JFK Assassination System . Identification Form Agency Information Date: 4/27/201 AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: — 180-10147-10191 RECORD SERIES: CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION AGENCY FILENUMBER: 61-10-05 Document Information ORIGINATOR: HSCA FROM: TO: TITLE: STAFF REPORT ON THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIA-SPONSORED ASSASSINATION CONSPIRACIES AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO DATE: 03/12/1979 PAGES: 101 SUBJECTS : Released under the John F. ANTIL-CASTRO ACTIVITIES Silisceion act of 1s82 {44 ORGANIZED CRIME Esce0 pace: oc-os-z017 CIA, FILES CIA, CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT CLASSIFICATION: — Unclassified RESTRICTIONS:  1A;1B CURRENT STATUS: — Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/07/1995 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 34 n¥'53080 Docld: 32273546 Page 1 i
| / STAFF REPORT Or ae | | ; BERET — fENOUATION «= AND aeme Lic ATIOAS AGHINS T -FIDEL CASTRO > Introduction The attempt of the United States government to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro as well “as other foreign leaders during the turbulent decade. of the 1960s shocked and disgusted the American | citizen. When sources disclosed that the Central . Intelligence Agency (hereinafter "CIA") intentionally - solicited and received the assistance of various ‘members of organized crime, a Cosa Nostra, in the : Leng 8) sere OT RR ~ furtherance of such pléts, more o outrage prevailed. Civilized society simply did. not and does not condone - “ such acts. asa legitimate instrument of foreign policy... There is no excuse; no rationalization. | The effect and influence of these actions did not ‘stop, however, with invoking the disdain of the American public and world. These assassination: attempts gave birth to ‘the haunting theory that. Fidel Castro orchestrated the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in defensive retaliation for the plots on his life. _ RIFF AW 53080, _Docld: 32273546 — Page 2 SOUS TS EOIN TSE BIT ARLEN IIE TTR LIT, ESE ON EIEN IOP ELIT AED EEE NURSERIES ST APR ARN RUT PHO
In its Final Report published in April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental . Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (hereinafter "SSC") responded to this theory. In this Report, the SSC focused on two operations . of the CIA which may have provoked Castro into retaliation. First, the SSC documented the joint effort of the CIA and Organized Crime to eliminate Castro, Second, “the SSC examined the nature. and extent of the CIA AMLASH operation. The Ssc concluded its analysis ‘with the statement that "/€/he Committee “believes the investigation should continue in certain areas, and for that ern does not reach any final ‘conclusions. "+ ae This analysis isan attempt to make such conclusions. It is not the purpose of the remainder eve Ce of this material to eles review tae detailg of the CIA-Mafia plots: or of the AMLASH operation, to | resolve all of the conflicting viewpoints of the | .SSC and the CIA in regard ‘to the importance of ‘the - Various operations, or to subject anyone to moral. tongue-lashing. 2 Instead, this material first. seeks” HW 53080 DoclId:32273546 Page 3
to present a comprehensive review of the CIA -“ operation AMLASH and of the involvement or potential involvement of organized crime in the CIA operations against Castro during 1960- 1963. From this review _ certain OES and conclusions are ‘then drawn concerning the nature, scope, and ramifications of these operations. | | 7 If. BACKGROUND MATERIAL ~ RELEVANT SUMMARY . A. CIA-Mafia Plots : | The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to - assassinate Castro is ‘placed by the 1967 Report of the | Inspector General as occurring during a conversation | between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, 3 ' and the Director, of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards. These plots extended £romj1960° until early 1963 and can be divided into two stages.4 The first stage A oe occurred from August, 1960 until april, 1961, arid aoe ots . can best be termed as Phase I or theres Bay of Pigs period. From April, 1961 until Me 1961 1 the ¢ CIA takes the position that the plots © were dormant. ‘HW 53080 DocId:32273546 ‘Page 4 eee
ef - in late 1961 the CIA decided to renew the CIA-Mafia plots, then” creating Phase II, and ~ - kept ‘them active until late 1962 or early. 1963. During the initial stages of: Phase I, Edwards - assigned the specific task of locating the proper persons to assassinate Castro to } m" @eSqnne Ll, who wae Chief of the Operational Support ; 8. Division Aa the office of Security. Both men | Operten| oput-cle | agreed thee C=SoEner] shecld contact Robert A. Maheu, whom the CIA had previously used in several covert operations, to recruit the necessary personnel. 9 oF - 10 Maheu subsequently contacted Roselli, who we a in turn CoE RS 0 persons initially. know wn: to - he One 2 pga Chie ay oe, VES CLeemErL says” : Conners as "Sam Gola" and "Joe. he, along with Maheu, later discovered the true identities of these persons to -be Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, “respectively. ¥ oe a oe ™ | After meeting several times in Miami and deciding “upon poison pills as the method of assassination, the 1967 IG Report Sonttends that. trafficante made the arrangements for the assassination of Castro with one. of his contacts inside Cuba on one of the trips . seater a mcenaeryentn ame nar te
13 he allegedly made to Havana, Cuba. This contact was Case Oetee— 2. Cuban official who held a position close to Castro. 14. The 1967 Ic Report then states that ‘Roselli ‘Passed the pills to Tr afficante. 15 Roselli subsequently told oO! Connell that the pills were delivered ton eeae Ce sou in Cuba. 16 eae. apparently retained the pills for a few weeks and then returned them since he was. unable to fulfill any pian? Qibanvas no / longer ina position to kill Castro because he had ‘lost his Cuban post.18 Ae bbw alten) With @assinz unable to perform, the S dicate pte ne oe looked elsewhere. Roselli next told Ome = sometime during early 1961, that Trafficante knew a man prominent in ‘the Cuban exile movement who could accomplish the job, 19 : Vicasesmenaymiinansedion agter meee ving approval, Trefficante Ye Cobra Ke Oy br approached Verora woke assassinating Castro and reported that Vemonce was rece eer , The 1967 IG > per R»)) pt da Coumactled in iterinaced pills ss ele eat Report states that which eventually reads 4
