[oto or] “Eysunaassieten — ((TeRNat 1) CONT DENTIAL [SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET S. D. Breckinridge ~ OLC 3/ Principal Coordinator/HSCA 1046 * 9 February 1979 TO: (Officer d ti O0 b and : stignation, room number, a [are | OFFIcer’s | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom . Tome INITIALS fo whom. Braw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVED | FORWARDED ee, building} pe] Handcarry (call 5441 (Karen) tratio wh | SUBJECT: (Optional) i Deputy Director for operat} 2. Deputy Director for Adminis Handcarry i 3. rs General Counsel Handcarry a! i 4. _ ; i ti Legislative Counsel Handcarry _ 5. Deputy £ Director of Central Intell 6 C Director of Central ‘Intel gence. For concurrence and/or comments. HN 13 14, fom S10 “EMS ET SECRET (] CONFIDENTIAL (] ys Umy (]_ UNCLASSIFIED _
14-00000 oe ‘ a . APN y 4 . " yd aoe. se | 797-03 /F 8 February 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence “VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Legislative Counsel FROM. : §S. D. Breckinridge co Principal Coordinator, HSCA | SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations References to Overseas CIA Stations (U) 1. Action Requested: That you approve one of the options set forth in paragraph IT. (a) oe 2. Background: CIA's participation in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination was limited by the pattern of Lee Harvey Oswald's life. He served in the Marine Corps in Japan, although he did not come to the attention of the CIA at that time. He travelled to the Soviet Union in 1959, returning to the United States in 1962. He did not come to CIA's attention until his defection was reported by the U. S. Embassy in Moscow. He.travelled to Mexico City in late September 1963, returning to the United States in early October after’'a five-day stay. CIA detected his presence and reported it at that time as a routine CI report because he contacted the Soviet Embassy. (C) 3. -False allegations by a disaffected CIA employee claiming CIA-Oswald ties in Japan consumed some of the Committee's time and attention. They discredited his testimony, but in the process of discussing it, they talk about the things he said, including his duties in Tokyo. (We have never «confirmed the existence of a We would endeavor to have the Committee sanitize and downplay this section of its report simply. because of the discredited nature of the witness's testimony. If this is unsuccessful, unclassified publication may become an issue. 4. Oswald's entry to the Soviet Union, with a visa given by the Soviet Consul _In Helsinki, leads to HSCA discussion in its report of Cexistencté oF | [and the file held on the Consul, who was KGB. We believe this can be remedied by sanitization; if not, it could become an issue if HSCA insists on publication. 2283 ORIGINAL CLBY 713190 CO pect Xi ees on February 1985 __ EXT BYND § YRS BY perenne rere es emcees atte Ys :
14-00000 8 ~ yar se ey yar Serene: Cl. Cc WUE. Cc me 5. Oswald's visit to Mexico City and other developments there have produced detailed discussion of certain events in HSCA drafts. One of those intended by the Committee for unclassified publication has to do — with a man who made allegations that Oswald received money in the Cuban Consulate for the purpose of killing the President. This considers the investigation of the allegation, with criticisms of the performance of the Agency. It involves detailed reference to the Station in Mexico. The other section intended for unclassified publication has to do with a man who flew to Cuba from Mexico City a few days after the assassination of President Kennedy. Again, there is extensive reference to the rale of the Station. Another section referring to the Mexico City Station involves detailed discussion of sensitive sources and methods; the position on sources and methods is clear, but there is uncertainty in the Mexico — Station aspect. (S) . an 6. The present issue is whether there can be some euphemism for describing CIA personnel in Mexico City for the investigation, without specifying that they were assigned there on a permanent basis, or whether we simply oppose any references. The Committee can be expected to contest — our objections to any references, to the Station or CIA's presence there . for the investigation because the story cannot be told otherwise. To omit such references would mean that these limited sections would probably have to be deleted or so emasculated as to render them sterile and incomprehensible. (C) 7. The Warren Commission report has only limited references to CIA, = _. crediting it with reporting Oswald's visit to Mexico City prior to the “yr assassination, and obtaininig by undisclosed means a photograph