rm -CONPIDENTTAR extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special : Vulnerabilities of the parilenlar T¥pe of comparimented » information. involved. «av. Jn 7 LRAT Ls latey Thee, - Fo b. Security Supervisory Programs to ensure ‘hat supervisory” per." sonnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility. for main- .”. : taining ‘the security: of sensitive information.- Such programs’ shall provide practical guidance as to indicators: which may signal matters | of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting PIO- . . ' cedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to #:."/ Sas v's + +25 fake-timely-corrective action. to safeguard. the-security:.of-the. United. . _ “+ States as well as to provide all necessary help \to- the individual cone; - cerned to. neutralize- his vulnerability. ; wii ban she oe RE cre BS red 7 eSecurity - Review! Programs to ensure that appropriate “Seturity: of - - : authorities. invariably-receive: and exchange, in-a-timely:manner, all .*= a “information bearing on the security posture of persons having access - '# . ° :  -tto-sensitive information. Personnel history information shall } be Kept 7+ Pll 4... Seurrent:!. Security: and related. files shall be kept under’ continuing... 7 op . ~review.2: Departments and agencies shali develop security: programs * =. °°. * under which’at intervals ‘no greater than 5 -years; checks are. made: °° | with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as all relevant police ~ ' and credit sources and, where feasible, each individual is given a per=. -, Sonal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel. ehh fey ; % s : 45, Whenever indicated during the course of these Security Programs, “Si appropriate investigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. «In the. i absence of such indication the tempo of additional investigation shall be’ - i. 4). tailored by the adjudicating ‘agency to the circumstances ‘suirounding - 7 - the individual under consideration as ‘well as the breadth of knowledge. and dégree of sensitivity involyed i in his access... The investigation: shall’ - ..be sufficient i in scope to ensure that continued utilization of the individual - in activities ‘requiring sensitive compartmented ‘information’ is clearly: - — consistent with the interests 8 of the national | security. ww OE RE Peele eT. ty Pas Ritective Date ® * 16. This. “Directive ‘declares the policy “of USIB ‘concerning ‘Uniform . Personnel. Security Standards and Practices for Access to Sensitive Com.. ° oe . partmented Information.. This policy shall become effective as soon as - fo. .- practicable’ after approval of this Directive but in no case later’ than. ’- 1 July 1968.° Existing directives,2 regulations, agreements, and: such other references governing access to sensitive compartmented informa-. . tion as defined: herein:‘shall be’ revised Accordingly. ~ wo irvaee setup oS wee eee ues ~ eee wee STR eee aT * Richard pans? " Director of Central Intelligence ? These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Tnvéstiga- tion and Evaluation sections of DCID 6/3. . - 6 COMPEDEIEFAE, . > oo. a. ms oe 4 DON lew ee ag HW. A5073 Docld: 32969530 Page 60 . ‘ oa . . eee cine eee enter” we mene eemma rts arermemm aeemresmynmenpren mentee cant ae atte tmeteny etqenyineprnateenetnn teerent sentra tear ae Fate Aten tnt tere nnn, annua renee
« ~ * * * ? This is a preliminary view and is provided aS a report for information to the Ad Hoe Group. » z ve "Se ae wm = * Me . HW 55073 DoclId: 32969530 Page 61 . ,
The Organization of the Senate Select Committee - Rough Structure The Committee will organize inte four Task Forces ~ each witha Task Force Director, each with a lawyer or lawyers assigned and each wi ith - several researchers. Total professionals - 30/40. 7 LO - Task Force One - Foreign Intelligence SO oo ee This will deal with the CIA as a line Agency and with the institution of the Director of Central Intelligence in his responsibility under NSCID #1. - ' USIB intelligence entities, i.e., State, Treasury, AEC and the military . ‘ establishments collecting, processing or producing foreign intelligence a will be reviewed in this context as well. CIA covert action is “also covered here. They plan ts begin} with basic papers being prepared on USIB agencies - their missions, functions, organizations and general contribution so as to provide the Committee with a "sound understanding on the role, nature, performance and structure of intelligence looking toward legislation which would address national intelligence needs, and provide adequate oversight of national and defense intelligence entities and their relationships in .. - foreign policy generally.' William Bator is designated the Task Force _ Director. a Task Force Two - Military Intelligence This Task Force will deal with the organizational entities within the Department of Defense collecting, processing, or producing intelligence including the DIA, the Services Agencies, and the National Security Agency, the NRO, and other collection entities suchas AEDS, Attaches, etc. The interrelationships between Task Force One and Task Force Two according to the Staff Director will be accommodated by regular communication among the Select Committee staff and be addressed by the Committee in the broader, context of considering possible legislation for alternative structures. The staffing for this Task Force is still in process and no Task Force Director has yet been appointed. | AW 55073) Docld:329895350 Page 62
Task Force Three - Domestic. Activities ’ This Task Force will concern itself with intelligence organizations engaged in domestic activities and including the FBI, those parts of the GIA that relate to domestic matters, and possibly Army counterintelligence activities, The staffing for this Task Force is still in process ang no Task Force Director has yet “been appointed. - Task Force Four - Executive Branch Comrnand and Control - This Task Force will be concerned with the tasking of the intelligence __ community ~ its oversight, the use of intelligence, and the adequacy thereof and mesh with the DCI's role as principal intelligencé advisor to . -"- - the President. It will treat with the National Security Council's activities, | - functions, and structure. It will address the variety of sub- committees i thereunder as well as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board {(PFIAB). David Aaron will be the Task Force Director. Note: Cavert Action direction and oversight is also included herein, mo , The Staff Director has indicated that the Committee is interested in dealing with Agencies and documents therefrom in the most efficient fashion consistent ~~ with security and economy of time. He is not committed at this time to any particular procedure. He has stated a desire to work selectively inside the Agencies where access and scrgening of selective records could take place. He wishes to avoid shipping in loads of data to the Committee. » _ AW 55073 Docld:32969530 Page 63 I