_aW_53080 DoclId: 322735546 document anyaattempt to axes the services of This activity concluded the .pre-Bay.of Pigs phase of the plots. The 1967 IGR does not ACL cial “% administer ‘the pills: to ‘Castro. The 1967 IGR relates that after a period 22 - ce of apparent dormancy, Bissell directed William . Harve in a roximatel November ae 1961 to 7 v PP v r) Seip fe Cheek. 2398 © perv ae reactivate the CIA-Mafia plots. , @s@enuedal thectrore 24 |: "introduced Harvey to Roselli. oo During this phase, the CIA decided against using Giancana or Trafficante; instead, a person. referred to as (MEE o” entered the _ plot as ‘the person who would help provide Castro 25 contacts. © In addition, the plots still utilized A eile CBter Even though ‘the plots no , longer included Trafficante and Giancana, the CIA admi ted that 4 Roselli most likely kept them informed... @He™Cra ~ een . Cd _ eetred~ia The 1967 IGR that "/i/t would be naive '. to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of | informing higher- ups in the syndicate that he was working in a | territory considered to be the: private “settled a Gu phentsl wowely Page 7T
HW 53080 4 27 domain of someone else in the syndicate, noe In June of 1962 Roselli reported. to! Harvey Va Cleve ey | lester that Verora dispatched a three-man team: into Cuba with the general assignment of recruiting others to kill Castro, and, if the opportunity arose, to . 28 kill him themsleves, maybe through the use of pills. In September of 1962, Roselli reported to Harvey in Miami that the "medicine" was reported in piace, filet that the three-man team was safe, and that was prepared to dispatch another three- -man team 7 29 to” infiltrate Castro's bodyguard. ' In December, 1962, Roselli and Harvey agreed that not much seemed to. be occurring and by February, 1963, Harvey terminated S; oe 30 Lo the plets. B. The Las Vegas Wiretap Incident — SO ee eee Ne etap she1dent ' The (1967 IGR also mentioned an event that occurred during Phase I. of the CIA- -Mafia plots which resulted® in the first dissemination of the details of the plot to persons other than the ones involved - in the operation. On October 31, 1960, ‘Las Vegas DocId: 32273546 police arrested Arthur J. Balletti, an employee (of a Florida investigator named Edward DuBois, for placing Page 6 m afer ane css HEATON, AA RETIN 5 9 aR ae Tra LEI Bre rn UR PUM A AMT ITLES SETI OE NATE CAE STN APD FARM eT EIR IE ETRY REAENA ROE ESO Oe ECLA oe tater
oe 31 an electronic bug in a hotel room in Las Vegas. Subsequent investigation determined that Robert A. Maheu authorized the surveillance and possibly the wiretap of the subject involved and that naneGrobabl> acted on behalf of Giancana and the CIA. °2 | ~The violation of the wiretap statuteplaced the case under federal jurisdiction and the FBI soon. - began an investigation. - In the course of this. “investigation, Maheu informed the FBI that he instituted the surveillance on behalf of CIA efforts to obtain Cuban intelligence through the hood Lum element, including Giancana. In its efforts to _ prevent the prosecution of ‘Balletti, Maheu, and an unidentified individual known as J. We Harrison, the CIA eventually told the Justice Department the details heerassors — . of Phase I of the CIA-Mafia plots to Kill Castros can <a Make wecuradely Seba can best be related through the following HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 9
memorandum from J. Bagar. Hoover to Attorney 34 '. General Ramsey Clark /quoted in part7: Blank letterhead memorandum _. 3-6-67 TO: Attorney General . FROM: Director, FBI - TOP SECRET) ‘Attorney General Robert Kennedy/ indicated that a few days prior to /5-9-62/7 he had been advised by the CIA that Robert A. Maheu had been hired by the CIA to approach Sam Giancana with a proposition of paying $150,000. to hire gunmen to go into Cuba and kill Castro. He. further stated CIA admitted having assisted Maheu -in making the "bugging" installation in Las Vegas which uncovered this clandestine operation and for: this reason CIA could not afford ‘to have any action. taken against Giancana or Maheu. Mr. Kennedy stated that upon learning CIA had not cleared its action in hiring Maheu and Giancana with the Department of , Justice, he issued orders that the CIA should never again take such steps without first checking with the Department of Justice. Mr. Kennedy further advised that because of this matter it would be very difficult to initiate any prosecution against Giancana, as Giancana could immediately bring out the fact the United. States Government had approached him to arrange for thé. assasSination of Castro. He stated the same was true concerning any action we might take against Maheu for any violation in which he might become involved. . oO ‘inci den f In summary, the Las Vegas wiretap Reece damn os ol forced. the) -CIA to, acknowledge the existence of the. _CIA- Mafia plots to non-CIA government officials REVIEWED BY. FBIJFK TASK FORCE on 4 Sep 94 GuB _ RARELEASE IN FULL 1 RELEASE IN PART C1) TOTAL DENIAL“ =~ HW 53080 -DocId:32273546 Page 10__
HW 53080 Docld: 32273546 Page ii. “and provided the first occasion for participants to manipulate the operation to prevent prosecution. C. Robert Maheu and the Long Committee The next major event related to the CIA- Mafia plots occurred in 1966 when Maheu used his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee which was investigating. oo , ; 35 invasions of privacy. The attorney for Mahue, _ Edward Pierpont Morgan, informed the House Select Committee on Assassinations | (hereinafter the "Committee") that Maheu contacted him during the fall of 1966 and. | said he was going to be called before the Long | Committee in conjunction with the Morganthau investiga SG 352. tion. | Maheu then informed Morgan of the plots and suggested that any testimony might necessarily reveal his | wi) S5b - previous covert activities with the CIA. Morgan then contacted Senator Long and Lawrence Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, to reiterate Maheu's. concerns in an apparently successful effort to block | 35-38 any testimony.
