SECRET 233 i | CIA documents and, as a means of allowing the Agency to Ww monitor what they gave us and to make sure that everything 3 | that they gave us will be given back to them, they have ! you? 4 | number-stamped each page. That is also an appropriate way w { = 5 | for us to refer to each page, for purposes of our record, \ \ S 61 because eventually everything will be returned to. the S | | | = 7 | Agency. S 3 In the future, if somebody is trying to reconstruct ™“ 4 Qo 7 | what we are looking at, they just need to turn to the a | z 'G | appropriate page. g a At this time, I would like to refer to CIA-177, and I 2 ; = 14 | . ; _ '# | will ask you to read that. c i | (Pause) = i * 4 | Mr. Scelso. Yes, I remember this cable. ge 134 Mr. Goldsmith. That cable is dated when? = ! an a - | Mr. Scelso. 9 October 1963. . i n oF . Lae C Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated that you remember that - | cable? = 194 . . ~ Mr, Scelso. I remember having seen it two years ago { 7” with the Senate investigation. | 2 | BOS Mr. Goldsmith. On the upper left-hand corner of the ®@ a cable, it says WH-8.. Mr. Scelso.. That means eight coptes went to WH. a> | : Y | Mr. Goldsmith. Would one copy of this have gone toa | { SECRET posta | i ALDESSON REPORTING COMPANY Docld: 32277215 Page 34
SECRET a Mr. Scelso. Yes. 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. In October of '63 when the cable was | . -Mr.-Scelso. Yes. Went to Charlotte Bustos. 3 sent out? | | have been put there? | | i 2, a S| Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated it went to Bustos by ! | a 6 | writing indication on the top of the page. Is that correct? | a | x ‘ ‘Mr. Scelso. Well, iit came to our desk, you see. It | = : | is from Mexico City so we automatically got the action on | “ ‘i Go” | it and the information copies went to counterintelligence = ‘0 | staff, FI staff, Soviet Division, I guess that is Régistry. = m I do not know what "BR" is. | < | E 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. On the bottom right-hand corner of the | z a 120: . e = page, it says 201-289248. Zou | “ il Mr. Scelso. Yes. S i Mr. Goldsmith. What does that refer to? = { ! = 1g | | ~ ° | Mr. Scelso. Probably it refers to Oswald's 201. = i a 17 | ‘ Mr. Goldsmith. I noted in the left-hand corner of the | ez = page, left-hand side of the page, there is a notation that | = 19 | ™ | says D-200-5-41. Do you know. what that means? e 39 | . ° | Mr. Scelso. I have no idea. | Se Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when that indication would | = | | Mr. Scelso. No. That could be a subject file, refer- ring to the Kennedy assassination, or something like that. Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph of this cable makes SECRET 001815 i ALDESSON REPORTING COMPANY Docld: 32277215 Page 35 ;
SECRET 1-38 reference to a photograph. wo ! Mr. Scelso. Yes. | 4 prior to the assassination? Mr. Goldsmith. Was that. photograph sent to headquarters i i ; | i H 2 5 Mr. Scelso...-.No, I do not. believe it was. It was sent. : P | afterwards. | S 7 : Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether that photograph z a depicted Lee Harvey Oswald? < 9 : -  Mr.=Scelso.. No, I do not... This was the famous photo- : 1G | graph that was shown to Oswald's mother, and so on, which : 7 she thought. was Jack Ruby. | 3 12 | Mr. Goldsmith. That is correct. That is the photograph © = 33 | in question. | = i = 14 ’ Do you have any explanation for the photograph which is | : 1§ | commonly referred to as the "Mexico mystery man" photograph? | : iF Do you have any explanation for that? \7 | Mr. Scelso.. They looked at the photographs that they : : 18 | had for the period when the telephone call was made. This ” | = 19 | was the only one that could have conceivably been. him. | S 30 | So they said, they conjectured, concluded, that. if we do have pepe |! a photograph of the man, this is it. 4 ~~ A xv Mr. Goldsmith. On what do you base that explanation? 23 | Mr. Scelso. My knowledgesof the photography operation and talks with station officers before and afterward. They did not get pictures of everyone who entered and exited the SECRET 001816 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY eo °® Docld: 32277215 Page 36 | : {
SECRET SECRET recall anybody from Mexico coming up soon. after the ! ! ! ! } | L : oots17: ; | Soviet Embassy. 2 Mr. Goldsmith. The photograph of the Mexico mystery 3 | man, let's back up for a minute. 4 The Mexico mystery man. was a non-Latin.. Is that correct = 5 | Mr, Scelso. Yes. 5 P | Mr. Goldsmith. Was his picture the only picture of a g 7 | non-Latin taken during that time period? & 3! Mr. Scelso. Ido not know. I never saw all of the e ‘ ; pictures that were taken during that period. : 10 Mr. Goldsmith. If there were pictures of other non- 5 i 2 1 | Latins taken during that period of time, what reason would $ 12 | the Mexico City station have had for. sending that particular @ z 13 picture? ; t4 Mr. Scelso. I do not know, if there were other pictures! : i$ | of non-Latins. I do not. know what other pictures there = i were at all. “ "| Mr. Goldsmith. Who were the case officers that you = 18 ) spoke to down there pertaining to this particular photograph?) a = a Mr.. Scelso. Dave Phillips. Winn Scott. 5 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Did Phillips tell you that he was ae actually down in. Mexico City at the time during this particular @ ye 22 incident with the Mexico mystery man?- 23 Mr. Scelso. These discussions were after the assassina- r a4 | tion, probably a good deal after the assassination. I do not, 23 | i GN REPORTING COMPANY AL SERS Docld: 32277215 Page aT i | | | | | | |
to ye w z 5 ON i vay “a 6 a a Cc — a “ S 2 Land ™ . 4 oO x a co) & S = a a (o = — =z 1 = = fed ta Say i & 13 9 ze 13 > wn VW e te 3 4 i3 ie) = 19 ~ S 39 oe) aw ero 2 Chace OSS nd fa fas 22 oo 23 Aa a4 Docld: 32277215 Page 36 SECRET | 1-37 assassination. There was a great deal of cables back and forth on this whole business. Mr. Goldsmith. Can you recall anything else that Winn Scott might have said in reference to this photograph? | Mr. Scelso. No. We conjectured that Mexico City, and we conjectured that it was a Mexican seaman. Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragrpah of this cable contains an accurate description of Oswald. Is that a fair statement? (Pause) * Mr. Selso. The description would not apply to Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith. Why is. that? Mr. Selso. Because Oswald was not that old. He was not of athletic build. He was not six feet tall. He did have a receding hairline, and he could have worn anything. But. the description itself is too old, the build is wrong and the height is wrong. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether at any time the Mexico City station obtained a photograph of Oswald? Mr. Selso. No, I never heard that they did. They may have been sent one from Washington, but they did not photo- graph him locally, as far as I know. Mr. Goldsmith. That is what I meant. SECRET (001818 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
Mr. ow 0 - | 5 33 ~ t t 38 Mr. ~ 3 —N of 7 Mr. : | Gg Fi Mr. a 2 4 cable? eS Hi i qe t2 Mr. = ‘ = i ~ = 4 Mr. x ti zy Mr. sie | Mr. = i el row Mr. oa Ht . = id 4 Mr. —_ a f = | Ss 29 H Mr. | ~ an a : Vy ~h Mr. i 23 «il | J ADTOADP. Docld:32277215 Page, 39 1-38 Scélso. No. Goldsmith. Wet us look, now, at CIA-179. Would you please read through that? (Pause) Have you evér seen this particular cable before? Scelso. Yes. Goldsmith. When was that? Scelso. Probably the day it was written. Goldsmith. Does your name appear anywhere in that Scelso. Yes. Goldsmith. Where is that? Scelso. Right*=here [Indicating]. Goldsmith. AT the bottom of CIA 181? Scelso. Yes. Goldsmith. What is the date of this cable? Scelso. 10 October 1963. | Goldsmith. I believe that you acted as the coordi- nating officer with regards to this cable. Scelso. I was what was called the authenticating since it went out of my Branch, you see. Goldsmith. Does it not indicate here that J.C. King | is the authenticating officer? Scelso.. That is right. It was released by 001819 1 t { i | } ! H !
Mr. Goldsmith. . Thomas Karamessinas? » tw Mr. Scelso. Yes. a nd ee Mr. Goldsmith. What is the purpose of having so many people review a cable? 001829 | 3 ! Mr. Goldsmith. Were . you the coordinating officer? | 4 ! Mr. Scelso. They called me coordinating officer because | | 3 : there is no other place for it. But they came out of my | - 6 Branch, you see. It was written in my Branch, so I have to S "| Sign it before it can even leave the Branch, so I am really | s : an authenticating officer. | : 7 Mr. Goldsmith. What does the term "authenticating ) : 19 officer" mean? | : 7 | Mr. Scelso. An authenticating officer is responsible | = | : 2 | for the content of the cable. He approves the content of | TF 2 2 it and the coordinating officers certify that they have no | = | : . i = 14 objection to it and approve the general tenor of it, but. | is | they are not responsible for its content. | : | Mr. Goldsmith. When you. say responsible for its content, a 7 you mean responsible for its accuracy? | : a | Mr. Scekso. . For its accuracy, and the propriety of | 2 | its recommendations, and so on. | é 0 Mr. Goldsmith. What about a releasing officer? What : ee is his responsibility? | : y ox 22 Mr. Scelso. The releasing officer approves the. briefing, a all of the policy and the factual content. | ‘| i moss =e st 7 Docld:32277215 Page 40 ALQERSON RESORT!
