THO ‘INTEPVIEW, HE MAY COMTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION RY COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. I" THE USUAL CAS", AS CIPCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLNC1) THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, RUT THAT THE RUREAU CANNOT PROVIDE SAME3 (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WVITHIM SPECIFIED PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS 1” WHICH HE IS WOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION. THES] AREAS AR# RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY CA) IDENTIFY BUREAU SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES: CC) REVEAL IDENTITI®S OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENC®™ AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND CN) ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS. HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD RE AVAILAPLE NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIENEE MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS OF INTERVI=N OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT AS A LEGAL ADVISOR. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LOYGER PROVINE HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 35
y go YT PAGE THREE ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF TH7Y DESIRE ASSISTANC’ OF THIS NATURE DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY CIF INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR 3Y COLLECT CALL, THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. ™. R, WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. 0. CREGAR. THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUE AS LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES. FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION, WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF NEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD. END LVV FBI ALBANY ~ CLR HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 36
| e 9 ’ a . Co 7TSSPMMITEL 12/9/75 GHRS FBI EMPLOY EES BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ft MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES DATZD HAY 28, 1975, CAPT 10 WED “INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEE S$," ALL EMPLOYEES WERE ADVISED CF THE NECESSITY OF SECURING FBI HEADCUARTERS APPROVAL PRIOR TO SUBMITTING TO INTERVIEWS BY REPRESENTATIVES OF coRr- GRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. THE NECESS ITY OF SECURING THIS AP- “9 Pe) op) <= > = Se | wy “3 8) oO = ry ter wr) wo wt - ane ©} m4 me oc Oo a | ENT AGREEMENT ALL EMPLOYEES HAVE SIGNED. | | YOU YERE ADVISED THAT CONGRESSIONAL STAFF MEMBERS VERE CO'OUCTING INTERVIEWS OF FORMER R- AND/OR cuRREDT EMPLOYEES pu) THAT THIS BUPTSW HAD PLEDGSD ITS COOPERATION WITH co ite GRESS. OUR COOPERATIVE TFFORTS, OF couRsE, MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH BURESU PROCTDURES. oe | = RECENTLY, WE HAVE HAD ATTEMPTS BY CONGRESSIONAL CONMETTEE STAFF MEMBERS TO INTERVIEY CURRENT EMPLOYEES WITHOUT PRIOR CONTACT WITH FRI HEAD QUARTERS YOU 4R AGAIN REMINDED Ce : yr a | 62-2368-f HW 54955 DBocld:32989494 Page 37
END HW 54955 Docld:32969494 Page 36 @ . @ PAGE TWO THAT IFS ‘REPRES ENTATIVS OF & CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE SHOULD CONTACT ®& BUREAU EMPLOY<E, THAT EMPLOYEE SHCULD DECLINE TO 2ESPOM TO QUESTI ous POSED TO HIM AND, ADVISE THE CONGRES- SIONAL STAPF MEMBER OF THE NECESSITY OF RECEIVING FBI HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL BSFORE RESPONDING TO esti / | -LVV FBI ALBANY - ACK FOR THREE \
"ry OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 JULY 1973 EDITION GSA FPMR {41 CFR) 101-11.6 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Memorandum To: ALL EMPLOYEES (62-2368) DATE: 10/10/75 From : SAC ROBERT E. KENT ‘ suBJECT: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES BY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ReButel 10/9/75. — By memorandum to all employees dated May 28, 1975, captioned "Interviews of FBI Employees," all employees were advised of the necessity of securing FBI Headquarters approval prior to submitting to interviews by representatives of Congressional committees. The necessity of securing this approval is prompted by the employment agreement all employees have signed. — You were advised that Congressional staff members were conducting interviews of former and/or current .employees and that this Bureau had pledged its cooperation with Congress. Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent with Bureau procedures. Recently, we have had attempts by Congressional committee staff members to interview current employees without prior contact with FBI Headquarters. You are again reminded that if a representative of a Congressional committee should contact a Bureau employee, that employee should decline to respond to questions posed to him and advise the Congressional staff member of the necessity of receiving FBI Headquarters approval before responding to questions. All employees of the Albany Division are instructed that contacts received from representatives of Congressional committees should be immediately referred to the SAC without exception. 1 - Each Employee @ - 62-2368 1 - 66-11 Soi lh REK: pac act 1 41975 So Be ek Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan | HW 54955 DocTd:32989494 Page 39
' heeesiastuatentenaten 7) By William Safire WASHINGON, Nov. 19—On Oct. 10, 1963, the then-Attorney General of the United States put his personal signa- ture on a document that launched and legitimatized one cf the most horren- ' dous abuses of Federal police power in this century. In Senator Frank Church's subcom- mittee hearing room this week, the authorized wiretapping and  subse- quent unauthorized bugging and at- tempted blackmailing of Martin Luther King Jr. is being gingerly examined, with the “investigation” conducted in msuch a way as not to unduly em- barrass officials of the Kennedy or Johnson Adminisirations. With great care, the commitiee has focused on the FBI. Yesterday, when+ ihe committee counsel first set forth the result of shuffling through press clips, it seemed as if no Justice De-« pariment had existed in 1962; today, ° an F.B.I, witness pointed out that it fe Chure was Robert Kennedy who authorized - the wiretap of Dr. King, and that “the President of the United States and the Attorney General specifically discussed their concern of Communist influence with Dr, King.” But the Church committee showed no zest for getting further to the Ken- nedy root of this precedent to Water- gate eavesdropping. lf Senator Church were willing to let the chips fall where they may, he would call some knowl- . edgeable witnesses into the glare of the camera lights and ask them some questions that have gone unasked for thirteen years. For example, ne could call Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Ken- nedy’s deputy and successor, and ask what he knows of the Kennedy de- cision to wiretap Dr, King. Who at Justice concurred in the recommenda- tion? How does the F.B.I. know the 4 President was consulted or informed? Aftar Mr. Katzenbach assumed of- fice, and the wiretapping continued, he was told by angry newsmen that the F.B.1. was leaking scurrilous in- formation about Dr. King. Why did he wait far four months, and for a thou- sand telephonic interceptions, to dis~ continue the officially appruved tap? Of course, this sort of testimony wovid erode Senator Churci’s potitica! bas2. That is why we uo not see fer- mer Assistant F.B-L dicector Cartha (Meke) Deloach, (Cyodion Johnson's personal contact with tae FBI in the witness chair, What did President dobuson know about the « haiacrer- assxssination plot and when did he knew it? What conversations took place bewween Mr. Deleach aail Presi- dant Johrson on the iapring of Dr. TOTES, ot aocat the URS at the YUELE, in any ather datrasiens inta Lhe Hves of pelitveal beures? ‘HW 54955 DoclId: 32939494 sgvover-U p Page 40 The committee is not asking embar- rassing questions even when answers are readily available. A couple of weeks ago, at an open hearing, an F.B.1. man -inadvertently started to blurt out an episode about newsmen who were weritapping in 1962 wit the apparent knowledge of Attorney General Kennedy. The too-willing wit! ness was promptly shooshed into sir lence, and told that such informatior! would be developed only in executive session. Nobody raised an eyebrow. That pattern of containment by the Church committee is vividly shown by the handling of the buggings at the 1964 Republican and Democratic con- ESSAY Ca aemnenatemend ventions which were ordered by Lyn- don Johnson. Such invasions, of politi- . cal headquarters were worse than the crime committed at Watergate, sirice they involved the use of the ‘F.B.L, _ but the Church investigators seem to be determinetl not to probe too deeply. If F.B.I. documents say that reporis were made to specific Johnson aides, why are