U. Mw 55072 Ne SECTION 107. an INFORMANTS AND CONFIDE . “Al SOURCES, Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribu-~ tion or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for Limited use and not intended for release to public.) Retention of copies of passed material Be b. Co ad. True copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed. Such material should be aporopriately identified by double assent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passaga, Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense, It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody. Handling money and property received by double agents Be Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for Services rendered to Bureau. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute state- ment describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name, Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Menual of Rules and Regulations, Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing recollection in event testimony is later necessary. UPILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING 1. Use of students Be 2. Guar Be Doold: 32969529 Page Liss Students under age of [18]years are not to be developed as security informants, [potential security informants, Jor other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau. . Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, . individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed writ- ten statement for field file setting forth that this individvel has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. rterly letters . On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sources (including panel sources), Include following: 1 Specific productivity 2 Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus - - (3) Frequency of contact ° Quarterly letters on all racial and security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "Utilization of ‘Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning.” Include following in cover letter: {1} Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at each educational institution affected (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants : and sources . 24 : 9-30-70 oo : . ‘ . | cpm 2 9K ERT RO ROIS SAE IRY HEAT ENOU E030 Wf REY SIOUEN GN UIT HORT Mend ReNRrN NY Bee ERVINTD RORTUPYA Ew TOTITE 1854108
LO7T-U SECTION 107. . INFORMANTS AND conrrpen@ SOURCES. b. Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribu- tion or sale to public, (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for limited use and not intended for release to public.) ( 4, Retention of copies of passed material a. frue copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or material related to national defense which is passed, b. Such material should be appropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage. c. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which is considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense. ad. Jt is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody. . 5. Handling money and property received by double agents - a, Double agents must turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence - operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely. separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau. : be. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute state- ment describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name. “ : . Ge. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations. ad. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double > agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing. recollection in event testimony is later necessary. ae ™“. U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING “ 1. Use of students . a. Students under age of 18 years ara not to be developed as security “Anformants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstencss, furnish complete justification to Bureau. be. Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individuel should be tactfully requested to execute 2 brief signed writ- ten statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. 2. Quarterly Letters a. On January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1, submit quarterly . 7 letters on each student and teacher authorized by Bureau for contact as security informant, potential security informant, or other sourcas (including panel sources), Include following: 1 Specific productivity 2 Specific information furnished not otherwise available from public source material or other office sources off campus (3) Frequency of contact { b. Quarterly letters on allfextremistJand security informants or sources should be jointly transmitted to Bureau by cover letter captioned "utilization of Informants and Sources at Institutions of Learning." Include following in cover letter: (1) Number of informants, potential informants, and other sources active and under development at cach educational institution affected (2) An overall analysis of coverage afforded by campus informants and sources : fn 24 NW S072 Doold: 32989525 Page 1194. 9-13-71 . . coppers SOBA PARA eb eon ATE CLE PSO INCASE t's eet 19 TO tnd GAM acevo hE Red ETUC AORAL Nene rebeLAc YP Phba Hm aRRiae IEA cele e trusts et tee Thom beh o