HW) 53000 D. -Roselli Efforts to Avoid Prosecution avrkest tttrorts to Avoid Prosecution The SSC related that. in May, 1966, the’ FBI pl threatened to ‘deport Roselli *for _ living in the United States under an assumed name unless. he q i? cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia’ The SSC then. states that Roselli contacted Edwards who subsequently Spoke to the FBI in regard to 38.40 Roselli. BDoocld: 32273546 ‘Page 12 The s8sc reports that Roselli again contacted | CIA sources in an effort to thwart prosecution when Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities } 3H at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, Roselli * contacted Harvey, who was no longer a CIA employee, Yate OR __UMS vcces fel to represent nin. Harvey subsequently attempted . ly to influence the CIA into preventing the prosecution. The Justice Department, however, subsequently convicted Roselli ‘for a violation of the interstate gambling hey Laws.
HW 53060 “12 oe E. Debut of the Retaliation on Theory The genesis of this theory can be attributed ma) . to an interview that Premier Castro held: on Docld: 32273546 “Page 13 cee te cab ea ee wean te ee ai September 7, 1963, with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker. In that interview, Castro warned against the United States ‘Gp terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban Leaders. te stated, according to Harker, that United States leaders would be in danger if they promoted any attempt. ‘to eliminate the leaders of cura in early ramuary daar Morgan approached Drew Pearson, related the background of the plots, posed the possibility that the plots could have provoked a Castro retaliation, and asked Pearson to inform _ | tiD -44~ (no No. 434 Chief Justice Earl Warren (of the operation..— Warren subsequent ly informed Secret Service Director James J. Rawley who “in turn notified the FBI. Morgan - informed the Committee that Roselli initially apbroached him complaining of excessive FBI surveillance OV since he had been involved in this patriotic venture. Roselli. also informed Morgan that Castro had retaliated for these plots by assassinating President Kennedy. 60)
HW 53080 187 After receiving this: information the FBI . a7 decided not to further investigate the allegation. _ Following the publication of the Jack Anderson and Drew Pearson articles of March 3 and 7, 1967, however, where the theory of retaliation first gained public notoriety, President Johnson ordered p “AB. . the FBI to investigate the matter. The PBL DoclId: 32273546 consequently interviewed Edward Morgan ‘on March 20, S24 49 | 1967. | ‘Morgan informed the FBI that he. represented clients that were reasonable individuals who entered into | a project that they understood | to have high . governmental backing and which involved the assassina-~ S54 BO tion of Fidel Castro. Morgan then stated that his... clients had reason to suspect that castro learned. of these plots and ‘killed President Kennedy in Shs retaliation. The FBI investigation resulted in President Johnson acquiring a personal interest. in the ! retaliation theory. which prompted CIA Director Richard . . 52.26. Helms to prepare a report on the assassination plots. : F. 1967 ‘IGR Page 14
AW 53060 -On March 23, 1967 Director Helms ordered the CIA Inspector General to prepare a report on Docld: 32273546 GC. Anderson Articles ~ 5/ 53. the CIA assassination plots. “This report detailed the accounts of various (Cin ot operations against fare including an analysis of the CIA-Organized Crime plots and the AMLASH operation. The IGR also examined the 1960 Las vegas wiretap incident. In reference to the AMLASH operation, the IGR related AMLASH' s activities in “Madrid, Spain in late 1964 and early 1965, where AMLASH was meeting / $5 54 - with Manuel Artime. The IGR further noted that Rafael Garcia- -Bongo, a former lawyer for Santo - a Trafficante, was’ in Madrid, Spain in March, (1965. Bongo claimed to be in. contact. with dissident Cuban military leaders, including AMLASH. In 1971, Anderson once again published information promoting the retaliation. theory in two articles dated January 18 and 19. These articles | exhibited more detail, “relating that several assassins made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro ‘before being apprehended, © that this event Page 15 ;
HW 53060 Occurred in late February or early March, 1963, that Robert Kennedy at least condoned the CIA- Mafia plots, and that. Roselli delivered poison ‘pills to be used in killing Castro to a contact at ¢« the. Miami Beach Fountainbleu Hotel on March 13, 1961. H. Roselli deportation ‘In 1971, the same year that Anderson releaséd additional information on-the plots, the CIA contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department.” of Justice, in an attempt to ‘prevent information on | CIA operations from being disclosed in the event INS ~ brought deportation proceedings against Roselli. The SSC stated in its Interim Report, released in. November, 1975, that ‘the deportation order was still . “S84 in the process of being litigated. In. August, 1976, authorities discoverea Roselli'ts butchered . body stuffed in an ofl. drum and floating in Miami,'s DocId: 32273546 bY Bg ‘Biscayne Bay, His colleague in the plots to kidd. Castro, Sam Giancana, had been shot to death in his: home in June, 1975 6& b: 2) Page is
Je , ul HW 53080 PE y amine the War | ren Co a . . mmission Of the CIA'. a * CIA's (en-s0ing prots port 2273546—Rage 17
HW 530580 affiliated in any way with the CIA. (")? Lp d- 62 G7 The SSC identified the AMLASH operation, , however, as being "clearly different" from the under- bs 63> oe world plots. The SSC stated that AMLASH was in Pee eo Docld: 32273546 progress at the time of the assassination, that it. could clearly ‘be traced ‘to the CIA, and that AMLASH's proposal for (He yaa been endorsed by the CIA, GF ~64- the initial step being the assassination of Castro. | een aN The Ssc cautioned, however, that it saw "no evidence | _that Fidel Castro or others in the Cuban government plotted President. Kennedy" s assassination in retaliation (65579 for U. s. operations against Cuba. AS related in the Introduction ‘to this material, the ssc did not reach any ‘conclusion because it i 2-66, believed additional. investigation needed to eA) TASK Force (Ee) J. The CIA 1977 LSanta bite Ga Oia, Report tse Stung. by the Senate criticism and the rippling ef fect that Book V caused in the media, the CIA - ener : IG TT 2. prepared a comprehensive report in Epes disigned to oy at least within the CIA, the critical quest fons postulated in the SSC Final Report. Page 16. ;