> wa =. S = > ™ ' ve : wt Q A ~ ; = > Pa i — N o a < ™ . ot 3 Y Pat ~° 1G S S = oy te C2 @ =» = ~ = = tea & = te 2 tw ~ c Ey, is > a \7 — 4 be 1S an = i) ~ c c 30 = 20 q1 ~a a aad Pos. Sal 22 oN Docld: 32277215 Page 41 In this particular case, we have had four people. We have had the originating officer. We have an authenticating officer, a coordinating officer, and then the releasing officer. Mr. Scelso. Well, it went up to Mr. Karamessinas. because it involved disseminating information on an American citizen to other U.S. government agencies, you see. At that time -- probably still -- the CIA did not investigate or pass around information on American citizens unless it were requested to by another government agency, either. in that particular case or by some standard operating procedure. In other words, the CIA, seeing an American abroad, @bserving an American abroad, engaging in some skullduggery, would inform the responsible U.S. agency here and sit and wait for instructions before doing anything further. In this case, we were passing on information to other U.S. government agencies in Mexico City and this probably went to other places in Washington as well. Mr. Goldsmith. This particular information was dissem- inated to other agencies without the request of-any other such agency. Is that correct? | | Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. This fit into the other category of cases where disseminations were made? Mr. Scelso. Disseminations would be made to other SAnry SLbknd 8 ALSESSON REZOR GMP ARLE +) OP ee, | teal a ag daa’ 0041821
interested agencies, and any information we came across | | 2 | had action taken to follow up to take further investigative | to “steps ,Digseminstionwould only be taken if another agency requested it, either specifically in that case, or unless it were*a part of standard operating procedure, which would have been agreed upon with another agency. Mr. Goldsmith. Was any follow-up action contemplated by thisccable? ant 20024 (202) $5%~-2345 ~s Mr. Scelo. Yes.. Please keep headquarters advised of 0.C. wp a any further contacts or for positive identification.of Oswalds«. UASH EMC TON , Mr. Goldsmith. | That would be considered a follow-up. Mr, Scelo. Yes. They were instructed to stay alert and report any further evidence of this man's presence. Therefore, Mr. Karamessinas had to sign off. on it. day REPORTERS WUPLDENG, Mr. Goldsmith. M¥. Karamessinas had to sign off on it aU, Oo s “1 _ because follow-up action was contemplated? - Mr. Scelo. With regard to a U.S. citizen abroad. STRENC, oa “Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, I think . \ you said that there were two situations where Mr. Karamessinag 390 Vt requested the dissemination? | Mr. Scelo. Yes. No -- not the question of the dissemina- tion. It is a question of operational action being taken. | i ' | a would have to sign off. One would be where another agency | | i Mr. Goldsmith. A request for operational action. What | 001822 Docld:32277215 Page 42
rey 4 < 4 4 wv = 5 o a GN t wT . wa § ~ en c on 7 ~— 2 ~ “ o fol = ~ . Py t3 x aQ * wal = ae] S od Ss = b oeed im Pel << = 14 ta - ‘2 = fo 14 2 is pay road ta io ios a -— & te = in = x = : * lé ~ = wn Iv “ = be (ona vy S i3 nn ef ~ c Cc ~ = 29 Docld: 32277215 1-42 is the second example? : Mr. Scelo. Well -- : i Mr. Goldsmith. Would the Agency itself decide to take | operational action?: ; | Mx... Scelo. Ordinarily, operational action in an ordinary case would not require Mr. Karamessinas'!s>approval at all. interest in an American citizen might come about because of | | . tas . | It was only because an American citizen was involved.?.That | a specific statement of interest about this individual from another U.S. government agency or it might come. about because. of a standard operating procedure.. For example, we had an agreement with the FBI that we - would follow up leads on any American citizen in Mexico City | who appeared around the Soviet. Embassies, and so on, or any~- body who was down there appearing. to defect, which we might learn through our telephone intercepts. t $ | i We could just as well have sent this cable out without . | Mr.. Karamessinas ‘releasing it. I do not know why we did nots! Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, you pointed to something which as high up in the Agency as Mr. Karamessinas was the releasing | | | | I was going to ask you about. I was wondering why somebody officer. Mr. Scelo. It would have been because of the U.S. citizen aspect, because so many other U.S. government agencies were *nvolvedy State Department, FBI and the Navy. i ALDERSON Ss? TING COMP AAY Page 43
Doctld: ww iy ae bad 1 A 3 | GN i a , wa 8 ~ a | = 7} —_ rs : if ~ if N . i .S) 3 i = ‘| GC ! rs ry ad rroogt a i a i" = rit ie) : | ‘2 i = : — $33 = i. | = Hi} = son i z i pm 4 = 1S i S it Eo. is | = | “ V7 i{ . | re ig | tue | a = 13 | = | f) < an! = 29.} \ i OS aya Rav 22 oot (ey nr — Ww ta 1-43 I suppose one of these things is the Navy. One of them could be the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Mr. Goldsmith. Let me attempt to summarize again. | Karamessinas would be responsible for signing off on this 1 { L | because operational action pertaining to an American was being . taken? Mr. Scelo. Yes. | Mr. Goldsmith. Either pursuant. to the request of another government agency or pursuant to some standard operating procedure of the Agency itself. | Mr. Scelo.s Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Any other reason that. you can think of? Mr. Scelo. No. ; | Mr. Goldsmith. I believe you indicated that there was | an arrangement, or an agreement, with the FBI that any activities by Americans around. the Soviet Embassy or Cuban | Embassy would be reported and followed up on by the Agency. Was that agreement in writing? Mr. Scelo. I do not know. It probably was.-in writing somewhere, It antedated my tenure, and the agreement was not! in the files. It would have been in the files of the DDP of of the CI. staff. Mr. Goldsmith. Would there have been a similar arrange-' ment with military intelligence? Mr. Scelo. Yes, but probably not formalized. We had 001824. 32277215 Blage 44 ALSERSON iene “NG a comeasiy
Bod a4 Sages 4 1-44 rary worked on a number of cases in Mexico involving military defectors. As you know, they had been detected, arrested nN “and taken back to the United States and convicted. we @ \ Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this cable, I believe that Ses = 5 it contains a correct description of Mr. Oswald in the first # 5 | paragraph. Is that not true? | S 5 | Mr. Scelo. Well, I would not think he was 165 pounds. % | Mr. Goldsmith... Other than that? 3 oh Mr. Scelo. I would say it is accurate. I do not know | | 2 | = 19 | the color of his eyes. | S i = n | Mr. Goldsmith. It is apparent from paragraph one of | = | i an i > this cable that there is some variation in description between @ = 4] | this cable and the one which was sent from the Mexico City 2 = i — i = ,, | station? = : i = | Mr. Goldsmith. “Did: you.or anyone else at Headquarters: ‘A IT | ever receive any response from the Mexico City station with = 13 regard to the discrepancy in the description of the Oswald = 13 | person. ¢ | Mr.-Scelo. Of the person in the photograph? | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes-« ai > atl Mr. Scelo. I am sure we did, but I do not know what OL ~ WwW ee _ oo EF dey /4 g.) b> oy Ly form it was in. Do you have all the cables, or just some of them.. > + Mr.’ Goldsmith... We have seen what the Agency has told us | | CEPRET | 001825. Docla:32277215 Page 45 — - ALSSSSON REPORTING COMPARIY
t's 1-45 i is all of the cable traffic. I am confining my question now | 4 to the period before the assassination. i 2 | Prior to the assassination, did the Mexico City station | | ’ ever respond to this cable, specifically with regards to this | E 7 question of the man who was identified as Oswald? . | é 4 Mr. Scelo. _ 1 dosnot recall that it did. : 7 Mr. Goldsmith. You indicated a few moments ago that | S the Mexico City Station sometimes did respond? | ; : Mr. Scelo. Yes. | ! : os Mr. Goldsmith. When was that? | : 7 Mr. Scelo. After the assassination. I do not remember | | af what form it was in. It could have been in one of the phone ; @ = 13 calls.. | = i | 2 tA Mr. Goldsmith. Telephone calls after the assassination? | : | Mr. Scelo. Yes. I am sure that there were a.lot of | z 7 telephone calls made after the assassination. : "| Mr. Goldsmith. Why was that? Why were telephone calls : : oe made instead of cables being sent? | 13 | Mr. Scelo. It. was the propensity of senior division : = 20 | | | a the Station Chiefs which was a terrible practice. Mc. Goldsmith. Do you recall if you ever? Mr. Scelo. I think I did on one or two occasions. | u officers to call over the Western Hemipshere by telephone to =. | | | | Mr. Goldsmith. For what purpose? ibe y 7 tn Mr. Scelo. I think probably at the time of Presidential | 001826 Ww { i 4 ! i i a Docld:32277215 Bage 46 ALDERSON 2S2catT ING COMPANY
1-46 trips to Mexico and to Costa Rica, maybe Panama. There were wo times when things came in=arid we telephoned -- I think I was ! ordered to telephone. This was at a time when, of course, | : i President Kennedy was flying to Mexico City and a million : | telephone calls were going back and forth from government | agents and so on. | ire ' Mr. Goldsmith... What about immediately after the assas- | ree) sination? 20024 €202) SS"-23n5 Mr. Scelo. I do not think I made any telephone calls Hic, We) oO although I cannot exclude it. I remember in the course of heavy debates with the station about the reports of this CASUTNGTON, ~* way rather than make telephone calls. ¢ be | | | | | Nicaraguan fabricator, instead of~going over to flash cables { | | | | ) 7 | Mr. Goldsmith. Turn to paragraph 5 of this cable. It | { ta indicates: "Please keep headquarters advised of any further ee REPORTERS BUEEEING, —y contacts or positive identification of Oswald." MW, S st i?) Do you recall whether the Mexico City station ever kept oo headquarters advised in the matter requested? Mr. Scelo. I do not recall and I assume that. they did | JN PTH STRERT, o not pick up any further information about himp:-although they did, did they not? | Mr. Goldsmith. They did, yes. Mr. Scelo. It just comes to me they did. Mr. Goldsmith. We will go into that in a little while. ! bd 7 45 : Mr. Scelo. -I do not recall whether they sent any further | : ra . : eri on eT | CRE | 001827 Docld: 32277215 Page 47 ALRESSON Belen SH 2A COMPBARLY