LO7T-U U. SECTION 1 © SECURITY INFORMANTS AND com yet SOURCES, Pamphlets, brochures, etc., prepared by private company for distribu-~ ‘tion or sale to public. (This does not include highly technical pamphlets, even if unclassified, which are prepared for Limited use - C and not intended for release to public.) Retention of copies of passed material as b. Co “ae frue copies should be retained by office of origin of any documents or’ material related to national defense which is passed. Such material should be apvropriately identified by double agent. Bureau Agents should not place identifying data on such material but should preserve any notes made by them in connection with its passage. Similar action should be taken regarding material which is passed which 4s considered evidentiary although not clearly related to national defense, It is not necessary to retain copies of buildup material obviously not evidentiary in nature where copies can be obtained at later date from Government agency or private concern having custody. Handling money and property received by double agents Qe Double agents must. turn over to Bureau any money or property received from their principals in connection with double agent intelligence ‘ operation. This should be made clear to double agent at inception of operation (consider obtaining signed statement to-this effect). Exceptions must be specifically approved by Bureau. Entirely separate arrangements must be made for payments to double agents for services rendered to Bureau. Any money or property received by double agent from his principal represents possible evidence and double agent should execute state- ment describing money received by type of currency, denomination, series of issue, and serial number and appropriately describing any other property received. Statement should be signed by double agent's code name. Money or property received from double agents should be retained as evidence in accordance with section 3, part II, Manual of Rules and Regulations. Bureau Agents receiving such money or property from double agents should make independent records for retention for purposes of refreshing { recollection in event testimony is later necessary. ‘ UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING Use of students 1. 2. Qe Students under age of ‘18 years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau, Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed writ- ten statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. [Deleted] 24 . . . 3-13-72 , . . HW 55072 Docld:32989529. Page 1195 , ote ONS
a4 \ > : ") frovu-v SECTION 107. [IN.Q@MAL SECURITY INFORMANTS AND COMM™DENTIAL SOURCES; [AND"FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSE®® | 1. Use of students ae Students under age of 18-.years are not to be developed as security informants, potential security informants, or other types of security sources in other than highly unusual circumstances. Under such circumstances, furnish complete justification to Bureau. be Upon initial contact with prospective student informant or source, individual should be tactfully requested to execute a brief signed written statement for field file setting forth that this individual has voluntarily come forward to furnish information to FBI because of his concern over individuals or groups that may be inimical to interests of U. S. Government and that he understands FBI has no interest in legitimate institution or campus activities. 2e Deleted 3. Responsibility for well-planned coverage Each office must have continuous and well-planned program to obtain necessary coverage at institutions of learning so that Bureau can fulfill . its obligations. Care with which this must be done in no way lessens responsibility of each field office to have proper coverage. U. UTILIZATION OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES AT INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING 2’ Ve CLASSIFICATION - 134 24 10-15-74 NW 35072 Doold: 3259595259 Page 1196
& SECTION 107. Wea ssciae INFORMANTS AND , ae SOURCES; 107W AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | PART II | NSECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" [We FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI) ASSETS This subsection deals with the development and operation of human assets, a field referred to as Human Intelligence or HUMINT. FCI assets are to be handled exclusively under this subsection, except for the administra~ tive instructions pertaining to informant indices, and monthly statistical letters, set out in Part I; such exceptions are noted herein. 1. Definitions FCI assets fall into two categories: informative assets and operational assets. . ae Informative assets (IA) Individuals in position to furnish continuing information relative to the location, overt activities, and personalities of the targets . of FBI investigations, @-g., doorman, garage attendant, neighbor, tradesman, rental agent, building superintendent, fellow employee, social contact, business contact, banker, ethnic community source, etc; or individuals who have left or openly defected from a foreign country and can furnish information of intelligence value. An IA is not actively involved in an intelligence operation as such; should he become so involved he then could become an OA. be Operational assets (OA) Individual actively involved in intelligence operations. This category includes but is not limited to the following individuals: Defector-in-place: A foreign official who overtly continues to work for his government and covertly provides information to us of intelligence value. A defector-in-place will in most instances be connected with a foreign government's intelligence service; Double agent: An OA who is cooperating with a foreign intel- ligence service on our behalf and under our control; sheen ete operon yyy tt ‘Asset under development: Individuals selected for their apparent attractiveness to foreign intelligence services whom we attempt to put in contact with such services for operational exploitation, sometimes known as a "dangle operation"; or individuals already in contact with a foreign intelligence service who have an immediate potential for development into double agents. Adoption of the generic term OA does not preclude use of the specific terms, eeg.-, double agent, where applicable, in official communications. ‘ 2e Objectives of OA ae Penetration Penetration of legal and illegal networks, identification of intelligence personnel and targets; collection of information regarding methods of operations; collection of positive intelligence. OE ene oe * ) "SECRET ~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 25 10-15-74 NW 35072 Doold: 329595259 Page 1197 ; a
REIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASS por SECTION 107. LEN AL JSECURITY INFORMANTS AND CO yes SOURCES ; NW 35072 “SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" be Control ~of information foreign intelligence services obtain; ~of recruitment, by creating Bureau-controlled OAs; ~-of foreign operations, by keeping foreign intelligence services occupied handling our OAs. ce Collection of evidence for prosecution d. Deception (Disinformation) Passing inaccurate or accurate. information designed to cause foreign intelligence services to draw conclusions or initiate action to their disadvantage and/or to U. S. advantage. e. Neutralization: to provide basis for persona non grata (PNG) action, exclusion, arrest or other disruptive action. f. Collection by OA of personality characteristics data on foreign officials for purpose of defection analysis. 3. Individuals to be considered as OAs ae Foreign officials in a position to furnish information of intel- ligence value. An intelligence officer (IO) is, of course, the most valuable OA. An official who is not an I0, while of lesser value, is stili a highly desirable OA because of the positive intelligence and information on the personalities and activities of other officials that he can provide. be Agents of foreign intelligence services. When thése individuals are identified, and the prospect and value of recruiting them outweighs any prosecutive potential, they should be seriously considered for development as OAs. ce Contacts of foreign officials. When contacts of foreign officials are identified as being of interest to a foreign intelligence service, we should attempt to enlist their cooperation and direct them against that intelligence service. d. Individuals who are particularly attractive to a foreign intel- ligence service. Our objective is to determine the specific interests of foreign intelligence services or individual IOs, and to then recruit asset(s) who would appear to that service or IO to satisfy their needs. Such assets must have potential for operation within a reasonably expected period of time. ee Former assets who currently offer potential for exploitation. 4. Restrictions FBIHQ authority is required prior to conducting detailed background investigation of any of the following individuals as an FCI asset, whether JA or OA. Of course, some investigation must initially be conducted, without disclosing our interest, to sufficiently identify the individual and generally assess his potential, so that FBIHQ can conduct a meaningful indices search and make an intelligent evaluation of the risks versus value involved. ae Individual under 21 years of age b. Official or employee of the United Nations or other public inter- national organizations of a governmental or quasi~governmental nature ce Official or employee of foreign diplomatic establishment or government 9 "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 26 10~15=74 Doold: 325895259 Page 1198 tmp tne,
SECTION 107. taN AL |SECURITY INFORMANTS AND coM@orvrrar SOURCES; 107W AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS } y ° "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" de Faculty member of an institution of learning ee Labor leader ; f. Federal, state, or local government official ; - ge News media employee he Prominent entertainment figure ie Prominent religious figure je Member of the U. S. Military . ke Ue. S. Government employee After FBIHQ authority to conduct detailed background investigation has been received, and investigation completed, FBIHQ authority is also required to conduct initial interview of the above individuals, whether IA or OA. . 5 Development of U. S. Military or other U. S. Government Personnel Whenever it becomes desirable to develop a member of the U. S. Military or an employee of another Government agency as an FCI asset, FBIHQ notifies the respective military service or agency of our interest. To facilitate this notification the office desiring to develop such an individual should submit to FBIHQ 5 copies of an LHM setting out: ae Proposed asset's name, rank or position, and current place of assignment. be Area of FBI interest in the asset, in general, and the foreign intelligence service, and official, if known, against which it is anticipated asset will be directed. Ce Extent of anticipated coverage to be provided by the asset, iee., describe the services he wiil provide. - d. The last paragraph of this LHM should read: ) "It is requested that no further dissemination of the foregoing be made without prior reference to FBI Headquarters. If you agree with our contemplated use of the above individual, please return a copy of this memorandum with your acknowledgement." ee Members of the military: estimated time period within which you wish to utilize the asset; desirability that the asset remain in his current area of assignment for a specified period of time. Upon receipt of clearance from the military, FBIHQ will select code name for future use in identifying the asset. This code name will be furnished to military intelligence component at headquarters level and to FBI field divisions. Every 6 months thereafter, as long as the FBI has continuing operational interest in the asset, an LHM captioned with code name should be transmitted to FBIHQ, by routing slip captioned with informant's symbol number. The LHM is to contain a statement that the asset continues to be of operational use to the FBI, and a statement detailing any ; difficulties encountered in control or direction of the asset or a statement that no such difficulties exist. NOTE: Generally, the U. S. Armed Forces may not be utilized to enforce the civilian criminal law; however, they may be utilized for foreign counterintelligence purposes. In foreign counterintel- ligence investigations in which there is a possibility of criminal prosecution, use of military personnel as assets might jeopardize successful prosecution, and all such cases must be discussed in detail with FBIHQ prior to utilization of such military assets. ‘ "SECRET ~- NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 27 10-15=74 NW 35072 Doold: 3259895259 Page 1199 .
