(04-1006%-10080 ‘Gambling Syndicate The first seriously-pursued CIA plan to assassinate Castro had its inception. dn. August 1960. - . EG involved the ‘use of. members: of the criminal underworld with: contacts inside Cuba. ‘The ‘operation had. two: phases: “the: first ran , from August: 1960 until. late. April. or early May 1961, when it was called off following the Bay of Pigss 3 : . ‘the second. ram from AgetL 1962. until February 1963 and was. merely a a. revival of the first Base wach bad been inactive, since ‘about "* Gambling Syndicate - Phase 1: August 1960, . a BO So oo "Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Flans, asked Sheffield - Baverds, | Director, of SecurLty,, if Bdvards could: establish contact vith the ws. “gambling syndicate that Was. active in Cuba. ‘the . “objective clearly + Was: . the: assassination of Castro although. Bavards : élaims that there was a. studied avoidance of the tern: in his ; conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of WH Division, although King now recalls having. had. only limited knowledge of such a plan and ata ; much. later date~-about mid~1962.
14-00000 Edwards consulted Robert A. Maheu, a private. investigator whd had done sensitive work for the Agency, to see if Maheu had any | underworld contacts. Maheu was once a special agent of the FEL. ; He: opened a. | private office in Wasizington in 1956. The late. Robert. ; Cuniingham, of the Office of f Security (and also: a. former Special. Agent, with, the var) y knew Maheu and. knew that his. business was having 8 shaky start financially. "Cunningham arranged. to subsidize Mahew oe the extent of $500 per month. Within, six months Naheu was doing os BO. well financielly that he ‘Suggested that the retainer be @iscontinued. we Over the: years he has been intimately involved in providing support for some of the Agency" Ss more sensitive operations. - He has since i moved his personal headquarters to Los Angeles but, retains a ° od Washington office. A more detailed account of Maheu's background appears in a separate section of this report. . | (Comment :, Although: we see nothing sinister in it, wwe are | struck ‘by the: fact that so “many of the persons . whose names appear in this account once worked for the FBI. We have already named Cunningham ‘ana Maheu. Later to appear are William | Harvey, James 0’Connell, and Edward Morgan. ) Maheu acknowledgea that he had a contact who might furnish access to the criminal underworld, but Maheu was most reluctant to allow himself to be involved.in such an assignment. He agreed to
14-00000 participate only after being pressed by Edwards to do so. Maheu identified his contact as one Johnny Roselli, who lived in Los Angeles: and had the concession for the ice-making machines. on "the strip” in Las Vegas and whom Maheu understood. to: be : a: member of the syndicate. Maheu. was known, to. Roselli asa. man who had. a number of ' large business. organizations as ‘clients. Edwards and. Mabou agreed _t that Mahou, would, agmroach, Roselli as. the representative of. business- men with: interests in Cuba: vito: saw. the elimination of Castro: as the essential first step to the recovery of their investments. . Maheu W Was euthorized. to tell Roselli. that. his "elients” were wiring. * to - "pay $150,000 for Castro' s removal. - e : -~ ' Sheff. Edwards. named. as his case officer for the operation | . 7 Janes P.. "Comme LL @ former Special Agent; of the FBI) ,. then: Chief. : 7 Operational, Support Division, Office of Security. 0'Connelt. and - Maheu met Roselli. a Tew. York. Clty on 14 Septenber 1960 where Mahe. ‘made the pitch. - ‘Roselli inftially was also reluctant to become involved, but finally agreed to “introduce Maheu to "Sam Gold" who either had or could arrange contacts. with syndicate elements in. Cuba who might. handle the job. Roselli said he had no interest in being paid for his participation and believed: that "Gold" would feel the Nee cee eee ee eee
14-00000 ‘same way. A memorandum for the record prepar red by Sheffield Edwards on 14 May 1962° states: "No monies were ever 1 paid to: Roselli and Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods that he was in Mam." (Gtancana is “Gold."). a O'Connell was. introduced (in true. naine ) ta. Roselli. as an 1 employee: of Maheu, the explanation being that O'Connell would handle the case for Maneu, Because Maneu was “too busy to work ‘On it full ‘time ‘i bimself.. No one else in the Office of Security was made -witting of : ; “the operation at this. time. | Rawards himself aid not meet Roselli. . until the sumer of 1962. . At this point, about the second half of. September, Shef Edwards 1 % told Bissell that he had: a friend, a private investigator, who. had fe ‘a contact who in ‘turn had other contacts ‘through whom syndicete i “oot elements in Cuba could be reached. “These syndicate elements in Cubs, would be willing to take on such an operation. As. of the latter ; part of Septenber 1960, Edwards, O'Connell, and Bissell were the only -ones in. the Agency yho new. of a plan against Castro involving U. Ss. gangster ‘elements. Edwards states that Richard Helms was ‘not informed of the plan, because Cuba was being handled by Bissell at that, time. With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Allen Dulles) and the DDCI (General Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. The discussion was circumspect; Edwards