those men not given the same opportunity to publicly tell their story so avidly given the next Presi- dent’s men? If Lyndon Johnson com- mitted this impeachable high crime of using the F.B.I. to spy on political , opponents, who can be brought for- ’ -ward to tell us all about it? But that would cause embarrass- ment to Democrats, and Senator ” Church wants {o embarrass profes- sional employees of investigatory agencies only. A new sense of Con- gressional decorum exists, far from the sense of outrage expressed in the Senate Watergate committee’s hear- ing room. When it is revealed that the management of NBC News gave press credentials to L.B.J.’s spies at the 1964 convention, everybody blushes deraure-; ly—and nebody demands to know! which network executive made waa, decision under what pressure. I have been haranguing patient! readers for years about the double standard applied te Democratic and Republican political crimes, and had hoped the day would come when the hardball precedents sct by the Ken- nedy and Johnson men would be Jaid before the public in damning detail. Obviously, Demoec.at Frank Church > por the man cw da i. His jowl shahing indignation 1: ull toy selec- live: the trail of high-level responsi- bility for the crimes committed 2 gainst Dr, Hing and ainers is evidently gseing to he allowed t cool, Puy, Youd think flat after all the natica uas been tnarsagh im the past fey years ur political leaders would have leaned thay the one ure that brings you cown is tue arf of eeyer- Ing UD. THE NEW YORK TIMES THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20&h,197? PAGE C~41 etenaane nee ES s
} 2 —_ « Routing Sup (Copies to Offi, Checked) 0-7 (Rev, 12-17-73) TO: SAC: TO LEGAT {_) Albany ([] Houston ([] Oklahoma City = 4 Beirut {_) Albuquerque [_] Indianapolis (_] Omaha (1) Bern Cc Alexandria [7] Jackson [£) Philadelphia (] Bonn {i Anchorage C_] Jacksonville Phoenix [_] Brasilia {_] Baltimore L_] Knoxville {_] Portland (_] Caracas (_] Birmingham ([_] Las Vegas (_] Richmond {—] Heng Kong ([] Boston (_} Little Rock {_] Sacramento (_.] London (_1 Buffalo [_] Los Angeles [] St. Louis [1 Madrid {_} Butte L__} Louisville C} Salt Lake City [_] Manila {_] Charlotte C{_} Memphis (_] San Antonio [] Mexico City f] Chicago (_] Miami L_] San Diego (_] Ottawa (_] Cincinnati (_} Milwaukee [_j San Francisco CO Paris (] Cleveland (CC) Minneapolis [_]} San Juan [_] Rome _} Columbia C_] Mobile [_} Savannah (| Singapore C] Dallas Cj Newark [_] Seattle (_] Tel Aviv i] Denver New Haven C_] Springfield (__] Tokyo C_} Detroit (_] New Orl cans Tampa {_] El Paso CLNewYork City (—] Washington Field aa Norfolk (—] Quantico 11/21/75 RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE Paste L2h/ ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Retention For appropriate (CJ For infomation Tj optional (7 action (] Surep, by t—} The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, (] conceal all sources, [7] paraphrase contents. (77 Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA . " dated . ‘ Remarks: Enclosed for your information an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr. Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the November 20, 1975, issue of "The New York Times.": wer, is a copy of SEARCHED 1.2 _INDENED SERIALIZED NOV 24 1975 a Bie. FBI-ALBANY Bufile fo eee a! Grfil of HW 54955 DoclId: 32969494 Page 41
ROS WA PLAIN 19:34PM NITEL 12/19/75 GHS TO ALL SACS. FROM DIRECTOR: 7 a | ; - | ‘ “2 DIRECTOR’ S. APPEARANCE BEFORE ENATE SELEC COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, Ecswnen 1@, 1975 A COPY OF THE STATEMENT 1 DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON Zt TELL IGE NCE ACTIVITIES TODAY Has BEEN SENT ALL. OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMAT 104 , THERE FOLLOWS A SY NOPS IZED ACCOUNT OF THE ‘MAJOR A AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER. WITH ‘MY RESPONSES: | C1). REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS CMY RESPONSE WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY. OVER: USE OF INFORMANTS ARE SATISFACTORY) 5 HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPS RATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITE so ‘THEY Do NOT LAVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELTANCE NUST BE PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING THE AGENTS* WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE DECAa as FEI—ALBARY, KEEFE © Lo Y LONERGAN } HW 54955 Bocld:32989494 Page 4?
