1-62 Mr. Scelso. Yes. Of course, it was processed differently, ! a4 wo you see. It was being processed by other people and the { Spanish-speaking, or the non-Russian material, you see, was te ae not processed this fast. = 5 Mr. Goldsmith. Nevertheless, all of this material was | é é | before the Mexico City station certainly within two weeks of | g 1 | Oswald's contact on October lst? x 7 Mr. Scelso. It was someplace in the pipeline in the $ station. You.do not know whether the tapes were transcribed, c ‘you see. You don't know whether these Mexicans in the inter- cept stations had even listened to the tapes, let alone trans- WASHINGTON, cribed them. They may have just stacked them up -- taken them 4 = off the recorders and stacked them up. BUTLDING, rey Mr. Goldsmith. My questions are asking you to testify about things that you do not have direct knowledge about. REPORTERS Assuming that the employees from the Mexico City station who We s. 1 were responsible for these transcripts have testified before i 1a} this Committee that the transcripts were reviewed in chrono- | = nn | : E19 | logical order -- in fact, the transcripts were linked to = 29 | Oswald prior to the assassination. Should that information have been sent to Headquarters? & \ nm — \ iY 3 Mr. Scelso. Ideally, yes, but I again state, in view eS % of the tremendous work overload of the station which again, nN tO) especially in the counterintelligence field, the outstanding BY station we had inthe entire world. Their performance really , cam 001843 SEuALL Docld: 32277215 tage 63 ALMERSON REPORTING COMPANY he
DoctId: was not open to professional criticism at that time. ie) | Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald, as you indicated ; | before, was a significant case? ors | Mr. Scelso. Yes, a significant case, but really, a one- tay time defector who came back and wanted to defect again, you see, is not really an important matter. In other words, there 20028 (202) $54-2945 ree) Certainly, even if J. Edgar Hoover had said, have the oO | with the Mexicans and have them arrested. | | { t D.C. man arrested by. the Americans and we will send a military plane down and have him put him on it and we will take him back. VASHTINGTON , This was done with military defectors, but I do not think that the Agené¢y would have done it. They would not. have had + ta $s a shred of legal right to do it. Mr. Goldsmith. Another possibility, aside from the fact day REPORTERS BUPTEDING , that he may have been trying to redefect, another possibility on aM, was that Oswald, when he returned to the states, was actually S “1 aie Soviet spy. Another possibility, and he was making contact. Mr. Scelso. That makes it of interest, that is correct. 390 7TH STRENT, Oo an still would not have warranted his arrest because there was no evidence that he was a Soviet spy, even today. Mr. Goldsmith. Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have i Ww ta OTPRrEyT 001844 32277215 Page 64 ALOSSSON REFORTING COMEARY
been handled in any different manner? nw . i | | Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissimina~ }. ; | tion of information about him, but I do not think that. any to operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or aT Z 7 to contact him or to try to force him back to the United | 5 é States. | g , | Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how. would the ! ~ . i Sa : dissemination have been treated differently? 3 = : | Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have | 5 ro disseminated any additional information that we got. | | g a Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters evér criticize the | Z 13 Mexico City station for failure to send this information? ! : i @ = 17 ! Mr: Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to! : ta go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of | in i | e 7 the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used 7 to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, | r i | secretly. | . i , z a We were running, at that time, a vast political action - | Prooran in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its | = 20 | Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction.and it : a! succeeded. I do not. know whether you informed yourself : BSS i ; Y gal 39 about the magnitude of our political action program there at , nh the time -- absolutely enormous. | . ; | r Zé : We were trying to follow the Soviets and. all the satel- : a lites and the Cubans. At. the same time, the main thrust of | 001845 COMBARLY Docld: 32277215 Page 65° ALSSRSON RESCRTIN
i ; ; - ; | the station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, 3 | Cubans and satellite people. n i ; | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall seeing any other transcrip pertaining to Oswald in addition to the ones I have shown you be | | : today? there were. ~m 2 Mr. Goldsmith. We can count these. F | Mr. Scelso. I do not recall seeing any additional ones. | S | I know that. there were several additional transcripts that cand s || encouse later in cable form. Those cables are in here, I | : | believe. | ! : 19 i Mr. Goldsmith. Pertaining to? | Ss ! - | : 1 Mr. Scelso. Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban ! 2 a embassies, and his telephone conversations. 7 - ' © : 14 Mr. Goldsmith. You are saying that, in cable form -- : z ta Mr. Scelso. After the assassination, more came in. | n ; | : sl Mr. Goldsmith. More transcripts came. in? What I am’ | : 1é saying is that these transcripts reflect a total of four. con- : r 17 | tacts by Oswald to the various embassies. | - E 7 Mr..Scelso. Yes. | = ! ' = a Mr. Goldsmith. To your knowledge, were there any | g 20 additional contacts by Oswald to the embassies? | —— . Mr. Scelso. I would like to say first, I do not recall i e © ea = you say there were four. I do not recall exactly how many : i + +: : t so Mr. Scelso. I do not recall any additional ones. aD 001846 ocbae! ) ALDESSON RESCRTING COMPANY > Docld:32277215 Page 66
DocIa: > 3 4! i ! 2 a 3 ~“ ' t ? a , ! wi Q i t ~ land o 7 —_— x 2 = 3 ™ 3 9 ~- ‘10 g = Si = 32 cS = = 12 ~ HT = | = ta i 2 \ tome - 1 2 ft a . i “a isd fy & 134 a | _ \ = fF e a i = | 21 | ma 224 4 23 i 32277215 Page 67 ! 4 Sy a Raed tr. gi 1-66 No. WNor.can’ L“swear that this file contains all the. informa- tion we. got. I cannot swear that my memory is not that good. I know that we got additional information on several other telephone conversations and trips to these embassies after the assassination. We got the information. Mr. Goldsmith. That information you received may have been. the same, exactly the same, as these transcripts here? Mr. Scelso. That's right. Mr, Goldsmith. You don't know that there was a fifth transcript -- Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. -- of a fifth contact? Mr. Scelso. No. Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take a look at CIA Number 185. Would you identify that document? Mr. Scelso. That is a request. from the Mexico City station to Headquarters to send a photo of Oswald. Mr. Goldsmith Do you know why they requested that photo? Mr. Scelso. They wanted. to compare it with all the photos that they may have had of people entering the Cuban and Soviet embassies. Mr. Goldsmith. How do you’-know that? Mr. Scelso. Deduction. Mr. Goldsmith. Was a photo ever sent by headquarters to the Mexico City station? ) ALDERSON REPORTING COMPASLY 001847