_HW 53080 Docld: 32273546 i's The Bawa +e identifies a principal theme of Book V as the possibility that Castro retaliated -against the United States for attempts on his life .and that the. CIA operations may have specifically Fk. “Fl. caused any such actions by Castro. In responding to this theory the CIA decided to perform the following: . . ow“. 1). to conduct a ful}kMreview of information and onduct a ful hrev Cuban target to identify any activity that might relate - -to the assassination of President Kennedy, -. and Se 2) . to review the possibility that CIA . activities against Cuba did, by their nature, cause Castro to order the assassina- tion of President Kennedy. R21. ~The details of the “are thoroughly ‘related in this material because no source has previously publicly released them. 1. Syndicate Operations: . 7 7 — we | Before analyzing the AMLASH operations, the CIA first related new considerations pertaining to the ~ syndicate operations. The fee refers to a series of articles written by Paul Meskill and appearing | in the New York Daily News in april, 1975. 'In these. articles Meskill described how iSO Frank Fiorini, 2p known as Sturgis, allegedly , Page 19
HW. 53080 DoclId: 32273546 at { “192. recruited Marie. Lorenz to spy on Castro. v-and how Sturgis knew .amges@ra and planned to use him 77 193. in a bombing assassination of Castro. Meskill - asserted that Sturgis claimed he had been a hired operat yn) for the CIA for at least a decade and that Sturgis was in touch with all the casino operators 19476 in Havana during the period of the Castro takeover. . In another article on June 13, 1976, Meskill. related: the claim of Marie Lorenz that) in the fall of 1960. Frank Sturgis, acting for the CIA, . gave her two capsules of poison powder which she was to sprinkle ie) in: some food or drink of ore The writers of the 1999~ToR were quite concerned f é rege with three assertions because Greens 5 name had publiciy surfaced,in connection. with a Castro assassina- ces rate! Loses Bh Na fe. tion plot before the sec ENTS oe CIA-~ organized crime plots, asdotms—the-~aseignment: to “en ALIEN NP poison.Castyo-cave the of PiCTal case tun Castro | who: hay. have, reteived-kickbacks-Gromztherganbting interester Cl mhe possibility that enre was involved in assassination plots other than the CIA: operation | oR) also. attracted the attention of the crn Page 20
HW 53060 DBocld: 32273546 ‘In reference to Sturgis’ allegation that he “had been a hired operator for the :CIA for a decade ” ‘the FopjereR asserted that "he was in contact with | some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area,. ~b9-R but had no direct relationships with the Agency. " TER The: BSR recognizes that Sturgis, through his gambling rg iy activities and relationships with various casino owners, may quite possibly. have known Onea , “and also raises the question of whether Sturgis may have been a source of information to Castro regarding Caan S participation “E98. , in any assassination plot. In reference to the Lorenz- Sturgis poison pall oT oe Fe ot plot, noted the similarity of this plot - Ky Mera Tanke ore’ we oe a pi ink 4 Citi Casir 79.9 to the details in n the 18 October 1960 FBI sand ~ The CIA concluded that this October date is “toa early for the CIA syndicate operations and that therefore ; BL Fol, the syndicate may have been acting independently. The CIA also concluded that Antoniondentieasmery the Cuban exile leader active in the CIA syndicate operations, may have already been active in plots BR with the Mafia when the CIA approached him. Page 21 |
‘yt The CIA cited two FBI memorandum as support. -.First, a 21 December 1960 memorandum pertaining to underworld support for some Cubans, and second, a 18 January 1961 memorandum relating an unconfirmed report that Useemm was one of the Cubans receiving Support. a __. | The cia ffurther} acknowledged ‘that although a the operation with the MafiaGwas suspended after | the Bay of Pigs, it appeared to still be in progress when re-activated in April, 1962. TF ie ~ . -. Lo ; .  * The 3 summarized its position concerning . non-CIA sponsored syndicate operations in the following © passage: ‘It is possible that CIA simply. found / itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that | the syndicate already had underway.../ L/ix a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material | contribution was also supplying an aura of ~~ official sanction. 1, St 2. AMLASH The WER states the ssc Suggests that AMLASH was possibly a Castro agent assigned a provacation. .. -.. HW 53080 Docld: 32273546 Page 22 ;
HW 53080 nny “ Py ade om, mission which would then justify retaliation, or, in the alternative, that AMLASH was a security. “risk through which details of the plotting may~have surfaced to, Castro thus providing the impetus for G7 86. TER provocation. Additionally, the ER cites the SSC as holding that in a case, -AMLASH should | st f Ns have been reported to the Warren Coinmission. 7 9g VR “B88. The ee. contends neither theory is correct. stating that the relationship between the CIA and AMLASH before the death of President Kennedy was so "unsubstantial and inconclusive that it provided no |. basis for AMLASH/1 ‘to feel that he had any tangible B90 CIA. support for plotting against Castro. oo In support the Bie broceeas to narrate: the . _ Agency" Ss understanding of the operation. “on ‘August L7, 1962, the case officer for AMLASH reported that he "fnas/ no intention Lot giving AMLASH/17 physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this Las/ something he could or might try to carry | “1 98. out on his own initiation." - Headquarters replied DocId: 32273546 oe Page 23
