SEGRETin, that in his opinion at that time was necessary to carry off a 134 coup. . Mr. Rhea. - But “knowing what he! planned on doing, you felt it was quite Proper to put him in touch with People who could enable him to do that? AMLASH Case Officer, Well, I don't think it was felt, it wasn't a matter of it being proper or improper. The objective for a military coup inside Cuba still existed. There was a group on the outside -- it was bigger than just that part of the Operation, in other words, to put him in touch with just the People who would provide him with the arms to eliminate thea leadership, because we never got down with him to talking about that specific operation. | In other words, Artime had a group on the outside that could give him general Support, any kind of support, which we would have to conclude included providing any weapons that he had requested. | Mr. Rhea. Lat me read you ore further statement in the Inspector Generals Report which I will then ask you about. ft isa parenthetical statement that is captioned as a comment, and it refers to your testimony before the Inspector General, that is at page 100 of the report -- it states that you "Ex= plained to us that what had happened was that SAS contrived to ARES and AMLASH together in such a way that neither knew the contact had been engineered by CIA. The thought was Artime