pom" SECTION 107. (MPa issomars INFORMANTS AND Mo svrtan SOURCES ; 8. 9. ao rs rere ooo AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" UFR-AcE 6 (1) (B) Developmen The development of assets depends on the individual circumstances of each Situation. No rigid procedural steps or contact schedules can be imposed which will uniformly apply to all cases; however, the development should proceed with the objective of obtaining valuable results as quickly as feasible, consistent with maintaining the asset's security, credibility, and confidence, and with developing the asset's potential to its fullest. Opening of asset files Open a 134 file for all individuals at the time they are first con- sidered for development as assets. This file should consist of two parts: a main file which will contain all identifying data, results of back- ground investigation, personal status data, and administrative data; and a subfile which will contain at least one copy of all information provided by asset. The asset is not to be identified, beyond his symbol number, in subfile. Maintain files of all active assets as pending. Utilize FD-238 as unserialized top document in main file. Assignment and tickler cards must not reflect name of asset; use symbol and/or file number. Maintenance of FCI asset files and indices Maintain all FCI asset files, pending and closed, under lock and key under personal supervision of SAC, ASAC, or employee designated by SAC. Files of FCI assets will be included in calculation of delinquencies in monthly administrative report. FCI asset indices will be maintained according to the administrative instructions set out under section 107 J, part I, of this manual. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 28 10-15~74 NW 55072 Doold: 32989529 Page i200
a SECTION 107. ping a at JonCURITY INFORMANTS AND COh ENTIAL SOURCES; 107W REIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSES®| °) “SECRET ~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 10. Symbol numbers . Assign a symbol number to all individuals when first considered for development as asset. The symbol number is to consist of two-letter prefix identifying the office, a numerical sequence number (which will never be reassigned to another asset or informant), and suffix which describes the type of asset, eege, NY 1001~OA (or IA). The numerical sequence is to be the same as that used for all other informants, e.g-, potential security informant, security informant, criminal informant, etc. The suffix may change if the nature of the information provided changes, e.ge, from IA to OA. Submit identity of asset and symbol number assigned to FBIHQ via coded. "Nitel"; this is the only communication ever in which both asset's true name and symbol number are to appear together. Assets must not be informed . of their symbol numbers. 11. Captions In administrative communications dealing solely with asset, indicate in caption the character and the country concerning which the asset is reporting, e.ge, NY 1001-OA, IS-R (Russia). 12. Background inquiries and interviews ae Informative asset Based on the type of information the IA can provide, the nature and extent of contact with him, and the IA's relationship with the target: (1) Conduct sufficient background investigation to satisfy the SAC as to the IAts stability, suitability, reliability, and potential. For example, a more detailed background investi- gation is required for a social or business contact than for ,) a doorman or building superintendent. A minimal background wee epee pnp ery raps eenerenereereepeerers ese investigation should include appropriate police and field offices! indices checks. (2) Request search of FBIHQ indices. . (3) Check NCIC. (4) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as IA on FD-165. Also utilize FD-165 to place stop. (5) Outside of the restrictions set out in 4. above, interview IA prospect on SAC authority. be Operational asset When an individual appears to have OA potential conduct the fol- lowing background investigation commensurate with OA's security: (i) Obtain pertinent data on OA's personal history (date and place of birth, nationality and citizénship, social security number or other identifying numbers, family status, names of immediate family, past and present residences, employments, etc), and other data such as physical description, patriotism, heaith, reliability, stability, integrity, reputation, and business connections. (2) Check appropriate police and field offices! indices. (3) Request search of FBIHQ indices. (4) Check NCIC. seekers} ep renreentepeye eer seterewe muse sant eri earn nen ogy SARE TTReVENEeTT ES ot Tite ep apeeree Belpy tee mperal Wyet manvewernanee—eers undrey pus tay sons wre Some fom, 4) . ; "SECRET — NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 29 10-15-74 MW 55072 Doeld:32959529 Page 1201