1-47 4 | cables. , As I say, although I did sign off-on these-cables ~ the day of the assassination, I had: no recollection of the 3 | name Oswald, although I have a very, very good memory. You | : can imagine. Thousands of names were crossing my desk every : 3 3 | month. ) | ! “ ' Mr .:.Goldsmith.. Charlotte Bustos remembered. | g 7 “Mr. Scelo. She remembered, and so did other people, | fs 7 the girls who typed the things and so on remembered this S 7 and immediately pounced upon it in our files. | = 10 | Mr. Goldsmith. Charlotte Bustos probably came across ! : 7 as Many names as you did. Is that a fair statement? | a : = 2 | Mr. Scelo. Yes. She was concerned only with Mexico and 2 : 1 I had five or six other countries to work with as well. She | : is has a fantastic memory. | | is | Mr. Goldsmith. What is your impression of Charlotte : = ie | Bustos as far as competenvé-and integrity? 4 7 | Mr. Scelo. Charlotte Bustos in her job as the manager | Pa E al of records, traces and files, in this Mexico desk, was an | z + | state officer to whom I. gave, in one of her fitness ! 5 7: reports, the highest evaluation, outstanding, number 6 and so. . ae on, that can be given, that was very rarely given at that aaa | time. _— ne Her work was pretty near flawless and she also was an outstanding trainer of new employees. Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that this cable refers to oswald i Aare Docld:32277215 Page 48 ALDERSON RESOCRTING COMPANY
DocId:32277215 Page 49 ALDERSON  REPORTIN te} ww =z 3 ron) ~ GN 1 “ : wa 3 ~ ™ , Ss o 7 ~~ S a = ™ . a a 7 a = i s g = 71 a « = : a le uz = 19 = 12 = = 2 1 ood a - = 13 S = => n 17 = ‘ S 3 in = 19 ~ ¢ e 30 3 4 qa] ORES ws -+ af aN 1-48 | as "Lee Henry Oswald" in the first paragraph of that cable. Is there any way that you can explain that error in terms of . | the incorrect name? | . Mr. Scelo. I have heard after the fact that, in some book of records, that this was a mistake in the 201 file. — | Mr. Goldsmith. Did you. ever check that yourself? Mr.-Scelo. No. It was straightened out immediately in the néxt cable. | Mr. Goldsmith. Why would Charlotte Bustos have been the originated officer of this cable? Mr. Scelo. Because she wrote it. The person who actually composed the wording of the cable wrote his name up i there, and she was, on an important case like this, compli- cated:.. she frequently did the tracing and so on-herself. . Lesser. matters may be handled by any number of other analysts. Mr. Goldsmith. Why was this an important case? Mr. Scelo. Because it involved an American security | | suspect. | Mr. Goldsmith. The fact of Oswald's appearance at the | Soviet Embassy in Moscow would not have been considered an insignificant matter? © ; | Mr. Scelo. No. But, as I say, what went on in the | | Soviet Union and what the CIA officers in the Soviet Union | did, is something: that: completely escaped my knowledge and scope and view at that time. _— 901829 SEGRE :
1-49 As a matter of fact, in an Agency like ours, at that time, you heard all kinds of scuttlebut from all over the i | ' | place, but you just did not hear anything about who was in | a | Moscow or what they were doing there. You did not hear any- thing. in } Even when I was in my later positions where I saw every~ | thing in the world, I did not see that. It is one of the ou 20024 (202) 554-2305 “ t | reasons I retired,bbecause they refused to give me access. | t i They gave me the responsibility for evaluating operations p.c. vey | i worldwide and no insight into our Soviet and satellite recruit! ments.. . VASHTHGTON , 1 i t | Mr. Goldsmith. Staying with oswala's appearance at the Embassies in Mexico City, the fact that Oswald was’an Amer ican defector and showed up at these embassies was considered by | the Agency as being significant? | | | Mr. Scelo. Yes. REPORTERS BUPELDTNG, ta | | | “Mr. Goldsmith. Stepping back for a moment, at the time i : . that Oswald made the appearance at the embassies. would the Mexico City station have considered his contact with the embassies to be significant? Joo 7TH STRERT, orn 7 41: Mr. Scelo. Oh, yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Even though they did not necessarily know that he had been a defector, they just knew that Oswald had contacted the embassies? r re Mr. Scelo. Yes. The fact that he was an American ~SEGReT 001830 a ALDERSC a] REPORTING COMPANY Docld: 32277215 Page 50
contacting the Cubans and the Russians, especially in the context of which they knew it, because they had détails of | i the telephone conversations,. signalling this to them, that this was a very important case. ‘Mr. Goldsmith. Were Americans frequently contacting either the Soviet or Cuban Embassy? ree) many cases like ~-- of course they were. On the Soviet 2002" (202) SSn-2345 ; i "| Mr. Scelo. I do not know about the Cuban Embassy. Not | Oo Embassy, a significant number of American military. people N.C. involved in sensitive, highly-classified military activities VTON , in the southwestern United States attempted to defect to WASHTY the Russians in order to pass information to them and were Q détected by our surveillance means and were apprehended. That had happened before this. Mr. Goldsmith. Every time that an American contacts REPORTERS ROELDING, one of these embassies, would a cable be sent? JW, s Mr. Scelo. If you were identified, yes. Mr. Goldsmith. A cable would be sent insteadd of a dispatch, because the matter. would be considered important? 390 TT STRENT, ray | Mr. Scelo. Yes. Mrs Goldsmith. I presume,.then, if we were to review all of the Mexico City cable traffic for, let's say, half a year prior to the assassination, we would come across other | contacts by Americans:.who.were identified, Americans who would ' : have visited these embassies? . ALDESS5N REPORTH Docld: 32277215 Page 51
al a Pale | ER 4 1-51 7 Mr. Scelo. I do not want to imply that these contacts | 2 | were. detected every week or every month. af Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. | S| Mr. Scelo. They were detected enough so that J. Edgar z s | Hoover used to glow every time that he thought of the Mexico | : | station. This was one of our outstanding areas of coopera- : ~ { 5 " tion with the FBI. S i Mr. Goldsmith. Let me see if we can reconstruct this s 5 | somewhat. Oswald's initial contact to the embassies in : 0 Mexico City would, in the eyes of the Mexico City station, | : nl be considered significant because it was a contact by an | nn Fi | 5 2 American? | ® - 12 ' Mr. Scelo. Yes.. . _ | z | Mr.cGoldsmith. Then the Mexico City station receives | : is | information that Oswald was a defector, had been:a defector? | z ig | Mr. Scelo. Yes. 3 ‘ 17 | Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure if this made reference to ! : 18 | his offering to give military secrets or not. : : 9 | Mr. Scelo. I think he did. | S 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. No, it. does not.. ! {yt “a PT 3 In any event, they know he is an American contacting N J | : 1 | (Pause) ae a | | { ! the Soviet and Cuban embassies and they know that he is a | b> we former defector, so that would elevate the significance of i Y il . -- » his contact. Is that correct? | 001832. SLbne | i oe “5s wens TTS YN Docld: 32277215 Page 52 ALDERSON RESORT. COMP AM
Mr. Scelo. Yes. i 7 Now,.:-why did they not report everything they found..cut? a | Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question. | ~ 4 | Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by | ! = z principally Mexican supervision of an American, or Mexican- | 2 é | American. These people were just. inundated with. information 5 Z and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to = 3 7 Washington. | v 2 | The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on, | z ne) which only were divulged after the assassination. It. is an | : 4 enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest and most : = = 12 active telephone intercept operations in the whole world ©. z 13 and the job of processing this material is just. impossible. | : 14 Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step, | : is although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going, 5 Is | to modify the line of inquiry somewhat .. | “ "| Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were : 8 in the Mexico City station? n H : = a Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped? | = 20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet. Mr. Scelo. I think there are about 30 lines being tapped altogether. That is just the number that sticks in my mind. | i ; i Mr. Goldsmith. Thirty meaning a total of thirty from t \ : | both the Soviet and the Cuban? a Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects. CET 001833 ‘ae REPORTING COMEFARY v3 ms: i ALOERSON Docld:322772715 Page 453 ALS ¥
1-53. Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related to the Soviet or Cuban? — tw Ww es | | , Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists | living there whom we tapped at the.specific request of J.. | 5 i Edgar Hoover. 5 é | Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines how many, at your | 5 "| best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans? | < a Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they aS had. | : 10 Mr. Goldsmith. You think just. about every outside | : 1 | phone? . $ 2 Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines. |  ) : 14 Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you? | FE td Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based on my» recollection; 2 i : 3 | going back 15 years. : = a Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was : 3 7 | that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City ! : a was one of the most extensive in. the world? : : 7 Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great : é 2 deal which they could not exploit. They could not later | i . H “TE at | listen to it; they did not. have time. They used. to listen | © es 22 to it sort of spottily, you see, and attempt then to exploit | 2 : what was. the most. important. > 7 Vn Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the _SECR eRe 901834 Docld:32277215 Page 54