14-00000 -B to c." “As he then envisioned it, "A" was Maheu,. npr | Was: Roselli, Le and. Ng" was. the: principal in Cuba. Hawards recalls. ‘hat Mr. Dulles. a merely nodded, presumably in understanding and. approval. certainly, there 1 was. no opposition. ; ‘Edwards states. that, vhile. there Was -no - formal. exproval, as. ‘such,: ‘be felt that he clearly had tacit ; approval te use: his. own judgnents” BiaseiL committed, $150,000 for, the support | i of 4 the operation. 7 a ee deltterately buized end. the specific intended result 1 was never - deliberately avoided the use of any “bad words.” The descriptive term used was "an intelligence operation.” Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCL clearly understood. ‘the nature of the operation he _was discussing. He recalls desoribing the channel as “being “from A to = (Comment: In the ligt of this. description. of the briefing, bt ts eupropriate to conjecture « as to just whet the Director did “spprove. re as safe to conclude, given the men. participating - - and: the general. subject. of the meeting, that there was: Little - Likethooa of. misunderstanding--even though + the details were . stated. in unmistakable. Language It. is also ‘reasonable to ‘conclude. that. the: pointed avoidance of "bad words” emphasized to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the. operation. yt During the week of 25 Septenber 1960, O'Connell + and Naew went to Miemi where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold” at a meeting. - 18 -
14-00000 wre, \ t i He. aia, however, learn their true identities. An Office of Security ° in tae Fontainbleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man, whom he identified only as "Joe," who would. serve as courier. to Cuba and make arrangements there. Maheu pointed out "Gold" to 0'Conne11. from a distance, but. O'Connell never "met either "Gold" or "Joe .' memorandum. to the. DCT of 2h June. 1966 places the time as "several. - weeks later.” (0'ConnelL is now uncertain as to whether it was on. this : first visit to ‘Mdent or on a. subsequent one that he and Mabeu learned ‘the true identities of the two men. Maheu and O'Connell : were staying at separate hotels. Maheu phoned ‘O'Connell one Sunday morning and called his attention to- the Parade supplement in one of that morning! Ss Miami newspapers. It carried an article on the Cosa Nostra, witha . pictures of prominent members. The man Maheu and OF ‘Connell knew as "Sam Gola” appeared, as Mom Salvatore | (Sam) Giancana, a. Chicago-based. gangster. . "Joe ? the courier” (vino was never identified to either Maheu or O'Connell. in any other way) turned out to > be Santos Trafficante, the Cosa Nostra. chieftain in. Cuba. At that time “the gambling ‘casinos were still operating in Cuba 2. and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana. on syndicate business. (The casinos were closed and gambling was banned - effective 7 January 1959. On 13 January 1959, Castro announced that - the casinos would be permitted to reopen for tourists and foreigners
14-00000 but that Cubans would be barred. The cabinet on. 17 February 1959 authorized reopening the ‘casinos for the tourist trade.. Time maga zine , for 2 March 1959. announced that the casinos had ‘been reopened the- . . 7 previous week. the New York Times issue of 30 September 196L announced that the last of the casinos: ‘still. running had. pean closed.) . , Tratficante w Was. te. make the arrangenents with one of bis contacts | "anstae Cuba on. one of his trips: to ‘Havens. Very early in the operation, well before the first contact with ( —-  . ‘Roselli, the machinery for readying the means of assassination was set in motion. | The sequence of events is not clear, but itis. apparent that a nunber of methods were considered. Preparation oF some neterials wert, ahead without express ‘epproval- | (Comment: ‘Tt showla be noted that TSD maintains a stock of equipment and materials for operational use. When queries are made of: sD techni cians. about. materials or devices that are not | stock items, itis not unusual. for the technicians to. gO ahead with the preparation of the materials or devices against the event that there is a formal request for. them. Because of this, undue significance should not be attached to advance preparations for this operation. It should also be noted that