the next day, "Strongly concur that no physical le elimination mission be given AMLASH/1. From August 29, 1962 until September, 1963 the CIA states 92 fie Jit dia not have any. contact with AMLASH. On September 7, 1963 the CIA received the following cable: AMLASH still feels there only. two. ways accomplish change either inside job or invasion he realistic enough to realize latter out of question. . According AMWHIP, ‘AMLASH still ne 779 for, ‘U- S. reveal Pian of action. the Sam” notes that the SSc interpreted "inside job" as referring to an operation against. Castro;—the cta, > however, says it refers to a general 94 Tee how to effect change. - The #@%.also states that at: concerning af & this point Book Vv says - "characterizat ion of this phase , O5.. ; a of the AMLASH operation is disputed. "5 The CIA. exrsleel - contends that ‘any dispute only @ebsks in the eyes of the XY “2647 - . - SSC. — mo ce The — “next comments on an interview of Castro by AP ‘reporter Daniel Harker in which castro said that anti-Castro terrorists haa the “support of
HW 53060 Pes "what the. SSC characterized -as assassination plots. DocId:32273546__ Page 27 27 U. S. leaders. The “2GR states that the Book v implies that AMLASH/1 may have. reported to Castro vl The CIA response is that "Castro's remarks at that time could not have stemmed from anything said to AMLASH/1 by CIA officers as they proposed nothing and undertook nothing." poo ; coed On October 11, 1963. the case officer CS i headquarters and said that’ AMLASH/1 claimed to have . the necessary people ‘and. equipment to overthrow 7 10 FH Castro without U. S. assistance. /}/. OFS ‘October 29;,. . +02 —- 1963 Desmond Fitzgerald met AMLASH/1 in Paris. /90 ~Xecords ' At this meeting the CIA maintains that Fitzgerald | rejected AMLASH's request for an assassination weapong specifically, a high powered rifle with a telescopic. re2. TER lens. 152. The oe contends that at this point it was clear that AMLASH was informed that there would be no U. S. assistance until after the facty which ‘is contrary to the SSC statement in Book V to the ' effect that: it was uncertain how. AMLASH interpreted - 103 the put-off by Fitzgerald.yoy — h Wher dak! A | vecibwbe, ok. a Asad Wak The | pu ro wre =. & School! woe cot WL Fit | Arvestel cal Seema Sot wa | nt? wil cley hone AMER a reached MR was vice os ta REIN PUR NL ra Bete er A NRTA RT BR SQM NATO RII TEN ONCAEID A EE TELA ORCL AE RE tO toe
Ry orn On November 19, 1963, Fitzgerald approved informing AMLASH/1 that he would be given a cache aN inside Cuba and that a high-vowered rifle with a . scope would be included upon request.35- On rss wv - bay a ale November 20 the case officer informed mamiasi that 2 jel he would be receiving the meeting he requested. J This meeting occurred on November. 22.407 TEER The EGR ‘summarized the significance of these contacts with AMLASH as related to the contentions _ in Book V in the following passage: -Whatever the relationship with AMLASH/1 following the death of President. Kennedy, there is every indication that during. | President Kennedy's life AMLASH/1 had no ‘basis for believing that he had CIA support > for much of anything. Were he a provocateur reporting to Castro, or if he was merely careless and leaked what he knew, he had no factual basis for leaking or reporting AnY s. actual CIA plot directed against Castro. ” te iF] fOC- Finally, in reply to the SSC allegation that - the CIA inadequately responded ‘to the Warren Commission’ Ss request for all possible relevant information, the TH IL. EGR observed: . HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 28
While one can understand tfday why the Warren Commission limitedfits inquiry to.normal avenues of invgstigation, it —— ‘would have served to re-inform the. credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view . of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms - the possibility of Soviet or Cuban os involvement in the assassination (JFK) because so? of tensions of the time...The Agency should 67. have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." K. © Recent Ander on Arti les : ers c SACK In September 1976 and October, 1978,“Anderson again published articles which propounded the retaliation a LO7- . oe ee theory. /!9 In addition, for the first time Anderson. publicly revealed that John - Roselli served as his | source Hen for the retaliation theory in alt of the articles ‘published through the years. The September 7, 1976 article appearing ‘in: the Washington Post contains all components of the retaliation theory. This states: Mafia mobster John Roselli may. - have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his _death. He was brutally murdered a_ few weeks ago, his hacked up body . stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay. ‘Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators he suggested,whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld H¥ 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 290
‘contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy.was behind the plot. The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and . use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's . assassination according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the. plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger. Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking . about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there’ is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the facinating highlights. , The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a: flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intélligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. .He had no © authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana. “They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. His gambling et enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn! t endear -Castro. to him. After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization ~ behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner _ circle. These were the people Roselli wanted | _.to use to knock off Castro.