1-54 headquarters prior to the assassination. I think that the ta 7 fact that. Oswald's other telephonic contact with the Embassy | | was not knowrm is that an accurate summary? oe Mr. Scelo. I think they did have other information on 3 : this later telephonic -- | | : S| Mr. Goldsmith. Why was it not reported? | 5 : Mr. Scelo. A question of too much material to process : S a and too many important priorities. And possibly they would | Re ¢ 7 have gotten around to doing it, you see. They have a backlog. | = 0 They would have gotten around to it. | = no Mr. Goldsmith. We have already established a few things. 7 = 2 One, Winn Scott is a very demanding and competent station i cS : i : @ a 12 chief. | = al Mr. Scelo. Yes. : : a Mr. Goldsmith. We have established that. Oswald's ! — = IE | contact was initially important and the importance became : 4 7 somewhat elevated when they found out that he had been a : : ia | defector? | | ai 2.1 | Mr. Scelo. Yes. | 5 . Mr. Goldsmith. Which Suggests not only he had been a | mee defector but formerly had served in the Marines? : EET | Mr. Scelo. Yes. | Mr Goldsmith. It is possible that his contacts with oS te the embassies was for the purpose of attempting to defect again, and yet there is no communication from the Mexico City: SEGHE, 001835 Docld:32277215 Page 55 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
DoctId: ce ta a Seude 3 1+55 station to headquarters concerning any of Oswald's. other 2 contacts. yo 2 | Mr. Scelo.. You see, they had reels and reels of tape t : ; to go over. The monitors would monitor certain lines and | Es ae record. other lines and when they had time, they had to scan 5 7 the other lines to see who was calling what, and they could | g 7 have missed it. And, of course, maybe they just had a back- : S 2 | log which they were going to process later. ! : | I do not remember when his latest contacts were. They : = | were right in the dame period or within a few days, were | : nl they not? | 3 i | = 12 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | 5 12 Mr. Scelo. When was he first. in Mexico City anyway? | z 14 What was the time of that? | é is | Mr. Goldsmith. .I believe, according to the Warren ! © i 2 1s Commission, he arrived in Mexico City on September 26th or 3 a in 27th? | , : Mr. Scelo. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Excuse me for a moment. (Pause) 3n0 VTU STRERT, Ww -~ = oO ve) oo ~ pee US (A brief recess was taken.) ast = : . . ' pe 22 \ -Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelo, I am going to show you some | 21" transcripts to review in a minute. Before I do so, though, | | 24 | I would like to ask you to read CIA No. 162, 161, specifically 451 the section marked "Liaison Coverage." arp eT 901836 32277215 Page 56 ALDERSON win Vibh ae EC seatey
DoctId: Ww i i 7 3 j 2 | = si 7 ~ 3 ~ | 4 i = i 2 4 wy w 6 i “ | Cc ~ 7 | ~ | ne 2! o a4 = | ™N | tt . 4 o 7 |! S - tn H = Nw, sc ! = i oe oi = if = i a fej = i = i ei : i fe re = iv u ° it a i| lol ra t = le. ~ i = | “ \7 i - i ~~ j = 174 ~ { _ { 9 - \ a 20 | | 21 i Om ri Ma 22 3 Ve ~\ 23 i ! | | | ie a ‘ 32277215 Page 57 ALDERSON REPORT! if (Pause) Mr. Scelo. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on that. This refers to the envoy operation that was the joint operation conducted by the Mexicans and the Americans and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lines, in fact, connected at one time, so that your early eestimony was, in all likelihood, accurate. | I am going to have to ask you also tomead the section marked number 3, Oswald coverage. Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask? Mr. Goldsmith. This is taken Erom the 1977 Inspector General Report. Mr. Scelo. I see. Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162. ¢ (Pause) On page 161, the section where it says: “Oswald Cover- age. In mid-62, the Mexican officer in charge of the envoy, ‘the joint tap operation, asked the American officer at the envoy listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible coverage." The question I have for you is as follows. It would seem, from the earlier paragraph, that the liaison operation | 001837
1-57 was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary for the Mexican officer in charge to ask the American officer | | 2 I for the telephone numbers? 4 i Mr. Scelo. The Mexicans were probably tapping other | = 3 | things at that time, not these targets. They were tapping | : 5 other Mexicans, and so on. We had our own unilateral tap | S - | operations .-~ : a | Mrs Goldsmith. I understand that. | . | Mr. Scelo. “7 on those important targets. : 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior.to 1962 | 5 r the liaison operations with the Mexicans did not cover the | = i = 3 Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies? | © 2 ir Mr. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really | = 2 a recall. That would have been in mid-62. That was just | : 7 about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk. | : 16 And I do not recall what the previous status was. ! > o | I do recall that they certainly did ask -- they suddenly - 13 | disclosed the intent to tap certain lines which we were | = . i - 15 | tapping unilaterally. - : : at Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that the liaison operation : 7 had taps on 30 lines. If it was. not. the Soviet, Cuban and | nos i e a BE? 2 satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have | 32 been. | @ 24 Mr. Sdelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; , Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or | i | | =n 001838 _ SEDRE! Docld:32277215 Page 58 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
ae) ey Sa, Bate tial five Mexican Communist Parties. 1 i | of Mexico, political rivals and. so on. | Je 2 | They were also tapping the phone of previous Presidents | | However, I cannot swear that this statement is correct. 2 7 I do not. know that the July envoy was not previously tapping : 7 some of the phoneswwhich are indicated here. = : . You see, Mexico City, at that time, had the most compre-} S | hensive, extensive telephone tap facilities and surveillance 5 | facilities of any station ‘in the world; and although Mexico : of was a-big, and very well-run station, it is in the nature. : nl of things -- they had far more material to deal with than a they could possibly handle. - i i @ : 13 This is something which everyone in the intelligence : 7 business knew, you see, but no one ever said it. in writing. & E is | You did not like to go.before your bosses or put on the 2 | record the fact that you have far more, like ten times, work | A 7 to do than you can possibly do, especially when you consider | 7 that the Agency has a counter-espionage responsibility for ! = I } : 9 | the United States government abroad and that the FBI had | 5 °| no business in these operations at all in Mexico City, but | j . : . i = a1 | they were doing so well that nobody tampered with it. Feawd 22 In vast parts of the world, the agency was unable to 4 i ' 1 i even lay avhand on the counter-espionage task, because they » ee did not have the personnel. In African. countries which were Ww tn being taken over in front of our eyes by Communist groups, | __ Seered _ 001839 Docld:32277215 Bage 59 ALDSSSON REPORTING COMBaNY
DoctId: 1-59 wa two officers and a secretary -- so that Mexico was regarded .t 4a | in a number of important. critical cases, it performed the ” | = 5 i task. 7 | “ | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand. en & : Mr. Scelo. To say we were doing it. comprehensively would . | = * | have meant that we would have had an organization. there pro- 8 ” || portionately as big as the FBI in Washington. < . { = oy _Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the transcripts, I would like = !1 + you to look at CIA number 13, which is the transcript. of aA f| = ' October 1, 1963, and that apparently is a transcript in which Oswald identifies himself, and it is a transcript where the contact with the Soviet Embassy that triggered the cable REUPGRIEES BUPLDING, i } | | | P| . . . > } from the Mexico City station. | | S| (Pause) ” 7 | Now, the transcript, or the translator, indicates in : © | brackets that this was the same person who phoned a day or an ye = FI so ago and spoke in broken Russian. And Oswald also indicates 5 ne in fact, this was Oswald -- "I was at your placé last wee?! | saturday." pe Re October lst, for the record, was a Tuesday. 23 | “Then we have the next transcript that appears in CIA | Number 14, Oswald's contact on Saturday, September 28th. Ww ls Have you read a this? : | 001840 | SERRE 32277215 Page 60 ALOSESON eon NS COMPAALY as an outstanding station because in some discernible way,. and | mainly Russia, even Red China, we would have a two-man station i-- a © Ye
Doctld: 3 4 2 4 3 w = 5 pa Pe) « i n P ws fo} a ~N : c ad ~ é _— > ™ oa a Lag ~ . * rae Y a - {0 S & _ ty — tt a = = ° = 12 . % = 13 ~~ = tA is Ped o . al tw oC = 4 > an \7 « bed ’ s ig ae) = 19 ~ co = 29 Say 3 7S - aN 23 44 33 ao 32277215 Mrs Scelo. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. When would this transcript have come to the attention of the personnel of the Mexico City station? | | | | Mr. Scelo. That, I do not know. As you noted from the 1 other writings, when Russian was involved it had to go to a Russian transcriber who often had a backlog, of a week. Mr. Goldsmith. That is right. Mr. Scelo. It might have been a week or more before they saw this. | | | | | | Mr. Goldsmith. In any event,.Oswald indicates in the | conversation on the lst that he had been at the embassy on the previous Saturday and the translator also indicates the same person who phoned a day or. so ago, so there is. some sort of clue that this person, that there had been a previous Mr. Scelo. .That is right. -----"~ | | | | contact? | | Of course, he might not have identified himself in that previous contact. Mr. Goldsmith. In fact; in this contact of 9-28-63, | : there was no identification by him? Mr. Scelo. That is right. Mr. Goldsmith. There were two other. contacts on September 27, 1963. One at 4:05 in the afternoon and one at Oswald identify himself. : ECR Bage 61 ALDSSSCN REZSORTIN we a fr “i 3 COMFERY 4:26 in the afternoon... In neither of those two contacts does | 1 | 001844