, A ‘PAGE TWO . PROSECUTED -~ AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS) s- AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ‘ON DECEMB ER 2 THOT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT .TO PREVENT THEM CMY Y RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTINONY WAS NOT ACCURATE). | (2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER co Np UCT: BY. FBI. EMPLOYEES, ‘IL STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR | OTHER | APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INS PECTION DI IVISIOW HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT 5 | THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT , ‘AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL, - INCLUDING P31 EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THA TIT WOULD RESERVE COMMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE, CREATION OF @ NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENER AL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY... HW 54955 DBocld: 32999494 Page 43
, } } -’PAGE THREE | | (3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF | MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDING “RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN _ RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED. TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I WAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED. 70 “REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. | | (4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD” BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED |’ THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO.BE COMPATIBLE, AND 1: _ FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH: AREAS. . (5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCER NING THE ADEQUACY - OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE’ AND FROM OTHER’ GOVERNMENT. AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION| I ‘HW 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 44
ar PAGE FOUR - ‘ FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEW ‘SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN’ WRITING 5 THAT. WE WOULD WEL CONE ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS. WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY; OF PARTISAN MISUSE. A. FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE autsticyr AND ANSUE RS WILL BE FUR NI SHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE. ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY. ; , ‘ ‘ ; od PLS ACK FOR 2 TELS ° . oO oO fo “ 4 LVV FBI ALBANY. ACK FOR TWO CLR i TKS ' HW 54955 Docld: 32969494 Page 45
“ “ ce ad RES WA PLAIN “"~  16334PM NITEL 12/18/75 GHS TO ALL SACS FROM DIRECTOR DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 18, 1975 A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES: (1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF | INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS CMY RESPONSE | WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING THE AGENTS’ WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE ba) - 2308 - 1) DECI 1975 FBi-~ALEANY HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 46
HW 54955 Docld:32989494 Page 47 < PAGE TWO PROSECUTED -- AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO COMMIT VIOLATIONS): AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2 THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM CMY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE). (2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY $ THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT: THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL , INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS, OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT: THAT I WOULD RESERVE. COMMENT . REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL AGENCY.
* ° @ PAGE THREE (3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR«, I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE ~ RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KINGs THAT WE RETAIN RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT 1 HAVE NOT REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. . " ¢4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I FEEL THE FBI I$ DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS. (5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION HW 54955 DBocld:32989494 Page 46
PAGE FOUR FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE. A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE. ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY. END , PLS ACK FOR 2 TELS LVV FBI ALBANY ACK FOR TWO CLR TKS HW 54955 Docld: 32999494 Page 49
AY . OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR @ @ : j UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 FOR RELEASE 10 A.M., EST WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975 STATEMENT OF CLARENCE M. KELLEY DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ‘BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES U. S. SENATE WASHINGTON, D. C. DECEMBER 10, 1975 b2 -AILF- (3 DEC I FBI-ALBANY NTO, Orton RICAN RS @ Yapeg D7gag? | Docld: 327989494 Page 50 HW 54955
I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelligence and internal security fields. I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that. are themselves fully consistent with law. I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told the members of that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight. This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 51
HW 54955 outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in responding to your questions and complying with your requests. I believe we have lived up to those promises. The members and staff of this Committee have had unprecedented access to FBI information. You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type investigations and who are personally involved in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations. You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with all major areas of our activities and operations in the national security and intelligence fields. In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the Congress. As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's record of performance. Docld: 327989494 Page 52
. T g @ g It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the organization. The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over- all work. A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370 -- less than three-fourths -- were approved. I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative matters per year. Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate and understandable. The question might well be asked what I had in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it did under the circumstances then existing would have been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people. HW 54955 Docld: 32989494 Page 53
HW 54955 What I said then -~- in 1974 -- and what I believe today, is that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General, the Congress, and the people of the United States. Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid siege to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such acts of violence from New England to California.. The victims of these acts were human beings -- men, women, and children. As is the case in time of peril -- whether real or perceived -- they looked to their Government, their elected and appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their rights. There were many calls for action from Members of Congress and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands...impatient demands...for immediate action. FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a responsibility to respond; and, in good faith, Docld: 327989494 Page 54
HW 54955 DBocld: 32999494 initiated actions designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities. In the development and execution of these programs, mistakes of judgment admittedly were made. Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counterintelligence Programs -- and there were some substantial ones -- should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs. We must recognize that situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the future where the Government may well be expected to depart from its traditional role -- in the FBI's case, as an investi- gative and intelligence-gathering agency -- and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or property. In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried out NOW, can we truly meet our responsibilities by-investigating only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to human life. Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt, the Congress must consider the question of Page 55
@ e , whether or not such preventive action should be available to the FBI. These matters are currently being addressed by a task force in the Justice Department, including the FBI, and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible manner. Probably the most important question here today is what assurances can I give that the errors and abuses which arose under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again? First, let me assure the Committee that some very substantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's methods of operations since I took the oath of office as Director on July 9, 1973. Today we place a high premium on openness ~~ openness both within and without the service. I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion in the decision-making process which insures that no future program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a full and critical review of its propriety. HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 56
Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI, I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations. The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner weakening or undermining our basic command structure. The results of this program have been most beneficial...to me personally...to the FBI's disciplined performance...and to the morale of our employees. In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability -- in his own words -- "as a ‘lightning rod' to deflect improper requests." | Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi instructed that I immediately report to him any Docld: 327989494 Page 57
. HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 53 requests or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which, considering the context of the request, I believéd presented the appearance of impropriety. I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the Attorney General that during my nearly two and one-half years as Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no one has approached me or made overtures -~ directly or otherwise -- to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper purposes. I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider honoring any such request. I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities over the FBI. I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity can be assured only through institutional means. Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the character of the person who occupies the office of Director and every member of the FBI under him.