| - > ~ fo" SECTION 107. (rx Isecunrzy INFORMANTS AND CONQMENTIAL SOURCES; NW 35072 13. 14. 15. AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | ct "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" (5) Submit FD-165 for search of FBIHQ identification records; make no reference to individual as OA on FD-165; and also utilize FD-165 to place stop. (6) If applicable, check armed services records, both at Military Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri, and at Defense Central Index of Investigations, Ft. Holabird, Maryland. (7) Canvass logical sources, commensurate with OA's security. (8) Upon completion of above investigation submit results to” FBIHQ via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel,'" and interview UACB. ce All leads to auxiliary offices must be sent and replied to, via coded teletype, preferably "Nitel," under caption utilizing asset's true name, followed by "IS-(country).'' Do not set out asset's symbol number. Do not send copies of such leads of IAs to FBIHQ. Leads must be covered within 45 days; office of origin notify auxiliary offices of this time limit when setting out leads. Authority to operate assets IAs are approved and operated on SAC authority. Inform FBIHQ via coded "Nitel" when SAC approval given, and type of information IA can providee OAs are approved and operated on FBIHQ authority. After interview of OA submit results of interview via coded "Nitel" requesting FBIHQ approval to operatee Detail OA'ts potential and your contemplated use of OA. In exceptional cases, when the resuits of the interview and details of the OAts potential and contemplated use are voluminous, the practi- cality of "Nitel" and the relative security of the mails should be balanced against the sensitivity of the information and the security of the asset. Where the former factors prevail, submit summary by tNitel" and full results and details by letter or airtel. Contact with assets Contact should be maintained commensurate with maximum productivity, security, and development of asset's further potential. If an asset has not been contacted for a period of 45 days, a memorandum. to the SAC must be directed to the asset's main file stating the reason(s) why no contact was made. Do not disclose to asset any information not essential to his operation. Confidentiality of relationship Emphasize to all assets that the effectiveness of the FBI's investi- gation, and in some instances his own personal security, depend on both sides maintaining the confidentiality of the relationship. If the asset feels he must disclose this relationship to another, e.g., wife, parent, employer, etc., or circumstances develop in which asset requests FBI to disclose the relationship to another, e.g., to an employer threatening dismissal of asset because of his affiliation with certain individuals or groups, notify FBIHQ with recommendation to disclose relationship and continue under these conditions or to terminate relationship with or without disclosing relationship, and reasons for recommendation. “SECRET ~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 30 10-15-74 Doold: 325895259 Page i202 t [ p zg § 5 f i ‘ i i a CRT MT TPE A RPO RE YER BIT SITET OE PIN eines MODERN TA Pe OT 2 SI a EY TID IO EY. ET CTE oP P IN IPI, MTT eC TREN 9g PTT,
~ ! SECTION 107. [EN AL]SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CON@MBDENTIAL SOURCES; 107W AND“FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSEtS | » . "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 16. Reliability of assets Reliability of all assets must be constantly checked. If any doubt exists concerning asset, give consideration to use of various inves~ tigative techniques to insure asset is completely reliable and is furnishing accurate information. 17. Assignment of pseudonyms In sensitive cases, where necessary; if asset will sign reports or receipts; or if asset is an OA receiving operational funds from a foreign intelligence service or payment from the U. S. which requires bookkeeping records, assign pseudonym for these purposes. 18. Recording of information received from asset When recording information from any asset in a communication prepared for dissemination, characterize the asset either as one "with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability," or as one “who has furnished reliable information in the past." ae Oral information ; (1) Information pertaining to asset's personal status is recorded in 134 main file, e.g., marital difficulties, change of employment, change of residence. (2) Information pertaining to operational administrative matters is recorded in asset's 134 subfile. When this data, e.g, , location of meet sites, times of meets, any data which tends to identify asset, is furnished to EBIHQ, it should not be included in communications prepared for dissemination, but in cover pagese When the asset is a member of the military, submit, in addition to the communication for dissemination described immediately above, a communication for dissemination : containing all operational administrative details for the information of the asset's service. (3) Information of intelligence value should be submitted