14-00000 and with a ‘fimly Predictable end result. ‘Botulin comes nearest to - Liquid or solia tom tying it toa recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee, or bouton, for. which 3 a liquid poison would be particularly well suited. January -. Februmsy. 3961. “Despite the decision, that a . potson in r Liquid. form would. be. most, desirable, viet was ; actually prepared and delivered was a “solid in | | “the form of sma LL pis about the size of saccharine tablets. . —— | renenbers meeting. with Bawards and O'ConneLL in Edwards" ‘office to : “ discuss. the requtrenent. ‘The. specifications were that the poison be . stable , soluble > safe to handle, ; “ wmdetectable, ; not immediately acting, . meeting all of those requixenents, and it may be put up in either co. _ (J states that the pill form) was: . | a chosen because of ease and. safety of handling. he gangsters may have had. some influence | on the. ces - choice of | a mbans of assassination. O*Connelt says that in his very. early ‘@iscussions with the gangsters (ory more ‘precisely, 7 Maheu's discussions with. then) considerat on was given to possible “ways: of accomplishing ‘the mission. . Apparently the Agency -had first thought: in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancane was flatly opposed to the
14-00000 use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do | the Job, because the chance of survival and escape vould be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante ("Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban. . ' official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to. surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta who was then Office Chief and Direcwor General of the Office of the Prime Minister (Castro). The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position. to. receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income » and needed the money.) When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into.a glass of water to test it for solubility and found.that it did not even . disintegrate, let. ‘alone dissolve. [Teo them back and made 7 up a new ‘batch that met the requirement for solubility: Edwards 7 ; - at that point wanted assurance that the pills. were truly lethal. ‘He called on Dr. Gunn to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave Gunn ‘money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. Gunn has a record of a conversation wef dc on 6 February 1961. It may have related to the tests » but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that Gunn tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective.
14-00000 In any event, O'Connell did. receive the pills, and he believes there were six of. them. He recalls giving three to Roselli. Presumably the other three were used in testing for solubility and effectiveness. | The. dates. on which. O'Connell received the pills and. subsequently passed then to Roselli cannot be. established. It would have been a sometime. after Gunn's: ‘notation of 10 February 1961. Ll Gunn also. has a record of being approached about the undertaking vn es vy William K. Harvey ‘(former special agent of the FBI) in February | 4 in connection with a sensitive project. Harvey was working. on for ~ , ‘Bissell. According ta Gunn! r=] notes, he oriefed Harvey « on the operation, “ ae and. Harvey instructed him to discuss techniques, but not targets, “ati with Gottlieb. - Gunn! s notation on this point is not in accord with ; the recollectiors of any of the others involved. We are unable to clarify it; the. note may have been in another context. O'Connel2 states that J. Cc. King was also briefed at this time, although King denies “learning of ‘the ‘operation until much later. Late se Yetirwary - iach 1961 Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante. Roselli reported to - O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba.” Orta is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks-before returning them. “According to the gangsters, Orta got cold feet. - 27 - Nee cee creer ne es nee
14-00000 \ (Comment: Orta lost his position in the Prime Minister's: Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation Was ‘still going on in Miami and. in Washington. . He took refuge in “the Venezuelan Embassy. On. 1 April i961 and became the responsi- “bility of the ‘Mexc.can. Eubassy when. Venezuela broke relations with Cuba. in. Novenber 1961. Castro refused. ta- give him a. safe conduct. pass until October 196% when. he was ‘allowed. to leave for | Mexico city He arrived in beams. in. early February 1965. (tt appears that Edwards and 0" Connel1. aia not know at the time of Orta's fall from favor. They have made no reference to it--aseribing orta's failure. to cold feet. It would seen, though, ‘that the gangsters did mow that orta had already lost “his _ ecess to Castro. ‘They deserined him as a man who had once had: a position that allowed him a “yake-off on gambling profits, -a position that he had since Lost. _ The only job with which we can | associate orta, that might. have allowed him a rake-off was the one | he hela im the Prime. Minister’ 8 Office, which he. lost on, 26 January 198. it seems likely that, » While the Agency. thought the gangsters haa. a man. in Cuba with easy access to castro, what they actually had was a man disgrintled at having lost access.) . The previously-mentioned 24 June 1966 summary of the operation | prepared by the Office of Security states that when Orta asked out