of an unidentified man. Other information from CIA js not specified in the report; while: the press has accurately described those matters, the Agency has never officially confirmed it. (Cc) 8. The Church Committee report, in Book V, makes 28 separate refer- ences to the Mexico Station (not Mexico City Station), or its Chief, or its communications with Washington, While this is not publication by CIA, -4t has the quality of official confirmation by virtue of being contained - in a Senate report. The Agency did not contest this at the time. Further, the Agency subsequently approved references to the Mexico City Station and its Chief, in the book published by David Phillips, possibly because already public in the Senate report. (C) a Do 9. Staff Discussion: Since the Church Committee investigation, and the approval of the references in the Phillips book, there has been an increase in the sensitivity of the Mexico City Station. While CIA has ‘come under attack in the Mexican Press from time-to-time in the past, the Station and the COS in particular recently have been the subject of a. running campaign. This is the first time that a COS has been subjected to a prolonged personal attack in the local press. Heightened political controversy within the ruling PRI Party has focused attention on the Embassy and the Station, with allegations of bribery and other misdeeds
74-90000 to Toe : eee EG oe oe ee re * . sm: ~ . . es g “; . involving high-level officials. Because of the political discord within the PRI, certain high-level Mexican officials have at least seen fit to permit the continuation of this campaign if not supporting and instigating it. Their objective is to tarnish the image of other officials who are political opponents and traditionally have been very supportive of the Station. The interest of the United States in Mexico's gas and petroleum has heightened sensitivity concerning anything that may affect the political atmosphere. The official publication by any U. S. Government entity of material which confirms the presence of CIA operations in Mexico (past or present) provides’ new ammunition for renewed attacks on our Station and causes considerable embarrassment to the GOM. President. Carter will be visiting in Mexico soon.: The president himself has instructed the Attorney General that there can be no references to the Mexico City Station in its prosecution of the ITT matter. While the President can instruct a-member of the Executive Branch on this matter, a formal position from him on this subject, directed to the Congress, does not have the- same weight. (S) . '.40. The agreement between you and Chairman Stokes provides that when ' we receive an official notice of the intent to publish, you have five days in which to respond to him if you object. At present, we have this inform- ation on an informal basis and the five-day period does not apply. Therefore, — this is posed to you in anticipation of a disagreement if discussions do ‘not produce a way around the issue. 7: “if . 11. Our options are: a. To seek some compromise by discussions; (U) “pb. Accept some euphemism that suggests the presence in. Mexico of CIA people in 1964 for purposes of the investigation . without specifying that they were assigned there permanently; (C) e. categorically oppose publication of those sections: - .mentioning any CIA presence in Mexico. ( ce nd to pursue option (a), but prior to. 42. Action Requested: We inte 1 ( be necessary“ to shape doing so, your decision on options (b) and (c) will. how we proceed. 7 cine, ©. Dee a S. D. Breckinridge ~ . Distribution: | 1 - BCI 1-R. Holmes - }.- DBDCI 1 - Legislative Counsel “7 -. ER ] - OLC/Subj 1 - DDA * 1 - OLC/Chron 1 - DDC OLC/SDB/kw - ? Feb 1979 1 - OGC Attn: R. Rininger - 1 ~ LA/DDO Attn: W. Sturbitts 1 - OS Attn: J. Sullivan
cS ” e . . pei es 1 . L cet . . . . . jeg ie bk « ~ ‘ ‘ ee ne Nemenr mies ae Foad Hay adel , Legislative Counsel Date. Ur-purhel lhe a ere Cornet fh baade.| | am & ORAL ON Wren bine [i te A ape aa Une 2 iamucticte Drain a bbb 9 February 1979 Date | ~ Stan: Agree with Option c; oppose Option b. Agree to Option a assuming : no mention of CIA in Mexico. At this very moment, the Mexican - Situation is super sensitive regarding CIA and we should not further inflame that situation by admitting to CIA activities in Mexico — City under any guise or name. Pl a/7 Deputy Director for Administration - pate — (nce weve ex austedl Compr d mats ae assume we wl J) have bb sethve Ophon "Le ry vfets oF Ke CK stng recare, Dy a. WALA “re ast | x% Ob-joce ey {[ med OM. ral , A vEs foorpre A) ACER, OR KOE Grsyht fe iy | fp Aa. Oe Aere vo Poa. ; os 2atrzy fa * seseph Woo frag 69 Ag OH: velT, — kaphes sana faking ale, é LA - General Counsel