But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary. arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Same (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante. ; As Roselli's associates tell it, He persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements. Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, “Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot . Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's | food. . The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught. - The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters _ -had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the. ‘whole operation. The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro. — ae _» . In an impromptu,. three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his. ‘life and warned that U..S. leaders also HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 31
might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963. , a according to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly ' were Cubans from the old Trafficante organiza-~ tion. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement. . According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a. decoy while others ambushed him from closer. range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared ' he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U. S. crackdown on the Mafia. SO So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against © . the President's killer. At least this is how | Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas. - . Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination. It has ‘also been established that . Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections ° in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, .- dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante | in his Cuban prison. ee ae HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 32
III. ISSUE ANALYSIS en inner. : sem investigated this material to determine what conclusions can 1 be ascertained concerning the nature, scope, and’ remi fications of these operations. In this regard, various issues are presented. in the following sections, “subjected to analysis, and then resolved according, to available evidence, probable jnotivations and the most logical inferences... - | ; | Com autir | To fulfill this process, the HOSA reviewed material from numerous governmental’ sources that _ pertained to the persons and‘operations relevant — q. “to the investigation. These persons included: “1, -dohn Roselli | © =\ principal in crafOsc a - . operation - CF - 2. Santo Trafficante oe principal in CIA-O.C. oo operation oo 'e Antonio de Verona - principal in-CIA-0.¢. - operation - principal in CIA-o. Clk ores 4. Sam Giancana os “opeFation .. eS 5. Robert Maheu Co principal in CIA-0.¢. no ms - operation. HW.53080 DocId:32273546 Page 33
| Michael McLaney ra . Samuel nenton Norman Rothman Sohn Martino 10. Edward P. Morgan ll. Edward K. Moss | 12. Dino Cellini 132 Richard Cain 14. Charles Tourine 15. Rafael "Macho" Gener. 16.. Evelio Duque Miyar - - oe . a ns 17. Jorge Alonso Pujol = = = rn cue as age mw we het er ee a . ‘18. Joseph Shimon 19. Angelo -Bruno . Sam Mannarino 20.
21. (22... 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.. 31. 32. 34.- Kelly Mannarino Edward -Browder | Joseph Merola Arthur Balletti Dominick Bartone Richard Helms James—ecomreT1 Luis Balbuena Calzadilla ‘ ~ AMLASH William Alexander Morgan vennonss Jack Anderson Frank Sturgis Fidel Castro (Roselli attorneys) ! Z fo ie f 3 Castres caches Ae EW eA Sia. (Eee 7%
Wherever applicable and desirable, the rages Coma ctlic., either interviewed or deposed these persons or “subpoenaed ‘them to give testimony before Committee ‘members. | | | | The government sources where the sen Cones requested and reviewed material were: le. Central Intelligence Agency 2. Federal Bureau of Investigation —_ . i 3. Drug Enforcement agency | 4: Department of Defense 5. Department of State 6. Department of Alcohol, “Tobacco and Firearms 7. United States Customs service 8. Immigration and Naturalization Service 9. United States Senate ‘Committee on Intelligence 10. ‘United States Secret Service ll. Chicago Crime Commission _ 42. “Chicago Police Department 13. New York Police Department -. 414. Public Safety Department, Organized Crime. “Bureau, “Dade County, Florida 15.. Cuban Government
In the majority of instances, review ' of any material at these sources and any statements from individuals were not pertinent to any assassination plots against Castro, particularly and the CilA-Organized Crime er the AMLASH operations. Further, almost all relevant information acquired was already known through the SSC investigation and the CIA Inspector General Report For this reason the following analysis represents conclusions ws principally derived from information subs tantively | the same as that which | ‘the SSC and CIA previously > are et recsa tan knees \ a Comedie. TT considered! Consequently , the HeeR investigation Fine CTA resulted in additionalacorroboration of this informa- —_ TOE tion from a diversity of sources. }l What remained Looe Lee, ae : , to be drawn ave the conclusions. B. Issues Pertaining to the AMLASH Operation wo I> The Committee. found no evidence that the | oy \ f AV, a } AMLASH Operation provoked Premier Castro to assassinate po : i ape | Leresident: Kennedy in “retaliation. | LY may 2 Nee ; . { ; t i¥ i in awe yoke phe . Sere aaa HW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 37
errmel® acl we. We ws ie , : OE 4 . Vr b The Committee has received equally persuasive evidence and therefore cannot state whether the ae. ! eae a . ™ : “ . AMLASH operation prior to the death of President —.. Kennedy can be characterized as an assassination ae . . ‘ plot. . Ce ‘Richard Helms, the former Director of the CIA,. in his testimony before this Committee stated that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot. [12< - As already indicated, TE FR, the tor? ten concluded that AMLASH had "no factual basis for leaking ox reporting any actual CIA plot directea against Castro" during President Kennedy ' s - “ESSb -: life. |i _ . Joseph Langosch, the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff in 1963, the component responsible for CIA. operations directed against the Government of Cuba ana the Cuban Intelligence Services, offered a contrasting view to_ the testimony of Mr. Helms and the assertions of the LOI-EER, Desmond Fitzgerald. headed the Special Affairs Staff | — =LOBA™ which was responsible for the AMLASH operation. In an affidavit to. the Committee, Longosch recalled that: © yp ereaee SEC; ‘NW 53080 Docld:32273546 Page 38 OC lb eg oe el ete aes bate Peete