DoctlId: you of Oswald's -- of any of these other contacts prior to the | 1-61 Butmy question is, did the Mexico City station inform \ 4 001842 2 1 | assassination? | Mr. Scelo. No. “ 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think they should have? - tt , 2 a] Mr. Scelo. No. & - | Mr.. Goldsmith. Why not? z : | Mr. Scelo. The gist of all the conversations was the ; , | same, that the man was trying to get a Cuban visa to go to : _— in order to get a Russian visa, and there was no other i 1, | Significant information. 2 al Mr¢ Goldsmith. Did you know from the October Ist cable z aie the October 9th cable that arrived in Headquarters that 5 |, | Oswald was trying to get a visa? = al Mr. Scelo. I do not remember. Whatever the cable says. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Lét us look at the cable for a moment. = | Mr. Scelo. In other words, in the dynamics of the - - .g | security business--- = \ | Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to CIA 177, does that. make any : ra | reference to Oswald's visiting the Cuban Embassy or to the 1 fact that he was trying to obtain a visa? ESF x | Mr. Scelo. No. No indication about the Cubans and 37 || nothing about a visa. 7 7 Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that information should 2 | have been communicated to Headquarters? t 32277215 Page 62 Mie RLY
1-62 Mr. Scelso. Yes. Of course, it was processed differently, ! a4 wo you see. It was being processed by other people and the { Spanish-speaking, or the non-Russian material, you see, was te ae not processed this fast. = 5 Mr. Goldsmith. Nevertheless, all of this material was | é é | before the Mexico City station certainly within two weeks of | g 1 | Oswald's contact on October lst? x 7 Mr. Scelso. It was someplace in the pipeline in the $ station. You.do not know whether the tapes were transcribed, c ‘you see. You don't know whether these Mexicans in the inter- cept stations had even listened to the tapes, let alone trans- WASHINGTON, cribed them. They may have just stacked them up -- taken them 4 = off the recorders and stacked them up. BUTLDING, rey Mr. Goldsmith. My questions are asking you to testify about things that you do not have direct knowledge about. REPORTERS Assuming that the employees from the Mexico City station who We s. 1 were responsible for these transcripts have testified before i 1a} this Committee that the transcripts were reviewed in chrono- | = nn | : E19 | logical order -- in fact, the transcripts were linked to = 29 | Oswald prior to the assassination. Should that information have been sent to Headquarters? & \ nm — \ iY 3 Mr. Scelso. Ideally, yes, but I again state, in view eS % of the tremendous work overload of the station which again, nN tO) especially in the counterintelligence field, the outstanding BY station we had inthe entire world. Their performance really , cam 001843 SEuALL Docld: 32277215 tage 63 ALMERSON REPORTING COMPANY he
DoctId: was not open to professional criticism at that time. ie) | Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald, as you indicated ; | before, was a significant case? ors | Mr. Scelso. Yes, a significant case, but really, a one- tay time defector who came back and wanted to defect again, you see, is not really an important matter. In other words, there 20028 (202) $54-2945 ree) Certainly, even if J. Edgar Hoover had said, have the oO | with the Mexicans and have them arrested. | | { t D.C. man arrested by. the Americans and we will send a military plane down and have him put him on it and we will take him back. VASHTINGTON , This was done with military defectors, but I do not think that the Agené¢y would have done it. They would not. have had + ta $s a shred of legal right to do it. Mr. Goldsmith. Another possibility, aside from the fact day REPORTERS BUPTEDING , that he may have been trying to redefect, another possibility on aM, was that Oswald, when he returned to the states, was actually S “1 aie Soviet spy. Another possibility, and he was making contact. Mr. Scelso. That makes it of interest, that is correct. 390 7TH STRENT, Oo an still would not have warranted his arrest because there was no evidence that he was a Soviet spy, even today. Mr. Goldsmith. Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have i Ww ta OTPRrEyT 001844 32277215 Page 64 ALOSSSON REFORTING COMEARY
been handled in any different manner? nw . i | | Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissimina~ }. ; | tion of information about him, but I do not think that. any to operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or aT Z 7 to contact him or to try to force him back to the United | 5 é States. | g , | Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how. would the ! ~ . i Sa : dissemination have been treated differently? 3 = : | Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have | 5 ro disseminated any additional information that we got. | | g a Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters evér criticize the | Z 13 Mexico City station for failure to send this information? ! : i @ = 17 ! Mr: Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to! : ta go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of | in i | e 7 the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used 7 to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, | r i | secretly. | . i , z a We were running, at that time, a vast political action - | Prooran in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its | = 20 | Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction.and it : a! succeeded. I do not. know whether you informed yourself : BSS i ; Y gal 39 about the magnitude of our political action program there at , nh the time -- absolutely enormous. | . ; | r Zé : We were trying to follow the Soviets and. all the satel- : a lites and the Cubans. At. the same time, the main thrust of | 001845 COMBARLY Docld: 32277215 Page 65° ALSSRSON RESCRTIN
i ; ; - ; | the station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, 3 | Cubans and satellite people. n i ; | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall seeing any other transcrip pertaining to Oswald in addition to the ones I have shown you be | | : today? there were. ~m 2 Mr. Goldsmith. We can count these. F | Mr. Scelso. I do not recall seeing any additional ones. | S | I know that. there were several additional transcripts that cand s || encouse later in cable form. Those cables are in here, I | : | believe. | ! : 19 i Mr. Goldsmith. Pertaining to? | Ss ! - | : 1 Mr. Scelso. Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban ! 2 a embassies, and his telephone conversations. 7 - ' © : 14 Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying that, in cable form -- : z ta Mr. Scelso. After the assassination, more came in. | n ; | : sl Mr. Goldsmith. More transcripts came. in? What I am’ | : 1é saying is that these transcripts reflect a total of four. con- : r 17 | tacts by Oswald to the various embassies. | - E 7 Mr..Scelso. Yes. | = ! ' = a Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, were there any | g 20 additional contacts by Oswald to the embassies? | —— . Mr. Scelso. I would like to say first, I do not recall i e © ea = you say there were four. I do not recall exactly how many : i + +: : t so Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any additional ones. aD 001846 ocbae! ) ALDESSON RESCRTING COMPANY > Docld:32277215 Page 66
DocIa: > 3 4! i ! 2 a 3 ~“ ' t ? a , ! wi Q i t ~ land o 7 —_— x 2 = 3 ™ 3 9 ~- ‘10 g = Si = 32 cS = = 12 ~ HT = | = ta i 2 \ tome - 1 2 ft a . i “a isd fy & 134 a | _ \ = fF e a i = | 21 | ma 224 4 23 i 32277215 Page 67 ! 4 Sy a Raed tr. gi 1-66 No. WNor.can’ L“swear that this file contains all the. informa- tion we. got. I cannot swear that my memory is not that good. I know that we got additional information on several other telephone conversations and trips to these embassies after the assassination. We got the information. Mr. Goldsmith. That information you received may have been. the same, exactly the same, as these transcripts here? Mr. Scelso. That's right. Mr, Goldsmith. You don't know that there was a fifth transcript -- Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. -- of a fifth contact? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA Number 185. Would you identify that document? Mr. Scelso. That is a request. from the Mexico City station to Headquarters to send a photo of Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith Do you know why they requested that photo? Mr. Scelso. They wanted. to compare it with all the photos that they may have had of people entering the Cuban and Soviet embassies. Mr. Goldsmith. How do you’-know that? Mr. Scelso. Deduction. Mr. Goldsmith. Was a photo ever sent by headquarters to the Mexico City station? ) ALDERSON REPORTING COMPASLY 001847
4 « J A w = 5 a + ™ 1 wn : wi fo} ~ ON t a 7 ~ Ps a lad ™ . a t3 Y = i 5 = oti D > 4 Ve 2 . = _ 19 so. rant Boo a te Ped is 2 a “te for > a 17 ~ . e183 n = 19 ~ Cc S 7290 21 bs oo a ma? 22 Docld: 32277215 iw a ‘ J thee t 1-67 Mr.Scelso. I do not think so. We requested the Office SIE Ry of Naval Intelligence for one, and I do not think they ever gave us one. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why they never gave it to you? 2M Mr. Scelso. No. | { i Mr. Goldsmith. In the middle of the page here, there | is a line that says C/S COMINT and then it gives a description. J | Mr. Scelso. That is the cable center. There is an } intelligence duty officer down in the cable center who, for | | | i | il | the senior officer: .who read the board, read the cable board, i | and do not have all of these references at hand, write a a | i 1 i phrase here to explain to senior people what this cryptic ' sentence means, and he made a mistake. Mr. Goldsmith. That is my next question. In attempts of { i} \ 4 { t Lee Harvey Oswald and wife to re-enter -- iH Mr. Scelso. He quickly looked at the reference and mis- I | Mr. Goldsmith. What was therreference here? Mexico " City 6534? Mr. Scelso. Yes. | | f (Pause) . . i | Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 193. Would you please read that, and identify it.for the record? } ; id : : { Mr. Scelso. This is a cable that I wrote and sent to i DEERE] —s-: 001848 age 68 ALSESSN RE: S COMPAAY
PCE MEETCEPe | 1-68 i Mexico on November 23rd. .Was. that the day after the assassina+ tion? 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Scelso. Asking them to send a staff officer to 2 5 | Headquarters carrying the photos of Oswald -- meaning the = 7 | oi = : photos of what they believed to be Oswald. | 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever receive those photos? : = : ‘Mr. Scelso. Yes, we did. We got. them some way. There : ; | was only one photo. It was a photo of the unknown man. I do : a not know whether it‘ came that way, or whether we got them i g i from the FBI. I think an FBI officer returned to seadquarters: é _ | carrying them. | © : 3 Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates, "Call Mr. Whitten, é52-6027% : al Mr. Scelso. That was my home phone. So if he came in | 2 | the middle of the night.to the airfield, I would go pick him | E “16 up and take him to headquarters. I think by that time, Mr. : . i ! Helms had appointed me and put me in charge of the whole i ser, S. “1 thing. This was when I requisitioned an electric typewriter, you see. A person in my grade could not operate a typewriter.. JON TIM STRERT, we) I am a good typist, so, by using my priorities, I got an IBM 2ST electric typewriter and I wrote most of these cables myself, Ly nin 4 ’ me hundreds of cables. Ro (es) Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look now at Number 194. Would re @ you please read that cable and identify it? Ww da ALQERSON whe wi Ae Y COMESSY - , Docld:32277215 Page 69