14-00000 of the assignment he suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success. Neither Edwards nor O'Connell know the identity of. Orta's: replacenent nor any.additional details of the reported. further attempts. March - April 1961, . Following the’ collapse of the ‘Orta channel, Roselli told. O*Conne11 ‘that Trafficante amew of a man high up in the. Cuban exile . movement who md, ght do the job. “He identified him as Tony, Verona (Dr. Manuel Antonio de VARONA y - Loredo). Varona was, the head of. the - Democratic Revolutionary Front, a group supported. by the Agency a as ° part of the. larger Cuban operation. — O'Connell understood that Varona was dissatisfied with the nature and the extent of this support and that. MHA suspected, that Varona was not keeping his = bargain with the Agency. “(Coment: 3 Reports from the FBI suggest how Trafficante : may. a : have known | of .Varona. On 21 December 1960 the Bureau forvarded to the Agency a memorandum reporting that efforts were, being ‘made by U.S. racketeers to finance anti~ Castro activities in hopes of securing the ganbling, ? prostitution, and dope monopolies - in Cuba in the event Castro was overthrown. A later report of 18 January 1961 associates Varona with those schemes. Varona
14-00000 -_—. woe, approval became invalid if Moss were not used within six months of the date of the approval.) Trafficante approached Varona and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro and. that they would pay big: money . for the Job. Varona is reported to have been very receptive > since. . it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ‘ships, arms and. communications equipment.» | . | (comment: ° By this time Roselli had become certain that. O'Connell was. an Agency employee, not a subordinate of Maheu.. I- | se told O'Connell that he vas sure that O'Connell was "a ow 7 government man - CIA” but that O'Connell should not confirm © hot ~ this to him. Roselli said that as a loyal American he would ' do whatever he could and would never divulge the operation.) ‘Roselli was to deliver money to Varona. for expenses. (O'Connell now recalls the amount as: $50, 000. Edwards, who was away at the: time, recalls Lt as $25,000. Since Edvards | was absent, O'Connell had to : : get approval ‘from avers? deputy, Robert Bannerman, who until. then had been unwitting of the operation, O'Connell told Bannerman ‘thet . the operation was known to and approved by Edwards. . . Bannerman authorized passing the money and now recalls the amount as being on the order of $20,00¢ to $25,000. An Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI, —
14-00000 of just how it was planned to get the poison into Castro's food by employing someone with access to a restaurant frequented by Castro. The mechanics were identical. with those described by Edwards and as reported in our earlier account of phase one of the operation. - - ; . 7 a e. O'Connell"s account of his own role in the operation. in the early weeks following Harvey's supposed takeover makes it evident that there was not a clean break between the Office of Security's responsibility and that of Harvey. Further, O'Connell . now believes that there must have been "something going on” os ( : 7 between April 196 (after the Bay of Pigs) ‘and April 1962, but | he claims to: be unable to remember any of the ‘particulars. - There are other disagreements among the three on facts.» They are | reviewed here, not because they alter the essential fact of the | turnover or of Harvey’ s& sole responsibility. for. the operation after .@ certain point in. time, but because they suggest that persons who ae | were supposedly uniting. of events after the turnover were in fact. z witting, because. they were not effectively cut ‘off at the instant of turnover. a . . . . Harvey's notes show that he and O'Connell went to New York City to meet Roselli ‘on the 8th and 9th of April. 1962. O'Connell recalls it-.as being early in April and that the introduction was made on a 8 «
14-00000 and’ when. Roselli said that & nothing + Was. happening, Giancana. said, , " *ITIg9 bad.” Aaattionally; Santos Trafficante ( "Joe, the courier" from ; the earlier phase ) was no longer ‘involved. With the closing of the | last casing ash Havana in . September 1961, Trafficante presumably no ‘longer haa access. Roselli now had @ man. known to Harvey. as Maceo, . who also used the names Garcia-Gonez and Godoy. in the original cast of hoodlum players. Harvey specified that Giancana was not to, be brought in on the reac tivation of the opera tion, and he believes that Roselli honored the- request. Roselli once reported tq Harvey ‘that Glancana had asked if anything was going on, , (Comment : Harvey is unable further to. Adentity Maceo; he 7 | describes ‘him as "a Cuban who spoke Italian.” One of Varona's associates in the Cuban exile community was named Antonio MACEO Mackle, but it seems unlikely that he was the Maceo of ‘this Operation. He | was prominent enough in the exile commun ty to have been known to Harvey. “Further, % seems. clear that Maceo, was - "Roselli 's mare This second phase appeers to lack the overwhelming, high-level gangster flavor. that characterized the - first phase. Roselli remained. as a prominent figure in the operation, but working directly ‘with the Cuban extle commund ty and directly on behalf of CIA. Roselli was essential to the second phase as a contact with Varona, who presumably still .