es HW 54955 I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism, their standards, and the self- discipline which they personally demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the Nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct at all times by the FBI. The Congress and the members of this Committee in particular have gained a great insight into the problems confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields -- problems which all too often we have been left to resolve without sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress itself. As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even to the Executive Branch. The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised. An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Hearings had been Docld: 327989494 Page 59
L- commenced, and we were fully committed to maximum participation with the members of that Subcommittee. I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very recent origin in terms of the FBI's history. One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step -- a step that I believe is absolutely essential -- a legislative charter, expressing congressional determination of intelligence jurisdiction for the FBI. Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in the past. This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role, not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of our performance. I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the Courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role of the Courts into the early stages HW 54955 DBocld:32989494 Page 60 -~- 10 -
HW 54955 of the investigative process and, thereby, would take over what historically have been Executive Branch decisions. I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Congressional oversight or Executive decision. The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both the will and the needs of the American people. Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer -~ a career police officer. In my police experience, the most frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing law enforcement in this country -- Federal, state, or local -- is when demands are made of them to perform their traditional role as protector of life and property without clear and understandable legal bases to do so. I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative charter will be a most precise and demanding task. - 11 - Docld: 327989494 Page 61
6 e : It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle FBI effectiveness in combating the growing incidence of crime and violence across the United Statés. That charter must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past; yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive challenges. The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced the formulation of operational guidelines governing our intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need for legislation. The responsibility for conferring jurisdiction resides with the Congress. In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that information needed for the prevention of violence can be acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations. As a practical matter, the line between intelligence work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there are some: fundamental differences between these HW 54955 Docld:329899494 Page 62 - 12 -
OO @ @ investigations that should be recognized -- differences in scope, in objective and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a crime has occurred and it } remains only for the Government to identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence for prosecution. . Since the investigation normally follows the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is limited and fairly well defined. By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but rather to thwart crime or to insure that the Government has enough information to meet any future crisis or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on our anticipation of those unlawful acts. Anticipation, in turn, is dependent on advance information -- that is intelligence. Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues. Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction of the Congress. We - 13 - HW 54955 Docld: 329899494 Page 63
_ WW 54955 @ | @ recognize that what is at stake here is not the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or its successor in this important task. In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit of such legislation as the Congress may enact. - 14 - Docld: 327989494 Page 64
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR  ) 6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 FOR RELEASE 10 A.M., EST WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1975 en STATEMENT OF CLARENCE M. KELLEY DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ‘BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES U. S. SENATE WASHINGTON, D. C. 1975 oe Ow DEC 12 1975 FBI-ALBANY OWTOn, eRiCay we on Ce & rng? A Pr. HW 54955 DBocld:329899494 Page 65 Le
HW 54955 I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelligence and internal security fields. I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my 35-year career in law enforcement you will find the same insistence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs of law enforcement that. are themselves fully consistent with law. I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of the FBI was being considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee two and one-half years ago, I told the members of that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight. This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been undertaken by anyone Docld: 327989494 Page 66
HW 54955 outside the FBI other than the present Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as possible in responding to your questions and complying with your requests. | I believe we have lived up to those promises. The members and staff of this Committee have had unprecedented access to FBI information. You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type investigations and who are personally involved in every facet of our day-to-day intelligence operations. You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with all major areas of our activities and operations in the national security and intelligence fields. In brief, you have had a firsthand examination of these matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the Congress. As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of necessity, focused largely on certain errors and abuses. I credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's record of performance. Docld:32989494 Page 67
HW 54955 It is, perhaps, in the nature of such hearings to focus on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the organization. The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted an infinitesimal portion of our over- all work. A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found 3,247 Counterintelligence proposals were submitted to FBI Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. O£f this total, 2,370 -- less than three-fourths -~ were approved. I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative matters per year. Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate and understandable. The question might well be asked what I had in mind when I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it did under the circumstances then existing would have been an abdication of its responsibilities to the American people. Docld: 32989494 Page 66