104-10102-102 / PROCESSING —- POSED PUSHED | | e___ | MARKED FOR INDEXING _ | * __[ no swoexina requinto | ONLY QUALIFIED es ee HEADQUARTERS DESK . = CAN JUOGE INDEXING eo s . = es % 9 . a : FROM ° A —— ary S . j | 7, a SQ ABSTRACT Chief of Station, JMWAVE /< rs SS fF 6} 8TOperational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK € Project AMTRUNK Operational Review... ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK. i 1. - Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress ‘report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. . Station views on the operation are summarized below. , a ‘2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak- nesses: (W101 ERT D A. | BARK and to be workin Cwith" ow 9 _— ey 3 Ki PT Other wende he cooperate with KUBARK only is to/their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that merle) “fugéee political groups at any ti at he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es- cambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt own way with the operation. . He helieves ED AL, LS nth Sande £ : attention because of his ZRM TAL connections, and he will not heai— ah¢.t0...20, behind KUBARK'’s bdck to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1. and ODACID 9: r uthority..it the gperation or KUBARK handling of thej A does not progress td his liking. Since MTRUNK/1, accprding to AMCAPE/1,"masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may - be assumed that the AMTRUNKS lwill withhold nothing! from AMTRUNK/1, co, . ; . LGR yt G-E- 87, | de Evagest 44-1 THUA'A Distribution: . ANG eee, - 3 - C/SAS w/attchs a mga: / VIE DATE DISPATCHED a oer: - - app 8 oe ° pom te qa meee . : i CROSS REFERENCE(TO: ney; = te we em em a om a atm ene i aa gine: a het a oe 6 a gi” wey “ie op 2° eet “en gt oe: Stn oP cdl OS ger ar io Speer i te ‘ee tog Eg ‘ % SP usb e . i al. < » . . Aan ee, 2 pec NR Rr aad to a, ie gine eee te rent alton Site ld See 70° Ow bade memo, oe a ree | mk ez
CQNTINUATION OF ._ DISPATCH o . . P . i os Eilat 2 _ 1 vISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER FI ome er | UFGA ~ 8381 B. This operation has a very high "flap potential if any AMTRUNK agents are picked up by. 2pposi n Cul only will KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the opera tien as may. also PLOW SGE, ne whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed, Castro's hands. C. : The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects. ' At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not. Satistactorily resolve The dusetion gf aithhoiding information's "an unknown nature from his KUBARK con- tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on 29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made ' such an approach. to AMTRUNK/3. D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily develop. Dd E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within five miles of a cruise missile site ‘radar, and-in an area frequently patrolled by sea. a RABEL. Pez | a “the lack of control i “AMTRUNK operation, poss y of the two operations crossing or targetting on the Same individual will be present. 3. %&In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Thxyee of the four have been outstandin in training. They appear to have a nuiliber of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex- pect to be able to call on for assistance. ‘Although they have been out of ,direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods ranging up to two years, this is frequently. the case in this type . of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile. view and the ‘advantages and quarters’ decision is to continue with the operation at this Lime, | operational plans -for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as formulated. ~ ‘END OF MESSAGE ) “A aa Ve . CLASSIFICATION PAGE NO. | S60 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. ogy ’ 14h : S E Cc RE T CONTINUES 2 .
a aN ‘3 19-6 - 54 6 on a | f $ C/y _ me rr P0328: Ra@govad from Progeot 2/71 7 NU. C6 Clazeificass Cu Wevoiea al \ 31 March 1963 en to PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH. amen la . The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, ‘and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 - on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J, VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica- tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of ‘appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational dis- | cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, ‘both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, ‘debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass -and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under dis- cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series ' Of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed: for .alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The re- sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted’ as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the _AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE. a ars . . : * ay a : . ae ' _ rare tna wer ee ht ee ee ee
14-00000 SAT ag ewteCommunists from power, A secondary and subordinate - ihisSion iS to determine the climate prevailing amony the populace in Havana for organizing resistance eleménts capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, .the operation has been split into two initial phases, which “On. “the orth. n coast the. he black infiltration ‘of AMTRUNK /2 and - _of Havana province. ThéSe two individuals plan to go into a - “Havana fora periad of of approximately two..w and then exfiltrate black. from the same point at which “they infiltrated. Sean ees ‘through ‘the “keys. area si the north ‘woaet of. Matanzas. These two individuals. will likewisé go into. ‘Havana. for = period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. » di in following para= mi SDS ames fi igures in Havana. ~The “following “paragraphs discussing ‘these phases aré not designed to be operational plans, Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as dé= veloped. A. AMTRUNK Personnel years, j i 4 UNK/2 is a a year old Cuban who is mature for his and “in some Canoe tid ea ea ed in elandestine opera- tions. _ two years, majoring “in. ‘Prior to Fidel’ S takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico Which upheld the constitution 6f 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti=Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasioné great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise, He continued in this fork through 1961 and finally Lett Cuba ig ‘Sar , Although A/2_does not consider S¢ . } _ne has been cooperative rrougnhout Tae He isa pensive individual who displays good » - judgement. | His present | attitude towards KUBARK appears to. - be one of “wait and see" In the méanwhile, he is con- scientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.