14-00000 Nee his technical people and delivered to Cubela in Madrid. | Cubela 7 As March.1965 11 February 1965 | | i | . [seam teaa: "From Cubela on 10 February: On 10 or : / aL February. Cubela is to receive one (Pistol with, silencer and one Belgian FAL rifle with silencer from Artine’ s secretary. Both weapons . come from.U.S. and now in Madrid.” . (this is in conflict with the . | earlier report, that Artine would cache a rifle and silencer if that were all he could 1 find. We are unable to. resolve the. conflict. a 12 February 1965. . ‘The — Jcabled: "Artime reported on final meeting - with Cubela: Artime had three packages of special items made up by - seemed satisfied."  Marched 1965 — Jrezortea receiving a. telephone call. from a . friend in Havana who had seen Cubela back in Havana the previous aay. a ee The| cabled that one Rafael GARCIA-BANGO Dirube had arrived ‘in Madria from Cuba on. oa ‘March cand had been introduced to a 2 Station officer. .Garcia-Bango claimed to be in contact with a = 103 =
14-00000 group of Cuban military leaders who * were planning. to eliminate Castro and take over the government. Tt quickly became clear that he was referring to Cubela. Garcia~Bango said that he had. always been publicly identifies a. a ‘close: friend of. Cubela, whom he last. saw - in Havana on 9 March. ; Garcia-Bengo, sala that he had. been the lawyer — for the Capri Hotel : in Ravana. He Was jailed. for 15 days in July 1962 ‘Por defending § Santos. ‘Trafticante, a U.S. -eLtizen. and ex-mahager . - of the Capri gambling casino. who was kicked out of. Cuba. (Comment: This is, another name-Link between Cubela and | the gambling syndicate plots reported upon earlier in this 7 report. Trafficante was one of the principals in Shef Edwards' - Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all,. Trafficante. was the man who brought Verona. into the operation late in Phase One ,.. and. Varons: was one of the main players during ‘Phase Two. “Wie three-man team that was sent wf arona, was reported on 21° June. 1962. to be in - Place in Cuba.. y June 1965 . Headquarters decided to terminate all contacts with key members of the Cubela group. It had become increasingly apparent that the circle of Cubans who knew of Cubela's plans and of CIA's assoclation ~ 104 -. = GROG PTLD SURE RROLEG RC ENS SS a8 IED
14-00000 underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on — 18 January 1961, suggests that. ——s was: one of those receiving — that support, although this was not confirmed. As a matter of | interest, as late as 10 June 1964. there was a report that gangster elements in the Miami area were offering $150,000 for anyone wha would kill Castro (an amount. mentioned to the syndicate repre- sentatives by CIA case officers at an earlier date). These bits of information, fitted together, could provide the basis for an | explanation of why was so readily available when approached by Roselli. It also may throw light ona question noted in the 1967 IG Report. The operation with the syndicate had been called off following the Bay of Pigs in April 1961; yet, when it was reactivated in April 1962 the case officer felt there was something already ongoing in spite of the Fact that the operation had been terminated a year earlier. It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. The criminal syndicate had important interests in Cuba, and to recover them may well have Sought on its own to eliminate Castro. In a sense CIA may have. been - piggy-backing on the syndicate and in addition to its material contri- butions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.
14-00000 “ships between Sturgis and Trafficante, have been a source of information on the subject whereby Castro could have learned of CIA's earlier plan against his life. Newspaper stories are not necessarily reliable sources of information. . However, because the statement by Sturgis - indicated a familiarity with | CO oo Toot yadditional attention was given the statement . in the press to see how it might fit.in with other things that are known. What follows is subject to reservations that must attach to the reliability of newspaper stories. Press stories * | refer to possible relation-