Dien. INTELLIGENCE an, | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 ~ 411 MAR 1975 The Honorable Frank Church Chairman Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510 Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter will confirm and reduce to writing some of the matters agreed upon at our recent meeting. At the outset, I should like to express my deep personal appreciation for the candor and helpfulness of you and Senator Tower in that meeting and for your sensitivity to the respective responsibilities under our Constitutional framework of the Select Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency in the area of your review. For my part, I should like to renew again, for myself and the CIA, my promise of cooperation with respect to the important work of the Select Committee. In my judgment, a spirit of good faith and cooperative effort is not only necessary to enable your Committee to discharge its responsibilities fully and expeditiously, but is indeed in the best interests of the intelligence community as well. I am convinced that a responsible and thorough review of U.S. intelligence activities will serve to vindicate the CIA and enhance the public's understanding of the important contribution that the intelligence efforts of this nation can make toward the goal of preserving and strengthening our democracy. ENCLOSURE ode L1E JG 5727 - HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 64 ~ —
I am particularly appreciative of your recognition that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of :operational methods, the identities of certain of our employees who could be targets of kidnapping or assassination, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems, should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals. Where these kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appro- priate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time to satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our activities. t As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to protect the identity of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure. I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to avoid such dangers. I assume the Committee will make its own arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no longer have the authority to direct their cooperation. However, I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this regard. As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires that they keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further requires that they may not disclose classified informa- tion, either orally or by publication, without prior authoriza- tion from the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to the protection of classified information continue after his employment with the CIA has been terminated. HW 55073 Docld:32989530 Page 65
: HW 55073 DBocld:32989530 Page 66 It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed hy our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the Select Committee. To accomplish this, and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Select Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will constitute an authorized provision af infor- mation within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement, but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters such as mentioned above. With respect to those particularly sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously neces- sary. Accordingly, where any matter included in these sensi~- tive categories would be involved in responding to the Com- mittee, the employee should express his concern and, if possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without exposing such sensitive details. If the Committee believes that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary, the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the Agency. I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine together the appropriate course of action to be taken. With the good faith evident in our discussions on these matters, I helieve that these arrangements will enable me to discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same time to provide the Select Committee with all the information it needs to accomplish its task. As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence community to ensure that your review proceed as smoothly and as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have in- structed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of coopera~ tion. Sincerely, W. E. Colby Director
© onmptoye® BULLETIN guises 12 March 1975 Senate Select Committee To Review —- U.S. Intelligence Activities Senate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls for a comprehensive review of the total U.S. intelligence effort and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its impact. It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and will pro- duce new understanding of, and improvements in, the American intelligence system. It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal coop- eration and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and Tower, the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees of the CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff interviews and for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff to design procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of concern. Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special proce- dures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sensi- tive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation between the Committee and the Agency. if HW 55073 DBocld:32989530 Page 67 =
HW 55073 ) | sm woe 7 The Sooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee and its-Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any interview or other appearance. r When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed oa) by the Seléct Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel will normally notify Mr. John M. Clarke, who is my principal liaison with the Committee and its Staff. Mr. Clarke, in turn, will notify the employee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of the Committee. It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance from an appropriate senior officer. My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelli- gence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative changes and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and contribution of U.S. intelligence programs. W. E. Colby Director Attachment: a/s DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES Docld: 327989530 Page 68
oat , | FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN , , a JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS. VICE CHAIR, 7 N ‘> PHILIP A. BART, MICH, . HOWARC &. BA’ oy TENN, . WALTER F. MONCALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWA’ RIZ, . WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD. ROBERT MORGAN, N.C, RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA, | HW 55073 i? samy HART ouILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR ‘Anitea Diates Dente ‘ SELECT COMMITTEE TQ STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (PURSUANT 76 5. RES, 21, &TH CONGRESS} " WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 March 12, 1975 Mr. William E. Colby Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Dear Mr. Colby: Enclosed is an initial request for documents approve by the Committee at its meeting this afternoon. Our respective staffs have discussed the request in its ; draft form and I trust that they will continue to work together in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is necessary ta ensure’a thorough and v/a investigation. y, . Frank Church. Chairman Enclosure DoclId:329895350 Page 69 ee _ ye