14-00000 B.. SUR IS Hs old Cuban, in Contrast to A/2, is CG, ios On the othéy hand he ais "quite. Toyal to “R72 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the Underground aS an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he waS in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter= revolutionaries and began full time Anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoidéd detection and Continued to engagé in ‘underground activities. Finally when the situation bécame hopeless hé left Cuba by airy for Wiami 2 $9} 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/S feels KUBARK should only ot inter- he Soernti on, Fortunately his en eT pienso role in this operation is comparatively minor and hé appears. willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, di =problems_in the future. TASKS Gn Conduct black infiltration janding at Punta La or 2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana. 3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his& ae and train assets in maritimé reception and clandésti @ communications. Having completed this he would then be ex- filtrated at Punta Jijira. 4, A/2 will go to Havana and obtain Safehouse and operational support through his contacts. 5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets With high level connections within the Rebel Army. 6. A/2 will train support ard operational assets in clandes- tine Communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration.. oF Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).
14-00000 C, IMFIL-EXFIL PLANS Punta La Jijira.is 18 May 1963. The infiltrées will make . their way to, farm one kilometer from the coast | and from there A/2 will be provided with tranSportation to go to Guanabo or Havana. | l. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at 2, The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration, This arrangment, aS yet, is not definite. 3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively plannéd for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 fééls that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram Signal would indicate his preference. 4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritimé Operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedulée will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 éonsiders thé minimum accéptable period of time to make his contacts. D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA li _ Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the | si 1 weak Way to a farm owned jointly by| _ | , locatedal from the point of intiitration, hey will make contact ith the manager of the farm named @S: TAO years of agé, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depénd upon to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation = to Guanabo or Havana: ae , - who lives a few kilometers away in bwns a small farm and a : ein the area and also owns a truck. He is EEORE years of age, married with Six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter= revolutionary activities. ‘bs Iff >is unsuccessful in flares ar truck he will contacti _—sss dh operates a farm next . * Sse to farm. He is 43250 years old, married, no Children, wWite's name is| He was the ( | in 1954. He owns a jeep.
14-00000 e. Another contact of A/3 is age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form 6f food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Havana, He owns a(___]shop in the of Havana. Subject will. be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana. 2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 aftér arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Théir function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2. a. 4 years of age, born in Havana, A/2 first mét her when she was 4 Stiident at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 HaS tlaintained cor- réspondence with her. She Has hélped previously in providing. safehousing for the underground. She also has a car, " Peer errata TRE ee mtacancnarea ee ee b. | born in Havana. He is * I Jnas lives and practiced> in Havana. « has hélped A/2 in underground activi- ties previously, He has a brother, tw6 daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in' - New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and Was a professor of ; . at the University of Havana up until 1961 When he re- — . signed. also a close friénd of | age about ‘GQ? born in Cienfuegos, a as well as thé former head of the Subject was originally a member fidante during Castro's takedéver,. as an apart- ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in undér- ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is fiot Sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, howevei, works for .A/2 has maintained correspondence with _|age about ‘@B, born in Havana, single. Subject is an“Eneiesh teacher who runs a small private g lschool in[____—_i|in Havana. Shé was A/2's and offered support to the underground. of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK con- 1 ives by herself, has an automobile and is a ; Oo , close friend of A/2 and his wife. d :
14-00000 ze aie in Havana, single, ed. 6_ attended the University of Havana ‘and. Villanova from{_ __| She became a closé friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana, She has no record of undérground work. She lives in| | during the summer. A/2 felt he micht attemnt_to contact her if she was living at lin order to safehouse A/3 there if necessar: The following two opérational assets will be contactéd by A/2 after he is safehousSed in Havana. Their funetion will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime. a. q JagelLl oo married, § Subject holds the rank ofc in thé Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. Hé was a friend of Castro'’s dtiring the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. Hé also claims[__jhas been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally assoéiated with thé MRR and Monte Cristo groups. {__lprimary interest has been trying to or= ganize his friends within the Rebél Army against Fidel. A/2 féelsé is a véry discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti=Castro cod ool the G=2, A/2 claims to be a close friénd off and trusts him completely A/2 saw and talked to% Jin be age early@O3, served in the jduring World War II. According to A/2, : was made commander of the by) | i was removed from the post and pre+ sently ives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said started working against Castro within the MRP undér Mantel RAY. For a timehe was the sécretary of the MRP and became quité involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it Was rumored at the time that was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually {was placéd on a G-2 suspect list, but a¢cording to Wa | was able to evade detection. Subject has g00d connectiotis within the Rebel Army and re- volutionary government, A/2 trusts this individual and has - confidence in. oan as a potential operational