to FBIHQ via appropriate communication, and, if of interest to other U. S. agencies or friendly foreign services, should be sub- mitted to FBIHQ in form suitable for dissemination. (4) Execute and maintain form FD-209 in asset's main file concern- ing contacts with asset. If contacts produced information of intelligence value, record only date of contacts; if negative, record as such. be. Written information (1) Written information prepared by asset, or by FBI SA for signature of asset, pertaining to operational activities (not a written report passed by asset to his principal) must be dated at the top of page one and signed at the bottom of each numbered page by the asset using his pseudonym. This material may be maintained as an attachment to a serialized memorandum in the asset's subfile (punched holes are allowed), or in a la section of the asset's 134 subfile. (2) Information received in this manner should be devoid of FBI ; identification, block or time stamps, serialization number or other administrative markings. (3) Only the original need be maintained; asset must not Keep a copy. . "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" Nv 31 10-15-74 seaseepmusnnmeanserinnett oP Shia! in? asus te enum rose teeta se ed SERA OY 18 USCA IAN EVAR TOY ISU Ne SO Se NW 35072 Dooid: 32989525 Page i203 m, ‘
YY Lorw SECTION 107. [1 Qe Isecunscy INFORMANTS AND CON@@MENTIAL SOURCES; AND SRREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSES “SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" +X (4) Any corrections, changes, erasures, additions, or deletions on original must be identified by asset using his pseudonym initials beside it. (5) Handling FBI SA must not make any changes on the original or permit his name to be recorded therein. (6) Written information pertaining to operational activities should not include administrative matters pertaining to . asset's personal status. (7) Handle recording of written information and contact with asset in same manner as detailed under recording of oral information. 19. Channelization of information of intelligence value received from the’ asset Important factor in channelizing information of intelligence value received from the asset to substantive case files is the security of the asset. Limit information in communication sent to substantive file to only that necessary for that ‘case; i.ee., do not send one comprehensive communication to several substantive files if to do so might compromise source or other individual. (Be aware that some of our documents are being made available in response to subpoenas, and the court is some- times not allowing excision of material not pertinent to case in question. Consequently, other individuals or operations can be "blown" by revealing one such comprehensive memo. ). ae Extract information of value received from asset and channelize to substantive case files either inter- or intra-office by separate communications under substantive case captions. be A copy of all channelizing communications must be maintained in an asset's subfile. 20. Passage of documents, written report or oral information, to hostile foreign intelligence Type of information to be passed depends on circumstances of particular operation, interests of involved foreign intelligence service, the credible access of the OA and the time element involved. Great care should be given to the selection of information to be passed to insure the operation accrues to the overall benefit of the U. S. ae Authority for passage FBIHQ authority required for passage of all classified information and unclassified information prepared for limited use by concerned Federal and local governments, not intended for public consumption. Above FBIHQ authority applies to passage of documents , written reports, and oral information. ‘ SAC authority required for passage of material prepared by commer- cial concerns, Federal, and local governments for public distribution. Examples are: newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets and brochures, photographs, background information on companies and organizations. If there is any doubt that material selected to be passed is not in the best interest of the U. S., submit material to FBIHQ for clearance; e«g., see Example (1) following. | et eens eee ee eee et ee | cree [ ed sete nee meet eee ee | ON a gy ay CE a an "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" ) 32 10-15~74 NW 55072 Doocld: 32989525 Page i204. \