yin on" /t/he AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was Characterized by the Special Affairs “staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the aan CIA. rose ewe Langosch FurtheF recollected, that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligénce Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which he based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was - insecure was available to senior level CIA officials, including 10-8£- ; Desmond FitzGerald. Vt In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee received the affidavit of Kent (CIA | pseudonym) L. Pot tock sam is fe? Pollock "served as ‘Executive officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he: was Chief of the Special. Affairs Staff... and- discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." Pollock - specifically contested the assertions of ‘Langosch stating: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. “FitzGerald considered the AMLASH — operation to. be a political action Hi 53060 Docld: 322735546 Page 39 —
activity with the object i SY of organizing a group under GabaAnrecn/y to overthrow Castro and the. “Castro regime by means of a coup d' etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as | an assassination operation. Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing: on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of life. 108g . Los - 378 . He also stated: at ‘Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize © the AMLASH operation as an ‘assassination > operation'; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer. did not, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. L@ngosch; the Deputy Chief, the other branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially filled with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH > for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) .The case officer offered the pen. to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy Ss ‘death. AMLASH rejected the pen with -disdain.108h aad
) oo es ° > . rae a) shee a 2 Assuming that AMLASH was not an assassination t plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro uncovered its existence 3 and Scope, the Committee . pers UAyartue un Mie. pbelieves4that castto Would net have been provoked in a manner sufficient to induce assassinating President Kennedy in retaliation. ; | Assuming that AMLASH was an assassination plot during the life of President Kennedy and that Castro. uncovered its existence and scope , the Committee pt 43 wr GLieees, | still. believeshthat €astro’ “would. Eee have resorted to i assassinating the President of the United States in 7 retaliation. ‘Castro set forth some reasons supporting this contention. In his interview with the Committee, Premier . The Committee ‘agrees with .the reasoning in his statements. Castro said in part: That was insane. From the ideological ae “point of view it was insane. And from *~ the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? ‘We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane... - ‘absolutely sick. ‘Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort,- because who could think of the idea of .
Docld: 32273546 ' organizing the death of the President of Castro the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States. to invade our country which is what I havé tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. ‘The destruction would have been here. 12z0 ; - also added: I want to tell you that the death of the leader does not change the system. It has never done that. 42 1 : In this interview Castro also commented on _. ‘the speech of September 7, 1963 which has been cited throughout the years as an indication that Castro may have assassinated President Kennedy in retaliation, Premier Castro asserted: So, I said something like those plots Start to set a very bad precedent. A very serious one - that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions...but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that...not in the least...but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting -O£ other countries would be a very bad. precedent...something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under 4 oe
the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I. didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. TI did not mean by that that we were going to take measures ~ similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known. there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but . I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life. ;22 Some reasoning, which Committee ‘cautions is speculative, may. be of some assistance, heme. It does not seem likely that Castro would make ao veiled ‘reference to assassinating\inerican leaders in retaliation for plots on his life if he was actually - | planning Ger contemplating such acts? he would want to call as (little attention as possible to himself. Rather, it seems Castro was attempting to display a r his Public dismay and knowledge of such. attempts in an effort to Prevent their continuance. Consequently, together with’ an absence of any evidence implicating Castro in the assassination, the Committee believes
fot . ae] 8 , ‘ ves tc “Tha Lopes peta beet Co Binite ytd we a # he ot med ’ i ” LG eto La wae He Cat oer Los a4 UL as oa ae toe ° nat cnt cnet. sane displaying Castro's | displeasure at American activities, does not implicate Castro in the assassination. The Committee believes there are additional reasons to discount any involvement of Castro in - the assassination which are also compelling. The Committee cautions that these reasons, while persuasive, are aan necessarily speculative. First, William Atwood, Special Advisor to the United States Delegation to the United Nations, was involved in diplomatic efforts to establish a frame- work for detente during the fall of 1963!" Atwood told the “scc that McGeorge Bexndy, an advisor to President. Kennedy, told him that President Kennedy was - in favor of “pushing towards an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out by the ‘Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back to normal." rake _ Atwood also arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel to meet with Kennedy pripr to. a scheduled 12> trip: by Daniel to see Castro. Daniel and: Kennedy NW 53080 -DocId:32273546 Page 44.