to de wt 2 - = 5 ™ { 5, WI Nw ~ GN ce = 7 ied ™N = a = OM es 3 cam) . + = iG 2 & ~~ 1 od 1 a ee = 14 Va = = 42 . a ‘= = — ts bee te = is gS e , = Vs = ni V7 =z 18 a = 19 ~ c S 29 ra Panera DQ RT os “ wwe 22 AR - oy “ 23 @ * <> a: “: ra Docld: 32277215 (Pause) Mr. Scelso. all of the tapes; to | Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith. | tion of the CI staff? it was supposed to do -- special investigations. not be handled by one of the area divisions. ve. | i | | | CIA counterintelligence investigations which were so sensitive Birch O'Neal was an officer of the CI staff | | | which was in charge of the Special Investigation Section and i he, too, was working on this case and asked Mexico to review | see if there was other information about | \ What. was the Special Investigation Sec- Mr. Scelso. The Special Investigation Section of the CI Staff was a section, for once with the title indicating what. That was or of such a general super-regional nature that they should And this, in particular, applied to investigations of CIA employees who were suspected for working for foreign intelligence organizations or where you had to work abroad. Of course, the Office of Security was mixed up with this, too. a Soviet defector comes out and says, i as in the case of Nosenko or Solzenitsyn, a high-level spy, j Wo For instance, 1 | 1 Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso. : | ‘Would it. be CI/SIG? | | It is up here someplace. | ‘ Mr. Goldsmith. They were together with us, Page 70 OM REPORTING COMFAMY this section would have had to have done all of the leg work. What would be the abbreviation for that? t to a certain: 001850
WR rete 5 — ~ ee See 3 he! | Jutaa @ 1-70 degree. For instance, this was the outfit that had access to Mr. Scelso.- On an American who had defected abroad? ~# | the letter intercepts and I think it was at the time of the | 3 | assassination that I was first briefed on the letter inter- i} t ! . \ ® 4 cepts, you know, which later became such a scandal, although 5 * | they did not tell me’they were intercepting the letters in ene | £ i | “a s | United States. _ a | & "| Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, would this 5 * outfit be responsible for opening.up the 201 file on a defec- | J 7 | tor? | 2 10 | Mr. Scelso. No. | g i . = oud Mr. Goldsmith. Why not? i Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. BULEDTBS , Cre) re . | ‘Me Scelso. IE do not know. They could have been assigned i | } it. Perhaps they were assigned that responsibility. I do not know that they followéd American defectors, or not. Wo REPORTERS ! oO a4; - Mx. Goldsmith. I am not saying they were, or that they 2 | | : 3 did not, but I am wondering, as a matter of routine, CI/SIG : i = a would --. | E 20 | Mr. Scelso. I do not know that. I did not have any | fee UE insight into their charter. I just happened to have enough | contact with them on a few cases where they questioned me about people that I knew, and so on, on differentcases, and then in this case. t ae a2 5 Mr, Goldsmith. Would there be anywhere at Headquarters | — SEGRET 001851 ALDERSON REPORTIN’ MARE Docld:32277215 Page 71
1-71 a charter, as you put it, written rules and regulations as nm were? se | | | | | to what the responsibilities of the CI/SIG section or branch | : Mr. Scelso. There should have been. There are such 2 7 operational plans, as they are called. I think they are ; z } : called that, which you write at the time that you put in your S 7 | budget that tells everything, and then usually each staff has | o 7 a charter. written and approved and:sso on -- sobemnized, and | : 7 then buried away and forgotten. - : 0 However, this came under Angleton and everything that : 7 Angleton did was so secret -- several times in my career I | ¢ 2 | Was appointed by Helms ox by Karamessinas to investigate or | © = 12 handle or look into investigations wkrere Angleton was running. | = i = 14 H This always caused bitter feelings, the most bitter feelings. | : | Mr. Goldsmith. For what purpose would they ask you to | z " look into Angleton's operations? : . 7 Mr. Scelso. Because Helms or Karamessinas suddenly found E 7 out about one of Angleton's operations and did not like the : ne | = 19 | looks of it. ! < ca | “Mx. Goldsmith. How would you go about looking into that | eet without Mr. Angleton's finding out about it? . - | Ooh i ez ; Mr. Scelso. He knew it.. They always told him. Afd | then they said, now, you go tell Angleton you are going to do ! this. I used to go in fingering my insurance policy, notify- ES a ie) ing my next of kin. This happened many times over the years. ORET 001852 i 3ANj RED od HRs oe aA Docld: 32277215 . Page 72 son bu GS COMP as
The first time I was a polygraph operator and then, later on, when I was in Headquarters, they put me, right out w : of the blue. Karamessinas, you see. Helms never forgot my | work as a polygraph operator from 1948 on for a few years. ' Hl i i Mr. Goldsmith. To summarize, before we proceed analyzing: Z > I was the first polygraph operator and I went. to Europe,» i 3 4 and T only ran the polygraph as a sideline. I was a case ! 5 7 | officer handling agents. And, of course, I had been a prisonex | 8 2 of war interrogator. And 1 was immediately given .all your | ; 7 really nutsy cases to go over, and I cracked one of them after | z 0 another. Helms never forgot this. | : 7 When various big cases came up, he used to assign me, | S 32 like the disappearance of the head of the West German Security| | 3 = 13 Service in 1954, Helms immediately gave me that. | z “| Mr. Goldsmith. Were you ever asked to review the poly- | : is | graph results of the Nosenko polygraph tests? | 2 i | « 5 | Mr. Scelso. By that time I was out of the polygraph | 4 7 | business. The Office of Security nudged me out of it and : id took it over and thereafter tried to prevent me from running : 5 : 2a other polygraph cases. But when I retired, Mr. Helms | ¢ #9 | personally gave:.meva medal and he said he was giving it to ! come me principally for having successfully introduced the poly- : ga? 2 | graph into the agency. | | | a+ —_ cable here, which was originally by Birch o' Neal, which 4a was CI/SIG, which Q" Neal -- was he head?™ \ i } ey oy et | 001859 ALSERSON Sw etoae NG oo. MPARY Docld:32277215 Page 73
‘| Mr. Scelso. Yes, he was. i @ 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. CI/SIG was sort of a super -- | Mr..Scelso. Special investigations group. @ 4 : Mr. Goldsmith. Confined to sensitive counterintelligenc Es | operations? : 7 Mr. Scelso. Yes. g 7 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Mr. O'Neal would have a | sent out this particular cable? : . Mr. Scelso. He was probably writing this cable just - "9 before or after the meeting that Helms called and put me in = i E 7 charge of everything. : 2 | You see, Angleton immediately went into action to do all 1 i © = 13 of the. investigating and Helms called a meeting which Angleton j 2 I and a lot of others were present and told everybody that I : 7 was in charge and that everybody should report everything to z s | me and that no.one should have any conversations’ with anyone r + | about the Kennedy case without my being present, which was : 7 violated from the word go by Angleton, who dealt with the - | Boreas and the Warren Commission and John Foster Dulles him- é 20 | self. tt] Mr.. Goldsmith. Was there communication on a more or OSS . u less ex parte basis between the CIA and Dulles? < Mr. Scelso. Yes, between Angleton and Dulles. Mr. Goldsmith. How do you know that? Mr. Scelso. From Angleton. > ia 001854 (erpory : P don od 2S Bon | | . ALDEESON REPORTING COMPANY Docld:32277215 Page 74 e | | i { | i | ; | | 4 i : t
DoctlId: \ INA 7TH STRENT, So. REPORTERS BULLDTNG, UASHTHGTON, D.C, 20024 (202) S54u-23N5 ih to de LeTy ro 0) Oo We y a] 4 a Sars 32277215 Page 75 ~ mass f 4s erste ee, Mr. Goldsmith. He told you that? Mr. Scelso. Yes. On one or two. occasions I went to talk to him about the case, or he called me in. It was a very strange situation.. Mr. Goldsmith. In what way? Mr. Scelso. Well, Angleton ignored Helms' orders that no one was to discuss the case with anyone without my being present. He ignored that. I tried to get Helms to make him obey and Helms said,. you go tell hin. Mr. Goidsmith.. Why was not. Angleton reprimanded, or even dismissed, for failing to obey that order? contacts with J.. Edgar Hoover. He had his own direct ties to the Director at various times he was -- I believe he and his staff were intimately tied in with the House Subversive  AtFaaes. or whatever it is, Committee. And Angleton was a very formidable person to deal with. Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what kind of information | Angleton gave to Dulles ex parte? ‘ 4 1 : Hl i 4 i i Mrs. Scelso. No. | | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know of any improper action by |Angleton? | . | Mr.Scelso. ‘No, except that he violated Helms' ALDERSON REPORTING COMPAAY Mr. Scelso. None of the senior officials at. the Agency were ever able to cope with him. He had enormously influential | } | | | | | ! ! { \ | | 1 | i | 001855