14-00000 ‘ $ I ! 7 - c, A/2 may also attémpt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact. | | age “ married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal. Area. Following the Castro takéover he servéd as one of the military zones within Havana province, Evetitually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is. now working “TH Oriente Province. He claims ‘ ssisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons COVER AND coumunrcantons L. Cover | A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a 1o0é¢al brewery in Havana. A/3 on the othér hand will be issued documentation. as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will. also be issued drivers licenses and Additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, ete. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises. “2. Communications Primary communications Will be established through an SW system, Both tien will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited .agsets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre- telegram. to “indicate their progress ahd confirm their ‘place and time of exfiltration. Both mémbers will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions inh case of an emergency. OPERATIONAL. AND SECURITY EVALUATION 1. The opévational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considérable risk. The area of infiltration is within five milésS of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are kaAOown to work this portion of ‘the coast at frequent intérvals. “Once infiltrated the team will not havé to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at His for any length of time and he does not want his to know of his présence in Cuba. For this reason the “farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse, A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same y lands. This presents the problem of what to do * On approach is to take A/3
14-00000 ce acai it eo NY : to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, However, may jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and ness, He may “take advantage of ‘his visit to “Havana to under= take a clandestine assignment on his own, When A/2 and 3 step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2 -haS a sufficient resource of judgement to g6 about his busi= ness competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication. For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards developing assets around His [with maritime reception capabilities. 2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe af supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana However; he has not seen{___]and|_ for over a year. In organization ‘and this position may “dampen their effectiveness in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on[] con- flict with A/2's évaluation of this man. While there is no evidence to verify that L_____llis pro=régime, there has been a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 Which claimns|| is an opportunist who might work for the a bidder. A/2's rebuttal to thesé remarks is that has assisted him in. ' the past’ and when the chips were down he continued to aid him in his underground activities. This still leaves a question mark next to the worth of vhich unfortunately can only be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are other security itiplications which should be discussed in this evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot bé considered triily se- curity conscious, While safehotised A/2 wrote a letter to a contact in Miami which Was to be transmitted by his Case officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking contacts in Havana and conveyed the impréssion that a trip was in the dfing. A/2 has written several other letters not séén by his C Os which might faye given the same impres~ eae ee that would vee them. first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go to his and begin to make contacts. A/3 also stated a man Faed| area ute bé one of their con= tacts. ‘This loosé talk Coupled with A/3's attitude that KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him 4 marginal candi-«= date for this opération. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated “.three-.days after his entry into Cuba, the opération will ". gain, his usefulness and G6liminate somé of the risk he presents.
Iv. 3," 'The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence,’ competence, and confidence to approach and re- cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti~regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained. PHASE II | A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL . iassteenenenees eeeenemmenaeaeentaemmmme nes teen a year Old PBRUMEN c: i thy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities, In May 1961, at which time he'‘held the position of Under- Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground ‘activities. had come. to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti- vated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary ‘activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense win Seon Seeded 2 i sen . He states that he is working for the overthrow o ~ the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control, His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre- sents a difficult handling problem. 2, AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a Taw graduate of the University. of Havana. He has been in- ‘volved much of his adult life in Clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME .He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed — \ifrom his counter-revolutionary experiences, From January to July 1961 he made four biocigsigefiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cubs ; aim, and has an excellent ‘Knowledge of the nortH@Mtaoze> area, He is easy to work
i 7 with and has evidenced ‘little of the hostilities or anti- KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27, 3.  AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a @@ year old fisherman from the area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/l4 in infils and exfils and will - be used as a maritime guide. B, TASKS l. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact , individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations. - ot . 2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for trans- portation into Havana. - 7 wd a 3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana “ and obtain safehousing and operational support. a oe - 4, Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil- 4 _ tration and future infiltrations, — 5. Approach and recruit two-key individuals with contacts - among important military figures. 6.. Establish internal and external communications. _ 7.. Exfiltrate from Phase II. | C.- INFIL-EXFIL PLANS Iti atta Ne de Ve lI 2.111 Gubtdltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Ci Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April Subjects.will take a small: boat with Silent motor — spleen area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements _ with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 TII, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be i i of May. at which time ANTCE yinco Leguas and expect to be ‘passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).