HW 53080 Docld: 32273546 — . Daniel to see. him after visiting Castro. discussed the prospects for reestablishing United States~- ~Cuba ‘relations and Kennedy asked 2 The Committee believes that such efforts to establish a peaceful coexistence between the . United States and Cuba would have hampered any desire by Castro to assassinate Kennedy. | phe in Corpor ng the aehitudc: ay PS Second, the Committisealalso believes Bhat — a . . | ; it cars he Orqued Lttak angngewe leaders of ‘the United States, ‘President Kennedy supported a less hostile attitude and position .— ‘toward cuba. Even if Castro § felt the relations between | Cuba and the United States were bad under the Kennedy Presidency, there were legitimate reasons to suspect, they would have been worse under any other administration. Thus, with the prospects | of renewed diplomatic. relations in: the air and the knowledge ‘that Kennedy possessed a more favorable attitude toward Cuba than other military or political leaders, Castro would have - Page 45 —
HW 53080 had every reason to hope that -Kennedy maintained the Presidency. Further, the Committee. does not _ believe that eliminating Kennedy would necessarily Docld: 32273546 © have £avorably altered the United States' operations and ties toward Cuba. In addition, the Committee -does not believe Castro would have assassinated President Kennedy because such an act, if discovered, would have afforded the United States the excuse to destroy Cuba. The risk would -not have been ‘worth it. B. Issues Pertaining to the CIA-Organized .° Crime Plots Ll. Scope and Nature of Plots - Analysis a) Roselli Knowledge of CIA Sponsi xship Te CLA Onerrtona) Soap Clr ee | Ganesnot cali info ed the Committee that Maheu told. RES@iladsi. he represented an international bes 126 group of clients who had vested interest in Cubas Roselli, however, testified to ane SSC that Maheu Af “9 pire cy e oe told him from the beginning that. @icensiebLl was with rae: Be : od the CIA. 1207 Maheu confirmed this account to the Ssc. “Maheu also stated ina deposition to the Committee that | reape Chyref. Giancana knew at the ‘time that @hceaneall, was with the. . “EQ CIA. ,24 Further, Trafficante testified to the Page 46
Committee that Resed informed him that he, ,a° Roselli, was operating as an agent of the cla. The weight of the evidence indicates that. Roselli, and thus Giancana and Trafficante, knew the CIA was behind the assassination plots at an ‘early stage. “This recognition of CIA initiation is important, basis, it shows that Giancana and Txafficante and thus organized crime knowingly became involvea with the CIA. _b) Discovery of True Identities | Roselli arranged for the | entrance of Giancana and Trafficante into ‘the plots” and introduced a Supply Chios yas them to G4 s "Sam Golda" and "Joe." io Okonme LL contends he learned the true identities of these” persons a few months after the operation was in progress when he and Maheu saw an article in one of the Sunday ; sections of the Miami newspaper.t> This article supposedly pertained to Organized crime in the United States and. contained pictures of top hoodluns, including | “ITs. _ Same Giancana and Santo vrafficante. 132 In the HW 53080 DoclId: 32273546 Page 47
HW 53060 Docld: 32273546 a 45" (eae vot Chae oe 1967 IGR oxeaten 1. stated that the article tr? ‘came From the Parade inagazine ;34 in the Miami Times. Maheu also contends that he did not know the true identities o of Sam Gold and yoe until this article Conve (\ra® appeared. ;32 OLeéontre®t also stated that this incident occurred after the "we were up ‘to our ears” in the - operations and consequently the CIA decided to “E19 progress forward. ' 3% The SSC conducted a search of supplements to all Miami newspapers for the reques site time period and could not locate any such article.'?/ The Committee consequently searched Parade magazine for the fall of 1960, all of 1961, and all of1962," the years “which. spanned the entire operation. The Committee learned that on January 21, 1962, Parade . Woe UNTO SOG e One | EE published an article entitled, “One government’s crackdown on organized crime," written by Jack — Anderson, which contains a Listing of the top ten hood1ums in the country as well as several photographs | “21 of mobsters, including santo Trafficante. 13. The - article focuses on the efforts of Attorney General Page 43 _
Robert Kennedy's campaign against organized crime and’ mentions both Giancana and Trafficante. . Although vt Parade va appears LAN wi oo, to ‘correspond with qherst: and Maheu's description, ae it is over one year past the beginning months of the operation. Indeea, it occurs nine months after the completion of Phase I of the plots. Additionally, neither the SSC nor the Committee has discovered any other article pertaining to organized crime in: Parade magazine or the supplements of any Miami - newspaper for the alleged ah aa It appears @hednrTe and Maheu are lying in’ ‘an attempt to. look for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top. organized crime figures in the United States. Implicit in their contention is that while | the CIA wished to. solicit criminal sources to 7 assassinate castro, it would not_ knowingly have recruited any figures from the top- echelon of Anal organized crime. '24_ Additionally, Bases HW 53080) Docld:32273546 Page 49
Pee re ae vRage se statement that "we were up to our ears in it" is even more difficult to fathom since according to the. - .1967 IGR the operation’ was in its embryonic stage ‘in the fall of 1960 and no pills were even delivered until approximately February or March of 1961,.——) | —__-without additional support, the Committee | does not believe the contentions of Maheu and Senet tinetas thie ora plot to assassinate Castro was “necessarily a highly volatile and secret operation. Once Roselli introduced additional contacts into the scene ait is not logical that the CIA would have neglected to verify the identities of such principals. On the contrary, it is more believable and more | | probable. that the CIA ascertained the true_ identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" at an early stage. and consciously progressed forward in the operation, confident that these two persons; in the words. attributed to Colonel Sheffield Edwards, were § individuals "tough enough" to handle the job. id