1-75 instructions. In view of the fact that he got away with it, w he probably figured it was condoned. | 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to this first paragraph of the | | cable in CIA 194, it indicates: "It. is important that you | 5 7 review all envoy tapes and transcripts from 27 September." | : é 5 | My question, do you know why September 27th was picked | ~ 4 ; ~ 1 a 7 Mr. Scelso. That. date appears on one of the other | = . cables, does it not? | a i E tg Mr. Goldsmith. That date appears on the other trans- Fal ‘ 2 7 cripts. In other words that Oswald had been at the Cuban | i Embassy on the 27th of September and there were two phonecall Y ) 12 intercepts pertaining to Oswald? There is no traffic that | = 4 . z 1s ‘ indicates that Headquarters knew about the 27th of September ! PG i = 1s contact. - eo Mr. Scelso. I do not know. What is this cable? | ~ “ : “ 17 | 6453. Is that the original cable? | : Ia Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. -Mexico 6453 was the very first | = 19 one that I showed you. . | ¢ ° Mr.Scelso. Are we sure that nothing came in in the meant q time in any of those follow-up cables by Mexico City and he | i  ) cal 22 \ just: referred to the original cable and not to the follow up 23} cables? @ 24) Mr. Goldsmith. Really, you are in a position where you | i more or less have to take our word for it. We are relying SECRET 001856 i ALDSSSON REFSORTING COMPAAY Docld: 32277215 Page 76 t ’ t
1-76 upon what the Agency has given us. We have reviewed all the ~> | cable traffic and assembled it, and one of the reasons we | are asking you the question is we have not been able to find any intervening cables.referring to the contact by Oswald fo SS jon at STREMT, SoH. REPGRTEES RUTLDING, UASHITHCTON, DLC. 2002" (202) S54-2345 qn on September 27th, and that is why we wondered how. September j | 4 | 27th happened to be picked out. Is itepessible that there was telephonic communication? | 3 Mr.. Scelso. There could well be. | 5 : Mr. Goldsmith. Other than that, you have no explanation? 19 ! Mr. Scelso. Or it could be the FBI set up information, | you see, that they got this from the FBI. The CI staff was | 4 +4 | in. very close touch with the FBI. Mr. Goldsmith. The third paragraph of this letter asks, 1, | this cable asks, whether the original tapes were available. { : | What was the response to that? | Mr. Scelso. I do not. remember. Well, the response was j fey sent in a lot of transcripts. I do not know whether == a they probably transcribed. them then. \ | 19 | Mr. Goldsmith. Were they able to locate the original | 39 | tapes? | | Mr. Scelso. I think so. | eS : | | r Ze? 21! Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall what was done with those | \ 27 | tapes? : @ 22 | Mr. Scelso. No. 2 28 : Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever --* tos ya ; 0018 oy Sivael 288? Docld: 32277215 Page TT ALRESSON REZORTING CO: MBEANLY '
Mr. Scelso. I nevértheard them. Mr. Goldsmith. You never heard them? t i | | i 1 i \ i 1 } | _ | Mr. Scelso. No. | Mr. Goldsmith. On what basis do you say that the original Es *| tapes were found? . | : ‘| Mr. Scelso. I had the impression that after the assassina- 5 7 tion they did a lot of transcribing. I may be wrong. | i Mr. Goldsmith. When you say, "they did a lot of trans- | , | eribing," who are you referring to? | , : o “Mr. Scelso. Both the staff of the envoy and our Soviet ! : 1) | transcriber, our Russian transcriber. However, I am not at all | 3 2 | sure of that. I-was not looking for things like this at this : TF 2 He time. We were rushing ahead, being flooded with cables from | = oo 2 eau over the world. | : ss Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 208. Paragraph four : 1s | there, which indicates that the person who did the transcript, | =~ 4 : “i 7 [ane says, "Oswald is identical with the person in an earlier : 12 | paragraph who spoke broken Russian and called on 28 September." 2 4 | ‘That. indicates that. some sort of asvoice comparison was | 5 jade, | . . | a Mr. Scelso. Yes. Tapes were probablystill in existence, e cE? 2 ! Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at CIA 196. Woudd you please i | | 22 | read that? is (Pause) | 28 i. Mr. Scelso. Yes. 001858 Docld: 32277215 Page 7a
DoctId: 3 a | ° ! - | = Qe: ” ~ | “ : i i a p | wa ro) a | [nog a 7 | ~ | nw 203 e ~ = i ™ 1 i . ~ eo 7 < | : "| 3 li ~ a < = ia a i = 5 \ = 4 : \ = nN = 14 = tI = rf Zoo | & i a 4 ras ,200 a i) u = i zy. | iS: - ~ i - i s id 4 = | = 1g | Be ie H ¢ \ = « Ss 20 | 7 il - OSS i Sarees a i wae? 2 woN : i 234 | 24 | 1 ’ t ‘ 4 1 i i i ! , 32277215 Pa 4 \ { 1-78 Mr.. Goldsmith. It indicates "FBI says photos of man entering Soviet Embassy," et cetera, etcetera. | Was that the first time that you and Headquarters learned that the photograph. that had been taken in the Mexico City station of the man that they thought was Oswald in fact was not Oswald? Mr. -Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at. CIA number 197. Would you please read the first paragraph? (Pause) Actually, please read the first two paragraphs. (Pause) | Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. I have two questions for you. The first is here.thé station in Mexico City is reporting only the 9/28 contact and is not reporting the 9/27 contact. We still have an inconsistency here between what headquarters apparently knows and what the Mexico City station is sending up. Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mrs Goldsmith. Is there any way that you can explain that? Mr.. Scelso. It could have been -~- what were they speak- ing here, English or what? You see, it depends. Maybe one was being transcribed by one transcriber and the other by 4 another transcriber. One got finished first. foe tow ot ea SESSOCN REPORTING COMP ARLY ge 79 ALOES PASE 0018 1 t
1-79 Mr. Goldsmith. My impression is that the Spanish con- wv | ! | versations were only transcribed, they were not translated, | | | : ! and the Russian ones had to be translated. | ®@ 7 Mr. Scelso. Yes. | z 5 ) _Mr.GGoldsmith. In any event, this was well. down the | 1 i 2 6 line. This conversation was from September 28th. By then, - | 5 7 : everything would have been transcribed -- translated and/or | S 3 transcribed. | u 7 : Mr. Scelso. Not necessarily. They might just not have a z 10 gotten around to it. The backlog might have been greater. = in There was only | _ talk of an average backlog. | 4 = 12 | Mr. Goldsmith. Understood. The information that the | @ : 13 | Committee has received has been to the effect that the Spanish| z ‘4 transcription was received at the station within about three : = ; 13 days of the call, and the Russian translations came in about : = 1s a week within the receipt of the call, and this was November ! A 7 23rd, so we are talking about a period of between seven and : : 13 eight weeks after the receipt of the call. | e | Mr. Scelso. Yes. | S20 Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any way you can explain this | oe | discrepancy? @ ge? 32 Mr.=Scelso. Not everything they transcribed was sent ! a ; | 23 to Headquarters, of course. : @ 24 Mr. Goldsmith. rt. seems that. Headquarters already knew 2 25 " " about the 9/27 contact by virtue of the earlier cable. ALOER SON abel tet Beas Docld: 32277215 Page 60
DoctlId: D.C. 20024 (292) $5n-2345 WASTING TON , REPORTS BOTLDING, MW, s 300 7TH STRENT, oy oS ree) | acer es A 1-80 Mr. Scelso. It could have been through the FBI, parti- cularly since Birch O'Neal sent that other cable. Mr. Goldsmith. Why because of Birch O'Neal's -- | | ‘Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal was in the counter-intelligence staff which had direct liaison with the FBI. Mr. Goldsmith. Incidentally, I. am informed: by my researcher that the Spanish transcriptions were usually received by the station within one day of the receipt of the call, the Russian within two days. Mr. Scelso. if the conversation were transcribed. They were not all transcribed, you see? Only interesting conversations. It could be that they did not even transcribe this one. Mr. Goldsmith. This was a conversation involving an American. "ME. Scelso. That is true. Still, they may not have transcribed it. Mr. Goldsmith. A conversation involving an American would be interesting. Me. Scelso. Except. the people handling the tapes were Mexicans. They could have slipped up. Mr. Goldsmith. I am sure they were informed. Mr. Scelso. Yes. | { Mr. Goldsmith. If an American comes along, that is high, interest. or 001861 sede! ALDERSON Me roat NG COMPAR 32277215 Page 61
Doctld: 4 ; 4 3 w = g pa ) w 1 wr , w fo} =~ “Ss ' a SN 7 — ~ S a = ™ . a rn) , ~ met a ' = H G 1 = og = TY jt it — = el a = ~ = 2 - t= tS = a - ad L ca wo ae a * = 1A = 14 a = ! 3 ~ Cc = ae Pa) cae Es ars sme aa i= 7 “< as 4 ae <+ oa a: ~~ Mr. Scelso. That is true. They still may have delayed transcribing, or put it aside. Mr. Goldsmith. As I indicated before, the testimony we have already received is that everything had been transcribed } i ! \ j | | i 1 t | well before the assassination and had been reviewed well beford the assassination. Mr. Scelso. It could be they had just not sent it in. Mr. Golidsmith. Headquarters apparently knew about the 9/27 contact by Oswald by virtue of this earlier cable. Mr. .Scelso. Birch O'Néal's cable? Mr.©Goldsmith. Yes. Mr. Scelso. Birch O'Neal may have found that out after the assassination, you see. The FBI could well have sent up a summary cable based on the information they were getting hour by hour from us, and they may have come over, Or phoned over, because they have a gray line you know, and told the CI staff this. Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to the second paragraph now, that suggests that one of the tapes had been erased, does it not? . | Mr + Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Does*that, in any way, aid your memory as to whether any tapes of Oswald's voice were obtained after the assassination? Mr.:Scelso. Sent -up from Mexico? 001862 ga me SeGind Sa aa cor 32277215 Page 82 ALDESSSON EFS 3G Comeasy { i i | | |
1-82 Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. Whether the Mexico City had we onhand any tapes of Oswald's voice? Mr. Scelso. I just do not recall whether they did or not. I am sure if they had had, we would have wanted to hear hem. Mr. Goldsmith. Your initial answer before was they did. Now you. are saying you do not know? Mr. Scelso. I am groping. I thought at the time that ree] they were transcribing some of these things down here. They 20024 (202) S54-23"5 ™N oa. tn ve B.C. oO | ' | 1 { 1 H | | H i 1 ! ' ! | | still had the original tapes after the assassination. In | other words. I do not recall their ever saying that they had erased all tapes with Oswald's voice. | Mr. Goldsmith. -In any event here, thus far, the only contacts by Oswald that have been reported by the Mexico City station to Headquarters are contact ‘of September 28th and 1 ! the contact of October lst. So, according to the cable traf- | 1 REPORTERS KUTLDING, UASUTHGTON, rat) Mia | | ! | | fic, anyway, Headquarters did not know about the 9/27. contacts, | t “ i | Mr. Scelso. Yes. 2 if : Sow Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at number 204, CIA o ! : a y = '? 1) number 204. © , ! S 204 (Pause) | | . : j vax a! This: cable. contains the transcripts from Oswald's r ox? i : 9/28 contact. and 10/1 contact. You might want. to skim through that. | | (Pause) Again, it would seem the Mexico City station is not SEpDr 001863 Docld:32277215 Page 83 ALDESSON REFORTING Boos Pany