SECTION 107. [rw Qa Jszcuntry INFORMANTS AND CO@@BDENTIAL SOURCES; 107W AND“FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSES | 5 "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" be Clearance requirements for information to be passed under FBIHQ authority Submit original and 9 copies of LHM to FBIHQ bearing appropriate classification via cover communication with appropriate caption. Leave LHM uncaptioned; FBIHQ will insert code name caption. The first paragraph of the LHM should read: ‘It is requested that clearance be granted for passage in this operation of the following items to a representative of (name of foreign intelligence service)" If the information to be passed is a document, set forth an adequate description of it in the LHM. Examples: . (1) Article entitled "Moon Rockets," prepared by physicist John Doe, January, 1972, issue of " y' publication of American Rocket Society. (2) Air Force Training Manual captioned " 3'' dated July, 1972, classified "Secret." In addition, also submit to FBIHQ, if possible, a true copy of document for review which will be returned after clearance by FBIHQ is obtained. If the information to be passed is a writteh report prepared by OA, set forth report verbatim in the LHM. verbatim in the LHM. If more than one item of information in any form is to be passed, number each item in the LHM. The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the sentence: "The above data should not be further disseminated.'" Upon receipt of LHM, FBIHQ will submit to appropriate authorities and request clearance. Reply will be promptly furnished to field. ce. Notification to FBIHQ of passage of document, written report, or oral information which required clearance After passage, submit original and 9 copies of uncaptioned LHM bearing appropriate classification.via cover communication with appropriate caption. FBIHQ will insert code name caption. In LHM refer to LHM which requested clearance. LHM should merely state, "On (date) our source transmitted the information detailed in referenced memorandum to (name of foreign intelligence service) ." If referenced memorandum detailed more than one item, do not list the items unless one or more was not passed. In such an instance list only those items that were passed. The last paragraph of the LHM should contain the following sentence, "The above data should not be further disseminated." L L t ' If the information to be passed is oral, set forth oral information NSECRET = NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" 33 10-15-74 NW S5072 Doold: 32989529 Page 1205 4 ” oA aR REIT EPIC HERD AIEEE EPO MET DR TTNE TIUOE RIG CITED PHT LUE HOMIES St LORY PATA APP CaN RONDE EOE TED A OE F REL ERS RETR LR PETE RD ROTTS URE OF HPV TDOAPT IRR PET ETE TN AONE ITT RM PAWN EIERE UN TEOMA ET SY 8.31 RTE WET DT DSS 2 PERE MACON AIRE TTR! EA) UIE NOMI Pet PENT UN TT OFT ET
\ “ . {to7W SECTION 107. (rors securer INFORMANTS AND co nvrrar SOURCES ; AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ASSETS | “SECRET ~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" Y) d. Administrative handling of documents, written reports, and oral information selected for passage (1) Documents and written reports Field offices should retain a copy of document or written report passed which would be identified by OA as a true copy of item passed by him. No other marks, identifying data, staple or punch holes should be placed on field office copy. When submitting document or written report to FBIHQ, identify it, in cover communication, as the actual item which will be passed or a copy. To insure that the actual document to be passed -is not con= taminated by fingerprints of FBI personnel, maintain in plastic envelope when being handled in field office or when submitted to FBIHQ. Documents obtained by FBIHQ or other field offices from com- mercial concerns or other government agencies which will be passed will be handled in similar fashion. | If copy of document is maintained on permanent basis by preparing concern or agency and available at a later date, no need exists to submit copy to FBIHQ or to maintain in % field office file. If copy not maintained on permanent basis, a copy should be retained in field office file. (2) Oral information Oral information passed must be recorded in a signed statement ) or FD-302. Purpose for preserving documents and written reports is for evidence in event of prosecution, persona non grata action, expulsion, etc. 21. Oral information received from debriefing asset Oral information received upon debriefing an asset (i.e., not necessarily pertaining to information passed) must be recorded in a signed statement or FD-302. , 22. Coverage of OA meets with foreign intelligence officer, co-opted worker, or agent. Coverage of these meets is required except when prohibited by security or other overriding factors. . ae To cross-check the OA. We must be as certain as possible that the OA is reporting details of his meets accurately. be To verify identification of principal or agent and to gather infor- mation about modus operandi. ce Consider use of photography and other technological surveillance techniques to provide data for improving future CI operations or improving chances for success of official actions, eeg., prosecution, . persona non grata action. Be aware that these meets are often covered by the principal's intel- ligence service using photography, radio intercepts, and possible electronic surveillance. "SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION" +) _ 34 10-15-74 MW 55072 Doold: 32809529 Page 1206 : . \