476-10011-10107 JFK Assassination System ~ Date: 5/5/2016 Identification Form Agency Information AGENCY: NARA : RECORD NUMBER:  176-10011-10107 RECORD SERIES: NSF . AGENCY FILENUMBER:  16C Document Information - ORIGINATOR: WH FROM: TO: TITLE: OBJECTIVEC ? DATE: 00/00/0000 PAGES: 4 SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES - DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Top Secret RESTRICTIONS: IC , CURRENT STATUS:  Redact DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 05/08/1998 Z OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEW COMMENTS : NSF ‘-M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED):8/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-90-50 nen uinnnnnInINIEnEEEE nn v9.1 ii HW 49061 Docld:32205271 Page 1
[ee wing: » TOP SECRET-NOPCAN ° OBJECTIVE C: INTENSIFY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION /[SPECIAL. HANDLING 34. ACTIVITY Spot, recruit, and train legally estab- blished Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban Government Posts abroad. (CIA, supported by State and Defense): PURPOSE The purpose of all activities under _this objective is to provide maximum intelligence coverage of Guba with particular emphasis on the following: a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro Government. Soviet activities in Cuba in- cluding details of Soviet military personnel, units, locations, capabilities, et al. Activities of Cuban G-2Z. Military and militia order of battle and morale. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population. Focus-of power and/or stress and strain arnong the 'Power Centers" in the Cuban Govern- ment. Evidence of Cuban subversive ‘activities in the hemisphere. — CONSIDERATIONS When possible they will be recruited and trained while visiting outside Cuba; however, when necessary recruitment and training will be done inside Cuba either by established agents or by agents infiltrated especially for the task. Whether this is done unilaterally or jointly with a third country intelligence organization is determined on a case by case basis. In some cases the travel as generated specifically by CIA; in other cases the travels can be utilized to meet intelligence requirements. ‘ ~ r 4 HW 49061 ..Decld:32205271 Page 2
loc ACTIVITY — 34. (continued) ae 35. Spot, recruit, and train third \ country nationals resident in Cuba. — (CIA, supported by State and Defense). 36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State and Defense). : 37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense, USIA, and other support). & TOP SECRET-NOFORN . SPECIAL HANDLING PURPOSE In addition to meeting the above cited intelligence objectives, operational intelligence, and re- ‘eruitment leads as well as agent material result from the Opa-locka and| _joperations. In addition to meeting basic intelligence re- quirements above, timely opera- tional intelligence is vital to CLA’ current operations. See 34 above. See 34 above. See 34 above. CONSIDERATIONS. The continuation of the refugee flow and . the selective debriefing of refugees provide the most significant source of intelligence. Follow up debriefing of selected refugees after departure from Opa-locak will - continue: : FQ). NW 49061 _Doold:32205271 Page 3
38. w afea TESSOTTZE 2 PIVeg T9306 (BN 39. 41. 42, ACTIVITY Continue /CIA interro- gation center, (CIA) & Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support). Continue and expand, as practical, communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications nets. (Defense and CIA). Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA). Urge, assist, and/or support friendly third country intelligence services to expand their intelligence coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. (CIA). TOP SECRET-NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING PURPOSE | See 34 above. well as to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba. See 34 above. c To obtain intelligence and pfopa - ‘ganda material. See 34 above. ” OP SECRET-NOFCRH - |SPECIAL HANDLING | CONSIDERATIONS Due to local conditions and problems, the Debriefing Center will continue to € more limited in size and selective in choice of refugees than Opa-locka. This is primarily an NSA problem but CIA will continue to assist as practicable. PAA requires financial assistance to con- tinue this activity. It is recognized that significant increase in coverage of the internal micro -wave system would become a major budget and personnel problem. This is done on a regular basis by FBIS. This will be handled through existing liaison channels. .
léc 43. | 44, ACTIVITY + oe Expand, as practical, audio coverage of potentially profitable Cuban intelli~ gence targets. (CIA) re Establish program of periodic reports from_U.S. Embassies in Hemisphere analyzing the effects of existence of the target area regime on host country. (State); ‘ “TOP SECRET-NOFCRN SPECIAL HANDLING | PURPOSE See 34 above. _ To maintain’a reasonably current estimate of the impact of the target area regime on the Hemisphere. TOP SECRET-NOFCRN SPECIAL HANDLING | . CONSIDERATIONS These installations are in third countries. In some cases, 4) r NW 49061 .Docld:32205271 Page 5 _
9 afeg TLZGQZZE:PIOCG - t906p (AN 38. 39. 40 } 41. 42. ACTIVITY a! Continue ICLA interro - gation center, {CLA) Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support). Continue and expand, as practical, communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications nets. (Defense and CIA). ° Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA). : Urge, assist, and/or support friendly third country intelligence services to expand their intelligence coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. (CIA). TOP SECRET-NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING See 34 above... well as to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba. See 34 above. To obtain intelligence and propa- ganda material. . See 34 above. TOP SECRET-NOrOnN "SPECIAL HANDLING | a CONSIDERATIONS Due to local conditions and problems, the ebriefing Center will continue to be more limited in size and selective in choice of refugees than Opa-locka. This is primarily an NSA problem but CIA will continue to assist as practicable. ° PAA requires financial assistance to con- tinue this activity. It is recognized that significant increase in coverage of the internal micro-wave system would become: a-major budget and personnel problem. 3) This is done on a regular basis by FBIS. This will be handled through existing liaison channels.