Doctlda:: nN ir +e wt a GN a | wi oa 2 = 7 x 3! = i - 9 e \ tt WASUTHOTON, --e re) es REPORTERS BUTEDINS , ' j oO station, anyway, Mr. Scelso. Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Scelso. Mr. Goldsmith. transcript. again. ip Sosebet Duran and Soviet Embassy, or consulate officials obtaining a visa. telling Headquarters, 1-83 for some reason, of the 9/27 contact. I do not mean to suggest that the reason is sinister or innocent, but according to cable traffic, the Mexico City is not telling you about it. Yes Let us look at CIA What was the nature of If you would like, Essentially, it was a ' number 211. that 9/27 contact? you can review the conversation between in respect to.Oswald's obtaining a visa and the problem of Reading through CIA number 211, can you identify that? Mr. Scelso... 15S = Mexico? Mr.“Goldsmith. Why. do you think that, a | bet 13 | = | GI = 1 t | og « S 29 | | -SE 21h Mr.. Scelso. pas 22 i a2 *~ | Mexico. i ** | got there -- no, || i i i 4 a i it i} i 32277215 Page 84 Oswald's contact to be important?. Correct. in paragraph I suppose this was the President. of 3, the person send- ing the cable considered the fact that*Litensor was aware of The fact that he was aware of it, and passing the information along would be important? You get into a psychological question. The iH it wasn't that. oN SECRET RE-SCRTING COMP ALY Chief of Station is called in to speak to the President of There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador It was a very peculiar situ- ation in Mexico whereby the Mexican President's primary contact 001864
nw DoctId: > w = 5 = 3 mM t am ’ w fo} a a . = = 7 — z . S 3 = ™ Pa 9 ra - 1A = id o S = 11 —_ 1 < = 14 te i Z = 33 var a 1 nd iw S = te iS = n i7 _ . S 13 “a = is ~ c Ss 20 71 esau OS h is ar ea 22 Ww ose 32277215 Page 85 - President of Mexico, whereupon the President of Mexico called 1-84 with the U.S. government was through our Chief of Station rather than through the Ambassadors. This caused no great problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten. | Mr. Goldsmith. Thomas Mann? Mr. Scelso. Yes. He was a very fine guy and. recognized | the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador, | | Mr. Friedman, tried to cut Winn Scott out of contact with the | in Winn Scott: and said, I want you to send a cable to the White House telling them I am not. going to deal with this. jackass, | I want to deal only with you. | So, the result was, eventually, Winston Scott and : Ambassador Friedman went to the White House and talked to | President Johnson and straightened the whole thing out in | | | favor of Winston Scott. So Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that | the President of Mexico is aware of our telephone operation. Mr. Goldsmith. Heshould have been since it was a | : liaison operation? | | Mr. Scelso. Yes. But. you do not always know. whether: | he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. | It is just significant that the person calls you in and says, | here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing. , Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA 210. Would you please redd that? 001865 COMPANY
Doctld: 4 4 3 A 4 ww = 5 a 3 ~ ' re ws 4 ~ fot , “ 7 — “ o a a ™ . a o Y a - 1 2 a = ! = ad G orn = 7) te = & i = = ty - i - = 1S S = 7 is = “ 7 S 13 wn = 19 S Cc S 29 aa on OSS 2SF fev 72 if aN 34 3% 322377215 ss rad a e va = 1 2 a 4 ta io Sy Be DD (Pause) Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith... Would you identify this document? Mr. Scelso. This is a cover sheet for the cable from the Mexico station. Mr. Goldsmith. The cover sheet to the cable we just referred to? Mr. Scelso. Yes. Mr. Goldsmith. Winn Scott here indicates, due memo of my.meeting with Litensor. Mr. Scelso. It is addressed to.this person who is supposed to write a memo on it. Mr. ‘Goldsmith. Scott? That is Scott's signature. Mr.‘‘Scelso. Yes, he writes it back to himself and reminds himself to write a memo on.it. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever see the memo? Mr. Scelso. I do not think SO. Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever talk to Scott about his meeting with Litensor? | Mr. Scelso. I do not recall having done so. Mr... Goldsmith... In any event, by this time, the Mexico City station still had not informed Headquarters of the 9-27 contact? Mr. Scelso. No. - Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA 213. Woulg OTR gee SECRET ALDESSON RESORTING COMPANY Page 86 ot
Doctld: tee) > wa = a} N t a wa § i ~ il ~ ! c 5 7 | ~ t . | ~ 2! co - 4 o ™“ tf gS F i Sc MK ed i = i = iti = iH n i = ‘| z i2 | = H = Ht = 1s 4 o. 7 it = i = aA ott - od 2 ia | = i in = 1g ~ i 1 Fog A i = av | i ewe at mal? 22 WD i (Pause) Mr. Scelso. This was all on the same day. Mr. Goldsmith. The cable traffic was pretty heavy on that. day, I would imagine. Mr. Scelso. Right. Mr. Goldsmith. This cable is the first time that the ; | Mexico City station informs Headquarters about Oswald's | 9/27 contacts. | | Mr. Scelso. Yes. | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that there is any connec- tion between the fact that this contact was recorded after ' | the Mexico City station became aware of the fact that Litensor | | t { | | | ! - knew about Oswald's contacts? Mr. Scelso. I would imagine that there were probably | many -- several Mexicans transcribing : reels transcribing things and some got finished before others. ! | Mr. Goldsmith. This was months ago. The conversations . have been transcribed and reviewed months earlier. : { i Mr. Scelso. What are the numbers of the various cables?! They were all going out in a series. They may have had | several analysts in the Mexico Station working on them. One | said you take this one and write a cable and the other said : you take that one and write a cable, and so on, and they went | | out and went into the COMM Center and the COMM Center sent them out in some order. Here. : . 001867 | 32277215, Page 87 — - ° oe ,
1-87 | Mr. Goldsmith. Were you aware of any dissension within ; the Mexico City station concerning the amount of information that should be sent from Mexico City to Headquarters? on) Mr. Scelso. No, not then, or at any Later time. Mr. Goldsmith. Apparently you called him for some Pn § ‘ J& Wa 1 reason? Es 5 : Mr. Goldsmith. Let's look at CIA number 217, Winn s s | Scott, this document, has written something in the margin. : > | couta you possibly read that into the record? 7 Mr. Scelso. "I had a call from Washington, Jack Whitten : : at 620 hours on 23rd November. Scott. I told Jack Whitten : | at that at 1620 or 30 hours, our time, on 23rd November, : | that this would be enroute to him soon." E a Mr; Goldsmith. By "this," what is he referring to? Is rT 2 : 13 he referring to the cable? 7 z t4 Mr. Scelso. To the cable of the 27th? : as! Mr. Goldsmith. The cable -- : 7 mo Mr, Scelso. About the meeting, Oswald's meeting, on F 7 | the 27th. © o>.) mo, .! i z 3 Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. The document, CIA number 217 nA i : 2 | indicates a telephone conversation between you and Scott. é = Do you remember the purpose of that™ conversation? . ae Mr. Scelso. No. > | @ at Mr. Scelso. Yes. I do not have any idea why. I may have been ordered to call him on any number. of things. 901868 Docld: 32277215 Page 6a
wn = 5 a ~ “ ! ww P w fo) a N : c 7 iN / — “~ = a = N : a © 7 a = i = pans i ot < = 4 . 12 S 2° 4 = 'd = = = ta ot Soe 2 i) a = ; = ols => ~~ wn 17 = a ’ £ is wa = 19 ~ J c 30 o ‘Z A 21 | BOS ay mae aes sn a) N\ Ww ta Docld: 32277215 Mr. Goldsmith. conversation?in any way? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. i | | | i late? i heavy. really was. Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you say Mr. Scelso. this’ information about. Oswald's 9-27 contact a little bit that? 1-88 Do you. remember the substance of the s Mr. Scelso. It was the daysafter the assassination at 4:00-something in the afternoon and. I did not feel the least bit bad about it. We were getting the stuff in hot. and! In fact, the overall performance of the Agency in this thing was the only bright light in the U.S. government. It Because we had had advance information that! we had disseminated on Oswald's. activities which we had properly disseminated to the other U.S. government agencies which might, have led them to act other than they had. Do you think that they would have paid more attention to Oswald if they had received additional { . Mr. Goldsmith. | | information, his Cuban contact as we Mr. Scelso. Conceivably, yes. the Bureau acted in it, though, I am After all, we notified them. He was intelligence officer. { t ‘| i u 4 if nt CrPgs : ALSSRSON RESORTING CO Page 69 11? In the light of the way not sure they would have. in touch with MeSaLY the Soviet 001869 Do you remember being upset at receiving: { | | | | | ! ( t
1-104 Mr. Goldsmith. Can you think of any reason at all why the Mexico City Station did not communicate in a timely | ~ Ly manner Oswald's contacts with the Embassies on September 27th? | i @ 4 Mr. Scelso. Overwork.. | Es S| Mr. Goldsmith. At the time of the assassination, ‘the 4 ! 2 8 | Mexico City station was sending materials pertaining to the | 7 | contact on September 28th and October lst. | & 2 Mr. Scelso. They sent the one on the 27th in last. J "| Mr. Goldsmith. That is right. . | s | ; = ic | Mr. Scelso.. In the. rush of events, you see, they came ie | across that transcript somewhere in the stack and sent it. : a } 2 12 | I do not think they were suppressing it for any reason. I | 2 | cannot conceive. why they would have been. Mr.. Goldsmith. If the Agency had a taperecording of da Oswald's voice, where would it be today? Mr. Scelso. “In. Registry. REPORTERS BUTEDIENG, Oo. | i | Mry Goldsmith. Which Registry? | | : 3 | Mr. Scelso. The central Registry. : a Lo | E 19 | Mr. Goldsmith. That is the name it goes by, the | E 26 | Central Registry? | a Mr. Scelso. That is what it used to be called. | Mr. Goldsmith. What is the Central Registry used ® for? , an Mr. Scelso. That is where all our records are deposited. i Mr. Goldsmith. With the 201 files contained in the : : __s eRe Ty 001886 . ue ALDER: aoe NG a ME ORLY Docld: 32277215 Page 106